Podcast appearances and mentions of Alfred Thayer Mahan

With Eliot traveling, Eric welcomes back prolific historian and author Hal Brands to the show to discuss his forthcoming book The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2025) which will be published in mid-January. They discuss the ideas and careers of geopolitical thinkers Halford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Nicholas Spykman whose views about the influence of geography on international affairs became enormously influential among political leaders of all stripes in the early to mid-Twentieth Century. They touch on the costs of deterrence versus the much higher costs of great power wars, the breakdown of the international trading system in the 1930s and how it presaged military conflict, why regional crises in the interwar period rapidly metastasized into the most costly global conflict in history and how our contemporary world resembles the world of 1940-1941. They also discuss the rise of China and the bipartisan consensus it has spawned on diagnosing our current international environment but has not yet led to a bipartisan execution of policies to remedy the situation. They also discuss the rise of geopolitical super predators in the 1930s, the evolution of "Fortress Eurasia" -- the emerging alliance among the PRC, Russia, Iran and North Korea, Senator Mitch McConnell's recent Foreign Affairs article arguing against retrenchment, and why it is hard to imagine a future conflict not becoming a global conflict today. Shield of the Republic will be taking a break for the holidays and will return in early January. The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern World: https://a.co/d/2XQ7lWa The Price of American Retreat: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/price-american-retreat-trump-mitch-mcconnell Shield of the Republic is a Bulwark podcast co-sponsored by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.

Nicholas Lambert joins the Strategy Bridge Podcast to talk about Alfred Thayer Mahan, his concept of sea power, and the ideas and events that shaped his worldview. Lambert is the author of “The Neptune Factor: Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Concept of Sea Power.”  

Ein Kommentar von Ralph Bosshard.Von der deutschsprachigen Öffentlichkeit weitgehend unbeachtet – oder vielleicht auch willentlich ignoriert – fand Ende vergangener Woche in der belarussischen Hauptstadt Minsk schon die zweite Konferenz für eurasische Sicherheit statt, an welcher 600 Vertreter aus 40 Staaten über die zukünftige Ausgestaltung der Sicherheit auf der größten Landmasse der Erde diskutierten . Umso mehr erstaunt die Abwesenheit wichtiger Akteure, die einen Führungsanspruch in der Weltpolitik erheben: Es fehlten weitgehend offizielle Vertreter aus Westeuropa und Nordamerika, ebenso wie solche aus der Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa OSZE. Das gibt vielleicht schon einmal einen Vorgeschmack auf die Rolle, welche namentlich Westeuropa in der Weltpolitik in Zukunft noch spielen könnte. Hat sich Brüssel soeben selbst kastriert?An mangelnder Relevanz des eurasischen Raums kann es nicht gelegen haben. Dass Eurasien als Weltregion relevant ist, wird auch ohne die Geopolitik-Theorien von Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford Mackinder oder in neuerer Zeit auch von Zbigniew Brzeziński klar, wenn man sich verdeutlicht, dass in diesem Raum – unabhängig davon wie man ihn nun genau definiert – die Mehrheit der Weltbevölkerung lebt und der Großteil der natürlichen Ressourcen der Welt zu finden ist. Er dürfte auch der Hauptschauplatz künftiger Konflikte werden, denn hier harren zahlreiche ungelöste Probleme einer Regelung. Dazu kommt, dass in naher Zukunft wohl die Mehrzahl der strategischen Waffen hier stationiert werden wird, sowohl konventionelle wie auch nukleare, wobei gerade letztere in einem Ausmaß aufgestellt sein werden, das geeignet ist, im Falle eines Atomkriegs den gesamten Erdball unbewohnbar zu machen. Es lohnt sich folglich, sich mit den Ambitionen der Staaten des eurasischen Raums zu beschäftigen.Vielfalt statt RivalitätDer Wunsch, sich zu organisieren, zeigt sich in erster Linie in der Absicht, eine Charta der Vielfalt und der Multipolarität zu kreieren, eine Idee, die anlässlich der ersten Konferenz über eurasische Sicherheit im vergangenen Jahr entstanden war. Dieser Wunsch zeigt sich aber auch in der Revitalisierung der Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten GUS, deren Generalsekretär an der Konferenz auftrat, und der Präsenz der Generalsekretäre der Schanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit SOZ, der Organisation des Vertrags über kollektive Sicherheit OVKS , der Konferenz für Interaktion und vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen in Asien CICA und anderer. Mit der unterschiedlichen Ausrichtung dieser Organisationen sind auch die Dimensionen der Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen der Charta skizziert und damit auch das Verständnis von Sicherheit, welches der Konferenz zugrunde liegt:Es geht um weit mehr als militärische Fragen, sondern primär um Fragen von Wirtschaft, innerer Sicherheit, Diplomatie und Außenpolitik.Vielsagend war auch die Diskussion über die Zukunft der OVKS, die im Rahmen der Konferenz geführt wurde. Primäres Anliegen scheint hier die Schaffung gemeinsamer Analyse-Kapazitäten zu sein und weniger von zusätzlichen militärischen Fähigkeiten, welche ja in der NATO in der Regel im Vordergrund stehen. Auch wenn eine Ausweitung des Sicherheitsbegriffs nicht zu einer umfassenden Mobilisierung der Bevölkerung führen darf, ist eine einseitige Fokussierung des Begriffs der Sicherheit auf militärische Sicherheit sicher falsch, weil anachronistisch...hier weiterlesen: https://apolut.net/eurasien-organisiert-sich-selbst-wahrend-europa-sich-kastriert-von-ralph-bosshard/ Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Subscribe to The Realignment to access our exclusive Q&A episodes and support the show: https://realignment.supercast.com/REALIGNMENT NEWSLETTER: https://therealignment.substack.com/PURCHASE BOOKS AT OUR BOOKSHOP: https://bookshop.org/shop/therealignmentEmail Us: realignmentpod@gmail.comFoundation for American Innovation: https://www.thefai.org/posts/lincoln-becomes-faiNicholas A. Lambert, author of The Neptune Factor: Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Concept of Sea Power, joins The Realignment. Marshall and Nicholas discuss why Alfred Thayer Mahan's 19th century work on The Influence of Sea Power Upon was so influential, how today's era of globalization, geopolitical rivalry, and economic entanglement rhymes with the pre-WWI period, the importance of naval power today, and how policymakers and the military consistently fail to focus their attention on the right metrics of success.

Gran parte del pensamiento estratégico de los oficiales navales de entreguerras se nutrió de las conferencias y libros escritos por el capitán Alfred Thayer Mahan a finales del siglo XIX, y podríamos decir que gran parte de su doctrina, sigue aún vigente y visible en los acontecimientos del presente. Te lo narra Esaú Rodríguez con ayuda de Dani CarAn. 🔗 Enlaces para Listas de Episodios Exclusivos para 💥 FANS 👉 CB FANS 💥 https://bit.ly/CBPListCBFans 👉 Histórico 📂 FANS Antes de la 2GM https://bit.ly/CBPListHis1 👉 Histórico 📂 FANS 2ª Guerra Mundial https://bit.ly/CBPListHis2 👉 Histórico 📂 FANS Guerra Fría https://bit.ly/CBPListHis3 👉 Histórico 📂 FANS Después de la G Fría https://bit.ly/CBPListHis4 Casus Belli Podcast pertenece a 🏭 Factoría Casus Belli. Casus Belli Podcast forma parte de 📀 Ivoox Originals. 📚 Zeppelin Books (Digital) y 📚 DCA Editor (Físico) http://zeppelinbooks.com son sellos editoriales de la 🏭 Factoría Casus Belli. Estamos en: 🆕 WhatsApp https://bit.ly/CasusBelliWhatsApp 👉 X/Twitter https://twitter.com/CasusBelliPod 👉 Facebook https://www.facebook.com/CasusBelliPodcast 👉 Instagram estamos https://www.instagram.com/casusbellipodcast 👉 Telegram Canal https://t.me/casusbellipodcast 👉 Telegram Grupo de Chat https://t.me/casusbellipod 📺 YouTube https://bit.ly/casusbelliyoutube 👉 TikTok https://www.tiktok.com/@casusbelli10 👉 https://podcastcasusbelli.com 👨💻Nuestro chat del canal es https://t.me/casusbellipod ⚛️ El logotipo de Casus Belli Podcasdt y el resto de la Factoría Casus Belli están diseñados por Publicidad Fabián publicidadfabian@yahoo.es 🎵 La música incluida en el programa es Ready for the war de Marc Corominas Pujadó bajo licencia CC. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/ El resto de música es bajo licencia privada de Epidemic Music, Jamendo Music o SGAE SGAE RRDD/4/1074/1012 de Ivoox. 📧¿Queréis contarnos algo? También puedes escribirnos a casus.belli.pod@gmail.com ¿Quieres anunciarte en este podcast, patrocinar un episodio o una serie? Hazlo a través de 👉 https://www.advoices.com/casus-belli-podcast-historia Si te ha gustado, y crees que nos lo merecemos, nos sirve mucho que nos des un like, ya que nos da mucha visibilidad. Muchas gracias por escucharnos, y hasta la próxima. Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

John H. Maurer, the Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy at the Naval War College and contributor to New Makers of Modern Strategy, joins the show to talk about Mahan and his relevance today. ▪️ Times      •    01:30 Introduction      •    02:06 Mahan struck from the syllabus     •    06:30 Early writings     •    09:19 Looking out at the world      •   12:17 Six elements of seapower     •    15:01 Arming for peace     •    20:35 Corbett      •    22:54 The 18th century     •   29:49 A political scientist      •    35:10 Where might one go wrong?     •   39:03 Free security     •    42:26 Who should we be reading?  Follow along on Instagram http://schoolofwar.substack.com

Alfred Thayer Mahan's writings on naval warfare have overshadowed his contributions to geopolitics. His theories, however, are clearly playing out today. Read by Leighton Pugh. Image: A print of a First World War Imperial German Navy battlecruiser, the SMS Goeben. Credit: Troy GB images / Alamy Stock Photo

