Podcasts about northern chinese

Last time we spoke about the Sino-Soviet Conflict of 1929. In 1919, Soviet Commissar Lev Karakhan promised China the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway at no cost, aiming to foster good relations amid the Russian Civil War. However, the Soviets retracted the offer, causing tensions. Over the next decade, control of the railway shifted between Chinese and Soviet hands, sparking conflicts. By 1929, Zhang Xueliang, a Chinese warlord, attempted to reclaim the railway, leading to military confrontations. Despite initial diplomatic efforts, the situation escalated into a full-scale war. The Soviets, under General Vasily Blyukher, launched a powerful offensive, using their superior military force to overpower the Chinese defenses. After intense battles, including naval engagements, the Soviets gained the upper hand, leading to heavy Chinese casualties and loss of territory. The conflict ended with the Soviets firmly in control, highlighting the fragile nature of Sino-Soviet relations during this tumultuous period.   #122 The Chiang-Gui War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. With the reunification of China, China's Warlord Era was over…but it really wasn't. Chiang Kai-Shek came to Beijing via a trail laid open by Yan Xishan. The Northern Expedition had been completed by August, just as the Generalissimo promised it would. According to previous agreements amongst the KMT, he tendered in his resignation upon completing the Northern Expedition. But the party refused to accept it, instead the Generalissimo was commanded to go visit the tomb of Dr Sun Yat-Sen over in the western Hills. He was accompanied by many of his generals who all oversaw a impressive ceremony, culminating with Chiang Kai-Shek weeping before Dr Sun Yat-Sen's shrine. Now Beijing was of course a symbol of China's Manchu past. The KMT and all revolutionaries within China for that matter hated it for that reason. It was seen as suitable enough for the government of North China, but not for the national capital, no this was moved to Nanking. Nanking of course had been seen as the secondary capital for centuries and held ancient history as being the first capital of China. Yet there was a lot of opposition to this. The Northern Chinese of course wanted to retain Beijing as the capital, many Chinese scholars had arguments against it, the foreign legations were annoyed at the idea of moving their residence and staff, so on and so forth. There was a great love for the northern capital, for its wonderful shops, restaurants rich history and such. Many did not believe Nanking could match Beijing's beauty. But the KMT assured all Nanking would become the gem of China. Beijing, which was actually called Peking at this time, again I just keep using modern terms to not confuse you guys, but Peking was then changed to Peiping translating to “northern peace”. As much as the capital was ruffling feathers, another more pressing issue was the enormous NRA army now that they had no Northern Expedition to run. Armies are not cheap, demobilization obviously needed to be done. However the KMT dragged their feet on the issue. Demobilization is something many governments face, but China's situation was rather unique. The NRA held many professional armies, made up of men who had never been anything but soldiers with no desire to become civilians. Many of the NRA generals also did not wish to carry on as civilians. Most of these men were doing a career and knew nothing else. In June of 1928, over 2 million men were on military pay roll. The minister of finance, T.V Soong, believed in keeping straight books and protested the enormous military expense. The KMT central committee passed resolutions and formed a plan; the standing army, needed to be cut down to at least 715,00 men. But when it came to deciding who gets disbanded, here lay the troubles.  There was another issue, the mechanics of the new government. In the first days of the peace, Chiang Kai-Shek had proven himself a pretty good manager. He had a lot of help from his political right hand man, Hu Hanmin, and they were on good terms. Chiang Kai-Shek was quite popular in the beginning, many looked up to him. However as the days went by, things started to crumble. The first major conflict occurred when Chiang Kai-Shek attempted to do away with the political subcouncils in Guangzhou and Wuhan. Chiang Kai-Shek argued this new united China did not need any more than a single central federal government office. The regimes in Guangzhou and Wuhan needed to disband and become integrated properly at Nanking. However Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren were the respective governors of the two provinces that held these regimes and they very much liked their current status. They obviously resented what they saw as a slight against them by Chiang Kai-Shek. Both men began using the term “dictator” to describe Chiang Kai-Shek, they said things like he was getting too big for his boots.  Now going back to the roots of the KMT, Dr Sun Yat-Sen had hoped to implement a national constitution. Yet simply flinging out what Sun Yat-Sen had once written down was out of the question, a new constitution needed to be drafted. Thus, basically for the next 5 years, China went through an awkward transformation process, trying to become a real voting republic. But in the meantime the country was controlled by a government of 5 “yuans” (committees). These were the executive, legislative, control, judicial and examination committees. The high officials of these committees were members of the State council, also seen as a cabinet, headed by the President. Chiang Kai-Shek became the first president and was very careful on who he included in his cabinet. Yan Xishan became the Minister of the Interior and Feng Yuxiang Minister of War. Both of these men were still bonafide warlords, but they were the two leaders who helped reunify China with him. He had to keep them happy, they controlled vast private armies, he also knew to keep them close.  Nanking was fraught with activity, but no demobilization. Months went by. Chiang Kai-Shek was happy, it was quite a creative time for him, but the reality was, the government was filled with potential traitors, great amounts of land were not really assimilated, nor were their populations. Nonetheless China had not seen such unity in centuries. Chiang Kai-Shek felt an immense sense of pride, he himself was full of energy and overworking. Chiang Kai-Shek began promising to rebuild Nanking in a fitting style. A magnificent tomb was planned for the slope of Purple Mountain, above the ruins of the old Ming temple, where Sun Yat-Sens remains would be moved. The city was remodeled, its old narrow and messy streets were cleared out. Nanking possessed a certain antiquity look, and many were fond of it and hated the construction efforts. Chiang Kai-Shek envisioned retaining the Chinese style of architecture, with sloping roofs, painted ceilings, tiles and courtyards, but also clean, cool interiors with electrical appliances. He basically wanted to blend the new with the old. Chiang Kai-Shek found an American architect to help rebuild Nanking. He also began hunting down advisors for just about every field. He looked up foreign farmer experts, German military advisors, American educational advisors, medical advisors, highway construction advisors and such. The climax to it all was recognition of the new Nanking government from the great powers. Chiang Kai-Shek found himself stuck in interviews with diplomats nearly every day. It is said the Generalissimo worked from dawn to night, with his wife Meiling as his secretary. Her primary role was translating important work into English, she was also his English interpreter. Meiling pushed Chiang Kai-Shek to try and learn English so he would be less dependent on her. She taught him as best as she could, and he was apparently making good headway until he had a incident. One day he was meeting with the British Minister and tried to practice his english by saying “good morning, Lampson” but instead he said “kiss me, Lampson”. Henceforth he never tried talking in English with foreigners. In May came some excitement with the Sino-Soviet conflict. Zhang Xueliang literally tossed the Soviet ultimatum to Nanking, an unwelcome gift to Chiang Kai-Shek. Ultimately Zhang Xueliang could do nothing against the Soviet power. It was certainly a blow to China, but perhaps in the grand scheme of things, Chiang Kai-Shek's mind worried more about the Japanese. The Soviets and Japanese were not all Chiang Kai-Shek should have been worried about, there were plenty of internal enemies. Back in July of 1928, it was estimated the NRA held over 2.2 million soldiers within 84 corps and 272 divisions. This accounted for an annual expenditure of over 800 million yuan, when the national fiscal revenue was something like 450 million yuan. Chiang Kai-Shek advocated for demobilization, hoping to bring it down to 1.2 million with 80 divisions, thus reducing expenditures to 60% of the national budget. By January of 1929 the issue came up again, now based on German military advisors advice, Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to reduce the NRA to 50 divisions at around 800,000 troops. His First Army belonging to the central system would be reorganized into 20 divisions, and the remaining army groups would be divided into 10 divisions. Uh huh you see where this is going. Chiang Kai-Shek also proposed establishing a 200,000 man strong military police force. So if you remember from the end of the Northern Expedition, there were 4 NRA collective armies. The 1st was led by Chiang Kai-Shek, the 2nd by Feng Yuxiang, the 3rd by Yan Xishan and the 4th by Li Zongren. Each of these men were warlords in the own right with cliques behind them. For example Li Zongren was the leader of the New Guangxi Clique who controlled Guangxi, Hunan, Hubei and parts of the Shanhai pass connecting Hubei to Tianjin. The NRA 4th army had 16 divisions and 6 independent units, some 200,000 troops. When Wang Jingwei went into exile, Li Zongren inherited his Wuhan regime government. Li Zongren also had the support of Li Jishen who controlled Guangdong. Now Chiang Kai-Shek certainly had the upper hand, his first NRA army was 500,000 strong and he was the President of the nation. Yan Xishan had over 200,000 troops in his 3rd NRA army and controlled the Shanxi clique, Shanxi province, northern Hubei, Beijing and Tianjin. Lastly Feng Yuxiang had 400,000 troops in his 2nd NRA army, was the leader of the Guominjun and controlled a large part of northwest China, alongside Henan. Alone none of the others could challenge Chiang Kai-Shek, but what if they united against him?  The Guangxi clique led by Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren had won a lot from the northern expedition. They controlled Wang Jingwei's old Wuhan Regime, Guangxi, Hubei, but did not control all of Hunan. They both felt they should control Hunan and its lucrative revenues of course. Yet the governor of Hunan insisted the taxes collected were property of Nanjing. So Bai Chongxi and Li Zongrenplaced him under house arrest. After this Lu Diping was appointed by Li Zongren to preside over Hunan's civilian government affairs. Lu Diping was forced to work with a bitter rival, He Jian. What the Guangxi Clique members did not know was that Lu Diping had been groomed by Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang Kai-Shek also began arming Lu Diping's private army in February of 1928. He Jian found out about this and reported it to the rest of the Guangxi clique. Li Zongren took notice of the situation and immediately had Lu Diping removed from office and deported. He was replaced by He Jian, go figure. Lu Diping then fled to cry to Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang Kai-Shek was furious his man had been taken out of office and began threatening the Guangxi clique. Li Zongren's family were living in Nanking at the time and he took them quickly over to the Shanghai concession as he believed a storm was brewing. Li Zongren then met with Chiang Kai-Shek striking a peaceful deal by march 2nd, both agreeing He Jian would temporarily serve as the chairman over Hunan. However back over in Hunan, the situation was quickly deteriorating. Guangxi troops were taking out political opponents in the province and looked to be fomenting a rebellion. Chiang Kai-Shek took decisive action and mobilized his forces to pacify the Guangxi clique. Li Jishen, fearing a war would break out at any moment, sped north to Nanking to mediate, only to be arrested upon arriving by Chiang Kai-Shek. He was charged with treason. With Li Jishen out of Guangdong, the Cantones Generals Chen Jizhen and Chen Mingshu tossed their lot in with Chiang Kai-Shek, thus severing the Guangdong-Guangxi alliance. On March 21st Nanking issued a statement expelling Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi and Li Jishen from the KMT, accusing the 3 men of treason.  Now Chiang Kai-Shek actually was dealing with a lot more than insubordination from the Guangxi clique, in fact there was a growing anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition forming. I wont get into it here, but Feng Yuxiang was raising hell in the northwest, Yan Xishan was not at all happy with the new Nanking government and even Wang Jingwei over in Europe was tossing public accusations against Chiang Kai-Shek. This led a lot of KMT officials to resign in protest. Chiang Kai-Shek had a serious rebellion, perhaps a civil war on the horizon. He reacted first by bribing key Northern Chinese leaders to be neutral for the time being so he could focus all of his attention on the Guangxi clique menace. Chiang Kai-Shek did another clever thing, he reconciled with the exiled Tang Shengzhi. Many forces under Bai Chongxi were former soldiers under Tang Shengzhi, many of whom were still loyal to him. Chiang Kai-Shek brought Tang Shenzhi back over to China from Japan and dispatched him to Tangshan in Hubei, where he was ordered to steal back two of his old divisions from Bai Chongxi.  Yes Chiang Kai-Shek was playing the divide and conquer strategy. First he bribed as many as he could, so he could focus on the Guangxi clique. Then amongst the Guangxi he tried to bribe some and arrest others, isolating Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren. In the face of the situation, Zhang Xueliang was the first to publicly express his support for Chiang Kai-Shek, he was followed by Liu Wenhui, the warlord over Sichuan, then Yan Xishan and finally a reluctant Feng Yuxiang.  Initially Bai Chongxi was going to lead his troops station in Hubei to march south to Xuzhou to try and link up with other Guangxi clique forces to advance east and attack Nanking. However as he quickly found out, most of his troops were loyal to Tang Shengzhi who purchased their service and stole them from him. Bai Chongxi lost control over a significant part of his army, panicked and fled Hubei by boat. He intended to flee for Hong Kong, but Chiang Kai-Shek ordered the Navy to halt the ship, and if it did not stop to sink it. Li Zongren quickly asked support from Japanese allies to get Bai Chongxi safely to Hong Kong. Meanwhile Li Zongren began mobilizing 3 armies under Guangxi Generals Xia Wei, Tao Wei and Hu Zongqi. These armies were intended to be deployed in Huangpu and Wuxue, however Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi could not physically get over to them to command them. Meanwhile Chiang Kai-Shek appointed General Zhu Peide in command of 5 divisions in Jiujiang and Nanchang. Their job was to occupy the Wuchang-Changsha railway, thus cutting off the withdrawal of any troops from Guangxi. Chiang Kai-Shek also placed General Liu Zhi  in command of 5 divisions over in Anhui and Hubei's border area with orders to attack Wuhan and General Han Fuju would take 5 divisions from southern Henan to attack Wuhan. On March 31st, Chiang Kai-Shek dispatched his general attack orders. Subsequently He Jian betrayed the Guangxi clique and joined Chiang Kai-Shek. Within the Guangxi clique, the Generals Hu Zongtang, Tao Shu, Li Mingrui and Yu Zuobai all began inhouse fighting over old petty grudges. Chiang Kai-Shek learnt of the situation and bribed Yu Zuobai and Li Mingrui to join his side for 400,000 silver dollars. On April 3rd, Li Mingrui's troops began to defect over in Huayuan and Xiaogan. A bunch of other Guangxi Generals began contacting Chiang Kai-Shek privately, tell him they would not participate in the civil war and asked if they could take their men safely out of the region. So many gaps in the Guangxi cliques defensive lines around Wuhan were exploited by Nankings forces coming from Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan and Yichang. Nearly surrounded at Wuhan, the Guangxi forces fled into western Hubei. At the same time, Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi both arrived in Hong Kong and made their way to Guangxi only to find the situation an utter mess.  On April 11th, Nanking issued a message calling upon the Guangxi clique's soldiers to give up resistance. The demoralized Guangxi troops of Xia Wei, Tao Jun, Hu Zongtang all began surrendering themselves at Shashi, Yichang and other places. On April 25th, Chiang Kai-Shek unleashed an offensive into Guangxi. The response by the surviving Guangxi Clique was to establish an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition on May 5th. They dispatched a telegram calling upon everyone to join them and initiated an offensive first aimed at Guangdong. By the 15th, Feng Yuxiang heeded the call, and began discussing how the Guominjun might send troops to attack Chiang Kai-Shek. However Feng Yuxiangs colleagues, Han Fuyu and Shi Yousan urged Feng Yuxiang not to do so. Then Chiang Kai-Shek offered Feng Yuxiang the position as president of the Executive committee, control over Hubei and Hunan if he continued to support him and send forces against the Guangxi rebels. Feng Yuxiang superficially agreed to Chiang Kai-Sheks request, mobilizing his forces between Henan and Hubei. While this looked like he was helping Chiang Kai-Shek, in reality he was eagerly waiting in the shadows for Chiang Kai-Shek and the Guangxi clique forces to weaken so he might pounce upon Wuhan. By mid May Guangxi's troops began entering Guangdong from two directions, easily overwhelming he Guangdong Provincial army, and marched into Guangzhou. Chiang Kai-SHek mobilized further armies in Hunan, Yunnan and Guizhou to invade Guangxi. This soon saw major battle break out in the Baimu region, ultimately dislodging the Guangxi troops from Guangdong and back into Guangxi. However, simultaneously, the Guangxi forces advanced on the front lines in Guilin and Liuzhou, defeating the Xiangjun, Qijun, and Qijun troops. In the same month, in Hunan, a significant push was made from Shonan to Guilin; meanwhile, Chen Guangdong's forces attacked Zhaoqing from Wuzhou, He County, and Guizhou's Dushan County, ultimately seizing Liuzhou. Chiang Kai-shek quickly mobilized forces led by Li Mingrui, Yu Zuobai, and the old Guangxi clique army under Yang Tenghui to move south towards Guangdong and west to attack Guangxi. Thanks to the strong efforts of these forces, they swiftly captured Wuzhou and Guiping. Wei Yunwei abandoned the city, and the Guangxi forces were unable to sustain the fight. Guangxi Province was attacked from three fronts, with enemy forces advancing from Longzhou. By June, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, and Huang Shaoxiong had fallen. Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, and others fled to Hong Kong, Sai Kung, Haiphong, and other locations. On June 27, Li Mingrui and his troops entered Nanning. The new Guangxi clique was defeated, and Chiang appointed Li Mingrui, Yu Zuopeng, and Yang Tenghui to govern Guangxi Province. The war concluded with Chiang's victory. What became known as the Chiang-Gui War had lasted for 3 months and ended in victory for Chiang Kai-Shek. It was a severe blow to the Guangxi Clique, though not a fatal one. The Guangxi clique leaders had lost considerable power, but those like Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi would return to cause further trouble.  Victory would be short lived however. As Feng Yuxiang arrayed his forces between Henan and Hubei hoping to pounce on Wuhan at the right moment, Chiang Kai-Shek defeated the Guangxi clique far too quickly. Feng Yuxiang's opportunity was lost and he became extremely bitter over this. Knowing full well what Feng Yuxiang had been planning to do, Chiang Kai-Shek mobilized forces in Shandong and Henan to suppress the Guominjun.  Feng Yuxiang then declared himself commander in chief of the Northwest National salvation army, officially joining the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek cause. Chiang Kai-Shek then bribed Generals Han Fuju and Shi Yousan to defect over to his side greatly hurting Feng Yuxiang. Chiang Kai-Shek also unleashed propaganda warfare accusing Feng Yuxiang of sabotaging the revolution, being treasonous, trying to obstruct the unification of China and such. On May 23rd, the KMT central committee removed Feng Yuxiang from all of his posts and permanently expelled him from the party. Two days later Chiang Kai-Shek personally called Feng Yuxiang, asking him to go into exile abroad and hand over his remaining forces. Completely isolated politically and militarily, Feng Yuxiang sent a nationwide telegram on the 27th expressing his resignation. In order to mitigate Chiang Kai-Shek's advances, and in order to see if he could gain an alliance, Feng Yuxiang took his family to Shanxi on June 21st, claiming to the nation he was about to go abroad. Instead he had Yan Xishan place him under house arrest within the Jinci Temple at Jian'an village.  Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan were not friends by any measure. But they were quick to reach an understanding. The two Warlords made a formidable combination and had similar attributes. Both were strongmen, with firmly loyal and affection forces. Feng Yuxiang had his theatrical Christian values and rustic simplicity. Yan Xishan had this record of being a just man of the people. Both understood their names combined would see many join their cause. They named their coalition the Peoples Army.Yan Xishan then joined Feng Yuxiang to publicly label Chiang Kai-Shek a dictator. Despite the energy and charisma, what the two men lacked as a brilliant political mind, and suddenly Wang Jingwei came out of the woodwork. Wang Jingwei joined their coalition, obviously hoping to get revenge and dethrone Chiang Kai-Shek. He supplied them with loftier motives and more stylish vocabulary. Together they publicly accused Chiang Kai-Shek of departing from the original spirit of the revolution; that he was the scourge of democracy; nothing more than a military man who sought to seize the power of government. Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren bandwagoned and it seemed a large part of China was becoming very anti-Chiang Kai-Shek. After this a “telegraph war: erupted for over a month. Yan Xishan demanded the currently KMT government step down so he and Wang Jingwei could lead a reorganization, implementing proper votes by all party members to determine the party's policies going forward in a more fair manner. Chiang Kai-Shek responded he was willing to step aside for Yan Xishan but not Wang Jingwei. Then Chiang Kai-Shek bribed Yan Xishan with 12.5 million dollars of foreign currency if he backed down. To make matters more complicated, during all of this, Feng Yuxiang sent a secret message with his subordinate Lu Zhonglin to forces in Shaanxi asking them to send people to contact Chiang Kai-Shek. He did this deliberately, making sure Yan Xishan found the note and of course suspected him of being in league with Chiang Kai-Shek. Some real game of thrones shit. It seems Feng Yuxiang pulled a big brain move, because Yan Xishan under the belief Feng Yuxiang was colluding with Chiang Kai-SHek, then publicly claimed he was the commander in chief of the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition and that his deputy commanders were Feng Yuxiang, Li Zongren and Zhang Xueliang. So, it seems Feng Yuxiang had dragged Yan Xishan to be binded to the cause because perhaps he knew Chiang Kai-Shek was trying to bribe and divide them?  On February 23, under the leadership of Yan Xishan, 45 generals including Feng Yuxiang , Li Zongren, Zhang Fakui, He Jian, Han Fuju, Shi Yousan, and Yang Hucheng jointly sent a telegram demanding a "general vote of all party members to establish a unified party." On February 27, 1930, Yan Xishan personally visited Feng Yuxiang in Jian'an Village, where they apparently hugged each other and cried, saying to each other: "We live and die together, share hardships, and fight against Chiang until the end" Then they  pledged their blood to form an alliance. Very theatrical. The next morning Yan Xishan hosted a banquet for Feng Yuxiangs family where 34 representatives joined the anti-chiang kai-shek coalition. This became known as the Taiyuan conference. On March 1st the coalition sent officials into 19 provinces and cities including Peiping, Nanking, Guangzhou and overseas to attack Chiang Kai-Shek. They stated "If Chiang refuses to give up, the revolutionary forces will be increasingly destroyed by him. I sincerely hope that our compatriots and comrades throughout the country will , rise up together and eliminate the thieves together.". That sam month the Nanking government held their third plenary session where they expelled Wang Jingwei officially from the party. Yan Xishan then called Chiang Kai-Shek asking him personally to step down. On March 15th, 57 generals from the former 2nd, 3rd and 4th NRA armies sent representatives to Taiyaun to discuss the anti-chiang movement. There they listed 6 crimes Chiang Kai-Shek had committed and promoted Yan Xishan to officially be the commander in chief of the army, navy and air forces of a new Republic of China. Li Zongren, Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Xueliang would be his deputy commanders. Yan Xishan's army moved into the government offices in Peiping where KMT forces were disarmed. In April 1st, Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang and Li Zongren announced the inauguration in Taiyuan, Tongguan and Guiping of their anti-chiang army, however one name was not present, that of Zhang Xueliang. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After performing the Northern expedition and finally reunifying China it took all but…what just over a year for it to collapse? It really seemed most of China hand banded together against the Generalissimo, but he was no fool and had planned accordingly. The anti-Chiang Kai-shek coalition would find themselves in a war they may very well lose. 

