Podcasts about Richard Sorge

Last time we spoke about General Zhukov's arrival to the Nomohan incident. The Kwantung Army's inexperienced 23rd Division, under General Komatsubara, suffered heavy losses in failed offensives, including Colonel Yamagata's assault and the annihilation of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma's detachment, resulting in around 500 Japanese casualties. Tensions within the Japanese command intensified as Kwantung defied Tokyo's restraint, issuing aggressive orders like 1488 and launching a June 27 air raid on Soviet bases, destroying dozens of aircraft and securing temporary air superiority. This provoked Moscow's fury and rebukes from Emperor Hirohito. On June 1, Georgy Zhukov, a rising Red Army tactician and tank expert, was summoned from Minsk. Arriving June 5, he assessed the 57th Corps as inadequate, relieved Commander Feklenko, and took charge of the redesignated 1st Army Group. Reinforcements included mechanized brigades, tanks, and aircraft. Japanese intelligence misread Soviet supply convoys as retreats, underestimating Zhukov's 12,500 troops against their 15,000. By July, both sides poised for a massive clash, fueled by miscalculations and gekokujo defiance.   #190 Zhukov Unleashes Tanks at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. At 4:00 a.m. on July 1, 15,000 heavily laden Japanese troops began marching to their final assembly and jump-off points. The sun rose at 4:00 a.m. and set at 9:00 p.m. that day, but the Japanese advance went undetected by Soviet/MPR commanders, partly because the June 27 air raid had temporarily cleared Soviet reconnaissance from the skies. On the night of July 1, Komatsubara launched the first phase. The 23rd Division, with the Yasuoka Detachment, converged on Fui Heights, east of the Halha River, about eleven miles north of its confluence with the Holsten. The term "heights" is misleading here; a Japanese infantry colonel described Fui as a "raised pancake" roughly one to one-and-a-half miles across, about thirty to forty feet higher than the surrounding terrain. For reasons not fully explained, the small Soviet force stationed on the heights was withdrawn during the day on July 1, and that night Fui Heights was occupied by Komatsubara's forces almost unopposed. This caused little stir at Zhukov's headquarters. Komatsubara bided his time on July 2.   On the night of July 2–3, the Japanese achieved a brilliant tactical success. A battalion of the 71st Infantry Regiment silently crossed the Halha River on a moonless night and landed unopposed on the west bank opposite Fui Heights. Recent rains had swollen the river to 100–150 yards wide and six feet deep, making crossing difficult for men, horses, or vehicles. Combat engineers swiftly laid a pontoon bridge, completing it by 6:30 a.m. on July 3. The main body of Komatsubara's 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments (23rd Division) and the 26th Regiment (7th Division) began a slow, arduous crossing. The pontoon bridge, less than eight feet wide, was a bottleneck, allowing only one truck at a time. The attackers could not cross with armored vehicles, but they did bring across their regimental artillery, 18 x 37-mm antitank guns, 12 x 75-mm mountain guns, 8 x 75-mm field guns, and 4 x 120-mm howitzers, disassembled, packed on pack animals, and reassembled on the west bank. The crossing took the entire day, and the Japanese were fortunate to go without interception. The Halha crossing was commanded personally by General Komatsubara and was supported by a small Kwantung Army contingent, including General Yano (deputy chief of staff), Colonel Hattori, and Major Tsuji from the Operations Section. Despite the big air raid having alerted Zhukov, the initial Japanese moves from July 1–3 achieved complete tactical surprise, aided by Tsuji's bold plan. The first indication of the major offensive came when General Yasuoka's tanks attacked predawn on July 3. Yasuoka suspected Soviet troops south of him attempting to retreat across the Halha to the west bank, and he ordered his tanks to attack immediately, with infantry not yet in position. The night's low clouds, no moon, and low visibility—along with a passing thunderstorm lighting the sky—made the scene dramatic. Seventy Japanese tanks roared forward, supported by infantry and artillery, and the Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment found itself overwhelmed. Zhukov, hearing of Yasuoka's assault but unaware that Komatsubara had crossed the Halha, ordered his armor to move northeast to Bain Tsagan to confront the initiative. There, Soviet armor clashed with Japanese forces in a chaotic, largely uncoordinated engagement. The Soviet counterattacks, supported by heavy artillery, halted much of the Japanese momentum, and by late afternoon Japanese infantry had to dig in west of the Halha. The crossing had been accomplished without Soviet reconnaissance detecting it in time, but Zhukov's counterattacks, the limits of Japanese armored mobility across the pontoon, and the heat and exhaustion of the troops constrained the Japanese effort. By the afternoon of July 3, Zhukov's forces were pressing hard, and the Japanese momentum began to stall. Yasuoka's tanks, supported by a lack of infantry and the fatigue and losses suffered by the infantry, could not close the gap to link with Komatsubara's forces. The Type 89 tanks, designed for infantry support, were ill-suited to penetrating Soviet armor, especially when faced with BT-5/BT-7 tanks and strong anti-tank guns. The Type 95 light tanks were faster but lightly armored, and suffered heavily from Soviet fire and air attacks. Infantry on the western bank struggled to catch up with tanks, shot through by Soviet artillery and armor, while the 64th Regiment could not keep pace with the tanks due to the infantry's lack of motorized transport. By late afternoon, Yasuoka's advance stalled far short of the river junction and the Soviet bridge. The infantry dug in to withstand Soviet bombardment, and the Japanese tank regiments withdrew to their jump-off points by nightfall. The Japanese suffered heavy losses in tanks, though some were recovered and repaired; by July 9, KwAHQ decided to withdraw its two tank regiments from the theater. Armor would play no further role in the Nomonhan conflict. The Soviets, by contrast, sustained heavier tank losses but began to replenish with new models. The July offensive, for Kwantung Army, proved a failure. Part of the failure stemmed from a difficult blend of terrain and logistics. Unusually heavy rains in late June had transformed the dirt roads between Hailar and Nomonhan into a mud-filled quagmire. Japanese truck transport, already limited, was so hampered by these conditions that combat effectiveness suffered significantly. Colonel Yamagata's 64th Infantry Regiment, proceeding on foot, could not keep pace with or support General Yasuoka's tanks on July 3–4. Komatsubara's infantry on the west bank of the Halha ran short of ammunition, food, and water. As in the May 28 battle, the main cause of the Kwantung Army's July offensive failure was wholly inadequate military intelligence. Once again, the enemy's strength had been seriously underestimated. Moreover, a troubling realization was dawning at KwAHQ and in the field: the intelligence error was not merely quantitative but qualitative. The Soviets were not only more numerous but also far more potent than anticipated. The attacking Japanese forces initially held a slight numerical edge and enjoyed tactical surprise, but the Red Army fought tenaciously, and the weight of Soviet firepower proved decisive. Japan, hampered by a relative lack of raw materials and industrial capacity, could not match the great powers in the quantitative production of military materiel. Consequently, Japanese military leaders traditionally emphasized the spiritual superiority of Japan's armed forces in doctrine and training, often underestimating the importance of material factors, including firepower. This was especially true of the army that had carried the tactic of the massed bayonet charge into World War II. This "spiritual" combat doctrine arose from necessity; admitting material superiority would have implied defeat. Japan's earlier victories in the Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian incident, and the China War, along with legendary medieval victories over the Mongol hordes, seemed to confirm the transcendent importance of fighting spirit. Only within such a doctrine could the Imperial Japanese Army muster inner strength and confidence to face formidable enemies. This was especially evident against Soviet Russia, whose vast geography, population, and resources loomed large. Yet what of its spirit? The Japanese military dismissed Bolshevism as a base, materialist philosophy utterly lacking spiritual power. Consequently, the Red Army was presumed to have low morale and weak fighting effectiveness. Stalin's purges only reinforced this belief. Kwantung Army's recent experiences at Nomonhan undermined this outlook. Among ordinary soldiers and officers alike, from the 23rd Division Staff to KwAHQ—grim questions formed: Had Soviet materiel and firepower proven superior to Japanese fighting spirit? If not, did the enemy possess a fighting spirit comparable to their own? To some in Kwantung Army, these questions were grotesque and almost unthinkable. To others, the implications were too painful to face. Perhaps May and July's combat results were an aberration caused by the 23rd Division's inexperience. Nevertheless, a belief took hold at KwAHQ that this situation required radical rectification. Zhukov's 1st Army Headquarters, evaluating recent events, was not immune to self-criticism and concern for the future. The enemy's success in transporting nearly 10,000 men across the Halha without detection—despite heightened Soviet alert after the June 27 air raid—revealed a level of carelessness and lack of foresight at Zhukov's level. Zhukov, however, did not fully capitalize on Komatsubara's precarious position on July 4–5. Conversely, Zhukov and his troops reacted calmly in the crisis's early hours. Although surprised and outnumbered, Zhukov immediately recognized that "our trump cards were the armored detachments, and we decided to use them immediately." He acted decisively, and the rapid deployment of armor proved pivotal. Some criticized the uncoordinated and clumsy Soviet assault on Komatsubara's infantry on July 3, but the Japanese were only a few hours' march from the river junction and the Soviet bridge. By hurling tanks at Komatsubara's advance with insufficient infantry support, Mikhail Yakovlev (11th Tank Brigade) and A. L. Lesovoi (7th Mechanized Brigade) incurred heavy losses. Nonetheless, they halted the Japanese southward advance, forcing Komatsubara onto the defensive, from which he never regained momentum. Zhukov did not flinch from heavy casualties to achieve his objectives. He later told General Dwight D. Eisenhower that if the enemy faced a minefield, their infantry attacked as if it did not exist, treating personnel mine losses as equal to those that would have occurred if the Germans defended the area with strong troops rather than minefields. Zhukov admitted losing 120 tanks and armored cars that day—a high price, but necessary to avert defeat. Years later, Zhukov defended his Nomonhan tactics, arguing he knew his armor would suffer heavy losses, but that was the only way to prevent the Japanese from seizing the bridge at the river confluence. Had Komatsubara's forces advanced unchecked for another two or three hours, they might have fought through to the Soviet bridge and linked with the Yasuoka detachment, endangering Zhukov's forces. Zhukov credited Yakovlev, Lesovoi, and their men with stabilizing the crisis through timely and self-sacrificing counterattacks. The armored car battalion of the 8th MPR Cavalry Division also distinguished itself in this action. Zhukov and his tankmen learned valuable lessons in those two days of brutal combat. A key takeaway was the successful use of large tank formations as an independent primary attack force, contrary to then-orthodox doctrine, which saw armor mainly as infantry support and favored integrating armor into every infantry regiment rather than maintaining large, autonomous armored units. The German blitzkrieg demonstrations in Poland and Western Europe soon followed, but, until then, few major armies had absorbed the tank-warfare theories championed by Basil Liddell-Hart and Charles de Gaulle. The Soviet high command's leading proponent of large-scale tank warfare had been Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. His execution in 1937 erased those ideas, and the Red Army subsequently disbanded armored divisions and dispersed tanks among infantry, misapplying battlefield lessons from the Spanish Civil War. Yet Zhukov was learning a different lesson on a different battlefield. The open terrain of eastern Mongolia favored tanks, and Zhukov was a rapid learner. The Russians also learned mundane, but crucial, lessons: Japanese infantry bravely clambering onto their vehicles taught Soviet tank crews to lock hatch lids from the inside. The BT-5 and BT-7 tanks were easily set aflame by primitive hand-thrown firebombs, and rear deck ventilation grills and exhaust manifolds were vulnerable and required shielding. Broadly, the battle suggested to future Red Army commander Zhukov that tank and motorized troops, coordinated with air power and mobile artillery, could decisively conduct rapid operations. Zhukov was not the first to envision combining mobile firepower with air and artillery, but he had rare opportunities to apply this formula in crucial tests. The July offensive confirmed to the Soviets that the Nomonhan incident was far from a border skirmish; it signaled intent for further aggression. Moscow's leadership, informed by Richard Sorge's Tokyo network, perceived Japan's renewed effort to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alliance as a dangerous possibility. Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov began indicating to Joachim von Ribbentrop and Adolf Hitler that Berlin's stance on the Soviet–Japanese conflict would influence Soviet-German rapprochement considerations. Meanwhile, Moscow decided to reinforce Zhukov. Tens of thousands of troops and machines were ordered to Mongolia, with imports from European Russia. Foreign diplomats traveling the Trans-Siberian Railway reported eastbound trains jammed with personnel and matériel. The buildup faced a major bottleneck at Borzya, the easternmost railhead in the MPR, about 400 miles from the Halha. To prevent a logistics choke, a massive truck transport operation was needed. Thousands of trucks, half-tracks, gun-towing tractors, and other vehicles were organized into a continuous eight-hundred-mile, five-day shuttle run. The Trans-Baikal Military District, under General Shtern, supervised the effort. East of the Halha, many Japanese officers still refused to accept a failure verdict for the July offensive. General Komatsubara did not return to Hailar, instead establishing a temporary divisional HQ at Kanchuerhmiao, where his staff grappled with overcoming Soviet firepower. They concluded that night combat—long a staple of Japanese infantry tactics—could offset Soviet advantages. On July 7 at 9:30 p.m., a thirty-minute Japanese artillery barrage preceded a nighttime assault by elements of the 64th and 72nd Regiments. The Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment and supporting Mongolian cavalry were surprised and forced to fall back toward the Halha before counterattacking. Reinforcements arrived on both sides, and in brutal close-quarters combat the Japanese gained a partial local advantage, but were eventually pushed back; Major I. M. Remizov of the 149th Regiment was killed and later posthumously named a Hero of the Soviet Union. Since late May, Soviet engineers had built at least seven bridges across the Halha and Holsten Rivers to support operations. By July 7–8, Japanese demolition teams destroyed two Soviet bridges. Komatsubara believed that destroying bridges could disrupt Soviet operations east of the Halha and help secure the border. Night attacks continued from July 8 to July 12 against the Soviet perimeter, with Japanese assaults constricting Zhukov's bridgehead while Soviet artillery and counterattacks relentlessly pressed. Casualties mounted on both sides. The Japanese suffered heavy losses but gained some positions; Soviet artillery, supported by motorized infantry and armor, gradually pushed back the attackers. The biggest problem for Japan remained Soviet artillery superiority and the lack of a commensurate counter-battery capability. Japanese infantry had to withdraw to higher ground at night to avoid daytime exposure to artillery and tanks. On the nights of July 11–12, Yamagata's 64th Regiment and elements of Colonel Sakai Mikio's 72nd Regiment attempted a major assault on the Soviet bridgehead. Despite taking heavy casualties, the Japanese managed to push defenders back to the river on occasion, but Soviet counterattacks, supported by tiresome artillery and armor, prevented a decisive breakthrough. Brigade Commander Yakovlev of the 11th Armored, who led several counterattacks, was killed and later honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union; his gun stands today as a monument at the battlefield. The July 11–12 action marked the high-water mark of the Kwantung Army's attempt to expel Soviet/MPR forces east of the Halha. Komatsubara eventually suspended the costly night attacks; by that night, the 64th Regiment had suffered roughly 80–90 killed and about three times that number wounded. The decision proved controversial, with some arguing that he had not realized how close his forces had come to seizing the bridge. Others argued that broader strategic considerations justified the pause. Throughout the Nomonhan fighting, Soviet artillery superiority, both quantitative and qualitative, became painfully evident. The Soviet guns exacted heavy tolls and repeatedly forced Japanese infantry to withdraw from exposed positions. The Japanese artillery, in contrast, could not match the Red Army's scale. By July 25, Kwantung Army ended its artillery attack, a humiliating setback. Tokyo and Hsinking recognized the futility of achieving a decisive military victory at Nomonhan and shifted toward seeking a diplomatic settlement, even if concessions to the Soviet Union and the MPR were necessary. Kwantung Army, however, opposed negotiations, fearing it would echo the "Changkufeng debacle" and be read by enemies as weakness. Tsuji lamented that Kwantung Army's insistence on framing the second phase as a tie—despite heavy Soviet losses, revealed a reluctance to concede any territory. Differences in outlook and policy between AGS and Kwantung Army—and the central army's inability to impose its will on Manchukuo's field forces—became clear. The military establishment buzzed with stories of gekokujo (the superiority of the superior) within Kwantung Army and its relations with the General Staff. To enforce compliance, AGS ordered General Isogai to Tokyo for briefings, and KwAHQ's leadership occasionally distanced itself from AGS. On July 20, Isogai arrived at General Staff Headquarters and was presented with "Essentials for Settlement of the Nomonhan Incident," a formal document outlining a step-by-step plan for Kwantung Army to maintain its defensive position east of the Halha while diplomatic negotiations proceeded. If negotiations failed, Kwantung Army would withdraw to the boundary claimed by the Soviet Union by winter. Isogai, the most restrained member of the Kwantung Army circle, argued against accepting the Essentials, insisting on preserving Kwantung Army's honor and rejecting a unilateral east-bank withdrawal. A tense exchange followed, but General Nakajima ended the dispute by noting that international boundaries cannot be determined by the army alone. Isogai pledged to report the General Staff's views to his commander and take the Essentials back to KwAHQ for study. Technically, the General Staff's Essentials were not orders; in practice, however, they were treated as such. Kwantung Army tended to view them as suggestions and retained discretion in implementation. AGS hoped the Essentials would mollify Kwantung Army's wounded pride. The August 4 decision to create a 6 Army within Kwantung Army, led by General Ogisu Rippei, further complicated the command structure. Komatsubara's 23rd Division and nearby units were attached to the 6 Army, which also took responsibility for defending west-central Manchukuo, including the Nomonhan area. The 6 Army existed largely on paper, essentially a small headquarters to insulate KwAHQ from battlefield realities. AGS sought a more accountable layer of command between KwAHQ and the combat zone, but General Ueda and KwAHQ resented the move and offered little cooperation. In the final weeks before the last battles, General Ogisu and his small staff had limited influence on Nomonhan. Meanwhile, the European crisis over German demands on Poland intensified, moving into a configuration highly favorable to the Soviet Union. By the first week of August, it became evident in the Kremlin that both Anglo-French powers and the Germans were vying to secure an alliance with Moscow. Stalin knew now that he would likely have a free hand in the coming war in the West. At the same time, Richard Sorge, the Soviet master spy in Tokyo, correctly reported that Japan's top political and military leaders sought to prevent the escalation of the Nomonhan incident into an all-out war. These developments gave the cautious Soviet dictator the confidence to commit the Red Army to large-scale combat operations in eastern Mongolia. In early August, Stalin ordered preparations for a major offensive to clear the Nomonhan area of the "Japanese samurai who had violated the territory of the friendly Outer Mongolian people." The buildup of Zhukov's 1st Army Group accelerated still further. Its July strength was augmented by the 57th and 82nd Infantry Divisions, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 212th Airborne Brigade, numerous smaller infantry, armor, and artillery units, and two Mongolian cavalry divisions. Soviet air power in the area was also greatly strengthened. When this buildup was completed by mid-August, Zhukov commanded an infantry force equivalent to four divisions, supported by two cavalry divisions, 216 artillery pieces, 498 armored vehicles, and 581 aircraft. To bring in the supplies necessary for this force to launch an offensive, General Shtern's Trans-Baikal Military District Headquarters amassed a fleet of more than 4,200 vehicles, which trucked in about 55,000 tons of materiel from the distant railway depot at Borzya. The Japanese intelligence network in Outer Mongolia was weak, a problem that went unremedied throughout the Nomonhan incident. This deficiency, coupled with the curtailment of Kwantung Army's transborder air operations, helps explain why the Japanese remained ignorant of the scope of Zhukov's buildup. They were aware that some reinforcements were flowing eastward across the Trans-Siberian Railway toward the MPR but had no idea of the volume. Then, at the end of July, Kwantung Army Intelligence intercepted part of a Soviet telegraph transmission indicating that preparations were under way for some offensive operation in the middle of August. This caused a stir at KwAHQ. Generals Ueda and Yano suspected that the enemy planned to strike across the Halha River. Ueda's initial reaction was to reinforce the 23rd Division at Nomonhan with the rest of the highly regarded 7th Division. However, the 7th Division was Kwantung Army's sole strategic reserve, and the Operations Section was reluctant to commit it to extreme western Manchukuo, fearing mobilization of Soviet forces in the Maritime Province and a possible attack in the east near Changkufeng. The Kwantung Army commander again ignored his own better judgment and accepted the Operations Section's recommendation. The main strength of the 7th Division remained at its base near Tsitsihar, but another infantry regiment, the 28th, was dispatched to the Nomonhan area, as was an infantry battalion from the Mukden Garrison. Earlier, in mid-July, Kwantung Army had sent Komatsubara 1,160 individual replacements to make up for casualties from earlier fighting. All these reinforcements combined, however, did little more than replace losses: as of July 25, 1,400 killed (including 200 officers) and 3,000 wounded. Kwantung Army directed Komatsubara to dig in, construct fortifications, and adopt a defensive posture. Colonel Numazaki, who commanded the 23rd Division's Engineer Regiment, was unhappy with the defensive line he was ordered to fortify and urged a slight pullback to more easily defensible terrain. Komatsubara, however, refused to retreat from ground his men had bled to take. He and his line officers still nourished hope of a revenge offensive. As a result, the Japanese defensive positions proved to be as weak as Numazaki feared. As Zhukov's 1st Army Group prepared to strike, the effective Japanese strength at Nomonhan was less than 1.5 divisions. Major Tsuji and his colleagues in the Operations Section had little confidence in Kwantung Army's own Intelligence Section, which is part of the reason why Tsuji frequently conducted his own reconnaissance missions. Up to this time it was gospel in the Japanese army that the maximum range for large-scale infantry operations was 125–175 miles from a railway; anything beyond 200 miles from a railway was considered logistically impossible. Since Kwantung Army had only 800 trucks available in all of Manchukuo in 1939, the massive Soviet logistical effort involving more than 4,200 trucks was almost unimaginable to the Japanese. Consequently, the Operations Staff believed it had made the correct defensive deployments if a Soviet attack were to occur, which it doubted. If the enemy did strike at Nomonhan, it was believed that it could not marshal enough strength in that remote region to threaten the reinforced 23rd Division. Furthermore, the 7th Division, based at Tsitsihar on a major rail line, could be transported to any trouble spot on the eastern or western frontier in a few days. KwAHQ advised Komatsubara to maintain a defensive posture and prepare to meet a possible enemy attack around August 14 or 15. At this time, Kwantung Army also maintained a secret organization codenamed Unit 731, officially the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army. Unit 731 specialized in biological and chemical warfare, with main facilities and laboratories in Harbin, including a notorious prison-laboratory complex. During the early August lull at Nomonhan, a detachment from Unit 731 infected the Halha River with bacteria of an acute cholera-like strain. There are no reports in Soviet or Japanese accounts that this attempted biological warfare had any effect. In the war's final days, Unit 731 was disbanded, Harbin facilities demolished, and most personnel fled to Japan—but not before they gassed the surviving 150 human subjects and burned their corpses. The unit's commander, Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro, kept his men secret and threatened retaliation against informers. Ishii and his senior colleagues escaped prosecution at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials by trading the results of their experiments to U.S. authorities in exchange for immunity. The Japanese 6th Army exerted some half-hearted effort to construct defensive fortifications, but scarcity of building materials, wood had to be trucked in from far away—helped explain the lack of enthusiasm. More importantly, Japanese doctrine despised static defense and favored offense, so Kwantung Army waited to see how events would unfold. West of the Halha, Zhukov accelerated preparations. Due to tight perimeter security, few Japanese deserters, and a near-absence of civilian presence, Soviet intelligence found it hard to glean depth on Japanese defensive positions. Combat intelligence could only reveal the frontline disposition and closest mortar and artillery emplacements. Aerial reconnaissance showed photographs, but Japanese camouflage and mock-ups limited their usefulness. The new commander of the 149th Mechanized Infantry Regiment personally directed infiltration and intelligence gathering, penetrating Japanese lines on several nights and returning crucial data: Komatsubara's northern and southern flanks were held by Manchukuoan cavalry, and mobile reserves were lacking. With this information, Zhukov crafted a plan of attack. The main Japanese strength was concentrated a few miles east of the Halha, on both banks of the Holsten River. Their infantry lacked mobility and armor, and their flanks were weak. Zhukov decided to split the 1st Army Group into three strike forces: the central force would deliver a frontal assault to pin the main Japanese strength, while the northern and southern forces, carrying the bulk of the armor, would turn the Japanese flanks and drive the enemy into a pocket to be destroyed by the three-pronged effort. The plan depended on tactical surprise and overwhelming force at the points of attack. The offensive was to begin in the latter part of August, pending final approval from Moscow. To ensure tactical surprise, Zhukov and his staff devised an elaborate program of concealment and deception, disinformation. Units and materiel arriving at Tamsag Bulak toward the Halha were moved only at night with lights out. Noting that the Japanese were tapping telephone lines and intercepting radio messages, 1st Army Headquarters sent a series of false messages in an easily decipherable code about defensive preparations and autumn-winter campaigning. Thousands of leaflets titled "What the Infantryman Should Know about Defense" were distributed among troops. About two weeks before the attack, the Soviets brought in sound equipment to simulate tank and aircraft engines and heavy construction noises, staging long, loud performances nightly. At first, the Japanese mistook the sounds for large-scale enemy activity and fired toward the sounds. After a few nights, they realized it was only sound effects, and tried to ignore the "serenade." On the eve of the attack, the actual concentration and staging sounds went largely unnoticed by the Japanese. On August 7–8, Zhukov conducted minor attacks to expand the Halha bridgehead to a depth of two to three miles. These attacks, contained relatively easily by Komatsubara's troops, reinforced Kwantung Army's false sense of confidence. The Japanese military attaché in Moscow misread Soviet press coverage. In early August, the attaché advised that unlike the Changkufeng incident a year earlier, Soviet press was largely ignoring the conflict, implying low morale and a favorable prognosis for the Red Army. Kwantung Army leaders seized on this as confirmation to refrain from any display of restraint or doubt, misplaced confidence. There were, however, portents of danger. Three weeks before the Soviet attack, Colonel Isomura Takesuki, head of Kwantung Army's Intelligence Section, warned of the vulnerability of the 23rd Division's flanks. Tsuji and colleagues dismissed this, and General Kasahara Yukio of AGS also went unheeded. The "desk jockey" General Staff officers commanded little respect at KwAHQ. Around August 10, General Hata Yuzaburo, Komatsubara's successor as chief of the Special Services Agency at Harbin, warned that enemy strength in the Mongolian salient was very great and seriously underestimated at KwAHQ. Yet no decisive action followed before Zhukov's attack. Kwantung Army's inaction and unpreparedness prior to the Soviet offensive appear to reflect faulty intelligence compounded by hubris. But a more nuanced explanation suggests a fatalistic wishful thinking rooted in the Japanese military culture—the belief that their spiritual strength would prevail, leading them to assume enemy strength was not as great as reported, or that victory was inevitable regardless of resources. Meanwhile, in the rational West, the Nazi war machine faced the Polish frontier as Adolf Hitler pressed Stalin for a nonaggression pact. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact would neutralize the threat of a two-front war for Germany and clear the way for Hitler's invasion of Poland. If the pact was a green light, it signaled in both directions: it would also neutralize the German threat to Russia and clear the way for Zhukov's offensive at Nomonhan. On August 18–19, Hitler pressed Stalin to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow to seal the pact. Thus, reassured in the West, Stalin dared to act boldly against Japan. Zhukov supervised final preparations for his attack. Zhukov held back forward deployments until the last minute. By August 18, he had only four infantry regiments, a machine gun brigade, and Mongolian cavalry east of the Halha. Operational security was extremely tight: a week before the attack, Soviet radio traffic in the area virtually ceased. Only Zhukov and a few key officers worked on the plan, aided by a single typist. Line officers and service chiefs received information on a need-to-know basis. The date for the attack was shared with unit commanders one to four days in advance, depending on seniority. Noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers learned of the offensive one day in advance and received specific orders three hours before the attack.   Heavy rain grounded Japanese aerial reconnaissance from August 17 to midday on the 19th, but on August 19 Captain Oizumi Seisho in a Japanese scout plane observed the massing of Soviet forces near the west bank of the Halha. Enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the river in dispersed formations, with no new bridges but pontoon stocks spotted near the river. Oizumi sent a warning to a frontline unit and rushed back to report. The air group dispatched additional recon planes and discovered that the Japanese garrison on Fui Heights, near the northern end of Komatsubara's line, was being encircled by Soviet armor and mechanized infantry—observed by alarmed Japanese officers on and near the heights. These late discoveries on August 19 were not reported to KwAHQ and had no effect on the 6th Army and the 23rd Division's alertness on the eve of the storm. As is common in militaries, a fatal gap persisted between those gathering intelligence and those in a position to act on it. On the night of August 19–20, under cover of darkness, the bulk of the Soviet 1st Army Group crossed the Halha into the expanded Soviet enclave on the east bank.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By August, European diplomacy left Moscow confident in a foothold against Germany and Britain, while Sorge's intelligence indicated Japan aimed to avoid a full-blown war. Stalin ordered a major offensive to clear Nomonhan, fueling Zhukov's buildup in eastern Mongolia. Kwantung Army, hampered by limited logistics, weak intelligence, and defensive posture, faced mounting pressure. 

