Podcasts about xi jinping thought

On a wet October afternoon in Beijing, a group of teenage students gathered around a mediation table to discuss a potential court case. Some scrutinized "evidence bags" and debated "property allocation", while others consulted the Civil Code to confirm the validity of "wills".在一个阴雨绵绵的十月午后，北京的几名青少年学生围坐在调解桌旁，讨论一起潜在的法庭案件。有人仔细检查“证据袋”，有人争论“财产分配”，还有人查阅《民法典》来确认“遗嘱”的有效性。This was not an actual trial but an immersive legal workshop where students took on the roles of plaintiffs, defendants and judges to navigate an inheritance dispute.这并非真实审判，而是一场沉浸式法律工作坊，学生们分别扮演原告、被告和法官的角色，共同处理一起遗产纠纷。The session, centered on wills and property division, was part of an innovative initiative by Haidian District People's Court to make the law more relatable and accessible to young people.本次以遗嘱与财产分割为主题的讲座，是海淀区人民法院推出的一项创新举措，旨在让法律更贴近年轻人生活，更易于理解。Under the guidance of Sun Jiayun, who assists judges in case handling at the court, the students from Beijing 101 High School completed the workshop within an hour, learning not only about the legal validity of wills, but also judicial procedures such as court investigation, evidence exchange and statements.在北京一中学生的参与下，在法院协助法官处理案件的孙佳韵指导下，学生们仅用一小时便完成了工作坊课程。他们不仅学习了遗嘱的法律效力，还了解了法庭调查、证据交换和陈述等司法程序。Legal education in China is undergoing a transformation, and it now offers customized courses for different participants, according to Sun.孙佳韵指出，中国的法律教育正在经历转型，如今为不同参与者提供定制化课程。This transformation is a result of the implementation of Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law, which emphasizes the need to focus on the effectiveness of legal education, particularly by strengthening law education for young people.这一转变源于习近平法治思想的贯彻实施，该思想强调必须注重法律教育的实效性，特别是加强青少年法律教育。On Monday and Tuesday, at a central conference on work related to overall law-based governance in Beijing, President Xi Jinping instructed that efforts should be intensified on advancing the rule of law across various sectors in the nation's modernization drive.周一和周二，在北京市召开的关于全面依法治国工作的中央会议上，习近平主席指示，要加大力度推进各领域依法治国工作，为国家现代化建设提供有力保障。Xi, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, called for across-the-board efforts to ensure society-wide observance of the law.习近平同时担任中共中央总书记和中央军事委员会主席，他呼吁全社会共同努力，确保法律得到全面遵守。Zhao Leji, chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, also underscored the priority of law-based governance, stressing the need to deepen the endeavor to build a law-abiding society.全国人大常委会委员长赵乐际也强调了依法治国的优先地位，指出必须深化依法治国、依法治党、依法治国、依法治民的实践。The meeting coincided with the fifth anniversary of the introduction of Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law, which requires upholding a people-centered approach in advancing the building of the rule of law, and continuously enhancing the legal awareness and literacy of the entire public.此次会议恰逢习近平法治思想提出五周年。习近平法治思想要求坚持以人民为中心推进法治建设，不断提高全社会的法律意识和法律素养。激发兴趣Sparking interestHan Chu, a sophomore from the high school, played the role of a "judge" that afternoon.该校高二学生韩储当天下午扮演了“评委”的角色。During the workshop, he listened carefully to the statements of classmates playing the plaintiff and defendant, verified the various items of evidence they provided, and frequently consulted the provisions related to wills in the Civil Code.在研讨课上，他认真聆听了扮演原告和被告的同学们的陈述，核实了他们提供的各类证据，并频繁查阅《民法典》中关于遗嘱的相关条款。The script, adapted from real cases, revolved around three siblings who brought their deceased parents' handwritten, printed and audio-recorded wills to court, with each claiming sole inheritance.该剧本改编自真实案例，围绕三兄妹展开——他们将父母生前手写、打印及录音遗嘱带至法庭，各自主张获得全部遗产继承权。Han, guided by Sun, concluded that all three wills had legal flaws in accordance with the code, ruling that the family's assets should be divided equally among the three children.韩储在孙佳韵的指导下认定，根据该法典，三份遗嘱均存在法律瑕疵，裁定该家族资产应由三名子女均分。"Not only was this activity incredibly interesting, but it truly helped me grasp legal concepts. I've gained a much deeper understanding of the law by taking part in the workshop," Han said.韩储说：“这项活动不仅极其有趣，更让我真正掌握了法律概念。通过参与研讨会，我对法律有了更深入的理解。”His classmate Hu Shihan said: "The activity felt much more real than just reading textbooks. By stepping into a character's shoes, I experienced the courtroom process firsthand, which let me understand what I learned in class."他的同学胡世涵（音译）说：“这次活动比单纯读教科书真实得多。通过扮演角色，我亲身体验了法庭流程，这让我真正理解了课堂上学到的知识。”Sun beamed with satisfaction at the students' engagement. "For young people, such an immersive method is key to providing legal education," she said. "Reading law books and observing trials used to feel distant. By becoming the judges and litigants involved, their engagement and understanding deepen."孙佳韵对学生们的投入感到十分满意。“对年轻人而言，这种沉浸式教学法是开展法律教育的关键，”她说道，“过去阅读法律书籍和旁听庭审总让人觉得遥不可及。而当他们亲身扮演法官和诉讼当事人时，参与度和理解力都会显著提升。”"Our primary goal was never just to teach them laws, but to ignite a genuine interest. After all, interest is the best teacher, and that's the most important foundation for any learning," Sun added.孙佳韵补充道：“我们的首要目标从来不只是传授法律知识，而是要点燃他们真正的兴趣。毕竟，兴趣是最好的老师，这也是任何学习最重要的基础。”简明语言Easy languageHowever, when educating the elderly, Sun uses a different set of materials — large fonts and case studies without legal jargon or complex provisions.然而，在为老年人提供教育时，孙佳韵采用了一套不同的材料——大字体和案例研究，避免使用法律术语或复杂条款。"The key of offering legal education to older people lies in plain language and everyday cases," she said after sharing the topics of a will and property allocation with seniors at Yanyuan community in Beijing's Haidian district.她在北京市海淀区燕园社区向长者讲解遗嘱与财产分配相关话题后如是说：“向老年人提供法律教育的关键在于使用通俗易懂的语言和日常案例。”Sun compared "making a will" to "cooking your own meal" in her course, explaining: "If you want to distribute your house and money according to your own ideas, you need to specify in the will who gets what and how much. It's like cooking for yourself — you decide what to eat and how much."孙佳韵在课程中将“立遗嘱”比作“自己做饭”，解释道：“若想按自己的想法分配房产和财产，就需要在遗嘱中明确指定谁获得什么以及多少份额。这就像自己做饭——你决定吃什么以及吃多少。”For statutory inheritance, she compared it to "ready-made meals", saying: "If you don't have specific ideas, the Civil Code will help you. It prepares 'meals' for you, which means your assets will be divided equally."对于法定继承，她将其比作“现成的套餐”，表示：“若无具体安排，民法典将为你提供指引。它为你准备了‘套餐'，意味着你的资产将被平均分配。”Zhang Dejun, 66, welcomed these comparisons. "They make it easier for me to understand the legal issues," she said. "At my age, it's natural to start thinking about making a will and distributing assets. The legal course is exactly what I need, and I've learned a lot."66岁的张德君（音译）对这些类比表示欢迎。“它们让我更容易理解法律问题，”她说，“到了我这个年纪，开始考虑立遗嘱和分配资产是很自然的。这门法律课程正是我需要的，我学到了很多。”Sun highlighted that when educating seniors, it is crucial to use language that they can easily understand. "They don't need the legal definition of a 'legacy support agreement', but they must understand the risks of not planning ahead."孙佳韵强调，在为老年人提供教育时，使用他们容易理解的语言至关重要。“他们不需要‘遗产支持协议'的法律定义，但必须明白不提前规划的风险。”定制化教育Tailored educationThanks to the tailored education, Qian Shuo, another judges' assistant from the Haidian court, said the public's overall legal awareness has been enhanced.海淀法院另一名法官助理钱硕表示，通过定制化教育培训，公众的整体法律意识得到了提升。"Many people coming to us are more knowledgeable. Instead of saying 'I don't know the law, but this is unfair', they can cite specific legal provisions and fight for their legitimate rights," she said.钱硕表示：“现在来找我们的人普遍更有法律知识。他们不再说‘我不懂法律，但这太不公平'，而是能援引具体法律条款来维护自身合法权益。”Official data shows that since 2021, the court's staff have visited more than 100 communities, schools and enterprises across the district, providing in-person legal education nearly 600 times.官方数据显示，自2021年以来，法院工作人员已走访全区100多个社区、学校和企业，开展现场法律宣讲近600次。The staff have stimulated the public's interest in the law through short videos, and helped build legal education centers in parks, libraries and technological compounds.工作人员通过短视频激发公众对法律的兴趣，并协助在公园、图书馆和科技园区建立法律教育中心。"Legal education is not a one-way street; it's a two-way interaction," said Fang Xu, who works for the court's litigation service center. "Through this process, I've learned to see things from the residents' perspectives and empathize with their conflicts, with deeper understanding about their legal demand."法院诉讼服务中心工作人员方旭（音译）表示：“法律教育不是单向灌输，而是双向互动。通过这个过程，我学会了站在居民角度看待问题，体察他们的矛盾冲突，对他们的法律诉求有了更深的理解。”In addition to face-to-face interactions, legal-based television dramas and films have also found audiences over the past few years, attracting millions of viewers and encouraging judicial workers to interpret legal issues on the screen.除面对面交流外，近年来以法律为主题的电视剧和电影也吸引了大量观众，数以百万计的观众通过荧幕了解法律问题，这促使司法工作者开始在影视作品中解读法律议题。Zhang Tongyu, from Beijing's Chaoyang District People's Court, has interpreted the laws involved in the relevant cases in No More Bets, a film about telecom fraud, providing an analysis of these related legal issues to the public.北京市朝阳区人民法院的张彤宇（音译）法官，就电信诈骗题材电影《别再赌了》中涉及的相关案件所适用的法律进行了阐释，向公众剖析了这些关联法律问题。According to a law on publicity and education regarding the rule of law, which took effect on Nov 1, legal education, as a lifelong education for citizens, should be incorporated into the national education system.根据11月1日生效的《法治宣传教育法》，法律教育作为公民的终身教育，应当纳入国家教育体系。The law stipulates that schools and internet platforms should provide stronger legal education for young people.法律规定，学校和互联网平台应加强对青少年的法律教育。Civil Code《民法典》judge and litigant法官和诉讼当事人legacy support agreement遗产支持协议

Every year, hundreds of films are produced in Hengdian, a once-obscure township in Zhejiang province that is now often referred to as "China's Hollywood".Few people realize, however, that the ascent of Hengdian — and the broader transformation of Zhejiang as a cultural powerhouse — was shaped earlier when Xi Jinping served as the province's Party secretary.In 2003, months after becoming secretary of the Communist Party of China Zhejiang Provincial Committee, Xi visited Hengdian at a moment when its sprawling film sets were growing rapidly, but the industry lacked support for deeper integration across the production value chain.Private capital was still restricted from entering critical areas such as film production and distribution."He encouraged us to explore boldly and vigorously develop the film and cultural industry," recalled Xu Tianfu, vice-president of Hengdian Group.Soon after Xi's visit, Zhejiang authorities launched a provincial task force to study reforms, which led to the creation of China's first national-level film industry pilot zone in Hengdian in 2004.The move marked a turning point in widening investment opportunities for the cultural sector and laid the groundwork for what is now one of the world's busiest film production hubs.In 2005, the provincial Party committee, under Xi's leadership, adopted "eight projects" to build Zhejiang into a province with strong culture.The projects span eight areas — civic quality, cultural excellence, cultural research, cultural preservation, cultural industry promotion, cultural infrastructure, cultural communication and cultural talent development.As China pushes to build itself into a nation strong in culture, the projects have provided key references and are a critical component of Xi Jinping Thought on Culture, analysts said.The thought, first put forward at a two-day national meeting on the work of public communication and culture in October 2023, highlighted the need to meet the people's increasingly diverse, multitiered and multifaceted spiritual and cultural needs, and enhance the supply of services and products, in order to strengthen people's sense of cultural fulfillment and happiness.Chen Ye, former vice-president of the Zhejiang Academy of Social Sciences, said the eight projects reflected Xi's belief that cultural development is central to modernization."His strategic vision, forward-looking ideas, political courage and pragmatic approach laid a solid foundation for preserving cultural heritage and promoting contemporary cultural development," she said.In Zhejiang, the results have been more than palpable. More than 5,000 film and television companies operate across the province. Since 2003, the added value of Zhejiang's cultural industries has risen from 44.2 billion yuan ($6.15 billion) to over 615 billion yuan. Their share of the province's GDP has more than doubled, to over 7 percent.The province is now home to three UNESCO World Heritage sites, five national archaeological parks, 281 nationally protected heritage sites and 926 registered village museums.One of the most notable preservation efforts has focused on the archaeological ruins of Liangzhu City, a Neolithic site on the outskirts of Hangzhou.Preserving heritageDuring a 2003 visit, Xi was briefed on the status of the preservation of the site — a hub for a rice-cultivating and jade-worshiping culture dating back 4,300 to 5,300 years."The Liangzhu archaeological site is a sacred testament to China's 5,000-year civilization and a rare, invaluable treasure. We must ensure its preservation with the utmost care," Xi said during the visit.He ordered the expansion of the preservation zone, halted nearby quarrying and called for the site to be prepared for nomination as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Over the next decade, archaeological work accelerated alongside policy, legal and ecological support, and in 2019, Liangzhu was inscribed on the World Heritage List.Preservation of intangible heritage was also elevated under Xi's tenure in Zhejiang.In 2005, when he visited a Kunqu Opera troupe in Yongjia county, the troupe had been struggling to survive since losing public funding in the 1980s.After watching the performance and speaking with veteran actress Lin Meimei, Xi initiated a provincial-level plan to rescue the centuries-old Kunqu Opera.The troupe was granted heritage status and allocated funding of 1 million yuan per year. Today, it stages more than 200 shows annually and has worked with a vocational college to train new performers."We are full of gratitude," Lin said. Now recognized as a national inheritor of Kunqu Opera, she added: "The flame of Kunqu Opera in Yongjia has not gone out. We've lived up to the legacy entrusted to us by our forebears."Innovation mattersXi's emphasis on cultural innovation also extended to the animation and gaming sectors.In 2005, he visited the China Academy of Art, where he highlighted the broad potential of the animation sector and the strength for Hangzhou to build a "city of animation".That same day, he toured Zhejiang Zhongnan Animation Co, now one of the largest original animation companies in China."Animation should not be measured purely in financial terms," Xi told Wu Jianrong, chairman of Zhongnan Group, of which Zhongnan Animation is a subsidiary."It provides young people with healthy spiritual nourishment. Chinese civilization has over 5,000 years of history — you can create animated works featuring our national heroes," Xi said.Encouraged by Xi's remarks, Zhongnan produced a series of animations and began exporting them.That year, Hangzhou hosted the inaugural China International Cartoon & Animation Festival, generating over 10 million yuan in on-site sales and 3 billion yuan in potential deals.Xi later wrote to national regulators to help secure Hangzhou as the event's permanent home and supported the creation of a dedicated organizing office.Hangzhou is now home to more than 270 animation and gaming companies, employing over 12,000 people. The city is the birthplace of the hit video game Black Myth: Wukong, and 227 internet-based animated series produced in the city were licensed in 2024, accounting for 34.45 percent of the national total.Across Zhejiang, there are more than 300,000 private cultural enterprises — up from fewer than 45,000 in 2003.Chen, the former vice-president of Zhejiang Academy of Social Sciences, said that Xi's cultural initiatives during his tenure in Zhejiang and the landmark achievements in the new era highlighted the importance of sustained efforts to deliver cultural development outcomes that truly benefit the people."It also indicated that the implementation and evaluation of cultural initiatives should prioritize the production of more high-quality outcomes to meet the cultural rights and interests of the broadest segments of the population."

