Podcasts about Werner Heisenberg

Between the time the first Nobel Prize was awarded in 1901 and 1933, a total of 31 were awarded to German scientists and politicians. To name just a few, Wilhelm Röntgen (1901), Max Planck (1918), Albert Einstein (1921) and Werner Heisenberg (1932) for Physics, Emil Fischer (1902), Fritz Haber (1918), Walther Nernst (1920) and Hans Fischer (1930) for chemistry, Emil von Behring (1901), Robert Koch (1905) and Otto Warburg (1931) for medicine, Theodor Mommsen (1902), Gerhart Hauptmann (1912) and Thomas Mann (1929) for literature and Gustav Stresemann for peace. The UK and France received 17 and 15 respectively, whilst the US picked up just 6 during that same period. How could German universities rise to such dominance during the 19th and early 20th century from very humble beginnings? That is what we will look at in this episode.The music for the show is Flute Sonata in E-flat major, H.545 by Carl Phillip Emmanuel Bach (or some claim it as BWV 1031 Johann Sebastian Bach) performed and arranged by Michel Rondeau under Common Creative Licence 3.0.As always:Homepage with maps, photos, transcripts and blog: www.historyofthegermans.comIf you wish to support the show go to: Support • History of the Germans PodcastFacebook: @HOTGPod Threads: @history_of_the_germans_podcastBluesky: @hotgpod.bsky.socialInstagram: history_of_the_germansTwitter: @germanshistoryTo make it easier for you to share the podcast, I have created separate playlists for some of the seasons that are set up as individual podcasts. they have the exact same episodes as in the History of the Germans, but they may be a helpful device for those who want to concentrate on only one season. So far I have:The Ottonians Salian Emperors and Investiture ControversyFredrick Barbarossa and Early HohenstaufenFrederick II Stupor MundiSaxony and Eastward ExpansionThe Hanseatic LeagueThe Teutonic KnightsThe Holy Roman Empire 1250-1356The Reformation before the Reformation

Letos mineva sto let od prelomnega trenutka, ko je nemški fizik Werner Heisenberg izpeljal zakone moderne kvantne fizike. Kar se je začelo kot abstraktna teorija za razlago skrivnostnih pojavov, je v desetletjih preraslo v temelje sodobnih tehnologij. Tokrat smo potovali v svet fotonov in elektronov in ta svet je precej drugačen od tega, ki smo ga vajeni in kot ga spontano razumemo. Če se nam zdi, da je v našem svetu vse obstaja na določenem mestu ob določenem času, je ta svet, kvantni svet, kot mu pravimo, zavit v meglo verjetnosti. Slišati je zapleteno … in najbrž je res kaj na tem. Frekvenca X je bila ob Kvantnem dnevu na Inštitutu Jožef Stefan, da vso to zapletenost vsaj malo razblini. Gostje: dr. Lev Vidmar, Institut "Jožef Stefan" in Fakulteta za matematiko in fiziko v Ljubljani, dr. Lara Ulčakar, Institut "Jožef Stefan" in Fakulteta za matematiko in fiziko v Ljubljani, dr. Anton Ramšak, Institut "Jožef Stefan" in Fakulteta za matematiko in fiziko v Ljubljani, dr. Andrej Zorko, Institut "Jožef Stefan" in Fakulteta za matematiko in fiziko, dr. Rok Žitko, Institut "Jožef Stefan" in Fakulteta za matematiko in fiziko v Ljubljani, Martin Kerin, študent Fakultete za matematiko in fiziko v Ljubljani, Robert James Sunderland, arhiv na Inštitutu Nielsa Bohra, dr. Anton Zeilinger, Univerza na Dunaju, Janez Dovč, fizik, skladatelj, multiinstrumentalist, dr. Peter Jeglič, Institut "Jožef Stefan", dr. Matej Huš, Kemijski inštitut, Iris Ulčakar, Institut "Jožef Stefan" dr. Martin Rigler, Aerosol Poglavja: 00:01:14 Kaj je kvantna znanost? 00:06:14 Kaj je kvantna prepletenost? 00:09:42 Kako študentje razmišljajo o kvantni fiziki? 00:15:21 Zgodovina kvantne mehanike 00:33:00 Slovarček izrazov iz kvantne fizike 00:47:30 Kaj pomeni biti fizik? 00:57:26 Uporaba kvantne fizike v glasbi 00:59:46 Eksperiment, kvantno kriptiranje in teleportacija 01:16:20 Kje se uporabljajo kvantne tehnologije? 01:25:01 Kakšna je vloga slovenskih fizikov v svetu kvantne fizike

ABOUT JON HYMANJon Hyman is the co-founder and chief technology officer of Braze, the customer engagement platform that delivers messaging experiences across push, email, in-app, and more. He leads the charge for building the platform's technical systems and infrastructure as well as overseeing the company's technical operations and engineering team.Prior to Braze, Jon served as lead engineer for the Core Technology group at Bridgewater Associates, the world's largest hedge fund. There, he managed a team that maintained 80+ software assets and was responsible for the security and stability of critical trading systems. Jon met cofounder Bill Magnuson during his time at Bridgewater, and together they won the 2011 TechCrunch Disrupt Hackathon. Jon is a recipient of the SmartCEO Executive Management Award in the CIO/CTO Category for New York. Jon holds a B.A. from Harvard University in Computer Science.ABOUT BRAZEBraze is the leading customer engagement platform that empowers brands to Be Absolutely Engaging.™ Braze allows any marketer to collect and take action on any amount of data from any source, so they can creatively engage with customers in real time, across channels from one platform. From cross-channel messaging and journey orchestration to Al-powered experimentation and optimization, Braze enables companies to build and maintain absolutely engaging relationships with their customers that foster growth and loyalty. The company has been recognized as a 2024 U.S. News & World Report Best Companies to Work For, 2024 Best Small & Medium Workplaces in Europe by Great Place to Work®, 2024 Fortune Best Workplaces for Women™ by Great Place to Work® and was named a Leader by Gartner® in the 2024 Magic Quadrant™ for Multichannel Marketing Hubs and a Strong Performer in The Forrester Wave™: Email Marketing Service Providers, Q3 2024.  Braze is headquartered in New York with 15 offices across North America, Europe, and APAC. Learn more at braze.com.SHOW NOTES:What Jon learned from being the only person on call for his company's first four years (2:56)Knowing when it's time to get help managing your servers, ops, scaling, etc. (5:42)Establishing areas of product ownership & other scaling lessons from the early days (9:25)Frameworks for conversations on splitting of products across teams (12:00)The challenges, complexities & strategies behind assigning ownership in the early days (14:40)Founding Braze (18:01)Why Braze? The story & insights behind the original vision for Braze (20:08)Identifying Braze's product market fit (22:34)Early-stage PMF challenges faced by Jon & his co-founders (25:40)Pivoting to focus on enterprise customers (27:48)“Let's integrate the SDK right now” - founder-led sales ideas to validate your product (29:22)Behind the decision to hire a chief revenue officer for the first time (34:02)The evolution of enterprise & its impact on Braze's product offering (36:42)Growing out of your early-stage failure modes (39:00)Why it's important to make personnel decisions quickly (41:22)Setting & maintaining a vision pre IPO vs. post IPO (44:21)Jon's next leadership evolution & growth areas he is focusing on (49:50)Rapid fire questions (52:53)LINKS AND RESOURCESWhen We Cease to Understand the World - Benjamín Labatut's fictional examination of the lives of real-life scientists and thinkers whose discoveries resulted in moral consequences beyond their imagining. At a breakneck pace and with a wealth of disturbing detail, Labatut uses the imaginative resources of fiction to tell the stories of Fritz Haber, Alexander Grothendieck, Werner Heisenberg, and Erwin Schrödinger, the scientists and mathematicians who expanded our notions of the possible.This episode wouldn't have been possible without the help of our incredible production team:Patrick Gallagher - Producer & Co-HostJerry Li - Co-HostNoah Olberding - Associate Producer, Audio & Video Editor https://www.linkedin.com/in/noah-olberding/Dan Overheim - Audio Engineer, Dan's also an avid 3D printer - https://www.bnd3d.com/Ellie Coggins Angus - Copywriter, Check out her other work at https://elliecoggins.com/about/

Albert Einstein, Genel Görelilik'i yazmış, hemen ardından bu teorisini gözleme dayalı bir şekilde kanıtlamıştı. Evrenin şifrelerini çözecek bir noktaya gelmişti artık. Kağıt üzerindeki tüm tahminleri evrende sıfır sapmayla karşılık buluyordu. Tüm gözler onun üzerindeydi. Ama o bunlarla da yetinmeyecekti. Kendince son bir misyonu daha vardı... Bilimin kutsal kasesini, yani Her Şeyin Teorisini bulmak.Hiçbir Şey Tesadüf Değil'deki Albert Einstein serimizin dördüncü ve son bölümünde bu hikayeye odaklanıyoruz. Einstein'ın son yıllarında yaşadıklarını ve Her Şeyin Teorisi'ni ararken başından geçenleri mercek altına alıyoruz.------- Podbee Sunar -------Bu podcast, Kuveyt Türk hakkında reklam içerir.Miles&Smiles Kuveyt Türk, ayrıcalıklı Mil dünyası ve size özel fırsatlarıyla her devirde yanınızda! Siz de mobilden Kuveyt Türklü olarak Miles&Smiles Kuveyt Türk kart başvurunuzu yapın, ayrıcalıklardan faydalanmaya başlayın. Detaylı bilgi için web sitesini ziyaret edebilirsiniz.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Humanity's understanding of the universe radically altered with the advent of quantum mechanics in the early 20th century. The theory of quantum mechanics describes how nature behaves at or below the scale of atoms, and the road to that theory was littered with seemingly insurmountable obstacles. With us to discuss the development of quantum mechanics, and the major schools of thought represented by Neils Bohr and Albert Einstein, is Jim Baggott. Today we discuss many of the key players in the development of quantum mechanics, including Bohr, Einstein, Wolfgang Pauli, Werner Heisenberg, Erwin Schrödinger, Max Planck, and Max Born.

Much is made in the LDS Church about how David Whitmer, one of the Three Witnesses of the Book of Mormon, never recanted his testimony, even though he left the Church. What they don't tell you is that it was precisely his testimony of the Book of Mormon that drove him out. In this episode, Karl C. Sandberg tells the rest of Whitmer's story, showing how Whitmer, B. H. Roberts, and Werner Heisenberg represent three different types of believers—all offering something completely different. https://sunstone.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/SLP-189.mp3

In unserem Feiertagsspecial lassen wir das Jahr 2024 gemeinsam ausklingen. Eva, Elka und Jana sprechen über einige der faszinierendsten Wissenschaftler:innen, die wir für ihre vielleicht übermenschlich erscheinenden Leistungen und Entdeckungen kennen. Aber dahinter stecken auch nur Menschen mit Stärken und Schwächen. Wir erzählen von Wolfgang Pauli, der angeblich technische Geräte zum Versagen brachte, von Werner Heisenberg, der fast durch die Doktorprüfung fiel, und von leuchtenden Waschbären. Außerdem haben wir Buchempfehlungen für die Feiertage mitgebracht und Elka wirft für uns einen Blick in die Zukunft. Ihr könnt uns gerne bei [Steady](https://steadyhq.com/de/cosmiclatte/), [Patreon] (https://patreon.com/CosmiclattePodcast), [Paypal](https://paypal.me/cosmiclattepod) unterstützen!

Get the latest insights from the AAMBITION Podcast delivered straight to your inbox. Subscribe HERE.++++Episode 42 of the “Aerospace Ambition Podcast” featuring Prof. Ulrich Schumann (DLR) is out!Talking PointsInfluential Mentors and Career Journey: Ulrich reflects on formative mentorships, including ties to Werner Heisenberg, and a career spanning fluid dynamics, turbulence, and contrail science.Contrail Science Essentials: An accessible explanation of contrail formation, persistence, and their climate impact, including the Schmidt Appleman Criterion and radiative effects.Advances in Contrail Research: Key milestones in understanding contrails, evolving public discourse on aviation's non-CO2 effects, and debates shaped by influential studies.Contrail Prediction Models: Insights into CoCiP's framework, integration with pycontrails, and advancements through observational datasets and modeling techniques.Future of Contrail Management: Exploring bold visions for contrail mitigation, trial strategies, and the role of contrail science in sustainable aviation.GuestProf. Dr. Ulrich Schumann is a world leading expert in atmospheric physics. He earned his doctorate in Turbulence in 1973, was Director of the Institute of Atmospheric Physics at DLR the German Aerospace Center from 1982 until 2012, and now lectures on aviation climate impact at Technical University Munich.Professor Schumann is widely known for his seminal works on contrail science, contributing to the 1999 IPCC report and developing the contrail cirrus prediction tool CoCiP. He has also cooperated on various aviation research projects with the FAA, EUROCONTROL, NATS, ECMWF, airlines and engine industry.

Wenn heute von „Nachhaltigkeit“ die Rede ist, dann dominiert oft das Ökonomische. So als könnten wir uns Ökologie oder soziale und kulturelle Belange erst dann „leisten“, wenn „die Zahlen“ stimmen. Was aber würde es bedeuten, Nachhaltigkeit radikal von der Natur her zu denken? Von der Tatsache, dass wir Menschen Teil der Natur sind und als Naturwesen unhintergehbar eingebettet und eingebunden sind in Naturzusammenhänge. Dieser Frage ist der vor 10 Jahren verstorbene Physiker Hans-Peter Dürr immer wieder in seinen Schriften und Vorträgen nachgegangen. Der Schüler und Nachfolger des Physik-Nobelpreisträgers Werner Heisenberg war ein vielbeachteter Vordenker und Wegbereiter der weltweiten Ökologie- und Friedensbewegung. Er übersetzt den eher spröden Begriff der Nachhaltigkeit in die Aufforderung an uns Menschen, all unser Tun und Lassen daran auszurichten, die Natur und das Lebende lebendiger werden zu lassen. Nur so handeln wir dann auch – nachhaltig.

