Podcasts about peking

PREVIEW CHINA'S ECONOMIC DESCENT AND TRADE WAR UNCERTAINTY Colleague Anne Stevenson-Yang. Discussing the "lose-lose proposition" of the current trade war, Anne Stevenson-Yang analyzes the Chineseeconomy's decline. She points to erratic signals regarding tariff exemptions and the difficulty of predicting market outcomes, noting the massive challenges facing China's export-driven model amidst this instability. 1906 PEKING

De broederlijke selfie van Poetin en Modi vertelde de wereld één ding: het Westen is er niet in geslaagd Rusland te isoleren. Maar achter de glimlach schuilt een wanhoopsrelatie – Rusland ziet zijn wapenexport naar India halveren en grijpt naar drastische maatregelen om relevant te blijven. Tegelijkertijd staat India met de rug tegen de muur: China levert vijfde generatie straaljagers aan Pakistan, en Delhi heeft geen westerse opties. In deze aflevering bespreken India analist Rajeev Lachmipersad en Michel Michaloliákos de nucleaire onderzeeërdeal, het straaljagersdillema en waarom de Noordpool opeens cruciaal wordt voor New Delhi. De vraag is: kan Europa nog concurreren, of kijkt het machteloos toe?

Vanuit het niets werd het Nijmeegse Nexperia deze oktober wereldnieuws. De maker van zeer simpele chips – niet meer waard dan een paar cent per stuk – bleek ineens een cruciale speler te zijn in de mondiale autosector. Autofabrikanten, van Volkswagen en Honda tot Ford, raakten anderhalve maand geleden in paniek toen Nexperia geen chips meer kon leveren. De reden: het bedrijf was van de ene op de andere dag onderwerp geworden van een knetterende ruzie tussen Den Haag en Peking. Hoe de auto-industrie met deze sluimerende crisis omgaat, hoor je van redacteur mobiliteit Hans de Jongh. Lees: Hoe een Nijmeegs chipbedrijf wereldnieuws werd Peking reageerde furieus. Meteen stelde de Chinese regering een verbod in op de export van chips die Nexperia in China laat maken. Dat was geen loos gebaar. In de plaats Dongguang staat met afstand de grootste fabriek van Nexperia. Daar worden ook de chips gemaakt waar de auto-industrie niet zonder kan. Bert van Dijk, die voor het FD de chipsector volgt, vertelt wat deze crisis ons zegt over de afhankelijk van China. Lees: Nexperia-debacle illustreert hoe groot afhankelijkheid van China (nog) is En de paniek beperkte zich niet tot autoproducenten. Toen hun plotseling opgestoken kopzorgen waren doorgedrongen tot de politiek was de opwinding compleet, in Den Haag, maar meer nog in Berlijn, Brussel en Washington. Binnen een week was Nexperia wereldnieuws. Parlementair verslaggever Cor de Horde vertelt over de onbekende wet die demissionair minister Karremans inzette om te voorkomen dat Nexperia ‘heimelijk werd leeggetrokken’. Lees: Karremans: vooraf overleg binnen EU over Nexperia was onmogelijkSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Als sich die thailändische und kambodschanische Armee entlang ihrer Grenze heftige Gefechte geliefert hatten, hielt sich die chinesische Regierung auffallend bedeckt. Doch sobald eine Waffenruhe unterzeichnet war, prescht Peking nun mit einer diplomatischen Initiative vor. Wie ich dir im aktuellen Update des Beijing Briefing erkläre, lässt sich anhand der jüngsten Ereignisse in Südostasien beispielhaft sehen, nach welchen Prinzipien die chinesische Außenpolitik funktioniert. Viel Spaß beim Hören!Kontakt: BeijingBriefing@gmail.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Im August sind sie Vize-Weltmeister bei den „World Humanoid Robot Games“ in Peking, China, geworden: die HWTK Robots. Das Roboterfußball-Team der Hochschule für Technik, Wirtschaft und Kultur Leipzig besteht seit 2009. Teammitglied Max Polter erzählt in dieser Episode, warum der Roboterfußball ein relevantes Gebiet für die Robotik-Entwicklung ist, wie sie trainieren und was Roboterfußball tatsächlich mit menschlichem Fußball zu tun hat. Moderiert wird die Episode von t3n-Redakteur:in Nils Bolder. _Hinweis: Dieser Podcast wird von einem Sponsor unterstützt. Alle Infos zu unseren Werbepartnern findest du [hier](https://linktr.ee/t3npodcast)_.

«Ich fahr Pakete aus in Peking» ist Hu Anyans Bericht über 20 Jahre prekäre Arbeit in Niedriglohnjobs in chinesischen Riesenstädten – immer so lang, bis Frust, Erschöpfung oder Langeweile zu gross wurden. Für Simon Leuthold eine eindrückliche Stimme von Ausgebeuteten, die selten zu Wort kommen. Während seiner Zeit als Paketbote in Peking kämpft Hu Anyan mit riesigem Zeitdruck. Jede Minute, in der er kein Paket zustellt, kostet ihn einen Teil seines sowieso schon winzigen Lohns. Fehler werden mit Strafgebühren geahndet. Trotzdem begehrt er kaum auf – dafür liest er in seiner knappen Freizeit James Joyce oder Robert Musil. Wie passt das zusammen? Wie deckt sich Hu Anyans Bericht mit der Realität in China? Was macht ein so nüchtern geschriebenes Buch lesenswert? Und was hat Hu Anyans Geschichte mit uns zu tun? Diesen Fragen gehen Simon Leuthold und Felix Münger im Gespräch ausgehend von Hu Anyans Memoir nach. ____________________________________ Dieses Buch steht im Zentrum der Folge: - Hu Anyan. «Ich fahr Pakete aus in Peking». Aus dem Chinesischen von Monika Li. 295 Seiten. Suhrkamp Nova, 2025. ____________________________________ Im Podcast zu hören sind: - Monika Li, Übersetzerin - Samuel Emch, SRF-Korrespondent China - Kai-Uwe Hellmann, Soziologe und Konsumforscher ____________________________________ Bei Fragen oder Anregungen schreibt uns: literatur@srf.ch ____________________________________ Hosts: Simon Leuthold und Felix Münger ____________________________________ Das ist «Literaturclub: Zwei mit Buch»: Ein Podcast über Bücher und die Welten, die sie uns eröffnen. Alle zwei Wochen tauchen wir im Duo in eine Neuerscheinung ein, spüren Themen, Figuren und Sprache nach und folgen den Gedanken, welche die Lektüre auslöst. Dazu sprechen wir mit der Autorin oder dem Autor und holen zusätzliche Stimmen zu den Fragen ein, die uns beim Lesen umgetrieben haben. Lesen heisst entdecken. Weitere Informationen und den wöchentlichen Literaturnewsletter gibt es unter srf.ch/literatur.

Diese Folge ist ursprünglich am 6. Juni 2025 erschienen. Im Rahmen des aktuellen Highlight-Programms während der Winterpause von »Acht Milliarden« veröffentlichen wir sie hier noch einmal. Immer wieder tauchen Berichte über den Einsatz von Uiguren als Zwangsarbeiter in China auf. Neue Recherchen des SPIEGEL zeigen nun das tatsächliche Ausmaß: Uiguren werden systematisch aus ihrer Heimatprovinz Xinjiang in andere Landesteile gebracht, wo sie unter teils prekären Bedingungen arbeiten müssen. Den Betroffenen drohen willkürliche Inhaftierungen, sie stehen unter ständiger Überwachung und sind oftmals in Wohnheimen untergebracht, die sie kaum verlassen dürfen. In der aktuellen Folge des SPIEGEL-Podcasts »Acht Milliarden« spricht Host Juan Moreno mit Christoph Giesen, SPIEGEL-Korrespondent in Peking. In einer langwierigen Recherche in Kooperation mit der »New York Times« und dem Londoner »The Bureau of Investigative Journalism« fanden Giesen und seine Kollegen 75 Werke in elf Provinzen, in denen Angehörige der muslimischen Minderheit arbeiten müssen. Zu den Profiteuren zählen mutmaßlich auch deutsche Unternehmen, da sie direkt oder indirekt von dieser Form der Ausbeutung profitieren könnten. Mehr zum Thema: (S+) Der VW-Konzern wollte beweisen, dass es in seinem umstrittenen Werk in Xinjiang keine Zwangsarbeit gibt. SPIEGEL-Recherchen belegen: Der Prüfbericht enthält Mängel, die Prüfer scheinen zweifelhaft: https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/volkswagens-bluff-mit-den-menschenrechten-fragwuerdige-fabrik-in-xinjiang-a-cf3028b4-6c27-4caf-8277-47603c650a92 (S+) Der chinesische Staat soll in Umerziehungslagern rund eine Million Uiguren interniert haben: Die Xinjiang Police Files geben diesem System nun Namen und Gesichter: https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/xinjiang-police-files-einblick-in-chinas-brutales-lagersystem-a-6e85c81a-43c5-4a7b-85ad-8c70b22179a2 Abonniert »Acht Milliarden«, um die nächste Folge nicht zu verpassen. Wir freuen uns, wenn ihr den Podcast weiterempfehlt oder uns eine Bewertung hinterlasst.+++ Alle Infos zu unseren Werbepartnern finden Sie hier. Die SPIEGEL-Gruppe ist nicht für den Inhalt dieser Seite verantwortlich. +++ Den SPIEGEL-WhatsApp-Kanal finden Sie hier. Alle SPIEGEL Podcasts finden Sie hier. Mehr Hintergründe zum Thema erhalten Sie mit SPIEGEL+. Entdecken Sie die digitale Welt des SPIEGEL, unter spiegel.de/abonnieren finden Sie das passende Angebot. Informationen zu unserer Datenschutzerklärung.

Gestur Aukakastsins í desember er silfurdrengurinn Sverre Andreas Jakobsson. Sverre fer yfir uppvaxtar árin sín, afrekin á körfuboltavellinum og lífið fyrir norðan. Hvernig var að vera í KA í pakkfullu húsi og þegar hann hætti í handboltanum. Ævintýrið í Peking 2008 og lífið í atvinnumennskunni. Þetta og svo miklu miklu meira í nýjasta þætti Aukakastsins.