China held a massive meeting in Zunyi, Guizhou province, on Wednesday to mark the 90th anniversary of the Zunyi Conference, a crucial turning point during the Long March (1934-36) that marked the maturity of the Communist Party of China.1月15日，纪念遵义会议90周年大会在中国贵州省遵义市隆重举行。遵义会议是长征（1934-1936年）期间的一个重要转折点，标志着中国共产党的成熟。Li Shulei, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, attended the conference and addressed nearly 1,000 participants from central departments, Guizhou authorities and the People's Liberation Army.中共中央政治局委员、中宣部部长李书磊出席会议并讲话。中央有关部门、贵州省、中国人民解放军有关同志共约1000人参加。Attendees noted that the Zunyi Conference was a historic moment in the Party's history. They called for careful study and implementation of General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Xi Jinping's remarks on summarizing and using the historical experience of the Zunyi Conference, so that people can gather wisdom and strength from the Party's history to help them on their own "Long March" in the new era.会议指出，遵义会议是共产党历史上的一个历史性时刻，要认真学习并贯彻中共中央总书记习近平关于总结运用遵义会议历史经验的重要论述，从党的历史中汲取智慧力量，奋力走好新时代的长征路。Participants also called on the Chinese people to stick to Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, enhance confidence and determination in pursuing Chinese modernization and national rejuvenation, uphold the revolutionary tradition of bravely struggling, and pool strength to overcome difficulties and keep fighting.会议强调，中国人民要坚持习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想，坚定推进中国式现代化、实现民族复兴的信心决心，发扬敢于斗争的革命传统，凝聚攻坚克难、勇毅前行的强大力量。In January 1935, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was held in Zunyi to resolve the most critical military and organizational issues of the time. The participants reviewed the causes behind the Kuomintang's defeat in its fifth encirclement campaign and discussed the next steps to be taken by the Party and the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the PLA's predecessor.1935年1月，中共中央在遵义召开政治局扩大会议，以解决当时具有决定意义的军事和组织问题。会议分析了反对国民党第五次“围剿”失败的原因，并讨论了党和中国工农红军（中国人民解放军的前身）的下一步行动。The meeting also restructured the Party's top leadership, recognized Mao Zedong's key role in the Party and pointed the Chinese revolution in the right direction.会议还对党的最高领导层进行了重组，确认了毛泽东同志在党中央的领导地位，为中国革命指明了正确方向。predecessorn.前辈；前身

As President Xi Jinping wrapped up his trip to Latin America last week, observers noted that the year 2024 has been special for marking the 10th anniversaries of a range of landmark events, such as China's hosting of the 2014 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Beijing and the founding of the Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.Following these memorable moments, Thursday also marks the 10th anniversary of another landmark event in China's foreign policy history — Xi's proposing of the idea of major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.Many scholars and officials have been impressed by how Beijing has showcased distinct Chinese characteristics, style and ethos in its diplomacy, and how it has been working on building the image of a confident, self-reliant, open and inclusive major country with a global vision over the past 10 years.In the eyes of Keith Bennett, a London-based senior analyst on international relations and co-editor of the Friends of Socialist China platform, the Chinese characteristics of the country's major country diplomacy include a number of components, such as the country's commitment to peace, dialogue, equality, mutual respect, noninterference and win-win cooperation."The Chinese policies are not based solely on the narrow national interest, or interest at the expense of other countries", but instead have a global vision and "are for the benefit of all of humanity," he said.On Nov 28, 2014, Xi stated in his speech at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs that China "must have a major country diplomacy with its own characteristics".In March 2016, the concept of major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics was for the first time clearly stated in the annual Government Work Report.Analysts said the concept has been developed in the past decade and has seen its theoretical architecture greatly taking shape and its supporting pillars being built.The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs held in December last year identified the theme of China's external work as building a community with a shared future for mankind, which is also the noble goal pursued by China in conducting major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.The conference decided that the current and future work on foreign affairs should follow the principles of "self-confidence and self-reliance, openness and inclusiveness, fairness and justice, and win-win cooperation" — the guidelines of major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics."The concept helps to explain the definition and the underlying logic of China's diplomacy," said Chen Xulong, a professor of multilateral diplomacy and United Nations' reform studies at the University of International Business and Economics.The concept calls for the country to act as a major country should, shoulder its duties, meet the challenges, and make contributions to global governance, he said."A range of outstanding, distinct qualities of Chinese culture have been endorsed by this concept, including the consistent pursuit of a peaceful rise, objecting to hegemony and subscribing to innovation," he added.In an article published in January in Qiushi Journal, the flagship magazine of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, Foreign Minister Wang Yi wrote that "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in the new era builds on and carries forward New China's diplomacy"."China has become a responsible major country with enhanced international influence, stronger capacity to steer new endeavors and greater moral appeal," he wrote."Head-of-state diplomacy has played an important and irreplaceable role in major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in the new era", he added.At a bilateral meeting with Xi on the sidelines of the 31st APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Lima, Peru, on Nov 15, Chilean President Gabriel Boric brought a copy of the fourth volume of Xi Jinping: The Governance of China, one of Xi's books.Boric presented the book to Xi and invited him to sign it.Nadia Helmy, an associate professor of political science at Beni Suef University in Egypt and an expert on Chinese politics and Asian affairs, said, "We find that China has achieved fruitful diplomatic results, as the diplomacy of the Chinese head of state, Comrade Xi Jinping, played a strategic guiding role."Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics "led China to achieve tangible achievements in the field of Beijing's foreign policy and international relations, (and) brought China closer to assuming the forefront of the global scene", she wrote in an article published in January.She listed some main points of China's major country diplomacy, such as "maintaining justice while seeking to achieve common interests at the political and economic levels", "sincere and friendly international relations with the developing countries" and "building a new type of relations between major countries".Regarding his expectations for China's major country diplomacy in the next 10 years and beyond, Bennett, the London-based international relations analyst, said that China is expected to win more support and more understanding from more countries, as there is "quite a strong contrast" between "the worldview and practice of China and the worldview and practice of most other major powers".

The 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) adopted a resolution on further deepening reform comprehensively to advance Chinese modernization at its third plenary session held here from Monday to Thursday.The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee presided over the meeting. General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Xi Jinping delivered important addresses, according to a communique released Thursday.At the session, the Central Committee heard and discussed a report on the work of the Political Bureau, presented by Xi on behalf of the Political Bureau, and considered and adopted the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Further Deepening Reform Comprehensively to Advance Chinese Modernization. Xi delivered explanatory remarks on the draft version of the resolution.The overall objectives of further deepening reform comprehensively are to continue improving and developing the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics and modernize China's system and capacity for governance, according to the communique."By 2035, we will have finished building a high-standard socialist market economy in all respects, further improved the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, generally modernized our system and capacity for governance, and basically realized socialist modernization," it said.All of this will lay a solid foundation for building China into a great modern socialist country in all respects by the middle of this century, it noted.The reform tasks laid out in the resolution shall be completed by the time the People's Republic of China celebrates its 80th founding anniversary in 2029, said the communique.The Central Committee made systematic plans for further deepening reform comprehensively, it added.In building a high-standard socialist market economy, the role of the market must be better leveraged, with a fairer and more dynamic market environment to be fostered and resource allocation to be made as efficient and productive as possible. Restrictions on the market will be lifted while effective regulation will be ensured to better maintain order in the market and remedy market failures, said the communique.In promoting high-quality development, the communique urged deepening supply-side structural reform, improving incentive and constraint mechanisms for promoting high-quality development, and creating new drivers and strengths for realizing growth."We will improve the institutions and mechanisms for fostering new quality productive forces in line with local conditions, for promoting full integration between the real economy and the digital economy, for developing the service sector, for modernizing infrastructure, and for enhancing the resilience and security of industrial and supply chains," it stated.In supporting all-around innovation, the Party will deepen comprehensive reform in education, structural scientific and technological reform, and institutional reforms for talent development.In improving macroeconomic governance, the communique urged pursuing coordinated reforms in the fiscal, tax, financial, and other major sectors and enhancing the consistency of macro policy orientation, with the national strategic planning system and policy coordination mechanisms to be improved.On integrated urban and rural development, the Party must promote equal exchanges and two-way flows of production factors between the cities and the countryside, so as to narrow the disparities between the two and promote their common prosperity and development, according to the communique. Reform of the land system will be deepened, it added.Describing opening up as a "defining feature of Chinese modernization," the communique said that the Party will "steadily expand institutional opening up, deepen the foreign trade structural reform, further reform the management systems for inward and outward investment, improve planning for regional opening up, and refine the mechanisms for high-quality cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative."On developing whole-process people's democracy, it said: "We must firmly stay on the path of socialist political advancement with Chinese characteristics and uphold and improve our country's foundational, basic, and important political systems."On the rule of law, efforts were demanded to ensure full implementation of the Constitution and uphold its authority, coordinate the reforms to promote sound legislation, law enforcement, administration of justice, and observance of the law, and improve the mechanisms for ensuring that all are equal before the law.The communique urged boosting cultural confidence and working to develop advanced socialist culture, promote revolutionary culture, and carry forward fine traditional Chinese culture.In ensuring and enhancing the people's wellbeing, the Party will improve the income distribution system, the employment-first policy, and the social security system, further reform the medical and healthcare systems, and improve the systems for facilitating population development and providing related services.On ecological conservation, the communique said: "We must improve ecological conservation systems, take a coordinated approach to carbon cutting, pollution reduction, green development, and economic growth, actively respond to climate change, and move faster to improve the systems and mechanisms for applying the principle that lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets."On national security, it noted that the Party must fully apply a holistic approach to national security, improve the institutions and mechanisms for safeguarding national security, and ensure that high-quality development and greater security reinforce each other, so as to effectively safeguard the country's stability and security over the long term.On national defense, the communique urged maintaining the Party's absolute leadership over the people's armed forces and fully implementing the strategy of strengthening the military through reform to provide a strong guarantee for realizing the goals for the centenary of the People's Liberation Army in 2027 and achieving basic modernization of national defense and the armed forces.In improving the Party's leadership, it said: "We must acquire a deep understanding of the decisive significance of establishing Comrade Xi Jinping's core position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole and establishing the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era."The communique stressed that Chinese modernization is the modernization of peaceful development. "In foreign relations, China remains firmly committed to pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace and is dedicated to promoting a human community with a shared future," it noted.Studying and implementing the guiding principles from the session represent a major political task for the entire Party and nation both at present and for some time to come, according to the communique.The session conducted an analysis of the present situation and the tasks the Party faces, urging firm commitment to accomplishing the goals for this year's economic and social development.Both development and security must be ensured, with various measures to be implemented for preventing and defusing risks in real estate, local government debt, small and medium financial institutions, and other key areas, the communique said.According to the communique, the session decided to accept Comrade Qin Gang's resignation from the Central Committee, and confirmed the Political Bureau's earlier decision to expel Li Shangfu, Li Yuchao and Sun Jinming from the Party.A total of 199 members and 165 alternate members of the Central Committee attended the session.

China has unveiled a new AI chatbot trained on President Xi Jinping's political ideology, a significant step in spreading his ideas and a reminder of the ideological parameters AI models in China must operate within. The chatbot was trained on seven databases, including one dedicated to Xi Jinping Thought, a doctrine promoting socialism with Chinese characteristics. Its creation is part of a broader effort to promote Xi's ideologies, already integrated into education and available through an app. The chatbot can generate reports, summarize information, and provide translations, highlighting China's ambitions to lead in AI by 2030. --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/tonyphoang/message

Plus, China announces a new chatbot trained on Xi Jinping Thought. And the face of dogecoin dies. Zoe Thomas hosts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Join us on China-Mena as we delve into Xi Jinping's political philosophy and its effects on the Middle East and North Africa. Discover Xi's global vision, autocratic alliances, and conflicts with leaders like India's Modi. With expert insights from Steve Zhang, we'll unravel Xi Jinping Thought, explore the Belt and Road Initiative, and China's diplomatic strategies. Delve into power dynamics, internal party debates, and Xi Jinping's quest for superpower status, exploring its impact on the MENA region.Takeaways:Xi Jinping's Vision versus Other Global South LeadersChina's Redefinition of International OrderThe Ideology of Xi Jinping ThoughtGlobal Diplomacy and Foreign Policy under Xi JinpingBelt and Road Initiative and Global South RelationsQuotes"Let's aim to radiate beauty, not just for ourselves but for the Global South and the world. - Steve Tsang"Embrace and uphold Xi's leadership and political thought, fostering unity and determination, even in discomfort." - Steve TsangFeatured in the EpisodeSteve TsangDirector of the SOAS China InstituteLinkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/steve-tsang-3b937012/Website: https://www.soas.ac.uk/about/steve-tsangJonathan FultonNonresident Senior Fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. Associate Professor of Political Science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabihttps://ae.linkedin.com/in/jonathan-fulton-2627414bhttps://twitter.com/jonathandfultonChapters00:00 - Introduction04:17 - China's political evolution under Mao and beyond.09:16 - Evolving Chinese economic system: state vs private.12:19 - Xi Jinping requires widespread support for his ideology.14:39 - Xi Jinping's vision: unity, control, national rejuvenation.21:32 - Xi Jinping aims to reshape global power dynamics.24:07 - China leading democratization of international order, global South.29:58 - Overview of China's global engagement and state-centric approach.34:03 - Global South: diverse, India-China tension, leadership struggle.39:15 - Navigating Soft Power and Wolf Warrior Diplomacy Under Xi Jinping44:58 - Steering China's Assertive Stance and Western Relations49:10 - Outro

The CCP is promoting the compatibility of traditional Confucian philosophy and Marxist theory. As China rejects the liberal democratic tradition of the World Order it looks to a home grown philosophy as the foundation of its worldview. --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/james-herlihy/message

It's a big week for Chinese politics as its annual political conclave gets under way in Beijing. Amid the pomp and heightened security, the Two Sessions is an important preview of the government's plans and policies for the year ahead. And increasingly over the last decade, that roadmap has been underpinned by the instructions of China's leader and the doctrine named for him - Xi Jinping Thought.  But despite the fact that his decisions affect so many, Xi's beliefs and what guides him can seem difficult to understand, at least to outsiders.Our guests this week have set out to decipher this. Steve Tsang is Professor of China Studies and Director of the China Institute at SOAS in London; and his colleague Olivia Cheung is a research Fellow there. Together they have written a book - ‘The Political Thought of Xi Jinping' - which sets out Xi's philosophy and why it's important for us all to understand his beliefs. 

In this episode, Mukesh Bansal (Founder Myntra and Cult.Fit) is in conversation with Neelkanth Mishra, Chief Economist - Axis Bank and Head of Global Research - Axis Capital. In this compelling podcast episode, Neelkanth Mishra returns for an insightful economic exploration of India's future. We delve into the intricacies of India's economic landscape, focusing on the pivotal metric of growth - Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The episode explores pressing questions, envisioning India's future amidst the forecasted India Century. From the calculation of GDP by the Central Statistics Office to the diverse economic dynamics among states, the discussion provides a nuanced understanding. Neelkanth sheds light on the challenges of economic growth in a democratic setup, advocating for India's capacity to make tough decisions for sustainable development. Join the conversation as they unravel the intricacies shaping India's economic trajectory.Chapters: 00:00:00 - 00:00:53 Coming up!00:00:53 - 00:01:06 Opening theme00:01:06 - 00:02:54 Themes to be explored in this series00:02:54 - 00:09:46  The dynamics of GDP: Unveiling its origins, evolution, and calculative framework00:09:46 - 00:19:40 Understanding how GDP is measured in India00:19:40 -  00:25:51 Aiming for prosperity: Realistic economic goals and understanding GDP growth00:25:51 - 00:31:37 Analysing how China achieved accelerated growth in GDP 00:31:37 - 00:39:42 How can India increase the chances of accelerating the country's economic growth?00:39:42 - 00:54:51 What achievable economic growth rate can India realistically aim for, over what timeframe, and how?00:54:51 -  01:05:01 Neelkanth breaks down what India's economic market will look like in the future01:05:01 - 01:15:52 Diversity's impact: State-wise GDP and India's overall economic landscape01:15:52 - 01:29:07 What are the potential sources and amounts of capital expenditure available to India?01:29:07 - 01:34:55 Neelkanth predicts potential risks, drawbacks, and factors that may hinder India's future GDP growth01:34:55 - 01:36:09 Concluding today's episode and talking about what's to come in the next episodeResources: 1. GDP of Indian States and Union Territories: https://www.forbesindia.com/article/e... 2. More on China's Financial Repression: https://www.researchgate.net/publicat...3. Will this be India's Century? https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2...4. More on India's 20 Trillion Economy Goal: https://www.deccanherald.com/business...5. How is the GDP of India calculated? https://www.investopedia.com/articles...6. Foxconn in India: https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/...7. More on the Xi Jinping Thought: https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/202...About SparX by Mukesh BansalSparX is a podcast where we delve into cutting-edge scientific research, stories from impact-makers and tools for unlocking the secrets to human potential and growth. We believe that entrepreneurship, fitness and t...

Chinese politics have been transformed since Xi Jinping became paramount leader in 2012. He has accumulated power in a way unprecedented since the era of Mao Zedong and he expects China's people to study his ideology, just as Chairman Mao's supporters studied his 'Little Red Book'. Professor Steve Tsang, Director of the SOAS China Institute, and Olivia Cheung, Research Fellow at the SOAS China Institute, have co-authored a new book on the philosophy of the Chinese leader, 'The Political Thought of Xi Jinping', which was recently published by Oxford University Press. In this podcast, Professor Tsang discusses the book's themes with Isabel Hilton, visiting Professor at King's College London and the founder of China Dialogue.

