Podcasts about Kazakhs

Envie de découvrir une expatriation un peu hors du commun ? Dans cet épisode de podcast, Clothilde nous raconte son expatriation au Kazakhstan avec son mari et ses 4 enfants. Ils ont posé leurs valises dans ce pays d'Asie Centrale depuis 6 mois.Comment ont-ils atterri là-bas ? Quels sont les défis d'une expatriation familiale dans un pays aussi singulier ? De l'organisation de l'école à la gestion du quotidien en passant par l'apprentissage de la langue et la découverte d'une culture pleine de surprises, Clothilde partage son expérience avec sincérité et humour.Elle nous parle de l'école à la maison, des difficultés et des joies d'intégrer un nouveau pays, des températures glaciales et des décalages de vie, mais aussi de l'accueil chaleureux des Kazakhs une fois qu'on les connaît vraiment.Si vous avez envie de vivre cette expérience unique à travers ses yeux, ne manquez pas cet épisode !

Diplomatic Hell Hole.Book 3 in 18 parts, By FinalStand. Listen to the ► Podcast at Explicit Novels."Are we in the right place?" the stranger worried."I'm afraid so. Anais, you need to leave.""Not until you tell me what is going on here," she sizzled."She's not here to have sex, if that's what you worried about," I retorted. "Wait, are you here to have sex with me?""I barely know you.""That rarely stops me," I muttered."He's a master of bedroom antics," Pamela praised me. "He's pretty much at a loss at doing anything else.""Thanks Grandma," I griped."Your welcome, Grandson.""We, are here to meet someone," the stranger hedged."You came to the right place," Pamela preempted me. "He's definitely someone.""Fine, redo. I'm Cáel Nyilas," (deep breathe), "NOHIO, HCIESI-NDI, U HAUL, Magyarorszag es Erdely Hercege plus a bunch of other honorifics that have yet to be confirmed. I am single-handedly bringing back medievalism to the center of Europe and the Near East. The woman to my left is Pamela Pale, and she really is my bodyguard. The woman to my right is Sgt. Anais Saint-Amour, RCMP, my ex-lover and the person that needs to leave   right now.""I'm not sure I should leave at this moment," Anais shifted possessively. I had to recall earlier this morning, the part where we'd broken up by mutual consent. Yep. That had really happened. I had thought I was whittling down my current list of paramours. Why do the Goddesses hate me so?"Told you, she can't give up that cock," Pamela whispered."As you can see, I have limited control of my life," I told the strange woman. "I know you are here to meet somebody who isn't me. Now you know who I am. Who are you and your companions?""I'm Ms. Quincy.""Sorry; I'm on a first name basis with everyone I meet," I interrupted."What's your rank, Honey?" Pamela added."What makes you think,?""She doesn't think. That's what makes her so dangerous." I explained."Hey now," Pamela faux-complained."Okay. She's a fledgling telepath, or medium," I shrugged."Captain, Zelda Quincy.""In case you are mesmerized by her tits," Pamela tapped me, "she's packing some serious hardware.""One of those personal defense gizmos?" I leaned Pamela's way."Close, but no cigar. She's my kind of girl, big 'bang-bang', back-up at the small of her back and knife in her boot.""What!" Zelda gulped."She's his knife-fighting instructor," Anais answered drolly."Are you Special Forces?" Zelda regarded my mentor."Nah, I got kicked out for a consistent failure to observe even the loosest Rules Of Engagement. I'm a free-spirit.""Oh, you're a sniper," Zelda nodded."I like this one," Pamela smiled."Ah, thank you." Then, over her shoulder, "I think we are in the right place." Zelda entered the room, followed by a Hispanic panther of a man (kind of like a tanned, slightly shorter Chaz without the cool accent) wearing a long coat, and a Subcontinent-cast woman who looked at everyone as if she expected us to sprout fangs, or start quoting the Koran any second now. She obviously was a brain seconded to this mission very much against her will.The fourth person had that cagey 'when my lips move, I'm lying' look while seemingly unhappy with her current assignment. The heavy implication was that the lady was a career diplomat. Considering our current company and who we were talking to, she was State Department. She was in her late 30's or early 40's and giving off the sensation she had devoted so much to her career that she was starting to wonder if that was all that life had to offer.The fifth member was a military man clearly uncomfortable about what he was doing here, thus not a spook. His off-the-rack suit wasn't terrible, so he expected to socialize somewhat while performing his duties. He also looked like a man who expected other people to speak half-truths and obfuscated lies as easily as they breathed. Numbers three, four and five were dressed for the weather and unarmed.All of this meant they were good at what they did, though they probably didn't know the particulars of what was expected of them. They had their marching orders. Those orders were about to be made irrelevant in the company they would be keeping. The latter weren't the 'doing it by rote' kind of people they would normally be dealing with."I bet you she's a doctor," I murmured to Pamela, "she's with State and he's some sort of Foreign Service type.""I bet the first guy is Air Force," she countered."Like one of those Para-rescue guys?""No. More like one of those Battlefield Air Operations guys, I'm guessing," she corrected me."That guy?" I nodded to the final guy. "Pentagon wonk?""More likely he's one of those embassy guys. I'm going to take an educated leap here, Office of Military Cooperation, Mongolia?""That is pretty clever of you. Kazakhstan. Major Justin Colbert.""I bet some people in the White House, Pentagon and Langley are disappointed with you right now," I reasoned. His jaw grew tight."Don't worry, Major," Pamela grinned. "We consider that a good thing. We don't like the people in charge and have a low opinion of their opinion on just about everything, including their habit of blaming the blameless for their government's fuck ups.""Who are these people?" the first man whispered to Quincy."She's a telepath." That was Zelda"She's a psychic-medium." That was Anais."She can see through time." That was me. "Nice to meet you. Who are you?""Chris Diaz. Lieutenant Colonel, USAF.""Dr. Saira Yamin," the second woman introduced herself. "Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. Are you the man from Johnston Island?""Why yes, yes I am," I beamed."The APCSS is in Waikiki, Hawaii," Pamela educated me. "Your arrival probably cost her some prime surfing time.""I was more interested in the fact that he survived a plane crash in a Category Four Cyclone," she admitted."Mother Nature hates me. No matter how hard I try, she refuses to kill me," I confessed. "My suffering is an endless source of amusement to that bitch.""That, that wasn't the helpful answer I was looking for," she stammered."So, Lt. Colonel Chris Diaz, you must be with JSOC, I have a deep and abiding respect for you guys. If you need something, just ask," I greeted him. "Captain Zelda, you are not with JSOC.""She's with the DCS ~ that is the Defense Clandestine Service," Pamela kept going. "Zelda, you love being in your uniform, you're proud, yet happy with the concept of dying in an unmarked grave for Constitution and Country. You are too old to have been in the first female class at Ranger School, so that means no 'in the field' JSOC for you. You've gotten around that stone wall by joining the US Defense Department's own little pack of killers.""Also, you felt it was necessary to bring a Benelli M4-11707. That's a close-in action shotgun, but a bit over-kill considering the paper-thin walls in this building. That tells me you are used to being in the kinds of places where such a tool is a necessity. Or in other words, since you think you are meeting a band of terrorists, you brought along your favorite toy.""Your personal weapon is a SIG Sauer P229R DAK in .357 which is a new weapon still under trial by the US Army and Air Force. Your boot dagger is ceramic so it will pass a cursory exam, or scan. You hate the idea of being trapped on a public aircraft weaponless. You have also given up killing power for a proper balance for throwing. I like a forward-thinking gal.""Air Force ~ you've recently come back from Asia, most likely Tibet. It shows in your breathing brought about by a close call with Altitude Sickness. The only reason for an Air Force guy to be here is because he's familiar with the Khanate military and you are not US Army, or Marine Corp Special Forces. I know the type.""You went with the MP5K in the standard 9mm, so you are more interested in sending bullets down range than looking into someone's face as you kill them. You may be a 'light' Colonel, which means you are almost somebody. What your higher-ups haven't appreciated is that our guests will respect you because they are like that ~ remembering past friends and comrades in arms. Of greater importance, you have Cáel's gratitude which will count for more than you currently believe."I pledged then and there to be as good as Pamela at determining that kind of stuff before I died. She had assured me it was as much a matter of psychology as eagle-eyed perception. People were often a type that gravitated to various forms of destruction, be they old school, or going for the latest gadget."I told you all that firepower was excessive," State softly chastised her associates (what they really were, not the underlings she saw them as)."So, you appeared to have forgotten to tell us your name," I regarded the State lass."Nisha Desai Biswal. I'm with the government.""Oh, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, I've examined your website," I told her. It clearly pissed her off somewhat that I so swiftly disregarded her crude attempt at subtle manipulation."Hey. I've got some real enemies at State, so it pays to know who might be the next suit trying to cock me over," I explained. I had to prioritize. It would take some serious effort to convince Zelda to have a MFF three-way straight out the gate and she was definitely the hotter number."Major, you came here unarmed," Pamela noted. "That won't do. They expect you to be armed because you are a warrior, damn it. Cáel get him one of your Glock 22's.""Gotcha," I nodded. I went to my room, tipped away the false back to my closet (that Havenstone had installed recently so Odette wouldn't accidently fire off one of my weapons) and retrieved one of my spare Glocks, but not the one with the laser sight. Such over-the-top fancy gear would be inappropriate. I only gave him one mag. If he couldn't get the job done with 15 rounds, he wouldn't have a chance to reload.Mind you, I took two in a twin-rig shoulder holster and four 22 round magazines, because I tend to shoot two-handed which doesn't exactly give you a bullseye every time. I returned to our crowded living room, handed the Major his weaponry, and then directed the US group to the far side of the room (towards Timothy's bedroom. Saira and Nisha took the couch.Because this tiny space wasn't crowded enough, there was a knock at the door. I checked. It was Juanita, oh yeah, my real bodyguard."Listen up everybody," I announced to the room. "This is my other bodyguard, my official one. Her names is Juanita Leya Antonio Garza, she's from the Dominican Republic via Buenos Aires and she is armed, so don't freak out." I opened the door."What is going on?" Juanita hissed."I'm having a private meeting with a few heavily armed friends. The other side to this party hasn't arrived yet. Why don't you come in?" She came in."Why didn't you warn me?" she whispered her complaint."Long night, worse wake-up, needed to do some soul-searching. Pamela was looking after me, then this came up and I forgot. I apologize," I lowered my head in shame. Juanita was only trying to do the job she'd been entrusted with and by not thinking of her, I was making that so much harder.I made the introductions, first names only."Juanita, Anais, Pamela; please slip into the kitchenette," I suggested.Anais "Why?"Juanita "Where are you going to be?"Pamela "Sure. I'm starving. I'm going to raid the fridge.""Anais, because I need my faction in one place. Juanita, I will be refereeing this meeting, so I will have to remain in the living room, roughly six feet from you." It was really a small apartment. "Pamela, if it is edible, it isn't mine and you'll have to replace it."Great Caesar's Ghost! No wonder Big Wigs had their personal assistants handle this pre-meeting crap. I was on my last two fucking nerves and one of those was already stressed and tender. And the real reason for being here hadn't even arrived yet."Why am I in your faction?" Anais mulled over threateningly."Because you haven't walked out that door. There are going to be three sides to this meeting, not three plus Anais. That is the way it is going to be. Now, are you going to behave, or are Juanita and Pamela going to toss you out?""You are threatening me!""Finally catching on to that, aren't you, Sweetie?" Pamela chimed in."I'm only staying because I believe you are in trouble," Anais grumped."Why is she (Anais) here?" Nisha inquired heatedly. "This is supposed to be a very, very private encounter.""I know Anais. I don't know you. I trust Anais with my well-being despite the fact she has numerous reasons to distrust me. She's staying because she is a straight arrow. That's good enough for me.""But is she going to keep her mouth shut about what happens here today?" Nisha pressed."Anais, this is a clandestine meeting that isn't going to be recorded by anybody so, barring a crime being committed, you can never discuss this with anyone who isn't already in the room. Agreed?"Pause."I agree," she nodded. I really was going to have to fuck her again. Not today. Well, maybe not today; I had to keep my options open. Her investigator mind was going into overdrive. Give it a week and she'd be knocking on my door late one night. Inquisitive, truth-hungry dames are like that, trust me. Then it would be 'bask in my genius' sex. It had been a while since I'd experienced that, with Lady Yum-Yum.There was another knock at the door. I checked before Juanita could do the checking for me, in case someone was going to shoot me through the door. Fuck it. I was going to talk to Timothy about moving. Him, me and Odette. I couldn't give those two up. It was Kazak bookends. I opened up and invited them in. It turned out they had names besides Bookends #1 and #2, Nuro and Roman.Nuro (I think) checked out the rooms while Roman (I was pretty sure) kept an eye on my guests. I made introductions, first names only and specifying who was with who. Technically, they could trust my side because I was the Great Khan's brother and thus my servants were his servants. Technically.Iskender came next followed by OT. A woman I didn't know (sadly, not OT's daughter) came in behind him while the other two quintuplets stayed in the hallway. Iskender and I hugged."Ulı Khaan s yikti ağası," he smiled. That was 'Prince-something'. My Kazak was a bit rusty. He then whispered into my ear. "OT bows to you first. His title is Hongtaiji." What?"Ulı Khaan s yikti ağası," OT bowed."Hongtaiji Oyuun T m rbaatar," I bowed back. I remembered I had to rise first. It was an etiquette thing. In retrospect, Iskender had stretched the bounds of tradition by hugging me, his titular superior. "Welcome to my humble abode.""I thank you for your hospitality," he 'grinned'. His face wasn't made for that gesture so that faint gesture came across as rather unnatural.My mind finally finished translating what Iskender and OT had called me. It wasn't 'prince'. It was 'beloved brother of the Great Khan'. Mother fucker!"Wait," Justin, the military attach  guy muttered, "we are here to meet this guy?" indicating me."What do you mean?" Saira questioned."The title Mr. Nyilas was identified with means 'beloved brother of the Great Khaan'," he explained. "The Kazakhs don't go tossing honorifics like that around. This guy," again pointing at me, "is a really important somebody.""Thanks for dropping this grenade in my lap, OT," I joked. "I'll get you for this, and your little yak too.""Odette is going to be so miffed that she missed this," Pamela chuckled."Mr. Nyilas," Zelda began."Please, call me Cáel. It is how I roll.""Cáel, can I ask you a stupid question?""Go right ahead," Pamela snorted. "Cáel does stupid real well. It is a critical part of his skill set. It makes him adorable instead of annoying. Trust me, you'll learn that soon enough."Too much 'trust me' was flying around in a room where nobody trusted anybody."Thanks for that encouragement, Teach," I grumbled. "Ask away, Captain Zelda.""Why are you playing this game with us?""I wasn't. Until thirty seconds ago I was sure I was here totally as a spectator," I gripped. "My buddy," the word dripped with sarcasm, "Temujin likes dumping these kinds of surprises on me.""Did you mean what Ms. Pale said about you feeling you owed me?" Chris asked."Absolutely.""We need help defusing this Thailand crisis before a shooting war begins.""What do you suggest?""We want the Khanate to back down," Chris stated firmly."I thought we had agreed that I would spearhead this delegation," Nisha reminded Chris."I think the situation had evolved and we need a different approach," Chris insisted."You should listen to the Lieutenant Colonel," I advised. "He knows a whole lot more about what is going on than you do.""Why don't you explain it to us?" she began her weevil-ling."You are engaging in linguistic niceties with men who have bled together, Ms. Biswal," I instructed. "Not that Chris and I have bled on the same battlefield, we have shed blood in the same cause; and that cause has been bringing our two nations, the Khanate and the US, together. The Khanate owes Chris for his efforts on our behalf and we pay our debts.""How so?" Nisha asked."National Security stuff," I evaded. "If you don't know, you shouldn't know and you probably don't want to know. Suffice it to say, the Khanate is willing to listen to Lt. Colonel Diaz's request as a friend.""But he doesn't speak for the United States Government," she corrected."Why not?" I riposted. "He's dealt with the Khanate longer than you have. He has a clue about the mindset of their rank and file.""But does he know their leadership?" she persisted."I don't know. Chris, do you think you have a handle on me?""Are you really capable of talking for the Khanate government?" Nisha preempted Chris. What she left unsaid was 'are you culpable in their atrocities?'"Let's find out," I then looked over my shoulder. "Hongtaiji Oyuun T m rbaatar, will my words and wishes reach my brother's ear?""That is why I am here," he replied."Don't you have the authority to speak for your leader?" she grilled OT. Nisha was relentless trying to stay in the limelight. "Aren't you a diplomat?""There is no need to insult the man," Pamela snidely commented."I am one of many voices that provide information to the Great Khan. I am not his brother. Cáel Nyilas is and has already proved his familial affection by proposing Operation Funhouse and brought whole nations as gifts," OT schooled her. "He is gifted with both tactical and strategic insight as well as sharing the Great Khan's love for his people and his hopes for their eventual freedom.""I didn't think you were a soldier," Zelda looked me over."Oh no," I wove off that insinuation. "I've never been a real soldier and am unworthy of that distinction. I know quite a few who have earned that title and they scare the crap out of me. I mean, they go looking for trouble. In my case, trouble comes looking for me. I'm damn lucky to still be alive and that's the damn truth.""Bullshit," Pamela coughed."What was that, Artemisia?" I winked at her."Bitch," she laughed "My men have become women, and my women men. At least you didn't call me Cassandra.""Well, she's Greek (a deadly insult to all Amazons), but you could be her Evil Twin because everyone believes whatever you say.""Can we get down to business?" Chris inquired."Damn," Pamela shook her head. "They haven't been paying attention.""What does that mean?" Zelda griped."Iskender, you know what I'm talking about, don't you?" I asked."Not a clue, Exalted One," he stood there like a stone statue. Note, the Khanate contingent really were standing there like the Altai Mountains, doing nothing. You had to carefully examine them to see that they did indeed breathe and blink."Use small words," Pamela advised."You really are a rude misanthrope," Anais told Pamela."Do you know what's going on?" Pamela volleyed."No.""Then sit back and watch how the madness works," she snickered. "It is all you, Cáel.""Okay. One; how did Artemisia escape the battle of Salamis?" I began. Nothing."Oh," Justin nodded. "She rammed an allied ship to make the pursuing Athenians think she was an ally. What does that have to do with our current predicament?""Achieve your ends by using violence as a distraction," I sighed. "The Khanate will invade Thailand in," I looked to OT, "tomorrow?" He nodded."How does that help us?" Nisha complained."Second example, Cassandra. She saw the truth through all illusions and falsehoods and no one believed her. Now, reverse that."Pause."We are waiting," Saira finally joined the conversation. I could hear those little microprocessors inside her noggin firing electrons at light speed."We fight a phony war. The Khanate and their buddies invade in a lightning campaign that appears to be successful. Shit like attacking the opposition where they ain't. Things that look epic on CNN where some retired colonel, no offense...""None taken," Chris responded."Where some colonel talks about seizing resources, severed supply lines and encirclement. We, the Khanate, bomb shit like bridges and supply dumps, things with no civilians to get killed. On the downside, to make this work the Khanate needs to put some level of force into Bangkok.""That will get civilians killed," Nisha reminded me, unnecessarily."Civilians are getting killed right now by their own government. This time they will get a chance to strike back," I stated firmly. "The Thai protestors aren't cowards. They are just grossly outgunned. We can change that.""How does that help the United States?" Nisha queried."The US gets to come in and save the day," I sighed. "The US can t get there until the day after, so you don't look bad about letting the first 24 hours of brutality happen.""Oh," Zelda blinked."The US gets to end the fighting that the Khanate has no desire to continue. The US brings peace, while whomever takes over owes the Khanate. Both sides look good. Both sides claim victory. The President gets a second Nobel Peace Prize (psychic, aren't I?). The US gathers some regional allies like Malaysia, the ROC and the Philippines along with our Marines to ensure free and fair elections. The Khanate isn't seen to be backing down against the Titan of Western Civilization. They are working with them to bring about a better world.""Win-win," Saira nodded in agreement."The Khanate is still an autocratic tyranny," Nisha commented."As opposed to the People's Republic's oligarchical tyranny?" Chris countered."Agreed," Saira said. "I now think we should work with the Khanate to bring stability to Central Asia which which was impossible while those member nations were being squeezed between Russia, Europe, China and India.""What are you a doctor of?" I asked."I specialize in 'failed states', among other things," Saira grinned."This could still turn into one bloody cluster-fuck," Zelda mused."My peopled don't have the resources to devastate Thailand," OT finally spoke. "If you, the US, agrees to intervene on our timetable, you will have our thanks, off the record, of course.""How do we know this isn't some ruse to allow the Khanate to overthrow Thailand's existing government?" Justin questioned."You have my word," I replied. No one said anything for several heartbeats."Really?" Nisha balked."Mr. Nyilas, Cáel, do you give me the Great Khan's word?" Chris studied me intently."Without reservation," I answered. "For what you have done for us and more, the Great Khan will honor this deal. We and the Thai's will do the bleeding. You will get your accolades. We avoid a pointless clashing of forces, which is why we are all here today.""I will give you my written recommendation in a few hours," Saira told Nisha.Chris stepped forward to shake my hand. He was an alpha-type alright. I gave as good as I got. His eyes bore into mine, looking for a faltering of will."What did you do in Romania?""I got a lot of good men killed.""Okay.""Okay?" Nisha squawked. "A handshake, a pat on the back and the deals done? Since when did our democratic republic do business this way? He admitted he got men killed in Romania. What is to say this won't be Romania writ large?""Ms. Biswal, he told the truth. He got good men killed and he isn't happy about it. I would be worried if he claimed one bit of glory from that episode. He didn't.""Nisha," I took a deep breathe, "When you unleash men with weapons, nothing is assured. Maybe the Thai government will see the hate coming their way and back down. Maybe the people will resist the intrusion. Maybe the Khanate's forces will get slaughtered at the starting line. It isn't like they have enough time to deploy enough forces to win a protracted war.""What happens if the Khanate decides it won't go?" she continued."Then they get destroyed on the ground in a war of attrition," Chris answered for me. "He's right. They can't bring enough in the time allotted to completely overwhelm the roughly 120,000 members of the Royal Thai Army that have remained loyal to the regime.""In three days they will be out of fuel, shells, rockets and bullets. It is logistics, Ms. Biswal," Zelda piled it on. "The Khanate war-fighting systems are not NATO compatible. That means they can't simply capture more material as they penetrate the frontiers. If they overstay their welcome, we can launch missile strikes against their fuel depots. The combat devolves back to World War I and that's a style of war they can't afford to fight.""What about stopping the Khanate from invading in the first place?" Nisha wouldn't give up."Had the US acknowledged the Khanate, none of this would have happened, Ms. Biswal," I became snappish. "Neither superpower talked to the other until other commitments had been made.""If you think you can come in and start dictating Khanate policy, you are dreadfully mistaken. The US doesn't have the power, or the resolve," I glared at her. "Don't try convincing the Khanate that isn't the case. We know better.""You don't know what the US is capable of," she snapped back."Abandoning Iraq with a fractured pseudo-democratic process? Abandoning Afghanistan without destroying the Taliban? The Syrian Civil War? The Donbass Crisis? The collapse of Libya? Boko Haram? Somalia? Yemen? Exactly how has the US's power and resolve solved any of those issues?" I countered."Ms. Biswal," OT spoke again. "We are willing to create a desert and call it 'Peace'. Our enemies know that. Your unwillingness to do so is neither a strength nor a weakness. It is a hallmark of your society in the same way that 'Total War' is a hallmark of ours. We are more than willing to leave you to manage the Peace. Let us manage the War against the forces opposed to civilized discourse.""As ugly and disagreeable as it is, we are willing to keep creating pyramids of skulls on every street corner until either they learn their lesson, or we kill them all. Let us do that and you will have your global stability and reap the economic benefits and accolades of Pax Americana. We are not your enemy. We are precisely the ally you need to keep the peace and we will do that, if you let us.""To allow barbarism is to become barbarians," Saira mused."That is complete fiction," I scoffed. "The United States didn't become communist because it allied with the Soviet Union in World War II. Truman didn't become Stalin. The enemy of my enemy is my friend is older than recorded history.""It is the Carrot and the Stick on a Global basis," Justin agreed. "Listen to the gentle words of the West, or you will end up feeling the wrath of the East.""As long as the Khanate accepts the limitations of is role," Saira added, "this might work. Please understand there will be factions in the Western Democracies who will not accept that status quo. It is not in the nature of our societies to stifle dissent.""Is it possible to get any political concessions from the Khanate's leadership?" Justin requested. "A pledge to hold some level of democratic elections? A Constitution with some strong provisions to protect individual rights and liberties would be nice.""Justin, in case your bosses missed it, the Khanate is still at a state of war with the PRC," I shook my head. "With their limited experience with democratic government throughout most of the Khanate's territories, that would be madness.""With limited concessions to the Imperial State, we have not interfered with the politics of Albania, Armenia, Georgia and Turkey. We are never going to become a Western-style democracy. We have had limited rule by consensus long before White Men arrived in the Western Hemisphere," OT informed them."Discounting the Irish Monks, Vikings and Knights Templar," Pamela interjected."If you say so," OT gave a minuscule bow to Pamela. "Long before your nation was anything more than the scribbled history of a long-faded Greek city-state, we had meritocracies, oligarchies of senior statesmen & warriors, thinkers and religious leaders, and we had codified judicial moral equality into the political arena. We have a far superior record of religious and minority freedom, of genuine multi-culturalism plus a deeper understanding of the arts and crafts as a means of uniting disparate peoples. We find your claims of cultural superiority to be childish.""Oh, snap," I snickered. "You get'em, OT.""I bet the boys in Foggy Bottom felt that pimp-slap," Pamela agreed."I bet the bronzed skull of some Harvard dean just fell off its pedestal.""They are called 'busts'," Anais groaned. "With a name like that, how could you forget it?""So true," I concurred. "All this responsibility must have clouded my normally hedonistic vocabulary.""That doesn't change the fact that you have employed biological warfare and genocide in this current day and age," Justin pointed out."Tell that to our Native Americans," I snorted. "They are easy to find. They live in trailer parks in whatever blasted Hell Hole we stuck them in, or in their casinos where they are buying back their country, one rube at a time. Ask them if they've gotten over it.""We don't claim to be perfect," Justin insisted."No, we merely claim to have the only correct form of government, economic policy and schools of philosophical, political, scientific and educational thought," I pointed out."We definitely should revive ethical utilitarianism," Pamela slapped a fist into her palm. "Oh, and the guillotine. Work houses for orphans and grist mills for the disabled, and A Modest Proposal for those chronically unemployed and terminally homeless, yes, and,""Pamela, what is it with you today?" I snickered."It is nearly sunset,""Ah, and you haven't killed anyone yet.""You know how cranky I get when I don't get my daily dose of homicide.""Are you two done?" Anais frowned. She did that a lot around me."And you don't hand out Mini-Uzi's to your preschoolers," Pamela glowered. "What is wrong with you people?"Pause, waiting for that punch line that was never coming. See, it was more difficult to sense Pamela was an immediate threat to your health if you thought she was completely off her rocker."Hmm, well, on that note, ladies and gentlemen, I believe we have a deal. Chris and Justin, I will leave you with my loyal Iskender to work out the gory details. Who wants to grab dinner?" I inquired."Are you serious?" Nashi gasped."Oh yeah. I had the Russian invasion of Manchuria figured out in this amount of time and Manchuria is way bigger than Thailand." Was it? I didn't know. Geography was not one of those subjects which gets you laid."What do you have in mind?" Zelda inquired."Whatever you want."{1 am, Sunday, August 31st ~ 8 Days to go}"How did I end up in bed with you?" Zelda sighed happily, her body splayed halfway over mine and her head resting on my chest, listening to my heartbeat."You aren't the first girl to ask me that question."On the other side, Anais moaned in her sleep. Yeah, she was over me. Abso-fucking-lutely. If you recall, she'd try anything once. I convinced her the military babes were totally different than that Goth chick we'd blown the mind of back in Montreal.Zelda was with me because I had caught her in a lie. She claimed to be a lesbian when I first hit on her. She was adamant. I destroyed her with incontrovertible evidence.A) She hadn't scoped out Anais when she came in. A glance didn't count and Anais oozed sexy when she was angry, which was most of the time.B) She hadn't scoped out Juanita's figure when said worthy went to the kitchenette. I look for such things and Juanita has thighs to die for.C) When I told her she had a wicked sense of humor, she blushed. Honestly, lesbians rarely care about strange men complimenting their personalities.D) Then I double-downed by asking her if she preferred a shower, or bath. She said shower (because that's the butch thing to say). When I asked her 'when was the last time she'd had a bubble bath', she blushed again. Lesbians don't like it when a man imagines them naked. Straight chicks, unless you are a creepy, stalker guy, like it when men fantasize about them swathed in bubbles, thus semi-clothed, thus not creepy.E) In a final and fatal act of evasion, she asked a grumpy Anais what she liked about me. Anais was blunt."He can fucking hammer you all night, sneak in a romantic quickie in the shower, cook you a delicious breakfast then give you another round of mind-numbing intercourse up against the wall before you have to go to work. And still find the time and energy to fuck your neighbor."Woot!"So, this happens to you often?" she mused, it was a trap. She really wanted to know if I was an egotistical scumbag who took advantage of every woman I came across. At the same time, she wanted to know if I considered her a 'whoe' ~ a woman who gives up the goodies for free."Do you mean 'am I taking advantage of you'?" I replied."That is not what I asked," she persisted. That meant 'yes'."Let me see," I laid back and looked up at the ceiling. "I have a fiancée, six women I am close enough to to spend quality time with, a fuck-buddy who is a sweet girl and trusts me too much and a passel of ex-girlfriends who have found my infidelity to be reprehensible.""Six women?" she frowned."Four co-workers (Rhada, Oneida, Yasmin and Buffy), the girlfriend of a co-worker who dumped her in a very public fashion (Brooke) and that woman's friend (Libra). She was the wing-chick who was stuck with me on a quadruple-date and was underwhelmed with me when we first met."I didn't count my 'hook-ups' and I wasn't sure how to qualify Nicole."Ex's?""'No' is not a word in common usage in my vocabulary. I've dated a best friend's girl, a mother, sister and aunt of the same girlfriend, basically, I'm either highly immoral, incredibly loose, or a letch.""Don't you take responsibility for any of those, relationships?""Hell yeah," I tilted her chin up so that we could make eye-contact. "I've never blamed a woman for taking out her frustrations on my flesh, ran away from a screaming fit (Big Lie!), or blamed them for any failing in our relationship. It is always my fault because I can't stay loyal.""That's depressing," Zelda moped."Don't get me wrong. I don't find fault in any of the women I have spent time with. That is my problem, I find women fascinating; never boring, or bland. Quite frankly, it is a gift that I don't regret having. I may be a fuck-up, but I'm a fuck-up who will give you the very best attention.""Full of yourself, much?" her attitude shifted. I had short-circuited her fears; I was a cheater, I confessed to it without shame because I was inexorably drawn to her beauty, personality and charm. With Anais around, I couldn't claim to be solely enchanted with Zelda, so I had to think quickly on my feet. After all, Zelda was energetic and had great stamina."I promised you pleasure," I countered. "Did I deliver?""Yes, you are full of yourself," she slapped my stomach. I wasn't full of myself. I was a confident sex machine."Thank you.""Huh?""Wonderful sex, taking a chance with me, agreeing to a three-way, being awake after," I looked at the bed-table clock, "six hours.""I run five miles a day," she bragged."I try to have ten hours of sex a day," I teased. Zelda slapped my stomach again. Anais stirred."Do any women like you, for any reason beyond your cock?""I'm considered loyal where sex is not concerned, reliable and brave," I offered."What happened in Romania?""Have you ever been in combat?""I've been in violent confrontations, but not a true firefight," she admitted."Hmm,""Is it something that you can't relate?" she asked."No. You are a soldier so you probably know more about combat than I do. It was, not chaotic at all. I never lost perspective of what was going on despite the bullets flying around. The Romanian Captain in charge knew his stuff, directed his company well and all I had to do was figure out where the terrorist leader was.""What happened?" she perked up."I am here talking with you and he's in a morgue in Bucharest.""Oh," She wanted more."I have to live with the knowledge that I set all of that in motion, Zelda. I convinced the Romanians that they had to confront that terror group before they moved on to their next target, me.""I knew they would come after me and my friends, no matter where we were. Which would have ended up as a blood bath in some urban center. So I felt compelled to strike first. Based on information I provided, the Romanian Army sent two battalions, the 22nd and 24th, of the 6th Mountain Troops Brigade into battle.""It was a massacre," I remembered sadly."But you won," she tried to comfort me."Of the four companies involved in the battle, the Romanians suffered nearly two hundred dead and wounded. I hardly consider it anything other than a massacre. Yes, we won. Only three of the terrorists escaped. Their leader died. I don't think I've ever felt so hollow in my life," I finished."Forty percent losses, that is horrific," she crawled on top of me."The kicker is the Romanians sent some men of the 24th to hunt me down when I was kidnapped. A squad was in the group that rescued me and my companion from Johnston Island. I thought they would never want to deal with me ever again.""Don't be so hard on yourself. If they thought well enough of you to send their men out to rescue you, then you must have done right by them.""Chaz said something like that too," I felt sheepish and sleepy."Chaz? Who is she?"Honest to God, one day I want to find a girl who thinks I'm talking about another girl and asks if we can have a three-way, instead of trying to compare herself to this unknown person. Wait... I already had someone like that. Her name was Odette."Chaz is Color Sergeant Charles 'Chaz' Tomorrow of Her Majesty's SSR," I corrected her assumption."SSR? Those are some tough people. How do you know him?""Black Bag directives from the National Security Council, sworn to secrecy upon penalty of death, pinky-promise kind of stuff," I grinned. Maybe I wasn't all that sleepy after all."You really are a Man of Mystery," Zelda purred. She had truly exceptional stamina. "Maybe I can convince you to talk.""Maybe I can find another use for my tongue," I countered and off we went. Somewhere along the process, Anais woke up and joined in.It wasn't all fun and games. Anais' parting words were "You are a pig," then she sauntered out of my room and out of my life. Had she remembered to take her Serge with her, I would have bought the act. As it was,"Is she always so volatile?" Zelda remarked."Volatile? That's not her being volatile. That's Anais being affectionate. Volatile usually is accompanied by thrown objects and bodily harm," I sighed happily. Meeting her one more time couldn't be all that bad, could it? Zelda looked hungry so I shoved that thought to the back of my mind and got to work.That was the highlight of my Sunday. Zelda had to fly back to Washington D.C. and I had to go to work with JIKIT. It seemed that the Khanate and the US military were heading for a showdown. I unloaded all my Saturday's activities to the team and we got to work, no recriminations. I was the Khan's spiritual brother and sometimes that meant I had to do him favors.I asked Addison when she thought he would return the favor. She laughed, then smiled and told me that wasn't how it worked. He was a world leader now and I was merely his kooky kinsman that he would keep throwing problems at until one day I broke. Then it would be some other poor saps turn.Then she told me she was kidding and clearly the Great Khan thought the world of me. I chose to believe the second lie because it made me feel better, and it was promising to be a long weekend/start of the week.Note: Geopolitical DevelopmentsWhat follows are snippets of the Battle for Thailand that takes place late in the night of September 1stand continued into the early morning of September 3rd. If this does not interest you, you can rejoin Cáel's exploits in four pages)On the eve of battle, the Royal Thai High Command had decided to strip all but one armored unit from the 2nd Army in order to give the First Army's offensive against the rebels more of a punch. It's decision to strip the tank battalions from both their infantry divisions as well as the armored and one of the two mechanized regiments would prove to be disastrous. It was as if the leadership of the Royal Thai military were idiots.The least economically valuable part of the country was the northeast which the 2nd Army warded. They had severely underestimated the airlift capacity of the Khanate as well as the willingness of Laos and Cambodia to both use their armed forces in an invasion as well as their willingness to let Vietnamese troops cross their countries.That thinking had led the Thai military to adopt a 'forward defense' strategy, the desire to fight the enemy at the borders, as opposed to having stronger formations deeper within the country. Considering the relative weakness of the Cambodian and Laotian militaries, that policy had made sense:- The baseline Laotian and Cambodian tank was the T-54/55, a 1950's Soviet relic. The normal anti-tank capabilities in all Thai infantry formations was more than equal to such a threat.-Neither country had an air force worth worrying about.In contrast, the Khanate's primary tanks, the T-90SM and T-95 were resistant to most of what the Thai Army could throw at them, at least from the front. The seven hundred combat aircraft the Khanate and the Vietnamese were able to field was an equal catastrophe for the Thais. It greatly compensated for the relative small numbers of invaders.Finally, there was a fundamental misunderstanding of what the Alliance's goals were. Military logic dictated the destruction of Thailand's mobile force followed by the capture of Bangkok. As long as the Thai regime held the capital, it would remain the legitimate power in the country.Due to the altering political landscape, the Alliance's only option was to make the government 'look bad'. The loss of peripheral provinces, while of negligible immediate strategic value, looked great on the maps the world-wide media would be showing to their audiences. It would appear that the Thai army had failed to defend their country. That would (hopefully) make the Thai Third Army look like the legitimate authority in Thailand.That was the plan anyway, and you know what they say about battle plans and the enemy, right? H-hour was 4 am, September 1st.The commander of the Zuun stood up and waited to be recognized. The staff officer from the Yunnan Command pointed at him."Sir, why are we doing this? I am not afraid to fight for the Great Khan, but this action seems to be suicidal. We will be far behind enemy's lines while our offensive force will be grossly under-equipped.""You will have to rely on our ability to supply you by air.""We only have supplies for two days of operations. What happens then?""We rely on the Americans to come and save us," the senior officer responded bitterly."Allah save us from allies," the young commander muttered. What else could he do?He was part of the 2nd Mountain Sultan Mehmet Tumen which had just arrived in Yunnan to replace the exhausted 1st Mountain Abu al-Ghazi Bahadur Tumen. His men were from Turkey, inexperienced in combat and using new equipment they were not familiar with. They would be working with a unit he had never worked with before, the 1st Airmobile Tauekel Khan Tumen, Kazaks, who would be seizing the small airport his men needed to land in.From there, they were to 'run amok'. That was the technical term for racing south down a highway in Central Thailand, attacking the headquarters of the 3rd Cavalry Division, an armored unit. Once that was accomplished, they were to attack the local police precinct. Provided they were still alive after that, they were to return to the air strip to resupply then they were to 'spread chaos' until they were finally hunted down by the vastly larger Thai division his 100 men would be fighting.Of course, there was the plan for the rebel Royal Thai Third Army to force their way through the larger frontline forces of the loyalist Royal Thai First Army and come to his rescue. How would the Thai troops respond when ordered to fight their fellow Thais? No one was sure. If there was any hope in this mission, it was the knowledge that several other Zuuns had the exact same mission in other areas of Thailand.  It was H-hour minus twenty-two.It was 11 o'clock in the evening when the general in charge of the Royal Thai 9th Infantry Division was woken up. The Marines were leaving. That was correct; the three Royal Thai regiments were heading west to Sattahip Naval Base, because they had been ordered to by the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Navy. It didn't take a rocket scientist to realize why this was going on.Seven hours earlier, the Royal Thai Army had seized all the Air Force bases in the 1st and 2nd Army districts as well as ordering the 4th Army to do the same thing (The Royal Thai Air Force had been trying to remain neutral in the upcoming civil war).Undoubtedly the navy had decided to make their assets less 'hijack-able'. A few phone calls later confirmed that most of the Navy had set sail for parts unknown and the naval air units at Ban Sattahip Air Base (U-Tapao International Airport) had also departed either out to sea, or to ports and bases in the South.He made a personal appeal to the commander of Marine Forces to no avail. They wanted no part of the upcoming struggle and advised the general to do the same. The general had other problems. The Royal Thai Marines were the frontline forces facing the southern border with Cambodia. He quickly reorganized his regiments, sending them to take the old Marine strongpoints to await further orders. Stopping the Marines never entered his mind.That was a bloodletting he wanted no part of. The last thing he did was inform his superiors, thus avoiding any stupid orders to the contrary. Suddenly the nebulous movements along the Cambodian border developed a haunting significance. He wondered how much longer he had before something happened.  It was H-hour minus five.At midnight a loyalist commander of a company of mechanized infantry in the 2nd Cavalry's 11th Battle Group (named after their axis of advance, Highway 11) decided to send a motorized section of his command forward to the advance position his battalion was to occupy come sunrise. Either later in the day, or tomorrow morning, the forces loyal to the regime would launch a coordinated assault against the rebels main supply center at Phitsanulok.He had a cot set up in his communications hut and had just nodded off when the radio squawked to life. His lieutenant in charge of the advance made a hurried report. They had encountered serious opposition in a confusing night action, then he went silent. The captain immediately swung into action. He put the rest of his men on alert, then contacted the neighboring Tank Battalion. He needed some armored support. He made a similar call to the attached artillery component.The Tank Battalions night officer quickly put a platoon of light tanks at his disposal. The artillery were ready for any fire mission he sent their way. Before the armor could arrive, the company commander found himself being called to the carpet by the Duty Officer at the 3rd Cavalry (two regiments of the 2nd Cav. had been attached to the 3rd's command) over his 'offensive' action and the relief mission was called off. What had happened to the patrol of 20 Royal Thai soldiers? He was ordered to wait until sunrise to find out.Little did anyone know, these were the first combat casualties of the upcoming rebel offensive. His patrol had stumbled across a battalion of mechanized troops arriving at their jump off point for the attack that was less than six hours from beginning. Neither the commander of the 11th Battle Group, the 3rd Cavalry Division, or First Army was informed that the enemy had already advanced twenty kilometers south of where they were supposed to be.  