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Zhejiang. Chiang Kai-Shek kept the momentum going by invading Zhejiang after taking Jiangxi and Fujian. However Sun Chuanfang in desperation ran to an unlikely ally, Zhang Zuolin to form the National Pacification Army. Now the NPA would go to war with the NRA. The NRA also faced internal strife as strikes broke out in Guangzhou and Wuhan. After quelling the worker strikes, the NRA began to concentrate on the Zhejiang campaign performing strategic counter attacks against Sun Chuanfangs offensives. By early 1927 Sun Chuanfang's control over Zhejiang was being undermined by Zhejiang independence movement leaders who joined the KMT to overthrow him. Sun Chuanfang was served disastrous defeats, his armies began to rout with many plundering before they fled north. Those that still continued the fight fled for Shanghai, where Sun Chuanfang prepared to make a last stand to hold the NRA back before Zhejiang fell.   #113 The Northern Expedition Part 4: The taking of Shanghai & Nanking Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The NRA east route army had concentrated around Sungchiang just in front of Shanghai. They made it seem they were preparing for a major assault on the super city, yet up the Yangtze, half of the NRA were secretly preparing an offensive directed against Nanking. If the NRA captured Nanking and its strategic Tianjin-Pukou railway line, Sun Chuanfang's forces south of the Yangtze would be isolated and cut off from reinforcements and supplies. On February 19th of 1927, Sun Chuanfang pulled his battered armies out of Zhejiang as he awaited reinforcements from Zhang Zongchang's Shandong army. Meanwhile the KMT called upon their agents and allies within Shanghai to foment disorder. Going back to November of 1926, KMT and CCP members within Shanghai had been assembling recruits together to strengthen their first united front. Shanghai held a large part of China's modern factory workers, numbering in the several hundred of thousands. They represented a considerable percent of the Shanghai population. Following the formation of the NPA, Shanghai unions began attacking Sun Chuanfang for bringing Shandong mercenaries into Zhejiang and strongly disagreed with his alliance with the northerners. They had real grievances with the northerners, because they had ties to foreign powers like the Empire of Japan. Those in Shanghai sought to break the chains of foreign imperialism and wanted more autonomy. From 1926 onwards many unions, particularly those directed by the CCP organized demonstrations against Sun Chuanfang and the NPA. By February of 1927 the anti-Sun Chuanfang movement really heated up. The National General Labor Union of the CCP had ordered some assassinations to terrorize the Chinese and foreign industrialists. To bring even more Shanghai workers under their influence and hurt Sun Chuanfangs hold over the city the CCP organized a political strike, similar to what had occurred in Hong Kong the year prior. A general strike in Shanghai was planned for February 19th and it would include the foreign concession factories. The strikers had 5 political and 12 economic demands. A major aim of the strike was to seize power through the use of the masses, even against a well armed regime like Sun Chuanfangs. The CCP hoped to direct large crowds of workers against Sun Chuanfang's police stations and garrison posts where they could seize their weapons to arm some workers corps. They had acquired quite a bit of experience during the Hong Kong and Guangzhou strikers when it came to arming workers. However the response of Sun Chuanfangs regime would be vastly different than the KMT in Guangzhou.  Sun Chuanfangs garrison commander at Shanghai responded violently and quickly. He dispatched broadsword carrying executioners and soldiers through the city grabbing and beheading any strikers on sight. Heads were placed on lamp posts at street corners and on spikes all around. Its estimated out of perhaps 100,000 to 350,000 workers who striked, the headcount ranged between 100-500. The CCP continued its efforts to attack police stations, but the general strike died out on the third day. In a form of retaliation the Shanghai workers held a mass trial and execution of at least one police officer. A new garrison commander was sent to Sahnghai, Pi Shucheng in an effort to reinforce the city. By the point he showed up the CCP gave up and told the strikers to get back to work to end the bloodshed. What became known as the second shanghai uprising failed to achieve much.  Despite its failure, the second uprising in Shanghai displayed disunity under Sun Chuanfangs rule. By mid February Sun Chuanfangs Shanghai navy had begun to act suspiciously. On the 22nd as the CCP led sorties against the Shanghai Police, shells from the warships Chienkang and Chienwei fll over the Jiangnan arsenal. Thinking not much of it, Sun Chuanfang blamed a few young officers for the bombardment and gave his Admiral Yang Shuchuang a demerit. Sun Chuanfang was of course reluctant at this point to penalize his subordinates for fear they mutiny. The bombardment did not knock out the aresnal but a fire began mysteriously on the 28th blowing up 40 crates of artillery shells. The uprising did little to weaken Sun Chuanfangs hold over Shanghai, so the NRA shifted strategy. Over in Hangzhou, NRA units advance to the Sungchiang front while NRA units in Jiangxi advance downriver towards Nanking. The 6th and 7th NRA armies advance along the Jiangxi-Anhui border as the eastern route command dug in near Shanghai. Back in December, at the Nanchang conference Chiang Kai-Shek and Borodin had managed to smooth the tension between the CCP and KMT. Borodin agreed to curtain some union disorder that were interfering with the war effort so the First United Front would not collapse. However within the new conquered territories, many that contained enormous industrial potential, strikes and labor violence kept breaking out. This was quite dangerous for the stability of the NRA as they performed the northern expedition. But from the CCP point of view they were simply organizing the enormous untapped power of Chinese workers. The CCP began to really grow in power at Wuhan and were becoming less cooperative with Chiang Kai-Shek. They believed Chiang Kai-Shek was dependent and at the mercy of Soviet aid. They also believed, since he had left Guangdong, a more malleable KMT military figure would better suit their interests. Thus a concerted effort was made to replace Chiang Kai-Shek. You could call it a anti-Chiang movement sprang up and it was taking an effect on the Northern Expedition. Chiang Kai-Shek had just wired the Wuhan administration three times for funds to pay some disgruntled 7th army troops. The administration at Wuhan created by a joint council of the party and government, by insistence of Borodin, were generally compliant to Chiang Kai-Sheks demands. One of their leaders was Xu Chen, the current minister of justice. According to a group close to Wang Jingwei, it seemed the CCP, Chiang Kai-Sheks inner circle and the new Joint Council at Wuhan between January and February of 1927 were becoming quite dependent on Soviet advice. Early in January the CCP were attacking Chiang Kai-Shek with propaganda aimed to make it seem he was in bed with other warlords and the Japanese, thus a betrayer to Dr Sun Yat-Sens movement. Xu Chen the current commander of the 8th NRA army became a potential replacement for Chiang Kai-Shek, but the CCP were still afraid to risk open strife with the KMT. Borodin and CCP leaders like Mao Zedong were encouraged by the CCP membership growth in the countryside and within military units around Wuhan. As the NRA advance through Hunan, CCP membership increased as they spread through peasant associations. It was a similar case in Hubei. The Hunanese commander of the 2nd NRA army brought up the issue at a KMT meeting warning his colleagues “not to neglect the dangers of internal strife. Many of our members have become sidetracked by… ideas … not indicated in Sun Yat-sen's instructions,… not belittle the enemy. Our enemies are now uniting together and gathering to attack us. We should concentrate the power of the Party and obey its orders strictly regardless of our own opinions.” Chiang Kai-Shek of course was not oblivious to the danger all around him. He launched his own sort of counterattack. He began claiming the CCP strategy and those who were following them, threatened the all-class union of the KMT. On February 19th he urged a KMT audience during a speech to “look to … the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen and nothing else.” The anti Chiang Kai-Shek sentiment was felt in crowds at Wuhan. On February 24th, a crowd of 50,000 assembled at the party HQ parade ground where they made fiery speeches against Chiang Kai-Shek and against the Northern Expedition. “All we have seen is military power, but no Party power; individual will but not Party will…. Old degenerate counterrevolutionaries have caused these pathetic facts of the Party. That is why we must… knock down the feudal influences.” After this several people began chanting “Down with the Old and Degenerate!” Then another man made a speech stating “a few individuals could not do the work…. Now the old, rotten feudal thinking members manipulate the KMT, we must therefore knock them down.” Then the chant turned to “Down with Chang Ching-chiang,Oppose the Military Dictatorship.” Then the head of the NRA's Political Departments, Teng Yenta stated “democratic centralization was the way to achieve the ideals of the Three People's Principles, but now our leadership has been occupied by the old, ignorant, and the incompetent …, and we must overthrow personal dictatorship … and bring the military under control….” Chiang Kai-Shek was enraged by all of this of course and he refuted the charges made against him. He singled out Xu Chen who had just made himself chairman of the new Joint Council without KMT party authorization. Chiang Kai-Shek began a little investigation and concluded it was Borodin's doing so he telegrammed Moscow on February 26th requesting Borodin be sent back to the USSR. The next day at a KMT meeting, Chiang Kai-Shek told his colleagues he felt despite the fact the NRA advanced into new territories, while the people saw them as KMT members, they only heard propaganda from the CCP. By March the anti-Chiang cabal now sought to replace him with General Tang Shengchih, the Hunanese defector made commander of the 8th NRA army. According to one soviet report written on the 5th of March, Tang Shengchih was seen to be much more dependent on Soviet aid and a lot more cooperative in helping the anti-chiang effort amongst the other generals. A new anti-chiang alliance would require the support of other high ranking generals such as Chang Fakuai new corps, Chen Mingshu's 11th army, Chu Peitehs 3rd army and the 9th and 10th armies. According to the same Soviet report, Tang Shenchih managed to turn Li Tsungjen against Chiang Kai-Shek and this hampered Chiang Kai-Sheks ability to obtain funds from Wuhan to pay Li Tsunjens 7th army.  Spring of 1927 brought more disunity to the First United Front and thus hurt the Northern Expedition. Although the NRA were clearly on a roll in Zhejiang and Fujian, their progress north of Wuhan and downriver from Jiangxi lost steam. Chiang Kai-Shek still held confidence of the men in the eastern route army concentrating along the Jiangsu-Anhui border, but their offensive was also halted. In southern Honan where the NRA were facing the remnants of Wu Peifu's army, winter's chill was beginning to slow down the expedition.  The offensive kicked back up with a bunch of defections amongst Sun Chuanfang's forces in Anhui. Chen Tiaoyuan, Sun Chuanfangs commander in Chief for his Anhui forces, had became dissatisfied with him and how he was ruling the 5 province empire…which I guess is now more like 2. Chen Tiaoyuan was demoralized, who could blame him. Back on December 5th of 1926, Chen Tiaoyuan began secret negotiations by dispatching some of his subordinates such as Fan Shao-kai over to the KMT hoping to defect and gain a decent position. Simultaneously, Sun Chuanfang maintained hope of holding his frontline in Anhui by promoting subordinates. Sun Chuanfang appointed Chen Tiaoyuan to be the director of defenses over the province on December 21st. On February 20th of 1927, one of Chen Tiaoyuans divisions, led by Liu Paoti defected to the NRA when he was guarding a strategic pass known as the Chimen gateway. This was a 5000 foot high range leading into Anhui. Now the NRA held a mountain side door leading directly into Anhui. The mountain range in question also happened to be the last natural barrier that Sun Chuanfang's troops were utilizing to defend the lower Yangtze area, including of course Shanghai. After that Chen Tiaoyuang tossed the towel to the inevitable and defected to the NRA. Chen Tiaoyuan proved his defection by turning his defensive sector along the Yangtze over on March 2nd. He brought with him the mixed brigade of Wang Pu and elements of the Hunan Army led by Yue Kaixin. The NRA proceeded to advance over the Yellow Mountain and down it to seize Taiping in Anhui on march 3rd. Pretty much unopposed the NRA marched upon Nanking through Anhui taking several routes. By March 17th, the 17th Division of Cheng Chens 6th NRA Army had advanced 200 miles downstream using river steamboats and was only 70 miles away from Nanking. Over the north banks of the Yangtze the NRA formed a spearhead and thrusted it into the soft midsection of the north-south railway. By mid march the NRA captured Hofei in northern Anhui. At this point Sun Chuanfangs relationship with his navy was greatly waning and he was becoming more and more dependent on the Tsinpu railway as an escape option to head north rather than via the sea. Thus March of 1927 saw the NRA effectively begin trapping Sun Chuanfang into the Yangtze delta around Shanghai.  The NRA southern forces were now advancing out of Zhejiang into the delta region. One pincer was heading north along the shores of Lake Tai aiming for the Shanghai-Nanking railway at Changzhou. Meanwhile in Anhui the 6th army was attacking Wuhu on the 6th of March. Anti-foreign disorder broke out at Wuhu as NRA political agents raillied crowds of civilians and soldiers to mob the foreigners maritime customs office and clubhouse. This sent the foreigners to flee downriver to Shanghai by ship carrying more tales of anti-foreign abuse with them. The eastern route force facing Shanghai was met with heavy artillery bombardment as more and more NPA troops from Shandong arrived. Several NRA attacks north of Shanghai against railway links were made, threatening the city's defensive capabilities. By mid march many forces defending Shanghai began evacuating for Nanking. On March 15th the eastern route army had its first major breakthrough over the hills that overlooked Lake Tai. NRA forces managed to outflank the enemy artillery placements and erected a real blockade by march 16th. Now a new NRA pincer moved west against Lishui, 40 miles from Nanking. Along the east shore of said lake, the NRA was effectively blocked by Shandong troops who held an advantage in heavy artillery. By mid march many Shandong reinforcements arrived at Changzhou along the Nanking-Shanghai railway, but were simply turned back to Nanking. Not a good look.  From Wuhu the NRA kept the advance towards Tangtu which was outflanked and captured on the 17th, while the east route force took up a position 50 miles from Nanking on some ridges where Sun Chuanfang had once headquartered. On the 18th, north of the Yangtze the 7th NRA army just captured Hofei and its railway link. The delta area's defenses were falling apart everywhere one looked. The Dogmeat General took one look and ordered a general withdrawal of all the Shandong forces from the Shanghai area to some positions north of the Yangtze. With that Shanghai defenses fell apart. Over at the Sungchiang front the forces of Pi Shucheng retreated into the city towards the railway station, but did not high tail it to Nanking despite being ordered to do so. According to foreign and Chinese journalists, Pi Shucheng had been waiting for the opportune moment to defect to the NRA and had been secretly negotiating to turn Shanghai over. Thus it seemed the NRA had managed to capture the city without provoking the foreigners. On the 20th the NRA managed to flank the railroad artillery position still manned by some White Russian forces. They managed this through more defections, this time from Shanghai police. The Shanghai police controlled the waterways and aided the NRA in navigating them so they could advance more rapidly. Simultaneously Suzhou, Changzhou and Henglin were captured. Sun Chuanfang was receiving zero aid from the sea for over a week by this point as AdmiralYang Shuchuang had taken the fleet upriver to join the NRA's river fleet. Of course Admiral Yang Shuchuangs defection had been in the works for well over a year, but his timing could not have been worse for Sun Chuanfang. On March 21st a bloodless seizure of Shanghai proceeded. Now going back to our conversation about the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement, there had been a lot of development during this time period. In January of 1927, Wang Jingwei with his left wing allies, members of the CCP and Borodin had transferred the seat of the KMT government from Guangzhou to Wuhan. On March 1st the KMT government then reorganized the military commission and placed Chiang Kai-Shek under its jurisdiction with the secret intent to arrest him. As the NRA was about to storm Shanghai, a major opportunity presented itself to the CCP. Most of the Northern Chinese defenders still stuck in Shanghai were simply looking to surrender. Thus on March 21st, CCP leaders Zhou Enlai and Chen Duxiu launched an armed uprising. The CCP seized weapons, created a general strike and seized most of the city. This caused many of Sun Chuanfangs soldiers to flee to the railway station or coasts, looting as they did. Major battle took place between armed workers and soldiers, causing fires and damaged to heavily populated areas of the city. For example in the northern suburb of Zhapei, armed workers burnt down 3000 homes. By the night of the 22nd Bai Chongxi's NRA troops were gradually occupying the city, however the general strike was disrupting their efforts. General Bai Chongxi' ordered the CCP to call off the general strike on the 24th, but for over 4 days 322 Chinese were killed and over 2000 were wounded. As the NRA consolidated their authority over the city, their top spokesmen, Chiang Kai-SHek, Ho Yingqin and Bai Chongxi tried to alleviate the foreign community who were ridden with frightened refugees in the international settlement. The settlement was a literal warzone, fitted with barbed wire, gates, marines and soldiers behind sandbag trenches and such. Very real and many false stories were spread of anti-foreign atrocities. The NRA put out notices stating “The purpose of the military operations of the Northern Expedition is to establish a nation governed by the people and to get rid of the warlords. Our army occupied Hunan, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Fukien, Chekiang, Anhui, and other provinces and the unification of the entire nation will be accomplished soon. The Party Army's success is the victory of the people…. In accordance with international morality we shall guard the lives and property of foreigners. We have occupied Shanghai by more than force. We request that consuls inform your nationals to carry on your activities as usual and order the marines not to misunderstand our motives and not to carry out means to obstruct our revolutionary cause'. And now we come to a large and confusing part of the story. At Nanking and Shanghai major events would unfold, seeing the end of the first United Front. After a few days, anti-foreign actions would follow the capture of Nanking requiring more and more public assurances from the KMT. The last demoralized rear guard crossed the Yangtze to get to the safer northern bank. By doing this, now the NPA's most southern position was the rail terminal at Pukou. The NRA vanguard entered Nanking on March 24th, with units of the 6th army and countless NPA Anhui defectors alongside them. Chiang Kai-Shek loyalists in the KMT then charged the head of the 6th NRA army's political department, a CCP member named Lin Xuhan with masterminding attacks upon foreigners. These attacks provoked the foreign powers to then attack Chiang Kai-Shek, diverting his attention from the northern expedition and weakening his authority over the new Wuhan government. Elements of the 6th army had stirred up anti-foreign attitudes amongst their troops and civilians within Nanking. Yet the foreign community in the city would go on to say the attacks they witnessed were not made by civilian mobs. Whatever motivations, the situation that unfolded at Nanking signified a giant breach of soldier discipline. For Chiang Kai-Shek to have permitted such actions to take place was inconsistent with his strategy of avoiding any provocation upon the foreign powers. Yet over 25,000 Nanking refugees flooded over to Shanghai as 25,000 foreign marines and soldiers began defending the concessions, assuring the NRA they were ready for a fight. Going back in time somewhat, the March 20th coup was something akin to a patient zero. Back on January 3rd of 1927 elements of the KMT at Wuhan had triggered mobs to attack the British concessions until they gave back authority at Hankou and Kiukiang to the Chinese. Yet the KMT had never given such orders to do so. It seemed the CCP were pushing these actions. Between March 7th to the 17th, the new Joint Council at Wuhan was openly being defiant towards Chiang Kai-Shek and they held their first plenary session to work against him. They met with KMT leftists and CCP members and agreed to appoint CCP members, Su Chaocheng and Tan Pingshan as ministers; promoted CCP peasant and labour groups and dispatched three representatives to the Third Communist International to discuss China's role in the would be world revolution. It did not seem the CCP intended to keep their promise to the KMT about China not going communist. All of this authority at Wuhan undermined Chiang Kai-Sheks authority and those loyal to him. They immediately voted to take direct control of military funds which had been previously handled by the minister of Finance, T.V Soong, obviously considered a loyal supporter to Chiang Kai-Shek. In order to gain more influence in the NRA, the Wuhan guys began creating a parallel military chain of command and recruited CCP members into major officer positions. They hoped such actions would see more military types defect over to their cause. Now by this point the NRA really had become a giant beast. When the northern expedition launched in July of 1926 the were 8 armies, by March of 1927 they were now 40. Wuhans fiscal and political control over said armies would clearly undermine and probably be capable of getting rid of Chiang Kai-Shek, so it was a no brainer to attempt seizing them for the CCP. The Wuhan cabal hoped to incorporate some of the new armies, made mostly of defectors, whose alliances were probably flimsy to be under their control. Chiang Kai-Shek tried to counter these attacks, but anything he did would be seen as censorship or anti-communist, thus shattering the first united front, from which he still depended….or did he?  Now technically the Wuhan Cabal was only able to do what they were doing because leading KMT figures were not present such as Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei. Thus lesser members like Xu Chen and Teng Yenta were able to make some big decisions. Both men were CCP aligned and worked to abolish Chiang Kai-Sheks posts that he held such as ministry of the military which was replaced by the Wuhan Military council. The Wuhan cabal was able to reduce Chiang Kai-Sheks role as commander in chief and give various tasks to other military commanders. Likewise the military education programs at the KMT academics removed Chiang Kai-Sheks supervisory role, depriving him of obtaining the loyalty of the new junior officer corps. Appointment, promotions and dismissals of commanders would be done by the Military council, ie: Xu CHen and Teng Yenta. They first relieved Chen Mingshu, a known Chiang Kai-Shek loyalist and replaced him with a Moscow certified star Tang Shengchih. It became very obvious what they were trying to do. Thus as the Wuhan cabal tore apart Chiang Kai-Sheks authority piece by piece, the NRA's war against Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang began to collapse. Without a high degree of coordination and leadership, the NRA was finding it difficult to fight the numerically superior NPA forces. In March of 1927, Wuhan proclaimed all regulations ordered by Chiang Kai-Sheks HQ to be nullified. This meant although he retained authority over troops at the frontlines, Wuhan now claimed authority over all the other troops. All of these attacks upon Chiang Kai-Shek caused massive confusion in the ranks. Many within the KMT believed and rightfully so that the CCP was trying to take leadership over the movement. As the northern expedition took the NRA into Jiangsu, the momentum of their previous victories had pushed them across the Yangtze. This was heavily aided by the recent Shanghai Navy defectors who eased the crossing using their vessels. Those already operating north of the Yangtze such as the 3rd, 7th and 10th armies were pressing past Hofei towards Pengpu by early April. Pengpu was the capital of Anhui, forming a sort of bridgehead over the Huai river with a railway depot for Zhang Zongchang's armies. Thus its capture would open a door to the invasion of North China. Yet the NRA's momentum died in confusion over which direction they were to take, because of the Wuhan cabal-Chiang Kai-Shek fighting, and their logistical support was falling apart. It seemed to all like the northern expedition might never make it to the north.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The NRA managed to seize the super cities of Shanghai and Nanking. The NRA now dominated most of south China and were about to begin invading the north, when internal problems arose. The CCP and Chiang Kai-Shek were not seeing eye to eye and now a civil war seemed to be breaking out in the first united front.

Leiyan Ma and her son Jeff Kang spent some time together making vegetarian spring rolls with CBC's Jeanne Armstrong.

In this episode, I catch up with my mate in Sydney's Inner West, Brendan. Brendan tells me about two of his favourite local places and throws in some honourable mentions as well.Brendan's two favourite places:-       Chinese restaurant in Ashfield called New Shanghai. -       Middle Eastern restaurant in Stanmore called Emma's Snack Bar.Honourable mentions:-       Italian deli in Rozelle called Lombardo.-       Northern Chinese noodle restaurant in Burwood called Xian Eatery.-       Pub in Stanmore called Warren View Hotel.

Nanny Piggins tells the story of her distant relative, Mulan, who fought in the Northern Chinese army 1600 years ago.Support the show at https://www.buymeacoffee.com/storiesrasprattSupport the showFor information about live shows use this link... https://raspratt.com/live-shows/To buy one of my books use this link... https://amzn.to/3sE3Ki2

英语新闻∣“台湾省地图”上山西刀削面店老板发声：大陆同胞来吃能打折Mainland netizens are expressing deep affection for Taiwan and a strong desire for national reunification after they found streets and even snack bars on the island could be searched using online maps.大陆网友发现能在手机地图软件中搜索到台湾的街道和小吃店，大家按捺不住的激动心情与热切期待，对台湾的深厚感情和统一祖国的强烈愿望一齐迸发出来。Through some Chinese navigation apps, such as Baidu Map and Gaode Map, internet users can easily learn of detailed location information about streets, buildings and small food shops in Taiwan, with some named after mainland cities, including Chongqing, Nanjing and Changsha.手机地图软件搜索“台湾省”，可以显示台湾地图细节，精确到街道、建筑，甚至各类餐饮店铺。其中一些地方以大陆城市命名，比如重庆、南京和长沙。Users can also search bus routes, whether there are traffic jams and what foods are available around popular scenic spots in Taiwan using Baidu Map.网友还可以用百度地图搜到台湾公交线路、实时交通状况、景区附近的美食。On Friday, mapping services like these began receiving significant attention on mainland social media platforms. As of 8 pm on Friday, a hashtag called "Maps have already shown every street in Taiwan" has been viewed more than 1.3 billion times on Chinese social media platform Sina Weibo. Discussion on the topic could be heard in coffee shops, restaurants and on subways.8月5日，地图上的这些变化开始引起人们的关注。当日晚八点，一个叫“地图可显示台湾省每个街道”的话题冲上微博热搜，阅读量超10.3亿。甚至在咖啡馆、餐厅和地铁上都能听到讨论这个话题的声音。Although the service has been in place for quite a long time, the enhanced public attention came after United States House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi's recent visit to the island. Weibo user Hia-Taurus said: "I could feel older generations'homesicknesswhen I saw many streets on the island named after mainland cities. Come back, Taiwan!"虽然很久之前也能在手机地图软件上搜索到相关信息，但佩洛西窜访台湾一事再次引起人们对台湾地图的关注。一位微博网友说：“当我看到岛上许多以大陆城市命名的街道时，我能感受到老一辈人的乡愁。回到祖国大陆的怀抱吧，台湾!”After discovering via Gaode Map that a few Taiwan food shops were also called Shanxi knife-cut noodles, a traditional food from the Northern Chinese province, another Weibo user Zhangbeibeina, whose IP address is in Shanxi, said: "I would like to know if the noodles in Taiwan are as delicious as ours."另一位IP地址在山西的网友通过高德地图发现台湾有许多山西刀削面馆，他说：“我想知道台湾的面是不是和我们这的一样好吃”。Baidu Map said that so many searches such as "knife-cut noodle shops in Taiwan" had been made in the app, leading to complaints about delays or the failure of results to appear on Friday.8月5日，百度地图发布公告，“由于大家今天对于台湾省‘山西刀削面'的热情空前高涨，导致百度地图搜索该词条时出现卡顿。”Apart from these friendly comments, many netizens have also expressed support and understanding for how the mainland has been responding to Pelosi's recent visit.除了这些友好的评论外，网友也对中方就佩洛西窜访台湾一事做出的回应表示理解和支持。Zheng Ning, an associate professor at Beijing-based Communication University of China, has been following online opinions. Zheng said she could feel mainland netizens' deep feelings for Taiwan.中国传媒大学副教授郑宁一直关注着网友的评论。郑宁表示她能感受到大陆网友对台湾的深厚感情。"Many posts are full of emotion, and have become more sensible compared with theinfuriationseen a few days earlier. Some of my friends on WeChat, especially young students, for example, were angry on Tuesday while seeing Pelosi's flight land in Taiwan without receiving drastic military countermeasures from the mainland.“许多帖子充满了情感，几天前网友都还很愤怒，现在已经变得理智了。我微信上的一些朋友，尤其是年轻的学生，周二看到佩洛西的飞机在台湾降落，没有受到大陆严厉的军事反制措施，他们都很愤怒。”"Such anger or disappointment was their purepatrioticfeeling, and it could be understood. But when they calmed down and saw the countermeasures gradually unfolding, they've been aware of what kind of response is more beneficial to China," she said.“这种愤怒和失望是纯粹的爱国主义感情，可以理解。但是他们冷静下来之后，看到大陆逐步开展反制措施的时候，才意识到到底该怎么回应才能对我们最有利。”Zheng said that such emotional shifts have also happened to many of her students. "More netizens, I believe, will be more sensible while talking about the Taiwan question with more information and countermeasures provided by the country."郑宁说她的很多学生都有这种态度转变。“我觉得，随着网友得到的信息和国家采取的反制措施越来越多，他们在讨论台湾问题时会更加理性。”Huang Min, a Fujian province native who experienced the 1996 Taiwan Straits confrontation, said the Chinese military conducting drills all around Taiwan is a "noticeableprogress of military capability".福建人黄敏（音）经历过1996年台海危机，他说解放军围绕台岛举行大规模军演表明中国的“军事实力有了显著进步”。However, Huang said he and his friends still wish to see a peaceful reunification, given how Fujian and Taiwan share many similarities in culture, language and customs, and also have close ties in terms of history, family ties, economy and other aspects.但是黄敏和他的朋友还是希望看到和平解放台湾，因为福建省和台湾省在文化、语言和风俗上等方面具有绵密深厚的联结，经济往来密切。两岸同胞同根同源、同文同宗，心之相系、情之相融。homesickness英['həʊmsɪknəs]美['hoʊmsɪknəs]n. 乡愁infuriation英[ɪnˌfjʊərɪ'eɪʃən]美[ɪnˌfjʊrɪ'eɪʃən]n. 激昂，激怒patriotic英[ˌpætriˈɒtɪk]美[ˌpeɪtriˈɑːtɪk]adj. 爱国的，有爱国心的noticeable 英[ˈnəʊtɪsəbl]美[ˈnoʊtɪsəbl]adj. 显而易见的，明显的

1.China reports human case of bird flu2.Northern Chinese city goes into semi-shutdown3.China: Cover-up of post-vaccine deaths?4.Universal music stock debut: win for China company5.Evergrande domestic debt deal calms concern

1.China reports human case of bird flu 2.Northern Chinese city goes into semi-shutdown 3.China: Cover-up of post-vaccine deaths? 4.Universal music stock debut: win for China company 5.Evergrande domestic debt deal calms concern

Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the Chengde Mountain Resort, a village and a community-based service center for elderly home care.

