Podcasts about Balikpapan

Last time we spoke about the end of the Bougainville campaign. In June 1945, the Australia and Allied forces intensified their campaign in the Pacific, spearheaded by General Hammer, as they battled entrenched Japanese troops on Bougainville. Following the capture of the Soraken Peninsula, the Australians aimed to control the strategic Hongorai River but faced fierce resistance. Meanwhile, General Kanda adjusted his strategies, pulling back Japanese forces to a defensive perimeter around Buin, allowing his troops to regroup. Australian battalions, notably the 24th and 57th/60th, pressed forward, making significant gains despite encountering numerous obstacles, including concealed mines and relentless counterattacks. The turning point came when they crossed the Hongorai River, marking a vital milestone in their advance. Ultimately, the combination of perseverance and tactical maneuvers set the stage for future successes within the broader context of the Pacific Theater. This episode is the Fall of Wewak Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In the last episode we finished off the Bougainville campaign. Now its been 4 long ass grueling years for the boys fighting in New Guinea. Today we are finally going to finish that story.  As we last saw, by early April 1945, General George Stevens and his 6th Australian Division were making significant strides in their Wewak offensive. The campaign, aimed at capturing the strategically important town of Wewak, was crucial for disrupting Japanese forces in New Guinea and aiding in their eventual defeat. Brigadier King's 16th Brigade had effectively secured the But and Dagua areas, notable locations that played vital roles in the region's agricultural landscape and supply lines. Simultaneously, Brigadier Moten's 17th Brigade was concentrating its efforts along the Ninab River, a key waterway that would facilitate the final drive toward Maprik, a town essential for both its infrastructure and resources. Facing intense Australian pressure, the remnants of General Mano's 41st Division were forced to retreat northwestward to Wora, a strategic village located near the coast, while the Miyake Force reorganized itself along the defensive line formed by the Imbia, Neligum, Kumbungua, and Bainy rivers. This area is characterized by its rugged terrain, dense jungles, and numerous waterways, making it a challenging environment for military operations. On April 3, General Moten ordered the 2/7th Battalion to advance toward Maprik and the Agricultural Station, aiming to seize this vital supply center. At the same time, the 2/6th Battalion was tasked with moving towards the Screw River to block any potential enemy retreats to the north. Hayforce, a composite group of Australian troops, was directed to push forward to the Maprik-Marui road. This mission was critical as it aimed to establish a new airfield, designated as Hayfield, to alleviate the pressing supply issues faced by Australian forces. The Australians began their assault towards Maprik, yet they quickly discovered that the enemy was well-prepared to defend this food-producing region. Throughout the week, they were largely limited to patrol actions as they engaged with scattered enemy forces. Concurrently, Hayforce advanced eastward, encountering strong resistance at Wora on April 10. This strategic location, once teeming with activity, had become a focal point for Japanese defense. On April 12, feeling increasingly under pressure, General Mano opted to abandon Wora, allowing him to concentrate his forces more effectively at Bainyik. This decision was pivotal, as it permitted Australian forces to secure the site of the proposed airstrip, enhancing their logistical capabilities.  Meanwhile patrols had been pressing on from village to village. On 28th March, for example, Sergeant J. W. Hedderman, of the 2/6th, a notable leader in these as in earlier operations, had led a reconnaissance to Kulkuil and Gwanginan. Next day he led a fighting patrol which took Kulkuil with a carefully-planned surprise attack. On the 30th Lieutenant Errey's platoon (16), with Hedderman as platoon sergeant, attacked Gwanginan. Hedderman confused the enemy by shouting to imaginary platoons to right and left (thus incidentally drawing fire on himself); and when the leading section was halted he brought down supporting fire and enabled it to move again. A man was wounded within 10 yards of the enemy's pits; Hedderman went forward, killed two Japanese with grenades, and dragged his comrade to safety. The enemy were 25 to 30 strong and the attack failed despite these gallant efforts. Hedderman covered the withdrawal, firing until all others had gone. On 30th March a patrol found Mairoka clear of the enemy and on 4th April Lieutenant Gordon's platoon established a patrol base there. On the 7th Errey's platoon attacked a village to the east of the Milak villages but without success, Lieutenant Errey being killed, and Sergeant Layfield wounded. Chicanambu was occupied on the 9th. On April 15, two companies from the 2/6th pushed eastward towards the Screw River. Over the next five days, they faced strong opposition as they engaged in fierce skirmishes and patrol actions to secure critical territories, ultimately capturing Wambak, Kombichagi, and Bungara. Each of these locations represented not only strategic advantages but also a deepening impact on the local population and the broader campaign dynamics. On April 15, 1945, the 2/7th Battalion launched its main assault, with one company advancing towards the line of Nimrod Creek. This location, nestled within the dense jungles of New Guinea, proved to be strategically significant yet perilous. As they approached, Australian troops encountered heavily defended and camouflaged pillboxes, fortifications designed to protect the Japanese troops stationed in the area. Despite the challenges, they managed to secure a long, kunai-covered spur to the northeast of a critical area known as Maprik 2 by the following day. On April 17, another company from the 2/7th continued the offensive, advancing toward a target referred to as Maprik 1. They reached a point approximately 400 yards northwest of the objective but soon found themselves in a precarious situation as they became surrounded on both flanks the next day. It was not until April 19 that they successfully broke through to the southwest, escaping their encirclement.   The House Tamboran feature, a prominent ridge north of Maprik 1, was finally secured on April 20. This strategic high ground was essential for controlling the surrounding terrain and allowing further advances in the area. The following day, the 2/7th began probing towards the Maprik airstrip and Bainyik. Their efforts to secure the airstrip were fruitful within the next few days; however, they faced staunch resistance at both Maprik 2 and Bainyik, where Japanese forces continued to mount a determined defense. On April 25, the Australians crossed the Screw River, a vital waterway that flows through this region, on their way toward Midpum Creek, which they reached the following day. This movement was crucial for maintaining momentum in the campaign. While the 2/7th Battalion was engaged in heavy fighting, patrols from the 2/6th Battalion successfully secured the Neligum villages, although they encountered strong Japanese resistance at Mangumbu. This locality, bordered by lush vegetation and steep hills, served as a vital defensive position for Japanese forces. Simultaneously, intelligence reports about a small enemy contingent under Lieutenant-Colonel Takenaga Masaharu positioned at Tau prompted a swift response. On April 16, a platoon from the 2/5th Battalion departed from Aitape, a coastal town known for its strategic significance during the campaign. They tracked down the Japanese troops and engaged them at Kubriwat on April 24. After the Kubriwat engagement, Colonel Takenaga's troops managed to shake off pursuit by the Australians; yet as the Australians continued to harass them, Takenaga ultimately decided that they would surrender. They took a leaflet containing a notice of surrender that one of the soldiers had been carrying, added some conditions underneath in English, tied it to a pole for the Australians to find, and left the area. Scouts from Miles' platoon then found the leaflet and brought it back with them. On May 2, the Australian platoon spotted Takenaga's unit near Womgrer village, and asked a native to help them make contact. Two truce bearers from the Japanese side came to the Australians to negotiate, and on the following day Takenaga's unit surrendered at Womgrer and were disarmed. At the time of surrender, Takenaga's unit consisted of 42 men: five officers (including Takenaga), four warrant officers, and 33 non-commissioned officers and soldiers. They were equipped with five light machine guns, 17 rifles, five pistols, and 750 rounds of ammunition. The prisoners, escorted by Miles' platoon, marched for three days in an orderly fashion to Maprik Airport, and were then transported to Aitape. Takenaga's unit were held in Aitape for around one month, before being broken up and sent to prison camps in Lae and in Australia, where they received good treatment. They were all interrogated, and in particular, Takenaga was transported to Manila for a detailed interrogation. As well as giving character information about the commanders of the 18th Army, Takenaga gave his opinion of how the Allies should deal with Emperor Hirohito: "If the Emperor is killed then the Japanese people will resist until the bitter end, but if there is an order from the Emperor then they will probably surrender peacefully." Back in the Maprik sector, while Hayforce conducted probing operations and successfully captured Yentagim in early May, the Miyake Force began a withdrawal toward the Loanim-Yamil-Kumbungua line. This defensive line was a series of natural features and fortified positions designed to obstruct the advancing Australian troops. On the northern flank, the 2/6th Battalion also continued to patrol eastward, successfully securing the strategically important Mangumbu on May 2. This advancement not only disrupted enemy operations but also paved the way for further Australian advances in the region. On May 8, 1945, the 2/7th Battalion launched a decisive attack, successfully capturing part of the Kumbungua Ridge, a strategically significant high ground dominating the surrounding terrain. Two flame-throwers had now been received by the 2/7th and on 8th May these were used to drive the enemy from part of the narrow steep-sided Kumbungua ridge. The Japanese made off, abandoning 30 weapon-pits, but engaged the Australians from a knoll farther up the ridge. Just three days later, they captured the southern end of the ridge while another company moved to occupy Waigakum 1, a forward position that offered a crucial vantage point over the area. Flame-throwers were proving very effective. On 10th May the 2/7th occupied Waigakum 1, and on the 11th a platoon with flame-throwers attacked and took a position where the defenders abandoned 50 packs. Another platoon approached the knoll at the south end of the Kumbungua ridge from the south, attacked up a steep slope and put to flight the defenders who abandoned 25 packs and 100 sticks of gelignite. The Japanese opened fire, however, from higher up and, the ground being unsuitable for defence, the platoon withdrew. By May 13, following effective air support that softened enemy defenses, central Kumbungua was found abandoned by Japanese forces, a testament to the pressure the Australians had applied. The following day, after another heavy bombardment from both aircraft and artillery, the entire ridge was finally secured, marking a significant accomplishment in the campaign. Pressing on, the Australians cleared the area northeast of Kalabu by May 26. However, they faced stiff resistance and found it challenging to make further advances. As a result, the 2/7th Battalion reorganized to defend the captured positions, consolidating their gains to ensure they could withstand potential counterattacks from the tenacious enemy. In the meantime, on May 17, Waigakum 2 fell to Australian troops. This success forced the cutoff remnants of General Mano's 41st Division to begin their retreat to the east, as the Australians patrolled further towards Malba, another critical location along their advance. The loss of Waigakum to the 2/7th Battalion in mid-May had a very upsetting effect on the Japanese. It was the point of junction between Miyake Force, now 800 strong, and the 41st Division and, according to General Yoshiwara, this loss led directly to the withdrawal from Kalabu and Loanim. On the 19th a platoon, guided by natives, surprised six Japanese in a garden south-east of Kalabu. Here Private Jenkins" came upon one Japanese asleep outside a weapon-pit. As he was within feet of me (wrote Jenkins later) I thought it was an excellent opportunity to take a prisoner so I woke him with a light kick and pulled him to his feet with my left hand, keeping my Owen gun in my right. I had managed to get my prisoner some paces from his position when a slight noise alerted his mates and they opened fire on the patrol. With this the Jap broke from my grasp and I was forced to shoot him. One other Japanese was killed and the others made off.Turning their attention northward, the 2/6th Battalion attempted to attack the village of Jamei on May 20. However, they were met with fierce resistance from Japanese defenders, which compelled the Australians to bombard the area intensively with artillery and air strikes until the enemy was finally forced to retreat on May 25. While the Australians were continuing to probe towards Yamil, elements of the 2/7th Battalion executed successful attacks in the Malba area, which was ultimately secured by the end of the month. This marked a crucial step in their advance as they pushed deeper into enemy territory. Meanwhile, in the coastal sector, Brigadier King's 16th Brigade concentrated its efforts east of the But River, extending up to the Kofi area. At the same time, Brigadier Martin's 29th Brigade assembled at But, preparing for the final drive toward Wewak, a town that had become a strategic target for Allied forces in their campaign to eradicate Japanese presence in New Guinea. On April 14, the 2/1st Battalion passed through the lines of the 2/2nd Battalion, launching an attack toward the Karawop-Wisling area. This sector, known for its rugged topography and dense underbrush, finally fell to the relentless Australian assaults two days later after a series of intense company-level attacks. On April 25, the 2/1st Battalion occupied the crucial 1800 Feature without facing any opposition. This high ground provided them with significant tactical advantages in the ongoing conflict. Meanwhile, the 2/3rd Battalion, positioned to the north, successfully launched an attack on Boiken Plantation. Their efforts were rewarded as they advanced to Kalimboa the following day, further consolidating Australian positions in the region. On April 27, 1945, the 2/2nd Battalion moved swiftly through the advancing lines, pushing forward to Hawain and crossing the river in their quest to engage Japanese forces. Concurrently, the 2/3rd Battalion patrolled south along Boiken Creek, where they encountered significant enemy resistance in the Koanumbo area. After a series of determined assaults, this area was ultimately secured by May 2, allowing the Australians to fortify their positions. At this point in the campaign, Brigadier Martin's 19th Brigade took over the advance towards Cape Wom, and subsequently, the strategic objective of Wewak. This movement coincided with preparations by Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Hennessy's 2/6th Commando Regiment, which was organizing for a surprise landing east of Cape Moem, a critical maneuver aimed at outflanking Japanese defenses. On May 3, the 2/4th Battalion advanced from Hawain, managing to cover six miles without facing any opposition. By the next day, they reached Wom without incident. As night fell, Australian patrols had already established a presence along the Waringe River, preparing for further actions. During this time, patrols targeted Japanese stragglers in the vicinity, eliminating several and gathering intelligence. Reconnaissance units were then sent forward to Minga Creek to assess enemy positions while the 2/4th secured Yarabos on May 7, progressively tightening the noose around Japanese defenses. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Battalion, positioned on the right flank, engaged in a series of minor clashes, successfully capturing Ranimboa on May 4, followed by Numikim just days later. These advances were crucial in pressuring the remaining Japanese forces, which, under Generals Adachi and Nakano, were increasingly evident in their abandonment of the substantial base at Wewak. Their main forces began to withdraw over the rugged terrain of the Prince Alexander Mountains, leaving behind strong rearguards tasked with covering their exit routes from Wewak. To counter this withdrawal, the 2/11th Battalion and the 2/7th Commando Squadron were dispatched on a wide encircling movement towards the Sauri villages and Wirui Mission, aiming to cut off the retreating Japanese forces. Meanwhile, the 2/4th Battalion crossed Minga Creek and launched an attack towards Wewak on May 8, seeking to claim the final strategic stronghold. Two days later, bolstered by supporting tanks and artillery, the 2/4th Battalion initiated a vigorous assault on Wewak Point. This area, positioned at the very tip of the peninsula, was essential for controlling the coastal approaches to Wewak. After a hard-fought engagement, the Australians successfully seized the entirety of Wewak Point, subsequently mopping up the remaining Japanese soldiers who had entrenched themselves in the caves along the cliffs, effectively concluding the intense fighting in this region. At 12.15 two companies were ordered to mop up.cThat afternoon a flame-thrower fired into a bunker apparently lit a dump of bombs which blew up. Smith's company found several occupied caves and, since the Japanese would not surrender, merely picqueted them until engineers arrived and blew up the entrances, sealing the Japanese in. It was estimated that about 50 perished in the caves; by midnight 65 other dead had been counted and three 75-mm guns and two 20-mm had been captured. In a brilliant action the Australians, supported by tanks and more than 40 field guns, had lost only 2 killed and 17 wounded. Mopping up was continued next day, and no live Japanese remained on the point by midday. Finally it was estimated that from 180 to 200 Japanese had been killed. On May 11, 1945, following their progress along the Big Road, the 2/11th Battalion set out to occupy the strategic 620, 710, and 770 Features. However, they soon encountered unexpected resistance over the following days. This was not merely an isolated skirmish; it was part of a broader engagement as they pressed their advance against the entrenched Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, an important operation was unfolding to the west. The 2/9th and 2/10th Commando Squadrons, supported by a small flotilla formed around the sloop Swan, successfully landed on Dove Bay's Red Beach, located just to the west of Forok Point. This maneuver was critical, as it disrupted Japanese supply lines and provided the Australians with a foothold to cut off the Wewak Road. Following their landing, the squadrons dispatched patrols eastward, further isolating Japanese forces. The next day, the 2/3rd Machine-Gun Battalion secured the junction of the Wewak Road and Forok Creek, a key point for controlling the surrounding areas, while the 2/9th Commando Squadron patrolled past Mandi, gaining valuable intelligence. The 2/4th Battalion, capitalizing on this chaos, pressed forward to secure the Wewak airfield and the Wirui Mission, both of which were vital for maintaining air support and supply routes in the theater of operations. On May 13, the 2/11th Battalion successfully captured the 620 Feature, a crucial hill that provided vantage points over the battlefield. However, they struggled to take the 710 Feature the next day, as Japanese resistance intensified in the rugged foothills south of the Big Road.  On 14th May, the 2/11th being heavily engaged in the foothills south of the Big Road, Lt Martin had ordered the 2/4th to attack Wirui Mission, which was on a steep kunai-covered hill about 300 feet high dominating the airfield. Approaching from the east through tall kunai the leading com-pany with a troop of tanks soon took the first objective-dominating ground about half way up the hill. Captain Smith's company passed through and, with the tanks, whose crews estimated that they killed about 30 Japanese, reached the top. By nightfall the top and the eastern slopes were held but the Japanese were fighting back from bunkers on the north-west slopes. Next day Smith's company attacked these remaining bunkers. The lead-ing section was halted by intense fire after several men had been hit. Private Kenna, in the supporting section, which was firing on the bunkers at a range of only 50 yards, stood up in the kunai grass in full view of the enemy and fired his Bren at one of the Japanese machine-gun posts. The Japanese machine-gunners returned his fire but failed to hit him. Kenna then said to Private Rau who was beside him that the Japanese "had a bead on him" and he asked for Rau's rifle. Still standing, he fired four rifle shots and silenced the enemy post. He then took the Bren again and opened fire on another post about 70 yards away and silenced it too. The remaining post was then knocked out by a tank; soon the 2/4th and 2/11th were in contact. About 40 Japanese were killed and perhaps 20 escaped in the fight for the mission. Large quantities of weapons, vehicles, generators, tele-phones and other equipment were found there. Possession of Wirui Mission gave complete control of the Wewak coastal plain. Captured papers made it possible to make a fairly precise estimate of the forces immediately round Wewak: Kato Force, built round the 25th Airfield Battalion and about 300 strong, was holding from Sauri to Wirui Creek; Jinka Force, about 400 strong, was holding from Wirui Creek to the east, including Boram airfield, and south into the range as far as Passam; to the east was Aoyama Force, of unknown strength; the coastal plain to a depth of about 1,000 yards was not held in strength, and it was thought that there would be little opposition on the coast at least as far as Boram airfield Supported by artillery fire and through persistent efforts, the 2/11th finally took the 710 Feature on May 15, which allowed them to begin patrolling towards the 770 Feature and the nearby Klewalin, two additional strongholds that were key to the entire operation. Simultaneously, since May 11, the 2/7th Commando Squadron had been engaged in fierce fighting. They maneuvered through a series of knolls in the Sauri villages area, which they ultimately cleared by May 16, further tightening the noose around Japanese defenses. On that same day, after intense air and naval bombardments prepared the way, the 2/8th Battalion began their advance toward Boram. This crucial location fell into their hands unopposed by nightfall, allowing significant advances in the Australian front line. However, on May 17, as the 2/8th Battalion continued its push to the mouth of Boram Creek, they encountered a strongly-held Japanese position. This area, characterized by intricate terrain and dense jungle cover, presented formidable challenges as they sought to advance further into Japanese-occupied territory. The enemy bunkers would remain a formidable obstacle until May 20, when a heavy bombardment finally rendered them inoperative. Following this, the Australians seized the opportunity to exploit their gains and advanced further east to occupy Cape Moem. This maneuver allowed them to establish contact with the commando force at Brandi Plantation just two days later, strengthening their foothold along the coast. On May 24, the 2/11th Battalion occupied the strategic 770 feature after enduring its own heavy bombardment. Three days later, they managed to destroy the last remnants of enemy forces south of the 710 feature, marking a significant step in the campaign. On May 25, the 2/4th Battalion also launched a patrol into the village of Koigin, taking the location after a sharp and intense fight. However, amidst these operations, Brigadier Martin fell ill with malaria and was temporarily replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel John Bishop, a shift that would guide the troops through the operational challenges ahead. By the end of May, the 6th Division had pushed most remnants of the Japanese 18th Army away from the coast, including their vital base at Wewak. The Japanese forces were now confined within the rugged, mountainous terrain, squeezed between the 17th Brigade, positioned forward of Maprik to the west, and the remainder of the 6th Division to the north. In preparation for the next phase of their campaign, General Moten set out to secure the line from Solongan to Kulauru Mission. The 2/5th Battalion relieved the 2/7th Battalion and moved against Kulauru and Ulupu, while the 2/6th Battalion advanced towards Yamil. The Australians acted swiftly and decisively, rapidly capturing Newton's Knoll and Palketia during the first week of June. On June 10, after extensive air strikes and bombardments weakened enemy defenses, the 2/6th Battalion successfully entered Yamil. Just three days later, on June 13, the 2/5th Battalion continued their momentum by capturing Yamil 3 and Yuman as the beleaguered Miyake Force began its retreat towards Ulupu, indicating the deteriorating situation for Japanese forces in the region. Despite the Australians' relentless advance and the heavy bombardment inflicted upon them, the Japanese remained determined to defend Kunai Spur. Their tenacity meant that the Australians could only secure Yamil 4 on June 24, underscoring the intensity of the fighting in this strategic area. At this critical juncture, the 2nd New Guinea Battalion arrived in the Hayfield area to patrol southwards towards Kwimbu, Mikau, and Kunjinge. These movements further reinforced the Australian positions and set the stage for the continuing efforts to dismantle the last remnants of Japanese resistance in the region. On June 11, 1945, the 2/8th Battalion successfully seized Hill 1 after a concentrated air and artillery bombardment that softened up the enemy defenses. This pivotal victory allowed them to establish a critical foothold in the area, vital for subsequent operations. Just five days later, on June 16, both artillery and aircraft targeted Hill 2 and Shiburangu, two crucial positions that had become points of interest in the ongoing campaign. After numerous attempts and repeated efforts by the infantry, the Australians ultimately captured Hill 2, a strategic vantage point that further pressured Japanese forces in the region.At 8 a.m. on 16th June aircraft struck both Hill 2 and Shiburangu and then the artillery began a program in which 3,000 rounds were fired. One company began to advance on Hill 2 at 9.30. Warrant-Officer Fisk's platoon, which was forward, met heavy fire from snipers on both flanks and machine-gun fire from the hills and lost one man killed and one wounded. It withdrew to the cover of the spur and moved to outflank the enemy on the left. Meanwhile at 9.45 a second company had taken the pocket without opposition. At 10 a.m. the first company was still held. The men rested under the lip of the hill while the artillery again bombarded the enemy's positions and flame-throwers were brought forward. At 1.30 the company surged over the crest of the hill and, after close fighting in which each bunker was grenaded, the surviving Japanese fled leaving 38 visible dead and perhaps another 20 buried by the air and artillery bombardment. The Australians lost 2 killed and 3 wounded. "Aerial bombing coupled with artillery concentration does not deter the enemy from fighting nor unsettle him unduly," wrote the battalion diarist. "Such fanatical resistance in face of such odds makes the capturing of these strong points no light task." Meanwhile, the 2/4th Battalion worked diligently to clear the eastern side of the Koigin-Tazaki track, progressing 600 yards south of Koigin by June 13. This advancement helped secure vital supply routes and reinforced the Australians' operational capabilities. On June 14, the Australians continued their momentum by successfully securing Mount Kawakubo, another significant terrain feature. Five days later, on June 19, the 2/4th and 2/11th Battalions launched a coordinated attack towards Tazaki. Thanks to the overwhelming support of air and artillery bombardments, Tazaki ultimately fell into Australian hands by June 24, marking yet another victory in their relentless push against Japanese defenses. On June 22, the 2/8th captured the last knoll before Shiburangu. Following this success, artillery began to register targets on Shiburangu, setting the stage for a significant assault. By June 27, after a particularly heavy air and artillery bombardment that saturated the area with firepower, the 2/8th Battalion launched a bold attack to seize Shiburangu. Utilizing an outflanking maneuver, they managed to surprise the fierce defenders, overcoming their determined resistance. As the 2/4th Battalion cleared the remaining enemy pockets in the Tazaki area, the 2/8th Battalion pressed their advantage, attacking and securing the area to the west on July 3. The two battalions effectively linked up two days later, solidifying their control over the region and paving the way for further advances in the campaign. Looking back to the southwest, after nearly three weeks of stiff resistance, the Japanese finally abandoned Kunai Spur on July 3, 1945. This withdrawal opened the door for Australian forces, who swiftly occupied Ulupu just two days later. The effort to clear the surrounding area began in earnest, but it wasn't until July 8 that the strongly-held northern knoll was taken after intense fighting. On July 9, through a sustained bombardment, the Japanese were driven out of Ulum, marking a significant breakthrough; their defense system had been shattered. Following this success, patrols from the 2/5th Battalion advanced rapidly, moving forward about 2000 yards with only minor skirmishes. They reached and occupied Kulauru Mission on July 11, reinforcing the Australians' control over the area. Pressing northeast, the remaining Japanese forces in the vicinity were rapidly dispersed, and by July 18, Ilipem fell into Australian hands. During this time, the 2/6th Battalion was busy securing the Ulunkohoitu Ridge, further consolidating the Australians' hold on the region. At the same time, the 2nd New Guinea Battalion had been probing south and east, successfully securing critical locations such as Kongambe, Kwandaning, Naila, and Gisanambu. With the Japanese now regrouping along the Kaboibus-Ahegulim-Gwalip line, General Moten aimed to accelerate the advance, directing both the 2nd New Guinea Battalion and the rested 2/7th Battalion to converge on Gwalip. Meanwhile, the 2/5th and 2/6th Battalions pressed east towards Kaboibus. Despite facing challenges and some failed attacks against Dunbit and Aoniaru, the New Guineans were able to concentrate their forces near Gwalip by July 22, and five days later, Sigora fell to their determined assault. On July 30, they launched an attack and captured Ulama, nearly catching General Mano's headquarters at Winge in the process, which forced the defenders to retreat towards Suaui. As momentum continued to build, the 2/5th Battalion pressed on, supported by heavy air strikes. By August 1, they had successfully taken Gwenik, further disrupting Japanese lines. The following day, as the Australians advanced along the Kaboibus Ridge, they successfully occupied the Kaboibus villages. To their astonishment, they encountered only minor opposition, underscoring the disarray within the Japanese ranks as the Australians continued their relentless push through the region. On August 4, 1945, the 2/5th Battalion successfully seized Ahegulim, a strategic location that added to their momentum. Three days later, they captured Malabeim, completing their objectives in the region. Following this success, the Australians began probing towards Mount Irup, further extending their influence over the landscape. Concurrently, on August 6, the 2/7th Battalion embarked on a wide movement from Sigora aimed at Kiarivu, reaching this target two days later. This advance was part of a broader campaign in which New Guinean troops also secured key areas such as Miyamboara and Mananingi, reflecting the persistent efforts of Moten's 17th Brigade as they conducted their final offensive actions. Turning to the eastern front, the 8th Brigade's 30th and 35th Battalions had relieved the 2/4th and 2/11th Battalions in early July, taking charge of the Wirui Creek-Mandi area. On July 13, Brigadier Martin, who had resumed command of the 19th Brigade, ordered the 2/8th Battalion to capture the critical positions known as The Blot and Hambrauri. Following this directive, the Australians successfully attacked and seized The Blot the very next day. On July 16, Hambrauri 1 fell into Australian hands without opposition, allowing them to begin probing towards another strategically important feature: St. Patrick's. After significant preparations and a heavy bombardment, St. Patrick's was captured on July 21. The following day, the 2/8th Battalion captured Hambrauri 2 with little resistance, showcasing their growing operational effectiveness. During this time, the 2/1st Battalion executed a diversionary thrust along the Sambukaua Track, drawing Japanese attention away from main Australian advances. Simultaneously, the 2/6th Commando Regiment faced daring infiltration attempts to the west in the vicinity of Boiken, further complicating the operational landscape.  On June 24 five Japanese approaching along the beach entered the Angau compound at Wisling, stole 3 Owen guns, a pistol, and 3 Japanese rifles. A patrol followed these marauders, killed 2 and retrieved the weapons. Next day about 10 Japanese ambushed a party of the 2/10th Commando Squadron south of Boiken Plantation and killed Lieutenant Martin and wounded 4 others; and that night about 20 stole into the plantation. On June 28 signs were found that some 35 Japanese had slept the previous night 400 yards from a commando perimeter. On July 23 a commando patrol had a sharp clash with perhaps 40 Japanese in the hills south of Wanpea and more than 15 miles west of Wewak; 8 Japanese were killed as well as 4 Australians. The Japanese were justly proud of the valour and successes of the raiding parties which harassed the Australians between Wewak and Dagua in May, June and July. Several groups were organised and trained for these enterprises, the most celebrated being led by Lieutenant Saito Hachiro of the 78th Regiment who had first earned fame as a patrol leader in the Huon Peninsula fighting. In June his party set off to raid Maprik, but was intercepted, Saito and most of his followers being killed. From June 15 onwards two parties of raiders operated in the Karawop and Boiken areas with the object of diverting their enemy's strength away from the 51st Division farther east. These parties, which claimed to have killed more than 100 Australians (a wild overestimate) were the ones coped with by the 2/6th Commando Regiment. Another series of raids in late July and early August were considered less successful, because of improved Australian security measures. On July 25, Japanese General Adachi issued orders for a "last stand" around the areas of Nyakombi and Sassuia. The main body of the 18th Army was now in an are facing north and west. The 51st Division was on the right opposing the troops advancing from Wewak, the 20th Division in the centre and the 41st on the left. Yoshiwara had now reported that the food resources of the Sepik area were less than had been believed, though there might be more in the hinterland. Already about 2,800 troops were stationed in the Sepik Valley from Marienberg to about Kanganaman and were living off the country. Adachi decided to make a last stand in the area embracing, in the north, Nyakombi and Sassuia. Here they would fight on "as long as ammunition and food are available and at least until the end of September". Liaison was to be maintained with the force in the Sepik area which was to prepare to carry on "ambush warfare" after the main force had been wiped out. This plan had been conveyed to Field Marshal Terauchi, commanding the Southern Army, and he approved it on 8th July. Despite its many setbacks during the campaign, Terauchi sent a citation to the 18th Army. It was the first time that a Japanese army had been so honoured. The citation ran: "To the 18th Army and all attached units: With Lieut-General Hatazo Adachi as your com-mander, you have fought vigorously for three years in north-east New Guinea, where numerous epidemics prevailed and where the terrain was hitherto unknown to any Japanese. When the enemy occupied the west coast in April 1944, to cut off supplies, you learned to live off grass and trees, and by making the best of the situation, you conquered all unfavourable conditions. Officers and soldiers alike displayed the true spirit of the Japanese Army. Wherever you encountered the enemy, you crushed them and inflicted many casualties. You have inspired fear into the hearts of the enemy and diverted their sea and air strength, thereby contributing much to the Southern Army's operations and furthermore, to all the Armies of the Empire. You were able to accomplish this through the excellent leadership, planning, fidelity and character of your Army Commander. By the sense of sincerity, loyalty and moral obligation of all the troops, you have set a model for all men to follow. I hereby present this citation and proclaim this to all the Armies."  Amidst these developments, Major General Stevens was orchestrating a series of troop reliefs along the front lines. King's 16th Brigade was set to replace the 19th Brigade, which in turn would relieve the 17th Brigade to the west, ensuring continuous pressure on Japanese positions while maintaining the momentum of the Australian advance. Consequently, on July 28, 1945, the 2/2nd Battalion relieved the 2/8th in the Hambrauri area, immediately dispatching patrols to probe towards Numoikum. Their operational efforts culminated in the successful seizure of Mount Shoto on August 2. By August 6, with the backing of artillery fire, the Australians had secured Numoikum and Rindogim. However, this marked the last offensive action in the area, as the Australians shifted their focus to patrolling forward in order to consolidate their gains. By the end of the Aitape-Wewak Campaign, the 6th Division had sustained significant casualties, with 442 men killed and 1,141 wounded, while inflicting heavy losses on Japanese forces, estimated at around 9,000 killed and capturing 269 prisoners. With this chapter closed, it was time to shift the scene to Balikpapan, where the conclusion of the Borneo Campaign awaited. As we rejoin the action, by July 9, General Milford's 7th Australian Division had largely secured the Balikpapan area. Brigadier Chilton's 18th Brigade executed a successful landing at Penadjam, Djinabora, and Teloktebang on the western side of the bay. Simultaneously, Brigadier Eather's 25th Brigade advanced towards Batuchampar along Milford Highway, while Brigadier Dougherty's 21st Brigade secured key positions in the Sepinggang and Manggar areas. On July 10, the 2/31st Battalion secured the Cello position and the fallen-timber area directly in front with crucial support from artillery and tanks. In a bold move, one of their companies launched an attack towards the position known as Coke; however, this assault was met with fierce resistance and was ultimately repelled by intense crossfire from well-entrenched defenders. To the left of their advance, the 2/6th Commando Squadron probed toward Sumber Kiri, successfully securing the village and bolstering the Australians' hold in the region. At this moment, the 2/27th Battalion took over the left flank at Manggar, which allowed the exhausted 2/14th Battalion to probe towards Sambodja without risk of being outflanked. The next day, as the 2/27th moved through the 2/14th to occupy Lamaru, the 2/25th Battalion began the process of relieving the weary 2/31st, ensuring that fresh forces could continue the advance. On July 12, the commandos initiated probing operations towards a position known as Charm, successfully occupying both Cloncurry and Abash in the following two days. These captures were significant in securing the area and maintaining the momentum of the Australian advance through Balikpapan. After extensive patrolling on both sides of the highway, the 2/25th Battalion finally dispatched two companies on July 14 to occupy the strategic locations of Cart and Calm. These efforts led to the successful securing of Cocoa, Calm, and Chair, all achieved without resistance. That same day, to the east, patrols discovered Amborawang and the ridges north of Bale unoccupied. Recognizing this opportunity, the 2/27th Battalion moved into the area three days later. On July 15, the 2/9th Battalion sent patrols towards Separi and along the Parehpareh River, aiming to cut the enemy's lines of communication. Concurrently, the 2/25th Battalion solidified its control over Cart, enabling them to dominate the highway from both the east and west. However, their position was soon contested as they faced a series of heavy Japanese counterattacks during the following nights, testing their resolve and defensive capabilities. By July 17, the 2/25th had moved to occupy Charm, situated prominently by the highway, while a company from the 2/33rd Battalion took over Cart, allowing both units to repel yet another strong night counterattack from Japanese forces. The next day, the 2/27th finally entered the unoccupied Sambodja area, while patrols began to probe westward toward the Milford Highway. On July 19, the 2/31st Battalion cleared the last remnants of Japanese presence from the highway, paving the way for uninterrupted Australian operations. The following day, the 2/25th destroyed a robust enemy pocket, allowing them to occupy Abide without further incident. On July 21, the remaining Japanese forces retreated from the Batuchampar area, prompting the Australians to push toward Pope's Track while extensively patrolling northward. By this time, the bulk of the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion had been landed at Djinabora, establishing a patrol base in the Tempadung area. A week later, following a naval bombardment, the Australians occupied Pamaluan and began probing operations to the east and north. This series of actions marked the conclusion of the Battle of Balikpapan. The Australians opted to halt any offensive operations at this point and instead focus on consolidating their positions through enhanced patrolling. During the course of the battle, Australian forces tragically suffered 229 killed and 634 wounded, while inflicting significant losses on the Japanese, with approximately 2,032 killed and 63 captured. Thus, Australian casualties for the broader Borneo Campaign totaled around 2,100, while Japanese losses were estimated at around 4,700. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General George Stevens led brave troops against the entrenched Japanese forces aiming to capture the strategic town of Wewak. Despite fierce resistance and rugged terrain, they successfully advanced, featuring key victories after relentless battles. Australian artillery and infantry engaged in daring assaults, securing vital positions like the Kumbungua Ridge and establishing airfields. As the campaign progressed, Japanese forces dwindled, ultimately surrendering at Wewak. 

Last time we spoke about the allied invasion of Balikpapan. In June 1945, the war in the Pacific escalated as American forces, spearheaded by Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, fiercely battled the entrenched Japanese on Luzon. Despite harsh conditions and fierce resistance, the Americans made crucial advances, capturing key positions that rekindled hope for the Filipino people. Concurrently, preparations for the invasion of Balikpapan intensified. The Australian 7th Division assembled for a July 1 amphibious assault against a heavily fortified Japanese defense, known for its formidable coast artillery and entrenched positions. The Australians faced fierce opposition upon landing; however, skilled maneuvering and robust artillery support allowed them to swiftly gain a foothold. As the Australians secured their beachhead, they marked the beginning of a challenging campaign against determined Japanese forces in Balikpapan, setting the stage for further confrontations in the Pacific theater.  This episode is Victory at Bougainville  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off on Bougainville, by mid-April, Brigadier Heathcote Hammer's 15th Brigade had commenced its crucial task of relieving Brigadier Field's weary and battered 7th Brigade. This transition came at a pivotal moment when Brigadier Stevenson's 11th Brigade successfully secured the Soraken Peninsula, a strategic point on Bougainville's southern coast, while also continuing their efforts to contain enemy forces along the notorious Numa Numa Trail, a crucial supply route for Japanese troops. Supported by reinforcements in artillery and air power, Generals Savige and Bridgeford were optimistic about continuing their limited offensive toward the south. Their immediate objective was to capture the line of the Hongorai River, considered a significant tactical advantage, followed by the Hari River, which would serve as the 15th Brigade's main aim. On the opposing side, General Kanda had learned a harsh lesson about the ineffectiveness of banzai charges during the fierce fighting at the Battle of Slater's Knoll. This costly experience prompted him to alter his strategy significantly. He decided to pull his remaining troops back to a defensive perimeter focused around Buin, which is located in the southern region of Bougainville. Here, he reinforced his defenses with garrison troops from Kieta, situated on the eastern side of Bougainville, the Shortlands Islands to the northwest, and the Fauros Islands to the northeast. However, with this concentration of forces not expected to be operational until July, the troops stationed in the forward areas were tasked with executing a critical delaying action in the meantime, buying precious time for reinforcements to arrive. Meanwhile, on April 17, the Australian 24th Battalion began its advance along the Buin Road, a vital route for both supply and troop movement. Two companies made their way toward Dawe's Creek, while another company launched an assault against the enemy strongholds at Kindara. Remarkably, they broke through enemy lines the following day, pushing further to Sindou Creek and Umam Creek. Here, they faced multiple sharp counterattacks over the next week, demonstrating the fierce resistance from Japanese forces determined to hold their ground. As patrols moved deeper into the thick jungle on either side of the Buin Road, the struggle became increasingly intense. Each advance was hard-fought, marked by skirmishes that tested the resolve and endurance of the Australian soldiers. Finally, on April 26, the advance resumed in earnest, making rapid gains toward the Hongorai River. The combination of heavy air support and relentless artillery bombardment had effectively dispelled any opposition along the route, allowing the Australians to push forward with renewed vigor. By May 4, as the 24th Battalion finally approached the banks of the Hongorai River, they encountered significant resistance. However, on the 4th Lieutenant Lawn's platoon was advancing with two tanks and a bulldozer when the crew of the leading tank came to a log across the road and saw movement in the bush. A burst of machine-gun fire from the tank cut the leaves away and revealed the barrel of a field gun. The first round fired from the tank's 2-pounder disabled the enemy gun and the enemy seemed to flee. Farther ahead, however, a mine exploded at the rear of the second tank. It was discovered that it had been exploded with a wire by a Japanese concealed in the bush. Henceforward mines and concealed guns were encountered more and more frequently. They were detected chiefly by the practised eyes of the engineer teams of Major Needham's 15th Field Company who became increasingly skilful. Mechanical detectors were defeated by several sorts of mine employed wooden boxes filled with T.N.T., for example; but their presence was betrayed by protruding fuses, wires, disturbed earth, and confirmed by prodding with a bayonet. As the 24th Battalion neared the Hongorai it became evident that the Japanese intended to make the Australians pay a price for each advance, and that they were willing to trade a field gun for a tank at every opportunity. On the 4th and many later occasions leading tanks were fired on at a range of a few yards by guns cleverly concealed beside the track, but in positions from which the Japanese could not hope to extricate them. In other respects also the Japanese tactics were improving and their striking power was strengthened. Each forward Australian battalion was now under frequent artillery fire, evidently directed by Japanese observers who remained close to the Australian advance, and it was this which was now causing most of the casualties. The shells usually burst in the trees and their fragments were scattered over a wide area with lethal effects. To counter the tanks the Japanese were now establishing their positions not astride the track but about 100 yards from it in places where the tanks could not reach them until a side track had been made. The Hongorai River, a critical geographical landmark, ran through Bougainville's lush terrain, acting as both a natural barrier and tactical objective. In late April, the 9th Battalion had continued to push forward across the Huio River, a vital waterway that intersected with Japanese defenses. They faced some enemy resistance but managed to clear the Horinu-Rumiki Trail by the end of the month. This narrow, winding path had strategic importance, connecting various units and enabling supplies to move closer to the frontline. On May 3, the 9th Battalion was finally relieved by the 57th/60th Battalion, which, due to its relative inexperience, found progress challenging along the Commando Road a route named after the elite Australian commandos who often operated in this area. Their inexperience in facing seasoned Japanese troops led to slower advances in the crucial days that followed. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Commando Squadron had been conducting deep reconnaissance patrols towards the Hari River and along the Tiger Road, determined to discover the extent of Japanese defenses south of the Hongorai. The Tiger Road, notorious for its rugged conditions, was pivotal for troop movements in the region. On May 5, the 24th Battalion, now bolstered by a newly assigned tank squadron, resumed its advance with renewed determination. However, they were once again halted by fierce defenders who launched a strong yet costly counterattack the following morning. This desperate but valiant effort by the Japanese troops resulted in significant casualties and demonstrated their resolve to maintain control of the Hongorai line. Subsequently, the Japanese forces ultimately abandoned their positions along the Hongorai during the night. Finally, on May 7, the Australians reached the Hongorai River, marking a significant milestone in their campaign. At that moment, the 57th/60th Battalion was securing a crucial crossing over the Hongorai on the Commando Road, enabling further advances into enemy territory. With the next objective focused on the line stretching from the Hari River to Monoitu and Kapana, Brigadier Hammer's battalions shifted their tactics for the second and third weeks of May. They undertook deep patrols into Japanese-occupied territory, gathering vital intelligence while also seeking to harass the enemy and disrupt their operations. Additionally, the commandos maintained their patrols along the challenging Tiger Road and established a new patrol base further north at Monorei. This base would serve as a critical outpost for monitoring enemy movements and launching further operations. Meanwhile, the 58th/59th Battalion explored the rugged areas south of the Buin Road, successfully clearing the Aitara Mission. This mission played a crucial role in their broader strategies, as it prepared them to execute a wide flanking maneuver aimed at cutting the road east of the Hongorai, further encircling Japanese forces. To support the advancing Australian forces, New Zealand aircraft launched significant attacks on Japanese concentrations positioned along the Buin and Commando Roads. On May 17, the 57th/60th Battalion crossed the upper reaches of the Hongorai River, advancing across a wide front along the Commando Road to draw the enemy's attention to that area. On the eve of this move Hammer issued an order of the day in a characteristic style. He spoke of his "undying admiration" for and "extreme confidence" in his men and told them that the next few weeks might see the major defeat of the Japanese in south Bougainville. "Go to battle as you have done in the last month and no enemy can withstand you." In the subsequent days, they successfully secured territory up to the Torobiru River, creating pressure on the Japanese lines and disrupting their defensive operations. On May 20, following a powerful air and artillery bombardment, the 24th Battalion finally launched its long-anticipated assault across the Hongorai River. This marked a turning point as they occupied the strategically significant Egan's Ridge by May 22. Egan's Ridge offered an elevated position that overlooked the surrounding terrain, making it crucial for controlling movement in the vicinity. Meanwhile, the 58th/59th Battalion executed a stealthy wide flanking maneuver towards Mayberry's Crossing, positioning themselves strategically to disrupt Japanese supply lines and communication. On May 21, the Australians moved out once more to cut the Buin Road at Runai, an essential route that facilitated movement and supplies for the Japanese forces. In the following days, the remaining sections of this critical road were secured as the Japanese forces west of the Hari River were forced to retreat, effectively diminishing their operational capabilities in the region. As these operations unfolded, the 2/8th Commando Squadron established a new base on Morokaimoro, positioning themselves for further reconnaissance and engagements. They began patrolling towards Taitai and the Mivo River, both vital points of interest as the Australians sought to gather intelligence on enemy movements. In the meantime, the 57th/60th Battalion pressed on to capture the Oso Junction by May 27. However, they encountered harassment from night raiding parties and artillery fire, which highlighted the persistent threat of Japanese resistance in this area. On 2nd June the main advance was resumed, the 58th/59th moving forward without opposition through positions which had been "completely devastated by air, artillery and mortars". "Not one enemy was found alive or dead," wrote the battalion diarist, "although a strong smell of death pervaded the whole area." A prisoner taken later in the day said that the air strike had completely demoralised the defenders, and when they heard the tanks approaching they had fled. On the left the 57th/60th reached the Sunin River against slight opposition. On the 3rd and 4th the 58th/59th continued the advance, moving slowly because of the need to disarm an unprecedentedly large number of mines and booby-traps-more than 100 in three days-until they reached the Peperu River. Patrols moving stealthily forward to the Hari and across it found evidence of much confusion, many positions dug but unoccupied, and small groups of Japanese at large. It was decided to attack frontally towards the Hari next day. At the same time, the 57th/60th Battalion also reached the Sunin River, facing only slight opposition during their advance. On June 6, the 58th/59th Battalion launched an attack towards the Hari River, but despite their efforts, they only managed to gain about 500 yards against strong defensive positions held by the Japanese. The next three days proved challenging as the 58th/59th Battalion, supported by tanks, found their progress impeded by swampy terrain, a road littered with hidden mines, and intermittent shellfire threatening their advance. The combined obstacles of the natural environment and determined enemy resistance severely limited their ability to make significant gains. In light of the pressing circumstances, Brigadier Hammer made a pivotal decision to send the 58th/59th Battalion on a shallow outflanking march to the north. Their mission was clear: cut the Buin Road several miles east of the Hari River. At the same time, the 57th/60th Battalion was tasked with thrusting wide to the south, maneuvering around the Ogorata River to intercept the same road near Rusei. After four days of concentrated air and artillery bombardment designed to weaken enemy defenses, the 58th/59th Battalion commenced its operation on June 12. They sent two companies forward to secure a position along the road, located 2,000 yards east of the Hari. This forward position was critical for their strategy to disrupt Japanese supply lines. Two days later, on June 14, these forces continued their advance eastward toward the Ogorata River, while the remainder of the battalion engaged the enemy at the Hari ford, a crucial crossing point. Despite the fierce opposition, the ford was finally secured on June 15, following another extensive bombardment that significantly diminished the Japanese presence along the road west of the Ogorata. This success was instrumental in facilitating further operations in the area.  Concurrently, the 57th/60th Battalion had embarked on their mission on June 11, making slow but steady progress through the challenging, trackless bush. They ultimately found a path leading from Kingori to Rusei, where they began encountering Japanese resistance. Pushing through treacherous swampy terrain and dense bamboo thickets, the Australians reached the Buin Road at Rusei by June 15, successfully coordinating with patrols from the 58th/59th Battalion the following day. In addition to securing Rusei, a robust patrol from the 57th/60th Battalion set out along the northern flank to establish a patrol base north of Musaraka. This base detected a significant enemy presence behind them, leading to a critical reassessment of their positions. Consequently, in late June, the 24th Battalion was dispatched to take over the Taitai-Kingori-Katsuwa area, reinforcing the Australian foothold and securing vital routes in the region. Meanwhile, back to the south, the 57th/60th Battalion began to push eastward toward the Mobiai River on June 16. However, their advance quickly met strong opposition just 400 yards into enemy territory. Faced with determined resistance, the battalion executed a wide outflanking maneuver, a tactical shift that successfully forced the Japanese forces to withdraw by June 19, allowing the Australians to continue their advance. In the following days, the 57th/60th Battalion pressed steadily forward, ultimately encountering increased opposition near the Mobiai River on June 24. A heavy bombardment was launched in an attempt to dislodge the entrenched Japanese forces, but it proved ineffective. However, the next day, the Japanese troops had mysteriously withdrawn, allowing the Australians to secure a vital crossing over the river. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the 58th/59th Battalion moved in to occupy the newly attained Mobiai positions. Meanwhile, the 57th/60th and 24th Battalions advanced farther north, preparing for an outflanking maneuver aimed at Shishigatero, a critical tactical point lying to the northeast. In anticipation of an Australian offensive, General Kanda dispatched the 23rd Regiment to establish a defensive base near the Mivo ford. This strategic relocation was part of his preparations for the final defenses behind the Mivo River, as Japanese troops sought to hold their ground against the advancing Australians. By June 28, the 57th/60th and 24th Battalions reached their designated assembly areas, where they successfully repelled several Japanese counterattacks. The next morning, they began their advance southeast, shrouded in the loud thunder of artillery barrages that paved the way for their push. They reached the Buin Road at the confluence of the Ivana, Koopani, and Mivo Rivers, making significant headway. At the same time, the 58th/59th Battalion aimed to open the road for the 24th Battalion, positioned about 1,000 yards away. However, they encountered sharp resistance from Japanese forces defending their positions fiercely. Following this notable success, as Hammer's units faced and repelled various Japanese counterattacks at their new positions, General Bridgeford directed Brigadier Noel Simpson's 29th Brigade to the frontline to relieve the beleaguered 15th Brigade. Each incoming battalion was met with sharp clashes as they moved up, as Japanese forces sought to maintain their hold on strategic territory. Finally, on July 10, Hammer's units were relieved, a long-awaited reprieve after weeks of grueling combat. Despite the shift in command, Simpson's battalions began sending patrols forward in preparation for a crossing of the Mivo River. Unfortunately, due to the heavy resistance encountered and the onset of relentless rains that would continue throughout the month, this final offensive was never carried out. Instead, the troops were limited to vigorous patrolling activities during July and August, maintaining a presence but unable to launch significant offensives in the harsh conditions. Many of these patrols encountered fierce opposition, signaling that the enemy intended to mount a determined defense along the Mivo line. These patrols regularly captured crucial documents from Japanese soldiers ambushed along the tracks leading to their forward positions, allowing Australian forces to construct a clearer picture of the enemy's intentions and deployments. Among these daring reconnaissance missions was one conducted by a patrol from the 42nd Battalion, led by Lieutenant Oldfield. Tasked with scouting a potential crossing at the Mivo, Oldfield and four other soldiers discovered the river was in flood. Undeterred, they stripped off their gear, swam across the turbulent waters, and advanced 500 yards beyond the riverbank, without any weapons. The weight of the Australian artillery and mortar bombardments altered the enemy's tactics. Rather than holding fixed positions, the Japanese began to dig in less and instead employed a strategy of hit-and-run raids and ambushes executed by small groups of three to ten men. Before July 10 arrived, the relentless rain compelled a second postponement of the advance; the new date for the operation was set for July 24. However, the downpour continued to intensify. By July 10, even the patrols could not cross the flooded Mivo. "Torrential rain flooded the divisional area, reducing the Buin Road to a treacherous sea of mud and creating a series of islands between the various rivers." On July 17, conditions worsened further, with a dramatic eight inches of rain falling in just 36 hours. The new challenge was no longer about advancing troops but ensuring that the men were fed where they remained. Virtually all the bridges along the lines of communication were washed away, and all the rivers were flooded; the Mivo was now surging at a speed of twelve miles an hour. As a result, the forward units could only be supplied via air transport. It would take weeks to repair the damaged roads and bridges, leading to D-day being postponed until late August. As the southern operations unfolded, General Savige made a strategic decision to bring Brigadier Arnold Potts' 23rd Brigade from Munda and its surrounding islands to Torokina. Upon arrival, Savige immediately tasked the 27th Battalion with taking over the central sector beyond Pearl Ridge. The Australians quickly began bombing and launching attacks in the Berry's Hill-Hunt's Hill area, ultimately securing this crucial location on May 16. Following the seizure of Berry's Hill, the 27th Battalion conducted patrols toward key positions at Sisivie, Tokua, Base Point 3, and Wearne's Hill throughout late May. On June 3, they initiated an attack towards Tiernan's Spur, making significant progress before being relieved by the 7th Battalion. The 7th Battalion, upon taking over, adopted an aggressive posture, and on June 11, they attacked Tiernan's Spur, successfully securing the feature this time. Soon after, a combination of reconnaissance and air bombardment set the stage for an assault on Wearne's Hill on June 16. However, they encountered strong opposition and were unable to seize its crest until June 20. In parallel operations, a company captured Sisivie without encountering resistance on June 12. Another company was dispatched to establish a forward base in the Wakunai Valley, successfully creating observation posts that overlooked Inus Point and the large Numa Numa Plantation by June 21. After conducting extensive bombardments against remaining Japanese positions, the Australians finally secured the remainder of Wearne's Hill on June 24. Starting June 26, the 7th Battalion began probing towards Centre Hill, which they ultimately found abandoned on July 6. Meanwhile, on July 3, Tokua was occupied as a base for future operations probing north toward Ibu and Buritsiotorara. Artillery and aircraft continued to harass North Hill, which was finally captured on July 13. Just five days later, Cameron's Hill was also successfully attacked and secured. The 7th Battalion then pressed forward along the main track towards Charlie Creek and McInnes Hill, achieving their objectives by August 8 as the remaining Japanese forces were forced to retire to Numa Numa. Looking north, the 55th/53rd Battalion took over from the exhausted 26th Battalion in early April, following the fall of the Soraken Peninsula. Upon assuming command, Lieutenant Colonel Stevenson immediately directed the 55th/53rd to cross the Nagam River and launch an attack towards Pora Pora, a key strategic location in the region. The battalion pressed on along the main coastal track, but on April 13, they faced an unsuccessful assault against the enemy positioned at McKinnon's Ridge. Meanwhile, a company from the battalion moved through an inland route, encountering no resistance as they advanced to a position just two miles from Pora Pora. Recognizing the resolute enemy defenses along the main track, the Australians initiated a program of heavy artillery bombardment, complemented by flanking maneuvers designed to outmaneuver the entrenched defenders. This relentless strategy began to pay off, eventually forcing the Japanese to retreat on April 21. During this critical period, the unopposed company on the inland track continued to push forward until it was only one mile from Pora Pora. In the following four days, the 55th/53rd Battalion fought its way into the Pora Pora bottleneck, engaging in fierce combat that successfully expelled the Japanese forces by April 30. With this victory, the Australians were able to continue their advance northward, making rapid gains against a retreating enemy. On May 4, they captured the Ratsua jetty, a vital logistics point that facilitated further operations. Two columns of the 55th/53rd commenced a swift march towards Ruri Bay, while a company from the 26th Battalion successfully seized Torokori Island on May 6. Three days later, as they finally approached Ruri Bay, the Australians successfully repelled an enemy ambush. However, Brigadier Stevenson's orders were now to halt their advance at the Ratsua-Ruri Bay line and focus on active patrolling extending northward to Tarbut and Tarlena. Despite this directive, the situation became increasingly precarious. The Japanese, bolstered by four small provisional battalions of naval troops under Captain Kato Ekichi, grew aggressive beyond the established line. Daily patrol clashes erupted, with Australian positions and supply lines subjected to constant ambushes. Recognizing the need for reinforcements, the weary 55th/53rd Battalion was relieved by the 26th Battalion on May 21. In response, the 26th immediately dispatched two companies to thrust forward in the area south and east of Buoi Plantation. However, these units quickly encountered strong counterattacks, while patrols faced heavy resistance around Siara and Chindawon. As Stevenson's forces found themselves facing a fortified opponent stronger than anticipated, permission was granted to send two companies from the 31st/51st Battalion to take over the western sector on June 3. Despite this reinforcements, the Australians continued to struggle to make meaningful progress northward. After the 26th Battalion had been in the line for three hard weeks its diarist wrote that the campaign had become one of "holding a superior number of enemy by the aggressive action of a tired depleted battalion-companies were no more than half strength and had been in forward areas continuously for four months". The battalion's fighting strength on 3rd June was only 23 officers and 353 other ranks. The constant patrolling, the artillery fire and the raids on jeep trains on tracks well to the rear were wearing down the men's spirits. In response to the persistent challenges, a strategic decision was made to outmaneuver the Japanese by landing a reinforced company of the 31st/51st Battalion at Porton Plantation, aiming to approach the enemy from the western flank. During the early hours of June 8, the assault force successfully landed unopposed and swiftly established a perimetric defense reaching 150 yards inland. However, the surprised defenders quickly regrouped, unleashing a barrage of machine-gun fire that effectively thwarted the unloading of heavy weapons, reserve ammunition, and essential supplies. Although supporting artillery fire was effectively directed at the Japanese positions, the Australians soon found themselves pinned down as Captain Kato reinforced the defenses surrounding their perimeter. To complicate matters further, a convoy of Australian supplies and reinforcements attempting to reach the newly established perimeter was successfully repelled by the tenacious defenders during the night. The next morning, it was decided to withdraw the force late that evening. However, as the Australians prepared for their retreat, the Japanese launched a strong counterattack from three sides. The enemy attacked in relentless waves, and although they were met with devastating Australian fire, the pressure forced the company to pull back towards the beach. In the morning they launched what was evidently intended as a final blow, thrusting from three sides. Now estimated at over 400 they attacked in waves and were mowed down by the Australian fire. To confuse their enemy they shouted English phrases such as "Watch the right flank", "Throw it in the middle", "It's only me, Jack", and so on. The Australians pulled back towards the beach and at 1 p.m.  During the afternoon, three landing craft moved towards the beach under heavy enemy fire in an effort to embark the soldiers. Unfortunately, two of the crafts were overloaded and became stranded. One eventually drifted off with the tide during the evening; however, the other remained besieged by heavy fire throughout the night. On June 10, Australian forces continued their attempts to rescue the stranded men, launching efforts under the cover of a strong air attack. At dawn on June 10, there were 38 living men on board the besieged landing craft, commanded by Corporal Hall. Their meager arsenal included two Bren guns, five Owen submachine guns, and nine rifles. The remaining rations consisted of eight tins of fruit or vegetables, three or four tins of meat, and three tins of condensed milk. Corporal Hall devised a defensive plan to maximize their chances of survival. He removed the wooden shelves under the overlapping sides of the ALCA to create protective cover under the flaps for all the troops. The dismantled wireless set was discarded overboard to free up additional space. To assist with breathing during rising tides, each man was issued six-inch lengths of copper piping. A continuous watch was kept from the coxswain's enclosure to monitor Japanese movements and report any developments. The soldiers cleaned and oiled their weapons using lubricant sourced from the engines, ensuring that they were well-maintained and ready for use. A medical kit was placed in the capable hands of a member of the 19th Australian Field Ambulance, who diligently distributed morphine and dressings as needed. At 15:30 on June 10, a concerted effort to rescue the stranded survivors commenced. An intense and precise air attack targeted the enemy positions, but unfortunately, it failed to hit the pillbox from which most of the fire directed at the barge was originating. Bombers dropped inflated rubber rafts near the landing craft in an attempt to assist, but Japanese gunfire prevented any men from reaching these lifelines. Under the cover of an artillery smoke screen, a landing craft attempted to reach the shore. However, enemy fire wounded several crew members, including the coxswain, damaging the steering gear and causing the craft to circle out of control. Amidst this chaos, Corporal Hall attempted to silence the pillbox with a Bren gun, but his efforts were in vain. In a desperate bid to assist the aircraft in locating the target, he splashed bullets towards the pillbox, yet the attempt proved futile as the damaged landing craft was forced to withdraw. They successfully repelled several Japanese parties attempting to swim out to the immobilized craft during the night. Finally, in the early hours of June 11, the besieged Australians were rescued by three assault boats, managing to pull them from the critical situation. In this endeavor, the Australian forces suffered significant losses, with 23 men reported killed or missing and 106 wounded. Among these casualties, five killed and seven wounded belonged to the 42nd Landing Craft Company. Estimates suggest that the Japanese forces faced losses of approximately 147 confirmed dead, with an additional 50 likely killed. The infantry units suffered specifically dire consequences, with two officers killed and three wounded, these included both company commanders, leaving only Lieutenants Patterson and Reiter, two young veterans from the 6th Division, as the sole surviving leaders from six platoon commanders. Additionally, 14 other ranks were reported killed or missing, while 57 were wounded. Of those wounded, five were sent to the field ambulance suffering from exposure, and nine sustained cuts and bruises. The repulse of the Australian attempt to land near Porton on June 8, 9, and 10 significantly boosted Japanese morale. Observers reported that the landing occurred on a rough strip of beach, making it difficult for the enemy to negotiate the surrounding reefs. The high ground in the vicinity provided an excellent vantage point for the Japanese, allowing for optimal placement of automatic weapons. In response to the Australian advance, Captain Kato swiftly dispatched 150 troops from Chabai to reinforce the approximately 100 men already engaged in combat. These reinforcements succeeded in thwarting any further enemy landings, ultimately pushing the Australians back to the beach, from where their remaining forces were evacuated in haste. Kato estimated that around 250 Australians had landed, resulting in the loss of 60 killed and 100 wounded, alongside 26 Japanese fatalities. If the Japanese report regarding their own losses is accurate, it suggests that both sides engaged in this grim action sustained approximately equal losses. Moreover, during this battle, the reinforced 26th Battalion failed to exploit this diversionary attack, missing the opportunity to push against the stubborn resistance of Captain Kato's isolated posts. On June 20, Brigadier Potts' 23rd Brigade began taking over the northern sector, with orders to contain the Japanese forces in the Bonis Peninsula and patrol towards Buka Passage. This relief operation was completed by the end of the month. However, the 8th and 27th Battalions continued to face harassment from Kato's deep patrols throughout July. Ultimately, the overextended 27th Battalion on the right flank was withdrawn on July 22 to allow the 8th Battalion to successfully attack and capture Commo Ridge the following day. On July 24, the 8th Battalion launched an unsuccessful attack on Part Ridge. However, this heavy assault shook the defenders, paving the way for the Australians to capture the ridge against light opposition on August 5. This marked the last major action of the Bougainville Campaign. In total, Savige's 2nd Corps endured losses of 516 Australians killed and 1,572 wounded. It is estimated that approximately 8,500 Japanese soldiers were killed by Australian forces and their native allies, while an additional 9,800 succumbed to illness during the Australian period on Bougainville. By the end of the campaign, only 23,571 men remained out of about 65,000 who had been on the island when the Americans launched their attack in November 1943. Now, attention turned westward to Balikpapan, where General Milford's 7th Australian Division successfully landed on July 1. They secured an important perimeter extending through Santosa Hill, Parramatta, Mount Malang, and Stalkudo. The battle resumed the following day, with the 2/14th Battalion advancing along the Vasey Highway to seize the Sepinggang airstrip unopposed. Meanwhile, the 2/3rd Commando Squadron took over the area northeast of Stalkudo, though they made little progress toward the Lady Schofield feature due to heavy enemy fire. The 2/27th Battalion strengthened and extended its hold on the high ground northwest of Stalkudo. The 2/16th Battalion pressed northward, successfully capturing Resort, Owen, and Oxley without sustaining any losses. The 2/12th Battalion took Potts and consolidated its position on Portee. The 2/10th Battalion conducted mopping-up operations in the secured areas, patrolling vigorously forward, and also seized Mount Sepuluh. Lastly, the 2/9th Battalion, supported by a troop of tanks, cleared Kandasan town along the coast as far as Signal Hill. By the end of the day, Brigadier Eather's 25th Brigade had landed to take over the central portions of the front, tasked with pushing inland astride the Milford Highway. On July 3, one company of the 2/10th Battalion advanced through the port, while another cleared the Tank Plateau, and a third focused on the lower ground between the plateau and Parramatta. Concurrently, the 2/9th Battalion, supported by its troop of tanks, successfully took the Santosa barracks, which they had bypassed the previous day. The division now held a bridgehead approximately five miles wide and one mile deep, successfully securing one of the two airstrips. On July 3, light aircraft began operating from this newly established base. However, unloading heavy equipment and stores proved to be a challenging task, causing considerable anxiety among the troops. A swell made it difficult to transfer loads to Landing Craft Tank (LCTs) and small craft, while it was impossible to run the Landing Ship Tank (LSTs) directly onto the beach. By 06:00 on July 3, progress was evident, with 985 vehicles and 1,932 tons of various equipment and stores successfully landed, alongside 16,950 men ashore. Later that morning, an LST began unloading at a pontoon jetty constructed on Green Beach by an American naval construction battalion. The captured port was a scene of devastation, characterized by wrecked workshops and warehouses, leaving little more than twisted, rusty steel and piles of rubble where houses once stood. The seven wharves designed for ocean-going vessels had all been burned, rendering them unusable. Among the debris, one dump of scrap iron collected by the Japanese from the ruins measured 520 yards long, with another scrap pile opposite it stretching about 150 yards. As unloading operations continued on the main beaches, the 2/14th Battalion began moving towards the Manggar airstrip but found themselves halted at Batakan Kechil. The 2/27th Battalion took over the defense of the Sepinggang strip, and the 2/3rd Commando Squadron discovered the Lady Schofield feature abandoned, allowing their patrols to press on more than a mile across the high ground overlooking the Sepinggang River. Meanwhile, the 2/33rd Battalion encountered heavy opposition in the hills above Chilton Road but managed to capture Opus, Operator, and Oxygen, as well as a height to the northeast named Orange. The 2/31st Battalion advanced along Milford Highway, facing increasing opposition, but they rapidly secured the junction with Chilton Road. However, they were unable to capture the strong enemy defenses at Nobody and Nurse. The 2/12th Battalion began a march towards Pandansari but had to assault Nail to eliminate the threat of enemy harassing fire. The following day, while the 2/33rd Battalion occupied Letter and Lewis, the 2/31st found Nobody and Nurse abandoned, allowing them to easily secure these features. One company also took control of Nail and began probing towards Lodge. At the same time, the 2/14th Battalion resumed its advance towards Manggar. They successfully crossed the river and pushed 1,300 yards across the airstrip without facing any opposition. However, after midday, heavy Japanese fire unexpectedly swept across the airfield, resulting in the deaths of several officers at the control tower. Despite this setback, and aided by the fire from destroyer Eaton, the Australians pressed on and ultimately secured Manggar and its airfield. By the end of the day, General Milford had successfully pushed the enemy out of Balikpapan and further secured the Sepinggang and Manggar strips. However, it became clear that Admiral Kamada was attempting to withdraw the remnants of his force to the Batuchampar area, aiming to delay any advance along the Milford Highway for as long as possible. The 454th Independent Battalion continued to hold the commanding terrain north of Manggar, and on July 5, its defenses came under intense naval, air, and artillery bombardment, which initially failed to silence the Japanese guns. Meanwhile, Brigadier Eather pressed his advance north in the center. The 2/25th Battalion took control of the positions at Nurse and Nail, while the 2/33rd pressed on against dwindling opposition to capture Mackay, Marshall, Mutual, and Margin. The 2/31st Battalion moved forward to seize Letter and Lewis, followed by the capture of Laverton and Liverpool. Recognizing the necessity of securing the western side of Balikpapan Bay to facilitate port operations, Milford ordered Brigadier Chilton's 18th Brigade to land the reinforced 2/9th Battalion at Penadjam. Following a naval and artillery bombardment, the landing was executed unopposed during the afternoon of July 5, with patrols of the 2/9th immediately probing north and south to secure the perimeter. The following day, a patrol moved south toward Nanang village and onward to the Sesumpu River, while other units explored the area towards the Riko River and Separi. On July 6, the 2/33rd Battalion successfully attacked and captured Metal and Muffle, but they were ultimately repelled from Judge. Meanwhile, the 2/25th pressed onward, taking control of Liverpool and occupying Huon. Looking southeast, the 2/14th Battalion began to probe enemy positions on this day. A strong patrol successfully captured Waites' Knoll but had to repel a series of strong counterattacks during the night, while another patrol was forced back along Vasey Highway. Over the next few days, the Australians continued to engage, probing and bombarding the commanding enemy positions. Ultimately, the 2/14th launched an attack and captured the Frost and Brown features on July 9, effectively eliminating the enemy threat in that area. Meanwhile, the 2/16th Battalion and the 2/5th Commando Squadron attacked an enemy concentration at Gate on July 6 and secured the position two days later, further solidifying their hold on Grand by July 9. To the northwest, on July 7, the 2/25th Battalion moved to Cult and then attempted an assault on Jam but was repelled by fierce defenders. The following day, while Jam underwent probing and bombardment, the 2/33rd Battalion discovered Justice abandoned after heavy shelling and pressed on toward Joint and Judge. Concurrently, Brigadier Eather had dispatched the 2/6th Commando Squadron into the hills overlooking the Sumber River. They successfully occupied Job on July 8 and seized Freight the following day. By July 9, after a concentrated artillery barrage, Jam, Joint, and Judge finally fell as the 25th Brigade secured the first stretch of the Milford Highway to Batuchampar. The 2/31st Battalion then advanced to a road bend due north of Junior, where they encountered an ambush by Japanese raiders. Meanwhile, a company of the 2/9th Battalion landed unopposed at Djinabora on the afternoon of July 8, and on the following day, a patrol base was established at Teloktebang. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Hammer launched a fierce campaign across Bougainville, battling entrenched Japanese troops, they secured the strategic Soraken Peninsula and advanced toward the vital Hongorai River. By July, they had reached the Hari River, significantly weakening Japanese defenses. However, relentless rain hindered further operations.

Last time we spoke about liberation of Luzon.. American forces, led by General Eichelberger and supported by General Krueger's armies, relentlessly advanced against the entrenched Japanese defenders of General Yamashita's 14th Area Army. Amid thick jungle and treacherous terrain, battles raged through the northern mountain ranges, as American troops aimed to restore the Filipino government. Facing overwhelming odds, the Japanese forces displayed extraordinary resilience, temporarily halting American progress. Remarkable efforts from General Swift's 1st Corps across Routes 9 and 11 led to significant breakthroughs as American forces captured critical positions, including Sablan and Baguio. However, the Japanese command, complacent and misjudging the American strategy, fell into disarray. As the tide turned with relentless American assaults, key Japanese positions were systematically dismantled. By late April, most of Luzon was liberated, restoring hope and autonomy to the Filipino people.  This episode is Invasion of Balikpapan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The battles for Okinawa and Luzon just closed up, and today we are going to be venturing back to the Dutch East Indies. As we left off in mid-May, the tides of war were shifting dramatically on the island of Luzon, with General Krueger's 6th Army celebrating significant victories across the region. In the north, General Swift's 1st Corps had successfully secured the scenic Baguio area, known for its lush mountains and cool climate, a stark contrast to the tropical heat that engulfed much of the Philippines. Yet, the fighting was far from over, as fierce battles continued on three major fronts. Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla 121st Regiment was making strides, snagging much of the strategically vital Bessang Pass, a crucial artery connecting northern Luzon to the central regions. However, their success came at a cost, leaving them overextended amidst fierce Japanese resistance. Meanwhile, General Gill's weary 32nd Division managed to claim dominance over the rugged terrain of Salacsac Pass along the historic Villa Verde Trail, known for its breathtaking views and treacherous paths that had challenged both soldiers and their supply lines. General Mullins' 25th Division achieved a remarkable breakthrough by capturing the key Balete Pass, opening the way for further advances. Not stopping there, the 25th Division pressed onward, quickly redirecting their focus northward towards the town of Santa Fe. By May 24, the 27th Regiment had cleared the Sawmill River valley, an area teeming with dense foliage and rugged hills, a significant accomplishment that paved the way for the next objectives. From there, the 1st Battalion expertly maneuvered eastward against the imposing Kanami Ridge. On May 22, the 161st Regiment dealt a heavy blow to Japanese positions in a stronghold on Mount Haruna, a location known for its steep, challenging slopes. Following this triumph, they began their descent down the northern slopes of Haruna Ridge, gearing up for a critical junction with the Villa Verde Trail by May 27. Meanwhile, the 35th Regiment launched a vigorous assault from Balete Pass, systematically clearing out the remaining Japanese caves and fortifications by May 26, culminating in the capture of Santa Fe the very next day. At Salacsac, the Japanese forces, led by General Iwanaka, initiated a limited counteroffensive, presumably to buy time for a strategic evacuation of their increasingly tenuous positions. If delay was indeed Iwanaka's intention, he executed it well; it wasn't until May 19 that the American supply line was finally deemed secure again. The 2nd Battalion of the 128th Regiment resumed its push east from Hill 525, but the progress was slow. By May 22, the 1st Battalion had only managed to advance a mere 500 yards east from Hill 508, while the 3rd Battalion commenced a southward and southeastward advance from Hill 516 on May 16. It was not until May 24 that the relentless fighting in the region bore fruit, leading to the eventual clearing of the area, and Salacsac Pass was officially declared secured. On that pivotal day, General Iwanaka began the difficult task of withdrawing the remnants of his battered forces northward, retreating up the winding valley of the Imugan River. This river, which flows through a lush, verdant landscape, would serve as a vital sanctuary, albeit one fraught with danger for the disheartened Japanese troops. Meanwhile, the American forces were gaining ground. The 2nd Battalion aggressively seized control of Hill 527, a position that provided a commanding view of the surrounding area, crucial for planning further advances. The 126th Regiment took decisive action, utilizing trucks to transport troops swiftly along Route 5 to Balete Pass before launching an assault toward Imugan from the east and southeast. Concurrently, the guerrilla 1st Battalion of the Buena Vista Regiment embarked on a northward push from Valdez, culminating in the hard-fought capture of Hill 528 on May 28. This hill, commanding and steep, presented a formidable challenge but also promised a vantage point critical for any further operations in the region. The very next day, Imugan finally succumbed to the relentless pressure of the advancing American forces, marking a significant milestone as the Villa Verde Trail came firmly under American control. This development effectively concluded the arduous operations of the 32nd Division. It was a costly campaign for General Gill; the division suffered approximately 825 men killed, 2,160 wounded, with an alarming 6,000 classified as non-battle casualties. In stark contrast, the Japanese defense was decimated, with at least 5,750 of the 8,750 troops they had deployed to defend the trail lying dead. As we gaze northward, we find Colonel Volckmann's guerrillas, who had extended themselves too thinly across Bessang Pass and into the challenging terrain of Yubo Ridge. The aftermath of their overreach saw them facing fierce Japanese counterattacks that swiftly pushed them back across Lamagan Ridge in the latter part of May. However, a small contingent managed to hold tenaciously onto the eastern slopes of Langiatan Hill, a strategic position that allowed them to maintain some level of influence in the region. Additionally, a robust force from the Japanese 76th Regiment assembled south of Butac, planning an offensive northward. However, this advance was met with fierce resistance from the guerrilla 15th Regiment, who successfully repelled the attack. Seizing the momentum, Volckmann directed the 15th Regiment into a new offensive eastward, and by the end of May, they had successfully re-secured their foothold up to Lamagan Ridge. Meanwhile, elements of the 121st Regiment executed a remarkable retaking of both Langiatan Hill and Yubo Ridge, gradually restoring control over this strategically vital area. Looking south, we find General Hall's 11th Corps vigorously engaged in two crucial offensives aimed at capturing Ipo Dam and Wawa Dam, both essential water reservoirs located east of Manila. The strategic importance of these dams cannot be overstated; they were vital not only for securing fresh water but also for controlling the flow of operations in the region. However, the relentless heavy downpours that characterized the season rendered air support missions impractical, exacerbating an already challenging supply situation for the advancing troops. As a result, General Wing's 43rd Division was forced to pause its offensive late on May 14 to reassess and devise new attack plans.  As of late May 14, the 43rd Division found itself in a precarious situation, necessitating a halt to operations to devise new attack plans. To this point, the division had made limited progress toward securing Route 52, a crucial supply line vital for their mission to capture Ipo Dam. Recognizing the urgency, General Wing decided it was essential to commit the 169th Regiment to a targeted attack to clear this road, as it would serve as a critical route for both supply and evacuation in the coming days. The adverse weather conditions had created a significant operational hindrance. For nearly the entire duration of their offensive, intermittent rains had severely disrupted ground and aerial supply chains, as well as evacuation and the crucial air support operations necessary for a successful advance. Ground conditions had become challenging, and division engineers struggled to construct and maintain supply roads at a pace even close to that of the infantry's advances. Consequently, supply drops and hand-carried provisions were just sufficient to keep combat units barely above the minimum required levels, but the evacuation of sick and wounded soldiers remained a pressing issue that plagued the division. By May 14, the situation worsened significantly. For the first time since May 6, the 5th Air Force was completely grounded, unable to conduct any air support or supply missions due to the worsening weather conditions. This represented a troubling turning point for the 43rd Division. Moreover, intelligence reports indicated that sizable groups from the Japanese Tomono and Hanabusa Detachments had shifted their focus away from their defenses along Route 52, moving instead to confront the 103rd and 172nd Regiments attacking from the south. General Wing recognized that this presented a timely opportunity for the 169th Regiment. Striking directly along Route 52 would likely be far easier and less costly than it would have been just a week prior. Furthermore, a successful offensive by the 169th could not only expedite the capture of Ipo Dam but also prevent further eastward redeployments of Japanese forces. This would be a vital maneuver, potentially relieving pressure from Fork Ridge, where the left flank of the 172nd Regiment was currently bogged down in fierce fighting. Time was of the essence, and decisive action was required to turn the tide in favor of the 43rd Division. The situation was critical; delay would allow Japanese forces to fortify their defenses further. In response, Wing mapped out a robust plan: he directed the 103rd Regiment to capture the Route 52 terminus at Ipo Dam itself, which was crucial for any further advances. Their orders included not only taking control of the dam but also clearing the high ground north of the road and west of the dam to ensure a secure position against any possible counterattacks. Additionally, he tasked the 172nd Regiment with seizing Hill 804, a vantage point that could provide vital intelligence and support to the offensive, while the 169th Regiment was directed to eliminate the last Japanese defenders in the Bigti area before advancing eastward along Route 52 to connect with the 172nd. A break in the weather finally came on May 17, allowing the 43rd Division to launch their offensive with much-needed air support. Aircraft successfully dropped napalm and strafed Japanese defensive positions, a strategy that proved devastatingly effective. General Kawashima, facing mounting losses, ultimately ordered the remnants of his command to withdraw to an assembly point on the western slopes of Mount Maranat, a retreat that revealed their deteriorating ability to hold the line. With the air support providing a critical advantage, the 103rd Regiment advanced boldly and swiftly cleared the last Japanese holdouts from Hill 860, securing an essential position. However, it was the guerrilla forces, under the command of Colonel Augustin, from the Marking Regiment who achieved a historic victory by capturing Ipo Dam shortly after noon. His patrols descended the slopes of Hill 803, crossed the Angat River at the dam, and triumphantly raised the American flag over the powerhouse on the south bank, a potent symbol of liberation and resistance. Simultaneously, the 172nd Regiment seized control of Fork Ridge, further tightening the noose around Japanese forces, while the 169th Regiment secured strategic ground from Hill 535 to Osboy Ridge, pushing forward with relentless determination. In the following four days, the 43rd Division, supported by the fearless Marking guerrillas, meticulously mopped up the area west of Ipo Dam. Their efforts culminated in the successful opening of Route 52 from Bigti to Ipo on May 19, a critical milestone that allowed for the unhindered movement of troops and supplies. By May 21, they completed the operation by clearing out the last pockets of organized resistance in the region west of the dam and south of the Angat River, a crucial waterway that would play a significant role in sustaining American operations. With the capture of Ipo Dam intact, General Wing achieved his primary objective, making a significant contribution to addressing Manila's pressing water supply problems. This success would have lasting implications for the civilians and military alike, as the dam was key to ensuring a reliable water supply in the region. The 43rd Division maintained its momentum, continuing mopping-up operations through May 31. They patrolled eastward across the Ipo River, pressed northeast up the Angat from the dam, and scoured the areas that had witnessed some of the most intense fighting during the campaign. The cost of these operations was notable; Wing's forces suffered losses of 120 killed and 515 wounded, while the Kawashima Force endured devastating casualties, with over 2,700 men killed and approximately 115 captured during the grueling battle. Meanwhile, General Chase's 38th Division pressed forward with its offensive against Wawa Dam, following the failure of General Yokoyama's most recent counteroffensive. The 145th Regiment found itself holding a precariously exposed salient at Mount Binicayan, which severely hampered their ability to launch an effective attack toward Wawa Dam. Japanese positions on the high ground to the north of the dam dominated the narrow, winding road with artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire, making any advance perilous. In response to this daunting challenge, General Chase decided to launch an offensive with the 151st Regiment in the area north of the Marikina River, targeting the formidable Mounts Pamitinan and Hapanong-Banoy. This bold maneuver was contingent upon the 152nd Regiment gaining momentum in its attack to clear Woodpecker Ridge. As such, on May 19 and 20, the 152nd Regiment executed enveloping maneuvers centered on Woodpecker Ridge, ultimately breaking through enemy lines on May 21. The breakthrough was dramatically supported by the introduction of medium tanks and flamethrower tanks, powerful assets that helped turn the tide of battle. The following day, what began as a breakthrough rapidly escalated into a rout of Japanese defenders. By May 25, the 152nd Regiment had established control over the strategic junction of the Marikina and Bosoboso Rivers, a key position that not only bolstered their operational capabilities but also positioned them for further advances in the ongoing campaign. As Japanese resistance began to dissipate under the relentless pressure from the advancing American forces, the 149th Regiment, which had successfully relieved the 145th at Mount Binicayan, launched a bold strike toward Wawa Dam on May 27. Encountering little to no opposition, they secured the dam intact the following morning, marking a significant victory. It was on May 27 that General Yokoyama ordered a general retreat, recognizing the untenable position of his forces. Acting on these instructions, General Kobayashi's remaining troops fell back, pursued by vigilant patrols from the 38th Division. With Wawa Dam secured, General Chase shifted his strategy; rather than launching direct assaults against organized Japanese lines, he opted to focus on mopping up operations and pursuing the retreating enemy. The human cost of the campaign was significant. Chase's forces sustained losses of 160 killed and 590 wounded, while the Kobayashi Force suffered catastrophic losses, with over 10,000 men killed since the onset of the offensive.  Shifting focus southeast, the 7th Cavalry and Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Anderson's guerrillas converged on the coastal town of Infanta in late May. Faced with overwhelming pressure, the Japanese naval garrison retreated westward into the Sierra Madre mountains, a rugged and dense area that posed challenges for both sides. Infanta ultimately fell on May 25, and by the evening of the following day, the reinforced 7th Cavalry had successfully cleared the entire flat, rice-rich region surrounding the town, encountering only scattered and ineffective resistance. In a strategic move bolstered by overwater supply movements, the 7th Cavalry implemented an aggressive patrolling program to the southwest, seeking out any remaining enemy forces. Meanwhile, the 8th Cavalry focused its efforts on clearing the northern section of Santa Maria Valley, advancing northward into the Sierra Madre. By the end of May, the Shimbu Group, once a significant Japanese fighting force, was rendered ineffective. Its main units began to disband, breaking into small groups in a desperate bid to forage for food or to navigate their way to safety in northern Luzon. At the end of May, the Shimbu Group still boasted a strength of nearly 26,000 men, over half of its total personnel as of February 20. However, the remaining survivors were not the elite forces they once were. The relentless campaigns by the 11th and 14th Corps had decimated the best-trained and most well-equipped units, leaving behind a shell of what had once been a formidable fighting force. Of the approximately 13,000 survivors still organized into units, their combat effectiveness had deteriorated so significantly that it's worthy of mention only in passing. Meanwhile, about 13,000 others were struggling to survive without proper organization; roughly 5,000 of these were receiving whatever limited medical treatment the Shimbu Group could provide. The remaining 8,000 men had essentially lost all structure, scattering into small groups to forage for food or attempting to make their way north to Luzon, where they hoped to find safety and sustenance. The supply situation faced by the Shimbu Group at the end of May was even more dire than its personnel situation. They had been unable to transport significant portions of their vast stockpiles of supplies into the Sierra Madre mountains, a shortfall that would prove catastrophic for their survival. The only supplies they still possessed in any quantity were ammunition for small arms and machine guns, alongside medical materials for treating combat wounds. The most pressing issue, however, was a critical lack of food. The early loss of several key agricultural regions, including the Bosoboso Valley, the shores of Laguna de Bay, the Santa Maria Valley, and the fertile Infanta region, had deprived the Shimbu Group of expected food stocks. Most of the supplies brought out of Manila had already been consumed. For instance, the organized remnant of the Noguchi Force could currently allocate a meager two ounces of rice per day for each man—a portion that would undoubtedly vanish by mid-June. The Kobayashi Force fared little better, while the Kawashima Force managed to issue slightly more, around six to eight ounces of rice daily. The troops were gradually reduced to scavenging for survival, resorting to eating roots, bark, grass, and whatever food they could find in long-abandoned Filipino gardens. It's worth noting that after just a few days in June, there wasn't a single pig, carabao, or dog left alive within sight of the remnants of the Shimbu Group. Recognizing that mere existence was the overarching challenge, General Yokoyama hoped to regroup his organized units and move them into areas where they might have some chance to cultivate food, scattering them through the challenging terrain of the Sierra Madre. This desperate strategy highlighted the dire straits faced by the Shimbu Group as their chances for survival dwindled. Meanwhile, the Noguchi Force received orders to transfer its main strength to the mountainous region along the eastern shore of Laguna de Bay, where some of its elements were already positioned. This shift aimed to gather their forces in a more favorable terrain, potentially allowing for better access to resources. The Kobayashi Force was tasked with establishing a defensive sector in the area north of Mount Purro and east of Wawa. In a coordinated effort, the 31st Infantry, minus its 3rd Battalion, along with various miscellaneous troops from the 8th Division, were ordered to occupy positions north of the Lenatin River, enhancing their defensive capabilities in a strategic location. The remnants of the Kawashima Force, already in the process of withdrawing from the Ipo Dam area, were instructed to relocate to the mountains east of San Miguel, approximately 22 miles northwest of Ipo. This area was believed to have more abundant food supplies, crucial for the survival of their forces. However, as circumstances unfolded, this transfer later proved impossible. Unable to move effectively, the bulk of the Kawashima Force remained entrenched in the area surrounding Mount Inuman, where they faced mounting challenges in sustaining their troops. In the following month, General Hall directed the 38th Division and Major Edwin Ramsey's 2nd Provisional Regiment to pursue the remnants of Yokoyama's forces as they moved eastward toward Santa Iñez. Meanwhile, the 112th Cavalry employed various mountain and river valley trails to mount a converging attack from the south. They encountered light opposition and successfully captured the town on June 9, further consolidating their gains in the region. At the same time, patrols from the 43rd Division reported no signs of organized resistance north and east of Ipo Dam. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade, alongside Anderson's guerrillas, effectively dispersed the last organized remnants of the Kogure Detachment and the remaining Japanese naval units at Lamon Bay. By the end of June, the only indication of organized Japanese resistance in an area extending five miles north and ten miles east of Wawa Dam was found in the Lenatin River valley, approximately three miles north of Santa Iñez. This development forced the remnants of Yokoyama's forces into trackless and only partially explored wilderness, significantly complicating their ability to regroup or launch further operations. The operations throughout June were costly for Hall, resulting in approximately 110 men killed and 370 wounded. In contrast, Japanese losses during the month were staggering, amounting to 7,540 killed or found dead, alongside 1,105 captured.  Looking back north, General Yamashita aimed to avoid a similar fate for his northern forces. Ever since the fall of Baguio, he had been meticulously planning for the ultimate withdrawal of the Shobu Group deep into the Cordillera Central.  On May 5, less than two weeks following the fall of Baguio, General Yamashita disseminated an outline plan for future operations to the major components of the Shobu Group throughout northern Luzon. His strategy was built on three fundamental premises: Estimation of Enemy Actions: Yamashita assessed that the 6th Army would concentrate its main effort on a northward drive along Route 5, anticipating that General Krueger would only launch secondary attacks toward Bontoc via Routes 4 and 11. This understanding allowed him to anticipate the flow of enemy movements and allocate his resources more effectively. Timing for Resource Stripping: He calculated that the Shobu Group would have approximately three months during which it could strip the Cagayan and Magat Valleys of the essential food and military supplies needed for a protracted stand in the mountains. During this period, the group aimed to transport this matériel into the Cordillera Central through the junction of Routes 4 and 5, located near Bagabag, 25 miles north on Route 5 from Bambang. Control of Key Routes: Yamashita recognized that the success of his planned withdrawal and future delaying actions hinged on maintaining control over the Routes 4-5 junction for as long as possible. He estimated that his defenses south of Santa Fe would be robust enough to hold until mid-June. Additionally, he planned to construct new defensive positions across Route 5 between Santa Fe and Bambang, enabling him to contain the 1st Corps south of Bambang until the end of June. Most crucially, he believed that he would be able to retain control of the Junction of Routes 4 and 5 until the end of July, which was essential for his operational strategy. His initial perimeter encompassed the vital Route 11 terminus of the Baguio-Aritao supply road, as well as key locations such as Bessang Pass, Bontoc, Banaue, Oriung Pass, and Santa Fe In his May 5 plan, Yamashita outlined the necessity of holding the Salacsac Pass-Balete Pass line until mid-June while constructing additional defenses between Santa Fe and Bambang. After mid-June, the Japanese forces were to withdraw to a second perimeter, extending through Ambuclao, Mankayan, Sabangan, Bontoc, Oriung Pass, and Bambang, strategically positioning themselves for potential future engagements. Yamashita understood that these defenses would need to hold until July, when the defenders would be expected to retreat to his last-stand positions centered around Bokod, Mankayan, Polis Pass, the Rayambugan Farm School, and Bambang. He anticipated that the Shobu Group would be compelled to hold their ground until annihilation at these key locations. On April 27, the 103rd Division received orders from the Area Army to transfer its main strength to the Cauayan-Cabagan area, leaving behind only the Yuguchi Detachment 80th Brigade Headquarters in Aparri, which comprised a meager two battalions of nuclear infantry. Yamashita's plans called for virtually abandoning the Cagayan Valley, temporarily retaining only the 103rd Division, which was significantly outnumbered and equated to less than two American Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs), particularly since the Araki Force was stationed in the Cervantes area. The primary duty of the 103rd Division would be to gather all available resources in the valley, including rice and livestock such as carabaos, and dispatch these supplies into the Cordillera Central through Bagabag. Once this crucial task was completed, the division would also withdraw into the mountains, aligning with Yamashita's broader strategic objectives. Yamashita's decision to abandon the Cagayan Valley made logical sense. He realized that the forces he had remaining could not hold the valley for much longer. Additionally, there seemed little necessity to maintain a strong presence there any further. Initially, he had kept units in the valley to harvest and gather food, deny the Allied Air Forces of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) the use of airfields for strikes against Formosa and Okinawa, and hold onto Aparri in the hope that supplies and reinforcements might still reach Luzon. However, by early May, Yamashita concluded that the situation at Okinawa was largely resolved, negating any strategic purpose behind holding the valley airfields. The hope for reinforcements had long since faded, and crucially, his troops had already gathered the early rice harvest from the valley. With no new crop expected to come in until late September, Yamashita recognized that he would not be able to harvest this future crop, further solidifying his decision to withdraw. Yamashita also ordered the 79th Brigade to take over the defense of Banaue, while directing the 105th Division to defend both the Magat Valley and the Bato Bridge area against potential airborne attacks. However, by the end of May, the situation deteriorated significantly: Santa Fe had fallen, and the retreat of the 10th Division had devolved into a chaotic rout. This development put the defenders at risk of allowing the enemy to reach Bambang before they could establish any strong delaying positions south of the town. In response, Yamashita ordered the 10th Division and the 2nd Tank Division to assemble for a defensive stand across Route 5 at Bato Bridge. He also repositioned the 105th Division to the Rayambugan Farm School and directed the 103rd Division to occupy the vacated defenses at Oriung Pass. Despite these strategic maneuvers, time was not on their side. General Krueger wasted no time launching an aggressive pursuit northward, immediately sending the relatively fresh 37th Division to drive straight up Route 5 from Santa Fe to Bagabag. This force was then to swing east through Oriung Pass into the Cagayan Valley, continuing its advance north along Route 5 toward Aparri. To prepare for a larger offensive, Krueger also intended to use the 25th and 33rd Divisions in the initial assault against the Japanese home islands. To this end, he directed the 32nd Division to take over operations in the Baguio area, while the 6th Division was tasked with relieving the 25th at Santa Fe before striking northwest up Route 4 into the deep Cordillera Central, pursuing the Japanese forces further into the mountainous terrain. Finally, Swift was ordered to execute limited attacks up Route 11 from Baguio, maintain the guerrilla offensive against Cervantes, and deploy the Connolly Task Force to follow Route 3 around the northwest tip of Luzon to secure the Aparri region. Leading the charge, the 129th Regiment of the 37th Division advanced north from Santa Fe on May 31, quickly encountering a reinforced provisional anti-tank unit just south of Aritao. This unit managed to delay the town's capture until June 5. However, the following day, Bambang fell without resistance, and the 129th faced only token opposition at Bato Bridge before ultimately reaching Bayombong on June 7. On June 8, the 145th Regiment took over the lead, and by nightfall, they had seized the crucial junction of Routes 4 and 5 near Bagabag without a fight. Advancing further, the 145th crossed the Magat River on June 9 and pressed toward Oriung Pass, where they rapidly engaged the reinforced 179th Independent Battalion. Although the outgunned and outnumbered defenders valiantly delayed the advance, the 145th pushed through the pass along Route 5 and secured it late on June 12. This breakthrough prompted the bulk of the 103rd Division to decide on a strategic retreat toward the Bontoc-Natonin area, while the remnants of the 4th Air Division abandoned Echague to join this withdrawal. By the evening of June 13, the 145th finally halted its advance at Santiago, while the 148th Regiment worked to neutralize the remaining Japanese positions at Oriung Pass. With these positions secured, the offensive resumed, resulting in the fall of the Echague airbase on June 14, followed by the occupation of Cauayan two days later. As we can see, neither the 10th Division nor the 2nd Tank Division managed to reach Bagabag in time to impede the American advance; the latter was assembling along the Bambang-Pingkian road. On June 12, the 20th Regiment initiated a southwest drive along this road from Bambang. Two days later, elements of the 126th Regiment began pushing west toward Pingkian from Aritao, thereby applying significant pressure on Iwanaka's beleaguered troops. Meanwhile, the 10th Division had become hopelessly cut off east of Route 5 and had retreated to the Old Spanish Trail south of Aritao. On June 11, the 25th Division launched a two-pronged attack against this isolated group, forcing General Okamoto's remnants to retreat eastward deep into the Sierra Madre. In the meantime, General Clarkson dispatched the 130th Regiment up Route 11, where they encountered the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, which was only capable of weak resistance. Poor weather conditions hindered the 33rd Division's operations in the following days, but by June 15, elements of the 130th Regiment had swung east along the Baguio-Aritao supply road and reached Ambuclao on the Agno River. To the north, Volckmann continued his offensive throughout June, deploying the 121st Regiment to clear Route 4 and secure the northern half of Lamagan Ridge. The 15th Regiment was tasked with advancing to seize Upper Cadsu Ridge and then moving generally northeast along the south side of Route 4. Additionally, the still-arriving 66th Regiment aimed to secure the area south of Butac and swing to the east on the 15th's right flank. As a result, both Lamagan Ridge and Lower Cadsu Ridge were cleared by June 5, with the 15th Regiment then turning its focus toward Upper Cadsu while the 121st Regiment advanced directly toward Bessang Pass. Volckmann's Provisional Battalion launched an attack on Magun Hill and, after a series of minor setbacks, succeeded in clearing much of the area by June 10. On that day, the 121st Regiment initiated a final assault toward Bessang Pass, advancing from the west and southwest. The following day, the Provisional Battalion began pressing in from the north and northeast. Meanwhile, the 15th Regiment overran the last organized resistance on Upper Cadsu on June 12, just as the 66th Regiment was reaching the southwestern corner of the ridge. Supported by artillery, the 121st finally overcame the last organized defenses at Bessang Pass on June 14, establishing contact with the Provisional Battalion east of the pass. On the same day, the final pockets of opposition crumbled before the 15th and 66th Regiments south of the pass. Consequently, the remnants of Japanese forces fled east along Route 4 toward Cervantes, pursued by elements of the 15th and 121st Regiments, which successfully secured the town before dark on June 15. During this final offensive, the guerrillas suffered losses of 119 men killed and 120 wounded, while exaggerated estimates placed Japanese losses at around 2,600 killed. At the same time, by mid-June, the guerrilla 11th and 14th Regiments had cleared almost all the valley west of the Cagayan River, stretching from Cauayan north to Aparri. They also gained complete control over Route 11 from Bontoc to the valley, effectively preventing the 103rd Division from joining Yamashita's last-stand positions. Meanwhile, the Connolly Task Force, after a largely uneventful march, approached Aparri and began an attack on June 11 to clear the last Japanese forces from the area. The last event forcing Yamashita to alter his plans came on 13 June, when the 6th Division's 63d Infantry began probing northwest up Route 4 from Bagabag. The reconnaissance foreshadowed a push that Yamashita especially feared, since Route 4 provided direct access to the deep Cordillera Central. The 105th Division, with defenses across Route 4 at the Rayambugan Farm School, did not have sufficient strength to hold the highway, Yamashita knew. Recognizing that he could not hope to maintain control along any of the three perimeters he had established in May, Yamashita issued new orders for a strategic withdrawal to a last-stand area. This new perimeter would be set up along the inhospitable valley of the Asin River, positioned between Routes 4 and 11. Accordingly, the orders were as follows: The 105th Division was to retreat from Route 4 to the Pacdan-Antipolo line. The 2nd Tank Division was to move north and hold the line from Tubliao to Antipolo. The 23rd Division was tasked with defending along the Adaoay-Bokod line. The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade was to hold the Agno Valley from Buguias south to Adaoay. The 19th Division was to consolidate the bulk of its forces into the Agno Valley, defending the river line from the Loo Valley south to Buguias. The 79th Brigade was assigned to defend Route 390 at Hapao. Once this last-stand perimeter collapsed, Yamashita planned for all remaining forces to retreat into the barren Asin Valley between Toccucan and Kiangkiang, prepared to fight to the death. The area behind this new last-stand perimeter boasted excellent defensive terrain, and Yamashita estimated that most of his units had sufficient ammunition for machine guns, mortars, and small arms to hold their positions for an extended period. However, the Shobu Group faced dire challenges: they were virtually out of medical supplies, had no clothing stocks, and their food reserves would be completely exhausted by mid-September. If they were not annihilated by the advancing Filipino-American forces, the Shobu Group could only anticipate a slow death by starvation and disease. Now, it's time to shift focus from the Philippines and head to Borneo to cover the preparations for the invasion of Balikpapan, codenamed Operation Oboe II. As the 9th Australian Division completed its tasks in North Borneo, General Milford's 7th Australian Division was assembling at Morotai for the upcoming invasion scheduled for July 1. Milford's plan entailed an amphibious assault on a two-brigade front between the Klandasan Besar River and Klandasan town, where the Japanese had established their strongest defenses.  In June, it was estimated that approximately 3,900 troops were stationed around Balikpapan, composed of: 1,500 in mobile units. 2,400 in anti-aircraft, air force, and base units. Additionally, there were 1,100 Japanese workers, 2,400 Indonesians, and 1,000 Formosans present. Near Samarinda, it was believed there were about 1,500 troops, plus possibly a battalion that had recently arrived from Tarakan. Experience had demonstrated that when estimating the strength of the enemy's resistance, every Japanese and Formosan, whether part of a fighting unit, base unit, or civilian labor group, had to be regarded as a combatant. Key defensive features included: At least 18 coast-defense guns, primarily located on ridges overlooking the sea. 26 heavy dual-purpose guns and 78 medium and light anti-aircraft guns. Offshore, between Klandasan and Manggar, rows of stout poles were driven into the seabed, horizontally braced with timber, and protected with barbed wire. An almost continuous anti-tank ditch, from 12 to 14 feet wide, extended above the beach from Stalkudo to Sepinggang. Extensive trench systems, with many tunnel openings, were detected on the ridges overlooking Klandasan. Numerous concrete strongpoints and a continuous line of bunkers lined the beach's fringe. This area was among the most strongly fortified that the Australians had encountered during the war. Indeed, Air Vice-Marshal Bostock, responsible for air support of the landing, cautioned the Prime Minister in a letter that these meticulously prepared defenses might result in Australian casualties comparable to those experienced during the landing at Gallipoli. It appeared that the Japanese had established their main defenses on the slopes overlooking the beaches from Klandasan to Stalkudo. The Australian staff believed the Japanese would attempt to contain the invaders within their beachhead area for as long as possible, before withdrawing inland, either south to Bandjermasin or overland to Bintulu in Sarawak. Additionally, it was anticipated that the enemy would direct burning oil onto the beach unless the oil tanks were destroyed during the preliminary bombardment. Brigadier Ivan Dougherty's 21st Brigade was to land with one battalion on Green Beach, while Brigadier Frederick Chilton's 18th Brigade would go ashore with two battalions on the Yellow and Red Beaches. Once a beachhead was secured, the 18th Brigade would seize the high ground dominating the town and clear the harbor for use, while the 21st Brigade would advance along the coast to capture the airstrips. Additionally, Brigadier Kenneth Eather's 25th Brigade, held in reserve, was set to land on July 2 with the likely objective of thrusting inland along the Milford Highway. Although Admiral Barbey favored a landing site farther east, possibly at Sepinggang, where their ships could be positioned more safely and further from Japanese coastal defense guns, Milford countered with sound reasoning: “Why land up the coast and have to fight miles through jungle, which suits the enemy, when you can go straight in under heavy supporting fire, which the enemy can't withstand, in comparatively open and favorable country?” Supported by General Morshead, this plan received approval, and by June 16, the 7th Division was successfully assembled at Morotai. Admiral Noble's Task Force 78 would once again transport the Australian troops to the landing area, supported by Rear-Admiral Ralph Riggs' cruiser group and Rear-Admiral William Sample's escort carriers. Against the Japanese defenses, Admiral Kamada's 22nd Special Base Force consisted of approximately 3,900 troops, with 1,500 in mobile units and 2,400 in anti-aircraft, air force, and base units, in addition to an estimated 4,500 laborers. In preparation for the invasion, aircraft from the Royal Australian Air Force and the 5th and 13th Air Forces began bombarding enemy defenses and storage tanks on June 4. These attacks intensified a week later as they specifically targeted Japanese gun positions. On June 15, Noble's minesweepers arrived to clear the sea around Balikpapan of magnetic mines, but faced losses, with three ships sunk and three damaged during the operation. Ten days later, American underwater demolition teams began working to locate and breach the underwater obstacles, often under heavy gunfire. To further confuse the enemy, efforts were made to create the impression that the landing would occur at Manggar. This included spreading rumors, landing a reconnaissance party in that area, and demolishing underwater obstacles at both Manggar and Sepinggang. Finally, on June 26, Noble's convoy set sail from Morotai. After an uneventful voyage, they reached Balikpapan unmolested just before dawn on July 1. During the morning, Riggs' cruisers and Noble's destroyers shelled the landing beaches and the defenses behind them, continuing the bombardment until the first waves of landing craft were within 1,300 yards of the shore, at which point the fire shifted to the flanks and rear of the enemy positions. About an hour before the landing, a combined rocket barrage and low-level airstrike were executed, followed by a second rocket barrage just ten minutes before the troops hit the beaches. In total, during the 20 days leading up to the assault, the Balikpapan-Manggar area received 3,000 tons of bombs, 7,361 rockets, 38,052 shells, and 114,000 rounds from automatic weapons, all aimed at crippling the formidable Japanese defenses. Covered by a successful bombardment, the assault waves finally hit the beaches just before 09:00. However, due to navigation errors, the troops were put ashore at the wrong locations. The 2/27th Battalion landed on Yellow Beach instead of Green Beach and quickly captured the Ration, Romilly, Rottnest, and Charlie's Spur positions. The 2/12th Battalion landed on Red Beach instead of Yellow, necessitating a northeast swing to take over Ration and reduce the remaining Japanese defenses in the area. A platoon was also detached to push inland along Vasey Road to seize Portee, while other elements secured Parkes, Plug, and Blyth's Junction. The 2/10th Battalion, correctly landing on Red Beach, rapidly seized the high ground in front of them. Patrols found Prudent and Petersham Junction to be unoccupied. The 2/10th then assembled at Petersham Junction and captured the lower slopes of Hill 87, successfully taking the hill under assault by noon. Meanwhile, Dougherty landed his reserve units, which also came ashore further west than expected on Yellow Beach. The 2/16th Battalion quickly assembled at Ravenshoe and captured Record, Pigeon, and Mount Malang. By 11 a.m. the battalion was on Ravenshoe, whence Malang and Pigeon were visible. Advancing under sharp fire Captain Madigan's company on the left took Record about 4 p.m., killing 46 Japanese. At 4.5 Captain R. H. Christian's company launched a concerted attack on Malang, sup-ported by the fire of artillery, mortars and machine-guns, and using a flame-thrower. The hill was taken and 40 Japanese were killed. The Australians lost four killed, including the leading platoon commander, Lieutenant Armstrong, and 14 wounded. By nightfall the 2/16th held a line through Malang, Pigeon and Record. It had lost 6 killed or died of wounds in the day and 24 wounded; 86 Japanese dead had been counted.  The 2/14th Battalion advanced swiftly to secure a bridgehead over the Klandasan Besar and seized the Stalkudo ridge. The 2/5th Commando Squadron passed through this bridgehead and attacked northeast but encountered heavy opposition. Returning to Hill 87, the 2/10th Battalion assaulted and captured Parramatta in the afternoon, aided by artillery and tanks, while patrols further secured Newcastle and the Cracking Plant by dusk. A patrol led by Sergeant A. A. Evans was sent out from Davey's platoon towards Newcastle. They silenced a bunker with a flame-thrower, and came to a house from which Japanese were firing. They overcame this position with grenades and small arms fire and then moved on to New-castle. As Evans reached Newcastle he saw the surviving Japanese making off towards Portee. Davey's platoon now occupied Newcastle and the other platoon took up positions on Parramatta. The seizure of Parramatta gave the 2/10th observation over the low ground to the north and the northern end of the town, and tied the battalion in with the 2/12th on Portee; the Japanese were now in a very poor position to counter-attack from the western end of the beach-head. Lieutenant Russack of Sanderson's company led a patrol to the Cracking Plant where it silenced a Japanese pill-box. This patrol was strafed by American aircraft, but worse was to follow. At 4.55 American carrier-borne aircraft made a run over Parramatta from the west and dropped bombs and fired rockets across Hill 87, which had then been in the hands of the 2/10th for four hours and a half. Much of this fire landed in the area into which Captain Brocksopp's" company ("D") had moved and where Daly's command post was established. Three were killed, including Lance-Sergeant Hackett, a veteran of several cam-paigns, and 14 wounded, including Major G. R. Miethke and two other officers. Air panels were displayed in all platoon areas after this. Daly decided to hold that night as far forward as Newcastle, on which he placed two platoons plus a platoon of the 2/1st Machine Gun Bat-talion, all under Captain Bowie. In the day the battalion had lost 13 killed and 30 wounded, but 216 Japanese dead were counted. That night 24 more Japanese were killed while trying to penetrate the Australians' positions and no Australian was hit. All night there were fires round about where houses were burning, and the blazing oil tanks on the Tank Plateau 600 yards to the west of the Parramatta ridge lit up the landscape. Finally, Brigadier Chilton also landed the reserve 2/9th Battalion on Red Beach and sent it west in the afternoon to occupy Klandasan town, leading to the capture of Santosa Hill by nightfall. Thus, the Australians successfully landed at Balikpapan and secured a sizable beachhead, marking the beginning of what would become a fierce and challenging battle. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In June 1945, American forces, led by Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, fought fiercely against Japanese troops in Luzon, achieving significant victories despite heavy resistance. The tide turned as they captured key positions, restoring hope to Filipinos. Meanwhile, preparations for the Balikpapan invasion intensified. The 7th Australian Division readied for an amphibious assault on July 1 against well-fortified Japanese defenses. Despite facing strong opposition, the Australians successfully landed at various beaches, seizing vital ground.

Last time we spoke about the Liberation of Mindanao. In the spring of 1945, as the battle for Okinawa intensified, American forces relentlessly confronted entrenched Japanese troops. General Buckner's 10th Army faced fierce resistance amidst harsh weather and dwindling supplies. Despite these challenges, they captured the strategic Shuri Castle, marking a critical turning point as Japanese troops retreated. Simultaneously, the liberation of Mindanao was underway. American troops, under General Eichelberger, rapidly advanced, overcoming fortified Japanese defenses in mountainous terrain. With the 24th Division securing key locations like Digos and Davao, the 31st Division pushed northward against General Morozumi's forces. Despite stubborn resistance, American forces displayed tenacity and courage, leading to significant victories. By May 20, the Americans approached Malaybalay, where remnants of the 30th Field Artillery Regiment held their ground. As Japanese troops attempted to regroup, they faced relentless assaults from the advancing American divisions. Throughout the campaign, the Americans endured heavy casualties, but their determination led to more than 10,000 Japanese losses. This episode is the North Borneo Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we continue our story, by June 9, General Buckner's forces had pushed through to the enemy's main defensive line on the Kiyamu Peninsula. It was there that General Ushijima was preparing to make his final stand. Meanwhile, General Shepherd's 6th Marine Division landed on the Oroku Peninsula, determined to dismantle a stubborn pocket held by Admiral Ota's naval units. On June 10, the pace of the assault quickened dramatically. Colonel Shapley's 4th Marines broke through enemy defenses, capturing the strategic Hills 58 and 55(2). At the same time, Colonel Roberts' 22nd Marines secured Hills 28 and 55(1). Although Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines made only limited progress, they effectively identified the last significant pocket of resistance in the high ground west of Oroku village. Looking south, General Del Valle's 1st Marine Division also reignited its offensive. Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines successfully advanced into Itoman and Tera, while Colonel Mason's 1st Marines, supported by tanks, cleared the southern slopes of the key ridge between Tera and Yuza, capturing Yuza Hill in the process. To the east, General Bradley's 96th Division launched a renewed attack, bolstered by artillery and tank support. Colonel May's 383rd Regiment advanced approximately 700 yards toward the town of Yuza. Meanwhile, Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment pushed into Yunagusuku and Tomui. However, they faced fierce resistance, quickly encountering heavy machine-gun fire originating from the heights of Yaeju Dake, which halted their advance. Meanwhile, General Arnold's 7th Division continued its relentless push toward Nakaza, employing the full might of their tanks and artillery. Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment steadily advanced onto the eastern slopes of Hill 95, pressing toward Hanagusuku. At the same time, Colonel Pachler's 17th Regiment fought to solidify its precarious position on the southeast end of Yaeju Dake. Back at sea, a kamikaze attack tragically sank the destroyer William D. Porter. That same day, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 unleashed a barrage of bombs and artillery on Minami Daito Island before retreating to Leyte-Samar after 89 consecutive days off the coast of Okinawa. This marked the conclusion of their role in Operation Iceberg. The following day, the sustained pressure from Arnold's offensive began to fracture General Suzuki's 44th Independent Mixed Brigade on both flanks.Seas of flame engulfed Hill 95 on 11 June as 1/32 slowly advanced toward the crest of the enemy position behind the jets of armored flame throwers. Flame fuel was pumped and sprayed from hoses over portions of the ridge inaccessible to tanks and then ignited. Infantrymen moved among the still hot and smoking rocks and drove back the surviving defenders. That night the battalion dug in just short of the Hill 95 peak. Although little forward progress was made by 2/32 or the 17th Infantry on 11 June, the enemy position was considerably weakened. Intensive fire from supporting weapons was concentrated against the slopes of Yaeju Dake, and strong patrols cleaned out enemy groups that held positions near the 7th Division front lines. The 32nd Regiment achieved a significant victory by capturing the peak of Hill 95, while the 17th Regiment struggled to make further headway To the west, advances in the 96th Division zone were minimal as Bradley's regiments focused on consolidating their newly-won positions amidst intense enemy fire. Simultaneously, at Yuza Hill, fierce counterattacks were thwarted, and Mason's 2nd Battalion accomplished the critical capture of Hill 69, just west of Ozato, despite heavy machine-gun fire coming from Yuza Dake. Further east, ahead of the 7th Marines, some 800 yards from the southern fringes of the two settlements, lay "the scene of the most frantic, bewildering, and costly close-in battle on the southern tip of Okinawa"Kunishi Ridge. This precipitous coral escarpment constituted the western-most anchor of the last heavily defended line on Okinawa. The ridge contained innumerable caves, emplacements, and tombs on both the forward and reverse slopes. The intervening area between this formidable fortress and the lines of the 7th Marines was a broad valley of grassy fields and rice paddies which offered no protection to advancing infantry. The supporting tanks were restricted to two approaches into the position: a road across the valley which cut through the center of the ridge and another along the coast line. Both of these routes were covered by anti-tank guns. Shortly after noon patrols from the 1st and 2nd Battalions moved out with armored support to probe the Japanese defenses. Intense frontal fire from Kunishi Ridge, enfilade fire from the enemy on Hill 69 opposing the attack of 2/1, and artillery concentrations directed at the tanks forced a withdrawal at 14:47. Because of the complete fire coverage of the open valley enjoyed by the Japanese, both from the heights and slopes of the ridge itself and from the Yuza Dake area, it was apparent that a daylight assault of the position would be a costly affair. Consequently, after Colonel Snedeker had made a personal reconnaissance of the objective from a light liaison plane, it was determined to attack at night. The commanding officers of the assault battalions were oriented on the general plan during the afternoon. The central road and a line of telephone poles was designated as the boundary between battalions upon which the assault units would guide. The scheme of maneuver contemplated a penetration of the ridge where the road passed through it, followed by an expansion of the initial foothold to the right and left flanks to secure the remainder of the objective in the regimental zone of action. Normal artillery would be placed alternately on Kunishi Ridge and Mezado Ridge (500-600 yards southwest of Kunishi) until H-Hour and thereafter on the latter. On June 11, General Shepherd launched a concerted attack. The 22nd Marines successfully secured the Tomigusuki area and Hill 53, while the 29th Marines faced stiff opposition, making only limited gains against the heavily fortified hills west of Oroku. Meanwhile, the 4th Marines worked to strengthen their line, completing the encirclement of Ota's naval forces. Nevertheless, the ramparts of the Oroku fortress were cracking, and Admiral Ota released his last dispatch to General Ushijima: “Enemy tank groups are now attacking our cave headquarters. The Naval Base Force is dying gloriously at this moment… We are grateful for your past kindnesses and pray for the success of the Army.” During the night, artillery units successfully targeted and either killed or dispersed a group of Japanese troops attempting to cross the Kokuba River. Meanwhile, 51 infiltrators were eliminated as they tried to breach the lines held by the 22nd Marines. The following day, the 4th and 29th Marines intensified their efforts to compress the enemy pocket west of Tomigusuki, breaking through to seize Easy Hill while the 22nd Marines consolidated their positions. The capture of this key terrain feature forced the enemy into the alluvial flats along the coast between Oroku and Hill 53. "In the late afternoon enemy troops began displaying flags of surrender. Language officers equipped with loud speaker systems were dispatched to the front line areas to assist in the surrender of those Japs who desired to. The attempt was partially successful, 86 enemy soldiers voluntarily laid down their arms." For several days General Buckner had been sending messages to the Japanese commander by radio broadcast and air drops pointing out the hopelessness of the enemy situation in an attempt to persuade General Ushijima to surrender. During the afternoon of 11 June, Tenth Army representatives were conducted to the 2d Battalion OP overlooking Itoman to await any enemy party that might desire to negotiate. At 1700 all fire was suspended in the 7th Marines' area pending the doubtful appearance of a white flag. About 15 Japanese wearing white headgear appeared in the 1/7 zone in front of Company A at 1740, but dispersed when hailed. Six of the enemy surrendered to Company C at 1802, but the situation returned to normal two minutes later when hostile mortar fire fell on the captors' position. Final orders for the resumption of the attack were issued by Colonel Snedeker about 2000 setting H-Hour at 0330, 12 June. Both 1/7 and 2/7 were to make the assault with one company each, and at 0225 Company C moved out to establish contact with Company F on the line of departure. The attack was launched on schedule at 0330 and at 0500 Companies B and G moved out in support of the assault companies. Concurrently, Company F reached the objective at a point 500 yards north of Mezado village, as Company C came up on its left to extend the line eastward. The enemy was completely surprised and several small groups were wiped out by Company C while they were engaged in preparing breakfast. At the same time, the 1st Battalion extended the line eastward toward Kunishi. However, the Japanese quickly regrouped, pinning down the attackers for the rest of the day, though the Marines managed to reinforce and consolidate their hard-won gains. By midnight the positions there could be considered reasonably secure. But as General del Valle put it, "The situation was one of those tactical oddities of this peculiar warfare. We were on the ridge. The Japs were in it, both on the forward and reverse slopes." Elsewhere, the 1st Marines focused on mopping up Hill 69, dispatching patrols south through Ozato and maintaining their defenses on Yazu Hill. To the east, another pre-dawn attack initiated by the 17th Regiment caught the defenders off guard.  Colonel Pachler had compelling reasons for favoring a night operation. The defenders held a significant advantage in observation, which had posed serious challenges when the 3rd Battalion of the 17th Infantry seized the southeast end of the escarpment. The coral wall of the escarpment was particularly high at this end, and the narrow routes leading to the high ground were easily controlled by Japanese fire. After days of holding positions at the base of the 170-foot cliff, the troops had grown familiar with the terrain and, as their commander, Major Maynard Weaver, noted, they were eager to reach the top and finally see something new. The night attack was primarily planned for the 1st Battalion, but Colonel Pachler decided to coordinate a move to expand the territory held by the 3rd Battalion as well. The final plan involved three assault companies: Company A would occupy a cluster of coral about a hundred yards beyond the edge of the escarpment, near the boundary between the 7th and 96th Divisions. Company B aimed for a similar objective located about 200 yards to the southeast, while Company L was assigned to capture a small hill situated between the 1st Battalion's targets and the positions held by the 3rd Battalion since June 11. Each company was given a separate route: Company A's path led straight up the cliff's face, Company B needed to head south to reach a break in the escarpment before turning right toward its goal, and Company L had an accessible objective near the edge of the escarpment. Movement was set to begin at 0400 on June 12. Since the attack relied on stealth, no artillery preparation was planned. However, two battalions of 105-mm artillery, one battery of 155-mm howitzers, and an 8-inch howitzer battalion were scheduled to deliver heavy harassing fire during the night. Additionally, 21 batteries registered their fire on the afternoon of June 11 and were ready to provide protective artillery support if needed once the objectives were reached. For added firepower, a section of heavy machine guns was assigned to each assault company. Colonel Pachler meticulously planned the attack, ensuring that every soldier involved understood the details of the operation. Reconnaissance patrols had scouted the trails leading to the high ground, and demolition teams had already prepared known cave positions at the cliff's face with satchel charges. Despite thorough preparations, there was a collective apprehension about potential confusion caused by the unknown conditions of darkness. This anxiety was amplified at 2000 on the night of June 11 when the 7th Division G-2 Section intercepted an enemy radio message indicating, "Prepare to support the attack at 2300." Soon after, another intercepted message stated, "If there are any volunteers for the suicide penetration, report them before the contact which is to be made one hour from now." Meanwhile, from dusk until almost 2300, the Japanese unleashed a heavy artillery barrage, leading front-line troops to anticipate a counterattack. That counterattack did come, aimed at the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry, which had reached the summit of Hill 95 earlier that day, as well as against the 96th Division. However, there was no enemy activity observed in the 17th Infantry's sector. As night illumination and harassing fire ceased shortly before 0400, the attack proceeded according to plan. The companies moved out in single file. Remarkably, a heavy fog settled over southern Okinawa, creating the perfect conditions for concealment while allowing the troops to follow their paths without confusion. On the high ground, Company A encountered a few civilians wandering about, while the leading platoon of Company B unexpectedly came across three Japanese soldiers as they reached the shelf of the escarpment. The Americans chose to ignore them and continued silently on their way, with the enemy surprisingly not opening fire. By 0530, just minutes after dawn, Companies A and B were in position without firing a single shot. Company L also successfully reached its objective, and eager to capitalize on the fog and absence of enemy fire, its commander sent a support platoon to a small hill fifty yards beyond. This objective was secured quickly, but not without incident; two enemy soldiers were killed in the process. The platoon leader reported their progress but quickly called for mortar fire as about fifty Japanese troops approached in a column. The Americans opened fire with rifles and BARs, disrupting the formation and resulting in thirty-seven enemy soldiers killed, while the rest managed to escape. The men of the 1st Battalion celebrated the success of the night attack. Shortly after Company A took position, four enemy soldiers stumbled into view and were swiftly eliminated. A few moments later, another four followed suit, meeting the same fate. Company B remained undisturbed until around 0530 when Japanese soldiers attempted to emerge from several caves within the company's area. Although the cave entrances were heavily reinforced with concrete and couldn't be sealed with demolition charges, the Marines guarded the openings and shot at the Japanese as they appeared. Not long after daylight, Company C began clearing the caves at the base of the escarpment, eventually regrouping with the rest of the battalion on the high ground. By 0800, the situation had stabilized, and the 17th Infantry held strong positions on Yaeju Dake. During the night, the Japanese had withdrawn their front-line troops from Yaeju Dake to escape the punishing artillery fire, intending to reoccupy it before the anticipated 0700 attack. Fifteen hours after the 32nd Infantry fought their way to the top of Hill 95, the 17th Infantry had executed a masterful night attack to seize their portion of Yaeju Dake. Throughout the day, the 2nd Battalion of the 17th Infantry relieved Companies I and K, and with Company L attached and supported by medium and flame tanks, continued the offensive. The 1st Battalion maintained its position, firing at enemy soldiers who were slow to realize that their defensive terrain had been lost. Company B alone accounted for sixty-three Japanese soldiers killed throughout the day. Taking advantage of this breakthrough, the 381st Regiment advanced to occupy the slopes of Yaeju Dake, while the 383rd extended the division front and secured Yuza. As the situation unfolded, Japanese troops maintained control over Big Apple Peak, which towered about sixty feet above the surrounding plateau. However, by the evening of June 12, the 7th and 96th Divisions had succeeded in forcing the reconstituted 44th Independent Mixed Brigade from the southeastern end of the enemy's line. General Ushijima acted swiftly, given the limitations imposed by his damaged communication system and the chaos among his front-line units. With his artillery nearly silenced by enemy bombardments and his supplies dwindling faster than his manpower, Ushijima's only hope lay in sending more troops into the relentless shellfire and flames unleashed by American forces sweeping across the frontline. His urgent order read: “The enemy in the 44th IMB sector has finally penetrated our main line of resistance. The plan of the 44th IMB is to annihilate, with its main strength, the enemy penetrating the Yaeju-Dake sector. The Army will undertake to reoccupy and hold its Main Line of Resistance to the death. The 62nd Division will place two selected infantry battalions under the command of the CG, 44th IMB.” Unfortunately, the 64th Brigade, the part of the 62nd Division that had shifted from Shuri to reserve positions near Makabe, didn't receive this order until late on June 13, a full thirty hours after it became critical. This piecemeal commitment of reserve troops proved to be grossly inadequate. By June 13, the 44th Brigade was teetering on the brink of destruction. When reinforcements finally arrived, they found the remnants of the 44th Brigade overwhelmed and absorbed into the reinforcing battalions, with still not enough men to hold the line. In a last-ditch effort, the enemy committed the main strength of the 62nd Division, his final reserve, with a desperate plea for cooperation and orders to "reoccupy and secure the Main Line of Resistance." However, by the time the 62nd Division moved onto the line, they ran headlong into General Hodge's forces, who were advancing southward across the coral-studded plateau. The Americans pressed forward, shielded by the fire of machine guns and tanks, advancing over the bodies of Japanese defenders who had fought fiercely to hold their last stronghold "to the death." On June 13, General Arnold resumed his assault against the rapidly disintegrating 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. The 32nd Regiment successfully secured the Hill 95-Hanagusuku area, while the 17th Regiment expanded its control over the escarpment's summit. To the west, May's 3rd Battalion and Halloran's 2nd Battalion struggled to capture the top of the escarpment despite repeated attempts. However, they significantly diminished the defenders' strength with a relentless volume of covering fire. At the same time, May's 1st Battalion advanced through Yuza and swept southward to successfully secure Ozato. Meanwhile, General Del Valle prepared to commit the 1st Marines to the fight on Kunishi Ridge, as the isolated 7th Marines continued to be pinned down by heavy Japanese fire, relying on tanks for supplies and evacuation. Further north, the 29th Marines launched an attack southeast to eliminate the enemy pocket, while Shapley's 3rd Battalion moved swiftly toward the beach, progressively chasing the demoralized Japanese forces from the thick brush and marshy terrain along the waterfront. As they reached the sea wall, the assault turned into a rout. Some of the enemy threw down their arms and fled at the Marines' approach. Large numbers surrendered; but some fought back with hand grenades in desperate, individual last ditch stands, while many more used grenades to destroy themselves in despair. The sea wall was reached at noon, and the remainder of the day was spent running to earth small groups hiding in the cane fields and rice paddies. In the late afternoon General Shepherd notified General Geiger that all organized resistance on Oroku had ceased. In the early hours of June 14, Mason's 2nd Battalion advanced toward Kunishi Ridge, tenaciously fighting their way to positions east of the 7th Marines, which remained isolated. Simultaneously, Shepherd's reinforced Reconnaissance Company successfully landed on Senaga Island, completing the occupation of the Oroku Peninsula. Looking south once again, May's 1st Battalion completed the cleanup in Ozato but soon had to withdraw from its vulnerable position, while the rest of the 383rd Regiment pressed forward to the edge of the escarpment west of Yaeju Dake. To the east, despite heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, the 381st Regiment maintained constant pressure on the northern face of Yaeju Dake, finally reaching the top of the escarpment by nightfall. Their success allowed them to link up with the 7th Division, which dealt a crushing blow to the 13th Independent Battalion, advancing approximately 300 yards across the front. After a night of disorganized counterattacks and infiltration attempts, the 7th Division launched an assault toward Hills 115 and 153, advancing about 1,200 yards and reaching the outer slopes of the hill positions. To the west, the 381st Regiment and May's 3rd Battalion successfully secured the escarpment between Yuza and Yaeju Dake, although the remainder of the 383rd struggled to move forward due to heavy fire from Yuza Dake. On Kunishi Ridge, the pressure from the Japanese remained relentless, restricting the 7th Marines to only minor local gains. However, Mason's 2nd Battalion managed to inch its way along the ridge, successfully extending the line by about 200 yards to the east. Behind them, Colonel Griebel's 5th Marines began to relieve the weary 1st Marines, with Griebel's 2nd Battalion finally moving forward during the night to support Mason's isolated 2nd Battalion. On June 16, after an intense bombardment of artillery, mortars, and rockets, the 7th Marines finally broke through. Snedeker's 1st Battalion advanced along the northern slope of Kunishi Ridge, while the 2nd Battalion extended the line into the initial high ground of the Mezado hill mass. Concurrently, Griebel's 2nd Battalion advanced, making slow but steady progress until they secured a coral peak on the ridge that commanded their position. To the east, the 62nd Division, attempting to move from its reserve locations southwest of Makabe to support the faltering Japanese lines, faced devastating fire from artillery, ship guns, and aerial bombardments of rockets and napalm. Seizing the opportunity created by the relentless bombardment of enemy rear areas, Bradley launched his battalions through the Yuza Dake perimeter. Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment pushed through the 383rd and advanced toward Ozato, aiming to gain control of the high ground southwest of Yuza, while May's 3rd Battalion successfully captured Yuza Dake. Additionally, the 381st Regiment gained approximately 600 yards along its front, reaching the saddle between Yuza Dake and Hill 153. Meanwhile, the 17th Regiment pressed onto the forward slopes of Hill 153, and the 32nd Regiment, driving down the coast, took Hill 115, effectively eliminating the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment. Back at sea, despite a significant depletion of Japanese air strength, a kamikaze attack succeeded in sinking the destroyer Twiggs.  But now, it's time to leave Okinawa and turn our attention to Borneo, where we continue covering the Australian offensive. As we last noted, by May 6, Brigadier Whitehead's 26th Australian Brigade had successfully landed on Tarakan, pushing the Japanese garrison into the island's rugged interior. By the evening of 6th May fairly copious information obtained from prisoners and Indonesians and from captured documents indicated that the enemy had about 390 naval troops in the Mount Api area, about 400 troops and civilians in the Fukukaku headquarters area (embracing Hills 105 and 102), 200 from Sesanip along Snags Track to Otway, 300 on Otway and in District VI, 300 in the Amal River area and 60 at Cape Juata. Having lost the airfield and the water-purifying plant and hospitals "the enemy at this time was displaying a decided disinclination to hold ground. In particular he was shunning any ground which could be subjected to heavy bombing, shelling, or attack by tanks; or against which large-scale attacks could be launched by our troops"; and he was directing his operations to delaying the attackers, particularly with mines, booby-traps, suicide raids, and isolated parties fighting to the death in tunnels and dugouts. The 4th Company of Tokoi Force (IJA) plus the 1st Company of the 2nd Naval Guard Force were on Hill 105, Margy and Janet; the 1st Company of Tokoi Force, and other troops were on Hill 102. In the north was a composite group. To secure the recently captured airfield from potential counterattacks, raids, or indirect fire, Brigadier Whitehead decided to deploy the 2/48th Battalion to gain the high ground north of the town, reaching up to Snags Track. The 2/4th Commando Squadron was tasked with advancing along Snags Track toward the Sesanip oilfields, while the 2/3rd Pioneers were assigned to sweep the high ground east of the town and move along John's Track to the mouth of the Ama River. Meanwhile, the Dutch company was to clear the unoccupied Cape Batu peninsula, a task that proved surprisingly straightforward. In the Mount Api area, however, the 2/23rd Battalion faced fierce resistance, particularly at Tiger and along Crazy Ridge, resulting in minimal progress until they were relieved by the 2/24th Battalion on May 9. Further to the right, the 2/48th Battalion seized Otway without opposition, and the commandos successfully cleared Snags Track up to Haigh's by May 8, though tanks could not advance any further. The pioneers, on the other hand, encountered heavy resistance along John's Track, which they couldn't overcome until May 9. That day, a long-distance patrol from the 2/24th Battalion also succeeded in driving the Japanese out of the Juata oilfields after a skirmish. On May 10, while the 2/48th and the commandos patrolled aggressively forward, the pioneers began their assault on the heavily defended Helen feature, which would successfully repel repeated Australian attacks for the next five days. Simultaneously, the 2/24th faced strong resistance in the Mount Api area but tenaciously pushed forward to Hill 105 on May 11, capturing Tiger the following night. They conducted patrols that probed about 1,000 yards southeast, cutting Snags Track at several points. On May 12, the 2/48th set out to cut King's Track and clear the heights from Sykes to Butch. The next morning, they successfully attacked and captured the knoll north of Snags Track. Meanwhile, following a highly effective air bombardment, the key Helen feature was found abandoned on May 15. This allowed the pioneers to clear John's Track and reach the coast at the mouth of the Amal River. Concurrently, the commandos secured the Agnes feature, followed by the 2/24th Battalion's capture of Elbow on May 16. The remaining positions on Hill 105 were then subjected to intensive bombing and bombardment, leading to an Australian assault on May 19. They finally captured the feature the following day. In the meantime, the 2/48th Battalion moved to Agnes to attack the Freda feature on May 14.  It was now evident that if the Freda hill was to be taken the attack must have heavier support. Therefore, on 22nd May, 12 Liberators and 12 Lightnings were sent out with bombs and napalm, but the cloud was so low that some of the heavy bombers did not find the objective. Then the artillery and mortars fired, and a two-company attack went in, the infantry moving very close behind the barrage. Gooden's company thrust from the east, and Captain Nicholas's advanced with one platoon pushing east along Snags Track towards Track Junction Knoll and another pressing north. The former platoon (Lieutenant Harvey), moving through very difficult country along a razor-back so narrow that only two men could be deployed on it, edged forward under heavy fire; after losing one killed and 4 wounded and finding the enemy becoming stronger Harvey manoeuvred out of this position. It was then found that a wounded man was not with them, so Harvey and three volunteers thrust back and engaged the enemy fiercely while the wounded man was carried out. During the day Gooden's company on the right had encountered two strongly-held knolls. Derrick's platoon succeeded in cutting the saddle between them and taking one knoll. Derrick's platoon and another launched “a most courageous attack up the steep slopes of Knoll 2 in the fading light. Here, in some of the heaviest and most bitter close-in fighting of the whole campaign these two platoons finally reached the top and secured the Knoll after inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.... [Lance-Sergeant] Fennells time and again ... crawled ahead of the attacking troops, even to within five yards of the enemy, and gained vital information. On one occasion, when his section was forced to ground he had charged the Jap positions with his Owen gun blazing and had silenced the enemy post, killing the occupants. In a similar manner, Private W. R. How found the advance of the troops checked by a well-sited pill-box, raced forward with his Owen firing until within grenade range, and then, throwing grenades, moved in for the kill until he fell wounded. He had silenced the post and killed the machine-gunner, thus allowing the advance to continue.” At this stage 28 enemy dead had been counted; one Australian had been killed and 15 wounded.  Unfortunately, the Japanese counterattacked the following day, effectively recapturing the position. Following a devastating combination of air and artillery bombardment, the Australians managed to secure Freda and Track Junction Knoll on May 25. During this time, the 2/23rd Battalion remained in close contact with a resolute enemy at Janet and Margy but struggled to make significant progress. The 2/24th Battalion continued probing northward and captured the Droop feature on May 26. After another failed attack on May 29, a heavy air and artillery bombardment supported the 2/23rd as they finally captured Margy on May 31. Concurrently, the 2/24th successfully attacked and held the Poker Hills. On June 1, the 2/48th Battalion then attacked Hill 102, supported by aircraft and machine-gun fire. Lieutenant O'Rourke's platoon attacked, following an artillery barrage as closely as they could, and bringing with them three flame-throwers. They gained the forward slopes without being fired on and then saw five Japanese moving towards them, evidently to re-enter their positions after the bombing. These were fired on while the flame-throwers were brought into action. One operator sprayed the slope from side to side while another fired straight up it. “The result was devastating (said O'Rourke later). The hill was set completely ablaze to a depth of 50 yards, two of the five Japs were set on fire and the other three killed in their posts. The platoon was able to advance almost immediately through the flames, and with the help of the flame-throwers the feature was com-pletely captured within 15 minutes of the advance commencing. The flame which was fired up a slight rise hit the trees on the crest and also sprayed the reverse slope and had the effect of completely demoralising the enemy.“ While the Australians launched an unsuccessful assault on Wally, the 2/23rd Battalion was engaged in clearing out the remaining Japanese forces from Margy and its surrounding areas. On June 6, the Australians finally secured Wally, and the 2/24th Battalion also managed to capture Roger. In the early hours of June 10, the Japanese launched a counterattack toward Hill 105, but it was easily repelled. At the same time, the defenders began preparing for a withdrawal northeast into the island's interior, planning to split into independent groups to wage guerrilla warfare. Despite the looming withdrawal, Whitehead's battalions commenced attacks on Beech 2, Joyce, and Linda on June 11. However, progress was slow over the next three days, with the only notable achievement being the capture of Sandy on June 13. By nightfall that day, the Japanese finally began their withdrawal, leaving behind only rearguards to hold the crucial Essie Track. This allowed the Australians to capture the abandoned features of Linda, Joyce, Clarice, Hilda Paddy, Melon, and Aunty on June 14. The next day, the Australians took Nelly and Faith, but the Japanese rearguard on Essie Ridge managed to temporarily halt their pursuit. Eventually, however, Essie Ridge was overrun, and by June 16, Fukukaku was cleared. The 2/48th Battalion then pursued the Japanese as they fled eastward from Essie. On June 18, they caught a few but found that a large group had scattered into smaller parties. By June 19, patrols were radiating east, north, and west in pursuit, with Japanese forces standing firm at several points. Ultimately, the fall of Hill 90 on June 20 marked the end of organized resistance on Tarakan. Following this victory, Whitehead initiated a mop-up operation that would continue until the war's end. While the 26th Brigade was fighting to secure Tarakan, General Wootten's 9th Australian Division was preparing to launch the invasion of the Brunei Bay area of north Borneo, codenamed Operation Oboe VI. At the Manila conference in April General Morshead had learnt that OBOE I (Tarakan), OBOE VI (north Borneo) and OBOE II (Balikpapan) were to be carried out in that order. 34 LSTs would be allotted for OBOE VI but had to be released by 23 days after the landing. There were other fairly severe restrictions on the vessels available: the one boat battalion of the American Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment and the one amphibian tractor battalion allotted to OBOE VI had to be used for Balikpapan. Morshead and his staff arrived back at Morotai from Manila on April 21 and next day the Corps issued its staff study of the north Borneo operation, and the 9th Division's staff, which from April 4 to 17 had been planning an operation against Balikpapan, began preparing an outline plan for an attack on Brunei Bay instead. This was presented to Corps and approved on April 26; the final plan, which contained no major changes, was approved on May 16. Meanwhile a variety of problems had arisen at the Corps level and above. On May 1, 2200 troops and 1200 vehicles (including guns) of the 9th Division were still in the Cairns or Atherton areas awaiting shipment, and some of the stores and equipment were not scheduled to arrive at Morotai until May 25, two days after the proposed date of the landing. It also appeared that, on the day of the landing, the 24th Brigade would lack some unit stores and vehicles, and the 20th Brigade would possess only one battalion; there would be no field or anti-aircraft guns, a shortage of signal vehicles and equipment, no equipment for building wharves and bulk oil storage, and neither of the casualty clearing stations allotted would be present. Due to a series of issues at the Corps level and above, the invasion plan had been scaled down to a landing by a brigade on Labuan Island and just a battalion on Muara Island, with the operation further postponed to June 10. The strategy involved landing Brigadier Selwyn Porter's 24th Brigade on Victoria Harbor's Brown Beaches to capture the Labuan airfield and eliminate all hostile forces on the island. Simultaneously, Brigadier William Windeyer's 20th Brigade would put ashore the 2/15th Battalion on Muara Island's White Beach and the 2/17th Battalion on Brunei Bluff's Green Beach. These units were tasked with capturing Brooketon and securing the southern and western sides of Muara Island, setting the stage for an advance on Brunei Town. Upon capturing these objectives, the 9th Division was to occupy and defend the Brunei Bay-Beaufort area and take control of the Miri-Lutong-Seria regions. Once again, Admiral Barbey's Naval Attack Force, primarily comprising Admiral Royal's transports and Admiral Berkey's cruisers, was designated to facilitate the amphibious movement of troops to Brunei Bay. In preparation for the invasion, American and Australian air forces, under General Kenney's command, targeted airfields and other military installations, focusing particularly on destroying bridges on the railway to Jesselton to prevent the arrival of reinforcements to Labuan by rail. On June 4, Barbey's convoy finally departed Morotai, embarking on its 1,100-mile voyage to Brunei Bay. Air attacks intensified on June 5, successfully rendering the Papar River bridge unusable. Four days later, on June 9, the air campaign reached its peak: 54 Liberators and 24 Mitchells launched strikes against targets on Labuan, while 23 Liberators targeted the Brooketon area. In the meantime, minesweepers successfully cleared a channel into the bay, destroying 69 mines between June 7 and 9. Berkey's cruisers sailed ahead and shelled the Brown, White, and Green Beaches in the two days leading up to the landings. The convoy finally arrived at the main channel between Labuan Island and Brunei Bluff just before sunrise on June 10, fully prepared to execute the invasion. Opposing them, General Baba's 37th Army had assembled General Nozaki's depleted 56th Independent Mixed Brigade in the Brunei Bay sector. This included two battalions near Brunei, one at Beaufort, and one garrisoning Labuan. Additionally, the 553rd Independent Battalion was stationed in the Miri area; however, none of these units were equipped to make a stand at the beaches. At 08:15, Barbey's warships commenced a bombardment of the southern beaches as the troops were loading onto the landing vessels. Shortly after 09:05, the first waves began to advance, preceded by craft firing rockets and artillery. As anticipated, there was no opposition on the landing areas. The 2/15th Battalion successfully reached the shore at 09:15, followed by the 2/17th Battalion, which made landfall three minutes later, approximately 1,000 yards east of its intended location. By dusk, the 2/15th had scoured the swampy terrain of Muara Island and reported no Japanese presence. The 2/17th pushed forward a few miles along the road to Brunei, while the 2/13th Battalion landed and moved into reserve behind the 2/17th. Meanwhile, the 2/28th Battalion landed without incident at 09:15 and quickly secured Labuan town, with the 2/43rd Battalion following ashore at 09:20 to initiate the advance toward the airfield.  There was no opposition until 10:45, when the leading troops came under rifle fire just south of Flagstaff Hill. This post was quickly bypassed and taken, but the Australians continued to face strong resistance from the 371st Independent Battalion. Despite this, the defenders could not prevent the 2/43rd from capturing the airfield by nightfall. During the day, Porter also landed the 2/11th Commando Squadron on the unoccupied Hamilton Peninsula, with one troop initiating a move north along Charlie Track. On June 11, while the 2/43rd patrolled north and west, overcoming some opposition, the 2/28th slowly advanced toward the Able and Baker routes, where they encountered the bulk of enemy resistance. Meanwhile, after repelling an enemy patrol overnight, the 2/17th continued its advance to Brunei unopposed, with a company from the 2/15th moving up the Brunei River to land about four miles downstream from the town. The following day, the 2/17th reached and seized the airstrip, finally encountering defenses manned by the 366th Independent Battalion. On Labuan, the 2/43rd moved unopposed to Hamilton Road and successfully linked up with the commandos, leaving behind one company and three tanks to destroy a bypassed stronghold to the northwest. At the same time, the 2/28th probed the strongly held area astride MacArthur Road and to its west, making good progress to compress the resilient enemy into a pocket. On June 13, although the 2/43rd occupied an emergency airstrip at Timbalai, the primary objective remained to continue compressing the enemy into "the Pocket" and mop up the remainder of the island. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Australian troops, under Brigadier Whitehead, landed on Tarakan, swiftly overcoming Japanese strongholds. By May 20, they began the North Borneo Offensive, achieving significant territorial gains amid brutal combat. As Japanese forces faltered, some surrendered, signaling a turning tide. The campaign showcased immense courage and sacrifice, with heavy casualties on both sides, ultimately paving the way for Allied victories in the Pacific theater.

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Mindanao. In April 1945, the US launched the invasion of Mindanao under General Eichelberger, focusing on Illana Bay. Initial assaults were swift, and American forces quickly captured vital areas due to the disarray among Japanese troops, who were struggling with low morale and supply shortages. The Japanese were under significant pressure, with commanders ill-prepared to mount a robust defense as American troops advanced toward Davao. Fierce battles unfolded, including attempts to seize key positions, but Japanese forces, that included remnants from earlier campaigns, faced overwhelming and relentless assaults. Despite stiff resistance in some areas, the Americans ultimately made considerable territorial gains, significantly weakening Japanese positions. This successful operation in Mindanao laid crucial groundwork for further advances in the Pacific theater, marking a decisive phase in the war as the tide turned heavily in favor of the Allies. As this chapter closed, it was evident that the end of Japanese resistance in the region was drawing near. This episode is the Allied Invasion of Borneo Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  A long time ago, in a galaxy far away we talked about the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies. Now it is time to talk about how the Dutch strikes back. . . well not exactly, but I wanted to finish the star wars reference. For an extended period, the Australian forces that had valiantly fought on the island of New Guinea during a crucial phase of the Allied war effort had been assigned to garrison duties in remote areas, conducting minor offensives against a desperate enemy more concerned with obtaining food than engaging in battle. At the same time, General MacArthur deemed it politically unwise for Australians to take a prominent role in reclaiming the Philippines, an American territory, and he also found it politically unfavorable for American troops to participate in restoring Dutch and British authority in the Indies. Recognizing the urgent need to secure the oilfields of British and Dutch Borneo to supply accessible oil for the push toward Japan, Lieutenant-General Leslie Morshead's 1st Australian Corps was designated for the operation to retake Borneo, known as Operation Oboe. Should note that after a period of illness, suffering from malaria and a skin condition, the fighting General George Alan Vasey had finally recovered by February 1945. General Blamey, who still had doubts about his physical fitness despite Vasey being given an A by an Army medical board, reluctantly appointed him to command the 6th Division, then in action in the Aitape-Wewak campaign. Vasey then flew north to take up his new command. The aircraft Vasey was travelling in, RAAF Lockheed Hudson A16-118, took off from RAAF Station Archerfield on the afternoon of March 5, 1945. Due to a cyclone that was ravaging the Queensland coast at the time, the aircraft crashed into the sea about 400 metres out from Machans Beach, just north of the mouth of the Barron River, 2 kilometres short of the Cairns Airport. Vasey was killed in the crash along with all those on board. His body was recovered from the crash site and was buried with full military honours in Cairns cemetery along with those of Major-General Rupert Downes and Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Bertram. Vasey's concern for his men outlived him. The men called him 'Bloody George', not after his casualties, but after his favourite adjective, and Vasey's personable style of command attracted immense loyalty from them. "Vasey owns the 7th," wrote a Melbourne journalist, "but every man in the division believes he owns Vasey." Thus now it fell to General Steven to retain command of the 6th Division at that time already engaged in combat at Aitape-Wewak, the initial plan was to land Brigadier David Whitehead's 26th Brigade at Tarakan on April 23 to establish an airstrip for supporting aircraft for subsequent operations, specifically an assault on Balikpapan by the remaining forces of Major-General George Wootten's 9th Division on May 18. Following that, ten days later, a brigade was set to land at Bandjarmasin to secure air support for the planned invasion of Java by the entire corps on June 27. Ultimately, the operations at Bandjarmasin and Java were cancelled; the Tarakan landing was postponed to May 1; the Balikpapan invasion would instead be conducted by Major-General Edward Milford's 7th Division on July 1; and the 9th Division was tasked with the invasion of Brunei Bay on June 10. Consequently, by the end of March, Morshead's headquarters and the entire 9th Division had relocated to Morotai, where they would prepare and rehearse for the impending invasion. In March 1944, General Doihara Kenji organized the 7th Area Army to establish a new defensive line across Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. Yes you heard that right, General Doihara Kenji. For those of you who listen to my Fall and Rise of China podcast, this guy is that infamous intelligence officer who worked on nearly all the significant false flag operations during the second sino-Japanese war. Working as an intelligence officer he played a key role in the orchestration of the Huanggutun Incident, Mukden Incident, kidnapping of Emperor Puyi and Marco Polo Bridge Incident, amongst countless other “incidents”. He was a bonafide mastermind behind numerous false flag operations and the Manchurian drug trade earning the moniker Lawrence of Manchuria.  Now, anticipating an impending enemy invasion, Lieutenant-General Yamawaki Masataka reorganized the Borneo Defence Army into the 37th Army in September, placing it directly under General Terauchi's Southern Army. This force gradually received reinforcements from the 56th and 71st Independent Mixed Brigades, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment, and several smaller units. Despite this, the command was understrength and poorly equipped, as most of the available equipment and experienced troops were reassigned to more critical locations in the Southwest Pacific. By the end of the year, under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Baba Masao, the 37th Army had stationed the majority of Major-General Nozaki Seiji's 56th Independent Mixed Brigade at Tawau, Major-General Yamamura Hyoe's understrength 71st Independent Mixed Brigade at Kuching, most of Colonel Iemura Shinichi's 25th Independent Mixed Regiment on Tawi-Tawi Island, Rear-Admiral Kamada Michiaki's 22nd Naval Special Base Force at Balikpapan, along with three battalions in Sandakan, two battalions and a naval unit in Tarakan, and one battalion each in Kudat, Beaufort, and Miri. However, in 1945, both Baba and Terauchi recognized that the enemy was likely to first target strategic locations on the east coast before establishing a strong presence in western Borneo to prepare for an invasion of Malaya. Consequently, they decided that the majority of the 37th Army should be concentrated around Brunei Bay, leading to orders for the 56th Independent Mixed Brigade to march overland toward northern Borneo. The 370th Independent Battalion remained in Tawau, while the 369th Independent Battalion was sent to garrison Bandjarmasin. Additionally, half of the 454th Independent Battalion was dispatched to Balikpapan, and the other half to Bandjarmasin. This left only the 455th Independent Battalion and part of the 2nd Guard Unit at Tarakan. Early in April the strength of the Japanese force on Tarakan was estimated at about 4000 of whom 2500 were base troops. On the eve of the attack, however, largely because of information indicating that a battalion had been moved from Tarakan to Balikpapan, it was estimated that only 1500 to 2000 troops remained on the island. Aerial photographs showed five gun positions on the south-eastern tip of the island covering the channel along which ships normally entered Tarakan. Round Lingkas and Tarakan there seemed to be 15 anti-aircraft guns, and 9 medium and 5 light anti-aircraft guns seemed to be round the airfield. The whole of Lingkas beach was protected by parallel rows of posts, rails and pipes driven into the mud and extending into the sea to a distance of 125 yards from high-water mark; and between the beach and the road was an anti-tank ditch about 25 feet wide. A group of oil tanks was near the beach and, as it was possible that the Japanese might try to impede an attacker by flooding the oil over the sea and the swamp near the Pamusian River and setting it alight, the air force had taken pains to destroy these tanks. Field works could be seen; there were concrete pill-boxes built by the Dutch; and it was suspected that, here as elsewhere, tunnels had been dug into the hills.  Units stationed at Sandakan were also ordered to move toward Brunei, leaving the 554th Independent Battalion behind. Furthermore, due to the challenges in supplying Tawi-Tawi, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment was withdrawn to Borneo in February and instructed to march toward Jesselton, where it was expected to arrive in May. During this time, little was done to enhance the island's defenses, and the overland marches took a significant toll on the soldiers' stamina. Meanwhile, enemy air raids intensified, severely disrupting communications. Between April 11 and 29, Air Commodore Arthur Harry Cobby's Australian 1st Tactical Air Force, along with Major-General Paul Wurtsmith's 13th Air Force, conducted several air assaults on Tarakan and Tawau, targeting oil storage tanks, artillery positions, radar stations, defenses, and various buildings. On April 27, Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's Task Group 78.1 departed Morotai, carrying Whitehead's 26th Brigade, protected by Admiral Berkey's cruisers and destroyers. Over the next two days, this force executed a naval bombardment on shore targets while a minesweeping unit cleared and marked the approach route within 800 yards of the beach and Sadau Island. Early on April 30, the 2/4th Commando Squadron landed unopposed on Sadau, where they established an artillery battery to support the engineers in clearing obstacles from the invasion beaches. After successfully completing the task with just a few sniper and mortar attacks, the main convoy reached the southwest coast of Tarakan Island an hour before sunrise on May 1. Following a heavy air and naval bombardment prior to landing, Whitehead's assault waves began their approach to the shore, supported by rocket fire from the LCI gunboats. Around 08:00, the 2/23rd and 2/48th Battalions landed on Green Beach and Red Beach, respectively, without facing any opposition. However, once they moved inland, they encountered intense fire from Lingkas Hill and Roach. The 2/23rd Battalion launched an attack and captured both locations while the 2/48th took the Finch and Parks positions as they advanced to secure the Collins Highway ridge. Throughout the day, the remaining units of the 26th Brigade landed despite poor beach conditions and overcrowding, with the 2/24th Battalion held in reserve along Anzac Highway. By nightfall, the brigade managed to hold an area 2,800 yards wide at the base and up to 2,000 yards deep. Early on May 2, the 2/23rd seized Milko with minimal resistance, advancing further north to the Pages feature and Hospital Spur. Simultaneously, the 2/48th quickly secured Lyons and the junction with Burke Highway, while the 2/24th effectively attacked the Wills, Sturt, and Frank positions with support from aircraft and artillery. In the late afternoon, as one company moved up Anzac Highway toward the airfield, Lieutenant-Colonel George Warfe's other companies converged on the Essex feature, which was captured without opposition during the night. The next morning, the 2/24th attacked the airfield from the south and east; although they successfully took the airfield ridge at a high cost, their late assault on the Rippon position to the north was repelled by determined enemy defenders. At the same time, the 2/48th conducted reconnaissance towards the Peter and Sykes features, while the 2/23rd managed to secure the area between Gleneleg Highway and Pamusian. However, their assaults on Hospital Spur and Tarakan Hill were unsuccessful. Fortunately, Burke Ridge was found abandoned on May 4. By then, Whitehead had already instructed the 2/23rd to advance east and join the 2/24th in their attacks on the airfield, with the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion and the 2/4th Commando Squadron taking over their positions in the west. The commandos then launched an attack on Tarakan Hill. Despite being initially held down by fierce enemy fire, they eventually forced the defenders off the high ground through sustained pressure, tank support, and a sweeping maneuver to the right. Simultaneously, the 2/48th advanced and successfully took control of the Evans feature, while a company from the 2/24th attacked the Peningkibaru stronghold after an intense artillery barrage, managing to secure the position just in time to fend off the Japanese who had retreated during the bombardment. Additionally, Warfe planned another assault on Rippon, but heavy Japanese shelling ultimately compelled him to call it off. On May 5, as the commandos and pioneers continued to diminish the remaining strongholds on Tarakan Hill, the 2/48th successfully cleared the road north to Otway, although they faced greater resistance near Sykes. Rippon was also discovered to be abandoned and was swiftly captured, though the Japanese still controlled the high ground to the north. Finally, on May 6, the 2/48th launched another attack on Sykes and successfully cleared the hill this time. While capturing the airfield and town accomplished Whitehead's primary objective, the Japanese continued to hold the rugged interior of Tarakan, indicating that much fighting lay ahead until the garrison was completely defeated. By the evening of 6th May fairly copious information obtained from prisoners and Indonesians and from captured documents indicated that the enemy had about 390 naval troops in the Mount Api area, about 400 troops and civilians in the Fukukaku headquarters area, 200 from Sesanip along Snags Track to Otway, 300 on Otway and in District 6, 300 in the Amal River area and 60 at Cape Juata. Having lost the airfield and the water-purifying plant and hospitals "the enemy at this time was displaying a decided disinclination to hold ground. In particular he was shunning any ground which could be subjected to heavy bombing, shelling, or attack by tanks; or against which large-scale attacks could be launched by our troops".The enemy was now directing his operations to delaying the attackers, particularly with mines, booby-traps, suicide raids, and isolated parties fighting to the death in tunnels and dugouts.  After the unsuccessful general attack on April 19, which yielded minimal gains, Generals Hodge and Buckner were preparing to push the offensive southward, fully aware that breaching the first Shuri defense ring would be a slow and costly endeavor. On the western front, the primary enemy positions on Kakazu Ridge had been entirely circumvented, with General Griner directing his troops to advance and focus on cleanup later. Consequently, on April 20, the majority of the 165th Regiment secured the coastal region before launching a southern attack that encountered immediate and fierce resistance in the rugged terrain north of Gusukuma, particularly around Item Pocket.  The center of the Japanese resistance lay in the I section of Target Area 7777, which came to be called "Item Pocket", in military terminology I is called Item. Actually, the pocket was the hub of the enemy position; from it, like spokes of a giant wheel, extended four low ridges, separated from each other by ravines and rice paddies. Potter's Ridge ran north from the hub, Charlie Ridge to the northeast, Gusukuma Ridge to the southeast, and Ryan Ridge to the southwest. Lying between Gusukuma and Charlie Ridges and sloping to the east was a cone-shaped hill called by Americans "Brewer's Hill." A gulch ran along each side of the hill Anderson's Gulch on the north and Dead Horse Gulch on the south. Both ran in an easterly direction, crossing Route 1 at small bridges just north of Gusukuma. The ground was superbly suited for active defense. Typical Japanese positions were connected by tunnels along the sides and under the crests of the ridges; Ryan Ridge, in particular, was honeycombed with such defenses. From Item Pocket the enemy had excellent command both of the coastal areas to the north and west and of the open land to the east where Route 1 ran north-south. The Japanese had long been aware of the defensive value of this position against either a beach landing on the northwest or an attack from the north. Months before the Americans landed, Japanese troops and Okinawan laborers were boring tunnels and establishing elaborate living quarters and aid stations. The area was held by two companies of the 21st Independent Infantry Battalion of the 64th Brigade, 62nd Division, supported by an antitank company, a machine gun company, and elements of antiaircraft, artillery, and mortar units. At least 600 Japanese occupied the Pocket, reinforced by several hundred Okinawans. Only through persistent effort was the 1st Battalion able to reach a position east of Gusukuma by nightfall, while the 2nd Battalion successfully took control of Potter's Ridge and Fox Ridge but failed in its attempts against Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket itself. The leading platoon was well up on the slope of Ryan when Japanese on top opened up with mortars, machine guns, and artillery, cutting off the rest of Company E. While the company commander, his clothes torn by bullets, and the rest of the company straggled back to Fox Ridge, the leading platoon continued doggedly ahead. Its leader, T/Sgt. Earnest L. Schoeff, managed to reach the top with eight of his men despite almost constant fire. He was ordered by radio to hold until relief came. The men hugged the ground as darkness slowly descended. Then from three directions from fifty to sixty heavily armed Japanese set upon the Americans. In wild hand-to-hand fighting the nine men beat off the attack. Pfc. Paul R. Cook fired four cases of ammunition into the enemy, shooting down at least ten before he was killed. With grenades, rifle butts, and the enemy's own weapons, Schoeff and his men killed another dozen before the Japanese withdrew. With two of his men killed, another missing, and two wounded, Schoeff led the survivors back to his company during the night. To the east, the 106th and 105th Regiments tried to advance south towards the village of Iso and the Pinnacles but were hindered by heavy enemy gunfire. In response, Colonel Winn dispatched his 2nd Battalion to maneuver around the East Pinnacle to reach the village of Natama, where Companies F and G were ultimately repelled by a strong Japanese counterattack. As they retreated in chaos, they faced an ambush from Japanese infiltrators, resulting in significant casualties. Despite these challenges, the 106th Regiment and Winn's 3rd Battalion managed to bypass the West Pinnacle and advance with relative ease, halting 200 yards southwest of Iso. Additionally, Winn's 1st Battalion fought its way to the western edge of Kakazu village and nearly cleared Kakazu Ridge to its eastern point before being ordered back to the escarpment to support the 2nd Battalion and halt any enemy breakthroughs. At the same time, General Bradley ordered the 381st and 382nd Regiments to advance toward Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment. In response, Colonel Dill's 3rd Battalion moved along Tombstone Ridge, clearing out the enemy from caves and tombs, and reached the southern end just in time to join Colonel Halloran's 1st Battalion for a surprise offensive against Nishibaru. They quickly captured the crest but were ultimately driven back by the determined defenders. However, this partial victory prompted Halloran to deploy the 2nd Battalion in the afternoon for another assault to the south. By day's end, the 381st was entrenched along the northern slope of Nishibaru Ridge, though at a significant cost. Further west, Dill's 2nd Battalion also pushed forward despite persistent fire from the Rocky Crags, where attempts by the 184th and 17th Regiments to attack were unsuccessful. They could not catch up with the 3rd Battalion. Meanwhile, General Arnold targeted Ouki Hill, but his initial assault was quickly halted by enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. Two armored flamethrowers successfully advanced 400 yards ahead of the infantry, neutralizing an enemy mortar position on Ouki Hill's west slope. Consequently, the Americans concentrated their mortars and smoke to cover the enemy positions, allowing a composite company to launch a surprise attack that secured the crest of Ouki Hill, although the isolated troops would soon have to fend off a series of fierce counterattacks. The next morning, the 32nd Regiment launched an attack down Skyline Ridge with two companies. However, they were quickly halted by mortar fire at a deep road cut in the middle of the ridge. Despite this setback, the troops persevered, largely due to Sergeant Theodore MacDonnell's efforts, and eventually gained control of the entire forward face of the ridge. When, east of the road cut, a man in the stalled third platoon, Company E, was killed, Sgt. Theodore R. MacDonnell, a gist Chemical Mortar Company observer, was impelled to drastic action. MacDonnell had frequently joined men on the line and shown qualities of a determined infantryman. Now, infuriated, he gathered up a handful of grenades and ran in the face of the machine-gun fire along the slope to a point underneath the spot where he believed the enemy gun to be located, and then started up the 20-foot embankment. When he looked over the crest he failed to spot the gun, but he did see three enemy soldiers and grenaded them. He made two trips to the bottom of the embankment for fresh supplies of grenades, but it was not until his third trip to the crest that he located the machine gun. MacDonnell then slid back to the bottom, grabbed a BAR, and mounted the embankment with it, only to have the weapon jam after the first shot. He skidded to the bottom, seized a carbine, and went back up for the fifth time. On reaching the crest he stood up and fired point-blank into the machine-gun position, killing the gunner and two covering riflemen. MacDonnell then hurled the machine gun down the slope behind him. A mortar that he found in the position was also sent crashing down the hillside. Sergeant MacDonnell was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism on this occasion. Lt. Fred Capp, commanding Company E, sent troops to reinforce MacDonnell immediately, and the position was consolidated. Then Company F, on orders given as a result of this sudden development, pressed the attack down Skyline Ridge, and by 18:00 the entire forward face of the ridge was occupied and only a knob at the lower tip was causing trouble.  To the west, while Colonel Pachler's Company B attempted another attack on Rocky Crags, Dill's 3rd Battalion reorganized and encircled to reach Nishibaru Ridge via the 381st Regiment, launching an eastward assault that made good headway until they were met with fierce enemy counterattacks that forced them to halt. Simultaneously, Halloran coordinated an attack on Nishibaru, which was successfully repelled by the defenders. Colonel May's 3rd Battalion was then deployed to fill the gap at the gorge. Overnight, a large number of Japanese troops had moved from the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment to set up mortars and machine guns in the Kakazu Pocket, prompting the 27th Reconnaissance Troop to advance toward Kakazu, where they became pinned down at the village's edge. As a result, Colonel Stebbins' 3rd Battalion was ordered to position itself on Kakazu West. Looking west, the majority of the 105th and 106th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the Pinnacles, but with little success. They did manage to clear the road to the escarpment's summit of mines and obstructions to facilitate tank movements. Finally, Colonel Kelley's 2nd Battalion launched another unsuccessful attack across the mouth of Item Pocket, while Company F attempted to advance along the coast using amphibious tractors but was likewise repelled by intense fire from Ryan Ridge. The 1st Battalion also pushed southwest into Gusukuma, but without armor support, they made minimal progress against the machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket attacking from the right rear. The enemy's defense was very effective on the east. Here the 1st Battalion had a major supply problem on its hands. Two blown bridges along Route 1 east of the Item Pocket were holding up vehicles of support units. During the previous night, fire from the Pocket had driven off an engineer platoon working at the site and killed the platoon leader. Early on the 21st Lieutenant Golden, the Bailey bridge expert, came up with ten truckloads of material. His engineers worked for an hour but had to stop in the face of almost ceaseless fire from the Pocket. Colonel Kelley then ordered scouts to find another stream crossing. A bulldozer cut a bypass around Anderson's Gulch near the railroad, but when, about 10:00, the operator nosed his machine out in the open, he was shot in the ear. General Griner, in Colonel Kelley's observation post at the time, ordered Lt. Col. Walter F. Anderson, commander of the 193rd Tank Battalion, to push the bypass through. Anderson himself climbed into his battalion's sole remaining "tank-dozer" and completed the bypass. A 47-mm. anti-tank gun, hitherto silent, scored a direct hit on Anderson's tank, killing him and a guide. The bypass was now blocked and had to be abandoned. This break-down in supply over Route 1 seriously affected operations east of Gusukuma. Colonel Mahoney's 1st Battalion attacked southwest early on the 21st into Gusukuma, but without tanks or cannon the troops made little ground against machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket on the right rear. Mahoney's left company did reach a point 400 yards north of the village of Yafusu, the farthest advance yet registered by 24th Corps since April 19, but here the troops were stopped by a network of enemy positions. Concerned about the significant vertical separation between his battalions, Kelley decided to deploy his 3rd Battalion in an effort to fill the gap and simultaneously penetrate Item Pocket. Consequently, the American forces advanced through Dead Horse Gulch, with Company K fighting nearly to the center of the pocket. However, they were ultimately compelled to retreat due to heavy losses and intense counterattacks. On April 22, Kelley opted to hold and enhance his current positions while conducting extensive patrols. Looking to the east, as the 105th Regiment regrouped following a night counterattack from Kakazu, Stebbins' 1st Battalion systematically located and neutralized enemy positions behind them along the escarpment. Brigadier-General William Bradford also took command in the Kakazu area, bolstered by the 3rd Battalion, 17th Regiment, and most of the 2nd Battalion, 165th Regiment, successfully containing the pocket. Further west, the 383rd Regiment replaced the weakened 382nd, while the 2nd Battalion advanced down Nishibaru Ridge to capture the village and higher ground facing Hill 143 to the south. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion made minimal progress toward the Gate of the Tanabaru Escarpment. Additionally, Pachler's Company B initiated another attack on the west side of the Rocky Crags, supported by howitzers, tanks, and armored flamethrowers. However, once again, they faced hand grenades and knee mortar shells raining down from above, resulting in heavy casualties and the need to retreat. Finally, the 32nd Regiment maintained control of the forward face of Skyline Ridge but made no attempt to advance, while patrols scoured extensive sections of the southern slope to reach the abandoned eastern face of Hill 178. That night, artillery provided cover to the beleaguered defenders as Colonel Yoshida's 22nd Regiment took over along Skyline Ridge. Following several days of inactivity, 41 kamikaze planes were once again launched on April 22. They successfully sank the minesweeper Swallow and one LCS, while also damaging two destroyers and another minesweeper, resulting in the loss of 25 aircraft. The next day, the 32nd Regiment remained stationed on the north slope of Skyline Ridge, except when conducting patrols or securing caves. This allowed the Japanese defenders to withdraw overnight from their remaining positions around Hill 178. With Company B worn out, the rest of the 1st Battalion, 17th Regiment joined the assault on the Rocky Crags, which fell with little resistance. To the west, medium tanks and armored flamethrowers finally launched a direct attack on Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment, successfully destroying most of the enemy positions, although few territorial gains were made. Further west, Winn's 1st Battalion executed a surprise attack on the East Pinnacle, managing to capture the position after fierce hand-to-hand combat. At the same time, the remaining defenders at West Pinnacle initiated a desperate banzai charge towards Iso, where they were ultimately overwhelmed. Kelley then ordered Company I to conduct a probing assault on Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket, while Company C ascended Brewer's Hill but was unable to descend the steep side to join the fight. On April 24, no new attacks were launched due to a confusing mix-up of orders, but preparations were made for an assault the following day. After an artillery barrage, Bradford's task force finally attacked the Kakazu Pocket with four battalions; however, they faced no enemy resistance, as the Japanese had abandoned their positions overnight. To the east, the beleaguered defenders in front of the 96th Division had also retreated, leading to the fall of the Tanabaru Escarpment, its village, Hill 143, and the rest of Nishibaru Ridge without opposition. In a similar manner, the 17th Regiment ascended Hill 178 with only a few scattered artillery rounds landing nearby. The Japanese forces had resisted fiercely for five days, but with the first ring of Shuri defenses breached at multiple points, they chose to withdraw under the cover of heavy mist and light fog the night before. Even so, this advancement was minimal, and it was clear that reaching Shuri would take considerable time given the rate of progress over the first three and a half weeks of the operation. Nonetheless, Buckner believed that any significant landing on the Minatoga beaches or between Machinato airfield and Naha could not be logistically supported and would be vulnerable to strong enemy counterattacks. Therefore, he dismissed proposals to deploy the 77th Division or the 1st Marine Division for these efforts. Instead, it was decided to move the 3rd Marine Corps and the 77th Division from northern Okinawa and Iejima to replace the 24th Corps in the Shuri area. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In April 1945, the Allies launched the invasion of Borneo, led by General Morshead. Swift assaults secured strategic areas against demoralized Japanese troops. Despite fierce resistance, American forces gained ground, crippling Japanese defenses. This victory marked a pivotal moment in the Pacific War, signaling the end of Japanese influence in the region.

Gelombang penolakan terhadap revisi UU TNI masih santer meski sudah diketok DPR menjadi undang-undang. Unjuk rasa bahkan kian meluas ke berbagai daerah seperti Majalengka, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Palangkaraya, Balikpapan, Semarang, Lumajang, Makassar, hingga NTT. Tuntutan utamanya agar pengesahan RUU TNI dibatalkan.Suara penolakan tak hanya lantang di jalanan, tetapi juga diupayakan lewat jalur hukum. Sembilan mahasiswa Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia (FH UI) mengajukan permohonan uji formil terhadap revisi UU TNI Gugatan ke Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK), pada 21 Maret 2025, selang satu hari pasca-DPR meloloskan UU TNI di sidang paripurna.Para penggugat mengajukan uji formil karena UU TNI dinilai tidak transparan. Ini tercermin dari minimnya partisipasi publik hingga sulitnya masyarakat mengakses draf RUU TNI.Bagaimana peluang menang gugatan ke MK? Apakah UU TNI masih mungkin dibatalkan?Kita bincangkan bersama Pakar Pertahanan Keamanan Indonesia Centre for Democracy Diplomacy and Defence, Teuku Rezasyah, Ph.D, Dosen Sekolah Tinggi Hukum (STH) Indonesia Jentera, Asfinawati, dan Kuasa Hukum Para Pemohon sekaligus mahasiswa FHUI, Abu Rizal Biladina.*Kami ingin mendengar saran dan komentar kamu terkait podcast yang baru saja kamu simak, melalui surel ke podcast@kbrprime.id

Satgas Pangan Polda Kaltim kembali melakukan inspeksi mendadak ke sejumlah pedagang bahan pangan pokok di Pasar Pandansari, Balikpapan. Sidak ini dilakukan untuk memastikan takaran sesuai dengan ketentuan pemerintah.

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Craig and Gaurav go over the early naval engagements between the Dutch and Japanese during the Pacific War.   Two weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, Japan accelerated its plans to invade the Dutch East Indies for vital oil resources, essential for its war efforts. As Japanese forces swiftly advanced in the Philippines, they captured strategic locations, including Mindanao and Davao, while Allied defenses crumbled. In late December 1941, Japan launched further assaults in Malaya, isolating Singapore and diminishing Allied naval power. By January 1942, Japanese forces targeted Balikpapan, a crucial oil hub in Borneo. The Dutch, determined to defend their territory, prepared for a guerrilla campaign and attempted to sabotage oil facilities. However, the Japanese invasion fleet approached Balikpapan on January 21, 1942. Despite Allied air attacks and submarine efforts, the Japanese landed on January 24, marking a significant step in their campaign to secure the East Indies, while the Allies faced overwhelming challenges and dwindling resources.   In the early hours of January 24, 1942, Talbot's destroyers stealthily approached the anchored Japanese fleet, illuminated by burning oil facilities. Utilizing torpedoes for surprise attacks, they struck swiftly, sinking several transports, including Sumanoura Maru. Despite their efforts, many torpedoes missed, and the Japanese fleet sustained fewer losses than expected. By dawn, the Allies had achieved a tactical victory, but nine of twelve transports survived, allowing the Japanese advance into the Dutch East Indies to continue. In February, an Allied strike force was formed, but they faced devastating air assaults, retreating to Surabaya after suffering heavy damage without losing ships.                                                                  

Hello Listeners! Di episode kali Wulan ngobrol-ngobrol dengan Penyanyi kelahiran Balikpapan yang mempunyai darah Batak, Manado dan baru saja merilis single terbarunya bersama Hits Records. Episode kali ini kita ditemani Anneth Anneth Delliecia lahir di Balikpapan yang dan mempunyai darah Batak dan Manado mencintai menyanyi sejak umur 3 tahun. Berbagai kompetisi telah menyanyi telah di ikuti oleh Anneth sejak dari Kecil. Setelah ia Merilis beberapa single dan Album di tahun 2022, Anneth kembali merilis karyanya terbarunya, yang lagi-lagi menyayat hati pendengarnya. Anneth menegaskan namanya di industri musik Indonesia lewat “Pandai Bicara”, yang mengisahkan kekecewaan terhadap pasangan. Single“Pandai Bicara” jadi lagu pertama Anneth yang dirilis bersama Hits Records, setelah ia resmi bergabung dengan label tersebut pada Maret lalu. Single Anneth sendiri bercerita tentang sebuah bentuk kekecewaan, dari seseorang telah yang mencintai pasangannya. Namun akhirnya rasa itu berujung pada rasa sakit hati, dan akhirnya sadar jika selama ini ia terluka pada orang yang salah. Untuk Cerita lebih lengkapnya yuk dengarkan obrolan Langsung di Channel Podcast Bingkai Suara Season 5 di Spotify, Apple Podcast, Youtube atau kunjungi website kita di ⁠⁠⁠⁠www.bingkaikarya.com

kebakaran terjadi di kawasan kilang Pertamina Balikpapan, kebakaran diketahui terjadi menjelang subuh.

Last time we spoke about Operation Reckless, Operation Persecution and the Japanese retreat in New Britain. General Douglas MacArthur unleashed his two amphibious assaults, opening up the Western New Guinea Campaign. Both Operation Reckless and Persecution achieved complete surprise upon the Japanese. Múltiple Japanese units already performing withdrawals were caught into a chaotic new flight when the allies landed and began seizing key territory such as Hollandia and Aitape. The Japanese commanders fell into disarray leaving some to seize command and order further withdrawals in the face of hopeless battles. Yet again, forces already used to retreating through rough terrain without adequate provisions, were hitting the jungle track. Morale was all but collapsing in New Guinea. Over on New Britain matters were similar as the Japanese continued to retreat under heavy pressure from American patrols. Competent commanders would lose their lives beside their men in another hopeless battle.  This episode is the Drive for Myitkyina Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Operation Reckless and Persecution were tremendous successes. There was very little opposition for the men advancing upon Hollandia, the Japanese simply did not even attempt to defend their well developed defenses there. The drive towards Hollandia's airfields was led by the 1st Battalion, 186th regiment. From Leimok Hill to Brinkman's Plantation, they did encounter opposition, but it was scattered and uncoordinated. Colonel Oliver Newman was very cautious, he believed thousands of Japanese were still around the airfields. Just before they came across the airfields, they found large, undefended Japanese supply dumps. This would be one of many Japanese supply dumps captured through the following days, as General Eichelberger recalled “There were more than six hundred supply dumps. There were clothing dumps as high as houses. There were ammunition dumps everywhere. There were pyramids of canned goods and tarpaulin-covered hills of rice which looked like Ohio haystacks. There were saki and beer. There were tons and tons of quinine and other medical supplies, which, as a result of our landing, never reached the Japanese troops at the front. I believe Hollandia was the richest prize—supply wise—taken during the Pacific War”. These types of discoveries indicated the Japanese were extremely desperate. By May 4th, Major General William Gill's 32nd Division had just arrived at Aitape to relieve the 163rd regiment, who were earmarked to take part in the next amphibious assault. The terrain, alongside the weather was dreadful at Hollandia, making it impossible to provide the needed airfields suitable for heavy bombers without some legendary engineer work. General MacArthur considered it necessary to seize and develop new heavy bomber airfields in the Wakde-Sarmi-Biak region in order to neutralize enemy bases in the western Caroline. To be honest given the track records of these amphibious assaults in causing absolute mayhem for Japanese commanders, forcing them to keep on running, it was a great idea to keep the pace up. With the knowledge General Tagami's 36th Division was still in the region and that the enemy might still seek to reinforce that said area before the allies could land there, MacArthur initially planned to send the full 41st Division against Wakde-Sarmi on May 15th, once the Hollandia fields were ready to support the amphibious assault. However supply congestion at Hollandia's beaches was thwarting such designs. Admiral Barbey proposed that D Day be postponed until May 21 and gave two reasons for the postponement. First, tides would be higher in the Wakde area on the 21st than on the 15th. Second, postponement would allow orderly and complete preparations to be made. Congestion was severe at the Hollandia beaches, where the bulk of the 41st Division was to stage. Lack of lighterage and beach space, combined with an inadequate road net, hampered unloading of equipment, supplies, and troops which were pouring into the Hollandia area. The arrival of such supplies and units, some of which had to be reloaded for Wakde-Sarmi, seriously interfered with mounting the 41st Division. As such, General Krueger decided that the operation could be started no earlier than the 16th but that unless important strategic considerations dictated otherwise, the 21st would be much preferable. Additionally, a number of engineer and air force organizations were scheduled to arrive at Hollandia on the 12th, either for employment there or to be staged for Wakde-Sarmi. The shipping bringing these units to Hollandia was needed to support the Wakde phase of the new operation, which could not begin until the vessels were reloaded. As beach congestion at Hollandia remained a major problem, this reloading could not be accomplished quickly. It was therefore proposed that the Wakde landings be postponed at least another day to the 17th. Although MacArthur initially approved the proposed delay, new aerial photography of the coastal area from Sarmi eastward to Wakde indicated the ground conditions of the region were not suited for heavy bomber airstrips. Thus MacArthur decided that the Sarmi portion of the operation should be axed and instead they would focus on Wakde Island slated for D-day May 17th. 10 days after the capture of Wakde, or as soon as the airfields were repaired, the allies would next hit Biak, where more suitable airstrip sites were known to exist. General Doe thus prepared the Wakde Landings, Codenamed Operation Tornado while General Fuller's remaining regiments were expected to seize the airdrome areas on Biak. Over on the other side, General Anami planned to send the 36th division over to perform an immediate counterattack against Hollandia, but was denied. General Adachi over to the east had more freedom to act. The 18th Army had found itself cut off from all provisions and supplies, thus deprived of every possibility of rejoining the 2nd Area Army west of Hollandia, for the crucial defense of Western New Guinea. Because of this Adachi reasoned the best move for his 55,000 troops was to perform some quick actions before their strength was sapped out. Thus on April 26th, Adachi ordered the 20th, 41st and 51st Divisions to prepare a counterattack against the enemy beachhead at Aitape. Adachi hoped such a bold action against his enemy's rear might force a major diversion of the enemy eastwards, in turn hampering their drive against Western New Guinea.  Now back in mid-February the Japanese were adjusting their forces in the Central Pacific. They had established the 31st Army in Saipan, formed around the 52nd and 29th Division, led by Lt General Obata Hideyoshi. The bulk of the 52nd division, led by Lt General Mugikura Shunzaburo had landed in Truk mid-February, Lt General Takashina Takesi's 29th Division meanwhile were still in the progress of traveling to the Marianas, escorted by the destroyers Kishinami, Asashimo and Okinami. The bulk of the division departed Busan on February 24; but the convoy would be torpedoed some 200 km south of Okidaitōjima by the submarine Trout on February 28. The 18th Regiment, led by Colonel Monma Kentaro suffered 1657 deaths, including its commanding officer, and 570 wounded. Because of this the 18th regiment was landed at Saipan to recover; 50th regiment was diverted to land at Tinian under the command of Colonel Ogata Keiji and the 38th regiment was sent to Guam on March 4th. Allied submarine interceptions of these troop movements was no mere coincidence. The submarine activities were frequently guided by 'Magic' intelligence relating to ship movements which was collected by intercepting and decrypting encoded radio transmissions. The IJN routinely broadcast the location and intended route of convoys under its protection, and decrypting these messages allowed Allied naval commanders to alert submarines in the vicinity of convoys. The submarine commanders were free to plan their interception and attack where conditions were most favorable. The IJN's faulty anti-submarine doctrine also contributed to Japan's shipping losses. The Navy had placed a low priority on protecting merchant shipping from submarine attack before and during the early years of the war and convoys were not routinely assembled until 1943. Vast swathes of Japanese shipping was being sunk in early 1944. There were two large reasons for this. Number 1) obviously the IJN was greatly diminished and thus allied submarines were operating further into enemy territory. Number 2) fixing the torpedo issue, yes those pesky Mark 14s/15s were now hitting hard and providing enormous results. In response to this emerging crisis, the Japanese established the Grand Escort Fleet Headquarters, under the overall command of Admiral Oikawa Koshiro, to coordinate convoys and implement a standard doctrine. The first order of business was to increase the average size of Japanese convoys from 5 ships to "large" convoys of 10 to 20 ship in order to assign more escort ships to protect against enemy submarine activity. To further reinforce the Central Pacific, the Japanese also created nine expeditionary units from the forces of the 1st and 7th Kwantung and 8th Korean Armies. They also decided to assign the 14th and 43rd Divisions of Lieutenant-Generals Inoue Sadae and Saito Yoshitsugu to General Obata's command, designated Truk Sector Group. To support them, the IJN decided to combine the 4th Fleet and the 14th Air Fleet on March 4th to form the Central Pacific Area Fleet, under Admiral Nagumo. Between March-April, the 31st Army was assigned the priority for shipping, so Nagumo would send a total of eleven large convoys collectively known as the Matsu Fleet to bring said reinforcements to the Central Pacific. Though the deadly American submarines would hunt relentlessly to prevent these reinforcements, they would only be able to sink the light cruiser Tatsuta, the destroyer Asanagi, six transports and one submarine chaser, so the Matsu Fleet was considered as largely successful.  By mid-April the success of the Matsu Fleet allowed the IJN to allocate more shipping to the 2nd Area Army. Thus the Take-Ichi convoy was formed to carry the 32nd division of Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio and the bulk of the 35th division to Western New Guinea. The large convoy consisting of 15 transports was escorted by an unusually strong force under Admiral Kajioka consisting of minelayer Shirataka; destroyers Asakaze, Shiratsuyu, Fujinami and Kuri; Mikura-class escort ship Kurahashi; Type D escort ships No. 20 and No. 22; gunboats Ataka and Uji; minesweepers No. 22 and No. 101; and submarine chasers No. 37, No. 38 and Tama Maru No. 7. They departed Shanghai on April 17th enroute for Manila. Unbeknownst to the Japanese allied code breakers were decrypting their radio signals and managed to figure out the convoys departure and arrival points. The Submarine Jack was given the coordinates and intercepted Kajioak's convoy around nightfall of April 26th. Jack fired 19 torpedoes from long range, managing to sink the 5425-ton freighter SS Yoshida Maru No. 1, which was carrying the entire 210th Regiment of the 32nd Division. 3000 soldiers and their commander Colonel Koike Yasumasa all drowned with the ship. Its moments like these I always find myself taking a step back. Thousands of men fighting on all these islands in the Pacific, absolute carnage in places like New Guinea, Guadalcanal, later on Peleliu….one submarine and woosh, a regiment gone. The allied submarine campaign during the Pacific War, did a lion's share of work, horrifying work. War is a horrible thing.  The remaining convoy ships continued to Manila, arriving there on April 29th. Upon reaching Manila, however, Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio learned that his 32nd Division was reassigned to the 2nd Army to further reinforce western New Guinea, so a new convoy of eight transports would resume the journey to New Guinea on May 1st, carrying the bulk of the 32nd and 35th Divisions. You can bet after hearing what happened to the 210th regiment on the Yoshida Maru, these men were dreading to sail again. They had every reason to feel that dread, as the American intelligence operators figured out the convoys departure and arrival information again. They pinpointed the convoys route, speed, daily noon positions, everything. This time the submarine Gurnard intercepted Kajioka's convoy in the Celebes Sea on May 6. Gurnard's captain, Commander Herb Andrew  submerged his boat and made a cautious approach to avoid detection by aircraft. He reached a firing position 4 hours later and fired 6 torpedoes at 2 transports. Only 1 of these torpedoes struck its mark, and a 2nd salvo missed its intended targets but hit another transport. Andrews then turned his boat and fired further torpedoes from Gurnard's stern torpedo tubes which hit a 3rd transport. One of the Japanese destroyers then counterattacked Gurnard and forced Andrews to break off his attack. The destroyer was traveling at too great a speed for its detection gear to function, however, and did not damage the submarine, despite dropping approximately 100 depth charges. Two hours later, Gurnard rose to periscope depth and found that a major effort to rescue troops and equipment from the torpedoed transports was under way. That night, the submarine also torpedoed one of the crippled transports which was still afloat. In the end, its attack successfully sank transports Aden Maru (5,825 tons) and Taijima Maru (6,995 tons) as well as the cargo ship Tenshinzan Maru (6,886 tons). Although the Japanese rescue effort was relatively successful, 1290 troops were killed, The 4th Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment was completely destroyed and much of their equipment was lost.   Due to these heavy losses, the Take-Ichi convoy finally docked at Halmahera on May 9th, where the remnants of the 32nd and 35th Divisions were ultimately unloaded. General Ikeda's 35th division, including the 219th regiment from Palau were shipped over to Sorong, with the 219th left to guard the St.Andrew Strait Islands. General Ishii's 32nd division, was retained at Halmahera to garrison the island. The terrible loss of the Take-Ichi convoy forced the Japanese leadership to acknowledge it was no longer possible to reinforce Western New Guinea, thus General Anami would have to fight with what he had on hand. Alongisde this, IJA General HQ decided to pull back the perimeter of the absolute defense zone in the southern area to a line extending from Sorong to Halmahera, with units at Geelvink Bay, Biak and Manokwari ordered to hold out as long as possible to delay the enemy advance. Anami did not like the orders one bit, as he belived the forward line should be aggressively defended to secure the valuable land holding air bases between Palau and Western New Guinea. What Anami was not aware of, was that the IJN combined fleet were preparing for the famed decisive naval battle in the area. This was part of Admiral Toyoda's Operation A-Go. Under the plans elaborated by the Combined Fleet, the First Mobile Fleet, and the First Air Fleet were assigned the principal roles in the projected battle. The former assembled its surface strength at Tawitawi in the Sulu Archipelago on May 16th, while the land-based units of the First Air Fleet continued to be widely deployed in the Marianas and Carolines to take advantage of any tactical opportunity that might arise. Tawitawi was chosen as the main staging point for the First Mobile Fleet because of its proximity to both the refueling facilities of Balikpapan and the sea area which the Navy High Command expected to be the scene of the decisive battle.  It was also safely beyond the range of enemy land-based air power and afforded greater security against Allied intelligence than other anchorages in the Philippines. Orders are orders, thus Anami ordered General Teshima to hold onto Geelvink Bay at all costs while also contuining to secure the Sarmi area as a lifeline for the 18th Army who were being cut off from east of Hollandia. While Admiral Ozawa's 1st Mobile Fleet assembled its at Tawi Tawi for Operation A-Go and Admiral Kakuta's 1st Air Fleet deployed its land-based units in the Marianas and Carolines, Admirals King, Nimitz and Spruance had also been planning their invasion of the Marianas, aiming to secure Saipan, Tinian and Guam as advance air and naval bases to allow striking of the Philippines, Formosa and Okinawa. After the landings at Hollandia and Aitape, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 realized there was very little opposition and he still had plenty of strength to continue operating. Thus Nimitz decided to carry out a preventive strike against Truk, to ensure that the Japanese would not be able to build up their air power before the Marianas invasion scheduled for June.  Intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese had been rebuilding their strength at Truk. Indeed Truk's air garrison had grown enough to be a concern again. By late March, 30 flyable Zero fighters had been pieced together from aircraft destroyed during the February raids. Additionally, aircraft were being withdrawn from bypassed bases in the Marshalls and sent to Truk. By April, the Japanese had 104 flyable aircraft at Truk: 6 G4M twin-engine bombers, 12 D4Y1s dive bombers/reconnaissance bombers, 13 B5N or B6N torpedo bombers, 55 Zero fighters, 10 J1N1 night fighters, and 8 floatplanes used for observation and reconnaissance. Moen No. 1 airfield housed the G4Ms and 20 Zero, while Eten had the rest of the Zeros and all the night fighters. The single-engine bombers, the D4Y1s, B5Ns, and B6Ns, were all at Param, with the floatplanes at Dublon. There were another 63 unserviceable aircraft scattered throughout Truk's airfields. Admiral Spruance's 5th fleet would also conduct a bombardment of the Satawa and Ponape islands. On its return from Hollandia, Task Force 58 traveled to Truk, arriving shortly before dawn on April 30th and immediately tossed a fighter sweep consisting of 84 Hellcats. 5 Nakajima bombers from Param were aloft doing a dawn sweep, something that had become routine since February. Truk's radar detected the inbound US aircraft when they were 30 minutes out, shortly before the scout's interrupted radio report. The warning gave the Japanese ample time to launch air cover. Before the US fighters arrived, Moen No. 1 had scrambled 20 Zeros, Eten another 29, and Param its remaining eight Nakajima bombers. Yet the 57 Japanese aircraft were brushed aside, nearly 25 Zeros were shot down at the cost of 2 Hellcats. Just like we saw in February, Task Force 58 began staggering air strikes throughout the day. The carriers launched full deckloads seeing fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers continously over Truk for the entire day. Task Force 58 performed 2,200 bomber sorties, 467 of which were flown by fighters carrying bombs. In all, US Navy aircraft dropped 748 tons of bombs during the two-day operation. The Hino Maru No. 2, a 1,500-ton cargo ship and auxiliary gunboat, was hit and heavily damaged by a bomb by an Avenger from USS Cabot during the attack's first day. It sank four days later on May 4. The Sapporo Maru, a 600-ton auxiliary provision stores ship, was bombed on April 30 and sank north of Fefan. The 300-ton auxiliary minelayer Minsei Maru and 20 other craft were also destroyed in the harbor during the two days of raids. While a small haul when compared to February's results, these losses further reduced the number of vessels remaining in Truk Atoll. This increased the difficulty of moving supplies and personnel between the different islands in the lagoon, further decreasing Truk's usefulness as an outpost. Additionally, the Japanese submarine I-174 was detected 20 miles south of the atoll on May 1. Aircraft from the light carrier Monterey teamed up with the destroyers MacDonough and Stephen Potter to sink the submarine. Whether the submarine was fleeing Truk or heading back to it after a patrol is not known. Its loss contributed to the decision to abandon Truk as a submarine base later in 1944. The Japanese losing 23 auxiliary vessels and one submarine, but this time the American bombers also targeted Truk's shore facilities, giving special attention to the airfields on Moen and Eten, the Dublon naval headquarters and oil storage tanks, and Fefen's docks warehouses and ammo dumps.  On the morning of May 1st, the Japanese attempted several straggling strikes against the American carriers, but none managed to cause any damage. The largest attack against the US fleet contained 8 bombers, D4Y1 dive bombers, and Nakajima torpedo bombers which survived the first day's attack. They found Task Group 58.2 and Task Group 58.3 at 8:15am, making a series of attacks against aircraft carriers in both groups. Met by heavy antiaircraft fire, they were shot down, most before they could drop their torpedoes or bombs. Only one came close enough to drop a bomb, which fell near the Lexington but caused no damage. Task Force 58 contuined to pound Truk throughout the day before finally retiring towards Majuro during the night. Based on interpretation of post-strike aerial photography, US intelligence estimated 40 percent of the buildings on Dublon, 80 percent of those on Eten, 75 percent of those at Moen, 20 percent of the buildings on Fefan, 15 percent of those on Param, and 80 percent at Ulalu were destroyed during the airstrikes of April 30 and May 1. Roughly 423 buildings and six hangars were destroyed, 44 others were damaged, 59 Japanese aircraft were shot down, a further 60 were destroyed on the ground, 36 were left damaged, and only 12 were still flyable. All of this cost Mitscher 35 aircraft, with another 33 damaged. Furthermore, half the airmen shot down were rescued by planes or by submarines.  Thus the threat posed by Truk was yet again neutralized. After this, Admiral Montgomery's carrier group Task Force 58 was given orders to hit Minami Torishima and Wake Island for mid May. Leaving Majuro on May 15th, Montgomery assemled his forces about 420 miles southeast of Marcus Island on the17th. On the 19th, light carrier San Jacinto hunted for enemy picket boats north and west of Minami Torishima. At 7:28am a Avenger of VT-9 and a Hellcat of VF-9 found and attacked an enemy trawler 475 miles north of Marcus Island. They dropped their bombs and strafed it with machine gun fire. No direct bomb hits were obtained but the target was well covered with machine gun fire. The Japanese trawler was left dead in the water and down by the stern, with a 1/4 miles oil slick and debris behind it. No personnel were visible on the boat. Meanwhile fleet carriers Wasp and Essex launched a predawn fighter sweep. A flight of 4 night fighters launched at 5am from the Wasp on an intruder mission over Marcus Island, but the Essex had to cancel its flight of night fighters. At 11:15, another air attack commenced. Aircraft dove through antiaircraft bursts with bomb blasts occuring all over the island. At one time the entire island was completely smothered by smoke and dust, but the Anti-aircraft fire contuined undiminished. After the planes left, explosions and fires continued on Marcus Island for some time. They managed to inflict a moderate amount of damage to buildings, shot down one G4M and sunktwo small boats; ut the defenders' anti-aircraft fire was ferocious, successfully shooting down 4 American planes and damaging another 69. On May 21st, San Jacinto rejoined the group and also reported sinking one sampan. Montgomery's carriers then launched a series of composite carrier strikes against Wake on May 23, further damaging many installations there and sinking a slugger and three barges, at the cost of only one plane. But that is all for carrier actions today as we now need to jump oer to the Burma front. General Stilwell was contuining his offensive, with the 22nd division advancing south towards Inkangahtawng. General Lioa's 65th Regiment plus the 3rd Battalion, 66th regiment were advancing down the Kamaing road when they ran into Japanese resistance north and west of Inkangahtawng. The 64th regiment was kept behind to guard the Japanese flank until May 3rd, while the rest of the 22nd Division awaited better weather to perform a coordinated attack against the town. But this was Burma, and Burma is going to Burma. There was an outbreak of monsoons that quickly prevented the effective use of tanks and made supply movement over the Ledo Road a nightmare. By June about one inch of rain fell daily. Though supply convoys could still move from Ledo to Shingbwiyang, the combat trail from Shingbwiyang south was very difficult. The road was graded to Tingkawk Sakan known also as mile post 164 and metaled almost to Mile Post 138. However, rainfall had blocked the road over the flats north of Tingkawk Sakan. At the end of June the situation was unchanged. The Japanese stand at Kamaing and the heavy rains immobilized the survey party and the road trace. As the flood waters rose in the valley, they effectively barred armor from moving south to Mogaung or Myitkyina. Thus on May 3rd, the 64th avaned east across the Kamaing Road to try and cut the trail 500 yards south of the Hwelon Hka. The next day presented clearer skies, so the Chinese troops initiated their attack. Once Inkangahtawn fell, the 22nd Division would hold the area for several weeks while the first elements of Lt General Pen Yukun's 50th Division arrived to the front to reinforce them. To the east, General Sun's 114th regiment were engaging General Tanaka's 55th regiment along the Lahkraw Hka. To break the stalemate along the Lahkraw Hka, the Chinese 114th Regiment had to clear away the Japanese observation posts in the hills. The 1st battalion, 114th on the regiment's east flank cut around the flank of the 55th Regiment on April 28th, while the 2nd battalion, 114th pushed the same Japanese unit back a few hundred yards. This bending process continued during the next two days, and the 114th Regiment was well south of the enveloped Japanese flank and within half a mile of Wala. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 114th then began moving straight south, leaving behind them pockets of determined Japanese who held up the 3rd battalion, 114th. The Chinese managed to envelope the Japanese, pushing them all the way to Wala. The 113th Regiment also came back into line at the end of April to put frontal pressure on the Japanese positions along the Lahkraw Hka and Tigrawm Hka while the 112th Regiment held its salient without attempting to move. Though the Japanese managed to stabilize their lines on the creeks east and west of Wala, a company of the 114th would cross the Nawngmi Hka on May 6th, thus starting the advance southwards again. Two days later, the 114th's advance became general, while on the east, at Stilwell's order, the 112th began to gather its companies to take Warong.  On the 9th, the 114th Regiment finally took East Wala and Hlagyi and subsequently linked with the 112th Regiment pushing south towards Warong. The 114th's penetration, driving deeper into the Japanese lines, began to approach the 112th's outposts just north of Manpin. By the 12th the 114th and 112th Regiments were able to maintain communications, with very few Japanese between them. The 114th's penetration further weakened the position of the Japanese facing the 113th Regiment, which in turn began to roll up slowly from east to west as its 1st and 2nd Battalions pressed on to Wala and Maran. Between the 28-30th, Merrills End Run Force began the long grueling advance upon Ritpong. K Force moved out on 28 April; H Force, on 30 April. The so-called trail over the pass was more nearly a route used by the Kachins; in some places there was no path. Twenty pack animals slipped and fell off the narrow, muddy way. It was a grueling march for men who had already marched 500 miles and fought several battles, most of the time on K ration. Before End Rrun Force reached Ritpong, it had only one contact with the Japanese. A few of the enemy were flushed from cover by the 1/88th, but it was feared the Japanese held Ritpong in strength. On May 5th, the Japanese 2nd Battalion, 114th Infantry Regiment made contact with the K Force at Ritpong, 16 miles northwest of Nsopsup, and a four day battle ensued. The Battalion was forced to withdraw to Tingkrukawng, about eight miles to the southeast. There, after several skirmishes, contact with the enemy was lost for a period of five days. On the 5th, when the leading elements of K Force were a mile from Ritpong, Colonel Kinnison began an envelopment to hit the village from north and south. The 3rd Battalion managed to cut its way through the woods and place itself across the southern approaches to Ritpong on the 6th. Meanwhile, the 89th Regiment tried to take Ritpong from the north but failed. Next day an American reinforced company attacked Ritpong from the south but was stalled by a machine gun nest. Merrills Marauders would block the trail to the south, while the 80th Regiment contuined to hit their enemy positions. As the Chinese captured Ritpong on the 9th, M Force had had one skirmish with Japanese, routed them, and begun to cut its own paths. The march was fatiguing in the extreme; fully half the animals died of exhaustion or fell into the gorges. The men were farther harassed by fevers and dysentery, but they were only two days behind H and K Forces To the south, General Lentaigne's Chindits were contuining Operation Thursday. Yet under the overall direction of Stilwell, the Chindits were no longer a “special force”, now they were line infantry tasked with the traditional role of advancing and seizing well defended objectives, for which they did not have the training nor equipment to do effectively. Brigadiers Brodie and Ricketts men covered the general Chindit movement heading north. The plan called for closure of Aberdeen, Broadway and White City before the Monsoon broke. It was now the turn of 14 Brigade to play a major role. The new Block near Hopin would cut the road and rail link to the town of Mogaung. Meanwhile Major Masters' 111th Brigade began to establish the Blackpool Stronghold on May 5. The site was occupied on the night of May 5/6, and Masters spent the entirety of the following day setting up defenses. What he should have done was immediately attack the Japanese-held village of Namkwin just ahead of his positions. Instead, he busied himself with preparing the stronghold. It was a critical mistake, and says much about the lack of enterprise from the brigade. Blackpool Block was finally established on May 7th, with the King's Own's 46 Column the first to arrive at the site. They came under fire as they dug in. For the next 5 nights they would be attacked by a railway unit based out of Pinbaw. The railway unit was using 105mm guns firing from up the valley, while troops from Pinbaw attacked for the next five nights, held at bay by the rifles and machine guns of the King's own Rifles, and the mortars, which Masters had gathered from the battalions and wielded as single battery of eight. Despite the strong defense, in one section of the northern line nicknamed the “Deep”  which was the tip of the “boar's nose,” the Japanese were as close as 10 to 20 yards from the wire. Enemy snipers took shots at anything that moved while the King's own snipers and Bren gunners occupied hidden places among the shattered trees, firing whenever they saw the target, after which a cry would resound amid the quiet that followed: “got him!” The Japanese brought up a single 75mm artillery piece from Pinbaw, with which they shelled the camp, blasting the airstrip with impunity and setting the gliders and Dakotas on fire, until May 13 when Masters came into possession of three airlifted 25-pdr guns, allowing him to hit back. Overhead Cochran's Air Commandos mounted sortie after sortie against the Japanese positions but it was clear they could not maintain the ante. The dark clouds of the monsoon were gathering in strength. After the successful establishment of Blackpool, Brigadier Calvert's 77th brigade began advancing north towards Mogaung on the 8th. The night night, White City was abandoned as Brigadiers Broddie and Ricketts marched north to defend Blackpool. On May 11th, Lt General Takeda launched an attack against White City, but was surprised to find it abandoned. It then advanced to the then-abandoned Broadway and onwards to the Namkwin area, where the Blackpool stronghold was located. Having rushed through empty Broadway and White City, the 53rd Division thus tore into the zone in strength. Takeda Kaoru's 53rd Division began pursuing Broddie and Ricketts forces. For the next few days Master's troops continued to repel increasingly stronger and stronger Japanese attacks. Masters quote “Where in the name of God were the floater brigades? White City had been evacuated 13 days earlier and 14th Brigade was supposed to come straight up here. My brigade had marched 140 route miles in 14 days to establish this block. Surely those bloody nitwits could cover 120 route miles in 13 days? Where the hell were they? Where were the West Africans?… 20 bloody battalions, 40 flaming columns of Chindit bullshit sat on their arses and drank eat and wondered how we were getting on.” In mid-May, the 3rd Battalion, 114th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment tried to break through towards Kamaing and Myitkyina to reinforce Tanaka's spent defenders and would join in on the attacks against Blackpool. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment would also support their attacks. The Japanese continued their efforts to quickly crush Blackpool Block. A Company-strength attack on May 14 was backed by artillery support. It was repulsed, the Japanese losing 60 killed. They returned the following morning, when another 50 were killed. Air strikes were called in to further punish the enemy. Then the monsoon took hold and air support and supply became more difficult – Lalaghat and Hailakandi were fair weather fields. The Japanese also retaliated through a single heavy mortar, firing 60lb bombs, note in comparison, Chindit's standard 81mm mortar fired a 10lb bombs. Delayed by the outbreak of the monsoons on May 15, the brigades of Brodie and Ricketts had managed to secure the vital Kyunsalai Pass, but they failed to get close enough to provide significant support for the stronghold. At the same time, the flooding of the Namyin river would leave Calvert's 77th Brigade unable to aid Masters in the defense of Blackpool; and Morris Force, which had successfully cut the Myitkyina road, was too far to the east to come into the stronghold's assistance. The monsoons had also hampered the airdrop of supplies, so the Chindits would have to make their five days' rations last up to 14 days. Meanwhile, proceeding from Ritpong, K Force feinted towards the Japanese supply point at Nsopzup in order to attract the Japanese attention while H Force advanced directly to Myitkyina.  On the 12th, Colonel Henry Kinnison's Marauders engaged the 2nd Battalion, 114th Regiment, near Tingkrukawng. The Japanese at Tingkrukawng were strong enough to pin both of K force's combat teams to the ground and then to halt the Chinese when they were committed. Attempts to envelop the Japanese failed. Since H Force was proceeding unmolested, Merrill told Kinnison to withdraw. K Force then picked up H's trail and followed it to Myitkyina. While K Force was fighting at Tingkrukawng, H Force kept on to a river just south of the village of Namkwi on the Mogaung-Myitkyina railroad and about two miles from the principal Myitkyina airstrip that lay almost due west of Myitkyina itself. Despite the several brushes with the Japanese, Kachin informants were sure that the Myitkyina garrison was not on the alert. To ensure surprise, before Colonel Hunter and his force bivouacked for the night of the 16th they rounded up the local Burmans and kept them under careful watch. Kinnison would reach Hkumchet by the 17th, where the Colonel had to be evacuated because he had contracted a deadly mite typhus, dying shortly after with shocking speed. In all, 149 men contracted this little-known scourge. While M Force was about to reach Arang, H Force began an attack of Pamati and the Myitkyina airstrip on the 17th. The 150th Regiment was ordered to take the airstrip, while GALAHAD personnel took the Irrawaddy ferry terminal at Pamati. The other airstrip, north of the town, was left alone for the present. The attack went like a service school demonstration, for though the Japanese knew Myitkyina was in danger, the actual assault was a complete surprise. Colonel Maruyama, the Japanese commander, had two understrength battalions of the 114th Regiment in the town of Myitkyina and in its little suburb of Sitapur. There were 100 more men of the 15th Airfield Battalion on the north and south airstrips, 318 men from labor and service units on various details in Myitkyina, and 320 patients in a military hospital. Perhaps 700 able-bodied Japanese were present when the battle began. They took the Japanese by complete surprise and subsequently securing both positions.  As soon as Hunter considered his hold on the major airstrip secure, he sent the prearranged code signal, “Merchant of Venice”, which meant the process of supply and reinforcement could begin. Consequently, some reinforcements began to be flown into the airstrip, though to the disappointment of General Merrill most of these were engineers and anti-aircraft instead of the needed infantry.  Back at his HQ, Stilwell was exultant. The brilliant seizure of the Myitkyina airstrip was the height of his career and the grand climax of the North Burma Campaign, as his forces had driven 500 miles into Burma and won engagements against seven Japanese regiments in the last six months. Stilwell's triumph also came right on time, as American planners in Washington were beginning to adopt the British position suggesting an end to offensive action in north Burma. Stilwell's bold stroke at Myitkyina would instead see the Americans issue a directive encouraging Admiral Mountbatten's command to exploit the opening of the Ledo Road and to secure enough of north Burma to protect the Allied hold on China's lifeline.   After the capture of the airstrip, Hunter immediately sent two battalions of the 150th Regiment to take Myitkyina. One battalion of the Chinese 89th Regiment, which had arrived from Ledo, would defend the air strip while two battalions of the 150th Regiment attacked Myitkyina. The other battalion of the 150th Regiment would be in reserve at the strip. They would encounter the 114th Regiment HQ and its 1st Battalion. As early as 1700 on 17 May Colonel Maruyama had also brought the 3rd Company, 148th Regiment, 56th Division, in across the Irrawaddy to reinforce Myitkyina. Following the wrong road, however, they went to Sitapur instead, where they were ambushed by the Japanese. On encountering Japanese rifle fire, they lost direction completely and engaged in fighting among themselves. Furthermore, some Marauders would continue toward Zigyun to secure the ferry crossing south of the city. On May 18, as more Chinese battalions were flown to reinforce the Chindits, the 150th again moved against Myitkyina; but repeating the mishap of the day before, the Chinese became confused, fought among themselves, and ultimately drove themselves right back out of the town. Nonetheless, the Siege of Myitkyina had just begun. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invasion of Hollandia and Aitape was such quick successes it allowed the Americans to bombard further islands. The Take-Ichi convoy improved the transportation of troops, but it also came at a horrifying cost. The loss of such shipping was yet again the paint on the wall for the Empire of Japan. Despite this the IJN was fully committed to forcing a decisive naval victory. 

KPU Minta Masyarakat Kawal Penghitungan Suara Pemilu | Ribuan Surat Suara Rusak di Kota Cirebon Dimusnahkan dengan Cara Dibakar | Laporan Live Pencoblosan di Balikpapan, Kaltim *Kami ingin mendengar saran dan komentar kamu terkait podcast yang baru saja kamu simak, melalui surel ke podcast@kbrprime.id

Berita Koran Tempo hari ini: Dugaan pembengkakan biaya proyek revitalisasi kilang Pertamina di Balikpapan capai Rp 18,3 triliun; Koalisi gemuk pendukung Prabowo jika Demokrat resmi bergabung; Pabrik piringan hitam di Indonesia kembali muncul setelah Lokananta terakhir produksi 1974. — Dukung Tempo untuk menghadirkan produk jurnalisme berkualitas s.id/dukungtempo.  Baca berbagai laporan mendalam majalah Tempo dan Koran Tempo dengan mengunduh aplikasi Tempo. --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/berita-utama-koran-tempo/message

Welcome to Focus Asia your first window to discover Asia. This week, we have news from Indonesia, Hong Kong, and The 90s Festival. Find out more episode and listening to Bingkai Suara Podcast. Don't forget to always listen to focus asia every week to update your knowledge about what happens in Asia and updated with our recent news on www.bingkaikarya.com

KILAS KABAR NUSANTARA. Sejumlah peristiwa penting yang telah kami rangkum pada hari Kamis, 6 Juli 2023. BANDUNG (00:22) Tim Penilai Kinerja Percepatan Penurunan Stunting Jabar mengapresiasi hasil kerja keras Pemerintah Kota Bandung dalam menekan angka stunting. MAKASSAR (00:56) Pemerintah Kota bersama KPU Makassar siap mensukseskan Kirab Pemilu 2024. BALIKPAPAN (01:59) PT PT Pertamina Patra Niaga Regional Kalimantan, menanggapi pernyataan pemerintah kota dan komisi II DPRD Balikpapan terkait kesulitan masyarakat yang memperoleh gas elpiji ukuran 3 kilogram bersubsidi. Kontributor: Sonora Bandung - Yogi Smart Makassar - News Anchor: Deddy Detars ll Reporter: Muh Said Smart Balikpapan - Etty Hariyani Saran dan kolaborasi: ⁠podcast@kgmedia.id

KILAS KABAR NUSANTARA. Sejumlah peristiwa penting yang telah kami rangkum pada hari Rabu, 5 Juli 2023. MAKASSAR (00:22) Perum Bulog Sulselbar memastikan stok beras di Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan aman hingga akhir tahun. BALIKPAPAN (01:14) Anggota Komisi 2 DPRD Balikpapan meminta agar Pemerintah Kota mengambil sikap terkait masalah kelangkaan LPG 3KG bersubsidi. MANADO (02.04) Jumlah wisatawan mancanegara yang datang ke Sulawesi Utara melalui pintu masuk Bandara Sam Ratulangi pada mei 2023, sesuai data BPS Sulawesi Utara tercatat sebanyak 3.798 orang, turun 8,61% dibanding dengan April 2023. Kontributor: Smart Makassar - News Anchor: Deddy Detars  ll Reporter: Dian Mega Safitri Smart Balikpapan - Etty Haryani Smart Manado - Edwin  Saran dan kolaborasi: ⁠podcast@kgmedia.id

KILAS KABAR NUSANTARA. Sejumlah peristiwa penting yang telah kami rangkum pada hari Selasa, 4 Juli 2023. MANADO (00:22) BPS Sulawesi Utara dalam rilis terbalunya menyatakan pada bulan Juni 2023 Kota Manado mengalami inflasi sebesar 0,11 persen, dengan inflasi tahun kalender sebesar 1,05 persen dan inflasi year on year sebesar 2,68 persen. MAKASSAR (01:27) Wali Kota Makassar, Danny Pomanto memutuskan untuk keluar dari keanggotaan partai Nasdem. BALIKPAPAN (02:09) Walikota Balikpapan Minta Restoran Pakai LPG Non-Subsidi. Kontributor: Smart Manado - Edwin Smart Makassar - News Anchor: Deddy Detars ll Reporter: Muh Said Smart Balikpapan - Etty Hariyani Saran dan kolaborasi: ⁠podcast@kgmedia.id

In today's daily round-up of export, trade and commodity finance news, TXF's Ralph Ivey covers the latest stories and trends across the market: Newcrest Mining is set to accept a $19.5 billion takeover proposal from Newmont Euler Hermes offers support for Angola's Caculo-Cabaca hydro-electric facility Pertamina approaches financial close for $3 billion Balikpapan refinery deal despite rumours that US Exim will withdraw support Like what you hear? Hit subscribe to stay up to date and for all the latest news online visit www.txfnews.com today.

KILAS KABAR NUSANTARA. Sejumlah peristiwa penting yang telah kami rangkum pada hari Kamis, 7 April 2023. MANADO (00:18) Maskapai Super Air Jet secara resmi mulai mendarat perdana di bandara Sam Ratulangi Manado dan disambut dengan Water Salute. PALEMBANG (01:14) Sebanyak 56 ribu orang warga Provinsi Sumatera Selatan yang tergolong sebagai keluarga ekonomi rendah masuk dalam daftar penerima bantuan beras gratis dari Bulog tahun ini. MAKASSAR (02:09) PT Pelabuhan Indonesia Group tahun ini kembali menggelar mudik gratis Lebaran 1444 Hijriah bagi masyarakat yang menggunakan moda transportasi laut. Kontributor: Smart FM Manado - Edwin Smart FM Palembang - Host Esy | Source Antara Smart FM Makassar - News Anchor: Deddy Detars | Reporter: Dian Mega Safitri Saran dan kolaborasi: podcast@kgmedia.id

Aksi kekerasan jalanan tampaknya tak berkurang selama Ramadan. Polda Metro Jaya mencatat terjadi delapan aksi tawuran antarwarga yang terjadi pada awal bulan Ramadan 2023 untuk wilayah Jakarta saja. Salah satu kekerasan jalanan yang banyak terjadi dan seolah menjadi ‘tren' adalah perang sarung. Sarung yang digunakan diisi batu, senjata tajam dan besi. Ini terjadi di berbagai daerah antara lain Jakarta, Surabaya, Kabupaten Bandung, Majalengka, hingga Balikpapan. Korban luka-luka bahkan korban tewas tak terelakkan. Mengapa aksi kekerasan seperti perang sarung ini bisa menjadi ‘tren'? Apa upaya untuk mencegahnya? Pagi ini di Ruang Publik KBR akan kita bahas hal ini bersama Sosiolog dari Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), Andreas Budi Widyanta.

Aksi kekerasan jalanan tampaknya tak berkurang selama Ramadan. Polda Metro Jaya mencatat terjadi delapan aksi tawuran antarwarga yang terjadi pada awal bulan Ramadan 2023 untuk wilayah Jakarta saja. Salah satu kekerasan jalanan yang banyak terjadi dan seolah menjadi 'tren' adalah perang sarung. Sarung yang digunakan diisi batu, senjata tajam dan besi. Ini terjadi di berbagai daerah antara lain Jakarta, Surabaya, Kabupaten Bandung, Majalengka, hingga Balikpapan. Korban luka-luka bahkan korban tewas tak terelakkan. Mengapa aksi kekerasan seperti perang sarung ini bisa menjadi 'tren' ? Apa upaya untuk mencegahnya? Di Ruang Publik KBR akan kita bahas hal ini bersama Sosiolog dari Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), Andreas Budi Widyanta. *Kami ingin mendengar saran dan komentar kamu terkait podcast yang baru saja kamu simak, melalui surel ke podcast@kbrprime.id

Alex Lloyd introduces the WWII video documentary FOR SCHOOL AND COUNTRY, coming to YouTube over the next five weeks. FOR SCHOOL AND COUNTRY is a five-part video documentary miniseries, created by us, Thistle Productions. The series chronicles the lives and service of twelve WWII veterans who went to school together and took up arms when war broke out. This production was originally released on DVD in 2015 - the first ‘Thistle Productions' project - and it is finally available for free via streaming. These dozen veterans served across the whole theatre of war. At sea they fought the Bismarck and the Admiral Graf Spee, and sailed in the Mediterranean Fleet and the Pacific Fleet, including at the largest naval engagement of the war. On land they fought at Tobruk, El Alamein and Tarakan; and they trekked through the jungles of New Guinea and landed on the beaches of Balikpapan. And in the sky they flew over Europe for Bomber Command, over the Middle East for the Desert Air Force, and with the Forgotten Army in Burma. Many had narrow escapes, including one sole survivor when his bomber crashed in enemy territory. Watch the episodes via www.youtube.com/lifeonthelinepodcast as they drop on the following dates at 7pm Sydney time: Episode I - Books to Arms - 21 March Episode II - Scuttled & Sunk - 28 March Episode III - A Great Escape - 4 April Episode IV - Terror in the Jungle - 11 April Episode V - You Do Your Part - 18 April Find out more about the documentary at www.lifeonthelinepodcast.com/documentary. 

Awal mula hantu kuyang yang berasal dari Balikpapan !! --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/ceritaseram/support

@adhi_KZ kedatengan teman-nya, putra Balikpapan yang mewah alias @glennnirwan . --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/goodridespodcast/support

Bersyukur Tuhan memberikan kesempatan bisa berbagi di Sekolah Balikpapan. Dan banyak hal positif terjadi.

KILAS KABAR NUSANTARA. Sejumlah peristiwa penting yang telah kamu rangkum pada Jum'at,7 Oktober 2022 MAKASSAR (00:33) Penerbangan langsung atau direct flight rute Toraja menuju Balikpapan akan mulai beroperasi hari ini Jumat, 7 Oktober 2022. MANADO (01:36) Bank Indonesia mengadakan sosialisasi pemanfaatan BI Fast kepada masyarakat dan insan perbankan di wilayah Sulawesi,Maluku dan Papua. SURABAYA (02:23) Wali Kota Surabaya Eri Cahyadi mengungkap berdasar hasil pencocokan data dengan kondisi kenyataan di lapangan bahwa terdapat ribuan warga ber-KTP dan ber-KK Surabaya , namun berdomisili di luar daerah atau bertempat tinggal di luar kota Surabaya. Kontributor: Smart Makassar - News Anchor: Deddy Detars l Reporter: Dian Mega Safitri Sonora FM Surabaya- Budi Smart FM Manado Saran dan kolaborasi: podcast@kgmedia.id

(Rediffusion du 20 février 2022) Selon les prévisions les plus pessimistes, d'ici 2030, un tiers de la capitale indonésienne sera engloutie sous les eaux. En cause : la surpopulation (11 millions d'habitants), un pompage excessif des nappes phréatiques qui provoque l'affaissement des sols, les inondations et la hausse inéluctable du niveau de la mer provoquée par le réchauffement climatique. En 2019, la décision est prise : une nouvelle capitale verra le jour à 2000 km de là, à Kalimantan, la partie indonésienne de l'île de Bornéo. Mais ce projet titanesque suscite de nombreuses controverses. La nouvelle capitale s'appellera Nusantara. Sa construction, retardée par la pandémie, devrait s'étaler en plusieurs étapes jusqu'en 2045. Ambitieux, le gouvernement envisage même un déménagement du pouvoir exécutif dès 2024. La future capitale « verte » sera construite sur l'île de Bornéo, connue pour abriter l'une des plus grandes forêts tropicales au monde. L'ONG AMAN, l'Alliance des peuples indigènes de l'archipel, lance un cri d'alarme : « Nusantara occupera à terme plus de 256 000 hectares de terres et une surface aquatique de plus de 68 000 hectares », dit Muhammad Arman, directeur de la politique, du droit et du plaidoyer pour les droits de l'homme. « Notre organisation dénombre 21 groupes indigènes qui vivent dans cette zone. Au total, onze de ces groupes soit 20 000 personnes sont directement affectés par le projet de développement de la future capitale. » Un désastre pour les communautés autochtones locales Ce mégaprojet utopiste, d'une ville intelligente qui se veut « zéro émission » et construite au beau milieu des arbres, est pourtant un désastre pour les communautés autochtones de la province de Kalimantan-Est. Ces populations sont déjà en conflit avec les exploitants miniers et d'huile de palme qui ont pullulé ces dernières années dans la région. « La lutte contre l'invasion des plantations d'huile de palme sur leurs terres coutumières est une question de survie pour les indigènes. Ils se battent pour récupérer leurs terres qui ont été confisquées par ces sociétés. Ils doivent protester auprès du gouvernement local pour l'inciter à les reconnaître et à protéger leurs droits », alerte Muhammad Arman. Un vœu pieu, puisque leurs demandes de protection, notamment de leurs droits fonciers, sont restées jusqu'ici lettre morte. Les dangers qui pèsent sur ces populations sont pourtant bien réels. « Pour les indigènes, les terres coutumières constituent plus qu'un espace de vie. Elles font partie de leur identité. En perdant ces terres, ils perdent absolument tout ! La construction de la nouvelle capitale leur fera perdre aussi leur travail, car ils ne pourront plus exercer leur métier traditionnel que sont l'agriculture et la pêche », poursuit-il. Les écosystèmes de la province endommagés Une enquête récente de plusieurs ONG, dont AMAN, a révélé qu'au moins 162 permis d'exploitation minière de plantation, de sylviculture et de centrales électriques au charbon avaient été accordés dans la zone de la future capitale. Les écologistes sont convaincus que Nusantara endommagera aussi les écosystèmes de la province. Un avis que partage Muhammad Arman. La baie de Balikpapan est incluse dans le projet, cela aura forcément un impact sur l'écosystème des mangroves. Les mangroves couvrent une surface de plus de 12 000 hectares. Si cet écosystème est endommagé, les populations qui y vivent n'auront plus accès à l'eau potable et ne couvriront plus leurs besoins existentiels. De plus, la construction de ce mégaprojet aggravera la situation écologique. Des milliers de permis divers d'exploitation ont déjà été délivrés à des entreprises. Cela entraînera aussi sans aucun doute des inondations de plus en plus fréquentes dans la région de Kalimantan-Est. Si les inquiétudes des organisations environnementales et de défense des droits humains s'avèrent fondées, avec son projet pharaonique, le gouvernement indonésien ne fera que déplacer un problème d'un point à un autre de l'archipel. Pour l'ONG AMAN, leur plus grand défi sera de faire reconnaître et de protéger les peuples autochtones, leur habitat, leur tradition et leurs moyens de subsistance. Mais la bataille s'annonce rude aux vues des investissements et des intérêts financiers des entreprises impliquées dans la construction de la nouvelle capitale politique.

Ini pengalaman lagi tahun ini bisa mengisi sesi Warrior Camp di salah satu sekolah Balikpapan. Pengalaman yang menantang saat harus menghadapi jaringan. Simak langsung.

Berita hari ini: Ancaman kenaikan harga mi dan roti akibat larangan ekspor gandum India; Pertamina upayakan kilang yang terbakar di Balikpapan segera beroperasi kembali; Pemerintah masih menunggak pembayaran sejumlah vendor pada perhelatan PON XX Papua 2021. --- Baca informasi harian komprehensif lainnya dengan mengunjungi website koran.tempo.co atau mengunduh aplikasi Tempo. Saran & kritik: podcast@tempo.co.id

Krisis Ekologi Mengancam Negeri Oleh. Fitria Zakiyatul Fauziyah CH (Kontributor Tetap NarasiPost.Com) Voice over talent: Sofia Ariyani NarasiPost.Com-Kerusakan lingkungan semakin meningkat seiring dengan berjalannya roda peradaban manusia. Ikatan manusia dengan alam sangatlah kuat. Bila manusia tidak menjaga kelestarian lingkungan, maka manusia akan merasakan kerugian yang sangat besar. Akibatnya, banyak upaya eksploitasi sumber daya alam (SDA) yakni kerusakan lingkungan. Hal itu terbukti bukan tanpa data. Isu-isu tersebut di antaranya, air sungai di Denpasar berwarna merah, yakni sungai yang melewati di Jalan Resimuka barawt, Desa Tegal Kertha, Denpasar, Bali. Rekaman air sungai yang berwarna merah sempat viral di media sosial. Seorang warga bernama Zaenal yang tinggal di Perumahan Resimuka Barat Permai, menyatakan bahwa air sungai sudah berwarna merah sejak hari Kamis (7/4). Dugaannya, air sungai yang berubah merah itu diakibatkan dari limbah industri, karena peristiwa tersebut terjadi berkali-kali. Walaupun tidak bau, tetapi mencemari lingkungan. (cnnindonesia.com, 08/04/2022) Selain itu, adanya proyek Smelter telah memicu kerusakan hutan mangrove di Teluk Balikpapan. Disebut-sebut area sungai Tempadung terancam oleh aktivitas pembangunan fasilitas pemurnian dan pengolahan mineral (smelter) nikel di kawasan Industri Kariangau (KIK), Kelurahan Kariangau, Kecamatan Balikpapan Barat, Kalimantan Timur. Koordinator Advokasi Pokja Pesisir, Husen Suwarno, dan nelayan Balikpapan menerangkan bahwa setidaknya ada 30 hektare (ha) lahan mangrove yang dibabat. Jika diuraikan sebanyak 10 ha di pesisir sungai dan 20 ha lagi berada di kawasan darat. Dugaan kuat pembalakan tersebut berangkat sebelum Desember 2021 dan berlangsung hingga Maret 2022. Apabila pembalakan ini terus terjadi, maka akibatnya potensi abrasi di Teluk Balikpapan semakin besar. Hutan mangrove juga merupakan rumah dari berbagai macam hewan, jika dirusak maka ekosistem bakal mengalami kematian. Terakhir, tangkapan ikan nelayan juga akan berkurang. (cnnindonesia.com, 08/04/2022) Naskah selengkapnya: https://narasipost.com/2022/04/16/krisis-ekologi-mengancam-negeri/ Terimakasih buat kalian yang sudah mendengarkan podcast ini, Follow us on: instagram: http://instagram.com/narasipost Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/narasi.post.9 Fanpage: Https://www.facebook.com/pg/narasipostmedia/posts/ Twitter: Http://twitter.com/narasipost

Musibah dan Cubitan Kecil dari Allah Oleh. Ana Nazahah (Kontributor Tetap NarasiPost.Com) Voice over talent: Dewi Nasjag NarasiPost.Com-Tahun 2022 baru saja kita lalui. Namun, bencana demi bencana terus datang silih berganti. Mulai erupsi di Gunung Semeru. Banjir bandang di Jember. Gempa bumi, hingga kecelakaan maut di Balikpapan baru-baru ini. Deretan musibah tersebut, seolah mencubit kita. Mungkin itulah cara Allah Swt. memperingatkan kita. Karena kerap mendurhakai perintah dan larangan-Nya. Ya, betapa banyak manusia saat ini mendustakan kebenaran dari syariat Tuhan-Nya. Kendati dia muslim, namun pada syariat-Nya sendiri dia alergi, melawan dan merasa anti. Keimanan tersungkur di bawah sikap takabur dan kepongahan hati. Melawan perintah Rabb dengan begitu percaya diri. Lihatlah! Bagaimana islamofobia begitu mengakar tertanam dalam benak umat. Simbol-simbol Islam dituduh lambang terorisme. Beberapa pasantren tempat mendidik generasi yang beriman dan bervisi Rabbani dicurigai sarang teroris. Sejumlah hamluddakwah dikekang geraknya, dipersekusi. Tidakkah ini terkategori sikap durhaka? Mencurigai ajaran Islam yang mulia, apa bedanya dengan menista? Di sisi lain, gerakan-gerakan seperti kaum yang benderanya menyimbolkan pelangi diberi ruang. Atas nama hak asasi syariat Allah dipelintir sesuka hati. Kebijakan demi kebijakan pun tak kurang zalimnya. Utang membengkak, pajak kian meninggi. Kemiskinan menjerat, sementara harta kekayaan milik rakyat dibiarkan diprivatisasi atas dalih investasi demi mendongkrak kemajuan ekonomi. Naskah selengkapnya: https://narasipost.com/2022/02/09/musibah-dan-cubitan-kecil-dari-allah/ Terimakasih buat kalian yang sudah mendengarkan podcast ini, Follow us on: instagram: http://instagram.com/narasipost Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/narasi.post.9 Fanpage: Https://www.facebook.com/pg/narasipostmedia/posts/ Twitter: Http://twitter.com/narasipost

Selon les prévisions les plus pessimistes, d'ici 2030, un tiers de la capitale indonésienne sera engloutie sous les eaux. En cause : la surpopulation (11 millions d'habitants), un pompage excessif des nappes phréatiques qui provoque l'affaissement des sols, les inondations et la hausse inéluctable du niveau de la mer provoquée par le réchauffement climatique. En 2019, la décision est prise : une nouvelle capitale verra le jour à 2 000 km de là, à Kalimantan, la partie indonésienne de l'île de Bornéo. Mais ce projet titanesque suscite de nombreuses controverses. La nouvelle capitale s'appellera Nusantara. Sa construction, retardée par la pandémie, devrait s'étaler en plusieurs étapes jusqu'en 2045. Ambitieux, le gouvernement envisage même un déménagement du pouvoir exécutif dès 2024. La future capitale « verte » sera construite sur l'île de Bornéo, connue pour abriter l'une des plus grandes forêts tropicales au monde. L'ONG AMAN, l'Alliance des peuples indigènes de l'archipel, lance un cri d'alarme : « Nusantara occupera à terme plus de 256 000 hectares de terres et une surface aquatique de plus de 68 000 hectares », dit Muhammad Arman, directeur de la politique, du droit et du plaidoyer pour les droits de l'homme. « Notre organisation dénombre 21 groupes indigènes qui vivent dans cette zone. Au total, onze de ces groupes soit 20 000 personnes sont directement affectés par le projet de développement de la future capitale. »  Un désastre pour les communautés autochtones locales Ce mégaprojet utopiste, d'une ville intelligente, qui se veut « zéro émission » et construite au beau milieu des arbres, est pourtant un désastre pour les communautés autochtones de la province de Kalimantan-Est. Ces populations sont déjà en conflit avec les exploitants miniers et d'huile de palme qui ont pullulé ces dernières années dans la région.  « La lutte contre l'invasion des plantations d'huile de palme sur leurs terres coutumières est une question de survie pour les indigènes. Ils se battent pour récupérer leurs terres qui ont été confisquées par ces sociétés. Ils doivent protester auprès du gouvernement local pour l'inciter à les reconnaître et à protéger leurs droits », alerte Muhammad Arman. Un vœu pieu, puisque leurs demandes de protection, notamment de leurs droits fonciers, sont restées jusqu'ici lettre morte. Les dangers qui pèsent sur ces populations sont pourtant bien réels. « Pour les indigènes, les terres coutumières constituent plus qu'un espace de vie. Elles font partie de leur identité. En perdant ces terres, ils perdent absolument tout ! La construction de la nouvelle capitale leur fera perdre aussi leur travail, car ils ne pourront plus exercer leur métier traditionnel que sont l'agriculture et la pêche », poursuit-il. Les écosystèmes de la province endommagés Une enquête récente de plusieurs ONG, dont AMAN, a révélé qu'au moins 162 permis d'exploitation minière de plantation, de sylviculture et de centrales électriques au charbon avaient été accordés dans la zone de la future capitale. Les écologistes sont convaincus que Nusantara endommagera aussi les écosystèmes de la province. Un avis que partage Muhammad Arman. La baie de Balikpapan est incluse dans le projet, cela aura forcément un impact sur l'écosystème des mangroves. Les mangroves couvrent une surface de plus de 12 000 hectares. Si cet écosystème est endommagé, les populations qui y vivent n'auront plus accès à l'eau potable et ne couvriront plus leurs besoins existentiels. De plus, la construction de ce mégaprojet aggravera la situation écologique. Des milliers de permis divers d'exploitation ont déjà été délivrés à des entreprises. Cela entraînera aussi sans aucun doute des inondations de plus en plus fréquentes dans la région de Kalimantan-Est.  Si les inquiétudes des organisations environnementales et de défense des droits humains s'avèrent fondées, avec son projet pharaonique, le gouvernement indonésien ne fera que déplacer un problème d'un point à un autre de l'archipel. Pour l'ONG AMAN, leur plus grand défi sera de faire reconnaître et de protéger les peuples autochtones, leur habitat, leur tradition et leurs moyens de subsistance. Mais la bataille s'annonce rude aux vues des investissements et des intérêts financiers des entreprises impliquées dans la construction de la nouvelle capitale politique. 

Kecelakaan bus dan truk yang menimbulkan korban meninggal dunia terus terjadi. Setelah kecelakaan maut truk rem blong di Balikpapan, kini ada lagi kecelakaan maut bus pariwisata di Bantul yang menewaskan 13 orang. Sebagian besar penyebab kecelakaan adalah kondisi rem blong. Selain itu, kelalaian sopir ketika mengemudi juga menjadi salah satu penyebabnya. Llau, bagaimana seharusnya pencegahan kecelakaan bus dan truk ini dilakukan? Berikut perbincangan kami bersama Pakar Transportasi, Djoko Setijowarno dan Badan Kehormatan Road Safety Association, Rio Octaviano. *Kami ingin mendengar saran dan komentar kamu terkait podcast yang baru saja kamu simak, melalui surel ke podcast@kbrprime.id

Hotel Bintang Empat Catat TPK Terbesar di Akhir Tahun 2021 | Kota Balikpapan Genap Berusia 125 Tahun | Sekolah di Makassar Ditutup Usai Siswa dan Guru Positif Covid-19 KILAS KABAR NUSANTARA. Sejumlah peristiwa penting yang telah kami rangkum hari Jumat, 11 Februari 2022 MANADO (00:51) Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) Sulawesi Utara merilis data kunjungan wisatawan pada akhir 2021. Dari pemaparan Kepala BPS Sulut, Asim Saputra kunjungan wisatawan di Sulut mengalami penigkatan 21.62 persen secara month to month (MoM) pada Desember 2021. BALIKPAPAN (02:14) Kota Balikpapan genap merayakan hari jadinya ke-125 tahun pada Kamis (10/02/2022). MAKASSAR (03:11) Sekolah di kota Makassar terpaksa tutup sementara. Menyusul, sejumlah pelajar dan guru terpapar Covid 19 setelah menerapkan pembelajaran tatap muka (PTM). Kontributor: Smart FM Manado - Casey Renata Smart FM Balikpapan - Etty Smart FM Makassar - News Anchor: Deddy Detars | Reporter: Muh Said Saran dan kolaborasi: podcast@kgmedia.id

Komite Nasional Kecelakaan Transportasi menemukan sejumlah fakta terkait komponen truk tronton yang alami kecelakaan di Balikpapan.

Headline News Metro TV Edisi 885 kali ini membahas: Hasil penyelidikan KNKT pasca laka maut Balikpapan. Penataan jalan pasca kecelakaan maut Rapak. Lagi, sekolah tutup karena positif Covid-19. Kasus Covid-19 naik, tinjau ulang PTM.

Headline News Metro TV Edisi 883 kali ini membahas: Penendang sesajen Semeru santri Abu Bakar Baasyir. Menguak penyebab kecelakaan maut Balikpapan. Perajin tahu keluhkan mahalnya harga kedelai. NII diduga menyebar di seluruh Indonesia.

Headline News Metro TV Edisi 879 kali ini membahas: Viral, Nakes diduga suntik vaksin kosong ke siswa. Lima zona merah Omicron DKI Jakarta. Kecelakaan maut Balikpapan 4 orang tewas. Percepatan vaksinasi booster.

Headline News Metro TV Edisi 878 kali ini membahas: Kecelakaan maut di Balikpapan, 5 tewas. Viral, nakes suntik vaksin kosong ke siswa SD. 3 ruko terbakar di Nagan Raya. Mendadak jadi "petani" untuk hindari tilang. Emak-emak serbu minyak goreng murah. Hakim PN Surabaya tersangka kasus suap. Lima zona merah omicron DKI Jakarta. Wagub DKI Jakarta ajak warga taat prokes. Pengawasan distribusi minyak goreng subsidi. Antisipasi dampak Tapering Off The FED.

Yuhuu! Di awal tahun 2022 Movie Date kembali hadir untuk membahas film-film yang lagi hype di @cinema.Balikpapan. Kali ini ada film animasi, komedi, Sing 2. Setelah menunggu cukup lama dari film pertamanya yang rilis di 2016. Sing 2 hadir dengan nama-nama wow sebagai karakter dan pengisis suara baru. Ada Bono U2, Pharrell Williams dan Halsey. Bintang dari film pertamanya juga masih ada kok, ada Taron Egerton, Scarlett Johansson, Tori Kelly dan masih banyak lagi. Sesuai judulnya, tentunya film karya Garth Jennings ini masih menghadirkan konsep musikal dengan puluhan lagu populer di dalamnya. Ditambah dengan jalan cerita menarik plus nilai positif yang tentunya bisa dibawa pulang. Lebih lengkapnya bisa langsung check Movie Date terbaru PDH ya. Eits, disimak baik-baik supaya bisa mendapatkan hadiah Give Awaynya.

Sepertinya, hampir semua film Indonesia, ada unsur Cinta di dalamnya. Entah itu Cinta terhadap pasangan, Keluarga, pekerjaan dan lain sebagainya. Tapi, bagaimana ya, kalau ada film yang bercerita tentang Cinta, ditabur bumbu-bumbu Sex, Toxic Masculinity dan ada juga tentang Mental Illnes loh. Wow! Paket lengkap ya. Nah, hal itulah yang bisa ditemukan dalam film terbaru Reza Rahardian (Budi Baik) yang berjudul Seperti Dendam, Rindu Harus Dibayar Tuntas. Selain Reza, film settingan akhir tahun 1980n ini juga turut dibintangi oleh beberapa nama populer Tanah Air. Seperti Marthino Lio (Ajo Kawir), Ladya Cheryl (Iteung), Ratu Felisha (Jelita), Lukman Sardi (Codet), serta ada Christine Hakim (Mak Jerot). Yang bikin menarik lagi, film kategori 18+ ini diangkat dari Novel terkenal karya Eka Kurniawan yang rilis pada tahun 2014. Duh, bikin penasaran kan? Nah, sebelum nonton full filmnya di CGV Balikpapan, yuk dengerin Movie Date Minggu ini yang membahas Seperti Dendam, Rindu Harus Dibayar Tuntas bersama Sultan Effendi salah satu Fashion Retail Store Manager di Balikpapan. Eits, jangan lupa ikut GiveAwaynya ya. Pertanyaannya kita umumkan besok!

Vaksin Massal di Balikpapan Sebagai Upaya Terciptanya Herd Immunity | Sulsel Ekspor 11 Ton Hasil Perikanan ke Hongkong Lewat Udara | Tanggapan Walikota Semarang Terkait Jual Beli Lapak di Kawasan Johar Utara KILAS KABAR NUSANTARA. Sejumlah peristiwa penting yang telah kami rangkum hari Selasa, 2 November 2021. BALIKPAPAN (00:21) Vaksinansi massal diadakan di Balikpapan Sport & Convention Centre (DOME) Jalan Ruhui Rahayu Balikpapan Selatan sebagai upaya terciptanya herd immunity. MAKASSAR (01:55) Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan kembali melakukan ekspor komoditas perikanan berupa ikan segar dan ikan hidup ke negara tujuan Hongkong. Volume ekspor perikanan kali ini mencapai 11 ton dengan nilai lebih dari 176 ribu Dollar Amerika atau setara RP2,5 Miliar. SEMARANG (03:01) Wali Kota Semarang, Hendrar Prihadi menanggapi serius laporan dari pedagang dan LBH terkait dugaan adanya jual beli lapak di kawasan Johar Utara yang dilakukan oleh oknum Dinas Perdagangan. Kontributor: Smart FM Balikpapan - Etty Smart FM Makassar - News Anchor & Reporter - Dian Mega Safitri Sonora Semarang - Iyeng Veda Saran dan kolaborasi: podcast@kgmedia.id

Vaksin Massal di Balikpapan Sport & Convention Centre (DOME) | Program Pembangunan Rumah Susun | Rumah Moderasi Beragama IAIN Wujudkan Sikap Toleran KILAS KABAR NUSANTARA. Sejumlah peristiwa penting yang telah kami rangkum hari Senin, 1 November 2021. BALIKPAPAN (00:21) Forum Komunikasi Umat Beragama (FKUB) yang didukung oleh Smart FM Balikpapan dan Total Energies Indonesia mengadakan kegiatan Vaksin Massal, Senin 1 November 2021, berlokasi di Balikpapan Sport & Convention Centre (DOME) Jalan Ruhui Rahayu Balikpapan Selatan. SEMARANG (02:06) Menteri PUPR, Basuki Hadimuljono mengungkapkan pihaknya terus berupaya untuk meningkatkan kualitas hidup para penerima bantuan dengan memiliki rumah yang lebih layak, sehat, dan nyaman melalui program pembangunan rumah susun (rusun). MANADO (03:15) Rumah Moderasi Beragama IAIN Manado sebut sikap toleran salah satu ciri moderasi beragama. Sekretaris Rumah Moderasi Beragama IAIN Manado mengungkapkan komitmen kebangsaan harus kuat dan memiliki sikap toleran, untuk mencapai moderasi beragama. Kontributor: Smart FM Balikpapan - Etty Sonora Semarang - Iyeng Veda Smart FM Manado - Ketut Martin Saran dan kolaborasi: podcast@kgmedia.id

Vaksinasi Massal di Kantor Imigrasi Kelas I Polonia Medan Dihadiri Kadis Kesehatan Kota Medan | Triwulan 3 2021, Produksi Nikel PT Vale Meningkat | Pemerintah Kota Balikpapan Menggunakan Vaksin Pfizer Kepada 1.800 Warga Balikpapan KILAS KABAR NUSANTARA. Sejumlah peristiwa penting yang telah kami rangkum hari Minggu, 24 Oktober 2021. MEDAN (00:21) Kantor Imigrasi Kelas I Polonia Medan bekerjasama dengan FKPPI Sumatra Utara yang didukung oleh TotalEnergies Indonesia melaksanakan vaksinasi massal. Acara ini mendapat dukungan penuh dari Dinas Kesehatan Kota Medan yang dihadiri langsung oleh Kepala Dinas Kesehatan Kota Medan. MAKASSAR (01:46) PT Vale Indonesia Pada triwulan ketiga tahun 2021 telah memproduksi sebanyak 18 ribu metrik ton nikel dalam matte. Angka tersebut 20 persen lebih tinggi dibanding volume produksi di triwulan 2 tahun ini. BALIKPAPAN (02:53) Untuk pertama kalinya Pemerintah Kota Balikpapan menggunakan vaksin jenis Pfizer kepada 1.800 warga Balikpapan yang dilaksanakan di Embarkasi Haji Batakan Balikpapan Timur. Kontributor: Smart FM Medan - Rini Smart FM Makassar - News Anchor: Priscila Riny | Reporter: Dian Mega Safitri Smart FM Balikpapan - Etty Haryani Saran dan kolaborasi: podcast@kgmedia.id

PPKM Turun, Pengguna Bandara Sultan Aji Muhammad Sulaiman Sepinggan Naik | Kota Surabaya Raih Penghargaan Udara Terbersih Se-Asia Tenggara | DPRD Kalsel Tolak Swab Antigen Untuk Peserta Didik Sebelum PTM KILAS KABAR NUSANTARA. Sejumlah peristiwa penting yang telah kami rangkum hari Jumat, 22 Oktober 2021. BALIKPAPAN (00:18) Bandar Udara Sultan Aji Muhammad Sulaiman (SAMS) Sepinggan Balikpapan selama penurunan level PPKM di Kota Balikpapan mulai tanggal 5 Oktober 2021 hingga 17 Oktober 2021 telah melayani penumpang sebanyak 105.749 orang atau rata-rata perharinya 8.135 penumpang. SURABAYA (01:43) Kota Surabaya berhasil meraih penghargaan ASEAN Environmentally Sustainable City (ESC) kategori Udara Terbersih Kota Besar se-ASEAN atau Asia Tenggara. Penghargaan yang pertama diraih sepanjang sejarah ini diterima langsung oleh Wali Kota Surabaya Eri Cahyadi dalam acara yang bertajuk “The 5 ASEAN ESC Award and the 4 Certificate of Recognition”. BANJARMASIN (02:33) DPRD Kalimantan Selatan menolak adanya keharusan bagi peserta didik untuk menjalani swab antigen sebelum masuk sekolah ketika Pembelajaran Tatap Muka (PTM) berlangsung. Kontributor: Smart FM Balikpapan - Etty Sonora Surabaya - Budi Santoso Smart FM Banjarmasin - News Anchor & Reporter: Eva Rizkiyana Saran dan kolaborasi: podcast@kgmedia.id

Terima Kasih Sulawesi Selatan Oleh: Dewi Murni Voice Over Talent : Arien S NarasiPost.Com-Dulu aku pernah bertanya, akankah aku naik pesawat? Tapi ke mana? Pertanyaan itu menyelinap begitu saja di tengah-tengah aktivitasku. Sedikit menyesakkan ketika kuberusaha mencari jawabannya. Sebab aku merasa tidak punya kemungkinan apa pun yang membawaku pada takdir itu. Tapi aku salah. Aku lupa bahwa di dunia ini tidak ada yang tidak mungkin, kecuali Allah itu makhluk. Senin, 28 Januari 2019. Musim hujan. Pertanyaan itu menjadi nyata tanpa disangka-sangka. Untuk pertama kalinya aku naik pesawat. Aku akan terbang melintasi langit menuju Sulawesi Selatan. Keberangkatan terjadwal bakda isya di Bandar Udara Internasional Sultan Aji Muhammad Sulaiman, Balikpapan. Dengan perasaan senang, bahagia dan terharu aku memasuki badan pesawat. Duduk dekat jendela sesuai keinginanku. Ketika pesawat lepas landas, lampu kabin dimatikan. Ruang kabin diselimuti kegelapan, sunyi dan dingin. Dalam kegelapan, aku menundukkan kepala dan berdoa. Air mataku jatuh. Betapa mensyukuri kesempatan menjelajah yang Allah berikan, setelah sempat aku mendustakan kemungkinan itu. Terima kasih ya, Allah. Perjalanan pesawat dari Balikpapan menuju Makassar memakan waktu 65 menit. Saat pesawat berada di langit Makassar, terlihat hamparan bumi di bawah sana yang gelap penuh kerlap-kerlip lampu. Aku seperti melihat hamparan bintang yang turun menyemuti tanah Makassar. Indah. Indah sekali. Tentu saja aku tidak akan menyia-nyiakan pemandangan ini dengan mengabadikannya lewat kamera ponselku. Pesawat mendarat. Roda-rodanya menyentuh landasan dengan bunyi gedebuk. Mesin-mesin meredam daya tolaknya dan pesawat melambat. Alhamdulillah, aku tiba di Bandar Udara Internasional Sultan Hasanuddin Makassar. Setelah semua urusan di bandara selesai, aku keluar mencari sosok gadis yang akan membawaku menjelajah indahnya Sulawesi Selatan. Gadis yang baru kukenal setahunan. Kami bertemu di sosial media, akrab lalu bersahabat. Dialah yang mengajakku datang ke rumahnya di Sulawesi Selatan. Kemudian aku berjanji akan datang ke sana. Naskah Selengkapnya : https://narasipost.com/2021/09/18/terima-kasih-sulawesi-selatan/ Terimakasih buat kalian yang sudah mendengarkan podcast ini, Follow us on : instagram : http://instagram.com/narasipost Facebook : https://www.facebook.com/narasi.post.9 Fanpage : Https://www.facebook.com/pg/narasipostmedia/posts/ Twitter : Http://twitter.com/narasipost

With Tarakan and North Borneo secured, the last great Allied attack of World War II would take place with the landings to take Balikpapan. Despite the war being almost over, the capture of Balikpapan was deemed vital and so despite disquiet among some of the Australian High Command, the invasion went forward. Our GDPR privacy policy was updated on August 8, 2022. Visit acast.com/privacy for more information.

Have you ever heard of Benzo Rage? What about other withdrawal symptoms like depression, aggression, or violent tendencies? All these behaviors can be escalated by benzos and learning how to deal with them just might be the key to success. In today's episode, D explores the behavioral symptoms of benzo withdrawal and shares a few resources which might help manage them. He also shines a light on Benzo Buddies, shares a comment about yeast overgrowth and candida, and tells a caregiver story from Long Island, New York. Welcome to Episode #13 Today we focus on anger and depression during benzo use and withdrawal. We'll explore various aspects of these symptoms along with some resources to help the patient and caregiver manage them. We also have a couple of comments, a benzo story from Long Island, New York, and shine our benzo spotlight on the largest online forum for benzos, Benzo Buddies. But first, let's list the resources used in this episode, and then we'll dive deeper into the content of episode 13. Episode Resources The following resource links are provided as a courtesy to our listeners. They do not constitute an endorsement by Benzo Free of the resource or any recommendations or advice provided therein. BENZO NEWS"The Challenge of Going Off Psychiatric Drugs" by Rachel Aviv from NewYorker.comBenzo Free Podcast: Episode #12 — "Conversation with a Caregiver""What Do Doctors Need to Understand About Patients on Benzos?" by Jocelyn Pedersen from Benzo Brains"10 Tips for the Benzo Caregiver" by D E Foster on Benzo Free"Benzo Use in Pregnancy: Study Findings" by D E Foster on Benzo Free BENZO SPOTLIGHTBenzo Buddies FEATURE: The Benzo Bad Guys: Anger, Aggression, Obsession, and DepressionBenzo Free Suicide Prevention Resources"Over Anxious Americans" by Renee Garfinkel from the Washington TimesPink Floyd "Comfortably Numb" by Waters and GilmoreThe Ashton Manual by C. Heather Ashton"Tranquilizer Detox Withdrawal Can Last Years" by Lauren Cox on ABC News"Britain Takes Halcion Sleeping Pills off the Market" by Liz Hunt and Glenn Frankel from the Washington Post"Psychotropic Drugs and Induced Hostility" by A. DiMascio, R.I. Shader and J. Harmatz from Psychosomatics"Anything for a Quiet Life?: Valium, Librium and Mogadon Once Seemed to Provide the Perfect Answer to Stress. We Now Know How this Group of Drugs Alters the Chemistry of the Brain; No Wonder They Create More Problems Than They Solve" by C. Heather Ashton in New ScientistBOOK: "The Book of Joy: Lasting Happiness in a Changing World" by His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Archbishop Desmond Tutu with Douglas Abrams (Amazon)BOOK: "The Subtle Art of Not Giving a F*ck: A Counterintuitive Approach to Living a Good Life" by Mark Manson (Amazon)AUDIOBOOK: "Don't Bite the Hook" by Pema Chodron (Amazon)YOUTUBE: "Don't Bite the Hook" by Pema Chodron (YouTube Audio) BENZO FREE LINKSWebsitePodcast Home PageFeedback FormDisclaimer Podcast Summary This podcast is dedicated to those who struggle with side effects, dependence, and withdrawal from benzos, a group of drugs from the benzodiazepine and nonbenzodiazepine classes, better known as anti-anxiety drugs, sleeping pills, sedatives, and minor tranquilizers. Their common brand names include Ambien, Ativan, Klonopin, Lunesta, Valium, and Xanax. Introduction In today's intro, I went off-script. I decided to just talk in the opening, instead of script it. I shared my experiences with getting tongue tied and why I do script most of the podcast. Mailbag This is where we share questions and comments which were discussed: CORRECTION: Hendy's Home TownLast week, I introduced Hendy's story as if he was from Jarkata, Indonesia. I was wrong, Hendy is actually from Balikpapan, in East Borneo. I corrected this on the air and talked a bit about his actual home town.COMMENT: Benzo Belly, Candida, and Yeast Over GrowthThis was a comment from Jenny, in New England.

Have you ever heard of Benzo Rage? What about other withdrawal symptoms like depression, aggression, or violent tendencies? All these behaviors can be escalated by benzos and learning how to deal with them just might be the key to success. In today's episode, D explores the behavioral symptoms of benzo withdrawal and shares a few resources which might help manage them. He also shines a light on Benzo Buddies, shares a comment about yeast overgrowth and candida, and tells a caregiver story from Long Island, New York. https://www.easinganxiety.com/post/benzo-bad-guys-anger-aggression-depression-and-obsession-bfp013Video ID: BFP013 Chapters 00:00 Introduction06:00 Mailbag09:20 Benzo News11:28 Benzo Spotlight14:52 Benzo Story21:06 FEATURE: Benzo Bad Guys53:56 Moment of Peace  Resources The following resource links are provided as a courtesy to our listeners. They do not constitute an endorsement by Easing Anxiety of the resource or any recommendations or advice provided therein. BENZO NEWS“The Challenge of Going Off Psychiatric Drugs” by Rachel Aviv from NewYorker.comBenzo Free Podcast: Episode #12 — “Conversation with a Caregiver”“What Do Doctors Need to Understand About Patients on Benzos?” by Jocelyn Pedersen from Benzo Brains“10 Tips for the Benzo Caregiver” by D E Foster on Benzo Free“Benzo Use in Pregnancy: Study Findings” by D E Foster on Benzo Free BENZO SPOTLIGHTBenzo Buddies FEATURE: Benzo Bad GuysBenzo Free Suicide Prevention Resources“Over Anxious Americans” by Renee Garfinkel from the Washington TimesPink Floyd “Comfortably Numb” by Waters and GilmoreThe Ashton Manual by C. Heather Ashton“Tranquilizer Detox Withdrawal Can Last Years” by Lauren Cox on ABC News“Britain Takes Halcion Sleeping Pills off the Market” by Liz Hunt and Glenn Frankel from the Washington Post“Psychotropic Drugs and Induced Hostility” by A. DiMascio, R.I. Shader and J. Harmatz from Psychosomatics“Anything for a Quiet Life?: Valium, Librium and Mogadon Once Seemed to Provide the Perfect Answer to Stress. We Now Know How this Group of Drugs Alters the Chemistry of the Brain; No Wonder They Create More Problems Than They Solve” by C. Heather Ashton in New ScientistBOOK: “The Book of Joy: Lasting Happiness in a Changing World” by His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Archbishop Desmond Tutu with Douglas Abrams (Amazon)BOOK: “The Subtle Art of Not Giving a F*ck: A Counterintuitive Approach to Living a Good Life” by Mark Manson (Amazon)AUDIOBOOK: “Don't Bite the Hook” by Pema Chodron (Amazon)YOUTUBE: “Don't Bite the Hook” by Pema Chodron (YouTube Audio)  Introduction In today's intro, I went off-script. I decided to just talk in the opening, instead of script it. I shared my experiences with getting tongue tied and why I do script most of the podcast.  Mailbag This is where we share questions and comments which were discussed: CORRECTION: Hendy's Home TownLast week, I introduced Hendy's story as if he was from Jarkata, Indonesia. I was wrong, Hendy is actually from Balikpapan, in East Borneo. I corrected this on the air and talked a bit about his actual home town.COMMENT: Benzo Belly, Candida, and Yeast Over GrowthThis was a comment from Jenny, in New England. Jenny shared information about yeast overgrowth and candida during benzo withdrawal. She had some good information, and I shared that I would look into it further.  Benzo Spotlight Our spotlight today shined on Benzo Buddies, the largest online discussion board in the benzo community. They can be found at benzobuddies.org.  Benzo Stories I shared a story today from Mary in Long Island, New York.  Feature Today's featured topic: Benzo Bad Guys: Anger, Aggression, Depression, and Obsession Today's feature focused on anger and depression. This is part of our 14 -part series on benzo symptom groups. This is the behavioral group from the psychological symptoms category. These symptoms include anger, irritability, aggression, depression, obsession, and suicidal thoughts. I shared some of my own ongoing experiences with these and talked about a few resources which I found useful.  The PodcastThe Benzo Free Podcast provides information, support, and community to those who struggle with the long-term effects of anxiety medications such as benzodiazepines (Xanax, Ativan, Klonopin, Valium) and Z-drugs (Ambien, Lunesta, Sonata). WEBSITE: https://www.easinganxiety.comMAILING LIST: https://www.easinganxiety.com/subscribe YOUTUBE: https://www.youtube.com/@easinganx DISCLAIMERAll content provided by Easing Anxiety is for general informational purposes only and should never be considered medical advice. Any health-related information provided is not a substitute for medical advice and should not be used to diagnose or treat health problems, or to prescribe any medical devices or other remedies. Never disregard medical advice or delay in seeking it. Please visit our website for our complete disclaimer at https://www.easinganxiety.com/disclaimer. CREDITSMusic provided / licensed by Storyblocks Audio — https://www.storyblocks.com Benzo Free Theme — Title: “Walk in the Park” — Artist: Neil Cross PRODUCTIONEasing Anxiety is produced by…Denim Mountain Presshttps://www.denimmountainpress.com ©2022 Denim Mountain Press – All Rights Reserved