Podcasts about sino russian

This episode explores the political, military, and economic dimensions of the relationship between Russia and Iran.  Guest Biographies Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick is an expert on China-Russian relations, Chinese foreign policy, and Arctic strategy. At CNA, Wishnick contributes her dual regional expertise on China and Russia, including professional proficiency in both languages, to research and analyze Xi Jinping's risk-taking, Sino-Russian military cooperation, China's Arctic policy, and Chinese and Russian disinformation. She was part of a team that won CNA's CEO Teamwork Award for Arctic research. Dr. Julian G. Waller is a Research Analyst in the Russia Studies Program at CNA and an applied analyst of Russian political-military affairs, elite strategic decision-making, adversary systems of governance and civil-military relations, and the politics of authoritarian rule and illiberal ideologies globally. Further Reading CNA Report: The Evolving Russia-Iran Relationship CNA Talks: Syria After Assad

Robert Ward hosts Professor Takahara Akio, Emeritus Professor of The University of Tokyo, Dr Elizabeth Wishnick, Senior Research Scientist at the Centre for Naval Analyses (CNA) and Dr Catherine Jones, a Lecturer at the University of St Andrews, to explore Japan's challenges amid growing cooperation between Russia and China.  Robert, Akio, Elizabeth and Catherine discuss:   The recent development of the Russia-China strategic partnership in the Ukraine war The limitations of the Sino-Russian relationship and the potential overlap of their interests Japan's security, economy and energy challenges amid growing Sino-Russian aligment   The following books are recommended by our guests to gain a clearer picture of the topics discussed:   Takahara Akio and et al., Japan–China Relations in the Modern Era, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 250pp. Takahara Akio and et al., Nicchū kankei 2001-2022 [Japan-China Relations 2001-2022], (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 2023), 432pp. Charles E. Ziegler, Russia in the Pacific: The Quest for Great Power Recognition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024), 296pp. Gaye Christoffersen, Russia in the Indo-Pacific: New Approaches to Russian Foreign Policy, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2022), 298pp. Endo Shusaku, Chinmoku [Silence], (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1981), 320pp. Endo Shusaku, The Samurai, (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1986), 520pp. We hope you enjoy the episode and please follow, rate, and subscribe to Japan Memo on your podcast platform of choice. If you have any comments or questions, please contact us at japanchair@iiss.org.    Date recorded: 17 February 2025   Japan Memo is recorded and produced at the IISS in London.   Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In the Agora Strategy Group geopolitics podcast “The Future of Power”, Dr. Timo Blenk (CEO) invites decision-makers from diplomacy, business, politics and the military to discuss current geopolitical developments on a monthly basis. The goal of this project is to provide information about the influences of these developments and to create a sound basis for decision-making. In this 26th episode Dr. Timo Blenk speaks with Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, about the war in Ukraine, Sino-Russian cooperation and a possible Western answer. The most important topics of the month: Crystal ball: Ukraine war and beyond Power dynamics in the Kremlin: The bear remains in control The Sino-Russian partnership: a geopolitical shift in the making Icy winds in the Arctic: players, interests and cooperation Existent but hard to quantify: Russian interference in Western democracies House announcements All further episodes of the podcast Agora Strategy on the web Agora Strategy on LinkedIn Current projects & events of the Agora Strategy team Agora Institute Executive Membership Agora Risk Report 2025 Dean's Comment: Dr. Peter Ammon zu Trumps Comeback New publication by Dr. Elli Pohlkamp - Südkorea & Japan

Welcome to Double Trouble, a special foreign policy focused podcast series within MLI's Inside Policy Talks, to address the growing challenge of the Sino-Russian axis of authoritarianism facing the West.In this episode, hosts Balkan Devlen and Jonathan Berkshire Miller look at the year ahead in foreign policy and global security. They talk about Trump's return to the Whitehouse, shifting global alliances, a dangerous year ahead for Ukraine, and much more.The Macdonald-Laurier Institute gratefully acknowledges the support of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Canada.Find Inside Policy Talks on Apple, Spotify, Google, or wherever else you get your audio.Like, comment, share, subscribe!

Welcome to Double Trouble, a special foreign policy focused podcast series within MLI's Inside Policy Talks, to address the growing challenge of the Sino-Russian axis of authoritarianism facing the West.In this episode, host Balkan Devlen sits down with MLI Senior Fellows Alexander Lanoszka and Richard Shimooka to discuss the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the decline of Russia's power globally.The Macdonald-Laurier Institute gratefully acknowledges the support of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Canada.Find Inside Policy Talks on Apple, Spotify, Google, or wherever else you get your audio.Like, comment, share, subscribe!

Welcome to Double Trouble, a special foreign policy focused podcast series within MLI's Inside Policy Talks, to address the growing challenge of the Sino-Russian axis of authoritarianism facing the West.In this episode, MLI's Balkan Devlen sits down with Aaron Gasch Burnett to discuss an innovative policy solution to fund Ukraine's war effort and reconstruction: confiscating the approximately $300 billion US of Russian assets frozen in G7 countries and give it to Ukraine. Western tax payers wouldn't need to pay a cent.The Macdonald-Laurier Institute gratefully acknowledges the support of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Canada.Find Inside Policy Talks on Apple, Spotify, Google, or wherever else you get your audio.Like, comment, share, subscribe!

In this week's Live from the Vault, Andrew Maguire examines the recent gold retracement rally, driven by physical demand reclaiming control from speculative momentum traders, and delves into the central banks' quiet revaluation process.Andrew also highlights China's strategic gold acquisitions and the PBOC's game-changing efforts to bolster the yuan with gold-backed reserves, while Basel III pressures heighten risks of a COMEX default amid soaring delivery demands.Ask your questions for Andy here: https://forum.kinesis.money/forums/questions-for-lftv-live-from-the-vault.80/ __________________________________________________________________Timestamps: 00:00 Start01:40 Andrew discusses the recent gold retracement rally06:50 Gold chart: Andrew's analysis of recent price action16:45 Gold chart: Short-term market outlook20:20 Andrew on China's gold purchases and PBOC efforts32:45 Could a Sino-Russian currency revalue global gold reserves? __________________________________________________________________Sign up for Kinesis on desktop:https://kinesis.money/kinesis-precious-metals/?utm_source=youtube&utm_medium=video&utm_campaign=lftv_191Download the Kinesis Mobile app - available App Store and Google Play:Apple: https://kms.kinesis.money/signupGoogle: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kinesis.kinesisappAlso, don't forget to check out our social channels where you can stay up to date with all the latest news and developments from the team.X: https://twitter.com/KinesisMonetaryFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/kinesismoney/Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/kinesismoney/Telegram: https://t.me/kinesismoneyTikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@kinesismoney

Welcome to Double Trouble, a special foreign policy focused podcast series within MLI's Inside Policy Talks, to address the growing challenge of the Sino-Russian axis of authoritarianism facing the West.In this episode, MLI's Balkan Devlen sits down with Edward Hunter Christie, a senior research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and former deputy head of NATO's Innovation Unit, to discuss how the West's policy of fear and non-escalation projects weakness and places Europe and even North America in greater danger. The Macdonald-Laurier Institute gratefully acknowledges the support of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Canada.Find Inside Policy Talks on Apple, Spotify, Google, or wherever else you get your audio.Like, comment, share, subscribe!

In new episode of The Critical Hour hosts and guests such issues as EU, Sino-Russian cooperation and much more.