Dr. Li-Meng Yan w/ The Voice of Dr. Yan – Since CCP agents and the cyber army failed to play the anti-Chinese card with pianist Brendan, they turned to blow off steam at others. According to Xi Jinping Thought, it's the great rejuvenating process of Communist China, and it is the CCP's goal to eliminate freedom in the free world. However, the two cases demonstrate the ability of defending freedom in the US and UK to strike back resolutely at the CCP...

China's President Xi Jinping is a figure of extraordinary influence around the world but it in the West the nuances and intricacies of his political agenda are less well understood. The Political Thought of Xi Jinping is a new book from Steve Tsang, Director of the SOAS China Institute, and Dr Olivia Cheung, Research Fellow of the China Institute at SOAS University of London. The book draws from Xi Jinping's own words and writings issued in his name to explain his ideas and plans, offering the first comprehensive and critical analysis of what "Xi Jinping Thought" is and whether it should be treated as China's state ideology. Joining Tsang and Cheung in conversation for this episode is Katie Stallard, senior editor for China and global affairs at the New Statesman and author of Dancing on Bones: History and Power in China, Russia, and North Korea. If you'd like to get access to all of our longer form interviews and members-only content, just visit intelligencesquared.com/membership to find out more. For £4.99 per month you'll also receive: - Full-length and ad-free Intelligence Squared episodes, wherever you get your podcasts - Bonus Intelligence Squared podcasts, curated feeds and members exclusive series - 15% discount on livestreams and in-person tickets for all Intelligence Squared events - Our member-only newsletter The Monthly Read, sent straight to your inbox ... Or Subscribe on Apple for £4.99: - Full-length and ad-free Intelligence Squared podcasts - Bonus Intelligence Squared podcasts, curated feeds and members exclusive series ... Already a subscriber? Thank you for supporting our mission to foster honest debate and compelling conversations! Visit intelligencesquared.com to explore all your benefits including ad-free podcasts, exclusive bonus content, early access and much more ... Subscribe to our newsletter here to hear about our latest events, discounts and much more. https://www.intelligencesquared.com/newsletter-signup/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Last weekend, the Chinese Communist Party concluded a two-day National Ideological and Cultural Work Conference. The big outcome of this was the establishment of Xi Jinping Thought on Culture. In this episode, Anushka Saxena and Manoj Kewalramani discuss why the canonisation of such ideas as thoughts matters in Chinese politics and what are the implications of this new thought. Do check out Takshashila's public policy courses: https://school.takshashila.org.in/courses We are @‌IVMPodcasts on Facebook, Twitter, & Instagram. https://twitter.com/IVMPodcasts https://www.instagram.com/ivmpodcasts/?hl=en https://www.facebook.com/ivmpodcasts/ You can check out our website at https://shows.ivmpodcasts.com/featured Follow the show across platforms: Spotify, Google Podcasts, Apple Podcasts, JioSaavn, Gaana, Amazon Music Do share the word with your folksSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

On today's show Andrew and Bill begin with a meeting between Xi Jinping and a congressional delegation led by Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, the latest indication that Xi and the PRC are working toward a trip to APEC in November and a likely meeting with President Biden. From there: Reports of updates to the semiconductor export controls in advance of a Xi visit, Senator Schumer asks Xi and Wang Yi for a swift condemnation of Hamas terror attacks, and whether PRC messaging in the Middle East will deviate from the playbook we saw Russia and Ukraine. Then: The introduction of Xi Jinping Thought on Culture, an analyst's look at the evolution of semiconductor export controls, and why Nvidia reportedly sought to have the aforementioned analyst "sidelined" as policymakers continue to calibrate new restrictions for U.S. exports. At the end: Tim Cook's takes on manufacturing expertise in China, a competing theory as to how that expertise was honed, and Kyrie Irving becomes a global ambassador for ANTA apparel.

Xi Jinping Thought on Culture was formally put forward at a national meeting on work related to public communication and culture, which was held in Beijing on Saturday and Sunday.President Xi Jinping stressed the need to foster a stronger sense of cultural confidence, uphold openness and inclusiveness, and strive to break new ground while upholding fundamental principles, in a recent instruction made for work that is related to public communication and culture.The instruction made by Xi, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, was conveyed at the two-day meeting in Beijing.During the meeting, Xi Jinping Thought on Culture was put forward as part of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.In the instruction, Xi underlined new situations and tasks on the front of public communication and culture, as well as the need for fresh approaches and accomplishments, with the world undergoing major changes unseen in a century and the nation's great rejuvenation entering a crucial period.He highlighted the need to focus on arming the Party with innovative theories and educating the people, and to continue promoting cultural prosperity, building a nation that is strong in culture, and developing modern Chinese civilization from a new historical starting point.Xi stressed steps to enhance the Party's leadership over public communication and culture, develop a socialist ideology that has the power to unite and inspire the people, and cultivate and apply socialist core values.It is important to carry forward Chinese cultural heritage, promote the creative transformation and innovative development of fine traditional Chinese culture, and promote the prosperity of the cultural sector, he said.The president reiterated the need to enhance the nation's capacity in international communication, promote exchanges and mutual learning between civilizations, and fully stimulate the creativity and vitality of the entire nation in the cultural sector.The goal is to keep enhancing the soft power and influence of Chinese culture and provide strong ideological assurance, powerful spiritual strength and favorable cultural conditions for building a modern socialist country and advancing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, he said.Participants in the Beijing meeting highlighted that Xi Jinping Thought on Culture has made clear the road map and letter of assignment for the development of culture in the new era.It marked a new height for the CPC in its level of confidence over its history and culture and will serve as a powerful spiritual weapon and scientific playbook for work related to public communication, ideology and culture in the new era and on the new journey, they said.Cai Qi, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and a member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, spoke at the two-day meeting.The meeting followed a decadelong effort from the CPC to build up the level of the nation's confidence regarding its culture and make the country more united and cohesive, as the world's second-largest economy forges ahead against various headwinds."We must not slacken or weaken the ideological work at any time while focusing on economic growth," Xi emphasized during a national meeting on public communication in 2013.Han Qiang, dean of the School of Marxism at Beijing Foreign Studies University, said the establishment of Marxism at the guiding position in the ideological field has charted the right direction for the nation's course of public communications, ideology and culture.The new ideas and judgments about cultural development in the new era put forward by Xi have enriched and developed Marxist cultural theories and led to Xi Jinping Thought on Culture, he said."With the nation's traditional culture being revitalized, the level of cultural confidence among the people has been brought to an unprecedented level, and the unity among society has been lifted," he said.Meanwhile, Han observed that China's soft power in the world has also increased over the past decade, especially in the developing world."As the world's largest Marxist ruling party, the leadership of the CPC has been widely lauded by the international community, and the global recognition over Chinese culture has also been increased," he said.In the eyes of many analysts, Xi has taken the imperative to pool strength from the nation's traditional culture and raise it to an unprecedented height, calling for the integration of basic tenets of Marxism with fine traditional Chinese culture, also known as the "second integration".Building on the CPC's "first integration" theoretical synthesis — integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China's specific realities, the "second integration", many analysts said, will pave the way for the building of China's own discourse system on civilization and help the nation firm up its confidence amid the complex international landscape.Wang Huiyao, president of the Beijing-based think tank Center for China and Globalization, said that pooling strength from China's traditional culture, which emphasizes the value of harmony, family, education and diligence, coupled with the modern market system, will give rise to strong cohesive power and productivity in the nation.He noted that the nation's deep-rooted Confucian culture is also shared by many other countries in East and Southeast Asia, and that amplifying elements from the culture will help promote the building of an Asian community with a shared future.Stephen Ndegwa, executive director of South-South Dialogues, a development communication think tank based in Nairobi, Kenya, said China's cultural soft power "has been understated and underestimated because of its nonaggressive policies".Xi Jinping Thought on Culturen.习近平文化思想Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Eran.习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想South-South Dialoguesn.南南对话

Go to https://Surfshark.deals/advpodcast and use code advpodcast to get 83% off a 2 year plan plus 3 extra months for free!Jordan Harbinger - Fast Fashion and The Abusive Labor Behind Your Favorite Products (China made cheap goods) Episode here - https://www.jordanharbinger.com/fast-fashion-skeptical-sunday/ Video about abusive labor behind cheap products - https://youtu.be/lOm_avLMVsUWe called it!!! So China is giving pregnancy supplements to teens, and promoting Xi Jinping thought to fetuses in the womb...Support the show here and see the Monday Exclusive show Xiaban Hou! - https://www.patreon.com/advpodcasts Friend of the channel - Chris Fenton - give him a follow on Twitter - https://twitter.com/TheDragonFeeder Lao Lei's video about the lawsuit - https://youtu.be/N0zeMO1-i_c Stay Awesome China Documentary: https://youtu.be/mSie5A3LWgI **Conquering China Box Set** - http://vimeo.com/ondemand/conqueringchinaboxset Laowhy86 - "Eat Bitterness" - China's Hopeless New Trend - https://youtu.be/yYFnsFNvZSk SerpentZA - China's EV disaster - https://youtu.be/1SEfwoqKRU8 ADVChina - The Red Dress Slasher - https://youtu.be/SIH0g0yAZ30 China Fact Chasers - Please subscribe! https://www.youtube.com/c/ChinaFactChasers Support the show here and see the Monday Exclusive show Xiaban Hou! - https://www.patreon.com/advpodcasts Support us and the channel on Paypal! http://paypal.me/advchina Our personal Patreon accounts SerpentZA: http://www.patreon.com/serpentza C-Milk: http://www.patreon.com/laowhy86 ADVChina Subreddit - https://reddit.com/r/ADVChina Tune in, hop on, and stay awesome! http://www.facebook.com/advchina Cartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember U https://soundcloud.com/nocopyrightsounds Track : Cartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember U

This is a linkpost for https://www.forourposterity.com/want-to-win-the-agi-race-solve-alignment/Society really cares about safety. Practically speaking, the binding constraint on deploying your AGI could well be your ability to align your AGI. Solving (scalable) alignment might be worth lots of $$$ and key to beating China.Look, I really don't want Xi Jinping Thought to rule the world. If China gets AGI first, the ensuing rapid AI-powered scientific and technological progress could well give it a decisive advantage (cf potential for >30%/year economic growth with AGI). I think there's a very real specter of global authoritarianism here. Or hey, maybe you just think AGI is cool. You want to go build amazing products and enable breakthrough science and solve the world's problems.So, race to AGI with reckless abandon then? At this point, people get into agonizing discussions about safety tradeoffs. And many people just mood affiliate their way to an answer: "accelerate, progress go brrrr," or "AI scary, slow it down."I see this much more practically. And, practically, society cares about safety, a lot. Do you actually think that you'll be able to and allowed to deploy an AI system that has, say, a 10% chance of destroying all of humanity?Original article:https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/Ackzs8Wbk7isDzs2n/want-to-win-the-agi-race-solve-alignmentNarrated for the Effective Altruism Forum by TYPE III AUDIO.Share feedback on this narration.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Want to win the AGI race? Solve alignment., published by leopold on March 29, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Society really cares about safety. Practically speaking, the binding constraint on deploying your AGI could well be your ability to align your AGI. Solving (scalable) alignment might be worth lots of $$$ and key to beating China. Look, I really don't want Xi Jinping Thought to rule the world. If China gets AGI first, the ensuing rapid AI-powered scientific and technological progress could well give it a decisive advantage (cf potential for >30%/year economic growth with AGI). I think there's a very real specter of global authoritarianism here. Or hey, maybe you just think AGI is cool. You want to go build amazing products and enable breakthrough science and solve the world's problems. So, race to AGI with reckless abandon then? At this point, people get into agonizing discussions about safety tradeoffs. And many people just mood affiliate their way to an answer: "accelerate, progress go brrrr," or "AI scary, slow it down." I see this much more practically. And, practically, society cares about safety, a lot. Do you actually think that you'll be able to and allowed to deploy an AI system that has, say, a 10% chance of destroying all of humanity? Society has started waking up to AGI; like covid, the societal response will probably be a dumpster-fire, but it'll also probably be quite intense. In many worlds, to deploy your AGI systems, people will need to be quite confident that your AGI won't destroy the world. Right now, we're very much not on track to solve the alignment problem for superhuman AGI systems (“scalable alignment”)—but it's a solvable problem, if we get our act together. I discuss this in my main post today (“Nobody's on the ball on AGI alignment”). On the current trajectory, the binding constraint on deploying your AGI could well be your ability to align your AGI—and this alignment solution being unambiguous enough that there is consensus that it works. Even if you just want to win the AGI race, you should probably want to invest much more heavily in solving this problem. Things are going to get crazy, and people will pay attention A mistake many people make when thinking about AGI is imagining a world that looks much like today, except for adding in a lab with a super powerful model. They ignore the endogenous societal response. I and many others made this mistake with covid—we were freaking out in February 2020, and despairing that society didn't seem to be even paying attention, let alone doing anything. But just a few weeks later, all of America went into an unprecedented lockdown. If we're actually on our way to AGI, things are going to get crazy. People are going to pay attention. The wheels for this are already in motion. Remember how nobody paid any attention to AI 6 months ago, and now Bing chat/Sydney going awry is on the front page of the NYT, US senators are getting scared, and Yale econ professors are advocating $100B/year for AI safety? Well, imagine that, but 100x as we approach AGI. AI safety is going mainstream. Everyone has been primed to be scared about rogue AI by science fiction; all the CEOs have secretly believed in AI risk for years but thought it was too weird to talk about it; and the mainstream media loves to hate on tech companies. Probably there will be further, much scarier wakeup calls (not just misalignment, but also misuse and scary demos in evals). People already freaked out about GPT-4 using a TaskRabbit to solve a captcha—now imagine a demo of AI systems designing a new bioweapon or autonomously self-replicating on the internet, or people using AI coders to hack major institutions like the government or big banks. Already, a majority of the population says they fear AI risk and want FDA-style regulation ...

This episode presents a deep-dive examination of Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's efforts to revive communist ideology under the new hardline doctrine called Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era.

