Podcasts about peking

Werden Sie JETZT Abonnent unserer Digitalzeitung Weltwoche Deutschland. Nur EUR 5.- im ersten Monat. https://weltwoche.de/abonnemente/Aktuelle Ausgabe von Weltwoche Deutschland: https://weltwoche.de/aktuelle-ausgabe/KOSTENLOS: Täglicher Newsletter https://weltwoche.de/newsletter/App Weltwoche Deutschland http://tosto.re/weltwochedeutschlandDie Weltwoche: Das ist die andere Sicht! Unabhängig, kritisch, gut gelaunt. Köppel aus St. Petersburg: Europäische Symbolstadt von Glanz, Pracht, Krieg, Elend, Revolution und Wiederaufstieg. Attacken auf Tino Chrupalla. Deutsche fordern Merz-Telefonat mit Putin. Nato militärisch kaum wehrfähig. Zwist zwischen Peking und BrüsselDie Weltwoche auf Social Media:Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/weltwoche/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/Weltwoche TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@weltwoche Telegram: https://t.me/Die_Weltwoche Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/weltwoche Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In China zijn er tijdens het jaarlijkse koopjesfestijn ‘618’ grote kortingen op consumentenproducten, en dat draagt bij aan de prijzenoorlogen die de deflatie in het land aanjagen. Beleidsmakers in Peking zijn bezorgd en roepen op tot maatregelen om deze destructieve trend te stoppen. De prijsdalingen, georganiseerd door JD.com, worden ingezet terwijl ook grote merken zoals Starbucks en BYD hun prijzen verlagen. China-correspondent Roland Smid legt uit wat de mogelijke gevolgen zijn. Lees: Chinese consument profiteert van prijzenoorlog, maar Peking vreest verdere deflatie Mediahuis wil met Spil een doelgroep bedienen die zijn nieuws nu voornamelijk via sociale media krijgt. Het nieuwe digitale nieuwsmerk richt zich op jongeren tussen 15 en 25 jaar en zoekt manieren om deze groep uit zijn nieuwsbubbel te halen. Door te beginnen op platforms zoals TikTok en Instagram, concurreert Spil met media zoals NOS Stories en CestMocro. Redacteur Jeroen Piersma legt uit hoe Mediahuis met Spil de betrokkenheid van jongeren wil vergroten. Lees: Mediahuis lanceert Spil om jongeren nieuws te bieden Supermarktketen Lidl investeert €520 mln in de aanschaf van vijf containerschepen via zijn rederij Tailwind Shipping. Deze stap versoepelt de aanvoer van goederen uit Azië en vermindert de afhankelijkheid van grote rederijen, zoals MSC. Het strategische besluit om met eigen schepen sneller te schakelen, past bij de mentaliteit van Lidl om zaken in eigen hand te houden. Duitsland-correspondent Han Dirk Hekking licht toe hoe deze investering Lidl ten goede komt. Lees: Supermarkt Lidl zet in op eigen containerschepen: ‘Zelf doen behoort tot het DNA van het bedrijf’ Redactie: Floyd Bonder & Nelleke van der Heiden Presentatie: Nelleke van der Heiden See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Mjuk makt är centralt när Kina vill utmana väst och skaffa sig större svängrum på världsscenen. Hör om hur animerad film och dataspel kan bli geopolitiska verktyg för Peking. Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radio Play. Kina spänner inte bara hårda militära muskler för att stärka sin position. När olika länders mjuka makt rankas klättrar Kina och närmar sig USA. Vi dyker ner i den aktuella filmen Ne Zha 2, som även visats på bio i Sverige under våren. Filmen är omskriven som den mest framgångsrika animerade filmen någonsin och den första animerade filmen att generera inkomster på över 2 miljarder dollar. Med Xi Jinping har Kina växlat upp sina ambitioner för global kulturell påverkan och under parollen ”berätta Kinas historia väl” läggs stor kraft på att förändra det globala narrativet om Kina. Hör om vilka budskap som sprids och hur kulturexporten hänger samman med Pekings geo- och säkerhetspolitiska mål.Medverkande: Hanna Sahlberg, Kinareporter och Moa Kärnstrand, Kinakorrespondent.Programledare: Björn DjurbergProducent: Therese Rosenvinge

Nach gewalttätigen Protesten gegen Abschiebungen in Los Angeles hat FBI-Chef Kash Patel Ermittlungen wegen möglicher ausländischer Einflussnahme angekündigt. Besonders im Fokus: Verbindungen zur Kommunistischen Partei Chinas und deren Nähe zu US-Linksbündnissen wie der PSL und Code Pink. Auch milliardenschwere Unterstützer geraten ins Blickfeld.

In der aktuellen Folge des Beijing Briefing präsentiere ich diesmal die Aufzeichnung einer Online-Diskussion, an der ich gemeinsam mit meinem Kollegen Klaus Bardenhagen teilgenommen habe. Klaus, der genau wie ich Teil des Korrespondenten-Netzwerks "Weltreporter" ist, lebt seit etlichen Jahren in Taiwan. Gemeinsam haben wir über den Konflikt zwischen Peking und Taipeh gesprochen, wie groß die Gefahr eines Krieges ist, und wie die jeweiligen Bevölkerungen aufeinander blicken. Viel Spaß beim Zuhören!Kontakt: BeijingBriefing@gmail.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Handelskriget har väckt frågan om Europa borde omvärdera relationen till Kina. Under våren har Kina gått på charmoffensiven och i sommar ska EU:kommissionens ordförande Ursula von der Leyen besöka Peking. Kan det leda till en ny fas i relationen mellan Europa och Kina? Och vilken roll återstår för Europa i en ny världsordning?Medverkande: Björn Fägersten, senioranalytiker på UI:s Europaprogram.Alexis von Sydow, analytiker vid Nationellt kunskapscentrum om Kina, UI.Programledare och redaktör: Annica Ögren. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Der Kanzler hat SPD-Sorgen. In Kiel startet die Aufarbeitung eines Millionen-Desasters. Und: Vage Hoffnungen auf einen Zolldeal zwischen Peking und Washington. Das ist die Lage am Donnerstagmorgen.Die Artikel zum Nachlesen: Mehr Hintergründe hier: Das Manifest der UnbelehrbarenDie ganze Geschichte hier: Wie Millionen Euro aus Schleswig-Holstein im Northvolt-Grab landetenMehr Hintergründe hier: Trump verkündet Teileinigung mit China im Handelsstreit+++ Alle Infos zu unseren Werbepartnern finden Sie hier. Die SPIEGEL-Gruppe ist nicht für den Inhalt dieser Seite verantwortlich. +++ Den SPIEGEL-WhatsApp-Kanal finden Sie hier. Alle SPIEGEL Podcasts finden Sie hier. Mehr Hintergründe zum Thema erhalten Sie mit SPIEGEL+. Entdecken Sie die digitale Welt des SPIEGEL, unter spiegel.de/abonnieren finden Sie das passende Angebot. Informationen zu unserer Datenschutzerklärung.

55 Prozent Einfuhrzoll auf Waren aus China, aber nur nur zehn auf US-Exporte: Was Trump über die angebliche Handels-Einigung verkündet, klingt nicht so, als hätte Peking dem wirklich zugestimmt.

"The Holy Martyrs of China were native Chinese Orthodox Christians brought up in piety at the Russian Orthodox Mission in Peking, which had been founded in 1685. During the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 against the foreign powers occupying China, native Chinese Christians were commanded by the Boxers to renounce Christianity or be tortured to death. Two hundred and twenty-two members of the Peking Mission, led by their priest Metrophanes Tsi-Chung and his family, refused to deny Christ, and were deemed worthy of a martyric death." ( Great Horologion)

Japan meldet zwei chinesische Flugzeugträger in seiner Ausschließlichen Wirtschaftszone. Xi Jinping vereinbarte zudem eine enge Zusammenarbeit mit Südkoreas neuem Präsidenten. Südkorea lud Xi zum nächsten Gipfeltreffen der Apec ein.

Am 6. Juli feiert der Dalai Lama seinen 90. Geburtstag - ein Meilenstein für den spirituellen Führer Tibets. Doch mit seinem hohen Alter rückt eine heikle und hochpolitische Frage in den Mittelpunkt: Wer wird sein Nachfolger - und wer entscheidet das? In China laufen bereits die Vorbereitungen für eine Reinkarnation unter staatlicher Kontrolle. Die kommunistische Führung will die Tradition der Wiedergeburt bewahren - allerdings nach ihren Regeln. Kritiker fürchten einen "Staats-Dalai-Lama": von Peking bestimmt, fern von echter spiritueller Autorität. Doch der Dalai Lama will das verhindern und gab in seinem neuen Buch einen kleinen, aber klaren Hinweis: Seine Wiedergeburt werde "in der freien Welt" stattfinden, außerhalb Chinas.   Der Kampf um seine Nachfolge hat längst begonnen. Mit unseren Korrespondenten Benjamin Eyssel in Beijing und Ruth Kirchner aus dem ARD-Hauptstadtstudio diskutieren wir die Frage: Wer entscheidet über das spirituelle Erbe Tibets - Religion oder Politik? Außerdem nimmt uns Benjamin Eyssel mit ins tibetische Hochland nach Qinghai. Und wir sprechen wir mit Angela Köckritz von "ChinaTable" - sie hat den Dalai Lama vor Kurzem persönlich getroffen.   "Welt.Macht.China" ist der China-Podcast der ARD. Aktuelle und ehemalige Korrespondent*innen und Expert*innen haben sich zusammengetan, um einen vielfältigen Einblick zu geben in das riesige Land. Es geht um Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur, das Leben und den Alltag in der Volksrepublik, außerdem um Klischees und Chinas Rolle in der Welt. Eine neue Folge gibt es jeden zweiten Dienstag in der ARD Audiothek und in allen anderen Podcast-Apps: https://www.ardaudiothek.de/sendung/welt-macht-china/10494211/ Ihr habt Anmerkungen, Lob und Kritik? Schreibt uns an weltmachtchina@rbb-online.de.   Unser Podcast Tipp: "Das Wissen" - Der SWR Podcast bringt täglich eine halbe Stunde gründlich recherchierte Hintergründe zu euch - über die unterschiedlichsten Themen: Warumunterstützt Russlands Bevölkerung Putin? Wie lebten Diebinnen im 18. Jahrhundert? Und was steckt hinter dem neuen Medikament gegen Alzheimer? "Das Wissen" spricht mit Menschen, die sich auskennen, reist an die wichtigsten Schauplätze und sammelt so Erkenntnisse um sich den drängendsten Fragen von heute, gestern und der Zukunft zu stellen. "Das Wissen" findet ihr täglich in der ARD Audiothek und überall, wo es Podcasts gibt: https://1.ard.de/das-wissen

Kina bygger ut sin kärnvapenarsenal. Frågan om att skaffa kärnvapen är aktuell i Sydkorea och även på agendan i Japan. Står vi inför ett kärnvapenrace i Asien? Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radio Play. När Peking uppges vilja bygga ut Kinas kärnvapenarsenal i snabb takt uppstår nya spänningar i närområdet. Samtidigt som det hos USA:s allierade i Östasien väckts tvivel om de amerikanska säkerhetsgarantierna efter Trumps återkomst i Vita huset. Frågan om kärnvapen är nu högaktuell i flera länder och hotet från Kina blir en faktor som riskerar att driva på en upprustning. Hör folk på gatan i Sydkorea och hur samhällsdebatten om kärnvapen skiftat i Japan. Samtidigt har Trumps handelskrig fått rivaler att knyta nya ekonomiska band. Kan det bidra till konstruktiva samtal och att spänningar kyls ner?Medverkande: Moa Kärnstrand, Kinakorrespondent. Hanna Sahlberg, Kinareporter. Programledare: Björn DjurbergProducent: Therese Rosenvinge

Immer wieder tauchen Berichte über den Einsatz von Uiguren als Zwangsarbeiter in China auf. Neue Recherchen des SPIEGEL zeigen nun das tatsächliche Ausmaß: Uiguren werden systematisch aus ihrer Heimatprovinz Xinjiang in andere Landesteile gebracht, wo sie unter teils prekären Bedingungen arbeiten müssen. Den Betroffenen drohen willkürliche Inhaftierungen, sie stehen unter ständiger Überwachung und sind oftmals in Wohnheimen untergebracht, die sie kaum verlassen dürfen. In der aktuellen Folge des SPIEGEL-Podcasts »Acht Milliarden« spricht Host Juan Moreno mit Christoph Giesen, SPIEGEL-Korrespondent in Peking. In einer langwierigen Recherche in Kooperation mit der »New York Times« und dem Londoner »The Bureau of Investigative Journalism« fanden Giesen und seine Kollegen 75 Werke in elf Provinzen, in denen Angehörige der muslimischen Minderheit arbeiten müssen. Zu den Profiteuren zählen mutmaßlich auch deutsche Unternehmen, da sie direkt oder indirekt von dieser Form der Ausbeutung profitieren könnten. Mehr zum Thema: (S+) Der VW-Konzern wollte beweisen, dass es in seinem umstrittenen Werk in Xinjiang keine Zwangsarbeit gibt. SPIEGEL-Recherchen belegen: Der Prüfbericht enthält Mängel, die Prüfer scheinen zweifelhaft: https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/volkswagens-bluff-mit-den-menschenrechten-fragwuerdige-fabrik-in-xinjiang-a-cf3028b4-6c27-4caf-8277-47603c650a92 (S+) Der chinesische Staat soll in Umerziehungslagern rund eine Million Uiguren interniert haben: Die Xinjiang Police Files geben diesem System nun Namen und Gesichter: https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/xinjiang-police-files-einblick-in-chinas-brutales-lagersystem-a-6e85c81a-43c5-4a7b-85ad-8c70b22179a2 Abonniert »Acht Milliarden«, um die nächste Folge nicht zu verpassen. Wir freuen uns, wenn ihr den Podcast weiterempfehlt oder uns eine Bewertung hinterlasst.+++ Alle Infos zu unseren Werbepartnern finden Sie hier. Die SPIEGEL-Gruppe ist nicht für den Inhalt dieser Seite verantwortlich. +++ Den SPIEGEL-WhatsApp-Kanal finden Sie hier. Alle SPIEGEL Podcasts finden Sie hier. Mehr Hintergründe zum Thema erhalten Sie mit SPIEGEL+. Entdecken Sie die digitale Welt des SPIEGEL, unter spiegel.de/abonnieren finden Sie das passende Angebot. Informationen zu unserer Datenschutzerklärung.