Nhà phân tích người Nga Tikhon Syssoev trên trang mạng Expert ở Matxcơva được tuần báo Pháp Courrier International lược dịch, cho rằng nếu muốn hiểu rõ quan điểm của Matxcơva về cuộc chiến tranh tại Ukraina, thì nên xem xét « chiến dịch quân sự đặc biệt » do tổng thống Vladimir Putin phát động dưới góc độ lợi ích kinh tế và chiến lược của Nga tại Biển Đen (Hắc Hải) Peter Đại đế và chiến lược Nam tiếnKhông có biên giới biển, Nga chỉ là một cường quốc trên đất liền, nằm lọt thỏm trên lục địa. Thế nên, trong suốt nhiều thế kỷ, nước Nga luôn có một nỗi ám ảnh : Kiểm soát Biển Đen, con đường ngắn nhất nối Nga với những vùng biển nước ấm như Địa Trung Hải, vùng Trung Đông, châu Phi, Nam Âu, Nam Á, rồi châu Á và châu Mỹ Latinh. Đó là tuyến đường đưa Nga đến với những vùng chủ chốt trên địa cầu, và tầm quan trọng của Hắc Hải đối với Nga ngày càng lớn trong bối cảnh bị phương Tây trừng phạt. Tầm nhìn chiến lược này của Nga đã được vạch ra từ cuối thế kỷ XVII đầu thế kỷ XVIII, dưới thời Sa hoàng Peter Đại Đế, một nhân vật lịch sử rất được tổng thống Nga Vladimir Putin ngưỡng mộ, xem đấy như là một hình mẫu, một anh hùng phải noi theo. Trong di ngôn năm 1725, Peter Đại Đế có ghi : « Càng xích đến gần Constantinopolis chừng nào càng tốt chừng ấy. Ai ngự trị được khu vực này sẽ là chủ nhân của thế giới. »* Trong suốt thời trị vì, Peter Đại Đế đã tiến hành nhiều cuộc viễn chinh, tiến ra biển Baltic, vùng Kavkaz, và một chuỗi trận chiến với đế chế Ottoman để rồi có thể đặt chân lên bán đảo Crimée và các vùng duyên hải phía đông và tây bắc của Biển Đen. Những cuộc chinh phục này đã cho phép đế chế Nga lần đầu tiên thành lập một hạm đội hải quân hùng mạnh. Vị thế địa chính trị của vương quốc cũng từ đó đã thay đổi.  Học thuyết quân sự này của Peter Đại đế đã được một số nhà địa chính trị lớn của phương Tây sau này chứng minh vào cuối thế kỷ XIX. Sử gia Martin Motte, giám đốc nghiên cứu Trường Cao đẳng Thực hành, chuyên trách giáo trình chiến lược Trường Chiến Tranh (Ecole de Guerre) trả lời Le Figaro nhớ lại, Alfred Thayer Mahan, một sĩ quan hải quân Mỹ và cũng là sử gia, trong tác phẩm « Vấn đề của châu Á », đã so sánh nước Nga – cường quốc lục địa, với Vương Quốc Anh – cường quốc hải quân.« Cường quốc hải quân Anh vào thời kỳ này đã kiểm soát vùng duyên hải phía nam của lục địa Á-Âu như kiểm soát eo biển Gibraltar, Malta, rồi kênh đào Suez. Từ kênh đào Suez thông qua Biển Đỏ, Anh Quốc kiểm soát cả vùng biển Aden. Để rồi từ đó, nước Anh vươn ra Ấn Độ Dương, chiếm lấy Ấn Độ. Và sau cùng là qua eo biển Malacca, Vương Quốc Anh có được các điểm giao dịch ở Trung Quốc.  Kết quả là, Anh Quốc hưởng lợi từ các luồng giao thương thế giới. Và Mahan giải thích rằng rắc rối của Nga là không thể tiếp cận được các tuyến đường thương mại này, và vì vậy chậm phát triển do liên quan đến việc không có lối thoát ra biển. Chính vì thế, đây là một xu hướng của Nga, điều mà ông Mahan đã nêu lên trên bình diện địa chính trị, nhưng đồng thời ông cũng cho rằng cần phải chống lại xu hướng mở lối thoát ra phía Nam bằng mọi giá của Nga. Lẽ đương nhiên, đó là Biển Đen, bởi vì chính ở đây, phần đất lục địa Nga gần với những vùng biển tự do nhất. »NATO và những mưu đồ ở Biển ĐenChiến lược Nam tiến của Peter Đại Đế sau này vẫn được chế độ Xô Viết tiếp tục củng cố và mở rộng ảnh hưởng tại vùng Hắc Hải và Địa Trung Hải. Nhưng Liên Xô sụp đổ đã kéo theo những thay đổi về cấu trúc, và trở thành một bài toán hóc búa cho Nga thời hậu Xô Viết. Sau năm 1991, Matxcơva chỉ còn giữ được một phần nhỏ vùng Biển Đen với cảng biển Novorossiisk, vốn dĩ chỉ có vai trò thứ yếu thời Xô Viết. Hơn nữa, hạm đội Biển Đen bị chia làm đôi giữa Nga và Ukraina. Đổi lại, Nga vẫn giữ được căn cứ quân sự cũ Sebastopol, thuê lại từ Ukraina với một thời hạn là 20 năm. Nhưng Nga cũng nhanh chóng nhận ra rằng các vị trí của mình tại những vùng biên giới phía Nam đang bị thu hẹp, có lợi cho Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ và Liên Minh Bắc Đại Tây Dương (NATO). Nhà chính trị học và chuyên gia quân sự độc lập Prokhor Tebine được Tikhon Syssoev, tác giả bài viết trên trang Expert trích dẫn, có giải thích như sau : « Việc NATO, đặc biệt là Anh – Mỹ thâm nhập ngày càng sâu vào vùng Biển Đen không chỉ có động cơ răn đe. Hai nước này còn muốn kiểm soát con đường ngắn nhất đi đến Trung Á, khu vực rất giầu nguồn tài nguyên thiên nhiên và như vậy tạo thêm một đòn bẩy áp lực bổ sung nhắm vào Matxcơva và Bắc Kinh ». Một loạt các sự kiện diễn ra trong suốt thập niên 2000 đã khiến Nga quan ngại. Nhiều chính phủ thân phương Tây lên cầm quyền sau các chuỗi « cách mạng hoa hồng » (2003-2004) tại Gruzia và « cách mạng mầu cam » ở Ukraina (2004-2005). Rồi Bulgarie và Rumanie gia nhập NATO (2004). Tính đến giữa thập niên 2000, ba trong số sáu nước vùng Biển Đen – Rumanie, Bulgarie và Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ - là thành viên của NATO, trong khi hai nước khác là Ukraina và Gruzia bắt đầu có những mối hợp tác chặt chẽ với khối liên minh quân sự này.  Nhưng giọt nước tràn ly là thượng đỉnh NATO 2008, diễn ra tại Bucarest, thủ đô Rumanie. Biển Đen có nguy cơ biến thành « ao nhà » của NATO với lời hứa cho Kiev và Tbilisi gia nhập liên minh quân sự. Đây là một trong số những nguyên nhân dẫn đến việc Nga quyết định can thiệp vào cuộc chiến năm ngày giữa Gruzia và Nam Ossetia năm 2008 và nhất là sáp nhập bán đảo Crimée năm 2014.  Theo nhà phân tích Tikhon Syssoev, Matxcơva cảm thấy bất an trước mối đe dọa ngày càng lớn, một phần trực tiếp từ Ukraina và phần khác là từ NATO khi khối liên minh quân sự này cho triển khai hệ thống tên lửa phòng không Aegis Ashore ở Rumanie hay tăng quân số hiện diện trong khu vực. Số tầu chiến và chiến đấu cơ trong vùng Biển Đen ngày một nhiều hơn.Dù vậy, ý đồ tăng cường sự hiện diện của NATO tại Biển Đen cũng vấp phải thái độ cẩn trọng từ Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ e ngại rằng tình hình có thể sẽ gây ra nhiều « khó khăn lớn » cho Nga. Chính vì lập trường này mà Ankara vẫn luôn được Matxcơva xem như là một tác nhân chủ chốt trong khu vực. Điều này cũng giải thích vì sao ngay từ đầu cuộc xung đột, Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ không những đóng cửa các eo biển, ngăn cấm tầu chiến của NATO và Nga đi vào Biển Đen, mà còn tức thì đảm nhận vai trò trung gian hòa giải chính giữa Nga và Ukraina.  Biển Azov : Những con đường thủy thương mại và chiến lượcTuy nhiên, trong cuộc chinh phục Biển Đen của Nga còn phải tính đến vai trò chiến lược quan trọng của vùng biển Azov, dù là khép kín, có diện tích nhỏ chỉ bằng một nước Thụy Sĩ. Ông Martin Motte cho rằng, đây còn là một trong những mục tiêu chiến tranh của ông Putin cho phép hợp nhất lãnh thổ giữa Nga và bán đảo Crimée cũng như là bảo vệ an ninh cho bán đảo. Chiến lược này đã được minh chứng trong cuộc chiến tranh Crimée trong suốt những năm 1850, giữa Ngà và Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ, được Pháp và Anh hậu thuẫn. « Năm 1854, Pháp và Anh bao vây Sébastopol, vốn là cảng lớn của Crimée, căn cứ hải quân lớn của Nga và Sebastopol đã cầm cự được trong vòng một năm. Một trong số các nguyên nhân, bởi vì cảng này không bị liên quân Anh – Pháp bao vây hoàn toàn và tiếp viện vẫn có thể được đưa vào. Vậy nguồn tiếp viện đó đến từ đâu ? Đến từ biển Azov. Bởi vì biển Azov có sông Don đổ vào, vì vậy, việc đưa ngũ cốc từ các đồng bằng rộng lớn của Nga bằng sà lan là rất dễ dàng. Để rồi từ đó đưa ngũ cốc đến bờ biển Crimée, đổ hàng vào ban đêm và cung cấp lương thực cho Sébastopol. » Ngoài ra, Biển Đen và eo biển Azov giúp tiếp cận các vùng sông nước của Nga và Biển Caspi, khu vực có nhiều công ty vận tải hoạt động trên khắp Địa Trung Hải. Kênh đào Volga-Don, nối sông Volga và sông Don, đóng một vai trò quan trọng trong quá trình vận chuyển đường thủy của Nga và là một phần của hành lang vận tải Bắc-Nam quốc tế (nối Saint Petersburg với Bombay). Tuyến hàng hải này còn cho phép các quốc gia vùng Caspi tiếp cận Biển Đen, Địa Trung Hải và các đại dương, giúp các nước này trở thành những tác nhân quan trọng trong thương mại toàn cầu. Không chỉ có các lợi ích kinh tế - thương mại, Biển Đen và Azov còn có những giá trị thực tiễn lớn trên bình diện quân sự. Khi nắm được vùng biển Azov, kể từ giờ, Nga rộng đường cho di chuyển tầu chiến của mình từ vùng biển này sang vùng biển khác : Nghĩa là từ Biển Đen đến biển Caspi thông qua biển Azov và kênh đào Don – Volga. Về điểm này, sử gia Martin Motte nhận định thêm : « Biển Caspi, ít được sử dụng về mặt chiến lược, giờ trở thành một không gian với nhiều biến đổi. Tầu chiến của Nga có thể bắn tên lửa từ vùng biển Caspi này. Con kênh nào kết nối vùng biển này với hệ thống kênh đào thời Xô Viết ? Đó là kênh đào nối liền biển Caspi với biển Azov. Còn vì sao việc có tầu chiến là điều thú vị ? Bởi vì tầu chiến luôn di chuyển, do vậy kẻ thù khó mà xác định được vị trí của con tầu. Và do vậy, một dàn tên lửa di chuyển thường trực, thay đổi vị trí liên tục nên khó mà đánh trúng. »Biển Đen-Azov-Caspi và tham vọng cường quốc hải quân lục địa của NgaTrong một bài viết đăng năm 2016 trên tạp chí « Quốc Phòng » (Revue Défense Nationale), chỉ huy tầu hộ tống Pháp, ông Pierre Rialland phân tích chiến lược mới của hải quân Nga như sau : « Hai vùng biển Caspi và Azov, được nối liền bởi con kênh Don-Volga, mang lại một không gian hành động rộng bằng vùng biển Đông Địa Trung Hải và Vịnh Ả Rập – Ba Tư gộp lại. Bản đồ về tầm hoạt động của SSN 30A cho thấy là Nga sắp có được khả năng hoạt động theo chính sách "pháo hạm" trên một chiến trường dài 6.000 km mà không cần tiếp cận các vùng biển nước ấm. » Những điều này giải thích vì sao ngay trong những tháng đầu tiên của cuộc chiến, quân Nga có những bước tiến rõ rệt tại các mặt trận phía nam Ukraina. Thế nên, theo ông Tikhon Syssoev, nếu giành được toàn bộ thắng lợi ở miền nam, Matxcơva sẽ bảo toàn được nhiều lợi thế. Thứ nhất là gạt hẳn mối đe dọa chính cho hạm đội Biển Đen cũng như là toàn bộ bán đảo Crimée, đồng thời bảo vệ và củng cố « chiếc cầu nối » với Crimée. Tikhon Syssoev dẫn phân tích từ chuyên gia Vassili Kachine, Trường Kinh tế Cao cấp Nga, đánh giá, « trong trường hợp ngược lại, mọi căn cứ mà Ukraina có thể giữ được dọc theo Biển Đen, cho dù bị hạn chế về vũ khí, vẫn sẽ tạo thành một mối đe dọa to lớn đối với Nga ».Thứ hai, mất các cảng Kherson, Mykolaiiv và Odessa, Kiev không những sẽ bị mất cơ sở cảng biển mà cả một phần lớn những gì nước này đang xuất khẩu, kể cả nông sản. Một thất bại mà Ukraina cảm thấy khó nuốt. Cuối cùng, chiếm được Biển Đen, Nga có cơ hội trở thành tác nhân nông nghiệp lớn nhất thế giới, đồng thời củng cố đáng kể an ninh trục giao thương Bắc – Nam. Việc đoạn tuyệt với phương Tây còn làm nổi rõ hơn nữa tầm quan trọng của những mối liên hệ thương mại với Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ, Trung Đông, châu Phi, châu Á và châu Mỹ Latinh.Đối với Vassili Kachine, « nếu Nga thực hiện được những dự án này và kiểm soát bờ Biển Đen, Nga sẽ có được một cơ sở hạ tầng xuất khẩu có tiềm năng rất lớn và một vùng lãnh thổ nông nghiệp quan trọng và một nguồn tài nguyên vô giá. Nga sẽ nắm thế độc quyền thật sự trong ngành công nghiệp này trên thế giới. »  Tóm lại, với việc kiểm soát một vùng ảnh hưởng rộng lớn liên quan đến khoảng 30 quốc gia trong khu vực bao gồm vùng ảnh hưởng hiện nay, những dấu tích lịch sử của đế chế Nga và những địa điểm đối đầu địa chính trị, Nga có thể sẽ trở thành một « cường quốc hải quân lục địa » như kết luận từ nhà sử học Martin Motte.

Admiral Arne Røksund joins Beatrice and Paul to discuss a set of French strategists collectively referred to as the Jeune Ecole, ‘the young school'. The Jeune Ecole is considered the counterpoint to many battle-obsessed land strategists and followers of 19th century US naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan. Leading among the strategists of the Jeune Ecole were Admiral Théophile Aube (1826–1890), who held the posts of governor of Martinique and navy minister, and Gabriel Charmes, an influential journalist whom he had met in the French colonies. For them, as for many other strategists of the decades before and after the First World War, treaties were scraps of paper to be torn up upon the outbreak of war; all was fair, they argued, for a weaker power in defence of its interests. Our guest, Admiral Arne Røksund, has had a distinguished career, holding posts including the Commandant and Commander in charge of all Norwegian military education, and Secretary General of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Currently the Secretary General of the Surveillance Authority of the European Free Trade Area, he holds a PhD in History from the University of Oslo.

Van's interview with Dr. Matthew Specter discusses his new book, The Atlantic Realists. They get into the diverse understandings of the realist tradition, trace its roots to imperial competition in the 19th century, the bizzare intellectual inspirations the Nazis found in US history, whether realism is useful for progressives and the left, and some surprising history about a cast of characters ranging from Hans Morgenthau to Alfred Thayer Mahan to Carl Schmitt. Buy the Book: https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=28906 Un-Diplomatic Newsletter: https://www.un-diplomatic.com Buy Me a Coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/undiplomatic

The field of strategy is littered with authors whose works are often-quoted but seldom-read. While Clausewitz is likely the foremost example of such an author, the naval strategists Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett are not far behind.  In this week's episode of Horns of a Dilemma, Professor Kevin McCranie of the U.S. Naval War College discusses his book, Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought. McCranie's talk provides an overview of the writings of both naval thinkers, and highlights how their works complement each other and continue to exert a profound influence on modern strategy. This talk was given at the University of Texas, Austin.

Writing when the USA was becoming a great power, strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) drew on historical precedent in his talks and books to prepare America to pick up the baton from the United Kingdom. Unashamedly imperialist, Mahan wrote in his The Impact of Sea Power on History, ‘Naval strategy has for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace and in war, the sea power of a country.' Yet as he pondered the instruments and their ways of application, blending geopolitical, economic and cultural considerations in his analysis, Mahan's thinking was much more nuanced than many of his fans realised. Although naval battle was prominent, it was not the only tool of strategy in Mahan's toolbox. Col. Dr Benjamin Armstrong, Permanent Military Professor at the United States Naval Academy, joins Paul and Beatrice to discuss Mahan and how naval leaders and educators the world over – including RUSI which awarded him its highest prize, the Chesney Gold Medal - fell under his spell, albeit in a caricatured rendering dictating the pre-eminence of the navy over the army, and with an undue fixation on naval battle. Col. Dr Armstrong's publications include Small Boats and Daring Men: Maritime Raiding, Irregular Warfare, and the Early American Navy (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2019), and has edited a work on Innovation, Education, and Leadership for the Modern Era (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015). He has received several awards for his publications.

In Episode 116 of the CounterVortex podcast, Bill Weinberg provides an overview of geostrategic and political thinking on the criticality of Eastern Europe and especially Ukraine, from the Crimean War to the contemporary catastrophe. Despite contemporary misconceptions, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels shared the perception of a "Russian meance to Europe" with thoerists of Western imperialism such as Halford John Mackinder, Lord Curzon, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Nicholas J. Spykman, and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Arch-reactionary or openly fascist conceptions of "Eurasianism" were taken up by the German Karl Haushofer and the Russians Mikhail Katkov and Ivan Ilyin—the latter a formative influence on Alexander Dugin, the intellectual mastermind of Vladimir Putin's revanchist imperial project. Listen on SoundCloud or via Patreon. https://www.patreon.com/countervortex Production by Chris Rywalt We ask listeners to donate just $1 per weekly podcast via Patreon -- or $2 for our new special offer! We now have 30 subscribers. If you appreciate our work, please become Number 31!

Alfred Thayer Mahan would feel right at home in today's geopolitical landscape: all of the great struggles of our time are playing out atop, within, and below the world's oceans. Bruce Jones joins host Richard Aldous this week to discuss what the struggle for global supremacy might look like, as outlined in his new book, To Rule the Waves.

Chỉ trong vòng chưa đầy một tuần, Hoa Kỳ cùng các đồng minh châu Á lần lượt có cuộc họp quan trọng : Thượng đỉnh Diễn đàn An ninh không chính thức bốn bên – QUAD (Bộ Tứ) ngày 12/03/2021, rồi hai cuộc họp cấp cao 2+2 Quốc Phòng và Ngoại Giao với Nhật Bản và Hàn Quốc. Vậy, Mỹ tìm kiếm gì tại khu vực Ấn Độ - Thái Bình Dương ? Ấn Độ - Thái Bình Dương chỉ là bọt biển ? Tháng 03/2018, ngoại trưởng Trung Quốc Vương Nghị từng tuyên bố rằng khái niệm « Ấn Độ - Thái Bình Dương rồi sẽ tan biến như bọt sóng biển ». Nhưng ngày nay, khái niệm này ngày càng hiện hữu trong nhiều phát biểu và chiến lược của nhiều quốc gia. Câu hỏi đặt ra, khái niệm này có tự bao giờ ? Ông Pierre Grosser, giáo sư sử học về quan hệ quốc tế, trường đại học Khoa học Chính trị (Sciences Po), trên đài France Culture nhắc lại rằng ngay từ những năm 1960, Nhật Bản – lúc ấy bắt đầu dấn thân trở lại ở châu Á – đã từng sử dụng đến một thuật ngữ khá đặc trưng « châu Á – Thái Bình Dương ». Một sự kết hợp giữa châu Á « da vàng » và Thái Bình Dương « da trắng ». Mục tiêu là nhằm không tạo ra một cảm giác làm sống lại một trục châu Á « chống phương Tây ». Trong suốt những năm 1980, Nhật Bản suy nghĩ đến những hình thức hợp tác kinh tế tại vùng này và đưa ra nhiều sáng kiến nhưng lại để Úc lên tuyến đầu trong những tuyên bố chính thức. Vậy thì thuật ngữ Ấn Độ - Thái Bình Dương ra đời trong hoàn cảnh nào ? Nhà sử học, tác giả tập sách « L’histoire du monde se fait en Asie » (tạm dịch là Lịch sử thế giới được viết nên tại châu Á) giải thích tiếp : « Thuật ngữ Ấn Độ - Thái Bình Dương được phát triển trong những năm 2000, trong một bối cảnh khá đặc biệt, nghĩa là người ta ngày càng nhận thức được mối liên hệ kinh tế giữa Trung Đông và châu Á – nhất là cho dầu hỏa, hay cuộc chiến chống hải tặc trên những con đường giao thông hàng hải. Rồi còn có tác động sóng thần tsunami năm 2004, bao trùm toàn khu vực. Về mặt lịch sử mà nói, chúng ta có thể nhận thấy điều này chẳng có gì là mới cả. Nhưng kể từ những năm 2000, người ta có cảm giác là đối diện với Trung Quốc và nhất là trước các tham vọng thật sự hay giả định của Bắc Kinh tại Ấn Độ Dương, các nước Nhật Bản, Ấn Độ, rồi sau đó là Mỹ, và bây giờ là cả Liên Hiệp Châu Âu, cụ thể là Anh, Pháp đều nói về Ấn Độ - Thái Bình Dương với những định nghĩa khác nhau. Nước Pháp có một định nghĩa rộng hơn đi từ châu Mỹ Latinh đến tận châu Phi ». Điều thú vị là Trung Quốc, ngay khi có thể, tránh sử dụng khái niệm « Ấn Độ - Thái Bình Dương » - một khái niệm mà Bắc Kinh cáo buộc là nhằm bao vây Trung Quốc, « chống Trung Quốc ». Sách Trắng Quốc Phòng Trung Quốc năm 2017 chỉ nói về một vùng « châu Á – Thái Bình Dương ». Mong muốn phớt lờ khái niệm Ấn Độ - Thái Bình Dương còn được khẳng định rõ trong tài liệu dành nói về chiến lược quốc phòng Trung Quốc công bố hồi tháng 7/2019, trong đó, cụm từ « Ấn Độ - Thái Bình Dương » hoàn toàn vắng bóng. Nhưng điều đó không có nghĩa là Bắc Kinh không có một tầm nhìn chiến lược về khu vực này mà họ đang phát triển bằng cách kết nối hai vùng rộng lớn với nhau. Châu Á – Thái Bình Dương vẫn là khu vực ưu tiên, được xem như là vùng ảnh hưởng tự nhiên của Trung Quốc. Với Ấn Độ Dương, những người theo trường phái học thuyết Alfred Mahan ở Trung Quốc rất rõ ràng : « Ai làm chủ Ấn Độ Dương thì kiểm soát châu Á ». Ông Alfred Thayer Mahan, là một nhà sử học, một sĩ quan hải quân và là một chiến lược gia của Hải quân Mỹ (US Navy) cuối thế kỷ XIX đầu thế kỷ XX, nổi tiếng với chủ trương tăng cường sức mạnh hải quân. Tác phẩm của ông được rất nhiều người biết đến là « The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 » (phát hành năm 1890). Do vậy, theo nhà sử học Pierre Grosser, tầm nhìn « Ấn Độ - Thái Bình Dương » của Trung Quốc được diễn giải ở hai cấp độ : « Ở mức thứ nhất, người ta gần như có học thuyết Monroe như người Mỹ đang có, nghĩa là thống trị vùng Đông Nam Á và những vùng biển sát cạnh nhau. Rồi ở cấp độ thứ hai, như chúng ta đã biết, là thông qua những con đường tơ lụa, phát triển hải quân đại dương để có thể triển khai xa hơn, nhằm bảo vệ các lợi ích ngày càng nhiều của Trung Quốc trên khắp thế giới. » Mỹ có thể huy động mạng lưới liên minh ? Sau bốn năm nhiệm kỳ Donald Trump hỗn loạn, làm sứt mẻ phần nào niềm tin của các đồng minh, Hoa Kỳ dưới thời tân tổng thống Joe Biden, ưu tiên khôi phục các mối quan hệ đó và tái tập trung vào cuộc cạnh tranh với Trung Quốc. Chính sách này đầu tiên hết phải được tiến hành bằng các cuộc vận động ngoại giao thông qua những mạng lưới liên minh truyền thống của Mỹ, được thiết lập sau khi chiến tranh Triều Tiên kết thúc năm 1953 như với Nhật Bản, Hàn Quốc, Đài Loan, và trong một chừng mực nào đó là với Úc và New Zealand. Tuy chỉ là những liên minh song phương, không có kiểu đa phương như tại châu Âu, nhưng theo ông Pierre Grosser, những mối quan hệ kiểu này tại châu Á, một mặt cho phép Mỹ áp đặt các quan điểm của mình, và mặt khác Hoa kỳ vẫn có thể giám sát Nhật Bản không để nước này vực dậy về mặt quân sự, Hàn Quốc không tấn công Bắc Triều Tiên và ngăn cản Đài Loan tái chiếm lãnh thổ Hoa lục. Kiểu quan hệ đồng minh này đặt ra những thách thức không phải là nhỏ, ít nhiều gây khó khăn cho Mỹ trong cuộc đọ sức với Trung Quốc ngày nay, theo như phân tích của nhà nghiên cứu về Quan hệ Quốc tế. « Vấn đề của những mối liên minh này mà chuyến công du vừa qua với một mục tiêu quan trọng thúc đẩy cùng nhau hành động, là giữa Nhật Bản và Hàn Quốc có nhiều rắc rối lớn. Bởi vì Hàn Quốc trong khoảng gần 10 năm từng bị Nhật Bản đô hộ với những ký ức lịch sử nặng nề như vấn đề « gái giải sầu », cho đến giờ vẫn còn gây bất đồng giữa hai nước. Nhưng đến những năm 2000, và kể từ năm 2007, ý tưởng QUAD xuất hiện, nghĩa là cùng hợp sức với nhau không những với Úc và Nhật Bản mà có cả Ấn Độ nữa. Chính vì vậy mà Trung Quốc có cảm giác như là bị bao vây. Vì sao ? Bởi vì, Hoa Kỳ đã tìm cách xích lại gần Ấn Độ. Về mặt lịch sử, Ấn Độ chưa bao giờ là bạn của Mỹ thậm chí còn liên kết với Liên Xô vào năm 1971. Ở đây người ta thấy rõ ý đồ sâu xa của Mỹ. Nhật Bản bắt đầu chú ý đến khả năng mở rộng ảnh hưởng trong khu vực. Biến số lớn ở đây là người ta sẽ đi đến đâu với QUAD. Đây là lần đầu tiên có cuộc họp ở cấp độ lãnh đạo Nhà nước bởi vì thông thường chỉ là cuộc gặp giữa các ngoại trưởng. Nhưng tôi không nghĩ là Bộ Tứ có thể trở thành một liên minh chính thức bởi vì Ấn Độ sẽ không tham gia vào liên minh chính thức đó. » Ông Pierre Grosser lưu ý, trong cuộc đọ sức mới này, Hoa Kỳ khó thể lập mặt trận chung theo kiểu truyền thống như thời Chiến Tranh Lạnh ở châu Âu, do các nước lệ thuộc nhiều vào Trung Quốc về kinh tế. « Thế nên người ta mới có một số lượng lớn các thỏa thuận chiến lược như Việt Nam chẳng hạn, vừa phụ thuộc một phần kinh tế Trung Quốc vốn có cùng một mô hình chế độ, nhưng vẫn duy trì các mối quan hệ với Nga. Ấn Độ cũng vậy. Nước này tham gia tổ chức Thượng Hải cùng với Nga và Trung Quốc. Là một nước lớn, khá tự tin, tuy có những tranh chấp biên giới với Trung Quốc, công luận cũng bài Trung Quốc nhưng Ấn Độ không thể liên minh với Hoa Kỳ ». Kềm hãm Trung Quốc : Chiến lược Reagan có hiệu quả ? Thái độ này được thể hiện rõ qua việc trong thông cáo chung QUAD không dùng đến cụm từ « chống Trung Quốc ». Vậy đâu là mục tiêu chính của Bộ Tứ trong khi mà Trung Quốc không ngừng trỗi dậy, củng cố năng lực tấn công cho hải quân ? Trong năm 2021 này, Bắc Kinh sẽ cho hạ thủy 25 tầu chiến, một đội tầu chiến chất lượng cao, cực kỳ hùng mạnh. Ngoài ra, Bắc Kinh còn có cả một đội tầu hải cảnh mà một đạo luật vừa thông qua cho phép lực lượng này nã súng vào các tầu nước ngoài khiến các nước quan ngại, và nhất là Trung Quốc còn có cả một đội tầu đánh cá ngang dọc khắp vùng Thái Bình Dương. Tuy nhiên, theo quan điểm của nhà sử học, mối đe dọa lớn nhất cho Mỹ trong khu vực chính là hệ thống tên lửa phòng không của Trung Quốc. « Vấn đề nghiêm trọng đối với Mỹ ở đây chính là việc họ đã quen thống trị biển cả khi cho rằng điều đó là tốt cho tài sản chung, cho phép tự do lưu thông hàng hải, duy trì hòa bình và bảo đảm giao thương quốc tế. Giờ Mỹ có cảm giác là không còn được như thế do các hệ thống tên lửa phòng không và sự trỗi dậy của hải quân Trung Quốc tại Biển Đông và các vùng duyên hải Trung Quốc. Trong một chừng mực nào đó, điều này làm Hoa Kỳ lo lắng. Cách đáp trả truyền thống là đóng thêm nhiều tầu chiến, đương nhiên cách làm này mang lại nhiều nguồn lợi cho các ngành công nghiệp hàng hải. Vấn đề tranh cãi ở đây là : Thay vì tăng số tầu chiến, lượng vũ khí nên chăng phát triển chiến tranh mạng để ngăn chận Trung Quốc tấn công tầu chiến Mỹ mới là quan trọng hơn ? Theo tôi, có lẽ tốt hơn hết là nên đầu tư vào chiến trang mạng hơn là xây thêm tầu chiến mỗi lúc một nhiều và dễ bị tấn công. » Liệu đó chẳng phải là chiến lược của Reagan được áp dụng từ trước cho đến nay ? Theo đó, Hoa Kỳ phô trương sức mạnh quân sự, một năng lực tấn công mạnh mẽ nhưng thực chất là để thương lượng ? Sử gia Pierre Grosser giải thích thêm. « Về mặt quân sự, chiến lược của Reagan là tấn công trên biển để đối phó với Liên Xô. Tấn công ở đây có nghĩa là giam hãm không cho các tầu chiến Nga ra khỏi vùng biển Barents, biển Okhostsk… Bởi vì, kể từ những năm 1960, Liên Xô bắt đầu xây dựng các loại tầu chiến lớn, đó là điểm thứ nhất. Điều thứ hai, cần phải xem đối với Reagan, đó là thương lượng trong thế mạnh. Như vậy, đầu tiên hết, thương lượng trong thế mạnh bởi vì ta có nhiều vũ khí và là vũ khí tối tân. Thứ đến là khi đã có đồng minh rồi thì ta có thể thương lượng. » Chỉ có điều thời thế đã thay đổi. Trung Quốc không phải là Liên Xô. Hoa Kỳ và Trung Quốc phụ thuộc chặt chẽ lẫn nhau về kinh tế. Liệu rằng chiến thuật này có thể áp dụng cho Trung Quốc, vốn dĩ cũng là một cao thủ cờ vây ? Hạ hồi phân giải !

Caleb Karges, Sam Fluegge, and Jacob Lange discuss Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History and lessons from surfing for understanding naval warfare end existential reflection.

In today’s episode, I want to talk about an idea I call fifth-generation management. 1/ Fifth-generation management is an emerging style of management we don’t know much about because it doesn’t actually exist yet. But it is guaranteed to emerge post-Covid because historically, big sharp disruptions have reliably triggered discontinuous changes in management culture, and it is already clear that this one is doing that.2/ The idea of generations in management, in the form I’m going to lay it out, is causally related to the idea of generations of warfare, and in particular the idea that contemporary styles of warfare strongly shape future styles of management. So if there are generations in warfare, they are going to cause generations in management. Military ideas are not the only cause of course, but I’m going to argue that historically they’ve been the strongest one. Strong enough to almost be determinative. During WW2 for instance, business and military culture became almost the same thing for a few years.3/ This is not a universally popular idea because a significant number people find even the business-as-war metaphor distasteful, let alone the suggestion that military culture directly shapes business culture, or worst of all, that it is in fact the dominant source of business thinking. But personally, I’ll admit I’m enough of both a military nerd and a management nerd that I actually find the connection stimulating rather than depressing to think about. And I have a little bit of history here, my research during my PhD and postdoc fifteen-twenty years ago was on military command and control models, and a lot of my consulting work draws from that experience.4/ For better or worse, the connection between military and business evolution happens to be historically solid, and seems set to remain true. In the past this was much stronger, due to a large number of men serving in wars and then entering business, and business being male-dominated. Today, the coupling mainly has to do with relative rates of technology adoption in military vs business evolution, and to a lesser extent, shared exogenous events affecting both military and business affairs.5/ Before we get into it, a couple of caveats. First, as with any clean, linear, sequential or cyclic model applied to a messy branching, evolutionary reality, you have to apply it very tastefully. You have to think like a historical artisan, matching up the conceptual boundaries of a constructivist notion you’re working with to real history. And where they don’t line up, actual historical events should shape your thinking rather than the abstract idea of one sequence of generations driving another. Second caveat, don’t make the mistake of thinking that each generation fully displaces the previous one in either military or business. Instead, it adds a new layer, and the older layer simply gets confined to a small zone of the action. Generations accumulate like geological layers, they don’t displace each other.6/ To understand the management version, we have to understand the military version first. The idea of generations of warfare was popularized by William S. Lind, who coined the term fourth-generation warfare around 1980. It became the dominant style in actual warfare after the Iraq War, which was probably the last major third-generation war.7/ I have illustrated the generations in the lower half of the diagram. The story basically starts with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, after the Thirty Years War. The first generation lasted almost 150 years. The second generation lasted about 100 years from 1815 to 1915, the third about 65 years from 1938 to 2003. The fourth, I will argue, only lasted about 15 years, from 2003 to 2020, and Covid will trigger a shift to a fifth generation.8/ The first generation was based on final abandonment of medieval warfare, and relied on early smooth-bore muskets. It utilized uniformed, paid armies fighting for nations rather than feudal lords, or mercenary companies. It involved what is known as line-and-column warfare. Think of armies marching in long columns towards strategic targets. Maybe a little large-scale maneuvering and flanking, but lacking the communications and intelligence capabilities to do more.9/ The second generation stretches roughly a century from the end of the Napoleonic wars, around 1815 to World War I. It was based on the development of rifled breech-loading guns, interchangeable parts, and early electronic communications with the telegraph. Technology improved steadily so that WW1 was quite different from say the war of Mexican independence. But the broad style is what’s known as attrition warfare between roughly evenly matched forces in numerical and materiel terms. Armies bogged down in trenches or extended sieges. In second generation warfare, usually the side with the greater economic resources eventually prevails, as in the US Civil War.10/ Third-generation warfare was developed primarily by the German military in the interwar period, and is what is usually called Blitzkrieg in the historical case, or maneuver warfare in more modern terminology. It makes use of fast-moving mechanized infantry, tanks, and sophisticated local communications to move very fast behind enemy lines, maneuver and reorient rapidly in response to changing situations, and collapse the enemy from the inside. 11/ This is the style that was developed and refined by John Boyd, and is roughly what lasted all the way through the Iraq War. In third-generation warfare, often an asymmetrically smaller and technologically primitive force can beat a larger, technologically superior force. This is the style that is based on the OODA loop, which we talk about a lot.12/ This asymmetric outcome potential often creates a conundrum around how to establish the peace after the victory, because economic superiority may not line up with military superiority. In the case of WW2, eventually the Allies got better at maneuver warfare, the Germans got worse and backslid into 2nd generation to some extent, and economic superiority prevailed. And after the war, the Allies won the peace with the Marshall Plan, which was second-generation peace thinking. So in a way WW2 was actually a Generation 2.5 war.13/ Third-generation warfare is also what is sometimes called total war, where you fight with unsentimental professional skill to win. It’s not about honor or fair-play, and deceit, cunning, and cheating are considered legitimate. This means it can get really ugly by design. In older styles of warfare, you would have a collapse of honor norms like “giving quarter,” but for third-generation warfare, which is an extremely rational kind of warfare, you had to have things like the United Nations laws and the idea of war crimes and trials. Because everything from gas chambers to concentration camps is otherwise on the table.14/ Now fourth-generation warfare is best defined not by how war is fought, but by who fights the war. In some ways the Vietnam War for the US, and the Afghanistan War for the Soviet Union, were both early fourth-generation wars. But proper fourth-generation warfare requires non-state actors who can operate with near capability parity on many fronts, which requires the internet and cellphones. It also often has non-state actors with more legitimacy than mere third-generation terrorist groups, and state actors that have much less legitimacy than they used to in the past. In a way, the Peace of Westphalia made states the legitimate combatants, and the Great Weirding is reversing that legitimacy after almost 400 years.15/ Of course, as we’ve all learned by now, fourth-generation warfare, since about 2003, also means dank memes, influence operations, fake news, and disruption of political processes, especially democratic ones like elections, using social media. A good example is modern conflict like Syria involves both state forces, in this case Syria and Russia, as well as ISIS and a people’s resistance. Or Ukraine. It is what is sometimes called hybrid or nonlinear war, and Russia has been the leading practitioner of it. Arguably, the West has been subject to a fourth-generation war attack for four years from Russia.16/ And of course this mix has always been present in warfare in some form, but what distinguishes 4th-generation warfare is that guerrilla goals shape the conflict via leveraged high-tech digital means, instead of just being subject to first, second, or third generation logic, or limited to violent terror tactics. This also means guerrilla goals become top-level political goals, instead of being subsidiary to the goals of a sponsor state. Guerrilla goals are what Henry Kissinger described with his famous line: “The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.” 17/ In other words, fourth-generation warfare brings guerrilla goals to the political table directly. It is not total war, but what I call infinite war: it brings infinite-game war goals, into the picture, the goal being to continue the game rather than win it (infinite game in the sense of James Carse). It’s a true fourth-generation war if at least one top-level combatant is fighting with the guerrilla goal of simply staying in the game, rather than trying to win formally in the sense of a declared war, getting the opponent to surrender, and doing so without a state sponsor. Sometimes of course, the guerrilla actually wins in a conventional sense, in which case they often struggle to transition from a stateless actor to a state actor, as with the Taliban.18/ Okay, now that we have our four generations lined up, let’s talk about how that connects to generations of business management. To do that, I want to talk about an episode you may have heard of, called the Millennium War Games, but you probably haven’t heard anything like my spin on it.19/ Briefly, the Millennium War Games were games held in 2002 in which the Blue Team, operating by a doctrine called Network Centric Warfare or NCW, was defeated by Red Team, led by Marine Corps Lt. Gen Paul Van Riper, operating by standard third-generation Boydian doctrines. NCW was basically a very high-tech model, using satellites and surveillance and tight synchronization. Basically “how would we fight a war with the internet on our side.”20/ Van Riper avoided electronic communications and instead used motorcycle messengers to communicate, and attacks with fishing boats to destroy the Blue Team. Basically, using relatively low-tech and irregular forces to operate in the blind-spot of the high-tech larger adversary that was overconfident in its technological ability. Classic OODA loop style conflict.21/ The normal interpretation of the outcome is that low-tech with superior strategic thinking beats high-tech with weaker strategic thinking, but this is simplistic. It also doesn’t explain why, 50 years after Blitzkrieg was recognized around the world, the Blue Team would operate against the logic of third-generation warfare. The key point to note here is that the war games were primarily naval, and NCW was a doctrine that emerged out of the US Navy and its relationship to technology, specifically from an essay by Admiral William Owens in 1996. 22/ This is not an irrelevant fact. Navies have historically been the highest-tech branch of the military, but not in the sense of adopting the newest, shiniest tech. They are the highest tech in the sense of using the most technology, in the most complete and systematic way, to vertically integrate operations all the way from satellites to bullets. They are platforms. Today for example, the US Navy operates carrier groups, the most advanced version of this thinking.23/ Aircraft carriers are obviously the most sophisticated technology in military use. They run actual little air forces and missile defense and offense that are superior to the entire militaries of small nations. They use satellites. They have destroyers, submarines, anti-submarine capabilities, all operating in coordination. And this has been true going back centuries. Large capital ships were hugely expensive technological marvels even in the age of sailing ships, and money and technological superiority can overwhelm a historic maritime tradition sometimes, as happened in the 18th century when France under Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s administrative leadership briefly pulled ahead of more naval nations like the UK and the Dutch in capability.24/ On the other hand, prototypical third-generation warfare is best exemplified by the US Marine Corps. It’s not exactly a low-tech force, but you could say it selectively uses a few really high-tech bits in an otherwise low-tech style of fighting. The same is true of special forces, but to a greater degree of tech early-adoption. Third-generation warfare you could say is an early-adopter of technology that uses it in a small-scale but highly leveraged and strategic way. It’s the military equivalent of a startup, while navies are the military equivalents of large enterprises.25/ These military startups don’t just use new technology, they rapidly evolve tactics through trial-and-error in actual conflict, and build out strategies and doctrines bottom-up, in real-time, adapted to the current conflict. And this is not because they’re smarter than navies, but because they play a different role: usually offensive, high-speed, messy and ground level.26/ Navies on the other hand, usually play a very different role. Their firepower is primarily deployed from a distance and with overwhelming scale, in what’s called stand-off mode. A modern carrier group will park itself outside a battlespace and send hundreds of sorties into the warzone, launch hundreds of missiles, conduct economic blockades or humanitarian activities, and in general create a sort of boundary condition for the rest of the war. Their job is to create and maintain boundaries, not maneuver within them.27/ In fact, historically, navies have been most powerful when they simply stood off to the side and did nothing. This is one takeaway from Alfred Thayer Mahan’s classic The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. It also applies to nuclear power, which has a similar effect (so nuclear deterrence enforcing the peace). Notably, Boydian thinking emerged out of fighter warfare and doesn’t have much to say about that side of warfare. The point is that complex, systemic technological capability is just a very different sort of weapon, and you have to apply generational thinking separately to it. 28/ Sometimes navies play a more active, maneuvering type third-generation role, as in the Atlantic war against U-Boats, but in general, you could say that navies play a late-adopter, complex systems platform technology role in warfare, while marines and special forces play an early adopter, startup role. If you want to apply the four-generations model to navies, you have to do it separately. I won’t get into how to apply the four-generation model to these boundary-condition parts of the military, but it’s possible.29/ The quick version is that both have a role to play in modern warfare, just as both startups and large companies have a role to play in the tech economy. If your takeaway from the Van Riper Millennium war games episode is that you should give up high-tech complex military capabilities and network-centric operations, and run a cheap military using motorcycle messengers, and fishing boats, you learned exactly the wrong lesson. 30/ In fact all the conflict since 2002 shows the opposite. Network-centric warfare is what’s actually dominating war zones, though not in the doctrinal sense Admiral Owens imagined. Russia, ISIS, China, and other actors who are good at this all operate in a network-centric way. It’s just not in the form that the US NCW doctrine envisioned, but much messier and bottom-up. Missing this point is like thinking all companies should be small startups and that the Googles and Amazons can’t possible work.31/ A better way to think about it is that you should pursue hot military objectives with marines style startup action, but consolidate victories and preserve the peace with navy style network-centric type systemic capabilities. Both have a role to play in every generation of warfare. You could say marines win wars while navies preserve the peace. Though of course in modern conditions, there is never really clear hot war or cold peace, or cold war and hot peace, but a continuous partial warm chaotic conflict.32/ Okay, that was a very long preamble, which was unfortunately necessary because most people make military-to-business connections without knowing much of the relevant military history. But we’re now ready to make the connection to business management generations. I’m going to state it in the form of two laws, and then describe the four generations in relation to the top half of the diagram. 33/ The first law is: On average, business management generations lag military generations by one.34/ This is an average in two ways. The first is across branches of the military. Military startups, marines and special forces, might be 1.5 generations ahead of management cultur, innovating tactics based on the most promising new technologies. Air forces and armies might be 1 generation ahead, using more proven technology, and navies might be 0.5 generations ahead, deploying the most proven technology at the most complex scale. 35/ The second is across time. You may have heard the line that generals are always prepared to fight the last war. This means, every significant new war causes a paradigm shift. It’s like a staircase evolution, and on average, military management culture is ahead. And in a world like ours, where we’re nearly continuously at war somewhere, the saying actually is pretty meaningless.36/ The second law is: The evolution of business management is driven by more frequent, but smaller magnitude, exogenous events. So it has a much smoother evolutionary profile. Every war is an exogenous disruption to business, but not every exogenous business disruption drives evolution in warfare. Business is also driven by political events, economic crises, financial crashes, and many more technologies than warfare. Every military crisis is a business crisis, but not every business crisis is a military crisis.37/ For those of you who follow the computer industry, an analogy to laptops and phones versus gaming consoles is useful here. Gaming consoles are like military technology, they have sudden jumps in capabilities every few years, as specialized chips are designed and launched. But phones and laptops evolve more smoothly with smaller jumps. They eventually catch up and even briefly overtake the console market. But then the consoles jump ahead again.38/ So if you apply these two laws, you get a description of four generations of management that loosely correspond to the four generations of warfare, but with roughly a lag of 1 generation, and a smoother evolutionary profile. So let’s take them in order, as shown in the diagram.39/ First-generation management, which is roughly the mercantile era, overlaps with the first generation of warfare in time, but resembles medieval warfare in structure. It is a little longer by about 25 years, about 1648 to 1854, the London Crystal Palace World Fair. It relies on ways of running businesses that would be familiar to people in the 15th and 16th centuries. Medieval management.40/ Second-generation management, which is roughly the Robber Baron era, roughly 1870 to 1930, loosely resembled first-generation warfare. It features paycheck employees, a traditional column and line type approach to business operations, and leadership that looked a bit like 17th century military leadership. It established large business empires that resembled colonial empires, and used relatively primitive communications based on mail and telegraph to maneuver a little but, but not a lot.41/ Third-generation management, which is roughly the familiar modern managerial era in the old economy, resembles second-generation warfare. It stretched from roughly the Great Depression to 1997, and has two clear phases. In the first phase, about 1935 to 1980, we had a heavily state-regulated corporatist environment, and in the second phase, from 1980 to about 1997, we had a deregulated environment. But despite the differences, the key feature is that professional managers ran the show, and the competition had some of the trench warfare attrition characteristics of WW1. Competitors were roughly evenly matched and were trying to wear each other out in the market.42/ Finally, getting into modern times, fourth-generation management, which is roughly the entrepreneurial era, resembles third generation warfare. It stretches from the dotcom boom and the rise of Clayton Christensen’s disruption model, which is really maneuver warfare for business settings, all the way to 2020. It features charismatic founder-entrepreneurs, rather than professional managers, setting the agenda. Just like third-generation warfare, it puts marines/special forces type startups in the center, and navy-like systemic capabilities on the margins. In the fourth-generation, HBR, Michael Porter and McKinsey took a backseat, while Silicon Valley and the VC blogosphere was in the spotlight.43/ There’s a lot more to be said, but that’s the basic model. Take the military generations, subtract one, adjust boundaries, smoothen the evolutionary curve, and you get management culture. 44/ Which brings us to fifth-generation management. Obviously, Covid and what I call the Great Weirding have been a huge disruption for both military and business. Obviously, climate action is already starting to shape the agenda in a very significant way, and business-to-business or military-vs-military competition is almost taking a backseat while society-to-nature competition is front and center. We are fighting a two front war, with the virus on one front and climate on the other. Neither will be the same coming out the other end. So what can we expect?45/ First, military affairs are in uncharted territory. The US military for instance, is dealing with dangerously unstable domestic politics where they might become a factor for the first time since the Civil War. Syria and Ukraine were fourth-generation wars, but already fifth-generation situations are cropping up all over the place, like the urban conflicts in Western cities, detention camps for refugees, and so on. I won’t go deep into military futures here.46/ But business affairs are in somewhat of a clearer situation. By applying the first law, we can already predict that fifth-generation business will look at least partly like fourth-generation warfare, 2003-20. In other words, like Syria or Ukraine. Just as non-state actors shape fourth-generation warfare, non-business entities will shape fifth-generation business. This includes culture war groups fighting for social justice, climate action nonprofits, governments administering post-Covid recovery funds, and so on.47/ There is also stuff that’s already been recognized, ranging from open-source communities and the gig economy, to the blockchain economy, and various moves towards home-based economic activity and work-from-home that is outside the financial economy. 48/ But the big thing is that there are a large number of reckonings that have to be dealt with. Besides climate, we have the trade war, we have China turning into a new kind of evil empire and surveillance state, we have the techlash, we have financialization on Wall Street, we have a world awash in fiscal responses to Covid. And in the middle of all this, we have supply chains breaking down, wildfires, and other climate-related disruptions.49/ A lot of what I write about on this newsletter is looking at various aspects of all this. The three main projects I have going here all are about researching the background context against which fifth-generation management is emerging, though that’s not the main motivation. In the Great Weirding series, I’m looking at how the equilibrium has been destabilized over the last five years. In the Clockless Clock project, I’m looking at how new temporalities are displacing the clock-based temporality that has coincided with all four generations of war and business, since the invention of the pendulum clock in 1657. In the After Westphalia project, I’m looking at the future of the nation-state.50/ Trying to figure out how to manage military or economic affairs against this complex backdrop is the task of fifth-generation management in both domains, and it will be probably take us all the rest of our lives to figure it out. But at least we now have a starting point and a sense of the nature of the challenge. A lot of this thinking came out of my last few years of consulting work, with clients who are already practicing fifth-generation management, and I’m currently trying to put together an online course based on this material. So if that interests you, stay tuned. There will be an update on that front soon.This has been one of the occasional free podcast issues of the Breaking Smart newsletter, where I send out an essay a week. Usually an installment of one of my longer series projects, which I just mentioned, and occasionally one-off stand-alone essays. So if you liked the ideas in this issue, do subscribe. Get full access to Breaking Smart at breakingsmart.substack.com/subscribe

According to US Naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, the United States achieved dominance and “victory” over the “high seas” on Earth by enabling and protecting global commercial shipping. Through a strong Navy, a civilian Merchant Marine, and control of strategic geography including coaling stations, island possessions, choke points, and great works such as the Panama Canal, the American shipping domain included all of the “blue waters” of the world's oceans.

There are countless ways to study the history of U.S. foreign policy. David Milne, however, makes the case that it is “often best understood” as “intellectual history.” In his innovative book, Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2015), follows the lives and ideas of several foreign policy thinkers, from the naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan at the turn of the twentieth century to Barack Obama in the twenty-first. By doing so, Milne helps us understand the changes and continuities in US foreign policy. One of the virtues of studying biography is that a life is idiosyncratic and one's experiences shapes how one sees the world. An examination of the lives of foreign policy thinkers can therefore help explain why U.S. foreign policy took particular paths. It matters, for instance, that the pessimist Henry Kissinger was deployed as a U.S. soldier in post-Holocaust Germany. It also matters, as you'll find out during the interview, that the cosmopolitan neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz won a cooking contest in Indonesia. The book will interest a wide audience, including historian of U.S. foreign relations, intellectual historians, and political scientists. Dexter Fergie is a PhD student of US and global history at Northwestern University. He is currently researching the 20th century geopolitical history of information and communications networks. He can be reached by email at dexter.fergie@u.northwestern.edu or on Twitter @DexterFergie. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

There are countless ways to study the history of U.S. foreign policy. David Milne, however, makes the case that it is “often best understood” as “intellectual history.” In his innovative book, Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2015), follows the lives and ideas of several foreign policy thinkers, from the naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan at the turn of the twentieth century to Barack Obama in the twenty-first. By doing so, Milne helps us understand the changes and continuities in US foreign policy. One of the virtues of studying biography is that a life is idiosyncratic and one’s experiences shapes how one sees the world. An examination of the lives of foreign policy thinkers can therefore help explain why U.S. foreign policy took particular paths. It matters, for instance, that the pessimist Henry Kissinger was deployed as a U.S. soldier in post-Holocaust Germany. It also matters, as you’ll find out during the interview, that the cosmopolitan neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz won a cooking contest in Indonesia. The book will interest a wide audience, including historian of U.S. foreign relations, intellectual historians, and political scientists. Dexter Fergie is a PhD student of US and global history at Northwestern University. He is currently researching the 20th century geopolitical history of information and communications networks. He can be reached by email at dexter.fergie@u.northwestern.edu or on Twitter @DexterFergie. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

There are countless ways to study the history of U.S. foreign policy. David Milne, however, makes the case that it is “often best understood” as “intellectual history.” In his innovative book, Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2015), follows the lives and ideas of several foreign policy thinkers, from the naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan at the turn of the twentieth century to Barack Obama in the twenty-first. By doing so, Milne helps us understand the changes and continuities in US foreign policy. One of the virtues of studying biography is that a life is idiosyncratic and one’s experiences shapes how one sees the world. An examination of the lives of foreign policy thinkers can therefore help explain why U.S. foreign policy took particular paths. It matters, for instance, that the pessimist Henry Kissinger was deployed as a U.S. soldier in post-Holocaust Germany. It also matters, as you’ll find out during the interview, that the cosmopolitan neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz won a cooking contest in Indonesia. The book will interest a wide audience, including historian of U.S. foreign relations, intellectual historians, and political scientists. Dexter Fergie is a PhD student of US and global history at Northwestern University. He is currently researching the 20th century geopolitical history of information and communications networks. He can be reached by email at dexter.fergie@u.northwestern.edu or on Twitter @DexterFergie. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

There are countless ways to study the history of U.S. foreign policy. David Milne, however, makes the case that it is “often best understood” as “intellectual history.” In his innovative book, Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2015), follows the lives and ideas of several foreign policy thinkers, from the naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan at the turn of the twentieth century to Barack Obama in the twenty-first. By doing so, Milne helps us understand the changes and continuities in US foreign policy. One of the virtues of studying biography is that a life is idiosyncratic and one’s experiences shapes how one sees the world. An examination of the lives of foreign policy thinkers can therefore help explain why U.S. foreign policy took particular paths. It matters, for instance, that the pessimist Henry Kissinger was deployed as a U.S. soldier in post-Holocaust Germany. It also matters, as you’ll find out during the interview, that the cosmopolitan neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz won a cooking contest in Indonesia. The book will interest a wide audience, including historian of U.S. foreign relations, intellectual historians, and political scientists. Dexter Fergie is a PhD student of US and global history at Northwestern University. He is currently researching the 20th century geopolitical history of information and communications networks. He can be reached by email at dexter.fergie@u.northwestern.edu or on Twitter @DexterFergie. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

There are countless ways to study the history of U.S. foreign policy. David Milne, however, makes the case that it is “often best understood” as “intellectual history.” In his innovative book, Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2015), follows the lives and ideas of several foreign policy thinkers, from the naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan at the turn of the twentieth century to Barack Obama in the twenty-first. By doing so, Milne helps us understand the changes and continuities in US foreign policy. One of the virtues of studying biography is that a life is idiosyncratic and one’s experiences shapes how one sees the world. An examination of the lives of foreign policy thinkers can therefore help explain why U.S. foreign policy took particular paths. It matters, for instance, that the pessimist Henry Kissinger was deployed as a U.S. soldier in post-Holocaust Germany. It also matters, as you’ll find out during the interview, that the cosmopolitan neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz won a cooking contest in Indonesia. The book will interest a wide audience, including historian of U.S. foreign relations, intellectual historians, and political scientists. Dexter Fergie is a PhD student of US and global history at Northwestern University. He is currently researching the 20th century geopolitical history of information and communications networks. He can be reached by email at dexter.fergie@u.northwestern.edu or on Twitter @DexterFergie. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

There are countless ways to study the history of U.S. foreign policy. David Milne, however, makes the case that it is “often best understood” as “intellectual history.” In his innovative book, Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2015), follows the lives and ideas of several foreign policy thinkers, from the naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan at the turn of the twentieth century to Barack Obama in the twenty-first. By doing so, Milne helps us understand the changes and continuities in US foreign policy. One of the virtues of studying biography is that a life is idiosyncratic and one’s experiences shapes how one sees the world. An examination of the lives of foreign policy thinkers can therefore help explain why U.S. foreign policy took particular paths. It matters, for instance, that the pessimist Henry Kissinger was deployed as a U.S. soldier in post-Holocaust Germany. It also matters, as you’ll find out during the interview, that the cosmopolitan neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz won a cooking contest in Indonesia. The book will interest a wide audience, including historian of U.S. foreign relations, intellectual historians, and political scientists. Dexter Fergie is a PhD student of US and global history at Northwestern University. He is currently researching the 20th century geopolitical history of information and communications networks. He can be reached by email at dexter.fergie@u.northwestern.edu or on Twitter @DexterFergie. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

There are countless ways to study the history of U.S. foreign policy. David Milne, however, makes the case that it is “often best understood” as “intellectual history.” In his innovative book, Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2015), follows the lives and ideas of several foreign policy thinkers, from the naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan at the turn of the twentieth century to Barack Obama in the twenty-first. By doing so, Milne helps us understand the changes and continuities in US foreign policy. One of the virtues of studying biography is that a life is idiosyncratic and one’s experiences shapes how one sees the world. An examination of the lives of foreign policy thinkers can therefore help explain why U.S. foreign policy took particular paths. It matters, for instance, that the pessimist Henry Kissinger was deployed as a U.S. soldier in post-Holocaust Germany. It also matters, as you’ll find out during the interview, that the cosmopolitan neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz won a cooking contest in Indonesia. The book will interest a wide audience, including historian of U.S. foreign relations, intellectual historians, and political scientists. Dexter Fergie is a PhD student of US and global history at Northwestern University. He is currently researching the 20th century geopolitical history of information and communications networks. He can be reached by email at dexter.fergie@u.northwestern.edu or on Twitter @DexterFergie. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Episódio 3. Alfred Thayer Mahan