Episode Notes:A discussion recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally.Links:John Culver: How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan - Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceTranscript:Bill: Welcome back to the very occasional Sinocism podcast. Today we are going to talk about the recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally. So we have a lot of experience here to help us understand what just happened. Chris, welcome back and thanks for taking the time.Chris: My pleasure. Always fun to be with you, Bill.Bill: Great. Well, why don't we jump right in. I'd like to talk about what you see as the most important outcomes from the Congress starting with personnel. What do you make of the leadership team from the central committee to the Politburo to the Standing Committee and what does that say about.Chris: Yeah, well, I, think clearly Xi Jinping had a massive win, you know, with personnel. I think we see this particularly in the Politburo Standing Committee, right, where on the key portfolios that really matter to him in terms of controlling the key levers of power inside the system. So we're talking propaganda, obviously, Uh, we're talking party bureaucracy, military less so, but security services, you know, these, these sort of areas all up and down the ballot he did very well.So that's obviously very important. And I think obviously then the dropping of the so-called Communist Youth League faction oriented people in Li Keqiang and Wang Yang and, and Hu Chunhua being  kind of unceremoniously kicked off the Politburo, that tells us that. He's not in the mood to compromise with any other  interest group.I prefer to call them rather than factions. Um, so that sort of suggests to us that, you know, models that rely on that kind of an analysis are dead. It has been kind of interesting in my mind to see how quickly though that, you know, analysts who tend to follow that framework already talking about the, uh, factional elements within Xi's faction, right?So, you know, it's gonna be the Shanghai people versus the Zhijiang Army versus the Fujian people. Bill: people say there's a Tsinghua factionChris: Right. The, the infamous, non infamous Tsinghua clique and, and and so on. But I think as we look more closely, I mean this is all kidding aside, if we look more closely at the individuals, what we see is obviously these people, you know, loyalty to Xi is, is sort of like necessary, but not necessarily sufficient in explaining who these people are. Also, I just always find it interesting, you know, somehow over. Wang Huning has become a Xi Jinping loyalist. I mean, obviously he plays an interesting role for Xj Jinping, but I don't think we should kid ourselves in noting that he's been kind of shunted aside Right by being pushed into the fourth position on the standing committee, which probably tells us that he will be going to oversee the Chinese People's Consultative Congress, which is, you know, kind of a do nothing body, you know, for the most part. And, um, you know, my sense has long been, One of Xi Jinping's, I think a couple factors there with Wang Huning.Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.One is, you know, yes, he is very talented at sort of taking their very, uh, expansive, um, theoretical ideas and coming up with snappy, um, snappy sort of catchphrases, right? This is clearly his, um, his sort of claim to fame. But, you know, we had that article last year from the magazine, Palladium that kind of painted him as some sort of an éminence grise or a Rasputin like figure, you know, in terms of his role.Uh, you know, my sense has always been, uh, as one contact, put it to me one time. You know, the issue is that such analyses tend to confuse the musician with the conductor. In other words,  Xi Jinping.  is pretty good at ideology, right? And party history and the other things that I think the others had relied on.I think the second thing with Wang Huning is, um, in a way XI can't look at him I don't think, without sort of seeing here's a guy who's changed flags, as they would say, right? He served three very different leaders, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and now Xi , um, and, and continued on and I think at some level, uh, and we look at the rest of the appointments where it appears that, uh, loyalty was much more important than merit.Um, where that's also a question mark. So there's those issues I think on the Politburo. You know, you mentioned the, the Tsinghua clique it was very interesting. You had shared with me, uh, Desmond Shum of Red Roulette fame's Twitter stream sort of debunking, you know, this, this Tsinghua clique and saying, well, it turns out in fact that the new Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining can't stand Chen Xi, even though, you know, they both went to Tsinghua and were there at the same time and so on.Um, you know, who knows with Desmond Shum, but I think he knows some things, right? And, and, and it just a reminder to us all, I think, how little we understand right, about these relationships, especially now, uh, with Xi's concentration of power. And also a situation where we've had nearly three years of covid isolationBill: Right. And so it's really hard to go talk to people, even the fewer and fewer numbers, people who, who know something and can talk. Back to the standing committee. I, I think certainly just from friends and contacts the biggest surprise you know, I think, uh was Li Keqiang and Wang Yang not sticking around. And as that long explainer said without naming them they were good comrades who steps aside for the good of the party in the country,Chris: Because that happens so often,Bill: whatever that means. Um, but really the, the bigger surprise was that, oh, Cai Qi showing up. Who I think when you look at the standing committee, I think the general sense is, okay, the, these people are all, you know, not, they're loyal, but they're also competent, like Li Qiang, Chris: Right, Bill: The likely new premier number two on the standing committee is pretty competent. The Shanghai lockdown, disaster aside, Cai Qi on the other hand, was just, looks more like, it's just straight up loyalty to Xi. I think he was not really on anybody's short list of who was gonna make it on there. And so, it does feel like something happened, right?Chris: Yeah. Well, um, a couple things there. I think, um, one, let's start with the. The issue you raised about the economic team cuz I think that's actually very important. Um, you know, I, at some level, sometimes I feel like I'm sort of tiring my, of my role as official narrative buster or a windmill tilter.Uh, whether, whether it's pushback from Li Keqiang or the myth of the savior premier as I was calling it, which, uh, we didn't see, or that these norms actually aren't very enduring and it's really about power politics. I, I think I'm kind of onto a new one now, which is, you know, Xi Jin ping's new team of incompetent sycophants.Right? That's kind of the label that's, uh, come out in a lot of the takes, uh, since the Congress. But to your point, I mean, you know, Li Qiang has run the three most important economic powerhouses on China's east coast, either as governor or as party chief. Right. He seems to have had a, a good relationship with both.Private sector businesses and, and foreign, you know, people forget that, you know, he got the Tesla plant built in Shanghai in a year basically. Right. And it's, uh, responsible for a very significant amount of, of Tesla's total input of vehicles. Output of vehicles. Excuse me. Um, likewise, I hear that Ding Xuexiang, even though we don't know a lot about him, uh, was rather instrumental in things.Breaking the log jam with the US uh, over the de-listing of Chinese ADRs, uh, that he had played an important role in convincing Xi Jinping it would not be a good idea, for example, to, uh, you know, we're already seeing, uh, sort of decoupling on the technology side. It would not be a good idea to encourage the Americans to decouple financially as well. So the point is I think we need to just all kind of calm down, right? And, and see how these people perform in office. He Lifeng, I think is perhaps, you know, maybe more of a question mark, but, But here too, I think it's important for us to think about how their system worksThe political report sets the frame, right? It tells us what. Okay, this is the ideological construct we're working off of, or our interpretation, our dialectical interpretation of what's going on. And that, I think the signal there was what I like to call this fortress economy, right? So self-sufficiency and technology and so on.And so then when we look at the Politburo appointments, you can see that they align pretty closely to that agenda, right? These people who've worked in state firms or scientists and you know, so on and forth.Bill: Aerospace, defenseChris: Yeah, Aerospace. Very close alignment with that agenda. I'm not saying this is the right choice for China or that it even will be successful, I'm just saying it makes sense, you know,Bill: And it is not just sycophants it is actually loyal but some expertise or experience in these key sectors Chris: Exactly.  Yeah, and, and, and, and of interest as well. You know, even people who have overlapped with Xi Jinping. How much overlap did they have? How much exposure did they have? You know, there's a lot of discussion, for example, about the new propaganda boss, Li Shulei being very close to Xi and likewise Shi Taifeng.Right? Uh, both of whom were vice presidents at the party school when, when Xi also was there. Um, but remember, you know, he was understudy to Hu Jintao at the time, you know, I mean, the party school thing was a very small part of his portfolio and they were ranked lower, you know, amongst the vice presidents of the party school.So how much actual interaction did he have? So there too, you know, I think, uh, obviously. , yes these people will do what Xi Jinping wants them to do, but that doesn't mean they're not competent. On Cai Qi, I agree with you. I think it's, it's, it's difficult. You know, my speculation would be a couple of things.One, proximity matters, right? He's been sitting in Beijing the last five years, so he is, had the opportunity to, uh, be close to the boss and, and impact that. I've heard some suggestions from contacts, which I think makes some. He was seen as more strictly enforcing the zero Covid policy. Right. In part because he is sitting in Beijing than say a Chen Min'er, right.Who arguably was a other stroke better, you know, candidate for that position on the Politburo standing committee. And there, you know, it will be interesting to see, you know, we're not sure the musical chairs have not yet finished. Right. The post party Congress for people getting new jobs. But you know, for example, if Chen Min'er stays out in Chongqing, that seems like a bit of a loss for him.Bill: Yeah, he needs to go somewhere else if he's got any hope of, um, sort of, But so one thing, sorry. One thing on the Politburo I thought was really interesting, and I know we've talked about offline, um, is that the first time the head of the Ministry State Security was, was. Promoted into the Politburo - Chen Wenqing.  And now he is the Secretary of the Central Political Legal Affairs Commission, the party body that oversees the entire security services system and legal system. and what do you think that says about priorities and, and, and where Xi sees things going?Chris: Well, I think it definitely aligns with this concept of Xi Jiping's of comprehensive national security. Right. We've, we've seen and heard and read a lot about that and it seems that the, uh, number of types of security endlessly proliferate, I think we're up to 13 or 14Bill: Everything is National Security in Xi's China.Chris: Yeah. Everything is, is national security. Uh, that's one thing I think it's interesting perhaps in the, in the frame of, you know, in an era where they are becoming a bigger power and therefore, uh, have more resources and so on. You know, is that role that's played by the Ministry of State Security, which is, you know, they have this unique role, don't they?They're in a way, they're sort of the US' Central Intelligence Agency and, and FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation combined, and that they do have that internal security role as well, but, They are the foreign civilian anyway, uh, foreign intelligence collection arm. So perhaps, you know, over time there's been some sense that they realized, yes, cyber was great for certain things, but you still need human intelligence.Uh, you know, we don't know how well or not Chen Wenqing has performed, but you know, obviously there, this has been a relentless campaign, you know, the search for spies and so on and so forth. Um, I also think it says something about what we seem to be seeing emerging here, which is an effort to take what previously were these, you know, warring, uh, administrative or ministerial factions, right, of the Ministry of Public Security MPS, the MSS, uh, and even the party's, uh, discipline watchdog, the, uh, Central Commission on Discipline inspection, you know, in an effort to sort of knit those guys into one whole.And you know, it is interesting.Chen wending has experience in all three of those. He started off, I think as a street cop. Um, he did serve on the discipline inspection commission under, uh, Wang Qishan when things were, you know, really going  in that department in the early part of, Xi's tenure and then he's headed, uh, the Ministry of State Security.I think, you know, even more interesting probably is. The, uh, formation of the new secretariat, right? Where we have both Chen Wenqing on there and also Wang Xiaohong as a minister of Public Security, but also as a deputy on the CPLAC, right? And a seat on the secretariat. And if we look at the, um, The gentleman who's number two in the discipline inspection, uh, space, he was a longtime police officer as well.So that's very unusual. You know, uh, his name's escaping me at the moment. But, um, you know, so in effect you have basically three people on the Secretariat with security backgrounds and, you know, that's important. It means other portfolios that might be on the secretariat that have been dumped, right? So it shows something about the prioritization, uh, of security.And I think it's interesting, you know, we've, we've often struggled to understand what is the National Security Commission, how does it function, You know, these sort of things. And it's, it's still, you know, absolutely clear as mud. But what was interesting was that, you know, from whatever that early design was that had some aspect at least of looking a bit like the US style, National Security Commission, they took on a much more sort of internal looking flavor.And it had always been my sort of thought that one of the reasons Xi Jinping created this thing was to break down, you know, those institutional rivalries and barriers and force, you know, coordination on these, on these institutions. So, you know, bottom line, I think what we're seeing is a real effort by Xi Jinping to You know, knit together a comprehensive, unified, and very effective, you know, stifling, really security apparatus. And, uh, I don't expect to see that change anytime soon. And then, you know, as you and I have been discussing recently, we also have, uh, another Xi loyalist Chen Yixin showing up as Chen Wenqing's successor right at the Ministry of State SecurityBill: And he remains Secretary General of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission too.Chris: Exactly. So, you know, from, from a, a sheet home where Xi Jinping five years ago arguably had very loose control, if at all, we now have a situation where he's totally dominant. Bill: I think the, the official on the Secretariat, I think it's Liu Jinguo.Chris: That's the one. Yes. Thank you. I'm getting old…Bill: He also has, has a long history of the Ministry of Public Security system. Um, but yeah, it does, it does seem like it's a, it's a real, I mean it, I I, I don't wanna use the word securitization, but it does like this is the indication of a, of a real, sort of, it just sort of fits with the, the general trend  towards much more focus on national security. I mean, what about on the, the Central Military Commission? Right? Because one of the surprises was, um, again, and this is where the norms were broken, where you have Zhang Youxia, who should have retired based on his age, but he's 72, he's on the Politburo he stays as a vice chair of the CMCChris: Yep. Yeah, no, at, at, at the rip old age of 72. It's a little hard, uh, to think of him, you know, mounting a tank or something  to go invade Taiwan or whatever the, you know, whatever the case may be. But, you know, I, I think here again, the narratives might be off base a little bit, you know, it's this issue of, you know, well he's just picked, you know, these sycophantic loyalists, He's a guy who has combat experience, right?And that's increasingly rare. Um, I don't think it's any surprise that. That himself. And, uh, the, uh, uh, gentleman on the CMC, uh, Li, who is now heading the, um, Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also has Vietnam combat experience, not from 79, but from the, uh, the border incursions that went on into the80s. Um, so it's not that surprising really.But, but obviously, you know, Zhang Youxia is very close to Xi Jinping, their father's fought together, right? Um, and they have that sort of, uh, blood tie and Xi is signaling, I want, uh, I. Political control and also technologically or, or, um, you know, operationally competent people. I think the other fascinating piece is we see once again no vice chairman from the political commissar iatside of the PLA.I think that's very interesting. You know, a lot of people, including myself, were betting that Miao HuaWould, would, would get the promotion. He didn't, you know, we can't know. But my sense is in a way, Xi Jiping is still punishing that side of the PLA for Xu Caihou's misdoings. Right. You know, and that's very interesting in and of itself.Also, it may be a signal that I don't need a political commissar vice chairman because I handle the politicsBill: And, and, and he, yeah. And in this, this new era that the, the next phase of the Xi era, it, it is, uh, everybody knows, right? It's, it's all about loyalty to Xi.Chris: we just saw right, uh, today, you know, uh, yet, yet more instructions about the CMC responsibilities, Chairman, responsibility systems. Bill: Unfortunately they didn't release the full text but it would be fascinating to see what's in there.Chris: And they never do on these things, which is, uh, which is tough. But, um, you know, I think we have a general sense of what would be in it, . But, but even that itself, right, you know, is a very major thing that people, you know, didn't really pick up. Certain scholars, certainly like James Mulvenon and other people who are really good on this stuff noticed it. But this shift under Hu Jintao was a CMC vice chairman responsibility system. In other words, he was subletting the operational matters certainly to his uniformed officers, Xi Jinping doesn't do thatBill: Well, this, and here we are, right where he can indeed I mean, I, I had written in the newsletter, um, you know, that she had, I thought, I think he ran the table in terms of personnel.Chris: Oh, completely. Yeah.Bill: And this is why it is interesting he kept around folks like Wang Huning, but we'll move on. The next question I had really was about Xi's report to the party Congress and we had talked, I think you'd also, um, you've talked about on our previous podcasts, I mean there, there seems to be a pretty significant shift in the way Xi is talking about the geopolitical environment and their assessment and how they see the world. Can you talk about a little bit?Chris: Yeah, I mean, I think definitely we saw some shifts there and, uh, you know, you and I have talked a lot about it. You know, there are problems with word counting, right? You know, and when you look at the thing and you just do a machine search, and it's like, okay, well security was mentioned 350 times or whatever, but, but the, you know, in what context?Right. Um, and, uh, our, uh, mutual admiration society, the, uh, the China Media project, uh, I thought they did an excellent piece on that sort of saying, Remember, it's the words that go around the buzzword that matter, you know, just as much. But what we can say unequivocally is that two very important touchstones that kind of explain their thinking on their perception of not only their external environment, but really kind of their internal environment, which had been in the last several political reports, now are gone. And those are this idea of China's enjoying a period of strategic opportunity and this idea that peace and development are the underlying trend of the times. And, you know, on the period of strategic opportunity, I think it's important for a couple reasons. One, just to kind of break that down for our listeners in a way that's not, you know, sort of, uh, CCP speak, , uh, the, the basic idea was that China judged that it's external security environment was sufficiently benign, that they could focus their energies on economic development.Right? So obviously that's very important. I also think it was an important governor, and I don't think I've seen anything out there talking about its absence in this, uh, political report on this topic, It was a, it was an important governor on sort of breakneck Chinese military development, sort of like the Soviet Union, right?In other words, as long as you were, you know, sort of judging that your external environment was largely benign, you. Didn't really have a justification to have a massive defense budget or to be pushy, you know, in the neighborhood, these sort of things. And people might poo poo that and sort of say, Well, you know, this is all just rhetoric and so on. No, they actually tend to Bill: Oh, that's interesting. Well, then that fits a little bit, right, Cuz they added the, the wording around strategic deterrence in the report as well  which is seen as a, you know, modernizing, expanding their nuclear forces, right?Chris: Exactly, right. So, you know, that's, uh, an important absence and the fact that, you know, the word, again, word searching, right. Um, strategic and opportunity are both in there, but they're separated and balanced by this risks and challenges, languages and, and so on. Bill: Right the language is very starkly different. Chris: Yeah. And then likewise on, on peace and development. This one, as you know, is, is even older, right? It goes back to the early eighties, I believe, uh, that it's been in, in these political reports. And, uh, you know, there again, the idea was sort of not only was this notion that peace and economic development were the dominant, you know, sort of trend internationally, globally, they would be an enduring one. You know, this idea of the trend of the times, right? Um, now that's missing. So what has replaced it in both these cases is this spirit of struggle, right? Um, and so that's a pretty stark departure and that in my mind just sort of is a real throwback to what you could call the period of maximum danger for the regime in the sixties, right? When they had just split off with the Soviets and they were still facing unremitting hostility from the west after the Korean War experience and, and so on. So, you know, there's definitely a, a decided effort there. I think also we should view the removal of these concepts as a culmination of a campaign that Xi Jinping has been on for a while.You know, as you and I have discussed many times before, from the minute he arrived, he began, I think, to paint this darker picture of the exterior environment. And he seems to have always wanted to create a sort of sense of urgency, certainly maybe even crisis. And I think a big part of that is to justifying the power grab, right? If the world outside is hostile, you need, you know, a strongman. Bill: Well that was a lot of the propaganda going into the Party of Congress about the need for sort of a navigator helmsman because know, we we're, we're closest we have ever been to the great rejuvenation, but it's gonna be really hard and we need sort of strong leadership right. It was, it was all building to that. This is why Ci needs to stay for as long as he wants to stay.Chris: and I think we saw that reflected again just the other day in this Long People's Daily piece by Ding Xuexing, right, Where he's talking again about the need for unity, the throwback, as you mentioned in your newsletter to Mao's commentary, there is not to be lost on any of us you know, the fact that the Politburo standing committee's. Uh, first field trip is out to Yan'an, right? I mean, you know, these are messages, right? The aren't coincidental.Bill: No, it, it is. The thing that's also about the report that's interesting is that while there was, speaking of word counts, there was no mention of the United States, but it certainly feels like that was the primary backdrop for this entire discussion around. So the, the shifting geopolitical, uh, assessments and this broader, you know, and I think one of the things that I, and I want to talk to as we get into this, a little bit about US China relations, but is it she has come to the conclusion that the US is implacably effectively hostile, and there is no way that they're gonna get through this without some sort of a broader struggle?Chris: I don't know if they, you know, feel that conflict is inevitable. In fact, I kind of assume they don't think that because that's pretty grim picture for them, you know? Um, but I, I do think there's this notion that. They've now had two years to observe the Biden administration. Right? And to some degree, I think it's fair to say that by certain parties in the US, Xi Jinping, maybe not Xi Jinping, but a Wang Qishan or some of these characters were sold a bit of a bag of goods, right?Oh, don't worry, he's not Trump, he's gonna, things will be calmer. We're gonna get back to dialogue and you know, so on and so forth. And that really hasn't happened. And when we look at. Um, when we look at measures like the recent, chip restrictions, which I'm sure we'll discuss at some point, you know, that would've been, you know, the, the wildest dream, right of certain members of the Trump administration to do something that, uh, that's that firm, right? So, um, I think the conclusion of the Politburo then must be, this is baked into the cake, right? It's bipartisan. Um, the earliest we'll see any kind of a turn here is 2024. I think they probably feel. Um, and therefore suddenly things like a no limits partnership with Russia, right, start to make more sense. Um, but would really makes sense in that if that is your framing, and I think it is, and you therefore see the Europeans as like a swing, right, in this equation. This should be a great visit, right, for Chancellor Scholz, uh, and uh, I can't remember if it was you I was reading or someone else here in the last day or so, but this idea that if the Chinese are smart, they would get rid of these sanctions on Bill: That was me. Well, that was in my newsletterChris: Yeah. Parliamentary leaders and you know, Absolutely. Right. You know, that's a no brainer, but. I don't think they're gonna do it , but, but you know, this idea definitely that, and, and when they talk in the political report, you know, it, it's, it's like, sir, not appearing in this film, right, from Money Python, but we know who the people who are doing the bullying, you know, uh, is and the long armed jurisdiction and , so on and so forth and all, I mean, all kidding aside, I think, you know, they will see something like the chip restrictions effectively as a declaration of economic war. I don't think that's going too far to say that.Bill: It goes to the heart of their sort of technological project around rejuvenation. I mean, it is, it is a significant. sort of set of really kind of a, I would think, from the Chinese perspective aggressive policies against them,Chris: Yeah, and I mean, enforcement will be key and we'll see if, you know, licenses are granted and how it's done. And we saw, you know, already some, some backing off there with regard to this US person, uh, restriction and so on. But, but you know, it's still pretty tough stuff. There's no two ways aboutBill: No, and I, I wonder, and I worry that here in DC. You know, where the mood is very hawkish. If, if people here really fully appreciate sort of the shift that's taking, that seems to be taking place in Beijing and how these actions are viewed.Chris: Well, I, I think that's a really, you put your hand on it really, really interesting way, Bill, because, you know, let's face it really since the Trump trade war started, right? We've all analysts, you know, pundits, uh, even businesses and government people have been sort of saying, you know, when are the Chinese gonna punch back? You know, when are they going to retaliate? Right? And we talk about rare earths and we talk about Apple and TeslaBill: They slapped some sanctions on people but they kind of a jokeChris:  And I guess what I'm saying is I kind of worry we're missing the forest from the trees. Right. You know, the, the, the work report tells us, the political report tells us how they're reacting. Right. And it is hardening the system, moving toward this fortress economy, you know, so on and so forth. And I wanna be real clear here, you know, they're not doing this just because they're reacting to the United States. Xi Jinping presumably wanted to do this all along, but I don't think we can say that the actions they perceive as hostile from the US aren't playing a pretty major role in allowing him to accelerate.Bill: Well, they called me. Great. You justifying great Accelerationist, right? Trump was called that as well, and, and that, that's what worries me too, is we're in. Kind of toxic spiral where, where they see us doing something and then they react. We see them do something and we react and, and it doesn't feel like sort of there's any sort of a governor or a break and I don't see how we figure that out.Chris: Well, I think, you know, and I'm sure we'll come to this later in our discussion, but you know, uh, yes, that's true, but you know, I'm always deeply skeptical of these inevitability memes, whether it's, you know, Thucydides trap or, you know, these other things. Last time I checked, there is something called political agency, right?In other words, leaders can make choices and they can lead if they want to, right? They have an opportunity to do so at in Bali, and you know, we'll have to see some of the, you know, early indications are perhaps they're looking at sort of a longer meeting. So that would suggest maybe there will be some discussion of some of these longstanding issues.Maybe we will see some of the usual, you know, deliverable type stuff. So there's an opportunity. I, I think one question is, can the domestic politics on either side allow for seizing that opportunity? You know, that's an open.Bill: Interesting. There's a couple things in the party constitution, which I think going into the Congress, you know, they told us they were gonna amend the Constitution. There were expectations that it, the amendments were gonna reflect an increase in Xi's power, uh, things like this, this idea of the two establishments, uh, which for listeners are * "To establish the status of Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Party's Central Committee and of the whole Party"* "To establish the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era"The thinking, and I, I certainly believe that, I thought that they would write that in. There was some talk that, uh, Xi Jinping Thought the longer version would be truncated to just Xi Jinping thought. that possibly he might get, a, a sort of another title like People's Leader. None of those happened. One thing that did happen, What's officially translated by the Chinese side in English as the two upholds- “Uphold the 'core' status of General Secretary Xi Jinping within the CC and “Uphold the centralized authority of the Party” those were written in. And so the question is, was there some kind of pushback or are we misreading we what mattered? And actually the two upholds are more important than the two of establishes.Chris: Well, I, and I think it, this may be a multiple choice answer, right? There might be elements of all the above in there. Uh, you know, I think it is important that he didn't get the truncation to Xi Jinping thought. You have to think that that was something he was keen on. In retrospect, it may be that it was something akin. I've always felt, you know, another thing that was on the table that didn't happen was reestablishing the party chairmanship. My view had always been he was using that largely as a bargaining chip. That, you know, in some ways it creates more trouble than it's worth you. If you're gonna have a chairman, you probably have to have vice chairman and what does that say about the succession? I mean, of course he could have, you know, a couple of geezers on there.  