Veckans Pazzapodden tar såklart ner överkörningen på Strawberry under tisdagen och knyter ihop sista landslagssamlingen med både plus, några frågetecken och ett konstaterande att det egentligen bara är en plats kvar för Gerhardsson i EM-truppen… Dessutom uppsnack inför tionde omgången av OBOS Damallsvenskan där Peking nog behöver börja studsa tillbaka poängmässigt och hur har Djurgården hanterat uppehållet? Dessutom presenteras Månadens Spelare - Maj!! Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Am 4. Juni 1989 ging die chinesische Armee mit Panzern brutal gegen Studenten vor, die für Demokratie demonstrierten. Seither versucht Peking, „aktiv die Fakten zu zensieren“, wie US-Außenminister Rubio erinnert. Viele junge Menschen wissen nicht, was damals geschehen ist.

BiH potrebna koalicija koja se pridržava dejtonskog okvira, poručio Schmidt. Iz RS-a najavili otvaranje kontroverzne kineske laboratorije, Peking demantovao navode. Zabilježeni fizički napadi na novinare u Zaječaru i Kosjeriću.

  Last time we spoke about China's preparations for War. In December 1936, the tension in China reached a boiling point as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek was captured by his own commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on fighting communists instead of the encroaching Japanese forces, the generals sought a unified response to Japanese aggression. After being held in Xi'an, Chiang reluctantly agreed to collaborate with the Chinese Communist Party, marking a significant shift in strategy against Japan. Amidst the rising chaos, Chiang's government reviewed historical military strategies and prepared for a prolonged conflict. However, they faced challenges, including inadequate supplies and a lack of modern equipment compared to the Japanese. By 1937, China was ill-prepared for war, with Chiang later expressing regret about their military readiness. Despite these setbacks, the alliance formed with the communists laid a foundation for a united Chinese front against the brutalities of the Sino-Japanese War that would follow.   #153 Japan Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So in the last episode we talked about how China was preparing itself for war, now its time for Japan. Since Japan's invasion of North China, Japanese field armies had promoted a series of autonomous zones in northern China. Officers from the Kwantung Army, skeptical of China's capacity to modernize, believed that the vast region would inevitably fragment into regional factions. This policy effectively maintained a weak and divided China, which served Japan's to defend Manchukuo. However many Japanese military leaders frequently pointed to the threat posed by the KMT's five-year plan, initiated in 1933 with assistance from German military advisors, aimed at modernizing and expanding the national army. To counter what they perceived as a Chinese threat, the field armies advocated for a preemptive war to dismantle Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Any attempt by Tokyo to alter the military's China policy faced vigorous opposition from the Kwantung Army, which, in February 1937, pushed for intensified covert actions to expel the KMT from northern China and supported a preemptive war to secure strategic areas for future operations against the Soviet Union. At a March meeting in Tokyo, staff officers from the China Garrison and Kwantung armies insisted that any concessions to China would be a grave mistake and would likely yield only temporary outcomes. In early spring 1937, Prince Konoe Fumimaro inherited a China policy fraught with competing views, however, there was consensus that China must not distract the empire from its preparations against the USSR. The end goal was clear, but the means to achieve it remained uncertain. The cabinet's approval of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" in August 1936 indicated a need for stability as the army and navy reconfigured Japan's war machine. The challenge lay in aligning long-term strategic goals with practical short-term interests in northern China without upsetting the existing balance of power. Expanding demands propelled the army's contingency planning, which had traditionally focused on safeguarding Japanese interests and the approximately 13,000 Japanese citizens residing in the region. Tokyo typically responded to serious incidents by deploying troops from homeland garrisons to address localized emergencies and then withdrawing them. However, by the mid-1930s, the growing Soviet threat to Manchukuo rendered this doctrine obsolete. Incidents in northern China gained strategic importance as they diverted resources from the Kwantung Army's preparations against the Soviet Union. Disruptions in northern China hindered access to essential raw materials necessary for army modernization and rearmament, while hostile Chinese forces threatened the Kwantung Army's strategic left flank in the event of war with the Soviets. With these considerations in mind, the army revised its operational war plans, assuming that northern China would serve as Japan's strategic rear area for operations against the USSR. In 1911 Japan's plan for general war mandated thirteen divisions to occupy southern Manchuria, capture Beijing, and subsequently occupy Zhejiang and Fujian. Limited contingency operations in northern China required two divisions to secure rail communications from Beijing to the coast. In the weeks following the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the General Staff in Tokyo drafted plans to counter a Sino-Soviet alliance, anticipating a 2 month campaign involving 15-16 divisions, with the majority engaged against the Soviet Red Army. 2 divisions were designated to secure northern China, while smaller units would monitor the Inner Mongolian front to protect Japan's western flank in Manchuria. After further refinement, the General Staff identified three contingencies for China in early 1932: maintaining the traditional mission of safeguarding Japanese interests and citizens with a standard two-division force; ensuring a secure line of communication between the Chinese capital and the sea with the China Garrison Army, which consisted of approximately 1,700 officers and men, reinforced by one division; and, in a worst-case scenario of all-out war, deploying three divisions to reinforce the Kwantung Army, along with 7 additional divisions and 3 cavalry brigades to suppress resistance in northern China and the Shandong Peninsula, while two additional divisions secured key areas in central China. Between 1932-1936, China received less attention as the General Staff focused on the Soviet military buildup in the Far East. Anxiety, stemming from the Soviet buildup in the Far East, was a pervasive concern reflected in the draft rearmament plan submitted to the throne on May 21, 1936, as part of the national budget formulation process. The army proposed countering the Soviet threat by enhancing Japanese strategic mobility in Manchukuo through the renovation and expansion of airfields, ports, roads, and rail infrastructure, and by constructing army air force arsenals, storage depots, and medical facilities. The positioning of Japanese divisions in eastern Manchuria suggested their wartime objectives, with the Kwantung Army relying on a mobile independent mixed brigade composed of armored car and mounted cavalry units stationed in Gongzhuling, central Manchuria, as its immediate response force for contingencies in northern China. Major units were not concentrated in western Manchuria, where they would be expected to deploy before any planned invasion of northern China. Nevertheless, General Staff planners remained vigilant regarding developments in China, where the resurgence of nationalism, Communist movements advancing north of the Yellow River in February 1936, and the spread of anti-Japanese sentiments across northern China raised the specter of limited military operations escalating into full-scale warfare. China's improving military capabilities would likely hinder Japanese forces from accomplishing their objectives. For example, around Shanghai, Chinese defenses were bolstered by extensive, in-depth, and permanent fortifications. In mid-September 1936, the General Staff in Tokyo issued orders to preempt significant outbreaks in northern China by repositioning a division in Manchukuo closer to the boundary. If hostilities broke out, the China Garrison Army, supported by Kwantung Army units, would launch punitive operations against Chinese forces as necessary. Higher headquarters expected local commanders to act swiftly and decisively, employing rapid maneuvers and shock tactics to address outbreaks with minimal force. Given that no alternative responses were considered, Japanese operational planning for northern China relied on an all-or-nothing approach to force deployment, even for minor incidents. Yet, the senior leadership of the army remained deeply divided over its China policy. Influenced by Ishiwara, the General Staff wanted to avoid military actions that could lead to a full-scale war with China, focusing instead on advancing the army's extensive rearmament and modernization program. In contrast, a majority of high-ranking officers in the Army Ministry and General Staff, particularly within the 2nd Operations Section and the Kwantung Army, favored forceful action against China, believing it necessary to quell rising anti-Japanese sentiments. Drawing from past experiences, these officers anticipated that the Chinese would quickly capitulate once hostilities commenced. This lack of a unified military strategy reflected broader disagreements among the army's leadership regarding operations in China. While operational planning called for the permanent occupation of large regions in northern and central China, the General Staff aimed to contain outbreaks to maintain focus on Soviet threats. There was a clear absence of long-term operational planning; instead, the army concentrated on initial battles while relegating planning for prolonged combat operations to contingent circumstances. In summary, the Japanese army preferred to avoid military force to address Chinese issues whenever feasible but was equally unwilling to concede to Chinese demands. Since 1914, Tosui Koryo or “Principles of Command” had served as the foundational doctrine for senior Japanese army commanders and staff officers engaged in combined arms warfare at the corps and army levels. The advent of new weapons, tactics, and organizational changes during World War I compelled all major military forces to reassess their existing military doctrines across strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions. In response, Japan modified the Principles of Command to blend its traditional post-Russo-Japanese War focus on the intangible factors in battle with the newest concepts of modern total war. A revision in 1918 recognized the significance of “recent great advances in materiel” for total warfare, yet it maintained that ultimate victory in battle relied on dedication, patriotism, and selfless service. In the 1920s, the General Staff's Operations Section, led by Major General Araki Sadao, who would become the leader of the Kodoha faction, had produced the most significant and impactful revision of the Principles. A staunch anti-communist and ideologue who valued the intangible elements of combat, Araki appointed Lieutenant Colonel Obata Toshishiro and Captain Suzuki Yorimichi as the principal authors of the manual's rewrite. Obata, a Soviet expert, was strongly influenced by German General Count Alfred von Schlieffen's classic theories of a “war of annihilation,” while Suzuki, the top graduate of the thirtieth Staff College class, shared Araki's focus on “spiritual” or intangible advantages in warfare. Both men were brilliant yet arrogant, working in secrecy to create a doctrine based on what Leonard Humphreys describes as “intense spiritual training” and bayonet-led assaults to counter the opponent's material superiority.  The latest version of the Principles of Command preserved the operational concept of rapid Japanese mobile offensive operations, aiming to induce a decisive battle or “kaisen” early in the campaign. It reaffirmed the sokusen sokketsu or “rapid victory' principle of rapid warfare. Attaining these goals relied exclusively on offensive action, with the army expecting commanders at all levels to press forward, defeat enemy units, and capture key territories. The troops were indoctrinated with a spirit of aggression and trained to anticipate certain victory. The emphasis on offensive action was so pronounced that Araki eliminated terms like surrender, retreat, and defense from the manual, believing they negatively affected troop morale. This aggressive mindset also infused the Sento Koryo or “Principles of Operations”, first published in 1929 as a handbook for combined arms warfare tailored for division and regimental commanders. The manual emphasized hand-to-hand combat as the culminating stage of battle, a principle regarded as unchanging in Japanese military doctrine since 1910. Senior commanders were expected to demonstrate initiative in skillfully maneuvering their units to encircle the enemy, setting the stage for climactic assaults with cold steel. Infantry was deemed the primary maneuver force, supported by artillery. To complement rapid infantry advances, the army developed light and mobile artillery. Operationally, encirclement and night attacks were vital components of victory, and even outnumbered units were expected to aggressively envelop enemy flanks. In assaults against fortified positions, units would advance under the cover of darkness, avoiding enemy artillery fire and positioning themselves for dawn attacks that combined firepower with shock action to overwhelm enemy defenses. In encounters with opposing forces, commanders would maneuver to flank the enemy, surround their units, and destroy them. If forced onto the defensive, commanders were expected to seize opportunities for decisive counterattacks to regain the initiative. These high-level operational doctrines were distilled into tactical guidelines in the January 1928 edition of the Infantry Manual or “Hohei Soten”, which saw a provisional revision in May 1937 . Both editions opened with identical introductions emphasizing the necessity for a rapid victory through the overpowering and destruction of enemy forces. Infantry was identified as the primary arm in combined arms warfare, and soldiers were taught to rely on cold steel as fundamental to their attacking spirit. The 1928 Infantry Manual underscored the commander's role in instilling a faith in certain victory or “hissho shinnen”, drawing from the glorious traditions of Japanese military history. The 1928 infantry tactics employed an extended skirmish line with four paces between soldiers. Individual initiative in combat was generally discouraged, except under exceptional circumstances, as success relied on concentrating firepower and manpower on narrow frontages to overwhelm defenders. An infantry company would create a skirmish line featuring two light machine gun squads and four rifle squads, preparing for a bayonet-driven breakthrough of enemy defenses. For the final assault, the infantry company would line up along a 150-yard front, likely facing casualties of up to 50% while breaching the enemy's main defensive line. Historical analysis reveals the shortcomings of these tactics. During World War I, armies constructed extensive, multi-layered defenses, trenches, pillboxes, and strong points, each independent yet all covered by artillery. If assaulting infantry suffered heavy losses breaching the first line, how could they successfully prosecute their assault against multiple defense lines? The 1937 revision elaborated on new tactics to overcome entrenched Soviet defenses, drafted in anticipation of arms and equipment that were either in development or production but not yet available for deployment. This became official doctrine in 1940, but as early as summer 1937, units from the China Garrison Army were field-testing these new tactics. The provisional manual adopted combat team tactics, forming an umbrella-like skirmish formation. This involved a light machine gun team at the forefront with two ammunition bearers flanking it to the rear. Behind the machine gun team were riflemen arranged in a column formation, maintaining six paces between each. The light machine gun provided cover fire as the formation closed in on the enemy for hand-to-hand combat. Increased firepower expanded the assault front to 200 yards. The combination of wider dispersion and night movement aimed to reduce losses from enemy artillery fire while the infantry advanced through successive lines of resistance. Commanders at the platoon level were responsible for leading the final assault into enemy lines, with increased tactical responsibility shifting from platoon to squad leaders, allowing for greater initiative from junior officers and non-commissioned officers. This emphasis on broader dispersal and fluidity on the battlefield required frontline infantry to exhibit aggressiveness and initiative. Contrary to popular belief, the Japanese military did not solely rely on the bayonet or an offensive spirit during engagements with Chinese forces. They effectively employed superior firepower and modern equipment within their combined arms framework, using heavy weapons and artillery to soften enemy positions before launching infantry attacks. Without such firepower, unsupported infantry attacks would have struggled to achieve their objectives. In January 1937, the Imperial Japanese Army consisted of approximately 247,000 officers and men, organized in a structure comprising seventeen standing infantry divisions, four tank regiments, and fifty-four air squadrons equipped with a total of 549 aircraft. The China Garrison Army and the Taiwan Garrison Army each included two infantry regiments, while a separate independent mixed brigade was stationed in Manchuria. Two divisions were permanently based in Korea, with four more