What does it mean to perceive reality? How do art, science, and philosophy converge in shaping our understanding of the world? In this episode of Departures with Robert Amsterdam, we sit down with William Egginton, acclaimed author and professor, to dive into his latest book, "The Rigor of Angels: Borges, Heisenberg, Kant, and the Ultimate Nature of Reality." Egginton weaves a captivating narrative that bridges the literary genius of Jorge Luis Borges, the groundbreaking physics of Werner Heisenberg, the poetry of Robert Frost, and the profound philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Egginton explores how these thinkers confronted the boundaries of human knowledge, the mysteries of perception, and the paradoxes of existence, fate, and choice. In this conversation with Robert Amsterdam, Egginton shares his insights into the unexpected connections and overlapping themes with these towering figures, the questions they asked, and how their ideas resonate with our quest to make sense of an increasingly complex universe. The remarkable harmony between nature, science, art, philosophy and literature during these critical years resonated deeply with us, and we hope you enjoy this conversation about this special book.

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Nach der »Kunst des Friedens« sehnt sich wohl jeder und jede von uns angesichts der nicht enden wollenden Eskalation kriegerischer Gewalt und Auseinandersetzungen – nicht nur im Nahen Osten oder der Ukraine. Wie kann Frieden entstehen und woran können wir uns orientieren, um Frieden zu stiften; Frieden unter den Menschen, aber auch Frieden mit der Natur? Diese Fragen beschäftigten zeitlebens den Physiker Hans-Peter Dürr, der vor 10 Jahren verstorben ist. Der Schüler und Nachfolger des Physik-Nobelpreisträgers Werner Heisenberg war ein vielbeachteter Vordenker und Wegbereiter der weltweiten Ökologie- und Friedensbewegung. Für ihn war gerade die Beschäftigung mit der Quantenphysik eine nie versiegende Inspirationsquelle für die Lösung gesellschaftlicher Probleme – auch bei der Frage von Krieg und Frieden.

The Uncertainty Principle, also known as Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, is a concept in quantum mechanics. Formulated by the German physicist Werner Heisenberg in 1927, it states that there is a limit to the precision with which certain pairs of physical properties, such as position and momentum, can be simultaneously known. In simpler terms, the more accurately we know the position of a particle, the less accurately we can know its momentum, and vice versa. This principle highlights the inherent limitations in measuring quantum systems and is a key feature distinguishing quantum mechanics from classical physics.

Nova znanstvena spoznanja ne odpirajo le vrat v lepšo prihodnost, ampak lahko v temelju zamajejo ustaljene predstave življenju, svetu in našem položaju v njemV romanu Slepa luč imajo osrednjo vlogo znanstveniki in v njem srečamo številna velika pa tudi manj znana imena 20. stoletja, kot so denimo fiziki Albert Einstein, Werner Heisenberg, Ervin Schrödinger, matematik Alexander Grothendieck ali kemik Fritz Haber.Toda to v središču tega esejističnega romana so znanstvena spoznanja, ki izrazito odstopajo ne samo od naših ustaljenih predstav o svetu, ampak celo od zmožnosti najboljših umov neke dobe, da konsekvence resnično prebojnega odkritja ali enačbe integrirajo v širše razumevanje ustroja sveta, vesolja. Prav ideje, ki se upirajo razumevanju, so deležne osrednje avtorjeve pozornosti.Čilski pisatelj Benjamin Labatut se je s Slepo lučjo, svojo tretjo knjigo, leta 2021 uvrstil v izbor za mednarodno nagrado Booker, prevedena pa je že v več kot 20 jezikov. Zdaj je ta intrigantni roman v prevodu Vesne Velkavrh Bukilica izšel v slovenščini pri založbi Mladinska knjiga.

Who were the German scientists who worked on atomic bombs during World War II for Hitler's regime? How did they justify themselves afterwards?  Examining the global influence of the German uranium project and postwar reactions to the scientists involved, Mark Walker explores the narratives surrounding 'Hitler's bomb'. The global impacts of this project were cataclysmic. Credible reports of German developments spurred the American Manhattan Project, the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in turn the Soviet efforts. After the war these scientists' work was overshadowed by the twin shocks of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.  Hitler's Atomic Bomb: History, Legend, and the Twin Legacies of Auschwitz and Hiroshima (Cambridge UP, 2024) sheds light on the postwar criticism and subsequent rehabilitation of the German scientists, including the controversial legend of Werner Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's visit to occupied Copenhagen in 1941. This scientifically accurate but non-technical history examines the impact of German efforts to harness nuclear fission, and the surrounding debates and legends. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Who were the German scientists who worked on atomic bombs during World War II for Hitler's regime? How did they justify themselves afterwards?  Examining the global influence of the German uranium project and postwar reactions to the scientists involved, Mark Walker explores the narratives surrounding 'Hitler's bomb'. The global impacts of this project were cataclysmic. Credible reports of German developments spurred the American Manhattan Project, the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in turn the Soviet efforts. After the war these scientists' work was overshadowed by the twin shocks of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.  Hitler's Atomic Bomb: History, Legend, and the Twin Legacies of Auschwitz and Hiroshima (Cambridge UP, 2024) sheds light on the postwar criticism and subsequent rehabilitation of the German scientists, including the controversial legend of Werner Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's visit to occupied Copenhagen in 1941. This scientifically accurate but non-technical history examines the impact of German efforts to harness nuclear fission, and the surrounding debates and legends. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Who were the German scientists who worked on atomic bombs during World War II for Hitler's regime? How did they justify themselves afterwards?  Examining the global influence of the German uranium project and postwar reactions to the scientists involved, Mark Walker explores the narratives surrounding 'Hitler's bomb'. The global impacts of this project were cataclysmic. Credible reports of German developments spurred the American Manhattan Project, the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in turn the Soviet efforts. After the war these scientists' work was overshadowed by the twin shocks of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.  Hitler's Atomic Bomb: History, Legend, and the Twin Legacies of Auschwitz and Hiroshima (Cambridge UP, 2024) sheds light on the postwar criticism and subsequent rehabilitation of the German scientists, including the controversial legend of Werner Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's visit to occupied Copenhagen in 1941. This scientifically accurate but non-technical history examines the impact of German efforts to harness nuclear fission, and the surrounding debates and legends. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

Who were the German scientists who worked on atomic bombs during World War II for Hitler's regime? How did they justify themselves afterwards?  Examining the global influence of the German uranium project and postwar reactions to the scientists involved, Mark Walker explores the narratives surrounding 'Hitler's bomb'. The global impacts of this project were cataclysmic. Credible reports of German developments spurred the American Manhattan Project, the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in turn the Soviet efforts. After the war these scientists' work was overshadowed by the twin shocks of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.  Hitler's Atomic Bomb: History, Legend, and the Twin Legacies of Auschwitz and Hiroshima (Cambridge UP, 2024) sheds light on the postwar criticism and subsequent rehabilitation of the German scientists, including the controversial legend of Werner Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's visit to occupied Copenhagen in 1941. This scientifically accurate but non-technical history examines the impact of German efforts to harness nuclear fission, and the surrounding debates and legends. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/german-studies

Who were the German scientists who worked on atomic bombs during World War II for Hitler's regime? How did they justify themselves afterwards?  Examining the global influence of the German uranium project and postwar reactions to the scientists involved, Mark Walker explores the narratives surrounding 'Hitler's bomb'. The global impacts of this project were cataclysmic. Credible reports of German developments spurred the American Manhattan Project, the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in turn the Soviet efforts. After the war these scientists' work was overshadowed by the twin shocks of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.  Hitler's Atomic Bomb: History, Legend, and the Twin Legacies of Auschwitz and Hiroshima (Cambridge UP, 2024) sheds light on the postwar criticism and subsequent rehabilitation of the German scientists, including the controversial legend of Werner Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's visit to occupied Copenhagen in 1941. This scientifically accurate but non-technical history examines the impact of German efforts to harness nuclear fission, and the surrounding debates and legends. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Who were the German scientists who worked on atomic bombs during World War II for Hitler's regime? How did they justify themselves afterwards?  Examining the global influence of the German uranium project and postwar reactions to the scientists involved, Mark Walker explores the narratives surrounding 'Hitler's bomb'. The global impacts of this project were cataclysmic. Credible reports of German developments spurred the American Manhattan Project, the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in turn the Soviet efforts. After the war these scientists' work was overshadowed by the twin shocks of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.  Hitler's Atomic Bomb: History, Legend, and the Twin Legacies of Auschwitz and Hiroshima (Cambridge UP, 2024) sheds light on the postwar criticism and subsequent rehabilitation of the German scientists, including the controversial legend of Werner Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's visit to occupied Copenhagen in 1941. This scientifically accurate but non-technical history examines the impact of German efforts to harness nuclear fission, and the surrounding debates and legends. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/science-technology-and-society

Who were the German scientists who worked on atomic bombs during World War II for Hitler's regime? How did they justify themselves afterwards?  Examining the global influence of the German uranium project and postwar reactions to the scientists involved, Mark Walker explores the narratives surrounding 'Hitler's bomb'. The global impacts of this project were cataclysmic. Credible reports of German developments spurred the American Manhattan Project, the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in turn the Soviet efforts. After the war these scientists' work was overshadowed by the twin shocks of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.  Hitler's Atomic Bomb: History, Legend, and the Twin Legacies of Auschwitz and Hiroshima (Cambridge UP, 2024) sheds light on the postwar criticism and subsequent rehabilitation of the German scientists, including the controversial legend of Werner Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's visit to occupied Copenhagen in 1941. This scientifically accurate but non-technical history examines the impact of German efforts to harness nuclear fission, and the surrounding debates and legends. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/technology

Who were the German scientists who worked on atomic bombs during World War II for Hitler's regime? How did they justify themselves afterwards?  Examining the global influence of the German uranium project and postwar reactions to the scientists involved, Mark Walker explores the narratives surrounding 'Hitler's bomb'. The global impacts of this project were cataclysmic. Credible reports of German developments spurred the American Manhattan Project, the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in turn the Soviet efforts. After the war these scientists' work was overshadowed by the twin shocks of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.  Hitler's Atomic Bomb: History, Legend, and the Twin Legacies of Auschwitz and Hiroshima (Cambridge UP, 2024) sheds light on the postwar criticism and subsequent rehabilitation of the German scientists, including the controversial legend of Werner Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's visit to occupied Copenhagen in 1941. This scientifically accurate but non-technical history examines the impact of German efforts to harness nuclear fission, and the surrounding debates and legends.

Attentatet mot Norsk Hydros anläggning i Vemork, väster om Oslo, 1943 är en av de mest legendariska specialoperationerna under andra världskriget. Syftet var att förstöra möjligheterna för de nazityska fysikerna i Berlin att producera en kärnreaktor, och i förlängningen en atombomb. För detta krävdes så kallat tungvatten, eller deuterium, ett ämne som behövdes för att kontrollera kärnklyvningsprocessen i en reaktor.Den enda tungvattenanläggningen som Hitler hade kontroll över, var Norsk Hydros anläggning i Vemork. Därav hamnade anläggningen snart bland de allierades prioriterade mål.I denna nymixade repris av Militärhistoriepodden berättar idéhistorikern Peter Bennesved och professorn i historia Martin Hårdstedt om dramat vid Vemork och varför vi minns det än idag.Attentatet mot Norsk Hydro i Vemork genomfördes av norska frivilliga soldater under brittisk ledning och träning, och otroligt nog, helt utan blodspillan. Kommandosoldaterna, kända under namnet ”Kompani Linge”, lyckades obemärkt landsättas från England och ta sig över fjällvidderna på skidor, ta sig in i anläggningen obemärkt, spränga utrustningen i källaren och sedan fly därifrån utan att ett enda skott avlossades.Dramat runt kompani Linge och deras försök att beröva tyskarna möjligheterna att utveckla atombomber är väldokumenterat och framstår i sig som en närmast otrolig bedrift. Händelserna i Vemork ska dock ses i kontext med något mycket större och i efterhand kan hela uppdraget delvis ifrågasättas. Kompani Linges attacker var ju förvisso lyckade, men för att lyckas med att producera en atombomb skulle det krävas mycket mer än bara deuterium, så hur stor roll spelade egentligen Kompani Linges aktioner mot tyska intressen?Sedan 1930-talets mitt hade forskare på båda sidor av den europeiska konflikten försökt beforska och så småningom också försöka behärska kraften i kärnklyvningsprocessen. Men den tyska krigsmaktens sätt att bedriva forskning möjliggjorde knappast någon produktion av atombomber i långa loppet. Medan wehrmacht endast enrollerade en handfull fysiker och assistenter till försöken att producera en testreaktor, så beordrade President Roosevelt en enorm industriell satsning inom ramen för Manhattanprojektet, som sysselsatte mer än 100 000 människor. Den industriella och intellektuella kapaciteten i väst var helt enkelt mångdubbelt större.I efterhand är det än idag inte säkert att de tyska forskarna, med Werner Heisenberg i spetsen, ens hade förstått hur en bomb skulle kunna produceras. Kanske var då en av 1900-talets mest spektakulära specialoperationer, också en av de mest onödiga?Bild: Bilden är hämtad från Norska Nationalbibliotekets bildsamling. Noteringar till bilden var: Fotograf: Okänd Rjukanfossen, Vemork, Vestfjorddalen, Tinn, Telemark, Wikipedia, Public Domain.Klippare: Emanuel Lehtonen Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