Säpo varnar för det kinesiska säkerhetshotet på svenska universitet. Men vad riskerar att gå förlorat i jakten på spioner från Kina? Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radios app. Medverkande: Elsa Johnsson, student vid Stanforduniversitetet, Gabriel Wernstedt, pressekreterare Säkerhetspolisen, Lotta Edholm, forskningsminister, Mattias O'Nils, professor vid forskningscentret STC i Sundsvall, Cheng Peng, forskare vid universitetet i Sundsvall, Brian Vinter, vice-dekanus på Århus universitet, He Zixuan, kinesisk forskare vid Århus universitet som genomgått deras screening för kinesiska studenter, Mette Thunø, lektor och PhD i Kinastudier på Århus universitet, ”Ming”, kinesisk forskare som doktorerat på Harvard men återvänt till Kina, kinesisk familj i Peking som resonerar kring västs hårda retorik mot kinesiska studenter mflProgramledare: Viktor Löfgrenviktor.m.lofgren@sr.seReportrar: Björn Djurberg och Hanna SahlbergTekniker: Calle Hedlund och Rasmus HåkansProducent: Anja Sahlberganja.sahlberg@sr.se

Trump kann die mögliche Reaktion Russlands und Chinas nicht ignorieren, die angesichts ihrer Interessen in Venezuela und der dort investierten Summen zwangsläufig kommen wird. Natürlich werden weder Moskau noch Peking direkt für Venezuela kämpfen, aber auch in Korea und Vietnam haben sie nicht direkt gekämpft. Von Dmitri Rodionow  

Die ZDF-Auslandskorrespondentinnen und -korrespondenten berichten täglich aus verschiedenen Regionen der Welt. Bis Heiligabend geben sie im auslandsjournal-Adventskalender Einblicke in ihren Arbeitsalltag. Jeden Tag ein besonderer Moment hinter den Kulissen der Berichterstattung. Alle Türchen auch als Video unter: https://kurz.zdf.de/4oQ0/ Der auslandsjournal-Adventskalender ist eine Produktion von BosePark Productions im Auftrag des ZDF-auslandsjournal.   Lead Producerin: Miki Sič Redaktion: Julia Ilan Schnitt und Sound: Alexander von Bargen Executive Producer:innen: Su Holder und Chris Guse   ZDF auslandsjournal: Christian Semm Sprecher: Gert Anhalt  Leiterin ZDF auslandsjournal: Stefanie Schoeneborn  

Samtidigt som Europas ledare åker till Kina och ber om hjälp med Ukraina så stärks Pekings armkrok med Moskva. Vad är Kinas syn på kriget i Ukraina? Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radios app. Både Frankrikes president och Tysklands utrikesminister har nyligen besökt Kina för att få Pekings hjälp att påverka Ryssland gällande kriget i Ukraina. Båda dessa möten gick så där för européerna. Istället för konstruktiva samtal om Ukraina möttes gästerna av den kinesiska regimens föreläsningar om Taiwan och Kinas infekterade läge med Japan. Wang Yi, Pekings utrikesnestor, besökte också Moskva samtidigt som de amerikanska sändebuden var där för att mäkla fred i kriget i Ukraina. Och Wang Yi fick ett betydligt bekvämare mottagande än amerikanerna. Vad säger det om relationen mellan Kina och Ryssland. Hur hänger kinesernas syn på kriget i Ukraina ihop med deras ambitioner för Taiwan? Använder Peking kriget i Ukraina för stärka den egna maktsfären i Östasien, och är det här bevis på att Kina och Ryssland gemensamt strävar efter en ny multipolär världsordning?Medverkande: Moa Kärnstrand, Kinakorrespondent. Hanna Sahlberg, Kinareporter. Fredrik Wadström, Rysslandskorrespondent.Programledare: Björn DjurbergProducent: Mattias Dellert

China ist Deutschlands wichtigster Handelspartner, die deutsche Abhängigkeit von Importen aus China ist groß. Das weiß auch Außenminister Johann Wadephul, der Anfang dieser Woche zu Gesprächen in Peking und Guangzhou war. Er wollte in China unter anderem über die scharfen Exportkontrollen für seltene Erden sprechen, die auch die deutsche Industrie unter Druck setzen. Denn in der Gewinnung und Verarbeitung seltener Erden, die für Wirtschaft und Energiewende unverzichtbar sind, hat China eine unangefochtene Vormachtstellung in der Welt. Kann Deutschland überhaupt ohne China? Wie groß Chinas wirtschaftliche Macht ist und warum Deutschland und Europa davon so abhängig sind, bespricht Anne Will in dieser Folge mit Janka Oertel, Asien-Expertin und Distinguished Policy Fellow beim European Council on Foreign Relations. Oertel ist eine der führenden China-Expertinnen Deutschlands und plädiert immer wieder dafür, sich möglichst schnell unabhängiger von China zu machen. Seit der Veröffentlichung der deutschen China-Strategie 2023 seien wir im De-Risking nicht weitergekommen, sagt sie, die Risiken seien sogar noch gestiegen. Es brauche nun echte Interventionen und alternative Lieferketten, auch EU-Zollerhöhungen könnten eine Option sein. In dieser Folge geht es außerdem darum, wie die EU da mit einem neuen Aktionsplan gegensteuern will und warum Chinas wirtschaftliche Lage jetzt ein Möglichkeitsfenster bietet, in den chinesisch-europäischen Beziehungen Druck aufzubauen. Redaktionsschluss für diese Folge war der 10.12.2025, 18:30 Uhr.

Peking hat nicht nur die Kontrolle über Metalle der Seltenen Erden erlangt, sondern auch über deren Produktion. Doch eine neue Technik könnte beide Probleme lösen: Im Januar 2026 beginnt in den USA die kommerzielle Produktion von Gallium.

Außenminister Wadephul ist in Peking eingetroffen. Nach dem geplatzten Termin im Oktober stehen diesmal mehrere hochrangige Gesprächspartner bereit. Im Mittelpunkt: die harten Handelskonflikte, Chinas Exportkontrollen für Seltene Erden und der Druck auf deutsche Unternehmen.

Außenminister Wadephul ist in Peking eingetroffen. Nach dem geplatzten Termin im Oktober stehen diesmal mehrere hochrangige Gesprächspartner bereit. Im Mittelpunkt: die harten Handelskonflikte, Chinas Exportkontrollen für Seltene Erden und der Druck auf deutsche Unternehmen.

16 daga átak gegn kynbundnu ofbeldi er alþjóðleg herferð UN Women sem stendur ár hvert frá 25. nóvember til 10. desember. Herferðin tengir saman alþjóðlegan baráttudag Sameinuðu þjóðanna gegn kynbundnu ofbeldi og alþjóðlegan mannréttindadag Sameinuðu þjóðanna. Í ár, þegar 30 ár eru liðin frá undirritun Peking-sáttmálans, er athyglinni beint að stafrænu ofbeldi gegn konum og stúlkum. Sara McMahon, kynningarstjóri UN Women á Íslandi, settist niður með mér í morgun og ræddi við mig um stöðuna, áhyggjuefnin og framtíðina. Síðustu helgi hóf ný þáttaröð göngu sína á Rás 1 sem heitir Fatlist – í þáttunum fjalla Kolbrún Dögg Kristjánsdóttir og Heiða Vigdís Sigfúsdóttir um birtingarmyndir fötlunar í menningu og listum og kafa ofan í sögu fötlunar, skilgreiningar hennar og hvaða mynd listin dregur upp af fötluðu fólki. Í seinni hluta þáttar ætla Kolbrún Dögg og Heiða Vigdís að setjast hjá okkur og segja okkur meira um Fatlist – en byrjum á alþjóðlegri herferð UN Women. Umsjón: Ástrós Signýjardóttir og Pétur Magnússon. Tónlist þáttarins: Marvin Gaye - Yesterday

När USA vill mota bort Kina från Panamakanalen har Peking en plan B. Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radios app. Världens två supermakter har drabbat samman i Panama. Donald Trump vill ha bort kinesiskt inflytande från den för världshandeln så viktiga kanalen och amerikanska Blackrock vill köpa ut Hongkongbolaget CK Hutchison som där driver två hamnar. Men Peking bromsar affären och har även investerat miljarder i en ny djuphavshamn i Peru, söder om Panama. Konflikten visar hur hamnar blivit centrala i stormaktskampen och där Kina i många år ökat sitt inflytande över hamnar världen över. Även i Europa där USA nu också tycks vilja pressa bort Kina från den stora hamnen Piraeus i Grekland.Medverkande: Hanna Sahlberg, Ekots KinareporterProgramledare & producent: Björn Djurberg

Schniederjann, Nils www.deutschlandfunk.de, Andruck - Das Magazin für Politische Literatur

Skridskoåkaren Nils van der Poel tar dubbla OS-guld i Peking 2022 och ger ett oförglömligt svar på den ångestfyllda reportern Patric Ljunggrens fråga. Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radios app. Medverkande:Patric Ljunggren, reporterArkivljud: Sveriges Radio.Slutmix: Maria Stillberg.Ett program av Cecilia Marqvard, 2025.

China verkauft seine Stacheldrahtzäune in die ganze Welt. Sie kommen aus einer kleinen Stadt in der Nähe von Peking. Unser China-Korrespondent Gustav Theile war da. F.A.Z.-Wirtschaftsherausgeber Gerald Braunberger ordnet die weltwirtschaftlichen Zusammenhänge ein.

Nu ska man återigen leta efter flygplanet MH370, 10 år efter att det försvann. Här berättar lyssnare om vad de letar efter och hur jakten går! Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radios app. Planet MH370 försvann när det var på väg från Kuala Lumpur till Peking år 2014 med 239 personer ombord och beskrivs som ett av luftfartshistoriens största mysterium. Nu ska letandet återupptas och företaget som ska leda insatsen får 70 miljoner dollar om de lyckas. Att leta kan vara oerhört frustrerande, det är ju ett sökande efter något som man vill ha eller behöver eller önskar. En ny kärlekspartner, en gammal fin modelltraktor en billig enkelbiljett till paradiset eller kanske bästa julklappen till mormor - här berättar lyssnare om vad de letar efter just nu! Det kan vara stort som smått såklart. Mitt letande med Annika IlmoniRing oss, mejla på karlavagnen@sverigesradio.se eller skriv till oss på Facebook och Instagram. Programmet startar 21:40.

