Podcasts about Malacca

Jim talks with Timothy Clancy about wicked mess problems & the potential for a new Cold War centered on AI. They discuss the evolution from chat-based to reasoning AI, military applications, social & systemic complexity in national security, the scaling hypothesis, China vs US competition, DeepSeek R1 model implications, export controls on GPU chips, Taiwan's strategic importance, multipolar trap & arms race dynamics, power & chip requirements, training vs implementation costs, context scaling in reasoning AI, innovation in AI efficiency, models & simulations in military planning, validation challenges, statistical distributions vs single predictions, Taiwan conflict scenarios & deterrence strategies, operational causality, the strategic importance of the Straits of Malacca, and much more. Episode Transcript "Applying AI to Strategic Warning," by Anna Knack, Nandita Balakrishnan, and Timothy Clancy JRS EP57 - Timothy Clancy on Russia's Mid-Game JRS EP248 - Timothy Clancy on the Israel-Hamas War "MegaMullet: The DeepSeek Moment – The Start of an AI Cold War," by Timothy Clancy Timothy Clancy is an Assistant Research Scientist at START specializing in studying wicked mess problems, including violence and instability, as complex systems. For over 30 years Timothy has helped stakeholders in all manner of organizations understand their wicked mess problems and work towards resolving them. This included prior work at IBM where he was the Chief Methodologist of Lean, Six Sigma, and Agile supporting Fortune 50, government, and military clients to navigate their own wicked messes in strategy, business models, and enterprise transformation.

President Trump has been threatening to “take back” the Panama Canal since he regained power. In this episode, listen to testimony from officials serving on the Federal Maritime Commission who explain why the Panama Canal has become a focus of the administration and examine whether or not we need to be concerned about an impending war for control of the canal. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes Current Events around the Panama Canal March 5, 2025. the Associated Press. Sabrina Valle, Suzanne McGee, and Michael Martina. March 4, 2025. Reuters. Matt Murphy, Jake Horton and Erwan Rivault. February 14, 2025. BBC. May 1, 2024. World Weather Attribution. World Maritime News Staff. March 15, 2019. World Maritime News. July 29, 2018. Reuters. Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 U.S. Department of State. The Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative” Michele Ruta. March 29, 2018. World Bank Group. The Trump-Gaza Video February 26, 2025. Sky News. Laws Audio Sources Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation January 28, 2025 Witnesses: Louis E. Sola, Chairman, Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) Daniel B. Maffei, Commissioner, FMC , Professor, Scalia Law School, George Mason University Joseph Kramek, President & CEO, World Shipping Council Clips 17:30 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): Between the American construction of the Panama Canal, the French effort to build an isthmus canal, and America's triumphant completion of that canal, the major infrastructure projects across Panama cost more than 35,000 lives. For the final decade of work on the Panama Canal, the United States spent nearly $400 million, equivalent to more than $15 billion today. The Panama Canal proved a truly invaluable asset, sparing both cargo ships and warships the long journey around South America. When President Carter gave it away to Panama, Americans were puzzled, confused, and many outraged. With the passage of time, many have lost sight of the canal's importance, both to national security and to the US economy. 18:45 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): But the Panama Canal was not just given away. President Carter struck a bargain. He made a treaty. And President Trump is making a serious and substantive argument that that treaty is being violated right now. 19:10 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): President Trump has highlighted two key issues. Number one, the danger of China exploiting or blocking passage through the canal, and number two, the exorbitant costs for transit. 19:20 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): Chinese companies are right now building a bridge across the canal at a slow pace, so as to take nearly a decade. And Chinese companies control container points ports at either end. The partially completed bridge gives China the ability to block the canal without warning, and the ports give China ready observation posts to time that action. This situation, I believe, poses acute risks to US national security. 19:50 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): Meanwhile, the high fees for canal transit disproportionately affect Americans, because US cargo accounts for nearly three quarters of Canal transits. US Navy vessels pay additional fees that apply only to warships. Canal profits regularly exceed $3 billion. This money comes from both American taxpayers and consumers in the form of higher costs for goods. American tourists aboard cruises, particularly those in the Caribbean Sea, are essentially captive to any fees Panama chooses to levy for canal transits, and they have paid unfair prices for fuel bunkering at terminals in Panama as a result of government granted monopoly. Panama's government relies on these exploitative fees. Nearly 1/10 of its budget is paid for with canal profit. 21:25 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): Panama has for years flagged dozens of vessels in the Iranian ghost fleet, which brought Iran tens of billions of dollars in oil profits to fund terror across the world. 21:40 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): And Chinese companies have won contracts, often without fair competition, as the infamous Belt and Road Initiative has come to Panama. China often engages in debt trap diplomacy to enable economic and political coercion. In Panama, it also seems to have exploited simple corruption. 32:40 Louis Sola: The Panama Canal is managed by the Panama Canal Authority, ACP, an independent agency of the Panamanian government. The ACP is a model of public infrastructure management, and its independence has been key to ensure a safe and reliable transit of vessels critical to the US and global commerce. 33:25 Louis Sola: In contrast, the broader maritime sector in Panama, including the nation's ports, water rights, and the world's largest ship registry, falls under the direct purview of the Panamanian government. 33:35 Louis Sola: Unfortunately, this sector has faced persistent challenges, including corruption scandals and foreign influence, particularly from Brazil and China. These issues create friction with the ACP, especially as it works to address long term challenges such as securing adequate water supplies for the canal. 33:55 Louis Sola: Although the ACP operates independently, under US law both the ACP and the government of Panama's maritime sector are considered one in the same. This means that any challenges in Panama's maritime sector, including corruption, lack of transparency, or foreign influence, can have a direct or indirect impact on the operations and long term stability of the canal. This legal perspective highlights the need for diligence in monitoring both the ACP's management and Panama government's policies affecting maritime operations. 34:30 Louis Sola: Since 2015, Chinese companies have increased their presence and influence throughout Panama. Panama became a member of the Belt and Road Initiative and ended its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Chinese companies have been able to pursue billions of dollars in development contracts in Panama, many of which were projects directly on or adjacent to the Panama Canal. Many were no bid contracts. Labor laws were waived, and the Panamanian people are still waiting to see how they've been benefited. It is all more concerning that many of these companies are state-owned, and in some cases, even designated as linked to the People's Liberation Army. We must address the significant growing presence and influence of China throughout the Americas and in Panama, specifically. 35:20 Louis Sola: American companies should play a leading role in enhancing the canal's infrastructure. By supporting US firms, we reduce reliance on Chinese contractors and promote fair competition. 36:55 Daniel Maffei: Because the canal is essentially a waterway bridge over mountainous terrain above sea level, it does depend on large supplies of fresh water to maintain the full operations. Panama has among the world's largest annual rainfalls. Nonetheless, insufficient fresh water levels have occurred before in the canal's history, such as in the 1930s when the Madden Dam and Lake Alajuela were built to address water shortages. Since that time, the canal has undertaken several projects to accommodate larger, more modern ships. In the last couple of years, a trend of worsening droughts in the region, once again, has forced limits to the operations of the canal. Starting in June of 2023 the Panama Canal Authority employed draft restrictions and reduced the number of ships allowed to transit the canal per day. Now the Panama Canal limitations, in combination with the de facto closure of the Suez Canal to container traffic, has had serious consequences for ocean commerce, increasing rates, fees and transit times. 39:30 Daniel Maffei: Now, fortunately, Panama's 2024 rainy season has, for now, alleviated the most acute water supply issues at the canal, and normal transit volumes have been restored. That said, while the Panamanian government and Canal Authority have, with the advice of the US Army Corps of Engineers, developed credible plans to mitigate future water shortages, they also warned that it is likely that at least one more period of reduced transits will occur before these plans can be fully implemented. 41:55 Eugene Kontorovich: We shall see that under international law, each party to the treaty is entitled to determine for itself whether a violation has occurred. Now, in exchange for the United States ceding control of the canal which it built and maintained, Panama agreed to a special regime of neutrality. The essential features of this regime of neutrality is that the canal must be open to all nations for transit. That's Article Two. Equitable tolls and fees, Article Three. An exclusive Panamanian operation, Article Five. The prohibition of any foreign military presence, Article Five. Article Five provides that only Panama shall operate the canal. Testifying about the meaning of the treaty at the Senate ratification hearings, the Carter administration emphasized that this prohibits foreign operation of the canal, as well as the garrisoning of foreign troops. Now, Article Five appears to be primarily concerned about control by foreign sovereigns. If Panama signed a treaty with the People's Republic of China, whereby the latter would operate the canal on Panama's behalf, this would be a clear violation. But what if Panama contracted for port operations with a Chinese state firm, or even a private firm influenced or controlled in part by the Chinese government? The Suez Canal Company was itself, before being nationalized, a private firm in which the United Kingdom was only a controlling shareholder. Yet this was understood to represent British control over the canal. In other words, a company need not be owned by the government to be in part controlled by the government. So the real question is the degree of de jure or de facto control over a Foreign Sovereign company, and scenarios range from government companies in an authoritarian regime, completely controlled, to purely private firms in our open society like the United States, but there's many possible situations in the middle. The treaty is silent on the question of how much control is too much, and as we'll see, this is one of the many questions committed to the judgment and discretion of each party. Now turning to foreign security forces, the presence of third country troops would manifestly violate Article Five. But this does not mean that anything short of a People's Liberation Army base flying a red flag is permissible. The presence of foreign security forces could violate the regime of neutrality, even if they're not represented in organized and open military formations. Modern warfare has seen belligerent powers seek to evade international legal limitations by disguising their actions in civilian garb, from Russia's notorious little green men to Hamas terrorists hiding in hospitals or disguised as journalists. Bad actors seek to exploit the fact that international treaties focus on sovereign actors. Many of China's man made islands in the South China Sea began as civilian projects before being suddenly militarized. Indeed, this issue was discussed in the Senate ratification hearings over the treaty. Dean Rusk said informal forces would be prohibited under the treaty. Thus the ostensible civilian character of the Chinese presence around the canal does not, in itself, mean that it could not represent a violation of the treaty if, for example, these companies and their employees involved Chinese covert agents or other agents of the Chinese security forces. So this leads us to the final question, Who determines whether neutrality is being threatened or compromised? Unlike many other treaties that provide for third party dispute resolution, the neutrality treaty has no such provision. Instead, the treaty makes clear that each party determines for itself the existence of a violation. Article Four provides that each party is separately authorized to maintain the regime of neutrality, making a separate obligation of each party. The Senate's understanding accompanying to ratification also made clear that Article Five allows each party to take, quote, "unilateral action." Senator Jacob Javits, at the markup hearing, said that while the word unilateral is abrasive, we can quote, "decide that the regime of neutrality is being threatened and then act with whatever means are necessary to keep the canal neutral unilaterally." 46:35 Joseph Kramek: My name is Joe Kramek. I'm President and CEO of the World Shipping Council. The World Shipping Council is the global voice of liner shipping. Our membership consists of 90% of the world's liner shipping tonnage, which are container vessels and vehicle carriers. They operate on fixed schedules to provide our customers with regular service to ship their goods in ports throughout the world. 47:15 Joseph Kramek: As you have heard, using the Panama Canal to transit between the Atlantic and Pacific saves significant time and money. A typical voyage from Asia to the US or East Coast can be made in under 30 days using the canal, while the same journey can take up to 40 days if carriers must take alternate routes. From a commercial trade perspective, the big picture is this. One of the world's busiest trade lanes is the Trans Pacific. The Trans Pacific is cargo coming from and going to Asia via the United States. Focusing in a bit, cargo coming from Asia and bound for US Gulf and East Coast ports always transits the Panama Canal. Similarly, cargo being exported from US and East Coast ports, a large share of which are US Agricultural exports, like soybeans, corn, cotton, livestock and dairy also almost always transits the Panama Canal. The result is that 75% of Canal traffic originates in or is bound for the United States. 48:55 Joseph Kramek: We've talked about the drought in 2023 and the historic low water levels that it caused in Lake Gatún, which feeds the canal locks, a unique system that is a fresh water feed, as contrasted to an ocean to ocean system, which the French tried and failed, but which is actually active in the Suez Canal. These low water levels reduced transits from 36 transits a day to as low as 22 per day. Additionally, the low water levels required a reduction in maximum allowable draft levels, or the depth of the ship below the water line, which for our members reduced the amount of containers they could carry through the canal. This resulted in a 10% reduction in import volumes for US Gulf and East Coast ports, with the Port of Houston experiencing a 26.7% reduction. 51:10 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): Are you aware of allegations from some vessel operators of disparate treatment such as sweetheart deals or favorable rebates by Panama for canal transits? Louis Sola: Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman, we have become aware through some complaints by cruise lines that said that they were not getting a refund of their canal tolls. When we looked into this, we found a Panamanian Executive Order, Decree 73, that specifically says that if a cruise line would stop at a certain port, that they could be refunded 100% of the fees. And as far as I know, that's the only instant where that exists. 53:05 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): So Panama was the very first Latin American country to join China's Belt and Road Initiative, and right now, China is building a fourth bridge across the Panama Canal for car traffic and light rail. Chairman Sola, why should Chinese construction of a bridge near Panama City concern the United States? Louis Sola: Mr. Chairman, we all saw the tragedy that happened here in the Francis Scott Key Bridge incident and the devastation that had happened to Baltimore. We also saw recently what happened in the Suez Canal, where we had a ship get stuck in there. It's not only the construction of the bridge, but it's a removal of a bridge, as I understand it, called the Bridge of the Americas. It was built in 1961 and that would paralyze cargo traffic in and out of the canals. 53:55 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): Panama also recently renewed the concessions for two container ports to a Chinese company, Hutchison Ports PPC. Of course, Chinese companies are controlled by the Communist Party. How does China use control of those ports for economic gain? Louis Sola: Mr. Chairman, I am a regulator, a competition regulator. And the Chinese ports that you're referring to, let me put them into scope. The one on the Pacific, the Port of Balboa, is roughly the same size as the Port of Houston. They do about 4 million containers a year. They have about 28 game tree cranes. The one on the Atlantic is the same as my hometown in Miami, they do about 1 million containers. So where Roger Gunther in the Port of Houston generates about $1 billion a year and Heidi Webb in Miami does about $200 million, the Panama ports company paid 0 for 20 years on that concession. So it's really hard to compete against zero. So I think that's our concern, our economic concern, that we would have. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): Commissioner Maffei, anything to add on that? Daniel Maffei: Yeah, I do too also think it is important. I would point out that you don't have to stop at either port. It's not like these two ports control the entrance to the canal. That is the Canal Authority that does control that. However, I think it's of concern. I would also point out that the Panamanian government thinks it's of concern too, because they're conducting their own audit of those particular deals, but we remain very interested as well. 56:25 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): Would the facts discussed here be considered violations of the neutrality treaty in force right now between the United States and Panama? Eugene Kontorovich: So I think Senator, I think potentially they could, but it's impossible to say definitively without knowing more, in particular, about the degree of Chinese control and involvement in these companies. I think it's important to note that these port operation companies that operate the ports on both sides, when they received their first contract, it was just a few months before Hong Kong was handed over to China. In other words, they received them as British companies, sort of very oddly, just a few months before the handover. Now, of course, since then, Hong Kong has been incorporated into China, has been placed under a special national security regime, and the independence of those companies has been greatly abridged, to say nothing of state owned companies involved elsewhere in in the canal area, which raised significantly greater questions. Additionally, I should point out that the understandings between President Carter and Panamanian leader Herrera, which were attached to the treaty and form part of the treaty, provide that the United States can, quote, "defend the canal against any threat to the regime of neutrality," and I understand that as providing some degree of preemptive authority to intervene. One need not wait until the canal is actually closed by some act of sabotage or aggression, which, as we heard from the testimony, would be devastating to the United States, but there is some incipient ability to address potential violations. 58:10 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): If the United States determines that Panama is in violation of the treaty, what is the range of remedies the United States would have for that treaty violation? Eugene Kontorovich: So I think it may be shocking to people to hear today, but when one goes over the ratification history and the debates and discussions in this body over this treaty, it was clear that the treaty was understood as giving both sides, separately, the right to resort to use armed force to enforce the provisions of the treaty. And it's not so surprising when one understands that the United States made an extraordinary concession to Panama by transferring this canal, which the United States built at great expense and maintained and operated to Panama, gratis. And in exchange, it received a kind of limitation, a permanent limitation on Panamanians sovereignty, that Panama agreed that the United States could enforce this regime of neutrality by force. Now, of course, armed force should never be the first recourse for any kind of international dispute and should not be arrived at sort of rationally or before negotiations and other kinds of good offices are exhausted, but it's quite clear that the treaty contemplates that as a remedy for violations. 1:03:20 Louis Sola: I believe that the security of the canal has always been understood to be provided by the United States. Panama does not have a military, and I always believed that there's been a close relationship with Southern Command that we would provide that. And it would be nice to see if we had a formalization of that in one way or another, because I don't believe that it's in the treaty at all. 1:05:05 Daniel Maffei: While we were down there, both of us heard, I think, several times, that the Panamanians would, the ones we talked to anyway, would welcome US companies coming in and doing a lot of this work. Frankly, their bids are not competitive with the Chinese bids. Frankly, they're not that existent because US companies can make more money doing things other places, but even if they were existent, it is difficult to put competitive bids when the Chinese bids are so heavily subsidized by China. 1:06:10 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): What would China's incentive be to heavily subsidize those bids to undercut American companies and other companies? Daniel Maffei: Yeah, it's not a real short answer, but Senator, China's made no secret of its ambitious policies to gain influence of ports throughout the globe. It's invested in 129 ports in dozens of countries. It runs a majority of 17 ports, that does not include this Hong Kong company, right? So that's just directly Chinese-owned ports. So it has been a part of their Belt and Road strategy, whatever you want to call it, the Maritime Silk Road, for decades. So they believe that this influence, this investment in owning maritime ports is important to their economy. 1:07:05 Sen. Deb Fischer (R-NE): In 2021, Hutchison was awarded those two ports, Port Balboa and Port Cristobal, in a no-bid award process. Can you tell me, does the United States have any authority or recourse with the Panama Canal Authority under our current agreement with Panama to rebid those terminal concession contracts. And perhaps Mr. Kantorovich, that's more in your purview? Louis Sola: Senator, both of those ports were redone for 25 years, until 2047, I believe. And they have to pay $7 million is what the ongoing rate is for the Port of Houston- and the Port of Miami-sized concessions. Sen. Deb Fischer (R-NE): And it can't be rebid until after that date? Louis Sola: Well, I believe that that's what the comptroller's office is auditing both of those ports and that contract. That was done under the previous Panamanian administration. A new administration came in, and they called for an audit of that contract immediately. 1:20:10 Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK): Are the companies now controlling both sides of the Panama Canal, the Chinese companies, subject to the PRC national security laws that mandate cooperation with the military, with state intelligence agencies. Does anyone know that? Eugene Kontorovich: They're subject all the time. They're subject to those laws all the time by virtue of being Hong Kong companies. And you know, they face, of course, consequences for not complying with the wishes of the Chinese government. One of the arguments -- Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK): Wouldn't that be a violation of the treaty? And isn't that a huge risk to us right now that the Chinese -- Eugene Kontorovich: That is a threat to the neutrality -- Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK): If they invaded Taiwan, invaded the Philippines, they could go to these two companies saying, Hey, shut it down, make it hard, sink a ship in the canal. And wouldn't they be obligated to do that under Chinese law if they were ordered to by the PLA or the CCP? Eugene Kontorovich: I don't know if they'd be obligated, but certainly the People's Republic of China would have many tools of leverage and pressure on these companies. That's why the treaty specifically says that we can act not just to end actual obstructions to the canal. We don't have to wait until the canal is closed by hostile military action. Thatwould be a suicide pact, that would be catastrophic for us, but rather that we can respond at the inchoate, incipient level to threats, and then this is up to the president to determine whether this is significantly robust to constitute -- Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK): So aren't we kind of walking up to the idea of a suicide pact, because we've got two big Chinese companies on both ends of the Panama Canal, who, if there's a war in INDOPACOM, Taiwan that involves us and China, these companies would be obligated to do the bidding of the Chinese Communist Party and PLA? I mean, are we kind of walking up to a very significant national security threat already? Eugene Kontorovich: Yeah, certainly, there's a threat. And I think what makes the action of the Chinese government so difficult to respond to, but important to respond to, is that they conceal this in sort of levels of gray without direct control. Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK): Let me ask you on that topic, as my last question, Professor, let's assume that we find out. And again, it wouldn't be surprising. I think you can almost assume it that these two companies have Chinese spies or military officials within the ranks of the employees of the companies. Let's assume we found that out, somehow that becomes public. But I don't think it's a big assumption. It's probably true right now. So you have spies and military personnel within the ranks of these two companies that are controlling both ends of the Panama Canal for you, Professor, and Chairman Sola, wouldn't that be a blatant violation of Article Five of the neutrality treaty, if that were true, which probably is true? Eugene Kontorovich: Yeah, I do think it would be a clear violation. As former Secretary of State, Dean Ross said at the ratification hearings, informal forces can violate Article Five as well as formal forces. Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK): Is there any evidence of Chinese spies or other nefarious Chinese actors embedded in these companies? Louis Sola: Senator, we have no information of that. That's not under the purview of -- Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK): But you agree that would be a violation of Article Five of the neutrality treaty? Louis Sola: I do. 1:26:25 Daniel Maffei: Senator Sullivan was talking about Hutchison Ports. That's actually the same company that runs terminals on both ends of the canal. I am concerned about that. However, if we want to be concerned about that, all of us should lose a lot more sleep than we're losing because if there are spies there, then there might be spies at other Hutchinson ports, and there are other Hutchinson ports in almost every part of the world. They own the largest container port in the United Kingdom, Felix Dow, which is responsible for nearly half of Britain's container trade. They control major maritime terminals in Argentina, Australia, the Bahamas, Germany, Indonesia, Mexico, Myanmar, the Netherlands, South Korea and Tanzania. If owning and managing adjacent ports means that China somehow has operational control or strategic control over the Panama Canal, they also have it over the Suez, the Singapore Straits, the Mediterranean Sea and the English Channel. 1:35:45 Louis Sola: The fees that I think we are looking at, or have been looked at, the reason that we went there was because of the auctioning of the slots. And so what Panama did is they had a smaller percentage, maybe 20% allocation, and then they moved it up to 30% and 40% because it became a money maker for them. So as they were doing -- Sen. Marsha Blackburn (R-TN): Okay, let me interject here. The auctioning of the slots gives these the right to skip the queue? Louis Sola: Yes, ma'am. Sen. Marsha Blackburn (R-TN): Okay, so just for the record there. Continue. Louis Sola: So the auctioning of the slots. Under maritime law, it's first come first serve, but Panama has always put a certain percentage aside, and they started to put more and more. So we got a lot of complaints. We got a lot of complaints from LNG carriers that paid $4 million to go through, and we got a lot of complaints from agriculture that didn't have the money to pay to go through, because their goods were gonna go down. So if you look at the financial statements -- I'm a nerd, I look at financial statements of everybody -- the canal increased the amount of revenue that they had from about $500 million to $1.8 billion in the last three years just because of those fees. So this is what is very concerning to us. 1:39:20 Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN): Do you know of any instances where the United States has been singled out or treated unfairly under the neutrality treaty in the operation of the canal? Daniel Maffei: I do not. I would add that one of the reasons why saying the US is disproportionately affected by raises in Canal fees and other kinds of fees at the canal is because the United States disproportionately utilizes the canal. 1:44:55 Louis Sola: We have a US port there, SSA, out of Washington State that I actually worked on the development of that many years ago, and helped develop that. That used to be a United States Navy submarine base, and we converted that. As far as the two ports that we have, they're completely different. One is a major infrastructure footprint, and also a container port that's moving 4 million containers a year. That's really phenomenal amount. That's more than Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and you've probably got to get Tampa and a little bit of Jacksonville in there to get that type of volume. And on the other side, we have a very small port, but it's a very strategic port on the Atlantic. So how are the operations done?I don't know how they don't make money. I mean, if you want to come right down to it, if they've been operating the port for 20 years, and they say that they haven't made any money, so they haven't been able to pay the government. That's what concerns me is I don't believe that we're on a level playing field with the American ports. 1:58:50 Eugene Kontorovich: I think the charges and fees are less of an issue because they don't discriminate across countries. We pay more because we use more, but it's not nationally discriminatory. 1:59:00 Eugene Kontorovich: The presence of Chinese companies, especially Chinese state companies, but not limited to them, do raise serious issues and concerns for the neutrality of the treaty. And I should point out, in relation to some of the earlier questioning, the canal, for purposes of the neutrality treaty, is not limited just to the actual locks of the canal and the transit of ships through the canal. According to Annex One, paragraph one of the treaty, it includes also the entrances of the canal and the territorial sea of Panama adjacent to it. So all of the activities we're talking about are within the neutrality regime, the geographic scope of the neutrality regime in the treaty. 2:00:30 Daniel Maffei: I actually have to admit, I'm a little confused as to why some of the senators asking these questions, Senator Blackburn, aren't more concerned about the biggest port in the United Kingdom being run by the Chinese. Petraeus in the port nearest Athens, one of the biggest ports in the Mediterranean, is not just run by a Chinese-linked company, it's run directly by a Chinese-owned company, and I was there. So you're on to something, but if you're just focusing on Panama, that's only part. 2:01:45 Louis Sola: About a year ago, when we were having this drought issue, there was also a lot of focus on Iran and how they were funding Hamas and the Houthis because they were attacking the Red Sea. What the United States has found is that Iranian vessels are sometimes flagged by Panama in order to avoid sanctions, so that they could sell the fuel that they have, and then they can take that money and then they can use it as they wish. Panama, at the time, had a very complicated process to de-flag the vessels. There was an investigation, there was an appeals process. By the time that OFAC or Treasury would go ahead and identify one of those vessels, by the time that they were doing the appeals and stuff like this, they've already changed flags to somewhere else. So when we went to Panama, we met with the Panamanian president, and I must say that we were very impressed, because he was 30 minutes late, but he was breaking relations with Venezuela at the time because the election was the day before. We explained to him the situation. The very next day, we met with the maritime minister, with US embassy personnel and Panama actually adjusted their appeals process so to make it more expedient, so if the United States or OFAC would come and say that this Iranian vessel is avoiding sanctions, now we have a process in place to go ahead and do that, and 53 vessels were de-flagged because of that. 2:06:05 Sen. John Curtis (R-UT): Is there any reason that China can't watch or do whatever they want from this bridge to get the intel from these containers? And does that concern anybody? Louis Sola: Well, it definitely concerns Southern Command, because they've brought it up on numerous occasions that there could be some sort of surveillance or something like that on the bridges. 2:20:30 Sen. Tim Sheehy (R-MT): We segregate ourselves artificially in a way that they do not. We segregate ourselves. Let's talk about military. Let's talk about intelligence. Let's talk about economics. They don't. China doesn't work that way. It's a whole of government approach. They don't draw a delineation between an economics discussion and a military one. And their attack may not look like Pearl Harbor. It may look like an everyday ship that decides, you know, it pulls into the locks and blows itself up. And now the locks are non-functional for our usage, and we can't support an inter ocean fleet transfer, and our ability to defend it, as you referred to Chairman, is now inhibited by the fact that we no longer have the military infrastructure around the canal that we did just as recently as 1999. 2:21:10 Sen. Tim Sheehy (R-MT): So from a commercial perspective, do the shipping companies have concerns over the security of the narrow waterways? We've the Strait to Malacca, we've got the Suez Canal, we've got Gibraltar, we've got Panama. Is that a concern that's thrown around in the boardrooms of the largest shipping corporations in the world? Joseph Kramek: Senator, I think it's something they think about every day. I mean, really, it's drawn into sharp relief with the Red Sea. It was what I call a pink flamingo. There's black swans that just come up and there's pink flamingos that you can see, but you don't act. But no one really thought a whole lot that one of the most important waterways in the world could be denied, and moreover, that it could be denied for such a sustained period. The good news is that -- Sen. Tim Sheehy (R-MT): And denied, I might add, by a disaffected non-state actor of Bedouins running around with rocket launchers, who also managed to beat us in a 20 year war in Afghanistan. My point to saying all this is we're just debating operational control of the canal, yet it seems very clear to all of us that a very simple act can debilitate the canal and eliminate our ability to use it in a matter of minutes with no warning, and we have no ability to intervene or stop that. To me, that means we do not have operational control of the canal. 2:30:40 Daniel Maffei: I will say that certainly we need to look at other kinds of ways to get US companies in positions where they can truly compete with the Chinese on some of these things. Blaming it all on Panama really misses the point. I've seen the same thing in Greece, where Greece didn't want to give the concession of its largest port to a Chinese company, but because of its financial difficulties, it was getting pressure from international organizations such the IMF, Europe and even maybe some of the United States to do so. So I just ask you to look at that. 2:31:20 Daniel Maffei: Panamanians are making far more on their canal than they ever have before. That's not necessarily a bad thing, as long as it's going to the right place. But where they're really making the money is on these auctions, and that is why it remains a concern of mine and I'm sure the chairman's. That is where we are looking at, potentially, using our authority under Section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act where we could, if we can show that it is a problem with the foreign trade of the US, it's interfering with foreign trade of the US, there are certain things that we can do. Senate Foreign Relations Committee January 15, 2024 Clips 4:01:40 Marco Rubio: The thing with Panama on the canal is not new. I visited there. It was 2016. I think I've consistently seen people express concern about it, and it's encapsulized here in quote after quote. Let me tell you the former US ambassador who served under President Obama said: "the Chinese see in Panama what we saw in Panama throughout the 20th century, a maritime and aviation logistics hub." The immediate past head of Southern Command, General Laura Richardson, said, "I was just in Panama about a month ago and flying along the Panama Canal and looking at the state owned enterprises from the People's Republic of China on each side of the Panama Canal. They look like civilian companies or state owned enterprises that could be used for dual use and could be quickly changed over to a military capability." We see questions that were asked by the ranking member in the house China Select Committee, where he asked a witness and they agreed that in a time of conflict, China could use its presence on both ends of the canal as a choke point against the United States in a conflict situation. So the concerns about Panama have been expressed by people on both sides of the aisle for at least the entire time that I've been in the United States Senate, and they've only accelerated further. And this is a very legitimate issue that we face there. I'm not prepared to answer this question because I haven't looked at the legal research behind it yet, but I'm compelled to suspect that an argument could be made that the terms under which that canal were turned over have been violated. Because while technically, sovereignty over the canal has not been turned over to a foreign power, in reality, a foreign power today possesses, through their companies, which we know are not independent, the ability to turn the canal into a choke point in a moment of conflict. And that is a direct threat to the national interest and security the United States, and is particularly galling given the fact that we paid for it and that 5,000 Americans died making it. That said, Panama is a great partner on a lot of other issues, and I hope we can resolve this issue of the canal and of its security, and also continue to work with them cooperatively on a host of issues we share in common, including what to do with migration. 4:38:35 Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT): Now, President Trump has recently talked a little bit about the fact that there are some questions arising about the status of the Panama Canal. When we look to the treaty at issue, the treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and operation of the Panama Canal, we're reminded that some things maybe aren't quite as they should be there right now. Given that the Chinese now control major ports at the entry and the exit to the canal, it seems appropriate to say that there's at least an open question. There's some doubt as to whether the canal remains neutral. Would you agree with that assessment? Marco Rubio: Yes. Here's the challenge. Number one, I want to be clear about something. The Panamanian government, particularly its current office holders, are very friendly to the United States and very cooperative, and we want that to continue, and I want to bifurcate that from the broader issue of the canal. Now I am not, President Trump is not inventing this. This is something that's existed now for at least a decade. In my service here, I took a trip to Panama in 2017. When on that trip to Panama in 2017 it was the central issue we discussed about the canal, and that is that Chinese companies control port facilities at both ends of the canal, the east and the west, and the concerns among military officials and security officials, including in Panama, at that point, that that could one day be used as a choke point to impede commerce in a moment of conflict. Going back to that I -- earlier before you got here, and I don't want to have to dig through this folder to find it again, but -- basically cited how the immediate past head of Southern Command, just retired general Richardson, said she flew over the canal, looked down and saw those Chinese port facilities, and said Those look like dual use facilities that in a moment of conflict, could be weaponized against us. The bipartisan China commission over in the House last year, had testimony and hearings on this issue, and members of both parties expressed concern. The former ambassador to Panama under President Obama has expressed those concerns. This is a legitimate issue that needs to be confronted. The second point is the one you touched upon, and that is, look, could an argument be made, and I'm not prepared to answer it yet, because it's something we're going to have to study very carefully. But I think I have an inkling of I know where this is going to head. Can an argument be made that the Chinese basically have effective control of the canal anytime they want? Because if they order a Chinese company that controls the ports to shut it down or impede our transit, they will have to do so. There are no independent Chinese companies. They all exist because they've been identified as national champions. They're supported by the Chinese government. And if you don't do what they want, they find a new CEO, and you end up being replaced and removed. So they're under the complete control of their government. This is a legitimate question, and one that Senators Risch had some insight as well. He mentioned that in passing that needs to be looked at. This is not a joke. The Panama Canal issue is a very serious one. 4:44:30 Marco Rubio: In 2016 and 2017 that was well understood that part of the investments they made in Panama were conditioned upon Panama's ability to convince the Dominican Republic and other countries to flip their recognition away from Taiwan. That happened. Jen Briney's Recent Guest Appearances Travis Makes Money: Give and Take: Music by Editing Production Assistance