November 7, 1944. A spy who predicted the Nazi invasion of the USSR and Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is executed. This episode originally aired in 2024.Support the show! Join Into History for ad-free listening and more.History Daily is a co-production of Airship and Noiser.Go to HistoryDaily.com for more history, daily.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Hey guys, what you are about to listen to is basically a “what if” Japan performed Hokushin-ron instead of Nanshin-ron, ie: What if Japan invaded the USSR during WW2? Before I jump into it I just want to thank all of you that signed up for the patreon, you guys are awesome. Please leave a comment on this episode to let me know what more you want to hear about in the future. With all of that said and done lets jump right into it.   Part 1 The Geopolitical context   Ok so, one of the questions I get the most is, what if Japan invaded the USSR. I've actually already tackled this subject, albeit lightly with Cody from AlternatehistoryHub and once with my friend Eric. Its too complicated to give a real answer, a lot of this is guess work, though I really will try to provide hard numbers. I think off the bat something needs to be made clear since we are dealing with alternate history. I am not doing a “what if Japan developed completely different, or what if the IJA got their way in the early 1930's” no no, this is going to be as realistic as possible…even though this is batshit crazy.    Japan faced the decision of whether to go to war with the USSR in 1941 during Operation Barbarossa. They held meetings, made plans, and ultimately it was decided they would not engage the Soviets. Our scenario will follow exactly what they did to a T, but when the made the decision not to go to war, we will see them go to war.    Now before I jump into our this timeline, I think its very important to explain the actual situation Japan faced in 1941. There were two major strategies that emerged during the 1930's within the Japanese military. Many junior officers in the IJA favored the Hokushin-ron “northern strike” strategy against the USSR. Many officers in the IJN with some in the IJA favored the Nanshin-ron “southern strike” strategy, to seize the resource rich dutch east indies by invading Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The idea of Hokushin-ron was to perform an invasion into Southern Siberia and outer mongolia ending around Lake Baikal where they would set up defenses. They had already tried to establish this during the Russian civil war as part of the Siberian Intervention, but failed to create a buffer state. From 1935-1939 there were 108 border clashes between the USSR and Japan. In 1938 one of these border clashes turned into quite a catastrophe, it was called the battle of Lake Khasan.  The Soviets suffered nearly 800 deaths, more than 3000 wounded, perhaps nearly 50 tanks were destroyed with another 100 damaged. The Japanese suffered about 600 deaths with 2500 wounded. The result ultimately was a ceasefire, but for the Kwantung army it seemed to them like a victory. In May of 1939 they had a much larger and more famous battle known as the battle of Khalkhin Gol.  During the early part of the battle the IJA sent 80 tanks crossing over Khalkhin Gol, driving the Soviets back towards Baintsagan Hill. Zhukov was waiting for the attack and sent 450 tanks and armored cars unsupported by infantry to attack the IJA from three sides. The IJA were practically encircled and lost half their armored units as they struggled to fight back as it withdrew. The two armies spared for the next 2 weeks along the east bank of the Khalkhin Gol. Problem was the Japanese were having issues getting their supplies to the area as they lacked motor transport while Zhukov whose army was over 460 miles away from its base of supply had 2600 trucks supplying them. On july 23rd the Japanese launched attacks supported by artillery and within two days they had consumed half their ammunition stores. The situation was terrible, they suffered 5000 casualties and made little progress breaking the Soviet lines. Zhukov then unleashed an offensive on august 20th using over 4000 trucks to transport supplies from Chita base. He assembled around 500 tanks, 550 fighters and bombers and his 50,000 infantry supported by armored cars. This mechanized force attacked the Japanese first using artillery and the aircraft as his armor and infantry crossed the river. The IJA were quickly flanked by the fast moving Soviet armor and encircled by August 25th. The IJA made attempts to break out of the encirclement but failed. They refused to surrender despite overwhelming artillery and aerial bombardment; by the 31st the Japanese forces on the Mongolian side of the border were destroyed. The Japanese suffered nearly 20,000 casualties, the lost 162 aircraft, 29 tanks, 7 tankettes, 72 artillery pieces a large number of vehicles. The Soviets took a heavy hit also suffering almost 25,000 casualties, 250 aircraft, 250 tanks, 133 armored cars, almost 100 artillery pieces, hundreds of vehicles. While these numbers make it seem the Japanese did a great job, you need to consider what each party was bringing to this fight. The Japanese brought roughly 30,000 men, 80 tanks and tankettes, 400 aircraft, 300 artillery pieces, 1000 trucks. The Soviets brought nearly 75,000 men, 550 tanks, 900 aircraft, 634 artillery pieces, 4000 trucks. There are some sources that indicate the IJA brought as many artillery rounds as they could muster from Japan, Manchuria and Korea, roughly 100,000 rounds for the operation. The Soviets fired 100,000 rounds per day. A quick look at wikipedia numbers, yes I know its a no no, but sometimes its good for quick perspectives show: USSR: Bomber sorties 2,015, fighter sorties 18,509; 7.62 mm machine gun rounds fired 1,065,323; 20 mm (0.80 in) cannon rounds expended 57,979; bombs dropped 78,360 (1,200 tons). Japan: Fighter/bomber sorties 10,000 (estimated); 7.7 mm (0.30 in) machine gun rounds fired 1.6 million; bombs dropped 970 tons. What I am trying to say is there was an enormous disparity in military production. And this is not just limited to numbers but quality. After the battle the Japanese made significant reforms. They increased tank production from 500 annually to 1200. The Japanese funded research into new anti-tank guns, such as the Type 1 47 mm. They mounted this gun to their Type 97 Chi-Ha tanks, the new standard medium tank of the IJA. Because of the tremendous defeat to Soviet armor they send General Yamashita to Germany to learn everything he could about tank tactics. But they simply could not produce enough tanks to ever hope to match 10% of the USSR. The Soviets had mostly been using T-26's, BT-5's and BT-7's who were crudely made, but made en masse. The Japanese would find most of their tank models with less effective range, less armor and some with less penetration power. It took the Japanese a hell of a lot more time to produce tanks, they were simply not on par with the Soviets in quantity or quality. Their tank tactics, albeit improved via Yamashita after 1939, were still nothing compared to the Soviets.  The major outcome of the battle of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol was the abandonment of the hokushin-ron strategy and adoption of the nanshin-ron strategy. But, that didnt mean Japan did not have a plan in case they had to go to war with the USSR. Part 2 Kantōgun Tokushu Enshū Kantōgun Tokushu Enshū or the Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers was an operational plan created by the General Staff of the IJA for an invasion of the Russian Far East to capitalize on Operation Barbarossa. Here our story truly begin. Between 1938-1939 the IJA General Staff and Kwantung Army formed two “Hachi-Go” plans. Variants A and B examined the possibility of an all out war with the USSR beginning in 1943. In both plans they expected to be facing 60 Soviet divisions, while they could deliver 50 divisions, delivered incrementally from China and Japan. Plan A called for attacks across the eastern and northern borders of Manchuria while maintaining a defensive stance in the west. Plan B, much more ambitious, called for striking into the vast steppe between the Great Khingan Mountains and Lake Baikal, hoping to cut off the trans-siberian railway. If this was done successfully it was believed the whole of European Russia would be doomed to be defeated in detail. Defeated in detail means to divide and conquer. This battle would take place over 5000 kilometers with Japan's final objective being to advance 1200 km into the USSR. That dwarves Operation Barbarossa in distance, let that sink in. Both plans faced impossible odds. First of all the railway networks in Manchuria were not sufficiently expanded for such far reaching offensives, especially for plan B. Furthermore the 50 divisions required for them would be impossible to come by, since 1937 Japan was bogged down in a war with China. When Japan went to war with the west in 1941 she had 51 divisions. She left the base minimum in China, 35 divisions and tossed nearly 20 into southeast asia and the pacific. On top of not having the men, the IJA estimated a fleet of 200,000 vehicles would be necessary to sustain an offensive to Lake Baikal. That was twice the number of military vehicles Japan had at any given time. After the battle of Khalkhin Gol, plan B was completely abandoned. Planning henceforth focused solely on the northern and eastern fronts with any western advance being limited in scope. Now Japan formed a neutrality pact with the USSR because of her defeat at Khalkhin Gol and Molotov Ribbentrop pact between Germany and the USSR. The Molotov Ribbentrop Pact came as a bitter and complete surprise to Japan. It pushed Japan to fully adopt the Nanshin-ron strategy and this began with her invasion of French IndoChina, which led the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and United States to embargo her. The Netherlands Dutch East Indies refused to sell oil to Japan, the UK refused to sell oil from Burma and the US gradually cut off selling oil to Japan, with her oil exports alone being 80% of Japans supply, the rest from the Dutch east indies. The United States also placed an embargo on scrap-metal shipments to Japan and closed the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping. 74.1% of Japan's scrap iron came from the United States in 1938, and 93% of Japan's copper in 1939. Other things like Rubber and tin were also off the table, as this was mostly acquired from British held Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.    Now the crux of everything is the China War. Japan was stuck, she needed to win, in order to win she needed the resources she was being denied. The only logical decision was to attack the places with these resources. Thus until 1941, Japan prepared to do just that, investing in the Navy primarily. Then in June of 1941, Hitler suddenly informs the Japanese that he is going to invade the USSR. The Japanese were shocked and extremely angry, they nearly left the Tripartite Pact over the issue. This unprecedented situation that ushered in the question, what should Japan do? There were those like Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka who argued they must abandon the neutrality pact and launch a simultaneous offensive with the Germans against the USSR. The IJA favored this idea….because obviously it would see them receiving more funding as the IJN was currently taking more and more of it for the Nanshin-ron plans. But this is not a game of hearts of Iron IV, the Japanese government had to discuss and plan if they would invade the USSR….and boy it took awhile. I think a lot of you will be very disappointed going forward, but there is no grand unleashing of a million Japanese across the borders into the Soviet Far East, in the real world there is something called logistics and politics.    The Japanese military abided by a flexible response policy, like many nations do today. Theres was specifically called the Junbi Jin Taisei or “preparatory formation setup”. Japan would only go to war with the USSR if favorable conditions were met. So in our timeline the Junbi Jin encountered its first test on June 24th when the IJA/IJN helped a conference in the wake of operation barbarossa. A compromise was made allowing the IJA to prepare an invasion plan if it did not impede on the nanshin-ron plans. There was those in the IJA who argued they should invade the USSR whether conditions were favorable or not, there were those who only wanted to invade if it looked like the USSR was on the verge of collapse. One thing agreed upon was if Japan unleashed a war with the USSR, the hostilities needed to be over by mid-October because the Siberian climate would hit winter and it would simply be impossible to continue. The IJA needed 60-7 days to complete operational preparations and 6-8 weeks to defeat the Soviets within the first phase of the offensive. Here is a breakdown of what they were thinking: 28 June: Decide on mobilization 5 July: Issue mobilization orders 20 July: Begin troop concentration 10 August: Decide on hostilities 24 August: Complete readiness stance 29 August: Concentrate two divisions from North China in Manchuria, bringing the total to 16 5 September: Concentrate four further divisions from the homeland, bringing the total to 22; complete combat stance 10 September (at latest): Commence combat operations 15 October: Complete first phase of war   The plan called for 22 divisions (might I add my own calculations of 20 divisions were pretty spot on), with roughly 850,000 men, including Manchukuo allies, supported by 800,000 tons of shipping. The Japanese hoped the Soviets would toss at least half their forces in the Far East, perhaps 2/3rd of their armor and aircraft against the Germans giving them a 2-1 superiority. Even the 22 divisions was questionable, many in the war ministry thought only 16 divisions could be spared for such a venture, something only suitable for mop up operations in the aftermath of a German victory along the eastern front. It was clear to all, Japan needed perfect conditions to even think about performing such a thing.    The War hawks who still sought to perform Hokushin-ron tried to persaude Hideki Tojo on july 5th to go through with a new plan using a total of 25 divisions. This plan designated “Kantogun Tokushu Enshu or Kantokuen” would involve 2 phases, a buildup and readiness phase and an offensive phase. On July 7th they went to Hirohito for his official sanction for the build up. Hirohito questioned everything, but gradually relented to it. The plan was nearly identical to the former plans, banking on the Soviets being unable to reinforce the Far East because of Germany's progress. The level of commitment was scaled down somewhat, but still enormous. Again a major looming issue was the Manchurian railways that would need to be expanded to accomodate the movement of men and supplies. This meant the construction of port facilities, military barracks, hospitals and such. Kantokuen would begin with a initial blow against the Ussuri front, targeting Primorye and would be followed up by a northern attack against Blagoveshchensk and Kuibyshevka. The 1st area army, 3rd and 20 armies with the 19th division of the Korean army would penetrade the border south of Lake Khanka to breach the main soviet defensive lines, thus threatening Vladivostok. The 5th army would strike south of Dalnerechensk to complete the isolation of the maritime province, sever the trans-sierian railway and block Soviet reinforcements. The 4th army would attack along the Amur river before helping out against Blagoveshchensk. Two reinofrced divisions would invade Sakhalin from land and sea. The second phase would see the capture of Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, and Nikolayevsk. Additionally, amphibious operations against Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula were contemplated.   It was agreed the operation could only afford 24 divisions, with 1,200,000 men, 35,000 vehicles, 500 tanks, 400,000 horses and 300,000 coolies. The deployment of thse forces would mean the western front facing Mongolia and the Trans-baikal region would be pretty much open, so delaying actions would have to be fought if the soviets performed a counter offensive there. Air forces were critical to the plan. They sought to dispatch up to roughly 2000 aircraft cooperating with 350 naval aircraft to launch a sudden strike against the Soviet Far East Air Force to knock them out early.    The Soviet Far East had two prominent weaknesses to be exploited. Number 1 was Mongolia's 4500 km long horeshoe shaped border. Number 2 was its 100% dependency on European Russia to deliver men, food and war materials via the trans-siberian railway. Any disruption of the trans-siberian railway would prove fatal to the Soviet Far East.    Now as for the Soviets. The 1930's and early 1940's saw the USSR take up a defensive policy, but retained offensive elecments as well. Even with the German invasion and well into 1942, the Soviets held a strategy of tossing back the IJA into Manchuria if attacked. The primary forces defending the Far east in 1941 were the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts, under the command of Generals Iosif Apanasenko and Mikhail Kovalyov. The Trans-Baikal front held 9 divisions, including 2 armored, a mechanized brigade and a heavily fortified region west of the Oldoy River near Skovorodino had a garrison. The Far Eastern Front had 23 divisions including 3 armored, 4 brigades and 11 heavily fortified regions with garrisons including Vladivostok. Altogether they had 650,000 men, 5400 tanks, 3000 aircraft, 57,000 vehicles, 15,000 artillery pieces and nearly 100,000 horses. By 1942 the Vladivostok sector had 150 artillery pieces with 75 -356 mm calibers organized into 50 batteries. As you can imagine after Operation Barbarrosa was unleashed, things changed. From June to December, roughly 160,000 men, 3000 tanks, 2670 artillery pieces, 12,000 vehicles and perhaps 1800 aircraft were sent to deal with the Germans. Despite this, the Soviets also greatly expanded a buildup to match the apparent Japanese buildup in Manchuria. By July 22nd 1941 the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts were to be raised by 1 million men for august. By December it was nearly 1.2 million. Even the Soviet Far East Navy saw an increase from 100,000 men to 170,000 led by Admiral Yumashev. The Soviet Mongolian allies were capable of manning about 80,000, though they lacked heavy equipment.    