Podcasts about Baath

Die Verenigde Nasies sê die de facto-owerhede in Sirië het opregte inskiklikheid getoon om die land ʼn beter plek te maak. Dit volg ná die skielike val van een van die gewelddadigste regimes in die Arabiese wêreld, die diktatorskap van president Bashar al-Assad van die Baath-party. Die VN se adjunk- spesiale gesant vir Sirië, Najat Rochdi, sê Siriërs het ʼn sterk begeerte dat mense van reg oor die sosiale spektrum bymekaarkom en ʼn nuwe grondwet saamstel:

* Israeli attack on Gaza's Kamal Adwan hospital leaves it deserted — WHO The World Health Organization has confirmed that Kamal Adwan Hospital in northern Gaza is now empty after an Israeli military raid on Friday, which has forced the last major health facility in the area out of service. Expressing its outrage, the WHO stated, "Hospitals have once again become battlegrounds," condemning the attack as part of a systematic dismantling of Gaza's health system. The organisation warned that the 75,000 Palestinians remaining in northern Gaza face severe risks after over 80 days of siege, with critical healthcare no longer accessible. Dozens dead as plane bursts into flames following crash in South Korea *A Jeju Air plane from Bangkok to South Korea crashed upon landing at Muan airport, killing at least 120 people, the National Fire Agency said. Two survivors have been pulled from the wreckage as rescue efforts continue, according to the national fire agency. Footage broadcast by MBC showed the plane engulfed in flames shortly after landing, with smoke streaming from its engines. Officials believe a landing gear failure, possibly caused by a bird strike, may have led to the crash. * Over 112,000 missing Syrians probably killed in Assad prisons: rights group More than 112,000 Syrians forcibly disappeared under the Baath regime remain unaccounted for, with evidence pointing to widespread killings in detention, the Syrian Network for Human Rights reported. Following the collapse of the Baath regime on December 8, the scale of torture and extrajudicial executions in Syrian prisons has come to light. The group has documented about 136,000 cases of detention or forced disappearance during the regime's rule and reports that 24,200 prisoners have been released from detention facilities since its fall. * Over 21 killed in Sudan shelter attack by paramilitary forces At least 21 civilians were killed and 17 injured in a Rapid Support Forces drone strike on a shelter for displaced people in El Fasher, North Darfur, activists reported. The El Fasher Coordination of Resistance Committees said the attack targeted the Qouz Beina school, which housed many displaced individuals. Separately, the General Coordination of Darfur Displaced People and Refugees reported heavy artillery bombardment by the RSF on the Abu Shouk displacement camp in El Fasher, resulting in additional casualties. * Putin apologises to Aliyev over Azerbaijan Airlines plane crash tragedy Russian President Vladimir Putin has apologised to Azerbaijan's leader for a "tragic incident" after an Azerbaijani airliner crashed in Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. The Kremlin said that air defence systems were active near Grozny during a Ukrainian drone strike on Wednesday but did not confirm whether one caused the crash. On Friday, a US official and an Azerbaijani minister made separate statements blaming the crash on an external weapon.

Author of A Battle for the Soul of Islam: An American Muslim Patriot' s Fight to Save His Faith, Dr. Zuhdi Jasser, M.D. is a former Lieutenant Commander of the U.S. Navy, Founder and President of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD), and Co-Founder of the Muslim Reform Movement.A first generation American Muslim, Dr. Jasser's parents fled the oppressive Baath regime of Syria in the mid-1960s for American freedom. A devout Muslim, he and his family have strong ties to the American Muslim community having helped lead mosques in Wisconsin, Arkansas, Virginia and Arizona.He is also co-Director, with me, of the CLARITy Coalition- a global coalition with the goal of defending the west from Islamists who are intent on undermining and dismantling liberal democracy. He the Join me and Zuhdi to discuss the ongoing chaos in Syria- what is next now that the brutal Assad regime has been toppled? Will Syrians finally be free from famine, torture, and war? Or will jihadis fill the power vacuum with yet another terrorist regime? What does this mean for Russia, Iran, Israel and the rest of the region and the world?

Kemenangan Suriah Akankah Menjadi Titik Kebangkitan Umat? Oleh. Puput Ariantika, S.T.(Kontributor NarasiPost.Com) Voice over talent: Dewi Nasjag NarasiPost.Com-Sorak gembira kaum muslim menggaung di berbagai negara, terkhusus di Suriah sendiri. Para mujahidin telah berhasil menguasai kota Aleppo, Hama, Homs, dan Damaskus. Keberhasilan ini menjadi akhir kekuasaan rezim zalim Baath di Suriah dan menjadi momen keruntuhan era keluarga Assad yang telah berkuasa 54 tahun. Bahkan, Bashar Al-Assad dan keluarganya telah hengkang dari Suriah menuju Moscow, Rusia. Masyarakat menyambut kemenangan  dengan menggemakan takbir di masjid-masjid, merobohkan patung-patung Hafez Al-Assad, menghancurkan foto-foto Bashar Al-Assad, dan semua simbol-simbol yang identik dengan rezim Assad. Rakyat Suriah yang berada di negara lain juga merayakan kemenangan itu, seperti di Inggris, warga Suriah berkumpul di pusat kota London pada Minggu 8 Desember 2024. Mereka membagikan manisan sebagai bentuk kebahagiaan atas kemenangan itu. (Antaranews.com, 9-12-2023) Naskah selengkapnya: ⁠https://narasipost.com/world-news/12/2024/kemenangan-suriah-akankah-menjadi-titik-kebangkitan-umat/ Terimakasih buat kalian yang sudah mendengarkan podcast ini, Follow us on: instagram: http://instagram.com/narasipost Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/narasi.post.9 Fanpage: Https://www.facebook.com/pg/narasipostmedia/posts/ Twitter: Http://twitter.com/narasipostx

*) Türkiye holds the key for Syria's future: Trump US President-elect Donald Trump has expressed uncertainty about post-Assad Syria but emphasised that Türkiye will “hold the key” to the nation. Speaking at his Mar-a-Lago estate, Trump refrained from commenting directly on the withdrawal of US troops from northeastern Syria, but praised Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Trump also condemned ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as a "butcher" for his actions against children and called Türkiye a "major force" in the region. *) Israel committing genocide in Gaza, German rights group's analysis finds A Berlin-based human rights group, the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, has said Israel is committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. In a statement, the group said its independent research and analysis of Israel's actions in Gaza led to a "legally sound argument" that genocide is taking place. The group highlighted that numerous reports, commentaries, and judgments support this conclusion, further underscoring the severity of the situation. *) Gaza truce talks 'productive', 'small differences' remain — US The US has described recent talks on a potential ceasefire and prisoner exchange deal between Israel and Hamas as "productive," while acknowledging that a few key differences remain. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said during a press briefing that negotiations have progressed in recent days but added "a very small number of differences" still need to be resolved. "We have continued to try to work with the other mediators to narrow the differences," Miller stated, underscoring ongoing efforts to reach an agreement. *) More than 12 mass graves discovered in Syria's Daraa More than 12 mass graves have been discovered in Syria's Daraa Governorate, containing remains believed to be of civilians killed by the regime of ousted leader Bashar al Assad. The graves were uncovered following the recent collapse of the Baath regime earlier this month, as search and survey operations continue across the country. Efforts to locate and document mass graves are ongoing as Syria begins to confront the scale of atrocities committed under Assad's rule. *) Mystery drones over 8 US states spark fear and calls for action Mysterious drones spotted across at least eight US states are sparking unease and national debate, with sightings reported near critical sites, including an Air Force base. At a press conference in Mar-a-Lago, President-elect Donald Trump claimed, "Something strange is going on" with the East Coast drones and accused the government of withholding information. The buzzing crafts have been seen from Massachusetts to Ohio, leaving communities unsettled and prompting lawmakers to demand urgent action.

*) Israel kills over 110 Palestinians in one day The Israeli army continues to brutally target displaced people, civilians, municipal teams and others. In just 24 hours, the Israeli army has killed more than 110 people, Palestinian media office in Gaza says. One of the deadliest Israeli attacks on a school-turned-shelter in the northern town of Beit Hanoon left at least 43 people dead. More than 213 shelters have been targeted in Israeli attacks since the start of its genocide last year and at least 94 civil defence personnel also lost their lives in Israeli bombardment. The media office also said the Israeli army has carried out successive massacres against medical teams and hospitals in recent days, killing several doctors and staff. *) UN envoy meets HTS leader to discuss Syria's future The United Nations Special Envoy for Syria has met with the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Ahmad al Sharaa, to discuss recent developments in Syria. According to information from Syrian interim government sources, Geir Pedersen visited Damascus for the first time since the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime to meet with Sharaa. During the meeting, Sharaa emphasised the need to update and align the UN Security Council Resolution 2254 with the current realities of the situation in Syria. He highlighted the necessity of quick and effective cooperation to address the issues facing Syrians. *) South Korea's Yoon faces summons amid martial law probe, impeachment trial South Korean law enforcement authorities are pushing to summon impeached President Yoon Suk-yeol for questioning over his short-lived martial law decree as the Constitutional Court began its first meeting on Yoon's case to determine whether to remove him from office or reinstate him. A joint investigative team involving police, an anti-corruption agency, and the Defence Ministry said it plans to request that Yoon's office hold him for questioning on Wednesday as they expand a probe into whether his ill-conceived power grab amounted to rebellion. *) Mass grave and drug factories uncovered in Damascus A mass grave was discovered in the Husainiyya district of the Syrian capital Damascus. The discovery comes as part of search and investigation efforts continued across Syria following the fall of Bashar al Assad's regime. The mass grave is located in the southeastern part of the capital, just behind Damascus Airport. A villa in Syria's capital Damascus was identified as a drug production hub linked to Maher al Assad, the brother of ousted regime leader Bashar al Assad. Since the collapse of the decades-long Baath regime on December 8, drug manufacturing centres across Syria have been steadily uncovered. *) Cyclone Chido wreaks havoc in French-colonised archipelago Several hundred people may have been killed by Cyclone Chido in the French-colonised archipelago in the Indian Ocean. The French interior ministry said it would be difficult to account for all victims and said a figure could not be determined at this stage. Cyclone Chido swept through Mayotte overnight, bringing winds of more than 200 kilometres per hour and damaging makeshift housing, government buildings and a hospital.

On March 8, 1963, the Baath party overthrew the government of Syria, and since then the Assad family has ruled the country—until last weekend, when the son of Hafez al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad, fled to Russia. The 60-year Baathist domination of Syria came to an end, deposed by a Sunni Islamist organization called Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).   Whereas many current conversations are, appropriately, focused on the military and political revolution that Syrians are now living through, the ideological revolution deserves equal consideration. There is no way of knowing how long the current government in Syria, or the Syrian state as we know it, will endure. We don't know if the new regime will be just and serve its people well, or whether it will be corrupt and tyrannical. We don't know how Syria will relate to the West, to America, or to Israel. But by recovering the ideological genealogy of Baathism, from which Syria's present rulers fought to free their country, we can begin to try to understand Arab politics the way that Arab intellectuals do. To that end, Mosaic's editor Jonathan Silver is joined by Hussein Aboubakr Mansour, a writer, student of the modern Middle East, and senior fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs.