Trump ställer nya krav på Taiwan, vars regering svarar med en charmoffensiv för att framtidssäkra USA:s stöd. Men hur långt räcker det när Trump vill åt en deal med Xi? Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radios app. Taiwans regering föreslår en rekordsatsning på försvaret med stora inköp av amerikanska vapen. Förslaget kommer efter nya krav från Trump-administrationen om att Taiwan måste lägga ännu mer pengar på sitt eget försvar. Samtidigt vill USA också se att Taiwans viktiga och världsledande halvledarindustri, som ofta beskrivs som Taiwans ”sköld” mot Kina, delvis flyttas över till USA. Den senaste utvecklingen reser nya frågor om var USA och Taiwan har varandra under Trump 2.0. Donald Trump och Xi Jinping har nyligen pratat i telefon om Taiwan och i korten framåt ligger också ett amerikanskt statsbesök i Peking.Medverkande: Moa Kärnstrand, Kinakorrespondent. Alexis von Sydow, analytiker vid Nationellt kunskapscentrum om Kina på Utrikespolitiska institutet.Programledare: Björn DjurbergProducent: Therese Rosenvinge

Reklam för Dbet. Här hittar ni våra andelsspel på Supertipsethttps://trk.affiliates.dbet.com/o/NRI1ix?lpage=vWZQ4d&site_id=7012722Fullständiga villkor gäller. +18. Spela ansvarsfullt. Stödlinjen stödlinjen.seÅrets bästa sportdealar är här! TV4 och Studio Allsvenskan har ett samarbete där du för endast 249 kr/månaden får TV4:s fotbollspaket (Allsvenskan, Superettan, Serie A, LaLiga, plus massa mer). Ordinarie pris är 449 kr/månaden så detta erbjudande innebär 200 kr rabatt varje månad! Gå in på https://www.tv4play.se/kampanj/studioallsvenskan för att ta del av erbjudandet! Dessutom har vi nu även hockeypaketet där du kan se SHL och Hockeyallsvenskan till halva priset hos TV4. Klickan på länken för mer info: https://www.tv4play.se/kampanj/studiohockeyÄntligen måndag, äntligen Studio Allsvenskan!Vi inleder i kvalrysaren mellan Norrköping och Örgryte där vi gratulerar ÖIS till Allsvenskan och vinkar adjö till Peking.Hur ser vi på matchen? Och vad händer nu?Därefter går vi igenom ALLA Silly Season-nyheter som har kommit under den senaste veckan.Hur går tränarjakten?Vilka spelare är aktuella att värvas in?Och vilka spelare kan säljas från din klubb?Vi går igenom alla allsvenska lag.Avsnittet finns ute överallt.Studio Allsvenskan finns även på Patreon, där du får ALLA våra avsnitt reklamfritt direkt efter inspelning. Dessutom får du tillgång till våra exklusiva poddserier där vi släpper avsnitt tisdag till fredag varje vecka. Bli medlem här!Följ Studio Allsvenskan på sociala medier: Twitter!Facebook!Instagram!Youtube!TikTok! Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Die USA drängen die UNO, nicht länger wegzuschauen: Christliche Kirchen sollen in China die Ideologie der Kommunistischen Partei predigen und ihre Kreuze entfernen. Seit über 26 Jahren verfolgt das Regime Falun-Dafa-Praktizierende – ebenso wie Uiguren, Tibeter und andere religiöse Gruppen.

China's Property Crisis Deepens as State-Owned Giant Vanke Plunges; Export Model Creates International Friction — Fraser Howie — Howie documents the deepening property market crisis, evidenced by the financial collapse of state-owned developer Vanke. The central government avoids massive bailout commitments, converting acute sectoral problems into chronic structural drags that leave municipal and regional banks dangerously exposed. Howie notes that the government's current strategy—relying on massive export volumes—is generating significant international friction and pushback, as other nations fear being "swamped by cheap Chinese imports" and demand market access reciprocity. 1947 PEKING

Ein hypothetischer chinesischer Angriff auf Taiwan könnte eine „existenzielle Bedrohung” für Japan darstellen. Seit dieser Aussage der japanischen Premierministerin Takaichi schlagen in Peking die Wogen hoch. Einen Tag, nachdem Trump mit dem chinesischen Staatschef Xi telefoniert hatte, sprach Takaichi ebenfalls mit Trump am Telefon.

Taiwan will deutlich mehr in seine Verteidigung investieren. In einer US-Zeitung erklärt Präsident Lai den Vorstoß. Die Ankündigung erfolgt parallel zu steigenden diplomatischen Spannungen in der Region.

Der Tag in 2 Minuten – vom 27.11.

US-Präsident Trump telefonierte mit dem chinesischen Staatschef Xi. Sie sprachen über Taiwan und die Ukraine, so Peking. Taiwan lehnt die Forderung Xis, nach der Taiwan nach China „zurückkehren“ solle, ab.

Geopolitics of the Gulf and Eurasia: US-Saudi Relations and China's Global Strategy — Victoria Coates, Vice President, Heritage Foundation — Victoria Coates addresses U.S.-Saudi relations, noting that technology transfer risks from China exist but remain manageable through export-controlled F-35 versions. She argues that Russia is dependent on Beijing in the Ukraine war, which serves China's strategic objective of distracting the West from Indo-Pacific developments. A perceived Russian victory would embolden China toward aggression in East Asia. Coates identifies security guarantees and Saudi openness to the Abraham Accords as key priorities for regional stability.  1922 PEKING

Declan Ganley, ein irischer Telekommunikationsunternehmer, plant eine weltraumgestützte Alternative zum aktuellen Internet, um die Abhängigkeit von anfälligen Unterseekabeln zu verringern. Anfang 2026 will er 600 Satelliten – das sogenannte Outernet – in Betrieb nehmen.

Vad får vd:n för amerikanska Nvidia, världens högst värderade bolag, att säga att Kina kommer vinna AI-racet? Vi söker svaret i en robottaxi i Peking. Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radios app. Jensen Huang, vd och grundare av amerikanska chiptillverkaren Nvidia, sade nyligen i en intervju att Kina ”kommer att vinna” AI-racet. En vändpunkt i utvecklingen var när kinesiska AI-appen Deepseek slog ner som en bomb i början av året och fick Donald Trump att tala om ”ett uppvaknande för USA”. Men vad hände sen? Och hur stort problem är det för Kina att USA kan hindra export av AI-chip? Hör om hur kommunistpartiet agerar på AI-området och vad som står på spel för världen när Kina och USA slåss om att ta ledningen. Hanna Sahlberg tar med oss in i en kinesisk robottaxi utan mänsklig förare, ett exempel på hur AI integreras i vardagen i kinesiska storstäder.Medverkande: Hanna Sahlberg, Kinareporter. Moa Kärnstrand, Kinakorrespondent. Sven Carlsson, teknikreporter på Ekot.Programledare: Björn DjurbergProducent: Therese Rosenvinge

Münchenberg, Jörg www.deutschlandfunk.de, Kommentare und Themen der Woche

From the ridges of Blanc Mont to the jungles of China, this chapter follows the Marines as they emerge from the Great War hardened and transformed. It opens on the blood-soaked hills of France, where the Corps shattered German lines at Blanc Mont and the Meuse, then traces their return to a nation eager for peace but uncertain of their purpose.  In the decades between wars, the Marines rebuilt themselves on football fields, in classrooms, and on ponies at Peking. They forged doctrine, studied war, and turned lessons from Haiti and France into the blueprint for amphibious victory. By the eve of World War II, they had become a force unlike any in history and ready for the storm to come. Support the Series Listen ad-free and a week early on historyofthemarinecorps.supercast.com Donate directly at historyofthemarinecorps.com Try a free 30-day Audible trial at audible.com/marinehistory Social Media Instagram - @historyofthemarines Facebook - @marinehistory Twitter - @marinehistory

Lars Klingbeil ist zu einer mehrtägigen China-Reise nach Peking aufgebrochen. Die Gespräche stehen im Zeichen eines historischen Handelsdefizits, neuer geopolitischer Spannungen und wachsender Abhängigkeiten Deutschlands von chinesischen Lieferketten. Nach dem diplomatischen Eklat um den abgesagten Wadephul-Besuch richtet sich die internationale Aufmerksamkeit erneut auf Berlin und Peking.

PREVIEW Anne Stevenson-Yang focuses on the decline of China's economic miracle, which was fueled by borrowing and falsehoods and is potentially headed toward japanification or worse. The idea that China was continuously rising and overtaking the United States is now largely disregarded. Although some asset investors hold hope that Asia, specifically China, will provide yield, few believe the downturn is temporary. Guest: Anne Stevenson-Yang. 1918 PEKING

Xi Jinping's Exile and Family Betrayal. Joseph Turigian describes how political torment extended to Xi Zhongxun's family, forcing Xi Jinping's mother to denounce her teenage son when he fled incarceration, a difficult moral judgment made to protect the remaining siblings. During the Cultural Revolution, Xi Jinping was exiled to the countryside near Yanan, a sacred site of Chinese Communist Party history. This mass "sending down" of youth was intended to toughen them up and instill revolutionary spirit, becoming a deeply formative experience for Xi Jinping. Xi Zhongxun spent years in prison writing unanswered, plaintive letters seeking relief and reconsideration from the leadership. Guest: Joseph Turigian. 906 PEKING

Nach einem Solidaritätszuspruch der japanischen Regierung zu Taiwan zeigt sich China empört. Das Regime in Peking manövriert daraufhin gleich mehrere Militärflugzeuge und Marineschiffe in japanisches Gebiet. Ebenso hat China seine Bürger vor Reisen nach Japan gewarnt.

Holz, Dorothee www.deutschlandfunk.de, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft

All aboard, Culture Kids! In this week's magical adventure, Mom and Asher hop on the Culture Train and travel to Beijing, China, a city filled with history, color, and stories that stretch back thousands of years. Together with special guest Ms. Dan Song, author of the My City Adventures series, they step through the mighty red gates of the Forbidden City, where emperors once ruled and legends were born. You'll hear the echoes of ancient footsteps, learn what the color red means in Chinese culture, and even discover why the Forbidden City was once “forbidden.” From dragons and phoenixes to royal bedrooms and bronze cranes, this episode brings China's past to life in a way kids can see, hear, and imagine. And of course, no Culture Kids adventure would be complete without food!

