Podcasts about sead

Nuacht Mhall. Príomhscéalta na seachtaine, léite go mall.*Inniu an seachtú lá de mhí an Mheithimh. Is mise Siubhán Nic Amhlaoibh.Tá an suíomh UNESCO Sceilg Mhichíl, a bhfuil clú agus cáil air mar shampla de lonnaíocht luath-chreidimh, le hathoscailt aríst inniu, i ndiaidh conspóid dlí maidir le ceadúnais bháid a ghlacann daoine anonn agus anall ón oileán. Bíonn an t-oileán, a bhí ina shuíomh scannánaíochta sna scannáin Star Wars, druidte i rith an gheimridh, idir mí Mheán Fómhair agus mí Aibreáin. Osclaíonn an suíomh aríst don tréimhse úr samhraidh gach bliain i lár mhí na Bealtaine, ach tháinig moill ar an oscailt i mbliana mar gheall ar an chonspóid seo, inar ghlac dhá chomhlacht nar éirigh leo i gcomórtas d'oibreoirí báid éileamh dlíthiúil chuig an ardchúirt. Agus an cás seo beo, cuireadh bac ar aon oibreoir báid seirbhís a chur ar fáil chuig an oileán. Dúirt an tAire Norma Moriarty go bhfuil faoiseamh le mothú sa phobal i ndiaidh an chinnidh seo.  “Níl aon áibhéil faoin tionchar a bhí ag an chinneadh seo ar an cheantar. Bhí sé ríthábhachtach gur athosclaíodh an suíomh. Is é an príomháit turasóireachta sa cheantar é agus bhí gnólachtaí ag fulaingt mar gheall ar a dhúnadh,” a dúirt sí.An tseachtain seo, chuir Uachtarán na Stát Aontaithe Donald Trump cosc ar dhaoine ag taisteal ó thíortha eagsúla go dtí na Stáit Aontaithe. Chuir foireann an Tí Bháin síos ar an pholasaí seo mar “choscanna ciallmhara” a dhéanfadh Meiriceánaigh a chosaint ó eachtrannaigh chontúirteacha. Is é seo an dara huair a chuir an tUachtarán Trump cosc ar an taisteal. Agus é ina chéad téarma in 2017, chuir sé cosc ar an taisteal, agus tháinig éileamh dlíthiúil mar gheall air. Rinne an tUachtarán Biden é a aisghairm in 2021.  I measc na dtíortha a bhfuil tionchar ag an bheartas seo orthu ná an Afganastáin, Maenmar, Sead, Poblacht an Chongó, an Ghuine Mheánchiorclach, an Eiritré, Háítí, an Iaráin, an Libia, an tSomáil, an tSúdáin agus Éimin. Tá leathchosc tagtha ar thíortha eile mar chuid den bheartas seo, Tóga, Laos, Cúba agus Siarra Leon san áireamh. Shéan urlabhraí ón Teach Bhán gur beartas frith-Mhoslamach atá ann.Tá Mark Shields, imreoir CLG le Contae Ard Mhacha agus buaiteoir Chraobh na hÉireann anuraidh, i ndiaidh a thaithí ar theacht amach mar dhuine aerach a roinnt go poiblí i ndiaidh deich mbliana ag imirt leis an chontae. I bhfíseán a roinneadh ag ócáid Bhróid a d'eagraigh Cumann na nImreoirí Gaelacha, rinne sé cur síos ar an dúshlán a bhí roimhe teacht amach i dtimpeallacht CLG atá faoi thionchar na bhfear. Mar sin féin, luaigh sé fosta an t-athrú dearfach atá tagtha ar an chultúr, agus thug le fíos go bhfuil dearcadh laistigh de ghrúpa Ard Mhacha agus laistigh den CLG níos tuisceanaí ná mar a bhí blianta ó shin. Aithníonn Shields go bhfuil athrú tagtha ar an teanga agus ar an tacaíocht laistigh den ghrúpa, agus go bhfuil comhoibritheoirí ag seasamh an fhóid le daoine aeracha ar bhealach nach raibh siad ariamh roimhe seo. Agus a scéal féin á roinnt, tá sé ag súil go gcuideoidh sé le himreoirí eile—fir, mná nó daoine neamh-dhénartha— béim a leagan ar a gcultúir féin agus a bheith tacaithe agus sábháilte. Chomh maith leis sin, chuir Shields béim ar an tábhacht atá le daoine iontaofa, cosúil lena dheirfiúr agus lena pháirtí féin, chun comhráite pearsanta a dhéanamh. *Léirithe ag Conradh na Gaeilge i Londain. Tá an script ar fáil i d'aip phodchraolta.*GLUAISlonnaíocht luath-chreidimh - early religious settlementoibreoir báid - boat operatoreachtrannaigh chontúirteacha - dangerous foreignersaisghairm - repealdearcadh - outlookdaoine neamh-dhénartha - non-binary people

In this episode of the Afterburn Podcast, host John “Rain” Waters sits down with Vincent “Jell-O” Aiello, former Navy fighter pilot and host of the  @FighterPilotPodcast  for a deep dive into the highs and hardships of naval aviation. From his first spark of inspiration at an airshow to flying over 700 successful carrier landings, Jell-O shares a candid and compelling journey through the world of military flight. They discuss the grit required to survive flight school, the evolution of airmanship and training, and the life-changing experience of attending Top Gun. JJell-O recounts intense moments from deployments aboard the USS George Washington and John F. Kennedy, reflects on the emotional toll of military service, and gives insight into his time flying as an adversary pilot in the F-16. He also opens up about his book, Through the Yellow Visor, and how storytelling plays a crucial role in honoring those who serve. This episode is rich with wisdom on perseverance, mentorship, and what it truly means to be a fighter pilot. Through the Yellow Visor: https://amzn.to/4jaAfc6 Get a signed copy: https://www.fighterpilotpodcast.com/product-page/through-the-yellow-visor

In this episode of the Afterburn Podcast, John “Rain” Waters is joined by Vince “Snapper” Sherer, a veteran A-10 pilot with 4,500 flight hours and 299 combat missions. Snapper breaks down his path from the Air Force Academy to deployments across Afghanistan flying the A-10A and A-10C, including time in the MC-12. He details the evolution of close air support, the integration of targeting pods, and the challenges of executing time-sensitive strikes in complex environments. Snapper also shares how personal events—including his brother's career-ending accident and a high-casualty strike on a high-value target—shaped his approach to combat and leadership. The discussion covers training, weapons employment, A-10 capabilities, and the operational realities of supporting ground forces across multiple conflicts.Snapper YT: https://www.youtube.com/@snapperlandSnapper IG: https://www.instagram.com/snapperland

In Episode 133, John “Rain” Waters sits down with F-16 pilot Trent “Teddy” Meisel for a gripping and emotional conversation. Teddy walks us through his journey from small-town Oklahoma to the cockpit of the Viper, including a traumatic ejection over South Korea that nearly cost him his life. "Teddy" is also the founder of  @4th_GenHuntingCo This episode dives into the moment-by-moment chaos of that day in May 2023, when a systems failure during a combat exercise forced him to make the ultimate call—pulling the ejection handle. Teddy reflects on what went wrong, how his training kicked in, and what it's like to come back from an ejection both physically and mentally. Rain and Teddy also discuss the realities of Total Force Integration, life in a Guard unit, and the camaraderie forged through the crucible of flying fighters. Plus, hear how Teddy founded 4th Gen Hunting Co. and how the outdoors became part of his recovery journey. This is more than a story of survival—it's a deep dive into resilience, pilot culture, and the unforgiving nature of modern air combat. 4th GenHuntingCo: https://www.4thgenhuntingco.com/

In Part V of the SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) series, host Mike “Flash” McVay sits down once again with A-10 pilot Ridge "Kelso" Flick to dive deep into the critical role the Warthog plays in SEAD and close air support operations. Drawing from his extensive experience flying the A-10 in hostile environments, Kelso shares insights into how low-level tactics, survivability, and precision targeting come together in the face of modern air defense threats. From Cold War-era training to post-9/11 combat deployments, this episode explores how A-10 pilots adapted to evolving SAM and AAA threats while maintaining their mission to protect ground forces. Kelso's perspective offers a unique look at the intersection of close air support and SEAD, highlighting the courage and coordination required in every mission.Stay tuned and subscribe for more frontline stories and tactical lessons from the world of combat aviation and special operations.

Mike “Flash” McVay welcomes a seasoned fighter pilot and Wild Weasel veteran to break down the evolution of the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses mission in the Viper community. From crafting airplanes out of bobby pins as a toddler to executing real-world SEAD missions over Baghdad, this guest's career spans decades of pivotal moments in combat aviation. Listeners will hear how a single incentive flight in an F-16 transformed a lifelong dream of flying Eagles into a passion for the Viper's multi-role capabilities.The guest shares his formative years at Nellis as a maintenance officer during the transition from F-4G to F-16CJ in the Weasel role, offering a rare behind-the-scenes look at how the mission set developed. He discusses deployments supporting Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch, including a gripping account of being in Turkey when 9/11 occurred and the following political complications. As the conversation shifts to Operation Iraqi Freedom, he recalls leading night SEAD sorties over Baghdad, vividly describing the chaos, coordination, and execution of real-time missions under fire.

On today's episode, Laci is joined by pasta inventor and OG podcaster Dan Pashman (The Sporkful) to dive into a seafood scandal affecting shrimp lovers everywhere. That's right—Laci and Dan don their lab coats and discover the investigative firm SeaD to uncover the widespread shrimp fraud impacting restaurants across the country and hurting small businesses. Plus, thieves pull off the ultimate heist, making off with 100,000 eggs. Stay schemin'! CON-gregation, catch Laci's new TV Show Scam Goddess, now on Freeform and Hulu!Make sure to sink your teeth into Dan's pasta tour of Italy tour with fans! Pashmans Pasta Pilgrimage Follow on Instagram:Scam Goddess Pod: @scamgoddesspodLaci Mosley: @divalaciDan Pashman: @thesporkful Research by Kathryn Doyle  SOURCEShttps://www.yahoo.com/news/shrimp-fraud-found-rampant-many-173137438.htmlhttps://news.fsu.edu/news/science-technology/2023/03/23/prawn-broker-fsu-researchers-develop-shrimp-authenticity-test/https://ldh.la.gov/assets/oph/Center-EH/sanitarian/retailfood/LDHACT372CrawfishandShrimpMenuLabeling.pdfhttps://www.seadconsulting.com/genetic-testing-to-identify-seafood-specieshttps://www.cnn.com/2019/03/07/health/fish-mislabeling-investigation-oceana/index.htmlhttps://www.cnn.com/2025/02/05/us/pennsylvania-egg-theft-hnk/index.htmlhttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/05/us/eggs-stolen-pennsylvania-shortage.htmlhttps://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jul/28/subway-tuna-lawsuit-dismissed Get access to all the podcasts you love, music channels and radio shows with the SiriusXM App! Get 3 months free using this show link: https://siriusxm.com/scam.

Through the Yellow Visor: https://amzn.to/4jaAfc6Get a signed copy: https://www.fighterpilotpodcast.com/product-page/through-the-yellow-visorIn this short promo episode, host John “Rain” Waters highlights an exciting new release from fellow aviator and podcast host Vincent “Jell-O” Aiello, founder of the Fighter Pilot Podcast. Jell-O's new book offers a rare, first-person look into the making of a real fighter pilot—from his early dreams sparked at an airshow, through flight school, and ultimately to the elite ranks of TOPGUN as a F/A-18 Hornet instructor. The book doesn't shy away from the highs and lows, including a near-fatal medical scare late in his career, making it a must-read for anyone serious about understanding the reality of combat aviation. Stay tuned—Jell-O will be joining Rain in an upcoming full-length episode following the SEAD series to share more insights from his journey.If you're passionate about military aviation and fighter pilot culture, don't miss this. Be sure to subscribe and keep listening for more veteran stories and tactical airpower discussions.Through the Yellow Visor: https://amzn.to/4jaAfc6Get a signed copy: https://www.fighterpilotpodcast.com/product-page/through-the-yellow-visor

In this episode of the Afterburn Podcast, we continue our Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) series hosted by Mike “Flash” McVay.Our guest, Sonny “Blink” Blinkinsop, brings decades of Wild Weasel experience to the table — from Vietnam-era air combat tactics to F-16 SEAD missions during Operation Allied Force. Blink dives into the mindset shift required when flying into heavily defended airspace, the evolution of SEAD tactics, and what it truly means to wear the Weasel patch.This episode covers real-world use of air-to-surface weapons like the AGM-88 HARM, F-16CJ combat operations, and the tactical and cultural challenges of suppressing enemy air defenses. Perfect for fans of fighter pilot strategy, modern air warfare, and U.S. Air Force history.

