Podcasts about Shashi

Akshayakalpa is known as India's first certified organic dairy enterprise. But in this conversation, Shashi Kumar makes it clear that the deeper story has always been farming.In this episode of the Prime Venture Partners Podcast, Jerome Manuel speaks with Shashi Kumar, Founder & CEO of Akshayakalpa, about building at the farm level for 16 years, far away from the usual startup playbook of fast growth, quick scale and easy metrics.Akshayakalpa began with dairy because farmers needed reliable cash flow. Once that started working, the model expanded into animal care, soil management, manure-making, beekeeping, backyard poultry and diversified farms.Today, Akshayakalpa is a profitable ₹60-crore-a-month business working with 2,800 farmers, including 1,200 women farmers. Last financial year, the average monthly payout to each farming family was ₹1.28 lakh.The conversation explores:• Why Akshayakalpa raised no institutional money for 9 years• Why Shashi refused to sell investors a hypergrowth story• How Nithin Kamath invested ₹5 crore in 5 days during the pandemic• Why 27 people took equity in the company when it was struggling• Why each cluster takes nearly 7 years to build• How 2,800 farmers produce what would conventionally need nearly 100,000 farmers• Why 45,000 customers visited Akshayakalpa farms• Why premium pricing is a value play• What founders can learn from building with patience and truthFor founders building in India, this episode is a reminder that every great company does not have to be built by chasing the fastest story.Some are built by saying the harder thing early, and still finding the right people to believe in it.Episode Timestamps00:00 - Introduction00:38 - What Akshayakalpa is really building02:06 - Why young people are moving away from farming10:17 - Making farming economically viable again15:37 - Scaling through role models, clusters and culture32:16 - Why Akshayakalpa started with dairy39:13 - The first 9 years: struggle, frugality and survival46:02 - Building customer trust through farm visits48:09 - Why premium pricing is a value play51:08 - Organic food and the challenge of fundraising in farming1:15:42 - Investor expectations, Nithin Kamath and long-term capital1:18:10 - What still keeps Shashi up at nightSubscribe to the Prime Venture Partners Podcast for more conversations with founders building enduring companies in India.#AgriCapital #FarmEconomics #FoodSystems

Zendesk went private two weeks before ChatGPT launched, and the moment it came out, it was obvious that customer service would never be the same again. Shashi Upadhyay, head of product, engineering, and AI at Zendesk, joins Craig Smith to explain what the company has built since: a self-improving AI system that doesn't just resolve tickets but learns from every failure, studies what the human did to fix it, and gets measurably better over time. He calls it the resolution learning loop, and for Zendesk's best customers, it's already resolving 70 to 90% of incoming tickets autonomously, up from the 10 to 20% that chatbots managed just a few years ago. The conversation goes deep on the engineering decisions that actually matter: why hallucination is a feature, not a bug, and why the real challenge is knowing exactly when to switch from creative AI to deterministic code; why Zendesk acquired Forethought and what made their approach to going live in days rather than months so valuable; and why, despite all the momentum, Upadhyay estimates we are only about 5% through the adoption of AI in customer service. The bottleneck isn't the technology, it's the change management required to restructure how human and AI workforces operate together. His vision of the end state is striking: personal AI agents talking directly to enterprise AI agents, resolving 90% of issues instantly, while humans focus exclusively on the complex, high-value interactions that genuinely require them. Subscribe to Eye on A.I. for weekly conversations with the people building and deploying the future of AI.

Last time we spoke about the One Hundred Regiment Offensive. During Phase Three of the One Hundred Regiment Offensive, CCP forces in the Taihang/Jizhong area emphasized strongpoint attacks and transportation warfare. Rather than trying to defeat Japanese units head-on, they used tactics such as night raids and ambushes to disrupt Japanese supply routes and communications. The underlying goal was to make Japanese logistics unstable, weakening their ability to maintain control and conduct effective operations. After CCP successes, the Japanese responded with large-scale "mopping-up" operations beginning October 6. As the Eighth Route Army continued resisting, it adopted flexible methods to counter the Japanese sweeps, especially rapid repositioning and targeted ambushes. One notable action described involves an ambush of a Japanese convoy that caused substantial enemy losses, demonstrating how disrupting enemy mobility could blunt the effectiveness of larger Japanese operations. Overall, the situation remained fluid, with both sides continually adapting their tactics in an ongoing contest for control across occupied North China.   #205 The Hubei-Henan Campaign of 1940-1941 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. By 1940, the war had settled into a grueling stalemate, with Japanese troops occupying vast swathes of central China, including parts of Hubei, but facing persistent Chinese guerrilla and conventional resistance that prevented total consolidation. In the aftermath of the Battle of Zaoyang in the summer of 1940, Japanese forces had secured the key cities of Yichang and Shashi along the middle reaches of the Yangtze River. Yet Chinese Nationalist troops of the Fifth War Area retained firm control over the vital territories east and west of the Xiang River. Their defensive lines formed a broad arc stretching from the southwest of Yuan'an through Jingmen, north of Zhongxiang, and the rugged foothills of the Dahong Mountains, extending northwest to Suixian. These positions straddled both banks of the Xiang River, anchored on the right by the Wudang Mountains and on the left by the Tongbai range. Working in close coordination with guerrilla detachments operating in the southeast, Chinese units repeatedly harassed the Japanese garrisons that had pushed into Yichang. The constant pressure on the enemy's flanks left the Japanese forces in Yichang and Shashi dangerously exposed and hemmed in, unable to expand or consolidate their gains. To the Japanese high command, this situation had become an intolerable thorn that demanded immediate removal.   Under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Nationalist government faced severe strains as the war with Japan escalated. Its problems were not only military, but also political and economic. Deep ideological and territorial rivalries with the CCP meant that efforts to present a single front were constantly undermined. Although the two sides officially formed a United Front in 1937, earlier violence and competition, such as the 1927 Shanghai Massacre and the CCP's Long March of 1934 – 1935 had left distrust and strategic differences in place. As a result, Nationalist resistance was harder to coordinate than it would have been under full unity. Meanwhile, the CCP strengthened its position in northern China by expanding rural strongholds. Through land reforms and the use of guerrilla warfare, the communists were able to win local support and apply pressure to Japanese forces in ways that often did not require large, conventional armies. This strategy also drew influence and manpower away from the Nationalists' more traditional, state-centered military structure.   Economically, the Nationalists were squeezed from multiple directions. The loss of China's coastal industrial regions to Japanese occupation forced the government to rely heavily on the interior, with Chongqing becoming a key base. That geographic shift left the administration more vulnerable to shortages of critical supplies, especially raw materials, fuel, and modern weapons. On top of wartime disruption, the global Great Depression intensified fiscal and logistical difficulties, limiting how quickly and effectively the Nationalists could mobilize resources for large-scale operations. By late November 1940, these weaknesses intersected with renewed Japanese pressure. Japanese commanders were also concerned about the possibility of a major Nationalist push, particularly fears of a counteroffensive by the Thirty-first Army Group under General Tang Enbo.    Determined to break the stalemate, the Japanese launched a major offensive in late November 1940. Preparations had begun in earnest early that month. Engineers repaired and expanded highways and bridges, constructed new defensive works and airfields, and stockpiled vast quantities of rations, ammunition, steel-hulled boats, and rubber rafts in the Zhongxiang area. Five regiments were concentrated near Zhongxiang, while additional troops east and west of the Xiang River brought the total strength to more than three divisions. Along the Suixian–Xiangyang Highway, Japanese forces were reinforced to divisional strength, supported by increased artillery and tank detachments. These meticulous measures left no doubt that the enemy was ready for a large-scale operation.   By 23 November the Japanese had completed their deployments and moved into assault positions. The Japanese forces assigned to the Central Hubei Operation were placed under the overall command of Lieutenant General Waichirō Sonobe, who directed the campaign from his headquarters in Wuhan. Sonobe's 11th Army drew on a broad mix of formations, combining units from the 3rd, 4th, 15th, 17th, 39th, and 40th Divisions. The offensive backbone for the thrust into central Hubei province was reinforced by the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, which helped supply the infantry strength needed for sustained fighting across difficult ground. In practice, this multi-division structure reflected the 11th Army's key mission in the region, acting as the main Japanese formation after the earlier Battle of Zaoyang and it emphasized coordinated divisional advances supported by attached brigades and specialized elements, including limited armored capabilities.   In terms of manpower, the Japanese force is commonly estimated at roughly 40,000 to 50,000 troops. This strength included several infantry regiments and artillery batteries, along with only limited armored elements rather than a fully armored formation. Because the operation depended on finding and exploiting opportunities quickly, it was supported by aerial reconnaissance and bombing carried out by the 3rd Air Brigade operating in central China. Infantry units formed the majority of the fighting power, while artillery was used to provide suppressive fire during advances. Air support, meanwhile, was intended to help identify and target Chinese positions—particularly along important riverine and rail corridors, where disruptions could slow resistance and complicate Chinese reinforcement or retreat.   To manage the operation across varied terrain and combat tasks, Sonobe's command used smaller combined formation often described as task forces, that could operate with some flexibility. Among them were the Kayashima Force, commanded by Major General Koichi Kayashima of the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, consisting of the entire brigade reinforced by elements of the 40th Division. The Muragami Force, under Lieutenant General Keisaku Muragami, commander of the 39th Division, which included the full division plus supporting non-infantry units. The Hirabayashi Force, led by Lieutenant General Morito Hirabayashi of the 17th Division, formed from detachments of the 17th and 15th Divisions.The Kitana Force, commanded by Lieutenant General Kenzo Kitana of the 4th Division, incorporating portions of the 4th Division and the Kususe Armored Force. These four groups were deployed in parallel around Tangyang, Jingmen, Zhongxiang, and north of Jingshan. The Hanjima Force, commanded by Lieutenant General Fusataro Hanjima of the 3rd Division, positioned near Suixian along the Xiangyang–Hua Highway. This task-force approach helped tailor combat power to specific mission profiles—such as flanking movements, raids, or pressure on Chinese defensive lines—while keeping the overall campaign plan under a unified command.   Equipment choices also reflected the tactical environment of Hubei. The Japanese units made use of Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks for reconnaissance and for anti-infantry roles, typically best suited to the reconnaissance, pursuit, and screening functions that were available even with constrained armor numbers. For fire support, the force relied on conventional artillery, including 75mm Type 90 guns for field engagements and 105mm howitzers for heavier bombardment where stronger explosive impact was needed. Together, these assets were intended to allow Japanese formations to maneuver around Chinese positions and apply pressure in rugged landscapes where rivers, roads, and rail lines often determined the rhythm of battle.   Logistics were a decisive factor in whether the operation could sustain momentum. Sonobe's army depended heavily on existing transportation infrastructure, particularly rail lines radiating from the Wuhan hub toward forward areas such as Suizhou and Zaoyang. These routes were critical for moving ammunition, replacements, and other supplies closer to the front as the Japanese advanced. The campaign also used river transport along the Yangtze River, including motorized barges and steamers, to deliver supplies to units operating near waterways. However, reliance on these corridors came with risks: Chinese interdiction raids could disrupt shipments, forcing convoys to be escorted and increasing the time and resources required to keep the forward units supplied. Overall, this dependence on both rail and fluvial networks highlighted a central operational challenge, maintaining secure access to transportation arteries in contested territory so that the Japanese could keep fighting effectively rather than stalling as supplies dwindled.   The Central Hubei Operation was driven by an intelligence assessment that Chinese troop movements were signaling preparations for a Nationalist counteroffensive. Acting on that interpretation, the Japanese began tightening plans and positioning forces early in the final days of November 1940. On 23 November 1940, the Japanese 11th Army under Lieutenant General Waichirō Sonobe began organizing for the offensive in central Hubei. In order to conduct a coordinated advance across the Han River, the army arranged its forces into five groups, each tasked with moving in a way that supported the broader pincer-style pressure on Chinese positions. The approach also reflected lessons drawn from the earlier Zaoyang–Yichang campaign earlier in 1940, when Japanese divisions had been able to cross the Han River at multiple points, such as Dangyang, Jiukouzhen, and Shayangzhen—to help secure access toward Yichang and the Yangtze route. Logistics were built around infrastructure the Japanese had already established during prior operations. The Hankou hub supported the 11th Army through arrangements that included munitions storage, medical facilities, and transport coordination. Supplies and reinforcements were moved using truck convoys and river crossings, while forward depots—such as those at Shayangzhen northwest of Hankou—provided additional capacity, including freight handling and field hospitals. Because the area was not secure, these supply points were also guarded against threats from guerrilla activity, which could disrupt communications and threaten personnel and equipment.   Operationally, the offensive used limited artillery and air support, reflecting Japanese constraints and directives aimed at keeping the campaign short and avoiding commitments that could stretch units beyond their logistical reach. Instead of trying to grind down Chinese defenses through prolonged bombardment, the plan prioritized speed, reconnaissance, and focused disruption. Japanese intelligence preparation relied heavily on aerial reconnaissance over the Han River valley to locate Chinese positions and infer where resistance would likely concentrate. That information enabled Japanese units to coordinate select maneuvers, including converging pressure from different directions. Where river transport mattered, coordination with naval or riverine elements supported movement and resupply, with overall oversight connected to the China Expeditionary Army.   Anticipating the coming assault, the Chinese Fifth War Area headquarters acted swiftly on instructions from the National Military Council. Orders were issued to the River West Army Group (30th and 77th Corps), the Right Army Group (44th and 67th Corps), and the Central Army Group (41st and 45th Corps) to employ a flexible defensive strategy: hold key positions firmly while committing the main strength to strike the enemy's outer flanks at the decisive moment. The 59th Corps was directed to advance toward the Xiangfan area, ready to reinforce operations on either bank of the river as the situation developed.   As commander of the Fifth War Area, Li Zongren arranged the defense to meet a likely Japanese thrust along the Han River, particularly in the approaches to Wuhan and Yichang, following the wider stalemate that settled in after the 1938 fall of Wuhan. The Fifth War Area could draw on roughly 300,000 troops, though many units were understrength, and the overall readiness varied by locality. Among the formations Li Zongren placed in the most sensitive sectors was the 31st Army Group under General Tang Enbo, which Japanese planners had identified as a potential threat to Japanese intentions in the region. In keeping with the terrain and the limits on manpower, Li's defensive design relied heavily on natural barriers—most importantly the Han River itself—and on the defensibility of rugged ground. Forces were arrayed to hold or contest riverbank positions, supported by fortifications, trenches, and smaller auxiliary elements. Divisions such as the 44th were positioned with an eye toward slowing an enemy crossing and forcing the Japanese to fight for difficult approaches rather than moving rapidly. At the same time, irregular forces and prepared defensive works were used to complicate Japanese reconnaissance and to make it harder for the attacker to coordinate a clean operational flow. Strategically, Li Zongren leaned on elastic defense rather than attempting to win decisive battles at fixed lines. Regular units were supported by guerrilla-style harassment intended to strike Japanese vulnerabilities, especially supply and transportation, between forward bases and the front. Local operations, including actions coming from areas such as Xinyang, were designed to disrupt Japanese logistics in periods when the Nationalists were still managing shortages of ammunition and medical supplies. Militias in the inter-mountainous regions further reinforced this approach: instead of seeking costly frontal engagements, they concentrated on disruption, delaying movements, and making Japanese operations slower and more expensive.   At dawn on 25 November the Japanese offensive began, with columns advancing along multiple axes. On the western Xiangyang front, more than 1,000 troops from Tangyang and over 3,000 from Jingmen struck Hengdian and Yanzhimiao, shattering the positions of the Chinese 30th Corps. Simultaneously, a column moving from Zhujiafu toward Tunglinling split into several detachments and drove deep northward into Liangshuijing, Xiajiazi, and Kuaihuopu. By nightfall the River West Army Group had regrouped along the line from Hengdian through Yanzhimiao to Kuaihuopu. On 26 November the Japanese reached Xianzhu. The following day they assaulted Liuhouji and Lijiatang in a day-long battle that ended in stalemate. At dusk the 30th Corps launched a powerful counterattack; the 27th and 31st Divisions dispatched raiding parties into the enemy's rear. Unable to withstand the pressure, the Japanese fell back toward Jingmen and Zhongxiang, pursued by Chinese forces that inflicted heavy losses.   Along the Jingmen–Zhongxiang Highway the Japanese massed more than 3,000 troops to attack Changshoutian and Wangjiatian, encircling Changjiachi and Shahetian. The Chinese 149th Division withdrew in good order to the stronger Wangjiahe–Wulongguan line. On 26 November enemy strength grew to 4,000–5,000. One column advanced on Sanligang while the main body assaulted Peizhai, Wangjiahe, and Yunanmen. Fighting continued until dark without decisive result. On 27 November the main force of the 44th Corps counterattacked from Wangjiahe, converging with the 67th Corps advancing from the northwest. The coordinated assault inflicted severe casualties, yet the Japanese continued to fight stubbornly. On the Suixian front, more than 2,000 Japanese troops reached Liangshuikou on the morning of 25 November and launched a violent attack against the 123rd Division at Lishan. Two additional columns, each exceeding 1,000 men, pushed westward toward Hoyuantian and Qingmingpu; their numbers swelled steadily as darkness fell. On 26 November fierce combat raged against the 124th and 127th Divisions at Jinjishan and Qingmingpu. A separate force of 700–800 men advanced from Xihe via Langhetian to Tangjiafan. After clashing with the 41st Corps, the Japanese near Qingmingpu linked up with those at Jinjishan and moved toward Hoyuantian on 27 November. That night the detachment at Tangjiafan reached the vicinity of Huantan Zhen, confronting the 125th Division. Recognizing that the enemy had become dangerously dispersed, the War Area Command ordered its units to hold critical localities while the main forces exploited the mountainous terrain for ambushes. The tactic proved effective. Heavy fighting continued until 28 November, when the Japanese, unable to achieve their objectives, began a general withdrawal. Chinese forces west of Xiangyang immediately took up the pursuit. The enemy opposing the Right Army Group was routed and retreated along several routes. In the Suixian sector, Japanese units at Hoyuantian and Huantan Zhen were caught in converging attacks by the Central Army Group, driven back to high ground, and encircled. In a desperate attempt to relieve the trapped forces, the Japanese rushed 1,500–1,600 infantry and cavalry troops from Suixian and Yingshan through Shangshitian and Shatian in a flanking maneuver—only to be ambushed once more. Covered by aircraft and armor, the enemy withdrew toward Suixian and Xihe as Chinese troops pressed forward along the line from Chunchuan to Anchu, Lishan, and Gaocheng. By 30 November all Chinese Army Groups had restored their original positions.   The Central Hubei Operation produced uneven battlefield outcomes, particularly in reported casualties. Japanese accounts describe relatively limited losses, just 132 killed and 445 wounded attributed to advantages in air superiority, artillery, and armored support, even though the advance was complicated by difficult terrain. At the same time, Japanese forces faced persistent Chinese counterattacks along the Han River, which contributed to localized pressure and eventual withdrawal. The Japanese reported 6,439 Chinese killed  and 474 captured, but the evidence base is uncertain and the language of reporting suggests possible exaggeration or propaganda. Conversely, Chinese-era estimates reportedly placed Japanese losses at roughly 5,000 killed and 7,000–8,000 wounded, illustrating a substantial gap between competing narratives. Some alternate reconstructions suggest total Chinese casualties in the range of 20,000–30,000, depending on whether wounded and missing personnel are included. However, because wartime reporting was fragmented and inconsistent, there is no fully verifiable casualty ledger for all units involved.   Despite these tolls, the operation did not appear to achieve a decisive Chinese destruction of Japan's intended target force. The Chinese Fifth War Area, including elements associated with the 31st Army Group under Tang Enbo, suffered attrition but generally avoided annihilation. No major command-level losses are indicated in the surviving accounts, and unit formations were not described as collapsing permanently. On the material side, Japan reportedly seized rifles and supplies from positions that Chinese forces had encircled or abandoned in the short term, but overall equipment losses for either side were described as limited, consistent with the operation's restricted intensity.    Strategically, the operation offered Japan short-term tactical advantages—notably through localized envelopments and the temporary pressure of combined-arms support—but it failed to translate these gains into a sustained strategic result. The fighting also strained Japanese logistics in central China, especially given that the offensive was not followed by major reinforcements. At the same time, it exposed continuing vulnerabilities in rugged terrain where Chinese guerrilla activity and organized counteraction could offset superior firepower.   Ultimately, the Central Hubei Operation produced no net territorial gains. By the end of the week, Japanese troops had returned to positions that did not fundamentally alter control in central Hubei. Local clashes may have disturbed formations and disrupted movement temporarily, but the campaign did not create durable forward bases, did not change administrative control meaningfully, and did not permanently disrupt key supply corridors. The territorial status quo largely persisted: Chinese Fifth War Area forces maintained positions north of the Yangtze River, and there was no widespread abandonment of strongholds sufficient to indicate a strategic collapse.   In the months following the Japanese repulse in central Hubei in November 1940, enemy forces remained largely immobilized across the Jing-Xiang plains, their earlier ambitions checked by determined Chinese resistance. Seeking to regain momentum and draw Chinese strength away from other theaters, the Japanese high command prepared a massive offensive into southern Henan in late January 1941. By the end of the month they had concentrated an imposing array of seven infantry divisions, one independent cavalry brigade, three independent armored regiments, and one independent artillery regiment. In all, more than 150,000 infantrymen, over 8,000 cavalry, 550 artillery pieces, 300 tanks, and 200 armored cars stood ready. Over a hundred aircraft were massed at forward bases in Anyang, Xinxiang, Huaiyang, and Xinyang. From early January onward, ammunition and equipment had been laboriously shipped up the Yangtze and moved inland to Xinyang, while Japanese reconnaissance planes repeatedly overflew Chinese rear areas. Additional troops were concentrated in southern Henan itself.   On 20 January, as a preliminary move to pin down Chinese forces and facilitate the main effort in central Henan, the Japanese 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, together with elements of the 39th and 4th Divisions, launched a limited attack against the Chinese 29th and 33rd Army Groups. The principal assault, however, began on 24 January under the overall command of Lieutenant General Katsuichiro Enbu. The Japanese organized their southern Henan forces into three powerful columns: The Left Flank Force, built around the entire 3rd Division reinforced by the 8th Regiment of the 4th Division and the Mizuno Armored Unit, commanded by Lieutenant General Fusataro Hanjima of the 3rd Division. The Central Force, centered on the 17th Division (less one regiment) and strengthened by the 67th Regiment of the 15th Division and the Yoshimatsu Armored Unit, commanded by Lieutenant General Amaya of the 40th Division. The Right Flank Force, formed around the main body of the 40th Division, also under Lieutenant General Amaya.   In support of this main thrust, Japanese forces in northern Anhui and eastern Henan—principally the 4th Cavalry Brigade with the Hirabayashi Tank Regiment—advanced westward from Haozhou toward Woyang. The Ouda Regiment of the 21st Division pushed west from Suzhou, while the Uguchi and Kobayashi Regiments of the 35th Division, accompanied by engineer, cavalry, artillery, and tank units, moved from Kaifeng, Tongxu, and Zhuxian Zhen along the north bank of the Yellow River and through the flooded areas toward Zhengzhou. These supporting columns were intended to tie down Chinese reserves and prevent reinforcement of the southern front.   The National Military Council in Chongqing correctly assessed the enemy's intention: to drive north along the Beiping-Hankou Railway with their main strength, force a decisive battle against the Chinese field armies, and rely on the northern Anhui–eastern Henan forces to strike westward in coordination. Accordingly, the Council instructed the Fifth War Area to avoid a costly frontal engagement. Instead, a small portion of its troops would offer delaying resistance along the railway, while the main force would maneuver to the enemy's flanks and rear, severing communications and launching devastating counterattacks. In compliance, the Fifth War Area left only a single division near Xiping on the Beiping-Hankou line. The bulk of its strength—carefully concealed in depth on both sides of the enemy's expected axis of advance—remained highly mobile, ready to strike the Japanese flanks or rear the moment the enemy divided his forces or pushed toward Runan, Yancheng, or Wuyang. This elastic strategy proved decisive.   At dawn on 25 January the Japanese southern Henan forces advanced in three columns. The Left Flank Force moved along the line from Xiaolindian to Gucheng and Chashan. The Central Force struck northward from the Minggang area. The Right Flank Force crossed the Huai River between Huaijiao Zhen and Chengyang under heavy air support. Japanese planes bombed Chinese positions relentlessly. True to plan, Chinese units employed only light screening forces to harass the enemy with ambushes and flank attacks, preserving their main strength for the decisive moment.   By 26 January the Japanese had reached the line from Piyang to Gaoyi, Xingtian, and Queshan. On the 27th they pressed on to Chunshui, Shahetian, and Zhumadian. At this point Chinese mobile forces sprang into action. The 13th Corps of the 31st Army Group swung northward toward Xiangheguan, while the main body of the 85th Corps moved toward Shangcai to begin an enveloping maneuver. The 68th Corps of the 11th Army Group struck the enemy rear south of Xiangheguan; the 55th Corps advanced from Tanghe to Piyang; and the 59th Corps of the 33rd Army Group pushed toward Nanyang. On 29 January the 13th Corps attacked the Japanese Left Flank Force near Jieguanting and Xiaoshidian south of Wuyang, while the 85th Corps struck the Right Flank Force around Runan, southeast of Shangcai. The enemy's Central Force, advancing along and west of the railway, found the Chinese positions already evacuated and failed to trap any major units. The Japanese columns on the extreme flanks suffered over 3,000 casualties and lost six tanks in the fighting around Jieguanting.   By 31 January the enemy, desperate to rescue his exposed flank columns, reordered his forces. The Central Force executed turning movements on both sides: elements of the 15th Division swung right from Suiping through Shangcai to converge with troops moving north from Runan against the 85th Corps, while the main body of the 17th Division split into two columns and advanced from Suiping through Xiping toward Wuyang. Simultaneously, the main force of the 3rd Division and part of the 4th Division also converged on Wuyang, hoping to link with the 17th Division and crush the 13th Corps near Jieguanting and Xiaoshidian. Before the trap could close, however, the Chinese 13th and 85th Corps withdrew in good order to the area north of Ye Xian, between Yancheng and Shangshui, and north of the Sha River. When the Japanese broke through at Wuyang and Shangcai they found no major Chinese forces to destroy.   Meanwhile, Chinese troops from western Henan, the 59th, 55th, and 68th Corps, advanced from Tanghe, Piyang, and points north to strike the enemy rear at Wuyang. On 29 January the 84th Corps and local guerrillas in western Anhui recaptured Chengyang and continued the pursuit. The Japanese, having failed to concentrate superior strength or control the battlefield, now found themselves isolated. Their rear communications were severed, and they were under constant pressure from the 68th, 55th, and 59th Corps. After days of exhausting combat the enemy began to withdraw southward on the night of 2 February. Leaving only rear guards at Wuyang and Baoanzhai to tie down the 13th Corps, the main body of the 3rd Division moved from Fangcheng toward Nanyang and Zhenping. The 13th Corps immediately counterattacked, recaptured Baoanzhai and Wuyang, and pursued the enemy toward Fangcheng.   On the night of 2 February, as the Japanese main force approached Nanyang, the 17th Division together with elements of the 15th and 4th Divisions had already pushed south from Wuyang via Xiangheguan toward Piyang, hoping to link with forces moving east from Nanyang and trap the Chinese 68th, 55th, and 29th Corps. Fierce resistance by the 68th Corps near Xiangheguan inflicted heavy losses and forced the enemy to abandon large quantities of supplies. Further south, the 29th Corps exacted still greater casualties around Piyang. On the night of 7 February the trapped Japanese column split: part retreated along the Tanghe–Piyang highway, while the main body withdrew along the Tongbo–Xinyang highway toward Xinyang, leaving many dead behind. The Chinese 85th Corps pursued southeastward, while elements of the 13th, 29th, 55th, and 59th Corps harried the enemy toward Xinyang. By the time the fighting ended, all Chinese units had regained their original positions.   In coordination with the southern Henan offensive, the Japanese forces in northern Anhui and eastern Henan advanced westward in four columns on the morning of 25 January. The Ouda Regiment of the 21st Division struck west from Suzhou. The 4th Cavalry Brigade, reinforced by the Hirabayashi Tank Regiment, split into three routes from Bozhou to attack Woyang, Shanheji, and Shuangqiao, clashing bitterly with a Chinese cavalry division near Shizihe and Niqiuji. The Uguchi Regiment of the 35th Division advanced through the flooded areas from Tongxu and Zhuxian Zhen, while the Kobayashi Regiment moved westward along the north bank of the Yellow River near Zhengzhou. Japanese aircraft intensified their bombing of Chinese cities and front-line positions, including Zhoujiakou, Zhengzhou, Yancheng, Ye Xian, Xiangcheng, Wuyang, and Luoyang. On 29 January one enemy column reached Santaiji and suffered heavy losses under Chinese attack. Threatened on the left by forces near Huaiyang, two Chinese corps withdrew temporarily to the line from Fuyang to Taihe and Jieshou. On 5 February the Japanese captured Taihe and Jieshou, but a Chinese counterattack on the morning of 6 February regained both towns, forcing the enemy to retreat northeastward.   The Battle of Southern Henan, which opened on 25 January and concluded on 10 February after seventeen days of continuous fighting, ended in a clear Chinese victory. Japanese casualties exceeded 9,000; when the enemy withdrew from Nanyang more than 300 military vehicles were left burning on the battlefield. Large quantities of arms, ammunition, and supplies fell into Chinese hands. Chinese losses were significantly lighter. The enemy had hoped to force a decisive battle along the railway and shatter the Chinese armies of the Fifth War Area. Instead, skillful Chinese maneuver, timely flank attacks, and relentless pressure on the enemy's rear and communications had turned the Japanese offensive into a costly failure. The victory not only preserved the integrity of the central Chinese front but also demonstrated once again the effectiveness of elastic defense and mobile counteroffensive tactics against a numerically superior but overextended foe.   In the wake of their costly repulse in central Hubei the previous November and the even more humiliating defeat in Southern Henan between late January and early February 1941, the Japanese sought once more to regain the initiative in the spring of 1941. Their target was western Hubei, where Chinese forces continued to deny them freedom of movement along the middle Yangtze. The entire Japanese 13th Division garrisoned the Yichang salient. Its regiments were deployed in a defensive arc: the 65th Regiment and the 19th Artillery Regiment held positions east of the city at Longchuanpu, Tumenya, and Yaqueling; the 104th Regiment guarded the northwest approaches; and the 17th Cavalry Regiment patrolled the Yangchalu–Baishanao sector. On the west bank of the Yangtze, the 58th Regiment had constructed strong bridgehead fortifications between Chaojialing and Shangwulongkou, ready to support any renewed thrust westward.   Facing this entrenched enemy was the Chinese 26th Corps, entrusted with the critical mission of river defense on the west bank of the Yangtze opposite Yichang. The corps commander had organized his forces into three sectors. The 41st Division held the right zone, anchoring its line from Mujiatian and Tanjiataizi northward to the vicinity of Fanjiah u. The 32nd Division defended the left zone, stretching from Mujiatian through Ceyang to Xiangzikou. The 44th Division remained in corps reserve near Caojiafan, poised to reinforce either flank or exploit opportunities for counterattack.   On 6 March 1941 the Japanese struck. Having quietly reinforced their forces west of Yichang to more than three regiments, supported by cavalry and artillery, they opened the assault at 5:30 a.m. with a violent artillery barrage, followed immediately by infantry advances under cover of air strikes. Chinese security positions at Tanjiataizi and Chaojiadian were overrun. The enemy then hurled itself against the main line at Changgangling. Simultaneously, 600 to 700 Japanese troops, backed by planes and guns, assaulted Fanjiah u. After hours of bitter fighting both localities fell. On the morning of 7 March, Japanese aircraft again spearheaded the attack, enabling the capture of positions at Qianjiatai and Wujiaba. The enemy pressed on toward Qianjiachong and Yutaishan but was thrown back. Meanwhile, the force that had taken Fanjiah u clashed fiercely with the Chinese 44th Division around Taipingqiao; although the division was eventually compelled to withdraw to the eastern end of the bridge under relentless air attack, it continued to resist stubbornly. When the enemy seized Hut zeye from the direction of Fanjiah u, the 32nd Division fell back in good order to the line from Tunziqiao to Tuyanzhong, where it beat off further assaults. By this stage the Japanese had driven themselves into a dangerously narrow salient, exposed on both flanks.   Seizing the moment, the River Defense Force reorganized its lines. The 103rd Division of the 8th Corps relieved the sector from Mujiatang through Yingzishan to Chaotianguan, while the 26th Corps consolidated new positions at Yutaishan, Pijiashan, Qingshuiba, Guangongling, and Xiaopingshanba. The plan was clear: hold the enemy east of this line, then launch a converging counterstroke to destroy the invaders and restore the original front. On 8 March two guerrilla columns from the 41st Division struck at Changgangling and Fanjiayuan, while another detachment hit the enemy east of Pifengjian. More than 2,000 Japanese troops assaulted the 44th Division's positions from Gaolingpo and Dajiaobian toward Wanghuzizhong; determined resistance by the 44th Division, supported by elements of the 41st, brought the attack to a standstill. Later that day the enemy managed to penetrate the 32nd Division's line at Tianwangshi, forcing Chinese troops to fight a delaying action along the outskirts of the Shibai Fortress from Mingjiachong to Heitangou.   Dawn on 9 March brought renewed Chinese initiative. The 103rd Division occupied the line from Tutiling to Shizinao and advanced in several columns against the enemy. A portion of the 44th Division waged a grim holding action on the high ground flanking Guojiaba, suffering heavy losses but buying time for the main body to launch a powerful flank attack against the Japanese at Taipingqiao and Xianglingkou. By dusk Chinese forces had captured the enemy strongpoints at Dujiaoba and Dajiaobian along the highway, annihilating numerous enemy troops. The 32nd Division threw its main strength against the area northwest of Dajiaobian; heavy fighting raged around Wanghuzizhong into the afternoon until enemy reinforcements were driven off. The 41st Division, meanwhile, executed effective flank attacks that yielded significant gains. On 10 March the 103rd Division recaptured the high ground at Xiawulongkou and north of Tianzipo, while guerrillas of the 41st Division continued to harass the enemy through every gap in his lines. When positions at Hongshipo and Lungtanping held by the 44th Division were breached, the division withdrew to the western heights of Bomuping and faced the enemy anew.   At dawn on 11 March, after suffering severe casualties, the Japanese resorted to smoke screens and began withdrawing eastward along several routes. Chinese pursuit forces swiftly retook Xianglingkou, Guojiaba, Guangongling, Tianwangshi, and Dajiaobian. By 12 March the enemy had fallen back to a defensive line running from east of Taipingqiao to Hu z'ai and Huangnikeng. On 13 March Chinese units launched general counterattacks. Unable to withstand the pressure, the Japanese retreated to their original positions. The eight-day engagement thus ended exactly where it had begun.   The battle had been fought with only a portion of the available Chinese forces, yet it proved decisive. The Japanese, who had hoped to crack the river defenses and resume their westward drive, instead suffered 4,000 to 5,000 casualties. The swift and skillful Chinese counteroffensive not only restored the front but left the enemy shaken and apprehensive. Their design to push deeper into western Hubei was decisively thwarted, buying precious time for the broader Chinese war effort in the Yangtze theater and demonstrating once again that determined defense, timely reinforcement, and aggressive counteraction could blunt even the most carefully prepared Japanese offensive. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In November 1940, a Central Hubei Operation using five task forces attempted to exploit Chinese dispersal but achieved no territorial gains despite local successes. A larger January 1941 offensive into southern Henan deployed 150,000+ troops but again failed strategically. Despite Japanese tactical advantages and superior firepower, logistical constraints and rugged terrain favored mobile Chinese resistance. Both campaigns ended with Japanese withdrawals and restored Chinese positions, demonstrating that determined defense and timely counteraction could blunt large-scale Japanese operations.

