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This week, host Basant Kumar is joined by Newslaundry's Anmol Pritam and The News Minute's Nidhi Suresh.While the rest of the country exhaled a sigh of relief at the announcement of a ceasefire in the India-Pakistan conflict, Poonch held its breath – and bled quietly. Nidhi and Anmol were on the ground, when the cross-border shelling began. Thirteen lives were lost. Thirteen names that won't make it into strategic briefings or celebration speeches. Parents buried their twins, Zain Ali and Urwa Fatima – born five minutes apart, and died five minutes apart. In another home, a wedding that was about to be planned turned into a funeral when the father of the bride-to-be never came home. These aren't just tragic anecdotes. This is the aftermath of a conflict that never really ends for the people living on its edge. Nidhi and Anmol's reports on the families in both the city and the villages reveal that all of them carry the same expression – numb, disbelief, and tired of being forgotten. Their stories don't scream, they ache. And in that ache lies a quiet question: why is Poonch always left behind?They came back with more than interviews. They came back with grief, with names, with stories that deserve to be told. Stories of loss, of resilience, of people who live through war long after the last gun falls silent.Tune in.Timecodes00:00:00 - Introduction00:02:15 - From Tension to Tranquility: Ceasefire was announced 00:09:34 - Shelling without Warning: The Unseen Threat Lurked in Poonch00:36:56 - Misinformation flooded in mainstream and social media 00:43: 58 - RecommendationsRecommendationsNidhiSociety Girl: A Tale of Sex, Lies, and Scandal AnmolSaving Private RyanBasantAmerican Man Hunt: Osama Bin Laden Produced and edited by Hassan Bilal, Ashish Anand and Tista Roy Chowdhury, recorded by Anil Kumar. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Mississippi State routed Missouri to take game one of the weekend series. Game two tonight at 6 PM CT.Support this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/the-boneyard/donationsAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy
Your daily news in under three minutes. At Al Jazeera Podcasts, we want to hear from you, our listeners. So, please head to https://www.aljazeera.com/survey and tell us your thoughts about this show and other Al Jazeera podcasts. It only takes a few minutes! Connect with us: @AJEPodcasts on Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, Threads and YouTube
Schools in Pakistan's capital Islamabad and in Punjab province have been shut, as the country says it is preparing to respond to the Indian strikes. Guardian journalist, Shah Meer Baloch reports.
No, you're not imagining it Easter eggs have started getting smaller and do taste different. So, is it still worth shelling out on the treat? We asked Caitriona Redmond, Consumer Columnist with the Irish Examiner.
No, you're not imagining it Easter eggs have started getting smaller and do taste different. So, is it still worth shelling out on the treat? We asked Caitriona Redmond, Consumer Columnist with the Irish Examiner.
Recently, local businesses and consumers may have noticed inflated egg prices. These come amid a nationwide shortage of eggs caused by a national outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza, commonly known as bird flu. The bird flu has killed more than 30 million birds this year, according to the March 7 U.S. Department of Agriculture's Egg Markets Overview. Many Providence egg establishments have been forced to raise prices and adjust their offerings, and some consumers report shifting their purchasing and eating habits in response. In this episode of the Bruno Brief, we learn more about the details of this story and fill you in on other important stories from the week.Subscribe to the podcast on Spotify or Apple Podcasts or listen via the RSS feed. Send tips and feedback for the next episode to herald@browndailyherald.com.Music:Denzel Sprak: https://app.sessions.blue/browse/track/304681Frank and Poet: https://app.sessions.blue/browse/track/304762
Click here to share your thoughts or questions! Listen in to learn about about Shell Science and hear us struggle to say so many ssss sounds in one episode!
Former chief of staff to Vice President Pence Marc Short weighs in on President Trump's latest tariff threats, and Elon Musk's efforts with his DOGE team to shrink government and gain access to sensitive data. Plus, Citi equity strategist says Uber is poised for more upside following its earnings report this month. And, the CEO of Accenture Song discusses the two ads the company created for the Super Bowl, and whether any ads really gain traction with viewers.
Is it possible to grow protein-packed vegetables in your garden? In this episode, we break it down for you! Building on last week's conversation with Dr. Vickie Petz Kasper about the importance of plant-based proteins, I'm sharing which crops are worth your time, space, and effort. We'll cover: Dry beans like pinto, kidney, and black beans Shelling beans such as black-eyed peas and lima beans Chickpeas, lentils, edamame, and more Discover the growing requirements, space needs, and harvest realities of these crops to decide if they're the right fit for your garden. I'll also share my honest take on which ones I recommend skipping and how to get the most from the ones you do plant. Plus, don't miss the details about my live Winter Workshop on January 21st, focusing on seed starting and planting. Learn more and register at journeywithjill.net/winterworkshop. Let's dig in!
You may have noticed empty shelves at your grocery store's egg counter recently. When there are eggs available, prices have shot up. The problem is mostly on the supply side of the supply-and-demand equation. You can blame an ongoing outbreak of the avian flu. Plus, McDonald’s is the latest corporation to roll back some of its diversity initiatives, and we’ll look at labor organizing history from the docks of Liverpool, England.
You may have noticed empty shelves at your grocery store's egg counter recently. When there are eggs available, prices have shot up. The problem is mostly on the supply side of the supply-and-demand equation. You can blame an ongoing outbreak of the avian flu. Plus, McDonald’s is the latest corporation to roll back some of its diversity initiatives, and we’ll look at labor organizing history from the docks of Liverpool, England.
Today on the feed, Pauly is featuring a special episode of Shelling Peas; A Plant-Powered Podcast with Chef Ryan Jennings. Listen in for a conversation with Rick Rainey, managing partner of Forge Cellars—one of the most celebrated wineries in the Finger Lakes region. From the intricacies of winemaking to the essence of community, Rick shares his passion for crafting wines that tell the unique story of their vintage. The discussion touches on the impact of changing market dynamics and the vital role of promoting regional pride in local products. The episode concludes with Rick's vision for the future of Forge Cellars and his commitment to enhancing the winemaking craft and supporting local agriculture.Mentioned in this episode:Joe Bean Coffee - Coffee that lifts everyone.Use promo code Lunchador for 15% off your order! https://shop.joebeanroasters.com
20241013 Sunday Night Shelling Originally Broadcasted October 13, 2024, on ACB Media 5 Participants joined Cindy LaBon and Diane Ducharme every other Sunday for a discussion about all things Shells - could be peanut shells, seashells but mostly BlindShells. Cindy and Diane love answering questions so bring lots to the discussion. Find out more at https://acb-community.pinecast.co This podcast is powered by Pinecast.
In this exciting premier episode of 'Shelling Peas', special guest Pauly Guglielmo, of the Pauly Guglielmo Show and Craft Cannery shares insights into his entrepreneurial journey from radio host to business owner. Chatting with Chef Ryan Jennings, Pauly reflects on their meeting at Grow New York and the critical role of mentorship. Topics include navigating the pandemic's impact on the food industry, developing pricing strategies, and balancing work with family life. Pauly's humorous and thoughtful stories reveal the challenges and joys of blending professional and personal aspirations, showcasing resilience and authenticity as keys to success. The discussion underscores the value of supportive relationships and the pursuit of one's passions.Mentioned in this episode:Pauly Guglielmo ShowPauly Guglielmo is a former radio guy turned food business entrepreneur. While running a manufacturing facility is his day job, he likes to dust off his broadcasting skills once a week on this podcast and talk to entrepreneurs and other influencers.Food About TownFood About Town hosted by Chris Lindstrom, focusing on restaurants, food and drink of all kinds, and whatever topics I want to cover! https://foodabouttown.captivate.fm/ Sweet Pea Plant Based KitchenBased in Rochester, NY, Sweet Pea is a plant-powered kitchen creating transformative ways of wellness. Harnessing the power of food as medicine, we help you realize your happiest, healthiest self. Use promo code Lunchador15 for 15% off your order!Joe Bean RoastersJoe Bean Coffee - Coffee that lifts everyone. Use promo code Lunchador for 15% off your order! https://shop.joebeanroasters.com
In this exciting premier episode of 'Shelling Peas', special guest Pauly Guglielmo, of the Pauly Guglielmo Show and Craft Cannery shares insights into his entrepreneurial journey from radio host to business owner. Chatting with Chef Ryan Jennings, Pauly reflects on their meeting at Grow New York and the critical role of mentorship. Topics include navigating the pandemic's impact on the food industry, developing pricing strategies, and balancing work with family life. Pauly's humorous and thoughtful stories reveal the challenges and joys of blending professional and personal aspirations, showcasing resilience and authenticity as keys to success. The discussion underscores the value of supportive relationships and the pursuit of one's passions.Mentioned in this episode:Pauly Guglielmo ShowPauly Guglielmo is a former radio guy turned food business entrepreneur. While running a manufacturing facility is his day job, he likes to dust off his broadcasting skills once a week on this podcast and talk to entrepreneurs and other influencers.Food About TownFood About Town hosted by Chris Lindstrom, focusing on restaurants, food and drink of all kinds, and whatever topics I want to cover! https://foodabouttown.captivate.fm/ Sweet Pea Plant Based KitchenBased in Rochester, NY, Sweet Pea is a plant-powered kitchen creating transformative ways of wellness. Harnessing the power of food as medicine, we help you realize your happiest, healthiest self. Use promo code Lunchador15 for 15% off your order!Joe Bean RoastersJoe Bean Coffee - Coffee that lifts everyone. Use promo code Lunchador for 15% off your order! https://shop.joebeanroasters.com
Introducing Shelling Peas with Ryan JenningsIn this episode, we are introduced to Ryan Jennings, chef and owner of Sweet Pea Plant-Based Kitchen, and the new host of the Shelling Peas podcast on the Lunchador Network. Ryan discusses his journey from running restaurants to starting a podcast. He shares insights on balancing a busy career with family life, the motivation behind launching his podcast, and the thrill of connecting with interesting people. Ryan and Chris Lindstrom also delve into Sweet Pea's expansion and the launch of a new granola bar company, Junabar. The episode highlights the importance of having impactful conversations and working with passionate people to make a difference in the community.Mentioned in this episode: Sweet Pea Plant Based KitchenBased in Rochester, NY, Sweet Pea is a plant-powered kitchen creating transformative ways of wellness. Harnessing the power of food as medicine, we help you realize your happiest, healthiest self. Use promo code Lunchador15 for 15% off your order!Joe Bean RoastersJoe Bean Coffee - Coffee that lifts everyone. Use promo code Lunchador for 15% off your order! https://shop.joebeanroasters.com
Introducing Shelling Peas with Ryan JenningsIn this episode, we are introduced to Ryan Jennings, chef and owner of Sweet Pea Plant Based Kitchen, and the new host of the Shelling Peas podcast on the Lunchador Network. Ryan discusses his journey from running a restaurant to starting a podcast. He shares insights on balancing a busy career with family life, the motivation behind his podcast, and the thrill of connecting with interesting people. Ryan and Chris Lindstrom also delve into Sweet Pea's expansion and the launch of a new granola bar company, Junabar. The episode highlights the importance of having impactful conversations and working with passionate people to make a difference in the community.Mentioned in this episode: Sweet Pea Plant Based KitchenBased in Rochester, NY, Sweet Pea is a plant-powered kitchen creating transformative ways of wellness. Harnessing the power of food as medicine, we help you realize your happiest, healthiest self. Use promo code Lunchador15 for 15% off your order!Joe Bean RoastersJoe Bean Coffee - Coffee that lifts everyone. Use promo code Lunchador for 15% off your order! https://shop.joebeanroasters.com
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In our news wrap Monday, Russian shelling on Ukraine wounded three people and cast a shadow over what was to be the first day of the school year there, the U.S. government seized a private plane used by Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, Chicago police say a shooting on a subway train killed four people and more than 10,000 hotel workers across the U.S. spent this Labor Day on strike. PBS News is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders
In our news wrap Monday, Russian shelling on Ukraine wounded three people and cast a shadow over what was to be the first day of the school year there, the U.S. government seized a private plane used by Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, Chicago police say a shooting on a subway train killed four people and more than 10,000 hotel workers across the U.S. spent this Labor Day on strike. PBS News is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders
AP correspondent Naeun Kim reports on the latest attacks in Russia and Ukraine where at least five people have died, and journalists were injured.
Narrator: Arif Hodzic
Your daily news in under three minutes. Connect with us: @AJEPodcasts on Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, Threads and YouTube
AP correspondent Laurence Brooks reports on deadly strikes in Ukraine, while the country's leader appeals for more help from allies.
AP correspondent Laurence Brooks reports on Russian strikes in Ukraine.