"The tragedy of this world is that no one is happy, whether stuck in a time of pain or of joy. The tragedy of this world is that everyone is alone. For a life in the past cannot be shared with the present. Each person who gets stuck in time gets stuck alone.” Welcome back to another episode of Made You Think! In this episode, we explore the concept of time through the lens of one of the most imaginative books of our time, Einstein's Dreams. The novel portrays Albert Einstein as a young scientist grappling with his dreams as he works on his theory of relativity. This episode promises to spark deep reflection, ignite your curiosity, and challenge your perception of time. We cover a wide range of topics including: The hidden costs of immortality Contemplating a world where every day is a fresh start Why it's easy to forget to appreciate the things you have How death ultimately gives our life meaning Our most obnoxious literary opinions And much more. Please enjoy, and make sure to follow Nat, Neil, and Adil on Twitter and share your thoughts on the episode. Links from the Episode: Mentioned in the Show: Click (4:32) Books Mentioned: Einstein's Dreams Tao Te Ching (1:33) (Book Episode) (Nat's Book Notes) The Sovereign Individual (12:59) (Book Episode) (Nat's Book Notes) The Fourth Turning (13:01) (Book Episode) Logicomix (22:41) (Book Episode) East of Eden (30:30) (Book Episode) (Nat's Book Notes) The Unbearable Lightness of Being (32:11) The First World War (34:50) The Brothers K (34:51) Musashi (34:53) Infinite Jest (37:34) (Book Episode 1) (Book Episode 2) (Nat's Book Notes) Atlas Shrugged (37:58) (Book Episode) (Nat's Book Notes) Gödel, Escher, Bach (43:45) (Book Episode) (Nat's Book Notes) People Mentioned: Alan Lightman John Steinbeck (18:31) Werner Heisenberg (23:29) Milan Kundera (32:23) David Perell (44:29) Show Topics: (0:00) In today's episode, we're covering Einstein's Dreams by Alan Lightman. Adil shares his experience going through the book for the 3rd time, noting its unique approach devoid of traditional characters yet filled with intense emotional resonance across the theme of 'time'. (2:43) The stories challenge the way we think about time, with each chapter introducing a unique time variable that initially appears distinct on the surface. However, beneath the surface, these chapters resonate with aspects of our own reality. We list off a few chapters that were top of mind for us. (6:10) Death is what gives life meaning. We explore this concept by diving into one of the short stories where nobody dies. If you know that time is infinite, how would you spend that time?  (8:45) Which chapter(s) of Einstein's Dreams did we connect with the most?  (11:16) We discuss the concept of sleep training, contemplating the ideal scenario where babies would sleep according to their natural rhythms. However, balancing the baby's freedom to sleep spontaneously with the demands of a structured work and life schedule can be a struggle. (12:32) Nat, Neil, and Adil ponder the scenario if everyone were to just live one day. You wouldn't know seasons, and all you'll ever know is what the current day brings. (16:08) Connections between Einstein's Dreams and a previous read on the podcast, The Fourth Turning.  (17:51) Despite not having main characters (aside from Einstein and Besso), this book still manages to drive a lot of emotions. We admire Lightman's ability to write in a soft, empathetic way, while painting the picture for readers very effectively.  (19:59) Were these short stories from the book thoughts that Einstein may have had in real life as he worked towards his theories on time and relativity? (23:45) We touch on a story from the book where every day is truly a fresh start, and there is no knowledge of the past or future.  (26:45) Doing everything as if it's for the first time will give you excitement, but it's also meaningful to act as if you're doing something for the very last time.  (28:25) Einstein's theory of general relativity, and how at the time of this theory, it was still unknown in the world of physics that the world is constantly expanding rather than fixed. (30:27) Though it may not be the longest book, it still hits hard. Nat, Neil, and Adil share their appreciation for Einstein's Dreams being impactful despite the length. It's one of those books that can make you feel a different way each time you read it. (36:47) Shoutout to Jack for the book recommendation on Musashi! If you have any book recommendations that you'd like us to pick up for the show, you can submit them to us here.  (38:55) You can get away with a lot in books, but what about a 35,000 word speech? We talk about John Galt's mighty speech in Atlas Shrugged. So long as you give the readers a reason to finish the book and recommend it to others, you can really do what you want within the pages.  (44:17) That concludes this thought-provoking episode! Next up, we're tackling Martin Gilbert's The First World War. Make sure to give our new Instagram page a follow and shoot us a book recommendation. If you have any recs, please send them our way! If you enjoyed this episode, let us know by leaving a review on iTunes and tell a friend. As always, let us know if you have any book recommendations! You can say hi to us on Twitter @TheRealNeilS, @adilmajid, @nateliason and share your thoughts on this episode. You can now support Made You Think using the Value-for-Value feature of Podcasting 2.0. This means you can directly tip the co-hosts in BTC with minimal transaction fees. To get started, simply download a podcast app (like Fountain or Breez) that supports Value-for-Value and send some BTC to your in-app wallet. You can then use that to support shows who have opted-in, including Made You Think! We'll be going with this direct support model moving forward, rather than ads. Thanks for listening. See you next time!

Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss the German physicist who, at the age of 23 and while still a student, effectively created quantum mechanics for which he later won the Nobel Prize. Werner Heisenberg made this breakthrough in a paper in 1925 when, rather than starting with an idea of where atomic particles were at any one time, he worked backwards from what he observed of atoms and their particles and the light they emitted, doing away with the idea of their continuous orbit of the nucleus and replacing this with equations. This was momentous and from this flowed what's known as his Uncertainty Principle, the idea that, for example, you can accurately measure the position of an atomic particle or its momentum, but not both.With Fay Dowker Professor of Theoretical Physics at Imperial College LondonHarry Cliff Research Fellow in Particle Physics at the University of CambridgeAnd Frank Close Professor Emeritus of Theoretical Physics and Fellow Emeritus at Exeter College at the University of OxfordProducer: Simon TillotsonReading list:Philip Ball, Beyond Weird: Why Everything You Thought You Knew about Quantum Physics Is Different (Vintage, 2018)John Bell, ‘Against 'measurement'' (Physics World, Vol 3, No 8, 1990)Mara Beller, Quantum Dialogue: The Making of a Revolution (University of Chicago Press, 2001)David C. Cassidy, Beyond Uncertainty: Heisenberg, Quantum Physics, And The Bomb (Bellevue Literary Press, 2010) Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy (first published 1958; Penguin Classics, 2000)Carlo Rovelli, Helgoland: The Strange and Beautiful Story of Quantum Physics (Penguin, 2022)

Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss the German physicist who, at the age of 23 and while still a student, effectively created quantum mechanics for which he later won the Nobel Prize. Werner Heisenberg made this breakthrough in a paper in 1925 when, rather than starting with an idea of where atomic particles were at any one time, he worked backwards from what he observed of atoms and their particles and the light they emitted, doing away with the idea of their continuous orbit of the nucleus and replacing this with equations. This was momentous and from this flowed what's known as his Uncertainty Principle, the idea that, for example, you can accurately measure the position of an atomic particle or its momentum, but not both.With Fay Dowker Professor of Theoretical Physics at Imperial College LondonHarry Cliff Research Fellow in Particle Physics at the University of CambridgeAnd Frank Close Professor Emeritus of Theoretical Physics and Fellow Emeritus at Exeter College at the University of OxfordProducer: Simon TillotsonReading list:Philip Ball, Beyond Weird: Why Everything You Thought You Knew about Quantum Physics Is Different (Vintage, 2018)John Bell, ‘Against 'measurement'' (Physics World, Vol 3, No 8, 1990)Mara Beller, Quantum Dialogue: The Making of a Revolution (University of Chicago Press, 2001)David C. Cassidy, Beyond Uncertainty: Heisenberg, Quantum Physics, And The Bomb (Bellevue Literary Press, 2010) Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy (first published 1958; Penguin Classics, 2000)Carlo Rovelli, Helgoland: The Strange and Beautiful Story of Quantum Physics (Penguin, 2022)

This is our latest weekly market update. Formulated by the German physicist and Nobel laureate Werner Heisenberg in 1927, the uncertainty principle states that we cannot know both the position and speed of a particle, such as a photon or electron, with perfect accuracy; the more we nail down the particle’s position, the less we … Continue reading "The Market's Uncertainty Principle…"

In Christopher Nolans Film "Oppenheimer" hat er, alias Mathias Schweighöfer, eine kleine Rolle, und Oppenheimer sagt: "Ich habe noch nie jemand mit einem intuitiveren Verständnis der atomaren Strukturen getroffen, als ihn". Das postulierte "Wettrennen" um die Erfindung der Atombombe mit den Nazis, das Oppenheimer und seine Kolleg*innen so sehr anspornte, hat es aber in Wirklichkeit nie gegeben.  Werner Heisenberg, Nobelpreisträger und Begründer der Unschärferelation, forschte an anderen Dingen und meinte gegen Ende seiner Karriere sogar, eine "Weltenformel" gefunden zu haben.  Seine Geschichte erzählen wir in der heutigen Podcast-Folge.

fWotD Episode 2427: Niels Bohr Welcome to featured Wiki of the Day where we read the summary of the featured Wikipedia article every day.The featured article for Wednesday, 27 December 2023 is Niels Bohr.Niels Henrik David Bohr (Danish: [ˈne̝ls ˈpoɐ̯ˀ]; 7 October 1885 – 18 November 1962) was a Danish physicist who made foundational contributions to understanding atomic structure and quantum theory, for which he received the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1922. Bohr was also a philosopher and a promoter of scientific research.Bohr developed the Bohr model of the atom, in which he proposed that energy levels of electrons are discrete and that the electrons revolve in stable orbits around the atomic nucleus but can jump from one energy level (or orbit) to another. Although the Bohr model has been supplanted by other models, its underlying principles remain valid. He conceived the principle of complementarity: that items could be separately analysed in terms of contradictory properties, like behaving as a wave or a stream of particles. The notion of complementarity dominated Bohr's thinking in both science and philosophy.Bohr founded the Institute of Theoretical Physics at the University of Copenhagen, now known as the Niels Bohr Institute, which opened in 1920. Bohr mentored and collaborated with physicists including Hans Kramers, Oskar Klein, George de Hevesy, and Werner Heisenberg. He predicted the properties of a new zirconium-like element, which was named hafnium, after the Latin name for Copenhagen, where it was discovered. Later, the element bohrium was named after him.During the 1930s, Bohr helped refugees from Nazism. After Denmark was occupied by the Germans, he had a famous meeting with Heisenberg, who had become the head of the German nuclear weapon project. In September 1943 word reached Bohr that he was about to be arrested by the Germans, so he fled to Sweden. From there, he was flown to Britain, where he joined the British Tube Alloys nuclear weapons project, and was part of the British mission to the Manhattan Project. After the war, Bohr called for international cooperation on nuclear energy. He was involved with the establishment of CERN and the Research Establishment Risø of the Danish Atomic Energy Commission and became the first chairman of the Nordic Institute for Theoretical Physics in 1957.This recording reflects the Wikipedia text as of 00:18 UTC on Wednesday, 27 December 2023.For the full current version of the article, see Niels Bohr on Wikipedia.This podcast uses content from Wikipedia under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License.Visit our archives at wikioftheday.com and subscribe to stay updated on new episodes.Follow us on Mastodon at @wikioftheday@masto.ai.Also check out Curmudgeon's Corner, a current events podcast.Until next time, I'm Gregory Neural.

Am 10.12.1933 erhält der Physiker Paul Dirac den Nobelpreis. Seine Dirac-Gleichung schreibt Geschichte. Trotzdem gilt das britische Ausnahmetalent als Außenseiter. Von Wolfgang Burgmer.

The Rigor of Angels: Borges, Heisenberg, Kant, and the Ultimate Nature of Reality by William Egginton https://amzn.to/3tKTVPy Argentine poet Jorge Luis Borges was madly in love when his life was shattered by painful heartbreak. But the breakdown that followed illuminated an incontrovertible truth—that love is necessarily imbued with loss, that the one doesn't exist without the other. German physicist Werner Heisenberg was fighting with the scientific establishment on the meaning of the quantum realm's absurdity when he had his own epiphany—that there is no such thing as a complete, perfect description of reality. Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant pushed the assumptions of human reason to their mind-bending conclusions, but emerged with an idea that crowned a towering philosophical system—that the human mind has fundamental limits, and those limits undergird both our greatest achievements as well as our missteps. Through fiction, science, and philosophy, the work of these three thinkers coalesced around the powerful, haunting fact that there is an irreconcilable difference between reality “out there” and reality as we experience it. Out of this profound truth comes a multitude of galvanizing ideas: the notion of selfhood, free will, and purpose in human life; the roots of morality, aesthetics, and reason; and the origins and nature of the cosmos itself. As each of these thinkers shows, every one of us has a fundamentally incomplete picture of the world. But this is to be expected. Only as mortal, finite beings are we able to experience the world in all its richness and breathtaking majesty. We are stranded in a gulf of vast extremes, between the astronomical and the quantum, an abyss of freedom and absolute determinism, and it is in that center where we must make our home. A soaring and lucid reflection on the lives and work of Borges, Heisenberg, and Kant, The Rigor of Angels movingly demonstrates that the mysteries of our place in the world may always loom over us—not as a threat, but as a reminder of our humble humanity.

It can be tempting, when first introduced to a deep concept of physics like Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, to draw grand philosophical conclusions about the impossibility of knowing anything precisely. That is generally a temptation to be resisted, just because it's so easy to do it wrong. But there is absolutely a place for a careful humanistic synthesis of these kinds of scientific ideas with other ideas, for example from philosophy or literature. That's the kind of task William Egginton takes on in his new book The Rigor of Angels, which compares the work of philosopher Immanuel Kant, physicist Werner Heisenberg, and author Jorge Luis Borges, three thinkers who grappled with limitations on our aspirations to know reality directly.Blog post with transcript: https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/podcast/2023/10/23/254-william-egginton-on-kant-heisenberg-and-borges/Support Mindscape on Patreon.William Egginton received his Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from Stanford University. He is currently the Decker Professor in the Humanities and Director of the Alexander Grass Humanities Institute at Johns Hopkins. He is the author of numerous books on literature, literary theory, and philosophy. In addition to The Rigor of Angels, he has an upcoming book on the work of Chilean film director Alejandro Jodorowsky.Web siteJohns Hopkins web pageWikipediaAmazon author pageSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

 “The scientific community is by any measure a very strange kind of community”, writes my guest. “For starters, no one knows who exactly belongs to it... Its members are a miscellany of individuals but also of disparate institutions…Nor does it have a fixed location. …the village conjured up by the term “scientific community” is scattered all over the globe and its inhabitants meet only occasionally, if at all. Far from living in neighborly harmony or even collegial mutual tolerance, the members of this uncommunal community compete ferociously and engage in notoriously vitriolic polemics … Although modern science has been called the locomotive of all modernity, the scientific community more closely resembles a medieval guild…” Given this, one is bound to ask how precisely this scattered contentious stratified “community” even exists, let alone cooperates. Yet cooperation has been a continuous strand uniting modern science.  Lorraine Daston has described the growth and mutations of that community in her new book Rivals: How Scientists Learned to Cooperate. She  is the Director Emerita of the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin, visiting professor in the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago, and permanent fellow at the Berlin Institute of Advanced Study.  For Further Investigation Lorraine Daston, Rules: A Short History of What We Live By Here is an excellent conversation with Lorraine Daston about her book Rules which, unfortunately, was not a conversation on Historically Thinking We've had numerous conversations about topics within the history of science over the years. Here is a list. The featured image below is of the Fifth Solvay Conference, at which every luminary of past and future physics seems to have been gathered. Hopefully you recognize the bushy-haired man with the big mustache more or less in the center of the first row. Less identifiable than Albert Einstein: Max Planck (first row, 2nd from left); Marie Curie (first, row 3rd from left); Niels Bohr (second row, extreme right); Paul Dirac (second row, fifth from left); Ernst Schrödinger (third row, sixth from right); Wolfgang Pauli (third row, fourth from right); Werner Heisenberg (third row, third from right). And many more who deserve mention, which you can find here.

