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Last time we spoke about the Japanese Victory over Changkufeng. Japan's generals hatched a plan: strike at night, seize the peak, then bargain if need be. Colonel Sato, steady as a compass, chose Nakano's brave 75th Regiment, selecting five fearless captains and a rising star, Nakajima, to lead the charge. Ahead, scouts and engineers threaded a fragile path through darkness, while distant Soviet tanks rumbled like distant thunder. At 2:15 a.m., wire breached and soldiers slipped over the slope. The crest resisted with brutal tenacity, grenades flashed, machine guns spit fire, and leaders fell. Yet by 5:15 a.m. dawn painted the hill in pale light, and Japanese hands grasped the summit. The dawn assault on nearby Hill 52 and the Shachaofeng corridor followed, with Takeshita's and Matsunobe's units threading through fog, fire, and shifting trenches. Narukawa's howitzers answered the dawn with measured fury, silencing the Soviets' early artillery as Japanese infantry pressed forward. By daybreak, the Russians were driven back, their lines frayed and retreating toward Khasan. The price was steep: dozens of officers dead or injured, and a crescent of smoke and memory left etched on every face.    #181 The Russian Counter Offensive over the Heights Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After admitting the loss of Changkufeng and Shachaofeng by dawn on 31 July, the Russian government issued a communique the next day asserting that Soviet troops had "hurled back a Japanese division… after a two-day battle" involving tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Some hours after the Japanese penetration, Soviet regulars rushed to the scene and drove out the invaders. Japanese losses amounted to 400 men; Soviet losses were 13 killed and 55 wounded. On Soviet soil, the Japanese abandoned five cannons, 14 machine guns, and 157 rifles, while the Russians admitted losing one tank and one gun. A Soviet reconnaissance pilot may have fallen into Japanese hands after bailing out. "Both before and during the Japanese attack… Soviet troops did not once cross the Manchukuoan frontier,which deprived them of the possibility of surrounding or outflanking the invaders." By 1 August, Russian ground forces were deployed and the Soviet Air Force took action. Soviet aircraft appeared at 24:30 to reconnoiter. Soon after, more than ten planes flew in formation, launching strikes against forward units. Eight sorties, light bombers and fighters, roughly 120–150 aircraft in flights of two or three dozen, bombed and strafed. Raids were conducted by as many as 30 planes, though no Soviet losses were reported. The Russians also hit targets on the Korean side of the Tumen. The 75th Regiment judged that the Soviet Air Force sought only to intimidate. Russian planes dropped several dozen bombs on the Kyonghun bridge, but the span was not struck; damage was limited to the railway, producing an impression of severity that was misleading. The lack of air cover troubled the troops most. Japanese casualties on 1 August were modest: three men wounded in the 75th Infantry, and one wounded and a horse killed in the 76th. However the three Japanese battalions expended over 15,000 machine-gun and 7,000 rifle rounds that day. The appearance of Soviet air power at Changkufeng drew anxious international attention. Shanghai reports electrified observers, who anticipated that major Russo-Japanese hostilities would transform the China campaign overnight. Some observers were openly dismayed, foreseeing a prolongation of the mainland war with potential benefits to Soviet interests. Japanese Army spokesmen sought to downplay the situation. Officers in Hsinking told correspondents that the raids, while serious, represented only a face-saving measure. The Red Army was reportedly attempting to compensate for losses at Changkufeng and other disputed positions, but aside from the bombings, the frontier remained quiet. If the Russians were serious, observers noted, they would have bombed the vital Unggi railway bridge, which remained untouched; raids focused on minor bridges, with limited damage. In Tokyo, foreign observers believed the appearance of about 50 Soviet heavy bombers over North Korea signaled an extension of the incidents and that the Japanese government was taking urgent measures. Military leaders decided not to escalate but prepared for emergencies. The Korea Army Headquarters denied Soviet bombing of Harbin in Manchuria or Najin and Chongjin in Korea. Regarding retaliation, an American correspondent reported that the Japanese military had no intention of bombing Russian territory. Although Soviet use of aircraft introduced a new dimension of danger, the main efforts remained ground-based on both sides. After Japanese troops cleared Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, the Russians appeared to be redeploying to contract their defensive frontage; no troops or works remained west of Khasan. Four or five Russian infantry companies and ten artillery pieces stood between the lake and Paksikori, while the main forces, with numerous gun sites, were concentrated west of Novokievsk. On the Kwantung Army front in southeast Manchuria, no changes were observed. "The Russians were apparently shocked by their defeat at Changkufeng and must suddenly have resorted to negative, conservative measures." Korea Army Headquarters assessed the situation as of the evening of 31 July: "The enemy must fear a Japanese advance into the Novokievsk plain and therefore is concentrating his main forces in that district. Our interests require that we anticipate any emergency, so we must prepare the necessary strength in the Kyonghun region and reinforce positions at Wuchiatzu."  At 20:45 on the 31st, the 19th Division received a detailed message from the Hunchun garrison commander describing his northward deployments. Suetaka was heartened; he "earnestly desired to bring about the end of the incident as a result of the fighting of 30–31 July but was equally resolved to defend the border firmly, based on Japanese interpretation of the Hunchun pact, in case the Soviet side did not perform intensive self-reflection." First, Suetaka issued instructions from Kyonghun at 8:15 on the 31st via K. Sato: "It is our intention that Changkufeng and the high ground northwest of Shachaofeng be secured, as well as the high ground south of Shachaofeng if possible. Enemy attacks are to be met at our positions, but you are not to pursue far." Second, Colonel Tanaka was instructed not to fire as long as Russian artillery did not bombard friendly forces. "Except for preparing against counterassaults, your actions will be cautious. In particular, harassing fire against inhabited places and residents is prohibited." Suetaka was finally armed with formal authority, received at 22:05 on 1 August. He did not delay in implementing it. At 23:00 he ordered the immediate rail movement of strong reinforcements: the alerted infantry brigade headquarters, as well as four infantry battalions and the remaining mountain artillery battalion. Thus, Suetaka could deploy forward not only the forces he had requested but also a brigade-level organization to assume control of the now sizeable combat elements massed at the front for "maneuvers." Earlier that afternoon he had already moved his division's message center forward to the Matsu'otsuho heights at the Tumen, and he regularly posted at least one staff officer there so that the center could function as the division's combat headquarters. An additional matter of explosive potential was built into the divisional order: provision of Japanese Air Force cover for rail movements forward, although use of aircraft had been prohibited by all higher headquarters; Nakamura intended only ground cover. At the front, Japanese units spent most of their time consolidating their hard-won positions. By 3 on 1 August, a column of Soviet forces with vehicles was observed moving from the east side of Khasan. Late in the day, the division received an extremely important telegram from the 2nd (Intelligence) Section of the Kwantung Army: "According to a special espionage report from our OSS in Khabarovsk city, Red Army authorities there have decided to retake the high ground along Changkufeng." From other intelligence, the Kwantung Army concluded that the Russians were rebuilding in the Novokievsk region. Frequent movements observed immediately to the rear of the Soviet battle zone caused K. Sato to grow apprehensive about a dawn counterattack on the 1st, and he reinforced Changkufeng with the 6th Company. The second of August was marked by continuation of Soviet air attacks and the anticipated Russian counteroffensive. According to Japanese intelligence, Marshal Blyukher had arrived in Khabarovsk, and Lieutenant General Sokolov was in Voroshilov. An offensive buildup, estimated at about 3,000 men plus tanks and guns, was reported in the Kozando area by evening on the 1st. Hirahara, commanding the battalion at Changkufeng, grew concerned about Hill 52. With day's end approaching, he reinforced the defenses further and ordered the battalion medical officer to establish a dressing station at Fangchuanting. Around 15:00 Soviet artillery began firing at forward areas, especially gun positions; the bombardments were described as severe. Japanese artillery sought to conserve ammunition, firing only at worthwhile, short-range targets. Main Russian ground actions focused on the far-right (Hill 52) and far-left (Shachaofeng) sectors, not Changkufeng. In line with Hirahara's orders, two infantry companies and four heavy machine guns were moved by 8:00 from Changkufeng to the heights 800 meters southeast. Soviet heavy artillery pounded the zone between Fangchuanting and Hill 52; observing the enemy became difficult. Russian planes engaged at 9:00 fighters, then bombers, to soften defenses and gun positions. Meanwhile, the Soviets deployed firepower southeast of Khasan, while two infantry battalions and more than ten tanks advanced through the pines on the western slopes. Japanese regimental guns and two machine-gun platoons at Hill 52 attacked the enemy heavy machine guns and neutralized them. By 10:00 the Russians had advanced with heavy weapons to the high ground 800 meters from Hill 52. From Changkufeng, the battalion guns engaged heavy weapons. Hirahara moved with the engineers and battalion guns to the heights to which he had transferred reinforcements earlier, took command, and prepared an assault. Initially, Soviet troops advanced in formation, but after cresting a dip, they dispersed and moved onto the high ground opposite Hill 52. Heavily armed, they drew within 700 meters, with artillery and heavy machine guns providing coverage. By 10:00 Sato requested Shiozawa's mountain guns across the Tumen to unleash a barrage against Hill 52's front. For about half an hour, the battery fired. By 10:30, the Soviet advance grew listless. Believing the moment ripe, Hirahara deployed his men to charge the foe's right wing, ordering rapid movement with caution against eastern flank fire. On the heights north of Hill 52, Inagaki watched the struggle; with the telephone out and the situation urgent, he brought up firepower on his own initiative. Taking the main body of the 1st Machine Gun Company, along with the battalion guns, he moved out at noon, making contact with the 10th Company on Hill 52 around 14:00, where the Japanese machine guns and battalion guns joined the fray. The Russians, losing momentum, were checked by Japanese heavy weapons and by mountain guns from Hill 82. Hirahara's main battalion advanced onto the high ground north of Hill 52 around noon. By 15:00, two enemy companies began to fall back, climbing the western slopes of Hill 29 as the main forces retreated piecemeal to a dip. By 16:00, Suetaka observed that his units were continuing to secure their positions and were "gradually breaking the hostile intention." Despite heat and rain, front-line troops showed fatigue but remained vigilant. Between 11:00 and 16;00, Sato inspected the lines and directed defensive positions, particularly at Hill 52. After a poor initial performance, the Russians awaited reinforcements before attempting another assault on Hill 52. They moved up a mechanized corps, and by 15:00 50 tanks massed east of Maanshan. Around 17:00, the Russians began moving south along the high ground across Khasan. Another two Soviet battalions advanced along the Tumen hills, led by armor. Hirahara anticipated an assault at twilight, especially after 18:00, when nine bombers struck Hill 52. Earlier, Takeshita had received reports from the antitank commander, Lieutenant Saito, that at 17:00 several enemy tanks and three infantry battalions were advancing from Hill 29. Convinced of an imminent Soviet strike, Takeshita ordered the defense to conceal its efforts and to annihilate the foe with point-blank fire and hand-to-hand fighting. He sought to instill confidence that hostile infantry could not reach the positions. Before 19:00, the enemy battalions came within effective range, and Japan opened with all available firepower. Rapid-fire antitank guns set the lead tank alight; the remaining tanks were stopped. Support came from Hisatsune's regimental guns and two antitank gun squads atop Changkufeng. The Russian advance was checked. By nightfall, Soviet elements had displaced heavy weapons about 400 meters from Japanese positions. As early as 16:00, Suetaka ordered a mountain artillery squad to cross the river. Sato told Takeshita at 7:30 that there would be a night attack against Hill 52. Takeshita was to annihilate the foe after allowing them to close to 40–50 meters. The Russians did mount a night assault and pressed close between 8 and 9 p.m. with three battalions led by four tanks. The main force targeted Takeshita; all ten Russian heavy machine guns engaged that side. Japanese machine guns and battalion guns joined the fray. The Russians pressed within 30 meters, shouted "Hurrah! Hurrah!" and hurled grenades before advancing a further 15 meters. The Japanese repelled the first waves with grenades and emplaced weapons, leaving light machine guns and grenade dischargers forward. Soviet illuminating shells were fired to enable closer approaches within 100 meters. Japanese grenade-discharger fire blasted the forces massed in the dead space before the works. While the Hill 52 night attack collapsed, other Russian units, smaller in strength and with one tank leading, moved against the hill on the left that the Japanese had not yet occupied that morning. The Russians advanced along the Khasan slope north of Hill 52, came within point-blank range, and shouted but did not charge. By 22:00, the Japanese, supported by machine guns, had checked the foe. Thereupon, the 6th Company, now under a platoon leader, Narusawa, launched a counterattack along the lake. "The enemy was bewildered and became dislocated. Buddies were heard shouting to one another, and some could be seen hauling away their dead." The Soviet troops held back 300–400 meters and began to dig in. Sato decided artillery should sweep the zone in front of Hill 52. At 21:30, he requested support, but the mountain guns could not open fire. Still, by 23:00, not a shadow of an enemy soldier remained on the Hill 52 front, where the Japanese spent the night on alert. In the northern sector, eight Russian tanks crossed the Japanese-claimed border at 5:25 on 2 August and moved south to a position northwest of Shachaofeng. Around 7 Russian artillery opened fire to "prepare" the Japanese while a dozen heavy bombers attacked. An hour later, the ground offensive began in earnest, with one and a half to two infantry battalions, a dozen machine guns, and several tanks. Supporting Takenouchi's left wing were several batteries of mountain artillery and two heavy batteries. Well-planned counterfire stopped the offensive. There was little change north of Shachaofeng and in the southeast, where Kanda's company held its positions against attack. On Takenouchi's front, Akaishizawa notes 120-degree daytime heat and nighttime chill. Men endured damp clothes and mosquitoes. To keep warm at night, soldiers moved about; during the day they sought shade and camouflage with twigs and weeds. No defense existed against cold night rain. Nocturnal vigilance required napping by day when possible, but the intense sun drained strength. For three days, Imagawa's company had only wild berries and dirty river water to eat. At 6:00 on 2 August, Colonel Tanaka exhorted his artillery to "exalt maximum annihilation power at close range, engage confirmed targets, and display firepower that is sniperlike—precise, concentrated, and as swift as a hurricane." Tanaka devised interdiction sectors for day and night attacks. At 10:30, the artillery laid down severe fire and eventually caused the enemy assault to wither. Around 24:40, Rokutanda's battalion detected a Russian battalion of towed artillery moving into positions at the skirt of Maanshan. When the first shells hit near the vanguard, a commander on horseback fled; the rest dispersed, abandoning at least eight artillery wagons and ten vehicles. Suetaka, observing from the Kucheng BGU, picked up the phone and commended the 3rd Battalion. Japanese casualties on 2 August were relatively light: ten men killed and 15 wounded. Among the killed, the 75th Infantry lost seven, the 76th Infantry two, and the engineers one. Among the wounded, the 75th suffered nine and the 76th six. Infantry ammunition was expended at an even higher rate than on 30–31 July. In Hirahara's battalion area, small arms, machine guns, ammunition, helmets, knapsacks, and gas masks were captured. A considerable portion of the seized materiel was employed in subsequent combat, as in the case of an antitank gun and ammunition captured on 31 July. Soviet casualties to date were estimated at 200–250, including 70 abandoned corpses. Twelve enemy tanks had been captured, and five more knocked out on 1–2 August; several dozen heavy bombers and about 5,000 Soviet ground troops were involved in the concerted offensives.  Nevertheless, reports of an imminent Soviet night attack against Hill 52 on 2–3 August alarmed Suetaka as much as his subordinates. Shortly after 20:00 accompanied by his intelligence officer, Suetaka set out for the hill, resolved to direct operations himself. Somewhat earlier, the division had sent Korea Army Headquarters a message, received by 18:30, reflecting Suetaka's current outlook: 30 to 40 Soviet planes had been bombing all sectors since morning, but losses were negligible and morale was high. The division had brought up additional elements in accord with army orders, and was continuing to strive for nonenlargement, but was "prepared firmly to reject the enemy's large-scale attacks." Impressed by the severity of the artillery and small-arms fire, Suetaka deemed it imperative "quickly to mete out a decisive counterassault and thus hasten the solution of the incident." But Japanese lines were thinly held and counterattacks required fresh strength. This state of affairs caused Suetaka to consider immediate commitment of the reinforcements moving to the front, although the Korea Army had insisted on prior permission before additional troops might cross the Tumen. Suetaka's customary and unsurprising solution was again to rely on his initiative and authorize commitment of every reinforcement unit. Nearest was T. Sato's 73rd Regiment, which had been ordered the night before to move up from Nanam. Under the cover of two Japanese fighters, these troops had alighted from the train the next morning at Seikaku, where they awaited orders eagerly.   K. Sato was receiving reports about the enemy buildup. At 20:10 orders were given to the 73rd Regiment to proceed at once to the Matsu'otsuho crossing and be prepared to support the 75th. Involved were T. Sato's two battalions, half of the total infantry reinforcements. Suetaka had something else in mind: his trump, Okido's 76th Infantry. At 23:40 he ordered this regiment, coming up behind the 73rd, to proceed to Huichungyuan on the Manchurian side of the Tumen, via Kyonghun, intercept the enemy, and be ready to go over to the offensive. On the basis of the information that the division planned to employ Okido's regiment for an enveloping attack, K. Sato quickly worked out details. He would conceal the presence of the reinforcements expected momentarily from the 73rd Regiment and would move Senda's BGU and Shimomura's battalion to Huichungyuan to cover the advance of the 76th Regiment and come under the latter's control. Japanese forces faced the danger of Soviet actions against Changkufeng from the Shachaofeng front after midnight on 2 August. Takenouchi had been ready to strike when he learned that the enemy had launched an attack at 01:00 against one of his own companies, Matsunobe's southwest of Shachaofeng. Therefore, Takenouchi's main unit went to drive off the attackers, returning to its positions at 02:30. The Russians tried again, starting from 04:00 on 03 August. Strong elements came as close as 300 meters; near 05:00 Soviet artillery and heavy weapons fire had grown hot, and nine enemy fighters made ineffective strafing passes. By 06:30 the Russians seemed thwarted completely. Hill 52 was pummeled during the three battles on 2 August. Taking advantage of night, the Russians had been regrouping; east of the hill, heavy machine guns were set up on the ridgeline 500 meters away. From 05:00 on 03 August, the Russians opened up with heavy weapons. Led by three tanks, 50 or 60 infantrymen then attacked from the direction of Hill 29 and reached a line 700–800 meters from the Japanese defenses. Here the Russian soldiers peppered away, but one of their tanks was set ablaze by gunfire and the other two were damaged and fled into a dip. Kamimori's mountain artillery reinforcements reached Nanpozan by 07:15 on 03 August. Tanaka issued an order directing the battalion to check the zone east of Hill 52 as well as to engage artillery across Khasan. A site for the supply unit was to be selected beyond enemy artillery range; on the day before, Russian shells had hit the supply unit of the 3rd Mountain Artillery Battalion, killing two men and 20 horses. The exposed force was ordered to take cover behind Crestline 1,000 meters to the rear. After 09:00 on 03 August, the artillery went into action and Japanese morale was enhanced. Near 09:00, Soviet bombardment grew pronounced, accompanied by bomber strikes. The Japanese front-line infantry responded with intensive fire, supported by mountain pieces and the regimental guns atop Changkufeng. Enemy forces stayed behind their heavy weapons and moved no further, while their casualties mounted. At 11:00 the Russians began to fall back, leaving only machine guns and snipers. One reason the Soviets had been frustrated since early morning was that K. Sato had seen the urgency of closing the gap midway between Changkufeng and Hill 52 (a site called Scattered Pines) and had shifted the 2nd Company from Changkufeng. Between 06:00 and 07:40, the company fired on Soviet troops which had advanced north of Hill 52, and inflicted considerable casualties. A corporal commanding a grenade launcher was cited posthumously for leading an assault which caused the destruction of three heavy machine guns. In the afternoon, the Japanese sustained two shellings and a bomber raid. Otherwise, the battlefield was quiet, since Russian troops had pulled back toward Hill 29 by 15:00 under cover of heavy weapons and artillery. At Hill 52, however, defense posed a problem, for each barrage smashed positions and trenches. During intervals between bombardments and air strikes, the men struggled to repair and reinforce the facilities. Changkufeng was again not attacked by ground troops during the day but was hit by planes and artillery. Trifling support was rendered by the mountain gun which had been moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen. Japanese infantry reinforcements were on the way. By 23:00 on 02 August, T. Sato had left Shikai. His 73rd Regiment pushed forward along roads so sodden that the units had to dismantle the heavy weapons for hauling. The rate of advance was little more than one kilometer per hour, but finally, at 05:20 on 03 August, he reached Chiangchunfeng with the bulk of two battalions. The esprit of the other front-line troops "soared." K. Sato, who was commanding all forces across the Tumen pending Morimoto's setting up of headquarters for the 37th Brigade, had T. Sato take over the line to the left of Changkufeng, employing Takenouchi's old unit and the 73rd Regiment to cover Shachaofeng. T. Sato set out with his battalions at 06:00 amid heavy rain. By 07:30, under severe fire, he was in position to command the new left sector. According to division orders to Morimoto, this zone was to include the heights south and northwest of Shachaofeng, but, in the case of the former, it was "permissible to pull back and occupy high ground west of the heights south of Shachaofeng." T. Sato contemplated using his regiment to encircle the foe on the north side of the lake, while Okido's 76th Infantry formed the other prong. Most of the day afterward, Soviet artillery was active; the Japanese responded with barrages of their own. Eventually, from 15:30, the entire enemy front-line force in this sector began falling back under violent covering fire. Morimoto's initial operations order, received at 18:00, advised T. Sato officially that he was coming under command of the 37th Brigade. The night of 03–04 August passed with the units uneasy, striving to conduct security and reconnaissance while working on the battered defenses. Total Japanese casualties on 3 August were light again: six men killed and ten wounded, four of the dead and seven of the wounded being suffered by the 75th Infantry, the rest by Takenouchi's battalion. Ammunition was expended at a lower rate than on the preceding day. The Japanese War Ministry reported no significant change since nightfall on 03 August. Thereafter, the battlefield seemed to return to quiescence; Japanese morale was high. In the press abroad, Changkufeng attracted overriding attention. The world was no longer talking of "border affrays." Three-column headlines on page 1 of the New York Times announced: "Soviet Hurls Six Divisions and 30 Tanks into Battle with Japanese on Border, 2 Claims Conflict, Tokyo Reports Victory in Manchukuo and Foes' Big Losses, Moscow Asserts It Won." The startling claim that six Soviet divisions were in action seemed to have been supplied for external consumption by Hsinking as well as Seoul. According to Nakamura Bin, the Russians employed 4,000 to 5,000 men supported by 230 tanks. Although Japanese casualties were moderate, Soviet artillery bombardment had stripped the hills of their lush summer grass. According to the uninformed foreign press, "the meager information showed both sides were heavily armed with the most modern equipment. The Russians were using small, fast tanks and the Japanese apparently were forewarned of this type of weapon and were well supplied with batteries of armor-piercing antitank guns." On 03 August the Russians lost 200 men, 15 tanks, and 25 light artillery pieces. One feature of the fighting was Japanese use of "thousands of flares" to expose fog-shrouded enemy ranks during a Soviet night attack. During the "first phase counteroffensive" by the Russians on 2–3 August, the 75th Regiment judged that the enemy's choice of opportunities for attacking was "senseless"; once they started, they continued until an annihilating blow was dealt. "We did not observe truly severe attacking capacity, such as lightning breakthroughs." With respect to tactical methods, the Japanese noted that Soviet offensive deployment was characterized by depth, which facilitated piecemeal destruction. When Russian advance elements suffered losses, replacements were moved up gradually. Soviet artillery fired without linkage to the front-line troops, nor was there liaison between the ground attacks staged in the Shachaofeng and Hill 52 sectors. Since enemy troops fought entirely on their own, they could be driven off in one swoop. Additionally, although 20–30 Russian tanks appeared during the counterattacks, their cooperation with the infantry was clumsy, and the armor was stopped. Soviet use of artillery in mobile warfare was "poorness personified." "Our troops never felt the least concern about hostile artillery forces, which were quite numerous. Even privates scoffed at the incapability of Russian artillery." It seemed that "those enemies who had lost their fighting spirit had the habit of fleeing far." During the combat between 31 July and 03 August, the defeated Russians appeared to fear pursuit and dashed all the way back to Kozando, "although we did not advance even a step beyond the boundary." On 4 August Suetaka prepared a secret evaluation: the enemy attacks by day and night on 2 August were conducted by front-line corps built around the 40th Rifle Division. "In view of the failure of those assaults, the foe is bound to carry out a more purposeful offensive effort, using newly arrived corps reinforcements." Russian actions on 02 August had been the most serious and persistent offensive efforts undertaken since the outset of the incident, but they were about the last by the front-line corps whose immediate jurisdiction lay in the region of the incident. Consequently, the enemy's loss of morale as a result of their defeat on 30–31 July, combined with their lack of unity in attack power, caused the attacks to end in failure. "We must be prepared for the fact that enemy forces will now mount a unified and deliberate offensive, avoiding rash attacks in view of their previous reversal, since large new corps are coming up." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the shadowed night, Japan's Sato chose Nakano's 75th to seize a peak, sending five captains and a rising Nakajima into darkness. At 2:15 a.m., they breached wires and climbed the slope; dawn lit a hard-won crest, then Hill 52 and Shachaofeng yielded to resolve and fire. The day wore on with brutal artillery, fluttering bombers, and relentless clashes. By August's edge, casualties mounted on both sides, yet Japanese regiments held fast, repelling night assaults with grit. 