As the Army of Northern Virginia moved into Pennsylvania during 1863's Gettysburg Campaign, Confederate forces under Richard Ewell made it as far north as Carlisle, a small town which had already made a name for itself in American history. Garry Adelman and Kris White are joined by special guests Courtney Cauthon and Chris Jones of Barefoot Historian & Co. for a look into the Shelling of Carlisle. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/battlefields/support
Last time we spoke about landings at Biak. General Fuller unleashed a amphibious assault against Biak that faced countless hurdles. The Hurricane Task force encountered a lot of terrain issues at Humboldt bay, leading to logistical headaches. Despite the disorganization, they shipped off and landed, forming a beachhead. Colonel Kuzume and his men were caught with their pants down, units were scattered all over the place. The first tank battle of the Southwest Pacific occurred, seeing American Shermans absolutely desolate Japanese Type 95's. General Fuller planned to consolidate his troops at Ibdi and Bosnek while reinforcements arrived, but the Japanese continuously lobbed surprise night attacks to horrible effect. Over in the Burma front, Mutaguchi's operation continued to unravel as his subordinate officers disregarded his orders and performed their own withdrawals. As Mutaguchi relieved men of command and replaced them, General Slim finally reopened the Imphal-Kohima road spelling doom for the Japanese. This episode is the Fall of Mogaung Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As General Vinegar Joe unleashed what he believed to be a masterstroke against Myitkyina, it soon turned out to be an absolute gruesome struggle. As we last saw, General Stilwell's men had begun a long and difficult siege of Myitkyina. The 22nd and 38th Chinese Divisions were now pinned down by General Tanaka's battered 18th Division south of Kamaing. To the south Brigadier Calvert's Chindits began a battle for Mogaung, which forced General Takeda's 53rd Division to suspend the relief of Myitkyina and rush back to reinforce the town. Though the Mogaung Garrison and the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to the north had been effectively destroyed by the Chindit and Chinese attacks, the Japanese had been able to maintain their hold on Mogaung by mid-June. To the east, General Wei's Y Force had opened a new offensive on Yunnan, gradually pushing Colonel Kurashige's 148th Regiment to Tengchong but failing to seize Longling against the tenacious resistance of General Matsuyama's forces. Along the Kamaing-Mogaung front, by late June, Tanaka had been able to assemble most of his depleted command at Lakatkawng, determined to keep the blockade on the Hukawng Valley. His main aim was to clear the Seton roadblock, which had been recently reinforced with General Sun's 113th Regiment; but once again, his attacks would fail to dislodge the tenacious Chinese defenders. Yet upon receiving orders from the 33rd Army commander to withdraw, General Tanaka reported that the 18th Division could continue to hold in the Kamaing area. This statement, inspired by Colonel Ohgoshi, the chief of staff, proved to be unwarranted optimism. The 18th had staged a desperate resistance in the vicinity of Kamaing for about a month and, for most of the period, had only 80 men for each mile of front. Supplies of ammunition and food were very low with only about 1400 rounds of rifle ammunition per day for the entire Division and 60 rounds per machine gun. The daily ration was about 2.5 ounces of rice per man. On receipt of the Army's message to withdraw, Colonel Ohgoshi had advised the Division commander that further resistance in the area was possible, but had not made it clear that this was his personal belief and did not reflect the opinions of the rest of the Division staff. Within a day or two the commander became aware of the fact that the other staff officers were convinced that further resistance in the Kamaing area was impossible. He therefore forwarded to the 33rd Army a revised report of the Division's actual situation. Upon receipt of the second message, on June 27 the Army directed the Division to retire to the Sahmaw sector. Tanaka believed he needed to stand his ground while the 53rd Division pushed aside the Seton Block and reopened his line of communications. Thus, he elected to continue to resist the attacks from the north while he himself attacked Seton for three more days; but failing to make any progress, he would finally comply with his orders to withdraw to the hills north of Sahmaw in early July. While the 4th and 146th Regiments performed covering attacks, the remnants of the 55th and 56th Regiments destroyed their artillery and heavy equipment, and withdrew along an escape trail cut through the forest west of the Seton roadblock. On 2 July the 18th Division began its withdrawal, utilizing an obscure trail that ran directly south from Kamaing. Crossing the mountain range west of Seton, the Division completed its concentration near Sahmaw about 7 July. The Hukawng Operation was then considered concluded, ending a campaign that had been a miserable failure and had cost almost 8,000 casualties. By July 15th, the 18th Division would finally assemble in the Indaw area. Though only 3000 men from the elite 18th Division would survive the Hukawng Valley Campaign, Tanaka had effectively managed to keep intact the blockade to China for another year, something that would have profound repercussions later on in Chinese history. Further south, the 114th Regiment finally arrived at Gurkhaywa on June 16th, ready to reinforce the Chindits; yet Takeda had also brought most of his troops back to Mogaung, subsequently starting a deadly shelling of the Chindit positions. By when June 15th arrived, the Chinese still had not appeared, and Calvert pulled his troops back towards the bridge. At that moment, remarkable news arrived: The Japanese were abandoning their positions along the river. Calvert was exuberant. This meant he could move out of his bridgehead perhaps capture the town. Certainly, it meant a reduction of the shelling which was claiming at least 15 of his men a day. Yet, when the shelling did not die down and it quickly became apparent that Takeda was merely redeploying his troops along the railway, to get them out of flooding in low-lying areas. Chindit recce teams reported the area from the train station, in the heart of the town to the Mogaung Railway Bridge, further north, was heavily defended with eight bunkers dominating the landscape. Shelling from the village of Naungkyaiktaw, astride the road to Mogaung, set between fields of paddy, was persistent. Naungkyaiktaw had to be captured. Calvert estimated the village was held by a hundred Japanese. Because of this, on June 18th, Calvert ordered his forces to attack the apparent Japanese artillery encampment at Naungkyaiktaw after a heavy air and mortar bombardment. His troops outnumbered them, but unwilling to suffer needless casualties, Calvert directed the American fighter-bombers against the village, which was bombarded on the night of the 17th. Half an hour before dawn on the 18th, the Chindit mortars pummeled the place with 400 rounds for good measure. Calvert then sent in his assault force. Among the attackers was a company of 70 men from King's Liverpool led by Major Fred Reeman. This was a company that had stayed on with the 77th Brigade after the rest of the battalion had been transferred to the 111th Brigade. They were joined by 12 men of Blaine's Detachment, once evacuated to India but since returned, this time armed with about a dozen flamethrowers. In the darkness, Blaine's Detachment was told to advance in front of the company of King's, and to “turn the fucking lights on.” As the detachment began to hurl flames far and wide, the Chindits behind them began cheering. The men had been told that the village had many bunkers, but never saw any at first. The scene soon turned fantastic. They went through the entire village “with twenty or thirty yards of flame shooting out in front.” They soon found the bunkers. The Japanese became crazed with fear especially after the British began yelling “put out the fucking lights,” and turning the flamethrowers their way. Many Japanese fled the bunkers, joined by those outside. They fled through the paddy fields, making for the railway station 400 yards away. Calvert's machine gunners had been waiting and blazed away, killing at least forty. Meanwhile, the rest of Fusiliers and the Kings walked up the paddy, picking off Japanese hiding or trying to crawl away in the ditches. Calvert, his mobile brigade-major Brash and his orderly Lance-Corporal Young decided to join the mop-up, shooting at Japanese while standing on chairs, as more Fusiliers began clearing the last of the bunkers, hurling grenades into them and blasting the insides with flamethrowers. As twilight set in that day, the most peculiar thing happened. The Fusiliers were cooking an evening meal in their newly-won positions, when a weary, seven-man patrol walked into their billet and began to take off their kit. The Fusiliers who looked up casually, noticed to their horror, that the new men were Japanese. The Japanese, for their part, had not noticed. The Fusiliers lunged for their weapons and opened fire. The Japanese patrol did not survive. In all, Calvert estimated that his troops had killed about 70 Japanese in the capture and holding of Naungkyaiktaw, while suffering 16 killed and 38 wounded. Major Reeman's King's company had become reduced to a platoon. Calvert was considerably cheered on the evening of the 18th, when the much promised Chinese reinforcements finally arrived, guided over the river in motorized ranger boats by a towering Chindit officer, Captain Andrew. This was the 1st Battalion of the Chinese 114th Regiment led by Major P'ang, which quickly deployed in the positions pointed out by Calvert but left the Chindits a little flummoxed when they proclaimed that they were in no particular hurry to fight as they had been fighting for years. On the following day, another battalion of Chinese arrived under the personal command of the regimental leader, Colonel Li Hung, as did a battery of 75mm pack howitzers the “6th Battery” under US Major Wayne Cook. The Chinese quickly assumed the defense of Mahaung, prompting an American liaison officer with the Chinese to send a press release that the Chinese had “captured” the village, which embarrassed Li. Cook's battery was deployed into position at Pinhmi village began operations on the 20th, hurling fire against the Japanese positions as the Chinese infantrymen consolidated their positions. Meantime, elements of the Chinese 113th Infantry, operating five miles north of Mogaung, surrounded a Japanese company, while Cook's guns hammered them. Fifty Japanese died from first blast alone. The Chinese finished off those who survived.The assault, was so ferocious that all the bunkers were overrun The reinforcements heartened Calvert for his own brigade was now a shell of its former self. The Lancashire Fusiliers and the King's Liverpool had only 110 men, the South Staffords had 180 and the Gurkha Rifles had 230. He planned a fresh advance, this time aiming for the hamlet of Natgyigon, on Mogaung's right flank, near the river. This area, Calvert believed, was the “key to Mogaung.” For the time, he chose the early hours of darkness on June 23rd a day which would go down in the annals of the 77th Brigade as the “stuff of legends.” The plan called for a mortar barrage of 1,000 bombs, in addition to shelling from the 75mm guns to cover the advance of the Chindits across the open ground towards Natgyigon. The Gurkhas were to move on the right, with the South Staffords on the left. Blaine's Detachment and the Lancashire Fusiliers were in reserve. The objective was to capture the entire stretch of ground from the Mogaung Bridge to the train station, the latter of which the Chinese were to secure. Once the area was in Allied hands, the troops were to dig in while the reserve troops mopped up. In addition, Allied aircraft were to bombard the area before the start of the assault, which itself was timed to launch at about 3.10 am. In the dark, section commanders could be heard telling their men: “We attack Mogaung tonight and once we've taken it the Brigadier says we are through!” Later, during the attack, Calvert discovered the Chinese infantry had not captured the all-important train station, even as their American liaison officer insisted that they had. Calvert angrily pointed out that no, the Chinese had not, because enemy fire from that direction continued to pick off his men at the railway embankment. The Gurkhas, moving along a wide right flank along the banks of the Mogaung River, headed for the railway bridge. Approaching the bridge, they came under heavy fire. Captain Allmand, by now suffering from trench foot as were most of the troops, moved forward to silence a machine gun firing on his men. He could barely run because of his affliction but advancing through the mud, he hurled grenades at the Japanese position. A burst of gunfire plunged into him. He fell, badly wounded. One of his Gurkhas, Sergeant. Tilbir Gurung pulled Allmand and another wounded NCO to safety. For this, Gurung was to get a Military Medal. Allmand's own valor was to be recognized by a Victoria Cross. The South Staffords swept into Mogaung town. Resistance was heavy. Lt Durant of the South Stafford deployed his machineguns to rake Japanese positions with fire. Meantime, the flamethrowers were brought up. As they moved up past Durant's positions, a shell burst exploded one, setting the man wielding it on fire. The man screamed and somehow shook off the flamethrowing unit from his back. Durant and some of his men rushed forward and rolled him into water in a nearby ditch. The Japanese had dug-in beneath the ruins of a brick house from where they were stubbornly holding the Staffords at bay. The rest of the flamethrowers moved in and sprayed the building. One Japanese, his clothes ablaze, leapt from his positions and tried to make a run for it. A scythe of gunfire cut him down. The rest valiantly held their positions and were burned to cinder. The Staffords, mopping up the, found the Japanese officer. He had shot himself with his revolver. The Japanese had entrenched themselves at a strategically important building known as the Red House, which was well-protected with machine-gun nests. The advancing Gurkhas consequently ran smack into this killing zone, getting caught in a murderous crossfire and suffering heavy casualties. In response, Calvert threw his reserves into the fray and the Chindits also began to pummel the Japanese positions with mortars and machine-guns, which allowed the infantry to reach the all-important train station. Inflicting some 120 casualties and losing 60 dead and over 100 wounded, the Chindits then successfully captured all their objectives by noon. For the rest of the day, heavy fighting would continue as the Chindits dug in on their gained positions; but during the night, the Japanese would finally pull out, leaving the town to the shattered remnants of the 77th Brigade. Mopping up then continued until June 27, when Mogaung was declared void of Japanese. Though this was the first major town to be recaptured in Burma, Calvert lost over 250 killed and 500 wounded at Mogaung, which was more than any Chindit formation was prepared to take. This was also a bittersweet victory for Calvert because Stilwell would claim that the town had been taken by his Chinese troops, even though the Chindits had done most of the fighting. Stilwill wrote in his diary on June 27th “Good news from Mogaung, We have it!” Then came a remarkable broadcast from Stilwell's headquarters via the BBC “The Chinese had captured Mogaung”. There was no mention of the Chindits. Calvert was incensed. Colonel Li was appalled and apologized profusely. “If anyone has taken Mogaung it is your Brigade and we all admire the bravery of your soldiers.” Calvert, his anger against Stilwell unmitigated, sent a message to US headquarters “Chinese reported taking Mogaung. My Brigade now taking umbrage” this prompted Stilwell's staff to scour the maps for the location of Umbrage. Meantime, congratulations poured in from Lentaigne, from “Scottie” Scott, from John Masters, and the other brigade commanders. Among the lot, there was one, from Derek Tulloch, which struck Calvert's heart the most: “Wingate would have been proud of you.” After this defeat, and learning of the concurrent withdrawal of the 18th Division, Takeda's 53rd Division would withdraw to the Sahmaw River line in early July, where