What if the future of AI is not one all-knowing assistant, but an entire workforce of specialized agents working together behind the scenes? Recorded st Zendesk Relate, this episode features a fascinating conversation with Shashi Upadhyay about where enterprise AI is really heading, and why many businesses are still underestimating the scale of operational change required to make agentic AI work. Shashi explains why Zendesk views AI agents as a new form of digital labor rather than simply another software feature. Instead of building one giant general-purpose assistant, Zendesk is developing coordinated networks of specialized agents designed for specific business functions such as billing, collections, refunds, returns, employee service, and industry-specific workflows across sectors like healthcare, banking, and e-commerce. We also go behind the curtain inside Zendesk itself. Shashi shares how the company has transformed internally from a traditional seat-based SaaS business into an organization focused on measurable outcomes such as automation rates, customer satisfaction, and successful resolutions. He also discusses how AI is changing software development itself, enabling smaller engineering teams to move dramatically faster while reshaping how products are designed and built. The conversation explores some of the biggest themes emerging across the AI industry right now, including outcome-based pricing, AI trust and guardrails, resolution learning loops, embedded AI, and the growing shift toward agent-to-agent interactions where personal AI assistants may eventually negotiate directly with enterprise AI systems on behalf of consumers. We also discuss the fears many people have around jobs and automation. Rather than predicting catastrophic job loss, Shashi argues there is still enormous unmet demand for better service experiences, and that AI may ultimately allow businesses to finally deliver the level of customer experience people have wanted for years. If you're trying to understand where enterprise AI moves next after copilots and chatbots, this conversation offers a clear and thought-provoking look at the systems, workflows, and cultural shifts already reshaping the future of work.

This is about How BJP Pulled Off The Biggest Political Comeback Of Our Generation! Behind the historic BJP victory wasn't just a charismatic leader — it was a small group of professionals who quietly built India's first real digital election machine. Shashi Shekhar Vempati was one of them. A decade later, he became the first non-bureaucrat CEO of Prasar Bharati, took on India's biggest media reform challenge, and is now one of the most important voices on India's AI future — co-founding AI4India and recently appointed Chairperson of the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC). This isn't a political conversation. It's a conversation about power — how it's won, how it's lost, and what it'll take for India to hold its own in the next decade. In this conversation with Roshan Cariappa on Bharatvaarta, Shashi takes us inside the digital war room that helped propel PM Modi to power in 2014 —We cover: - How a small group of techies helped BJP win 2014 - Why digital became the new battleground for elections - The dark side of social media — deepfakes, algorithms, influence operations - Why India has no BBC or Al-Jazeera equivalent - The "lost decade" inside Indian bureaucracy (2004-2014) - Why we don't have an Indian ChatGPT (yet) - AI for India: language, voice, sovereignty - The "lag and leap" theory of Indian tech - Modi as a leader — what makes him different - Advice for young Indians who want to contribute