Podcast 25 of the Zen Buddhist Podcasthosted by Buddha Zhen of the shaolinZEN.org Cybertemple. Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang, founder of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple leads Zen Buddhist lessons to be aired and broadcast over the internet discussing Chinese Chan Buddhism from the Shaolin Zen Cyber Temple Sangha. Buddhism Basics:  "Page 5 - The Nature of Buddhism" Podcast Host:       Buddha Zhen   "Spirit Wolf of Truth" Dharma Online:   shaolinZEN.org      Buddhism Basics   BUDDHISM DHARMA FOR TODAY:      "Control your thinking."   FEATURED DHARMA:   "The Nature of Buddhism"        Author: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Spoken by: Buddha Zhen "Spirit Wolf of Truth"      Published by Shaolin Communications      Used by permission of Shaolin Zen      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com Page 5 of the "BUDDHISM BASICS" explains that controlling our thinking is controlling our responses. Buddha Zhen reads quotes from the Original Buddha Shakyamuni. Buddha explains that "emotions interfere with your intellect."   Shakyamuni Buddha is challenged before entering a town.  "You are right to have doubts... don't be fooled by clever logic... when you know that any teachings... when used in your life are not profitable you should reject them." What you share is what you have.  What you have is what you accept into your life.  What are you accepting?  Look at what you share.   INTRO MUSIC: "Dao Mountain"   (Pipa song by Buddha Zhen for performing the Yang Style Tai Chi Short Form.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Original flutes recorded in Salt Lake City, Utah.)    FEATURED SONG of Master Zhen's DHARMA AND A SONG: "You're Lazy"   (Instrumental foreboding of harsh lyrics to come--with kazoo.)      Composer: The Hippy Coyote      Performed by American Zen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Acoustic guitar and drums are basic tracks of album in production by American Zen.) BACKGROUND MUSIC SCORE: "Boundless Space"   (Solo flute by Buddha Zhen in Utah.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style meditation song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) Podcast BLOG and ARCHIVES:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET Podcast RSS FEED:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET/rss Podcast LISTS:   ZENbuddhistPODCAST.com iTunes Podcast:   Zen Buddhist Podcast of Shaolin Zen Produced by Richard Del Connor for   Shaolin Records. Copyright 2009 shaolinMUSIC.com All rights reserved. Lyrics, music, and poetry used by permission of shaolinMUSIC.com ASCAP   

Podcast 22 of the Zen Buddhist Podcasthosted by Buddha Zhen of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple. Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang, founder of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple leads Zen Buddhist lessons to be aired and broadcast over the internet discussing Chinese Chan Buddhism from the Shaolin Zen Cyber Temple Sangha. Buddhism Basics:  "Page 3 - Human Learning" Podcast Host:       Buddha Zhen   "Spirit Wolf of Truth" Dharma Online:   shaolinZEN.org      Buddhism Basics   BUDDHISM DHARMA FOR TODAY:      "Realize why you do what you do."   FEATURED DHARMA:   "Human Learning"        Author: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Spoken by: Buddha Zhen "Spirit Wolf of Truth"      Published by Shaolin Communications      Used by permission of Shaolin Zen      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com Page 3 of the "BUDDHISM BASICS" explains that the first step in Buddhism is to recognize your conditioned or automatic responses. "Buddhism directs each person towards personal freedom," reads Buddha Zhen.   INTRO MUSIC: "Dao Mountain"   (Pipa song by Buddha Zhen for performing the Yang Style Tai Chi Short Form.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Original flutes recorded in Salt Lake City, Utah.)    FEATURED SONG of Buddha Zhen's DHARMA AND A SONG: "Road To The Mountaintop"   (Active mind meditation song.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Solo flute song.) BACKGROUND MUSIC SCORE: "Boundless Space"   (Solo flute by Buddha Zhen in Utah.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style meditation song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) Podcast BLOG and ARCHIVES:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET Podcast RSS FEED:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET/rss Podcast LISTS:   ZENbuddhistPODCAST.com iTunes Podcast:   Zen Buddhist Podcast of Shaolin Zen Produced by Richard Del Connor for   Shaolin Records. Copyright 2009 shaolinMUSIC.com All rights reserved. Lyrics, music, and poetry used by permission of shaolinMUSIC.com ASCAP

Podcast 21 of the Zen Buddhist Podcasthosted by Buddha Zhen of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple. Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang, founder of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple leads Zen Buddhist lessons to be aired and broadcast over the internet discussing Chinese Chan Buddhism from the Shaolin Zen Cyber Temple Sangha. Buddhism Basics:  "Page 2 " Podcast Host:       Buddha Zhen   "Spirit Wolf of Truth" Dharma Online:   shaolinZEN.org      Buddhism Basics   BUDDHISM DHARMA FOR TODAY:      "Who is your spiritual guide?."   FEATURED DHARMA:   "Buddhism Teaches "        Author: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Spoken by: Buddha Zhen "Spirit Wolf of Truth"      Published by Shaolin Communications      Used by permission of Shaolin Zen      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com Page 2 of the "Buddhism Basics" discusses how spirituality and religion are a lifelong pursuit of knowledge or ignorance, depending upon your religion. Buddha Zhen also contradicts his Catholic upbringing by stating that, "fear is an impediment to learning." The Dharma Lecture ends with Buddha Zhen explaining, "Buddhism is a common sense religion."   INTRO MUSIC: "Tai Chi Magic"   (Pipa song by Buddha Zhen for performing the Yang Style Tai Chi Short Form.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Original flutes recorded in Salt Lake City, Utah.)    FEATURED SONG of Buddha Zhen's DHARMA AND A SONG: "Road To The Mountaintop"   (Active mind meditation song.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Solo flute song.) BACKGROUND MUSIC SCORE: "In The Pool Of Enlightenment"   (Used by Shaolin Chi Mantis Demo Team for many performances.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style meditation song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) Podcast BLOG and ARCHIVES:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET Podcast RSS FEED:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET/rss Podcast LISTS:   ZENbuddhistPODCAST.com iTunes Podcast:   Zen Buddhist Podcast of Shaolin Zen Produced by Richard Del Connor for   Shaolin Records. Copyright 2009 shaolinMUSIC.com All rights reserved. Lyrics, music, and poetry used by permission of shaolinMUSIC.com ASCAP

Podcast 20 of the Zen Buddhist Podcasthosted by Buddha Zhen of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple. Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang, founder of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple leads Zen Buddhist lessons to be aired and broadcast over the internet discussing Chinese Chan Buddhism from the Shaolin Zen Cyber Temple Sangha. Buddhism Basics:  "Page 1" Podcast Host:       Buddha Zhen   "Spirit Wolf of Truth" Dharma Online:   shaolinZEN.org      Buddhism Basics   BUDDHISM DHARMA FOR TODAY:      "The more you know, the more you GLOW."   FEATURED DHARMA:   "The Original Buddha"        Author: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Spoken by: Buddha Zhen "Spirit Wolf of Truth"      Published by Shaolin Communications      Used by permission of Shaolin Zen      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com Buddha Zhen and the Methodist Pastor have a long lunch discussing marriage. BZ states he will share much of this information if enough people request it at Buddha1@BuddhaKungFu .com "Page 1" of the Buddhism Basics lists different translations and viewpoints of the word, "buddha." Shakyamuni Buddha means, "First Enlightened One of the Shakya Clan." Starting with the birth of Siddhartha Gautarma, Buddha Zhen begins our adventure in the Shaolin Zen Buddhism Basics. "In order to see that tree, we need to be in as many positions as we can, which means that we have to appreciate, or at least understand the way other people think, and see things, in order really see all the perspectives of that tree." Buddha Zhen explains what "Buddha Nature" means and how you need it to be a Buddhist. "Buddhism teaches that more important than knowing the right answer, is the desire and path to obtaining right answers. Buddhism teaches each of us to become a Buddha within our own lifetime." Buddha Zhen explains how his Kung Fu school, Buddha Kung Fu, is designed to create Buddhas. "Buddhism is a spiritual university where each student picks their courses, tests their self, and decide what grade they deserve."   INTRO MUSIC: "Tai Chi Magic"   (Pipa song by Buddha Zhen for performing the Yang Style Tai Chi Short Form.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Original flutes recorded in Salt Lake City, Utah.)    FEATURED SONG of Buddha Zhen's DHARMA AND A SONG: "Boundless Space"   (Active mind meditation song.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Solo flute song.) BACKGROUND MUSIC SCORE: "In The Pool Of Enlightenment"   (Used by Shaolin Chi Mantis Demo Team for many performances.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style meditation song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) Podcast BLOG and ARCHIVES:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET Podcast RSS FEED:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET/rss Podcast LISTS:   ZENbuddhistPODCAST.com iTunes Podcast:   Zen Buddhist Podcast of Shaolin Zen Produced by Richard Del Connor for   Shaolin Records. Copyright 2009 shaolinMUSIC.com All rights reserved. Lyrics, music, and poetry used by permission of shaolinMUSIC.com ASCAP

Podcast 19 of the Zen Buddhist Podcasthosted by Buddha Zhen of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple. Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang, founder of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple shares his unique Chan-style Zen Buddhism discussing religions, relationships, and relativity. "Easter Buddhism Basics Introduction." Podcast Host:      Buddha Zhen   "Spirit Wolf of Truth" Dharma Online:   Shaolin Zen       CyberTemple   BUDDHISM DHARMA FOR TODAY: "Reading aloud for enlightenment."   FEATURED DHARMA:   "Read the Buddhism Basics of Shaolin Zen out loud."     (Easter Sunday podcast begins Buddhism Basics.) Starting with the "Buddhism Basics" page at shaolinZEN.org Buddha Zhen reads out loud the instructions and overview of his Buddhism Basics used to train his children and disciples in Zen Buddhism. Buddha Zhen emphasizes the importance of reading out loud with other people and how this improves the potential for enlightenment and "...will improve your diction." Stay tuned for this Buddhism crash course written by Buddha Zhen in 2001 and 2002. INTRO MUSIC: "Tai Chi Magic"   (Pipa song by Buddha Zhen for performing the Yang Style Tai Chi Short Form.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Original flutes recorded in Salt Lake City, Utah.)    FEATURED SONG of Buddha Zhen's DHARMA AND A SONG: "In The Pool Of Enlightenment"   (Used by Shaolin Chi Mantis Demo Team for many performances.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style meditation song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) BACKGROUND MUSIC SCORE: "In The Pool Of Enlightenment"   (Used by Shaolin Chi Mantis Demo Team for many performances.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style meditation song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) OUTRO SONG: "In The Pool Of Enlightenment"   (Used by Shaolin Chi Mantis Demo Team for many performances.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style meditation song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) Podcast BLOG and ARCHIVES:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET Podcast RSS FEED:   zenbuddhistpodcast.net/rss Podcast LISTS:   ZENbuddhistPODCAST.com iTunes Podcast:   Zen Buddhist Podcast of Shaolin Zen Produced by Richard Del Connor for   Shaolin Records. Copyright 2009 shaolinMUSIC.com All rights reserved. Lyrics, music, and poetry used by permission of shaolinMUSIC.com ASCAP

Podcast 18 of the Zen Buddhist Podcasthosted by Buddha Zhen of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple. Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang, founder of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple shares his unique Chan-style Zen Buddhism discussing religions, relationships, and relativity. "Irish people are Jewish." Podcast Host:       Buddha Zhen   "Spirit Wolf of Truth" Dharma Online:   Shaolin Zen       CyberTemple   BUDDHISM DHARMA FOR TODAY: "Irish are the lost tribe of Israel."   FEATURED DHARMA:   "Irish people will not be smoted by God."     (Continuing about the Bible reading with his daughter at a local church.) The lost tribe were the warriors of Israel who became mercernaries, conqured Corsica, and southern Portugal before migrating to Ireland where they decimated the indigenous people, then appearing for the first time in history as "The Celts." Buddha Zhen reassures that when since Irish people are "the lost tribe of Israel," that God will treat them as his "chosen children." Buddha Zhen tells HIS VERSION of the BIG BANG THEORY describing our entire reality dimension to be a "Burp of Matter" from colliding dimensions...we're living in a universal burp... Buddha Zhen warns us of upcoming podcasts that will reveal some of his previous spiritual journeys in Lakota Pipe Ceremonies. Aliens are Gods? Tabulating historical smotes by God, leads Buddha Zhen to believe that... Germany owns Los Angeles foreclosures in San Fernando similar to the screenplay, Chinatown, starring Jack Nicholson, written by Robert Towne. "Wonderment of what reality is." INTRO MUSIC: "Tai Chi Magic"   (Pipa song by Buddha Zhen for performing the Yang Style Tai Chi Short Form.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Original flutes recorded in Salt Lake City, Utah.)    FEATURED SONG of Buddha Zhen's DHARMA AND A SONG: "God Is Smaller Than You Think"     (Everyone grows older and smaller...)      Performed by American Zen      From the album:   LEVEL 3 = I WANT YOU TO LOVE ME      Courtesy of Shaolin Records      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com      Song download:   shaolinCOM.com MUSIC LIBRARY      iTUNES Store:   LEVEL 3 = I WANT YOU TO LOVE ME   by American Zen      (With harmonizing basses. ) BACKGROUND MUSIC SCORE: "In The Pool Of Enlightenment"   (Used by Shaolin Chi Mantis Demo Team for many performances.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style meditation song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) OUTRO SONG: "Let's Go To Church"     (A poem depicting a conversation between a father and son.)      Performed by American Zen      From the album:   LEVEL 3 = I WANT YOU TO LOVE ME      Courtesy of Shaolin Records      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com      Song download:   shaolinCOM.com MUSIC LIBRARY      iTUNES Store:   LEVEL 3 = I WANT YOU TO LOVE ME   by American Zen      (With harmonizing basses. ) Podcast BLOG and ARCHIVES:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET Podcast RSS FEED:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET/rss Podcast LISTS:   ZENbuddhistPODCAST.com iTunes Podcast:   Zen Buddhist Podcast of Shaolin Zen Produced by Richard Del Connor for   Shaolin Records. Copyright 2009 shaolinMUSIC.com All rights reserved. Lyrics, music, and poetry used by permission of shaolinMUSIC.com ASCAP

Podcast 17 of the Zen Buddhist Podcasthosted by Buddha Zhen of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple. Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang, founder of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple shares his unique Chan-style Zen Buddhism discussing religions, relationships, and relativity. "First Montrose Podcast" Podcast Host:       Buddha Zhen   "Spirit Wolf of Truth" Dharma Online:   Shaolin Zen       CyberTemple   BUDDHISM DHARMA FOR TODAY: "Let's Go To Church" After spending the morning in church, reading the Holy Bible with his daughter, Buddha Zhen discusses the genocide, theft, and obedience that God instructed his chosen people, the Hebrews. Buddha Zhen also shares some words of wisdom from a 96 year old Mason, he'd been chatting with the night before. Still having financial troubles, the elderly man reassured Buddha Zhen that he should continue to do the work he's "best" at, and that sleeping well at night is worth more than a Rolls Royce. FEATURED DHARMA:   "Let's Go To Church"     (A poem depicting a conversation between a father and son.)      Performed by American Zen      From the album:   LEVEL 3 = I WANT YOU TO LOVE ME      Courtesy of Shaolin Records      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com      Song download:   shaolinCOM.com MUSIC LIBRARY      iTUNES Store:   LEVEL 3 = I WANT YOU TO LOVE ME   by American Zen      (With harmonizing basses. ) INTRO MUSIC: "Tai Chi Magic"   (Pipa song by Buddha Zhen for performing the Yang Style Tai Chi Short Form.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Original flutes recorded in Salt Lake City, Utah.)    FEATURED SONG of Buddha Zhen's DHARMA AND A SONG: "Let's Go To Church"     (A poem depicting a conversation between a father and son.)      Performed by American Zen      From the album:   LEVEL 3 = I WANT YOU TO LOVE ME      Courtesy of Shaolin Records      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com      Song download:   shaolinCOM.com MUSIC LIBRARY      iTUNES Store:   LEVEL 3 = I WANT YOU TO LOVE ME   by American Zen      (With harmonizing basses. ) BACKGROUND MUSIC SCORE: "In The Pool Of Enlightenment"   (Used by Shaolin Chi Mantis Demo Team for many performances.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style meditation song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) OUTRO SONG: "Let's Go To Church"     (A poem depicting a conversation between a father and son.)      Performed by American Zen      From the album:   LEVEL 3 = I WANT YOU TO LOVE ME      Courtesy of Shaolin Records      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com      Song download:   shaolinCOM.com MUSIC LIBRARY      iTUNES Store:   LEVEL 3 = I WANT YOU TO LOVE ME   by American Zen      (With harmonizing basses. ) Podcast BLOG and ARCHIVES:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET Podcast RSS FEED:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET/rss Podcast LISTS:   ZENbuddhistPODCAST.com iTunes Podcast:   Zen Buddhist Podcast of Shaolin Zen Produced by Richard Del Connor for   Shaolin Records. Copyright 2008 shaolinMUSIC.com All rights reserved. Lyrics, music, and poetry used by permission of shaolinMUSIC.com ASCAP

This 2,000 year old tool for cooking has resulted in some amazingly tasty cuisine. In this episode we'll talk about the Wok and the woman who popularized Northern Chinese cuisine in the United States, the one and only Joyce Chen.

Podcast 16 of the Zen Buddhist Podcasthosted by Buddha Zhen of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple. Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang, founder of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple leads Buddhist Zen lessons to be aired and broadcast over the internet discussing Chinese Chan Buddhism from the Shaolin Zen CyberTemple Sangha. "Last Tujunga Podcast" Podcast Host:       Buddha Zhen   "Spirit Wolf of Truth" Dharma Online:   Shaolin Zen       CyberTemple   BUDDHISM DHARMA FOR TODAY: "Thanks for all your support - Back when I find a home." At the end of his 18 year semi-marriage, Buddha Zhen's ex-wife has stopped paying the bills and he's been evicted with no where to take his two kids and without utilities, he says he'll try to upload this last Tujunga podcast from the library... Buddha Zhen reassures that when possible he will continue these Buddhism podcasts. With many "thank yous," Buddha Zhen is appreciative for all the support he's received that has allowed him to pursue his Buddhist / Kung Fu / Tai Chi teaching programs and the opportunity to raise and homeschool his children since 1992. Buddha Zhen compares his 8 years in Tujunga to the 8 years Bodhidharma spent meditating at his cave at the Shaolin Monastery. "Hopefully the genesis of Buddha Kung Fu will be worth the 8 years I have spent here in Tujunga." Buddha Zhen also mentions that purchasing more products will help... FEATURED DHARMA: "Thanks for your support. I'll be homeless this week."      Author:   Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang   (private lessons)      Read by:   Buddha Zhen      Published by   Shaolin Communications      Used by permission of   Shaolin Zen      Under license from   shaolinMUSIC.com   INTRO MUSIC: "Tai Chi Magic"   (Pipa song by Buddha Zhen for performing the Yang Style Tai Chi Short Form.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Solo flute song recorded in Salt Lake City, Utah.)    FEATURED SONG of Buddha Zhen's DHARMA AND A SONG: "In The Pool Of Enlightenment"   (Used by Shaolin Chi Mantis Demo Team for many performances.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style meditation song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) BACKGROUND MUSIC SCORE: "In The Pool Of Enlightenment"   (Used by Shaolin Chi Mantis Demo Team for many performances.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style meditation song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) OUTRO SONG: "In The Pool Of Enlightenment"   (Used by Shaolin Chi Mantis Demo Team for many performances.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style meditation song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) Podcast BLOG and ARCHIVES:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET Podcast RSS FEED:   zenbuddhistpodcast.net/rss Podcast LISTS:   ZENbuddhistPODCAST.com iTunes Podcast:   Zen Buddhist Podcast of Shaolin Zen Produced by Richard Del Connor for   Shaolin Records. Copyright 2008 shaolinMUSIC.com All rights reserved. Lyrics, music, and poetry used by permission of shaolinMUSIC.com ASCAP

Podcast 15 of the Zen Buddhist Podcasthosted by Buddha Zhen of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple. Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang, founder of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple leads Buddhist Zen lessons to be aired and broadcast over the internet discussing Chinese Chan Buddhism from the Shaolin Zen CyberTemple Sangha. "Father's Day Podcast about CURSE OF THE GOLDEN FLOWER Movie" Buddha Zhen says that women can't plan their future because their bodies will defeat them. Using examples and enlightenment from the movie, Curse Of The Golden Flower starring Chow Yun Fat, Buddha Zhen tells how the movie answered all his questions about why his marriages and family didn't work. Discussing loyalty, filial piety, and Confucian concepts, Buddha Zhen explains that a family, a business, or an army operate under the same principles or failure will result. Buddha Zhen criticizes Christians for giving Jesus alien zombie powers. Muslims are called, "women," if they believe in vengeance... People are called, "stupid," if they don't try to learn, and women are criticized for not obeying their husbands. Buddha Zhen then rewrites the world's marriage vows to be, "Love, cherish, and protect," for the man and, "Love, honor, and obey," for the women. Podcast Host:       Buddha Zhen   "Spirit Wolf of Truth" Dharma Online:   Shaolin Zen       CyberTemple   BUDDHISM DHARMA FOR TODAY: "Movie about Heavenly Family: CURSE OF THE GOLDEN FLOWER"   FEATURED DHARMA: "Family Success Requires Filial Piety and Ritual"      Author:   Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang   (private lessons)      Read by:   Buddha Zhen      Published by   Shaolin Communications      Used by permission of   Shaolin Zen      Under license from   shaolinMUSIC.com   INTRO MUSIC: "Tai Chi Magic"   (Pipa song by Buddha Zhen for performing the Yang Style Tai Chi Short Form.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Solo flute song recorded in Salt Lake City, Utah.)    FEATURED SONG of Buddha Zhen's DHARMA AND A SONG: "House Of Rejection"   (Drum THEME SONG of Shaolin Chi Mantis and Buddha Kung Fu.)      Composer: The Hippy Coyote      Performed by American Zen      From the album, LEVEL 3 = I WANT YOU TO LOVE ME by American Zen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Song about a family that doesn't utilize filial piety.) BACKGROUND MUSIC SCORE: "In The Pool Of Enlightenment"   (Used by Shaolin Chi Mantis Demo Team for many performances.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style meditation song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) "Inner Will"   (Drum song)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Drums of the Shaolin Chi Mantis DEMO TEAM. Lyric by Coyote while recording the drums.) "Boundless Space"   (Solo flute song.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Buddha Zhen in Utah, late at night...) "Road To The Mountaintop"   (Chinese style folk song)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Drums by The Hippy Coyote of American Zen.) "Wishwood Bridge"   (Mandolin folk song by The Hippy Coyote in 1974.)      Composer: The Hippy Coyote      Performed by American Zen      From the album, LEVEL 3 = I WANT YOU TO LOVE ME by American Zen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Recorded with band, Lotus, at Bonita studios.) "5th South"   (Long dramatic flute song about street Coyote lived on in Salt Lake City.)      Composer: The Hippy Coyote      Performed by American Zen      From the album, LEVEL 3 = I WANT YOU TO LOVE ME by American Zen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Background vocals by The Nephilim Choir of Shaolin Records.) OUTRO SONG: "House Of Rejection"   (Drum THEME SONG of Shaolin Chi Mantis and Buddha Kung Fu.)      Composer: The Hippy Coyote      Performed by American Zen      From the album, LEVEL 3 = I WANT YOU TO LOVE ME by American Zen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   Shaolin Records Record Store      (Song about a family that doesn't utilize filial piety.) Podcast BLOG and ARCHIVES:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET Podcast RSS FEED:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET/rss Podcast LISTS:   ZENbuddhistPODCAST.com iTunes Podcast:   Zen Buddhist Podcast of Shaolin Zen Produced by Richard Del Connor for   Shaolin Records. Copyright 2008 shaolinMUSIC.com All rights reserved. Lyrics, music, and poetry used by permission of shaolinMUSIC.com ASCAP

