Podcasts about kissinger

This interview will fill you with Hope and Courage!Today we have the opportunity to talk with Sam Russell, the founder of The Buttered Biscuit. Also joining us we have the director of operations, Hunter Kissinger.The Buttered Biscuit is a rare example of a company that was founded as a Kingdom Driven Enterprise that is actually very successful financially and is equally successful at the business of the Kingdom.When the concept of a faith based company comes up even believers are hard pressed to describe what that would look like. Well the Buttered Biscuit will give you a real picture of what is possible.I dive into the story of The Buttered Biscuit and discover an example of how a company can be excellent and operate in alignment with the interests of the Kingdom. This is a fully authentic and raw discussion that will fill you with hope that things can be different and give you the courage to be the one to bring change. Highlights Include:People over Profit!How do you love your employees better and yet protect the company?The hardest thing is telling the truth and creating a safe space for that to happen“It's the people that make us want to Risk it for the Biscuit!”“Restaurants are not for the faint of heart!”Solving loneliness and solving hungerExcellent practical advise for aspiring entrepreneurs!

BONUS CONTENTPatreon: https://www.patreon.com/MFTIC?fan_landing=trueRokfin: https://www.rokfin.com/myfamilythinksimcrazySubstack: https://myfamilythinksimcrazy.substack.com/Synchro-Wisdom Dialogue: https://linktr.ee/mysticmarkpodcastKo-fi: https://ko-fi.com/myfamilythinksimcrazyMerch: https://mftic-podcast.creator-spring.comHelp fund the show, I cannot do this without your support.CashApp: $MarkSteevesJrVenmo: @MysticMarkPaypal: @mysticmarkBTC: 3MQBrF1sGKm17icjQZCxuW7Z3R19jLzTZbBuy Me A Coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/MFTICWithout you this Podcast would not exist.Esoteric Eddie, Author and Documentarian, returns to discuss his latest piece on The Committee of 300, The Club of Rome, Bernays, Brzezinski, Kissinger, and Klaus Schwab. Eddie has done a deep dive linking this depopulation agenda back to certain elites who want to replace humanity with AI. Eddie cites Dr. J Coleman who passed away shortly after publishing an important book that exposed a lot of what Eddie has to share with us. Eddie shares information he's learned about Carroll Quigley one of Bill Clinton's mentors and Author of Tragedy and Hope. Support Esoteric Eddie at https://www.esotericeddie.com and on youtube @esotericeddietvReplace this Episode's Artwork email me at mfticpodcast@gmail.comShare This Episode: https://share.transistor.fm/s/1fba22d1This Podcast is Sponsored by the Hit Kit! check out the Hit Kit Here  https://hitkit.us/New Booklet by Mystic MarkS.E.E.E.N. #2 N.E.M.M.E.S.S.I.S.S. Buy Nowhttps://ko-fi.com/s/9baa70f625MFTIC MerchJoin us on TelegramLeave me a message On Telegram!For Exclusive My Family Thinks I'm Crazy Content: Only 5$ get 150+ Bonus Episodes, Sign up on our Patreon For Exclusive Episodes. Check out the S.E.E.E.N.or on Rokfin@MFTICPodcast on Twitter@myfamilythinksimcrazy on Instagram, Follow, Subscribe, Rate, and Review we appreciate you!https://www.myfamilythinksimcrazy.comhttps://altmediaunited.com/my-family-thinks-im-crazy/Listen to Every AMU Podcast with this link. https://lnns.co/pI5xHeyFdfgGET A NEW PODCASTING APP! https://podcastindex.org/appsMUSICAL CREDITSIntro Song by Destiny LabMusic: Constant SurveillanceBy JCarOutroMusic: One/Up And Down/Open the SourceBy Paolo PavanMusic: It Takes A VillageBy HoliznaRapsReleased under a Creative Commons Attribution International 4.0 License Thanks To Soundstripe and FMA CC4.0 ★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

Now we know why Henry Kissinger looks the way he does. He peered into the true face of the New God // New Technology. He is paying the price for this forbidden glance – cursed to live for eternity in a shriveled flesh husk, damned to preach about its power, along with Eric Schmidt and Daniel Huttenlocher. Their reverence is tempered by vague warnings of risk and responsibility. Their hysterical register is offset by the hushed tones of sober reflection. Stuff we reference: ••• ChatGPT Heralds an Intellectual Revolution | Henry Kissinger, Eric Schmidt, Daniel Huttenlocher https://www.wsj.com/articles/chatgpt-heralds-an-intellectual-revolution-enlightenment-artificial-intelligence-homo-technicus-technology-cognition-morality-philosophy-774331c6 ••• How the Enlightenment Ends | Henry Kissinger https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/06/henry-kissinger-ai-could-mean-the-end-of-human-history/559124/ ••• Planning for AGI and beyond | Sam Altman https://openai.com/blog/planning-for-agi-and-beyond/ ••• The Myth of Artificial Intelligence | Meredith Whittaker, Lucy Suchman https://prospect.org/culture/books/myth-of-artificial-intelligence-kissinger-schmidt-huttenlocher/ Subscribe to hear more analysis and commentary in our premium episodes every week! https://www.patreon.com/thismachinekills Hosted by Jathan Sadowski (www.twitter.com/jathansadowski) and Edward Ongweso Jr. (www.twitter.com/bigblackjacobin). Production / Music by Jereme Brown (www.twitter.com/braunestahl)

Chris Li, director of research of the Asia-Pacific Initiative and fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, leads the conversation on U.S. strategy in East Asia. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to today's session of the Winter/Spring 2023 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR.  Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic, if you would like to share it with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.  We're delighted to have Chris Li with us to discuss U.S. strategy in East Asia. Mr. Li is director of research of the Asia-Pacific Initiative, and a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, where he focuses on U.S.-China relations, Asia-Pacific security, and technology competition. Previously, he was research assistant to Graham Allison in the Avoiding Great Power War Project, and coordinator of the China Working Group, where he contributed to the China Cyber Policy Initiative and the Technology and Public Purpose Project, led by former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter.  Chris, thanks very much for being with us today. I thought we could begin with you giving us your insights and analysis of the Biden administration's foreign policy strategy in East Asia, specifically vis-à-vis China.  