Last time we spoke about the Guangzhou, Gansu and Red Spear Uprisings. During China's Warlord Era, the CCP faced many challenges as they sought to implement land revolutions and armed uprisings. Following the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest uprisings, the CCP held an emergency meeting criticizing Chen Duxiu for his appeasement of the KMT right wing. With strong encouragement from Soviet advisors, the CCP planned a major uprising to seize control of Guangdong province. In November 1927, the CCP saw an opportunity as petty warlords in Guangdong and Guangxi engaged in conflict. Zhang Fakui's troops, vulnerable and demoralized, were targeted by the CCP. Mobilizing workers and peasants, the CCP initiated the Guangzhou Uprising. The uprising was ultimately suppressed by superior NRA troops, resulting in heavy CCP casualties and brutal reprisals. The failed uprisings, though unable to achieve immediate goals, ignited a persistent revolutionary spirit within the CCP, marking the beginning of a prolonged civil conflict that would shape China's future.   #121 The Sino-Soviet Conflict of 1929 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. All the way back in 1919, the brand new Soviet government's assistance Commissar of foreign affairs, Lev Karakhan, issued a manifesto to the Beiyang government, promising the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway at zero financial cost. That statement was made in late July and alongside the railway, he also mentioned relinquishing a lot of rights the former Russian Empire had acquired from unequal treaties, such as the Boxer Protocol. This all became known as the Karakhan Manifesto, and it was formed in a time when the Soviets were fighting the Russian Civil War, advancing east into Siberia. In order to secure the war in Siberia the Soviets had to establish good relations with the Chinese. Yet six months after the july manifesto, Karakhan personally handed over a second version of said manifesto, one that did not influence the rather nice deal of handing over the Chinese eastern railway for free. The Soviets official statement was that they had accidentally promised the deal prior. The truth of the matter was some real politik work at play. The Soviets had been trying to secure a Sino-Soviet alliance against the Japanese, but it looked to them it would never come to be so they simply took the deal off the table.  Henceforth the issue cause a lot of friction. In March of 1920 the Fengtian forces disarmed White Russian Troops along the railway and seized control over its operations. In February of 1922 China and the USSR signed a agreement stipulating the Beiyang government would set up a special agency to manage the railway. Then in November the Chinese announced an area within 11 km along the railway would be designated a Eastern Province special district. In December the Soviet Union officially formed and by May the two nations agreed to settle a list of issues. The Soviets agreed to abolish all the unequal treaties formed by the Russian Empire handing over all the leased territories, consular jurisdiction, extraterritoriality, Boxer payments and such, but the Chinese Eastern Railway would be jointly managed by China and the USSR. Now since the railway sat in the area that Zhang Zuolin came to control, in September of 1924 the Soviets signed an agreement with the Fengtian clique. In this agreement, the Soviets lessened the 80 year lease over the railway to 60 years. The Soviets also promised to hand full control to Chinese administrators, but had a trick up their sleeve. The Soviets let the Chinese think they were adding workers and officials loyal to them, in reality the Soviets were creating more jobs on the railway while hiring Soviet workers. In the end the Soviets controlled roughly 67% of the key positions. When Zhang Zuolin went to war with Feng Yuxiang's Guominjun this changed things considerably. In December of 1925, Zhang Zuolin's army owed the Chinese eastern railway some 14 million rubles, prompting the Soviet administrator over the railway, Ivanov to prohibit Zhang Zuolin's army from using it. Fengtian commander Zhang Huanxiang simply arrested Ivanov disregarding his ban. The Soviets then sent an ultimatum to the Beiyang government demanding his release. So Zhang Zuolin ran to the Japanese to mediate. Things smoothed over until 1928 when the Huanggutun incident saw Zhang Zuolin assassinated. As we saw at the end of the northern expedition, his son Zhang Xueliang responded by raising the KMT flag on December 29th of 1928, joining Chiang Kai-Shek. The next day Zhang Xueliang was made commander in chief of the Northeast.  Now Chiang Kai-Shek's government had broken diplomatic relations with the USSR after the Shanghai massacre purge. Thus Zhang Xueliang felt the old treaties signed by his father with the Soviets were null and void and looked upon the Chinese Eastern Railway enviously. To give some context outside of China. At this point in time, the USSR was implementing rural collectivization, ie; the confiscation of land and foodstuffs. This led to wide scale conflict with peasants, famines broke out, I would say the most well known one being the Holodmor in Ukraine. Hundreds of millions of people starved to death. The USSR was also still not being recognized by many western powers. Thus from the perspective of Zhang Xueliang, it looked like the USSR were fraught with internal and external difficulties, they had pretty much no friends, so taking the railway would probably be a walk in the park.  Zhang Xueliang began diplomatically, but negotiations were going nowhere, so he got tougher. He ordered his officials to take back control over the Chinese Eastern Railway zone police, municipal administration, taxation, land, everything. He instructed Zhang Jinghui, the governor of Harbin's special administrative zone to dispatch military police to search the Soviet embassy in Harbin and arrest the consul general. Zhang Jinghui did so and closed the Soviet consulates in Harbin, Qiqihar and Hailar. All of this of course pissed off the Soviets who responded by protesting the new Nanjing government, demanding the release of their people, while increasing troops to the border of Manchuria. The Soviets announced they were willing to reduce their control over the railway as a concession. This entire situation became known as the May 27th incident and unleashed a tit for tat situation. On July 13th, the Soviets sent an ultimatum giving three days for a response "If a satisfactory answer is not obtained, the Soviet government will be forced to resort to other means to defend all the rights of the Soviet Union." On the 17th the Soviets recalled their officials, cut off the railway traffic between China and the USSR, ejected Chinese envoys from the USSR and cut off diplomatic relations with China. In the background Joseph Stalin was initially hesitating to perform any military actions, not wanting to antagonize the Japanese in Manchuria. However the Soviet consul in Tokyo, sent back word that Japan was completely willing to stay out of any conflict if the Soviets limited it to just northern Manchuria. Thus Stalin decided to act. On August 6th, Stalin formed the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army under the command of General Vasily Blyukher. It was composed of three infantry divisions; the 1st Pacific Infantry Division, the 2nd Amur Infantry Division, and the 35th Trans-Baikal Infantry Division), one cavalry brigade (the 5th Kuban Cavalry Brigade), and the addition of the Buryat Mongolian Independent Cavalry Battalion. The total force was said to be as many as 30,000 with their headquarters located in Khabarovsk. Blyukher also had the support of the Far Eastern Fleet, roughly 14 shallow water heavy gunboats, a minesweeper detachment, an aviation detachment with 14 aircraft, and a marine battalion commanded by Yakov Ozolin. Blyukher had served during the civil war and was a military advisor in China attached to Chiang Kai-SHek's HQ. He had a large hand to play in the northern expedition, and was one of the select Soviets Chiang Kai-Shek intentionally made sure got home safe during the purge. Blyukher would exercises a unusual amount of autonomy with his far east command, based out of Khabarovsk. For the upcoming operation a 5th of the entire Red Army was mobilized to assist. On the other side Zhang Xueliang mobilized as many troops as he could, including many White Russians hiding out in Manchuria. His total strength on paper was 270,000, but only 100,000 would be actively facing the Soviets as the rest were needed to maintain public order and to defend southern Manchuria. The person in charge of the Eastern Line of the Chinese Eastern Railway was the brigade commander of the Jilin Army, Ding Chao, and the western line was the brigade commander of the Heilongjiang Army, Liang Zhongjia, and the chief of staff was Zhang Wenqing. Wang Shuchang led the First Army to guard the eastern line, and Hu Yukun led the Second Army to guard the western line. The Soviet army also had a quality advantage in equipment. In terms of artillery, the Soviet army had about 200 artillery pieces, including more than a dozen heavy artillery pieces, while the Chinese army had only 135 infantry artillery pieces and no heavy artillery. At the same time, the Soviet army also had a quality advantage in machine guns because it was equipped with 294 heavy machine guns and 268 highly mobile light machine guns. The Chinese army was equipped with only 99 heavy machine guns. In terms of air force, the Chinese army had 5 aircraft that were combat effective. On July 26th the Soviets bombarded Manzhouli from three directions along the western end of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Two days later a Soviet infantry regiment, 3 armored vehicles and 4 artillery pieces advanced to Shibali station, cutting the lines to Manzhouli. They then ordered the Chinese military and police to withdraw as they captured Manzhouli. Then on the 29th the began bombarding Dangbi. On August 8th, 100 Soviet troops carrying two artillery pieces and 3 machine guns engaged Chinese forces outside the south gate of Oupu County street, casualties were heavy for both sides. 5 Soviet aircraft circled over Suifenhe City firing 200 rounds and dropping bombs over the Dongshan Army defense post and Sandaodongzi. The next day 40 Soviet soldiers established two checkpoints at Guzhan blocking traffic and they even began kidnapping civilians. That same day 300 Soviet soldiers and two gunboats occupied the Hujiazhao factory. On the 12th, Sanjianfang, Zhongxing and Lijia's Oil Mill were occupied by over 2000 Soviet troops. Meanwhile 80 Soviets amphibiously assaulted Liuhetun using 8 small boats, killing its defenders before returning to the other side. The next day two Soviet gunboats, 300 marines and 2 aircraft attacked Suidong county in Heilongjiang province while another force attacked Oupu county with artillery. On the morning of the 14th both counties fell. In response the Nanjing government dispatched Liu Guang, the chief of the military department to inspect the Northeast front. On the 15th Zhang Xueliang issued mobilization orders against the USSR, seeing his standing front line forces bolstered to 100,000. On the 15th the foreign minister of the Nanjing government, Wang Zhengting reported to Chiang Kai-Shek negotiations were going nowhere, the Soviets were adamant about getting their rights returned over the Chinese Eastern Railways. The next day, Wang Zhenting told reporters that if the Soviets attacked anymore China would declare war. The next day Zhang Xueliang was interviewed by the Chicago Daily News and had this to say. "The Soviet Union disregarded international trust, trampled on the non-war pact, and rashly sent troops to invade our country. We respect the non-war pact and have repeatedly made concessions to show our responsibility for provoking the provocation. If the Russian side continues to advance, we will be willing to be the leader of the war, so we have prepared everything and will do our best to fight to the death."  On the 16th two Soviet infantry companies and one cavalry company attacked Zhalannur from Abagaitu along the border. The two sides fought for 2 hours until the Soviets stormed the Zhalannur station. After another 5 hours of combat the Soviets pulled back over the border. By this point enough was enough. China declared war on August 17th escalating what was an incident around the Chinese Eastern Railway zone into a full blown war.  Blyukher had developed a plan for an offensive consisting of two rapid operations. The first would be against the Chinese naval forces and the second against the ground forces via a large encirclement. After the war was declared on the 17th, the Soviet Army advanced into Manchuria from the western end of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Red Banner Special Far Eastern Army initially dispatched a total of 6,091 infantrymen and 1,599 artillerymen in front of Manchuria, equipped with 88 artillery pieces of 76.2 mm or above, excluding artillery belonging to infantry regiments, 32 combat aircraft, 3 armored trains, and 9 T-18 light tanks . The army units included: the 35th and 36th Infantry Divisions of the 18th Infantry Army; the 5th Cavalry Brigade; the Buryat Mongolian Cavalry Battalion; an independent tank company equipped with T-18 tanks, the 6th Aviation Detachment, the 25th Aviation Detachment, the 26th Bomber Squadron, the 18th Army Artillery Battalion, the 18th Engineering Battalion, and a Railway Battalion.  The first battle broke out around Manzhouli. Liang Zhongjia, the brigade commander stationed in Manzhouli, reported this to his superiors of the engagement “of the battle situation, the 38th and 43rd regiments under my command fought with a regiment of Soviet infantry and cavalry for 4 hours in the afternoon and are still in a standoff. The Soviet army has more than one division of troops near Abagaitu”. At 10:30 p.m. on the 18th, the Soviets began to attack the positions of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 43rd Regiment of the Northeastern Army in Zhalannur. At 1 p.m. on August 19, the Soviets added about 600 to 700 troops opposite the positions of the 43rd Regiment of Zhalannur. At 5 a.m the Soviets dispatched five aircraft from Abagaitu to Shibali Station. On the 19th, the Soviets captured Suibin County with ease. At 6 a.m. on the 20th, the Soviets used armored trains to transport more than 200 troops to attack the 10th Cavalry Regiment of Liang Zhongjia's troops. After fighting for about an hour, the Soviets retreated. On the 23rd a battle broke out in Mishan and on the 25th 400 Soviet cavalry began building fortifications roughly a kilometer near the Chinese 43rd regiment at Zhalannur. Zhang Xueliang spoke again to the Chinese and foreign press on the 25th stating this. "Foreigners have many misunderstandings about the Eastern Province's actions this time, thinking that it is to take back the Eastern Route and violate the treaty. In fact, we have no intention of violating the 1924 Sino-Russian Agreement or the Agreement with Russia, because China has signed it and has no intention of violating it. China has no intention of taking back the route at all. What it wants is to remove the Russian personnel who are involved in the communist movement. Moreover, in this matter, the Eastern Route is a very small issue. The real point is that the Russians use China as a base for communism, and we have to take measures in self-defense." Between the 28th to the 30th an intense battle broke out at Wangqing.  On the 31st, Soviet gunboats bombarded three garrisons around  Heihe. On September 4th, the Soviet army bombarded the right wing of the 43rd and 38th Regiments stationed in Lannur. At 4 pm on the 9th, a single regiment of the Soviet army, under the cover of artillery, launched a fierce attack on the Chinese army at Manzhouli Station from the Shibali Station, but by 8:30 pm, they pulled back. At 4 pm, 8 Soviet aircraft bombed Suifenhe Station, causing over 50 Chinese casualties and injured a regimental commander. On the night of the 16th, more than 100 Soviet troops attacked the Kukdoboka checkpoint in Lubin County and burned down the checkpoint. On the 18th, the Soviet government announced to the ambassadors of various countries that they had always advocated for a peaceful solution to the issue of the Chinese Eastern Railway, while China's attitude was hypocritical and insincere. It was believed that future negotiations were hopeless, and all previous negotiations mediated by Germany were terminated. From now on, they stated quote “the Soviet Union would not bear any responsibility for any ominous incidents caused on the Sino-Russian border”. With negotiations completely broken down, Blyukher was given the greenlight to launch a fatal blow.  On October 2, more than a thousand Soviet infantryman, supported by aircraft and artillery stormed the positions of the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Regiment in Manzhouli. The two sides fought until the morning of the 3rd. On the 4th Zhang Xueiliang drafted the “national volunteer army organization regulations letter” trying to embolden the population stating "when the foreigners invade the border, the first thing to do is to resist. All citizens or groups who are willing to sacrifice their lives for the country on the battlefield will be volunteers or volunteer soldiers." The new regulations stipulated that volunteers of this new group would be named as the National Volunteer Army. On October the 10th, 30,000 Soviet forces on the Baikal side advanced through the northeastern border of China. At this time, the brigade responsible for defending Liang Zhongjia had been fighting with the Soviet troops for dozens of days. There was no backup and they were in urgent need of help. According to Chinese observations, the Soviets deployed nearly 80,000 troops by land, sea and air on the Sino-Soviet border. Along the eastern front, the Soviets capture in succession Sanjiangkou, Tongjiang and Fujin. Meanwhile at 5am on the 12th the Far Eastern Fleet commanded engaged in a firefight with the Songhua River Defense Fleet, near Sanjiangkou. According to Chinese reconnaissance, the Soviet warships participating in the battle included: the flagship "Sverdlov" a shallow-water heavy gunboat led by Sgassk, the shallow-water heavy gunboat "Sun Yat-sen", the shallow-water heavy gunboat "Red East", the shallow-water heavy gunboat "Lenin", the inland gunboat "Red Flag", and the inland gunboat "Proletariat", with a total of 4 152mm cannons, 26 120mm cannons, 6 85mm anti-aircraft guns, 8 37mm anti-aircraft guns, and more than ten aircraft for support. The Chinese forces were led by Yin Zuogan who commanded six shallow-water gunboats, including the "Lijie" (flagship), "Lisui", "Jiangping", "Jiang'an", and "Jiangtai", and the "Dongyi" armed barge as a towed artillery platform. Except for the "Jiangheng" of 550 tons and the "Liji" of 360 tons, the rest were all below 200 tons, and the entire fleet had 5 120mm guns. In the ensuing battle the Jiangping, Jiang'an, Jiangtai, Lijie, and Dongyi, were sunk, and the Lisui ship was seriously injured and forced to flee back to Fujin.The Chinese side claimed that they damaged two Soviet ships, sunk one, and shot down two fighter planes; but according to Soviet records, five Soviet soldiers were killed and 24 were injured.  At the same time as the naval battle around Sanjiangkou, two Soviet gunboats covered four armed ships, the Labor, Karl Marx, Mark Varyakin, and Pavel Zhuravlev, carrying a battalion of more than 400 people from the 2nd Infantry Division Volochaev Regiment, landing about 5 kilometers east of Tongjiang County and attacking the Chinese military station there. The Northeast Marine Battalion guarding the area and the Meng Zhaolin Battalion of the 9th Army Brigade jointly resisted and repelled the Soviet's initial attack. The Chinese suffered heavy losses, with more than 500 officers and soldiers killed and wounded, and more than 70 people including the Marine Battalion Captain Li Runqing captured.  On the 14th, the Chinese sank 6 tugboats, 2 merchant ships and 2 warships in the waterway 14 kilometers downstream of Fujin, forming a blockade line; and set up solid artillery positions and a 13-kilometer-long bunker line nearby, destroying all bridges on the road from Tongjiang to Fujin. A battle broke out at Tongjiang and according to the the report of Shen Honglie “the Northeast Navy suffered more than 500 casualties (including marines), 4 warships were sunk, 1 was seriously damaged, and the "Haijun" gunboat (45 tons) was captured by the Soviet army and renamed "Pobieda"; 17 officers including the battalion commander Meng Zhaolin and 350 soldiers of the army were killed; the Chinese side announced that 2 Soviet planes were shot down (some sources say 1), 3 Soviet warships were sunk, 4 were damaged, and more than 300 casualties”. On the 18th, the Soviets completely withdrew from the Tongjiang, allowing the two regiments of Lu Yongcai and Zhang Zuochen of the 9th Brigade to recapture it. On the 30th, Admiral Ozolin led some Soviet land forces in a major attack in the Fujian area. He organized the troops under his jurisdiction into two groups. He led the first group personally, who were supported by heavy gunboats Red East, Sun Yat-Sen and gunboats Red Flag, Proletarian, Buryat, minelayer Powerful and the armored boat Bars. Their mission was to annihilate the remnants of the river defense fleet anchored in Fujin. The second group was commanded by Onufryev, the commander of the Soviet 2nd infantry division. His group consisted of the shallow-water heavy gunboat Serdlov, gunboat Pauper and the transport fleets steam carrying the Volochaev Regiment and the 5th Amur regiment who landed at Fujin.  On the other side the Chinese had concentrated two infantry brigades, 3 cavalry regiments and a team of police with the support of the gunboats Jiangheng,  Lisui, Liji and the tugboat Lichuan. At 9 am on the 31st, the 7 Soviet ships suddenly destroyed the river blocking ropes and entered the Fujin River bank, bombarding the Chinese army, as cavalry landed. The Chinese ships "Lisui" and "Lichuan" sank successively, and only the "Jiangheng" managed to participate in the battle, but soon sank after firing only three shots. At 7 pm 21 Soviet ships sailed up the Songhua River, as part of the cavalry landed at Tuziyuan, advancing step by step towards Fujin. At 9 pm 7 Soviet ships approached the Fujin River bank, with roughly 700 infantry, cavalry and artillery soldiers of the 2nd Amur Infantry Division landed. The Chinese army collapsed without a fight, retreating to Huachuan, and by11am, Fujin county was occupied. Chinese sources reported “the Soviet army burned down the civil and military institutions separately and destroyed all the communication institutions. They distributed all the flour from the Jinchang Fire Mill to the poor, and plundered all the weapons, ammunition and military supplies." On the evening of November 1, the Soviet infantry, cavalry and artillery withdrew from the east gate. On the morning of the 2nd, the Soviet ships withdrew one after another. According to Soviet records, nearly 300 Chinese soldiers were killed in this battle, with thousands captured, while the Soviet army only lost 3 people and injured 11 people . The Chinese Songhua River fleet was completely destroyed, and 9 merchant ships were captured. In early November, the weather in the north became freezing cold, leading the rivers to freeze. Soviet warships retreated back to Khabarovsk, and their infantry and cavalry also returned by land. The war on the Eastern Front was basically over.  As for the western front, the main battlefields revolved around Manzhouli and Zhalannur. Since August 1929, conflicts here continued, a lot of back and forth stuff. The soviets would storm the areas and pull out. Yet in November, the war in the west escalated.  The commander of the Soviet Trans-Baikal Group, was Stepan Vostrezov, wielding the 21st, 35th and 36th infantry divisions, the 5th Cavalry Brigade, 331 heavy machine guns, 166 light machine guns, 32 combat aircraft, 3 armored trains, 58 light artillery, 30 heavy artillery, 9 T-18 ultra-light tanks, amongst other tanks. The Chinese side had about 16,000 people. There would be three major battles : the Battle of Zhallanur, the Battle of Manzhouli, and the Battle of Hailar. On November the 16th, the Soviets unleashed a large-scale offensive, tossing  nearly 40,000 troops, 400 artillery pieces, 40 tanks and 30 aircraft against the western front. At 11pm the Soviets crossed over the border. At 3am on the 17th the 5th Kuban Cavalry Brigade set out from Abagaitui, followed by the 35th Infantry Division who crossed the frozen surface of the Argun River, hooking around the rear of the Chinese garrison in Zhalannur along the east bank of the Argun River. At 7am Soviet aircraft began bombing the western front. The Chinese garrison headquarters, tram house, 38th Regiment building, and military police station were all bombed, and the radio station was also damaged. At noon, the Binzhou Railway was cut off 10-12 kilometers east of the city, and Zhalannur was attacked. Supported by 8 T-18 tanks and fighter planes, they attacked Zhalannur several times. On the morning of the 18th, the Soviet 5th Cavalry Brigade launched an attack against the 7,000-man 17th Brigade of the Chinese Army guarding Zhalannur. At 1pm on the 18th the Zhalannur Station and the Coal Mine was occupied by the Soviet army. The Chinese defenders, Brigadier Han Guangdi and Commander Zhang Linyu, were killed in action. More than half of the brigade officers and soldiers were killed and more than a thousand were captured. After capturing Zhalannur the Soviets concentrated their forces against Manzhouli. On the 19th, 7 T-18s supported the 108th Infantry Regiment of the Soviet 36th Division to attack Manzhouli from the east and west. Artillery pounded the city, before it was stormed. The 15th Brigade of the Chinese Army guarding the area was quickly surrounded by the Soviet army. Brigade Commander Liang Zhongjia and Chief of Staff Zhang Wenqing, alongside nearly 250 officers, fled to the Japanese consulate and surrendered to the Soviet army on the 20th. According to Soviet records, in the battles of Zhalannur and Manzhouli, over 1,500 Chinese soldiers were killed and more than 9,000 were captured, while the Soviet side lost 143 people, 665 were wounded and 4 were missing. Additionally 30 Chinese artillery pieces and 2 armored trains were captured by the Soviet army. The Soviets claimed that Chinese troops from Lake Khinkai were attacking Iman, modern day Dalnerechensk. In the name of self-defense, the Soviets began bombing Mishan on November 17 and mobilized  the Soviet Primorsky State Army and the 1st Pacific Rifle Infantry Division. The 1st Pacific Division and the 9th Independent Cavalry Brigade advanced towards Mishan, 40 kilometers from the border. Soviet records showed that during this battle the Chinese army suffered more than 1,500 casualties and 135 prisoners. The Soviets seized 6 machine guns, 6 mortars, 500 horses, 6 mortars, 200 horses and a large number of confidential documents. On November 23rd, 12 Soviet aircraft bombed Hailar, before capturing the city the next day.  By late November the Chinese had suffered something in the ballpark of 10,000 casualties along various fronts and an enormous amount of their equipment was taken by the Soviets. The Chinese officially reported 2000 deaths, 1000 wounded with more than 8000 captured. The Soviets reported 812 deaths, 665 wounded with under 100 missing. The Japanese had actually been quite the thorn for the Chinese during the war. They had intentionally barred Chinese forces from advancing north through their South Manchurian Railway zone, a large hindrance. Likewise the Kwantung army stationed in Liaoning were mobilizing, giving the impression they would exploit the situation at any moment.  In the face of quite a catastrophic and clear defeat, Nanjing's ministry of foreign affairs tossed a cease fire demand asking for foreign mediation. By December 3rd, Britain, France and the US asked both sides to stop the war so they could mediate a peace. The USSR rejected the participation of a third nation and suggested they could negotiate with China mono e mono. Zhang Xueliang accepted the proposal, dispatching Cai Yunsheng quickly to Shuangchengzi who signed an armistice with the Soviet representative Smanovsky. On the 16th real negotiations began and on the 22nd a draft agreement was signed. The draft stipulated both nations would re-cooperate over the Chinese Eastern Railway and that the Red Army would pull out of Manchuria as soon as both sides exchanged prisoners and officials. Thus the entire incident was resolved after humiliating China. While this all seemed completely needless, perhaps not significant, don't forget, the Japanese were watching it all happen in real time, taking notes, because they had their own ideas about Manchuria.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And so the Soviets and brand new Nationalist Republic of China went to war over, honestly a petty squabble involving railway rights and earnings. It was a drop in the bucket for such a war torn nation and only further embarrassed it on the world stage. Yet the Soviets might not be the foreign nation China should be looking out for. 