Last time we spoke about the battle over Changfukeng Hill. In the frost-bit dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, two empires faced a cliff of fate: Soviet and Japanese, each convinced that Changkufeng belonged to them. Diplomats urged restraint, yet Tokyo's generals brewed a daring plan, strike at night, seize the crest, then bargain. Sato and Suetaka debated risk and restraint, weighing "dokudan senko" against disciplined action as rain hissed on the ground. Night fell like velvet. Nakano, a quiet, meticulous regimental leader, gathered the 75th Regiment's veterans, choosing five fearless captains and a rising star, Nakajima, to carry the charge. Scouts and engineers moved ahead, weaving a fragile path across the Tumen: wire-cutters in the dark, signals humming softly, and the thunder of distant Soviet tanks rolling along the shore. At 02:15, after breaches breached and silent men slid through wire, the Japanese surged up the slopes with bayonets glinting, swords ready, and nerves as taut as steel. The crest lunged with savage resistance: grenades flashed, machine guns roared, and leaders fell. By 05:15, dawn broke, and the hill, Course of blood and courage, stood in Japanese hands.   #180 A premature Japanese Victory over Changkufeng Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. On 31 July 1938, dawn seemed to indicate Changkufeng Hill was in Japanese hands. From his command post, Colonel Sato Kotoku, his regimental staff, and most of Hirahara's 3rd Battalion had been anxiously watching the progress of the 1st Battalion's operations since 12:30 on 31 July. Around 03:00, the Japanese infantry commanders issued "heroic orders to charge," audible above the withering fire. Sato expected the crest to fall in little more than an hour; when no signal shell burst over the hill, he grew apprehensive, praying for success with his heart breaking. A mile away on Hill 52, the troops could discern no voices, only gunfire and the spectacular glow of flares and tracers. As one soldier recalled "It was like fireflies," another soldier added "it was like a carnival". To Sasai, on the heights at Kucheng, it was, as he put it, "c'était un grand spectacle." By the way I think its one of the only times I've read a Japanese soldier using French, what he said translates to "it was a large spectacle", I am from Quebec so I speak baguette. The mist moved up Changkufeng Hill, and Japanese troops followed it, fighting for hours. Fearing Nakano's battalion might have been wiped out, Sato's staff prayed for fog. Sato later admitted, "By dawn we were failing to take our objectives."   At the base of Chiangchunfeng, Sato held the 6th Company in reserve, ready to attack Changkufeng from the left. He would have preferred not to commit it, given the danger of an accidental fire-fight with friendly forces. Nevertheless, as combat intensified, Sato decided to push the company into support of the 1st Battalion. After orders at 03:15, Ito moved toward the northwest side of Changkufeng. The Russians laid down heavy fire, especially from a well-placed machine-gun position on the far left. Ito's company, suffering heavy and needlessly casualties, had to hold near the middle of the slope. A runner was sent to the regimental command post requesting artillery support after dawn. By 04:30, Sato could discern the Changkufeng crest, where fierce close-quarters fighting raged between Japanese and Russians on the south edge, while the enemy continually sent reinforcements, troops followed by tanks, up the northern slope. Ito's company was visible on the western slope, bravely bearing a Japanese flag. 10-15 minutes later, grenade-discharger fire began to blast the Soviet positions. At 04:40, Ito, redeploying at dawn, observed elements of the 1st Company near the hill's summit. Contact was established with Inagaki's men. The Russians began to show signs of disarray under the grenade dischargers and the heavy weapons deployed by the reserve battalion at Chiangchunfeng. Thereupon Ito's company charged as well, capturing the northwest corner of Changkufeng roughly concurrently with the main body of the 1st Battalion under Sakata. Ito was wounded and evacuated; two sergeants were later cited in dispatches. Meanwhile, the 10th Company, led by Takeshita of the 3rd Battalion, was to conduct a separate night assault against fire points around Hill 24, about 1,000 meters north of Changkufeng. The aim was to disrupt Russian withdrawal along the slopes to the rear and to hinder reinforcements. At midnight, the company left the skirts of Chiangchunfeng in fog and darkness. Moving stealthily over the undulating terrain, they faced knee-deep bogs and tall vegetation. After evading sentries, they penetrated behind the enemy. By 02:00, five teams totaling 16 men under Sergeant Uchibori were ready to strike Hill 24. Takeshita led the charge from the right and overran the defenders by 02:20. The Russians, numbering 20 to 30 riflemen with one machine gun, fled toward Khasan, leaving four soldiers behind whom the Japanese bayoneted. Takeshita's company continued to consolidate Hill 24, awaiting counterattacks, which soon followed. At 04:00, eight tanks, with headlights on, launched an attack from the Shachaofeng sector, supported by an infantry company . Takeshita reinforced Uchibori's unit with assault teams; the Russian infantry were routed, and five tanks were knocked out. At dawn, about 100 Soviet troops were observed retreating from the direction of Changkufeng, surprised and mowed down by heavy and light machine guns at ranges of about 300 meters. At 06:30, the Soviets attacked again with an infantry battalion and a machine-gun company from north of Khasan. The Japanese allowed them to close, then concentrated the firepower of both infantry platoons plus heavy machine guns. After a 30-minute firefight with heavy casualties on the Soviet side, the Russians fell back. Again, at 07:10, the Soviets struck from the north of Khasan, this time with one company and five tanks. Russian infantry, supported by three tanks, pushed in front of the Japanese positions, but machine-gun and small-arms fire forced them to retreat eastward, the tanks being stopped 50 meters from the lines. Meanwhile, two Japanese enlisted men on patrol near the lake encountered armor; they attacked and, after taking casualties, returned with captured ammunition and equipment. One rapid-fire piece had been providing covering fire behind Takeshita's unit and opened fire on three tanks attacking north of Changkufeng, helping to stop them. As daybreak arrived, Takeshita's company cleared the battlefield, retrieved casualties, and reinforced the defenses. Then an order from the regiment transferred the main body to Changkufeng. Leaving one platoon at Hill 24, Takeshita came directly under Hirahara's command. Takeshita was later officially cited by the regiment. If Hill 52 fell, Changkufeng would be lost. The Russians understood the importance of this constricted sector as well. Their armor could swing south of Khasan, while the terrain to the north was boggier and could be made impassable by the field-artillery battery emplaced on the Korean side of the Tumen. To check hostile reinforcements into this vital region, Sato had dispatched an infantry element to Hill 52 early. Northward, he had 1st Lieutenant Hisatsune emplacement the two 75-millimeter mountain pieces belonging to his infantry gun battery, together with two of 2nd Lieutenant Saito's three 20-millimeter anti-tank guns and the two 37-millimeter infantry rapid-fire guns belonging to 2nd Lieutenant Kutsukake's battalion gun battery. At 23:00 on 30 July, in accord with Nakano's orders, Hisatsune moved these six guns to the ridgeline between Changkufeng and Hill 52. Apart from the guns to the left, defense of Hill 52 was entrusted to the experienced Master Sergeant Murakoshi Kimio, 2nd Platoon leader in Nakajima's company. After the Shachaofeng affair, Murakoshi was ordered to occupy the hill. Moving along the shore on 30 July, his unit encountered neither friendly nor hostile troops. The regimental records note that "some enemy unit came into the dip east of Hill 52 since morning on the 30th, and both sides were watching each other." Murakoshi deployed his three rifle squads, totaling 34 men. After Nakano's battalion jumped off on 31 July, the platoon observed not only the "fireworks display" but also Soviet motorized units with lights aglow, moving on high ground east of Khasan. Later, tanks could be heard clanking toward Hill 52. Around 04:00, Murakoshi organized anti-tank teams and sent them into action. Most accounts emphasize the anti-tank efforts, rather than the fire of Murakoshi's machine gunners. Three privates, carrying anti-tank mines, undertook daring assaults once the terrain obliged the Russian tanks to slow. They laid their mines, but the soil proved too soft, and the attempt failed. In the most publicized episode, Private First Class Matsuo, nicknamed a "human bullet," was badly wounded by machine-gun fire from a tank and knocked from the vehicle, but he managed to reboard with a satchel charge and, it is said, stop the tank at the cost of his life. The platoon leader and his remaining 20 men, having withdrawn 200 meters below their positions, poured torrents of fire at the infantry accompanying the tanks. Flames from the antitank mine assaults provided blazing targets. In concert with Hisatsune's six infantry guns emplaced on the Crestline southeast of Changkufeng, Murakoshi knocked out the remaining two tanks. When the tanks were immobilized, the Soviet troops did not press forward; exposed to Japanese fire, their losses mounted. By daybreak, the Russians had pulled back. Official records describe one Soviet company with four heavy machine guns, led by mounted officers. After hours of intense combat, Colonel Sato and his staff observed that all operations were succeeding by dawn. It was fortunate that Japanese units had posed a threat from the east; only then did the Russians begin to retreat. "But what an incomparably heroic first combat it had been… the scene at Changkufeng was sublime and inspiring. Private feelings were forgotten, and all bowed their heads in respect for the gallant fighting by matchless subordinates." As soon as Sato confirmed that Changkufeng had been occupied, he sent an aide to assess casualties. "When the colonel learned about the death of his capable and dependable officers," a lieutenant recalled, "he… murmured, 'Is that so?' and closed his eyes. The dew glistened on his lids." Meanwhile, in addition to the battle of annihilation at Changkufeng, Major Takenouchi of Okido's regiment was to conduct the dawn assault in the Shachaofeng area. His 1st Battalion and attached elements numbered 379 men; Kanda's company of the Kucheng Border Guard Unit added another 49. An engineer platoon was attached. At 18:00 on 30 July, Takenouchi issued his orders. According to that evening's regimental maps, north of Khasan were two battalions of Soviet infantry and 20 tanks. South of Shachaofeng, the Russians had entanglements and machine-gun nests, with additional emplacements to the rear, west of the lake, and armor moving south toward Changkufeng. Northwest of Shachaofeng lay the main body of Takenouchi's battalion. Signal lines connected his headquarters with Sato's command post. The only Soviet patrol activity noted, as of evening, was in the direction of Matsunobe. Around 02:00, machine guns chattered south of Changkufeng, signaling an increasing intensity of Sato's night assault. On Takenouchi's front, the Russians went on alert, firing illuminating shells and opening fire from the north side of Changkufeng. At 02:30, Matsunobe's unit finished breakfast and moved to the jump-off site. The terrain was difficult and there was considerable enemy tracer fire, but, thanks to effective reconnaissance, the force reached its destination without loss by 04:00. Matsunobe eliminated an outpost unit using rear-area scouts who struck from the rear and gave the enemy little opportunity to respond. Then the Japanese prepared for the main attack as they awaited daybreak. At 04:00, the supporting mountain artillery platoon took position between Matsunobe and Takenouchi. Throughout this period, the sounds of fighting grew more violent toward Changkufeng; machine guns were especially active. At 05:00, three enemy tanks could be seen moving up the northern slope of Changkufeng, but soon after news arrived that friendly forces had seized the crest. With sunrise imminent, the Japanese guns assumed their role. The longest-range support Takenouchi could expect was Narukawa's two 15-centimeter howitzers, emplaced across the Tumen north of Sozan. This battery took position at 04:20, after which the commander went to join Sato just behind the front. Several thousand meters of telephone line had been strung across the river, linking observation post and battery. Narukawa watched the fierce struggle at Changkufeng and prepared to support the dawn assault, while honoring the desperate effort of Ito's company for covering fire. Firing began at 05:10, though range data were not adequate. After little more than ten rounds, the enemy heavy machine guns on the Shachaofeng front subsided. A veteran artilleryman proudly remarked, "These were the first howitzer shells ever fired against the Soviet Army." At 05:20, Takenouchi's own heavy weapons added effective counterfire. Matsunobe and his company had crept to a line 150 meters in front of the Russian positions, taking advantage of dead angles and covered by light machine guns. Three Soviet tanks, however, had pressed forward against the main body. Two Private First Class soldiers, members of a close-quarters team, waited until the lead tank reversed course, then dashed in from the rear and blew it up. Two other soldiers attacked the third tank with mines but could not destroy it because of the tall grass. In a dramatic action that always thrilled Japanese audiences, a Private First Class jumped aboard with a portable mine, while a superior private jammed explosives into the tank's rear and allegedly blew off both treads, though the tank continued firing. While Matsunobe's company laid a smoke screen and prepared to charge, the Soviet tank was knocked out by rapid-fire guns. Master Sergeant Sudo's platoon seized the opportunity to race forward 15 meters and overrun two firing points at 05:40. When the Russians counterattacked with 60 infantrymen and three new tanks, Matsunobe ordered the grenade-discharger squad to fire while he had Sudo pull back to the foot of the hill. Close-quarter teams knocked out the tanks in succession. By this time the Russians had been shaken badly, allowing Matsunobe's main force to surge into two more positions. Five or six remaining Soviet soldiers were wiped out by a combination of Japanese pursuit fire and Soviet gunfire emanating from east of Khasan. After 06:00, the Japanese held the high ground at Shachaofeng. Kanda's unit had achieved a similar result, swinging around Matsunobe and skirting the left of the Soviet positions. Russian artillery opened from the east, but the Japanese used the terrain to advantage and suffered no casualties. Around this time, enemy forces in the Changkufeng area began to retreat, a portion by motor vehicle. Takenouchi had Matsunobe secure the site and, at 06:13, directed the main battalion to advance toward the north side of Khasan. A stubborn four-hour battle then ensued as Soviet forces delayed their retreat and the covering unit occupied the northern edge of the lake. Takenouchi estimated the enemy's strength at two infantry companies, a company of 12 heavy machine guns, and one heavy battery. Several Russian counterattacks were mounted against Matsunobe, while Takenouchi reinforced Kanda. The battalion attacked with great intensity and by 10:30 had managed to encircle the right flank of the enemy defenses at the northwest edge of Khasan. The Russians began to fall back, though one company of infantry resisted vigorously. At 10:50, the Soviet rear-guard company opened fire with machine guns while several tanks delivered heavy machine-gun and cannon fire. Soviet artillery, firing rapidly, also joined the resistance to Takenouchi's advance. Firepower pinned down the Japanese in this sector from late morning until nightfall.    For reasons of necessity as well as doctrine, the night assault on Changkufeng Hill received no artillery support. The dawn assault to clear Shachaofeng, however, required all available firepower, even if limited. Firing diagrams reflect no howitzer fire directed north of Changkufeng; this is understandable since Narukawa had only two pieces to handle numerous targets. A Soviet tank element was driven off, west of the lake, by 03:00 from the skirt of Chiangchunfeng by 3rd Battalion heavy weapons. Sasai, at the Kucheng command post, contends that Japanese artillery scored a significant success: school-tactics were followed, and the battery stood ready in case the night assault by the infantry failed. By dawn, Russian remnants clung to the crest, though the infantry had "peeled the skin" from their defenses. "In the morning, one of our howitzer shells hit near Changkufeng, whereupon the last of the enemy fled." Survivors of the night assault recalled no direct artillery support by Japanese artillery, though firing charts suggest some; Soviet sources dispute this. Regimental records note: "After firing against positions southwest of Shachaofeng, the Narukawa battery fired to cut off the enemy's retreat path from Shachaofeng and to neutralize the foe's superior artillery. Results were great." In the morning, Sato returned to Chiangchunfeng, observed the difficult anti-artillery combat by the Narukawa battery, and commended their performance. He watched howitzer fire disrupt Soviet artillery positions opposite Shachaofeng and estimated enemy strength at a battalion. Sato saw Russian horse-drawn artillery blasted from its sites and pulled back north of Khasan. Narukawa's first targets were positions and tanks south of Shachaofeng. Northeast of the lake, one battery of Russians headed north after dawn. In Narukawa's firing pattern, north of the lake, a Soviet motorized unit of more than ten vehicles withdrew in the afternoon. A new Russian artillery formation moving north of Khasan that afternoon received the heaviest fire from the howitzers. On that day Narukawa's two active pieces fired a total of 74 rounds. The only other Japanese artillery support for the infantry consisted of the half-battery of 75-millimeter mountain guns already forward. The platoon under 2nd Lieutenant Ikue moved west of Shachaofeng, starting from behind Kanda at 04:00, and bombarded Soviet positions to the northeast. Firing a lighter projectile than Narukawa's pieces, Ikue's men fired 162 shells and 37 shrapnel rounds at the Russians. Colonel Tanaka, the artillery regiment commander, reached the front during the night as battle's fury peaked from Changkufeng. Tanaka's mission was to take over Narukawa's battery and support infantry combat from dawn. Upon establishing his headquarters, Tanaka sent a liaison officer to the 75th Regiment. The 3rd Mountain Artillery Battalion completed unloading at Shikai Station in the night, and at 03:40, it entered emplacements on the north side of Nanpozan. Tanaka ordered Rokutanda to repel any enemy attacks that might be staged from Changkufeng and north of Yangkuanping. The battalion made good use of prior surveys and proved helpful in thwarting offensive attempts from the vicinity of Shachaofeng after daybreak. Rokutanda also coordinated with Narukawa to cut off the Soviet retreat route after enemy motorized and infantry forces began to fall back from Shachaofeng.   At Changkufeng, once the last Russians had been routed, two hours of quiet settled over both sides. The Japanese busied themselves with cleaning up the field, retrieving casualties, and bearing the dead to the rear. The few Japanese historians who have worked with 75th Regiment records have argued with a dramatic passage describing dawn: "From 05:15, after the top had been secured by us, the fog began to drift in. At about 05:30 rain started to drench the whole area; therefore, enemy artillery had to stop firing. God's will." Sakata counters that no Russian artillery shelled the peak after his men had cleared it. Sato agrees; only in the afternoon did at least 20 Soviet guns, emplaced north of the lake, open fire at Changkufeng. At first, Russian shells fell harmlessly into a pond nearby; Sato recalls fish splashing out. Thereafter, Soviet gunners gradually corrected their aim, but the Japanese took cover behind rocks and sustained no casualties. Soviet shellfire may have begun at dawn but appeared to be directed mainly toward Shachaofeng, where Soviet defenders were not evicted until an hour after Changkufeng fell. Tanaka, however, argues that when he arrived at the front at 05:00, Russian artillery was firing on objectives west of the Tumen, and several shells struck his men and guns. Japanese firing charts show that Soviet guns initially bombarded Takenouchi's sector at Shachaofeng from two positions north and northeast of Khasan. After these Russian positions were forced to evacuate, the new Soviet gun unit that arrived in the afternoon engaged not only Changkufeng but also the area of the Japanese regimental headquarters. A Japanese military history suggests that Chiangchunfeng, the site of the observation post for the heavy field-artillery battery, was hit early in the morning, just after Takenouchi's ground assault against Shachaofeng had begun. The only other Russian artillery fire noted is the early-morning bombardment of the region of Hill 52. This shelling emanated from a point southeast of the lake but appeared directed primarily against Hisatsune's guns, which pulled back to Changkufeng at 06:00. Takeshita's company, which had jumped off at 02:00 and struck to the rear of Changkufeng toward the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, sustained severe enemy artillery fire after dawn. The main body secured the positions it had captured, while one platoon occupied Hill 24. On Takenouchi's front, intense enemy artillery fire continued after the Shachaofeng district was cleared, but the battalion maintained its position throughout the day. At 20:00, Takenouchi pulled back to the heights northwest of Shachaofeng. Elements of Matsunobe's unit on the right flank clung to advanced positions southeast of Shachaofeng. Regarding the theological allusion to merciful rain at dawn, no interviewee recalled a torrential downpour at Changkufeng. One soldier remembered descending from the crest at 08:30, taking breakfast, and returning for battlefield cleanup an hour later, at which time it began to drizzle. The 75th Regiment's weather record for Sunday, 31 July, simply states, "Cloudy; sunrise 05:08."   At 06:40, Colonel Sato ordered Hirahara's 3rd Battalion to relieve Nakano's mauled 1st Battalion and Ito's company atop Changkufeng. The 1st Battalion was to become the regimental reserve force, assemble at Chiangchunfeng, and collect its dead and wounded. Shortly after 08:00, Hirahara arrived at the crest of Changkufeng. Sakata was still upright, blood-streaked. "It's all right now," Hirahara told him. "You can go down." Sakata limped away with the remnants of the 1st Battalion. At the command post he met Sato, who praised him, promised to replace his damaged sword with one of his own, and told him to head for the hospital. When he protested, Sato bellowed, more in pride than anger, "To the hospital with you!" Sakata went, leaving Kuriyama as acting company commander. That morning, Sato climbed Changkufeng and gave Hirahara instructions. He commended the heavy field artillery battery commander, Narukawa, for his effective support of Takenouchi's dawn attack at Shachaofeng. Before returning to his command post, Sato carefully supervised the collection of Japanese dead. He looked into the face of each man and bade him farewell, a regiment officer recalls. "His sincerity and sorrow inspired reverence in all of us." In the afternoon, Sato sent Oshima back to Haigan to report the victory to forces in the rear, to visit the families of the fallen, and to "exert a beneficial influence on the native inhabitants lest they become confused and upset by the recent fighting." After the Russians had been ousted from Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, information became available to Japanese headquarters concerning the extent of the victory and the price. The 75th Regiment put Soviet casualties at 300 men in each area and claimed a total of 17 tanks knocked out during the operations—seven at Changkufeng, three at Hill 52, seven at Shachaofeng. Assault infantrymen noted that few Soviet bodies were found in the crestline positions, other than those cut down by cold steel; many Russians were presumably wounded by grenades. Colonel Sato asserts that 30 Soviet corpses were picked up in the Changkufeng area after the night attack. Most Japanese survivors judge that Soviet casualties were at least double those incurred by their own forces. The Japanese used much of the materiel they had captured. The price had been grim in the assault units: 45 killed, 133 wounded. In both Colonel Nakano's and Colonel Takenouchi's battalions, about 25 percent of the officers and almost 10 percent of the men were killed or wounded. The main assault waves, chiefly the 1st and 2nd infantry companies and 1st Machine-Gun Company of Colonel Nakano's unit, suffered as many as one-half or two-thirds casualties, down to platoons and squads. Before the night attack, Colonel Nakano's battalion had a total of 401 men. The strength of Shimomura's battalion had diminished by only 17: Hirahara's by 10. Nakano's unit lost over 80 percent of all Japanese killed and wounded in the Changkufeng–Hill 52 sector.  Japanese accounts were lavish in their praise of Colonel Sato's conception and execution of the night-dawn assaults. "Everybody had conducted several inspections of the front, yet only two or three individuals were acquainted with the precise sector where we carried out our assault." The costly lack of comprehensive intelligence necessitated reduction of firing points in succession and made the assault on the peak, the true key, possible only at the end. "This was a rather difficult method. It would have been better to have thrown one small unit against one firing point invariably and to have used the main force to break through the depth of the foe swiftly." On the larger benefits of the night operation, Akaishizawa wrote, "We prevented the main hostile forces, numbering several thousand troops concentrated east of Khasan about 600 or 700 meters behind Changkufeng, from laying a finger on us." Sato regards the night attack as a success: "The Soviets would have taken over the entire region unless checked." But with respect to Suetaka's words of praise for Sato himself, one candid division staff officer does not share what he calls "extravagant laudation." "The night-attack plan had been devised long in advance. I do not see anything particularly brilliant about it. Only in terms of results could one call the assault well done." Sakata concurs but stresses that training paid off: "All the men in my company followed their leaders to the crest and thus displayed their teamwork and unity," despite the unexpectedly severe casualties. The Soviets seemed particularly apprehensive about the possibility of Japanese armored operations. Antitank weapons were deployed on the eastern slopes of Changkufeng, ready to fire against the axis of Hill 52, which theoretically was good tank country. Illuminating shells and flares were employed profusely in concert with heavy machine guns firing blue tracers from the time Japanese troops entered the zone of wire defenses. Tanks supplemented the fire network, as did artillery zeroed in east of Khasan. But it was the grenades, in "heaps and mounds," that troubled the attackers most: "This tactic must be one of the most important aspects of Soviet infantry training, together with snipers. Our night assault unit did not sustain too many casualties until the crest but, since we could not run up into the positions, the foe was able to hurl many milk-bottle-size grenades. Our forces must be given more training with hand grenades".  The first phone call to Seoul did not come until Changkufeng had been assaulted and cleared. Around 05:00 the division learned that victory had been achieved at Changkufeng; the first reports mentioned no Japanese casualties. "Thank God!" was the reaction. Suetaka and the major toasted Sato's victory with sake. "At 06:00, one company of the Sato unit occupied Shachaofeng and expelled the Soviet forces across the border." Not long afterward, the division, like the 75th Regiment, began to learn the extent of the casualties. Although personal sorrow displaced initial elation, there was grim satisfaction that the insolent Russians had been ousted and the dignity of the Imperial Army maintained. It was hoped and expected that the Korea Army would share this view. Seoul had learned of the Japanese assaults only after the fact and in a rather cursory fashion. Nakamura ordered the front-line units to secure the heights and to localize the affair by limiting the strength used in that area and by ensuring cautious action.  Nakamura's orders to not expand upon the victory were criticized heavily. However Tsuchiya recalled "The decision was taken too easily. Perhaps some had covert opposition, but no one spoke up. I think there was some misunderstanding of individual positions. Yet the crisis should have been analyzed carefully. It is too bad that there was no direct supervision by the Chief of Staff." For Tsuchiya, the Korea Army would have been in trouble if the incident had dragged on because of Soviet buildup and Japanese casualties and low mobilization. Although Nakamura likely wished the 19th Division to abandon unnecessary actions regardless of victory or defeat, he did not seem to care; he showed no intention of inspecting the local scene. Yet Tsuchiya felt such a keen sense of responsibility that he was prepared to commit suicide if matters went wrong. Inada argued that Nakamura did not visit the front to avoid expanding the troubles and disturbing the troops. Analyzing the Korea Army's nebulous control, Imaoka notes that Nakamura had only recently arrived in Korea and had little time before fighting began, but something seemed lacking in the army's exercise of command. Thus, Nakamura never met Suetaka until after the incident had been resolved, although the governor-general came from Seoul to visit Suetaka at the battlefront and to express appreciation in person. "It was quite proper to adhere to the policy of nonenlargement, but the Korea Army should have furnished more positive operational guidance in such a case when a subordinate division was in serious trouble." There were important lessons to be learned here, Tsuchiya recalled  "The 19th Division attacked the Russians twice in 36 hours without army orders or approval. How is it that the division commander, a lieutenant general and certainly not an reckless man, could have been allowed so much margin to act independently?" Some suggest that Suetaka tended to violate the spirit of the law, especially in force majeure. Others think that Suetaka was loyal, deliberate, and law-abiding, a worrier who could be expected to follow orders. Why risk one's career—one's life, given that self-censure loomed—when headquarters' decision was available? Military discipline and national interest dictated prior consultation and compliance. Or did Suetaka, like other notable generals, think gambles were justified by the goddess of Victory? I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A daring Japanese night assault, led by Colonel Sato and his bold captains, threaded through fog, wire, and enemy fire. As dawn broke, the crest fell into Japanese hands, after brutal stand-ins on Hill 52 and Shachaofeng. Glinting grenades, roaring tanks, and disciplined infantry forged the victory, at a heavy price: dozens of officers and many men lost.   