Last time we spoke about the battle of West Suiyuan. The Ma Clique, Muslim warlords controlling Northwest China, led by Ma Hongkui and Ma Hongbin, rebuffed Japanese overtures to ally, citing historical grievances like the 1900 invasion. Driven by patriotism, they aligned with the Nationalists, reorganizing forces into the 17th Army Group. In 1938, Ma Hongbin commanded West Suiyuan defenses, building fortifications in harsh desert and mountain terrain, blending cavalry tactics with modern training despite equipment shortages. In January 1940, Japanese and puppet troops advanced from Baotou, occupying Wuyuan and Linhe. Chinese forces, including Fu Zuoyi's 35th Army and Ma's 81st Army, employed guerrilla and mobile warfare. A major counterattack in March recaptured Wuyuan, killing Lt. Gen. Mizukawa and thousands, forcing Japanese retreat. Through ambushes and night raids, the Chinese recovered territories, securing Soviet aid routes and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region. Over 2,000 Ningxia soldiers perished, their sacrifices underscoring peripheral fronts' role in national resistance.   #200 The battle of Yaoyi Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After capturing Wuhan, the Japanese army had already stretched itself dangerously thin. Most regular and Class A reserve divisions were committed to the front, yet they failed to annihilate the main Chinese force. Despite losing its core industrial and resource regions, the Nationalist government in Chongqing refused Japan's peace terms. Japan now found itself trapped in the very protracted war it had desperately sought to avoid. The logical Japanese response was to halt major advances, consolidate control over occupied areas, and conduct limited offensives to pressure Chiang Kai-shek into negotiations—essentially repeating the post-Nanjing strategy of late 1937. But the situation had deteriorated sharply: occupied territory had at least doubled, Japanese garrisons were inadequate, and strategic reserves were nearly exhausted. What might have been prudent a year earlier had become plainly unwise by late 1938.   To stabilize the front, Japan reorganized its China Expeditionary Army at the end of 1938. Large numbers of newly raised independent mixed brigades and lower-quality Class B reserve divisions were sent to relieve veteran regular and Class A divisions. The relieved units were either demobilized back to Japan or shifted north to reinforce the Kwantung Army against the Soviet threat.   By early 1940 Japan maintained roughly 24 divisions, 21 independent mixed brigades, and 2 cavalry brigades in China proper (excluding Manchuria), totaling nearly 800,000 ground troops. The enormous scale and expense strained the home economy severely. Even so, the vast occupied zones could not be effectively controlled: divisions often held only a single mobile battalion while dispersing the rest into scattered platoon- and squad-sized outposts. Guerrilla activity by both Nationalist and Communist forces not only persisted but intensified, occasionally clashing with each other in "friction" incidents.   Beyond mere occupation, Japan sought to wear down Chinese strength. With most elite Central Army units held in reserve in the southwest or around Wuhan, Japanese local offensives targeted the Fifth and Ninth War Zones, aiming to methodically destroy Chiang's best troops. Thus, while other Japanese armies focused on garrison relief and brigade substitution, the 11th Army—still holding Wuhan with seven divisions and three brigades—remained the main offensive instrument. In 1939 it captured Nanchang, then mounted major operations against the Fifth War Zone (Suizao Campaign) and Ninth War Zone (First Battle of Changsha). Except for the seizure of Nanchang, however, these offensives inflicted only limited and temporary damage on Chinese forces.   Japan's domestic economy was in even worse shape. In early 1937, it had approved a massive 2.4 billion yen naval and army rebuilding program aimed at countering the United States and Russia, but implementation had barely started when the Sino-Japanese War erupted. The conflict generated enormous war costs while military expansion continued unabated, rapidly draining the Bank of Japan's gold reserves. By the end of 1938, those reserves (valued at just 1.35 billion yen) had shrunk by more than two-thirds. To fund the Battle of Wuhan that year, Japan postponed key elements of the rebuilding plan. After Wuhan fell, the Army revised its wartime reorganization: the original target of forty divisions grew to fifty-five by early 1938, then to sixty-five divisions plus 164 Army Air Force squadrons by 1942. The funding required to equip and stockpile for this expansion escalated steadily; the 1939 expansion budget alone demanded 1.8 billion yen, pushing Japanese finances to the breaking point.   Japan repeatedly sought a way out of China, but its peace terms remained far beyond what Chongqing would accept, leaving negotiations stalled. Efforts to install puppet regimes in North and Central China—culminating in the Wang Jingwei government in 1940—aimed to "use Chinese to control Chinese" and undermine Nationalist influence, yet produced disappointing results.   The 11th Army's 1939 campaigns yielded only mediocre outcomes, hampered by chronic troop shortages. Even its divisions were tied down in occupation duties; mounting a serious offensive required pulling garrison forces, leaving no reserves to hold the line unless new units arrived. Sustained large-scale operations to seriously weaken Chinese strength demanded a major troop increase—otherwise, Japan was limited to shallow, localized attacks. Lt. Gen. Yasuji Okamura, commanding the 11th Army, recognized this clearly. In a December 1939 report, he argued that diplomacy and small offensives were futile and urged a large-scale operation backed by substantial reinforcements. His superiors, however, were preoccupied with funding the broader military buildup and could offer no extra men. The post-Wuhan "defensiveization" of operations was largely a cost-saving measure to support that expansion. Japanese ground strength in China, which peaked near 850,000 after Wuhan, had already dropped by about 50,000. Full-strength regular or Class A divisions numbered roughly 22,000 men (four regiments), while newer garrison divisions had only about 15,000 (three regiments), and independent mixed brigades just 6,000. Okamura's proposal was sensible but politically impossible; high command was even contemplating slashing China troop levels to 400,000.   The Chinese Winter Offensive of December 1939, together with counterattacks at Nanning and Kunlun Pass, inflicted serious losses and exposed the limited damage done to Chinese forces in 1939 operations. The recapture of Wuyuan in March 1940 signaled the start of a new phase. Shortly afterward, intensified Chinese guerrilla raids deep into Japanese rear areas prompted large Japanese "mop-up" operations in southern Shanxi, central Hubei, southern Jiangxi, and northern Hunan. In the Wuhan sector, repeated blows from the Winter Offensive heightened fears of Chinese forces in the Dahong and Tongbai Mountains, which threatened control over the vital Jianghan Plains rice-producing region. In mid-April 1940, the Japanese abandoned outposts at Macheng (eastern Hubei), Fengxin, and Jing'an (northern Jiangxi), withdrew elements of the 6th Division (northern Hunan), 40th Division (northern Jiangxi), and the 3rd, 13th, and 39th Divisions (Hubei), and concentrated them around Zhongxiang, Suixian, and Xinyang for a maximum-effort push.   These setbacks finally forced Tokyo to abandon deep troop reductions in China and approve reinforcements of two regular divisions for a major 1940 offensive. The revised end-1940 target became 740,000 troops in China. In spring 1940, the 11th Army—backed fully by Imperial General Headquarters and the China Expeditionary Army—began detailed preparations for a large-scale assault on China's Fifth War Zone.   On February 25, 1940, the 11th Army issued its "Guiding Strategy for the Campaign." The operational goal was to defeat the main force of China's Fifth War Zone along both banks of the Han River before the rainy season, inflict further heavy losses on Chiang Kai-shek's army through decisive victory, and thereby advance Japan's overall political and strategic position vis-à-vis China. The guiding principle called for the quickest possible preparations, with the offensive to begin around early May: first destroy Chinese forces on the left (east) bank south of the Baihe River, then completely annihilate the core units on the right (west) bank near Yichang. On April 7, under the new commander Lt. Gen. Sonobe Kazuo (who replaced Okamura Yasuji), the 11th Army produced a more detailed plan. On April 10, Imperial General Headquarters Order No. 426 ("Continental Order") authorized the China Expeditionary Army to conduct operations in central and southern China during May–June, even beyond established boundaries, to fulfill current objectives.   Japanese planners viewed the Fifth War Zone—roughly 50 divisions encircling Wuhan—with its main strength concentrated along the Han (Xiang) River in northwestern Hubei. Striking Yichang would deliver a severe blow to the zone. As the gateway to Sichuan, only 480 km from Chongqing, Yichang held immense strategic value: an inland port, Three Gorges logistics hub, and key base for air raids on Chongqing. Capturing it would directly threaten the Nationalist wartime capital and southwestern rear, advancing political leverage. Still, long-term occupation was not pre-decided; initial plans stressed inflicting maximum damage followed by withdrawal, in line with the post-Wuhan policy of avoiding permanent overextension. China, aware that holding the Jianghan Plain's rice-producing areas enabled sustained attrition against Japan, deployed guerrilla units to harass Japanese rear areas (increasing occupier losses) while tasking the River Defense Force to hold key front-line points: Jingmen, Shashi, and Yichang.   To achieve these aims, the 11th Army committed as much as possible of its seven divisions and four brigades (88 battalions total). Core units included the 3rd Division (Maj. Gen. Yamakoshi Masataka; regiments 6, 18, 34, 68), 13th Division (Maj. Gen. Tanaka Shioichi; 58, 65, 104, 116), 39th Division (Maj. Gen. Murakami Keisaku; 231–233), elements of the 40th Division, detachments from the 33rd and 34th Divisions, and others. Reinforcements comprised the Ikeda Detachment (three battalions from 6th Division), Ishimoto Detachment (four–five from 40th), Ogawa Detachment (two from 34th), and Provisional Mixed Brigade 101. Supporting assets included the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, 7th and 13th Tank Regiments, 3rd Air Group, Navy 1st China Dispatch Fleet, and 2nd Combined Air Team. The China Expeditionary Army transferred seven battalions from the 15th and 22nd Divisions (13th Army, lower Yangtze). The main effort north of the river involved roughly 48–54 battalions, or 80,000–110,000 men, making the Zaoyi (Zaoyang–Yichang) Campaign the largest Japanese operation on the central front since Wuhan. Sonobe's staff structured the offensive in two phases. Phase One targeted the Fifth War Zone's main force around Zaoyang (east of the Han River) through converging pincer movements: right flank from Xinyang (reinforced 3rd Division), left flank from Zhongxiang (reinforced 13th Division), and central thrust by the reinforced 39th Division from Suixian. The plan exploited terrain—Dahong and Tongbai Mountains—for encirclement. After seizing Minggang (right flank) and advancing from Zhongxiang (left), the pincers would close on Zaoyang, with the center (along the Xianghua Highway from Suixian) drawing Chinese forces into the trap for envelopment. Diversionary attacks south of the Yangtze, propaganda hinting at limited scope, and planted false orders helped mask intentions. Japanese radio intelligence—intercepts and direction-finding of Chinese headquarters signals—provided critical advantages, especially in later stages.   By March 1940, Chinese intelligence had already detected the 11th Army's intent to mount a major offensive from Xinyang and Wuhan into northwestern Hubei. On April 10, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Li Zongren and other Fifth War Zone commanders, urging immediate preparations for a preemptive strike against any push toward Shapingba and Yichang. He emphasized proactive flanking attacks on Japanese rear areas via Wusheng Pass and threats to the Pinghan Railway, while keeping main forces east of the Han River for decisive engagement once the enemy committed.   Following Military Commission directives, the Fifth War Zone devised a plan that used part of its strength for forward advances and deep raids into Japanese rear areas to harass and divert. The bulk of forces would hold the rear, seizing chances for preemptive strikes and a decisive battle east of Zaoyang or south of Jingmen–Dangyang. Deployments included: the 33rd Army Group garrisoning the Xiang River; in the center, the 45th Corps (22nd Army Group) west of Luoyangdian–Suixian and the 84th Corps (11th Army Group) north of Suixian–south of Gaocheng; in southern Henan, the 30th Corps east of Tongbai and the 68th Corps north of Pingchangguan–Minggang; the 41st Corps in reserve near Xiangyang; the 29th Army Group (with part garrisoning north of Tongqiao Zhen–Sanyangtien) concentrated in the Dahong Mountains; and the 31st Army Group positioned between Queshan and Ye Hsien as the mobile force to strike invaders. River Defense Army commander Guo Chan controlled the 26th, 75th, and 94th Armies, the 128th Division, and the 6th and 7th Guerrilla Columns. Total Chinese strength approximated 350,000–380,000 men across roughly 50–54 divisions. To mask preparations and mislead, the Japanese conducted a late-April "mop-up" near Jiujiang, staged naval feints on Poyang and Dongting Lakes, and bombed key points in Hunan and Jiangxi, simulating an imminent Ninth War Zone operation.   With forces assembled, the Japanese offensive began May 1, 1940, from Xinyang, Suixian, and Zhongxiang. The advance split into five routes: (1) Changtaiguan–Minggang–Biyang–Tanghe; (2) Xinyang–Tongbai; (3) Suixian–Zaoyang; (4) Suixian–Wujiadien; (5) Zhongxiang–Shuangkou. Employing flanking with central breakthrough, the reinforced 3rd Division (right flank, including Ishimoto Detachment from 40th Division with tanks and engineers) spearheaded from Xinyang toward Biyang, breaching the Chinese Second Army front on day one. By May 1, elements of the 3rd and 40th Divisions captured Minggang, Lion's Bridge, and Xiaolintien; on May 5 they took Biyang and Tongbai. The Chinese 31st Army Group (northeast of Biyang) linked with the 68th and 92nd Corps to hit Japanese flanks and rear. Leaving some forces west of Tongbai to press the enemy, the main 30th Corps struck Japanese flanks. After seizing Tanghe on May 7, the Japanese pushed south toward Zaoyang. On May 8–9, the 31st Army Group retook Tanghe and Xinye, pursuing vigorously. On May 8, the Japanese left flank (13th Division) attacked from Zhongxiang, breaking through the 33rd Army front the same day.   On May 3, the Japanese 13th Division—supported by over 20 tanks, 40 aircraft, artillery, and cavalry—advanced north from Zhongxiang, capturing Changshoudian and Tianjiachi. It seized Fengyao and Changjiachi by May 6. Chinese 33rd Army Group forces used favorable terrain to intercept, while the 29th Army Group struck Japanese flanks and rear at Changjiachi and Wangjiadian, and the 41st Corps fought tenaciously to halt the advance. By May 7, Japanese spearheads reached Changjiachi on the Zaoyang–Xiangyang Highway, with elements entering Shuangkou; their rear cavalry took Xinye on May 8. Fifth War Zone commander Zhang Zizhong personally led attacks along Tianjiachi–Huanglongtang, supported by fierce 29th Army Group assaults on Japanese rear.   The Japanese 39th Division and a 6th Division brigade delayed their assault on the Chinese 11th Army Group until May 4 from Suixian. After overrunning Gaocheng and Anchu on May 5, Chinese forces withdrew to Huantan–Tang Hsien–north of Gaocheng. As the 33rd Army Group faltered, part of the 11th Army Group reinforced it; the 175th Division held at Tang Hsien while the main body fell back toward Zaoyang. During the maneuver, Japanese tanks enveloped at Tang Hsien, cutting the Zaoyang–Xiangyang Highway and forcing bitter fighting by the 174th Division. To break out, Chinese abandoned Zaoyang, using the 173rd Division for rearguard resistance while the bulk shifted west of the Tang and Bai Rivers. Japanese captured Suiyangdian and Wujiadien on May 7, Zaoyang on May 8; the 173rd Division suffered heavy losses, including the death of its commander, Gen. Zhong Yi.   On May 10, Japanese completed an encirclement east of Xiangdong along the Tang and Bai Rivers—but it collapsed as Chinese exterior forces outflanked both Japanese wings and compressed the center, trapping much of the Japanese in the Xiangdong Plains. The Chinese 2nd and 31st Army Groups plus 92nd Corps pressed south, 39th and 75th Corps east, and 33rd and 29th Army Groups north against the pocket. The 94th Corps advanced along the Han–Yichang Highway deep into Jingshan, Zaoshi, Yingcheng, and Yunmeng to sever Japanese rear communications. Meanwhile, the 7th Corps and eastern Hubei guerrillas seized Jigong Shan, Lijiachai, and Liulin station on the Beijing–Hankou Railway. The 92nd and 68th Corps retook Zaoyang, Tongbai, and Minggang, encircling four Japanese divisions in the Xiangdong Plains. By May 11, battered Japanese retreated eastward under pursuit, Chinese flanking and rear attacks leaving many dead on the field. The 31st Army Group recovered Zaoyang on May 16. Chinese reports claimed 45,000 Japanese casualties, plus capture of over 60 guns, 2,000+ horses, 70+ tanks, and 400+ trucks. The 33rd Army Group fought fiercely to intercept retreating columns, driving large Japanese remnants toward Nanguadian.   Tragically, on May 16 noon, Gen. Zhang Zizhong—personally commanding his Guard Battalion and main 74th Division—was killed in action. With pressure eased on the Japanese left, they counterattacked and retook Zaoyang on May 17. Chinese forces withdrew to Xinye on the Tangbai River's west bank and north of the Tang River, regrouping for a renewed counteroffensive.   The Military Commission anticipated a Japanese withdrawal to original lines, likely along the rain-impassable Xianghua Road. Exploiting the enemy's supply shortages, exhaustion, and retreat difficulties, it ordered Fifth War Zone units to encircle and annihilate Japanese forces near the battlefield, then pursue toward Yingcheng–Huayuan. The zone promptly launched a counteroffensive. By nightfall on May 8, Japanese pincers neared junction, having inflicted serious damage on the Chinese 84th Army but achieved little else. Nonetheless, the 11th Army ordered frontline divisions to withdraw to the Tanghe–Baihe line after reaching it, preparatory to encircling Chinese forces west of the Han River. Chongqing issued general offensive orders at 8 PM and 11 PM that night. By then, six divisions of the 31st Army Group advanced south from Nanyang in the north, five from the 33rd Army Group pressed from the south, and five from the 45th and 94th Armies pursued in the southeast—nearly completing the Japanese encirclement. Intense combat erupted.   On May 10, retreating Japanese first clashed with the advancing 33rd Army Group from the south. Seizing the moment, they ordered the 13th and 39th Divisions plus Ikeda Detachment south to smash it, with the 3rd Division covering the northern flank. Full-scale battle broke out on May 12: two Japanese divisions assaulted five Chinese divisions of the 33rd Army Group, plunging them into desperate fighting. Japanese radio intercepts—including telegrams between the Military Commission and Fifth War Zone, plus Zhang Zizhong's report to Chiang on his five divisions' movements—revealed exact positions and plans. Sonobe Kazuo concentrated the 13th and 39th Divisions to strike south along the Han's east bank against Zhang's army group, while ordering the 3rd Division (south of Xinye) back to Zaoyang to guard the rear. Direction-finding had long pinpointed the 33rd Army Group headquarters radio (call signs and bearings) about 10 km northeast of Yicheng. With air support, the Japanese encircled it. On the night of May 15, the 39th Division advanced from Fangjiaji and Nanying toward Nanguadian, completing tactical encirclement by dawn on May 16. Artillery-supported four-sided assaults followed. The defending 74th Division resisted fiercely with repeated counterattacks. Fighting raged into the afternoon, with the Special Service Battalion joining. Japanese attackers swelled to over 5,000, backed by concentrated artillery and 20+ aircraft for a final push. Zhang Zizhong, wounded multiple times, continued commanding calmly until a severe chest wound killed him heroically. The exhausted, isolated 74th Division and battalion suffered devastating losses. That day, the 13th Division also routed the main 33rd Army Group force, breaking the southern encirclement. Japanese then redeployed, concentrating around Zaoyang.   In the north, 17 divisions (including six from the 31st Army Group) attacked the isolated Japanese 3rd Division from east, south, and north, severing its supply lines. With limited ammunition and no resupply, the division faced crisis; its 29th Brigade telegram pleaded: "Enemy fighting spirit extremely high... safe return very difficult; request battalion reinforcements." Yet southern Chinese forces remained undestroyed amid chaos. Japanese choices narrowed to independent 3rd Division retreat or holding for relief. They opted to lure pursuers: ordering the division southeast toward Zaoyang to draw Chinese into pursuit. From May 16–18, the 3rd Division fought a delaying retreat; relentless Chinese pursuit inflicted limited damage due to insufficient firepower, allowing escape. By evening May 18, it reached northeast of Zaoyang and prepared offensives. The 13th and 39th Divisions, after defeating the 33rd Army Group, also advanced north to the Zaoyang line.   The 3rd Division's retreat shortened Japanese lines and hastened convergence. Unsuspecting Chinese pursued to Zaoyang. After a successful counterattack northeast of Yicheng, the 13th and 39th Divisions rejoined the 3rd Division there. On May 19 morning, three Japanese divisions attacked abreast, forcing decisive battle along the Tang River. Chinese divisions collapsed within hours; the 75th Army took heavy losses, others significant casualties. Fifth War Zone ordered hasty retreat. Japanese pursued vigorously. By May 21, the 3rd Division reached Dengxian, 13th east of Laohekou, 39th Fancheng. Early that day, the 39th Division—crossing the Baihe—met fierce west-bank fire, losing Regiment Commander Kanzaki Tetsujiro and over 300 men. That evening, the 11th Army halted pursuit, ending east-bank (Xiang River) fighting. The 20+ day operation east of the Han inflicted heavy Japanese losses, far exceeding the planned duration, leaving troops exhausted. After halting, units withdrew to Zaoyang vicinity for rest and reorganization rather than immediate return to base positions. Commanders debated proceeding to Yichang west of the Han: abandoning the plan would signal Phase One failure, eroding authority and imperial trust. Most argued troop fatigue and casualties should not deter continuation. Over 1,000 tons of supplies rushed forward via six motor companies. Following east-bank termination, Japanese consolidated for the next phase targeting Yichang. Reinforcements arrived: the 4th Division from Manchuria and 18th Independent Brigade from Wuning. The 4th Division assumed Shayang–Zhongxiang positions east of the Xiang River.   The Japanese bombarded the west bank of the Han River for ninety minutes before forcing a crossing at Wangji north of Yicheng. That midnight, the 3rd Division also crossed southeast of Xiangyang. Both met little resistance and completed crossings before dawn. The 11th Army left the 40th Division at Dahongshan for rear-area mopping-up and assigned the Xiaochuan and Cangqiao Detachments to guard mobile supply depots. On May 31 night, the 3rd and 39th Divisions crossed the Xiang River at Yicheng and Oujiamiao. After seizing Xiangyang on June 1 night, the main force split into columns crossing westward. By June 3, Japanese captured Nanzhang and Yicheng. The Chinese 41st Corps fiercely counterattacked, retaking part of Xiangyang while its main body battled around Nanzhang; the 77th Corps also struck hard. On June 4, Chinese recovered Nanzhang, forcing Japanese retreat southward. Meanwhile, the 13th Division and elements of the 6th Division forced a crossing on the Han–Yichang Highway near Jiukou and Shayang to link with southern columns for a joint push. The Chinese River Defense Force shifted its main strength to key positions, using terrain to block southward advances. The 2nd and 31st Army Groups pursued south separately. Chinese abandoned Shayang on June 5; Japanese took Jingmen, Shilipu, and Shihujiao on June 6. The 77th Corps and river defense units resisted stubbornly from Jingmen to Jiangling. After retaking Yicheng, the 2nd Army Group continued pursuit. Japanese concentrated around Jingmen–Shilipu as Jiangling fell.   On June 9 morning, Japanese launched joint air-ground assaults from Dongshi to Dangyang and Yuanan. By afternoon, penetrating the Chinese right flank forced a night withdrawal to Gulaobei–Shuanlianshi–Dangyang along the Zu River to Yuanan. June 10 saw Japanese capture Gulaobei and Dangyang, pushing Chinese to Yichang outskirts. After days of heavy fighting and prohibitive losses, Chinese abandoned Yichang on their own initiative. The 2nd and 31st Army Groups then reached Dangyang north of Jingmen. On June 16, they mounted a general offensive. By June 17, Chinese briefly retook Yichang; the 2nd Army Group linked with the 77th Corps against Dangyang, while the 31st Army Group severed Dangyang–Jingmen communications and assaulted Jingmen violently. South of the Yangtze, the 5th and 32nd Divisions crossed to hit Shayang and Shilipu. By June 18, Japanese main force held stubbornly from Dangyang to the Xiang River with superior equipment. Chinese, fighting on exterior lines, formed an encirclement from Jiangling–Yichang–Dangyang–Zhongxiang–Suixian–north of Xinyang while maintaining surveillance. Thus, the Zaoyi (Zaoyang–Yichang) Campaign ended. No prior decision existed on holding Yichang long-term. Per post-Wuhan Imperial General Headquarters policy, even extended operations aimed only to inflict severe blows and erode Chinese resistance, not expand occupation. On capture day, the 11th Army declared objectives achieved, ordering reorganization, destruction of Yichang military facilities, and dumping irremovable captured supplies into the Yangtze preparatory to withdrawal. At 10 PM June 15, formal orders withdrew to the Han's east bank: 3rd and 39th Divisions first to Dangyang–Jingmen to cover, then the 13th Division. The 13th began retreating from Yichang at midnight June 16, reaching Tumenya (10 km east) by 7 AM June 17. Chinese counterattacked along the route; the 18th Army pursued and retook Yichang morning of June 17. Japanese held Yichang only four days.   Intense debate erupted between frontline commanders and Imperial General Headquarters over retaining Yichang. With Nazi Germany's Western Europe offensive underway—Paris fell June 12, the day Yichang was taken—global upheaval intensified Japanese urgency to resolve China swiftly and free resources for wider competition. Many in high command and China Expeditionary Army argued long-term occupation would threaten Chongqing more directly, aid political maneuvers, and hasten settlement, offering immense strategic value. This swayed the Emperor, who inquired at the June 15 Imperial Conference about securing it. Backed by imperial support, high command ordered temporary retention (one month) on June 16. By transmission through Expeditionary Army and 11th Army channels, the rearguard 13th Division had withdrawn 52 km. With 3rd Division cooperation, it reversed, broke Chinese resistance, and retook Yichang afternoon June 17. On July 1, to offset expanded 11th Army responsibilities, General Headquarters transferred the 4th Division from Kwantung Army (Jiamusi, Heilongjiang) to 11th Army control. July 13 orders confirmed long-term Yichang retention, redefining Wuhan-region operations to Anqing–Xinyang–Yichang–Yueyang–Nanchang. The 11th Army assigned: 13th Division to Yichang, 4th Division to Anlu, 18th Independent Mixed Brigade east/west of Dangyang; remaining units returned to original defenses.   Post-recapture, Chinese continued counterattacks on Yichang and rear lines until ordered to halt: "To adapt to international changes, preserve National Army combat strength, and facilitate reorganization, Fifth War Zone cease attacks on Yichang immediately." A stalemate followed along lines encircling Yichang, Dangyang, Jiangling, Jingmen, Zhongxiang, Suixian, and Xinyang. To shield Chongqing and Sichuan, Nationalists re-established the Sixth War Zone (briefly created post-First Changsha, abolished April 1940), appointing Chen Cheng commander-in-chief with 33rd and 29th Army Groups, River Defense Army, and 18th Army covering western Hubei, western Hunan, eastern Sichuan. The Zaoyi campaign thus concluded. Japanese combat power again proved markedly superior. Official Japanese records (11th Army/China Expeditionary Army) reported 2,700 killed, ~7,800 wounded (total ~10,500; some phases ~1,403 killed/4,639 wounded). Chinese admitted heavy losses: 36,983 killed, 50,509 wounded, 23,000 missing (total >110,000 in some accounts). Wartime Nationalist claims inflated Japanese casualties to 45,000 killed/wounded with major captures (60+ guns, 70+ tanks, 400+ trucks), likely propagandistic; Japanese sources show far lower equipment losses. With 56 battalions deployed, Japanese suffered 12–15% combat casualties; Chinese (54 divisions, ~380,000 men) incurred 25–30% or higher—underscoring firepower/equipment disparity. Japan achieved tactical success by securing Yichang long-term (as a Chongqing bombing base) but failed to annihilate the main Chinese force or compel peace. Chinese resistance thwarted full encirclement and imposed attrition, albeit at crippling cost to the Fifth War Zone—severely weakened and never fully recovering until war's end. Japanese aims were realized to a significant, though not decisive, degree.   The Fifth War Zone's operational plan was fundamentally sound. Chinese intelligence detected Japanese intentions early, accurately predicted the attack axis, and deployed accordingly. The plan included preemptive strikes at Wusheng Pass and the Guangshui section of the Pinghan Railway to harass Japanese rear areas, threaten Wuhan, gather reconnaissance, and disrupt enemy preparations. Though well conceived, these actions never materialized. In the first phase (Xiangdong operations), Chinese forces resisted while shifting the main body to outer lines, securing mobile flanking positions. This frustrated Japanese encirclement efforts in the Xiangdong Plains. Exploiting the enemy's retreat, China launched a timely counteroffensive that encircled the Japanese 3rd Division. Despite breakout support from over 100 aircraft and 200 tanks, the poorly equipped Chinese inflicted heavy casualties during the three-day siege, blunting the division's momentum.    On the southern front, the 33rd Army Group's intercepting deployment was appropriate, but insufficient strength and compromised communications allowed the Japanese 13th and 39th Divisions to counterattack decisively, inflicting major losses and claiming the heroic death of Commander-in-Chief Zhang Zizhong—whose steadfast patriotism remains a lasting source of national pride. Overall, Chinese assessments and deployments in Phase One were largely correct. The battlefield showed China retained initiative and was not wholly dominated by Japanese plans. The core issue was overestimation of Chinese combat power amid severe shortages of heavy weapons. At least three corps suffered heavy attrition, yet Japanese captured only twenty-three mountain/field guns. Relying on manpower for brute force left Chinese units critically undergunned, enabling repeated encirclement attempts but preventing decisive destruction or severe damage to encircled enemies like the 3rd Division.   Phase Two, by contrast, was entirely passive. The initial Japanese Han River crossings were largely feints, yet the west bank received scant attention in overall planning—leaving Yichang virtually undefended as main forces deployed east of the river. Post-Phase One, Japan reinforced the 11th Army with three infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion from the 13th Army (lower Yangtze), plus six motor transport companies rushing massive supplies forward. Chinese intelligence missed these moves, remaining complacent in expectation of Japanese withdrawal eastward. After regrouping, Japan abruptly pivoted west with rapid advances. The Military Commission and Fifth War Zone, caught unprepared, made frantic, chaotic adjustments that failed to mount effective defense. The loss of strategically vital Yichang was inevitable, complicating the resistance both militarily and psychologically. This stemmed directly from command misjudgment of Japanese strategic and operational aims. Had plans anticipated a westward thrust and retained strong reserves—or detected the 10-day regrouping window to readjust deployments—China could have retained greater initiative, inflicted more damage, and reduced its own losses.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japan's 11th Army launched an offensive in Hubei to encircle Chinese forces in the Fifth War Zone and seize Yichang for bombing Chongqing. Chinese troops countered effectively, encircling Japanese divisions and inflicting heavy losses, though General Zhang Zizhong was killed in action. After intense fighting east of the Han River, Japanese crossed west, captured Yichang, briefly withdrew, then retook and held it long-term. 