LI: Great. Well, first of all, thanks, Irina, for the invitation. I'm really looking forward to the conversation and also to all the questions from members of the audience and, in particular, all the students on this seminar. So I thought I'd start very briefly with just an overview of how the Biden administration's strategy in the Indo-Pacific has shaped up over the last two years, two and a half years. What are the key pillars? And essentially, now that we're about halfway through the first term—or, you know, if there is a second term—but President Biden's first term, where things are going to go moving forward?  So as many you are probably familiar, Secretary of State Tony Blinken laid out essentially the core tenets of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, of which China, of course, is a focal centerpiece. And he did so in his speech last summer at the Asia Society, where he essentially described the relationship between the U.S. and China as competitive where it should be, cooperative where it can be, and adversarial where it must be. So sort of three different pillars: competition, cooperation, a sort of balance between the two. And in terms of the actual tenets of the strategy, the framing was three pillars—invest, align, and complete.  And so briefly, just what that meant according to Secretary Blinken was really investing in sources of American strength at home. Renewing, for example, investment in technology, investment in STEM education, infrastructure, and many of the policies that actually became known as Build Back Better, a lot of the domestic spending packages that President Biden proposed, and some of which has been passed. So that first pillar was invest sort of in order to o compete with China, we need to first renew our sources of American strength and compete from a position of strength.  The second element was “align.” And in this—in this pillar, I think this is where the Biden administration has really distinguished itself from the Trump administration. Many folks say, well, the Biden administration's China policy or its Asia policy is really just Trump 2.0 but with a little bit—you know, with essentially a nicer tone to it. But I think there is a difference here. And I think the Biden administration's approach has really focused on aligning with both traditional security partners—our allies, our alliances with countries like the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines—but also invigorating those nontraditional partnerships, with India, for example.   I think another part of this strategy, another part of this dimension, has also been reinvigorating U.S. presence and U.S. leadership, really, in multilateral organizations. Not only, for example, taking the Quad and reestablishing some of the leader-level summits, the ministerials, proposing, for example, a COVID cooperation regime among new members of the Quad, but also establishing newer frameworks. So, for example, as many of you have read about, I'm sure, AUKUS, this trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. when it comes to sharing of nuclear submarine technology. That's been a new proposed policy. And I think we're about to see an update from the administration in the next couple of weeks.  And even with elements of the region that have been unappreciated and perhaps under-focused on. For example, the Solomon Islands was the focal point of some attention last year, and you've seen the administration propose the Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative, which seeks to establish greater cooperation among some of the Pacific Island nations. And there was actually a summit hosted by President Biden last fall with leaders of the Pacific Island countries. So that alignment piece I think has really been significant as a cornerstone of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy.  The third element, of course, competition, I think is the most evident. And we've seen this from some of the executive orders on semiconductors, the restrictions on advanced chips, to elements of trade, to even sort of advocacy for human rights and greater promotion of democracy. You saw the Summit for Democracy, which has been a pillar of the administration's foreign policy agenda. So that's basically what they've done in the last two and a half years.  Now, in terms of where that's actually brought us, I think I'll make four observations. The first is that, unlike the Biden—unlike the Trump administration, where most of the policy pronouncements about the People's Republic of China had some tinge of inducing change in China—that was the phrase that Secretary Pompeo used in a speech on China policy—I think the Biden administration largely has said: The assumption and the premise of all of our policy toward China is based on the idea that the U.S. government does not seek fundamentally to change the Chinese government, the Chinese regime, the leadership, the administration, the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.  So that is both a markedly important difference, but it's also a part of the strategy that I believe remains ambiguous. And here, the problem is, you know, invest, align, and compete, competitive coexistence, where does that all actually take us? And I think this is where analysts in the strategic community and think tank world have said, well, it's great to invest, of course. You know, there's bipartisan support. Alignment with partners and allies is, of course, a pretty uncontroversial, for the most part, approach. And competition is, I think, largely a consensus view in Washington, D.C. But where does this actually take us?  You know, for all of its criticisms, the Trump administration did propose a specific end state or an end objective. And I think the Biden administration has just sort of said, well, it's about coexisting. It's about just assuming to manage the relationship. I think there are, of course, valid merits to that approach. And on an intellectual level, the idea is that because this is not necessarily a Cold War 2.0, in the words of the Biden administration, we're not going to have an end state that is ala the Cold War—in essence a sort of victory or demise, you know, the triumph of capitalism over communism, et cetera. In fact, it's going to be a persistent and sustained rivalry and competition. And in order to harness a strategy, we essentially need to manage that competition.   So I think that's—it's an intellectually coherent idea, but I think one of the ambiguities surrounding and one of the criticisms that has been proposed is that there is no clear end state. So we compete, we invest, we align, but to what end? Do we just keep—does the administration continue to tighten up and enhance alliances with partners and allies, and then to what end? What happens next? And sort of where does this lead us—leave us in ten years from now? So I think that's the first comment I'll make about the approach to the Indo-Pacific.  