assigned on a rotating basis to the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo. The remainder of the forces were stationed in the Japanese home islands. A substantial pool of reservists and partially trained replacements was available to mobilize, enabling the expansion of peacetime units to their wartime strength as needed. Conscription provided the primary source of enlisted manpower for the army, though a handful of young men volunteered for active duty. For conscription purposes, Japan was divided into divisional areas, which were further subdivided into regimental districts responsible for conscription, mobilization, individual activations, and veteran affairs within their jurisdictions. Typically, conscripts served with the regiment associated with their region or prefecture. However, the Imperial Guards regiments in Tokyo selected conscripts from across the nation, as did the Seventh Infantry Division, which recruited from the sparsely populated Hokkaido area and from regular army units stationed in Korea, China, and Taiwan. Draftees from Okinawa Prefecture usually served with Kyushu-based regiments. All males reaching the age of 20 underwent an army-administered pre-induction physical examination conducted between December 1 and January 30 of the following year. This evaluation classified potential conscripts into three categories: A “suitable for active duty”, B1, and B2, while others were deemed unfit for the demands of military life. In 1935, 29.7% of those examined received A classifications, while 41.2% were graded as B1 or B2. Among the 742,422 individuals eligible for conscription in 1937, approximately 170,000 were drafted, amounting to 22.9% of the cohort; this figure had remained relatively consistent since the post-Russo-Japanese War years. Within the conscripted group, 153,000 men were classified as A and an additional 17,000 as B. Conscripts served for two years of active duty, with variations based on their military specialty and any prior civilian military training. After their discharge, they were subject to a lengthy reserve obligation. In total, 470,635 individuals fell into the B category, being otherwise fit for service but excess to the army's active personnel needs. These men were assigned to the First Replacement Pool, where they underwent around 120 days of basic military training, primarily focused on small arms usage and fundamental tactics. Regular officers and NCOs led the training in their respective regimental districts. Following their initial training, the army called these replacements and reservists to active duty annually for several days of refresher training. Army leaders regarded discipline as the cornerstone of military effectiveness. Basic training emphasized the necessity of unquestioning obedience to orders at all levels. Subsequent training focused on fieldcraft, such as utilizing terrain strategically to surprise or encircle the enemy. However, training exercises often lacked diversity due to the limited maneuver areas available in Japan, leading to predictable solutions to field problems. The training regimen was rigorous, merging strict formal discipline and regulated corporal punishment with harsh informal sanctions and unregulated violence from leaders to instill unwavering compliance to orders. As an undergrad taking a course specifically on the Pacific War, it was this variable my professor argued contributed the most to the atrocities performed by the Japanese during WW2. He often described it as a giant pecking order of abuse. The most senior commanders abused, often physically their subordinates, who abused theirs, going through the ranks to the common grunts who had no one else but civilians and the enemy to peck at so to speak. Of course there were a large number of other variables at play, but to understand that you outta join my Patreon Account over at the www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel , where I made a fan favorite episode on “why the Japanese army performed so many atrocities”. In there I basically hit a big 10 reason list, well in depth, I highly recommend it! As the concept of the “Imperial Army” and the cult of the emperor gained prominence, appeals to imperial symbols and authority bolstered this unquestioning obedience to superiors, who were seen as the conduits of the emperor's will. It was during this period that the term kogun or “imperial army” gained favor over kokugun or “national army”, reflecting a deliberate effort by military authorities to forge a direct connection between the military and the imperial throne. The 1937 Japanese infantry division was structured as a square formation, with a peacetime strength established at approximately 12,000 officers and men organized into two brigades, each comprising about 4,000 personnel, formed from two infantry regiments, about 2,000 men each. The division included a field artillery regiment, an engineer regiment, and a transport battalion as organic units. Each infantry regiment was composed of three battalions, approximately 600 men each, which contained three rifle companies, 160 men each and a weapons platoon. A rifle company consisted of three rifle platoons and one light machine gun platoon. Regiments also included infantry assault gun platoons, and battalions contained a heavy machine gun company. Upon mobilization, a fourth infantry company augmented each battalion, along with reserve fillers, nearly 5,000 personnel assigned as transport and service troops, raising the authorized wartime strength of an infantry division to over 25,000 officers and men.  Reforms implemented in 1922 reduced personnel numbers in favor of new and improved weapons and equipment. Among these advancements, the 75 mm Type 90 field artillery piece, which boasted increased range and accuracy, was integrated into the forces in 1930, along with the 105 mm Type 10 howitzer and 75 mm pack mountain artillery which could be disassembled for transport using pack animals. These became standard artillery components for divisions. The emphasis on light, mobile, and smaller-caliber field artillery enabled swift deployment during fast-moving engagements. By minimizing the size of the baggage train, infantry and artillery units could quickly set up off the march formation and maneuver around enemy flanks. Army leaders further streamlined road march formations by eliminating the fourth artillery battery from each regiment, thus sacrificing some firepower for enhanced speed and mobility. Heavier artillery pieces were still used in set-piece battles where mobility was less critical. In a typical 1936 division, the field artillery regiment, equipped with Type 90 field artillery or lighter Type 94 mountain artillery, had thirty-six guns. Training focused on quality rather than quantity, reflecting the conservative doctrine of “one-round-one-hit”. Live-fire training was infrequent due to the scarcity of artillery firing ranges in Japan. Ammunition stockpiles were inadequate for anticipated operational needs; government arsenals produced over 111,000 artillery shells in 1936, which was fewer than one-tenth of the quantities specified in wartime consumption tables. Similar industrial shortcomings also hampered advancements in motorization and armor. Motorization proved costly and relied on foreign supply, presenting challenges given the inferior road networks in Manchuria, northern China, and the Soviet Far East. Military estimates suggested a need for 250,000 trucks to fully motorize the army, a goal beyond the capabilities of the nascent Japanese automotive industry, which produced fewer than 1,000 cars annually until 1933. Japanese tanks, described as “handcrafted, beautifully polished, and hoarded” by Alvin Coox, suffered from shortages similar to heavy artillery and ammunition. The army prioritized light weighing ten tons or less and medium tanks sixteen tons or less due to the necessity of deploying armor overseas, size and weight were crucial for loading and unloading from transport ships. Smaller tanks were also more suitable for the terrains of northern China and Manchuria, as they could traverse unbridged rivers using pontoons or ferries. The Japanese industrial base, however, struggled to mass-produce tanks; by 1939, factories were producing an average of only twenty-eight tanks of all models per month. Consequently, in 1937, foot soldiers remained as reliant on animal transport for mobility as their ancestors had been during the Russo-Japanese War. Despite enjoying technological and material superiority over disorganized Chinese forces, these deficiencies in heavy artillery, armor, and vehicles would prove catastrophic against more formidable opponents. Another significant factor constraining Japanese industry's capacity to produce tanks, trucks, and artillery was the 1936 decision to expand the army's air wing and homeland air defense network. This policy diverted resources, capital, and technology away from the army's ground forces. The nascent Japanese Army Air Force or “JAAF” aimed to support ground operations through reconnaissance, bombing enemy bases, and achieving air superiority. However, direct support for ground operations was limited, and Japanese military planners did not anticipate that aerial bombardment could supplement or replace artillery bombardments. The expanded air arm's strategic mission centered on executing preemptive air strikes against Soviet air bases in the Far East to thwart potential air attacks on Japan. By the mid-1930s, the army had approximately 650 aircraft, roughly 450 of which were operational. The JAAF emphasized rigorous training that prioritized quality over quantity, producing only about 750 pilots annually up until December 1941. Basic flight skills were developed through this training, while specialized tactical instruction was deferred to newly established pilot units. According to logistics doctrine, Japanese maneuver units typically operated within a 120 to 180-mile radius of a railhead to facilitate resupply and reinforcement. A field train transport unit was responsible for moving supplies daily from the railhead to a division control point for distribution. The division established a field depot to manage the transfer of supplies from field transport to company and lower-echelon units. At the depot, transport troops would hand over supplies to a combat train that ferried ammunition, rations, and equipment directly to frontline units. Horse-drawn wagons and pack animals were the primary means of transportation. Each wartime division included a transport battalion, which varied in size from approximately 2,200 to 3,700 personnel, depending on the type of division supported. The division typically carried enough supplies for one day. Upon mobilization, the logistical framework was reinforced with the addition of an ordnance unit, a field hospital, a sanitation unit, and additional field and combat trains. The size of the transport regiment grew from around 1,500 officers and men with over 300 horses to nearly 3,500 troops and more than 2,600 animals. In the battalion, one company generally transported small-arms ammunition while two companies handled artillery shells and two others carried rations; this arrangement was flexible based on operational needs. Pack horses and dray horses were assigned to each company to carry or tow infantry assault artillery, mortars, artillery ammunition, and rations. Infantry soldiers carried minimal rations, approximately two and a half pounds, primarily rice, along with tinned condiments and salt. Consequently, the field train included a field kitchen stocked with fresh vegetables, rice or bread, soy sauce, and pickles. Each evening, a forward echelon train distributed supplies received from the field transport unit to the combat unit's bivouac area. When combat seemed imminent, a section of the transport battalion would move forward to deliver essential combat supplies, ordnance, equipment, medical supplies, directly to frontline units. These units would also handle resupply, medical evacuation, and repair of ordnance and equipment once fighting commenced.  On the evening of September 18, 1936, the fifth anniversary of the Manchurian Incident, Chinese troops from the Twenty-Ninth Army clashed with Japanese soldiers from the Seventh Company's rear-guard medical unit at Fengtai. When a Japanese officer arrived on horseback, a Chinese soldier struck his horse, prompting the Chinese troops to retreat to their barracks. Major Ichiki Kiyonao, the battalion commander, ordered an emergency assembly, surrounded the Chinese encampment, and demanded that Chinese authorities surrender the aggressors immediately. To defuse the situation, Major General Kawabe Masakazu, the brigade commander and Ichiki's superior, instructed Regimental Commander Mutaguchi to resolve the incident swiftly. Mutaguchi negotiated an agreement that required the Chinese to apologize, punish those responsible, withdraw from the vicinity of the Japanese barracks, and maintain a distance of two miles. Although Mutaguchi and Ichiki wanted to disarm the Chinese forces, they ultimately complied with Kawabe's wishes and allowed the Chinese to retain their weapons “in the spirit of Bushido.” Later, the Chinese claimed the Japanese had refrained from disarming them due to their fear of the strength and influence of the 29th Army. This insult infuriated Mutaguchi, who vowed not to make any further concessions and promised to eliminate the anti-Japanese provocateurs decisively if another incident occurred. He warned his officers against allowing an “overly tolerant attitude toward the Chinese” to undermine the prestige of the imperial army and emphasized the need for swift, decisive action to prevent such incidents in the future. Tensions were further exacerbated by large-scale Japanese field exercises conducted from late October to early November. These maneuvers, the largest ever executed by Japanese forces in China, mobilized about 6,700 active-duty and reserve troops for a series of complex battle drills, night maneuvers, and tactical field problems. During these exercises, Japanese troops were quartered in Chinese homes. Although local residents were compensated for any damage caused, the exercises nonetheless heightened tensions between the two sides. The fallout from the Suiyuan Fiasco in December 1936, coupled with a tumultuous summer and fall, led to rising anti-Japanese sentiment and prompted Tokyo to caution the Kawabe brigade against actions that might escalate the already precarious situation. In March 1937, during the annual personnel assignments, Ishiwara was promoted to major general and appointed chief of the 1st Department Operations of the General Staff. However, Army Vice Minister Umezu, a hardliner regarding China and a rival of Ishiwara, successfully maneuvered the Hayashi cabinet into approving the command choices for army and navy ministers, overriding Ishiwara's proposals. General Sugiyama Hajime, another hawk on China, replaced the terminally ill General Nakamura Kotaro as army minister shortly after Nakamura's appointment and remained in that position until June 1938. Lieutenant General Imai Kiyoshi, army vice chief of staff and an Ishiwara supporter, was also battling a terminal illness that rendered him largely ineffective during his short five-month tenure from March to August 1937. Imai was expected to play a crucial role in high command because the army chief of staff, Prince Kan'in, had been appointed in 1931 as a figurehead due to internal factions preventing agreement on a candidate. Ishiwara further complicated his conciliatory approach by selecting Colonel Muto Akira, a known hardliner who believed force was the only means to resolve the Japan-China conflict, for the vital position of chief of Operations Section within the General Staff. From Kwantung Army headquarters, Commanding General Ueda Kenkichi and his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki, advocated for a preemptive war against China to serve the Kwantung Army's interests. In contrast, the China Garrison Army, under Lieutenant General Tashiro and his chief of staff, adopted a more moderate stance, aligning with central headquarters' policy of restraint. The China Garrison Army estimated the 29th Army to consist of 15,000–16,000 troops, with its main strength centered around Peking and an additional 10,000 troops in the surrounding area. Starting in spring 1937, Japanese units began observing tactical indicators suggesting that the Chinese were preparing for war. These indicators included increased guard presence at Peking's gates in June, bolstering units near the Marco Polo Bridge to over two battalions, preparing new fighting positions, digging trenches and constructing concrete pillboxes near the Marco Polo Bridge, infiltrating agents into Japanese maneuver areas for intelligence on night tactical exercises, and heightened strictness among Chinese railroad guards evident since late June. Nevertheless, the Japanese commanders did not view China as a formidable opponent. They believed that Chinese armies would quickly disintegrate due to what they perceived as a lack of fighting spirit and ineffective leadership. By 1937, Japan's national policy was shifting away from the persistent and aggressive efforts of field armies to undermine Chinese political authority in northern China toward a more conciliatory stance. This shift resulted in increased tensions between field armies and the General Staff in Tokyo, leading to substantial fractures among senior officers regarding the “solution” to their so-called China problem. Those tensions broke the camels back that year.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese grossly underestimated their enemy and their own logistical capabilities. There was to say “too many cooks in the kitchen” of the Japanese military and competing visions ultimately were leading Japan and China into an official full blown war. Japan assumed they could bully China until it was so fragmented it would be a simple matter of grabbing the pieces it liked, that was not to be the case at all.   