Podcast 14 of the Zen Buddhist Podcasthosted by Buddha Zhen of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple. Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang, founder of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple leads Buddhist Zen lessons to be aired and broadcast over the internet discussing Chinese Chan Buddhism from the Shaolin Zen CyberTemple Sangha. "Spiritual Zen is Spiritual Health" Everyone has a zen. Your zen has a health. Your zen health is your spiritual health. Your spiritual capacity, your spiritual ability, your spiritual strength is your spiritual zen. Podcast Host:       Buddha Zhen   "Spirit Wolf of Truth" Dharma Online:   Shaolin Zen       CyberTemple   BUDDHISM DHARMA FOR TODAY: "Spiritual Zen is Spiritual Health" It takes work to be smart. It takes work to be healthy. It takes work to be spiritual. FEATURED DHARMA: "Spiritual Zen is Spiritual Health"      Author:   Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang   (private lessons)      Read by:   Buddha Zhen      Published by   Shaolin Communications      Used by permission of   Shaolin Zen      Under license from   shaolinMUSIC.com   INTRO MUSIC: "Tai Chi Magic"   (Pipa song by Buddha Zhen for performing the Yang Style Tai Chi Short Form.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Solo flute song recorded in Salt Lake City, Utah.)    FEATURED SONG of Buddha Zhen's DHARMA AND A SONG: "In The Pool Of Enlightenment"   (Drum THEME SONG of Shaolin Chi Mantis and Buddha Kung Fu.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) BACKGROUND MUSIC SCORE: "Inner Will"   (Drum song)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Drums of the Shaolin Chi Mantis DEMO TEAM. Lyric by Coyote while recording the drums.) OUTRO SONG: "In The Pool Of Enlightenment"   (Used by Shaolin Chi Mantis Demo Team for many performances.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style meditation song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) DHARMA OF SHAOLIN ZEN:  "Spiritual Zen is Spiritual Health"   (Webpage at shaolinZEN.org with link on BuddhaKungFu.com homepage.)      Today's Dharma Webpage:   "Buddha Kung Fu"      Topic:   Your Zen Buddhism is dependent upon being healthy and mobile. Without exercise, you are not a Zen Buddhist.      Author:   Buddha Zhen      Published by   Shaolin Communications      Buddhist CyberTemple:   shaolinZEN.org Podcast BLOG and ARCHIVES:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET Podcast RSS FEED:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET/rss Podcast LISTS:   ZENbuddhistPODCAST.com iTunes Podcast:   Zen Buddhist Podcast of Shaolin Zen Produced by Richard Del Connor for   Shaolin Records. Copyright 2008 shaolinMUSIC.com All rights reserved. Lyrics, music, and poetry used by permission of shaolinMUSIC.com ASCAP

Podcast 13 of the Zen Buddhist Podcasthosted by Buddha Zhen of the shaolinZEN.org Cybertemple. Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang, founder of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple leads Buddhist Zen lessons to be aired and brodcast over the internet discussing Chinese Chan Buddhism from the Shaolin Zen CyberTemple Sangha. "Mind / Body / Spirit" Buddha Zhen complains of how this slogan is overused. Then, breaking each part down, Buddha Zhen shows the need to have ALL THREE to have enlightenment. Podcast Host:       Buddha Zhen   "Spirit Wolf of Truth" Dharma Online:   Shaolin Zen       CyberTemple   BUDDHISM DHARMA FOR TODAY: "A balance of the mind and body and spirit is required for enlightenment." Exercise your mind, exercise your body, and exercise your spirit. Feed your mind, feed your body, and feed your spirit. Relax your mind, relax your body, and relax your spirit. FEATURED DHARMA: "Mind / Body / Spirit"      Author:   Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang   (private lessons)      Read by:   Buddha Zhen      Published by   Shaolin Communications      Used by permission of   Shaolin Zen      Under license from   shaolinMUSIC.com   INTRO MUSIC: "Tai Chi Magic"   (Pipa song by Buddha Zhen for performing the Yang Style Tai Chi Short Form.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Solo flute song recorded in Salt Lake City, Utah.)    FEATURED SONG of Buddha Zhen's DHARMA AND A SONG: "Inner Will"   (Drum THEME SONG of Shaolin Chi Mantis and Buddha Kung Fu.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) BACKGROUND MUSIC SCORE: "Road To The Mountaintop"   (Horseback song.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Ancient trucking song.) OUTRO SONG: "Inner Will"   (Drum song)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Drums of the Shaolin Chi Mantis DEMO TEAM. Lyric by Coyote while recording the drums.) DHARMA OF SHAOLIN ZEN:  "Mind / Body / Spirit"   (Webpage at shaolinZEN.org with link on BuddhaKungFu.com homepage.)      Today's Dharma Webpage:   "Buddha Kung Fu"      Topic:   Your Zen Buddhism is dependent upon being healthy and mobile. Withouth exercise, you are not a Zen Buddhist.      Author:   Buddha Zhen      Published by   Shaolin Communications      Buddhist CyberTemple:   shaolinZEN.org Podcast BLOG and ARCHIVES:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET Podcast RSS FEED:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET/rss Podcast LISTS:   ZENbuddhistPODCAST.com iTunes Podcast:   Zen Buddhist Podcast of Shaolin Zen Produced by Richard Del Connor for   Shaolin Records. Copyright 2008 shaolinMUSIC.com All rights reserved. Lyrics, music, and poetry used by permission of shaolinMUSIC.com ASCAP

Podcast 12 of the Zen Buddhist Podcasthosted by Buddha Zhen of the shaolinZEN.org Cybertemple. Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang, founder of the shaolinZEN.org CyberTemple leads Buddhist Zen lessons to be aired and brodcast over the internet discussing Chinese Chan Buddhism from the Shaolin Zen CyberTemple Sangha. "Zen Mind" Buddha Zhen simplifies his explanation that the Zen Mind is whatever colors your perspective. Then he complicates it by stating that there are infinite zen minds... Another controversial concept of Buddha Zhen is exposed, that women have, "...the antithesis" of the hierarchic mind of men. Continuing to explain how a mother is the opposite of a samurai man, Buddha Zhen demands that each person determine what and who their Zen mind is. Podcast Host:       Buddha Zhen   "Spirit Wolf of Truth" Dharma Online:   Shaolin Zen       CyberTemple   BUDDHISM DHARMA FOR TODAY: "The Female Zen Mind Is Different From The Male Zen Mind" Buddha Zhen states that women will prioritize their newer born over the oldest of their children. FEATURED DHARMA: "Zen Mind"      Author:   Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang   (private lessons)      Read by:   Buddha Zhen      Published by   Shaolin Communications      Used by permission of   Shaolin Zen      Under license from   shaolinMUSIC.com   INTRO MUSIC: "Tai Chi Magic"   (Pipa song by Buddha Zhen for performing the Yang Style Tai Chi Short Form.)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Solo flute song recorded in Salt Lake City, Utah.)    FEATURED SONG of Buddha Zhen's DHARMA AND A SONG: "Road To The Mountaintop"   (First mix of song from TAI CHI MAGIC cd)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Warrior style song of the Northern Chinese and Mongols.) BACKGROUND MUSIC SCORE: "Boundless Space"   (flute solo song by Buddha Zhen)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Lonely haunting flute song with some dignity and hope.) "Inner Will"   (flute music)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Drums of the Shaolin Chi Mantis DEMO TEAM. Lyric by Coyote while recording the drums.) OUTRO SONG: "Tai Chi Magic"   (First mix of song from TAI CHI MAGIC cd)      Composer: Buddha Zhen Shen-Lang      Performed by Buddha Zhen      From the album, Tai Chi Magic 1 by Buddha Zhen      Produced, Mixed, and Mastered by Richard Del Connor      Used by permission of shaolinRECORDS.com      Under license from shaolinMUSIC.com   ASCAP      Download Song:   shaolinCOM.com      (Theme song by Buddha Zhen, composed for his Shaolin Chi Mantis and Tai Chi Youth Demo Teams, who performed the Yang Style Tai Chi Short Form to this song.) DHARMA OF SHAOLIN ZEN:  "Zen Body"   (Webpage at shaolinZEN.org with link on BuddhaKungFu.com homepage.)      Today's Dharma Webpage:   "Buddha Kung Fu"      Topic:   Your Zen Buddhism is dependent upon being healthy and mobile. Without exercise, you are not a Zen Buddhist.      Author:   Buddha Zhen      Published by   Shaolin Communications      Buddhist CyberTemple:   shaolinZEN.org Podcast BLOG and ARCHIVES:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET Podcast RSS FEED:   zenbuddhistpodcast.NET/rss Podcast LISTS:   ZENbuddhistPODCAST.com iTunes Podcast:   Zen Buddhist Podcast of Shaolin Zen Produced by Richard Del Connor for   Shaolin Records. Copyright 2008 shaolinMUSIC.com All rights reserved. Lyrics, music, and poetry used by permission of shaolinMUSIC.com ASCAP

“In the West there is a province called Kafje-Guh, in which there are forests and other places of difficult access. It adjoins Qara-Jang and parts of India and the coast. There are two towns there, Lochak and Hainam and it has its own ruler, who is in rebellion against [Kublai Khaan]. Toghan, the son of the [Khaan], who is stationed with an army in Lukin-fu in the [south of China], is defending [China] and also keeping an eye on those rebels. On one occasion, he penetrated with an army to those towns on the coast, captured them, and sat for a week upon the throne there. Then all at once their army sprang out from ambush in the sea[shore], the forest, and the mountains and attacked Toghan’s army while they were busy plundering. Toghan got away safely and is still in the Lukin-fu area.”       So the Ilkhanid historian and vizier Rashid al-Din, writing in the first years of the 1300s, describes events less than twenty years prior but very far away. Rashid al-Din transcribed a very brief, but recognizable sketch, of the Mongol invasions of Vietnam in the 1280s. Having covered for you the first half of Kublai’s reign up until the end of the 1270s and his conquest of China, we will now take you to the beginnings of his failures. Back in July we already presented the Mongol invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281, so now we’ll turn our gaze southwards, to the efforts to extend Mongol suzerainty over the kingdoms of what is now Vietnam. I’m your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.       Before we discuss the military operations, it’s useful to set the scene and establish Vietnam’s 13th century status. As has been so often over this series, for context we must go back to the fall of China’s Tang Dynasty in 907. For roughly a thousand years, starting from the Han Dynasty in 111 BCE, the northern half of what is now Vietnam was under Chinese dominion, broken up by a few decades of revolts and brief independence here and there. Of course, the Chinese Dynasties were not dominating a ‘Vietnam’ in any modern sense. Rather, they were exerting control or tributary relationships with the Viet, or Kinh, peoples around the Red River, or Hong River, Delta. This delta is usually described as the cradle of Vietnamese civilization, the most densely populated and fertile part of the country even today. Vietnam’s capital, Hanoi, sits in this region. The long period  of Chinese rule and influence left an undeniable mark upon Vietnamese conceptions of state, and every succeeding Viet dynasty has born obvious echoes of it.       With the collapse of the Tang in 907, the Chinese presence in the north of Vietnam weakened, and local groups began to exert independence. Some of the Tang’s successors in Southern China invaded and briefly brought the Red River Delta back under Chinese rule. But by the middle of the tenth century, the first fully independent Vietnamese Dynasty in centuries, the Ngô Dynasty, was established… and collapsed into feuding warlords by 965. It was not until the Lý Dynasty, founded in 1009, was stability reached. Under the Lý Emperors- though only Kings, if you asked the Chinese- the recognizable aspects of medieval northern Vietnam were built. The capital was moved to Thăng Long, modern day Hanoi. Buddhism was adopted as the state religion, and in 1054 a new emperor declared a new name for their state; Đại Việt,, meaning ‘great Viet,’ by which we most commonly know the medieval and early modern state. Administrative and military reforms made it the most stable and powerful Vietnamese kingdom yet, and the state expanded both north and south. Agricultural expansion and land reclamation fueled population growth and a steady Viet colonization southwards.       Good times for the Lý Kings did not last. By the start of the thirteenth century their rule had weakened, local warlords exerted their independence and the monarchs were generally inept with few heirs. In a series of political alliances and marriages, the Trần family gathered power and began to try to force the Lý Kings to be their puppets. Warfare broke out. The Lý Kings maintaned the throne, but with the Trầns the power behind it. The final ailing Lý King abdicated the throne in 1224 with only two daughters. His 7 year old daughter, Lý Chiêu Thánh, was enthroned as the only queen-regent in Vietnam’s history. Throught the machinations of the Trần “mayor of the palace,”  Trần Thủ Độ married the young queen to his nephew, Trần Cảnh. The queen soon abdicated the throne, making Trần Cảnh the reigning monarch- the first ruler of Vietnam’s prestigious Trần Dynasty, known by his temple name Thái Tông, the Vietnamese rendition of that classic Chinese temple name, Taizong. His father was posthumously made Taizu, and the scheming uncle Thủ Độ became the chancellor and the major powerbroker within Đại Việt until his death in 1264.       The powerful new Trần Dynasty of Đại Việt centralized power and continued the expansion begun the Lý  Dynasty. Further reclamation efforts and dykes to control the flooding of the Red River continued to increase the agricultrual production of the north. Adminsitration, territories, taxes, the army, the law code, all were reorganized under the Trần. Confucianism influenced the government but did not replace Buddhism, and Chinese was the official language of the court. Relations were stabilized with their most important neighbours; the Song Dynasty to the northeast, to which Đại Việt paid tribute and nominal allegiance in exchange for expensive gifts and lucrative trade; to the northwest, trade flowed with the Dali Kings in Yunnan; to the south, a cordial period began with the Chams.    The Chams are a part of the far flung Austronesian people, inhabiting central and southern Vietnam for millenia. For most of their history they were a collection of small, competing Hindu and Muslim kingdoms, but in the 12th century entered a new period of unity in the face of an invasion by the Khmer Empire of Cambodia, the builders of the famed Angkor Wat. United under a ‘king of kings,’ the Chams repulsed both the Khmer and Đại Việt when it attempted to take advantage of perceived Cham weakness. Though not unified or centralized in the manner of Đại Việt, from the mid-12th century onwards there was a King of Kings based out of Vijaya who wielded more influence over the other Cham kings and princes- the kingdom of Champa, as it’s sometimes called. And hence, by the 13th century we can say that Vietnam was divided into two states; Đại Việt in the north, ruled by the Trần Dynasy and known as Annam to the Chinese, and Champa in the south. You can get your references to twentieth century North and South Vietnam out of the way now.    Đại Việt was the first of the two to encounter Mongol armies in the 1250s. As we’ve discussed a few times before, in 1253, on the orders of his brother the Grand Khan Mongke, prince Kublai marched into Yunnan and conquered the Dali Kingdom. Though Kublai quickly returned north, his general Uriyangqadai stayed in the region and continued to subdue the local peoples. Uriyangqadai, the son of the illustrious Sube’edei, led a series of wide ranging campaigns across Yunnan, the edges of Tibet to the small kingdoms on the western edge of the Song Dynasty. In this process, Uriyangqadai came right to the northern border of Đại Việt. At this point Mongol imperial ideology was well entrenched: of course Đại Việt would become subject to the Grand Khan. The more immediate strategic concern though was to prevent the Trần kings offering any sort of support to the Song Dynasty, against which Mongke was planning a massive assault upon for 1258. With Đại Việt’s trade and tribute contacts with the Song, the Mongols were not willing to allow a possible enemy in their rear. With his envoys to the Trần court at Thăng Long illicting no response, in the winter of 1257 Uriyangqadai and his son, Aju, led the army over the border, some 10-30,000 men, Mongols supported by locally raised troops from Yunnan.   Splitting his forces into two, Uriyangqdai ordered the vanguard to cross the Thao River, north of Thăng Long, but not engage the Việt forces; Uriyangqadai knew of the river fleets used by Đại Việt, and desired to draw them into an ambush and thus neutralize their mobility. The vanguard commander did not listen and immediately engaged with the enemy, and a frustrated Uriyangqadai then advanced to support him. Despite the insubordination and the Vietnamese fielding war elephants, the Mongols had the better of the battle; Aju is said to have ordered archers to shoot into the eyes of the elephants. However, a defiant rear guard allowed the Trần leadership to escape the battle on the ships, and the always strict Uriyangqadai ensured the foolish vanguard commander paid for this with his life.   The Trần forces again attempted to stop the Mongol advance, occuping a bank of the Phù Lỗ river at the start of 1258 and cutting down the bridge. The Mongols cleverly found a ford; shooting arrows into the sky, when they fell and disappeared -meaning they had sunk into the mud- that indicated an area shallow enough to cross. They met and routed the Trần army, and now they rushed onto the capital, Thăng Long- only to find it abandoned. The Trần King, government and most of its population had evacuated before the Mongol arrival, taking most of the foodstuffs with them.   Vietnamese and the Chinese sources differ on the precise details of what followed, but generally it can be said that Uriyangqadai withdrew, and was harassed by local forces as went, and the Trần King offered tribute to keep the Mongols at bay. It may have been that the heat, humidity and tropical disease wreaked havoc on Mongolian men, bows and horses and he wanted out of there as quickly as possible, only escaping with heavy losses. It may have been that due to the timetable Mongke had set for the assault on the Song, Uriyangqadai simply did not have time to stay in Đại Việt any longer. Indeed, upon his return to Mongol occupied Yunnan, he was almost immediately leading forces into the Song Dynasty’s southwestern border.   The Trần Kings now sent tribute to the Mongols, expecting it would be a continuation of the relationship they had had with the Song: tribute once every three years, a nominal submission to keep the peace. For almost two decades, this was essentially what followed, as the Mongols were too preoccupied with the succession struggle after Mongke’s death and Kublai’s ensuing war with the Song Dynasty to press the matter further. Likewise, Champa began to send tribute to the Khan. With the Song still a buffer between them, the kingdoms of Vietnam felt some security from the Mongols.       However, Kublai began asking for both monarchs to submit to him in person and confirm their allegiance, which both put off in favour of continued tribute missions. Other demands had to be met as Mongol vassals, such as censuses, allowing daruqachi to be posted in their cities and demands for labour and materials- all were requirments neither kingdom had yet to meet.  The end of Song resistance at Yaishan by 1279 to Kublai’s Yuan Empire removed  the buffer between them, and now the excuses of the Trần and Cham kings was far less acceptable, as was their housing of fleeing Song officials. In 1280 Kublai demanded that if the Trần king could not come in person, then he must send a massive golden likeness of himself with pearls for eyes, as well as increased amounts of tributes, as well as demanding the kingdom’s most skilled doctors and artisans, most virtuous scholars and most beautiful women every three years. The Great Khan’s demands grew ever greater, the intention clear: the submission of Đại Việt and Champa must be total.   Kublai’s eyes were also going further afield. Dreaming of completing the conquest of the world, the fall of the Song, the greatest single independent power not subject to the Mongols, seemed to open up access to valuable maritime trade routes.  It has been speculated that Kublai saw Champa as key to controlling the south-east Asian trade, essentially a landing strip jutting out into the trade routes darting from India, Indonesia and China. After years of perceived insubordination, once the Chams imprisoned Yuan envoys in 1282, Kublai had his pretext for war and a chance to seize the sea trade. Striking at Champa first had the added benefit of putting Đại Việt in a vice grip between Yuan China and an occupied Champa, and hopefully bring it to heel as well. Having overcome the formidable Song Dynasty, the often politically fragmented Champa would have seemed an easy target in comparison. Officials in Guangxi province had sent encouraging messages to the court, saying less than 3,000 men would be needed to overrun the Chams. After the failure of the second invasion of Japan in 1281, Kublai was also hungry for a quick and easy victory. Though the 1270s had been successful, they had worn Kublai out; by the 1280s, he was no longer the patient man he had been in the 1250s, planning out every detail of the Dali campaign with his experienced generals and advisers. His most loyal and critical advisers had died over the 1270s, and Kublai had outlived the most veteran commanders. Having come to expect total victory regardless, Kublai now demanded it immediately.       In December 1282, Sogetu, a hero of the final war against the Song Dynasty and governor of Fujian, departed with 5,000 men drawn from former Song territory aboard a hundred transport ships, arriving near the Cham capital of Vijaya in February 1283. After brief resistance, Vijaya fell to Sogetu, who found that the Cham leadership, its King Indravarman V and Prince Harijit, had fled into the mountains. After wasting a month in fruitless negotiation with Cham envoys, once Indravarman executed his envoys, in March 1283 Sogetu set out on the attack.  In the jungle his men were ambushed and driven back, and Sogetu retreated to the coast where he cleared land to plant rice to feed his men. There, he sent envoys to the Khmer Empire (who were detained) and sent messages to the Yuan court for aid.        Initially, the court’s response was slow, still planning for a third invasion of Japan. Ariq Khaya, the Uighur commander who had helped crush the last of Song resistance, was ordered to raise thousands of Jurchen, Northern Chinese and former Song troops to aid Sogetu, but failed to do so. It was not until March 1284, after plans for the third Japanese invasion were finally abandoned, when an army of 20,000 was dispatched to aid Sogetu. Setting out by sea and delayed by a brief mutiny, they arrived the next month to link up with a campaigning Sogetu, who had begun sacking Cham cities along the coast. The Cham King Indravarman sent word he was willing to submit, but would be unable to offer tribute due to the plundering. Such concerns did not really bother the Mongols.       By August 1284 the Yuan court had received maps showing the land routes through Đại Việt to Champa, and it was declared that Kublai’s eleventh son Toghon would lead a force overland to assist Sogetu. Đại Việt was ordered to help supply this army, but they refused: it was immediately apparent in the Trần court that this was almost certainly a pretext for a Yuan conquest of Đại Việt. At that time, the reigning Trần King was Trần Khâm, temple name Trần Nhân Tông. His father, the previous king Trần Thánh Tông, was still alive: the Vietnamese had a similar institution to the Japanese, wherein the previous monarch would ‘retire,’ abdicating the throne for their heir and as ‘emperor-emeritus,’ tutor their successor while stepping out of all that strict court protocol. So it was in 1284 that the 15th century chronicle the Complete Book of the Historical Records of Đại Việt, records a famous episode. The ‘emperor-emeritus’ Trần Thánh Tông, once it was apparent that the Mongol attack was forthcoming, summoned elders and advisers from across Đại Việt to discuss the best course of action and strategy. Supposedly, they all shouted in unison, “Fight!”   So the Trầns began to prepare for the assault, readying officers and men. Of these, one man is the most famous for his preparations, Trần Quốc Tuấn, though you may know him better by his later title, Prince Hưng Đạo. Part of Hưng Đạo’s long standing popularity in Vietnamese history was his character, worth a small digression. Hưng Đạo’s rise to prominence was an unexpected thing. He was the nephew of the first Trần King, the son of his rebellious older brother. While his father died disgraced and as a traitor, Hưng Đạo made himself a shining beacon of loyalty and filial piety- two very good traits to have if you want to have Confucian inspired historians write nice things about you. Hưng Đạo actively made himself appear the most loyal of all the Trần King’s servants, perhaps to overcompensate for his father’s actions. His charisma, natural talent and skill made his life an exemplary subject for chroniclers to fawn over,  with one notable exception: when he was around 20 years old, Hưng Đạo had an affair with an imperial princess already engaged to another man. It was a scandal resolved by marrying the two, but was nonetheless an embarrassment. When it became apparent that war was coming, Hưng Đạo marked himself out by preparing and training men and officers, before taking a leading role in the strategy himself.    In January 1285, Prince Toghon and Ariq Khaya led some eight tumens over the border from Yunnan into Đại Việt. He had with him an ousted member of the Trần royal family, Trần Ích Tầc, who the Yuan had declared the new King of Đại Việt and were going to place onto the throne. In addition, another column came further west, led by Nasir ad-Din, the Khwarezmian appointed by the Mongols to govern Yunnan; he was the son of the first Mongol appointed governor of the province, a skilled figure named Sayyid Ajall. The forces sent against Toghon, Ariq Khaya and Nasir ad-Din were quickly overcome, and captured ships allowed them to cross the Phu-luong River in February.  Meanwhile, Sogetu was marching north, a great pincer movement on Đại Việt. Prince Hưng Đạo divided his forces to try and prevent Sogetu from linking up with Toghon, but Sogetu overwhelmed them, capturing 400 renegade Song officials. By the time Sogetu linked up with Toghon, the Prince had constructed a full river fleet and placed them under the command of Omar, one of the Yuan’s top naval commanders and Nasir ad-Din’s son. Together, they undertook a full offensive against Đại Việt, Omar driving the King out to sea while Toghon and Sogetu captured the capital of Thăng Long. Armies sent against them were annhilated and many Trần generals defected to the Yuan forces.       With Thăng Long’s seizure, the Yuan experienced their final success of this campaign. Again, Thăng Long had been skilfully evacuated to deny the Mongols access to supplies or the royal family, thus preventing the city’s occupation from being a true strategic gain. In Thăng Long, Yuan forces and supply lines were overextended, running low on food while heat and disease took their toll. In June one of the Yuan commanders, Li Heng, was killed by poisoned arrows and his force decimated by ambushes. A former Song Dynasty officer and his entourage, fighting alongside the Vietnamese, donned their old Song style uniforms and armours, which panicked  the Yuan detachments thinking they were now facing long-lost Song reinforcment! The fallen Vietnamese were found to have tattooed “kill the Tatars!” on their own bodies, angering, frustrating and frightening the Yuan forces- many of whom, it should be noted, were not Tatars but conscripted Chinese and others who would be forced to share their fate. All bodies with such tatoos were ordered to be decapitated. Toghon, seeing their position was untenable as morale crumbled, decided to call a full retreat back to Yuan territory. So swiftly was this done that Toghon failed to inform Sogetu of the retreat, who suddenly realized he was left isolated deep in enemy territory.  Hurriedly he forced his way north, but the Vietnamese harried him. Sogetu was captured and killed in battle, and the remainder of his force was largely surrounded and destroyed at Ssu-ming on the Yuan border.       This was a disastrous end to the campaign. The Mongols had suffered reversals, loss of commanders and had to turn back from campaigns before. Battles had been lost of course, but major defeats like the Japan invasions could be explained away as the interventions of nature and the heavens. But the Vietnam campaign was a direct military fiasco, one of Kublai’s own sons failing to deliver victory.  Kublai was so furious he refused to allow Toghon back to the capital. Frustrated by failures and his mind increasingly clouded by drink and depression, Kublai ordered a third invasion of Đại Việt. Special care was taken for this invasion. The Trần pretender Trần Ích Tầc was once again to be promoted, to hopefully encourage dissension, and great effort was taken to prevent the logistical issues of the previous campaign. Supply ships were ordered from all along the southern Chinese coast to ferry troops and provide the food necessary for the great army being assembled: 70,000 Mongol, Jurchen and Northern Chinese, 6,000 troops from Yunnan, 1,000 former Song soldiers, 6,000 local troops from Guangxi and 17,000 Loi people from the island of Hainan, for a total of 100,000 men not including the crews of the 500 warships and transports. Toghon was placed in overall command again, his final chance to redeem himself before his aging father.        While it is easy to focus on the Yuan losses, it must not be thought it was an easy experience in Vietnam. As per custom, the Mongols had metted out savage reprisal on cities; we know from elsewhere that when frustrated, as when denied a chance to meet the foe directly in battle, it only resulted in increased devastation on those they fell across. Crops and rice patties were destroyed by the tred of armies and horses, and we cannot imagine what starvation and horrors greeted the population caught in the middle of this conflict. Many thousands fled into the wilderness to escape the Yuan armies, and few could have been prepared for the experience. Their suffering from disease, lack of water and resources goes unmentioned in the sources. The capital of Thăng Long had been looted and occupied for the second time in thirty years. In Champa the evidence is less clear, but it seems Sogetu burned his way through many of the most prominent city’s along the coast in his march north. In the Complete Book of the Historical Records of Đại Việt, in the entry for the year 1286 Prince Hưng Đạo provides this assessment to the King:   “Our kingdom has been at peace for a long time. The people do not know about military matters. Previously when the Yuan came and raided, there were those who surrendered or fled. By relying on the potent awe of the imperial ancestors, Your Highness’s divine [perspicacity] and martial [awe] wiped clean the dust of the nomadic barbarians. If they come again, our troops are trained at fighting, while their army fears a distant campaign. They are also dejected by the defeats of Heng and Guan. They do not have the heart to fight. As I see it, they are sure to be defeated.”   Hưng Đạo, as fitting his character, comes across optimistic and eager to fight. Yet, he recognized that many had quickly defected or routed before the Mongols. The Vietnamese needed to prepare to meet the Mongols again ahead on, rather than simply rely on the ‘awe’ of the King.       In October 1287, the third invasion began. The army  into three major forces: Toghon took the main army overland, 6,000 traveled west of the main army to act as a diversionary force and 18,000 were taken by Omar and Fan Yi aboard war ships sailing along the coast to find and neutralize the Việt navy. The large transport fleet followed some days behind Omar’s armada, anticipating that Omar would have cleared the way of enemy ships for them. In December the main army crossed the border in two columns and defeated several Đại Việt forces, marching to Vạn Kiếp on the Bạch Đằng River to await the arrival of Omar’s fleet, who arrived after fighting off a Vietnamese navy. Despite early success, neither force had brought much for food supplies, expecting to be supplied by the transport fleet.       Toghon waited for the supply fleet until the end of January 1288, but unbeknownst to him much of the supply fleet was blown off course by a storm, and the rest were attacked by the Việt  navy. The commander Trần Khánh Dư held his fleet in secret up a river near the coast at Vân Đồn, and allowed the Yuan warships under Omar to pass by. Once Omar and the warships were beyond reach, Trần Khánh Dư  fell upon the unguarded, slower moving Yuan supply ships. By seizing and scattering these, he ensured the breakdown of the massive Yuan army. With food supplies running low, Toghon marched onto Thăng Long, hoping to resupply there. The city fell without opposition in February 1288, but to their horror they found there wasn’t a grain of rice left within: the defenders had once again stripped it in their flight. The increasingly desperate Yuan forces went to great effort to gather food until learning of the disaster which befell the supply fleets at Vân Đồn. Toghon ordered the army back to stockades they had constructed at Vạn Kiếp, and by the end of March, once his men were on the verge of starvation, he ordered a general retreat back to China. It was now the Việt forces sprung their trap. The Yuan army’s route north was harried by continual ambushes and the destruction of roads and bridges to hamper their movements. Arrows flew out from the trees to strike men down. Tropical diseases the Mongols were unused to spread among them, humidity warped their bows and the trees howled with the sounds of alien creatures ensuring sleepless nights. Toghon, great-grandson of Chinggis Khan, showed his pedigree by hiding in a copper tube on the march, then abandoning the troops to board a warship and sail back to the Yuan realm.       On April 9th, 1288, Omar’s fleet was sailing past the mouth of the Bạch Đằng river when a group of Vietnamese ships, commanded by Prince Hưng Đạo, sailed out to meet him at high tide. Eager for some sort of victory, Omar took a portion of the fleet and attacked. The Vietnamese routed before the Yuan warships, fleeing back up the river whence they had come. When the Yuan fleet pursued up the river, the trap was sprung: while the smaller and lighter Vietnamese craft had cruised by in safety, wooden stakes placed along the river bottom impaled the larger Yuan vessels, holding them in place as the tide receded. With the Yuan ships immobilized, the Vietnamese turned about and attacked: helpless, many Yuan soldiers jumped into the river, drowning or picked off by the arrows of Đại Việt, and Omar was captured. The other fleet commander, Fan Yi, attempted to rescue Omar, but his vessels were surrounded and boarded, Fan Yi himself killed in the fighting. Some 400 ships were captured, capping off a campaign which saw most of its land forces destroyed in the wilderness.       1288 proved to be a total fiasco for the Yuan. Only a few years after the destruction of the great armada off the shores of Kyushu, another fleet and army were destroyed with little to show for it. Toghon was sent into political exile after both disastrous campaigns, his son another disgrace to add to Kublai’s troubles of the 1280s. Unlike earlier, thoroughly planned and prepared campaigns, the Mongol leadership was unable to gather the information they needed to properly orchestrate their attacks. The destruction of the cities did not sway or put adequate fear into the Vietnamese monarchs, the sufferings of the population could not move them and unable to capture the enemy leadership, the Mongol were denied many of the strategic tools they had commonly employed to disable the enemy defense. In the dense and rugged jungles and mountains, the Mongols’ greatest tactical advantage, the mobility and range of their horse archers, was neutralized, while the heat, humidity and diseases wrought havoc upon troops and horses unused to such a climate. While victorious in the primary field engagements, the Yuan were unable to transform these battles into strategic successes. And crucially, the Mongols struggled to supply themselves. Small foraging parties could be picked off by the locals, supply lines could more be secured and larger armies were dependent on those supply fleets. When the supply fleets of the third invasion were destroyed by Trần Khánh Dư  at Vân Đồn, the massive army commanded by Toghon became a huge, unreadable, liability. All of these were compounded by the fact the Yuan leadership totally underestimated Vietnamese resilience and the Yuan commander, Toghon, was an inept and inexperienced general: in contrast, the military leaders of  Đại Việt were able to maximize their strengths and strike at the Yuan when they were their most vulnerable.    While Bạch Đằng was a masterfully executed victory by Prince Hưng Đạo, Đại Việt and Champa had suffered terribly over both campaigns, and both kingdoms, to avoid another invasion began sending tribute and recognized Kublai’s authority. Still, their resilience and refusal of either monarch to come before him left Kublai wanting another invasion, the Trần pretender Trần Ích Tầc again readied to be put onto the Trần throne, but as with much else, such thoughts were abandoned on Kublai’s death in 1294. After Kublai’s death, relations were eased between Yuan, Đại Việt and Champa. The kingdoms in Vietnam paid their tribute, and they were spared another Mongol assault. Relations between Đại Việt and Champa improved, and a marriage alliance was organized. The former Cham Prince Harijit, now King Simhavarman III, married the daughter of the Trần King, only to die suddenly in 1307. The death of the Cham king brought a new round of tension between the two states, eventually turning into a continuous conflict between them that ultimately culminated in the Viet seizure of Vijaya in 1471.   Today, Bạch Đằng is a highly celebrated episode in Vietnam’s history, the tactics and strategy of Hưng Đạo studied by the Vietnamese during the Vietnam war. The introduction of the idea of the nation-state to Vietnam has seen Hưng Đạo turned into a symbol of the nation, a single person embodying the ideals of resistance to powerful, foreign foes.  But for Kublai, the disasters in Vietnam were only the start to a rough decade, which we will explore over our next episodes, so be sure to subscribe to the Kings and Generals podcast to follow. To help us keep bringing you great content, please consider supporting us on Patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. This script was written and researched by Jack Wilson, with the kind assistance of Phú Võ for accessing Vietnamese and Chinese materials. I’m your host David, and we’ll catch you on the next one.