as vice chairman too. , But I, my view was always is he was holding that out there to trade away. Right. You know, at, at the last minute. Um, maybe that's what happened with Xi Jinping thought. I don't know.You know, uh, there have been some media articles, one of which, You and I were discussing yesterday from, uh, the Japanese, uh, publication Nikkei, you know, that suggested that, you know, the elders had, this was their last gasp, right? So the Jiang Zemins and the Zeng Qinghongs and Hu Jinataos, so on. Um, I'm a little skeptical of that. It is possible. Uh, but, um, I, I'd be a little skeptical of that. You know, it's, it's not at all clear that they had any kind of a role, you know, even at Beidaihe this year and so on, Jiang Zemin didn't even attend the Party Congress so clearly, you know, he must be pretty frail or he thought it was not with his time. You know, a little hard to say, but, you know, I kind of struggle with the notion that, you know, the 105 year old Song Ping gets up on a chair or something and starts,  starts making trouble. Right. You know, uh, the poor man's probably lucky if he stays awake during the meeting. Bill: One question, and again, because of the, just, you know, how much more opaque Chinese politics are than the really I think they've ever been. Um, but just one question. It mean, is it possible, for example, that you know, it's more important to get the personnel done. It's more, and then once you get your, you stack the central committee, you get the politburo, you get the standing committee, that these things are sort of a next phase.Chris: yeah, it's entirely possible and, and I think it, it, it does dovetail with this idea that, you know, another reflection from both the political report and the lineup in my mind, is Xi Jinping is a man in a hurry. Right? And he's kind of projected that, as you said, the great accelerator since he arrived.But I think he sees this next five years is really fundamental, right in terms of breaking through on these chokepoint technologies as they call them. You know, these sort of things. And so maybe therefore having the right people in place to handle, you know, uh, speedier policy, execution, you know, was more important.Likewise, I mean, he's sort of telegraphing, He's gonna be around for a while, right? No successor, no visible successor anywhere. Bill: A successor would need likely need five years on the standing committee. So we're looking at ten more years.Chris: Yes, exactly. And so there will be time. The other thing is, um, Xi Jinping is a, is a sort of determined fellow, right? You know, so of interest, even before the 19th Party Congress, I'd been hearing very strong rumors that the notion of lingxiu was out there, that he was contemplating it, right? And so then we see the buildup with, uh, Renmin lingxiu and so on and so forth.And, you know, it didn't happen clearly at the 19th. It didn't happen. But it doesn't mean it won't, you know, at some point. And I think it's really important also to think about, you know, We just saw a pretty serious, um, enterprise of the, you know, quote unquote norm busting, right? So what's to say that mid-course in this five years, he doesn't, uh, hold another sort of extraordinary conference of party delegates like them, Deng Xiaoping did in 1985, right, to push through some of these. You never know, right? In other words, these things don't necessarily have to happen. Just at Party Congresses. So my guess is, you know, this isn't over yet. Uh, but you know, at some level, given how the system was ramping up with those articles about Navigator and the people's leader stuff and so on, you know, that's usually a tell, and yet it didn't happen. And, and so something interesting there. Bill: now they're in the mode of, they're out with these sort of publicity, propaganda education teams where they go out throughout the country and talk about the spirit of the party Congress and push all the key messaging. Um, you know, so far none of those People's leader truncation have happened in that, which is I think an area where some people thought, Well, maybe that could sort of come after the Congress.Chris: What is interesting is it's all two establishments all the time in those discussions, so that's been very interesting since it didn't make it into the, uh, into the document. I guess the other thing is, At some level, is it sort of a distinction without a difference? You know, I, I haven't done the work on this to see, but my guess is short of, you know, the many times they've just junked the entire constitution and rewritten it, this is probably the most amendments there have been, you know, in the to at one time. You know, to the 1982 constitution, and most of them are his various buzzwords. Right. Um, and you know, I think you've been talking about this in the newsletter, there may very well be, uh, something to this issue of, you know, which is the superior thought two establishments or to upholds/safeguards?Bill: and even if the two establishes were superior and then it didn't go in, then somehow it will be theoretically flipped to what got in the ConstitutionChris: I mean, I guess the, the, the thing though where we, it's fair to say that maybe this wasn't his ideal outcome. To me, there's been a very clear and you know, structured stepwise approach on the ideology from the word go. Right? And the first was to create right out of the shoot, this notion of, you know, three eras, right?The, Mao period, Deng  and those other guys we don't talk about it anymore, period.  and Xi Jinping's new era, right? And then that was. You know, sort of crystallized right at the 19th Party Congress when you know, Xi Jinping thought for horribly long name went into the Constitution. And so, you know, the next step kind of seemed like that should be it.And as we've discussed before, you know, if he's able to get just Thought, it certainly enhances his ability to stay around for a very long time and it makes his diktats and so on even more unquestionable. But you know, you can say again, matter of prioritization. With a team where there's really no visible or other opposition, does it really matter? You know, in other words, no one's gonna be questioning his policy ideas anyway.Bill: Just an aside, but on  his inspection, the new standing committee will go on group trip right after the Party Congress and the first trip sends key messages. And group went to Yan'an, you know, they went, they went to the caves. Um, and you know, in the long readout or long CCTV report of the meeting, the visit, there was a section where the tour guide or the person introducing some of the exhibits talked about how the, the famous song, the East Is Red was,  by a person, written by the people sort of spontaneously, and it w it definitely caused some tittering about, well, what are they trying to signal for?You know, are we gonna be seeing some  Xi songs? there's some kind of really interesting signaling going on that I don't think we quite have figured out how to parse Chris: My takeaway on all this has been, I, I need to go back and do a little more book work on, you know, what was, what was the content of the seventh party Congress? What were the outcomes? I mean, I have the general sense, right? Like you, I immediately, you know, started brushing up on it. But, you know, Xi delivered a, an abridged work report. Right, A political report, which is exactly what Mao did then. I mean, in other words, they're not kidding around with the parallelism here. The question is what's the message?Bill: Just for background, at the visit last week to Yan'an, and the first spot that was in the propaganda was the, the, site of the seventh party Congress which is where…to be very simplistic, the seventh party was really moment, you know, as at the end of the Yan'am rectification came in, it was the moment where sort of Mao fully asserted his dominance throughout the system. Mao Thought etc. Right? The signaling, you could certainly, could certainly take a view that, you know, he doesn't do these things by coincidence, and this is. This is signaling both of, you know, can through anything because they, livedin caves and ended up beating the Japanese and then won the Civil War. You know this, and we can, and by the way, we have a dominant leader. I mean, there are ways, again, I'm being simplistic, but the symbolism was not, I think one that would, for example, give a lot of confidence to investors, which I think is, you know, one, one of the many reasons we've seen until the rumors earlier this week, a, pretty big selloff in the, in the Hong Kong and manland stock markets rightChris: most definitely. And I think, you know, this is the other thing about, about what I was trying to get at earlier with, uh, forest and trees, right? You know, in other words, . Um, he's been at this for a while too. You know, there's a reason why he declared a new long march right in depths of the trade war with Trump.Bill: And a new historical resolution, only the third in historyChris: Yeah. And they have been stepwise building since then. And this is the next building block.Bill: The last thought, I mean, he is 69. He's. 10 years younger than President Joe Biden. He could go, he could be around for a long timeBill: well just quickly, cause I know, uh, we don't have that much more time, but I, you say anything about your thoughts on Hu Jintao and what happened?My first take having had a father and a stepfather had dementia was, um, you know, maybe too sympathetic to the idea that, okay, he's having some sort of a senior cognitive moment. You know, you can get. easily agitated, and you can start a scene. And so therefore, was humiliating and symbolic at the end of the Communist Youth League faction, but maybe it was, it was benign as opposed to some of the other stuff going around. But I think might be wrong so I'd love your take on that.  Chris: Well, I, I think, you know, I, I kind of shared your view initially when I watched the, uh, I guess it was an AFP had the first, you know, sort of video that was out there and, you know, he appeared to be stumbling around a bit. He definitely looked confused and, you know, like, uh, what we were discussing earlier on another subject, this could be a multiple choice, you know, A and B or whatever type scenario as well.We don't know, I mean, it seems pretty well established that he has Parkinson's, I think the lead pipe pincher for me though, was that second longer one Singapore's channel, Channel News Asia put out. I mean, he is clearly tussling with Li Zhanshu about something, right. You know that that's. Yes, very clear. And you know, if he was having a moment, you know, when they finally get him up out of the chair and he seems to be kind of pulling back and so on, you know, he moves with some alacrity there,  for an 80 year old guy. Uh, I don't know if he was being helped to move quickly or he, you know, realized it was time to exit stage.Right. But I think, you know, as you said in your newsletter, I, we probably will never know. Um, but to me it looked an awful lot like an effort by Xi Jinping to humiliate him. You know, I mean, there was a reason why they brought the cameras back in at that moment, you know? Unless we believe that that just happened spontaneously in terms of Hu Jintao has his freak out just as those cameras were coming back in the stone faces of the other members of the senior leadership there on the rostrum and you know, Wand Hunting, pulling Li Zhanshu back down kind of saying basically, look buddy, this is politics, don't you don't wanna, that's not a good look for you trying to care for Hu Jintao. You know, I mean obviously something was going on, you know? No, no question. Bill: Right. And feeds into  the idea that Hu Chunhua, we all expected that he at least be on the Politburo again, and he's, he's off, so maybe something, something was going Chris: Well, I, I think what we know from observing Xi Jinping, right? We know that this is a guy who likes to keep people off balance, right? Who likes to keep the plate spinning. He, this is definitely the Maoist element of his personality, you know, whether it's strategic disappearances or this kind of stuff. And I think it's entirely plausible that he might have made some last minute switches right, to, uh, the various lists that were under consideration that caused alarm, you know, among those who thought they were on a certain list and  and no longer were.Bill: and then, and others who were smart enough to realize that if he made those switches, they better just go with it.Chris: Yeah, go along with it. Exactly. I mean, you know, in some ways the most, aside from what happened to Hu Jintao, the, the most, um, disturbing or compelling, depending on how you wanna look at it, part of that video is when Hu Jintao, you know, sort of very, um, delicately taps Li Keqiang on the shoulder. He doesn't even look at it, just keeps looking straight ahead. Uh, and that's tough. And as you pointed out in the newsletter and elsewhere, you know, how difficult must have that have been for Hu Jintao's son Hu Haifeng, who's in the audience watching this all go on? You know, it's, uh, it's tough. Bill: And then two two days later attends a meeting where he praises Xi to high heaven.Chris: Yeah, exactly. So, so if the darker narrative is accurate, I guess one thing that concerns me a bit is, as you know, well, I have never been a fan of these, uh, memes about comparing Xi Jinping to either Stalin or Mao in part because I don't see him as a whimsical guy. They were whimsical people. I think because of his tumultuous upbringing, he understands the problems with that kind of an approach to life, but this was a very ruthless act. If that more malign, you know, sort of definition is true and that I think that says something about his mentality that perhaps should concern us if that's the case. Bill: It has real implications, not just for domestic also potentially for its foreign policy.Chris: Absolutely. I mean, what it shows, right to some degree, again, man in a hurry, this is a tenacious individual, right?  if he's willing to do that. And so if you're gonna, you know, kick them in the face on chips and, you know, things like that, um, you should be taking that into consideration.Bill: And I think preparing for a more substantive response  that is more thought out and it's also, it happened, it wasn't very Confucian for all this talk Confucian definitely not. and values. One last question, and it is related is what do you make of this recent upsurge or talk in DC from various officials that PRC has accelerated its timeline to absorb Taiwan, because nothing in the public documents indicates any shift in that timeline.Chris: No. Uh, and well, first of all, do they, do they have a timeline? Right? You know, I mean, the whole idea of a timeline is kind of stupid, right? You don't, if you're gonna invade somewhere, you say, Hey, we're gonna do it on on this date. I mean, 2049. Okay. Bill: The only timeline that I think you can point to is is it the second centenary goal and, and Taiwan getting quote unquote, you know, returning Taiwan to the motherland's key to the great rejuvenation,Chris: Yeah, you can't have rejuvenation without it. Bill: So then it has to be done by 2049. 27 years, but they've never come out and specifically said 27 years or 2049. But that's what No. that's I think, is where the timeline idea comes from.Chris: Oh yes, definitely. And, and I think some confusion of. What Xi Jinping has clearly set out and reaffirmed in the political report as these important, um, operational benchmarks for the PLA, the People's Liberation Army to achieve by its hundredth anniversary in 2027. But that does not a go plan for Taiwan make, you know, And so it's been confusing to me trying to understand this. And of course, you know, I, I'm joking, but I'm not, you know, if we, if we listen now to the chief of naval operations of the US Navy, you know, like they're invading tomorrow, basically.My former colleague from the CIA, John Culver's, done some very, you know, useful public work on this for the Carnegie, where he sort his endowment, where he sort of said, you know, look, there's certain things we would have to see, forget about, you know, a D-day style invasion, any type of military action that, that you don't need intelligence methods to find out. Right. You know, uh, canceling, uh, conscription, demobilization cycles, you know, those, those sort of things. Um, we don't see that happening. So I've been trying to come to grips with why the administration seems fairly seized with this and and their public commentary and so on. What I'm confident of is there's no smoking gun you know, unlike, say the Russia piece where it appears, we had some pretty compelling intelligence. There doesn't seem to be anything that says Xi Jinping has ordered invasion plans for 2024, you know, or, or, or even 2027. Um, so I'm pretty confident that's not the case. And so then it becomes more about an analytic framework. And I, from what I can tell, it's seems to be largely based on what, uh, in, you know, the intelligence community we would call calendar-int.. calendar intelligence. In other words, you know, over the next 18 months, a lot of stuff's going to happen. We're gonna have our midterm elections next week. It's pretty likely the Republicans get at least one chamber of Congress, maybe both.That would suggest that things like the Taiwan Policy Act and, you know, really, uh, things that have, uh, Beijing's undies in a bunch, uh, you know, could really come back on, uh, the radar pretty forcibly and pretty quickly. Obviously Taiwan, nobody talks about it, but Taiwan's having municipal elections around the same time, and normally that would be a very inside Taiwan baseball affair, nobody would care. But the way that KMT ooks like they will not perform, I should say,  in those municipal elections. They could be effectively wiped out, you know, as a, as a sort of electable party in Taiwan. That's not a good news story for Beijing.And then of course we have our own presidential in 2024 and Taiwan has a presidential election in 24 in the US case.I mean, look, we could end up with a President Pompeo, right? Or a President DeSantis or others who. Been out there sort of talking openly about Taiwan independence and recognizing Taiwan. And similarly, I think whoever succeeds, uh, President Tsai in Taiwan, if we assume it will likely be a a, a Democratic Progressive party president, will almost by definition be more independence oriented.So I think the administration is saying there's a lot of stuff that's gonna get the Chinese pretty itchy, you know, over this next 18 month period. So therefore we need to be really loud in our signaling to deter. Right. And okay. But I think there's a risk with that as well, which they don't seem to be acknowledging, which is you might create a self-fulfilling prophecy.I mean, frankly, that's what really troubles me about the rhetoric. And so, for example, when Secretary Blinken last week or the before came out and said  Yeah, you know, the, the, the Chinese have given up on the status quo. I, I, I've seen nothing, you know, that would suggest that the political report doesn't suggest. Bill: They have called it a couple of times  so-called status quo.Chris: Well, Fair enough. Yeah. Okay. That's, that's fine. Um, but I think if we look at the reason why they're calling it the so-called status quo, it's because it's so called now because the US has been moving the goalposts on the status quo.Yeah. In terms of erosion of the commitment to the one China policy. And the administration can say all at once, they're not moving the goal post, but they are, I mean, let's just be honest.Bill: Now, and they have moved it more than the Trump administration did, don't you think?Chris: Absolutely. Yeah. Um, you know, no president has said previously we will defend Taiwan  multiple times. Right. You know, um, and things like, uh, you know, Democracy, someone, I mean, this comes back also to the, the framing, right, of one of the risks I think of framing the relationship as democracy versus autocracy is that it puts a very, uh, heavy incentive then for the Biden administration or any future US administration to, you know, quote unquote play the Taiwan card, right, as part of said competition.Whereas if you don't have that framing, I don't think that's necessarily as automatic. Right? In other words, if that's the framing, well Taiwan's a democracy, so we have to lean in. Right? You know? Whereas if it's a more say, you know, straight realist or national interest driven foreign policy, you might not feel that in every instance you've gotta do that,Bill: No, and and I it, that's an interesting point. And I also think too that, um, I really do wonder how much Americans care, right? And, and whether or not we're running the risk of setting something up or setting something in motion that, you know, again, it's easy to be rhetorical about it, but that we're frankly not ready to deal withChris: Well, and another thing that's interesting, right, is that, um, to that point, Some of the administration's actions, you know, that are clearly designed to show toughness, who are they out toughing? You know, in some cases it feels like they're out toughing themselves, right? I mean, obviously the Republicans are watching them and so on and all of that.Um, but you know, interesting, uh, something that came across my thought wave the other day that I hadn't really considered. We're seeing pretty clear indications that a Republican dominated Congress after the midterms may be less enthusiastic about support to Ukraine, we're all assuming that they're gonna be all Taiwan support all the time.Is that a wrong assumption? You know, I mean, in other words, Ukraine's a democracy, right? And yet there's this weird strain in the Trumpist Wing of the Republican party that doesn't wanna spend the money. Right. And would that be the case for Taiwan as well? I don't know, but you know, the point is, I wonder if the boogieman of looking soft is, is sort of in their own heads to some degree.And, and even if it isn't, you know, sometimes you have to lead. Bill: it's not clear the allies are listening. It doesn't sound like the Europeans would be on board withChris: I think very clearly they're not. I mean, you know, we're about to see a very uncomfortable bit of Kabuki theater here, aren't we? In the next couple of days with German Chancellor Sholz going over and, um, you know, if you, uh, read the op-ed he wrote in Politico, you know, it's, it's painful, right? You can see him trying to, uh, Trying to, uh, you know, straddle the fence and, and walk that line.And, and obviously there are deep, deep divisions in his own cabinet, right? You know, over this visit, the foreign minister is publicly criticizing him, you know, and so on. So I think this is another aspect that might be worrisome, which is the approach. You know, my line is always sort of a stool, if it's gonna be stable, needs three legs, right.And on US-China relations, I think that is, you know, making sure our own house is in order. Domestic strengthening, these guys call it, coordinating with allies and partners, certainly. But then there's this sort of talking to the Chinese aspect and through a policy, what I tend to call strategic avoidance, we don't.Talk to them that much. So that leg is missing. So then those other two legs need to be really strong. Right. Um, and on domestic strengthening, Okay. Chips act and so on, that's good stuff. On allies and partners, there seems to be a bit of an approach and I think the chip restrictions highlight this of, look, you're either for us or against us.Right? Whereas I think in, you know, the good old Cold War I, we seem to be able to understand that a West Germany could do certain things for us vis-a-vis the Soviets and certain things they couldn't and we didn't like it and we complained, but we kind of lived with it, right? If we look at these chip restrictions, it appears the administration sort of said, Look, we've been doing this multilateral diplomacy on this thing for a year now, it's not really delivering the goods. The chips for framework is a mess, so let's just get it over with and drag the allies with us, you know? Um, and we'll see what ramifications that will have.Bill: Well on that uplifting note, I, I think I'm outta questions. Is there anything else you'd like to add?Chris: Well, I think, you know, something just to consider is this idea, you know, and maybe this will help us close on a more optimistic note. Xi Jinping is telling us, you know, he's hardening the system, he's, he's doing this fortress economy thing and so on. But he also is telling us, I have a really difficult set of things I'm trying to accomplish in this five years.Right? And that may mean a desire to signal to the us let's stabilize things a bit, not because he's having a change of heart or wants a fundamental rapprochement, so on and so forth. I don't think that's the case, but might he want a bit of room, right? A breathing room. Bill: Buy some time, buy some spaceChris: Yeah, Might he want that? He might. You know, and so I think then a critical question is how does that get sorted out in the context of the negotiations over the meeting in Bali, if it is a longer meeting, I think, you know, so that's encouraging for that. Right. To some degree. I, I, I would say, you know, if we look at what's just happened with the 20th party Congress and we look at what's about to happen, it seems with our midterms here in the United States, Who's the guy who's gonna be more domestically, politically challenged going into this meeting, and therefore have less room to be able to seize that opportunity if it does exist.Exactly. Because I, I think, you know, the, the issue is, The way I've been framing it lately, you know, supposedly our position is the US position is strategic competition and China says, look, that's inappropriate, and we're not gonna sign onto it and forget it.You know, my own view is we kind of have blown past strategic competition where now in what I would call strategic rivalry, I think the chip restrictions, you know, are, are a giant exclamation point, uh, under that, you know, and so on. And my concern is we're kind of rapidly headed toward what I would call strategic enmity.And you know, that all sounds a bit pedantic, but I think that represents three distinct phases of the difficulty and the relationship. You know, strategic enmity is the cold, the old Cold War, what we had with the Soviets, right? So we are competing against them in a brass tax manner across all dimensions. And if it's a policy that, you know, hurts us, but it hurts them, you know, 2% more we do it, you know, kind of thing. I don't think we're there yet. And the meeting offers an opportunity to, you know, arrest the travel from strategic rivalry to strategic enmity. Let's see if there's something there/Bill: And if, and if we don't, if it doesn't arrest it, then I think the US government at least has to do a much better job of explaining to the American people why we're headed in this direction and needs  to do a much better job with the allies cuz because again, what I worry about is we're sort of heading down this path and it doesn't feel like we've really thought it through.You know, there are lots of reasons  be on this path, but there's also needs to be a much more of a comprehensive understanding of the, of the costs and the ramifications and the solutions and have have an actual sort of theory of the case about how we get out the other side of this in a, in a better way.Chris: Yeah, I think that's important. I want to be real, um, fair to the administration. You know, they're certainly more thoughtful and deliberative than their predecessor. Of course, the bar was low, but, um, you know, they, they seem to approach these things in a pretty. Dedicated and careful manner. And I think they really, you know, take, take things like, uh, looking at outbound investment restrictions, you know, my understanding is they have been, you know, seeking a lot of input about unintended consequences and so on. But then you look at something like the chips piece and it just seems to me that those in the administration who had been pushing for, you know, more there for some time, had a quick moment where they basically said, look, this thing's not working with multilaterally, Let's just do it, you know? And then, oh, now we're seeing the second and third and other order consequences of it. And the risk is that we wind up, our goal is to telegraph unity to Beijing and shaping their environment around them as the administration calls it. We might be signaling our disunity, I don't know, with the allies, and obviously that would not be a good thingBill: That's definitely a risk. Well, thanks Chris. It's always great to talk to you and Thank you for listening to the occasional Sinocism podcast. Thank you, Chris.Chris: My pleasure. Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit sinocism.com/subscribe