Två kinesiska krigsfångar visas upp i Ukraina och fallet reser nya frågor om Kinas roll i kriget. Enligt president Zelenskyj krigar fler än 150 kineser på Rysslands sida. Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radio Play. Det var i april som Ukrainas president Volodymyr Zelenskyj gick ut med att två kinesiska soldater gripits vid fronten i Donetsk. Gripandet blev en världsnyhet och den ukrainska underrättelsetjänsten visade upp fångarna på en presskonferens. Fallet har på nytt aktualiserat frågan om Kinas roll i kriget och hur nära Kina egentligen samarbetar med Ryssland. Krigsfångarna själva beskriver ingående hur de rekryterades via sociala medier i Kina, samtidigt som Peking förnekar all inblandning. För Ukraina blev fallet med de kinesiska krigsfångarna ett tillfälle att öka pressen på både Kina och USA.Medverkande: Hanna Sahlberg, Kinareporter. Moa Kärnstrand, Kinakorrespondent. Lubna El-Shanti, Ukrainakorrespondent. Programledare: Björn DjurbergProducent: Therese Rosenvinge

Jörg Wuttke war langjähriger Leiter der Europäischen Handelskammer in Peking und ist heute Partner bei der DGA Group in Washington DC. Im Gespräch mit Raimund Löw analysiert er den Stand des Handelskrieges, den Donald Trump mal an- und dann wieder absagt.Hat China gewonnen, weil die Regierung in Peking hart bleibt? Soll Europa auf China zugehen, wenn sich die USA abwenden?Das Gespräch wurde am 27.05.2025 aufgenommen. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Kooperation mit China – Erfahrungswerte aus erster Hand Oliver Radtke ist seit 2024 Managing Director des Thinktanks Global Neighbours mit Sitz in Wien. Er hat Sinologie, Philosophie und Geschichte in Heidelberg und Shanghai studiert und mehrere Bücher über China veröffentlicht. Über zehn Jahre lang leitete er das China-Programm der Robert Bosch Stiftung; zuletzt war er Büroleiter der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung in Peking – dort haben wir uns auch persönlich kennengelernt. In dieser Episode spricht Oliver über seine umfassenden Erfahrungen in der Zusammenarbeit mit chinesischen Partnern. Seine Einsichten sind besonders relevant für deutsche mittelständische Unternehmen, die ihre Lokalisierungsstrategien in China vertiefen und tragfähige Partnerschaften mit chinesischen Akteuren aufbauen wollen – oder müssen.

Inspired by the recent Tampopo "Food Scenes Only" episode, Dave cooks ramen live while talking about the history of the dish, how the dish has changed over time, and he answers some commonly asked questions. He finishes with some incredible bowls of ramen. You're going to want to watch this one! An Ask Dave is also answered. Watch the episode on Tampopo here: https://youtu.be/42e29MJaeOc Get Dave's Shio Tare recipe from this episode here: https://www.majordomo.com/blogs/recipes/dave-changs-shio-tare Learn about Kansui and how to make your own at home here: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/15/dining/15curious.html?smid=url-share Check out Dave on 'Mind of a Chef' here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ckYjZDtdXmo Learn more about Taishoken here: https://www.taishokenusa.com/about Learn about Sun Noodle here: https://sunnoodle.com/our-story/ Learn about Jiro Ramen: https://ramenbeast.substack.com/p/ramen-jiro-japans-most-infamous-food Check out the Javier Cabral episode where they talk about the holy ideal of Peking duck and a tortilla: https://youtu.be/H3f_AZF4an0 Send in your questions to askdave@majordomomedia.com. Subscribe to the show on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@thedavechangshow. Subscribe to Recipe Club on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@recipeclubofficial. Submit your favorite food moments in your favorite movies to majorfoodporn.com. Join our community Discord on majordomo.com. Host: Dave Chang Guest: Chris Ying Majordomo Media Producers: Kelsey Rearden, David Meyer, Ira Chute, and Molly O'Keeffe Spotify Producer: Felipe Guilhermino Editor: Stefano Sanchez Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Årets fotbollsdeal är här! TV4 och Studio Allsvenskan har just nu ett samarbete där du för endast 249 kr/månaden får TV4:s Sportpaket (Allsvenskan, Superettan, Serie A, LaLiga, Svenska Cupen, Sveriges herrlandskamper plus massa mer). Ordinarie pris är 349 kr/månaden så detta erbjudande innebär 100 kr rabatt varje månad! Gå in på https://www.tv4play.se/kampanj/studioallsvenskan för att ta del av erbjudandet!Det är tisdag och Studio Allsvenskan dukar upp för att snacka ner de två matcherna som spelades i går.Bajen vann till slut hemma mot Degerfors, men det var ingen rolig tillställning som tittarna bjöds på.Hur bra är Degerfors försvar? Och vad är det Bajen behöver göra bättre?Vi konstaterar hur som helst att det är ett fyrlagsrace uppe i toppen och Hammarby är med där.Borde Degerfors fått en straff?Därefter tar vi oss till Norrköping där Peking och Mjällby kryssade.En match med två helt olika halvlekar där Mjällby körde över i första men där Norrköping var betydligt bättre i den andra.Var resultatet rättvist tillslut?Slutligen så tar vi ut omgångens lag och tar dessutom ner de hetaste Silly-bollarna som har kommit.Vilka kommer värva mest i sommar?Missa inte dagens avsnitt.Ute överallt.Studio Allsvenskan finns även på Patreon, där du får ALLA våra avsnitt reklamfritt direkt efter inspelning. Dessutom får du tillgång till våra exklusiva poddserier där vi släpper avsnitt tisdag till fredag varje vecka. Bli medlem här!Följ Studio Allsvenskan på sociala medier: Twitter!Facebook!Instagram!Youtube!TikTok! Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Peking utnyttjar en mer USA-skeptisk omvärld och tar plats i de geopolitiska luckor som Trumps framfart i världspolitiken lämnat öppna. Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radio Play. När Donald Trump vill dra USA ut ur WHO går Kina istället in med mer pengar. När Trumps tullar ger forna rivaler gemensamma problem kan Peking knyta nya band. Kommer Kina dessutom bli en mer aktiv biståndsgivare nu, när Trump monterar ner det amerikanska biståndet? Radiokorrespondenterna Kina ringar in nya luckor som Trumps politik skapat och som Peking nu kliver fram för att fylla. Samtidigt går Kina om USA i popularitet och Kinas kommunistparti kan skörda frukten av en mer Kina-vänlig omvärld.Medverkande: Moa Kärnstrand, Kinakorrespondent. Hanna Sahlberg, Kinareporter. Programledare: Björn DjurbergProducent: Therese Rosenvinge

Was passiert, wenn zwei atomar bewaffnete Großmächte – China und Indien – in einer der gefährlichsten Grenzregionen der Welt aufeinandertreffen? In dieser Folge von Weltmacht China beleuchten wir den brisanten Konflikt in Aksai Chin und Arunachal Pradesh – zwei Gebiete, die weit mehr als nur strategisch bedeutsam sind. Warum streiten sich zwei der größten Wirtschaftsnationen Asiens genau hier? Was steckt hinter den wiederkehrenden Spannungen im Himalaya? Und was sagen diese territorialen Konflikte über den globalen Machtkampf zwischen Peking und Neu-Delhi aus? Gemeinsam mit ARD-Korrespondent Christoph Kober (Beijing) und Peter Hornung (Neu-Delhi) schaffen wir die Faktenbasis – und mit Politikwissenschaftler Johannes Plagemann (GIGA) analysiert Host Joyce Lee die geopolitischen Auswirkungen dieses Konflikts auf Asien und die Weltordnung. Feedback? Anregungen? Schreibt uns an: weltmachtchina@rbb-online.de "Welt.Macht.China" ist der China-Podcast der ARD. Aktuelle und ehemalige Korrespondent*innen und Expert*innen haben sich zusammengetan, um einen vielfältigen Einblick zu geben in das riesige Land. Es geht um Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur, das Leben und den Alltag in der Volksrepublik, außerdem um Klischees und Chinas Rolle in der Welt. Eine neue Folge gibt es jeden zweiten Dienstag in der ARD Audiothek und in allen anderen Podcast-Apps. https://www.ardaudiothek.de/sendung/welt-macht-china/10494211/ Ihr habt Anmerkungen, Lob und Kritik? Schreibt uns an weltmachtchina@rbb-online.de. Unser Podcast Tipp: "Das Gift in Dir" heißt die erste Staffel im neuen Podcast-Feed von 11KM Stories von der Tagesschau. Los geht’s mit Lobby-Machenschaften rund um PFAS. Das sind wasser- und schmutzabweisende Chemikalien, zum Beispiel in Outdoorjacken oder Pfannen. Einige sind nachgewiesenermaßen krebserregend und gelangen beispielsweise durch Abwasser von Chemiefirmen in die Umwelt, ins Grundwasser – und letztlich in unserem Körper. Obwohl diese Risiken bekannt sind, ist ihre Herstellung erlaubt. Der fünfteilige Storytelling-Podcast "Das Gift in Dir" folgt der Spur einer extrem mächtigen Chemie-Lobby, zeigt wie selbst Robert Habeck als Wirtschaftsminister ihren Erzählungen auf den Leim ging und wie ein Dorf in Oberbayern gegen die PFAs Verschmutzung auf die Barrikaden geht. "Das Gift in Dir" im neuen 11KM Stories Podcast von der Tagesschau: In der ARD Audiothek und überall da, wo es Podcasts gibt. https://1.ard.de/11KM_Stories_Das_Gift_in_Dir?=cp