Welcome to The Times of Israel's Daily Briefing, your 20-minute audio update on what's happening in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world. Legal reporter Jeremy Sharon and reporter Diana Bletter join host Amanda Borschel-Dan for today's Daily Briefing podcast. Part of Israel’s strategy to deter the Syrian rebel forces from expanding into Israel is the decision to fill the vacuum in the buffer zone between Israel and Syria with IDF forces. Bletter reports back from a trip to a Druze town within shouting distance of Syria -- Majdal Shamas, which saw 12 youths killed in July when a Hezbollah bomb struck a soccer pitch. We hear how the residents, many who have relatives living on the other side of the border, view the fall of the Assad regime. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu finally took to the witness stand on Tuesday in his criminal trial on corruption charges, the first time in Israeli history that a serving prime minister has appeared in court to testify as a defendant. Sharon was there and discusses the festive circus-like atmosphere in the courtroom as well as some choice Netanyahu anecdotes. For news updates, please check out The Times of Israel’s ongoing live blog. Discussed articles include: In war-struck Majdal Shams, Assad’s fall sparks hope for Israel’s Druze In historic campaign across Syria, IDF says it destroyed 80% of Assad regime’s military Netanyahu, 1st PM to testify as criminal defendant, ridicules charges, denies illicit media ties Netanyahu regales court with story of John Kerry’s invitation to visit Afghanistan Coalition MKs, ministers line up at court to back Netanyahu as trial testimony kicks off Subscribe to The Times of Israel Daily Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts. This episode was produced by the Pod-Waves. IMAGE: Residents in the Israeli Druze village of Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights celebrate on December 9, 2024, after Islamist-led rebels declared that they had taken the Syrian capital in a lightning offensive, sending President Bashar al-Assad fleeing and ending five decades of Baath rule in Syria. (Menahem Kahana / AFP)See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

*) Israel kills 7 Palestinians in an overnight strike on Nuseirat camp Medics in besieged Gaza say that Israel's overnight air strikes on a house in the Nuseirat camp has killed at least seven Palestinians and wounded many others. Israel's onslaught comes in the backdrop of the UN General Assembly vote on a draft resolution today that seeks an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. In addition to calling for "an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire," the draft resolution seeks "the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages." *) 104 journalists killed in 2024, over half in Gaza: press group The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) has said this year has been "particularly deadly" for journalists with 104 killed worldwide, over half of them being in Gaza. According to the figures collated by the press group 55 Palestinian media workers were killed in 2024 in the face of Israel's offensive in Gaza. Since the start of the war on 7 October 2023, at least 138 Palestinian journalists have been killed. *) Russian strike kills three, destroys clinic in Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Meanwhile, three people were killed and 16 others wounded in a Russian missile strike that destroyed a private clinic in the southeastern Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia. Officials have said many more were trapped under the rubble. The regional governor Ivan Fedorov said the rescue operations were ongoing in search of at least eight more people who are trapped under the rubble. *) Fallen Assad regime used more than 70 torture methods During the rule of the collapsed Baath regime in Syria, thousands were subjected to torture in dozens of centres beyond Sednaya prison. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), regime forces detained at least 1.2 million Syrians during the civil war and subjected them to various torture methods. According to the SNHR report, the Baath regime employed 72 torture methods involving physical, psychological, and sexual violence. The regime also subjected detainees to forced labour and solitary confinement, violating basic human rights. *) Eygi's family to meet Blinken, call for US-led probe into her killing The family of a Turkish-American woman, Aysenur Ezgi Eygi, killed by Israel in the Occupied West Bank, will meet US Secretary of State Antony Blinken as they call for an independent US-led probe into her killing. Ozden Bennett, Eygi's sister, said in a statement that for the last three months, Blinken and State Department officials have repeatedly told us to wait for Israel, the government whose army perpetrated the crime against Aysenur, to investigate itself.

What happened today in Syria is a death blow to the Palestine resistance. The lifeline from Iran is closed, the Silk Road is mined. From tonight Israel is in a state of war with Syria.Netanyahu has succeeded in raising the black flag of ISIS and Al-Qaeda in Damascus. Prof Seyed Marandi on Israel's part in birthing the Islamist throat-cutters who have taken Syria. Scott Ritter gives his expertise on the strange behaviour emanating from Iran and the effects this will have on Russia's influence in the area. Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi: Professor of English Literature and Orientalism at the University of Tehran - Twitter: https://twitter.com/s_m_marandi- Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Prof.MohammadMarandi/Scott Ritter: Former UN Weapons Inspector and Marine Corps Intelligence Officer, Author and Political Analyst.- Twitter: https://twitter.com/realscottritter- Rumble: https://rumble.com/v27scfr-scott-ritter-extra-ep.-41-ask-the-inspector.html@Scott Ritter Extra - YouTube: https://youtube.com/@ScottRitterAgain- Website: ScottRitterExtra.com- Telegram: https://t.me/ScottRitter Become a MOATS Graduate at https://plus.acast.com/s/moatswithgorgegalloway. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

*) Syrian spring arrives in winter: 'tyrant' falls, prisoners freed Sixty-one years of Syria's Baath regime came to an end. The Syrian opposition announced in a televised statement that they had freed Damascus and overthrown Bashar al Assad's 24-year regime. The opposition said it "toppled 'tyrant' Bashar al-Assad." Prisoners in the Sednaya Prison in Damascus, known for its association with the regime and notorious torture practices, were freed by demonstrators who stormed the facility. *) Bashar al Assad, family are in Moscow: Russia Syria's Bashar al Assad and his family fled to Russia and have been granted asylum by the Russian authorities. Moscow said that Assad and his family were granted asylum on humanitarian grounds. The Syrian opposition leaders, meanwhile, have guaranteed the safety of Russian military bases and diplomatic missions inside Syria. *) Israel continues to bomb southern and central Gaza Meanwhile, Israel bombarded central and southern besieged Gaza, killing at least eight Palestinians and wounding several others. A man and his wife were killed, and six others, including their infant daughter, were seriously wounded when an air strike hit the tent where they were staying in the town of Al-Zawayda in central Gaza. Six more Palestinians were killed and several others wounded when an Israeli drone targeted a motorcycle and a civilian vehicle in the Khirbat Al-Adas area in Rafah City. *) Trump urges immediate Ukraine truce, hints at possible NATO withdrawal US President-elect Donald Trump has called for an immediate ceasefire and negotiations between Ukraine and Russia to end what he called "the madness", prompting Ukrainian President Volodymr Zelenskyy and the Kremlin to list their conditions. Trump wrote on his social media platform Truth Social that Zelenskyy and Ukraine would like to make a deal adding that Kiev had lost some 400,000 soldiers. Trump also said in an interview that he would "absolutely" consider leaving NATO if allies didn't "pay their bills." Trump has long complained that European and Canadian governments in the mutual defence bloc are freeloading on military spending by the US, by far the most powerful partner in NATO. *) Türkiye, US defence chiefs discuss Syria and other regional issues Turkish National Defence Minister Yasar Guler and US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin discussed the latest developments in Syria and security issues in a phone call. Guler and Austin also discussed bilateral and regional defence issues, the ministry said. It came hours after the collapse of Syria's al-Assad regime after decades in power.

Caiu o regime de Bashar al-Assad na Síria, o paradeiro do presidente é incerto. Governou o país durante 24 anos, reprimindo de forma sangrenta uma rebelião que se transformou em guerra. A Turquia congratula-se com vitória dos rebeldes islâmicos e com o fim de cinco décadas do governo do partido Baath. De momento ainda são mais as perguntas do que as respostas, mas “Rússia, Irão e Coreia do Norte são três dos grandes perdedores da queda do regime na Síria”, afirma Nuno Rogeiro. Na Europa, está instalado o grande mistério romeno, com o Tribunal Constitucional a declarar nula a primeira volta das eleições presidenciais, vencida por um candidato pró-russo. Em França, a reconstrução de Notre Dame reuniu em Paris vários líderes políticos, com especial foco no encontro entre Zelensky e Trump, mediado por Macron. Na Ucrânia a guerra continua, a caminho de mais um triste Natal marcado pelo conflito. Em Kharkiv a cidade ofereceu alguma esperança às crianças que passam a vida em escolas subterrâneas. Ouça a análise de Nuno Rogeiro na versão podcast do programa Leste/Oeste, emitido na SIC Notícias a 8 de dezembro e conduzido pela jornalista Nelma Serpa PintoSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Hello Darkness, My Old Friend, we're in the relegation zone again... You host Andy, Dun and Bill pick the bones out of a disappointing 4 days as the R's early season form hits a sticky patch, and the fans pre-season optimism evaporates. This week's therapy session covers - Zeroes and Ones will not take us there (one for Jesus Jones fans there) - Goals are becoming hard to come by - Le Resistance - Nardi's incredible performance on Saturday, capped by a quadruple save that was all over Twitter at the weekend - Halleluj-aaaaargh. Has Lucas lost it? - Varane ran into hot water, late tackle on Batth leads to early Baath. - Why does it always rain on us? Travis scores deflection to put Rovers 1-0 up - Batth drains the life out of the game, tapping in from close range to make it 2. - Rangers score from open play but man of the match Pawson sees something no one else does and rules out Smyth's strike - Fans Forum gives cause for optimism - Marti, Xavi and JCS extend their stay - Dembele here to stay - Long term plan. Patience, patience, patience - Home comforts as the R's host Hull - R's fast start denied by perfect Pandur - Hull bring the Drameh to go 1-0 up. WHY DO WE HAVE TO ALWAYS GO 1-0 DOWN - Defensive disaster leaves Bedia alone in the box to make it 2 - Madsen scores the greatest penalty ever taken to bring us closer before the break - Second half sludge. Miller's third condems R's to lose 2 in 4 days. - There seems to be some hope in Saito, but can we cope right now? Nope - Major Mayoral Maelstrom. Mayhem! - Can't bring ourselves to talk about the election in Democracy Manifest. Too Depressing... - Too depressed for a Blighty Bulletin - Predictions: Our friends at Derby next. Can we salvage some Pride at at a prickly Pride Park? - One of us starts actually crying. (This may not actually be true) Can someone give us a hug? or at least 5 Stars, That might cheers us up a bit

Book Presentation Viola Raheb in conversation with Hind Kabawat, Randa Siniora and Heidemarie Winkel WOMEN'S POLITICAL BIOGRAPHIES IN THE MENAT REGION At the end of the conference at the Bruno Kreisky Forum in November 2023 on „Women's lives and agency in the MENAT Region- between political activism and realism“, women from different countries and backgrounds were invited to shed light on their contexts, socio-economic and political developments, violence – especially gender-based violence – in times of war and its impact on women's lives, engagement and agency. With the rise of populism and reactionary movements, women's rights seem to need to be renegotiated. As a result of polarization and ambivalence, listening to and understanding women from the MENAT region is becoming less important. In many Western countries, a hegemonic perception of the lives and work of women in the MENAT region prevails and a knowledge deficit compared to other regions of the world, e.g. Latin America, still exists. The book aims to give female political actors from the region a face and a name by using biographical essays as a method of knowledge production and awareness-raising, while promoting synergies and advocating the need for networking and cooperation. „Eleven biographies from seven different countries from diverse generations, backgrounds, and areas of engagement are presented in this book. In their biographies, the contributors address political developments over the last decades in their countries and the region. Historical political phases, be it the end of the colonial rule and the phase of independence in Tunisia, the Baath-rule era and the war in Syria, or the Palestinian Nakba of 1948 and the continuing wars and displacement of Palestinians, become embodied in the lives of the women narrators and how these phases shaped and still shape their lives and work.” Viola Raheb, Co-Editor   Welcome:Getraud Auer Borea d'Olmo, General Secretary of the BKF Introductory remarks:Ursula Plassnik, former Federal Minister for European and International Affairs, Ambassador ret. Hind Kabawat, former deputy head of the Syrian Negotiation Commission's Geneva Office and a former member of the High Negotiations Committee (HNC); President of TASTAKEL women's organization for women's empowerment and peacebuilding Randa Siniora, General director of the Women´s Center for Legal Aid and Counselling and Palestinian human rights activist Heidemarie Winkel, professor of sociology at Universität Bielefeld and senior research associate at the VHI/St. Edmund's College, Cambridge University (UK) Viola Raheb, scholar of religious studies lecturer, writer and Senior Fellow at BKF