We have this issue in Latin America where the region is going towards a much more autocratic direction. Democracy is kind of dying in the darkness, and Russia, China and Iran are positioning themselves to take advantage of all that.”Joseph Humire is executive director of the Center for a Secure Free Society and a visiting fellow at the Heritage Foundation. An expert on asymmetric warfare, he has been looking closely at Latin America for 20 years.“The Sino-Iranian connection, in many respects, is probably the most dangerous one, even more so than the Sino-Russian connection, which is more talked about, I think, in foreign affairs,” says Humire.In this episode, we dive into how the China–Iran–Russia coalition is influencing the region, from Venezuela to Bolivia. We also discuss how this is impacting America and the greater Western world.“If you think China is simply doing this for economic ambitions, you're not reading the tea leaves on how China operates. They're buying a country. They're buying the sovereignty of this country,” says Humire. “Fundamentally, China is making Latin America a region more inhospitable to the United States.”Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Welcome to Double Trouble, a special foreign policy focused podcast series within MLI's Inside Policy Talks, to address the growing challenge of the Sino-Russian axis of authoritarianism facing the West.In this episode, MLI's Balkan Devlen sits down with Una Bērziņa-Čerenkova, political scientist and China scholar, to discuss the shifting attitudes towards China across the Baltic countries. In recent years, China has gone from being seen as an economic opportunity (one that the Balkans were in danger of missing out on) to an authoritarian security challenge. The Macdonald-Laurier Institute gratefully acknowledges the support of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Canada.Find Inside Policy Talks on Apple, Spotify, Google, or wherever else you get your audio.Like, comment, share, subscribe!

Welcome to Double Trouble, a special foreign policy focused podcast series within MLI's Inside Policy Talks, to address the growing challenge of the Sino-Russian axis of authoritarianism facing the West.In this episode, MLI senior fellows Jonathan Berkshire Miller, Marcus Kolga, and Alexander Lanoszka discuss their experience in Prague at a premier global security forum, GLOBESEC. The Macdonald-Laurier Institute gratefully acknowledges the support of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Canada.Find Inside Policy Talks on Apple, Spotify, Google, or wherever else you get your audio.Like, comment, share, subscribe!

Eric and Eliot pay homage to Daily Telegraph journalist and podcaster David Knowles who was the driving force behind the podcast, Ukraine: The Latest, on which Eliot has appeared several times. They also discuss the intensifying cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea including the just announced intensified schedule of joint Sino-Russian military exercises and Iran's transfer of medium range Fateh 360 ballistic missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine. They consider the historical analogies for this type of alliance/coalition and, in particular, the ideological underpinnings of the alignment, as well as the tightening institutional links among these nations. They discuss the new JINSA report on Iran's advancing nuclear program as well as the challenges facing U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. They also discuss increasing instances of state failure around the world in Sudan, Lebanon, Venezuela, Somalia, the Sahel and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the relationship of this phenomenon to the retrograde of American power and that of its allies in Britain and France around the world. Finally, they discuss the Marquis de Custine's writings on Russian national character as well as takedowns of Tucker Carlson's holocaust denying, Churchill bashing guest Daryl Cooper. Eliot's Latest in the Atlantic: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2024/09/british-foreign-secretary-david-lammy-israel-speech/679729/ JINSA's Iran Nuclear Report: https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/JINSA-Why-the-Next-President-Should-Start-Worrying-and-Fear-the-Iran-Bomb-2.pdf Sergei Lebedev on Navalny: https://libertiesjournal.com/articles/the-heroic-illusion-of-alexei-navalny/ Cathy Young on Tucker Carlson/Churchill: https://www.thebulwark.com/p/tucker-carlson-and-the-beer-hall-putz-darryl-cooper Andrew Roberts on Churchill: https://freebeacon.com/culture/no-churchill-was-not-the-villain/ Shield of the Republic is a Bulwark podcast co-sponsored by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.

The tumultuous relationship between Red China and the Soviet Union hints at an uncertain future for the Sino-Russian partnership. Read by Helen Lloyd. Image: Sino-Soviet propaganda poster. Credit: Album / Alamy Stock Photo

In this episode of the ChinaPower Podcast, Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick joins us to discuss recent Sino-Russian activities and what they mean for the overall China-Russia relationship. Dr. Wishnick analyzes the May 2024 Xi-Putin meeting in Beijing, noting that the joint statement the two countries released had significant areas of continuity and some areas of change compared to 2023. She then analyzes the meeting between the two leaders at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit and the nearly half a dozen military exercises the two countries engaged in in July and August 2024. Dr. Wishnick emphasizes that the recent surge of China-Russia military exercises are meant to signal China-Russia political and strategic coordination, with some scheduled in advance as part of their normal annual exercise plans and others scheduled in response to U.S. activities. Finally, Dr. Wishnick shares her predictions for developments within Sino-Russian relations in the coming months.  Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick is a Senior Research Scientist in the China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at CNA. She was a Professor of Political Science at Montclair State University from 2005-2024 and the Coordinator of MSU's Asian Studies Undergraduate Minor from 2010-2019. Since 2002, she has been a research scholar at Columbia University's Weatherhead East Asian Institute. She previously taught undergraduate and graduate courses in international relations, Chinese politics, and Chinese foreign policy at Barnard College, Columbia College, and SIPA. Dr. Wishnick has dual regional expertise on China and Russia and is an expert on Chinese foreign policy, Sino-Russian relations, Northeast Asian and Central Asian security, and Arctic geopolitics.  She received a PhD in Political Science from Columbia University, an MA in Russian and East European Studies from Yale University, and a BA from Barnard College. She speaks Mandarin, Russian, and French.

On the structure of the Chinese state and its external relations. [Patreon Exclusive: for the full episode, go to patreon.com/bungacast] We welcome back Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri to reflect on the outcome of the recent plenum of the Chinese Communist Party and to ask who, if anyone beyond Xi Jinping, is calling the shots. How will the CCP respond to the US election? Why is China not a monolithic, integrated state in the way some think? How important is the the Sino-Russian alliance? Does it matter more to Russia or to China? What happened to "wolf-warrior diplomacy"? Is it still a thing?  What's going on economically with the property bubble, and with Chinese manufacturing over-capacity? Should we be worried about WWIII over Taiwan or the South China Sea?   Links: China's plenum must offer action not rote slogans, Financial Times Views of China and Xi Jinping in 35 countries, Pew Research Centre Fractured China: How State Transformation is Shaping China's Rise, Lee Jones & Shahar Hameiri

Anxiety may have been abounding in the old Cold War West that progress - whether political or economic - has been reversed, but for citizens of former-socialist countries, murky temporal trajectories are nothing new. Grounded in the multiethnic frontier town of Hunchun at the triple border of China, Russia, and North Korea, Ed Pulford traces how several of global history's most ambitiously totalizing progressive endeavors have ended in cataclysmic collapse here. From the Japanese empire which banished Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynastic histories from the region, through Chinese, Soviet, and Korean socialisms, these borderlands have seen projections and disintegrations of forward-oriented ideas accumulate on a grand scale. Taking an archaeological approach to notions of historical progress, the book's three parts follow an innovative structure moving backwards through linear time. Part I explores “post-historical” Hunchun's diverse sociopolitics since high socialism's demise. Part II covers the socialist era, discussing cross-border temporal synchrony between China, Russia, and North Korea. Finally, Part III treats the period preceding socialist revolutions, revealing how the collapse of Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynasties marked a compound “end of history” which opened the area to projections of modernity and progress. Examining a borderland across linguistic, cultural, and historical lenses, Past Progress: Time and Politics at the Borders of China, Russia, and Korea (Stanford UP, 2024) is a simultaneously local and transregional analysis of time, borders, and the state before, during, and since socialism. Ed Pulford is Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Manchester. His research and teaching focus on anthropological and historical approaches to Eurasian borderlands, Sino-Russian relations, the past and present of socialism, and comparative experiences of socialism and empire. He has lived and worked in China, Russia, Japan, and Korea. Yadong Li is a PhD student in anthropology at Tulane University. His research interests lie at the intersection of the anthropology of state, the anthropology of time, hope studies, and post-structuralist philosophy. More details about his scholarship and research interests can be found here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Anxiety may have been abounding in the old Cold War West that progress - whether political or economic - has been reversed, but for citizens of former-socialist countries, murky temporal trajectories are nothing new. Grounded in the multiethnic frontier town of Hunchun at the triple border of China, Russia, and North Korea, Ed Pulford traces how several of global history's most ambitiously totalizing progressive endeavors have ended in cataclysmic collapse here. From the Japanese empire which banished Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynastic histories from the region, through Chinese, Soviet, and Korean socialisms, these borderlands have seen projections and disintegrations of forward-oriented ideas accumulate on a grand scale. Taking an archaeological approach to notions of historical progress, the book's three parts follow an innovative structure moving backwards through linear time. Part I explores “post-historical” Hunchun's diverse sociopolitics since high socialism's demise. Part II covers the socialist era, discussing cross-border temporal synchrony between China, Russia, and North Korea. Finally, Part III treats the period preceding socialist revolutions, revealing how the collapse of Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynasties marked a compound “end of history” which opened the area to projections of modernity and progress. Examining a borderland across linguistic, cultural, and historical lenses, Past Progress: Time and Politics at the Borders of China, Russia, and Korea (Stanford UP, 2024) is a simultaneously local and transregional analysis of time, borders, and the state before, during, and since socialism. Ed Pulford is Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Manchester. His research and teaching focus on anthropological and historical approaches to Eurasian borderlands, Sino-Russian relations, the past and present of socialism, and comparative experiences of socialism and empire. He has lived and worked in China, Russia, Japan, and Korea. Yadong Li is a PhD student in anthropology at Tulane University. His research interests lie at the intersection of the anthropology of state, the anthropology of time, hope studies, and post-structuralist philosophy. More details about his scholarship and research interests can be found here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Anxiety may have been abounding in the old Cold War West that progress - whether political or economic - has been reversed, but for citizens of former-socialist countries, murky temporal trajectories are nothing new. Grounded in the multiethnic frontier town of Hunchun at the triple border of China, Russia, and North Korea, Ed Pulford traces how several of global history's most ambitiously totalizing progressive endeavors have ended in cataclysmic collapse here. From the Japanese empire which banished Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynastic histories from the region, through Chinese, Soviet, and Korean socialisms, these borderlands have seen projections and disintegrations of forward-oriented ideas accumulate on a grand scale. Taking an archaeological approach to notions of historical progress, the book's three parts follow an innovative structure moving backwards through linear time. Part I explores “post-historical” Hunchun's diverse sociopolitics since high socialism's demise. Part II covers the socialist era, discussing cross-border temporal synchrony between China, Russia, and North Korea. Finally, Part III treats the period preceding socialist revolutions, revealing how the collapse of Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynasties marked a compound “end of history” which opened the area to projections of modernity and progress. Examining a borderland across linguistic, cultural, and historical lenses, Past Progress: Time and Politics at the Borders of China, Russia, and Korea (Stanford UP, 2024) is a simultaneously local and transregional analysis of time, borders, and the state before, during, and since socialism. Ed Pulford is Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Manchester. His research and teaching focus on anthropological and historical approaches to Eurasian borderlands, Sino-Russian relations, the past and present of socialism, and comparative experiences of socialism and empire. He has lived and worked in China, Russia, Japan, and Korea. Yadong Li is a PhD student in anthropology at Tulane University. His research interests lie at the intersection of the anthropology of state, the anthropology of time, hope studies, and post-structuralist philosophy. More details about his scholarship and research interests can be found here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

Anxiety may have been abounding in the old Cold War West that progress - whether political or economic - has been reversed, but for citizens of former-socialist countries, murky temporal trajectories are nothing new. Grounded in the multiethnic frontier town of Hunchun at the triple border of China, Russia, and North Korea, Ed Pulford traces how several of global history's most ambitiously totalizing progressive endeavors have ended in cataclysmic collapse here. From the Japanese empire which banished Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynastic histories from the region, through Chinese, Soviet, and Korean socialisms, these borderlands have seen projections and disintegrations of forward-oriented ideas accumulate on a grand scale. Taking an archaeological approach to notions of historical progress, the book's three parts follow an innovative structure moving backwards through linear time. Part I explores “post-historical” Hunchun's diverse sociopolitics since high socialism's demise. Part II covers the socialist era, discussing cross-border temporal synchrony between China, Russia, and North Korea. Finally, Part III treats the period preceding socialist revolutions, revealing how the collapse of Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynasties marked a compound “end of history” which opened the area to projections of modernity and progress. Examining a borderland across linguistic, cultural, and historical lenses, Past Progress: Time and Politics at the Borders of China, Russia, and Korea (Stanford UP, 2024) is a simultaneously local and transregional analysis of time, borders, and the state before, during, and since socialism. Ed Pulford is Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Manchester. His research and teaching focus on anthropological and historical approaches to Eurasian borderlands, Sino-Russian relations, the past and present of socialism, and comparative experiences of socialism and empire. He has lived and worked in China, Russia, Japan, and Korea. Yadong Li is a PhD student in anthropology at Tulane University. His research interests lie at the intersection of the anthropology of state, the anthropology of time, hope studies, and post-structuralist philosophy. More details about his scholarship and research interests can be found here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies

Anxiety may have been abounding in the old Cold War West that progress - whether political or economic - has been reversed, but for citizens of former-socialist countries, murky temporal trajectories are nothing new. Grounded in the multiethnic frontier town of Hunchun at the triple border of China, Russia, and North Korea, Ed Pulford traces how several of global history's most ambitiously totalizing progressive endeavors have ended in cataclysmic collapse here. From the Japanese empire which banished Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynastic histories from the region, through Chinese, Soviet, and Korean socialisms, these borderlands have seen projections and disintegrations of forward-oriented ideas accumulate on a grand scale. Taking an archaeological approach to notions of historical progress, the book's three parts follow an innovative structure moving backwards through linear time. Part I explores “post-historical” Hunchun's diverse sociopolitics since high socialism's demise. Part II covers the socialist era, discussing cross-border temporal synchrony between China, Russia, and North Korea. Finally, Part III treats the period preceding socialist revolutions, revealing how the collapse of Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynasties marked a compound “end of history” which opened the area to projections of modernity and progress. Examining a borderland across linguistic, cultural, and historical lenses, Past Progress: Time and Politics at the Borders of China, Russia, and Korea (Stanford UP, 2024) is a simultaneously local and transregional analysis of time, borders, and the state before, during, and since socialism. Ed Pulford is Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Manchester. His research and teaching focus on anthropological and historical approaches to Eurasian borderlands, Sino-Russian relations, the past and present of socialism, and comparative experiences of socialism and empire. He has lived and worked in China, Russia, Japan, and Korea. Yadong Li is a PhD student in anthropology at Tulane University. His research interests lie at the intersection of the anthropology of state, the anthropology of time, hope studies, and post-structuralist philosophy. More details about his scholarship and research interests can be found here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/anthropology