Winner of the Tony Award for Best Play in 2000, “Copenhagen,” is a gripping and intellectually stimulating play that explores the events surrounding a mysterious and fateful meeting between two of the most brilliant minds of the 20th century: Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg. The play is being performed through October 29th at the Berkshire Theatre Group's Unicorn Theatre. Eric Hill directs the production for BTG and he joins us.

Wolf's inquiring mind has delved into the relationship between human consciousness, psychology, physiology, the mystical, and the spiritual. His investigations have taken him from intimate discussions with physicist David Bohm to the magical and mysterious jungles of Peru, from a significant meeting with Werner Heisenberg to the hot coals of a firewalk. For more info about Carole Dean and From the Heart Productions please visit www.FromtheHeartProductions.com.

This week, Dana and Stephen are once again joined by Kat Chow, author of the memoir Seeing Ghosts. The panel begins by jumping into the ring with Cassandro, the oddly conflict-adverse biopic about the lucha libre superstar and exótico gay icon, Saúl Armendáriz, who is played terrifically by Gael García Bernal in a provocative, tour-de-force performance. Then, the trio wades into comedian–and future Daily Show host hopeful–Hasan Minhaj's thorny web of lies with Slate staff writer, Nitish Pahwa, who detailed the devastating impact of Minhaj's many falsehoods in his essay, “Hasan Minhaj Meant Something to Brown Americans. Was It All an Act?” Finally, the three react to “The 40 Greatest Stand-Alone TV Episodes of All Time,” written by the Slate Staff, a massive labor of love and fun thought experiment that spans The Sopranos, Atlanta, The Larry Sanders Show, Black Mirror, and High Maintenance.  In the exclusive Slate Plus segment, the panel discusses the impact the last few years have had on their lives, inspired by Katy Schneider's essay for The Cut, “The Pandemic Skip.” Email us at culturefest@slate.com.  Endorsements: Dana: Dana sent this to everyone she knows–family, friends, etc. It's a new interview with Martin Scorsese, written by Zach Baron for GQ entitled “Martin Scorsese: ‘I Have To Find Out Who The Hell I Am.'” In addition to films and moviemaking (his latest, Killers of the Flower Moon, is set to be released in October), the legendary director, now 80, also speaks candidly about life, its inevitable end, and his own mortality. It's a dream of an interview and absolutely sublime.  Kat: Small Things Like These, a beautifully written historical fiction novel by Claire Keegan about the horrific conditions women and children endured at Magdalene Laundries in Ireland.  Stephen: “Quantum poetics,” an essay in Aeon written by William Egginton, a professor of humanities at James Hopkins University. In it, Egginton describes the ways Argentine short story author, Jorge Luis Borges, and German theoretical physicist Werner Heisenberg “converged on the notion that language both enables and interferes with our grasp of reality.”  Outro music: “Forbidden Love” by OTE Podcast production by Cameron Drews. Production assistance by Kat Hong.  If you enjoy this show, please consider signing up for Slate Plus. Slate Plus members get an ad-free experience across the network and exclusive content on many shows. You'll also be supporting the work we do here on the Culture Gabfest. Sign up now at Slate.com/cultureplus to help support our work. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This week, Dana and Stephen are once again joined by Kat Chow, author of the memoir Seeing Ghosts. The panel begins by jumping into the ring with Cassandro, the oddly conflict-adverse biopic about the lucha libre superstar and exótico gay icon, Saúl Armendáriz, who is played terrifically by Gael García Bernal in a provocative, tour-de-force performance. Then, the trio wades into comedian–and future Daily Show host hopeful–Hasan Minhaj's thorny web of lies with Slate staff writer, Nitish Pahwa, who detailed the devastating impact of Minhaj's many falsehoods in his essay, “Hasan Minhaj Meant Something to Brown Americans. Was It All an Act?” Finally, the three react to “The 40 Greatest Stand-Alone TV Episodes of All Time,” written by the Slate Staff, a massive labor of love and fun thought experiment that spans The Sopranos, Atlanta, The Larry Sanders Show, Black Mirror, and High Maintenance.  In the exclusive Slate Plus segment, the panel discusses the impact the last few years have had on their lives, inspired by Katy Schneider's essay for The Cut, “The Pandemic Skip.” Email us at culturefest@slate.com.  Endorsements: Dana: Dana sent this to everyone she knows–family, friends, etc. It's a new interview with Martin Scorsese, written by Zach Baron for GQ entitled “Martin Scorsese: ‘I Have To Find Out Who The Hell I Am.'” In addition to films and moviemaking (his latest, Killers of the Flower Moon, is set to be released in October), the legendary director, now 80, also speaks candidly about life, its inevitable end, and his own mortality. It's a dream of an interview and absolutely sublime.  Kat: Small Things Like These, a beautifully written historical fiction novel by Claire Keegan about the horrific conditions women and children endured at Magdalene Laundries in Ireland.  Stephen: “Quantum poetics,” an essay in Aeon written by William Egginton, a professor of humanities at James Hopkins University. In it, Egginton describes the ways Argentine short story author, Jorge Luis Borges, and German theoretical physicist Werner Heisenberg “converged on the notion that language both enables and interferes with our grasp of reality.”  Outro music: “Forbidden Love” by OTE Podcast production by Cameron Drews. Production assistance by Kat Hong.  If you enjoy this show, please consider signing up for Slate Plus. Slate Plus members get an ad-free experience across the network and exclusive content on many shows. You'll also be supporting the work we do here on the Culture Gabfest. Sign up now at Slate.com/cultureplus to help support our work. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Werner Heisenberg fue uno de los científicos más controvertidos del Tercer Reich: figura clave en la construcción de una bomba atómica, objetivo de un complot de asesinato aliado.Werner Karl Heisenberg ​ fue un físico teórico alemán y uno de los pioneros clave de la mecánica cuántica. Publicó su trabajo en 1925 en el artículo revolucionario Über quantentheoretische Umdeutung kinematischer und mechanischer Beziehungen. Premio Nobel de Física, Medalla Matteucci, Medalla Max Planck, Medalla de Oro Internacional Nield Bohr

La primera bomba atómica de la historia hizo explosión en la madrugada del 16 de julio de 1945 en un desierto del Estado de Nuevo México. No mató a nadie, fue una simple prueba que culminaba el denominado Proyecto Manhattan, nombre en clave que empleó el Gobierno de Estados Unidos para desarrollar las tres primeras armas nucleares. La primera de ellas, llamada Trinity, fue la que detonaron en el desierto para comprobar si las investigaciones realizadas en el laboratorio les habían llevado a buen puerto. Fabricaron otras dos: Little Boy, que sería arrojada sobre la ciudad japonesa de Hiroshima el 6 de agosto de 1945, y Fat Man, que se lanzó sobre Nagasaki tres días después. Estas bombas forzaron al imperio japonés a solicitar la rendición y así concluyó la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El director de ese proyecto que convirtió a Estados Unidos en la primera potencia nuclear fue Julius Robert Oppenheimer, un físico teórico de Nueva York que en sólo un par de años reunió en el laboratorio nacional de Los Álamos a muchos de los mejores científicos de la época. Gracias a su intuición y sus dotes de liderazgo, consiguió demostrar que lo que tan sólo era una novedosa teoría se transformase en el arma más temida de la historia. Quizá por eso mismo y ya en condición de héroe nacional fue posteriormente matizando su visión del arma atómica. En ese cambio tuvo mucho que ver la experiencia de los bombardeos de Hiroshima y Nagasaki. Cuando observó con sus propios ojos la destrucción absoluta que había ayudado a crear, se convirtió en un crítico de su uso, se opuso al desarrollo de la bomba de hidrógeno e insistió en que se controlase la proliferación de armas nucleares. Ese Oppenheimer de posguerra es mucho menos conocido, pero ayuda a entender al personaje histórico. Oppenheimer no era un físico al uso. Hijo de un rico comerciante textil hecho a sí mismo, estudió en Harvard, pero no física, sino química. Se interesó entonces por la física experimental y decidió cruzar el Atlántico para estudiar en la universidad de Cambridge junto a uno de los físicos experimentales más famosos del mundo. Una vez allí comprobó que lo suyo no era experimentar, sino trabajar la teoría, eso le llevó de cabeza a Alemania, a la universidad de Gotinga, para realizar su doctorado. En esos años en Europa trabó contacto con los principales físicos de su época, gente como Max Born, Enrico Fermi, Werner Heisenberg, Wolfgang Pauli o Niels Bohr que se encontraban en ese momento realizando contribuciones revolucionarias a esa ciencia. De regreso a Estados Unidos obtuvo un puesto de profesor en la universidad de Berkeley donde empezó a colaborar con Ernest Lawrence, un compatriota suyo y físico experimental que años después sería galardonado con el premio Nobel. En Berkeley, aparte de desarrollar alguna actividad política menor, se convirtió en un profesor muy reconocido tanto por sus alumnos como por sus colegas. Esa sería su carta de presentación cuando la Segunda Guerra Mundial y el Proyecto Manhattan se cruzaron en su vida. El Gobierno tenía la urgente necesidad de anticiparse a los alemanes en el desarrollo de la bomba atómica y ahí estaba Robert Oppenheimer con todo su conocimiento, su red de contactos y sus dotes organizativas para resolver ese problema. Fue ese proyecto el que le catapultaría hacia la inmortalidad y seguramente también del que más se arrepintió años después. 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Episode: 2699 Heligoland, a bucolic magnet for the machines of war.  Today, we visit Heligoland.

In 1938, German scientist split the atom for the first time, and the nuclear age is born. The Nazis give the task of building the Atomic Bomb to Nobel Peace prize-winning nuclear physicist Werner Heisenberg. In response to the threat of Hitler with nuclear weapons, the United States government devises a plan to send someone after the German scientist to ascertain the validity of the intelligence recieved, and assassinate Werner Heisenberg if it is credible... The person they tab for this mission is, former MLB back-up catcher, Moe Berg. #MoeBerg #OSS #CIA #RaySchalk #FranklinDelanoRoosevelt #BrooklynRobins #ChicagoWhiteSox #ClevelandIndians #BostonRedSox #AdolphHitler #WashingtonSenators #BabeRuth #LouGehrig #JimmyFoxx #WernerHeisenberg

In 1938, German scientist split the atom for the first time, and the nuclear age is born. The Nazis give the task of building the Atomic Bomb to Nobel Peace prize-winning nuclear physicist Werner Heisenberg. In response to the threat of Hitler with nuclear weapons, the United States government devises a plan to send someone after the German scientist to ascertain the validity of the intelligence recieved, and assassinate Werner Heisenberg if it is credible... The person they tab for this mission is, former MLB back-up catcher, Moe Berg. #MoeBerg #OSS #CIA #RaySchalk #FranklinDelanoRoosevelt #BrooklynRobins #ChicagoWhiteSox #ClevelandIndians #BostonRedSox #AdolphHitler #WashingtonSenators #BabeRuth #LouGehrig #JimmyFoxx #WernerHeisenberg