Shashi Shankar, CEO of Novellia,  focuses on enabling patients with serious medical conditions to consolidate their medical history into a single record using a free app.  The business model provides anonymized real-world data to pharmaceutical companies for research, clinical trial recruitment, and the acceleration of new therapy development. Artificial intelligence is used to help patients make sense of their fragmented medical records, identify clinical trials, and better understand drug safety profiles and therapeutic effectiveness.  Shashi explains, "In a nutshell, what we do is we help folks living with serious and complex medical conditions find access to and then collect all of their medical records going back 20 plus years across different physicians, sites of care, labs, and insurance into one always continuously updated record that then helps them manage and navigate their course of care." "I actually spent months of my career working at Genentech and Roche, working on a number of different cancer therapeutics, and it was an amazing opportunity, and you get to meet so many different patient communities. But one of the most difficult parts, I think, for anybody who's working on developing new medications and new therapies, is that you need to really understand the communities that you hope to serve one day. And unfortunately, a lot of data that exists right now doesn't actually capture the true patient journey. And it's not very representative of the communities that are dealing with and trying to navigate all of these different conditions." "The benefit of being able to share this data with researchers in a way that's anonymous and de- identified, so patient data is always totally secure and always held private by Novellia. The benefit of this is that researchers are able to finally understand the full journey of patients and think through how their therapies can actually help those who are trying to navigate their care."  #Novellia#HealthcareInnovation #PatientEmpowerment #DigitalHealth #HealthTech #MedicalRecords #AIinHealthcare #PatientCenteredCare #HealthcareData #ClinicalTrials #Oncology #PharmaceuticalResearch #HealthIT Novellia.com Download the transcript here

Shashi Shankar, CEO of Novellia,  focuses on enabling patients with serious medical conditions to consolidate their medical history into a single record using a free app.  The business model provides anonymized real-world data to pharmaceutical companies for research, clinical trial recruitment, and the acceleration of new therapy development. Artificial intelligence is used to help patients make sense of their fragmented medical records, identify clinical trials, and better understand drug safety profiles and therapeutic effectiveness.  Shashi explains, "In a nutshell, what we do is we help folks living with serious and complex medical conditions find access to and then collect all of their medical records going back 20 plus years across different physicians, sites of care, labs, and insurance into one always continuously updated record that then helps them manage and navigate their course of care." "I actually spent months of my career working at Genentech and Roche, working on a number of different cancer therapeutics, and it was an amazing opportunity, and you get to meet so many different patient communities. But one of the most difficult parts, I think, for anybody who's working on developing new medications and new therapies, is that you need to really understand the communities that you hope to serve one day. And unfortunately, a lot of data that exists right now doesn't actually capture the true patient journey. And it's not very representative of the communities that are dealing with and trying to navigate all of these different conditions." "The benefit of being able to share this data with researchers in a way that's anonymous and de- identified, so patient data is always totally secure and always held private by Novellia. The benefit of this is that researchers are able to finally understand the full journey of patients and think through how their therapies can actually help those who are trying to navigate their care."  #Novellia#HealthcareInnovation #PatientEmpowerment #DigitalHealth #HealthTech #MedicalRecords #AIinHealthcare #PatientCenteredCare #HealthcareData #ClinicalTrials #Oncology #PharmaceuticalResearch #HealthIT Novellia.com Listen to the podcast here

Shashi Tripathi focuses on the tech labor market, arguing the AI revolution will be a net job creator. Data science, prompting, and other AI-centric roles are growing, though he acknowledges that there will likely be more layoff rounds like we've seen lately, with Oracle (ORCL) as the latest. Shashi also looks at how immigration policy is impacting the tech market, particularly when it comes to H1-B visas. He also touches on quantum computing, which he thinks will disrupt the industry even more.======== Schwab Network ========Empowering every investor and trader, every market day.Options involve risks and are not suitable for all investors. Before trading, read the Options Disclosure Document. http://bit.ly/2v9tH6DSubscribe to the Market Minute newsletter - https://schwabnetwork.com/subscribeDownload the iOS app - https://apps.apple.com/us/app/schwab-network/id1460719185Download the Amazon Fire Tv App - https://www.amazon.com/TD-Ameritrade-Network/dp/B07KRD76C7Watch on Sling - https://watch.sling.com/1/asset/191928615bd8d47686f94682aefaa007/watchWatch on Vizio - https://www.vizio.com/en/watchfreeplus-exploreWatch on DistroTV - https://www.distro.tv/live/schwab-network/Follow us on X – https://twitter.com/schwabnetworkFollow us on Facebook – https://www.facebook.com/schwabnetworkFollow us on LinkedIn - https://www.linkedin.com/company/schwab-network/About Schwab Network - https://schwabnetwork.com/about

A song written by Shashi Kant Singh and created with the music and vocals by him only. Copyright/Shashi Kant SingCurated by Irfan"ये मेरी नई और भोजपुरी कंपोजिशन है, पिया परदेसी बिना...मैं क्षेत्रीय बोली के गीतों जैसे अवधी, भोजपुरी आदि पर एक प्रयोग कर रहा हूं। बड़े लंबे समय से मैं देख रहा हूं कि हमारी क्षेत्रीय बोली के गीतों का कंपोजिशन ऐसे किया जा रहा है, जैसे यह जाहिलों और गवारों का ही गीत हो, या सौत के बेटे को किसी ने उबटन और काजल लगाया हो। इसीलिए इन गीतों को दूसरी बोली वाले तो क्या सुनेंगे, खुद इन्हीं बोली के लोग इन्हें नहीं सुनते। आखिर क्या वजह है कि पंजाबी और हरियाणवी समझ में ना आने के बावजूद भोजपुरी क्षेत्र में पंजाबी और हरियाणवी सुनी जाती है? हमारे गीतों में ऐसी क्या बुराई है जो दूसरे क्षेत्रों में तो छोड़ो, हमारे ही क्षेत्र के संपन्न वर्ग में नहीं सुनी जाती, जबकि शास्त्रीय गायन के सभी कंपोजिशन हमारी क्षेत्रीय बोलियों में ही हैं, जैसे, का करूं सजनी आए ना बालम, आयो कहां से घनश्याम, मोहे पनघट पे नंदलाल छेड़ गयो रे, चदरिया झीनी रे झीनी.. ? मैंने गायन शैली में शालीनता भरी है, प्रयुक्त वाद्य यंत्रों और उनके वादन के तरीकों में थोड़ा परिवर्तन किया है, थोड़ा क्लासिकल टच देने की कोशिश की है।"Cover: Irfan

The internet is full of viral photos and videos taken without the subject's consent. Are we actually allowed to post these images and videos, and what are the legal ramifications of it? Join us on #TheBIGShowTV with Shashi Nathan, white-collar defense and investigation Leading Lawyer as we answer all burning questions on taking and posting photos of strangers online! Connect with us on Instagram: @kiss92fm @Glennn @angeliqueteo @officialtimoh Producers: @shalinisusan97 @snailgirl2000See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The internet is full of viral photos and videos taken without the subject's consent. Are we actually allowed to post these images and videos, and what are the legal ramifications of it? Join us on #TheBIGShowTV with Shashi Nathan, white-collar defense and investigation Leading Lawyer as we answer all burning questions on taking and posting photos of strangers online! Connect with us on Instagram: @kiss92fm @Glennn @angeliqueteo @officialtimoh Producers: @shalinisusan97 @snailgirl2000See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Last time we spoke about the battle of Nanchang. After securing Hainan and targeting Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway corridors, Japan's 11th Army, backed by armor, air power, and riverine operations, sought a rapid, surgical seizure of Nanchang to sever eastern Chinese logistics and coerce Chongqing. China, reorganizing under Chiang Kai-shek, concentrated over 200,000 troops across 52 divisions in the Ninth and Third War Zones, with Xue Yue commanding the 9th War Zone in defense of Wuhan-Nanchang corridors. The fighting began with German-style, combined-arms river operations along the Xiushui and Gan rivers, including feints, river crossings, and heavy artillery, sometimes using poison gas. From March 20–23, Japanese forces established a beachhead and advanced into Fengxin, Shengmi, and later Nanchang, despite stiff Chinese resistance and bridges being destroyed. Chiang's strategic shift toward attrition pushed for broader offensives to disrupt railways and rear areas, though Chinese plans for a counteroffensive repeatedly stalled due to logistics and coordination issues. By early May, Japanese forces encircled and captured Nanchang, albeit at heavy cost, with Chinese casualties surpassing 43,000 dead and Japanese losses over 2,200 dead.    #187 The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Having seized Wuhan in a brutal offensive the previous year, the Japanese sought not just to hold their ground but to solidify their grip on this vital hub. Wuhan, a bustling metropolis at the confluence of the Yangtze and Han Rivers, had become a linchpin in their strategy, a base from which they could project power across central China. Yet, the city was far from secure, Chinese troops in northern Hubei and southern Henan, perched above the mighty Yangtze, posed an unrelenting threat. To relieve the mounting pressure on their newfound stronghold, the Japanese high command orchestrated a bold offensive against the towns of Suixian and Zaoyang. They aimed to annihilate the main force of the Chinese 5th War Zone, a move that would crush the Nationalist resistance in the region and secure their flanks. This theater of war, freshly designated as the 5th War Zone after the grueling Battle of Wuhan, encompassed a vast expanse west of Shashi in the upper Yangtze basin. It stretched across northern Hubei, southern Henan, and the rugged Dabie Mountains in eastern Anhui, forming a strategic bulwark that guarded the eastern approaches to Sichuan, the very heartland of the Nationalist government's central institutions. Historian Rana Mitter in Forgotten Ally described this zone as "a gateway of immense importance, a natural fortress that could either serve as a launchpad for offensives against Japanese-held territories or a defensive redoubt protecting the rear areas of Sichuan and Shaanxi". The terrain itself was a defender's dream and an attacker's nightmare: to the east rose the imposing Dabie Mountains, their peaks cloaked in mist and folklore; the Tongbai Mountains sliced across the north like a jagged spine; the Jing Mountains guarded the west; the Yangtze River snaked southward, its waters a formidable barrier; the Dahong Mountains dominated the center, offering hidden valleys for ambushes; and the Han River (also known as the Xiang River) carved a north-south path through it all. Two critical transport arteries—the Hanyi Road linking Hankou to Yichang in Hubei, and the Xianghua Road connecting Xiangyang to Huayuan near Hankou—crisscrossed this landscape, integrating the war zone into a web of mobility. From here, Chinese forces could menace the vital Pinghan Railway, that iron lifeline running from Beiping (modern Beijing) to Hankou, while also threatening the Wuhan region itself. In retreat, it provided a sanctuary to shield the Nationalist heartlands. As military strategist Sun Tzu might have appreciated, this area had long been a magnet for generals, its contours shaping the fates of empires since ancient times. Despite the 5th War Zone's intricate troop deployments, marked by units of varying combat prowess and a glaring shortage of heavy weapons, the Chinese forces made masterful use of the terrain to harass their invaders. Drawing from accounts in Li Zongren's memoirs, he noted how these defenders, often outgunned but never outmaneuvered, turned hills into fortresses and rivers into moats. In early April 1939, as spring rains turned paths to mud, Chinese troops ramped up their disruptions along the southern stretches of the Pinghan Railway, striking from both eastern and western flanks with guerrilla precision. What truly rattled the Japanese garrison in Wuhan was the arrival of reinforcements: six full divisions redeployed to Zaoyang, bolstering the Chinese capacity to launch flanking assaults that could unravel Japanese supply lines. Alarmed by this buildup, the Japanese 11th Army, ensconced in the Wuhan area under the command of General Yasuji Okamura, a figure whose tactical acumen would later earn him notoriety in the Pacific War, devised a daring plan. They intended to plunge deep into the 5th War Zone, smashing the core of the Chinese forces and rendering them impotent, thereby neutralizing the northwestern threat to Wuhan once and for all. From April onward, the Japanese mobilized with meticulous preparation, amassing troops equipped with formidable artillery, rumbling tanks, and squadrons of aircraft that darkened the skies. Historians estimate they committed roughly three and a half divisions to this endeavor, as detailed in Edward J. Drea's In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Employing a classic pincer movement, a two-flank encirclement coupled with a central breakthrough, they aimed for a swift, decisive strike to obliterate the main Chinese force in the narrow Suixian-Zaoyang corridor, squeezed between the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains. The offensive erupted in full fury on May 1, 1939, as Japanese columns surged forward like a tidal wave, their engines roaring and banners fluttering in the dust-choked air. General Li Zongren, the commander of the 5th War Zone, a man whose leadership had already shone in earlier campaigns like the defense of Tai'erzhuang in 1938, issued urgent orders to cease offensive actions against the Japanese and pivot to a defensive stance. Based on intelligence about the enemy's dispositions, Li orchestrated a comprehensive campaign structure, assigning precise defensive roles and battle plans to each unit. This was no haphazard scramble; it was a symphony of strategy, as Li himself recounted in his memoirs, emphasizing the need to exploit the terrain's natural advantages. While various Chinese war zones executed the "April Offensive" from late April to mid-May, actively harrying and containing Japanese forces, the 5th War Zone focused its energies on the southern segment of the Pinghan Railway, assaulting it from both sides in a bid to disrupt logistics. The main force of the 31st Army Group, under the command of Tang Enbo, a general known for his aggressive tactics and later criticized for corruption, shifted from elsewhere in Hubei to Zaoyang, fortifying the zone and posing a dire threat to the Japanese flanks and rear areas. To counter this peril and safeguard transportation along the Wuhan-Pinghan Railway, the Japanese, led by the formidable Okamura, unleashed their assault from the line stretching through Xinyang, Yingshan, and Zhongxiang. Mobilizing the 3rd, 13th, and 16th Divisions alongside the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades, they charged toward the Suixian-Zaoyang region in western Hubei, intent on eradicating the Chinese main force and alleviating the siege-like pressure on Wuhan. In a masterful reorganization, Li Zongren divided his forces into two army groups, the left and right, plus a dedicated river defense army. His strategy was a blend of attrition and opportunism: harnessing the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains, clinging to key towns like lifelines, and grinding down the Japanese through prolonged warfare while biding time for a counterstroke. This approach echoed the Fabian tactics of ancient Rome, wearing the enemy thin before delivering the coup de grâce. The storm broke at dawn on May 1, when the main contingents of the Japanese 16th and 13th Divisions, bolstered by the 4th Cavalry Brigade from their bases in Zhongxiang and Jingshan, hurled themselves against the Chinese 37th and 180th Divisions of the Right Army Group. Supported by droning aircraft that strafed from above and tanks that churned the earth below, the Japanese advanced with mechanical precision. By May 4, they had shattered the defensive lines flanking Changshoudian, then surged along the east bank of the Xiang River toward Zaoyang in a massive offensive. Fierce combat raged through May 5, as described in Japanese war diaries compiled in Senshi Sōsho (the official Japanese war history series), where soldiers recounted the relentless Chinese resistance amid the smoke and clamor. The Japanese finally breached the defenses, turning their fury on the 122nd Division of the 41st Army. In a heroic stand, the 180th Division clung to Changshoudian, providing cover for the main force's retreat along the east-west Huangqi'an line. The 37th Division fell back to the Yaojiahe line, while elements of the 38th Division repositioned into Liushuigou. On May 6, the Japanese seized Changshoudian, punched through Huangqi'an, and drove northward, unleashing a devastating assault on the 122nd Division's positions near Wenjiamiao. Undeterred, Chinese defenders executed daring flanking maneuvers in the Fenglehe, Yaojiahe, Liushuihe, Shuanghe, and Zhangjiaji areas, turning the landscape into a labyrinth of ambushes. May 7 saw the Japanese pressing on, capturing Zhangjiaji and Shuanghe. By May 8, they assaulted Maozifan and Xinji, where ferocious battles erupted, soldiers clashing in hand-to-hand combat amid the ruins. By May 10, the Japanese had overrun Huyang Town and Xinye, advancing toward Tanghe and the northeastern fringes of Zaoyang. Yet, the Tanghe River front witnessed partial Chinese recoveries: remnants of the Right Army Group, alongside troops from east of the Xianghe, reclaimed Xinye. The 122nd and 180th Divisions withdrew north of Tanghe and Fancheng, while the 37th, 38th, and 132nd Divisions steadfastly held the east bank of the Xianghe River. Concurrently, the main force of the Japanese 3rd Division launched from Yingshan against the 84th and 13th Armies of the 11th Group Army in the Suixian sector. After a whirlwind of combat, the Chinese 84th Army retreated to the Taerwan position. On May 2, the 3rd Division targeted the Gaocheng position of the 13th Army within the 31st Group Army; the ensuing clashes in Taerwan and Gaocheng were a maelstrom of fire, with the Taerwan position exchanging hands multiple times like a deadly game of tug-of-war. By May 4, in a grim escalation, Japanese forces deployed poison gas, a violation of international norms that drew condemnation and is documented in Allied reports from the era, inflicting horrific casualties and compelling the Chinese to relinquish Gaocheng, which fell into enemy hands. On May 5, backed by aerial bombardments, tank charges, and artillery barrages, the Japanese renewed their onslaught along the Gaocheng River and the Lishan-Jiangjiahe line. By May 6, the beleaguered Chinese were forced back to the Tianhekou and Gaocheng line. Suixian succumbed on May 7. On May 8, the Japanese shattered the second line of the 84th Army, capturing Zaoyang and advancing on the Jiangtoudian position of the 85th Army. To evade encirclement, the defenders mounted a valiant resistance before withdrawing from Jiangtoudian; the 84th Army relocated to the Tanghe and Baihe areas, while the 39th Army embedded itself in the Dahongshan for guerrilla operations—a tactic that would bleed the Japanese through hit-and-run warfare, as noted in guerrilla warfare studies by Mao Zedong himself. By May 10, the bulk of the 31st Army Group maneuvered toward Tanghe, reaching north of Biyang by May 15. From Xinyang, Japanese forces struck at Tongbai on May 8; by May 10, elements from Zaoyang advanced to Zhangdian Town and Shangtun Town. In response, the 68th Army of the 1st War Zone dispatched the 143rd Division to defend Queshan and Minggang, and the 119th Division to hold Tongbai. After staunchly blocking the Japanese, they withdrew on May 11 to positions northwest and southwest of Tongbai, shielding the retreat of 5th War Zone units. The Japanese 4th Cavalry Brigade drove toward Tanghe, seizing Tanghe County on May 12. But the tide was turning. In a brilliant reversal, the Fifth War Zone commanded the 31st Army Group, in concert with the 2nd Army Group from the 1st War Zone, to advance from southwestern Henan. Their mission: encircle the bulk of Japanese forces on the Xiangdong Plain and deliver a crushing blow. The main force of the 33rd Army Group targeted Zaoyang, while other units pinned down Japanese rear guards in Zhongxiang. The Chinese counteroffensive erupted with swift successes, Tanghe County was recaptured on May 14, and Tongbai liberated on May 16, shattering the Japanese encirclement scheme. On May 19, after four grueling days of combat, Chinese forces mauled the retreating Japanese, reclaiming Zaoyang and leaving the fields strewn with enemy dead. The 39th Army of the Left Army Group dispersed into the mountains for guerrilla warfare, a shadowy campaign of sabotage and surprise. Forces of the Right Army Group east of the river, along with river defense units, conducted relentless raids on Japanese rears and supply lines over multiple days, sowing chaos before withdrawing to the west bank of the Xiang River on May 21. On May 22, they pressed toward Suixian, recapturing it on May 23. The Japanese, battered and depleted, retreated to their original garrisons in Zhongxiang and Yingshan, restoring the pre-war lines as the battle drew to a close. Throughout this clash, the Chinese held a marked superiority in manpower and coordination, though their deployments lacked full flexibility, briefly placing them on the defensive. After protracted, blood-soaked fighting, they restored the original equilibrium. Despite grievous losses, the Chinese thwarted the Japanese encirclement and exacted a heavy toll, reports from the time, corroborated by Japanese records in Senshi Sōsho, indicate over 13,000 Japanese killed or wounded, with more than 5,000 corpses abandoned on the battlefield. This fulfilled the strategic goal of containing and eroding Japanese strength. Chinese casualties surpassed 25,000, a testament to the ferocity of the struggle. The 5th War Zone seized the initiative in advances and retreats, deftly shifting to outer lines and maintaining positional advantages. As Japanese forces withdrew, Chinese pursuers harried and obstructed them, yielding substantial victories. The Battle of Suizao spanned less than three weeks. The Japanese main force pierced defenses on the east bank of the Han River, advancing to encircle one flank as planned. However, the other two formations met fierce opposition near Suixian and northward, stalling their progress. Adapting to the battlefield's ebb and flow, the Fifth War Zone transformed its tactics: the main force escaped encirclement, maneuvered to outer lines for offensives, and exploited terrain to hammer the Japanese. The pivotal order to flip from defense to offense doomed the encirclement; with the counterattack triumphant, the Japanese declined to hold and retreated. The Chinese pursued with unyielding vigor. By May 24, they had reclaimed Zaoyang, Tongbai, and other locales. Save for Suixian County, the Japanese had fallen back to pre-war positions, reinstating the regional status quo. Thus, the battle concluded, a chapter of resilience etched into the chronicles of China's defiance. In the sweltering heat of southern China, where the humid air clung to every breath like a persistent fog, the Japanese General Staff basked in what they called a triumphant offensive and defensive campaign in Guangdong. But victory, as history so often teaches, is a double-edged sword. By early 1939, the strain was palpable. Their secret supply line snaking from the British colony of Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland was under constant disruption, raids by shadowy guerrilla bands, opportunistic smugglers, and the sheer unpredictability of wartime logistics turning what should have been a lifeline into a leaky sieve. Blockading the entire coastline? A pipe dream, given the vast, jagged shores of Guangdong, dotted with hidden coves and fishing villages that had evaded imperial edicts for centuries. Yet, the General Staff's priorities were unyielding, laser-focused on strangling the Nationalist capital of Chongqing through a relentless blockade. This meant the 21st Army, that workhorse of the Japanese invasion force, had to stay in the fight—no rest for the weary. Drawing from historical records like the Senshi Sōsho (War History Series) compiled by Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, we know that after the 21st Army reported severing what they dubbed the "secret transport line" at Xinhui, a gritty, hard-fought skirmish that left the local landscape scarred with craters and abandoned supply crates, the General Staff circled back to the idea of a full coastal blockade. It was a classic case of military opportunism: staff officers, poring over maps in dimly lit war rooms in Tokyo, suddenly "discovered" Shantou as a major port. Not just any port, mind you, but a bustling hub tied to the heartstrings of Guangdong's overseas Chinese communities. Shantou and nearby Chao'an weren't mere dots on a map; they were the ancestral hometowns of countless Chaoshan people who had ventured abroad to Southeast Asia, sending back remittances that flowed like lifeblood into the region. Historical economic studies, such as those in The Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China by Stephen Fitzgerald, highlight how these funds from the Chaoshan diaspora, often funneled through family networks in places like Singapore and Thailand, were substantial, indirectly fueling China's war effort by sustaining local economies and even purchasing arms on the black market. The Chao-Shao Highway, that dusty artery running near Shantou, was pinpointed as a critical vein connecting Hong Kong's ports to the mainland's interior. So, in early June 1939, the die was cast: Army Order No. 310 thundered from headquarters, commanding the 21st Army to seize Shantou. The Chief of the General Staff himself provided the strategic blueprint, a personal touch that underscored the operation's gravity. The Army Department christened the Chaoshan push "Operation Hua," a nod perhaps to the flowery illusions of easy conquest, while instructing the Navy Department to tag along for the ride. In naval parlance, it became "Operation J," a cryptic label that masked the sheer scale unfolding. Under the Headquarters' watchful eye, what started as a modest blockade morphed into a massive amphibious assault, conjured seemingly out of thin air like a magician's trick, but one with deadly props. The 5th Fleet's orders mobilized an impressive lineup: the 9th Squadron for heavy hitting, the 5th Mine Boat Squadron to clear watery hazards, the 12th and 21st Sweeper Squadrons sweeping for mines like diligent janitors of the sea, the 45th Destroyer Squadron adding destroyer muscle, and air power from the 3rd Combined Air Group (boasting 24 land-based attack aircraft and 9 reconnaissance planes that could spot a fishing boat from miles away). Then there was the Chiyoda Air Group with its 9 reconnaissance aircraft, the Guangdong Air Group contributing a quirky airship and one more recon plane, the 9th Special Landing Squadron from Sasebo trained for beach assaults, and a flotilla of special ships for logistics. On the ground, the 21st Army threw in the 132nd Brigade from the 104th Division, beefed up with the 76th Infantry Battalion, two mountain artillery battalions for lobbing shells over rugged terrain, two engineer battalions to bridge rivers and clear paths, a light armored vehicle platoon rumbling with mechanized menace, and a river-crossing supplies company to keep the troops fed and armed. All under the command of Brigade Commander Juro Goto, a stern officer whose tactical acumen was forged in earlier Manchurian campaigns. The convoy's size demanded rehearsals; the 132nd Brigade trained for boat transfers at Magong in the Penghu Islands, practicing the precarious dance of loading men and gear onto rocking vessels under simulated fire. Secrecy shrouded the whole affair, many officers and soldiers, boarding ships in the dead of night, whispered among themselves that they were finally heading home to Japan, a cruel ruse to maintain operational security. For extra punch, the 21st Army tacked on the 31st Air Squadron for air support, their planes droning like angry hornets ready to sting. This overkill didn't sit well with everyone. Lieutenant General Ando Rikichi, the pragmatic commander overseeing Japanese forces in the region, must have fumed in his Guangzhou headquarters. His intelligence staff, drawing from intercepted radio chatter and local spies as noted in postwar analyses like The Japanese Army in World War II by Gordon L. Rottman, reported that the Chongqing forces in Chaozhou were laughably thin: just the 9th Independent Brigade, a couple of security regiments, and ragtag "self-defense groups" of armed civilians. Why unleash such a sledgehammer on a fly? The mobilization's magnitude even forced a reshuffling of defenses around Guangzhou, pulling resources from the 12th Army's front lines and overburdening the already stretched 18th Division. It was bureaucratic overreach at its finest, a testament to the Imperial Staff's penchant for grand gestures over tactical efficiency. Meanwhile, on the Nationalist side, the winds of war carried whispers of impending doom. The National Revolutionary Army's war histories, such as those compiled in the Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Shi (History of China's War of Resistance Against Japan), note that Chiang Kai-shek's Military Commission had snagged intelligence as early as February 1939 about Japan's plans for a large-scale invasion of Shantou. The efficiency of the Military Command's Second Bureau and the Military Intelligence Bureau was nothing short of astonishing, networks of agents, double agents, and radio intercepts piercing the veil of Japanese secrecy. Even as the convoy slipped out of Penghu, a detailed report outlining operational orders landed on Commander Zhang Fakui's desk, the ink still fresh. Zhang, a battle-hardened strategist whose career spanned the Northern Expedition and beyond , had four months to prepare for what would be dubbed the decisive battle of Chaoshan. Yet, in a move that baffled some contemporaries, he chose not to fortify and defend it tooth and nail. After the Fourth War Zone submitted its opinions, likely heated debates in smoke-filled command posts, Chiang Kai-shek greenlit the plan. By March, the Military Commission issued its strategic policy: when the enemy hit Chaoshan, a sliver of regular troops would team up with civilian armed forces for mobile and guerrilla warfare, grinding down the invaders like sandpaper on steel. The orders specified guerrilla zones in Chaozhou, Jiaxing, and Huizhou, unifying local militias under a banner of "extensive guerrilla warfare" to coordinate with regular army maneuvers, gradually eroding the Japanese thrust. In essence, the 4th War Zone wasn't tasked with holding Chao'an and Shantou at all costs; instead, they'd strike hard during the landing, then let guerrillas harry the occupiers post-capture. It was a doctrine of attrition in a "confined battlefield," honing skills through maneuver and ambush. Remarkably, the fall of these cities was preordained by the Military Commission three months before the Japanese even issued their orders, a strategic feint that echoed ancient Sun Tzu tactics of yielding ground to preserve strength. To execute this, the 4th War Zone birthed the Chao-Jia-Hui Guerrilla Command after meticulous preparation, with General Zou Hong, head of Guangdong's Security Bureau and a no-nonsense administrator known for his anti-smuggling campaigns, taking the helm. In just three months, Zhang Fakui scraped together the Independent 9th Brigade, the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Guangdong Provincial Security Regiments, and the Security Training Regiment. Even with the 9th Army Group lurking nearby, he handed the reins of the Chao-Shan operation to the 12th Army Group's planners. Their March guidelines sketched three lines of resistance from the coast to the mountains, a staged withdrawal that allowed frontline defenders to melt away like ghosts. This blueprint mirrored Chiang Kai-shek's post-Wuhan reassessment, where the loss of that key city in 1938 prompted a shift to protracted warfare. A Xinhua News Agency columnist later summed it up scathingly: "The Chongqing government, having lost its will to resist, colludes with the Japanese and seeks to eliminate the Communists, adopting a policy of passive resistance." This narrative, propagated by Communist sources, dogged Chiang and the National Revolutionary Army for decades, painting them as defeatists even as they bled the Japanese dry through attrition. February 1939 saw Commander Zhang kicking off a reorganization of the 12th Army Group, transforming it from a patchwork force into something resembling a modern army. He could have hunkered down, assigning troops to a desperate defense of Chaoshan, but that would have handed the initiative to the overcautious Japanese General Staff, whose activism often bordered on paranoia. Zhang, with the wisdom of a seasoned general who had navigated the treacherous politics of pre-war China, weighed the scales carefully. His vision? Forge the 12th Army Group into a nimble field army, not squander tens of thousands on a secondary port. Japan's naval and air dominance—evident in the devastation of Shanghai in 1937, meant Guangdong's forces could be pulverized in Shantou just as easily. Losing Chaozhou and Shantou? Acceptable, if it preserved core strength for the long haul. Post-Xinhui, Zhang doubled down on resistance, channeling efforts into live-fire exercises for the 12th Army, turning green recruits into battle-ready soldiers amid the Guangdong hills. The war's trajectory after 1939 would vindicate him: his forces became pivotal in later counteroffensives, proving that a living army trumped dead cities. Opting out of a static defense, Zhang pivoted to guerrilla warfare to bleed the Japanese while clutching strategic initiative. He ordered local governments to whip up coastal guerrilla forces from Chao'an to Huizhou—melding militias, national guards, police, and private armed groups into official folds. These weren't elite shock troops, but in wartime's chaos, they controlled locales effectively, disrupting supply lines and gathering intel. For surprises, he unleashed two mobile units: the 9th Independent Brigade and the 20th Independent Brigade. Formed fresh after the War of Resistance erupted, these brigades shone for their efficiency within the cumbersome Guangdong Army structure. Division-level units were too bulky for spotty communications, so Yu Hanmou's command birthed these independent outfits, staffed with crack officers. The 9th, packing direct-fire artillery for punch, and the 20th, dubbed semi-mechanized for its truck-borne speed, prowled the Chaoshan–Huizhou coast from 1939. Zhang retained their three-regiment setup, naming Hua Zhenzhong and Zhang Shou as commanders, granting them autonomy to command in the field like roving wolves. As the 9th Independent Brigade shifted to Shantou, its 627th Regiment was still reorganizing in Heyuan, a logistical hiccup amid the scramble. Hua Zhenzhong, a commander noted for his tactical flexibility in regional annals, deployed the 625th Regiment and 5th Security Regiment along the coast, with the 626th as reserve in Chao'an. Though the Fourth War Zone had written off Chaoshan, Zhang yearned to showcase Guangdong grit before the pullback. Dawn broke on June 21, 1939, at 4:30 a.m., with Japanese reconnaissance planes slicing through the fog over Shantou, Anbu, and Nanbeigang, ghostly silhouettes against the gray sky. By 5:30, the mist lifted, revealing a nightmare armada: over 40 destroyers and 70–80 landing craft churning toward the coast on multiple vectors, their hulls cutting the waves like knives. The 626th Regiment's 3rd Battalion at Donghushan met the first wave with a hail of fire from six light machine guns, repelling the initial boats in a frenzy of splashes and shouts. But the brigade's long-range guns couldn't stem the tide; Hua focused on key chokepoints, aiming to bloody the invaders rather than obliterate them. By morning, the 3rd Battalion of the 625th Regiment charged into Shantou City, joined by the local police corps digging in amid urban sprawl. Combat raged at Xinjin Port and the airport's fringes, where Nationalist troops traded shots with advancing Japanese under the absent shadow of a Chinese navy. Japanese naval guns, massed offshore, pounded the outskirts like thunder gods in fury. By 2:00 a.m. on the 22nd, Shantou crumpled as defenders' ammo ran dry, the city falling in a haze of smoke and echoes. Before the loss, Hua had positioned the 1st Battalion of the 5th Security Regiment at Anbu, guarding the road to Chao'an. Local lore, preserved in oral histories collected by the Chaozhou Historical Society, recalls Battalion Commander Du Ruo leading from the front, rifle in hand, but Japanese barrages, bolstered by superior firepower—forced a retreat. Post-capture, Tokyo's forces paused to consolidate, unleashing massacres on fleeing civilians in the outskirts. A flotilla of civilian boats, intercepted at sea, became a grim training ground for bayonet drills, a barbarity echoed in survivor testimonies compiled in The Rape of Nanking and Beyond extensions to Guangdong atrocities. With Shantou gone, Hua pivoted to flank defense, orchestrating night raids on Japanese positions around Anbu and Meixi. On June 24th, Major Du Ruo spearheaded an assault into Anbu but fell gravely wounded amid the chaos. Later, the 2nd Battalion of the 626th overran spots near Meixi. A Japanese sea-flanking maneuver targeted Anbu, but Nationalists held at Liulong, sparking nocturnal clashes, grenade volleys, bayonet charges, and hand-to-hand brawls that drained both sides like a slow bleed. June 26th saw the 132nd Brigade lumber toward Chao'an. Hua weighed options: all-out assault or guerrilla fade? He chose to dig in on the outskirts, reserving two companies of the 625th and a special ops battalion in the city. The 27th brought a day-long Japanese onslaught, culminating in Chao'an's fall after fierce rear-guard actions by the 9th Independent Brigade. Evacuations preceded the collapse, with Japanese propaganda banners fluttering falsely, claiming Nationalists had abandoned defense. Yet Hua's call preserved his brigade for future fights; the Japanese claimed an empty prize. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese operations had yet again plugged up supply leaks into Nationalist China. The fall of Suixian, Zaoyang and Shantou were heavy losses for the Chinese war effort. However the Chinese were also able to exact heavy casualties on the invaders and thwarted their encirclement attempts. China was still in the fight for her life.