Anxiety may have been abounding in the old Cold War West that progress - whether political or economic - has been reversed, but for citizens of former-socialist countries, murky temporal trajectories are nothing new. Grounded in the multiethnic frontier town of Hunchun at the triple border of China, Russia, and North Korea, Ed Pulford traces how several of global history's most ambitiously totalizing progressive endeavors have ended in cataclysmic collapse here. From the Japanese empire which banished Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynastic histories from the region, through Chinese, Soviet, and Korean socialisms, these borderlands have seen projections and disintegrations of forward-oriented ideas accumulate on a grand scale. Taking an archaeological approach to notions of historical progress, the book's three parts follow an innovative structure moving backwards through linear time. Part I explores “post-historical” Hunchun's diverse sociopolitics since high socialism's demise. Part II covers the socialist era, discussing cross-border temporal synchrony between China, Russia, and North Korea. Finally, Part III treats the period preceding socialist revolutions, revealing how the collapse of Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynasties marked a compound “end of history” which opened the area to projections of modernity and progress. Examining a borderland across linguistic, cultural, and historical lenses, Past Progress: Time and Politics at the Borders of China, Russia, and Korea (Stanford UP, 2024) is a simultaneously local and transregional analysis of time, borders, and the state before, during, and since socialism. Ed Pulford is Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Manchester. His research and teaching focus on anthropological and historical approaches to Eurasian borderlands, Sino-Russian relations, the past and present of socialism, and comparative experiences of socialism and empire. He has lived and worked in China, Russia, Japan, and Korea. Yadong Li is a PhD student in anthropology at Tulane University. His research interests lie at the intersection of the anthropology of state, the anthropology of time, hope studies, and post-structuralist philosophy. More details about his scholarship and research interests can be found here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

Anxiety may have been abounding in the old Cold War West that progress - whether political or economic - has been reversed, but for citizens of former-socialist countries, murky temporal trajectories are nothing new. Grounded in the multiethnic frontier town of Hunchun at the triple border of China, Russia, and North Korea, Ed Pulford traces how several of global history's most ambitiously totalizing progressive endeavors have ended in cataclysmic collapse here. From the Japanese empire which banished Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynastic histories from the region, through Chinese, Soviet, and Korean socialisms, these borderlands have seen projections and disintegrations of forward-oriented ideas accumulate on a grand scale. Taking an archaeological approach to notions of historical progress, the book's three parts follow an innovative structure moving backwards through linear time. Part I explores “post-historical” Hunchun's diverse sociopolitics since high socialism's demise. Part II covers the socialist era, discussing cross-border temporal synchrony between China, Russia, and North Korea. Finally, Part III treats the period preceding socialist revolutions, revealing how the collapse of Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynasties marked a compound “end of history” which opened the area to projections of modernity and progress. Examining a borderland across linguistic, cultural, and historical lenses, Past Progress: Time and Politics at the Borders of China, Russia, and Korea (Stanford UP, 2024) is a simultaneously local and transregional analysis of time, borders, and the state before, during, and since socialism. Ed Pulford is Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Manchester. His research and teaching focus on anthropological and historical approaches to Eurasian borderlands, Sino-Russian relations, the past and present of socialism, and comparative experiences of socialism and empire. He has lived and worked in China, Russia, Japan, and Korea. Yadong Li is a PhD student in anthropology at Tulane University. His research interests lie at the intersection of the anthropology of state, the anthropology of time, hope studies, and post-structuralist philosophy. More details about his scholarship and research interests can be found here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/geography

Anxiety may have been abounding in the old Cold War West that progress - whether political or economic - has been reversed, but for citizens of former-socialist countries, murky temporal trajectories are nothing new. Grounded in the multiethnic frontier town of Hunchun at the triple border of China, Russia, and North Korea, Ed Pulford traces how several of global history's most ambitiously totalizing progressive endeavors have ended in cataclysmic collapse here. From the Japanese empire which banished Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynastic histories from the region, through Chinese, Soviet, and Korean socialisms, these borderlands have seen projections and disintegrations of forward-oriented ideas accumulate on a grand scale. Taking an archaeological approach to notions of historical progress, the book's three parts follow an innovative structure moving backwards through linear time. Part I explores “post-historical” Hunchun's diverse sociopolitics since high socialism's demise. Part II covers the socialist era, discussing cross-border temporal synchrony between China, Russia, and North Korea. Finally, Part III treats the period preceding socialist revolutions, revealing how the collapse of Qing, Tsarist, and Choson dynasties marked a compound “end of history” which opened the area to projections of modernity and progress. Examining a borderland across linguistic, cultural, and historical lenses, Past Progress: Time and Politics at the Borders of China, Russia, and Korea (Stanford UP, 2024) is a simultaneously local and transregional analysis of time, borders, and the state before, during, and since socialism. Ed Pulford is Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Manchester. His research and teaching focus on anthropological and historical approaches to Eurasian borderlands, Sino-Russian relations, the past and present of socialism, and comparative experiences of socialism and empire. He has lived and worked in China, Russia, Japan, and Korea. Yadong Li is a PhD student in anthropology at Tulane University. His research interests lie at the intersection of the anthropology of state, the anthropology of time, hope studies, and post-structuralist philosophy. More details about his scholarship and research interests can be found here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/korean-studies

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Greg Lawson is a realist thinker, a history buff, and a geopolitical analyst. He joins the podcast to discuss the legacy and meaning of former Secretary of State, the late Dr. Henry Kissinger, as well as the problem of Russia, and the urgency of China. There has never been a more urgent time for prioritization in American foreign policy; Greg lays out a clear vision on what he sees as the realist way forward. Greg R. Lawson is a Contributing Analyst at WikiStrat and a Research Fellow at the Buckeye Institute. His opinions have been widely circulated in the foreign policy community amongst thought leaders in the field; his 2014 article "Avoiding America's Ultimate Geopolitical Nightmare" published in The National Interest was an insightful and landmark text on the burgeoning Sino-Russian axis. He is a graduate of Ohio State University. Garrison Moratto is the founder and host of The New Diplomatist Podcast; he earned a M.S. of International Relations as well as a B.S. in Government: Public Administration (Summa Cum Laude) at Liberty University in the United States. He has been published in RealClearDefense, and Pacific Forum International's "Issues & Insights", among other publications. Guest opinions are their own. All music licensed via UppBeat.

On May 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded a two-day visit to China for his 43rd meeting with Xi Jinping. Based on public readouts, Putin emphasized the economic benefits that the Sino-Russian partnership could bring to both countries. Economic integration between Russia and China has accelerated dramatically, with total trade between them reaching $240 billion US dollars in 2023. Beijing's decision to increase trade with Moscow after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has kept the Russian economy afloat. Western sanctions have failed to cripple Russia's economy or its war effort. After the European Union halted the import of Russian oil, China stepped in and has since become Russia's top energy buyer. Moreover, China has become Russia's top goods supplier, having surged its sales of machine tools, microelectronics, and other technology that Moscow uses to produce weaponry in its ongoing war with Ukraine. To discuss China's trade with Russia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yanmei Xie. Yanmei is a Geopolitics Analyst at Gavekal Research, where she analyzes the implications of rising geopolitical and geoeconomic risks on trade, investments, and supply chains. Yanmei recently published a report on China's economic support for Russia, which was titled “How China Keeps Russia in Business.”  Timestamps[02:00] China's Economic Support of Russia [05:29] Areas of Success for Western Sanctions[07:11] A Surge in Chinese Exports After the Invasion of Ukraine [09:54] Chinese Playbook for Circumventing Sanctions[13:36] Chinese Provision of Crucial Materials[15:17] Incentive to Capture the Russian Energy Market[19:17] Impact of Western Industrial Policies on Sino-Russian Trade [20:20] Possibility of Increased Sanctions to Deter China[23:24] China's Toolbox of Retaliatory Measures [26:48] Plateauing Economic Support for Russia

Unless something changes FAST ...  collapse of the dollar as the worlds reserve currency seems imminent.  The easy money days are OVER and the time is now to prepare!Founder and CEO of Colonial Metals Group Paul Stone walks us through the anatomy of a currency collapse as we look to history to learn how to THRIVE in a chaotic future. HUGE THANK YOU - to our valued sponsors at Colonial Metals Group!Set up a SAFE & Secure IRA or 401k with a company who shares your values and supports this show!  Learn about your options HERE ——> https://colonialmetalsgroup.com/shannonjoy-show/ Or, to talk to a REAL person! Give them a call at this special number for the SJ audience!Call CMG at (888)-705-0950 today! Extra special bonus from Field of Greens!!!!Plug in the promo code SHANNON for an additional 15% off your purchase!Go to www.fieldofgreens.com to shop and save! Support the Show.Please Support Our Sponsors! Achieve financial independence with Colonial Metals Group!!! Set up a SAFE & Secure IRA or 401k with a company who shares your values and supports this show! Learn about your options HERE ——>https://colonialmetalsgroup.com/joy Get FIT and healthy with your daily serving of Field of Greens!!! Go to www.fieldofgreens.com and use the promo code JOY for 15% off! For TOTAL phone security and privacy check out our sponsors at Connecta Mobil! Visit them TODAY at www.Phone123.com/Joy Or talk to a real person by calling: 941-246-2156

This week, Walter and Jeremy discuss Gantz's ultimatum to Netanyahu, the death of Ebrahim Raisi, a failed unionization push in the American South, and how China, Russia, and Iran went from an Axis of Weevils to a legitimate alliance of revisionist powers. Each week on What Really Matters, Walter Russell Mead and Jeremy Stern help you understand the news, decide what matters and what doesn't, and enjoy following the story of America and the world more than you do now. For more, check out tabletmag.com/what-really-matters. You can read Walter Russell Mead's Tablet column here, and check out more from Tablet here. Connect with us Follow the podcast on Twitter Follow Walter on Twitter Follow Jeremy on Twitter Email us: wrm@tabletmag.com

Max and Donatienne discuss the assassination attempt on Slovakia's Prime Minister Robert Fico (0:53) and the announcement of a new Dutch government (0:53). Then, they turn to a conversation with Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, for a conversation about President Xi's recent trip to Europe and the state of Sino-Russian ties (18:54).    Learn more:   Russian Roulette | CSIS Podcasts  Pekingology | CSIS Podcasts 

Russia's President Vladimir Putin is set to visit Beijing in May to meet with China's leader Xi Jinping. This will be Putin's  first foreign trip after his reinauguration on May 7. The meeting will be another chance for the two leaders to emphasize how important and close the “no limits” partnership of Russia and China is. In this episode of our podcast, we look at the implications of the Sino-Russian relationship for the European Union, in particular due the ongoing invasion of Ukraine and their opposition to and undermining of the existing global order.Johannes Heller-John is joined by Alice Ekman, Senior Analyst in charge of the Asia portfolio at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris and Helena Legarda, Lead Analyst at MERICS. In their view, the China-Russia relationship is more stable than is often assumed. ---This podcast episode is part of the “Dealing with a Resurgent China” (DWARC) project, which has received funding from the European Union's Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 101061700. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

As economic sanctions continue to tighten their grip on Russia, the nation is forced to seek assistance from whoever it can, turning to China not out of mutual interest but as a necessity. Yet, this support comes at a steep price, heightening concerns in Moscow that it's inadvertently solidifying a new, skewed power dynamic. As China capitalizes on Russia's vulnerabilities, one has to wonder if this is merely business or if there's a deeper play to settle historical grievances. Can Russia untangle itself from this precarious alliance? What are the obstacles in broadening their so-called "no-limits" friendship, and what implications will these have on future Sino-Russian energy deals? We ask our panel of experts: On the panel this week: - Keir Giles (Chatham House) - Gavin Wilde (CEIP) - Temur Umarov (CEIP) Intro - 00:00 PART 1 - 04:07 PART 2 - 23:47 PART 3 - 38:47 Outro - 58:10 Follow the show on @TheRedLinePod Follow Michael on @MikeHilliardAus Support the show at: https://www.patreon.com/theredlinepodcast Submit Questions and Join the Red Line Discord Server at: https://www.theredlinepodcast.com/discord For more info, please visit: https://www.theredlinepodcast.com/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We are joined by Sergey Radchenko, a Wilson E. Schmidt Distinguished Professor at SAIS Europe, and Director of the Bologna Institute for Policy Research. An expert on Sino-Soviet relations, Soviet and Chinese foreign policies, he discusses the State of Sino-Russia Relations in the wake of a raging war in Ukraine.Connor Crago conducted this interview. The episode was researched and produced by Benie Kwarteng and Adi Baurzhanuly.

In this episode of China-Mena titled "Performative or Substantive Engagement? China & Russia in the Middle East," our host Jonathan Fulton and guests Dr. Li-Chen Sim and Mark Katz explore the growing collaboration between China and Russia and its impact on the Middle East. We unravel the complexities of Sino-Russian engagement in the region, discussing Russia's interests, China's role, and the influence of the Ukraine war. Join us as we navigate the evolving geopolitical landscape of this crucial region.TakeawaysChina-Russia Collaboration in the Middle EastChina's Activities and Interests in the Middle EastPerceptions of Great Power Competition and Influence in the Middle EastQuotes"There is room for negotiation and cooperation between the US and China, transcending any cold war-like conflict." - Mark Katz"Together, as a force multiplier, they amplify their interests and narratives in the Middle East, projecting greater collective power and influence."- Dr. Li-Chen SimFeatured in the EpisodeDr. Li-Chen Sim​​Political Scientist At Khalifa University Abu Dhabi United United Arab EmiratesLinkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/li-chen-sim-3098035a/Mark KatzProfessor of Government and Politics, George Mason University--Schar School of Policy and GovernmentLinkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/mark-n-katz-0707b213/Jonathan FultonNonresident Senior Fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabihttps://ae.linkedin.com/in/jonathan-fulton-2627414bhttps://twitter.com/jonathandfultonChapters00:00 - Introduction03:13 - Russian Weaponry and Reactor Sales: Driving Middle East Cooperation10:01 - Amplifying Influence through Media Collaboration: The Force Multiplier13:42 - Middle East's Perspective: Russia as Muscle, China as Financial Power16:07 - Russia's Challenges as a Weapon Supplier: The Impact of Ukraine19:06 - Changing Power Dynamics: China's Role in the Gaza Conflict23:24 - China's Benefits from Russia's Non-Compliance with OPEC28:14 - Prospects for Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation: A Realistic Outlook30:08 - Middle Easterners' Support for Russian Influence in 201532:32 - US Concerns and Attention-Seeking in Response to Russia's Actions38:48 - Acting with Diplomatic Considerations: Weighing Repercussions42:08 - Inevitable Cooperation: China, Russia, and the Middle East44:26 - Exploring Cooperation: Russia, Ukraine, West, and the Middle East46:23 - Outro

Mike and Jude are joined by Sergey Radchenko, the Wilson E. Schmidt Distinguished Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Sergey is an accomplished author, and has written extensively on the Cold War, nuclear history, and on Russian and Chinese foreign and security policies.  The conversation begins by delving into the nature of Beijing's ties with Moscow, and how they have evolved from the Cold War. They explore points of divergence in the interests of China and Russia, and assess how both countries have reacted to frictions in the relationship over time. Next, they turn to the war in Ukraine, examining to what extent tightening Beijing-Moscow ties might have affected Putin's ultimate decision to invade, and then discuss China's strategic interests in how the conflict ends. Finally, they discuss ideological alignment between China and Russia, and how each state aims to shape the global order, before briefly considering the scope of Russia's likely responses to escalating tensions between the U.S. and China in Asia. 

This week on Sinica, a live recording from New York on the eve of the 2023 NEXTChina Conference. Jeremy Goldkorn joins Kaiser as co-host, with guests Maria Repnikova of Georgia State University, who specializes in Chinese soft power in Africa and on Sino-Russian relations, and Eric Olander, co-founder of the China Global South Project and co-host of the excellent China Global South Podcast and China in Africa Podcast. This show is unedited to preserve the live feel!Recommendations: Jeremy: Empire podcast William Dalrymple and Anita Anand, about how empires rise, fall, and shape the world around usMaria: A Day in the Life of Abed Salama: Anatomy of a Jerusalem Tragedy by Nathan ThrallEric: Eat Bitter, a documentary by Ningyi Sun, a filmmaker from China, and Pascale Appora Gnekindy, from the Central African RepublicKaiser: Wellness, an ambitious novel by Nathan Hill about a Gen X couple in Wicker Park, Chicago; and the NOVA documentary Inside China's Tech Boom, of which Kaiser is correspondent, narrator, and co-producer.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Walter and Jeremy discuss the Sino-Russian alliance, the U.S. national debt, the rise of the European right, Roosevelt v. Wilson, and the Puritan-Woke connection. Each week on What Really Matters, Walter Russell Mead and Jeremy Stern help you understand the news, decide what matters and what doesn't, and enjoy following the story of America and the world more than you do now. For more, check out tabletmag.com/whatreallymatters. You can read Walter Russell Mead's Tablet column here, and check out more from Tablet here. Connect with us Follow the podcast on Twitter Follow Walter on Twitter Follow Jeremy on Twitter Email us: wrm@tabletmag.com

Van sat down with China watcher Carla Freeman (US Institute of Peace) to explore this thing Xi Jinping announced last year called the “Global Security Initiative,” which turned into a larger discussion about how China thinks about security and international order generally. The catalyst was a piece she wrote with Alex Stephenson. We get into: What China's “relational” thinking about world politics really means in practice; How Chinese security thinking affects the global South; How US choices affects Sino-Russian ties; How Made in China 2025 looks in hindsight; The aspects of international order China likes most; and more!Subscribe to the Un-Diplomatic Newsletter: https://www.un-diplomatic.com

The IDF assassinates Islamic Jihad leadership in Gaza and Israelis brace for escalation. Celebrating Israel's 75th, a possible Sino-Russian alliance and how AI could impact people of faith. Dr. Robert Jeffress receives the Friends of Zion award.

On this week's Cyber Report, sponsored by Fortress Information Security, Justin Sherman, the founder of the Global Cyber Strategies consultancy who is also a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Cyber Statecraft Initiative and a Wired Magazine contributor, discusses what to expect from the House Energy and Commerce Committee hearing tomorrow on TikTok, the revelation of TikTok owner ByteDance's ownership structure, whether to ban foreign social media platforms and if not how best to regulate them, the new Hill & Valley Forum coalition of lawmakers and Silicon Valley firms, Sino-Russian cyber cooperation as Beijing and Moscow warm ties, and what to expect from Chinese and Russian cyber activities as Beijing ratchets up tensions over Taiwan and Moscow seeks to bolster domestic production by stealing foreign intellectual property to compensate for Western sanctions in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine with Defense & Aerospace Report Editor Vago Muradian.

A policy of ambiguity is swiftly shifting; the country is falling into a Sino-Russian orbit at just the time it needs the most help from Western allies. How learning to debate can improve the lives of those inside and released from New York City's biggest prison. And meeting a street artist who decorates the wreckage of Kharkiv, Ukraine's second city.For full access to print, digital and audio editions of The Economist, subscribe here www.economist.com/intelligenceoffer Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

A policy of ambiguity is swiftly shifting; the country is falling into a Sino-Russian orbit at just the time it needs the most help from Western allies. How learning to debate can improve the lives of those inside and released from New York City's biggest prison. And meeting a street artist who decorates the wreckage of Kharkiv, Ukraine's second city.For full access to print, digital and audio editions of The Economist, subscribe here www.economist.com/intelligenceoffer Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Days before Russia illegally and brutally invaded Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a “no limits” partnership, demonstrating their deepening relations. It has been a year since Putin's full-scale invasion on February 24 and the relationship between China and Russia seems as strong as ever. While Xi has proposed a peace plan and wishes to remain neutral in the war, China has still yet to condemn Russia for the invasion. Meanwhile, Western officials are looking at the visit from Beijing's most senior foreign policy official, Wang Yi, to Moscow this week as an indication of China's continued support of Russia.  Alexander Gabuev, one of the world's foremost analysts of the Sino-Russian relationship, joins Stewart on the show to unpack how that relationship has changed since Putin's invasion of Ukraine a year ago and the vision Xi and Putin share for a new world order. As the incoming director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, Alexander also discusses the future of Russia as a nation as well as how the war might end.  Alexander Gabuev. (2022, August 9). "China's New Vassal." Foreign Affairs. 

On this episode of Russian Roulette, listen to Max Bergmann interview Brian Hart and Meia Nouwens about a recent report from the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS, titled "Understanding the Broader Transatlantic Security Implications of Greater Sino-Russian Military Alignment." Brian and Meia both contributed papers to the report and discuss their findings with Max, along with their thoughts on the impact of Russia's war in Ukraine on the Sino-Russian strategic relationship at large. This conversation was originally recorded in early December 2022. Read the full report: https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-broader-transatlantic-security-implications-greater-sino-russian-military

Last time we spoke The foreign community of Shanghai did not take the Taiping advances lightly and fired upon the rebels as they approached the great port city. The filibuster Frederick Townsend Ward created a foreign mercenary team to fight the rebels with pretty mixed results. Hong Rengan tried to smooth things over with the foreigners to earn their support, but nothing was going the Taiping's way. Meanwhile Zeng Guofan was building up his Xiang army, falling into despair at the prospect that Beijing might be captured by foreigners. Yet this did not stop Zeng Guofans resolve to take Anqing, a major stepping stone to seize Nanjing. It seems Hong Rengans grand strategy was falling apart as a result of the foreign community, could he turn things around before Zeng Guofan crushed his plans?   #31 This episode is The Taiping Rebellion part 8: The Fall of Anqing   Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. When the Taiping generals and officers were around things went relatively well for the populaces that came in contact with the Taiping assaults. However as the Taiping armies moved onwards, large groups of bandits followed in their wake, many Taiping secretly amongst them. They would plunder, rape and murder, the usual as it were. Horrible atrocities were common, one account from Xiangshan county in Zhejiang province had a recently groom disemboweled before 12 bandits raped his bride and killed her as well. In the same province one story told that “there were those who would cut open the stomach and drink the blood, and others who chopped off the four limbs. Some would dig out the heart and eat it…my pen cannot bear to write this”. They would carry off women to rape and young boys to be made into future conscripts. Often the Taiping vanguards if they could not find Qing officials, they would kill citizens of a city and dress up their corpses in Qing official attire, to invigorate the rest of the army. Heads went on stakes, placards were nailed to them. The violence between the Qing and Taiping was becoming indistinguishable. But as so often in China, alongside the horror, taxes were collected, crops were grown, new officials were appointed, life simply went on.    The frank truth about this time period, is the Chinese commoners did not care who was in charge whether it be Taiping or Qing, they simply wanted the damn fighting to end so they could carry on with their lives, they just wanted some order and to be able to provide for their families. Facing so many new territorial gains and countless differing population under their control the Taiping established agreements with local leaders, such as the gentry class who were willing to play ball. Thus a lot of these territories held a lot of autonomy, that is if they paid taxes and made sure not to help the Qing. There was an interesting element of class struggle going on as well. Where the Qing ruled, the wealthy landowner gentry class or scholars generally called the shot. But where the Taiping ruled, you could join their ranks, no matter what class you came from and move up the social ladder.   Real control still lay outside the Taiping's grasp. Though the Qing were weakened by the European victory of them and even with the Emperor literally fleeing the capital, the mandate of heaven still remained and as long as it did, those loyal to it would resist the rebels. Hong Rengan and Li Xiucheng did not agree on a great many things, but one thing they certainly saw eye to eye on was the need to consolidate the fertile southern provinces, to take what was once the old Ming empire and use it to starve the Qing in the north. By autumn of 1860, Li xiucheng was forced to leave his command in the eastern provinces, to come to relieve Anqing from Zeng Guofan's siege. Hong Xiuquan actually sent orders for Li Xiucheng to march north to hit Beijing again now that it was weakened, but he refused, ironically similar to how Zeng Guofan refused Emperor Xianfeng. Instead Li Xiucheng insisted he should go west into Jiangxi and Hubei provinces, were several hundreds of thousands of people could be recruited into the Taiping ranks. He would use these men to lift the Anqing siege and this all meant a clash with Zeng Guofan in Qimen. Before Li Xiucheng left Nanjing for his campaign he told the citizens ‘if Anqing can be held, there is no need to worry, but if it is not firm, the capital will not be secure, everyone needs to start stockpiling food”.   In 1861 Hong Rengan took to the field under orders from the heavenly king, to help relieve Anqing. It was the first time he commanded an army, he himself had never really fought in a battle before. All the way over in Beijing, Prince Gong was begging Emperor Xianfeng to return to the capital, hell the war was over, the foreign barbarians had left, the sovereign was needed in the capital to reassure the people. Yet Xianfeng refused to go back to Beijing, he was furious that Pring Gong agreed to allow foreign envoys to be in Beijing, he could not be around them. Thus Xianfeng stayed at his hunting retreat with his empress and harem of concubines, busying himself by ordered his staff to make improvements to what had become his new home. Prince Gong meanwhile was received terrible reports from Zeng Guofan about difficult situation at Anqing. Prince Gong understood the Taiping menace was akin to a disease in ones inner organs, they were the most urgent problem the dynasty had to deal with, the foreigners were actually a secondary threat when compared. Thus he decided to do what was ever necessary to appease the foreigners  while everything should be directed at defeating the Taiping. Once the rebellion was over then they could do something about all the foriegn encroachment. At the same time he wondered if it was time for the Qing to seek aid from the foreigners to quell the Taiping. Russia unlike the others, was free from the obsession of neutrality and had been hassling Qing officials to offer direct military aid. The Russians also offered shipping aid, suggesting they could coordinate with the Americans to bring southern rice to Tianjin by ocean routes. The Russians were the oddball out when it came to foreign powers in China. They were still angry about the Crimean War and while the Americans British and French fought tooth and nail for maritime trade rights, Russia alone shared a land border with the Qing, one that was thousands of miles long. The Russians saw the enormous opportunity a weak Qing government offered them, they could perhaps expand their territory or develop cross border trade. Thus the Tsar sent representatives who offered Xianfeng rifles as early as 1857, and during the negotiations in Tianjin in 1858 they went a step further offering military advisors. All they asked was for a little control over the territory north of the Amur river, which was in the Manchu homelands.    As you can imagine Xianfeng didn't like that deal and said no, but then in 1860 when the Europeans defeated the Qing and forced them to sign the treaty of Tianjin, the Russian diplomat, Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev managed to negotiate a secret Sino-Russian treaty on the side. Ignatiev said he would help the Qing to not be toppled by the other Europeans, if Prince Gong granted Russia control over the north region of the Amur river, an area 300,000 miles large, that was bigger than Korea. The Russians offered a gift of rifles and 400 russians aboard steam powered gunships to coordinate with the Qing military and attack Nanjing. Prince Gong took the offer seriously and pressed the question over to many high ranking Qing officials, one of which was Zeng Guofan. There was a ton of bickering amongst those in support of the deal and those against, Zeng Guofan was one of those for it. Zeng argued Russian and China had no real qualms between another, and it was not unprecedented to accept such help, the previous dynasty after all accepted help from the Dutch to fight the Taiwan rebels in the 17th century. But Zeng Guofan also argued what he needed was not naval forces, no they needed land forces, there was simply no route by which to advance on Nanjing otherwise. He advised modifying the offer to such means. Zeng Guofan finished by arguing what they really needed was to improve their own technological abilities, so they would not need external help in the future. “If we study how they make their cannons and ships, it will be of great benefit to us in the long run.” In the end Xianfeng agreed to taking 10,000 rifles and 8 cannons from the Russians, but declined naval services.    In february of 1861 Admiral Hope sailed up the Yangtze river to see if relations could be opened with the Taiping without permission from the British government. The government back home was bickering over the civil war issue, many demanded Britain must remain neutral, a few thought it would be a good idea to help the Qing defeat the rebels, they did after all have a treaty with them and expected the weakened dynasty to pay up, and a select few thought the Taiping cause might be just. Regardless Admiral Hope was enroute to Nanjing with a small squadron of gunboats and it took them two weeks to navigate 200 miles up the river to Nanjing. They were the largest foreign party to visit Nanjing and their lead negotiator was none other than the racist nutcase Harry Parkes. They reached Nanjing on February 24th, missing Hong Rengan who had left in early February to help Anqing. On march 1st, Harry Parkes explained the British sought trade along the Yangtze river as was their right under the new treaty they signed with the Qing. Regardless of which side held control over the river banks, Britain wanted to sail freely and they intended to leave a 6 gun paddle frigate, the Centaur in Nanjing to protect British subjects who might visit the city. The Taiping officials relayed the messages to Hong Xiuquan and he sent word back warning his followers not to allow the British to leave their gunboat, he could simply not allow this. Apparently Parkes had a screaming match with the officials saying “he must have another vision!”. And somehow this led to the Taiping agreeing, then Parkes warned them if they attacked Zhenjiang or Jiujiang, both under Qing control, they had best not harm any British subjects or property. In return he promised British forces would not interfere nor harm Taiping. After this apparently the officials just kept pestering Parkes for weapons and he had this to write about it all “The rebels want arms it is the same … on the side of the Imperialists, opium and arms, opium and arms, is the one cry we hear from mandarins, soldiers, and people, at every place we have yet come to.” Admiral Hope meanwhile observed the Taiping and concluded they were a destructive force that should be kept at arms length. He deduced “a period of anarchy, indefinite in duration in China, in which the commercial towns of the empire will be destroyed, and its most productive provinces laid waste.” To this end Hope urged that a 30 mile radius around Shanghai be defended to prevent the Taiping from entering the city.   By the end of March, Parkes demanded the Taiping not approach Shanghai with a 2 days march of the city or any other treaty port. Hong Xiuquan agreed to not let his forces within 30 miles of Shanghai, but made no promises for the other cities. Admiral Hope told the Taiping officials, Britain would put an end to any renegade British subjects helping the Qing as mercenaries, but would ask the same be done for the Taiping side. Speaking about those foreign mercenaries on the Taiping side, a British representative named Robert Forrest was sent from Shanghai in march of 1861 to go to Nanjing to investigate if and who were aiding the Taiping. It turns out there were around a hundred or so foreign men working as mercenaries for them. They were the same group of men that had been led by Savage before his death, now their leader was a man named Peacock. On the other side, the British consul reported they had caught 13 members of Frederick Townsend Ward's mercenary men at Songjiang and one of them said he had another 82 men under his command. 29 of these men were royal navy deserters. By May 19th, Ward was caught and arrested as he was trying to recruit more men in Shanghai. Since he was an American, the only person with jurisdiction over him was the US consul. When Ward was questioned the man said he was no longer American and now a subject of the Qing emperor. He was even engaged to a Chinese woman, though that would prove to be a quick ruse. On top of that the provincial governor of Shanghai happened to be a patron of Ward and produced papers proving his Qing citizenship. All of this was so convincing the US consul refused to prosecute Ward and he was set free to keep luring more foreigners into the service of the Qing. There was no real legal basis to go after Ward and a very frustrated Admiral Hope simply grabbed the man and locked him up on his flagship. But Ward jumped out a window and swam away.   Now back to the Anqing front, Zeng Guofan had begun his campaign against the fulcrum point to Nanjing in the summer of 1860. The city was the domain of the Brave king, Chen Yucheng. In the spring of 1860 he decamped with the bulk of his army to help Li Xiucheng break the Qing siege of Nanjing, leaving behind a garrison of around 20,000 to hold the city of Anqing. The garrison were unseasoned recruits mostly from Hunan and Hubei provinces. Zeng Guofan took advantage of Chen Yucheng's sortie by sending his brother with 10,000 men through the Jixian pass to prod Anqing. Anqing did not flinch, their defenses were quite strong and they were very well provisioned. Initially Zeng Guofans siege of Anqing was of little concern to the Taiping leadership. They knew the city was strong enough to hold out and took their time to gradually send a relief force in september of 1860. However, this was also part of Hong Rengans strategy's second phase. After consolidating the southern reaches of the Yangtze east of Nanjing, he directed the Taiping forces upstream. Once it became very apparent the foreigners in Shanghai would not sell steamships to them, which Hong Rengan was depending on to get the forces to hit Wuchang, he opted to simply march overland to capture the city.    After the fall of Suzhou, Chen Yucheng and Li Xiucheng formed a massive pincer operation against Wuchang. Chen Yucheng would take a 100,000 strong army around the north through Anhui while simultaneously breaking the siege of Anqing in early winter en route to Wuchang. Li Xiucheng would mirror this by going south of the great river hitting Zeng Guofans HQ in Qimen alone the way and send his forces to smash Zeng Guoquan at Anqing before marching on Wuchang. Now Zeng Guofan had staked just about all his forces on the siege of Anqing, he only had a defensive garrison at Qimen of 3000 troops. All of his troops were in danger of being cut off from their supplies and reinforcements. Cheng Yucheng went through Anhui recruiting some Nian rebels who help create feint attacks to confuse the Qing as to where they were marching. Eventually in late november his army turned south to hit Anqing, but between them lay the Taiping held city of Tongcheng and alongside it Chen Yucheng ran right into an enormous Qing cavalry force of 20,000 men led by the Manchu general Duolonga. Duolonga had been sent by Zeng Guofan to protect the approach of Anqing from its north and the cavalry force proved a major obstacle to the Taiping. Chen Yucheng was forced to take his men to Tongcheng for its walls protection and had to abandon his march upon Anqing. Remember the Taiping were rather weak when it came to cavalry, it was one of the few advantages the Qing held over them. Thus a force of 20,000 Qing cavalry was quite a force to be reckoned with.   Chen Yucheng held Tongcheng against the Qing through the winter and decamped in March around the same time Hong Rengan left Nanjing. He led his force northwest beyond the range of the Qing cavalry and then turned sharply southwest to rush over to Wuchang. Along the way his men had to smash several Qing militia forces while a Qing cavalry detachment tried to cut their way off. But by march 17th of 1861 Chen Yuchengs men got to Huangzhou on the Yangtze's northern bank just 50 miles downstream from Wuchang. There his men surprised the Qing garrison of 2000 men slaughtering them all. By capturing Huangzhou, Chen Yucheng had the perfect base of operations to attack Hankou and then Wuchang.    Meanwhile in Qimen, Zeng Guofan was anxious about the Taiping advances that seemed to be converging. The attending King, cousin to Li Xiucheng had captured Xiuning, 30 miles to his immediate east. He dispatched Bao Chao to take back the city while he was receiving news his brother Guoquan was not doing well at Anqing. Then terrible news came on November 26th, Li Xiuchengs entire army was approaching from the north. Zeng Guofan quickly dispatched riders to call for help, but his nearest forces had left with Bao Chao to take back Xiuning and Li Xiuchengs forces had appeared directly between them. All he could do was send a letter to his brother at Anqing stating “the rebels are only 15 miles from my Headquarters, just a stones throw and there are no obstacles to stop them….All we can do now is study our defenses and, when they come, try to hold out until someones comes to help us”. However Li Xiucheng did not immediately attack Qimen, he had no idea of the HQ's strength and paused to gather intel. This pause allowed Bao Chao to come sweeping in with his cavalry to smash into the Loyal King's army who were exhausted from their long march. Bao Chao's force was much smaller so he continuously harassed the Taiping army, but never fully dedicated his army to a full battle. Li Xiucheng simply took his men and marched into Jiangxi as per the pincer plan. Despite Li Xiucheng moving on, 3 smaller Taiping forces were still harassing Zeng Guofan and he suspected this was a feint to mask an offensive against Anqing. His HQ were severed off from their supply routes because of the Li Xiuchengs cousin, thus he had to disband his HQ and tried to march east, only to be attacked and pushed right back to Qimen.   Meanwhile Chen Yucheng awaited Li Xiucheng's forces to meet up with him at Hankou, but he was in a bit of a situation. Hankou was a new treaty port for the British and it just so happened Admiral Hope's expedition was on its way back from Nanjing. Harry Parkes showed up to pay a visit warning the Taiping not to cause any harm to the treaty port. Chen Yucheng spoke with Parkes, talking about the plan to take Hankou and Wuchang. Parkes had gone past these cities and knew they were weakly defended and because some British subjects were there stated this.  “I commanded his caution in this respect and advised him not to think of moving on Hankou because they could not take the city without seriously interfering with British commerce”. Thus Parkes basically threatened Chen Yucheng, that he would face the same fate as Li Xiucheng had at Shanghai. Chen Yucheng tried to negotiate, stating his forces would absolutely make sure not to hinder the British, but Parkes was adamant and Chen Yucheng was forced to agree not to advance on the city.   Now Chen Yucheng had no idea what to do, so he sent word back to Nanjing asking for instructions and thus the opportunity to smash Hankou was slipping away. The Qing cavalry that was chasing him across Anhui province made it to Wuchang sounding the alarm forcing him to dig in at Huangzhou. It would take months for Nanjing to give Chen Yucheng a message back and in the meantime Wuchang and Hankou would be heavily reinforced. Downriver at Anqing the siege had reached its 8th month. Zeng Guoquans trench lines surrounded the city with sequences of walls and moats about 2 miles from Anqing's walls. It was like an extra fortified wall around Anqing that defended against anyone coming out of the city or coming to relieve it. Zeng Guoquan even had riverine units blockading Anqing from receiving aid via the river, but there was a major flaw in this, foreign ships. At Anqing's southern gate, foreign steamships could drop anchor and unload food or weapons at very inflated prices for the people of Anqing. If Zeng Guoquan tried to stop them it violated the treaty of Tianjin, which the Taiping were trying to abide by to win over western support. And alongside this, believe it or not a small market emerged between the besiegers and besieged. Zeng Guofan had not dished out the payroll for over 9 months, forcing the besiegers to seek salaries elsewhere, thus many began to smuggle food into Anqing for money. War can be quite silly at times.   Back to Li Xiucheng, his army moved past Qimen in December and made its way through southern Anhui to see if Zeng Guoquan would back off of Anqing. Li Xiucheng also sent forces into Jiangxi and Hubei where hundreds of thousands of possible new recruits lay for the plucking. Slowly but surely, his army made its way to Wuchang to meet up with Chen Yucheng's army, but he was expected by April and he missed this deadline. By April most of his army was still in Jiangxi province, more than 200 miles away from the assembly point. By early May his forces got to the city of Ruizhou, 150 miles from Wuchang. But instead of carrying on, the citizens of Ruizhou begged him to stay and Li Xiucheng found himself doing so as he likewise recruited another 300,000 followers over the course of a few weeks. Now as incredible as it sounds, for him to gain so many, these were all untrained forces, given weapons yes, but not exactly trustworthy. Zeng Guofan understood this and he understood that such an army had a large mouth to feed.    Li Xiucheng would only arrive to Wuchang in June, 2 months late for the expected rendezvous. He expected Chen Yucheng to be in Hankou ready to launch an assault on Wuchang, but soon learnt his colleague had left and worse yet, he never took Hankou. By this point, Wuchang had enjoyed 3 full months of warning of the impending Taiping armies and had called up reinforcements. With such vast numbers of untrained men, Li Xiucheng did not dare approach Wuchang too close and set camp on the outskirts of its county. Chen Yucheng had left a garrison at Huangzhou to coordinate with Li Xiucheng, but when Li arrived in the area the river was being controlled by Zeng Guofans navy making it impossible to communicate with Huangzhou. In desperation Li Xiucheng turned to the British consul at Hankou to deliver a message to Huangzhou. The British consul kept that letter as a souvenir and did not deliver it. With no reply from Chen Yucheng, and with no idea where or what he was doing, Li Xiucheng had basically no options left when it came to Wuchang. He could not remain where he was, his new forces were untested and he did not believe they could take Wuchang. He received word Bao Chao was coming from the east to attack him and he knew such veteran troops could do carnage to his green forces. Thus at the end of June he abandoned the western campaign and took his goliath sized army into Hubei. Bao Chao tried to pursue him, but Li Xiucheng had a good headstart and made his way over land and sea eventually moving through southern ANhui and then into Zhejiang.   With Li Xiucheng failing to show up in time, Chen Yucheng had to act on his own. He received no further instructions from Nanjing about whether or not to attack Hankou so he decided to leave a garrison at Huangzhou and took his forces downriver to hit Anqing. On April 27th he made it to the Jixian pass with 30,000 troops easily scaring off the quite outnumbered Xiang troops there. Then he began the process of building fortifications outside Zeng Guoquans fortified encirclement…basically it was a fort, covered by another fort, covered by now another fort, infortception? So now there were 2 rings surrounding Anqing, meanwhile Chen Yucheng managed to sent rafts with supplies across the river to Anqing. After 3 days of trying to break through parts of Zeng Guoquans walls, Duolonga's pursuing force had gotten between his forces and the nearest Taiping held city of Tongcheng. This threatened Chen Yuchengs supply and communications line to Nanjing and without Li Xiucheng it seemed he would be unable to break Zeng Guoquans defensive lines. Thus Chen Yucheng looked like he was going to have to depart, but then on May 1st, a Taiping army 20,000 strong showed up led by Hong Rengan at Tongcheng.    By May 6th, Hong Rengan sent scouts to meet up with Chen Yucheng, but they were beaten back savagely by Duolonga's cavalry force. It was at this point Chen Yucheng made a grave mistake. He left 12,000 men behind to hold the encirclement defenses and withdrew with the rest of his men northwards to strike at Duolonga's cavalry in coordination with Hong Rengan from the north. On May 24th the two Taiping armies attacked Duolonga in 3 columns, 2 from the north and 1 from the south, but a Qing spy had revealed this strategy to Duolonga. Duolonga set up an ambush, using a detachment of cavalry going around Chen Yuchengs forces rear, falling upon the men and sending them into a rout. Soon Chen Yucheng's army was running to Tongcheng receiving massive casualties in the process. The rout also severed Chen Yucheng from his 12,000 men back at the encirclement of Anqing, leaving them helpless without leadership nor possible reinforcements. As for Hong Rengan, it was his first foray into military command and it would effectively be his last. At the same time Hong Rengan's army was receiving its defeat, the Heavenly King was hosting a visit from Harry Parkes and was greatly unnerved by it wishing for Hong Rengan to return to Nanjing to deal with such matters. Thus an order was sent out for him to return and he did so.   Chen Yuchengs blunder left 12,000 men in a terrible situation, 4000 were manning the Jixian pass and around 8000 were at Waternut Lake with only the supplies they had brought with them. They outnumbered Zeng Guoquans encirclement forces, but only by a bit and now the Qing would smash them. Zeng Guofan had ordered Bao Chao to help ferry his army across the Yangtze river to get over to his brother to help. The day after Chen Yucheng had fled to Tongcheng, Zeng Guofan and his brother's armies swept over the Jixian Pass force, breaking them within a week. On June 7th, the Taiping at Jixian Pass surrendered, Bao Chao's men killed 3000 of them. Then they went on to smash the Taiping at Waternut Lake, eventually defeating them by July 7th. 8000 Taiping surrendered, handing in 6000 foreign rifles, 8000 long spears, 1000 jingalls, 800 Ming dynasty matchlocks and 2000 horses, a very nice haul.    Zeng Guoquan had no idea what to do with all the prisoners, a force almost as large as his own who were very dangerous. One of his battalion commanders suggested they just kill them all and he made a suggested plan. They could open the gates of the camp and let the prisoners in 10 at a time so they could be beheaded in batches, “in half a day, we could be done”. What a monster. Zeng Guoquan didnt have the stomach for such a thing and left it all to the said commander who by his own accounts oversaw the butchering of 8000 POW's in the course of a single day. Apparently they started at 7am, and were done by sun down, my god. It seems Zeng Guoquan was deeply troubled by the slaughter and I don't blame him.    Despite the great victory, the siege of Anqing still ground on as Bao Chao and Zeng Guoquan smashed Taiping relief forces. It was the foriegn ships bringing provisions into the city that was making the difference. Zeng Guofan tried to send word to the British to stop making deliveries, but they kept ignoring his messages. By mid July he was fed up after finding out a foreign ship had unloaded nearly 200 tons of rice to Anqing, so he sent a complaint to Beijing. It seems his complaint worked like a charm, Prince Gong sent word to Bruce on July 18th protesting the British help of the Taiping at Anqing, demanding Qing forces be allowed to search every ship that went to the city. Thus Bruce halted any British ships from going to Anqing and in the late summer Zeng Guofan began to receive captured letters from Anqing defenders indicating they were finally running out of food.   Chen Yucheng tried one last time to try to lift the siege at Anqing, taking the remnants of his battered army along with the survivors of Hong Rengans he marched in a long northern sweep around Duolonga's forces to get to the Jixian Pass where his force reoccupied the defenses they had made there. Chen Yucheng planned for all out offensive leading him to perform a desperate mission to rescue his family from Anqing by river while Zeng Guofan's navy fired upon any and all ships departing from the city. August saw a symphony of gun and cannon fire with Taiping waves of men throwing themselves against Zeng Guoquans encirclement, row upon row of them pouring out from Anqing and from Chen Yucheng. The dead piled up against the defensive works on either side as the living clambering over them to try and kill the gunners atop. Then on the night of september 3rd, with the sound of guns, cannons and blades sundering the landscape, all went quiet as Chen Yucheng tossed the towel at last. He burnt the stockade at Jixian Pass to the ground and left Anqing to suffer its fate to the Qing.    Most of the defenders managed to escape Anqing during the battle, escaping through some tunnels made underneath Zeng Guoquans encirclement. The burning of the Jixian Pass stockades provided a decent distraction, though there is evidence that the great escape of so many Taiping was actually an arrangement made by a Qing commander. In exchange for handing over Anqing without a fight they perhaps let the Taiping defenders go. Regardless, all the civilians remained in Anqing alongside some poor defenders chained to the wall mounted cannons. The Xiang forces entered the city unopposed on September 5th. The depths of horror found within the city would leave a long last nightmare. After the foreign ships were banned form bringing provisions, the inhabitants of Anqing ate all the food, then the animals including rats, until nothing was left, all except for one thing. The Xiang forces found out while all the food had run out, the markets were still open for business, the business of selling human flesh, at around half a tael per catty, or 38 cents a pound. Around 16,000 people were left alive in the city. Zeng Guofan wrote to his brother asking what they should do with the people “When we conquer the city, the proper thing to do will be to kill a lot of people. We shouldn't let compassion lead us to err in the grand scheme of things. What do you think?” There are differing accounts of the slaughter, one states Zeng Guofans officers first separated the women and children from those being killed, another states all were treated the same.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Zeng Guofan finally captured the great city of Anqing, a stepping stone to taking Nanjing. The Taiping pincer strategy failed utterly and now they were left in disarray. Can the Taiping come back from these defeats?