Last time we spoke about the Changsha fire. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man or flood the land to slow the invaders. He chose both, pushing rivers and rallying a fractured army as Japanese forces pressed along the Yangtze. Fortresses at Madang held long, but the cost was high—troops lost, civilians displaced, a city's heart burning in the night. Wuhan fell after months of brutal fighting, yet the battle did not break China's will. Mao Zedong urged strategy over martyrdom, preferring to drain the enemy and buy time for a broader struggle. The Japanese, though victorious tactically, found their strength ebbing, resource strains, supply gaps, and a war that felt endless. In the wake of Wuhan, Changsha stood next in the Japanese crosshairs, its evacuation and a devastating fire leaving ash and memory in its wake. Behind these prices, political currents swirled. Wang Jingwei defected again, seeking power beyond Chiang's grasp, while Chongqing rose as a western bastion of resistance. The war hardened into a protracted stalemate, turning Japan from an aggressive assailant into a wary occupier, and leaving China to endure, persist, and fight on.   #175  The Soviet-Japanese Border Conflicts Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So based on the title of this one, you probably can see we are taking a bit of a detour. For quite some time we have focused on the Japanese campaigns into China proper 1937-1938. Now the way the second sino-japanese war is traditionally broken down is in phases. 1937-1938, 1939-1942 and 1942-1945. However there is actually even more going on in China aside from the war with Japan. In Xinjiang province a large full blown Islamic revolution breaks out in 1937. We will be covering that story at a later date, but another significant event is escalating border skirmishes in Manchukuo. Now these border skirmishes had been raging ever since the USSR consolidated its hold over the far east. We talked about some of those skirmishes prior to the Sino-Soviet war in 1929. However when Japan created the puppet government of Manchukuo, this was a significant escalation in tensions with the reds. Today we are going to talk about the escalating border conflicts between the Soviets and Japan. A tongue of poorly demarcated land extends southeast from Hunchun, hugging the east bank of the Tumen River between Lake Khasan to the east and Korea to the west. Within this tongue stands Changkufeng Hill, one of a long chain of highlands sweeping from upstream along the rivers and moors toward the sea. The twin-peaked hill sits at the confluence area several miles northwest of the point where Manchuria, Korea, and the Russian Far East meet. The hill's shape reminded Koreans of their changgo, which is a long snare drum constricted at the center and tapped with the hands at each end. When the Manchus came to the Tumen, they rendered the phonetic sounds into three ideographic characters meaning "taut drum peaks" or Chang-ku-feng. The Japanese admired the imagery and preserved the Chinese readings, which they pronounce Cho-ko-ho. From their eastern vantage, the Russians called it Zaozernaya, "hill behind the lake." Soviet troops referred to it as a sugar-loaf hill. For many years, natives and a handful of officials in the region cultivated a relaxed attitude toward borders and sovereignty. Even after the Japanese seized Manchuria in 1931, the issue did not immediately come to a head. With the expansion of Manchukuo and the Soviet Far East under Stalin's Five-Year plans, both sides began to attend more closely to frontier delimitation. Whenever either party acted aggressively, force majeure was invoked to justify the unexpected and disruptive events recognized in international law. Most often, these incidents erupted along the eastern Manchurian borders with the USSR or along the 350-mile frontier south of Lake Khanka, each skirmish carrying the seeds of all-out warfare. Now we need to talk a little bit about border history. The borders in question essentially dated to pacts concluded by the Qing dynasty and the Tsardom. Between the first Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 and the Mukden Agreement of 1924, there were over a dozen accords governing the borders. Relevant to Changkufeng were the basic 15-article Convention of Peking, supplementing the Tientsin Treaties of November 1860, some maps made in 1861, and the eight-article Hunchun Border Protocol of 1886. By the 1860 treaty, the Qing ceded to Tsarist Russia the entire maritime province of Siberia, but the meaning of "lands south of Lake Khanka" remained rather vague. Consequently, a further border agreement was negotiated in June 1861 known as "the Lake Khanka Border Pact", by which demarcations were drawn on maps and eight wooden markers erected. The border was to run from Khanka along ridgelines between the Hunchun River and the sea, past Suifenho and Tungning, terminating about 6 miles from the mouth of the Tumen. Then a Russo-Chinese commission established in 1886 drew up the Hunchun Border Pact, proposing new or modified markers along the 1860–1861 lines and arranging a Russian resurvey. However, for the Japanese, in 1938, the Chinese or Manchu texts of the 1886 Hunchun agreement were considered controlling. The Soviets argued the border ran along every summit west of Khasan, thereby granting them jurisdiction over at least the eastern slopes of all elevations, including Changkufeng and Shachaofeng.  Since the Qing dynasty and the house of Romanov were already defunct, the new sovereignties publicly appealed to opposing texts, and the Soviet side would not concede that the Russian-language version had never been deemed binding by the Qing commissioners. Yet, even in 1938, the Japanese knew that only the Chinese text had survived or could be located.    Now both the Chinese and Russian military maps generally drew the frontier along the watershed east of Khasan; this aligned with the 1861 readings based on the Khanka agreement. The Chinese Republican Army conducted new surveys sometime between 1915 and 1920. The latest Chinese military map of the Changkufeng area drew the border considerably closer to the old "red line" of 1886, running west of Khasan but near the shore rather than traversing the highland crests. None of the military delimitations of the border was sanctified by an official agreement. Hence, the Hunchun Protocol, whether well known or not, invaluable or worthless, remained the only government-to-government pact dealing with the frontiers.  Before we jump into it, how about a little summary of what became known as the Soviet-Japanese border conflicts. The first major conflict would obviously be the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Following years of conflict between the Russian Empire and Japan culminating in the costly Battle of Tsushima, Tsar Nicholas II's government sought peace, recognizing Japan's claims to Korea and agreeing to evacuate Manchuria.  From 1918 to 1920, the Imperial Japanese Army, under Emperor Taishō after the death of Meiji, assisted the White Army and Alexander Kerensky against the Bolshevik Red Army. They also aided the Czechoslovak Legion in Siberia to facilitate its return to Europe after an Austrian-Hungarian armoured train purportedly went astray. By 1920, with Austria-Hungary dissolved and Czechoslovakia established two years earlier, the Czechoslovak Legion reached Europe. Japan withdrew from the Russian Revolution and the Civil War in 1922. Following Japan's 1919-1920 occupations and the Soviet intervention in Mongolia in 1921, the Republic of China also withdrew from Outer Mongolia in 1921. In 1922, after capturing Vladivostok in 1918 to halt Bolshevik advances, Japanese forces retreated to Japan as Bolshevik power grew and the postwar fatigue among combatants increased. After Hirohito's invasion of Manchuria in 1931–1932, following Taishō's death in 1926, border disputes between Manchukuo, the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Soviet Union increased. Many clashes stemmed from poorly defined borders, though some involved espionage. Between 1932 and 1934, the Imperial Japanese Army reported 152 border disputes, largely tied to Soviet intelligence activity in Manchuria, while the Soviets accused Japan of 15 border violations, six air intrusions, and 20 cases of "spy smuggling" in 1933 alone. Numerous additional violations followed in the ensuing years. By the mid-1930s, Soviet-Japanese diplomacy and trust had deteriorated further, with the Japanese being openly labeled "fascist enemies" at the Seventh Comintern Congress in July 1935. Beginning in 1935, conflicts significantly escalated. On 8 January 1935, the first armed clash, known as the Halhamiao incident, took place on the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo. Several dozen cavalrymen of the Mongolian People's Army crossed into Manchuria near disputed fishing grounds and engaged an 11‑man Manchukuo Imperial Army patrol near the Buddhist temple at Halhamiao, led by a Japanese military advisor. The Manchukuo Army sustained 6 wounded and 2 dead, including the Japanese officer; the Mongols suffered no casualties and withdrew after the Japanese sent a punitive expedition to reclaim the area. Two motorized cavalry companies, a machine‑gun company, and a tankette platoon occupied the position for three weeks without resistance. In June 1935, the first direct exchange of fire between the Japanese and Soviets occurred when an 11‑man Japanese patrol west of Lake Khanka was attacked by six Soviet horsemen, reportedly inside Manchukuo territory. In the firefight, one Soviet soldier was killed and two horses were captured. The Japanese requested a joint investigation, but the Soviets rejected the proposal. In October 1935, nine Japanese and 32 Manchukuoan border guards were establishing a post about 20 kilometers north of Suifenho when they were attacked by 50 Soviet soldiers. The Soviets opened fire with rifles and five heavy machine guns. Two Japanese and four Manchukuoan soldiers were killed, and another five were wounded. The Manchukuoan foreign affairs representative lodged a verbal protest with the Soviet consul at Suifenho. The Kwantung Army of Japan also sent an intelligence officer to investigate the clash. On 19 December 1935, a Manchukuoan unit reconnoitering southwest of Buir Lake clashed with a Mongolian party, reportedly capturing 10 soldiers. Five days later, 60 truck‑borne Mongolian troops assaulted the Manchukuoans and were repulsed, at the cost of three Manchukuoan dead. On the same day, at Brunders, Mongolian forces attempted three times to drive out Manchukuoan outposts, and again at night, but all attempts failed. Further small attempts occurred in January, with Mongolians using airplanes for reconnaissance. The arrival of a small Japanese force in three trucks helped foil these attempts; casualties occurred on both sides, though Mongolian casualties are unknown aside from 10 prisoners taken. In February 1936, Lieutenant-Colonel Sugimoto Yasuo was ordered to form a detachment from the 14th Cavalry Regiment to "drive the Outer Mongol intruders from the Olankhuduk region," a directive attributed to Lieutenant-General Kasai Heijuro. Sugimoto's detachment included cavalry guns, heavy machine guns, and tankettes. They faced a force of about 140 Mongolians equipped with heavy machine guns and light artillery. On February 12, Sugimoto's men drove the Mongolians south, at the cost of eight Japanese killed, four wounded, and one tankette destroyed. The Japanese began to withdraw, but were attacked by 5–6 Mongolian armored cars and two bombers, which briefly disrupted the column. The situation was stabilized when the Japanese unit received artillery support, allowing them to destroy or repel the armored cars. In March 1936, the Tauran incident occurred. In this clash, both the Japanese Army and the Mongolian Army deployed a small number of armored fighting vehicles and aircraft. The incident began when 100 Mongolian and six Soviet troops attacked and occupied the disputed village of Tauran, Mongolia, driving off the small Manchurian garrison. They were supported by light bombers and armored cars, though the bombing sorties failed to inflict damage on the Japanese, and three bombers were shot down by Japanese heavy machine guns. Local Japanese forces counter-attacked, conducting dozens of bombing sorties and finally assaulting Tauran with 400 men and 10 tankettes. The result was a Mongolian rout, with 56 Mongolian soldiers killed, including three Soviet advisors, and an unknown number wounded. Japanese losses were 27 killed and 9 wounded. Later in March 1936, another border clash occurred between Japanese and Soviet forces. Reports of border violations prompted the Japanese Korean Army to send ten men by truck to investigate, but the patrol was ambushed by 20 Soviet NKVD soldiers deployed about 300 meters inside territory claimed by Japan. After suffering several casualties, the Japanese patrol withdrew and was reinforced with 100 men, who then drove off the Soviets. Fighting resumed later that day when the NKVD brought reinforcements. By nightfall, the fighting had ceased and both sides had pulled back. The Soviets agreed to return the bodies of two Japanese soldiers who had died in the fighting, a development viewed by the Japanese government as encouraging. In early April 1936, three Japanese soldiers were killed near Suifenho in another minor affray. This incident was notable because the Soviets again returned the bodies of the fallen servicemen. In June 1937, the Kanchazu Island incident occurred on the Amur River along the Soviet–Manchukuo border. Three Soviet gunboats crossed the river's center line, disembarked troops, and occupied Kanchazu Island. Japanese forces from the IJA 1st Division, equipped with two horse-drawn 37 mm artillery pieces, quickly established improvised firing positions and loaded their guns with both high-explosive and armor-piercing shells. They shelled the Soviet vessels, sinking the lead gunboat, crippling the second, and driving off the third. Japanese troops subsequently fired on the swimming crewmen from the sunken ships using machine guns. Thirty-seven Soviet soldiers were killed, while Japanese casualties were zero. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested and demanded the Soviet forces withdraw from the island. The Soviet leadership, apparently shocked by the incident and reluctant to escalate, agreed to evacuate their troops. By 1938 the border situation had deteriorated. The tangled terrain features, mountain, bog, stream, forest, and valley, would have complicated even careful observers' discernment of the old red line drawn in 1886. Fifty years later, the markers themselves had undergone a metamorphosis. Japanese investigators could find, at most, only 14 to 17 markers standing fairly intact between the Tumen estuary and Khanka—roughly one every 25 miles at best. The remainder were missing or ruined; five were found in new locations. Marker "K," for example, was 40 meters deeper inside Manchuria, away from Khanka. Japanese military experts noted that of the 20 markers originally set along the boundaries of Hunchun Prefecture alone, only four could be found by the summer of 1938. The rest had either been wrecked or arbitrarily moved and discarded by Russian or Chinese officials and inhabitants. It is even said that one missing marker could be seen on display in Khabarovsk. The Chinese had generally interpreted the boundary as the road line just west of Khasan, at least in practice. Free road movement, however, had become a problem even 20 years before the Japanese overran Manchuria in 1931–1932 during the so-called Manchurian Incident. The Japanese adopted, or inherited, the Chinese interpretation, which was based on the 1886 agreement on border roads; the key clause held that the frontier west of Khasan would be the road along the lake. Japanese sources emphasize that local residents' anger toward gradual Soviet oppression and penetrations westward into Manchurian territory fueled the conflict. Many natives believed the original boundaries lay east of the lake, but the Soviets adjusted the situation to suit their own convenience. In practice, the Russians were restricting road use just west of Khasan by Manchurian and Korean residents. There was speculation that this was a prelude to taking over the ridgelines, depending on the reaction of the Manchukuoan–Japanese side. Villagers who went to streams or the lake to launder clothing found themselves subjected to sniper fire. Along a 25-mile stretch of road near Shachaofeng, farmers reported coming under fire from new Soviet positions as early as November 1935. Nevertheless, Japanese and Koreans familiar with the Tumen area noted agrarian, seasonal Korean religious rites atop Changkufeng Hill, including fattened pigs sacrificed and changgo drums beaten. Village elders told Japanese visitors in 1938 that, until early the preceding year, no Russians had come as far as Changkufeng Hill. Looking only at the border sector around Changkufeng, the easy days were clearly behind us. In the summer of 1938, Gaimusho "Foreign Ministry" observers described the explosive situation along the Korea–Manchuria–USSR borders as a matter of de facto frontiers. Both sides pressed against each other, and their trigger-happy posture was summed up in the colloquial refrain: "Take another step and we'll let you have it." Near dawn on 13 June 1938, a Manchurian patrol detected a suspicious figure in the fog swirling over Changlingtzu Hill on the Siberian–Manchurian frontier. Challenged at 15 feet, the suspect hurled two pistols to the ground and raised his hands in surrender. At headquarters, the police soon realized this was no routine border-trespassing case. The man was a defector and he was a Russian general, in fact he was the director of all NKVD forces in the Soviet Far East. Beneath a mufti of spring coat and hunting cap, he wore a full uniform with medals. His identification card No. 83 designated him as G. S. Lyushkov, Commissar 3rd Class, countersigned by Nikolai Yezhov, NKVD head in Moscow. Lyushkov was promptly turned over to the Japanese military authorities, who transferred him to Seoul and then to Tokyo under close escort. On 1 July, the Japanese press was permitted to disclose that Lyushkov had sought refuge in Japan. Ten days later, to capitalize on the commissar's notoriety and to confound skeptics, the Japanese produced Lyushkov at a press conference in Tokyo. For the Japanese and foreign correspondents, who met separately with him, Lyushkov described Soviet Far East strength and the turmoil wracking the USSR, because for those of you unfamiliar this was during the Stalinist purges. Clearly, the Japanese had gained a unique reservoir of high-level intelligence and a wealth of materials, including notes scratched in blood by suspects incarcerated at Khabarovsk. A general tightening of Russian frontier security had recently been reported. Natives of Fangchuanting asserted that a Soviet cavalry patrol appeared in June, seemingly for the first time. Contact with Yangkuanping, northwest of Khasan, was severed. More importantly, Japanese Army Signal Corps intelligence detected a surge of Soviet message traffic from the Posyet Bay district. After Lyushkov's defection, a drastic reshuffle in the local Russian command apparently occurred, and responsibility for border surveillance seems to have been reallocated. Japanese records indicate that the Novokievsk security force commander was relieved and the sector garrison replaced by troops from Vladivostok. Gaimusho intelligence also received reports that a border garrison unit had been transferred from Khabarovsk or Chita to the Tumen sector. The Kwantung Army signal monitors also intercepted two significant frontline messages on 6 July from the new Russian local commander in the Posyet region, addressed to Lieutenant General Sokolov in Khabarovsk. Decoded, the messages suggested (1) that ammunition for infantry mortars amounted to less than half the required supply; and  (2) a recommendation that higher headquarters authorize Russian elements to secure certain unoccupied high ground west of Khasan.  The commander noted terrain advantages and the contemplated construction of emplacements that would command Najin and the Korean railway. As a start, at least one Russian platoon should be authorized to dig in on the highest ground (presumably Changkufeng) and deploy four tons of entanglements to stake out the Soviet claim. Korea Army Headquarters received a telegram from the Kwantung Army on 7 July conveying the deciphered messages. On the same day, the 19th Division in North Korea telephoned Seoul that, on 6 July, three or four Soviet horsemen had been observed reconnoitering Manchurian territory from atop a hill called Changkufeng. The alarming intelligence from the Kwantung Army and the front warranted immediate attention by the Korea Army. Some Kwantung Army officers doubted the significance of the developments, with one intelligence official even suggesting the Russian messages might be a deliberate ploy designed to entrap the Japanese at Changkufeng. On 7–8 July, all staff officers in Seoul convened at army headquarters. The name of Changkufeng Hill was not well known, but maps and other data suggested that neither the Japanese nor the Russians had previously stationed border units in the ridge complex west of Khasan. As early as March 1936, Army Commander Koiso Kuniaki had distributed maps to subordinate units, indicating which sectors were in dispute. No patrol was to enter zones lacking definitive demarcation. Until then, the only Japanese element east of the Tumen was a Manchurian policeman at Fangchuanting. Ownership of the high ground emerged as an early issue. A number of other points were raised by  the Kwantung Army: At present, Soviet elements in the area were negligible. The intrusion must not be overlooked. The Russians could be expected to exploit any weakness, and half-measures would not suffice, especially regarding the Japanese defense mission along a 125-mile frontier. In Japanese hands, Changkufeng Hill would be useful, but two excellent observation posts already existed in the neighboring sector of the Manchurian tongue. With dissidence and purges underway, the Russians may have judged it necessary to seal border gaps, particularly after Lyushkov's defection. They may also have sought to control Changkufeng to offset Japanese dominance of the high ground to the north. Soviet seizure of Changkufeng would upset the delicate status quo and could provoke a contest for equivalent observation posts. In broader terms, it mattered little whether the Russians sought a permanent observation post on Changkufeng Hill, which was of relatively minor strategic value. Japan's primary concern lay in the China theater; Changkufeng was peripheral. The Japanese should not expend limited resources or become distracted. The matter required consultation with the high command in Tokyo. In the absence of more comprehensive intelligence, the assembled staff officers concluded that the Korea Army should, at a minimum, ignore or disregard Soviet actions for the time being, while maintaining vigilant observation of the area. The consensus was communicated to Major General Kitano Kenzo, the Korea Army chief of staff, who concurred, and to Koiso. Upon learning that the recommendation advocated a low posture, Koiso inquired only whether the opinion reflected the unanimous view of the staff. Having been assured that it did, he approved the policy. Koiso, then 58, was at the threshold of the routine personnel changes occurring around 15 July. He had just been informed that he would retire and that General Nakamura Kotaro would succeed him. Those acquainted with Koiso perceived him as treating the border difficulties as a minor anticlimax in the course of his command tour. He appeared unemphatic or relaxed as he prepared to depart from a post he had held for twenty-one years. Although neither Koiso nor his staff welcomed the Soviet activities that appeared under way, his reaction likely reflected a reluctance to make decisions that could constrain his soon-to-arrive successor. On 8 July Koiso authorized the dispatch of warnings to the 19th Division at Nanam, to the Hunchun garrison, and to the intelligence branch at Hunchun. These units were instructed to exercise maximum precautions and to tighten frontier security north of Shuiliufeng. In response to the initial appearance of Soviet horsemen at Changkufeng, the Kucheng Border Garrison Unit of the 76th Infantry Regiment maintained close surveillance across the Tumen. By about noon on 9 July, patrols detected approximately a dozen Russian troops commencing construction atop Changkufeng. Between 11 and 13 July, the number of soldiers on the slopes increased to forty; there were also thirty horses and eleven camouflaged tents. Operating in shifts on the western side, thirty meters from the crest, the Russians erected barbed wire and firing trenches; fifty meters forward, they excavated observation trenches. In addition to existing telephone lines between Changkufeng, Lake Khasan, and Kozando, the Russians installed a portable telephone net. Logistical support was provided by three boats on the lake. Approximately twenty kilometers to the east, well within Soviet territory, large forces were being mobilized, and steamship traffic into Posyet Bay intensified. Upon learning of the "intrusion" at Changkufeng on 9 July, Lt. General Suetaka Kamezo, the commander of the 19th Division, dispatched staff officers to the front and prepared to send elements to reinforce border units.  