it was also reinforced with the recently-arrived 119th Regiment. Meanwhile over at Myitkyina, General Boatner had to order a stop to the attacks after June 18th because of the heavy casualties. For the time being, tunneling would be used to close with the enemy. On June 25th, however, Boatner would have a severe recurrence of malaria that would force him to abandon the frontlines. This led General Stilwell to appoint Brigadier-General Theodore Wessels in command of the Myitkyina Task Force on June 26th. Luckily for Wessels the situation started to improve after the fall of Mogaung, as Chinese troops there could now move up the railroad to connect with Wessels' forces. This removed the recurrent menace of a Japanese drive from Mogaung, guaranteed reinforcements and the opening of a ground line of communications, and further eliminated one of General Minakami's two bases from which supplies had trickled into the Japanese perimeter. Despite this, the only gains in the week of June 25th were a few hundred yards taken by the 150th Regiment and the 236th Engineers. Alongside this, Stilwell ordered the 1st Battalion, 42nd Regiment to penetrate through the Japanese positions towards Sitapur on June 28. They would drive deep into the Japanese defense system, leading Stilwell to hope this was the turning point; on receiving Japanese fire, it halted and dug in. Air supply was necessary.In response, Wessels dispatched some Marauder reinforcements. F Company, unaware it had lost its way and under an inexperienced commander, proceeded with a small point almost directly ahead of the marching column. The company commander at the head of the point met a small group of Orientals whom he took to be Chinese and who greeted him affably. The strangers then suggested he and his party lay aside their guns. At this point the commander realized that he had been ambushed and gave the alarm. The Japanese machine guns opened on his trapped column, inflicting heavy casualties. Some of his men made their way back to the Allied lines, but the company was never reconstituted and was broken up and distributed among the rest of Galahad. For his constant gallantry during a stubborn eight-hour rear-guard action, which permitted the survivors to extricate themselves from ambush, Private first class. Anthony Firenze of New Galahad received the Distinguished Service Cross. Wessels then planning to launch a set-piece attack to capture a stretch of the Sumprabum Road. Over in the Yunnan front, Colonel Matsui's 113th Regiment had successfully relieved the pressure from Longling by mid-June. General Matsuyama further ordered him to maintain the offensive while he continued to reorganize his forces. Though Matsui managed to seize the Tiechanghe pass on June 21st, most of his attacks would end up in nothing. In the north, the 20th Army Group launched simultaneous attacks against Qianshuang and Gudong on June 18th. This finally forcing the Japanese to retreat in disorder towards Tengchong by June 22nd. With the fall of Qianshuang, the Japanese had been forced to abandon the upper Shweli valley, and were now moving in some disorder toward Tengchong over three excellent trails. In Qianshuang, they left behind large quantities of ammunition and a few pieces of artillery, suggesting a disorganized withdrawal. 150 dead Japanese were found in Qianshuang itself; more than 300 Chinese gave their lives for the village. South of Qianshuang, the Japanese hastily destroyed their pontoon bridge to slow the Chinese pursuit. On reaching the Qianshuang-Baifen-Gudong line, the 20th Army Group had wrested 4000 square miles from Japanese control in forty days of fighting. The advance had been made over the precipitous ranges of the Kaolikung Mountains in an almost constant rain, a downpour sometimes heavy, sometimes light, rarely abating, and always turning to fog and sleet in the higher altitudes. More than 150 coolie supply porters fell to their deaths from the narrow, slippery trails that snaked precariously over the mountains. On June 25th General Wei received a personal order from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to take Teng-chung. A few days later, th 20th Group Army, though delayed by the need to rebuild bridges over each of the swift mountain streams that crossed its advance, had pressed the Japanese rear guards back to the hills that surrounded Teng-chung at a distance of two to three miles from the formidable walled town itself. Meanwhile, the Fourteenth Air Force was trying to soften Teng-chung by daily attacks with bombs and machine-gun fire. The outer defenses of Teng-chung were pillboxes covering every avenue of approach, supported and covered by the 6,500-foot-high, fortified mountain peak of Lai-feng Shan, "The Place Where the Birds Come." Here were 600 or more Japanese with most of the garrison's artillery. Teng-chung itself was girdled by a massive wall of earth that in some places was forty feet high and sixty feet thick at the base, faced throughout with great slabs of stone. Chinese necromancers had carefully laid out the wall in a great square to cut the cardinal points of the compass. Each side had a gate, and each gate now had a Japanese command post, while Japanese machine guns and rifles swept the approaches to the wall, its face, and its parapets. Within the city were about 2,000 Japanese. In all, Colonel Kurashige, who had defended the Kaoli-kung mountains, had about 1,850 Japanese, a heavily reinforced battalion combat team built around the 2nd, 148th regiment. Kurashige's orders were to hold Teng-chung until the Chinese threat to Lung-ling passed Over at Longling, Matsui saw the arrival of some reinforcements on June 22nd that would allow him to continue his counteroffensive. Making repeated night and day attacks, the Japanese would be able to penetrate the enemy positions on June 24. Matsuyama then directed him to exploit towards Bengmiao and Huangcaobacum; yet a heavy raid by 24 B-25s and the arrival of the 1st Division would manage to halt the Japanese attempt to exploit their success, with Mitsui only securing the area northwest of Bengmiao by July 1st. The next day, Matsuyama then suspended the counteroffensive because of heavy casualties and he could see the enemy were strengthening their positions. In the meantime, Major Kanemitsu's Lameng Garrison was successfully holding off against a siege by three divisions since June 4th, though the Chinese would only launch unsuccessful attacks in regimental strength during this period; and to the southeast, the Pingda Garrison was also successfully repelling the small enemy attacks against them in spite of being cut off and disease-ridden. That is all for the Burma front today as we now need to head over to the Biak front. After the arrival of two battalions of the163rd Regiment for reinforcements, General Fuller planed a two-pronged attack against Mokmer Drome, with the 186th Regiment advancing west over the inland plateau while the 162nd Regiment resumed its attack west along the coast. On the morning of June 1, in preparation for the offensive, Colonel Newman's 3rd Battalion therefore left Bosnek and marched north over the coastal ridge, with the 2nd Battalion also moving from Opiaref to join them. By 11:00, both battalions successfully set up defensive perimeters; yet their preparations would be interrupted abruptly in the afternoon as Colonel Kuzume directed his 1st Battalion to attack the positions held by Company K. These Japanese, who were supported by machine guns and mortars emplaced northwest of the trail crossing, continued attacks until 5:00, when a platoon of Company K, by a flanking movement, forced their withdrawal northward. Company K and two platoons of the Antitank Company remained at the trail crossing for the night. Company I was moved forward to K's left and left rear, and Company L extended K's perimeter east along the main road toward the surveyed drome. Battalion headquarters and Company M stayed near the strip's western end. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion, the Cannon Company, the 2nd Battalion, regimental headquarters, the attached engineers, and the tanks remained near the center of the airfield. Thankfully, the Americans would manage to repel the assaults and would ultimately force a Japanese withdrawal via a bold enveloping maneuver. But the Japanese would return after midnight. The first part of the night passed without incident, but at 3:30 the entire area held by the 3rd Battalion, 186th Infantry, flamed into action. About a company and a half of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, moved from the south against the semicircular perimeter held by Companies I, K, and L, having outflanked the 3rd Battalion on the west. Simultaneously, other elements of the 1st Battalion attacked from the northwest, attempting to drive a wedge between Companies L and K. Under the support of mortar and machine gun fire from both the northwest and southwest, the encircled Japanese desperately tried to fight their way north. Four hours of confused hand-to-hand fighting, marked by the use of bayonets, machetes, and grenades, ensued. At daylight a count revealed that 86 dead Japanese were within and around the 3rd Battalion's perimeter. The dead included the commander of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry. Losses to the American unit were 3 men killed and 8 wounded. After dealing with the threat, Newman resumed the westward advance at 9:00 on June 2nd. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, supported by five tanks and an antitank platoon, were to advance abreast, while the 2nd protected the right flank by patrolling north of the main road. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion was to provide continuous close support and was to displace forward with the infantry. Neither artillery nor air bombardment seems to have been provided for or delivered prior to the attack. However, both the 121st and 146th Field Artillery Battalions were registered on targets north and west of the 186th Infantry. Air support was available from Wakde Island upon call. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry broke camp at its beach defense area at 8:00 on June 2nd and moved north over the ridge to join the rest of the regiment. The 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, had made no serious attempt to stop the 186th Infantry's progress westward because the inland plateau was nearly indefensible and because the battalion would have been decimated in battle with the superior strength of the reinforced American regiment. The 1st Battalion was withdrawn from the surveyed drome area, initially in preparation for counterattack against the Bosnek beachhead. While no such counteroffensive was mounted, the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion at least had the advantage of keeping the unit intact. The American advance would thus be opposed by the 10th Company, 222nd Regiment; the 3rd Company, 36th Division Sea Transportation Unit and some other naval and engineer units. The 1st and 3rd Battalions then advanced with two companies abreast against scattered but determined opposition from elements of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry. Small enemy patrols aimed machine gun and rifle fire at the advancing American units and held their positions until killed or dispersed by tank or artillery fire. Most of the enemy parties were located on the north flank and apparently many of them had been driven westward out of the cave and garden area north of the surveyed drome by fire from the 121st Field Artillery Battalion, which destroyed Biak Detachment headquarters installations in that area. By nightfall the 186th Infantry had killed 96 Japanese and had itself lost 6 men killed and 10 wounded. The unit halted shortly after 1600 and began digging in at a point about 600 yards northeast of the day's objective. The advance had carried the regiment west until it was almost abreast and north of the 162nd Infantry, at the Ibdi Pocket. The latter had attempted to move west along the coast during the day, but it would be unable to dislodge the Japanese from the Ibdi Pocket, ultimately having to attach its 2nd Battalion to the 186th. The addition of the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Regiment to the 186th Regiment helped to complicate the supply problems of the troops on the plateau. No water had yet been found inland. Heat and humidity were intense, and thick scrub growth, about 12 feet high, stopped any breezes. Despite the best efforts of Company B, 116th Engineers, the supply road could not be repaired fast enough to keep pace with the advancing infantrymen. Water had to be brought around from Bosnek via Opiaref to the forward units, and there were not enough water trailers nor 5-gallon cans available to supply all the water needed. At night each man received only one canteen of water for the next day, an inadequate amount under the conditions which prevailed inland. The water situation and the necessity for hauling all other supplies north through Opiaref did more to delay the 186th Regiment's progress westward than did the opposition of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Regiment. Meanwhile Kuzume's only support so far had been some air raids carried out by the depleted 23rd Air Flotilla and 7th Air Division. By late May, the 23rd Air Flotilla had only twelve fighters and six medium bombers at Sorong and the 7th Air Division had four large bombers, 20 medium bombers and three fighters. Both units threw what strength they could muster into attacks on the enemy landing force. On May 27th four Army heavy bombers and nine Navy fighters carried out a daylight attack against fierce air opposition, all but four fighters failing to return. Kuzume would need more than that to launch a determined attack that would succeed in pushing the enemy back into the sea. Consequently, on May 29th, General Numata and Admiral Senda had requested the immediate commitment of fleet and air strength into the Biak battle. They both relayed this message “The enemy apparently found the difficulty of rapid occupation of the airfield sector. The enemy will change, in all probability, its policy to occupy the whole island of Biak after the arrival of reinforcements, securing its present positions with landed units for a while. The officers and men on Biak Island are firm in their resolution to crush the enemy. However, our operations are severely restricted by the uncontested superiority of the enemy's feet and air units. The Biak Detachment, which is making every effort in destroying the confronting enemy, request for further support by the army and navy units concerned. We believe that the immediate commitment of our air forces and, if possible, some fleet units would give us a splendid opportunity to turn the tide of battle in the whole Pacific area in our favor.