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle of lake Khasan. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, two empires, Soviet and Japanese, stared at Changkufeng, each certain the ridge would decide their fate. Diplomats urged restraint, but Tokyo's generals plotted a bold gamble: seize the hill with a surprise strike and bargain afterward. In the Japanese camp, a flurry of trains, orders, and plans moved in the night. Officers like Sato and Suetaka debated danger and responsibility, balancing "dokudan senko", independent action with disciplined restraint. As rain hammered the earth, they contemplated a night assault: cross the Tumen, occupy Hill 52, and strike Changkufeng with coordinated dawn and night attacks. Engineers, artillery, and infantry rehearsed their movements in near-poetic precision, while the 19th Engineers stitched crossings and bridges into a fragile path forward. Across the river, Soviet scouts and border guards held their nerve, counting enemy shadows and watching for a break in the line. The clash at Shachaofeng became a lightning rod: a small force crossed into Manchurian soil in the restless dark, provoking a broader crisis just as diplomacy teetered.   #179 From Darkness to Crest: The Changkufeng Battle Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. As remarked in the 19th division's war journal "With sunset on the 30th, the numbers of enemy soldiers increased steadily. Many motor vehicles, and even tanks, appear to have moved up. The whole front has become tense. Hostile patrols came across the border frequently, even in front of Chiangchunfeng. Tank-supported infantry units were apparently performing offensive deployment on the high ground south of Shachaofeng." Situation maps from the evening indicated Soviet patrol activity approaching the staging area of Nakano's unit near the Tumen, moving toward Noguchi's company to the left of Chiangchunfeng, and advancing toward Matsunobe's unit southwest of Shachaofeng. Russian vessels were depicted ferrying across Khasan, directly behind Changkufeng, while tanks moved south from Shachaofeng along the western shores of the lake. The 19th division's war journal states "Then it was ascertained that these attack forces had gone into action. All of our own units quietly commenced counteraction from late that night, as scheduled, after having systematically completed preparations since nightfall." Meanwhile, to the north, the Hunchun garrison reinforced the border with a battalion and tightened security. All evidence supported the view that Suetaka "in concept" and Sato"(in tactics" played the main part in the night-attack planning and decisions. Sato was the only infantry regimental commander at the front on 30 July. One division staff officer went so far as to say that Suetaka alone exerted the major influence, that Sato merely worked out details, including the type of attack and the timing. Intertwined with the decision to attack Changkufeng was the choice of an infantry regiment. The 76th Regiment was responsible for the defense of the sector through its Border Garrison Unit; but the latter had no more than two companies to guard a 40-mile border extending almost to Hunchun, and Okido's regimental headquarters was 75 miles to the rear at Nanam. T. Sato's 73rd Regiment was also at Nanam, while Cho's 74th Regiment was stationed another 175 miles southwest at Hamhung. Thus, the regiment nearest to Changkufeng was K. Sato's 75th, 50 miles away at Hoeryong. Although Suetaka had had time to shuffle units if he desired, Sasai suggested that troop movements from Nanam could not be concealed; from Hoeryong they might be termed maneuvers. Suetaka undoubtedly had favorites in terms of units as well as chiefs. K. Sato had served longest as regimental commander, since October 1937; Okido's date of rank preceded K. Sato's, but Okido had not taken command until 1938. He and Cho were able enough, but they were unknown quantities; T. Sato and Cho were brand-new colonels.  Thus, K. Sato was best known to Suetaka and was familiar with the terrain. While he did not regard his regiment as the equal of units in the Kwantung Army or in the homeland, K. Sato's training program was progressing well and his men were rugged natives of Nagano and Tochigi prefectures. From the combat soldier's standpoint, the Changkufeng Incident was waged between picked regulars on both sides. The matter of quantitative regimental strength could have played no part in Suetaka's choice. The 74th, 75th, and 76th regiments each possessed 1,500 men; the 73rd, 1,200. Even in ordinary times, every unit conducted night-attack training, attended by Suetaka, but there was nothing special in July, even after the general inspected the 75th Regiment on the 11th. It had been said that the most efficient battalions were selected for the action. Although, of course, Sato claimed that all of his battalions were good, from the outset he bore the 1st Battalion in mind for the night attack and had it reconnoiter the Changkufeng area. Some discerned no special reasons; it was probably a matter of numerical sequence, 1st-2nd-3rd Battalions. Others called the choice a happy coincidence because of the 1st Battalion's 'splendid unity' and the aggressive training conducted by Major Ichimoto, who had reluctantly departed recently for regimental headquarters. Coming from the 75th Regiment headquarters to take over the 1st Battalion was the 40-year-old aide Major Nakano. By all accounts, he was quiet, serious, and hard-working, a man of noble character, gentle and sincere. More the administrative than commander type, Nakano lacked experience in commanding battalions and never had sufficient time to get to know his new unit (or they, him) before the night assault. He could hardly be expected to have stressed anything particular in training. Since there was no battalion-level training, the most valid unit of comparison in the regiment was the company, the smallest infantry component trained and equipped to conduct combat missions independently. Sato valued combat experience among subordinates; Nakano's 1st Battalion was considered a veteran force by virtue of its old-timer company commanders. All but one had come up through the ranks; the exception, young Lieutenant Nakajima, the darling of Sato, was a military academy graduate. For assault actions synchronized with those of the 1st Battalion, Sato selected Ito, the one line captain commanding the 6th Company of the 2nd Battalion, and Takeshita, 10th Company commander, one of the two line captains of the 3rd Battalion. In short, Sato had designated five veteran captains and a promising lieutenant to conduct the night-attack operations of 30-31 July, the first Japanese experience of battle against the modern Red Army. During the last two weeks of July, numerous spurious farmers had gambled along the lower reaches of the Tumen, reconnoitered the terrain, and prepared for a crossing and assault. Scouts had operated on both the Manchurian and Korean sides of the river. Major Nakano had conducted frequent personal reconnaissance and had dispatched platoon and patrol leaders, all heavy-weapons observation teams, and even the battalion doctor to Sozan Hill, to Chiangchunfeng, and close to enemy positions. In Korean garb and often leading oxen, the scouts had threaded their way through the Changkufeng sector, sometimes holing up for the night to observe Soviet movements, soil and topography, and levels of illumination. From this data, Nakano had prepared reference materials necessary for an assault. Hirahara, then located at Kucheng BGU Headquarters, had established three observation posts on high ground to the rear. After Chiangchunfeng had been occupied, Hirahara had set up security positions and routes there. Regarding Changkufeng, he had sought to ensure that even the lowest private studied the layout. Formation commanders such as Takeshita had volunteered frequently. Sato had also utilized engineers. Since the order to leave his station on 17 July, Lieutenant Colonel Kobayashi had had his regiment engage in scouting routes, bridges, and potential fords. Sato's 1st Company commander had prepared a sketch during 3% hours of reconnaissance across from Hill 52 during the afternoon of 18 July. Captain Yamada's intelligence had contributed to the tactical decisions and to knowledge of Russian strength and preparations. The most important information had been his evaluation of attack approaches, suggesting an offensive from the western side, preferably against the right flank or frontally. This concept had been the one applied by the regiment in its night assault two weeks later; Yamada had died on the green slopes he had scanned. Cloudy Saturday, 30 July, had drawn to a close. The moment had been at hand for the 75th Regiment to storm the Russians atop Changkufeng. Setting out from Fangchuanting at 22:30, Nakano's battalion, about 350 strong, had assembled at a fork one kilometer southwest of Changkufeng. The roads had been knee-deep in mud due to intermittent rain and downpours on 29–30 July. Now the rain had subsided, but clouds had blotted out the sky after the waning moon had set at 22:30. Led by Sakata's 1st Platoon leader, the men had marched silently toward the southern foot of Changkufeng; the murk had deepened and the soldiers could see no more than ten meters ahead. It had taken Sakata's men less than an hour to push forward the last 1,000 meters to the jump-off point, where they had waited another two hours before X-hour arrived. Scouts had advanced toward the first row of wire, 200–300 meters away. Platoon Leader Amagasa had infiltrated the positions alone and had reconnoitered the southeastern side of the heights. Sakata had heard from the patrols about the entanglements and their distance and makeup. While awaiting paths to be cut by engineer teams, the infantry had moved up as far as possible, 150 meters from the enemy, by 23:30. Although records described Changkufeng as quite steep, it had not been hard to climb until the main Russian positions were reached, even though there were cliffs. But as the craggy peak had been neared, the enemy defenses, which had taken advantage of rocks and dips, could not have been rushed in a bound. It had been 500 meters to the crest from the gently sloping base. The incline near the top had been steep at about 40 degrees and studded with boulders. Farther down were more soil and gravel. Grass had carpeted the foot. Japanese Army radio communications had been in their infancy; wire as well as runners had served as the main means of linking regimental headquarters with the front-line infantry, crossing-point engineers, and supporting guns across the Tumen in Korea. From Chiangchunfeng to the 1st Battalion, lines had been installed from the morning of 29 July. Combat communications had been operated by the small regimental signal unit, 27 officers and men. In general, signal traffic had been smooth and reception was good. Engineer support had been rendered by one platoon, primarily to assist with wire-cutting operations. Nakano had ordered his 1st Company to complete clearing the wire by 02:00. At 23:30 the cutters had begun their work on the right with three teams under 1st Lieutenant Inagaki. Since the proposed breach had been far from the enemy positions and there were no outposts nearby, Inagaki had pressed the work of forced clearing. The first entanglements had been breached fairly quickly, then the second. At about midnight, a dim light had etched the darkness, signaling success. There had been two gaps on the right. On the left side, Sakata's company had hoped to pierce the barbed wire in secrecy rather than by forced clearing. Only one broad belt of entanglements, actually the first and third lines, had been reconnoitered along the south and southeastern slopes. Sakata had assigned one team of infantry, with a covering squad led by Master Sergeant Amagasa, to the engineer unit under 2nd Lieutenant Nagayama. Covert clearing of a pair of gaps had begun. The Russian stakes had been a meter apart and the teams cut at the center of each section, making breaches wide enough for a soldier to wriggle through. To the rear, the infantry had crouched expectantly, while from the direction of Khasan the rumble of Soviet armor could be heard. At 00:10, when the first line of wire had been penetrated and the cutters were moving forward, the silence had been broken by the furious barking of Russian sentry dogs, and pale blue flares had burst over the slopes. As recalled by an engineer "It had been as bright as day. If only fog would cover us or it would start to rain!" At the unanticipated second line, the advancing clearing elements had drawn gunfire and grenades. But the Russians had been taken by surprise, Sakata said, and their machine guns had been firing high. Two engineers had been wounded; the security patrol on the left flank may have drawn the fire. Sakata had crawled up to Lieutenant Nagayama's cutting teams. One party had been hiding behind a rock, with a man sticking out his hand, grasping for the stake and feeling for electrified wire. Another soldier lay nearby, ready to snip the wire. The enemy had seemed to have discerned the Japanese, for the lieutenant could hear low voices. Although the cutters had been told to continue clearing in secrecy, they had by now encountered a line of low barbed wire and the work had not progressed as expected. Forced clearing had begun, which meant that the men had to stand or kneel, ignoring hostile fire and devoting primary consideration to speed. The infantrymen, unable to delay, had crawled through the wire as soon as the cutters tore a gap. Ten meters behind the small breaches, as well as in front of the Soviet positions, the Japanese had been troubled by fine low strands. They had resembled piano-wire traps, a foot or so off the ground. The wires had been invisible in the grass at night. As one soldier recalled "You couldn't disengage easily. When you tried to get out, you'd be sniped at. The wires themselves could cut a bit, too." Sakata had kept up with the clearing teams and urged them on. On his own initiative, Amagasa had his men break the first and third lines of wire by 01:50. Meanwhile, at 01:20, Nakano had phoned Sato, reporting that his forces had broken through the lines with little resistance, and had recommended that the attack be launched earlier than 2:00. Perhaps the premature alerting of the Russians had entered into Nakano's considerations. Sato had explained matters carefully, that is, rejected the suggestion, saying Changkufeng must not be taken too early, lest the enemy at Shachaofeng be alerted. The entire battalion, redeployed, had been massed for the charge up the slope. In an interval of good visibility, the troops could see as far as 40 meters ahead. A little before 02:00, Nakano had sent runners to deliver the order to advance. When the final obstructions had been cut, Nagayama had flashed a light. Then a white flag had moved in the darkness and the infantry had moved forward. Sakata's company, heading directly for Changkufeng crest, had less ground to traverse than Yamada's, and the point through which they penetrated the wire had been at the fork, where there appeared to have been only two lines to cut. The soldiers had crawled on their knees and one hand and had taken cover as soon as they got through. It had been 02:15 when the battalion traversed the barbed wire and began the offensive. The Japanese Army manual had stated that unaimed fire was seldom effective at night and that it had been imperative to avoid confusion resulting from wild shooting. At Changkufeng, the use of firearms had been forbidden by regimental order. Until the troops had penetrated the wire, bayonets had not been fixed because of the danger to friendly forces. Once through the entanglements, the men had attached bayonets, but, although their rifles had been loaded, they still had not been allowed to fire. The men had been traveling light. Instead of the 65 pounds the individual rifleman might ordinarily carry, knapsack, weapons and ammunition, tools, supplies, and clothing, each helmeted soldier had only 60 cartridges, none on his back, a haversack containing two grenades, a canteen, and a gas mask. To prevent noise, the regulations had prescribed wrapping metal parts of bayonets, canteens, sabers, mess kits, shovels, picks, and hobnails with cloth or straw. The wooden and metal parts of the shovel had been separated, the canteen filled, ammunition pouches stuffed with paper, and the bayonet sheath wrapped with cloth. Instead of boots, the men had worn web-toed, rubbersoled ground socks to muffle sound. Although their footgear had been bound with straw ropes, the soldiers occasionally had slipped in the wet grass. Considerations of security had forbidden relief of tension by talking, coughing, or smoking. Company commanders and platoon leaders had carried small white flags for hand signaling. In Sakata's company, the platoons had been distinguished by white patches of cloth hung over the gas masks on the men's backs, triangular pieces for the 1st Platoon, square for the second. Squad leaders had worn white headbands under their helmets. The company commanders had strapped on a white cross-belt; the platoon leaders, a single band. Officer casualties had proven particularly severe because the identification belts had been too conspicuous; even when the officers had lay flat, Soviet illuminating shells had made their bodies visible. On the left, the 2nd Company, 70–80 strong, had moved up with platoons abreast and scouts ahead. About 10 meters had separated the individual platoons advancing in four files; in the center were Sakata and his command team. The same setup had been used for Yamada's company and his two infantry platoons on the right. To the center and rear of the lead companies were battalion headquarters, a platoon of Nakajima's 3rd Company, and the Kitahara Machine-Gun Company, 20 meters from Nakano. The machine-gun company had differed from the infantry companies in that it had three platoons of two squads each. The machine-gun platoons had gone through the center breach in the entanglements with the battalion commander. Thereafter, they had bunched up, shoulder to shoulder and with the machine guns close to each other. Kitahara had led, two platoons forward, one back. The night had been so dark that the individual soldiers had hardly been able to tell who had been leading and who had been on the flanks. The 2nd Company had consolidated after getting through the last entanglements and had walked straight for Changkufeng crest. From positions above the Japanese, Soviet machine guns covering the wire had blazed away at a range of 50 meters. Tracers had ripped the night, but the Russians' aim had seemed high. Soviet illuminating shells, by revealing the location of dead angles among the rocks, had facilitated the Japanese approach. Fifty meters past the barbed wire, Sakata had run into the second Soviet position. From behind a big rock, four or five soldiers had been throwing masher grenades. Sakata and his command team had dashed to the rear and cut down the Russians. The captain had sabered one soldier who had been about to throw a grenade. Then Master Sergeant Onuki and the others had rushed up and overran the Russian defenses. The Japanese had not yet fired or sustained casualties. There had been no machine guns in the first position Sakata had jumped into; the trenches had been two feet deep and masked by rocks. To the right, a tent could be seen. Blind enemy firing had reached a crescendo around 02:30. The Russians had resisted with rifles, light and heavy machine guns, hand grenades, rifle grenades, flares, rapid-fire guns, and a tank cannon. "The hill had shaken, but our assault unit had advanced, disregarding the heavy resistance and relying only on the bayonet." The battalion commander, Major Nakano, had been the first officer to be hit. Moving to the left of Sakata's right-hand platoon, he had rushed up, brandishing his sword, amid ear-splitting fire and day-like flashes. He had felled an enemy soldier and then another who had been about to get him from behind. But a grenade had exploded and he had dropped, with his right arm hanging grotesquely and many fragments embedded in his chest and left arm. After regaining consciousness, Nakano had yelled at soldiers rushing to help him: "You fools! Charge on! Never mind me." Staggering to his feet, he had leaned on his sword with his left hand and pushed up the slope after the assault waves, while "everybody had been dashing around like mad." Sakata had encountered progressive defenses and more severe fire. The main body of the company had lost contact with other elements after getting through the entanglements. Sakata had thought that he had already occupied an edge of Changkufeng, but about 30 meters ahead stood a sharp-faced boulder, two or three meters high, from which enormous numbers of grenades had been lobbed. The Japanese, still walking, had come across another Soviet position, manned by four or five grenadiers. Sword in hand, Sakata had led Sergeant Onuki and his command team in a rush : "The enemy was about to take off as we jumped them. One Russian jabbed the muzzle of his rifle into my stomach at the moment I had my sword raised overhead. He pulled the trigger but the rifle did not go off. I cut him down before he could get me. The others ran away, but behind them they left grenades with pins pulled. Many of my men fell here and I was hit in the thighs".  Onuki had felled two or three Russians behind Sakata, then disposed of an enemy who had been aiming at Sakata from the side. It had been around 03:00. On the right, the 1st Company had made relatively faster progress along the western slopes after having breached two widely separated belts of barbed wire. Once through the second wire, the troops had found a third line, 150 meters behind, and enemy machine guns had opened fire. Thereupon, a left-platoon private first class had taken a "do or die" forced clearing team, rushed 15 meters ahead of the infantry, and tore a path for the unit. At 03:00, Yamada had taken his men in a dash far up the right foot of the hill, overran the unexpected position, and captured two rapid-fire guns. The company's casualties had been mounting. Yamada had been hit in the chest but had continued to cheer his troops on. At 03:30, he had led a rush against the main objective, tents up the hill, behind the antitank guns. Yamada had cut down several bewildered soldiers in the tents, but had been shot again in the chest, gasping "Tenno Heika Banzai!" "Long Live the Emperor!", and had fallen dead. His citation had noted that he had "disrupted the enemy's rear after capturing the forwardmost positions and thus furnished the key to the ultimate rout of the whole enemy line." Sergeant Shioda, though wounded badly, and several of the men had picked up their commander's body and moved over to join Lieutenant Inagaki. On the left, Kadowaki had charged into the tents with his platoon and had played his part in interfering with the Russian rear. After this rush, the unit had been pinned down by fire from machine-gun emplacements, and Kadowaki had been wounded seriously. His platoon had veered left while watching for an opportunity to charge. Eventual contact had been made with Sakata's company.   The assault on the right flank had been failing. With the death of Yamada, command of the company had been assumed temporarily by Inagaki. He and his right-flank platoon had managed to smash their way through the entanglements; Inagaki had sought to rush forward, sword in hand. Furious firing by Soviet machine guns, coupled with hand grenades, had checked the charge. Losses had mounted. Still another effort had bogged down in the face of enemy reinforcements, supported not only by covered but by tank-mounted machine guns. Russian tanks and trucks had appeared to be operating behind Changkufeng. Sergeant Shioda had been trying to keep the attack moving. Again and again, he had pushed toward the Soviet position with five of his surviving men, to no avail. The left-flank platoon had sought to evade the fierce fire by taking advantage of rock cover and hurling grenades. Finally, a private first class had lobbed in a grenade, rushed the machine gun, and silenced the weapon. By now, precious time and lives had been lost. Either instinctively or by order, the 1st Company had been shifting to the left, away from the core of the enemy fire-net. Inagaki had decided to veer left in a wide arc to outflank Changkufeng from the same side where the 2nd Company and most of the battalion were at-tacking. There would be no further attempts to plunge between the lake and the heights or to head for the crest from the rear. Military maps had indicated tersely that remnants of the 1st Company had displaced to the 2nd Company area at 04:00, sometime after the last charge on the right by Yamada. On the left front, in the sector facing the main defenses on Changkufeng crest, Sakata had fallen after being hit by a grenade. A machine gunner had improvised a sling. "I had lost a lot of blood," Sakata had said, "and there were no medics. Onuki, my command team chief who had been acting platoon leader, had been killed around here. I had ordered Warrant Officer Kuriyama to take the company and push on until I could catch up." As Sakata lay on the ground, he had seen the battalion commander and the Nakajima company move past him in the darkness. Nakano had said not a word; Sakata had not known the major had been maimed. "I still hadn't felt intense pain," Sakata had recalled. "I had rested after the first bad feelings. In about 15 minutes I had felt well enough to move up the hill and resume command of my company." With both Nakano and Sakata wounded, individual officers or noncoms had kept the assault moving. The 1st Platoon leader, Kuriyama, had been securing the first position after overrunning it but had become worried about the main force. On his own initiative, he had brought his men up the hill to join the rest of the company, while the battalion aide, 2nd Lieutenant Nishimura, had made arrangements to deploy the heavy machine guns and reserve infantry in support. Before 4 A.M., these troops under Kitahara and Nakajima had caught up with the remnants of the 2nd Company, which had pressed beyond the third position to points near the Soviet Crestline.   By the time Sakata had regained his feet and moved toward the peak, somewhere between 03:30 and 04:00, the Japanese had been pinned down. Most of the losses had been incurred at this point. "Iron fragments, rock, sand, blood, and flesh had been flying around," Akaishizawa had written. Grenades had caused the preponderance of wounds after the men had penetrated the barbed wire. Deaths had been inflicted mainly by the Soviet "hurricane" of small arms and machine-gun fire and by ricochets ripping from man to man. Six Russian heavy weapons had kept up a relentless fire from three emplacements, and milk-bottle-shaped grenades had continued to thud down on the Japanese. The grenades had hindered the advance greatly. Mainly at the crest, but at every firing position as well, the Russians had used rifle grenades, primarily to eliminate dead angles in front of positions. There had been low piano wire between firing points, and yellow explosive had been planted amidst rock outcroppings and in front of the emplacements. "The Russians had relied exclusively on fire power; there had been no instance of a brave enemy charge employing cold steel." Only 20 meters from the entrenchments atop Changkufeng, Kitahara had been striving to regain the initiative and to hearten the scattered, reeling troops. One Japanese Army motto had concerned the mental attitude of commanders: "When surprised by the enemy, pause for a smoke." Kitahara had stood behind a rock, without a helmet, puffing calmly on a cigarette—a sight which had cheered the men. Sakata could not forget the scene. "It really happened," he had said, respectfully. As soon as Sakata had reached the forward lines, he had joined Kitahara (the senior officer and de facto battalion commander till then) and three enlisted men. All had been pinned behind the large boulder, the only possible cover, which had jutted in front of the Soviet crestline positions. Fire and flame had drenched the slopes, grenades from the peak, machine guns from the flank. The eastern skies had been brightening and faces could be discerned. Troubled by the stalemate yet not feeling failure, Sakata had said nothing about his own wounds but had told Kitahara he would lead his 2nd Company in a last charge up the left side of Changkufeng if only the machine gun company could do something about the enemy fire, especially some Soviet tanks which had been shooting from the right. "The enemy must have learned by now," the regimental records had observed, "that our forces were scanty, for the Soviets exposed the upper portions of their bodies over the breastworks, sniped incessantly, and lobbed illuminating shells at us." Agreeing with Sakata that the "blind" Japanese would have to take some kind of countermeasure to allow his two available heavy machine guns to go into concerted action, Kitahara had ordered illuminating rounds fired by the grenade dischargers. He had clambered atop the boulder and squatted there amidst the furious crossfire to spot for his guns, still only 20 meters from the Russian lines. Perhaps it had been the golden spark of Kitahara's cigarette, perhaps it had been the luminescence of his cross-bands, but hardly a moment later, at 04:03 am, a sniper's bullet had caught the captain between the eyes and he had toppled to his death. Nakajima had wanted to support Sakata's stricken company as well. The lieutenant had seen the advantage of outflanking the emplacements from the far left of Changkufeng where the fire of two Soviet heavy machine guns had been particularly devastating. Nakajima had swung his reserve unit around the crest to the southwest side, pressed forward through deadly grenade attacks, and had managed to reach a point ten meters from the Russian positions. Perched on the cliff's edge, he had prepared to continue: "Nakajima, who had been calming his men and looking for a chance to advance, leaped up and shouted, "Right now! Charge!" Sword in hand, he led his forces to the front on the left and edged up against the crest emplacements. But the enemy did not recoil; grenades and machine gun fusillades burst from above on all sides. Men fell, one after another. [During this final phase, a platoon leader and most of the key noncoms were killed.] A runner standing near Nakajima was hit in the head by a grenade and collapsed. Nakajima picked up the soldier's rifle, took cover behind a boulder, and tried to draw a bead on a Russian sniper whom he could see dimly 20 meters away through the lifting mist. But a bullet hit him in the left temple and he pitched forward, weakly calling, "Long Live the Emperor!" A PFC held the lieutenant up and pleaded with him to hang on, but the company commander's breath grew fainter and his end was at hand. The time was 4:10 am". Nakajima's orderly said of the event "Lieutenant Nakajima charged against the highest key point on Changkufeng, leading the reserve unit, and ensured the seizure of the hill. The lieutenant was wearing the boots which I had always kept polished but which he had never worn till this day." Akaishizawa added that Nakajima had purified himself in the waters of the Tumen before entering combat, in traditional fashion. Lieutenant Yanagihara had penned a tribute to his young fellow officer, the resolute samurai "Lt. Nakajima must have been expecting a day like today. He was wearing brand-new white underclothes and had wrapped his body with white cloth and the thousand-stitch stomach band which his mother had made for him. .. . Was not the lieutenant's end the same as we find in an old tanka verse? "Should you ask what is the Yamato spirit, the soul of Japan: It is wild cherry blossoms glowing in the rising sun."  On this main attack front, Soviet heavy machine guns and tanks had continued to deliver withering fire against the Japanese remnants, while Russian snipers and grenadiers had taken an increasing toll. Shortly after 04:00, enemy reinforcements had appeared at the northeast edge. Of the company commanders, only Sakata had still been alive; the other three officers had died between 03:30 and 04:30. A machine gunner who had been pinned down near the crest had commented: "It must have been worse than Hill 203" (of bloody Russo-Japanese War fame). Between a half and two-thirds of each company had been dead or wounded by then. Sakata had still been thinking of ways to rush the main positions. After Kitahara had been shot down, he had moved around to investigate. A colleague had added: "The agony of the captain's wounds had been increasing. He rested several times to appease the pain while watching intently for some chance to charge once more." Now, Sakata had been wounded again by grenade fragments tearing into the right side of his face. "It hadn't been serious," Sakata had insisted. As he had limped about, he could see his platoon leader, Kuriyama, sniping at a Russian grenadier.   Much would depend on the effectiveness of supporting firepower. With the death of Kitahara, control of the machine-gun company had been assumed by Master Sergeant Harayama. There had been almost no time to coordinate matters before Kitahara had fallen, but Harayama as well as Sakata had known that the infantry could not break loose until the Soviet heavy weapons had been suppressed. Working with another sergeant, Harayama had ordered his gunners to displace forward and rush the positions 20 meters away. The one heavy machine gun set up for action had been the first to fire for the Japanese side at Changkufeng, after its crew had manhandled it the last few meters to the first Soviet trench below the crest. The trench had been empty. Thereupon, the gunner had opened up against tents which could be seen 20 meters to the rear. Other friendly machine guns had begun to chatter. Kuriyama had dashed up and secured the southeast edge of the heights. Enemy resistance had begun to slacken. What appeared to be two small Soviet tanks, actually a tank and a tractor had been laying down fire near the tents in an apparent effort to cover a pullback. The two vehicles had advanced toward the Japanese and sought to neutralize the heavy machine guns. A squad leader had engaged the tractor, set it afire, and shot down the crewmen when they had tried to flee. Next, the tank had been stopped. The Japanese lead gun had consumed all of its armor-piercing (AP) ammunition—three clips, or 90 rounds—in 10 or 15 seconds. No more AP ammunition had been available; one box had been with the last of the six squads struggling up the heights. "More AP!" had yelled the 1st Squad leader, signaling with his hand—which had at that moment been hit by a Russian slug. A tank machine-gun bullet had also torn through the thumb and into the shoulder of the squad's machine gunner, whereupon the 21-year-old loader had taken over the piece. Similar replacements had occurred under fire in all squads, sometimes more than once in the same unit. "It had been a fantastic scene," Sakata had commented. "Just like grasshoppers! But they had finally neutralized the heavy weapons." The knocked-out Russian vehicles had begun to blaze while the eastern skies had lightened. New enemy tanks (some said many, others merely three) had lumbered up the slopes, but the Japanese heavy machine guns had continued to fire on them, and the tanks had stopped. If the machine guns had gone into action minutes later, the Russian armor might have continued to the top, from which they could have ripped up the surviving Japanese infantrymen: "So we gunners fired and fired. I could see my tracers bouncing off the armor, for there was still no AP. We also shot at machine guns and infantry. Since we carried little ammo for the night attack, my gun ran out, but by then the enemy had been ousted. We had originally expected that we might have to fire in support of the infantry after they took the crest. We lost none of our own heavy machine guns that night, overran four Maxims and captured mountains of hand grenades. By dawn, however, our machine gun company had lost more than half of its personnel—about 40 men".  The light-machine-gun squad leader had been wounded in the hand by a grenade near the site where Sakata had been hit. Nevertheless, the superior private had clambered up the slope with his men. After 04:00, when he and his squad had been pinned down with the infantry below the crest, he had heard Japanese heavy machine guns firing toward the foe on the right: "Our units were in confusion, bunched up under terrific fire in a small area. Getting orders was impossible, so I had my light machine gun open up in the same direction at which the heavies were firing. We could identify no targets but tried to neutralize the enemy located somewhere on the crest. Although Soviet flares were going off, we never could glimpse the enemy clearly. But we heard the Russians yelling "Hurrah!" That ought to have been the signal for a charge; here it meant a retreat".  But, of the ten men in this Japanese machine-gun squad, only four had been in action when dawn had come. The turning point had arrived when the machine-guns belonging to Sakata, and the reserves of the late Nakajima, had torn into the Russian emplacements, tanks, and tents behind. Others had said the key had been the fire of grenade dischargers belonging to the same units. A high-angle weapon, the grenade discharger, had been light, effective, and ideal for getting at dead space. In terms of ammunition, it had been especially useful, for it could fire hand grenades available to the foot soldier. Undoubtedly, the combined action of the grenade dischargers and machine guns (heavy and light) had paved the way for a last charge by the infantry. The four light machine guns of the 2nd and 4th companies had played their part by pouring flank fire against the Russians, who had clung to the position although Kuriyama's platoon had made an initial penetration. At about 04:30, Japanese assault forces could be seen dimly, in the light of dawn, exchanging fire with the Russians only a few meters away on the southern edge of Changkufeng Hill. At the same time, on the northern slopes, enemy reinforcements numbering 50 men with trucks and tanks had been scaling the hill. Around 04:45, Japanese grenades began to burst over the heads of the last enemy atop Changkufeng; the Russians had wavered. After the heavy weapons had finally begun to soften up the Soviet positions, Sakata had judged that there were not many Russians left. He had jumped into the first trench, ahead of his only surviving platoon leader, Kuriyama, and several soldiers. Two or three Russians had been disposed of; the rest had fled. By then the 2nd Company had been chopped down to a platoon; about 40 men still lived. There had been no cheer of banzai, as journalists had written; it would have drawn fire to stand up and raise one's arms. But Sakata had remained proud of the assertion by Sato that, from Chiangchunfeng, he had observed the last rush and knew the "real story," that "Sakata was the first to charge the peak." The regimental eulogist had written that Sakata's earnestness "cut through iron, penetrated mountains, and conquered bodily pain." As for Inagaki, about 15 or 20 minutes after the badly wounded Sakata had managed to reach the point where Kitahara and Nakajima had been pinned down near the Crestline, the lieutenant had arrived with the remnants of Yamada's company, probably by 04:20. The records would have us believe that Sakata had been able to coordinate the next actions with Inagaki despite the storm of fire: "The acting battalion commander [Sakata] resumed the charge with a brand-new deployment—his 2nd Company on the right wing and the 1st Company on the left." Actually, all Sakata could think of had been to charge; it had been too confused a time to issue anything like normal orders as acting battalion commander: "About all I remember asking Inagaki was: "What are you doing over here? What happened to your company commander?" I think he told me that Yamada had been killed and resistance on the right flank had been severe. Undoubtedly, he acted on his own initiative in redeploying. Nor was there any particular liaison between my company and Inagaki's force." To the left of Sakata's survivors were the vestiges of Nakajima's platoon, and further to the left, the outflanking troops brought up by Inagaki. These forces gradually edged up to the rear of the foe, in almost mass formation, on the western slope just below the top. "The enemy soldiers who had been climbing up the northern incline suddenly began to retreat, and Inagaki led a charge, fighting dauntlessly hand-to-hand." As a result of the more or less concerted Japanese assaults, "the desperately resisting enemy was finally crushed and Changkufeng peak was retaken completely by 05:15," three hours after the night attackers had jumped off. Akaishizawa had said that the troops "pushed across the peak through a river of blood and a mountain of corpses. Who could withstand our demons?" Sato's regimental attack order had called for the firing of a green star shell to signal success. At 05:15, according to the records, "the signal flared high above Changkufeng, showering green light upon the hill; the deeply stirring Japanese national flag floated on the top." Sakata thought that this must have been 10 or 20 minutes after the hill was taken, but he remembered no flare. "After the last charge I had no time to watch the sky!" The flare had probably been fired from a grenade launcher by the battalion aide or a headquarters soldier. After the final close-quarter fighting, Sakata had pressed forward while the survivors came up. The captain had deployed his men against possible counterattack. Later he had heard that Soviet tanks had lumbered up to reinforce the peak or to counterattack but that, when they observed the Japanese in possession of the crest, they had turned back. Only after his men had secured the peak had Sakata talked to Inagaki about sharing defensive responsibility. The records described Sakata's deployments at 05:20, but there had been painfully few men to match the tidy after-action maps. Did Sakata and his men push across the peak? "Not downhill a bit," he had answered. "We advanced only to the highest spot, the second, or right-hand peak, where we could command a view of the hostile slope." He had merely reconnoitered to deploy his troops. The senior surviving Japanese officer atop Changkufeng heights had been Sakata. What had happened to Major Nakano, who had been wounded shortly after jump-off? Although his right arm had been shattered, he had dragged himself to his feet, once he had regained consciousness, and kept climbing to catch up. His men had pleaded with him to look after his terrible wounds, but he had insisted on advancing, leaning on his sword and relying on spiritual strength. "Left! Move left!" he had been heard to shout, for the faltering Japanese had apparently been of the opinion that they were at the enemy's rear. Instead, they had pressed against the Russians' western wing, directly in front of the enemy works, from which murderous fire had been directed, especially from machine-gun nests ripping at their flanks. With sword brandished in his uninjured hand, high above his head, Nakano had stood at the corner of the positions. The explosion of an enemy grenade had illuminated him "like the god of fire," and he had been seen to crumple. He had died a little before 0500, to the left of where young Nakajima had fallen at 0430. His citation had said: "The battalion commander captured Changkufeng, thanks to his proper combat guidance and deployments. He provided the incentive to victory in the Changkufeng Incident." A eulogist had called Nakano a "human-bullet demon-unit commander": "All who observed this scene were amazed, for it was beyond mortal strength. One could see how high blazed the flame of his faith in certain victory and what a powerful sense of responsibility he had as unit commander. Major Nakano was a model soldier." When Nakano had pitched forward, badly wounded PFC Imamura had tried to protect the commander's corpse. Imamura had killed a soldier who appeared from behind a boulder, had lunged at another two or three, but had toppled off the cliff. Two other Japanese privates—a battalion runner and PFC Iwata—had been lying nearby, hurt seriously; but when they saw Imamura fall to his death, leaving the major's body undefended, they had dragged themselves to the corpse, four meters from the foe. Iwata, crippled and mute, had hugged Nakano's corpse until other soldiers managed to retrieve it. While death had come to Nakano, Sakata had been fighting with no knowledge of what was going on to his left. Pinned behind a boulder, he had had no way of checking on the battalion commander. Only after Sakata had charged onto the crest and asked for the major had he been told by somebody that Nakano had been killed. He had not even been sure where the commander had fallen. Such had been the time of blood and fury when battalion chief, company commanders, and platoon leaders had fought and died like common soldiers, pressing on with saber or pistol or sniping rifle under relentless cross-fire. Pretty patterns of textbook control had meant nothing. Life—and victory—depended on training, initiative, raw courage, and the will to win. The result of this combination of wills could not be ascertained, on 31 July 1938, until dawn brightened the bleeding earth on Changkufeng Hill. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Tokyo gambled on a night strike to seize Changkufeng, while diplomacy urged restraint. Amid mud, smoke, and moonless skies, Nakano led the 1st Battalion, supported by Nakajima, Sakata, Yamada, and others. One by one, officers fell, wounds multiplying, but resolve held. By 05:15, shattered units regrouped atop the peak, the flag rising as dawn bled into a costly, hard-won victory.