With the loss of control over the western half of the Mongol Empire, Kublai Khan was left to direct his considerable energies against the single strongest holdout to Mongol rule; the Southern Song Dynasty, dominating China south of the Huai River since the early 1100s. An immense economic and military power, the conquest of this dynasty would be no small feat- trying to do so claimed the life of no less that Kublai’s predecessor the Grand Khan Mongke in 1259, as covered in episode 31. The completion of the conquest of China was to be Kublai’s greatest accomplishment; but first Kublai needed to overcome the mighty walls of Xiangyang, the key to Song China. I’m your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.       As discussed in episode 31 and 32, at the end of 1259 Kublai was forced to withdraw from his campaign against the Song, returning to his residence in Inner Mongolia where he declared himself Khan in the first months of 1260. The led to war between Kublai and his brother Ariq Boke for the throne, culminating with Ariq’s surrender in 1264 and Kublai securing his title as Khan of Khans. However, the upheaval of this conflict broke Mongol imperial unity, and by the mid 1260s the Mongol Empire was irrevocably broken into independent Khanates. Kublai had little authority over these western Khanates, his effective power only with difficulty reaching to the Altai Mountains and the Tarim Basin.        Unlike the previous Khans whose power centres were in Mongolia proper, Kublai’s very legitimacy was tethered to his Chinese territory. Aside from his own personal interests in Chinese culture, it had been the resources of northern China which had allowed him to overcome his brother Ariq. Abandoning Karakorum in Mongolia, which was exposed and difficult to support, Kublai moved his capitals south: first at Shangdu, in what is now Inner Mongolia on the very border of the steppe and China; and then at the site of the former Jin Dynasty capital of Zhongdu, where modern Beijing sits. This was Dadu, the “great city” in Chinese, or as it was known to Turks, Mongols and Marco Polo, Khanbaliq, the Khan’s city. The indications were clear from the outset; Kublai was not just a Mongol Emperor, but Emperor of China- though the specifics of this political aspect we will explore in a future episode.        As a part of this, Kublai needed to bring the Song Dynasty under his rule. Kublai, much like his brothers, was a firm believer in the eventuality of Mongol world domination.  It was not a debate of if, but when. Kublai may have cultivated an image as a more humane conqueror than the likes of Chinggis or Mongke, but he was a conqueror nonetheless. The Song Dynasty had to accept Mongol overlordship or be destroyed. For a man also trying to overcome his ‘barbarian’ origins to show himself as rightful ruler of China, having a rival dynasty claiming to be the heirs of the illustrious Han and Tang Dynasties was a major hurdle to his legitimacy in the eyes of many Chinese. The flight of refugees from north China to the Song Dynasty was considerable throughout the thirteenth century, and any revolt within Kublai’s domains could see Song aid, financial, moral or military.       The subjugation of the Song to solidify his rule as both a Mongol Khan and a Chinese Emperor was, in Kublai’s mind, absolutely necessary. The problem was actually doing that. Warfare with the Song broke out in 1234, months after the final defeat of the Jin Dynasty. Thirty years later, in 1264, the frontier had hardly shifted. The Mongols controlled the territory across the Song’s northern and western frontiers, including Tibet and the Dali Kingdom in Yunnan. Even the northern Vietnamese Kingdom of Dai Viet, known to the Chinese as Annam, now paid tribute to the Khan. Advances against Song were difficult; western Sichuan was under a tenuous Mongol hold, unmoved since Mongke’s death in that province. The Mongols had found they could often easily penetrate the Song border, but holding territory was another matter. Unlike northern China, marked by the relatively open North China Plain, the south was a myriad of thick forest, mountains, rivers and canals, the available space covered in rice paddies and other agriculture. This was not the open terrain so suited to Mongol cavalry warfare. The humidity and heat grew ever more oppressive the farther south one travelled, spreading diseases the Mongols and their horses struggled against. It was also home to the largest cities in the world. The Song capital of Linan, modern Hangzhou, held well over one million people- about the population of Mongolia when Chinggis Khan unified the tribes in 1206. The Song fielded a regular army of at least 700,000, supported by a large navy. The many huge cities built along the Yangzi River could be resupplied by naval support, an area in which the Mongols had little experience. The thoroughly planned campaign of Mongke in 1258-9 had wrought much devastation but little gain, and on the Mongol withdrawal at the end of 1259 the Song reoccupied most of the lost territory.       A military conquest of the Song was an immense task, and something Kublai wanted to avoid. Soon after declaring himself Khan in 1260, he sent an emissary with terms. The Song Emperor, Lizong of Song since 1224, could continue to reign as a client of the Khan. They had merely to recognize Kublai as the Son of Heaven and they could continue to rule, with of course yearly tribute and prayers in the name of the Khan. It was, from Kublai’s point of view, a chance for them to enjoy great prosperity and avoid the many hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives that would be lost by further fighting.  Since it didn’t involve extensive retribution as punishment for thirty years of fighting, Kublai must have thought it a very generous offer.       Kublai’s envoy, one of his top Chinese advisors named Hao Ching, was promptly imprisoned. He would not be released for 15 years. Hao Ching had run afoul of the man now in charge of the southern Song, the infamous Jia Sidao. To some, Sidao was the last intelligent man in Hangzhou, deftly guiding the dynasty against an indomitable enemy, outmaneuvering his foes and a political mastermind let down by a corrupt and rotten dynasty. To others, Sidao is the archetypal “bad minister,” overconfident and inept, downplaying the Mongol threat and hiding the truth from the emperors until it was too late. For some, he is best known as the ‘Cricket Minister,’ who liked to train the insects to fight each other. Sidao’s role in the fall of the Song is complicated, though his 15 year mastery of the Song court saw the loss of the final chance to avoid disaster.       Unlike the majority of the court officials, Jia Sidao was no graduate of the Examinations from which most bureaucrats from the Tang to the Qing were chosen. Born in 1213 to a military family in Zhejiang province, Sidao’s father Jia She was a respected Song military commander in Shandong, and Sidao followed in a variety of military and civil positions in strategic areas along the Yangzi River. Sidao’s good fortune was helped by his talent and the fact his sister was a favourite consort of Emperor Lizong. Lizong and Sidao did not meet until 1254 when Sidao was Associate Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, and immediately struck up a friendship. Promotions quickly followed. The relationship seems to have been genuine; contrary to the Netflix series where Sidao’s rise is due to his sister’s influence, Sidao’s sister had died in 1247, leaving Sidao to ascend on his own charisma and competence.        In Sichuan when Mongke attacked in 1258, Sidao returned east after the Khan’s death. His timing was good; the removal of the Chancellor of the Right, Ding Daquan, left an opening at the top of the Song court, which Lizong replaced with his buddy Jia Sidao at the end of 1259. One of Sidao’s first acts was to play up Kublai’s withdrawal, acting as if Sidao had won a great victory. It was Sidao who imprisoned Kublai’s envoy, Hao Ching in 1260. Acting as sole Chancellor from 1260 onwards, Sidao wished to fervently resist the Mongols, something in which the court was in agreeance. How to do it was another matter. For Sidao, an important step was fiscal reform to strengthen the dynasty. The economic cost of the war was immense. A massive standing army, destruction of valuable regions across the frontier, alongside rampant corruption and hyperinflation of their paper currency put the Song court in a precarious economic position. Sidao ordered land surveys in 1262 to find those avoiding taxation. In 1263, he ramped this up with his Public Fields Measures, wherein officials with tax exempt status had  their excess lands confiscated. The government was supposed to purchase the land from the owners, but they were largely paid in the increasingly worthless paper money, or the land was outright seized.  Sidao hoped to use this land to grow the foodstuffs necessary for the Song army, but his effort had the side effect of creating a large body of Song officials and elite highly antagonistic to Sidao.        Sidao also set up letter boxes to anonymously report corruption and official offensives. It was a fine sentiment, though it turned out many of these corrupt officials also happened to be the ones Sidao didn’t like. Removing and at times executing those who stood in his way, Sidao appointed his own men to their positions. The polarization of the court was intense, though Sidao could overcome this as he had the strong support of the Emperors. Lizong died suddenly in November 1264, succeeded by his 24 year old nephew Zhao Qi, known by his temple name Duzong of Song. Duzong, if anything, had an even closer relationship with Jia Sidao, who had been his tutor. Duzong was much more interested in extravagant feasts and women than affairs of state -hardly the image of austerity expected when facing the threat of the Mongols, when other lordly men were required to give up lands and sons for the cause. The new Emperor was immensely loyal to Sidao, and in some depictions subservient to him. In 1269 when Sidao played with resigning from the court, Emperor Duzong came on his knees begging and crying for Sidao to return, which Sidao did with the dismissal of more of his court foes.       While this was going on, Sidao was putting substantial investment in defense, especially around the region of Xiangyang, which we will get to shortly, and in improving the walls of the capital. Diplomatic efforts were at their lowest with the Mongols since the outbreak of war in the 1230s, and even though Kublai Khan routinely released captured Song merchants and prisoners in an effort to build goodwill, Jia Sidao did not budge. And since Sidao controlled the court and policy of the Song, the Song court did not budge either.       Aside from retaking some cities and border skirmishing, Jia Sidao did not take any larger offensives against Kublai during his occupation with Ariq in Mongolia. Sidao likely recognized that, with their well-built walls and defensive weapons supported by rivers and ships, the Song’s defense could stick up to the Mongols. Yet on the offense, especially in the more open territory of the north, the Song armies would suffer the same results they had on every other northern expedition in the Dynasty’s 300 year history; a dismal defeat against the cavalry based armies.  Perhaps the most notable effort at undermining Kublai’s rule in north China was by encouraging a Chinese warlord in Shandong allied to the Mongols, Li Tan, to revolt. Despite both he and his father, the Red Coat warlord Li Quan, having fought the Song for decades, Li Tan was not feeling like he was favoured under Kublai. Encouraged by Song promises and Kublai’s conflict with Ariq, in February 1262 Li Tan declared for the Song and threw off Mongol rule.        It took about a month for Mongol forces to arrive and defeat Li Tan’s rebels in the field. Li Tan was caught in August 1262 and executed. The Song had provided no direct aid for Li Tan, whose small forces were quickly overcome by Mongolian and Chinese under Shih Tienzi, a Northern Chinese whose family had loyally served the Mongols since the late 1210s. Jia Sidao may have wanted to see if the Chinese of the north would rise up against the Mongols, but the Mongol response was quick enough to violently put a stop to any talk of rebellion. The most significant outcome of the rebellion was upon Kublai himself. Not only had Li Tan, a Chinese warlord considered a loyal subject of the Khan rebelled, but Li Tan’s father-in-law Wang Wentung was found to have been complicit. Wang Wentung was the Chief Administrator of Kublai’s Central Secretariat, and one of the most influential figures in Kublai’s administration. Executed only weeks after Li Tan’s initial revolt, it was a blow to Kublai’s trust of the Chinese in his government. In the aftermath, Kublai decreased the power of many of the Chinese in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy, replacing them with Central Asians, Muslims, Turks and Tibetans. Many of the Chinese warlord families who had served the Mongols since Chinggis Khan saw their holdings reduced or forfeited. The family of Shih Tienzi, a man noted for his loyalty to the Mongols over many decades of service, ceased to be feudal lords, though this was partly on Tienzi’s urging in order to not lose the trust of the Khan.  Such was the effect of Sidao’s effort to undermine Mongol rule in North China.       Kublai’s first years as Khan were focused on consolidating and establishing his governing apparatus of northern China, and for the first half of the 1260s conflict with the Song was relegated to border skirmishes. Aside from diplomatic efforts to encourage a surrender of the Song Dynasty, Kublai also offered great rewards and lands for defectors in an effort to encourage desertions. Here, Kublai had some successes, perhaps the most notable early on being Liu Zheng, who became one of Kublai’s staunchest supporters and the ardent proponent of a navy. Liu Zheng and other like minded men convinced Kublai that the key was not multi-front attacks, but seizing control of the Yangzi River, the backbone of the Song realm where the Dynasty’s most prominent cities sat. To do this, the Mongols needed to build a navy and take the stronghold of Xiangyang.       If you look at a topographic map of China, three river systems should stand out to you, running in three lines from west to east. The northernmost and the longest is the Yellow River, which curls from the foothills of Tibet down into the Ordos desert, where it forms its great loop before cutting across the north China plain to spill out into the sea by the Shandong peninsula. This was the barrier which the Jin Dynasty moved their capital behind in an effort to protect themselves from Chinggis Khan. South of the Yellow River is the Huai, the shortest of the three rivers here, which marked the border between Jin and Song for a century, and now served as the Mongol-Song border line. By Kublai’s time, the Mongols had failed to hold it, the area south of the Huai a mess of canals and smaller rivers serving agriculture, terrain unsuited to cavalry maneuvers. Our third river on the map is the Yangzi, a wide and fast flowing river which was the natural defense against any northern invader. The most populated cities in the world were clustered along it, including the Song capital of Hangzhou, a short trip south from the River’s eastern end on the ocean. The Yangzi could only be crossed with difficulty, and the Song used it as a highway to reinforce and resupply cities, ferry troops and generally prevent a Mongol conquest. Lacking any beachheads on the Yangzi, the Mongols had nowhere to build up a navy and begin to challenge Song authority there.       That is, except for the Han River. Nestled between the mountains of Sichuan in the west and end of the Huai river to its east, runs the Han River, cutting north to south to intersect with the Yangzi at what is now Wuhan. The Han was the strategically vital access point, one where the Mongols had the potential to build up a river fleet in security before assaulting the Yangzi. Kublai knew this, and so did Jia Sidao, who for this reason spent huge amounts improving the defences of the twin cities of Xiangyang and Fancheng, which today are the super-city of Xiangfang. Sitting on opposite sides of the Han River, the two cities stood at the edge of the Song Dynasty and the Mongol Empire. Xiangyang and Fancheng were both huge, well fortified with wide moats, well provisioned and guarded by large garrisons and a variety of counter siege weapons. With both cities right on the river, they could continually be resupplied and deny the Mongol advance. Liu Zheng and the other Chinese defectors argued that Kublai should forget the favourite Mongol ploy of vast pincer movements. The Song had resources and moral enough to withstand these. Instead, the defectors argued, Kublai needed to throw his total might against Xiangyang and Fancheng.        Preparations began in the second half of the 1260s with the creation of a river fleet. In 1265, the Mongols won a battle at Tiaoyu Shan in Sichuan against the Song, capturing 146 boats. Koreans, Jurchen and Northern Chinese were put to work building more ships; in early 1268, officials in Shaanxi and Sichuan were ordered to construct another 500 vessels. By the last months of 1268, a large force of Mongols, Turks and northern Chinese converged upon Xiangyang and Fancheng. The Song defector Liu Zheng was placed in charge of the Mongol fleet, blocking off the Han River south of the cities to cut them off from the Yangzi. Aju, Subedei’s grandson, was entrusted with the siege of Fancheng; Shih Tienzi, the Chinese warlord long in service to the Khans, held overall command outside the walls of Xiangyang. A frontal assault was dismissed; the wide moats and thick walls were all but impervious to the catapults the Mongols brought with them. Attempting to storm the cities would result in heavy losses. No, they would need to be starved out. To do so, the Mongols erected walls and defensive works around the cities to cut off land access, while Liu Zheng and his fleet prevented Song reinforcements from the river.        In December of 1268 the garrison made an attempt to break out before the cordon could be tightened, but this was repulsed. The Song commander in Xiangyang, Lu Wenhuan, was a steady hand and kept moral up. They probed the Mongol besiegers continuously, trying to find the weak point in the lines. By March 1269, Shih Tienzi requested another 20,000 reinforcements from Kublai for this reason. The large cities and river access made closing them off a great challenge.       While Jia Sidao has often been accused of hiding the details of the siege of Xiangyang from the Song court, this is a baseless accusation. Duzong of Song may have taken little interest in military matters, but it was beyond the skill of Jia Sidao to hide the massive efforts going on outside Xiangyang; everyone along the Yangzi River would have known of it. The court was very much aware of the siege; the annals of the Song Dynasty, the Song shih, describe the court heaping rewards onto the defenders of Xiangyang in order to encourage their resistance. The court was still united in the opinion of resisting Kublai, even if the how was not agreed upon. Sidao sent multiple armies to relieve the defenders, some of them led by his own brother-in-law, Fan Wenhu. In August 1269, the first of these relieving forces sailed up the Han River to Xiangyang, but was defeated by the Mongol fleet and their boats captured.        In March of 1270 another attempt by the garrison of Xiangyang to break out was defeated and another Song relief fleet was repulsed. Though by then the city was largely closed off by the ever expanding Mongol fortifications, the Mongol commanders needed more men: 70,000 men and 5,000 more ships were requested, giving an image to the scale of the task to really surround these cities. Xiangyang was a whirlpool pulling in men from across the Mongol and Song empires, neither side willing to budge. Several times in later 1270 and 1271 Sidao’s brother-in-law Fan Wenhu led fleets up the Han River to assist Xiangyang, and each time the new Mongol navy proved victorious. The skilled Mongol fleet commanders, most notably the Chinese Liu Zheng and Zhang Hongfan, were adept at this river warfare, luring the Song into ambushes and developing a lengthy system along the Han to detect approaching fleets and communicate response. Jia Sidao ordered attacks on Sichuan, along the border and even a naval attack on the Shandong peninsula. His hopes these would divert Mongol resources were dashed, as most of these were inconclusive, won only minor victories or were outright disasters, as with the Shandong attack. All Sidao achieved was the wasting of Song resources while the noose tightened on Xiangyang.       Though the Mongol navy had a good chokehold on Xiangyang and Fancheng, the cities stood defiant. Well stocked and moral still high, any sort of frontal assault would still result in high losses and possibly allow the Song to break the siege. In 1272 one relief force actually pushed through to reach the city, albeit with heavy losses of most of their men and resources.  Kublai needed something to bring the siege to an end, and reached out west to see about acquiring some news tools.       In 1271, Kublai’s nephew Abaqa sat on the throne of the Ilkhanate. Abaqa was Hulegu’s son, and unlike his cousins in the Golden Horde, still recognized Kublai as the nominal head of the empire. When Kublai’s envoys arrived in 1271 asking for something to assist in the siege, Abaqa had just the ticket. Abaqa sent two Muslim siege engineers, Ismail and Ala al-Din, experienced in the newest advancement in projectile weaponry; the counterweight trebuchet. Developed in Europe in the early thirteenth century, it spread to the crusader kingdoms by the end of the 1250s, where Hulegu may have utilized them in his campaign in Syria in 1260. They were pretty nifty; instead of manpower, as required by the Chinese catapults the Mongols used, the trebuchet used its counterweight and gravity to hurl projectiles with greater accuracy, power and distance.        By the last weeks of 1272, Ismail and Ala al-Din arrived outside the walls of Fancheng and began to build the machines. In December, the first shots were launched into the walls of Fancheng. Within days, they were breached, the Mongols in the city and Fancheng was overrun. A massacre was conducted on those found within, ensured to be visible from the walls of Xiangyang. Still, Xiangyang held out.  Carefully, the trebuchets were disassembled and transported across the river. In the first weeks of 1273, the weapons were carefully set up at  the southeastern corner of Xiangyang. The trebuchets were carefully calibrated and launched a projectile supposedly nearly 100 kilos in weight. The first shot hit a tower along the city walls, a crack like thunder heard across Xiangyang. Panic set in, Xiangyang’s formerly untouchable walls now under real threat.       One of the Mongol commanders, a Uighur named Ariq Qaya, rode to the walls and called for the city’s commander, Lu Wenhuan. He commended Wenhuan on his skilled resistance, but now it was time to submit; do so now, and he would be rewarded by Kublai. Resistance would meet the same end as Fancheng. Lu Wenhuan recognized there would be no relief force from the Song for him now. On the 17th of March, 1273, Lu Wenhuan surrendered Xiangyang to the Mongols. After a 5 year siege, the battle was decisely won in the favour of the Mongols, and the Han River could now become a veritable shipyard for the Mongol advance on the Song.       The fall of Xiangyang sent shockwaves across the Song Empire; Jia Sidao’s authority was greatly undermined, though Duzong of Song’s confidence in him was not shaken. He had  now to prepare for a full river and land invasion of the Song heartland. For Lu Wenhuan, the Mongols kept their promise; siding with the Khan, he would now lead the Mongol spear thrust against the Song. Xiangyang was perhaps the decisive victory in the Mongol-Song war, its fall ensuring the Mongols had a route to truly conquer the dynasty. So great was the story that Marco Polo retold it time and time again on his return to Europe; either through his own ‘enhancing’ of the story, or that of his ghost-writer Rustichello, the account was shifted to remove the Muslims’ role from the siege. Instead, Polo, his father and his uncle became the ones who shared the knowledge of the trebuchet with Kublai. Considering that the siege ended in early 1273, and Polo did not arrive in China until 1274 or 5, we can rather safely dismiss that. However, Polo, the Chinese language Yuan Shi compiled around 1370, and Rashid al-Din, writing in Iran in the early 1300s, all include the story of Kublai gaining his siege equipment from westerners.  Polo just happened to be the only one indicating it wasn’t a Muslim.     Kublai Khan was now poised to end the forty year long war with the Song Dynasty, completing the conquest of China begun by Chinggis Khan some sixty years prior. Our next episode will look at the fall of the Song Dynasty, so be sure to subscribe to our podcast. If you’d like to help us continue bringing you great content, please support us on patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. I’m your host David, and we’ll catch you on the next one. 