Today I welcome Author Perry Dockter who shares about the power of story telling after writing his book Shashi Bellatramo. Useful insights for anyone wanting to write their story or book to the world.To find Perry's books you can find him here:perrydockterbooks.com

Send us a textAs women in leadership, we may feel equipped to lead our team and ourselves.. But what about our finances?In this episode of Female Founder Unplugged, I'm joined by Shashi Behl, Founder & CEO of Joydrop, for a powerful conversation on the part of business we often avoid. We get into what it really means to lead your financial future with clarity and confidence.✨ Episode HighlightsFinancial reframes to take a more grounded approach to your financesWhat it means to take agency over yourselfInvesting in yourself, your business, and beyond, in ways that support your futureBecoming the CFO of youWhen you're clear on your numbers, you're clear on your decisions. And when your people, your plan, and your financial vision are aligned—you stop playing small and start scaling something built to thrive!Support the showOur mission for Female Founder Unplugged is to impact 1000 female entrepreneurs every season, and we need your help to do that. Please subscribe to the show, and share your favorite episodes with anyone you feel could benefit. We are growing a powerful community here, and everyone is welcome. Together, we can pave a path to giving more women a seat at the table, and providing opportunities for financial independence.

Send us a textAs women in leadership, we may feel equipped to lead our team and ourselves.. But what about our finances?In this episode of Female Founder Unplugged, I'm joined by Shashi Behl, Founder & CEO of Joydrop, for a powerful conversation on the part of business we often avoid. We get into what it really means to lead your financial future with clarity and confidence.✨ Episode HighlightsFinancial reframes to take a more grounded approach to your financesWhat it means to take agency over yourselfInvesting in yourself, your business, and beyond, in ways that support your futureBecoming the CFO of youWhen you're clear on your numbers, you're clear on your decisions. And when your people, your plan, and your financial vision are aligned—you stop playing small and start scaling something built to thrive!Support the showOur mission for Female Founder Unplugged is to impact 1000 female entrepreneurs every season, and we need your help to do that. Please subscribe to the show, and share your favorite episodes with anyone you feel could benefit. We are growing a powerful community here, and everyone is welcome. Together, we can pave a path to giving more women a seat at the table, and providing opportunities for financial independence.

Sometimes the hardest part of ultrarunning isn't the miles—it's just getting an episode recorded. After multiple attempts, the HappyCast crew finally sits down with Lisa Decker and Shashi Reddy to share their stories from two of Laz Lake's infamous journey races: Vol State and Heart of the South. Both are 300+ mile tests of grit, resourcefulness, and pure stubbornness, and their experiences run the gamut from roadside naps to navigating storms and heat rash with Dollar General t-shirts.Lisa takes us through the camaraderie of her “trauma bonded trash panda” crew at Vol State, while Shashi details the unpredictable game of Heart of the South—where runners don't even know the starting line until the night before. Between road angels, the legendary “meat wagon” driver who refuses to let you quit, and the strange joys of eating soggy Subway sandwiches mid-race, the stories capture the feral, unpredictable beauty of these journey runs.Since those finishes, Lisa and Shashi haven't slowed down. Lisa went straight into the brutal heat of the Habanero 100, earning her first sub-30 finish, while Shashi found his way back to the trails at the 6-0 Ranch 50K. With both eyeing even bigger challenges ahead, this conversation is equal parts hilarious, inspiring, and a testament to what happens when runners embrace the chaos of the road.Be sure to subscribe to the podcast wherever you listen, and we always appreciate you leaving a good rate and review. Join the Facebook Group and follow us on Instagram and check out our website for the more episodes, posts and merchandise coming soon. Have a topic you'd like to hear discussed in depth, or a guest you'd like to nominate? Email us at info@happyendingstc.org

Annie Jackson has been a key player in the successes of the industry's most prominent beauty companies. Annie began her career at Estée Lauder, where, after six years, she was recruited to be one of the early members of the team that launched Sephora USA and Japan. Later, she took on the role of Director of Global Product Marketing for Benefit Cosmetics and, in 2011, returned to her roots in merchandising for color cosmetics at Sephora within JCPenney. Her love of beauty and quest for cleaner options led her, alongside Shashi Batra, to create Credo Beauty. As Co-founders, they shared a vision to change the way people think about what they put in and on their bodies and skin, fostering a new generation of beauty brands—natural, organic, effective, clean, and sustainable—and to pioneer the clean beauty movement. In today's episode, Nada talks with Annie about the non-traditional path that led her to the beauty industry. Annie shares her ambitious jump into adulthood when she crossed the country without the benefit of family or a degree, but found herself with a dream job at Estée Lauder. After spending time at two global brands, Annie took a break to be with her children, and later, she returned to the beauty space when an industry friend lured her back with a new vision. She recalls her initial hesitancy when her soon-to-be business partner, Shashi, pitched the idea of Credo. She quickly discovered her passion for clean beauty and an opportunity to reshape the industry by offering consumers transparency and skincare alternatives that were good for them and the planet. Check out Credo's website for brand and store information. Also, “The Dirty List” PDF can be found on Credo's Clean Standard page. Follow on Instagram: @credobeauty. Please follow us at @thisislibertyroad on Instagram; we want to share and connect with you and hear your thoughts and comments. Please rate and review this podcast. It helps to know if these conversations inspire and equip you to consider your possibilities and lean into your future with intention.

Gang reflects on their failures on not being able to be astro talk. They also listen to Shashi uncle singing offkey and apologize that they wanted him to be INC chief and then Yogi Ji movie trailer. MV from PCCIPod is with us on the episode too.

Today, Jonathan lays out more fully his thoughts about the Peak Skis debacle; Luke Koppa offers his perspective too; and they discuss Jonathan's initial comments made here on GEAR:30 back on May 23, what he's been up to and learning since then, and what we think needs to happen going forward.RELATED LINKS:BLISTER+ Get Yourself CoveredJason Blevins' article on Peak SkisGEAR:30 ep 191: Bode on Peak SkisGEAR:30 ep 163: Bode on Crosson Skis TOPICS & TIMES:Be Like Rocco, Rosemary, & Shashi (1:10)Some Background re: Peak (4:54)Reckless Spending (8:01)False Promises & Broken Contracts (11:57)How to Operate in the Outdoor Community (16:00)Lawsuits (23:17)Peak's Crowdfunding Effort (26:55)What Needs to Happen Next? (31:00)CHECK OUT OUR OTHER PODCASTS:Blister CinematicCRAFTEDBikes & Big IdeasBlister Podcast Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Today on TPE we look at the Indian and Pakistani delegations, their narratives and the official state propaganda of both countries.Is Pakistan a t*rrorist state?What is the history of India and Pakistan?We look at Balochistan, Hindutva Terrorism, Narendra Modi, the aftermath of Pahalgam, the India-Pakistan conflict and the Bilawal Bhutto and Shashi Tharoor delegations.The Pakistan Experience is an independently produced podcast looking to tell stories about Pakistan through conversations. Please consider supporting us on Patreon:https://www.patreon.com/thepakistanexperienceTo support the channel:Jazzcash/Easypaisa - 0325 -2982912Patreon.com/thepakistanexperienceAnd Please stay in touch:https://twitter.com/ThePakistanExp1https://www.facebook.com/thepakistanexperiencehttps://instagram.com/thepakistanexpeperienceThe podcast is hosted by comedian and writer, Shehzad Ghias Shaikh. Shehzad is a Fulbright scholar with a Masters in Theatre from Brooklyn College. He is also one of the foremost Stand-up comedians in Pakistan and frequently writes for numerous publications. Instagram.com/shehzadghiasshaikhFacebook.com/Shehzadghias/Twitter.com/shehzad89Join this channel to get access to perks:https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC44l9XMwecN5nSgIF2Dvivg/joinChapters:0:00 History of India-Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh3:16 India's position on Kashmir5:00 Pakistan's support for militancy, FATF and crack down7:16 Pakistan Establishment's relationship with militant groups12:31 Timeline of the recent conflict15:30 America's support for militant groups, the Taliban and Pakistan20:30 India and Pakistan's narratives and Narendra Modi22:40 Narendra Modi, BJP and Hindutva Terr*rism27:00 Religious Extremism30:00 Islamophobia in India, India's belligerence and Godi Media33:29 India's flawed narrative

The American Farm Bureau estimates that roughly 40% of US farmland is either rented of leased. It's a reality that creates a labyrinth of contracts and agreements between farmers and landowners that the two have to navigate together. One entrepreneur is turning to the power of software to transform that challenge into an opportunity that makes that relationship a little easier to navigate. Shashi Raghunandan, CEO of Oaken, joins us to talk the complex web between landowners and farm operators. We get into: The existing challenge between landowners and farmers, especially as farms grow to significant acreage Oaken as a platform not only manage multiple contracts for large acre farms but to also manage the unique specifics of each individual deal How the migration to cloud-based technologies like Oaken balance in an industry like agriculture that is largely relationship-based The feedback farmer customers are giving on the Oaken platform thus far Shashi's background in payments and financial services and how it paved the way to him connecting with Purdue DIAL Ventures and eventually leading Oaken What to expect from Oaken in the next 12-18 months

The American Farm Bureau estimates that roughly 40% of US farmland is either rented of leased. It's a reality that creates a labyrinth of contracts and agreements between farmers and landowners that the two have to navigate together. One entrepreneur is turning to the power of software to transform that challenge into an opportunity that makes that relationship a little easier to navigate. Shashi Raghunandan, CEO of Oaken, joins us to talk the complex web between landowners and farm operators. We get into:  The existing challenge between landowners and farmers, especially as farms grow to significant acreage Oaken as a platform not only manage multiple contracts for large acre farms but to also manage the unique specifics of each individual deal  How the migration to cloud-based technologies like Oaken balance in an industry like agriculture that is largely relationship-based The feedback farmer customers are giving on the Oaken platform thus far Shashi's background in payments and financial services and how it paved the way to him connecting with Purdue DIAL Ventures and eventually leading Oaken What to expect from Oaken in the next 12-18 months  

We begin our series of conversations with candidates running in the June Democratic primary. This hour, we sit down with Shashi Sinha, candidate for Rochester mayor. Sinha is an IT executive, real estate investor, and first-time candidate whose priorities for office include lowering taxes and increasing the availability of housing. Earlier this year, he told WXXI's Gino Fanelli, "I'm living a happy life; beside my family, nobody knows me. But if that kind of individual, average people like me don't stand up, who will?” Sinha joins us in the studio to discuss his background and his platform, and he answers our questions and yours. In studio:Shashi Sinha, candidate for Rochester mayor

Tell us what you though of the episodeProducer Shashi Ranjan explores the rich legacy of music, lyrics, and poetry in South Asian cinema—once the soul of storytelling—and how their influence is gradually fading in the face of Westernization and evolving audience tastes. This episode delves into the unique narrative power of Indian musical traditions and the poetic essence that once defined the region's films, while examining the cultural shifts reshaping global cinematic narratives.​Shashi Ranjan is an Indian actor, director, and producer known for his contributions to the Bollywood film and television industry. He has directed and produced films such as "Dobara" (2004) and "Dhoom Dadakka" (2008). As an actor, he has appeared in movies like "Guddo" (1985) and "Prem Geet" (1981). Additionally, he played the role of Mohanlal in the 2012 film "Gali Gali Chor Hai." ​#bollywood #bollywoodmusic #bollywood60s #bollywoodsongs #bollywoodlyrics  http://twitter.com/dreamingkingdomhttp://instagram.com/kingdomofdreamspodcasthttp://facebook.com/kingdomofdreamspodcast Watch the feature films that I have directedCitizen of Moria - https://rb.gy/azpsuIn Search of My Sister - https://rb.gy/1ke21Official Website - www.jawadmir.com

Yes yes, we've already done an episode on Shashi Kapoor, but his filmography is so vast and varied that there's always room for another! We both chose a film for his young, middle and older years, so there are 6 films under discussion today: Dharmputra (1961, his debut as an adult), Pyaar Kiye Jaa (1966), Chori Mera Kaam (1975), Trishna (1978), Pyaar Ki Jeet (1987), and In Custody/Muhafiz (1994).If you want to read Beth's post on Chori Mera Kaam, it's here https://www.bethlovesbollywood.com/2009/10/chori-mera-kaam.htmland all her blog posts on Shashi films are here https://www.bethlovesbollywood.com/search/label/house%20favorite%3A%20Shashi%20Kapoor. The song Beth mentions (Are Kahe Ko Kahe Ko) is here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CYwzDNBpbwI with the beating heart at about 2:45. Subscribe to Filmi Ladies on Spotifyhttps://open.spotify.com/show/7Ib9C1X5ObvN18u9WR0TK9 or Apple Podcastshttps://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/filmi-ladies/id1642425062@filmiladies on Instagram Pitu is @pitusultan on InstagramBeth is @bethlovesbollywood on BlueskyEmail us at filmiladies at gmailSee our letterboxd for everything discussed on this podcast. https://boxd.it/qSpfyOur logo was designed by London-based artist Paula Ganoo @velcrothoughts on Instagram https://www.art2arts.co.uk/paula-vaughan

Bhagawan Shiva is Shashi-shekhara. Shashi is a name given for the moon . The meaning of the word is one who has a rabbit like mark . Moon shows a rabbit like mark when seen from earth so it is given that name . Shekara means crest or crest ornament. One who wears moon as an ornament in his crest is called shashishekara . Moon is the presiding deity of the mind.  The crescent moon is symbolic of our mind being steady. The moon goes through waxing and waning but the moon on Lord Shiva's jata does not go through any modification. It remains steady. Vedanta says Manaso Devataa Chandramaaha. In the Vedas, Shiva Sankalpa sukta's each mantra ends with the line – Tan me manah Shiva-sankalpam astu. May my mind have an auspicious resolve. By the grace of Lord Shiva, may our mind have positive and auspicious resolve. May we not fall for negative thinking. May we continue to lift ourselves higher and higher. Moon also is a symbol of coolness. As seekers, we have to keep our mind cool and calm. Though Lord Shiva is known for anger or Rudra Tandava, yet he is calm, composed and equanimous. He is a yogi whose mind is very calm. Bhagawad Geeta says - Prashanta manasam hyenam, yoginam sukham uttamam. The calm mind of a yogi experiences Supreme Bliss. Shivagamas say that chandra is the symbol of Jnana or ultimate wisdom. Moon is also symbol of yogic bliss. Lord Shiva is the greatest yogi so he bears moon ( divine bliss ) on his crest. The scriptures describing yoga shaastra also compares moon with unmani sthithi (thoughtless state beyond the mind). Advaita speaks of it as Amani bhaava(state of Consciousness, beyond thoughts).Comment “Chandra” to get the story of how moon came to adorn Bhagawan's crest and why He is called Chandrashekhara #shiva #chandra #moon #mahadev #yogalife #yogic #bliss#advaita #mindset #mind #mindfulness #spirituality

Shashikant lyengar, who has worked in Big Pharma for years before giving it up, now leads the low carb movement in India. He is an integral part of dlife.in, India's only Low carb platform. He has co-hosted the Metabolic Health conference 1.0-3.0 which boasts of a stellar line up of guests. He is back on in this episode where he shares all the research that have been done regarding the prevalence of metabolic syndrome, hypertension, diabetes, micronutrient deficiencies and mental health in healthcare providers. How fit are the doctors that you go to?Follow him on him socials - X - @shashiiyengarIG - @shashikant_iyengarLearn more about the Low Carb Nutrition and if you want to enroll into their program then check out - www.dlife.inApologies for the technical issues in the end.