All eyes are set on Beijing, as the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) holds the inaugural meeting of its 20th National Party Congress (NPC), where the President of China and General Secretary of the CPC, Xi Jinping, is expected to secure an unprecedented third time as head of the Party and of the government. During the meeting, President Xi will also deliver a work report, which is likely to solidify and expand the development concepts which have emerged during his administration, and which collectively are known as ‘Xi Jinping Thought.' One thing is sure: US-China relations in the next decades will be challenging for all parties involved!!Link to articles:A first look at the upcoming 20th National Party Congress of the CPC:https://www.conference-board.org/publ...The importance of the 20th CPC National Congress to the world:https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-10-18...Join us on Locals: https://geopolitics.locals.com/Subscribe to our Instagram: @GeopoliticsInConflictSubscribe to our Blog: https://www.globalperspectiveconsulti...Follow us on Rumble: https://rumble.com/GeopoliticsInConflictFollow us on Odysee: https://odysee.com/@GeopoliticsInConf...Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/doualaalou

What are Chinese characteristics all about? How can African countries take a page from the China story to write their own chapter of development? Liu Xin sat down with South African scholar Paul Tembe who just published a book on Xi Jinping Thought.

On this episode of the PME podcast, I welcome back Ian Easton. Ian recently published a book called The Final Struggle: Inside China's Global Strategy. Topics of discussion include: The prospect of China invading Taiwan and an update from Ian's first book, The Chinese Invasion Threat Is Xi Jinping on drugs? Hard to tell. But Ian does mention that his dad and sister were purged. He also spent seven years living in a cave. We discuss “Xi Jinping Thought” which is Marxism infused with Xi Jinping's worldview and his political philosophy. How China and Xi Jinping use euphemisms to promote dark ideas. For example, the idea of constructing “A Community of Common Destiny for all Mankind.”  U.S. policies toward China and how previous administrations have and have not recognized threats from the PRC How TikTok poses a direct threat to U.S. national security China's social credit system which uses big data analytics and mass surveillance How China uses predatory economic policies to its benefit while hurting the U.S.   Biography: Ian Easton is a Senior Director at the Project 2049 Institute, where he studies defense and security issues involving the People's Republic of China. Previously, he was a visiting fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs, a China analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, and a researcher for the Asia Bureau of Defense News. Ian holds an M.A. in China Studies from National Chengchi University in Taiwan and a B.A. in International Studies from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. He studied Mandarin at Fudan University in Shanghai and National Taiwan Normal University in Taipei.   Buy the book, The Final Struggle, from Camphor Press or Amazon  Ian's first book: The Chinese Invasion Threat Follow him on Twitter @Ian_M_Easton and at the Project 2049 Institute   HELP SPREAD THE WORD! If you like the interview and want to hear others, subscribe in iTunes, Spotify, or Audible. Support the show with written reviews, share on social media, and through word of mouth.    I recently started a Patreon page: https://www.patreon.com/pmecomplete Please consider showing your support for the show by becoming a patron.    To request additional shows or guests, e-mail me: tim@professionalmilitaryeducation.com  Check out the website: www.professionalmilitaryeducation.com  