The last time we spoke, Ishiwara had been spending considerable amounts of time with the Kwantung Army staff trying to figure out a way to push the envelope on seizing Manchuria. Ishiwara and his like minded colleagues had tried everything to persuade the Imperial Japanese army high command to initiate a course of action, but everytime the message was the same “wait, wait until next year, we can't do this at this time”. In 1931 Ishiwara and Itagaki organized the last major expedition into Northern Manchuria to get the newest recruited Kwantung officers up to speed and ready for plans they had been cooking up. Captain Nakamura Shintaro disappeared on the way back to Port Arthur. The Kwantung officers took the initiative, one could call it “Gekokujo / ruling from below” because without approval, in fact basically against the orders of high command they mobilized their forces outside their designated railway zone and headed for Mukden to quote “get the Chinese military to help investigate the Nakamura disappearance”. When Tokyo HQ got a whiff of this they dispatched a telegram immediately demanding the Kwantung officers get their men back and not use the Nakamura incident as a way of “solving the Manchurian problem”   For Ishiwara this was the last straw. He doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” . During the last hectic weeks, General Honjo Shigeru arrived to take command of the Kwantung Army and there is no solid evidence Ishiwara and his radical group had disclosed their plans to him. However when everything began to move into motion, Honjo agreed to Ishiwara's military solution for the Manchurian problem.   On september 18th of 1931, a bomb was planted by the Kwantung army upon the south manchurian railway tracks at Liutiaokou. There was an explosion and the Kwantung army immediately claimed it to be a Chinese plot and moved with skill and precision to overrun the Peitaying Barracks. General Honjo's first reaction was hesitation, but then he committed additional units to aid the radicals and upon seeing the chaos unfold, ordered the seizure of all of Mukden in the process. Investigators would find the actions of Honjo over the course of the next few days to be quite indecisive. At first he seemed to be attempting to localize the incident, but then, likely as a result of Ishiwara and Itagaki pressuring him, relented to ordering a general assault on all Chinese positions in the area. Thus what was a isolated incident, transformed into a major offensive, and that major offensive was largely directed by two of Honjo's subordinates, as you may guess Ishiwara and Itagaki.   Now after the bomb explosion, the next 10 days saw southern and central Manchuria suddenly under the control of the Kwantung army. Itagaki as a senior staff officer and full colonel, was technically Ishiwara's superior, but for the next 4 months it appears Ishiwara was the main driver behind the military actions. Itagaki was quote to say to a friend during the offensive “Never mind Honjo, it's Ishiwara's War”. And indeed, being so far from Tokyo HQ's control, it really was Ishiwara's war. Tokyo dispatched official orders on September the 19th opposing the offensive, despite a lot of sympathy for the cause amongst the high commanders. Ishiwara and Inagaki had been planning this for months, they were willing to risk it all, so they disobeyed and carried on. Ishiwara began by first coercing Honjo for reinforcements and freedom to take initiative, as he was quoted asking ‘to pursue actively the security and order of all of Manchuria”.   Now obviously Ishiwara and Itagaki wanted to expand the offensive through the officials means firstmost, but they definitely went around the officials channels as well. One devious method they employed was to create chaos for civilians in Manchurian cities, thus increasing the need for better security for Japanese residents. This would allow the Kwantung army troops to deploy past their set perimeters. Immediately after what is now called “the Mukden incident”, military agents were dispatched to Kirin to create some chaos within the city. Reports of incidents from Kirin began to poor into the Kwantung Army HQ alongside Ishiwara demanding Honjo dispatch forces to Kirin to protect Japanese residents there. He also advocated for demanding reinforcements from the Korea Army, but Honjo was unwilling to go that far. It seems Ishiwara feared missing a golden opportunity and chose another course of action. On the night of the 20th, he gathered together a bunch of younger Kwantung officers such as Itagaki's assistant, Captain Katakura Tadashi and told them “I can't do anything more to budge the commander and so i'm giving up my responsibilities for the direction of operations. Katakura, you take over”. Well it seems this little ploy had the intended effect as all the young officers immediately began pressuring Honjo to support Ishiwara's demands to advance to Kirin, many of them threatening to resign. After several hours of the officers nagging, Honjo related and authorized the despatch of troops.    The operation against Kirin was carried out in lightning fast speed. Ishiwara directed the bulk of the 2nd division led by General Tamon Jiro to rush over to Kirin by rail. They entered the city without firing a single shot and forced the local Chinese commander to proclaim the independence of the province from Zhang Xueliang's regime. Within hours after this, the Korea army responded to a aid request sent out by the Kwantung Army staff on september 21st and began moving into Manchuria. Within only 48 hours the Japanese military had seized Kirin which lay outside the Kwantung operational zone and the Korea army was invading Manchuria without any approval from Tokyo, military discipline thus had been shattered.    Chief of staff Kanaya Hanzo had issued specific orders to limit the scope of the Kwantung army's operations and entrusted discretionary authority to the field commanders for certain emergency situations, usually of a local nature. The Kirin expedition did not exactly fall within any of these boundaries. Bolstered by their success, Ishiwara and Itagaki followed up the Kirin operation by pressing for an advance upon Harbin. As you might recall from the previous episode, the entire idea of taking Manchuria was built upon speed and precision. The Kwantung army had tiny forces compared to the immediate Chinese forces in Manchuria. However here they were blocked by directives sent from Tokyo HQ which forbade the movement of Kwantung troops beyond the south manchuria railway, up to this point they had limited their actions along those margins. Ishiwara attempted arguing something on more political lines. He argued Japan should aid Manchurian independence and sent the idea straight to Tokyo central HQ. In a sharp rebuff on October 3rd, Tokyo HQ affirmed its opposition to expanding the hostilities and rejected the political idea.   With the hard no from Tokyo HQ, the Kwantung radicals thought the only course of action was to cause even more chaos to force the issue. Ishiwara took the lead again, trying to toss Tokyo HQ off balance. Ishiwara personally went out on October the 8th, dressed in military pilot gear and slipped into one of five Chinese aircraft that had been seized at Mukdens airfield. He then personally led a raid, though later in life, such as at the Tokyo War crimes trials he would argue the flight was supposed to be just a reconnaissance of enemy activities at Chinchou. As he asserted, it was only at the last minute, some intelligence sprang up that anti-aircraft guns had been installed at Chinchou and thus the Kwantung army Commander had given permission to neutralize them if fired upon. Ishiwara stated that he and the 4 other aircraft accompanying him were fired upon and thus they dropped around 75 bombs on Chinchou, yes quite the course of events. As you might guess, more contemporary accounts would indicate this was a premeditated effort designed to freak out Tokyo.    The raid against Chinchou did indeed freak out Tokyo, the staff there began to fear the west would begin tossing condemnation upon them. Tokyo high command was in a bad spot. They felt obliged to back up the Kwantung army publically, by issuing post-facto approval of the many chaotic attacks, but internally they were livid. Major Endo Saburo of the intelligence division was sent to Manchuria to investigate the Chinchou situation. Saburo said upon asking Ishiwara what occurred, he responded that he had acted under the principle of field initiative and that was the reason why he never informed Tokyo in advance. Saburo also noted the manner in which he spoke to him indicated that Saburo alongside the intelligence division should mind their own business. Saburo also found out there were murmurs in Manchuria that if Tokyo high command did not get onboard, the Kwantung army was prepared to go it alone. It seemed the radical Kwantung officers would even go against the imperial japanese army command to get what they wanted. Ishiwara went as far as to send this telegram to Tokyo “For the sake of the nation we are doing our very best in Manchuria, but if the Japanese government constantly interferes we cannot complete our great work. Then the Kwantung army will have to come to the point where we will have to break the glorious history of the imperial army and separate ourselves from the empire”.If you thought this was pretty nuts, a rumor also emerged that Ishiwara and Itagaki were going to use an independent Manchuria as a base to perform a coup d'etat against the Japanese government, to overthrow the capitalists strangling the people and to establish a national socialist regime built around the emperor. For those of you who know your 1930's Japanese government by assassination history, you know exactly what this rumor is about, a little something that will occur in 1936. Whether Ishiwara and Itagaki actually intended to do this is unknown, but they certainly put out the word.   On october 18th, war minister Minami Jiro sent a telegram over to the Kwantung army ordering them to cease any and all talk of making Manchuria independent or trying to take control of it. Alongside that, they sent operations section, Colonel Imamura Hitoshi to Manchuria to talk some sense into Ishiwara and Itagaki. They all met at a restaurant in Mukden where Imamura began by explaining the purpose of his mission, but before he could even really begin, Ishiwara blurted out “whats the matter? Doesn't central headquarters have any backbone?” A great way to start a meeting to be sure. Imamura tried to explain the situation, but Ishiwara said “if we follow the spineless Tokyo approach we'll never settle the Manchurian problem”. Imamura replied “we can't accomplish anything by following the arbitrary decision of field elements, which may create a crisis that will shake the whole army. In such a problem it is essential for the whole nation to be unified”. To this Ishiwara apparently said really loudly in the restaurant that he was sleepy, rolled over on the tatami and closed his eyes. Imamura furious haha, get up quickly after denouncing his so called hosts for conducting official IJA business at a restaurant and left. The next day they all met again, where Ishiwara and Itagaki kept speaking about the necessity to create an independent state, since there was no hope of the Chinese reforming Manchuria. After Imamura left that meeting, Ishiwara said to Itagaki “Imamura is a fine fellow, but he doesn't understand China”.   And so despite the chaos and mania, the Kwantung Army had been restrained from pursuing any sustained military action through october. Ishiwara as you would imagine kept arguing they had to advance into northern manchuria. In early november Ishiwara got lucky again, finding a pretext in more destroyed railways. The rail bridges over the Nonni river south of Tsitsihar had allegedly been blown up by hostile Chinese forces. When Japanese engineer units showed up to repair the damaged tracks they were fired upon by Chinese forces. To the high officials in Tokyo it looked like a justifiable reason to take defensive measures. This was also being meet with Kwantung intelligence information being sent to Tokyo that Chinese forces in northern Manchuria were planning a southward offensive. Ishiwara had provided some rather exaggerated reports to the Japanese public to manipulate their opinion through the press which in turn put pressure on Tokyo into supporting an advance into northern manchuria.   Tokyo authorized a defensive operation, limited to time and distance aimed at defending the Japanese positions at the Nonni River bridges. Kwantung army forces began moving north and soon were engaged in heavy fighting around the railway area of Tahsing. Ishiwara personally led men during this, it would actually be the only time in his military career to do so. General Honjo, rightfully feared the Kwantung forces were getting out of hand sent a cabled on November 5th announcing under the “rinsan inmei / provisional mandate”, the general staff was assuming direct command authority in Manchuria. As you can imagine Ishiwara and his like minded Kwantung officer colleagues were livid. Honjo followed this up by stating he would resign if they did not comply, but Ishiwara brushed off the provisional mandate stating “that the directive from the chief of staff is just a personal, not an imperial order. No matter how many we get of those we shouldn't' care. We'll just go ahead with our plans”. On november 17, the Kwantung army began advancing upon the city of Tsitsihar seizing it 2 days later.    Facing yet another terrible situation publicly, the IJA high command allowed the Kwantung to advance upon Tsitsihar, but then uproar started abroad, forcing them to order the city evacuated. Ishiwara then began a huge argument amongst the staff stating the evacuation was unacceptable because of the sacrifices the forces had already made. But Honjo was standing firm. Then a few days later, Chinese forces began to assemble at Chinchou  and there had been some conflicts emerging between Japanese and chinese forces at Tientsin. Well Ishiwara immediately went to work demanding Honjo launch an offensive on Chinchou as a first step of linking their forces closer to Tientsin incase they were overwhelmed. To secure the advance, they also asked the Korea army to help out. Yet again Tokyo was tossed the hot potato. Tokyo high command ordered an immediate cease to the offensive and a withdrawal east of the Liao river. The Kwantung army paused, not so much before of the order, but because the Korea army refused to participate in the offensive against Chinchou, and they were most definitely needed.    Ishiwara faced a dilemma, without the reinforcements the entire offensive might be doomed. And then fatefully, Premier Wakatsuki was outed on December 11th.War Minister Minami and Chief of staff Kanaya, both who tried to moderate the Kwantung army's offensives were replaced by Araki Sadao an aggressive leader of the Kodoha Faction, known in english as “the imperial way faction”. To explain a bit, within the Japanese military there were cliques, kind of like the warlords cliques in many ways. They fought to direct the future operations of the IJA and even IJN to an extent. There were two main ones that influenced the 1930's heavily, the Kodoha and Toseiha (control faction). The Kodoha were not an organized political party, nor did they have an official standing within the IJA, but they were certainly influential. Kodoha members tended to be younger officers in the IJA, particularly those in the Kwantung army. General Sadao Araki was a founder of the faction and they were heavily influenced by Bushido, Fascism and the Kokutai. They sought a return to “the good old days” as one says. They say liberal democracy as a poison hurting Japan. They viewed the capitalists, industrialists and elites of Japan, ie the politicians, bureaucrats and Zaibatsu leaders to be responsible for ruining the once great nation. They wanted to see the Emperor take back full power, in what they would call a “showa restoration”. Their number one enemy, as was viewed by most of the Japanese military at this time, was the USSR and communism as a whole. Thus they were also by proxy in favor of the Hokushin-ron “northern strike policy” which was the Japanese theoretical war plan to invade the USSR. Now I don't want to go to far down the rabbit whole, but due note they were counter balanced by another faction known as the Toseiha faction, who were I guess to put it lightly, more moderate. The Toseiha were headed by Hideki Tojo famously and they opposed the Kodoha faction on a few grounds, one important one being, they did not want to cause a violent revolution to usher in the Emperor dominance. The Toseiha shared a lot of principles with the Kodoha, but they did not favor the Hokushin-ron strategy and instead adopted the Nanshin-ron strategy “southern strike” into southeast asia and the resource rich dutch east indies. It goes without saying the Toseiha faction enjoyed better relations with the IJN. So just to place this story within the political realm we are speaking, these two factions began to compete heavily for dominance 1931 onwards.   With Araki Sadao and some help from Prince Kan'in who was a Kodoha sympathizer things dramatically changed in Tokyo command. All of a sudden, offensive operations against Chinese forces in Manchuria became “bandit suppression” campaigns. The Kwantung army with Tokyo's full backing soon pursued all their military objectives, set out by Ishiwara and Itagaki since September. Chinchou and Shanhaikwan were seized in early January of 1932; Tsitsihar by February and by spring of 1932 Ishiwara argued to the staff they should complete the full seizure of Manchuria both north and south. In April that year he laid out “Manshu haiti heiryaku / the program for pacification of manchuria”. This new plan called for the seizure of Hailar in the north because “it was pivotal to the defense against the USSR”. It also called for seizing Jehol province because “it was an important condition to the independence of Manchuria”. By the end of the year Hailar was taken and in 1933 the Kwantung army was marching upon Jehol.   It goes without saying Ishiwara was central to the conquest of Manchuria. The Kwantung Army and IJA overall had numerous options laid bare to them to solve the Manchurian problem, but Ishiwara's primary concern was total control over Manchuria for its resources, strategic position and to obtain a continental base for a war against America. To Ishiwara, taking all of Manchuria was necessary to prepare for the Final War. Without Ishiwara it is certain there would have been conflict in Manchuria between Japan and China, but would Japan have outright seized the province? Ishiwara spent years planning and pushing the envelope. When the plan was unleashed, it would turn out Ishiwara and his colleagues did not have a concrete timetable for conquest and lacked quite a few contingency plans. Despite the chaotic nature of it all, the conquest of Manchuria was a stunning success. So much so, Ishiwara said to a friend of his, Satomi Kishio in 1932 “Even if Japan has to face the entire world, she can't be beaten”.   Ironically as many of you know, Japan's actions in Manchuria cost her greatly. Japan was now hated by the Chinese, well much more so. The west condemned Japan's actions, alongside the USSR. As my professor first taught me in a class about the Pacific War when I was a wee lad in his early 20's “It all was about Manchuria, everything started with Manchuria, and it ended with Manchuria in 1945”. The Manchuria affair started Japan on an inevitable course to fight the China War, which inturn led her to fight the west. It was a self-fulfilling prophecy. The entire affair also brings into question the subject of military discipline. Many look at the Gekokujo variable as an explanation as to how people like Ishiwara and Itagaki got away with all they did. You know, these militarist hardtype junior officers just ran amok, performed some rebellious acts defying their superiors, forcing their hands to become accomplices. Now don't get me wrong Gekokujo definitely played a hand, particularly when you look at Ishiwara. But it does not take away from the fact there simply was a high level of indiscipline within the Japanese army.   Ishiwara would have been 100% fully aware what his actions might result in, hell the guy before him, Colonel Komoto Daisaku is a great example. Ishiwara spent a long time with Komoto and saw the man's career broken as he was exiled for the Huanggutun incident. But Ishiwara was not only focus on Manchuria, he had a close eye on the political situation in Tokyo. Ishiwara knew the 1931 cabinet was crumbling, he knew certain high officials like Araki Sadao were in fast track position for promotions and their sympathies were with his cause. Ishiwara was betting, certain sympathizers such as Kodoha faction aligned ones would take seats of power necessary to help push his cause. His gamble more than paid off. All the main actors in the Manchurian affair were rewarded for their accomplishments. Ishiwara received the Order of the Golden Kite 3rd class. More importantly he returned to Japan as a rockstar hero, the younger IJA officers were enthralled by him. Ironically Ishiwara had fostered indiscipline within the army more so, that when he went up the ladder becoming a member of the Tokyo staff it would bite him in the ass.   Manchukuo and racial harmony   Now Ishiwara's dream of taking control over Manchuria was almost purely a means to end end: ie to obtain resources and a strategic position to face America. Once Manchuria was under their control, Ishiwara directed his attention towards another goal aside from this, that of racial cooperation among the asian peoples. Manchukuo or rather Ishiwara's view of what it could be was a springboard of his vision for a East-Asian league, something that had a firm basis in his Final War theory. During Ishiwara's tour of duty in Manchuria in 1932, this Pan-Asian idea of what Manchukuo could be is what set him apart from many of his Kwantung Army colleagues, it also marked him to be very unorthodox within the IJA.    Manchukuo as many of you probably know, was a sham puppet state created to legitimize Japan's seizure of Manchuria. The Japanese high command simply sought to use the guise of an indigenous movement for independence to hide the fact the simply invaded a part of China and stole it. To do this they went as far as grabbing the last Qing emperor, Puyi and tossing him upon the throne of the new state of Manchukuo while they tossed up principles of racial harmony. For obvious reasons this was all done. You can't control a region full of a population that rightfully hates you without trying to win them over. Now what the Japanese did have going for them, was there did exist elements in Manchuria who sought independence. This was Manchuria, the heart of Nurhaci's Manchu people, don't get me started on what a Manchu exactly is by the way, listen to the fall and rise of China podcast for that. The Japanese had a lot to work with, it could be seen as a righteous Qing revival, or simply giving power back to the Manchu. There was also a large presence of Mongolians, and yes Inner Mongolia would come into all of this. Manchuria came into the nationalist fold late and not exactly willingly. Also the fear of the USSR was not something Japan had alone, Manchuria had struggled against the USSR for a very long time. There was also of course a large Japanese settler population in Manchuria who obviously welcomed the seizure. The Zhang Xueliang regime was not exactly too too friendly to the Japanese within the borders and a lot of discriminatory measure had been exacted upon them. When Zhang Xueliang had joined the Nationalists this had basically spelt doom upon them, at some point they knew they would be kicked out.   While the offensives were in full swing, Ishiwara and Itagaki met with other influential Kwantung Officers to figure out how they could exert control over Manchuria. Officer Katakura, chief of staff Miyake, Dohihara Kenji of the Mukden special service organ all met, looking over a previous plan created by Colonel Dohihara, for a multi racial autonomous nation of Manchuria. It was to be headed by the last Qing emperor, Puyi and needed to possess complete autonomy in internal matters, but its defense and foreign relations would be entrusted to Japan. Ishiwara drafted the plans by September 22nd and they were telegrammed to Tokyo on October 2nd. Tokyo high command disproved of the objectives, but nonetheless worked with the Kwantung army for 5 months on the creation of a new state based on two major principles: the so-called indigenous movement for Manchurian independence and the administrative planning for the Kwantung army to control it.    The Kwantung army went to work using the traditional structure of Manchuria, local self governing bodies. They bribed, persuaded and threatened as many as they could throughout 1931 carefully cultivating a local autonomy movement against the Kuomintang hardliners. One of the first things they created was “Jichi Shidobu self-government guidance board”, whose organ was responsible for coordinating various regional movements for independence to work with the Kwantung army to, in the words of Miyake “guide Manchuria to self-government”. The head of this board was appointed to the Mukden elder statesmen Yu Ch'ung-han, a man educated in Japan and previous advisor to Zhang Zuolin. His board would consist of 20 Japanese and 10 Manchurian members. Such organs were opened Japanese civilians in Manchuria and they flocked to them to support the so called multiracial political structure, because they could bend it to their own benefit.   The Kwantung army began tossing the slogans “racial harmony, racial equality and the righteous way” around heavily. The Kwantung army control over Manchuria was hashed out easily by establishing Japanese advisors over all organs who held ultimate veto authority, they would be appointed at all levels of government, thus everything was in reality Japanese controlled. Everything was going according to Ishiwara's vision….or was it? You would think so, and Ishiwara was definitely pushing all of this forward, but by 1933 he suddenly became a ferocious critic of the very beast he had helped create. 