Thus if this war broke out in September the Soviets and Mongolians would have just over a million men, with 2/3rds of them manning the Amur-Ussuri-Sakhalin front, the rest would defend Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal region. Even though the war against the Germans was dire, the Soviets never really gave up their prewar planning for how to deal with the Japanese. There would be an all-out defense over the border to prevent any breach of Soviet territory. The main effort would see the 1st and 25th armies holding a north-south axis between the Pacific ocean and Lake Khanka; the 35th army would defend Iman; the 15th and 2nd Red Banner armies would repel the Japanese over the Amur River; and other forces would try to hold out on Sakhalin, Kamchatka and the Pacific coast. The Soviets had constructed hundreds of fortified positions known as Tochkas along the border. Most of these were hexagonal concrete bunkers contained machine gun nests and 76 mm guns. The fortified regions I mentioned were strategically placed forcing the Japanese to overcome them via frontal attacks. This would require heavy artillery to overcome. Despite the great defensive lines, the Soviets did not intend to be passive and would launch counteroffensives. The Soviet air force and Navy would play an active role in defeating a Japanese invasion as well. The air force's objetice would be to destroy the Japanese air force in the air and on the ground, requiring tactical ground attack mission. They would also destroy key railways, bridges and airfields within Manchuria and Korea alongside intercepting IJN shipping. Strategic bombing against the home islands would be limited to under 30 DB-3's who could attack Tokyo, Yokosuka, Maizuru and Ominato. The Soviet Navy would help around the mouth of the Amur River, mine the Tatar Strait and try to hit any IJN ships landing men or materials across the Pacific Coasts.    Japan would not be able to continue a land war with the USSR for very long. According to Japanese military records, in 1942 while at war they were required to produce 50 Kaisenbun. A Kaisenbun is a unit of measurement for ammunition needed for a single division to operate for 4 months. Annual production never surpassed 25 kaisenbun with 100 in reserve. General Shinichi Tanaka estimated for an operation against the USSR 3 Kaisenbun would be needed per divisions, thus a total of 72 would be assigned to 24 divisions. This effectively meant 2/3rds of Japans ammunition stockpile would be used on the initial strike against the USSR. Japan would have been extremely hard pressed to survive such a war cost for 2 years.    Now in terms of equipment Japan had a lot of problems. During the border battles, Japanese artillery often found itself outranged and grossly under supplied compared to the Soviet heavier guns. Despite moving a lot of men and equipment to face the Germans, the Red Army maintained a gross superiority in armor. The best tank the Kwantung Army had in late 1941 was the Type 97 Chi-Ha, holding 33mm armor with a low velocity 57 mm gun. There was also Ha-Go and Te-Ke's with 37 mm guns but they had an effective range less than 1 km.   The Soviet T-26, BT-5 and BT-7's had 45 mm guns more than capable of taking out the Japanese armor and the insult to injury was they were crudely made and very expendable. Every Japanese tank knocked out was far greater a loss, as Japan's production simply could not remotely match the USSR. For aircraft the Japanese were a lot better off. The Polikarpov I-16 was the best Soviet fighter in the Far East and performed alright against the Nakajima Ki-27 at Khalkhin Gol. The rest of the Soviet air arsenal were much older and would struggle. The Soviets would have no answer to the IJN's Zero fighter or the IJA's high speed KI-21 bomber that outraced the Soviet SB-2. Japanese pilots were battle hardened by China and vastly experienced.   Another thing the Japanese would have going for them was quality of troops. The Soviets drained their best men to fight the Germans, so the combat effectiveness in the far east would be less. Without the Pacific War breaking out, some of Japan's best Generals would be brought into this war, of course the first one that comes to mind for me is General Yamashita, probably the most armor competent Japanese general of ww2.    Come August of 1941 those who still sought the invasion of the USSR were facing major crunch time. The IJA planners had assumed the Soviets would transfer 50% or more of their power west to face the Germans, but this was not the case. By August 9th of 1941, facing impossible odds and with the western embargos in full motion, in our timeline the Japanese Hokushin-Ron backers gave up. But for the sake of our story, for some batshit insane reason, the Japanese military leadership and Hirohito give the greenlight for an invasion on August 10th.   Part 3 the catastrophe   So to reiterate the actual world plan had    10 August: Decide on hostilities 24 August: Complete readiness stance 29 August: Concentrate two divisions from North China in Manchuria, bringing the total to 16 5 September: Concentrate four further divisions from the homeland, bringing the total to 22; complete combat stance 10 September (at latest): Commence combat operations 15 October: Complete first phase of war   So what is key to think about here is the events of September. The Battle for Moscow is at the forefront, how does a Japanese invasion in the first week or two of September change things? This is going to probably piss off some of you, but Operation Typhoon would still fail for Germany.  In our time line the legendary spy Richard Sorge sent back information on Japan's decision to invade the USSR between August 25th to September 14th. On the 25th he informed Stalin the Japanese high command were still discussing whether to go to war or not with the USSR. On September 6th Stalin was informed the Japanese were beginning preparations for a war against the west. Then on September 14th, the most important message was relayed to Stalin "In the careful judgment of all of us here... the possibility of [Japan] launching an attack, which existed until recently, has disappeared...."[15]    With this information on hand from 23 June to 31 December 1941, Stalin transferred a total of 28 divisions west. This included 18 rifle divisions, 1 mountain rifle division, 3 tank divisions, 3 mechanized divisions and 3 mountain cavalry divisions. The transfers occurred mainly in June (11 divisions) and October (9 divisions).    Here we come to a crossroads and I am going to have to do some blunt predictions. Let's go from the most optimistic to the most pessimistic. Scenario 1) for some insane reason, Stalin abandons Moscow and moves his industry further east, something the Soviets were actively preparing during Operation Typhoon. This is not a defeat of the USSR, it certainly would prolong the war, but not a defeat. Now that seems rather silly. Scenario 2) Stalin attempts transferring half of what he did in our time line back to Moscow and the Germans fail to take it. The repercussions of course is a limited counteroffensive, it wont be as grand as in our timeline, but Moscow is saved. Scenario 3) and the most likely in my opinion, why would Stalin risk moscow for the Far East? Stalin might not transfer as many troops, but certainly he would have rather placed his chips in Moscow rather than an enemy literally 6000 km's away who have to cross a frozen desert to get to anything he cares about.  Even stating these scenarios, the idea the German army would have taken Moscow if some of the very first units from the far east arrived, because remember a lot of these units did not make it in time to defend moscow, rather they contributed to the grand counteroffensive after the Germans stalled. The German armies in front of Moscow were depleted, exhausted, unsupplied and freezing. Yes many of the Soviet armies at Moscow were hastily thrown together, inexperienced, poorly led and still struggling to regain their balance from the German onslaught. Yet from most sources, and by sources I mean armchair historian types argue, the Germans taking Moscow is pretty unlikely. And moscow was not even that important. What a real impact might have been was the loss of the Caucasus oil fields in early 1942, now that could have brought the USSR down, Moscow, not so much, again the Soviets had already pulled their industry further east, they could do it again.   So within the context of this Second Russo-Japanese War, figure the German's still grind to a halt, they don't take Moscow, perhaps Soviets dont push them back as hard, but the USSR is not collapsing by any means. Ok now before we talk about Japans invasion we actually need to look at some external players. The UK/US/Netherlands already began massive embargoes against Japan for oil, iron, rubber, tin, everything she needed to continue her war, not just against the USSR, but with over 35 divisions fighting in China. President Roosevelt was looking for any excuse to enter WW2 and was gradually increasing ways to aid Britain and the Soviets.  Now American's lend-lease program seriously aided the USSR during WW2, particularly the initial stages of the war. The delivery of lend-lease to the USSR came through three major routes: the Arctic Convoys, the Persian Corridor, and the Pacific Route. The Arctic route was the shortest and most direct route for lend-lease aid to the USSR, though it was also the most dangerous as it involved sailing past German-occupied Norway. Some 3,964,000 tons of goods were shipped by the Arctic route; 7% was lost, while 93% arrived safely. The Persian Corridor was the longest route, and was not fully operational until mid-1942. Thereafter it saw the passage of 4,160,000 tons of goods, 27% of the total. The most important was the Pacific Route which opened up in August of 1941, but became affected when Japan went to war with America. The major port was Vladivostok, where only Soviet ships could transport non-military goods some 8,244,000 tons of goods went by this route, 50% of the total. Vladivostok would almost certainly be captured by the Japanese in our scenario so it won't be viable after its capture. Here is the sticky part, Japan is not at war with the US, so the US is pretty much free to find different Pacific paths to get lend-lease to the Soviets, and to be honest there's always the Arctic or Persian corridors. Hell in this scenario America will be able to get supplies easily into China as there will be no war in Burma, hong kong, Malaya and such. America alone is going to really ruin Japans day by increasing lend-lease to the UK, China and the USSR. America wont be joining the war in 1941, but I would strongly wager by hook or by crook, FDR would pull them into a war against Germany, probably using the same tactic Woodrow Wilson did with WW1. This would only worsen things for Japan. Another player of course is China. Late 1941, China was absolutely battered by Japan. With Japan pulling perhaps even more troops than she did for the Pacific war to fight the USSR, Chiang Kai-Shek would do everything possible to aid his new found close ally Stalin. How this would work out is anyone's guess, but it would be significant as I believe America would be providing a lot more goodies.    Ok you've all been patient, what happens with the war? Japan has to deliver a decisive knock out blow in under 4-6 months, anything after this is simply comical as Japan's production has no resources. The oil in siberia is not even remotely on the table. The Japanese can't find it, would not be able to exploit it, let alone quick enough to use it for the war. Hell the Italians were sitting on oil in Libya and they never figured that out during WW2.   So Kantokuen is unleashed with an initial blow against the Primorye in the Ussuri Front followed by an assault against Blagoveshchensk and Kiubyshevka. The main soviet lines south of Lake Khanka are attacked by the Japanese 1st area army, 3rd and 20th armies and the 19th Korean division. This inturn threatens Vladivostok who is also being bombarded by IJA/IJN aircraft. The 5th Ija army attacks south of Dalnerechensk in an attempt to sever the trans-siberian railway, to block Soviet reinforcements and supplies. The 4th IJA army fords the Amur river to help with the assault of Blagoveshchensk. Meanwhile Sakhalin is being attacked from land and sea by two IJA divisions.  Despite the Soviets being undermanned the western front facing Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal region is wide up to an attack as its only defended by the 23rd IJA division, so a limited counteroffensive begins there. The Japanese quickly win air superiority, however the heavily fortified Tochkas are not being swept aside as the Japanese might have hoped. A major problem the Japanese are facing is Soviet artillery. The Japanese artillery already placed along the borders, initially performed well, crushing Tochkas in range, but when the Japanese begin advancing and deploying their artillery units they are outgunned perhaps 3-1, much of the Soviet artillery outranges them and the Soviets have a much larger stockpile of shells. Airpower is failing to knock out soviet artillery which is placed within Tochkas and other fortified positions with anti-aircraft guns. Without achieving proper neutralization or counter battery fire, the Japanese advance against the fortified Soviet positions. The Soviets respond shockingly with counterattacks. The 15th and 35th Soviet armies with the Amur Red Banner Military Flotilla toss limited counterattacks against both sides of the Sungari River, harassing the Japanese. While much of the soviet armor had been sent west, their light tanks which would be useless against the Germans have been retained in the far east and prove capable of countering the IJA tanks. The Soviets inflict tremendous casualties, however General Yamashita, obsessed with blitzkrieg style warfare he saw first hand in the west, eventually exploits a weak area in the line.Gradually a blitzkrieg punches through and begins to circle around hitting Soviet fortified positions from the rear. The Soviets knew this would be the outcome and had prepared to fight a defense in depth, somewhat managing the onslaught.  The trans-siberian railway has been severed in multiple locations close to the border area, however this is not as effective as it could be, the Japanese need to hook deeper to cut the line further away. In the course of weeks the Soviets are gradually dislodged from their fortified positions, fighting a defense in depth over great stretches of land. Vladivostok holds out surprisingly long until the IJN/IJA seize the city. Alongside this Sakhalin is taken with relative ease. The Soviet surface fleet is annihilated, but their large submarine force takes a heavy toll of the IJN who are attempting Pacific landings. Kantokuen phase 1 is meeting its objectives, but far later than expected with much more casualties than expected. The Japanese are shocked by the fuel consumption as they advance further inland. Each truck bearing fuel is using 50% of said fuel to get to the troops, something reminiscent of the north african campaign situation for Rommel. The terrain is terrible for their vehicles full of valleys, hills, forests and mountains. Infrastructure in the region is extremely underdeveloped and the Soviets are burning and destroying everything before the Japanese arrive. All key roads and cities are defended until the Japanese can encircle the Soviets, upon which they depart, similar to situations the Japanese face in China. It is tremendously slow progress. The IJA are finding it difficult to encircle and capture Soviet forces who have prepared a series of rear lines to keep falling back to while performing counterattacks against Japanese columns. As the Japanese advance further into the interior, the IJN are unable to continue supporting them with aircraft and much of the IJA aircraft are limited in operations because of the range. The second phase of Kantokuen calls for the capture of Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, and Nikolayevsk. Additionally, amphibious operations against Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula are on standby as the IJN fears risking shipping as a result of Soviet submarine operations. The sheer scope of the operation was seeing the tide sides stretching their forces over a front nearly 5000 km in length. At some points the Japanese were attempting to advance more than 1000 km's inland, wasting ungodly amounts of fuel and losing vehicles from wear and tear.  So what does Japan gain? Within the span of 4 months, max 6 months Japan could perhaps seized: Sakhalin, the Primorsye krai including Vladivostok, segments of the trans siberian railway, Blagoveshchensk, Kuibyshevka. If they are really lucky Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, Nikolayevsk. Additionally, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula. What does this mean? Really nothing. Pull out a map of manchuria during WW2, take a pencil and expand the manchurian border perhaps 1000 km if you really want to be generous, that's the new extent of the empire of the rising sun. The real purpose of attacking the USSR is not to perform some ludicrous dash across 6000 km's of frozen wasteland to whittle down and defeat the Soviets alongside the rest of the Axis. It was only to break them, in late 1941 at Moscow there was perhaps a fools chance, but it was a fool's chance for Japan.  Japan has run out of its stockpiles of Kaisenbun, oil, iron, rubber, tin, all types of resources necessary for making war. Unlike in our timeline where Japan began exporting resources from its conquests in southeast asia and the pacific, here Japan spent everything and now is relying on the trickles it has within its empire. The China war will be much more difficult to manage. The lend-lease will increase every day to China. The US/UK/Netherlands will only increase pressure upon Japan to stop being a nuisance, Japan can't do anything about this as the US Pacific Fleet is operating around the Philippines always a looming threat. The Japanese are holding for a lack of better words, useless ground in the far east. They will build a buffer area to defend against what can only be described as a Soviet Invasion of Manchuria x1000. The Allies will be directing all of their effort against Germany and Italy, providing a interesting alternate history concept in its own right. After Germany has been dealt with, Japan would face a existential threat against a very angry Stalin. Cody from Alternate History Hub actually made an episode on this scenario, he believed the Soviets would conquer most of Japan occupied Asia and even invade the home islands. It would certainly be something on the table, taking many years, but the US/UK would most likely interfere in some way. The outcome would be so much worse for Japan. Perhaps she is occupied and a communist government is installed. Perhaps like in our timeline the Americans come in to bolster Japan up for the looming coldwar.  But the question I sought to answer here was, Japan invading the USSR was a dumb idea. The few Japanese commanders who pushed it all the way until August 9th of 1941 simply had to give up because of how illogical it was. I honestly should not have even talked about military matters, this all came down to logistics and resources. You want to know how Japan could have secured itself a better deal in WW2? 1941, the China War is the number one problem Japan can't solve so they look north or south to acquire the means to solve the China problem? Negotiate a peace with China. That is the lackluster best deal right there.    Sorry if this episode did not match your wildest dreams. But if you want me to do some batshit crazy alternate history stuff, I am more than happy to jump into it and have fun. Again thank all of you guys who joined the patreon, you guys are awesome. Until next time this is the Pacific War channel over and out. 