The fabled city of Malacca was the portal through which the trade treasures of the Indian and Pacific Oceans flowed. It had a formidable army and a determined sultan. Afonso de Albuquerque arrived in 1511 with just over a thousand men, but he was even more determined to make it a part of the Portuguese Empire.    Flash Point History YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCTYmTYuan0fSGccYXBxc8cA Contribute on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/FPHx Leave some feedback: flashpointhistory@gmail.com Follow along on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/FLASHPOINTHX/ Engage on Twitter: https://twitter.com/FlashpointHx

Exactly a month into his new term, President Donald Trump's latest major pick, Kash Patel, has been appointed as the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation after a grueling confirmation in the US Senate. Tulsi Gabbard had earlier been confirmed as the Director of National Intelligence. Both these are positive from India's point of view: they signal that the sinister Deep State may well be reined in, after decades of anti-India activism on its part.Over the last week or two, there have been revelations after revelations of bad faith on the part of the disgraced US establishment, most notably in the shadowy USAID agency, which, it appears, was the absolute “Heart of Darkness” of the Deep State, neck-deep in covert operations, election interference, and general mayhem all over the world, and certainly in India.Trump himself emphasized that $21 million in covert funds had gone towards affecting election outcomes in India. Presumably the reduced majority Modi got in 2024 could be traced back to this. Fortress AmericaThe general contours of Trump's foreign policy are beginning to emerge. I predicted a month ago, before Trump had taken over, in ‘Greenland, Canada, Panama: Chronicles of a Foreign Policy Foretold', that Western Europe, and the United Kingdom in particular, would find themselves treated as irrelevant to the new order to come. That has happened.In fact, things have gone beyond what I anticipated. In a nutshell, Trump is downgrading the Atlantic, and his focus will be on the Americas, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. Which, from a historical perspective, makes sense: the world's economic center of gravity is moving towards Asia; trade flows in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans are increasingly more important than in the Atlantic; and a few centuries of European domination are pretty much over.Sorry Europe, Atlanticism is at an endTo put it bluntly, the vanity that Europe is a ‘continent' is now being exposed as hollow: to be precise, it is merely an appendage, an outpost, to vast Asia. Europe is at best a subcontinent, like India is; it should probably be renamed as ‘Northwest Asia'. The saga of ‘Guns, Germs and Steel' post the Industrial Revolution is winding down rapidly. There is some schadenfreude in that the UK becomes even more irrelevant: just a small, rainy island off NW Asia.The Putin-Trump dialog suggests that Ukraine, and even NATO, are now superfluous. Atlanticism has been a constant in US foreign policy, mostly pushed by two forces:* Eastern European-origin State Department officials who have inherited a blood-feud with Russia from their ancestors, eg. Brzezinski, Albright, Nuland, Blinken, Vindman* an ancient intra-Christian schism between the Eastern Orthodox Church and (for a change) an alliance of Roman Catholics and Western Protestants like Lutherans, Anglicans and Calvinists.It is time that the Americans realized they've been turned into cats'-paws by these forces, and turned their backs on these ancient animosities, which have almost no relevance today. In fact one could argue that a NATO-Russian alliance is the right solution in the medium term, because otherwise both could become puppets of China. Bringing the Ukraine war to an end is a start.The general tone of the Trump White House implies a Fortress America. In practice, this seems to mean that instead of being Globocop, the US focuses on a) the Americas, North and South, b) the Pacific Ocean, d) the Indian Ocean, in that order.A new Monroe Doctrine in the AmericasThe attention being paid to Canada and Mexico over and above the tariffs issues suggests that there is a plan to create a stronger and more unified North American entity; the noises about “Canada the 51st state” and “Gulf of America” suggest that maybe a new NAFTA-style agreement could be inked, especially now that the warming Arctic Ocean makes the thawing tundra of Canada more appealing.It is true that there is no immediate thrust for a Monroe Doctrine-style exclusive US ‘sphere of influence' in South America, but I suspect it is coming. Already, there have been positive vibes between Trump and Argentina's Milei, and Salvador's Bukele: the former for his DOGE-style chainsaw-wielding that's showing results, and the latter for his strong law enforcement.The Island Chains and other red lines in the PacificIn the Pacific, there has been pushback against China's moves on the Panama Canal: there are two Hong-Kong-based entities (read proxies of the Chinese government) controlling ports around it: Balboa on the Pacific side, and Cristobal on the Atlantic side.On the other hand, there is increasing global support (with the judicious use of Chinese carrots such as BRI) for the annexation of Taiwan by China, including, if necessary, by force. A Lowy Institute study (“Five One Chinas: The Contest to Define Taiwan”) suggests that some 119 UN member states accept the official Chinese position on ‘reunification'. Only 40 countries are not on board with China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.It is very likely that there will be a showdown between the US and China over Taiwan, within the next two years. It is said that Xi Jinping has given a timeframe of 2027 for all this. It will be interesting to see how many states that condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine will condemn China's future attack on Taiwan. Chances are that many will be strategically silent.Japan, Australia, South Korea and other friends of the US will have a hard time keeping the peace in the Pacific. The “Three Island Chains” act as increasingly critical red lines to contain an aggressive China. In fact, the Asia Maritime Initiative is speaking of five island chains (“China's Reach Has Grown, So Should the Island Chains”), including those in the Indian Ocean (remember the “String of Pearls” intended to tighten around India's throat).The three island chains: 1. Taiwan, Japan, Philippines; 2. Guam, Marianas; 3. Hawaii(Source: China is making waves in the Pacific, Alexandra Tirziu, Jan 2024 https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/china-pacific-conflict/)Meanwhile, in a show of aggression far from its shores, three Chinese warships indulged in “live firing” in international waters between Australia and New Zealand, and commercial aircraft were warned to keep away. This is a warning to Australia, which, thanks to AUKUS foolishness, cancelled French submarines and now await British submarines… in the 2040s.The increasing relevance of the Indian Ocean and the Middle EastMuch of the world's trade, including 75% of global maritime trade and 50% of its daily oil shipments, go through the Indian Ocean.The main issues will be the control of the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz, and the alternative routes being explored by China via the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand, possible use of Coco Islands and other Myanmarese ports including Sittwe and (a bit of a stretch for China) access to Chittagong. There are also troublesome pirates, including Houthis, that make for perilous journeys leading to the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea.Interestingly, the US is making moves in the Indian Ocean that will support both the IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor) and I2U2, the India-Israel-UAE-US economic partnership. IMEC is the old Spice Route, revivified.There is also the proposed Ben-Gurion Canal through the Negev Desert in Israel that would benefit Saudi Arabia as well (its futuristic NEOM city is nearby), and this would be made feasible by Trump's proposed transformation of Gaza. It would be an alternative to Suez.Following up on the Abraham Accords, Trump 2.0 would like to bring the Gaza war to an end, and create an environment in the Middle East where Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE et al will form a counter and a buffer to the machinations of Iran and Turkey.The Indo-US joint communique is a statement of intentIt is in this global context that we need to analyze the joint communique between the US and India after the Trump-Modi summit. Both nations will be attempting to advance their own strategic doctrines. The US would like India to become a non-treaty ally. India would like to keep its multi-alignment policy going, along with Atmanirbharatha. These may make any bilateral progress a little rough but some give and take will work.There are a few specific areas of interest:* Defense* There is an effort by the US to wean India away from its dependency on Russia for weapons. The most evident carrot here is the F-35 advanced fighter jet, which has now been offered to India for the first time, along with other conventional weapons such as Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stryker infantry combat vehicles, as well as the P8i Poseidon anti-submarine patrol aircraft, and various drones* The P8i is already in service in India, and it would help keep an eye on the southern Bay of Bengal with its proximity to China's submarine pen on Hainan Island* The F-35 raises some questions. In the Bangalore Air Show it was pitted against the Russian Su-57, which is a lot less expensive. Also, the F-35 needs extraordinary levels of maintenance for its ‘stealth' coating. Finally, should India invest in building its own AMCA 5th-generation fighter jet rather than buying?* Even though there will be co-production agreements, the US is a whimsical supplier (remember Tarapur), and there will be little transfer of technology, so military procurement and cooperation must be carefully thought through by India* Trade and Investment* The goal is to reach $500 billion in bilateral trade by 2030, which would involve a doubling from current levels ($200 billion in 2023). Besides, the Trump doctrine of reciprocal tariffs and zero trade imbalance may make some of this difficult* Indian firms are planning to invest $7.35 billion in the US* Energy* India will now get access to US civil nuclear technology, but there's a small twist: the clauses invoking civil liability for nuclear damage will be deleted. This is reminiscent of Pfizer's covid-era contract with developing countries: Pfizer was assured of indemnity (with the local governments being liable) in case of injury or death caused by its vaccine. This sounds like a bad idea* India will increase its purchases of US oil and natural gas. This is a win-win: it will increase US imports to India, thus reducing the trade deficit, and India will be assured of additional supplies* Technology and Innovation* A whole raft of actions have been proposed, including a tie-up between the US National Science Foundation and the Anusandhan National Research Foundation in India, a program called TRUST, another called INDUS innovation, and one in the area of space collaboration, titled NISAR* Multilateral Cooperation* The Quad, IMEC and I2U2 figured in communique, but also something called the Indian Ocean Strategic Venture. I note this nomenclature progress with approval: there used to be the Asia-Pacific, then it was the Indo-Pacific, and now the Indian Ocean is being singled out* In the area of counter-terrorism, the communique explicitly named Pakistani entities such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba, among others. This is a welcome change from the shadow-boxing indulged in by the Biden administration and others, whereby Pakistani terrorists were treated as ‘assets'* The extradition of Tahawwur Rana, a Pakistani-Canadian now in a Los Angeles jail, to India for investigation into his role supporting David Headley, in the 26/11/2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, is a welcome sign, after the curious Biden exertions in the Pannun case* People to people links* Indian parents are spending $8 billion a year to support 300,000 Indian students in the US. This amounts to a sort of ‘foreign aid', and also incidentally supplies a lot of especially STEM graduates to the US economy* Facilitating visas, which have become frustratingly difficult for Indian business and leisure travelers to the US. Last year, the wait for just a visa interview was 452 days in Chennai (as compared to 15 days in Beijing), which probably was the result ot the Biden State Department ‘punishing' India for refusing to toe their Ukraine sanctions line* The legal movement of students and professionals between the two countries is to be eased.Overall, this is a statement of intent: both Modi and Trump are laying their cards on the table, and they will both (as they should) bargain hard to benefit their own nations. But India is no longer being treated as a pariah as it was since the Pokhran blasts, the denial of cryogenic rocket engines (via, yes, the Biden Amendment), and so on.As Trump moves towards the inevitable multipolar world, he does not wish to leave Asia to eager hegemon China; as he wishes to move the US out of military entanglements in far-off places (for which he expects Europe and others to bear the burden of their own defense), it is natural for him to want India to punch its weight in Asia.A mutually beneficial relationship free of the supercilious lectures by previous Democratic administrations (eg Daleep Singh on Ukraine sanctions, and he was, ironically enough, the great-grand-nephew of Dalip Singh Saund) would be welcome from the Indian point of view. Having a counterweight to China, and a G3 instead of a G2, would likewise be useful from the US point of view. Thus, there are glimpses of a possible win-win situation.2222 words, 22-02-2025 This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe

This episode we are taking a trip down the Silk Road--or perhaps even the Spice Road--as we investigate references in this reign to individuals from "Tukara" who seem to have arrived in Yamato and stayed for a while. For photos and more, see our podcast webpage:  https://sengokudaimyo.com/podcast/episode-119 Rough Transcript   Welcome to Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.  This is episode 119: The Question of “Tukara”   Traveling upon the ocean was never exactly safe.  Squalls and storms could arise at any time, and there was always a chance that high winds and high waves could capsize a vessel.  Most people who found themselves at the mercy of the ocean could do little but hold on and hope that they could ride out whatever adverse conditions they met with.  Many ships were lost without any explanation or understanding of what happened to them.  They simply left the port and never came back home. And so when the people saw the boat pulling up on the shores of Himuka, on the island of Tsukushi, they no doubt empathized with the voyagers' plight.  The crew looked bedraggled, and their clothing was unfamiliar.  There were both men and women, and this didn't look like your average fishing party.  If anything was clear it was this:  These folk weren't from around here. The locals brought out water and food.  Meanwhile, runners were sent with a message:  foreigners had arrived from a distant place.  They then waited to see what the government was going to do.     We are still in the second reign of Takara Hime, aka Saimei Tenno.  Last episode we talked about the palaces constructed in Asuka, as well as some of the stone works that have been found from the period, and which appear to be referenced in the Nihon Shoki—at least tangentially.   The episodes before that, we looked at the expeditions the court sent to the far north of Honshu and even past Honshu to Hokkaido. This episode we'll again be looking past the main islands of the archipelago to lands beyond.  Specifically, we are going to focus on particularly intriguing references to people from a place called “Tukara”.  We'll talk about some of the ideas about where that might be, even if they're a bit  far-fetched. That's because Tukara touches on the state of the larger world that Yamato was a part of, given its situation on the far eastern edge of what we know today as the Silk Road.  And is this just an excuse for me to take a detour into some of the more interesting things going on outside the archipelago?  No comment. The first mention of a man from Tukara actually comes at the end of the reign of Karu, aka Koutoku Tennou.  We are told that in the fourth month of 654 two men and two women of “Tukara” and one woman of “Sha'e” were driven by a storm to Hiuga.  Then, three years later, the story apparently picks up again, though possibly referring to a different group of people.  On the 3rd day of the 7th month of 657, so during the second reign of Takara Hime, we now hear about two men and four women of the Land of Tukara—no mention of Sha'e—who drifted to Tsukushi, aka Kyushu.  The Chronicles mention that these wayfarers first drifted to the island of Amami, and we'll talk about that in a bit, but let's get these puzzle pieces on the table, first.  After those six people show up, the court sent for them by post-horse.  They must have arrived by the 15th of that same month, because we are told that a model of Mt. Sumi was erected and they—the people from Tukara—were entertained, although there is another account that says they were from “Tora”. The next mention is the 10th day of the 3rd month of 659, when a Man of Tukara and his wife, again woman of Sha'e, arrived.  Then, on the 16th day of the 7th month of 660, we are told that the man of Tukara, Kenzuhashi Tatsuna, desired to return home and asked for an escort.  He planned to pay his respects at the Great Country, i.e. the Tang court, and so he left his wife behind, taking tens of men with him. All of these entries might refer to people regularly reaching Yamato from the south, from a place called “Tukara”.  Alternately, this is a single event whose story has gotten distributed over several years, as we've seen happen before with the Chronicles.  .  One of the oddities of these entries is that the terms used are not consistent.  “Tukara” is spelled at least two different ways, suggesting that it wasn't a common placename like Silla or Baekje, or even the Mishihase.  That does seem to suggest that the Chronicles were phonetically trying to find kanji, or the Sinitic characters, to match with the name they were hearing.   I would also note that “Tukara” is given the status of a “kuni”—a land, country, or state—while “sha'e”, where some of the women are said to come from, is just that, “Sha'e”. As for the name of at least one person from Tokara, Kenzuhashi Tatsuna, that certainly sounds like someone trying to fit a non-Japanese name into the orthography of the time.  “Tatsuna” seems plausibly Japanese, but “Kenzuhashi” doesn't fit quite as well into the naming structures we've seen to this point. The location of “Tukara” and “Sha'e” are not clear in any way, and as such there has been a lot of speculation about them.  While today there are placenames that fit those characters, whether or not these were the places being referenced at the time is hard to say. I'll actually start with “Sha'e”, which Aston translates as Shravasti, the capital of the ancient Indian kingdom of Kosala, in modern Uttar Pradesh.  It is also where the Buddha, Siddartha Gautama, is said to have lived most of his life after his enlightenment.  In Japanese this is “Sha'e-jou”, and like many Buddhist terms it likely comes through Sanskrit to Middle Chinese to Japanese.  One—or possibly two—women from Shravasti making the journey to Yamato in the company of a man (or men) from Tukara seems quite the feat.  But then, where is “Tukara”? Well, we have at least three possible locations that I've seen bandied about.  I'll address them from the most distant to the closest option.  These three options were Tokharistan, Dvaravati, and the Tokara islands. We'll start with Tokharistan on the far end of the Silk Road.  And to start, let's define what that “Silk Road” means.  We've talked in past episodes about the “Western Regions”, past the Han-controlled territories of the Yellow River.   The ancient Tang capital of Chang'an was built near to the home of the Qin dynasty, and even today you can go and see both the Tang tombs and the tomb of Qin Shihuangdi and his terracotta warriors, all within a short distance of Xi'an, the modern city built on the site of Chang'an.  That city sits on a tributary of the Yellow River, but the main branch turns north around the border of modern Henan and the similarly sounding provinces of Shanxi and Shaanxi.  Following it upstream, the river heads north into modern Mongolia, turns west, and then heads south again, creating what is known as the Ordos loop.  Inside is the Ordos plateau, also known as the Ordos Basin.  Continuing to follow the Yellow river south, on the western edge of the Ordos, you travel through Ningxia and Gansu—home of the Hexi, or Gansu, Corridor.  That route eventually takes to Yumenguan, the Jade Gate, and Dunhuang.  From there roads head north or south along the edge of the Taklamakan desert in the Tarim basin.  The southern route travels along the edge of the Tibetan plateau, while the northern route traversed various oasis cities through Turpan, Kucha, to the city of Kashgar.  Both routes made their way across the Pamirs and the Hindu Kush into South Asia. We've brought up the Tarim Basin and the Silk Road a few times.  This is the path that Buddhism appears to have taken to get to the Yellow River Basin and eventually to the Korean Peninsula and eastward to the Japanese archipelago.  But I want to go a bit more into detail on things here, as there is an interesting side note about “Tukara” that I personally find rather fascinating, and thought this would be a fun time to share. Back in Episode 79 we talked about how the Tarim basin used to be the home to a vast inland sea, which was fed by the meltwater from the Tianshan and Kunlun mountains.  This sea eventually dwindled, though it was still large enough to be known to the Tang as the Puchang Sea.  Today it has largely dried up, and it is mostly just the salt marshes of Lop Nur that remain.  Evidence for this larger sea, however, can be observed in some of the burials found around the Tarim basin.  These burials include the use of boat-shaped structures—a rather curious feature to be found out in the middle of the desert. And it is the desert that was left behind as the waters receded that is key to much of what we know about life in the Tarim basin, as it has proven to be quite excellent at preserving organic material.  This includes bodies, which dried out and naturally turned into mummies, including not only the wool clothing they were wearing, but also features such as hair and even decoration. These “Tarim mummies”, as they have been collectively called, date from as early as 2100 BCE all the way up through the period of time we're currently talking about, and have been found in several desert sites: Xiaohe, the earliest yet discovered; Loulan, near Lop Nur on the east of the Tarim Basin, dating from around 1800 BCE; Cherchen, on the southern edge of the Tarim Basin, dating from roughly 1000 BCE; and too many others to go into in huge detail. The intriguing thing about these burials is that  many of them don't have features typically associated with people of ethnic Han—which is to say traditional Chinese—ancestry, nor do they necessarily have the features associated with the Xiongnu and other steppe nomads.  In addition they have colorful clothing  made from wool and leather, with vivid designs.  Some bodies near Hami, just east of the basin, were reported to have blonde to light brown hair, and their cloth showed radically different patterns from that found at Cherchen and Loulan, with patterns that could reasonably be compared with the plaids now common in places like Scotland and Ireland, and previously found in the Hallstadt salt mine in Central Europe from around 3500 BCE, from which it is thought the Celtic people may have originated. At the same time that people—largely Westerners— were studying these mummies, another discovery in the Tarim basin was also making waves.  This was the discovery of a brand new language.  Actually, it was two languages—or possibly two dialects of a language—in many manuscripts, preserved in Kucha and Turpan.  Once again, the dry desert conditions proved invaluable to maintain these manuscripts, which date from between the late 4th or early 5th century to the 8th century.  They are written with a Brahmic script, similar to that used for Sanskrit, which appears in the Tarim Basin l by about the 2nd century, and we were able to translate them because many of the texts were copies of Buddhist scripture, which greatly helped scholars in deciphering the languages.  These two languages were fascinating because they represented an as-yet undiscovered branch of the Indo-European language family.  Furthermore, when compared to other Indo-European languages, they did not show nearly as much similarity with their neighbors as with languages on the far western end of the Indo-European language family.  That is to say they were thought to be closer to Celtic and Italic languages than something like Indo-Iranian.  And now for a quick diversion within the diversion:  “Centum” and “Satem” are general divisions of the Indo-European language families that was once thought to indicate a geographic divide in the languages.  At its most basic, as Indo-European words changed over time, a labiovelar sound, something like “kw”,  tended to evolve in one of two ways.  In the Celtic and Italic languages, the “kw” went to a hard “k” sound, as represented in the classical pronunciation of the Latin word for 100:  Centum.  That same word, in the Avestan language—of the Indo-Iranian tree—is pronounced as “Satem”, with an “S” sound.  So, you can look at Indo-European languages and divide them generally into “centum” languages, which preserve the hard “k”, or “Satem” languages that preserve the S. With me so far? Getting back to these two newly-found languages in the Tarim Basin, the weird thing is that they were “Centum” languages. Most Centum languages are from pretty far away, though: they are generally found in western Europe or around the Mediterranean, as opposed to the Satem languages, such as Indo-Aryan, Iranian, Armernian, or even Baltic Slavic languages, which are much closer to the Tarim Basin.  So if the theory were true that the “Centum” family of Indo-European languages developed in the West and “Satem” languages developed in the East, then that would seem to indicate that a group of a “Centum” speaking people must have migrated eastward, through the various Satem speaking people, and settled in the Tarim Basin many thousands of years ago. And what evidence do we have of people who look very different from the modern population, living in the Tarim Basin area long before, and wearing clothing similar to what we associated with the progenitors of the Celts?  For many, it seemed to be somewhat obvious, if still incredible, that the speakers of this language were likely the descendants of the mummies who, in the terminology of the time, had been identified as being of Caucasoid ancestry.  A theory developed that these people were an offshoot of a group called the Yamnaya culture, which may have arisen around modern Ukraine as an admixture between the European Hunter Gatherers and the Caucasian Hunter Gatherers, around 3300-2600 BCE.  This was challenged in 2021 when a genetic study was performed on some of the mummies in the Tarim basin, as well as several from the Dzungarian basin, to the northeast.  That study suggested that the people of the Dzungarian basin had genetic ties to the people of the Afanasievo people, from Southern Siberia.  The Afanasievo people are connected to the Yamnayan culture. It should be noted that there has long been a fascination in Western anthropology and related sciences with racial identification—and often not in a healthy way.  As you may recall, the Ainu were identified as “Caucasoid” by some people largely because of things like the men's beards and lighter colored hair, which differ greatly from a large part of the Japanese population.  However, that claim has been repeatedly refuted and debunked. And similarly, the truth is, none of these Tarim mummy burials were in a period of written anything, so we can't conclusively associated them with these fascinating Indo-European languages.  There are thousands of years between the various burials and the manuscripts. These people  left no notes stashed in pockets that give us their life story.   And Language is not Genetics is not Culture.  Any group may adopt a given language for a variety of reasons.  .  Still, given what we know, it is possible that the ancient people of the Tarim basin spoke some form of “Proto-Kuchean”, but it is just as likely that this language was brought in by people from Dzungaria at some point. So why does all this matter to us?  Well, remember how we were talking about someone from Tukara?  The Kuchean language, at least, is referred to in an ancient Turkic source as belonging to “Twgry”, which led several scholars to draw a link between this and the kingdom and people called Tukara and the Tokharoi.  This leads us on another bit of a chase through history. Now if you recall, back in Episode 79, we talked about Zhang Qian.  In 128 BCE, he attempted to cross the Silk Road through the territory of the Xiongnu on a mission for the Han court.  Some fifty years earlier, the Xiongnu had defeated the Yuezhi.  They held territory in the oasis towns along the north of the Taklamakan dessert, from about the Turpan basin west to the Pamirs. The Xiongnu were causing problems for the Han, who thought that if they could contact the remaining Yuezhi they could make common cause with them and harass the Xiongnu from both sides.  Zhang Qian's story is quite remarkable: he started out with an escort of some 99 men and a translator.  Unfortunately, he was captured and enslaved by the Xiongnu during his journey, and he is even said to have had a wife and fathered a child.  He remained a captive for thirteen years, but nonetheless, he was able to escape with his family and he made it to the Great Yuezhi on the far side of the Pamirs, but apparently the Yuezhi weren't interested in a treaty against the Xiongnu.  The Pamirs were apparently enough of a barrier and they were thriving in their new land.  And so Zhang Qian crossed back again through Xiongnu territory, this time taking the southern route around the Tarim basin.  He was still captured by the Xiongnu, who spared his life.  He escaped, again, two years later, returning to the Han court.  Of the original 100 explorers, only two returned: Zhang Qian and his translator.  While he hadn't obtained an alliance, he was able to detail the cultures of the area of the Yuezhi. Many feel that the Kushan Empire, which is generally said to have existed from about 30 to 375 CE,was formed from the Kushana people who were part of the Yuezhi who fled the Xiongnu. In other words, they were originally from further north, around the Tarim Basin, and had been chased out and settled down in regions that included Bactria (as in the Bactrian camel).  Zhang Qian describes reaching the Dayuan Kingdom in the Ferghana valley, then traveling south to an area that was the home of the Great Yuezhi or Da Yuezhi.  And after the Kushan empire fell, we know there was a state in the upper regions of the Oxus river, centered on the city of Balkh, in the former territory of the Kushan empire. known as “Tokara”.  Geographically, this matches up how Zhang Qian described the home of the Da Yuezhi.  Furthermore, some scholars reconstruct the reading of the Sinic characters used for “Yuezhi” as originally having an optional reading of something like “Togwar”, but that is certainly not the most common reconstructed reading of those characters.  Greek sources describe this area as the home of the Tokharoi, or the Tokaran People.  The term “Tukhara” is also found in Sanskrit, and this kingdom  was also said to have sent ambassadors to the Southern Liang and Tang dynasties. We aren't exactly certain of where these Tokharan people came from, but as we've just described, there's a prevailing theory that they were the remnants of the Yuezhi and Kushana people originally from the Tarim Basin.  We know that in the 6th century they came under the rule of the Gokturk Khaganate, which once spanned from the Liao river basin to the Black Sea.  In the 7th and 8th centuries they came under the rule of the Tang Empire, where they were known by very similar characters as those used to write “Tukara” in the Nihon Shoki.  On top of this, we see Tokharans traveling the Silk Road, all the way to the Tang court.  Furthermore, Tokharans that settled in Chang'an took the surname “Zhi” from the ethnonym “Yuezhi”, seemingly laying claim to and giving validation to the identity used back in the Han dynasty.   So, we have a Turkic record describing the Kuchean people (as in, from Kucha in the Tarim Basin) as “Twgry”, and we have a kingdom in Bactria called Tokara and populated (according to the Greeks) by people called Tokharoi.  You can see how this one term has been a fascinating rabbit hole in the study of the Silk Roads and their history.  And some scholars understandably suggested that perhaps the Indo-European languags found in Kucha and Turpan  were actually related to this “Tokhara” – and therefore  should be called “Tocharian”, specifically Tocharian A (Kuchean) or Tocharian B (Turfanian). The problem is that if the Tokharans were speaking “Tocharian” then you wouldn't expect to just see it at Kucha and Turpan, which are about the middle of the road between Tokhara and the Tang dynasty, and which had long been under Gokturk rule.  You would also expect to see it in the areas of Bactria associated with Tokhara.  However, that isn't what we see.  Instead, we see that Bactria was the home of local Bactrian language—an Eastern Iranian language, which, though it is part of the Indo European language family, it is not closely related to Tocharian as far as we can tell. It is possible that the people of Kucha referred to themselves as something similar to “Twgry”, or “Tochari”, but we should also remember that comes from a Turkic source, and it could have been an exonym not related to what they called themselves.  I should also note that language is not people.  It is also possible that a particular ethnonym was maintained separately by two groups that may have been connected politically but which came to speak different languages for whatever reason.   There could be a connection between the names, or it could even be that the same or similar exonym was used for different groups. So, that was a lot and a bit of a ramble, but a lot of things that I find interesting—even if they aren't as connected as they may appear.  We have the Tarim mummies, which are, today, held at a museum in modern Urumqi.  Whether they had any connection with Europe or not, they remain a fascinating study for the wealth of material items found in and around the Tarim basin and similar locations.  And then there is the saga of the Tocharian languages—or perhaps more appropriately the Kuchean-Turfanian languages: Indo-European languages that seem to be well outside of where we would expect to find them. Finally, just past the Pamirs, we get to the land of Tokhara or Tokharistan.  Even without anything else, we know that they had contact with the court.  Perhaps our castaways were from this land?  The name is certainly similar to what we see in the Nihon Shoki, using some of the same characters. All in all, art and other information suggest that the area of the Tarim basin and the Silk Road in general were quite cosmopolitan, with many different people from different regions of the world.  Bactria retained Hellenic influences ever since the conquests of Alexander of Macedonia, aka Alexander the Great, and Sogdian and Persian traders regularly brought their caravans through the region to trade.  And once the Tang dynasty controlled all of the routes, that just made travel that much easier, and many people traveled back and forth. So from that perspective, it is possible that one or more people from Tukhara may have made the crossing from their home all the way to the Tang court, but if they did so, the question still remains: why would they be in a boat? Utilizing overland routes, they would have hit Chang'an or Louyang, the dual capitals of the Tang empire, well before they hit the ocean.  However, the Nihon Shoki says that these voyagers first came ashore at Amami and then later says that they were trying to get to the Tang court. Now there was another “Silk Road” that isn't as often mentioned: the sea route, following the coast of south Asia, around through the Malacca strait and north along the Asian coast.  This route is sometimes viewed more in terms of the “spice” road If these voyagers set out to get to the Tang court by boat, they would have to have traveled south to the Indian Ocean—possibly traveling through Shravasti or Sha'e, depending on the route they chose to take—and then around the Malacca strait—unless they made it on foot all the way to Southeast Asia.  And then they would have taken a boat up the coast. Why do that instead of taking the overland route?  They could likely have traveled directly to the Tang court over the overland silk road.  Even the from Southeast Asia could have traveled up through Yunnan and made their way to the Tang court that way.  In fact, Zhang Qian had wondered something similar when he made it to the site of the new home of the Yuezhi, in Bactria.  Even then, in the 2nd century, he saw products in the marketplace that he identified as coming from around Szechuan.  That would mean south of the Han dynasty, and he couldn't figure out how those trade routes might exist and they weren't already known to the court.  Merchants would have had to traverse the dangerous mountains if they wanted to avoid being caught by the Xiongnu, who controlled the entire region. After returning to the Han court, Zhang Qian actually went out on another expedition to the south, trying to find the southern trade routes, but apparently was not able to do so.  That said, we do see, in later centuries, the trade routes open up between the area of the Sichuan basin and South Asia.  We also see the migrations of people further south, and there may have even been some Roman merchants who traveled up this route to find their way to the Han court, though those accounts are not without their own controversy. In either case, whether by land or sea, these trade routes were not always open.  In some cases, seasonal weather, such as monsoons, might dictate movement back and forth, while political realities were also a factor.  Still, it is worth remembering that even though most people were largely concerned with affairs in their own backyard, the world was still more connected than people give it credit for.  Tang dynasty pottery made its way to the east coast of Africa, and ostriches were brought all the way to Chang'an. As for the travelers from Tukhara and why they would take this long and very round-about method of travel, it is possible that they were just explorers, seeking new routes, or even on some kind of pilgrimage.  Either way, they would have been way off course. But if they did pass through Southeast Asia, that would match up with another theory about what “Tukara” meant: that it actually refers to the Dvaravati kingdom in what is now modern Thailand.  The Dvaravati Kingdom was a Mon political entity that rose up around the 6th century.  It even sent embassies to the Sui and Tang courts.  This is even before the temple complexes in Siem Reap, such as Preah Ko and the more famous Angkor Wat.  And it was during this time that the ethnic Tai people are thought to have started migrating south from Yunnan, possibly due to pressures from the expanding Sui and Tang empires.  Today, most of what remains of the Dvaravati kingdom are the ruins of ancient stone temples, showing a heavy Indic influence, and even early Buddhist practices as well.  “Dvaravati” may not actually be the name of the kingdom but it comes from an inscription on a coin found from about that time.  The Chinese refer to it as  “To-lo-po-ti” in contemporary records.  It may not even have been a kingdom, but  more of a confederation of city-states—it is hard to piece everything together.  That it was well connected, though, is clear from the archaeological record.  In Dvaravati sites, we see coins from as far as Rome, and we even have a lamp found in modern Pong Tuk that appears to match similar examples from the Byzantine Empire in the 6th century.  Note that this doesn't mean it arrived in the 6th century—similarly with the coins—but the Dvaravati state lasted until the 12th century. If that was the case, perhaps there were some women from a place called “Shravasti” or similar, especially given the Indic influence in the region. Now, given the location of the Dvaravati, it wouldn't be so farfetched to think that someone might sail up from the Gulf of Thailand and end up off-course, though it does mean sailing up the entire Ryukyuan chain or really running off course and finding yourself adrift on the East China sea.  And if they were headed to the Tang court, perhaps they did have translators or knew Chinese, since Yamato was unlikely to know the Mon language of Dvaravati and people from Dvaravati probably wouldn't know the Japonic language.  Unless, perhaps, they were communicating through Buddhist priests via Sanskrit. We've now heard two possibilities for Tukara, both pretty far afield: the region of Tokara in Bactria, and the Dvaravati kingdom in Southeast Asia.  That said, the third and simplest explanation—and the one favored by Aston in his translation of the Nihon Shoki—is that Tukara is actually referring to a place in the Ryukyu island chain.  Specifically, there is a “Tokara” archipelago, which spans between Yakushima and Amami-Oshima.  This is part of the Nansei islands, and the closest part of the Ryukyuan island chain to the main Japanese archipelago.  This is the most likely theory, and could account for the entry talking about Amami.  It is easy to see how sailors could end up adrift, too far north, and come to shore in Hyuga, aka Himuka, on the east side of Kyushu.  It certainly would make more sense for them to be from this area of the Ryukyuan archipelago than from anywhere else.  From Yakushima to Amami-Oshima is the closest part of the island chain to Kyushu, and as we see in the entry from the Shoku Nihongi, those three places seem to have been connected as being near to Japan.  So what was going on down there, anyway? Well, first off, let's remember that the Ryukyuan archipelago is not just the island of Okinawa, but a series of islands that go from Kyushu all the way to the island of Taiwan.  Geographically speaking, they are all part of the same volcanic ridge extending southward.  The size of the islands and their distance from each other does vary, however, creating some natural barriers in the form of large stretches of open water, which have shaped how various groups developed on the islands. Humans came to the islands around the same time they were reaching the Japanese mainland.  In fact, some of our only early skeletal remains for early humans in Japan actually come from either the Ryukyuan peninsula in the south or around Hokkaido to the north, and that has to do with the acidity of the soil in much of mainland Japan. Based on genetic studies, we know that at least two groups appear to have inhabited the islands from early times.  One group appears to be related to the Jomon people of Japan, while the other appears to be more related to the indigenous people of Taiwan, who, themselves, appear to have been the ancestors of many Austronesian people.  Just as some groups followed islands to the south of Taiwan, some appear to have headed north.  However, they only made it so far.  As far as I know there is no evidence they made it past Miyakoshima, the northernmost island in the Sakishima islands.  Miyako island is separated from the next large island, Okinawa, by a large strait, known as the Miyako Strait, though sometimes called the Kerama gap in English.  It is a 250km wide stretch of open ocean, which is quite the distance for anyone to travel, even for Austronesian people of Taiwan, who had likely not developed the extraordinary navigational technologies that the people who would become the Pacific Islanders would discover. People on the Ryukyu island chain appear to have been in contact with the people of the Japanese archipelago since at least the Jomon period, and some of the material artifacts demonstrate a cultural connection.  That was likely impacted by the Akahoya eruption, about 3500 years ago, and then re-established at a later date.  We certainly see sea shells and corals trade to the people of the Japanese islands from fairly early on. Unlike the people on the Japanese archipelago, the people of the Ryukyuan archipelago did not really adopt the Yayoi and later Kofun culture.  They weren't building large, mounded tombs, and they retained the character of a hunter-gatherer society, rather than transitioning to a largely agricultural way of life.  The pottery does change in parts of Okinawa, which makes sense given the connections between the regions.  Unfortunately, there is a lot we don't know about life in the islands around this time.  We don't exactly have written records, other than things like the entries in the Nihon Shoki, and those are hardly the most detailed of accounts.  In the reign of Kashikiya Hime, aka Suiko Tennou, we see people from Yakushima, which is, along with Tanegashima, one of the largest islands at the northern end of the Ryukyu chain, just before you hit Kagoshima and the Osumi peninsula on the southern tip of Kyushu.  The islands past that would be the Tokara islands, until you hit the large island of Amami. So you can see how it would make sense that the people from “Tokara” would make sense to be from the area between Yakushima and Amami, and in many ways this explanation seems too good to be true.  There are a only a few things that make this a bit peculiar. First, this doesn't really explain the woman from “Sha'e” in any compelling way that I can see.  Second, the name, Kenzuhashi Tatsuna doesn't seem to fit with what we generally know about early Japonic names, and the modern Ryukyuan language certainly is a Japonic language, but there are still plenty of possible explanations.  There is also the connection of Tokara with “Tokan”, which is mentioned in an entry in 699 in the Shoku Nihongi, the Chronicle that follows on, quite literally to the Nihon Shoki.  Why would they call it “Tokan” instead of “Tokara” so soon after?  Also, why would these voyagers go back to their country by way of the Tang court?  Unless, of course, that is where they were headed in the first place.  In which case, did the Man from Tukara intentionally leave his wife in Yamato, or was she something of a hostage while they continued on their mission?   And so those are the theories.  The man from “Tukara” could be from Tokhara, or Tokharistan, at the far end of the Silk Road.  Or it could have been referring to the Dvaravati Kingdom, in modern Thailand.  Still, in the end, Occam's razor suggests that the simplest answer is that these were actually individuals from the Tokara islands in the Ryukyuan archipelago.  It is possible that they were from Amami, not that they drifted there.  More likely, a group from Amami drifted ashore in Kyushu as they were trying to find a route to the Tang court, as they claimed.  Instead they found themselves taking a detour to the court of Yamato, instead. And we could have stuck with that story, but I thought that maybe, just maybe, this would be a good time to reflect once again on how connected everything was.  Because even if they weren't from Dvaravati, that Kingdom was still trading with Rome and with the Tang.  And the Tang controlled the majority of the overland silk road through the Tarim basin.  We even know that someone from Tukhara made it to Chang'an, because they were mentioned on a stele that talked about an Asian sect of Christianity, the “Shining Religion”, that was praised and allowed to set up shop in the Tang capital, along with Persian Manicheans and Zoroastrians.  Regardless of where these specific people may have been from, the world was clearly growing only more connected, and prospering, as well. Next episode we'll continue to look at how things were faring between the archipelago and the continent. Until then thank you for listening and for all of your support. If you like what we are doing, please tell your friends and feel free to rate us wherever you listen to podcasts.  If you feel the need to do more, and want to help us keep this going, we have information about how you can donate on Patreon or through our KoFi site, ko-fi.com/sengokudaimyo, or find the links over at our main website,  SengokuDaimyo.com/Podcast, where we will have some more discussion on topics from this episode. Also, feel free to reach out to our Sengoku Daimyo Facebook page.  You can also email us at the.sengoku.daimyo@gmail.com.  Thank you, also, to Ellen for their work editing the podcast. And that's all for now.  Thank you again, and I'll see you next episode on Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.  

Welcome to the China Compass Podcast on the Fight Laugh Feast Network! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. You can follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post daily reminders to pray for China (PrayforChina.us). You can find links to everything else we are involved in @ PrayGiveGo.us. Summary: I begin by explaining my upcoming plans for the podcast, then talk about my travels and adventures in China 22 years ago this week. (3:08) Next, we drop in on the Millionaire Missionary in Cairo in January of 1913 (19:04) and on William Milne in Malacca on January 18 of both 1812 and 1820. (24:00) After discussing how to Pray for China (32:44), we look at the unfortunate trend of Chinese house church pastors being falsely accused of “fraud”. Finally, we end with a call to pray (51:05) for Vanuatu (former home of John G. Paton) as they recover from a recent earthquake and deal with an aggressive China. The Millionaire Missionary in Cairo (1913) (BordenofYale.com) https://chinacall.substack.com/p/crazy-colorful-cairo The Memoirs of William Milne (200th Anniversary Edition) (https://a.co/d/bALLtAf) https://chinacall.substack.com/p/on-this-day-from-the-journals-of All about Pray for China (PrayforChina.us) Chinese Pastors Accused of Fraud https://chinapartnership.org/blog/2025/01/joint-statement-against-persecution-on-charges-of-fraud/ https://chinapartnership.org/blog/2022/12/accused-of-fraud/ Vanuatu Earthquake https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/539227/vanuatu-one-month-on-aftershocks-a-no-go-zone-and-anxiety https://apnews.com/article/vanuatu-earthquake-pacific-ocean-port-vila-magnitude-85f483b151f928cc25175038c33fb6d1 Tears for Tanna The Perseverance of John G. Paton and the Transformation of Tanna www.JohnGPaton.com If you enjoy this podcast, follow or subscribe on Spotify or Apple or right here on PubTV. You can also email any questions or comments to contact @ PrayforChina dot us. And don’t forget to check out everything we are involved in at PrayGiveGo.us.

Welcome to the China Compass Podcast on the Fight Laugh Feast Network! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. You can follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post daily reminders to pray for China (PrayforChina.us). You can find links to everything else we are involved in @ PrayGiveGo.us. Summary: I begin by explaining my upcoming plans for the podcast, then talk about my travels and adventures in China 22 years ago this week. (3:08) Next, we drop in on the Millionaire Missionary in Cairo in January of 1913 (19:04) and on William Milne in Malacca on January 18 of both 1812 and 1820. (24:00) After discussing how to Pray for China (32:44), we look at the unfortunate trend of Chinese house church pastors being falsely accused of “fraud”. Finally, we end with a call to pray (51:05) for Vanuatu (former home of John G. Paton) as they recover from a recent earthquake and deal with an aggressive China. The Millionaire Missionary in Cairo (1913) (BordenofYale.com) https://chinacall.substack.com/p/crazy-colorful-cairo The Memoirs of William Milne (200th Anniversary Edition) (https://a.co/d/bALLtAf) https://chinacall.substack.com/p/on-this-day-from-the-journals-of All about Pray for China (PrayforChina.us) Chinese Pastors Accused of Fraud https://chinapartnership.org/blog/2025/01/joint-statement-against-persecution-on-charges-of-fraud/ https://chinapartnership.org/blog/2022/12/accused-of-fraud/ Vanuatu Earthquake https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/539227/vanuatu-one-month-on-aftershocks-a-no-go-zone-and-anxiety https://apnews.com/article/vanuatu-earthquake-pacific-ocean-port-vila-magnitude-85f483b151f928cc25175038c33fb6d1 Tears for Tanna The Perseverance of John G. Paton and the Transformation of Tanna www.JohnGPaton.com If you enjoy this podcast, follow or subscribe on Spotify or Apple or right here on PubTV. You can also email any questions or comments to contact @ PrayforChina dot us. And don’t forget to check out everything we are involved in at PrayGiveGo.us.

A version of this essay was published by firstpost.com at https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/greenland-canada-panama-how-trump-2-0-is-going-to-be-a-wild-ride-13852423.htmlIn a week when a staggeringly large wildfire laid Los Angeles low, for which the ‘progressive' mayor and the governor could be partly to blame, it was also intriguing to see president-to-be Trump's statements about purchasing Canada and Greenland, and laying claim to the Panama Canal.There was also the withering attack on Britain – including direct accusations against their Prime Minister Keir Starmer – over the horrific gang-rapes of young girls there for decades. Presidential Buddy #1 Elon Musk used X (Twitter) to exhume this story of 250,000 girls (according to Musk) being turned into sex-slaves. It had been swept under the carpet.My first reaction to these – how shall I put in politely – “imperial” assertions was that Trump is being himself, mercurial, and that he was merely making flippant comments with no intention of following through. But on thinking about it, there is a certain logic to it, as outrageous as it might appear.On the one hand, there is precedent: the US did buy Alaska from Russia, and Louisiana from France. There is also precedent for invasions: it invaded Mexico and annexed, if I remember correctly, California, Texas, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and bits of several other states. Furthermore, the province of Panama itself was separated from Columbia by the US in 1903.On the other hand, there are fairly good reasons for all this. I have been of the opinion that the recent H1-B narrative was astroturfed by the British Deep State (“Whitehall”); the Musk counter-narrative on rape affects both Whitehall and its Parliament (“Westminster”) as Starmer appeared unnerved in debate with his opposition; who knows if it might lead to his downfall.Apart from any personal reasons Musk may have (he himself went through the H-1B system and may be sensitive about it), it is yet another indication that the alleged ‘Special Relationship' between the US and the UK may now be mostly a pious myth. Trump, rightly, focused on the Quad, and it was Biden, an Atlanticist, who cooked up the AUKUS submarine alliance, which seems to have achieved very little so far, although The Economist magazine talks it up.Britain, to nobody's surprise after Brexit, is spiralling down into irrelevance.Besides, the UK Labour Party allegedly indulged in election interference, with 100+ ‘volunteers' sent to swing states during the US Presidential election campaign to support Kamala Harris, the Democratic candidate. This, one could argue, is casus belli.Trump has also in the past made noises about Europeans not bearing their fair share of the cost of the NATO military alliance: he prodded them to increase their spending to 2% of respective GDP, and now may want more. He does not seem to think it's America's duty to spend blood and treasure protecting wealthy Europeans from the alleged Russian threat.But the Canada/Greenland offer is not so much about Europe as it is about China. It is about the fabled Northwest Passage, the alternative polar route for trade, which becomes viable as a result of global warming. This can become a new seaborne trade route between the Atlantic and the Pacific, much of which is now through the Panama Canal.In an engaging conversation on pgurus.com, retired General and geo-strategist Rajiv Narayanan laid out the case for fending off the Chinese. He said they have been talking up the ‘Arctic Silk Route', which alarmed the Russians, who immediately upgraded the military capability of some of their Arctic Ocean outposts.China does have a problem. They are concerned about their dependence on the Straits of Malacca, which India (and possibly other Quad members) could blockade. They have been talking to the Thais about a canal through the Isthmus of Kra, and it is possible they may have grand plans of getting access to Chittagong (after surgically removing India's control of the Northeast by invading through the Chicken's Neck).The Chinese are also active in the Panama Canal. A Hong Kong firm now runs two major ports, Balboa and Cristobal, at either end of the canal. Chinese firms also run the Panama-Colon container port under the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative). They also have a railway project that is a direct competitor to the Panama Canal, the 3000 kilometer Bi-Oceanic Corridor, from Brazil's port of Santos to Peru's port of Ilo, connecting the Pacific to the Atlantic.Thus, it is not purely idle talk on the part of Trump to pinpoint Canada, Greenland and the Panama Canal. There is method to this apparent madness. There are also immense mineral resources in both Canada and Greenland, which will become accessible as the tundra thaws.Canadians may well accept such an offer from the US, considering the mess their politicians, especially Trudeau, have made. The Canadian dollar is now at 0.69 US dollars, down from a peak of 1.06 US dollars in 2011. In addition, the Trump threat of 25% tariffs on Canada, if put in place, could squeeze that nation's exports.As for Greenland, its sparse population of only about 57,000 people may not feel particularly Danish, since they were actually colonized by the Danes around 1721. They may well be willing to join the US. Incidentally, we are all used to thinking Greenland is a gigantic landmass, but that is an illusion from the Mercator Projection. In reality, it is about 2/3rds the size of India, and about the same as Saudi Arabia.Be that as it may, what is most relevant to India in these musings by Trump is whether it gives any clues as to how he may affect India's interests. If he is intensely focused on China, then that is good for India. If he wants to cut Europe down to size, and to exit the disastrous Ukraine war, India would benefit. If he can end the Gaza war, great.Biden's national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, visited India recently. It is likely that the intent was to bully India into unilateral concessions before Trump takes over. I saw a new AI roadmap on Twitter that shows a) allies with whom the US will share technology (basically the Anglosphere + Japan + some of Western Europe), b) friends with which it will be arms-length (most of the world, including India), and then c) foes that will be sanctioned (eg. China).Then there is the Damocles Sword of tariffs hanging over India (Trump claims India has the highest tariffs in the world and he threatens to retaliate in kind), and these will hurt.At the moment, trying to divine Trump's foreign policy is a tall order. We have to read the tea leaves or chicken entrails, or extrapolate from whatever crumbs of information we get. This is going to be a wild ride.The AI-generated podcast on this essay courtesy NotebookLM from Google:1100 words, 11 Jan 2025 This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe

Jenny Summerlot, a realtor specializing in rural real estate in Malacca, talks about her journey and strategies for success. Jenny emphasizes the importance of community involvement, consistent social media posting, and detailed buyer consultations. Jenny also highlights her approach to setting client expectations, including discussing commission structures and market conditions. Last, Jenny discusses her plans for 2025, including focusing on personal deals and acquiring new builder clients. If you'd prefer to watch this interview, click here to view on YouTube! Jenny Sommerlot can be reached at (320) 260-5668 and jennysommerlot@kw.com. This episode is brought to you by Real Geeks.