Photo: No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow #Ukraine:  Beijing POV: Reluctance snd the long history of Sino-Russian relations.  Professor H.J. Mackinder, International Relations. #FriendsofHistoryDebatingSociety

This week on Sinica, Kaiser and Jeremy welcome Leroy Chiao, a NASA astronaut who flew three shuttle missions and served as commander of the International Space Station for over six months. Leroy is also very knowledgeable about China's space program and was the first American astronaut to visit the Astronaut Center of China outside of Beijing. He discusses the abortive history of Sino-American space collaboration, attitudes toward China's space program in the U.S., and China's impressive accomplishments and its grand ambitions for space.4:27 – How Leroy became an astronaut9:09 – The effects of long-term weightlessness15:10 – Leroy's access to the Astronaut Center of China18:16 – The peak years of Sino-U.S. collaboration in space exploration23:11 – The Wolf Amendment and the end of Sino-American space collaboration26:36 – Leroy on the most impressive accomplishments of the Chinese space program37:53 – U.S.-China competition as a driver of advances in space technologies48:04 – Sino-Russian space cooperation?49:12 – The weaponization of outer space52: 58 – RecommendationsA complete transcript of this podcast is available on SupChina.com.Recommendations:Jeremy: Nuremberg Diary by G.M. Gilbert.Leroy: Old Henry, a micro-Western filmKaiser: Putin by Philip Short; and a preview of a forthcoming paper about the Cyberspace Administration of China, CAC, written by Jamie HorsleySee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, Congress has signed four laws that send enormous amounts of money and weapons to Ukraine, attempting to punish Russia for President Putin's invasion. In this episode, we examine these laws to find out where our money will actually go and attempt to understand the shifting goals of the Biden administration. The big picture, as it's being explained to Congress, differs from what we're being sold. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Content Ukraine and Russia CD249: A Few Good Laws CD248: Understanding the Enemy CD244: Keeping Ukraine CD229: Target Belarus CD167: Combating Russia (NDAA 2018) LIVE CD068: Ukraine Aid Bill CD067: What Do We Want In Ukraine? Syria CD172: The Illegal Bombing of Syria CD108: Regime Change CD041: Why Attack Syria? World Trade System What Is the World Trade System? CD230: Pacific Deterrence Initiative CD102: The World Trade Organization: COOL? Russian Blockade Shane Harris. May 24, 2022. “U.S. intelligence document shows Russian naval blockade of Ukraine.” The Washington Post. NATO Expansion Jim Garamone. Jun 1, 2022. “Russia Forcing Changes to NATO Strategic Concepts.” U.S. Department of Defense News. Matthew Lee. May 27, 2022. “US: Turkey's NATO issues with Sweden, Finland will be fixed.” AP News. Ted Kemp. May 19, 2022. “Two maps show NATO's growth — and Russia's isolation — since 1990.” CNBC. U.S. Involvement in Ukraine Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt and Julian E. Barnes. May 5, 2022. “U.S. Intelligence Helped Ukraine Strike Russian Flagship, Officials Say.” The New York Times. Julian E. Barnes, Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt. May 4, 2022. “U.S. Intelligence Is Helping Ukraine Kill Russian Generals, Officials Say.” The New York Times. Private Security Contractors Christopher Caldwell. May 31, 2022. “The War in Ukraine May Be Impossible to Stop. And the U.S. Deserves Much of the Blame.” The New York Times. Joaquin Sapien and Joshua Kaplan. May 27, 2022. “How the U.S. Has Struggled to Stop the Growth of a Shadowy Russian Private Army.” ProPublica. H.R. 7691 Background How It Passed Glenn Greenwald. May 13, 2022. “The Bizarre, Unanimous Dem Support for the $40b War Package to Raytheon and CIA: ‘For Ukraine.'” Glenn Greenwald on Substack. Catie Edmondson and Emily Cochrane. May 10, 2022. “House Passes $40 Billion More in Ukraine Aid, With Few Questions Asked.” The New York Times. Republican Holdouts Glenn Greenwald and Anthony Tobin. May 24, 2022. “Twenty-Two House Republicans Demand Accountability on Biden's $40b War Spending.” Glenn Greenwald on Substack. Amy Cheng and Eugene Scott. May 13, 2022. “Rand Paul, lone Senate holdout, delays vote on Ukraine aid to next week.” The Washington Post. Morgan Watkins. May 13, 2022. “Sen. Rand Paul stalls $40 billion in aid for Ukraine, breaking with Mitch McConnell USA Today. Stephen Semler. May 26, 2022. “The Ukraine Aid Bill Is a Massive Windfall for US Military Contractors.” Jacobin. Biden Signs in South Korea Biden signs Ukraine Bill and Access to Baby Formula Act in South Korea. Reddit. Kate Sullivan. May 20, 2022. “Flying the Ukraine aid bill to South Korea for Biden's signature isn't unheard of. It also may not be totally necessary.” CNN. How Much Money, and Where Will It Go? Stephen Semler. May 23, 2022. “A breakdown of the Ukraine aid bill.” Speaking Security on Substack. “CBO Estimate for H.R. 7691, Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, as Passed by the House of Representatives on May 10, 2022.” May 11 2022. Congressional Budget Office. Christina Arabia, Andrew Bowen, and Cory Welt. Updated Apr 29, 2022. “U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine.” [IF12040] Congressional Research Service. “22 U.S. Code § 2346 - Authority.” Legal Information Institute, Cornell School of Law. Representatives' Raytheon and Lockheed Martin Stocks Kimberly Leonard. May 19, 2022. “20 members of Congress personally invest in top weapons contractors that'll profit from the just-passed $40 billion Ukraine aid package.” Insider. Kimberly Leonard. Mar 21, 2022. “GOP Rep. John Rutherford of Florida bought Raytheon stock the same day Russia invaded Ukraine.” Insider. Marjorie Taylor Green [@RepMTG]. Feb 24, 2022. “War is big business to our leaders.” Twitter. “Florida's 4th Congressional District.” GovTrack. “Rules Based Order” Anthony Dworkin. Sep 8, 2020. “Why America is facing off against the International Criminal Court.” “History of the multilateral trading system.” *The World Trade Organization “Facts: Global Inequality” Inequality.org “Timeline: Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin.” Apr 23, 2007. NPR. Crimea Kenneth Rapoza. Mar 20, 2015. One Year After Russia Annexed Crimea, Locals Prefer Moscow To Kiev Forbes. “Crimea exit poll: About 93% back Russia union. March 16, 2014. BBC. Shifting Strategies Economic War Larry Elliott. Jun 2, 2022. “Russia is winning the economic war - and Putin is no closer to withdrawing troops. The Guardian. Nigel Gould-Davies. May 12, 2022. “We Must Make Sure Russia Finishes This War in a Worse Position Than Before” The New York Times. Weapons Escalation Jake Johnson. Jun 1, 2022. “'Slippery Slope... Just Got a Lot Steeper': US to Send Ukraine Advanced Missiles as Russia Holds Nuke Drills.” Common Dreams. C. Todd Lopez. Jun 1, 2022. “Advanced Rocket Launcher System Heads to Ukraine.” U.S. Department of Defense News. Greg Norman. Jun 1, 2022. “Russia stages nuclear drills after US announces rockets to Ukraine.” Fox News. Christian Esch et al. May 30, 2022. “What's Next for Ukraine? The West Tries to Figure Out What Peace Might Look Like.” Spiegel International. See Image. Alastair Gale. May 24, 2022. “China and Russia Sent Bombers Near Japan as Biden Visited Tokyo.” The Wall Street Journal. Mike Stone. Mar 11, 2022. “Exclusive: Pentagon revives team to speed arms to Ukraine and allies, sources say.” Reuters. Secretary Austin and the Pentagon Jim Garamone. May 20, 2022. “Austin to Host Second Ukraine Contact Group Meeting Monday.” U.S. Department of Defense News. Natasha Bertrand et al. Apr 26, 2022. “Austin's assertion that US wants to ‘weaken' Russia underlines Biden strategy shift.” CNN. David Sanger. Apr 25, 2022. “Behind Austin's Call for a ‘Weakened' Russia, Hints of a Shift.” The New York Times. Mike Stone. Apr 12, 2022. “Pentagon asks top 8 U.S. weapons makers to meet on Ukraine -sources.” Reuters. Glenn Greenwald. Dec 8, 2020. “Biden's Choice For Pentagon Chief Further Erodes a Key U.S. Norm: Civilian Control.” Glenn Greenwald on Substack. Democrats Still All In Marc Santora. May 1, 2022. “Pelosi and Democratic lawmakers vow the U.S. will stand with Ukraine. The New York Times. RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service. May 1, 2022. “Civilians Evacuated From Mariupol; U.S. House Speaker Pelosi Visits Kyiv.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “Ukraine war: Joe Biden calls for removal of Vladimir Putin in angry speech.” Mar 26, 2022. Sky News. The Laws H.R. 7691: Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 House Vote: 368-57 Senate Vote: 86-11 Transcript of House Debate S.3522: Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022 Passed by Voice Vote in the Senate House Vote 417-10 House "Debate" H.R.6968 - Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act Senate Vote: 100-0 House Vote: 413-9 House Debate H.R.7108: Suspending Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus Act Senate Vote: 100-0 (amended the original House bill) Final House Vote: 424-8 House debate 1 (on original version) House debate 2 (final version) Audio Sources Joe Manchin at the World Economic Forum's meeting in Davos May 23, 2022 Clips Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV): Speaking about Ukraine, first what Putin, Putin's war on Ukraine and Ukraine's determination, resolving the sacrifices they've made for the cause of freedom has united the whole world, that it's united, US Senate and Congress, I think like nothing I've seen in my lifetime. I think we're totally committed to supporting Ukraine, in every way possible, as long as we have the rest of NATO and the free world helping. I think we're all in this together. And I am totally committed as one person to seeing Ukraine to the end with a win, not basically resolving in some type of a treaty. I don't think that is where we are and where we should be. Reporter: Can I just follow up and ask you what you mean by a win for Ukraine? ** Sen. Joe Manchin:** I mean, basically moving Putin back to Russia and hopefully getting rid of Putin. The Ukraine Crisis: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Indo-Pacific May 19, 2022 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation Witnesses: Charles Edel, Ph.D., Australia Chair and Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies Bonny Lin, Ph.D., Director, China Power Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies Tanvi Madan, Ph.D.Director, The India Project, Brookings Institution Dan Blumenthal, Ph.D., Senior Fellow and Director of Asian Studies, American Enterprise Institute Clips 6:57 Tanvi Madan: One implication that is already evident, most visibly in Sri Lanka, is the adverse economic impact. The rise in commodity prices in particular has led to fiscal food and energy security concerns and these, in turn, could have political implications and could create a strategic vacuum. 7:15 Tanvi Madan: A separate and longer term economic impact of the crisis could be renewed goals, perhaps especially in India, for self reliance and building resilience not just against Chinese pressure, but also against Western sanctions. 7:28 Tanvi Madan: The second potential implication of the Russia-Ukraine war could be that Beijing might seek to take advantage in the Indo-Pacific while the world's focus is on Europe, between the Taiwan or the East or South China Sea contingencies. The contingency that would have the most direct impact in South Asia would be further action by the PLA at the China-India boundary, or at the Bhutan-China boundary that could draw in India. This potential for Sino-Indian crisis escalation has indeed shaped Delhi's response to the Russia-Ukraine war. Despite its recent diversification efforts, the Indian military continues to be dependent, if not over dependent, on Russia for supplies and spare parts for crucial frontline equipment. India has also been concerned about moving Moscow away from neutrality towards taking China's side. Nonetheless, there is simultaneously concern that Russia's war with Ukraine might, in any case, make Moscow more beholden to Beijing and also less able to supply India, and that will have implications for India's military readiness. 10:10 Tanvi Madan: The fourth implication in South Asia could flow from the war's effect on the Russia-China relationship flows. The Sino-Russian ties in recent years have benefited Pakistan. However, they have been of great concern to India. If China-Russia relations deepened further, it could lead to increased Indian concern about Russian reliability. And a Dheli that is concerned about Moscow's ability and willingness to supply India militarily or supported in international forums will seek alternative partners and suppliers a potential opportunity for the US as well as its allies and partners. 18:15 Bonny Lin: China has shifted its position on the Ukraine conflict to be less fully pro Russia. Xi Jinping has expressed that he is deeply grieved by the outbreak of war. China has engaged in diplomacy, called for a ceasefire, proposed a six point humanitarian initiative, and provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine. China's position on Ukraine, however, is far from neutral. China has not condemned Russia or called its aggression an evasion. Xi has yet to speak to President Zelenskyy. There is no evidence that China has sought to pressure Russia in any way or form. China has amplified Russian disinformation and pushed back against Western sanctions. To date, Beijing has not provided direct military support to Russia and has not engaged in systemic efforts to help Russia evade sanctions. However, China's ambassador to Russia has encouraged Chinese companies to quote "fill the void in the Russian market." 19:14 Bonny Lin: The Ukraine crisis has reinforced China's view that US military expansion could provoke conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese interlocutors have voiced concern that the United States and NATO are fighting Russia today, but might fight China next. China views NATO expansion as one of the key causes of the Korean conflict and sees parallels between NATO activities in Europe and US efforts in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing is worried that increasing US and ally support for Taiwan and other regional allies and partners elevates the risk of US-China military confrontation. This pessimistic assessment is why Beijing will continue to stand by Russia as a close strategic partner. 19:56 Bonny Lin: The Ukraine crisis has reinforced and strengthened China's desire to be more self reliant. China is investing more to ensure the security of food, energy, and raw materials. Beijing is also seeking more resilient industrial supply chains, as well as PRC-led systems, including alternatives to Swift. At the same time, Beijing is likely to further cultivate dependencies on China, such that any potential Western led sanctions on China or international-community-led sanctions on China in the future will be painful to the West and difficult to sustain. 21:15 Bonny Lin: China has observed that Russia put its nuclear and strategic forces on high alert and NATO did not send conventional forces to Ukraine. This is leading China to question its nuclear policy and posture. 21:57 Bonny Lin: As Beijing watches the Western and particularly G7-led unity among advanced democracies, it is also seeing that a number of countries in the developing world are not joining in on the sanctions. As a result, Beijing has tried to increase its influence and in many ways building on Russian influence in developing regions. And Beijing is likely to try to get all that influence moving forward. 24:24 Dan Blumenthal: China took the opportunity of Russia's invasion on February 4 to lay out a document that criticizes, very specifically, almost all aspects of United States global policy. Very specifically, including Oculus for NATO enlargement to Oculus to the Indo Pacific strategy. It got Russia to sign up to Xi Jinping's theory that we're in a new era of geopolitics that will replace US leadership, that US leadership is faulty and it's dividing the world into blocks such as NATO, that NATO expansion is the problem, that Indo-Pacific strategy is the same thing as NATO expansion. 25:45 Dan Blumenthal: We should take very seriously what they say, particularly in Chinese, and what they're saying is very clearly pro-Russia and very clear, specific, searing critiques of the US-led world order. 26:47 Dan Blumenthal: And frankly, while the West is unified, and the US and the West and some of our Asian allies are unified, most of the rest of the world is not with us on this issue of China and Russia being these authoritarian, revisionist great powers, and that's a real problem. Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism May 18, 2022 House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism Witnesses: Dr. Hanna Notte, Senior Research Associate, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Dr. Frederic Wehrey, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Caitlin Welsh, Director of the Global Food Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies Grant Rumley, Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Clips 12:55 Hanna Notte: First, Moscow's military presence in Syria has given it a buffer zone on its southern flank to counter perceived threats from within the region, but also to deter NATO outside the European theater. And second, Russia has turned to the region to diversify its economic relations with a focus on arms sales, civilian nuclear exports and wheat supplies. And in building influence, Russia has largely followed what I call a low cost high disruption approach, also using hybrid tactics such as private military companies and disinformation. Now, these Russian interests in the region will not fundamentally change with the invasion of Ukraine. Today, Russia's regional diplomacy remains highly active, aimed at offsetting the impact of Western sanctions and demonstrating that Moscow is not isolated internationally. 14:09 Hanna Notte: Starting with arms control and Non-Proliferation, though Moscow seemed intent on spoiling negotiations to restore the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] in early March. It subsequently dropped demands for written guarantees that its cooperation with Iran would not be hindered by sanctions imposed over Ukraine. But still, I think the geopolitical situation might make Moscow less willing to help finalize a nuclear deal. As in the past, Russia is also unlikely to support any US efforts to curb Iran's use of missiles and proxies in the region, because essentially, Iran's regional strategy pins down us resources while elevating Russia as a regional mediator, which serves Russian interests well. 15:17 Hanna Notte: Just a few words on Syria. Security Council resolution 2585 on the provision of humanitarian aid to northwest Syria is up for renewal in July. Now, Rationally speaking, the Kremlin should cooperate to avoid a worsening of serious food crisis, especially if an end game in Ukraine remains out of reach. But considering the current level of tensions between Russia and the West, I think the United States should be prepared for a Russian Security Council veto regardless, alongside continued Russian stalling on the Syrian constitutional committee. Moscow has no serious interest in seeing the committee advance. It will instead try to foster a Gulf Arab counterweight to Iran in Syria through normalization, especially for the contingency that Russia may need to scale back its own presence in Syria due to Ukraine. 16:14 Hanna Notte: First, unfortunately I think there's a widespread perception that the Ukraine war is not their war, that it's a Great Power NATO-Russia war, partially fueled by NATO and US actions visa vis Russia. 