Last time we spoke about the complicated story of Xinjiang. Xinjiang, though part of China since the Han dynasty, has a distinct cultural and geographic identity aligned more with Central Asia than China's east. Its remote, mountainous landscapes divide its regions and isolate its ethnic groups, which include Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Hui Muslims. Yang Zengxin, Xinjiang's Republican governor, ruled with shrewd, divisive tactics, maintaining peace by balancing loyalties but alienating many. His rule ended in 1928, when an ambitious subordinate, Fan Yaonan, assassinated him, marking a turning point. Yang attended a banquet hosted by Fan, where disguised soldiers fired on him, mortally wounding him. Fan seized power but was soon defeated and executed by Jin, who succeeded Yang as ruler of Xinjiang. Jin enforced strict policies, favoring Han Chinese officials and worsening the economy. He raised taxes, restricted Muslim customs, and monopolized industries. His annexation of the Kumul Khanate in 1931 incited unrest among the local Uyghurs, setting the stage for rebellion.   #132 The Beginning of the Kumul Rebellion Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So last we left off, things had reached a boiling point in Kumul. The explosion at Kumul would begin mostly as a result of a religious and cultural slight against the Muslim population both Turkic speaking and Tungan. They became offended and banded together against the Chinese officials. As a result of the new administration and annexation of the Kumul Khanate, a young Han named Chang Mu from Gansu, was appointed tax collector and chief of police over the small village of Xiaopu, lying due north of Kumul. According to the Nanjing official Wu Aichen “this Chang Mu was a 'wastrel' whose conduct soon became a public scandal”. In early 1931, Chang Mu met a pretty Turkic Muslim girl in Xiaopu and tried to force her father, a Uyghur called Salih, to give him her hand in marriage. Now for those unaware shari law specifically prohibits marriage between Muslim women and men of other religions. What followed is described in two differing accounts. The first account has it that on April 4th of 1931, Chang Mu was invited to eat at the girls house, allegedly in honor of the forthcoming wedding. During the dinner, Chang Mu was attacked by Uyghur's and slaughtered alongside 32 members of his personal bodyguard. It was further implied by our friend Wu Aichen, Chang Mu had already seduced the girl and that the ulama, those being islamic scholars who act as a sort of authority under shari law, upon discovering so, took it upon themselves to correct the situation. On the night of the proposed ceremony a mob appeared in the streets of Xiaopu. Chang Mu and his guard detail were already thoroughly drunk and easily overcome by the pissed off Uyghurs. All were killed, including the poor Uyghur girl. The Uyghurs then took 30 rifles from the dead and turned their attention towards the Gansu Chinese who were said to number in about a hundred families in the area. All of them were massacred and “had their heads buried in the soil of their farms”. Following this the Uyghurs marched upon the Chinese outposts at Tuluhu and Laimahe killing their garrisons and tax collectors while acquiring even more weapons. Better armed, the Uyghurs elected to make a move against Kumul. Kumul held an overwhelming Uyghur majority and easily fell into the hands of the rebels with little to no fighting. Most of the Han fled into the fortified Old City barring its gates. The Han caught outside the Old City were massacred brutally. Soon the rebel forces controlled Kumul's Muslim part of the city and the surrounding countryside, but the provincial forces remained secure within the Old city and its key arsenal. It is unclear whether the Xiaopu incident was carefully planned prior or simply just came into being. Regardless it was a spark that ignited a much larger rebellion. According to Mildred Cable and Francesca French, two members of the China inland Mission, who resided in Xiaopu at the time, it was indeed a systematically planned rebellion. “While officials surreptitiously transferred their wealth to a place of safety, the instigators of trouble were equally persistent in their secret preparations for war. Camels and mules were requisitioned to transport weapons, ammunition and stocks of food over little-known tracks, that they might be stored in mountain caves known only to the few. Steady streams ofsmall caravans carrying ammunition to the mountains came from the South Road, from Tunhwang and across the most lonely tracks of the desert connecting Kansu with Barku!. All these converged on the Khan's summer palace grounds in AraHim, and the stronghold of Bardash was stocked with huge supplies of food and firearms”. Yulbars Khan, the former chancellor of Maqsud Shah claimed he was in the Tien Shah escaping heat when the fighting began. Many speculate he had a hand in planning the uprising. Cable and French argued the Tungan population of Kumul also joined the rebellion early on. The insurgents of Kumul were quickly joined by neighboring Kirhiz of the Karlik Tagh who also held grievances against Jin as he had imposed Chinese officials upon them in 1929. According to Wu Aichen the Barkul and Kazakhs in the area also joined the rebellion. Thus Jin had succeeded in alienating the Turkic speaking peoples of northeastern Xinjiang now had a full scale Muslim rising on his hands.  Jin reacted with a strong show of force despite his Commissioner of Education Liu Wenlung and Commissioner for Reconstruction Yen Yushan both arguing for a policy of conciliation. Jin ordered troops to crack down on the rebels without mercy. Meanwhile back in Kumul the rebels were unable to breach the Old City so they fanned out into the countryside hunting Han settlers and soldiers down. According to the British Vice Consul General at Kashgar, R.P Watts, an initial detachment of 300 troops sent by Jin relieved Kumul Old City were ambushed and killed nearly to a man. Its also implied they had lost so easily because many of them were sleeping off the effects of opium. Despite the initial success, the rebels were unable to prevent provincial forces led by Zhu Juiqi, the Taoyin of Aksu from relieving the Old City. By late April the siege was lifted, Zhu Juiqi occupied the Old City and ordered his second in command Xiong Fayu to occupy Kumul's Muslim quarters. The rebels still controlled the countryside and were harassing Zhu's forces whenever they strayed a bit too far from their forts, but overall were not much of a match. Meanwhile Chinese troops under the leadership of Xiong Fayu began a series of reprisal massacres against Muslim civilians in Kumul and the surrounding villages. The Uyghur leaders quickly determined they needed external help in their rebellion against Jin. According to testimony from Yulbars Khan, they sent an appeal to the KMT government in Nanjing. Then in June of 1931 Yulbars was chosen, most likely because he was fluent in Mandarin, to head out secretly to Nanjing to carry the appeal. Along the way, Yulbars went to Suzhou to meet with Ma Chongying, known as the youngest and most extreme of the 5 Ma Tungan warlords. Ma Chongying was a Gansu native. Very little is known about his early years nor about his father, but he shared the same paternal grandfather of the Gansu/Qinghai warlords Ma Puqing and Ma Pufang. He was also distantly related to the Gansu/Ningxia warlords Ma Hongkuei and Ma Hungpin. Altogether the 5 were known as the 5 Ma warlord clique. Ma Congying entered military service in 1924 at the age of 14 when he joined a local Muslim militia. A year later the Guominjun forces of Feng Yuxiang invaded Gansu, but the Tungan warlords of western Gansu remained for the most part untouched. Ma Chongying became an officer for the forces of his uncle Ma Kechong and laid a siege and captured the important city of Huzhou on his own initiative. His troops easily defeated reinforcements sent to relieve the city under the command of Ma Lin. With this great victory, at the age of 16, Ma Chongying earned the reputation of a military genius and the nickname Ga Ssuling or “little commander”. His triumph would be short lived however for his superior Ma Kuchung had not ordered the seizure of Huzhou and dismissed his nephew for insubordination. Thus Ma Chongying took his men to Xining in Qinghai and there began building a private army.  The Guominjun eventually left Gansu after devastating it. In 1927 the northwestern parts of Gansu was hit by a massive earthquake and this combined with Feng Yuxiang's regional commander Liu Yufen using much of its land for opium cultivation led to a mass famine. In the spring of 1928, the northwestern Tungans began a revolt against the Guominjun led by the Muslim General Ma Tingxiang. Ma Chongying tossed his lot into the fighting leading to three successive attacks against the Guominjun at Huzhou. According to Robert Ekvall, an American traveler in the region “The revolt had by this time assumed all the aspects of a holy war. Chanting prayers, forty or fifty thousand fighters went into battle with fanatical zeal ... the young rebel leader Ma Chong-ing [sic] seemed to bear a charmed life and by his reckless courage gained the utmost in obedience and devotion from his ruffian troops. The Chinese were panic-stricken at the desperate courage of the Moslems, but eventually, by machine gun fire and light artillery, proved superior”. Alongside this American diplomats reported that the famine and war in Gansu had reduced many to cannibalism with a possible two million people dying between 1926-1929. One of the many to die was Ma Chongyings father who was executed by Liu Yufen as a reprisal against him for his actions in 1929.  That year Ma Chongying had strengthened his position by defeating several Guominjun forces. He traveled to Nanjing where he enrolled briefly at the military academy there. Rumors had it there he offered his services to the KMT on the understanding that if he could win control over Xinjiang that they recognize him. After departing Nanjing he traveled to Chongwei along the Yellow River where he joined his army before marching across the southern friends of the Ala Shan desert to head into northwestern Gansu. There he seized control over 4 districts; Kanzhou, Suzhou, Anxi and Tunhuang. Thus by the time of the Kumul uprising in April of 1931, Ma Chongying had established himself the Tungan warlord over northwestern Gansu. In June of that year, Yulbars Khan visited him at Suzhou while enroute to Nanjing. After a dinner, Ma Chongying asked Yulbars what was going on with the Kumul rebellion and the state of Kumul. Ma Congying then proceeded to criticize Jin Shujen whom he thought was unfit to govern Xinjiang. Upon hearing this Yulbars disclosed why he was going to Nanjing. Yulbars told him that many in Gansu did not support Jin and that he was appealing to Nanjing to see if Jin could be replaced with a new governor. Ma Chongying sat silently for some time before asking if Yulbar's had any personal contacts in Nanjing, to which he replied he did not. He then advised Yulbars to not go to Nanjing because of three reasons: 1) The Kuomintang had just completed its Northern Expedition and was in need of stability, so it was not in a position to replace its frontier governors, despite any shortcomings they had.2) Even if the Nanking government agreed to remove Chin Shu-jen, implementing the decision would likely take two or three years due to the vast distances involved. 3) Furthermore, Chin's greed would likely make him unwilling to step down, and he might even seek support from a foreign power to secure his position. Under these conditions, Sinkiang could potentially come under foreign control. The points were sound, however Yulbars stated the people had sent him to Nanjing, what should he do if he failed? Ma Congying replied “I have a way ... I can meet the needs of the Uighurs of Ha-mi ... In the name of Muslim brotherhood, I shall take my army into Sinkiang. First I shall alleviate the suffering of the Uighurs of Ha-mi, then I shall drive Chin Shu-jen from the stage by force of arms.” A lot of this is conjecture, as it would seem impossible Ma Chongying spontaneously decided to invade Xinjiang over dinner. Ma Chongying was interested in the Kumul uprising long before the arrival of Yulbars in Suzhou and based on other sources it seems Yulbars was well aware of this prior to his visit. Ma Chongying most likely had decent information on the political ongoings of Xinjiang as two Muslim Turks from Istanbul had traveled to northwestern Gansu from Urumqi in early 1931 and entered Ma Chongying's military HQ. One was Kamal Kaya Efendi who went on to become his chief of staff. Ma Chongying was also gun running to places like Kumul, meaning he would have a lot of intel. Ma Chongyings powerbase in Kanzhou was also temporary. As pointing out by Mildred Cable and Francesca French “based on the assumption of the paralysing effect of frightfulness in action, and as a method of temporary invasion it answered his purpose well, but it never served him as a basis of true conquest, nor did he ever establish rule over one single acre of the land which he invaded. His was the method of the locust. . . and his army was always viewed as a plague. It came, it devoured, and when it had passed over, the patient, constructively minded peasants instantly began to repair the damage done to their fields, and to begetsons to replace those who had been swept away in his train” In 1931 Ma Chongyings private army was not a large one, it was perhaps no more than 1000 men and given the account of Mildred Cable and Francesca French, his army had to roam around like locusts to survive. Ma Chongying was a very ambitious and young warlord who like many in this part of China dreamed of carving out a Muslim empire in central asia. In the spring of 1931, Ma Chongying had only two possible directions to take. One was through China proper where he would most likely face his uncle Ma Pufang, whom at the time he was in this sort of propaganda war with. The other was to go through Xinjiang, where it seemed he could receive aid from other Muslim groups seeking to be rid of Jin Shujen. Ma Chongying assembled a force of 500 Tungan cavalry and swiftly crossed the desert between Anxi and Kumul during the full heat of midsummer, arriving in the oasis on the 28th of June, at around the same time as the French Citroen expedition. The French Citroen expedition got to see an encounter between Ma Chongyings Tungan Cavalry and some Chinese machine gun detachment outside of the village of Yikoshu. The French account indicated the Chinese forces also had some Mongol soldiers with them decisively beating back the Tungan riders. After witnessing this the French headed for Kumul's Old City which they found in a state of chaos. Everyone within the city was busy organizing defenses. The French were taken immediately to the local Chinese commander, Zhu Juichih. As they made their way they could see anxious Muslims peering out of their windows and on telegraph poles were heads, hearts and livers, most likely from captured insurgents. Commander Zhu gave the French permission to continue to Urumqi, stating they could do so at their own risk. Most of the French departed on July 1st, leaving behind 3 members at the Old City who would become eyewitnesses to Ma Chongyings attack.  On July 3rd, Ma Chongying dispatched two messangers to Zhu Juichich baring the following message. “By order of the National Government of China I have been appointed commander-in-chief of all military forces of Kansu and Sinkiang. Having assumed my new occasional pistol shot could be heard as hand-to-hand fighting began on the wall Its self ... Just when the place seemed to be doomed a machine gun, which up to this had been silent ... suddenly came to life. Emplaced in a blockhouse flanking the wall, It opened fire, mowing down the assault, and the glacis was soon cleared except for heaps of corpses”.  Ma Chongyings Tungan cavalry force lacked heavy artillery necessary to breach the Old city walls. Three separate attacks were made on the night of the 3rd, all beaten back. Zhu Juichih, a military veteran had zero intention of surrendering to the so called “little commander” whom he dismissed as a “thieving cub”. Ma Chongying seemed to have little stomach for siege warfare so on the 5th he led a large portion of his Tungan cavalry away from Kumul Old City. By doing so he had left roughly 1000 Uyghur insurgents with a handful of Tungans to continue a siege against the Kumul Old City who had 2000 provincial troops. Zhu Juichih was unaware of Ma Chongyings true purpose so he elected not to sortie fearing a trap. Meanwhile Ma Congying led his riders over the Karlik Tagh to Barkul surprising its defenders. Barkul would end up surrendering without much of a struggle. The commander at Barkul named Hedin handed over 2000 rifles and opened the Barkul arsenal to Ma Chongying. Ma Chongying left a hundred man garrison to capture the town as he turned south. According to Wu Aichen, the sudden small victories of the young commander emboldened other groups to join his cause such as the Kazakhs and Tungans north of Karlik Tagh. By mid-July Muslim insurgents were effectively controlling the entire territory of the Old Kumul Khanate, from Xingxingxia to Iwanquan. Groups of invading Tungans from Gansu formed an alliance with the Muslims of Xinjiang, notably from Xingxingxia and Barkul to hold the siege of Kumul Old City. Ma Chongying seemed to also hold the full support of indigenous Muslims of the area whether it be Hazakh, Kirghiz, Uyghur or Xinjiang Tungans.  Jin Shujen's received word of the young commander leading a force of Tungan cavalry attacking various places. It seemed his next target was to be Qiqiaoqing. Jin appointed his chief secretary, Lu Xiaozu to be his commander in chief of the provincial forces; Tu Qikuo and Sheng Shihtsai were to be his joint chiefs of staff. Lu Xiaozu was a younger brother to Jin Shujen, a civilian with little to no military experience and was the bitter rival of the current commissioner for military affairs at Urumqi, Jin Shuxin. Lu Xiaozu mustered a force roughly 1000 strong of men almost all lacking any military training or experience. They were immediately tossed over to Qiqiaoqing with orders to halt the Tungan advance pending further reinforcements. Shortly after their arrival, the troops were met by a surprise night attack and killed nearly to a man. Their commander Tu Qikuo committed suicide in disgrace. According to Kamal Kaya Efendi, the Tungans were led personally by Ma CHongying during the daring attack. He had taken his forces into the oasis through little known trails in Karlik Tagh and Bogdo Ula after his capture of Barkul.  Following this victory, Ma Chongying returned to Kumul Old City to see if the siege was providing any results. This was a rather bizarre decision as Jin Shujens capital of Urumqi was basically open for the taking, but perhaps the young commander had overestimated his enemy. When Ma Congying arrived at Kumul Old City, the besiegers' morale improved greatly. Between July 3rd to October 16th over 43 attacks had been levied against the Chinese garrison. The Tungans dug trenches and built barricades trying to storm the walls. Meanwhile within the old city walls the besieged people were forced to eat their camels, horses and mules to survive. By October 1st the defenders were reduced to a ration of 750 grammes of kaoliang floor per day and were expected to run out by the end of the month. Likewise ammunition was running low, prompting Zhu Juichih to resort to more archaic weapons such as fire arrows and Dao swords that the men had found preserved in the arsenal going back to the time of Zuo Zungtang's campaign in the 19th century. One of the French expeditionaries reported the only thing being sold in the bazaars was opium. One could not even obtain oil as it was boiled and hurled over the walls at the attackers. The Tungans attempted numerous times to breach the walls using mines, but they lacked sufficient powder to create large enough explosions. On one occasion a breach was made in the walls, but the defenders were quickly able to block the hole with wool before the attackers could get through. Afterwards a ditch was dug around the walls and flooded so the Tungan trenches would be unable to continue mining. Siege warfare is neat isn't it? Horrible to be sure, but so much ingenuity. By Mid-October the defenders were very desperate. According to the French expeditionaries inside after 108 days of siege, the defenders sortied out of the town on October 16th and tried to reach Urumqi. “What sustained the men was opium. They could not have held out without it, and so long as it lasted and no strenuous effort was demanded of them, they could get along on practically no food. At night the opium lamps of the sentries could be seen sparkling like little stars the length of the ramparts. The whole garrison was in fact intoxicated. It was fantastic!” It is quite probable the defenders chose to make a break for it because they were a majority Han Chinese and greatly feared their fate if the Tungans got in. If you know Islamic history, well you know. Ma Chongying had refused any terms other than unconditional surrender and given the feelings of Kumuls Muslim insurgents, it seemed highly unlikely any prisoners would be taken. Regardless, the siege had delayed the Tungans for a long time, allowing Jin Shujen to hastily organize provincial forces at Urumqi. After his first military campaign had failed horrendously, Jin now orderedTsetsen Puntsag Gegeen, the “living Buddha” of Xinjiang of the Torgut Mongols to lead his famous Torgut Cavalry regiment against the Tungans at Kumul. The Turgot troops were by far the best available at the time to Jin, and the most capable to go one on one with Tungan cavalry. However Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen was one of the many Torguts who had grievances with Jin over his policy of enforcing Han Chinese officials upon his people to take positions of leadership. Moreover a plot had recently been discovered that one of his subordinates had been paid off to assassinate him. Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen suspected Jin Shujen to be the culprit to the plot and when the said assassins fled to Urumqi, Jin refused to hand them over for justice, all but confirmed his suspicions.  Thus Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen refused to become involved in the war over Kumul and instead took his forces to Kara Shahr as a demonstration of power. Lacking sufficient numbers or reliable Han Chinese troops, Jin turned next to the White Russian community. Lu Xiaozu who proved himself an imbecile at military matters was replaced with Chang Peiyuan, the Military commander of the Ili Region which also happened to be the region where most White Russians resided. Chang Peiyuan went to work rallying White Russian volunteers who more or less refused to fight for the Chinese, until Jin threatened to repatriate them to Stalin's USSR. In late September Chang Peiyuan had a force headed by 250 White Russians under the leadership of Colonel Pappengut with the mission of relieving Kumul Old City. During this time Ma Chongying decided to march upon the capital, drawing most of his Tungan cavalry away from Kumul heading westwards along the Qiqiaoqing road. This took him directly into the path of the advancing White Russians who began skirmishing around the village of Liaotun. At some point Ma Chongying was seriously wounded, shot through both of his legs. Despite this both sides had negligible casualties. Yet as a result of his grievous injury a large portion of Ma Congying's Tungan riders retreated back into northwestern Gansu. Rumor has it, at this time Ma Congying was bought off by Jin Shujen, regardless he had to take a prolonged time to recuperate and was away from the front lines. Once safely across the Gansu-Xinjiang frontier, Ma Chongying handed control of his four districts of Tunhuang, Anxi, Yumen and Suzhou to his uncle Ma Pufang. Meanwhile Chang Peiyuans forces with Pappenguts White Russians in the spearhead were still advancing towards Kumul Old City. They managed to relieve it on November 1st. The victorious Chinese troops sacked Kumul as a reward, that was denied to the White Russian forces. The provincial troops then performed a systematic destruction of large parts of Kumul, levelling entire villages and terrorizing the population. Zhu Juichih had returned to Urumqi, but his Lt Xing Fayu had remained at Kumul and began a series of mass executions. The reprisals were so heinous, all of the Uyghurs who had remained neutral during the ordeal threw their lot in with the rebellion. Refugees began to pour westwards towards Turfan while Uyghur insurgents withdrew to Karlik Tagh, notably to their well stocked mountain fort at Bardash. Those who went to Bardash unleashed a guerilla war against Jin troops in collaboration with Ma Chongyings Tungans who awaited their leader in Xinjiang. A communication network led from Bardash and Anxi for this purpose. While Ma Chongying was licking his wounds he reorganized his forces. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus the Kumul Rebellion had just been unleashed. Those who were oppressed were gradually forming a rebellious coalition against Jin Shujen. Although Ma Chongying had literally been cut down at the legs so to say, he was not down for the count. The Rebellion had only just begun.

Last time we spoke about the Long March. Amidst escalating conflicts, the Red Army, led by the newly empowered Mao Zedong, faced immense pressures from the Nationalist Army. Struggling through defeats and dwindling forces, they devised a bold retreat known as the Long March. Starting in October 1934, they evaded encirclement and crossed treacherous terrain, enduring heavy losses. Despite dire circumstances, their resilience allowed them to regroup, learn from past missteps, and ultimately strengthen their strategy, securing Mao's leadership and setting the stage for future successes against the KMT. During the Long March (1934-1936), the Red Army skillfully maneuvered through treacherous terrain, evading the pursuing National Revolutionary Army. Despite harsh conditions and dwindling numbers, advances and strategic ploys allowed them to cross critical rivers and unite with reinforcements. Under Mao Zedong's leadership, they faced internal struggles but ultimately preserved their unity. By journey's end, they had transformed into a formidable force, setting the stage for future victories against their adversaries and solidifying their influence in China.   #131 The Complicated Story about Xinjiang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. I've said probably too many times, but theres one last major series of events I'd like to cover before we jump into the beginning of the 15 year war between China and Japan. When I say Xinjiang I imagine there are two responses from you in the audience, 1) what the hell is Xinjiang or number 2) oh what about that place in northwest China. That pretty much sums it up, the history of this province, or region if you want to call it that is almost never spoken about. It was a place as we have seen multiple times in the series, where conflicts come and go like the weather. But in the 1930's things really heated up. What I want to talk about is collectively part of the Xinjiang Wars, but more specifically I want to talk about the Kumul Rebellion. There's really no way to jump right into this one so I am going to have to explain a bit about the history of Xinjiang.  Xinjiang in a political sense is part of China and has been the cornerstone of China's strength and prestige going back to the Han dynasty over 2000 years ago. In a cultural sense however, Xinjiang is more inline with the Muslim dominated middle-east. It's closer to th Turkic and Iranian speaking peoples of Central Asia. From a geographical point of view Xinjiang is very much on the periphery. It is very isolated from western asia by the massed ranks of the Hindu Kush, the Pamirs, the Tien Shan, the Indian Subcontinent of Karakoram, Kunlun, the Himalaya ranges and of course by the Gobi desert. It neither belongs to the east or west. As a province of China its the largest and most sparsely populated. It can be divided into two main regions, the Tarim Basin and Zungharia and then into two lesser but economically significant regions, the Ili Valley and Turgan Depression. The Tien Shan mountain range extends roughly eastward from the Pamir Massif, creating a formidable barrier between Zungharia and the Tarim Basin. This natural obstacle complicates direct communication between the two regions, particularly during winter. The Ili Valley, separated from Zungharia by a northern extension of the Tien Shan, is physically isolated from the rest of the province and can only be easily accessed from the west. This western area came under Russian control in the mid-nineteenth century and now forms part of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. Now it has to be acknowledged, since the formation of the PRC in 1949, Xinjiang changed in size and ethnic composition. The CCP drove a massive Han migrant wave over. Regardless, Han's make up a minority and according to some population statistics taken during the 1940s, Xinjiang was dominated by 7 Muslim nationalities, roughly 3.5 million people out of a total population of 3.7 million. 200,000 of these were Han settlers, while 75,000-100,000 were Mongols, Russians, Tunguzic peoples (those being Sibo, Solon and Manchu), a few Tibetans, Afghans and Indians. Among the various indigenous Muslim nationalities of Xinjiang, the Uighurs stand out as the most numerous and politically important. This Turkic-speaking group primarily consists of sedentary agriculturalists who reside in the oases of the Tarim Basin, Turfan, Kumul, and the fertile lowlands of the Hi Valley. In the late 1940s, the Uyghur population in Xinjiang was estimated to be approximately 2,941,000. Following the Uyghurs, the second-largest Muslim nationality in the region is the Kazakhs, with an estimated population of around 319,000 during the late Republican Period. Kirghiz come in third, with an estimated population of about 65,000 at the same time. Both the Kazakhs and Kirghiz in Xinjiang are nomadic Turkic-speaking peoples, with the Kazakhs primarily found in the highland areas of Zungharia and the Hi Valley, while the Kirghiz inhabit the upland pastures of the Tien Shan and Pamirs. There also exist a small group of Iranian-speaking 'Mountain' Tajiks living in the upland Sarikol region in the far southwest, with an estimated population of 9,000 in the mid-1940s; a primarily urban group of Uzbeks residing in larger oasis towns and cities of the Tarim Basin, numbering approximately 8,000 in the mid-1940s; and a smaller group of Tatars settled mainly in Urumqi and the townships near the Xinjiang-Soviet border, estimated at 5,000 during the same period. Lastly, it is important to mention the Hui, a group of Chinese-speaking Muslims dispersed throughout China, particularly in Zungharia and Kumul within Xinjiang, as well as in the neighboring northwestern provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia. Known as 'Tungan' in Xinjiang, the Hui population was estimated at around 92,000 in the mid-1940s and held significant political and military influence during the Republican Period. Excluding the Ismaili Tajik's of Sarikol, the Muslim population of Xinjiang, whether Turkic or Chinese speaking, are Sunni following the orthodox of Hanafi Madhhab.  As for the non Muslim population, excluding the Mongols who numbered roughly 63,000 and inhabit a narrow strip of land along the northeastern frontier between Xinjiang and the Mongolian People's Republic, Tien Shan, Ili Vally and Chuguchak, most were newcomers, migrants from the mid 18th century while the region was being conquered. Again according to the same statistics from the 1940s I mentioned, Hans represented 3-4 % of the population. Although the Han population disproportionately held power with the main administrative areas, they had no sizable territorial enclaves. The Han population can basically be divided into 5 groups; descendants of exiled criminals and political offenders; Hunanese settlers who came over after Zuo Zungtang's conquests; Tientsin merchants who were supplying Zuo's army; Shanxi caravaneers who came to trade and Gansu colonists. Lastly there were the Tunguzic Peoples and Russians. The Tunguzic speaking Sibo, Solon and Manchu settled mostly in the Ili region. The Russians also tended to live in the Ili region. These were mostly White Russian refugees from the civil war.  Xinjiang's first Republican governor was Yang Zengxin, a Yunnanese native. He had previously worked as the district magistrate in Gansu and Ningxia earning a reputation as a good manager of the local Tungan Muslim population. In 1908 he was transferred to Xinjiang and quickly found himself promoted to by the last Qing governor of Xinjiang. He held out his post after the Xinhai revolution and quelled a Urumqi rebellion soon after. Yang Zengxin's survived politically by always siding with whichever faction he thought was winning. For example in 1917, President Li Yuanghong dispatched Fan Yaonan to watch over Yang and try to replace him if possible. Yang recognized quickly whichever Warlord faction held power over the Beiyang government should be courted. Thus Yang held out for a long time and his province was comparably peaceful compared to most of warlord era China. To maintain his power, Yang enacted a divide and rule style, trying to placate the conflicts between certain groups within Xinjiang, but made sure to exclude Russian influence. Basically Yang tried his best to keep groups who could come into conflict away from each other, keeping the Uyghurs of southern Xinjiang away from the pastoral nomads of Zungharia and Tien Shan. Above all Yang considered the Bolshevik Russians to be the greatest threat to his regime, in his words “The Russians ... aimed at ... isolating the country from all outside influence, and at maintaining it in a state of medieval stagnation, thus removing any possibility of conscious and organised national resistance. As their religious and educational policy, the Russian administrators sought to preserve the archaic form of Islam and Islamic culture. . . Quranic schools of the most conservative type were favoured and protected against any modernist influence”. During his 16 year of power, Yang established himself as a competent autocrat, a mandarin of the old school and quite the capable administrator. Yet his economic policies were long term exploitative causing hardship and exhausting the province. Yang realized he was reached the threshold of what the population was willing to endure and endeavored to allow corruption to emerge within his administration provided it remained within acceptable limits. IE: did not spring forward a Muslim revolution. He opened junior positions in the administration to Muslims which had a duel effect. It made the Muslim community feel like they were part of greater things, but placed said officials in the path of the populations anger, insulating senior Han officials. Ironically it would be his fellow Han Chinese officials who would become angry with him. Some were simply ambitious of his power, others felt that Xinjiang should be more closely inline with China proper.  Rumors have it that after a dinnr party, Yang deliberately surrounded himself with opium addicts, stating to his subordinates “the inveterate opium smoker thinks more of his own comfort and convenience than of stirring up unrest among his subordinates”. Needless to say, Yang later years saw him seriously alienating senior officials. By 1926 he claimed “to have created an earthly paradise in a remote region” so he seemed to be quite full of himself. That same year he turned against his Tungan subordinates. He accused many of conspiring with Ma Qi, a Tungan warlord of Xuning in Qinghai, whom he also thought were driven by Urumqi. Deprived of his formerly loyal Tungans, Yang found himself increasingly isolated. A expedition was sent to Urumqi in 1926, whr G. N Roerich noted “The Governor's residence consisted of several well-isolated buildings and enclosed courtyards. The gates were carefully guarded by patrols of heavily armed men ... The Governor's yamen seemed to us to be in a very dilapidated condition. The glass in many of the windows on the ground floor was broken and dirty papers and rags had been pasted on the window frames. Numerous retainers roamed about the courtyards and villainous bodyguards, armed with mauser pistols, were on duty at the entrance to the yamen.” It seems likely Yang had decided to leave Xinjiang at that point. He had amassed a immense personal fortune and sent much of it to his family in China proper and also to Manila where he had a bank account. Further evidence of this was provided by Mildred Cable and Francesca French, two members of the China inland Mission who reported 'Wise old Governor Yang ... as early as 1926 ... quietly arranged a way of escape for his family and for the transference of his wealth to the security of the British Concession in Tientsin. Later in the same year, accompanied by several 'luggage cases of valuables', Yang's eldest son was sent out of Sinkiang, travelling incognito, in the company of these missionaries”. It was also at this time Yang erectd a statue of himself in th public gardens at Urumqi. According to Nicholas Roerich, this memorial was paid for with forced contributions 'from the grateful population'; by all accounts the statue was in execrable taste . While the NRA was marching upon Beijing in June of 1928, Yang ordered the KMT flag to be raised in Xinjiang. This gesture indicated to all, Yang was about to depart the province. One of Yang's most dissident subordinates, a Han named Fan Yaonan decided to act. Fan Yaonan was an ambitious modernist who received his education in Japan and someone Yang distruste from day one. Fan was appointed the post of Taoyin of Aksu by the Beijing government, an appointment Yang could have easily ingored, but was grudgingly impressd by Fans abilities. Fan proved himself very useful to Yang and was soon promoted to the Taoyin of Urumqi alongside becoming the Xinjiang Provincial Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. It seems Fan and Yang mutually disliked each other. At some point in 1926 Fan got together with a small group of like minded officials, such as the engineer at Urumqi's telegraph station and the Dean of the local school of Law, and Fan told them he wanted to assasinate Yang. Some believe Fan sought to gain favor with the KMT as motivation. Regardless on July 7th of 1928, 6 days after Yang took the post of Chairman of the Xinjiang Provincial Government under the KMT, Fan attacked. On that day, Yang was invited to a banquet to celebrate a graduation ceremony at the Urumqi law school. Fan had arranged the banquet, with 18 soldiers present, disguised as waiters wearing “red bands around their arms and Browning pistols in their sleeves”. During the meal, Fan proposed a toast to the health of Yang at which time “shots rang outsimultaneously, all aimed at the Governor. Seven bulletsin all were fired, and all reached their mark. Yang, mortally wounded, but superb in death, glared an angry defiance at his foes, 'who dares do this?' he questioned in the loud voice which had commanded instant obedience for so many years. Then he fell slowly forward, his last glance resting upon the face of the trusted Yen, as though to ask forgiveness that he had not listened to the advice so often given to him”. According to Yan Tingshan who was also wounded, Fan Yaonan finished Yang Zengxin off with two shots personally. After the assassination, whereupon 16 people were killed or wounded, Fan went to Yang official residence and seized the seals of office. He then sent a letter summonig Jin Shujen, the Commissioner for Civil Affairs in Xinjiang and Yang's second in command. Jin called Fan's bluff and refusing to come, instead sending soldiers to arrest the assassin. It seems Fan greatly miscalculated his personal support as a short gun battle broke out and he was arrested by Jin and shortly thereafter executed with his complices on July 8th. And thus, Jin Shujen found himself succeeding Yang, a less able man to the job. Jin Shujen was a Han Chinese from Gansu. He graduated from the Gansu provincial academy and served for a time as the Principal of a Provincial normal school. He then entered the Imperial Civil Service, where he came to the attention of Yang, then working as the district Magistrate at Hozhou. Yang took him on as district magistrate and Jin rose through the ranks. By 1927 Jin became the Provincial Commissioner for Civil Affairs at Urumqi. After executing Fan, Jin sent a telegram to Nanjing seeking the KMT's official recognition of his new role. Nanjing had no real options, it was fait accompli, they confirmed Jin into office and under the new KMT terminology he was appointed Provincial Chairman and commander-in-chief. In other words an official warlord.  Following his seizure of power, Jin immediately took steps to secure his newfound power. His first step was to double the salaries of the secret police and army. He also expanded the military and acquired new weaponry for them. Politically, Jin maintained the same old Qing policies Yang did, pretty much unchanged. Jin did however replace many of the Yunnanese followers under Yang with Han CHinese from Gansu. Jins younger brother, Jin Shuxin was appointed Provincial Commissioner for military affairs at Urumqi and his other brother Jin Shuqi was given the senior military post at Kashgar. His personal bodyguard member Zu Chaoqi was promoted to Brigade Commander at Urumqi. Jin maintained and expanded upon Yang's system of internal surveillance and censorship, like any good dictator would. According to H. French Ridley of the China Inland Mission at Urumqi “people were executed for 'merely making indiscreet remarks in the street during ordinary conversation”. Jin also introduced a system of internal passports so that any journey performing with Xinjiang required an official passport validation by the Provincial Chairman's personal seal, tightening his security grip and of course increasing his official revenue. Travel outside Xinjiang became nearly impossible, especially for Han officials and merchants seeking trade with China proper.  Under Jin Xinjiang's economy deteriorated while his fortune accumulated. Yang had introduced an unbacked paper currency that obviously fell victim to inflation and Jin upted the anty. Within a process of several stages, he expanded the currency, causing further inflation. Under Yang the land taxes had been a serious source of the provincial revenue, but Yang was not foolish enough to squeeze the Turkic peasantry too hard, he certainly was intelligent enough to thwart peasant revolts. Jin however, not so smart, he tossed caution to the win and doubled the land taxes, way past what would be considered the legal amount. Jin also emulated Ma Fuxiang, by establishing government monopolies over various profitable enterprises, notably the gold mine at Keriya and Jade mine at Khotan. He also monopolized the wool and pelt industry, using his police and army to force the sale of lambskins at a mere 10% of their market value. Just as with Yang's regime, wealth flowed out of the province in a continuous stream, straight into banks within China proper. According to George Vasel, a German engineer and Nazi agent hired to construct airfields in Gansu during the early 1930s, he knew a German pilot named Rathje who was secretly employed by Jin to fly a million dollars worth of gold bullion from Urumqi to Beijing. Jin did his best to keep all foreign influence out of Xinjiang and this extended also to KMT officials from China proper. Jin also of course did his best to conceal his corrupt regime from Nanjing. For all intensive purposes Jin treated Xinjiang like a feudal, medieval society. He tried to limit external trade to only be through long distance caravans. All was fine and dandy until Feng Yuxiang occupied Gansu and thus disrupted the traditional trade routes. Alongside this the Soviets had just constructed a new railroad linking Frunze, the capital of Kirghiz with Semipalatinsk in western siberia. This railroad known as the Turksib was aimed primarily to develop western Turkstan, integrating it within the new soviet system. The railroad was constructed 400 miles away from the Xinjiang frontier, on purpose to limit any activities with capitalists. When the railway was completed in 1930 it virtually strangled Xinjiang. China's share of Xinjiang's market dropped by 13% and the value of trade with the Soviets which had dropped to zero since the Russian civil war was not rising past 32 million roubles by 1930. The Soviet trade gradually was seizing a monopoly over Xinjiang and this of course affected the merchants and workers who were unable to compete. The revenue of the merchants and workers declined as new taxes were levied against them. Meanwhile alongside an increase in Soviet trade, the new railway also increased Soviet political influence over Xinjiang. It was also much faster and easier to travel from China proper to Xinjiang via Vladivostok, the trans-siberian railway and Turksib than across the North-West roads of China. For the Turkic speaking Muslims of Xinjiang, it was quite impressive and many wanted to do business and mingle with the Soviets. However to do so required a visa, and thus KMT officials in Nanjing held the keys. Jin's policies towards the Turkic Muslims, Tungans and Mongols were extremely poor from the very beginning. It seems Jin held prejudice against Muslims, some citing bad experiences with them in Gansu. Whatever the case may be, Jin rapidly antagonized both his Turkic speaking and Tungan Muslim citizens by introducing a tax on the butchering of all animals in Xinjiang and forbidding Muslims to perform the Hajj to Mecca. Some point out he did that second part to thwart a loophole on leaving Xinjiang for trade. Obviously the Muslim majority of Xinjiang and the military powerhouse of Torgut Mongols in the Tien Shan bitterly resented Jin. Despite wide scale hostility against him, the first challenges at his autocratic rule came not from various minority groups, but some ambitious Han officers under his command. Palpatin would say it was ironic.  In May of 1929 the Taoyin of Altai attempted a coup against Jin, but he was forewarned and able to confine the fighting to the Shara Sume area. In the spring of 1931 troubles broke out in Urumqi as discontented Han officers and soldiers attacked Jin's yamen. The attack failed, and the instigators of the plot were all executed. The same year, Jin annexed the Kumul Khanate, known to the Chinese as Hami, finally pushing the Turkic speaking Muslims into open rebellion. Going back in time, after Zuo Zengtangs reconquest of Xinjiang in the 1870s, a few local principalities were permitted to survive on a semi-autonomous basis. Of these Kumul was the most important and was ruled by a royal family dating back to the Ming Dynasty and descended from the Chaghatay Khans. The Khanate of Kumul dominated the chief road from Xinjiang to China proper and was therefore of strategic importance to the Chinese. It extended from Iwanquan northwards to the Barkul Tagh and along the mountains to Bai and south to Xingxingxia along the Xinjiang-Gansu border. During the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, Maqsud Shah was sitting on the throne of Kumul. He was known to the Chinese as the Hami Wang, to his subjects as Khan Maqsud or Sultan Maqsud and to Europeans as the King of the Gobi. He was the last independent Khan of Central Asia as the rest were tossing their lot in with the progress of the times. During Yangs regime he was content with allowing Kumul to train its semi autonomous status, mostly because Maqsud Shah was very friendly towards the Chinese. He spoke Turkic with a marked Chinese accent and wore Chinese clothes. On the other hand he had a long whit beard and always wore a turban or Uyghur cap. He was a staunch Muslim ruling a petty oasis kingdom from an ancient and ramshackle palace in Kumul proper, one of three towns making up the capital of Kumul, known to the Chinese as Huicheng. He had a bodyguard consisting of 40 Chinese soldiers armed with mausers and had a Chinese garrison billeted in fortified Chinese town. The third city in his domain was known as New City or Xincheng, populated by a mix of Chinese and Turkic peoples. By 1928, shortly after the assassination of Yang, it was estimated Maqsud Shah ruled over roughly 25,000-30,000 Kumulliks. He was responsible for levying taxes, dispensing justice and so forth. His administration rested upon 21 Begs, 4 of whom were responsible for Kumul itself, 5 others over plains villages and the other 12 over mountain regions of Barkul and Karlik Tagh. Maqsud Shah also maintained a Uyghur militia who had a reputation as being better trained than its Chinese counterpart at Old City. Throughout Yangs regime, Kumul remained relatively peaceful and prosperous. Maqsud Shah paid a small annual tribute to Urumqi and in return the Xinjiang government paid him a formal subsidy of 1200 silver taels a year. Basically this was Yang paying for the Sultans compliance when it came to moving through his strategic Khanate. For the Uyghurs of Kumul, they were free from the typical persecution under Chinese officials. The only tax paid by citizens of Kumul was in livestock, generally sheep or goats, given annually to the Khan. The soil of the oasis was rich and well cultivated. Everything was pretty fine and dandy under Yang, but now was the time of Jin. In March of 1930, Maqsud Shah died of old age. His eldest son Nasir should have inherited the throne of Kumul, but Jin and his Han subordinates stationed in Kumul Old City had other plans. Shortly after Maqsud Shah's death, Nasir traveled to Urumqi, most likely to legitimize his rise upon the throne. Nasir was not very popular amongst his people, thus it seemed he needed Jin's aid to bolster him. However there also was the story that it was Jin who ordered Nasir to come to Urumqi to perform a formal submission. Now at the time of Maqsud Shah's death, Li Xizeng, a Han Chinese divisional commander stationed in Kumul suggested to Jin that the Khanate should be abolished and annexed officially. There was of course a great rationale for this, if Jin took control over Kumul it would offer increased revenue and new positions for his Han Chinese officials. Thus Jin ordered a resolution be drawn up by his ministers to abolish the Khanate, dividing Kumul into three separate administrative districts, Hami centered around the capital, I-ho and I-wu. When Nasir arrived in Urumqi he was given the new position of Senior Advisor to the provincial government, but forbidden to return to Kumul. Basically it was the age old government via hostage taking. Meanwhile another official named Yulbars was sent back to Kumul with a group of Chinese officials to set up the new administration.  While the people of Kumul had no love for Nasir and were taxed pretty heavily by his father, this did not mean that they wanted the Khanate to end. For the Turkic Muslims the Khanate held a religious significance. For Uyghurs there was a question of national pride associated with it. Of course there were economic issues. Within Xinjiang Han were allowed to settle, but in the Khanate there were restrictions. In the words of the Nanjing Wu Aichen on the situation “subject peoples obstinately prefer self-government to good government”. Well Jin's government was definitely not good, so what outcome does that give? The newly appointed Han administration upset the people of Kumul from the very minute of its installation. When it was announced the privilege of being except from direct taxation by Urumqi was to be abolished, ompf. To add insult to injury, one years arrears of taxes were to be collected from the Uyghurs. On top of that, Kumul was tossed wide open to Han settlers who were incentivized to settle by giving them a tax exemption for two years. Yeah that be some wild policies. To add even more misery, Kumul being situated on the chief road from northwestern Gansu to Xinjiang saw an enormous flow of refugees from famine and warfare going on in Gansu. A column of these refugees were seen by Berger Bohlin of the Sino-Swedish Expedition of 1931. His account is as follows “During my stay at Hua-hai-tze I witnessed a curious spectacle. The Chen-fan region had for a number of years been visited by failure of the crops and famine, and large numbers of people therefore emigrated to more prosperous tracts. Such an emigration-wave now passed Hua-hai-tze. It consisted of a caravan of 100 camels, transporting 150 persons with all their baggage to Sinkiang, where it was said that land was being thrown open”. It seemed to Bohlin that the refugees looked carefree and happy and that the ruler of Xinjiang, Jin Shujen, a Gansu man himself was enthusiastic to have them come settle his province. Jin had his official in charge of I-ho district Lung Xulin provide land for the would-be settlers coming from Gansu. Lung Xulin responded by forcing his Uyghur population to leave their cultivated land and simply handed it over to the refugees. The expropriated Uyghurs were compensated for their land by being given untilled lands on the fringe of the desert where most soil was barren. The Uyghurs were also assessed for their land tax based on their old holdings. To make this even worse hear this, untilled land was exempt from taxation for two years, so they didn't even get that, while the Gansu refugees were excused from tax payments for three years. So yeah the Kumul people quickly organized a petition and sent it to the yamen in Urumqi. There was zero acknowledgement from the yamen it was received and nothing was done to address the long list of grievances, especially from the Uyghurs. Instead the Gansu settlers kept flooding in and with them the price of food skyrocketed, largely because of the enormous amount of provincial troops sent in to watch over everybody. Now for the moment the Turkic speaking Muslims in the region remained relatively peaceful, and this perhaps lulled Jin into a false sense of security. But according to Sven Hedin of the Sino-Swedish Expedition “Discontent increased; the people clenched their teeth and bided their time; the atmosphere was tense and gloomy. Inflammable matter accumulated, and only a spark was needed to fire the powder magazine.”  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The history of Xinjiang is unbelievably bizarre, complicated and quite frankly really fun. Before researching this I had no idea about anything and am really enjoying this as I write it. The next episode is going to be on the Kumul Rebellion, so buckle up buckaroo. 