Việt Nam muốn Trung Quốc hỗ trợ trợ xây dựng đường sắt ở miền bắc để kết nối sáng kiến "Hai hành lang, Một vành đai" với "Sáng kiến Vành đai và Con đường" (BRI) của Trung Quốc. Theo ông Hùng Ba, đại sứ Trung Quốc tại Việt Nam, hệ thống đường sắt này "sẽ kết nối Việt Nam với các nước châu Âu - Tây Á qua tuyến đường sắt liên vận. Việt Nam sẽ thành cửa ngõ để Trung Quốc kết nối với các nước ASEAN, đồng thời là đầu mối quan trọng kết nối ASEAN với châu Âu và Trung Á". Sáng kiến « Hai hành lang, Một vành đai », được Việt Nam và Trung Quốc thông qua năm 2004, là cụm từ gọi tắt của hành lang « Côn Minh - Lào Cai - Hà Nội - Hải Phòng » và hành lang « Nam Ninh - Lạng Sơn - Hà Nội - Hải Phòng » và « Vành đai kinh tế Vịnh Bắc Bộ ». Sau nhiều năm cân nhắc bên phía Việt Nam, vấn đề hợp tác đường sắt được nhấn mạnh trong Điều 7 Tuyên bố chung ngày 20/08/2024, nhân chuyến công du Trung Quốc của tổng bí thư-chủ tịch nước Tô Lâm.Việt Nam được lợi ích gì từ những dự án này ? Vai trò của Việt Nam trong kế hoạch Vanh đai và Con đường của Trung Quốc ? RFI Tiếng Việt đặt câu hỏi với nhà nghiên cứu Laurent Gédéon, giảng viên trường Sư phạm Lyon (École normale supérieure de Lyon), Pháp.RFI : Việt Nam dự kiến nhiều kế hoạch hiện đại hóa hệ thống đường sắt từ lâu. Vào tháng 04/2024, sau khi thông báo ý định trên, Việt Nam đã kêu gọi Trung Quốc hỗ trợ trong khi dường như Việt Nam đã lưỡng lự trong thời gian dài. Tại sao lại chọn thời điểm này ? Và tại sao lại là Trung Quốc ? Laurent Gédéon : Dường như Trung Quốc đang tìm cách thúc đẩy mối quan hệ kinh tế với Việt Nam thông qua đầu tư vào cơ sở hạ tầng để xây dựng thiện chí và niềm tin song phương. Điều này đặc biệt quan trọng đối với Bắc Kinh trong bối cảnh mất lòng tin dai dẳng do các yêu sách lãnh thổ của Trung Quốc ở Biển Đông.Chúng ta thấy mong muốn hòa dịu và xích lại gần nhau giữa hai nước từ nhiều năm nay, được thể hiện rõ qua các chuyến thăm của nhiều quan chức cấp cao. Chủ tịch Trung Quốc Tập Cận Bình đến thăm chính thức Việt Nam vào ngày 12 và 13/12/2023 theo lời mời của người đồng cấp Việt Nam lúc bấy giờ là tổng bí thư đảng Cộng Sản Việt Nam Nguyễn Phú Trọng. Trong chuyến thăm này, ông Tập đã nêu một dự án xây dựng đường sắt liên doanh có thể nằm trong khuôn khổ Sáng kiến ​Vành đai và Con đường (BRI) của Trung Quốc. Đọc thêm : Thăm Trung Quốc, lãnh đạo đảng Cộng Sản Việt Nam sẽ thúc đẩy kết nối đường sắt giữa hai nướcSau đó, chủ đề này đã được thủ tướng Phạm Minh Chính nhắc lại trong chuyến thăm Trung Quốc từ ngày 24 đến 27/06/2024. Ông cho biết Việt Nam có kế hoạch xây dựng 3 tuyến đường sắt nối Trung Quốc trong khuôn khổ Sáng kiến Vành đai và Con đường, cụ thể là ba tuyến Lào Cai - Hà Nội - Hải Phòng ; Lạng Sơn - Hà Nội và Móng Cái - Hạ Long - Hải Phòng.Cuối cùng, chuyến thăm Bắc Kinh của tổng bí thư chủ tịch nước Việt Nam Tô Lâm vào ngày 19-20/08/2024 đã cho phép Trung Quốc và Việt Nam ký kết 14 thỏa thuận, nhằm tăng cường thương mại và kết nối biên giới, đặc biệt là kế hoạch đường sắt. Nhân dịp này, ông Tập Cận Bình khẳng định Việt Nam là « ưu tiên » trong chính sách ngoại giao láng giềng của Trung Quốc. Ông cũng cam kết mở rộng Sáng kiến ​Vành đai và Con đường bằng cách thúc đẩy xây dựng đường sắt, đường cao tốc và hải cảng.Tất cả những công bố và quyết định này đều nhất quán với Quy hoạch tổng thể đến năm 2050 với mục tiêu là kết nối mạng lưới đường sắt Việt Nam với tuyến đường sắt xuyên Á thông qua Trung Quốc và với mạng lưới đường sắt ASEAN thông qua Lào và Cam Bốt. Nếu mọi việc diễn ra theo đúng kế hoạch, hai tuyến đường sắt cao tốc sẽ được xây dựng từ nay đến năm 2030 và sẽ nối các tỉnh Vân Nam, Quảng Tây của Trung Quốc với các cảng trọng điểm Hải Phòng và Hà Nội.Cho nên theo tôi, có lẽ bối cảnh chung hiện nay được đánh dấu bởi nhiều yếu tố : mong muốn phát triển đường sắt của Việt Nam, nguồn vốn dồi dào và sẵn có bên phía Trung Quốc và cuối cùng là mong muốn của Trung Quốc giảm bớt căng thẳng với nước láng giềng phương Nam vào lúc căng thẳng có xu hướng gia tăng ở eo biển Đài Loan và biển Hoa Đông. Tất cả những yếu tố này giải thích cho động lực phát triển hiện nay trong hợp tác Việt - Trung.RFI : Người ta thường nói đến rủi ro hoặc « bẫy nợ » khi nhắc đến các khoản vay từ Trung Quốc. Vậy Việt Nam có thể sẽ phải đối mặt với những tác động như thế nào nếu nhận hỗ trợ từ Trung Quốc ? Liệu có thể có nguy cơ nào đó phụ thuộc vào Trung Quốc ? Laurent Gédéon : Trong chuyến đi Trung Quốc vào tháng 06/2024, thủ tướng Phạm Minh Chính cho biết chính phủ Việt Nam sẽ yêu cầu các cơ quan nghiên cứu soạn thảo một hiệp định liên chính phủ về việc triển khai ba tuyến đường sắt, trong đó nhấn mạnh đến « các khoản vay ưu đãi » từ Trung Quốc, « chuyển giao công nghệ và đào tạo nhân lực » để Việt Nam có thể tự phát triển ngành công nghiệp đường sắt.Cũng cần lưu ý rằng bối cảnh hiện tại khá thuận lợi cho Việt Nam. Việc chuỗi cung ứng Mỹ và phương Tây rời khỏi Trung Quốc và tái tổ chức hoạt động, trong đó có Việt Nam, cũng đã buộc Trung Quốc phải tổ chức lại các mạng lưới chuỗi cung ứng sản xuất hướng sang Việt Nam. Đọc thêm : Việt Nam gia tăng sử dụng đường sắt Trung Quốc xuất hàng sang châu ÂuNhưng cũng cần phải cảnh giác vì Việt Nam sẽ phụ thuộc nhiều vào nhập khẩu từ Trung Quốc, đặc biệt là thép, nhựa và linh kiện điện tử thiết yếu để sản xuất thành phẩm. Động lực kinh tế đã làm gia tăng thâm hụt thương mại của Việt Nam với Trung Quốc và lên đến 50 tỷ đô la vào năm 2023, tăng gần 50% trong 5 năm qua. Do đó, sự hội nhập của Việt Nam vào chuỗi cung ứng toàn cầu về cơ bản là nhờ vào hàng nhập khẩu Trung Quốc và bị phụ thuộc vào nhập khẩu từ Trung Quốc. Rõ ràng, sự phụ thuộc này, nếu đi kèm với khoản nợ đáng kể với Trung Quốc liên quan đến đầu tư vào cơ sở hạ tầng, đặc biệt là đường sắt, có thể gây ra rủi ro cho nền kinh tế Việt Nam, kể cả « bẫy nợ ».Tuy nhiên, chúng ta có thể lưu ý rằng bẫy nợ cho đến nay vẫn gây nhiều tác động đến các quốc gia nhỏ hơn Việt Nam, như Sri Lanka hay Montenegro. Tương tự, cần phải nhớ rằng lợi ích đầu tiên của một chủ nợ, kể cả đó là một Nhà nước, là phải thu hồi vốn cùng với lợi nhuận, hơn là thấy « con nợ » chìm sâu trong vòng xoáy nợ nần. Dù sao vẫn phải luôn cảnh giác vì một Việt Nam yếu kém và phụ thuộc về tài chính có thể trở thành một lá bài về địa-chính trị cho Trung Quốc.RFI : Ngược lại, đâu là những lợi ích mà Việt Nam có thể được hưởng từ những chương trình đầu tư này ? Laurent Gédéon : Nhờ kết nối, vận tải hàng hóa và du lịch được cải thiện, Việt Nam có thể thu được nhiều lợi ích từ những khoản đầu tư này, cả về kinh tế lẫn chính trị :Trước hết, nhờ tăng cường kết nối, Việt Nam sẽ có thể tạo điều kiện thuận lợi cho giao thương với các nước láng giềng ASEAN cũng như với Trung Quốc. Số lượng container được vận chuyển mỗi năm bằng đường sắt về nguyên tắc sẽ tăng lên, song song đó là giảm chi phí về hậu cần.Tiếp theo, ngành du lịch cũng sẽ được hưởng lợi nhiều nhờ sự gia tăng kết nối đường sắt này. Ngoài ra, sức hấp dẫn sẽ được tăng cường do tiết kiệm được đáng kể thời gian nhờ các mạng lưới đường sắt mới. Ví dụ, một chuyến tàu chở hàng từ Thành Đô hiện giờ mất khoảng bảy ngày để đến Hà Nội. Trước đây, hàng hóa từ Trùng Khánh về Việt Nam mất trung bình 20 ngày do phải đi đường biển qua Thượng Hải. Đọc thêm : Bắc Kinh và Hà Nội xem xét nâng cấp tuyến đường sắt xuyên qua vùng giàu đất hiếm của Việt NamCuối cùng, một tuyến đường sắt từ Trung Quốc xuyên qua Việt Nam có thể sẽ nâng tầm quan trọng của Việt Nam hơn về mặt chiến lược đối với Bắc Kinh và nâng cao vị thế của Hà Nội nếu nhìn từ góc độ Trung Quốc. Khi đó, Trung Quốc có lẽ sẽ quan tâm nhiều hơn đến việc để Việt Nam là đối tác thân thiết trong bối cảnh chuỗi cung ứng toàn cầu đang được tái cấu trúc, cũng như cạnh tranh Mỹ - Trung.Về mặt thực tiễn, các tuyến đường sắt được quy hoạch sẽ tích hợp mạng lưới của Việt Nam vào mạng lưới đường sắt xuyên Á, hiện có ba tuyến : tuyến ở giữa đi từ Côn Minh đến Lào và Bangkok ; tuyến phía tây đi qua Miến Điện và Thái Lan ; tuyến phía đông dự kiến đi qua Việt Nam, Cam Bốt và Thái Lan và kéo dài xuống phía nam tới Malaysia và Singapore.Cũng cần lưu ý rằng tuyến tàu chở hàng Trùng Khánh - Hà Nội hiện đã kết nối Việt Nam vào hành lang thương mại quốc tế đường bộ-đường biển mới International Land-Sea Trade Corridor (ILSTC). Xin nhắc lại rằng đây là hành lang thương mại và hậu cần có trung tâm hoạt động ở Trùng Khánh và kết nối với 190 cảng ở 90 quốc gia. ILSTC là một trong số nhiều hành lang thương mại trong Sáng kiến ​​Vành đai và Con đường.Ngoài ra, còn phải nói đến tuyến đường sắt giữa Việt Nam và Lào đang được nghiên cứu, theo dự kiến sẽ được kết nối với tuyến đường sắt hiện có giữa Trung Quốc và Lào. Dự án này sẽ giúp Lào tiếp cận với lĩnh vực hàng hải và sẽ tạo ra các luồng trao đổi kinh tế có lợi cho Việt Nam.RFI : Liệu thông qua những tuyến đường này có thể coi là Việt Nam tham gia vào dự án Con đường tơ lụa mới của Trung Quốc không ? Laurent Gédéon : Trước tiên cần lưu ý rằng xét về mặt địa lý, Việt Nam nằm ở cực đông của tất cả các tuyến đường và điều này khiến Việt Nam phần nào nằm bên rìa so với những nước khác. Việt Nam chỉ có thể được đưa vào dự án Con đường Tơ lụa mới thông qua hai tuyến : đường biển và hành lang Đông Dương. Liên quan đến Con đường Tơ lụa trên biển, Việt Nam nằm ngoài dự án này vì chỉ có cảng Hải Phòng nằm trên tuyến đường dự tính ban đầu. Cho nên, khả năng lớn nhất để Việt Nam hội nhập vào Sáng kiến Vành đai và Con đường (BRI) là thông qua các tuyến trên đất liền.Về mặt chính thức, Tuyên bố chung về Tăng cường Quan hệ Đối tác Hợp tác Chiến lược Toàn diện giữa Việt Nam và Trung Quốc và Xây dựng Cộng đồng chia sẻ tương lai được công bố vào ngày 20/08, nhân chuyến thăm của Tô Lâm tới Bắc Kinh, nhấn mạnh đến việc « Hai bên nhất trí thúc đẩy kết nối chiến lược phát triển giữa hai nước, thực hiện hiệu quả kế hoạch hợp tác gắn sáng kiến ​​Việt Nam « Hai hành lang, một vành đai » với sáng kiến « Một vành đai, một con đường » của Trung Quốc ; đẩy mạnh « kết nối cứng » về đường sắt, đường cao tốc và cơ sở hạ tầng biên giới ; […] ; Trung Quốc cũng cam kết hỗ trợ Việt Nam trong việc phát triển quy hoạch các tuyến đường sắt khổ tiêu chuẩn ». Do đó, việc đưa Việt Nam vào hệ thống, đặc biệt là những con đường tơ lụa mới trên đất liền, có lẽ là điều hiển nhiên. Đọc thêm : Việt Nam-Trung Quốc nhất trí xây dựng “Cộng Đồng Chia Sẻ Tương Lai”Tuy nhiên, tôi muốn lưu ý đến một yếu tố mang tính chiến lược hơn và rất được Trung Quốc quan tâm trong kế hoạch này. Chúng ta thấy rằng tuyến Côn Minh - Lào Cai - Hà Nội - Hải Phòng cũng kết nối cảng Phòng Thành Cảng ở vùng duyên hải Quảng Tây. Trong khi cảng này nằm gần dự án kênh đào Bình Lục (Pinglu). Kênh này được dự kiến kết nối Nam Ninh, thủ phủ khu tự trị Quảng Tây, với vịnh Bắc Bộ. Thông qua tuyến đường này, hàng hóa có thể từ eo biển Malacca đi bằng đường biển vào Quảng Tây, rồi từ đó được chuyển vào sâu trong lục địa Trung Quốc, tránh đi qua eo biển Đài Loan.Rõ ràng lợi ích của dự án này là rất lớn, ở cấp độ chiến lược bởi vì trong trường hợp xảy ra xung đột ở eo biển Đài Loan, Trung Quốc vẫn có thể vận chuyển thực phẩm và nguyên liệu thô qua kênh đào này, ngay cả khi toàn bộ tuyến đường Biển Đông, từ Hồng Kông đến Hoàng Hải, bị ngăn chặn. Với giả thuyết như vậy, chúng hiểu rằng Bắc Kinh cần phải duy trì mối quan hệ tốt đẹp với Việt Nam để những luồng vận tải này không bị gián đoạn.RFI Tiếng Việt xin chân thành cảm ơn nhà nghiên cứu Laurent Gédéon, giảng viên trường Sư phạm Lyon (École normale supérieure de Lyon), Pháp.

Việt Nam muốn Trung Quốc hỗ trợ trợ xây dựng đường sắt ở miền bắc để kết nối sáng kiến "Hai hành lang, Một vành đai" với "Sáng kiến Vành đai và Con đường" (BRI) của Trung Quốc. Theo ông Hùng Ba, đại sứ Trung Quốc tại Việt Nam, hệ thống đường sắt này "sẽ kết nối Việt Nam với các nước châu Âu - Tây Á qua tuyến đường sắt liên vận. Việt Nam sẽ thành cửa ngõ để Trung Quốc kết nối với các nước ASEAN, đồng thời là đầu mối quan trọng kết nối ASEAN với châu Âu và Trung Á". Sáng kiến « Hai hành lang, Một vành đai », được Việt Nam và Trung Quốc thông qua năm 2004, là cụm từ gọi tắt của hành lang « Côn Minh - Lào Cai - Hà Nội - Hải Phòng » và hành lang « Nam Ninh - Lạng Sơn - Hà Nội - Hải Phòng » và « Vành đai kinh tế Vịnh Bắc Bộ ». Sau nhiều năm cân nhắc bên phía Việt Nam, vấn đề hợp tác đường sắt được nhấn mạnh trong Điều 7 Tuyên bố chung ngày 20/08/2024, nhân chuyến công du Trung Quốc của tổng bí thư-chủ tịch nước Tô Lâm.Việt Nam được lợi ích gì từ những dự án này ? Vai trò của Việt Nam trong kế hoạch Vanh đai và Con đường của Trung Quốc ? RFI Tiếng Việt đặt câu hỏi với nhà nghiên cứu Laurent Gédéon, giảng viên trường Sư phạm Lyon (École normale supérieure de Lyon), Pháp.RFI : Việt Nam dự kiến nhiều kế hoạch hiện đại hóa hệ thống đường sắt từ lâu. Vào tháng 04/2024, sau khi thông báo ý định trên, Việt Nam đã kêu gọi Trung Quốc hỗ trợ trong khi dường như Việt Nam đã lưỡng lự trong thời gian dài. Tại sao lại chọn thời điểm này ? Và tại sao lại là Trung Quốc ? Laurent Gédéon : Dường như Trung Quốc đang tìm cách thúc đẩy mối quan hệ kinh tế với Việt Nam thông qua đầu tư vào cơ sở hạ tầng để xây dựng thiện chí và niềm tin song phương. Điều này đặc biệt quan trọng đối với Bắc Kinh trong bối cảnh mất lòng tin dai dẳng do các yêu sách lãnh thổ của Trung Quốc ở Biển Đông.Chúng ta thấy mong muốn hòa dịu và xích lại gần nhau giữa hai nước từ nhiều năm nay, được thể hiện rõ qua các chuyến thăm của nhiều quan chức cấp cao. Chủ tịch Trung Quốc Tập Cận Bình đến thăm chính thức Việt Nam vào ngày 12 và 13/12/2023 theo lời mời của người đồng cấp Việt Nam lúc bấy giờ là tổng bí thư đảng Cộng Sản Việt Nam Nguyễn Phú Trọng. Trong chuyến thăm này, ông Tập đã nêu một dự án xây dựng đường sắt liên doanh có thể nằm trong khuôn khổ Sáng kiến ​Vành đai và Con đường (BRI) của Trung Quốc. Đọc thêm : Thăm Trung Quốc, lãnh đạo đảng Cộng Sản Việt Nam sẽ thúc đẩy kết nối đường sắt giữa hai nướcSau đó, chủ đề này đã được thủ tướng Phạm Minh Chính nhắc lại trong chuyến thăm Trung Quốc từ ngày 24 đến 27/06/2024. Ông cho biết Việt Nam có kế hoạch xây dựng 3 tuyến đường sắt nối Trung Quốc trong khuôn khổ Sáng kiến Vành đai và Con đường, cụ thể là ba tuyến Lào Cai - Hà Nội - Hải Phòng ; Lạng Sơn - Hà Nội và Móng Cái - Hạ Long - Hải Phòng.Cuối cùng, chuyến thăm Bắc Kinh của tổng bí thư chủ tịch nước Việt Nam Tô Lâm vào ngày 19-20/08/2024 đã cho phép Trung Quốc và Việt Nam ký kết 14 thỏa thuận, nhằm tăng cường thương mại và kết nối biên giới, đặc biệt là kế hoạch đường sắt. Nhân dịp này, ông Tập Cận Bình khẳng định Việt Nam là « ưu tiên » trong chính sách ngoại giao láng giềng của Trung Quốc. Ông cũng cam kết mở rộng Sáng kiến ​Vành đai và Con đường bằng cách thúc đẩy xây dựng đường sắt, đường cao tốc và hải cảng.Tất cả những công bố và quyết định này đều nhất quán với Quy hoạch tổng thể đến năm 2050 với mục tiêu là kết nối mạng lưới đường sắt Việt Nam với tuyến đường sắt xuyên Á thông qua Trung Quốc và với mạng lưới đường sắt ASEAN thông qua Lào và Cam Bốt. Nếu mọi việc diễn ra theo đúng kế hoạch, hai tuyến đường sắt cao tốc sẽ được xây dựng từ nay đến năm 2030 và sẽ nối các tỉnh Vân Nam, Quảng Tây của Trung Quốc với các cảng trọng điểm Hải Phòng và Hà Nội.Cho nên theo tôi, có lẽ bối cảnh chung hiện nay được đánh dấu bởi nhiều yếu tố : mong muốn phát triển đường sắt của Việt Nam, nguồn vốn dồi dào và sẵn có bên phía Trung Quốc và cuối cùng là mong muốn của Trung Quốc giảm bớt căng thẳng với nước láng giềng phương Nam vào lúc căng thẳng có xu hướng gia tăng ở eo biển Đài Loan và biển Hoa Đông. Tất cả những yếu tố này giải thích cho động lực phát triển hiện nay trong hợp tác Việt - Trung.RFI : Người ta thường nói đến rủi ro hoặc « bẫy nợ » khi nhắc đến các khoản vay từ Trung Quốc. Vậy Việt Nam có thể sẽ phải đối mặt với những tác động như thế nào nếu nhận hỗ trợ từ Trung Quốc ? Liệu có thể có nguy cơ nào đó phụ thuộc vào Trung Quốc ? Laurent Gédéon : Trong chuyến đi Trung Quốc vào tháng 06/2024, thủ tướng Phạm Minh Chính cho biết chính phủ Việt Nam sẽ yêu cầu các cơ quan nghiên cứu soạn thảo một hiệp định liên chính phủ về việc triển khai ba tuyến đường sắt, trong đó nhấn mạnh đến « các khoản vay ưu đãi » từ Trung Quốc, « chuyển giao công nghệ và đào tạo nhân lực » để Việt Nam có thể tự phát triển ngành công nghiệp đường sắt.Cũng cần lưu ý rằng bối cảnh hiện tại khá thuận lợi cho Việt Nam. Việc chuỗi cung ứng Mỹ và phương Tây rời khỏi Trung Quốc và tái tổ chức hoạt động, trong đó có Việt Nam, cũng đã buộc Trung Quốc phải tổ chức lại các mạng lưới chuỗi cung ứng sản xuất hướng sang Việt Nam. Đọc thêm : Việt Nam gia tăng sử dụng đường sắt Trung Quốc xuất hàng sang châu ÂuNhưng cũng cần phải cảnh giác vì Việt Nam sẽ phụ thuộc nhiều vào nhập khẩu từ Trung Quốc, đặc biệt là thép, nhựa và linh kiện điện tử thiết yếu để sản xuất thành phẩm. Động lực kinh tế đã làm gia tăng thâm hụt thương mại của Việt Nam với Trung Quốc và lên đến 50 tỷ đô la vào năm 2023, tăng gần 50% trong 5 năm qua. Do đó, sự hội nhập của Việt Nam vào chuỗi cung ứng toàn cầu về cơ bản là nhờ vào hàng nhập khẩu Trung Quốc và bị phụ thuộc vào nhập khẩu từ Trung Quốc. Rõ ràng, sự phụ thuộc này, nếu đi kèm với khoản nợ đáng kể với Trung Quốc liên quan đến đầu tư vào cơ sở hạ tầng, đặc biệt là đường sắt, có thể gây ra rủi ro cho nền kinh tế Việt Nam, kể cả « bẫy nợ ».Tuy nhiên, chúng ta có thể lưu ý rằng bẫy nợ cho đến nay vẫn gây nhiều tác động đến các quốc gia nhỏ hơn Việt Nam, như Sri Lanka hay Montenegro. Tương tự, cần phải nhớ rằng lợi ích đầu tiên của một chủ nợ, kể cả đó là một Nhà nước, là phải thu hồi vốn cùng với lợi nhuận, hơn là thấy « con nợ » chìm sâu trong vòng xoáy nợ nần. Dù sao vẫn phải luôn cảnh giác vì một Việt Nam yếu kém và phụ thuộc về tài chính có thể trở thành một lá bài về địa-chính trị cho Trung Quốc.RFI : Ngược lại, đâu là những lợi ích mà Việt Nam có thể được hưởng từ những chương trình đầu tư này ? Laurent Gédéon : Nhờ kết nối, vận tải hàng hóa và du lịch được cải thiện, Việt Nam có thể thu được nhiều lợi ích từ những khoản đầu tư này, cả về kinh tế lẫn chính trị :Trước hết, nhờ tăng cường kết nối, Việt Nam sẽ có thể tạo điều kiện thuận lợi cho giao thương với các nước láng giềng ASEAN cũng như với Trung Quốc. Số lượng container được vận chuyển mỗi năm bằng đường sắt về nguyên tắc sẽ tăng lên, song song đó là giảm chi phí về hậu cần.Tiếp theo, ngành du lịch cũng sẽ được hưởng lợi nhiều nhờ sự gia tăng kết nối đường sắt này. Ngoài ra, sức hấp dẫn sẽ được tăng cường do tiết kiệm được đáng kể thời gian nhờ các mạng lưới đường sắt mới. Ví dụ, một chuyến tàu chở hàng từ Thành Đô hiện giờ mất khoảng bảy ngày để đến Hà Nội. Trước đây, hàng hóa từ Trùng Khánh về Việt Nam mất trung bình 20 ngày do phải đi đường biển qua Thượng Hải. Đọc thêm : Bắc Kinh và Hà Nội xem xét nâng cấp tuyến đường sắt xuyên qua vùng giàu đất hiếm của Việt NamCuối cùng, một tuyến đường sắt từ Trung Quốc xuyên qua Việt Nam có thể sẽ nâng tầm quan trọng của Việt Nam hơn về mặt chiến lược đối với Bắc Kinh và nâng cao vị thế của Hà Nội nếu nhìn từ góc độ Trung Quốc. Khi đó, Trung Quốc có lẽ sẽ quan tâm nhiều hơn đến việc để Việt Nam là đối tác thân thiết trong bối cảnh chuỗi cung ứng toàn cầu đang được tái cấu trúc, cũng như cạnh tranh Mỹ - Trung.Về mặt thực tiễn, các tuyến đường sắt được quy hoạch sẽ tích hợp mạng lưới của Việt Nam vào mạng lưới đường sắt xuyên Á, hiện có ba tuyến : tuyến ở giữa đi từ Côn Minh đến Lào và Bangkok ; tuyến phía tây đi qua Miến Điện và Thái Lan ; tuyến phía đông dự kiến đi qua Việt Nam, Cam Bốt và Thái Lan và kéo dài xuống phía nam tới Malaysia và Singapore.Cũng cần lưu ý rằng tuyến tàu chở hàng Trùng Khánh - Hà Nội hiện đã kết nối Việt Nam vào hành lang thương mại quốc tế đường bộ-đường biển mới International Land-Sea Trade Corridor (ILSTC). Xin nhắc lại rằng đây là hành lang thương mại và hậu cần có trung tâm hoạt động ở Trùng Khánh và kết nối với 190 cảng ở 90 quốc gia. ILSTC là một trong số nhiều hành lang thương mại trong Sáng kiến ​​Vành đai và Con đường.Ngoài ra, còn phải nói đến tuyến đường sắt giữa Việt Nam và Lào đang được nghiên cứu, theo dự kiến sẽ được kết nối với tuyến đường sắt hiện có giữa Trung Quốc và Lào. Dự án này sẽ giúp Lào tiếp cận với lĩnh vực hàng hải và sẽ tạo ra các luồng trao đổi kinh tế có lợi cho Việt Nam.RFI : Liệu thông qua những tuyến đường này có thể coi là Việt Nam tham gia vào dự án Con đường tơ lụa mới của Trung Quốc không ? Laurent Gédéon : Trước tiên cần lưu ý rằng xét về mặt địa lý, Việt Nam nằm ở cực đông của tất cả các tuyến đường và điều này khiến Việt Nam phần nào nằm bên rìa so với những nước khác. Việt Nam chỉ có thể được đưa vào dự án Con đường Tơ lụa mới thông qua hai tuyến : đường biển và hành lang Đông Dương. Liên quan đến Con đường Tơ lụa trên biển, Việt Nam nằm ngoài dự án này vì chỉ có cảng Hải Phòng nằm trên tuyến đường dự tính ban đầu. Cho nên, khả năng lớn nhất để Việt Nam hội nhập vào Sáng kiến Vành đai và Con đường (BRI) là thông qua các tuyến trên đất liền.Về mặt chính thức, Tuyên bố chung về Tăng cường Quan hệ Đối tác Hợp tác Chiến lược Toàn diện giữa Việt Nam và Trung Quốc và Xây dựng Cộng đồng chia sẻ tương lai được công bố vào ngày 20/08, nhân chuyến thăm của Tô Lâm tới Bắc Kinh, nhấn mạnh đến việc « Hai bên nhất trí thúc đẩy kết nối chiến lược phát triển giữa hai nước, thực hiện hiệu quả kế hoạch hợp tác gắn sáng kiến ​​Việt Nam « Hai hành lang, một vành đai » với sáng kiến « Một vành đai, một con đường » của Trung Quốc ; đẩy mạnh « kết nối cứng » về đường sắt, đường cao tốc và cơ sở hạ tầng biên giới ; […] ; Trung Quốc cũng cam kết hỗ trợ Việt Nam trong việc phát triển quy hoạch các tuyến đường sắt khổ tiêu chuẩn ». Do đó, việc đưa Việt Nam vào hệ thống, đặc biệt là những con đường tơ lụa mới trên đất liền, có lẽ là điều hiển nhiên. Đọc thêm : Việt Nam-Trung Quốc nhất trí xây dựng “Cộng Đồng Chia Sẻ Tương Lai”Tuy nhiên, tôi muốn lưu ý đến một yếu tố mang tính chiến lược hơn và rất được Trung Quốc quan tâm trong kế hoạch này. Chúng ta thấy rằng tuyến Côn Minh - Lào Cai - Hà Nội - Hải Phòng cũng kết nối cảng Phòng Thành Cảng ở vùng duyên hải Quảng Tây. Trong khi cảng này nằm gần dự án kênh đào Bình Lục (Pinglu). Kênh này được dự kiến kết nối Nam Ninh, thủ phủ khu tự trị Quảng Tây, với vịnh Bắc Bộ. Thông qua tuyến đường này, hàng hóa có thể từ eo biển Malacca đi bằng đường biển vào Quảng Tây, rồi từ đó được chuyển vào sâu trong lục địa Trung Quốc, tránh đi qua eo biển Đài Loan.Rõ ràng lợi ích của dự án này là rất lớn, ở cấp độ chiến lược bởi vì trong trường hợp xảy ra xung đột ở eo biển Đài Loan, Trung Quốc vẫn có thể vận chuyển thực phẩm và nguyên liệu thô qua kênh đào này, ngay cả khi toàn bộ tuyến đường Biển Đông, từ Hồng Kông đến Hoàng Hải, bị ngăn chặn. Với giả thuyết như vậy, chúng hiểu rằng Bắc Kinh cần phải duy trì mối quan hệ tốt đẹp với Việt Nam để những luồng vận tải này không bị gián đoạn.RFI Tiếng Việt xin chân thành cảm ơn nhà nghiên cứu Laurent Gédéon, giảng viên trường Sư phạm Lyon (École normale supérieure de Lyon), Pháp.