Ne apropiem cu pași repezi de festivitatea de deschidere a Jocurilor Olimpice de la Paris și presa internațională prefațează evenimentul din diferite unghiuri. Iar controversele nu lipsesc. „Pentru prima dată, din câte știm, Jocurile Olimpice de la Paris ar putea chiar să ajungă la rentabilitate, iar organizatorii speră să scape de problemele care afectează de obicei toate edițiile – legate de infrastructură, locuințe și transport”, anticipează The New York Magazine.Bloomberg consideră că „Olimpiada de la Paris poate contribui la unitatea unui oraș fracturat. În ultimii ani, de la nivelul veniturilor până la accesul la servicii, diferența s-a mărit între cele două milioane de parizieni și cele 10 milioane de locuitori din Ile-de-France. Investițiile masive în suburbii și dezvoltarea rețelei de transport public pentru a conecta mai bine Parisul de periferia sa, vor permite o reechilibrare vitală”, crede Bloomberg.Sau, ”cel puțin Jocurile vor fi făcut posibilă accelerarea transformării ecologice și reamenajarea suburbiilor”, notează El País.Nu lipsesc nici controversele. Una legată de paturile din carton din Satul Olimpic, pe care unii le-au descris drept ”anti-sex”.”Mii de sportivi din întreaga lume se pregătesc să concureze – și să doarmă – la Paris” - informează NBC News.Ca parte a eforturilor organizatorilor de a face ca Jocurile Olimpice din 2024 din capitala Franței să fie „cele mai responsabile și mai durabile Jocuri din istorie”, Satul Olimpic va găzdui paturi de carton realizate din materiale complet reciclate.Citeste siJurnal Olimpic, 22 iulie 2024: Suntem pregătiți (Președintele Macron)”Un total de 14.250 de paturi vor fi răspândite în Satul Olimpic de 54 de hectare din partea de nord a Parisului.Unii sportivi au împărtășit o privire asupra patului de carton pe YouTube înainte de deschiderea oficială a Satului Olimpic”.De fapt – spune Forbes - ”paturile pot suporta 440 de pounds, [aproape 200 de kilograme] și se pare că sunt mai rezistente decât lemnul. Paturile din carton au fost create de multă vreme pentru a fi folosite în adăposturile pentru dezastre. Jocurile Olimpice de la Tokyo au introdus paturile ca un gest ecologic.O dovadă suplimentară a rezistenței patului vine de la gimnastul irlandez Rhys McClenaghan, care a postat un videoclip în care dezminte zvonurile „anti-sex”. El sare în mod repetat pe patul său de carton, care rămâne încăpățânat de intact. McClenaghan continuă să descrie zvonurile drept știri false”.Și o controversă, de această dată, în registrul grav:Un criminal de război sirian la Jocurile Olimpice?Acuzat de participare activă la reprimarea revoltei împotriva lui Bashar El-Assad, președintele Comitetului Paralimpic Sirian, Omar Al-Aroub, ar putea face parte din delegația oficială siriană, spre marea consternare a oponenților regimul, citim în Courrier International.Potrivit Deutsche Welle, Al-Aroub este un membru înalt al așa-numitelor Brigăzi Baath, o miliție afiliată guvernului Assad. Înainte, a fost lider al Uniunii Naționale a Studenților Sirieni, sau NUSS, care este, de asemenea, legată de regimul Assad.„Torționarul fiului meu va reprezenta Siria la Jocurile Olimpice de la Paris”, scrie activista siriană Mariam El-Hallak, pe site-ul EUObserver. Fiul ei, Ayham a murit după ce a fost torturat cu cruzime de membrii NUSS, mai spune activista.

As the historical dominoes are lining up, a critical and world changing even happens on September 11th, 2001. It will be a major tipping point in the events that follow in the months and years to come. For the United States the gloves are now off, and the memory of that fateful September morning will fuel a fire that will see the deployment of U.S. Military forces to both Afghanistan and Iraq. The dominoes are lined up, and they will slowly fall, one by one.  The dominoes... - September 11th, 2001  - Invasion of Afghanistan - Assassination of U.S. Diplomat Laurence Foley - Invasion of Iraq - The disbanding of the Iraqi military and Baath party - The arrival of Zarqawi 

Azeez served as an Iraqi interpreter during Operation Iraqi Freedom during the "Surge" as sectarian strife erupted during the US occupation of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Baath party.In Episode 3, you'll hear what it was like for Azeez to be imbedded as an interpreter with a MiTT (e.g., Military Transition Team) whose role was to help transition Iraq from an occupied country to one led by a newly minted Iraqi government...and it did not go smoothly.Support the show

Azeez served as an Iraqi interpreter during Operation Iraqi Freedom during the "Surge" as sectarian strife erupted during the US occupation of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Baath party.In this episode, you'll hear Azeez talk about the tragedy his family endured due to sectarian violence and this path to becoming an interpreter for the US Armed forces. Support the show

Azeez served as an Iraqi interpreter during Operation Iraqi Freedom during the "Surge" as sectarian strife erupted during the US occupation of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Baath party.In this episode, Azeez shares what it was like growing up in southern Iraq as the war with Iran ended and a new war with the US -led coalition began, and the impact it had on him and his family.Support the show

In 2003, after completing the March Up in dramatic fashion, and after an all-night gunfight to seize one of Saddam’s palaces, the Marines of Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment were immediately sent to capture Baath officials suspected to be in a neighborhood nearby. The Marines established a cordon and began searching house by house for their targets with little to go on beyond a set of grid coordinates. As the search continued, the cordon came under increasingly intense and accurate fire. One of Blanke’s machine gunners, Lance Corporal Jackson (pseudonym), was among those on the cordon and was responsible for protecting both the Iraqi civilians inside and his fellow Marines. On that day in 2003, his actions left an indelible impression on his platoon commander and his fellow Marines. Note: this episode originally aired in 2021.

Rabbi Michael Beyo and Dr. Adrian McIntyre talk with M. Zuhdi Jasser, MD, the Founder and President of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy and the author of “A Battle for the Soul of Islam: An American Muslim Patriot's Fight to Save His Faith.” A first-generation American Muslim, Jasser's parents fled the oppressive Baath regime of Syria in the mid-1960's for American freedom. A devout Muslim, he and his family have strong ties to the American Muslim community having helped lead mosques in Wisconsin, Arkansas, Virginia and Arizona. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States, Jasser and a group of American Muslims founded AIFD which promotes Muslim voices for liberty and freedom through the separation of mosque and state. They believe the root cause of Islamist terrorism is the ideology of political Islam (Islamism) and a belief in the supremacy of the Islamic state. AIFD's primary projects include the Muslim Liberty Project and the Muslim Reform Movement, which was launched in December 2015 and is comprised of a coalition of over 15 Western Muslim Leaders from the US, Canada, and Europe. Conversation with the Rabbi is a project of the East Valley Jewish Community Center, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit, neighborhood organization that has served individuals and families inclusive of all races, religions, and cultures since 1972. Visit us online at https://www.evjcc.org The Conversation with the Rabbi podcast is supported by a grant from Arizona Humanities, National Endowment for the Humanities, and the federal American Rescue Plan (ARP) Act.The show is recorded and produced in the studio of PHX.fm, the leading independent B2B podcast network in Phoenix, Arizona. Learn more at https://phx.fm

En este episodio vamos a hablar de este poderoso e influyente partido político que desde su fundación y hasta hoy, ha sido una parte fundamental de la historia moderna del Medio Oriente. Para entrar al curso de Hebreo recomendado por Etzlil: http://tracking.eteachergroup.com/SHa Para contribuir a nuestra creación de contenido: https://www.patreon.com/etzlil Síganos en nuestras redes sociales: Instagram Facebook Blog

Two kinds of revolutions:Throwing off an external oppressorOften violent, sometimes notForcing regime change in your own country through extra-political or violent meansLargely violentLargely nonviolentThe outcomes tend to be very different.(Focusing on outcomes where they win -- turns out most revolutions fail militarily)Those throwing off an outsider tend to work out pretty well!US revolutionSpanish-American independenceHaitian slave revolt (note unlike many slave revolts, the Haitians were the natives)Indian revolution (mostly)Greek & Balkan revolutions, generally the revolutions of Nationalism of the 19th centuryGenerally the anticolonial revolutionsThose forcing internal change through violence tend to lead to brutal dictatorshipsRussian revolutionFrench revolutionChinese revolutionEnglish revolutionCuban revolutionIranian revolutionRoman Republic revolutions / civil warsGENERALLY:-Kicking people out works out pretty well-Civil wars don't: they lead to dictatorshipsOK why?-Kicking people out: you use tribalism to your advantageYour people are united against an outsiderOnce it's over, the outsiders can generally leave-Regime change: tribalism works against youYour people are divided because you're using violence to create winners and losersOnce it's over, the defeated folks stick around (see: the Iraq war and the Baath party)But there's a second bit: When you have an internal revolution, you're using violence not just against the current system, but at the very idea of legitimacy of any given system. You set a precedent: if I don't like it, I can use violence to change it.Any regime, or system of government, relies on legitimacy. Building that legitimacy is hard. Lots of people study this. It usually relies on traditions, taught and shared belief systems, propaganda, and enough of a track record that people feel they have some means of getting their needs met through the system some reasonable amount of the time.So you end up reverting to using raw power, secret police, fear, etc. You don't have unity or legitimacy so you can only resort to violence.When that doesn't work, you end up losing the revolution and either the old regime comes back pretty quickly (English revolution) or you have ongoing violent anarchy where everyone is getting beheaded, including the children of the revolution, until a strongman comes in and restores order and people are generally OK with this (French, Roman Republic revolutions)See: Machiavelli's PrinceWe must be wary in our own democracies of escalating rhetoric and actions that chip away at the legitimacy of the liberal system. Liberal systems are designed to solve problems through a process: when you eschew that process to get what you need, you erode that legitimacy and bring about its downfall, and what's going to come next will be ugly.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/reconsiderpodcast. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

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Etter revolusjonen tok Abd al-Karim Qasim makten i Irak. Han var sympatisk ovenfor kommunistene. Baathistene forstod at de ville ha liten makt i det nye Irak, så de begynte å planlegge et attentat. Når Baath-partiet til slutt kom til makten (med god drahjelp fra CIA) fikk Saddam Hussein en sentral rolle. Han ble med i nasjonalgarden, som stod for tortur og henrettelser av motstandere av regimet. Samtidig ble han landets ansikt utad, hvor han fremstod som en sofistikert politisk tenker. Vipps – 621533https://taakeprat.com

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The Chaldean League (Issora-Melbourne), commemorated the 51st Anniversary of the massacre of our people in the village of Sorya in northern Iraq. Tens of innocent people were shot and killed for no reason other than been victims of the barbaric and savage nature of members of the Iraqi army under the rule of Baath’s regime during the Kurdish revolt against the central government of Iraq.

Part of Akmaral's speech: Wintrade asked me to do a talk on what I chose as the most important issues affecting my life as a professional woman. So what follows are issues which impact my career as a journalist and film producer, as a professional woman, and indeed, simply as a woman and a mother at this point in humanity's history. To address these issues, I need to focus on 2 questions. First: Why is protest so often depicted as looting? (Or you choose a question – for structure) Second: What do COVID-19 and ISIS have in common? So, to answer the first question, I need to go back to where it all started for me. While studying the situation in Syria, I often communicated with politicians, diplomats, the military, think-tanks and journalists from different countries, as well as researching information from a variety of sources. These sources included independent media in different languages. I've seen time and again how the consciousness not only of an individual or a group of people, the population of entire countries and even on a global scale, can be skilfully manipulated using modern political technologies. The events in Syria are one striking contemporary example of this. Before my first trip to Syria, I had already been acquainted with the position of the Syrian government and the armed opposition during The Astana Process - the peace talks which take place in the capital of Kazakhstan and are aimed at resolving the Syrian crisis. There is a side of the Syrian conflict which has been barely mentioned in the global mass media. This side is represented by the Syrians who have not left their country, continue to live there, resist the military terror and economic and information blockade. They study, work, and give birth to children. Many of them have written to me, telling about what they are going through and asking: Akmaral, speak for us! Through this communication with the Syrians - both those who support President Assad and those who are against him - I have formed an insight into what has happened in Syria, and I'd like to share it with you today. Many participants of the initial protests, who have now left Syria and live in different countries, told me that the vision of the revolution that they wanted to achieve at the beginning was exactly as they dreamed it to be - they had an opportunity to express their views and opinions. According to the world mass media reporting at that time, president Assad brutally suppressed peaceful demonstrations using military forces, as a result, his actions led to the civil war. However, the people in Syria told me that at the time of Western politicians stating, “Assad must go!”, no media enlightened the public about the fact that President Assad had actually met with the protesters, addressed them with a speech, negotiated with them and went on to meet their following demands: Number 1 - Abolition of article 8 of the Constitution, which had positioned the Baath party as the leading political power in the country. This change allowed various parties to participate in the parliamentary elections. Number 2 - Abolition of the state of emergency law, which had prevailed in the country for decades. Number 3 - Banning the exceptional courts. Number 4 - Freeing thousands of political prisoners from prisons, according to the list of names presented by the protesters. The majority of them were radicals, who later joined the terrorist groups. If you would also like to watch it again, join the Wintrade Global Membership, where you can see her webinar and many more like it, in addition to a wealth of resources, training and support for women in business.