“ This finally convinced Admiral Toyoda to send reinforcements to the island. To counter the Allied advance to Biak, the IJN dispatched from one third of its available naval land-based air strength from the Central Pacific to reinforce the 23rd Air Flotilla in western New Guinea. On May 28th 70 carrier-type fighters, 4 reconnaissance bombers, and 16 medium bombers were dispatched to western New Guinea. Another group of planes, comprising 48 fighters, 8 reconnaissance aircraft, and 20 bombers, were sent to western New Guinea and Halmahera from the Carolines on or about May 31st. On 29-30th May the flotilla carried out fresh attacks on the Biak landing force. On May 29th, sixteen medium bombers attacked the enemy fleet in the sea near BIAK Island before daybreak of that day, yet none of them returned. Furthermore, in a daylight attack on the same day, four Zero fighters strafed BIAK Island. None of them returned to the base either. On May 30th, the unit of the Zero fighters of the Navy again fired upon enemy ships in the sea off Mokmer. The damage on the enemy ships was not confirmed. However, the unit reported that they fought four P-38s and four B-25s of the enemy and shot down two B-25s above BIAK Island. Also as part of Operation KON, a huge task force under Admiral Sakonju, which included the battleship Fuso, four cruisers and eight destroyers, was to transport Major-General Tamada Yoshio's 2nd Amphibious Brigade towards Biak. Additionally, it was decided to move three infantry companies of the 35th Division from Sorong to Biak by barge. Sakonju's convoy finally left Davao on the night of June 2nd. In connection with KON Force's advance, the Japanese had planned heavy air strikes against Biak which were to be carried out by the recently reinforced 23rd Air Flotilla and the few army aircraft which remained at bases within range of Biak. Between 1645 and 1700 on 2 June, from eleven to fifteen Japanese planes bombed Allied positions on Biak, causing a few casualties and some light damage. Seven of these planes were shot down by shore-based anti-aircraft weapons, while guns aboard Seventh Fleet ships lying off Bosnek accounted for at least one more. Later during the same night, a few more enemy planes dropped some bombs harmlessly on and near Owi Island. Still more approached Biak during the night, causing many red alerts but not dropping any bombs. The next night, that of 3-4 June, no Japanese planes attacked Biak, although an unknown number bombed Owi Island without causing any damage or casualties. Again, however, enemy aircraft flew many reconnaissance flights around Biak, causing an almost continuous red alert until the early morning hours of 4 June. Early on the morning of June 3rd, at a point just east of the Talaud Islands, between Mindanao and Morotai, a 7th Fleet submarine sighted the Transport and 1st Screening Units and was in turn sighted by ships of the latter organization. Alongside this 7th Fleet PB4Y's, operating from Wakde Island, kept the Japanese vessels under surveillance the rest of the day, reporting that the course and speed of the enemy ships could bring them into range of Biak during the evening of June 4th. Their discovery by Allied aircraft so far from Biak apparently had not been anticipated by the Japanese, who later reported that they had not known Allied aircraft were capable of such long-range reconnaissance. Nevertheless, the three KON Force elements steamed on toward Biak, probably hoping that friendly aircraft might drive off the Allied reconnaissance planes and also protect the sea approaches to Biak. To further muddy the situation, Sakonju received false reports that a strong American carrier group was approaching the waters east of Biak. Admiral Kinkaid had indeed dispatched a special task force to deal with this threat, yet the warships could only arrive off Biak on the night of June 4th and didn't include any aircraft carrier. Nonetheless, knowing that he had been discovered and unwilling to risk so many ships under these circumstances, Sakonju would have to suspend the reinforcement run and turn back to Davao and Sorong. When the Japanese called off KON on June 3rd, the Transport and the 1st and 2nd Screening Units were a little over 500 miles northwest of Biak and about 250 miles east-southeast of the Talaud Islands. At this point, the three forces were reorganized. The Transport Unit, accompanied by the three destroyers of the 1st Screening Unit, changed course for Sorong, while the 2nd Screening Unit and the two heavy cruisers of the 1st turned back toward Davao, which they probably reached late on June 5th. Of the ships moving to Sorong, the Fifth Air Force claimed to have sunk one destroyer and damaged at least two others. The Transport Unit and the 1st Screening Unit's three destroyers arrived safely at Sorong during the evening of June 4th. The Detached Unit, which had been moving toward Biak from Zamboanga on an independent course far to the west of the other three sections of KON Force, had also changed its direction during the night of 3-4 June, and reached Sorong sometime on the 4th. At Sorong the Transport Unit unloaded the 1,700 men of the 2nd Amphibious Brigade. The six destroyers of the Transport and 1st Screening Units then proceeded southwest to Ambon where they refueled. The Transport Unit's one heavy cruiser and one light cruiser sought shelter in Kaboei Bay, Waigeo Island, about 60 miles northwest of Sorong. On 6 June the heavy cruiser Aoba was attacked there by fifteen B-24's of the Fifth Air Force. First reports were that at least two hits were scored on the cruiser, but it was later learned that the ship suffered no damage. Instead, it was able to take part in a second KON Operation. Back over at Biak, Newman resumed the advance westward on the morning of June 3rd, making painfully slow progress because of the difficult terrain and lack of adequate supply lines. Meeting no opposition, they would finally dig in half a mile from the point at which the main ridge left the coast and turned inland near Mokmer. That day, however, Fuller learnt about the possible enemy naval attack, so he decided to halt any offensive actions for the moment. On June 4th, upon learning that no enemy carriers were in the Biak area, Sakonju was again ordered to prepare to run the American blockade, this time bringing the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 219th Regiment. There would be two naval groups, the first was the Transport Unit, containing three destroyers which had been part of the first KON Operation Transport Unit. The second section was the Screening Unit, also comprising three destroyers. For the second KON Operation there were two detached units, the 1st had one heavy and one light cruiser while the 2nd Detached Unit included the small craft and patrol boats which had put into Sorong at the end of the first KON. The three destroyers of the Transport Unit were each to embark 200 infantrymen at Sorong. In addition, the destroyers of either or both the Transport and Screening Units were each to tow to Biak one landing barge crammed with troops, probably 30 to 50 men to a barge. After two quiet nights, meanwhile, Newman decided to send three battalions forward toward the north-south section of the main ridge northwest of Mokmer on June 5th. Warned by the regimental commander that it was important to secure a foothold on the ridge before the Japanese could deny it to the 186th Infantry, the three assault battalions started westward about 8:00 on June 5th. Lack of water again slowed the advance. No water had been received in the forward area since the morning of the 4th, and Colonel Newman had ordered the troops westward against the advice of his staff and battalion commanders. About noon, however, a heavy rain fell. The regimental commander ordered all troops to halt, catch the rain in ponchos, and fill their canteens. "Had it not been for this lucky break, we would undoubtedly have had to halt in midafternoon." As events turned out, no Japanese opposition was encountered, and by 1500 the 3rd Battalion, 186th Infantry, was within 500 yards of the main ridge. Although Newman and General Doe then wanted to secure the dominating terrain north and northwest of the airfield, they would receive direct orders from Fuller to immediately seize Mokmer Drome and a beachhead on the coast directly south of that strip. Throughout the morning of June 6th the 186th Infantry directed most of its efforts to bringing supplies up to the forward units. Almost the entire 2nd Battalion was engaged in hand-carrying supplies to the 3rd Battalion atop the ridge, while the latter unit sent patrols toward Mokmer Drome seeking good routes of approach to that objective. About noon Colonel Newman reported to task force headquarters that no good route had been found and that supplies, especially the ever-needed water, had not been brought forward in sufficient quantities to allow a regimental attack to be launched that day, and he therefore recommended that the attack be postponed until June 7th. General Fuller approved this suggestion. The lack of supplies and water would delay the attack, however, though the 3rd Battalion would be able to move down the west side of the main ridge to take up positions along a line of departure for the next morning's attack. To support the infantry attack, on June 7th, a thirty-minute artillery concentration began at 7:00 that morning. The 146th, 205th, and 947th Field Artillery Battalions, from positions along the coast to the east, were registered on targets in the airfield area ready to support the advance, but most of the firing was undertaken by the 121st Field Artillery from its location behind the 186th Infantry. While the artillery fired on Mokmer Drome and along the low ridge between that field and the 186th Infantry, Fifth Air Force bombers attacked the Borokoe Drome area and also struck some targets along the low ridge. The airfield was only occupied by the 108th Airfield Construction Unit, which immediately fled the area because of the heavy bombardment. Newman's 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced south encountering no resistance as they crossed Mokmer Drome and reached the beach. When, on 5 June, the 186th Infantry had reached the crest of the main coastal ridge, it had been on the left rear of the Japanese defenses on the low ridge and terraces above Mokmer Drome. Thus, the regiment had been in a favorable position to take these defenses from the rear. But in its move to the airfield, the 186th Infantry had bypassed the Biak Detachment's principal defensive positions. The bypassing had not been intentional. Colonel Newman had instructed both leading battalions to halt on the low ridge, reconnoiter along it in both directions, and report on Japanese defenses before moving on. According to Colonel Newman: "I received a negative report from both battalions, and ordered the movement to the airdrome. Evidently, the right battalion had failed in this patrolling effort." Instead, the 186th had captured its main objective, but now found itself surrounded by Kuzume's strongest defenses. The Japanese immediately began to pound the new American perimeter, with an artillery duel soon erupting. By nightfall, it had become impracticable to supply the 186th Regiment over the inland plateau road, which ended on the east side of the main ridge. From that point, all supplies would have to be hand-carried to Mokmer Drome and supply parties would be endangered by Japanese patrols, a few of which moved in behind the 186th as the regiment reached the beach, so the 3rd Battalion, 163rd Regiment would be dispatched to push over the inland plateau and protect the parties. Overwater supply was also attempted, yet as the first boats approached the shore they were greeted by machine gun and rifle fire from Japanese whom the 186th Infantry had not yet cleaned out of caves along the water line in front of Mokmer Drome. The small craft returned the fire, but were finally forced to withdraw. The 186th Infantry, according to Colonel Newman, was "glad to see them withdraw since they had our troops running for cover." At 2:00 another attempt was made to land supplies at Sboeria. The three LCM's managed to put their tanks ashore in the face of continuing Japanese fire, but accompanying LCT's were driven off by Japanese artillery. Two of the LCM's were so damaged by enemy fire that they could not fully retract their ramps and had to proceed the nine and a half miles back to Bosnek in reverse. Plans were made to effect all delivery of supplies and evacuation of casualties at night until the enemy fire on the Sboeria beachhead could be neutralized. The tanks which had been landed lumbered along the shore road fronting Mokmer Drome, destroying several small bunkers along the beach. Then they wheeled toward the low ridge north of the airfield, taking under fire a Japanese 75-mm. mountain gun and a 20-mm. piece which had opposed their landing. These two weapons were silenced. Moving cautiously northwestward from the field along a road which crossed the low ridge, the tanks destroyed two large pillboxes. Alongside this, Fuller sent two companies of Haney's 3rd Battalion to land on the Parai Jetty in order to outflank the Ibdi Pocket, which the 162nd had been unsuccessfully attempting to dislodge since the start of the month. But June 7th would also see the start of Operation KON's second attempt. After rendezvousing off Misoöl Island that morning, Sakonju instructed his 8 destroyers to proceed to Biak. Air cover was to have been provided by planes of the 23rd Air Flotilla. But the cape area was being patrolled by Allied aircraft on June 8th and, about 1:30, the 23rd Air Flotilla cover of six planes was shot down or driven away by 5th Air Force P-38's. Finding the air now free of enemy planes, American B-25's dived to the attack th convoy, reporting the convoy as 2 light cruisers and 4 destroyers. Initially, it was claimed that 1 destroyer was sunk, 2 were left sinking, and the fourth was damaged. A few days later, destruction was reassessed as 4 destroyers sunk and 2 light cruisers chased to the northwest. These claims were exaggerated. One destroyer, the Harusame, was holed by a near miss and sank rapidly, the bulk of its crew being saved. Another destroyer was damaged by a bomb and took some water; two others were slightly damaged by strafing. Neither speed nor navigation was impeded for any of the three. The two light cruisers reported by the Allied planes were, of course, the other two destroyers. These two might have taken some evasive action by heading northwest for a short time, but as soon as the Harusame crew had been rescued and the Allied planes had disappeared, the convoy reformed and continued on toward Biak. The convoy reformed and continued on toward Biak, undeterred by reports of strong enemy elements in the area. By nightfall, however, it was on a collision course with the cruisers of Admirals Crutchley and Berkey. At about 6:00 on the 8th, the Transport and Screening Units received a report from a Japanese aircraft that an Allied naval force comprising 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, and 8 destroyers was moving west at high speed from an undesignated point east of Biak. This report was at least partially correct. The Allied task force which had been formed on June 3rd had again assembled on the 8th, having been alerted by reports of the air-sea battle off the Kaap de Goede Hoop. But the Japanese convoy commander apparently took this air reconnaissance report with at least one grain of salt--had not similar information received on June 3rd proved inaccurate? The Transport and Screening Units steamed on, despite the fact that the Kaap de Goede Hoop action had put the force behind schedule. At 11:30 the two enemy groups were approximately forty miles off the north coast of Soepiori Island, ready to turn southeast toward Korim Bay, on the northeast side of Biak. Minutes later a destroyer in the van sighted the Allied task force heading northwest around Biak. The convoy commander quickly realized that he was badly outnumbered and decided that discretion was called for. The Japanese convoy slipping towards the Mapia islands, seeing the allied destroyers failing to pursue them. Yet that is it for Biak for now as we now need to head over to the Wakde-Sarmi front. General Sibert was preparing to resume the westward offensive. By June 14th, the 20th Regiment had relieved the 158th at the Tirfoam River; and although Sibert wanted to complete unloading of his remaining units before sending the 20th to push westward, General Krueger ordered him to start an immediate offensive on June 18th. Now, however, they were up against almost the full strength of General Tagami's 36th Division. Company B pushed on toward the village at the entrance to the defile between Lone Tree Hill and the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin. This advance was greeted by a hail of fire from Japanese automatic weapons emplaced in the defile--fire reminiscent of the opposition encountered by Company B, 158th Infantry, at the same place more than three weeks earlier. The 20th Infantry's Company B tried to outflank the enemy position to the south but was halted by intense Japanese machine gun fire. Tanks sent forward to aid the infantry were unable to reach the enemy guns because the terrain was impassable to tracked or wheeled vehicles, which could scarcely negotiate the rough road, let alone the thick jungle and rising ground to the south. Late in the afternoon Company A was sent forward to Company B's position, but both units encountered heavy fire and soon lost contact with the rest of the 1st Battalion. The two companies remained for the night in an isolated perimeter near the village and about 400 yards west of the main body. The 3rd Battalion had moved north off the coastal road during the morning, and late in the afternoon it had established a perimeter extending south 200 yards from the beach along the east bank of the Snaky River. The battalion had encountered little opposition during the day, but patrols which had crossed the Snaky before dark reported finding many Japanese defensive positions on the eastern slopes of Lone Tree Hill. A gap which existed between the 1st and 3rd Battalions was partially filled just before nightfall by elements of the 2nd Battalion, which were sent forward late in the afternoon. Casualties during the day were four killed and twenty-eight wounded. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 1st Infantry, moved across the Tor River in the morning of June 20th and took over the positions in the vicinity of Maffin No. 1 vacated by the 20th Infantry. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry, assumed responsibility for the protection of the bridgehead across the Tor. The following morning, Sibert then directed his units to patrol extensively in order to locate enemy strong points on and around the hill. Thanks to the information gathered, the 3rd Battalion would attack towards Rocky Point in the afternoon. At the top of Lone Tree Hill was a stretch of rough but generally level ground lying mostly along the western part of the hill. This flat ground, about 700 yards long north to south, was shaped like a crude dumbbell. At its northern end, the level area was about 300 yards wide. It narrowed at the center of the hill to less than 100 yards but broadened again on the south to a width of about 250 yards. There were many coral outcroppings, potholes, and small crevices, while on the north the hill terminated in a very rugged prominence called Rocky Point. This terrain feature, which extended into Maffin Bay from the central mass of Lone Tree Hill, was about 300 yards wide east to west. Its northern face was not as heavily overgrown as the rest of Lone Tree Hill. Although Rocky Point's northeast slope was steep, foot troops could climb that face with more ease than they could approach the top of Lone Tree Hill from most other points. A deep ravine ran southwest into the central mass of Lone Tree Hill from a sandy beach on the east side of Rocky Point. The floor of the ravine varied from 20 to 30 yards in width and its nearly vertical western wall was 40 to 50 feet high. Both sides were honeycombed with natural or man-made tunnels, caverns, and small caves, most of which were connected with each other by underground or deeply defiladed passages. Some caves reached a width of 40 feet, a depth into the hillside of 50 feet, and a height of 20 feet. The ravine terminated on the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill in a steep grade at the narrow central portion of the hilltop. At 1:45pm, after a fifteen-minute artillery and 4.2-inch mortar preparation, one company moved across the Snaky River, immediately finding the twenty-foot cliff along the eastern side of the shelf which lay between the Snaky River and the central mass of Lone Tree Hill. The morning patrols had not, apparently, reported the existence of this cliff, and naturally it was not known that Japanese defenses were established along it. Machine gun and rifle fire from the 1st Battalion, 224th Infantry, soon pinned down the 3rd Battalion's leading platoon. The company commander quickly sent part of his unit northward to find the Japanese left flank. Moving around the northeast end of the shelf, this group discovered the beach entrance to the deep ravine between the western side of the shelf and Rocky Point. Progress into or across the ravine was impossible in the face of the intense Japanese small arms fire which greeted the advancing American unit. Company B, 6th Engineers, then in the forward area to cut a road from the mouth of the Snaky River to Rocky Point, was brought up to the ravine to help clean out caves and crevices with flame throwers and demolitions, but could not reach the enemy positions through the continued machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire. Infantry bazooka squads also tried to blast the Japanese out of their caves but failed when their ammunition ran out. Since there was no time to bring additional rockets forward before dark, all elements of the 3rd Battalion and the engineer company were withdrawn to the east bank of the Snaky River for the night. The 20th Infantry was to continue the assault on the morrow with the 3rd Battalion moving against Lone Tree Hill from the northeast, the 2nd Battalion in reserve, and the 1st Battalion remaining in its holding position. On the morning of June 22, after a heavy air and artillery concentration on Rocky Point, the 3rd Battalion once again attacked northwest with Companies K and I, successfully driving the Japanese back into their caves to reach the top of Lone Tree Hill just south of Rocky Point. Meanwhile, another two companies had attacked southwest to force their way up the southeast slope of the hill; but subjected to heavy machine-gun fire, they would have to withdraw and march north to join Companies K and I. The 2nd Battalion also moved forward and took positions to the south of the 3rd Battalion. Worried about the American gains, Colonel Matsuyama personally led two companies in the afternoon to fall on the 3rd Battalion's perimeter with suicidal fury. Confused fighting, sometimes hand-to-hand, continued well into the night, with Matsuyama himself getting shot on the thigh. Yet this attack would successfully position the Japanese companies on the rear of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, thus cutting them off from regimental headquarters. Matsuyama also recalled his 2nd Battalion from the Maffin area, so he would employ these reinforcements to attack Sibert's 2nd Battalion on June 23. At dawn on the 23rd Japanese troops, some of whom were using American weapons and wearing parts of American uniforms, attacked the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, from the deep ravine. The battalion initially held its fire, thinking that the enemy force might be a friendly patrol, and the Japanese were able to advance to within fifteen yards of the battalion lines before being recognized. It was an hour before the results of this error could be corrected--an hour during which both the 2nd Battalion and the Japanese suffered heavy losses. The hour ended with an enemy retreat. Isolated, the 2nd Battalion then decided to withdraw and march north towards the 3rd Battalion's perimeter at the top of the hill, getting harassed all the way by Matsuyama's forces. During the night, the Japanese launched a banzai charge against the perimeter, getting very close to retaking Lone Tree Hill but suffering heavy casualties in the end. Upon learning that his battalions were cut off, meanwhile, Sibert decided to outflank the hill by a shore-to-shore maneuver and then continue the attack from both west and east. Accordingly, Companies K and I of the 1st Regiment boarded ten LVTs on the morning of June 24th and moved to the beach just west of Rocky Point, under the protection of the 6th Reconnaissance Troop. Both companies would land successfully by midday against strong Japanese fire, though they would be rapidly pinned down on the narrow beach. Thankfully, Sibert also landed four tanks two hours later to secure the beachhead. This diversion would allow the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Regiment to begin clearing the Japanese from the many caves and crevices on Rocky Point, the deep ravine east of the point, and the hilltop plateau, further securing the supply route up the hill. By nightfall, no enemy counterattack developed, as Tagami had instead decided to withdraw the 224th Regiment to the Hill 255-Mount Saksin line while the 223rd Regiment retreated behind the Woske River. Thus Matsuyama's resistance in the area weakened and the Americans were finally able to clear Rocky Point. The next day the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Infantry, continued clearing Rocky Point, the deep ravine, the northern part of the hilltop plateau, and the eastern shelf, where a few scattered Japanese still held positions along the twenty-foot-high cliff. Flame throwers, demolition charges, bazookas, and hand grenades all proved successful in eliminating Japanese resistance and sealing or clearing caves and crevices. The task was easier on the 25th, for the Japanese slowly gave up the fight and were killed or sealed off in their caves. Casualties continued to mount, the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, had only about two hundred effectives by the end of the day but many of the losses were not due to Japanese action. Many men were evacuated over the now secured supply route to the top of the hill as they fell from exhaustion or became sick. On the beach west of Rocky Point Companies I and K, 1st Infantry, had little success in expanding their beachhead. The tanks proved useless in the area and were therefore withdrawn to Maffin No. 1. The two infantry companies, pinned down during the morning, kept up a continuous mortar barrage against Japanese positions in the swamp to the south, against the western cliff of Lone Tree Hill, and, when certain such fire would not endanger troops atop the hill, against the northwest corner of Rocky Point. This mortar fire, coupled with the operations on the plateau, began to have the desired effect during the afternoon, and Companies I and K were able to push their defenses beyond the narrow beachhead slightly southward and westward and toward the shore beneath Rocky Point. Once or twice during the afternoon, patrols were able to reach the top of Lone Tree Hill from the northwest corner of the point and established contact with 20th Infantry units. Late in the afternoon Company M, 1st Infantry, operating from the east side of the point, managed to push a patrol around the shore to establish contact with Company K. Though Companies I and K could find little tangible evidence of the results of their operations, they had actually wiped out the 223rd Infantry's defense force in the area just west of Lone Tree Hill. By dusk on the 25th, it had become obvious that the combined efforts of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Infantry, had either cleared out the northern half of Lone Tree Hill or had forced the Japanese to withdraw. The latter conclusion was the more nearly correct. The 36th Division decided on 25 June to withdraw the bulk of the Center and Right Sector Forces west of the Woske River and establish new defensive positions, thereby keeping the 223rd Infantry, the bulk of which had not been committed to action in the Lone Tree Hill area, more or less intact. Only the remnants of the 224th Infantry were to remain east of the Woske, and they were to withdraw into rough terrain southwest of Mt. Saksin. At nightfall on the 25th, General Sibert estimated that his three forward battalions had lost approximately 140 men killed and 850 wounded and evacuated, including those who had to be sent back to the rear because of wounds, sickness, heat exhaustion, or psychoneurotic disorders. Known Japanese dead in the northern part of the hill numbered 344, but it could not be estimated how many more had been thrown over the west cliff, sealed in caves, or carried off by withdrawing remnants of the Japanese defense force. According to Japanese sources, the Japanese had lost about 500 men killed and another 300 wounded in the Lone Tree Hill-Hill 225-Mt. Saksin area. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Chinese were accredited with the fall of Moguang despite the Chindits taking the lionshare of the fighting. Things were advancing very well for the allies in the new Biak front. As for the battle for Lone Tree Hill, it was a costly one, and not one the Americans or Japanese would soon forget.
Last time we spoke about the Japanese defeats at Imphal and Kohima. General Mutaguchi's Operation U-Go was gradually falling apart. General Yamauchi faced defeat afte defeat and was forced to dig in around Sendgmai and Kanglatongbi. The allies then began tossing large counteroffensives while Mutaguchi was forced to change targets for Bishenpur, only to be repelled again. The allies' anvil-hammer strategy proved very effective, the Japanese lost their momentum and now the allies were seizing it. The battle for Kohima was fierce, seeing the Japanese struggle to seize key features upon it. Despite many victories in Kohima, it did not seem like the Japanese would be able to seize the entire area. Within the China theater, Operation Kogo saw the Japanese push into Luoyang, earning enormous victories over the Chinese forces. Out in the Pacific, the British eastern fleet launched a successful airstrike against Surabaya, gaining valuable experience despite minimal Japanese response. This episode is the Battle of Wakde Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. A new mission was afoot, Operation Tornado, the amphibious assault of Wakde Island. The nucleus of the force that would hit Wakde was to be General Doe's 163rd regiment of the 41st division. The war planners devoted a lot of time to the selection of a landing beach for Tornado. However the island was too small and her beaches were too limited to permit the landing of a reinforced regiment. Furthermore a landing on Wake would most likely be met by hidden Japanese artillery on the mainland. Thus to stop such a thing from occurring they would have to perform a landing against the mainland to eliminate artillery positions. It was decided that a landing at Toem, on the mainland directly opposite Wakde, would not be sensible. There the landing craft and cargo ships would be subjected to small-caliber fire from Wakde. In such restricted waters the enemy could place enfilade fire on the ships, but in more open waters to the west naval fire support ships and amphibious vessels would have freedom of movement and could maneuver to neutralize both Wakde and the Toem area while the TORNADO Task Force moved ashore and set up its artillery. After consideration of all these factors, it was finally decided that the initial beachhead would be at Arare, a native settlement on the coast about three miles west of Toem and four and one-half miles southwest of Wakde Island. Additionally, the Allied Air Forces desired that radar warning stations be established in the Wakde area. For this purpose, Liki and Niroemoar Islands, about fifteen miles off Sarmi, were to be seized. As such the Tornado Task Force was going to begin landing on the mainland opposite of Wakde island at Arare on May 17th. The next day the 1st Battalion, 163rd Infantry would assault Wakde island, covered not only by the task force artillery but also by the Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai and by naval fire support ships. After all of that, on the 19th, Liki and Niroemoar islands would be captured where radar stations would be constructed. Furthermore, in reserve would be the 128th and 158th Regiments, ready to reinforce Doe's troops if needed. Admiral Fechteler's Task Force 77 was going to take charge of the operations against Wakde and Biak, with Captain Noble's Eastern Attack Group providing fire support for Operation Tornado. Captain Noble divided his fire support ships into three groups: Fire Support Group A two heavy cruisers and four destroyers, Fire Support Group B three light cruisers and six destroyers, and Fire Support Group C, ten destroyers. These ships would begin firing on assigned targets at H minus 45 minutes and would continue bombardment until H minus 3. The bulk of the D Day fire was to be aimed at Sawar and Maffin Dromes, west of the landing beach. No resistance was expected at the beach and a light bombardment to be directed on it was purely precautionary. Some fire support ships were assigned counterbattery missions and others were to aim their shells at Wakde and Insoemanai Islands. Other ships assigned to participate in the landing phase were 3 submarine chasers, 2 destroyer-escorts, 4 minesweepers, 2 rocket-equipped submarine chasers, and 3 rocket-equipped LCIs. Rocket fire was to begin at H minus 3 minutes and was to be directed principally against the beachhead area. At H minus 1, all fire on the beach was to cease and the landing craft were to make their final dash to the shore. After the landing, the fire support ships were to shift bombardment to targets on the beach flanks and were to be prepared to deliver call fire upon request from the troops ashore. The landing on Insoemanai was to be supported by two LCI”G”s and two destroyers. Throughout the night of 17-18 May, cruisers and destroyers were to bombard Wakde and on the morning of the 18th they and the rocket-equipped vessels were to support the assault on that island. On the 19th a few destroyers were to support the landings on Liki and Niroemoar Islands. Admiral Crutchley's cruisers would shell the mainland around Sarmi and Sawar, while Admiral Berkey's cruisers would hit Wakde Island. On top of that, General Kenney's 5th Air Force would hit the Wakde-Sarmi area alongside other targets along New Guinea's northern coast. Special attention was given to enemy fields east of the Vogelkop Peninsula and on Biak Island. Japanese waterborne supply and