It was a tremendous honor & pleasure to interview Richard Rhodes, Pulitzer Prize winning author of The Making of the Atomic BombWe discuss* similarities between AI progress & Manhattan Project (developing a powerful, unprecedented, & potentially apocalyptic technology within an uncertain arms-race situation)* visiting starving former Soviet scientists during fall of Soviet Union* whether Oppenheimer was a spy, & consulting on the Nolan movie* living through WW2 as a child* odds of nuclear war in Ukraine, Taiwan, Pakistan, & North Korea* how the US pulled of such a massive secret wartime scientific & industrial projectWatch on YouTube. Listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or any other podcast platform. Read the full transcript here. Follow me on Twitter for updates on future episodes.Timestamps(0:00:00) - Oppenheimer movie(0:06:22) - Was the bomb inevitable?(0:29:10) - Firebombing vs nuclear vs hydrogen bombs(0:49:44) - Stalin & the Soviet program(1:08:24) - Deterrence, disarmament, North Korea, Taiwan(1:33:12) - Oppenheimer as lab director(1:53:40) - AI progress vs Manhattan Project(1:59:50) - Living through WW2(2:16:45) - Secrecy(2:26:34) - Wisdom & warTranscript(0:00:00) - Oppenheimer movieDwarkesh Patel 0:00:51Today I have the great honor of interviewing Richard Rhodes, who is the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb, and most recently, the author of Energy, A Human History. I'm really excited about this one. Let's jump in at a current event, which is the fact that there's a new movie about Oppenheimer coming out, which I understand you've been consulted about. What did you think of the trailer? What are your impressions? Richard Rhodes 0:01:22They've really done a good job of things like the Trinity test device, which was the sphere covered with cables of various kinds. I had watched Peaky Blinders, where the actor who's playing Oppenheimer also appeared, and he looked so much like Oppenheimer to start with. Oppenheimer was about six feet tall, he was rail thin, not simply in terms of weight, but in terms of structure. Someone said he could sit in a children's high chair comfortably. But he never weighed more than about 140 pounds and that quality is there in the actor. So who knows? It all depends on how the director decided to tell the story. There are so many aspects of the story that you could never possibly squeeze them into one 2-hour movie. I think that we're waiting for the multi-part series that would really tell a lot more of the story, if not the whole story. But it looks exciting. We'll see. There have been some terrible depictions of Oppenheimer, there've been some terrible depictions of the bomb program. And maybe they'll get this one right. Dwarkesh Patel 0:02:42Yeah, hopefully. It is always great when you get an actor who resembles their role so well. For example, Bryan Cranston who played LBJ, and they have the same physical characteristics of the beady eyes, the big ears. Since we're talking about Oppenheimer, I had one question about him. I understand that there's evidence that's come out that he wasn't directly a communist spy. But is there any possibility that he was leaking information to the Soviets or in some way helping the Soviet program? He was a communist sympathizer, right? Richard Rhodes 0:03:15He had been during the 1930s. But less for the theory than for the practical business of helping Jews escape from Nazi Germany. One of the loves of his life, Jean Tatlock, was also busy working on extracting Jews from Europe during the 30. She was a member of the Communist Party and she, I think, encouraged him to come to meetings. But I don't think there's any possibility whatsoever that he shared information. In fact, he said he read Marx on a train trip between Berkeley and Washington one time and thought it was a bunch of hooey, just ridiculous. He was a very smart man, and he read the book with an eye to its logic, and he didn't think there was much there. He really didn't know anything about human beings and their struggles. He was born into considerable wealth. There were impressionist paintings all over his family apartments in New York City. His father had made a great deal of money cornering the markets on uniform linings for military uniforms during and before the First World War so there was a lot of wealth. I think his income during the war years and before was somewhere around $100,000 a month. And that's a lot of money in the 1930s. So he just lived in his head for most of his early years until he got to Berkeley and discovered that prime students of his were living on cans of god-awful cat food, because they couldn't afford anything else. And once he understood that there was great suffering in the world, he jumped in on it, as he always did when he became interested in something. So all of those things come together. His brother Frank was a member of the party, as was Frank's wife. I think the whole question of Oppenheimer lying to the security people during the Second World War about who approached him and who was trying to get him to sign on to some espionage was primarily an effort to cover up his brother's involvement. Not that his brothers gave away any secrets, I don't think they did. But if the army's security had really understood Frank Oppenheimer's involvement, he probably would have been shipped off to the Aleutians or some other distant place for the duration of the war. And Oppenheimer quite correctly wanted Frank around. He was someone he trusted.(0:06:22) - Was the bomb inevitable?Dwarkesh Patel 0:06:22Let's start talking about The Making of the Bomb. One question I have is — if World War II doesn't happen, is there any possibility that the bomb just never gets developed? Nobody bothers.Richard Rhodes 0:06:34That's really a good question and I've wondered over the years. But the more I look at the sequence of events, the more I think it would have been essentially inevitable, though perhaps not such an accelerated program. The bomb was pushed so hard during the Second World War because we thought the Germans had already started working on one. Nuclear fission had been discovered in Nazi Germany, in Berlin, in 1938, nine months before the beginning of the Second World War in Europe. Technological surveillance was not available during the war. The only way you could find out something was to send in a spy or have a mole or something human. And we didn't have that. So we didn't know where the Germans were, but we knew that the basic physics reaction that could lead to a bomb had been discovered there a year or more before anybody else in the West got started thinking about it. There was that most of all to push the urgency. In your hypothetical there would not have been that urgency. However, as soon as good physicists thought about the reaction that leads to nuclear fission — where a slow room temperature neutron, very little energy, bumps into the nucleus of a uranium-235 atom it would lead to a massive response. Isidore Rabi, one of the great physicists of this era, said it would have been like the moon struck the earth. The reaction was, as physicists say, fiercely exothermic. It puts out a lot more energy than you have to use to get it started. Once they did the numbers on that, and once they figured out how much uranium you would need to have in one place to make a bomb or to make fission get going, and once they were sure that there would be a chain reaction, meaning a couple of neutrons would come out of the reaction from one atom, and those two or three would go on and bump into other Uranium atoms, which would then fission them, and you'd get a geometric exponential. You'd get 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, and off of there. For most of our bombs today the initial fission, in 80 generations, leads to a city-busting explosion. And then they had to figure out how much material they would need, and that's something the Germans never really figured out, fortunately for the rest of us. They were still working on the idea that somehow a reactor would be what you would build. When Niels Bohr, the great Danish physicist, escaped from Denmark in 1943 and came to England and then United States, he brought with him a rough sketch that Werner Heisenberg, the leading scientist in the German program, had handed him in the course of trying to find out what Bohr knew about what America was doing. And he showed it to the guys at Los Alamos and Hans Bethe, one of the great Nobel laureate physicists in the group, said — “Are the Germans trying to throw a reactor down on us?” You can make a reactor blow up, we saw that at Chernobyl, but it's not a nuclear explosion on the scale that we're talking about with the bomb. So when a couple of these emigres Jewish physicists from Nazi Germany were whiling away their time in England after they escaped, because they were still technically enemy aliens and therefore could not be introduced to top secret discussions, one of them asked the other — “How much would we need of pure uranium-235, this rare isotope of uranium that chain reacts? How much would we need to make a bomb?” And they did the numbers and they came up with one pound, which was startling to them. Of course, it is more than that. It's about 125 pounds, but that's just a softball. That's not that much material. And then they did the numbers about what it would cost to build a factory to pull this one rare isotope of uranium out of the natural metal, which has several isotopes mixed together. And they figured it wouldn't cost more than it would cost to build a battleship, which is not that much money for a country at war. Certainly the British had plenty of battleships at that point in time. So they put all this together and they wrote a report which they handed through their superior physicists at Manchester University where they were based, who quickly realized how important this was. The United States lagged behind because we were not yet at war, but the British were. London was being bombed in the blitz. So they saw the urgency, first of all, of eating Germany to the punch, second of all of the possibility of building a bomb. In this report, these two scientists wrote that no physical structure came to their minds which could offer protection against a bomb of such ferocious explosive power. This report was from 1940 long before the Manhattan Project even got started. They said in this report, the only way we could think of to protect you against a bomb would be to have a bomb of similar destructive force that could be threatened for use if the other side attacked you. That's deterrence. That's a concept that was developed even before the war began in the United States. You put all those pieces together and you have a situation where you have to build a bomb because whoever builds the first bomb theoretically could prevent you from building more or prevent another country from building any and could dominate the world. And the notion of Adolf Hitler dominating the world, the Third Reich with nuclear weapons, was horrifying. Put all that together and the answer is every country that had the technological infrastructure to even remotely have the possibility of building everything you'd have to build to get the material for a bomb started work on thinking about it as soon as nuclear fusion was announced to the world. France, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, even Japan. So I think the bomb would have been developed but maybe not so quickly. Dwarkesh Patel 0:14:10In the book you talk that for some reason the Germans thought that the critical mass was something like 10 tons, they had done some miscalculation.Richard Rhodes 0:14:18A reactor. Dwarkesh Patel 0:14:19You also have some interesting stories in the book about how different countries found out the Americans were working on the bomb. For example, the Russians saw that all the top physicists, chemists, and metallurgists were no longer publishing. They had just gone offline and so they figured that something must be going on. I'm not sure if you're aware that while the subject of the Making of the Atomic Bomb in and of itself is incredibly fascinating, this book has become a cult classic in AI. Are you familiar with this? Richard Rhodes 0:14:52No. Dwarkesh Patel 0:14:53The people who are working on AI right now are huge fans of yours. They're the ones who initially recommended the book to me because the way they see the progress in the field reminded them of this book. Because you start off with these initial scientific hints. With deep learning, for example, here's something that can teach itself any function is similar to Szilárd noticing the nuclear chain reaction. In AI there's these scaling laws that say that if you make the model this much bigger, it gets much better at reasoning, at predicting text, and so on. And then you can extrapolate this curve. And you can see we get two more orders of magnitude, and we get to something that looks like human level intelligence. Anyway, a lot of the people who are working in AI have become huge fans of your book because of this reason. They see a lot of analogies in the next few years. They must be at page 400 in their minds of where the Manhattan Project was.Richard Rhodes 0:15:55We must later on talk about unintended consequences. I find the subject absolutely fascinating. I think my next book might be called Unintended Consequences. Dwarkesh Patel 0:16:10You mentioned that a big reason why many of the scientists wanted to work on the bomb, especially the Jewish emigres, was because they're worried about Hitler getting it first. As you mentioned at some point, 1943, 1944, it was becoming obvious that Hitler, the Nazis were not close to the bomb. And I believe that almost none of the scientists quit after they found out that the Nazis weren't close. So why didn't more of them say — “Oh, I guess we were wrong. The Nazis aren't going to get it. We don't need to be working on it.”?Richard Rhodes 0:16:45There was only one who did that, Joseph Rotblat. In May of 1945 when he heard that Germany had been defeated, he packed up and left. General Groves, the imperious Army Corps of Engineers General who ran the entire Manhattan Project, was really upset. He was afraid he'd spill the beans. So he threatened to have him arrested and put in jail. But Rotblat was quite determined not to stay any longer. He was not interested in building bombs to aggrandize the national power of the United States of America, which is perfectly understandable. But why was no one else? Let me tell it in terms of Victor Weisskopf. He was an Austrian theoretical physicist, who, like the others, escaped when the Nazis took over Germany and then Austria and ended up at Los Alamos. Weisskopf wrote later — “There we were in Los Alamos in the midst of the darkest part of our science.” They were working on a weapon of mass destruction, that's pretty dark. He said “Before it had almost seemed like a spiritual quest.” And it's really interesting how different physics was considered before and after the Second World War. Before the war, one of the physicists in America named Louis Alvarez told me when he got his PhD in physics at Berkeley in 1937 and went to cocktail parties, people would ask, “What's your degree in?” He would tell them “Chemistry.” I said, “Louis, why?” He said, “because I don't really have to explain what physics was.” That's how little known this kind of science was at that time. There were only about 1,000 physicists in the whole world in 1900. By the mid-30s, there were a lot more, of course. There'd been a lot of nuclear physics and other kinds of physics done by them. But it was still arcane. And they didn't feel as if they were doing anything mean or dirty or warlike at all. They were just doing pure science. Then nuclear fission came along. It was publicized worldwide. People who've been born since after the Second World War don't realize that it was not a secret at first. The news was published first in a German chemistry journal, Die Naturwissenschaften, and then in the British journal Nature and then in American journals. And there were headlines in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune, and all over the world. People had been reading about and thinking about how to get energy out of the atomic nucleus for a long time. It was clear there was a lot there. All you had to do was get a piece of radium and see that it glowed in the dark. This chunk of material just sat there, you didn't plug it into a wall. And if you held it in your hand, it would burn you. So where did that energy come from? The physicists realized it all came from the nucleus of the atom, which is a very small part of the whole thing. The nucleus is 1/100,000th the diameter of the whole atom. Someone in England described it as about the size of a fly in a cathedral. All of the energy that's involved in chemical reactions, comes from the electron cloud that's around the nucleus. But  it was clear that the nucleus was the center of powerful forces. But the question was, how do you get them out? The only way that the nucleus had been studied up to 1938 was by bombarding it with protons, which have the same electric charge as the nucleus, positive charge, which means they were repelled by it. So you had to accelerate them to high speeds with various versions of the big machines that we've all become aware of since then. The cyclotron most obviously built in the 30s, but there were others as well. And even then, at best, you could chip a little piece off. You could change an atom one step up or one step down the periodic table. This was the classic transmutation of medieval alchemy sure but it wasn't much, you didn't get much out. So everyone came to think of the nucleus of the atom like a little rock that you really had to hammer hard to get anything to happen with it because it was so small and dense. That's why nuclear fission, with this slow neutron drifting and then the whole thing just goes bang, was so startling to everybody. So startling that when it happened, most of the physicists who would later work on the bomb and others as well, realized that they had missed the reaction that was something they could have staged on a lab bench with the equipment on the shelf. Didn't have to invent anything new. And Louis Alvarez again, this physicist at Berkeley, he said — “I was getting my hair cut. When I read the newspaper, I pulled off the robe and half with my hair cut, ran to my lab, pulled some equipment off the shelf, set it up and there it was.” So he said, “I discovered nuclear fission, but it was two days too late.” And that happened all over. People were just hitting themselves on the head and saying, well, Niels Bohr said, “What fools we've all been.” So this is a good example of how in science, if your model you're working with is wrong it doesn't lead you down the right path. There was only one physicist who really was thinking the right way about the uranium atom and that was Niels Bohr. He wondered, sometime during the 30s, why uranium was the last natural element in the periodic table? What is different about the others that would come later? He visualized the nucleus as a liquid drop. I always like to visualize it as a water-filled balloon. It's wobbly, it's not very stable. The protons in the nucleus are held together by something called the strong force, but they still have the repellent positive electric charge that's trying to push them apart when you get enough of them into a nucleus. It's almost a standoff between the strong force and all the electrical charge. So it is like a wobbly balloon of water. And then you see why a neutron just falling into the nucleus would make it wobble around even more and in one of its configurations, it might take a dumbbell shape. And then you'd have basically two charged atoms just barely connected, trying to push each other apart. And often enough, they went the whole way. When they did that, these two new elements, half the weight of uranium, way down the periodic table, would reconfigure themselves into two separate nuclei. And in doing so, they would release some energy. And that was the energy that came out of the reaction and there was a lot of energy. So Bohr thought about the model in the right way. The chemists who actually discovered nuclear fusion didn't know what they were gonna get. They were just bombarding a solution of uranium nitrate with neutrons thinking, well, maybe we can make a new element, maybe a first man-made element will come out of our work. So when they analyzed the solution after they bombarded it, they found elements halfway down the periodic table. They shouldn't have been there. And they were totally baffled. What is this doing here? Do we contaminate our solution? No. They had been working with a physicist named Lisa Meitner who was a theoretical physicist, an Austrian Jew. She had gotten out of Nazi Germany not long before. But they were still in correspondence with her. So they wrote her a letter. I held that letter in my hand when I visited Berlin and I was in tears. You don't hold history of that scale in your hands very often. And it said in German — “We found this strange reaction in our solution. What are these elements doing there that don't belong there?” And she went for a walk in a little village in Western Sweden with her nephew, Otto Frisch, who was also a nuclear physicist. And they thought about it for a while and they remembered Bohr's model, the wobbly water-filled balloon. And they suddenly saw what could happen. And that's where the news came from, the physics news as opposed to the chemistry news from the guys in Germany that was published in all the Western journals and all the newspapers. And everybody had been talking about, for years, what you could do if you had that kind of energy. A glass of this material would drive the Queen Mary back and forth from New York to London 20 times and so forth, your automobile could run for months. People were thinking about what would be possible if you had that much available energy. And of course, people had thought about reactors. Robert Oppenheimer was a professor at Berkeley and within a week of the news reaching Berkeley, one of his students told me that he had a drawing on the blackboard, a rather bad drawing of both a reactor and a bomb. So again, because the energy was so great, the physics was pretty obvious. Whether it would actually happen depended on some other things like could you make it chain react? But fundamentally, the idea was all there at the very beginning and everybody jumped on it. Dwarkesh Patel 0:27:54The book is actually the best history of World War II I've ever read. It's about the atomic bomb, but it's interspersed with the events that are happening in World War II, which motivate the creation of the bomb or the release of it, why it had to be dropped on Japan given the Japanese response. The first third is about the scientific roots of the physics and it's also the best book I've read about the history of science in the early 20th century and the organization of it. There's some really interesting stuff in there. For example, there was a passage where you talk about how there's a real master apprentice model in early science where if you wanted to learn to do this kind of experimentation, you will go to Amsterdam where the master of it is residing. It's much more individual focused. Richard Rhodes 0:28:58Yeah, the whole European model of graduate study, which is basically the wandering scholar. You could go wherever you wanted to and sign up with whoever was willing to have you sign up. (0:29:10) - Firebombing vs nuclear vs hydrogen bombsDwarkesh Patel 0:29:10But the question I wanted to ask regarding the history you made of World War II in general is — there's one way you can think about the atom bomb which is that it is completely different from any sort of weaponry that has been developed before it. Another way you can think of it is there's a spectrum where on one end you have the thermonuclear bomb, in the middle you have the atom bomb, and on this end you have the firebombing of cities like Hamburg and Dresden and Tokyo. Do you think of these as completely different categories or does it seem like an escalating gradient to you? Richard Rhodes 0:29:47I think until you get to the hydrogen bomb, it's really an escalating gradient. The hydrogen bomb can be made arbitrarily large. The biggest one ever tested was 56 megatons of TNT equivalent. The Soviet tested that. That had a fireball more than five miles in diameter, just the fireball. So that's really an order of magnitude change. But the other one's no and in fact, I think one of the real problems, this has not been much discussed and it should be, when American officials went to Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the war, one of them said later — “I got on a plane in Tokyo. We flew down the long green archipelago of the Japanese home island. When I left Tokyo, it was all gray broken roof tiles from the fire bombing and the other bombings. And then all this greenery. And then when we flew over Hiroshima, it was just gray broken roof tiles again.” So the scale of the bombing with one bomb, in the case of Hiroshima, was not that different from the scale of the fire bombings that had preceded it with tens of thousands of bombs. The difference was it was just one plane. In fact, the people in Hiroshima didn't even bother to go into their bomb shelters because one plane had always just been a weather plane. Coming over to check the weather before the bombers took off. So they didn't see any reason to hide or protect themselves, which was one of the reasons so many people were killed. The guys at Los Alamos had planned on the Japanese being in their bomb shelters. They did everything they could think of to make the bomb as much like ordinary bombing as they could. And for example, it was exploded high enough above ground, roughly 1,800 yards, so that the fireball that would form from this really very small nuclear weapon — by modern standards — 15 kilotons of TNT equivalent, wouldn't touch the ground and stir up dirt and irradiate it and cause massive radioactive fallout. It never did that. They weren't sure there would be any fallout. They thought the plutonium and the bomb over Nagasaki now would just kind of turn into a gas and blow away. That's not exactly what happened. But people don't seem to realize, and it's never been emphasized enough, these first bombs, like all nuclear weapons, were firebombs. Their job was to start mass fires, just exactly like all the six-pound incendiaries that had been destroying every major city in Japan by then. Every major city above 50,000 population had already been burned out. The only reason Hiroshima and Nagasaki were around to be atomic bombed is because they'd been set aside from the target list, because General Groves wanted to know what the damage effects would be. The bomb that was tested in the desert didn't tell you anything. It killed a lot of rabbits, knocked down a lot of cactus, melted some sand, but you couldn't see its effect on buildings and on people. So the bomb was deliberately intended to be as much not like poison gas, for example, because we didn't want the reputation for being like people in the war in Europe during the First World War, where people were killing each other with horrible gasses. We just wanted people to think this was another bombing. So in that sense, it was. Of course, there was radioactivity. And of course, some people were killed by it. But they calculated that the people who would be killed by the irradiation, the neutron radiation from the original fireball, would be close enough to the epicenter of the explosion that they would be killed by the blast or the flash of light, which was 10,000 degrees. The world's worst sunburn. You've seen stories of people walking around with their skin hanging off their arms. I've had sunburns almost that bad, but not over my whole body, obviously, where the skin actually peeled blisters and peels off. That was a sunburn from a 10,000 degree artificial sun. Dwarkesh Patel 0:34:29So that's not the heat, that's just the light? Richard Rhodes 0:34:32Radiant light, radiant heat. 10,000 degrees. But the blast itself only extended out a certain distance, it was fire. And all the nuclear weapons that have ever been designed are basically firebombs. That's important because the military in the United States after the war was not able to figure out how to calculate the effects of this weapon in a reliable way that matched their previous experience. They would only calculate the blast effects of a nuclear weapon when they figured their targets. That's why we had what came to be called overkill. We wanted redundancy, of course, but 60 nuclear weapons on Moscow was way beyond what would be necessary to destroy even that big a city because they were only calculating the blast. But in fact, if you exploded a 300 kiloton nuclear warhead over the Pentagon at 3,000 feet, it would blast all the way out to the capital, which isn't all that far. But if you counted the fire, it would start a mass-fire and then it would reach all the way out to the Beltway and burn everything between the epicenter of the weapon and the Beltway. All organic matter would be totally burned out, leaving nothing but mineral matter, basically. Dwarkesh Patel 0:36:08I want to emphasize two things you said because they really hit me in reading the book and I'm not sure if the audience has fully integrated them. The first is, in the book, the military planners and Groves, they talk about needing to use the bomb sooner rather than later, because they were running out of cities in Japan where there are enough buildings left that it would be worth bombing in the first place, which is insane. An entire country is almost already destroyed from fire bombing alone. And the second thing about the category difference between thermonuclear and atomic bombs. Daniel Ellsberg, the nuclear planner who wrote the Doomsday machine, he talks about, people don't understand that the atom bomb that resulted in the pictures we see of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, that is simply the detonator of a modern nuclear bomb, which is an insane thing to think about. So for example, 10 and 15 kilotons is the Hiroshima Nagasaki and the Tsar Bomba, which was 50 megatons. So more than 1,000 times as much. And that wasn't even as big as they could make it. They kept the uranium tamper off, because they didn't want to destroy all of Siberia. So you could get more than 10,000 times as powerful. Richard Rhodes 0:37:31When Edward Teller, co-inventor of the hydrogen bomb and one of the dark forces in the story, was consulting with our military, just for his own sake, he sat down and calculated, how big could you make a hydrogen bomb? He came up with 1,000 megatons. And then he looked at the effects. 1,000 megatons would be a fireball 10 miles in diameter. And the atmosphere is only 10 miles deep. He figured that it would just be a waste of energy, because it would all blow out into space. Some of it would go laterally, of course, but most of it would just go out into space. So a bomb more than 100 megatons would just be totally a waste of time. Of course, a 100 megatons bomb is also a total waste, because there's no target on Earth big enough to justify that from a military point of view. Robert Oppenheimer, when he had his security clearance questioned and then lifted when he was being punished for having resisted the development of the hydrogen bomb, was asked by the interrogator at this security hearing — “Well, Dr. Oppenheimer, if you'd had a hydrogen bomb for Hiroshima, wouldn't you have used it?” And Oppenheimer said, “No.” The interrogator asked, “Why is that?” He said because the target was too small. I hope that scene is in the film, I'm sure it will be. So after the war, when our bomb planners and some of our scientists went into Hiroshima and Nagasaki, just about as soon as the surrender was signed, what they were interested in was the scale of destruction, of course. And those two cities didn't look that different from the other cities that had been firebombed with small incendiaries and ordinary high explosives. They went home to Washington, the policy makers, with the thought that — “Oh, these bombs are not so destructive after all.” They had been touted as city busters, basically, and they weren't. They didn't completely burn out cities. They were not certainly more destructive than the firebombing campaign, when everything of more than 50,000 population had already been destroyed. That, in turn, influenced the judgment about what we needed to do vis-a-vis the Soviet Union when the Soviets got the bomb in 1949. There was a general sense that, when you could fight a war with nuclear weapons, deterrence or not, you would need quite a few of them to do it right. And the Air Force, once it realized that it could aggrandize its own share of the federal budget by cornering the market and delivering nuclear weapons, very quickly decided that they would only look at the blast effect and not the fire effect. It's like tying one hand behind your back. Most of it was a fire effect. So that's where they came up with numbers like we need 60 of these to take out Moscow. And what the Air Force figured out by the late 1940s is that the more targets, the more bombs. The more bombs, the more planes. The more planes, the biggest share of the budget. So by the mid 1950s, the Air Force commanded 47% of the federal defense budget. And the other branches of services, which had not gone nuclear by then, woke up and said, we'd better find some use for these weapons in our branches of service. So the Army discovered that it needed nuclear weapons, tactical weapons for field use, fired out of cannons. There was even one that was fired out of a shoulder mounted rifle. There was a satchel charge that two men could carry, weighed about 150 pounds, that could be used to dig a ditch so that Soviet tanks couldn't cross into Germany. And of course the Navy by then had been working hard with General Rickover on building a nuclear submarine that could carry ballistic missiles underwater in total security. No way anybody could trace those submarines once they were quiet enough. And a nuclear reactor is very quiet. It just sits there with neutrons running around, making heat. So the other services jumped in and this famous triad, we must have these three different kinds of nuclear weapons, baloney. We would be perfectly safe if we only had our nuclear submarines. And only one or two of those. One nuclear submarine can take out all of Europe or all of the Soviet Union.Dwarkesh Patel 0:42:50Because it has multiple nukes on it? Richard Rhodes 0:42:53Because they have 16 intercontinental ballistic missiles with MIRV warheads, at least three per missile. Dwarkesh Patel 0:43:02Wow. I had a former guest, Richard Hanania, who has a book about foreign policy where he points out that our model of thinking about why countries do the things they do, especially in foreign affairs, is wrong because we think of them as individual rational actors, when in fact it's these competing factions within the government. And in fact, you see this especially in the case of Japan in World War II, there was a great book of Japan leading up to World War II, where they talk about how a branch of the Japanese military, I forget which, needed more oil to continue their campaign in Manchuria so they forced these other branches to escalate. But it's so interesting that the reason we have so many nukes is that the different branches are competing for funding. Richard Rhodes 0:43:50Douhet, the theorist of air power, had been in the trenches in the First World War. Somebody (John Masefield) called the trenches of the First World War, the long grave already dug, because millions of men were killed and the trenches never moved, a foot this way, a foot that way, all this horror. And Douhet came up with the idea that if you could fly over the battlefield to the homeland of the enemy and destroy his capacity to make war, then the people of that country, he theorized, would rise up in rebellion and throw out their leaders and sue for peace. And this became the dream of all the Air Forces of the world, but particularly ours. Until around 1943, it was called the US Army Air Force. The dream of every officer in the Air Force was to get out from under the Army, not just be something that delivers ground support or air support to the Army as it advances, but a power that could actually win wars. And the missing piece had always been the scale of the weaponry they carried. So when the bomb came along, you can see why Curtis LeMay, who ran the strategic air command during the prime years of that force, was pushing for bigger and bigger bombs. Because if a plane got shot down, but the one behind it had a hydrogen bomb, then it would be just almost as effective as the two planes together. So they wanted big bombs. And they went after Oppenheimer because he thought that was a terrible way to go, that there was really no military use for these huge weapons. Furthermore, the United States had more cities than Russia did, than the Soviet Union did. And we were making ourselves a better target by introducing a weapon that could destroy a whole state. I used to live in Connecticut and I saw a map that showed the air pollution that blew up from New York City to Boston. And I thought, well, now if that was fallout, we'd be dead up here in green, lovely Connecticut. That was the scale that it was going to be with these big new weapons. So on the one hand, you had some of the important leaders in the government thinking that these weapons were not the war-winning weapons that the Air Force wanted them and realized they could be. And on the other hand, you had the Air Force cornering the market on nuclear solutions to battles. All because some guy in a trench in World War I was sufficiently horrified and sufficiently theoretical about what was possible with air power. Remember, they were still flying biplanes. When H.G. Wells wrote his novel, The World Set Free in 1913, predicting an atomic war that would lead to world government, he had Air Forces delivering atomic bombs, but he forgot to update his planes. The guys in the back seat, the bombardiers, were sitting in a biplane, open cockpit. And when the pilots had dropped the bomb, they would reach down and pick up H.G. Wells' idea of an atomic bomb and throw it over the side. Which is kind of what was happening in Washington after the war. And it led us to a terribly misleading and unfortunate perspective on how many weapons we needed, which in turn fermented the arms race with the Soviets and just chased off. In the Soviet Union, they had a practical perspective on factories. Every factory was supposed to produce 120% of its target every year. That was considered good Soviet realism. And they did that with their nuclear war weapons. So by the height of the Cold War, they had 75,000 nuclear weapons, and nobody had heard yet of nuclear winter. So if both sides had set off this string of mass traps that we had in our arsenals, it would have been the end of the human world without question. Dwarkesh Patel 0:48:27It raises an interesting question, if the military planners thought that the conventional nuclear weapon was like the fire bombing, would it have been the case that if there wasn't a thermonuclear weapon, that there actually would have been a nuclear war by now because people wouldn't have been thinking of it as this hard red line? Richard Rhodes 0:48:47I don't think so because we're talking about one bomb versus 400, and one plane versus 400 planes and thousands of bombs. That scale was clear. Deterrence was the more important business. Everyone seemed to understand even the spies that the Soviets had connected up to were wholesaling information back to the Soviet Union. There's this comic moment when Truman is sitting with Joseph Stalin at Potsdam, and he tells Stalin, we have a powerful new weapon. And that's as much as he's ready to say about it. And Stalin licks at him and says, “Good, I hope you put it to good use with the Japanese.” Stalin knows exactly what he's talking about. He's seen the design of the fat man type Nagasaki plutonium bomb. He has held it in his hands because they had spies all over the place. (0:49:44) - Stalin & the Soviet programDwarkesh Patel 0:49:44How much longer would it have taken the Soviets to develop the bomb if they didn't have any spies? Richard Rhodes 0:49:49Probably not any longer. Dwarkesh Patel 0:49:51Really? Richard Rhodes 0:49:51When the Soviet Union collapsed in the winter of ‘92, I ran over there as quickly as I could get over there. In this limbo between forming a new kind of government and some of the countries pulling out and becoming independent and so forth, their nuclear scientists, the ones who'd worked on their bombs were free to talk. And I found that out through Yelena Bonner, Andrei Sakharov's widow, who was connected to people I knew. And she said, yeah, come on over. Her secretary, Sasha, who was a geologist about 35 years old became my guide around the country. We went to various apartments. They were retired guys from the bomb program and were living on, as far as I could tell, sac-and-potatoes and some salt. They had government pensions and the money was worth a salt, all of a sudden. I was buying photographs from them, partly because I needed the photographs and partly because 20 bucks was two months' income at that point. So it was easy for me and it helped them. They had first class physicists in the Soviet Union, they do in Russian today. They told me that by 1947, they had a design for a bomb that they said was half the weight and twice the yield of the Fat Man bomb. The Fat Man bomb was the plutonium implosion, right? And it weighed about 9,000 pounds. They had a much smaller and much more deliverable bomb with a yield of about 44 kilotons. Dwarkesh Patel 0:51:41Why was Soviet physics so good?Richard Rhodes 0:51:49The Russian mind? I don't know. They learned all their technology from the French in the 19th century, which is why there's so many French words in Russian. So they got good teachers, the French are superb technicians, they aren't so good at building things, but they're very good at designing things. There's something about Russia, I don't know if it's the language or the education. They do have good education, they did. But I remember asking them when they were working, I said — On the hydrogen bomb, you didn't have any computers yet. We only had really early primitive computers to do the complicated calculations of the hydrodynamics of that explosion. I said, “What did you do?” They said, “Oh, we just used nuclear. We just used theoretical physics.” Which is what we did at Los Alamos. We had guys come in who really knew their math and they would sit there and work it out by hand. And women with old Marchant calculators running numbers. So basically they were just good scientists and they had this new design. Kurchatov who ran the program took Lavrentiy Beria, who ran the NKVD who was put in charge of the program and said — “Look, we can build you a better bomb. You really wanna waste the time to make that much more uranium and plutonium?” And Beria said, “Comrade, I want the American bomb. Give me the American bomb or you and all your families will be camp dust.” I talked to one of the leading scientists in the group and he said, we valued our lives, we valued our families. So we gave them a copy of the plutonium implosion bomb. Dwarkesh Patel 0:53:37Now that you explain this, when the Soviet Union fell, why didn't North Korea, Iran or another country, send a few people to the fallen Soviet Union to recruit a few of the scientists to start their own program? Or buy off their stockpiles or something. Or did they?Richard Rhodes 0:53:59There was some effort by countries in the Middle East to get all the enriched uranium, which they wouldn't sell them. These were responsible scientists. They told me — we worked on the bomb because you had it and we didn't want there to be a monopoly on the part of any country in the world. So patriotically, even though Stalin was in charge of our country, he was a monster. We felt that it was our responsibility to work on these things, even Sakharov. There was a great rush at the end of the Second World War to get hold of German scientists. And about an equal number were grabbed by the Soviets. All of the leading German scientists, like Heisenberg and Hans and others, went west as fast as they could. They didn't want to be captured by the Soviets. But there were some who were. And they helped them work. People have the idea that Los Alamos was where the bomb happened. And it's true that at Los Alamos, we had the team that designed, developed, and built the first actual weapons. But the truth is, the important material for weapons is the uranium or plutonium. One of the scientists in the Manhattan Project told me years later, you can make a pretty high-level nuclear explosion just by taking two subcritical pieces of uranium, putting one on the floor and dropping the other by hand from a height of about six feet. If that's true, then all this business about secret designs and so forth is hogwash. What you really need for a weapon is the critical mass of highly enriched uranium, 90% of uranium-235. If you've got that, there are lots of different ways to make the bomb. We had two totally different ways that we used. The gun on the one hand for uranium, and then because plutonium was so reactive that if you fired up the barrel of a cannon at 3,000 feet per second, it would still melt down before the two pieces made it up. So for that reason, they had to invent an entirely new technology, which was an amazing piece of work. From the Soviet point of view, and I think this is something people don't know either, but it puts the Russian experience into a better context. All the way back in the 30s, since the beginning of the Soviet Union after the First World War, they had been sending over espionage agents connected up to Americans who were willing to work for them to collect industrial technology. They didn't have it when they began their country. It was very much an agricultural country. And in that regard, people still talk about all those damn spies stealing our secrets, we did the same thing with the British back in colonial days. We didn't know how to make a canal that wouldn't drain out through the soil. The British had a certain kind of clay that they would line their canals with, and there were canals all over England, even in the 18th century, that were impervious to the flow of water. And we brought a British engineer at great expense to teach us how to make the lining for the canals that opened up the Middle West and then the West. So they were doing the same thing. And one of those spies was a guy named Harry Gold, who was working all the time for them. He gave them some of the basic technology of Kodak filmmaking, for example. Harry Gold was the connection between David Greenglass and one of the American spies at Los Alamos and the Soviet Union. So it was not different. The model was — never give us something that someone dreamed of that hasn't been tested and you know works. So it would actually be blueprints for factories, not just a patent. And therefore when Beria after the war said, give us the bomb, he meant give me the American bomb because we know that works. I don't trust you guys. Who knows what you'll do. You're probably too stupid anyway. He was that kind of man. So for all of those reasons, they built the second bomb they tested was twice the yield and half the way to the first bomb. In other words, it was their new design. And so it was ours because the technology was something that we knew during the war, but it was too theoretical still to use. You just had to put the core and have a little air gap between the core and the explosives so that the blast wave would have a chance to accelerate through an open gap. And Alvarez couldn't tell me what it was but he said, you can get a lot more destructive force with a hammer if you hit something with it, rather than if you put the head on the hammer and push. And it took me several years before I figured out what he meant. I finally understood he was talking about what's called levitation.Dwarkesh Patel 0:59:41On the topic that the major difficulty in developing a bomb is either the refinement of uranium into U-235 or its transmutation into plutonium, I was actually talking to a physicist in preparation for this conversation. He explained the same thing that if you get two subcritical masses of uranium together, you wouldn't have the full bomb because it would start to tear itself apart without the tamper, but you would still have more than one megaton.Richard Rhodes 1:00:12It would be a few kilotons. Alvarez's model would be a few kilotons, but that's a lot. Dwarkesh Patel 1:00:20Yeah, sorry I meant kiloton. He claimed that one of the reasons why we talk so much about Los Alamos is that at the time the government didn't want other countries to know that if you refine uranium, you've got it. So they were like, oh, we did all this fancy physics work in Los Alamos that you're not gonna get to, so don't even worry about it. I don't know what you make of that theory. That basically it was sort of a way to convince people that Los Alamos was important. Richard Rhodes 1:00:49I think all the physics had been checked out by a lot of different countries by then. It was pretty clear to everybody what you needed to do to get to a bomb. That there was a fast fusion reaction, not a slow fusion reaction, like a reactor. They'd worked that out. So I don't think that's really the problem. But to this day, no one ever talks about the fact that the real problem isn't the design of the weapon. You could make one with wooden boxes if you wanted to. The problem is getting the material. And that's good because it's damned hard to make that stuff. And it's something you can protect. Dwarkesh Patel 1:01:30We also have gotten very lucky, if lucky is the word you want to use. I think you mentioned this in the book at some point, but the laws of physics could have been such that unrefined uranium ore was enough to build a nuclear weapon, right? In some sense, we got lucky that it takes a nation-state level actor to really refine and produce the raw substance. Richard Rhodes 1:01:56Yeah, I was thinking about that this morning on the way over. And all the uranium in the world would already have destroyed itself. Most people have never heard of the living reactors that developed on their own in a bed of uranium ore in Africa about two billion years ago, right? When there was more U-235 in a mass of uranium ore than there is today, because it decays like all radioactive elements. And the French discovered it when they were mining the ore and found this bed that had a totally different set of nuclear characteristics. They were like, what happened? But there were natural reactors in Gabon once upon a time. And they started up because some water, a moderator to make the neutrons slow down, washed its way down through a bed of much more highly enriched uranium ore than we still have today. Maybe 5-10% instead of 3.5 or 1.5, whatever it is now. And they ran for about 100,000 years and then shut themselves down because they had accumulated enough fusion products that the U-235 had been used up. Interestingly, this material never migrated out of the bed of ore. People today who are anti-nuclear say, well, what are we gonna do about the waste? Where are we gonna put all that waste? It's silly. Dwarkesh Patel 1:03:35Shove it in a hole. Richard Rhodes 1:03:36Yeah, basically. That's exactly what we're planning to do. Holes that are deep enough and in beds of material that will hold them long enough for everything to decay back to the original ore. It's not a big problem except politically because nobody wants it in their backyard.Dwarkesh Patel 1:03:53On the topic of the Soviets, one question I had while reading the book was — we negotiated with Stalin at Yalta and we surrendered a large part of Eastern Europe to him under his sphere of influence. And obviously we saw 50 years of immiseration there as a result. Given the fact that only we had the bomb, would it have been possible that we could have just knocked out the Soviet Union or at least prevented so much of the world from succumbing to communism in the aftermath of World War II? Is that a possibility? Richard Rhodes 1:04:30When we say we had the bomb, we had a few partly assembled handmade bombs. It took almost as long to assemble one as the battery life of the batteries that would drive the original charge that would set off the explosion. It was a big bluff. You know, when they closed Berlin in 1948 and we had to supply Berlin by air with coal and food for a whole winter, we moved some B-29s to England. The B-29 being the bomber that had carried the bombs. They were not outfitted for nuclear weapons. They didn't have the same kind of bomb-based structure. The weapons that were dropped in Japan had a single hook that held the entire bomb. So when the bay opened and the hook was released, the thing dropped. And that's very different from dropping whole rows of small bombs that you've seen in the photographs and the film footage. So it was a big bluff on our part. We took some time after the war inevitably to pull everything together. Here was a brand new technology. Here was a brand new weapon. Who was gonna be in charge of it? The military wanted control, Truman wasn't about to give the military control. He'd been an artillery officer in the First World War. He used to say — “No, damn artillery captain is gonna start World War III when I'm president.” I grew up in the same town he lived in so I know his accent. Independence, Missouri. Used to see him at his front steps taking pictures with tourists while he was still president. He used to step out on the porch and let the tourists take photographs. About a half a block from my Methodist church where I went to church. It was interesting. Interestingly, his wife was considered much more socially acceptable than he was. She was from an old family in independence, Missouri. And he was some farmer from way out in Grandview, Missouri, South of Kansas City. Values. Anyway, at the end of the war, there was a great rush from the Soviet side of what was already a zone. There was a Soviet zone, a French zone, British zone and an American zone. Germany was divided up into those zones to grab what's left of the uranium ore that the Germans had stockpiled. And there was evidence that there was a number of barrels of the stuff in a warehouse somewhere in the middle of all of this. And there's a very funny story about how the Russians ran in and grabbed off one site full of uranium ore, this yellow black stuff in what were basically wine barrels. And we at the same night, just before the wall came down between the zones, were running in from the other side, grabbing some other ore and then taking it back to our side. But there was also a good deal of requisitioning of German scientists. And the ones who had gotten away early came West, but there were others who didn't and ended up helping the Soviets. And they were told, look, you help us build the reactors and the uranium separation systems that we need. And we'll let you go home and back to your family, which they did. Early 50s by then, the German scientists who had helped the Russians went home. And I think our people stayed here and brought their families over, I don't know. (1:08:24) - Deterrence, disarmament, North Korea, TaiwanDwarkesh Patel 1:08:24Was there an opportunity after the end of World War II, before the Soviets developed the bomb, for the US to do something where either it somehow enforced a monopoly on having the bomb, or if that wasn't possible, make some sort of credible gesture that, we're eliminating this knowledge, you guys don't work on this, we're all just gonna step back from this. Richard Rhodes 1:08:50We tried both before the war. General Groves, who had the mistaken impression that there was a limited amount of high-grade uranium ore in the world, put together a company that tried to corner the market on all the available supply. For some reason, he didn't realize that a country the size of the Soviet Union is going to have some uranium ore somewhere. And of course it did, in Kazakhstan, rich uranium ore, enough for all the bombs they wanted to build. But he didn't know that, and I frankly don't know why he didn't know that, but I guess uranium's use before the Second World War was basically as a glazing agent for pottery, that famous yellow pottery and orange pottery that people owned in the 1930s, those colors came from uranium, and they're sufficiently radioactive, even to this day, that if you wave a Geiger counter over them, you get some clicks. In fact, there have been places where they've gone in with masks and suits on, grabbed the Mexican pottery and taken it out in a lead-lined case. People have been so worried about it but that was the only use for uranium, to make a particular kind of glass. So once it became clear that there was another use for uranium, a much more important one, Groves tried to corner the world market, and he thought he had. So that was one effort to limit what the Soviet Union could do. Another was to negotiate some kind of agreement between the parties. That was something that really never got off the ground, because the German Secretary of State was an old Southern politician and he didn't trust the Soviets. He went to the first meeting, in Geneva in ‘45 after the war was over, and strutted around and said, well, I got the bomb in my pocket, so let's sit down and talk here. And the Soviet basically said, screw you. We don't care. We're not worried about your bomb. Go home. So that didn't work. Then there was the effort to get the United Nations to start to develop some program of international control. And the program was proposed originally by a committee put together by our State Department that included Robert Oppenheimer, rightly so, because the other members of the committee were industrialists, engineers, government officials, people with various kinds of expertise around the very complicated problems of technology and the science and, of course, the politics, the diplomacy. In a couple of weeks, Oppenheimer taught them the basics of the nuclear physics involved and what he knew about bomb design, which was everything, actually, since he'd run Los Alamos. He was a scientist during the war. And they came up with a plan. People have scoffed ever since at what came to be called the Acheson-Lilienthal plan named after the State Department people. But it's the only plan I think anyone has ever devised that makes real sense as to how you could have international control without a world government. Every country would be open to inspection by any agency that was set up. And the inspections would not be at the convenience of the country. But whenever the inspectors felt they needed to inspect. So what Oppenheimer called an open world. And if you had that, and then if each country then developed its own nuclear industries, nuclear power, medical uses, whatever, then if one country tried clandestinely to begin to build bombs, you would know about it at the time of the next inspection. And then you could try diplomacy. If that didn't work, you could try conventional war. If that wasn't sufficient, then you could start building your bombs too. And at the end of this sequence, which would be long enough, assuming that there were no bombs existing in the world, and the ore was stored in a warehouse somewhere, six months maybe, maybe a year, it would be time for everyone to scale up to deterrence with weapons rather than deterrence without weapons, with only the knowledge. That to me is the answer to the whole thing. And it might have worked. But there were two big problems. One, no country is going to allow a monopoly on a nuclear weapon, at least no major power. So the Russians were not willing to sign on from the beginning. They just couldn't. How could they? We would not have. Two, Sherman assigned a kind of a loudmouth, a wise old Wall Street guy to present this program to the United Nations. And he sat down with Oppenheimer after he and his people had studied and said, where's your army? Somebody starts working on a bomb over there. You've got to go in and take that out, don't you? He said, what would happen if one country started building a bomb? Oppenheimer said, well, that would be an act of war. Meaning then the other countries could begin to escalate as they needed to to protect themselves against one power, trying to overwhelm the rest. Well, Bernard Baruch was the name of the man. He didn't get it. So when he presented his revised version of the Acheson–Lilienthal Plan, which was called the Baruch Plan to the United Nations, he included his army. And he insisted that the United States would not give up its nuclear monopoly until everyone else had signed on. So of course, who's going to sign on to that deal? Dwarkesh Patel 1:15:24I feel he has a point in the sense that — World War II took five years or more. If we find that the Soviets are starting to develop a bomb, it's not like within the six months or a year or whatever, it would take them to start refining the ore. And to the point we found out that they've been refining ore to when we start a war and engage in it, and doing all the diplomacy. By that point, they might already have the bomb. And so we're behind because we dismantled our weapons. We are only starting to develop our weapons once we've exhausted these other avenues. Richard Rhodes 1:16:00Not to develop. Presumably we would have developed. And everybody would have developed anyway. Another way to think of this is as delayed delivery times. Takes about 30 minutes to get an ICBM from Central Missouri to Moscow. That's the time window for doing anything other than starting a nuclear war. So take the warhead off those missiles and move it down the road 10 miles. So then it takes three hours. You've got to put the warhead back on the missiles. If the other side is willing to do this too. And you both can watch and see. We require openness. A word Bohr introduced to this whole thing. In order to make this happen, you can't have secrets. And of course, as time passed on, we developed elaborate surveillance from space, surveillance from planes, and so forth. It would not have worked in 1946 for sure. The surveillance wasn't there. But that system is in place today. The International Atomic Energy Agency has detected systems in air, in space, underwater. They can detect 50 pounds of dynamite exploded in England from Australia with the systems that we have in place. It's technical rather than human resources. But it's there. So it's theoretically possible today to get started on such a program. Except, of course, now, in like 1950, the world is awash in nuclear weapons. Despite the reductions that have occurred since the end of the Cold War, there's still 30,000-40,000 nuclear weapons in the world. Way too many. Dwarkesh Patel 1:18:01Yeah. That's really interesting. What percentage of warheads do you think are accounted for by this organization? If there's 30,000 warheads, what percentage are accounted for? Richard Rhodes 1:18:12All.Dwarkesh Patel 1:18:12Oh. Really?  North Korea doesn't have secrets? Richard Rhodes 1:18:13They're allowed to inspect anywhere without having to ask the government for permission. Dwarkesh Patel 1:18:18But presumably not North Korea or something, right? Richard Rhodes 1:18:21North Korea is an exception. But we keep pretty good track of North Korea needless to say. Dwarkesh Patel 1:18:27Are you surprised with how successful non-proliferation has been? The number of countries with nuclear weapons has not gone up for decades. Given the fact, as you were talking about earlier, it's simply a matter of refining or transmuting uranium. Is it surprising that there aren't more countries that have it?Richard Rhodes 1:18:42That's really an interesting part. Again, a part of the story that most people have never really heard. In the 50s, before the development and signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was 1968 and it took effect in 1970, a lot of countries that you would never have imagined were working on nuclear weapons. Sweden, Norway, Japan, South Korea. They had the technology. They just didn't have the materials. It was kind of dicey about what you should do. But I interviewed some of the Swedish scientists who worked on their bomb and they said, well, we were just talking about making some tactical