Legendary online radio station NTS  played a 30-minute special on Migration Sounds on 15 December, as part of a 24-hour broadcast marking International Migrants Day. Our programme is a 30-minute mix of field recordings taking you through three aspects of migration: forced migration, diaspora communities and daily life as a migrant. Programme info: The field recording excerpts in this programme are as follows:  Forced migration 2.15: Mediterranean Sea: Three boats rescuing around 130 people from an overloaded rubber boat in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, at 2.00am on 27 December, 2022.  The rescuees were attempting to reach Europe from Libya - where they had suffered extensive abuse. Among them were many children, and one infant just weeks old. Recorded by Frey Lindsay 4:29: Mediterranean Sea: After the first rest they've had in a long time, the rescuees aboard the Ocean Viking celebrated having survived the journey, utilising the drums kept onboard.  Recorded by Frey Lindsay 5:36: Mediterranean Sea: Testimony from Joseph, an asylum seeker from Nigeria, onboard a charity rescue ship. Along with over a hundred other people, he was rescued from an unseaworthy rubber boat headed for Europe from Libya. Recorded by Frey Lindsay 6:33 Marianosztra, Hungary: Inmates in the prison behind the Marianosztra Monastery were feeding metal tape through stamping machines to make razor wire to fortify Hungary's border fences against migrants and refugees. The razor wire was also being exported to other countries. Recorded by Maria Margaronis 7:36 Eidomeni, Greece: In 2016,  more than 14,000 people on the move from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere were living in a muddy, makeshift camp site at Eidomeni on the Greek-North Macedonian border, hoping to make their way north. This is the voice of Mohammed, from Syria. Recorded by Maria Margaronis 8:36 Bordeaux, France: On 19th of December 2023 France approved a new immigration law. It is a law that makes it harder for families of immigrants to join them, limits the support for migrants from outside the EU, establishes staying illegally in the country as a crime, suppresses the automatic right to citizenship for those who are born in France from foreign parents and demands a fee from foreign students in the country. This is a recording of a protest against this law. Recorded by Rocio Calvo 9:39: Bremen, Germany: Protest against racism and strict EU/Germany migration laws in Bremen, Germany. Protesters are chanting "Um Europa keine Mauern – Bleiberecht für alle und auf Dauer!" ("No walls around Europe – Permanent right to stay for everyone!") Recorded by Pedro Oliveira Diaspora communities 10:16 Louisville, USA: A Somali immigrant speaks at the Louisville Movement Against Trump rally, March 2017, set up to oppose Trump's visit to Kentucky. Recorded by Aaron Rosenblum 11:19: London, England: Prayers inside the Sri Guru Singh Sabha Gurdwara Sikh temple in Southall, a modern Sikh temple with space for 3,000 worshippers which also organises regular community events.  Recorded by Cities and Memory 12:56: New York, USA: Columbus Park in Chinatown, New York has served as a gathering place for the local Chinese community, where the neighbourhood meets up to play mahjong, perform traditional Chinese music and practise tai chi in the early mornings.  Recorded by Cities and Memory 15:21: Xinjiang, China: In Altay, Xinjiang, Kazakhs have lived here for hundreds of years and still maintain a nomadic lifestyle that follows the seasons. However, the process of modernization and development is changing their traditions, customs and even language. The younger generation is unwilling to continue the hard nomadic life, and the older generation who are gradually aging may be the last generation of nomadic Kazakhs. Recorded by Yang Jie 17:36: London, England: The sound of traditional garment manufacture and repair at Dressmode Tailoring, which is run by Bangladeshi Mohammed Shajahan, originally from Sylhet, Bangladesh. This shop has been operating for around 17 years, but times have been tough for businesses like this in recent years due to the growth of fast fashion and outsourcing. The owners were telling us that while the older generation of Bangladeshis often travel home to visit, the younger generation are forgetting Bangladesh completely. Recorded by Cities and Memory 18:38: London, England: The sound of a traditional west African barber's shop in Peckham. Barber's shops like these often operate as a centre for the local African community to come together and socialise, just as much as to get their next haircut - they're an essential part of the fabric of local African diaspora communities in the city. Recorded by Cities and Memory 20:41: Padova, Italy: Dominic is an immigrant from Senegal, West Africa, who has been living in Padova in Italy for a number of years, performing as busker in the same spot every single day. We had been enjoying listening to his beautiful voice and songs from his home every time we visited the city for several years until last year we finally stopped and spoke to him to hear a little bit of his story. Recorded by Cities and Memory 22:12: Dubai, United Arab Emirates:  The field recording is of a group of Filipino expats having a competitive game of basketball. Filipinos form close to 25% of the population in Dubai. Most come to Dubai for work in order to support their families back home. One of the most common activities for Filipinos (usually men) to engage in is basketball. Recorded by Zubin Aroz Migration is life 23:37: Ljubljana, Slovenia: “While I was feeling gloomy, I stirred a soup in order to feel close to my parents, my hometown, and to feel at home again.” Recorded by Görkem Özdemir 24:54: Cartagena, Colombia: Christine's daughter, aged 9, recites a fable in French - born in Colombia to a French mother, she has been home schooled in French. Reading and reciting poems was part of her distance learning programme.  Recorded by Christine Renaudat 26:23: San Francisco, USA: Juan Pablo is 19 years old. I randomly approached him in Dolores Park in San Francisco and asked to record him speaking about what he's learned about himself so far in life. He's explaining his migration from Brazil to the US. This piece explores his journey through the confines of cultural, social, and political borders.  Recorded by Wendy Baker 27:26: Zitacuaro, Mexico: The sound of thousands of monarch butterflies known for their long annual migration between Mexico and the United States, recorded as Christine, a migrant settled in Latin America, was mourning her grandmother, who had passed away in France, back “home”. Recorded by Christine Renaudat

Kate Adie presents stories from Sudan, South Korea, Kazakhstan, South Africa and Ireland.Lyse Doucet recently gained rare access to Sudan, where she met the remarkable Mama Nour. A steely woman, orphaned in childhood, she now provides refuge for other women and children amid Sudan's ongoing civil war, which the UN has called 'the biggest humanitarian crisis in the world'.South Korea's president sent shockwaves across the world when he declared martial law earlier this week. Jake Kwon describes the moment the president made his announcement, and the swift, decisive response from both politicians and the South Korean people to stop him in his tracks.China's Xinjiang province is home to a huge tomato industry, which has been linked to forced labour - an allegation China denies. Still, many Uyghurs and ethnic Kazakhs have fled Xinjiang into neighbouring Kazakhstan, where Runako Celina met one woman who revealed the realitles of life in the region.In South Africa, there's an on-going stand-off between authorities and illegal workers living down an abandoned gold mine, southwest of Johannesburg. Security forces briefly stopped food and water from being sent down the mine, before a court ruled against them. Nomsa Maseko recalls her first time entering this hidden world.Ireland's elections last weekend did not prove to be a political game-changer unlike other polls this year. Michael Martin will return as Taoiseach for the second time, but scratch the surface and there's an underlying anti-establishment sentiment, says Chris Page.Series Producer: Serena Tarling Editor: Richard Fenton-Smith Production Coordinators: Sophie Hill & Katie Morrison

Last time we spoke about the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings. On August 1st, during the Nanchang Uprising, the CCP's 2nd Front Army inflicted heavy casualties and seized substantial weaponry. Reorganized under He Long and Ye Ting, the army, then 20,000 strong, celebrated in Nanchang, attracting new recruits. However, faced with an imminent counterattack, they retreated south in what became known as the "little long march." Despite initial successes, like capturing Huichang County, internal strife and harsh conditions reduced their numbers significantly. By the end of August, they reached Guangdong, but relentless opposition from Nationalist forces led to severe losses. The remaining forces retreated east, encountering brutal battles and a final, devastating defeat. Scattered, the remnants sought refuge and eventually regrouped, with leaders like Zhou Enlai and He Long navigating exile and adversity. The uprising marked the CCP's first armed resistance against the KMT, a prelude to continued revolutionary efforts, notably the Autumn Harvest Uprising, amid widespread, strategic shifts in CCP policy and leadership, including Mao Zedong's influential role.   #120 The Guangzhou, Gansu and Red Spear Uprisings Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Last we left off the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest uprisings saw mixed to….lets be honest kind of lackluster results. Both certainly saw their hardships for the passionate people involved. Countless gave their lives for a cause they truly believed in. This was China's warlord era, so many differing groups made grand promises for bright futures, such as warlords, the KMT and of course the CCP. The CCP having undergone the White Terror, now sought to unleash their own independent revolution, now released by the shackles of the KMT.  On the 7th the CCP Central Committee held an emergency meeting, where Chen Duxiu was criticized for his appeasement of the KMT right wing. It was also during this meeting, the CCP formalized how they would go about implementing a land revolution and armed uprisings. The CCP then received strong suggestions from Joseph Stalin, that they should unleash a major uprising to seize control over a province, hinting at performing such a deed in Guangzhou in the hopes of taking Guangdong. In accordance the head of the CCP Qu Qiubai decided they needed to persuade soldiers to their cause to perform such a thing. Many within the CCP leadership did not support such plans, deeming the chance of winning control over a province to be highly unlikely, but their Soviet advisors were strongly pushing for it.   On the 20th Zhang Tailei, the secretary of the Guangdong CCP provincial committee, discussed plans for a provincial wide uprising. They would mobilize the workers and peasants to hold riots in key locations within Guangdong, particularly Guangzhou. The ultimate plan was to seize Guangdong by establishing uprising committees in Beijiang, Xijiang and Guangzhou. In early October the Nanchang uprising suffered tremendous losses at Chao'an and Shantou. This setback changed the minds of those seeking to seize all of Guangdong and instead they directed their efforts to mobilizing workers in Guangzhou to carry out political and economic struggles. On November 17th within Guangdong and Guangxi, petty warlords began a little war. This was between the KMT aligned warlords Zhang Fakui and Li Jishen. The CCP Central Committee believed this little war was a major opportunity and jumped to exploit it.  Zhang Fakui was vulnerable in particular. He was colluding with Wang Jingwei at the time, his primary job was to eliminate the pervading influence of the CCP in the Guangzhou area. Zhang Fakui's troops continuously rounded up suspected communists and kept a close eye on the Soviet consulate at all times. Zhang Fakui's troops were more or less brutalizing the common people, not a tasteful job by any means and one that demoralized them. It was because of this the CCP knew they might be able to win over some of his troops to their side. The CCP played upon the low standard of living and economic instability of warlord era China, hoping to appeal to the masses for a Soviet communist style system rather than what the KMT proposed. Here is a taste of some of the slogans they wrote on placards and proclaimed in major city centers: Raise the Soldiers' Pay to 20 Silver Dollars! Food for the Workers! Land to the Tillers! Knock Down the KMT and the Warlords! Kill All the Country Bullies and the Evil Landlords! Confiscate the Capitalists' Homes and Give Them to the Rebel Masses! All Authority to the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers! They passed the “resolution of the Guangdong work plan”, this would require the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee to expand some riots using workers and peasants within the cities and villages; incite soldiers to mutiny and resist the war and hopefully direct all said into a general riot to seize power. They would first begin by mobilizing farmers to refuse to pay winter rent and riot if they could. On November 26th, Zhang Tailei went to Guangzhou from Hong Kong covertly and convened a secret meeting with CPP members there. During these meetings it was decided they would take advantage of Zhang Fakui troops, who were currently very demoralized from fighting battles they honestly wanted nothing to do with. Within Guangzhou was the 4th army teaching corps and part of the guards corps amongst smaller CCP militia groups. Zhang Tailei would act as chairman, Huang Ping and Zhou Wenyong would all lead the uprising. After the meeting Zhang Tailei and the others went to the Teaching Corps and Guards Corps to mobilize them, as well as begin training some worker Red Guards who formed into 7 regiments and 2 death squads with Zhou Wengyong as their commander in chief. The Fourth army teaching corps was reorganized from a KMT political school with Ye Jianying as their leader. In early December, Comintern agent Heinz Neumann arrived in Guangdong, to add the uprising. Its said he had a large influence on the committee and took a leading role in what happened. Ye Jianying formed a communist infiltrated cadet regiment roughly 1200 men strong, that would form the core of their army. Added to this was an ad-hoc Red Guard of about 2000 armed workers. On December 6th the Guangdong Provincial Committee chaired by Zhang Tailei approved a declaration and letter to the people as well as made arrangements for the establishment of a Soviet government in Guangzhou. They had decided to enact the uprising on December 12th. In the meantime the headquarters and staff for the uprising were established, Ye Ting would be commander in chief and Ye Jianying would be his deputy. On the eve of the uprising, Wang Jingwei and Zhang Fakui both became aware of the impending uprising so they immediately began disbanding the teaching units, imposed martial law in Guangzhou and transferred their main forces back to Guangzhou. The CCP found out the jig was up so they unleashed the uprising ahead of schedule on the morning of the 11th.  At 3:30am under the leadership of Zhang Tailei, Ye Ting, Huang Ping, Zhou Wenyong, Ye Jianying and Yang Yin, the entire teaching regiment, part of the guard regiment and the armed worker Red Guards totaling about 5000 people, 2000 of which were the Red Guards, launched a surprise attack upon key points in Guangzhou from several directions. Some Soviets, Koreans and Vietnamese in Guangzhou also were said to participate in the uprising. I read that last one from a single source and I kinda doubt it. In fact evidence suggests the CCP leadership was extremely mixed on this uprising. Commanders Ye Ting, Ye Jiangying and Xu Xiangqian strongly suggested against going through with it, arguing they were too badly armed to have any success, only 2000 of them even had rifles. The CCP began by first seducing troops of Zhang Fakui. The first units to enter the city were the infamous dare-to-die units. As the name suggests, these men were like a suicidal vanguard stormed police stations, seizing their weapons and cars. They also took control over city buses and trucks to spread the incoming Red army units throughout the city as fast as possible. Along the eastern route, under the direct command of Ye Ting the main force quickly defeated an infantry regiment stationed in Shahe, capturing 600 prisoners, numerous small firearms and eliminated an artillery regiment stationed at Yantang. On the middle route, part of the teaching regiment and Red Guards captured the KMT Guangdong Provincial government building sitting on the commanding heights of Guangyin Mountain, known today as Yuexiu Mountain. On the southern route, the 3rd battalion of the Guards regiment and Red Guards attacked the headquarters of the 4th army and their arsenal, but encountered stiff resistance and were unable to capture them. Meanwhile peasants in Fangcun, Xicun and suburbs of Guangzhou launched uprisings with some gaining urban worker cooperation. Within 4 hours of battle the uprising was providing results, excluding the headquarters of the 4th army. The armory, rear office of the 12th division of the 4th army, the police forces and urban area north of the Pearl River was secured. They took control over government buildings, the central bank which at that time had a very large silver reserve and numerous barracks. To suppress any resistance they began grabbing KMT troops who refused to comply and executed them in the streets. They also marked and burnt down the residences of KMT officials. They had eliminated numerous enemies and captured 20 artillery pieces and 1000 small arms. That same day members the new Soviet government of Guangzhou was formed with Su Zhaozheng becoming its chairman. Upon its establishment the Guangzhou Soviet declared a “letter to the people” with decrees.  Meanwhile during the outbreak of hostilities, Chen Gongbo, the chairman of the KMT Guangdong provincial government, Zhang Fakui, Huang Qixiang the commander of the 4th Army and other KMT officials hastily fled to the headquarters of Li Fulin's 5th army stationed over at the Haizhong temple on the south bank of the pearl river. There they ordered the 12th division, the 78th rgiment of the 26th division, the 25th division in Dongjiang and the 1st and 2nd regiment of the 1st training division in Shunde to march upon Gaungzhou. This saw roughly 15,000 NRA troops converging upon the city. On the 12th more than 3 of Zhang Fakui's divisions and part of Li Fulin's 5th army assembled along the south bank of the pearl river with the support of British, American, French and Japanese warships and marines. They prepared a counterattack from the east, west and south. The communists fought desperately against much superior forces in terms of numbers, training and equipment. They suffered heavy losses, including the death of Zhang Tailei. Zhang Fakui's troops arrived one after another gradually surrounding the city. At a critical moment the CCP leadership called for a retreat from the city to preserve the forces they had left. The surviving 1000 Reds fled Guangzhou in the early hours of the 13th whereupon they were reorganized into the 4th Red division. They fled to Huaxian, then Haifeng and Lufegen counties where they joined others performing uprisings in the Dongjiang and Youjiang areas. A few survivors went to Shaoguan, joining survivors of the Nanchang uprising led by Zhu De and Chen Yi. After the KMT secured Guangzhou they carried out a bloody suppression of anyone suspecting of being a communist or sympathetic to the cause. The CCP estimated that perhaps more than 5700 people were killed. The Soviet consulate in Guangzhou was also attacked around 8pm on the 13th. All of its personnel were arrested and according to the testimony of Soviet Consul Pokhvalinsky, diplomats Ukolov and Ivanov “Each of them had a sign tied to their body that read: ‘Russian Communist, anyone can punish him at will.' … Along the way, people threw things at them, hit them, stabbed them with knives, and spit on them.” They both would later be shot, alongside the deputy consul named Hasis. Ye Ting, was scapegoated, purged and blamed for the failure of the Guangzhou uprising, despite the fact he was one of the commanders arguing it should have been called off in the first place. Enraged by how he was treated, Ye Ting fled China and went into exile in Europe. Although the Nanchang, Autumn Harvest and Guangzhou uprisings had all failed to achieve their primary objectives, they did kindle a fire within China. Rather then become demoralized and whither away, the communists pushed even more uprisings and would grow each year. This began what the CCP refers to as the “ten year civil war”, a period that will end in 1936. Now we are going to take a little break from the Chinese Civil War until we hit the early 1930's, but there have been quite a lot of events overshadowed by the Northern Expedition. I of course can't get into everything that was going on in China during the late 1920's, but I thought it be a good idea to at least tackle some of the big ones. If you remember all the way back when I was listing the different warlord cliques, one of them was the Ma clique. Feng Yuxiang's Guominjun had been shoved into the northwest after the Anti-Fengtian war and one province his men began to oversee was Gansu. At the time famine, natural disasters and the forced seizure of farming land for opium cultivation drove the people of Gansu to rebellion. Two Hui Muslim Generals, Ma Zhongying and Ma Tingxiang exploited the situation to perform a revolt against the Guominjun in 1928.  Prior to this, there had been a lot of ethnic/religious fighting within the province of Gansu. An American botanist named James Rock wrote accounts of how he saw fighting between the Hui Muslims ld by the warlord Ma Qi and Tibetan Buddhists at the Labrang Monastery. Back in 1917, Tibetans in Xunhua had rebelled against Ma Anliang because of over taxation. Ma Anliang did not report this to the Beiyang government and was reprimanded for it, seeing Ma Qi sent by the Beiyang government to investigate and suppress the rebellion. Ma Qi commanded the Ninghai Army in Qinghai and used his forces to seize the Labrang Monastery in 1917. This was the first time non-Tibetans had taken the monastery. Because of this ethnic/religious riots broke out between Muslims and Tibetans seeing Ma Qi defeat the Tibetans. Afterwards he heavily taxed the town of Labrang for over 8 years and repeatedly quelled uprisings. In 1921 he crushed Tibetan Monks trying to retake the monastery. In 1925 a full blown Tibetan rebellion broke out, seeing thousands attacking Hui Muslims. Ma Qi responded by deploying 3000 troops who quickly retook Labrang and machine gunned thousands of Tibetans trying to flee. Ma Qi would besiege Labrang numerous times seeing Hui Muslims, Mongols and Tibetans all fighting for control over Labrang, but by 1927 Ma Qi gave it all up. Ma Qi became the governor of Qinghai and moved on. However, that was not the last Labrang would see of General Ma Qi. The Hui forces looted and ravaged the monastery again and in revenge Tibetans skinned alive many Hui soldiers. One of the most common practices was to slice open the stomach of a living soldier and then put hot rocks inside the stomach. Many Hui women were sold to the ethnic Han and Kazakhs. Children were adopted by the Tibetans. Now come 1927, Feng Yuxiang became the governor of Gansu. To control the region, Feng Yuxiang incorporated and promoted Hui Muslim Generals within his Guominjun. Feng Yuxiang placed Liu Yufen with 15,000 troops to act as governor while he jumped into the northern expedition. There was a particularly nasty earthquake that year, followed by drought and famine. Liu Yufen responded to the situation by overtaxing the populace. During the later half of the northern expedition, Zhang Zuolin fomented any rebellious fires he could amongst his enemies and he could see within Gansu there was an opportunity to exploit. He began sending shipments of weapons to the son of Ma Anliang, Ma Tingxiang who unleashed a revolt against Liu Yufen in Liangzhou. The revolt soon spread and this saw Ma Tingxiang unleash a siege against Hezhou in the spring of 1928. To support the siege, Ma Zhongying recruited Hui, Dongxiang and Salar Muslims, forming an army nearly 10,000 strong. By November, the Hezhou besiegers numbered 25,000 and were beginning to starve. So the men were directed towards the Tao River Valley in the south where they began slaughtering Tibetan monks. They burned the place of the Tibetan Tusi Chief King Yang Jiqing after defeating his 3000 man strong army and sacked the Tibetan city of Chone. The Tibetan areas south of Gansu were laid to waste. At Taozhou Tibetan militias tried to fight off the force of Ma Tingxiang but were defeated. However they did inflict severe casualties upon Ma Tingxiang's forces. This only emboldened more atrocities, seeing muslim forces burn printing presses and temples of the Tibetan Buddhists in Chone. The muslims then looted the Gompa (for those who don't know a Gompa is a sacred Buddhist spiritual compound, sort of like a buddhist university) and massacred the Tibetan Buddhist monks of the Labrang monastery.  The Austrian-American botanist Joseph Rock witnessed much of the carnage and even found himself stuck in a battle in 1929. He described seeing Muslim armies leaving behind Tibetan skeletons over wide areas and decorated the Labrang Monastery with severed Tibetan heads. During the 1929 battle of Xiahe near Labrang, severed Tibetan heads were apparently used as ornaments by Hui Muslim troops within their camps. Rock stated “how the heads of young girls and children were staked around the encampment. Ten to fifteen heads were fastened to the saddle of every Muslim cavalryman. The heads were "strung about the walls of the Moslem garrison like a garland of flowers" The blood flowed until 1929 whence Liu Yufen with support of Feng Yuxiang finally drove off their forces. Its estimated up to 2 million died in the war across Gansu. Ma Tingxiang tried to defect to Chiang Kai-Shek, but would find himself captured later by Feng Yuxiang who executed him. Another notable rebellion occurred in the good old province of Shandong, because where else right?  You may remember me talking about a small group known as the Red Spear Society. They were a movement made up of peasants, who formed self-defense militias during China's Warlord Era. There were numerous branches, but the largest one was in Shandong, particularly within Laiyang county. They of course were so numerous in Shandong because of our old friend the Dogmeat General Zhang Zongchang. Zhang Zongchang notoriously abused the populace of Shandong with gross mismanagement, over taxation and pure brutality. Lets also be honest, Shandong just keeps rearing its head through this podcast series, its basically the melting pot for uprisings. In the fall of 1928, banditry rose exponentially across the Shandong Peninsula, leading more and more villages to join the Red Spear Society trying to defend themselves. Meanwhile with Zhang Zongchang defeated and tossed into exile in Dalian, his subordinate, Liu Zhennian became the new ruler of the province. Liu Zhennian had defected to the KMT at the very last moment, betraying his master so he could steal his fiefdom. Liu Zhennians rule was just as bad if not worse than the Dogmeat General. He overtaxed the population, though a little less than Zhang Zongchang mind you. He used his personal army to brutalize the population, many of his troops simply became bandits looting and pillaging the countryside. All of this further antagonized the Red Spear Society.  In 1928 the Red Spear Society organized a militant tax resistance, causing Liu Zhennians officials to fear even going near a village, particularly at Laiyang and Zhaoyuan where large concentrations of Red Spears were. Now the Red Spears were not the only problem that would hit Shandong in the late 1920's. Our good friend, Zhang Zongchang, exiled in Dalian could not take it anymore and wanted to seize back his power base from his former subordinate. He formed a plot to perform an uprising in Shandong with the help of Chu Yupu and Huang Fengqi. Zhang Zongchang first enlisted the help of one of his former White Russian Commanders, Generals Grigory Semyonov and Konstantin Petrovich Nechaev. Zhang Zongchangs plan to recapture Shandong rested upon the tens of thousands of his former soldiers still within the province. Many of them had not joined the NRA and instead tossed their lot in as bandits. Within quite a precarious economic situation without a real leader, many of them were willing to come back to Zhang Zongchang. These men were certainly not in the best shape. They were demoralized, lacked weapons and training, but they did have one thing going for them. Their war was to be against Liu Zhennians forces and not the crack NRA. Liu Zhennians forces were technically part of the NRA, but in reality they were just a bunch of under trained Fengtian troops who had no real allegiance to the new Nationalist government. They had zero support from the population of Shandong, whom they terrorized. Zhang Zongchang would also have the financial backing of Japan for his little venture.  When Zhang Zongchang came over to Shandong, this caused Liu Zhennians garrison units at Longkou and Huangxian to mutiny in late January of 1929. The local commanders, Liu Kaitai, Xu Tienpin, Li Xutung and Kao Pengqi all began working to overthrow Liu Zhennian. They renounced their allegiance to the KMT and began a revolt. Roughly 3000 men strong consisting of Zhang ZOngchangs former Shandong troops and some Ex-Zhili forces they began to loot and pillage Longkou, Huangxian and Dengzhou. The foreign communities in these parts fled to two Japanese warships at harbor. The Imperial Japanese Navy then sent a squadron to protect their citizens in the area. This was soon followed up by 20,000 troops of Liu Zhennian. However instead of facing Liu Zhennian's men, the mutineers fled into areas defended by the Red Spears. The mutineers and Red Spears formed an alliance, and they prepared an offensive against Longkou. In February the rebels gained the upper hand and pushed Liu Zhennian into the Zhifu area in northeastern Shandong. On February 19th, Zhang Zongchang, Chu Yupu and Huang Fengqi landed at Longkou with a small detachment. The mutineers promptly joined their old master and as he set up a new HQ at Dengzhou. From there they marched upon Zhifu. 15 miles short of Zhifu Zhang Zongchang's now 5000 man strong army ran into Liu Zhennians near Fushan. Zhang Zongchang was hopelessly outnumbered, but luckily Huang Fengqi had spent most of February recruiting their old comrades and managed to assemble 26,000 troops. Meanwhile, Liu Zhennian now had fewer troops than Zhang Zongchang and his KMT backers did not support him very much. What he did receive from the KMT was 200,000 rounds of ammunition, and roughly 50,000 yuan for military funds. Furthermore he was impaired by the presence of the IJN who were secretly supporting Zhang Zongchang by not allowing NRA reinforcements into the area. After a series of skirmishes, Zhang Zongchang arrived at Zhifu with a force nearly 25,000 strong, while Liu Zhennian only had 7000 men left to defend the town. On february 21st the two sides clashed and surprisingly it was Zhang Zongchang who lost. Despite their numbers, they simply were not armed well enough to fight an army who enjoyed fortifications. Another issue they faced was the fact, Zhang Zongchang was not even present during the battle. Zhang Zongchang suffered 500 casualties, roughly 200 deaths and 300 captured, perhaps worse he lost nearly 3000 rifles and 15 machine guns. He pulled back his army to Dengzhou, undaunted by the defeat. Zhang Zongchang's troops then began pillaging the local population. Zhang Zongchang began negotiations with Liu Zhennian trying to convince him to surrender. Certainly Liu Zhennian was not in a good state, by February 25th roughly 15,000 of his troops near the area of Weihaiwei had defected to Zhang Zongchang. By the end of the month Zhang Zongchang effectively controlled eastern Shandong. It was around early March when Zhang Zongchang announced a new warlord coalition, consisting of himself, Chu Yupu, Qi Xieyuan, Wu Peifu, Bai Chongxi, Yan Xishan and countless Fengtian commanders who would soon launch a campaign to defeat the KMT. You are probably thinking to yourself, some of those names don't make any sense, why would they join old Dogmeat? They didn't, he simply made the entire thing up, because he had something cooking in Beijing. Zhang Zongchang sought to foment an anti-KMT movement in north China. On March 2nd, 20 armed men wearing civilian clothing suddenly disarmed the Shanxi Army guards at the Yonghe Temple. These men then fired into the air signaling a regiment loyal to Zhang Zongchang to perform a mutiny. The mutineers quickly manned the temple walls, barricaded themselves in and seized control over nearby fortifications. From their vantage points they began shooting at the local populace causing panic and disorder. Then at lightning speed the KMT forces in Beijing surrounded the Yonghe Temple and forced the mutineers to surrender. Only 2 mutineers were killed, 35 were wounded, but a lot of civilians had been hurt. Despite being a bit comical if you think about it, the Beijing Revolt as it became known received a lot of press. The Nanjing government then took some steps to prevent any more Shandong NRA troops from joining the rebels. Meanwhile back over in eastern Shandong, Zhang Zongchangs troops had literally razed 6 large towns and 50 villages to the ground, apparently in retaliation because someone tried to assassinate Zhang Zongchang. It would not take much for those back under the Dogmeat Generals rule to want to kill him. He was back to his old brutal ways, going even above and beyond. It is said captured women were being sold as slaves at Huangxian for 10-20 mexican dollars. One of Zhang Zongchangs commanders, General Li Xudong had his forces plunder Laizhou before returning to the frontlines around Zhifu. Liu Zhennians forces were likewise looting, albeit on a smaller scale. Liu Zhennian was also ignoring orders from Chiang Kai-Shek to control his men and act in accordance with NRA protocols, IE: no raping, looting and such. The civilian population of Zhifu were so brutalized many simply fled for Dalian. There emerged a growing international concern for the foreign community in eastern Shandong. Several foreign warships began to anchor there. Meanwhile the Red Spear Society was occupying parts of Shandongs hinterland, expanding their influence as countless villages and towns joined them for protection. The Red Spear Society were not the only ones forming localize self defense forces. Being Shandong, the act of doing so had been as ancient as time it self, a lot of irregular armed groups rose up such as the one 2000 man strong army led by Wang Zucheng known as the “southern army” and another force calling themselves the White Spear Society. This group was explicitly raised to defend local villages from Zhang Zongchangs men, but quickly found themselves under attack from local armed groups as well. The White Spears, like the Red Spears, formed a powerbase in Shandongs hinterland.  By early March, Zhang Zongchang and Liu Zhennian agreed to a 5 day ceasefire. Zhang Zongchang followed this up by trying to bribe Liu Zhennian to defect back to him. He offered him 100,000 yuan but in Liu Zhennians words "I thought my loyalty was worth at least 500,000 yuan". Zhang Zongchang was unwilling to pay that much, so Liu Zhennian remained on the side of the KMT. Thus both parties gathered more troops to do battle, once the 5 days were over Zhang Zongchang attacked Zhifu. While under siege, Liu Zhennian received 7000 reinforcements from a local warlord named Sun Dianying. Unfortunately soon after, one of Liu Zhennians regimental commanders, Colonel Liang defected to Zhang Zongchang, opening the gates of the city. Liu Zhennians forces managed to retreat in good order eastwards as Zhang Zongchang began brutalizing the local population. A 6 day long spree of rape, murder and looting devestated Zhifu. By March 28th the Japanese and KMT government signed an agreement resulting in the departure of Japanese forces from Shandong. Meanwhile Liu Zhennian's army had fled to Muping where they found themselves yet again under siege. Liu Zhennian sortied to attack his assailants, inflicting 2000 casualties. As the siege progressed, Liu Zhennian offered to surrender on April 4th, but Zhang Zongchang refused, thinking he had the win in the bag. Unfortunately for Zhang Zongchang, his men gradually sought to plunder the undefended countryside rather than maintain the siege, greatly reducing his strength. During a final attempt to take Muping on April 22nd, Zhang Zongchang's army was routed. Liu Zhennian launched a counter offensive forcing most of Zhang Zongchangs men into the countryside. Countless simply became bandits again, Zhang Zongchangs big attempt to retake the province had crumbled.  Zhang Zongchang yet again fled to Dalian, leaving Chu Yupu with just under 5000 men. Chu Yupu fled to Fushan where he took its 20,000 inhabitants hostage. For 13 days Chu Yupu was besieged by NRA forces. During those 13 days, Chu Yupu's men raped, murdered and looted. Apparently they tied up over 400 women and children to be used as human shields during the siege as well. Chu Yufu eventually surrendered, whereupon numerous women and girls committed suicide having become raped and pregnant. Over 1500 NRA and 2000 rebels were reportedly killed during the siege of Fushan. The city that had been plundered heavily for 13 days, was then plundered by the besiegers. Chu Yupu had secured a deal with the KMT to be allowed to go into exile in Korea with 400,000$ worth of silver. Now again back to those Red Spears. By the summer of 1929 they had ballooned into what was effectively a proto-state around Dengzhou. They had established a magistrate, taken over all the local administration and introduced land and head taxes to fund themselves…which is ironic. Within their territory they refused to pay governmental taxes. They introduced a forced conscription of at least one member of each family. The taxes collected funded buying arms and ammunition and any NRA or KMT officials who came near were shot on sight. It got to the point if anyone was caught speaking without the local dialect they were turned away. By august they were roughly 60,000 strong and were too large for Liu Zhennian not to deal with any longer. On September 23rd Liu Zhennien unleashed an encirclement campaign between Dengzhou and Huangxian, performing a scorched earth policy. His troops destroyed 18 villages and largely burned down another 60 killing everyone they encountered, whether man, woman or child. By November the Red Spears in the area ceased to exist. It was just another sunny day in Shandong province.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Guangzhou uprisings was another testament to the lengths the CCP would go to try and carve out a new communist China. The Gansu and Red Spear uprisings were just a few amongst countless tales of the absolute mayhem and chaos that was China's warlord era, when the real victims were always the same, the common people of China.  

Kazakhs will vote on October 6 in a national referendum to authorize construction of a nuclear power plant. In recent winters, Kazakhstan has experienced severe power shortages, and Kazakh officials assert that nuclear power could help fill the gap. People remember, however, that 456 nuclear weapons were detonated in northeastern Kazakhstan between 1949 and 1989 as part of the Soviet Union's testing program. The byproducts of these tests continue to affect public health in the region, and many people in Kazakhstan are not pleased with the prospect of nuclear power. Joining host Bruce Pannier to discuss the pros, cons, and controversy of Kazakhstan's proposed nuclear power plant are guests Togzhan Kassenova, author of the widely acclaimed book Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up The Bomb; Aya Renaud, an editor at RFE/RL's Kazakh Service, known locally as Azattyq; and Darkhan Umirbekov, digital editor at Azattyq, who is based in Astana.

Conversation with Yerdaulet Rakhmatulla (right) about young Qazaqs' (Kazakhs') fight to preserve and expand the knowledge of nuclear testing consequences and the hope of a world free of nuclear weapons to a new generation in Qazaqstan (Kazakhstan). Recorded April, 2024. Steppe Organization for Peace (STOP): Qazaq Youth Initiative for Nuclear Justice Samtal med Yerdaulet Rakhmatulla (till höger) om unga Kazakers kamp för att föra vidare kunskapen om kärnvapenprovens effekter och hoppet om en kärnvapenfri värld till en ny generation. Inspelat april 2024. För ytterligare bakgrund så handlar de första 11 minuterna av avsnitt 11 om Kazakstans tidigare kärnvapen. Även 13:45 i avsnitt 13 nämns kort att nomadbefolkningar i Kazakstan drabbades. Skicka gärna feedback, kommentarer, ris och ros till podd@slmk.org Understimulerad? Testa att lyssna på 1,25x hastigheten! Cover art: Yerdaulet Rakhmatulla and nuclear testing survivor Dmitriy Vesselov at the Stronger than Death monument in Semipalatinsk, photo by Bennet Rietdorf

Cette semaine dans ABDR, débrief d'une bonne carte du Glory avec une très belle perf de Petchpanomrung contre Haraguchi, une petite preview des forces en présence aux JO en boxe (des Kazakhs et des Uzbeks principalement) et de la défense de titre d'Edwards contre Muhammad à l'UFC 304.

In Altay, Xinjiang, China, Kazakhs have lived here for hundreds of years and still maintain a nomadic lifestyle that follows the seasons. However, the process of modernization and development is changing their traditions, customs and even language.  The younger generation is unwilling to continue the hard nomadic life, and the older generation who are gradually aging may be the last generation of nomadic Kazakhs. From now on, we will probably only be able to see the nomadic transition performances at the visitor centre.  That's what I'm trying to keep - those sounds for the next generations. This is the second time I've spent days living with the herders in the deep mountain of Altay. In this track, we can hear the herders talking and busy footsteps of the sheep on a rock and soil pass.   Recorded by Yang Jie. Part of the Migration Sounds project, the world's first collection of the sounds of human migration.  For more information and to explore the project, see https://www.citiesandmemory.com/migration

“We used to drive Mercedes or BMW, but now we prefer Li Auto and BYD,” a local Kazakh told China Daily reporter Peng Yixuan. With more Chinese car companies investing in Kazakhstan, locals favor Chinese new-energy cars for their attractive price and design.

PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETYHow do you foster more connection and psychological safety in the workplace?Sounds like a “nice to have,” not a “got to have” thing, but today's guest, Mike Brcic says it actually plays a huge role in business success. And in today's episode he explains how to do it.What You'll Discover About Psychological Safety:* The most common misunderstanding about psychological safety* The foundation and precursor to psychological safety is* The 4-part framework for establishing more psychological safety* The power of repetition in protecting psychological safety*And much moreGuest: Mike Brcic Community-builder and serial entrepreneur by nature, Mike Brcic is passionate about helping entrepreneurs live inspired, more connected lives. Via his events and adventure retreats around the world with Wayfinders, Mike helps entrepreneurs find the tribe and the support they need to achieve great things and personal fulfilment. He's travelled to and spent time with locals in some of the remotest places on Earth, from the Kazakhs of far western Mongolia to the hunters of Greenland, to the Batwa forest people of the Bwindi Impenetrable Forest of Uganda. In the process, he's learned a thing or two about living a meaningful life.He is a passionate speaker on many topics related to entrepreneurship, community building, and mental health. Via his Substack channel he shares tips and resources about human connection and how to live a more deeply connected life.Related Resources:If you liked this interview, you might also enjoy our other Leadership and Management episodes.Contact Mike and connect with him on LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.Also get more people management tips on Mike's Substack channelJoin, Rate and Review:Rating and reviewing the show helps us grow our audience and allows us to bring you more of the rich information you need to succeed from our high powered guests. Leave a review at Lovethepodcast.com/BusinessConfidential.Joining the Business Confidential Now family is easy and lets you have instant access to the latest tactics, strategies and tips to make your business more successful.Follow on your favorite podcast app here as well as on Facebook, YouTube, and LinkedIn.Download ♥ Follow ♥ Listen ♥ Learn ♥ Share ♥ Review ♥ Comment ♥ Enjoy

Content warning for discussion of genocide, torture, mutilation, rape, and slavery Hey, Hi, Hello, this is the History Wizard and welcome back for Day 13 of Have a Day w/ The History Wizard. Thank you to everyone who tuned in for Day 12 last week, and especially thank you to everyone who rated and/or reviewed the podcast. I hope you all learned something last week and I hope the same for this week. This week marks the 4th part of our mini series of currently ongoing genocides and humanitarian crises. Episode 2 was on Palestine, Episode 11 was on Congo, episode 12 was on Sudan and today's will be on a very widely denied genocide, especially in left wing political circles. The Uyghur Genocide. But first, let's fortify ourselves with the waters of life and remember that part of our activism needs to always be finding joy in life and getting ourselves a little treat. It's time for the Alchemist's Table. Today's libation is called a Rumsberry Breeze. In your shaker muddle some raspberries with half an ounce of simple syrup. Add two ounces of dark rum. Shake well and double strain over ice. Top with ginger beer and enjoy. The genocide of the Uyghur people and the longer history of ethnic tensions between Han Chinese and the Uyghur peoples has centered around Xinjiang for as long as it's been around. First thing's first. Let's dive a bit into the history of the Uyghur people. The Uyghur are an ethnically Turkic people living, mostly in the Tarim and Dzungarian Basins in East Turkestan (what is sometimes called Uyghurstan) today. Xinjiang, sometimes also called the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, has been under Chinese control since it was conquered from the Dzungar Khanate in around 1759. Now, how long have the Uyghur people been living in the area? Well, that's a matter of some contention and the answer you get will depend on what sources you go with. The history of the Uyghur people, including their ethnic origin, is an issue of contention between Uyghur nationalists and Chinese authorities. Uyghur historians view Uyghurs as the original inhabitants of Xinjiang, with a long history. Uyghur politician and historian Muhammad Amin Bughra wrote in his book A history of East Turkestan, stressing the Turkic aspects of his people, that the Turks have a 9,000-year history, while historian Turgun Almas incorporated discoveries of Tarim mummies to conclude that Uyghurs have over 6,400 years of history. The World Uyghur Congress has claimed a 4,000-year history. However, the official Chinese view, as documented in the white paper History and Development of Xinjiang, asserts that the Uyghurs in Xinjiang formed after the collapse of the Uyghur Khaganate in ninth-century CE Mongolia, from the fusion of many different indigenous peoples of the Tarim Basin and the westward-migrating Old Uyghurs. Regardless of which timeline we go with, the Uyghur people have certainly been living in the region for far longer than the Chinese Empires that have been dominating them for hundreds of years. And, make no mistake, modern day China is still very much imperial. Something that we'll cover in more detail later, as it is very relevant to the current genocide, is that the Uyghur people are, as a general rule, Muslim. The earliest records we have indicate that before this conversion to Islam around the 10th century CE the Old Uyghur people (Old Uyghur is meant to differentiate the Pre-Chinese Uyghur population from the modern one) followed the Tocharian religion. We don't really have any details about what, exactly, that religion entailed, but today most of the Tocharian inscriptions are based on Buddhist monastic texts, which suggests that the Tocharians largely embraced Buddhism. The pre-Buddhist beliefs of the Tocharians are largely unknown, but several Chinese goddesses are similar to the reconstructed Proto-Indo-European sun goddess and the dawn goddess, which implies that the Chinese were influenced by the pre-Buddhist beliefs of the Tocharians when they traveled on trade routes which were located in Tocharian territories.  The history of China's abuses over the peoples they conquered is a long one, but details on the exact situation of the Uyghur people are somewhat few and far between. However two of the most important parts of Uyghur-Chinese history in the region come from the 19th century CE with the Dungan Revolt and the Dzungar genocide. Something we need to note right now is that the modern Uyghur Ethnic group wasn't called the Uyghur before the Soviet Union gave them that name in 1921, although the modern Ughurs are descended from the Old Uyghurs, at the time of the Dungan Revolt and the Dzungar Genocide they were known by the Chinese as Turki or Taranchi. So if you're ever reading sources about these two events, you might not ever see the word Uyghur, despite them being involved in both events. The Dungan Revolt lasted from 1862 until 1877 and saw a roughly 21 million people killed. According to research by modern historians, at least 4 million Hui were in Shaanxi before the revolt, but only 20,000 remained in the province afterwards, with most of the Hui either killed in massacres and reprisals by government and militia forces, or deported out of the province. It has its roots in the ongoing ethnic tensions between the Hui (Muslim) minorities of China and the ethnic Han peoples. It also stemmed from economic conflicts as Han merchants were known to greatly overcharge Hui peoples and there was massive corruption and fiscal instability resulting from the Taiping Rebellion that led to the peoples of Xinjiang being heavily burdened by unfair taxes.  All of these tensions would explode into a riot in 1862 (some sources say over inflated pricing on bamboo stalks). As a result of this there was a massacre of Han people's by the Hui and everything snowballed from there. With the start of the revolt in Gansu and Shaanxi in 1862, rumors spread among the Hui (Dungans) of Xinjiang that the Qing authorities were preparing a wholesale preemptive slaughter of the Hui people in Xinjiang, or in a particular community. Opinions as to the veracity of these rumors vary: while the Tongzhi Emperor described them as "absurd" in his edict of September 25, 1864, Muslim historians generally believe that massacres were indeed planned, if not by the imperial government then by various local authorities. Thus it was the Dungans who usually revolted in most Xinjiang towns, although the local Turkic people—Taranchis, Kyrgyzs, and Kazakhs—would usually quickly join the fray. The revolt would rage for 15 years, with many Muslim people of Xinjiang and China been slaughtered or forced to convert away from Islam. Though these reprisal killings and forced conversions really only took place in areas that were in active revolt. There were many Chinese Muslims in the Qing armies during the pacification of the Revolt and many also received great acclaim and promotions once the war was over.  Although, it needs to be stated that there were some cities that were actively committing genocide, such as the city of Kashgar which carried out a preemptive slaughter of their Hui population in 1864. So, there was a genocide of the Hui people, as genocide is defined as actions taken with intent to destroy in whole or in part a particular national, racial, ethnic or religious group. Hell, the Taranchi Turkic peoples, our modern Uyghurs, originally aided the Hui, but wound up turning against them to join the Qing armies once they learned that the Hui wanted to put Xinjiang under their specific rule. I technically did these events out of order, but I'm not going to fix that. We've got to dip 100 years into the past to find the Dzungar Genocide. This genocide happened at the end of Mongol Rule in Xinjiang and around the time the Qing initially came in. We're going to talk about this very briefly, as we still have all our modern issues to discuss. The main reason we even need to bring up the Dzungar genocide in a podcast episode on the Uyghur Genocide is that the Uyghurs participated in this genocide on the side of the Qing army as part of an uprising against the Dzungar Khanate. The Dzungar Genocide killed between 70 and 80% of their original population of about 600,000. The Qianlong Emperor had this to say when ordering the extermination of the Dzungari people. "Show no mercy at all to these rebels. Only the old and weak should be saved. Our previous military campaigns were too lenient. If we act as before, our troops will withdraw, and further trouble will occur. If a rebel is captured and his followers wish to surrender, he must personally come to the garrison, prostrate himself before the commander, and request surrender. If he only sends someone to request submission, it is undoubtedly a trick. Tell Tsengünjav to massacre these crafty Zunghars. Do not believe what they say." So, Xinjiang was once again under Qing rule and would remain so until the Wuchang Uprising overthrew the Qing Dynasty and established the Republic of China (not to be confused with the modern day Republic of China, which is actually the nation of Taiwan under Chinese imperialist control.  All of this context is to show that relations between the Chinese government and the various Muslim ethnicities within its borders have always been one of Master and Slave. The Chinese government has always treated non-Han peoples as lesser, and the presence of Muslim Chinese peoples was only tolerated for as long as they worked in lock step with Beijing. Once they didn't, they were prime targets for reprisal massacres and forced conversion. We would see this scenario play out again during the time of the Chinese Republic in 1931 with the Kumul Rebellion.  The Kumul Rebellion began because of the actions of Jin Shuren, the governor of Xinjiang from 1928 until 1933. Jin was notoriously intolerant of Turkic peoples and openly antagonized them. Such acts of discrimination included restrictions on travel, increased taxation, seizure of property without due process and frequent executions for suspected espionage or disloyalty. However, the event that would spark the rebellion would be the annexation of the Kumul Khanate, a semi autonomous region in northern Xinjiang. At the end of the Rebellion Jin was dead and the First East Turkestan Republic was established around the city of Kashgar in the far west of Xinjiang. The First East Turkestan Republic would only last for a year before being conquered by a Chinese warlord named Shen Shicai, who had backing and support from the Soviet Union. In 1937, specifically to coincide with Stalin's own Great Purge, Shicai planned and executed the elimination of "traitors", "pan-Turkists", "enemies of the people", "nationalists" and "imperialist spies". His purges swept the entire Uyghur and Hui political elite. The NKVD provided the support during the purges. In the later stages of the purge, Sheng turned against the "Trotskyites", mostly a group of Han Chinese sent to him by Moscow. It's estimated that he killed between 50 and 100,000 people in these purges. Shicai would eventually betray the Soviets to join with the Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party, which would lead to the Soviets backing the Uyghur people in the Ili Rebellion leading to the creation of the Second East Turkestan Republic, which would eventually get folded into Mao Zedong's People's Republic of China in 1949. From the 1950s to the 1970s China enacted two main policies against the Uyghur people. They instituted mass migrations of Han Chinese people into Xinjiang as well as passing various laws designed to infringe and smother Uyghur ethnic and religious identity. Uyghurs are barred from freely practicing their religion, speaking their language, and expressing other fundamental elements of their identity. Restrictions apply to many aspects of life, including dress, language, diet, and education. The Chinese government closely monitors Uyghur religious institutions. Even ordinary acts such as praying or going to a mosque may be a basis for arrest or detention. While repression of Uyghur cultural beliefs and identity had existed from day 1 on the PRC, it was in 1990 that everything started to go pear shaped. The Barin Uprising took place between the 4th and 10th of April, 1990. Violence began on the evening of 4 April, when a group of 200 to 300 Uyghur men attempted to breach the gates of the local government office in a protest against alleged forced abortions of Uyghur women and Chinese rule in Xinjiang. Following the uprising in an unprecedented move, Chinese authorities arrested 7,900 people, labelled "ethnic splittists" and "counter-revolutionaries", from April to July 1990. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s there were various terrorist attacks committed by Uyghur resistance groups and freedom fighters, leading to further crackdowns and tightening of police control in Xinjiang throughout the years. Until 2001 Beijing spoke about these attacks as isolated incidents and made no broad statements of all Uyghur being terrorists, despite regularly arresting thousands of Uyghur people for no real reason. Many of those arrested Uyghur people wound up in Laogai (reform through labor) camps or in laojiao (re-education through labor) camps scattered throughout China. But, after the 9/11 attacks on the United States the tone shifted and more and more anti-Uyghur rhetoric started to become anti-terrorist rhetoric. This type of shift in language always precedes an uptick in genocidal violence. Now that all Uyghur are being labeled as terrorists, all Uyghur can be arbitrarily arrested and put in camps or even merely killed and no one will really care because it's not ethnic based discrimination. It's an anti terrorism campaign designed to protect the people from violent thugs.  After 2001 Beijing Sided with the U.S. in the new “global war against terrorism,” the Chinese government initiated an active diplomatic and propaganda campaign against “East Turkestan terrorist forces.” This label was henceforth to be applied indiscriminately to any Uighur suspected of separatist activities. There has been no sign of any attempt by the Chinese authorities to distinguish between peaceful political activists, peaceful separatists, and those advocating or using violence. Although, it needs to be said that violence is a perfectly valid political tool when resisting genocide and imperialism. This leads us to China's Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism and the creation of their “vocational education and training centers” (both laogai and laojiao allegedly closing down in around 2013, although satellite evidence says that's bullshit).   In early 2014, Chinese authorities in Xinjiang launched the renewed "strike hard" campaign around New Year. It included measures targeting mobile phones, computers, and religious materials belonging to Uyghurs. The government simultaneously announced a "people's war on terror" and local government introduced new restrictions that included the banning of long beards and the wearing of veils in public places. Over the life of the camps it is estimated, by various sources that between a few hundred thousand and 1.8 million people have been arbitrarily detained in these camps and subjected to forced labor as a method of reformation. This is part of a Chinese government policy called hashar and includes many public works projects in Xinjiang. Beyond the simple fact of these slave labor camps, the state also began imposing harsh penalties for violations of birth limits. It also implemented an aggressive campaign of mass sterilization and intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD) implantation programs. Chinese government officials justify this by equating high birth rates with religious extremism. Chinese academics have argued that ethnic minority population growth threatens social stability and national identity.  Leaked government documents show that violations of birth limits are the most common reason Uyghur women are placed in a detention camp. Women have testified to being sterilized without their consent while in detention. Other women have testified that they were threatened with detention if they refused sterilization or IUD implantation procedures. So, in summation, since the 1950s at least the Chinese government has been engaging in forcible assimilation practices. Something that the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (a legally non binding resolution passed in 2007) says Indigenous people have a right to not be subjected to. As well as forced sterilization and forced abortions for violating China's family planning laws. And arbitrary detention and forced labor on invented charges of religious extremism and separatist activities. And then also having their children taken away from them and placed into something akin to the residential school system of the US, Canada, and Australia where they are forbidden from even speaking the Uyghur language. Under the UN CPPCG China is guilty of genocide in the form of causing severe bodily or mental harm to the group, imposing measures designed to prevent births within the group, and transferring children of the group to another group. The Uyghur Genocide is one of the more difficult ones to talk about online, especially if you frequent leftist political circles and spaces like I do as anything anti-China is seen often seen as Western propaganda and part of Cold War policies of anticommunism, as if China doesn't have roughly 814 billionaires controlling the majority of their means of production. The wealthiest man in China is Zhong Shanshan. He privately owns a bottled water company and is worth over 60 billion dollars. China isn't a communist country, it's not even socialist. It's just fascist and capitalist. But that's a rant for a different day. The Uyghur Genocide is real and verifiable, although it can be difficult to do so as there is a lot of misinformation and propaganda regarding it on both sides of the discussion. None of that changes the fact of the genocide or of the destruction of Uyghur culture in Xinjiang.  That's it for this week folks. No new reviews, so let's get right into the outro. Have a Day! w/ The History Wizard is brought to you by me, The History Wizard. If you want to see/hear more of me you can find me on Tiktok @thehistorywizard or on Instagram @the_history_wizard. Please remember to rate, review, and subscribe to Have a Day! On your pod catcher of choice. The more you do, the more people will be able to listen and learn along with you. Thank you  for sticking around until the end and, as always, Have a Day, and Free Xinjiang.  

INARGUABLE DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE: 1/4: No Escape: The True Story of China's Genocide of the Uyghurs Kindle Edition by  Nury Turkel https://www.amazon.com/No-Escape-Chinas-Genocide-Uyghurs-ebook/dp/B09CMRPZL1/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2HQXI67T1UBCW&keywords=NO+ESCAPE+TURKEL&qid=1669243597&s=books&sprefix=no+escape+turkel%2Cstripbooks%2C73&sr=1-1 In recent years, the People's Republic of China has rounded up as many as three million Uyghurs, placing them in what it calls “reeducation camps,” facilities most of the world identifies as concentration camps. There, the genocide and enslavement of the Uyghur people are ongoing. The tactics employed are reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, but the results are far more insidious because of the technology used, most of it stolen from Silicon Valley. In the words of Turkel, “Communist China has created an open prison-like environment through the most intrusive surveillance state that the world has ever known while committing genocide and enslaving the Uyghurs on the world's watch.” As a human rights attorney and Uyghur activist who now serves on the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, Turkel tells his personal story to help explain the urgency and scope of the Uyghur crisis. Born in 1970 in a reeducation camp, he was lucky enough to survive and eventually make his way to the US, where he became the first Uyghur to receive an American law degree. Since then, he has worked as a prominent lawyer, activist, and spokesperson for his people and advocated strong policy responses from the liberal democracies to address atrocity crimes against his people. The Uyghur crisis is turning into the greatest human rights crisis of the twenty-first century, a systematic cleansing of an entire race of people in the millions. Part Anne Frank and Hannah Arendt, No Escape shares Turkel's personal story while drawing back the curtain on the historically unprecedented and increasing threat from China. 1759 XINJIANG CLAUDE: I believe you might be referring to "Xinjiang," which is an autonomous region located in the northwestern part of China. Here are some key points about Xinjiang: Geography: Xinjiang is the largest Chinese administrative division, covering over 1.6 million square kilometers. It borders several countries, including Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Demographics: Xinjiang is home to various ethnic groups, with the Uyghurs, a predominantly Muslim Turkic ethnic group, making up the majority of the population. Other ethnic groups include Han Chinese, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Mongols. Historical significance: The region has a rich history, serving as a crucial part of the ancient Silk Road trade route connecting China to Central Asia and Europe. Political tensions: In recent years, Xinjiang has been the focus of international attention due to reports of human rights abuses and the Chinese government's treatment of the Uyghur population. There have been allegations of mass surveillance, arbitrary detention, forced labor, and restrictions on religious and cultural practices. Economic development: The Chinese government has invested heavily in Xinjiang's infrastructure and economic development, particularly in the energy, mining, and agricultural sectors. However, critics argue that these investments have disproportionately benefited the Han Chinese population

INARGUABLE DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE: 2/4: No Escape: The True Story of China's Genocide of the Uyghurs Kindle Edition by  Nury Turkel https://www.amazon.com/No-Escape-Chinas-Genocide-Uyghurs-ebook/dp/B09CMRPZL1/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2HQXI67T1UBCW&keywords=NO+ESCAPE+TURKEL&qid=1669243597&s=books&sprefix=no+escape+turkel%2Cstripbooks%2C73&sr=1-1 In recent years, the People's Republic of China has rounded up as many as three million Uyghurs, placing them in what it calls “reeducation camps,” facilities most of the world identifies as concentration camps. There, the genocide and enslavement of the Uyghur people are ongoing. The tactics employed are reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, but the results are far more insidious because of the technology used, most of it stolen from Silicon Valley. In the words of Turkel, “Communist China has created an open prison-like environment through the most intrusive surveillance state that the world has ever known while committing genocide and enslaving the Uyghurs on the world's watch.” As a human rights attorney and Uyghur activist who now serves on the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, Turkel tells his personal story to help explain the urgency and scope of the Uyghur crisis. Born in 1970 in a reeducation camp, he was lucky enough to survive and eventually make his way to the US, where he became the first Uyghur to receive an American law degree. Since then, he has worked as a prominent lawyer, activist, and spokesperson for his people and advocated strong policy responses from the liberal democracies to address atrocity crimes against his people. The Uyghur crisis is turning into the greatest human rights crisis of the twenty-first century, a systematic cleansing of an entire race of people in the millions. Part Anne Frank and Hannah Arendt, No Escape shares Turkel's personal story while drawing back the curtain on the historically unprecedented and increasing threat from China. 1759 XINJIANG CLAUDE: I believe you might be referring to "Xinjiang," which is an autonomous region located in the northwestern part of China. Here are some key points about Xinjiang: Geography: Xinjiang is the largest Chinese administrative division, covering over 1.6 million square kilometers. It borders several countries, including Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Demographics: Xinjiang is home to various ethnic groups, with the Uyghurs, a predominantly Muslim Turkic ethnic group, making up the majority of the population. Other ethnic groups include Han Chinese, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Mongols. Historical significance: The region has a rich history, serving as a crucial part of the ancient Silk Road trade route connecting China to Central Asia and Europe. Political tensions: In recent years, Xinjiang has been the focus of international attention due to reports of human rights abuses and the Chinese government's treatment of the Uyghur population. There have been allegations of mass surveillance, arbitrary detention, forced labor, and restrictions on religious and cultural practices. Economic development: The Chinese government has invested heavily in Xinjiang's infrastructure and economic development, particularly in the energy, mining, and agricultural sectors. However, critics argue that these investments have disproportionately benefited the Han Chinese population

INARGUABLE DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE: 3/4: No Escape: The True Story of China's Genocide of the Uyghurs Kindle Edition by  Nury Turkel https://www.amazon.com/No-Escape-Chinas-Genocide-Uyghurs-ebook/dp/B09CMRPZL1/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2HQXI67T1UBCW&keywords=NO+ESCAPE+TURKEL&qid=1669243597&s=books&sprefix=no+escape+turkel%2Cstripbooks%2C73&sr=1-1 In recent years, the People's Republic of China has rounded up as many as three million Uyghurs, placing them in what it calls “reeducation camps,” facilities most of the world identifies as concentration camps. There, the genocide and enslavement of the Uyghur people are ongoing. The tactics employed are reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, but the results are far more insidious because of the technology used, most of it stolen from Silicon Valley. In the words of Turkel, “Communist China has created an open prison-like environment through the most intrusive surveillance state that the world has ever known while committing genocide and enslaving the Uyghurs on the world's watch.” As a human rights attorney and Uyghur activist who now serves on the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, Turkel tells his personal story to help explain the urgency and scope of the Uyghur crisis. Born in 1970 in a reeducation camp, he was lucky enough to survive and eventually make his way to the US, where he became the first Uyghur to receive an American law degree. Since then, he has worked as a prominent lawyer, activist, and spokesperson for his people and advocated strong policy responses from the liberal democracies to address atrocity crimes against his people. The Uyghur crisis is turning into the greatest human rights crisis of the twenty-first century, a systematic cleansing of an entire race of people in the millions. Part Anne Frank and Hannah Arendt, No Escape shares Turkel's personal story while drawing back the curtain on the historically unprecedented and increasing threat from China. 1942 XINJIANG CLAUDE: I believe you might be referring to "Xinjiang," which is an autonomous region located in the northwestern part of China. Here are some key points about Xinjiang: Geography: Xinjiang is the largest Chinese administrative division, covering over 1.6 million square kilometers. It borders several countries, including Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Demographics: Xinjiang is home to various ethnic groups, with the Uyghurs, a predominantly Muslim Turkic ethnic group, making up the majority of the population. Other ethnic groups include Han Chinese, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Mongols. Historical significance: The region has a rich history, serving as a crucial part of the ancient Silk Road trade route connecting China to Central Asia and Europe. Political tensions: In recent years, Xinjiang has been the focus of international attention due to reports of human rights abuses and the Chinese government's treatment of the Uyghur population. There have been allegations of mass surveillance, arbitrary detention, forced labor, and restrictions on religious and cultural practices. Economic development: The Chinese government has invested heavily in Xinjiang's infrastructure and economic development, particularly in the energy, mining, and agricultural sectors. However, critics argue that these investments have disproportionately benefited the Han Chinese population

INARGUABLE DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE: 4/4: No Escape: The True Story of China's Genocide of the Uyghurs Kindle Edition by  Nury Turkel https://www.amazon.com/No-Escape-Chinas-Genocide-Uyghurs-ebook/dp/B09CMRPZL1/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2HQXI67T1UBCW&keywords=NO+ESCAPE+TURKEL&qid=1669243597&s=books&sprefix=no+escape+turkel%2Cstripbooks%2C73&sr=1-1 In recent years, the People's Republic of China has rounded up as many as three million Uyghurs, placing them in what it calls “reeducation camps,” facilities most of the world identifies as concentration camps. There, the genocide and enslavement of the Uyghur people are ongoing. The tactics employed are reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, but the results are far more insidious because of the technology used, most of it stolen from Silicon Valley. In the words of Turkel, “Communist China has created an open prison-like environment through the most intrusive surveillance state that the world has ever known while committing genocide and enslaving the Uyghurs on the world's watch.” As a human rights attorney and Uyghur activist who now serves on the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, Turkel tells his personal story to help explain the urgency and scope of the Uyghur crisis. Born in 1970 in a reeducation camp, he was lucky enough to survive and eventually make his way to the US, where he became the first Uyghur to receive an American law degree. Since then, he has worked as a prominent lawyer, activist, and spokesperson for his people and advocated strong policy responses from the liberal democracies to address atrocity crimes against his people. The Uyghur crisis is turning into the greatest human rights crisis of the twenty-first century, a systematic cleansing of an entire race of people in the millions. Part Anne Frank and Hannah Arendt, No Escape shares Turkel's personal story while drawing back the curtain on the historically unprecedented and increasing threat from China.claude: I believe you might be referring to "Xinjiang," which is an autonomous region located in the northwestern part of China. Here are some key points about Xinjiang: 1940 Boxers Geography: Xinjiang is the largest Chinese administrative division, covering over 1.6 million square kilometers. It borders several countries, including Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Demographics: Xinjiang is home to various ethnic groups, with the Uyghurs, a predominantly Muslim Turkic ethnic group, making up the majority of the population. Other ethnic groups include Han Chinese, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Mongols. Historical significance: The region has a rich history, serving as a crucial part of the ancient Silk Road trade route connecting China to Central Asia and Europe. Political tensions: In recent years, Xinjiang has been the focus of international attention due to reports of human rights abuses and the Chinese government's treatment of the Uyghur population. There have been allegations of mass surveillance, arbitrary detention, forced labor, and restrictions on religious and cultural practices. Economic development: The Chinese government has invested heavily in Xinjiang's infrastructure and economic development, particularly in the energy, mining, and agricultural sectors. However, critics argue that these investments have disproportionately benefited the Han Chinese population

In this episode of Battle Lines, Defence Editor Danielle Sheridan and Telegraph writer Tom Sharpe bring the latest news and analysis from the Red Sea, as Britain and America strike Houthi positions after months of attacks on civilian and military vessels. Then Middle East Correspondent Nataliya Vasilyeva updates us from Israel as the IDF continues to battle Hamas across Gaza, and Senior Foreign Correspondent Sophia Yan describes how the Chinese state forced ethnic Kazakhs to round up Muslim families in Xinjiang who were then never seen again.Finally, journalist and academic Mathew Charles speaks about the internal conflict in Ecuador, where government forces battle drug gangs for control of the country. Contributors:David Knowles (Host). @djknowles22 on X.Danielle Sheridan (Defence Editor). @SheridanDani on X.Tom Sharpe (former Royal Navy officer). @TomSharpe134 on X.Nataliya Vasilyeva (Middle East Correspondent). @Nat_Vasilyeva on X.Sophia Yan (Senior Foreign Correspondent). @sophia_yan on X.Mathew Charles (Foreign Reporter and academic). @mat_charles_ on X.ReadThe Telegraph's Live Blog on the Red SeaWest is united against Houthi threat, says Biden as Britain and US launch air strikes in Yemen, by Danielle Sheridan‘We did it to our own people': How China forced Kazakhs to implement its ethnic crackdown, by Sophia YanHow Ecuador's 36-year-old leather jacket-wearing president took on the drug cartels – and lost, by Mathew CharlesFor 3 months access to The Telegraph for just £1: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/audio |Email: battlelines@telegraph.co.uk | Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Jenny Lee, vice president for Arizona International, dean of international education, and professor of educational policy studies and practice at the University of Arizona, leads the conversation on U.S. international academic collaboration and how U.S.-China tensions are affecting higher education. FASKIANOS: Welcome to CFR's Higher Education Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We're delighted to have Jenny Lee with us to discuss U.S. international academic collaboration. Dr. Lee is vice president for Arizona International, dean of international education, and professor of educational policy studies and practice at the University of Arizona. She is also a fellow of the American Educational Research Association. Dr. Lee formerly served as a senior fellow of NAFSA, the Association of International Educators, as chair for the Council of International Higher Education, and as a board member for the Association for the Study of Higher Education. And she has also served as a U.S. Fulbright scholar to South Africa, as a distinguished global professor at Korea University, and as an international visiting scholar at the City University of London, the University of Pretoria, and the University of Cape Town in South Africa. So, Dr. Lee, thank you very much for being with us for today's topic. I thought you could begin by giving us an overview of current trends in U.S. international academic collaboration, especially looking at what's happening with our relations with China. LEE: Sounds great. Well, thank you for the opportunity, Irina. It's a pleasure to be here and to speak with you and all those listening right now. I'll speak for about ten or so minutes, and then open it up and engage with the audience. Hopefully, you all have some good questions that will come up during my remarks. So, clearly, we're entering a very interesting and somewhat uncertain chapter in how we understand the role of higher education globally. So I will begin with some general observation so all our viewers are on the same page. Now, first and foremost, the U.S. is mostly at the top when it comes to the higher education sector. Most of us already know that the United States houses the most highly ranked institutions. And this allows the country to be the largest host of international students and scholars from around the world. According to the latest IIE Open Doors report published a couple of weeks ago, the U.S. attracted over a million students from all over the world. And we're almost back to pre-pandemic levels. We also host over 90,000 scholars. And the primary purpose for them being here is research, for about two-thirds to 75 percent of them. These international scholars, as well as international graduate students, contribute significantly to the U.S. scientific enterprise. The U.S. is also among the leading countries in scientific output and impact, and the largest international collaborator in the world. In other words, the U.S. is highly sought because of its prestigious institutions, drawing top faculty and students from around the world. And with that comes the ability to generate cutting-edge scientific breakthroughs which further secures the U.S.' global position in academia. At the same time, of course, we've seen China's economy rise significantly as the country surpassed the United States in scientific output, and more recently in impact as measured by publication citations, and is outpacing the U.S. in the extent of R&D investment. Chinese institutions have also made noticeable jumps in various global rankings, which is a pretty big feat considering the fierce competition among the world's top universities. What we're witnessing as well are geopolitical tensions between the two countries that have impacted the higher education sector. While these two countries, the U.S. and China, are the biggest global collaborators—and they collaborate more with each other than any other country—they're also rival superpowers. As global adversaries, what we are witnessing as well is increased security concerns regarding intellectual theft and espionage. I'm going to spend some time summarizing my work for those who are not familiar to provide some further context. I and my colleagues, John Haupt and Xiaojie Li, also at the University of Arizona, have conducted numerous studies about U.S.-China scientific collaboration. And what we're observing across these studies is how the scientific pursuit of knowledge, which is fundamentally borderless, is becoming bordered in the current geopolitical environment. International collaboration, long valued as positive-sum, is being treated as zero-sum. Besides the rise of China and the accompanying political rhetoric that posed China as a so-called threat, tensions also grew among accusations, as you may recall, about the origins of SARS-CoV-2 and a corresponding sharp increase in anti-Asian hate crimes in the United States. Public opinions about China were not favorable, and thus there was not a whole lot of public resistance when the FBI's China Initiative was launched in 2018. This initiative basically signaled that anyone of Chinese descent was a potential enemy of the state, including possible Chinese Communist Party spies in our own universities, even though there was no pervasive empirical or later judicial cases that proved such a damaging assumption. Nevertheless, world-renowned Chinese scientists were falsely accused of academic espionage and their careers and personal finances ruined. In my research that followed with Xiaojie Li, with support from the Committee of 100, we surveyed about 2,000 scientists in the U.S.' top research universities during the China Initiative. And we found that one in two Chinese scientists were afraid that they were being racially profiled by the FBI. We also observed that consequently scientists, especially those with Chinese descent, were less inclined to collaborate with China, less inclined to pursue federal grants, less inclined to even stay in the United States but rather to take their expertise to another country where they felt safer to pursue their research, including in China. In sum, the federal government's attempts to weed out possible Chinese spies was highly criticized as a damaging form of racial profiling affecting even U.S. citizens and, in the end, undermined the U.S.' ability to compete with China. Especially now, as we continue to observe Chinese scientists leaving the U.S. and taking their skills and talents elsewhere. With John Haupt and two academics at Tsinghua University in China, Doctors Wen Wen and Die Hu, we asked about two hundred co-collaborators in China and in the United States how were they able to overcome such geopolitical tensions and the challenges associated with COVID-19 during the pandemic? And we did learn something somewhat unexpected, and I hope valuable. Basically, we found that mutual trust between international collaborators helped overcome such perceived hurdles, including risks of being unfairly targeted. What this tells us is that a chilling effect is certainly real and remains possible, but in the end scientists have tremendous agency on what they study, where they study, and whether or not they seek funds, or where they seek funds. Regardless of the host or home country, international collaboration is important to all countries' scientific enterprise. Coauthors from different countries improve the knowledge being produced, its applicability, enlarges global audiences, and thereby increases the impact of the work. So considering the value, yet risks, where do we begin? Firstly, federal and institutional policies, of course, matter, for better or for worse. But policies do not manufacture trust. The formation of an academic tie does not suddenly occur over a cold call in the middle of a global meltdown, as often portrayed in Hollywood. Rather, this is a gradual process. And the longevity of the relationship helps strengthen that trust over time. According to our research, these collaborative relationships begin as graduate students, postdocs, visiting researchers. They occur at academic conferences and other in-person opportunities. Cutting short-term fellowships, for example, will impact the potential of a future scientific relationship, but its effects may not be felt for years. Same with denied visas and opportunities for travel. Fewer graduate students from particular countries or fields also means a different shape when it comes to global science. U.S. for instance, was not too long ago Russia's biggest foreign scientific collaborator, with the war in Ukraine, those research relationships, as well as much—with much of the Western world, have ceased. All of this, and my related empirical research, was conducted when I was a professor at my home institution. And since July, I've been serving, as Irina mentioned, as the dean and vice president of international affairs at my own institution. And I've been thinking a lot of, what does this mean for institutional practice? For those in university leadership positions, as mine, you know this is a tough challenge. Especially as domestic demand and state funding for higher education is generally declining. And at the same time, internationalization is increasingly central to senior leadership strategies. Universities are continuing vying to attract the world's students, even despite a decline of interest from China. And at the same time, research universities in particular are quite dependent on federal grants. We have our own research security offices that need to ensure our universities have good reputations and relations with our large federal funding agencies and taking every precaution to not be seen as a vulnerable site of intellectual theft. These units tend not to operate within international affairs. And I'm very well aware that in my role of trying to attract as many students from China and develop international partnerships, all of them can be suddenly erased if a Chinese University partner does not pass visual compliance or there is a sudden presidential executive order, as we experienced under the Trump administration. I'm also very well aware that of senior leaders have to choose between my educational offerings and partnerships in China versus risking a major grant from a federal agency, I will lose. We witnessed that with the shutting down of over 100 Confucius Institutes in the U.S., despite a lack of evidence of systematic espionage occurring through these centers. Public perceptions, informed or not, strongly affect the nature of our international work, as in the case of Florida. Such negative perceptions are not one country-sided, of course. A key concern for Chinese and other international students and their parents relate to safety. Gun violence, including on our own college campuses, anti-Asian hate crimes in surrounding neighborhoods, and unfavorable political environment in which studies might be interrupted as in the case of Proclamation 10043, or visa non-renewals are all contributing factors for the decline of interest from China, and uncertain future student exchange as well. In closing, when it comes to China these days no practices are guaranteed. However, I can recommend some while also keeping in mind geopolitical conditions can suddenly change for worse, or perhaps better. I mentioned earlier the value of mutual trust. At my university, we have long-standing relationships with university leaders at Chinese institutions. We've set up dual degree programs in China. Actually, about 40 percent of our international student enrollment are through such partner relationships throughout the world, in which we go to where they are. Hiring staff who speak the language and know the culture are also essential. And, like any relationship, these arrangements have developed over time. They are not built overnight. It takes intention. It takes effort. But in my experience, as trust is established the numbers have grown, and the positive impact is still being felt. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much for that. That was terrific. Let's go now to all of you for your questions, comments. You can use this to share best practices and what you're doing to your universities or institutions. Please click the raise hand icon on your screen to ask a question. On your iPad or tablet, you can click the “more” button to access the raise hand feature. And when you're called upon, please accept the unmute prompts, state your name and affiliation, followed by your question. You can also submit a written question, they've already started coming in, by the Q&A icon. And if you can also include your affiliation there, I would appreciate it, although we will try to make sure we identify you correctly. So let's see. I'm looking for—no raised hands yet, but we do have questions written. So first question from Denis Simon, who's a professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: Many U.S. universities have curtailed their exchanges and cooperation with China. You referenced that. Officials at these universities are worried that if they appear too friendly toward China they will lose all sorts of federal funding. Are these concerns justified? Are there any regulations or legislation that actually says federal funding can be removed assuming these universities are in compliance with the export controls, et cetera? LEE: All right. Well, thanks, Denis, for your question. I know there—when I saw the list of those who signed up, I know there are many here who can speak to this directly. So I encourage those to also raise their hands and provide input in the Q&A, maybe in the form of an A instead of a Q. But in any case, going to that question, you know, it's a tough environment. And so much in my role, but what I even experienced in my research, is about that perception, that overinterpretation. So maybe signaling that we have this exchange program might draw attention in ways that might lead to suspicions that, oh, well is this, you know, somehow creating an opportunity for us to disclose military secrets? I mean, that's where we take it. A friendly exchange or visit is oftentimes now having to be scrutinized and ensuring that there is no remote violation of export controls, even in educational delivery in a non-STEM field. And what we're seeing is that this—we have our highly sensitive fields, but that kind of scrutiny we're also seeing applied to the institution more broadly. So these seemingly benign programs about language or culture, about fields that are enhanced or help promote so-called American values, are also being watched. So I believe as an institutional leader, again, as I mentioned earlier, having to deal with the possibility of unwanted or unwarranted attention versus not having that program, I think some, as Denis has pointed out, are leaning towards being more cautious. Unfortunately, China—any work with China is considered a risk, even if there is no reason for risk, as we've witnessed under—or, observed under the China Initiative. I don't know if I've fully answered that question, but please follow up if I haven't. And I know others can probably say more to that issue. FASKIANOS: Great. I'll take the next question from Peter—I don't know how to pronounce— LEE: Peter Becskehazy. Hi, Peter. (Laughs.) FASKIANOS: There you go. Thank you very much. LEE: I know Peter. FASKIANOS: All right. Good. Well, I'd love if Peter asked his question directly, if he can. Oh, good. From Pima Community College. Go ahead, Peter. Q: Hello, Jenny. Nice to see you. LEE: Hi, Peter. Q: Now my question is, the University of Arizona and other universities have had an inflow of dozens of countries, adding up to the million that you mentioned. Are other countries trying to fill in slots left vacant by Chinese students and scholars? LEE: Yeah. Great question, Peter. And I think you can also share what you've observed at Pima in terms of the patterns you've witnessed. But for us, and as we are seeing nationally, we're seeing India rise. Not at the—not at higher numbers in many institutions, compared to China, but the rate is rising. It's not so simple, though, because we also have relations in India, and trying to set up agreements, and bring students. The competition in India is intense. So even though there's a relatively so-called large market, and the U.S. has been quite successful in attracting Indian students, that is perhaps where the attention is as a more, I would say—I hate to use the word “market,”—but a stable student market. There's a lot more interest in graduate-level education globally, as we've observed. These countries that formerly didn't have capacity now do have capacity. They have online offerings. They have branch campuses, dual degrees, lots of other options. And so the niche for the U.S., whereas before we didn't really have to think about a niche, is really in graduate education. Now, of course, that's not good news for Pima, that's thinking about a community college and other kinds of educational offerings. But for us, we're thinking about India a lot. Southeast Asia, of course, has always been an important partner to us. Africa continues to be a challenge. We know that when we think about population growth, Africa is the future. There's still challenges and trying to identify places where there is capacity. But also the affordability of a U.S. education is a huge challenge. So it's a great question. And, again, I'm curious to know other places in the world people recommend. Of course, Latin America, given our location, is a key strategic partner. But again, affordability becomes an issue. And again, I'm just talking about the traditional international student who would choose to come to Arizona. Not talking about research collaboration, which is less bound by affordability issues. Irina, you're muted. FASKIANOS: How long have I been doing this? OK. (Laughs.) I'm going to take the next written question from Allison Davis-White Eyes, who is vice president for diversity, equity, and inclusion at Fielding Graduate University: We have tried to work on collaborations with European universities and African universities, and met with much difficulty. What trends are you seeing in these regions? And what are emerging global markets beyond China? LEE: Great question, Allison. I mean, if you could leave the question in the future, so because I am visually looking at the question at the same time. FASKIANOS: Oh, great. Sorry. LEE: So, Allison, I'm not sure if you're referring to academic or research. Of course, within Europe, where the government does highly subsidized tuition, it's just becomes financially a bad deal, I suppose—(laughs)—for a student in the world who would normally get a free or highly reduced tuition to pay full price at our institution. So that kind of exchange of partnership, especially when it's about—when it's financially based, becomes almost impossible from my experience. But thinking about research collaboration, it depends on the level. So if it's an institutional agreement, you know, it's—often, these MOUs tend to just be on paper. It takes quite a bit of—it's very ceremonial. You need to get legal involved. It's a whole process to get an MOU. We really don't need these non-binding MOUs for research agreements. Some countries like it, just to display that they have an MOU with a U.S. institution. But essentially, it doesn't stop me as a professor to reach out to another professor at the University of Oslo, and say, hey, let's do a study. Which we actually are doing. So, yeah, feel free to be more specific, or if you want to raise your hand or speak on—and elaborate on that question. So, again, for educational exchange, it is difficult because we are—there's already a process within the EU that makes it very affordable and highly supported within the EU, or if you're part of that bigger program. Africa, again, my challenge from my role as an institutional leader is identifying places where there is already enough mass education up through high school where one would be able to consider, first of all, being admitted to a U.S. institution, but secondly, to be able to pay the cost. FASKIANOS: Allison, do you want to expand a little bit? Q: Oh, sorry. (Laughs.) FASKIANOS: There you go. There you go. Q: Right. Dr. Lee, thank you for your response. I think it was helpful, especially regarding the subsidizing of education in Europe. We've been working on some research partnerships. And we have just—you know, really, it has just been extremely difficult with European universities. And I do think part of it has to do with the way things are subsidized in Europe. I was just wondering if there were new and different ways to do it. I do appreciate your comment about the MOUs being largely ceremonial. I agree. And would like to see something with a little more substance. And that will take some creativity and a lot of partnership and work. As for Africa, we have tried to create partnerships with South Africa. I think there's some potential there. Certainly, some excitement. We've had a few students from Nigeria, extremely bright and motivated. I just would—you know, would like to hear, maybe from some other colleagues as well on the call, if there are creative ways in working with these students as well. So, thank you. LEE: Yeah, no. And just to follow up quickly, and, again, opportunities for others to share, academic collaboration, as I mentioned during my remarks, is largely built upon mutual trust. And not to say it can't happen from top down, but really does—is most successful from bottom up. And I don't mean to refer to professors at the bottom, but meaning those that are actually engaged with that work. And so just some considerations is rather than a top-down initiative or strategy, is to identify those that are visiting scholars, already from that country, have networks within that country. What's interesting, as I learned in my current role, is how little my predecessors worked with professors in these area's studies programs, because they're oftentimes treated as a separate or having different interests in mind when actually there is a lot of overlap to identify those that are actually there. Allison, by the way, I lived in South Africa for eight years. And I know it actually takes a long time. My Fulbright started off as a one year, and I had to extend it because even getting the data while I was on the ground takes time. And I'll be honest, I think part of it was taking some time just to build trust the intentions of my work, what was I going to do with that data, how is that going to be used? Was it actually going to be ways to empower them? You know, for those who study international collaboration, know this north and south divide, and I think there are places in the world that are—maybe have some guardrails up from those—not saying this is what's happening in your institution—but someone that they don't know coming from the Global North to study someone else in the Global South. And so how do we create or initiate a collaboration that is clearly, expressly mutual at the onset? And, again, this is where trust can be operationalized lots of different ways, but that even begins with that initial message. I mean, I remember when I started my work, nobody responded to me. They're like, who are you? And I don't care who you are or what your CV says. And it takes time. You know, building that relationship, and that person introducing me to that other person. Like, you know, this is how scientific networks form. And I think, to some extent, this is also how institutional collaborative relationships also form. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to David Moore, who has a raised hand. Q: OK, thank you. I just got unmuted. FASKIANOS: Great. Q: Lee, I appreciate your comments. And I heard your reference to Florida earlier. I don't know if we have colleagues on this call from Florida, but I think they'll know what I'm about to say. I'm the dean of international education at Broward College in Fort Lauderdale. And as of tomorrow, December 1, Florida has to—all institutions in Florida, public institutions, colleges and universities, must be completely devoid of any partnerships in China. And not just China. There are seven countries of concern. And you probably can cite them, most of you would know the other six. But of the seven countries, Broward had four partnerships in China alone, none in the other countries that were active. And so we are now officially done, have to be. And I've had to notify the partners as well as our accrediting body, because these were international centers of Broward where they literally offer—we offered associate degrees, two-year degrees. And students could then transfer to an institution in the United States. Now, this didn't catch us too much by surprise because two and a half years ago our Florida legislature started in on this, really probably before that, where they isolated universities in Florida and said: You cannot do research—sensitive research, whatever, you know, engineering, computer science, et cetera—any research without notifying the state. And there's an elaborate process that had to be—you know, they had to go through to do this. But now it's not just research institutions. Now it's not just those kinds of collaborations. It is, in fact, all partnerships of any kind. We had to end our agent agreements where we were recruiting students from China that were—where the companies were based in China. And in course our programs were not research. They're just general education, two-year associate's degree, maybe some business. But we've been informed now it's completely done. And so I'm actually looking for institutions outside of Florida who might be willing to take over the role that we've had in transcripting students who later want to come to the United States. At least for the first two years in China, and then transferring to the upper division to the U.S. So I'm not sure. You're probably quite familiar with this. I don't know if you know the details of how it was worked out in practice. We were the only community college in the state that had any partnerships. So we were the ones that had to desist. So I want to—there are probably people on the call that are familiar with this, but there might be many others. And I just wanted to say that I'm looking to, you know, open that door to other institutions outside of Florida that might be willing in, yes, take a risk to go into China, but to—I've always felt that these kinds of programs were very good to build relationships, partnerships, communication. Ambassadors really. Where we feel like we were representing American education, whatever, you know, we call American values, democracy, you know, community. We thought we were doing good. But we found out we were—we were not. We were—we were doing something that went opposed to the prevailing political climate, at least in Florida. So that's my comment. I think people should know about it. And thank you for letting me speak to it a bit. Maybe someone will speak up and say they're interested in they can get in touch with me, David Moore at Broward College, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. LEE: David, thank you for sharing what you did. This is a really important example of where other states could very well head. And what's interesting, as David noted, we're talking about a community college. When we normally think about cutting ties, it's usually around the concerns about national security. Now, how this translates to a two-year degree that is solely educational based is a pretty far stretch, and yet is being impacted quite severely. So I think we should continue to follow this example—unfortunate example. And, David, yeah, your partners have reached out to my office, and I'm sure to others. But thank you for being available. Q: You're welcome. We have partners—we are also working with your Jakarta, Indonesia center there. So we have that connection. Thank you. LEE: Mmm hmm. Thanks. FASKIANOS: And if anybody wants to share contact information in the Q&A box, you can certainly do that. That would be great. There is a written question from Tutaleni Asino at Oklahoma State University: There was an article today in SEMAFOR highlighting that there are currently 350 U.S. students studying in China compared to 11,000 in 2019. Comparatively, there are 300,000 Chinese students in the United States. Is this a one-way problem, where the U.S. is not investing in international engagements as a result of being more inward looking and other countries having more options of who to collaborate with? LEE: Yeah. Tutaleni, that's—I think your question is an answer. And I think it's—I agree with your observation. So we are seeing that as there's state and public disinvestment in higher education, and including scrutiny about international higher education, we're also seeing a decline and cutting of foreign language programs in the United States. So here we are, a monolingual country whose students mostly go to Europe or other English-speaking countries to study abroad. A very limited number of international—U.S. students who pursue undergraduate degrees in a foreign country. And knowing that the future is global and international, at least in my opinion, does not set the U.S. up well to be globally competitive, even though much of its international policy is around this rhetoric of we need to compete with China. And so you raise a good point. How is this possible if U.S. citizens don't speak Chinese, or have no interest in learning about Chinese culture, or there's reduced opportunities even in our own institutions, I think is something to think about and ask more questions about. FASKIANOS: I'm going to take the next question from Zhen Zhu, chair and professor of marketing, director of faculty excellence, and director for international engagement at Suffolk University: How do you see the trend of U.S. students' interest in study abroad to China? LEE: There is actually growing interest. As many of you know, China—offering Chinese language in high schools is not as unusual as it used to be. There is growing interest as students are thinking about employability in global markets in multinational or international organizations or corporations. It would be fundamental, in fact, for someone who has any interest in international work to pick up the language if they can, and at your own institution. FASKIANOS: Great. Let's see. From—I'm going to take the next question from Jeff Riedinger: Is there a role for universities to play in knowledge diplomacy to sustain international relationships and collaborations in addressing global problems such as climate change and pandemics when national governments may be at odds with each other? LEE: Thanks, Jeff. And hi, Jeff. I'm just going to read over that question so I can kind of digest it a bit. Is there a role for institutions to play in knowledge diplomacy, such as climate change, pandemics, when national governments may be at odds with each other? Absolutely, 200 percent. It is occurring—knowledge diplomacy, science diplomacy. That one individual going on a Fulbright or coming to study here for some extended visit, having these collaborations and, ultimately, you know, science—knowledge production—I mean, there's no bounds. And when we think about the kind of research that may not occur because of these national governments are at odds when it comes to addressing climate change or other global issues, you know, the world is paying somewhat of a price when it comes to that in—when there are overarching concerns about national security. So, you know, my issue has always been with policy you overlook nuance, and with sweeping policies that overlook the disciplinary distinctions and contributions, what is lost in the pursuit of trying to stay ahead of another country in fields and areas that really have no economic or military value, right? But yet, have an important cultural value, or maybe will address something bigger, such as COVID-19. So as I mentioned, the work that I referenced earlier about U.S.-Chinese scientists coming together during COVID-19, were actually scientists who studied COVID-19 together. And again, this was not—this was fraught with risks. They were very well aware that there was a lot of scrutiny about any research about COVID-19 coming from China. There was scrutiny about, you know, where the data was held, who was analyzing it, who was funding it. And yet, these scientists took these risks in order to address how does the world deal with the pandemic. And this was based on interviews of those studies that were actually successful and published. This is where that mutual trust, as I've mentioned earlier, is so important. And without that mutual trust, these studies, I'm pretty certain, would never have been published, because it was not an easy path when it comes to that particular geopolitical climate during the pandemic. FASKIANOS: Jenny, I'm just going to ask a question. President Biden and President Xi met during APEC. Did anything come out of that meeting that could affect U.S.-China academic collaboration? LEE: Yeah. You know, this is tough. I mean, how do you analyze political statements? What do they really mean? And what is really going to change? I think what's clear is that there's an acknowledgment that we're interdependent, but we're also adversaries. Almost a love/hate codependent, in a relationship that we can't just easily separate but we do need each other. But the form that it takes, I think there's an understanding it needs to be more specific. And I don't think that has been clarified yet. I realize I missed part of Jeff's question on what can institutions do? That's such a good question. And I got more into the topic than the actual to-do. What can institutions do? Honestly—(laughs)—I'll just speak as a researcher, to back off a bit, right? To let scientists do what they want to do. Yes, we need to follow disclosures. We need to make sure there's no conflicts of interest. We need to follow all of these procedures. But what I also found during the China Initiative, there was also this chilling climate in which there's an overinterpretation that may put institutions at risk. And to my knowledge, institutions were not at risk to the extent to which their scientists, especially those of Chinese descent, felt scrutinized. FASKIANOS: Thank you. We have a raised hand from Dan Whitman. Q: OK, I think I'm unmuted. Thank you, Irina. And thanks, Professor Lee, for mentioning the Great Wall that that prevents us from dealing with even Europeans who have subsidized education or Africans who have no money. And just an anecdote, since you have welcomed anecdotes, I am an adjunct at George Washington University. But totally unrelated to that, just for free and just for fun, pro bono, nobody pays, nobody gets paid. A course that I'm giving by webinar, it's zero cost. The topic is crisis management, but it could be any topic. And in that group, which there are about eighty people who tune in twice a week, fifteen Kenyans, twenty-five Ukrainians, and forty Kazakhs. I mean, I don't know if there's ever been exchange between Kazakhstan and Kenya. Anyway, my point is things can be done. We share it for free. What motivates the students? A certificate. It's so easy to give them a certificate. And in many countries, they very highly value that, even though it's not a—there's no formality, there's no formal academic credit. But the students are very motivated. And possibly, there may be universities in the U.S. that could—that might want to give a professor a small stipendium to do an informal webinar course, which would create connections, which would be zero cost, basically, and would bridge that gap of funding that you've alluded to. Thank you. LEE: Yeah. Dan, thank you for that. And I think this leads to a kind of a spin-off comment about certificates. Absolutely. Micro-credentials or alternative forms of education, where there's maybe not a full-fledged undergraduate degree but some certificate, I think, is important niche, especially for returning adults or communities where they're not able to afford to take time off. So that flexibility, and obviously now with online education, just becomes so much more accessible and very low cost. Something else to keep in mind, though, is that, depending on the institution you're from, that will make a difference in certificates. I mean, an institution like George Washington University offering a certificate may have some symbolic or perceived value that may be higher than an institution that is lower or are not ranked at all. So this is where, unfortunately—I'm a big critic of global rankings. But unfortunately, it does play a role in how that certificate is being perceived and the attractiveness of that certificate. But absolutely, this is definitely a way to open access especially for places in the world that just cannot physically move or have the funds to support their studies. FASKIANOS: Great. There are two comments/questions in the Q&A that I wanted to give you a chance to respond to about Africa, from Tutaleni Asino and Fodei Batty. Dr. Asino talks about English is the language of instruction and governments in Africa where they're funding education to a higher degree, and thinks that there are opportunities there, but it sounds like all fifty-four countries are grouped together. And Dr. Batty talks a little bit about there are a lot of students from African countries pursuing graduate education in the United States. But South Africa is usually an exception to the higher education American norm in Africa. Most South Africans don't like to travel, especially travel to America. I thought maybe you could just clarify some—respond to those comments. LEE: Yeah. Absolutely. Thank you for sharing those comments. There's a book I edited called Intra-Africa Student Mobility. And I agree with the comments. And one of the things I didn't mention that I think is important to help us understand the broader global context is that there's actually considerable international activity within the continent. And there's actually considerable intra-Africa mobility within the continent. South Africa is the most important country player in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is globally ranked—has more globally ranked institutions than any other African country. And so South Africa then becomes an important hub. And, yes, as an English-speaking, among many other languages, country, that does attract African students to go oftentimes for a similar sense of shared culture, despite sometimes different languages and customs and backgrounds. And yet, nevertheless, South Africa is an important player within the continent. Not to say that there is no international mobility occurring, but there is increased capacity within the continent that would allow students and interested students to travel within the continent. Not the same extent, of course, as Europe. But the least we're seeing that rise over time. And so it's called Intra-Africa Student Mobility. Chika Sehoole and I coedited the book. We were able to get about eight African scholars to talk about the various reasons students would choose that particular African country, and what draw them. And what was really interesting about this phenomenon is that it goes against this prevailing notion of Africa's victim of brain drain or all going to the north. That's actually not what is happening. But that there is capacity building within the continent. So in trying to answer a different question, I skirted over a lot of the things I could go further into. But hopefully that book will shed light on what's happening within that continent, at least from the perspective of eight different countries. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Thank you for that. I'm going to go next to Jonathan Scriven at Washington Adventist University in Maryland: What are some of the strategies universities are using to make education more affordable in the United States? If that is a challenge, are schools investing more or less in setting up campuses in foreign countries as a way to reach foreign students? LEE: I'm just going to read over that question. OK, yeah. Great question, Jonathan. So what's happening in my institution and many others is a way to attract students is we're providing considerable aid, merit aid, financial aid, aid even to international students. The majority may not even be paying the full sticker price. Now this, of course, will affect the revenue that would have otherwise been generated, but nevertheless is a way to deal with the fierce competition across U.S. institutions for these top students. So how to make it affordable? There's a lot of aid going around at the undergraduate, not just the graduate, levels. And so what are institutions doing? Well, for example, at the University of Arizona for our dual degrees, it's a fraction of the cost of what it would cost to be a student at our main campus. When you have a combination of hybrid or online delivery with a campus partner maybe providing most of the gen ed's and then we would teach most of the major courses as an example, that does significantly lower the cost where that student will still get a bona fide University of Arizona degree, just like they would at main campus. So these alternative forms of delivery certainly make it more affordable, especially for those that opt to stay in their home country and receive an online education, or a flipped classroom model, or a dual degree. FASKIANOS: Great. Denis Simon, if you can—why don't you ask your question? Q: Here I am. OK. Recently, on a trip to China in September, a number of faculty have told me they're no longer wanting to send their best students abroad. They want to keep them in China. And this is all part of the rise of Chinese universities, et cetera. And so it may not be simply the souring of Sino-U.S. relations that has causal effect here, but simply the fact that China now is becoming a major, you know, educational powerhouse. And that also could change the dynamics. For example, even the BRI countries could start to send their students to China instead of sending them to the United States. Do you see anything evolving like this or—and what might be the outcome? LEE: Yeah. Spot on, David. That halo effect of a U.S. degree is not the same as it was when I was a university student. Chinese students, as well as students in the world, are much more savvy. They have access to information. They have access to rankings. They know all universities are not the same. And they know that they have some institutions that are highly ranked and may offer better quality education than the U.S. So that the image of a U.S. degree, of course, is not as universally perceived as it may have been, I don't know, pre-internet, or without the—all sorts of rankings in which institutions are rated against one another. And absolutely, Chinese institutions are very difficult to get into, fiercely competitive, producing far more scientific output than some of our leading institutions. And there's another factor when it comes to Asian culture just more broadly speaking, is that social network tie. Sociologists refer to it as social capital. When a Chinese student, a Korean student, Japanese student decides to study in the United States, they may lose that social tie that may possibly put them in a disadvantage when they decide to come back and compete for a position when they may just have that U.S. credential, but may have either lessened or no longer have that relationship that may have allowed them to get a position at the university, or in a place where that alumni network would have been especially useful. So again, I don't want to generalize, you know, in any place to the world, but there is that component that I think sometimes is missed in the literature. Maintaining that social network is pretty key, especially as jobs, of course, global, you know, unemployment—places where students are competing for positions need to have every edge possible. So that also can be part of that reason they decide to stay. FASKIANOS: Great. The next question from Michael Kulma, who's at the University of Chicago. He's following on David Moore's comments about Florida: Do you know how many other states in the U.S. are enacting or are considering such policies against partnerships with China? LEE: I do not know the answer. So if anyone wants to raise their hand and share about their own state, or put it on the answer part of the question and answer. There are related concerns about DEI, diversity, equity, and inclusion. Some of that may spill over to China. Hopefully, at some point at the Council of Foreign Relations will have a discussion on Israel and Hamas conflict and how institutions are dealing with that. And so we're seeing a pretty challenging political environment that is clearly spilling over to our classrooms and to our international activities, our domestic recruitment. But I'm not answering your question, Michael. (Laughs.) I'll leave it up to someone else to answer. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. So we don't have very much time left. I thought maybe you could, given your research and expertise, could suggest resources—recommend resources for higher ed leaders and administrators to better understand how to promote collaboration. LEE: Sure. So promoting collaboration, it really—each person at a time. You know, again, MOUs may be signed, and maybe overarching presidents will come together and have an agreement, but there's no guarantee that will ever happen. I'd love to do a study on how many MOUs never actually materialized into real action. So where do we begin? International affairs SIOs out there, identify who are your area studies experts? Who are your visiting postdocs? Who are your Fulbright scholars from other parts of the world? They all represent their own network and are certainly are valuable resources to consider. What I've sometimes have heard even at my own institution is, you know, how do we bring these people to the table? Why are they not at the table to begin with, and then how do we bring them there? And this is a relatively low-cost way to go about this, right? Like, faculty engaged in service. What kind of opportunities can your university provide for faculty service that is aligned with their area of expertise, the areas of the world they represent, the networks they have? And many of—some of you already have experienced this directly. These partnerships often begin with our alumni, international—former international students who decide to go back home. So, again, there's just a lot of exciting opportunity. I love this field because it's never boring. There's always new ways to grow, expand new partners. But it really does begin with that essential element of trust. And that often begins with our own institutions and identifying those who've already started to build that network. FASKIANOS: Wonderful. Thank you very much. Really appreciate your being with us and for sharing your expertise and background, Dr. Lee. It's been fantastic. And to all of you, for your questions and comments, and sharing your experiences as well. You can follow Dr. Lee on X, the app formerly known as Twitter, at @JennyJ_Lee. I will send out a link to this webinar, the transcript, and the video, as well as the link to the book—your book that you mentioned, and any other resources that you want to share with the group. And I encourage you all to follow @CFR_academic on X, visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. We also—just putting in a plug for our other series, Academic Webinar series, which is designed for students. We just sent out the winter/spring lineup and we hope that you will share that with your colleagues and your students. It is a great way for them to have access to practitioner scholars and to talk with students from around the country. So if you haven't received that lineup, you can email cfracademic@CFR.org, and we will share that with you. So, again, thank you, Jenny, for being with us, and to all of you. And wishing you safe and happy holidays. And good luck closing out this semester before we get to the holidays. (Laughs.) So thank you again. (END)