*) EU leaders bicker over virus recovery package EU leaders have failed so far to reach an agreement on the details of a 850-billion dollar coronavirus recovery fund. Richer states want strict conditions attached to the funds but this has been rejected by Italy and Spain, both hard-hit by Covid-19. Sunday's session ended on early Monday morning, and will resume later in the afternoon. * ) Syria holds parliamentary elections Syrians have begun voting to elect a new parliament, as the country grapples with international sanctions and war. Without any real opposition, regime leader Bashar al Assad's Baath ruling party and its allies are expected to take most of parliament's 250 seats. These are the third such polls since the war began nine years ago and come amid a crippling economic crisis. *) South Africa virus death toll tops 5,000 South Africa's death toll from the coronavirus has passed the 5,000 mark with more than 364,000 confirmed cases. The country’s health minister has appealed to South Africans to adhere to health regulations to curb the spread of the virus. South Africa is now the fifth worst-affected country globally with its peak expected over the next few weeks. *) Protests in India over rape, murder of teenage girl Protests in eastern India have erupted over the alleged gang rape and murder of a teenage girl. The girl went missing on Saturday and was found dead on Sunday, less than a kilometre from her home in West Bengal, local media says. Protesters have blocked a highway and set police vehicles and public buses on fire. And finally *) UAE probe heads for Mars A UAE spacecraft blasted off from Japan on a journey to Mars on the Arab world’s first interplanetary mission. The unmanned probe named Al Amal – Arabic for Hope – will help provide a picture of the Mars’ atmosphere throughout the Martian year. Amal is set to reach Mars in February 2021, the year the UAE celebrates 50 years since the country’s formation.

Nossa bancada analisa os processos históricos e os cenários de um dos conflitos mais sangrentos e violentos, que tem perturbado o jogo da geopolítica mundial: a Guerra da Síria _____________________________________________________________ 1. Abertura do Programa. 2. O Que Qui Rolou na História: 07/12/1941 - Ataque a Pearl Harbor 3. Mestre dos Memes 4. Bloco principal - Luta contra o colonialismo francês. - Partido Baathista Socialista e nacionalismo Sírio. - Processo revolucionário em 1963 coloca os Baathistas no poder. - Reforma agrária, direitos trabalhistas e melhorias nas condições de vida da população mais pobre. - 1970 há um Golpe militar (por alguns chamado de revolução) - O socialismo baathista de fato melhora a vida população Síria, porém, o arabismo secular passar se tornar uma tendência chauvinista - Em 1970, seu pai Hafez Al-Assad, então General e Ministro da Defesa, da um golpe de Estado no presidente Nouredine Atassi. É eleito presidente em 1971 e só sai do poder nos anos 2000 com sua morte. - Entender a dinâmica dos países envolvidos no conflito e os interesses em jogo - Revolução Iraniana, caminhos do petróleo e Arábia Saudita - Irã e Arábia Saudita são os dois países tem uma reserva de considerável do Oriente Médio, mais ou menos um quarto de todo o petróleo da região. - Após a revolução o Irã rompe com os E.U.A e a Arábia Saudita recebe as atenções norte-americanas. As tensões entre os países aumentam, pois o Irã é majoritariamente Xiita e a Arábia Saudita é majoritariamente Sunita. - O que é ser Xiita e Sunita no Islamismo? - E.U.A e a política intervencionista no Oriente Médio. - Reais interesses das nações envolvidas - Como Bashar Al-Assad chegou ao poder - Historicamente ligado ao partido Baath nacionalista e socialista - apoiado pela União Soviética. Ambos temiam uma teocracia de tipo Sunita. - Apoio ao Hisbolá dado pelo Irã, Síria e Rússia e pelo exército revolucionário iraniano, que por sua vez enfrenta a Al Qaeda e o Estado Islamico. - Primavera Árabe e controvérsias políticas - Juventude insatisfeita com ditaduras, teocracia e principalmente com a crise econômica nos seus países - Apoio norte-americano para derrubada de regimes que não atendiam os seus interesses - Discutir o caso do Líbano - Os E.U.A pouco se importam com os Direitos Humanos - Acusações de uso e manipulação de armas químicas - Com Trump no Poder os ataque se intensificam 5. Barraca do Beijo 6. Rolê Cultural. __________________________________________________________ Links e Bibliografia Um ano de Primavera Árabe: o furacão que derrubou governos e contagiou o mundo Link: https://operamundi.uol.com.br/noticia/18931/um-ano-de-primavera-arabe-o-furacao-que-derrubou-governos-e-contagiou-o-mundo Primavera árabe: O protagonismo dos jovens Link: https://www.alem-mar.org/cgi-bin/quickregister/scripts/redirect.cgi?redirect=EFpEApylFAMKbqLdbC A Revolução Baath no Iraque e na Síria: o que mudou? - Daniela Zapata de Oliveira* O problema dos mitos à esquerda sobre a Síria Link: https://www.cartamaior.com.br/?/Editoria/Pelo-Mundo/O-problema-dos-mitos-a-esquerda-sobre-a-Siria/6/39591 Entenda as diferenças e divergências entre sunitas e xiitas Link: https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2016/01/160104_diferencas_sunitas_xiitas_muculmanos_lab O Aiatolá Khomeini e a revolução iraniana de 1979 Link: https://iqaraislam.com/o-aiatola-khomeini-e-revolucao-iraniana-de-1979/ A REVOLUÇÃO IRANIANA EM DEBATE Link: https://www.revistadiaspora.org/2017/08/02/a-revolucao-iraniana-em-debate/ Hoje na História - 1970: General Hafez-Al-Assad derruba o presidente sírio Nouredine Atassi Link: https://operamundi.uol.com.br/noticia/7565/hoje-na-historia-1970-general-hafez-al-assad-derruba-o-presidente-sirio-nouredine-atassi A Revolução Iraniana - Osvaldo Coggiola Síria: guerra aberta entre sunitas e xiitas Link: https://www.alem-mar.org/cgi-bin/quickregister/scripts/redirect.cgi?redirect=EFVAAZkFEEUYZQDixi Quais interesses cada país tem na guerra da Síria? Link: https://www.cartacapital.com.br/internacional/quais-interesses-cada-pais-tem-na-guerra-da-siria Comentarista israelense: 'Guerra civil na Síria não terminará em Idlib' Link: https://br.sputniknews.com/oriente_medio_africa/2018091312205586-siria-guerra-idlib-israel/ Há tempos a guerra na Síria não é mais sobre Assad Link: https://www.cartacapital.com.br/internacional/ha-tempos-a-guerra-na-siria-nao-e-mais-sobre-assad Irã x Arábia Saudita: um retrato da disputa entre xiitas e sunitas Link: https://www.otempo.com.br/blogs/carta-e-cronica-19.120/ir%C3%A3-x-ar%C3%A1bia-saudita-um-retrato-da-disputa-entre-xiitas-e-sunitas-19.983258 _____________________________________________________________ Campanha de Financiamento Coletivo: https://www.catarse.me/clio Financiadores desse episódio: Humberto Athayde Jr., Rosana Athayde Vecchia, Letícia Alves Não se esqueça de deixar seu like e compartilhar esse vídeo, de se inscrever no canal e ativar as notificações Siga o Clio nas redes sociais: YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC1mlLGfLYbhztostdvOMR2w Instagram: http://instagram.com/cliohistoriaeliteratura Fanpage: https://www.facebook.com/ClioHistoriaELiteratura Twitter: https://twitter.com/cliohistelit Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4ozjK7hTFAnlml5ElWtdVV Medium: https://medium.com/@cliohistoria

On today's episode we determine Lotti's family tree. We like her robe. Her grandpa Mecmedi has some decent stuff too. When we finally get to Citra, we agree that they put a lot of effort into fleshing out her plotline. A lot of plot in this unit. The third batch of global seven star units is out and we give them all their report cards (Rem, the Baath, and BBQ all got top grades). And to top it all off, Mini insults the French. Get in touch with us, we’d love to hear from you! Email: ffbepodcast@gmail.com Wilmgaard: Twitter – twitter.com/Wilmgaard Instagram – www.instagram.com/asmirbasic/ Miniado: Twitter – twitter.com/admir_basic Instagram – www.instagram.com/gourmetking69/

What were the primary concerns of Iraqis in the run up to the election and who were the main protagonists contending for power? What does the outcome mean to both regional and international actors? To answer these questions, Vomena’s Shahram Aghamir spoke with Loulouwa Al Rachid, who has been conducting research on Iraq and the Gulf region for the past 20 years. She argues that the elections highlighted the wide and dangerous gap between rulers and the ruled in Iraq by reflecting massive popular rejection of the post-Baath political order.