(NOTAS COMPLETAS Y ENLACES DEL CAPÍTULO AQUí: https://www.jaimerodriguezdesantiago.com/kaizen/qa-el-principio-de-incertidumbre-hablar-a-un-microfono-estereotipos-de-genero-el-efecto-de-escribir-ingelitencia-cambio-climatico-david-deutsch-ikigai-sesgos-y-mexico/)¡Nuevo capítulo de preguntas y respuestas! Te decía en el anterior que con aquellas me había puesto al día, pero se me han vuelto a acumular y tengo la sensación de que soy un poco desastre gestionándolas, así que si has mandado alguna y no te respondo en este capítulo ni te he dicho nada por whatsapp, recuérdamelo que lo mismo se me ha traspapelado. Dicho lo cual, la verdad es que este experimento al más puro estilo de los consultorios de aquellas revistas espantosas para adolescentes que había en los 80 y 90, está funcionando sorprendentemente bien y espero que te esté gustavo. Por eso, te animo como siempre a participar no sólo preguntándome a mí, sino respondiendo a las preguntas de otros oyentes o complementando lo que yo diga. Porque a veces, al escuchar algunas preguntas, me es inevitable acordarme de una historia de mis abuelos que me hace bastante gracia. Y es el día de año nuevo del año 2000, cuando todos debatíamos si cambiaba de verdad el milenio o no y si se iba a acabar el mundo por un error informático, los telediarios hicieron el habitual repaso a cómo se había recibido el año en distintas partes del mundo. En una de esas imágenes, salía un japonés hablando a la gente… en japonés, lógicamente. Y por lo que fuera ni pusieron subtítulos ni el locutor explicó nada. Mis abuelos, que por entonces llevarían unos 50 años casados, estaban viéndolo muy atentamente, cuando mi abuela se giró y con toda su inocencia le dijo a mi abuelo: José Antonio, ¿qué dice el japonés?Y mi abuelo, que era un tipo bastante serio y poco dado a decir tacos, le respondió: “¿Y yo qué coño sé, Rosita?”Con perdón, pero eso dijo el hombre. Pues no te negaré que con algunas preguntas se me queda la misma cara que debió poner mi abuelo entonces… lo cual hace todo más divertido. Pero, como te decía, aunque yo tenga el morro suficiente como para aventurarme a responder casi cualquier pregunta, eso no significa que tenga buenas respuestas a todas.Así que no te cortes en mandar tus audios ya sea con tus preguntas o complementando o corrigiendo mis respuestas.