In this episode of the Afterburn Podcast, host Mike "Flash" McVay continues the exploration of the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) in Part II of the series. Joined by Pat “Curly” Pence, they delve into the evolution of the Wild Weasel mission during Operation Desert Storm. Curly recounts his progression from pilot training to becoming a Wild Weasel, sharing insights into the challenges and tactics of air combat against surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. The conversation further explores the preparation for conflict, intelligence assessments of enemy capabilities, and the execution of strike packages. Curly highlights the realities of engaging with air defense systems and the significance of pre-conflict training missions. He also discusses the evolution of weapon systems in air-to-ground tactics. Additionally, Flash and Curly examine the intricacies of the High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) system, its development, and tactical lessons from various military engagements. Curly shares personal accounts of radar engagements, underscoring the importance of system proficiency and tactics in countering SAMs. The episode also covers the transition from the F-4G to the F-16C Block 50, the critical nature of SEAD missions, and the ongoing necessity for effective intelligence in modern warfare.  

In this episode of the Afterburn Podcast, Mike “Flash” McVay hosts Leonard “Lucky” Ekman and Jim “Gringo” Webster, two original Wild Weasel fighter pilots from Vietnam, as they share firsthand experiences and insights from their military careers. This is Part I of the five-part Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) Series. The discussion follows their journeys from joining the military to their roles in some of the most dangerous combat missions of the Vietnam War. They dive deep into the evolution of the Wild Weasel mission, a high-risk operation designed to counter deadly surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats. “Lucky” and “Gringo” reflect on their intense training, the dangers they faced in combat, and the unbreakable camaraderie among fighter pilots. They recount harrowing encounters with SAMs, detailing the tactics and strategies Wild Weasel crews developed to survive and protect their fellow aviators. The conversation highlights the evolution of air combat tactics, the advanced technology used in their aircraft, and the role of intelligence in mission success. They share personal accounts of flying against formidable air defenses, the mental and physical demands of their missions, and the calculated risks that defined the Weasel community. This episode is a deep dive into the Wild Weasel legacy—its impact on modern air warfare, the sacrifices made, and the lessons passed down to future generations of fighter pilots.

The Jane Doe who accused Jay Z of sexually assaulting her along with Sead “Diddy” Combs has admitted she was not telling the truth. In a voice recording, she can be heard saying that Jay Z did not assault her, but he was at the party. She said that her attorney said to add Jay Z’s name to the lawsuit. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

It is Thursday on The Rickey Smiley Morning Show Podcast. On this episode, the RSMS crew discusses various topics. Singer Dawn Robinson of groups En-Vogue and Lucy Pearl revealed some shocking news about her current living situation. Robinson revealed that for the past three years, she has been living in her vehicle. She chronicled how she got to her current situation, but it all happened after she left parents' home in Las Vegas. Kevin Hart was on the Jennifer Hudson show and he spoke about him getting older. Hart said he is at the point that he does not like to wear jeans anymore and only wears slacks. Also, the Jane Doe who accused Jay Z of sexually assaulting her along with Sead “Diddy” Combs has admitted she was not telling the truth. In a voice recording, she can be heard saying that Jay Z did not assault her, but he was at the party. She said that her attorney said to add Jay Z’s name to the lawsuit. All of this and more on The Rickey Smiley Morning Show Podcast. Website: https://www.urban1podcasts.com/rickey-smiley-morning-show See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) mission has evolved alongside the development of Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems. In this episode of The Lowdown, host Mike "Flash" McVay takes a deep dive into the history and advancements of SAM technology, from its early origins to today's modern, highly integrated air defense networks.

The Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) mission, better known as the Wild Weasel mission, has been a critical component of air warfare since Vietnam. In this special five-part series, host Mike "Flash" McVay explores the evolution of SEAD from its early days in Rolling Thunder to Desert Storm, Kosovo, and today's modern air battles.

O Minuto TCE é um quadro da Rádio TCE com o noticiário diário do Tribunal. Foi realizado no Tribunal de Contas do Estado de Goiás o maior evento sobre BPM do mundo!Confira os comentários dos palestrantes Sérvio Túlio Teixera, chefe do Gabinete da Presidência do TCE-GO, Alan Farias, secretário da SEAD e Airton Caetano, um dos participantes do encontro.Edição de som: Israel BorsattoReportagem: Maria Eduarda Arruda, Rafaela Nogueira e Gabriel AntonelyLocução: Leticia Marques

With Christmas a mere two weeks away, Rob and Matt delve headlong into the business end of the Tag League, reviewing the play-offs and finals.They chat about the return of Fukigen Death, Winggori and SaoriPoi managing to better their block match, BMI2000 in SEAD, Dream Queendom matches, HANAKO's push, a stellar 2-out-of-3 falls match, and title challenges galore before giving their end-of-tournament awards!Thanks to friend of the show Steve Kaklamanos for the excellent Thekla-themed Christmas Carol that starts the episode!Buy Rob's NEW Stardom Book – Chasing the Dream: 50 of Stardom's Greatest Matches Right Here: https://tinyurl.com/2eemszmtSubscribe to our PATREON: https://patreon.com/TheStardomCastThe website: https://www.talkjoshi.comSubscribe to the Podcast: https://linktr.ee/talkjoshiJoin our Discord Server: https://discord.gg/bbDcAwcTwitter: https://www.twitter.com/thestardomcastFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/thestardomcastTwitch: https://www.twitch.tv/thestardomcastBuy our Merch: https://teespring.com/en-GB/stores/podmania-podcasting-networkYouTube: https://tinyurl.com/2s4zrf3rAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

U poslednjoj epizodi Radar Foruma u kojoj je izazivač bio advokat Sead Spahović, gost je bio Vukašin Milićević, bivši profesor sa Bogoslovije. Njih dvojica razgovarali su o ulozi i uticaju religije na društvene i političke odnose na Balkanu. Spahović je na početku želeo da razjasni da li je pomirenje u regionu moguće bez praštanja, a praštanje bez kajanja? “Pravo pomirenje nije moguće bez pokajanja i spremnosti da se oprosti, a opet, pokajanje i praštanje nisu mogući bez spremnosti da se prihvati odgovornost. Ako posmatramo i hrišćansku tradiciju, i tradicije koje njoj prethode, jevrejske i helenske, u stvari je reč o jednom veoma aktivnom stanju duha. Metanoja je zapravo promena načina mišljenja koja treba da dovede do konkretne promene u postupcima. Dakle, nema nikakvog pokajanja i praštanja bez konkretnih dela. Simbolički činovi i aktovi jesu važni, ali oni apsolutno postaju isprazni ukoliko to ne dovodi do promene u načinu postupanja”, kaže Milićević. Govoreći o paradoksalnim situacijama gde kriminalci nose krstove oko vrata ili “trče u džamiju pet puta”, Milićević kaže da se zapravo radi o maskiranju stvarnog karaktera pozivanjem na religijski autoritet. On je kritikovao i SPC navodeći da se ona danas “nažalost sistematski brendira pozivajući se na sporno nasleđe”. “To je nešto čega se zapravo treba stideti. Imate kanonizaciju vladike Irineja Ćirića bačkog zajedno sa mučenicima iz Novosadske racije. Za vreme te iste racije, taj vladika Irinej, koji jeste bio značajna ličnost pre rata po mnogo čemu, on jeste spasavao neke ljude… Ali on jeste bio praktično Horitjev intimus. On za to vreme dok oni bacaju Srbe pod led, poziva narod da ostanu verni tim mađarskim vlastima i da ne podležu provokacijama kojima ti banditi hoće da se bore protiv okupacije i šire, misleći na komuniste. I to izjednačavanje je veoma sporno”, ističe Milićević. Sagovornici su se složili da se ovde promenio osnov na temelju kojeg je moguće artikulisati političku moć. “To nisu više one univerzalne priče, već ovde sada imate polufeudalne elite i jedini način da zadrže moć, koja je i ekonomska i politička, jeste to da podižu tenzije”.

U jedanaestoj epizodi Radar Foruma, izazivač Sead Spahović ugostio je publicistu Zlatoja Martinova, a njih dvojica osvetlili su složene teme iz perioda Drugog svetskog rata. Martinov ističe da savremeni istoričari selektivno koriste nemačke dokumente zaplenjene nakon pada Berlina, koji otkrivaju prijateljske odnose između Hitlera i Staljina, o čemu i piše u svojoj knjizi Treći rajh i SSSR (1939-1941), a koji su omogućili Hitlerove vojne uspehe na zapadu Evrope. „Ako im je trebalo da se govori loše o Staljinu, što su i radili posle 1948, oni su koristili neke od tih dokumenata, a ako su govorili protiv Hitlera, opet su uzimali iste dokumente… ali niko nije sagledao celinu tih odnosa koji su od aprila-marta 1939, pa do 22. juna 1941. zapravo bili toliko prijateljski, nažalost, da su i te kako uticali na tok rata. Nikada Hitler ne bi tako lako osvojio u tom periodu i Holandiju i Norvešku i Dansku, Belgiju, Luksemburg, Francusku, najznačajniju evropsku demokratsku zemlju, da nije Staljin držao leđa Hitleru na istoku“, priča Martinov. On je posebno istakao njihov tajni Pakt o nenapadanju koji je uključivao podelu interesnih sfera gde je Staljin insistirao na bazama na Dardanelima i Bosforu, kompletnoj kontroli nad Bugarskom, sve do Sredozemlja, što je, naglašava Martinov, za Sile osovine bilo neprihvatljivo. Spahović je upitao i za razloge zbog kojih Srbi imaju averziju prema Zapadu. Martinov povezuje to s dugim periodima strane dominacije i različitim kulturnim uticajima, nasuprot građanskim nacijama Zapada koje su razvile svoj identitet kroz prosvetiteljstvo i Francusku revoluciju. Sagovornici su se dotakli i tanke linije između ekstremne levice i desnice, te razloga Putinovog okretanja Aziji. Za kraj, razmišljajući o trenutnim globalnim trendovima, sagovornici su izrazili zabrinutost za budućnost Evrope i sveta, poredeći današnje prilike sa onima iz predvečerja Drugog svetskog rata. „Mi živimo sada u izvesnoj 1936/37, tu smo negde, i to je jako opasno, plašim se za budućnost Evrope i sveta“, kaže Martinov. Više na www.radar.rs

U desetoj epizodi Radar Foruma stavove su ukrstili advokati Sead Spahović i Novak Lukić koji su pokušali da proniknu u kompleksne i često kontroverzne teme koje su oblikovale ratnu istoriju Balkana. U svojoj karijeri, Lukić je bio branilac u nekoliko visokoprofilnih slučajeva pred sudom u Hagu, uključujući i slučaj Momčila Perišića, bivšeg načelnika Generalštaba Vojske Jugoslavije.​ S druge strane, Spahović, kao renomirani advokat, je aktivno učestvovao u brojnim slučajevima vezanim za ratne zločine, te je poznat po svojim stavovima i javnim nastupima koji se bave pitanjima negiranja genocida. Spahović je provocirao debatu pitanjem o legalitetu i legitimnosti Haškog tribunala navodeći da su sve vlade, i Miloševićeva i Koštuničina, sarađivale sa sudom, što Lukić nije osporio navodeći da za njega legitimitet nije upitan, jer nije ni za državu Srbiju. Domaćin je dalje hteo da razjasni tumačenje presude Međunarodnog suda pravde o Srebrenici u kontekstu često zloupotrebljavanog termina „genocidan narod“. „Izgleda ima nekih koji su tako protumačili. Apsolutno se nijednom rečju nigde ne pominje, uopšte pojam genocidan narod ne postoji. Postoji nešto što se korsti često kao „genocidna politika“, problem je genocidne države koja se ovde pominje u nekoj ravni Republike Srpske, da će onda Republika Srpska biti proglašena genocidnom republikom, a to je apsolutno protiv onoga što je sadržaj presude. MSP je rekao u svojoj presudi, posebno analizirajući taj prvi period, do Srebrenice, da nema nijedna, ni odluka, niti dokaz koji ukazuje na postojanje genocidne namere bilo kog lica iz vlasti Republike Srpske u tom periodu. Čak citiraju čuvenu odluku od šest strateških ciljeva Republike Srpske ‘92. godine. Znači, eksplicitno su rekli da Republika Srpska nije zasnovana kao genocidna tvorevina, a opet jasno poručili da su određeni članovi Glavnog štaba Vojske Republike Srpske izvršili genocid i onda posle iz toga proizilazi odgovornost države za konvenciju o genocidu, to je drugi deo priče“. Sead se nadovezao pitanjem „šta je problem da to postane javna istina, zašto se stalno pumpa ta priča i ta paranoja, šta je osnov, odakle to dolazi?“. „Iz želje da se stvori neprijatelj“, dodao je Lukić. Više na www.radar.rs

In this episode, Pako and Scar return to examine the concepts, abilities, and future of Remotely Piloted Aircraft in warfare. The discussion reviews the history of technology, from early trials in the 1910s to the current day. The difference between remotely piloted aircraft and autonomous aircraft is clarified, emphasizing the human involvement in drone operations. The conversation also investigates the different levels of autonomy and the possibility for cooperative combat aircraft. The use of drones in war zones, such as Ukraine, is analyzed, including the emergence of expendable drones for kinetic operations. The difficulty of the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) mission is underscored as one of the most demanding air missions. Brought to you by Authentic Media with the support of Cubic Defense (https://www.cubic.com). Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Stars of Joshi. ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Join the patreon⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Intro and topics (0:00) LPGA, bowling, Thoughts on AEW to NJPW to CMLL State of Joshi (20:00) seaD, Catch the Wave opening Oz Academy Battle Big Bonus Stardom All Star Grand Queendom 2024 AJW Classics 111 G*Top 1995 (1:08:00) Rickee block: (1:44:00) AEW Dynasty WCW Spring Stampede 2000 (2:32:00) ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://linktr.ee/RedLeafRetrocast⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Twitter: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@BowlingJD⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Rickee: @RickeeLynn

För tillfället är Sead Haksabanovic utlånad från Celtic till Stoke i engelska Championship. Den 24-årige mittfältaren från Halmstad har fått uppleva mycket under en karriär som hittills tagit honom till åtta klubbar. När jag poddintervjuade honom våren 2019 hade han precis lämnat West Ham för IFK Norrköping för att lugnet kring klubben passade honom och han berättade om hur det var att vara eftertraktad av klubbar över hela Europa, om när han nobbade Brügge, om varför West Ham då kändes rätt, om den nära relationen med Marko Arnautovic, om West Ham-stjärnorna som försökte få honom att dricka sprit och om den katastrofala utlåningen till Malaga där han inte blev spelklar på flera månader och tränaren inte visste vem han var.Naturligtvis talade Haksabanovic om uppoffringarna han gjort för att nå långt, om varför Halmstads BK är en bra plantskola, om hur det var att välja landslag, om varför det blev Montenegro och om hur det svenska förbundet borde agera för att inte tappa fler spelare som kan välja landslag. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Welcome to the seventy-seventh episode of the Lessons from the Cockpit show with your host retired Lt Col Mark Hasara, KC-135 pilot and Air Force Weapons School graduate. I was turned on to a great memoier website by my good friend Scott Brown. Navy Captain Bo Smith is responsible for helping create the Navy's IRON HAND Surface to Air Missile or SAM supression procedures during the Vietnam War. His unit went from flying the A-4 Skyhawk with iron gunsights to the fabulous smart airplane the LTV A-7 Corsair II. In this first of a two part series, Bo tells us what it's like flying the A-4 and A-7 on DIXIE Station to flying the F-105 Wild Weasel at McConnell during an exchange tour with the US Air Force. This episode of the Lessons from the Cockpit show is financially sponsored  by Wall Pilot, custom aviation art for the walls of your home, office, or hanger. Wall Pilot sells four, six, and eight foot long profiles of famous aircraft printed on vinyl you can peel off and stick on any flat surface. Bo's first assignment flying attack aircraft was in the Douglas A-4C Skyhawk, known as Heinemenn's Hotrod after Ed Heinemann the famous Douglas engineer, because you literally wore the small attack jet. Bo flew with VA-15 Golden Valions and this is his plane during the first Vietnam Cruise of 1966. During the LINEACKER campaign over Vietnam, Bo flew with the VA-82 Mauraders. This VA-82 Mauraders A-7C is loaded for an Iron Hand mission he spoke of during the show carrying Mk20 Rockeye cluster bombs and AGM-45 Shrike anti-radiation missiles. Here is another Iron Hand A-4F Skyahwk assigned to VA-55 Warhorses. The Mauraders were chosen for the famous Than Hoa Railway Bridge strike carrying AGM- Walleye tv guided bombs. The second Walleye launched by Lt Scott Baldwin dropped one span into the river taking the bridge out of action. During an exchange tour with the Air Force, Bo flew the Republic F-105F and F-105G Wild Weasel Thunderchief. This F-105G from the 333rd Tactical Fighter Squadron flew missions over Vietnam and is credited with three North Vietnamese MiG kills, one by dropping a bomb rack off the jet which hit the MiG chasing it The last comat cruise for LTV A-7E Corsair IIs was during Desert Storm. VA-46 Clansmen and VA-72 Blue Hawks were part of the USS John F Kennedy airwing. This VA-72 A-7E was the Squadron Skipper Commander JR "Shooter" Saunders jet armed for a Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses or SEAD mission into Iraq. Please go by Bo Smith's fantastic website, an electronic journal of his exploits flying missions in the A-4 Skyhawk and A-7 Corsair II over Vietnam. He even has some of the charts of his targets showing the triple A gun sites and SAM sites on the maps! This is probably one of the best Vietnam War websites you will come across at Bo Smith. He does update the wesite when he finds new information. The second episode with Captain Bo Smith will be out next week. Thanks for downloading and listening to this and previous episodes of the Lessons from the Cockpit show. We are over 25,000 downloads now. This and previous episodes can be found on the new Lessons from the Cockpit website at www.lessonsfromthecockpit.show  

Welcome to the seventy-seventh episode of the Lessons from the Cockpit show with your host retired Lt Col Mark Hasara, KC-135 pilot and Air Force Weapons School graduate. I was turned on to a great memoir website by my good friend Scott Brown. Navy Captain Bo Smith is responsible for helping create the Navy's IRON HAND Surface to Air Missile or SAM suppression procedures during the Vietnam War. Bo started his Naval Aviation career with two Vietnam tours in the Douglas A-4B and A-4C Skyhawk with Attack Squadron VA-15 Valions. His third tour during the 1972 LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II campaigns Bo was assigned to Attack Squadron VA-82 Marauders flying the A-7C Corsair II. In this first of a two part series, Bo tells us what it's like flying the A-4 and A-7 on YANKEE Stations, to teaching new aircrews in the Republic F-105 Thunderchief at McConnell AFB Kansas in a US Air Force exchange tour. This episode of the Lessons from the Cockpit show is financially sponsored  by Wall Pilot, custom aviation art for the walls of your home, office, or hanger. Wall Pilot sells four, six, and eight foot long profiles of famous aircraft printed on vinyl you can peel off and stick on any flat surface. Bo's first assignment flying Navy attack aircraft was in the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk during the 1966 and 1967 Rolling Thunder air campaign. Bo flew with VA-15 Gold Tails, developing the IRON HAND SAM suppression tactics used in Carrier Air Wing Ten. This print of a VA-15 A-4C was Bo's personal Skyhawk during his second 1967 Rolling Thunder Vietnam cruise. During the LINEBACKER I and II campaigns in 1972 over Vietnam, Bo flew with Attack Squadron VA-82 Marauders. This VA-82 Marauders A-7C is loaded for an Iron Hand mission he spoke of during the show carrying Mk20 Rockeye cluster bombs and AGM-45 Shrike anti-radiation missiles. US Navy attack planes carried similar weapons loads on Iron Hand SAM suppression missions like this A-4F Skyhawk assigned to VA-55 Warhorses. The Marauders were chosen for the famous Than Hoa Railway Bridge strike on 6 October 1972 carrying  AGM-62 Walleye tv guided bombs. Walleyes launched by LCDR Leighton "Snuffy" Smith and his wingman Ltjg Marv Baldwin destroyed the center pillar supporting the Than Hoa bridge causing the center span to collapse. LCDR Leighton Smith retired as a four star Admiral and commander of all Naval Forces in Europe. Bo flew the Republic F-105B/D and F-105F Thunderchief as an instructor pilot training new Thud crews during his Air Force exchange tour out of McConnell AFB near Wichita Kansas. Being around Thud Drivers, Bo learned a lot about Air Force SAM and defense suppression tactics, techniques and procedures. Although Bo did not fly Wild Weasel Thuds, this F-105G from the 333rd Tactical Fighter Squadron flew missions over Vietnam and is credited with three North Vietnamese MiG kills, one by dropping centerline bomb rack off the jet which hit the MiG chasing it. The last combat cruise for LTV A-7E Corsair IIs was during Desert Storm. VA-46 Clansmen and VA-72 Blue Hawks were part of the USS John F Kennedy air wing sailing in the Red Sea. This VA-72 A-7E was the Squadron Skipper Commander JR "Shooter" Saunders jet armed for a Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses or SEAD mission into Iraq during the Desert Storm air campaign. Please go by Bo Smith's fantastic website, an electronic journal of his exploits flying missions in the A-4 Skyhawk and A-7 Corsair II over Vietnam. He even has some of the charts of his targets showing the triple A gun sites and SAM sites on the maps! This is the best Vietnam War memoir website you will come across at Bo Smith. He does update the website when he finds new information. The second episode with Captain Bo Smith will be out next week. Thanks for downloading and listening to this and previous episodes of the Lessons from the Cockpit show. We are over 25,000 downloads now. This and previous episodes can be found on the new Lessons from the Cockpit website at www.lessonsfromthecockpit.show    

The Joint Readiness Training Center is pleased to present the forty-first episode to air on ‘The Crucible - The JRTC Experience.' Hosted by CPT Benjamin Malcolm of 1-509th IN (OPFOR) on behalf of the Commander of Operations Group. Today's guest is the Deputy Commanding Officer – Operations for the 82nd Airborne Division, COL Andrew Saslav, All American 07. COL Saslav was the COG from 2021-2022 and the commander of 11th DTG  (OPFOR notional higher headquarters).   The 82nd Airborne Division specializes in joint forcible entry operations via vertical envelopment, both airborne and air assault, into denied areas with a U.S. Department of Defense requirement to respond to crisis contingencies anywhere in the world within 18 hours. They have the Hollywood call-sign of “All American” Division and the motto of “In Air, On Land.”   In this episode we discuss how airborne forces would be utilized at the commencement of large-scale combat operations. Specifically, we look at how Airborne forces allow the US Army to set conditions for follow-on operations to meet national objectives anywhere in the world. The individuals that become paratroopers are some of the most versatile, capable, and lethal lightfighters in the world that pride themselves in seizing the initiative and aggressively bringing the fight to the enemy on the complex, dynamic modern battlefield. GEN McGavin, the longest serving CDR of the 82nd ABN said, “You show me a man willing to jump out of an airplane and I'll show you a man that will fight [and win] for his country.”   An interesting point that is discussed is that previously the DoD's took for granted that the US would have air supremacy immediately, but lessons from Ukraine has forced the DOD to reevaluate this concept. The 82nd ABN operates under the premise that they will conduct a JFE into a contested environment to seize a key piece of terrain and establish a lodgment for US forces. This can only be done during a set time window along planned air corridors secured through joint suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) assets.    Part of S01 “The Leader's Laboratory” series.   Don't forget to check-out XVIII Airborne Corps' social media pages, their handles are ‘82ndAirborneDivision' on Facebook, ‘82ndABNDiv' on X, and ‘82ndairbornediv' on Instagram.   For additional information and insights from this episode, please check-out our Instagram page @the_jrtc_crucible_podcast   Be sure to follow us on social media to keep up with the latest warfighting TTPs learned through the crucible that is the Joint Readiness Training Center.   Follow us by going to: https://linktr.ee/jrtc and then selecting your preferred podcast format.   Again, we'd like to thank our guests for participating. Don't forget to like, subscribe, and review us wherever you listen or watch your podcasts — and be sure to stay tuned for more in the near future.   “The Crucible – The JRTC Experience” is a product of the Joint Readiness Training Center.

Meet Lindsey Ardmore, a former overworked COO turned entrepreneur, whose journey from relentless work to a balanced life is both inspiring and transformative. Once consumed by the pursuit of success, Lindsey now embraces a radically different approach: taking the first week of every month off, working from 9 am to 2 pm, and regularly enjoying days off during the week.   Join Lindsey, Jason, and Peter, as Lindsey unveils the secrets to trimming down her workload to the essentials while maintaining a thriving business. You'll discover:    Practical strategies that empower you to actually follow through with taking your much-needed time off  How to ensure that working less hours this week doesn't result in more work next week How to harness the true power of focusing solely on efforts that yield real results   Unlock the keys to work-life harmony and productivity in this enlightening podcast, where Lindsey shares invaluable insights and actionable tips to reclaim your time and achieve sustainable success.   Learn more about Lindsey's marketing services at: LindseyArdmore.com   Transform your life in 3 days at one of our events (use promo code PODCAST for 50% off): Lifeonaire.com/upcoming-events   Get on the fast track to creating a wildly profitable business: Lifeonaire.com/SEAD  

Puro trouble. ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Join the patreon⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Intro and topics (0:00) Puro - Dragongate Final Gate, Noah The New Year, AJPW Mania (5:00) CMLL Year End (30:00) Joshi indies seaD, Oz (56:00) Stardom Dream Queendom AJW Classics n/a Rickee block: (1:29:00) End of year party special WCW Nitro n/a (2:13:00) ⁠⁠⁠https://linktr.ee/RedLeafRetrocast⁠⁠⁠⁠ Twitter: ⁠⁠⁠⁠@BowlingJD⁠⁠⁠⁠ Rickee: @RickeeLynn

#STARDOM Dream Queendom du 29.12 AphroditEMirai vs Saori le retourSuzu ou Maika ? #SEAdLINNNG Final round du 28.12 Changement de plan !Nouveau clan de NatsuAyame au titre+reco & FAQ00:00 - Intro 10:07 - STARDOM preview DreamQueendom & NB 43:56 - SEAd preview 24.12 01:03:18 - Actu Joshi 1:17:47 - Reco de matchs 1:29:10 - FAQ & OutroRéseaux sociauxSoutenez nous : https://www.patreon.com/stardlinnngRejoignez le Discord : https://discord.gg/z9U5vKE4ZQRetrouvez nous sur Youtube : https://www.youtube.com/@stardlinnngSuivez nous : https://twitter.com/stardlinnng

Once poised to become a neurosurgeon, Michelle Weger's life took an unexpected turn with her first narcoleptic episode, leading her on an extraordinary path towards a different dream. In this captivating episode, Michelle shares her riveting story, including all the challenges from getting her diagnosis, to losing her driver's license, to the daunting question of forging a new career path.  You may not have narcolepsy or even a debilitating condition, but if you're contemplating a monumental change or facing seemingly insurmountable odds, Michelle's insights are invaluable. Discover a wealth of wisdom as Michelle dives into her own life, unveiling the strategies that propelled her to establish a thriving automation business. She unpacks key lessons: Shifting your mindset from 'I can't afford this' to 'I can't afford NOT to do this.' Understanding your boundaries and crafting success within your personal capacity. Embracing setbacks as potential advantages (as Michelle's business soared after embracing her condition publicly). This episode is a treasure trove of motivation, urging you to break through barriers and leverage what feels like an obstacle into a stepping stone toward your goals. Tune in for a dose of inspiration and seize the power to propel yourself forward, regardless of what stands in your way! Learn more about Michelle and what she does: MichelleWeger.com Get on the fast track to creating a wildly profitable business: Lifeonaire.com/SEAD  

Everywhere you look, there's a frenzy of business tips, promising a better work-life balance and reduced stress. But amid the overload of information, how do you know which principles truly work?   At Lifeonaire, we've curated the ultimate guide – the top 10 guiding business principles. When followed, they can help you transform your business into a customized, purpose-driven endeavor that is tailored to your life.   In this three-part series, Jason Wojo and Polish Peter will be dissecting these 10 principles one by one. In today's episode, they kick-start the adventure with the first three:   Your business MUST fit your personal Vision Your business is not a hobby You are in the business of sales and marketing   Don't miss this opportunity to take control of your business, your life, and your future!   Here's a free quick-start guide to creating a wildly profitable business: Lifeonaire.com/SEAD  

Stephen Biddle, adjunct senior fellow for defense policy at CFR and professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University, leads the conversation on military strategy in the contemporary world. FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the fall 2023 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record, and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic, if you would like to share them with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We're delighted to have Stephen Biddle with us to discuss military strategy in the contemporary world. Dr. Biddle is an adjunct senior fellow for defense policy at CFR and professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University. Before joining Columbia he was professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University. He regularly lectures at the U.S. Army War College and other military schools and has served on a variety of government advisory panels and analytical teams, testified before congressional committees on issues relating to the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria; force planning; conventional net assessment; and European arms control, just to name a few. And, finally, Dr. Biddle is the author of numerous scholarly publications and several books, including his most recent, Nonstate Warfare, published by Princeton University in 2021 and he just recently authored a piece in CFR's magazine Foreign Affairs in the September/October 2023 issue entitled “Back in the Trenches: Why New Technology Hasn't Revolutionized Warfare in Ukraine,” and we shared that out in the background readings for this conversation. So, Steve, thank you for being with us. I thought you could give us an overview of the changes you've seen in military operations as a result of technological innovation and say a few words about wartime military behavior especially as you've studied it over the years and what we're seeing now in Ukraine and now with the Israel-Hamas war. BIDDLE: Yeah, I'd be happy to. There's a lot going on in the world of military affairs and strategy at the moment between Gaza, Taiwan Straits, and, of course, Ukraine. Maybe as a conversation starter I'll start with Ukraine but we can go in whatever direction the group wants to go in, and the spoiler alert is in the headline of the article from Foreign Affairs that you've already assigned. There's a big debate over what Ukraine means for the future of warfare and what Ukraine means for the way the United States should organize its military, modernize its equipment, write its doctrine and so on. One of the most common interpretations of what Ukraine means for all this is that it's harboring—it's a harbinger of a revolutionary transformation. The new technology, drones, space-based surveillance, precision-guided weapons, hypersonics, networked information, artificial intelligence, this whole panoply of things in this argument is making the modern battlefield so lethal, so radically more lethal than the past is that in the present and in the future offensive maneuver will become impossible and we'll get the dawn of some new age of defense dominance in conventional warfare, which, if true, would then have all sorts of implications for how the United States should make all these kinds of defense policy decisions. As those of you who read the Foreign Affairs article know I don't buy it because I don't think the evidence is consistent with that supposition. You'll be happy to hear that I'm not planning to do a dramatic reading of the Foreign Affairs essay, entertaining as I'm sure that would be, but I did think it might be useful for me to briefly outline the argument as a way of teeing up the subsequent conversation. And the basic argument in the article is that whereas there are, indeed, all sorts of very new technologies in use in this war, when you actually look carefully at the results they're producing, at the attrition rates that they're actually causing, at the ability of the two sides to gain ground and to suffer the loss of ground, the actual results being produced by all this very new technology are surprisingly less new than is assumed and supposed in the argument that we're looking at some transformational discontinuous moment in which a new age of defense dominance is dawning. This doesn't mean that nothing's changing or that the United States military should do in the future exactly what it's done in the past. But the nature of the change that I think we're seeing is evolutionary and incremental as it has been for the last hundred years, and if you think what's going on is incremental evolutionary change rather than discontinuous transformation that then has very different implications for what the U.S. should do militarily. So just to unpack a little bit of that by way of pump priming let me just cite some of the examples of what one actually observes and the outcomes of the use of all these new technologies as we've seen in Ukraine. So let's start with casualty rates and attrition. At the heart of this argument that new technology is creating a new era of defense dominance is the argument that fires have made the battlefield so lethal now that the kind of offensive maneuver you saw in World War II or in 1967 or in 1991 is now impossible. And, yet, the actual attrition rates of, for example, tanks, right—tanks tend to be the weapon system that gets the most attention in this context—are remarkably similar to what we saw in the world wars. So in the first twelve months of the fighting in Ukraine, depending on whose estimates you look at the Russians lost somewhere between about half and about 96 percent of their prewar tank fleet in twelve months of fighting. The Ukrainians lost somewhat in excess of 50 percent of their prewar tank fleet, and intuitively that looks like a heavy loss rate, right? Fifty (percent) to 96 percent of what you opened the war with, that seems pretty—you know, pretty dangerous. But in historical context it's actually lower than it frequently was in World War II. In 1943, the German army suffered an attrition rate to the tanks it owned at the beginning of the year of 113 percent. They lost more tanks in 1943 than they owned in January 1943. Their casualty rate went up in 1944. They lost 122 percent of all the tanks they owned in January of 1944. So these attrition rates while high aren't unusually high by historical standards. What about artillery, right? Artillery is the single largest casualty inflicter on the modern battlefield defined as since the turn of the twentieth century, 1900. As far as we can tell the attrition rate from Ukrainian artillery fire of Russian forces in this war looks to be on the order of about eight casualties inflicted per hundred rounds of artillery fired and that's higher than in World War II but not discontinuously radically higher. In World War II that figure would have been about three casualties per hundred rounds fired. In World War I that figure would have been about two casualties per hundred rounds fired. If you chart that over time what you see is an essentially linear straight line incremental increase over a hundred years of about an additional .05 casualties per hundred rounds fired per year over a century of combat experience. There's no sudden discontinuous increase as a result of drones or networked information or space-based surveillance at the end of the period. What about ground gain and ground loss? The purpose of attrition on a modern battlefield is to change who controls how much territory and the whole transformation argument is that all this putatively much more lethal technology is making ground gain much, much harder than in the past, and yet the Russia offensive that opened the war, mishandled as it was in so many ways, took over 42,000 square miles of Ukraine in the first couple of months of the war. The Ukrainian Kyiv counteroffensive retook more than 19,000 square miles. Their Kharkiv counteroffensive retook 2,300 square miles. The Kharkiv counteroffensive took back more than 200 square miles. There's been plenty of defensive stalemate in the war, right? The Russian offensive on Bakhmut took ten months to take the city. Cost them probably sixty (thousand) to a hundred thousand casualties to do it. The Mariupol offensive took three months to take the city. But this war has not been a simple story of technologically determined offensive frustration. There have been offensives that have succeeded and offensives that have failed with essentially the same equipment. Drones didn't get introduced into the war in the last six months. Drones were in heavy use from the very outset of the fighting and this kind of pattern of some offensives that succeed, some offensives that don't, like the attrition rate is not particularly new. I mean, the popular imagination tends to see World War I as a trench stalemate created by the new technology of artillery and machine guns and barbed wire and World War II as a world offensive maneuver created by the new technologies of the tank, the airplane, the radio. Neither World War I nor World War II were homogeneous experiences where everything was defensive frustration of World War I and everything was offensive success in World War II. That wasn't the case in either of the two world wars. The Germans advanced almost to the doorsteps of Paris in the initial war opening offensive in 1914. In 1918, the German spring offenses broke clean through Allied lines three times in a row and produced a general advance by the Allies and the subsequent counteroffensive on a hundred-eighty-mile front. There was a lot of ground that changed hands in World War I as a result of offensives in addition to the great defensive trench stalemate of 1915 to mid-1917. In World War II some of the most famous offensive failures in military history were tank-heavy attacks in 1943 and 1944. The Battle of Kursk on the Russian front cost the German attackers more than a hundred and sixty thousand casualties and more than seven hundred lost tanks. The most tank-intensive offensive in the history of war, the British attack at Operation Goodwood in 1944, cost the British a third of all the British armor on the continent of Europe in just three days of fighting. So what we've seen in observed military experience over a hundred years of frequent observational opportunity is a mix of offensive success and defensive success with technologies that are sometimes described as defense dominant and, yet, nonetheless, see breakthroughs and technologies that are sometimes seen as offense dominant and, yet, sometimes produce defensive stalemates and what really varies is not so much driven by the equipment, it's driven by the way people use it. And the central problem in all of this is that military outcomes are not technologically determined. The effects of technology in war are powerfully mediated by how human organizations use them and there are big variations in the way human organizations use equipment. And if you just look at the equipment alone and expect that that's going to tell you what the result of combat is going to be and you don't systematically account for how the human organizations involved adapt to what the technology might do on the proving ground to reduce what it can do on the battlefield then you get radically wrong answers and I would argue that's what's going on in Ukraine. Both sides are adapting rapidly and the nature of the adaptations that we're seeing in Ukraine are very similar to the nature of the adaptations we've seen in previous great power warfare. Again, incremental lineal extensions of emphases on cover, emphases on concealment, combined arms, defensive depth, mobile reserve withholds—these are the ways that all great power militaries have responded to increasingly lethal equipment over time to reduce their exposure to the nominal proving ground lethality of weapons in actual practice. The problem is this collection of techniques—and in other work I've referred to them as the modern system, this kind of transnational epistemic community of practice and the conduct of conventional warfare—to do all these things right and minimize your exposure is technically very challenging. Some military organizations can manage this very complex way of fighting; others cannot. Some can do it on one front and not on another front, and the result is we get a lot of variance in the degree to which any given military at any given moment embraces the entirety of this doctrinal program. Where they do, defenses have been very hard to break through for a hundred years. This isn't something that came about in February of 2022 because of drones and networked information. This has been the case repeatedly for a century of actual combat. But where they don't, where defenses are shallow, where reserve withholds are too small, where combined arms aren't exploited, where cover and concealment isn't exploited, then casualty rates go way, way up. Then breakthrough becomes possible. Then attackers can gain a lot of ground with tanks or without tanks. The German offensives that broke clean through Allied defensive lines in 1918 had almost no tanks. The first of them, Operation Michael, was a one-million soldier offensive that had exactly nine tanks in support of it. So the differences that have mattered are the interaction of increasingly lethal technology with these variations and the ability of real human organizations to master the complexity needed to fight in a way that reduces exposure to this and that's the same thing we've seen in Ukraine. Where defenses have been shallow and haven't had enough reserves behind them you've gotten breakthroughs. Where they've been deep, adequately backed by reserves, as we've seen in this summer counteroffensive over the last three or four months, for example, they've not been able to break through and this isn't a new story. This is just a recapitulation of a hundred years' worth of military experience. If that's so then what difference does it make to the U.S.? So, again, as I suggested earlier, that doesn't mean don't change anything, right? A 1916 tank on a modern battlefield would not fare well. Part of the stability in these kinds of outcomes is because people change the way they do business. They change the way they fight. They update their equipment. They execute measure/countermeasure races and so we need to continue to do that. Depth is probably going to increase. Reserve withhold requirements are going to go up. Demands for cover and concealment are going to increase. There will be technological implications stemming from the particular measure/countermeasure races that are emerging now especially with respect to drones. Almost certainly the U.S. Army is going to have an incentive, for example, to deploy counter drone escort vehicles as part of the combined arms mix, moving forward. But the principle of combined arms that's behind so much of the way the U.S. Army fights is very unlikely to change very much. What's going to happen is a new element will be added to the combined arms mix, and escort jammers and anti-aircraft artillery and other air defense systems that are optimized for drones will become part of the mix of tanks and infantry and engineers and signals and air defense and all the rest, moving forward. The whole revolution argument, though, is not that, right? The reason people refer to this as a revolution, as transformation, is they're using language that's designed to tee up the idea that ordinary orthodox incremental updating business as usual isn't enough in this new era because of drones, because of hypersonics, or space-based surveillance or whatever. We need something more than that, and I think if we look closely at what's going on in Ukraine what we see is not an argument that we need to transform the way the U.S. military does business. What we see is an argument for incremental change that implies incremental adaptation is appropriate, that it's not the wrong thing to do. I think it's possible to over-innovate. I think there are ample historical examples of militaries that have gone wrong not by being resistant to innovation—there are plenty of those, too—but by doing too much innovation. In the 1950s and 1960s U.S. Air Force transformed itself around an idea that conventional warfare is a thing of the past, all wars of the future will be nuclear, and they designed airplanes for nuclear weapon delivery that were horribly ill-suited to the conventional war in Vietnam that they then found themselves in. The U.S. Army transformed its doctrine following a particular understanding of the lethality of precision-guided anti-tank weapons in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, adopted a concept called active defense that relied on static defense in a shallow disposition from fixed positions, emphasizing the ostensible new firepower of anti-tank weapons. Found that that was very innovative but very ineffective and abandoned it in favor of the airline battle doctrine that's a lineal descendant of the doctrine we use now, which was much more orthodox and conventional. There are plenty of examples of militaries that have over-innovated. This language of revolution and transformation is designed to promote what I'm concerned could be over-innovation again. I think we could talk more about the particulars of what incremental adaptation should comprise but I think that's the right way forward in light of what we actually observe about what's going on in Ukraine. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Thank you for that, Steve. That was great. Let's go now to all of you for your questions. (Gives queuing instructions.) And so don't be shy. This is your time. We have our first question from Terrence Kleven. Q: Hello. Can you hear me? FASKIANOS: We can. If you could tell us your affiliation that would be great. Q: Yes, very good. Terrence Kleven. I'm at Central College in Pella, Iowa, and I teach in a philosophy and religious studies department and I teach quite a lot of Middle Eastern studies. Thank you very much for your presentation because so much of this we don't talk about enough and we don't understand, and I appreciate the opportunity to hear what you have to say and look forward to reading your—some of your material. Just kind of a practical question, why aren't the Russians using more planes in this war or are they and we just don't have a report of that? I assume that the Russian air force is much superior to what the Ukrainians have but it doesn't seem to give them a great advantage. What's missing? What's going on? BIDDLE: Yeah. You're raising a question that has bedeviled military analysts in this war since its beginning. Part of the issue is the definition of what plane is, right? If we define a plane as something that uses aerodynamic lift to fly through the air and perform military missions the Russians are using lots of planes; they just don't have pilots. We call them drones. But a drone, to a first approximation, is just a particular inexpensive, low-performance airplane that is relatively expendable because it's inexpensive. But because it's inexpensive it's also low performance. If by airplanes one includes drones, then there's lots of airplane use going on. What you had in mind with the question, I'm sure, is the airplanes that have people in them—why aren't they more salient in the military conduct of the war, and the Russians have tried to use piloted aircraft. The trouble is the loss rates have kept them, largely, out of the sky. So this again gets back to the question of human adaptation to new technology. Air forces—and navies, by the way, but that's a different conversation—are much more exposed to more technology increases—the technology changes that produce increasing lethality than ground armies are. Ground armies have much easier access to cover and concealment. It's hard to find much cover and concealment up there in the sky, right? You're highlighted against a largely featureless background. There are things you can do as an air force to try and reduce your exposure to precision-guided anti-aircraft weapons and the U.S. Air Force, for example, practices those extensively. But the complexity of operating an air force to be effective at the mission called SEAD—suppression of enemy air defenses—is very high and it requires a lot of practice and it requires a lot of flight hours and it requires you to burn a lot of fuel in training, and the U.S. Air Force is willing to do that. The Russians historically have not. Therefore, they're not very good at it. Therefore, they're very—they have been very exposed to the lethality precision-guided Ukrainian anti-aircraft defenses and, therefore, they've mostly decided not to expose themselves to this fire. They fly mostly over friendly terrain, especially in metropolitan Russia, and they fly at low altitudes that keep them under the radar, which is a cliché that's leached into public conversation because of the actual physics of the way radar works and responds to the curvature of the earth. If the Russians operate over Russian territory at low altitude and launch cruise missiles at huge distances then their airplanes don't get shot down as much. But then the airplanes are a lot less effective and contribute a lot less and that's the tradeoff that the Russians have accepted with respect to the use of airplanes. The airplanes they use a lot are unpiloted cheap low-performance drones which they are willing to get shot down in huge numbers and they do get shot down in huge numbers. But piloted aircraft have played a limited role because the air defense environment is too lethal for an air force with skills no better than the Russians are to survive in it. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Mike Nelson. Q: Thanks for a very interesting overview. I work at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and also have taught at Georgetown on internet policy and the impacts of digital technologies. Seems to me that one of the big changes with this war has been the incredible transparency, more information on what's actually going on on the ground from social media, satellite photos, drone photos. I saw a tweet today about how they're able to infer how many Russian soldiers have mutinied by counting these soldiers marching back from the front, presumably under armed guard. It just seems that there's a lot more information on what's going on hour by hour. I wonder if that is causing some changes on both the Russian and the Ukrainian side and whether the insertion of disinformation to make it appear that things are going differently than it seems is also something that's getting better and better. Thank you. BIDDLE: Yeah. I mean, the information environment in Ukraine is complicated in ways that the debate often doesn't deal with very well, in my view. So starting at the superficial level, public perceptions of what the lethality of first-person view kamikaze drones has been against tanks and artillery are wildly exaggerated and the reason why the public impression is wildly exaggerated is because the medium formerly known as Twitter puts up endless videos of successful attacks. But nobody posts a video of their failed attack so we only see the subset of all drone missions that succeeded. The ones that don't are invisible. Therefore, the public gets this impression that all—that there are successful drone missions by the millions all the time and that that's—there are serious selection effects with the way the public understands drone success rates in light of that. So one point is that the apparent transparency is subject to a variety of selection biases that lead to misunderstandings of the transparency on the battlefield as a whole. Similarly, there are lots of videos of images of Russian soldiers in a trench and especially videos of Russian soldiers in a trench before a quadcopter drone drops a grenade on them and then kills them. You don't see any video feeds of a drone flying over a camouflaged position where you can't see anything because nobody's going to post that, right? It's not interesting enough. But, therefore, again, we get the selection effect. People believe that everything is visible and everything is transparent because every video feed they see, and they see a lot of them, shows a visible target. The trouble is you're not seeing the failed drone missions that didn't produce a visible target and those are the vast majority as far as we can tell from more careful analyses that try to look at the totality of drone missions rather than just the selected subset that appear on now X, formerly Twitter. Now, that leads to the general issue of how transparent is the modern battlefield and I would argue that the modern battlefield is a lot less transparent than people popularly imagine that it is. The cover and concealment available in the earth's surface to a military that's capable of exploiting it is still sufficient to keep a sizeable fraction of both militaries' targets invisible to the other side most of the time and that's why the artillery casualty rate hasn't gone up dramatically as a result of all this. It's because cover and concealment is still keeping most of the targets out of the way. So I would argue the battlefield is less transparent than we often assume that it is and in part that's because the systems that would generate information are countered by the other side so that they generate less information. Again, take drones, which have been the thing that everybody's been focusing on. There have been multiple waves of measure/countermeasure races just on the technical side, setting aside technical adaptation, with respect to drones already. When the war opened the primary drone in use, especially on the Ukrainian side, was the Bayraktar TB2, Turkish-built large, you know, capable, fairly expensive drone which was very lethal against exposed Russian armored columns. Then several things happened. One is the armored columns decided to get less exposed. Smart move on the Russians' part. The other thing is the air defense system under the Russians adapted and started shooting down Bayraktar TB2s at a huge rate to the point where the Ukrainians stopped flying them because they were so vulnerable and, instead, drones shifted from big expensive higher performance drones to smaller, cheaper, lower performance drones, which were so cheap that it didn't make sense to fire expensive guided anti-aircraft missiles at them anymore and then the air defense environment shifted to emphasize jamming, which is even cheaper than the drones, and anti-aircraft artillery firing bullets that are cheaper than drones. So the systems that would create this transparency and that would give you this information don't get a free ride. The opponent systematically attacks them and systematically changes the behavior of the target so that the surviving seekers have less to find, and in addition to cover and concealment and complementary to it is dispersion and what dispersion of ground targets does is even if you find a target it may very well not be worth the expenditure of an expensive precision munition to kill. A guided 155-millimeter artillery shell costs on the order of a hundred thousand dollars a shell. If you're shooting it at a concentrated platoon of enemy infantry that's a good expenditure. If you're shooting it at a dispersed target where they're in one- or two-soldier foxholes now even if you know where all the foxholes are—even if your drones have survived, the concealment has failed and the drone has accurately located where every single two-soldier foxhole is does it make sense to fire a $100,000 guided artillery shell at each of them or are you going to run out of guided artillery shells before they run out of foxholes, right? So the net of all of this—the technical measure/countermeasure race and the tactical adaptation is that I would argue that the battlefield is actually not as transparent as people commonly assume. If it were we'd be seeing much higher casualty rates than what we're actually seeing. There's incremental change, right? The battlefield is more transparent now, heaven knows, than it was in 1943. But the magnitude of the difference and the presence of technical measures and countermeasures is incremental rather than transformational and that's a large part of the reason why the change in results has been incremental rather than transformational. FASKIANOS: So we have a lot of questions but I do want to just ask you, Steve, to comment on Elon Musk's—you know, he shut down his Starlink satellite communications so that the Ukrainians could not do their assault on the—on Russia. I think it was the submersible—they were going to strike the Russian naval vessels off of Crimea. So that, obviously—the technology did affect how the war was—the battlefield. BIDDLE: It did, but you'll notice that Crimea has been attacked multiple times since then and metropolitan Russia has been attacked multiple times since then. So there are technical workarounds. On the technical side rather than the tactical side there are multiple ways to skin a cat. One of these has been that the U.S. has tried to make Ukraine less dependent on private satellite communication networks by providing alternatives that are less subject to the whims of a single billionaire. But tactical communications of the kind that Starlink has enabled the Ukrainians are very useful, right? No doubt about it, and that's why the U.S. government is working so hard to provide alternatives to commercial Starlink access. But even there, even if you didn't have them at all the Ukrainian military wouldn't collapse. I mean, in fact, most military formations were taught how to function in a communications-constrained environment because of the danger that modern militaries will jam their available communication systems or destroy communication nodes or attack the satellites that are providing the relays. Certainly, the U.S. military today is not prepared to assume that satellite communications are always going to be available. We train our soldiers how to operate in an environment in which those systems are denied you because they might be. So, again, I mean, tactical adaptation doesn't eliminate the effects of technological change—having Starlink, being denied Starlink, right, this Musk-owned communication satellite constellation that was the source of all the kerfuffle. It's not irrelevant whether you have it or not but it's less decisive than you might imagine if you didn't take into account the way that militaries adapt to the concern that they might be denied them or that the enemy might have them and they might not, which are serious concerns. Certainly, if the U.S. and Russia were true belligerents both the danger of anti-satellite warfare destroying significant fractions of those constellations is serious, or jamming or otherwise making them unavailable is a serious problem so militaries try to adapt to deal with it—with their absence if they have to. FASKIANOS: Great. We have a question—a written question from Monica Byrne at—a student at Bard College: Can you share thoughts and strategy for Israel and Gaza, given the conditions in Gaza? BIDDLE: Yeah. So shifting gears now from Ukraine to the Middle East, given Israel's declared war aim, right—if Israel's aim is to topple the Hamas regime and then hopefully replace it with something that's another conversation. But let's for the moment just talk about the military dynamics of realizing their stated war aim of toppling the Hamas regime. That will certainly require a ground invasion that reoccupies at least temporarily the entirety of Gaza, right? Airstrikes aren't going to accomplish that war aim. Special forces raids aren't going to accomplish that war aim. The Hamas administrative apparatus is, A, too large and, B, too easily concealed, especially underground, for those kinds of techniques to be sufficient. So if the Israelis really are going to topple Hamas a large-scale ground invasion is needed. That has obvious horrible implications for collateral damage and civilian fatalities in Gaza—urban warfare is infamously destructive of capital and of civilian human life—but also for military casualties to the Israelis. Urban warfare is a radically advantageous military environment for defenders and so Israel inevitably will take serious losses if they really expect to completely reoccupy Gaza as would be needed to depose Hamas. Now, there are ways that conventional militaries can try and reduce either the loss of innocent civilian life or casualty rates to their own forces but none of these things are perfect and the techniques militaries use to reduce civilian fatalities can be exploited by defenders who want to take advantage of them to increase Israeli military casualties and limit the Israelis' ability to limit collateral damage. You can fire only at identified targets and not at entire buildings. You can use small-caliber weapons rather than large-caliber artillery and missiles. You can warn the civilian occupants of a building either with leaflets or text messages or the Israeli technique that's called knocking on the roof where they drop a nonexplosive weapon on the ceiling to create a sound that tells the occupants they are about to be attacked so they leave. There are a variety of things like that that you can do and that the U.S. should hope that the Israelis are going to do. But the whole problem here is that the Hamas political and military infrastructure is deeply intermingled with the civilian population in Gaza, and so even if you're going to be as discriminating as modern technology and military skill potentially could make you, you're still going to kill a lot of civilians and Hamas is not going to conveniently remove the military infrastructure from the civilian population to make it easier for the Israelis to kill the fighters and not kill the civilians. They're going to keep them tightly intermingled. Now, the Israelis can reduce their losses by being slower and more deliberate and methodical in the way they enter Gaza. There's been a discussion in recent weeks about the difference between Mosul and Fallujah and the U.S. experience of urban warfare in Iraq. In Fallujah, we entered quickly with a large ground force that was fairly dependent on small arms direct fire and relatively less reliant on artillery and airstrikes. In Mosul with Iraqi allies on the ground, we did the opposite. Very slow entry. The campaign took months. Limited exposure, small-caliber weapons, heavy emphasis on airstrikes and artillery to reduce the ground—even so, thousands of civilians were killed in Mosul. Even so, our Iraqi allies took serious casualties. There's no way for the Israelis to do this Gaza offensive if they're going to realize their war aim that won't destroy Gaza, kill a lot of civilians, and suffer a lot of casualties themselves. All these things are marginal differences at the most. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Dan Caldwell. Q: Oh, Steve, thanks very much for a very interesting overview. I'd like to raise another subject that is, obviously, very broad but I would really appreciate your comments on it and that's the question of intelligence and its relationship to military operations that you've described. Broadly speaking, we can separate out tactical intelligence from strategic intelligence, and in the case of tactical intelligence the use of breaking down terrorists' cell phones' records and things like contributed to military successes in Iraq and Afghanistan. In a strategic sense, the breaking of the Japanese codes, Purple, and the Ultra Enigma secret in World War II contributed to the Allies' success, and in terms of the Middle East the strategic failures of Israeli intelligence in 1973 and, I would argue, in the recent Hamas attacks contributed to the losses that Israel has suffered. So how do you think about the relationship of intelligence to military strategy? BIDDLE: Yeah. I mean, intelligence is central to everything in security policy, right? It's central to forcible diplomacy. It's central to preparation for war. It's central to the conduct of military. So intelligence underlies everything. All good decision making requires information about the other side. The intelligence system has to provide that. The ability of the intelligence system to create transformational change is limited. Let's take the national level strategic intelligence question first and then we'll move to things like Ultra and battlefield uses. As you know, the problem of military surprise has been extensively studied, at least since the 1973 war in which Israel was famously surprised by the Egyptian attack in the Sinai. There's been an extensive scholarly focus on this problem of intelligence failure and surprise—how can this possibly happen. And the central thrust of that literature, I would argue, has been that almost always after a surprise you discover later that the surprised intelligence system had information that should have told them an attack was coming. They almost always receive indicators. They almost always get photographic intelligence. All sorts of pieces of information find their way into the owning intelligence system. And yet, they got surprised anyway. How could this happen? And the answer is that the information has to be processed by human organizations, and the organizational challenges and the cognitive biases that individuals have when they're dealing with this information combine in such a way to frequently cause indicators not to be understood and used and exploited to avoid surprise and part of the reason for that—the details, of course, are extensive and complex. But part of the reason for that is you get indicators of an attack that didn't—that then didn't happen way more often than you get the indicators of the attack that does happen. You get indicators all the time but usually there's no attack and the trick then is how do you distinguish the indicator that isn't going to become an attack from the indicator that is going to become the attack when you've always got both. And if you—especially in a country like Israel where mobilizing the reserves has huge economic consequences, if you mobilize the reserves every time you get indicators of an attack you exhaust the country and the country stops responding to the indicators anymore. It's the cry wolf problem. I mean, the first couple of times you cry wolf people take it seriously. The eighth, ninth, tenth, twelfth time they don't. So because of this the ability to change, to do away with surprise, with, for example, new technology, all right, a more transparent world in which we have a better ability to tap people's cell phones and tap undersea cables to find out what governments are saying to themselves we have better ability to collect information. But there are still organizational biases, cognitive problems, and just the basic signal-to-noise, wheat-to-chaff ratio issue of lots and lots of information, most of which is about an attack that isn't going to happen. And distinguishing that from the ones that are going to happen is an ongoing problem that I doubt is going to be solved because it isn't a technological issue. It resides in the structure of human organizations and the way the human mind operates to filter out extraneous and focus on important sensory information, and human cognitive processes aren't changing radically and human organizations aren't either. So at the strategic level I don't see transformation coming soon. Then we've got the battlefield problem of what about intercepted communications, for example, which have changed the historiography of World War II in an important way. We'll note that that didn't cause the Allies to defeat the Germans in 1944, right? I mean, the Allies cracked the German and the Japanese codes long before the war ended and, yet, the war continued, and this gets back to this question of how militaries adapt to the availability of information about them on the other side. At sea where there's not a lot of terrain for cover and concealment, right, then these kinds of communications intercepts were more important and as a result the Japanese navy was, largely, swept from the Pacific long before the war ended in 1945. But wars are ultimately usually about what goes on on land, and on land even if you intercept people's communications if they're covered, concealed, dispersed, and in depth being able to read German communications, which we could do in 1944, didn't enable us to quickly break through, rapidly drive to Berlin and end the war three months after the Normandy invasions. In spite of the fact that we could read the communications traffic we couldn't do those things because the communications traffic is only part of success and failure on the battlefield. So if that was the case in World War II where we had, you know, unusually good comment and usually good ability to break the enemy's codes and read their message traffic, again, I would argue that improvements in intelligence technology today were certainly helpful, and they're worth having and we should pursue them and use them, but it's not likely to transform combat outcomes in a theater of war any more than—to a radically greater degree than it did when we had that kind of information in 1944. FASKIANOS: So I'm going to combine the next two questions because they're about innovation from the Marine Corps University and Rutgers University: You mentioned over innovation. Can you explain what that is and how it can be detrimental? And then are you concerned that the Department of Defense R&D program could be at risk of being out of balance by over emphasizing advanced technology versus getting useful technology deployed and into the field? BIDDLE: I think that's one of the most important implications of this war is that the United States has historically chosen to get way out on the envelope of what technology makes possible for weapon acquisition, creating extremely expensive weapons that we can buy in very small numbers that we evaluate and we decide to buy because of their proving ground potential because what they can do against targets that haven't adapted to them yet. What the record of adaptation in Ukraine, I think, shows is that the actual lethality of very sophisticated weapons is not as high as it looks on a proving ground because the targets are going to be noncooperative and the real-world performance of extremely expensive sophisticated technologies is normally less than it looks, and if that's the case we are probably overspending on very sophisticated, very expensive weapons which we can only buy in very small numbers and which if they don't produce this radical lethality wouldn't be worth the expenditure that they cost. And if the adaptation of the target is going to reduce their lethality and increase their vulnerability, which is certainly what we're observing in Ukraine, then we're going to have a dickens of a time replacing them when they get lost, right, because very sophisticated high technology weapons, among other things, require a supply chain of materials that are often quite scarce—rare earths, cobalt, lithium. One of the reasons why the American Defense Industrial Base has had a hard time responding rapidly to the demands that the expenditure rate of things in Ukraine has created is because of these complicated supply chains that we can manage when we're building things in small numbers, which we think is sufficient because we're expecting that each one of them is going to be tremendously lethal. If we now realize that they're less lethal in practice than we expect them to be and therefore we need larger numbers of them, how are we going to get the materials we need to do that? And the experience in Ukraine has been that the kind of revolution in military affairs expectation for the lethality of high technology just hasn't been realized. Yes, weapons are very lethal in Ukraine, but not orders of magnitude differently than they were in 1944, right, and so I think this ought to suggest to us that the historical post-World War II U.S. strategy emphasizing very high technology at very high cost in very small numbers to compensate for small numbers with radical lethality may very well be misguided. It works well when you're fighting an opponent like the Iraqis who can't handle the complexity of cover and concealment, combined arms, and all the rest. They're exposed and the weapons have the kind of proving ground effect that you expect because the targets are not undercover. Not clear that it has been producing that kind of results in Ukraine and it's not clear that it would produce those kinds of results for the United States in a coming great power conflict. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going take the next question from Genevieve Connell at the Fordham graduate program in international political economy and development. How much does successful military strategy rely on stable domestic economic systems to fund it or is this less of an issue when one or both sides have strong geopolitical support and aid? BIDDLE: War is very expensive, as the Ukraine war is reminding us, right? This isn't news. The expenditure rates in modern industrial age warfare are massively expensive to maintain and that in turn means that the strength of the national economy is a fundamental foundational requirement for success in modern great power warfare. This, of course, leads to the set of tradeoffs that are fundamental in grand strategy, right? Grand strategy, as opposed to operational art, military strategy, or tactics, integrates military and nonmilitary means in pursuit of the ultimate security objectives of the state and one of the more important of the nonmilitary means is the economy. So you need a large GDP to support a large expensive war effort. The way you maximize GDP is with international trade. International trade makes you vulnerable to cutoff in time of war through blockade. Therefore, if we just maximize GDP in the short run we run the risk—we increase our vulnerability in time of war or blockades. We say: Oh, no, we don't want to do that. Let's reduce the amount of international trade we do, make ourselves more self-sufficient. Now GDP growth rates go down and now the size of the military you can support in steady state goes down. There's a fundamental tradeoff involving the interaction between classically guns and butter in the way you design the economy in support of the grand strategy you have in mind for how you're going to pursue your security interest in the international system at any given time. So, yeah, a productive expanding economy is essential if you plan to be able to afford the cost of modern warfare. The implications for what that means for things like international trade, though, are complicated. FASKIANOS: Great. I'll try to sneak in one last question from David Nachman. Q: Thank you. Thank you for this really interesting presentation. I teach at the Yale Law School, nothing related to the topic of today's submission and discussion. I'm just wondering, and you captured it towards the end here where you said something about wars are won and lost on land. With the advent of cyber and all the technological development that we're seeing in our armed forces is that still true as a matter, you know, and are we—is the Ukraine and even Gaza experience sort of nonrepresentative of the true strategic threats that the United States as opposed to its allies really faces at sea and in the air? BIDDLE: Yeah. Let me briefly address cyber but then extend it into the sea and the air. One of the interesting features of cyber is it's mostly been a dog that hasn't barked, at least it hasn't barked very loudly. There were widespread expectations as Russia was invading that cyberattacks would shut down the Ukrainian economy, would shut down the Ukrainian military effort, or vice versa, and neither of those things have happened. So I don't—there have been plenty of cyberattacks, right, and there have been plenty of efforts at break in and surveillance and manipulation. So far none of them have been militarily decisive and it's an interesting and I think still open question for the cyber community about why that has been so and what, if anything, does that tell us about the future of cyber threats to national military projects. But so far it hasn't radically—it hasn't produced a result that would have been different in the pre-cyber era. Now, when I say wars are won on land what I mean by that is that people live on the land, right? People don't live in the air and people don't live on the surface of the water. People live on land. Economies are on land. Populations are on land. That means that usually the stakes that people fight wars over are things having to do with the land. That doesn't mean that navies and air forces are irrelevant. We own a large one. I'm in favor of owning a large one. The Navy—my friends in the Navy would be very upset if I said otherwise. But the purpose of the Navy is to affect people who live on the land, right? In classic Mahanian naval strategy the purpose of the Navy is destroy the opposing fleet, blockade the enemy's ports, destroy the enemy's commerce, and ruin the land-based economy and it's the effect of the land-based economy that causes surrender or compromise or concession to the opponent or whatever else ends the war in ways that you hope are favorable to you. What this means then is that especially where we're dealing with large continental powers like Russia, classically—China's an interesting sub case but let's talk about Russia—the ability to influence the Russian decision-making calculus that leads to an end to a war or the beginning of a war without affecting the life of people on land is very limited. Cyber has not proven able to do that. Air attack historically has not been a good tool for doing that. Navies do that by affecting the land-based economy and I don't see that changing rapidly anytime soon. FASKIANOS: Well, Steve, thank you very much for this really insightful hour. I'm sorry to all of you we couldn't get to the questions, raised hands, so we'll just have to have you back. And thanks to all those of you who did ask questions. I commend to you, again, Steve Biddle's Foreign Affairs piece, “Back in the Trenches,” and hope you will read that. Our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, November 8, at 1:00 p.m. (EST) with José Miguel Vivanco, who is an adjunct senior fellow here for human rights, to talk about human rights in Latin America. So, Steve, thank you again. BIDDLE: Thanks for having me. FASKIANOS: And I—yes. And I'd just encourage you all to learn about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/careers. Our tenured professor and our fellowship deadlines is at the end of October. I believe it's October 31, so there's still time. And you can follow us on X at CFR_Academic. Visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. Thank you all again for being with us today. (END)