"What happened after 2014 is another chapter of what happened to this city" say Omar Mohammed, when speaking about his home city of Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq. Mohammed was born in Mosul during some of the worst moments of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. “I was born on 8 April, the Baath party was born on 7 April, and the fall of the regime was on 9 April. I turned 17 when I saw the [US] invasion ... 2014 changed everything in my country," he explains. Mohammed was in Mosul under the corrupt Iraqi army, after the US invasion and while the Islamic State (referred to as ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, pre-2014) was beginning to strengthen and grow. At the time they already had a foothold in Mosul: “We were used to seeing [car] bombs, weekly there were dead bodies in the street, people gett[ing] kidnapped, people paying taxes to the jihadists. The corruption among the security forces [was] something that was being normalised in the city for about 10 years. The city was terrorised I would say,” explains Mohammed. Even then, heading out to work was not an easy situation. “When I wake up and go out, the first thing I think about: am I going to die?” One story in particular - which is well known among Mosul residents - is about a businessman who refused to pay IS before they seized control of the city in 2014. So to send the man a message "they put a bomb in the car of his son on his wedding day", some time in 2011 or 2012. "After that they told him that if he was not going to pay he should prepare another grave for his other son." Although the Iraqi security forces were in Mosul until 2014, Mohammed points out that such threats were common. “If I get threatened by ISIS, I can’t go to the Iraqi security forces or to the police because they are corrupted and my name will go directly to ISIS and they will come to kill me. So we were blocked in the middle of this corruption and ISIS.” IS enters Mosul Although news of the newly-formed Islamic State armed group in nearby cities was known across Mosul, many chose to stay. In fact, when they arrived, even the Turkish consulate stayed while the former governor appeared in public telling people not to worry  and that everything was ok, explains Mohammed. He adds that as the diplomatic staff didn’t leave, most people didn’t see the need to run away. Even after IS arrived in June of 2014, it didn't show its true colours. "At the very beginning, ISIS (Islamic State of Syria post-2014) wanted to give the people [the impression] that they were there to protect the city, to take the city from the control of the corrupted government. It was very misleading.The people didn’t understand,” adds Mohammed. But then in three weeks things had changed.  “It’s like they pressed [a] button. Everything changed in two days." Mohammed remembers receiving a list of what was permitted and the consequences if people refused to obey. Public executions started, beheadings in the streets, arrests, lashes for not attending mosque, throwing LGBT people off buildings and stoning women on allegations of adultery - actions which took Mosul back to the Middle Ages, he says. Everyone was expected to attend public executions if they were being filmed. A crew of camera men would often repeat the scenes, explaining that a given camera angle or position was not good enough to take a decent shot. Mosul Eye launched The day IS arrived to take over the city, Mohammed says he was using his personal account to post everything. The attack came at 3:00 am on 6 June, an account of which he posted on his personal account as Omar. However, a friend who saw his post told him to be careful. Mohammed erased his personal profile and created an anonymous one called Mosul Eye. “It wasn’t just to share info with others, it was more telling the truth about what’s happening in the city” he explains, adding that the people of Mosul were in a black box. "They couldn’t get out and people couldn’t get in. If no one knew the truth about what was really happening to them, then how would future generations know" he asks. “If there wasn’t another narrative, people would only suspect what happened, they would start investigating and they would find only the narrative of ISIS. So we [would have] lost the truth.” As a trained historian, Mohammed risked his life and that of his family’s to chronicle the day-to-day life in the city. Every day, he would post on his blog stories about how the people lived, the crimes of IS, what IS have done to the people, along with the names of the victims, the impact of the airstrikes. He also listed the names of IS fighters who were killed - in fact, everything that happened. At times he would push his own security boundaries of risk to take photos or videos. But all of this was done to ensure the history of the city was accurately being recorded. Writing about Mosul No one knew of his blog. Not even his family. While Mosul Eye was intended for English-speakers, he had other blogs under various names to target Iraqis. He wanted to clarify a misunderstanding amongst Iraqis outside Mosul that the people of Mosul supported IS, something which was clearly not true. So his blogs became a trusted platform, especially his Mosul Eye among the international community. Even those in his own city were reading his blog through the help of family and friends who could access them outside of the city and report the news. But shouldering the responsibility of such a chronicle became a burden and one that he couldn’t share. “I was so tired, that I couldn’t express my feelings to my mother, to my brother, to my sister. It was heavy on my shoulders, so I thought the only option is to die” he explains. "So I went to the Tigris River, drinking tea, wearing red, smoking publicly,” says Mohammed. He waited for IS to kill him. But to his surprise, no one noticed him. A few months later he decided it was time for him to leave. He had been receiving numerous threats on his blog from IS, and they were getting more active within the neighbourhoods, by searching houses. There was an IS leader living in the house next to his. His neighbourhood in particular had become surrounded by IS. “If they find me, I’m ready to die, but this is my family. I’ve been protecting them for more than a year, so why should I give them up?" he asked himself. The result is that he made arrangements to be smuggled out of the city. Mohammed explains that he left with his notebook and his hard drive that contained every observation about his Mosul under IS. While the car waited for him at six in the morning to sneak him out of the city, he quickly woke his mother up to say a quick good bye without offering any details so as ensure her safety. Even in the safety of Turkey and elsewhere, Mohammed continued to update Mosul Eye until the city was liberated. In November of 2017, he finally decided to reveal his identity and in doing so relieve himself of the burden he had been carrying for nearly two years. He explains that while he had initially vowed to never reveal himself, the liberation of Mosul meant there was no longer a threat to his family. He also wanted the people of his city to learn to trust again. How could they could learn to do so if he didn’t make that first step to reveal his identity,  he asks. On top of all those reasons is the most basic one: “I was also tired of hiding.” Since he revealed his identity, Mohammed has been telling his story to different media outlets and working on his doctoral thesis. He also writes in an effort to move on and find security amongst people. “I’m writing now, writing from the beginning of my life and will continue until the end," he explains. "Writing is helping me to get all of these ideas and images out of my mind." He’s also trying to be as involved as possible from a distance with the cultural revival in his city; a city he hopes to go back to very soon. You can follow Omar Mohammed on Twitter on @omardemosul and @MosulEye  

Guten Morgen, Brasilien! Estreamos este ano com uma notícia muito triste. Terrível, de verdade. É algo tão trágico que se torna difícil de acreditar, mas... deturparam Marx, gente. Sério. Foram aplicar o maior filósofo e pensador do Universo e... deturparam. Saiu tudo errado, e não foi o socialismo de verdade. O socialismo real ainda está por vir, tornando o socialismo científico a doutrina que, curiosamente, tem a característica de não existir tão logo você aplique Karl Marx. Foi assim na União Soviética: veio Stalin (já que ninguém lembra de Lenin como um totalitário genocida) e matou às pencas – logo, não era o socialismo de verdade, e o stalinismo (chamado, justamente, de marxismo-leninismo) é pura deturpação de Marx. Bom mesmo seria Trotsky, o marxista verdadeiro, que, nova e cientificamente, não chegou ao poder. Mas também foi assim na China comunista. Por coincidência, também aplicaram Marx por lá mas CATAPIMBA! deturparam tudo de novo. E também na Alemanha Oriental. E no Zimbábue. E no Camboja. E na Romênia. E na Coréia do Norte. E no Afeganistão. E em Cuba. E na Polônia. E na Hungria. E na Checoslováquia. E na Líbia. E no Vietnã. E na Iugoslávia. E no Congo. E na Venezuela.  Onde quer que você tente aplicar o marxismo, em seus variegados graus de diferença (do leninismo ao socialismo juche, do maoísmo ao socialismo Baath, do trotskysmo ao bolivarianismo), como analisados por Leszek Kołakowski em seu clássico Main Currents of Marxism, TCHAPLAU!, alguém, por desastre do destino, deturpa Marx ali na última hora, causa fome e genocídio, com paredón ou Gulag, o povo fica em desespero para fugir para o país capitalista conservador mais próximo (haitianos estão do lado de Cuba, mas preferem até fugir para o Brasil "golpista") e intelectuais e youtubers correm para dizer que não era ainda o verdadeiro socialismo, que o verdadeiro socialismo é o socialismo ainda não verdadeiro, que deturparam Marx de novo, que Marx é puro humanismo, o maior pensador do Universo etc. Há um fator simples para explicar muita coisa: dá para virar marxista em um minuto, e é este o apelo do barbudão da Renânia. Nós fazemos o teste neste podcast. Em um minuto pode-se ensinar alguém a ser um marxista fanático e ortodoxo. Com filósofos bons ou ruins de outras cepas, seja Nietzsche ou Kant, seja Heidegger ou Leibniz, há pelo menos alguns anos de estudos difíceis, com temas complexos (mesmo que o filósofo em questão tenha errado em tudo) para alguém se considerar um "kantiano" ou um discípulo de Wittgenstein ou D'Alembert. Que dirá de sumidades do pensamento, de Kierkegaard a Bernard Lonergan. Mas foi justamente Marx, o "materialista científico", que definiu que só se pode julgar uma filosofia pelos seus resultados práticos. Por isso, fazemos uma sucinta análise filosófica de seu "materialismo histórico-dialético", à luz de pensadores muito mais gabaritados, como Benedetto Croce e Eric Voegelin, para entender os problemas fundamentais que fazem o marxismo ter tamanha alergia da realidade, para ser "deturpado", segundo a desculpa da moda, toda vez que alguém consubstancia o marxismo, justamente, na ditadura do proletariado apregoada por ele. E não deixem de fazer seu currículo valendo ouro com o CVPraVC (sensoincomum.cvpravc.com.br), nosso primeiro anunciante, que vai te ajudar a conquistar aquela vaga tão desejada!

On this episode of Cultural Anomaly, we explore how different countries and cultures mark this intersection of religion, secular tradition and sugar. We also dive into the realms of celebrity deaths, alternative sweetening methods, feminism and more! Show notes: Introductions: Emily and Anna introduce each other and discuss their home areas and the prevalence of cowboys in each. Emily laments the death of Celine Dion’s husband, Renee and Anna in turn mourns Michael Jackson. We then discuss the true meaning of femininity that somehow leads to turmeric milk and palm sugar as a healthy alternative to white sugar. Anna educates us on how to eat with all of our senses and then shares a recipe she found for Baath cake – a traditional Easter treat from India. Serious Crap – Easter Time! Anna tells us about how Easter is celebrated in her home town and then Emily shares as well. We discuss the Cadbury egg hunt scandal in Britain and offer reflections on control issues and edible religious symbols. Next, we go around the world to explore and give our thoughts on how 5 different countries/cultures celebrate Easter. Current Events & Wrapping Up Anna shares about the recent terror attack in Stockholm. We discuss ideas around extremism and finding balance in a world that only becomes ever-crazier. We share about how to get in touch with us (see below) and then wrap up with some inspiring words from Anna. Please let us know what you thought of the podcast, what question you have and if there are any topics you’d like us to research or talk about! Email us – culturalanomaly17@gmail.com Follow us on Twitter -