Taiwans Zukunft ist mehr als ungewiss. China hat gedroht, die Insel an sein Reich anzuschliessen, wenn nötig militärisch. Käme es zu einem Anschluss oder gar zu einem Krieg, hätte dies fatale Folgen für uns alle. Einst kämpften auf dem chinesischen Festland der kommunistische Mao Zedong und der damalige Präsident Chiang Kai-shek in einem Bürgerkrieg gegeneinander. Der unterlegene Chiang Kai-shek floh im Jahr 1949 mit rund zwei Millionen Menschen auf die Insel Taiwan. Seither gibt es zwei Länder, die sich als das wahre China betrachten: Taiwan, das sich offiziell als «Republik China» bezeichnet, und die Volksrepublik China. Zuerst war Taiwan das international anerkannte China, dann wurde die Volksrepublik immer mächtiger und verdrängte Taiwan im Jahr 1971 aus den Vereinten Nationen. Für Peking gilt das Ein-China-Prinzip: Jedes Land, das mit China diplomatische Beziehungen führen und Geschäfte machen will, darf Taiwan nicht offiziell als eigenständigen Staat anerkennen. Dies führte dazu, dass Taiwan heute nur noch von dreizehn Ländern offiziell anerkannt wird. Und dies, obwohl es sich seit den Achtzigerjahren zu einem der demokratischsten und liberalsten Länder Asiens entwickelt hat. Spätestens seit dem Ukrainekrieg ist die bedrohliche Lage der Insel in den internationalen Fokus gerückt. Die Angst geht um, der chinesische Präsident Xi Jinping könnte es Putin gleichtun und den Inselstaat angreifen. In mehreren Reden hat er angekündigt, die Vereinigung mit Taiwan auf jeden Fall herbeizuführen, wenn nötig mit militärischen Mitteln. Westliche Politiker verschiedenster Länder bekunden ihre Solidarität und reisen symbolträchtig nach Taiwan. Allen voran sind es die USA, die seit Jahrzehnten als Verbündete Taiwans gelten. Jede Reise wird von immer heftigerem militärischem Säbelrasseln der Chinesen begleitet. In der Pandemie standen in vielen westlichen Ländern, vor allem in der Automobilindustrie, die Fliessbänder still. Der Grund: Chipmangel. Der Welt wurde schlagartig bewusst, wie abhängig sie von internationalen Lieferketten und vor allem von der Chipproduktion in Taiwan ist. Das Land produziert rund 60 Prozent aller weltweiten Halbleiter. Bei den hochklassigen Halbleitern sind es sogar über 90 Prozent. Halbleiter werden auch als das Öl des 21. Jahrhunderts bezeichnet. Würde die Chipproduktion Taiwans gestört, könnte die gesamte digitalisierte Welt um Jahrzehnte zurückgeworfen werden. Mit prägnanten Bildern und im Gespräch mit internationalen Experten vermittelt der Film ein Bild des Landes und der aktuellen Lage. Anhand der politischen Beziehungen der Schweiz zu Taiwan erzählt der Film, wie heikel es für die meisten Länder der Welt ist, mit Taiwan umzugehen, ohne das grosse China zu erzürnen. Der Film zeigt auch, wie gefährlich es für die Welt und deren Wirtschaft wäre, wenn China tatsächlich angreifen würde. Hätte Taiwan eine Chance, sich zu verteidigen? Würden die USA, Japan, Australien und Korea eingreifen und stünde somit der Beginn eines grossen Krieges bevor? Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass China tatsächlich ernst macht? Erstausstrahlung 3sat: Mittwoch, 6. Dezember 2023, 20.15 Uhr

The 9 th . Peking to Paris Motor challenge got under way last Saturday, theevent covering 14,500 kilometres over 37 days across twelve countries. 80entries started at the Great Wall of China including five from Australia, withthis year’s challenge taking crews across China, Mongolia, Kazakhstan,across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan continuing into the tough tracks ofGeorgia and Turkey, followed with a sting in the tail across Bulgaria,Romania, Hungary, Austria, Switzerland before finishing in France. A truehistoric vehicle and human endurance challenge that follows in the tracksof the original 1907 pioneers. The entry fee per vehicle to participate with acrew of two 69,000 pounds. Entries include vehicles up to 1985 – theoldest vehicle this year from Melbourne’s Alan Madan – a 14.5 litre 1917American La France, formerly a fire truck. I’m David BerthonSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Taiwans Zukunft ist mehr als ungewiss. China hat gedroht, die Insel an sein Reich anzuschliessen, wenn nötig militärisch. Käme es zu einem Anschluss oder gar zu einem Krieg, hätte dies fatale Folgen für uns alle. Einst kämpften auf dem chinesischen Festland der kommunistische Mao Zedong und der damalige Präsident Chiang Kai-shek in einem Bürgerkrieg gegeneinander. Der unterlegene Chiang Kai-shek floh im Jahr 1949 mit rund zwei Millionen Menschen auf die Insel Taiwan. Seither gibt es zwei Länder, die sich als das wahre China betrachten: Taiwan, das sich offiziell als «Republik China» bezeichnet, und die Volksrepublik China. Zuerst war Taiwan das international anerkannte China, dann wurde die Volksrepublik immer mächtiger und verdrängte Taiwan im Jahr 1971 aus den Vereinten Nationen. Für Peking gilt das Ein-China-Prinzip: Jedes Land, das mit China diplomatische Beziehungen führen und Geschäfte machen will, darf Taiwan nicht offiziell als eigenständigen Staat anerkennen. Dies führte dazu, dass Taiwan heute nur noch von dreizehn Ländern offiziell anerkannt wird. Und dies, obwohl es sich seit den Achtzigerjahren zu einem der demokratischsten und liberalsten Länder Asiens entwickelt hat. Spätestens seit dem Ukrainekrieg ist die bedrohliche Lage der Insel in den internationalen Fokus gerückt. Die Angst geht um, der chinesische Präsident Xi Jinping könnte es Putin gleichtun und den Inselstaat angreifen. In mehreren Reden hat er angekündigt, die Vereinigung mit Taiwan auf jeden Fall herbeizuführen, wenn nötig mit militärischen Mitteln. Westliche Politiker verschiedenster Länder bekunden ihre Solidarität und reisen symbolträchtig nach Taiwan. Allen voran sind es die USA, die seit Jahrzehnten als Verbündete Taiwans gelten. Jede Reise wird von immer heftigerem militärischem Säbelrasseln der Chinesen begleitet. In der Pandemie standen in vielen westlichen Ländern, vor allem in der Automobilindustrie, die Fliessbänder still. Der Grund: Chipmangel. Der Welt wurde schlagartig bewusst, wie abhängig sie von internationalen Lieferketten und vor allem von der Chipproduktion in Taiwan ist. Das Land produziert rund 60 Prozent aller weltweiten Halbleiter. Bei den hochklassigen Halbleitern sind es sogar über 90 Prozent. Halbleiter werden auch als das Öl des 21. Jahrhunderts bezeichnet. Würde die Chipproduktion Taiwans gestört, könnte die gesamte digitalisierte Welt um Jahrzehnte zurückgeworfen werden. Mit prägnanten Bildern und im Gespräch mit internationalen Experten vermittelt der Film ein Bild des Landes und der aktuellen Lage. Anhand der politischen Beziehungen der Schweiz zu Taiwan erzählt der Film, wie heikel es für die meisten Länder der Welt ist, mit Taiwan umzugehen, ohne das grosse China zu erzürnen. Der Film zeigt auch, wie gefährlich es für die Welt und deren Wirtschaft wäre, wenn China tatsächlich angreifen würde. Hätte Taiwan eine Chance, sich zu verteidigen? Würden die USA, Japan, Australien und Korea eingreifen und stünde somit der Beginn eines grossen Krieges bevor? Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass China tatsächlich ernst macht? Erstausstrahlung 3sat: Mittwoch, 6. Dezember 2023, 20.15 Uhr

On Today's Menu:

Bezüglich des Zollkrieges zwischen den USA und China zitiert ein Experte die berühmte militärische Strategie „Die Kunst des Krieges“. Damit warnt er davor, dass Peking versuchen werde, die Verhandlungen zu verzögern, um sich einen Vorteil zu verschaffen.

Xi Jinping har en långsiktig plan för att göra Kina till en militär supermakt. Medan andra länder slappnade av efter kalla kriget fortsatte Kina att ösa pengar över militären. Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radio Play. Satellitbilder tyder på att ett gigantiskt hemligt militärkomplex byggs några mil utanför Peking. Enligt amerikanska uppgifter rör det sig om en anläggning tio gånger Pentagons storlek. Men megaprojektet är bara en del i Xi Jinpings stora upprustningsplan för Kina. Visionen och målet är en moderniserad militärmakt som inom ett par decennier ska kunna mäta sig med USA:s. Kina är idag det land i världen som efter USA lägger mest pengar på sin militär. Men avsaknad av stridserfarenhet och dolda maktkamper reser samtidigt frågetecken om Xis plan.Medverkande: Hanna Sahlberg, Ekots Kinareporter och Moa Kärnstrand, Kinakorrespondent. Programledare: Björn DjurbergProducent: Therese Rosenvinge

Er det at skadefryd er den eneste sanne fryd og at det er stygt å peke? Stemmer det at alle vil se Julius?

Was macht einen Olympiasieger wirklich aus?In diesem tiefgründigen Gespräch nehmen wir dich mit auf eine Reise durch die Höhen und Tiefen von Matthias Steiners außergewöhnlichem Leben. Vom dramatischen Goldmoment in Peking über den Weg raus aus dem Leistungssport hin zur Gründung seines eigenen Food-Unternehmens – Matthias teilt bewegende Geschichten, knallharte Learnings und seine persönliche Philosophie von Erfolg, Gesundheit und Lebensfreude.Dabei geht's nicht nur um Muskelkraft und Ernährung, sondern vor allem um mentale Stärke, Ehrlichkeit zu sich selbst und den Mut, neue Wege zu gehen. Ob du selbst Sportler, Biohacker oder einfach lebenshungrig bist – diese Folge wird dich berühren und motivieren.► In dieser Episode erfährst du:• Warum Matthias Steiner Muskelkraft als Lebensversicherung betrachtet• Wie er als Diabetiker Typ 1 seinen Stoffwechsel meisterhaft steuert• Was mentale Stärke wirklich bedeutet – in drei einfachen Sätzen• Wie du durch Ehrlichkeit und Begeisterung deine Richtung findest• Warum Spaß und Bewegung für ihn die wahre Gesundheitsformel sind• Wie Steiner's Food entstanden ist – und was es wirklich besonders macht• Welche Rolle Spiritualität und die Frage nach dem Sinn heute in seinem Leben spielen„Wenn du dir immer alle Türen offen hältst, verbringst du dein Leben auf dem Flur.“► Wer ist Matthias Steiner?Matthias ist Olympiasieger im Gewichtheben (Peking 2008), Unternehmer, Typ-1-Diabetiker und Bestsellerautor. Gemeinsam mit seiner Frau Inge gründete er „Steiner's“, eine innovative Low-Carb-Food-Marke. Matthias nutzt seine Lebensgeschichte, um andere Menschen zu inspirieren, auf ihre Gesundheit zu achten, Verantwortung zu übernehmen – und sich nie von äußeren Umständen definieren zu lassen.Folge Matthias auf Instagram► Kapitel der Folge00:00 Intro05:45 Vom Spitzensport zur persönlichen Transformation15:00 Der Moment des Olympiasiegs21:00 Mentale Stärke & Ehrlichkeit zu sich selbst33:00 Bewegung, Freude & der innere Antrieb41:00 Körperbewusstsein & gesundes Training49:00 Ernährung, Blutzucker & echte Lebensmittelauswahl59:00 Supplements, Schlaf & Stressmanagement01:10:00 Krafttraining, Muskelmasse & Longevity01:21:00 Werte, Familie & Generationenbewusstsein01:29:00 Erfolg, Sinn & spirituelle Perspektiven01:44:00 Lieblingsbücher, Ratschläge & Lebensweisheiten01:56:00 Abschluss & persönliche Botschaft► Erlebe Biohacking live beim FlowFest 2025!Das Event für alle, die ein gesundes, bewusstes und langes Leben gestalten wollen – mit Vorträgen, Workshops und innovativen Tools zum Ausprobieren.

„Čína byla velmi těžce zasažena,“ nechal se slyšet americký prezident Donald Trump. Devadesátidenní obchodní příměří podle něj dokazuje úspěch jeho administrativy i „kamikadze“ strategie celního nátlaku. V Číně to ale vidí přesně opačně. Britský magazín Economist se zaměřuje na to, jak si obě strany situaci vykládají a co to vypovídá o jejich strategiích.Všechny díly podcastu Svět ve 20 minutách můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.

Afrikas Handelspolitik befindet sich in einer Zwickmühle: Auf der einen Seite zieht Peking, auf der anderen Washington. Doch afrikanische Staaten können es nicht zwei Herren recht machen. China betrachtet Afrika als seinen Kontinent und droht bereits mit Vergeltung.

Laut Ex-KPCh-Kadern im Exil sehen viele chinesische Beamte keinen Ausweg mehr im gegenwärtigen System. Die CIA bietet ihnen erstmals in der Geschichte öffentlich einen Ausweg an. Doch Peking ist erbost.