The second is that one of the tenets, of course, as I describe, is this compartmentalization of compete, cooperate. In essence, you know, we will compete—we, being the United States—with China on issues of technology, issues of economics, but we will also cooperate on areas of shared concern—climate change, nonproliferation. I think what you've seen is that while the Biden administration has proposed this idea, we can split—we can cooperate on one hand and also compete on the other—the People's Republic of China, the Chinese government, has largely rejected that approach.   Where you've seen statements from senior officials in China that have said, essentially, we will not cooperate with you, the United States, until you first cease all of the behavior, all of the negative policies that we don't like. In essence, if you will continue to sell arms to Taiwan, if you continue, the United States, to restrict semiconductors, to crackdown on espionage, to conduct military exercises in the region, then forget about any potential cooperation on climate, or forget about any cooperation on global health, et cetera.   So in essence, being able to tie the two compartments together has prevented a lot of what the Biden administration has sought to achieve. And we've seen that very clearly with Special Envoy John Kerry and his relentless efforts to conduct climate diplomacy. And I think largely—for example, last summer in the aftermath of Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, you saw a lot of those collaborative efforts essentially derailed. That's the second comment I'll make, which is while this approach, again, logically to most Americans would seem sound, it's actually met a lot of resistance because the Chinese reaction to it is not necessarily the same.  The third is I think we've seen increasingly, even though there has been an increased alignment since the Trump administration with allies and partners, there's still a degree of hedging among countries in the region. And that makes sense because from the perspectives of many of those leaders of countries in the region, the United States is a democratic country. We have an election coming up in 2024. And there's no guarantee that the next president, if President Biden is no longer the president in 2024 or even in 2028, will continue this policy.   And I think all of you, as observers of American politics, know the degree to which American politics has become largely one that is dysfunctional, is almost schizophrenic in a way. And so one would imagine that if you are a leader of a country in the Asian-Pacific region, to support the Biden administration's engagement, but also to maintain a degree of strategic autonomy, as this is often called. And so what I think we'll continue to see and what will be interesting to watch is how middle powers, how other countries resident in the region approach the United States in terms of—(inaudible). I think India will be key to watch, for example. Its defense relationship with the United States has increased over the years, but yet it still has close interests with respect to China.  The final comment I'll make is that on the military dimension I think this is another area of concern, where the Biden administration has said that one of its priorities is creating guardrails, constructing guardrails to manage the potential escalation in the event of an accident, or a miscommunication, miscalculation that could quickly spiral into a crisis. And we needn't—we need not look farther than the 2001 Hainan incident to think of an example, which was a collision between a(n) EP-3 aircraft and a Chinese intelligence plane. And that led to a diplomatic standoff.  And so I think the United States government is very keen on creating dialogue between militaries, risk reduction mechanisms, crisis management mechanisms. But I think they've encountered resistance, again, from the People's Republic of China, because the perspective there is that much of the U.S. behavior in the region militarily is invalid, is illegitimate. You know, the Chinese government opposes, for example, U.S. transits through the Taiwan Strait. So the idea therefore that they would engage and essentially deconflict and manage risk is sort of legitimizing American presence there militarily. And so we've encountered that obstacle as well.  So I think going forward on all four elements, we're going to continue to see adjustment. And I think, as students, as researchers, I think these are four areas where there's fertile room for discussion, for debate, for analysis, for looking at history. And I look forward to a conversation. Hopefully, many of you have ideas as well because there's no monopoly on wisdom and there are many creative proposals to be discussed. So I look forward to questions. I'll stop there.  FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Thank you, Chris. That was great. Now we're going to go to all of you.  (Gives queuing instructions.)  Our first written question comes from Grace Wheeler. I believe a graduate student at the University of West Florida. Kissinger proposed the future of China-U.S. relations be one of coevolution instead of confrontation. Is it still realistically possible for the future of China-U.S. relations to be one of cooperation instead of confrontation?  LI: So terrific question. Thank you for the question. It's a very interesting idea. And I think Henry Kissinger, who I know has long been involved with the Council on Foreign Relations, has produced through his many decades,strategic frameworks and new ways of thinking about cardinal challenges to geopolitics. I have not yet actually understood or at least examined specifically what the concrete pillars of coevolution entail. My understanding on a general level is that it means, essentially, the United States and the People's Republic of China adjust and sort of mutually change their policies to accommodate each other. So a sort of mutual accommodation over time to adjust interests in a way that prevent conflict.  I think on the face—of course, that sounds—that sounds very alluring. That sounds like a terrific idea. I think the problem has always been what would actually this look like in implementation? So for example, on the issue of Taiwan, this is an issue where the Chinese government has said: There is no room for compromise. You know, the refrain that they repeat is: Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. It is part of sovereignty. And there is no room for compromise. This is a red line. So if that's the case, there's not really, in my view, much room for evolution on this issue, for example. And it's an intractable problem.  And so I don't necessarily know how to apply the Kissinger framework to specific examples. And, but, you know, I do think it's something worth considering. And, you know, I would encourage you and others on this call to think about, for example, how that framework might actually be adapted. So I think it's an interesting idea, but I would—I think the devil's in the details. And essentially, to think about how this would be applied to specific issues—South China Sea, human rights, trade—would be the key to unpacking this concept.  I think the second part of your question was, is cooperation possible? And again, I think, as I stated in my remarks, the Biden administration publicly says—publicly asserts that they do seek to maintain a space for cooperation in climate, in nonproliferation, in global health security. I think, again, what we've encountered is that the Chinese government's view is that unless the United States ceases behavior that it deems detrimental to its own interests, it will not pursue any discussion of cooperation.   And so I think that's the problem we're facing. And so I think there are going to be discussions going forward on, well, given that, how do we then balance the need for cooperation on climate, in pandemics, with, for example, also concerns about security, concerns about military activity, concerns about Taiwan, et cetera? And I think this is the daily stuff of, of course, the conversations among the Biden administration and senior leadership. So personally, my view, is I hope cooperation is possible, of course. I think there are shared issues, shared vital interests, between the two countries and, frankly, among the global community, that require the U.S. and China to be able to work out issues. But I'm personally not optimistic that under this current framework, this paradigm, there will be a significant space open for cooperation.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. Going next to Hamza Siddiqui, a raised hand.   Q: Thank you. Hi. I'm Hamza Siddiqui, a student from Minnesota State University, Mankato.   And I actually had two questions. The first was: What kind of role does the U.S. envision Southeast Asian states—especially like the Philippines and Vietnam—playing in their U.S. strategy when it comes to Asia-Pacific security issues, specifically? And the second is that for the last few years there's been some discussion about Japan and South Korea being formally invited to join the Five Eyes alliance. And I wanted to get your take on that. What do you think are the chances that a formal invitation would be extended to them? Thank you.  LI: Great. Thank you for the question. Two terrific questions.  So, first, on the role of countries in Southeast Asia, I think that under the Biden administration they have continued to play an increasing degree of importance. So you've seen, for example, even in the Philippines, which you cited, I think just last month Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made a visit there. And in the aftermath of the visit, he announced a new basing agreement. I haven't reviewed the details specifically, and I'm not a Philippines expert, but in short my understanding is that there is going to be renewed American presence—expanded American presence, actually, in the region.   And the Philippines, just based on their geostrategic location, is incredibly important in the Indo-Pacific region. So I think that the administration is very active in enhancing cooperation on the defense element, but also on the political and economic side as well. So with the Quad, for example, in India, you've seen cooperation on elements of economics as well, and technology. I think there's an initiative about digital cooperation too. So I think the answer is increasingly an important role.   On Japan and Korea, there have, of course, been discussions over the years about expanding the Five Eyes intelligence alliance to other countries in Asia as well. My assessment is that that's probably unlikely to occur in a formal way in the near term. But I could be wrong. And that assessment is primarily based on the fact that the countries that currently are part of the Five Eyes agreement share certain elements of linguistic convergence. They all speak English. There are certain longstanding historical ties that those countries have. And I think that to necessarily expand—or, to expand that existing framework would probably require a degree of bureaucratic sort of rearrangement that might be quite difficult, or quite challenging, or present obstacles.  I think what you will see, though, is enhanced security cooperation, for sure. And we've seen that even with Japan, for example, announcing changes to its military, its self-defense force, and increased defense spending as well in the region. So I think that is a trend that will continue.  FASKIANOS: Next question I'm taking from Sarah Godek, who is a graduate student at the University of Michigan.   What do guardrails look like, from a Chinese perspective? Thinking how China's foreign ministry has consistently put out lists of demands for the U.S. side, I'm wondering how guardrails are formulated by Wang Yi and others.  LI: Great. Thanks for the question.  So I guess I'll step back first and talk about what guardrails, in my view, actually entail. So I think the idea here is that in the event of a crisis—and, most of the time, crises are not planned. (Laughs.) Most of the time, crises, you know, occur as a result of an accident. For example, like the 2001 incident. But an accidental collision in the South China Sea between two vessels, the collision accidentally of two planes operating in close proximity. And as Chinese and American forces operate in closer proximity and increasing frequency, we do have that risk.   So I think, again, the idea of a guardrail that essentially, in the military domain, which is what I'm speaking about, entails a mechanism in place such that in the event of an accident or a crisis, there are ways based on that mechanism to diffuse that crisis, or at least sort of stabilize things before the political leadership can work out a solution. In essence, to prevent escalation because of a lack of dialogue. And I think for those of you who've studied history, you know that many wars, many conflicts have occurred not because one power, one state decides to launch a war. That has occurred. But oftentimes, because there is an accident, an accidental collision. And I think many wars have occurred this way.  So the idea of a guardrail therefore, in the military domain, is to create, for example, channels of communication that could be used in the event of a conflict. I think the easiest parallel to imagine is the U.S. and the Soviet Union, where there were hotlines, for example, between Moscow and between Washington, D.C. during that era, where the seniormost national security aides of the presidents could directly reach out to each other in the event of a crisis.   In the China context, what has been difficult is some of those channels exist. For example, the National Security Council Coordinator for Asia Kurt Campbell has said publicly: We have hotlines. The problem is that when the Americans pick up the phone and call, no one picks up on the other side. And in short, you know, having just the structure, the infrastructure, is insufficient if those infrastructure are not being used by the other side.   I think with respect to the U.S.-China context, probably, again, as I mentioned earlier, the largest obstacle is the fact that guardrails help the United States—or, in the Chinese perspective—from the Chinese perspective, any of these guardrails would essentially allow the U.S. to operate with greater confidence that, in the event of an accident, we will be able to control escalation. And from the Chinese perspective, they argue that because the United States fundamentally shouldn't be operating in the Taiwan Strait anyway, therefore by constructing that guardrail, by, for example, having dialogue to manage that risk, it would be legitimizing an illegitimate presence in the first place.   So that's always been perennially the problem. And I think the argument that the United States has made is that, well, sure, that may be your position. But it is in your interest as well not to have an accident spiral into a conflict. And so I think we've seen not a lot of progress on this front. I think, for example, in the aftermath of Speaker Pelosi's visit, there—you know, a lot of the defense cooperation ties were suspended.   But the last comment I'll make is that that doesn't necessarily mean that all dialogue has been stayed. There are still active channels between the United States and China. We have embassies in each other's countries. From public remarks, it seems like during moments of enhanced tension there are still ways for both governments to communicate with each other. So I think the good news is that it's not completely like the two countries aren't speaking to each other, but I think that there are not as many channels for reducing risk, managing potential crises, in the military sphere that exist today, that probably should exist.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Michael Long. Let's see. You need to unmute yourself.  LI: It looks like he's dropped off.  FASKIANOS: It looks like he put down his hand. OK. So let's go next to Conor O'Hara.  Q: Hi. My name is Conor O'Hara. And I'm a graduate student at the Pepperdine University School of Public Policy.  In one of my classes, titled America's Role in the World, we often talk about how America really does not have a comprehensive understanding of China. Not only China's military and state department, but really China as a society. How can Americans change that? And where does America need to focus its efforts in understanding China? And then also, one other thing I think of, is, you know, where does that understanding begin? You know, how early in someone's education or really within, say, the United States State Department do we need to focus our efforts on building an understanding? Thank you.  LI: Great. Well, thanks for the question. It's a great question. Very hard challenge as well.  I think that's absolutely true. I think the degree of understanding of China—of actually most countries—(laughs)—around the world—among senior U.S. foreign policy practitioners, I think, is insufficient. I think particularly with respect to China, and also Asia broadly, much of the diplomatic corps, the military establishment, intelligence officers, many of those people have essentially cut their teeth over the last twenty-five years focusing on the Middle East and counterterrorism. And that makes sense because the United States was engaged in two wars in that region.  But going back farther, many of the national security professionals before that generation were focused on the Soviet Union, obviously because of the Cold War. And so really, you're absolutely correct that the number of people in the United States government who have deep China expertise academically or even professionally on the ground, or even have the linguistic ability to, you know, speak Mandarin, or other countries—or, languages of other countries in East Asia, I think is absolutely limited. I think the State Department, of course, has—as well as the intelligence community, as well as the Department of Defense—has tried to over the last few years reorient and rebalance priorities and resources there. But I think it's still—my understanding, today it's still limited. And I think there's a lot of work to be done.  I think your question on how do you understand China as a society, I think with any country, number one, of course, is history. You know, every country's politics, its policy, its government is informed by its history of, you know, modern history but also history going back farther. And I think China is no exception. In fact, Chinese society, and even the Communist Party of China, is deeply, I think, entrenched in a historical understanding of its role in the world, of how it interacts compared with its people, its citizens, its foreign conflicts. And so I think, number one is to understand the history of modern China. And I think anyone who seeks to be involved in discussions and research and debate on China does need to understand that history.  I think the second point is linguistics is actually quite important. Being able to speak the language, read the language, understand the language is important. Because so much of what is written—so much of our knowledge as, you know, American think tank researchers, is based on publicly available information in China. And a lot of that primarily is in Mandarin. So most speeches that the senior leadership of China deliver are actually in Mandarin. And some of them are translated, but not all of them. A lot of the documents that they issue, a lot of academics who write about—academics in China who write about foreign policy and international relations, write in Mandarin.  And so I think that an ability to be able to read in the original text is quite important. And in fact, you know, a lot of the nuances, and specifically in the Communist Party's ideology, how it sees itself, its role in the world, a lot of that really is best captured and best understood in its original language. Some of the—you know, the ideology, the campaigns of propaganda, et cetera.  And I think the last part of your question was how early. I am not an education scholar. (Laughs.) I don't study education or developmental psychology. But, you know, I imagine, you know, as with anything, linguistics, language, is best learned—or, most easily learned early on. But I think that does not mean that, you know, someone who's in college or graduate school can't begin to learn in a different language. So I'd answer your question like that.