In the summer of 1942, Stanley Lovell, a renowned industrial chemist, received a mysterious order to report to an unfamiliar building in Washington, D.C. When he arrived, he was led to a barren room where he waited to meet the man who had summoned him. Lovell became the head of a secret group of scientists who developed dirty tricks for the OSS, the precursor to the CIA. Their inventions included bat bombs, suicide pills, fighting knives, silent pistols, and camouflaged explosives. Moreover, they forged documents for undercover agents, plotted the assassination of foreign leaders, and performed truth drug experiments on unsuspecting subjects. Shermer and Lisle discuss: • why countries have spy agencies • from COI to OSS to CIA • Wild Bill Donavan • Stanley Lovell as Professor Moriarty • Vannevar Bush • Division 19 • George Kistiakowsky and the Aunt Jemima explosive weapon • cat bombs, bat bombs, rat bomb, suicide pills, fighting knives, silent pistols, camouflaged explosives, A-pills, B-pills, E-pills, L-pills • psychological warfare • heavy water and nuclear weapons • Werner Heisenberg, Moe Berg, and Carl Eifler • biological and chemical warfare • Operation Paperclip • truth drugs • Sidney Gottlieb, LSD, and MKULTRA (Bluebird, Artichoke). John Lisle is a historian of science and the American intelligence community. He earned a Ph.D. in history from the University of Texas and has taught courses on U.S. history, cyberspace, and information warfare at the University of Texas, Louisiana Tech University, and Austin Community College. His writing has appeared in Scientific American, Smithsonian Magazine, Skeptic, The Journal of Intelligence History, and Physics in Perspective. The Dirty Tricks Department is his first book. In Vol. 25, No. 2 of Skeptic he wrote about MKULTRA, the CIA program in search of mind control technology.