The four-day seventh plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which concluded in Beijing on Wednesday, decided that the Party's 20th National Congress will open on Sunday, according to a communique issued after the meeting.Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, made an important speech at the meeting, which was attended by 199 members and 159 alternate members of the CPC Central Committee. Members of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and leading officials of related departments were also present in a nonvoting capacity.The meeting, presided over by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, analyzed the current situation and tasks the nation is facing, discussed a number of major issues about upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era and building a modern socialist country in all respects, and made full preparations for the opening of the Party's 20th National Congress, the communique said.The upcoming 20th CPC National Congress is considered as crucially important, as the Party is expected to unveil its road map for the next five years and beyond, a key period for China to realize national rejuvenation and achieve its modernization goals.Entrusted by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Xi delivered a work report at the meeting.A report to be made by the 19th CPC Central Committee to the 20th National Congress, a work report of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to the 20th National Congress, and an amendment to the Party's Constitution were discussed and approved at the meeting. It was decided that the three documents will be submitted to the upcoming Congress for examination and deliberation, according to the communique.The plenary session fully affirmed the work of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee since the sixth plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee last year.The meeting's participants reached the consensus that in the face of the complex and grave international landscape and arduous tasks in terms of ensuring the nation's reform, development and stability, the Political Bureau united and led the whole Party, the armed forces and all the Chinese people to make significant achievements in advancing the various causes of the Party and State, the communique said.While commending the accomplishments in coordinating COVID-19 response and socioeconomic development, improving people's well-being, pushing for ecological conservation and exercising rigorous governance over the Party, the meeting's participants highlighted the nation's efforts in resolutely fighting secessionist attempts and foreign interference, and in properly coping with the risks and challenges arising from the Ukraine crisis.The plenum also summarized the work over the past five years since the 19th CPC National Congress and said that those five years were "extremely extraordinary and momentous".Over the past five years, the CPC Central Committee with Xi at the core has united and led the whole Party, armed forces and all the Chinese people in effectively responding to the huge risks and challenges arising from the grave and complex international situation, advanced socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era, addressed long-lasting difficulties and problems, and achieved success on issues that matter to the nation's future development, the communique said.The CPC Central Committee has coordinated development and security, comprehensively advanced the process of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, made consistent efforts to implement the new development philosophy, and built a new development paradigm to pursue high-quality growth, it said.The plenary session affirmed efforts to promote major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics and the work in poverty alleviation and environmental protection, in safeguarding national security, preventing and defusing major risks and maintaining social stability, as well as efforts in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic to protect people's lives and health.It also recognized work related to Hong Kong and Taiwan. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has returned from chaos to governance, and on the Taiwan question, the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus have been upheld to demonstrate the nation's strong determination and its ability to oppose secessionist elements and to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the communique said.The communique emphasized that the Party has established Comrade Xi Jinping's core position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole, and has defined the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. This reflects the common will of the Party, the armed forces and Chinese people of all ethnic groups, and is of decisive significance for advancing the cause of the Party and the country in the new era and for driving forward the historic process of great national rejuvenation.Bearing in mind national interests and giving priority to domestic politics, the CPC Central Committee has been endeavoring to safeguard the nation's dignity and core interests and has firmly taken the initiative in terms of the country's development and security, it added.The plenum promoted three alternate members of the 19th CPC Central Committee to full members. It also endorsed the decisions made by the Political Bureau to expel former minister of justice Fu Zhenghua and two other former senior officials from the Party. Another former senior official was removed from Party posts, according to the communique.记者：曹德胜

In Episode 126 of the CounterVortex podcast, Bill Weinberg marks the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 4, 1989—"6-4," as it is known in China, or "63+1" or "65-1," in a game of keeping ahead of online censors. With the massacre commemoration first exiled from Beijing to Hong Kong, it has now been exiled from Hong Kong to New York City as police-state measures are extended from the mainland. But China's official denialism about the massacre extends even to the US, where both the sectarian left and "paleoconservatives" echo Beijing's revisionist line. Both regime proponents and detractors share the consensus that the massacre and subsequent wave of repression across China was a "red terror," carried out as it was by a "Communist Party." A case can be made, however, that it was actually a "white terror," enforcing China's capitalist conversion. The recent crackdown on dissident workers and Marxist student activists in China—complete with extrajudicial "disappearances"—reveals "Xi Jinping Thought" to be (like Putinism and Trumpism) an updated variant of fascism. Listen on SoundCloud or via Patreon. https://www.patreon.com/countervortex Production by Chris Rywalt We ask listeners to donate just $1 per weekly podcast via Patreon -- or $2 for our new special offer! We now have 41 subscribers. If you appreciate our work, please become Number 42!

Shanghai officials seem to have been surprised by how quickly Omicron went out of control in the city. Given their usually very high level of bureaucratic competence that is worrisome. It is also a bit surprising to see that officials, who spend lots of time studying some topics, like Xi Jinping Thought, do not seem to have spent a lot of time learning the lessons from other cities, and so we are again seeing some issues around food provision and access to medical care, this time in Shanghai.

During the Mao era, students and workers studied Mao's “Little Red Book.” Today, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” is a bestseller in China.

All political parties have weaknesses for jargon and buzzwords, and the Chinese Communist Party more than most. It's why Party documents – whether they be speeches, Resolutions or reports – can be hard going. Sentences like the following (from the Resolution adopted at the Sixth Plenum) abound: ‘All Party members should uphold historical materialism and adopt a rational outlook on the Party's history.' ‘We need to strengthen our consciousness of the need to maintain political integrity, think in big-picture terms, follow the leadership core, and keep in alignment with the central Party leadership' In other words, full of platitudes and dense Marxist terminology. So what is, then, the purpose of official Party documents? Can they ever reveal division within the Party, or say anything new at all? And throughout the fusty rhetoric, who is the audience, who are these words designed for? On this episode, I'm joined by two guests expert at reading the Communist tea leaves. In this wide ranging – and slightly longer than usual – Chinese Whispers, we discuss the power of political language and how the Chinese Communist Party makes the most of it, why it's important to control the historical narrative, and exactly what, if anything, does Xi Jinping Thought entail. My guests are Professor Rana Mitter, a historian of China at the University of Oxford and author of numerous books, the latest being China's Good War; and Bill Bishop, who curates the newsletter Sinocism. Bill's newsletter is a must-have round up of the most important political and economic China news, in your inbox four times a week. Very much worth every penny, and frequently featuring translated Party documents and Chinese articles. To continue the conversation, we also mention a couple of past episodes of Chinese Whispers: I interview the exiled Professor Sun Peidong about the witch hunt against her at a top Shanghai University: https://www.spectator.co.uk/podcast/healing-the-cancer-of-the-cultural-revolution. I discuss just why Taiwan is so important to China with Rana and analyst Jessica Drun: https://www.spectator.co.uk/podcast/why-does-china-care-about-taiwan-. You can also find my review of Jing Tsu's Kingdom of Characters here: https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-great-chinese-puzzle-how-to-adapt-the-language-to-modern-communication-technologies.

All political parties have weaknesses for jargon and buzzwords, and the Chinese Communist Party more than most. It's why Party documents – whether they be speeches, Resolutions or reports – can be hard going. Sentences like the following (from the Resolution adopted at the Sixth Plenum) abound: ‘All Party members should uphold historical materialism and adopt a rational outlook on the Party's history.' ‘We need to strengthen our consciousness of the need to maintain political integrity, think in big-picture terms, follow the leadership core, and keep in alignment with the central Party leadership' In other words, full of platitudes and dense Marxist terminology. So what is, then, the purpose of official Party documents? Can they ever reveal division within the Party, or say anything new at all? And throughout the fusty rhetoric, who is the audience, who are these words designed for? On this episode, Cindy is joined by two guests expert at reading the Communist tea leaves. In this wide ranging – and slightly longer than usual – Chinese Whispers, they discuss the power of political language and how the Chinese Communist Party makes the most of it, why it's important to control the historical narrative, and exactly what, if anything, does Xi Jinping Thought entail. Her guests are Professor Rana Mitter, a historian of China at the University of Oxford and author of numerous books, the latest being China's Good War; and Bill Bishop, who curates the newsletter Sinocism. Bill's newsletter is a must-have round up of the most important political and economic China news, in your inbox four times a week. Very much worth every penny, and frequently featuring translated Party documents and Chinese articles. To continue the conversation, they also mention a couple of past episodes of Chinese Whispers: Cindy interviews the exiled Professor Sun Peidong about the witch hunt against her at a top Shanghai University: https://www.spectator.co.uk/podcast/healing-the-cancer-of-the-cultural-revolution. Cindy discusses just why Taiwan is so important to China with Rana and analyst Jessica Drun: https://www.spectator.co.uk/podcast/why-does-china-care-about-taiwan-. You can also find Cindy's review of Jing Tsu's Kingdom of Characters here: https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-great-chinese-puzzle-how-to-adapt-the-language-to-modern-communication-technologies.

Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, has called for adopting a rational outlook about the Party's history and drawing on the experience and lessons of the past century to blaze a path toward new victories.▲ The sixth plenary session of the 19th Communist Party of China Central Committee is held in Beijing, from Nov 8 to 11, 2021. Photo/XinhuaXi made the remarks when explaining the draft of the resolution on the major achievements and historical experience of the CPC's 100 years of endeavors, which was passed by the sixth plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee held on Nov 8 to 11. Xi's speech about the explanation of the draft document at the meeting and the text of the adopted resolution were released on Tuesday.Explaining the draft of the resolution to the meeting's participants, Xi called for resolutely opposing "historical nihilism"－which refers to some political thoughts that seek to distort the history of the Chinese revolution, the CPC and the armed forces.He underlined the need to see history from a broader perspective in order to develop an accurate understanding of the underlying trends and defining features of the CPC's development."We need to properly address the mistakes and setbacks that have occurred on the Party's path forward. We should draw experience from our successes and learn lessons from our mistakes so as to score new victories," Xi said.The landmark resolution highlighted Xi's core position on the CPC Central Committee and in the whole Party as well as the significance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era in advancing the cause of the Party and the State.It reflected on the Party's great achievements in the country's new-democratic revolution, socialist revolution and construction, reform and opening-up as well as the socialist modernization process, and underscored the accomplishments it has made since the country entered a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics following the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012.The resolution also stressed the historical significance of the Party's endeavors over the past century, saying they have fundamentally transformed the future of the Chinese people, opened up the right path for achieving the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and had a profound influence on the course of world history.The resolution listed 10 items with respect to the Party's historical experience, including upholding the Party's leadership, putting the people first, staying independent, following the Chinese path, maintaining a global vision, and remaining committed to self-reform.While noting that the nation is closer, more confident and more capable than ever of realizing the goal of national rejuvenation, the resolution cautioned that there remain many risks and challenges on the journey ahead.It urged all Party members to have a precise grasp of historical trends, stay true to the Party's founding mission and not be intimidated by any risks or led astray by any distractions.The review of the major achievements and historical experience of the Party over the past century "will help build a broader consensus and stronger unity in will and action among all members and rally and lead Chinese people of all ethnic groups in achieving new and great success in building socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era", Xi said at the sixth plenary session.记者：曹德胜

Today’s Essential Eight items: Historical resolution Great Thought 伟大思想 US-China An email from Peng Shuai? Wang Yi on Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy EU-China Intensifying efforts to replace US tech Real estate Thanks for reading.

DOCUMENTATION AND ADDITIONAL READING PART 1 (0:0 - 12:26): ────────────────── China Adopts Party-Approved History to Heroize Its Leader and Establish Supremacy of “Xi Jinping Thought.” Guess What? The New History Says He Is a Genius NEW YORK TIMES (CHRIS BUCKLEY) To Steer China's Future, Xi Is Rewriting Its Past WALL STREET JOURNAL (KEVIN RUDD) ‘Xi Jinping Thought' Makes China a Tougher Adversary FINANCIAL TIMES (GIDEON RACHMAN) China's Self-Isolation is A Global Concern PART 2 (12:27 - 19:10): ────────────────── History Always Has A Reckoning: F.W. de Klerk, Last South African Apartheid President, Dies At 85 ASSOCIATED PRESS (ANDREW MELDRUM AND CARA ANNA) South Africa's Last Apartheid President, F.W. de Klerk, Dies PART 3 (19:11 - 24:3): ────────────────── Hunger In A Fallen World — In the Main, the Problem of Hunger Today Is Moral, Not Material NEW YORK TIMES (MUJIB MASHAL) India Wants to Send Wheat to Ease Afghan Hunger Crisis. Pakistan Has Yet to OK Transit.

A key Party meeting has adopted a landmark resolution on the major achievements and historical experience of the Communist Party of China's endeavors in the 100 years of its glorious journey, urging all Party members to stay true to the Party's founding mission to better uphold and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era.The four-day sixth plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, which ended on Thursday in Beijing, also adopted a resolution on convening the 20th CPC National Congress in the second half of next year in Beijing.Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, delivered a work report at the meeting on behalf of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. He also explained the draft of the resolution on the major achievements and historical experience of the CPC's 100 years of endeavors.▲ Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, delivers a speech at the sixth plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee in Beijing, which was held from Monday to Thursday. Ju Peng/XinhuaReflecting on the major achievements and historical experience of the Party is essential in embarking on the new journey of comprehensively building China into a modern socialist country and upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era, said a communique released after the meeting.It is also important to advance the Party's self-reform, improve its ability to cope with risks and challenges, always maintain its vigor and vitality and continue to unite and lead all of the Chinese people to strive to realize the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation, the communique said.All Party members should fully understand from the CPC's 100 years of endeavors why it was successful in the past and how it can continue to succeed in the future, the communique added.The participants in the meeting reflected on the great achievements the Party has made in the country's new-democratic revolution, socialist revolution and construction, reform and opening-up as well as socialist modernization process, saying that the endeavors of the Party and the people over the past century represent the most magnificent chapter in the millennia-long history of the Chinese nation.▲ The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee presides over the sixth plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee in Beijing, capital of China. Yan Yan/ XinhuaThey stressed the significance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era in advancing the cause of the Party and the State, and said the Thought is the Marxism of contemporary China and of the 21st century. "It embodies the best of the Chinese culture and ethos in our times and represents a new breakthrough in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context," the communique said.The participants in the meeting highlighted Xi's core position on the CPC Central Committee and in the whole Party, saying that it demonstrates the common will of the Party, the armed forces and the Chinese people of all ethnic groups. It is of decisive significance for advancing the cause of the Party and the State in the new era and for driving forward the historic process of national rejuvenation, according to the communique.▲ Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, and the six other members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee vote during the sixth plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee in Beijing. Li Tao/XinhuaDuring the meeting, the participants hailed what the Party has achieved since the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012 in the fields of Party building, economic growth, reform and opening-up, ecological conservation, cultural and social progress, national defense and foreign affairs, as well as in promoting law-based governance, safeguarding national security and upholding the policy of "one country, two systems" and advancing national reunification."We uphold the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus. We firmly oppose separatist activities seeking 'Taiwan independence'. We firmly oppose foreign interference. We have maintained the initiative and ability to steer cross-Straits relations," the communique said.The meeting required all Party members to "have a precise grasp of historical trends, stand firm in our ideals and convictions, and stay true to our Party's founding mission", guard against arrogance and rashness, not be intimidated by any risks or led astray by any distractions, and avoid making catastrophic mistakes on fundamental issues.In the new development stage, efforts should be made to apply the new development philosophy, foster a new development paradigm and promote high-quality development, said the communique.While underlining the importance of deepening reform and expanding opening-up across the board, the participants in the meeting stressed the need to promote common prosperity for all, and build up the country's strength in science and technology."We should develop whole-process people's democracy and ensure it is the people who run the country," the communique said. "We need to balance development and security imperatives, move faster to modernize national defense and the armed forces, and take well-coordinated steps toward making our people prosperous, our nation strong, and our country beautiful."Highlighting the importance of continuing to advance the great project of Party building in the new era through exercising full and rigorous self-governance, the meeting asked all Party members to remain committed to improving their conduct, upholding their integrity and combating corruption."The entire Party must forever maintain close ties with the people and act in line with the people-centered philosophy of development, so as to better realize, safeguard, and advance the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people," the communique said.A total of 197 members and 151 alternate members of the CPC Central Committee attended the meeting. Members of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and leading officials of other relevant departments, some grassroots representatives who were delegates to the 19th CPC National Congress, along with experts and scholars, attended the meeting in a non-voting capacity.记者：曹德胜

The transnational criminal organization that is the Chinese Communist Party has just effectively elevated its top Mafioso to the status of emperor. That's not good for the people of China or anybody else. The so-called Sixth Party Plenum has rubber-stamped current dictator-for-life Xi Jinping's status as equivalent to history's most monstrous and murderous thug, CCP founder Mao Tse-tung. And it endorsed Xi's agenda of “making China strong.” In accordance with “Xi Jinping Thought” and his “China Dream,” that means acquiring and exercising the capability to dominate the planet and, in the process, destroy the United States and the rest of what's left of the Free World. Will we confront and counter Emperor Xi in time? Not if it's up to a man aptly described as our Manchurian president, Joe Biden. So, it better not be left up to him. This is Frank Gaffney. 

The 6th Plenum opened today. Party media is as you would expect full of fulsome praise for Xi. From some of the items I have read, including some of the ones included in item #1 below, I would not be surprised if we have a more formal truncation to Xi Jinping Thought by the end of the week.

Maarten van Rossem en Tom Jessen analyseren Xi Jinping. Wat is de president van de Volksrepubliek China van plan? Hij is anders dan eerdere leiders. Xi drukt een dominante stempel op toekomst van China. Dat doet hij alleen al met Xi Jinping Thought, dat van de basisschool tot de universiteit onderwezen wordt. Wil Xi alleen maar meedoen op het wereldtoneel of zinspeelt hij op wraak voor gebeurtenissen uit het verleden? Geproduceerd door t-talks. Tickets Live Podcast TivoliVredenburg: https://bit.ly/3mpis6P. Nieuwe lezing: Maarten van Rossem over het Tijdperk Donald Trump: https://bit.ly/30YVTxj. Telegram-groep: https://bit.ly/36mn4l2.