Welcome back to another enlightening episode of The Brand Called You (TBCY). Today, our host Ashutosh Garg engages in a thought-provoking conversation with Shashi Kumar, the visionary Founder and CEO of Akshayakalpa Organic. Shashi shares his remarkable journey from a tech career to revolutionizing organic dairy farming in India. Background:Shashi came from a farming family and witnessed the struggles of making farming viable. Initial Conversations:Along with a group from Wipro, they discussed overhauling traditional farming practices. Accidental Journey:Became an engineer at the cusp of the technology revolution, which influenced his outlook on farming. Fundamental Idea:Focused on making farming profitable and sustainable by managing small problems like soil management.

Tell us what you though of the episodeDiscover the untold story of legacy in "The Roshans" as acclaimed director Shashi Ranjan joins the Kingdom of Dreams podcast.Known for his remarkable work on Netflix's series "The Roshans," Shashi shares his creative journey, from building trust with the Roshan family to crafting a heartfelt narrative that blends cinema, emotion, and human connection.  Shashi Ranjan is an Indian producer born in New Delhi, India. Ranjan has also worked as actor and director. He is married to his wife Anu Ranjan. He did his graduation in Humanities from Punjab University and later joined prestigious FTII, India.Don't miss this insightful conversation! Watch now and immerse yourself in the world of cinema and storytelling.#untoldstoriesoflegacy #filmindustrygrowth #stories #thestateofthefilmindustry #filmindustryinsights http://twitter.com/dreamingkingdomhttp://instagram.com/kingdomofdreamspodcasthttp://facebook.com/kingdomofdreamspodcast Watch the feature films that I have directedCitizen of Moria - https://rb.gy/azpsuIn Search of My Sister - https://rb.gy/1ke21Official Website - www.jawadmir.com

In this episode, Justin Rodriguez, General Manager at the Shashi Hotel, shares insights on how technology is transforming the hospitality experience at their hotel in the heart of Silicon Valley.Listen to learn:How Shashi Group is using technology to create a customizable room experience for guests.The impact of technology on the hotel's staff and operations.The benefits and challenges of implementing new tech in a hospitality setting.How the hotel uses guest data to enhance service and improve guest interactions.Examples of unique services and amenities enabled by technology.The importance of flexibility and adaptability in meeting guest preferences.Insights into the future of hospitality and the role of technology in shaping guest experiences.You might also enjoy: This Hotelier is Next to Google, Sees The Future, and Shares What He's Doing About It (Dipesh Gupta, Shashi Group)Send Josiah a text Sign up for the Mint Pillow newsletter and start receiving the independent hotel industry's freshest newsletter today. Take my State of Hotel Industry Survey now to get insights on challenges, priorities, and opportunities in hospitality today.A few more resources: If you're new to Hospitality Daily, start here. You can send me a message here with questions, comments, or guest suggestions If you want to get my summary and actionable insights from each episode delivered to your inbox each day, subscribe here for free. Follow Hospitality Daily and join the conversation on YouTube, LinkedIn, and Instagram. If you want to advertise on Hospitality Daily, here are the ways we can work together. If you found this episode interesting or helpful, send it to someone on your team so you can turn the ideas into action and benefit your business and the people you serve! Music for this show is produced by Clay Bassford of Bespoke Sound: Music Identity Design for Hospitality Brands

Brought to you by the Founders Unfiltered podcast by A Junior VC - Unscripted conversations with Indian founders about their story and the process of building a company. Hosted by Aviral and Mazin. Join us as we talk to Shashi Kumar, the Founder and CEO of Akshayakalpa Organic about their story. Shashi completed his BE and Master's in Telecommunication and Software Engineering in 1995. He began his career as an MTS at CG-Smith Software, progressed to Lead Architect at Wipro Technologies, and ultimately founded Akshayakalpa Organic in 2016.

Last time we spoke about the Sino-Soviet Conflict of 1929. In 1919, Soviet Commissar Lev Karakhan promised China the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway at no cost, aiming to foster good relations amid the Russian Civil War. However, the Soviets retracted the offer, causing tensions. Over the next decade, control of the railway shifted between Chinese and Soviet hands, sparking conflicts. By 1929, Zhang Xueliang, a Chinese warlord, attempted to reclaim the railway, leading to military confrontations. Despite initial diplomatic efforts, the situation escalated into a full-scale war. The Soviets, under General Vasily Blyukher, launched a powerful offensive, using their superior military force to overpower the Chinese defenses. After intense battles, including naval engagements, the Soviets gained the upper hand, leading to heavy Chinese casualties and loss of territory. The conflict ended with the Soviets firmly in control, highlighting the fragile nature of Sino-Soviet relations during this tumultuous period.   #122 The Chiang-Gui War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. With the reunification of China, China's Warlord Era was over…but it really wasn't. Chiang Kai-Shek came to Beijing via a trail laid open by Yan Xishan. The Northern Expedition had been completed by August, just as the Generalissimo promised it would. According to previous agreements amongst the KMT, he tendered in his resignation upon completing the Northern Expedition. But the party refused to accept it, instead the Generalissimo was commanded to go visit the tomb of Dr Sun Yat-Sen over in the western Hills. He was accompanied by many of his generals who all oversaw a impressive ceremony, culminating with Chiang Kai-Shek weeping before Dr Sun Yat-Sen's shrine. Now Beijing was of course a symbol of China's Manchu past. The KMT and all revolutionaries within China for that matter hated it for that reason. It was seen as suitable enough for the government of North China, but not for the national capital, no this was moved to Nanking. Nanking of course had been seen as the secondary capital for centuries and held ancient history as being the first capital of China. Yet there was a lot of opposition to this. The Northern Chinese of course wanted to retain Beijing as the capital, many Chinese scholars had arguments against it, the foreign legations were annoyed at the idea of moving their residence and staff, so on and so forth. There was a great love for the northern capital, for its wonderful shops, restaurants rich history and such. Many did not believe Nanking could match Beijing's beauty. But the KMT assured all Nanking would become the gem of China. Beijing, which was actually called Peking at this time, again I just keep using modern terms to not confuse you guys, but Peking was then changed to Peiping translating to “northern peace”. As much as the capital was ruffling feathers, another more pressing issue was the enormous NRA army now that they had no Northern Expedition to run. Armies are not cheap, demobilization obviously needed to be done. However the KMT dragged their feet on the issue. Demobilization is something many governments face, but China's situation was rather unique. The NRA held many professional armies, made up of men who had never been anything but soldiers with no desire to become civilians. Many of the NRA generals also did not wish to carry on as civilians. Most of these men were doing a career and knew nothing else. In June of 1928, over 2 million men were on military pay roll. The minister of finance, T.V Soong, believed in keeping straight books and protested the enormous military expense. The KMT central committee passed resolutions and formed a plan; the standing army, needed to be cut down to at least 715,00 men. But when it came to deciding who gets disbanded, here lay the troubles.  There was another issue, the mechanics of the new government. In the first days of the peace, Chiang Kai-Shek had proven himself a pretty good manager. He had a lot of help from his political right hand man, Hu Hanmin, and they were on good terms. Chiang Kai-Shek was quite popular in the beginning, many looked up to him. However as the days went by, things started to crumble. The first major conflict occurred when Chiang Kai-Shek attempted to do away with the political subcouncils in Guangzhou and Wuhan. Chiang Kai-Shek argued this new united China did not need any more than a single central federal government office. The regimes in Guangzhou and Wuhan needed to disband and become integrated properly at Nanking. However Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren were the respective governors of the two provinces that held these regimes and they very much liked their current status. They obviously resented what they saw as a slight against them by Chiang Kai-Shek. Both men began using the term “dictator” to describe Chiang Kai-Shek, they said things like he was getting too big for his boots.  Now going back to the roots of the KMT, Dr Sun Yat-Sen had hoped to implement a national constitution. Yet simply flinging out what Sun Yat-Sen had once written down was out of the question, a new constitution needed to be drafted. Thus, basically for the next 5 years, China went through an awkward transformation process, trying to become a real voting republic. But in the meantime the country was controlled by a government of 5 “yuans” (committees). These were the executive, legislative, control, judicial and examination committees. The high officials of these committees were members of the State council, also seen as a cabinet, headed by the President. Chiang Kai-Shek became the first president and was very careful on who he included in his cabinet. Yan Xishan became the Minister of the Interior and Feng Yuxiang Minister of War. Both of these men were still bonafide warlords, but they were the two leaders who helped reunify China with him. He had to keep them happy, they controlled vast private armies, he also knew to keep them close.  Nanking was fraught with activity, but no demobilization. Months went by. Chiang Kai-Shek was happy, it was quite a creative time for him, but the reality was, the government was filled with potential traitors, great amounts of land were not really assimilated, nor were their populations. Nonetheless China had not seen such unity in centuries. Chiang Kai-Shek felt an immense sense of pride, he himself was full of energy and overworking. Chiang Kai-Shek began promising to rebuild Nanking in a fitting style. A magnificent tomb was planned for the slope of Purple Mountain, above the ruins of the old Ming temple, where Sun Yat-Sens remains would be moved. The city was remodeled, its old narrow and messy streets were cleared out. Nanking possessed a certain antiquity look, and many were fond of it and hated the construction efforts. Chiang Kai-Shek envisioned retaining the Chinese style of architecture, with sloping roofs, painted ceilings, tiles and courtyards, but also clean, cool interiors with electrical appliances. He basically wanted to blend the new with the old. Chiang Kai-Shek found an American architect to help rebuild Nanking. He also began hunting down advisors for just about every field. He looked up foreign farmer experts, German military advisors, American educational advisors, medical advisors, highway construction advisors and such. The climax to it all was recognition of the new Nanking government from the great powers. Chiang Kai-Shek found himself stuck in interviews with diplomats nearly every day. It is said the Generalissimo worked from dawn to night, with his wife Meiling as his secretary. Her primary role was translating important work into English, she was also his English interpreter. Meiling pushed Chiang Kai-Shek to try and learn English so he would be less dependent on her. She taught him as best as she could, and he was apparently making good headway until he had a incident. One day he was meeting with the British Minister and tried to practice his english by saying “good morning, Lampson” but instead he said “kiss me, Lampson”. Henceforth he never tried talking in English with foreigners. In May came some excitement with the Sino-Soviet conflict. Zhang Xueliang literally tossed the Soviet ultimatum to Nanking, an unwelcome gift to Chiang Kai-Shek. Ultimately Zhang Xueliang could do nothing against the Soviet power. It was certainly a blow to China, but perhaps in the grand scheme of things, Chiang Kai-Shek's mind worried more about the Japanese. The Soviets and Japanese were not all Chiang Kai-Shek should have been worried about, there were plenty of internal enemies. Back in July of 1928, it was estimated the NRA held over 2.2 million soldiers within 84 corps and 272 divisions. This accounted for an annual expenditure of over 800 million yuan, when the national fiscal revenue was something like 450 million yuan. Chiang Kai-Shek advocated for demobilization, hoping to bring it down to 1.2 million with 80 divisions, thus reducing expenditures to 60% of the national budget. By January of 1929 the issue came up again, now based on German military advisors advice, Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to reduce the NRA to 50 divisions at around 800,000 troops. His First Army belonging to the central system would be reorganized into 20 divisions, and the remaining army groups would be divided into 10 divisions. Uh huh you see where this is going. Chiang Kai-Shek also proposed establishing a 200,000 man strong military police force. So if you remember from the end of the Northern Expedition, there were 4 NRA collective armies. The 1st was led by Chiang Kai-Shek, the 2nd by Feng Yuxiang, the 3rd by Yan Xishan and the 4th by Li Zongren. Each of these men were warlords in the own right with cliques behind them. For example Li Zongren was the leader of the New Guangxi Clique who controlled Guangxi, Hunan, Hubei and parts of the Shanhai pass connecting Hubei to Tianjin. The NRA 4th army had 16 divisions and 6 independent units, some 200,000 troops. When Wang Jingwei went into exile, Li Zongren inherited his Wuhan regime government. Li Zongren also had the support of Li Jishen who controlled Guangdong. Now Chiang Kai-Shek certainly had the upper hand, his first NRA army was 500,000 strong and he was the President of the nation. Yan Xishan had over 200,000 troops in his 3rd NRA army and controlled the Shanxi clique, Shanxi province, northern Hubei, Beijing and Tianjin. Lastly Feng Yuxiang had 400,000 troops in his 2nd NRA army, was the leader of the Guominjun and controlled a large part of northwest China, alongside Henan. Alone none of the others could challenge Chiang Kai-Shek, but what if they united against him?  The Guangxi clique led by Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren had won a lot from the northern expedition. They controlled Wang Jingwei's old Wuhan Regime, Guangxi, Hubei, but did not control all of Hunan. They both felt they should control Hunan and its lucrative revenues of course. Yet the governor of Hunan insisted the taxes collected were property of Nanjing. So Bai Chongxi and Li Zongrenplaced him under house arrest. After this Lu Diping was appointed by Li Zongren to preside over Hunan's civilian government affairs. Lu Diping was forced to work with a bitter rival, He Jian. What the Guangxi Clique members did not know was that Lu Diping had been groomed by Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang Kai-Shek also began arming Lu Diping's private army in February of 1928. He Jian found out about this and reported it to the rest of the Guangxi clique. Li Zongren took notice of the situation and immediately had Lu Diping removed from office and deported. He was replaced by He Jian, go figure. Lu Diping then fled to cry to Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang Kai-Shek was furious his man had been taken out of office and began threatening the Guangxi clique. Li Zongren's family were living in Nanking at the time and he took them quickly over to the Shanghai concession as he believed a storm was brewing. Li Zongren then met with Chiang Kai-Shek striking a peaceful deal by march 2nd, both agreeing He Jian would temporarily serve as the chairman over Hunan. However back over in Hunan, the situation was quickly deteriorating. Guangxi troops were taking out political opponents in the province and looked to be fomenting a rebellion. Chiang Kai-Shek took decisive action and mobilized his forces to pacify the Guangxi clique. Li Jishen, fearing a war would break out at any moment, sped north to Nanking to mediate, only to be arrested upon arriving by Chiang Kai-Shek. He was charged with treason. With Li Jishen out of Guangdong, the Cantones Generals Chen Jizhen and Chen Mingshu tossed their lot in with Chiang Kai-Shek, thus severing the Guangdong-Guangxi alliance. On March 21st Nanking issued a statement expelling Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi and Li Jishen from the KMT, accusing the 3 men of treason.  Now Chiang Kai-Shek actually was dealing with a lot more than insubordination from the Guangxi clique, in fact there was a growing anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition forming. I wont get into it here, but Feng Yuxiang was raising hell in the northwest, Yan Xishan was not at all happy with the new Nanking government and even Wang Jingwei over in Europe was tossing public accusations against Chiang Kai-Shek. This led a lot of KMT officials to resign in protest. Chiang Kai-Shek had a serious rebellion, perhaps a civil war on the horizon. He reacted first by bribing key Northern Chinese leaders to be neutral for the time being so he could focus all of his attention on the Guangxi clique menace. Chiang Kai-Shek did another clever thing, he reconciled with the exiled Tang Shengzhi. Many forces under Bai Chongxi were former soldiers under Tang Shengzhi, many of whom were still loyal to him. Chiang Kai-Shek brought Tang Shenzhi back over to China from Japan and dispatched him to Tangshan in Hubei, where he was ordered to steal back two of his old divisions from Bai Chongxi.  Yes Chiang Kai-Shek was playing the divide and conquer strategy. First he bribed as many as he could, so he could focus on the Guangxi clique. Then amongst the Guangxi he tried to bribe some and arrest others, isolating Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren. In the face of the situation, Zhang Xueliang was the first to publicly express his support for Chiang Kai-Shek, he was followed by Liu Wenhui, the warlord over Sichuan, then Yan Xishan and finally a reluctant Feng Yuxiang.  Initially Bai Chongxi was going to lead his troops station in Hubei to march south to Xuzhou to try and link up with other Guangxi clique forces to advance east and attack Nanking. However as he quickly found out, most of his troops were loyal to Tang Shengzhi who purchased their service and stole them from him. Bai Chongxi lost control over a significant part of his army, panicked and fled Hubei by boat. He intended to flee for Hong Kong, but Chiang Kai-Shek ordered the Navy to halt the ship, and if it did not stop to sink it. Li Zongren quickly asked support from Japanese allies to get Bai Chongxi safely to Hong Kong. Meanwhile Li Zongren began mobilizing 3 armies under Guangxi Generals Xia Wei, Tao Wei and Hu Zongqi. These armies were intended to be deployed in Huangpu and Wuxue, however Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi could not physically get over to them to command them. Meanwhile Chiang Kai-Shek appointed General Zhu Peide in command of 5 divisions in Jiujiang and Nanchang. Their job was to occupy the Wuchang-Changsha railway, thus cutting off the withdrawal of any troops from Guangxi. Chiang Kai-Shek also placed General Liu Zhi  in command of 5 divisions over in Anhui and Hubei's border area with orders to attack Wuhan and General Han Fuju would take 5 divisions from southern Henan to attack Wuhan. On March 31st, Chiang Kai-Shek dispatched his general attack orders. Subsequently He Jian betrayed the Guangxi clique and joined Chiang Kai-Shek. Within the Guangxi clique, the Generals Hu Zongtang, Tao Shu, Li Mingrui and Yu Zuobai all began inhouse fighting over old petty grudges. Chiang Kai-Shek learnt of the situation and bribed Yu Zuobai and Li Mingrui to join his side for 400,000 silver dollars. On April 3rd, Li Mingrui's troops began to defect over in Huayuan and Xiaogan. A bunch of other Guangxi Generals began contacting Chiang Kai-Shek privately, tell him they would not participate in the civil war and asked if they could take their men safely out of the region. So many gaps in the Guangxi cliques defensive lines around Wuhan were exploited by Nankings forces coming from Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan and Yichang. Nearly surrounded at Wuhan, the Guangxi forces fled into western Hubei. At the same time, Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi both arrived in Hong Kong and made their way to Guangxi only to find the situation an utter mess.  On April 11th, Nanking issued a message calling upon the Guangxi clique's soldiers to give up resistance. The demoralized Guangxi troops of Xia Wei, Tao Jun, Hu Zongtang all began surrendering themselves at Shashi, Yichang and other places. On April 25th, Chiang Kai-Shek unleashed an offensive into Guangxi. The response by the surviving Guangxi Clique was to establish an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition on May 5th. They dispatched a telegram calling upon everyone to join them and initiated an offensive first aimed at Guangdong. By the 15th, Feng Yuxiang heeded the call, and began discussing how the Guominjun might send troops to attack Chiang Kai-Shek. However Feng Yuxiangs colleagues, Han Fuyu and Shi Yousan urged Feng Yuxiang not to do so. Then Chiang Kai-Shek offered Feng Yuxiang the position as president of the Executive committee, control over Hubei and Hunan if he continued to support him and send forces against the Guangxi rebels. Feng Yuxiang superficially agreed to Chiang Kai-Sheks request, mobilizing his forces between Henan and Hubei. While this looked like he was helping Chiang Kai-Shek, in reality he was eagerly waiting in the shadows for Chiang Kai-Shek and the Guangxi clique forces to weaken so he might pounce upon Wuhan. By mid May Guangxi's troops began entering Guangdong from two directions, easily overwhelming he Guangdong Provincial army, and marched into Guangzhou. Chiang Kai-SHek mobilized further armies in Hunan, Yunnan and Guizhou to invade Guangxi. This soon saw major battle break out in the Baimu region, ultimately dislodging the Guangxi troops from Guangdong and back into Guangxi. However, simultaneously, the Guangxi forces advanced on the front lines in Guilin and Liuzhou, defeating the Xiangjun, Qijun, and Qijun troops. In the same month, in Hunan, a significant push was made from Shonan to Guilin; meanwhile, Chen Guangdong's forces attacked Zhaoqing from Wuzhou, He County, and Guizhou's Dushan County, ultimately seizing Liuzhou. Chiang Kai-shek quickly mobilized forces led by Li Mingrui, Yu Zuobai, and the old Guangxi clique army under Yang Tenghui to move south towards Guangdong and west to attack Guangxi. Thanks to the strong efforts of these forces, they swiftly captured Wuzhou and Guiping. Wei Yunwei abandoned the city, and the Guangxi forces were unable to sustain the fight. Guangxi Province was attacked from three fronts, with enemy forces advancing from Longzhou. By June, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, and Huang Shaoxiong had fallen. Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, and others fled to Hong Kong, Sai Kung, Haiphong, and other locations. On June 27, Li Mingrui and his troops entered Nanning. The new Guangxi clique was defeated, and Chiang appointed Li Mingrui, Yu Zuopeng, and Yang Tenghui to govern Guangxi Province. The war concluded with Chiang's victory. What became known as the Chiang-Gui War had lasted for 3 months and ended in victory for Chiang Kai-Shek. It was a severe blow to the Guangxi Clique, though not a fatal one. The Guangxi clique leaders had lost considerable power, but those like Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi would return to cause further trouble.  Victory would be short lived however. As Feng Yuxiang arrayed his forces between Henan and Hubei hoping to pounce on Wuhan at the right moment, Chiang Kai-Shek defeated the Guangxi clique far too quickly. Feng Yuxiang's opportunity was lost and he became extremely bitter over this. Knowing full well what Feng Yuxiang had been planning to do, Chiang Kai-Shek mobilized forces in Shandong and Henan to suppress the Guominjun.  Feng Yuxiang then declared himself commander in chief of the Northwest National salvation army, officially joining the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek cause. Chiang Kai-Shek then bribed Generals Han Fuju and Shi Yousan to defect over to his side greatly hurting Feng Yuxiang. Chiang Kai-Shek also unleashed propaganda warfare accusing Feng Yuxiang of sabotaging the revolution, being treasonous, trying to obstruct the unification of China and such. On May 23rd, the KMT central committee removed Feng Yuxiang from all of his posts and permanently expelled him from the party. Two days later Chiang Kai-Shek personally called Feng Yuxiang, asking him to go into exile abroad and hand over his remaining forces. Completely isolated politically and militarily, Feng Yuxiang sent a nationwide telegram on the 27th expressing his resignation. In order to mitigate Chiang Kai-Shek's advances, and in order to see if he could gain an alliance, Feng Yuxiang took his family to Shanxi on June 21st, claiming to the nation he was about to go abroad. Instead he had Yan Xishan place him under house arrest within the Jinci Temple at Jian'an village.  Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan were not friends by any measure. But they were quick to reach an understanding. The two Warlords made a formidable combination and had similar attributes. Both were strongmen, with firmly loyal and affection forces. Feng Yuxiang had his theatrical Christian values and rustic simplicity. Yan Xishan had this record of being a just man of the people. Both understood their names combined would see many join their cause. They named their coalition the Peoples Army.Yan Xishan then joined Feng Yuxiang to publicly label Chiang Kai-Shek a dictator. Despite the energy and charisma, what the two men lacked as a brilliant political mind, and suddenly Wang Jingwei came out of the woodwork. Wang Jingwei joined their coalition, obviously hoping to get revenge and dethrone Chiang Kai-Shek. He supplied them with loftier motives and more stylish vocabulary. Together they publicly accused Chiang Kai-Shek of departing from the original spirit of the revolution; that he was the scourge of democracy; nothing more than a military man who sought to seize the power of government. Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren bandwagoned and it seemed a large part of China was becoming very anti-Chiang Kai-Shek. After this a “telegraph war: erupted for over a month. Yan Xishan demanded the currently KMT government step down so he and Wang Jingwei could lead a reorganization, implementing proper votes by all party members to determine the party's policies going forward in a more fair manner. Chiang Kai-Shek responded he was willing to step aside for Yan Xishan but not Wang Jingwei. Then Chiang Kai-Shek bribed Yan Xishan with 12.5 million dollars of foreign currency if he backed down. To make matters more complicated, during all of this, Feng Yuxiang sent a secret message with his subordinate Lu Zhonglin to forces in Shaanxi asking them to send people to contact Chiang Kai-Shek. He did this deliberately, making sure Yan Xishan found the note and of course suspected him of being in league with Chiang Kai-Shek. Some real game of thrones shit. It seems Feng Yuxiang pulled a big brain move, because Yan Xishan under the belief Feng Yuxiang was colluding with Chiang Kai-SHek, then publicly claimed he was the commander in chief of the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition and that his deputy commanders were Feng Yuxiang, Li Zongren and Zhang Xueliang. So, it seems Feng Yuxiang had dragged Yan Xishan to be binded to the cause because perhaps he knew Chiang Kai-Shek was trying to bribe and divide them?  On February 23, under the leadership of Yan Xishan, 45 generals including Feng Yuxiang , Li Zongren, Zhang Fakui, He Jian, Han Fuju, Shi Yousan, and Yang Hucheng jointly sent a telegram demanding a "general vote of all party members to establish a unified party." On February 27, 1930, Yan Xishan personally visited Feng Yuxiang in Jian'an Village, where they apparently hugged each other and cried, saying to each other: "We live and die together, share hardships, and fight against Chiang until the end" Then they  pledged their blood to form an alliance. Very theatrical. The next morning Yan Xishan hosted a banquet for Feng Yuxiangs family where 34 representatives joined the anti-chiang kai-shek coalition. This became known as the Taiyuan conference. On March 1st the coalition sent officials into 19 provinces and cities including Peiping, Nanking, Guangzhou and overseas to attack Chiang Kai-Shek. They stated "If Chiang refuses to give up, the revolutionary forces will be increasingly destroyed by him. I sincerely hope that our compatriots and comrades throughout the country will , rise up together and eliminate the thieves together.". That sam month the Nanking government held their third plenary session where they expelled Wang Jingwei officially from the party. Yan Xishan then called Chiang Kai-Shek asking him personally to step down. On March 15th, 57 generals from the former 2nd, 3rd and 4th NRA armies sent representatives to Taiyaun to discuss the anti-chiang movement. There they listed 6 crimes Chiang Kai-Shek had committed and promoted Yan Xishan to officially be the commander in chief of the army, navy and air forces of a new Republic of China. Li Zongren, Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Xueliang would be his deputy commanders. Yan Xishan's army moved into the government offices in Peiping where KMT forces were disarmed. In April 1st, Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang and Li Zongren announced the inauguration in Taiyuan, Tongguan and Guiping of their anti-chiang army, however one name was not present, that of Zhang Xueliang. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After performing the Northern expedition and finally reunifying China it took all but…what just over a year for it to collapse? It really seemed most of China hand banded together against the Generalissimo, but he was no fool and had planned accordingly. The anti-Chiang Kai-shek coalition would find themselves in a war they may very well lose. 

Matt and Mike had a great conversation with Shashi Lo this week! Shashi is a senior software engineer at Microsoft and founder of Gridiron Survivor - an open source NFL Survivor pool SaaS application that's designed to help the junior developers working on it further their skills and knowledge through real-world experience. Unlike self-taught personal projects, Shashi walks us through how his mentees on the Gridiron Survivor project are guided through corporate standards such as writing clean code and covering all the bases with proper testing - concepts that may seem superfluous on small portfolio project, but are a must-have in a corporate setting. Show Notes: https://www.htmlallthethings.com/podcasts/mentoring-developers-with-shashi-lo Companion Article: https://www.htmlallthethings.com/blog-posts/bridging-the-skills-gap-empowering-junior-developers-through-apprenticeship-programs  

In this episode of the Modern Web Podcast, we sit down with Shashi Lo, Senior UX Engineer at Microsoft and the founder of the Gridiron Survivor project. Shashi shares his approach to mentoring junior developers by helping them bridge the gap between boot camp and their first job in tech. We cover the challenges of onboarding, the importance of code reviews, and how companies can better support new talent by investing in mentorship and training. Shashi also talks about his experience with building a community of learners, the process of de-risking junior candidates, and why companies should be more proactive in nurturing the next generation of developers.  00:00 - Meet Shashi Lo 02:25 - The Gridiron Survivor Project 05:02 - The Importance of Code Reviews 07:25 - Teaching the Basics of Project Communication 09:47 - Code Reviews as a Learning Tool 12:06 - Why Shashi Mentors: Giving Back to the Community 14:26 - The Importance of De-Risking Junior Candidates 16:41 - Building in Public: Transparency and Learning 19:00 - Assessing Candidates for the Gridiron Survivor Project 21:25 - The Power of Simple Coding Tests 23:45 - Scaling Up Skills: From Small Tasks to Big Projects 26:07 - Should Companies Be Doing This? 28:25 - Finding Hidden Gems in the Job Market 30:47 - The Challenges of Filtering Candidates 33:02 - Where to Find Shashi Online 34:38 - Closing Remarks Follow Shashi Lo on Social Media Twitter: https://x.com/shashiwhocodes Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/shashilo/ Github: https://github.com/shashilo Sponsored by This Dot.

Bestselling author Lesley Crewe reflect on how the slow pace of Cape Breton Island inspired her latest novel, Talia Kliot shares captivating historical fiction recommendations, catching up on CBC Books' most anticipated fiction novel of Spring 2024 on this episode of the summer edition of The Next Chapter with Christa Couture.

In this episode of The Core Report: Weekend Edition, host Govindraj Ethiraj sits down with Mr. Shashi Kiran Shetty, Founder and Chairman of Allcargo Group, India's largest homegrown logistics multinational. With operations spanning 180 countries, Allcargo has been at the forefront of transforming India's logistics landscape. Mr. Shetty shares his insights on India's evolving port infrastructure and the complexities of shipping schedules in today's global market. He reflects on his early days in the industry, transporting garments, footwear, and textiles, and how he established Allcargo in 1994 as a leader in shipping cargo from India. The discussion dives deep into pivotal moments like building India's first container freight station and the impact of the Ukraine-Russia conflict on global ports. Mr. Shetty also sheds light on how Allcargo navigated through the onslaught of COVID-19 and the importance of becoming a digitally enabled business amid the latest disruptions.About Shashi Kiran ShettyMr Shashi Kiran Shetty is the Founder and Chairman of Allcargo Group, India's largest homegrown logistics multinational with operations in 180 countries. Over the past two decades, he has spearheaded Allcargo Group's foray into new verticals and geographies, with over 18 successful strategic acquisitions in India and across the globe, the most significant of which was the acquisition of the world's leading LCL consolidator, ECU Worldwide (then ECULine), and the acquisition of India's premier express distribution company – Gati.Listeners! We await your feedback....The Core and The Core Report is ad supported and FREE for all readers and listeners. Write in to shiva@thecore.in for sponsorships and brand studio requirements.For more of our coverage check out thecore.inJoin and Interact anonymously on our whatsapp channelSubscribe to our NewsletterFollow us on:Twitter | Instagram | Facebook | Linkedin | Youtube

Is there an AI bubble and if so what does it mean to businesses? Geoff Livingston and Greg Verdino discuss the AI bubble with guest Shashi Bellamkonda, Principal Research Director, Marketing & AI Research and Advisory for Info-Tech Research Group. The three explore a hype wave or a bubble in the AI industry and the challenges faced by companies that have overinvested in generative AI. They also discuss the role of OpenAI and its missteps in managing consumer expectations. The conversation highlighted the importance of practical applications and the need for critical thinking when it comes to AI. The conversation explores the future of AI and its impact on various industries with an emphasis on driving revenue growth rather than just focusing on cost savings. Chapters 04:43 The AI Bubble: Hype Wave or Bubble? 12:10 The Missteps of OpenAI 21:07 The Importance of Critical Thinking in Evaluating AI 31:29 Consolidation and Shakeout in the AI Market Shashi's LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/sbellamkonda/ Shashi's X Account: https://x.com/shashib Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this episode of Front End Happy Hour, we're joined by Shashi Lo, a Senior Software Engineer at Microsoft, to explore our thoughts on the journey after attending a engineers complete a bootcamp. Shashi shares his experiences mentoring self-taught developers and bootcamp graduates, discussing the skills that are often missing and the creative ways to bridge the gap between education and landing that first job in tech. Guests: Shashi Lo - @shashiwhocodes Panelists: Ryan Burgess - @burgessdryan Augustus Yuan - @augburto Picks: Shashi Lo - Frontend Mentor https://www.frontendmentor.io/ Ryan Burgess - Prompt Crafting - Nando Costa https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/prompt-crafting-nando-costa-08drc/ Augustus Yuan - Electric Spoon https://news.sky.com/story/electric-spoon-that-enhances-salty-taste-of-food-and-promotes-healthier-eating-launched-in-japan-13146505 Episode transcript: https://www.frontendhappyhour.com/episodes/after-attending-a-coding-bootcamp

In this weeks podcast, Ps Phil sits down with Ps Clarance and Deborah Shashi, lead pastors of Destiny C3 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Ps Clarance & Deborah were recently made the Regional Directors for Mainland SE Asia, a quickly growing region including churches across Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. Hear their story of becoming pastors and some valuable refections on what have been significant keys in seeing church growth. In this conversation we explore the transformative power of God's presence in our lives and churches. We're reminded that making space for the Holy Spirit is crucial for church growth and individual spiritual development, and when this is partnered with healthy, intentional community an atmosphere for growth is created. “Growth comes from making room for God's presence and building genuine connections.

In this episode of the Top CMO podcast, host Ben Kaplan interviews Shashi Kiran, former CMO of Fortanix. Shashi shares his insights on maintaining a startup mindset amidst rapid market changes and the key traits successful marketers need. With over 20 years of experience in business and technology roles, Shashi discusses the challenges and adaptations required when transitioning from large companies like Cisco to smaller, well-funded startups. He delves into the importance of learning and adaptability, the benefits of predictability in marketing, and the strategic approach to scaling businesses. Tune in to learn how Shashi navigates the complexities of marketing in both large and small enterprises and his perspective on staying cutting-edge in a dynamic industry.

In the latest heart-stirring episode of HappyCast, join Stephanie as she takes on the formidable Copper Kings 100, an awe-inspiring mountain race crafted by ultra-runner Wes Plate. Set in the picturesque town of Butte, Montana, this race is not for the faint of heart—marked by its "fatass" style, it challenges runners with no aid stations and no course markers, demanding resilience and raw endurance.Central to this episode and the race itself is Butte's towering landmark, Our Lady of the Rockies. This 90-foot statue of the Virgin Mary, perched atop the Continental Divide, stands as a beacon of hope and perseverance for the runners. Conceived as a tribute to all women, especially mothers, the statue overlooks the city from over 8,500 feet above sea level, embodying the spirit of community and undying faith.As Stephanie navigates the unmarked trails of the Copper Kings 100, the imposing silhouette of Our Lady of the Rockies serves not only as a literal landmark guiding her through the night but also as a metaphorical guide through the challenges of the race. With Richard at the helm as crew and Shashi setting the pace, the episode delves into the trials and tribulations of nighttime navigation, the unexpected hurdles after the sun sets, and the mental battle that ensues deep into the endurance test.Through candid storytelling, Stephanie explores how the serene yet formidable presence of Our Lady of the Rockies inspired her to push beyond her limits. The episode also teases the future of the Copper Kings 100, questioning whether it will retain its grassroots "fatass" charm or evolve into a more commercialized race. Listeners are encouraged to stay tuned to Ultrasignup for updates on this unique mountain challenge.Be sure to subscribe to the podcast wherever you listen, and we always appreciate you leaving a good rate and review. Join the Facebook Group and follow us on Instagram and check out our website for the more episodes, posts and merchandise coming soon. Have a topic you'd like to hear discussed in depth, or a guest you'd like to nominate? Email us at info@happyendingstc.org

Dr. Shashikant "Shashi" Singhal is a biomaterials expert...a dentist and researcher with Ivoclar. After a short discussion about the best way to find interesting food when traveling, Shashi and Alan have a deep conversation about advances in cementation of indirect restorations. Ivoclar's goal is to give as many options as possible while making the options simple to use Read your instructions! Ivoclar is interested in finding the "pain points" of the clinician and solving them! Offering a light cured AND dual cured option...flexibility is the key Ivoclar has nailed color stability between light cured and dual cured (imagine cementing a veneer next to a full crown) What is Ivoclar Academy? (a BUNCH of free continuing education!) Some links from the show: Ivoclar Variolink Esthetic Ivoclar Academy Ivoclar Adhese Universal Do you have questions for Dr. Singhal? You can get in touch with him at Shashikant.Singhal@ivoclar.com! 

Continuing our Kapoor series, we discuss Shashi Kapoor's family in this episode: wife and actress Jennifer Kendal and their children Karan, Kunal, and Sanjana. If you know anything about them at all, it's probably that they all launched in films and never went anywhere as actors, but we watched a film starring each of them to flesh out that story. Jennifer, of course, was an accomplished stage actor before her marriage to Shashi, and when she chose to dip her toes back in acting, you can see the talent! Films discussed: Junoon (1978), 36 Chowringhee Lane (1981), Vijeta (1982), Sultanat (1986) (read Beth's essay here https://antiserious.com/sultanat-the-epic-of-fictitioustan-bf1f42c80838), and Hero Hiralal (1988) Have you seen any of these films? Subscribe to Filmi Ladies on Spotify https://open.spotify.com/show/7Ib9C1X5ObvN18u9WR0TK9 or Apple Podcasts https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/filmi-ladies/id1642425062 @filmiladies on Instagram and Twitter Pitu is @pitusultan on Instagram Beth is @bethlovesbolly on Twitter Email us at filmiladies at gmail See our letterboxd for everything discussed on this podcast. https://boxd.it/qSpfy Our logo was designed by London-based artist Paula Ganoo @velcrothoughts on Instagram https://www.art2arts.co.uk/paula-vaughan

Our cities have changed -- but the ways in which they are governed and imagined can take time to catch up. Shashi Verma joins Amit Varma in episode 386 of The Seen and the Unseen to describe his journey in thought and action -- and his pioneering work in reshaping urban transport. (FOR FULL LINKED SHOW NOTES, GO TO SEENUNSEEN.IN.) Also check out: 1. Shashi Verma on LinkedIn and Centre for London. 2. Shashi Verma on Transport in the 21st Century -- Episode 83 of Brave New World, hosted by Vasant Dhar. 3. The Brave New Future of Electricity -- Episode 40 of Everything is Everything. 4. Guns, Germs and Steel -- Jared Diamond. 5. Gita Press and the Making of Hindu India — Akshaya Mukul. 6. The Gita Press and Hindu Nationalism — Episode 139 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Akshaya Mukul). 7. Deepak VS and the Man Behind His Face — Episode 373 of The Seen and the Unseen. 8. How We Do the Small Things -- Amit Varma. 9. Praise for intelligence can undermine children's motivation and performance — Claudia Mueller and Carol Dweck. 10. Fixing Indian Education — Episode 185 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Karthik Muralidharan). 11. Confronting Constraints: Shashi Verma & Transport for London Tackle a Tough Contract -- Harvard case study. 12. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure -- Oliver Hart. 13. India: The Dabhol Power Corporation -- Shashi Verma's case study for Harvard Kennedy School. 14. The Practice of Medicine — Episode 229 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Lancelot Pinto). 15. The Epic of Gilgamesh. 16. Dunbar's number. 17. The Life and Death of Ancient Cities -- Greg Woolf. 18. The Complete Sherlock Holmes -- Arthur Conan Doyle. 19. Urban Governance in India — Episode 31 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan). 20. The Importance of the 1991 Reforms — Episode 237 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan and Ajay Shah). 21. The Life and Times of Montek Singh Ahluwalia — Episode 285 of The Seen and the Unseen. 22. The Reformers -- Episode 28 of Everything is Everything. 23. The Death and Life of Great American Cities — Jane Jacobs. 24. The Power Broker — Robert Caro. 25.  Michael Beesley and Cost Benefit Analysis -- CD Foster. 26. Pritika Hingorani Wants to Fix Our Cities -- Episode 361 of The Seen and the Unseen. 27. Reclaim the Sky -- Episode 11 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Alex Tabarrok). 28. Status Quo Bias. 29. Parkinson's Law — C Northcote Parkinson. 30. Seen/Unseen episodes with singing by Karthik Muralidharan and Ashwini Deshpande -- and no singing by TM Krishna. 31. Wanderers, Kings, Merchants: The Story of India through Its Languages — Peggy Mohan. 32. Understanding India Through Its Languages — Episode 232 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Peggy Mohan). 33. Pyaasa -- Guru Dutt. Amit's newsletter is active again. Subscribe right away to The India Uncut Newsletter! It's free! Amit Varma and Ajay Shah have launched a new video podcast. Check out Everything is Everything on YouTube. Check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing. Episode art: ‘London Calling' by Simahina.

Gautam Bhattacharyya welcomes arbitrator and independent practitioner, Manini Brar in this “Spotlight on…” episode. We discover what drew Manini to the law, who her greatest mentors and inspirations have been, and how she developed an interest in international arbitration. The conversation then turns to Manini's launch of Arbridge Chambers and the differing roles of counsel and arbitrator, before closing with Manini's views on achieving greater diversity, equity, and inclusion.   ----more---- Transcript: Intro: Hello and welcome to Arbitral Insights, a podcast series brought to you by our International Arbitration Practice lawyers here at Reed Smith. I'm Peter Rosher, Global Head of Reed Smith's International Arbitration Practice. I hope you enjoy the industry commentary, insights, and anecdotes we share with you in the course of this series, wherever in the world you are. If you have any questions about any of the topics discussed, please do contact our speakers. And with that, let's get started. Gautam: Hello, everyone, and welcome back to our Arbitral Insights podcast series. And our latest edition is going to be another very informative and fun one, I am sure. I'm very delighted to say our guest today is Manini Brar. Hello, Manini. Manini: Hello, Gautam. Hi. Gatuam: It's great to see you again. It's wonderful to see you. The last time I saw you was in Delhi during Global Arbitration Review's Delhi Live and as part of Delhi Arbitration Weekend. And it's lovely to see you again. Thank you for agreeing to be part of this podcast. Manini: Like I said before, when we were leading up to this, this seems to be a podcast which is very popular and has a loyal following. So I'm very happy to be here. But the other is that we got along so well over that dinner over Delhi Arbitration Week that I'm seeing this as a bit of a two-way exchange where I get some insights from you as well. So that's part of my motivation. Gautam: Well, that's wonderful to hear. And I hope I won't disappoint you. I will do my best to achieve what you hope that we could achieve in the course of this podcast. And I really am over the moon that we're doing this one together. I have a lot of admiration for you, Manini, and that's why I'm so happy that we could have you on this podcast. As I always do, I'm going to give a quick introduction to you as our guest. So Manini is a dual qualified lawyer. She's qualified in India and in England and Wales. She has worked in a variety of places and gained much experience. So both in private practice... She's worked with senior advocates in India. She's worked at arbitral institutions. She's been involved as a tribunal secretary on a number of occasions. And in 2021, set up her own chambers in Delhi called Arbridge Chambers. And is not only a wonderful counsel, but is one of that rare generation, which I love to see, female arbitrators of ethnic origin. And I make no bones about it I love that so that's a quick introduction to you Manini I hope I've done you justice in that introduction I could never do you justice because I need to take 10 or 15 minutes to go through all your wonderful accolades but I hope that's uh at at least a good summary for our listeners. Manini: No no this is great because when I hear it back it sounds you know so much better than when one has lived it. Gautam: Well, I can assure you, you've achieved a lot. And in the course of this podcast, we are going to explore, I hope, a fair bit of the things that I mentioned. And I mean, I guess a really appropriate way to start this is what inspired you to the law in the first place? Manini: So just a bit of background, I was in an all-girls school where I was the head of the debating society. So I loved to debate and I really thought I was going to get into an area which involved more public service. And what I had in mind at the time was journalism. And my father looked at me when I told him that and said, that's all right. But if you're expecting me to fund your professional journey through journalism. Gautam: That's a good leveler, right? That's a good leveler. Manini: So I said, okay, what is it that I can do where I will be immediately qualified to help the larger public good? And for me, it was an easy choice. It was becoming a lawyer. And then I got to law school and within a month of being there I knew that this is something that I wanted to do and I've never looked back. Gatuam: Now that's great and you know I suppose in many ways lawyers are in some part journalists right because we tell stories right so I dare say that in the context of your legal career you have also borne out your journalism dreams I'm sure you have. You know, one of the things that we all benefit from in the course of our careers are wonderful people who mentor and inspire us. And I know that I've got a number of people who've held those roles for me. And I'd be really interested, and I know our listeners would be, if you could just share with us some of those people who've been your greatest mentors and inspirations in your career so far. Manini: You know, I have a slightly different experience with finding a mentor only because I don't belong to a legal family and I have actually no one in my family is a lawyer and we're not even remotely connected to business. My dad was a cop. He was an IPS officer in India. So I sort of went through this journey a bit on my own. And as much as I would have loved to have one particular person who I could have, you know, tugged along with and had the benefit of the experience, that is something that I never, a point that I never really got to. But what did happen for me is that. Almost all the people that I worked with were very high level professionals. And not only the seniors that I worked with, but also my colleagues. And so I've had the good fortune of really meeting inspiring people who have set the bar very high in terms of what is expected of a lawyer and what is the kind of professional etiquette that you should have. And that is something that I have taken with me from different people at different points of time in different ways and sort of held on to. So the seniors that I worked with at the bar, some of the lawyers, some of the colleagues that I've worked with, they've been very helpful. But for me, I think the most inspiring thing has been a bunch of people who didn't know me, who had no relationship with me, who had not mentored me, not helped me, not been in touch with me professionally, but who found me out to help a total stranger. So my professional journey is one which is full of these amazing instances of... Goodwill of generosity from total strangers and that I find is something that I would really like to give back in future and I try to every day. You know I try and I try and seek out the people who I think are meritorious and I try and sort of take them along if they need any help or if there's any way that I can help them I try and do that because I know that there have been so many people who have done that for me. Gautam: You know, that in itself is really inspiring and uplifting to me, Manini. I must tell you, you know, and I'm going to just spend a few seconds because you did say to me, and I'm not one to turn down a request from you, that you wanted to hear a little bit of my thoughts. And, you know, so one thing I love is you're also first generation, I'm first generation. There was no one I could turn to. No one gave me a leg up. No one gave me any favors or anything on a plate. And I had to discover the law for myself and everything. So, I mean, I know that your family has always been a great inspiration to you. My family, of course, has been a great inspiration to me and continues to be. But also, I think professionally, it's very interesting. There have been some people along my career that I've known for the last, you know, I am older than you, over the many, many years that I've I've been doing all of this, but you know, there are some people who I look back on and who, I mean, there was, it's some people who I didn't even meet who inspired me. And I think I want to dwell on that for a few seconds, because I remember when I was very junior, there was a, someone called Shashi Rajani, who at that time, and I've never met Shashi, but he, when I began in 1991 in a law firm, he was already a senior partner in a city law firm in London. And that was a really peculiar thing, right? To see someone like that, of that age, of that level of experience at that time was really something. And that inspired me to want to be like him. The other person who inspired me at that time in 1991 is I heard of a certain person who became a very, very dear friend of mine and a great mentor of mine. And who unfortunately we lost in February of this year, Fali Nariman. I didn't meet Fali until a lot later, but I came to know of him through reading about him back in the early 90s. And I thought to myself, I really want to be like him. So it's really interesting. And I won't dwell on other people because we haven't got time, but there are so many people I owe a huge debt of gratitude to. But it's those people who I I heard about, I read about in the early stages of my career, who really gave me the drive to try to be something. And I'll always be grateful to all of them. And Uncle Fali remains, even though he's now left us, a huge inspiration to me. Manini: Can I just add to that, that, you know, one of the first things I did when I enrolled at the bar in 2010 was I went to court number one, which is the chief's court in the Supreme Court. And I sat there during the lunch recess just to sort of take it all in and you know there were these big so they have these portraits of all the chief justices and then and then of one particular judge who had done the country a great favor during the emergency and I was sitting there and I was looking at their portraits and feeling very inspired and then lunch recess got over and the first matter that came up was one where Fali was arguing. So we have that in common. I have been thoroughly inspired by him. And then I bought his book and I got someone to help me get his autograph on it. And so I read Before Memory Fades and it's one of the most influential things in my life. Gautam: Oh, I agree. That book, I've got a signed copy myself of that book. And it still inspires me just to read some of those stories, anecdotes and stuff so no no it's wonderful well no I mean and I say it's nice to know that and I probably wouldn't have found that out but for this podcast with you so that's a really nice thing. So now one of the things that you've done really well is you you've gained a lot of experience in the field of arbitration. As a practitioner, as a tribunal secretary, with institutions, and now as a practitioner and arbitrator. But how did you first discover arbitration? Or how did arbitration discover you? Manini: So I joined a litigating lawyers chamber back in 2011, about 13 years ago. It was one of the beginning, starting years of my practice. And I thought that I was going to go to court every day. But in about the third week of my being there, these three very thick binders landed on my table. And there were three different arbitrations regarding very complex hydropower project. And so for the one, one and a half years that I was associated with that chamber, I worked only on that matter. And then I said, okay, this is something that I enjoy because I really feel that as compared to court litigation, a lot visibly happens in an arbitration over good, careful drafting, over good structured arguments. And it is, shall I use the word, but a very equitable way of resolving disputes. So I was attracted to that. And then I decided to study further and do my master's in Cambridge, where I studied dispute resolution in particular. And from then on, there was no looking back. I worked as a research assistant with one of my professors, and he was kind enough to recommend me to the ICC. And I think that was when I absolutely fell in love with the practice all over again. Because one thing that the ICC taught me, and you've referred to my various experiences, is that you have to absolutely know the process and what is market best practice before you feel confident enough to start giving your opinion about it or to start using that as a legal skill or to use that to advise other people. So I think the repetition of the tasks that we had to do every day at the ICC is really where I learned that. So I said, before I start my own practice, I need to know what this whole scene is about the litigating lawyer who's doing arbitration, about the arbitration chambers that are only doing the arbitration hearings but not appearing in court, about the involvement of the government. Because a lot of arbitration in India is government facing. It's either government contracts or it has one element involving a government tender. And so I made it my mission to sort of get a perspective on everything before I felt like I was confident enough to, you know, branch out on my own. Gautam: Well, well, fabulous. And that's a perfect segue to asking you about branching out on your own, because I mentioned mine in the introduction. That you are the founder of Arbridge Chambers in Delhi. And you founded that chambers in 2021. And so just tell us a little bit about, what drove you to set up your own chambers? And, you know, tell us a little bit about Arbridge Chambers in terms of your team, and the sorts of work that you're currently involved in, of course, no names, of course, because we all respect confidentiality, but the sorts of things that you and your team are doing. Manini: So Arbridge Chambers happened because, like I said, I always wanted to get into independent practice and have a setup of my own. And the constant struggle for me was, of course, one was being sure that I know everything that I need to know, that I have the skill and the wherewithal. But the other was also that every time I spoke to someone about setting up an independent arbitration practice, they said, well, why don't you do it in a firm? You know, because firms have larger teams, they're dealing with bigger projects, and it will be easier for you to do more meaty arbitrations. And I thought that in India in particular, the firm setup inevitably involves engaging a separate council for the court-facing part of the arbitration. Most often than not, although now that is changing, but that was the setup then. And I said, I don't want to be in that system where I have to choose between which part of the arbitration I'm involved in. And so that wasn't working for me and the other thing that people said a lot was that you know you're going to be a small fish in a really big pool and I looked around myself and there were so many practitioners who were male who had their own independent practices and were identifying as arbitration practitioners and I just wondered why is it that there are no women doing this. So for me, I said, let's see, you know, that was my thought process that if it doesn't work in, say, three years or five years, I will go back and I'll do something else. But if it does work, then great kudos for us. And so I set up a chamber where the people who work for me also see themselves as independent advocates. So we work together on matters that, for example, are mine. But I also encourage them to take on independent work. And the idea is very much like a chamber for everybody to eventually develop into their own practitioner. When I started I must tell you I started in the January or January of 2021 and that is the month that I found out that I was pregnant with my first child. So I left and I thought that no I'm going to focus on client facing business development and I have so much work to do and about 15 days after I made this announcement that i'm starting in my chamber, I found out I was pregnant. And then I just kept thinking for another couple of months, how I'm going to do it. And, you know, how is this thing going to come about? And one day I was walking very furiously on my evening walk, thinking of all this and thinking, maybe this is a really bad time. Maybe I should park it for another three years. And I got a call from the Delhi High Court, from a judge who said, I have read some of your published articles on arbitration and I have a really small arbitration that I'm looking for an arbitrator for and would you be interested and this is you know one of those people who who has no connection with me I spoke earlier about the generosity of strangers and that's how I started my practice he gave me two matters one one was the small arbitration another one was a batch matter which had 18 connected arbitrations. And that actually sustained me through those initial phases of my practice. Gautam: Now, that's a great story. That really is. I mean, you know, there's so much in there, which I love. First of all, you had the courage and the desire to set up your own chambers and your own practice. Number two, you weren't put off by people saying that you'd be a small fish in a big pond. I love that. Number three, you said that there were lots of men in their own chamber, so why shouldn't there be a woman? I love that. And I love also, amongst other things, that point you just made about a stranger to you, a judge who rang you up and said, look, I've read your publications, which just shows it's really worthwhile to all the younger lawyers listening on this podcast. You can never start publishing too early. Always love the law, love the practice, write about it, add to knowledge. That's really important. Now, the fact that you did that, Manini, led to that lovely circumstance that you got these matters and then that helped you. And it's just, no, there's a lot in there that's very inspirational. And, you know, well, look, thank goodness you didn't get put off and you've certainly made a great success. So, you know, as I know, our listeners will, of course, know from you and everything you stand for. So, no, that's really interesting. And also the point that you mentioned about how you love to see colleagues of yours branch out themselves. I think that's another thing. I mean, again, I'm going to use your request to me to say a little bit about my perspective to what you say. I think that's so important. You see, you have to want people who work with you, not just to equal you, but to surpass you, right? And there's no point looking to help people and benefit people and mentor people, inspire people, if you don't want them to do really, really, really well. And so I love that message from you, Manini, there. You covered a lot of ground in that last answer, and I loved it. So then, now that you're a counsel and an arbitrator, I wanted to get your perspectives on, you know, what are the key skills that you think an arbitrator really absolutely has to have? Manini: You know, so this journey of trying to be both and wear both hats is actually a very challenging one. And I have immense respect for people who have done it before me and done it so well. Because when you're practicing in India, especially, for example, in a high court like the Delhi High Court, which has very high stakes and it's one of the most highly regarded courts in the country, you'd– on on an everyday basis you have about 50 to 60 matters listed before a particular judge so you have about three minutes to make your point and you have to do it in spite of the other lawyer sort of also trying very desperately to make his point so the entire skill involved is is to be quick, to be to the point, and to get the relief that you want loudly and quickly. And when you're being an arbitrator, the thing that you have to do is park that argumentative side of your personality completely and stop judging the matter for its merits, before they are presented to you. That essence of being a neutral, of not having an opinion about either the people who are appearing before you or the case the merits of the case that they may have without actually looking at their pleadings and and keeping a balanced view is really the the core of what you're expected to do and it is drastically different from how you think as a counsel so I think for me that is the most important thing. I don't try and go behind the party's intentions when I'm wearing the arbitrator hat. I don't try and go behind, well, why are they putting this counsel forward to argue or why did he time his application in this particular way? I don't get into that unless it is argued before me. So that's what I try and do. And I think that has worked for me so far. And it has helped me to resolve disputes efficiently because we don't get caught up in the rigmarole that a lot of, I think, other people sometimes get stuck with. Gautam: Yeah, no, I'm again, I couldn't agree more. And I think you're so right. It's just that approach. You know, when we were at GAR in Delhi together last month, you would have met, I hope you would have met Sadaf Habib, who was one of the other panelists on another panel that you weren't on at GAR. And one of the things that she mentioned about her experience as an arbitrator was about having empathy and trying to be balanced in the approach that you give and feeling, as always, that each side has the ability to feel that, you know, okay, they might have won, they may have lost, but they've been fairly heard, that they've been respectfully heard, and they've been empathetically heard. And I think that's a really important point which you've touched on there. And I think that's such an, that really, I think that's one, from my perspective, I think that's one of the things that differentiates arbitrators, because people do know who the very decent ones are in terms of character, personality, and their traits. Now, one thing I want to ask you about, Manini, is you and I both know that there are happily many more women like you coming through as arbitrators, but there aren't enough of them, right? And I think we can agree on that. There are not enough. And I know that you're also a massive champion of diversity, equality and inclusion and the advancement of women. And we, of course, I mean, I have the privilege of sitting with you on the advisory board of Indian Women in International Arbitration. And we both share that passion for the advancement of women. But in terms of. From your perspective, what more can the community do to ensure that more women get those opportunities, more women get appointments as arbitrators, more women get the recognition they deserve? What more can we do? Manini: I think this conversation has to start somewhere from recognizing the multiple roles that women play in society and recognizing that success is not a unidimensional thing. It's not really about making it to the 40 under 40 list or having your name up on Chambers and Partners when when your male colleagues are also there because you take time out as a woman you take time out to have a family you take time out to you know set up your marriage and you make decisions around those life choices so i think one of the things that absolutely needs to happen is the conversation needs to shift towards gender inclusivity in the sense of really understanding that the two genders perform very different roles in society and factoring that in when you measure success. For example, I have not set myself up for these unreasonable standards of, for example, being a senior counsel in the Delhi High Court by the age of 42. It's simply not something that I aspire towards, because I know that there are other facets to my life that I also want to take care of. And towards that, towards gender inclusivity, I think. Judges who are appointing arbitrators, institutions who are appointing arbitrators, parties who are appointing arbitrators, have to recognize that simply because a woman is not visible at every networking event or at every panel discussion doesn't mean that she's not capable or not interested. It's just that in a day, she has to do so many other things. And sometimes the priorities are different. On a particular day, your children need you more than work does. And so I know that there's a lot of pressure on being visible within the arbitration community. But I think there needs to be a certain amount of flexibility there. I mean, the example of the judge that I gave you before, right, he made the effort of going online to look at who were the new people, young arbitrators who were publishing or people who were talking about arbitration or were visible online, which kudos to him, he could have, you know, asked his juniors about who they met at the last conference who looked like a promising person, but he didn't, He made that extra effort and I think that is what we all need to do. As an arbitration community, we need to seek out women, because sometimes they're just held back by circumstances, and not really by a desire to, you know, hold back. Gatuam: I couldn't agree with you more. And I know, I just think that's, again, so inspirational. And, you know, people like you, that's what people, you are real role models for so many people, because you live and breathe those values and those aspirations and those beliefs. And, you know, and I know many people who listen listen to this podcast will feel that too.Now regrettably we've come to the - please is that something else you want to mention Manini? Manini: Yes I actually want to ask you Gautam that when you I know that you're you know also such a champion of diversity the fact that we're doing this podcast in some way is you know your step to put more people on the map and i want to ask you What is it that you see in the people around you as a quality that they should have to help diversity or to bring the community together? Gautam: Yeah, well, look, you know, thank you for that question. I think, you know, I just think that people need to be generous in their outlook. And I use that word because I think generosity is something that's very important. I think as people get more senior, more experienced, they owe it. A bit like you said earlier on in this podcast about giving back. We need to ensure that we leave our arbitration community, our legal community, our litigation community, our legal community a better place than when we arrived in it. Because one of the sayings that I remember reading many years ago was, the legal profession graces us. Lawyers don't grace the legal profession. And I think it's very important you look at it in that way, that you need to ensure that people get opportunities, not least because not everyone comes from a privileged background. Not everyone comes from the best schools, the best universities. Some people haven't got the best general knowledge, whatever you want to say. Some people haven't traveled as much as other people. But there's a real diversity in that. Some of the best people I've ever met and I've ever worked with. Are people who are unconventional, who aren't from a straight line, this background, that background. And I think that's when you've got to say a bit like you yourself said, and I'm going to steal one of your lines here, when you see good and you seek out people, because some people will actively come to you for mentorship and for help. But many people won't do that because they're not sure, they're afraid, you know, they're a bit uncertain about it. Make it easy for them, be generous and reach out to people and make sure that you leave the legal atmosphere that you've joined a much better place when you leave it. So that's what I would say. And I try to do that in the best way that I can. I'm not perfect by any means, but that's what I try to do. Manini: Inspiring. Thank you for that. That's a good tip. I'm taking it back, generosity. Gautam: No, thank you for asking me. And just so everyone knows on this podcast, these questions, which Manini are asking me are completely unscripted and I had no idea but I'm but I'm grateful to you for asking that to me. So we have regrettably come to the end of our podcast I could talk to you for hours Manini because there's so much we could talk about and and the dinner that we sat in together in Delhi last month as you yourself kindly said was a really really nice nice occasion. And I honestly could have spent hours just talking to you on many things. But we always end these podcasts with a bit of fun. And this podcast is no exception. So I want to ask you, what's your favorite sort of music? Have you got a favorite singer, a favorite group? So tell us about that. Manini: You know, these days, I've been spending a lot of time in my village in Punjab because of my kids. I like to take them there as much as I can because it's open and it's green. So I'm immensely immersed in Punjabi music. And these days, my favorite is Ali Sethi, who's a Pakistani singer. He's done some fantastic things in the past couple of years, and he's been to Coachella, and he's, you know, basically rocked the Punjabi music world. So I love that. Yeah, that's what I'm living by. Gautam: I love all that stuff. I mean, I yeah, yeah, no, know and you know I yeah I love that you know it's great to have that because it is great music someone who's played at Coachella has to be pretty cool as well just so everyone knows and the last quick question to you have you got a favorite travel place where you like to go with your husband and your children? Manini: It's actually London, London is my favorite. So yeah i think i think we have a lot in common more than more than the law beyond the law I love being in London because my sister is there and I love to shop and it's my shopping, and the other is home, Punjab. If I can get away from Delhi, it's either London or Punjab. These are my two options. Gautam: Well, dare I say, you know, one of the things I remember my dad saying many years ago is how proud he was that the rivers of Bengal ran so deep in his veins. And I dare say you would also say that you're very proud that the rivers of Punjab run deep in your veins. So, well, look, So it's been an absolute delight to do this podcast with you, Manini. Thank you very much for doing it. I've genuinely enjoyed it. I've been uplifted, inspired by you. I just think that our listeners will absolutely love hearing your perspectives and the enthusiasm and the drive that you bring to so many things. And I just want to end by saying, you know, very well done for everything you've achieved so far, and I wish you all continued success. So thank you again, Manini. Manini: Thank you so much. Thank you, Gautam, for having me. And I hope outside of this podcast, we're going to continue these conversations because I'm always looking to talk about. Gautam: We will. It's a promise. Thank you. Outro: Arbitral Insights is a Reed Smith production. Our producer is Ali McCardell. For more information about Reed Smith's global international arbitration practice, email arbitralinsights@reedsmith.com. To learn about the Reed Smith Arbitration Pricing Calculator, a first-of-its-kind mobile app that forecasts the costs of arbitration around the world, search Arbitration Pricing Calculator on reedsmith.com or download for free through the Apple and Google Play app stores. You can find our podcast on Spotify, Apple, Google Play, Stitcher, reedsmith.com, and our social media accounts at Reed Smith LLP on LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter. Disclaimer: This podcast is provided for educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice and is not intended to establish an attorney-client relationship, nor is it intended to suggest or establish standards of care applicable to particular lawyers in any given situation. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Any views, opinions, or comments made by any external guest speaker are not to be attributed to Reed Smith LLP or its individual lawyers. All rights reserved. Transcript is auto-generated.

In today's episode of Filmi Ladies, we continue discussing the Kapoor family. We've previously done episodes on Prithviraj Kapoor and his three sons - Raj, Shammi and Shashi. We now move on to the next generation - Raj's sons Randhir and Rajiv, plus we also discuss Babita Shivdasani, an actor and star in her own right before she became Randhir's wife and a Kapoor bahu. [Note: Pitu's phone initially autocorrected "bahu" to "baguette."] Films discussed: Farz (1967), Jawani Deewani (1972), Haath Ki Safai (1974), Ram Teri Ganga Maili (1985), and Prem Granth (1996), plus another splash of Kal Aaj Aur Kal. What are your thoughts on Randhir, Rajiv and Babita? Even though none of these Kapoors are in it, do watch the super cute Upar Wale Teri Duniya Mein from Haath Ki Safai starring the great character actor Satyen Kappu. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6T8_m1WlB0 Subscribe to Filmi Ladies on Spotify https://open.spotify.com/show/7Ib9C1X5ObvN18u9WR0TK9 or Apple Podcasts https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/filmi-ladies/id1642425062 @filmiladies on Instagram and Twitter Pitu is @pitusultan on Instagram Beth is @bethlovesbolly on Twitter Email us at filmiladies at gmail See our letterboxd for everything discussed on this podcast. https://boxd.it/qSpfy Our logo was designed by London-based artist Paula Ganoo @velcrothoughts on Instagram https://www.art2arts.co.uk/paula-vaughan

In this episode, we are joined by Dipesh Gupta, a hotel owner and operator at Shashi Group who has integrated cutting-edge technology into the guest experience, creating a truly personalized and innovative stay. (Which was profiled in a recent article from the Wall Street Journal, "Make Yourself at Home in the Hotel of the Future.")What You'll Learn:Lessons from His Career Journey: Discover how Dipesh went from an engineer in financial services and AI to a successful hotel investor and operator in Silicon Valley.Technology and Disruption: Understand why the hospitality industry is ripe for disruption and how technology can bridge the gap between current offerings and customer expectations.Customer-Centric Innovation: Explore how focusing on the customer can lead to significant innovations, from digital keys to hyper-personalized guest experiences.AI in Hospitality: Get insights into how AI can empower hotel staff to offer meaningful, personalized interactions with guests."Living Room in a Box" Concept: Hear Dipesh's vision of bringing your living room to your hotel room, complete with personalized settings for temperature, lighting, and entertainment.Future Trends: Hear predictions about the future of the hospitality industry, including the role of technology, sustainability, and multi-dimensional lifestyle offerings.Thoughts, questions, suggestions? Send me a text message This episode is brought to you with support from Sojern. I teamed up with Sojern to study how hoteliers use data to drive revenue and build stronger guest relationships. You can see what we found in this research report: How Hotel Brands Are Using First-Party Data to Drive Revenue & Build Stronger Relationships. Want to get my summary and actionable insights from each episode delivered to your inbox each day? Subscribe here for free.Follow Hospitality Daily and join the conversation on YouTube, LinkedIn, and Instagram.Music by Clay Bassford of Bespoke Sound: Music Identity Design for Hospitality Brands

He has been a driver of change at Transport for London, which has shown the way to the rest of the world. Shashi Verma joins Vasant Dhar in Episode 83 of Brave New World to share his learnings on urban transport -- and the governance structures that lead to the best results. Useful resources: 1. Shashi Verma on LinkedIn and Centre for London. 2. Albert Wenger on the World After Capital — Episode 29 of Brave New World. 3. Estimating the Social Benefit of Constructing an Underground Railway in London -- CD Foster and ME Beesley. 4. A History of London Transport -- TV Barker and Michael Robbins. 5. The Subterranean Railway --  Christian Wolmar. 6. Evaluating Urban Transport Improvements -- Anthony J Venables. 7. Agglomeration, Productivity and Transport Investment -- Daniel J Graham. Check out Vasant Dhar's newsletter on Substack. Subscription is free!