reinforcement movements in the Geelvink Bay area were to be stopped insofar as weather, time, and the availability of aircraft permitted it. Insofar as range, weather, and time permitted, Australian bombers, aided by a Dutch squadron of B-25s, were to neutralize enemy air bases on the Arafura Sea islands and on other islands of the Indies southwest of the Vogelkop. On D minus 1 Fifth Air Force bombers were to attempt detonation of possible land mines on the mainland beach and subsurfaces mines in the waters surrounding Wakde. On the morning of D Day there was to be additional bombing west of the landing area, but there was to be no bombing or strafing of the beach immediately before the assault. Fighters were to be on air alert, weather permitting, over the Wakde area from first light to dusk on D Day. During part of the day A-20s would also be on alert over the area and were to strike Wakde. Such daily cover was to continue until aircraft could use the Wakde strip. To face this onslaught was a signal IJA company, the Japanese 9th Company of the 224th Infantry Regiment, reinforced with a mountain artillery platoon and a few mortar and both light and heavy machine-gun squads from other 224th Regiment units. The strength of this combat force was about 280 men. They would be assisted by the IJN's 91st Guard Unit of about 150 men and a battery of the 53rd Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, most of whose weapons had long since been demolished by the air attacks. Alongside miscellaneous airdrome engineers and other service personnel, both Army and Navy over on Insoemoear Island, this brought the total of Japanese strength on the island to nearly 800 troops. This was all the result of General Tagami's decision to concentrate the bulk of his division in the Maffin Bay-Sawar sector, leaving the coastal stretch east of the Tor River and opposite of Wakde pretty much unguarded. A series of untoward circumstances emerged which hampered the loading process. LSTs on which the Task Force units at Aitape were to be loaded were some eight hours late reaching the staging point. When these vessels finally reached Aitape, adverse surf conditions and congestion on the shore prevented their beaching until late in the afternoon of May 13th, and loading was delayed another twelve hours. There was also some trouble about units scheduled to take part in the Wakde operation. The Shore Battalion, 533rd EBSR, an important element of the Task Force, did not arrive at Aitape until the afternoon of May 12th. The battalion and its equipment could not be unloaded from the ships which had brought it to BLUE Beach from eastern New Guinea and be reloaded on LSTs of the Wakde convoy in time for the departure of the task force from Aitape, scheduled for no later than midnight on May 14th. In view of these logistic difficulties, General Doe was therefore forced to drive his troops to the limit of their endurance in order to get the loading finished on time. He solved the problem of the Shore Battalion, 533rd EBSR by substituting for that unit the Shore Battalion, 593rd EBSR, which was already stationed at Aitape. Finally at 1am on the 15th, Noble's ships departed Aitape, stopping at Hollandia to load the remainder of the task force, before assembling off Arare and Wakde by dawn of the 17th. The fire support ships successfully bombarded the Japanese targets against little resistance while as Troops aboard the assault ships arose early, ate the breakfast quickly, and by 5:30 began loading on their assigned landing craft. The sea remained calm and the rain gave way to the sun shortly after dawn. Men of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, transferred from the APA's which had brought them from Aitape to the eight LCVP's of the first wave. The beach was clearly visible and its limits had been marked by colored smoke grenades dropped by cruiser-based seaplanes of the fire support units. Meeting zero opposition, the first American troops would hit the shore at 7:15, with succeeding waves rapidly arriving behind them. The 3rd Battalion then fanned out along the shore and quickly secured the Arare beachhead area, just as the remaining units were being brought to shore. Upon landing, Doe's 2nd Battalion passed through the 3rd and immediately moved eastward towards Tementoe Creek, successfully securing Toem against no opposition by 9:30. There, the 1st Battalion assembled for the assault on Wakde while Company E was transported from the mainland to Insoemanai Island, where the Americans would successfully establish a Provisional Groupment of heavy weapons to support the next day's assault. Within a few hours after the mainland beachhead had been secured, the Tornado Task Force was ready to execute the second phase of the D Day plan, the capture of Insoemanai Island, a little over 3,500 yards offshore. At about 10:45, under cover of fire from two destroyers and two rocket-equipped LCIs, a platoon of Company E, 163rd Infantry, was transported from the mainland to Insoemanai. There was no opposition to this maneuver and the islet proved to be unoccupied. Four LCMs, an LCVP, and two LCSs immediately took the rest of the company and the Provisional Groupment of heavy weapons to Insoemanai. The landing of the force was rendered difficult only by the fact that a coral fringing reef made it necessary for the troops to wade ashore from about seventy-five yards out. The mortars and machine guns of the Provisional Groupment were quickly set up and began firing on Wakde. The Japanese at Wakde responding to their first bombardments with machine-gun and mortar fire, which was the only noticeable resistance of this day. At the same time, elements of the 3rd Battalion had moved west to the Tor River, successfully reaching it during the afternoon. Thus, by the end of the day, the Americans had landed a total of 7000 men and had successfully secured a firm beachhead between the Tementoe and Tor Rivers at the cost of only 2 killed and 11 wounded. Once he received news of the landings, General Tagami ordered all his forces to prepare a counterattack to try and destroy the allied beachhead. He also ordered the Matsuyama Detachment, who were advancing towards Hollandia, to turn back to Toem as quickly as possible so they could launch and attack against the enemy from the east. Yet before the Japanese could begin their advances, General Doe's amphibious assault began. Shore-based artillery, the Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai, and some of the naval fire support ships unleashed harassing fire on Wakde throughout the night. 36 A-20s of General Kenney's Fifth Air Force bombed and strafed the Japanese defenses beginning at 7:15am on the 15th. Naval bombardment lasted until 8:57 when the gunfire was aimed at the proposed landing beach on the southern shore of Wakde, and was then to be lifted to the northern side of the island. The 191st Field Artillery Group fired for twenty-three minutes on Wakde, and this bombardment was supplemented by 20-mm. and 40-mm. weapons aboard naval support vessels upon completion of the latters' fire from heavier weapons. The Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai joined in. In addition, rocket-equipped LCIs threw 850 4.5-inch rockets on the island. Noble's warships expending a total of 400 rounds of 6-inch and 1950 rounds of 5-inch ammunition against Wakde's defenses. The Japanese had constructed many defensive positions on Wakde. There were about a hundred bunkers of various sizes and constructions. Some were made of coconut logs and dirt, others utilized cement in sacks, and a few contained concrete or lumps of coarse coral. There were many foxholes and slit trenches, and the Japanese had improved some of the bomb craters to make defensive positions. There were at least two well-constructed concrete air raid shelters and the Japanese were prepared to use the few coral caves on the eastern shore for both defense and storage. Many of the defensive positions were well camouflaged, and some were dug deep into the ground to present a low silhouette. Coconut trees toppled by pre-assault bombardments added more natural camouflage and protection to the enemy's defensive positions. The majority of the many bunkers were mutually supporting, but, on the other hand, some had been built with no apparent relationship to others. Some of the bunkers, most of the field and anti-aircraft gun positions, the airstrip, and many buildings had been severely damaged or destroyed by carrier-based aircraft during their attacks on the Wakde-Sarmi area in support of the Hollandia operation. By 9am, the first wave of LCVPS were surging forward under Japanese rifle and machine gun fire at around 300 yards range. They hit the beaches at Wakde at 9:10am. For the next 15 minutes, three rifle companies and two Sherman tanks landed against increasing fire from Japanese machine-guns and rifles in hidden positions on the flanks of the beachhead. Despite the resistance, the beachhead was quickly organized and the Americans soon began to expand the perimeter in all directions. The two tanks, with Companies B and F, started moving west to widen the initial hold. Company C struck north toward the airstrip and Company A pushed to the southeast along the small peninsula to destroy a troublesome machine gun nest on the little knoll. After destroying an enemy bunker, Company A cleared the eastern peninsula by 10:45 while Companies B and F, after meeting initial heavy resistance on the west flank, found that most opposition collapsed once the ruins of prewar plantation houses had been cleared by hand grenades and rifle fire. The two companies thereupon left the beach and swung north toward the airfield. Company C then encountered strong resistance in its drive up the center of the island, laboriously clearing a group of bunkers by 10:15 but then calling for tank support to destroy a second group in front of the airfield. At the same time, Companies B and F swung north towards the airfield, reaching its southern edge at 10:30 and then pushing eastwards. Just before 11:30 the tanks joined the infantry unit, which had now pushed halfway from the beach to the airstrip. With this added strength Company C reduced each bunker in a series of separate actions which included 75-mm. fire from the tanks, lobbing hand grenades into the bunkers' fire ports, and killing with rifle fire all Japanese who showed themselves. With Company B's aid and the continued support of the two tanks, Company C was able to push on to the airstrip. In the northeast corner of the island the Japanese forces maintained a fierce defense, and Companies B, C, and F were subjected to considerable small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire originating from positions at the eastern end of the airstrip. Movement eastward along the south side of the strip was slow, even though Companies B and F had been reinforced by Company D's heavy machine guns, which had arrived on Wakde from Insoemanai late in the morning. In the meantime, Company A was sent to aid in the mop up of the plantation houses, before turning northwest to clear the western end of Wakde. Company A pushed along the beach road and down a dispersal lane running off the southwest side of the strip. About 1245 the advance was held up by three Japanese bunkers on the right flank. Tank 75-mm. fire, delivered from as close as 20 yards, soon eliminated the Japanese defenders. Small groups of Japanese, originally hiding in foxholes behind the three pillboxes, attempted to assault the tanks with hand grenades and bayonets. Company A's automatic riflemen quickly dispersed or killed these men, and the unit pushed on around the west end of the airstrip. Little opposition was encountered in this movement and the company reached the north shore of Wakde Island about 1:30pm. Major Wing of the 1st battalion, decided to await the arrival of two more tanks from the mainland and the redisposition of Company D's weapons before attacking what promised to be the strongest Japanese defenses on Wakde. The two additional tanks were to be used wherever opposition proved heaviest, while the heavy weapons of Company D were to be equally divided between Companies B and F. Meanwhile Company C attempted to advance across the strip in support of Company A, but their movement would be delayed due to the ferocious enemy resistance. At 3:45, Company A finally restarted the drive eastwards while Companies B and F kept pushing along the airfield. Company A rapidly moved forward from the western end of the strip, passed through Company C at the halfway point, and pushed cautiously eastward. Movement after passing Company C was slowed by increasingly heavy machine gun and mortar fire from the northeast section of the island. At 6:00, when Major Wing ordered his men to dig in for the night, Company A had not quite reached the northeastern corner of the airfield. Meanwhile, south of the strip Company B had scarcely started its attack when fire from hidden Japanese machine guns held up the advance. Company F was immediately pulled out of its reserve role and committed to action on B's right flank. Two tanks were moved forward to Company B's front at the same time. Despite their best efforts and even with the tank support, Companies B and F were unable to progress more than 300 yards east of the lines of departure. Major Wing decided that since dusk was approaching it would be useless to continue the attack. The two companies were therefore halted and instructed to take up night defensive positions. Company A had set up its night perimeter about 100 yards short of the northeast corner of the airdrome. Company B was on the south side of the strip about 450 yards from the eastern end, and Company F was on B's right. Company C was pulled back to the southern side of the field and extended Company F's line to the southeast beach at the base of the small peninsula. The battalion command post was about 400 yards behind the lines of Company F. There was no connection across the strip between Companies A and B. The former was in a dangerously exposed position. However, Japanese fire against the company perimeter ceased before dark, and the Japanese did not attack. The night was fairly uneventful except at around 2:30 am on the 19th a small group of Japanese attacked a command post, defended by elements of Company D, and a half-hour fire fight raged in the darkness. Twelve Japanese were killed while three Americans, all of D Company, were wounded. This night battle did not delay the next day's attack which started, after an artillery and mortar preparation of one hour's duration, at 9:15am. Company C was the first unit under way on the 19th. Two tanks were assigned to the 3rd Platoon and one to the 2nd. The 3rd Platoon was on the left, the 2nd on the right, and the 1st and Weapons Platoons were in support. The 3rd Platoon pushed eastward up a slight rise, harassed by light rifle fire from the front and left flank. Once on top of the rise the platoon met heavy Japanese fire from behind fallen coconut trees and from a number of bunkers, bomb craters, and demolished buildings to the east. The 75-mm. guns of the tanks methodically destroyed each enemy position, and the few enemy that escaped from the bunkers were cut down by 3rd Platoon riflemen. The 2nd Platoon, followed by the rest of C Company, moved on toward the eastern beaches, and was slowed only by heavy brush near the shore. Upon turning north at the beach the company found that the Japanese had converted a number of small coral caves into minor strong points. These were slowly cleared by riflemen, tank fire, and flame throwers as the company pushed on. Meanwhile, Company B, moving east along the south edge of the airstrip, had also encountered many Japanese defensive positions. Progress was at a snail's pace. Company F, in reserve during the early part of the drive, was thrown into the fight on B's right flank about 11:30 and two tanks were sent from Company C's front to support Company B. The latter, with its zone of responsibility now nearly halved, was able to concentrate its forces for more effective operations. A rifle platoon was assigned to each tank and the remaining rifle platoon was in support. Some Japanese were found hidden in wrecks of aircraft, some of which covered bunkers, and others were in foxholes in heavy brush. This brush was difficult for soldiers afoot to penetrate but the tanks, spraying every likely hiding place with machine gun fire, rapidly broke paths through it. The advance, even with the tank support, was slow, because it was necessary to comb every square foot of ground for Japanese riflemen. It was not until 1400 that Company B