Jenny Lee, vice president for Arizona International, dean of international education, and professor of educational policy studies and practice at the University of Arizona, leads the conversation on U.S. international academic collaboration and how U.S.-China tensions are affecting higher education. FASKIANOS: Welcome to CFR's Higher Education Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We're delighted to have Jenny Lee with us to discuss U.S. international academic collaboration. Dr. Lee is vice president for Arizona International, dean of international education, and professor of educational policy studies and practice at the University of Arizona. She is also a fellow of the American Educational Research Association. Dr. Lee formerly served as a senior fellow of NAFSA, the Association of International Educators, as chair for the Council of International Higher Education, and as a board member for the Association for the Study of Higher Education. And she has also served as a U.S. Fulbright scholar to South Africa, as a distinguished global professor at Korea University, and as an international visiting scholar at the City University of London, the University of Pretoria, and the University of Cape Town in South Africa. So, Dr. Lee, thank you very much for being with us for today's topic. I thought you could begin by giving us an overview of current trends in U.S. international academic collaboration, especially looking at what's happening with our relations with China. LEE: Sounds great. Well, thank you for the opportunity, Irina. It's a pleasure to be here and to speak with you and all those listening right now. I'll speak for about ten or so minutes, and then open it up and engage with the audience. Hopefully, you all have some good questions that will come up during my remarks. So, clearly, we're entering a very interesting and somewhat uncertain chapter in how we understand the role of higher education globally. So I will begin with some general observation so all our viewers are on the same page. Now, first and foremost, the U.S. is mostly at the top when it comes to the higher education sector. Most of us already know that the United States houses the most highly ranked institutions. And this allows the country to be the largest host of international students and scholars from around the world. According to the latest IIE Open Doors report published a couple of weeks ago, the U.S. attracted over a million students from all over the world. And we're almost back to pre-pandemic levels. We also host over 90,000 scholars. And the primary purpose for them being here is research, for about two-thirds to 75 percent of them. These international scholars, as well as international graduate students, contribute significantly to the U.S. scientific enterprise. The U.S. is also among the leading countries in scientific output and impact, and the largest international collaborator in the world. In other words, the U.S. is highly sought because of its prestigious institutions, drawing top faculty and students from around the world. And with that comes the ability to generate cutting-edge scientific breakthroughs which further secures the U.S.' global position in academia. At the same time, of course, we've seen China's economy rise significantly as the country surpassed the United States in scientific output, and more recently in impact as measured by publication citations, and is outpacing the U.S. in the extent of R&D investment. Chinese institutions have also made noticeable jumps in various global rankings, which is a pretty big feat considering the fierce competition among the world's top universities. What we're witnessing as well are geopolitical tensions between the two countries that have impacted the higher education sector. While these two countries, the U.S. and China, are the biggest global collaborators—and they collaborate more with each other than any other country—they're also rival superpowers. As global adversaries, what we are witnessing as well is increased security concerns regarding intellectual theft and espionage. I'm going to spend some time summarizing my work for those who are not familiar to provide some further context. I and my colleagues, John Haupt and Xiaojie Li, also at the University of Arizona, have conducted numerous studies about U.S.-China scientific collaboration. And what we're observing across these studies is how the scientific pursuit of knowledge, which is fundamentally borderless, is becoming bordered in the current geopolitical environment. International collaboration, long valued as positive-sum, is being treated as zero-sum. Besides the rise of China and the accompanying political rhetoric that posed China as a so-called threat, tensions also grew among accusations, as you may recall, about the origins of SARS-CoV-2 and a corresponding sharp increase in anti-Asian hate crimes in the United States. Public opinions about China were not favorable, and thus there was not a whole lot of public resistance when the FBI's China Initiative was launched in 2018. This initiative basically signaled that anyone of Chinese descent was a potential enemy of the state, including possible Chinese Communist Party spies in our own universities, even though there was no pervasive empirical or later judicial cases that proved such a damaging assumption. Nevertheless, world-renowned Chinese scientists were falsely accused of academic espionage and their careers and personal finances ruined. In my research that followed with Xiaojie Li, with support from the Committee of 100, we surveyed about 2,000 scientists in the U.S.' top research universities during the China Initiative. And we found that one in two Chinese scientists were afraid that they were being racially profiled by the FBI. We also observed that consequently scientists, especially those with Chinese descent, were less inclined to collaborate with China, less inclined to pursue federal grants, less inclined to even stay in the United States but rather to take their expertise to another country where they felt safer to pursue their research, including in China. In sum, the federal government's attempts to weed out possible Chinese spies was highly criticized as a damaging form of racial profiling affecting even U.S. citizens and, in the end, undermined the U.S.' ability to compete with China. Especially now, as we continue to observe Chinese scientists leaving the U.S. and taking their skills and talents elsewhere. With John Haupt and two academics at Tsinghua University in China, Doctors Wen Wen and Die Hu, we asked about two hundred co-collaborators in China and in the United States how were they able to overcome such geopolitical tensions and the challenges associated with COVID-19 during the pandemic? And we did learn something somewhat unexpected, and I hope valuable. Basically, we found that mutual trust between international collaborators helped overcome such perceived hurdles, including risks of being unfairly targeted. What this tells us is that a chilling effect is certainly real and remains possible, but in the end scientists have tremendous agency on what they study, where they study, and whether or not they seek funds, or where they seek funds. Regardless of the host or home country, international collaboration is important to all countries' scientific enterprise. Coauthors from different countries improve the knowledge being produced, its applicability, enlarges global audiences, and thereby increases the impact of the work. So considering the value, yet risks, where do we begin? Firstly, federal and institutional policies, of course, matter, for better or for worse. But policies do not manufacture trust. The formation of an academic tie does not suddenly occur over a cold call in the middle of a global meltdown, as often portrayed in Hollywood. Rather, this is a gradual process. And the longevity of the relationship helps strengthen that trust over time. According to our research, these collaborative relationships begin as graduate students, postdocs, visiting researchers. They occur at academic conferences and other in-person opportunities. Cutting short-term fellowships, for example, will impact the potential of a future scientific relationship, but its effects may not be felt for years. Same with denied visas and opportunities for travel. Fewer graduate students from particular countries or fields also means a different shape when it comes to global science. U.S. for instance, was not too long ago Russia's biggest foreign scientific collaborator, with the war in Ukraine, those research relationships, as well as much—with much of the Western world, have ceased. All of this, and my related empirical research, was conducted when I was a professor at my home institution. And since July, I've been serving, as Irina mentioned, as the dean and vice president of international affairs at my own institution. And I've been thinking a lot of, what does this mean for institutional practice? For those in university leadership positions, as mine, you know this is a tough challenge. Especially as domestic demand and state funding for higher education is generally declining. And at the same time, internationalization is increasingly central to senior leadership strategies. Universities are continuing vying to attract the world's students, even despite a decline of interest from China. And at the same time, research universities in particular are quite dependent on federal grants. We have our own research security offices that need to ensure our universities have good reputations and relations with our large federal funding agencies and taking every precaution to not be seen as a vulnerable site of intellectual theft. These units tend not to operate within international affairs. And I'm very well aware that in my role of trying to attract as many students from China and develop international partnerships, all of them can be suddenly erased if a Chinese University partner does not pass visual compliance or there is a sudden presidential executive order, as we experienced under the Trump administration. I'm also very well aware that of senior leaders have to choose between my educational offerings and partnerships in China versus risking a major grant from a federal agency, I will lose. We witnessed that with the shutting down of over 100 Confucius Institutes in the U.S., despite a lack of evidence of systematic espionage occurring through these centers. Public perceptions, informed or not, strongly affect the nature of our international work, as in the case of Florida. Such negative perceptions are not one country-sided, of course. A key concern for Chinese and other international students and their parents relate to safety. Gun violence, including on our own college campuses, anti-Asian hate crimes in surrounding neighborhoods, and unfavorable political environment in which studies might be interrupted as in the case of Proclamation 10043, or visa non-renewals are all contributing factors for the decline of interest from China, and uncertain future student exchange as well. In closing, when it comes to China these days no practices are guaranteed. However, I can recommend some while also keeping in mind geopolitical conditions can suddenly change for worse, or perhaps better. I mentioned earlier the value of mutual trust. At my university, we have long-standing relationships with university leaders at Chinese institutions. We've set up dual degree programs in China. Actually, about 40 percent of our international student enrollment are through such partner relationships throughout the world, in which we go to where they are. Hiring staff who speak the language and know the culture are also essential. And, like any relationship, these arrangements have developed over time. They are not built overnight. It takes intention. It takes effort. But in my experience, as trust is established the numbers have grown, and the positive impact is still being felt. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much for that. That was terrific. Let's go now to all of you for your questions, comments. You can use this to share best practices and what you're doing to your universities or institutions. Please click the raise hand icon on your screen to ask a question. On your iPad or tablet, you can click the “more” button to access the raise hand feature. And when you're called upon, please accept the unmute prompts, state your name and affiliation, followed by your question. You can also submit a written question, they've already started coming in, by the Q&A icon. And if you can also include your affiliation there, I would appreciate it, although we will try to make sure we identify you correctly. So let's see. I'm looking for—no raised hands yet, but we do have questions written. So first question from Denis Simon, who's a professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: Many U.S. universities have curtailed their exchanges and cooperation with China. You referenced that. Officials at these universities are worried that if they appear too friendly toward China they will lose all sorts of federal funding. Are these concerns justified? Are there any regulations or legislation that actually says federal funding can be removed assuming these universities are in compliance with the export controls, et cetera? LEE: All right. Well, thanks, Denis, for your question. I know there—when I saw the list of those who signed up, I know there are many here who can speak to this directly. So I encourage those to also raise their hands and provide input in the Q&A, maybe in the form of an A instead of a Q. But in any case, going to that question, you know, it's a tough environment. And so much in my role, but what I even experienced in my research, is about that perception, that overinterpretation. So maybe signaling that we have this exchange program might draw attention in ways that might lead to suspicions that, oh, well is this, you know, somehow creating an opportunity for us to disclose military secrets? I mean, that's where we take it. A friendly exchange or visit is oftentimes now having to be scrutinized and ensuring that there is no remote violation of export controls, even in educational delivery in a non-STEM field. And what we're seeing is that this—we have our highly sensitive fields, but that kind of scrutiny we're also seeing applied to the institution more broadly. So these seemingly benign programs about language or culture, about fields that are enhanced or help promote so-called American values, are also being watched. So I believe as an institutional leader, again, as I mentioned earlier, having to deal with the possibility of unwanted or unwarranted attention versus not having that program, I think some, as Denis has pointed out, are leaning towards being more cautious. Unfortunately, China—any work with China is considered a risk, even if there is no reason for risk, as we've witnessed under—or, observed under the China Initiative. I don't know if I've fully answered that question, but please follow up if I haven't. And I know others can probably say more to that issue. FASKIANOS: Great. I'll take the next question from Peter—I don't know how to pronounce— LEE: Peter Becskehazy. Hi, Peter. (Laughs.) FASKIANOS: There you go. Thank you very much. LEE: I know Peter. FASKIANOS: All right. Good. Well, I'd love if Peter asked his question directly, if he can. Oh, good. From Pima Community College. Go ahead, Peter. Q: Hello, Jenny. Nice to see you. LEE: Hi, Peter. Q: Now my question is, the University of Arizona and other universities have had an inflow of dozens of countries, adding up to the million that you mentioned. Are other countries trying to fill in slots left vacant by Chinese students and scholars? LEE: Yeah. Great question, Peter. And I think you can also share what you've observed at Pima in terms of the patterns you've witnessed. But for us, and as we are seeing nationally, we're seeing India rise. Not at the—not at higher numbers in many institutions, compared to China, but the rate is rising. It's not so simple, though, because we also have relations in India, and trying to set up agreements, and bring students. The competition in India is intense. So even though there's a relatively so-called large market, and the U.S. has been quite successful in attracting Indian students, that is perhaps where the attention is as a more, I would say—I hate to use the word “market,”—but a stable student market. There's a lot more interest in graduate-level education globally, as we've observed. These countries that formerly didn't have capacity now do have capacity. They have online offerings. They have branch campuses, dual degrees, lots of other options. And so the niche for the U.S., whereas before we didn't really have to think about a niche, is really in graduate education. Now, of course, that's not good news for Pima, that's thinking about a community college and other kinds of educational offerings. But for us, we're thinking about India a lot. Southeast Asia, of course, has always been an important partner to us. Africa continues to be a challenge. We know that when we think about population growth, Africa is the future. There's still challenges and trying to identify places where there is capacity. But also the affordability of a U.S. education is a huge challenge. So it's a great question. And, again, I'm curious to know other places in the world people recommend. Of course, Latin America, given our location, is a key strategic partner. But again, affordability becomes an issue. And again, I'm just talking about the traditional international student who would choose to come to Arizona. Not talking about research collaboration, which is less bound by affordability issues. Irina, you're muted. FASKIANOS: How long have I been doing this? OK. (Laughs.) I'm going to take the next written question from Allison Davis-White Eyes, who is vice president for diversity, equity, and inclusion at Fielding Graduate University: We have tried to work on collaborations with European universities and African universities, and met with much difficulty. What trends are you seeing in these regions? And what are emerging global markets beyond China? LEE: Great question, Allison. I mean, if you could leave the question in the future, so because I am visually looking at the question at the same time. FASKIANOS: Oh, great. Sorry. LEE: So, Allison, I'm not sure if you're referring to academic or research. Of course, within Europe, where the government does highly subsidized tuition, it's just becomes financially a bad deal, I suppose—(laughs)—for a student in the world who would normally get a free or highly reduced tuition to pay full price at our institution. So that kind of exchange of partnership, especially when it's about—when it's financially based, becomes almost impossible from my experience. But thinking about research collaboration, it depends on the level. So if it's an institutional agreement, you know, it's—often, these MOUs tend to just be on paper. It takes quite a bit of—it's very ceremonial. You need to get legal involved. It's a whole process to get an MOU. We really don't need these non-binding MOUs for research agreements. Some countries like it, just to display that they have an MOU with a U.S. institution. But essentially, it doesn't stop me as a professor to reach out to another professor at the University of Oslo, and say, hey, let's do a study. Which we actually are doing. So, yeah, feel free to be more specific, or if you want to raise your hand or speak on—and elaborate on that question. So, again, for educational exchange, it is difficult because we are—there's already a process within the EU that makes it very affordable and highly supported within the EU, or if you're part of that bigger program. Africa, again, my challenge from my role as an institutional leader is identifying places where there is already enough mass education up through high school where one would be able to consider, first of all, being admitted to a U.S. institution, but secondly, to be able to pay the cost. FASKIANOS: Allison, do you want to expand a little bit? Q: Oh, sorry. (Laughs.) FASKIANOS: There you go. There you go. Q: Right. Dr. Lee, thank you for your response. I think it was helpful, especially regarding the subsidizing of education in Europe. We've been working on some research partnerships. And we have just—you know, really, it has just been extremely difficult with European universities. And I do think part of it has to do with the way things are subsidized in Europe. I was just wondering if there were new and different ways to do it. I do appreciate your comment about the MOUs being largely ceremonial. I agree. And would like to see something with a little more substance. And that will take some creativity and a lot of partnership and work. As for Africa, we have tried to create partnerships with South Africa. I think there's some potential there. Certainly, some excitement. We've had a few students from Nigeria, extremely bright and motivated. I just would—you know, would like to hear, maybe from some other colleagues as well on the call, if there are creative ways in working with these students as well. So, thank you. LEE: Yeah, no. And just to follow up quickly, and, again, opportunities for others to share, academic collaboration, as I mentioned during my remarks, is largely built upon mutual trust. And not to say it can't happen from top down, but really does—is most successful from bottom up. And I don't mean to refer to professors at the bottom, but meaning those that are actually engaged with that work. And so just some considerations is rather than a top-down initiative or strategy, is to identify those that are visiting scholars, already from that country, have networks within that country. What's interesting, as I learned in my current role, is how little my predecessors worked with professors in these area's studies programs, because they're oftentimes treated as a separate or having different interests in mind when actually there is a lot of overlap to identify those that are actually there. Allison, by the way, I lived in South Africa for eight years. And I know it actually takes a long time. My Fulbright started off as a one year, and I had to extend it because even getting the data while I was on the ground takes time. And I'll be honest, I think part of it was taking some time just to build trust the intentions of my work, what was I going to do with that data, how is that going to be used? Was it actually going to be ways to empower them? You know, for those who study international collaboration, know this north and south divide, and I think there are places in the world that are—maybe have some guardrails up from those—not saying this is what's happening in your institution—but someone that they don't know coming from the Global North to study someone else in the Global South. And so how do we create or initiate a collaboration that is clearly, expressly mutual at the onset? And, again, this is where trust can be operationalized lots of different ways, but that even begins with that initial message. I mean, I remember when I started my work, nobody responded to me. They're like, who are you? And I don't care who you are or what your CV says. And it takes time. You know, building that relationship, and that person introducing me to that other person. Like, you know, this is how scientific networks form. And I think, to some extent, this is also how institutional collaborative relationships also form. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to David Moore, who has a raised hand. Q: OK, thank you. I just got unmuted. FASKIANOS: Great. Q: Lee, I appreciate your comments. And I heard your reference to Florida earlier. I don't know if we have colleagues on this call from Florida, but I think they'll know what I'm about to say. I'm the dean of international education at Broward College in Fort Lauderdale. And as of tomorrow, December 1, Florida has to—all institutions in Florida, public institutions, colleges and universities, must be completely devoid of any partnerships in China. And not just China. There are seven countries of concern. And you probably can cite them, most of you would know the other six. But of the seven countries, Broward had four partnerships in China alone, none in the other countries that were active. And so we are now officially done, have to be. And I've had to notify the partners as well as our accrediting body, because these were international centers of Broward where they literally offer—we offered associate degrees, two-year degrees. And students could then transfer to an institution in the United States. Now, this didn't catch us too much by surprise because two and a half years ago our Florida legislature started in on this, really probably before that, where they isolated universities in Florida and said: You cannot do research—sensitive research, whatever, you know, engineering, computer science, et cetera—any research without notifying the state. And there's an elaborate process that had to be—you know, they had to go through to do this. But now it's not just research institutions. Now it's not just those kinds of collaborations. It is, in fact, all partnerships of any kind. We had to end our agent agreements where we were recruiting students from China that were—where the companies were based in China. And in course our programs were not research. They're just general education, two-year associate's degree, maybe some business. But we've been informed now it's completely done. And so I'm actually looking for institutions outside of Florida who might be willing to take over the role that we've had in transcripting students who later want to come to the United States. At least for the first two years in China, and then transferring to the upper division to the U.S. So I'm not sure. You're probably quite familiar with this. I don't know if you know the details of how it was worked out in practice. We were the only community college in the state that had any partnerships. So we were the ones that had to desist. So I want to—there are probably people on the call that are familiar with this, but there might be many others. And I just wanted to say that I'm looking to, you know, open that door to other institutions outside of Florida that might be willing in, yes, take a risk to go into China, but to—I've always felt that these kinds of programs were very good to build relationships, partnerships, communication. Ambassadors really. Where we feel like we were representing American education, whatever, you know, we call American values, democracy, you know, community. We thought we were doing good. But we found out we were—we were not. We were—we were doing something that went opposed to the prevailing political climate, at least in Florida. So that's my comment. I think people should know about it. And thank you for letting me speak to it a bit. Maybe someone will speak up and say they're interested in they can get in touch with me, David Moore at Broward College, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. LEE: David, thank you for sharing what you did. This is a really important example of where other states could very well head. And what's interesting, as David noted, we're talking about a community college. When we normally think about cutting ties, it's usually around the concerns about national security. Now, how this translates to a two-year degree that is solely educational based is a pretty far stretch, and yet is being impacted quite severely. So I think we should continue to follow this example—unfortunate example. And, David, yeah, your partners have reached out to my office, and I'm sure to others. But thank you for being available. Q: You're welcome. We have partners—we are also working with your Jakarta, Indonesia center there. So we have that connection. Thank you. LEE: Mmm hmm. Thanks. FASKIANOS: And if anybody wants to share contact information in the Q&A box, you can certainly do that. That would be great. There is a written question from Tutaleni Asino at Oklahoma State University: There was an article today in SEMAFOR highlighting that there are currently 350 U.S. students studying in China compared to 11,000 in 2019. Comparatively, there are 300,000 Chinese students in the United States. Is this a one-way problem, where the U.S. is not investing in international engagements as a result of being more inward looking and other countries having more options of who to collaborate with? LEE: Yeah. Tutaleni, that's—I think your question is an answer. And I think it's—I agree with your observation. So we are seeing that as there's state and public disinvestment in higher education, and including scrutiny about international higher education, we're also seeing a decline and cutting of foreign language programs in the United States. So here we are, a monolingual country whose students mostly go to Europe or other English-speaking countries to study abroad. A very limited number of international—U.S. students who pursue undergraduate degrees in a foreign country. And knowing that the future is global and international, at least in my opinion, does not set the U.S. up well to be globally competitive, even though much of its international policy is around this rhetoric of we need to compete with China. And so you raise a good point. How is this possible if U.S. citizens don't speak Chinese, or have no interest in learning about Chinese culture, or there's reduced opportunities even in our own institutions, I think is something to think about and ask more questions about. FASKIANOS: I'm going to take the next question from Zhen Zhu, chair and professor of marketing, director of faculty excellence, and director for international engagement at Suffolk University: How do you see the trend of U.S. students' interest in study abroad to China? LEE: There is actually growing interest. As many of you know, China—offering Chinese language in high schools is not as unusual as it used to be. There is growing interest as students are thinking about employability in global markets in multinational or international organizations or corporations. It would be fundamental, in fact, for someone who has any interest in international work to pick up the language if they can, and at your own institution. FASKIANOS: Great. Let's see. From—I'm going to take the next question from Jeff Riedinger: Is there a role for universities to play in knowledge diplomacy to sustain international relationships and collaborations in addressing global problems such as climate change and pandemics when national governments may be at odds with each other? LEE: Thanks, Jeff. And hi, Jeff. I'm just going to read over that question so I can kind of digest it a bit. Is there a role for institutions to play in knowledge diplomacy, such as climate change, pandemics, when national governments may be at odds with each other? Absolutely, 200 percent. It is occurring—knowledge diplomacy, science diplomacy. That one individual going on a Fulbright or coming to study here for some extended visit, having these collaborations and, ultimately, you know, science—knowledge production—I mean, there's no bounds. And when we think about the kind of research that may not occur because of these national governments are at odds when it comes to addressing climate change or other global issues, you know, the world is paying somewhat of a price when it comes to that in—when there are overarching concerns about national security. So, you know, my issue has always been with policy you overlook nuance, and with sweeping policies that overlook the disciplinary distinctions and contributions, what is lost in the pursuit of trying to stay ahead of another country in fields and areas that really have no economic or military value, right? But yet, have an important cultural value, or maybe will address something bigger, such as COVID-19. So as I mentioned, the work that I referenced earlier about U.S.-Chinese scientists coming together during COVID-19, were actually scientists who studied COVID-19 together. And again, this was not—this was fraught with risks. They were very well aware that there was a lot of scrutiny about any research about COVID-19 coming from China. There was scrutiny about, you know, where the data was held, who was analyzing it, who was funding it. And yet, these scientists took these risks in order to address how does the world deal with the pandemic. And this was based on interviews of those studies that were actually successful and published. This is where that mutual trust, as I've mentioned earlier, is so important. And without that mutual trust, these studies, I'm pretty certain, would never have been published, because it was not an easy path when it comes to that particular geopolitical climate during the pandemic. FASKIANOS: Jenny, I'm just going to ask a question. President Biden and President Xi met during APEC. Did anything come out of that meeting that could affect U.S.-China academic collaboration? LEE: Yeah. You know, this is tough. I mean, how do you analyze political statements? What do they really mean? And what is really going to change? I think what's clear is that there's an acknowledgment that we're interdependent, but we're also adversaries. Almost a love/hate codependent, in a relationship that we can't just easily separate but we do need each other. But the form that it takes, I think there's an understanding it needs to be more specific. And I don't think that has been clarified yet. I realize I missed part of Jeff's question on what can institutions do? That's such a good question. And I got more into the topic than the actual to-do. What can institutions do? Honestly—(laughs)—I'll just speak as a researcher, to back off a bit, right? To let scientists do what they want to do. Yes, we need to follow disclosures. We need to make sure there's no conflicts of interest. We need to follow all of these procedures. But what I also found during the China Initiative, there was also this chilling climate in which there's an overinterpretation that may put institutions at risk. And to my knowledge, institutions were not at risk to the extent to which their scientists, especially those of Chinese descent, felt scrutinized. FASKIANOS: Thank you. We have a raised hand from Dan Whitman. Q: OK, I think I'm unmuted. Thank you, Irina. And thanks, Professor Lee, for mentioning the Great Wall that that prevents us from dealing with even Europeans who have subsidized education or Africans who have no money. And just an anecdote, since you have welcomed anecdotes, I am an adjunct at George Washington University. But totally unrelated to that, just for free and just for fun, pro bono, nobody pays, nobody gets paid. A course that I'm giving by webinar, it's zero cost. The topic is crisis management, but it could be any topic. And in that group, which there are about eighty people who tune in twice a week, fifteen Kenyans, twenty-five Ukrainians, and forty Kazakhs. I mean, I don't know if there's ever been exchange between Kazakhstan and Kenya. Anyway, my point is things can be done. We share it for free. What motivates the students? A certificate. It's so easy to give them a certificate. And in many countries, they very highly value that, even though it's not a—there's no formality, there's no formal academic credit. But the students are very motivated. And possibly, there may be universities in the U.S. that could—that might want to give a professor a small stipendium to do an informal webinar course, which would create connections, which would be zero cost, basically, and would bridge that gap of funding that you've alluded to. Thank you. LEE: Yeah. Dan, thank you for that. And I think this leads to a kind of a spin-off comment about certificates. Absolutely. Micro-credentials or alternative forms of education, where there's maybe not a full-fledged undergraduate degree but some certificate, I think, is important niche, especially for returning adults or communities where they're not able to afford to take time off. So that flexibility, and obviously now with online education, just becomes so much more accessible and very low cost. Something else to keep in mind, though, is that, depending on the institution you're from, that will make a difference in certificates. I mean, an institution like George Washington University offering a certificate may have some symbolic or perceived value that may be higher than an institution that is lower or are not ranked at all. So this is where, unfortunately—I'm a big critic of global rankings. But unfortunately, it does play a role in how that certificate is being perceived and the attractiveness of that certificate. But absolutely, this is definitely a way to open access especially for places in the world that just cannot physically move or have the funds to support their studies. FASKIANOS: Great. There are two comments/questions in the Q&A that I wanted to give you a chance to respond to about Africa, from Tutaleni Asino and Fodei Batty. Dr. Asino talks about English is the language of instruction and governments in Africa where they're funding education to a higher degree, and thinks that there are opportunities there, but it sounds like all fifty-four countries are grouped together. And Dr. Batty talks a little bit about there are a lot of students from African countries pursuing graduate education in the United States. But South Africa is usually an exception to the higher education American norm in Africa. Most South Africans don't like to travel, especially travel to America. I thought maybe you could just clarify some—respond to those comments. LEE: Yeah. Absolutely. Thank you for sharing those comments. There's a book I edited called Intra-Africa Student Mobility. And I agree with the comments. And one of the things I didn't mention that I think is important to help us understand the broader global context is that there's actually considerable international activity within the continent. And there's actually considerable intra-Africa mobility within the continent. South Africa is the most important country player in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is globally ranked—has more globally ranked institutions than any other African country. And so South Africa then becomes an important hub. And, yes, as an English-speaking, among many other languages, country, that does attract African students to go oftentimes for a similar sense of shared culture, despite sometimes different languages and customs and backgrounds. And yet, nevertheless, South Africa is an important player within the continent. Not to say that there is no international mobility occurring, but there is increased capacity within the continent that would allow students and interested students to travel within the continent. Not the same extent, of course, as Europe. But the least we're seeing that rise over time. And so it's called Intra-Africa Student Mobility. Chika Sehoole and I coedited the book. We were able to get about eight African scholars to talk about the various reasons students would choose that particular African country, and what draw them. And what was really interesting about this phenomenon is that it goes against this prevailing notion of Africa's victim of brain drain or all going to the north. That's actually not what is happening. But that there is capacity building within the continent. So in trying to answer a different question, I skirted over a lot of the things I could go further into. But hopefully that book will shed light on what's happening within that continent, at least from the perspective of eight different countries. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Thank you for that. I'm going to go next to Jonathan Scriven at Washington Adventist University in Maryland: What are some of the strategies universities are using to make education more affordable in the United States? If that is a challenge, are schools investing more or less in setting up campuses in foreign countries as a way to reach foreign students? LEE: I'm just going to read over that question. OK, yeah. Great question, Jonathan. So what's happening in my institution and many others is a way to attract students is we're providing considerable aid, merit aid, financial aid, aid even to international students. The majority may not even be paying the full sticker price. Now this, of course, will affect the revenue that would have otherwise been generated, but nevertheless is a way to deal with the fierce competition across U.S. institutions for these top students. So how to make it affordable? There's a lot of aid going around at the undergraduate, not just the graduate, levels. And so what are institutions doing? Well, for example, at the University of Arizona for our dual degrees, it's a fraction of the cost of what it would cost to be a student at our main campus. When you have a combination of hybrid or online delivery with a campus partner maybe providing most of the gen ed's and then we would teach most of the major courses as an example, that does significantly lower the cost where that student will still get a bona fide University of Arizona degree, just like they would at main campus. So these alternative forms of delivery certainly make it more affordable, especially for those that opt to stay in their home country and receive an online education, or a flipped classroom model, or a dual degree. FASKIANOS: Great. Denis Simon, if you can—why don't you ask your question? Q: Here I am. OK. Recently, on a trip to China in September, a number of faculty have told me they're no longer wanting to send their best students abroad. They want to keep them in China. And this is all part of the rise of Chinese universities, et cetera. And so it may not be simply the souring of Sino-U.S. relations that has causal effect here, but simply the fact that China now is becoming a major, you know, educational powerhouse. And that also could change the dynamics. For example, even the BRI countries could start to send their students to China instead of sending them to the United States. Do you see anything evolving like this or—and what might be the outcome? LEE: Yeah. Spot on, David. That halo effect of a U.S. degree is not the same as it was when I was a university student. Chinese students, as well as students in the world, are much more savvy. They have access to information. They have access to rankings. They know all universities are not the same. And they know that they have some institutions that are highly ranked and may offer better quality education than the U.S. So that the image of a U.S. degree, of course, is not as universally perceived as it may have been, I don't know, pre-internet, or without the—all sorts of rankings in which institutions are rated against one another. And absolutely, Chinese institutions are very difficult to get into, fiercely competitive, producing far more scientific output than some of our leading institutions. And there's another factor when it comes to Asian culture just more broadly speaking, is that social network tie. Sociologists refer to it as social capital. When a Chinese student, a Korean student, Japanese student decides to study in the United States, they may lose that social tie that may possibly put them in a disadvantage when they decide to come back and compete for a position when they may just have that U.S. credential, but may have either lessened or no longer have that relationship that may have allowed them to get a position at the university, or in a place where that alumni network would have been especially useful. So again, I don't want to generalize, you know, in any place to the world, but there is that component that I think sometimes is missed in the literature. Maintaining that social network is pretty key, especially as jobs, of course, global, you know, unemployment—places where students are competing for positions need to have every edge possible. So that also can be part of that reason they decide to stay. FASKIANOS: Great. The next question from Michael Kulma, who's at the University of Chicago. He's following on David Moore's comments about Florida: Do you know how many other states in the U.S. are enacting or are considering such policies against partnerships with China? LEE: I do not know the answer. So if anyone wants to raise their hand and share about their own state, or put it on the answer part of the question and answer. There are related concerns about DEI, diversity, equity, and inclusion. Some of that may spill over to China. Hopefully, at some point at the Council of Foreign Relations will have a discussion on Israel and Hamas conflict and how institutions are dealing with that. And so we're seeing a pretty challenging political environment that is clearly spilling over to our classrooms and to our international activities, our domestic recruitment. But I'm not answering your question, Michael. (Laughs.) I'll leave it up to someone else to answer. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. So we don't have very much time left. I thought maybe you could, given your research and expertise, could suggest resources—recommend resources for higher ed leaders and administrators to better understand how to promote collaboration. LEE: Sure. So promoting collaboration, it really—each person at a time. You know, again, MOUs may be signed, and maybe overarching presidents will come together and have an agreement, but there's no guarantee that will ever happen. I'd love to do a study on how many MOUs never actually materialized into real action. So where do we begin? International affairs SIOs out there, identify who are your area studies experts? Who are your visiting postdocs? Who are your Fulbright scholars from other parts of the world? They all represent their own network and are certainly are valuable resources to consider. What I've sometimes have heard even at my own institution is, you know, how do we bring these people to the table? Why are they not at the table to begin with, and then how do we bring them there? And this is a relatively low-cost way to go about this, right? Like, faculty engaged in service. What kind of opportunities can your university provide for faculty service that is aligned with their area of expertise, the areas of the world they represent, the networks they have? And many of—some of you already have experienced this directly. These partnerships often begin with our alumni, international—former international students who decide to go back home. So, again, there's just a lot of exciting opportunity. I love this field because it's never boring. There's always new ways to grow, expand new partners. But it really does begin with that essential element of trust. And that often begins with our own institutions and identifying those who've already started to build that network. FASKIANOS: Wonderful. Thank you very much. Really appreciate your being with us and for sharing your expertise and background, Dr. Lee. It's been fantastic. And to all of you, for your questions and comments, and sharing your experiences as well. You can follow Dr. Lee on X, the app formerly known as Twitter, at @JennyJ_Lee. I will send out a link to this webinar, the transcript, and the video, as well as the link to the book—your book that you mentioned, and any other resources that you want to share with the group. And I encourage you all to follow @CFR_academic on X, visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. We also—just putting in a plug for our other series, Academic Webinar series, which is designed for students. We just sent out the winter/spring lineup and we hope that you will share that with your colleagues and your students. It is a great way for them to have access to practitioner scholars and to talk with students from around the country. So if you haven't received that lineup, you can email cfracademic@CFR.org, and we will share that with you. So, again, thank you, Jenny, for being with us, and to all of you. And wishing you safe and happy holidays. And good luck closing out this semester before we get to the holidays. (Laughs.) So thank you again. (END)