Jacob Shapiro and Kamran Bokhari discuss the geopolitical importance of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and whether the realities it created will define the future. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0 TRANSCRIPT: JS: Hello everyone and welcome to another Geopolitical Futures podcast. My name is Jacob Shapiro, I am the director of analysis for Geopolitical Futures and I am joined again this week by Kamran Bokhari, who is our senior analyst, welcome Kamran. KB: Thanks for having me, Jacob. JS: I just want to apologize to our listeners, I know that we didn't manage to get a podcast out last week, so we're going to try and get two out this week. In general, we are going to try to stick to one a week, so we appreciate you guys bearing with us as we go along. Last time we talked, Kamran, we talked about the Islamic State and we talked about the Islamic State's origins and its futures. And one of the things I think is interesting right now is that the Middle East is really in a state of flux. The balance of power in the Middle East is changing. We can see it changing all the time. One of the things we are chronicling in our writing is how the balance of power in the Middle East is changing all the time. You brought up to us when we were thinking about what to talk about today, that we're coming up on the 50th anniversary of the 1967 war between Israel and Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and also Lebanon and Iraq had some token forces in there, but really it was between Israel and Jordan, Syria and Egypt. The 50th anniversary is coming up in June. How about you lay out for our readers why you think this is such an important anniversary to note? KB: I think 50 years is a good point in time to go back and review and measure just how things have unfolded in the region. And 1967 is particularly important because it really shaped the way the region has unfolded. It was a pivotal moment. Israel, as a result of that war, its massive victory over three Arab states, really established it as a military power in the region. And it was only 19 years old, Israel was only 19 years old when that war happened. And at the time, no one could've foreseen that Israel would be able to defend itself against three major Arab powers, at least they were perceived as major Arab powers. And the whole perception of Arab strength was essentially laid bare. The image of the Arabs was tarnished. I mean the fact that in the collective Arab memory, June 5, 1967, is seen as Yawm al-Naksa, which is loosely defined or translated as the day of setback, although ‘naksa' in Arabic is far more, if you will, stronger than just the word ‘setback' as we know it in English, but nonetheless, it left a deep imprint on the Arab world and established that the Arab world was very much hollow and it could not impose a military solution on Israel. JS: Kamran, I think this was one of the things you brought up last week that was interesting, which was when we were talking about the Islamic State and we were talking about the rise of radical jihadist Islam as a major ideology in the region, you pointed towards this moment as the moment at which the political ideology of the time, which was secular nationalism, Arab nationalism – in 1967 Egypt was still known as the United Arab Republic technically, right, which is an ode to the short-lived entity that existed when Egypt and Syria were part of the same republic from 1958 to 1961. So you sort of pointed out last week just how important this moment was in history and how it really defined how the Arab world was going to move forward. It amounted to the failure of Nasserism and in some ways, it was the moment that Egypt abdicated leadership in the Arab world, wouldn't you say? KB: Absolutely, and I think that it was forced to do that. I think that nobody could argue and nobody could sustain the image of this leadership role that Egypt had projected, that it was the leader of Arab nationalism, the Arab soul, the Arab world. When the Egyptian Air Force was destroyed in a matter of hours on the fifth of June, you couldn't make that argument anymore. And it was essentially the beginning of the end of the Nasser regime, at least Nasserite Egypt – though some would argue that we are still living in the legacy of Nasserite Egypt – but Nasser himself didn't live too long after that. He died in 1970, and that really closed that chapter of Arab nationalism, but it also demonstrated that the Arab states, and here we are talking about Egypt, I mean Egypt is the heart of the Arab world given it is the largest Arab state by population, any type of cultural renaissance, new ideologies that take shape in Egypt, in Cairo particularly, and then disseminate to the rest of the Arab world. So that was the status of Egypt. That war really, really demonstrated the impotence of the Egyptian military in the face of Israel, which was seen as a weak state at that point, and it really established many of the boundaries that we are currently dealing with and the relationships that Israel has with many of its Arab neighbors. So we know that in 1978, Israel and Egypt made peace and in many ways the outcome of 1967, really laid the foundation for that eventual rapprochement and the diplomatic relationship, the uneasy diplomatic relationship that has existed since then. Likewise, the relationship with Jordan, even though the formal peace treaty between Jordan and Israel did not emerge until 1994, but it is well known that Israelis and Jordanians have had a very close security relationship, especially as it pertains to the Palestinians and those living in the West Bank. The Israeli-Syrian relationship was also established. The hostilities that exist till this day, the state of war as many would refer to it, was established in 1967 when Israel conquered the Golan Heights and was able to seize that territory from the Syrians and the Syrians have not been able to take that back. So the entire geopolitical landscape that we now know as sort of the defining borders and the boundaries that established the Arab-Israeli dynamic were set in the aftermath of the 1967 war with a little bit of modification within the case of the Sinai, which Egypt was able to take back in the form of the peace treaty. JS: Well you are right to an extent, I will say that you are overlooking a little bit just how important 1973 was. So Israel and Egypt again fight another war in '73, and as much as 1967 was a success for the Israeli Defense Forces and for the strategy of preemptive attack, I mean Israel was in a weak position in some sense and it was forced to attack Egypt preemptively if it was going to be able to achieve its objectives. This led to a certain amount of arrogance on the part of the Israelis and in '73, there was a massive intelligence failure where they dismissed Egyptian mobilization in the Sinai. Israel ended up winning that war with U.S. support and then that sort of is what led to the peace treaty in the end. But I think you are right in the sense that a lot of the geopolitical realities that have defined this part of the world, which is the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, the sort of frozen state of conflict between Syria and Israel as I would call it, Israel obviously went into Lebanon a couple more times after that. But another thing that I think we need to point out here is that before '67, there really wasn't a very strong relationship between the United States and Israel, at least not the way that people think about that relationship now. Israel's success in the '67 war was really the moment the United States realized two things, first of all that most of the Arab states were in the Soviet Union's camp and that there was no getting them back, and second of all, that Israel could be a meaningful partner in balancing power against the Soviet Union in the Middle East. And I bring this up because I think it raises an interesting point, because you're right that a lot of the seeds of how things developed after '67 were laid in the results of that war. But at the same time, if we look 50 years later, a lot of those things are beginning to fall apart, right? The Soviet Union has collapsed, people are making a lot of Russia's involvement in the Middle East, but it's very miniscule compared to the chest pumping that everybody talks about. You know the Russians are not funding or massively arming states that are thinking about attacking Israel or other U.S. allies in the region. Egypt is an economic basket case, it just went through a pretty massive political transition, which began you know with the Arab Spring around 2010-2011, and they have issues of their own. Jordan is sort of the miracle of the region, how Jordan hasn't been affected by the stuff that's going on in the region is pretty incredible. Syria, I mean Syria is basically half a state right now. The Assad regime has been able to consolidate itself, but Syria, which really was one of the biggest vulnerabilities Israel faced from a military point of view, Syria is completely involved with its own fight against its own anti-regime rebels, and the Islamic State is there and they are having to rely on Hezbollah and all this other stuff. So when Israel looks out at its current strategic landscape, it doesn't see Egypt and Syria and Jordan as these major problems anymore. In '67 the major concern was, well what if Israel gets attacked by three entities at the same time. Those three entities aren't there. When you think about Israel's strategic position right now, the sort of first, most immediate thing that comes to mind is Hezbollah. We had those reports recently of Israel just a couple days ago striking a weapons convoy, an alleged weapons convoy of Hezbollah in Palmyra, which is pretty far in for the Israelis to go into Syria. So that's sort of the first thing. But Hezbollah is also completely distracted by the Syrian civil war. But then you take a step back and the challenges for Israel really aren't set by 1967, they are set by different things. So the first thing I would say is that, you know, what is going to happen with the Islamic State? Maybe the Islamic State is going to get defeated and maybe it's going to collapse but the real concern for Israel is the state of disrepair that is in the Arab world won't reign forever. Is there any potential for some kind of radical Sunni entity to rise in the Arab world and unite the factions and once again treat Israel as a common enemy? Taking a further step back, you look at Iran which was dealt a setback with the Syrian civil war and with the degradation of the Assad regime, but still maintains a lot of influence in Iraq and is still aggressively trying to push its influence in the region. And then farther back is Turkey. Turkey is rising, one of George Friedman's most identifiable forecasts and one of the things we write about a lot and that we get a lot of attention for, is our position that Turkey is going to rise and it's going to be the major power in the Middle East. Right now, there are decent relations between Israel and Turkey, but I think Israel's long-term thinking is about what a strategic landscape looks like, it has to think about Turkey as this major power reasserting itself in the region. So I agree with you in the sense that it's important, and '67 really did set the chain for a lot of different events, but in some ways, it's become obsolete. Would you agree with that characterization or do you want to argue with any of that? KB: No, I think you are right. I think we are still dealing with the post-1967 architecture but with the caveat that that architecture is in a meltdown mode. Defeating three of its neighbors at the same time established Israel's superiority in a military sense and really consolidated the state of Israel, and since that time, what's become clear, even though we had the 1973 war, it became clear to Egypt that there was no military solution. This almost romantic view of being able to establish Arab hegemony over all of historic Palestine through military means was shattered. That perception was completely shattered. And even though 1973 happened and was a surprise and intelligence failure for Israel, nonetheless the Egyptians I would argue did not think when they launched that war that they would be able to militarily defeat Israel. There's always the possibility you could do that, but deep down you know and if you have been dealt a blow like 1967, that really weighs heavily on your national psyche and your military strategy moving forward. And if you look at the way the negotiations panned out after that, with the moderation or the intercession of the United States, it becomes clear that really 1973 from the Egyptian point of view was enhancing your bargaining power. Improving your position to achieve some sort of, if you will, win-win scenario in which the Egyptians can come back and say yes, we were able to retake the Sinai from Israel and we restored national dignity. But 1967 really showed that the military option was no longer there for the Arabs. And moving forward from the Israeli point of view, those very states that were threatening them in 1967, Israel really relied on their behavior to not wage war against Israel as part of its natural security doctrine. Keep in mind that these are autocratic regimes that may view Israel in a certain way because they believe in it or maybe because it's pragmatic and because they are in power and have to balance pressures from all sides. But the sentiment in many of these countries until this day is one of hostility towards Israel. Israel relied on these capitols: Damascus, Cairo and Amman, to make sure that that national sentiment did not alter the national behavior of those countries, and Israel would not be threatened again. Now if you fast forward to the Arab Spring, that whole strategy seems to be falling apart, because if these countries, if these regimes cannot maintain order within their own country, then that is a problem. And if you have a power vacuum, we just recently published a couple of articles on how Jordan is weakening, and the implications particularly for Israel are massive, if the regime were to weaken much and God forbid fall, that could create a vacuum in which Israel faces a new kind of threat, an uncertainty. Clearly this is not a threat from a state, but non-state actors create a new dynamic. If we look at what is happening in Syria and how the Israelis have been trying to balance between the hostile forces on the Sunni side of the conflict, which includes ISIS, which includes al-Qaida and all those whom we call the moderate Sunni Arab rebel forces. They're not friends of Israel. Given a chance, they would wage war against Israel. On the other side is Syria, Iran and Hezbollah – again enemies of Israel. And Israel has to do this careful balancing act. At the moment, the Sunni side is not in a position to threaten Israel and therefore Israel is trying to make sure that Hezbollah does not gain more power than it already has and pose a bigger threat than it already does to Israel. Should those circumstances be replicated in Jordan and Egypt, then that's a tough balancing act for Israel to maintain. Because we're talking three different countries on the entire periphery of the Jewish state. JS: Well let's dig into that a little bit then. We know that Syria is in a state of civil war, the Assad regime seems to have been able to consolidate control there. For the most part that situation is actually ok with Israel because it's weakened an enemy, but not so much that there is just chaos reigning everywhere. But you've brought up Jordan and you've brought up Egypt. You said that Jordan is weakening. How about we dig a little more into that? What do you mean when you said Jordan is weakening? KB: Well if you look at Jordan geographically, it is sitting at the crossroads of major areas of conflict. It borders both the countries in which ISIS is operating i.e. Syria and Iraq. It has the second largest refugee population coming from Syria after Turkey. We're talking somewhere around 680,000 people. That's a huge strain on an already poor country. The economy really historically hasn't done well, it's gotten by with assistance from both the West, the United States and the U.K., and of course assistance from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. But with the price of oil declining, and we know that Saudi Arabia is in trouble on the home front, it has less and less financial bandwidth to come to the aid of Jordan. We also see the situation in the West Bank evolving towards a crisis where President Mahmoud Abbas is at an advanced age. He's not ill or anything, at least apparently. But when you reach, go beyond 80, you are operating on borrowed time. So what will happen to the Palestinians, the Palestinian Authority, especially in the wake of Israeli policies that are now aggressively pushing more settlements? That creates a large pressure on the Jordanians whose population is somewhere a little above 50 percent of Palestinian origin. Many of those people came in the aftermath of the 1948 war, a lot of them came after the 1967 one. But there's already an existing Palestinian population, which has been to one degree or another, if you will, assimilated into Jordanian mainstream political life. We recently had protests because of the cutting of subsidies by the government. There are no shortage of Islamist forces, from the Muslim Brotherhood, it has at least two major factions. You have a large Salafi population. You have al-Qaida there. The founder of ISIS, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, is from Jordan and the town of Zarqa. And you have Hizb ut-Tahrir. And then you have the spillover effect from Syria. So these are circumstances, to expect Jordan that it will continue to behave the way it has since the '67 war or over the decades, I think that would be a mistake. I don't think that the Israelis are looking at it that way. Recall the recent report in which the Jordanian ambassador to Amman told the IDF chief that he is worried about stability and security in the Jordanian kingdom. We've not had these kind of statements coming from Israel. So if the Israelis are worried, I would say that is a good barometer of how the situation is deteriorating in Jordan. JS: Yeah although, I would challenge you to go a little bit deeper, which is to say that you've just laid out a pretty scary laundry list of challenges for any country let alone one like Jordan that really doesn't have a lot of natural resources of its own, which like you say, has an incredibly diverse population. There's a lot of Palestinians in Jordan. Really Jordanians are Hashemites right, there are actually very small numbers of people who can actually claim to be Jordanian, so many of them are Bedouins and Circassians and this, that and the other thing. How do you explain the fact that Jordan hasn't succumbed to all this stuff? Because unlike Syria or unlike Egypt or unlike even Lebanon it has for the most part avoided a lot of the domestic political instability and a lot of the violence that a lot of the Arab states around it haven't avoided and with much fewer resources. KB: So I would say that there are three aspects to that in terms of how the Jordanian regime has maintained stability and security. So the first and foremost is that the Jordanian security establishment has been very competent. Particularly the General Intelligence Department, its main intelligence agency, it has a very good handle in pre-empting and not being on the reactive side that things happen and then the Jordanians act. They've been ahead of the curve in terms of making sure that any radical elements, be they ISIS or others, that they are kept under lock and key and so that's one aspect. The other aspect I mentioned earlier is that there has been this historic relationship between Israel and Jordan, a quiet one that is not really talked about much and understandably so from the Jordanian point of view, and that has helped quite a bit. Then it is a very close ally of the West, the United States and prior to that, the U.K., and the U.K. continues to be an ally of the Hashemite monarchy. They also have had assistance from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to the extent that they have been able to do that. So I think a mix of forces has allowed Jordan to continue to maintain stability even though we're six years out from the Arab Spring. But I think that the pressures are building and this is not a sustainable situation. Should there be a, we talk about the southern provinces of Syria where the government and different rebel factions and ISIS is in the mix as well. There's sort of this lack of clarity over who has the upper hand, its sort of a balance of weakness in southern Syria when it comes to the civil war, it has not been a major theater compared to Aleppo or Palmyra or ISIS-land up near Raqqa or Damascus. These are the things that have maintained order and these are the factors that enabled the regime. But to assume that this will continue, especially at a time when the established states, I mean Saudi Arabia is the largest state in that region and it also shares a large border with Jordan, although historically a quiet one. But nonetheless, if Saudi Arabia is having less and less financial bandwidth to assist countries around its periphery, then we are looking at a situation that is not something that the Jordanians will be able to handle on their own. There's a lot of hope that goes into this idea that Jordan will continue to manage its domestic politics and of course the wider geopolitics, it's a balancing act. But I think we need to get out of this assumption that things will continue and nothing will go wrong and there's a need for out-of-the-box thinking. JS: Although I just want to drive home for our listeners that a lot of people when they think about geopolitics, they think about geographical determinism, and what I mean by that is they think that it's as easy as looking at a map. And a map is going to be able to tell you exactly what's wrong with a country and what is going to happen to a particular country. Jordan is a really good example of where just the basics of a map or just the basics of geography or a layout of resources isn't enough to tell you everything. I think there is a conservative element in Jordanian society and an element that has always had to fight an uphill battle against a real lack of resources. I mean Jordan, its borders were not drawn in any logical way when you are thinking in terms of nationality or economic production or just about anything. So I agree with you that Jordan faces many challenges, but one of the things about Jordan is this intangible thing that has kept the kingdom together so far, and I think will serve it in good stead. But leaving Jordan aside for now, it's a relatively small country. One of the things that people brought up from the last podcast and I think it fits in exactly with this conversation, because we started by talking about 1967 and as you mentioned, in a lot of ways 1967 was one of the moments where Israel and the United States realized that they had interests in common. Those interests really were about blocking the Soviet Union and about Israel becoming a U.S. ally in a region that was becoming dominated by Arab states that were allied with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union obviously is no longer there, and the strategic basis of the relationship between Israel and the United States is not as strong as it once was. I know that there was a lot of talk about how special the relationship is and how close it is. But that strategic reason for the relationship has gone away and I think you've seen the United States and Israel pull away from each other a little bit. That's both because Israel has a lot more freedom of action than it did before and also because from a U.S. perspective the interests don't line up quite as well as they used to. But the question that I am circling around here is, so we've talked about how we're in this 50 years since 1967, but we're also in a Middle East that is changing rapidly, how does the U.S. respond to the things were talking about here, how does the U.S. respond to the hollowing out of the Arab world, how does the U.S. respond to Jordan and the serious challenges that Jordan is facing and what is the U.S.