Handelskriget mellan Kina och USA inleddes långt innan Trumps tullchock i våras. Hör om hur Peking förberett sig i åratal och om strategierna för att vinna. Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radio Play. Kommunistpartiets propagandaavdelning går på högvarv och pumpar ut budskap om att Kina ska slåss till slutet och besegra USA i handelskriget som trappats upp under våren. Från Kina berättar Moa Kärnstrand att många hon talat med stöttar budskapet uppifrån, samtidigt som det också finns en påtaglig oro bland kinesiska exportberoende företag. Vad talar för respektive emot att Peking kommer lyckas med sin taktik och hålla ut längre än USA i handelskriget? Och vad driver handelskonflikten mellan världens två största ekonomier? Hör också om förutsättningarna att långsiktigt reparera den spruckna handelsrelationen.Medverkande: Hanna Sahlberg, Ekots Kinareporter. Moa Kärnstrand, Kinakorrespondent. Programledare: Björn DjurbergProducent: Therese Rosenvinge

Sie sind eine Art Nationaltier in China, fast schon heilig: Die Pandabären. Hoch kompliziert in der Nachzucht, gelten die Tiere immer noch als gefährdet. China unternimmt große Anstrengungen, um den Bestand zu sichern und auszubauen. Gleichzeitig sind sie ein Milliardengeschäft und ein Mittel der Diplomatie. Seit Jahrzehnten verschickt China Pandas in die ganze Welt, schmiedet damit Allianzen und nutzt die Tiere, um das eigene Image zu stärken. Meist werden sie gegen eine Millionengebühr verliehen, der Nachwuchs muss zurück nach China. Bekannt ist das auch als Panda-Diplomatie. Was drückt die chinesische Staatsführung damit aus, wenn sie Pandabären verleiht, wie politisch sind diese Leihgaben? Wir sprechen mit unseren ARD-Korrespondent*innen in Peking und Shanghai über die Aufzuchtstation in Chengdu, den Artenschutz und die Panda-Diplomatie. Und wir fragen den Panda-Kurator im Berliner Zoo, Dr. Florian Sicks, wie die Nachzucht funktioniert. Der Berliner Zoo ist Deutschland einziger Tierpark mit Pandabären und steht regelmäßig in Kontakt mit China. "Welt.Macht.China" ist der China-Podcast der ARD. Aktuelle und ehemalige Korrespondent*innen und Expert*innen haben sich zusammengetan, um einen vielfältigen Einblick zu geben in das riesige Land. Es geht um Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur, das Leben und den Alltag in der Volksrepublik, außerdem um Klischees und Chinas Rolle in der Welt. Eine neue Folge gibt es jeden zweiten Dienstag in der ARD Audiothek und in allen anderen Podcast-Apps. https://www.ardaudiothek.de/sendung/welt-macht-china/10494211/ Ihr habt Anmerkungen, Lob und Kritik? Schreibt uns an weltmachtchina@rbb-online.de Unser Podcast Tipp: Wenn ihr täglich auf dem Laufenden bleiben wollt, auch in Sachen Nachrichten: dann empfehlen wir euch noch einen anderen Podcast: "0630 - der News-Podcast". In um die 20 Minuten gibts da Montag bis Freitag die wichtigsten Nachrichten für den Tag. Manchmal wird's persönlich, manchmal witzig, manchmal emotional. Es geht um Politik, Gesellschaft und andere Themen. www.wdr.de/0630

NSi in Demokrati so vložili interpelacijo zoper ministrico za kulturo Asto Vrečko. Poleg očitkov glede včeraj zavrnjenega zakona o pokojninah umetnikov ji očitajo negospodarno rabo sredstev in spodkopavanje vrednot osamosvojitve. Ministrica odgovarja, da gre za kulturni boj. Druge teme: - Washington in Peking bosta za tri mesece znižala uvedene vzajemne carine, in sicer za 115 odstotnih točk. Strani si želita nadaljnjih pogovorov, kako vzdržno bo carinsko premirje med velesilama, bo pokazal čas. - Rusija še ni sprejela ukrajinskega poziva k 30-dnevni prekinitvi ognja, ki naj bi začela veljati danes, predlagala pa je neposredne pogovore v četrtek v Carigradu. Iz Kremlja so sporočili, da si želijo dolgoročnega mirovnega dogovora, ne bodo pa si pustili postavljati ultimatov. Da bo Evropa ob neuveljavitvi premirja začela pripravljati nove sankcije, sta namreč zagrozila tako nemški zunanji minister Johann Wadephul kot Bruselj. - Na tretji razvojni osi so danes prebili predor Konovo na povezovalni cesti, bliža se tudi graditev najzahtevnejšega odseka glavne ceste. Časovnica se sicer še vedno zamika, projekt pa se draži.

„Řekněte v čínských obchodních halách nebo na veletrzích jméno Donald Trump a z různých koutů se ozve tiché uchechtnutí,“ píše BBC ve své reportáži z Číny. Prezident Si Ťin-pching dává Spojeným státům najevo, že Peking nemá v plánu v celní válce ustupovat. „Je to trochu performativní. Ve skutečnosti situace pro Čínu nevypadá zas tak růžově,“ komentuje sinolog Martin Hála.

„Řekněte v čínských obchodních halách nebo na veletrzích jméno Donald Trump a z různých koutů se ozve tiché uchechtnutí,“ píše BBC ve své reportáži z Číny. Prezident Si Ťin-pching dává Spojeným státům najevo, že Peking nemá v plánu v celní válce ustupovat. „Je to trochu performativní. Ve skutečnosti situace pro Čínu nevypadá zas tak růžově,“ komentuje sinolog Martin Hála.Všechny díly podcastu Osobnost Plus můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.

Die USA und China treffen sich in Genf zu ersten Gesprächen im Zollkonflikt. Peking will sich mit Konjunkturmassnahmen in eine bessere Verhandlungsposition bringen. Jens Korte, Börsenkorrespondent SRF, beobachtet an der Wallstreet eine kleine positive Reaktion trotz verhaltener Erwartungen. SMI: - 1.0%

Peking nutzt NGOs als Werkzeug, um Kritiker der KP Chinas in den UN zum Schweigen zu bringen, heißt es in einem neuen Bericht. Im Menschenrechtsrat stieg die Anzahl der chinesischen NGOs auf Rednerlisten innerhalb von sechs Jahren von drei auf 33. „Keine von ihnen kritisierte China.“

Travelhacking von Luxusreisen zum Eco-Preis! Fabian Hilpert reist, seit er 18 Jahre alt ist, um die Welt. Als günstige Alternative hat es ihn anfangs als Ultralight‑Abenteurer in den Norden Europas verschlagen, da man dort mit dem Zelt quasi umsonst reisen konnte. So entwickelte es sich, dass Fabian schon in jungen Jahren mehrere Jahre lang mehr als 6 Monate im Jahr im Zelt unterwegs war. Neben einem intensiven Reiseleben hat Fabian mit einem Ingenieurstudium in Wien begonnen und es schließlich mit drei Auslandssemestern in Moskau und Peking als Diplomingenieur abgeschlossen. Um sich das Studium im Ausland finanzieren zu können, hat Fabian früh nach Wegen gesucht, online zu arbeiten, und schließlich 2012 eine Werbeagentur für Google Ads gegründet, um mit einem Laptop von unterwegs aus zu arbeiten. Noch bevor der Name „Digital Nomad“ im deutschsprachigen Raum so richtig bekannt wurde, hat Fabian sich mit Leuten zusammengetan, um gemeinsam als reisende Unternehmer an Projekten zu arbeiten und sich die Arbeit in der neuen digitalen Economy zu teilen. So bestand die Werbeagentur am Höhepunkt aus über 10-15 reisenden Mitarbeitern, die oft gemeinsam Workations organisierten. Getrieben von dem Gedanken, Neues zu entdecken, hat sich Fabian dann für einen Auslandszivildienst in Riga, Moskau und Shanghai entschieden und konnte so neben neuen Erfahrungen auch die Fremdsprachen Russisch und Chinesisch vertiefen. Durch ein gutes Netzwerk in der damals neuen Digital Nomad‑Szene im deutschsprachigen Raum fand Fabian früh den Weg als Speaker zu Konferenzen und positionierte sich als einer der Pioniere der Szene. 2017 gründete er zusätzlich das Projekt „Business2travel“, um anderen Menschen diesen Lifestyle näherzubringen. Neben dem Coaching und Training für Leute, die auf Reisen arbeiten möchten, hat Fabian schließlich auch Unternehmen und Regierungen beraten, welche systemischen Voraussetzungen und Infrastruktur nötig sind, um digitale Nomaden anzuziehen. In seiner Zeit an den Universitäten hat Fabian mehrere wegweisende wissenschaftliche Arbeiten rund um das Thema digitales Nomadentum veröffentlicht und diese auf zahlreichen Konferenzen in der deutschen und internationalen Community präsentiert. Dadurch hat er diesen Lifestyle einer neuen Zielgruppe nähergebracht, die damit zuvor noch nicht vertraut war. Da das Budget anfangs begrenzt war, hatte er schon früh das Bedürfnis, auch mit wenig Geld bequem und luxuriös zu reisen. Deshalb suchte er nach Tricks und Hacks, um gratis Upgrades beim Fliegen und in Hotels zu erhalten sowie durch Punkte und Meilen günstiger zu reisen. Da Fabian schon früh präsent auf Social Media war und stets über sein Reiseleben informierte, kamen immer öfter die Fragen, wie es für einen Studenten möglich sei, in Luxussuiten an den schönsten Orten der Welt zu leben und immer luxuriöser zu reisen. Daraus entwickelte sich früh ein Coaching für digitale Nomaden, das den Teilnehmern die Statusprogramme und Punktesysteme der Reiseindustrie näherbringen sollte. Da die Nachfrage nach diesem Wissen stieg, legte Fabian immer mehr Fokus auf die Vermarktung dieses Wissens – noch bevor Begriffe wie „Travelhacking“ und „Lifehacking“ richtig bekannt wurden. Seit 2020 bietet Fabian sein Programm Elite Travelhacking an, in dem er sein Wissen zur Verfügung stellt. Das Programm ist mittlerweile stark gewachsen und gilt heute als das umfassendste Travelhacking‑Programm im deutschsprachigen Raum. In der Community versammeln sich namhafte Extremreisende, Abenteurer und einige der bekanntesten Online-Unternehmer der Szene. Es gibt verschiedene Angebote für Anfänger und Fortgeschrittene. Das Programm wird laufend weiterentwickelt und wurde mittlerweile auch um den „Elite Travelhacking Platinum Circle“, einen Concierge‑Service für anspruchsvolle Reisende, sowie um ein eigenes US‑Kreditkartenprogramm erweitert. Fabian widmet sein Leben im Moment intensiv dem Elite Travelhacking Programm, hat inzwischen mehr als 100 Länder bereist, lebt fast durchgehend in Hotels und testet ständig neue Travelhacks für und mit der Elite Travelhacking Community. Dein größter Fehler als Unternehmer?: Eventuell zu viele Projekte nebenbei. Deine Lieblings-Internet-Ressource?: Verschiedene Social Media Kanäle die gut sortiert sind und ausgewählte klassische Medien global ausgewählt. Fürs Travelhacking unzählige Tools. Link zur Ressource: Flightradar24   Deine beste Buchempfehlung: Buchtitel 1: The 4-Hour Workweek: Escape 9-5, Live Anywhere, and Join the New Rich; Timothy Ferriss   Kontaktdaten des Interviewpartners: www.elitetravelhacking.de Instagram: fabitravel Youtube: fabian.hilpert ++++++++++++++++++++++++   Hol Dir jetzt Dein Hörbuch "Selfmade Millionäre packen aus" und klicke auf das Bild!   +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Mehr Freiheit, mehr Geld und mehr Spaß mit DEINEM eigenen Podcast. Erfahre jetzt, warum es auch für Dich Sinn macht, Deinen eigenen Podcast zu starten. Jetzt hier zum kostenlosen Podcast-Workshop anmelden: https://Podcastkurs.com +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++   So fing alles an. Hier geht´s zur allerersten Episode von TomsTalkTime.com – DER Erfolgspodcast. Und ja, der Qualitätsunterschied sollte zu hören sein. Aber hey, das war 2012…

Seit 26 Jahren versucht das chinesische Regime, alle Erinnerungen an den 25. April 1999 auszulöschen. Damals fand einer der größten Proteste der jüngeren Geschichte in Peking statt.

Aussenminister Ignazio Cassis ist diese Woche nach Peking gereist. Will sich die Schweiz China annähern? Ein Experte ordnet ein. Weitere Themen: · Indien hat das Indus-Wasserabkommen mit Pakistan ausgesetzt - und das, obwohl der Vertrag seit 1960 besteht und mehrere Kriege überstanden hat. · In Albanien ist Tiktok seit einem Monat komplett verboten. Wie die Menschen im Land dazu stehen. · Essstörungen sind bei jungen Männern verbreitet - und trotzdem ein Tabu. Wir haben darüber mit einem Psychologen gesprochen.

Falls China kein Abkommen mit den USA schließt, kann es dort keine Geschäfte machen, sagt Trump. Peking drohte am 22. April mit Vergeltung, falls andere Staaten Abmachungen treffen, die der chinesischen Wirtschaft schaden könnten.

Die USA erhöhen den Druck auf die chinesische Solarindustrie – mit drastischen Strafzöllen. Bis zu 3.521 Prozent sollen künftig auf Solarmodule erhoben werden, die über Drittländer wie Thailand, Vietnam oder Kambodscha in die USA gelangen. Die Maßnahme soll bestehende Zollregelungen umgehen und ist Teil einer breiter angelegten Industriepolitik gegen unfaire Handelspraktiken des kommunistischen Regimes in Peking.