Bright on Buddhism - Episode 116 - What are some characteristics of Shingon Buddhist sacred spaces? How do they differ from other Buddhist sacred spaces? How are Shingon sacred spaces influenced by texts and doctrines?Resources: Andreeva, Anna. “Buddhist Temple Networks in Medieval Japan.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 47, no. 1 (2020): 11–41.; Bushelle, Ethan. “The Mountain as Mandala: Kūkai's Founding of Mt. Kōya.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 47, no. 1 (2020): 43–83.; Collection of Benevolent Deeds (Sazenshū 作善集). By Chōgen 重源 (1121–1206).In Shunjōbō Chōgen shiryō shūsei 俊乗房重源資料集成, ed. Kobayashi Takeshi小林 剛.Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1965.; Dobbins, James C. Jōdo Shinshū: Shin Buddhism in Medieval Japan. Religion in Asia and Africa Series. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989.; Goodwin, Janet R. “The Buddhist Monarch - Go-Shirakawa and the Rebuilding of Tōdai-Ji.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, The Emperor System and Religion in Japan, 17, no. 2/3 (1990): 219–42.; Horton, Sarah (2004). The Influence of the Ōjōyōshū in Late Tenth- and Early Eleventh-Century Japan, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 31 (1), 29-54; Inagaki, Hisao. “Esoteric Meaning of Amida.” Pacific World Journal New Series, no. 10 (1994).; Ingram, Evan. “Chōgen's Vision of Tōdaiji's Great Buddha as Both Mahāvairocana and Amitābha.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 46, no. 2 (2019): 173–92.; Johnson, Peter Lunde. Land of Pure Bliss: Sukhavati, 2021.; Kainuma, Yoshiko. “Chōgen's Jōdoji Amida Triad and Its Environment: A Theatrical Effect of the ‘Raigō' Form.” Artibus Asiae 74, no. 1 (2014): 97–127.; Kuroda, Toshio. “The Development of the Kenmitsu System as Japan's Medieval Orthodoxy.” Translated by James C Dobbins. Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, The Legacy of Kuroda Toshio, 23, no. 3/4 (1996): 233–69. ; Rosenfield, John. “Introduction: Todaiji in Japanese History and Art.” In The Great Eastern Temple: Treasures of Japanese Art From, edited by Yutaka Mino, 17–31. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986.; Rosenfield, John M. Portraits of Chōgen: The Transformation of Buddhist Art in Early Medieval Japan. Japanese Visual Culture ; Volume 1. Leiden, the Netherlands ; Brill, 2011.; Stone, Jacqueline I. Right Thoughts at the Last Moment–Buddhism and Deathbed Practices in Early Medieval Japan. University of Hawai'i Press, 2016.; Tōdaiji zōryū kuyōki 東大寺造立供養記. Anonymous. In Dai Nihon Bukkyō zen-sho 121, Tōdaiji sōsho 1, ed. Bussho Kankōkai, 47–57. Tokyo: Bussho Kankōkai,1912–1922.; Yen-Yi, Chan, and 晏怡詹. “Revealing the Miraculous: Objects Placed inside the Statue of the Kōfukuji Nan'endō Fukūkenjaku Kannon.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 49, no. 1 (2022): 45–88.Do you have a question about Buddhism that you'd like us to discuss? Let us know by emailing us at Bright.On.Buddhism@gmail.com.Credits:Nick Bright: Script, Cover Art, Music, Voice of Hearer, Co-HostProven Paradox: Editing, mixing and mastering, social media, Voice of Hermit, Co-Host