Who was Heisenberg? No, not Walt's alter ego. Who was Werner Heisenberg? And what are the parallels between him and Walt? As Walt emotionally pulls away from his family, he starts to bond with Jesse. For a man who claims to be risk-averse, Walt is very comfortable making dangerous bluffs. Hank certainly thinks he's the smartest man in the room, so why was Walt able to fly under the radar for so long? Want to see these dichotomies play out for yourself? Pete and Courtney say this episode makes for a great rewatch.  Got feedback, yo? Send it to breakingbadgdt@gmail.com. Support GDT: Our Patreon Growth Decay Transformation Twitter Pete Pepper's Twitter Courtney's Twitter Talitha Makes Things Instagram Check out Pete Pepper's YouTube Channel and Courtney's Reviews here for more coverage of your favorite entertainment. Looking for a watch-a-long podcast? Check out Bald Move's Breaking Good. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Norwegian commandos execute a daring sabotage mission to cripple the Nazi nuclear program. The fall of Werner Heisenberg. Original music for this series by https://mountainstandardtime.substack.com/Additional music by Hildur Guðnadóttir, Max Richter, William Basinski, Moondog, Sølvguttene, Jed Kurzel, Hala Strana, Anne Hytta, Nine Inch Nails, and Nico. Support the showwww.patreon.com/historium

Is it time to abandon the search for reality?Looking for a link we mentioned? It's here: https://linktr.ee/philosophyforourtimesNietzsche famously declared 'God is dead' in the late nineteenth century. Outspoken critic of philosophical realism Hilary Lawson observes that today we have replaced God with ‘reality'. He urges us to abandon this elusive and unattainable concept, offering an alternative view which embraces observation and reason while abandoning reality for good.There are thousands of big ideas to discover at IAI.tv – videos, articles, and courses waiting for you to explore. Find out more: https://iai.tv/podcast-offers?utm_source=podcast&utm_medium=shownotes&utm_campaign=the-world-after-reality-hilary-lawsonSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Things discussed: Big Ten rescheduling: Not in favor of replays, don't need the divisions but better that than replays. Absolutely gross to play Michigan-Ohio State in an antiseptic NFL stadium one week after The Game. Seth: No replays ever. If you lost to a team in the playoffs, you're out of the playoffs (sorry, Georgia). Conspiracy: Ohio State was about to be locked in with Wisconsin; if it's not unfair Ohio State thinks it's not fair. Showcase, Showcase, Showcase! You ALWAYS get the best games. NIL: Once this gets normalized it should be okay for Michigan, but they're being way too careful about following the intent of a rule that had no intent other than to not get sued. Sam: What if players want what the other player got? Seth: We figured this out already. Sam throws cold water on us. Michigan is intent on living in a world that nobody else is in. It's already pay for play. Look at the Fortnite ad: Nobody was like "Ooh, I'm gonna go play Fortnite" they're like "Hell yeah, my boy Roman Wilson is getting paid!" It's true that the system, especially the transfer portal is out of control. Hockey: Craig thinks they're going to be *BETTER* this year? Brian disagrees: they're going to be kids, set back to the 2-year cycle. Hobey for Hughes? He'll be the best player in college hockey, but that's rarely who wins the Hobey. Softball: Read Alex's column. Short version: Hutch has to adapt again. She has before!

In the 1920s, the scientist Werner Heisenberg came up with a wild idea that broke reality as Western science knew it. And it's still unsettling to think about. Benjamin Labatut's recent book, When We Cease to Understand the World, makes readers feel the aftershocks of the revelation, asking, "What's real?" We're thrilled that Unexplainable has been nominated for a Webby Award in the science & education category! It's for our episode called The mysteries of endometriosis. You can help us out by voting here in the Individual Episodes category. Voting is open through Thursday, April 21. Thank you!  For more, go to http://vox.com/unexplainable It's a great place to view show transcripts and read more about the topics on our show. Also, email us! unexplainable@vox.com We read every email. Support Unexplainable by making a financial contribution to Vox! bit.ly/givepodcasts Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices