Podcasts about Soviet invasion

Hey guys, what you are about to listen to is basically a “what if” Japan performed Hokushin-ron instead of Nanshin-ron, ie: What if Japan invaded the USSR during WW2? Before I jump into it I just want to thank all of you that signed up for the patreon, you guys are awesome. Please leave a comment on this episode to let me know what more you want to hear about in the future. With all of that said and done lets jump right into it.   Part 1 The Geopolitical context   Ok so, one of the questions I get the most is, what if Japan invaded the USSR. I've actually already tackled this subject, albeit lightly with Cody from AlternatehistoryHub and once with my friend Eric. Its too complicated to give a real answer, a lot of this is guess work, though I really will try to provide hard numbers. I think off the bat something needs to be made clear since we are dealing with alternate history. I am not doing a “what if Japan developed completely different, or what if the IJA got their way in the early 1930's” no no, this is going to be as realistic as possible…even though this is batshit crazy.    Japan faced the decision of whether to go to war with the USSR in 1941 during Operation Barbarossa. They held meetings, made plans, and ultimately it was decided they would not engage the Soviets. Our scenario will follow exactly what they did to a T, but when the made the decision not to go to war, we will see them go to war.    Now before I jump into our this timeline, I think its very important to explain the actual situation Japan faced in 1941. There were two major strategies that emerged during the 1930's within the Japanese military. Many junior officers in the IJA favored the Hokushin-ron “northern strike” strategy against the USSR. Many officers in the IJN with some in the IJA favored the Nanshin-ron “southern strike” strategy, to seize the resource rich dutch east indies by invading Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The idea of Hokushin-ron was to perform an invasion into Southern Siberia and outer mongolia ending around Lake Baikal where they would set up defenses. They had already tried to establish this during the Russian civil war as part of the Siberian Intervention, but failed to create a buffer state. From 1935-1939 there were 108 border clashes between the USSR and Japan. In 1938 one of these border clashes turned into quite a catastrophe, it was called the battle of Lake Khasan.  The Soviets suffered nearly 800 deaths, more than 3000 wounded, perhaps nearly 50 tanks were destroyed with another 100 damaged. The Japanese suffered about 600 deaths with 2500 wounded. The result ultimately was a ceasefire, but for the Kwantung army it seemed to them like a victory. In May of 1939 they had a much larger and more famous battle known as the battle of Khalkhin Gol.  During the early part of the battle the IJA sent 80 tanks crossing over Khalkhin Gol, driving the Soviets back towards Baintsagan Hill. Zhukov was waiting for the attack and sent 450 tanks and armored cars unsupported by infantry to attack the IJA from three sides. The IJA were practically encircled and lost half their armored units as they struggled to fight back as it withdrew. The two armies spared for the next 2 weeks along the east bank of the Khalkhin Gol. Problem was the Japanese were having issues getting their supplies to the area as they lacked motor transport while Zhukov whose army was over 460 miles away from its base of supply had 2600 trucks supplying them. On july 23rd the Japanese launched attacks supported by artillery and within two days they had consumed half their ammunition stores. The situation was terrible, they suffered 5000 casualties and made little progress breaking the Soviet lines. Zhukov then unleashed an offensive on august 20th using over 4000 trucks to transport supplies from Chita base. He assembled around 500 tanks, 550 fighters and bombers and his 50,000 infantry supported by armored cars. This mechanized force attacked the Japanese first using artillery and the aircraft as his armor and infantry crossed the river. The IJA were quickly flanked by the fast moving Soviet armor and encircled by August 25th. The IJA made attempts to break out of the encirclement but failed. They refused to surrender despite overwhelming artillery and aerial bombardment; by the 31st the Japanese forces on the Mongolian side of the border were destroyed. The Japanese suffered nearly 20,000 casualties, the lost 162 aircraft, 29 tanks, 7 tankettes, 72 artillery pieces a large number of vehicles. The Soviets took a heavy hit also suffering almost 25,000 casualties, 250 aircraft, 250 tanks, 133 armored cars, almost 100 artillery pieces, hundreds of vehicles. While these numbers make it seem the Japanese did a great job, you need to consider what each party was bringing to this fight. The Japanese brought roughly 30,000 men, 80 tanks and tankettes, 400 aircraft, 300 artillery pieces, 1000 trucks. The Soviets brought nearly 75,000 men, 550 tanks, 900 aircraft, 634 artillery pieces, 4000 trucks. There are some sources that indicate the IJA brought as many artillery rounds as they could muster from Japan, Manchuria and Korea, roughly 100,000 rounds for the operation. The Soviets fired 100,000 rounds per day. A quick look at wikipedia numbers, yes I know its a no no, but sometimes its good for quick perspectives show: USSR: Bomber sorties 2,015, fighter sorties 18,509; 7.62 mm machine gun rounds fired 1,065,323; 20 mm (0.80 in) cannon rounds expended 57,979; bombs dropped 78,360 (1,200 tons). Japan: Fighter/bomber sorties 10,000 (estimated); 7.7 mm (0.30 in) machine gun rounds fired 1.6 million; bombs dropped 970 tons. What I am trying to say is there was an enormous disparity in military production. And this is not just limited to numbers but quality. After the battle the Japanese made significant reforms. They increased tank production from 500 annually to 1200. The Japanese funded research into new anti-tank guns, such as the Type 1 47 mm. They mounted this gun to their Type 97 Chi-Ha tanks, the new standard medium tank of the IJA. Because of the tremendous defeat to Soviet armor they send General Yamashita to Germany to learn everything he could about tank tactics. But they simply could not produce enough tanks to ever hope to match 10% of the USSR. The Soviets had mostly been using T-26's, BT-5's and BT-7's who were crudely made, but made en masse. The Japanese would find most of their tank models with less effective range, less armor and some with less penetration power. It took the Japanese a hell of a lot more time to produce tanks, they were simply not on par with the Soviets in quantity or quality. Their tank tactics, albeit improved via Yamashita after 1939, were still nothing compared to the Soviets.  The major outcome of the battle of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol was the abandonment of the hokushin-ron strategy and adoption of the nanshin-ron strategy. But, that didnt mean Japan did not have a plan in case they had to go to war with the USSR. Part 2 Kantōgun Tokushu Enshū Kantōgun Tokushu Enshū or the Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers was an operational plan created by the General Staff of the IJA for an invasion of the Russian Far East to capitalize on Operation Barbarossa. Here our story truly begin. Between 1938-1939 the IJA General Staff and Kwantung Army formed two “Hachi-Go” plans. Variants A and B examined the possibility of an all out war with the USSR beginning in 1943. In both plans they expected to be facing 60 Soviet divisions, while they could deliver 50 divisions, delivered incrementally from China and Japan. Plan A called for attacks across the eastern and northern borders of Manchuria while maintaining a defensive stance in the west. Plan B, much more ambitious, called for striking into the vast steppe between the Great Khingan Mountains and Lake Baikal, hoping to cut off the trans-siberian railway. If this was done successfully it was believed the whole of European Russia would be doomed to be defeated in detail. Defeated in detail means to divide and conquer. This battle would take place over 5000 kilometers with Japan's final objective being to advance 1200 km into the USSR. That dwarves Operation Barbarossa in distance, let that sink in. Both plans faced impossible odds. First of all the railway networks in Manchuria were not sufficiently expanded for such far reaching offensives, especially for plan B. Furthermore the 50 divisions required for them would be impossible to come by, since 1937 Japan was bogged down in a war with China. When Japan went to war with the west in 1941 she had 51 divisions. She left the base minimum in China, 35 divisions and tossed nearly 20 into southeast asia and the pacific. On top of not having the men, the IJA estimated a fleet of 200,000 vehicles would be necessary to sustain an offensive to Lake Baikal. That was twice the number of military vehicles Japan had at any given time. After the battle of Khalkhin Gol, plan B was completely abandoned. Planning henceforth focused solely on the northern and eastern fronts with any western advance being limited in scope. Now Japan formed a neutrality pact with the USSR because of her defeat at Khalkhin Gol and Molotov Ribbentrop pact between Germany and the USSR. The Molotov Ribbentrop Pact came as a bitter and complete surprise to Japan. It pushed Japan to fully adopt the Nanshin-ron strategy and this began with her invasion of French IndoChina, which led the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and United States to embargo her. The Netherlands Dutch East Indies refused to sell oil to Japan, the UK refused to sell oil from Burma and the US gradually cut off selling oil to Japan, with her oil exports alone being 80% of Japans supply, the rest from the Dutch east indies. The United States also placed an embargo on scrap-metal shipments to Japan and closed the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping. 74.1% of Japan's scrap iron came from the United States in 1938, and 93% of Japan's copper in 1939. Other things like Rubber and tin were also off the table, as this was mostly acquired from British held Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.    Now the crux of everything is the China War. Japan was stuck, she needed to win, in order to win she needed the resources she was being denied. The only logical decision was to attack the places with these resources. Thus until 1941, Japan prepared to do just that, investing in the Navy primarily. Then in June of 1941, Hitler suddenly informs the Japanese that he is going to invade the USSR. The Japanese were shocked and extremely angry, they nearly left the Tripartite Pact over the issue. This unprecedented situation that ushered in the question, what should Japan do? There were those like Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka who argued they must abandon the neutrality pact and launch a simultaneous offensive with the Germans against the USSR. The IJA favored this idea….because obviously it would see them receiving more funding as the IJN was currently taking more and more of it for the Nanshin-ron plans. But this is not a game of hearts of Iron IV, the Japanese government had to discuss and plan if they would invade the USSR….and boy it took awhile. I think a lot of you will be very disappointed going forward, but there is no grand unleashing of a million Japanese across the borders into the Soviet Far East, in the real world there is something called logistics and politics.    The Japanese military abided by a flexible response policy, like many nations do today. Theres was specifically called the Junbi Jin Taisei or “preparatory formation setup”. Japan would only go to war with the USSR if favorable conditions were met. So in our timeline the Junbi Jin encountered its first test on June 24th when the IJA/IJN helped a conference in the wake of operation barbarossa. A compromise was made allowing the IJA to prepare an invasion plan if it did not impede on the nanshin-ron plans. There was those in the IJA who argued they should invade the USSR whether conditions were favorable or not, there were those who only wanted to invade if it looked like the USSR was on the verge of collapse. One thing agreed upon was if Japan unleashed a war with the USSR, the hostilities needed to be over by mid-October because the Siberian climate would hit winter and it would simply be impossible to continue. The IJA needed 60-7 days to complete operational preparations and 6-8 weeks to defeat the Soviets within the first phase of the offensive. Here is a breakdown of what they were thinking: 28 June: Decide on mobilization 5 July: Issue mobilization orders 20 July: Begin troop concentration 10 August: Decide on hostilities 24 August: Complete readiness stance 29 August: Concentrate two divisions from North China in Manchuria, bringing the total to 16 5 September: Concentrate four further divisions from the homeland, bringing the total to 22; complete combat stance 10 September (at latest): Commence combat operations 15 October: Complete first phase of war   The plan called for 22 divisions (might I add my own calculations of 20 divisions were pretty spot on), with roughly 850,000 men, including Manchukuo allies, supported by 800,000 tons of shipping. The Japanese hoped the Soviets would toss at least half their forces in the Far East, perhaps 2/3rd of their armor and aircraft against the Germans giving them a 2-1 superiority. Even the 22 divisions was questionable, many in the war ministry thought only 16 divisions could be spared for such a venture, something only suitable for mop up operations in the aftermath of a German victory along the eastern front. It was clear to all, Japan needed perfect conditions to even think about performing such a thing.    The War hawks who still sought to perform Hokushin-ron tried to persaude Hideki Tojo on july 5th to go through with a new plan using a total of 25 divisions. This plan designated “Kantogun Tokushu Enshu or Kantokuen” would involve 2 phases, a buildup and readiness phase and an offensive phase. On July 7th they went to Hirohito for his official sanction for the build up. Hirohito questioned everything, but gradually relented to it. The plan was nearly identical to the former plans, banking on the Soviets being unable to reinforce the Far East because of Germany's progress. The level of commitment was scaled down somewhat, but still enormous. Again a major looming issue was the Manchurian railways that would need to be expanded to accomodate the movement of men and supplies. This meant the construction of port facilities, military barracks, hospitals and such. Kantokuen would begin with a initial blow against the Ussuri front, targeting Primorye and would be followed up by a northern attack against Blagoveshchensk and Kuibyshevka. The 1st area army, 3rd and 20 armies with the 19th division of the Korean army would penetrade the border south of Lake Khanka to breach the main soviet defensive lines, thus threatening Vladivostok. The 5th army would strike south of Dalnerechensk to complete the isolation of the maritime province, sever the trans-sierian railway and block Soviet reinforcements. The 4th army would attack along the Amur river before helping out against Blagoveshchensk. Two reinofrced divisions would invade Sakhalin from land and sea. The second phase would see the capture of Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, and Nikolayevsk. Additionally, amphibious operations against Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula were contemplated.   It was agreed the operation could only afford 24 divisions, with 1,200,000 men, 35,000 vehicles, 500 tanks, 400,000 horses and 300,000 coolies. The deployment of thse forces would mean the western front facing Mongolia and the Trans-baikal region would be pretty much open, so delaying actions would have to be fought if the soviets performed a counter offensive there. Air forces were critical to the plan. They sought to dispatch up to roughly 2000 aircraft cooperating with 350 naval aircraft to launch a sudden strike against the Soviet Far East Air Force to knock them out early.    The Soviet Far East had two prominent weaknesses to be exploited. Number 1 was Mongolia's 4500 km long horeshoe shaped border. Number 2 was its 100% dependency on European Russia to deliver men, food and war materials via the trans-siberian railway. Any disruption of the trans-siberian railway would prove fatal to the Soviet Far East.    Now as for the Soviets. The 1930's and early 1940's saw the USSR take up a defensive policy, but retained offensive elecments as well. Even with the German invasion and well into 1942, the Soviets held a strategy of tossing back the IJA into Manchuria if attacked. The primary forces defending the Far east in 1941 were the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts, under the command of Generals Iosif Apanasenko and Mikhail Kovalyov. The Trans-Baikal front held 9 divisions, including 2 armored, a mechanized brigade and a heavily fortified region west of the Oldoy River near Skovorodino had a garrison. The Far Eastern Front had 23 divisions including 3 armored, 4 brigades and 11 heavily fortified regions with garrisons including Vladivostok. Altogether they had 650,000 men, 5400 tanks, 3000 aircraft, 57,000 vehicles, 15,000 artillery pieces and nearly 100,000 horses. By 1942 the Vladivostok sector had 150 artillery pieces with 75 -356 mm calibers organized into 50 batteries. As you can imagine after Operation Barbarrosa was unleashed, things changed. From June to December, roughly 160,000 men, 3000 tanks, 2670 artillery pieces, 12,000 vehicles and perhaps 1800 aircraft were sent to deal with the Germans. Despite this, the Soviets also greatly expanded a buildup to match the apparent Japanese buildup in Manchuria. By July 22nd 1941 the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts were to be raised by 1 million men for august. By December it was nearly 1.2 million. Even the Soviet Far East Navy saw an increase from 100,000 men to 170,000 led by Admiral Yumashev. The Soviet Mongolian allies were capable of manning about 80,000, though they lacked heavy equipment.    Thus if this war broke out in September the Soviets and Mongolians would have just over a million men, with 2/3rds of them manning the Amur-Ussuri-Sakhalin front, the rest would defend Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal region. Even though the war against the Germans was dire, the Soviets never really gave up their prewar planning for how to deal with the Japanese. There would be an all-out defense over the border to prevent any breach of Soviet territory. The main effort would see the 1st and 25th armies holding a north-south axis between the Pacific ocean and Lake Khanka; the 35th army would defend Iman; the 15th and 2nd Red Banner armies would repel the Japanese over the Amur River; and other forces would try to hold out on Sakhalin, Kamchatka and the Pacific coast. The Soviets had constructed hundreds of fortified positions known as Tochkas along the border. Most of these were hexagonal concrete bunkers contained machine gun nests and 76 mm guns. The fortified regions I mentioned were strategically placed forcing the Japanese to overcome them via frontal attacks. This would require heavy artillery to overcome. Despite the great defensive lines, the Soviets did not intend to be passive and would launch counteroffensives. The Soviet air force and Navy would play an active role in defeating a Japanese invasion as well. The air force's objetice would be to destroy the Japanese air force in the air and on the ground, requiring tactical ground attack mission. They would also destroy key railways, bridges and airfields within Manchuria and Korea alongside intercepting IJN shipping. Strategic bombing against the home islands would be limited to under 30 DB-3's who could attack Tokyo, Yokosuka, Maizuru and Ominato. The Soviet Navy would help around the mouth of the Amur River, mine the Tatar Strait and try to hit any IJN ships landing men or materials across the Pacific Coasts.    Japan would not be able to continue a land war with the USSR for very long. According to Japanese military records, in 1942 while at war they were required to produce 50 Kaisenbun. A Kaisenbun is a unit of measurement for ammunition needed for a single division to operate for 4 months. Annual production never surpassed 25 kaisenbun with 100 in reserve. General Shinichi Tanaka estimated for an operation against the USSR 3 Kaisenbun would be needed per divisions, thus a total of 72 would be assigned to 24 divisions. This effectively meant 2/3rds of Japans ammunition stockpile would be used on the initial strike against the USSR. Japan would have been extremely hard pressed to survive such a war cost for 2 years.    Now in terms of equipment Japan had a lot of problems. During the border battles, Japanese artillery often found itself outranged and grossly under supplied compared to the Soviet heavier guns. Despite moving a lot of men and equipment to face the Germans, the Red Army maintained a gross superiority in armor. The best tank the Kwantung Army had in late 1941 was the Type 97 Chi-Ha, holding 33mm armor with a low velocity 57 mm gun. There was also Ha-Go and Te-Ke's with 37 mm guns but they had an effective range less than 1 km.   The Soviet T-26, BT-5 and BT-7's had 45 mm guns more than capable of taking out the Japanese armor and the insult to injury was they were crudely made and very expendable. Every Japanese tank knocked out was far greater a loss, as Japan's production simply could not remotely match the USSR. For aircraft the Japanese were a lot better off. The Polikarpov I-16 was the best Soviet fighter in the Far East and performed alright against the Nakajima Ki-27 at Khalkhin Gol. The rest of the Soviet air arsenal were much older and would struggle. The Soviets would have no answer to the IJN's Zero fighter or the IJA's high speed KI-21 bomber that outraced the Soviet SB-2. Japanese pilots were battle hardened by China and vastly experienced.   Another thing the Japanese would have going for them was quality of troops. The Soviets drained their best men to fight the Germans, so the combat effectiveness in the far east would be less. Without the Pacific War breaking out, some of Japan's best Generals would be brought into this war, of course the first one that comes to mind for me is General Yamashita, probably the most armor competent Japanese general of ww2.    Come August of 1941 those who still sought the invasion of the USSR were facing major crunch time. The IJA planners had assumed the Soviets would transfer 50% or more of their power west to face the Germans, but this was not the case. By August 9th of 1941, facing impossible odds and with the western embargos in full motion, in our timeline the Japanese Hokushin-Ron backers gave up. But for the sake of our story, for some batshit insane reason, the Japanese military leadership and Hirohito give the greenlight for an invasion on August 10th.   Part 3 the catastrophe   So to reiterate the actual world plan had    10 August: Decide on hostilities 24 August: Complete readiness stance 29 August: Concentrate two divisions from North China in Manchuria, bringing the total to 16 5 September: Concentrate four further divisions from the homeland, bringing the total to 22; complete combat stance 10 September (at latest): Commence combat operations 15 October: Complete first phase of war   So what is key to think about here is the events of September. The Battle for Moscow is at the forefront, how does a Japanese invasion in the first week or two of September change things? This is going to probably piss off some of you, but Operation Typhoon would still fail for Germany.  In our time line the legendary spy Richard Sorge sent back information on Japan's decision to invade the USSR between August 25th to September 14th. On the 25th he informed Stalin the Japanese high command were still discussing whether to go to war or not with the USSR. On September 6th Stalin was informed the Japanese were beginning preparations for a war against the west. Then on September 14th, the most important message was relayed to Stalin "In the careful judgment of all of us here... the possibility of [Japan] launching an attack, which existed until recently, has disappeared...."[15]    With this information on hand from 23 June to 31 December 1941, Stalin transferred a total of 28 divisions west. This included 18 rifle divisions, 1 mountain rifle division, 3 tank divisions, 3 mechanized divisions and 3 mountain cavalry divisions. The transfers occurred mainly in June (11 divisions) and October (9 divisions).    Here we come to a crossroads and I am going to have to do some blunt predictions. Let's go from the most optimistic to the most pessimistic. Scenario 1) for some insane reason, Stalin abandons Moscow and moves his industry further east, something the Soviets were actively preparing during Operation Typhoon. This is not a defeat of the USSR, it certainly would prolong the war, but not a defeat. Now that seems rather silly. Scenario 2) Stalin attempts transferring half of what he did in our time line back to Moscow and the Germans fail to take it. The repercussions of course is a limited counteroffensive, it wont be as grand as in our timeline, but Moscow is saved. Scenario 3) and the most likely in my opinion, why would Stalin risk moscow for the Far East? Stalin might not transfer as many troops, but certainly he would have rather placed his chips in Moscow rather than an enemy literally 6000 km's away who have to cross a frozen desert to get to anything he cares about.  Even stating these scenarios, the idea the German army would have taken Moscow if some of the very first units from the far east arrived, because remember a lot of these units did not make it in time to defend moscow, rather they contributed to the grand counteroffensive after the Germans stalled. The German armies in front of Moscow were depleted, exhausted, unsupplied and freezing. Yes many of the Soviet armies at Moscow were hastily thrown together, inexperienced, poorly led and still struggling to regain their balance from the German onslaught. Yet from most sources, and by sources I mean armchair historian types argue, the Germans taking Moscow is pretty unlikely. And moscow was not even that important. What a real impact might have been was the loss of the Caucasus oil fields in early 1942, now that could have brought the USSR down, Moscow, not so much, again the Soviets had already pulled their industry further east, they could do it again.   So within the context of this Second Russo-Japanese War, figure the German's still grind to a halt, they don't take Moscow, perhaps Soviets dont push them back as hard, but the USSR is not collapsing by any means. Ok now before we talk about Japans invasion we actually need to look at some external players. The UK/US/Netherlands already began massive embargoes against Japan for oil, iron, rubber, tin, everything she needed to continue her war, not just against the USSR, but with over 35 divisions fighting in China. President Roosevelt was looking for any excuse to enter WW2 and was gradually increasing ways to aid Britain and the Soviets.  Now American's lend-lease program seriously aided the USSR during WW2, particularly the initial stages of the war. The delivery of lend-lease to the USSR came through three major routes: the Arctic Convoys, the Persian Corridor, and the Pacific Route. The Arctic route was the shortest and most direct route for lend-lease aid to the USSR, though it was also the most dangerous as it involved sailing past German-occupied Norway. Some 3,964,000 tons of goods were shipped by the Arctic route; 7% was lost, while 93% arrived safely. The Persian Corridor was the longest route, and was not fully operational until mid-1942. Thereafter it saw the passage of 4,160,000 tons of goods, 27% of the total. The most important was the Pacific Route which opened up in August of 1941, but became affected when Japan went to war with America. The major port was Vladivostok, where only Soviet ships could transport non-military goods some 8,244,000 tons of goods went by this route, 50% of the total. Vladivostok would almost certainly be captured by the Japanese in our scenario so it won't be viable after its capture. Here is the sticky part, Japan is not at war with the US, so the US is pretty much free to find different Pacific paths to get lend-lease to the Soviets, and to be honest there's always the Arctic or Persian corridors. Hell in this scenario America will be able to get supplies easily into China as there will be no war in Burma, hong kong, Malaya and such. America alone is going to really ruin Japans day by increasing lend-lease to the UK, China and the USSR. America wont be joining the war in 1941, but I would strongly wager by hook or by crook, FDR would pull them into a war against Germany, probably using the same tactic Woodrow Wilson did with WW1. This would only worsen things for Japan. Another player of course is China. Late 1941, China was absolutely battered by Japan. With Japan pulling perhaps even more troops than she did for the Pacific war to fight the USSR, Chiang Kai-Shek would do everything possible to aid his new found close ally Stalin. How this would work out is anyone's guess, but it would be significant as I believe America would be providing a lot more goodies.    Ok you've all been patient, what happens with the war? Japan has to deliver a decisive knock out blow in under 4-6 months, anything after this is simply comical as Japan's production has no resources. The oil in siberia is not even remotely on the table. The Japanese can't find it, would not be able to exploit it, let alone quick enough to use it for the war. Hell the Italians were sitting on oil in Libya and they never figured that out during WW2.   So Kantokuen is unleashed with an initial blow against the Primorye in the Ussuri Front followed by an assault against Blagoveshchensk and Kiubyshevka. The main soviet lines south of Lake Khanka are attacked by the Japanese 1st area army, 3rd and 20th armies and the 19th Korean division. This inturn threatens Vladivostok who is also being bombarded by IJA/IJN aircraft. The 5th Ija army attacks south of Dalnerechensk in an attempt to sever the trans-siberian railway, to block Soviet reinforcements and supplies. The 4th IJA army fords the Amur river to help with the assault of Blagoveshchensk. Meanwhile Sakhalin is being attacked from land and sea by two IJA divisions.  Despite the Soviets being undermanned the western front facing Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal region is wide up to an attack as its only defended by the 23rd IJA division, so a limited counteroffensive begins there. The Japanese quickly win air superiority, however the heavily fortified Tochkas are not being swept aside as the Japanese might have hoped. A major problem the Japanese are facing is Soviet artillery. The Japanese artillery already placed along the borders, initially performed well, crushing Tochkas in range, but when the Japanese begin advancing and deploying their artillery units they are outgunned perhaps 3-1, much of the Soviet artillery outranges them and the Soviets have a much larger stockpile of shells. Airpower is failing to knock out soviet artillery which is placed within Tochkas and other fortified positions with anti-aircraft guns. Without achieving proper neutralization or counter battery fire, the Japanese advance against the fortified Soviet positions. The Soviets respond shockingly with counterattacks. The 15th and 35th Soviet armies with the Amur Red Banner Military Flotilla toss limited counterattacks against both sides of the Sungari River, harassing the Japanese. While much of the soviet armor had been sent west, their light tanks which would be useless against the Germans have been retained in the far east and prove capable of countering the IJA tanks. The Soviets inflict tremendous casualties, however General Yamashita, obsessed with blitzkrieg style warfare he saw first hand in the west, eventually exploits a weak area in the line.Gradually a blitzkrieg punches through and begins to circle around hitting Soviet fortified positions from the rear. The Soviets knew this would be the outcome and had prepared to fight a defense in depth, somewhat managing the onslaught.  The trans-siberian railway has been severed in multiple locations close to the border area, however this is not as effective as it could be, the Japanese need to hook deeper to cut the line further away. In the course of weeks the Soviets are gradually dislodged from their fortified positions, fighting a defense in depth over great stretches of land. Vladivostok holds out surprisingly long until the IJN/IJA seize the city. Alongside this Sakhalin is taken with relative ease. The Soviet surface fleet is annihilated, but their large submarine force takes a heavy toll of the IJN who are attempting Pacific landings. Kantokuen phase 1 is meeting its objectives, but far later than expected with much more casualties than expected. The Japanese are shocked by the fuel consumption as they advance further inland. Each truck bearing fuel is using 50% of said fuel to get to the troops, something reminiscent of the north african campaign situation for Rommel. The terrain is terrible for their vehicles full of valleys, hills, forests and mountains. Infrastructure in the region is extremely underdeveloped and the Soviets are burning and destroying everything before the Japanese arrive. All key roads and cities are defended until the Japanese can encircle the Soviets, upon which they depart, similar to situations the Japanese face in China. It is tremendously slow progress. The IJA are finding it difficult to encircle and capture Soviet forces who have prepared a series of rear lines to keep falling back to while performing counterattacks against Japanese columns. As the Japanese advance further into the interior, the IJN are unable to continue supporting them with aircraft and much of the IJA aircraft are limited in operations because of the range. The second phase of Kantokuen calls for the capture of Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, and Nikolayevsk. Additionally, amphibious operations against Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula are on standby as the IJN fears risking shipping as a result of Soviet submarine operations. The sheer scope of the operation was seeing the tide sides stretching their forces over a front nearly 5000 km in length. At some points the Japanese were attempting to advance more than 1000 km's inland, wasting ungodly amounts of fuel and losing vehicles from wear and tear.  So what does Japan gain? Within the span of 4 months, max 6 months Japan could perhaps seized: Sakhalin, the Primorsye krai including Vladivostok, segments of the trans siberian railway, Blagoveshchensk, Kuibyshevka. If they are really lucky Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, Nikolayevsk. Additionally, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula. What does this mean? Really nothing. Pull out a map of manchuria during WW2, take a pencil and expand the manchurian border perhaps 1000 km if you really want to be generous, that's the new extent of the empire of the rising sun. The real purpose of attacking the USSR is not to perform some ludicrous dash across 6000 km's of frozen wasteland to whittle down and defeat the Soviets alongside the rest of the Axis. It was only to break them, in late 1941 at Moscow there was perhaps a fools chance, but it was a fool's chance for Japan.  Japan has run out of its stockpiles of Kaisenbun, oil, iron, rubber, tin, all types of resources necessary for making war. Unlike in our timeline where Japan began exporting resources from its conquests in southeast asia and the pacific, here Japan spent everything and now is relying on the trickles it has within its empire. The China war will be much more difficult to manage. The lend-lease will increase every day to China. The US/UK/Netherlands will only increase pressure upon Japan to stop being a nuisance, Japan can't do anything about this as the US Pacific Fleet is operating around the Philippines always a looming threat. The Japanese are holding for a lack of better words, useless ground in the far east. They will build a buffer area to defend against what can only be described as a Soviet Invasion of Manchuria x1000. The Allies will be directing all of their effort against Germany and Italy, providing a interesting alternate history concept in its own right. After Germany has been dealt with, Japan would face a existential threat against a very angry Stalin. Cody from Alternate History Hub actually made an episode on this scenario, he believed the Soviets would conquer most of Japan occupied Asia and even invade the home islands. It would certainly be something on the table, taking many years, but the US/UK would most likely interfere in some way. The outcome would be so much worse for Japan. Perhaps she is occupied and a communist government is installed. Perhaps like in our timeline the Americans come in to bolster Japan up for the looming coldwar.  But the question I sought to answer here was, Japan invading the USSR was a dumb idea. The few Japanese commanders who pushed it all the way until August 9th of 1941 simply had to give up because of how illogical it was. I honestly should not have even talked about military matters, this all came down to logistics and resources. You want to know how Japan could have secured itself a better deal in WW2? 1941, the China War is the number one problem Japan can't solve so they look north or south to acquire the means to solve the China problem? Negotiate a peace with China. That is the lackluster best deal right there.    Sorry if this episode did not match your wildest dreams. But if you want me to do some batshit crazy alternate history stuff, I am more than happy to jump into it and have fun. Again thank all of you guys who joined the patreon, you guys are awesome. Until next time this is the Pacific War channel over and out. 

Hello Youtube Members, Patreons and Pacific War week by week listeners. Yes this was intended to be an exclusive episode to join the 29 others over on my Youtube Membership and Patreon, but since we are drawing to the end of the Pacific War week by week series, I felt compelled to make some special episodes to answer some of the bigger questions. Why did Japan, or better said, why did Emperor Hirohito decide to finally surrender? It seems obvious on the face of it, but there is actually a lot more to it than bombs or Soviet invasions. I guess you can call this episode a teaser or a shameless plug for going over to my Youtube Membership or Patreon. There's honestly a lot of interesting subjects such as ‘why was the japanese army so brutal”, “Hirohito's war time responsibility”, “the 4 part Kanji Ishiwara series”. Thus if you liked this one please show some love and check out my other stuff on my Youtube Membership or over at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel.   Stating all of that lets just jump right into it.   We first need to start off briefly looking at Emperor Hirohito.    Upon taking the throne, Emperor Hirohito in 1926 Hirohito inherited a financial crisis and a military that was increasingly seizing control of governmental policies. From the beginning, despite what many of you older audience members may have been told, Hirohito intensely followed all military decisions. Hirohito chose when to act and when not to. When the Kwantung Army assassinated Zhang Zuolin, he indulged their insubordination. This emboldened them to invade Manchuria in 1931, whereupon Hirohito was furious and demanded they be reigned in. Attempts were made, but they were heavily undermined by radicals. Hirohito could have put his foot down, but he chose not to. On September 22nd, at 4:20pm Hirohito said to the IJA Chief of General staff, Kanaya Hanzo “although this time it couldn't be helped, the army had to be more careful in the future”. Thus Hirohito again acquiesced to the military, despite wanting them to stop or at least localize the conflict. The military had disregarded his wishes, they should have been severely punished. Why did Hirohito not take a firmer stance?    Again for older audience members you may have heard, “hirohito was a hostage at the whim of his own military”. This narrative made it seem he was some sort of hostage emperor, but this is not the case at all. In fact Hirohito was instrumental in many military decisions from 1931-1945. The reason this, I will call it “myth” , went on was because after Japan's surrender, the US basically rewrote the Japanese constitution and covered up the Emperor's involvement in all the nasty stuff, to maintain control over Japan. Yeah it sounds a bit conspiracy esque, but I assure you it was indeed the case. This narrative held firm all the way until Hirohito's death, when finally meeting notes and personal accounts from those close to him came out, illuminating a lot. Though to this day, many records are still red -tapped.   The reason Hirohito did not stamp his foot down has to do with the Kokutai.    The Kokutai   So before I carry on, I have to explain what exactly is the Kokutai.    The Kokutai, loosely translated as "national essence," refers to the qualities that distinguish the Japanese identity. However, this concept is remarkably vague and poorly defined; even Japanese historians acknowledge this ambiguity. In contrast to Kokutai is seitai, or "form of government." While the Kokutai embodies the eternal and immutable aspects of Japanese polity—rooted in history, traditions, and customs centered around the Emperor—Japan's seitai has evolved significantly throughout its extensive history. For instance, shoguns governed for over 700 years until 1868, when the Meiji Restoration reinstated direct imperial rule.   Nevertheless, Emperor Meiji's direct authority came to an end with the adoption of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, which established a constitutional monarchy, introducing significant complexities into the governance system.   Article 4 of the constitution declares: “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the Imperial Diet.” Under this framework, the Emperor alone possessed the power to appoint or dismiss ministers of state, declare war, negotiate peace, conclude treaties, direct national administration, and command the army and navy.   A glaring flaw in this arrangement is the inherent ambiguity of the Meiji Constitution. While it established a democratic parliament, it simultaneously afforded the Emperor absolute authority to usurp it. The document failed to clearly define the relationships between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and its language was intentionally vague. Most critically, the military—the army and navy—were not directly accountable to the civilian government.    So with the kokutai, the Emperor is a divine figure who embodies the state's sovereignty. It was not necessarily the Emperor's job to surrender on behalf of the official government of Japan, but he most certainly could do so, given the Japanese people still remained faithful to the kokutai.    Now Hirohito did not live an ordinary life. According to the imperial custom, Japanese royals were raised apart from their parents, at the age of 3 he was placed in the care of the Kwamura family who vowed to raise him to be unselfish, persevering in the face of difficulties, respectful of the views of others and immune to fear. One thing that was absolutely indoctrinated into him was to defend the kokutai. It became his top mission as a monarch, it was the only mission in many ways. At the very core of how he saw the world and how he acted, it was always to protect the kokutai.    So when the Japanese military began these insubordinate acts, Hirohito's primary concern was to the kokutai, ie: anything that threatened his imperial authority and the imperial institution itself. Although the military usurped his authority, the operations had been successful. Hirohito was not at all opposed to seeing his empire expand. He understood the value of manchuria, he was fully onboard with the military plans to eventually seize control over it, but these radicals were accelerating things to quickly for everyone's liking. He turned a blind eye, dished light punishments and carried on. However the local conflict escalated. It traveled to Shanghai by 1932 and here Hirohito took action. He understood Shanghai was full of western powers. Nations like Britain and America could place economic sanctions on Japan if things were allowed to get out of hand here. So he ordered General Yoshinori Shirakawa to bring the Shanghai expedition to a close.    During this period, two factions emerged within the Japanese military: the Kodoha, or “Imperial Way,” and the Toseiha, or “Control” faction. The Kodoha was founded by General Sadao Araki and his protégé, Jinzaburo Masaki. Their primary objective was a Shōwa Restoration aimed at purging Japan of corrupt politicians and businessmen, especially those associated with the zaibatsu. Composed mainly of young army officers, the Kodoha espoused a romanticized and radical interpretation of Bushido, idealizing pre-industrial Japan, which Araki believed had been tainted by Western influences. To achieve their goals, they resorted to assassinations and planned a coup d'état.   In response, the Toseiha faction was formed, initially led by Lt. General Tetsuzan Nagata and later by Hideki Tojo. Like the Kodoha, the Toseiha sought a Shōwa Restoration but adopted a more moderate and conservative approach. They recognized the importance of preserving traditional values while integrating Western ideals, advocating for a balanced perspective. The Toseiha promoted pragmatic military strategies to navigate the complexities of modern warfare. Although they acknowledged the existence of corrupt politicians and zaibatsu, they preferred to work within the existing political system, anticipating that future total wars would necessitate a strengthened industrial and military capacity. Their ranks primarily included promising graduates from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) Academy, Army Staff College, and select naval members. The most significant distinction between the two factions was that the Toseiha explicitly rejected the use of a coup d'état in pursuit of their goals.   Between 1932-1936 radical officers, mostly of the Kodoha faction assassinated politicians and military leaders trying to usher in a showa restoration. You might be led to believe this was in the interest of Hirohito, you would be mistaken. Hirohito did not want a military dictatorship at the whim of the cult of the emperor. Ironic to say, given how WW2 turns out mind you. This really would have been a hostage situation. Hirohito wanted to maintain the exact ambiguous situation that was Showa Era Japan pre 1945. He saw this as the most ideal structure to defend the kokutai, because blame could not be placed solely upon his shoulders. He always maintained a get out of jail free card one could say.    The February 26 incident of 1936, was the climax of the Kodoha faction. They performed a mutiny trying to usher in a SHowa restoration. They assumed when their messenger came to the emperor he would join them and take direct rule. Instead Hirohito was furious. His first thought was the mutineers were trying to enlist his brother Chichibu to overthrow him. He dragged his brother who was a fraternizer amongst the kodoha members mind you, into a meeting, demanding he never associate with them again nor attempt to challenge him. Then Hirohito furious demanded the mutineers be dealt with. At one point he even threatened to lead the imperial guards to put them down. The coup failed, the kodoha faction was destroyed. Ironically the toseiha faction were the ones to do it and thus they became the defacto ruling clique.    The military, especially the kwantung army did not stop with their insubordination.    On July 8th of 1937 the Kwangtung army performed the Marco Polo Bridge incident, ushering in the second sino-japanese war. This was one of many false flag operations they had pulled off over the years. Upon being told about this Hirohito's first response was whether the USSR would invade Manchukuo over the matter. This is what he said to Prime Minister Konoe and army minister Sugiyama “What will you do if the Soviets attack us from the rear?” he asked the prince. Kan'in answered, “I believe the army will rise to the occasion.” The emperor repeated his question: “That's no more than army dogma. What will you actually do in the unlikely event that Soviet [forces] attack?” The prince said only, “We will have no choice.” His Majesty seemed very dissatisfied. Hirohito furious demanded to know what contingency plans existed and his advisors told him before he gave his red seal of approval to invade northern china.   Henceforth he micromanaged a lot of the military decisions going forward and he oversaw the forming and dissolving of numerous cabinets and positions when things went his way or did not in the military and political scene.  Emperor Hirohito was presented with several opportunities to cause cease-fires or peace settlements during the war years. One of the best possible moments to end it all came during the attack on Nanking when Chiang Kai-sheks military were in disarray. On July 11 of 1938, the commander of the 19th division fought a border clash with the USSR known to us in the west as the battle of Lake Khasan. It was a costly defeat for Japan and in the diary of Harada Kumao he noted Hirohito scolded Army minister Itagaki “Hereafter not a single soldier is to be moved without my permission.” When it looked like the USSR would not press for a counter attack across the border, Hirohito gave the order for offensives in China to recommence, again an example of him deciding when to lay down the hammer.   By 1939 the US began threatening sanctions for what Japan was doing in China. Hirohito complained to his chief aide de camp Hata Shunroku on August 5th “It could be a great blow to scrap metal and oil”. Hirohito was livid and scolded many of his top officials and forced the appointment of General Abe to prime minister and demanded of him “to cooperate with the US and Britain and preserve internal order”.   Fast forward a bit, with war raging in Europe Hirohito, on June 19th of 1940 Hirohito asked if chief of staff Prince Kan'in and Army Minister Hata “At a time when peace will soon come in the European situation, will there be a deployment of troops to the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina?” This question highlighted Hirohito's belief at that time that Germany was close to achieving victory, which led him to gradually consider deploying troops to French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies since neither of those parent nations was in a position to protect their territories and vital resources. Regarding the war in China, the Japanese aimed to stop the flow of materials entering China from places like Hong Kong. Hirohito received reports indicating that Britain would not agree to block the shipment of materials into China via Hong Kong. The military recognized that an invasion of Hong Kong might be necessary, which would mean declaring war on Britain. When this was communicated to him, Hirohito responded, “If that occurs, I'm sure America will enforce an embargo, don't you think?” In response, Kido, the lord of the privy seal, reassured him by stating, “The nation must be fully prepared to resist, proceeding with caution and avoiding being drawn into events instigated by foreign interests.”   Hirohito went through countless meetings, but eventually signed order number 458 authorizing the invasion of French Indochina, knowing full well the consequences. The US,UK and Netherlands began embargoes of oil, rubber and iron. In the words of Admiral Takagai “As time passes and this situation continues, our empire will either be totally defeated or forced to fight a hopeless war. Therefore we should pursue war and diplomacy together. If there is no prospect of securing our final line of national survival by diplomatic negotiations, we must be resolved to fight.” Hirohito understood the predicament full well, that each day Japan was wasting its oil reserves, if they were to strike it had to be quickly.   On October 13th Hirohito told his closest advisor Koichi Kido “In the present situation there seems to be little hope for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. If hostilities erupt this time, I think I may have to issue a declaration of war.”   The reason I am bringing up all this stuff is to solidify, Hirohito had agency, he was micromanaging and forming decisions. After the war broke out with the west, Hirohito did have the ability to stamp his foot down. Of course there could have been wild repercussions, his military could have usurped him with Chichibu, it was definitely possible. But you need to keep this mind set, as far as why Hirohito acts or doesn't, its always to protect the Kokutai. Thus one of the levers for peace, solely rested on Hirohito's perception if the kokutai could be retained or not.    From the outset of the Pacific War, Hirohito believed Germany was going to defeat the USSR. In line with his military leaders, they all believed Japan had to seize everything they could in the asia-pacific and thwart off the US until a negotiated peace could be met. Hirohito committed himself to overseeing the war, determined to achieve victory at any cost. He was a very cautious leader, he meticulously analyzed each campaign, anticipating potential setbacks and crafting worst-case scenario predictions. He maintained a skeptical view of the reports from his senior officials and was often harshly critical of high commanders.   While he did not frequently visit the front lines like other commanders in chief, Hirohito wielded significant influence over theater operations, shaping both planning and execution whenever he deemed necessary. Similar to his approach during the war in China, he issued the highest military orders from the Imperial Headquarters, conducted audited conferences, and made decisions communicated under his name. He regularly welcomed generals and admirals to the imperial palace for detailed briefings on the battlefront and visited various military bases, battleships, and army and naval headquarters. His inspections encompassed military schools and other significant military institutions, adding to his comprehensive involvement in the war effort.   Now the war went extremely well for Japan until the battle of Midway. This was as major setback, but Japan retained the initiative. Then the Guadalcanal campaign saw Japan lose the initiative to the Americans. Upon receiving the initial report of the Ichiki detachment's destruction, Hirohito remarked, “I am sure it [Guadalcanal] can be held.” Despite the numerous reports detailing the devastating effects of tropical diseases and starvation on his troops, he persistently demanded greater efforts from them. Hirohito exerted continuous pressure on his naval and land commanders to retake the island. On September 15th, November 5th, and November 11th, he requested additional Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops and aircraft to be allocated to the cause.   General Sugiyama expressed concerns about dispatching more IJA pilots due to their inexperience in transoceanic combat, preferring to reinforce the North China Army for an attack on Chongqing instead. Hirohito pressed the issue again, but Sugiyama responded that the IJA had diverted its air resources to New Guinea and Rabaul. Undeterred by the objections from senior commanders, Hirohito persisted in his demands. By late November, it became evident that Guadalcanal was a lost cause.   At an Imperial Headquarters conference on December 31st, 1942, the chiefs of staff proposed canceling the attempts to recapture Guadalcanal. Hirohito sanctioned this decision but stated, “It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalcanal. We must launch an offensive elsewhere.” He insisted on this point, leading to the selection of new strategic targets in the Solomons, north of New Georgia, and in the Stanley Range on New Guinea. Hirohito even threatened to withhold authorization for withdrawing troops from Guadalcanal until a new plan was established. He later opposed the withdrawal from Munda Airfield, as it contradicted the newly defined defensive line.   As the defensive perimeter in the central and northern Solomons began to crumble, Hirohito continued to insist that the navy engage in decisive battles to regain the initiative, allowing for the transport of supplies to the many soldiers trapped on various islands. When he learned of the navy's failure to reinforce Lae on March 3rd, he asked, “Then why didn't you change plans immediately and land at Madan? This is a failure, but it can teach us a good lesson and become a source of future success. Do this for me so I can have peace of mind for a while.” The phrase “Do this for me” would come to be his signature rallying cry.   After Guadal canal, it was loss after loss for Japan. By February of 1944, Hirohito forced Sugiyama to resign so Hideki Tojo could take his position as chief of the general staff, note Tojo was prime minister and army minister at this point. Hirohito worked alongside Tojo to plan some last ditch efforts to change the war situation. The most significant one was Operation Ichi-Go. As much damage as they did to China with that, Chiang Kai-Shek's government survived. Hirohito watched as island by island fell to the Americans. When the Americans were poised to take Saipan he warned Tojo “If we ever lose Saipan, repeated air attacks on Tokyo will follow. No matter what it takes, we have to hold there.” Saipan fell, so Hirohito stopped supporting Tojo and allowed his rivals to take down his cabinet by june 18th of 1944.    Hirohito remained resolute in his determination to wrest victory from the Allies. On October 18th, the Imperial Headquarters ordered a decisive naval engagement, leading to the Battle of Leyte Gulf. After the war, Hirohito publicly stated, "Contrary to the views of the Army and Navy General Staffs, I consented to the showdown battle at Leyte, believing that if we launched an attack and America hesitated, we might find an opportunity to negotiate." Leyte Gulf didnt work. The military began the kamikaze program. On new years day of 1945 Hirohito inspected the special last meal rations given to departing kamikaze units. Iwo Jima fell. Okinawa remained, and Hirohito lashed out “Is it because we failed to sink enemy transports that we've let the enemy get ashore? Isn't there any way to defend Okinawa from the landing enemy forces?” On the second day of Okinawa's invasion Hirohito ordered a counter landing by the 32nd army and urged the navy to counterattack in every way possible. It was a horrible failure, it cost the lives of up to 120,000 Japanese combatants, 170,000 noncombatants. The Americans lost 12,500 killed and 33,000 wounded. An absolute bloodbath.    The Surrender time   Now we come to the time period where Japan seriously began looking for ways to surrender. In Europe Germany was heading to its defeat and Japan knew this. As for Japan, their army in Burma had been annihilated. Their forces in China were faring better after Operation Ichi-go, having opened up a land corridor along the main railway from Beiping to Wuhan and from throughout Guangdong but still stuck in a deadlock stalemate, facing a guerrilla war that was costing them 64% of their military expenditures. They deeply feared once the Soviets finished up with Germany, they would undoubtedly turn east against Manchuria. With the Soviets attacking from the north, the US would attack from the south, perhaps landing in Shanghai and the home islands. The Kamikaze tactics were proving formidable, but not nearly enough. By 1945, 43% of the IJA were now stationed in Japan, Korea and Formosa, bracing for the final stand. Former prime minister Reijiro Wakatsuki came out of retirement in may of 1945, having heard Germany collapsed, to urge Hirohito and the Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki to open negotiations with the US as soon as possible. However he also said “the enemy must first be made to see the disadvantages of continuing the war”. To this Hirohito's chief counselor Makino Nobuaki said that “the ultimate priority is to develop an advantageous war situation.” Advisor admiral Kesiuke Okada said Japan should wait for “a moment favorable for us,” then make peace. Advisors Kiichiro Hiranuma and Koki Hirota advised the emperor to fight on until the end.   Now I want to bring in a key player to the surrender decision, that of Prince Konoe. Konoe was very close to Hirohito and understood the emperors mentality, especially how he viewed things in relation to the kokutai.    The senior statesman Prince Konoe had been consulting with Hirohito for over 18 months at this point trying to convey the message that if the war continued it would threaten the kokutai. Many months prior, he confided in the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, that the army was suffering from “a cancer” in the form of the Toseiha faction. However, he noted that “Kido and others” did not share his perspective, while “his Majesty is relatively unconcerned with ideological issues.” For the past four years, he continued, the emperor had been advised and still believed that “the true extremists are the Kodoha faction.” In reality, the greater threat to the kokutai arose from the Toseiha faction. Konoe further asserted that if the war escalated, they would attempt to alter the kokutai.   Konoe speculated that whether the threat originated from communists within the nation, primarily referring to left-wing radicals in the Toseiha faction, or from the “Anglo-American enemy,” both would seek to preserve the emperor while pushing towards the country's communization.In his written report to the emperor on February 14, which Kido listened to attentively, Konoe elaborated on his conspiracy theory. He asserted that the Soviet Union regarded Japan as its primary threat in East Asia. The Soviets had allied with the Chinese Communists, the largest and most formidable Communist party in Asia, and were collaborating with the United States and Britain to drive Japan out of China. He warned that they would enter the war when the opportunity arose.   Defeat, he cautioned the emperor, was inevitable if the conflict persisted. However, he emphasized that a far greater fear was the potential destruction of the kokutai. The ongoing war was eroding the domestic status quo, unleashing forces that threatened Japan and its imperial institution from within as much as from external adversaries. The real danger lay in the emperor's and Kido's trust in the generals of the Toseiha faction, who were unintentionally facilitating the communization of Japan. Konoe implored for a swift peace settlement before a Communist revolution emerged, making the preservation of the kokutai impossible. Hirohito agreed with Konoe but stated “ To end the war would be “very difficult unless we make one more military gain.” Konoe allegedly replied, “Is that possible? It must happen soon. If we have to wait much longer, . . . [a mere battle victory] will mean nothing.” Hirohito replied “If we hold out long enough in this war, we may be able to win, but what worries me is whether the nation will be able to endure it until then.”   On February 15th of 1945, Hirohito's intelligence warned the Soviet Union would likely abrogate its Neutrality Pact with Japan. Even Tojo conceded there was a 50/50 chance the USSR would invade Manchuria. In March, the US began B-29 incendiary bombing raids over Tokyo, turning 40% of the capital into ash. On March 18th, Hirohito with some aides drove around the capital to witness the devastation. The civilians looked exhausted and bewildered to Hirohito. Factory production was collapsing, absenteeism was rising, instances of lese majeste were running rampant. For the next 5 months imperial family members and senior statesmen all began speaking to Hirohito about the “crises of the kokutai”. The threat Konoe had warned about for months was becoming the main talking point. It seemed like the Japanese people within the countryside and urban areas remained steadfast in the resolve to obey their leaders, work and sacrifice for their nation, but for how long would they feel so?    It was only after the battle for Okinawa was lost and 60 Japanese cities had been leveled by American incendiary bombs that Hirohito openly indicated he wanted to negotiate a surrender.   Kido's diary reveals the first clear indication that the emperor might be urged to consider an early peace on June 8, 1945, when Kido drafted his “Draft Plan for Controlling the Crisis Situation.” This marked a pivotal moment. It followed the unintentional bombing of the Imperial Palace, the complete loss of hope for saving Okinawa, and coincided with the day the Supreme War Leadership Council adopted the “Basic Policy for the Future Direction of the War.” With the fighting in Europe concluded, Japan found itself entirely isolated. Kido's plan, although vague, proposed seeking the Soviet Union's assistance as an intermediary to help Japan gain leverage in negotiations with its adversaries. By drafting this plan, Kido signaled the end of his long alliance with the military hard-liners. Hirohito's acceptance of it indicated his readiness for an early peace.   Hirohito was moved to an underground bunker in the mountains of Matsushiro in Nagano prefecture where upon those around him noted he fell into a deep depression. On June 22nd  Hirohito informed the Supreme War Leadership Council he wanted them to open diplomatic maneuvers to end the war. In early July Soviet Ambassador Jacob Malik broke off inconclusive talks with Hirota. Hirohito stepped in immediately and ordered a new special envoy be sent to Moscow. However Hirohito nor the Suzuki government had concrete plans on how to mediate a surrender through the Soviets. The only things they did prioritize was a guarantee of the emperors political position and retainment of the imperial system, ie the kokutai. This was taken into consideration rather than ending the war as quickly as possible to save the lives of millions.    From April 8, 1945, until Japan's capitulation, the Suzuki government's chief war policy was “Ketsugo,” an advanced iteration of the “Shosango” (Victory Number 3) plan for defending the homeland. The hallmark of this strategy was a heavy reliance on suicide tactics, including deploying a massive number of kamikaze “special attack” planes, human torpedoes launched from submarines, dynamite-stuffed “crash boats” powered by truck engines, human rocket bombs carried by aircraft, and suicide assaults by specially trained ground units.   While preparations for Operation Ketsu progressed, the Imperial Diet convened on June 9 to pass a Wartime Emergency Measures Law, along with five additional measures aimed at mobilizing the entire nation for this final battle. On the same day, the emperor, who had yet to initiate efforts to end the war, issued another imperial rescript in conjunction with the Diet's convocation, instructing the nation to “smash the inordinate ambitions of the enemy nations” and “achieve the goals of the war.” Concurrently, the controlled press launched a daily die-for-the-emperor campaign to foster gratitude for the imperial benevolence and, from around mid-July onward, initiated a campaign to “protect the kokutai.”   The Americans countered with their own propaganda aimed at breaking Japan's will to fight. B-29 bombers dropped millions of leaflets written in Japanese, announcing the next scheduled targets for bombing raids and urging surrender, while using the emperor to challenge the militarists. Leaflets bearing the chrysanthemum crest criticized the “military cliques” for “forcing the entire nation to commit suicide” and called on “everyone” to “exercise their constitutional right to make direct appeals [for peace] to the Emperor.” They asserted that “even the powerful military cliques cannot stop the mighty march for peace of the Emperor and the people.” One notable batch of seven million leaflets conveyed the terms of the “joint declaration” issued by the United States, Great Britain, and China. “Today we come not to bomb you,” they stated. “We are dropping this leaflet to inform you of the response from the United States government to your government's request for conditions of surrender.... Whether the war stops immediately depends on your government. You will understand how to end the war if you read these two official notifications.”   Amid pressures from imperial edicts to continue preparations for a final battle and focus solely on victory, the Japanese people were also subjected to an intense American psychological warfare campaign in addition to aerial bombardment. During late July and August, prefectural governors, police chiefs, and officers of the “special higher police” submitted reports to the Home Ministry detailing the rapidly deteriorating national morale.    Now on the other side, Roosevelt made it known back in January of 1943 at the Casablanca conference, the allies would only accept unconditional surrender. By 1945, the allies understood the predicament this left Japan with. On May 8th of 1945, Truman added “Japan's surrender would not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people” trying to indicate a non vindictive spirit. However the Kokutai question always remained ambiguous. State Department Joseph Grew, the former ambassador to Japan, began arguing to Truman they needed to make public a clear definition of the terms to persuade Japan to surrender. As he argued to Truman: Emperor Hirohito was seen as the key figure in Japan's surrender, likened to a "queen bee in a hive... surrounded by the attentions of the hive." Throughout the war, he was characterized in various ways—as a “puppet” of the militarists, a constitutional monarch, and a pacifist. Grew had immense faith in the influence exerted by what he referred to as the “moderates” surrounding the Japanese throne.    However many of Grew's colleagues argued the future existence of the monarchy was intolerable as it was akin to fascism. Many wanted to punish the emperor. Truman was in a tug of war. The Potsdam declaration issued on July 26th of 1945 came in the form of a ultimatum aiming to quicken japans surrender. Truman clarified the terms for the unconditional surrender at the end of its terms: "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." Zero mention of the emperor. Grew had argued to add “this may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty.” But it was deleted from the article. The status of the emperor was not guaranteed, the kokutai was thus up in the air.    The next day, the Suzuki cabinet rejected the terms. The Japanese leadership and Hirohito were still banking and awaiting Soviet replies to their terms.    Lets talk about the Soviet talks now   Back on July 12th ambassador Naotake Satō sent this message to the Soviets: “His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland”.  However the Soviets had made commitments to their allies, promising in fact to invade Japan to aid them.    As for the Soviets their primary objective was to ensure unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean. The year-round ice-free areas of the Soviet Pacific coastline, particularly Vladivostok, could be blockaded by air and sea from Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands. Securing these territories to guarantee free access to the Soya Strait was their main goal. Secondary objectives included acquiring leases for the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Southern Manchuria Railway, as well as gaining control over Dairen and Port Arthur.   To achieve these aims, Stalin and Molotov prolonged negotiations with the Japanese, creating a false sense of hope for a Soviet-mediated peace. Simultaneously, in their discussions with the United States and Britain, the Soviets insisted on strict adherence to the Cairo Declaration, which had been reaffirmed at the Yalta Conference. This declaration stipulated that the Allies would not accept a separate or conditional peace with Japan; thus, the Japanese would need to surrender unconditionally to all the Allies. The Soviets aimed to prolong the war by opposing any efforts to dilute this requirement. This approach would provide the Soviets with the necessary time to complete the transfer of their troops from the Western Front to the Far East and to conquer Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, northern Korea, South Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and potentially Hokkaidō, starting with an assault on Rumoi. AUGUST 1945   Thus we come to at last the critical point, August of 1945.    The Americans prepared for the deployment of atomic bombs and for an invasion of southern Kyushu, known as Operation Olympic, scheduled to commence on November 1. At 8:15 A.M. on August 6, a single B-29 bomber, the Enola Gay dropped little boy, devastating much of the undefended city of Hiroshima, instantly killing an estimated 100,000 to 140,000 people and leading to the deaths of possibly another 100,000 over the next five years. At the epicenter of the explosion, “a light appeared 3,000 times brighter than the sun,” creating a fireball that emitted thermal radiation capable of “instantly scorching humans, trees, and houses.” As the air heated and rushed upward, cold air surged in to ignite a firestorm. Hours later, a whirlwind escalated the flames to their peak until more than eight square miles were virtually reduced to cinders. Subsequently, black, muddy rain filled with radioactive fallout began to fall. Two days later, using Japan's rejection of the Potsdam Declaration as a pretext, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Then on August 9, the United States dropped a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, resulting in the immediate deaths of approximately 35,000 to 40,000 people and injuring more than 60,000.   Meanwhile, in Tokyo, during the critical period between the Potsdam Declaration and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Emperor Hirohito remained silent about accepting the Potsdam terms. However, on July 25 and 31, he explicitly conveyed to Kido that the imperial regalia must be defended at all costs. The three sacred objects—a mirror, a curved jewel, and a sword—symbolized the legitimacy of his rule through the northern court and were integral to his identity as the divine sovereign. Hirohito's focus was on protecting these symbols of office, as he insisted on having them brought to the palace. This fixation on maintaining his symbols occurred during a pivotal moment when the pressing issue was whether to accept immediate capitulation. Reflecting on this, he was unprepared to seize the opportunity to end the war himself.   Prime Minister Suzuki, following his initial rejection of the Potsdam ultimatum, also saw no need for further action. His Cabinet Advisory Council, which included the president of Asano Cement, the founder of the Nissan consortium, the vice president of the Bank of Japan, and other representatives from the nation's leading business interests that had profited significantly from the war, convened on the morning of August 3. They recommended accepting the Potsdam terms, arguing that the United States would permit Japan to retain its non-military industries and continue participating in world trade.    Here are some reactions to the two bombs and invasion of Manchuria.    Yonai Mitsumasa said to admiral Takagi Sokichi, on August 12, that “I think the term is perhaps inappropriate, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, gifts from the gods [tenyu, also “heaven-sent blessings”]. This way we don't have to say that we quit the war because of domestic circumstances. I've long been advocating control of our crisis, but neither from fear of an enemy attack nor because of the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war. The main reason is my anxiety over the domestic situation. So, it is rather fortunate that we can now control matters without revealing the domestic situation”.    Konoe's characterized the Soviet involvement in the war as “a godsend for controlling the army,”. Kido viewed of both the atomic bombings and the Soviet entry into the conflict as “useful” elements for ensuring a smooth transition. A nascent power struggle was unfolding, rendering the potential death toll—whether one hundred thousand or two hundred thousand—immaterial to those involved, as long as their desired outcome was achieved: an end to the war that would leave the monarchy intact and capable of managing the discontent that defeat would inevitably provoke. Throughout the final acts of this wartime drama, the Japanese “moderates” found it easier to capitulate to external pressures than to take decisive action on their own to conclude the war.   Another illuminating looks at Japan's elite's perspective on surrender terms was the document titled “Essentials of Peace Negotiations” (wahei kosho no yoryo). Drafted by Konoe and his adviser, retired Lt. Gen. Sakai Koji, after Konoe had reluctantly accepted a mission to Moscow, this document, stipulated the preservation of the emperor system, along with most of the imperial prerogatives, as the absolute minimum condition for peace. It defined the “original” or “essential homeland” as including the southern half of the Kurile Islands but showed a willingness to concede all overseas territories to the enemy, including Okinawa and the American-occupied Bonin Islands, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin. The “Essentials” also accepted complete disarmament for an unspecified period, thereby compromising on the issues of demobilizing and disarming the armed forces. More significantly, an “explanation” attached to the “Essentials” emphasized that “the main aim is to secure the imperial line and maintain the political role of the emperor.”    Why Japan surrendered   We come to it atleast after a long podcast. Why did Japan ultimately surrender?   The twin psychological shocks of the first atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war, combined with Kido's and the emperor's concern over escalating public criticism of the throne and its occupant, fueled an almost paranoid fear that, sooner or later, the populace would react violently against their leaders if the war persisted much longer. These factors ultimately led Hirohito to accept, in principle, the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.   At the first meeting of the six member constituents of the Supreme War Leadership Council, held from 10:30 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. on August 9, Army Minister Anami Korechika, Chiefs of Staff Umezu Yoshijiro, representing the army, and Yonai, representing the navy, along with Tōgō, from the Foreign Ministry, were expected to discuss the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. Instead, the conversation revolved around whether to attempt a conditional surrender—specifically, should they insist on one condition, the preservation of the kokutai, or four?   After Suzuki addressed the assembly regarding the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Soviet attack, Yonai, as recounted by Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda, was the first to speak, framing the issue in terms of four conditions. “Let's start to talk, Do we accept the Potsdam Declaration with no conditions? If not, and we wish to insist on attaching hopes and conditions, we may do so this way. First, preservation of the kokutai; then for the rest, the main items in the Potsdam Declaration: treatment of war criminals, method of disarmament, and the matter of sending in an army of occupation.” Thus, the participants identified what they perceived to be the ambiguous points within the Potsdam Declaration and used them as the foundation for their discussions.   The army insisted on four conditions: First, the preservation of the kokutai, which they considered distinct from the Potsdam Declaration itself. The other conditions proposed were, second, that the Imperial Headquarters assume responsibility for disarmament and demobilization; third, a prohibition on occupation; and fourth, the delegation of the punishment of war criminals to the Japanese government. The army equated the kokutai with the emperor's right of supreme command. Their self-serving desire for autonomous war crimes trials was based on the belief that the Allies would use such trials to politically indict the military. Consequently, army leaders aimed to preempt the activities of any international tribunal by conducting their own trials—similar to the approach taken by the uninvaded and unrepentant Germans after World War I.   Supporting the military's views during cabinet meetings that day were three civilian members of the Suzuki cabinet: Justice Minister Matsuzaka Hiromasa, Home Minister Yasui Toji, and Minister of Health Okada Tadahiko. At the imperial conference that night, which extended into the early hours of the tenth, Foreign Minister Tōgō's interpretation of the “preservation of the kokutai” referred solely to the safeguarding of the Imperial House or dynasty, rather than the continuation of Hirohito's reign.   Hiranuma, another advocate for the single condition, interpreted the kokutai as the “emperor's sovereign right to rule the state [not] deriving from national law. Even if the entire nation is sacrificed to the war, we must preserve both the kokutai and the security of the imperial house.” This discrepancy illustrated that there was no completely unified understanding of what the kokutai entailed; the debate over one condition versus four represented conflicting visions for the future of the Japanese state and masked the competition for political power that was already unfolding.   It remains doubtful whether the emperor and Kido initially sided with Tōgō against the four conditions proposed by the senior military leaders. A more likely inference is that both men retained sympathies for the hardliners, both military and civilian, who preferred to continue the futile war rather than surrender immediately and unconditionally. This may explain why, on August 9, Konoe had Hosokawa Morisada approach Navy General Headquarters to urge the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, to pressure Hirohito (through Kido) to accept the Potsdam terms. Later that afternoon, Konoe enlisted the help of diplomat Shigemitsu Mamoru to persuade Kido to reconsider his stance on the four conditions. Ultimately, at the urging of Takamatsu and Shigemitsu, Kido did shift to support Tōgō's position.   At the end of the war, as at its beginning and throughout every stage of its progression, Emperor Hirohito played a highly active role in supporting the actions carried out in his name. From the very beginning of the Asia-Pacific war, the emperor played a significant role in the unfolding events around him. Prior to the Battle of Okinawa, he consistently advocated for a decisive victory. Afterward, he acknowledged the necessity of pursuing an early peace, although he did not favor an immediate cessation of hostilities. Instead, he wavered, steering Japan toward ongoing warfare rather than direct negotiations with the Allies. When the final crisis fully unfolded, the only option left was unconditional surrender. Even then, he continued to procrastinate until the atomic bomb was dropped and the Soviets launched their attack. The wartime emperor ideology that once sustained morale made it exceedingly difficult for Japan's leaders to accept the act of surrender. Aware of their objective defeat, yet indifferent to the suffering the war inflicted on their own people—as well as on the populations of Asia, the Pacific, and the West whose lives they had disrupted—the emperor and his military leaders sought a means to lose without appearing to lose. They aimed to mitigate domestic criticism following surrender while preserving their power structure.   Blinded by their fixation on the fate of the imperial house and committed to an overly optimistic diplomacy toward the Soviet Union, Japan's leaders missed several opportunities to end their lost war. Would Japan's leaders have surrendered more promptly if the Truman administration had “clarified” the status of the emperor before the cataclysmic double shocks of the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war? Probably not. However, it is likely they would have surrendered to prevent the kokutai from being destroyed from within. The evidence suggests that the first atomic bomb and the Soviet declaration of war led Hirohito, Kido, and other members of the court to believe that continuing the war would inevitably result in that destruction. They recognized that the populace was war-weary and despondent, with rising hostility toward the military and the government, accompanied by increasing criticism of the emperor himself. More specifically, Kido and Hirohito were privy to Home Ministry reports, which contained information from governors and police chiefs nationwide. These reports indicated that citizens were beginning to label the emperor as an incompetent leader responsible for the deteriorating war situation.   This is the third variable, never spoken about. Many first look at the atomic bombs. Bigger brain people turn to the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria. But hardly anyone reads about how the collapse of Japan's social fabric, scared the shit out of the Emperor and his closest advisors. You can't have a kokutai, without a populace that worshiped you.    When the emperor expressed in February, “What worries me is whether the nation [could] endure” long enough to achieve victory, he was not merely voicing concern for the suffering of his subjects; rather, he feared that such suffering could lead to social upheaval—in short, revolution. At that time, he referred to the ordinary, war-related hardships of food shortages, air raids, devastated cities, destruction of homes, and the omnipresent grief from the loss of loved ones. The atomic bomb escalated death, pain, and suffering to unimaginably higher levels, intensifying the threat from within. After the bombings of Japan and two atomic bombs, Hirohito was in a dark way, given a golden get out of jail free card. Hirohito could now save his suffering people from further anguish by surrendering, allowing him to deflect responsibility for leading them into misery while adopting an air of benevolence and care. Indeed, Hirohito did care—though not primarily for the Japanese people, but rather for the survival of his own imperial house and throne.   After the bombing of Hiroshima, Hirohito delayed for a full two days before instructing Kido, shortly before 10 A.M. on August 9, to “quickly control the situation” because “the Soviet [Union]” had declared war. Kido immediately communicated with Prime Minister Suzuki, who began arrangements for an Imperial Conference scheduled for later that night. Following the seidan of August 10, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu took charge of drafting the “Imperial Rescript Ending the War” based on Hirohito's directives. Assisted by two scholars of the Chinese classics, Kawada Mizuho and Yasuoka Masahiro, Sakomizu worked tirelessly for over three days before submitting a version of the rescript to the Suzuki cabinet. After six hours of contentious discussion on the night of August 14, the cabinet modified and approved the document. Hirohito promptly signed it, and Shimomura and Kido persuaded him to record a suitably opaque final version for broadcast to the nation.   On the night of August 14, the Suzuki government notified the United States and other Allied nations that it had accepted both the Potsdam Declaration and the Byrnes letter of August 11. Accelerating the emperor's actions during this climactic moment of the unconditional surrender drama was the American psychological warfare campaign. When a leaflet dropped from B-29 bombers came into Kido's possession on the night of August 13 or the morning of the fourteenth, he conferred with the emperor and explained the gravity of the situation. The latest enemy leaflets were informing the Japanese people of the government's notification of surrender under one condition, along with the full text of Byrnes's response. If this continued, it would undermine the imperial government's reliance on secrecy to obscure the true nature of the lost war and the reasons for the prolonged surrender delay.   Given Kido's and the emperor's concerns about rising signs of defeatism, including criticism of the throne, immediate action was necessary to prevent the populace from acting on their own initiative. Thus, the second seidan was convened. At noon on August 15, the Japanese people gathered around their radio receivers and heard, for the first time, the high-pitched voice of their emperor telling them:    “After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure. We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration. To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors and which lies close to Our heart. Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone—the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people—the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest. Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers... The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable”.   Clearly Hirohito sought to justify his decision to surrender by citing the dropping of the atomic bombs. He wanted to become the saviour of the Japanese people. Hirohito wanted to obfuscate the issue of accountability, to prevent expressions of strife and anger and to strengthen domestic unity around himself, to protect and raise the kokutai.  Interestingly, the surrender declaration to the civilian population was not the same one sent to the military. On August 17th Hirohito issued a second “rescript to soldiers and sailors” throughout the asia-pacific.   “ Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue . . . under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire's existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity”.   The lesser-known August 17 rescript to the army and navy specified Soviet participation as the sole reason for surrender, while maintaining the kokutai as the primary aim. Dissembling until the end—and even beyond—it was noted that the emperor presented two different justifications for his delayed surrender. Both statements were likely true.   Months later Hirohito's said this about his decision to surrender “The main motive behind my decision at that time was that if we . . . did not act, the Japanese race would perish and I would be unable to protect my loyal subjects [sekishi—literally, “children”]. Second, Kido agreed with me on the matter of defending the kokutai. If the enemy landed near Ise Bay, both Ise and Atsuta Shrines would immediately come under their control. There would be no time to transfer the sacred treasures [regalia] of the imperial family and no hope of protecting them. Under these circumstances, protection of the kokutai would be difficult. For these reasons, I thought at the time that I must make peace even at the sacrifice of myself.”    There exists this sort of childish argument today whether it was the atomic bombs or the Soviet Invasion that caused Japan to surrender. However, this overlooks as I think I've explained in 9000 words jeez, the influence of the kokutai. Defending the kokutai was Hirohito's number one priority. The Soviets threatened it. Communism threatened it. What Japan perceived to be “democracy” threatened it. American victory threatened it. And the destruction of Japan's social fabric threatened it. I love this one piece of history, that I have only come across in one book, that being the main one I am using here.   On August 12th, Hirohito came to the imperial family to tell them he had made the decision to surrender. His uncle Prince Yasuhiko Asaka asked him whether the war would be continued if the kokutai could not be preserved. Hirohito replied “of course”.

The events of September 11, 2001 changed the world. Julian reflects on several interpretations of what they meant, proposing that each is a kind of Rorschach-test result based on our own religious and political beliefs, backgrounds, and social conditioning.  The conspiracy theorist simply can't believe something like that could happen to America, going in search of complicated alternative explanations that exist outside of the “official narrative,” even of reality itself. Where the Christian conservative might see a call to Holy War signaling that the End Times is near, Neocon warhawks surrounding Bush observe an opportunity to enact plans for maintaining economic and political power and security. Meanwhile, many on the left see the attack as justifiable “blowback” against American imperialism, Cold War atrocities, and Western colonialism. Religion is merely an inflaming of a fundamentalist minority based on political injustices. What about the Soviet Union? The history of political Islam and massive Muslim caliphates that ruled for nearly 1,300 years? The intractable sectarian conflicts and the multiple internal ideologies vying for control over the Middle East? There may be no easy answers, but perhaps engaging with these different perspectives can allow us to name some of the many factors that got us to 9/11 and the seemingly unsolvable dilemmas of our world today. Show Notes Popular Mechanics on 911 conspiracies Noam Chomsky on 911 conspiracies Pilger on Project for A New American Century NYT 2023 Piece on the Reasons for Iraq War Saddam's Ruthless Purge CNN on Kabul attitudes after US Invasion Polling of Iraqis Mahmood Mamdani Good Muslim, Bad Muslim Interview Human Rights Watch on Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Taimur Rahman's Red Star History of Political Islam Lectures Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

After student protests toppled Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina last year, New Delhi and Dhaka have been at odds. Indian politicians complain about Hindus being mistreated in the Muslim-majority country; Bangladesh's interim government fears that Hasina may launch a bid to return to power from India. It's the latest development in what's become an extremely complicated environment in what Avinash Paliwal calls “India's Near East”: India, Bangladesh (or East Pakistan before the 1970s), and Myanmar (or Burma before the 1980s). As Avinash explains his book India's Near East: A New History (Hurst: 2024), successive Indian leaders tried to get a handle on international tensions and ethnic conflict—and with a major external threat in China looming in the distance. Avinash Paliwal is Reader in International Relations at SOAS University of London, specialising in South Asian strategic affairs. A former journalist and foreign affairs analyst, he is also the author of My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the U.S. Withdrawal (Hurst: 2017) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of India's Near East. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

After student protests toppled Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina last year, New Delhi and Dhaka have been at odds. Indian politicians complain about Hindus being mistreated in the Muslim-majority country; Bangladesh's interim government fears that Hasina may launch a bid to return to power from India. It's the latest development in what's become an extremely complicated environment in what Avinash Paliwal calls “India's Near East”: India, Bangladesh (or East Pakistan before the 1970s), and Myanmar (or Burma before the 1980s). As Avinash explains his book India's Near East: A New History (Hurst: 2024), successive Indian leaders tried to get a handle on international tensions and ethnic conflict—and with a major external threat in China looming in the distance. Avinash Paliwal is Reader in International Relations at SOAS University of London, specialising in South Asian strategic affairs. A former journalist and foreign affairs analyst, he is also the author of My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the U.S. Withdrawal (Hurst: 2017) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of India's Near East. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

After student protests toppled Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina last year, New Delhi and Dhaka have been at odds. Indian politicians complain about Hindus being mistreated in the Muslim-majority country; Bangladesh's interim government fears that Hasina may launch a bid to return to power from India. It's the latest development in what's become an extremely complicated environment in what Avinash Paliwal calls “India's Near East”: India, Bangladesh (or East Pakistan before the 1970s), and Myanmar (or Burma before the 1980s). As Avinash explains his book India's Near East: A New History (Hurst: 2024), successive Indian leaders tried to get a handle on international tensions and ethnic conflict—and with a major external threat in China looming in the distance. Avinash Paliwal is Reader in International Relations at SOAS University of London, specialising in South Asian strategic affairs. A former journalist and foreign affairs analyst, he is also the author of My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the U.S. Withdrawal (Hurst: 2017) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of India's Near East. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

After student protests toppled Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina last year, New Delhi and Dhaka have been at odds. Indian politicians complain about Hindus being mistreated in the Muslim-majority country; Bangladesh's interim government fears that Hasina may launch a bid to return to power from India. It's the latest development in what's become an extremely complicated environment in what Avinash Paliwal calls “India's Near East”: India, Bangladesh (or East Pakistan before the 1970s), and Myanmar (or Burma before the 1980s). As Avinash explains his book India's Near East: A New History (Hurst: 2024), successive Indian leaders tried to get a handle on international tensions and ethnic conflict—and with a major external threat in China looming in the distance. Avinash Paliwal is Reader in International Relations at SOAS University of London, specialising in South Asian strategic affairs. A former journalist and foreign affairs analyst, he is also the author of My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the U.S. Withdrawal (Hurst: 2017) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of India's Near East. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/south-asian-studies

After student protests toppled Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina last year, New Delhi and Dhaka have been at odds. Indian politicians complain about Hindus being mistreated in the Muslim-majority country; Bangladesh's interim government fears that Hasina may launch a bid to return to power from India. It's the latest development in what's become an extremely complicated environment in what Avinash Paliwal calls “India's Near East”: India, Bangladesh (or East Pakistan before the 1970s), and Myanmar (or Burma before the 1980s). As Avinash explains his book India's Near East: A New History (Hurst: 2024), successive Indian leaders tried to get a handle on international tensions and ethnic conflict—and with a major external threat in China looming in the distance. Avinash Paliwal is Reader in International Relations at SOAS University of London, specialising in South Asian strategic affairs. A former journalist and foreign affairs analyst, he is also the author of My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the U.S. Withdrawal (Hurst: 2017) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of India's Near East. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

After student protests toppled Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina last year, New Delhi and Dhaka have been at odds. Indian politicians complain about Hindus being mistreated in the Muslim-majority country; Bangladesh's interim government fears that Hasina may launch a bid to return to power from India. It's the latest development in what's become an extremely complicated environment in what Avinash Paliwal calls “India's Near East”: India, Bangladesh (or East Pakistan before the 1970s), and Myanmar (or Burma before the 1980s). As Avinash explains his book India's Near East: A New History (Hurst: 2024), successive Indian leaders tried to get a handle on international tensions and ethnic conflict—and with a major external threat in China looming in the distance. Avinash Paliwal is Reader in International Relations at SOAS University of London, specialising in South Asian strategic affairs. A former journalist and foreign affairs analyst, he is also the author of My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the U.S. Withdrawal (Hurst: 2017) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of India's Near East. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/asian-review

After student protests toppled Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina last year, New Delhi and Dhaka have been at odds. Indian politicians complain about Hindus being mistreated in the Muslim-majority country; Bangladesh's interim government fears that Hasina may launch a bid to return to power from India. It's the latest development in what's become an extremely complicated environment in what Avinash Paliwal calls “India's Near East”: India, Bangladesh (or East Pakistan before the 1970s), and Myanmar (or Burma before the 1980s). As Avinash explains his book India's Near East: A New History (Hurst: 2024), successive Indian leaders tried to get a handle on international tensions and ethnic conflict—and with a major external threat in China looming in the distance. Avinash Paliwal is Reader in International Relations at SOAS University of London, specialising in South Asian strategic affairs. A former journalist and foreign affairs analyst, he is also the author of My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the U.S. Withdrawal (Hurst: 2017) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of India's Near East. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon.

This week we're going back to the 1980s with Charlie Wilson's War! Join us as we learn about the horrific things people used to do with safety pins, Soviet ambitions in the Persian Gulf, Gust Avrokotos, refugees from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and more! Sources: "Advertisement: Maybelline." Seventeen, 07, 1982, 18-19 "Mascara Magic." Seventeen, 05, 1981 "Advertisement: Maybelline." Cosmopolitan, 11, 1978, 117 "Dear Beauty Editor." Seventeen, 02, 1978, 10 The Wilson Center Digital Archive, Sources available at https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/topics/soviet-invasion-afghanistan The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, PBS Newshour: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/asia-july-dec06-soviet_10-10 Francis Fukuyama, "The Soviet Threat to the Persian Gulf" Rand Corporation, 1981, available at https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P6596.pdf' Jonathon Green, "slang," The Oxford Companion to Sugar and Sweets (Oxford University Press, 2015) "cake eater," Oxford English Dictionary (2020).  Ngram Google Books Tazreena Sajjad, "Analysis: Where do Afghanistan's refugees go?" PBS News Hour (24 August 2021). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/analysis-where-do-afghanistans-refugees-go  "Afghanistan's refugees: forty years of dispossession," Amnesty International (20 June 2019), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/afghanistan-refugees-forty-years/  "Afghan Migration After the Soviet Invasion," NatGeo, https://media.nationalgeographic.org/assets/file/afghan_MIG.pdf  Meindersma, Christa. "Afghanistan." In Encyclopedia of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2009). “The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Interview with Perez de Cuellar,” 1982-02-18, NewsHour Productions, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed April 25, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-507-xk84j0c044  Amina Khan, "Protracted Afghan Refugee Situation," Strategic Studies 37, no.1 (2017): 42-65.  Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Impact of the Afghan War on Pakistan," Pakistan Horizon 41, no.1 (1988): 23-45.  Patricia Sullivan, "CIA Agent Gust Avrokotos Dies at 67," Washington Post, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2005/12/25/cia-agent-gust-l-avrakotos-dies-at-age-67/22a47f22-6594-4b9d-a90a-6f7914aa909a/ Roger Ebert, "Evil Empire falls victim to clout," 20 December 2007, https://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/charlie-wilsons-war-2007  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charlie_Wilson%27s_War_(film) https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-reviews/charlie-wilsons-war-2-159301/ 

Subscribe to The Realignment to access our exclusive Q&A episodes and support the show: https://realignment.supercast.com/REALIGNMENT NEWSLETTER: https://therealignment.substack.com/PURCHASE BOOKS AT OUR BOOKSHOP: https://bookshop.org/shop/therealignmentEmail Us: realignmentpod@gmail.comFoundation for American Innovation: https://www.thefai.org/posts/lincoln-becomes-faiSteve Coll, author of The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, the C.I.A., and the Origins of America's Invasion of Iraq and Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, joins The Realignment. Marshall and Steve discuss America's decades-long relationship with Saddam Hussein before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the CIA's intelligence failures that led to radical misinterpretations of Saddam's ambitions after the Gulf War, the Iraq War's significance 20 years later, and how past mistakes can inform today's assessments of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. 

In this episode of Horns of a Dilemma, Aaron O'Connell, associate professor of history at the University of Texas at Austin and director of research for the Clements Center for National Security, hosts a discussion with Rob Rakove,  a lecturer in Stanford University's Program in International Relations. They discuss Rakove's new book, Days of Opportunity: The United States and Afghanistan Before the Soviet Invasion.

Long before the 1979 Soviet invasion, the United States was closely concerned with Afghanistan. For much of the twentieth century, American diplomats, policy makers, businesspeople, and experts took part in the Afghan struggle to modernize, delivered vital aid, and involved themselves in Kabul's conflicts with its neighbors. For their own part, many Afghans embraced the potential benefits of political and commercial ties with the United States. Yet these relationships ultimately helped make the country a Cold War battleground. Robert B. Rakove sheds new light on the little-known and often surprising history of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan from the 1920s to the Soviet invasion, tracing its evolution and exploring its lasting consequences. Days of Opportunity: The United States and Afghanistan Before the Soviet Invasion (Columbia UP, 2023) chronicles the battle for influence in Kabul, as Americans contended with vigorous communist bloc competition and the independent ambitions of successive Afghan governments. Rakove examines the phases of peaceful Cold War competition, including development assistance, cultural diplomacy, and disaster relief. He demonstrates that Americans feared the “loss” of Afghanistan to Soviet influence—and were never simply bystanders, playing pivotal roles in the country's political life. The ensuing collision of U.S., Soviet, and Afghan ambitions transformed the country—and ultimately led it, and the world, toward calamity. Harnessing extensive research in U.S. and international archives, Days of Opportunity unveils the remarkable and tragic history of American involvement in Afghanistan. Robert B. Rakove is a lecturer in international relations at Stanford University. He is the author of Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (2012). Zeb Larson is a recent graduate of The Ohio State University with a PhD in History. His research deals with the anti-apartheid movement in the United States. To suggest a recent title or to contact him, please send an e-mail to zeb.larson@gmail.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Long before the 1979 Soviet invasion, the United States was closely concerned with Afghanistan. For much of the twentieth century, American diplomats, policy makers, businesspeople, and experts took part in the Afghan struggle to modernize, delivered vital aid, and involved themselves in Kabul's conflicts with its neighbors. For their own part, many Afghans embraced the potential benefits of political and commercial ties with the United States. Yet these relationships ultimately helped make the country a Cold War battleground. Robert B. Rakove sheds new light on the little-known and often surprising history of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan from the 1920s to the Soviet invasion, tracing its evolution and exploring its lasting consequences. Days of Opportunity: The United States and Afghanistan Before the Soviet Invasion (Columbia UP, 2023) chronicles the battle for influence in Kabul, as Americans contended with vigorous communist bloc competition and the independent ambitions of successive Afghan governments. Rakove examines the phases of peaceful Cold War competition, including development assistance, cultural diplomacy, and disaster relief. He demonstrates that Americans feared the “loss” of Afghanistan to Soviet influence—and were never simply bystanders, playing pivotal roles in the country's political life. The ensuing collision of U.S., Soviet, and Afghan ambitions transformed the country—and ultimately led it, and the world, toward calamity. Harnessing extensive research in U.S. and international archives, Days of Opportunity unveils the remarkable and tragic history of American involvement in Afghanistan. Robert B. Rakove is a lecturer in international relations at Stanford University. He is the author of Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (2012). Zeb Larson is a recent graduate of The Ohio State University with a PhD in History. His research deals with the anti-apartheid movement in the United States. To suggest a recent title or to contact him, please send an e-mail to zeb.larson@gmail.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Long before the 1979 Soviet invasion, the United States was closely concerned with Afghanistan. For much of the twentieth century, American diplomats, policy makers, businesspeople, and experts took part in the Afghan struggle to modernize, delivered vital aid, and involved themselves in Kabul's conflicts with its neighbors. For their own part, many Afghans embraced the potential benefits of political and commercial ties with the United States. Yet these relationships ultimately helped make the country a Cold War battleground. Robert B. Rakove sheds new light on the little-known and often surprising history of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan from the 1920s to the Soviet invasion, tracing its evolution and exploring its lasting consequences. Days of Opportunity: The United States and Afghanistan Before the Soviet Invasion (Columbia UP, 2023) chronicles the battle for influence in Kabul, as Americans contended with vigorous communist bloc competition and the independent ambitions of successive Afghan governments. Rakove examines the phases of peaceful Cold War competition, including development assistance, cultural diplomacy, and disaster relief. He demonstrates that Americans feared the “loss” of Afghanistan to Soviet influence—and were never simply bystanders, playing pivotal roles in the country's political life. The ensuing collision of U.S., Soviet, and Afghan ambitions transformed the country—and ultimately led it, and the world, toward calamity. Harnessing extensive research in U.S. and international archives, Days of Opportunity unveils the remarkable and tragic history of American involvement in Afghanistan. Robert B. Rakove is a lecturer in international relations at Stanford University. He is the author of Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (2012). Zeb Larson is a recent graduate of The Ohio State University with a PhD in History. His research deals with the anti-apartheid movement in the United States. To suggest a recent title or to contact him, please send an e-mail to zeb.larson@gmail.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/middle-eastern-studies

Long before the 1979 Soviet invasion, the United States was closely concerned with Afghanistan. For much of the twentieth century, American diplomats, policy makers, businesspeople, and experts took part in the Afghan struggle to modernize, delivered vital aid, and involved themselves in Kabul's conflicts with its neighbors. For their own part, many Afghans embraced the potential benefits of political and commercial ties with the United States. Yet these relationships ultimately helped make the country a Cold War battleground. Robert B. Rakove sheds new light on the little-known and often surprising history of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan from the 1920s to the Soviet invasion, tracing its evolution and exploring its lasting consequences. Days of Opportunity: The United States and Afghanistan Before the Soviet Invasion (Columbia UP, 2023) chronicles the battle for influence in Kabul, as Americans contended with vigorous communist bloc competition and the independent ambitions of successive Afghan governments. Rakove examines the phases of peaceful Cold War competition, including development assistance, cultural diplomacy, and disaster relief. He demonstrates that Americans feared the “loss” of Afghanistan to Soviet influence—and were never simply bystanders, playing pivotal roles in the country's political life. The ensuing collision of U.S., Soviet, and Afghan ambitions transformed the country—and ultimately led it, and the world, toward calamity. Harnessing extensive research in U.S. and international archives, Days of Opportunity unveils the remarkable and tragic history of American involvement in Afghanistan. Robert B. Rakove is a lecturer in international relations at Stanford University. He is the author of Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (2012). Zeb Larson is a recent graduate of The Ohio State University with a PhD in History. His research deals with the anti-apartheid movement in the United States. To suggest a recent title or to contact him, please send an e-mail to zeb.larson@gmail.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

Long before the 1979 Soviet invasion, the United States was closely concerned with Afghanistan. For much of the twentieth century, American diplomats, policy makers, businesspeople, and experts took part in the Afghan struggle to modernize, delivered vital aid, and involved themselves in Kabul's conflicts with its neighbors. For their own part, many Afghans embraced the potential benefits of political and commercial ties with the United States. Yet these relationships ultimately helped make the country a Cold War battleground. Robert B. Rakove sheds new light on the little-known and often surprising history of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan from the 1920s to the Soviet invasion, tracing its evolution and exploring its lasting consequences. Days of Opportunity: The United States and Afghanistan Before the Soviet Invasion (Columbia UP, 2023) chronicles the battle for influence in Kabul, as Americans contended with vigorous communist bloc competition and the independent ambitions of successive Afghan governments. Rakove examines the phases of peaceful Cold War competition, including development assistance, cultural diplomacy, and disaster relief. He demonstrates that Americans feared the “loss” of Afghanistan to Soviet influence—and were never simply bystanders, playing pivotal roles in the country's political life. The ensuing collision of U.S., Soviet, and Afghan ambitions transformed the country—and ultimately led it, and the world, toward calamity. Harnessing extensive research in U.S. and international archives, Days of Opportunity unveils the remarkable and tragic history of American involvement in Afghanistan. Robert B. Rakove is a lecturer in international relations at Stanford University. He is the author of Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (2012). Zeb Larson is a recent graduate of The Ohio State University with a PhD in History. His research deals with the anti-apartheid movement in the United States. To suggest a recent title or to contact him, please send an e-mail to zeb.larson@gmail.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/national-security

Long before the 1979 Soviet invasion, the United States was closely concerned with Afghanistan. For much of the twentieth century, American diplomats, policy makers, businesspeople, and experts took part in the Afghan struggle to modernize, delivered vital aid, and involved themselves in Kabul's conflicts with its neighbors. For their own part, many Afghans embraced the potential benefits of political and commercial ties with the United States. Yet these relationships ultimately helped make the country a Cold War battleground. Robert B. Rakove sheds new light on the little-known and often surprising history of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan from the 1920s to the Soviet invasion, tracing its evolution and exploring its lasting consequences. Days of Opportunity: The United States and Afghanistan Before the Soviet Invasion (Columbia UP, 2023) chronicles the battle for influence in Kabul, as Americans contended with vigorous communist bloc competition and the independent ambitions of successive Afghan governments. Rakove examines the phases of peaceful Cold War competition, including development assistance, cultural diplomacy, and disaster relief. He demonstrates that Americans feared the “loss” of Afghanistan to Soviet influence—and were never simply bystanders, playing pivotal roles in the country's political life. The ensuing collision of U.S., Soviet, and Afghan ambitions transformed the country—and ultimately led it, and the world, toward calamity. Harnessing extensive research in U.S. and international archives, Days of Opportunity unveils the remarkable and tragic history of American involvement in Afghanistan. Robert B. Rakove is a lecturer in international relations at Stanford University. He is the author of Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (2012). Zeb Larson is a recent graduate of The Ohio State University with a PhD in History. His research deals with the anti-apartheid movement in the United States. To suggest a recent title or to contact him, please send an e-mail to zeb.larson@gmail.com.

Long before the 1979 Soviet invasion, the United States was closely concerned with Afghanistan. For much of the twentieth century, American diplomats, policy makers, businesspeople, and experts took part in the Afghan struggle to modernize, delivered vital aid, and involved themselves in Kabul's conflicts with its neighbors. For their own part, many Afghans embraced the potential benefits of political and commercial ties with the United States. Yet these relationships ultimately helped make the country a Cold War battleground. Robert B. Rakove sheds new light on the little-known and often surprising history of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan from the 1920s to the Soviet invasion, tracing its evolution and exploring its lasting consequences. Days of Opportunity: The United States and Afghanistan Before the Soviet Invasion (Columbia UP, 2023) chronicles the battle for influence in Kabul, as Americans contended with vigorous communist bloc competition and the independent ambitions of successive Afghan governments. Rakove examines the phases of peaceful Cold War competition, including development assistance, cultural diplomacy, and disaster relief. He demonstrates that Americans feared the “loss” of Afghanistan to Soviet influence—and were never simply bystanders, playing pivotal roles in the country's political life. The ensuing collision of U.S., Soviet, and Afghan ambitions transformed the country—and ultimately led it, and the world, toward calamity. Harnessing extensive research in U.S. and international archives, Days of Opportunity unveils the remarkable and tragic history of American involvement in Afghanistan. Robert B. Rakove is a lecturer in international relations at Stanford University. He is the author of Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (2012). Zeb Larson is a recent graduate of The Ohio State University with a PhD in History. His research deals with the anti-apartheid movement in the United States. To suggest a recent title or to contact him, please send an e-mail to zeb.larson@gmail.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Lalita du Perron welcomes Robert Rakove from International Relations at Stanford to talk about his new book Days of Opportunity: The United States and Afghanistan before the Soviet Invasion.Book link: http://cup.columbia.edu/book/days-of-opportunity/9780231210454

We all know that we need to reconnect to our HeartMinds and to bring our Heart Intelligence up to meet the explosion of left brain intelligence - we just don't know how to do it. This week's guest is one of my living heroes - who does have clear, grounded ideas of how to do this. Dr Scilla Elworthy was thirteen years old when she saw the Soviet Invasion of Hungary on the television and understood the horror of what was happening. Her mother found her packing a case to go to Budapest to help and managed to persuade her to stay home by promising she'd help to train her to be what the world needed. When she was sixteen, she worked in a holiday camp for Auschwitz survivors, and sat peeling potatoes and listening to them talk of their suffering. Since then, she has been nominated three times for the Nobel Peace Prize for her work with Oxford Research Group to develop effective dialogue between nuclear weapons policy-makers worldwide and their critics. In 2003 Scilla founded Peace Direct, to work closely with locally-led peace building initiatives throughout the world, bringing us daily experience in how to help prevent violent conflict and build sustainable peace throughout the world.She has written numerous books, given numerous TED and TEDx talks and now leads The Business Plan for Peace to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of transforming destructive conflict. She was awarded the Niwano Peace Prize in 2003 and the Luxembourg Peace Prize in 2020. She is one of the clearest, most grounded thinkers I have ever met and she's working tirelessly to create the future we'd be proud to leave behind. I was more than a little star-struck, but this was a genuinely heart-felt conversation and I hope listening to it leaves you feeling as heart-connected as it did me. The Mighty Heart https://mightyheart.co.uk/TED Talk: Fighting with Non Violence https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mk3K_Vrve-ETEDx Talk: Dare to Question: Why are we so afraid of getting older https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J6zenOjPC1ATEDx Talk: How do I deal with a bully without becoming a thug? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sgWyolwBGgETEDx Talk: The Future Belongs to those who can see it  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TWDl1PqGjqYTEDx Talk: Do something - OK, but how? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KYlhHkLgBWATEDx Talk: The Business Plan for Peace https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vH1WgurH5FAConversations in Compassion w Dr Scilla Elworthy https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3C5BMRDYzc8Book: Pioneering the Possible https://uk.bookshop.org/p/books/pioneering-the-possible-awakened-leadership-for-a-world-that-works-scilla-elworthy/3218709?ean=9781583948620Books: The Mighty Heart in Action and The Business Plan for Peace https://mightyheart.co.uk/media/

Summary Michael Vickers (Website) joins Andrew (Twitter; LinkedIn) to discuss his remarkable career and memoir. He was formerly the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.  What You'll Learn Intelligence His specialized training to wear a “Nuclear Backpack” (yes, literally!) Overseeing a multibillion-dollar CIA covert action program against the Soviets Planning the Osama Bin Laden raid Retooling defense intelligence for the 21st century Reflections Finding a narrative that unites the various chapters of your life  Serving a country vs. serving a political party  And much, much more … Episode Notes Michael Vickers has been on a heck of a ride. He started out as a U.S. Army private with no degree and went on to oversee hundreds of thousands of people as the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence while holding a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins. Michael is the author of By All Means Available: Memoirs of a Life in Intelligence, Special Operation & Strategy.  Quotes of the Week "That weapon was called the Special Atomic Demolition Munition [i.e., “Nuclear Backpack] ...it was a sporty, uh, you know, it seemed like a good idea when I was 23 years old. So, there you have it." – Michael Vickers. Resources  SURFACE SKIM *SpyCasts* “The Nuclear Doomsday Machine” – with Sean Maloney (2022_ “The Spies Who Came in From the Cold” - Chris Costa and John Quattrocki (2022) “The Spymaster's Prism” – CIA Legend Jack Devine (2021) “Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service” – Hank Crumpton (2012) “The CIA and the End of the Cold War” – Milt Bearden (2011) *Beginner Resources* Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Homeschool History (2022) [2:25 min video] Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Encyclopedia Britannica (2023) [3-minute read] The Operation That Took Out Osama Bin Laden, Military.com (2023) [3-minute read] The Plan to Get Osama, ABC News (2012) [6:44 min video] DEEPER DIVE Video The End of a Superpower - The Collapse of the Soviet Union, DW Documentaries (2022) Manhunt: The Search for Osma bin Laden, HBO (2013) Afghanistan 1979, the War that Changed the World, Gulya Mirzoeva, Icarus Films (2015) Red Star Over Khyber, PBS Frontline (1984) Primary Sources  Commander, 500th MI Group, Subj: Guerilla Use of Stinger Missiles and Their Effect on Soviet Tactics in AF, circa 1987. Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Bush and Pakistani President Zia, December 8, 1982 Conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan on Afghanistan (Excerpt), December 8, 1982 Message to Soviet Ambassadors on the Invasion of Afghanistan, Attachment to CPSU Politburo Decree #177, December 27, 1979 *Wildcard Resource* A Distant Plain: Counter-insurgency Afghanistan: Government, Coalition, Taliban and Warlords compete (2013) Play this board game developed by former guest and former World Board Game Champion, Volko Ruhnke, 

An episode looking at the wvents around the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Sometimes described as the USSR's Vietnam, it ended detente and drained the USSR leading to the eventual collapse of Communism in Europe.

We often think of the Middle East as a battleground of Western and Russian influence. In reality, one great rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran drives our world, rather than us shaping theirs. From the Gulf and Iraq Wars through al-Qaeda and Islamic State to our modern energy security crisis, colossal events that determine the fates of millions are decided by an invisible war few of us can even see. Arthur Snell goes back beyond the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and WWII to uncover the hidden conflict that shapes everything. Support Doomsday Watch on Patreon and get every episode a week early and ad-free, plus much more: www.doomsdaywatch.co.uk “We tell ourselves we interfere because we WANT their oil. Instead we're sucked into a region we don't understand because we NEED their oil.” – Arthur Snell “These conflicts changed everything… They unleash religion as a dominant factor in culture, in politics, and in militancy.” – Kim Ghattas “When America drew secular nationalist Iraq into an anti-terrorist action, they created a cauldron of chaos that persists to this day.” – Arthur Snell Photograph: Getty Images Written and presented by Arthur Snell. Produced by Robin Leeburn. Assistant producer: Jacob Archbold. Original music by Paul Hartnoll – https://www.orbitalofficial.com . Group Editor Andrew Harrison. Doomsday Watch is a Podmasters production Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

When Soviet forces mounted an invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, they entered a nation already in the grips of a complex civil war. Speaking to Matt Elton, Elisabeth Leake reveals how the invasion and ensuing occupation would go on to shape not only modern Afghanistan but also the course of the Cold War and subsequent international relations. (Ad) Elisabeth Leake is the author of Afghan Crucible: The Soviet Invasion and the Making of Modern Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2022). Buy it now from Amazon: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Afghan-Crucible-Soviet-Invasion-Afghanistan/dp/0198846010/?tag=bbchistory045-21&ascsubtag=historyextra-social-histipad Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

We welcome back Historian Peter Caddick-Adams back to show to cover 1969s 'The Bridge at Remagen' that pits George Segal against Robert Vaughn as they battle for the bridge! Directed by John Guillermin and produced by David L. Wolper, the production of the film is just as eventful as the action on screen as the filming was interrupted by the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.  A war movie in the vein of Kelly's Heroes and other late 60s American war films, Bridge at Remagen goes against the gun-ho war films of the 50s and shows 1945 in a far more accurate way. Both commanders are at breaking point as well as the men below them. Peter also brings his extensive knowledge of the battle to the show and even regales us with Bridge Demolition tips from his time in the British Army! Follow us on Twitter @FightingOnFilm and on Facebook. For more check out our website www.fightingonfilm.com Thanks for listening!  

This episode brought to you by eight cats.Lisa lassos Misty of Chincoteague as we tour tiny horse island.Whitney drifts across the plains with the invasive tumbleweed.Hayly has a high time with Aimo Koivunen, the Finnish soldier who survived a Russian attack in WWII thanks to a near-deadly dose of government-grade methamphetamines.

It's a tale that strikes at the heart of Afghan American identity, a generation of people who fled the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan to the U.S. and started over, watching painfully as their former homeland is torn apart. "The Kite Runner," based on Khaled Husseini's best-selling novel, opened as a play on Broadway last month. Jane Ferguson reports for our arts and culture series, "CANVAS." PBS NewsHour is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders

It's a tale that strikes at the heart of Afghan American identity, a generation of people who fled the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan to the U.S. and started over, watching painfully as their former homeland is torn apart. "The Kite Runner," based on Khaled Husseini's best-selling novel, opened as a play on Broadway last month. Jane Ferguson reports for our arts and culture series, "CANVAS." PBS NewsHour is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders

It's a tale that strikes at the heart of Afghan American identity, a generation of people who fled the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan to the U.S. and started over, watching painfully as their former homeland is torn apart. "The Kite Runner," based on Khaled Husseini's best-selling novel, opened as a play on Broadway last month. Jane Ferguson reports for our arts and culture series, "CANVAS." PBS NewsHour is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders

In this episode, we are joined by Steve Coll. Coll is a New Yorker staff writer and reports on issues of politics, intelligence, and national security in the United States and abroad. He has written about the education of Osama bin Laden, secret negotiations between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and the hunt for the fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. He was the managing editor of the Washington Post from 1998 to 2005, having earlier been a feature writer, a foreign correspondent, and an editor there; in 1990, he shared a Pulitzer Prize with David Vise for a series of articles about the Securities and Exchange Commission. From 2007 to 2013, he was the president of the New America Foundation. Coll is the author of several books, including “Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan”; “Private Empire: ExxonMobil and American Power”; “The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century,” which won the pen/John Kenneth Galbraith Award for Nonfiction; “On the Grand Trunk Road: A Journey Into South Asia”; “Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the C.I.A., Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001,” for which he received an Overseas Press Club Award and a Pulitzer Prize; “Eagle on the Street,” which was based on his reporting on the S.E.C.; “The Taking of Getty Oil”; and “The Deal of the Century: The Breakup of AT&T.” Coll has served as dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, where he continues to teach. Support the show and become a War Stories patron: https://www.patreon.com/warstoriespodcast Website: https://www.warstories.co

Afghan Australian media mogul Saad Mohseni was 12 years old in 1978 when the first president of Afghanistan was assassinated with his family by communist rebels, which led the way for the Soviet invasion.

After more than four decades of displacement, Afghan refugees constitute one of the largest protracted refugee situations in the world. There are nearly 6 million Afghans who have been forcibly displaced from their homes. Of those, 3.5 million are displaced within Afghanistan; 2.6 million are Afghan refugees living in other countries. We have Narges Meraj, Refugee from Afghanistan, Contract specialist, Lyondellbasel, with us to share her story as a refugee from Afghanistan. “I was born in Afghanistan in 1991, in the middle of the Civil War. It was not safe to stay in Afghanistan. Many people were leaving, and it was already 13-14 years later after the Soviet Invasion, so we left for Pakistan. We lived there for a year and then decided to move further away. Afghan people who had the means fled the country. My parents decided to move to Moscow as refugees for five years. But due to racism, we had to leave.” If you're interested in understanding the hardships of refugees living in camps, don't miss this episode! --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/tbcy/support

The Soviet Union began an invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979, leading to a ten-year-long conflict, millions of deaths, and world condemnation which helped topple the Soviet Union. Join us as we talk about the last time Russians invaded one of their neighboring countries.

Giselle, Dalibor, and Iulia welcome Dr. Aviezer Tucker, Center Associate at Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. Dr. Tucker discusses the themes of his piece in the UnPopulist, “Along with Ukraine, Putin is Destroying Putinism.” He draws a parallel between Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, arguing that similarly to how the 1968 invasion lead to the end of communism as an ideology, the invasion of Ukraine will lead to the end of “Putinism,” what he describes as a “witches' brew of authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, nationalism, reactionary social values, illiberalism, anti-internationalism and anti-Americanism.” References: https://theunpopulist.substack.com/p/along-with-ukraine-putin-is-destroying?s=r (Along with Ukraine, Putin is Destroying Putinism, UnPopulist).

(Bonus) The article details the invasion of Poland by the Soviet Union.

Danny and Derek welcome back Tim Nunan, lecturer in global history at the Free University of Berlin, for the second episode on Afghanistan's history. They cover the Soviet Invasion of 1979, the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship, the major players in 1980s Afghanistan politics, ideological influences on the Mujahideen, and other topics leading into the 1990s civil war.   Check out Tim's book here: https://bit.ly/3BYdPXh   Become a patron today: www.patreon.com/americanprestige

This week's episode is live!

About the Book In Three Dangerous Men, defense expert Seth Jones argues that the US is woefully unprepared for the future of global competition. While America has focused on building fighter jets, missiles, and conventional warfighting capabilities, its three principal rivals—Russia, Iran, and China—have increasingly adopted irregular warfare: cyber attacks, the use of proxy forces, propaganda, espionage, and disinformation to undermine American power. About Seth Jones Seth G. Jones is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, director of the International Security Program, and director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He leads a bipartisan team of over 50 resident staff and an extensive network of non-resident affiliates dedicated to providing independent strategic insights and policy solutions that shape national security. He also teaches at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Moderated by Steve Coll Dean Steve Coll is a staff writer at The New Yorker, the author of eight books of nonfiction, and a two-time winner of the Pulitzer Prize. Coll is the author of Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 published in 2004, for which he received an Overseas Press Club Award and a Pulitzer Prize. . . Do you believe in the importance of international education and connections? The nonprofit World Affairs Council of Dallas/Fort Worth is supported by gifts from people like you, who share our passion for engaging in dialogue on global affairs and building bridges of understanding. While the Council is not currently charging admission for virtual events, we ask you to please consider making a one-time or recurring gift to help us keep the conversation going through informative public programs and targeted events for students and teachers. Donate: https://www.dfwworld.org/donate

It's 1992. The 40th Army is long gone and the Soviet Union has collapsed, but war still rages across Afghanistan. As the Afghan communist regime crumbles, Ahmed Shah Massoud and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's forces clash in Kabul. While America turns its back and the Mujahideen turn on each other, new threats arise and threaten to sweep the old generation of freedom fighters away – The Taliban and Osama bin Laden. (Part 4 of Ghosts in the Mountains) SOURCES: Ahmadi-Miller, Enjeela. The Broken Circle: A Memoir of Escaping Afghanistan. 2019. Alexievich, Svetlana. Zinky Boys. 1989. Ansari, Mir Tamim. Games Without Rules: The Often-Interrupted History of Afghanistan. 2012. Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. 2010. Borovik, Artyom. The Hidden War. 1990. Braithewaite, Rodric. Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-1989. 2011. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to 2001. 2004.  Dobbs, Michael. Down with Big Brother: The Fall of the Soviet Empire. 1997. Feifer, Gregory. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. 2009.  Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The Soviet-Afghan War, 1979-89. 2012. Galeotti, Mark. Storm-333: KGB and Spetsnaz Seize Kabul. 2021. Gall, Sandy. Afghan Napoleon: The Life of Ahmed Shah Massoud. 2021. Grad, Marcela. Massoud: An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan Leader. 2009. Goodwin, Jan. Caught in the Crossfire. 1987.  Grau, Lester W. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics In Afghanistan. 1996. Hosdon, Peregrine. Under a Sickle Moon: A Journey Through Afghanistan. 1986. Kalinovsky, Artemy. A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. 2011. Kaplan, Robert D. Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 2001. Rosen, Ethan. The Bear, The Dragon, & the AK-47. 2017. Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: A Military History of Afghanistan from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban. 2009.  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

As the CIA wages a covert proxy war against the Soviet 40th Army, the Mujahideen are showered with billions of dollars and cutting-edge weaponry. An old animosity between two prominent Mujahideen commanders – Ahmed Shah Massoud and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar - turns into a bitter, deadly rivalry. Meanwhile, Soviet reformers led by Mikhail Gorbachev attempt to extricate the USSR from Afghanistan with a shred of dignity intact. After the Soviet withdrawal, the world turns it back on Afghanistan as a civil war rages between the Mujahideen factions – and the Taliban emerges.  SOURCES: Ahmadi-Miller, Enjeela. The Broken Circle: A Memoir of Escaping Afghanistan. 2019. Alexievich, Svetlana. Zinky Boys. 1989. Ansari, Mir Tamim. Games Without Rules: The Often-Interrupted History of Afghanistan. 2012. Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. 2010. Borovik, Artyom. The Hidden War. 1990. Braithewaite, Rodric. Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-1989. 2011. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to 2001. 2004.  Dobbs, Michael. Down with Big Brother: The Fall of the Soviet Empire. 1997. Feifer, Gregory. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. 2009.  Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The Soviet-Afghan War, 1979-89. 2012. Galeotti, Mark. Storm-333: KGB and Spetsnaz Seize Kabul. 2021. Gall, Sandy. Afghan Napoleon: The Life of Ahmed Shah Massoud. 2021. Grad, Marcela. Massoud: An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan Leader. 2009. Goodwin, Jan. Caught in the Crossfire. 1987.  Grau, Lester W. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics In Afghanistan. 1996. Hosdon, Peregrine. Under a Sickle Moon: A Journey Through Afghanistan. 1986. Kalinovsky, Artemy. A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. 2011. Kaplan, Robert D. Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 2001. Rosen, Ethan. The Bear, The Dragon, & the AK-47. 2017. Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: A Military History of Afghanistan from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban. 2009.  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

It's been a month since the fall of Kabul and the sudden Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. In the intervening weeks, policymakers the world over have been scrambling to understand the reasons for the sudden collapse of the Afghan government, the real aims of the new Taliban regime, and the geopolitical implications of this crisis for the region AND for the world.To kick off the sixth season of Grand Tamasha, this week Milan is joined by Avinash Paliwal to discuss what these developments mean for India. Avinash is a senior lecturer in international relations and deputy director of the SOAS South Asia Institute. His book, My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal, is one of the best guides we have to understanding India's role in Afghanistan.Milan speaks with Avinash about the notion of a “Taliban 2.0”, the composition of the new Taliban government, the divisions within the Pakistani establishment, and India's back-channel talks with the Taliban. Plus, the two of them discuss what the crisis means for U.S.-India relations and India's counterterrorism priorities.  Episode notes:Avinash Paliwal, “A strategic shock for the subcontinent,” Hindustan Times, August 25, 2021.Stephanie Findlay and Amy Kazmin, “Taliban cabinet shows west has little leverage over Afghanistan's new rulers,” Financial Times, September 8, 2021.Devirupa Mitra, “India's New Visa Policy for Afghans Is in Limbo, Leaving Thousands Tense,” The Wire, September 7, 2021.Amy Kazmin, “Taliban mount charm offensive to win Afghans' trust,” Financial Times, September 3, 2021.

Discussing the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan and the future of the Islamic Emirate. During today's episode, we talk about the history of imperialist war in Afghanistan and how it led to the rise of the Taliban. We also debunk common tropes about the so-called "Soviet Invasion" of the South Asian nation. Lastly, we discuss the international relations of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Today's guest is Caleb Maupin, a journalist and political analyst. Unmasking Imperialism exposes imperialist propaganda in mainstream media. Hosted by Ramiro Sebastián Fúnez.

Our final episode in this three-part special podcast series commemorating the 20th anniversary of the September 11th terror attacks, in which Michael Hurley, former CIA Officer and member of the 9/11 Commission, describes and offers insights about the fallout of the attacks on American policy and life. Suggested Additional Readings: When Government Writes History, Ernest May, 2005 9/11 Commission Report Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, Steve Coll

Our final episode in this three-part special podcast series commemorating the 20th anniversary of the September 11th terror attacks, in which Michael Hurley, former CIA Officer and member of the 9/11 Commission, describes and offers insights about the fallout of the attacks on American policy and life. Suggested Additional Readings: When Government Writes History, Ernest May, 2005 9/11 Commission Report Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, Steve Coll

Paul Saunders and Alex Powell join Bill to discuss the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and how world powers continue to make the same mistakes. Click here to visit our website and learn more about the participants.    

Paul Saunders and Alex Powell join Bill to discuss the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and how world powers continue to make the same mistakes. Click here to visit our website and learn more about the participants.    

This week we go back to the 1970's and explain the creation of the Mujahideen in direct response to the communist takeover and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and how the United States came to arm them. We talk about the origin, rise, and death of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Lion of Panjshir, and the Northern Alliance, a conglomerate of fighters from northern Afghanistan that resisted the Taliban in the 1990s. And with the Taliban today firmly in control of 33 out of 34 provinces, we discuss the resistance that has been created in the one province that has held out, Panjshir, led by Ahmad Massoud, the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud. T-Shirts and koozies in support of World Relief Seattle can be purchased at: https://bit.ly/3BfoJ9KTo donate directly to World Relief Seattle: https://worldrelief.org/seattle/get-involved/afghan-allies/#giveTo donate directly to World Relief: https://bit.ly/3krJGHrFor more information on how you can help our Afghan Allies: https://bit.ly/3muYOXn_________________________________________ Where to Listen:Apple: https://bit.ly/theboardwalkapple Spotify: https://bit.ly/theboardwalkspotify Pandora: https://bit.ly/3xZ8bk9 Google Podcasts: https://bit.ly/3gbZ6ya Amazon Music: https://amzn.to/37UuZXQ Stitcher: https://bit.ly/3AQNadj  iHeart Radio: https://bit.ly/3y0Vfdw TuneIn: https://bit.ly/2W1VEPN Buzzsprout: https://bit.ly/37PIdoy  Be sure to like, follow, subscribe, rate, review, and share wherever you listen to our podcast. New episodes of The Boardwalk are published every Saturday morning.  Our Social Media Sites:Instagram: @theboardwalkpodcast Facebook: @TheBoardwalkPodcastTwitter: @theboardwalkpod You can also reach us by email at: theboardwalkpodcast@gmail.com  The views expressed by the hosts and guests of this podcast do not represent the views of the United States Government or the United States Department of Defense. 

This episode is also available as a blog post: http://afghannewswire.com/2021/04/19/soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan-operation-storm-333-documentary/

The Soviet 40th Army invaded Afghanistan in the closing days of 1979. They would not leave for another nine years. Exhausted and frustrated by their inability to decisively crush the elusive freedom fighters in the mountains – the Mujahideen – the Soviets turn to atrocity and criminal violence to achieve their objectives. Meanwhile, adrenaline-seeking journalists and idealistic Western reporters illegally sneak into the war zone to uncover the truth behind the war.  SOURCES: Ahmadi-Miller, Enjeela. The Broken Circle: A Memoir of Escaping Afghanistan. 2019. Ansari, Mir Tamim. Games Without Rules: The Often-Interrupted History of Afghanistan. 2012. Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. 2010. Borovik, Artyom. The Hidden War. 1990. Braithewaite, Rodric. Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-1989. 2011. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to 2001. 2004.  Dobbs, Michael. Down with Big Brother: The Fall of the Soviet Empire. 1997. Feifer, Gregory. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. 2009.  Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The Soviet-Afghan War, 1979-89. 2012. Galeotti, Mark. Storm-333: KGB and Spetsnaz Seize Kabul. 2021. Goodwin, Jan. Caught in the Crossfire. 1987.  Grau, Lester W. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics In Afghanistan. 1996. Hosdon, Peregrine. Under a Sickle Moon: A Journey Through Afghanistan. 1986. Kalinovsky, Artemy. A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. 2011. Kaplan, Robert D. Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 2001. Rosen, Ethan. The Bear, The Dragon, & the AK-47. 2017. Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: A Military History of Afghanistan from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban. 2009.  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

When Soviet Russia invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979, few could have imagined what a seismic impact it would have on the modern world. In an attempt to prop up a wobbly client regime, the Soviets sparked a transnational jihad, inflamed Cold War tensions, and hastened the downfall of their own empire. Often referred to as “Russia's Vietnam”, the Soviet-Afghan War is an overlooked, deeply misunderstood, and immensely important conflict. In this first installment of a multi-part series, we will explore how the Soviets found themselves ensnared in the “graveyard of empires”, through the eyes of the everyday people who experienced it firsthand.  SOURCES: Ahmadi-Miller, Enjeela. The Broken Circle: A Memoir of Escaping Afghanistan. 2019. Ansari, Mir Tamim. Games Without Rules: The Often-Interrupted History of Afghanistan. 2012. Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. 2010. Borovik, Artyom. The Hidden War. 1990. Braithewaite, Rodric. Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-1989. 2011. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to 2001. 2004.  Dobbs, Michael. Down with Big Brother: The Fall of the Soviet Empire. 1997. Feifer, Gregory. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. 2009.  Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The Soviet-Afghan War, 1979-89. 2012. Galeotti, Mark. Storm-333: KGB and Spetsnaz Seize Kabul. 2021. Grau, Lester W. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics In Afghanistan. 1996. Hosdon, Peregrine. Under a Sickle Moon: A Journey Through Afghanistan. 1986. Kalinovsky, Artemy. A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. 2011. Kaplan, Robert D. Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 2001. Rosen, Ethan. The Bear, The Dragon, & the AK-47. 2017. Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: A Military History of Afghanistan from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban. 2009.  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this episode of Interpreting India, Avinash Paliwal and Thomas Ruttig join Deep Pal to analyze the present situation in Afghanistan, what the implications of the U.S. withdrawal might be, and what this might mean for India and other countries involved.  Episode Background:The withdrawal of the United States and its NATO allies from Afghanistan has led to concerns over the Kabul government's ability to survive in the face of an aggressive Taliban onslaught. The peace process, which the U.S. had initiated between the Taliban and the Afghan government, has also stalled without achieving a settlement. While President Ghani has asserted that the government forces are prepared to meet the challenges that the withdrawal presents, analysts remain pessimistic about the possibilities.  Episode Contributors:Avinash Paliwal is a senior lecturer in International Relations and deputy director of the SOAS South Asia Institute | Twitter: @PaliwalAviThomas Ruttig is co-founder and co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network | Twitter: @thruttigDeep Pal is a visiting fellow in the Asia program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Twitter: @DeepPal_Episode Timestamps: 2:26 The Current Situation and Prospects for Peace8:48 On the Possibility of a Power-Sharing Agreement 16:01 The Taliban and its Factions, and the India-Pakistan Dyad54:58 On the Role of Other  Countries and Players57:40  Where is the Conflict Headed?Further Reading: A Troika of Four: Looking back at the March 2021 Afghanistan meeting in Moscow by Thomas RuttigAfghanistan After the US Withdrawal: An Elusive Peace by Thomas RuttigEngaging with the Taliban is Necessary by Avinash PaliwalSino twist to Af-Pak puzzle: Given China's Forays, India's Afghanistan Strategy Must Look at Iran, Taliban, and Even Pakistan  by Avinash PaliwalMy Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US by Avinash Paliwal 

Photo: NATO Council Meeting, December 1952 . CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor CBS Audio Network @Batchelorshow #TheGreatMigration: Recalling the one-way mission to harass the first Cold War Soviet invasion of NATO. Michael Yon. Locals.com/MichaelYon

https://youtu.be/xjbbDI_70eQ Keith Knight joins me for this INSTANT CLASSIC episode of the Liberty Weekly Podcast. Keith and each picked and researched five proven conspiracies to share on air. Please review the show notes page for sources. Episode 172 of the Liberty Weekly Podcast is Brought to you by: Liberty Weekly Subscribestar Liberty Weekly Substack The Liberty Weekly Patreon Page: help support the show and gain access to tons of bonus content! Become a patron today! Become a Patron! Liberty Weekly on Flote. Patreon Bonuses for Crypto! Show Notes: Congressional Research Service: "Federal Conspiracy Law: A Brief Overview" Legal Definition of Conspiracy CIA Document 1035-960: Countering Criticism of the Warren Commission What is Open Source Intelligence? The Corbett Report The Shadows of Power by James Perloff [Amazon Affiliate Link] Council on Foreign Relations Foreign Affairs Hillary Clinton's Remarks to the CFR The Gardner Museum Theft Foreign Policy Focus Episode 204 - FBI Entrapment guest Pat MacFarlane Keith Knight: Who Was Elie Cohen? The Creature From Jekyll Island by G. Edward Griffin [Amazon Affiliate Link] The Lavon Affair: When Israel Firebombed U.S. Installations Haaretz on the USS Liberty The Wall Street Trilogy: A History by Antony Sutton [Amazon Affiliate Link] America's Secret Establishment: An Introduction to the Order of Skull & Bones by Antony Sutton Trading with the Enemy Act National Security Study Memorandum 200 John P. Holdren's Population Control James Corbett: Big Oil Series Great Wars and Great Leaders: A Libertarian Rebuttal by Ralph Raico America's "War on Terrorism" by Michel Chossudovsky Brzezinski's Memo to President Carter of December 26, 1979, Regarding the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan The Grand Chessboard by Zbigniew Brzezinski When FDR Abandoned the Gold Standard

Keith Knight joins me for this CLASSIC episode. Episode 172 of the Liberty Weekly Podcast is Brought to you by: Liberty Weekly Subscribestar Liberty Weekly Substack The Liberty Weekly Patreon Page: help support the show and gain access to tons of bonus content! Become a patron today! Become a Patron! Liberty Weekly on Flote. Patreon Bonuses for Crypto! Show Notes: Congressional Research Service: "Federal Conspiracy Law: A Brief Overview" Legal Definition of Conspiracy CIA Document 1035-960: Countering Criticism of the Warren Commission What is Open Source Intelligence? The Corbett Report The Shadows of Power by James Perloff [Amazon Affiliate Link] Council on Foreign Relations Foreign Affairs Hillary Clinton's Remarks to the CFR The Gardner Museum Theft Foreign Policy Focus Episode 204 - FBI Entrapment guest Pat MacFarlane Keith Knight: Who Was Elie Cohen? The Creature From Jekyll Island by G. Edward Griffin [Amazon Affiliate Link] The Lavon Affair: When Israel Firebombed U.S. Installations Haaretz on the USS Liberty The Wall Street Trilogy: A History by Antony Sutton [Amazon Affiliate Link] America's Secret Establishment: An Introduction to the Order of Skull & Bones by Antony Sutton Trading with the Enemy Act National Security Study Memorandum 200 John P. Holdren's Population Control James Corbett: Big Oil Series Great Wars and Great Leaders: A Libertarian Rebuttal by Ralph Raico America's "War on Terrorism" by Michel Chossudovsky Brzezinski's Memo to President Carter of December 26, 1979, Regarding the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan The Grand Chessboard by Zbigniew Brzezinski When FDR Abandoned the Gold Standard --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/libertyweekly/support

This week, A’ndre and Ryan speak with former Ronald Neumann, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Algeria, and Bahrain about the recently announced U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, scheduled to take place by September 11th, 2021. Ambassador Neumann provides a contextual background on Afghanistan pre-2001, focusing on the repercussions of the Soviet Invasion in the 1980s, the U.S. aid to the Mujahideen, and the linkages between the Mujahideen and Al Qaeda. We then dig into the Taliban — providing a brief overview of their governing style, their power in the country,  their actual beliefs, and their relationship to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda during, before, and after the 9/11 attacks. The second half of the interview sees Ambassador Neumann criticizing the Biden Administration’s decision for a non-conditional withdrawal, citing the relinquishment of a range of secondary goals, the likely subjugation of women, children, and other U.S.-favored Afghans, and a spate of violence that has already struck parts of the country. Ambassador Neumann expresses pessimism about the future of Afghanistan post-withdrawal, and voices concern for Afghans who had strongly believed in U.S.-based values.Ambassador Neumann currently serves as the President of the American Academy of Diplomacy, and you can find out more about his work there, here.

From facing the challenges of Ebola as Peace Corps Director in Guinea to the Soviet Invasion of Ukraine and his work as an Assistant Secretary of State for Elections in NH and State Representative Doug has lived a life of service. Now he has turned that service into a business guiding others.

Arsen Islamov is a cattle rancher in Kazakhstan. In today's episode of the podcast, we discuss the pastoralist traditions in Kazakhstan, the Soviet invasion, and their reeducation camps. We also discuss the subsequent conversion of rich, pastoral lands to grain and the health consequences of the removal of the traditional diet.   His journey into cattle ranching is unique and inspiring, and his stories about the erosion of topsoil due to cropping are reminiscent of our own dust bowl history in the midwest. This conversation is rich in history and lessons that we all can heed.   Follow Arsen on Instagram, YouTube, and Facebook.   This episode brought to you by DrinkLMNT who has an exclusive deal for my listeners. Visit this page to learn how you can get a sampler pack for only $5.

Guest: Gunar Olsen. Gunar recently published a response to an historian’s analysis of the Soviet Afghan invasion and the question of whether or not Zbigniew Brzezinski’s goal (under the Carter administration) in assisting the mujahedin was really about provoking the Soviet military intervention. There is also a bonus question on why there was so much push back and resistance to Trump’s last ditch effort to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and what the real reasons behind it.  Gunar Olsen is an independent scholar, writer and journalist who covers the politics of U.S. imperialism. His articles have been published in The New Republic, The Nation, Jacobin, The Grayzone, Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting and other publications. He also provides research for the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. FOLLOW @GunarOlsen. Find him and his work at his website gunarolsen.com Around the Empire is listener supported, independent media. Pitch in at Patreon: patreon.com/aroundtheempire or paypal.me/aroundtheempirepod. Find all links at aroundtheempire.com.  SUBSCRIBE on YouTube. FOLLOW @aroundtheempire and @joanneleon.  SUBSCRIBE/FOLLOW on iTunes, iHeart, Spotify, Google Play, Facebook or on your preferred podcast app. Music by Fluorescent Grey. Reference Links: “We Don’t Need a Smoking Gun”: U.S. Provocations and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Gunar Olsen

On today's episode, Andrew Keen talks with Steve Coll about what Donald Trump gets from contesting Joe Biden's presidential victory and the damage to foreign policy Trump's administration has caused. Steve Coll, a staff writer, is the dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University and reports on issues of politics, intelligence, and national security in the United States and abroad. For the magazine, he has written about the education of Osama bin Laden, secret negotiations between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and the hunt for the fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. He was the managing editor of the Washington Post from 1998 to 2005, having earlier been a feature writer, a foreign correspondent, and an editor there; in 1990, he shared a Pulitzer Prize with David Vise for a series of articles about the Securities and Exchange Commission. From 2007 to 2013, he was the president of the New America Foundation. Coll is the author of several books, including “Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan”; “Private Empire: ExxonMobil and American Power”; “The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century,” which won the pen/John Kenneth Galbraith Award for Nonfiction; “On the Grand Trunk Road: A Journey Into South Asia”; “Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the C.I.A., Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001,” for which he received an Overseas Press Club Award and a Pulitzer Prize; “Eagle on the Street,” which was based on his reporting on the S.E.C.; “The Taking of Getty Oil”; and “The Deal of the Century: The Breakup of AT&T.” Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This month on Coming in From the Cold, a discussion of the history of Afghanistan leading up to the Soviet Invasion, and the war's legacy in the nation today. Regular guest Steve Wills sits in for Bill Rosenau as host and is joined by Ohio University professor of history Dr. John Brobst, and Dr. Jon Schroden Director of CNA's Center for Stability and Development. Click here to visit our website and learn more about the participants. 

This month on Coming in From the Cold, a discussion of the history of Afghanistan leading up to the Soviet Invasion, and the war's legacy in the nation today. Regular guest Steve Wills sits in for Bill Rosenau as host and is joined by Ohio University professor of history Dr. John Brobst, and Dr. Jon Schroden Director of CNA's Center for Stability and Development. Click here to visit our website and learn more about the participants. 

Curtis has often mentioned his love of award-winning books, so today we’re taking a deep dive into our reading logs and TBR lists to recommend award-nominated or award-winning books. In today’s episode, we’re discussing various literary awards, sharing some of our favorite award-winning books, and taking a look at some of this year’s big nominations.  To find a list of every title we mention in today’s episode, go to hereadsheread.org/podcast for show notes.  Subscribe to our newsletter: hereadsheread.substack.com Follow us on Instagram: instagram.com/hereadsheread/ Get two audiobooks for the price of one w/code HRSR: libro.fm/membership/new     Books mentioned:   Bluebird, Bluebird by Attica Locke The River by Peter Heller The Song of Achilles by Madeline Miller LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media by P.W. Singer Transcendent Kingdom by Yaa Gyasi Cold Mountain by Charles Frazier  The Killer Angels by Michael Shaara Salvage the Bones by Jesmyn Ward  Vanity Fair Article “On Witness and Respair” Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 by Steve Coll  Long Way Down by Jason Reynolds  Ender's Game by Orson Scott Card  Starship Troopers by Robert A. Heinlein Circe by Madeline Miller Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents by Isabel Wilkerson The Warmth of Other Suns by Isabel Wilkerson The Dead Are Arising: The Life of Malcolm X by Les Payne and Tamara Payne Sweet Taste of Liberty: A True Story of Slavery and Restitution in America by W. Caleb McDaniel Red, White & Royal Blue by Casey McQuiston A Memory Called Empire by Arkady Martine The Calculating Stars by Mary Robinette Kowal Ghost Talkers by Mary Robinette Kowal   The Madalorian Season 2 trailer The Clone Wars trailer The Great British Baking Show S8

Pictured: Stuart Wheeler Matthew Bannister on Stuart Wheeler, the spread betting tycoon who used his millions to fund anti-EU political parties and campaigns. Josephine Cox, the multi-million selling author whose novels often drew on her working class childhood in Blackburn. Miloš Jakeš, the General Secretary of the Czech Communist Party at the time of the Velvet Revolution. Peter Green, the revered guitarist who founded Fleetwood Mac, but later suffered severe mental health problems. Interviewed guest: Philip Collins Interviewed guest: Kimberley Young Interviewed guest: Professor Mary Heimann Interviewed guest: Bernie Marsden Producer: Steven Williams Archive clips from: HARDtalk, BBC News 24 11/10/2019; General Election, ITN 24/05/2001; Nigel Farage on Stuart Wheeler, VoteLeaveMedia 02/04/2009; A Woman’s Fortune by Josephine Cox, read by Carole Boyd, Audible/HarperCollins 2018; Woman's Hour, Radio 4 02/09/1999; Woman’s Hour, Radio 4 09/10/2001; The Lion’s Den by Josephine Cox, read by Robert Glenister, Radio 4 Extra 24/04/2011; The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968, BBC News 21/08/2018; Miloš Jakeš speech, Radio Free Europe 17/07/1989; People’s Century: 1989: People Power, BBC One 16/02/1997; BBC News, BBC One 10/12/1989; Peter Green: Man of the World, BBC Four 04/02/2011; The Works: Peter Green: A Hard Road, BBC Two 03/10/1996.

Vashi Nedomanský is the son of Czechoslovak former legendary ice hockey forward Václav Nedomanský aka “Big Ned” who is best known as the first ice hockey player to defect to North America to play. We hear a dramatic true story that combines sports, politics, espionage, corruption, and life-changing events that played out on a global stage.Among the stories we hear are the vivid descriptions of the 1969 Ice Hockey World Championships where the Czechoslovak National Team faced the Soviet national team for the first time since the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia. Vashi is currently finishing a film that will reveal his father’s incredible story for the first time in his own words. Visit the show notes here to see the trailer and the 1969 Ice Hockey World Championships. https://coldwarconversations.com/episode132/If you are enjoying the podcast please leave a written review in Apple podcasts or share us on social media. By telling your friends you can really help us get new guests.If you can spare it I’m asking listeners to contribute at least $3 USD per month to help keep us on the air (larger amounts are welcome too) plus you can get a sought after CWC coaster as a monthly financial supporter of the podcast and you bask in the warm glow of knowing you helping preserve Cold War history.Just go to https://coldwarconversations.com/donate/Back to today’s episode, we welcome Vashi to our Cold War conversation…There’s further information on this episode in our show notes, which can also be found as a link in your podcast app here. https://coldwarconversations.com/episode132/If you like what you are hearing, please leave reviews in Apple podcasts and share us on social media.If you can’t wait for next week’s episode do visit our Facebook discussion group where guests and listeners continue the Cold War Conversation. Just search Cold War Conversations in Facebook.Thank you very much for listening. It is really appreciated – goodbye.Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/coldwarpod)

Paul Saunders and Alex Powell join Bill to discuss the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and how world powers continue to make the same mistakes.   Click here to visit our website and learn more about the participants. 

Paul Saunders and Alex Powell join Bill to discuss the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and how world powers continue to make the same mistakes.   Click here to visit our website and learn more about the participants. 

In this episode, I will be discussing The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Soviet Invasion of Hungary. If you want some more revision material, you can use the link below to access much more revision information on my website: https://sites.google.com/view/igcse-history-revision/home If you have any suggestions or questions, please fill in this Google Form: https://forms.gle/caEki6L8SzS6wwui7 THANKS FOR YOUR INTEREST IN MY PODCAST! --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/robin-whitehead1/message

It's episode 14! Ye Newe Dallam History Podcast is heading for the hills this week and covering the Soviet invasion/support of Afghanistan. A GCSE/IB hybrid today covering the events that students most wanted information on. Gribbin and Howarth take you through the murders, weapons and aims of the period and help you out with the importance question on Paper 2 of the GCSE. Along the way there will always be games and jokes but mainly this is serious history. Well as serious as we get! Follow the GCSE History page on Sharepoint and follow @MrHowarth on twitter! Music: Jolly Good by Shane Ivers - https://www.silvermansound.com

On 24th December 1979 Soviet troops poured into Afghanistan in support of an anti-government coup. The Soviet occupation would last for nine years. Plus, the hidden history of the board game Monopoly, the invention of chemotherapy, the heaviest aerial bombardment of the Vietnam war at Christmas 1972, and the street-performer origins of the global circus phenomenon Cirque du Soleil. Picture: Russian tanks take up positions in front of the Darulaman (Abode of Peace) Palace in Kabul, January 1980. (Henri Bureau/Corbis/VCG via Getty Images)

Today we are joined by Jenifer Parks, Associate Professor of History at Rocky Mountain College. Parks is the author of The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sport Bureaucracy, and the Cold War: Red Sport, Red Tape (Lexington Books, 2016), which asks how Soviet bureaucrats maneuvered the USSR into the Olympic movement and used the discourses of Olympism to promote athletic democratization, anti-colonialism, and socialism in the context of the Cold War. In The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sport Bureaucracy, and the Cold War, Parks assesses the growth of Soviet Olympism from the Second World War until the 1980 Moscow Games.  Her first chapters highlights the difficulties Soviet sports bureaucrats faced in their efforts to join the international Olympic movement. These bureaucrats needed to convince the IOC of the Soviet Union’s worthiness, in the face of persistent anti-communism from IOC president Avery Brundage. They also needed to win over Soviet politician who feared that any Olympic failure would embarrass the state in front of an international audience. In spite of these early misgivings and misstarts, the Soviet Union largely succeeded in their first Olympics, the 1952 Helsinki Games. The next three decades were an almost uninterrupted era of Soviet athletic dominance. In the 1970s, confident Soviet sports bureaucrats sought to bring the Olympics to Moscow. After losing the 1976 Games to Montreal, Moscow won the right to host the 1980s Olympics. A herculean effort ensued to make Moscow hospitable for the expected tens of thousands of athletes, international journalists, and one million tourists. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, which set off an international boycott of the Games, marred their extensive achievements which included the biggest Games to date, the largest number of female Olympians, and dozens of new World Records. Through a close reading of the archives of the Soviet Union’s main sporting agencies, including the State Committee for Sports and Physical Education, and an analysis of the key figures in the Soviet sports bureaucracy, Parks also reshapes our understanding of Soviet bureaucracy. The historiography of the USSR emphasizes stagnation in post-Brezhnev Soviet government agencies as a way to explain the state’s inability to deal with the challenges of the 1970s. However, the men of the Sports Committee were not just staid functionaries, but a cadre of professional, effective, pragmatic men driven to use Olympism to promote socialism abroad and at home. The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sport Bureaucracy, and the Cold War will interest scholars broadly concerned with the Soviet Union, the Cold War, and the international Olympic movement. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today we are joined by Jenifer Parks, Associate Professor of History at Rocky Mountain College. Parks is the author of The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sport Bureaucracy, and the Cold War: Red Sport, Red Tape (Lexington Books, 2016), which asks how Soviet bureaucrats maneuvered the USSR into the Olympic movement and used the discourses of Olympism to promote athletic democratization, anti-colonialism, and socialism in the context of the Cold War. In The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sport Bureaucracy, and the Cold War, Parks assesses the growth of Soviet Olympism from the Second World War until the 1980 Moscow Games.  Her first chapters highlights the difficulties Soviet sports bureaucrats faced in their efforts to join the international Olympic movement. These bureaucrats needed to convince the IOC of the Soviet Union’s worthiness, in the face of persistent anti-communism from IOC president Avery Brundage. They also needed to win over Soviet politician who feared that any Olympic failure would embarrass the state in front of an international audience. In spite of these early misgivings and misstarts, the Soviet Union largely succeeded in their first Olympics, the 1952 Helsinki Games. The next three decades were an almost uninterrupted era of Soviet athletic dominance. In the 1970s, confident Soviet sports bureaucrats sought to bring the Olympics to Moscow. After losing the 1976 Games to Montreal, Moscow won the right to host the 1980s Olympics. A herculean effort ensued to make Moscow hospitable for the expected tens of thousands of athletes, international journalists, and one million tourists. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, which set off an international boycott of the Games, marred their extensive achievements which included the biggest Games to date, the largest number of female Olympians, and dozens of new World Records. Through a close reading of the archives of the Soviet Union’s main sporting agencies, including the State Committee for Sports and Physical Education, and an analysis of the key figures in the Soviet sports bureaucracy, Parks also reshapes our understanding of Soviet bureaucracy. The historiography of the USSR emphasizes stagnation in post-Brezhnev Soviet government agencies as a way to explain the state’s inability to deal with the challenges of the 1970s. However, the men of the Sports Committee were not just staid functionaries, but a cadre of professional, effective, pragmatic men driven to use Olympism to promote socialism abroad and at home. The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sport Bureaucracy, and the Cold War will interest scholars broadly concerned with the Soviet Union, the Cold War, and the international Olympic movement. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today we are joined by Jenifer Parks, Associate Professor of History at Rocky Mountain College. Parks is the author of The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sport Bureaucracy, and the Cold War: Red Sport, Red Tape (Lexington Books, 2016), which asks how Soviet bureaucrats maneuvered the USSR into the Olympic movement and used the discourses of Olympism to promote athletic democratization, anti-colonialism, and socialism in the context of the Cold War. In The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sport Bureaucracy, and the Cold War, Parks assesses the growth of Soviet Olympism from the Second World War until the 1980 Moscow Games.  Her first chapters highlights the difficulties Soviet sports bureaucrats faced in their efforts to join the international Olympic movement. These bureaucrats needed to convince the IOC of the Soviet Union’s worthiness, in the face of persistent anti-communism from IOC president Avery Brundage. They also needed to win over Soviet politician who feared that any Olympic failure would embarrass the state in front of an international audience. In spite of these early misgivings and misstarts, the Soviet Union largely succeeded in their first Olympics, the 1952 Helsinki Games. The next three decades were an almost uninterrupted era of Soviet athletic dominance. In the 1970s, confident Soviet sports bureaucrats sought to bring the Olympics to Moscow. After losing the 1976 Games to Montreal, Moscow won the right to host the 1980s Olympics. A herculean effort ensued to make Moscow hospitable for the expected tens of thousands of athletes, international journalists, and one million tourists. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, which set off an international boycott of the Games, marred their extensive achievements which included the biggest Games to date, the largest number of female Olympians, and dozens of new World Records. Through a close reading of the archives of the Soviet Union’s main sporting agencies, including the State Committee for Sports and Physical Education, and an analysis of the key figures in the Soviet sports bureaucracy, Parks also reshapes our understanding of Soviet bureaucracy. The historiography of the USSR emphasizes stagnation in post-Brezhnev Soviet government agencies as a way to explain the state’s inability to deal with the challenges of the 1970s. However, the men of the Sports Committee were not just staid functionaries, but a cadre of professional, effective, pragmatic men driven to use Olympism to promote socialism abroad and at home. The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sport Bureaucracy, and the Cold War will interest scholars broadly concerned with the Soviet Union, the Cold War, and the international Olympic movement. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today we are joined by Jenifer Parks, Associate Professor of History at Rocky Mountain College. Parks is the author of The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sport Bureaucracy, and the Cold War: Red Sport, Red Tape (Lexington Books, 2016), which asks how Soviet bureaucrats maneuvered the USSR into the Olympic movement and used the discourses of Olympism to promote athletic democratization, anti-colonialism, and socialism in the context of the Cold War. In The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sport Bureaucracy, and the Cold War, Parks assesses the growth of Soviet Olympism from the Second World War until the 1980 Moscow Games.  Her first chapters highlights the difficulties Soviet sports bureaucrats faced in their efforts to join the international Olympic movement. These bureaucrats needed to convince the IOC of the Soviet Union’s worthiness, in the face of persistent anti-communism from IOC president Avery Brundage. They also needed to win over Soviet politician who feared that any Olympic failure would embarrass the state in front of an international audience. In spite of these early misgivings and misstarts, the Soviet Union largely succeeded in their first Olympics, the 1952 Helsinki Games. The next three decades were an almost uninterrupted era of Soviet athletic dominance. In the 1970s, confident Soviet sports bureaucrats sought to bring the Olympics to Moscow. After losing the 1976 Games to Montreal, Moscow won the right to host the 1980s Olympics. A herculean effort ensued to make Moscow hospitable for the expected tens of thousands of athletes, international journalists, and one million tourists. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, which set off an international boycott of the Games, marred their extensive achievements which included the biggest Games to date, the largest number of female Olympians, and dozens of new World Records. Through a close reading of the archives of the Soviet Union’s main sporting agencies, including the State Committee for Sports and Physical Education, and an analysis of the key figures in the Soviet sports bureaucracy, Parks also reshapes our understanding of Soviet bureaucracy. The historiography of the USSR emphasizes stagnation in post-Brezhnev Soviet government agencies as a way to explain the state’s inability to deal with the challenges of the 1970s. However, the men of the Sports Committee were not just staid functionaries, but a cadre of professional, effective, pragmatic men driven to use Olympism to promote socialism abroad and at home. The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sport Bureaucracy, and the Cold War will interest scholars broadly concerned with the Soviet Union, the Cold War, and the international Olympic movement. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

REVEALED, 50 years later! — My Role in the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia The Media Beat was first commissioned in 2004 by Tribune Newspapers from journalist and media critic DAVID TERESHCHUK. It ran as a weekly feature in Tribune's New York... Read More ›

On the 50th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, a look back at Czech Cinema. In a decade of tumultuous change in the arts and cultural expression this tiny country's filmmakers were as important to the youth revolution as artists in the West. In this podcast, originally broadcast on BBC Radio 3, FRDH host Michael Goldfarb tells the story of how a unique set of circumstances made Czechoslovakia in the 1960s one of the powerhouses of world cinema. These were films made by people who had the first rough draft of history burned onto them in childhood and were not broken by all that they endured: Hitler/Stalin ... they laughed at the worst and in sharing that mockery with audiences gave them courage to stand up to totalitarianism. Of course, there was a price. But the Czech cinema of that time lives on.

Czechia has a 50 year anniversary since the invasion of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. We discuss this topic with our commentator Petr Honzejk. - Naše země si připomínají 50. výročí od vpádu sovětských vojsk do Československa. O tomto tématu hovoříme s českým komentátorem Petrem Honzejkem.

Period. Menstrual cycle. Aunt Flow. Soviet Invasion. However you refer to that “time of the month,” it’s an important part of a lot of bodies! Come with Willow and Alyssa and explore the physiological, cultural, and otherwise systemic issues related to periods. From side effects to the Tampon Tax, periods await! Email: beautifulbodiescast@gmail.com / Twitter: … Continue reading Episode 2: Periods

Avinash Paliwal speaks at the South Asia Seminar on 20 February 2018. The archetype of 'my enemy’s enemy is my friend', India's political and economic presence in Afghanistan is often viewed as a Machiavellian ploy aimed against Pakistan. The first of its kind, this book interrogates that simplistic yet powerful geopolitical narrative and asks what truly drives India's Afghanistan policy. Based on an extensive repertoire of hitherto untapped primary sources including official memoranda, diplomatic correspondence, and a series of interviews with key political actors, My Enemy’s Enemy provides a comprehensive analysis of India’s strategy debates and foreign policymaking processes vis-a-vis Afghanistan, from the embers of the Cold War to the 1990s Afghan civil war and the more recent U.S.-led war on terror. It demonstrates that Indian presence in Afghanistan has been guided primarily by an enduring vision for the region that requires a stable balance of power across the Durand Line.

In December 1979, the Soviet Union (USSR) decided to intervene in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by sending troops to prop up the ailing and fractious Communist Party, based in Kabul. Afghanistan was of key geo-strategic significance in the Cold War to both the USSR and the USA; the USSR invaded on the pretence of an invitation by the domestic Afghan Communist Party, but the USA viewed this as an unprecedented expansion beyond Warsaw Pact borders by Soviet military forces. The period of Detente (relaxed relations) between the Superpowers which had characterised the 1970s was definitely over after this point, giving way to heightened tensions in the 1980s. But what was the primary consequence / significance of the invasion? Where was its impact felt most? In this episode, Co-Editor Elliott (@thelibrarian6) argues that the main ramifications were felt in the arena of international relations, while our Special Guest Conal (@prohistoricman) contends that the main impact was felt by the USSR domestically. Patrick (@historychappy) is on paternity leave this week. For terms of use, please visit www.versushistory.com

About 13 years ago, I climbed on the bandwagon and, like lots of other folks, read several books to better understand our history in Afghanistan and Iraq and with Al Quaeda — how we got into the mess and, maybe how we’d get out.You may recall – it was a bit of a golden age of reporting and writing. Among them: “The Looming Tower” by Lawrence Wright;  “Fiasco,” by Thomas Ricks; “Imperial Life In The Emerald City,” by Rajiv Chandrasekaran; “The Places in Between,” Rory Stewart’s crazy story of walking across Afghanistan, as well as his follow-up "The Prince of Marshes." But the first one I read has long stayed with me, and set the context for the all the others to come: That was the Pulitzer prizewinning “Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001” by Steve Coll.“Ghost Wars” outlined the CIA’s secret history in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s rise, the emergence of Osama bin Laden, and the failed efforts by U.S. forces to find and assassinate him in Afghanistan. It ends the day before 9/11.Now, finally, Steve Coll is back on the beat. His new book is "Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” It tells the story of America's intelligence, military, and diplomatic efforts to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 9/11.The book is as powerful and relevant and urgent as Ghost Wars was. It mixes details and insights and analysis that, once again makes plain — in painful ways — what happened after those planes hit the World Trade Center.More about Steve Coll — somehow, writing some of the most important books on our most important foreign policies is not all he does. Coll’s day job is serving as Dean of the Columbia School of Journalism. He is also a staff writer at The New Yorker, author of seven books, and a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner. There’s a lot more, but you get the idea. That’s also why at the end of our talk, I picked up on my conversation last week with Harvard professors Steve Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt. They wrote the outstanding “How Democracies Die.” My question for journalism Dean Coll, rather than the author: How does democracy work with people who think facts are alternative facts, that real news is fake news? How does it work with people who believe anything – or nothing at all?

Alternate history scenarios of the Iran Hostage Crisis, Iran Iraq War, Ronald Reagan, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and more. Cthulhu, World War 3, Terrorism, Watchmen, and Dennis’ Trump theory also appear.