This episode of the New Books in Military History podcast is something of a sea change, so to speak, as we turn our attention to naval policy and strategy.  Institutional reform is a well-established topic in studies of the ground and air forces of the United States, ranging from Alexander Hamilton and John C. Calhoun through to Emory Upton and Billy Mitchell.  By comparison, with the noted exception of Alfred Thayer Mahan, much less has been written about the growing professionalism and institutional transformation of the United States Navy in the late nineteenth century.  Our guest for this episode addresses this gap directly.  Scott Mobley is a former naval officer and University of Wisconsin PhD who has written Progressives in Navy Blue: Maritime Strategy, American Empire, and the Transformation of U.S. Naval Identity, 1873-1898 (Naval Institute Press, 2018).  Not only does Scott address many open question about the technological transformation of the Navy, from a wooden hulled, sail and steam powered force into one built around steel armored cruisers, he goes far to put Mahan into his proper context as one of a growing community of intellectuals willing to reassess the mission and global reach of the institution. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This episode of the New Books in Military History podcast is something of a sea change, so to speak, as we turn our attention to naval policy and strategy.  Institutional reform is a well-established topic in studies of the ground and air forces of the United States, ranging from Alexander Hamilton and John C. Calhoun through to Emory Upton and Billy Mitchell.  By comparison, with the noted exception of Alfred Thayer Mahan, much less has been written about the growing professionalism and institutional transformation of the United States Navy in the late nineteenth century.  Our guest for this episode addresses this gap directly.  Scott Mobley is a former naval officer and University of Wisconsin PhD who has written Progressives in Navy Blue: Maritime Strategy, American Empire, and the Transformation of U.S. Naval Identity, 1873-1898 (Naval Institute Press, 2018).  Not only does Scott address many open question about the technological transformation of the Navy, from a wooden hulled, sail and steam powered force into one built around steel armored cruisers, he goes far to put Mahan into his proper context as one of a growing community of intellectuals willing to reassess the mission and global reach of the institution. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This episode of the New Books in Military History podcast is something of a sea change, so to speak, as we turn our attention to naval policy and strategy.  Institutional reform is a well-established topic in studies of the ground and air forces of the United States, ranging from Alexander Hamilton and John C. Calhoun through to Emory Upton and Billy Mitchell.  By comparison, with the noted exception of Alfred Thayer Mahan, much less has been written about the growing professionalism and institutional transformation of the United States Navy in the late nineteenth century.  Our guest for this episode addresses this gap directly.  Scott Mobley is a former naval officer and University of Wisconsin PhD who has written Progressives in Navy Blue: Maritime Strategy, American Empire, and the Transformation of U.S. Naval Identity, 1873-1898 (Naval Institute Press, 2018).  Not only does Scott address many open question about the technological transformation of the Navy, from a wooden hulled, sail and steam powered force into one built around steel armored cruisers, he goes far to put Mahan into his proper context as one of a growing community of intellectuals willing to reassess the mission and global reach of the institution. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This episode of the New Books in Military History podcast is something of a sea change, so to speak, as we turn our attention to naval policy and strategy.  Institutional reform is a well-established topic in studies of the ground and air forces of the United States, ranging from Alexander Hamilton and John C. Calhoun through to Emory Upton and Billy Mitchell.  By comparison, with the noted exception of Alfred Thayer Mahan, much less has been written about the growing professionalism and institutional transformation of the United States Navy in the late nineteenth century.  Our guest for this episode addresses this gap directly.  Scott Mobley is a former naval officer and University of Wisconsin PhD who has written Progressives in Navy Blue: Maritime Strategy, American Empire, and the Transformation of U.S. Naval Identity, 1873-1898 (Naval Institute Press, 2018).  Not only does Scott address many open question about the technological transformation of the Navy, from a wooden hulled, sail and steam powered force into one built around steel armored cruisers, he goes far to put Mahan into his proper context as one of a growing community of intellectuals willing to reassess the mission and global reach of the institution. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This episode of the New Books in Military History podcast is something of a sea change, so to speak, as we turn our attention to naval policy and strategy.  Institutional reform is a well-established topic in studies of the ground and air forces of the United States, ranging from Alexander Hamilton and John C. Calhoun through to Emory Upton and Billy Mitchell.  By comparison, with the noted exception of Alfred Thayer Mahan, much less has been written about the growing professionalism and institutional transformation of the United States Navy in the late nineteenth century.  Our guest for this episode addresses this gap directly.  Scott Mobley is a former naval officer and University of Wisconsin PhD who has written Progressives in Navy Blue: Maritime Strategy, American Empire, and the Transformation of U.S. Naval Identity, 1873-1898 (Naval Institute Press, 2018).  Not only does Scott address many open question about the technological transformation of the Navy, from a wooden hulled, sail and steam powered force into one built around steel armored cruisers, he goes far to put Mahan into his proper context as one of a growing community of intellectuals willing to reassess the mission and global reach of the institution. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This episode of the New Books in Military History podcast is something of a sea change, so to speak, as we turn our attention to naval policy and strategy.  Institutional reform is a well-established topic in studies of the ground and air forces of the United States, ranging from Alexander Hamilton and John C. Calhoun through to Emory Upton and Billy Mitchell.  By comparison, with the noted exception of Alfred Thayer Mahan, much less has been written about the growing professionalism and institutional transformation of the United States Navy in the late nineteenth century.  Our guest for this episode addresses this gap directly.  Scott Mobley is a former naval officer and University of Wisconsin PhD who has written Progressives in Navy Blue: Maritime Strategy, American Empire, and the Transformation of U.S. Naval Identity, 1873-1898 (Naval Institute Press, 2018).  Not only does Scott address many open question about the technological transformation of the Navy, from a wooden hulled, sail and steam powered force into one built around steel armored cruisers, he goes far to put Mahan into his proper context as one of a growing community of intellectuals willing to reassess the mission and global reach of the institution. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Show Notes This week, we recap, review, and analyze Mobile Suit Gundam episode 27 and 28 (26 and 27 in the US), "A Spy on Board" and "Across the Atlantic Ocean," discuss our first impressions, and provide commentary and research on: possible inspiration for the G-Sky EZ, the Cape Verde Islands, famous pro-wrestling tag-teams that may have inspired the Gogg mobile suits, language and culture notes, and submarine warfare in WWII.- A reference on the Allied Phonetic Alphabet (as opposed to the in-use-now Nato Phonetic Alphabet), in which "E" = "Easy."- All about Sherman tank variants, including the "Easy Eight."- Explanation of canards (what they are, and their function on a plane), and the Rutan VariEze homebuilt aircraft (an example of a place with canards).- Overview of the Cape Verde independence movemement. Cape Verde had only recently gained it's independence (1975) when Gundam was released.- Pro-Wrestling Wiki's history of the National Wrestling Alliance, the international pro-wrestling organization that unified US and Japanese wrestling.- Biographies, history, and some video of the Wild Samoans.- Family tree showing the extended Anoa'i family history in wrestling and how the Wild Samoans are related to (among others) Dwayne Johnson.- Real sumo headbutt spear attacks: photo 1, photo 2, photo 3.- Wiki pages on Rikidozan and Toyonobori, and a profile of them as a tag-team.- Another profile of Rikidozan, a photo of him standing over a defeated Kimura, and an interview with The Destroyer about his matches with Rikidozan.- Overviews of the Battle of the Atlantic, and of submarine warfare in WWII.- Alfred Thayer Mahan, and his influence on naval tactics.- Technologies used to combat submarines: huff-duff (high-frequency direction-finding), FIDO (the Mark 24 mine), MAD (magnetic anomaly detector), and the Leigh Light.The Miharu tribute music is a 1926 Recording of Londonderry Air by Leo Rowsome, hosted by Irish Traditional Music Archive / Taisce Cheol Dúchais Éireann. The text is the lyrics to "Eily Dear," written by Fred Weatherly.You can subscribe to the Mobile Suit Breakdown for free! on fine Podcast services everywhere and on YouTube, follow us on twitter @gundampodcast, check us out at gundampodcast.com, email your questions, comments, and complaints to gundampodcast@gmail.com.Mobile Suit Breakdown wouldn't exist without the support of our fans and Patrons! You can join our Patreon to support the podcast and enjoy bonus episodes, extra out-takes, behind-the-scenes photo and video, MSB gear, and much more!The intro music is WASP by Misha Dioxin, and the outro is Long Way Home by Spinning Ratio, both licensed under Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 license. Both have been edited for length. Mobile Suit Breakdown provides critical commentary and is protected by the Fair Use clause of the United States Copyright law. All Gundam content is copyright and/or trademark of Sunrise Inc., Bandai, or its original creator. Mobile Suit Breakdown is in no way affiliated with or endorsed by Sunrise Inc. or Bandai or any of its subsidiaries, employees, or associates and makes no claim to own Gundam or any of the copyrights or trademarks related to it. Copyrighted content used in Mobile Suit Breakdown is used in accordance with the Fair Use clause of the United States Copyright law. Any queries should be directed to gundampodcast@gmail.comFind out more at http://gundampodcast.com

About the Book: Soon after the American Revolution, certain of the founders began to recognize the strategic significance of Asia and the Pacific and the vast material and cultural resources at stake there. Over the coming generations, the United States continued to ask how best to expand trade with the region and whether to partner with China, at the center of the continent, or Japan, looking toward the Pacific. Where should the United States draw its defensive line, and how should it export democratic principles? In a history that spans the eighteenth century to the present, By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783 follows the development of U.S. strategic thinking toward East Asia, identifying recurring themes in American statecraft that reflect the nation's political philosophy and material realities. Drawing on archives, interviews, and his own experience in the Pentagon and White House, Green finds one overarching concern driving U.S. policy toward East Asia: a fear that a rival power might use the Pacific to isolate and threaten the United States and prevent the ocean from becoming a conduit for the westward free flow of trade, values, and forward defense. By More Than Providence works through these problems from the perspective of history's major strategists and statesmen, from Thomas Jefferson to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Henry Kissinger. It records the fate of their ideas as they collided with the realities of the Far East and adds clarity to America's stakes in the region, especially when compared with those of Europe and the Middle East. About the Author: Michael Jonathan Green is senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and director of Asian Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He served on the staff of the National Security Council (NSC) from 2001 through 2005, first as director for Asian affairs with responsibility for Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, and then as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia, with responsibility for East Asia and South Asia. Before joining the NSC staff, he was a senior fellow for East Asian security at the Council on Foreign Relations, director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center and the Foreign Policy Institute and assistant professor at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and senior adviser on Asia in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He also worked in Japan on the staff of a member of the National Diet. Dr. Green is also a nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, a distinguished scholar at the Asia Pacific Institute in Tokyo, and professor by special appointment at Sophia University in Tokyo. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Aspen Strategy Group, the America Australia Leadership Dialogue, the advisory boards of Radio Free Asia and the Center for a New American Security, and the editorial boards of the Washington Quarterly and the Journal of Unification Studies in Korea. He also serves as a trustee at the Asia Foundation, senior adviser at the Asia Group, and associate of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Dr. Green has authored numerous books and articles on East Asian security, including most recently, By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783 (Columbia University Press, 2017). He received his master's and doctoral degrees from SAIS and did additional graduate and postgraduate research at Tokyo University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He received his bachelor's degree in history from Kenyon College with highest honors. He holds a black belt in Iaido (sword) and has won international prizes on the great highland bagpipe.

In this fourth episode of War Room’s special series on Great Strategists, Patrick Bratton explores Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Seapower upon History and its relevance to the 21st century. Writing at the turn of the 20th century, Mahan was explicitly thinking about the role of sea power for the United States as it emerged onto the world stage, and his ideas, though very influential at the time, have fallen somewhat out of favor in more recent thinking about sea power. Mahan's emphasis on big fleets and decisive battles have led some to dismiss Mahan as hopelessly out of date, but Mahan was also writing about broader political questions about the maritime domain. And in the 21st century, rising powers, particularly in Asia, are reading Mahan quite seriously, so it remains a text worth reading and exploring seriously. War Room podcast editor Jacqueline E. Whitt moderates.

The historical significance of sea power has been long since established. In 1890, naval expert Alfred Thayer Mahan authored a well-regarded and timeless book, "The Influence of Sea Power upon History" which outlined the influential history and perpetual importance of naval warfare. The concepts in Mahan's book have largely become a foundation for how experts currently regard naval strategy. Building off of these concepts, today's lecture will explain the impact of naval thought on the current geo-political system and the modern implications of naval supremacy. owensDr. Mackubin Thomas Owens is Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor at The Institute of World Politics. He is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia, and editor of Orbis, FPRI's quarterly journal. He recently retired as Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. At the War College he specialized in the planning of US strategy and forces, especially naval and power projection forces; the political economy of national security; national security organization; strategic geography; and American civil-military relations. From 1990 to 1997, Dr. Owens was Editor-in-Chief of the quarterly defense journal Strategic Review and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at Boston University. Before joining the faculty of the War College, Dr. Owens served as National Security Adviser to Senator Bob Kasten, Republican of Wisconsin, and Director of Legislative Affairs for the Nuclear Weapons Programs of the Department of Energy during the Reagan Administration. Dr. Owens is also a Marine Corps veteran of Vietnam, where as an infantry platoon and company commander in 1968-1969, he was wounded twice and awarded the Silver Star medal. He retired as a Colonel in 1994. Dr. Owens earned his Ph.D. in Politics from the University of Dallas, a Master of Arts in Economics from Oklahoma University, and his BA from the University of California at Santa Barbara. He has taught at the University of Rhode Island, the University of Dallas, Catholic University, Ashland University of Ohio, and the Marine Corps' School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW).

Emory Upton is considered one of the most influential reformers of the U.S. Army in American history. He is sometimes referred to as the Army’s version of Alfred Thayer Mahan. A respected combat veteran of the American Civil War, today Upton is remembered for successfully leading infantry against an entrenched enemy and also for suggesting that “excessive civilian control of the military” was the greatest weakness of the U.S. military. Controversial and brilliant, Upton influenced decades of U.S. military thought and his experiences and theories regarding “trench” warfare were proven on the battlefields of World War I. In 2013, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel David Siry sat down with the Memorial's staff to talk about Upton’s life and legacy. At the time of the interview, LTC Siry was serving as an instructor in American History at the United States Military Academy at West Point. (26:13)

Alfred Thayer Mahan and William Sims – two of the most important figures in American Naval History – are the subject of our discussion with Lieutenant Commander Benjamin (“BJ”) Armstrong. A doctoral candidate in the Department of War Studies at Kings College London, Armstrong is the author of two books collecting and analyzing critical essays by both men: Twenty-First-Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era (Naval Institute Press, 2013) and Twenty-First-Century Sims: Innovation, Education, and Leadership in the Modern Era (Naval Institute Press, 2015). We’re covering both books together in this interview, as they are so closely tied to each other conceptually and thematically, as well as being so recently published and available to the general public. Through the collected essays and his commentary, Armstrong makes a strong case for both the continued relevance and timelessness of the two men and their lesser known or understood works, not only as related to the operations of the United States Navy in the present day, but as touchstones for national security and international relations. A disclaimer, though: the thoughts that Lieutenant Commander Armstrong expresses in this interview are his own, and do not in any way reflect the policies or opinions of the Defense Department or the United States Navy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Alfred Thayer Mahan and William Sims – two of the most important figures in American Naval History – are the subject of our discussion with Lieutenant Commander Benjamin (“BJ”) Armstrong. A doctoral candidate in the Department of War Studies at Kings College London, Armstrong is the author of two books collecting and analyzing critical essays by both men: Twenty-First-Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era (Naval Institute Press, 2013) and Twenty-First-Century Sims: Innovation, Education, and Leadership in the Modern Era (Naval Institute Press, 2015). We’re covering both books together in this interview, as they are so closely tied to each other conceptually and thematically, as well as being so recently published and available to the general public. Through the collected essays and his commentary, Armstrong makes a strong case for both the continued relevance and timelessness of the two men and their lesser known or understood works, not only as related to the operations of the United States Navy in the present day, but as touchstones for national security and international relations. A disclaimer, though: the thoughts that Lieutenant Commander Armstrong expresses in this interview are his own, and do not in any way reflect the policies or opinions of the Defense Department or the United States Navy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Alfred Thayer Mahan and William Sims – two of the most important figures in American Naval History – are the subject of our discussion with Lieutenant Commander Benjamin (“BJ”) Armstrong. A doctoral candidate in the Department of War Studies at Kings College London, Armstrong is the author of two books collecting and analyzing critical essays by both men: Twenty-First-Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era (Naval Institute Press, 2013) and Twenty-First-Century Sims: Innovation, Education, and Leadership in the Modern Era (Naval Institute Press, 2015). We’re covering both books together in this interview, as they are so closely tied to each other conceptually and thematically, as well as being so recently published and available to the general public. Through the collected essays and his commentary, Armstrong makes a strong case for both the continued relevance and timelessness of the two men and their lesser known or understood works, not only as related to the operations of the United States Navy in the present day, but as touchstones for national security and international relations. A disclaimer, though: the thoughts that Lieutenant Commander Armstrong expresses in this interview are his own, and do not in any way reflect the policies or opinions of the Defense Department or the United States Navy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Alfred Thayer Mahan and William Sims – two of the most important figures in American Naval History – are the subject of our discussion with Lieutenant Commander Benjamin (“BJ”) Armstrong. A doctoral candidate in the Department of War Studies at Kings College London, Armstrong is the author of two books collecting and analyzing critical essays by both men: Twenty-First-Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era (Naval Institute Press, 2013) and Twenty-First-Century Sims: Innovation, Education, and Leadership in the Modern Era (Naval Institute Press, 2015). We’re covering both books together in this interview, as they are so closely tied to each other conceptually and thematically, as well as being so recently published and available to the general public. Through the collected essays and his commentary, Armstrong makes a strong case for both the continued relevance and timelessness of the two men and their lesser known or understood works, not only as related to the operations of the United States Navy in the present day, but as touchstones for national security and international relations. A disclaimer, though: the thoughts that Lieutenant Commander Armstrong expresses in this interview are his own, and do not in any way reflect the policies or opinions of the Defense Department or the United States Navy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Introduction "Whoever rules the waves rules the world," that is the thesis of Alfred Thayer Mahan's book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History. He was Naval strategist who wrote in 1890 saying,"Whoever rules the waves rules the world.” He was meditating on the effect of British sea power on confining Napoleon to the continent about 80 years before that. Because the French did not have a strong navy, not strong enough at least, compared to the British, they couldn't expand Napoleon's reign. He was just extending it beyond that, several centuries back and just talking about the need for naval might. He was writing at a time toward the end of the 19th century, when the British Empire was at its absolute apex, when the sun never set on the British Empire, and in which British people sang a somewhat unofficial national anthem written in 1740 by the British poet, James Thomson entitled "Rule Britannia". In the refrain it says, "Rule Britannia, Britannia rule the waves, Britains never will be slaves." British power was projected by naval might all around the world. It's an interesting thesis, the one who rules the waves rules the world. I happen to think it's true, I just happen to think Jesus rules the waves. I think he displays that in the text today. It's interesting in Daniel's prophecy and vision, he had a vision of the rise and fall of the world. Nebuchadnezzar had the dream of the statue, with the gold and the silver and the bronze and the iron and the clay and it was a picture of the rise and fall of world empires. Later in his book, in Daniel 7, he's looking out over the sea and the sea is troubled by the waves, the four winds of Heaven are churning up the great sea and up out of it come four beasts, each of them representing four world empires. John saw the same thing in Revelation 13, as the dragon was standing by the shore and up out of the sea, comes the Beast, which I think is the final world empire, the rule of the anti-Christ in Revelation 13. It's interesting that both the four beasts of Daniel, and this final beast, in Revelation 13, come out up out of the troubled sea, the churning sea and I think it represents humanity. The churning of the nations in its rise and fall, in its ebbing and all of its wickedness, and rebellion, and all of the lack of peace we feel inside our hearts. I think a turbulent sea is a good representation of human history, and I think the theme of the Book of Daniel is really the theme of all of world history, and that is that God almighty reigns over Heaven and Earth, and He will someday clearly establish the kingdom of Jesus Christ over all the Earth. It says in Daniel 2:44, "In the time of those kings, the God of heaven will set up a kingdom that will never be destroyed, nor will be left to another people. It will crush all those kingdoms and bring them to an end but will itself endure forever." This is the theme, I think, of the whole gospel of Matthew, the Kingdom of Heaven and especially the King of the Kingdom of Heaven who is Jesus, He will reign forever and ever. What is the nature of His power, how great is it? The nature of His omnipotence? I think we see it in our text today. "Whoever rules the waves rules the world, and I say that Jesus, Jesus rules the waves, and He will forever more. Isn't that encouraging as we look at the turbulence of our present day and we think that it's still true, that it's a fit metaphor for human history, the churning of the waves that cannot rest, that churn up mire and mud as Isaiah said, "There is no peace says my God for the wicked.” But there is Jesus, the Prince of Peace and what an image in our text today, Jesus walking on the water, walking through the waves through the bellows with omnipotence holding him up. The power of God. There was another British poet who wrote something else about an Empire, and it was Isaac Watts. Long before James Thomson wrote "Rule Britannia”, Isaac Watts wrote, "Jesus shall reign where'er the sun does his successive journeys run, His kingdom spread from shore to shore till moon shall wax and wane no more.” That I believe is the true theme of the great passage we're looking at today. This passage shows and displays, so beautifully, the power of Jesus Christ over all things, and is my purpose today to beguile you into a greater estimation of that power that you would have a sense of just how powerful Jesus is, over the winds and the waves. The Importance of Solitary Prayer We begin with Jesus's essential quiet and peaceful communion with His Heavenly Father. Let's set the thing in context. We already saw in John chapter 14, the martyrdom of John the Baptist, how John was beheaded at King Herod's birthday party after the dance of a dancing girl, when she said, “Give me here on a platter, the head of John the Baptist.” Then John's disciples came and took John's body and buried it, and then they went and told Jesus. When Jesus heard this, He got in a boat and withdrew privately to a solitary place. He’s wanting to be alone for prayer. Unfortunately, for that purpose, at least at that moment when He lands, He sees a huge crowd, 5000 men plus women and children. We saw last week the great compassion of Jesus to put his own needs aside and to minister in a three-fold way to that crowd in Mark's gospel. He had great compassion on them because they were harassed and helpless like sheep without a shepherd, so He taught them many things. First His teaching ministry, and then we saw Jesus's healing ministry, a river of miracles, flowing out and there was nothing He could not do. There was no sickness He could not heal. We see that great power and then He wasn't done. The disciples wanted to send the crowds away so they could buy themselves some food, but Jesus said, "They don't need to go.” Then we see the great miracle of the feeding of the 5000 that was a full coverage of all of their needs by Jesus, the preaching of the gospel, the healing of the sick, the feeding of the hungry every need met. Now it's Jesus's time. The time has come for him to send the crowd away and for Him to get back into that place of great power and communion with his Heavenly Father, the essential communion of Jesus, so He sends the crowd away. Look at verse 22, it says immediately that Jesus made the disciples get into the boat and go on ahead of him to the other side while He dismissed the crowd. There's really somewhat of a battle of wills going on here because in John 6:14, it says, "After Jesus had fed the 5000, the crowds wanted to take Him by force and make Him king.” They want to force Jesus to be king right there and then in their own way, after their own patter. Jesus forces the disciples to get in the boat and then forcefully dismisses the crowd. Who's in charge here? Jesus is in charge. He's not going to be made king in their way. He has his own timetable, and He must go to the cross. He does it his way because if He didn't do it that way, none of us would be saved. He's not going to be king that way, but He will be king, He is king, and He will reign forever and ever, but first He must go to the cross. He’s not going to follow their way; He's not going to be forced into their agenda. No, instead He's going to force the disciples to get on the boat. The Greek word is strong; He's going to dismiss the crowd and so off they go, and then Jesus returns to solitary prayer. He goes up by himself alone. It's night by this time, it's dark, and you can imagine Jesus by the light of the moon or by the light of the stars, making His way up the mountain side, and there He is in solitary prayer with His Heavenly Father. This was His regular habit. In Mark 1:35, it says that Jesus, a great while before dawn while it was still dark, got up and left the house, where He was staying, and went off to a solitary place where He prayed. Another time, after healing a leper, such a huge crowd surrounded Jesus, that He couldn't get any rest. In Luke 5: 15-16, it says, “News about this healed leper spread all the more so that crowds of people came to hear him and be healed of their sicknesses, but Jesus often withdrew to lonely places and prayed.” This was His regular habit. He would withdraw from the crowd to get alone, and He'd spend time in prayer. Crowds were overwhelming. Another time in Luke 6:12, He spent all night alone in solitary prayer to his Heavenly Father, then came down off the mountain, and designated his twelve apostles, after spending the whole night in prayer with His Father. Jesus regularly had this pattern of withdrawal into solitary places, sometimes mountains. This was his essential communion with his father, and I believe this was the true source of Jesus's power for ministry. This was the true source of the way that He ministered in power. Jesus did a river of miracles before. Toward the end of our text here everybody who comes, even those who just touched the hem of His garment, are healed. It’s a river of power flowing through Jesus. What was the source of that river? Well, Jesus told us He openly claimed it was the father working in him that accomplished these things. That's what he said. And we have to take his word for it, in consistent solitary communion with His Father, Jesus got his daily work assignments. And he also got from his Heavenly Father, the power in order to do those assignments and then went out in the power of the Spirit and did the things the Father told him to do. This is precisely what Jesus said happen in John 14, he said, "Don't you believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me." There's a perfect union between the Father and the Son. "The words I say to you are not just my own rather it is the Father living in me who's doing his work.” He says, "Believe me when I say that I am in the Father and the Father is in me or at least believe on the evidence of the miracles themselves.” Jesus claimed that the very words He spoke and certainly the miracles He did were the result of the Father living in him powerfully. He also said in John 10:32 to His enemies. "I have shown you many great works from the Father, for which of these do you stone me?” The Father is doing his work in Jesus again in John 8:28 when Jesus said, "When you have lifted up the son of man, then you will know that I am the one I claimed to be, and then I do nothing on my own, but speak just what the Father has taught me." Jesus got alone with his heavenly Father and He listened to the Father. The Father gave him the words to speak and the works to do, and he went and did it. Let me stop for a moment and ask about your own personal life. Is this your regular habit? Do you regularly get alone with the Heavenly Father in solitary prayer? Do you spend time alone with him to renew yourself spiritually or are you stronger than Jesus? Are you wiser than Him? You know just what to do and you've got the strength to do it. I think we're easily deceived in this. Do we really know just what to do and do we really have the strength to do it? Maybe you don't have a mountain side or some solitary place where you can go. Jesus, in Matthew 6 said, "Go into your room, close the door and pray to your Father is unseen." That could be your solitary place. The question is, are you doing it? Jesus did this regularly. This was his essential communion with his father. Next in our account, however we see the disciples’ peril and fear. Jesus is up there in serenity and in peaceful fellowship with his heavenly Father, but the disciples are in a boat in the middle of a storm. What a beautiful contrast that is. it. I want to apply it to our lives. Fear: The Enemy of Faith What a picture we have of Jesus up on the mountain, the disciples way down below in a boat. They're being tossed and turned by the waves, and Jesus, in peaceful a heavenly communion with his father, sees the problem and descends to help them. Hebrews 7 tells us that Jesus is at the right hand of God and is always living to intercede for us no matter what trouble we're going through. I think it's right for us to think that way, and that Jesus is able to help us in the midst of our troubles. Now we have the disciples in fear of peril. Now fear is intrinsic to our suffering here. Few of us go through a week without feeling some fear, perhaps some of us don't go through a day without feeling some kind of fear. Fears are connected to the danger of physical or psychological pain for us as people. Animals have physiological reactions. You see a deer drinking at a pond or something like that, and then jerking up its head and looking sniffing and then back down jerking up again, or a squirrel. Try to catch a squirrel. Squirrels are quick and they know what they're all about. They're all about survival; they have instincts towards survival. I don't know if we call it fear, but they're designed to be able to save themselves. Human fear is different though. It has to do with our intellect, it has to do with our imaginations and our anxieties as much as thinking that we're an imminent physical danger. Most of the time that's not the case, most of the time it's not the case that we think we're about to perish. Sometimes happens, like in a car situation when something unexpected quickly happens, but most of our fears are tied to our thoughts about the future and something's about to happen to us that we don't want to happen. It might be a sickness, it might take something from us or a loved one from us, or our own health, our ability to thrive in this world, we might be afraid of that. It might be financial dangers, thinking that ruin is facing us. Many times, however, our fear amounts to nothing at all, isn't that the case? We fear for no reason. We spent a lot of emotion, a lot of time, a lot of anxiety, afraid about something that never even happens. Wouldn't you admit that that's the way it is with most of your fears? But some of them are genuine, some of them really are genuine things we're afraid of, and they actually do come to pass and cause great harm, and they bring us great pain and suffering. Some of it doesn't go away for a long time, if it ever does go away in this world. It’s painful, we go through these experiences and we're afraid to go through them again. Once burned twice shy. We become afraid. Fear is part of life in this sin cursed world. The disciples were afraid, I think, in the midst of the storm. If you look at verse 24, it says, “The boat was already a considerable distance from land buffeted by the waves because the wind was against it.” John 6: 18 says, “A strong wind was blowing in the water.” The peaceful calm of the Sea of Galilee can quickly be transformed by a violent storm. It has to do with the way that the hills and mountains around are shaped. It can just kind of a funnel wind down in there. It swirls around and really can whip it up into quite a storm. The disciples were rightly afraid. But it wouldn't be long in this account before they're more afraid of Jesus than they are of the storm. Look at verses 25 through 27, "During the fourth watch of the night, Jesus went out to them walking on the lake when the disciples saw him walking on the lake.” They are terrified; “It's a ghost,” they said, and they cried out in fear, but Jesus immediately said to them, "Take courage. It is. Don't be afraid.” Their superstitions fit into this fear that they think it's a ghost. The theology of ghost does not receive much support from the Bible, but they thought it was a ghost. As a matter of fact, at a more significant moment in redemptive history, this issue is going to come up again namely, at the resurrection when doubts arise in their minds. They thought they were seeing a ghost. It was Jesus risen, and He has to prove to them that he's not a spirit. This is in Luke 24 when He eats a piece of broiled