Einer der berühmtesten Spione aller Zeiten - zumindest der bekannteste, der erwischt wurde: Richard Sorge (geboren am 4.10.1895) lebte ein filmreifes und komprissloses Leben... Von Joscha Seehausen.

In this sleepy episode, we explore the lives and times of two famous spies: Mata Hari in the world of show-business and courtesans in Paris during the Belle Epoque and WW1; and Richard Sorge, a spy for the Soviet Union who provided Moscow with valuable information about Germany and Japan before and during WW2. I hope you enjoy the mystery and intrigue in the stories of these spies, as you drift off to sleep tonight. Welcome to Lights Out Library Join me for a sleepy adventure tonight. Sit back, relax, and fall asleep to documentary-style bedtime stories read in a calming ASMR voice. Learn something new while you enjoy a restful night of sleep. Listen ad free and get access to bonus content on our Patreon: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.patreon.com/LightsOutLibrary621⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Listen on Youtube: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.youtube.com/@LightsOutLibraryov⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠   ¿Quieres escuchar en Español? Echa un vistazo a La Biblioteca de los Sueños! En Spotify: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://open.spotify.com/show/1t522alsv5RxFsAf9AmYfg⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ En Apple Podcasts: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/la-biblioteca-de-los-sue%C3%B1os-documentarios-para-dormir/id1715193755⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ En Youtube: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.youtube.com/@LaBibliotecadelosSuenosov⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ #sleep #bedtimestory #asmr #sleepstory #mythology #mayan #aztec #history Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

"Hommikumaa vägevate" IX hooaja keskmes on saladused; salaseltsid, salamõrvarid ja salaagendid. Viies saade kõneleb saksa-vene päritolu ideoloogilisest kommunistist Richard Sorgest (1895-1944), kes oli Teise ilmasõja eel ja ajal Nõukogude Liidu salakuulaja Tōkyōs.