-Israel relationship going to look like going forward? I know that a lot of people were thinking that Donald Trump was going to make that relationship much different than the relationship with Obama, but as with so many things with President Trump, he said one thing before getting into office and continues to say things all the time, but the things that he's actually doing don't always line up with what he says. He has not moved the embassy to Jerusalem, he has criticized the Netanyahu administration for settlements at some level, all things that Trump said he was going to do, but when we look in practice, it looks remarkably similar to before and it also seems like Trump is willing to throw his hat in the ring and to be yet another U.S. president who wants to try and solve the eternal conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, so I just threw some things at you but I think the main thing is so what does the U.S. do, how does the U.S. deal with all these dynamics we've brought up? KB: We've written about how the United States is pursuing a balance of power strategy. A balance of power strategy doesn't mean that there is a nice balance, that you can essentially create this system that's going to work for a while. It's a constant act of balancing, it doesn't end at one point, it doesn't begin at one point. You just have to continue to play with it, tweak it, to make sure that it is working and the U.S. balance of power strategy relies on working with the major powers of the region, we've identified them as Turkey, Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Now if you go into each one of them, we've talked about the historic relationship with Israel, and there is this disconnect between Israeli and American interests, but I still think that despite that divergence in interests, the United States and Israel aren't really that far apart if you look at it from a strategic point of view. Yes, tactically there can be many differences, you know, we can say that the United States does not want Israel to build new settlements but I think that that's sort of a minor issue in the larger regional geopolitical scheme of things. I don't think that the United States does not want Israel to assume a posture or an aggressive interventionist posture in its neighborhood and I don't think that the Israelis want to do that either. So if you look at the airstrikes in Syria, they do not demonstrate any desire on the part of the Israelis to intervene in the way they did in Lebanon, and that's great from an American perspective, because the United States is already dealing with a whole lot. The United States under the Obama administration was able to end that hostility that erupted between Turkey and Israel over the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010, and there was the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations and a sort of normalization. So I think that there again is another example of the United States trying to balance. The United States needs Turkey to manage Syria, and it has made it very clear to the Israelis that we need your cooperation. If the Israelis and the Turks are going after each other, then that undermines the United States' interests. You flip over to Iran's nuclear program and the way the nuclear agreement was forged, yes there was a lot of huffing and puffing on the part of the Israelis, there was a lot of bellicose rhetoric and unhappiness, and the media was all about how Netanyahu's personality clashes with that of Obama, but at the end of the day, Israel didn't do anything substantive to block that agreement from taking place. Israel maintains that it has very little faith in that agreement to produce the desired outcome, but that's a different story than saying we will go and actively work against American interests. JS: I am going to jump in and disagree with you a little bit in the sense that I think you are understating just how much the Netanyahu administration opposed the Iran deal. Israel didn't do anything in terms of Iran's nuclear program and won't do anything in terms of Iran's nuclear program, at least anything overt, because it doesn't have the capability. It simply does not have the military capability to go in and knock out the Iranian nuclear program. If it did, I would submit that it probably already would have done it. It did that with Iraq, it did that with Syria. If it felt like it had the capability, I think it would have gone and done it already. And I don't think it was a small thing what Netanyahu did when he came and addressed the U.S. Senate and gave that very flowery speech about how it was a bad deal and how the Obama administration had committed a catastrophic mistake. I don't think that Israel had much of a choice in the end though. At the end of the day, Israel knows where its bread is buttered and knows that it needs the United States as a key strategic ally. If this was the path that the United States would go down and this was the path that the United States thought was most in U.S. interests, Israel wasn't going to be able to thwart that. But I think that Israel in general is very intimidated by Iran, especially by Iran's rhetoric, and they would've preferred a much stronger U.S. reaction to Iran. I think that's one of the areas where you see that there's not going to be a break in relations between the United States and Israel but I think there you see a very, very different set of priorities. Israel is still a small country in a very hostile neighborhood that looks at things one way and the United States is the most powerful country in the world with a lot of different challenges in a lot of different regions. You've got everything going on with Russia, you've got everything going on with China, you've got allies all over the place, you've got a NATO alliance that isn't working the way the United States wants it to, the United States does not have time to get involved in every little thing inside the Middle East. The United States really can use Iran, not necessarily as an ally, I am not saying the United States and Iran are going to become best friends or anything, but the United States needs an Iran it can work with on a pragmatic basis, because there are bigger fish to fry. You've got ISIS sitting there right smack dab in the Middle East, you've got whatever is going to come after ISIS, you've got this huge jostling and competition for what's going to come after the hulking carcasses of Syria and Iraq going on there, so I think that's actually one of the areas where you see a little bit of the divergence and where you see that the challenges of '67 and the challenges that have really defined relations in the region since '67 are beginning to change. KB: Yes they are changing, but what I was pointing towards or trying to make the case for is that there is the divergence, and yes it is a function of capability that Israel did not opt for a military solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and went along with the U.S. diplomatic option, but at the end of the day, this is that difficult balancing act we've been talking about. The difficulty in maintaining a balance of power strategy whether it's between Turkey and Israel or Israel and Iran, I mean even between Turkey and Iran, although this is one of those relations that has yet to really emerge in terms of where it's going at this point. Even though they are at odds with one another over the outcome of Syria, Tehran and Ankara are not going to be seeing eye-to-eye, but for now they have both decided that it's not in their interests to go head-to-head with one another. I mean similarly if you look at how the U.S. is sort of caught. On one hand, there is an Iran that can be useful in the fight against ISIS in making sure that Iraq functions in some kind of semi-coherent way. But at the same time, the more that the Americans appear to be working with the Iranians – that deeply upsets the Saudis and the other Arab states, and therefore yet again you have a balancing act. We saw a lot of this balancing, it's not as if the United States can just say okay, Saudi Arabia has very little to offer and Iran has a little more to offer, therefore we're going to sort of swing that pendulum in the direction of Tehran. I don't think that would sort of undermine the entire thesis of a balance of power strategy, but once you immerse yourself into that, you put yourself in the shoes of Washington, it's a difficult balancing act. How do you make sure that the enmity between the Iranians and the Saudis does not upset your interests in the region. On one hand, the United States does not like the Saudis sponsoring militias in Syria that are not very different honestly from al-Qaida and ISIS. But at the same time, the United States needs the Saudis to make sure that the Iranians don't jump out of their box and become disproportionately powerful. So I guess, I am talking about a very complex balance of power strategy that will continue to twist and turn whether it involves the U.S.-Israeli relationship, the U.S.-Iranian tensions, the tensions that currently exist between Turkey, which we have identified as being the key to the American strategy for the long haul in Syria and in the wider region. We see great tensions, at least in the short term, there's a divergence of interests especially over the Kurds and the extent to which Turkey wants to commit forces in the fight against ISIS. But nonetheless the two sides have to work with each other, so Washington has been caught in between these four powers. JS: It's funny as you were talking, it's really striking to me when you think in terms of, you know, if you think about the 1960s and '70s, it was punctuated by these very intense wars. We call them wars in the full sense of the term. But overall it was a much more stable situation in the Middle East. You know, there were the people that were in the U.S. camp, there were the states that were in the Soviet camp and the states themselves were fairly stable. Egypt was a fairly stable state, Syria you know, there was the coup d'etat in ‘61 that brought the Baath party to power, but once the Assads eventually came to power, Syria also was very stable, the Hashemite kingdom has also been there since the 1940s. Right now, it's not so simple. The Arab world, as you said, really has been hollowed out. And there's a great deal of instability and there's a great deal of uncertainty about what is going to emerge out of it. I would suggest that if we are looking forward another 50 years, if we are talking about 100 years from 1967, I think that what we might see is we might see the pendulum swing back to the stability that we saw in '67. I just think the actors are going to be very different. I don't think that Egypt and Syria and war between Arabs and the Israelis is going to be the thing animating the region. I think the thing to really focus on is the rise of Turkey, how Iran is going to respond to that, how the Arab world is going to deal both with its own problems with radical Islam and then how Israel is going to try to navigate through all this and who the U.S. is going to use and how. I want to close, I just want to hit one more topic while we're here Kamran. It's one we've sort of danced around and it's the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it feels like the eternal conflict. And in some ways, it's strange to go to this issue after talking about such large weighty things, because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in strategic terms really does not matter that much. And I wonder how you are going to answer this question, because it's something that I ask people all the time. Why do you think there is such a degree of fascination and attention with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle East? The attention that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that it gets, really I don't think lines up with the strategic importance that it has overall, and I think it's appropriate to talk about it in this conversation, because as you said 1967 is when Israel takes over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and it hasn't relinquished them since. And the Palestinians, which used to be – the West Bank was a Jordanian problem and the Gaza Strip was an Egyptian problem. Since '67 it became an Israeli problem. So why do you think that there is such a level of focus such that even the Trump administration is sending out envoys talking about solution to this conflict that has eluded every single president. KB: I think there are two reasons for that. I think the first reason has to do with the fact that the Palestinian issue remains unresolved. In many ways there is, as time has gone by and as we move forward, the situation becomes more and more complex and resolution appears more and more elusive. But the fact is that the question of Palestine, the Palestinian issue, has not been resolved in some shape or form to where we can move beyond this idea of an Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even though successive American administrations have failed to really tackle this issue. I think the closest that we ever came was in the Clinton administration when there were final status talks between Yasser Arafat and former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in the late '90s. But we've drifted far from that and we've come to a point where the entire Palestinian landscape has become so incoherent that even before we talk about an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, there has to be some form of intra-Palestinian settlement and nothing tells me when I look at the Gaza Strip, when I look at the West Bank, when I look at Hamas, and when I look at Fatah and I look at the other Palestinian factions and the disunity and the incoherence, I look at it and I say we are moving even further away from anything called a Palestinian national entity. And therefore it becomes even less and less possible for a serious Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. But I think that there is another assumption built into the way we in the West look at this problem. Which is that if we were to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict then somehow the Middle East becomes far more manageable. I don't believe that. But that is the way I think that many within the various governments in the West, whether it's the British government or the French or the German or the American. And in many ways, this narrative has been peddled by the Arab regimes and the wider Muslim world, you know Turkey has been pushing this as well on its end, that you need to solve this problem, if you solve this problem then we won't have radicalism. Radicalism and al-Qaida, ISIS exist largely because of what has happened to the Palestinians and the wider fallout of that. I think there's the failure to recognize that it's not the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Arab Muslim world faces a deep malaise. We talked about this in our first podcast a couple of weeks ago. And that is at the heart of this issue, but I think that there is this obsession with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as being central to the wider problems of the Middle East. I will argue that even assuming somehow we can miraculously solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and we have this quote-unquote two-state solution before us, the problems of Syria, Egypt and Iraq and the rest of that region are not going to go away. But nonetheless because it's a historic continuing unfinished business, there is this tendency to sort of organically link it to the other problems, and if you look at every administration, the Bush administration, the Obama administration and even now the Trump administration, there's always this effort, this new effort to say let's get the Israelis and the Palestinians to start talking in a serious way. But at the end, we haven't seen any breakthrough, because the fundamentals have not changed, they've actually become worse. You have two Palestines, effectively there are two Palestinian Territories, not just geographically separated, they are ideologically separated, they are politically separated. Right now, the Israelis don't occupy Gaza, that is a Palestinian sort of self-ruled territory spinning on its own axis controlled by Hamas. That will continue, I don't think the Israelis are going to go in anytime soon or in the foreseeable future and reoccupy Gaza. So what can happen in the form of some negotiation is that there may be another Palestinian territory that emerges as a semi-quasi-sovereign in the West Bank. You will effectively have two Palestines. Does that solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? I would argue no, it just makes it much, much more complex. JS: And I think just the way I always talk about the Middle East when people ask me about it is my favorite metaphor to describe it basically as a chess board, that really for over a century now the Middle East has been a chess board for major powers outside the region to try and make moves against each other. And for the most part since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, it's been mostly pawns on the chess board with mostly people moving back less valuable pieces as they challenge each other. And I think the most important thing to think about going forward when we think about the next 50 years and where we are going to be 50 years from now is to watch the powers in the Middle East itself that are beginning to come up. I think really that means keeping a very close eye on Turkey, keeping a very close eye on Iran, keeping a very close eye on Saudi Arabia and whether and how it's able to tackle many of the issues facing it. I know that here at GPF, we're fairly bearish on Saudi Arabia's ability to do that, they are just facing too much. And then Israel, as it always has been, you know smaller country in a very messy neighborhood trying to figure out its right place in it all and trying to build the right level of strategic relationships that allow it to exist with a maximum amount of independence. All right, thanks Kamran. Thank you for joining me. Thank you everybody for listening. If you want to send us questions or comments, you can comment on our website or on SoundCloud. You can also send comments to comments@geopoliticalfutures.com. Again, I am Jacob Shapiro, I'm the Director of Analysis for GPF and this is Kamran Bokhari, and we will see you next time.