Peace Revolution episode 087: Privacy & Surveillance / The Future of Freedom vs. The Architecture of Oppression    To Purchase the HISTORY BLUEPRINT (Richard's Brain Model Organizing History):   https://www.tragedyandhope.com/the-brain/   To Donate or Subscribe to the Tragedy and Hope online learning community:   https://www.tragedyandhope.com/subscribe/   To Subscribe to Peace Revolution on iTunes:                         https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/the-peace-revolution-podcast/id659865433   The Peace Revolution Page (all feeds, formats, and episodes):   https://www.tragedyandhope.com/peace-revolution/   The Tragedy and Hope Official Youtube Page:   https://www.YouTube.com/TragedyandHopeMag   Follow Richard on Twitter (@TragedyandHope)   Reference Map to Episode 087 (0m-1h23m) Richard's Introductory Montage: Sample: Privacy's Dead. What Happens Next? By Tom Scott Sample 1 from the Munk Debate on State Surveillance: Greenwald/Ohanian vs Hayden/Dershowitz Brzezinski's thoughts on Mass surveillance by Patrick Wood Sample 2 from the Munk Debate / Glenn Greenwald Bitter Lake by Adam Curtis / FDR Saudi relationship / oil for Wahabis Sample 3 from the  Munk Debate / Gen. Michael Hayden MI6 agent St. John Philby handling Arab Nazis Mujahedeen, Philby's son sells terrorist network to Allen Dulles & CIA / John Loftus w. Dave Emory CIA Torture Memo 2015 Dan Carlin / WWI British Tapped American Messages on the Atlantic Cable / Hardcore History 54- Blueprint for Armageddon V School Sucks Podcast #337 /  discussion on Saudis, Afghanistan, and Adam Curtis' films including “Bitter Lake” Bitter Lake / Opium Production Optimized by Dams, U.S. and U.K. prosper Obama with British Prime Minister David Cameron on the “Special Relationship”, cyber-security, and the War on Terror (ISIS) A Yank at Eton / Mickey Rooney Sample 2 Obama Prime Min Chomsky on Surveillance state Chomsky on Civil Liberties Zbig Brzezinski / Al Qaeda Doesn't Exist (Documentary by James Corbett) Hayden “Whodunnit?”… let's look at the first 2 reels… Sample 2 School Sucks Podcast #337 Brzezinski's thoughts on Mass surveillance by Patrick Wood Zbigniew Brzezinski quote Hillary Clinton / The U.S. and British Governments created Al Qaeda (lies and says it was Soviet Invasion as the “Why” we did it) Corbett / Al Qaeda doesn't exist Sample 4 from the Munk Debate / Greenwald BBC: Al Qaeda doesn't Exist – The Power of Nightmares by Adam Curtis Sample 5 from the Munk Debate / Alexis Ohanian (1h23m-1h50m) Richard's Introductory Monologue (1h50m-9h30m) Bill Binney Interview + Round Table Commentary Discussion & Notes (9h30m-11h) Fourth Amendment Debate / Munk Debate on Privacy and Surveillance (11h-12h) Patrick Wood / Technocracy and the Trilateral Commission (12h-14h24m) America's Surveillance State NOTES FOR THE BILL BINNEY INTERVIEW ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION & COMMENTARY: (Video) The Future of Freedom: A Feature Interview with NSA Whistleblower William Binney: PDF of notes and references for episode 087 on Scribd Link for these notes in pdf/embeddable format on Scribd Edward Snowden Disclosures on U.S. and British Intelligence Community spying on citizens without probable cause Project BULL RUN (NSA/ GCHQ decryption program) Positive & Negative Rights Why Google made the NSA by Nafeez Ahmed How the CIA made Google by Nafeez Ahmed Sons of Liberty (History Channel Mini-Series) Between Two Ages: America and the Technetronic Era by Zbigniew Brzezinski Prof. A In his book Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era (New York: Viking Press;1970), Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote: “For impressive evidence of Western participation in the early phase of Soviet economic growth, see Antony C. Sutton's Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1917–1930, which argues that 'Soviet economic development for 1917–1930 was essentially dependent on Western technological aid' (p.283), and that 'at least 95 per cent of the industrial structure received this assistance.' “(p. 348). John Taylor Gatto on Brzezinski: "Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote his famous signature book Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era in 1970, a piece reeking with Fabianisms: dislike of direct popular power, relentless advocacy of the right and duty of evolutionarily advanced nations to administer less-developed parts of the world, revulsion at populist demands for "selfish self-government" (homeschooling would be a prime example), and stress on collectivism. Brzezinski said in the book:14  It will soon be possible to assert almost continuous control over every citizen and to maintain up-to-date files containing even the most personal details about health and personal behavior of every citizen, in addition to the more customary data. These files will be subject to instantaneous retrieval by the authorities. Power will gravitate into the hands of those who control information." Professor Antony C. Sutton Wall Street and Hitler Wall Street and Bolshevik Revolution Wall Street and FDR Project SHAMROCK Paris 1919 Peace Conference Department of Justice and Operations PAPERCLIP, DUSTBIN, ASHCAN (Nazis brought to America by U.S. and British Intelligence, Kissinger) Anglo-American Establishment Operation GLADIO GLADIO B (Operation involving Muslim Extremists) Arab Nazis (CIA Operatives in Operation GLADIO) JR Seeley (Quotation) Mentor / Hero of Cecil Rhodes Original Executor of Rhodes' first Will, but died before Rhodes Stasi, Gestapo, NKVD, KGB, etc. Panopticon 1917 Espionage Act / WWI Col. Edward Mandell House C. D. Jackson (Psychological Warfare WWII / GLADIO / Bilderberg Co-Founder / JFK) Henry Luce Life Magazine Empire Utilitarianism Prussian Education System The Ultimate History Lesson with John Taylor Gatto (2011 Interview) Peace Revolution episodes 041-045 The Ultimate History Lesson w/ Commentary GCHQ Dirty Tricks, Honeypots GCHQ (Government Communications HeadQuarters, U.K.) Special Relationship between America and Great Britain 5-EYES Joint Surveillance Programs in English Speaking Nations Church Committee Project THINTHREAD (Surveillance Program) General Michael Hayden, ex-Director of NSA, CIA, and DNI Project TRAILBLAZER MKULTRA / MKSEARCH 9-11 Commission Rhodes Scholar Ashton Carter, current Secretary of Defense Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger by Ashton Carter, John Deutch and Phillip Zelikow 1998 (CFR) Civil War Intelligence Revolutionary War Intelligence John Cecil Masterman (MI6 Director during WWII) Norman Holmes Pearson (worked under Masterman on XX Committee, recruited  James Jesus Angleton) BSC British Security Coordination, Rockefeller Center Double-Cross System (XX, Twenty-Committee) X-2  U.S. Counter-Intelligence (American XX/ Double-Cross Chapter of British Intelligence under the Special Relationship) Agent Tricycle and the “Questionnaire” Project MINARET The BORG (Star Trek metaphor) Tax Free Foundations Norman Dodd (whistleblower) Cecil John Rhodes Last Will and Testament of Cecil John Rhodes Internationalism “The Pan-Angles: A Consideration of the Federation of the Seven English-Speaking Nations” by Sinclair Kennedy (1916) Pilgrims Society (Anglo-American Alliance, 1902 upon death of Cecil Rhodes) Fabian Socialism Five-Eyes Supra-National Intelligence Community Royal Institute of International Affairs Council on Foreign Relations Rhodes Round Table Group The Battle of New Orleans War of 1812 Conspicuous Consumption Trilateral Commission David Rockefeller & Zbigniew Brzezinski co-Founders Bilderberg Group C.D. Jackson co-Founder of Bilderberg Mark Klein (whistleblower) James Bamford “The Shadow Factory” by James Bamford Technocracy Cybernetics Trans-Atlantic Cable Porter Goss John Negroponte William “Bucky” Bush STELLAR WIND (surveillance program) War Games on 9-11 Operation APHRODITE Joseph Kennedy Jr. October 24, 2000, a mass casualty (MASCAL) emergency drill was conducted to test the Pentagon's response to an airliner crashing into its headquarters Pentagon NRO Air Piracy Drill and Jamie Gorelick testimony Operation NORTHWOODS PNAC “Rebuilding America's Defenses” Saudi Arabian American Oil Company / Saudi ARAMCO “The Third British Empire” by Alfred Zimmern, Rhodes Round Table Group (1926 lectures at Columbia University) Alfred Zimmern, Rhodes Round Table Group Rhodes Round Table Group Source for Carroll Quigley “Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time” by Carroll Quigley “The Anglo-American Establishment” by Carroll Quigley “The Inquiry” à CFR & RIIA St. John Philby (MI6 agent who handled Saudi Empire, created Arab Nazis, sold them to Allen Dulles) Standard Oil / Saudi Arabia BBC Hijackers still alive U.K. Guardian: 9-11 Hijackers still alive Stewart Air Force Base 1993 WTC Bombing Emad Salem “The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI's Manufactured War on Terror” by Trevor Aaronson MI6 / British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) Allen Dulles Ian Fleming OSS (Office of Strategic Services) predecessor to CIA OSS, CIA, and Ian Fleming: For Special Services Burden of Proof June 30, 2001 Aircraft Piracy / Cheney Rumsfeld FOOTNOTE 103, 9-11 Commission Report “103. FAA regulations, Special Military Operations, Requests for Service, Order 7610.4J, paras. 7-1-1, 7-1-2 (2001); DOD memo, CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," June 1, 2001.” LIHOP MIHOP Skull and Bones & the Rhodes Scholarships David Boren and George Tenant Breakfast Mohammad Atta and Drug Connection to Wally Hilliard and Jeb Bush  “Free Trade” as defined by British Empire British East India Company CIA and Opium Smuggling Skull and Bones and Opium Smuggling 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Afghan Wars (Great Britain) Poppy as Veterans Day logo (Great Britain) Mena Arkansas / CIA Drug Trafficking Iran Contra / Drugs for Arms Air America / CIA Opium Smuggling “Bitter Lake” documentary by Adam Curtis Western expansion in Afghanistan post WWII increase in Poppy/Opium Yield (@20m) Afghanistan Poppy / Opium crops Running the Gauntlet Origins of the Security and Exchange Commission Origins of the FBI Terra-Forming Lord Percy Hotel Majestic Conference 1919 Parallel Construction (Snowden Disclosures) Operation MIDNIGHT CLIMAX (MKULTRA) Total Information Awareness (DARPA) Admiral John Poindexter (Iran Contra /DARPA) Mass Surveillance Tsarnaev Uncle Ruslan / CIA Sibel Edmonds / GLADIO B (Video) History… Cecil Rhodes & the Anglo American Establishment w/ Brett Veinotte and Kevin Cole School Sucks Project #236 (Live): Historical Research Methods, Historiography, and Historicity with Brett Veinotte and Kevin Cole The Round Table Group / Cecil Rhodes Investigation into Tax Exempt Foundations Norman Dodd Reece Committee Social Engineering Enkyklios Paideia (Learning within prescribed circle of reference) Imperial Federation Matthew Arnold & Prussian Education in England Great Books of the Western World  (Organic Unity Project) (Video) History… Connected: The Trivium Method vs. the Classical (Medieval) Trivium, a briefing by Kevin Cole Isocrates  “The Life and Times of Stein” by J.R. Seeley German Nationalism Johann Pestalozzi (crossroads of school system, Prussian education, and Bavarian Illuminati) Bavarian Illuminati Aeropagites Trivium (Classical/Medieval) Studium Generale / Medieval University system) Neologisms (new words) International Relations Holistic Ecology Jan Smuts & Holistic Ecology Artificial Scarcity Automatons Organic Unity Samuel Coleridge The Rime of the Ancient Mariner Dorothy Sayers Great Chain of Being The Lost Tools of Learning by Dorothy Sayers Scott Buchanan (Rhodes Scholar) The Moot (1938-1947) / Rhodes Round Table Sub-Group Alfred Zimmern The World Council of Churches Lionel Curtis (Rhodes Round Table Group) King George III of Great Britain Saxe-Coburg Gotha Family Empire of Germany Queen Victoria Kaiser Wilhelm Czar Nicholas II of Russia Peace Revolution episode 083: America and the Great Game: A Strategy of Tension Bertrand Russell “The Principles of Social Reconstruction” by Bertrand Russell (1916) “The Impact of Science on Society”  by Bertrand Russell (1952) Admiral John M. Poindexter General Michael Hayden George H.W. Bush (aka Poppy Bush) Double-Tap (tactic of random slaughter) James Clapper testimony (March 12, 2013) JTRIG (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group) Confessions of a Congressman (Vox) The Ultimate History Lesson with John Taylor Gatto Fabius Maximus War of Atrition Fabian Socialism Internationalism Intra-Specific Kleptoparasitism Electoral College The Auctors The Mythology of Democracy by Carroll Quigley Marshall McLuhan Peace Revolution episode 084: Builders of Empire I.A. Richards (Trivium to create general education without historical meaning) Stringfellow Barr (Rhodes Scholar) Scott Buchanan (Rhodes Scholar) New Criticism (Separation of History and Literature) John Crowe Ransom (Rhodes Scholar) Pythagorean Mystery School Heinz von Foerster (Cyberneticist) Squaring the Circle Karl Rove quote on Empire / "Faith, Certainty, and the Presidency of George W. Bush" New York Times Oct 17, 2004 by Ron Suskind / "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality- judiciously, as you will - we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors... and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do." - Karl Rove TV = Digital Enkyklios Paideia Weisbecker article on John O'Neill Jerome Hauer Bernard Kerik Rudyard Kipling “The White Man's Burden” (poem) by Rudyard Kipling Kipling and Cecil Rhodes Kipling and Freemasonry Kipling and re-integrating America into British Empire Rights of Man by Thomas Paine Common Sense by Thomas Paine Peace Revolution 086: Common Sense for the 21st Century   Would You Like to Know More? See also: Peace Revolution episode 027: DIAMONDS / The Jewel of Denial / Outgrowing Stockholm Syndrome Peace Revolution episode 023: How to Free Your Mind / The Occulted (Hidden) Keys of Wisdom Peace Revolution episode 046: Liberty is Life / Practical Applications of Rationality Peace Revolution episode 047: Slavery is Death / Practical Applications of Irrationality Peace Revolution episode 048: The Philosophy of Life / This is John Galt Speaking

Peace Revolution episode 087: Privacy & Surveillance / The Future of Freedom vs. The Architecture of Oppression  To Purchase the HISTORY BLUEPRINT (Richard's Brain Model Organizing History): https://www.tragedyandhope.com/the-brain/  To Donate or Subscribe to the Tragedy and Hope online learning community: https://www.tragedyandhope.com/subscribe/  To Subscribe to Peace Revolution on iTunes:                        https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/the-peace-revolution-podcast/id659865433  The Peace Revolution Page (all feeds, formats, and episodes): https://www.tragedyandhope.com/peace-revolution/  The Tragedy and Hope Official Youtube Page: https://www.YouTube.com/TragedyandHopeMag Follow Richard on Twitter (@TragedyandHope) Reference Map to Episode 087 (0m-1h23m) Richard's Introductory Montage: Sample: Privacy's Dead. What Happens Next? By Tom Scott Sample 1 from the Munk Debate on State Surveillance: Greenwald/Ohanian vs Hayden/Dershowitz Brzezinski's thoughts on Mass surveillance by Patrick Wood Sample 2 from the Munk Debate / Glenn Greenwald Bitter Lake by Adam Curtis / FDR Saudi relationship / oil for Wahabis Sample 3 from the  Munk Debate / Gen. Michael Hayden MI6 agent St. John Philby handling Arab Nazis Mujahedeen, Philby's son sells terrorist network to Allen Dulles & CIA / John Loftus w. Dave Emory CIA Torture Memo 2015 Dan Carlin / WWI British Tapped American Messages on the Atlantic Cable / Hardcore History 54- Blueprint for Armageddon V School Sucks Podcast #337 /  discussion on Saudis, Afghanistan, and Adam Curtis' films including “Bitter Lake” Bitter Lake / Opium Production Optimized by Dams, U.S. and U.K. prosper Obama with British Prime Minister David Cameron on the “Special Relationship”, cyber-security, and the War on Terror (ISIS) A Yank at Eton / Mickey Rooney Sample 2 Obama Prime Min Chomsky on Surveillance state Chomsky on Civil Liberties Zbig Brzezinski / Al Qaeda Doesn't Exist (Documentary by James Corbett) Hayden “Whodunnit?”… let's look at the first 2 reels… Sample 2 School Sucks Podcast #337 Brzezinski's thoughts on Mass surveillance by Patrick Wood Zbigniew Brzezinski quote Hillary Clinton / The U.S. and British Governments created Al Qaeda (lies and says it was Soviet Invasion as the “Why” we did it) Corbett / Al Qaeda doesn't exist Sample 4 from the Munk Debate / Greenwald BBC: Al Qaeda doesn't Exist – The Power of Nightmares by Adam Curtis Sample 5 from the Munk Debate / Alexis Ohanian (1h23m-1h50m) Richard's Introductory Monologue(1h50m-9h30m) Bill Binney Interview + Round Table Commentary Discussion & Notes(9h30m-11h) Fourth Amendment Debate / Munk Debate on Privacy and Surveillance(11h-12h) Patrick Wood / Technocracy and the Trilateral Commission(12h-14h24m) America's Surveillance StateNOTES FOR THE BILL BINNEY INTERVIEW ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION & COMMENTARY: (Video) The Future of Freedom: A Feature Interview with NSA Whistleblower William Binney: PDF of notes and references for episode 087 on Scribd Link for these notes in pdf/embeddable format on Scribd Edward Snowden Disclosures on U.S. and British Intelligence Community spying on citizens without probable cause Project BULL RUN (NSA/ GCHQ decryption program) Positive & Negative Rights Why Google made the NSA by Nafeez Ahmed How the CIA made Google by Nafeez Ahmed Sons of Liberty (History Channel Mini-Series) Between Two Ages: America and the Technetronic Era by Zbigniew Brzezinski Prof. A In his book Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era (New York: Viking Press;1970), Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote: “For impressive evidence of Western participation in the early phase of Soviet economic growth, see Antony C. Sutton's Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1917–1930, which argues that 'Soviet economic development for 1917–1930 was essentially dependent on Western technological aid' (p.283), and that 'at least 95 per cent of the industrial structure received this assistance.' “(p. 348). John Taylor Gatto on Brzezinski: "Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote his famous signature book Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era in 1970, a piece reeking with Fabianisms: dislike of direct popular power, relentless advocacy of the right and duty of evolutionarily advanced nations to administer less-developed parts of the world, revulsion at populist demands for "selfish self-government" (homeschooling would be a prime example), and stress on collectivism. Brzezinski said in the book:14  It will soon be possible to assert almost continuous control over every citizen and to maintain up-to-date files containing even the most personal details about health and personal behavior of every citizen, in addition to the more customary data. These files will be subject to instantaneous retrieval by the authorities. Power will gravitate into the hands of those who control information." Professor Antony C. Sutton Wall Street and Hitler Wall Street and Bolshevik Revolution Wall Street and FDR Project SHAMROCK Paris 1919 Peace Conference Department of Justice and Operations PAPERCLIP, DUSTBIN, ASHCAN (Nazis brought to America by U.S. and British Intelligence, Kissinger) Anglo-American Establishment Operation GLADIO GLADIO B (Operation involving Muslim Extremists) Arab Nazis (CIA Operatives in Operation GLADIO) JR Seeley (Quotation) Mentor / Hero of Cecil Rhodes Original Executor of Rhodes' first Will, but died before Rhodes Stasi, Gestapo, NKVD, KGB, etc. Panopticon 1917 Espionage Act / WWI Col. Edward Mandell House C. D. Jackson (Psychological Warfare WWII / GLADIO / Bilderberg Co-Founder / JFK) Henry Luce Life Magazine Empire Utilitarianism Prussian Education System The Ultimate History Lesson with John Taylor Gatto (2011 Interview) Peace Revolution episodes 041-045 The Ultimate History Lesson w/ Commentary GCHQ Dirty Tricks, Honeypots GCHQ (Government Communications HeadQuarters, U.K.) Special Relationship between America and Great Britain 5-EYES Joint Surveillance Programs in English Speaking Nations Church Committee Project THINTHREAD (Surveillance Program) General Michael Hayden, ex-Director of NSA, CIA, and DNI Project TRAILBLAZER MKULTRA / MKSEARCH 9-11 Commission Rhodes Scholar Ashton Carter, current Secretary of Defense Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger by Ashton Carter, John Deutch and Phillip Zelikow 1998 (CFR) Civil War Intelligence Revolutionary War Intelligence John Cecil Masterman (MI6 Director during WWII) Norman Holmes Pearson (worked under Masterman on XX Committee, recruited  James Jesus Angleton) BSC British Security Coordination, Rockefeller Center Double-Cross System (XX, Twenty-Committee) X-2  U.S. Counter-Intelligence (American XX/ Double-Cross Chapter of British Intelligence under the Special Relationship) Agent Tricycle and the “Questionnaire” Project MINARET The BORG (Star Trek metaphor) Tax Free Foundations Norman Dodd (whistleblower) Cecil John Rhodes Last Will and Testament of Cecil John Rhodes Internationalism “The Pan-Angles: A Consideration of the Federation of the Seven English-Speaking Nations” by Sinclair Kennedy (1916) Pilgrims Society (Anglo-American Alliance, 1902 upon death of Cecil Rhodes) Fabian Socialism Five-Eyes Supra-National Intelligence Community Royal Institute of International Affairs Council on Foreign Relations Rhodes Round Table Group The Battle of New Orleans War of 1812 Conspicuous Consumption Trilateral Commission David Rockefeller & Zbigniew Brzezinski co-Founders Bilderberg Group C.D. Jackson co-Founder of Bilderberg Mark Klein (whistleblower) James Bamford “The Shadow Factory” by James Bamford Technocracy Cybernetics Trans-Atlantic Cable Porter Goss John Negroponte William “Bucky” Bush STELLAR WIND (surveillance program) War Games on 9-11 Operation APHRODITE Joseph Kennedy Jr. October 24, 2000, a mass casualty (MASCAL) emergency drill was conducted to test the Pentagon's response to an airliner crashing into its headquarters Pentagon NRO Air Piracy Drill and Jamie Gorelick testimony Operation NORTHWOODS PNAC “Rebuilding America's Defenses” Saudi Arabian American Oil Company / Saudi ARAMCO “The Third British Empire” by Alfred Zimmern, Rhodes Round Table Group (1926 lectures at Columbia University) Alfred Zimmern, Rhodes Round Table Group Rhodes Round Table Group Source for Carroll Quigley “Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time” by Carroll Quigley “The Anglo-American Establishment” by Carroll Quigley “The Inquiry” à CFR & RIIA St. John Philby (MI6 agent who handled Saudi Empire, created Arab Nazis, sold them to Allen Dulles) Standard Oil / Saudi Arabia BBC Hijackers still alive U.K. Guardian: 9-11 Hijackers still alive Stewart Air Force Base 1993 WTC Bombing Emad Salem “The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI's Manufactured War on Terror” by Trevor Aaronson MI6 / British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) Allen Dulles Ian Fleming OSS (Office of Strategic Services) predecessor to CIA OSS, CIA, and Ian Fleming: For Special Services Burden of Proof June 30, 2001 Aircraft Piracy / Cheney Rumsfeld FOOTNOTE 103, 9-11 Commission Report “103. FAA regulations, Special Military Operations, Requests for Service, Order 7610.4J, paras. 7-1-1, 7-1-2 (2001); DOD memo, CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," June 1, 2001.” LIHOP MIHOP Skull and Bones & the Rhodes Scholarships David Boren and George Tenant Breakfast Mohammad Atta and Drug Connection to Wally Hilliard and Jeb Bush  “Free Trade” as defined by British Empire British East India Company CIA and Opium Smuggling Skull and Bones and Opium Smuggling 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Afghan Wars (Great Britain) Poppy as Veterans Day logo (Great Britain) Mena Arkansas / CIA Drug Trafficking Iran Contra / Drugs for Arms Air America / CIA Opium Smuggling “Bitter Lake” documentary by Adam Curtis Western expansion in Afghanistan post WWII increase in Poppy/Opium Yield (@20m) Afghanistan Poppy / Opium crops Running the Gauntlet Origins of the Security and Exchange Commission Origins of the FBI Terra-Forming Lord Percy Hotel Majestic Conference 1919 Parallel Construction (Snowden Disclosures) Operation MIDNIGHT CLIMAX (MKULTRA) Total Information Awareness (DARPA) Admiral John Poindexter (Iran Contra /DARPA) Mass Surveillance Tsarnaev Uncle Ruslan / CIA Sibel Edmonds / GLADIO B (Video) History… Cecil Rhodes & the Anglo American Establishment w/ Brett Veinotte and Kevin Cole School Sucks Project #236 (Live): Historical Research Methods, Historiography, and Historicity with Brett Veinotte and Kevin Cole The Round Table Group / Cecil Rhodes Investigation into Tax Exempt Foundations Norman Dodd Reece Committee Social Engineering Enkyklios Paideia (Learning within prescribed circle of reference) Imperial Federation Matthew Arnold & Prussian Education in England Great Books of the Western World  (Organic Unity Project) (Video) History… Connected: The Trivium Method vs. the Classical (Medieval) Trivium, a briefing by Kevin Cole Isocrates  “The Life and Times of Stein” by J.R. Seeley German Nationalism Johann Pestalozzi (crossroads of school system, Prussian education, and Bavarian Illuminati) Bavarian Illuminati Aeropagites Trivium (Classical/Medieval) Studium Generale / Medieval University system) Neologisms (new words) International Relations Holistic Ecology Jan Smuts & Holistic Ecology Artificial Scarcity Automatons Organic Unity Samuel Coleridge The Rime of the Ancient Mariner Dorothy Sayers Great Chain of Being The Lost Tools of Learning by Dorothy Sayers Scott Buchanan (Rhodes Scholar) The Moot (1938-1947) / Rhodes Round Table Sub-Group Alfred Zimmern The World Council of Churches Lionel Curtis (Rhodes Round Table Group) King George III of Great Britain Saxe-Coburg Gotha Family Empire of Germany Queen Victoria Kaiser Wilhelm Czar Nicholas II of Russia Peace Revolution episode 083: America and the Great Game: A Strategy of Tension Bertrand Russell “The Principles of Social Reconstruction” by Bertrand Russell (1916) “The Impact of Science on Society”  by Bertrand Russell (1952) Admiral John M. Poindexter General Michael Hayden George H.W. Bush (aka Poppy Bush) Double-Tap (tactic of random slaughter) James Clapper testimony (March 12, 2013) JTRIG (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group) Confessions of a Congressman (Vox) The Ultimate History Lesson with John Taylor Gatto Fabius Maximus War of Atrition Fabian Socialism Internationalism Intra-Specific Kleptoparasitism Electoral College The Auctors The Mythology of Democracy by Carroll Quigley Marshall McLuhan Peace Revolution episode 084: Builders of Empire I.A. Richards (Trivium to create general education without historical meaning) Stringfellow Barr (Rhodes Scholar) Scott Buchanan (Rhodes Scholar) New Criticism (Separation of History and Literature) John Crowe Ransom (Rhodes Scholar) Pythagorean Mystery School Heinz von Foerster (Cyberneticist) Squaring the Circle Karl Rove quote on Empire / "Faith, Certainty, and the Presidency of George W. Bush" New York Times Oct 17, 2004 by Ron Suskind / "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality- judiciously, as you will - we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors... and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do." - Karl Rove TV = Digital Enkyklios Paideia Weisbecker article on John O'Neill Jerome Hauer Bernard Kerik Rudyard Kipling “The White Man's Burden” (poem) by Rudyard Kipling Kipling and Cecil Rhodes Kipling and Freemasonry Kipling and re-integrating America into British Empire Rights of Man by Thomas Paine Common Sense by Thomas Paine Peace Revolution 086: Common Sense for the 21st Century  Would You Like to Know More?See also:Peace Revolution episode 027: DIAMONDS / The Jewel of Denial / Outgrowing Stockholm SyndromePeace Revolution episode 023: How to Free Your Mind / The Occulted (Hidden) Keys of WisdomPeace Revolution episode 046: Liberty is Life / Practical Applications of RationalityPeace Revolution episode 047: Slavery is Death / Practical Applications of IrrationalityPeace Revolution episode 048: The Philosophy of Life / This is John Galt Speaking