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Lucksika Udomsrisumran, a graduate student at New York University.  What is the implication of the Biden administration's three pillars of the Indo-Pacific strategy on the Mekong and the South China Sea? Which pillars do you see these two issues in, from the Biden administration's point of view?  LI: OK. I think, if I'm understanding the question correctly about South China Sea, you know, I think in general the South China Sea probably would most easily fall into the competition category. There are obviously not only the United States and China, but other countries in the region, including the Philippines, for example, are claimants to the South China Sea. And so I think there's always been some disagreement and some tensions in that region.  I think that that has largely been—the U.S. response or U.S. policy in South China Sea is just essentially, from the military perspective, has been to—you know, the slogan is, or the line is, to fly, sail, operate, et cetera—I'm not quoting that correctly—(laughs)—but essentially to operate wherever international law permits. And so that means Freedom of Navigation Operations, et cetera, in the South China Sea. I think that, of course, raises objections from other governments, mainly China, in the region.   So I would say that probably belongs in the competition category. And we spoke about earlier the idea of managing some of the risk that occurs or that emerges when the PLA Navy and the United States Navy operate in close proximity in that region. So from that perspective, if you're talking about risk reduction and crisis management, that actually could fall into collaboration or cooperation. But I think primarily it's competition.   FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Joan Kaufman. And, Joan, I know you wrote your question, but if you could ask it that would be great.  Q: Yes, will. Yes, certainly. Hi, Chris. Really great to see you here during this talk.  LI: Yeah, likewise.  Q: A proud Schwarzman Scholar.  I wanted to ask you a question about Ukraine and China's, you know, kind of difficult position in the middle almost, you know, as sort of seemingly allied with Russia, or certainly not criticizing Russia. And then just putting forth this twelve-point peace plan last week for—and offering to broker peace negotiations and a ceasefire for Ukraine. You know, there's no love lost in Washington for China on, you know, how it has positioned itself on this issue. And, you know, frankly, given China's own kind of preoccupation with sovereignty over the years, how do you see the whole thing? And what comments might you make on that?  LI: Right. Well, first of all, thanks so much, Joan, for joining. And very grateful for all of—all that you've done for the Schwarzman Scholars Program over the past. I appreciate your time very much.  The Ukraine problem is an incredibly important one. And I think absolutely China is involved. And it's a very complicated position that it's trying to occupy here, with both supporting its security partner, Russia, but also not directly being involved in the conflict because of U.S. opposition and opposition from NATO. So I think it's—obviously, China is playing a very delicate balancing role here.  I think a couple points. So the first is that I think my view is that, for the Chinese leadership, Ukraine—or, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a deeply uncomfortable geopolitical situation, where there is essentially not a—there's no good outcome, really, because, as you mentioned, Ukraine is a country with which China has diplomatic recognition. It recognizes it. It has an embassy there. And the Chinese foreign ministry, Chinese foreign policy, has long very much supported the concept of sovereignty, and being able to determine your own future as a country. And I think, in fact, that's been one of the pillars and one of the objections to many American actions in the past. So on one hand, it says: We support sovereignty of every country, of which Ukraine is a country that is recognized by China.  And on the other hand, though, Russia, of course, which has had long complaints and issues with NATO expansion, is a partner of China. And so it's obviously supporting Russia. It has alignment of interests between Russia and China in many ways, in many dimensions, including objections to, for example, U.S. presence in Europe, U.S. presence in Asia. So it's a delicate balancing act. And I think from what we've seen, there hasn't been sort of a clear one-sided answer, where you've seen both statements, you know, proposing peace and saying that, you know, all sides should deescalate. But on the other hand, the U.S. government, the Biden administration, is now publicly stating that they are concerned about China potentially lending support to Russia.  So, you know, in short, I think it's very difficult to really understand what exactly is going on in the minds of the Chinese leadership. But I think that we'll continue to see sort of this awkward back and forth and trying—this purported balancing act between both sides. But I think, you know, largely—my assessment is that it's not going to go very clearly in one direction or the other.  I think the other comment I would make is that I think, from Beijing's perspective, the clear analogy here is one for Taiwan. Because—and this has been something that has been discussed in the think tank community very extensively. But the expectation I think among many in Washington was that Ukraine would not be able to put up much resistance. In short, this would be a very, very easy victory for Putin. And I think that was a—you know, not a universal consensus, but many people believed that, in short, Russia with all of its military might, would have no issues subjugating Ukraine very quickly.  I think people have largely found that to be, you know, a strategic failure on Russia's part. And so today, you know, one year after the invasion, Ukraine is still sovereign, is still standing, is still strong. And so I think—from that perspective, I think this—the war in Ukraine must give many of the leaders in China pause when it comes to thinking about a Taiwan continency, especially using force against Taiwan. Because, again, I think the degree of support, both militarily, politically, economically, for the resistance that Ukraine has shown against Russia among NATO members, among other Western countries, I think has been deeply surprising to many observers how robust that support has been. And I think that if you're sitting in Beijing and thinking about what a potential response to a Taiwan contingency might be, that would absolutely inform your calculus.