Welcome to this special episode of China Compass, from Macau in the South China Sea. After mentioning my appearance this morning on Crosspolitic, I introduce a new series called “Wangyi’s Prison Pulpit” by looking at what he wrote regarding True Freedom during seasons of persecution: Wangyi wrote: “I hope God uses me, by means of first losing my personal freedom, to tell those who have deprived me of my personal freedom that there is an authority higher than their authority, and that there is a freedom that they cannot restrain, a freedom that fills the church of the crucified and risen Jesus Christ.” Next, I share a few fascinating details about the little city-state of Macau: Macau: Las Vegas of the East, Reclaimed Land, Longest Bridge, Most Dense City, etc Third, I talk about “The Legacy of Pastor Lucky”, who died January 20, 2007: Read more at China Call Substack: https://open.substack.com/pub/chinacall/p/the-legacy-of-pastor-lucky "Pastor Lucky has been obsessed with China all his life. No matter where he serves, he always has an unsolvable Chinese complex. When China just opened up in the early 1980s, he went to mainland China to preach the gospel to his own flesh and blood, build churches, and train preachers… Morrison was the first Christian missionary to come to China. He served in China for 27 years, translated the Chinese Bible, and later died in Macau. Pastor Ji often took his friends to see his cemetery because he felt that Morrison loved China. The scripture engraved on Morrison's tombstone comes from Revelation 14:13: "From now on, blessed are the dead in the Lord. Yes, says the Spirit, they will rest from their labors, for the fruit of their works will follow them." I believe that Pastor Ji, who has worked silently for the gospel of China throughout his life, is also remembered by the Lord." Finally, I talk about China’s first missionary, Robert Morrison, and his book, The Memoirs of William Milne, which I released today on Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0DJBRN3FB?ref_=pe_93986420_774957520 I first stumbled on the relatively unknown story of William Milne when researching Robert Morrison, one of the more famous missionaries in China's history. However, Milne was Morrison's equal in many ways. They served in many of the same places (Canton, Macau, Malacca). They seemed to share the same level of fluency in Chinese. Both were Bible translators, and they corrected each other's work. One possibility as to why Milne is lesser known is that he died so young, yet Morrison lived to see the Chinese Bible through to completion. When I found Morrison's edition of Milne's Memoirs, I knew immediately that this was something I wanted to both read and republish. In reality, people are more likely to read about Milne if Morrison commends him to them. The book also turned out to be an exciting window into the minds of both men. There is an intimacy to this work that cannot be reproduced in a normal biography. This book imperfectly (it is representative, not exhaustive, of his words and actions) tells the story of William Milne’s family and his sacrificial efforts to plant the Gospel in hostile soil by translating, printing, and shipping (literally) God’s Word far and wide throughout the Chinese diaspora. Ironically, Milne's one relatively well-known quote about the difficulty of learning Chinese is not found in these pages, and so I share it here. He stated that learning Chinese is. . . “a work for men with bodies of brass, lungs of steel, heads of oak, hands of spring-steel, eyes of eagles, hearts of apostles, memories of angels, and lives of Methuselah!”

Welcome to this special episode of China Compass, from Macau in the South China Sea. After mentioning my appearance this morning on Crosspolitic, I introduce a new series called “Wangyi’s Prison Pulpit” by looking at what he wrote regarding True Freedom during seasons of persecution: Wangyi wrote: “I hope God uses me, by means of first losing my personal freedom, to tell those who have deprived me of my personal freedom that there is an authority higher than their authority, and that there is a freedom that they cannot restrain, a freedom that fills the church of the crucified and risen Jesus Christ.” Next, I share a few fascinating details about the little city-state of Macau: Macau: Las Vegas of the East, Reclaimed Land, Longest Bridge, Most Dense City, etc Third, I talk about “The Legacy of Pastor Lucky”, who died January 20, 2007: Read more at China Call Substack: https://open.substack.com/pub/chinacall/p/the-legacy-of-pastor-lucky "Pastor Lucky has been obsessed with China all his life. No matter where he serves, he always has an unsolvable Chinese complex. When China just opened up in the early 1980s, he went to mainland China to preach the gospel to his own flesh and blood, build churches, and train preachers… Morrison was the first Christian missionary to come to China. He served in China for 27 years, translated the Chinese Bible, and later died in Macau. Pastor Ji often took his friends to see his cemetery because he felt that Morrison loved China. The scripture engraved on Morrison's tombstone comes from Revelation 14:13: "From now on, blessed are the dead in the Lord. Yes, says the Spirit, they will rest from their labors, for the fruit of their works will follow them." I believe that Pastor Ji, who has worked silently for the gospel of China throughout his life, is also remembered by the Lord." Finally, I talk about China’s first missionary, Robert Morrison, and his book, The Memoirs of William Milne, which I released today on Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0DJBRN3FB?ref_=pe_93986420_774957520 I first stumbled on the relatively unknown story of William Milne when researching Robert Morrison, one of the more famous missionaries in China's history. However, Milne was Morrison's equal in many ways. They served in many of the same places (Canton, Macau, Malacca). They seemed to share the same level of fluency in Chinese. Both were Bible translators, and they corrected each other's work. One possibility as to why Milne is lesser known is that he died so young, yet Morrison lived to see the Chinese Bible through to completion. When I found Morrison's edition of Milne's Memoirs, I knew immediately that this was something I wanted to both read and republish. In reality, people are more likely to read about Milne if Morrison commends him to them. The book also turned out to be an exciting window into the minds of both men. There is an intimacy to this work that cannot be reproduced in a normal biography. This book imperfectly (it is representative, not exhaustive, of his words and actions) tells the story of William Milne’s family and his sacrificial efforts to plant the Gospel in hostile soil by translating, printing, and shipping (literally) God’s Word far and wide throughout the Chinese diaspora. Ironically, Milne's one relatively well-known quote about the difficulty of learning Chinese is not found in these pages, and so I share it here. He stated that learning Chinese is. . . “a work for men with bodies of brass, lungs of steel, heads of oak, hands of spring-steel, eyes of eagles, hearts of apostles, memories of angels, and lives of Methuselah!”

Welcome to China Compass! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. You can follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post daily reminders to pray for China (PrayforChina.us). You can also email me any questions or comments @ bfwesten at gmail dot com. And if you want to learn more about everything we are doing, visit PrayGiveGo.us I've been in Malaysia for a couple of days, primarily in Malacca, working on The Memoirs of William Milne (see PrayGiveGo.us on Oct 1 for the Kindle version). I almost got robbed by some middle-aged Chinese guys walking to my hotel yesterday, and it reminded me of my previous adventures in Malaysia… I want to point out that France has just proved the point about the Tibet/Xizang question last week… https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/chandigarh-news/xizang-replacing-tibet-in-french-museums-irked-tibetan-govt-in-exile-flags-distortion-of-history-101726766779169.html Pray for China (Zhejiang/North Carolina) Zhejiang is our province of the week, as well as today’s Pray for China post on X (@chinaadventures): Sep 21 - Pray for Huzhou (“Hu-joe”), aka Lake District, in northern Zhejiang (浙江) Province on China's eastern seaboard. Zhejiang (“Juh-jiang”) one of China’s most populated and important provinces that nobody has ever heard of. South of Shanghai on China’s eastern seaboard, it is aptly paired up with North Carolina for prayer in our intercession scheme, which you can find @ https://prayforchina.us/ Zhejiang’s Name & Geography Asia Harvest: https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/zhejiang Book: https://www.asiaharvest.org/bookstore/Zhejiang-The-Jerusalem-of-China-The-China-Chronicles-N%C2%BA3-p283325105 Zhejiang Missionaries & Martyrs Hudson Taylor: https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/zhejiang/hudson-taylor Maria (Dyer) Taylor: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maria_Jane_Taylor Desiring God on Hudson & Maria: https://www.desiringgod.org/articles/a-marriage-of-tragedy-and-triumph Hudson Taylor & Maria (book): https://www.christianfocus.com/products/383/hudson-taylor-maria China’s First Protestant Martyr: https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/zhejiang/1847-walter-lowrie Thompson Family Massacred in Zhejiang: https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/zhejiang/1900-david-agnes-thompson-and-children

Welcome to China Compass! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. You can follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post daily reminders to pray for China (PrayforChina.us). You can also email me any questions or comments @ bfwesten at gmail dot com. And if you want to learn more about everything we are doing, visit PrayGiveGo.us I've been in Malaysia for a couple of days, primarily in Malacca, working on The Memoirs of William Milne (see PrayGiveGo.us on Oct 1 for the Kindle version). I almost got robbed by some middle-aged Chinese guys walking to my hotel yesterday, and it reminded me of my previous adventures in Malaysia… I want to point out that France has just proved the point about the Tibet/Xizang question last week… https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/chandigarh-news/xizang-replacing-tibet-in-french-museums-irked-tibetan-govt-in-exile-flags-distortion-of-history-101726766779169.html Pray for China (Zhejiang/North Carolina) Zhejiang is our province of the week, as well as today’s Pray for China post on X (@chinaadventures): Sep 21 - Pray for Huzhou (“Hu-joe”), aka Lake District, in northern Zhejiang (浙江) Province on China's eastern seaboard. Zhejiang (“Juh-jiang”) one of China’s most populated and important provinces that nobody has ever heard of. South of Shanghai on China’s eastern seaboard, it is aptly paired up with North Carolina for prayer in our intercession scheme, which you can find @ https://prayforchina.us/ Zhejiang’s Name & Geography Asia Harvest: https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/zhejiang Book: https://www.asiaharvest.org/bookstore/Zhejiang-The-Jerusalem-of-China-The-China-Chronicles-N%C2%BA3-p283325105 Zhejiang Missionaries & Martyrs Hudson Taylor: https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/zhejiang/hudson-taylor Maria (Dyer) Taylor: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maria_Jane_Taylor Desiring God on Hudson & Maria: https://www.desiringgod.org/articles/a-marriage-of-tragedy-and-triumph Hudson Taylor & Maria (book): https://www.christianfocus.com/products/383/hudson-taylor-maria China’s First Protestant Martyr: https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/zhejiang/1847-walter-lowrie Thompson Family Massacred in Zhejiang: https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/zhejiang/1900-david-agnes-thompson-and-children

We may think of globalism as a recent development but its origins date back to the fifteenth century and beyond, when seafarers pioneered routes across the oceans with the objectives of exploration, trade and proft. And what did they seek? Exotic spices: cloves, pepper, cinnamon, ginger. These spices brought together the European ports of Lisbon, London, Amsterdam and Venice, with Goa, Bombay, Malacca and Jakarta - and through those ports the Arab world and China.To find out more Dr Sam Willis spoke with Nicholas Nugent. Nicholas spent his career as a journalist with the BBC World Service and his spare time collecting a valuable archive of original maps, developing a passion for how the growth of the spice ports helped spread the exchange of global culture between east and west. His magnificent book, The Spice Ports: Mapping the Origins of the Global Sea Trade published by the British Library is out now. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Join Cyrus Broacha as he sits down with Alvin Yapp, a former Singapore Airlines station manager whose career took him to San Francisco and Dhaka. Discover how Alvin transitioned from a high-flying corporate role to a passionate collector of Peranakan culture artifacts. Frustrated by the corporate grind, Alvin turned his focus to a lifelong dream: preserving the rich, intricate spirit of the Peranakan culture through his remarkable collection. From Singapore to Malacca, Penang, and even distant lands like India, China, and England, Alvin's collection reflects a profound dedication to the heritage and artistry of Peranakan culture. Don't miss the end—Alvin and Cyrus belt out a surprise duet that you willSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The US government supported protests that overthrew Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. New interim leader Muhammad Yunus has been cultivated by Washington for decades. Ben Norton discusses the geopolitical reasons for the regime change; the roles of India, China, and Russia; and the Pentagon's desire to build a strategic military base on Saint Martin's Island. VIDEO: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=irlrT3zvsqQ Topics 0:00 Interim leader Muhammad Yunus: Made in USA 5:09 Overthrow of Sheikh Hasina 7:44 US military base on St. Martin's Island? 8:57 Myanmar 10:33 China's reliance on Strait of Malacca for oil imports 13:34 Bangladesh-China relations 14:47 BRICS 15:36 US pressure to join Quad 17:47 Russia warned of color revolution in Bangladesh 19:06 Arab Spring 19:58 Was Hasina's undelivered resignation speech fabricated? 22:26 Hasina: "White man" demanded military base in Bay of Bengal 23:58 Hasina: USA "can overthrow the government in any country" 25:36 US-backed 1975 coup against Sheikh Mujib 28:33 US-backed 2022 coup against Pakistan PM Imran Khan 31:00 US support for protests in Bangladesh 31:22 NED funding for Bangladeshi opposition 31:41 NED funding of opposition media outlet Netra News 34:13 Historical context: Partition, India, Pakistan, 1971 liberation war 38:40 Reasons for protests 41:13 US-backed color revolutions 46:21 US State Department pressure on Bangladesh 47:36 Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamaat-e-Islami, & extremism 54:12 Outro

Last broadcast, Terry Sacka, AAMS told us that Malaysia has announced it will join BRICS, granting BRICS control over the Strait of Malacca in which one-quarter of the world's commercial ships traverse that straight. Once the U.S. is blocked, the entire model of globalization trade collapses. In today's broadcast, Terry Sacka, AAMS informs us how China has just been banned a very key weapon ingredient here in the West. This is alarming since we went to globalism, most of what we need in the U.S. comes from other countries -- namely China.For Charts & Visual Aid: WATCH the Video Broadcast of the Episode on RUMBLESupport the Show.SUBSCRIBE & FOLLOW: RIGGED [against you] on YouTube RIGGED [against you] on Rumble RIGGED [against you] on Apple Podcasts RIGGED [against you] on SpotifyABOUT THE HOST:Terry Sacka, AAMS is a Wealth Strategist, Financial Analyst and Founder of Cornerstone Asset Metals, Wealth Transfer News Television, and the RIGGED podcast. He formerly was a financial advisor for A.G. Edwards and a strategist in commodity options and futures. Using his global travel and U.S. Army military experience, Terry has accumulated a unique perspective of the real global economic framework.RIGGED [against you] is a wealth and finance podcast designed to help you achieve your financial goals through advanced savings and investment techniques.

Last broadcast, Terry Sacka, AAMS explained how the once considered extremely safe, almost guaranteed, financial instrument known as the annuity is no longer safe due to economic climate we're currently in. Should you make adjustments? In today's broadcast, Terry Sacka, AAMS tells us that Malaysia has announced it will join BRICS, granting BRICS control over the Strait of Malacca in which one-quarter of the world's commercial ships traverse that straight. Once the U.S. is blocked, the entire model of globalization trade collapses.For Charts & Visual Aid: WATCH the Video Broadcast of the Episode on RUMBLESupport the Show.SUBSCRIBE & FOLLOW: RIGGED [against you] on YouTube RIGGED [against you] on Rumble RIGGED [against you] on Apple Podcasts RIGGED [against you] on SpotifyABOUT THE HOST:Terry Sacka, AAMS is a Wealth Strategist, Financial Analyst and Founder of Cornerstone Asset Metals, Wealth Transfer News Television, and the RIGGED podcast. He formerly was a financial advisor for A.G. Edwards and a strategist in commodity options and futures. Using his global travel and U.S. Army military experience, Terry has accumulated a unique perspective of the real global economic framework.RIGGED [against you] is a wealth and finance podcast designed to help you achieve your financial goals through advanced savings and investment techniques.

The spice islands: Specks of land in the Indonesian archipelago that were the exclusive home of cloves, commodities once worth their weight in gold. The Portuguese got there first, persuading the Spanish to fund expeditions trying to go the other direction, sailing westward across the Atlantic. Roger Crowley, in his new book Spice: The 16th-Century Contest that Shaped the Modern World (Yale University Press: 2024) covers six decades of exploration, conflict and conquest, starting from the Portuguese capture of Malacca in 1511 to the Spanish founding of Manila and the start of the galleon trade in 1571. Roger Crowley is a narrative historian of the early modern period. He is the author of five celebrated books, including City of Fortune: How Venice Won and Lost a Naval Empire (Faber & Faber: 2011) and Conquerors: How Portugal Forged the First Global Empire (Random House: 2015). You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Spice. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

The spice islands: Specks of land in the Indonesian archipelago that were the exclusive home of cloves, commodities once worth their weight in gold. The Portuguese got there first, persuading the Spanish to fund expeditions trying to go the other direction, sailing westward across the Atlantic. Roger Crowley, in his new book Spice: The 16th-Century Contest that Shaped the Modern World (Yale University Press: 2024) covers six decades of exploration, conflict and conquest, starting from the Portuguese capture of Malacca in 1511 to the Spanish founding of Manila and the start of the galleon trade in 1571. Roger Crowley is a narrative historian of the early modern period. He is the author of five celebrated books, including City of Fortune: How Venice Won and Lost a Naval Empire (Faber & Faber: 2011) and Conquerors: How Portugal Forged the First Global Empire (Random House: 2015). You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Spice. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

The spice islands: Specks of land in the Indonesian archipelago that were the exclusive home of cloves, commodities once worth their weight in gold. The Portuguese got there first, persuading the Spanish to fund expeditions trying to go the other direction, sailing westward across the Atlantic. Roger Crowley, in his new book Spice: The 16th-Century Contest that Shaped the Modern World (Yale University Press: 2024) covers six decades of exploration, conflict and conquest, starting from the Portuguese capture of Malacca in 1511 to the Spanish founding of Manila and the start of the galleon trade in 1571. Roger Crowley is a narrative historian of the early modern period. He is the author of five celebrated books, including City of Fortune: How Venice Won and Lost a Naval Empire (Faber & Faber: 2011) and Conquerors: How Portugal Forged the First Global Empire (Random House: 2015). You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Spice. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/southeast-asian-studies

The spice islands: Specks of land in the Indonesian archipelago that were the exclusive home of cloves, commodities once worth their weight in gold. The Portuguese got there first, persuading the Spanish to fund expeditions trying to go the other direction, sailing westward across the Atlantic. Roger Crowley, in his new book Spice: The 16th-Century Contest that Shaped the Modern World (Yale University Press: 2024) covers six decades of exploration, conflict and conquest, starting from the Portuguese capture of Malacca in 1511 to the Spanish founding of Manila and the start of the galleon trade in 1571. Roger Crowley is a narrative historian of the early modern period. He is the author of five celebrated books, including City of Fortune: How Venice Won and Lost a Naval Empire (Faber & Faber: 2011) and Conquerors: How Portugal Forged the First Global Empire (Random House: 2015). You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Spice. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/food

The spice islands: Specks of land in the Indonesian archipelago that were the exclusive home of cloves, commodities once worth their weight in gold. The Portuguese got there first, persuading the Spanish to fund expeditions trying to go the other direction, sailing westward across the Atlantic. Roger Crowley, in his new book Spice: The 16th-Century Contest that Shaped the Modern World (Yale University Press: 2024) covers six decades of exploration, conflict and conquest, starting from the Portuguese capture of Malacca in 1511 to the Spanish founding of Manila and the start of the galleon trade in 1571. Roger Crowley is a narrative historian of the early modern period. He is the author of five celebrated books, including City of Fortune: How Venice Won and Lost a Naval Empire (Faber & Faber: 2011) and Conquerors: How Portugal Forged the First Global Empire (Random House: 2015). You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Spice. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The spice islands: Specks of land in the Indonesian archipelago that were the exclusive home of cloves, commodities once worth their weight in gold. The Portuguese got there first, persuading the Spanish to fund expeditions trying to go the other direction, sailing westward across the Atlantic. Roger Crowley, in his new book Spice: The 16th-Century Contest that Shaped the Modern World (Yale University Press: 2024) covers six decades of exploration, conflict and conquest, starting from the Portuguese capture of Malacca in 1511 to the Spanish founding of Manila and the start of the galleon trade in 1571. Roger Crowley is a narrative historian of the early modern period. He is the author of five celebrated books, including City of Fortune: How Venice Won and Lost a Naval Empire (Faber & Faber: 2011) and Conquerors: How Portugal Forged the First Global Empire (Random House: 2015). You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Spice. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The spice islands: Specks of land in the Indonesian archipelago that were the exclusive home of cloves, commodities once worth their weight in gold. The Portuguese got there first, persuading the Spanish to fund expeditions trying to go the other direction, sailing westward across the Atlantic. Roger Crowley, in his new book Spice: The 16th-Century Contest that Shaped the Modern World (Yale University Press: 2024) covers six decades of exploration, conflict and conquest, starting from the Portuguese capture of Malacca in 1511 to the Spanish founding of Manila and the start of the galleon trade in 1571. Roger Crowley is a narrative historian of the early modern period. He is the author of five celebrated books, including City of Fortune: How Venice Won and Lost a Naval Empire (Faber & Faber: 2011) and Conquerors: How Portugal Forged the First Global Empire (Random House: 2015). You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Spice. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/asian-review