The special significance of Suetaka and his division stemmed from a series of unusual circumstances. Chientao Province, the same zone into which Lyushkov had fled and the sector where Soviet horsemen had appeared, fell within Manchukuo geographically and administratively. Yet, in terms of defense, the configuration of the frontier, the terrain, and the transportation network more closely connected the region with North Korea than with southeastern Manchuria. Approximately 80% of the population was of Korean origin, which implied Japanese rather than Manchukuoan allegiance. Consequently, the Korea Army had been made operationally responsible for the defense of Chientao and controlled not only the three-battalion garrison at Hunchun but also the intelligence detachment located there. In the event of war, the Korea Army's mission was defined as mobilization and execution of subsidiary operational tasks against the USSR, under the control and in support of the Kwantung Army.  The Korea Army ordinarily possessed two infantry divisions, the 19th in North Korea and the 20th stationed at Seoul, but the 20th Division had already departed for China, leaving only the 20th Depot Division in the capital. Beyond sparse ground units, devoid of armor and with weak heavy artillery, there were only two air regiments in Korea, the nearest being the unit at Hoeryong. The Korea Army was designed to maintain public security within Korea as well as fulfill minimal defensive responsibilities. Such an army did not require a full-time operations officer, and none was maintained. When needed, as in mid-1938, the task fell to the senior staff officer, in this case Colonel Iwasaki Tamio. In peacetime, training constituted the primary focus.  Thus, the 19th Division was entrusted with defending northeastern Korea. Its commander, Suetaka, a seasoned infantryman, resented the fact that his elite force had never engaged in combat in China. He intensified training with zeal, emphasizing strict discipline, bravery, aggressiveness, and thorough preparation. Japanese veterans characterized him as severe, bullish, short-tempered, hot-blooded, highly strung, unbending, and stubborn. Nonetheless, there was widespread respect for his realistic training program, maintained under firm, even violent, personal supervision. His men regarded Suetaka as a professional, a modern samurai who forged the division into superb condition. Privately, he was reputed for sensitivity and warmth; a Japanese phrase "yakamashii oyaji" captures the dual sense of stern father and martinet in his character. At the outset, however, Suetaka displayed little aggression. Although not widely known, he did not welcome the orders from army headquarters to deploy to the Tumen. Until late July, he remained somewhat opposed to the notion of dislodging the Soviets from the crest, a proposition arising from neither the division staff nor, initially, Suetaka himself. Colonel Sato noted that, for a week after reports of Soviet excavation at Changkufeng, the division's response was limited to preparations for a possible emergency, as they perceived the matter as a local issue best settled through diplomacy. Korea Army officers acknowledged that, around the time the Soviets consolidated their outpost strength at Changkufeng, an informal and personal telegram arrived in Seoul from a Kwantung Army Intelligence field-grade officer who specialized in Soviet affairs. If the Korea Army hesitated, the Kwantung Army would be obliged to eject the Russians; the matter could not be ignored. While the telegram did not demand a reply and struck several officers as presumptuous and implausible, the message was promptly shown to Koiso. Koiso was driven to immediate action, he wired Tokyo asserting that only the Korea Army could and would handle the incident. One staff officer recalled "We felt we had to act, out of a sense of responsibility. But we resented the Kwantung Army's interference." The Korea Army staff convened shortly after receipt of the unofficial telegram from Hsinking. Based on the latest intelligence from the division dated 13 July, the officers prepared an assessment for submission to the army commander. The hypotheses were distilled into three scenarios: The USSR, or the Far East authorities, desires hostilities. Conclusion: Slightly possible. The USSR seeks to restrain Japan on the eve of the pivotal operations in China: the major Japanese offensive to seize Hankow. Conclusion: Highly probable. The Posyet district commander is new in his post; by occupying the Changkufeng ridges, he would demonstrate loyalty, impress superiors, and seek glory. Conclusion: Possible. Late on 13 July or early on 14 July, Koiso approved the dispatch of a message to the vice minister of war, and the Kwantung Army chief of staff:  "Lake Khasan area lies in troublesome sector USSR has been claiming . . . in accordance with treaties [said Secret Message No. 913], but we interpret it to be Manchukuoan territory, evident even from maps published by Soviet side. Russian actions are patently illegal, but, considering that area does not exert major or immediate influence on operations [Japan] is intending and that China Incident is in full swing, we are not going to conduct counterattack measures immediately. This army is thinking of reasoning with Soviets and requesting pullback, directly on spot. . . . In case Russians do not accede in long run, we have intention to drive Soviet soldiers out of area east of Khasan firmly by use of force."  The message concluded with a request that the Tokyo authorities lodge a formal protest with the USSR, on behalf of Manchukuo and Japan, and guide matters so that the Russians would withdraw quickly. Dominant in Japanese high command thinking in 1938 was the China theater; the Changkufeng episode constituted a mere digression. A sequence of Japanese tactical victories had preceded the summer: Tsingtao fell in January; the Yellow River was reached in March; a "reformed government of the Republic of China" was installed at Nanking several weeks later; Amoy fell in early May; Suchow fell on the 20th. With these gains, northern and central fronts could be linked by the Japanese. Yet Chinese resistance persisted, and while public statements anticipated imminent Chinese dissension, private admissions acknowledged that the partial effects of Suchow's fall were ominous: control might pass from Chiang Kai-shek to the Communists, Chinese defiance might intensify, and Soviet involvement could ensue. A Hankow drive appeared desirable to symbolize the conclusion of the military phase of hostilities. The Japanese and their adversaries were in accord regarding the importance of the summer and autumn campaigns. Even after Suchow's fall, the government discouraged public insinuations that enemy resistance was collapsing; when Chiang addressed the nation on the first anniversary of hostilities, Premier Konoe prophetically proclaimed, "The war has just begun." Colonel Inada Masazum served as the Army General Staff's principal figure for the Changkufeng affair, occupying the position of chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March 1938. A distinguished graduate of the Military Academy, Inada completed the War College program and held a combination of line, instructional, and staff assignments at the War College, the Army General Staff, and the War Ministry. He was recognized as a sharp, highly capable, and driveful personality, though some regarded him as enigmatic. Following the capture of Suchow, Imperial General Headquarters on 18 June ordered field forces to undertake operational preparations for a drive to seize the Wuhan complex. Inada favored a decisive move aimed at achieving a rapid political settlement. He acknowledged that Soviet intervention in 1938, during Japan's involvement in China, would have been critical. Although Japanese forces could still defeat the Chinese, an overextended Japanese Army might be fatally compromised against the Russians. Soviet assistance to China was already pronouncedly unwelcome. The Soviets were reported to possess roughly 20 rifle divisions, four to five cavalry divisions, 1,500 tanks, and 1,560 aircraft, including 300 bombers with a range of approximately 3,000 kilometers, enabling reach from Vladivostok to Tokyo. Soviet manpower in Siberia was likely near 370,000. In response, Japanese central authorities stressed a no-trouble policy toward the USSR while seeking to "wall off" the border and bolster the Kwantung Army as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, the envisaged correction of the strategic imbalance could not occur before 1943, given shortages in ammunition, manpower, and materiel across existing theaters in China. By the end of 1937 Japan had committed 16 of its 24 divisions to China, bringing the standing force to roughly 700,000. Army General Staff planners reallocated three ground divisions, intended for a northern contingency, from north to central China, even as the Kwantung Army operated from a less favorable posture. Attitudes toward the northern problem varied within senior military circles. While concern persisted, it was not universal. As campaigns in China widened, planning at the high command level deteriorated, propagating confusion and anxiety to field armies in China. The Japanese Navy suspected that the Army general staff was invoking the USSR as a pretext for broader strategic aims—namely, to provoke a more consequential confrontation with the USSR while the Navy contended with its own strategic rivalries with the Army, centered on the United States and Britain. Army leaders, however, denied aggressive intent against the USSR at that time. The Hankow plan encountered substantial internal opposition at high levels. Private assessments among army planners suggested that a two-front war would be premature given operational readiness and troop strength. Not only were new War Ministry officials cautious, but many high-ranking Army general staff officers and court circles shared doubts.  Aggressive tendencies, influenced by subordinates and the Kwantung Army, were evident in Inada, who repeatedly pressed Tada Shun, the deputy army chief of staff, to endorse the Wuhan drive as both necessary and feasible, arguing that the USSR would gain from Japan's weakening without incurring substantial losses. Inada contended that Stalin was rational and that time favored the USSR in the Far East, where industrial buildup and military modernization were ongoing. He argued that the Soviet purges impeded opportunistic ventures with Japan. He posited that Nazi Germany posed a growing threat on the western front, and thus the USSR should be avoided by both Japan, due to China and Russia, due to Germany. While most of the army remained engaged in China, Tada did not initially share Inada's views; only after inspecting the Manchurian borders in April 1938 did he finally align with Inada's broader vision, which encompassed both northern and Chinese considerations. During this period, Inada studied daily intelligence from the Kwantung Army, and after Lyushkov's defection in June, reports suggested the Soviets were following their sector commander's recommendations. Russian troops appeared at Changkufeng, seemingly prepared to dig in. Inada recollects his reaction: "That's nice, my chance has come." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The simmering Soviet–Japanese border clashes centered on Changkufeng Hill near Lake Khanka, set within a broader history of contested frontiers dating to Qing and Tsarist treaties. Japan, prioritizing China, considered Changkufeng peripheral but ready to confront Soviet encroachment; Moscow aimed to consolidate border gains, with high-level war planning overlaying regional skirmishes. Conflict loomed over Manchuria.