Ein Funkgerät, ein Plan, ein Ende am Strick... Mach's dir bequem und kuschel dich ein! Dieser Podcast wird durch Werbung finanziert. Infos und Angebote unserer Werbepartner: https://linktr.ee/EinschlafenMitPodcast Hier geht's zum Wikipedia-Artikel. Der Artikel wurde redaktionell überarbeitet: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verrat_an_Deutschland CC BY-SA 4.0

The Russians came late to Japan, arriving after the Portuguese and other European powers. But as soon as they arrived, Russia tried to use spies and espionage to learn more about their neighbor—with various degrees of success. Sometimes, it failed miserably, like Russia's early attempts to make contact with pre-Meiji Japan, or the debacle during the Russo-Japanese War. Other times, they were wildly successful, like during the Battle of Khalkin Gol or with Richard Sorge's spy ring during the Second World War. James D. Brown covers Russia and the Soviet Union's efforts to learn more about Japan in Cracking the Crab: Russian Espionage Against Japan, from Peter the Great to Richard Sorge (Hurst, 2025), covering much both the famous examples of Russian spycraft, and the lesser-known missions—like Operation Postman, a successful effort to read the mail of Japanese diplomats in Italy. James is Professor of Political Science at Temple University, Japan. He is a specialist on East Asian politics and a regular media contributor, including for the BBC. His books include Japan, Russia and their Territorial Dispute (Routledge: 2016); and Japan's Foreign Relations in Asia (Routledge: 2018) and The Abe Legacy (Lexington Books: 2023) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Cracking the Crab. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

The Russians came late to Japan, arriving after the Portuguese and other European powers. But as soon as they arrived, Russia tried to use spies and espionage to learn more about their neighbor—with various degrees of success. Sometimes, it failed miserably, like Russia's early attempts to make contact with pre-Meiji Japan, or the debacle during the Russo-Japanese War. Other times, they were wildly successful, like during the Battle of Khalkin Gol or with Richard Sorge's spy ring during the Second World War. James D. Brown covers Russia and the Soviet Union's efforts to learn more about Japan in Cracking the Crab: Russian Espionage Against Japan, from Peter the Great to Richard Sorge (Hurst, 2025), covering much both the famous examples of Russian spycraft, and the lesser-known missions—like Operation Postman, a successful effort to read the mail of Japanese diplomats in Italy. James is Professor of Political Science at Temple University, Japan. He is a specialist on East Asian politics and a regular media contributor, including for the BBC. His books include Japan, Russia and their Territorial Dispute (Routledge: 2016); and Japan's Foreign Relations in Asia (Routledge: 2018) and The Abe Legacy (Lexington Books: 2023) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Cracking the Crab. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

The Russians came late to Japan, arriving after the Portuguese and other European powers. But as soon as they arrived, Russia tried to use spies and espionage to learn more about their neighbor—with various degrees of success. Sometimes, it failed miserably, like Russia's early attempts to make contact with pre-Meiji Japan, or the debacle during the Russo-Japanese War. Other times, they were wildly successful, like during the Battle of Khalkin Gol or with Richard Sorge's spy ring during the Second World War. James D. Brown covers Russia and the Soviet Union's efforts to learn more about Japan in Cracking the Crab: Russian Espionage Against Japan, from Peter the Great to Richard Sorge (Hurst, 2025), covering much both the famous examples of Russian spycraft, and the lesser-known missions—like Operation Postman, a successful effort to read the mail of Japanese diplomats in Italy. James is Professor of Political Science at Temple University, Japan. He is a specialist on East Asian politics and a regular media contributor, including for the BBC. His books include Japan, Russia and their Territorial Dispute (Routledge: 2016); and Japan's Foreign Relations in Asia (Routledge: 2018) and The Abe Legacy (Lexington Books: 2023) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Cracking the Crab. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies

The Russians came late to Japan, arriving after the Portuguese and other European powers. But as soon as they arrived, Russia tried to use spies and espionage to learn more about their neighbor—with various degrees of success. Sometimes, it failed miserably, like Russia's early attempts to make contact with pre-Meiji Japan, or the debacle during the Russo-Japanese War. Other times, they were wildly successful, like during the Battle of Khalkin Gol or with Richard Sorge's spy ring during the Second World War. James D. Brown covers Russia and the Soviet Union's efforts to learn more about Japan in Cracking the Crab: Russian Espionage Against Japan, from Peter the Great to Richard Sorge (Hurst, 2025), covering much both the famous examples of Russian spycraft, and the lesser-known missions—like Operation Postman, a successful effort to read the mail of Japanese diplomats in Italy. James is Professor of Political Science at Temple University, Japan. He is a specialist on East Asian politics and a regular media contributor, including for the BBC. His books include Japan, Russia and their Territorial Dispute (Routledge: 2016); and Japan's Foreign Relations in Asia (Routledge: 2018) and The Abe Legacy (Lexington Books: 2023) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Cracking the Crab. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/japanese-studies

The Russians came late to Japan, arriving after the Portuguese and other European powers. But as soon as they arrived, Russia tried to use spies and espionage to learn more about their neighbor—with various degrees of success. Sometimes, it failed miserably, like Russia's early attempts to make contact with pre-Meiji Japan, or the debacle during the Russo-Japanese War. Other times, they were wildly successful, like during the Battle of Khalkin Gol or with Richard Sorge's spy ring during the Second World War. James D. Brown covers Russia and the Soviet Union's efforts to learn more about Japan in Cracking the Crab: Russian Espionage Against Japan, from Peter the Great to Richard Sorge (Hurst, 2025), covering much both the famous examples of Russian spycraft, and the lesser-known missions—like Operation Postman, a successful effort to read the mail of Japanese diplomats in Italy. James is Professor of Political Science at Temple University, Japan. He is a specialist on East Asian politics and a regular media contributor, including for the BBC. His books include Japan, Russia and their Territorial Dispute (Routledge: 2016); and Japan's Foreign Relations in Asia (Routledge: 2018) and The Abe Legacy (Lexington Books: 2023) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Cracking the Crab. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/asian-review

Richard Sorge is one of history's most famous spies. This hard-drinking, womanising, motorcycle-crashing Soviet officer penetrated the German embassy in Tokyo during the 1930s and gathered intelligence credited with changing the course of the Second World War. It is an intriguing tale; but Sorge's spy ring was just one chapter in a much longer history of Russian and Soviet espionage in and against Japan. Cracking the Crab: Russian Espionage Against Japan, from Peter the Great to Richard Sorge (Hurst, 2025) by Dr. James D Brown tells the extraordinary full story of Russian intrigue targeting Japan, from first encounters in the eighteenth century to the Soviet declaration of war in August 1945. Colourful episodes include Gojong, King of Korea, being smuggled into the Russian legation dressed as a woman in 1896; the 1927 ‘Tanaka Memorial', an infamous forgery purporting to be Japan's hidden plan for world domination; and the secret intelligence of ‘Nero', a Soviet agent supplying invaluable insight into Japanese strategy during the Second World War. From Russians murdered in broad daylight in Meiji Tokyo to Soviet honey traps and ‘white magic' at the Battle of Nomonhan, this is a landmark history of the covert struggle between two great powers of the modern age. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. You can find Miranda's interviews on New Books with Miranda Melcher, wherever you get your podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Richard Sorge is one of history's most famous spies. This hard-drinking, womanising, motorcycle-crashing Soviet officer penetrated the German embassy in Tokyo during the 1930s and gathered intelligence credited with changing the course of the Second World War. It is an intriguing tale; but Sorge's spy ring was just one chapter in a much longer history of Russian and Soviet espionage in and against Japan. Cracking the Crab: Russian Espionage Against Japan, from Peter the Great to Richard Sorge (Hurst, 2025) by Dr. James D Brown tells the extraordinary full story of Russian intrigue targeting Japan, from first encounters in the eighteenth century to the Soviet declaration of war in August 1945. Colourful episodes include Gojong, King of Korea, being smuggled into the Russian legation dressed as a woman in 1896; the 1927 ‘Tanaka Memorial', an infamous forgery purporting to be Japan's hidden plan for world domination; and the secret intelligence of ‘Nero', a Soviet agent supplying invaluable insight into Japanese strategy during the Second World War. From Russians murdered in broad daylight in Meiji Tokyo to Soviet honey traps and ‘white magic' at the Battle of Nomonhan, this is a landmark history of the covert struggle between two great powers of the modern age. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. You can find Miranda's interviews on New Books with Miranda Melcher, wherever you get your podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

Richard Sorge is one of history's most famous spies. This hard-drinking, womanising, motorcycle-crashing Soviet officer penetrated the German embassy in Tokyo during the 1930s and gathered intelligence credited with changing the course of the Second World War. It is an intriguing tale; but Sorge's spy ring was just one chapter in a much longer history of Russian and Soviet espionage in and against Japan. Cracking the Crab: Russian Espionage Against Japan, from Peter the Great to Richard Sorge (Hurst, 2025) by Dr. James D Brown tells the extraordinary full story of Russian intrigue targeting Japan, from first encounters in the eighteenth century to the Soviet declaration of war in August 1945. Colourful episodes include Gojong, King of Korea, being smuggled into the Russian legation dressed as a woman in 1896; the 1927 ‘Tanaka Memorial', an infamous forgery purporting to be Japan's hidden plan for world domination; and the secret intelligence of ‘Nero', a Soviet agent supplying invaluable insight into Japanese strategy during the Second World War. From Russians murdered in broad daylight in Meiji Tokyo to Soviet honey traps and ‘white magic' at the Battle of Nomonhan, this is a landmark history of the covert struggle between two great powers of the modern age. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. You can find Miranda's interviews on New Books with Miranda Melcher, wherever you get your podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies

Richard Sorge is one of history's most famous spies. This hard-drinking, womanising, motorcycle-crashing Soviet officer penetrated the German embassy in Tokyo during the 1930s and gathered intelligence credited with changing the course of the Second World War. It is an intriguing tale; but Sorge's spy ring was just one chapter in a much longer history of Russian and Soviet espionage in and against Japan. Cracking the Crab: Russian Espionage Against Japan, from Peter the Great to Richard Sorge (Hurst, 2025) by Dr. James D Brown tells the extraordinary full story of Russian intrigue targeting Japan, from first encounters in the eighteenth century to the Soviet declaration of war in August 1945. Colourful episodes include Gojong, King of Korea, being smuggled into the Russian legation dressed as a woman in 1896; the 1927 ‘Tanaka Memorial', an infamous forgery purporting to be Japan's hidden plan for world domination; and the secret intelligence of ‘Nero', a Soviet agent supplying invaluable insight into Japanese strategy during the Second World War. From Russians murdered in broad daylight in Meiji Tokyo to Soviet honey traps and ‘white magic' at the Battle of Nomonhan, this is a landmark history of the covert struggle between two great powers of the modern age. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. You can find Miranda's interviews on New Books with Miranda Melcher, wherever you get your podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Richard Sorge is one of history's most famous spies. This hard-drinking, womanising, motorcycle-crashing Soviet officer penetrated the German embassy in Tokyo during the 1930s and gathered intelligence credited with changing the course of the Second World War. It is an intriguing tale; but Sorge's spy ring was just one chapter in a much longer history of Russian and Soviet espionage in and against Japan. Cracking the Crab: Russian Espionage Against Japan, from Peter the Great to Richard Sorge (Hurst, 2025) by Dr. James D Brown tells the extraordinary full story of Russian intrigue targeting Japan, from first encounters in the eighteenth century to the Soviet declaration of war in August 1945. Colourful episodes include Gojong, King of Korea, being smuggled into the Russian legation dressed as a woman in 1896; the 1927 ‘Tanaka Memorial', an infamous forgery purporting to be Japan's hidden plan for world domination; and the secret intelligence of ‘Nero', a Soviet agent supplying invaluable insight into Japanese strategy during the Second World War. From Russians murdered in broad daylight in Meiji Tokyo to Soviet honey traps and ‘white magic' at the Battle of Nomonhan, this is a landmark history of the covert struggle between two great powers of the modern age. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. You can find Miranda's interviews on New Books with Miranda Melcher, wherever you get your podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/japanese-studies

Programa 5x163, amb Alfred Garc

November 7, 1944. A spy who predicted the Nazi invasion of the USSR and Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is executed.Support the show! Join Into History for ad-free listening and more.History Daily is a co-production of Airship and Noiser.Go to HistoryDaily.com for more history, daily.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Er gilt als einer der wichtigsten Spione Moskaus während des Zweiten Weltkriegs: der deutsch-russische Kommunist Richard Sorge. Er verriet Kriegspläne Deutschlands und Japans an die Sowjetunion. Am 7. November 1944 wurde er in Tokio hingerichtet. Langels, Otto www.deutschlandfunk.de, Kalenderblatt

Heute vor 80 Jahren starb der Journalist und russische Top-Spion Richard Sorge.

Toute cette semaine, semaine spéciale Au cœur de l'Histoire... des Espions. Pour le cinquième et dernier épisode, Stéphane Bern nous raconte Richard Sorge, espion au sein de l'ambassade d'Allemagne au Japon au service de l'URSS pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, dont Staline disait qu'à lui tout seul, il valait une armée… Qu'est-ce qui a fait de lui l'un des meilleurs espions du 20ème siècle ? Comment a-t-il pu récolter autant d'informations pour l'Union Soviétique ? Est-ce à lui que l'on doit le tournant du conflit ? Pour en parler, Stéphane Bern reçoit Vladimir Fédorovski, écrivain, diplomate et auteur de "Sorge, un espion pour l'éternité" (Balland)Au Cœur de l'Histoire est réalisée par Guillaume Vasseau. Rédaction en chef : Benjamin Delsol. Auteure du récit : Sandrine Brugot. Journaliste : Clara Léger. Programmation : Morgane Vianey.

Toute cette semaine, semaine spéciale Au cœur de l'Histoire... des Espions. Pour le cinquième et dernier épisode, Stéphane Bern nous raconte Richard Sorge, espion au sein de l'ambassade d'Allemagne au Japon au service de l'URSS pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, dont Staline disait qu'à lui tout seul, il valait une armée… Qu'est-ce qui a fait de lui l'un des meilleurs espions du 20ème siècle ? Comment a-t-il pu récolter autant d'informations pour l'Union Soviétique ? Est-ce à lui que l'on doit le tournant du conflit ?Au Cœur de l'Histoire est réalisée par Guillaume Vasseau. Rédaction en chef : Benjamin Delsol. Auteure du récit : Sandrine Brugot. Journaliste : Clara Léger. Programmation : Morgane Vianey.

Toute cette semaine, semaine spéciale Au cœur de l'Histoire... des Espions. Pour le cinquième et dernier épisode, Stéphane Bern nous raconte Richard Sorge, espion au sein de l'ambassade d'Allemagne au Japon au service de l'URSS pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, dont Staline disait qu'à lui tout seul, il valait une armée… Qu'est-ce qui a fait de lui l'un des meilleurs espions du 20ème siècle ? Comment a-t-il pu récolter autant d'informations pour l'Union Soviétique ? Est-ce à lui que l'on doit le tournant du conflit ? Pour en parler, Stéphane Bern reçoit Vladimir Fédorovski, écrivain, diplomate et auteur de "Sorge, un espion pour l'éternité" (Balland)Au Cœur de l'Histoire est réalisée par Guillaume Vasseau. Rédaction en chef : Benjamin Delsol. Auteure du récit : Sandrine Brugot. Journaliste : Clara Léger. Programmation : Morgane Vianey.

