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Las ultimas declaraciones de Donald Trump, pone en invidencia que tiene conocimiento de todas las vinculaciones de Nicolas Maduro con el Tren de Aragua.A su vez Nicolas Maduro continua en un proceso de desviar la atención de lo que sucede, pero denota algo de temor en sus declaraciones¿Podría esto inclinar la balanza?Lo cierto, es que estas declaraciones ponen en evidencia al tirano Cucuteño. Seguiremos de cerca esta información.Aqui mi análisis.Si te interesa mi mas reciente libro.15 Meses para Morir, aquí puedes comprar en versionando digital o física.https://www.amazon.com/Meses-Morir-TIEMPO-MORIR-Spanish/dp/B0DHL681M1/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&sr=Sigueme en mis redes socialesFacebook https://www.facebook.com/orlandofuenmayorsalazar/Instagram https://www.instagram.com/orlandojosefs/X https://x.com/orlandojosefsTikTok https://www.tiktok.com/@orlandojosefs
Ralph welcomes Marc Rotenberg, founder and president of the Center for AI and Digital Policy to fill us in on the latest international treaty aimed at putting guardrails on the potential Frankenstein monster that is Artificial Intelligence. Plus, as we get to the end of the Medicare enrollment period, we put out one last warning for listeners to avoid the scam that is Medicare Advantage.Marc Rotenberg is the founder and president of the Center for AI and Digital Policy, a global organization focused on emerging challenges associated with Artificial Intelligence. He serves as an expert advisor on AI policy to many organizations including the Council of Europe, the Council on Foreign Relations, the European Parliament, the Global Partnership on AI, the OECD, and UNESCO. What troubles me is the gap between an increasingly obscure, technical, and complex technology—abbreviated into “AI” —and public understanding. You know, when motor vehicles came and we tried to regulate them and did, people understood motor vehicles in their daily lives. When solar energy started coming on, they saw solar roof panels. They could see it, they could understand it, they could actually work putting solar panels on roofs of buildings. This area is just producing a massively expanding gap between the experts from various disciplines, and the power structure of corporatism, and their government servants and the rest of the people in the world.Ralph NaderThe difference between these two types of [AI] systems is that with the old ones we could inspect them and interrogate them. If one of the factors being used for an outcome was, for example, race or nationality, we could say, well, that's impermissible and you can't use an automated system in that way. The problem today with the probabilistic systems that US companies have become increasingly reliant on is that it's very difficult to actually tell whether those factors are contributing to an outcome. And so for that reason, there are a lot of computer scientists rightly concerned about the problem of algorithmic bias.Marc Rotenberg[The sponsors of California SB 1047] wanted companies that were building these big complicated systems to undertake a safety plan, identify the harms, and make those plans available to the Attorney General…In fact, I work with many governments around the world on AI regulation and this concept of having an impact assessment is fairly obvious. You don't want to build these large complex systems without some assessment of what the risk might be.Marc RotenbergWe've always understood that when you create devices that have consequences, there has to be some circuit breaker. The companies didn't like that either. [They said] it's too difficult to predict what those scenarios might be, but that was almost precisely the point of the legislation, you see, because if those scenarios exist and you haven't identified them yet, you choose to deploy these large foundational models without any safety mechanism in place, and all of us are at risk. So I thought it was an important bill and not only am I disappointed that the governor vetoed it, but as I said, I think he made a mistake. This is not simply about politics. This is actually about science, and it's about the direction these systems are heading.Marc RotenbergThat's where we are in this moment—opaque systems that the experts don't understand, increasingly being deployed by organizations that also don't understand these systems, and an industry that says, “don't regulate us.” This is not going to end well.Marc RotenbergIn Case You Haven't Heard with Francesco DesantisNews 11/27/241. Last week, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. According to a statement from ICC prosecutor Karim Khan, the international legal body found reasonable grounds to believe that each has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the use of starvation as a method of warfare and intentionally directing attacks against civilians. This news has been met with varied reactions throughout the world. These have been meticulously documented by Just Security. The United States, which is under no obligation to honor the warrant as it is not a party to the Rome Statute, has said it “fundamentally rejects” the judgment and has called the issuing of warrants “outrageous.” Canada, which is party to the Rome Statue has vowed to uphold their treaty obligations despite their close ties to Israel. Germany however, another signatory to the Rome Statute, has suggested that they would not honor the warrants. In a statement, Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib said the warrants are “long overdue” and signal that “the days of the Israeli apartheid government operating with impunity are ending.” One can only hope that is true.2. On November 21st, 19 Senators voted for at least one of the three Joint Resolutions of Disapproval regarding additional arms transfers to Israel. As Jewish Voice for Peace Action puts it, “this is an unprecedented show of Senate opposition to President Biden's disastrous foreign policy of unconditional support for the Israeli military.” The 19 Senators include Independents Bernie Sanders and Angus King, progressive Democrats like Elizabeth Warren, Chris Van Hollen and Raphael Warnock, and Democratic caucus leaders like Dick Durbin, among many others. Perhaps the most notable supporter however is Senator Jon Ossoff of Georgia, whom Ryan Grim notes is the only Democrat representing a state Trump won and who is up for reelection in 2026 to vote for the resolution. Ossoff cited President Reagan's decision to withhold cluster munitions during the IDF occupation of Beirut in a floor speech explaining his vote. The Middle East Eye reports that the Biden Administration deployed Democratic Senate Leader Chuck Schumer to whip votes against the JRD.3. Last week, we covered H.R. 9495, aka the “nonprofit killer” bill targeting pro-Palestine NGOs. Since then, the bill has passed the House. Per the Guardian, the bill passed 219-184, with fifteen Democrats crossing the aisle to grant incoming-President Trump the unilateral power to obliterate any non-profit organization he dislikes, a list sure to be extensive. Congressman Jamie Raskin is quoted saying “A sixth-grader would know this is unconstitutional…They want us to vote to give the president Orwellian powers and the not-for-profit sector Kafkaesque nightmares.” The bill now moves to the Senate, where it is unlikely to pass while Democrats cling to control. Come January however, Republicans will hold a decisive majority in the upper chamber.4. President-elect Donald Trump has announced his selection of Congresswoman Lori Chavez-DeRemer as his pick for Secretary of Labor. Chavez-DeRemer is perhaps the most pro-labor Republican in Congress, with the AFL-CIO noting that she is one of only three Republicans to cosponsor the PRO Act and one of eight to cosponsor the Public Service Freedom to Negotiate Act. Chavez-DeRemer was reportedly the favored choice of Teamsters President Sean O'Brien, who controversially became the first ever Teamster to address the RNC earlier this year. While her selection has been greeted with cautious optimism by many labor allies, anti-labor conservatives are melting down at the prospect. Akash Chougule of Americans for Prosperity accused Trump of giving “A giant middle finger to red states,” by “picking a teachers union hack” and urged Senate Republicans to reject the nomination.5. Unfortunately, most of Trump's selections are much, much worse. Perhaps worst of all, Trump has chosen Mehmet Cengiz Öz – better known as Dr. Oz – to lead the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Beyond his lack of qualifications and history of promoting crackpot medical theories, Oz is a longtime proponent of pushing more seniors into privatized Medicare Advantage, or “Disadvantage,” plans, per Yahoo! Finance. This report notes that the Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 called for making Medicare Advantage the default health program for seniors.6. According to CNN, Brazilian police have arrested five people who conspired to assassinate leftist President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, better known as Lula, in 2022. This assassination plot was allegedly cooked up even before Lula took office, and included plans to kill Lula's Vice President Geraldo Alckmin and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes. The conspirators included a former high-ranking Bolsonaro advisor and military special forces personnel. Reuters reports investigators have discovered evidence that Bolsonaro himself was involved in the scheme.7. In more news from Latin America, Drop Site reports that the United States and Colombia engaged in a secretive agreement to allow the country's previous U.S.-backed conservative President Ivan Duque to utilize the Israeli Pegasus spyware for internal surveillance in the country. Details of the transaction and of the utilization of the spyware remain “murky,” but American and Colombian officials maintain it was used to target drug-trafficking groups and not domestic political opponents. Just two months ago, Colombia's leftist President Gustavo Petro delivered a televised speech revealing details of this shadowy arrangement, including that the Duque government flew $11 million cash from Bogotá to Tel Aviv. As Drop Site notes, “In Colombia, there's a long legacy of state intelligence agencies surveilling political opposition leaders. With the news that the U.S. secretly helped acquire and deploy powerful espionage software in their country, the government is furious at the gross violation of their sovereignty. They fear that Colombia's history of politically motivated surveillance, backed by the U.S. government, lives on to this day.”8. Following the Democrats' electoral wipeout, the race for new DNC leadership is on. Media attention has mostly been focused on the race to succeed Jamie Harrison as DNC Chair, but POLITICO is out with a story on James Zogby's bid for the DNC vice chair seat. Zogby, a longtime DNC member, Bernie Sanders ally and president of the Arab American Institute has criticized the party's position on Israel and particularly of the Kamala Harris campaign's refusal to allow a Palestinian-American speaker at this year's convention. He called the move “unimaginative, overly cautious and completely out of touch with where voters are.” This report notes Zogby's involvement in the 2016 DNC Unity Reform Commission, and his successful push to strip substantial power away from the so-called superdelegates.9. Speaking of Democratic Party rot, the Lever reports that in its final days the Biden Administration is handing corporations a “get out of jail free card.” A new Justice Department policy dictates that the government will essentially look the other way at corporate misconduct, even if the company has “committed multiple crimes, earned significant profit from their wrongdoing, and failed to self-disclose the misconduct — as long as the companies demonstrate they ‘acted in good faith' to try to come clean.” This is the logical endpoint of the longstanding Biden era soft-touch approach intended to encourage corporations to self-police, an idea that is patently absurd on its face. Public Citizen's Corporate Crime expert Rick Claypool described the policy as “bending over backward to protect corporations.”10. Finally, on November 23rd lawyer and former progressive congressional candidate Brent Welder posted a fundraising email from Bernie Sanders that immediately attracted substantial interest for its strong language. In this note, Sanders writes “The Democrats ran a campaign protecting the status quo and tinkering around the edges…Will the Democratic leadership learn the lessons of their defeat and create a party that stands with the working class[?]…unlikely.” The email ends with a list of tough questions, including “should we be supporting Independent candidates who are prepared to take on both parties?” Many on the Left read this as Bernie opening the door to a “dirty break” with the Democratic Party, perhaps even an attempt to form some kind of independent alliance or third party. In a follow-up interview with John Nichols in the Nation, Sanders clarified that he is not calling for the creation of a new party, but “Where it is more advantageous to run as an independent, outside of the Democratic [Party]…we should do that.” Whether anything will come of this remains to be seen, but if nothing else the severity of his rhetoric reflects the intensity of dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party in light of their second humiliating defeat at the hands of a clownish, fascistic game show host. Perhaps a populist left third party is a far-fetched, unachievable goal. On the other hand, how many times can we go back to the Democratic Party expecting different results. Something has got to give, or else the few remaining pillars of our democracy will wither and die under sustained assault by the Right and their corporate overlords.This has been Francesco DeSantis, with In Case You Haven't Heard. Get full access to Ralph Nader Radio Hour at www.ralphnaderradiohour.com/subscribe
El expresidente Iván Duque afirmó en La FM de RCN que la elección de Miguel Polo es “la última puntilla del ataúd de la independencia de la Corte Constitucional
El expresidente Iván Duque ha estado alejado de la política nacional.
In this Finance Colombia exclusive, Francisco “Pacho” Santos sits down for an in-depth interview with Loren Moss to discuss current events in Colombia. Santos is the former vice president of Colombia under Alvaro Uribe, and former Ambassador to the United States during the Ivan Duque administration.Santos is equally outspoken and fluent in English as he is in Spanish, and shares his opinion on:Petro's frustration, improvisation and his stalled reformsColombia's new Attorney General Luz Adriana CamargoWeaknesses in Colombia's prosecutorial structureGustavo Petro's “Paz Total” or “Total Peace” initiativeSantos' time as a victim of kidnapping and how it shaped his politicsThe state of the Colombia – US bilateral relationshipThe surging cocaine production in ColombiaA critique of both Biden & TrumpThe failure of US domestic drug policyColombia's health system & Petro's proposed health reformThe governance crisis at EcopetrolThe Thomas Greg passport scandal in the foreign ministryFiscal discipline and institutionality in the current administrationThe former Vice President's future projects Read more at Finance Colombia https://www.financecolombia.com/Need to hire bilingual talent? Try EmpleoBilingüe! https://empleobilingue.com/
En La FM de RCN, el expresidente Iván Duque explicó que debilitar las libertades económicas puede llevar a debilitar la democracia.