The spice islands: Specks of land in the Indonesian archipelago that were the exclusive home of cloves, commodities once worth their weight in gold. The Portuguese got there first, persuading the Spanish to fund expeditions trying to go the other direction, sailing westward across the Atlantic. Roger Crowley, in his new book Spice: The 16th-Century Contest that Shaped the Modern World (Yale University Press: 2024) covers six decades of exploration, conflict and conquest, starting from the Portuguese capture of Malacca in 1511 to the Spanish founding of Manila and the start of the galleon trade in 1571. Roger Crowley is a narrative historian of the early modern period. He is the author of five celebrated books, including City of Fortune: How Venice Won and Lost a Naval Empire (Faber & Faber: 2011) and Conquerors: How Portugal Forged the First Global Empire (Random House: 2015). You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Spice. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Ngày 12/07/2024 đánh dấu tròn 8 năm Tòa Trọng Tài Quốc Tế xác định rằng các yêu sách hàng hải mở rộng của Trung Quốc ở Biển Đông là không phù hợp với luật pháp quốc tế. Phán quyết cuối cùng của Tòa đã được Việt Nam “hoan nghênh” cùng với tuyên bố “ủng hộ mạnh mẽ việc giải quyết các tranh chấp ở Biển Đông bằng các biện pháp hòa bình”. Tám năm sau, Việt Nam, Philippines vẫn phải đối phó với những hành động bạo lực, hăm dọa của Trung Quốc trong chiến lược “mưa dầm thấm lâu” độc chiếm Biển Đông (1). “Các hành động của Trung Quốc phản ánh sự coi thường trắng trợn đối với luật pháp quốc tế”, theo thông cáo của ngoại trưởng Mỹ ngày 11/07. Phía Liên Hiệp Châu Âu khẳng định trong một tuyên bố ngày 12/07 rằng phán quyết của Tòa Trọng Tài Thường Trực năm 2016 có giá trị ràng buộc pháp lý đối với các bên liên quan. Tuy nhiên, đối với Bắc Kinh, chỉ có luật quốc gia của Trung Quốc mới có giá trị ở Biển Đông, theo nhận định của nhà phân tích, nghiên cứu độc lập Lénaïck Le Peutrec trong buổi phỏng vấn với RFI Tiếng Việt ngày 11/07/2024.Chiến lược này được ban thành luật về vùng lãnh hải tháng 02/1992. Thoạt nhìn định nghĩa “lãnh hải” của Bắc Kinh phù hợp với Công ước Liên Hiệp Quốc về Luật Biển (UNCLOS) 1982 mà Trung Quốc là thành viên. Nhưng điểm nguy hiểm nằm ở tuyên bố 1958, được nhắc lại trong bộ luật 1992, theo đó lãnh thổ đất liền của Trung Quốc bao gồm Đài Loan và các nhóm đảo khác như Sankaku/Điếu Ngư (tranh chấp với Nhật Bản), Bành Hồ, Đông Sa, Tây Sa (quần đảo Hoàng Sa), Nam Sa (quần đảo Trường Sa).RFI : Lénaïck Le Peutrec, bà là tác giả bài phân tích “Trung Quốc trong những xung đột ở Biển Đông : giải mã một trật tự mới mang màu sắc Trung Hoa”, đăng trên Asia Focus tháng 05/2024 của Viện Nghiên Cứu Quốc Tế và Chiến lược Pháp - IRIS (2). Trong bài viết, bà nhấn mạnh rằng luật về lãnh hải năm 1992 là một bộ luật quốc gia, thúc đẩy Trung Quốc tiếp tục những đòi hỏi chủ quyền ở Biển Đông theo từng chặng, để tạo thành những “chuyện đã rồi” bất chấp luật pháp quốc tế. Theo thời gian, những tích tụ đó chuyển thành một sự thay đổi chiến lược quan trọng. Vậy chiến lược của Trung Quốc là gì ? Liệu vì những yêu sách đó, Trung Quốc sẽ không bao giờ nhân nhượng ở Biển Đông ?Lénaïck Le Peutrec : Những yêu sách lãnh thổ của Bắc Kinh ở Biển Đông nằm trong nỗ lực toàn vẹn lãnh thổ rộng lớn hơn của Trung Quốc. Cho nên chúng được ghi khắc trong những lợi ích cơ bản của Trung Quốc, giống như đối với đảo Đài Loan. Bắc Kinh đưa ra lập luận đòi chủ quyền dựa vào các quyền lịch sử, nguyên tắc hiện diện lâu đời được cho là được chứng thực bằng các văn bản có từ thời nhà Tống, tức là từ thế kỷ thứ 10 đến thế kỷ 13.Do đó, Bắc Kinh tuyên bố chủ quyền đối với 80 đến 90% diện tích Biển Đông. Yêu sách này được chính thức ghi trong tài liệu “đường 9 đoạn”, lần đầu tiên được chính phủ nước Cộng hòa Nhân dân Trung Hoa công bố chính thức bằng một công hàm ngoại giao gửi tới Liên Hiệp Quốc vào tháng 05/2019. Bản thân tuyên bố này đã là một hành động kiểu “chuyện đã rồi”. Thêm vào đó còn có rất nhiều luật quốc gia khác củng cố cho những đòi hỏi chủ quyền của Trung Quốc ở Biển Đông và Bắc Kinh viện vào đó để biện minh cho hành động của họ. Đọc thêm : Biển Đông: Trung Quốc toan tính gì khi lập 2 ‘quận' mới cho ‘Tam Sa' ?Như vậy luật về vùng lãnh hải năm 1992 đã chọn định nghĩa rộng hơn về các vùng biển của Trung Quốc, trên thực tế bao gồm cả quần đảo Trường Sa và Hoàng Sa, trong khi Philippines, Việt Nam và Đài Loan cũng tuyên bố chủ quyền. Chính nhờ dựa vào những quyền lịch sử từ xa xưa, không thể chối cãi ở Biển Đông và dựa trên luật pháp quốc gia xác quyết chủ quyền - được coi là “chuyện đã rồi” - mà Trung Quốc liên tục đưa tầu đánh cá vào các vùng biển có tranh chấp, thường xuyên tổ chức tuần tra hải cảnh, tiến hành hoạt động bồi đắp, xây dựng đảo và thành lập các đơn vị, cơ quan hành chính mà trên thực tế là để thiết lập chủ quyền.RFI : Tháng 03/2024, Trung Quốc thông báo xác lập đường cơ sở ở vịnh Bắc Bộ. Thêm vào đó là hành động hung hăng, ví dụ những sự cố với Philippines ở Bãi Cỏ Mây và bãi cạn Scarborough trong thời gian gần đây… Phải chăng tất cả những hành động đó nằm trong chiến lược khẳng định chủ quyền của Trung Quốc ?Lénaïck Le Peutrec : Việc phân định đường cơ sở là một chủ đề hết sức nhạy cảm ở Biển Đông để chúng ta có thể hiểu được bản chất chiến lược. Bởi vì Biển Đông là nơi chồng chéo những yêu sách chủ quyền giữa phần lớn các quốc gia ven biển. Các đường cơ sở có tính chiến lược mạnh mẽ vì chúng chi phối việc tính toán đường biên giới lãnh thổ của quốc gia ven biển, vùng nội thủy và các vùng biển nằm trong quyền tài phán của họ. Những vùng biển này là các vùng lãnh hải và vùng đặc quyền kinh tế. Đọc thêm : Vịnh Bắc Bộ: Trung Quốc muốn vẽ lại ranh giới khi công bố "đường cơ sở" mới?Qua đó, người ta có thể thấy đó là “cánh tay nối dài” trong hành động áp đặt chủ quyền của Trung Quốc trên thực tế. Như tôi giải thích, phương thức hoạt động của Bắc Kinh bắt đầu từ một “chuyện đã rồi”. Trường hợp này chính là một ví dụ vì Trung Quốc đơn phương tuyên bố một đường cơ sở mới. Điều đáng quan ngại là Trung Quốc tiếp tục áp dụng cách hành động duy nhất đó, có nghĩa là viện đến luật quốc gia để áp đặt cơ sở pháp lý cho những hành động của họ.Những sự cố gần đây trong khu vực Bãi Cỏ Mây và bãi cạn Scarborough nằm trong chiến lược hành động của Trung Quốc ở Biển Đông từ năm 2004. Cần phải lưu ý rằng những hành động này còn được củng cố thêm nhờ những biện pháp mới trong luật hải cảnh, có hiệu lực từ ngày 15/06/2024, cho phép bắt giữ tàu nước ngoài ở Biển Đông và giam giữ thủy thủ đoàn mà không cần xét xử.RFI : Vẫn trong bài viết trên Asia Focus của Viện IRIS, bà nhấn mạnh rằng “chính sách láng giềng hữu hảo của Trung Quốc hiện nay, được suy tính để cổ vũ việc hội nhập kinh tế trong vùng, có thể được coi là một tầm nhìn được cập nhật về hệ thống triều cống của đế quốc Trung Quốc”. Tại sao nên cảnh giác với chính sách này ? Các nước láng giềng sẽ gặp rủi ro gì trong xung đột chủ quyền ở Biển Đông với Trung Quốc ?Lénaïck Le Peutrec : Trong câu hỏi này có những yếu tố lịch sử và văn hóa mà tôi cho rằng cần phải nêu bật, song song với những yếu tố thực tế, để hiểu đầy đủ hơn về hành động của Trung Quốc.Yếu tố đầu tiên mà tôi muốn lưu ý là tầm nhìn mang tính chu kỳ về lịch sử mà Trung Quốc vẫn chia sẻ. Điều này có thể được tóm tắt hoàn hảo trong câu tục ngữ Trung Quốc, tạm dịch “thống nhất lâu dài thì phải chia cắt, chia rẽ lâu thì phải đoàn tụ”. Nền văn minh Trung Quốc được đánh dấu bằng một lập luận lịch sử, theo đó “sau phân chia sẽ là sự thống nhất”.Điểm thứ hai, tôi muốn đề cập đến cách nhìn của Trung Quốc về vị trí trung tâm. Ngay tên gọi “Trung Quốc” - có nghĩa là “vùng đất ở giữa” - đã thể hiện rõ cách nhìn đó. Xuất phát từ vị trí trung tâm, Trung Quốc sống theo cách hiểu về địa lý thế giới xung quanh được định nghĩa theo cách nhìn của họ. Có thể thấy đa số những vùng lãnh thổ mà Trung Quốc tuyên bố chủ quyền ở Biển Đông được đặt tên theo vị trí của chúng so với Trung Quốc, ví dụ quần đảo Hoàng Sa (Paracels) được gọi là Tây Sa, Trường Sa (Spratleys) là Nam Sa, bãi ngầm Macclesfield là Trung Sa. Đọc thêm : Khó khăn kinh tế Trung Quốc đe dọa ASEANChính sách láng giềng hữu hảo của Bắc Kinh cũng thể hiện một phần tầm nhìn về vai trò trung tâm của Trung Quốc. Trên thực tế, chính sách - được lập ra để khuyến khích hội nhập kinh tế khu vực - có thể được coi như là một quan niệm được cập nhật về hệ thống triều cống của đế chế Trung Hoa, dựa trên tính trung tâm của họ. Những điều kiện dễ dàng về kinh tế và thương mại được Trung Quốc chấp thuận thời nay thay thế cho sự bảo vệ của họ ngày trước, còn quyền lực và những lợi ích mà họ thu được thay cho những cống vật của các nước chư hầu ngày xưa. Tình thế này để lại rất ít khả năng hành động cho các nước ven biển láng giềng - những nước không có sức mạnh kinh tế hoặc năng lực tấn công quân sự như Trung Quốc.Cuối cùng phải nhắc đến việc ASEAN gần như tê liệt. Nội bộ Hiệp hội các nước Đông Nam Á bất đồng nhau trong xung đột lãnh thổ với Trung Quốc. Từ nhiều năm nay, ASEAN tìm cách thông qua một Bộ Quy tắc Ứng xử ở Biển Đông (COC) mà họ muốn có tính ràng buộc về mặt pháp lý nhưng đến giờ vẫn bị Bắc Kinh một mực phản đối.RFI : Tại sao Biển Đông lại là một khu vực thử nghiệm để Trung Quốc áp đặt tầm nhìn của họ về một trật tự thế giới mới, như bà nêu trong bài phân tích ?Lénaïck Le Peutrec : Trước tiên, tôi nghĩ là cần phải hiểu được những yêu sách chủ quyền của Trung Quốc ở Biển Đông hay đúng hơn là những động cơ của họ. Theo tôi, có ba động cơ.Thứ nhất về mặt khai thác, việc bảo đảm tiếp tục các hoạt động đánh bắt hải sản, bảo vệ và khai thác các nguồn năng lượng, khoáng sản là việc cần thiết cho sự thúc đẩy phát triển của Trung Quốc. Tiếp theo là phải bảo đảm các nguồn tiếp cận với các tuyến hàng hải, đặc biệt là ưu tiên tiếp cận Ấn Độ Dương và Thái Bình Dương vì đây là những tuyến đường thiết yếu để dòng chảy thương mại của Trung Quốc được luân chuyển. Về mặt an ninh, việc tự do lưu thông ở Biển Đông là phương tiện quan trọng cho uy tín về năng lực răn đe trên biển của Trung Quốc. Phần lớn các căn cứ tàu ngầm mang tên lửa đạn đạo của Trung Quốc nằm trên đảo Hải Nam, ở phía bắc Biển Đông. Đọc thêm : Vai trò trung tâm của ASEAN trước thách thức của cạnh tranh Mỹ - TrungCũng đừng quên sự hiện diện mạnh mẽ của Mỹ trong khu vực làm tăng thêm cảm giác bất an của Trung Quốc, cũng như việc Hoa Kỳ tăng cường rõ rệt các liên minh với các nước trong khu vực trong thời gian gần đây để công khai chống lại sự trỗi dậy ngày càng tăng của Trung Quốc. Cấu trúc địa lý của Biển Đông cũng đặt Trung Quốc vào thế bị lọt thỏm và phụ thuộc lớn vào eo biển Malacca, tuyến đường thương mại chính của nước này. Từ năm 2023, Trung Quốc đã nhấn mạnh đến sự phụ thuộc quá mức của họ vào điểm trung chuyển này, cùng với sự bấp bênh về nguồn cung năng lượng do thiếu tuyến hàng hải thay thế.Bị thúc đẩy vì cảm giác bất an, Trung Quốc quyết tâm bảo đảm các lợi ích cơ bản của họ, bao gồm cả việc thống nhất đất nước, vốn là trọng tâm trong chính sách tái sinh vĩ đại của Trung Quốc và cũng là chính sách quan trọng hàng đầu của kỷ nguyên Tập Cận Bình. Những động cơ này của Trung Quốc khiến chúng ta nghĩ rằng Bắc Kinh có lẽ sẽ thử phản ứng của cộng đồng quốc tế về Biển Đông bằng cách dần dần gặm những không gian mà họ tuyên bố thuộc về mình. Do đó, Biển Đông sẽ là địa điểm thử nghiệm đầu tiên về một trật tự mới mang màu sắc Trung Hoa, trước khi chuyển sang giai đoạn tiếp theo, đó là thống nhất với đảo Đài Loan.RFI Tiếng Việt xin chân thành cảm ơn nhà phân tích, nghiên cứu Lénaïck Le Peutrec.(2) Lénaïck Le Peutrec, "La Chine dans les conflits en mer de Chine méridionale : décryptage d'un nouvel ordre aux caractéristiques chinoises", Asia Focus, mai 2024, IRIS.

George Town, Penang, has celebrated its 16th anniversary of being jointly inscribed on the Unesco World Heritage List with Malacca. Think City, a Khazanah Nasional subsidiary, was instrumental in helping to develop George Town since 2009, helping to maintain its status as a living heritage city. Hamdan Abdul Majeed, shares his experience as Think City's managing director as well as a Penangite.

Shiyan Koh, Managing Partner of  Hustle Fund, and ​​Jeremy Au talked about three main points: 1. Singapore Port Traffic Jam From USA Tariffs & Middle East Conflict: Shiyan and Jeremy examined the severe traffic congestion at Singapore's port, now at unprecedented levels. Yemen's Houthi rebel attacks on Red Sea commercial shipping (in support of the Gaza conflict) has diverted container ships from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope route, thus forcing ships to refuel and unload cargo in Singapore instead of Middle Eastern ports. The USA Biden administration's increased tariffs on China have prompted Chinese exporters to expedite shipments before the tariffs take full effect, further exacerbating the congestion. The broader manufacturing "China Plus One" decoupling strategy has also compounded the supply chain management issues. 2. Climate Change Creating Arctic Shipping Route: Global warming is melting the Arctic North Pole ice, thus empowering ships to soon bypass traditional shipping routes through the Straits of Malacca and thus Singapore. They discussed why Russia and China are interested in overcoming the substantial infrastructural and financial challenges to establish viable northern ports, and why this is a negative for Singapore's shipping industry over the course of the next 100 years - similar to the fall of the Venetian empire due to shifting trade routes. 3. Trump 10% Global & 60% China Tariffs: Jeremy noted that if Trump wins the 2024 election, his proposed tariffs could dramatically alter global trade dynamics, with tariffs as high as 60% on Chinese imports. They discussed how this trade war scenario would force Chinese companies to accelerate relocating to Southeast Asia or other regions. Shiyan shared insights from her recent trip to China, emphasizing the country's robust infrastructure capabilities and the strategic responses of Chinese companies. Jeremy and Shiyan also talked about Singapore's historical role as a deep-water port, technology's role in shaping future economic landscapes, and the potential for increased domestic manufacturing in the US. Watch, listen or read the full insight at https://www.bravesea.com/blog/global-supply-chain-disruptions Nonton, dengar atau baca wawasan lengkapnya di https://www.bravesea.com/blog//global-supply-chain-disruptions-id 观看、收听或阅读全文，请访问 https://www.bravesea.com/blog//global-supply-chain-disruptions-cn Xem, nghe hoặc đọc toàn bộ thông tin chi tiết tại https://www.bravesea.com/blog//global-supply-chain-disruptions-vn Get transcripts, startup resources & community discussions at www.bravesea.com WhatsApp: https://chat.whatsapp.com/CeL3ywi7yOWFd8HTo6yzde TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@jeremyau Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/jeremyauz Twitter: https://twitter.com/jeremyau LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/bravesea TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@jeremyau Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/jeremyauz Twitter: https://twitter.com/jeremyau LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/bravesea English: Spotify | YouTube | Apple Podcasts Learn more about Evo Commerce at bback.co and stryv.co 

Speakers: Natasha Kaneva, Head of Global Commodities Research   China's imports of commodities are at all-time highs, in stark contrast to the wider, faltering macroeconomic growth in the country. As the world's single largest consumer of commodities, China has three main sources of vulnerability: (i) it has abundant domestic resources of coal and rare earth but is relatively poor in others, (ii) with only 7% of the world's arable land and limited fresh water resources, the country feeds about 20% of the world's population, and (iii) most commodities are shipped to China via eight marine choke points—including the Strait of Malacca—over which the US has significant influence. To ensure the long-term security of strategic commodities, China is pursuing a three-pronged strategy: (i) more efficient development of domestic mineral and agricultural resources, (ii) establish control of resource bases overseas via equity stakes and partnerships, and (iii) build-up of strategic stockpiles. Given the increasing share of China-owned assets in the country's total commodity import mix and China's goal to boost its strategic reserves, the nation's imports of natural resources will continue to grow.   This podcast was recorded on 3 July 2024. This communication is provided for information purposes only. Institutional clients can view the related report at https://www.jpmm.com/research/content/GPS-4466326-0 for more information; please visit www.jpmm.com/research/disclosures for important disclosures. © 2024 JPMorgan Chase & Co. All rights reserved. This material or any portion hereof may not be reprinted, sold or redistributed without the written consent of J.P. Morgan. It is strictly prohibited to use or share without prior written consent from J.P. Morgan any research material received from J.P. Morgan or an authorized third-party (“J.P. Morgan Data”) in any third-party artificial intelligence (“AI”) systems or models when such J.P. Morgan Data is accessible by a third-party. It is permissible to use J.P. Morgan Data for internal business purposes only in an AI system or model that protects the confidentiality of J.P. Morgan Data so as to prevent any and all access to or use of such J.P. Morgan Data by any third-party.    

durée : 00:58:36 - Cultures Monde - par : Julie Gacon, Mélanie Chalandon - Situé en Asie du Sud-Est entre la péninsule malaise et l'île indonésienne de Sumatra, Malacca est un détroit hautement stratégique qui voit défiler un tiers du commerce mondial. Mais c'est aussi un lieu de vie, de migration et d'échange intenses pour les populations qui vivent sur ses rives. - invités : Nathalie Fau Professeure de géographie à l'Université Paris –Cité, chercheuse au CESSMA; Christine Cabasset Géographe, enseignante à l'université catholique de Lille et à Sc Po Lille, chercheuse associée à l'IRASEC et ancienne directrice adjointe de l'IRASEC entre 2018 et 2022.

With rising demand for sustainable aviation fuel and HVO or renewable diesel, the demand for feedstocks is surging. One feedstock is taking center stage, used cooking oil. Argus recently launched the EPA-compliant UCO fob China and EPA-compliant UCO fob Strait of Malacca price assessments to reflect the growing flows of UCO out of China and SE Asia to the US. How will these flows affect UCO demand around the world? Listen in on this latest episode with our market experts, Jamuna Gautam and Sarah Giam.

Today is Flag Day and an appropriate occasion to reflect on the diminished presence of warships and other vessels proudly displaying ours on the world's oceans – and an ominous consequence: Freedom of the seas is being increasingly threatened by the presence instead of hostile powers' navies and what amount to pirates in strategic choke points and waters.    Today, from the Panama Canal to the one in Suez to the straits of Taiwan, Hormuz, Malacca and the Bab el Mandeb, our own and others' commercial and national security interests are at risk.   An important webinar this afternoon will examine the role and implications of the Chinese Communist Party's burgeoning fleet, dual-use shipping companies, controlled ports and proxies in enabling free maritime movement for “friends of China,” but not so much for the rest of us.      Join us at PresentDangerChina.org.   This is Frank Gaffney.

fWotD Episode 2576: George Town, Penang Welcome to featured Wiki of the Day where we read the summary of the featured Wikipedia article every day.The featured article for Friday, 24 May 2024 is George Town, Penang.George Town is the capital of the Malaysian state of Penang. It is the core city of the George Town Conurbation, Malaysia's second largest metropolitan area with a population of 2.84 million and the second highest contributor to the country's GDP. The city proper spans an area of 306 km2 (118 sq mi) encompassing Penang Island and surrounding islets, and had a population of 794,313 as of 2020.Initially established as an entrepôt by Francis Light in 1786, George Town serves as the commercial centre for northern Malaysia. According to Euromonitor International and the Economist Intelligence Unit, it has the highest potential for revenue growth among all Malaysian cities and contributed nearly 8 per cent of the country's personal disposable income in 2015, second only to the national capital, Kuala Lumpur. Its technological sector, anchored by hundreds of multinational companies, has made George Town the top exporter in the country. The Penang International Airport links George Town to several regional cities, while a ferry service and two road bridges connect the city to the rest of Peninsular Malaysia. Swettenham Pier is the busiest cruise terminal in the country.George Town was the first British settlement in Southeast Asia, and its proximity to maritime routes along the Strait of Malacca attracted an influx of immigrants from various parts of Asia. Following rapid growth in its early years, it became the capital of the Straits Settlements in 1826, only to lose its administrative status to Singapore in 1832. The Straits Settlements became a British crown colony in 1867. Shortly before Malaya attained independence from Britain in 1957, George Town was declared a city by Queen Elizabeth II, making it the first city in the country's history. In 1974, George Town was merged with the rest of the island, throwing its city status into doubt until 2015, when its jurisdiction was reinstated and expanded to cover the entire island and adjacent islets.The city is described by UNESCO as having a "unique architectural and cultural townscape" that is shaped by centuries of intermingling between various cultures and religions. It has also gained a reputation as Malaysia's gastronomical capital for its distinct culinary scene. The preservation of these cultures contributed to the designation of the city centre of George Town as a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 2008.This recording reflects the Wikipedia text as of 00:42 UTC on Friday, 24 May 2024.For the full current version of the article, see George Town, Penang on Wikipedia.This podcast uses content from Wikipedia under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License.Visit our archives at wikioftheday.com and subscribe to stay updated on new episodes.Follow us on Mastodon at @wikioftheday@masto.ai.Also check out Curmudgeon's Corner, a current events podcast.Until next time, I'm Kendra Neural.

Last time we spoke about the remarkable success of Operation Reckless and Persecution.  Colonel Oliver Newman led the drive towards Hollandia's airfields, encountering scattered opposition and discovering large undefended Japanese supply dumps. General MacArthur was forced to postpone future plans until May 21st. Meanwhile, Allied submarine interceptions disrupted IJN troop movements, and Task Force 58's airstrikes neutralized Truk. Within Burma, General Stilwell's offensive faced challenges from Japanese resistance and heavy monsoon rains. Despite setbacks, the 22nd Division aimed to capture Inkangahtawng while Chinese forces engaged the enemy along various fronts. Chindits continued Operation Thursday, facing logistical hurdles and Japanese attacks. Colonel Kinnison's Marauders encountered strong resistance near Tingkrukawng, while Colonel Hunter's force successfully surprised the Japanese at Myitkyina.  This episode is the Japanese Defeat at Imphal and Kohima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We are jumping right back into the heat of General Mutaguchi's insane Operation U-Go. Poor General Yamauchi after suffering a devastating defeat at Nungshigum, was now facing allied tanks he simply had no answer for. Yamauchi ordered his men to dig in around Sendgmai and Kanglatongbi, basically so they would at least be hung around the Kohima-Imphal road. The allies answer to this was 6000 sorties, dropping 1000 bombs in the sector. It was a tremendous amount of damage, but the Japanese did benefit from bunkers. Yamauchi's 15th Division due north of Imphal were now being contained successfully, allowing General Briggs and Roberts to initiate their own counter offensives by the end of April. Simultaneously the 33rd Division was struggling to advance upon Bishenpur and the Shenam Saddle; over at Kohima, General Sato's 31st Division was reluctantly falling onto the defensive as the looming threat of a full British-Indian counteroffensive was dawning upon them. Imphal was still facing a grave threat from the Japanese along the Tiddim Road. Mutaguchi was personally directing the 33rd Divisions actions around Bishenpur at this time. Mutaguchi planned a three-pronged attack, one prong along the Tiddim Road, another down south from the Silchar Track by the 215th Regiment and a lastly from the north by the 214th Regiment. For the assault the 33rd Division received reinforcements in the form of the 14th Tank Regiment; the 2nd Battalion, 18th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment; and the 1st Anti-Tank Battalion from the Yamamoto Detachment. In late May they would also be receiving the 151st regiment and the 14th Tank regiment, amongst other units. This of course meant other units like the Yamamoto Detachment were being deprived of men, thus they in turn would be reinforced. The Yamamoto Detachment received the 2nd battalion, 51st regiment who were previously engaged with the Chindits at Indaw. They would arrive at Kampang after the fall of Crete West. Now in preparation for Mutaguchis renewed offensive the IJA would be tossing aircraft against the Gun Box in Bsihenpur. The Japanese Army Air Force made four air raids on the Gun Box position in Bishenpur in the first ten days of May. There was good reason for this, for at Gun Box the 32nd Indian Brigade had concentrated its artillery support. This included four 3.7in. howitzers, eight 25-pdrs, six 6-pdrs and three A/A guns. From here the guns were able to support the infantry's actions both on and around the Silchar Track, as well as the villages on the Tiddim Road such as Potsangbam. The Japanese heavy field artillery was at Khoirentak. The 215th regiment meanwhile performed some preliminary attacks against the positions at Ngarangial. Attacks began in early May against positions between Wireless Hill and Ngarangial, with two battalions attacking from the north and one from the south. The enemy, in strong positions, withstood a series of attacks which continued until the middle of May. While Mutaguchi waited for reinforcements to arrive so he could renew his southern offensive, Generals Yamamoto and Gracey were slugging it out for control over Crete West. The extremely exhausted 3rd battalion, 213 Regiment finally made a break through against the Lynch Pimple on the 8th,  forcing the 80th Brigade to evacuate Crete West two days later. On the night of the 10th, Yamamoto launched his first attacks against Scraggy Hill, which was extensively shelled, followed by a massive infantry assault: in classic style, wave upon wave of Japanese soldiers crashed on Scraggy, overwhelming its forward defenses. A point was finally reached in the night when the British battalion commander on Scraggy felt that the hill would fall unless supporting artillery fire was directed on his own positions. This was called in and the Japanese advance finally halted on the morning of 11th. But parts of Scraggy were now under the control of Yamamoto Force, which dug in. General Scoones reacted by relieving the exhausted 20th Division with the fresher 23rd Division of General Roberts. The new arrivals were shocked to see the conditions on the forward positions of the Shenam Saddle. Scraggy stood out. The Japanese were on part of the hill, while the rest of it was under British control. Trenches and bunkers covered the feature; in places, mere meters separated the two sides' front trenches. Bits of body parts of soldiers lay everywhere and a terrible stench covered the hillside. Now Cowan was planning a counter to Mutaguchis incoming offensive. He planned for an anvil and hammer maneuver; the hammer would be the 63rd Indian Brigade recently relieved from Sekmai in the first week of May by the 89th Indian Brigade. They would push down from Bishenpur towards Potsangbam, Ningthoukhong and even further south while the 48th Brigade established a roadblock on the Tiddim Road around Torbung, deep behind enemy lines. Cowan hoped to crush the 33rd Division along the road between his hammer and anvil while also cutting off the incoming Japanese reinforcements. Thus Brigadier Ronald Cameron's 48th Brigade stealthily advanced south along the eastern shore of Lake Loktak, crossed the Manipur River at Shuganu. It was a long grueling march. Simultaneously, Brigadier Guy Burton's 63rd Brigade advanced south against Potsangbam on the 10th. In their frustrated push southwards on the Tiddim Road, Burton's men had to deal first with the determined Japanese defense of Potsangbam. Burton took over on the 9th from Mackenzie's 32nd Indian Brigade, which had gained a foothold in the village the day before and was now to give its full attention to the Silchar Track. The 63rd Indian Brigade put in a first attack on Potsangbam on 10th. This involved two Gurkha battalions, each supported by a troop of tanks from the 3rd Carabiniers. The area they targeted was the main part of the village east of the Tiddim Road. The initial full frontal attacks failed to make much progress. Burton then changed tack against the Japanese, who had withdrawn to their main defenses south of the Potsangbam turel. He called for a heavy artillery bombardment from the same direction as before in the northern half of Potsangbam to make it appear that he was repeating the previous line of attack. Except this time he instructed one of his battalions to pass secretly behind the other and make for the area to the immediate east of the road. The move worked and the road through the village and its immediate vicinity were captured by the 15th. The Tiddim Road through Potsangbam was now open, although the Japanese still held on in parts of the village. But it had all taken much longer than expected. While the anvil at Torbung was about to be put in place, the hammer had only inched forward. After a long and difficult march, the brigade arrived near Torbung in mid-May. The roadblock was set up on 17th where three nullahs crossed the road near Milestone 33. To the east were several low-lying hills where brigade headquarters was established, centered on one called Point 3404. The sluggish Khuga River flowed between the hills and the road. In the Torbung sector, the Americas surprised Lt. Colonel Matsuki of the 33rd Supply Regiment, who was given the mission of reopening the line of communications using whatever troops were available in the immediate area. A composite company from the 33rd Supply Regiment, which had been deployed in the Mountainous area west of Churachandpur, held Hill 4358 against several enemy attacks. On the night of 17th, approximately 100 men of the 33rd Supply Regiment were gathered from rear elements to make the first attack on the roadblock. The attacking group was mounted on trucks and the leaders miscalculating the location of the enemy position drove squarely up to the roadblock and the entire attacking unit was virtually annihilated. Mutaguchi reacted furiously to this by unleashing artillery fire upon Point 3404 and the roadblock from the surrounding hills. Cameron's guns responded with retaliatory fire. Simultaneously Mutaguchi tossed his 1st battalion, 67th regiment against the Torbung roadblock, but Cameron's men held on inflicting tremendous casualties against the Japanese. Meanwhile Burton unleashed an attack against the hills immediately west of the road in the hopes of cutting off the supply line of the 214th and 215th Regiments. The 63rd rigade set off on 18th; the next day it had captured the villages of Tokpa Khul and Kha Aimol, and near them Three Pimple Hill and OP Hill respectively. This directly threatened the 33rd Divisions HQ at Laimanai. Mutaguchi reacted by abandoning the assaults from the west and south, and redirected the 215th Regiment to deal with Burton's 63rd division. All three of Sasahara's battalions were thrown into the counterattack, the first of which went in on the 20th. Another major assault was made two days later; both were driven off. The Japanese lost over 110 men. But they persisted and put in further attacks over the next week, frustrating any further movement southwards for the 63rd Indian Brigade. The Japanese failed to clear Burton's position, their relentless attacks would completely pin down the 63rd Brigade, thus preventing any further movement southwards.  Now at this point the 32nd Brigade had managed to recapture Wireless Hill, prompting Mutaguchi to abandon Potsangbam by the 24th. The 4th Independent Engineer Regiment and 2nd battalion, 213th Regiment fell back to Ningthoukhong. Mutaguchi then tossed another battalion to help out in the attack against Burton's 63rd division. Without further support of the hammer, Cameron's anvil force had to repel a coordinated tank-infantry attack on the 21st and again on the 23rd. The 2nd Battalion, 154th Infantry Regiment and a composite company from the 14th Tank Regiment attacked on the 21st and again on the 23rd but were not only unsuccessful in dislodging the enemy, but also suffered extremely heavy losses. Two tanks were destroyed during these attacks. Though the anvil held firm, Burton's failed attempts to continue the push south would ultimately force Cameron to abandon the roadblock and head back.  On May 24th, the 48th Brigade was fighting through Bishenpur heading up the road finally linking up with the other brigade around Potsangbam. Thus the Torbung roadblock was an enormous success for Cowan, his men had inflicted 500 casualties and disrupted Mutaguchi's plan completely. Now Mutaguchi chose to go ahead with only part of his original plan, the attack from the north that would be carried out by Colonel Sakuma Takayoshi's 214th regiment. To oversee the Bishenpur offensive,  Major-General Tanaka Nobuo was appointed in command of the 33rd Division. Leaving Bungte on the night of the 19th, Sakuma's 1st battalion advanced south to attack Bishenpur from the north, while the 2nd battalion moved north from Wainen and attacked Hill 2926. Yet as they tried to storm Point 2926, they were beaten off by a platoon of the 7/10th Baluchs. Failing to take the peak, they captured the southern part of the feature and parts of the adjacent Maibam village. The 1st battalion proceeded with their assault against Bishenpur targeting the area at the northern end of the village, near the junction between the Tiddim Road and the Silchar Track. This is also the area where the Gun Box was. Once they had managed to infiltrate the road junction area, however, the Japanese were repeatedly counter-attacked in the next few days, British tanks firing on their positions at close range. Without any anti-tank guns and the British tanks firing on their positions at close range, they were ultimately wiped out.  Back over with the 2nd Battalion, they had successfully captured Maibam village and Hill 2926, very close to Cowan's headquarters, so the British would have to direct several reinforcements to lay siege on these enemy positions. Early on the 26th, Sakuma directed a composite company to launch a last charge on Bishenpur from the north, but this attack would also end in failure. Cowan then directed the brigade-strength Woodforce to evict the Japanese from Hill 2926.  Woodforce consisted of the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade's HQ, commanded by Brigadier Woods and was a composite force of tanks, artillery, sappers and infantry. Taking over the front on the 26th, Woodforce mounted robust counter-attacks over the next two days, finally overcoming all opposition and recapturing the hill and Maibam by the 29th. With most of the 33rd Division fighting to reopen the Tiddim road at Torbung, Sakuma's 214th Regiment was left to extricate itself as best it could. But the fall of the Torbung roadblock on the 24th also allowed Mutaguchi's reinforcements to finally reinforce Ningthoukong in preparation for an attack on Potsangbam.  At this point, the balance of power had shifted very definitely to the allies. Sakuma's early success at Hill 2926 was the closest any Japanese would get to Imphal from the south. Meanwhile General Yamamoto's attacks against the Shenam Saddle resumed on the 20th, with his men rushing the crest of Scraggy in waves throwing gelignite bombs and grenades, but ultimately getting pushed back each time. Meanwhile the 2nd battalion, 51st regiment and 1st battalion, 60th regiment began an attack against Gibraltar, a very steep hill along the saddle. Their initial attacks were repelled easily, but on the night of the 23rd they managed to gain a foothold on Gibraltar's crest and this in effect cut off the 37th Indian brigade at Malta and Scraggy. With the Fourteenth Army units on Malta and Scraggy cut off, the fate of the entire Shenam Saddle now hung in the balance, but the very next day the hill was recovered by a counter-attack led by the 5/6th Rajputana Rifles and 3/10th Gurkha Rifles. Gibraltar would be the farthest the Japanese would be able to advance on the Shenam Saddle and the closest they came to breaking through; and from then on, a stalemate developed with neither side making any important moves. After the Japanese had been evicted from Gibraltar on the 24th, they did not follow up with another major attempt to push through the Shenam Saddle for a fortnight. But there was never really a quiet moment on these heights. Sniper fire was ever-present, as was the booming of artillery guns. The situation was the worst on Scraggy, where both sides continued to maintain their respective positions. The British and Indian units here would be fired on from Nippon Hill, besides being subjected to rifle fire, mortaring and grenade attacks from Scraggy itself. To the north, General Brigg's resumed his counteroffensive against Molvom, tossing his 9th Brigade into a series of attacks against the Japanese held Hump. The infantry put in several attacks against the Hump, suffering increasing casualties. The men of the 3/14th Punjabis attacked Hump at least half a dozen times that month. Despite it all, the Japanese were still found in their bunkers at the end of May. Sited on the reverse slopes of Hump, their bunkers were difficult to target by guns firing from the other side. Even when they were hit, they were so solidly built that they suffered little damage. The defenders of Hump would wait until the 3/14th Punjabis neared the crest; they would then let loose a barrage of machine-gun fire and grenade attacks. Attack after attack had to be called off in the face of such furious resistance. Though heavy artillery and mortar fire and repeated air strikes were called in on it, the tenacious Japanese defenders would successfully repel all British-Indian attacks throughout early May.  On the other side, realizing the vital need for artillery support, General Yamauchi decided to bring to the front the field guns that had been left east of the Chindwin River. He also was reinforced with the 2nd Battalion, 67th Regiment, which would seize Lamu on May 10th, securing the rear of the 15th Division. On the 15th, thanks to the timely arrival of the 89th and 123rd Brigades, Briggs was able to renew his assaults in front of Sekmai with greater intensity, finally clearing Kanglatongbi and the hills to the immediate east six days later.  Colonel Matsumura responded by creating new defensive positions around Modbung. As the month came to a close, Briggs decided to concentrate both his division's brigades on the Imphal–Kohima Road. The 9th Indian Brigade was to be brought on to the road, swapping places with the 89th Indian Brigade, which would move to the Iril River Valley. The opening of the Imphal–Kohima Road was a far greater priority than clearing the Mapao– Molvom Range. The Japanese defenders of the latter would be left where they had hung on for weeks. In any case, the opening of the road was likely to encourage them much more to leave than any direct attacks on their positions.  On May 15th Yamauchi was relieved of his command. Yamauchi had really drawn the short end of the straw. As he admitted at the time, his men simply had no answer to the British tanks. His men had thrown themselves into the jungle as lightly as possible in order to strike Imphal quickly, so they did not have effective anti-tank weapons. Ymauchi's division was always the Japanese weak spot, but they valiantly had refused to lift their roadblock at Kanglatongbi. As a last desperate throw, Yamauchi had ordered the use of poison gas. Yamauchi was also a man who understood how strong the allies were, especially America. Unlike the xenophobic and ignorant Tojo and Mutaguchi, Yamauchi had spent time in the USA and this led him to be quite pessimistic. Regardless, without anti-tank weapons it was quite hopeless. Yamauchi was carried from the battlefield on a litter and would later die in a hospital in Maymyo. Back over at Kohima, Generals Stopford and Grover were continuing their counteroffensive. Brigadiers 4th Brigade were occupying Oaks Hill when on May 1st, they began to descend during  The Royal Scots stopped their advance and reoccupied Oaks Hill, the brigade artillery back in Jotsoma was on standby to pound any Japanese positions the Norfolks, who were pressing on down the ridge, encountered. The Japanese, alert now to the dangerous presence of enemy troops above them, moved up against Oaks Hill and fought hard to expel the Royal Scots during that first night, with no success. The morning that followed a night of screaming, fear-inducing attacks found the jungle undergrowth littered with Japanese bodies. It was usual practice for the Japanese to take away their dead and wounded, but on this occasion there were too few Japanese survivors for the task. As the Royal Scots repelled numerous enemy counterattacks, the Norfolks were continuing their descent towards the GPT ridge. On May 4th, the Norfolks found themselves in a good position to assault the crests of the ridge. They stormed up catching the Japanese by surprise, managing to seize numerous bunkers. At the same time, the 161st Brigade was able to seize the area southeast of Two Tree Hill, but the Japanese had a complex bunker system there preventing them from linking Jotsoma with Pulebadze. The bunker complex on GPT Ridge was much more substantial than the British had expected, with literally dozens of small, carefully sited bunkers littering the entire area with interlocking arcs of fire, while the entire position was also covered by Japanese machine guns further to the east on the Aradura Spur. No sooner would one be discovered and attacked, than another would open up against the attackers from somewhere else. Until the entirety of GPT Ridge was cleared, Goschen's brigade could not enjoy the shortcut through to Jotsoma via Two Tree Hill; the road to Imphal remained in Japanese hands and their machine guns continued to spray fire on 6th Brigade's exposed right flank. Within the center the 6th Brigade was attacking Kuki Piquet and FSD Hill. While the attack against Kuki Piquet was not seeing much progress, they did gain a toehold atop FSD Hill. Further north, the 5th Brigade were able to bypass the 138th regiments position on Merema Ridge. They managed to secure a small part of Naga Village by the end of the day. Being close in proximity to General Sato's HQ, the response from the Japanese was a series of fierce counterattacks. THe 33rd battalion, 14th regiment stormed the Cameron Highlanders who did not have time to consolidate their success by digging in, and heavy Japanese mortar fire at daylight forced the Jocks back to the western edge of the hill. Here Hawkins had them dig to secure the ground that had been seized and the Worcesters, who had protected the flanks of the night advance, were called up to help build a defensive position able to resist counterattack. The rain was by now constant. Everyone was drenched to the skin. The next morning the Japanese Air Force made one of their occasional forays into the deep valley that flowed out of the Kohima Ridge westward, but to limited effect.  Meanwhile Brigadier Frederick Loftus-Tottenham's newly arrived 33rd Brigade was in the process of reinforcing the exhausted 6th Brigade at Kohima Ridge, with preparations being made for a renewed general counteroffensive. Meanwhile, over on Pulebadze on the 6th, B Company of the Norfolks, commanded by Captain Jack Randle, was ordered to seize the remaining part of the bunker position at the bottom of GPT Ridge, while the 4/lst Gurkhas of , assisting the breakthrough in the center against Kohima Ridge and Jail Hill, were to attack the lower, western slopes of GPT Ridge. In these attacks the Norfolks were to seize the remaining Japanese bunkers but at high cost, in which Capt. Randle was awarded the posthumous VC.  The Norfolks remained in the positions they had seized and, after a night of heavy rain, a further attempt to attack the remaining Japanese positions was made at first light on the morning of 7 May by the 4/lst Gurkhas and the Royal Scots. It was important that this operation was successful, as at 10.30am an attempt was to be made by the 1st Queen's - part of 33rd Indian Brigade, who had arrived at Kohima exhausted and malaria-ridden from Arakan the day before - on Jail Hill. If the machine-gun nests on GPT Ridge could be wiped out before the Queen's attacked they would enjoy a much higher chance of success. The only result of this failed assault would be the death of Brigadier Goschen, shot by snipers.  The Queen's, aware that 4th Brigade had not managed to secure GPT Ridge, nevertheless went in against Jail Hill as planned and were slaughtered. In retrospect the attack was premature, but Stopford continued to demand speed to remove the Japanese stranglehold on Kohima in order to relieve beleaguered Imphal. There was a belief in some higher quarters - held in particular by those whose only experience of the terrain came from reading a map in the comfort of a headquarters tent in the rear - that 2nd Division's offensive lacked pace. These accusations were preposterous to the hard-pressed men on the ground. It was impossible for commanders and staff officers in the rear who could not see the ground to understand how a small piece of jungle-topped hillside could absorb the best part of a brigade; how a small group of well-sited bunkers could hold up an advance until every single one - together with every single occupant - had been systematically destroyed; how only medium artillery could penetrate the roof of a Japanese trench; how only direct and short-range sniping by Lee/Grant tanks was guaranteed to defeat a Japanese bunker; how the desperate terrain, incessant rain and humidity led even the fittest men to tire quickly and what an extraordinarily determined opponent they faced. With few exceptions, the Japanese gave in only when they were dead. Every conscious man who could lift a weapon fought until he collapsed.  Due to these defeats, the British-Indian morale plummeted, even though Sato's men were also facing a serious supply problem that was further weakening them with each passing day.  Nevertheless, the Japanese continued a brave defense under heavy artillery, mortar and aerial bombardment. Sato's defensive technique, while it was not going to enable him to break through Kohima by dint of offensive action, was designed to do the next best thing: to draw the enemy onto defences of great complexity and depth and to break them there, both physically and morally. In so doing his troops had to withstand the sort of conditions few other soldiers in history could have survived. They did so, and very nearly succeeded in persuading Stopford that battering through Kohima was an impossible task. Between the 4th and the 'Black 7th', for instance, the 38 3.7in. mountain guns dug in around Jotsoma fired over 3,000 rounds, the 48 25-pdrs fired over 7,000 rounds and the big 5.5in. guns of the medium artillery fired more than 1,500 shells at the Japanese positions, not to mention the almost continuous salvoes from the 3in. mortars of the infantry battalions and the constant strafing and bombing by Hurricanes and Vengeance dive-bombers. For the next few days, General Stopford's brigades were slowly reducing the Japanese defenses. British progress, though slow, remained sure, even though it seemed to the troops on the ground as if this battle would go on for ever. 4th Brigade cleared GPT Ridge on 11 May, by which time further costly attacks by the British 6th and 33rd Indian Brigades had finally forced the Japanese to relinquish their hold on Pimple, FSD and Jail hills, the latter of which was captured by the Queen's and C Company, 4/lst Gurkha Rifles. The tide was slowly - and painfully - beginning to turn. On the days that followed, the positions seized on 11 and 12 May were carefully consolidated, the remaining Japanese being exterminated one by one, sniper by sniper and gun by gun. The Berkshires cleared FSD Hill on 12 May, discovering that the Japanese had honeycombed the hill with tunnels, creating an elaborate underground fortress that included a battalion headquarters, repair shop, ammunition storage dump and hospital. Those Japanese bunkers on the western edge of the ridge that remained out of reach of the British artillery could now be engaged directly and at pointblank range by the Lee/Grants, trundling up the road that divides DIS and Jail hills. They did so to the cheers of the British and Indian infantry, who found themselves hugging the ground as the 75mm smashed the enemy foxholes only metres from them, the ground shaking and the shockwave of the blast sucking out their breath and showering them with dirt and debris. The capture of the southern part of Kohima Ridge a full 37 days after the arrival of Sato's units would force the Japanese to retreat to a secondary defensive line north of Aradura. On the 15th, patrols of the 5th Brigade advanced down from Naga Hill, securing Treasury Hill before meeting up with the exhausted victors of Kohima Ridge who were advancing along the Imphal road. Yet that is all for the India front, as we now need to jump back over to check out what is going on with Operation Ichi-Go. After the fall of Xuchang, General Uchiyama dispatched some units south to attack Luohe, while the bulk of his 12th Army advanced north to capture Luoyang and hopefully annihilate General Enbo's 31st Army Group. On May 2nd, General Uchiyama dispatched the 110th Division against Dengfeng, the 62nd Division against Yuzhou and the bulk of his 37th Division, 3rd armored division and 4th cavalry Brigade against Jia and Ruzhou. On 2nd, the 4th Cavalry Brigade defeated the enemy force in the sector southwest of Yingchiaochen and, on the 4th, advanced to the sector northwest of Linju. The 3rd Armored Division routed the retreating enemy heading west and, on the 4th, mopped up the enemy in the vicinity of Linju. Also on the 4th, the 37th Division arrived at Linju. On the same day, the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade occupied Hsiangcheng. on the 3rd the 62nd defeated the 29th Army at Yuzhou while the 3rd Armored Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade pursued the retreating Chinese towards Ruzhou. On the 4th, Uchiyama's main forces were able to capture Ruzhou and the 110th Division managed to dislodge the 13th Army's position east of Dengfeng. After this Uchiyama's main forces enveloped the area, annihilating the 13th and 29th Armies at Dengfeng while the 62nd and 110th Divisions made a frontal assault of the city. Alongside this the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade attacked the enemy near Likouzhen. Yet before Uchiyama's men could complete the envelopment, General Enbo's men pulled out towards Tangjiezhen and Changshuixiang around midnight on the 5th. On the 7th, the 37th Division and 7th Brigade managed to envelop Tangjiezhen, and with air support inflicted heavy casualties on the outflanked defenders. Simultaneously, the 27th Division captured Luohe and Suipin. General Yokoyama had dispatched the 11th Independent Brigade to aid Uchiyamas men from the south, facing little resistance as they captured Queshan and Zhumadian before linking up with the 27th Division on the 11th.  On the other side, General Jiang Dingwen's 1st War Area Army was regrouping the bulk of its forces along the Luoyang-Yiyang line. General Okamura Ysuji ordered the 12th Army to advance upon Luoyang while Lt General Yoshimoto Teiichi's 1st Army crossed the Yellow River to try and cut off the Chinese retreat at Xin'An and Xiashichiang. Having defeated the enemy in the sector southwest of Dengfeng, the 12th Army continued to keep the enemy in the Loyang area under strict observation while, at the same time, it ordered the 110th Division to pursue the enemy toward Iyang, the 62nd Division to pursue them toward Pingteng, the main force of the 3rd Armored Division toward Iyang and Hsinan and the 4th Cavalry Brigade to the western sector of Pingteng. Okamura dispatched his reserve 63rd Division led by Lt General Nozoe Masanori to try and break through at Sishuizhen so they could join the attack upon Luoyang. They were successful and in the process, defeated the 177th Division and managed to reach the northeastern sector of Luoyang by the 12th. With assistance from the 59th Brigade coming from the west, Nozoe captured Xin'an by the 14th. The 62nd Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade captured Pingdengxiang on the 13th and part of the 110th Division captured Yiyang on the 14th. Most of the 110th Division, however, moved to Lungmenchieh below Luoyang. The 3rd Armored Division also reached the area southwest of Lungmenchieh at this point. The 37th Division, meanwhile, was directed to move towards Sunghsien. These actions effectively enveloped Luoyang as Uchiyama had his 110th Division advance through the Luohe River Valley; Yoshimoto's men advance to Sanmenxia which would fall by the 18th. The 37th Division captured Song alongside the aidromes at Luoning and Lushi by the 20th. But the main effort would be made by the 63rd Division assisted by elements o the 110th Division who launched the assault against Luoyang, being defended by the 36th Army Group. On the 19th, the 63rd Division initiated its attack against enemy positions on the outskirts of Loyang, however, the enemy positions were so strong that the battle situation did not progress as planned. As a result of this the North China Area Army ordered the 12th Army to place the main force of the 3rd Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade together with part of the 110th Division under the command of the 63rd Division commander. At the same time, the 63rd Division was ordered to defend the railway east of Mienchih. At 1pm on the 23rd, the 12th Army dispatched the 63rd Division to attack Luoyang Castle from the north and northeastern fronts of Luoyang to the northeastern corner of the castle while the 3rd Armored Division was to attack the castle from the western front toward the northwestern corner of the castle. The Army also directed the Cavalry Brigade to capture and destroy the enemy which it was expected would flee to the south at the line of the Lo Ho. On the 24th, the Army-called on the enemy in Luoyang to surrender but they refused. At 1pm, therefore, the Army opened its attack and, on the 25th, completely occupied the castle. During this battle, Lieutenant-General Li Jiayu would heroically die covering the retreat of the remaining troops of his battered 36th Army Group. With the fall of Luoyang and the near destruction of the 1st War Area, Operation Kogo ended in a resounding success for the Japanese, thus securing the South Beijing-Hankou railway. The Japanese estimated over 32000 Chinese casualties and some 7800 troops captured. In turn, they claimed to have lost only 2000 casualties. Interestingly, Operation Kogo also saw the Henan peasants attack the Kuomintang forces in revenge for the Yellow River flood of 1938 and the Henan Famine of 1942. As told to us by General Jiang Dingwen "During the campaign, the unexpected phenomenon was that the people of the mountains in western Henan attacked our troops, taking guns, bullets, and explosives, and even high-powered mortars and radio equipment... They surrounded our troops and killed our officers. We heard this pretty often. The heads of the villages and baojia (village mutual-responsibility groups) just ran away. At the same time, they took away our stored grain, leaving their houses and fields empty, which meant that our officers and soldiers had no food for many days… Actually this is truly painful for me to say: in the end the damages we suffered from the attacks by the people were more serious than the losses from battles with the enemy." In the end, the peasants would be able to disarm over 50000 troops, picking their weapons to defend themselves from the Japanese, but also causing much damage to the Nationalist defense. For their role in this disaster, Generals Dingwen and Enbo would be relieved from their commands, with General Chen Cheng later taking over the 1st War Area in July to oversee its recovery. Meanwhile, the Japanese would continue to prepare for Operation Togo, the Hunan offensive. Yet to finish off this episode we also need to mention some progress in the future plans to invade Wakde. Admiral King had requested support from the British Eastern Fleet. At this time the Eastern Fleet was organized into three forces for Operation Transom, the invasion of Japanese occupied Surabaya. Force 65 consisted of Battleships Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Renown, the French battleship Richelieu, two cruisers and eight destroyers, under the direct command of Admiral Somerville; Force 66 consisted of aircraft carriers Illustrious, Saratoga, two cruisers and six destroyers, under the command of Rear-Admiral Clement Moody aboard Illustrious. Force 67 was the replenishment group and comprised six tankers, a water distilling ship and the cruisers London and Suffolk. Somerville commanded the entire fleet from Queen Elizabeth. The warships were drawn from six navies, the capital ships being accompanied by three American destroyers, four British cruisers and three destroyers, four Australian destroyers, a Dutch cruiser and destroyer and a New Zealand cruiser. The Australian light cruiser HMAS Adelaide also sailed from Fremantle in Western Australia to protect the tankers while they were at Exmouth Gulf; this allowed their two escorting cruisers to augment Force 66 during the attack. Two squadrons of Supermarine Spitfire fighters were transferred from No. 1 Wing RAAF at Darwin to Exmouth Gulf to protect the Eastern Fleet while it refueled and Australian and American maritime patrol aircraft were assigned to operate offshore. Each carrier had an air group made up of units from their parent navies. Illustrious embarked two squadrons equipped with 14 Vought F4U Corsair fighters each and two squadrons with nine Avengers. Saratoga's air group comprised a squadron with 26 Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters, a squadron with 24 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers and a squadron operating 18 Avenger torpedo bombers, as well as a single Hellcat allocated to the Air Group Leader. As for Surabaya, its defenses against air attack at the time of Operation Transom included a few anti-aircraft guns, whose crews were inadequately trained. Radar stations and a network of observer posts were also sited to detect minelaying aircraft. The Japanese forces stationed in the city included the Imperial Japanese Army's 28th Independent Mixed Brigade and the headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Navy's 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet under Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi. Because of the distance to be covered from Ceylon and the Royal Navy's lack of experience in underway replenishment, the final plans for the operation involved the Eastern Fleet refueling at Exmouth Gulf in Western Australia before striking Surabaya. Force 67 was the first element of the Eastern Fleet to sail, departing on April 30th. Forces 65 and 66 sailed on May 6th. The Allied ships proceeded to Exmouth Gulf on a course that kept them at least 600 miles from Japanese airfields to avoid being detected or attacked. The carriers air wings practiced the attack they would conduct on Surabaya three times during the voyage. The warships arrived at Exmouth Gulf on 14 and 15th ofMay. The Eastern Fleet departed Exmouth Gulf on the afternoon of the 15th and proceeded north. It arrived at the flying off point at 6:30 am local time on the 17th without being detected by the Japanese. One British and seven American submarines also took up positions near Surabaya, the southern entrance to the Strait of Malacca and the Bali, Lombok and Sunda Straits to support the Eastern Fleet. The submarines were positioned to rescue Allied aircrew that were forced down, attack ships that tried to escape from Surabaya and intercept any Japanese warships that attempted to attack the Allied fleet. Operation Transom opened up with 76 aircraft launched from Illustrious and Saratoga. The aircraft launched by the carriers were organized into two strike forces. Force A was made up of nine Avengers from Illustrious, twelve Dauntless dive bombers and an escort of eight Corsairs. Force A's Avengers were to bomb the Braat Engineering Works and the Dauntlesses the oil refinery. Force B was to attack shipping and dock facilities in Surabaya's port. It comprised twenty-one Avengers and six Dauntlesses escorted by eight Corsairs and twelve Hellcats. The commander of Saratoga's air group, Commander Joseph C. Clifton, led both carriers' air wings during the attack. All of the aircraft were launched and formed up with the rest of their force by 7:20 am. Two British Avengers crashed during takeoff, their crews being rescued. The attack on Surabaya commenced at 8:30 am. The Japanese had not detected the aircraft as they approached, and were taken by surprise. The two forces made a well-synchronized attack, Force A approaching Wonokromo from the south and Force B attacking the port from the north. No Japanese fighter aircraft were encountered, and the anti-aircraft guns were largely ineffective. One of Saratoga's Avengers was shot down, and both members of its crew became prisoners of war. The two forces claimed to have damaged 10 ships, demolished the Wonokromo oil refinery and the Braat Engineering Works, destroyed 16 aircraft and leveled several buildings. Saratoga and her three escorting American destroyers detached from the Eastern Fleet shortly before sunset on the 18th, and proceeded to Fremantle. The remainder of the Eastern Fleet reached Exmouth Gulf the next morning, and sailed for Ceylon before sunset after refueling again. Adelaide and one of the Australian destroyers that had been attached to the Eastern Fleet left Exmouth Gulf bound for Fremantle after the tanker group departed on 19 May. The Eastern Fleet arrived back at Ceylon on the 27th. Saratoga reached Bremerton, Washington, on June 10th and after a refit re-joined the Pacific Fleet in September 1944. Though the Japanese would not really divert any forces from western New Guinea in response to the raid and despite the fact that the Japanese claim that not much damage had been inflicted on their shipping or shore facilities, with only one vessel confirmed sunk, Operation Transom would provide Somerville's Eastern Fleet important experience of carrier strike operations and exposure to superior American carrier tactics.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Allies were gradually countering Operation U-Go as the intense battles at Kohima Ridge and Pulebadze saw British-Indian forces slowly gaining ground amid heavy casualties. Meanwhile, Operation Ichi-Go saw major Japanese successes in China. Lastly Operation Transom saw British-Dutch-American successful carrier strikes against Surabaya, yielding experience despite limited damage.

In this episode of "Sleepless in Singapore," I take you along the first leg of a journey from Singapore to Laos, venturing through Malaysia, Thailand, Laos and almost touching the edge of Cambodia, before flying back home. This trip is a deep dive into some of the beauty of Southeast Asia, marked by the decision to travel light. After a hefty trip to Japan loaded with camera gear, Hatim and I opt for minimalism, packing just a small backpack each. This choice transforms our travel experience, allowing us to move freely and immerse ourselves fully in every moment, from sipping coffee in Malacca to exploring the Cameron Highlands. The essence of this journey lies not just in the places we visit but in the experiences we gather along the way. From a stolen but recovered GoPro to the simplicity of traveling with just a few essentials, the trip is a collection of small adventures that weave into a rich tapestry of memories. Each destination, from the hustle of Georgetown to the tranquility of Koh Tao, offers its own unique flavor.

George Town is the vibrant capital of the Malaysian Island of Penang. The bustling city was once an important trading hub within the Straits of Malacca and over the years has been influenced by a variety of cultures, which have transformed George Town's food scene into the eclectic culinary destination it is today. Here, Monocle's Lilian Fawcett takes us on a gastronomic tour of the Unesco world heritage site. Take a listen.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Il est le plus vaste État de l'Asie du Sud-Est, avec près de 2 millions de km2… mais paradoxalement assez peu visible, tant il se trouve éparpillé en îles de toutes tailles. On en recense 13.466, peuplées par 300 ethnies différentes. L'Indonésie est la première puissance économique d'Asie du Sud-Est, le quatrième pays le plus peuplé au monde et le premier pays musulman en termes de population. 275 millions d'habitants en 2022. L'archipel est traversé par la première route maritime mondiale via le détroit de Malacca. Membre fondateur de l'Asean dont il est le pays le plus important. Son second cercle d'influence est le Forum de la coopération économique de l'Asie Pacifique, (l'APEC) créé en 1989. L'Indonésie qui est également membre de l'Organisation de la Conférence islamique est le théâtre d'élections, présidentielle et législative, qui se tiendront ce mercredi 14 février 2024. Il s'agit de trouver un successeur au président Joko Widodo, communément appelé Jokowi qui, au terme de deux mandats, ne peut se représenter à la présidentielle. Sa popularité est immense, plus des trois quarts des Indonésiens approuvent ses actions. Fort de cela, le chef de l'État sortant est accusé de peser sur le scrutin en installant ses fils dans les hautes sphères politiques. Son fils aîné est le colistier du favori pour la présidence, le ministre de la Défense Prabowo Subianto, qui n'est rien de moins que l'ex-gendre du dictateur Suharto qui avait pris le pouvoir en 1965 au bénéfice d'un coup d'État aidé par les États-Unis dans le cadre de la lutte contre le communisme.Regard sur les enjeux de ce scrutin.Avec :  Delphine Alles, professeure de Science politique. Vice-présidente de l'INALCO Institut National des Langues et Civilisations orientales Françoise Nicolas, conseiller du Centre Asie de l'IFRI Rémy Madinier, historien de l'Indonésie contemporaine, directeur de recherche au CNRS au sein de l'Institut d'Asie Orientale de l'ENS de Lyon. 

Jason gives you a quick overview of Magellan's Expedition.Read the essay here: https://historywiththeszilagyis.org/hwts217 Find us on Twitter:The Network: @BQNPodcasts The Show: @HistorySzilagyi. Chrissie: @TheGoddessLivia. Jason: @JasonDarkElf.Send topic suggestions via Twitter or on our Facebook page History with the Szilagyis.History with the Szilagyis is supported by our patrons: PatiSusan Capuzzi-De ClerckLaura DullKris HillVince LockeJoin these wonderful supporters by visiting patreon.com/historywiththeszilagyis. The BQN Podcast Collective is brought to you by our listeners. Special thanks to these patrons on Patreon whose generous contributions help to produce this podcast and the many others on our network! You can join this illustrious list by becoming a patron here: https://www.patreon.com/BQN

A woman's honeymoon takes a sinister turn as malicious, ghostly whispers threaten to bring about her doom.Inspired by an account from Kay.Ghost Maps follows an unnamed narrator as he chronicles true accounts of the supernatural across Southeast Asia. ►GHOST MAPS CREDITS:Kyle Ong - DirectorWayne Rée - WriterJoline Lim - Art Director►FOLLOW US:Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/wearehantu/YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/c/wearehantuFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/wearehantu/Website: https://www.hantu.sg/ ►SUPPORT US:Libsyn:https://signup.libsyn.com/?promo_code=HANTUPatreon: https://www.patreon.com/wearehantuMerchandise: https://www.redbubble.com/people/wearehantu/shop ►MUSIC CREDITS:Kevin Macleod: https://incompetech.comMyuu: https://www.youtube.com/user/myuujiArtlist: https://artlist.io/ ►THANK YOU TO OUR SUPPORTERS ON PATREON: Stanley SantosAustin ChongLinda HadenNeoVegasAssassinMai Jake Lee YJSofeaCeph, the Ghost WriterSlajaSajkaNicolez PhuaAndika BramantioMedidi StephensMiranda Pruett Abby WintkerDyah Candra Hapsari SubagyoAdnan SalimPhani ShankarTom JohariR.YAayush GuptaNikoHeather TanKai LinJulie HolochwostMonica DuboisLexiHanni LaurenChristopher SmallwoodAshley ChanØyvind Husebø Kismet Sith Socheata ►ABOUT HANTU:#trueghoststory #ghoststory #ghoststories #horrorstory #horrorstories #southeastsia #singapore #ghostmaps #deadair #podcast #wearehantu #hantu #hantusg Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

December 13th- 16th: Nellie Bly is anxious as her steamship crosses through the Bay of Bengal and the Straits of Malacca to make up for lost time. In these few days, she does make progress. She touches down in two ports in Malaysia: Penang and Singapore.  While in Singapore, she analyzes how different cultures express the human experiences in vastly different ways. She compares and contrasts her normal to those on the other side of the planet and makes a very impulsive purchase. But to her delight, she has reached her mid-point, and Nellie Bly is officially halfway around the world.