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Lindsey McCormack, a graduate student at Baruch College.  How is the Biden administration's compete, cooperate, limited adversarial approach playing out with climate policy? What are you seeing right now in terms of the Chinese government's approach to energy security and climate?  LI: Yeah. It's a great question. Thanks for the question.  You know, we mentioned earlier, you know, I think the Biden administration's approach has been, you know, despite all of the disagreements between the United States and the Chinese government, there should be room for cooperation on climate because, as the Biden administration says, the climate is an existential risk to all of humanity. It's an issue of shared concern. So it's one that is not defined by any given country or constrained to one set of borders. I think it's largely not been very successful, in short, because China has not seemed to display much interest in cooperating on climate with the United States. And, again, China has largely coupled cooperation, linked cooperation in climate—or, on climate to other issues.  And so, you know, I think it's been reported that at several of the meetings between Secretary Blinken, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, and their Chinese counterparts, the Chinese officials had essentially given the American officials a list saying: Here are the twenty-something things that we object to. Why don't you stop all of these, correct all of your mistakes—so to speak—and then we'll talk about what we can do next. And so I think, again, that—you know, that, to me, indicates that this framework of compartmentalizing cooperation and competition has some flaws, because the idea that you can simply compartmentalize and say: We're going to cooperate at full capacity on climate, but we're not going to—you know, but we'll compete on technology, it just—it actually doesn't work in this situation.  I think the other comment I'll make is that what the Biden administration has done is—which I think has been effective—is reframed the notion of cooperation. Where, in the past, cooperation was sort of viewed as a favor that the Chinese government did to the Americans, to the American government. That if we—if the United States, you know, offered certain inducements or there were strong elements of the relationship, then China would cooperate and that would be a favor.   And I think the Biden administration has reframed that approach, where cooperation is now presented not as a favor that any country does to another, but rather sort of is shared here. And that this is something of concern to China, to the United States, to other countries, and so all major countries need to play their part, and step up their game, to take on. I think, unfortunately, it hasn't been extremely successful. But I think that there—I hope that there will be future progress made in this area.  FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to go next to Jeremiah Ostriker, who has raised—a raised hand, and also written your question. But you can ask it yourself. And you have to accept the unmute prompt. Is that happening? All right. I think I might have to read it.  Q: Am I unmuted now?  FASKIANOS: Oh, you are. Fantastic.  Q: OK. First, I'll say who I am. I am a retired professor from Princeton University and Columbia University and was an administrative provost at Princeton.  And our China policies have puzzled me. I have visited China many times. And I have wondered—I'll quote my questions now—I have wondered why we are as negative towards China as we have been. So specifically, does the U.S. foreign policy establishment need enemies to justify its existence? Is it looking around the world for enemies? And why should we care if other countries choose to govern themselves in ways which are antithetical to the way that we choose to govern ourselves? And, finally, why not cooperate with all countries on projects of common interest, regardless of other issues?  LI: Great. Well, first of all, thank you for the question—or, three questions, which are all extremely important. I'll do my best to answer, but these are very difficult questions, and I think they touch on a more philosophical understanding of what is American foreign policy for, what is the purpose of America's role in the world, et cetera. But I'll try to do my best.  I think on the first part, does the United States need enemies, is it looking to make enemies? I think if you asked any—and these are, of course, my own assessments. I think if you asked any administration official, whether in this current administration or in previous administrations—Republican or Democrat—I don't think anyone would answer “yes.” I think the argument that has been made across administrations in a bipartisan fashion is that foreign policy is fundamentally about defending American interests and American values. In essence, being able to support the American way of life, which obviously is not necessarily one clearly defined entity. (Laughs.)  But I think, therefore, all of our policy toward China is sort of geared at maintaining, or securing, defending U.S. interests in the region. And where the argument about your question comes into play is that I think a lot of—the Biden administration, the Trump administration, the Obama administration would argue that many of the concerns that the United States has with China are not fundamentally only about internal issues, where this is a question of how they govern themselves. But they touch upon issues of shared concern. They touch upon issues that actually affect U.S. interests.   And so, for example, the South China Sea is, again—is a space that is—contains much trade. There are many different countries in the region that access the South China Sea. So it's not necessarily just an issue—and, again, this is Secretary Blinken's position that he made clear—it's not just an issue specific to China. It does touch upon global trade, global economics, global rules, and global order. And I think this is the term that has been often used, sort of this liberal international rules-based order.   And while that's sort of an amorphous concept, in essence what I think the term implies is the idea that there are certain standards and rules by which different countries operate that allow for the orderly and for the peaceful and the secure exchange of goods, of ideas, of people, of—so that each country is secure. And I think this—again, this broader concept is why I think successive U.S. administrations have focused on China policy, because I think some of, in their view, China's behaviors impinge on U.S. interests in the region.   