The Rickshaw Man, Hiroshi Inagaki's 1958 film about a gruff rickshaw driver who becomes the surrogate father to a boy who loses his father unexpectedly, is a remake of his own 1943 black and white film of the same name.  The 1958 version won Inagaki the Golden Lion award at the Venice Film Festival and was one of 20 films the director made with his favored actor Toshiro Mifune.   Dan and Vicky discuss the film along with lots of recently seen items like A Complete Unknown, Oscar winner Flow, Mickey 17, Black Bag, 1997's Tower of Terror, and streaming shows like Daredevil: Born Again, Delhi Boys and The Americas. Our socials:  hotdatepod.com FB:  Hot Date Podcast Twitter: @HotDate726 Insta:  hotdatepod

Bright on Buddhism - Episode 105 - Who is Amitabha? What are some stories about him? How ought we understand him?Resources: Karashima, Seishi (2009), JSTOR 24049429 On Amitābha, Amitāyu(s), Sukhāvatī and the Amitābhavyūha], Bulletin of the Asia Institute, New Series, 23, 121–130Charles Muller, "Buddha of Immeasurable Life 無量壽佛" Digital Dictionary of Buddhism,http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?71.xml+id(%27b7121-91cf-58fd-4f5b%27)Tanaka, Kenneth K. 1990. The Dawn of Chinese Pure Land Buddhist Doctrine: Ching-ying Hui-yüanʼs Commentary on the Visualization Sutra, p. 12. Albany: State University of New York Press.The Three Pure Land Sutras (PDF), translated by Inagaki, Hisao, Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 2003, ISBN 1-886439-18-4,Georgios T. Halkias, Luminous Bliss: A Religious History of Pure Land Literature in Tibet Pure LandJones, Charles B. (2019). Chinese Pure Land Buddhism, Understanding a Tradition of Practice. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press.Jones, Charles B. (2021). Pure Land: History, Tradition, and Practice. Shambhala Publications. ISBN 978-1-61180-890-2.Amstutz, Galen (1998). The Politics of Pure Land Buddhism in India, Numen 45 (1), 69–96 JSTOR 3270334 (subscription required)Inagaki, Hisao, trans. (2003), The Three Pure Land Sutras (PDF), Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, ISBN 1-886439-18-4, archived from the original (PDF) on May 12, 2014.Müller, F. Max (trans) Buddhist Mahâyâna texts Vol. 2: The larger Sukhâvatî-vyûha, the smaller Sukhâvatî-vyûha, the Vagrakkedikâ, the larger Pragñâ-pâramitâ-hridaya-sûtra, the smaller Pragñâ-pâramitâ-hridaya-sûtra. The Amitâyur dhyâna-sûtra, translated by J. Takakusu. Oxford, Clarendon Press 1894. Pure Land Sutras.Shi Wuling: In one Lifetime: Pure Land Buddhism, Amitabha Publications, Chicago 2006. ISBN 978-1-59975-357-7.Halkias, Georgios and Richard Payne. Pure Lands in Asian Texts and Contexts: An Anthology. University of Hawaii Press, 2019.Halkias, Georgios. Luminous Bliss: A Religious History of Pure Land Literature in Tibet, with an annotated English translation and critical edition of the Orgyan-gling Gold manuscript of the short Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra. Hawaii: University of Hawai‘i Press 2013. [1]Johnson, Peter, trans. (2020). The Land of Pure Bliss, On the Nature of Faith & Practice in Greater Vehicle (Mahāyāna) Buddhism, Including a Full Translation of Shàndǎo's Commentary in Four Parts Explaining The Scripture About Meditation on the Buddha 'Of Infinite Life' (Amitāyur Buddha Dhyāna Sūtra, 觀無量壽佛經), ISBN 978-1-7923-4208-0.Kenneth Tanaka (1989). Bibliography of English-language Works on Pure land Buddhism: Primarily 1983–1989, Pacific World Journal, New Series, Number 5, 85–99.Do you have a question about Buddhism that you'd like us to discuss? Let us know by tweeting to us @BrightBuddhism, emailing us at Bright.On.Buddhism@gmail.com, or joining us on our discord server, Hidden Sangha ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://discord.gg/tEwcVpu⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠!Credits:Nick Bright: Script, Cover Art, Music, Voice of Hearer, Co-HostProven Paradox: Editing, mixing and mastering, social media, Voice of Hermit, Co-Host

When developing a business centered around Japanese prints, there are many factors to consider: the audience, the history, and how you want to be perceived by the public. The appeal of the Japanese aesthetic, along with your own personal aesthetic and brand identity, can also be just as important to your business. On this episode of The Unfinished Print, I speak with Malene Wagner, a gallerist, curator, writer, and art historian whose business operates under the name Tiger Tanuki. Malene shares her passion for collecting and selling Japanese prints, and we explore the European perspective on Japanese prints and printmaking. We also dive into Japanese aesthetics and how they are interpreted through a Western lens. Additionally, Malene discusses how these aesthetics influence her brand, Tiger Tanuki, the role history plays in shaping her business, and her upcoming book. Please follow The Unfinished Print and my own mokuhanga work on Instagram @andrezadoroznyprints or email me at theunfinishedprint@gmail.com  Notes: may contain a hyperlink. Simply click on the highlighted word or phrase. Artists works follow after the note if available. Pieces are mokuhanga unless otherwise noted. Dimensions are given if known. Print publishers are given if known. Malene Wagner & Tiger Tanuki - Instagram, website ukiyo-e - is a multi colour woodblock print generally associated with the Edo Period (1603-1867) of Japan. What began in the 17th Century as prints of only a few colours, evolved into an elaborate system of production and technique into the Meiji Period (1868-1912). With the advent of photography and other forms of printmaking, ukiyo-e as we know it today, ceased production by the late 19th Century.  Uniqlo -  a Japanese clothing brand known for its affordable, minimalist, and high-quality everyday wear. It focuses on functional designs, using innovative fabrics like Heattech for warmth and AIRism for breathability. Uniqlo is popular worldwide for offering essential wardrobe staples and often collaborates with well-known designers and artists to create unique collections. Clear Day With A Southern Breeze (1831) is a print usually known as "Red Fuji." From the series Thirty Six Views of Mt. Fuji this print was actually pink, red was used in later impressions by publisher Nishimuraya Yohachi.  The Great Wave off Kanagawa - is a woodblock print designed by Katsushika Hokusai in 1831. It is very famous.  Yayoi Kusama -  is a pioneering Japanese artist known for her immersive installations and polka dot motifs that explore themes of infinity, identity, and mental health. Born in 1929 in Matsumoto, Japan, Kusama began her artistic journey through painting and avant-garde practices, eventually moving to New York in the late 1950s, where she became a key figure in the pop art and feminist movements. Her works, range from large-scale installations like the "Infinity Mirror Rooms" to her vibrant sculptures and paintings. Kusama's art is a deeply personal expression of her own experiences with mental illness, transforming her obsessions into stunning visual experiences that resonate globally. Today, she is celebrated as one of the most influential contemporary artists, with exhibitions and installations that captivate audiences worldwide. From "Life Is The Heart of A Rainbow", Installation (2017) MANGA - was an exhibition from May 23 - August 26, 2019 held at the British Museum in London, England.  shin hanga - is a style of Japanese woodblock printmaking that emerged in the early 20th century, marking the end of the nishiki-e period. Originating around 1915 under the direction of Watanabe Shōzaburō (1885-1962), the art form responded to the foreign demand for "traditional" Japanese imagery. Shin hanga artists focused on motifs like castles, bridges, famous landscapes, and bamboo forests. The style was initiated when Watanabe discovered Austrian artist Fritz Capelari (1884-1950) and commissioned him to design prints for Watanabe's budding printing house. This collaboration led to the evolution of shin hanga into a distinctive new style of Japanese woodblock printing. The shin hanga movement thrived until its inevitable decline after the Second World War (1939-1945). sōsaku-hanga - or creative prints, is a style of printmaking which is predominantly, although not exclusively, prints made by one person. It started in the early twentieth century in Japan, in the same period as the shin-hanga movement. The artist designs, carves, and prints their own works. The designs, especially in the early days, may seem rudimentary but the creation of self-made prints was a breakthrough for printmakers moving away from where only a select group of carvers, printers and publishers created woodblock prints.  Tomoo Inagaki (1902-1980) - introduced to mokuhanga by Onchi Kōshirō and Un'cihi Hiratsuka in 1923. Beginning in 1924, Inagaki published his first prints in magazines such as Shi to hanga (issue 13), Hanga (issues 6, 9/10, 11, 14), and Kitsutsuki, and exhibited with the Nihon Sôsaku-Hanga Kyôkai (Japan Creative Print Association). He became a member of the Nihon Hanga Kyôkai (Japan Print Association) in 1932 and participated in various post-war international competitions, including the Paris, Tokyo, and Lugano biennales. His cat prints have been highly collectible. More info can be found at Viewing Japanese Prints, here. The Rival Cats - 18" x 24" (1960's - 1970's) Oliver Statler (1915-2002) -  was an American author and scholar and collector of mokuhanga. He had been a soldier in World War 2, having been stationed in Japan. After his time in the war Statler moved back to Japan where he wrote about Japanese prints. His interests were of many facets of Japanese culture such as accommodation, and the 88 Temple Pilgrimage of Shikoku. Oliver Statler, in my opinion, wrote one of the most important books on the sōsaku-hanga movement, “Modern Japanese Prints: An Art Reborn.” Frances Blakemore (1906-1997) - was an American-born artist, writer, philanthropist and curator of modern Japanese mokuhanga. She lived in Japan for over fifty years and helped to support the burgeoning sōsaku hanga print movement of the 1950s. Blakemore worked in mokuhanga (collaborating with Watanabe Shōzaburō) and making self-printed and carved prints. She also worked in oils.  Japanese Bath (1937) - 11 7/8" x 9 5/8 " Yoshitomo Nara - is a renowned Japanese contemporary artist and is celebrated for his distinctive paintings and sculptures featuring figures with large heads and expressive eyes, often exploring themes of innocence, rebellion, and solitude.  Change The History (2007) acrylic on wood 74-7/16" × 55-1/2" × 3-1/8" Mingei - is a Japanese term that translates to "folk craft" or "people's art." It refers to a movement that emerged in the early 20th century, emphasizing the value and beauty of traditional, handmade crafts created by anonymous artisans. Mingei focuses on everyday objects, such as pottery, textiles, furniture, and utensils, that reflect the culture and daily life of the people who made them. Lawrin Smith - is the author of the book "The Prints of Yoshitoshi: A Complete Illustrated Catalog" (2009). This comprehensive catalog focuses on the works of Tsukioka Yoshitoshi. The book provides detailed descriptions and illustrations of Yoshitoshi's prints, showcasing his significant contributions to the ukiyo-e genre and his influence on modern printmaking. Wabi-sabi is a Japanese aesthetic philosophy that celebrates the beauty of imperfection, transience, and the natural cycle of life. It combines two concepts: "wabi," which refers to rustic simplicity and tranquility found in nature, and "sabi,"which denotes the beauty that comes with age and wear. Wabi-sabi values simplicity, asymmetry, and the unique characteristics of objects and experiences, encouraging appreciation for the impermanent and humble aspects of life. This philosophy is reflected in various forms of art, architecture, and design, emphasizing natural materials and handcrafted items, and fostering mindfulness and acceptance of the imperfections that make life beautiful. A-yo - is a renowned Japanese artist associated with the Gutai Art Association, an avant-garde group that emerged in post-war Japan. Known for his vibrant colors and distinctive style, Ay-O's work often incorporates elements of nature, light, and movement, reflecting themes of playfulness and spontaneity. He engages with materials in innovative ways and has explored performance art as part of his creative expression. With extensive exhibitions both in Japan and internationally, Ay-O has made significant contributions to contemporary art, emphasizing the joy of creation and the aesthetic experience. Marcel Duchamp (1887–1968) was a French-American artist and a key figure in modern art, known for his significant influence on the Dada movement and conceptual art. He initially trained as a painter but became renowned for challenging traditional notions of art through his controversial works, such as "Fountain"(1917), a readymade sculpture of a urinal that questioned the definition of art and the role of the artist. Duchamp's other notable pieces, including "The Large Glass" (1915–1923) and "Bicycle Wheel" (1913), explored themes of chance and perception. His innovative ideas about art as a conceptual experience rather than a purely visual one continue to resonate, solidifying his status as one of the most influential artists of the 20th century.   Fountain (1917) replica (1964)   Naoko Matsubara - is a contemporary Japanese printmaker known for her expertise in mokuhanga. Born in Osaka, she studied at Kyoto Seika University, where she specialized in printmaking and mastered the techniques of this ancient art form. Matsubara's work often blends traditional methods with contemporary themes, exploring the relationship between nature, culture, and identity. Her prints are characterized by intricate details, vibrant colors, and a deep appreciation for the materials and techniques involved in woodblock printing. She teaches and promotes mokuhanga both in Japan and abroad, exhibiting her work in galleries and museums worldwide and receiving numerous awards for her contributions to the field. Naoko's interview with The Unfinished Print can be found, here.    Gihachiro Okuyama (1907-1981) - was a prominent Japanese printmaker and painter associated with the sōsaku hanga (creative prints) movement. Born in Tokyo, he studied traditional Japanese painting and was influenced by Western art styles, leading to innovative woodblock prints characterized by bold colors and dynamic compositions that blend traditional aesthetics with modern elements. Throughout his career, Okuyama exhibited extensively in Japan and internationally, contributing significantly to contemporary printmaking while also playing a vital role in art education by sharing his expertise with future generations. His work reflects a deep engagement with the cultural exchanges between East and West during the post-war period.     Moonscape - 10" x 21"   Utagawa Kuniyoshi (1798-1861) - is considered one of the last “masters” of the ukiyo-e genre of Japanese woodblock printmaking. His designs range from landscapes, samurai and Chinese military heroes, as well as using various formats for his designs such as diptychs and triptychs.   Prince Rokuson Tsunemoto from Suikoden of Japanese Heroes (1843) 10" x 7"    Utagawa Kunisada III (1848–1920) - was a ukiyo-e print designer from the Utagawa school of mokuhanga. Kunisada III's print designs were designed during the transformation of the Edo Period (1603-1868) into the Meiji Period (1868-1912) of Japanese history, where his prints showed the technological, architectural and historical changes in Japan's history.    Kabuki Plays - Narukami and Princess Toki (ca. 1890's) triptych   Saitō Kiyoshi (1907-1997) - was a Japanese woodblock printmaker and artist who worked in the sōsaku hanga style of mokuhanga. HIs fame outside of Japan was fairly comprehensive with his peak fame being in the 1950's and 1960's. For a comprehensive book on his life and times, Saitō Kiyoshi: Graphic Awakening published by The John & Mable Ringling Museum is an excellent source. Can be found, here. Lecture by Dr. Paget about Saitō can be found, here. My interview with Professor Paget can be found, here.    Dog, Daschund 2 10" x 15"   Edvard Munch (1863-1944) - was a Norweigan artist, who initially was a painter, but also ventured into printmaking making 850 images. His print medium was etching, lithography, and woodcut. More information can be found here, at Christie's.      Anxiety (1894)   Pieter Cornelius Mondrian (1872-1944) - a Dutch artist who's work helped found De Stijl in 1917, a group of Dutch painters who helped codify Mondrian's abstraction and industrial design. Mondrian has a wide spectrum of works and styles created throughout his career. More information can be found, here from the Guggenheim.   Mill in Sunlight (1908). Credit: Kunstmuseum Den Haag, The Hague, The Netherlands © 2021 Mondrian/Holtzman Trust   Shunga - meaning "spring pictures," is a genre of Japanese erotic art that flourished during the Edo period (1603–1868), characterized by woodblock prints, paintings, and illustrated books depicting explicit sexual scenes often combined with humor, romance, and social commentary. Notable for its vibrant colors and intricate details, shunga explores themes of intimacy and sexuality, serving both as entertainment and education in a culture where such topics were often taboo. The genre reflects societal attitudes toward love and relationships and has a rich history despite facing censorship at various times. Today, shunga is recognized as a significant part of Japanese art history, appreciated for its aesthetic qualities and cultural context. Paul Binnie - Candlelight (1994) kappazuri print 24" x 18"  Tosa Prefecture - historically known as Tosa Province, is located in the southern part of Shikoku, Japan, and corresponds to present-day Kochi Prefecture. Renowned for its natural beauty, including mountains, rivers, and coastal landscapes, Tosa has a rich cultural heritage that includes traditional crafts like Tosa washi (handmade paper) and Tosa pottery. The region is famous for its vibrant festivals, such as the Yosakoi Festival, which features lively dance performances, and is known for its agricultural products, particularly citrus fruits like yuzu and sudachi, along with seafood. Kochi City, the capital of Kochi Prefecture, serves as the cultural and economic center, showcasing local cuisine, historical sites, and museums. Tosa's unique blend of natural scenery, traditional crafts, and cultural events contributes to its significance within Japan. © Popular Wheat Productions opening and closing credit - I Am Pentagon by the band Make Up from their album Save Yourself (1999) released by K Records.  logo designed and produced by Douglas Batchelor and André Zadorozny  Disclaimer: Please do not reproduce or use anything from this podcast without shooting me an email and getting my express written or verbal consent. I'm friendly :) Слава Українi If you find any issue with something in the show notes please let me know. ***The opinions expressed by guests in The Unfinished Print podcast are not necessarily those of André Zadorozny and of Popular Wheat Productions.***        