Toute cette semaine, semaine spéciale Au cœur de l'Histoire... des Espions. Pour le cinquième et dernier épisode, Stéphane Bern nous raconte Richard Sorge, espion au sein de l'ambassade d'Allemagne au Japon au service de l'URSS pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, dont Staline disait qu'à lui tout seul, il valait une armée… Qu'est-ce qui a fait de lui l'un des meilleurs espions du 20ème siècle ? Comment a-t-il pu récolter autant d'informations pour l'Union Soviétique ? Est-ce à lui que l'on doit le tournant du conflit ?Au Cœur de l'Histoire est réalisée par Guillaume Vasseau. Rédaction en chef : Benjamin Delsol. Auteure du récit : Sandrine Brugot. Journaliste : Clara Léger. Programmation : Morgane Vianey.

ll prof. Barbero racconta la storia di Richard Sorge, giornalista tedesco che tra il 1933 e il 1941 operò in Giappone e in Germania per conto dell'Unione Sovietica, influenzando notevolmente l'andamento della Seconda Guerra Mondiale.Festival della Mente: https://festivaldellamente.itOriginale su Youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rh3NuKMC4Ww Twitter: https://twitter.com/barberopodcastFacebook: https://facebook.com/barberopodcastInstagram: https://instagram.com/barberopodcastGeorge Street Shuffle by Kevin MacLeodLink: https://incompetech.filmmusic.io/song/3800-george-street-shuffleLicense: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

ll prof. Barbero racconta la storia di Richard Sorge, giornalista tedesco che tra il 1933 e il 1941 operò in Giappone e in Germania per conto dell'Unione Sovietica, influenzando notevolmente l'andamento della Seconda Guerra Mondiale.Festival della Mente: https://festivaldellamente.itOriginale su Youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rh3NuKMC4Ww Twitter: https://twitter.com/barberopodcastFacebook: https://facebook.com/barberopodcastInstagram: https://instagram.com/barberopodcastGeorge Street Shuffle by Kevin MacLeodLink: https://incompetech.filmmusic.io/song/3800-george-street-shuffleLicense: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Wer unsere Arbeit mit einer Spende unterstützen will, kann dies per PayPal tun: paypal.me/hellepanke Likes, Abos und ein Besuch auf www.helle-panke.de unterstützen uns ebenso. Den Newsletter mit unserem Wochenprogramm gibt es hier: www.helle-panke.de/de/topic/22.newsletter.html Aufzeichnung vom 18. Oktober 2023, aus der Kopenhagener Str. 9 in Berlin 1. Tag der Konferenz "1923 – Sattelzeit der Revolution. Umbrüche in Politik, Kultur und radikaler Gesellschaftskritik" (3 Panels) 2. Panel:Die Marxistische Arbeitswoche Begrüßung: Peter Schulz Vorträge: Prof. Dr. Michael Buckmiller und Judy Slivi Die Marxistische Arbeitswoche war ein Treffen von Marxist_innen und Kommunist_innen, die sich Pfingsten 1923 in Geraberg bei Ilmenau trafen, um zu diskutieren, wie eine kritische Theorie der Gesellschaft aussehen könnte. Angesichts der Welle revolutionärer Erhebungen von 1917 bis 1923 in Europa, aber auch der zunehmenden Verringerung der Möglichkeit, Theorie frei innerhalb der kommunistischen Partei zu diskutieren, trafen sich die Anwesenden – unter ihnen Fukumoto Kazou, Karl Korsch, Georg Lukács, Friedrich Pollock, Felix Weil und Richard Sorge – und diskutierten die gerade erschienenen Schriften Lukács und Korschs. Seit 2022 beschäftigt sich damit das Projekt #100MAW von Arbeit und Leben Thüringen sowie der Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung Thüringen u.a. durch Veranstaltungen und mit einer von Michael Buckmiller konzipierten Ausstellung über Karl Korsch. Im Gespräch mit Volker Hinck (RLS Thüringen) führt Prof. Dr. Michael Buckmiller in die Marxistische Arbeitswoche ein, während Judy Slivi (Arbeit und Leben Thüringen) einen Blick auf die Biographien der dort anwesenden Frauen und ihre Arbeit wirft. Prof. Dr. Michael Buckmiller ist Politologe und lehrte bis 2008 am Institut für Politische Wissenschaft an der Universität Hannover. Er ist Herausgeber der historisch-kritischen Gesamtausgabe von Karl Korsch und der Gesammelten Schriften von Wolfgang Abendroth. Im Ruhestand widmete er sich seinen eigenen Forschungsprojekten sowie der Leitung des von ihm gegründeten Offizin-Verlages. Dort erschien – herausgegeben von ihm - im Januar 2023 die Erneuerung des Marxismus. Karl Korsch 1886-1961 u.a. mit Beiträgen aus dem Projekt #100JahreMAW. Judy Slivi wurde 1977 in Gotha geboren. Nach dem Studium der Soziologie in Jena, einem weiterem Studium der Archäologie in Halle/Saale und mehreren Auslandsaufenthalten kehrte sie 2010 nach Gotha zurück. Derzeit arbeitet sie als Projektleiterin bei Arbeit und Leben Thüringen e.V., einem der Träger von #100JahreMAW. Moderation: Peter Schulz

Dans ce premier épisode d'une série que j'ai nommée "La folle épopée" je vous raconte l'histoire fascinante de l'espion Richard Sorge. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Dans ce premier épisode d'une série que j'ai nommée "La folle épopée" je vous raconte l'histoire fascinante de l'espion Richard Sorge. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Cet épisode vous a plu ? Découvez mon podcast La folle épopée !Apple Podcasts:https://podcasts.apple.com/fr/podcast/la-folle-%C3%A9pop%C3%A9e/id1727649957Spotify:https://open.spotify.com/show/74el11FIusukqlTkEMPstjDeezer:https://deezer.com/show/1000659242-------------------------------------------Dans ce premier épisode d'une série que j'ai nommée "La folle épopée" je vous raconte l'histoire fascinante de l'espion Richard Sorge. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Dans ce premier épisode d'une série que j'ai nommée "La folle épopée" je vous raconte l'histoire fascinante de l'espion Richard Sorge. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Dreams of a better future have driven many a revolution, but not all have turned out the way the dreamers imagined.   China's early revolutionaries, a century ago, aimed to rid the country of what they saw as corrupt capitalism and the world of colonialism and imperialism. Instead, they said, socialism would bring a future of peace, prosperity, equality, and social justice.  Not all of that worked out. One of the dreamers was Chen Hansheng, a prominent Western-educated  public intellectual who wrote, lectured, and taught in the United States while secretly working for the Soviet Comintern and Communist Party of China, who worked over time with Zhou Enlai and more briefly with Soviet spy Richard Sorge, and who was close friends Agnes Smedley, an American journalist who supported China's Communist revolution, and with Soong Ching-Ling, the widow of Sun Yat-Sen. Chen's comprehensive surveys of rural regions of China in the 1930s painted a vivid picture of the realities on the ground for China's farmers and villagers, who China's Communist revolution ended up helping in some ways and hurting in others, particularly in the preventable Great Famine of the late '50s and early '60s, when as many as 50 million people starved to death. Chen died in 2004 at age 107.  He lived through a century of epic change in China and in the world that brought some of what he wanted, but not in the way he expected, and a lot of disillusionment. In this  episode, Chen's biographer Stephen R. MacKinnon, lays it all out. Stephen R. MacKinnon is an emeritus professor of 20th Century Chinese history and former director of the Center for Asian Studies at Arizona State University. He has lived and worked in the People's Republic of China, and has focused on China in his work since the early 1960s. He has written dozens of articles and edited volumes, and is the author of five books on China, including Chen Hansheng: China's Last Romantic Revolutionary (2023), Wuhan, 1938: War, Refugees, and the Making of Modern China (2008), and Agnes Smedley: The Life and Times of an American Radical (1987).  The China Books podcast is hosted and produced by Mary Kay Magistad, a former award-winning China correspondent for NPR and PRI/BBC's The World, now deputy director of Asia Society's Center on U.S.-China Relations. This podcast is a companion of the China Books Review, which offers incisive essays, interviews, and reviews on all things China books-related. Co-publishers are Asia Society's Center on U.S.-China Relations, headed by Orville Schell, and The Wire China, co-founded by David Barboza, a former Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times China correspondent. The Review's editor is Alec Ash, who can be reached at editor@chinabooksreview.com.

For a womanizing Soviet spy, wartime Tokyo is both playground and prison. Surrounded by the enemy, he's got to keep his wits about him - and with an increasingly paranoid leader in the Kremlin, the line between friend and foe is thin indeed. Daisy Ridley joins author Owen Matthews to tell the story of one the USSR's most formidable spies - Richard Sorge. A Communist true-believer, he provided crucial intelligence to Moscow before and during World War 2. But for Stalin's top spies, loyalty comes with no guarantee of reward... From SPYSCAPE, the home of secrets. A Cup And Nuzzle production. Series producer: Joe Foley. Produced by Morgan Childs. Music by Nick Ryan.

Ricevi dove e quando vuoi tutti gli ingredienti freschi e già dosati per cucinare ricette nuove e sempre diverse. L'ispirazione per le tue cene è in una box per cucinare! Solo con l'offerta esclusiva di HELLO FRESH! https://bit.ly/3oFAh5d Codice SCONTO: CHEFIT99Il nostro canale Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC1vziHBEp0gc9gAhR740fCwSostieni DENTRO LA STORIA su Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/dentrolastoriaAbbonati al canale: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC1vziHBEp0gc9gAhR740fCw/joinE' stato definito in molti modi, la piu' grande spia della storia, il James Bond di Stalin, la spia che ha cambiato il mondo e tanto altro ancora, Richard Sorge, la spia tedesca al soldo dell'Unione Sovietica di Stalin, operativo nel Giappone dell'asse durante la Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Catturato nel 1941, processato e condannato a morte nel 1944, non riconosciuto dai sovietici come agente fino al 1964, anno della riabilitazione, Sorge e' stato determinante per le sorti del secondo conflitto mondiale, passando informazioni preziose e determinati all'Unione Sovietica. Una storia di spie, donne, alcol come nella migliore tradizione spionistica letteraria.Diventa un supporter di questo podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/racconti-di-storia-podcast--5561307/support.

durée : 00:04:45 - Micro européen - par : Marie-Christine VALLET - Focus géopolitique sur l'actualité européenne est-ouest en ces temps troublés. José-Manuel Lamarque nous parle aujourd'hui d'un espion hors norme du XXe siècle, avec Vladimir Fédorovski.

James Bond Autor Ian Fleming nannte ihn einmal den außergewöhnlichsten Spion, den unsere Geschichte je geschrieben hat. Obwohl Richard Sorge vor dem zweiten Weltkrieg als überzeugter Kommunist tätig war, fiel seine Doppelidentität der Gestapo nie auf und auch die sowjetischen Geheimdienste stuften den Lebemann als ungefährlichen Journalisten ein. Seinen Frust darüber, dass Stalin seine Warnung eines auf den Tag genau vorhergesehenen Angriff Deutschlands in den Wind schlug, ertränkte er in Alkohol, schönen Frauen und nächtlichen, waghalsigen Motorradfahrten. Er tat alles um aufzufallen und blieb doch, bis zum bitteren Ende, unentdeckt. Seine Geschichte erzählen wir in der heutigen Podcast-Folge.

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Mitä suurvaltojen vakoilusta tiedetään? Miten Yhdysvallat ja Neuvostoliitto vakoilivat toisiaan toisessa maailmasodassa ja kylmän sodan aikana? Mikä merkitys tiedustelupalveluilla on ollut vallankaappauksissa? Studiossa vieraana yhteiskuntasuhdekonsultti ja kirjailija Lauri Mäkinen. Jakso on nauhoitettu 15.6.2022. (0:00) Kirjallisuus (3:19) Richard Sorge (5:38) Atomipommi (8:02) CIA:n perustaminen (11:01) Vakoilu ja vakoojat (13:38) Tiedustelu (17:30) Toinen maailmansota (21:13) Neuvostoliitto (26:24) Kontrolloitu informaatio (32:24) Kaksoisagentit (34:23) Laskuvarjo-operaatiot (39:27) Cambridge Five (41:22) Suomettuminen (45:10) Kylmä sota (49:24) Vallankaappaukset (53:13) Venäjä ja Vladimir Putin (58:57) Länsimaiden polarisaatio (1:02:51) Proxy-sodat (1:05:39) CIA:n operaatiot (1:10:18) Neuvostoliiton romahdus (1:11:36) Sota terrorismia vastaan (1:14:02) USA ja Venäjä (1:20:03) Ukrainan sota (1:26:00) Salaliittoteoriat

Brian and Steve bring historical topics to the table to discuss, including USSR's super spy Richard Sorge, Anthony brings a game, all while cracking jokes along the way. We then pick the next 3 movies we will watch! Please give us a rating and a review on ApplePodcasts or Spotify. It helps potential sponsors find the show! Follow Us: www.facebook.com/reviewinghistory twitter.com/rviewhistorypod letterboxd.com/antg4836/ letterboxd.com/spfats/ letterboxd.com/BrianRuppert/ letterboxd.com/brianruppert/list…eviewing-history/ twitter.com/Brianruppert

Richard Sorge fu una delle più abili spie durante la Seconda guerra mondiale: al servizio dei sovietici, operò in Giappone sotto copertura avvalendosi di un'ampia rete di complici. Si apre con la sua figura la seconda puntata del podcast dedicato ai servizi segreti in Russia. In un appassionante viaggio nel tempo, il giornalista Mirko Molteni, partendo dalla Polizia segreta fondata nel lontano sedicesimo secolo dallo zar Ivan il Terribile, giunge a raccontarci le vicende del KGB, il servizio segreto sovietico di cui ha fatto parte l'attuale presidente della Federazione Russa, Vladimir Putin. La Polizia repressiva, l'Ochrana che va all'estero, la Ceka contro i complotti, le infiltrazioni d'eccezione e il KGB a tutto campo: sono le parti in cui si sviluppa il racconto.Mirko Molteni, giornalista e saggista di storia aeronautica e militare, collabora col quotidiano “Libero” e con varie riviste. Per le edizioni Odoya ha scritto nel 2012 “L'aviazione italiana 1940-1945”, primo di vari libri. Sempre per Odoya: “Un secolo di battaglie aeree”, “Storia dei grandi esploratori”, “Le ali di Icaro” e “Dossier Caporetto”. Per Greco e Greco: “Furia celtica”. Nel 2018, per Newton Compton la sua enciclopedica “Storia dei servizi segreti”, su intelligence e spie dall'antichità fino a oggi.A cura di Francesco De Leo. Montaggio di Silvio Farina.https://storiainpodcast.focus.it - Canale Guerre e conflitti------------Storia in Podcast di Focus si può ascoltare anche su Spotify http://bit.ly/VoceDellaStoria ed Apple Podcasts https://podcasts.apple.com/it/podcast/la-voce-della-storia/id1511551427.Siamo in tutte le edicole... ma anche qui:- Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/FocusStoria/- Gruppo Facebook Focus Storia Wars: https://www.facebook.com/groups/FocuStoriaWars/ (per appassionati di storia militare)- Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/user/focusitvideo- Twitter: https://twitter.com/focusstoria- Sito: https://www.focus.it/cultura

Attiré très tôt par le marxisme et recruté par les services secrets soviétiques, Richard Sorge, très introduit dans les milieux diplomatiques nazi et nippon, recueillera des informations capitales, susceptibles de modifier le cours de la guerre.De la Russie au JaponNé en 1895, Richard Sorge vit d'abord dans l'Asie centrale soviétique, puis s'installe en Allemagne avec ses parents. La grave blessure qu'il reçoit durant la Première Guerre mondiale lui laissera une claudication à vie.Dans les années 1920, le jeune Richard Sorge est séduit par les thèses marxistes. Aussi adhère-t-il au parti communiste allemand en 1920, très peu de temps après sa création.Puis ce sont les Soviétiques qui s'intéressent à ce brillant sujet, dont, au surplus, la mère est russe. En 1930, Sorge intègre les services secrets soviétiques. On l'envoie en Orient, d'abord en Chine puis au Japon.Brillant et volontiers mondain, il se sert de son entregent pour entrer en contact avec l'ambassade d'Allemagne à Tokyo. Il en devient bientôt un hôte assidu et, dès lors, a accès à de précieuses informations.De très précieux renseignementsC'est en profitant de sa position privilégiée que Richard Sorge recueille deux informations essentielles, toutes deux susceptibles de modifier le déroulement du conflit.Il est ainsi le premier espion soviétique à apprendre, dès mai 1941, l'imminence de l'invasion de l'URSS par l'armée allemande. Il en informe aussitôt Moscou. Mais Staline n'accorde pas foi à ce renseignement.Courroucé contre un espion aussi peu fiable, il critique Sorge pour ses frasques et sa vie débridée, peu en rapport avec l'existence austère que doit mener un agent russe. On connaît la suite...La seconde information, en revanche, sera prise au sérieux. Sorge révèle en effet que le Japon, poussé par son allié allemand à intervenir, a l'intention de porter le combat dans le Pacifique, donc contre les États-Unis.L'Empire nippon ne songe donc pas à attaquer l'URSS. C'en est fini de la hantise d'être pris entre deux feux. Staline peut dès lors concentrer l'essentiel de ses forces sur le front occidental, ce qui lui permettra finalement de l'emporter sur la Wehrmacht. Voir Acast.com/privacy pour les informations sur la vie privée et l'opt-out.