Last time we spoke about Operation Nekka, the Invasion of Rehe Province. In 1932, the Kwantung Army eyed Rehe province as vital for Manchukuo's success. General Tang Yulin, ruling Rehe, initially favored Japanese interests due to economic ties, particularly in opium. Tensions escalated after a Japanese civilian was abducted, prompting military actions that led to skirmishes in Shanhaiguan. Amidst growing conflict, Zhang Xueliang mobilized forces against Tang, who eventually conceded. As Japan prepared for invasion, both sides strategized, with Chiang Kai-Shek reluctant to engage directly, fearing Japanese influence over his rivals. Operation Nekka commenced, showcasing the Kwantung Army's efficiency as they swiftly routed Chinese forces in Rehe. By March 4th, key passes were captured, but fierce resistance emerged. General Nishi faced counterattacks, leading to strategic retreats. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-Shek struggled with internal conflicts while managing the Japanese threat. As the Kwantung Army pushed beyond the Great Wall, logistical issues arose, prompting political maneuvers to secure local warlord alliances. However, plans faltered when Zhang Qingyao, a potential ally, was assassinated.   #147 The Battle for the Great Wall of China Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Thus in the previous episode, Operation Nekka had been unleashed. The Kwangtung Army tossed 2 divisions into Rehe province with the intent of forcing its annexation into Manchukuo. They were under strict orders to not extend operations past the Great Wall of China. However they believed it was necessary to seize the main gateways along the Great Wall of China to establish their new borders, and in order to do so this absolutely required going past them. Yet military operations were not the only means to secure their goals. The Japanese forces faced significant logistical challenges, including a shortage of troops, having advanced into Rehe with only 20,000 men. Even the most resolute general in the Kwantung Army doubted that their military strength could prevail against the vast numbers of Chinese troops in the plains of Hubei. As a result, they needed to supplement their military efforts with political strategies targeting regional warlords. The tactic of bribing local elites had proven highly effective during the pacification of Manchuria, and there was no reason to think it wouldn't work in North China as well. All of these actions were carried out without any oversight from Tokyo headquarters.   On February 13, 1933, Itagaki Seishiro, who was then the head of the Mukden Special Service Agency, was transferred to the General Staff without any formal announcement of his promotion. He took up a position in Tientsin specifically to initiate political maneuvers in eastern Hubei, leading to the establishment of the Tientsin Special Service Agency. Initially, this agency sought to engage various competing warlords in North China, including Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, and Sun Chuanfang, but eventually focused on Zhang Qingyao. Zhang had previously been a protégé of Duan Qirui, serving as the civil and military governor of Henan province. He had fought against Zhang Zuolin in 1925 before shifting his allegiance to Wu Peifu. During the second phase of the Northern Expedition, Zhang Qingyao again battled Zhang Zuolin, who was then in control of the National Pacification Army. After the Northern Expedition concluded, he allied with Yan Xishan's forces in Shanxi. So yeah it would seem he was not a man of principles nor loyalties of any kind. The Tientsin Special Service Agency initially aimed to approach Zhang Qingyao in hopes that he could orchestrate a coup d'état against Chiang Kai-Shek. They also hoped to persuade other figures such as Song Queyuan, Zhang Zuoxiang, Fang Chenwu, Xu Yusan, Zhang Tingshu, Sun Tienying, and Feng Zhanhai to join in. If successful, this could lead to a swift takeover of North China as they were advancing towards Peiping after taking the Great Wall. However, on May 7, Zhang Qingyao was assassinated, completely derailing their plans. With Zhang Qingyao dead, the agency concentrated their efforts instead to instigate riots in the Peiping-Tientsin region. They also began encouraging and propping up new political organizations that sought to form an independent northern regime. One scheme they were performing was to form a committee composed of Northern Warlords headed by Lu Zengyu, a banker who had studied in Japan. The idea was to form an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition to carve out north china. The agency received a significant amount of funds to make ends meet. Itagaki alone would spend over 50,000 yen to try and bring about an anti-Chiang regime in the north. Some sources indicated over 3 billion yen being allocated to the IJA to be dished out to various Chinese warlords and elites in the form of bribes.  Meanwhile operations in the district east of the Luan River saw attacks formed against the Xumenzhai and Lengkou gateways. On April 1st, the Kwantung Army issued Order 491, seeing the Iwata detachment of the IJA 6th Division storm through the Xumenzhai gate and succeed in securing a supply route behind the great wall to help with the assaults against the other gateways in the region. By April 10th, the IJA 6th Division was making steady progress against the Lengkou gate. The next day they stormed through and captured Qienqangying, pursuing the retreating Chinese to the banks of the Luan River. Meanwhile the IJA 8th Division were facing a much more difficult situation. On the 12th, they captured Xifengkou, but their assault against Quehlingkou was going nowhere. After repeated assaults, the Chinese finally retreated, allowing the Japanese to focus on Taitouying. Thus from the 10th to the 23rd the gateways in northeastern Hubei were all falling into Japanese hands. The Kawahara Brigade was well on its way towards Nantienmen. The Operations within the Great Wall area had been fully authorized by Generals Nishi and Sakamoto. However there still existed limits upon the operations. For example, Operations order 495 issued by General Muto given on the 11th stated "Without specific orders, pursuit by the main force of ground troops is to be limited to the line connecting Hotung, Chiench'angying, and T'ait'ouying; but air units are to be limited to the Luan River."  Meanwhile the Special Service Agency in Tientsin had reported that Zhang Qingyao would stage a coup on the 21st and this prompted Song Queyuans troops to prevent the Central Army forces from fleeing towards Peiping. The Agency requested that the Kwantung Army not return to the Great Wall and instead perform a feint attack towards Peiping and Tientsin to scare the Chinese. As the plot was reaching its climax, on the 18th the Kwantung Army chief of staff, General Koiso Kuniaki issued a order for the 8th Division to strike in full force against the Gubeikou area. The Kwantung Army's plan was to bomb Miyun while launching their feint attack in combination with an all out effort to break Gubeikou. However on the night of the 18th, all of these plans changed dramatically. Suddenly General Muto issued Operations Order 498, hastily ordering all forces to withdraw to the Great Wall. Emperor Hirohito had decided to put his foot down. In Tokyo the emperor asked the vice chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Mazaki Jinzaburö, "Has the Kwantung Army withdrawn from the Luan River line?" The vice chief retired from the imperial presence with a sense of guilt and wrote a confidential letter to the commander of the Kwantung Army. It was personally carried by Infantry Captain Katö [Michio] of the General Staff, who on April 19 arrived at the capital [of Manchukuo] bearing an imperial rescript. The vice chief also cabled to the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army a highly confidential dispatch, the main point of which stated, "Withdraw your troops immediately, or an imperial command will be issued." Thereupon the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army directed staff officer Endò Saburò to draft the withdrawal order. Thus as a result, the Kwantung Army began a withdrawal on the 21st, the same day the Peiping coup was to be unleashed. Those around Emperor Hirohito at this time have gone on the record to state it seemed to them, the emperor had hesitated heavily on issuing the withdrawal order. His motivations for giving the order are simply, the Kwantung Army had gone against his decrees, it was an identical situation to what had happened at Mukden in 1931. The Kwantung Army had no choice but to submit to what essentially was him “asking them to stop”. With that, operations east of the Luan River were over, for now. The order was certainly a critical blow to the Agency in Tientsin. How did they react? They doubled down on the coup effort. Likewise Koiso did not stop the 8th Division operation at Gubeikou. Instead the 8th Division was given orders "to maintain a menacing attitude toward hostile forces in North China." In accordance, the 3800 man Kawahara Brigade on direct orders from General Nishi, launched an attack against two Central Army Divisions numbered nearly 30,000 men stationed at Nantienmen. After a brutal week of battle the Kawahara Brigade seized the town. Meanwhile a battalion of 280 men led by Colonel Shimmura Eijiro attacked a central army force around 4000 strong at Xinglong. They suffered a 38% rate of casualties by the night of the 27th. The Battalion was nearly annihilated when suddenly the Chinese withdrew enabling the Japanese to slip by. Meanwhile the Piping coup did not materialize as planned on the 21st. Instead a secondary coup was initiated by Zhang Zuoxiang on the 26, but this misfired greatly. Reports began to emerge that troops led by Zhang Tingxu, Sun Tienying, Feng Zhanhai and Xu Yusan were willing to rebel in response to the failed coup attempts, but this proved completely false. A report issued on the 30th stated troops under Fang Chenwu were rebelling against Chiang Kai-Shek. However in reality Fang Chenwu only advanced his force north on May 10th and it was to join the anti-Japanese forces.  From mid April to mid May, the United States, Britain, France and Germany finally entered the fray in North China. It was an extremely chaotic situation for everyone. The Japanese military in Tokyo had no control nor idea what the Kwantung Army was doing, so when they tried to explain their actions to the international community, they continuously were walking over rakes. All the talk from Tokyo seemed incomprehensible to the other great powers. The Chinese were clamouring the entire time for a ceasefire agreement, but lacked the means to force the Japanese to do so. Japan had left the League of Nations, thus was extremely isolated and insecure in regards to foreign relations. Thus if a nation like Britain or the US had actually put their foot down, the Japanese more than likely would have backed off. Another element to this debacle was the stance of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who had made it adamantly clear they had zero intention of fighting off the British or Americans because of their unruly siblings within the Army. However, both Britain and America were too preoccupied with internal strife, mostly the result of the Great Depression, to devote considerable effort to the crisis in China. The League of Nations remained completely useless during the North China incident, similarly to how they were useless with the Manchurian incident. The Lytton Commission had performed an on the spot inquiry, and it did play a role in establishing a ceasefire by the time of the Shanghai incident, but did nothing to really help China. China had begun appealing to the League when Shanhaiguan was attacked and this prompted the nations of the league to rapidly agree to the Lytton Commission report's recommendations. In turn this led Matsuoka Yosuke to walk out on the league. With Japan out of the League, Wellington Koo proposed harsh sanctions upon Japan in response to their invasion of Rehe province. Yet they did nothing. China would continuously make pleas, but it was to no avail.  Rather than rely upon the League, the Chinese began secret talks with Japanese officials aiming first for a ceasefire. Tang Erho, Lee Shuzheng and Wang Komin attempted talks, but failed. Then Chen Yi the political vice minister of military affairs, secretly spoke with Nemoto Hiroshi, an army attache at the Shanghai legation on April 27th. They established negotiations with Nemoto speaking on behalf of the Kwantung Army and Chen Yi on behalf of Ho Yingqin. The Chinese were clearly more eager than the Japanese for a ceasefire, but the Japanese no longer had a rationale to continue their operation. Regardless the Japanese took the victors stance and demanded the Chinese withdraw from the battlefield as a prerequisite to further Japanese advances. In the first meeting, Nemoto told Chen that the Kwantung Army had already withdrawn from the area east of the Luan River to give Ho Yingqin an opportunity to consider a ceasefire. He described the action as a friendly gesture and suggested the Chinese reciprocate it by withdrawing their troops. Chen countered this by claiming Ho Yingqin had shown his own sincerity at the battle of Nantienmen by ordering his troops to withdraw to a second line of defense, hoping this would allow the Japanese to pull away from Nantienmen. However by May 1st, the Japanese claimed they had captured and secured Nantienmen, so Nemoto informed Chen the Chinese forces north of the Great Wall should withdraw to a line connecting Miyun, Pinkou, Yutien and the Luan River. On May 2nd, the Chinese sent a reply to this, completely ignoring the line idea and instead referred to the recent battle at Xinglong and explained the local commander there was eager for a victory and refused to withdraw despite being asked twice to do so. The Chinese also notified Nemoto that a Political affairs council headed by Huang Fu was being established at Peiping, and it should be through that body that further negotiations were held. The Japanese welcomed this development. Just as it seemed the Shanghai talks were paving a way to a ceasefire, the leadership of the Kwantung Army abandoned their political maneuvers in favor of a settlement. On April 30th the Tientsin Special Service Agency insisted to their Japanese colleagues, the Chinese were just buying time and not sincere in their actions. That same day the Army General Staff and Foreign Ministry suddenly refused to initiate a ceasefire on the grounds the Chinese had agreed to an armistice only to save face. Lt Colonel Nagatsu Sahishige, the army attache at Peiping urged the 8th Division to rapidly strike southwards as far as Miyun to annihilate He Yingqin's planned counteroffensive. Such an action would immediately threaten the Peiping-Tientsin region. To push the envelope, the Japanese could toss a new Division into the mix and force further negotiations when the Chinese withdrew south of Miyun. Clearly the Japanese had their eyes set on Miyun now. As such General Nishi was secretly told to capture it without any direction from Tokyo HQ, nor from most of the Kwantung Army leadership. The Operations department of the Kwantung Army also independently elected to move troops east of the Luan River again. They argued "the enemy again advances east of the Luan River and persists in its defiant attitude. Therefore we must again deal them a crushing blow." The IJA 6th Division had been evacuated to the Great Wall back on April 23rd and along the way were closely pursued by Chinese forces. General Sakamoto sent a plan to the Kwantung Army headquarters "to again drive the enemy west of the Luan River,". A lot of chaos was reigning within the Japanese military because they were in echo chambers and not relaying information to another. When the Kwantung Army Operations department suddenly proposed a new advance east of the Luan River, on May 2nd a heated exchange took place between them and the Kwantung Army Intelligence Section: “INTELLIGENCE SECTION: The defiant attitude of the enemy is a matter of degree. While it is indisputable that some of their forces continue defiant, their main force is still stationed west of the Luan River. Therefore, a defiant attitude on the part of the enemy is not sufficient reason to deal them a crushing blow. The Kwantung Army withdrew from the Luan River line only ten days ago. As we understand it, the purpose was to comply with the imperial wish. If the army begins operations on a flimsy pretext at this time, inviting intervention by the central leadership, how can the honor of the commander in chief be maintained? What we should now attack are rather the enemy forces facing the 8th Division. For this, we should employ additional strength. By dealing a severe blow to the Chinese Central Army forces in this area, we can threaten Peiping and the operation should be all the more effective.  