For most who experienced the Mongol invasions first hand, it was a sight of untold horror, an unstoppable enemy bringing fire and ruin. For Takezaki Suenaga, a samurai who fought against the Mongols in both of their failed invasions of Japan, it was a chance for the highest glory, and none could restrain him from taking the field against them. For the second episode in our Ghost of Tsushima -themed week, we present the story of a historical samurai who fought the Mongols, one who provided us with a set of illustrated scrolls which described his exploits. Today, we’re going to go through the account of Takezaki Suenaga, a rare opportunity to see how one man experienced the Mongol invasions first hand. Perhaps you’ll be able to compare his experiences with those of the player character, Jin, in Ghost of Tsushima. I’m your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.       Very little is known of Takezaki Suenaga prior to the invasions. He was a gokenin, a ‘houseman,’ a minor samurai from Higo province of Kyushu island, the southernmost of the main five of the Japanese home islands. He was part of the Takezaki clan, owned lands, could provide himself a horse, armour and bring 5 retainers to battle- about average for warriors from Kyushu, but slightly more than what the common samurai of Honshu, the largest Japanese island, could muster. 29 years old on the eve of the first Mongol invasion in 1274, Suenaga was known to have been involved in a land dispute which had put his personal finances in great jeopardy. Beyond such broad strokes, his early life is lost to us.   Higo Province, located in western Kyushu, was comparatively close to the strategic  Hakata Bay, the large, natural harbour which any invasion fleet departing southern Korea would certainly strike for. Suenaga, living in Higo Province, was probably put on warning from 1268 onwards, when the Japanese government, the Kamakura Bakufu, began to prepare for a possible Mongol invasion. The details of this buildup of tension between Japan and Kublai Khan was explained in our previous episode, and we won’t reiterate that here. The Mongol invasion fleet departed Korea early in November 1274, swiftly taking the islands of Tsushima and Iki. As the fleet neared Hakata Bay, the warriors of Kyushu were mobilized, Suenaga among them.  In theory, the warrior would fight together with families of shared lineage, but were under no obligation to do so. Suenaga was part of the Takezaki clan, but operated nearly totally independently of them. By the time he and his men, all on horseback, arrived near the area of Hakata Bay, the Mongols had already broken through the defensive line. Suenaga had trained since childhood in archery, swordsmanship and riding; he had his own colourful set of yoroi armour, rows of iron lamellar and lacquered leather laced together. His principal weapon was the long, asymmetrical yumi, the Japanese warbow, a heavier bow than that utilized by the Mongols. In his small party was a bannerman to mark Suenaga’s location on the battlefield. The sword- not yet the famous katana,which developed in the 14th century- was the dignified sidearm, though the longer, spear-like naginata was more commonly used once the enemy was too close for bow-work.   When Suenaga arrived, the Mongols had already established a temporary camp at Akasaka, some kilometres inland. The commander in charge of the gathering samurai was Shoni Kagesuke.  He ordered those samurai who were already approaching Akasaka, Suenaga among them, to fall back and await reinforcements. As it was poor terrain, they hoped to encourage the Mongols to come to them, lose their formation and then allow Japanese archery to tear at them. Suenaga followed the order, and once the various warriors were recalled and far from the enemy, Suenaga spurred his horse onwards, saying, “Waiting for the general will cause us to be late to battle. Of all the warriors of the clan, I Suenaga will be the first to fight from Higo!”   In Japanese warfare of the period, men were rewarded for valour in combat, being the first to enter battle, taking enemy heads or losing men of their own. Rewards included fine garments, horses, even lands. For a relatively poor samurai like Suenaga who could quite possibly lose his expensive armour, weapons and horse in the battle, not to mention faced dispossession of his lands, such rewards made all the difference. The prestige itself from heroic acts in combat could not be dismissed, either. The problem was that these were powerful incentives against patiently waiting for orders.  As Suenaga rode on, one of commander Kagesuke’s retainers called on Suenaga to dismount and wait, to which he replied, “We five are going to fight before you. We won’t limit ourselves to merely shooting down the enemy! I have no purpose in life but to advance and be known!” Kagesuke recognized that he’d be unable to hold Suenaga back, and told him that he would be witness to him. This was an important aspect to this reward system: unless someone could bring severed heads of the enemy, he needed witnesses, preferably multiple, who could vouch for the samurai’s actions. If the multiple witnesses provided contrasting details, then the Bakufu could dismiss the account.   On his ride to Akasaka, Suenaga encountered some Samurai returning, carrying severed heads of the enemy. Learning that the Mongols had abandoned Akasaka and were retreating to the beach in two main bodies, Suenaga drove his horse onwards ever faster. Pursuing the smaller of the two retreating Mongol forces, Suenaga was frustrated when he rode his horse right into mud flats. By the time he freed his horse, the Mongols had stopped at Sohara. Here he was finally about to close with his enemy, when one of his own retainers stopped him, urging him to wait for the oncoming Japanese reinforcements: better chances of victory, and witnesses, for his actions. In typical fashion, Suenaga dismissed his concerns, shouting: “The way of the bow and arrow is to do what is worthy of reward. Charge!” By then the Mongols had pressed on, reaching the beach and open ground. To Suenaga’s credit, he mentions  his bannerman was the first one out. The small party of samurai were met with a hail of Mongol arrows. The bannerman’s horse was shot out from under him and he was thrown; Suenaga and three other retainers were injured by arrows, and finally his own horse was struck, throwing him into the sand. This is the most famous scene in the illustrated scrolls, which shows Suenaga being thrown forward off his horse while blood spills copiously from the wound.  In the illustration, a bomb is being set off nearby. The presence of this bomb is generally taken to be a later addition to the art, drawn in a different style. Had the Mongols thrown explosives at Suenaga, doubtless he would have mentioned surviving such a terrifying weapon. The likely archaeological remains of such bombs have been found; this specific party of Mongols is just unlikely to have lobbed them at Suenaga.   Thrown from his horse, Mongol arrows raking his small party, Suenaga admits in his narrative that he would have died there, had it not been for a timely charge of a formidable unit of samurai cavalry from Hizen province. It’s commander, Shiroishi Rokuro Michiyasu (shi-roy-shi Ro-ko-ru Mich-i-yasu), rode right through the Mongol line, rider and horse miraculously emerging unscathed. Suenaga was evidently impressed by this, and acted as witness for him. Another gokenin was not so lucky: Suenaga watched the man bestruck in the neck by an arrow. After brief fighting, the Mongol party they had been chasing fled, evidently reached their ships, and thus ended Suenaga’s part in the first Mongol invasion of Japan.  The fleet soon departed, pushed back to Korea by strong winds, as we covered previously. Suenaga, by the way, never mentions anything regarding divine winds or storms, presenting a victory entirely through Japanese force of arms.    The next event in the narrative presented in Suenaga’s scrolls is the most detailed, wherein he travels to Kamakura city to try and get his rewards in 1275. To pay for the journey, Suenaga had to sell horse and saddle, and took the trip from Kyushu to Kamakura. There he met with little luck. The officials of the court ignored his requests, deeming him a minor, insignificant warrior. Here, Suenaga gives the most attribution to divinely inspired favour. Visiting a nearby shrine of Hachiman, the war god, and praying fervently, he returned and was in time to speak with the Office of Appeals. There he met with its administer, Adachi Yasumori, military governor of Suenaga’s home Higo province, one of the most powerful men in Japan and father-in-law to the shikken and Japan’s de facto ruler, Hojo Tokimune.  Suenaga told his story to Yasumori, and learned that Kagesuke’s brother, Tsunesuke, the military governor of Chikuzen province, had not mentioned Suenaga’s exploits in his report on the battle. Lacking this evidence, with neither dead retainers or enemy heads to show for it, Suenaga emphatically declared that if Kagesuke said under oath that Suenaga was lying, then they could take his head. Finally, Yasumori decided to take Suenaga’s deeds straight to the highest authority, the shikken Hojo Tokimune. Suenaga was recognized, rewarded with a fine horse and saddle, and had his land dispute settled in his favour. Of the 120 samurai rewarded for the 1274 invasion, Suenaga was also the only one who received commendation from the shogun. Yasumori’s actions evidently touched Suenaga, who commemorates him in the scrolls and in his will, urged his descendants to serve loyally the house of Adachi.    The Bakufu was generally reluctant to pay out these rewards. Normally as fighting was between the Japanese, confiscated lands and goods from the losing side were made the rewards for valourous samurai. But, fighting against a foreign enemy who retreated back over the sea, meant such rewards essentially had to be paid out of pocket by the Bakufu. A temporary measure to this was to forbid samurai like Suenaga from leaving Kyushu to make the trip to Kamakura to demand rewards, citing reasons of military defence. For the Kamakura Bakufu, this was to become a rather dangerous matter for them in coming years, and our next episode.   Hojo Tokimune and the Bakufu readily realized the victory in 1274 was not an end to the war. The Mongols would return, and in greater force. For this, an even greater effort was thrown into the defences. For over 20 kilometres around Hakata Bay a sea wall was built at likely beachheads, in places 3 metres high and 3 metres wide. Warriors from the provinces of Kyushu were to serve 3 months guard duty along the coast. The shugo positions, the military governors, came under more direct rule of the Hojo clan to strengthen its coordination abilities. Temples were ordered to pray for the nation, and in the final months of 1275 there was even discussion of a retaliatory attack against Korea, though it is difficult to judge if these preparations ever went past discussion.   With the conquest of the Song Dynasty in 1279, Kublai Khan now had ample men and resources for side projects, such as punishing the insolent Japanese archipelago. It was by all accounts a massive undertaking: 40,000 Northern Chinese, Mongolian and Korea troops departing from Korea aboard 900 ships, and as many as 100,000 men from the territories of the former Song Dynasty departing southern China aboard 3,500 ships.  It was immense, likely the largest seaborne invasion before D-Day in 1944, and only barely lurched from the gate. Many of the vessels were repurposed ships designed for rivers in southern China, not open ocean. Others were hastily constructed, built to hurriedly meet the deadline of an impatient Great Khan. The northern fleet, manned by experienced Korean sailors aboard sturdier ships, was ready to go, with a timetable to link up with the southern fleet at Iki island. The southern fleet was held up by the death of a commander, while its provisions spoiled in the warmth of south China. Frustrated, the northern fleet set out on its own;  by the 10th June 1281, Iki island was occupied, and again the fleet set out for Kyushu’s Hakata Bay. The Japanese sea-wall did its work. The Yuan Dynasty armada could not force a landing, well-protected Japanese archers repulsing efforts to land. For two months the fleet was essentially held in standstill, occupying Shiga island and unable to take advantage of the southern fleet’s arrival and disembarking on Kyushu.    With the enemy at sea, when the 35 year old Takezaki Suenaga arrived at Hakata Bay, he had a problem. He didn’t have a boat. Since the Mongols were not coming to them, and hungry for glory, the samurai were taking their small vessels out to sea, boarding the Yuan ships and fighting there. Suenaga and his retainers ran along the beach, looking for ships to take them but none had room. When hope seemed lost, the flag of Adachi Yasumori was spotted on a ship. Boarding a messenger skiff unsuited to the deeper waters where the Mongol fleet was, Suenaga and his retainers reached Yasomuri’s vessel. To the great displeasure of Yasumori’s retainers, Suenaga jumped aboard their ship. He told them he was ordered there by the military governor, and had to be on the ship- which Yasumori’s men saw right through, and ordered him to be thrown off. Suenaga cried that if they just gave him a small boat of his own, he’d leave on his own accord, but somehow that didn’t convince them.    Suenaga tried this same trick on the boat of another lord, Tsumori, where he annoyed them enough that they let him on board. There was no space for Suenaga’s retainers, who complained but could only watch him sail away. Such is the way of the bow and arrow, Suenaga simply wrote on that. In the process Suenaga forgot to grab his helmet, and fashioned an impromptu defence out of two shinguards he tied to his head.  Finally they neared an enemy ship, and in the process of trying to board Suenaga was injured. Frustrated, Suenaga threw his bow away, grabbed a naginata and roared at the rowers to bring them closer to the enemy ship-  only by then the rowers were trying to push them away, fearing for their life. Switching ships again, Suenaga finally got his boarding action later that afternoon, in which he suffered another wound. To his pleasure, his name was the first from the province to be entered into the report for the battle.    His final engagement with the Mongols was taking part in driving them from Shiga island. One of Suenaga’s retainers and a relative were injured in that battle, and two of their horses killed. The Yuan fleet had it worse. Bickering between the Mongolian, Chinese and Korean commanders hampered them, while the soldiers from South China fought poorly, seeing little incentive to die for foreign masters in a foreign land. The lack of progress raised tensions, provisions ran low, and the fleet was on the verge of retreat when on the 15th of August, 1281, the sea began to churn. With a storm oncoming, the men loaded onto the ships and tried to set out for deeper waters. A typhoon, rising unseasonably early, punished the fleet design. The riverine Chinese ships of the southern fleet were annihilated, brought to the depths or tossed onto the rocks. The archaeological remnants found on the sea floor by Takashima island mark their deep graves. The larger Korean vessels designed for open waters fared better; whereas half of the southern fleet was estimated to have been destroyed, only a third of the northern shared the same fate. Survivors who made it to shore, on Kyushu and the neighbouring islands, were hunted down and killed, though some mercy was shown to Southern Chinese- their fate was to be slaves to the Japanese. So ended the second Mongol attempt to invade Japan. Kublai Khaan was furious and demanded a third attack, but we will discuss this in our next episode.   Suenaga, in typical fashion, mentions none of this once his part in the fighting was done. Suenaga’s scrolls were compiled between 1293-1324, and were concerned with his personal exploits and commemorating Adachi Yasumori, murdered in 1285, rather than an overall view of the campaign. The existence of the scrolls themselves is quite unusual for someone living well outside the capital, and were an expensive undertaking. Extensive battle scenes are portrayed, highly detailed armours, horses and dozens of warriors. While his position in 1274 had been humble, he earned himself a pretty penny after the second invasion, primarily through donations people made to a shrine he controlled, and lending seeds at usurious rates. When the farmers failed to pay back the loan, Suenaga seized their lands. For Suenaga, the scrolls were an expensive endeavour, requiring foresight generally uncommon to the samurai of the period. The fact the scrolls survived for us is remarkable: the Takezaki clan lost them in the late fourteenth century when fighting spread through their lands and the scrolls, among other possessions, were seized. They traded between families; at one point, their owners died during the Japanese invasion of Korea in the 1500s. Not until the 1700s did they begin to be copied, and in 1890 they were handed over to Emperor Meiji: today, they sit in Japan’s Museum of the Imperial Collections. If you have seen medieval artwork of the Mongol invasion of Japan, you are looking at one of the illustrations from the scrolls. A full translation by Thomas Conlan can be found in his work, In Little Need of Divine Intervention: Takezaki Suenaga’s Scrolls of the Mongol Invasion of Japan, and provide a fascinating look at a man who perhaps best embodied the ideals of 13th century samurai culture.    If you’re eager for more from us on the Mongol invasions of Japan, please check out the previous episode in our series, and the latest video on our Youtube Channel, Kings and Generals. Our next podcast episode, will wrap up our short series on Japan, detailing the consequences of the invasion on both the Japanese and the Mongol Empire, and its longer historical legacy. Once that is complete, we will return to our original narrative timeline! To help us keep bringing you great content, please consider supporting us on Patreon at www.patreon/kingsandgenerals. I’m your host David, and we’ll catch you on the next one   