Hoy hace siete años gobierno y la entonces guerrilla de las Farc firmaron el histórico acuerdo para dejar las armas. Fueron 13 mil personas las que ingresaron a la vida civil, una transformación que muchas veces pasa debajo del radar y a veces, termina siendo irrelevante en la agenda pública. En el episodio de hoy, Carolina Varela* explica los avances del Acuerdo; y los retos de la implementación del Acuerdo de Paz, que está bajo la tutela del nuevo comisionado de paz, Otty Patiño.*Carolina es la coordinadora del proyecto Del Capitolio al Territorio, una iniciativa de la Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) para apoyar a la Comisión de paz del Congreso en el seguimiento a la implementación del Acuerdo de Paz.Para saber más puede leer:Informe de avances de la implementación. Iniciativa de del Capitolio al Territorio.Siete años de la firma del Acuerdo con las Farc: lecciones para la paz. Columna de Andrei Gómez-Suárez y Alejandro Posada-Téllez, en La Silla Vacía.Sin Rueda cambia el rumbo y el estilo de la paz total de Petro:Si anda interesado en el Curso de Inmersión de 2024 de La Silla, acá encuentra toda la información: Elija ser Súperamigo. Puede ser parte de nuestra comunidad acá: Un espacio de cuña en Huevos Revueltos puede ser suyo, excepto para contenido político y electoral. Si tiene interés, escriba a socampo@lasillavacia.com. Chequeo de datos: Tatiana Duque, coordinadora de pódcast de La Silla Vacía. Producción: Sergio García y Fernando Cruz, periodistas de La Silla Vacía.Foto de portada: X de Ángela María Calderón F.
José Miguel Vivanco, adjunct senior fellow for human rights at CFR and former executive director of the Americas division at Human Rights Watch, leads the conversation on human rights in Latin America. FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the Fall 2023 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record. The video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org, if you would like to share them with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have José Miguel Vivanco with us to discuss human rights in Latin America. Mr. Vivanco is an adjunct senior fellow for human rights at CFR and partner at Dentons Global Advisors. He formerly served as the executive director of the Americas Division at Human Rights Watch, where he supervised fact-finding research for numerous reports on gross violations of human rights and advocated strengthening international legal standards and domestic compliance throughout the region. He is the founder of the Center for Justice and International Law, an international civil society organization providing legal and technical assistance with the Inter-American Human Rights System. So, José Miguel, thank you very much for being with us today. I thought you could begin by giving us an overview of what you see as the most important human rights challenges and advances in Latin America today. VIVANCO: Well, thank you very much for this invitation. It is a pleasure to be with you all and to talk for an hour about human rights problems, human rights issues in Latin America. Let me first make a couple of points. First, I think it's very important that, in retrospect, if you look at Latin America in the 1960s, 1970s, and even 1980s, it was a region that was pretty much run by military dictatorships. So if you look at historically, the region is not in such a bad shape. I know that this comment is quite controversial and many experts who follow the region closely might disagree with that statement, but objectively speaking I think we need to recognize that most of the region is run today—with the exception, obviously, of Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua—by democracies, weak democracies, the kind of democracies that we have in Latin America are facing very serious challenges and with endemic problems such as corruption, abuse of power, lack of transparency, lack of proper accountability, and so on and so forth. But in general terms, this is a region that has a chance to conduct some self-correction. In other words, electoral democracy is a very, very important value in the region, and the citizens—most of the people are able to either reward or punish the incumbent government at the times of elections. That is not a minor detail. It is extremely important, especially if you take into account that during the last twenty years in Latin America, if I'm not wrong, the vast majority of the governments elected were from the opposition. The statistics, I think, show that in eighteen of the twenty last presidential elections, the winner has been the party of the opposition; which means that even though our democracies in Latin America are dysfunctional, weak, messy, slow, you know, short-term-oriented, obviously, but at least citizens take their rights seriously and they exercise their powers so that is why you see a regular zigzag or, you know, transfer of power from a left-wing government to a right-wing government or vice versa. And that is, again, something that is, obviously, a very, very important tool of self-correction. And that, obviously, includes or has an impact in terms of the human rights record of those countries. You know, I'm not—I'm not addressing yet—I will leave it for the Q&A section—conditions in those three dictatorships in Latin America. Let me just make some few more remarks about one of the biggest challenges that I see in the region. And that is, obviously, the rise of autocracy or autocratic leaders, populist leaders, leaders who are not interested or as a matter of fact are very hostile to the concept of rule of law and the concept of independence of the judiciary. And they usually are very charismatic. They have high level of popular support. And they run and govern the country in a style that is like a permanent campaign, where they normally go against minorities and against the opposition, against the free media, against judges and prosecutors who dare to investigate them or investigate the government. Anyone who challenges them are subject of this type of reaction. And that is, unfortunately, something that we have seen in Mexico recently and until today, and in Brazil, especially during the administration of President Bolsonaro. The good news about, in the case of Brazil, is that, thanks to electoral democracy, it was possible to defeat him and—democratically. And the second very important piece of information is that even though Brazil is not a model of rule of law and separation of power, we have to acknowledge that, thanks to the checks-and-balance exercise by the Supreme Court of Brazil, it was possible to do some permanent, constant damage control against the most outrageous initiatives promoted by the administration of President Bolsonaro. That, I think, is one of the biggest challenges in the region. Let me conclude my—make crystal clear that there are serious human rights problems in Latin America today regarding, for instance, abuse of power, police brutality, prison problems. Prisons are really, in most of the countries in the region, a disaster. And you know, a big number of prisoners are awaiting trial, in detention and unable to really exercise their rights. And unfortunately, populist leaders use the prison system or essentially criminal law, by expanding the practice and enlarging the numbers of crimes that could be subject of pretrial detention, and—you know, regardless of the time that it will take for that case to be prosecuted in full respect for the rule—due process, and so on and so forth. And that—the reason is very simple. There is a real demand in Latin America for policies that will address insecurity, citizen security. If you look at statistics in terms of crime rate, it is going up in most of the country. Obviously, there are big difference between countries like Mexico, for instance, or Colombia, and if you link—if you look at the power of cartels and big mafias, and gangs in other countries, or petty crime impacting the daily life of the citizens. Regardless of that point, one of the biggest demands in Latin America is for better and more public security. And that's why political leaders, usually the solution for that request and demand is to put people in prison with essentially no real due process and increase the number of prisoners without conviction. There are challenges for free speech occasionally, of those leaders who resent scrutiny of their practice. And normally there is a campaign against free media. And there are some attempts in some countries to constantly look for ways to undermine the independence of the judiciary. Keep in mind, for instance, that now in Argentina the whole Supreme Court is under impeachment, and it's essentially an impeachment promoted by the current government because they disagree with the rulings, positions of the Supreme Court. All the justices on the Supreme Court are subject of this political trial conducted by the Argentine Congress. That is a concrete example of the kinds of risks that are present for judges and the judiciary in general, when they exercise their power and they attempt to protect the integrity of the constitution. So let me stop here and we can move on to the most interesting part of this event. FASKIANOS: Well, that was quite interesting. So, thank you, José Miguel. We appreciate it. We going to go to all of you now for your questions. (Gives queuing instructions.) We already have some hands up. We will go first to Karla Soto Valdes. Q: My name is Karla Soto. I'm from Lewis University. My question is, what specific measures could be implemented to address and/or prevent trafficking within the asylum-seeking community during their journey to the U.S.? VIVANCO: Irina, are we going to take several questions, or? FASKIANOS: I think we should do one at a time. VIVANCO: Well, Karla, there are multiple tools to address that specific issue. But this applies to essentially most of the human rights problems all over the world. The menu is pretty ample, but depends on one important factor—whether the government involved cares about its own reputation. That is a very important premise here, because if you we are dealing with a democratic government, once again, it's not—when I refer to a democratic government, I don't have in mind a sort of Jeffersonian model, I'm referring to the kind of democracies that we have in Latin America. But, if the leaders in charge are—you know, they care about their own reputation, they care about domestic debate, very important, because these types of revelations usually have ramifications at the local level. If they pay close attention to those issues, I think it's possible to apply, essentially, the technique of naming and shaming. In other words, collecting information, documenting what exactly is happening, and revealing that information to the public, locally and internationally. That is going to create naturally a reaction, a process, an awareness, and local pressure is—hopefully, it's not just twenty-four hours news, so splash—big splash, but also will trigger some dynamics. If we are dealing with a country that is run by a dictatorship, it is a very, very different question, because normally you're facing a leader, a government, who couldn't care less about its own reputation. They have taken already and assume the cost of doing business in that type of context. Now, sometimes conditions are kind of mixed, where you have democratic country in general—so there is still free media, there is an opposition, there is Congress, there are elections. But the government in charge is so—is run by an autocratic leader. That makes, you know, quite—a little more challenging to just document and reveal that information. And you need to think about some particular agenda, governmental agenda. Some specific interests of the government in different areas. Let me see—let me give you an example. Let's say that the Bolsonaro administration is seriously interested in an incorporation into the OECD in Paris. That is an important piece of information. Whatever you think that is relevant information regarding the record of that government, you could provide information to an entity that is precisely evaluating the record of the government. And the government will be much more willing to address those issues because they have a genuine interest in achieving some specific goal at the international level. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. We're going to go to Nicole Ambar De Santos, who is an undergraduate student at the Washington University in St. Louis: When we consider weak democracy in a more personal sense, like Peru, the controversy of obligation to help these nations arises. How much third party or other nations, such as the United States, intervene? VIVANCO: Tricky question. Peruvian democracy is quite messy. Part of the problem is that the system, the political system, needs some real reform to avoid the proliferation of small political parties and to create the real link or relationship between leaders, especially in Congress, and their constituencies, and so they are much more accountable to their community, the ones who elected them. I don't think the U.S., or any other government, has a direct role to play in that area. My sense is that when we are looking into a dysfunctional democracy that deserve some probably even constitutional reforms, that is essentially a domestic job. That is the work that needs to be done by Peruvians. Without a local consensus about the reforms that need to be implemented in the political system, my sense is that it's going to be very difficult for the U.S. or any other large democracy, to address those kinds of points. It's very different, that type of conversation, from a conversation or an assessment of universal values, such as human rights. When we are looking into cases of police brutality, for instance, the international community has a role to play. But if I were part of the conversation or evaluation by the U.S. government or the European Union with regard to this dysfunctional democracy in Peru, I would approach very carefully by suggesting creating the right type of incentives, more than questions of punishment, or sanctions. It's incentives for them to create the right conditions to address the domestic problem that is—has become quite endemic, in the case of Peru. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Matthew. Matthew, you don't have a last name, so can you identify yourself? Q: Hello. Yes, my name is Matthew. I am a junior student from Arizona State University studying business, but working on a thesis that has to do with human rights and the ethics of supply chain management. My question is, you were talking at the very beginning kind of just about history and how understanding history is important. And what I was hoping to get was, why is understanding history and culture important when working to address human rights issues, history of dictatorship, colonialism? In cultures it's socially acceptable things, like child labor, in some countries, that's not acceptable in Western ideology. So, yeah, just how is history and culture important when working to address human rights for the future? VIVANCO: Matthew, I think you're referring to two different issues. History is central. It's really, really relevant. Because that helps you—if you—if you follow your history, especially periods of time when massive and gross violations were committed in Latin America, it's important to put things in context and value what you have today. And the job is to—not only to preserve democracy, but also to look for ways to strengthen democracy. Because part of the problem is that domestic debate is so polarized today, not just in Latin America, all over the world, that sometimes people—different, you know, segments of society—in their positions, they're so dismissive of the other side, that they don't realize that we need to frame our debate in a constructive way. Let me put it—one specific example. If the government of Argentina, who is a government very receptive and very sensitive to vast and gross violations of human rights committed during the military dictatorship, so in other words, I don't need to lecture that government on that subject. They are actually the people who vote for the current government of Argentina—not the new government, the current government of Argentina—is deeply committed to those kinds of issues. I think that one of the biggest lessons that you should learn from the past is the relevance of protecting the independence of the judiciary. If you don't have an independent judiciary, and the judiciary becomes an entity that is an appendix of the ruling party or is intimidated by politics, and they could be subject of impeachment procedures every time that they rule something, that the powerful—the establishment disagree, I think they're playing with fire, and they're not really paying attention to the lessons that you learn from recent history in Latin America. That would be my first comment regarding that type of issue. And the second one, about you mentioned specifically cultural problems, culture, tensions or conflicts. And you mentioned—your example was child labor. And, and you suggested that that—the combination of child labor is something typical of Western ideology. If I'm not wrong, that was the language that you used. I would—I would push back on that point. And because this is not just a Western or European commitment. This is a universal one. And this is reflected on international treaties, and that are supposed to eradicate that kind of practice. If you give up to the concept of local traditions, you know, cultural, you know, issues that you need to pay attention, sure, as long as they are not to be in conflict with fundamental human rights. Otherwise, in half of the planet you're not going to have women rights, and women will be subject of traditional control. And you wouldn't have rights for minorities, and especially—and not only, but especially—the LGBTQ community. And you wouldn't have rights for racial minorities, or different religious beliefs. So, we have to watch and be very careful about what type of concessions we make to cultural traditions. I am happy to understand that different communities in Latin America might have different traditions, but there is some firm, solid, and unquestionable minimum that are the these universal human rights values that are not the property or monopoly of anyone. You know, these are—and this is not an ethical conversation. This is a legal one, because these values are protected under international law. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to combine or take two questions. The first question is from Lindsay Bert, who is at the department of political science at Muhlenberg College, who asks if you could speak on the efficacy of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in addressing the human rights violations you described. And the second question is from Leonard Onyebuchi Ophoke, a graduate student at Cavendish University in Uganda: Why is it almost impossible to hold the actors that violate human rights accountable? What could be done to make the mechanism more enforceable? VIVANCO: The inter-American system of human rights protection, there is nothing similar to inter-American system of human rights protection in the Global South. You don't have something similar in Asia, or Africa, or the Middle East. In other words, you don't have a mechanism where ultimately a court, a court of law—not just a commission, a court of law—handle individual cases, specific complaints of human rights abuses, and governments participate in public hearings. The parties involved have the obligation to present evidence before the court, and the court finally ruled on the specific matters where its decisions are binding. The number of issues that have been addressed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the last thirty years in Latin America are really incredible. And the impact—this is most important point—the impact at a local level is remarkable. In the area, for instance, of torture, disappearances. I'm referring to the elaboration of concepts and the imposing the obligation of local governments to adjust their legislation and practice, and to address specific problems or issues by providing remedies to victims. That is quite unusual. And the court has remarkable rulings on free speech, on discrimination issues, on indigenous populations, on military jurisdiction. One of the typical recourse of governments in the region when security forces were involved in human rights atrocities was to invoke military jurisdiction. So they say, no worries, we are going to investigate our own crimes. And the court has been actually very, very firm, challenging that notion to the point that I don't think there is a single case in Latin America today—once again, with the exception of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, that I hope that somebody will ask me a question about those three countries—and I don't think there is a single case where today security forces try to—or attempt to shield themselves from investigation invoking military jurisdiction. And the credit is to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. I can elaborate, and give you—provide you with a long list of examples of areas where the court has been actually really, really critical in advancing human rights in the region. Let me give you actually one last example that I think is very—is very illustrative, very revealing. In Chile, something like probably twenty years ago or fifteen years ago, full democracy. Full democracy. No Chile under Pinochet. The Supreme Court of Chile ruled that a mother who was openly lesbian did not qualify for the custody of her children because she was lesbian. And she had a couple. So that was sufficient grounds to rule in favor of the father, because the mother didn't have the moral grounds to educate her own kids, children. And this was decided by the Supreme Court of Chile. Not just a small first instance tribunal. And I will point out that the vast majority of the—I mean, the public in Chile was pretty much divided, but I'm pretty sure that the majority of Chileans thought that the Supreme Court was right, you know? The case went to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. And fortunately, after a few years, the court not only challenged that decision of the Supreme Court, forced Chile to change its legislation, and to change the ruling of the Supreme Court of Chile, which is supposed to be the last judgment in the country. And the impact of that one, not only in Chile, in the rest of the region, because it shapes the common wisdom, the assumptions of many people. It helps for them to think carefully about this kind of issues. And the good news is that that mother was able to have the custody of her kids. And not only that, the impact in Chilean society and in the rest of the region was remarkable. Now, the second question that was asked was about how difficult it is to establish accountability for human rights abuses against the perpetrators of those abuses. I mean, it's a real challenge. It depends on whether or not you have locally an independent judiciary. If you do have an independent judiciary, the process is slow, it's messy, it's complicated. But there is a chance that atrocities could be addressed. And that is— especially human rights atrocities or abuses committed during the military dictatorship. There are countries in the region, like for instance, Chile, Peru, Argentina, Uruguay, where there are people in prison for those type of atrocities. In Brazil, thanks to an amnesty law that was passed in 1978, real investigation and prosecution of those atrocities actually never happened. And an important lesson that you could bear in mind is that Brazilian military are very dismissive of these type of issues, of human rights issues. But not only that, my sense is that Brazilian military officers at very high level are not afraid of stepping into politics, and give their opinion, and challenge the government. In other words, they were actually very, very active, and I'm referring to top officials in the Brazilian Army, during the Bolsonaro administration. There were top leaders who actually publicly argued that if they have to organize a coup again in Brazil, they are ready. That kind of language you don't find in Argentina, in Chile, in other countries where there have been some accountability. For one simple reason, the top military officers running the show are very much aware that if they get involved in politics, that they are part tomorrow of a coup d'état or something like that, at the end of the day they will be responsible. And they might be subject of criminal prosecution for atrocities committed during that period. And so there is a price to pay. So their calculation is much more, shall we say, prudent regarding this issue. But again, once again, how difficult it is? It's very difficult to establish accountability, and much more difficult when you're dealing with dictatorship, where you need to rely on the work done by, for instance, the ICC, the International Criminal Court, which is pretty active in the case of Venezuela. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Fordham. Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Vivanco. My name is Carlos Ortiz de la Pena Gomez Urguiza, and I have a question for you. El Salvador is currently battling crime and gangs with strategies such as mano dura, which have shown a significant decrease in crime at the cost of violating human rights. Do you see a possible effective integration of such policies in high-crime-rate countries, such as Mexico, to stop the growth of narco and crime gang activity? And if so, how? VIVANCO: Well, look, yeah, Carlos, very good question. Bukele in El Salvador is a real, real challenge. It's really, really a complicated case, for several reasons. He's incredibly popular. No question about it. He has managed to—thanks to that popularity—to concentrate power in his own hands. He fully controls Congress. But, much more relevant, he fully controls the judiciary, including the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court today is subordinated to the executive branch. And he is constantly going after the civil society, and free media, and the opposition. Now, in violation of the Salvadorean constitution, he's going to run for reelection. And he will be reelected, because he's also very popular. And his policies to go after gangs are cruel, inhuman, and without—not even a facade of respect for due process. Essentially, the policy which is not sustainable and is—I don't think is something that you could export to other countries—is a policy—unless you have full control, unless you have some sort of dictatorship or quasi dictatorship. Which is based, in essence, in the appearance, in the number of tattoos that people, especially in the marginal communities in the periferia in El Salvador, where shanty towns are located. The police has a, you know, green light to arrest anyone who fit that profile. And then good luck, because it's going to be very, very difficult for that person to avoid something like several months in prison. The whole point of having an independent judiciary and due process is that law enforcement agencies have the—obviously, not only the right, the duty to prevent crimes and to punish criminals. Not physically punish them. You know, it's to arrest them, to detain them, and to use proportional force to produce that attention. But they need to follow certain rules. They cannot just go around and arrest anyone who they have some sort of gut feelings that they are involved in crimes, because then you don't—you're not—the whole system is not able to distinguish and to make a distinction between potential criminals and innocent people. But it is complicated, the case of Bukele, because, for instance, I was referring initially to the technique of naming and shaming as a technique, as a methodology to expose governments with deplorable human rights record. But in the case of Bukele, he couldn't care less about. In other words, actually, I think he used the poor perception that exists, already that is established outside El Salvador as a result of his persecution of gangs in El Salvador—he used that kind of criticism as a way to improve his support domestically. In other words, when the New York Times published a whole report about massive abuses committed by Bukele's criminal system, in the prison system in El Salvador, what Bukele does is to take that one, that criticism, as actually ammunition to project himself as a tough guy who is actually, you know, doing the right thing for El Salvador. It's a question of time. It's a question of time. All of this is very sad for El Salvador, one of the few democracies in Central America with some future, I think, because I think they managed after the war to create institutions that are—that were much more credible than in the neighboring countries, like Guatemala, Honduras, and I'm not going to even mention Nicaragua. But under the control of this strongman, everything is possible today in El Salvador. He will be able to govern El Salvador this way as long as he's popular. Unfortunately, the Biden administration has relaxed its attention and pressure on that government, based on the question of migration. So they are hostage by the cooperation of Bukele government to try or attempt to control illegal immigration into the U.S. So that point trumps or, I mean, supersedes everything else. And that is actually very unfortunate. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next two questions, written questions. One is on the subject that you wanted, from Brittney Thomas, who is an undergraduate at Arizona State University: How come the governments of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua are socialist or communist while other Latin America countries are predominantly democracies? And then from Roger— VIVANCO: I'm sorry, I couldn't understand the question. Obviously, it's about Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, but? FASKIANOS: Why are they socialist or communist while other Latin American countries are predominantly democracies? VIVANCO: Oh, I see. OK. FASKIANOS: Yeah. And then the next question is from Roger Rose, who is an associate professor of political science at University of Minnesota, Morris: Given the recent decline in the norms of U.S. democracy in the last seven years, does the U.S. have any credibility and influence in the region in promoting democracy? And, again, if you could comment specifically on nations with the least democratic systems—Venezuela, Nicaragua—how could the U.S. play a more constructive role than it is currently? VIVANCO: The U.S. is always a very important player, very, very important. I mean, it's the largest economy in the world and the influence of the U.S. government in Latin America is huge. However, obviously, I have to acknowledge that our domestic problems here and serious challenges to the fundamentals of the rule of law, and just the notion that we respect the system according to which one who wins the election is—you know, has the legitimacy and the mandate to form a new government. If that notion is in question, and there are millions of American citizens who are willing to challenge that premise, obviously undermines the capacity of the U.S. to exercise leadership on this—in this context. And the autocrats and the autocracies in the region—I'm not referring to the dictatorships, but I'm referring to the Andrés Manuel López Obrador, once again, from Mexico, or Bolsonaro in Brazil—they take those kinds of developments in the U.S. as green lights to do whatever they want at local level. So that is a serious—obviously, it's a serious problem. And what is going on here has ramifications not only in the region, but also in the rest of the world. Now, Cuba is a historical problem. It's going to be too long to address the question in terms of why Cuba is a dictatorship and the rest of the region. Part of the problem with Cuba is that you have a government that violates the most fundamental rights and persecutes everyone who challenges the official line. And most of the Cubans today are willing to leave the country and to go into exile. But the problem is that we don't have the right tool, the right instrument in place, to exercise pressure on Cuba. And the right instrument today is the embargo. And that embargo, that policy is a total failure. The Cuban government is the same, exactly the same dictatorship. There has been no progress. And there's going to be no progress, in my view, as long as the U.S. government insist on a policy of isolation. You should be aware that every year 99 percentage of the states in the world condemned the isolation against Cuba, with the exception and the opposition of the U.S. government, Israel, and in the past was the Marshall Islands. Now, I don't think even the Marshall Islands joined the U.S. government defending that policy. So the policy is incredibly unpopular. And the debate at international level is about the U.S. government policy on Cuba and not about the deplorable human rights record of Cuba. That's why I was actually very supportive of the change of policy attempted during the Obama administration. Unfortunately, the isolation policy depends on Congress. And since the times of Clinton, this is a matter of who is the one in control of Congress. And the policy of isolation, it once again makes Cuba a victim of Washington. And Cuba, by the way, is not isolated from the rest of the world. So the U.S. is incredibly, I would say, powerless with regard to the lack of democracy and human rights in Cuba. And at the time, offers a fantastic justification for the Cuban government to present itself as a victim. I think that is the—this is one of the most serious mistakes of the U.S. foreign policy in Latin America that I hope that one day will be—will be addressed effectively. The case of Nicaragua and Venezuela is different, in the sense that we are looking into countries that—Venezuela in particular—have democracy for—a very questionable democracy, very weak, subject of tremendous corruption, and so on and so forth. But they have a system of political parties, free media, and so on, for many, many years. And they end up electing a populist leader whose marching orders and, you know, actually first majors was to establish some effective control of the judiciary. And the Supreme Court became an appendage of the government many, many, many years ago, which means that they managed during the Chavez administration to run the country with some sort of facade of democracy. Today, under Maduro it's no a longer a façade, it's a clear dictatorship responsible for atrocities. Fortunately, it is under investigation by the ICC. And the case of Nicaragua is an extreme case, similar to Venezuela. And it's—it's a dictator who has managed to put in prison everyone who is not in full alliance with the government, including religious leaders, and academics, and opposition leaders, civil society, et cetera. The case of Nicaragua is more complicated because Nicaragua is subject of sanctions by the U.S. government, and the European Union, and Canada, and some governments in the region. But still, we don't see much progress there. FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to go next to Nassar Nassar, who has a raised hand. You can unmute yourself and state your affiliation. Q: Yes. Hello. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. Q: Hi. My name is Nassar Nassar. I'm from Lewis University. So my question is, which are the most significant actors in the global governance of human trafficking? And how effective are they in tackling that? VIVANCO: Well, this is a matter that is usually—the main actors—so this is organized crime. This is organized crime. This is a question regarding—this is a—it's a huge business, and extremely profitable. And if you want to address these kinds of issues, you need regional cooperation, which is very challenging. Keep in mind that at a local level, in many of the most democratic countries in the region, you have tremendous tensions among the local police and different police. For instance, the local FBI—equivalent to an FBI, is usually in tension with other branches of law enforcement. And if you expect to have cooperation from the rest of the countries in the region, it's extremely challenging. So these type of issues require effective cooperation, adjustment on legislation. Require more better intelligence. The reason why you have this type—proliferation of this type of business is because, obviously, corruption and lack of accountability. So this is—my point is that it is a reflection of how weak is our law enforcement system, and how unprofessional, and subject many times of corruption. FASKIANOS: Just to follow up on that, a written question from Patricia Drown, who's at Regent University. How are the cartels and mafia being armed, and by whom? VIVANCO: Well, in the case of, for instance, Mexico, weapons comes from the U.S. Sometimes even legally. You know, the Second Amendment plays a role here. It's so easy to have access to weapons, all kind of weapons, in the U.S. So that helps. And a lack of actually an effective control mechanism to stop that type of traffic. The amount of money that cartels moved in countries like Mexico, but Colombia as well, and this mafia scene in Central America is significant. So they do have capacity to corrupt local enforcement officials that belongs to the police, the army, even the judiciary. And as long as you don't address the root cause of the problem, which is the lack of presence of the state—in other words, there are vast—as you know, there are regions of Colombia that are not under the control of the government, the territories in Colombia. And there are regions of Mexico that, unfortunately, are increasingly under more effective control of cartels than law enforcement and legitimate officials. So that unfortunately, is the—in my view, one of the reasons why it is relatively easy to witness this type of proliferation of illegal business. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. I think we are out of time. We have so many written questions and raised hands. Maybe I'll just try to sneak in one more from Andrea Cuervo Prados. You have your hand raised. I think you also wrote a question. So if you can be brief and tell us who you are. Q: OK. Hello. I'm adjunct faculty at Dickinson State University. And, Mr. Vivanco, I have a question related to Colombia. What do you think about the state of the human rights in Colombia under the new leftist president, Gustavo Petro, compared to the previous president, Ivan Duque? VIVANCO: Andrea, I think it's pretty much the same. When we witness actually an improvement of human rights conditions in Colombia, it was during the negotiations with the FARC. I'm referring to the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos. And with the signature of the peace agreement, when they signed the peace agreement, the numbers shows a serious decline in the cases of, for instance, internally displaced people, torture cases, executions, abductions, and many other of those typical abuses that are committed in Colombia in rural areas where this organized crime and irregular armed groups are historically present. But then the policies implemented during the Duque administration were actually not very effective. There was a sort of relaxation during that period, and not effective implementation of those commitments negotiated with the FARC. That had an implication in terms of abuses. And today I don't see a major shift. My sense is that the local communities are subject of similar abuses, including human rights activists as well as social leaders, in areas where there is a very weak presence of the state. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much. José Miguel Vivanco. We really appreciate your being with us today. And I apologize. Great questions. I'm sorry, we couldn't get to all of the written ones or raised hands. It's clear we will have to do this—focus in on this again and have you back. You can follow José Miguel on X at @VivancoJM. And the next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, November 29, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Time. Shibley Telhami, who's a professor at the University of Maryland, will lead a conversation on public opinion on Israel and Palestine. And in the meantime, I encourage you to learn about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/careers. You can follow us at @CFR_Academic. And visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. Again, José Miguel, thank you very much for today, and to all of you for joining us. VIVANCO: Thanks a lot. FASKIANOS: Take care. (END)
José Miguel Vivanco, adjunct senior fellow for human rights at CFR and former executive director of the Americas division at Human Rights Watch, leads the conversation on human rights in Latin America. FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the Fall 2023 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record. The video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org, if you would like to share them with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have José Miguel Vivanco with us to discuss human rights in Latin America. Mr. Vivanco is an adjunct senior fellow for human rights at CFR and partner at Dentons Global Advisors. He formerly served as the executive director of the Americas Division at Human Rights Watch, where he supervised fact-finding research for numerous reports on gross violations of human rights and advocated strengthening international legal standards and domestic compliance throughout the region. He is the founder of the Center for Justice and International Law, an international civil society organization providing legal and technical assistance with the Inter-American Human Rights System. So, José Miguel, thank you very much for being with us today. I thought you could begin by giving us an overview of what you see as the most important human rights challenges and advances in Latin America today. VIVANCO: Well, thank you very much for this invitation. It is a pleasure to be with you all and to talk for an hour about human rights problems, human rights issues in Latin America. Let me first make a couple of points. First, I think it's very important that, in retrospect, if you look at Latin America in the 1960s, 1970s, and even 1980s, it was a region that was pretty much run by military dictatorships. So if you look at historically, the region is not in such a bad shape. I know that this comment is quite controversial and many experts who follow the region closely might disagree with that statement, but objectively speaking I think we need to recognize that most of the region is run today—with the exception, obviously, of Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua—by democracies, weak democracies, the kind of democracies that we have in Latin America are facing very serious challenges and with endemic problems such as corruption, abuse of power, lack of transparency, lack of proper accountability, and so on and so forth. But in general terms, this is a region that has a chance to conduct some self-correction. In other words, electoral democracy is a very, very important value in the region, and the citizens—most of the people are able to either reward or punish the incumbent government at the times of elections. That is not a minor detail. It is extremely important, especially if you take into account that during the last twenty years in Latin America, if I'm not wrong, the vast majority of the governments elected were from the opposition. The statistics, I think, show that in eighteen of the twenty last presidential elections, the winner has been the party of the opposition; which means that even though our democracies in Latin America are dysfunctional, weak, messy, slow, you know, short-term-oriented, obviously, but at least citizens take their rights seriously and they exercise their powers so that is why you see a regular zigzag or, you know, transfer of power from a left-wing government to a right-wing government or vice versa. And that is, again, something that is, obviously, a very, very important tool of self-correction. And that, obviously, includes or has an impact in terms of the human rights record of those countries. You know, I'm not—I'm not addressing yet—I will leave it for the Q&A section—conditions in those three dictatorships in Latin America. Let me just make some few more remarks about one of the biggest challenges that I see in the region. And that is, obviously, the rise of autocracy or autocratic leaders, populist leaders, leaders who are not interested or as a matter of fact are very hostile to the concept of rule of law and the concept of independence of the judiciary. And they usually are very charismatic. They have high level of popular support. And they run and govern the country in a style that is like a permanent campaign, where they normally go against minorities and against the opposition, against the free media, against judges and prosecutors who dare to investigate them or investigate the government. Anyone who challenges them are subject of this type of reaction. And that is, unfortunately, something that we have seen in Mexico recently and until today, and in Brazil, especially during the administration of President Bolsonaro. The good news about, in the case of Brazil, is that, thanks to electoral democracy, it was possible to defeat him and—democratically. And the second very important piece of information is that even though Brazil is not a model of rule of law and separation of power, we have to acknowledge that, thanks to the checks-and-balance exercise by the Supreme Court of Brazil, it was possible to do some permanent, constant damage control against the most outrageous initiatives promoted by the administration of President Bolsonaro. That, I think, is one of the biggest challenges in the region. Let me conclude my—make crystal clear that there are serious human rights problems in Latin America today regarding, for instance, abuse of power, police brutality, prison problems. Prisons are really, in most of the countries in the region, a disaster. And you know, a big number of prisoners are awaiting trial, in detention and unable to really exercise their rights. And unfortunately, populist leaders use the prison system or essentially criminal law, by expanding the practice and enlarging the numbers of crimes that could be subject of pretrial detention, and—you know, regardless of the time that it will take for that case to be prosecuted in full respect for the rule—due process, and so on and so forth. And that—the reason is very simple. There is a real demand in Latin America for policies that will address insecurity, citizen security. If you look at statistics in terms of crime rate, it is going up in most of the country. Obviously, there are big difference between countries like Mexico, for instance, or Colombia, and if you link—if you look at the power of cartels and big mafias, and gangs in other countries, or petty crime impacting the daily life of the citizens. Regardless of that point, one of the biggest demands in Latin America is for better and more public security. And that's why political leaders, usually the solution for that request and demand is to put people in prison with essentially no real due process and increase the number of prisoners without conviction. There are challenges for free speech occasionally, of those leaders who resent scrutiny of their practice. And normally there is a campaign against free media. And there are some attempts in some countries to constantly look for ways to undermine the independence of the judiciary. Keep in mind, for instance, that now in Argentina the whole Supreme Court is under impeachment, and it's essentially an impeachment promoted by the current government because they disagree with the rulings, positions of the Supreme Court. All the justices on the Supreme Court are subject of this political trial conducted by the Argentine Congress. That is a concrete example of the kinds of risks that are present for judges and the judiciary in general, when they exercise their power and they attempt to protect the integrity of the constitution. So let me stop here and we can move on to the most interesting part of this event. FASKIANOS: Well, that was quite interesting. So, thank you, José Miguel. We appreciate it. We going to go to all of you now for your questions. (Gives queuing instructions.) We already have some hands up. We will go first to Karla Soto Valdes. Q: My name is Karla Soto. I'm from Lewis University. My question is, what specific measures could be implemented to address and/or prevent trafficking within the asylum-seeking community during their journey to the U.S.? VIVANCO: Irina, are we going to take several questions, or? FASKIANOS: I think we should do one at a time. VIVANCO: Well, Karla, there are multiple tools to address that specific issue. But this applies to essentially most of the human rights problems all over the world. The menu is pretty ample, but depends on one important factor—whether the government involved cares about its own reputation. That is a very important premise here, because if you we are dealing with a democratic government, once again, it's not—when I refer to a democratic government, I don't have in mind a sort of Jeffersonian model, I'm referring to the kind of democracies that we have in Latin America. But, if the leaders in charge are—you know, they care about their own reputation, they care about domestic debate, very important, because these types of revelations usually have ramifications at the local level. If they pay close attention to those issues, I think it's possible to apply, essentially, the technique of naming and shaming. In other words, collecting information, documenting what exactly is happening, and revealing that information to the public, locally and internationally. That is going to create naturally a reaction, a process, an awareness, and local pressure is—hopefully, it's not just twenty-four hours news, so splash—big splash, but also will trigger some dynamics. If we are dealing with a country that is run by a dictatorship, it is a very, very different question, because normally you're facing a leader, a government, who couldn't care less about its own reputation. They have taken already and assume the cost of doing business in that type of context. Now, sometimes conditions are kind of mixed, where you have democratic country in general—so there is still free media, there is an opposition, there is Congress, there are elections. But the government in charge is so—is run by an autocratic leader. That makes, you know, quite—a little more challenging to just document and reveal that information. And you need to think about some particular agenda, governmental agenda. Some specific interests of the government in different areas. Let me see—let me give you an example. Let's say that the Bolsonaro administration is seriously interested in an incorporation into the OECD in Paris. That is an important piece of information. Whatever you think that is relevant information regarding the record of that government, you could provide information to an entity that is precisely evaluating the record of the government. And the government will be much more willing to address those issues because they have a genuine interest in achieving some specific goal at the international level. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. We're going to go to Nicole Ambar De Santos, who is an undergraduate student at the Washington University in St. Louis: When we consider weak democracy in a more personal sense, like Peru, the controversy of obligation to help these nations arises. How much third party or other nations, such as the United States, intervene? VIVANCO: Tricky question. Peruvian democracy is quite messy. Part of the problem is that the system, the political system, needs some real reform to avoid the proliferation of small political parties and to create the real link or relationship between leaders, especially in Congress, and their constituencies, and so they are much more accountable to their community, the ones who elected them. I don't think the U.S., or any other government, has a direct role to play in that area. My sense is that when we are looking into a dysfunctional democracy that deserve some probably even constitutional reforms, that is essentially a domestic job. That is the work that needs to be done by Peruvians. Without a local consensus about the reforms that need to be implemented in the political system, my sense is that it's going to be very difficult for the U.S. or any other large democracy, to address those kinds of points. It's very different, that type of conversation, from a conversation or an assessment of universal values, such as human rights. When we are looking into cases of police brutality, for instance, the international community has a role to play. But if I were part of the conversation or evaluation by the U.S. government or the European Union with regard to this dysfunctional democracy in Peru, I would approach very carefully by suggesting creating the right type of incentives, more than questions of punishment, or sanctions. It's incentives for them to create the right conditions to address the domestic problem that is—has become quite endemic, in the case of Peru. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Matthew. Matthew, you don't have a last name, so can you identify yourself? Q: Hello. Yes, my name is Matthew. I am a junior student from Arizona State University studying business, but working on a thesis that has to do with human rights and the ethics of supply chain management. My question is, you were talking at the very beginning kind of just about history and how understanding history is important. And what I was hoping to get was, why is understanding history and culture important when working to address human rights issues, history of dictatorship, colonialism? In cultures it's socially acceptable things, like child labor, in some countries, that's not acceptable in Western ideology. So, yeah, just how is history and culture important when working to address human rights for the future? VIVANCO: Matthew, I think you're referring to two different issues. History is central. It's really, really relevant. Because that helps you—if you—if you follow your history, especially periods of time when massive and gross violations were committed in Latin America, it's important to put things in context and value what you have today. And the job is to—not only to preserve democracy, but also to look for ways to strengthen democracy. Because part of the problem is that domestic debate is so polarized today, not just in Latin America, all over the world, that sometimes people—different, you know, segments of society—in their positions, they're so dismissive of the other side, that they don't realize that we need to frame our debate in a constructive way. Let me put it—one specific example. If the government of Argentina, who is a government very receptive and very sensitive to vast and gross violations of human rights committed during the military dictatorship, so in other words, I don't need to lecture that government on that subject. They are actually the people who vote for the current government of Argentina—not the new government, the current government of Argentina—is deeply committed to those kinds of issues. I think that one of the biggest lessons that you should learn from the past is the relevance of protecting the independence of the judiciary. If you don't have an independent judiciary, and the judiciary becomes an entity that is an appendix of the ruling party or is intimidated by politics, and they could be subject of impeachment procedures every time that they rule something, that the powerful—the establishment disagree, I think they're playing with fire, and they're not really paying attention to the lessons that you learn from recent history in Latin America. That would be my first comment regarding that type of issue. And the second one, about you mentioned specifically cultural problems, culture, tensions or conflicts. And you mentioned—your example was child labor. And, and you suggested that that—the combination of child labor is something typical of Western ideology. If I'm not wrong, that was the language that you used. I would—I would push back on that point. And because this is not just a Western or European commitment. This is a universal one. And this is reflected on international treaties, and that are supposed to eradicate that kind of practice. If you give up to the concept of local traditions, you know, cultural, you know, issues that you need to pay attention, sure, as long as they are not to be in conflict with fundamental human rights. Otherwise, in half of the planet you're not going to have women rights, and women will be subject of traditional control. And you wouldn't have rights for minorities, and especially—and not only, but especially—the LGBTQ community. And you wouldn't have rights for racial minorities, or different religious beliefs. So, we have to watch and be very careful about what type of concessions we make to cultural traditions. I am happy to understand that different communities in Latin America might have different traditions, but there is some firm, solid, and unquestionable minimum that are the these universal human rights values that are not the property or monopoly of anyone. You know, these are—and this is not an ethical conversation. This is a legal one, because these values are protected under international law. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to combine or take two questions. The first question is from Lindsay Bert, who is at the department of political science at Muhlenberg College, who asks if you could speak on the efficacy of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in addressing the human rights violations you described. And the second question is from Leonard Onyebuchi Ophoke, a graduate student at Cavendish University in Uganda: Why is it almost impossible to hold the actors that violate human rights accountable? What could be done to make the mechanism more enforceable? VIVANCO: The inter-American system of human rights protection, there is nothing similar to inter-American system of human rights protection in the Global South. You don't have something similar in Asia, or Africa, or the Middle East. In other words, you don't have a mechanism where ultimately a court, a court of law—not just a commission, a court of law—handle individual cases, specific complaints of human rights abuses, and governments participate in public hearings. The parties involved have the obligation to present evidence before the court, and the court finally ruled on the specific matters where its decisions are binding. The number of issues that have been addressed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the last thirty years in Latin America are really incredible. And the impact—this is most important point—the impact at a local level is remarkable. In the area, for instance, of torture, disappearances. I'm referring to the elaboration of concepts and the imposing the obligation of local governments to adjust their legislation and practice, and to address specific problems or issues by providing remedies to victims. That is quite unusual. And the court has remarkable rulings on free speech, on discrimination issues, on indigenous populations, on military jurisdiction. One of the typical recourse of governments in the region when security forces were involved in human rights atrocities was to invoke military jurisdiction. So they say, no worries, we are going to investigate our own crimes. And the court has been actually very, very firm, challenging that notion to the point that I don't think there is a single case in Latin America today—once again, with the exception of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, that I hope that somebody will ask me a question about those three countries—and I don't think there is a single case where today security forces try to—or attempt to shield themselves from investigation invoking military jurisdiction. And the credit is to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. I can elaborate, and give you—provide you with a long list of examples of areas where the court has been actually really, really critical in advancing human rights in the region. Let me give you actually one last example that I think is very—is very illustrative, very revealing. In Chile, something like probably twenty years ago or fifteen years ago, full democracy. Full democracy. No Chile under Pinochet. The Supreme Court of Chile ruled that a mother who was openly lesbian did not qualify for the custody of her children because she was lesbian. And she had a couple. So that was sufficient grounds to rule in favor of the father, because the mother didn't have the moral grounds to educate her own kids, children. And this was decided by the Supreme Court of Chile. Not just a small first instance tribunal. And I will point out that the vast majority of the—I mean, the public in Chile was pretty much divided, but I'm pretty sure that the majority of Chileans thought that the Supreme Court was right, you know? The case went to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. And fortunately, after a few years, the court not only challenged that decision of the Supreme Court, forced Chile to change its legislation, and to change the ruling of the Supreme Court of Chile, which is supposed to be the last judgment in the country. And the impact of that one, not only in Chile, in the rest of the region, because it shapes the common wisdom, the assumptions of many people. It helps for them to think carefully about this kind of issues. And the good news is that that mother was able to have the custody of her kids. And not only that, the impact in Chilean society and in the rest of the region was remarkable. Now, the second question that was asked was about how difficult it is to establish accountability for human rights abuses against the perpetrators of those abuses. I mean, it's a real challenge. It depends on whether or not you have locally an independent judiciary. If you do have an independent judiciary, the process is slow, it's messy, it's complicated. But there is a chance that atrocities could be addressed. And that is— especially human rights atrocities or abuses committed during the military dictatorship. There are countries in the region, like for instance, Chile, Peru, Argentina, Uruguay, where there are people in prison for those type of atrocities. In Brazil, thanks to an amnesty law that was passed in 1978, real investigation and prosecution of those atrocities actually never happened. And an important lesson that you could bear in mind is that Brazilian military are very dismissive of these type of issues, of human rights issues. But not only that, my sense is that Brazilian military officers at very high level are not afraid of stepping into politics, and give their opinion, and challenge the government. In other words, they were actually very, very active, and I'm referring to top officials in the Brazilian Army, during the Bolsonaro administration. There were top leaders who actually publicly argued that if they have to organize a coup again in Brazil, they are ready. That kind of language you don't find in Argentina, in Chile, in other countries where there have been some accountability. For one simple reason, the top military officers running the show are very much aware that if they get involved in politics, that they are part tomorrow of a coup d'état or something like that, at the end of the day they will be responsible. And they might be subject of criminal prosecution for atrocities committed during that period. And so there is a price to pay. So their calculation is much more, shall we say, prudent regarding this issue. But again, once again, how difficult it is? It's very difficult to establish accountability, and much more difficult when you're dealing with dictatorship, where you need to rely on the work done by, for instance, the ICC, the International Criminal Court, which is pretty active in the case of Venezuela. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Fordham. Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Vivanco. My name is Carlos Ortiz de la Pena Gomez Urguiza, and I have a question for you. El Salvador is currently battling crime and gangs with strategies such as mano dura, which have shown a significant decrease in crime at the cost of violating human rights. Do you see a possible effective integration of such policies in high-crime-rate countries, such as Mexico, to stop the growth of narco and crime gang activity? And if so, how? VIVANCO: Well, look, yeah, Carlos, very good question. Bukele in El Salvador is a real, real challenge. It's really, really a complicated case, for several reasons. He's incredibly popular. No question about it. He has managed to—thanks to that popularity—to concentrate power in his own hands. He fully controls Congress. But, much more relevant, he fully controls the judiciary, including the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court today is subordinated to the executive branch. And he is constantly going after the civil society, and free media, and the opposition. Now, in violation of the Salvadorean constitution, he's going to run for reelection. And he will be reelected, because he's also very popular. And his policies to go after gangs are cruel, inhuman, and without—not even a facade of respect for due process. Essentially, the policy which is not sustainable and is—I don't think is something that you could export to other countries—is a policy—unless you have full control, unless you have some sort of dictatorship or quasi dictatorship. Which is based, in essence, in the appearance, in the number of tattoos that people, especially in the marginal communities in the periferia in El Salvador, where shanty towns are located. The police has a, you know, green light to arrest anyone who fit that profile. And then good luck, because it's going to be very, very difficult for that person to avoid something like several months in prison. The whole point of having an independent judiciary and due process is that law enforcement agencies have the—obviously, not only the right, the duty to prevent crimes and to punish criminals. Not physically punish them. You know, it's to arrest them, to detain them, and to use proportional force to produce that attention. But they need to follow certain rules. They cannot just go around and arrest anyone who they have some sort of gut feelings that they are involved in crimes, because then you don't—you're not—the whole system is not able to distinguish and to make a distinction between potential criminals and innocent people. But it is complicated, the case of Bukele, because, for instance, I was referring initially to the technique of naming and shaming as a technique, as a methodology to expose governments with deplorable human rights record. But in the case of Bukele, he couldn't care less about. In other words, actually, I think he used the poor perception that exists, already that is established outside El Salvador as a result of his persecution of gangs in El Salvador—he used that kind of criticism as a way to improve his support domestically. In other words, when the New York Times published a whole report about massive abuses committed by Bukele's criminal system, in the prison system in El Salvador, what Bukele does is to take that one, that criticism, as actually ammunition to project himself as a tough guy who is actually, you know, doing the right thing for El Salvador. It's a question of time. It's a question of time. All of this is very sad for El Salvador, one of the few democracies in Central America with some future, I think, because I think they managed after the war to create institutions that are—that were much more credible than in the neighboring countries, like Guatemala, Honduras, and I'm not going to even mention Nicaragua. But under the control of this strongman, everything is possible today in El Salvador. He will be able to govern El Salvador this way as long as he's popular. Unfortunately, the Biden administration has relaxed its attention and pressure on that government, based on the question of migration. So they are hostage by the cooperation of Bukele government to try or attempt to control illegal immigration into the U.S. So that point trumps or, I mean, supersedes everything else. And that is actually very unfortunate. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next two questions, written questions. One is on the subject that you wanted, from Brittney Thomas, who is an undergraduate at Arizona State University: How come the governments of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua are socialist or communist while other Latin America countries are predominantly democracies? And then from Roger— VIVANCO: I'm sorry, I couldn't understand the question. Obviously, it's about Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, but? FASKIANOS: Why are they socialist or communist while other Latin American countries are predominantly democracies? VIVANCO: Oh, I see. OK. FASKIANOS: Yeah. And then the next question is from Roger Rose, who is an associate professor of political science at University of Minnesota, Morris: Given the recent decline in the norms of U.S. democracy in the last seven years, does the U.S. have any credibility and influence in the region in promoting democracy? And, again, if you could comment specifically on nations with the least democratic systems—Venezuela, Nicaragua—how could the U.S. play a more constructive role than it is currently? VIVANCO: The U.S. is always a very important player, very, very important. I mean, it's the largest economy in the world and the influence of the U.S. government in Latin America is huge. However, obviously, I have to acknowledge that our domestic problems here and serious challenges to the fundamentals of the rule of law, and just the notion that we respect the system according to which one who wins the election is—you know, has the legitimacy and the mandate to form a new government. If that notion is in question, and there are millions of American citizens who are willing to challenge that premise, obviously undermines the capacity of the U.S. to exercise leadership on this—in this context. And the autocrats and the autocracies in the region—I'm not referring to the dictatorships, but I'm referring to the Andrés Manuel López Obrador, once again, from Mexico, or Bolsonaro in Brazil—they take those kinds of developments in the U.S. as green lights to do whatever they want at local level. So that is a serious—obviously, it's a serious problem. And what is going on here has ramifications not only in the region, but also in the rest of the world. Now, Cuba is a historical problem. It's going to be too long to address the question in terms of why Cuba is a dictatorship and the rest of the region. Part of the problem with Cuba is that you have a government that violates the most fundamental rights and persecutes everyone who challenges the official line. And most of the Cubans today are willing to leave the country and to go into exile. But the problem is that we don't have the right tool, the right instrument in place, to exercise pressure on Cuba. And the right instrument today is the embargo. And that embargo, that policy is a total failure. The Cuban government is the same, exactly the same dictatorship. There has been no progress. And there's going to be no progress, in my view, as long as the U.S. government insist on a policy of isolation. You should be aware that every year 99 percentage of the states in the world condemned the isolation against Cuba, with the exception and the opposition of the U.S. government, Israel, and in the past was the Marshall Islands. Now, I don't think even the Marshall Islands joined the U.S. government defending that policy. So the policy is incredibly unpopular. And the debate at international level is about the U.S. government policy on Cuba and not about the deplorable human rights record of Cuba. That's why I was actually very supportive of the change of policy attempted during the Obama administration. Unfortunately, the isolation policy depends on Congress. And since the times of Clinton, this is a matter of who is the one in control of Congress. And the policy of isolation, it once again makes Cuba a victim of Washington. And Cuba, by the way, is not isolated from the rest of the world. So the U.S. is incredibly, I would say, powerless with regard to the lack of democracy and human rights in Cuba. And at the time, offers a fantastic justification for the Cuban government to present itself as a victim. I think that is the—this is one of the most serious mistakes of the U.S. foreign policy in Latin America that I hope that one day will be—will be addressed effectively. The case of Nicaragua and Venezuela is different, in the sense that we are looking into countries that—Venezuela in particular—have democracy for—a very questionable democracy, very weak, subject of tremendous corruption, and so on and so forth. But they have a system of political parties, free media, and so on, for many, many years. And they end up electing a populist leader whose marching orders and, you know, actually first majors was to establish some effective control of the judiciary. And the Supreme Court became an appendage of the government many, many, many years ago, which means that they managed during the Chavez administration to run the country with some sort of facade of democracy. Today, under Maduro it's no a longer a façade, it's a clear dictatorship responsible for atrocities. Fortunately, it is under investigation by the ICC. And the case of Nicaragua is an extreme case, similar to Venezuela. And it's—it's a dictator who has managed to put in prison everyone who is not in full alliance with the government, including religious leaders, and academics, and opposition leaders, civil society, et cetera. The case of Nicaragua is more complicated because Nicaragua is subject of sanctions by the U.S. government, and the European Union, and Canada, and some governments in the region. But still, we don't see much progress there. FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to go next to Nassar Nassar, who has a raised hand. You can unmute yourself and state your affiliation. Q: Yes. Hello. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. Q: Hi. My name is Nassar Nassar. I'm from Lewis University. So my question is, which are the most significant actors in the global governance of human trafficking? And how effective are they in tackling that? VIVANCO: Well, this is a matter that is usually—the main actors—so this is organized crime. This is organized crime. This is a question regarding—this is a—it's a huge business, and extremely profitable. And if you want to address these kinds of issues, you need regional cooperation, which is very challenging. Keep in mind that at a local level, in many of the most democratic countries in the region, you have tremendous tensions among the local police and different police. For instance, the local FBI—equivalent to an FBI, is usually in tension with other branches of law enforcement. And if you expect to have cooperation from the rest of the countries in the region, it's extremely challenging. So these type of issues require effective cooperation, adjustment on legislation. Require more better intelligence. The reason why you have this type—proliferation of this type of business is because, obviously, corruption and lack of accountability. So this is—my point is that it is a reflection of how weak is our law enforcement system, and how unprofessional, and subject many times of corruption. FASKIANOS: Just to follow up on that, a written question from Patricia Drown, who's at Regent University. How are the cartels and mafia being armed, and by whom? VIVANCO: Well, in the case of, for instance, Mexico, weapons comes from the U.S. Sometimes even legally. You know, the Second Amendment plays a role here. It's so easy to have access to weapons, all kind of weapons, in the U.S. So that helps. And a lack of actually an effective control mechanism to stop that type of traffic. The amount of money that cartels moved in countries like Mexico, but Colombia as well, and this mafia scene in Central America is significant. So they do have capacity to corrupt local enforcement officials that belongs to the police, the army, even the judiciary. And as long as you don't address the root cause of the problem, which is the lack of presence of the state—in other words, there are vast—as you know, there are regions of Colombia that are not under the control of the government, the territories in Colombia. And there are regions of Mexico that, unfortunately, are increasingly under more effective control of cartels than law enforcement and legitimate officials. So that unfortunately, is the—in my view, one of the reasons why it is relatively easy to witness this type of proliferation of illegal business. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. I think we are out of time. We have so many written questions and raised hands. Maybe I'll just try to sneak in one more from Andrea Cuervo Prados. You have your hand raised. I think you also wrote a question. So if you can be brief and tell us who you are. Q: OK. Hello. I'm adjunct faculty at Dickinson State University. And, Mr. Vivanco, I have a question related to Colombia. What do you think about the state of the human rights in Colombia under the new leftist president, Gustavo Petro, compared to the previous president, Ivan Duque? VIVANCO: Andrea, I think it's pretty much the same. When we witness actually an improvement of human rights conditions in Colombia, it was during the negotiations with the FARC. I'm referring to the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos. And with the signature of the peace agreement, when they signed the peace agreement, the numbers shows a serious decline in the cases of, for instance, internally displaced people, torture cases, executions, abductions, and many other of those typical abuses that are committed in Colombia in rural areas where this organized crime and irregular armed groups are historically present. But then the policies implemented during the Duque administration were actually not very effective. There was a sort of relaxation during that period, and not effective implementation of those commitments negotiated with the FARC. That had an implication in terms of abuses. And today I don't see a major shift. My sense is that the local communities are subject of similar abuses, including human rights activists as well as social leaders, in areas where there is a very weak presence of the state. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much. José Miguel Vivanco. We really appreciate your being with us today. And I apologize. Great questions. I'm sorry, we couldn't get to all of the written ones or raised hands. It's clear we will have to do this—focus in on this again and have you back. You can follow José Miguel on X at @VivancoJM. And the next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, November 29, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Time. Shibley Telhami, who's a professor at the University of Maryland, will lead a conversation on public opinion on Israel and Palestine. And in the meantime, I encourage you to learn about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/careers. You can follow us at @CFR_Academic. And visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. Again, José Miguel, thank you very much for today, and to all of you for joining us. VIVANCO: Thanks a lot. FASKIANOS: Take care. (END)
A Colômbia estava há décadas governada pela direita e não participou da onda progressista sul-americana no início dos anos 2000, quando seus vizinhos enfrentavam a ressaca dessa onda, o primeiro presidente de esquerda foi eleito no país em 2022 após intensos protestos na pandemia contra o governo do direitista Ivan Duque. Gustavo Petro, ex-senador e ex-guerrilheiro do M-19, foi eleito pela coalizão Pacto Histórico e concluiu um ano de governo. Nesse Mini Pulso, Samiyah Becker entrevista o professor Pietro Alarcón para fazer um balanço da presidência de Petro até o momento. Este episódio foi produzido pelo Berta Coletivo Latinoamericanista.
Chayanne, el papá de América, es protagonista en este pódcast lleno de gente que ha viajado por el mundo para hacerle el daño a un pelito.
Él es líder de DDB México y Strategic Planning and Innovation VP de DDB Latina, agencia que ganó dos Grand Prix en Cannes Lions 2022. Lleva más de veinte años trabajando en la red. Además, fue asesor de la campaña para la presidencia de Iván Duque y es la cara detrás de los esperados informes de tendencias con que la industria publicitaria arranca cada año. Un tipo con alma nómade o viajero compulsivo que se declara fan de la cultura latinoamericana.Esa noche hablamos acerca de cómo se está preparando para Cannes 2023. Nos compartió una pincelada de una de sus mejores apuestas con un insight sobre el compromiso de las marcas con el colectivo LGBTQ+.Conversamos sobre lo que significaba y significa ser gay hoy en la industria publicitaria y las ideas que han ganado premios con el tema de diversidad e inclusión de fondo: “Data tienda” y “Tik Tok teachers”.Platicamos acerca de la importancia de los briefs, las ideas y su implementación, así como del papel del planner y del creativo en este proceso. Hablamos de su experiencia creativa multicultural, tanto a nivel personal como de su equipo. Nos contó el detrás de cámaras de una de sus experiencias laborales más importantes con Ivan Duque, y el valor de la emoción como parte fundamental en la estrategia.Basado en su Consumer Trend Report, terminamos hablando de las tendencias que ve más importantes para este 2023.Visítanos en https://www.elmartinez.net/ y suscríbete en Spotify, Apple Podcasts o donde lo estés oyendo ahora. Síguenos en FB o IG @elmartinezpodcast Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Just six months out of office, Colombian president Ivan Duque Marquez shares his personal insights and reflections on his government period. Having led the country during the pandemic he explains how he was able to navigate the political scene and whether or not he would have done anything different in his leadership (7:09). He also inherited the early stages of Colombian recently signed Peace Agreement and was in charge of strengthening the necessary institutions for its implementation. President Duque highlights the hardships of today's polarized society and the need to promote social cohesion to advance development (16:12). He also comments on the necessary actions to work with the opposition and social demands during the protests in 2021 around the tax reform (18:38). Listen to learn more about his post-presidency phase, the personal projects to advance innovation for development (21:00), and his recommendations to the new Colombian president, Gustavo Petro. This episode is hosted by Annelisse Escobar, a candidate for the Master of Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford. This episode was produced by Vitor Tomaz, Gloria Wawira, and the host, Annelisse Escobar. To keep up with our latest episodes in conversation with public leaders, practitioners, and experts follow us on Instagram @Oxfordpolicypod_.
Ottawa allonge sa liste. Après des chefs de gangs, des ministres en exercice et le président du Sénat ; le Canada a décidé d'inscrire trois nouveaux noms à la liste des personnalités haïtiennes sanctionnées pour leur soutien et financement aux gangs armés qui gangrènent Haïti. Parmi ces noms, celui de Michel Martelly l'ancien président. L'ancien président haïtien Joseph Michel Martelly (2011 - 2016) et deux anciens Premiers ministres, Laurent Lamothe et Jean Henry Céant ont tous les trois été sanctionnés par le Canada, le dimanche 20 novembre 2022. « Ces personnes profitent directement au travail des gangs et sont associées à un système de corruption », a confirmé la ministre canadienne des Affaires étrangères, Mélanie Joly. Les noms de Martelly, Lamothe et Céant s'ajoutent à ceux de l'actuel sénateur du Plateau central Rony Célestin, l'ancien sénateur du Sud Hervé Fourcand et l'ancien député Gary Bodeau. Les sanctions interdisent toute transactions financières et gèlent les avoirs des trois personnalités au Canada. Autant de personnes qui devraient bientôt se retrouver sur une liste noire que les Nations unies préparent et sur laquelle d'autres noms devraient encore être ajoutés. En attendant, la nouvelle a fait l'effet d'une petite bombe. Reportage aux Gonaïves de Ronel Paul. Colombie : reprise des négociations entre le gouvernement et l'ELN Le gouvernement de Colombie et la guérilla de l'ELN vont reprendre leurs pourparlers de paix à partir du lundi 21 novembre 2022 à Caracas, au Venezuela, après une suspension de presque quatre ans. Elles avaient été interrompues par le président conservateur Ivan Duque (2018-2022), après que les rebelles ont attaqué à la voiture piégée une école de police en janvier 2019. L'attaque a fait 22 victimes, outre l'assaillant. Le président Gustavo Petro, devenu en août 2022, le tout premier dirigeant de gauche colombien, s'est engagé à adopter une approche moins belliqueuse pour mettre fin à la violence perpétrée par les groupes armés. Pour l'instant, le gouvernement et les insurgés n'ont pas dévoilé la liste complète des négociateurs, bien que Petro ait déjà désigné le chef éleveur de bétail et opposant à son gouvernement, José Félix Lafaurie, dans le cadre de sa délégation. L'émoi de la communauté LGBTQIA+ à Colorado Springs Un homme de 22 ans «est entré» dans une discothèque LGBTQ et a immédiatement commencé à tirer, tuant au moins cinq personnes, avant d'être maîtrisé par des clients héroïques, dans la nuit de samedi à dimanche (du 19 au 20 novembre 2022) à Colorado Springs, aux États-Unis. Dix-huit personnes ont été blessées dans cette fusillade survenue peu avant minuit, a souligné la police, selon laquelle certains blessés étaient dans un état critique. Le tireur a été arrêté ensuite par la police et identifié comme étant Anderson Lee Aldrich. Beaucoup de journaux font aujourd'hui un lien entre le drame dans le Club Q et la rhétorique de plus en plus homophobe utilisée par une partie du parti républicain. À la Une du Journal de la 1ère En Guyane, le premier « transfert de patient » entre le Centre Hospitalier de St-Laurent-du-Maroni et l'Hôpital d'Albina au Surinam se déroulera demain, le mardi 22 novembre 2022.
Aftershocks from Russia's war against Ukraine continue rippling around the world, including to the deserts and jungles of Colombia. Producing increasing volumes of oil and fossil gas, this Andean country is also one of the world's largest coal exporters. Long rocked by violence, civil war as well as government and industry-linked terrorism, prior to Russia's invasion European buyers had been curtailing fossil fuel and “blood coal” imports from Colombia due linkages with human rights violations. But faced with its own energy crisis, following a personal call in April from German chancellor Olaf Scholz to Colombia's then President Ivan Duque, more coal than ever is sailing from Latin America to European ports. But then two months later, voters elected the nation's first ever left-green government into power. Campaigning on a platform to accelerate their clean energy transition, ban fracking, and restrict coal mining, the economist and former Bogotá mayor and former guerilla fighter Gustavo Pedro has now assumed power. To help us unpack how we got here and what to expect next from both Colombia, Germany and the European Union, in this episode, podcast host and lead blogger, Michael Buchsbaum, interviews Latin American expert and Deutsche Welle reporter and correspondent, Judit Alonso. Shownotes: Click here for background information on links between Colombia's civil war and coal and fossil fuel extraction. Click here to read more about Scholz' phone call to Duque. Click here to read stories and see images of how mining and development is impacting Colombia's Wayuu indigenous people. Click here to read more about the new government's tax reform plans. Audio from the podcast was mixed and edited by audio expert Christian Kreymborg.
Former Colombian President Ivan Duque Marquez sits down with Margaret Hoover to discuss his four years in office, the country's deep ties to the United States, and the economic and political challenges that loom on the horizon for both countries. Duque, who describes himself as a “radical centrist,” discusses Latin America's recent shift toward the left, the dangers he sees in populism and polarization, and his concerns about the policies of his successor, former Marxist guerilla Gustavo Petro. Duque explains why his administration welcomed refugees fleeing Venezuela's Maduro regime and how he approached the uncertainty created by the COVID-19 pandemic. He defends his economic policies, his strategy in the war on drugs, and his response to social unrest. The former president also addresses political trends in the U.S., including threats to democracy, the Jan. 6 riot, and the battle over immigration and border security. Support for “Firing Line for Margaret Hoover” is provided by Stephens Inc., Robert Granieri, Charles R. Schwab, The Fairweather Foundation, Asness Family Foundation, The Rosalind P. Walter Foundation, Damon Button, Pritzker Military Foundation on behalf of the Pritzker Military Museum and Library, and The Marc Haas Foundation.
*) Ceasefire takes effect between Israel, Palestinian group An Egyptian-brokered ceasefire in Gaza between Israel and the Palestinian group Islamic Jihad has taken effect late on Sunday. The ceasefire agreement came after three days of Israeli air strikes on Gaza. The attacks left at least 44 Palestinians, including 15 children dead and over 360 others injured, according to the Palestinian Health Ministry. Egyptian state news agency MENA reported that Egypt was exerting efforts to release Palestinian prisoners Khalil Awawdeh and Bassam al Saadi. *) Senate Democrats pass $740B 'Inflation Reduction Act' package in US The US Senate has passed a sweeping $430 billion bill intended to fight climate change, lower drug prices and raise some corporate taxes. Amid Republican efforts to derail the package, the Senate approved the legislation known as the Inflation Reduction Act by a 51-50 party line vote. Vice President Kamala Harris cast the tie-breaking ballot. That is a major victory for President Joe Biden that Democrats hope will aid their chances of keeping control of Congress in this year's elections. *) Gustavo Petro sworn in as Colombia's first leftist president Gustavo Petro has taken the oath of office as Colombia's first-ever leftist president. He was sworn in before a crowd of hundreds of thousands of people in Bogota. Petro takes over from the deeply unpopular Ivan Duque for a four-year term during which he will enjoy support from a left-leaning majority in Congress. *) Any attack on a nuclear plant in Ukraine 'suicidal' — UN Any attack on a nuclear plant is "suicidal", United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres has warned. His statement comes after fresh reports suggested shelling hit a huge atomic power complex in southern Ukraine. The fighting on Friday at the plant has prompted the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency to warn of "the very real risk of a nuclear disaster". Guterres said "any attack to a nuclear plant is a suicidal thing,” adding that he hopes the “attacks will end." And finally… *) UK museum agrees to return looted Benin Bronzes to Nigeria A London museum has agreed to return a collection of Benin Bronzes looted in the late 19th century from what is now Nigeria. The decision comes after Nigeria's National Commission for Museums and Monuments formally asked for the artefacts to be returned earlier this year. Since then, cultural institutions throughout Britain have come under pressure to repatriate artefacts acquired during the colonial era.
Lo peor de la semana y la despedida a Iván Duque como el peor presidente de la historia de Colombia. Si estás escuchando esto, eres de la resistencia. Somos #ElPodcastOficialDel2022 Saludamos a nuestros mecenas en Patreon de #PosLaVerda La canción que sonó en el episodio podcast de hoy fue: Charlie Palmieri And His Orchestra - Que Te Vas…Pues Vete https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVHZ5_L5PZs Escucha los programas de la Selección Musical de #PosLaVerda los domingos a las 9pm https://www.spreaker.com/show/seleccion-musical-poslaverda ¿Te gusta lo que hacemos? suscríbete en nuestro Patreon https://www.patreon.com/PosLaVerda O apóyanos en PayPal https://www.paypal.me/JABP008 Acompáñanos en Telegram en nuestro Grupo Oficial https://t.me/+hxC3py-pu-E4ZWQx Únete a la comunidad de #PosLaVerda en Twitter https://twitter.com/i/communities/1493752451458945025 Si quieres comprar productos y accesorios tanto informáticos como tecnológicos, visita www.tiendainformatica.co
Lo peor de la semana y la despedida a Iván Duque como el peor presidente de la historia de Colombia. Si estás escuchando esto, eres de la resistencia. Somos #ElPodcastOficialDel2022 Saludamos a nuestros mecenas en Patreon de #PosLaVerda La canción que sonó en el episodio podcast de hoy fue: Charlie Palmieri And His Orchestra - Que Te Vas…Pues Vete https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVHZ5_L5PZs Escucha los programas de la Selección Musical de #PosLaVerda los domingos a las 9pm https://www.spreaker.com/show/seleccion-musical-poslaverda ¿Te gusta lo que hacemos? suscríbete en nuestro Patreon https://www.patreon.com/PosLaVerda O apóyanos en PayPal https://www.paypal.me/JABP008 Acompáñanos en Telegram en nuestro Grupo Oficial https://t.me/+hxC3py-pu-E4ZWQx Únete a la comunidad de #PosLaVerda en Twitter https://twitter.com/i/communities/1493752451458945025 Si quieres comprar productos y accesorios tanto informáticos como tecnológicos, visita www.tiendainformatica.co
Tous les jours, les journalistes et correspondants de RFI ainsi que des spécialistes répondent à vos questions sur l'actualité. Ce matin: Mali : le GSIM annonce des « opérations » contre Bamako. Par Wassim Nasr, journaliste à France 24, spécialiste des mouvements jihadistes Niger-Bénin : Fin du différend autour de la boucle ferroviaire. Par Claire Fages, journaliste au service Afrique de RFI Guinée-Bissau : l'instabilité au Sahel au cœur de la rencontre entre Macron et Embaló. Par Antoine Glaser, journaliste spécialiste des relations entre l'Afrique et la France, auteur entre autres de Le piège africain de Macron, éditions Fayard Colombie : 29 enfants morts sous Ivan Duque. Par Pascal Drouhaud, président de l'association France Amérique latine, Latfran, spécialiste de la Colombie. * Par téléphone : de France : 09 693 693 70 de l'étranger : 33 9 693 693 70 * Par WhatsApp : +33 6 89 28 53 64 N'OUBLIEZ PAS DE NOUS COMMUNIQUER VOTRE NUMÉRO DE TÉLÉPHONE (avec l'indicatif pays). Pour nous suivre : * Facebook : Rfi appels sur l'actualité * Twitter : @AppelsActu
Esta es la última semana en la que Iván Duque será presidente. La complejidad de su gobierno radicó en que terminó reaccionando a circunstancias que no previó, como la molestia social que estalló dos veces en las calles; y que la pandemia le puso un rumbo momentáneo a un presidente que nunca supo explicar su visión de país. La Colombia que le entregará a Gustavo Petro es muy diferente y muy pocos en la clase política pudieron entender esa transformación.Para saber más puede leer:Balance Duque: un gobierno de promesas cumplidas a medias: https://www.lasillavacia.com/historias/silla-nacional/balance-duque-un-gobierno-de-promesas-cumplidas-a-medias/El legado de Duque es la política migratoria (con todo y sus lunares)https://www.lasillavacia.com/historias/silla-nacional/el-legado-de-duque-es-la-politica-migratoria-con-todo-y-lunares/El discurso final de Duque reafirma que no construyó un legado:https://www.lasillavacia.com/historias/silla-nacional/el-discurso-final-de-duque-reafirma-que-no-construyo-un-legado/Viva en primera fila nuestro periodismo con una membresía a los SuperAmigos de La Silla. Puede ser parte de nuestra comunidad acá https://www.lasillavacia.com/super-amigo/. Producción: Fernando Cruz, periodista de La Silla Vacía.
Análisis Con Alexis Ortiz. Eps #25 LLegando a cuatro años y una pandemia global más tarde, es Iván Duque quien ha presidido un país con alto desempleo y un electorado iracundo, un mandatario a la defensiva sobre las medidas que ha tomado para controlar la violencia persistente de los militantes. Inspirado por tres pilares de su plan general de gobierno, que incluyen la legalidad, el emprendimiento y la igualdad, de los que asegura han estado dando resultados favorables. Duque asegura que sus políticas han presentado oportunidades para las clases medias y bajas, impulsado por el espíritu empresarial y preparado el camino para que Colombia volviese a los niveles de crecimiento prepandémicos. También ofreció políticas sociales en donde se pudo haber abordado temas de comportamiento policial y desigualdad que el año pasado ocasionaron enfrentamientos violentos en los que murieron decenas de personas. @alexisortizbravo @nmmiamiradio #ivanduque #colombia #presidentecolombia Recording, Mix & Mastering Engineer: Jesús Carreño. Voice Over: Jessika C.Podcast recorded at: Nmmiami Studio. nmmiami.com @nmmiamiradio Para más información: anexostudio@gmail.com / nmmiamiradioonline@gmail.com Doral, FL 33166
Mientras el Clan del Golfo implementa su «plan pistola» en contra de los policías, el gobierno de Ivan Duque se encarga de raspar la olla. Si estás escuchando esto, eres de la resistencia. Somos #ElPodcastOficialDel2022 Saludamos a nuestros mecenas en Patreon de #PosLaVerda La canción que sonó en el episodio podcast de hoy es: El Astrólogo - Gildardo Montoya http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P3gsoWjL7j4 Escucha los programas de la Selección Musical de #PosLaVerda los domingos a las 9pm https://www.spreaker.com/show/seleccion-musical-poslaverda También estamos en Twitch búscanos como Pos_La_Verda_podcast ¿Te gusta lo que hacemos? suscríbete en nuestro Patreon https://www.patreon.com/PosLaVerda O apóyanos en PayPal https://www.paypal.me/JABP008 Acompáñanos en Telegram en nuestro Grupo Oficial https://t.me/+hxC3py-pu-E4ZWQx Únete a la comunidad de #PosLaVerda en Twitter https://twitter.com/i/communities/1493752451458945025 Si quieres comprar productos y accesorios tanto informáticos como tecnológicos, visita www.tiendainformatica.co
Mientras el Clan del Golfo implementa su «plan pistola» en contra de los policías, el gobierno de Ivan Duque se encarga de raspar la olla. Si estás escuchando esto, eres de la resistencia. Somos #ElPodcastOficialDel2022 Saludamos a nuestros mecenas en Patreon de #PosLaVerda La canción que sonó en el episodio podcast de hoy es: El Astrólogo - Gildardo Montoya http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P3gsoWjL7j4 Escucha los programas de la Selección Musical de #PosLaVerda los domingos a las 9pm https://www.spreaker.com/show/seleccion-musical-poslaverda También estamos en Twitch búscanos como Pos_La_Verda_podcast ¿Te gusta lo que hacemos? suscríbete en nuestro Patreon https://www.patreon.com/PosLaVerda O apóyanos en PayPal https://www.paypal.me/JABP008 Acompáñanos en Telegram en nuestro Grupo Oficial https://t.me/+hxC3py-pu-E4ZWQx Únete a la comunidad de #PosLaVerda en Twitter https://twitter.com/i/communities/1493752451458945025 Si quieres comprar productos y accesorios tanto informáticos como tecnológicos, visita www.tiendainformatica.co
In this week's news recap, monkeypox is confirmed in Colombia, the Truth commission issues its final report, President-Elect Petro appoints a foreign minister from the conservative party, a gruesome prison fire leaves at least 52 dead, and the San Andres archipelago mostly escapes Tropical Storm bonnie.
In this episode, Alex discusses Colombia's troubling elections, recession and stagflation worries, Eric Greiten's new campaign ad glorifying political violence, and the growing threat of white nationalist groups like Patriot Front. Colombia's outgoing president, a moderate named Ivan Duque, has tried to do everything right and has saved the country from economic collapse during the pandemic, however, his popularity was around 20%. Instead, two populists (far left and far right) are the most popular in Colombia for the presidential election. Alex ponders why the populace is so unhappy with Duque even when most indicators show he did a good job Alex worries that a recession could be inevitable in the coming year. Goldman Sachs has cut its economic forecast growth reports. Also, Bloomberg notes that “The Goldman team sees a 30% probability of entering a recession over the next year, up from 15% previously, and a 25% conditional probability of entering a recession in the second year if one is avoided in the first. That implies a 48% cumulative probability in the next two years versus 35% previously.” The Federal Reserve has also raised its interest rate by 75 basis points, Alex discusses how the goal of this is to cool off the economy by suppressing demand. Some worry that this may spark a recession and a spike in unemployment. These are symptoms of a malfunctioning economy or “stagflation.” Eric Greitens, the former governor of Missouri who had to resign due to assault charges and was accused of abusing his wife and children, has a new ad. This ad has him hunting “RINOS” (Republicans in Name Only). RINOS are Republicans like Liz Cheney that have criticized the MAGA movement and have condemned violent extremism. Alex worries that Greitens is glorifying political violence. However, it looks like he may win his election. Last week, 31 men were arrested for attempting to violently riot at a pride event in Idaho. They were members of the white nationalist group Patriot Front. Alex discusses that this group is growing in numbers and has had a national presence since its founding in 2017.