Environmental improvement in China under the ecological civilization promoted by President Xi Jinping is proof the philosophy can be an effective way forward for the world's sustainable development, experts said.The philosophy stresses harmonious coexistence of man and nature and is a workable alternative to capitalism, they said. The remarks came ahead of the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, or COP 15, which will be held in Kunming, Yunnan province, from Monday to Friday and continue in the first half of next year under the theme of "Ecological Civilization－Building a Shared Future for All Life on Earth".Qian Yong, director of the Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization, said it's the first global UN conference with ecological civilization as a theme. This alone demonstrated the international significance of the Thought.Inaugurated in July at the Ministry of Ecology and Environment office in Beijing, the center is tasked with researching not only theories relating to the philosophy, but also its practice.Since the dawn of industrial civilization, mankind has created massive material wealth. However, it has come at a cost of exploitation of natural resources, resulting in increasing conflicts between man and nature, Qian said."In light of the serious challenges presented by industrialization such as environmental pollution and ecosystem degradation, the Chinese government has been advocating and working to advance ecological civilization," he said.The development of China's ecological civilization has gained momentum since Xi became general secretary of the CPC Central Committee in 2012. "Both ecological civilization construction and the institutional system for environmental protection have been advanced in the country in an accelerated manner since then," Qian said.Qian pointed to a number of key statistics to show the achievements China has made in environmental management.As of the end of 2020, carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP in China had been reduced by 48.4 percent from the 2005 level, bettering the target of 40 to 45 percent.China has seen its forest areas expand for 30 straight years, contributing to one-fourth of the growth in the world's afforested area. On average, desert land in the country decreases by 2,424 square kilometers every year.▲ Journalists read brochures at the media center for the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, or COP 15, in Kunming, Yunnan province, on Saturday. The phase-one meeting of COP 15 starts on Monday and runs through Friday. Li Jiaxian/China News ServiceXi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization was officially established in 2018 at the national ecological and environmental protection conference. The harmonious coexistence of man and nature and the idea that "lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets "are two of the eight core principles of the Thought."Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization does not only belong to China but also to the world," he said.The philosophy is rooted in Chinese civilization and carries forward traditional Chinese ecological culture and wisdom. The philosophy not only addresses China's development problems, but also global problems that have arisen since the industrial civilization.Australian philosopher Arran Gare said in a recent interview with China Daily that ecological civilization "is a science that is aligned with the humanities and facilitates an integration of the best thinking in the West with the best thinking in the East, including Confucianism and Daoism".Modern life is characterized by economic globalization dominated by markets, said Gare, author of The Philosophical Foundations of Ecological Civilization: A Manifesto for the Future. The dynamics of these markets have set humanity on a trajectory of self-destruction through ecological destruction, he said.The joining of ecology and civilization in ecological civilization provides a basis for redefining eco-socialism and eco-Marxism that should appeal to everyone around the world as an alternative to capitalism, he said.Ecologists have shown that cooperation, rather than competition, is the most important factor in evolutionary progress. Capitalist competition and the conflicts it generates, including imperialist wars, are incompatible with ecological sustainability."Ecological civilization, founding civilization on ecological thinking, provides an image of the future to strive for," he said, adding it emphasized community and all humanity.Ecological civilization is also an advanced form of science that recognizes the complexity and reality of life, as opposed to the reductionist forms of earlier science that attempted to explain away life as nothing more than chemical processes.Gare said he looks forward to seeing China playing an even bigger role in promoting ecological civilization."China can promote the notion of ecological civilization in international institutions, as it has already done to some extent, having had it accepted by the United Nations," he said. "However, initial work in this area can be extended. It can also be extended through the Belt and Road Initiative."Making the BRI conform to the goal of creating an ecological civilization was witnessed in the Chinese government's decision to cease support for the development of coal-fired power plants in other countries, he said. It could be taken further through establishing sustainable forms of agriculture in developing nations, and also developing alternative energy sources in these countries.Building on the Chinese traditions of cultivation and celebration of nature, which are central to Confucianism and Daoism, China could develop a vibrant culture that provides an alternative to a consumer culture, he said.记者：侯黎强

In this episode I talk to Professor Kerry Brown who is internationally recognised as a leading authority on Chinese politics. His books on the Chinese Communist Party and on the politics of President Xi are seminal works. He explains how the Chinese 'party state' operates and how Xi has not just assumed powers unmatched since Mao but reinstated the central role of the Party in public life with his own personal philosophy - Xi Jinping Thought - at the heart of decision making. Interested in learning more? Vince's new book ‘The Chinese Conundrum: Engagement or Conflict' is available to buy online or from your local bookstore. Amazon, Bloomsbury, Waterstones, WHSmiths. To find out more about Vince, go to www.vincecable.org Follow him on Twitter: @vincecable Produced by Podcast.co

Angeline Tan, researcher for ISIS Malaysia, helps us understand President Xi Jin Ping's Common Prosperity agenda and what it means to China's broader society and economy as children from primary school age will begin learning “Xi Jinping Thought” as part of the national education syllabus. Image credit: pcruciatti / Shutterstock.com

Featured interview: Implications of the introduction of "Xi Jinping Thought" into China's school curriculum-중국 교육부의 '시진핑 사상' 교육과정 도입 전망Guest: Yaqiu Wang, China researcher, Human Rights WatchSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

We continue our discussion based on listeners suggestions, including China, deregulation, why we hold on to gold and why some capitalisms rely less on capital markets than others...

Explosions outside the Kabul airport on Thursday have upended the evacuation effort there and taken the lives of US soldiers and Afghans. At the time of the blasts, the airport was crowded with people trying to leave Afghanistan. Also, as the US and Mexico continue to debate the controversial “Remain in Mexico” policy, hundreds of migrants arrive every day at a rural border outpost in Guatemala. These forced removals could create a new border humanitarian crisis. Plus, China's Ministry of Education has issued new guidelines to integrate "Xi Jinping Thought" into the curricula, in the president's latest effort to consolidate the ruling Chinese Communist Party into almost every area of society.

China has announced that the political ideology of its president, Xi Jinping, will now be taught in schools from elementary through the university level. The Ministry of Education said the goal is to cultivate the builders and successors of socialism with an all-around moral, intellectual, physical and aesthetic grounding. What's known as "Xi Jinping Thought" has actually been enshrined in China's constitution since 2018.Related:  Taliban takeover could mean more security challenges for Chinese projects in PakistanIt includes caution against China's enemies. The move comes amid global tensions with Beijing, economically and politically. US Vice President Kamala Harris criticized China during her recent Southeast Asia tour, stemming from both countries' territorial ambitions in the South China Sea.Related: Southeast Asia allies express concern over US commitment amid Afghanistan crisisFrançois Godement is the author of "Les Mots de Xi Jinping" or "The Words of Xi Jinping." He's also a senior adviser for Asia at the Institut Montaigne in Paris. He spoke with The World's host Marco Werman about the new curricula. Marco Werman: François, is there a way to summarize what Xi Jinping Thought is?François Godement: Well, not easily, because it's a mixture of sometimes very personal aphorisms. But at the other extreme, it's literally a handbook on governance. Xi Jinping is a micromanager who touches just about every subject. There are already six volumes of his so-called works and speeches since he's come to power. At other times, it's very combative. As you said, it's very moral. And there's a mixture of Marxist communist ideology — sometimes bordering on a return to Maoism — but also conservative morals, which is much more akin to traditional China. And, of course, Xi Jinping's talent is to mix both in a kind of educative group that he has already imposed on the rest of the population.So, when Xi Jinping introduced this in 2017, it was a 3 1/2-hour speech at a party congress. It was called "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a New Era." What was the message for you that came through at the time?At the time, it wasn't as distinctive as it is now, because he has really branched out, and we now have also collections of his speeches at various places and various times. It's become more and more militant. It's obsessed with struggle. It's both class struggle, but struggle also with China's external enemies. I think in 2017, it was still a kind of cultural ideology that was quite compatible with what his predecessors have said.Were you surprised then by today's news that Xi Jinping Thought will now be part of the Chinese school curriculum?Not at all, because it has already spread through society. For example, there are several apps that broadcast Xi Jinping's thoughts and allow people also to literally train in memorizing and repeating them and using them. And these apps are downloaded hundreds of millions of times. They are Xi Jinping Thought centers in just about every university and institute. There is a Xi Jinping Thought center, for example, at the institute affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So, extending it to kids, who, in any case, are of course submitted to propaganda in their history and ideological courses, is not a surprise. Xi Jinping is really now taking a frontrow seat on just about every ground in preparation for the party congress of 2022, which would extend most likely his reign beyond two terms.So, what kinds of things will pupils and students be actually taught? Like, give us a sample of the ideas that Xi Jinping believes in.He believes in morals and anti-corruption. He believes in the power of will. It's an ideology that's focused on volunteerism. In that sense, it distinguishes itself from what you could call traditional Marxism and materialism. It's much closer to Mao Zedong, in fact. It makes a definite distinction between friends and enemies, it's absolutely central.And how does Xi distinguish from friends and enemies?I think the criteria is socialism and Chinese nationalism. So, even though he has an undertone sometimes about criticism, criticism is correct, for example, if it unmasks enemies. But you've got to watch out with criticism, so anybody who has a free mind is likely to be targeted. And one aspect of Xi Jinping is that he's very versatile. For example, during his ascent to power, he actually courted private entrepreneurs, and even foreign enterprises, because it suited him. It was the language of the time. And also, as a provincial leader, he needed these guys to have a better economic record. Now he's leading an onslaught against them, starting with the Chinese entrepreneurs and probably going on to foreign enterprises as well, slowly diminishing their role. And that is very close to Mao as well, who can, as you say, turn around on a dime.So, you've made the Mao comparison a few times. Xi Jinping Thought as an actual volume. It feels so much like Mao's "Little Red Book." But is that a fair comparison, or is Xi Jinping Thought more like a throwback to Chinese emperors laying down the law in a Draconian way?I think it's a bit of both. Ubiquity reminds one of the Cultural Revolution from when the "Little Red Book" was printed with hundreds of millions of copies and people waved it. But again, it's also a compendium for governance. And in that he emulates traditional emperors. A real characteristic of Xi Jinping is that he really fills all available space.Do you think the Chinese take Xi Jinping Thought seriously or are they just going through the motions?You know, it's always very difficult to guess people's minds and obviously there are no reliable opinion polls, and nobody is going to freely tell you what they think. The more you get to have contact with the people we know, who tend to be public intellectuals or experts, not the common people whom we seldom meet, the more you can see there is skepticism and there's probably hatred of Xi Jinping by the people who have suffered, if only because of the fight against corruption or because of the fights inside the party and the total dominance that he's established. For the common people, I would suggest they are very fatalistic about political power. Xi Jinping is very distant to them. They appreciate probably the order that is being kept. Order is very important in China and levels of income that would keep rising — it's his insurance policy.This interview has been lightly edited and condensed for clarity. AP contributed to this report.

Author François Godement discusses the new addition to China's school curriculum with The World's host Marco Werman, saying it's a mix of different ideologies.

Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, joined around 20,000 people on Monday evening to watch a grand gala in Beijing in celebration of the centenary of the CPC's founding.▲ An art performance titled "The Great Journey" is held in celebration of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC) at the National Stadium in Beijing, capital of China, on the evening of June 28, 2021. Photo/XinhuaMembers of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji and Han Zheng, as well as Vice-President Wang Qishan, were also among Party and State leaders who watched the gala at National Stadium, also known as the Bird's Nest.Shortly before 8 pm, Xi and other senior leaders walked into the stadium amid warm applause throughout the venue.Along with music and songs, fireworks displaying "100" lit up the night sky over the stadium. A shining Party emblem was shown on the stage, kicking off the grand gala event.▲ Fireworks are seen above the National Stadium in Beijing, capital of China, on the evening of June 28, 2021. Photo/XinhuaCalled The Great Journey, the four-part gala performance was presented in the style of a large-scale theater production. Through music and dance, stage plays, marching, dramas and documentary video, the performance vividly presented the CPC's 100-year endeavor in leading the people in pursuing revolution, construction and reform.It celebrated China's historic achievements as well as the transformations that have taken place under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Xi at its core since the 18th National Congress of the CPC in 2012. The event also highlighted the promising future of fully realizing a modern socialist country.Part one displayed the great struggle and painstaking efforts that the Chinese people, under the leadership of the CPC, made to achieve victories in the revolutionary period, the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931-45) and the War of Liberation (1946-49) before the founding of the People's Republic of China.Part two reflected on the heroes and role models in the period of socialist revolution and construction as well as the Chinese People's Volunteer Army entering the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to help in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea (1950-53).▲ Fireworks are seen above the National Stadium in Beijing, capital of China, on the evening of June 28, 2021. Photo/XinhuaPart three showed the great achievements China has made since the CPC adopted the reform and opening-up policy in the late 1970s, including Hong Kong's and Macao's return to the motherland and the Chinese people's solidarity to win the battle against the SARS epidemic in 2003.Part four showed how socialism with Chinese characteristics entered the new era under the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, particularly the country's achievements in elimination of absolute poverty, its people's war against the COVID-19 pandemic, and its strong commitment to advancing the building of a community with a shared future for mankind.The gala came to a climax with fireworks lighting up the sky again amid applause and cheers.记者：曹德胜图片来源：新华网

These days, China appears in the headlines A LOT! Whether in regard to its growing influence in international relations, competition with the United States, 5G and information technology rivalries with the West, or, of course, the Coronavirus pandemic, it's impossible not to notice the incredible prowess and impact of the world's most populous nation and second-largest economy. That's why we decided to meet with one of the top China experts around – Carice Witte, Founder and Executive Director of SIGNAL (Sino-Israel Global Network & Academic Leadership) - for a deep-dive into... well... everything China. We talked about China's rich history, cultural identity, and international affairs, as well as China's worldview and efforts to reshape the international order, the evolution and growth of China-Israel relations (of which Carice played a key role in fostering), and how the Chinese feel about Israelis and Jews. Carice Witte is the Founder and Executive Director of SIGNAL (Sino-Israel Global Network & Academic Leadership), an Israeli policy organization that specializes on China-Israel relations.  Ms. Witte initiated Chinese-Israeli Track-II exchanges in 2011. Having led over 1,000 briefings in China and Israel, she established a semi-annual China-Israel and annual China-Israel-U.S. Track-II dialogue in 2017.  In 2011, Ms. Witte initiated the founding of Israel Studies Programs (ISPs) at universities across China, including an annual program held in Israel for Chinese faculty on teaching Israel Studies.  An expert on China and China-Israel relations, Ms. Witte is a leading contributor to defining this field of policy research in Israel. Ms. Witte has authored articles, research and policy analysis papers on Sino-Israel relations, trade policy, strategic communications, and global Jewry. Her research focuses on Israel's perspective on Xi Jinping Thought and its potential implications for the Middle East, Israel and the BRI, China in the Middle East, and China's foreign policy.  Links: SIGNAL's http://www.sino-israel.org (website) SIGNAL's https://twitter.com/sinoisrael?lang=en (Twitter) Carice's most recent article in https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3848995,00.html (Calcalist), Israel's leading source of economic news. As always, make sure to subscribe to Jewanced on https://open.spotify.com/show/6984NiP7H1ULW9lJeVt8Ie?si=W7gbS9BmR5WDHN_eLwLV1g (Spotify), Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts and subscribe to our YouTube https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC7r6xLC1K4Zf29i9ttxbNFg/ (channel). For more information, visit us at http://www.jewanced.com/ (http://www.jewanced.com)

Chinese President Xi Jinping has become China's most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, having enshrined his place in Chinese history. At the end of the Communist Party Congress, the delegates unanimously voted to incorporate what's known as "Xi Jinping Thought" into the constitution. And the Congress concluded with no obvious candidate to take over from Xi in the future. What does this all mean for the world's second largest economy?

President Xi Jinping is said to be China's most powerful leader since Chairman Mao Zedong - so what does he want to do with this power?The Chinese Communist Party started its congress this week, held every five years, unveiling a new generation of political leaders. It is also expected that President Xi Jinping will be accorded the rare honour of seeing his own doctrine - Xi Jinping Thought - being enshrined in China's constitution. Where will that Thought take him and his huge, strategically essential country - and how might this affect the rest of the world? Joining David Aaronovitch in The Briefing Room are:Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia and president of the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI)Yanmei Xie, a writer on Chinese politicsLord Jim O'Neill, former UK Treasury Minister and chairman of Goldman Sachs