Buy a tee! https://www.10percenttrue.com/product-page/magnum-classic-teeSupport me with a coffee! https://www.buymeacoffee.com/10percenttrue Discussion on Discord: https://discord.gg/9vJ3hPYFQh00:00:00 - Introduction00:00:25 - Recap of previous episodes00:01:25 – Fast Jet Tac Weapons course outline00:02:33 – Bringing lessons learned at Tac Weapons to 9 Squadron at RAF Marham00:08:18 – Transitioning from the Hawk to the Tornado GR400:09:49 – Flying qualities of the GR400:13:47 – The idiosyncrasies of the GR4 / Ridge Crossings00:16:15 – Acceleration qualities of the GR400:18:31 – Examples of Hawk and GR4 handrails00:20:42 – GR4, SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) and the ALARM00:23:09 – What the ALARM designed for00:23:58 – The ALARM, the Tornado and potential use in the European Theatre00:26:54 – Planning an ALARM mission00:29:00 – Brief overview of ALARM modes (Direct, Loiter and Dual)00:29:46 – ALARM Loiter mode description00:33:18 – Self-suppressing with ALARM00:34:14 – SEAD mission planning and execution with two people in the cockpit00:36:33 – ALARM Dual mode description00:38:00 – ALARM Loiter mode - concerns about exploitation of landed missiles00:38:19 – Using ALARM and rules of engagement concerns00:40:28 – ALARM loadouts on the Tornado00:41:20 – Deconflicting targets with ALARM in Loiter mode00:43:50 – Question about how the ALARM “sees” the radar emitter00:44:18 – Weight-class of the ALARM00:45:02 – Did the RAF learn from the USAF/USN about the SEAD mission?00:49:16 – Potential Cold War ALARM missions00:51:24 – Did ALARM have the same modes as HARM (HAS, TOO, etc)?00:53:19 – Tolerances of threat reaction modes of the ALARM00:54:35 – Introduction to the Brimstone missile00:55:47 – Difficulty of identifying target from the air at low-level00:59:13 – How did the crew of the Tornado use Brimstone in flight?01:00:48 – Brimstone targeting capabilities01:04:53 – ROVER integration, working with JTACs01:11:28 – Post 2003 shift to insurgent enemy, prospects following ejection?01:16:36 – GR4 cockpit, redistributing the workload01:20:52 – Pride in the Tornado? Envy of other jets?01:24:59 – Force culture, upgrade quals, mentorship01:34:57 – Ejection! Thrust reversers and nose gear.Support the show

Can we get a bye-poi? For full Stardom 5 Star GP coverage and AEW All In review seek out the Patreon. Join the patreon Intro and topics (0:00) Bowling, Golf, and LPGA Joshi (17:00) Sukeban Stardom 5 Star time Ice Ribbon Ice in Wonderland 2023 seaD 8th Anniverary AJW Classics 96 Budokan P3 8/24/94 (54:00) Rickee block: (1:10:00) AEW Build to All Out 2023 NJPW n/a WCW Nitro Jan 17, 2000 (1:55:00) Website: https://redleafretrocast.blogspot.comhttps://linktr.ee/RedLeafRetrocastTwitter: @BowlingJD Rickee: @RickeeLynn

What do young Asian Americans care about? What issues are important to them? What is their vision for their neighborhoods and communities? In June 2023, seven Asian-led organizations in the Twin Cities hosted a community event, Spring into Action: Cultivating Grassroots Asian Power. As nonprofits whose mission is to uplift the community, we must also be accountable to what the community wants and needs. During the event, attendees had the opportunity to participate in a live podcast recording as a way to ground our work in community voices and provide an empowering space for young people to tell their stories. In Part 1 of this installment of New Narratives, you will hear the raw audio and stories from participants at the event. Attendees as young as eleven years old share their perspectives on their neighborhoods, issues they care about, and building Asian power. In Part 2, three of the organizers of Spring into Action, Jacqueline (she/her), Marie (she/they), and Tri (he/anh), sit down to talk in-depth about the prompts we posed to our community members at the event. Head on over to the next episode to hear us discuss topics like affirmative action, ABGs, and eating egg sandwiches in Minneapolis. Thank you to our partner organizations, The SEAD Project, Siengkane Lao MN, SEIU Asian Pacific Islanders Caucus, MN8, Coalition of Asian American Leaders, and Twin Cities Japanese American Citizens League, and to Tri Vo from The SEAD Project for collaborating on this audio project with us. For more info on AAOP, head to our: Website Instagram Facebook Twitter Participate in Tri's project at SEAD, Brave Harbors, which aims to strengthen the framing of and tools available to Southeast Asian peoples needed to build up a world from our hopes and imagination. To build this new world, SEAD needs to hear from you! Head to tinyurl.com/summerSEAD to share your thoughts and feelings as a Southeast Asian American.

Does Asian American solidarity exist? How can nonprofits genuinely engage with the community? How do Asian Americans interact with politics and organizing? In June 2023, seven Asian-led organizations in the Twin Cities hosted a community event, Spring into Action: Cultivating Grassroots Asian Power. As nonprofits whose mission is to uplift the community, we must also be accountable to what the community wants and needs. During the event, attendees had the opportunity to participate in a live podcast recording as a way to ground our work in community voices and provide an empowering space for young people to tell their stories. In Part 2 of this installment, three of the organizers of Spring into Action, Jacqueline (she/her), Marie (she/they), and Tri (he/anh), sit down to talk in-depth about the prompts we posed to our community members at the event. Tune in to hear us discuss topics like affirmative action, ABGs, and eating egg sandwiches in Minneapolis. In Part 1, you will hear the raw audio and stories from participants at the event. Attendees as young as eleven years old share their perspectives on their neighborhoods, issues they care about, and building Asian power. Head over to the previous episode to listen. Thank you to our partner organizations, The SEAD Project, Siengkane Lao MN, SEIU Asian Pacific Islanders Caucus, MN8, Coalition of Asian American Leaders, and Twin Cities Japanese American Citizens League, and to Tri Vo from The SEAD Project for collaborating on this audio project with us. For more info on AAOP, head to our: Website Instagram Facebook Twitter Participate in Tri's project at SEAD, Brave Harbors, which aims to strengthen the framing of and tools available to Southeast Asian peoples needed to build up a world from our hopes and imagination. To build this new world, SEAD needs to hear from you! Head to tinyurl.com/summerSEAD to share your thoughts and feelings as a Southeast Asian American.

Curious about the future of technology or want to explore starting your own tech business? Interested in attending the world's largest software development conference? Don't miss the latest episode of Work it Out with Sead Ahmetovic, Co-Founder of WeAreDevelopers, where he dives into these key topics and shares more valuable insights on entrepreneurship and the tech industry.  Enjoy listening!

Live from Toronto Join the patreon Intro and topics (0:00) Matches/Topics from outside promotions n/a AEW Forbidden Door (3:00) Joshi (1:15:00) seaD and Nakajima Stardom Sunshine Retro Wrestling: AJW Classics 92 Kochi 6/10/94 (2:22:00) NJPW 90's: n/a WCW Dec 27, 1999 New Years Evil (2:45:00) Website: https://redleafretrocast.blogspot.comhttps://linktr.ee/RedLeafRetrocastTwitter: @BowlingJD Rickee: @RickeeLynn

Support me here: https://www.buzzsprout.com/902257/supportOr buy me a coffee here: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/10percenttrue Discussion on Discord: https://discord.gg/9vJ3hPYFQh00:00:00 Intro00:03:38 D.A.C.T. aka Dissimilar Attitudes (in) Culinary Tastes00:06:15 APR-47 roundup and DOS program demonstration 00:26:26 Workflow of APR-47?00:29:53 Threat prioritisation and system confidence 00:33:00 displayed emitters and warnings?00:34:40 HARM, yeah but also Shrikes, MAVERICK and dumb bombs00:39:07 Maverick tape debrief00:59:50 AGM-65 limitations in high threat environment 01:02:05 DEAD vs SEAD in F-4G terms01:04:50 Shilka envelope and engagement considerations01:07:00 is low level still valid tactic?01:09:32 Nellis 01:15:40 Weasel Hostage Crisis sign 01:17:50 WA vs WA01:18:40 Airshows……01:27:40 interlude from airshows 1st deployment to Turkey and trees burned by the RAF01:41:09 2nd deployment to Turkey 01:48:00 a match made in Lake Mead and back to Airshows01:57:10 after Airshows……it wasn't me02:00:40 one more airshow tale including lightsabers 02:07:00 the legacy of WW and its providence in the modern (F-35) world. 02:11:55 Aggressors?Support the show

81 alumnos descalificados por bug informático / Reinicia su PC 292.000 veces para encontrar un fallo / Mayor ronda de VC en Europa / Adiós al Ariane 5 / Criminal de guerra encontrado con reconocimiento facial Patrocinador: Hasta el 30 de junio, en las estaciones de servicio de BP puedes conseguir un ahorro de hasta 8 céntimos por litro simplemente repostando BP Ultimate con tecnología Active. Descárgate la app Mi BP para tu Android o iPhone. — Date prisa, que se acaba el 30 de junio. 81 alumnos descalificados por bug informático / Reinicia su PC 292.000 veces para encontrar un fallo / Mayor ronda de VC en Europa / Adiós al Ariane 5 / Criminal de guerra encontrado con reconocimiento facial

Even as Russia rebuilds its way of fighting and combat power over the next 3-5 years, those forces should be easily overmatched by NATO (on paper at least) in combat operations provided Russian air and missile defences can be destroyed. The package to do that, according to Professor Justin Bronk of RUSI, is quite within European states ability to deliver: allowing them to then fight the air-to-air battle, and deliver decisive combat power on the ground. Yet it is quite hard to detect any urgency in various capitals to take this task in hand – to buy the munitions needed, and make time for the training to do the most challenging of tasks in the air power handbook: SEAD and DEAD. The alternative, a dispersal concept of operations, simply isn't affordable for most European powers based on the aircraft they operate and (more importantly) the support systems they don't possess in sufficient quantities to make workable. There are difficult decisions to be made about what the priorities are with limited resources - and there is a sense they are being fudged. We all probably need to question whether those decisions are being made or simply deferred – again and again – in favour of focusing on something decidedly more photogenic.