For the release of the new Sucker Punch video game, Ghost of Tsushima, which depicts a lone samurai defending a Japanese island from Mongol invaders, we’re going to change up our presentation for a few episodes.  This will be the first in a three part series looking at the Mongol invasions of Japan, a slight jump ahead in the timeline of our episodes so far, going from the reign of Great Khan Mongke to that of his younger brother, Kublai Khan. This first episode will provide greater context to the game, discussing the cause of the first Mongol invasion of Japan in 1274, the actual battle for Tsushima island and the fighting in Hakata Bay.  Our following episode will detail the story of Takezaki Suenaga, a samurai who fought against both invasions and later produced a brilliant set of scrolls depicting his exploits. The final episode will cover the oft-overlooked consequences of the invasion on both Japan and Kublai Khan’s empire, as well as its historical legacy: altogether, we hope to provide an accurate and well rounded view of the historical events surrounding the game utilizing both primary sources and scholarly literature. I’m your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.       Japan first came to Mongol attention through Japanese raids against the Korean peninsula. Called wakō, piracy against the Korean coastline had existed for centuries, but picked up again in the 1220s during Korean weakness caused by the Khitan and Mongol invasions, covered in our previous episodes. The island of Tsushima, situated between Korea and Japan, was a prominent base for these pirates making the short trip over the straits to strike undefended settlements. These attacks were not court sanctioned, a crime of individual opportunity rather an organized effort. By the time the Korean leadership finally submitted in 1259 the raids had largely ceased, but it meant the existence of Japan was known to the Mongols. The new King of Korea in 1260, King Wonjong, had a good relationship with the new Mongol Emperor, Kublai. We will return to Mongke’s reign after these episodes, but for those of you who do not know, Mongke Khan died on campaign in China in August 1259. Two of his younger brothers, Kublai and Ariq Boke, both declared themselves Khaan in the months following. Known as the Toluid Civil War, Kublai based in China was able to overcome his brother based in Mongolia by 1264. Consequences were immense: Mongol imperial unity was shattered as the Mongol ruled Khanates across western Asia began their own conflicts, the Hulegu-Berke war between the Ilkhanate and Golden Horde. Kublai had defeated Ariq, but lost the empire. His authority beyond the western borders of China was only nominal, and the Khanates were effectively independent states from that point on, though contact remained between them. Kublai, by necessity, was forced to focus his continued conquests on China and the surrounding territories.      Kublai’s main target was the Song Dynasty, which ruled southern China. A huge economic power with a massive population, the Song war was a difficult task. The Mongols needed to resort to indirect strategies to help bypass the frontier: in the 1250s, Kublai had conquered the Kingdom of Dali, in China’s modern Yunnan province, to open a front on the southwest of the Song. The Japanese, who had trade ties with the Song, were another direction Kublai could exert his influence. Forcing the Japanese to cut trade with the Song would help weaken the Song economy, and so aid Kublai’s overall war with them. Further, like his brother Mongke, Kublai firmly believed in the eventuality that all of the world was to come under Mongol rule. Bringing in the submission of the Japanese was merely Kublai enacting heaven’s will. He had one other concern that his predecessors did not. Despite controlling Mongolia, the core of Kublai’s realm was China, and tied himself to Chinese imperial tradition for legitimacy there. In classic Chinese tradition he declared his own dynasty in 1271, the Yuan Dynasty, marking himself as heir to the Chinese empires of Han, Tang and successor to the dying Song Dynasty. In the days of the mighty Tang Dynasty, ruling from 618-907 CE, Japan had diplomatic, economic and religious ties with China, and the Tang Emperors considered the Japanese their vassals. These ties petered out before the end of the Tang, and only during the years of the southern Song was there even trade between them. For Kublai, to vassalize Japan would help to legitimize him to the Chinese, bringing Japan ‘back into the fold,’ so to speak. With these various interests in mind, in 1266 he ordered a first set of envoys to travel to Japan via Korea.       Kublai addressed the letter to the King of Japan, and it's here we can discuss a rather unique feature of Japanese government of the time. Firstly, Japan’s official ruler was not the ‘King,’ but the Emperor, at that time Emperor Kameyama, the 90th emperor of Japan. However, since the end of the Genpei War in 1185, the emperor was a figurehead, with real power held by the Shogun. Known as the Kamakura Bakufu, based in the city of Kamakura, the Shogunate was founded by the fearsome Minamoto no Yoritomo, military rulers exercising real authority with the imperial court relegated to ceremonial and religious roles. However, on Yoritomo’s death in 1199, he was succeeded by his young son as shogun. The boy too young to rule, real power was held by the family of Yoritomo's widow, the Hojo clan. Sidelining and replacing shoguns as necessary, for well over a century, Japan was ruled by the regent of the regent, called the shikken. In 1268, the 17 year old Hojo Tokimune became shikken, the de facto ruler, of Japan.       Though Kublai’s envoys in 1266 turned back before they reached Japan, he was not discouraged. Envoys were sent again in 1268, taken aboard Korean vessels specifically instructed not to return without handing off Kublai’s letter. The letter was not as demanding as earlier Mongol missives of the century, but still referred to Kublai as master of the universe, and informed the Japanese that they should open contact with him, for, as Kublai’s wrote at the end of the letter, “Nobody would wish to resort to arms.” It was a tough position for the Japanese, as they knew next to nothing of the Mongols. What they did know, they had learned from merchants or Buddhist Monks from the Song Dynasty, at war with the Mongols since 1234. Having not engaged in actual overseas diplomacy since the 9th century, there was no experience within the court or the Bakufu on how to react. So, the chosen Japanese response was to simply dismiss the envoys with no official response, per the order of the shikken. Ghosting the most powerful monarch on the planet is not a terribly easy thing to do, however.       Later that same year, Kublai ordered the Koreans to build 1,000 warships and conscript 10,000 men, for use against the Song Dynasty or Japan. Later in 1268, he sent a third embassy, which in the first months of 1269, stopped on the island of Tsushima and turned back, but not without first capturing two local fishermen. Brought all the way back to Kublai’s imperial capital of Dadu, modern day Beijing, they were wined and dined by the mightiest man under heaven. Showing off his splendour and unimaginable power, the Khan of Khans told the fishermen he only wanted to have his envoys reach Japan, and to have his name remembered for all time. Was that so much to ask? The fishermen were escorted back to Japan late in 1269 to bring word of Kublai’s desires and his great power, and were promptly ignored by the Bakufu. The ongoing insolence of the Japanese was not something Kublai could ignore.        A diplomatic solution was still preferable, as the war with the Song Dynasty was still ongoing and in 1269 revolt broke out in Korea due to the onerous demands for materials and men. As we discussed in the previous episode, Korea had suffered under near continuous Mongol attacks from 1231 until 1259, and the population struggled to meet the latest demands. It took until the middle of 1271 for the rebellion to be crushed, but by then some Koreans had brought word to Japan of Mongol preparations. Since 1268, some coastal defenses had started to be rallied, but news of the proximity of the danger caused quite the start in the Bakufu. No aid was sent to Korea despite the requests of the defectors, but more warriors began to be mobilized to the island of Kyushu, the westernmost of the five main islands of Japan and most likely site of attack. Mongol envoys returned in 1271 after Korea was pacified, now with a direct threat of invasion if the Japanese failed to reply.  The envoy returned to Korea empty handed by the end of the year, and after trips back to Japan in 1272 and 1273, he finally came to Kublai with news of his failure. The envoy had spent some time in Japan while trying to get the court’s response, so at least he brought the Khan intelligence on the people, land and defences. This was enough for Kublai. Sending more envoys would only make him look toothless. His armies had just taken the major Song Dynasty stronghold of Xiangyang in 1273, the key to southern China. With the Song poised to fall, Kublai could spare forces to punish Japan.        The final preparation for the invasions were carried out over 1274, and departed from southern Korea that November. It was not a massive army, some 15,000 Mongol, Northern Chinese, Khitan and Jurchen troops, 6-8,000 Korean troops, another 7,000 Korean sailors aboard some 8-900 ships. Prince Khindu served as overall commander, with Mongol, Chinese and Korean generals and admirals. The Mongols had little naval experience beyond fighting on rivers in South China, so were reliant on the knowhow of the Koreans for this aspect. Once they made landfall, the Mongols would take care of the rest. The Mongols had overcome every foe they had faced in the 13th century: Kublai imagined a swift victory against the insignificant island of Japan, for Eternal Blue Heaven mandated nothing less. Late on the 4th of November, 1274, the fleet was spotted off the coast of Tsushima.        The island of Tsushima was controlled by the Sō clan, whose head, Sō Sukekuni, was the deputy shugo, military governor. Per the tradition held in the Japanese chronicle, the Hachiman Gudokun, on Tsushima there was a major shrine to Hachiman, the Japanese god of war. The day of the Mongol approach, a fire broke out at the shrine, a bad omen. Once the fire was extinguished, white doves gathered on the shrine’s roof. As doves were the messengers of Hachiman, Sukekuni saw it must have been a warning from Hachiman: surely, he would not have set his own shrine on fire? Indeed, later that day Sukekuni was alerted that a fleet was seen approaching the island. His garrison was mobilized, some 80 Samurai and their retainers who he led to the beach of Komoda; there, they awaited the dawn and the Mongols.        Sukekuni sent a small vessel out as the Mongols neared the beach to inquire as to their intentions. His envoys were rebuffed and the landing ships neared the beaches, forcing Sukekuni to draw his small force up for battle. While famous for their swordsmanship, the 13th century Samurai was primarily a horse archer like the Mongols. With their long, asymmetrical yumi, the iconic bow of the Samurai, their skill and accuracy with the arrow made them deadly. However, the desire for individual glory and distinction in combat preempted them from utilizing the complex unit tactics, repeated hit and runs, skirmishing and feigned retreats which made Mongol horse archery so tactically powerful. When the ships landed under the command of the general Ho-tun, the first troops sent up the beach were likely those considered expendable- i.e, anyone not Mongolian. Poorly armoured Chinese were rushed off the ships and met with Japanese arrows. They suffered under this withering fire, but the Chinese and Koreans did their job, holding up large wicker shields to soak up arrows while the Mongols had time to disembark and prepare their own horses. Sukekuni’s position was overrun, despite withdrawing to the treeline to face the Mongols in close combat where the Samurai were deadly. One of Sukekuni’s comrades took down several advancing soldiers and a Mongol officer, and standing on the body he shouted threats at the Mongols, daring them to face him in battle. The Mongols responded with arrows, piercing the man’s chest armour and ending his boasts. Sukekuni led one final charge against the Mongols before the last of his men were cut down. The Mongols overran Tsushima from November 5th until the 13th, destroying towns, farmland and annihilating the last strands of resistance. The women of the Sō family committed suicide so as to not fall into Mongol hands. The next island to face the fleet, Iki, was greeted by a gruesome sight. Attested in both Japanese and Yuan Dynasty sources, prisoners, mainly women, had wire threaded through their palms and were strung across the prows of the ships in a horrific necklace.       The island of Iki too fell within a day. Several small islands and the Matsuura peninsula were taken after only token resistance as the fleet neared  the northwestern corner of Kyushu and Hakata Bay, the island’s largest natural harbour. It made an ideal landing point for any large army. Hojo Tokimune knew this, and here had collected his warriors. The defensive force was mainly drawn of men from Kyushu, though the mobilization had been extended to parts of western Honshu, the largest Japanese island, in 1274. Exact figures for the Japanese force are uncertain, but were outnumbered. 4-6,000 is a common estimate, against over 20,000 of the Yuan fleet- though the main source for the Mongol side, the Yuan shi, states 102,000 Japanese were arrayed against them.        Landing on the soft sand beaches of Hakata Bay on November 19th, the Chinese and Korean infantry protected by their large shields and long spears disembarked; following were Mongols, Turks, Khitans and Jurchen leading their horses out and mounting them. Traditionally, the Japanese began battle by sending arrows with holes dug through the head, creating a whistling sound as they went through the air. The Mongols, who used such things often for communication in battle, laughed. The beating of drums and gongs signalled Mongol orders; unused to such noise, the Japanese horses panicked. Samurai riding forward to challenge worthy opponents to single combat were met with arrows, and those who tried to ride individually through the thickly pressed enemy line were cut down.. The Japanese sources accused the Mongols of using poisoned arrows, which sickened the men struck by them. Bombs, made of paper or iron and filled with Chinese gunpowder, were lobbed into the Japanese who had never experienced such things- the flash, the noise and smoke injured, disoriented and frightened them.       The Mongols, advancing or retreating as ordered and in unison, were an unnerving sight to Samurai used to smaller, individually led combat. Over the course of the day the Japanese were pushed from the beach and their defensive line was broken through. Fires were set on the nearby town of Hakata, which spread quickly. Another force broke out and tried to make camp at Akasaka, but were repulsed. Once past the initial surprise of the assault, the Japanese archers made a good show of themselves. Every samurai trained since a young age with a bow, and the accuracy and power of their bows took even the Mongols by surprise. Small Mongol parties isolated from the main force were picked off, and one of the top Yuan commanders, Liu Fuxiang, was struck in the face by a Japanese arrow and had his horse stolen. The gravely injured commander was rushed back to the ships. Japanese resistance had proven stiffer than anticipated, and the overconfident Yuan forces had suffered losses for this. Divisions and language barriers in the leadership hamstrung them, and uncertain of moving further inland in unknown territory without reinforcement, by nightfall it was decided to call a retreat.        The Yuan forces returned to their ships and set out for Korea, at which point we get to the most well known aspect of the invasions. Very few contemporary Japanese sources mention divine favour or wind in regards to the withdrawal, at most, stating strong winds pushed the armada back to Korea. One of the main Japanese sources, the Hachiman Gudokun, states the defenders were surprised to find the fleet gone in the morning, only a single ship having run aground. In sources from the Mongol point of view though, we have the most dramatic presentation. The Yuan shi, compiled in the 1370s from Mongol documents, describes the Mongols having crushed the Japanese and needing to withdraw for they had ran out of arrows. On the way back, they were struck by an almighty storm, losing many ships in the ocean. This emphasis by the Mongols is obvious: by blaming a freak weather accident, the retreat was easier explained, rather than give credit to the Japanese fighting harder than the Mongols had expected. Whatever the fact of the storm was, the first of the so-called kamikazes, the Yuan fleet had begun to withdraw before it struck. In the words of historian Thomas Conlan, the Japanese were “in little need of divine intervention.”       Neither side saw this as inconclusive though. The Japanese anticipated a Mongol return, and further preparations were made, such as building a wall for dozens of kilometres along Hakata Bay and preparing to quickly mobilize samurai if needed. For Kublai, this had been but a small force, a taste of what he could throw against Japan. He sent envoys again in 1275 to the bakufu, who were killed by the Japanese, ensuring the Khaan would need to send an armed force once more. Once Kublai completed the conquest of the Song Dynasty in 1279, he turned his attention to a massive invasion to subdue Japan once and for all.    But the second invasion is a topic for another day. Our next episode will come out this Friday, looking at the story of Takezaki Suenaga, a historical samurai who fought in both invasions and later compiled an excellent set of scrolls presenting his exploits. Through him, we’ll get a chance to talk in-depth on the Japanese defence, tactics and more. If that isn’t enough, we’ll have another episode coming out after that discussing the impact of the invasions on Japan and the Mongol Empire. But that’s not all: check out Kings and Generals on Youtube for a video this Thursday on the battles for Tsushima and Iki islands, the direct inspiration for the game. As well, the narrator for Kings and Generals will actually be playing Ghost of Tsushima on a livestream this weekend. Our writer for this series will be there as well, so prepare any questions you have for him and he’ll do his best to answer. If you’d like to help us continue bringing you content, please consider subscribing to our Patreon at www.patreon/kingsandgenerals.com. I’m your host David, and we will catch you on the next one. 

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Columns of Mongol rider, armed with bow, lance and mace, march through the dark defiles and narrow valleys of the Yan mountains, a confined route for warriors used to the open steppe. Here, the valleys were marked by towns and villages in close proximity, a track for their army to follow, falling upon terrified settlements whose newly collected harvests now fed hungry Mongols. After days of this claustrophobic territory, of surprising and outwitting the garrisons of the forts blocking their path, the mountains suddenly gave way, opening up to the Northern Chinese Plain: low, open country, marked by the great Yellow River, farmland and the capital of the mighty Jin Empire: Zhongdu, modern day Beijing. Northern China was now open to the Mongol horde, and the Mongol conquests were about to begin in earnest. I’m your host David and welcome to Ages of Conquest: a Kings and Generals Podcast.  This is the Mongol Conquests.   After returning from the Tangut Kingdom in early 1210, and shortly thereafter disrespecting the envoys of the new Jin Emperor, Wei Shao Wang, Chinggis Khan began his preparations, reviewing his forces and gathering intelligence. Alongside Muslim, Uighur and Ongguds  merchants and travelers who brought him information on the Jin, a few Khitan and Chinese officials had already defected to Chinggis, bringing him detailed intelligence and urging an attack. Though still mighty, the 13th century had not been kind to the Jin Dynasty. The 1190s saw a huge flood of the Yellow River, so severe it changed its course; once entering the ocean north of the Shandong peninsula, it now spilled to the south, a drastic shift which displaced entire villages, destroyed cropland and sowed discontent. War with the Song Dynasty from 1206-1208 drained Jin finances, and inflation caused the paper currency of the Jin to be near worthless.  The Jin armies, though large and their horsemen still fierce, were past their prime, many having become quite sinicized and lost the biting edge of their grandfathers. The time was as good as any for an assault upon the Altan Khan, the Golden Khan, as the Mongols called the Jin Emperors.    At the start of 1211, the Qarluqs (Kar-luk) of Almaliq (alma-lik) and Qayaliq (kaya-lik) submitted to Chinggis Khan, providing their own Turkic horsemen as auxiliaries. Chinggis positioned his son-in-law, Toquchar, in the west of Mongolia, doubtless with Qarluq forces, to act as a guard against roaming tribes or the Naiman prince Kuchlug (whooch-loog), who usurped power in Qara-Khitai that year. Feeling himself secure and that he had the favour of Eternal Blue Heaven, Chinggis Khan was ready. He marched south early in the spring of 1211 with as many men as he could muster, around 100,000 split into two armies, one commanded by himself, the other by his three oldest sons, Jochi ( Джучи, Зүчи, Züchi) Chagatai (Цагадай) and Ogedai (Өгэдэй). By May 1211, they had crossed the Gobi desert, entering what is now modern Inner Mongolia, the band of steppe between the Gobi and the Yanshan mountains which shield north China.    You may be anticipating the Mongols cinematically bursting through the Great Wall of China, or the popular internet variation wherein the Mongols ‘just went around it.’ But the Great Wall of China as it exists today was built by the Ming Dynasty in the 15th and 16th centuries, well after Chinggis’ invasion. There had been sections of walls built prior, most notably in the Qin and Han dynasties a millenium prior, but the 1000 odd years between the Han and the Ming saw only sporadic building, generally of rammed or stamped earth, which erodes comparatively quickly over time in unmaintained. The Jin Dynasty in the late 12th century had ordered the creation of several dozen kilometres of wall built in Inner Mongolia, a ditch before a rammed earth wall, marked by gates and a few forts. The base of this is still extant, a long, low, grass covered ridge which today doesn’t even block the wanderings of sheep. This wall was manned by whichever people inhabited the local area, largely from the Onggud tribe, a Turkic Nestorian people who had been on friendly terms with Chinggis Khan since 1204. The Naiman Khan had tried to urge them to attack Chinggis’ southern flank, which they refused, alerting the Mongol Khan to the scheme.    When Chinggis Khan arrived, the Onggud wisely opened the gates and submitted voluntarily to him: it was a fair assumption he may have forced his way through them had they refused. Rather than conquer the Great Wall, or go around it, we might better say that it was  opened to him. For their part, the Mongols treated the Onggud well, and a daughter of Chinggis Khan married into their ruling family- she would effectively rule the Onggud in her own right, the direct representative of Chinggis Khan. The Mongols spent the summer in Onggud territory, resting, fattening their horses on the local pasture, and taking the few Jin towns in the region- the first to fall was Fu-zhou, stormed after a brief resistance in late August 1211.       The Jin Emperor, Wei Shao Wang, was bolted awake by the news of the Mongol arrival on his doorstep. To his credit, he did not sit idle-  two large armies were mobilized and sent to the most likely route. Dividing the Northern Chinese plain from the steppe was the Yan Mountains, relatively low mountains with numerous towns and villages nestled in its many valleys. The primary defile which provides access from the steppe through the northern side of these mountains is the Yehuling, the Wild Fox Ridge, just south of Fu-zhou.    The army led by Chinggis’ sons was making its way into the Ordos to the west, but Chinggis himself was certainly to try passing through Yehuling (ye-hu-ling), a route which would lead him only a few days away from the Jin’s central capital of Zhongdu. It was here, the Jin leadership rightly supposed, that the determining battle should be fought with as much might as possible; kill the Khan, and the princes would certainly withdraw.  As Chinggis stormed Fu-zhou, a major force of crack Jurchen and Khitan cavalry, supported by Chinese infantry, all under the Jurchen commander Hushahu (hoosh-a-hu), was sent to Yehuling (ye-hu-ling). Hushahu was an unpopular, arrogant individual but influential with the Emperor, and had shown himself a cunning figure during the war against the Song Dynasty. Just a small note here; Hushahu is known by a dozen variations of Heshihlie Jiujun Hushahu (hesh-ee-hlee djioo-jun hoosh-a-hu), with some sources just calling by one of these names. Hushahu is the easiest to say, so we’ll stick with it here.   Supporting Hushahu was a smaller force under Wanyen Ho-Sha, who was sent ahead to repair the fort of Wo-shao-pao, between Fu-zhou and the entrance to the Yehuling. Together, this was a massive mobilization, given in the sources as anywhere from 300,000-500,00 men- though a good many of these were probably labourers, who would be tasked with digging ditches and building defenses along the passage.       Before the Wu-sha-pao fortifications could be completed, Chinggis sent his commander Jebe (Зэв) to surprise this smaller army in August shortly before the fall of Fu-zhou. Ho-sha escaped with much of his army, making his way to Huihebao, a fort south of the Yehuling, all before Hushahu could even reach Yehuling. Once within the defile, Hushahu set up at the narrow point within the Yehuling known as Huanerzui (Huan-er-zui), the Badger’s Mouth Pass. Here,his labourers were put to work, digging ditches and defences. His Khitan scouts informed him of the fall of Fu-zhou, and that the Mongols seemed occupied with looting the city, but Hushahu declined advice to immediately attack them. Wary of Mongol cavalry in the open field, he was hoping to use the narrow Huanerzui to protect his flanks.    A Khitan officer who had previously been sent as embassy to Chinggis Khan, Shimo Ming’an, was sent to speak to the Khan, officially to reprimand him for his actions but intended to gather intelligence and stall for time. Ming’an, a proud Khitan who admired the Mongol Khan, promptly defected and told Chinggis of Hushahu’s battle plans.  Alarmed, Chinggis’ scouts confirmed his statements.    The Jin had sent a great army to crush the invasion in one fell swoop, and Chinggis had only a part of the total Mongol force, his sons still in the west. Ming’an’s information, and Hushahu’s caution was to the Khan’s advantage. As one, the Mongols  moved into Yehuling, approaching the Jin army at Huanerzui. Jin scouts informed Hushahu of Chinggis’ sudden advance, and the Jurchen general ordered his huge army into position- wings of Jurchen and Khitan heavy cavalry and horse archers in the front, supported by a large group of Chinese infantry and the labourers who had started the fortifications. In the narrow defile, Hushahu’s army was tightly packed, unable to maneuver or envelop the smaller Mongol army.       Mongol archers got to work first, sending volleys of deadly arrows into the thick rows of Jin warriors, who had nowhere to move under the hail. One of Chinggis’ commanders, the tireless Mukhali ( Мухулай) saw opportunity, and his lancers led the first charge into the injured enemy- Chinggis followed with the imperial bodyguard, the Keshig. The Jurchen and Khitan horsemen buckled, and fell back, right into the dense rows of Chinese infantry behind them, who were trampled and crushed under the panicking horsemen. Discipline and command broke down, and the army disintegrated in the confusion, the Mongols cutting through them like a hot chainsaw through butter. As they ran, the Mongols pursued: bodies lined the road for kilometres, and the Secret History of the Mongols repeatedly described the fallen ‘heaped like rotten logs.’ Hushahu and Ho-sha met up at Huihebao (hwee-he-bao) fort several kilometres south, and put up another stand, only to be overwhelmed by the end of the day.        Huanerzui was long remembered by the Mongols as their greatest victory. Ten years later, a Taoist monk travelling through the region to meet with Chinggis Khan passed through and found bones still piled high throughout. Perhaps the finest warriors of the Jin fell that day, and the chance to nip the Mongol conquest in the bud had been ripped bloodily from their hands.       Hushahu fled to Zhongdu with nothing but bedraggled, bloody remnants of his great army. Mongol forces were briefly halted by the fortified pass of Juyongguan (joo-yong-guan), which guarded the narrow, 18 kilometre long Guangou Valley, the final barrier before entry into the North China plain, some 53 kilometres north of Zhongdu. During the Ming Dynasty, the famous Badaling section of the Great Wall was built at the north end of this valley. Badaling is the most popular tourist site of the entire wall, due to its preservation and proximity to Beijing. Indeed, it was this proximity to the capital that made it such a strategic pass, the final chokepoint before the open space of the Chinese plains. Therefore, even in the 13th century Juyongguan (joo-yong-guan) was strongly fortified with a large garrison, and the Mongols lacked any weapons to force it. So, Jebe Noyan fled before its impenetrable gate, and the defenders, eager to avenge their fallen comrades, sallied out to pursue. 30 kilometres from Juyongguan, Jebe (Zev) turned about and destroyed them. The mighty Juyongguan surrendered shortly thereafter.       By the end of October 1211, Chinggis Khan was on the North China Plain, and all hell was let loose. Chinggis made a brief effort to besiege Zhongdu itself, but this great city was far too well defended, its walls defiant and unbreachable. Leaving a force to blockade Zhongdu, Chinggis sent his armies to ravage across the plain. One army captured the imperial horse herds, depriving the Jin of much of their cavalry.  From the Jin’s western capital, Xijingto (Shi-jin-to)their eastern capital, Dongjing (dong-jing) in Manchuria, those are modern Datong and Liaoyang respectively, Mongols armies pillaged and raided. Dongjing fell to Jebe Noyan through another expertly executed feigned retreat, while Xijing stood firm against the Mongols.       Mongol armies withdrew back to Onggud territory in February 1212, loot and animals in tow, eager to give horses and riders a well deserved rest. The border passes they had fought so hard for were, somewhat surprisingly, left unoccupied. Why the Mongols chose not to garrison them is unclear- some suggest Chinggis had no ambitions beyond that initial raid, while others note that with the Mongols’ lack of administrative experience, attempting to hold territory at this point was foolish with the Jin still strong. The Jin, meanwhile, were left bloodied but still unbroken. The defeats at Huanerzui (Huan-er-zui) were horrific for the Jin, decimating their prized cavalry, but reinforcement Jurchen were called upon from Manchuria. Wei Shao Wang appointed Hushahu as Deputy Military Commander of the Empire and sent him to reoccupy the border forts, Juyongguan (joo-yong-guan) in particular.    Suspicious that the Khitan population of Manchuria may align themselves with the Mongols, Jurchen colonists were sent amongst them, an act which ironically prompted the large Khitan revolt the Jin so feared. Led by Yelu Liuge (ye-lu liu-ge), within a few months he had not only submitted to Chinggis Khan, but also declared a new Liao dynasty with himself as king. The Tangut began to raid the Jin’s western frontier, the Song ended their tribute payments to the Jin, and famine began to break out in several provinces.  To top it off, the Mongols returned in autumn 1212 after resting their horses for the summer, but this campaign was cut short when Chinggis was injured by an arrow to the leg at Xijing, and forced to withdraw.        Famine, Tangut attacks and insurrection did not abate, and only continued to spread in 1213. In July or August of that year, a healed Chinggis Khan returned to Jin China. In the valleys south of Yehuling, towns and settlements fell or surrendered with alarming speed. On the road towards Juyongguan, at modern Huai-lai, Chinggis was met by a large army under the commander Zhuhu Gaoqi. Supposedly a force of 100,000, in the narrow valley they had no room to maneuver and were crushed by the Mongols. The survivors fled to the refortified Juyongguan, where the ground for almost 50 kilometres was said to be covered by caltrops. For a month, Chinggis waited before the fort, trying to lure the garrison out. Finally he withdrew and wisely, the garrison stayed in the fort. A small Mongol force was left to watch the northern mouth, while Jebe was sent through the hills, finally coming out south below the Juyongguan, where the fortifications had not been improved. Surprising the garrison, its Khitan commander panicked and surrendered, and by the end of October 1213, the road to Zhongdu was once more open.    Things had developed rapidly in Zhongdu in the meantime. Hushahu had been ordered to remain in the city to defend it, though had spent the weeks before the Mongol return in 1213 hunting. When the Mongols returned to Juyongguan in September, a messenger had arrived from Wei Shao Wang to reprimand Hushahu for inactivity, but the panicked general killed the messenger. Now forced to act, he made his way to Zhongdu, overwhelmed the palace guards, captured and executed the emperor. He appointed Wei Shao Wang’s nephew, the 50 year old Wudubu, as Emperor, expecting him to be submissive. Hushahu’s arrogance and disrespect to the new emperor made him no allies in the court. He succeeded in defeating two Mongol raiding parties outside the walls in November, but fell ill. In Hushahu’s absence, Zhuhu Gaoqi was ordered to repulse the Mongols, on pain of death should he fail. Gaoqi failed, and hurried back to the palace before Hushahu could learn of it. Hushahu was captured and decapitated by Gaoqi, who was pardoned by Wudubu and made Vice-Commander of the Empire.    The course of this political upheaval left the Jin leadership paralyzed for two valuable months as the Mongols broke through Juyongguan. With the Mongol army before Zhongdu, the new emperor sent Chinggis a peace offering in December 1213. Recognizing the weakness of the Jin, Chinggis left a small force to blockade the Jin, and then unleashed a massive onslaught across the north China plain, a three pronged assault across the whole of Hebei province, into Shanxi and western Shandong. “Everywhere north of the Yellow River there could be seen dust and smoke and the sound of drums rose to Heaven,” was how one Chinese writer described the offensive. Almost 100 towns fell to the Mongols, farmland was destroyed, and the Mongol reputation for both invincibility, and cruelty, blossomed. The Jin had been hamstrung, unable to retaliate. By February 1214, Mongol forces were converging on Zhongdu.       While the Mongols had shown frightening success in the field and against less fortified settlements, Zhongdu was a different beast altogether. The Jin’s central capital since the early 1150s, now the site of modern Beijing, it had been keenly designed to withstand assaults. Built in a rough square, the city had almost 30 kilometres of stamped earthen walls 12 metres high. Over 900 towers were said to line these walls, lined with various types of defensive siege weapons. Before the city were three lines of moats, as well as four forts outside the main city, each with their own walls, moats, garrisons and supplies, connected to the main city by underground tunnels. The surrounding countryside had been stripped bare of not just food stores, but even stones and ties which could have been for projectiles. Each fort held 4,000 men, with another 20,000 manning the walls of the city itself. Zhongdu was well stocked, well fortified and well prepared for a siege.       The Mongols, with their siege knowledge still in its infancy, were not without their own cards to play.  They had near total freedom of movement outside of the city, and now had begun to have their forces bolstered by desertions, especially among the Chinese and Khitans in the Jin military. Some of these deserters had brought along their own catapults, and captured engineers provided knowledge to construct more. At one point, the Mongols burst through a gate of Zhongdu, or were perhaps allowed in, as they found themselves surrounded, the street behind them set on fire. That party only escaped with heavy losses. Another assault was repulsed by the garrisons of the forts. It seems some sort of disease was spreading among Chinggis’ forces as the siege dragged on, and they must have started to become frustrated. In April 1214, Chinggis sent an embassy under a Tangut officer in his service with terms, entailing the submission of the Jin and the Emperor relinquishing his title. Wudubu refused to be demoted. Since Wudubu had no bargaining position beyond ‘we haven’t starved yet!’ Chinggis sent his envoys again, with the message:     “the whole of Shandong and Hebei are now in my possession, while you retain only  Zhongdu; God has made you so weak, that should I further molest you, I know not what  Heaven would say; I am willing to withdraw my army, but what provisions will you make  to still the demands of my officers?”       Wudubu was finally convinced to come to terms, noting the reality of his situation. In May, 1214, the Jin Emperor capitulated. A daughter of Wei Shao Wang was sent in marriage to Chinggis, with 500 boys and girls for her retinue, and 3,000 horses, 10,000 liang of gold and 10,000 bolts of silk, which would have been a mighty caravan of tribute. For reference, 1 liang is equal to 50 grams. The Jin, who had once held the forefathers of Chinggis Khan in such contempt, were now his vassal, and Chinggis Khan withdrew back to Onggud territory, doubtless proud of his work.        What Chinggis Khan’s plans were from this point we will never know- perhaps he was to turn west, pursue those final few enemies like Kuchlug? Allow his men to grow fat and soft off the tribute from the Jin and enjoy his own retirement? Or perhaps, with his new vassals, march south against the Chinese Song Dynasty. But we’ll never know. For in June 1214, the anxious Wudubu, fearing himself too close to Chinggis Khan, made the ill-fated decision to abandon Zhongdu and flee to his southern capital, Kaifeng, in territory untouched by the Mongols and shielded by the mighty Yellow River. Shortly after his departure, he began to have misgivings over the 2,000 Khitans in his retinue, and tried to take their horses. The Khitans, like the Mongols, were skilled horsemen who prized their mounts. To take their horses was to take their legs, and they abandoned the fleeing Emperor, riding all the way north to Chinggis Khan in inner Mongolia.        When the Khan learned of this, he was incensed. This was the Jin Emperor breaking his word, violating the treaty in an action tantamount to preparation for future hostilies. South of the Yellow River, he would be beyond the authority of Chinggis Khan where he could plan further troubles. Zhongdu was left with a much smaller garrison and would now pay the price for Wudubu’s cowardice. In late summer the general Samukha, with Shimo Ming’an, and the 2,000 Khitans who had abandoned Wudubu marched to Zhongdu with perhaps 50,000 men. The city was reached around September 1214, and placed under siege. The garrison, forlorn but proud, stoutly manned their doomed walls. Even with it defenders reduced, an assault on the city’s mighty fortifications would be costly, so Samukha aimed to starve it out.        Wudubu hadn’t completely abandoned the city, and belatedly in early 1215 sent relief columns bearing foodstuffs and reinforcements to Zhongdu. The Mongols overcame these columns with ease, and sated their own hunger with the supplies meant for the people of Zhongdu. The noose only continued to tighten around the city. Those communities in the region still untaken were reduced: most of the Jurchen homeland in Manchuria had fallen to the Mongols and their vassal Khitan kingdom. One Jurchen commander in Manchuria, upon learning of Wudubu’s flight, deserted and founded his own kingdom in the far east of Manchuria. In the Shandong peninsula, a long simmering local uprising erupted quickly, commonly known as the Red Coats, who proved themselves staunch foes of the Jin government. Whatever Jin forces that remained had either joined the Mongols, or were already destroyed. North of the Yellow River, only a strip along it, and around Xijing in the west, remained under Jin rule.    For Zhongdu, these happenings made the chance of reinforcement grow ever dimmer. Starvation was severe in the city. All possible animals were eaten, and accusations of cannibalism seem unfortunately probable. At one point, thousands of the city’s virgins were said to have thrown themselves from the walls, rather than suffer fate at the hands of the Mongols. The city’s leadership began to fight each other, with one top commander committing suicide, while another made his way through the blockade, arriving in Kaifeng where he was executed for desertion.        In June 1215, Zhongdu finally surrendered. Mongol troops let out their pent up frustration on the poor souls still within the city. Many thousands were slaughtered, every home and shop looted. Parts of the city were said to have burned for a month. So terrible was the slaughter that a Khwarezmian embassy passing the city a few months later was horrified to see piles of human bones surrounding the city, the ground greasy with human fat and disease rampant. Some of their embassy even fell ill and died as a result.        For the Mongols, it is interesting to note what anecdotes they took away from this tragedy. Chinqai, an officer of importance in the decades to come, climbed one of Zhongdu’s towers and sent an arrow in every direction. When Chinggis learned of the feat, he was so tickled by it that he granted Chinqai ownership of everything within the range of arrows. Chinggis Khan always found a particular joy in these sorts of acts. The event most fondly reported by the Mongols was when several officers attempted to bribe Chinggis’ adopted son, Shigi Qutuqu, in splitting the loot of the city between them. He declined, stating he could not take it, as it was all the possessions of the Khan. Such loyalty to the Khan was prized greater than all the treasures of China.       There can be little doubt that the flight of Wudubu and destruction of Zhongdu a year later was an irreverseible blow to the prestige of the Jin Dynasty, alongside the obvious territorial losses. To many, coupled with years of natural disasters, disorders, and poor governance, the Mongol invasion and Wudubu’s abandonment of the north must have looked like the Jin had lost the Mandate of Heaven, the supernatural approval necessary to rule China. When Heaven rescinded its Mandate, it always awarded it elsewhere, and it seemed that Chinggis Khan had received its blessing. It should not be a surprise that the following years saw the desertions to the Mongols turn into a flood, and they were now able to staff their newly taken territory with loyal Chinese, Khitan and even Jurchen officials. Entire armies of Chinese were soon fighting for the Mongols to aid their conquest of China, something we will explore in detail in future.       Zhongdu was left a shell of its former self, and was renamed ‘Yen’ or ‘Yenching’ by the Mongols. It remained an important command centre, but only began to return to real significance again when Chinggis’ grandson Kublai built a capital near the site. But that’s a few decades ahead of us. In the meantime, Chinggis Khan returned to his homeland and found himself distracted by uprisings and the pursuit of old enemies- a path which brought him, unintentionally, into a collision course with the Khwarezmian Empire to west.        In the next episode we will explore the first western movements of the Mongols, so be sure to hit subscribe to the Kings and Generals podcast and to continue helping us bring you more outstanding content, please visit our patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. Thank you for listening, I am your host David and we will catch you on the next one!