Jon Sistiaga, David Alegre y Sara Rubayo espiarán a los expertos en el espionaje; los agentes secretos de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Contaremos con la entrevista en exclusiva de Maria Kreisler, hija del espía español más famoso, Juan Puyol, más conocido como Garbo, que consiguió engañar al mismísimo Hitler. Y ahondaremos también en otra figura clave Ramsey, o que es lo mismo Richard Sorge y su papel en el desembarco de Normandía. Todos los beligerantes invirtieron cantidades ingentes de recursos para hacerse con la mayor cantidad de agentes e información fiable obtenida directamente sobre el terreno. El objetivo fundamental era conocer semana a semana la situación del enemigo en campos tan diversos como la producción armamentística, la moral de la población, la cantidad y calidad de la dieta, los conflictos políticos, la voluntad de resistencia o los avances tecnológicos. De este modo se esperaba elaborar una estrategia de guerra que explotara los puntos débiles del contrario, todo ello con operaciones de diversión o engaño y sabotajes llevados a cabo por comandos que actuaban en la retaguardia enemiga. Espiando la Segunda Guerra Mundial, un podcast original de National Geographic con las voces de Jon Sistiaga, periodista, reportero de guerra y doctorado en Relaciones Internacionales; David Alegre, Doctor Europeo en Historia Comparada, Política y Social, y escritor; y Sara Rubayo, licenciada en Historia del Arte y divulgadora. También podéis disfrutar de documentales sobre la Segunda Guerra Mundial en nuestro canal National Geographic y en Disney +.

This week Johnboy shares the story of "Stalin's James Bond" the heavy drinking, womanizing Soviet spy who's intelligence work may have changed the outcome of the second world war and is considered by many the greatest spy who ever lived! Plus a 1980s strip club owner is murdered in the OC! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Il prof. Barbero racconta la storia di Richard Sorge, conosciutissimo giornalista tedesco che tra il 1933 e il 1941 spiò Giappone e Germania per conto dell'Unione Sovietica, influenzando notevolmente l'andamento della Seconda Guerra Mondiale.Festival della Mente: https://festivaldellamente.itCommunity: https://barberopodcast.it/communityTwitter: https://twitter.com/barberopodcastFacebook: https://facebook.com/barberopodcastInstagram: https://instagram.com/barberopodcastGeorge Street Shuffle by Kevin MacLeodLink: https://incompetech.filmmusic.io/song/3800-george-street-shuffleLicense: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Il prof. Barbero racconta la storia di Richard Sorge, conosciutissimo giornalista tedesco che tra il 1933 e il 1941 spiò Giappone e Germania per conto dell'Unione Sovietica, influenzando notevolmente l'andamento della Seconda Guerra Mondiale.Festival della Mente: https://festivaldellamente.itCommunity: https://barberopodcast.it/communityTwitter: https://twitter.com/barberopodcastFacebook: https://facebook.com/barberopodcastInstagram: https://instagram.com/barberopodcastGeorge Street Shuffle by Kevin MacLeodLink: https://incompetech.filmmusic.io/song/3800-george-street-shuffleLicense: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

To celebrate the release of No Time to Die (and in a shameless ploy to scam tickets to the premier) David and Michelle are taking a look at the real-life Bonds that may have inspired Ian Fleming in creating 007. This week: Codenamed “Ramsay”, Richard Sorge was a hard-drinking, motorbike-riding, womanising intelligence officer who literally changed the outcome of WWII. Regarded by Fleming himself as “the most formidable spy in history”, Sorge's story has everything: Nazis, Communists, torture, several wives and 52 mistresses in Japan alone. And he managed to thwart an invasion! He was such a Bond he has to be 001. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Spy: (noun) “A person employed by one nation to secretly convey classified information of strategic importance to another nation.” When someone says the word spy, the image that pops into most people's minds is James Bond (for us here at Historically Speaking that would be Sean Connery, the original,) but the father of modern-day espionage can be traced all the way back to the court of Queen Elizabeth I. But no matter what century you are playing your deadly game, spying often times isn't as glamorous as it seems. Yes, you may be hobnobbing with the elites of society, but in order to not reveal your cover you have to be tough enough to survive some extraordinarily perilous circumstances, while at the same time being clever enough to convince your adversaries that you're truly on their side. John le Carré, Ian Fleming and Frederick Forsyth had to base their novels on someone, could it possibly be one of these three gentlemen that we discuss here in Episode 26? We'll let you decide.BOOKSSir Francis Walsingham:The Reign of Elizabeth: 1558-1603 by J. B. BlackQueen Elizabeth I by J.E. NealeElizabeth's Spymaster: Francis Walsingham and the Secret War That Saved England by Robert Hutchinson Wilhelm Canaris:Canaris: The Life and Death of Hitler's Spymaster by Michael MuellerThe Secret War: Spies, Ciphers and Guerrillas, 1939-1945 by Max Hastings  Richard Sorge:An Impeccable Spy: Richard Sorge, Stalin's Master Agent by Owen MatthewsStalin's Spy: Richard Sorge and the Tokyo Espionage Ring by Robert WhymantThe Oxford Companion to World War II FILMRichard Sorge: Master Spy (2019) – Russian miniseries 12 episodes

Historian and biographer Owen Mathews on how Soviet master spy Richard Sorge infiltrated the Third Reich.

September 1941: die deutsche Armee steht kurz vor Moskau. Hitlers Strategie vom "Blitzkrieg" scheint aufzugehen. Dann findet allerdings der Spion Richard Sorge in Japan etwas heraus, das der Sowjetunion zum Sieg verhelfen würde. Eine Information, die den Verlauf des Zweiten Weltkrieges maßgeblich beeinflusst hat …

Continued discussion of Spy Sorge, a historical film showcasing the operations of Richard Sorge in the years leading up to WWII.   Next week we are busting out the Bruckheimer with 1998's Enemy of the State starring Will Smith, Gene Hackman and John Voight.         Music is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ‘Enter the Party' by Kevin MacLeod Source: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-free/index.html?isrc=USUAN1100240 Artist: http://incompetech.com/

Per otto anni, dal 1933 al 1941, un giornalista tedesco a Tokyo, conosciutissimo e iscritto al partito nazista, fornì segretamente a Stalin informazioni di vitale importanza, fra cui la data dell'attacco di Hitler all'Unione Sovietica. Formata da cronisti e politici giapponesi, un giornalista jugoslavo e un esperto tedesco di cifrari, la rete di Richard Sorge aveva accesso ai segreti dell'ambasciata tedesca e del governo nipponico: nessun'altra rete di spie ha contribuito così tanto all'esito della Seconda guerra mondiale.

The story of Richard Sorge might be lesser known to Western audiences, but his spy operation is considered by many authorities to be possibly the greatest of all time.  A WWI decorated German veteran, he was recruited by the Communist Party to infiltrate the Nazi embassy in Tokyo in the years leading up to WWII.  This accounting of historical events was Masahiro Shinoda's final film.   It may be difficult to procure an official copy of this film, but there is a high quality version easily found on YouTube.             Music is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ‘Enter the Party' by Kevin MacLeod Source: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-free/index.html?isrc=USUAN1100240 Artist: http://incompetech.com/

Continued discussion of the JJ Abrams version of the Mission: Impossible film formula, and how this film set the tone for massive franchise success going forward.   Next week we will be discussing a much more serious and historically based topic, the 2003 film Spy Sorge from legendary director Masahiro Shinoda.  Richard Sorge was an infamous spy for Russia that collected information from the Japanese in the build-up to World War II, under the guise of being a Nazi.  Lots of history to dig into there.     Music is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ‘Enter the Party' by Kevin MacLeod Source: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-free/index.html?isrc=USUAN1100240 Artist: http://incompetech.com/

Juan Jesús Vallejo, Alejandro Bernal y Yoana Arenas Bedoya, invitada. Hacen un recorrido por la historia de Richard Sorge, uno de los espías más importantes del mundo . Además de explorar misiones y operaciones realizadas por los servicios de inteligencia como la CIA. 00:01:29 El círculo de Cambridge y Guy Burgess 00:04:35 Operación Gatito Acústico de la CIA 00:12:55 Operación Retro de la CIA 00:13:54 Yoana Arenas Bedoya, periodista 00:15:31 Richard Serge , espía soviético 00:19:14 Richard Serge y Alemania 00:25:48 Operación Barbarroja 00:35:33 John Edgar Hoover, ex Director del FBI 00:39:56 Edgar Hoover y Hollywood 00:50:13 CIA y el Mosad , los servicios de inteligencia más poderosos del mundo 00:55:49 Incidente del golfo de Tolkin 01:00:07 Vietcong, Frente Nacional de Liberación de Vietnam 01:08:25 Operación Moisés y el Mosad, agencia de inteligencia de Israel 01: 18:22 Operación SalomónPodcast de Caracol en redes sociales:Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/CaracolPodcast/Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/caracolpodcast/Twitter: https://twitter.com/CaracolPodcastContáctenos: podcast@caracol.com.co See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

No cabe ninguna duda que el espionaje es uno de los temas más apasionantes de la historia. Existe desde el principio de los tiempos. El espionaje ruso tiene numerosas y destacadas figuras, muchas de ellas incluso como agentes dobles. Hoy hablaremos del legendario Richard Sorge, un espía con una historia más que curiosa…. Otros temas del programa: Filosofemos para entender el sexo It y la orgía de la que no se habla Ciencias o letras Locas teorías de la conspiración Una de romanos: Marco Antonio Publicado en luisbermejo.com en el enlace directo: https://www.luisbermejo.com/2021/01/el-ev3nto-02x21-espionaje-ruso.html Puedes encontrarme y comentar o enviar tu mensaje o preguntar en: Web: https://www.luisbermejo.com. Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/podcastluisbermejo/ Usuario Twitter/Instagram/Telegram: @LuisBermejo Canal Telegram: https://t.me/ElEv3nto

This week, we begin our exploration of the life and career of Richard Sorge, one of the most famous spies in Japanese (and arguably world) history. We're beginning this week with the story of his recruitment and his first trip to Asia -- a two year posting in Shanghai. Show notes here.

Thanks for coming back! In this episode, I speak with Ben Gibson. We have a great conversation about Daily Mass, Spiritual Direction, common themes in books he's read involving the Father's Wound, and other great topics. He also shares some memories during his time in an “Alternative Spring Break” while lending a helping hand in Oaxaca, Mexico. How does Ben keep his fire burning for our Catholic Faith? Click play and let's find out, together. Items mentioned on the Podcast: Litany of Trust in Song What is Apocrypha? Reading List from Ben: Intro to Devout Life: St. Francis de Sales  Way of Perfection St. Teresa of Avila These are Biographies of different Soviet Spy books Ben mentioned: Deep Undercover: Jack Barsky Spy in the Russian Club: Ronald Kessler Half-Life: The Divided Life of Bruno Pontecorvo, Physicist or Spy An impeccable spy Richard Sorge by Owen Matthews Mission Trips/Alternative Spring Breaks: Missioners of Christ Catholic Heart Work Camp Creatio Catholic Volunteer Network, Franciscan Mission Service The Diocese of Richmond  A BIG Thank you to our Executive Producers: Dr. Jeff Vista, Chris Lehmann, 2019 Men's ACTS Team and Joe Nunez, and two Anonymous Donors. Vision problems, need a diabetic annual eye exam, tired of glasses, and interested in LASIK? Call 210-692-1388 to set up an appointment with Dr. Gary Legault at South Texas Eye Institute or visit South Texas Eye Institute. Please support our Sponsor, Dr. Gary Legault. Special thanks to Philip Strauch III for providing the Outro Music, "He must Increase." Text and Tune copyrighted. We are also brought to you by Breadbox Media. Check out our ever-growing lineup of excellent Catholic Podcasts. Like what you hear? Support us on Patreon or Paypal. 

Em 7 de novembro de 1944, Richard Sorge, o mais importante dos espiões germano-soviéticos a serviço da inteligência da União Soviética antes e durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, é assassinado. Sorge sempre se apresentava como jornalista e alimentava Moscou de informações sobre a movimentação de alemães e japoneses, estes últimos seus algozes.★ Support this podcast ★

Ben Macintyre, author of Agent Sonya makes his debut on the Spybrary Spy Book podcast. Ben sits down with author, journalist, and special agent Tim Shipman to share more about his latest spy non-fiction book. I am embarrassed to say I knew nothing about Soviet spy Ursula Burton. Though there are some very familiar names in this book, notables include Richard Sorge, Klaus Fuchs, Roger Hollis, Alexander Foote and many more. As we have come to expect with Ben Macintyre's writing, Agent Sonya is filled with detail but told in the manner of a gripping spy novel rather than a dry academic tome. Ben discusses how he is enjoying his role as a consultant on the new TV series about Kim Philby and how he is enjoying reading the script based on his book A Spy Among Friends. Ben reveals his next project is a narrative history of Colditz which is due out in 2022

Audio file of a lesson for a course "Russian Language: Real Breakthrough" for a B2-C1 Level. Check your listening comprehension and learn even more (on the topic, with vocabulary and exercises) by booking a lesson with me on Italki https://www.italki.com/yulia.stepanova • Find out about a love story of a Japanese girl Hanako Ishii and Richard Sorge, a German journalist and Soviet military intelligence officer who was active before and during World War II and worked undercover as a German journalist in both Nazi Germany and the Empire of Japan. • If you like to discuss politics, we will speak about spying, stereotypes that we have when talking about spies etc. Try to compare Richard Sorge to James Bond. • You will remember new vocabulary with Quizlet Flash Cards, that I already prepared for you. We will use the new words many times during our conversation, so it can be easier for you to remember them. We can learn even more by doing extra exercises too. • You will become more confident in using Russian to describe and speak on your own unassisted and will learn to tell this story using drawings to help you along. • Grammar: Prepositions, Past Passive Participles.