Bright on Buddhism - Longer Pure Land Sutra - Part 1 Join us as we read and discuss Part 1 of the Hisao Inagaki translation of the Longer Pure Land Sutra! Resources: Gomez, Luis, trans. (1996), The Land of Bliss: The Paradise of the Buddha of Measureless Light: Sanskrit and Chinese Versions of the Sukhavativyuha Sutras, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press; Inagaki, Hisao, trans. (2003), The Three Pure Land Sutras (PDF), Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, ISBN 1-886439-18-4, archived from the original (PDF) on May 12, 2014; Müller, Max, trans. (1894), The Larger Sukhāvatī-vyūha. In: The Sacred Books of the East, Volume XLIX: Buddhist Mahāyāna Texts, Part II. Oxford: Clarendon Press, ISBN 1-60206-381-8; Nattier, Jan (2003). The Indian Roots of Pure Land Buddhism: Insights from the Oldest Chinese Versions of the Larger Sukhavativyuha, Pacific World (3rd series) 5, 179–201 Do you have a question about Buddhism that you'd like us to discuss? Let us know by tweeting to us @BrightBuddhism, emailing us at Bright.On.Buddhism@gmail.com, or joining us on our discord server, Hidden Sangha ⁠https://discord.gg/tEwcVpu⁠! Credits: Nick Bright: Script, Cover Art, Music, Voice of Hearer, Co-Host Proven Paradox: Editing, mixing and mastering, social media, Voice of Hermit, Co-Host

Bright on Buddhism - Research Project Series - Chōgen's Tōdaiji Campaign: Reconstruction and Reimagination Hello and welcome to a new type of episode of Bright on Buddhism. In this series, I will be presenting and discussing some of my own original research, which covers a broad range of topics in Japanese Buddhism, and discussing it in the context of East Asian Buddhism and other disciplines broadly Resources: Andreeva, Anna. “Buddhist Temple Networks in Medieval Japan.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 47, no. 1 (2020): 11–41.; Bushelle, Ethan. “The Mountain as Mandala: Kūkai's Founding of Mt. Kōya.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 47, no. 1 (2020): 43–83.; Collection of Benevolent Deeds (Sazenshū 作善集). By Chōgen 重源 (1121–1206).In Shunjōbō Chōgen shiryō shūsei 俊乗房重源資料集成, ed. Kobayashi Takeshi小林 剛.Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1965.; Dobbins, James C. Jōdo Shinshū: Shin Buddhism in Medieval Japan. Religion in Asia and Africa Series. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989.; Goodwin, Janet R. “The Buddhist Monarch - Go-Shirakawa and the Rebuilding of Tōdai-Ji.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, The Emperor System and Religion in Japan, 17, no. 2/3 (1990): 219–42.; Horton, Sarah (2004). The Influence of the Ōjōyōshū in Late Tenth- and Early Eleventh-Century Japan, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 31 (1), 29-54; Inagaki, Hisao. “Esoteric Meaning of Amida.” Pacific World Journal New Series, no. 10 (1994).; Ingram, Evan. “Chōgen's Vision of Tōdaiji's Great Buddha as Both Mahāvairocana and Amitābha.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 46, no. 2 (2019): 173–92.; Johnson, Peter Lunde. Land of Pure Bliss: Sukhavati, 2021.; Kainuma, Yoshiko. “Chōgen's Jōdoji Amida Triad and Its Environment: A Theatrical Effect of the ‘Raigō' Form.” Artibus Asiae 74, no. 1 (2014): 97–127.; Kuroda, Toshio. “The Development of the Kenmitsu System as Japan's Medieval Orthodoxy.” Translated by James C Dobbins. Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, The Legacy of Kuroda Toshio, 23, no. 3/4 (1996): 233–69.; Rosenfield, John. “Introduction: Todaiji in Japanese History and Art.” In The Great Eastern Temple: Treasures of Japanese Art From, edited by Yutaka Mino, 17–31. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986.; Rosenfield, John M. Portraits of Chōgen: The Transformation of Buddhist Art in Early Medieval Japan. Japanese Visual Culture ; Volume 1. Leiden, the Netherlands ; Brill, 2011.; Stone, Jacqueline I. Right Thoughts at the Last Moment–Buddhism and Deathbed Practices in Early Medieval Japan. University of Hawai'i Press, 2016.; Tōdaiji zōryū kuyōki 東大寺造立供養記. Anonymous. In Dai Nihon Bukkyō zen-sho 121, Tōdaiji sōsho 1, ed. Bussho Kankōkai, 47–57. Tokyo: Bussho Kankōkai,1912–1922.; Yen-Yi, Chan, and 晏怡詹. “Revealing the Miraculous: Objects Placed inside the Statue of the Kōfukuji Nan'endō Fukūkenjaku Kannon.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 49, no. 1 (2022): 45–88. Do you have a question about Buddhism that you'd like us to discuss? Let us know by finding us on email or social media! https://linktr.ee/brightonbuddhism Credits: Nick Bright: Script, Cover Art, Music, Voice of Hearer, Co-Host Proven Paradox: Editing, mixing and mastering, social media, Voice of Hermit, Co-Host --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/brightonbuddhism/message

Un des musiciens de jazz japonais parmi les plus emblématiques de ces 60 dernières années et le pionnier du jazz… The post S07E02 Jiro INAGAKI & His Soul Media first appeared on Radio Campus Angers.

Welcome to the Social-Engineer Podcast: The Doctor Is In Series - where we will discuss understandings and developments in the field of psychology.   In today's episode, Chris and Abbie are discussing: The Illusion of Rational Thought. We will discuss the positives and negatives of rational decision making, as well as the role our emotions play in our decision making processes. [March 6, 2023]   00:00 - Intro 00:22 - Dr. Abbie Maroño Intro 01:21 - Intro Links -          Tuxcare – tuxcare.com -          Social-Engineer.com - http://www.social-engineer.com/ -          Managed Voice Phishing - https://www.social-engineer.com/services/vishing-service/ -          Managed Email Phishing - https://www.social-engineer.com/services/se-phishing-service/ -          Adversarial Simulations - https://www.social-engineer.com/services/social-engineering-penetration-test/ -          Social-Engineer channel on SLACK - https://social-engineering-hq.slack.com/ssb -          CLUTCH - http://www.pro-rock.com/ -          innocentlivesfoundation.org - http://www.innocentlivesfoundation.org/                                                06:00 - The Topic of the Day: The Illusion of Rational Thinking 08:18 - The Difference "Framing" Makes 12:53 - Why "FREE" Isn't Free 17:49 - Western Influence 20:02 - Having More, Feeling Less 22:00 - Analysis Paralysis 28:33 - Embodied Cognition 30:21 - You're Getting Warmer 33:59 - Excitation Transfer Theory 35:13 - Let the Countdown Begin 39:02 - Emotional Responses 42:31 - Incidental Emotions 45:45 - Wrap Up -          www.social-engineer.com -          www.innocentlivesfoundation.org 48:01 - Outro   Find us online: -          Twitter: https://twitter.com/abbiejmarono -          LinkedIn: linkedin.com/in/dr-abbie-maroño-phd-35ab2611a -          Twitter: https://twitter.com/humanhacker -          LinkedIn: linkedin.com/in/christopherhadnagy   References: Mano, H. (1990). Emotional states and decision making. ACR North American Advances. DellaVigna, S. (2009). Psychology and economics: Evidence from the field. Journal of Economic literature, 47(2), 315-372. Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of general psychology, 2(2), 175-220. Klein, N. H., & Oglethorpe, J. E. (1987). Cognitive reference points in consumer decision making. ACR North American Advances. Koop, G. J., & Johnson, J. G. (2012). The use of multiple reference points in risky decision making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25(1), 49-62. Seiler, M. J., Seiler, V. L., & Lane, M. A. (2012). Mental accounting and false reference points in real estate investment decision making. Journal of Behavioral finance, 13(1), 17-26. Bottom, W. P., & Studt, A. (1993). Framing effects and the distributive aspects of integrative bargaining. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 56, 459–474 So, J., Achar, C., Han, D., Agrawal, N., Duhachek, A., & Maheswaran, D. (2015). The psychology of appraisal: Specific emotions and decision-making. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 25(3), 359-371. Kristensen, H., & Ga¨ rling, T. (1997). Anchor points, reference points, and counteroffers in negotiations. Manuscript submitted for publication. Neale, M. A., Huber, V. L., & Northcraft, G. B. (1987). The framing of negotiations: Contextual versus task frames. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39, 228–241 Broniarczyk, Susan M., Hoyer, Wayne D., & McAlister, Leigh (1998). Consumers' perceptions of the assortment offered in a grocery category: The impact of item reduction. Journal of Marketing Research, 35(May), 166–176. Carpenter, Gregory S., & Nakamoto, Kent (1989). Consumer preference formation and pioneering advantage. Journal of Marketing Research, 26(August), 285–298 Andrade, E. B., & Ariely, D. (2009). The enduring impact of transient emotions on decision making. Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 109(1), 1-8. Foglia, L., & Wilson, R. A. (2013). Embodied cognition. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 4(3), 319-325. Wilson, A. D., & Golonka, S. (2013). Embodied cognition is not what you think it is. Frontiers in psychology, 4, 58. Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 9, 625-636. Inagaki, T. K., & Eisenberger, N. I. (2013). Shared neural mechanisms underlying social warmth and physical warmth. Psychological science, 24(11), 2272-2280.

Cette fois, la 5e de Couv’ se rhabille à l’occasion d’un grand événement : la rencontre avec une légende du manga, Riichirô Inagaki ! En effet, le célèbre scénariste de Eyeshield 21, Dr. Stone et... L'article Rencontre avec Riichirô Inagaki – #5DC – Saison 8 – épisode 19 est apparu en premier sur La 5e de Couv' - Le podcast de débat autour du manga !.

Today's episode is all about Junichi Inagaki, a popular city pop singer known for his hits from the 1980s and 1990s. Inagaki's emotional tunes include some of the most popular songs of the Christmas season. City pop emerged in Japan during the economic boom with the introduction of new electronic musical instruments and cars built with cassette decks. Enjoy a long car ride and the soulful tunes of Junichi Inagaki. It may bring back memories of a past lover or two!Scripted & Quality Assured by: NolaHosted by: Connor & ChristineAudio Edited & Uploaded by: Fred Support this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/japan-top-10-ri-ben-nototsupu10-jpop-hits/donationsAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Link to bioRxiv paper: http://biorxiv.org/cgi/content/short/2022.10.20.512984v1?rss=1 Authors: Leiwe, M. N., Fujimoto, S., Baba, T., Moriyasu, D., Sakaguchi, R., Saha, B., Inagaki, S., Imai, T. Abstract: Fluorescence imaging is widely used for the mesoscopic mapping of neuronal connectivity. However, neurite reconstruction is challenging, especially when neurons are densely labelled. Here we report a strategy for the fully automated reconstruction of densely labelled neuronal circuits. Firstly, we established stochastic super-multicolour labelling with up to seven different fluorescent proteins using the Tetbow method. With this method, each neuron was labelled with a unique combination of fluorescent proteins, which were then imaged and separated by linear unmixing. We also established an automated neurite reconstruction pipeline based on the quantitative analysis of multiple dyes (QDyeFinder). To classify colour combinations, we used a newly developed unsupervised clustering algorithm, dCrawler, in which data points in multi-dimensional space were clustered based on a given threshold distance. Our new strategy allows for the reconstruction of neurites for up to hundreds of neurons at a millimetre scale without manual tracing. Copy rights belong to original authors. Visit the link for more info Podcast created by Paper Player, LLC

Wir starten in den #Japanuary mit dem ersten Teil von Hiroshi Inagakis Miyamoto Musashi-Trilogie. Der war Mitte der 1950er Jahre enorm wichtig für die Popularisierung des japanischen Films im Westen, aber heutzutage ist es seltsam still um diese Neudeutung des Nationalmythos Miyamoto Musashi geworden. Wir diagnostizieren, woran das liegen könnte - und sehen die Gründe eher als Stärken des Films. Inagaki will um jeden Preis herkömmliches Spektakel vermeiden, uns eher mit wunderschönen Naturbildern bewegen als mit den zahlreichen Monumentalszenen, die man oft gar nicht als solche wahrnimmt, trotz etlicher Hundertschaften an Komparsen. Genauso wie der junge Miyamoto Musashi zu Transzendenz und Introspektion finden muss, zwingt uns Inagaki in die kontemplative Distanz, selbst wenn es die Gelegenheit zu Chanbara-Action gibt. Wir reden auch darüber, wie der Film die Musashi-Saga mit einiger Konsequenz für die japanische Nachkriegsgesellschaft umdeutet. Und über die generell atemberaubende Farbfotografie.

Welcome back to episode 3. Numerous risk factors have been proposed to contribute to food allergy or sensitization, in this episode, I will address a few of the most researched genetic and environmental risk factors that increase the risk of developing IgE-mediated food allergy. If you would like to find out more please do visit my blog post which will detail everything that was discussed in the podcast. You can find the blog post based on this podcast on my website under blogs. Disclaimer:The information in this podcast is for information and entertainment purposes only.I am not a medical professional so I have never and will never give medical advice. You should always speak to a health care provider about your unique health needs. My opinions are entirely my own. I only discuss published literature in this podcast. I am not responsible for any claims related to the procedures, professionals, products or methods discussed in the podcast, and do does not approve or endorse any products, professionals, services or methods that may be referenced to in this podcast. Instagram: @AllergieswithAyah Website: https://allergieswithayah.wixsite.com/websiteImage description: The image is an infographic, with a light green background. There is a cartoon mustard tub, celery stick and different types of nuts at the bottom left corner. At the bottom right corner there is a cartoon image of a glass of wine, milk carton, tofu, shellfish, crustacean, purple fish and one egg. On the top left corner there are three wheat stalks and sesame and lupin seeds as cartoon images. On the top right there is a logo with a green antibody in a white box. The logo has the words Allergies at the top of the antibody, the word with to the centre left of the antibody and the word Ayah to the centre right of the antibody. At the centre top of the infographic there is the words Allergies with Ayah in written in grey. The word episode 2 is written to the centre left of Ayah's face. In the centre of the image there is a cartoon character depiction of Ayah. Ayah has brown long hair and is smiling. Ayah's hand is together in two fists and she is wearing a purple topReference list Allen, K.J., Koplin, J.J., Ponsonby, A.L., Gurrin, L.C., Wake, M., Vuillermin, P., Martin, P., Matheson, M., Lowe, A., Robinson, M. and Tey, D., (2013). Vitamin D insufficiency is associated with challenge-proven food allergy in infants. Journal of allergy and clinical immunology, 131(4), pp.1109-1116. Asai, Y., Eslami, A., van Ginkel, C.D., Akhabir, L., Wan, M., Ellis, G., Ben-Shoshan, M., Martino, D., Ferreira, M.A., Allen, K. and Mazer, B., (2018a). Genome-wide association study and meta-analysis in multiple populations identifies new loci for peanut allergy and establishes C11orf30/EMSY as a genetic risk factor for food allergy. Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology, 141(3), pp.991-1001. Asai, Y., Eslami, A., Van Ginkel, C.D., Akhabir, L., Wan, M., Yin, D., Ellis, G., Ben-Shoshan, M., Marenholz, I., Martino, D. and Ferreira, M.A., (2018b). A Canadian genome-wide association study and meta-analysis confirm HLA as a risk factor for peanut allergy independent of asthma. Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology, 141(4), pp.1513-1516. Chalmers JR, Haines RH, Mitchell EJ, Thomas KS, Brown SJ, Ridd M, et al. Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of daily all-over-body application of emollient during the first year of life for preventing atopic eczema in high-risk children (The BEEP trial): protocol for a randomised controlled trial. Trials 2017;18:343. Crespo JF, James JM, Fernandez-Rodriguez C, Rodriguez J. Food Allergy: Nuts and Tree Nuts. Br J Nutr. 2006;96 2:S95–102. Feeney, M., Du Toit, G., Roberts, G., Sayre, P.H., Lawson, K., Bahnson, H.T., Sever, M.L., Radulovic, S., Plaut, M., Lack, G. and Chan, S., 2016. Impact of peanut consumption in the LEAP study: feasibility, growth, and nutrition. Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology, 138(4), pp.1108-1118.Grimshaw, K. E., Bryant, T., Oliver, E. M., Martin, J., Maskell, J., Kemp, T., Clare Mills, E. N., Foote, K. D., Margetts, B. M., Beyer, K., & Roberts, G. (2016). Incidence and risk factors for food hypersensitivity in UK infants: results from a birth cohort study. Clinical and translational allergy, 6, 1. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13601-016-0089-8Lack, G., 2008. Epidemiologic risks for food allergy. Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology, 121(6), pp.1331-1336.Marenholz, I., Grosche, S., Kalb, B., Rüschendorf, F., Blümchen, K., Schlags, R., Harandi, N., Price, M., Hansen, G. & Seidenberg, J. (2017). 'Genome-wide association study identifies the SERPINB gene cluster as a susceptibility locus for food allergy', Nature communications, 8(1), pp. 1-10. Matsui, T., Tanaka, K., Yamashita, H., Saneyasu, K.-i., Tanaka, H., Takasato, Y., Sugiura, S., Inagaki, N. & Ito, K. (2019). 'Food allergy is linked to season of birth, sun exposure, and vitamin D deficiency', Allergology International, 68(2), pp. 172-177.Perkin MR, Logan K, Marrs T, Radulovic S, Craven J, Flohr C, et al. Enquiring About Tolerance (EAT) study: feasibility of an early allergenic food introduction regimen. J Allergy Clin Immunol 2016a 137:1477-86. Perkin MR, Logan K, Tseng A, Raji B, Ayis S, Peacock J, et al. Randomized trial of introduction of allergenic foods in breast-fed infants. N Engl J Med 2016b ;374: 1733-43. Perkin, M.R., Logan, K., Marrs, T., Radulovic, S., Craven, J., Boyle, R.J., Chalmers, J.R., Williams, H.C., Versteeg, S.A., Van Ree, R. and Lack, G., 2021. Association of frequent moisturizer use in early infancy with the development of food allergy. Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology, 147(3), pp.967-976.Savilahti, E. M., Ilonen, J., Kiviniemi, M., Saarinen, K. M., Vaarala, O. & Savilahti, E. (2010). 'Human leukocyte antigen (DR1)-DQB1* 0501 and (DR15)-DQB1* 0602 haplotypes are associated with humoral responses to early food allergens in children',International archives of allergy and immunology,152(2), pp. 169-177.siSchoemaker, A. A., Sprikkelman, A. B., Grimshaw, K. E., Roberts, G., Grabenhenrich, L., Rosenfeld, L., Siegert, S., Dubakiene, R., Rudzeviciene, O. & Reche, M. (2015). 'Incidence and natural history of challenge‐proven cow's milk allergy in European children–EuroPrevall birth cohort',Allergy,70(8), pp. 963-972.Sicherer, S. H., Furlong, T. J., Maes, H. H., Desnick, R. J., Sampson, H. A. & Gelb, B. D. (2000). 'Genetics of peanut allergy: a twin study',Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology,106(1), pp. 53-56.Tordesillas, L.,Berin,M. C. & Sampson, H. A. (2017). 'Immunology of foodallergy', Immunity,47(1), pp. 32-50.Van Ginkel, C.D., Flokstra‐de Blok, B.M.J., Kollen, B.J., Kukler, J., Koppelman, G.H. and Dubois, A.E.J., (2015). Loss‐of‐function variants of the filaggrin gene are associated with clinical reactivity to foods. Allergy, 70(4), pp.461-464.Venkataraman, Devasmitha et al. “Filaggrin loss-of-function mutations are associated with food allergy in childhood and adolescence.” The Journal of allergy and clinical immunology vol. 134,4 (2014): 876-882.e4. doi:10.1016/j.jaci.2014.07.033Visscher, P.M., Wray, N.R., Zhang, Q., Sklar, P., McCarthy, M.I., Brown, M.A. and Yang, J., (2017). 10 years of GWAS discovery: biology, function, and translation.The American Journal of Human Genetics,101(1), pp.5-22.