The opposite of addiction is not sobriety… it's connection.  -Mike BrcicI'm thrilled to share what turned out to be a fascinating and deeply meaningful discussion with community-builder and serial entrepreneur by nature, Mike Brcic.Mike is passionate about helping entrepreneurs live inspired, more connected lives, and our conversation was focused on the themes of the role of human connection in human health and our ability to thrive. He's traveled to and spent time with locals in some of the remotest places on earth, from the nomadic Kazakhs of western Mongolia to the Batwa forest people of Bwindi Impenetrable Forest in Uganda. In the process he's learned a thing or two about how to live a meaningful human life. We talk in depth about his events and adventure retreats around the world with Wayfinders, the business Mike created to help entrepreneurs find the tribe and the support they need to achieve great things and personal fulfillment. We also cover his personal journey, including his own struggle through periods of depression.Mike is a passionate speaker on many topics related to entrepreneurship, community building, and mental health. Via his Substack channel, he shares tips and resources about human connection and how to live a more deeply connected life.Enjoy!VIEW THE FULL SHOW NOTES AND GUEST BIO & LINKS HERE ---------------------------------------

Premier épisode de notre série « Les nouvelles routes de la soie, 10 ans après ». C'est au Kazakhstan que Xi Jinping lançait il y a exactement une décennie ce que Pékin appelle son « projet du siècle ». Le poids lourd des cinq républiques de l'Asie centrale, a-t-il su en profiter ? L'ex-république soviétique reste aujourd'hui sous influence de son mentor historique russe. Mais la guerre en Ukraine pousse le Kazakhstan davantage dans les bras de la Chine qui convoite ses hydrocarbures et sa position géostratégique. Sur un parking, des dizaines de voitures chinoises rutilantes sont garées l'une à côté de l'autre, en attendant d'être chargées sur des trains de fret. Elles traverseront le Kazakhstan sur des milliers de kilomètres pour arriver, neuf jours plus tard, à leur destination finale : Duisbourg en Allemagne. Nous sommes dans la zone économique spéciale (ZES) de Khorgos, un vaste parc industriel planté au beau milieu de la steppe kazakhe. C'est ici, à la frontière entre la Chine et le Kazakhstan, que les deux pays ont créé un nœud ferroviaire et routier, destiné à devenir un carrefour du commerce mondial, trait d'union entre la Chine et l'Europe.« Jusqu'en 2014, il n'y avait que des dunes ici, affirme Serguali Seitkazine, habillé d'un gilet orange, casque de chantier vissé sur la tête. Depuis, nous avons aplani le terrain et installé l'eau, les canalisations et l'électricité. » Un producteur de couches pour bébé, un fabricant de nourriture pour bétail et dix autres usines sont déjà implantées et 30 autres doivent suivre, indique le directeur des relations avec les investisseurs. À l'avenir, confie-t-il les yeux brillants, un aéroport international verra le jour, et le géant chinois du commerce en ligne Alibaba livrera ses marchandises dans le monde entier à partir d'un nouvel et immense entrepôt de distribution.La mer est à 2 500 kilomètresPourtant, rien ne s'y prête. L'endroit est situé près du point eurasiatique de non-accessibilité : la mer la plus proche se trouve à plus de 2 500 kilomètres d'ici. La Chine pouvait difficilement choisir une région moins accueillante pour réaliser ce que le président Xi Jinping appelle « le projet du siècle » : les « nouvelles routes de la soie ». L'objectif : désenclaver l'Ouest chinois pour exporter les produits fabriqués dans l'usine du monde vers les marchés internationaux.Dix ans après l'annonce par Xi Jinping des « nouvelles routes de la soie », Khorgos peine à attirer les multinationales. Seuls 700 sur les 4500 hectares sont occupés, et cela malgré les réductions d'impôts et les terrains mis à disposition gratuitement aux investisseurs. Mais Hicham Belmaachi y croit : « Quand Khorgos est sorti de terre, beaucoup de professionnels du monde de la logistique n'étaient pas convaincus, affirmant que c'était un projet fou ; mais aujourd'hui, il a son utilité primordiale pour desservir cette région, soutient cet homme d'affaires franco-marocain, envoyé au Kazakhstan en 2015 par son entreprise Dubaï DP World, troisième opérateur portuaire mondial. C'est un projet qui restera dans les livres d'histoire et ce n'est que le début : on va créer une véritable ville très dynamique aux portes de la Chine. »Cette ville nouvelle s'appelle Nurkent, entourée de vastes plaines de sables, fouettée par des vents de sables en été et des températures qui descendent à moins 20 dégrées en hiver. Avec ses aires de jeux envahies d'herbes folles et ses façades en plâtre déjà défraichies, le triste ensemble de barres d'immeubles ne donne guère envie d'y vivre. À terme, 100 0000 personnes doivent y habiter. Mais jusqu'à présent, seuls 4 000 ouvriers du rail et des douaniers ont élu domicile ici. Parmi eux, Aïmane et sa famille, venue de l'est du Kazakhstan, attirée par les salaires stables et des logements mis à disposition par l'employeur : « Nous travaillons pour la société nationale des chemins de fer. Nous sommes très heureux, parce que nous gagnons bien mieux notre vie ici que chez nous. » Seule attraction dans ce coin perdu pour Aïmane et ses voisins : le grand centre commercial « Duty free » transfrontalier, une immense zone franche sino-kazakhe où l'on peut acheter des produits hors taxe, pour la plus grande partie de fabrication chinoise.Le lait de chamelle kazakh côtoie des sacs Armani Après avoir passé quatre postes de contrôles et la zone militaire clôturée et équipée d'une myriade de caméras de vidéosurveillance, le visiteur est projeté dans un univers bien étrange et décidément chinois. Des écrans géants diffusent des publicités pour des rouges à lèvres aux couleurs criantes. Dans les boutiques climatisées, du lait de chamelle en poudre côtoie des sacs Armani. Tous les prix sont affichés en yuan, la monnaie chinoise. La grande carafe en cristal Baccarat de cognac Louis XIII coûte 240 000 yuans, soit 30 000 euros.À l'horizon, du côté chinois de la frontière, des gratte-ciels d'une trentaine d'étages frappent le regard, comme si Pékin était déterminé à bâtir ici, dans ce désert, une mégapole à l'image de Shenzhen ou de Shanghai.Un vrai corridor pour relier la Chine et l'EuropeDifficile de s'imaginer les caravanes de chameaux passer par cet endroit à l'époque des anciennes Routes de la soie. Mais, aujourd'hui, des siècles plus tard, ce point sur la carte a la même importance stratégique cruciale pour la Chine. « Khorgos est située sur la frontière chinoise : c'est le point d'entrée vers l'Asie centrale, et l'idée de la Chine était d'établir un vrai corridor pour relier la Chine et l'Europe, explique Hicham Belmaachi. Quand je suis arrivé ici en 2015, le volume de conteneurs était à 150 000 unités. Aujourd'hui, nous en sommes à 600 000 conteneurs. »Dans la gare d'Altinkhol avec ses bâtiments massifs de style vaguement romain qui ne voient jamais de passagers, des dizaines de conteneurs sont alignés sur la voie ferrée, bourrés de produits « made in China ». China Shipping, Cosco ou encore Maersk, les grands noms du transport mondial ne manquent pas. Le transport par train entre la Chine et l'Europe coûte bien plus cher que le bateau, mais il ne met que deux semaines là où la voie maritime prend deux mois. Les trains partent pleins, mais dix ans après la promesse par le numéro un chinois Xi Jinping de « nouvelles routes de la Soie » bénéfiques pour tous, une partie des trains revient toujours à vide.Dans le port sec de Khorgos, l'un des plus grands au monde, des ouvriers du rail s'activent sur d'immenses portiques. Tout ici ressemble à un port, sauf que tout autour, il n'y a ni la mer ni un fleuve. Juste une vaste plaine où, de temps en temps, apparaît un cavalier en train de faire brouter son cheval. C'est ici que les trains chinois sont déchargés et transbordés vers le rail kazakh, plus large. Pour un train classique de 50 conteneurs, cette opération prend environ une heure. « Nous déchargeons 16 voire 17 trains par jour ici, explique Serguali Seitkazine. C'est quatre fois plus qu'avant la pandémie de Covid-19. La Chine avait fermé la frontière, seul le passage des trains était autorisé. Le chemin de fer a donc fait ses preuves. »La pandémie a donné un coup d'accélérateur à ce port sec détenu à 49% par le géant chinois du transport maritime Cosco et une autre société chinoise. « Le commerce en ligne a vécu un boom, confirme Hicham Belmaachi. Les navires ayant atteint leur capacité maximale, il a donc fallu se rabattre sur d'autres voies, et le ferroviaire a connu une croissance fulgurante. » La guerre en Ukraine rebat les cartes La guerre en Ukraine a, elle aussi, redistribué les cartes en Asie centrale et permis à la Chine de s'engouffrer dans la brèche laissée par une Russie affaiblie. « Depuis la guerre, beaucoup d'entreprises internationales se sont retirées de la Russie, et les grandes compagnies maritimes y ont interrompu leur escale, confirme Hicham Belmaachi. Donc il a fallu redessiner complètement la logistique dans cette région du monde, et depuis, les Kazakhs, les Ouzbeks et les Kirghizes se sont tournés directement vers la Chine. »La Russie demeure le premier fournisseur du Kazakhstan, et lorsqu'en 2022, des émeutes ont secoué le pays, le président Kassym-Jomart Tokaëv a appelé son allié historique Moscou à l'aide. Mais depuis la guerre en Ukraine, les choses évoluent en faveur de la Chine qui étend son influence en Asie centrale.En 2022, le commerce entre la Chine et le Kazakhstan a augmenté de 34%, c'est plus que pendant les 30 dernières années. De plus en plus de transports de marchandises contournent d'ailleurs déjà la Russie, via la mer Caspienne vers l'Azerbaïdjan et la Turquie. Sur cette voie, la Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), les exportations ont quasiment triplé depuis début 2023. Une manière pour le Kazakhstan de se détourner de son allié historique, la Russie. Mais cela prendra du temps. « La Russie a encore des moyens de pression sur le Kazakhstan. Nos exportations de pétrole transitent toujours par le territoire russe, analyse le politologue Dossym Satpaïev, directeur du Risk Assessment Group, une organisation non gouvernementale de conseil. Une partie du territoire du Kazakhstan dépend de l'approvisionnement en électricité de la Russie, et nous recevons du gaz de la Russie. » Mais pour ce consultant en affaires internationales, il est en effet crucial pour son pays de se trouver un contrepoids géopolitique, en exploitant au mieux sa proximité avec ses deux grands voisins et en gardant de bonnes relations avec la Turquie, l'Union européenne et les États-Unis.Comme beaucoup de ses compatriotes, Abzal Dostiyar voit le rapprochement entre son pays et la Chine d'un mauvais œil. L'opposant au régime du président Kassym-Jomart Tokaëv a organisé plusieurs manifestations contre les investissements chinois. Il a été arrêté et emprisonné à maintes reprises. Il craint de voir son pays passer sous emprise chinoise après avoir vécu sous la tutelle soviétique : « Le Kazakhstan compte bien peu à leurs yeux. Le projet des "nouvelles routes de la soie" n'a été bénéfique que pour les Chinois, et nous, on accumule les dettes. Pour gérer les 56 usines construites par la Chine, ils sont venus avec leurs propres ouvriers. Et pour financer une nouvelle avenue dans la capitale Astana, le prêt n'a été disponible que pour des sociétés chinoises. » Si l'on en croit les statistiques officielles, l'Etat ne croule pas sous des dettes chinoises qui ne s'élèveraient qu'à 2% du PIB. Mais selon le centre de réflexion américain AidData, le Kazakhstan serait en réalité endetté à plus de 10% de son produit intérieur brut vis-à-vis de la Chine, au même niveau que la République démocratique du Congo, le Laos ou le Mozambique.Pour réduire ses propres risques et garantir ses investissements, Pékin mise d'ailleurs sur ce que l'on appelle « le modèle angolais ». Cela signifie que le jour où le Kazakhstan ne peut plus rembourser en espèces, il doit rembourser ses dettes avec des ressources naturelles en donnant accès à son gaz, son pétrole ou encore son uranium. La Chine s'appuie sur nos régimes corrompus pour gagner en influence.Lorsqu'en mai dernier, Xi Jinping a accueilli les dirigeants de l'Asie centrale en grande pompe à Xi'an pour leur promettre de nouveaux investissements et les inviter « à monter à bord du train express de son développement pour bâtir ensemble un avenir meilleur », certains ont pris peur. À l'instar d'Aïna Shormanbaeva, présidente de l'ONG International Legal Initiative : « Nous assistons à une pression de plus en plus forte sur la société civile au Kazakhstan, au Kirghizistan et dans les autres républiques d'Asie centrale, estime cette militante des droits de l'homme. Le projet des "nouvelles routes de la soie" ne fait que renforcer l'influence de la Chine qui s'appuie sur les régimes corrompus dans nos pays afin de gagner en influence. » Mieux vaut alors se méfier des ogres qui convoitent l'uranium, le gaz et le pétrole du Kazakhstan, mais aussi sa position géostratégique. « En prenant nos distances avec l'ours russe, il ne faut pas tomber dans les griffes du dragon chinois », avertit Dossym Satpaïev. Si l'on en croit cet universitaire, le Kazakhstan a quelques atouts dans ce grand jeu des puissances : c'est particulièrement vrai depuis la guerre en Ukraine, mais aussi à cause de la tension qui croît de jour en jour dans le détroit de Taïwan, voie maritime majeure pour le commerce mondial.« La Chine sait très bien que s'il y a un conflit militaire autour de Taïwan, alors la route terrestre qui passe par le Kazakhstan doit pouvoir remplacer la voie maritime qui sera bloquée », assure Dossym Satpaïev. Il en est convaincu : le Kazakhstan a toutes les cartes en main pour tenir tête à l'ours russe comme au dragon chinois.À lire aussiRetrouvez l'intégralité de notre dossier sur les «nouvelles routes de la soie»

This presentation will focus on the migration of Kazakhs, Uyghurs, Russians and some other ethnic groups from Xinjiang province of China to Soviet Kazakhstan in the 1950-60s. Discussion of the migration based on analysis of the Soviet archival materials as well as oral histories of migrants will be put into the context of the Great Game paradigm, that is a struggle of great powers for domination in Central Asia. Besides the historical background of the migration, we will examine the main factors of the migration. repatriation of Soviet citizens from Xinjiang and Manchuria and settling them in the ‘virgin lands' of Kazakhstan. Main stages of the mass migration, its ‘push' and ‘pull' factors, adaptation of migrants to Soviet environment and their involvement in the Sino-Soviet ideological war in the 1970-1980s, emergence of the ‘Chinese' segments among the ethnic communities of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics will be other issues to be discussed. About the speaker: Graduate of the Department of Oriental studies (China studies) of the Tashkent State University in 1984. Accomplished aspirantura (PhD) program at the Leningrad Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies (present Institute of Oriental manuscripts, St. Petersburg) and earned his PhD degree from that Institute in 1990. Gained his D.Sc. degree (habilitation) from the Institute of Oriental Studies in Almaty, Kazakhstan. His main academic interests include History of Turkic peoples of China, with a special focus on Uyghurs. His latest publications include monographs “Uyghurs of Kazakhstan”, “Dungans of Kazakhstan” (both: 2016), “Oral History of Migration of 1950-1970s from China to Kazakhstan” (ed., 2022) and “Links Across Time: Taranchis During the Uprising of 1916 in Semirech'e and the “Atu” Massacre of 1918”, in The Central Asian Revolt of 1916. A collapsing Empire in the age of war and revolution (Manchester, 2020: 227-255), “Uyghur Historiography”, in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History (Oxford University Press, 2021), “Nation, religion and social heat: heritaging Uyghur mäshräp in Kazakhstan”, in Central Asian Survey (2021: 9-33; co-authored with R. Harris). Held positions of visiting scholar at the University of Washington (Seattle), the US Library of Congress, Indiana University (Bloomington IN), University of Oxford (UK), and Maison des sciences de l'Homme (Paris). He served as President of European Society of Central Asian Studies (ESCAS) in 2020-2022), and was elected President of Central Eurasian Studies Society (CESS) in 2022. Editorial Board member of ‘Central Asian Survey' (UK) and other journals.

HOUR 1Ukraine launches its counter-offensive against Russia  / (NYT) https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/06/05/world/russia-ukraine-newsChina warship cuts off American warship / (CBS) https://www.cbsnews.com/video/chinese-warship-cuts-off-us-navy-vessel-as-tensions-between-countries-escalate/China is our greatest threat says Congressman Dusty Johnson (R-SD) / (FOXNews) https://www.foxnews.com/world/chinas-defense-minister-says-war-us-would-unbearable-disaster Robert Kennedy was killed 55 years ago / (NPR)https://www.npr.org/2023/06/05/1179430014/robert-kennedy-rfk-assassination-anniversaryEast Turkistan's Prime Minister Salih Hudayar joins Tom with an update on the Chinese subjugation of the Uyghurs (Turkic-speaking Muslims from the Central Asian region). The Uyghurs are the largest population in the region and the most severely persecuted Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, including the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, and Hui. Support them here:  https://east-turkistan.net/leadership/US birth rate falls to lowest number in 32 years / (FOXNews) https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/american-birth-rate-plummeting-not-some-statesHOUR 2Tom and Charles discuss America's birthrate - is a decline good or badNevada's lawmakers decide whether to offer up to $380 million in public funds to help build a baseball stadium in Las Vegas for the Athletics / (MB) https://www.morningbrew.com/daily/stories/2023/06/04/nevada-public-financing-athletics-stadium?Edward Snowden has been in Russia for over 10 years while U.S. tech laws have changed / (NPR) https://www.npr.org/2023/06/04/1176747650/a-decade-on-edward-snowden-remains-in-russia-though-u-s-laws-have-changedHomeless Clean-Slate Strategy Townhall meeting in Anchorage / (ANS) https://www.alaskasnewssource.com/2023/06/03/town-hall-held-clean-slate-strategy-permanent-homeless-shelter/California spent $17 Billion on homelessness / (WSJ) https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-homeless-population-oakland-wood-street-encampment-78d42cc3?mod=hp_lead_pos7Chuck Todd retires from Meet the Press / (NBC) https://www.nbcnews.com/news/chuck-todd-will-depart-nbcs-meet-press-kristen-welker-become-host-rcna87618

Бүгінгі қонағымыз Қазақстандағы АҚШ Елшісі Дэниел Розенблюммен бірге қазақстандықтардың АҚШ туралы түсінігі, америкалық арман не екені, сондай-ақ әртүрлі мемлекеттердің жұмсақ күші туралы тілдестік. Сонымен қатар Елші мырза АҚШ-Ресей арасындағы қырғи-қабақ соғыстың аяқталуы туралы естеліктері, Орталық Азия мемлекеттеріне сапары, сондай-ақ екі мемлекетіміздің ұқсастығы туралы айтып берді. Жобаны қолдау/Поддержка проекта:KASPI GOLD: 4400 4301 0802 3760Today's guest, U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan - Daniel Rosenblum talks about how Kazakhs see United States, what is “American Dream” and the soft power of different states. On top of that, Mister Ambassador will share his memories of the end of Cold War, his visits to the different countries of Central Asia, and will try to find similarities between our two nations. Таймкод: 0:00 Dope soz 63 0:35 Дипломатиялық қызметтегі қазақ тілі (Kazakh language at the diplomatic mission) 3:54 Small talk және подкастты қалай бастау керек (Small talk and how to start a podcast) 5:32 Орталық Азия бір аймақ ретінде (Central Asia, as the one region) 10:19 Қымыз бен алғашқы әсер (Kymyz (kumys) and first impressions) 12:59 Елшінің Қазақстандағы саяхаты (Ambassador's travel around Kazakhstan) 15:42 АҚШ-тың Қазақстандағы кейпі (The image of the United States in Kazakhstan) 19:20 Американың жұмсақ күш саясаты (Soft power of the United States) 24:03 Америкалық арман (American Dream) 32:02 Қазақтың арманы мен ашаршылық (Kazakh Dream and the famine) 35:54 Елшілік қандай бағдарламаларды қолдайды (the programs, supported by the U.S. Mission) 39:10 Қазақтар мен американың байырғы халқы (Kazakhs and Native Americans) 41:52 Заманауи қазақ музыкасы (Modern Kazakh music) 49:31 Melting pot/Salad bowl 53:30 Америка тамағы (American cuisine) 55:35 Тарихты қайта жазу (Re-writing the history) 1:01:52 Америка мен Ресей арасындағы қырғи-қабақ соғыс (The end of Cold War) 1:07:24 Серіктестікке үміт арту (Hope for partnership) 1:09:55 Дэниел Розенблюмнің мәдени мұрасы (Daniel Rosenblum and his cultural heritage) Dope soz Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/dopesoz/ Dope soz Telegram: https://t.me/dopesoz

In Xinjiang, more than a million Uyghurs and Kazakhs have been arbitrarily held in "re-education" camps. In this episode of Voices, Kadambari Raghukumar speaks to people behind a new documentary based on testimony from family members of the detained and survivors of the camps. 

The Prime Minister in exile of East Turkestan, Salih Hudayar, is joining me for this week's podcast. East Turkestan is the homeland of the Uyghur Muslims. Hudayar shares his personal story of growing up in East Turkestan and his family's experience with political persecution. He discusses the Chinese government's mass internment and genocidal campaign targeting Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkish peoples, including forced assimilation, concentration camps, slave labor, sterilization, and indoctrination of children.  Hudayar emphasizes the importance of the international community taking action to address this human rights crisis and the critical role of East Turkistan in Chinese strategy. Listeners will gain a deeper understanding of the severity of the situation in Xinjiang and the urgency for global intervention. Main Takeaways The Origins of the Uyghur Conflict with China China using forced Uyghur labor  Salih Hudayars Journey to Becoming Prime Minister in Exile  Mass surveillance of Uyghurs by the Chinese Communist Party Mass sterilization and rape of Uyghur women Follow Prime Minister Hudayar: https://twitter.com/SalihHudayar  https://east-turkistan.net This episode is sponsored by 4 Patriots, a survival food company. You can visit ⁠⁠www.4patriots.com⁠⁠ and use the code RECON for 10% off your first purchase.  Connect With John Hendricks ⁠⁠www.globalrecon.net⁠⁠ ⁠⁠www.instagram.com/igrecon ⁠⁠ Music provided by Caspian: ⁠⁠www.caspian.band --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/globalrecon/support

Whether it's the joy of dyeing cloth with pomegranates, the age-old practicality of turning sheep wool into felts and knits, or the rich legacy of complex embroideries and silk Ikat weaving, Central Asian textile traditions are bonded by cultural meaning and a respect for the natural world. And resources: nothing gets thrown away, as this week's guest Aigerim Akenova explains through her love for patchwork - her nomadic ancestors' answer to upcycling.Aigerim is the country co-ordinator of Fashion Revolution Kazakhstan. With a global outlook (studied in Milan, lives in California), she's also a contemporary Kazakh designer determined to centre sustainability in the national fashion conversation, as the country she was born and raised in scales up its design and creative industries. Still, the big money in this former Soviet territory of 19 million people, is still in mining. The economy is based on oil, coal, gas, but also things like copper, aluminium, zinc, bauxite and gold. As Aigerim puts it: "We've got the whole periodic table." And Kazakhstan is the world's largest uranium producer. What role could sustainable fashion play in growing newer, lower carbon industries here in line with SDGs? What do young urban Kazakhs and Central Asians in neighbouring countries want from the fashion today? As well as its craft heritage, Kazakhstan also has a vibrant modern fashion scene, its own fashion week, and (doesn't everywhere?) fast fashion - so how can these two sides find balance in future? Aigerim says we have much to learn from nomadic traditions of sustainable clothing systems.THIS IS OUR ANNUAL FASHION REVOLUTION SPECIAL BE CURIOUS, FIND OUT, DO SOMETHING. This year's theme is Manifesto for a Fashion Revolution - check it out here.Value the show? Please help us spread the word by sharing it with a friend, and following, rating and reviewing in your fave podcast app. Got feedback? Tell us what you think! Find Clare on Instagram and Twitter @mrspress Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Last time we spoke about the modernization efforts of China, Japan and the Hermit Kingdom of Korea. China and Japan undertook very different paths to modernization, and little Korea was stuck in between them. Yet there was even another play joining the mix, the empire of Russia who was threatening all 3 of the Asian nations with her encroachment. The 3 Asian nations attempted to cooperate against the common threat, but Japan and China were growing ever more and more hostile towards another, particularly over the issue of who should influence Korea more. Yet today we are actually doing something a bit different, this will be sort of a side episode, for China had too many events going on during the 19th century to cohesively tell. One story goes often forgotten, yet it encompassed numerous groups, vast amounts of territory and a lot of bloodshed.   #38 This episode is the Dungan Revolt   Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   I am not going to lie, I have no idea where to even start with this one. Originally I wanted to write a single episode, perhaps a two parter, explaining how China and Japan find themselves going to war in the 1890's largely over Korea. Yet the late 19th century is probably one of the most jam packed time periods for Chinese history. So many uprisings, rebellions, wars with foreign states occurs for the Qing dynasty, there's simply no way to tell them all, but here I want to touch upon just a few. Now I keep bringing up but barely talk about, the Dungan Revolt of 1862-1877. If you go right now and please do, to the wikipedia article on the Dungan Revolt, check out the list of Belligerents. You will see the Qing, the Russian Empire, a short lived state called the Kashgaria, the British Empire, the Ottoman Empire and an unbelievable number of Muslim rebel groups from all over the place. Events like this do not live in a bubble, as we say in the research world of neuroscience, this requires multivariable analysis. Well that's what I hope to accomplish, in a single episode. Now I expect when I say the Dungan Revolt, the first question that comes to mind for many of you is, who are Dungans? Its complicated. They can be described as Turkic or Chinese speaking, Hui Muslim people who inhabitant Xinjiang province, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Tajikistan and parts of modern Russia. Now you are saying, wait are they Turks or Chinese, thats a very politically motivated question haha. Today you could call them, Hui, Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Uzbeks, Tatars, etc. In essence they inhibit a part of the world that has so many different groups around and their history goes very deep, before the time of the Qing dynasty. When the Qianlong Emperor hit the scene in the early 18th century, he named the province Xinjiang, meaning “new frontier” and the people there were known by many as Hui, but specifically for those Chinese speaking muslims in the northwest, well they were often referred to as Dungans. Prior to the Qing rule, Xinjiang was ruled by the Oirat Mongols of the Dzungar Khanate. I am sure you veteran listeners before I came to this podcast know much of these peoples and their history, you probably could teach me a thing or two, as this is very much so out of my specialization. One thing you might remember that I touched upon I believe in the very first episode of this podcast series was the Dzungar genocide. As ordered by the Qianlong Emperor  “"Show no mercy at all to these rebels. Only the old and weak should be saved. Our previous military campaigns were too lenient. If we act as before, our troops will withdraw, and further trouble will occur. If a rebel is captured and his followers wish to surrender, he must personally come to the garrison, prostrate himself before the commander, and request surrender. If he only sends someone to request submission, it is undoubtedly a trick. Tell Tsengünjav to massacre these crafty Zunghars. Do not believe what they say." It is estimated perhaps 80 percent of the 600,000 or so Dzungars were killed through war and disease between 1755-1758, enough to argue the annihilation of them as a people. Now with Xinjiang so devastated and depopulated, the Qing sponsored a large-scale settlement of Han, Hui, Uyghur, Manchu and other Chinese. Thus the demographics of the region changed dramatically, Xinjiang became mostly Uyghurs around 60% or so, followed by 30% Han and Hui and the rest of various minority groups like Manchu. The Qing did their best to unify Xinjiang, and one of their policies was to turn over 17,000 acres of steppe grassland over to Han Chinese to farm and colonize. Some historians point this out to be an attempt to replace Uyghurs, but in truth its messier than just that, as the Qing also banned Han Chinese from settled in Uyghur concentrated areas of the province. Now the Oirat Mongol's come back to the scene, this time in the form of the Kalmyk Khanate. They were mostly Tibetan Buddhists and in 1770, over 300,000 of them tried to seize control of parts of Xinjiang from the Qing. However when they began their great expedition, their traditional rivals the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz attacked them the entire way leading them to show up to Xinjiang, worn out, starving and ridden with disease. Many of them simply came and surrendered to the Qing upon arrival and managed to settle within Qing territory. Now these were nomadic people, but the Qing demanded they give up the nomadic lifestyle to take up farming, which was a deliberate policy to break them as a people. They utterly failed at becoming farmers and quickly fell into poverty, undergoing such horrors as selling their own children into slavery, becoming prostitutes, bandits, and such, terrible times. Alongside the terrible treatment of the new coming Kalmyks, Uyghurs were being abused by Manchu officials. It is said Manchu officials were gang raping Uyghur women, such as the official Su-cheng. A rebellion occurred, and the Qing violently quelled. There were reports of mass rape by Manchu troops causing even more hatred from the Uyghur population.  Now fast forward to the Taiping Rebellion, during 1862 as Taiping forces approached Shaanxi province, the local population began to form militias known as the Yong Ying. The Yong Ying or “brave camps” were similar to our friend Zeng Guofans “Yung-Ying” Xiang army, just less well structured and terribly under equipped. If they were lucky the Qing government would hand over some Jingalls, but more or less the old sword and spear were their choice of weapon. Now the Yong Ying's being propped up by the Qing were Han Chinese, but around them were large populations of Muslim Chinese who, well lets just say were having PTSD episodes from the countless atrocities performed upon them by these same people for centuries now. So the Muslim groups formed their own Yong Ying's and this is where our story really begins.  In 1862 sporadic conflicts such as skirmishes between groups, riots, smaller uprisings and such. They ran the gambit for reasons, could be just a barroom brawl as they saw, trivial type of stuff. During this time any rebel groups that emerged drew attention from the Qing and by proxy association were believed to be possibly working with the Taiping. To add some more chaos to the situation, the Green Standard army as you would assume took its recruits from populaces all over China. Their job much more as a police force than a real army was to keep things running smoothly in all the provinces of the Qing dynasty. In northwest China this meant numerous Hui and other muslim chinese groups were amongst their ranks and thus training for combat and armed, so keep that in mind. There were numerous incidents that sprung the Dungan revolt, but one in particular involved of all things the price of bamboo poles. Some Han merchants were overcharging Hui and this led to a major fight. Bamboo poles were traditionally used to make spears. During a time of major conflict and open rebellion suddenly the Hui communities began to buy large quantities of bamboo poles and this led to the belief they were planning to set up an Islamic state in northwestern China. Organized mosques run by popular mullahs in Shaanxi were purchasing more and more bamboo poles, which they were indeed making into spears. The Hui communities were worried about their safety, seeing all these local militias pop up meant there would be fighting over resources and such. Well the non muslim merchants, mostly Han saw the paint on the wall and were obviously worried about selling bamboo poles to people who might attack them, or better said might defend themselves. Thus many merchants began to increase the prices on bamboo poles and this led to a major uprising known as the Shengshan bamboo incident.  Manchu general Duolongga, the same man we talked about during the Taiping Rebellion was leading a cavalry unit in the north when the Hui revolt suddenly turned into a siege laid against Xi'an in Shaanxi province. Duolongga led a campaign against the muslim bands and by 1863 the siege was lifted and the rebels were pushed out of Shaanxi into neighboring Gansu province. In Gansu the Muslim leaders began to spread rumors of an impending Qing crackdown on muslims. They spread fear that the Qing would soon massacre many and this allowed them to organize another siege, this time against Ling-chou, a large city 40 miles north from Jinjipu. Jinjipu happened to be the HQ of a major Muslim leader named Ma Hualong, more about him later. While Lingzhou was laid siege, another strategic city was also attacked by Muslim forces, the city of Lanchow. The Governor General at Lanchow, En-lin reacted by trying to apply a policy of reconciliation. He advocated to the Qing court to not alienate the Muslims and began sending edicts in Gansu reiterating non-discrimination policies towards Muslims. His efforts seem to have been all for naught, as the rumors of a Qing massacre upon the muslims won out the day and large scale violence just grew. Within Eastern Gangsu, many of the Shaanxi Muslim refugees formed the what became known as the “18 great battalions”. Their purpose was to train and arm themselves to take back their homes in Shaanxi. Now while Gansu and Shaanxi were kicking off the beginnings of the Dungan revolt, this also opened the door to more groups to join in. Yaqub Bek, was born in the town of Pskente in the Khanate of Kokand, today's Uzbekistan. There region he lived in was drawn into conflict continuously with outsiders like the Russian and from within as it was deeply factionalized. Yaqub Bek claimed to be a descendant of Timur Gurkani the Turco-Mongol conqueror of the Timurid Empire, probably a ruse to give himself more credibility as a great ruler. He conspired against factions such as the Qipchaqs, taking part in a horrible event known as the Qipchaq massacre. Eventually in the 1860's he fought for the Kokand khanate as a General against the Russians, but they defeated them in 1866 resulting in the major loss of Tashkent. The ruler of Khokand, Sadik Beg dispatched Yakub Beg to Kashgar to raise and find new troops amongst Muslim allies. Yaqub Beg instead invaded Kashgar, defeated its Chinese defenders and declared himself ruler. Now Yaqub Beh was stuck between the forces of the Russian, British and Chinese empires who were all vying for control of the surrounding area, this was part of something called “the great game” which I simply cannot get into for it is too great, pun intended. Thus Yaqub Beg began a campaign that basically saw him conquer Xinjiang province, and this drew the ire of the Qing as you can imagine.  So the Qing were now dealing with multiple Muslim rebel groups in the northwest and on top of this some of them were foreigners, who held considerable backing. The Qing dynasty sent one of their most formidable Generals, Zuo Zongtang in 1867 to Shaanxi to pacify the region. Zuo Zongtang as you already know was instrumental in the downfall of the Taiping, working closely with Zeng Guofan. Zuo Zongtangs task was to restore the peace, promote agricultural output particularly that of grain and cotton and to promote Confucian education. As we have seen throughout the series, northwestern China is a rough place to live, stricken with poverty and thus Zuo Zongtang would not be able to rely on the resources of the territory he would have to look elsewhere. This led Zuo Zongtang to immediately demand the Qing court help fund the expedition as he personally began to take out major loans worth millions of taels from foreigners. Zuo Zongtang wanted to prepare massive amounts of supplies before going on the offensive, a smart move. Zeng Guofan likewise helped his subordinate by allocating him 10,000 Xiang forces, led by General Liu Songshan to bolster Zuo Zongtang's 55,000 man army. Zuo Zongtang's forces were mostly Hunanese, but there were also men from Henan, Anhui and Sichuan as well. Because of the Taiping Rebellion, Zuo Zongtang was a proficient army raiser now and he did his best to train the men in a western fashion and outfit them with western arms. As I had mentioned, Zuo Zongtang was one of the champions of modernization and established the Lanzhou arsenal in 1872 which produced Remington breech loading type rifles for his forces alongside artillery and munitions. Now that name, Ma Hualong I had mentioned comes up here a bit. He was the leader of the Jahriyya, known also as “the new teaching”. They were something of a Muslim sect in Gansu province and had been around since the 1760s.They periodically rebelled as a group and caused conflict with other groups, including muslim ones. When Ma Hualong took the leadership position in 1849 he gradually began to build up their forces and to do so he created a vast trade network using a caravan trade through Inner Mongolia and Beijing. His group became extremely wealthy and when the Dungan revolt heated up he began to use his trade network to purchase guns. Zuo Zongtang understandably was suspicious of the gun purchasing activity and deduced Ma Hualong sought to conquer parts of Inner Mongolia and rebel. Ma Hualong began collaborating with Muslim refugees fleeing Shaanxi for Gansu and this led to conflicts with the Qing. General Liu Songshan ended up dying in combat while campaigning against multiple Muslim militia groups, some of which were controlled by Ma Haulong. Meanwhile Zuo Zongtang was finishing up suppressing Shaanxi and establishing control over the province when he finally had a free hand to deal with Ma Hualong who had heavily fortified Jinjipu into a stronghold. Zuo Zongtang's forces erected a siege upon Jinjipu using Krupps field guns, the good old fashion sappers tunneling with mines tactic and the age old classic of starving out the enemy. After 16 months of siege, starvation took its toll upon the defenders prompting Ma Hualong to surrender his forces in January of 1871. Ma Hualong hoped to save the majority of his people, but Jinjipu saw a massacre, thousands lose their lives and the town was rape, plundered and raized. Zuo Zongtang ordered the execution of Ma Hualong, his son Ma Yaobang and 80 Muslim rebel leaders via “Lingchi / death by slicing”. This was a horrible form of execution where a sharp object like a knife was used to slowly remove portions of ones body over long periods of time until the person died. Once done with Ma Hualong, Zuo Zongtang set his eyes upon another Muslim rebel leader named Ma Zhan'ao. Ma Zhan'ao worked loosely with Ma Hualong, but his stronghold was at Hezhou, present day Linxia. He controlled the region west of Lanzhou and benefited from Ma Hualong's vast trade network managing to arm his rebel forces. Unlike Ma Hualong who was of the “new teaching” sect, Ma Zhan'ao was of the “Khafiya / old teaching” sect and they proscribing trying to peacefully exist amongst the non muslim Qing population. When the Dungan revolt began, Ma Zhan'ao escorted numerous Han Chinese to the nearest safe area of Yixin and he did not attempt to conquer the area nor molest them. Regardless he was one of the major muslim leaders purchasing arms and earned the attention of Zuo Zongtang who began an offensive against his forces in 1872. Initially his muslim defenders inflicted heavy losses upon Zuo Zongtang's army much to the frustration of Zuo Zongtang. But Ma Zhan'ao did not want war and he dispatched his General Ma Chun to try and negotiate with General Zuo Zongtang. He offered to surrender his stronghold to the Qing and provide assistance to the Qing dynasty in quelling the Dungan revolt. Zuo Zongtang suspected this all to be a ruse, but the Qing ordered him to abide by the mutual assistance and indeed Ma Zhan'ao did assist the Qing. Zuo Zongtang began to pacify other areas, while Ma Zhan'ao basically saved his people from annihilation. To this very day the area he controlled holds a muslim population who control the Linxia Hui autonomous prefecture. Many of Ma Zhan'ao's generals like Ma Qianling and Ma Haiyan defected to the Qing, including his son Ma Anliang who proved themselves instrumental to helping Zuo Zongtangs campaign. As Zuo Zongtang pacified the areas he was soon awarded governor generalship over Shaanxi and Gansu. At this point Zuo Zongtang loosely followed a strategy of divide and conquer. Those Muslim groups part of the New Teaching he violently massacred, but those of the old teachings he tried to persuade defection to the Qing. The Qing government likewise began to make edicts stating the Muslim rebels did not represent all muslim chinese, just as all the White Lotus rebels back in the early part of the century did not represent all buddhists. They advocated the Muslim community take up the old teachings over the new teachings.  With the help of the Dungan people of Hezhou Zuo Zongtang then turned his gaze west towards Xinjiang to defeat the forces of Yaqub Beg. Zuo Zongtang was now joined by defected Dungan armies led by Generals like Ma Anliang, Dong Fuxiang. By 1875 Zuo Zongtang had assembled men and supplies along the Gansu corridor and the next year began his campaign by attacking Urumchi where he massacres their garrison. Next he besieged Manas for over a month until they surrendered. Allegedly the garrison were allowed to march out of the city with weapons, but it seemed to Zuo Zongtang's commanders in the field they were planning an armed break out so they were all put to the sword as well. The women and children were spared luckily. Zuo Zongtang established a HQ at Gucheng while the Russian Empire annexed the Khanate of Kokand, squeezing Yakub Beg further. In September of 1876, Yakub Beh received reports a Chinese army was on the march 700 miles to the east and he began to prepare his defenses. He built up fortifications at Turfan and in 1877 he was visited by Aleksey Kuropatkin. Kuropatkin was sent on a diplomatic mission to Yaqub Beg to try and resolve some Russian border claims over the Fergana Valley. Kuropatkin told him he had around 17,000 troops spread over the Fergana Valley region and that he could not hope to match them. Yaqub Beg was in a very bad situation. The Chinese army had entered Urumqi pretty much unopposed, many of his eastern forces were defecting over to the Qing and in the west they were defecting to the Russians. In the spring the Chinese attacked the fort of Davanchi which lay between Urumchi and Turfan. Simultaneously an army led by Chang Yao seized Pichuan just 50 miles east of Turfan. Yaqub Beg's forces were shrinking from lost battles, desertions and defections. The Qing forces attacked Turfan where Yaqub Beg's men were beaten badly, so he fled to Toksun. At Toksun the Qing pursued him quickly and defeated him again, so he fled to Karashar, and then Korla. All of the fleeing demoralized his troops causing further desertions and defections. It would be at Korla where Yaqub Beg died and historians are uncertain as to exactly how or when. The Qing claimed he died on May 22, while Aleksey Kuropatkin claimed it was May 29th. What he died of is a bit of a mystery. The Russians state he died of illness, multiple historians think it was poisoning. Some modern historians think it could have been a stroke. Regardless with Yaqub Beg dead this pretty much closed the curtain on his forces control over the area. In autumn of 1877, Zuo Zongtang had kept his forces around Turfan as it was the hot season and he wished to gather further supplies, when he received news of the death of Yaqub Beg. Yaqub Begs forces disorganized into multiple rebel groups without a real leader consolidating anything. Zuo Zongtang sent advance parties to occupy Karashar and Korla meeting limited resistance. Zuo Zongtans army pushed the rebels further west until he eventually seized Kashgar with barely a fight and this led notable cities like Yarkand and Kohtan to submit. Xinjiang was officially reconquered by the Qing. The rebel groups dissolved gradually and no large scale revolts would occur for some time in the northwest. In 1884 Xinjiang was established as a province officially again. Zuo Zongtangs Xiang army and other Han Chinese troops began purchasing Uyghur girls from their parents to take as wives, relying often on their Hui allies to work as translators. Countless Uyghur muslim women would be married off to Han Chinese in Xinjiang during the late 19th to early 20th century. This was not limited to Han Chinese under the Qing as plenty of Hindu, Armenians, Jews and Russians also did the same. A large rationale for the situation was the amount of male depopulation from the area which caused a vacuum of single women.  The punishments for the leaders who caused the Dungan revolt were harsh. Many of the songs of the Muslim leaders were castrated by the Qing imperial household department once they hit 11 years of age and they were sent to work as eunuch slaves for Qing held garrisons in Xinjiang. Many of the wives of the Muslim leaders were likewise enslaved. To give you an idea of how prevalent this was, the Muslim leader Ma Guiyuan had 9 of his sons castrated by the Qing. The Muslim leaders themselves were mostly executed by Lingchi. Yaqub Beg and his son Ishana's corpses were burned in public view. Yaqub had 4 other sons who died imprisoned at Lanzhou, Gansu or were killed by the Qing authorities upon discovery. Even Yaqub Beg's grandchildren were hunted for, many of which were caught and executed or castrated.  The Dungan revolt led to mass migration all over the place. Some Hui people fled to Russia, settling in places like Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Within the Qing dynasty, the Hui Generals who defected were all promoted by the Emperor such as Dong Fuxiang and Ma Anliang. The power of these pro Qing Hui forces would become quite important to the Qing military further down the road, particularly during the Boxer Rebellion.    I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Well I hope you enjoyed my butchering of the Dungan Revolt, again I did my best to tell it in regards to its significance to the history of China. In reality it was part of something known as the “great game” that had had a long lasting impact on many other nations history.