16:27 Hanna Notte: Second, there are accusations of Western double standards. The military support to Kyiv, the reception of Ukrainian refugees, these are rightly or wrongly viewed as proof that the West cares significantly more about conflict in Europe's neighborhood than those in the Middle East. 16:42 Hanna Notte: Third, regional elites worry about US conventional security guarantees. They fear that the threats posed by Russia and China will accelerate a decline in US power in the Middle East. And they also fear that the US will have limited bandwidth to confront Iran's missile and proxy activities. And with those fears, they feel they cannot afford to put all their eggs into the US basket. 17:07 Hanna Notte: And then finally, each regional state has very distinct business and security interests with Russia. As a result, and I'll end here, I think us opportunities to get regional states to turn against Russia are circumscribed. loosening these ties that states have been building with Russia will require a heavy lift. 18:57 Frederic Wehrey: This engagement is largely opportunistic and ad hoc. It seizes on instability and power vacuums and exploits the insecurities of US partners in the region about the reliability of US support, and their displeasure with the conditionality that the US sometimes attaches to its arms sales. Russian arms deliveries, in contrast, are faster and free from restrictions related to human rights. But Russia cannot provide the security guarantees that many Arab states have depended on from the United States. 19:29 Frederic Wehrey: Now, in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine, Russia is trying to reap dividends from its investment in the region, call in favors, and capitalize on local ambivalence and hostility to the United States, both from states and from Arab publics. America's Arab security partners have differed on joining the Western condemnation of Russian aggression, and some of refuse to join efforts to isolate Russia economically. 20:31 Frederic Wehrey: Russia's disastrous war in Ukraine is tarnishing its reputation as an arms supplier in the Middle East. Russian weapons have been shown to be flawed in combat and often fatally. So, Battlefield expenditures and attrition have whittled away Russia's inventory, especially precision munitions, and sanctions have eroded its defense industrial base, especially electronic components. As a result, Russia won't be able to fulfill its existing commitments, and potential buyers will be increasingly dissuaded from turning to Russia. This shortfall could be modestly exploited by China, which possesses large quantities of Russian made arms and spare parts, which you could use to keep existing inventories in the region up and running. It could also intensify its efforts to sell its own advanced weaponry like drones. 23:50 Caitlin Welsh: The war has reduced supplies and increased prices of foods exported from Ukraine and Russia, namely wheat, maize and sunflower oil, driven up demand for substitute products and reduced fertilizer exports from the Black Sea. Today's high cost of energy puts further pressure on food and fertilizer prices. Most vulnerable to the impact of these price spikes are countries for whom wheat is a major source of calories that rely on imports to meet their food security needs, and that source a significant proportion of their imports from Ukraine and Russia. 24:38 Caitlin Welsh: Egypt is the world's largest importer of wheat, sourcing over 70% of its wheat from the Black Sea. 25:42 Caitlin Welsh: The Russian Ukraine war is limiting access to wheat for Lebanon, already in one of the worst economic crises in the world. Lebanon has not recorded economic growth since 2017 and food price inflation inflation reached 400% in December 2021. Lebanon procures approximately 75% of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine. 28:48 Grant Rumley: Russia is one of the few countries in the world to maintain a relatively positive diplomatic standing with nearly every country in the Middle East. It does so through a combination of an active military presence, high level diplomatic engagement, and a concerted effort to position itself as a viable source of arms, should countries seek non-US material. 29:08 Grant Rumley: Russia's military presence in the region is well documented by Russian MOD statements. Russia has deployed over 60,000 troops to Syria since intervening in 2015. From its two bases in Syria, Hmeimim and Tartous, Russia is able to project power into the eastern Mediterranean, influence the course of the Syrian civil war, and intervene in countries like Libya. 29:47 Grant Rumley: Russia's invasion of Ukraine, however, threatens Russia standing in the region. Already reports indicate Russia has begun withdrawing some troops and mercenaries from the region to support its invasion of Ukraine. While we can expect these reports to continue if the war continues to go poorly for Russia, I'm skeptical of a full Russian withdrawal, and instead expect Russia to continue to consolidate its forces until it's left with a skeleton presence at Hmeimim and Tartous, its most strategic assets in the region. 30:26 Grant Rumley: On arms sales, the Russian defense industry, which has struggled to produce key platforms following sanctions initially placed after its 2014 invasion of Ukraine, will likely have to prioritize replenishing the Russian military over exporting. Further, customers of Russian arms may struggle with the resources to maintain and sustain the material in their inventory. Still, so long as Russia is able to make platforms, there will likely always be potential customers of Russian arms. 41:25 Grant Rumley: I definitely think customers of Russian arms are going to have several hurdles going forward, not only with simply maintaining and sustaining what they've already purchased, but in some of the basic logistics, even the payment process. Russian bank complained last month that it wasn't able to process close to a billion dollars in payments from India and Egypt over arms sales. I think countries that purchase Russian arms will also now have to consider the potential that they may incur secondary sanctions, in addition to running afoul of CAATSA [Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act-Related Sanctions]. I think from from our standpoint, there are many ways that we can amend our security cooperation approach. The Middle East, I think is a key theater for the future of great power competition, not only have we been competing with Russia in terms of arms sales there, but China increasingly has sold armed drones to the region. They've sold it to traditional partners, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE. And what they're doing is is oftentimes what we're not willing to do, our partners in the region seek co-production, they seek technology sharing. China and Russia are willing to work together to build these advanced platforms, Russia and the UAE inked an agreement several years ago to produce a fifth generation fighter. Nothing's come of that yet. China and Saudi Arabia, however, signed an agreement a couple of months ago to jointly produce armed drones in Saudi Arabia. And so I think the US may want to think creatively in terms of both what we sell, how we sell it, and what we're doing to make this more of a relationship and something beyond a strict transaction. 43:39 Grant Rumley: Their presence in Syria has evolved from a modest airstrip in 2015, to a base at Hmeimim that by open source reporting can serve as a logistics hub, a medical hub, it has the runways to host Russia's most advanced bombers. There was reports before Ukraine that Russia was deploying two 22 bombers there and hypersonic missiles. Their facility at Tartous, likewise. Their ability to stage naval assets there has expanded to they can now stage up to 11 ships there. So it has grown from from a rather modest beginning to something much more challenging from a US standpoint. In terms of what we can we can do, I think we can continue to support Ukraine and the defense of Ukraine, and the longer that Russia is bogged down in Ukraine, the harder it will be for Russia's military to extend and maintain its presence in the Middle East. 1:01:45 Grant Rumley: I think the US has several partners in the middle of major Russian arms purchases that we can, like Turkey and the S 400, that has requested the F 16, or Egypt and Sukhoi Su-35, that has requested the F 15. I'm not saying we have to make a deal right now for that, but I think it's clear that these countries are going to have gaps in their capabilities where they had planned on having Russian platforms to complement, and we can work with our partners and work with our own defense industry and see if there's ways in which we can provide off ramps for them to gradually disinvest these Russian platforms. 1:03:00 Frederic Wehrey: When countries in the in the region buy US arms, they believe they're buying much more than the capability, the hardware, that they're purchasing an insurance policy. I think especially for states in the Gulf, there's a fundamental sense of insecurity. These are states that face Iran, but they're also autocrats. They're insecure because of their political systems. They face dissent from within. We saw that with Egypt. So they're purchasing a whole stream of US assurances -- they believe they are. 1:06:00 Grant Rumley: The issue of of co-production is one means to address a common complaint, which is buying from America takes too long. That its too complicated, that if we get in line to buy something from the US, we're going to have to wait years to get it. A good example is the F 16. There are over 20 countries in the world that fly the F 16. We currently -- Lockheed Martin builds it out of one facility. That facility, if you get in line today, you're probably not getting the F 16 for five years from when you sign on the dotted line for it. In the 70s and 80s, we co-produced the F 16 with three other European countries and we were able to get them off the line faster. The initial order at those facilities was for 1000 F 16s. The initial order for the F 16 plant in South Carolina was for 90 F 16s for Taiwan and Morocco. And so from an industry standpoint, it's a question of scale. And so they're not able to ramp up the production because while the demand may get closer to 1000 over time, it's at 128. Last I checked, it's not there yet. And so I think we can use foreign military financing, longer security cooperation planning, working with our partners on multi-year acquisition timetables to then also communicate and send a signal to the defense industry that these are orders for upgrades, for new kits that are going to come down the road. You can start to plan around that and potentially address some of these production lags. 1:17:52 Grant Rumley: China has a lot of legacy Russian platforms, and will likely be a leading candidate to transfer some of these platforms to countries that had purchased Russian arms in the past and may be seeking maintenance and sustainment for them. I think China's already active in the Middle East, it's already flooding the market with armed drones. It's already looking to market other platforms as well. It's sold air defense systems to Serbia. It's looking to advance its arm sales. And so if if we aren't going to be the supplier, China is going to step in. 1:18:57 Caitlin Welsh: USDA has projected that 35% of the current wheat crop from Ukraine will not be harvested this year. So their exports are curtailed, at the same time Russia's exports are continuing. Russia has been exempted. Russia's agricultural exports and fertilizer has been exempted from sanctions for the United States, EU and other countries. So Russia continues to export. In fact, USDA is estimating that Russia's exports are increasing at this time. And I'm also seeing open source reporting of Russia stealing grain from Ukraine, relabeling it, and exporting it at a premium to countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Sen. Rand Paul: ‘We cannot save Ukraine by dooming the U.S. economy' May 12, 2022 NBC News Clips Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY): My oath of office is to the US Constitution, not to any foreign nation. And no matter how sympathetic the cause, my oath of office is to the national security of the United States of America. We cannot save Ukraine by dooming the US economy. This bill under consideration would spend $40 billion. This is the second spending bill for Ukraine in two months. And this bill is three times larger than the first. Our military aid to Ukraine is nothing new, though. Since 2014, the United States has provided more than $6 billion dollars in security assistance to Ukraine, in addition to the $14 billion Congress authorized just a month ago. If this bill passes, the US will have authorized roughly $60 billion in total spending for Ukraine Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY): The cost of this package we are voting on today is more than the US spent during the first year of the US conflict in Afghanistan. Congress authorized force, and the President sent troops into the conflict. The same cannot be said of Ukraine. This proposal towers over domestic priorities as well. The massive package of $60 billion to Ukraine dwarfs the $6 million spent on cancer research annually. $60 billion is more than the amount that government collects in gas taxes each year to build roads and bridges. The $60 billion to Ukraine could fund substantial portions or entire large Cabinet departments. The $60 billion nearly equals the entire State Department budget. The 60 billion exceeds the budget for the Department of Homeland Security and for the Department of Energy. And Congress just wants to keep on spending and spending. U.S. Efforts to Support Ukraine May 12, 2022 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Witnesses: Jessica Lewis, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Erin McKee, Assistant Administrator for Europe and Eurasia, U.S. Agency for International Development Karen Donfried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State Beth Van Schaack, Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice, U.S. Department of State Clips Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA): Are we making it very clear to Russia that we do not want to pose an existential threat to them, that our only goal is to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine? Karen Donfried: We are making it very clear to Russia that this is not a conflict between Russia and the United States. We are not going to engage directly in this war. President Biden has been explicit in saying we are not sending US troops to fight in this war. So I do believe we have made that clear. Our goal here is to end a war not to enlarge it. Sen. Rob Portman (R-OH): As you all are waking up every morning, I know with the thought in mind that America's role here is to help Ukraine win and I want to talk a little about how we define victory. When Secretary Austin said after meeting with President Zelenskyy, that we can win this war against Russia -- this happened a few weeks ago -- I thought that was positive. On Monday, the foreign minister of Ukraine, who all of us have had a chance to visit with said, of course, the victory for us in this war will be a liberation of the rest of the territory. So Assistant Secretary Donfried, first, just a yes or no. Do you believe Ukraine can win this war? Karen Donfried: Yes. Sen. Rob Portman: And how would you define victory? Would you define victory as requiring the return of all Ukraine sovereign territory, including that that the Russians seized in 2014? Karen Donfried: Well, Senator Portman, thank you for that question. And thank you for your engagement on these issues. Your question very much relates to where Chairman Menendez began, which is, are we in a position of believing that it is Ukraine that should be defining what winning means? And I agreed with Chairman Menendez's statement on that, and that is where the administration is. We believe Ukraine should define what victory means. And our policy is trying to ensure Ukraine success, both by — Sen. Rob Portman: So the administration's official position on victory is getting Crimea back and getting the Donetsk and Luhansk region back as well. Karen Donfried: Again, I believe that is for the Ukrainians to define. Karen Donfried: Against this threat to regional security, global stability, and our shared values, we are supporting freedom, democracy, and the rules based order that make our own security and prosperity and that of the world possible. Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ): I believe we must also think about reconstruction efforts in Ukraine, the tools and ongoing governance and economic reforms, specifically in the judicial space, that will facilitate rebuilding critical Ukrainian sectors and attracting foreign investment. The Impact of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine in the Middle East and North Africa May 11, 2022 House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense held a budget hearing on the Department of Defense. Witnesses: Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of Defense Michael J. McCord, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer General Mark A. Milley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Clips 21:40 General Mark Milley: Alongside our allies and partners, at any given time approximately 400,000 of us are currently standing watch in 155 countries and conducting operations every day to keep Americans safe. 21:56 General Mark Milley: Currently we are supporting our European allies and guarding NATO's eastern flank, in the face of the unnecessary war of aggression by Russia, against the people of Ukraine, and the assault on the democratic institutions and the rules based international order that have prevented great power war for the last 78 years since the end of World War Two. We are now facing two global powers, China and Russia, each with significant military capabilities, both who intend to fundamentally change the current rules based order. Lindsey Graham declares, "let's take out Putin" and says there is "no off-ramp in this war" May 9, 2022 Clips Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-SC): If Putin still standing after all this then the world is going to be a very dark place China's going to get the wrong signal and we'll have a mess on our hands in Europe for decades to come so let's take out Putin by helping Ukraine Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and Secretary ofDefense Lloyd J. Austin III Remarks to Traveling Press April 25, 2022 Jen's Highlighted PDF Remarks by President Biden on the United Efforts of the Free World to Support the People of Ukraine March 26, 2022 Jen's Highlighted PDF U.S. Policy and Russian Involvement in Syria November 4, 2015 House Foreign Affairs Committee Cover Art Design by Only Child Imaginations Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)

Photo: #BeforetheWar: Leaving aside long-standing distrust, Putin signs on with Xi.  Charles Burton. Gordon Chang. (Originally aired December 15, 2021). A millennium of Sino-Russian border discord dispelled in face of NATO. Charles Burton @cburton001 , MacDonald Laurier Institute; and @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/vladimir-putin-xi-jinping-hail-russia-china-ties-during-virtual-n1285990 Charles Burton @cburton001  Senior Fellow at the Centre for Advancing Canada's Interests Abroad at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute; associate professor of Political Science at Brock University.  Charles Burton and Associates