Scott E. is back with a second episode this week as he welcomed Sondre Bjorn of the Dramatic Dream Dragons podcast onto the show to talk all the happenings in Golden Week including Mio Momono's AAAW Championship win, more STARDOM Fukuoka thoughts, and a TJPW YES! WONDERLAND '23 review. 3:06: SEAdLINNNG Endeavour 2023! Main Event Review 12:18: Marvelous Korakuen Review + Thoughts on Unagi Sayaka 29:58: STARDOM Fukuoka Review 1:14:57: TJPW YES! WONDERLAND '23 Review Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Buy a tee! https://www.10percenttrue.com/product-page/magnum-classic-teeSupport me with a coffee! https://www.buymeacoffee.com/10percenttrue Discussion on Discord: https://discord.gg/9vJ3hPYFQh00:00:00 Buy a Tee Shirt, God Damn it!00:00:50 Introduction00:03:05 Thoughts on the effectiveness of the Spang mixed F-4G/Viper teams00:05:45 What do you think of the F-15G concept?00:09:00 Thoughts on the transition from F-16CJ/CM to F-35A in the SEAD/DEAD role?00:18:38 Do you know *Redacted*? Also an ex wild Weasel?00:22:47 If you could have persuaded the top Brass to keep the F-4G into the Balkans and beyond, what upgrades would you say it needed to stay relevant?00:29:23 You mentioned something close to the F-15E being closer to the WW role...00:30:20 Are you aware of or do you believe the systems on the F-16CJ have gotten better since the last time you flew with them?00:31:31 Is Starbaby the GIB who started chewing out *Redacted* in his first deployment to Germany as described in his book?00:33:22 Is there still a big weasel mission to suppress or destroy AAA?00:36:50 I have a question about beam rider weapons, like the Ataka, or the Vikhr. Do they require a non-maneuvering platforms?00:37:58 What are military aviators thoughts on us "sim pilots"?00:40:47 At what point is this accurate simulation potentially going too far and bordering on giving potential adversaries maybe too much information too easily?00:42:07 How was the F-4E used alongside the F-4G? How does the Hunter Killer mission patrol work and what were their respective roles?00:44:48 Was it only F-4E with ARN-101/DMAS? 00:47:06 I've heard stories of G model phantom dudes saying “magnum” on the radio to trick the Iraqis into thinking they launched a HARM. How prevalent was this in weasel units? Do you know if the navy or marines ever did anything similar?00:48:13 Question stemming from DCS: Is it a realistic thing for the strikers to dedicate one pylon to having a HARM on hand just in case there's a pop-up threat?00:50:28 Starbaby is promoted to Supreme commander of Allied forces in Europe and  gets order from politicians to create "no-fly zone" over Ukraine.How would you go about it?00:54:25 What were your most task saturating cockpit tasks in two situations; 00:58:44 Best example of teamwork during a weasel mission? Worst? (This one might be better phrased as “Most bungled SEAD operation you were a part of, that had a good plan at the beginning”)01:01:11 Any good LPA stories? (or what ever the correct term is for AF JOPA)01:04:03 If we are interested in how EW, GBAD and so on is performing in the real world (as opposed to marketing brochures and air shows) but only have access to OSINT, what if anything would we be looking for? If it is really possible to say anything.01:06:22 Starbaby do you think the B-2 and F-117 were worth their investments?01:10:36 So is the very big investment into the F-35 worth it?01:11:29 "You know you're going to leave that in".01:12:00 In old HUD footage I noticed magnum callouts are suffixed with "golf" or "tango"...01:12:21 At the end of the F4G's service life SAMs that are capable of point defense...01:13:48 Reading again about the famous Strike Package Q...01:16:47 Starbaby, you briefly mentioned using the APR 40 to find air targets...01:19:49 Your opinion on the friendly fire incidents during OIF...01:22:00 What was your most frightening moment in F-4/F-15 in combat operations if there's any?01:25:10 Curious to know how did it feel when you mastered the APG-70?01:30:07 Would you rather conduct SEAD in a F-4G, armed only with a fencing foil, or a F-16CJ...01:30:58 Do you think that the other services, or even other airforce pilots and crew mSupport the show

Mike "Flash" McVay joins the Bro Chat with "Vader" and "Bender" from the Kodiak Shack Podcast. "Flash" has flown the A-10, F-16, and F-35. He has also instructed at the USAF's Weapons School. You can check out a great article by Flash over on War on the Rocks: Still Flying and Serving, Just Not Active Duty Today we talk SEAD, the next fight, near-peer threats, pilot retention, and more. Kodiak Shack Podcast https://apple.co/3EzhttV Shop https://bit.ly/AfterburnMerch Patreon https://bit.ly/PatreonAfterburn Launch your Aviation Career https://bit.ly/BogiDope_Rain "Afterburn" for 5% Off' Wingman Watch https://bit.ly/WingmanWatches "Rain10" for 10% off YouTube https://bit.ly/YouTube_AfterburnPodcast --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/the-afterburn-podcast/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/the-afterburn-podcast/support

A Celtic State of Mind is a multi award-winning podcast. ACSOM was named as the UK's Best Football Podcast at the prestigious Football Blogging Awards in 2018. In 2020, the podcast was named as a finalist in the Best International Podcast category at the Football Content Awards. In 2021, ACSOM won a further three FCA awards - Best International Podcast (GOLD), Best International Club Content (GOLD), and Best Charitable Campaign (BRONZE).In this latest episode, Declan McConville is joined by Patrick McGilp and Lawrence Connolly to discuss the last 24 hours in the world of Celtic.A Celtic State of Mind has gone from strength-to-strength over the last five years, and there are many more guests lined up in the weeks ahead from the world of sport, music, film, art, broadcasting, literature and politics.Connect with A Celtic State of Mind @PaulJohnDykes and @ACSOMPOD and subscribe to the podcast via iTunes or through your podcast player.

This content is not monetised or behind a paywall. You can support me in keeping it that way here: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/10percenttrue Wild Weasel Story, Part 4. Flash Barker and the F-16CJ in Operation Allied Force. Discussion on Discord: https://discord.gg/9vJ3hPYFQh00:00:00 Introduction.00:01:38 Flash's background00:02:42 F-16 Block 30's role in Korea00:03:15 Block 30 and "Dumb HARM"00:04:20 The F-16CJ00:05:20 Developing Force Protection Tactics00:09:06 Were F-4G Pilots EWOs involved in Flash's Wing?00:10:40 The Harm Targeting System (HTS)00:13:50 The "Force Protection Role" - Priorities00:16:39 Datalink in the F-16CJ00:17:37 Allied Force00:19:48 Building the battle plan00:21:32 How much notice before deploying to Allied Force?00:22:09 The Serbian air defense threat00:23:48 Threat briefs given to 20th FW from Spangdahlem Viper Squadrons00:25:30 Levels of coordination between SEAD assets in theatre00:28:17 Implications of not having secure comms in combat00:30:25 The balance between SEAD and DEAD00:33:37 The psychology of kill or supress the SAM00:35:02 Memorable SEAD mission during Allied Force00:39:13 SEAD missions - successes, failures and lessons learned00:41:16 Typical F-16CJ mission - Preplanned vs dynamic00:42:50 HARM shots - Kills vs suppression00:44:10 Serbian air defense tactics - SAMS forcing aircraft into AAA WEZ00:45:20 Goldfein shot down by SA-300:47:51 Flash's closest call during Allied Force00:49:22 The pilot's trust in the technology to keep them safe00:50:15 The YGBSM motto and arriving in combat00:52:29 Air to air encounters00:57:03 Dog's MiG-29 kill01:00:45 Lessons learned after Allied Force01:02:42 Feelings on the Air Force divesting EW capability01:04:52 Towed decoys and how do they fit in to self protection01:05:55 Were weasel pilots briefed on cyber warfare01:06:56 The rationale of moving pilots between different blocks01:09:23 Did you feel like a Wild Weasel when flying Block 40's?01:11:22 Cultural issues in WW community when transitioning from F-4G to F-16CJ01:13:15 Flying the Block 30 in the AL ANG01:14:29 Flash's favourite Viper variant and favourite mission01:15:00 F-16C Block 30 Centre Display Unit and advanced targeting pods01:15:54 Deploying Afghanistan in 2014 with the Block 30 upgrades and close air support01:17:26 After 20 years and 4,000hrs is flying and fighting the Viper rote?01:19:00 Flash's thoughts on the Viper training pipelineSupport the show

A Celtic State of Mind is a multi award-winning podcast. ACSOM was named as the UK's Best Football Podcast at the prestigious Football Blogging Awards in 2018. In 2020, the podcast was named as a finalist in the Best International Podcast category at the Football Content Awards. In 2021, ACSOM won a further three FCA awards - Best International Podcast (GOLD), Best International Club Content (GOLD), and Best Charitable Campaign (BRONZE).In this latest episode, James McKenzie is joined by Sead Hakšabanović at the Livingston pre-match press conference.A Celtic State of Mind has gone from strength-to-strength over the last five years, and there are many more guests lined up in the weeks ahead from the world of sport, music, film, art, broadcasting, literature and politics.Connect with A Celtic State of Mind @PaulJohnDykes and @ACSOMPOD and subscribe to the podcast via iTunes or through your podcast player.

Building Policy Update: As of June 1, 2022, masks remain required at Town Hall Seattle. Read our current COVID-19 policies and in-building safety protocols. Thu 7/14, 2022, 7:30pm Blaise Agüera y Arcas and Melanie Mitchell with Lili Cheng How Close Are We to AI? BUY THE BOOKS   Ubi SuntBy Blaise Agüera y Arcas   Artificial Intelligence: A Guide for Thinking HumansBy Melanie Mitchell     Artificial Intelligence (AI), a term first coined at a Dartmouth workshop in 1956, has seen several boom and bust cycles over the last 66 years. Is the current boom different? The most exciting advance in the field since 2017 has been the development of “Large Language Models,” giant neural networks trained on massive databases of text on the web. Still highly experimental, Large Language Models haven't yet been deployed at scale in any consumer product — smart/voice assistants like Alexa, Siri, Cortana, or the Google Assistant are still based on earlier, more scripted approaches. Large Language Models do far better at routine tasks involving language processing than their predecessors. Although not always reliable, they can give a strong impression of really understanding us and holding up their end of an open-ended dialog. Unlike previous forms of AI, which could only perform specific jobs involving rote perception, classification, or judgment, Large Language Models seem to be capable of a lot more — including possibly passing the Turing Test, named after computing pioneer Alan Turing's thought experiment that posits when an AI in a chat can't be distinguished reliably from a human, it will have achieved general intelligence. But can Large Language Models really understand anything, or are they just mimicking the superficial “form” of language? What can we say about our progress toward creating real intelligence in a machine? What do “intelligence” and “understanding” even mean? Blaise Agüera y Arcas, a Fellow at Google Research, and Melanie Mitchell, the Davis Professor of Complexity at the Santa Fe Institute, take on these thorny questions in a wide-ranging presentation and discussion. The discussion will be moderated by Lili Cheng, Corporate Vice President of the Microsoft AI and Research division. Blaise Agüera y Arcas is a VP and Fellow at Google Research, where he leads an organization working on basic research and new products in Artificial Intelligence. His team focuses on the intersection of machine learning and devices, developing AI that augments humanity while preserving privacy. One of the team's technical contributions is Federated Learning, an approach to training neural networks in a distributed setting that avoids sending user data off-device. Blaise also founded Google's Artists and Machine Intelligence program and has been an active participant in cross-disciplinary dialogs about AI and ethics, fairness and bias, policy, and risk. He has given TED talks on Sead­ragon and Pho­to­synth (2007, 2012), Bing Maps (2010), and machine creativity (2016). In 2008, he was awarded MIT's TR35 prize. Melanie Mitchell is the Davis Professor at the Santa Fe Institute. Her current research focuses on conceptual abstraction, analogy-making, and visual recognition in artificial intelligence systems.  Melanie is the author or editor of six books and numerous scholarly papers in the fields of artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and complex systems. Her book Complexity: A Guided Tour won the 2010 Phi Beta Kappa Science Book Award and was named by Amazon.com as one of the ten best science books of 2009. Her latest book is Artificial Intelligence: A Guide for Thinking Humans. Lili Cheng is a Corporate Vice President of the Microsoft AI and Research division, responsible for the AI developer platform which includes Cognitive Services and Bot Framework. Prior to Microsoft, Lili worked in Apple Computer's Advanced Technology Group on the user interface research team where she focused on QuickTime Conferencing and QuickTime VR. Lili is also a registered architect, having worked in Tokyo and Los Angeles for Nihon Sekkei and Skidmore Owings and Merrill on commercial urban design and large-scale building projects. She has also taught at New York University and Harvard University. Ubi SuntBy Blaise Agüera y Arcas    Artificial Intelligence: A Guide for Thinking HumansBy Melanie Mitchell   Presented by Town Hall Seattle. To become a member or make a donation click here.

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