Nursultan Nazarbayev served as President of Kazakhstan from 1991 until 2019. He remained a backseat driver until last year, when Kazakhstan's biggest protests in decades finally put an end to Nazarbayev's 35-year rule. Nazarbayev oversaw his country's transition to independence and capitalism, and established strong relations with the United States and China. Temporarily at least, he established some semblance of order over a country many denied was coherent enough to survive, given that ethnic Russians actually outnumbered Kazakhs at the country's founding. On the other hand, Nazarbayev had a record in elections most dictators can only dream of, winning his last election with 98% of the vote, and jailing and murdering opposition figures with increasing passion as his rule progressed. He also maintained close relations with Russia, a friendship that has now come under unprecedented strain following Russia's invasion of another one of its neighbours. My guest for this episode is Joanna Lillis. Joanna is a British journalist who has lived in Kazakhstan since 2005, and writes principally for The Economist and Eurasianet. Joanna is also the author of recently published Dark Shadows, which examines Kazakhstan's independent history. 

A l'extrem oest de Mong

What does the Mongolian diet look like? What characterizes their lifestyle, and what changes might their choices make in my life? These are questions addressed by Mary Ruddick, the nutritionist known as the "Sherlock Holmes of Health" on today's episode. She was recently in Mongolia for an extended period. She observed the elements of the traditional Mongolian diet, its extraordinarily high-fat content, its shifts with the seasons, the similarities between the Mongolian and Maasai dietary patterns, and more. She describes her experiences with Eagle Hunters in a remote country region, and why she is convinced the Mongolians were uniquely prepared by their diet and lifestyle to expand their empire. She also offers insights into how their probiotic-rich foods and tight-knit community have served them well over the centuries. And how they can do the same for us wherever we live! Visit Mary's website: enableyourhealing.com Become a member of the Weston A. Price Foundation Check out realmilk.com for resources on raw milk See our sponsors: RaOptics, Second Spring Foods, Optimal Carnivore

We invite everyone who wants to join the military operations on the territory of Ukraine against the terrorist Russian regime, everyone who is able to help in the fight for the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine, you can join the ranks of the international brigade, which includes people from many countries such as the USA, Canada, Georgia, Belarus, Russians who disagree with Putin's regime, Chechens of the Republic of Ichkeria, and many other glorious sons are beating the enemy on the territory of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Zaporozhye, we are waiting for you, we are waiting for the guarantors of our security - soldiers from the United States and Great Britain, we need you on the battlefield, many glorious Cossacks - Ukrainians died fighting for Ukraine, don't stand aside, fight the unwashed Muscovite, drive him out of Ukraine, we repeat once again, give us tanks and planes, as well as missiles, we will end the war, no one is fucked tyrants in the world have no right to kill Ukrainians, we are a nation of winners, we won the 2nd world war, on our bones Moscow reached Berlin, be sure, fall we are the end of you, get ready, glorious people of Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Georgia, we are handing you our baton of war with the Muscovites, the war will come to your house, to your street, to your yard, the Muscovites are murderers, and they need someone to kill for them you are Churks, Pindos, Anglo-Saxons or whatever, any alliance with Russia is a failure, don't believe the Muscovites! We killed 100,000 peaceful locals in Mariupol, all of them were killed by a Russian soldier, a Russian tank, a Russian shell, a Russian aerial bomb, prepare for war Poles, Moldovans, Kazakhs. thanks for your help but it's not enough, it's not enough. I am grateful to all the allies of Ukraine, I am asking for a tribunal for castrated servicemen of the armed forces of Ukraine who were in enemy captivity, I am asking for a tribunal for every murdered child, I am asking for a tribunal for every raped woman, give me fucking tanks give me fucking missiles, only revenge, only death to everything that came to kill from Russia

We invite everyone who wants to join the military operations on the territory of Ukraine against the terrorist Russian regime, everyone who is able to help in the fight for the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine, you can join the ranks of the international brigade, which includes people from many countries such as the USA, Canada, Georgia, Belarus, Russians who disagree with Putin's regime, Chechens of the Republic of Ichkeria, and many other glorious sons are beating the enemy on the territory of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Zaporozhye, we are waiting for you, we are waiting for the guarantors of our security - soldiers from the United States and Great Britain, we need you on the battlefield, many glorious Cossacks - Ukrainians died fighting for Ukraine, don't stand aside, fight the unwashed Muscovite, drive him out of Ukraine, we repeat once again, give us tanks and planes, as well as missiles, we will end the war, no one is fucked tyrants in the world have no right to kill Ukrainians, we are a nation of winners, we won the 2nd world war, on our bones Moscow reached Berlin, be sure, fall we are the end of you, get ready, glorious people of Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Georgia, we are handing you our baton of war with the Muscovites, the war will come to your house, to your street, to your yard, the Muscovites are murderers, and they need someone to kill for them you are Churks, Pindos, Anglo-Saxons or whatever, any alliance with Russia is a failure, don't believe the Muscovites! Russians killed 100,000 peaceful civil people in Mariupol, all of them were killed by a Russian soldier, a Russian tank, a Russian shell, a Russian aerial bomb, prepare for war Poles, Moldovans, Kazakhs. thanks for your help but it's not enough, it's not enough. I am grateful to all the allies of Ukraine, I am asking for a tribunal for castrated servicemen of the armed forces of Ukraine who were in enemy captivity, I am asking for a tribunal for every murdered child, I am asking for a tribunal for every raped woman, give me fucking tanks give me fucking missiles, only revenge, only death to everything that came to kill from Russia Glorious sons and daughters of Ukraine successfully destroyed about 104,560 soldiers;— tanks — 3,018;— combat armored vehicles — 6,047;— artillery systems — 2004;— RSZV — 423;— air defense means — 212;— planes — 283;— helicopters — 268;— automotive equipment and tank trucks — 4,675;— ships/boats — 16;— UAVs of the operational-tactical level — 1,717;— cruise missiles — 653.

On the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, endangered plants bloom on the shrubsteppe. The Yakama Nation signed a treaty in 1855 to cede some of its lands to the US government. The treaty promised that the Yakama people could continue to use their traditional territory to hunt and fish. But in 1943, those promises were broken, as Hanford became a secretive site for nuclear plutonium production. Today, Hanford is one of the world's most contaminated sites, and the cleanup will take generations. As more ceded lands have been encroached on by agriculture and development, the Hanford land is home to an ugly irony: Untouchable by outsiders — but unsafe for members of the Yakama Nation to fully practice their traditions. Now, while they fight for the most rigorous cleanup possible, they're also finding other ways to keep those traditions alive. Flash back to 1989, on the other side of the world lies another steppe near Semey (once Semipalatinsk), Kazakhstan. A land that's survived famine, collectivization, and hundreds of nuclear tests. When an underground test goes wrong, Kazakhs band together with the world and say it's time to stop nuclear testing for good. — In addition to responding to questions we had about the Hanford site, the Department of Energy provided the following statement: “The Department is committed to continuing to work with the Yakama Nation on progressing toward our common goal of site cleanup,” it says in part. “DOE progress at Hanford is leading to a cleaner environment and additional protections for the Columbia River. This year alone Hanford … completed a protective enclosure around another former plutonium production reactor along the Columbia River and treated over 2 billion gallons of contaminated groundwater.” GUESTS: Robert Franklin, Associate Director of the Hanford History Project; Marlene Jones, Marylee Jones, and Patsy Whitefoot, Yakama Nation members; Kali Robson, Trina Sherwood, and McClure Tosch, Yakama Nation's Environmental Restoration/Waste Management Program; Togzhan Kassenova, Senior Fellow at the Center for Policy Research, SUNY-Albany; Sarah Cameron, University of Maryland ADDITIONAL RESOURCES: Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up The Bomb, Togzhan Kassenova Nuclear waste ravaged their land. The Yakama Nation is on a quest to rescue it, Hallie Golden, The Guardian How Native Land Became a Target for Nuclear Waste, Sanjana Manjeshwar, Inkstick Media Hanford Site Cleanup Costs Continue to Rise, but Opportunities Exist to Save Tens of Billions of Dollars, GAO

APAC stocks took their cue from Friday's sell-off on Wall St post-Powell which saw the S&P 500 close lower by 3.4%.European equity futures are indicative of a lower open with the Euro Stoxx 50 future -1.3% after the cash market closed down by 1.9% on Friday.DXY printed a fresh YTD peak overnight, hawkish ECB talk was unable to support EUR vs. USD, JPY lags G10 FX.ECB's Kazakhs said the ECB should discuss 50bps and 75bps hikes in September, Villeroy said a "significant" rate hike is needed.Looking ahead, today's calendar sees a lack of tier 1 highlights. Note, today is a UK bank holiday.Read the full report covering Equities, Forex, Fixed Income, Commodites and more on Newsquawk

How Stalin starved Ukraine in the 1930s and how Putin is doing it now.We're talking about the "Terror-Famine" created by Soviet farm policy in the 1930s which killed millions of people in Ukraine. If you like our content please become a patron and get our premium episodes, plus our public episodes, all ad-free! The Soviet Union had problems with food production throughout its existence. From the outset in 1917, Lenin was forced with a farm revolt in the Penza province that resulted in his infamous "hanging order" to execute 100 kulaks. We explain what a kulak is, how that class of people came to be, and how Stalin tried to exterminate them in the 1930s. 1 After Lenin's death in the early 1920s, it was Trotsky or Stalin for who would succeed him. Trotsky had the army, but Stalin had everyone else, and the fate of millions were sealed when Stalin rose to power. Stalin's first five year plan involved the collectivization of farmland, and it was thought that machinery could increase production with less labor, and so the kulaks were sent to labor camps and the women of farming villages left to work the fields, with disastrous results. On the low end, 3 to 5 million Ukrainians starved to death. Another 1.5 million Kazakhs. More in the northern Caucasus. And those not killed by the famine were also targets in Stalin's purges a few years later. Kherson, Odessa, and Mariupol: all cities in the news today with Russia's current invasion. They're grain ports in the country known as the bread basket of Europe, and Ukraine is still fighting for them 100 years later. Famines in 1918 may be more aptly described as food terrorism today, as Putin's destruction of grain ports could cause a global food crisis. Will we have mass migrations in response to mass hunger in Europe in 2022 if grain supplies run low? Little was written of the famines in the west, except by journalists like Welshman Gareth Jones, who kept diaries of his travels through Soviet territory. Sadly, Jones' legacy was tarnished by western journalists complicit with the Stalin regime such as Walter Duranty of the New York Times, who admitted in private that millions were dying of hunger, but downplayed that fact in the the paper of record. He was given a Pulitzer and "perks" from the Soviets for his efforts, Gareth Jones was given three fatal gunshot wounds while reporting on the Japanese invasion of Mongolia in 1935 with a man we now know to have been with the NKVD: the precursor to the KGB. 2 The famine was also documented in the photos of people living in 1930s Soviet territory such as Alexander Wienerberger and James Abbe. A particularly striking photo of Wienerberger's was one of a Soviet Health Minister's summer palace in Crimea, in which he lived while millions of people below his stately grounds were falling dead in the streets from starvation. Not very comrade-like... 3, 4 1. Lenin's Hanging Order for the Kulaks (1918). Alpha History. ⇤2. Neil Prior. Journalist Gareth Jones' 1935 Murder Examined by BBC Four. BBC, July 2012. ⇤3. 'A Gift To Posterity': Four Men Who Risked The Wrath Of Stalin To Photograph The Holodomor. Radio Free Europe. May 2021. ⇤4. Alexander Wienerberger. Soviet Health Commissar's Summer Residence in Crimea. The Holodomor Research and Education Consortium. ⇤

Fan of the show? https://www.patreon.com/newleftradio (Support us on Patreon). There is a lot of political posturing on the plight of the Uyghur people. We're joined by Darren Byler to cut through it and discuss what life is like for Uyghurs under colonialism in Western China, in the diaspora, and what we can do to support their struggle. About In the Camps China's High-Tech Penal Colony How China built a network of surveillance to detain over a million people and produce a system of control previously unknown in human history. A cruel and high-tech form of colonization has been unfolding over the past decade in China's vast northwestern region of Xinjiang, where as many as a million and a half Uyghurs, Kazakhs and Hui have vanished into high-security camps and associated factories. It is the largest internment of a religious minority since World War II. https://globalreports.columbia.edu/books/in-the-camps/ (Buy In the Camps China's High-Tech Penal Colony now) About Terror Capitalism: Uyghur Dispossession and Masculinity in a Chinese City In Terror Capitalism anthropologist Darren Byler theorizes the contemporary Chinese colonization of the Uyghur Muslim minority group in the northwest autonomous region of Xinjiang. He shows that the mass detention of over one million Uyghurs in “reeducation camps” is part of processes of resource extraction in Uyghur lands that have led to what he calls terror capitalism—a configuration of ethnoracialization, surveillance, and mass detention that in this case promotes settler colonialism. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in the regional capital Ürümchi, Byler shows how media infrastructures, the state's enforcement of “Chinese” cultural values, and the influx of Han Chinese settlers contribute to Uyghur dispossession and their expulsion from the city. He particularly attends to the experiences of young Uyghur men—who are the primary target of state violence—and how they develop masculinities and homosocial friendships to protect themselves against gendered, ethnoracial, and economic violence. By tracing the political and economic stakes of Uyghur colonization, Byler demonstrates that state-directed capitalist dispossession is coconstructed with a colonial relation of domination. https://www.dukeupress.edu/terror-capitalism (BuyTerror Capitalism: Uyghur Dispossession and Masculinity in a Chinese City now) About Darren Byler Darren Byler is a sociocultural anthropologist whose teaching and research examines the dispossession of stateless populations through forms of contemporary capitalism and colonialism in China, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. His monograph, https://www.dukeupress.edu/terror-capitalism (Terror Capitalism: Uyghur Dispossession and Masculinity in a Chinese City) (Duke University Press, 2021), examines emerging forms of media, infrastructure, economics and politics in the Uyghur homeland in Chinese Central Asia (Ch: Xinjiang). The book, which is based on two years of ethnographic fieldwork among Uyghur and Han internal male migrants, argues that Chinese authorities and technologists have made Uyghurs the object of what it names “terror capitalism.” It shows that this emergent form of internal colonialism and capitalist frontier-making utilizes a post-9/11 discourse of terrorism, what he shows produces a novel sequence of racialization, to justify state investment in a wide array of policing and social engineering systems. These techno-political systems have “disappeared” hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in “reeducation” camps and other forms of productive detention while empowering millions of state workers and private contractors who build the system. The book considers how the ubiquity of pass-book systems, webs of technological surveillance, urban banishment and mass internment camps have reshaped human experience among native Uyghurs and Han settler-colonizers in the capital of the region...

    For the final episode on the Mongol Empire, we take you, our dear listeners, in a quick survey of the final years of Chinggisid rule in Mongolia, after the Yuan Dynasty was forced from China in 1368, until the Manchu conquests in the seventeenth century. This will help bridge the gap with the next series in this podcast, and serve as an afterword to this season.  I'm your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.   We detailed in previous episodes the final years of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty in China, which culminated with Töghön Temür Khaan fleeing his capital of Dadu to Mongolia. With the Yuan rulers ousted, the new Ming Dynasty, ruled by the Chinese warlord Zhu Yuanzhang now styled the Hongwu Emperor, seized Dadu. Dadu was renamed to Beiping, “northern peace,” and would soon to Beijing, “northern capital.” The Ming, under its early emperors, was a highly militarized state with what's often described as an oppressively strong government. The Hongwu Emperor, though recognizing that the Mongols had had the Mandate of Heaven, had settled on one key flaw which allowed corruption and poor governance to settle in. That is, that the Yuan Khans simply did not have enough authority within their government, which had been augmented by Töghön Temür Khaan's debauchery. The lords of the Yuan state simply had too much more power in comparison to the Yuan Emperor. The Ming solution to that, was to, at least in early years of the dynasty, ensure there were few checks on the might of the Ming Emperor. This would lead to intense control over society and its own oppression, but that's another matter.       The flight of the Yuan rulers back into the steppe was neither the end of the Yuan, nor of the Mongol threat, and the Ming knew this. The flight of 1368, and Töghön Temür's death in 1370, was hardly the end of war, as Ming and Yuan forces raided back and forced over the frontier repeatedly. The Ming led continued assaults into Mongolia itself, on one occasion sacking the much reduced former Mongol capital of Qaraqorum. But the Hongwu Emperor's forces met defeats in Mongolia in 1372, and his armies were forced back in humiliating, destructive routs. The Hongwu Emperor continued to send armies into Mongolia throughout the 1380s, but finally recognized the stalemate. He had solidified rule over China, defeated the last of Yuan holdouts, but in the steppes his armies could be drawn out, starved and crushed by the Mongols. It was better to fall back to military garrisons along the frontier to launch counter attacks, rather than waste more resources in the steppes. Frustratingly, the sons of Töghön Temür continued to claim the right to rule China, and refused to recognize that the Ming now held the Mandate of Heaven. Ming historians from this point on refer to the Yuan in Mongolia as the Northern Yuan, though the Yuan Khaans themselves saw their rule as continuing unabated.       In the early fifteenth century, the ascension of the Hongwu Emperor's son, Zhu Di, known as the Yongle Emperor, brought renewed conflict. The Yongle Emperor personally led some of these campaigns, and when he met the Mongols in battle he was victorious, aided by the prodigious usage of gunpowder weapons. But in the final campaigns, the strong man of the Northern Yuan, a fellow named Arughtai, increasingly favoured avoiding direct engagement with the Ming entirely. The Yongle Emperor's ambitions were thus thwarted, and the threat of starvation and isolation in the steppes forced his withdrawal. It was on one of these withdrawals in 1424 that the Yongle Empire succumbed to illness, and with him died the last skilled military emperor of the Ming.    The arrival of the Yuan nobility back to the steppe brought with it its own problems, for the sinicized elite accustomed to the finery of great Dadu found life in Mongolia difficult and unrefined. The local lords in Mongolia, having long since felt abandoned by Dadu, did not easily abide the new arrivals or their demands for troops. The Dadu refugees also were decidedly much too Chinese for the liking of Mongolia's local elite. Many of the Mongolian leaders were descendants of Ariq Böke or Chinggis Khan's brothers, those who felt they had been left out of the power and resources of the empire. The upheaval brought on by the constant Ming attacks in eastern and central Mongolia at the same time did no favours to the position of the Yuan. On Töghön Temür's death in 1370, he was succeeded by his son, the much more capable Ayushiridara. Ayushiridara Khaan and his skilled general Koko Temür led effective counter attacks against the Ming, and even succeeded in gaining lost territory, though Ayushiridara's son Maidiribala was captured by the Ming. On Ayushiridara's death in 1378, the Ming released Maidiribala back to Mongolia to influence the election, for Maidiribala had been well treated and was seen as favourably disposed to the Ming. But Ayushiridara was succeeded by his brother Tögüs Temür, who continued war with the Ming and interfering along the border. After a series of battles, in 1388 Tögüs Temür was defeated near Buyur Lake in northern Mongolia. Though he escaped, the depowered Tögüs Temür Khaan was soon murdered by a distant relation named Yesüder. With the death of Tögüs Temür Khaan, the unbroken succession of the house of Khubilai came to an end. Now various lords within the Northern Yuan declared their independence, sought peace with the Ming or fought for the Chinggisid throne. As was the usual case when this occurred, khans now rapidly ascended to the throne only to soon be killed or ousted. Their order remains confused, their identities uncertain, and many were little more than figure heads for puppet masters. One of the most notable and longest lasting of these Mongol puppet masters was Arughtai. Until his death in 1434, Arughtai remained the most powerful man in the Northern Yuan court, fighting against the Ming, the Oirats and other rivals to power, but never able to reassert Yan hegemony over all of Mongolia.       This infighting in the Yuan court greatly benefitted one party in western Mongolia. These were the Oirat, or western Mongols, assembled in a political union known by its clever name, the Four Oirat. While they had been subjects to the Great Khan, their local lords were not Chinggisids, and had enjoyed a great degree of autonomy in the recent decades before the Yuan expulsion. The arrival of the Great Khans from China brought interference in their internal matters, demands for troops and supplies which caused resentment. The turmoil brought on the wars with the Ming and the succession struggles led to the Oirat leadership to challenge the Great Khans. In 1399, Ugechi Khasakha of the Khoit Oirat and Batula, son-in-law to the Khan, killed the Great Khan Elbeg, beginning open warfare between the Oirat and the Yuan. When Ugechi Khasakha assassinated Elbeg Khan's son Gün-Temür in 1402, the Oirat leader assumed supreme power in Mongolia and the title of Guilichi Khaan. By 1408 his former ally, Batula, ousted Ugechi Khaskha and assumed power himself, while Arughtai elected another of Elbeg Khan's sons, Bunyashiri, as Khaan. While this civil war was ongoing, the Ming continued to interfere, by granting imperial titles and supplies to other Oirat factions to strengthen them against the Khaan, coupled with invasions of Mongolia itself by the Yongle Emperor. On other occasions, in order to prevent the Oirat from becoming too powerful, the Ming would send troops and supplies to aid the Yuan Khans against the Oirat.       After the Yongle Emperor's death in 1424, Ming meddling in Mongolia slackened. With this, the Oirat leader Toghon Chingsang, son of Batula, gradually succeeded in taking control over eastern Mongolia. A skilled politician and diplomat, he maintained good ties with neighbours outside Mongolia, like the Ming and the Jurchen, while strengthening his control over the Mongols and finding rival puppets to install on the Yuan throne. Toghon and his son Esen defeated and executed Arughtai in 1434, and then the rival Chinggisid Khan in 1438. With this, Toghon took effective control of Mongolia. Through marriage alliance and diplomacy he took most of the rest too. With a new puppet Khaan on the throne, Toghon was made the taishi, derived originally from the Chinese Grand Preceptor. Toghon died soon after this, and was succeeded to the position of taishi by his son Esen. Hence, the influential Esen Taishi came to dominate Mongolia.       A skilled general beyond even his father, by the time Esen Taishi took control at the start of the 1440s he had campaigned as far west as Moghulistan and back. He held onto power with an iron hand and cooperative khaans, crushing rebellions and bringing the Jurchen in Manchuria and cities of what's now northwestern China's Gansu province under his rule. Ming armies into the steppe were defeated; the Ming generals and emperors could no longer hold a candle to the might of the Yongle Emperor.       Struggling to contain Esen Taishi's expansion militarily or politically, the Ming tried a new strategy: economic warfare. During Toghon Taishi's period, trade had flowed relatively easily between Mongolia and the Ming, with horses, livestock and furs coming from Mongol lands and manufactured goods and materials from China. Envoys had travelled freely, but the Mongols had also learned to take advantage of Ming gift giving to envoys. Mongol embassies arriving with several thousands persons in tow, which all had to be housed, fed and gifted at the expense of the Ming court. The Ming demanded that Esen Taishi restrict these embassies to only a few hundred men, which Esen felt as an insult. Though forbidden by the Ming, in exchange for horses, border guards and other lords near the frontier traded weapons and armour to the Mongols. Though Esen Taishi would have preferred to maintain good relations and continue profiting off of the Ming, the Ming's harsher treatment of his envoys and efforts to shut down the trade over the border either pushed Esen too far, or served as a useful pretext for war. Mongol attacks on the north began, and the inexperienced, overconfident and poorly advised Zhengtong Emperor, a great-grandson of the Yongle Emperor, marched from Beijing to face the Mongols in battle. In August 1449, the Mongol-Oirat forces outmaneuvered the Ming and then inflicted a crushing defeat upon them at the Tumu Fort, and captured the Zhengtong Emperor. With his captive in tow, Esen Taishi laid siege to Beijing itself and raided the northern countryside, though called off the campaign and eventually freed his imperial prisoner, hoping he would cause trouble with the new Ming emperor who had been installed.        The Tumu Crisis, as it came to be known, was a huge embarrassment for the Ming, and put an end to any belief that the Ming could continue to work offensively against the Mongols. While that had been possible in the careful military structure under the Yongle Emperor, after his death the Ming imperial and military infrastructure lacked the ability or the will to carry out such campaigns, yet had retained the misplaced confidence in their ability to do so. Esen Taishi had just poked through that lie with a hundred thousand arrows. Now turning to the defensive, the Ming renewed an age-old strategy against the nomads: building border fortifications to impede their movement. So began the steady construction of the Great Wall of China as it exists today, beginning first north of Beijing and in time crawling along the entire Mongol frontier.       In turn, the Tumu crisis did not help Esen Taishi's leadership. His puppet khan, Taisun, began to conspire against him, and they met in battle in 1452. Victorious, Esen Taishi sought to do away with the puppets altogether and rule as khan in his own right, until his assassination in 1455. The height of Oirat domination over the Chinggisids thus passed, and for the next decades contenders to the Chinggisid throne fought against Oirat efforts to reassert their hegemony. What followed was more warfare, great and petty, until Mongolia was reunified again under Chinggisid leadership in the early 1500s by Batu-Möngke Dayan Khaan, more usually known as Dayan Khaan. Raised to office and aided throughout his reign by his skilled mother-in-law/wife Mandukhai Khatun, after years of fighting against Oirats, other Mongols and the Ming, by 1510 Dayan Khaan succeeded in controlling all of Mongolia.  He appointed his sons and commanders to head new administrative units; removed the lords who stood against him, reconfirmed those who supported him,  and divided the population of Mongolia into  6 tümens, made up of  54 otogs.        The Dayan Khaanid 1500s was much more stable compared to the century before. It's not clear how long Dayan Khaan reigned for, with some putting his death in the 1540s, or before 1520. One consequence of his reign was dividing the empire between his sons, assigning them to the various tümed across Mongolia, with one intended as an overarching khan. But his power waned as that of the aristocrats' grew, and at the end of the 1540s a grandson of Dayan Khan, Altan Khan, usurped power. This ushered in another period of centralization and military authority, as Altan Khan led attacks against the Kazakhs, Oirats and the Ming. In one of his most notable exploits, in 1550 he attacked Beijing itself and set its outskirts aflame. The Ming Emperor was forced into a peace treaty which heavily favoured the Mongols and provided them gifts and advantageous trade terms; a far cry from the offensive might the Yongle Emperor had once employed.       One of the most lasting consequences of Altan Khan was the promotion of Buddhism in Mongolia, for Altan Khan and his third wife, Jönggen Khatun, were its great patrons. Though Buddhism had a presence in Mongolia for centuries, it had never been a large or significant one. The late thirteenth century saw some flourishing of the faith among the elite, which continued in the following centuries. In the 1570s Altan Khan and his Khatun invited to Mongolia the Third Dalai Lama, Sonam Gyatso; except, he was not yet called the Dalai Lama. This title was bestowed upon Sonam Gyatso by Altan Khan, coming from the Mongolian word Dalai,  meaning Ocean. The Dalai Lama was thus the oceanic, or universal, lama, and the title was posthumously applied to Sonam Gyatso's two previous reincarnations. After Sonam Gyatso's death in 1588, the Fourth Dalai Lama was a great-grandson of Altan Khan, and thereby a descendant of Chinggis Khan.        The official, dedicated patronage of Buddhism by Altan Khan and his successors allowed it to spread across Mongolia as it never had before. Altan Khan even took materials from the ruins of the once imperial capital of Qaraqorum to build a monastery nearby, known as the Erdene Zuu which still stands today. Anti-shamanic efforts by the succeeding khans and the new Buddhist clergy reduced the influence of the shamans, and the building of monasteries across Mongolia was the start of the powerful Buddhist Lamas who would, in time, rule large swathes of the country. It was not a quick or perfect transformation;  Mongolian sources speak of efforts to replace the traditional Mongol shamanist-animism well into the seventeenth century, and even today shamans can still be consulted in Mongolia.    From the conversion of the Northern Yuan and its people, Buddhism spread to the remaining independent Oirats, who the Yuan had steadily pushed from their base in western Mongolia. Part of the Oirats travelled far west in one of the final great steppe-migrations; these were the Kalmyks, who made their way west of the Caspian Sea, displacing and ruling over the Nogai Horde. This Kalmyk Khanate was conquered by the Russians in the early eighteenth century, and today they remain largely in Russia's republic of Kalmykia, which contains the only notable Buddhist population in Europe. Meanwhile, the left wing of the Oirat confederation, known in Mongolian as the dzün gar, went on to establish, in the early seventeenth century, what is normally considered the final steppe empire; the Dzungar Khanate. They ruled that ill-defined region of Moghulistan, known after them as Dzungaria, where today the border of China, Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan meet. The Dzungars would be a fierce foe against Qing Dynasty expansion into Central Asia, and fought constantine against their neighbours in Tibet, Mongolia proper and westwards against the Kazakhs. Ultimately the Dzungars met utter destruction at the hands of the Qing Dynasty in the mid-eighteenth century, an event known as the Dzungar Genocide. The state itself was not merely dismantled, but in its heartland in the Dzungar Basin, its Mongolian speaking population was exterminated and then their lands given to Qing soldiers.   After Altan Khan's death in the 1570s, the final period of Mongol unity under a Chinggisid khan passed. The succeeding khans of the lineage of Dayan Khaan could not regain their authority after Altan Khan's usurpation and minimization of them. The lords of the tümed, the regional divisions, had grown in power and independence. In 1604, a descendant of Dayan Khaan was to become the last Chinggisid in Mongolia to have real power. This was Ligdan Khaan, whose thirty year reign saw the end of Mongolian independence for the next four hundred years. So weak had the position of Great Khan grown compared to other tümed leaders, that Ligdan's rivals disparagingly called him only the Khan of the Chakhar Mongols —corresponding roughly to today's Inner Mongolia— rather than Great Khan. His greatest foe came from the east; the Jurchen had been unified and made resurgent. Their leader, Nurhaci, had declared himself Khan of a new Jin Dynasty. It was as if the Mongols' old foes had returned from the grave. Nurhaci led repeated attacks against Ligdan Khaan, and allied with his rivals in Mongolia.    Ligdan Khaan was hounded and pursued, and last minute reforms and promises he made could not arrest his fate. In 1634, he died of smallpox in what is now Gansu. His son, Ejei Khaan, was quickly forced to surrender to Nurhaci's son and successor, Hong Taiji, who declared both a new name for the Jurchen, and a new dynasty; now they were the Manchu, masters of the Qing Dynasty, the final imperial dynasty to rule China. With Ejei at his side, Hong Taiji took the submission of most of the Mongols. Many accompanied him in his conquest of China following the collapse of the Ming Dynasty in 1644, and Mongols remained important part of Qing armies even in the wars against the Dzungars. The Manchu, descendents of the Jurchen Jin Dynasty which had fallen to the Mongols in 1234, had in turn conquered both dynasties which had emerged from the Yuan. Ejei Khaan spent the remainder of his life a humbled prince in the Qing court, while his younger brother, Abunai, led a revolt in 1675 against Qing rule, which was swiftly crushed, Abunai killed and many Borjigin in the Chahar lands of southern Mongolia executed.   And so, Chinggisid rule in Mongolia passed into memory. Not all Borjigon were killed; an aristocracy of Dayan Khanid descent remained in Mongolia until the twentieth century, when most were lost in Soviet purges. But effective rule of Mongolia remained in the hands of the Qing Dynasty, their appointees, or Buddhist clergy who became feudal lords in their own right. And yet, Chinggis Khan's memory could not be dislodged. The Qing Emperors appealed to it when it came to controlling the Mongols, and after the start of Qing rule, new chronicles began to be written in Mongolia, in the same Uighur script Chinggis had adopted 400 years prior. With the rediscovery of sections of the Secret History of the Mongols in the seventeenth century, the past and the present of Mongolia could be reunited. In the Erden-yin Tobchi of Sayang Sechen, for example, chapters of the Secret History were combined with the Buddhist teaching which now permeated the Mongol world. Chinggis Khan's confrontation with the Tangut King now involved them both transforming into animals, with Chinggis' victory complete with his transformation into the very sky itself.  But even here, the story begins just as it did in the Secret History; a blue-grey wolf, and a fallow deer, from whose line would come the boy, Temüjin, born clutching a blood clot in his fist the size of a knuckle bone.         Our next series picks up with the conquests of the rise of the Manchu Qing Dynasty, and its conquest of China, so be sure to subscribe to the Kings and Generals Podcast to follow. If you enjoyed this and want to help us continue bringing you great content, please consider supporting us on Patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals , or share this  with your friends and leave reviews on the podcast catcher of your choice. This series was researched and written by Jack Wilson. You can hear more of his discussions on the Mongols at his channel on Youtube, the Jackmeister: Mongol History. This series was narrated by David Schroeder, host of the Cold War on Youtube. This has been Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest, Season 2: The Mongol Conquests. Thank you for listening, and we'll catch you on the next one.   

French postcards were as close as one could get to Playboy in the 19th century. And apparently, they were ubiquitous in America, particularly during the Civil War. And according to our guest, Professor Brett Gary, that's a good starting point to talk about the history of censorship in America. Anthony Comstock served in the Civil War and was appalled by the volume of pornography enjoyed by Union soldiers. After the war, he manifested his dedication to upholding Christian morality by becoming an anti-vice activist to root out obscene literature. To be sure, many were committed to this cause. But it was Comstock who had the power to impose his righteousness on others because of his positions as the U.S. Postal Inspector and secretary of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice. Later, the federal and many states' mini Comstock laws were named after him. With these laws, the vice squad raided bookstores, threatened publishers, and removed books from libraries. And surprisingly, these laws are still on the books, even if they are rarely enforced. But as time wore on, the U.S. Supreme Court, particularly during the Warren Court, restricted the scope of the Comstock laws. So in our time, while there is no censorship of adult literature, school literature continues to be subject to local scrutiny and banning. The latest high-profile such censorship was in Tennessee, where "Maus", a Pulitzer Prize-winning book about the Holocaust was banned. Professor Gary takes us through the history of censorship, including the pre-Civil War fear of "race suicide", all the way to the story of "Maus." He teaches at NYU's Dept. of Media, Culture, and Communication, and his recent book is titled Dirty Works, Obscenity on Trial in America's First Sexual Revolution. Enjoy this episode. Adel Host of ThePeel.news podcast Who are Ukrainians? Who are Kazakhs? History of Wars in Ukraine. Podcast Series: post-USSR SUPPORT: please click here and join our other supporters in the news peeler community. Thank you.