Over the last fifteen years Colombia has moved from ostensibly failed state to emerging market and tourist destination, providing Nobel-endorsed evidence that peace and reconciliation are possible after decades of brutalization. But while Colombia may no longer be the country that former president Ernesto Samper described in 2002, where governing was like trying to pilot an airplane in a storm while the passengers were rioting, neither is it the wonderland depicted in official propaganda. Many Colombians live badly; many more, well into the nominal middle class, live precariously; and still more structure their lives around minimizing their chances of falling victim to crime—something the poorest are unable to do. Unhappiness about the present and pessimism about the future are rampant across the social scale, focused precisely on those themes the Juan Manuel Santos government (2010–2018) touted as successes: the peace process, “social inclusion,” and infrastructure and public services. Much can be blamed on the administration of President Ivan Duque and the continual spectre of uribismo in addition to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Colombia may be more governable than it used to be, but not because the passengers are happier with the pilot—with the qualified (and to many Colombians highly suspicious) exception of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Tune in for a profound historical and amusing anecdotal look at Colombia through the eyes and experience of an expert Latin Americanist. Dr. Richard Stoller is Coordinator of Academic Advising and International Programs, Schreyer Honors College, Pennsylvania State University. Colombia news brief from journalist Emily Hart.
Escuche esta y más noticias de LA PATRIA Radio de lunes a viernes por los 1540 AM de Radio Cóndor en Manizales y en www.lapatria.com, encuentre videos de las transmisiones en nuestro Facebook Live: www.facebook.com/lapatria.manizales/videos
Kolombiya Cumhurbaşkanı Ivan Duque, Ulusal Tabiat Parkı'nı korumaya yönelik mahkeme kararına uymadığı gerekçesiyle 5 gün ev hapsine çarptırıldı.
Gustavo Petro, de esquerda, que liderou a apuração com 40,4% dos votos, “personifica a insatisfação econômica e social” disseminada no país, campeão regional de desigualdade. Rodolfo Hernandez, populista de direita que obteve 27,9%, “personifica a insatisfação com a política”. Quem explica, direto de Bogotá, é Thiago Vidal, gerente de análise política para a América Latina da consultoria Prospectiva. Neste episódio, ele analisa a conjuntura antigoverno e antissistema que acabou por excluir, da etapa final, o grupo que manda na Colômbia há mais de duas décadas, atualmente representado pelo desgastado presidente Ivan Duque - candidato apoiado por ele, o ex-prefeito de Medellín Federico Gutierrez chegou em terceiro. Thiago observa que, seis anos depois do histórico (e até hoje não inteiramente implementado) acordo de paz com as Farc, esta é a primeira eleição “na qual questões de segurança pública e nacional não dominam o debate”. Na conversa com Renata Lo Prete, ele também avalia as chances de Petro e Hernandez no segundo turno, em 19 de junho, além de mostrar qual seria o grau de dificuldade de cada um para construir base no Congresso.
A pocos días de elecciones, analizamos los formatos de debates y el cubrimiento del cierre de campaña de Gustavo Petro, Federico Gutiérrez y Rodolfo Hernández. Produce: Sara TrejosAnálisis: Juan Álvarez, Santiago Rivas, Andrés PáramoPost: Rodrigo Rodríguez (Loro Pódcast) y Sara TrejosAsistencia de producción: Paula Villán.Agradecimiento a Pascual Gaviria por su análisis del cierre de campaña de Federico Gutiérrez.Sillón Estudios 2022NOTAS DEL EPISODIO
Il Presidente del Consiglio Mario Draghi sente Vladimir Putin dopo il controverso piano di pace per l'Ucraina annunciato dal ministero degli Esteri: cosa è successo? Ne abbiamo parlato con Vittorio Emanuele Parsi, professore di Relazioni Internazionali all'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano, dove dirige anche l'ASERI- Alta Scuola di Economia e Relazioni Internazionali e con Andrey Kortunov, direttore generale del Russian Council, think-tank di Mosca. Subito dopo siamo tornati sul terreno, in Ucraina, dove le forze russe stanno avanzando nel Lugansk e puntano sulla città di Severodonetsk: ne abbiamo parlato con Alessandro Marrone, responsabile del Programma Difesa di Istituto Affari Internazionali - IAI. Infine siamo andati in Colombia, dove nel fine settimana si terranno le elezioni presidenziali e il candidato Gustavo Petro sta lanciando una sfida a tutto campo al presidente Ivan Duque: ne abbiamo parlato da Bogotà con Diego Battistessa, Docente Universidad Carlos III di Madrid, analista specializzato in America Latina e Caraibi.
Todays' episode: Elections Observers denied entry to ColombiaCo-Host: CODEPINK Latin America policy expert Leonardo Flores.Guest: Nestor Cristancho of Canal 2, Cali, ColombiaOn Sunday, May 29 Colombians will vote for President. The election comes at a difficult moment for the country. Polls show widespread dissatisfaction with the government of the current president, Ivan Duque and frustration over chronic poverty, a widening income gap and insecurity, all of which have worsened during the pandemic.Among those hurt the most by these problems are younger Colombians, who are likely to play a big role in determining whether or not the country takes a step to the left.Young people led anti-government protests that filled the streets of Colombia last year, dominating the national conversation for weeks. At least 46 people died — many of them young, unarmed protesters and many at the hands of the police — in what became referred to as the “national strike.” or Paro NacionalSome analysts expect young people to vote in record numbers, energized not just by the Pacto Historico presidential candidate Gustavo Petro, but also by his running mate, Francia Márquez, a 40 year old environmental activist with a gender, race and class-conscious focus who would be the country's first Black vice president.Additional Links:Colombia Erupts against NeoliberalismColombia Protesting NeoliberalismElection Primaries move Colombia LeftIn partnership with Friends of Latin America, Massachusetts Peace Action and Task Force on the Americas, original broadcasts of WTF is Going on in Latin America & the Caribbean can be viewed every Wednesday at 4:30pm PT/7:30pm ET on CODEPINK YouTube Live
Los Secretos de Darcy en La FM
The World Economic Forum's Annual Meeting in Davos is back as an in-person event following a move online during the Covid-19 pandemic. While Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the Ukrainian President will address the forum virtually on Monday, leaders scheduled to physically attend next week include Spain's Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, Ivory Coast Prime Minister Patrick Achi, Poland's Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, Colombia's President Ivan Duque and Rwanda's President Paul Kagame. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is scheduled to speak in Davos next Thursday. The business and finance world will be represented by, among others, ECB President Christine Lagarde and Director General of the WTO Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. From the Middle East region, attendees include Egyptian Minister of International Co-operation, Rania Al Mashat and Alain Bejjani, Majid Al Futtaim's chief executive. Co-founder of the Global Survivors Fund and 2018 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Nadia Murad is also expected to take part. Apart from the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, other main topics to be discussed include the energy transition, commodity price rises and inflation and how to harness technology to boost job creation and economic opportunity. Alexandre Raffoul, the Forum's Head of Business Engagement for the Middle East and Africa, joins co-hosts Mustafa Alrawi and Kelsey Warner to look ahead to next week's event and highlights what we can expect from its ability to convene some of the world's most influential minds in one place. In this episode: Davos 2022 is finally happening (0m 16s) What are the agendas for this year? (9m 18s) The importance of getting people together (10m 35s) Outcomes expected from the meeting (14m 06s) Read more on our website: Urgent action needed to ensure energy transition, World Economic Forum says The Middle East leaders included in WEF's 2022 Class of Young Global Leaders Cold comfort awaits a springtime Davos Subscribe to Business Extra for free to receive new episodes every week Apple Podcasts | Google Podcasts | Spotify | Podbean
Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz hat mit Kolumbiens Präsident Ivan Duque über die kurzfristige Erhöhung von Steinkohleexporten nach Deutschland gesprochen. Das hat die lokale Bevölkerung alarmiert – die Förderung ist verbunden mit Umweltzerstörung und Menschenrechtsverletzungen.
Entrevista en La FM a Luigi Echeverry, exgerente de la campaña de Iván Duque.
Entrevista en La FM a Iván Duque, presidente de la República.
El presidente Iván Duque hace parte de la campaña presidencial al hablar en discursos públicos contra Gustavo Petro, su máximo opositor y principal aspirante a sucederlo. Duque, en entrevista con La Silla, niega que haga participación en política, sino más bien dice ejercer el derecho a la libre expresión. Hoy revisamos las respuestas clave que nos dio sobre este tema, la controvertida operación militar en Putumayo y su legado político.Producción: Fernando Cruz, periodista de La Silla Vacía.
La propuesta de unificar los regímenes de pensiones en el país viene desde hace muchos años y hay consenso en que debe haber una reforma pensional. Pero esta semana, el presidente Iván Duque se la jugó por los fondos privados y volvió a criticar a Gustavo Petro, el —hasta ahora— más opcionado para reemplazarlo en el cargo. Hoy explicamos por qué la apuesta de Duque es riesgosa y qué implicaciones tendría la propuesta del aspirante de izquierda.Producción: Fernando Cruz, periodista de La Silla Vacía.
Los Secretos de Darcy en La FM
Hoy en Buenos Días América hablamos con Pedro Rojas, corresponsal de Univision en Washington sobre las conversaciones que adelanta la Casa Blanca con Venezuela, la visita de la Vicepresidenta Kamala Harris a la OTAN, el lio sobre los aviones con Polonia dentro de la invasión rusa a Ucrania.Además, nos acompaña Andrea Theran – Educadora Financiera, para hablarnos de economía familiar, y las acciones que podemos tomar ante el efecto de la inflación y como priorizar nuestros gastos.Juan Carlos Aguiar, nos da un repaso sobre las elecciones parlamentarias en Colombia este fin de semana y la toma de poder del nuevo presidente en Chile.Juan Guevara – experto en tecnología, nos habla de Tinder y las nuevas herramientas para revisar antecedentes penales de las personas que quieren contactar a quienes buscan citas, en un intento por evitar que los usuarios sean víctimas de estafadores o personas con historial de violencia.Y Clara Trullenque nos cuenta sobre la incitaba de un par de españoles que han decidido ir hasta la frontera en Ucrania con el fin de ayudar y en BDA vamos a seguirles día a día para conocer su experiencia.En Contacto Deportivo, Enrique Borja nos habla del clásico nacional del futbol mexicano este fin de semana, lo que los hinchas han sido invitados a asistir vestidos de blanco y todo acerca de nuestro sábado futbolero. Y Andrea Martinez con el futbol femenil e Indian Wells.Te invitamos a compartir con tus amigos y recuerda que también puedes encontrarnos en la App de UFORIA.Envíanos tus comentarios, inquietudes o sugerencias, a nuestras redes sociales en Facebook @buenosdiasam, Instagram buenosdiasamericaam o escríbenos a nfoudradio@UNIVISION.NET estaríamos encantados de recibirlas.
Entrevista en La FM a Juan Carlos Pinzón, embajador de Colombia en Estados Unidos.
Entrevista en La FM al presidente Iván Duque.
Los Secretos de Darcy en La FM.
Los Secretos de Darcy en La FM
María Fernanda Cabal, senadora por el Centro Democrático.
Entrevista en La FM a Iván Duque, presidente de Colombia.
En este episodio cubrimos los temas de los resultados de una encuesta educativa que se llevo acabo recientemente en la República Dominicana, porqué la agencia acreditadora de Moody´s le bajo su calificación al país de Perú y como los niveles de popularidad del presidente Colombia, Ivan Duque, van en descenso.
For this episode of our side project on Latin American history and politics, we talk to a Human Rights lawyer from the Colombian movement Congreso del Pueblos about the recent uprising against far-right President Ivan Duque's pandemic austerity measures, and the brutal repression that followed. Earlier this year Duque proposed a new tax on consumer goods, a regressive tax disproportionately effecting the poor population already struggling against booming unemployment. A series of nationwide strikes against the tax and austerity called for late April turned out to be far more massive than anyone had predicted, overcoming some of the deep divisions between the popular movements and Duque's base. But the dozens of deaths, disappearances, countless beatings and sexual assaults that followed have only galvanized the struggle further--and our guest has concluded that the State has "already lost." Special thanks to Projet Accompagnement Solidarité Colombie Relevant reading: https://crimethinc.com/2020/09/11/uprising-in-colombia-an-example-of-what-is-to-come-a-report-and-interview-on-the-background-of-the-revolt Song: Dead Hero - Dime quevas hacer? Previous episodes of Talkin' 'Tina on Peru, Brazil, and Argentina are available for our Patreon subscribers