China verlängert Russlands Krieg in der Ukraine – bewusst und strategisch. Das sagt EU-Außenbeauftragte Kaja Kallas. Ziel sei es, die Aufmerksamkeit der USA von Peking abzulenken. Im Hintergrund folgt ein strategischer Richtungswechsel in der EU-Politik.

Hey guys before you listen to this one, do realize this is part 3 on a series about General Kanji Ishiwara, so if you have not already done so I would recommend listening to Part 1 & 2.    This episode is General Kanji Ishiwara part 3: The gradual fall into War with China   I tried so hard this time to finish this up neatly in part 3 and utterly failed. I wrote pages and even deleted them to keep squeezing, but theres simply too much to the story. Part 3 will be focusing on the insane politics of the 1930's and how Ishiwara tried to prevent war with China.   Its rather ironic that the man who was the chief instigator that ushering in the conquest of Manchuria was unable to impose his will when it came to molding Manchukuo. Now while Ishiwara Kanji was the operations officer given official responsibility over the planning and conduct of military operations to seize Manchuria, the arrangements for that new state, being political in nature, were not in his sphere of influence. Regardless, Ishiwara was extremely vocal about his opinions on how Manchukuo should develop and he heavily emphasized racial harmony. He continuously hammered his colleagues that the economic development of Manchukuo should reflect the spirit of racial cooperation. Ishiwara assumed the economic interests of Manchukuo would simply coincide with that of the Kwantung army, by definition both's ultimate goals would be unity of Asia against the west. He was very wrong. Ishiwara was consumed by his theory of final war, everything he did was to prepare for it, thus his obsession of racial harmony was another part of the plan.    In 1932 the self government guidance board was abolished in march, leaving its functions and regional organizations to be tossed into brand new bureaus of the new government of Manchukuo. An organization emerged in April called the (Kyowakai / Concordia Association). It was brought together by Yamaguchi Juji and Ozawa Kaisaku, and its purpose was to promote racial harmony and it was backed by members of the Kwantung army, notably Ishiwara, Itagaki and Katakura. The Kwantung army flooded money into the organization and it grew rapidly…well amongst the Japanese anyways. General Honjo was a bit weary about how much the organization might have in the political sphere of Manchukuo, he did not want to see it become an official political party, he preferred it remain in a educative role. By educative role, I of course mean, to be a propaganda arm of the Kwantung army to exert influence over Manchukuo without having real skin in the game.    But to Ishiwara the Concordia Association was the logical means to unify the new nation, guiding its political destiny, to be blunt Ishiwara really saw it should have much more authority than his colleagues believed it should. Ishiwara complained in August of 1932, that Manchuria was a conglomerate of conflicting power centers such as the Kwantung army, the new Manchukuo government, the Kwantung government, the Mantetsu, consular office and so on. Under so many hats he believed Manchukuo would never become a truly unified modern state, and of course he was one of the few people that actually wanted it to be so. He began arguing the Kwantung army should turn over its political authority as soon as possible so “Japanese of high resolve should hasten to the great work of the Manchurian Concordia Association, for I am sure that we Japanese will be its leaders. In this way Manchukuo will not depend on political control from Japan, but will be an independent state, based on Japanese Manchurian cooperation. Guided by Japanese, it will be a mode of Sino-Japanese friendship, an indicator of the present trends of world civilization” Needless to say the Concordia Association made little headway with the Chinese and it began to annoy Japanese leaders. The association gradually was bent into a spiritless propaganda and intelligence arm of the IJA, staffed largely by elite Japanese working in the Manchukuo government.    Ishiwara began using the Concordia Association to promote things such as: returning leased territories like the Railway zone, abolition of extraterritoriality, equalizing payment between the races working in Manchukuo, the kind of stuff that would promote racial harmony. Such advocacy as you can imagine deviated heavily with the Japanese military, and Ishiwara's reputation would be hurt by this. The Kwantung Army staff began shifting dramatically, seeing Ishiwara isolated, aside from Itagaki and a few other followers being around. The upper brass as they say had had enough of the nuisance Concordia Association's and gradually took control of it and made sure to stop the talk of concessions. In August of 1932 Ishiwara received a new assignment and it seems he was only too happy to leave Manchuria.   Ishiwara returned to Japan, disgusted with the turn of direction Manchuria was going, and believing he would be blamed for its future failures he submitted his resignation. But the IJA knew how popular Ishiwara was and how dangerous he could become so they rejected his resignation. Instead they gave him a military decoration. He was in a very strange spot now, for the youthful officers of the Kodoha faction loved Ishiwara, but the senior top brass of the IJA were extremely suspicious of him and lets just say he was kept under close watch.   Now with Ishiwara back in Japan he would get himself involved in a bit of a war between two factions. As many of you probably already know, the Japanese military of the late 1920s and early 1930's saw the emergence of two factions: the Kodoha “imperial way” and Tosei “control” factions. The Kodoha sought what they called a “showa restoration” to give the emperor absolute power like the good olds days as they say. They were willing to even form a coup if necessary to make this happen. Another thing they believed was in the Hokushin-ron “northern strike” war plan. The idea behind this was that the USSR and communism as a whole was Japans largest threat and the IJA needed to invade the USSR. Now the Tosei faction believed in most of what the Kodoha did, but they differed on some issues. Number 1) they were not willing to perform a coup to usher in a showa restoration, no they thought they could work with the existing Zaibatsu elites and politicians to get things done. THe Kodoha hated the politicians and Zaibatsu to the point they wanted to murder them, so differing opinions. The Tosei also believed the next world war would require a total war strategy, to build up Japan to fight the USSR, but probably the US as well. They favored Nanshin-ron “the southern strike” policy, to target the resources of south east asia necessary to give Japan what it needed to be self sufficient. Another thing that separated these two factions, the Kodoha typically were younger officers.   Despite their differences, everyone in the Japanese military understood forceful expansion into Asia was going to happen and this meant collison with the USSR, America and Britain. Ishiwara's first assignment back in Japan was a temporary duty with the foreign ministry, he was a member of the Japanese legation to the league of nations under Matsuoka Yosuke. The league of nations at this time was performing the Lytton Commission which was investigating the Macnhurian problem, ie: Japan invading Manchuria. Upon returning to Japan in summer of 1933, Ishiwara sought a regimental command, but found it difficult to acquire because of his troublemaker like history. Then General Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko who commanded the 2nd sendai division gave him command over the 4th infantry regiment. Ishiwara went to work training the men under him to counter the latest soviet infantry tactics and of course he lectured extensively about his final war theories. During this time rumors emerged that Ishiwara supported the Nanshin-ron strategy. Many of his old colleagues who supported Hokushin-ron demanded he explain himself and Ishiwara did. These rumors were actually false, it was not that Ishiwara favored the Nanshin-ron strategy, it was simply that he did not back all aspects of the Hokushin-ron strategy.   Ishiwara believed to challenge the USSR, first Japan needed an Asian union, which he thought would take probably 30 years to create. But to usher such an Asian union, first Manchukuo needed to be hammered out properly, something Ishiwara thought Japan was failing to do. Also Japan's military strength was insufficient to overwhelm the multiple enemies before her, the war she would enter would be a protracted one. To win such a war she needed resources and allies, notably Manchukuo and China. To confront the USSR, Japan would need to subvert outer mongolia, but to confront the USA and Britain she would have to seize the Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong and Guam. It was going to be a global clash.   Ishiwara was gravely concerned with how powerful the USSR was becoming in the early 1930s. In the 3 years since he had left Manchuria, the Soviet divisions in east asia had jumped from 8 to 14 by the end of 1935, while Japanese divisions in Manchuria were only 3. For aircraft the Soviets had 950 vs 220 for Japan. On top of that the Soviets had TB-5 long range bombers, capable of hitting Japan, but the Japanese had no comparable aircraft. A large reason for such build up's were literally because Kodoha leaders were publicly threatening the Soviets such as Generals Sadao Araki. The Kodoha faction faced a lot of challenges as to how they could hope to face off against the USSR. They figured out three main principles needed to be overcome: 1) Japan had to prevent the USSR from being able to defeat its enemies to the west and east one at a time, Japan should seek diplomatic aims in this like allying with Germany. 2) A devastating blow was necessary to the USSR far east, perhaps against the Trans-siberian railway and air bases in the maritime provinces. 3) If Japan was able to demolish Soviet resistance in the far east, Japan would need to take forward positions on the Manchurian border for a protracted war. Ishiwara tried to figure out ways to get by these principles. First he advocated for Japanese troops strength in Manchuria and Korea to be 80% equivalent to that of the Soviets east of Lake Baikal at the offset of hostilities. He also urged cooperation with Germany and to preserve friendly neutral relations with Britain and the US, that is until the soviets were dealt with of course. Ishiwara vigorously felt the Nanshin ron strategy to push into southeast asia and the pacific was far too ambitious for the time being and that all efforts should be made to consolidate Manchuria for resources. Ishiwara tried to win over some Naval support for his plans, but none would be found. When Ishiwara showed his formal plans for Asia to the war ministry, they told him his projections in Manchuria would cost at least 1 billion 300 million yen. They also notified Ishiwara the navy were asking for about the same amount for their programs. Now while Ishiwara spent years trying to produce a 6 year plan to build up Manchuria, other significant things were going on in Japan.   The Kodoha faction as I said had a lot of younger officer support and a lot of these were men who came from rural parts of Japan. A lot of these men came from poor families suffering, and it looked to them that Japan was a nation full of social injustice and spiritual disintegration. These young officers were becoming more and more vocal in the early 1930's about wanting a showa restoration. They thought Japan would be better off as a military state with the emperor on top. Ishiwara empathized with the desire for a showa restoration, and many of the young officers calling for it claimed he was one of their champions. He made some fiery speeches in 1935 linking the evils of capitalism to the destitution of rural japan. He argued farmers were bearing crushing burdens because of economic privation. In his words “if the clash between the exploiters (landlords and capitalists) and the exploited continues much longer the exploited will be ground to bits. The present system of free economic competition has produced a situation where there is a small number of fabulously rich and limitless number of desperately poor. The national has indeed reached a national crisis. Liberal capitalism must inevitably give way to a newer system". What that “newer system was” however differed from what the youthful officers saw as their Showa restoration. Ishiwara wanted the Japanese government to create plans and policy, the Kodoha hardliners wanted to form a violent coup.    Kodoha officers began to push Ishiwara to champion their cause more and more. However by late 1935 Ishiwara's name would actually begin to be connected to the Tosei faction. While Ishiwara supported much of the Kodoha ideology, he simply did not share their beliefs in the same Showa restoration, he was more akin to the Tosei in that regard. Now after the manchurian incident the two factions kind of went to war with another to dominate the military. The Kodoha faction was early on the most powerful, but in 1934 their leader Araki resigned from the army due to failing health and he was replaced by General Senjuro Hayashi who favored the Tosei. In November of 1934, a plot was discovered that involved Kodoha officers seeking to murder some top ranking politicians. The result of this saw the Tosei faction force the resignation of the Kodoha leader General Jinzaburo Masaki, who was serving as the inspector general of military education. In retaliation to this, the Kodoha officer Saburo Aizawa murdered the Toseiha leader General Tetsuzen Nagata. This caused a frenzy, things began to really escalate, and many looked at Ishiwara Kanji to prove which side he favored. While in prison awaiting trial, Aizawa asked Ishiwara to be his defense counsel, to which he promised he would consider it. At the same time other Kodoha officers began pressing Ishiwara to support their cause openly. It is really hard to see where exactly Ishiwara was in all of this as all of his speeches prior were purposely ambiguous. He looked like a fence sitter and after what will be the February coup of 1936, there was testimony that Ishiwara was a middle-echelon member involved in the coup, other testimony literally had him on the list of people to be assassinated. A few weeks before Aizawa's trial, Ishiwara refused his request.   On February 26th, Ishiwara was awakened at his Tokyo home by a telephone call from Colonel Suzuki Teiichi informing him a rebellion was underway. Ishiwara, though ill at the time rushed over to the Military police HQ in Kudan. There he was informed of what was going on and how the officers were now taking the side of the showa restorationists or to quell the rebellion. From there he rushed to meet War Minister Kawashima Yoshiyuki where he demanded a proclamation of martial law to cope with the rebellion. He then urged Vice Chief of staff Sugiyama to order units from garrisons around Tokyo to overwhelm the rebels. Within 24 hours of the event, Ishiwara was then named operations officer of the Martial Law headquarters and he began coordinating plans to deal with the crisis. Thus Ishiwara occupied a crucial position in quelling the coup. On the night of the 27th a bunch of officers who sympathized with the rebels came to the HQ to argue for delaying actions against them. To this Ishiwara rose up and announced “we shall immediately carry forward plans for an assault. All units will assemble for that purpose. The army will wait until noon of the 28th; then it will begin its assault and crush the rebellion”. The next day,  Ishiwara went to the main entrance of the War Ministers office, where a large number of the rebels occupied and he demanded to talk to their leaders face to face. He hoped the youthful officers who looked up to him would see reason. They let him in, after they had shot Captain Katakura Tadashi for trying to do the same thing. Ishiwara then told them he shared many of their goals, but condemned their use of force. With a pistol pointed at him Ishiwara declared this “If you don't listen to reason you will be crushed by the severest measures”. He delivered his ultimatum and just walked out the door.    