Owen Matthews - An Impeccable Spy: Richard Sorge, Stalin’s Master Agent...with TRE's Dave Hodgson

In this thrilling episode of Travels Through Time, Owen Matthews takes us back to 1941 to see Richard Sorge, the ‘spy to end all spies’, operating at the highest level in the most dangerous months of the Second World War. ~ Two events in 1941 did more than anything else to settle the shape and outcome of the Second World War. The first was the most fateful decision of Adolf Hitler’s life: the launching of Operation Barbarossa against the USSR on 22 June. The second was the surprise Japanese aerial attack on the US naval base of Pearl Harbour, six months later on 7 December. These events appear crystal clear to us in retrospect, but for many living at that time they came like a flash out of the blue. A few people, though, did know what was coming. One of them was one of the most extraordinary communist underground operatives of the twentieth century: Richard Sorge. Sorge ran a Soviet spy group in Tokyo from the 1930s onwards that achieved astonishing access into the Nazi war machine. A drinker, a womaniser, a risk-taker, all on a breath-taking scale, one journalist has classified Sorge ‘as an example of the rare species we might call Homo undercoverus – those who find the dull, unclassified lives that the rest of us lead simply not worth living.’ Our guest on Travels Through Time today is Owen Matthews, author of a new biography of Sorge. Owen studied Modern History at Oxford. His book, Stalin's Children, was translated into twenty-eight languages and was shortlisted for the Guardian First Book Award. The scenes and subjects described in this episode feature in Owen Matthews biography of Richard Sorge, An Impeccable Spy. The book is available in paperback from Bloomsbury now. Show notes: Scene One: 31 May 1941, The Imperial Hotel in Tokyo. Richard Sorge receives final confirmation that Operation Barbarossa will shortly be launched. Scene Two: 22 June 1941. The Imperial Hotel in Tokyo. Sorge’s bitter fury when he hears news of the German invasion. Scene Three: One night in August, 1941. The Embassy Ballroom with Sorge and Eta Harich-Schneider Memento: Richard Sorge’s lighter People/Social Presenter: Peter Moore Guest; Owen Matthews Producer: Maria Nolan Editorial: Artemis Irvine Titles: Jon O == Follow us on Twitter @tttpodcast_ Check out the best colourised images from our new partner, Dynamichrome.

"Richard Sorge was a man with two homelands. Born of a German father and a Russian mother in Baku in 1895, he moved in a world of shifting alliances and infinite possibility. A member of the angry and deluded generation who found new, radical faiths after their experiences on the battlefields of the First World War, Sorge became a fanatical communist - and the Soviet Union's most formidable spy." Joining me to discuss Sorge is Owen Matthews. Owen is the former Moscow and Istanbul Bureau Chief for Newsweek Magazine and has just has just released a biography of Richard Sorge, An Impeccable Spy: Richard Sorge, Stalin’s Master Agent. It’s a cracking read! I thoroughly enjoyed it…  

Richard Sorge est un révolutionnaire et journaliste allemand et soviétique. En poste en Allemagne et au Japon, il est surtout connu pour son travail d'espion au Japon au service de l'URSS, avant et au début de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Son nom de code au NKVD était « Ramsay » Voici son histoire incroyable… Pour plus d'informations sur la confidentialité de vos données, visitez Acast.com/privacy See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

David Blistein reviews both the benefits and dangers of opium. Benjamin Breen, of the University of California, Santa Cruz, dives into the history of illicit and licit drug use, including spices. Owen Matthews tells the story of Richard Sorge, the only man in WWII known to be a part of the Nazi party and the Soviet Communist party at the same time. "Ironbark," starring Benedict Cumberbatch and Rachel Brosnahan, had its world premiere at the Sundance Film Festival.

The reports from Russian spy Richard Sorge back to Moscow were critical in determining the outcome of WW2.

The reports from Russian spy Richard Sorge back to Moscow were critical in determining the outcome of WW2.

Onze recensent Wim Berkelaar bespreekt de nieuwste historische boeken. Met ditmaal: De onfeilbare spion - Richard Sorge, Stalins geheim agent van Owen Matthews; Duizend jaar weer, wind en water in de Lage Landen, deel 7, van Jan Buisman; Missievaders - Een familiegeschiedenis van katholieke wereldverbeteraars van Mar Oomen; en De gedrevene - Joop den Uyl 1919-1987 van Dik Verkuil.

Greatest known spy of WW2 and one of the most effective in modern times. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/ogb/support

Richard Sorge is one of the greatest spies in history. Famously he reported to Stalin that the Germans were going to invade Russia, and famously Stalin ignored him. He then reported that the Japanese weren't going to invade Russia, and this time, the Russians listened. Siberian troops were redeployed to the western front, and they may have saved Moscow from the Nazis. Owen Matthews, a distinguished writer, historian and journalist, came on the podcast to talk about Richard Sorge's life, his spy network and just how exactly he knew that the Japanese weren't going to invade. From standing on tabletops singing "I love Stalin, Hitler is a bandit", to having an affair with his best source, Sorge lived a bizarre and brilliant life.For ad free versions of our entire podcast archive and hundreds of hours of history documentaries, interviews and films, signup to History Hit TV. Use code 'pod3' at checkout. All of the books discussed in the History Hit podcast are available at History Hit books. We'd love it if you supported what we do by using our affiliate link: https://books.historyhit.com/ Producer: Peter Curry See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Richard Sorge is one of the greatest spies in history. Famously he reported to Stalin that the Germans were going to invade Russia, and famously Stalin ignored him. He then reported that the Japanese weren't going to invade Russia, and this time, the Russians listened. Siberian troops were redeployed to the western front, and they may have saved Moscow from the Nazis. Owen Matthews, a distinguished writer, historian and journalist, came on the podcast to talk about Richard Sorge's life, his spy network and just how exactly he knew that the Japanese weren't going to invade. From standing on tabletops singing "I love Stalin, Hitler is a bandit", to having an affair with his best source, Sorge lived a bizarre and brilliant life.For ad free versions of our entire podcast archive and hundreds of hours of history documentaries, interviews and films, signup to History Hit TV. Use code 'pod3' at checkout. All of the books discussed in the History Hit podcast are available at History Hit books. We'd love it if you supported what we do by using our affiliate link: https://books.historyhit.com/ Producer: Peter Curry See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

In this week’s books podcast Sam is joined by Owen Matthews to talk about the man many have claimed was the greatest spy of the 20th century, Richard Sorge, the subject of Owen’s riveting new book An Impeccable Spy (reviewed in the new issue of The Spectator by Nicholas Shakespeare). Sorge (he’s pronounced 'zorgey', by the way — not, as I introduce the podcast, idiot that I am, 'sawj'). Here was a man who supplied information that changed the course of the Second World War — and far from being the sort of glum duffelcoated figure who populates Le Carre’s “Circus” — he really did lead an existence of James Bondish extravagance. He played the Germans off against the Japanese, all for the benefit of the Russians — and did so while drinking like a fish, seducing every woman he crossed paths with, waving around samurai swords and roaring about on a motorbike. Owen has the low-down on this “bad man who became a great spy”.

In this week’s books podcast Sam is joined by Owen Matthews to talk about the man many have claimed was the greatest spy of the 20th century, Richard Sorge, the subject of Owen’s riveting new book An Impeccable Spy (reviewed in the new issue of The Spectator by Nicholas Shakespeare). Sorge (he’s pronounced 'zorgey', by the way — not, as I introduce the podcast, idiot that I am, 'sawj'). Here was a man who supplied information that changed the course of the Second World War — and far from being the sort of glum duffelcoated figure who populates Le Carre’s “Circus” — he really did lead an existence of James Bondish extravagance. He played the Germans off against the Japanese, all for the benefit of the Russians — and did so while drinking like a fish, seducing every woman he crossed paths with, waving around samurai swords and roaring about on a motorbike. Owen has the low-down on this “bad man who became a great spy”. Literary interviews and discussions on the latest releases in the world of publishing, from poetry through to physics. Presented by Sam Leith.

RICHARD SORGE raccontato da Marco Del Bene

Per otto anni, dal 1933 al 1941, un giornalista tedesco a Tokyo, conosciutissimo e iscritto al partito nazista, fornì segretamente a Stalin informazioni di vitale importanza, fra cui la data dell’attacco di Hitler all’Unione Sovietica. Formata da cronisti e politici giapponesi, un giornalista jugoslavo e un esperto tedesco di cifrari, la rete di Richard Sorge aveva accesso ai segreti dell’ambasciata tedesca e del governo nipponico: nessun’altra rete di spie ha contribuito così tanto all’esito della Seconda guerra mondiale.

Per otto anni, dal 1933 al 1941, un giornalista tedesco a Tokyo, conosciutissimo e iscritto al partito nazista, fornì segretamente a Stalin informazioni di vitale importanza, fra cui la data dell'attacco di Hitler all'Unione Sovietica. Formata da cronisti e politici giapponesi, un giornalista jugoslavo e un esperto tedesco di cifrari, la rete di Richard Sorge aveva accesso ai segreti dell'ambasciata tedesca e del governo nipponico: nessun'altra rete di spie ha contribuito così tanto all'esito della Seconda guerra mondiale.

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Spies have been a feature of state security and military intelligence since the beginning of warfare. Entire wars have been won or lost according to these secret activities. Today we will look at spycraft during World War Two, a golden age of espionage.Spycraft was an essential element to the war effort as ships, planes, or weapons. At no time were military secrets so valuable. Nuclear technology was vital for both sides if they did not want to fall behind the other. Learning the troop movements of the enemy could make it possible to launch an attack on the level of D-Day, permanently crippling their war machine.In this episode I will discuss the careers of...Richard Sorge, the German playboy based in Tokyo who stole nearly all of Japan's World War 2 plan, sent it to the Kremlin, and prevented Nazi Germany's attempt to invade and capture Moscow.Nancy Wake, a socialite in France-turned- Resistance Fighter who saved hundreds, if not thousands, of lives of Allied airmen by smuggling them to the Spanish border.George Koval, the Iowa-born Soviet spy who worked on the Manhattan Project and fed all the scientific breakthroughs to Russia, accelerating their nuclear program by years  

Esta noche vamos a abordar, como tema principal, un tema de vanguardia, pues ciencia y tecnología se están dando la mano para que podamos alcanzar la inmortalidad, un concepto que está empezando a dejar de ser una quimera inalcanzable para convertirse en una posibilidad con la que la medicina nos empieza a hacer soñar. Esta noche os vamos a compartir una charla que pudimos mantener recientemente con el Dr. Joel I. Osorio, Vicepresidente de Desarrollo Clínico de Bioquark, una empresa puntera de biotecnología ubicada en los Estados Unidos, que está desarrollando fantásticos tratamientos médicos con el que están afrontando graves enfermedades y dolencias físicas que no tienen cura al día de hoy. Pacientes con parálisis cerebral, lesiones irreversibles de médula espinal, diabetes, artritis o esclerosis múltiples van a poder ver, por fin, la luz al final del túnel gracias al trabajo y esfuerzo que están desarrollando. Y eso sólo es el principio de algo mucho más grande que, estamos seguros, está todavía por venir. Será una entrevista en la que no sólo hablaremos de ciencia y desarrollo médico, si no que también abordamos aspectos como la espiritualidad, la muerte y el más allá. Después continuaremos con el primer capítulo de una nueva sección, Anima Mundi, dirigida por nuestra compañera Carmen Gómez. Para su estreno en El Sueño de Andrómeda ha elegido, nada más y nada menos, que un tema interesantísimo: "Duendes", un misterioso viaje por las leyendas y realidades que se encuentran detrás del mundo de las "casas enduendadas". Y cerraremos con nuestro compañero Rafael Marín y su espectacular sección "Acciones en la sombra", donde los espías campan a sus anchas y las conspiraciones e intrigas son la moneda de cambio habitual. En esta ocasión nos trae la historia de un personaje muy curioso: "Richard Sorge". __________

EL TEMOR A LAS BRUJAS. Pasaron de ser las sanadoras, las que aconsejaban y conocían lo poderes de la tierra, sus beneficios o sus perjuicios, a considerarlas criaturas del maligno. Hablaremos con Los Libros DE Fran Renedo Carrandi. EL CASO SIBYL. Coincidiendo con la película "Multiple" hablaremos de El Caso Sibyl. Donde a una mujer, Shirley Ardell Mason la llegaron a diagnosticar hasta 15 personalidades diferentes. Algunas hablaban incluso otros idiomas. RICHARD SORGE "EL ESPIA" Considerado un heroe en Russia, descubrimos que su tumba esta en Japón. Su trabajo cambió el curso de muchos acontecimientos de la historia reciente del hombre. Conoceremos su historia con Los Libros De Pablo Tresgallo.

EL TEMOR A LAS BRUJAS. Pasaron de ser las sanadoras, las que aconsejaban y conocían lo poderes de la tierra, sus beneficios o sus perjuicios, a considerarlas criaturas del maligno. Hablaremos con Los Libros DE Fran Renedo Carrandi. EL CASO SIBYL. Coincidiendo con la película "Multiple" hablaremos de El Caso Sibyl. Donde a una mujer, Shirley Ardell Mason la llegaron a diagnosticar hasta 15 personalidades diferentes. Algunas hablaban incluso otros idiomas. RICHARD SORGE "EL ESPIA" Considerado un heroe en Russia, descubrimos que su tumba esta en Japón. Su trabajo cambió el curso de muchos acontecimientos de la historia reciente del hombre. Conoceremos su historia con Los Libros De Pablo Tresgallo.

The Tradecraft Hut takes an unusual lead slot as Ken answers an FMGuru request for the tale of WWII Soviet spy Richard Sorge. Horatio stands to our right and Laertes to our right as the Gaming Hut contemplates the use of supporting characters as foils. Blasting his trumpet for Dreamhounds of Paris, the Consulting Occultist […]

Sea el asesinato del Presidente Kennedy o el accidente de la Princesa Diana de Gales, los rumores de conspiración y de participación de agentes secretos siempre aparecen e incitan la imaginación de la gente. A todos nos ha llamado la atención lo que ocurre entre los bastidores de las agencias de inteligencia, y en esta serie analizaremos la historia de los últimos cien años del oficio. Con dos guerras mundiales, la división del mundo en bloques ideológicos, la carrera armamentí¬stica entre este y oeste, y las nuevas tecnologí¬as hicieron que el siglo XX se convirtiera en un paraí¬so para el espionaje polí¬tico. El fin de la guerra frí¬a no supuso el final de esta actividad. Ataques terroristas, conflictos polí¬ticos y espionaje industrial presentan nuevos retos a los servicios de inteligencia en el siglo XXI. A través del testimonio de agentes, jefes de las agencias, testigos e historiadores, conoceremos a algunos de los espí¬as más famosos del mundo. Estos incluyen a Richard Sorge, Kim Philby, el doble agente jefe de la agencia anti-espionaje británica, la famosí¬sima Mata Hari y el misterioso Dimitri Polyakov..

08.04.1899: Der deutsche Botschafter in Tokio, Eugen Ott, wurde entlassen, weil er enge Freundschaft zu Richard Sorge unterhalten hatte, der für die Sowjetunion spionierte.Ott ging mit seiner Familie nach Peking und blieb dort bis Kriegsende, bevor er sich in Tutzing am Starnberger See niederließ. Dass er sich so hatte täuschen lassen, war jedoch verständlich. Sorge hatte sich perfekt getarnt...