U.S. National 24 Hour Running Team Friday morning at 9:00 am, USA Ultrarunner, Camille Herron will be running down a 48 hour record. Maybe more. Camille has the top two 24 Hour marks in the World. She set the World Record with 167.75 miles (270.116 km) in Albi, France, surpassing her own previous record of 162.919 (262.192) by almost five miles. She finished 4th overall. She will start the 48 hour race at 3 Days at the Fair with the opportunity to take down some long-standing, impressive records, but her eyes are on #4 and #5 below. 1.) Women's USA 48 Hour Record: Traci Falbo; 390.024km (242.349 miles/11:53 minutes per mile); June 2014; Anchorage, AK. This is also an indoor world record. 2.) Women's World 48 Hour Record: Sumie Inagaki (JPN); 397,103km (246.748 miles/11:40 minutes per mile ); May 2010; Surgeres, FRA 3.) First woman to break 400km: Patrycja Bereznowska; 401.00km (249.169 miles/11:33 minutes per mile); Athens International Ultramarathon Festival 1000 Mile race, Greece; **Berenowska broke Inagaki's record but it was not ratified 4.) Men's USA 48 Hour Record: Olivier Leblond; 421.939km (262.18 miles/10:59 minute per mile); Nov 2017, Icarus Florida UltraFest 5.) Men's World 48 Hour Record: The GOAT, Yiannis Kouros (GRE); road best of 269 miles [Yiannis Kouros ran 473,495km (294.2 miles) in a 48 hour event on the track/9:47 minutes per mile]; May 1996; Surgeres, FRA. Camille will dedicate her run to the late Ruth Bader Ginsburg. GOOD LUCK TO YOU AND Conor Holt! 6 Day (Hour 99) Amy Mower (51/F) 294 miles Philip Eberts (39/M) 329 miles 72 Hour (Hour 27) Jennifer McHale (41/F) 102 miles Ed Ettinghausen (58/M) 105 miles Endurance Noise & Random Musings Please Subscribe to my YouTube Channel! Stay Healthy. Be Boring. Not Epic. --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/andy-noise/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/andy-noise/support

⟩⟩ Wir alle haben Macht in unserem Leben. Je nach Kontext, Gruppe oder Situation ist es mal mehr oder mal weniger. Die Frage ist wie wir damit umgehen? Und welche Macht wir für uns selbst haben? Ist Macht etwas Gutes oder Schlechtes? Wie verändert sie uns? Wie gehen wir mit ihr um? Und wie können wir Macht neu definieren, um sie nutzbar zu machen? Diese und weitere Fragen wird Pam heute beantworten. Und Philipp hat auch mal wieder eine Studie zu Macht dabei. ⟩⟩ Quellen: „How can you tell if someone is kind? Ask how rich they are.“ Karen Weese. October 21, 2016. Washington Post. — https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/10/21/how-can-you-tell-if-someone-is-kind-ask-how-rich-they-are/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4d8c0e7be3e8 Muscatell, K. A., Morelli, S. A., Falk, E. B., Way, B. M., Pfeifer, J. H., Galinsky, A. D., Lieberman, M. D., Dapretto, M., & Eisenberger, N. I. (2012). Social status modulates neural activity in the mentalizing network. NeuroImage, 60, 1771-1777 — https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3909703/ Muscatell, K. A., Moeini, M., Inagaki, T. K., Dutcher, J. D., Jevtic, I., Breen, E. C., Irwin, M. R., & Eisenberger, N. I. (2016). Exposure to an inflammatory challenge enhances neural sensitivity to negative and positive social feedback. Brain, Behavior, and Immunity, 57, 21-29. — https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27032568 Muscatell, K.A., Dedovic, K., Slavich, G. M., Jarcho, M. R., Breen, E. C., Bower, J. E., Irwin, M. R., & Eisenberger, N. I. (2016). Neural mechanisms linking social status with inflammatory responses to social stress. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 11, 915-922. — https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26979965 --- ⟩⟩ Fragen und Anregungen zum Podcast: podcast@enneagramgermany.de

Learn about how drugs like Ritalin and Adderall actually make you “focus,” how tech companies are using lava lamps to make computers more secure, and why new life discovered at the bottom of the ocean opens up new possibilities for finding life on Mars. Scientists figured out how Ritalin actually makes you focus by Grant Currin Ritalin and similar medications cause brain to focus on benefits of work, not costs. (2020). EurekAlert! https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2020-03/bu-ras031820.php  Westbrook, A., van den Bosch, R., Määttä, J. I., Hofmans, L., Papadopetraki, D., Cools, R., & Frank, M. J. (2020). Dopamine promotes cognitive effort by biasing the benefits versus costs of cognitive work. Science, 367(6484), 1362–1366. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaz5891  Additional resources from Matt Parker, stand-up mathematician: Pick up “Humble Pi: When Math Goes Wrong in the Real World” on Amazon https://amzn.to/3c3xwi9  Matt Parker’s official website http://standupmaths.com/ Subscribe to Matt Parker’s YouTube channel https://www.youtube.com/user/standupmaths Follow @standupmaths on Twitter https://twitter.com/standupmaths Liebow-Feeser, J. (2017, November 6). LavaRand in Production: The Nitty-Gritty Technical Details. The Cloudflare Blog; The Cloudflare Blog. https://blog.cloudflare.com/lavarand-in-production-the-nitty-gritty-technical-details/ Scott, T. (2020). The Lava Lamps That Help Keep The Internet Secure [YouTube Video]. In YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1cUUfMeOijg  US5732138A - Method for seeding a pseudo-random number generator with a cryptographic hash of a digitization of a chaotic system - Google Patents. (1996, January 29). Google.com. https://patents.google.com/patent/US5732138 Researchers discover bacteria living in rock beneath the sea floor (which is good news for life on Mars) by Cameron Duke Discovery of life in solid rock deep beneath sea may inspire new search for life on Mars. (2020). EurekAlert! https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2020-04/uot-dol033020.php  Suzuki, Y., Yamashita, S., Kouduka, M., Ao, Y., Mukai, H., Mitsunobu, S., Kagi, H., D’Hondt, S., Inagaki, F., Morono, Y., Hoshino, T., Tomioka, N., & Ito, M. (2020). Deep microbial proliferation at the basalt interface in 33.5–104 million-year-old oceanic crust. Communications Biology, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.1038/s42003-020-0860-1  Subscribe to Curiosity Daily to learn something new every day with Cody Gough and Ashley Hamer. You can also listen to our podcast as part of your Alexa Flash Briefing; Amazon smart speakers users, click/tap “enable” here: https://www.amazon.com/Curiosity-com-Curiosity-Daily-from/dp/B07CP17DJY 

In this episode, an Interview with the multi-talented and lovely person - Stephanie Inagaki! Listen as she offers insight into being a Gothic Jewelry Designer, her tabling adventures and collaborating with fellow artists. Also, the Crossing Point, highlights of upcoming events in the Convention world. Host: Dee Chavez Director of Editing/Design: Tom Kanchanapinyokul Music credit to: iampunchdeck Website: conventioncrossing.com Write me if you have any questions or comments: conventioncrossing@gmail.com Follow and subscribe! Twitter: @concrossing IG: @conventioncrossing FB: conventioncrossing

This week I interview artist Stephanie Inagaki. Stephanie is an amazing fine artist, sculptor and jeweler among other things. We discuss the days of her youth as a goth, her Japanese heritage, art school, bridging the gap between the high end fine art world and the Dark Art world, dealing with loss, being a woman in the Dark Art scene, Feminism and a ton more. This was a really interesting conversation and I was really excited to learn about her! I also talk about my art life and answer the 5 questions. Talon Gallery (Stephanie's next show): https://talongallery.com/pages/schedule Stephanie's Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/stephanieinagaki Stephanie's Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/stephanieinagaki/ Stephanie's Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/stephanie.inagaki/ Stephanie's website: http://www.stephanieinagaki.com/ Stephanie's Jewelry: https://www.miyudecay.com/ Stephanie's Everyday Original: http://www.everydayoriginal.com/artistprofile/?artist=stephanieinagaki Stephanie's Threadless Shop: https://stephanieinagaki.threadless.com/ Stephanie's Twitter: https://twitter.com/sinfarquhar The Dark Art Society Podcast is produced by Chet Zar, with mixing and mastering by Bryan Kilgore of Kilgore Sound; find him on Instagram and Twitter (at)kilgoresound, or his website www.kilgoresound.com Become an Official Member of the Dark Art Society: www.patreon.com/DarkArtSociety Chet’s Patreon: www.patreon.com/ChetZar The Dark Art Society Instagram: instagram.com/darkartsociety Official Dark Art Society Website: www.darkartsociety.com The Dark Art Society Podcast is now available in a variety of places, including the following platforms: SoundCloud: @darkartsociety iTunes: apple.co/2gMNUfM Stitcher: www.stitcher.com/s?fid=134626&refid=stpr Podbay: podbay.fm/show/1215146981 YouTube: bit.ly/2nNYPre DarkArtSociety.com Copyright Chet Zar LLC 2019

Neste episódio Danilo Fernandes traz Alexandre Inagaki (@inagaki) para discutirem sobre o stress causado pela internet. Sabia que a web 2.0 tem menos de vinte anos e mesmo assim já conseguimos estragar esse brinquedo? Você já se deparou com termos como burnout e FOMO? Então esse podcast foi feito pra você. Escute agora!   Twitter:   http://twitter.com/dofsmartins http://twitter.com/comequepod   Instagram:   http://instagram.com/dofsmartins http://instagram.com/comequepod   Links comentados:   Thread do Inagaki no twitter sobre sua volta (link) Rede social Vero (link) Google+ vai acabar em abril (link) Anderson Gaveta - Burnout no YouTube (link) PC Siqueira - Saia você também das redes sociais (link) Ilha de Barbados - Estamos fora das redes sociais (link) Extra: PC Siqueira - O Ciclo Vicioso da interwebs (link) Gráfico de tweets da esquerda e da direita política (link)

Today I meet a new ghost living in the house who apparently likes to smoke weed, travel through space and listen to Jazz. Jazz Johnny takes me (Geoffrey didn't want to go) on a cosmic adventure through Space Jazz, Spy Jazz, and some really chill tunes!

Toyota is back at the top of the global auto industry five years after safety lapses savaged its reputation, sales had plunged and losses soared. Kana Inagaki goes to the Japanese carmaker's HQ to assess the reality of the rebound See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Donovan Hill joins us again as we continue our discussion on Inagaki's Samurai Trilogy, this time focusing on the second film in the series which came out in 1955 to quite a deal less acclaim internationally. But Mifune's still in it, so it can't be that bad, right? 

ATENÇÃO: ESTE MONACAST NÃO É RECOMENDÁVEL PARA MENORES DE 18 ANOS. Neste Podcast, Mafalda , Eubalena e Phoebe entram no espírito de férias e conversam sobre suas bebidas preferidas, bêbados e bebedeiras, @cardoso e Inagaki, cantadas de pedreiro, camelos, tigres, “agravo retido”, gambá, e outras coisas nonsenses que só poderiam ocorrer  neste terceiro episódio do […]

Lambda lambda lambda! Hoje Alottoni, Inagaki, JP, Sr.K e Azaghal, o anão finalmente fecham a semana de aniversário Jovem Nerd com um MEGABOGA PRESENTE e fazem um Nerdcast PERMITIDO sobre toda a sacanagem das PORNOCHANCHADAS! Neste podcast: Aprenda a escrever um roteiro de filme nacional, conheça outro significado para "escova", saiba como enrolar um cigarro pubiano, entenda a arte de falar um palavrão de respeito e participe da vaquinha para o busto do Pereio! Tempo de duração: 70 min ATENÇÃO: Linguagem e conteúdo impróprio para menores de 18 anos. ATENÇÃO 2: Este NÃO é o Nerdcast Proibido. :) Agradecimentos especiais a @guizaum do Nerdrops por ter nos recebido em sua casa com um arroz de forno durante nossa viagem a Brasília para subirmos o Nerdcast! :) DESAFIO INTEL GEEK GURU Confira os vencedores! Veja se você está no TOP 100! NERDOFFICE S02E12 (Vader, Obama, Yamato e Lanterna Verde) COMENTADO NA LEITURA DE E-MAILS Lombriga Sexy, por Thales Henrique Casais que falam como bebês são mais felizes Carlos Voltor Guerreiro, por Rapha Leite Caricatura de Alottoni, por Eder Galdino E-MAILS Mande suas críticas, elogios, sugestões e caneladas para nerdcast@jovemnerd.com.br iTUNES Você também pode assinar o Nerdcast em seu iTunes . Saiba como clicando aqui! BiCrossers

Lambda lambda lambda! Hoje Alottoni, Inagaki, JP, Sr.K e Azaghal, o anão finalmente fecham a semana de aniversário Jovem Nerd com um MEGABOGA PRESENTE e fazem um Nerdcast PERMITIDO sobre toda a sacanagem das PORNOCHANCHADAS! Neste podcast: Aprenda a escrever um roteiro de filme nacional, conheça outro significado para "escova", saiba como enrolar um cigarro pubiano, entenda a arte de falar um palavrão de respeito e participe da vaquinha para o busto do Pereio! Tempo de duração: 70 min ATENÇÃO: Linguagem e conteúdo impróprio para menores de 18 anos. ATENÇÃO 2: Este NÃO é o Nerdcast Proibido. :) Agradecimentos especiais a @guizaum do Nerdrops por ter nos recebido em sua casa com um arroz de forno durante nossa viagem a Brasília para subirmos o Nerdcast! :) DESAFIO INTEL GEEK GURU Confira os vencedores! Veja se você está no TOP 100! NERDOFFICE S02E12 (Vader, Obama, Yamato e Lanterna Verde) COMENTADO NA LEITURA DE E-MAILS Lombriga Sexy, por Thales Henrique Casais que falam como bebês são mais felizes Carlos Voltor Guerreiro, por Rapha Leite Caricatura de Alottoni, por Eder Galdino E-MAILS Mande suas críticas, elogios, sugestões e caneladas para nerdcast@jovemnerd.com.br iTUNES Você também pode assinar o Nerdcast em seu iTunes . Saiba como clicando aqui! BiCrossers

Lambda lambda lambda! Hoje Alottoni, Inagaki, JP, Sr.K e Azaghal, o anão finalmente fecham a semana de aniversário Jovem Nerd com um MEGABOGA PRESENTE e fazem um Nerdcast PERMITIDO sobre toda a sacanagem das PORNOCHANCHADAS! Neste podcast: Aprenda a escrever um roteiro de filme nacional, conheça outro significado para "escova", saiba como enrolar um cigarro pubiano, entenda a arte de falar um palavrão de respeito e participe da vaquinha para o busto do Pereio! Tempo de duração: 70 min ATENÇÃO: Linguagem e conteúdo impróprio para menores de 18 anos. ATENÇÃO 2: Este NÃO é o Nerdcast Proibido. :) Agradecimentos especiais a @guizaum do Nerdrops por ter nos recebido em sua casa com um arroz de forno durante nossa viagem a Brasília para subirmos o Nerdcast! :) DESAFIO INTEL GEEK GURU Confira os vencedores! Veja se você está no TOP 100! NERDOFFICE S02E12 (Vader, Obama, Yamato e Lanterna Verde) COMENTADO NA LEITURA DE E-MAILS Declaração de Alottoni ao Djavan, por Mateus Foca Lombriga Sexy, por Thales Henrique O "Homem" e o Poodle Casais que falam como bebês são mais felizes Azaghâl no Parkour, por Admilson Almeida O grupo de RPG na taverna, por Allan Jefferson Carlos Voltor Guerreiro, por Rapha Leite Caricatura de Alottoni, por Eder Galdino E-MAILS Mande suas críticas, elogios, sugestões e caneladas para nerdcast@jovemnerd.com.br iTUNES Você também pode assinar o Nerdcast em seu iTunes . Saiba como clicando aqui! BiCrossers

Lambda lambda lambda! Hoje Alottoni, Inagaki, JP, Sr.K e Azaghal, o anão finalmente fecham a semana de aniversário Jovem Nerd com um MEGABOGA PRESENTE e fazem um Nerdcast PERMITIDO sobre toda a sacanagem das PORNOCHANCHADAS! Neste podcast: Aprenda a escrever um roteiro de filme nacional, conheça outro significado para "escova", saiba como enrolar um cigarro pubiano, entenda a arte de falar um palavrão de respeito e participe da vaquinha para o busto do Pereio! Tempo de duração: 70 min ATENÇÃO: Linguagem e conteúdo impróprio para menores de 18 anos. ATENÇÃO 2: Este NÃO é o Nerdcast Proibido. :) Agradecimentos especiais a @guizaum do Nerdrops por ter nos recebido em sua casa com um arroz de forno durante nossa viagem a Brasília para subirmos o Nerdcast! :) DESAFIO INTEL GEEK GURU Confira os vencedores! Veja se você está no TOP 100! NERDOFFICE S02E12 (Vader, Obama, Yamato e Lanterna Verde) COMENTADO NA LEITURA DE E-MAILS Declaração de Alottoni ao Djavan, por Mateus Foca Lombriga Sexy, por Thales Henrique O "Homem" e o Poodle Casais que falam como bebês são mais felizes Azaghâl no Parkour, por Admilson Almeida O grupo de RPG na taverna, por Allan Jefferson Carlos Voltor Guerreiro, por Rapha Leite Caricatura de Alottoni, por Eder Galdino E-MAILS Mande suas críticas, elogios, sugestões e caneladas para nerdcast@jovemnerd.com.br iTUNES Você também pode assinar o Nerdcast em seu iTunes . Saiba como clicando aqui! BiCrossers

Lambda lambda lambda! Hoje Alottoni, Inagaki, JP, Sr.K e Azaghal, o anão finalmente fecham a semana de aniversário Jovem Nerd com um MEGABOGA PRESENTE e fazem um Nerdcast PERMITIDO sobre toda a sacanagem das PORNOCHANCHADAS! Neste podcast: Aprenda a escrever um roteiro de filme nacional, conheça outro significado para "escova", saiba como enrolar um cigarro pubiano, entenda a arte de falar um palavrão de respeito e participe da vaquinha para o busto do Pereio! Tempo de duração: 70 min ATENÇÃO: Linguagem e conteúdo impróprio para menores de 18 anos. ATENÇÃO 2: Este NÃO é o Nerdcast Proibido. :) Agradecimentos especiais a @guizaum do Nerdrops por ter nos recebido em sua casa com um arroz de forno durante nossa viagem a Brasília para subirmos o Nerdcast! :) DESAFIO INTEL GEEK GURU Confira os vencedores! Veja se você está no TOP 100! NERDOFFICE S02E12 (Vader, Obama, Yamato e Lanterna Verde) COMENTADO NA LEITURA DE E-MAILS Declaração de Alottoni ao Djavan, por Mateus Foca Lombriga Sexy, por Thales Henrique O "Homem" e o Poodle Casais que falam como bebês são mais felizes Azaghâl no Parkour, por Admilson Almeida O grupo de RPG na taverna, por Allan Jefferson Carlos Voltor Guerreiro, por Rapha Leite Caricatura de Alottoni, por Eder Galdino E-MAILS Mande suas críticas, elogios, sugestões e caneladas para nerdcast@jovemnerd.com.br iTUNES Você também pode assinar o Nerdcast em seu iTunes . Saiba como clicando aqui! BiCrossers

Lambda lambda lambda! Hoje Alottoni, Inagaki, JP, Sr.K e Azaghal, o anão finalmente fecham a semana de aniversário Jovem Nerd com um MEGABOGA PRESENTE e fazem um Nerdcast PERMITIDO sobre toda a sacanagem das PORNOCHANCHADAS! Neste podcast: Aprenda a escrever um roteiro de filme nacional, conheça outro significado para "escova", saiba como enrolar um cigarro pubiano, entenda a arte de falar um palavrão de respeito e participe da vaquinha para o busto do Pereio! Tempo de duração: 70 min ATENÇÃO: Linguagem e conteúdo impróprio para menores de 18 anos. ATENÇÃO 2: Este NÃO é o Nerdcast Proibido. :) Agradecimentos especiais a @guizaum do Nerdrops por ter nos recebido em sua casa com um arroz de forno durante nossa viagem a Brasília para subirmos o Nerdcast! :) DESAFIO INTEL GEEK GURU Confira os vencedores! Veja se você está no TOP 100! NERDOFFICE S02E12 (Vader, Obama, Yamato e Lanterna Verde) COMENTADO NA LEITURA DE E-MAILS Declaração de Alottoni ao Djavan, por Mateus Foca Lombriga Sexy, por Thales Henrique O "Homem" e o Poodle Casais que falam como bebês são mais felizes Azaghâl no Parkour, por Admilson Almeida O grupo de RPG na taverna, por Allan Jefferson Carlos Voltor Guerreiro, por Rapha Leite Caricatura de Alottoni, por Eder Galdino E-MAILS Mande suas críticas, elogios, sugestões e caneladas para nerdcast@jovemnerd.com.br iTUNES Você também pode assinar o Nerdcast em seu iTunes . Saiba como clicando aqui! BiCrossers