By the 28th the tides turned on the rebels. Emperor Hirohito put his foot down, demanding an end to the mutiny, many of the top Kodoha leaders walked away because of this. The Navy brought all of its power to Tokyo bay including its SNLF marines, all guns were on the rebels. Some of the rebels held out, still hoping the Emperor would change his mind and order a showa restoration, but by the 29th it fell apart. The rebels surrendered, aided by Colonel Tomoyuki Yamashita (one of my favorite generals of WW2, fascinating character). In the words of Matsumura Shuitsu a member of the Martial law HQ “In the midst of all the confusion and commotion, Ishiwara never lost sight of his objective and dealt with the criss with cool efficiency. If ever there was a case of the right man in the right place it was Ishiwara at that time. No doubt, what brought about the ultimate surrender of the rebel forces, was, of course, the Imperial command. But I believe that in a large part the collapse of the rebellion was due to the decisiveness of Ishwara, who never swerved, never hesitated. In short, Tokyo was saved by Ishiwara's courage”. It is rather ironic, many would point out it was Ishiwara who instigated the insurrection, but when it came time for it, he was the largest one to stamp down upon it. One could argue, by suppressing the rebellion, Ishawara had exploited the crisis in order to earn the political power necessary to bring about his version of a Showa Restoration.   During the mutiny, after meeting the rebels, Ishiwara actually had a secret meeting with two Kodoha officers at the Imperial Hotel. They were Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro and Colonel Mitsui Sakichi. He spoke to them about the possibility of forming a new government. The 3 of them came to these conclusions to actually perform a real Showa restoration. The rebels needed to go back to their barracks; the emperor needed to endorse the showa restoration; and members of the cabinet and top military leaders had to support it. Ishiwara then went to the Martial Law HQ and demanded Army vice chief of staff Sugiyama that he submit to the emperor a petition “to establish a restoration which would make clear the spirit of the nation, realize the national defense, and stabilize the peoples livelihood”. Sugiyama wanted nothing to do with this and told him “its simply impossible to relay such a request from the army” Ishiwara knew Sugiyama's position was too strong to challenge directly so he backed off, this was his last attempt to alter the nation's course through confrontation. Because of his actions during the quelling of the rebellion, this little scene was forgotten, his reputation was not tarnished…well it was amongst the Kodoha hardliners who saw him as a traitor, but other than that. Yet again he seems to be a man of many contradictions.  After the February coup the Kodoha faction ceased to exist and the Toseiha's ideology grabbed most of the military, though they also faded heavily.     Ishiwara went back to planning and lecturing taking a heavy notice of how Germany and Italy's totalitarian models were looking like the most efficient ones that Japan should emulate. He pushed heavily for a national defense state. He kept advocating for a 5 year plan he had to push Japan into a total war economy, but the industrialists and economists kept telling him it was far too much. I could write pages on all the ideas he had, he covered every aspect of Japanese society. He wanted the whole of Japan to devote itself to becoming the hegemonic power in Asia and this required self-sufficiency, more territory, alliances, an overhaul of Japan's politics, economy, etc etc he worked on this for years. One thing I find amusing to note, Ishiwara's plans had the national defense state not run directly by the military. No instead the military would only focus on military affairs to maximize their efficiency, thus civilians would lead the government. In his words “the tactics and strategy of national defense in the narrow sense are unquestionably the responsibility of the military. But national defense in the widest sense, industry, economy, transportation, communications are clearly related to the field of politics. Of course, the military can naturally express their opinion on these matters in order to counsel some minister whose duties are political, but to go before the general public and discuss the detailed industrial and economic is an arrogation of authority”. So ye, Ishiwara actually sought to remove military officers from political positions.    In 1937 Ishiwara was promoted to the rank of major general and his duties were of the operations division of the general staff. Because of his popularity and now his rank, some began to see him almost as that of a rising dictator. In January of 1937, the government of Hirota Koki who had come to power largely because of the february coup were having problems. Politicians were unable to deal with the rising military budgets. Ishiwara was eager to press forward his national defense state idea. Alongside this Captain Fukutome Shigeru, his naval counterpart was angry at the cabinet for hindering funding and called for their dissolution. In one meeting Ishiwara blurted out “if there's any disturbance the military should proclaim martial law throughout the country until things were straightened out”. Well within days the cabinet fell on its own and now everyone looked to a successor.    The Army and Navy fought for their candidate. The Nazi favored Ugaki Kazushige, but the Army held grudges against him. Ishiwara also did not like his appointment stating he had a bad political past, by bad that meant he had advocated for military budget cuts. Ugaki refused the job because of the pressure and made a note about Ishiwara's remarks towards him. Seeing Ugaki pushed aside, Ishiwara and his followers pushed for 3 other candidates; Hayashi Senjuro, House President Konoe Fumumaro and President of the privy council Hiranuma Kiichiro. Ishiwara sent to each man his 5 year plan to test their enthusiasm for it. Hiranuma didn't like it, Konoe was neutral and Hayashi liked it. So Ishiwara backed Hayashi go figure. All of his Manchurian oriented followers pushed to get him into office. When Hayashi was given Imperial command to head a new government, Ishiwara met with his Manchurian faction friends to draw a list of people to put in the cabinet. Itagaki Seishiro was chosen as war minister; Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa known to have radical reformist leanings for navy minister; Matsuoka Yosuke or SHiratori Toshio for foreign minister, industrialist Ikeda Seihin for finance, Tsuda Shingo for commerce and industry, Sogo Shinji as chief cabinet secretary and Miyazaki as chairman. Ishiwara himself stayed carefully in the background to make it seem like he was only attending military duties.    But rivals to Ishiwara began working against him, especially some of those Kodoha hardliners who felt he betrayed them. They pressed Hayashi to not accept many of Ishiwara's cabinet candidates such as Itagaki and Hayashi backed off the majority of them as a result. The effort to form a Macnhurian cabal failed and this further led to a lack of enthusiasm for Ishiwara's national defense plans. Hayashi's government which Ishiwara had placed his hopes upon became antagonistic towards him and his followers.    Now over in Manchuria, the Kwantung army was looking to seize territory in northern China and inner mongolia. This was something Ishiwara was flip floppy about. At first he began speaking about the need to simply develop Manchukuo so that China and Inner mongolia would follow suite, but gradually he began to warm up to schemes to invade. Though when he heard his former Kwantun colleagues were basically going to perform the exact same plan he had done with the Mukden incident he traveled back to Manchuria to dissuade them. Ishiwara landed at Dairen and within days of his arrival he learned that 15,000 troops under Prince Demchugdongrub, known also as Prince Teh of Mongolia, backed by Kwantung arms and aircraft were launching a full scale invasion of Suiyuan province. Ishiwara was furious and he screamed at the General staff “the next time I visit the Kwantung Army I'm going to piss on the floor of the commanders office!”    Within a month, the Warlord Yan Xishan, now fighting for the NRA turned back Prince Teh's forces. This angered the Kwantung army, fueling what Ishiwara always feared, a war between China and Japan. Ishiwara began lecturing left right and center about how Japan needed to curb her imperialist aggression against China. He advocated as always racial harmonization, about the East Asian League idea, cooperation between China and Japan. He thought perhaps China could be induced by joined a federation with Japan and to do all of this Japan should help develop Manchukuo as a positive model. Ishiwara warned any aggressive actions against China would waste valuable resources needed dearly to be directed against the USSR. In his words “China was an endless bog that would swallow men and materiel without prospect of victory and it would cripple the possibility of East Asian Union” Prophetic words to be sure.   Ishiwara was still influential and many in Hayashi's cabinet headed him, trying to push for more diplomacy with China. But by spring of 1937 Tokyo HQ had split over the issue. On one side were Ishiwara and those seeking to obtain a sort of treaty with China to form an alliance against the USSR. On the other hand the Nationalists and Communists were on the verge of forming a united front allied to the USSR, thus the invading China faction was gaining steam. This faction simply sought to get China out of the way, then focus on the USSR. As much as Ishiwara fought it, the China War would come nonetheless.   In June of 1937, a report from a Japanese civilian visiting China reached Colonel Kawabe Torashiro. The report stated that the China Garrison Army in the Peking area were planning an incident similar to what had occurred in Mukden in 1931. Kawabe took the report to Ishiwara who said he would investigate the matter. Ishiwara pressed the war ministry to send Colonel Okamoto Kiyotomi to the military administration section to north china to warn Generals Hashimoto Gun of the China Garrison Army and Kwabe Msakazu commander the brigade station in the Peking area that Tokyo would not tolerate provocation actions. Okamoto came back and stated they reassured him it was just rumors and nothing was occurring.   Two weeks later on July 7th, the infamous Marco Polo Bridge incident began WW2. When it began, Tokyo took it as a minor incident, just some skirmishes between minor forces, but the fighting grew and grew. The two factions in Tokyo who we can call the “expansionists and non expansionists” began arguing on what to do. The expansionists argued this was the time to deliver a quick and decisive blow, which meant mobilizing and dispatching divisions into northern China to overwhelm them. The non expansionists argued they needed to terminate hostilities immediately and seek diplomacy before the conflict got out of hand. From the offset of the conflict, Ishiwara led the doomed non expansionists. Ishiwara tried to localize the conflict to prevent more Japanese from getting involved. To do this he urged Prince Kan'in to send a cable on July 8th to the local Japanese forces to settle the issue locally. But they reported back that the Nanjing government was tossing 4 divisions of reinforcements to the area, prompting the Japanese to mobilize 3 divisions in response. For 3 days Ishiwara tried to halt the reinforcements, but the Nanjing report came true, the Chinese reinforcements arrived to the scene, pushing the Japanese to do the same. General Kawabe Masakazu argued 12,000 Japanese civilians were in the area and now under threat, thus Ishiwara had to stand down.   The conflict at the Marco Polo Bridge quickly got out of hand. Ishiwara was very indecisive, he tried to thwart the spread of the conflict, but he was continuously forced to stand down when reports false or true poured in about Chinese offensives. In fact, Ishiwara's efforts were getting him in a ton of trouble as his colleagues began to point out they were hindering the military operations which at the time were trying to end the conflict quickly. Ishiwara did not go down without a fight tossing one last attempt to stop the conflict. He urged Prime Minister Konoe to fly to Nanjing to speak directly with Chiang Kai Shek, it was a last ditch effort before the Japanese reinforcements arrived. When Konoe received requests to do this from multiple Japanese military leaders on urged on by Ishiwara, he was initially favorable to the idea and had a plane prepared for the trip. But within hours of the idea leaked out raising a storm of protests from the expansionists. Sugiyama then told Konoe it was Ishiwara pushing the idea and that his views represented a small minority in the military. Konoe ultimately back down and chose not to do it. Ishiwara was outraged when he found out screaming “tell the Prime minister that in 2000 years of our history no man will have done more to destroy Japan than he has by his indecisiveness in this crisis”.   Ishiwara began fighting with his colleagues as the situation worsened. He tabled a motion to press Nanjing to support Manchukuo in order for the Japanese to withdraw, but his colleagues blocked it. By August the conflict had spread as far as Shanghai and now even the IJN were getting involved. To this Ishiwara argued they should just evacuate Japanese civilians in Shanghai and pay them several hundred million yen in compensation as it would be cheaper than a war. He was quickly overruled. Thus the North China Incident simply became the China incident. In early september Ishiwara tried one last attempt to negotiate a settlement, trying to get Germany to mediate, but by mid september Ishiwara's influence had dropped considerably. By late september Ishiwara was removed from the General staff by General Tada. The remnants of Ishiwara's followers in the central army were defeated, particularly when Konoe declared in January of 1938 that Japan would not treat with Chiang Kai-shek. Ironically Konoe would quickly come around to believe Japan had made a grave mistake. By 1938 24 IJA divisions were tossed into China, the next year this became 34. 

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PLA Dissent Rumors and General Zhang Youxia's Loyalty Strategy. John Batchelor and General Blaine Holt discuss the rumor mill regarding the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and potential dissent against Xi Jinping. Specifically, rumors suggest General Zhang Youxia, a top uniformed PLA leader, is unhappy with changes in the country's direction. Holt notes that this information is currently under the "fog of diplomacy, fog of war." However, based on his research, Zhang Youxia has successfully ensured commanders of elite units, including the 82nd around Beijing, are loyal to the PLA itself, rather than solely the Chinese Communist Party. This strategy has helped stabilize the military situation. Holt suggests that average Chinese soldiers facing economic issues might see a morale boost if they believe their top general could lead efforts to "right the ship." 1906 PEKING

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PREVIEW HEADLINE: China Implements Rare Earth Export Controls Amid Trade Deal Negotiations GUEST NAME: Elizabeth Peek 50-WORD SUMMARY: John Batchelor speaks with Elizabeth Peek about Beijing's decision to implement export controls, potentially blocking rare earth materials essential for US and European electronics. China leverages its 70% global share, causing supply chain disruptions. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent condemned the "desperate act," claiming China aims to pull down the world economy alongside its sinking one. 1901 PEKING

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