From the heart of the Mongolian steppe, to North China's loess plateaus; from the rugged edges of Northern India, to the hot sands of Syria and the Levant, to humid jungles in southeastern Asia, rocky islands off the coast of Japan, the high peaks of the Caucasus, Himalayas, Altai, Tien Shan and Carpathian Mountains, to the frozen rivers  in Rus' granting access to Eastern Europe, and everywhere in between.  Our series on the Mongol Empire has taken you across Eurasia, meeting all sorts of figures; the brutal Tamerlane, the indefatigable Sultan Baybars, the brave if shortsighted Jalal al-Din Mingburnu and his foolish father Muhammad Khwarezmshah; the cunning Jia Sidao, the silver-tongued Qiu Chuji, the thorough scholar Rashid al-Din, and travellers like John de Plano Carpini, William of Rubruck, and Ibn Battuta, to the exhausted but noble-hearted Yelü Chücai. And of course, the Mongols themselves: the powerful Öz Beğ, Khan of the Golden Horde; the thorough and pious convert Ghazan Il-Khan; the scheming Du'a of the Chagatais, the stout Qaidu Khan of the Ögedaids, to the Great Khans of the thirteenth century, the most powerful of men; Khubilai, whose hands scrambled for more until his body and empire failed his ambitions; his brother Möngke, whose steely determination sought to solidify the empire at all costs, no matter the bloodshed; Güyük, a reluctant and unfortunate man to ascend to the throne; his mother Törögene, whose fierce will forced her son to that same throne; Ögedai, a drunk who despite his failings built the infrastructure of the empire. And of course, Chinggis himself; once a scared boy in the steppes, turned into the greatest conqueror of them all. Today we end our journey with the Empire of the Great Khans, and reflect on the passage of the Chinggisids. I'm your host David, and this is Kings and Generals, Ages of Conquest.       Back in our first episode, we highlighted certain trends to look for over the course of this series. The first emphasized looking for the middle ground between the Mongols as inherently evil or good forces, but as people whose expansion was rooted in historical events and personages. The second was the struggles that came with the management of a world empire, and the need to rely on non-Mongolian subject peoples—Chinese, Central Asian Muslims, Persians, Turks and others. The third was the struggle for the purpose of the empire; should it be continued conquest, or consolidation and serving the needs of the imperial princes. This was the balance between the Khan and his central government, or the Chinggisid and military aristocrats. The fourth was the steady assimilation, particularly Turkification, of the Mongols outside of Mongolia, as Mongolian was replaced as the language of administration, legitimacy and finally, among the ruling family itself, even while retaining the Mongolian imperial ideology.        Regarding the first theme, we have sought to highlight in our many discussions of sources their often complicated, conflicting portrayals or events and persons. While authors like Ibn al-Athir, Nasawi and Juzjani had little good to say about the Mongols or Chinggis Khan, and fit well with the popular model the destructive brute, we've also looked at many sources which had more positive portrayals of the khans. Some of these are rather obvious, imperial-produced sources such as the Secret History of the Mongols, but even sources from outside the empire could give glowing reviews of Chinggis Khan. For instance, the fourteenth century English writer Geoffrey Chaucer, in the Squire's Tale of his famous Canterbury Tales, opens with the following lines:   At Tzarev in the land of Tartary There dwelt a king at war with Muscovy Which brought the death of many a doughty man This noble king was known as Cambuskan And in his time enjoyed such great renown That nowhere in that region up or down Was one so excellent in everything; Nothing he lacked belonging to a king.       Written at the same time as Toqtamish Khan of the Golden Horde was fighting for control of that Khanate, here Chaucher remembered Chinggis Khan not as a bloodthirsty barbarian, but as a monarch embodying all ideal qualities of kingship. Chaucer continues thusly;   As to the faith in which he had been born He kept such loyalties as he had sworn, Then he was powerful and wise and brave, Compassionate and just, and if he gave His word he kept it, being honourable, The same to all, benevolent, and stable As is a circle's centre; and in fight As emulous as any squire or knight. Young personable, fresh and fortunate, Maintaining such a kingliness of state There never was his match in mortal man, This noble king, this Tartar Cambuskan.        For writers in fourteenth century England, obviously distant from the Mongol Empire itself, it was not unbecoming to idealize the portrayal of Chinggis Khan. This is not to say that Chaucher's description is accurate, or necessarily reflects any actual qualities about the man or any of his descendants. But rather, it reflects historical perception. How an individual is perceived by contemporaries, history, and modern people often bears little resemblance to actual details of the individual.  Instead, people will contort an image for whatever use suits their current purposes, context and political climate. Thus, warlords from the late imperial, and post-Mongol world styled Chinggis' image to suit their needs. In Central Asia Chinggisid descent remained one of the most prestigious, and necessary, requirements for rulership up until the nineteenth century in some areas. This was problematic though with the spread of Islam, given that Chinggis Khan's actual life produced very few episodes to nicely accommodate an Islamic narrative. Certain Persian writings during the Ilkhanate sought to fix this by making Chinggis a Muslim in all but name. On the tomb of Tamerlane, an inscription likely added during the reign of his grandson Ulugh Beğ, makes Tamerlane a descendant of both the Prophet Muhammad and of Chinggis Khan. Later post-imperial authors had a more direct solution; simply making Chinggis Khan outright a Muslim. As the destruction of the conquests slipped further back in time, this became easier and easier to accomplish.    Religion was not the only aspect which can be molded, for Chinggis' very status as a Mongol becomes malleable in state efforts to construct national mythos, in both medieval and modern settings. Today, you can find countries where official propaganda, or influential theorists, incorporate Chinggis into the desired story of their nation-state. In China, there remains a significant Mongolian population, largely in what the Chinese call the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, the land south of the Gobi desert but north of the mountains which divide it from the North China plain. The Chinese government has taken to presenting China's non-Han peoples, Mongols among them, more or less as Chinese minority peoples and actively encourages their adoption of the state-language, Mandarin, and Han Chinese culture. In this view, the Mongol conquests are sometimes presented as a period of national reunification rather than foreign conquest. The efforts of Khubilai Khaan to legitimize the Yuan Dynasty based on Chinese dynastic legal precedent becomes the quote-on-quote “historical evidence,” that Chinggis Khan was actually Chinese, or that in fact, the Mongol conquerors were fully assimilated into the Chinese population and culture. The borders of the Yuan Dynasty served to justify later Chinese territorial claims in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Manchuria, Tibet and Yunnan; places that were, before the Mongols, inconsistently in the Chinese sphere of influence, but since the conquests have often remained dominated by empires based in China. Not coincidentally, such narratives serve to support the narrative of 5,000 years of a continuous Chinese Empire, and remove the sting that may accompany the embarrassment of being conquered by perceived barbarians.    Likewise, various Turkic peoples, most notably Kazakhs, Tatars, and Anatolian Turks, have sought to claim Chinggis as their own, and there are even groups in Korea and Japan that will argue that Chinggis was actually one of theirs. The Japanese version has Chinggis as the Samurai Minamoto no Yoshitsune, who faked his death and fled Japan for the steppe! Khubilai's later invasions of Japan again become not foreign assaults, but attempts at national reunification or the efforts by Yoshitsune's descendants to return home. And of course, fringe groups even in Europe and Russia which, refusing to believe a barbarian horseman could conquer such great states, insist that Chinggis was actually a red-haired, green-eyed man of European ancestry. Such claims often include vague references to the mummies of the Tarim Basin, who bore some features associated with Caucasian populations. The fact that these mummies pre-date Chinggis by millenia is often conveniently left out. All of these people care much more about ethnic categorization than Chinggis himself likely ever did.        Just as religion or ethnicity can be forced to fit certain agendas, so too can portrayal as barbarian or saviour. In Mongolia today, Chinggis Khan's unification of the Mongols, his introduction of a writing system, religious tolerance, laws and stability are most heavily emphasized. For building a post-soviet national identity, obviously these are useful attributes to appeal to for the desired national character. But the Mongolian governmet also tends to gloss over the aspects less appreciated in the twenty-first century: namely, the destruction of people and property on a massive scale, mass-rapes, towers of skulls and wars of conquest. The fact that Mongolia's two neighbours, Russia and China, suffered particularly under Mongol onslaughts, also avoids some diplomatic hurdles to step past these military aspects. For most of the twentieth century during Mongolia's years as a Soviet satellite state, Chinggis was largely pushed aside, framed as a feudal lord. Instead, Mongolia's hero of the 1921 socialist revolution, Damdin Sükhbaatar, became the preferred national icon. After Mongolia was democratized in the 1990s after the fall of the USSR, Chinggis Khan has seen a massive resurgence in popularity. Today, Chinggis and Sükhbaatar remain national icons, with monuments to both throughout the country. Outside Mongolia's parliament, the main square has changed names from Sükhbaatar to Chinggis Square, and since back to Sükhbaatar square. An equestrian statue to Sükhbaatar sits in the middle of that square. More than a few foreign observers had mistakenly called this a statue of Chinggis. In fact, only a few metres away from the equestrian statue of Sükhbaatar sits a massive Chinggis Khan on a throne flanked by his generals, at the top of the steps leading into Mongolia's parliament. In a way it is metaphorical. No matter how prominent any later hero of Mongolia may be, he will always stand in the shadow of Chinggis Khan.  And that's not even mentioning the 40 metre tall silver monstrosity about 50 kilometres outside of Ulaanbaatar. Speaking of state narratives, much of the cost for this statue was covered by the company owned by Khaltmaagin Battulga, a former professional sambo wrestler who from 2017-2021 served as the fifth President of Mongolia.       Outside of Mongolia though, Chinggis and the Mongol Empire remain a top-point of reference to paint someone in the most unfavourable light. One of the highest level cases of recent years was when the President of Iraq, the late Saddam Hussein, compared former US President George W. Bush to Hülegü, Chinggis' grandson and conqueror of Baghdad. The American bombing and capture of Baghdad, and ensuing tragedies that Iraq as suffered in the aftermath of the campaign, have only solidified the connection for a number of Muslims.  Meanwhile Russian television and education tend to present the Mongols in a style comparable to Zack Snyder's film 300, such as the 2017 Russian film Легенда о Коловрате [Legenda O Kolovrate], also known as Furious. Like the Spartans in the film or Frank Miller's graphic novel, the Rus' soldiers are presented as formidable warriors fighting monstrous, untrained hordes from the east. Only through sheer numbers or trickery do the disgusting Orientals overcome the pasty-white heroes of the story— though few of the heroes in the Russian films have Scottish accents. Russia has turned the so-called Tatar Yoke into a catch-all to explain any perceived deficiencies compared to western Europe, from government absolutism to alcoholism. Not only the Russians have employed the comparison: “scratch a Russian and you'll find a Tatar,” Napoleon Bonaparte is supposed to have quipped. And in 2018 the Wall Street Journal released a particularly poorly written article, which compared the political machinations of current president Vladimir Putin as “Russia's turn to its Asian past,” accompanied by vague comparisons to the Mongols and an awful portrait of Putin drawn in Mongolian armour. In contrast, the Russian Defence Minister, at the time of writing, is Sergei Shoigu, a fellow of Tuvan descent who is alleged to enjoy comparisons of himself to Sübe'edei, the great Mongol general popularly, though inaccurately, portrayed as a Tuvan. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, essentially a good old-fashioned war of conquests accompanied by war crimes and destruction of cities, has also earned many comparisons to the Mongol conquests by many online commentators. Though unlike the Russians, the Mongols actually took Kyiv.   Somewhat surprisingly, most cinematic portrayals of Chinggis himself lean towards sympathetic or heroic. One of the most recent is a 2018 Chinese film entitled Genghis Khan in English, which features a slim Chinese model in the titular role, and one of his few depictions without any facial hair. In that film he battles a bunch of skeletons and monsters, and it could be best described as “not very good,” as our series researcher can, unfortunately, attest. One popular portrayal is the 2007 film Mongol, directed by Sergei Bodrov and starring a Japanese actor in the role of Chinggis. That actor, by the way, went on to play one of Thor's buddies in the Marvel movies.  Here, Chinggis is a quiet, rather thoughtful figure, in a film which emphasizes the brutal childhood he suffered from. Another sympathetic portrayal, and one perhaps the most popular in Mongolia, is the 2004 Inner Mongolian series where Ba Sen, an actor who claims descent from Chagatai and appeared in the previously two mentioned films, plays the role of Chinggis.       Hollywood does not tend to portray Chinggis Khan or the Mongols in films at all, but when it does, it really goes for a swing and a miss. Bill and Ted's Excellent Adventure has Chinggis essentially only a step above a cave-man in that film. Other Hollywood endeavours are infamous for having non-Asian actors in the role, such as Egyptian-born Omar Shariff in 1965's Genghis Khan, Marvin Miller in 1951's The Golden Horde and the most infamous of them all, the cowboy John Wayne in 1956's The Conqueror. That film's theatrical release poster bears the tasteful tagline of, “I am Temujin…barbarian… I fight! I love! I conquer… like a Barbarian!” The film was also produced by Howard Hughes, founder of Playboy Magazine, and was filmed near a nuclear testing site.  As you may suspect, that film bears as much resemblance to the historical events as an opium-induced fever dream.        The appearance and depiction of Chinggis and his successors varies wildly. The internet today loves the stories of Chinggis being the ancestor of millions of people, and killing so many people that it changed the earth's climate. The articles that made both of these claims though, rested on shaky evidence. In the first, which we dedicated an entire episode of this podcast too, the study claimed that high rates of a certain haplotype among the Hazara of Afghanistan demonstrated that Chinggis himself bore that haplotype, and Chinggis was extrapolated to be the ancestor of other peoples bearing such a haplotype. But the historical sources indicate Chinggis and his immediate descendants spent little time in Afghanistan, and the associated Haplotype was probably one associated with various populations leaving Mongolia over centuries, rather than specifically Chinggis himself.  Likewise, the study which spawned the claim that the Mongols killed enough people to cool the climate, firstly did not make that claim itself, but moreso incorrectly made the Mongol conquests last from 1206 to 1380, and presented it as an almost two-century period of population decline brought on by Mongolian campaigns; despite the fact that the major destructive Mongolian military campaigns largely halted after 1279. While campaigns continued after that, they were never on the level of the great-campaigns of conquest. Thus it's irresponsible to claim that any atmospheric carbon loss over the fourteenth century was brought on by continued Mongol military efforts.       What these two popular descriptions lend themselves to, is one of extremes. The internet loves extremes of anything. For instance, since 1999 the Internet has always sought to outdo itself in declaring the latest Star Wars product to actually be the worst thing ever made. And the Mongol Empire, as history's largest contiguous land-empire, responsible for immense destruction and long-ranging campaigns and forced migrations, can easily slot in this ‘extreme manner.' A “top-ten” list where the author writes about how the Mongols were the most extreme and destructive and badass thing ever, repeating the same 10 facts, probably gets released on the internet every other month. Just as national-myth makers in Ulaanbaatar, Beijing and Moscow set how to portray the Mongol Empire in the way most suited to them, so too does the internet and its writers choose an aspect of the empire to emphasis; be it religious tolerance, free-trade, brutality, multi-culturalism, Islam, clash of civilizations, human impact on climate, the territorial expanse of a certain country or its national identity, or whatever argument the author hopes to make.        The Mongol Empire though remains in the past, and should be treated, and learned about, as such.  The events which led to the rise, expansion and fall of the Mongol Empire do not fit into nice, sweeping modern narratives, but their own historical context and situation. The Mongol Empire was not predetermined to ever expand out of Mongolia, or to break apart in 1260; had Chinggis Khan been struck by an arrow outside the walls of Zhongdu, or Möngke lived another ten years, in both cases the empire, and indeed the world, would look dramatically different. History is not the things which ought to be or needed to happen or were supposed to happen; it is the things that did happen, and those things did not occur simply for the purposes of the modern world to exist. A million choices by hundreds of millions of individuals, affected by climate and geography with a healthy dose of luck and happenstance, resulted in the world as we know it. Reading backwards from the present to understand the course of the Mongol Empire, and attempting to make it fit into the political narratives we like today, only does a disservice to history. It should be seen not as a virtuous force bringing continental peace justified by easier trade, nor as a demonic horde, but as an event within human history, in which real humans took part, where great tragedy occured in the pursuit of empire.     History is not just written by the victor of the actual battles; as we've detailed across this series, we have no shortage of historical sources on the Mongol Empire; imperial approved sources, sources by travellers passing through the empire, to sources written by the peoples the Mongols crushed. Instead, the history learned in schools and passed down through historical memory and media is built on top of preferred state narratives, those made today and in the past.   Our series on the Mongol Empire concludes next week with a final afterward on Mongolia after 1368, so be sure to subscribe to the Kings and Generals podcast to follow. If you enjoyed this was want to help us keep bringing you great content, then consider supporting us on patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. This episode was researched and written by our series historian, Jack Wilson. I'm your host David, and we'll catch you on the next one. 

After two decades of anarchy, one man appeared from the darkness to restore the Golden Horde to its might: this was Toqtamish. Just as the candle may spark up just before it goes out,  Toqtamish seemed poised to right the wrongs of the previous decades, and reaffirm the power of the Golden Horde over its subjects, and thus bring about further centuries of greatness. But then came Temür, Toqtamish's former patron, turned greatest enemy. I'm your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Age of Conquest.   While our series on the Golden Horde has so far focused on the descendants of Batu Khan, the khans of the Golden Horde until the start of 1360s, the other descendants of Jochi's many other sons had their own appanages within the khanate. Of the fourteen named sons of Jochi,  by the late fourteenth century  there were two of these lineages left who held any might. These were the lines of Shiban, Jochi's fifth son, and Toqa-Temür, Jochi's youngest son. As the house of Batu and Orda went extinct in the middle of the fourteenth century, the torch of rulership was passed between these lineages. It seems both lineages were largely based in the eastern part of the khanate, in the Blue Horde or the ulus of Orda. The Shibanids held lands in what was to become the Khanate of Sibir, named for the fortress of the same name. The heart of this territory was the upper Irtysh River, and if the name of Sibir sounds familiar, that's because in time it gave its name to Siberia. The Toqa-Temürids meanwhile seem to have generally ranged east of the Ural river, across the Kazakh steppes.   In the chaos that followed Berdi Beğ Khan's death in 1359, it was representatives of the Shibanids who first moved west to claim the throne in Sarai. When Orda's line died out in the 1360s, the Toqa-Temürids were the ones on the scene to usurp the ulus in the Blue Horde lands, though it was not a secure power base. The order of khans is a matter of great contention: reigns were brief, and various sources often offer contradictory information, which is often further contradicted with the dates given on coinage in the period. What is clear is that the Blue Horde contenders quickly, if not immediately, saw their conflict and their state as independent of the wars for Sarai ongoing at the same time. The Blue Horde was now separate, once more, from the Golden.   One of the earliest figures to seize the vacant throne of the Ordaids was Qara-Nogai, a Toqa-Temürid. In the early 1360s he was elected khan in Sighnaq, the Blue Horde administrative capital, located on the lower reaches of Syr Darya River near the Aral Sea. His reign was brief, but after some years of conflict members of his family continued to claim the throne; the most notable of these was Urus Khan, whose reign is usually dated to beginning in 1368.    Urus Khan was a real strong man— and not a descendant of Orda, as newer research has demonstrated. In the decade of his reign Urus established a firm hold on power and firm military backing. Rivals for the throne were violently killed or exiled, and around 1372 he even led an army to take Sarai and declare himself Khan of the Golden Horde, though he soon abandoned the city. Nonetheless he exercised a monopoly on power in the Blue Horde which made it considerably more stable than the ongoing troubles in the Golden Horde, which was too much even for Urus to exert control over. But such was his influence that his sons and descendants continued to be prominent players for decades. Two sons, Quyurchuq and Ulugh Muhammad, later became khans of the Golden Horde, while the latter established the Khanate of Kazan; a grandson of Urus, Baraq, also became Khan of the Golden Horde, while Urus' great-grandchildren established the Kazakh Khanate. It should not be a surprise then that some historians suggest that Urus should be identified with Alash Khan, the legendary founder of the Kazakhs from whom all khans were descended.  Descent from Urus, in effect, became a new form of legitimacy after the fourteenth century.   As mentioned, Urus took to killing and exiling his rivals to power. These were often fellow Toqa-Temürids. One such fellow who he had killed was his cousin, Toy-Khwaja. In the aftermath, Toy-Khwaja's son was forced to flee; this is our first introduction to Toqtamish. Toy-Khwaja must have been quite the rival and had some following, for Toqtamish never had much trouble finding supporters for himself. One source indicates Toqtamish's mother was a high ranking lady of the Sufi-Qonggirads, a dynasty which had recently established its quasi-independence from the Blue Horde at Urgench and now ruled Khwarezm. A young and courageous warrior, if not the most tactically skilled, Prince Toqtamish deeply desired both revenge and power. Urus Khan's horsemen pursued him, and Toqtamish fled for his life right out of the steppe, crossing the Syr Darya River to seek shelter with a new rising power: Aksak Temür as the Turks of the time knew him; he'd prefer to be known as Emir Temür Güregen, son-in-law to the house of Chinggis and sahib-i qiran, “lord of the Auspicious Conjunction.” Persians knew him as Temür-i Lang, and today we know him best as Tamerlane. Since half the people in this period are named some variation of Temür, to help make it easier to tell everyone apart we'll stick with his popular moniker of Tamerlane.   Since the beginning of the 1360s, Tamerlane had fought for power in the ruins of the western half of the Chagatai Khanate. By spring 1370 he had succeeded in becoming master of Transoxania. As a non-Chinggisid, Tamerlane could not bear the title of khan or rule in his own right over nomads. Thus his official title was Emir, presenting himself as the protector of his new puppet khan, a descendant of Ögedai. From this basis the Timürid empire began to expand.    When Toqtamish fled to the domains of Tamerlane around 1375, the Emir's attention was still mostly local. His campaigns into Iran had not yet begun, and instead he alternated between attacking the Sufi-Qonggirads in Khwarezm, and Qamar al-Din, the ruler of the eastern Chagatai lands, or Moghulistan as it was commonly known at the time.  Undoubtedly, Tamerlane held a wary eye to his northern border; Urus Khan and his horsemen posed a real threat to Tamerlane, in a way none of his other neighbours did. Thus when a young, pliable claimant to the throne of Urus arrived in his court, Tamerlane was more than willing to oblige. Should Toqtamish control the Blue Horde, then Tamerlane needn't worry over that border and could turn his attention elsewhere. Toqtamish was received in Tamerlane's court with high honours and respect, and granted Otrar and other lands along the Syr Darya as patrimony, in addition to troops, horses and supplies. Not coincidentally, Otrar was within spitting distance of Sighnaq. Tamerlane had given Toqtamish a platform to seize the Blue Horde.   Toqtamish quickly began raiding the lands of Urus, building his reputation as a warrior and charismatic leader. But Urus was no fool and quickly had an army sent after Toqtamish, under the command of a son, Qutlugh Buqa. Despite fierce effort on Toqtamish's part, and the death of Qutlugh Buqa in the fighting, Toqtamish was defeated and sent back to Tamerlane. The Emir provided Toqtamish another army, only for Toqtamish to again be defeated when another of Urus' armies came seeking to avenge Qutlugh Buqa. This time, according to the Timurid historian Yazdi, Toqtamish was so thoroughly beaten down that he ditched his armour and swam across the Syr Darya River to save his life, and returned to Tamerlane naked and humbled. Not long after came a representative of Urus, named Edigü, a powerful bey within the Blue Horde and head of the Manghit people. Edigü bore Urus' message demanding Tamerlane handover Toqtamish; was it not right for the father to avenge the son? What right did Tamerlane have to hold such a fugitive?   Tamerlane refused to handover Toqtamish— whatever Tamerlaner's faults, and there were many, he had given his word as overlord to protect the young prince. Some authors go as far as to present an almost father/son dynamic between them. It's not impossible; Tamerlane had gone through his own period of qazaqliq,  the Turkic term for when a prince was reduced to a state of near brigandage, a freebooter fighting for every scrap. It's the etymological basis, by the way, for both the Turkic Kazakh and the Cossacks of the Pontic steppes.  Tamerlane may have sympathized with the fierce, proud Toqtamish, in contrast with his own sons who tended to range from lazy to unreliable. Tamerlane's own favoured son and heir, his second son Jahangir Mirza, died about this time in 1376 or 7, leaving his father stricken with grief. Toqtamish may have filled in the gap, and as Toqtamish himself had lost his father, it's not difficult to imagine Toqtamish valuing Tamerlane's presence greatly.  Of course, it may simply have been convenience on the part of both parties.    With Tamerlane's refusal to hand over Toqtamish, Urus Khan led an army against them. Tamerlane raised one in response, with Toqtamish in the vanguard. Skirmishing ensued, and nearly did the full forces clash, had not, according to Yazdi, a vicious rainstorm kept the armies apart. They returned to their respective realms. The dramatic confrontation between the two great warlords of Central Asia was averted when, likely in 1378, Urus Khan suddenly died, followed in quick succession by the chief of his sons, Toqta Caya.       In a mad dash, Tamerlane sent Toqtamish with an army to Sighnaq, and had him finally declared khan. Tamerlane returned comfortably to his capital of Samarkand, only to learn that Toqtamish had again been ousted, when another of Urus Khan's sons, Temür Malik, had declared himself khan and raised an army. Once more Tamerlane reinforced Toqtamish, though now Toqtamish was able to gather more support of his own. Finally Temür Malik Khan was overcome, and Toqtamish firmly emplaced as Khan of the Blue Horde. Not coincidentally, from this point onwards Tamerlane was able to secure his frontiers and begin his southern conquests into Iran, which would hold his attention for the rest of the 1380s.       The new Khan, Toqtamish,  set about confirming the support of the pillars of his new realm. The Shibanids of Sibir, and the Sufi-Qonggirads of Khwarezm, despite their capital of Urgench being sacked by Tamerlane in 1379, were important suppliers of troops for Toqtamish. Numerous beys and princes came over to pledge allegiance to him. Toqtamish either convinced them of his divine support, or richly rewarded them, and succeeded in breaking even some factions. The Manghit leader Edigü, for instance, found that his brother ‘Isa Beğ became a staunch ally of Toqtamish Khan. Edigü's sister had been married to Urus Khan's son, the late Temür Malik Khan, and despite the latter's defeat Edigü remained a powerful and prominent figure within the Horde, controlling a great swath of pasture east of the Ural and Emba Rivers. To bring him over, or at least stop his active resistance, Toqtamish provided Edigü tarkhan, or tax-exempt, status and granted him more lands.       With his rear secured, Toqtamish had not a moment to lose. His intentions were clear. Toqtamish was not aiming to just succeed his father, or Urus Khan, or be merely Khan of the Blue Horde. He had much bigger dreams. He idolized Öz Beg Khan and the glory days of the united ulus. Beyond that though, outside of Mongolia proper, Toqtamish was effectively the only Chinggisid monarch who held power in his own name. The Yuan Khans had been pushed from China, and their power restricted to the Mongol homeland, and their attention focused on battling Ming Dynasty incursions into the steppe. In the west, all other Chinggisids were puppets or minor princelings. Toqtamish therefore presented himself not just as heir to Özbeg and Jani Beg, or of Batu and Jochi, but as the heir to Chinggis Khan. For the rest of his life Toqtamish remained the most powerful single member of the house of Chinggis, and styled himself not as khan, but as khagan, Great Khan. And for that, he needed Sarai.         Quickly, but carefully, he made his way onto the Jochid capital, winning over allies or defeating foes as he went, before taking the city in 1380. Only one great enemy remained, and that was the western beylerbeyi, Mamai. There was not a moment to waste once Mamai suffered defeat at Kulikovo against the Prince of Moscow in September 1380. As Mamai retreated to his base in the steppes north of Crima, Toqtamish granted yarliqs to the Italians in the Crimea to confirm and expand their privileges, trapping Mamai between them. Toqtamish unleashed a full assault on Mamai and crushed his power in a decisive engagement along the Kalka River. In the aftermath Toqtamish took Mamai's camp, his treasury, his wives and beys, and the rest of his troops. Mamai fled for his life, making his way to Caffa, where the Genoese took him captive and executed him in the name of Toqtamish Khaan.        By 1381 Toqtamish was master of the Golden Horde, and set about reminding everyone of the order of things. The Rus' princes reaffirmed their submission, with even Dmitri Donskoi, the victor of Kulikovo, promptly sending gifts for Toqtamish, his wives and his princes. But their tardiness in submitting in person brought Toqtamish to shorten the leash. The Rus' had grown too haughty over the last two decades, and Toqtamish surprised them with a sudden and horrific onslaught.  The Prince of Ryazan' saved his city with a last moment surrender. Other cities were not so lucky. Dmitri Donskoi had hoped to raise an army, but losses after Kulikovo were too great, the princes unwilling to follow Dmitri to such certain doom. In the end Dmitri was forced to flee Moscow before Toqtamish encircled the city. After three days, on the 26th of August 1382,  the city was stormed, sacked and burned. Numerous others followed suit.        Dmitri Donskoi was forced to send his son Vasili as hostage to the Horde, and paid heavy tribute. Once more Moscow minted coins in the name of the Khan, and once more Dmitri collected taxes for him too. Though Dmitri had his revenge on the Prince of Ryazan' with a vicious attack, the victor of Kulikovo died in 1389, only thirty years old.        Now master of the lands of Jochi, Toqtamish set about re-strengthening the Horde. The internal stability, as the Horde enjoyed 10 years of relative peace after Toqtamish took Sarai, did wonders for internal trade and movement, coupled with the lessening of the plague impact. He enacted monetary reforms, expanding the centres which minted coins and a lighter standard for silver dirhams, which in the opinion of researchers like Nedashkovsky, was a recognition and response to inflation.  When the bey Bekbulat tried to declare himself khan in Crimea, Toqtamish was able to come to agreement with him and reach a peaceable solution.  Khwarezm and its Sufi-Qonggirad Dynasty, which Tamerlane had considered his subjects, now recognized Toqtamish as overlord and minted coins in his name from 1381 onwards. On the western frontier, the loss of lands to Lithuania was halted when Toqtamish won a victory over the Lithuanians at Poltava in 1382, and forced them to continue paying tribute for the lands they had already taken from the Horde. From Toqtamish's point-of-view, this was essentially making them his vassals, though the Lithuanians did not quite see it like this. Nonetheless, the Khan retained generally stable relations with the states along his border.   Toqtamish also looked abroad. In distant Moghulistan Toqtamish established relations with Qamar al-Din, the effective ruler of the eastern Chagatai lands. In 1385 he opened contact with the Mamluks of Egypt, the first time in ten years diplomatic contact was made. He did not make the mistake of invading Azerbaijan, but instead formed a treaty of friendship with its ruler, Sultan Ahmad Jalayir. And this became quite the issue, for shortly after this treatment was made, Tamerlane invaded Azerbaijan and forced Ahmad Jalayir to flee Tabriz.    Perhaps Tamerlane had been unaware of the treaty between Toqtamish and Sultan Ahmad, but it seems to have been the evolution of the ever-more fraught relationship between the two. Toqtamish Khan and Emir Tamerlane were already on roads to argument with both claiming the lands of Khwarezm. Tamerlane, now with a puppet Il-Khan, made a show of restoring the former lands of the Ilkhanate; just as Toqtamish was making a claim to restoring former Jochid lands in the Caucasus. But there was another ideological aspect at play. As we've emphasized already, Toqtamish was very proud of his Chinggisid ancestry, and appears to have a particular disgust for pretensions of non-Chinggisids to rule. Tamerlane's presentation of himself as a supreme lord, while also walking around with a bundle of Chinggisid puppets, was an insult Toqtamish could not idly abide. The Golden Horde and Timurid empire lay beside each other like two sharks, in a tank too tight for the both of them. Both rulers simply may have seen confrontation as inevitable, the presentations of both stretching past what the other anticipated, and both expected antagonism.    It was Toqtamish who launched the first blow. After Timurid forces withdrew from Azerbaijan, Toqtamish attacked in late 1386, taking Baku, Tabriz, and Nakhchivan. Then in 1387, Toqtamish spun around the Caspian and Aral Seas, and in conjunction with Qamar al-Din of Moghulistan, Toqtamish took Tashkent and Qarshi before besieging Bukhara and Tamerlane's capital of Samarkand.     Once Toqtamish withdrew, Tamerlane quickly retook Khwarezm, sacking Urgench in 1388 with a massacre to invoke those of Chinggis Khan. Immediate reprisals against Toqtamish were halted by rebellions in Khurasan and a retaliatory campaign in Moghulistan against Qamar al-Din. Once dealt with, Tamerlane could begin extensive preparations for an invasion of the Golden Horde, spending months assembling a large army and supplies collected from across his empire. After a series of feints, Tamerlane set out unexpectedly early in January 1391. Eyeing Tamerlane after several months of marching, Toqtamish felt he knew Tamerlane's plan. Anticipating that the Emir would cross the Ural River at Kurk-qul, Toqtamish ordered his army to gather there. In one of the surprise maneuvers he so loved, Tamerlane darted in a different direction; before Toqtamish's full force had even gathered, he learned Tamerlane had crossed further upriver. Toqtamish retreated lest he be outflanked, and his forces who arrived late were set upon by the Timurids.   But despite this, Tamerlane was playing in Toqtamish's lands, and was no man of the steppe. Toqtamish drew Tamerlane deeper into the steppe, and in the process began to starve his large army. Parties sent out to forage were ambushed by Toqtamish's warriors, and the Khan tried to burn the grasslands before the Timurids, though the wet spring hampered this. Knowing his starving men would soon be at their limit, Tamerlane rallied with men with  a large hunting expedition and glamourous review of the troops, while sending his son, Omar-Sheikh Mirza with 20,000 swift riders to overtake Toqtamish and force him to battle, allowing the main force to catch up to the Khan. The ploy worked, and Toqtamish was forced to draw up at the Kondurcha River on June 18th, 1391.    The two massive armies arrayed themselves in large, crescent formations. Both forces were largely horse archers, light and heavy cavalry, with Tamerlane bringing infantry from his Central Asian cities and as far as Badakhshan, and Toqtamish infantry from the Horde's urban centers. Tamerlane strengthened his wings with units staggered behind them to protect against encirclement, and commanded the rearguard behind the centre. The Golden Horde struck first, attacking across the entire front, Toqtamish himself leading repeated charges. However, some of Toqtamish's flank commanders retreated, either due to treachery or miscommunication. With the Horde now stretched thin,  Tamerlane ordered a counter charge against Toqtamish's left and centre, which broke and the rest retreated. Though the field was won, Toqtamish and much of his army had escaped. Deprived of a total victory, Tamerlane withdrew, but not before appointing another Toqa-Temürid Temür Qutlugh, as khan, with the wily Edigü empowered too.   With Tamerlane spending the next few years darting hither and yon across Iran, Toqtamish recoupled his strength, and planned the next bout. When the Prince of Moscow, Dmitri Donskoi's son Vasili, wished to annex the city of Nizhnii Novgorod, he delivered a large bribe to Toqtamish which the khan was happy to put to use. Gifts and messengers went across the world as Toqtamish built an anti-Timurid alliance. Old allies like the Mamluks and Jalayirids, but also other Turkic states with whom the Horde had had no ties with before, such as the Ottomans and Qaraqoyunlu, the so-called Black Sheep Turkomans.  Tamerlane was hardly blind to it, and engaged in his own diplomacy to dissuade such a coalition from forming. But Tamerlane's political capital was spent. Watching Tamerlane's movement, Toqtamish placed his own army north of the Caucasus. The two sent envoys to one another in a final diplomatic effort, to no avail, and Tamerlane marched into the steppe in the first months of 1395.   This time he caught Toqtamish along the Terek River in April 1395, near Grozny in Chechnya. The Golden Horde controlled the north bank of the closest ford and unwilling to storm it, Tamerlane marched upstream, with Toqtamish mirroring him for three days. According to a Spanish envoy to Tamerlane's court, Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, on the third night, the women and servants in Temur's camp donned armour and continued on, while the main force swiftly doubled back in the darkness and crossed the now unguarded ford. It didn't take Toqtamish long to discover the ruse, but it was too late: Tamerlane's army deployed on their side late on April 14th. Anticipating a night attack, Tamerlane ordered a moat dug around his camp. Toqtamish's forces skirmished along the edges of the moat, playing instruments and shouting, keeping Temur's army up with expectations of an assault. But Toqtamish held the main army back, resting them.   On the morning of the 15th, they formed up. Again they brought massive armies, and Tamerlane increased the size of his rearguard in expectation of encirclement. Toqtamish opened the battle, his right falling upon Temur's left rearguard. Tamerlane ordered the left wing to assist, and the Golden Horde's right retreated. Eager to press the assault, Tamerlane's left  pursued, leaving the security of the main army and were drawn into a feigned retreat. Surrounded, the Timurid left was decimated, the survivors colliding with Tamerlane's lines as a Jochid charge followed up. Battle order was lost. Tamerlane retreated to the fortified camp, Toqtamish's troops in hot pursuit and nearly captured the emir. With Tamerlane himself now under threat, his commanders acted promptly, forcing wagons together in an impromptu stockade. They held off the Horde long enough for the remainder of the army to form back up, and by evening counterattacked and forced back the Jochids, until nightfall separated them. So ended the first day of battle.   Discipline and composure were reestablished that night and the armies drew up early on the 16th. Toqtamish's army again began the battle, his left flank forcing back Tamerlane's vanguard, and soon Temur's right was nearly overcome as well. One commander ordered large shields forced into the ground, and from behind this barricade Tamerlane's archers dismounted and shot at the approaching Tatars, halting their advance. Temur reinforced them with several units from his bodyguard, repulsing the Jochids under this volley of arrows.   The second day ended better than the first for Tamerlane, but the old emir knew Toqtamish had him matched. That evening he made overtures to a discontented emir in Toqtamish's camp, Aktau, promising him rewards for promoting intrigue. By morning Aktau had abandoned the battlefield, making his way in time to Anatolia. Toqtamish was disheartened but determined, and formed up again, his left wing weaker with Aktau's absence. Toqtamish's centre and flanks all attacked Tamerlane, but Tamerlane had built up his forces on the right, and broke through the weakened Jochid left. Hard fighting continued until evening, Toqtamish valiantly trying to save the left and prevent encirclement, but Temur had the better of the day. Defeated, Toqtamish had an orderly retreat planned, sending one commander to the Caucasus in an effort to harass Tamerlane's rear. This gave Toqtamish enough time to escape while Temur crushed this army. However, Toqtamish could not rally another army, leaving his cities isolated before the might of Tamerlane.   Tamerlane pursued Toqtamish, but upon losing him decided to prevent Toqtamish from ever having strength to raise another army again. He then set about systematically dismantling the economy of the Golden Horde, thoroughly sacking every single one of the major cities of the steppe; from the Crimea trade cities, where only Caffa, due to a timely bribe escaped judgment. Tana, Ukek, Sarai to Hajji Tarkhan and more all were brought to ruin on Tamerlane's order, left smoldering husks as his army moved past. Despite some popular claims, Moscow was not attacked; the Rus' chronicles indicate only the town of ‘Elets suffered the wrath of the Emir. He declared another of Urus Khan's sons, Quyurchuq as Khan, and was convinced by Edigü to grant him yarliq to collect and summon his peoples; but realized too late that Edigü had tricked him, and used Tamerlane's patent and the vacuum of power to carve out his own lands.   By the summer of 1396, the steppe environment and some sort of epidemic was wreaking havoc on Tamerlane's troops, and he ordered the withdrawal to Samarkand, carrying with it the loot and treasures of the Golden Horde. The Horde's cities and trade had struggled through the upheavals of the fourteenth century, but Tamerlane had just delivered a death blow from which they would not recover.   Toqtamish was not done yet. For the next ten years he continued to seek to reclaim his throne, but now faced a stiff opponent in the form of Edigü. Ridding himself of Tamerlane's puppet, Edigü reenthroned Temür Qutlugh, in time followed by a host of other puppets, and directed the effort to crush Toqtamish once and for all. But as a man well accustomed to defeat and bouncing back from it, Toqtamish proved remarkably hard to kill, and simply would not take “no” for an answer. The most notable effort came in 1399. After allying with Vytautas the Great, Grand Duke of Lithuania, the two launched a joint-invasion of the Golden Horde. At the Vorskla River in 1399, Edigü and Temür Qutlugh inflicted a crushing defeat on the army of Vytautas and Toqtamish. Many Lithuanian princes were killed, and the fleeing Duke was chased as far as Kyiv, where only after hefty ransom was the city and its refugees spared. The Toqtamish-Lithuanian alliance continued though, and Toqtamish's son Jalal al-Din fought alongside Vytautas at the famous battle of Grünwald, or Tannenburg, against the Teutonic Order in 1410. Today, the Lipka Tatars in Lithuania and Poland are their distant descendants.   By 1405, the humbled Toqtamish was in Siberia, and reached out to his former mentor, Tamerlane. Tamerlane was then in the midst of a march on China, wintering in Otrar, and it seems his old heart was warmed by Toqtamish's offer of cooperation against Edigü. But nothing was to come of it; the old emir died that winter, and the next year Toqtamish fell in a skirmish against the forces of Edigü.   So ended the life of Toqtamish Khan, the final powerful khan over the whole of the Golden Horde. Though not a truly transformative or administrative monarch, the fact he instilled any sort of stability over the Horde, and led a remarkable effort at unifying it before its final disintegration, left him a powerful legacy.  In later Turkic histories Toqtamish is one of the most popular Jochid khans, and over the next century he was benchmark for others who wished to unify the Horde. In 1509, the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray, when sending a large army against Astrakhan during his own bid to reunify the Horde, is reported to have said “I shall be a Toqtamish.” And perhaps Toqtamish would have been successful, had he not faced Tamerlane in battle, perhaps the only man at the time with the strength to overcome the might of the Golden Horde. And for that, the Golden Horde paid dearly. Our next, and final episode on the Golden Horde, deals with its final disintegration, so be sure to subscribe to the Kings and Generals Podcast to follow. If you enjoyed this and would like to help us continue bringing you great content, consider supporting us on patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. This episode was researched and written by our series historian, Jack Wilson. I'm your host David, and we'll catch you on the next one.

This month we are delighted to host Togzhan Kassenova on our NBN Central Asian Studies podcast. Dr Kassenova is the author of the beautifully researched yet very readable Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2022).  Atomic Steppe tells the untold true story of how Kazakhstan said no to the most powerful weapons in human history. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Central Asian republic suddenly found itself with the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal on its territory. Would it give up these fire-ready weapons--or try to become a Central Asian North Korea? This book takes us inside Kazakhstan's extraordinary and little-known nuclear history from the Soviet period to the present.  Equipped with intimate personal perspective and untapped archival resources, Togzhan Kassenova introduces us to the engineers turned diplomats, villagers turned activists, and scientists turned pacifists who worked toward disarmament. With thousands of nuclear weapons still present around the world, the story of how Kazakhs gave up their nuclear inheritance holds urgent lessons for global security. Togzhan Kassenova is senior fellow at the University at Albany, SUNY and a nonresident fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Follow her on Twitter @tkassenova Luca Anceschi is Professor of Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow, where he is also the editor of Europe-Asia Studies. Follow him on Twitter @anceschistan Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

This month we are delighted to host Togzhan Kassenova on our NBN Central Asian Studies podcast. Dr Kassenova is the author of the beautifully researched yet very readable Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2022).  Atomic Steppe tells the untold true story of how Kazakhstan said no to the most powerful weapons in human history. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Central Asian republic suddenly found itself with the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal on its territory. Would it give up these fire-ready weapons--or try to become a Central Asian North Korea? This book takes us inside Kazakhstan's extraordinary and little-known nuclear history from the Soviet period to the present.  Equipped with intimate personal perspective and untapped archival resources, Togzhan Kassenova introduces us to the engineers turned diplomats, villagers turned activists, and scientists turned pacifists who worked toward disarmament. With thousands of nuclear weapons still present around the world, the story of how Kazakhs gave up their nuclear inheritance holds urgent lessons for global security. Togzhan Kassenova is senior fellow at the University at Albany, SUNY and a nonresident fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Follow her on Twitter @tkassenova Luca Anceschi is Professor of Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow, where he is also the editor of Europe-Asia Studies. Follow him on Twitter @anceschistan Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

This month we are delighted to host Togzhan Kassenova on our NBN Central Asian Studies podcast. Dr Kassenova is the author of the beautifully researched yet very readable Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2022).  Atomic Steppe tells the untold true story of how Kazakhstan said no to the most powerful weapons in human history. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Central Asian republic suddenly found itself with the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal on its territory. Would it give up these fire-ready weapons--or try to become a Central Asian North Korea? This book takes us inside Kazakhstan's extraordinary and little-known nuclear history from the Soviet period to the present.  Equipped with intimate personal perspective and untapped archival resources, Togzhan Kassenova introduces us to the engineers turned diplomats, villagers turned activists, and scientists turned pacifists who worked toward disarmament. With thousands of nuclear weapons still present around the world, the story of how Kazakhs gave up their nuclear inheritance holds urgent lessons for global security. Togzhan Kassenova is senior fellow at the University at Albany, SUNY and a nonresident fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Follow her on Twitter @tkassenova Luca Anceschi is Professor of Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow, where he is also the editor of Europe-Asia Studies. Follow him on Twitter @anceschistan Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

This month we are delighted to host Togzhan Kassenova on our NBN Central Asian Studies podcast. Dr Kassenova is the author of the beautifully researched yet very readable Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2022).  Atomic Steppe tells the untold true story of how Kazakhstan said no to the most powerful weapons in human history. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Central Asian republic suddenly found itself with the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal on its territory. Would it give up these fire-ready weapons--or try to become a Central Asian North Korea? This book takes us inside Kazakhstan's extraordinary and little-known nuclear history from the Soviet period to the present.  Equipped with intimate personal perspective and untapped archival resources, Togzhan Kassenova introduces us to the engineers turned diplomats, villagers turned activists, and scientists turned pacifists who worked toward disarmament. With thousands of nuclear weapons still present around the world, the story of how Kazakhs gave up their nuclear inheritance holds urgent lessons for global security. Togzhan Kassenova is senior fellow at the University at Albany, SUNY and a nonresident fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Follow her on Twitter @tkassenova Luca Anceschi is Professor of Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow, where he is also the editor of Europe-Asia Studies. Follow him on Twitter @anceschistan Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

This month we are delighted to host Togzhan Kassenova on our NBN Central Asian Studies podcast. Dr Kassenova is the author of the beautifully researched yet very readable Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2022).  Atomic Steppe tells the untold true story of how Kazakhstan said no to the most powerful weapons in human history. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Central Asian republic suddenly found itself with the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal on its territory. Would it give up these fire-ready weapons--or try to become a Central Asian North Korea? This book takes us inside Kazakhstan's extraordinary and little-known nuclear history from the Soviet period to the present.  Equipped with intimate personal perspective and untapped archival resources, Togzhan Kassenova introduces us to the engineers turned diplomats, villagers turned activists, and scientists turned pacifists who worked toward disarmament. With thousands of nuclear weapons still present around the world, the story of how Kazakhs gave up their nuclear inheritance holds urgent lessons for global security. Togzhan Kassenova is senior fellow at the University at Albany, SUNY and a nonresident fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Follow her on Twitter @tkassenova Luca Anceschi is Professor of Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow, where he is also the editor of Europe-Asia Studies. Follow him on Twitter @anceschistan Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/central-asian-studies

This month we are delighted to host Togzhan Kassenova on our NBN Central Asian Studies podcast. Dr Kassenova is the author of the beautifully researched yet very readable Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2022).  Atomic Steppe tells the untold true story of how Kazakhstan said no to the most powerful weapons in human history. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Central Asian republic suddenly found itself with the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal on its territory. Would it give up these fire-ready weapons--or try to become a Central Asian North Korea? This book takes us inside Kazakhstan's extraordinary and little-known nuclear history from the Soviet period to the present.  Equipped with intimate personal perspective and untapped archival resources, Togzhan Kassenova introduces us to the engineers turned diplomats, villagers turned activists, and scientists turned pacifists who worked toward disarmament. With thousands of nuclear weapons still present around the world, the story of how Kazakhs gave up their nuclear inheritance holds urgent lessons for global security. Togzhan Kassenova is senior fellow at the University at Albany, SUNY and a nonresident fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Follow her on Twitter @tkassenova Luca Anceschi is Professor of Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow, where he is also the editor of Europe-Asia Studies. Follow him on Twitter @anceschistan Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

"Old Man Get Out!" With personal stories and professional analysis, Prof. Tutumlu takes us through the history of her homeland, the aspirations of its people and their dashed hopes, and the deep-rooted causes for this month's widespread uprising. Kazakhstan is a resource-rich country with a very low population density. It has successfully attracted consortiums of large international corporations and diligently polished its business-friendly image abroad. So by all indications, Kazakhs should enjoy high living standards. Unfortunately, the realities of life in Kazakhstan are starkly different than the country's potentials otherwise suggest. The overwhelming majority of wealth and power is held by a few. And Kazakhstan's former president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who led the country from its independence from Soviet rule for some 30 years, still wields considerable power from behind the scenes. As for Russian troops, they were deployed to Kazakhstan not to ensure stability and peace for Kazakh people and businesses. Rather, President Putin sent them there to ensure the security of a friendly oligarchy within the sphere of its influence. Professor Assel Tutumlu, Near East University, has written extensively about Kazakhstan. Click this link to access some of her publications and read highlights of this podcast conversation. I hope you enjoy this episode and gain some perspective about Kazakhstan. Adel Host of ThePeel.news podcast Post-Soviet States Series SUPPORT: To continue our free podcast program, we depend on our listeners' support. So please click this link https://anchor.fm/the-peel-news/support and join our other supporters in the news peeler community. Thank you.