This week we follow the narrative of Iraq through the 1963 revolutions, the regime of Arif, and the Baathist Revolution of 1968. We then take a look at the rise of Saddam Hussein to become president of Iraq in 1979.

The podcast is back! This week we continue to tell the story of Iraq following the July Revolution of 1958. We look at the initial conflict, Qasim's Premiership, and the February 1963 Revolution.

This show is dedicated to: 18 US Service Men killed in the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia on October 3, 1993 Southern Sense is a bi-weekly show of conservative talk on news and events, with Annie "The Radio Chick" Ubelis as host and Dan Butcher, Pundit Press and Kel Fritzi, Red Fox Radio as co-hosts. Special Guests:  William V. Cowan, often nicknamed Bill Cowan, is a retired USMC Lieutenant Colonel, accomplished public speaker on matters of national security and terrorism, and a contributor for the Fox News Channel.  His latest best selling book is "Snatching Hillary". http://www.snatchinghillary.com/ Dr. Zuhdi Jasser is the Founder and President of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD).  A devout Muslim, Dr. Jasser founded AIFD in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States as an effort to provide an American Muslim voice advocating for the preservation of the founding principles of the United States Constitution, liberty and freedom, through the separation of mosque and state.  Dr. Jasser is a first generation American Muslim whose parents fled the oppressive Baath regime of Syria in the mid-1960's for American freedom.  He is leading the fight to shake the hold that the Muslim Brotherhood and their network of American Islamist organizations and mosques seek to exert on organized Islam in America. Informative, fun, irreverent and politically incorrect, you never know where we'll go, but you'll love the journey! Visit our website at http://www.Southern-Sense.com, become a member and follow us here and on Facebook.  

This show is dedicated to: 18 US Service Men killed in the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia on October 3, 1993Southern Sense is a bi-weekly show of conservative talk on news and events, with Annie "The Radio Chick" Ubelis as host and Dan Butcher, Pundit Press and Kel Fritzi, Red Fox Radio as co-hosts.Special Guests:  William V. Cowan, often nicknamed Bill Cowan, is a retired USMC Lieutenant Colonel, accomplished public speaker on matters of national security and terrorism, and a contributor for the Fox News Channel.  His latest best selling book is "Snatching Hillary".http://www.snatchinghillary.com/Dr. Zuhdi Jasser is the Founder and President of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD).  A devout Muslim, Dr. Jasser founded AIFD in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States as an effort to provide an American Muslim voice advocating for the preservation of the founding principles of the United States Constitution, liberty and freedom, through the separation of mosque and state.  Dr. Jasser is a first generation American Muslim whose parents fled the oppressive Baath regime of Syria in the mid-1960’s for American freedom.  He is leading the fight to shake the hold that the Muslim Brotherhood and their network of American Islamist organizations and mosques seek to exert on organized Islam in America.Informative, fun, irreverent and politically incorrect, you never know where we'll go, but you'll love the journey!Visit our website at http://www.Southern-Sense.com, become a member and follow us here and on Facebook. 

This show is dedicated to: 18 US Service Men killed in the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia on October 3, 1993Southern Sense is a bi-weekly show of conservative talk on news and events, with Annie "The Radio Chick" Ubelis as host and Dan Butcher, Pundit Press and Kel Fritzi, Red Fox Radio as co-hosts.Special Guests:  William V. Cowan, often nicknamed Bill Cowan, is a retired USMC Lieutenant Colonel, accomplished public speaker on matters of national security and terrorism, and a contributor for the Fox News Channel.  His latest best selling book is "Snatching Hillary".http://www.snatchinghillary.com/Dr. Zuhdi Jasser is the Founder and President of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD).  A devout Muslim, Dr. Jasser founded AIFD in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States as an effort to provide an American Muslim voice advocating for the preservation of the founding principles of the United States Constitution, liberty and freedom, through the separation of mosque and state.  Dr. Jasser is a first generation American Muslim whose parents fled the oppressive Baath regime of Syria in the mid-1960’s for American freedom.  He is leading the fight to shake the hold that the Muslim Brotherhood and their network of American Islamist organizations and mosques seek to exert on organized Islam in America.Informative, fun, irreverent and politically incorrect, you never know where we'll go, but you'll love the journey!Visit our website at http://www.Southern-Sense.com, become a member and follow us here and on Facebook. 

This show is dedicated to: 18 US Service Men killed in the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia on October 3, 1993Southern Sense is a bi-weekly show of conservative talk on news and events, with Annie "The Radio Chick" Ubelis as host and Dan Butcher, Pundit Press and Kel Fritzi, Red Fox Radio as co-hosts.Special Guests:  William V. Cowan, often nicknamed Bill Cowan, is a retired USMC Lieutenant Colonel, accomplished public speaker on matters of national security and terrorism, and a contributor for the Fox News Channel.  His latest best selling book is "Snatching Hillary".http://www.snatchinghillary.com/Dr. Zuhdi Jasser is the Founder and President of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD).  A devout Muslim, Dr. Jasser founded AIFD in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States as an effort to provide an American Muslim voice advocating for the preservation of the founding principles of the United States Constitution, liberty and freedom, through the separation of mosque and state.  Dr. Jasser is a first generation American Muslim whose parents fled the oppressive Baath regime of Syria in the mid-1960’s for American freedom.  He is leading the fight to shake the hold that the Muslim Brotherhood and their network of American Islamist organizations and mosques seek to exert on organized Islam in America.Informative, fun, irreverent and politically incorrect, you never know where we'll go, but you'll love the journey!Visit our website at http://www.Southern-Sense.com, become a member and follow us here and on Facebook. 

Veteran Radio Talk Show Host Chuck Morse analyses the issues. Chuck Morse Chuck Morse Speaks 258 Harvard St. #240 Brookline, MA 02446 Phone, 617-271-5044 Email: chuckmorse4@gmail.com Radio page: http://www.irnusaradio.com/index.php?id=194 Author page: http://t.co/oxZNlr94Fw Blog: http://awhigmanifesto.blogspot.com/ YouTube: www.youtube.com/watch?v=MetRuB_k2AQ Face Book: http://facebook.com/chuck.morse1 Twitter: https://twitter.com/chuckmorsespeak

45 minute interview with Dr. Zuhdi Jasser. We discussed Syria, Egypt, the Arab Awakening, Islamists, the Muslim Brotherhood and so much more.  Biography of Dr. Jasser: M. Zuhdi Jasser, M.D. is the Founder and President of theAmerican Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD).  A devout Muslim, Dr. Jasser founded AIFD in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States as an effort to provide an American Muslim voice advocating for the preservation of the founding principles of the United States Constitution, liberty and freedom, through the separation of mosque and state.  Dr. Jasser is a first generation American Muslim whose parents fled the oppressive Baath regime of Syria in the mid-1960’s for American freedom.  He is leading the fight to shake the hold that the Muslim Brotherhood and their network of American Islamist organizations and mosques seek to exert on organized Islam in America.

The government of President Assad of Syria is under threat. So too is the secretive Shia sect known as the Alawis - or Alawites - to which he and many of the governing party and security officials belong. Hostility towards the minority Alawi population is such that one leading commentator predicts they are likely to be the victims of the world's next genocide. Presenter Owen Bennett Jones investigates the Alawis' origins, history and culture and asks how these once marginalised people came to power in a Sunni majority state. He discovers that for many their fortunes changed fifty years ago when the Baath party seized power in a coup d'etat. Alawis were dominant among the army officers who took control. They set about modernising the country and rolling out a secular agenda. Now, as Syria's revolution has morphed into a civil war, many Alawis believe their only choice is to kill or be killed. Are the majority of Alawis right to be convinced that the Assad regime is all that stands between them and a return to second-class status, or worse? If the opposition wins in Syria, are warnings about pogroms against the Alawis alarmist, or inevitable? Presenter: Owen Bennett Jones Producer: Damian Quinn.