reached the southeast corner of the strip. On B's right, Company F and one tank encountered similar opposition but managed to keep abreast of Companies B and C. During the late afternoon, Companies C and F turned north, while Company A advanced northeast to join up with Company B. At this point the eastern end of the field had been cleared out, the Japanese resistance began to collapse as remaining defenders formed a small triangle perimeter by 6pm. Meanwhile Liki and Niroemoar were captured by Companies E and I on the 19th. The two companies had been transported to the objectives by two APD's and two LCT's, protected by DD's. The islands proved to be unoccupied by the Japanese and the Fifth Air Force radar detachments were immediately set up. The only casualty was the native chieftain of Liki, who was wounded by the pre assault naval bombardment. Detachments of the 163d Infantry were left on both islands to protect the radar installations. The morning of the 20th, suddenly opened up with a banzai charge performed by 37 Japanese, who had slipped through Company C's lines during the night against engineer units at the beachhead. The attack began at7:30, leaving36 dead and 1 wounded Japanese, the latter was taken prisoner. At 9:00 Companies A, C, and F started patrolling in the northeast pocket. A few Japanese were killed, others were buried by demolition charges in coral caves along the northeast shore, and many committed suicide. During the afternoon Major Wing's men moved back to the mainland and turned over control of Wakde Island to the Allied Air Forces. The 836th Engineer Aviation Battalion began repairing the western end of the Wakde airdrome, with the strip being declared operational on May 21st. The first planes landed on the island that afternoon, two days ahead of schedule. Within a few more days the Wakde strip was sufficiently repaired and enlarged to furnish the needed base from which bombers could support the Biak operation on May 27 and Admiral Nimitz' advance to the Marianas in mid-June. The final count of Japanese casualties on Wakde was 759 killed and 4 captured, with an additional 50 being killed on the mainland. In turn, the Americans only lost 43 killed and 139 wounded. That is all for today on this front as we now need to cross over to the India-Burma front. Last time, we saw the forces of General Stopford managed to retake Kohima Ridge in mid May, tossing General Sato's 31st Division onto the defense. Stopford reorganized his forces for a final push. The 5th brigade led by Brigadier Michael West prepared to launch coordinated set-piece attacks against the remaining Japanese positions atop Naga Hill. An attack was made by the Cameron Highlanders on Hunter's Hill on the night of May 15th, but it was hurled back. After this bulldozers were sent to cut a track up Naga Hill to allow tanks to support an infantry assault. On the 19th, Brigadier West launched another attack, but this time terrible weather hindered them, allowing the Worcesters to only seize 9 bunkers before being halted by enemy fire, coming from a group of bunkers on the reverse slope. After this, General Messervy of the 7th division was given responsibility for taking Naga Hill. On May 23rd, he brought with him Brigadier Loftus-Tottenham's 33rd brigade. This switch allowed General Grover to concentrate the remainder of his tired division for an attack on the Japanese positions on Aradura Spur. On the other side, Sato was exhorting his men to “You will fight to the death. When you are killed you will fight on with your spirit.” Yet Sato knew full well he lacked the ammunition and provisions necesary to hold Kohima, he would have to withdraw in short order. Two sets of attacks were unleashed upon the Japanse, first on Japanese defences around Point 5120, known also as Church Knoll and Hunter's Hill by Messervy's 7th Indian Division on the left of the battlefield, and then of Aradura Spur by Grover's 2nd Division on the right. The 4/15th Punjab suffered a bloody reverse in these assaults, losing 18 officers and 443 casualties for not a single metre of ground in return. No combination of attacks from the air, artillery strikes, tanks, flame-throwers, infantry or mortars could dislodge Sato's men. On the Aradura Spur, Grover ordered simultaneous assaults to take place on 27th and 28th of May. On the right the Royal Scots and Norfolks were to attack the north-east end of Aradura Spur, while 6th Brigade were to take the south-west, where their objectives were named 'Matthew', 'Mark', 'Luke' and 'John'. When launched, however, 6th Brigade's attack on the 28th failed miserably. The weather was poor, the terrain atrocious and the morale of the exhausted 2nd Division the lowest it had been since its arrival. The attack by the Norfolks and the Royal Scots on the north-west spur met the same fate as the luckless 6th Brigade. The Norfolks were now down to 14 officers and 366 men, many exhausted and ill and, despite the remarkable leadership of Lt. Col. Robert Scott and above-average morale, the Japanese positions looked typically impervious to anything other than a direct tank round into each bunker, which of course was not possible in the steep, jungle-matted hillsides. Along with the intantry attacks, Naga Hill was heavily attacked by Hurricane bombers during the 24th and 25th, but the Japanese remained firmly entrenched and resolutely immovable. The only major result of these attacks would be more casualties and a further drop in morale for the British-Indian troops. Sato's was alianted from the HQ of 15th Army, but had no doubt that it was Mutaguchi's abject failure to send supplies through the mountains that had forced him to undertake the kind of passive defense in which his division was now engaged. On May 29th, Sato thus reported that his position was hopeless, and that he reserved the right to act on his own initiative and withdraw when he felt that it was necessary to do so, in order to save what remained of his battered division from inevitable destruction. Later that day he signaled Mutaguchi: “We have fought for two months with the utmost courage, and have reached the limits of human fortitude. Our swords are broken and our arrows spent. Shedding bitter tears, I now leave Kohima.” Apoplectic with rage and astonished at his subordinate's blatant disobedience, Mutaguchi ordered Sato to stay where he was. Sato ignored him and on receipt of Mutaguchi's threat to court-martial him, replied defiantly: “Do as you please. I will bring you down with me.” The angry exchange continued, with Sato the following day sending a final angry message to Mutaguchi in which he declared: “The tactical ability of the 15th Army staff lies below that of cadets.” Sato then ordered his staff to close down the radio sets, in a final act of defiance. During the back and forth screamfest, Sato had requested Mutaguchi permis him to withdraw to a position that would allowed the 31st division to finally receive supplies, Mutaguchi simply refused and demanded he hold on another 10 days. Sato could simply not keep letting his men down, he made plans to withdraw for May 31st. The Miyazaki detachment was given the task of covering the retreat for the 31st division. On May 27th, the 4/1st Gurkhas under the newly appointed 27-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Derek Horsford, managed to capture the Gun Spur at the extreme eastern edge of Naga Hill via a night infiltration that took the Japanese entirely by surprise. This further allowed tanks to approach the Japanese positions and, by June 1st, an attack by the Queen's discovered that the Japanese were withdrawing. Grover then thrusted his troops from the newly captured Naga Hill south-east across a valley to cut off General Miyazuki's rearguard and the 124th regiment around the Aradura Spur from the road to Imphal just behind it. Recognizing the inevitable, Miyazaki then had to withdraw from Aradura on the night of June 4, planning to conduct further delaying actions at Viswema in protection of Sato's withdrawal. Yet that is it for the battle of Kohima as we now need to travel north to see how General Vinegar Joe's offensive is going. Last time we saw General Merrill's Marauders take the Myitkyina airstrip and prepare for a siege of Myitkyina. The Chinese forces of Generals Sun and Liao were pushing the 18th division towards the Kamaing area. As for the Chindits, Major Master's 111th Brigade contuined to repel numerous Japanese attacks against the Blackpool Stronghold, without the assistance of his floater Brigades. The Japanese artillery continued to take a killing toll on the camp with their near continuous fire. They had been reinforced with even heavier 155mm guns, which together with enemy mortars positions on a ridge 1,000 yards ahead, began to pummel them. Meanwhile allied aircraft were unable to supply them adequately because of the monsoons, and General Takeda's 53rd Division was furiously approaching to crush them. On May 16th Japanese troops penetrated the defenses and a counter-attack failed to eject them. Now many positions within the perimeter came under persistent sniper fire. Shelling that evening heralded another attack. It was beaten back, leaving 50 Japanese dead. This was followed by a night attack involving two companies. This was repulsed, the enemy losing another 70 men. Master's estimated his Brigade had killed about 800 Japanese, they had also suffered 200 casualties during the last few days. Luckily for them, however, the impending threat to Myitkyina and Kamaing, forced General Honda to redirect the 3rd Battalion, 114th Regiment to reinforce the Myitkyina garrison while the 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment continued north to reinforce General Tanaka. At this point Masters wanted to withdraw deeper into the jungle, from where they could ambush the advancing Japanese and set up a new stronghold with the help of 14th Brigade and West Africans, who were probing the jungle ridges east of them. He signaled Lentaigne asking for permission to abandon the block at his discretion. But Lentaigne's authority had become reduced. He was forced to take the message to Stilwell, who having been thwarted at Myitkyina, had allowed the Hyde to his Jekyll to emerge. In scathing language, he called the British “a bunch of lily-livered Limey popinjays.” Lentaigne then let his Irish temper get the better of him, and a fierce argument erupted at Stilwell's headquarters. Then on May 22nd, General Takeda's 53rd Division reached the stronghold. They unleashed an all-out assault, the Cameronians of 90th Column, who held the southern perimeter, were being forced back, inch by inch, as the Chindit artillery engaged the Japanese assaulters over open sights. Soon the airstrip was in enemy hands, prompting the Bofors 40mm AA gunners to lower their quadruple barrels and blaze away at the enemy troops. The pyrotechnics took on a fantastic quality as night fell. At dawn on the 23rd, the Japanese withdrew to just beyond the airstrip, as 10 Japanese fighters swept in to strafe and bomb the British. Their attack proved almost leisurely compared to the artillery and infantry strikes. When the fighters departed, the Japanese artillery and machineguns resumed. Masters called for a supply drop of ammunition as the previous night's expenditure had been massive, but necessary. Eight RAF Dakotas appeared that afternoon, in light rain, low, just over the hills, twisting and turning over the forested peaks. Nearing Blackpool, they straightened out and flew level. Doors opened, parachutes streamed and crates of supplies came from the sky. A storm of fire erupted from the Japanese positions. The heavy AA guns joined in, the boom-boom-booms of their heavy fire becoming rhythmic in the distance. The wing of a Dakota vanished and plane fell like a twirling leaf, crashing into the jungle across from the “Deep.” Two other planes in their haste to evade fire nearly crossed streams; their payloads hurled far and wide, most of falling into Japanese hands. In all, four Dakotas were shot down. The defenders only managed to get a half an aircraft's load of ammunition. Despite this the Chindits continued to resist the furious Japanese assaults; but before dawn on May 24th, the Japanese would finally overrun a hillock known as the Pimple, held by Harper's 3/9th Gurkhas. Harper mounted an immediate counterattack. Harper's Gurkhas struggled to dislodge the Japanese from the “pimple,” but failed. The defenders threw machine-gun fire and hurled mortar bombs towards the hillock with little apparent effect. The failed counterattack would only see the Japanese secure the Silly Point positions and advance rapidly east and south as the defenses progressively collapsed before them. By May 25, Masters was forced to withdraw while his forces still had enough ammunition to defend themselves. There were 90 men that could not walk without help and another 30-40 that could not walk at all. A doctor summoned Masters to a group of 40-50 disheveled men, many wounded, but still standing, carrying stretchers from the Main Dressing Station. They were now on the evacuation path, now largely devoid of fighting troops. None of the walking wounded would look Masters in the eye. The stretchers and litters were also full of men with horrific wounds; 19 in all. To Masters' distress, the doctor said there were another 30 such cases ahead who could be saved if they were evacuated. He had given the 19 here full doses of morphine and said, under the thundering noise of the rain, that the men had no chance. It dawned on Masters that the doctor was suggesting that these men be put out of their misery. Master's said “Very well. I don't want them to see any Japanese,” The dotor cried “Do you think I want to do it?” But Masters was already seeking a way out. “Get the stretcher bearers on at once” he snapped. As he went back up the ridge towards what was left of the camp, he heard the carbine shots going off one by one along the line of casualties. He pressed his hands on his ears to blot out the sound, but couldn't. Masters and his subordinate commanders decided to withdraw in stages, with the forward line of defenders leapfrogging over a second line of the defenders covering them from a defensive position, known as a layback. This second line, were in turn, then to be covered by the troops now behind them, allowing them to leapfrog to the next covering position, a formula which could be repeated for as long as possible, and as long as the ground permitted it. The Chindits would have to begin a long and difficult hill climb away from Blackpool, towards the rallying point of Mokso Sakan. Luckily for them, Takeda decided not to pursue them, as he had been redirected to reinforce Myitkyina instead. The victory was very costly, however, as the 128th Regiment lost about 400 men; but at last the Mogaung-Indaw route had been reopened after a three month's blockade. On May 29th, the survivors of the 111th Brigade would finally reach Mokso Sakan, bringing with them 2000 men whom required immediate hospitalization. In the end, the Blackpool Stronghold, desired by Lentaigne and Stilwell, had been a costly endeavor for the Chindits. Meanwhile, over with the 22nd Division, a failed envelopment maneuver by Task Force Purple, consisting of elements of the 149th regiment and former Galahad evacess, prompting Liao on the 19th to send the 65th regiment to aid the 64th regiments right flank and cut a trail south towards the Mogaung valley. The chinese hastily advanced to Chishidu, pushing the Japanese 1st company, 56th regiment over to Nanyaseik. Further east, Tanaka's right flank in the Mogaung valley was beginning to crumble against the 38th divisions offensive. This prompted Tanaka to reinforce the 1st battalion, 55th regiment with the 146 regiment. Tanaka ordered Major General Aida Shunji, commander of the 18th infantry group to block the Chinese advance in the mountainous region north of Kamaing. Despite this, General Sun had sent his 114th regiment hooking west behind the Japanese strongpoints, soon they would link up with the 113th to clear the Japanese from West Wala, Maran and Sharaw. Simultaneously, the 112th regiment managed to secure Warang on the 20th. Thus despite all his efforts, Tanaka's right flank was going to collapse. At this point, the 18th Division's daily ration of staple food was only 100 grams of rice the regular quantity being 860 grams and there was no supply of auxiliary rations. Moreover, as the supply of ammunition was cut off, the use of ammunition was limited to only four rounds per day and, as there was no gasoline, vehicles could not be used. Cases of malaria and malnutrition occurred successively and the number