fish, and shows them his hands, and side. He wants them to interact with him physically to prove He has actually defeated death and that He's not a spirit. He's not a ghost. But here they're being afraid, and they cry out in fear. They're afraid that Jesus is a ghost. Fear is the great enemy of our faith. Over 100 times in the Bible, God or an angel of God or a prophet of God, or a leader from God assures the people of God not to be afraid. It is a repeated theme. Fear is a great enemy of our faith. God is constantly laboring through the Word against our fears, because, like termites, fears are constantly laboring against the structure of our faith. So, we have to work on this issue of fear. God wants us to trust and not be afraid. How many Psalms pick this up as a theme? Psalm 56:3-4, "When I am afraid, I will trust in you, in God whose word I praise. In God I trust, I will not be afraid. What can mortal man do to me?" I get the sense there that the psalmist in Psalm 56 is preaching to himself, he's proclaiming truth to himself, he’s talking himself out of fear, and we need to do that. It is important in the Christian life to learn how to take scriptural truth and preach it to yourself. You are definitely your own most important preacher, far more than I am. Preach to yourself against your own fears. Jesus’ Compassion for the Fearful Next, we see Christ's compassion and power as He is sitting up on the mountain. He sees his disciples. We don't get that in Matthew's account, but we do get it in Mark's account. Mark 6:47-48, says, "When evening came the boat was in the middle of the lake and He, Jesus was alone in the land.” Verse 48, "He saw the disciple straining at their oars, because the wind was against them. About the fourth watch of the night, he went out to them walking on the lake." What an image. Jesus is up on the mountain and He looks down and sees the trouble the disciples are in. I tell you that God sees everything you're going through, He sees all things. The Lord Jesus sees everything you're going through. I don't know the nature of his vision at that time and in the days of His incarnate ministry on earth. Maybe God the Father, gave him a supernatural vision of the disciples in the middle of the lake. But He saw them. He looked, and seeing their peril, comes to their rescue. There is such a unifying theme in this text. He sees the disciples' peril and comes to their rescue. He sees Simon Peter's peril and comes to his rescue. He sees the people of Gennesaret and their peril, and He comes to their rescue. Above all, He sees your peril and mine, and He comes to our rescue. He comes to them walking on the water. Now we use that expression “walk on water” to do something extraordinary, something that can't be explained. Talk even about politicians, you know, they expected him or her to walk on water, this kind of thing. It's really blasphemous. Only Jesus can do it and those empowered by Jesus apparently. I have to add that because of this text. Now, people talk about the laws of physics, that expression you'll not find in the Bible. That's just the way God consistently chooses to work in this world. I'm not saying that science isn't something we can pursue, we can, but God isn't subject to those so-called laws, He can do whatever he wants. He's not asking permission of the water to hold them up, he's not doing a study on buoyancy or surface tension. My goodness, what some unbelievers will do to passages like this: The ever present and moving sandbar just below the surface. I've never seen a sandbar like that and certainly not one that went all the way across the whole lake. What a strange thing. One study group at Florida State University led by one particularly creative professor was talking about how, if the atmospheric and water conditions are right, you can actually get small chunks of ice floating, and that explains what happened. Imagine Jesus kind of surfing on the ice getting across. That's not convincing to me. And then, how does Peter get his own little piece of ice just outside the boat? It doesn't make any sense. The lengths that people will do to undercut what the Spirit of God is doing in this text, which is giving us a display of Jesus' power. He can do all things. He's walking on the water, because He's God, because He can do it. When they see Jesus they cry out, thinking he's a ghost, and He assures them that He is Christ, that He is God. He sees Peter's peril and comes to his rescue. We'll deal with that in a moment, but when He gets across the lake and lands of Gennesaret, his heart is moved with compassion for those people as well. He sees their peril, and his ministry extends to them as well. Look at verses 34-36. “When they crossed over, they landed at Gennesaret and when the men of that place recognized Jesus they sent word to all the surrounding country.” People brought all their sick to Him and begged Him to let the sick just touch the edge of his cloak. All who touched Him were healed. The crush of people resumed, that's Jesus' life, that was his ministry. He has those occasional times alone with his father, but mostly He's surrounded by needy people and He sees the peril. He's moved out of compassion and He wants to heal them and to take care of them. There is nothing that our Savior cannot do. Touching the hem of the garment, they're cured. The power of Jesus, that's what's displayed in Matthew 14. But above all, He looks and sees our peril and He come to our rescues. What is the nature of our peril? We could talk about the winds and the waves of your life. We can talk about the trials that you're facing, but let's go right to the heart of the matter. Jesus said, "Everyone who hears these words of mine and puts them into practice like a wise man who built his house on the rock, and the rains came, rose... Rains fell, and the streams rose and blew and beat against that house. But it did not fall because it had its foundation on the rock, but everyone who hears these words of mine and does not put them into practice, like a foolish man who built his house on the sand. And the rains fell on that house and the streams rose and the wind blew and beat against that house and it fell with a great crash. I think this is Judgment Day and the only way we're going to survive Judgment Day is Jesus seeing our peril and coming to our rescue. This is precisely what He has done at the cross. Do you know Him as your Savior, have you trusted in Him? Do you know for certain that your house is built on a foundation that will survive the peril of Judgment Day? Has Jesus reached down and drawn you up out of judgment by His saving grace? Trust in Him, don't leave this place without trusting in Christ. Call on Him as Peter does, “Lord save me.” Call on Him and He will rescue you. This is Jesus' ministry, He sees peril and He rescue, He saves, trust in Him. Now, let's talk for a moment about Peter's supernatural journey. What a fascinating thing. Let me ask you a question, if you had been with them in the boat would you have been Peter getting up and walking, or will you have been those that stayed in the boat and waited to see how it turned out with Peter? First of all, would the idea have popped in your mind, “You tell me to come to you on the water.” Would that have even come to your mind? What an amazing man Peter was. Aren't you glad for Peter and all of his successes, and even more perhaps for his failures? Aren't you glad to see what God can do through a person like him? What God can do through someone like you. Look at Peter’s supernatural journey, look at its beginning, its middle, and its end. First the beginning. "Lord if it's you, Peter replied, "Tell me to come to you on the water." "Come," said Jesus. Then Peter got down on the boat and walked on the water and came towards Jesus. Peter was willing to ask something that no one else thought to ask or was willing to ask. And Jesus granted to him a supernatural power that no other human being has ever had, as far as we know. The power to walk on water. We forget that it's not only true that God himself can do immeasurably more than all we could ask or imagine but he actually can do through us immeasurably more than all we could ask or imagine. Isn't it true? And how much we forget that, because we forget to ask, we don't ask him to do great things through us. But Jesus himself said in John 14, the night before he was crucified. "I tell you the truth, anyone who has faith in me will do what I have been doing, he will do even greater things than these because I am going to the Father and I will do whatever you ask in my name, so that the Son may bring glory to the Father. You may ask me for anything in my name and I will do it." We under-asked. Let's just stop and apply it for a moment. What are you trusting God for that only God can do? What ministry are you stepping out to do and you know if God doesn't support you, you will fail? I think we're just living natural lives and we really called to live super naturalized. We're called to do things that only God could do through us. Verse 30, "But when he [Peter]saw the wind and the waves, he was afraid and beginning to sink, cried out. Lord, save me." He steps out, he's doing well, but then all of a sudden, he maybe gets smacked in the face by a wave or some sound occurs, and he gets distracted. He stops looking at Jesus, and he starts to esteem the power of the waves to kill them as greater than the power of Jesus to save him. He starts to look at his situation and then he looks inward and says, "Can I do this? No, I cannot do this." And he sinks. Quickly. It's an issue of his faith. He has stopped focusing on Jesus' power and instead he's sinking because he’s sitting on his own strength and he knows he can't do it. He begins to sink and cries out, "Lord, save me," and Jesus says at that particular moment, "You of little faith, why did you doubt?" You will never find anywhere in the gospels or in all of scripture where Jesus cuddles unbelief, where he comforts the unbeliever. He doesn't, He rebukes it. "Why did you doubt? Don't you know who I am?" "Lord, if it's you, tell me to come." “It is me. I'm still me, I'm still here.” He never cuddles unbelief. The end of the journey is that Jesus is powerful to rescue. In the end, He gets the glory. He will get the glory for your supernatural journey also. He'll get the glory from mine. In the end, He gets all the glory. Beginning to sink, Peter cries out, Jesus reaches out and draws him up. What kind of strength would that take? But this is a supernatural power of almighty God working through them, and He draws him up instantly. He doesn't let him flounder, He doesn't let him sputter, He doesn't let him drown, He immediately rescues him. This is the compassion of Jesus. He's not going to let you drown either. The real issue going on in your life and mine right now is an issue of faith. Satan's real design on you is to destroy your faith in Jesus. That's what he’s after, he wants to kill your faith, so Jesus goes to the heart of the matter, “You of little faith. Why did you doubt?” These are issues of faith. Peter has not yet had at this point his hardest trial of faith. We know when it is. It's the night that Jesus was arrested, and Jesus predicted, "Simon, Simon. Satan has demanded to sift all of you like wheat.” It's plural, just sift all of them like wheat, “but I have prayed for you, Simon, particularly that your faith may not fail and when you have turned back, then strengthen your brothers." Jesus in that statement shows us the center of his intercessory prayer ministry for us while we're going through trials. You may be going through the biggest trials of your life, you may not. You may have just gotten through some of those winds and waves and all the stuff that was happening, and the water is coming in the boat and you think you're going to drown. But now you've gotten on the other side of it. Or this may yet be in your future. But the object of all of that from Satan's point of view, is to destroy your faith in Jesus. You say, "That's impossible. Isn't it true? Once saved, always saved.” Are we going to continue to believe in Jesus right to the end? Yes, we will. If we have been justified by faith, we will continue right to the end. But you know what? It's a dynamic process. Jesus had to reach up and grab Peter and hold him. Do you have faith independent of Jesus' energetic intercessory prayer in your behalf? Do you have it on your own? Is this your own faith? He gave the faith to you; He is the vine where the branch keeps sustaining that faith. He's interceding for you in the middle of your trial. “You of little faith. Why did you doubt?” He's saying, "Oh Father, don't let our faith fail. Oh, Father, don't let his faith fail." He continues to intercede at the right hand of God, that our faith may not fail. This is the issue. The ultimate inevitable conclusion is worshipping Jesus as God. Someday I'll get to see Jesus and I will get to worship Him. I'll get to fall down in His presence and say, "You are God, You are Almighty God." That's the outcome of this whole journey, that's where we're heading. What could be better than that? The outcome even in this account is they're worshiping him as God. In verse 27, when they cry out, Jesus literally says, "Take courage. I AM. Do not be afraid." What are the words “I AM” mean to you? This is God's name, he's saying, "I AM, I am God." This is the name by which the Jewish God, Yahweh, is known. He revealed himself to Moses, in the flames of the burning bush. Saying, "Tell them that I AM sent you, I AM that I AM.” This is what he says, "I AM. Don't be afraid, I AM God." The disciples, react naturally to a supernatural power, verse 33, "Then those who are in the boat worshipped him saying, ‘Truly you are the Son of God.’” This is God's end. His purpose is worship, in spirit and truth, and there's no jealousy in the trinity. It's not like the father says, "Hey, hey, wait about me, what about me? I'm the one who gave him the power." No, He wants us to honor the Son, even as we honor the Father, that's his yearning. It says in Philippians 2, that, “Jesus being found in appearance as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient to death, even death on a cross, therefore, God exalted him to the highest place and gave Him the name that is above every name, that at the name of Jesus, every knee should bow in heaven and on earth, and under the earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the father.” There's no jealousy in the trinity, He's delighted to see the disciples’ worship and say, "Truly, you are the Son of God." Application What application do we take from this? First, I've already given you, solitary prayer. Do not think that you can get along better without solitary prayer than Jesus did. Look at your prayer life. How is it? I had to do that just as I was preparing this sermon. How is my prayer life? Is it what it needs to be? I was convicted, that I need to spend more time in solitary prayer. I take comfort in Matthew 6, where Jesus said, "Go into your room and close the door and pray to your Father unseen.” That's good, but it's still good to have a special place where you can go to be refreshed and renewed spiritually to strengthen yourself. He restores my soul. Do you have that regular habit of private prayer? What about this whole issue of allegory? Is He the Lord of our rocking boat? Jesus will rescue from the storms of your life. What are the storms of your life? The problem with allegories it denies that this ever really happened historically. I tell you, it happened, there are details. It was about the fourth watch of the night. The disciples are straining at their oars. Peter starts, but it starts to sink. Who makes this kind of stuff up? This actually occurred in space and time. But that doesn't mean that there are not spiritual connections, the stuff you will face in your life, even if you never get into a boat the rest of your life. We have permission to do that because in Ephesians 4, it says if you get good teaching ministry, a good pastor and teacher to teach you, then you will no longer be infants, blown and tossed back and forth by the waves. You won’t be blown here and there by every wind of teaching and by the cunning and craftiness of men that are deceitful, scheming false doctrine, being under the influence of false doctrines, like being in a storm-tossed sea, says Paul in Ephesians 4. James says, "If you lack wisdom, then ask God, but you better believe that He'll give it to you, because he who doubts is like a wave of the sea blown and tossed by the wind. That man should not think he will receive anything from the Lord. He is a double-minded man unstable in all he does.” This is a way of speaking. We know what storms are like, we know what it's like to be under the influence of something that's more powerful than we are that seems to mean harm. We call those things trials. Jesus is watching over you in the middle of your trials to rescue you and help you. But I'm going to go further than that. He actually is bringing the trials to you. He has brought the storm into your life. He is not just managing the storm, he brought it, he has certain purposes in your life. Nothing comes to you except directly by the will of your Heavenly Father, and He is managing and protecting you in the middle of that storm and that trouble. Finally, look at Peter as a commendable example of faith. I know he failed in the middle of it, but he got up out of the boat. How comfortable do we get in our Christian lives? You know what I'm talking about? How comfortable? We don't want to witness; we don't want to go to the far reaches on a mission trip. He may be calling you to get up out of your boat and walk to Jesus. He may be calling on you to go to foreign lands. But there are applications to be courageous, to step out in faith and do things that only God can do in and through you. What are you doing like that? I want to close with the example of DL Moody who made two commitments in his life that carried him the rest of his life. DL Moody made a commitment after hearing Henry Varley who was a fellow evangelist say this, the world is yet to see what God can do with a man fully consecrated to Him. He resolved to be that man. A man fully consecrated Jesus. That means at every moment, I'm given over to doing the will of God. He said to RA Torrey, his co-worker, he said, "If I believe that God wanted me to jump out that window, I would jump." Fully consecrated, whatever God told me to do, I want to do. He made a second commitment, and this is very interesting. This came out in RA Torrey's funeral sermon for Moody. He preached why God used DL Moody. Moody made a commitment that he would not allow 24 hours to pass over his head without witnessing to somebody about Christ. That's pretty practical, isn't it? Are you courageous enough to make a commitment like that? Try a week, let's start with one week, alright? For one week, you won't let 24 hours pass over your head without witnessing to somebody. There are amazing stories about Moody's commitment. Once, late, late in the day, he hadn't witnessed anybody. It was about 11 o'clock, and he was going back to his hotel. He doesn't know what to do, and he sees a man by a lamp post, and he goes up and he starts sharing and says, "Friend. Are you a Christian?" The man is immediately offended, he says, "How dare you? You don't even know me; you don't know anything about me. And you're asking me that question?" The man knew that Moody was a preacher. He said, "If you weren't some kind of preacher, I'd knock you into the gutter right now." That man went and told some of DL Moody's sponsors that Moody had a zeal without knowledge, and that he was rude and was actually under cutting the work of Christ. The organizer called DL Moody in, he was a young man at this point and said, “You're doing more damage than good.” It caused Moody to doubt some of his own convictions. It was very tough time until three weeks later, late in the night, there’s a loud knock on the door and it's the same man. He said, I've not been able to get your question [ Are you a Christian?] out of my mind. I've come to the conclusion, I'm not a Christian, and I've given my life to Christ, and I just wanted to thank you. There was another time again late at night. Moody hadn't witnessed and thinking that it’s too late, he goes out and is pouring rain. He sees a man immediately, a man who is walking with an umbrella, so he runs out of his little hotel area, and goes out in the pouring rain, and says, “Do you mind if I share your umbrella? He said, "No, come on." So, there are two of them walking along under the umbrella and he gets an idea and says, "Do you know the security and the shelter that comes from following Christ? He uses the umbrella as a picture of salvation and led the man to Christ. I just think we don't step out in faith because we're afraid of what will happen. We're afraid of what will happen if we make a commitment to go to foreign places or to not let one day go by in seven that we don't witness for Jesus. We're afraid to try new ministries. Don't be. When you step out in faith, you will find the ground under your feet secured by the power of God, by the power of Jesus.