OPERATIONS SECTION: Due to the limitations of our supply capacity, we cannot use more than a certain level of forces against the enemy facing the 8th Division. Since the enemy east of the Luan River maintains a defiant attitude, they must be punished regardless of their strength.  INTELLIGENCE SECTION: Since the seizure of Nant'ienmen the 8th Division lacks the capability of pursuing the enemy. This is an unavoidable consequence of the small strength of its force from the outset of the operation. Isn't the First [Operations] Section uncertain that the enemy can be defeated even by the main force of the 8th Division, and doesn't it intend ultimately to deploy the 6th Division southward in concert with action by the 8th Division? If this is the case, it is understandable, and this section is not necessarily against it.   OPERATIONS SECTION: That is not what this section is considering.  INTELLIGENCE SECTION: In that case, there is no clear justification for launching the operation. The objective of the operation must be plainly spelled out to all concerned, from His Majesty at the top down to the lowest private. There must not be the slightest doubt about it.” After this conversation the Intelligence department debated amongst themselves before relaying another response at midnight, ultimately not approving it. The next day the Operations department sent a telegram to the negotiations team in Peiping: “1) Under present conditions, the Kwantung Army has no intention of accepting a cease-fire proposal for the time being, particularly because there are signs suggesting intervention by third countries in the matter.  2) Previously the Kwantung Army suggested the Miyun-Yiit'ienLuan River line as the retreat line for the Chinese army; but this did not mean it was to be their front line after a cease-fire. It rather indicated a line to which the Chinese army should immediately and voluntarily retreat as evidence of their sincerity. In other words, a cease-fire cannot be negotiated until they retreat to this line and abandon their provocative attitude, and until this is confirmed by the Kwantung Army. Their mere retreat to the indicated line, in today's circumstances, is not sufficient reason for us to respond to the cease-fire proposal. According to Peking telegram 483 [not identified], it appears that the intentions of our army have been somewhat misunderstood. Even if the Chinese retreat to the indicated line and display the sincerity of their intentions, we may possibly demand a retreat line farther south. We believe negotiations in this region should be handled by the central leadership in Tokyo rather than by the Kwantung Army. Act on this understanding.”   So after this message, the Intelligence department accused the Operations department of trying to find any excuse to renew the advance and sent a wire to Nemoto on April 29th "If the Chinese suddenly perceive their mistake, . . . we will not make war for the fun of it." However the Intelligence department was suddenly overruled by Colonel Kita who cabled the negotiators that the Operations department now had full approval from Kwantung Army vice chief of staff Okamura Yasuji. When General Muto received this notice he questioned "This draft order, states that the enemy has moved into the region east of the Luan River and is showing a provocative attitude. I did not receive such a report from the Second [Intelligence] Section before my departure from Hsinching. Does this mean there has been a subsequent change in the situation?" After being informed more so, Muto simply stated he wished to wait until the chief of staff could speak to him. Obviously Muto was getting wet feet and did not want to perform any actions not in accordance with Tokyo HQ, as Emperor Hirohito had put his foot down.  On May 3rd, General Koiso and Operations Department staff officer Endo Saburo spoke with Muto, indicating they had approval of Tokyo HQ general staff and even the Emperor. So Muto relented for a second advance and issued Order 503 on May 3rd to the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions. Now the Army General Staff were dragged into the Kwantung Army's debacle fully. So they drew up an emergency draft plan for measures in North China. To this aim:  “Through continuing pressure by the military might of the Kwantung Army, applied in concert with various political measures in North China, the Chinese forces in North China are to be compelled to make a substantia] surrender or to dissolve, thereby resulting in the withdrawal of the Chinese army along the China-Manchukuo border and in the establishment of peace in this area”.  Added to this the General Staff suggested a large counteroffensive be driven along the Great Wall and a formal truce agreement should be concluded once three conditions had been met: “(a) that Chinese forces had retreated voluntarily south and west of a line connecting Hsuanhua, Shunyi, Sanho, Yüt'ien, Luanchou, and Lot'ing; (b) that anti-Japanese activities had been controlled; and (c) that the preceding had been verified by the Japanese army”. Under immense pressure from the renewed Japanese advance, the Chinese government on May 3rd, had pushed for a new body to tackle the North China situation. That was the Peiping Political Affairs Council. It was composed of 22 members, headed by Huang Fu. Huang Fu was notably a pro-Japanese official, having been a graduate of the Tokyo Land Survey department training institute and had served early as a minister of foreign affairs. Since China had zero faith anymore in the League of Nations and believed if they failed to resolve the North China issue, this all might see a new civil war break out between Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei. Thus everyone felt the time for active resistance was over and they must place all their effort into negotiations. Chiang Kai-Shek placed a great amount of authority upon Huang Fu and trusted the man. Huang Fu began his new task by speaking with all the political and financial leaders from both sides of the conflict to see how a real ceasefire could be met through dealmaking.  Meanwhile on May 6th the IJA 6th Division unleashed a new offensive south of the Great Wall and were followed by the 8th Division on the 11th. General Muto at this time made public statements blaming the Chinese for the renewed hostilities, making it seem the Japanese had intended to stay within the Great Wall area. The 6th Division swept across the sector east of the Luan River and by the 11th the Chinese defensive line collapsed. On the 12th the 6th Division crossed the Luan River, pursuing Yu Xuechengs 51st Army. In turn this threatened He Yingqin's main force who were facing the 8th Division. In the previous battles, Yu Xuechengs men had performed quite poorly and now even under direct command of He Yingqin were proving themselves helpless against the 6th division. Additionally Itagaki's agency over in Tientsin were using radio facilities to dispatch false directives from Chinese high command, ordering the forces to retreat from the front battle line. Two to three Chinese divisions were neutralized by these fake radio messages and in turn the Chinese became very demoralized at their lines. The 8th division had driven into the Gubeikou area on the 11th and it took them only a day to dislodge the Chinese from their line near Xuxiachen. By the 13th Xuxiachen had fallen completely. On the 11th and 12th, Japanese aircraft began flying over Peiping, as a demonstration of the terror they could deliver to the city at any moment. These developments altogether were pushing the Chinese civilians to demand of their politicians and generals that they appease the Japanese. Huang Fu proposed to Nemoto on the 12th that all Chinese troops could be withdrawn from Miyun to a line extending from Shunyi to Yutien and Tangshan. This was an enormous concession and nearly mirrored the line the Japanese had demanded.  The Japanese however, rejected the concession. To make matters worse for the Chinese, He Yingqin had been notified of the large concession proposal in advance and expected the Japanese to take it. Thus he had refrained from operating in strength at Miyun and did not significantly defend the path towards Peiping. It was the belief of the Japanese commanders, if they performed a full-scale attack towards Peiping now, He Yingqin would have no choice but to withdraw towards Shunyi. With this in mind the Japanese made a proposal on the 14th:  “1) According to the reports of the Peiping military attaché, the 8th Division should be prepared to advance in a single sweep to the southern limit of Miyun, if it is deemed necessary. Preparations for this attack should be expedited.  2) In conjunction with the above, front-line aircraft should take actions implying that a major Japanese offensive is about to begin.  3) In Tokyo, it should be announced publicly, in liaison with the Foreign Ministry, that the security of Jehol province cannot be guaranteed as long as the Chinese army remains in Miyun. Furthermore, every so often Japanese aircraft should make demonstration flights over the Shunyi-T'ungchou area.” Confronted with this, the Chinese were pretty screwed. The Chinese negotiations team were frantically searching for any way to force a ceasefire. Then the secretary of the Shanghai legation, Suma Yakichiro showed up to Peiping, which the Chinese viewed as a golden opportunity. The Chinese complained to him that the Kwantung Army had resumed their offensive and that a political agency in Tientsin were trying to enact coups. Suma bluntly told them the Japanese actions were backed fully by Tokyo and despite the Chinese belief that this was false or that Japan was facing a major financial deficit, this was all untrue.  While the dialogue continued to go nowhere, the 6th division had pursued the Chinese forces to the vicinity of Fengjun. Muto believed this had gone to far so he issued orders on May 13th limiting operations to the area north of a line connecting Miyun, Pingkou, Fegjun and Yungping. Now the 6th and 8th divisions were to assemble around Xuxiachen and Zunhua. Two days later he issued this statement to the public "If the Chinese army immediately abandons its hitherto provocative attitude and withdraws some distance from the border, our army will quickly return to the line of the Great Wall and pursue its regular task of maintaining security in Manchukuo." Likewise Muto ordered the Tientsin group to inform the Chinese that the Kwantung Army would return to the Great Wall if the Chinese forces retreated to the Shunyi-Yutien-Tangshan line. Nemoto forwarded all of this to Chen Yi. On May 15th He Yingqin ordered the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to a line between Malanyu, Linnantsang and Pamencheng.  With what seemed a imminent ceasefire at hand, the Kwantung Army HQ ordered the 6th and 8th divisions to take up positions strategically favorable for the negotiations to finally begin in ernest. On the 17th a draft ceasefire plan was drawn up. It envisioned the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to the Shunyi-Yutien-Tangshan line and in return the Japanese would pull back to the Great Wall area. Huang Fu was on his way back to Peiping from Shanghai for probably the 10th time in two weeks, when the Japanese captured Fengjun and Zhunhua, routing the Chinese across the Qi Canal to the right bank of the Pai River. The 6th Division then advanced towards Yutien and Xumenchen as the 8th division stood around Xuxiachn. When the Chinese began retreating from Miyun on May 18th, the 8th division suddenly converged upon Miyun. Muto was of course delighted by their new advantageous position and even briefly began talking to his colleagues about the prospect of just marching upon Peiping. Instead he decided to sweep through Miyun, Pingku and the Qi Canal, going even further west than he had stated he would back on the 13th.  With these new orders in hand, the 6th Division quickly captured Qixien on the 19th and further pursued retreating Chinese forces to Sanho. The 8th Division entered Miyun and two days later began advancing to Huaijou. By the 23rd Huaijou had fallen as the 6th Division reached the Qi Canal. These advances threatened the Peiping-Tientsin region. Both Japanese divisions halted on the 25th as the ceasefire was issued. With that last strike Muto felt he had significantly increased their poker hand going forward. Meanwhile Itagaki's team at Tientsin were still trying to bring about a coup. In tandem with the 8th Divisions attack on Miyun, the agency tried to engineer a revolt by the militia troops led by Song Queyuan, Fang Chenwu, Sun Tienying, amongst others. The idea was for these forces to occupy Peiping while wrecking havoc upon the Chinese central army within th region. The agency had attempting recruiting Wu Peifu, but the old jade marshal was unwilling, so they turned to this former protege, the chairman of Hubei, Yu Xuecheng. However he also declined. Yu Xuecheng was also approached by Hu Hanmin, looking to form an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek campaign in cooperation with Han Fuqu and Feng Yuxiang. To this Yu Xuecheng declined as well. Itagaki kept searching for disgruntled warlords, and then turned to Li Qiashan and Xu Yusan. Xu Yusan was a former ally to Feng Yuxiang with a history of anti-Chiang Kai-Shek actions. If they got the backing of his personal army, roughly 10,000 men strong at Tangshan they could do some real damage. On May 16th Xu Yusan declared independence and took up the Manchukuo 5 color flag in direct opposition to the Kuomintang. He began issuing the slogan “Hubi for the people of Hubei” as his army marched west along the Peiping-Shanhaiguan railway. His force reached the vicinity of Tangu whereupon they had increased to 30,000 and rumors emerged they would occupy Tientsin. This began a mass panic. . . for literally a day. His army collapsed into nothing more than a rabble as now had the stomach to actually fight their fellow countrymen.  Despite this grand failure, the Tientsin group continued with other plots. At 8 pm on May 19th, a Peiping bound train from Tangu, carrying Chinese soldiers was bombed around Tientsin station. The Japanese love bombing trains as we all know. This resulted in small incidents involving Japanese and Chinese officials, giving precedent for 600 Japanese troops led by Lt General Nakamura Kotaro to reinforce Tientsin on May 23rd. There were a few other incidents were supposedly Chinese agents were tossing grenades at Japanese officials. One of these officials was Major Mori Takeshi of the Japanese Army General Staff who was working in Tientsin. However the grenade thrown at him was a dud, and before the Japanese could seize it, some local Chinese grabbed it, finding a stamp on it bearing “Tokyo Artillery Arsenal”, oops.  These numerous incidents influenced the Chinese who feared Japan was trying to force an invasion into North China. To these rumors, He Yingqin insisted they mount a proper defense of Peiping, but many were arguing they had to further retreat. Meanwhile the Tientsin agency was told to stop performing incidents and instead secure northern warlords to their future cause. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for the Great Wall of China was coming to a bitter end for the Chinese forces. The Japanese were using every deceptive measure to edge further and further into China proper. It seemed clear to the Chinese, nothing would stop Japanese encroachment upon their nation, while the rest of the world simply watched on doing nothing. 

PREVIEW: Colleague Steve Yates of Heritage reports on the bullying and harassing worldwide by Beijing against activists opposing the Xi regime. More later. 1890 PEKING

#PRC EMPTY BUILDINGS AND DEFLATION. ANNE STEVENSON-YANG, AUTHOR "WILD RIDE." 1890 PEKING