of men to one company dropped to about 30. As an extreme case, there was even a company of about 15 men led by a sergeant. About this time, the officers of the 18th Division also learned that there was no chance of the Japanese counter offensive in the Hukawng Valley on which so many hopes had been staked, for the U operation was failing "miserably." Their morale began to sag, and in Tanaka's later opinion this realization marked the "turning point" for his division. In order to deliver a killing blow, Sun elected to dispatch the 112th regiment wide around the Japanse eastern flank to cut the Kamain Road south of Seton, while the 114th regiment advanced down the Kumon Range towards Tumbonghka and Mogaung. The 112th managed to slip past the Aida Detachment whom were holding a position at the village of Lawa and would emerge out of the jungle in the rear of Tanaka's lines on the 25th. The Chinese crossed the Mogaung river by the 26th and captured a supply center at Seton. The Chinese captured 35 Japanese trucks, a jeep, a sedan, 8 warehouses of food and ammunition, 100 horses, 4 pieces of artillery, a workshop, and a motor pool. They then set up a roadblock, prompting Tanaka to strip his divisional HQ and other servicable units to get a force together to hit the 112th as quickly as possible. At the same time Tanaka ordered the 4th regiment to hit the roadblock from the north while the recently arrived 2nd battalion, 146th regiment would hit them from the south. Tanaka also ordered his engineers to cut a secret escape route running from the Noidaw Bum to the Bumrawng Bum via Noidawyang. Takeda's 53rd division had just reached Mogaung as they dispatched a depleted 3rd battalion, 128th regiment towards Seton to relive Myitkyina. Seeing the enemy positions emerge at Chishidu and Seton, Tanaka finally decided to withdraw his division to the Kamaing area on the 28th, while his engineers vigerously were constructing fortifications. The Aida detachment would secure Lawa on the right flank, while the 55th and 56th regiments concentrated in the vicinity of Nanyaseik to cover the withdrawal of rear echlon units to Kamaing. Over at the Seton roadblock, the 112th regiment repeled relentless Japanese attacks, throuhg flood weather. Meanwhile, Myitkyina was seeing its first two days of siege. The 150th regiment were halted by heavy enemy fire at the railroad yards, suffering 671 casualties on May 20th. K Force took the suburban village of Charpate, north-northwest of Myitkyina, and the 88th Regiment extended its lines south to the railway tracks, which in this area run northwest before turning south to Mogaung. Unfortunately, K Force did not occupy a small height which dominated Charpate. M Force took the little settlement of Namkwi without opposition, in order to shield the Allies against any Japanese attempt to relieve Myitkyina by an attack from Mogaung. General Merrill's forces were now so placed that Japanese reinforcements could reach Myitkyina only from across the Irrawaddy River to the east or along the Myitkyina-Mankrin or Myltkyina-Radhapur roads from the north. The Allied troops were disposed in a semicircle covering all approaches from the northwest, west, southwest, and south. So far, enemy activity was slight in this area. Even at the airfield the continual sniping did not prevent the planes from landing with an ever increasing amount of supplies. If General Merrill retained these positions, he could make a coordinated attack on Myitkyina. For this purpose he was forming a Myitkyina Task Force, which involved reshuffling of all the units under his command. H and K Forces were dissolved; the Marauder battalions were once more combined under Colonel Hunter; and the Chinese regiments operated as separate units.The opportunity to swiftly overrung Myitkyina emerged, as many troops under Major General Minakami Genzo were rushing through enemy gaps during the night to reinforce the battered 114th regiment. On May 30th, Minakami took command over the 3000 man garrison and ordered Myitkyina be held for atleast 3 months to keep the allies from advancing south into central Burma. On the allied side, Merrill suffered a heart attack and had to be evacuated. Colonel John McCammon assumed commander of the Myitkyina Task Force. McCammon immediately ordered Colonel Hunter's 3rd battalion to seize the auxiliary airstrip north of Myitkyina, but the Marauders would be halted by stiff Japanese defenses. Gaps were numerous through which the Japanese could work their way into Myitkyina, and Minakami set up a regular ferry service across the Irrawaddy by which supplies and individual replacements could be brought in. The terrain was excellent for defense. The roads lay high above the surrounding rice paddies, and each was therefore an earthwall making a first-rate obstacle. Clumps of trees were all about, and there were plenty of houses on the outskirts of town which the Japanese used to advantage. The northern part of the Japanese perimeter was well shielded by a crescent-shaped depression which the monsoon rains quickly turned into a swamp. In effect, the Allies and the Japanese were committed to position warfare. Though the operation was called a siege, the Japanese received a steady trickle of supplies and replacements until Mogaung fell. Colonel Hunter and his men would be forced to withdraw back to Charpate the following day. At 10pm on the night of May 23rd a battalion of Japanese launched an attack on Charpate from the rise northeast of the town. Beach's force had been depleted by sickness, and some of his men were out on patrol. The Japanese attack penetrated the 3rd Battalion's position early in the action. From the south 75-mm artillery supported the battalion's defense. The Marauders, fighting stubbornly, repelled the attack, but they suffered severe casualties. On the morning of May 24th at 9:335, the 3rd Battalion had to face still another attack. The fight was going badly when Hunter ordered Beach to break contact with the enemy and move to the railroad, 22 miles to the south. The Japanese occupied Charpate and held it in force as soon as the 3rd Battalion withdrew. McCammon had also ordered the 88th and 89th regiments to attack Myitkyina, but the Chinese barely advanced that day. Two days later the Japanese, supported by mortar fire, attacked Namkwi heavily, and the 2nd Battalion pulled back to a ridge about halfway to Myitkyina. The Japanese then occupied Namkwi and fortified it strongly. They had now taken over two of the towns on the main approaches to Myitkyina. Depressed by these defeats, McCammon was relieved of his command and Stilwell replaced him with General Boatner on May 30. Stilwell was becoming desperate, resorting to sending reinforcements of any kind, with two engineer battalions and a group of replacements and evacuees of Galahad arriving between May 26 and June 1. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landings against Wakde, while perhaps a bit overkill, saw the allies yet again showcase the prowess in amphibious assaults. Over in the Burma-India theater, the battle for Kohima was gradually becoming an allied victory and Vinegar Joe's first big foray against Myitkyina was painful but looked promising.
AP correspondent Karen Chammas reports on a building collapse in the Russian border town of Belgorod.
It's Tiki Time! And time for a wonderful interview with Captain Alex, owner of Tiki Tours in Surf City, North Carolina. He has 3 boats, including the iconic "Tiki Queen" ready to take you and yours out to enjoy the water, shelling, wildlife, and more. And how would you like to throw your next party out on the water with live music and dancing? We have all the information you need to book your Tiki Time with Tiki Tours in this episode of Topsail Insider! Enjoy!Tiki Tours Address - 412 Roland Ave, Surf City, NC 28445Phone - (910) 650-3223Email - Sales@TikiToursNC.comWebsite - https://www.tikitoursnc.com/Facebook - https://www.facebook.com/TikiToursNC________________________Topsail Insider is Sponsored by Saltwater Suites and Coming in May, 2024 - Saltwater Resort! Saltwater Suites - Topsail Island's premier luxury hospitality experience!Book your beach getaway today at SaltwaterTopsail.com or call (910) 886-4818!Topsail Insider is also Sponsored by Surf City Line! Come out for Beachin' Bowls, Margaritas, Live Music, and enjoy your meal on their top deck with Ocean Views!Visit SurfCityLineNC.com for their full food, bar, and brunch menus!Jim is my incredible, rockstar editor who works his magic to make Topsail Insider sound great! Learn more about Jim's services here: http://bit.ly/PodcastsByJim.Jim Mendes-Pouget | jimpouget@gmail.com________________________Send Christa a message and let her know if you enjoyed the episode! Support the Show.Please Follow/Subscribe to Topsail Insider on your favorite podcast-listening platform so you don't miss a single episode! We're on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, iHeart Radio and more!Please visit TopsailInsider.com and sign up for our Mailing List where you'll get early access to upcoming episodes. Or leave a Voicemail for Topsail Insider right from the website - your message just might be featured in an upcoming episode!Also find and Follow Topsail Insider on LinkedIn, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube!If you are a Greater Topsail business owner or nonprofit and wish to be interviewed or wish to Sponsor or Advertise with Topsail Insider, please email christa@topsailinsider.com or call/text 910-800-0111.
Liberty Conspiracy :: Earth Day collectivist roots tracing back to Plato :: Gard shows new examples of reality versus the Climate Cult claims :: What is or is not public property :: Shelling out more money for explosive shells to be given to foreign governments :: The double-standards by a Columbia professor who wants cops to remove protesters from the university grounds :: 2024-04-26 Host: Gardner Goldsmith
AP correspondent Mimmi Montgomery reports on deadly shelling attack in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine.
Rewarding your team with an unexpected bonus when the firm is thriving feels good, not just for them but for you too. However, shelling out cash without evaluating all the variables can end up creating a win-lose situation for your employees and the continued health of your firm. Join Melissa on this episode as she offers you a guide for giving impromptu bonuses. You'll learn why protecting the health of your firm must be a top priority, an evaluation process that will ground you in facts, not feelings, the four financial metrics you must be addressing, and Melissa's favorite ideas for rewarding your team in non-monetary ways if you're not quite ready to give them cash. Get full show notes and more information here: https://www.velocitywork.com/252
Patrick Lancaster : Ukrainian Shelling - LIVE from Belgorod, RussiaSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
Friday Club is back for another week, and no one still has a clue what's going on. Not much football, AGAIN. but we hit the mailbag to learn more about white dog sh*t, relationship advice and falling short on night out, swell as discussing the Gladiators re-vamp, Naked Attraction and confront Parky about some recent troubling allegations. We'd love to hear from you: fridayclub@undrthecosh.co.ukGet two extra episodes a month with the Undr The Cosh Patreon club⬇️https://tinyurl.com/2p8pts4a Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Your daily news in under three minutes. Connect with us: @AJEPodcasts on Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, Threads and YouTube
Your daily news in under three minutes. Connect with us: @AJEPodcasts on Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, Threads and YouTube
AP correspondednt Rica Ann Garcia reports on the explosion in Russian-occupied Ukraine.
Mass casualties have been reported among a crowd of civilians waiting to get humanitarian aid in Gaza city. A Michigan teacher gave emotional testimony about the moment she was shot by the gunman who's been sentenced in a deadly mass shooting at Oxford High School. A judge has sentenced a former Donald Trump adviser for failing to comply with a subpoena in a Jan. 6 probe. A prominent Russia blogger convicted of extremism charges will serve time in a Moscow court. And, Michigan's college football head coach Jim Harbaugh is going back to the NFL. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
AP correspondent Karen Chammas reports on Israeli-Palestinians shelling in Gaza
In our news wrap Sunday, Russia blamed Ukrainian shelling for at least 27 deaths near Russian-occupied Donetsk, Gaza health officials say more than 25,000 Palestinians have now died in the Israel-Hamas war, a U.S. airbase came under attack in Iraq, Indonesia's most active volcano erupted, and the motive behind the case of the stolen ruby slippers from "The Wizard of Oz" has been revealed. PBS NewsHour is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders
In our news wrap Sunday, Russia blamed Ukrainian shelling for at least 27 deaths near Russian-occupied Donetsk, Gaza health officials say more than 25,000 Palestinians have now died in the Israel-Hamas war, a U.S. airbase came under attack in Iraq, Indonesia's most active volcano erupted, and the motive behind the case of the stolen ruby slippers from "The Wizard of Oz" has been revealed. PBS NewsHour is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders
AP correspondent Mimmi Montgomery reports on Russia Ukraine War.
Your daily news in under three minutes.
In this week's episode of The Venue Rx Podcast, our host Jonathan Aymin sits down with Ryan and Danielle Patrick, owners of The Red Barn Weddings & Events. Ryan and his wife share their journey of transforming their walnut orchard in Northern California into a wedding venue. They delve into the hurdles they encountered, such as securing county approval and building permits, and detail the renovations undertaken to transform the property into a suitable space for weddings. The couple reflects on their agricultural backgrounds and the transition into the wedding industry. Sharing insights, they elaborate on booking events, handling power supply logistics during functions, and adapting venue packages to accommodate diverse needs. Additionally, they shed light on their respective roles in the business, their approaches to marketing, and their future aspirations for the venue. About Our Guests: Ryan and Danielle are the owners of The Red Barn Weddings & Events. The Red Barn has been in Ryan's family for over 25 years, undergoing various transformations from a Nuts & Gifts Store to a Walnut Hulling & Shelling facility, and most recently becoming the beautiful venue it is today. In 2018, Ryan and Danielle made the decision to expand and redefine the future of The Red Barn. Through research, hard work, and patience, they navigated the permit process and embarked on a journey of renovations. Their official permit was obtained in June 2019, marking the beginning of the transformation from a Walnut Huller to a Wedding Venue. Over the course of a year, they created the bridal suite, groom suite, renovated the reception barn, and added a spacious 15,000 sq. ft. lawn for the ceremony area, all in preparation to host remarkable weddings and events. However, just as they were on the verge of opening, the pandemic struck, altering the landscape of special events. Undeterred, Ryan and Danielle used this time to enhance and create additional remarkable spaces for future weddings. Now, The Red Barn features a large wooden arbor, a stunning chandelier for romantic first dances, and a truck stage capable of hosting either a band or a DJ, allowing guests to dance the night away under the stars. Find Them Here: Address: 10098 California Highway 99, Los Molinos, California 96055 Tel: (530) 518-9292 Email: Info@theredbarnevents.com Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/theredbarnweddingsevents?igshid=1xtu0js8ktcci Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/TheRedBarnWeddingsAndEvents/
Your daily news update in under three minutes.
In our news wrap Saturday, Ukraine marked 500 days since the start of Russia's invasion, Sudanese officials say at least 22 people died in an airstrike in Omdurman, a small business jet crash in Southern California killed at least 6 people, and more dangerous temperatures are forecast for much of the South and Southwest. PBS NewsHour is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders
Smoke was seen over the area of the army headquarters in the centre of Khartoum. Also: US Supreme Court delays abortion pill access decision, and could music increase our love of food?