How does casserole culture translate to Chinese cooking? Chef Lucas Sin and I get close-ish to an answer in episode 6. We also talk about his fast-casual, Northern Chinese cooking at Junzi Kitchen, the future of Chinese food, and the near universal appeal of cream of mushroom soup. Pinch Chinese Sommelier Miguel de Leon offers wine pairing recs (Pét-Nat, chilled Syrah, and skin contact white), and Lisa Elbert and Micah Fredman join us for a dinner of Chopstick Veal and Rice.

Join cohosts Ethan Frisch and Vallery Lomas for a conversation with Anna Francese Gass, author of the recently released cookbook Heirloom Kitchen. After a stint in corporate sales, she traded the boardroom for the test kitchen, and has since worked for Whole Foods, Mad Hungry, and Martha Stewart Living Ominmedia. Currently, she is a regular contributing editor at Food52 and contributing writer for msn.com. In her new book, Heirloom Kitchen, Anna shares the stories and recipes of 45 strong, exceptional women who immigrated to the United States, and whose family recipes helped shaped the landscape of American food. Organized by region, readers will enjoy Magda's meltingly delicious Pork Adobo from the Philippines; soak in the warmth of Shari's Fesenjoon, an Iranian walnut and pomegranate stew; learn to deftly seal pleat-perfect Northern Chinese dumplings with Tina; and yes, sink their teeth into Anna's mother's perfectly seasoned Calabrian Meatballs from Southern Italy. Along with these recipes are stories: recollections of a journey to America, of hardship and happiness, and of many nights by the stove using food as a comfort and a respite in a new land, a culinary tether to their cultural identities.She lives in Connecticut with her husband and three children. It's HRN's annual summer fund drive, this is when we turn to our listeners and ask that you make a donation to help ensure a bright future for food radio. Help us keep broadcasting the most thought provoking, entertaining, and educational conversations happening in the world of food and beverage. Become a member today! To celebrate our 10th anniversary, we have brand new member gifts available. So snag your favorite new pizza - themed tee shirt or enamel pin today and show the world how much you love HRN, just go to heritageradionetwork.org/donate Why Food? is powered by Simplecast.

This episode is with Kenny Lao, who worked with the masterminds behind Nobu, created his own restaurant empire Rickshaw Dumplings, and now brings it all together in his new project, Culinary Task Force, a consulting service to help bring new restaurant concepts to life. We have a couple of episodes on My Food Job Rocks that deal with building restaurants so I asked Kenny advice on how to build one. Especially in the New York scene. Kenny did not disappoint telling me the intricate and honest details on creating a restaurant in the city. We go over a lot of things in what you might not actually realize goes into a successful restaurant including the importance of foot traffic, to finding an architecture, to having (what Kenny calls) a full bench. Kenny and I also talk about some soft skills like how to improve your stress levels, or how to persistent in getting a call with someone important. We also, of course, talk about Chinese food in great detail, especially how to make a good dumpling. About Kenny As the Principal of Culinary Task Force Kenny’s culinary insights work is informed by his active involvement in creating forward thinking, sustainable F+B Concepts. Prior to Culinary Task Force, Kenny was the Founder and Managing Operator of New York based Rickshaw Dumplings, an Asian fast-casual restaurant group with 3 stores, one shipping container in Times Square, a fleet of 4 mobile trucks and a retail grocery product range for over a decade winning awards and recognitions in publications such as Nations Restaurant News, New York Magazine, New York Times, Monocle and Restaurant Hospitality Magazine. Before opening Rickshaw, Kenny gained vast restaurant industry experience providing consulting services to various well-known clients first as Special Projects Director for Drew Nieporent’s Myriad Restaurant Group as well as through independent consulting.   At Myriad, Kenny oversaw the opening of multiple new restaurant establishments for clients such as Starwood’s W Hotel Brand, Marriott, Sports Club/LA and Neiman Marcus.   Additionally, he has worked with store designers, brand consultants and chefs, as well as with opening teams of management and with managers and staff on day-to-day operations pre and post-opening.  Kenny has taught at the Brooklyn Kitchen and has spoken at the World Economic Forum, Fast Company Summit, Inc. Magazine, French Culinary, ICE, Johnson + Wales Culinary, Brown University and NYU Stern School of Business.  Honors include: UBS Clinton Foundation Fellow, Crain’s 40 Under 40, Inc. Magazine 30 Under 30.  Kenny holds an MBA from NYU Stern and a BA in International Relations from Brown University.  He loves riding his bike, mangoes, watermelon, bacon and seltzer. Shownotes Did you know: Kenny Lao is Google-able Did you also know: Food Network actually helps only retail or consumer-facing brands Foot Traffic for restaurants: sitting at your potential restaurant and count people going in and all ALL DAY. This indicates traffic is good. What do you do now?: I’m a hospitality consultant, The principal of Culinary Taskforce Culinary Taskforce is a collection of all of the services and skills to run a new concept and grow a successful one The landscape today is now about the client’s concept and finds the chef that fits that concept. In the past, that wasn’t the case How did you start in the restaurant business?: My parents loved dining out. My father used to ask me to order from the adult’s menu. I studied international relations. After a few non-restaurant stints, I found out about this new restaurant group at Nobu and I was very very aggressive trying to get Drew (the owner) to call. 411: ask for people’s numbers. I got Drew’s mother instead. Drew’s mother told Kenny that her mother wanted to him, and that’s how the relationship started Became their pro-bono project manager I was doing 3 unique concepts every year Starwood During that time, I got an MBA (you can work while getting your MBA by the way) I was priced out after getting an MBA. So I started Rickshaw Dumplings, a fast-casual dumpling place We grew the brand to 4 locations and 4 food trucks in a decade Anita Lo Any advice from starting a restaurant?: Get referrals, get referrals, get referrals. Get an architect and engineer who is on board with this. You never want to pay rent on a property you’re not opened on yet Would you pay for a premium price to build a restaurant?: I wouldn’t hire the same architect twice. You need to figure out what’s a good fit with your architecture What’s the indicator of starting another restaurant?: Has to be profitable. I mean really has money. You also need a deep bench. It’s ok to have one restaurant, but people are super important. People are very hard to scale and you need to scale things before you start another restaurant Deep bench: a foundational leadership team How much is a restaurant in New York?: I’ve seen $90k restaurant and I;ve seen $5 million restaurants. Typical buildout: $400-$500 square foot Why did you decide to go into consulting?: My husband forced me to. The restaurant industry was taking a toll of my personal life. What’s an important skillset that you need in the restaurant business?: You need to improve your stress tolerance. What do you find unique about New York’s food scene?: I’m excited to see a lot of new ethnic foods. I think it will be a marketplace for experimentation. I’m excited to see what’s coming in from out of the country. I think large conglomerates, families, and entrepreneurs are starting things. Los Angeles is actually is a really exciting a food city. LA and New York is different because LA takes time to plan, New York is easy access so the reward is greater than LA. Omakase What’s one thing in the food industry you’d like to know more about?: I want to see what Gen Z is eating. What do you know now about it?: Gen Z grew up snacking. I predict that Bodegas will expand Spiderman Homecoming Bodega Vending machines Café X What’s your favorite quote?: There’s no good decisions, there’s only ways to make decisions good Favorite Kitchen Item: Fish Spatula. I use it for everything. Fried dumplings, omelets, pancakes My Book: Hey There Dumplings. Has Anita’s dumpling recipe Dumpling tips: Ratio of dough to meat filling. Some people like thin skins and thick skins. You need a very well-feel dumpling. It’s the balance of flavor from the dipping sauce to the filling. It’s a balance between those two flavors. There’s nothing as good as a home made handwrapped dumpling Dim Sum is southern Northern Chinese is steamed, bready and wheaty Southern: more egg yolks, spices, gravy sauces (Cantonese) Hand pulled noodle: You don’t add anything, but you need the right temperature Any advice for anyone who wants to start a restaurant?: Work at a restaurant. The more you work at a restaurant, the more you’re familiar about it. I think it should be a year. It’s not hard because of what you have to do, but it’s hard because the repetition. I can wash dishes, but can you wash for 4 years straight? Where can we find you for advice?: Culinary Task Force.com kenny@culinarytaskforce.com. I like to talk to people. Even if they’re not ready

Hailing from Hong Kong, food has always been at the center of Lucas Sin's life. Since the age of 16, Sin has been running kitchens and pop ups. Sin even founded a pop up organization, YPOPUP, while attending Yale University. After graduation Chef Sin spearheaded launching Junzi Kitchen, located in New York city. Three years later the concept has grown to 3 locations. Sin's mission with Junzi is to show the America that Northern Chinese food is some of the best food in the world, if not THE best. Show notes… Favorite success quote or mantra: "The only way you're going to learn how to exist and survive in the restaurant industry is to figure out what you want to learn, who you're going to learn it from, and whether they're the best in the world. Then ask them, "Can I learn X form you?" If they so no, asked the second best." In This Episode with Lucas Sin, we discuss: Sin's mission to open Chinese restaurants in order to spread culture and share stories.   How Sin opened his first restaurant at the age of 16 in Hong Kong. When you're getting started, "Just do it!" Start where you can, as small as you can.  The Story behind YPOPUP. The benefits of getting your start with Pop-ups. How if you just focus on doing something great, and accomplish doing something great, people will naturally talk about you. Opening a restaurant in the city you know and love the most. Your odds of becoming successful increasing if you focus on doing one thing better than everyone else. Become a specialist.   If you have no experience, and you want to learn how to run a restaurant, become a franchisee; the franchisor teach you. Why it makes sense to build scalability into your original concept if scaling is ultimately what you want to do. Build big framework into your small business, i.e. replaceable food, HR, Marketing, clear brand.  Having a mission that people with money want to get behind. If your restaurant is serving food that has an ethnicity which differs from those who are serving it (example: Caucasians serving Northern Chinese food) then you'll need to create really solid systems and training to keep that food consistent and authentic. The benefits of hosting collaborative Pop-ups with other chefs and restaurateurs.  How to approach someone, with a larger following than your own, to do a collaborative pop-up event. What data to pay attention to when determining your next location. The strategy and reasoning of opening restaurants on or near college campuses. Today's sponsor: EthicsSuite.com -provide a safe, secure, simple and anonymous communication channel between you and your employees to help you protect your hard-earned reputation and assets. Demonstrate to your team that you are committed to providing a workplace that operates with the highest ethical standards. Staying informed about important issues will help you resolve them internally before they spiral into larger, costly, or public problems. Cashflowtool.com  A simple powerful and predictive cash flow companion for Qickbooks. Simple, because it requires no data entry, is always up to do and works on any device, anywhere. Powerful, because with it's built-in cash flow calendar, activitiy feed and anomaly detector, you instantly know all aspects of your cash flow with no surprises. Predictive, because you'll know your cash flow today and anticipate it tomorrow. Knowledge bombs Which "it factor" habit, trait, or characteristic you believe most contributes to your success? Curiosity. What is your biggest weakness? Distracts easily. What's one question you ask or thing you look for during an interview?  Curiosity. What's a current challenge? How are you dealing with it? Making sure the employees in his restaurants are as happy as they can be. Share one code of conduct or behavior you teach your team. Don't screw up. What is one uncommon standard of service you teach your staff? Assume everyone in your restaurant is confused. It will force you to go the extra step in service. What's one book we must read to become a better person or restaurant owner? GET THIS BOOK FOR FREE AT AUDIBLE.COM   Thinking, Fast and Slow If there was one tool or resource that you wish you had now -- or wish you had when you were getting started--to learn from others in the industry what would it be? What's the one thing you feel restaurateurs don't know well enough or do often enough? Took more risk with cuisine. What's one piece of technology you've adopted within your four walls restaurant and how has it influence operations? WhenIWork If you got the news that you'd be leaving this world tomorrow and all memories of you, your work, and your restaurants would be lost with your departure with the exception of 3 pieces of wisdom you could leave behind for the good of humanity, what would they be? Kindness and empathy. Don't knock high heat cooking. Chinese food is pretty good. Contact info: junzi.kitchen/  @junzikitchen @Lucas.sin Thanks for listening! Thanks so much for joining today! Have some feedback you'd like to share? Leave a note in the comment section below! If you enjoyed this episode, please share it using the social media buttons you see at the top of the post. Also, please leave an honest review for the Restaurant Unstoppable Podcast on iTunes! Ratings and reviews are extremely helpful and greatly appreciated! They do matter in the rankings of the show, and I read each and every one of them. And finally, don't forget to subscribe to the show on iTunes to get automatic updates. Huge thanks to Lucas Sin for joining me for another awesome episode. Until next time!   Restaurant Unstoppable is a free podcast. One of the ways I'm able to make it free is by earning a commission when sharing certain products with you. I've made it a core value to only share tools, resources, and services my guest mentors have recommend, first. If you're finding value in my podcast, please use my links!

With the Dragon Boat festival approaching on Monday, people around this country have begun gathering the ingredients needed to make the traditional "zongzi" rice dumplings. CRI's Sam Duckett has ventured out to sample the snacks ahead of the festival. The Dragon Boat Festival, or "Duan Wu Jie" occurs on the fifth day of the fifth month of Chinese Lunar calendar. The festival commemorates the death of the poet and minister, Qu Yuan. The story of Qu Yuan occurred during the Warring States period and the Zhou Dynasty. Qu Yuan was a poet and a minister for Chu during the warring states period. He was banished for apposing the alliance between the King of Chu and the state of Qin. During his banishment Qu Yuan wrote a great deal of poetry. After the sate of Qin took the capital of Chu, Qu Yuan drowned himself in the Miluo River. It is said that the local people that admired Qu Yuan raced out on boats to try and save him or at least retrieve his body. This story gave birth to the tradition of holding dragon boat races during dragon boat festival. Another tradition that is held during the dragon boat festival is the practice of eating zongzi. Zongzi is a Chinese food stuff made of glutinous rice, stuffed with different fillings and wrapped in bamboo reed. They are also known as rice dumplings or sticky rice dumplings. I have decided to go to Guo Hui supermarket and try this sticky delicious Chinese treat. Before departing on my quest for zongzi I decided to have a chat with Jinjiang hotel chef Li Peng Yu to find out a bit more about what I would be eating. "Most Sticky rice dumplings are filled with sweet potato's or bean paste. In Sichuan we like to eat sticky rice dumplings with spicy meet in the middle. In Guangzhou they often eat them with Cantonese BBQ pork in the middle. Sweet Sticky rice dumplings and preferred in Northern Chinese and salty ones are preferred by southerners. In south China they are also a lot smaller and in the shape of a cone. In northern china they are more of triangular shape." Wrapping a zongzi neatly is a skill that is passed down through families, as are the recipes. Making zongzi is traditionally a family event of which everyone helps out. Now let's see if I can order a zongzi. "We have ready made and freshly made zongzi. We have meat, vegetarian, sweet potato and red bean paste zongzi. Try a red bean paste one; I am sure you will like it. When you get home you may want to re-heat it, you can do this by either putting it in the microwave or boiling it" I have just ordered a red bean paste zongzi, I need to wait a couple of minutes for it be heated up. Ok so my Zongzi is ready to eat. Mmmmm it tastes delicious. The smooth sticky tecture complements the sweet taste so well. I thoroughly enjoyed my sticky rice dumplings and understanding the story behind them made the Dragon Boat Festivalmuch more pleasing. Wishing everyone a happy Dragon Boat Festival or "Duan Wu Jie Kuai Le".

Second lecture in the Martin D'Arcy Memorial lecture series on contemporary Chinese perspectives on Christianity in China. In this lecture, Dr Wu looks at the spread of christianity in china despite persecutions in the 18th and 19th century.