My guest today worked for Club Med from 1996 to 2001. His first season was in Club Med Punta Cana in 1996 as a Set Designer. He just might be the only set designer in Club Med that I have encountered who actually has a degree in Set Design from the University of Arizona. Around 1999, he helped form “The A Team”, in which my guest and a few others would travel from village to village evaluating the entertainment teams. I was working in Asia when this was going on and never had heard of it before now, so I had a few questions about that. We will also talk about how he helped design Sharkie's in Turks in 1997 and also helped design the Circus show, “Circus Nightmares & Children's Dreams”. He is now a college professor and has been living a very nomadic life for the last 10 years. Please help me welcome, from around the world, the one and only, Rapp! Rapp wanted to work and travel so he bought a book about working abroad and applied to Club Med. He had a phone interview and was sent to Punta Cana which turned out to be Kevin Batt's first season as CDV. Rapp also worked in the villages of Cherating and Ria Bintan in Asia. When he needed supplies for Bintan, he had to cross the Strait of Malacca in a tiny speedboat dodging tankers and waves just to get fabric! Rapp helped with the reopening of Punta Cana in 2000 and Crested Butte in 2001. He was at the opening of Club Med Varadero and tells us about that experience and what it was like buying black-market staples in Cuba! Please enjoy this episode with Rapp! **My First Season podcast has always been ad-free and free to listen to and is available to download on: Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Samsung Podcasts, Podbean App, Podchaser, Spotify, Amazon Music/Audible, TuneIn + Alexa, iHeartRadio, PlayerFM, Pandora and Listen Notes. And if you like what you hear, please leave a review at Apple podcasts. 

In June 1947, a chilling SOS went out to almost a hundred merchant ships on the Straits of Malacca. The ship, Silver Star, answered the distressed call - and what they found was a scene of horror and mystery that has continued to baffle researchers & historians to this day. _____________________________Please be sure to like us on social media: Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/shadowcarriersInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/shadowcarriersIf you like what you hear and want to buy your storytellers a drink, you can catch us at @shadowcarriers on Venmo.If you want more "Shadow Carriers", check out our Patreon at: patreon.com/shadowcarriers. As a Patron of the podcast, you'll be able to access exclusive, behind-the-scenes episodes, shout-outs from us, blooper reels, & more exciting things to come.If you'd like to get in touch with us, our email address is shadowcarriers@gmail.com.This Podcast and all endeavors by these individuals believe strongly that Black Lives Matter. 

Last time we spoke about the beginning of mop up operations after the fall of Munda, the amphibious invasion of Vella Lavella and the fall of Kiska. New Georgia was a lost cause for the Japanese with the fall of Munda and now all efforts were being made to perform a withdrawal while buying time for forces to be brought over to places like Bougainville. Admiral Halsey ultimately choose to bypass Kolombangara and targeting Vella Lavella, which saw a successful amphibious invasion with a minor naval scuffle during the process. Then the Americans and Canadians invaded Kiska at long last. Although there were numerous reports that the island was abandoned it was decided to go forward with the invasion, at minimum it would be good training for the men. All they found were booby traps and some abandoned dogs as they ushered in the conclusion to the aleutian islands campaign.  This episode is Into the Central Pacific Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    So its been nearly a year since the start of the allied offensive in the Pacific. Way back when the Japanese were trying to recover from the Midway disaster, the Americans had no idea if they could manage a major land victory. For nearly a year, the allied campaigns in New Guinea and the Solomons showcased what both sides were capable of. But the US Navy wanted something else, they wanted a drive through the central pacific. Now to begin a thrust into the central pacific meant performing two parallel Pacific campaigns north and south of the equator. Admiral Nimitz did not yet possess the naval, specifically carrier forces required to wage a central pacific offensive, hell legions of troops required months of amphibious training, is was an enormous feat. Admiral Halsey likewise never ceased calling for reinforcements to carry his fight through the central and northern solomons.  Ever since the Casablanca Conference, Admirals King and Nimitz had been analyzing the idea of a central thrust in the pacific. They were looking specifically at a thrust in the direction of Truk-Guam and to hit the Marshall Islands. The victory over Guadalcanal had allowed the allies to secure lines of communication and supply to Australia and King presumed Rabaul would fall in 1943. On June 10th King began demanding hard deadlines for a central pacific campaign stating “In order that effective momentum of offensive operations can be attained and maintained, firm timing must be set up for all areas.” The joint chiefs of staff four days later told Nimitz to prepare an invasion of the Marshall Islands with a tentative sailing date of November 15th, 1943. As for the direct thrust, King declared  "establishing a base in the northwestern Marshalls and then proceeding to Truk and the Marianas." To pull this off MacArthur was expected to release the 1st marine division in time to participate in the operation with most of Halsey's naval and amphibious forces as well. As you can imagine MacArthur was outraged and objected the demands of his Cartwheel campaign to preclude any transfer of troops or ships from his theater to Nimitz. MacArthur wanted covering support from the Pacific Fleet's new fast carrier task forces to help raid Rabaul, Truk and other Japanese bases on a southern route. Halsey likewise was anxious about withdrawing aircraft from the south pacific area to support operations north of the equator. He warned Nimitz on June 25th that if airpower were diverted from the drive on Rabaul “it would seriously jeopardize our chances of success at what appears to be the most critical stage of the campaign.” Without borrowing forces from the south pacific, Nimitz could not realistically tackle the Marshalls until early 1944 and many members of the planning staff counseled patience. They argued to Nimitz, the new offensive should await the arrival of a large fleet of Essex carriers. By February or March of 1944, they predicted a much expanded 5th fleet could simply steam into the Marshalls and seize 4 or 5 of the largest Japanese bases simultaneously. If the combined fleet came out to fight, such an American force would willingly and confidently give them battle. But King simply wanted action in 1943, he insisted the northern line of attack be opened before the final assault on Rabaul. This would prevent the enemy from concentrating their defenses against either prong of the westward advance. Enemy territory simply had to be taken, somewhere in the central pacific by the end of the year.  There was a lot of arguing going about. The joint chiefs had clearly intimated that the Philippines were to be approached through the central pacific, but MacArthur concluded that a drive through the Marshalls and Carolines would have to occur without land-based air support, thus it would be slow and extremely costly to naval power and shipping. MacArthur argued the central pacific route was unwise and thought after Rabaul was captured it should be southwest pacific forces advancing along the north coast of New Guinea and onwards to the Philippines. This would require the neutralization of various islands like Palaus and others in the Banda and Arafura seas to protect their flanks. This long range plan that he prepared was designated RENO.  Now all of this of course was intended to cut Japan off from her vast riches in the Dutch East Indies, the thing keeping her war machine alive. The British also had their own desires who applied much pressure onto their American allies, prompting General Marshall to assure them that a Gilberts-Marshalls-Carolines campaign would be undertaken “with the resources available in the theater”. DuringQuadrant conference, the British chiefs had agreed to back King's demand for resources in the central Pacific in return for more forces against Nazi Germany. However during the Trident conference in May, which was not concerned so much with the Pacific strategy, the joint chiefs of staff submitted a plan titled “the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan” which called for a large, sustained air offensive against the home islands in preparation for an invasion. For this all to occur, China had to be maintained, and that meant the Americans and British would need to right their way into China finding a good secure port to move materials properly, most likely this would be Hong Kong. In the meantime the Americans, British and Chinese would work together to recapture Burma to try and drive through the strait of Malacca to Hong Kong via a series of amphibious operations. The Americans would also attempt a drive through the Celebes sea to Hong Kong from the central pacific aided by some subsidiary efforts from the south and southwest pacific areas, good luck getting a penny from MacArthur.  The Central Pacific was the most advantageous and logical route because it was shorter than the southern route, it would require less ships, less troops, less supplies and the bases in the Marshalls, Marianas and Carolines would isolate Japan from her overseas empire. The Japanese would only be able to mount limited air and ground forces on the islands in the central pacific, but nonetheless the American planners were forced to make twin drives along the central and southern axes. It has been argued, President FDR was swayed by Marshall's insistent demands for a southern push, because MacArthur held considerable political weight and could have been made a republican nominee for presidency in 1944. There were positives to running twin operations of course. For one thing it would prevent the Japanese from being able to guess the time and place of forthcoming advances keeping them off balance. It also allowed for opportunities for mutual support. Some of the operations would require a behemoth amount of resources, take for example the estimations they ran for the capture of the Bismarck Archipelago which was required to secure the line of communications to Australia and provide access to the Celebes sea. They estimated it would require 7 divisions, 5 of which needed to be amphibious units. If Rabaul fell or was neutralized, perhaps the division numbers would be less. The Marshall operation would require two reinforced amphibious divisions, 4 heavy bombardment and two fighter groups of land based aircraft. On top of that was the naval aspect, they estimated that they needed four battleships, three more auxiliary carriers, twelve cruisers, sixty-three destroyers, twenty-four attack transports, forty-four tank landing ships (LST's), plus landing craft. Garrison forces would include one reinforced division, 10 defense battalions, 545 planes, and 18 motor torpedo boats. For the Carolines, the Combined Chiefs estimated that they would require 3 reinforced amphibious divisions, 2 heavy bomber groups, 10 carriers of the Enterprise and Essex classes, 7 auxiliary carriers, 4 modern battleships, 9 old battleships, 31 cruisers, 108 destroyers, 20 submarines, 45 attack transports, 15 attack cargo ships, 6 LSD's , 3 headquarters ships, and miscellaneous auxiliaries. To garrison the islands would take two reinforced divisions and three defense battalions, plus aircraft. Talk about a shopping list. By the end of the year it was expected that one Marine and 3 Army divisions would be allocated to the Central Pacific while the South Pacific would gain 2 marines, 5 US Army and 1 New Zealand division and in the southwest pacific 4 US infantry, 1 US airborne, 1 US marine and 11 Australian divisions. So calculated all that, the Joint chiefs estimated 2 more divisions would be needed for the Marshalls, 2 more for the Carolines and 3 more for New Guinea. The strategic plan got the stamp of approval by the combined chiefs of staff on May 22nd. For the planned central pacific offensive, Nimitz decided his first objective would be the Marshall Islands. Their seizure was essential to extend the line of communication to the Celebes sea and to shorten the routes to Australia. From the Marshalls, land-based aircraft could support naval operations against the enemy's communication lines and there was always the possibility that by hitting the Marshalls, this would lure the combined fleet out for a fight. By July 20th, it was decided that instead of directly hitting the Marshalls, which would be extremely costly requiring a large force, they would instead capture Nauru and the Gilbert Islands as a preliminary springboard to invade the Marshalls. There had been two competing suggestions debated at CINCPAC HQ. Captain Forrest Sherman the chief of staff to Vice admiral John Henry Towers advocated to recapture Wake Islands and employ it as a springboard to invade the Marshalls. Wake was around 500 miles south of the Marshalls. Admiral Spruance favored opening a campaign south and east where the fleet could count on greater land-based air support from rear bases in the south pacific. He was the one advocating to invade the Gilberts, which were 600 miles southeast of the Marshalls. Spruance persuaded Nimitz who persuaded King thus, the Gilberts won the day. Code named Operation Galvanic, was the offensive to simultaneously invade the Ellice Islands, Gilbert Islands and Nauru by November 15th 1943. For Galvanic, Nimitz would have at his disposal all surface forces of the Pacific Fleet, the air forces of the pacific excluding those in the south and southwest pacific areas, elements of the 7th air force, the 2nd marine division of Major General Julian Smith over in New Zealand currently performing amphibious training, 3 aviation engineer or construction battalions, a port battalion and 3 marine defense battalions. The 7th air force led by Major General Willis Hale had already carried out some reconnaissance and bombing missions against Nauru and the Gilberts back in January, February and April. In spite of some heavy interception they managed to hit the runway on Nauru and a local phosphate plant as well as some installations on Tarawa. The 7th air force were utilizing air bases on Canton and Funafuti which were the only ones in range of the Gilberts. To seize the Ellice islands and build new airfields, Nimitz ordered the 5th and 7th defense battalions and 2nd airdrome battalion accompanied by the 16th naval construction battalion to conduct neutralization and reconnaissance. Nimitz sought to build new airfields at Nukufetau and Nanomea which were around 600 miles south and 350 miles east of Tarawa. On August the 18th an advance survey party landed at Nanomea determining it to hold no enemy presence thus the first elements of the 7th defense battalion began occupying it 10 days later. On August the 22nd an advance party of the 2nd Airdrome battalion landed at Nukufetau finding no enemy presenced allowing the remainder of the battalion to follow suit 5 days later. Transforming the atolls into air bases was rapid work. By September 7th a 5000 foot airstrip was operational on Nanomea, by the end of the month a full squadron of aircraft were operating from it. Over on Nukufetau work was slower, but its strip would be operation by October 9th. Back on August 11th, the 804th aviation engineer battalion was sent to develop Baker island, a already american held island 480 miles east of the Gilberts. They began their work on September 1st, taking a week to build a strip capable of supporting fighters. All of this gave Nimitz and Hale the bases they needed to prepare Operation Galvanic.   Now over in the southwest pacific, Generals MacArthur and Blamey were continuing their planned invasion of Lae codenamed Operation Postern. By early 1943, MacArthur had devised plans that made Blamey the commander of “allied land forces” only in name. As we have seen, the creation of the Alamo Force led by General Krueger was MacArthurs attempt at seizing overall command. This led Blamey to gradually realized his only functions would be that of the commander of Australian military forces. MacArthur would reconstitute the United States Army Forces in the Far East USAFFE, for his command in the Philippines with himself as its commander. Now the original date for operation Postern was August 1st and it was to have two stages: the first was an amphibious assault neat the Lae coast and the second was an air-ground operation against Nadzab airfield to its west, this would prevent the enemy from reinforcing Lae overland.    The Amphibious operation would be carried out by General Vasey's 7th division, who would depart Milne Bay and move north of Buna to land near Lae utilizing small landing craft. Admiral Barbey estimated it would require 65 LCVPS (landing craft, vehicle personnel or Higgins boats) and LCTs from the 2nd engineer special brigade. To train for the operation the 7th would be sent to trinity beach near Cairns. However continuous outbreaks of malaria led it being believed the unit could not be used without endangering the civilian population. Major General George Wooten's 9th division not yet exposed to the conditions on Green Hell and malaria free ended up taking the amphibious role. After two weeks of amphibious training with higgins boats. The 9th moved to Milne bay by August 12th and would be followed by General Heavy's units who would help further train them at Morobe.    Now I had mentioned the second part was an air-ground operation, originally it was to consist of the 2/503rd american parachute battalion to take the airfield. Then the 25th and 21st brigades of the 7th division were to cross the Markham river and assist the parachute battalion to occupy the area. But it would turn out, when they arrived to Markham, the Australians first had to advance through the Bulldog road to reach Wau, and although a ton of work had been done on it the Bulldog road had not reached Markham river yet. At first General Berryman boldly said to General Kenney that he would be him a bottle of whisky that a jeep could simply cover the gap to the road by august the 1st, he lost the bet. Thus it was decided transport aircraft would be required to take the 7th division directly from Port Moresby into the overgrown landing ground at Nadzab. The parachute battalion would not receive any support from Markham. MacArthur decided to instead employ the full 503rd parachute regiment led by COlonel Kenneth Kinsler to hit Nadzab on August 8th. Now thanks in a large part to cooperation between Generals Vasey, Herring, Whitehead and Kenney the planning for the operation went well. Extensive air and land reconnaissance of the area was the key to success. With all the preparation done, D-day for the 9th division's amphibious assault was scheduled for September 1st, Z day for the 7th divisions operation against Nadzab would be September 2nd. Like all good operations, a diversion was going to be implemented. General Savige's forces had been conducting a series of attacks in the Salamaua area for months. The “Salamaua magnet” had successfully convinced General Nakano the allies intended to hit Salamaua. Nakano also believed holding Salamaua would keep Lae safe. General Adachi would go on the record to state, orders given to him and other forces was to hold Salamaua as long as possible, probably until the last man if it came down to it. Adachi knew if Salamaua fell, Lae was pretty much a lost cause. The irony of course was this all led to troops being pulled away from Lae to bolster Salamaua, when Lae was in fact the target.  Air supremacy over the Huon Gulf was going to be a necessity for Operation Postern to succeed. Generals Berryman and Kenney needed to acquire new airfields that would be used to neutralize Wewak and Madang, two key Japanese air bases. The allies began building airfields at Benabena and Tsili Tsili which could act as advanced fighter bases and refueling points. Benabena already had a functioning airstrip, but Whitehead wanted to develop it further, Kenney was concerned as he knew the Japanese were aware of the site. Kenney wanted to divert the enemy's attention away from the airfield being built at Tsili Tsili which the Japanese did not know about yet. The Japanese were tossing wave after wave of air raids against Benabena, doing minimal damage. Meanwhile a military road was being constructed from Bogadjim on the northern coast up the valley of Mindjim river to Yaula and Yokopi and it was intended to extend past the Finisterre range into the Ramu Valley. On August 1st the New Guinea force HQ estimated the road would reach Ramu Valley within 8 weeks. THe development of the road and other activity in the Ramu valley was drawing attention from the Japanese, thus the 2/2nd independent company as sent to reinforce the 2/7th at Benabena. As this occurred, the secret construction work at Tsili Tsili raged on using some innovative ideas. The construction workers were using camouflage and careful timing of flights to hide the existence of Tsili Tsili's airfield, and managing to do this successfully for two months. An enormous amount of air transport and equipment was allocated for the task. The 871st airborne engineers battalion were sent in to hammer the job out and soon 3 dry weather runways were operational by september. Over on the Japanese side, they were reorganizing their air forces in New Guinea. After receiving alarming reports of enemy airfields being constructed at Mount Hagen and Benabena, knowing full well these would threaten their airfields at Wewak and Madang, it was decided the air strength of New Guinea would be bolstered by the 7th air division of Lt General Sudo Einosuke. From June 19th onwards, aircraft of the 7th division began arriving at Wewak from the Dutch East Indies. The 6th air division had moved its HQ from Rabual to Wewak on July 9th of 1943, 324 aircraft strong. The 7th air division brought another 156 aircraft, alongside this the 4th air army was brought over to Rabaul on August 6th placed under the command of General Imamura's 8th area army. Additionally to support the defense of Wewak and Madang, General Adachi was planning to toss 3000 soldiers under Lt General Katagiri Shigeru's 20th division against Benabena while Lt General Mano Goro's 41st division would occupy Mount Hagen. Such operations were scheduled to begin in early september. A detachment of the 30th independent engineer regiment of Lt Kitamoto Masamichi were sent over to Kaiapit alongside patrols further into the Ramu valley. They gradually occupied Dumpu and Wesa. But the increasing allied threat to Salamaua and Lae prompted Adachi to postpone the Benabena attack until August 1st and as a result Lae's airbase was being abandoned. Since early july, Lae was facing a substantial issue maintaining aviation fuel, it had been a point of refueling for aircraft going between Rabaul and other airfields like Madang and Wewak. Alongside this, Lae was within allied medium bomber range, and the threat prompted the Japanese to build 3 new airfields on the northwestern coast of New Guinea at But, Dagua and the Boram Plantation. It was the 20th and 41st divisions who ended up providing most of the labor to construct these airfields. On August 14th Tsili Tsili saw its first two squadrons of P-39 Airacobras of the 35th fighter group led by Lt Colonel Malcolm Moore. These arrived just in time to meet the beginning enemy attacks. Japanese aircraft had finally spotted the secret airfield during some reconnaissance flights on August 11th. On the morning of August 15th, 7 Ki-48 Lilly's escorted by 36 Ki-43 Oscars attacked Tsili Tsili. The bombers were intercepted immediately and all were shot down by 26 Airacobras and 3 Lightnings. However the Oscars managed to shoot down two C-47's of the 21st troop carrier squadron. The other C-47's scrambled to escape back to Port Moresby by flying at treetop level. The allied fighters then intercepted the Oscars lading to 3 Oscars being downed at the cost of 4 Airacobras. The following day saw another raid, but Thunderbolts and Lightnings intercepted the raiders downing some 15 Oscars. After receiving such a blow, the Japanese commanders at Wewak decided to conserve further air strength. Unbeknownst to them the situation was far more dire than they thought. You see the Japanese commanders did not believe the enemy fighters and medium bombers had the range to hit Wewak.  To geek out a bit, when such aircraft like Mitchells first arrived in Australia, they were equipped with a lower turret. Now when they began performing operations in New Guinea, it required low altitude flying and thus the turrets became useless, so they were removed and replaced with forward firing guns at the nose. General Kenney's air depot at Townsville working tireless to modify 172 Mitchells between July and September of 1943. The removal of the large turrets allowed for an additional square shaped 11,500 liter metal fuel tank to be installed, which was suspended by hooks from a bomb shackle. These fuel tanks gave the aircraft an extra two hours flying time, just enough to give them the range to hit Wewak. These tanks were very vulnerable to catching fire during combat or from crash landings so they were made dischargeable. A minor innovation, that made all the difference. On August 1th aerial photographs indicated the Japanese had 8 medium bombers, 31 light bombers, 69 fighters at Wewak and Boram plus 34 medium and 34 light bombs with 23 fighters at Dagua and But. Thus Kenney elected to hit them and he had at his disposal two heavy bomber groups the 43rd and 90th bomb groups with 64 bombers alongside two medium groups, the 3rd attack group and 38th bomb groups with 58 modified mitchells.  Kenney's plan was to toss 8 squadrons of heavy bombers for night raids against Wewaks 4 airfields followed up by 5 squadrons of Mitchells. Fighter could refuel at Tsili Tsili to help escort and boy would they, an unprecedented 99 fighter escorts would take part in the raids. On the night of August 16th the first raid occurred seeing 12 B-17 and 38 Liberators take off from Port Moresby, all but two reached Wewak by midnight. For 3 hours Colonels Harry Hawthorne and Aruther Rogers led the 43rd and 90th bombardment groups to pound the 4 airfields causing tremendous damage. Countless aircraft tried to take off the next day at Boram only to fail due to damage. The next morning, two squadrons of Mithcells of Lt COlonel Brian O'Neill's 38th bomb group left Port Moresby to hit Dagua and But while two squadrons of Colonel Donald Hall's 3rd attack group would hit Wewak and Boram. They would be employing some new toys, the first parachute retarded fragmentation bombs or also called Parafrags. They had been developed from standard 10 kg fragmentation bombs which were carried in a honeycomb rack in the bomb bay. A small parachute slowed and straightened out the course of the bomb allowing the bomber to get out of the blast range before it exploded. Further work was also going into the development of “daisy-cutter” bombs, which were bombs wrapping with wire to iron rods onto them to produce a ground level fragmentation effect when used with a ground proximity fuse. Nerd stuff.    The 3rd group bombers ended up catching some newly arrived Japanese aircraft perfectly lined up on each side of the runways. The Mitchells strafed them before dropping 786 10 kg paragraph bombs, annihilating 60 aircraft. Meanwhile the 38th group Mitchells faced some issues discharging their auxiliary fuel tanks, leading to only 3 bombers reaching Dagua and none to But. The 3 who reached Dagua strafed and low level bombed it with 105 ten kg parafrags destroying and damaged at least 17 aircraft and intercepting a single Oscar. Not a bad haul at all for just 3 Mitchells. The following day, Kenney tried to repeat the raids, but this time only half of the 49 heavy bombers reached their targets and the bombing was quite inaccurate. However, most of the 62 Mitchell's reached the target this time, but they would be pounced upon by Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft fire from an enemy that was waiting for them. A flight led by Major Ralph Cheli, commanding the 405th bomb squadron was jumped by nearly a dozen Oscars. Cheli's plane was badly hit, his right engine and wing catch fire. Yet despite this Cheli led his flight across Dagua airfield before crashing into the ocean. He was captured and sent to Rabaul where he would later be executed. For this brave action Cheli was awarded the Medal of Honor. In the end 15 Oscars were destroyed at the cost of 2 lightnings and 1 mitchell. Two additional raids were conducted on August 20th and 21st.   The 5th air force claimed to have destroyed 20 enemy aircraft on the 20th and 70th on the final day, half of which were shot down in air combat by the Lightnings. An estimated 174 Japanese aircraft were put out of action during these attacks, almost 90% of which came from Wewaks total air strength around 200 strong. Even before it had a chance to derail the battle for Lae, the 4th air army had been completely annihilated. Wewak was neutralized, the door was open to smash Lae. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A ton of planning was raging on and now there was to finally be twin operations to thrust into the central pacific and south pacific. With some new toys, Kenney's airforces had all but smashed what the Japanese had created to defend Lae. Now the door was wide open for Lae to be assaulted.

Located at the narrowest point in the Strait of Malacca, one of the most strategically important points on Earth is the nation of Singapore. Singapore is unlike most other countries in the world for a host of reasons, including how it was created and the fact that it is one of the few remaining city-states.  Since its founding as an independent country, they have experienced one of the greatest economic success stories in history and a host of problems that are unique to the country. Learn more about Singapore and its unique history on this episode of Everything Everywhere Daily. Sponsors Expedition Unknown  Find out the truth behind popular, bizarre legends. Expedition Unknown, a podcast from Discovery, chronicles the adventures of Josh Gates as he investigates unsolved iconic stories across the globe. With direct audio from the hit TV show, you'll hear Gates explore stories like the disappearance of Amelia Earhart in the South Pacific and the location of Captain Morgan's treasure in Panama. These authentic, roughshod journeys help Gates separate fact from fiction and learn the truth behind these compelling stories.   InsideTracker provides a personal health analysis and data-driven wellness guide to help you add years to your life—and life to your years. Choose a plan that best fits your needs to get your comprehensive biomarker analysis, customized Action Plan, and customer-exclusive healthspan resources. For a limited time, Everything Everywhere Daily listeners can get 20% off InsideTracker's new Ultimate Plan. Visit InsideTracker.com/eed. Subscribe to the podcast!  https://link.chtbl.com/EverythingEverywhere?sid=ShowNotes -------------------------------- Executive Producer: Charles Daniel Associate Producers: Peter Bennett & Thor Thomsen   Become a supporter on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/everythingeverywhere Update your podcast app at newpodcastapps.com Discord Server: https://discord.gg/UkRUJFh Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/everythingeverywhere/ Facebook Group: https://www.facebook.com/groups/everythingeverywheredaily Twitter: https://twitter.com/everywheretrip Website: https://everything-everywhere.com/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Photo: 1900 Guam. No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow #France: #India: the odd couple to command the Indian Ocean from Reunion to the Straits of Malacca. Antonia Colibasanu, @GPFutures https://geopoliticalfutures.com/why-france-and-india-are-natural-partners/

A Ming Dynasty court eunuch, a diplomat, an explorer, a mariner, a Muslim…Zeng He lived from the 1370s to around 1433 and achieved what many have since considered to be impossible.Between 1405 and 1433 Zeng He commanded seven expeditionary voyages. He explored the East China Sea, South China Sea, up through the Straits of Malacca to the Bay of Bengal, around India and Sri Lanka to the Arabian sea, the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, and on to the east coast of Africa. He did this with enormous ships in enormous fleets. If you believe the sources some of this ships were almost twice as long as any wooden ship ever recorded. On the first voyage it is believed that there were no fewer than 265 ships in total, 62 of them being of the largest type, the 'Treasure Ships'. Historians believe these largest vessels had five or six masts and were up to 300 feet long - but that is the most conservative of estimates. There is very little physical evidence to prove any of this with the exception of one 36 foot-long rudder, a monstrous piece of timber that does suggest a ship of at least 300 feet in length.Zeng He's seven voyages provide a fascinating foundation for historical debate and narrative. Here is an empire using seapower to reach out beyond its borders in a golden time of exploration which does not last. The scale of the fleets, the distance of the voyages, and the activities of the Chinese are all very much unsettled in the minds of modern historians. To find out more Dr Sam Willis spoke with Professor Tim Brook, a historian of China at the University of British Columbia. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Original Air Date: October 02, 1950Host: Andrew RhynesShow: Challenge of the YukonPhone: (707) 98 OTRDW (6-8739) Stars:• Paul Sutton (Sgt. Preston) Writer:• Fran Striker Producer:• George W. Trendle Exit music from: Roundup on the Prairie by Aaron Kenny https://bit.ly/3kTj0kK