I think the second question is why should we care about how other countries govern themselves? I think in a way, the answer the Biden administration—this current administration has given to that question is: The U.S. government under President Biden is not trying to fundamentally change the Chinese system of governance. And I think you've seen Jake Sullivan and Tony Blinken say that publicly, that they are not seeking the collapse or the fundamental change in the Communist Party's rule of China. So I think in that sense, they have made that—they have made that response. I think, again, where there are issues—there are tensions, is when actions that the Chinese government take then touch upon U.S. interests. And I think we see that in Taiwan. We see that with economics. We see that with trade, et cetera.   And then finally, why not cooperate with every country in the world? I think obviously in an ideal world, that would be the case. All countries would be able to only cooperate, and all concerns shared among different nations would be addressed. I think unfortunately one of the problems that we're seeing now is that large major powers, like China and Russia, have very different worldviews. They see a world that is very different in its structure, and its architecture, and its organization, than the one that the U.S. sees. And I think that's what's led to a lot of tension.  FASKIANOS: So we have a written question from Julius Haferkorn, a student at California State University and Tübingen University, in Germany.  Ever since the escalation of the Ukraine war, there are discussions about the risk that, should Russia be successful with its invasion, China might use this as a template in regards to Taiwan. In your opinion, is this a realistic scenario?  LI: Great. Thanks for the question.  I think there are definitely analogies to be drawn between Ukraine and Taiwan, but I think there are also significant differences. The first is the relationship between Russia and Ukraine is one of two sovereign nations that the United States and international community recognizes. I think with Taiwan, what has—going back to our history question—Taiwan is a very complicated issue, even with regard to U.S. policies. The United States does not recognize Taiwan formally as an independent country. The United States actually does not take a position on the status of Taiwan. Briefly, the One China Policy, as articulated in the three communiques, the three joint communiques, essentially says that the United States government acknowledges the Chinese position that there is one China, and Taiwan is part of China, et cetera, et cetera.  And that word “acknowledge” is pretty key, because in essential its strategic ambiguity. It's saying, we acknowledge that the PRC government says this. We don't challenge that position. But we don't necessarily recognize or completely accept. And, obviously, the Mandarin version of the text is slightly different. It uses a term that is closer to “recognize.” But that ambiguity, in a way, permitted normalization and led to the democratization of Taiwan, China's economic growth and miracle, its anti-poverty campaign. So in essence, it's worked—this model has worked for the last forty-something years.  But I think that does mean that the situation across the Taiwan Strait is very different, because here the United States does not recognize two countries on both sides of the strait. Rather, it has this ambiguity, this policy of ambiguity. And in short, the only U.S. criterion for resolution of issues across the Taiwan Strait is peace. So all of the documents that the U.S. has articulated over successive administrations essentially boil down to: As long as the resolution of issues between Taiwan and the PRC and mainland China are peaceful, then the United States is not involved. That the only thing that the United States opposes is a forceful resolution—use of military force, use of coercion. And that's what is problematic.  I think what you've seen increasingly over the last few years is a sort of—it's not a formal shift away from that policy, but definitely slowly edging away from that policy. Now, any administration official will always deny that there are any changes to our One China Policy. And I think that's always been the refrain: Our One China Policy has not changed. But you've actually seen within that One China Policy framework adjustments, accommodations—or, not accommodations—but adjustments, recalibrations. And the way that the successive U.S. administrations defend that or justify it, is because it is our—it is the American One China Policy. Therefore, we can define what that One China Policy actually means.  But you have seen, in essence, greater increased relations and exchanges between officials in Taiwan, officials in the United States. I think it was publicly reported just a couple weeks ago that some of the senior national security officials in Taipei visited the United States. Secretary Pompeo at the end of his tenure as secretary of state changed some of the previous restrictions on—that were self-imposed restrictions—on interactions between the government in Taiwan and the government in the United States. So we're seeing some changes here. And I think that has led to—or, that is one element that has led to some of the tensions across the Taiwan Strait.   Obviously, from Beijing's perspective, it sees that as the U.S. sliding away from its commitments. Now, on the other hand, Beijing, of course, has also started to change its policy, despite claiming that its policy is exactly the same. You've seen greater military incursions in Taiwan's air defense identification zone, with planes, fighter jets, that are essentially flying around the island. You've seen greater geoeconomic coercion targeted at Taiwan in terms of sanctions. So you've seen essentially changes on all sides.  And so the final point I'll leave here—I'll leave with you is that the refrain that the United States government articulates of opposing any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, to me, is actually quite ambiguous. Because there's never been a status quo that has truly existed. It's always been a dynamic equilibrium between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington, D.C. Where Beijing is seeking to move Taiwan toward unification. Taiwan, at least under its current leadership, under Tsai Ing-wen, is obviously seeking, in a way, to move from at least—at least to move toward de facto or maintain de facto independence. Whether it's moving toward de jure is a topic of debate. And then the United States, of course, is enhancing its relationship with Taiwan.  So there's never been a static status quo between the three sides. It's always been a dynamic, evolving and changing equilibrium. Which is why the concept of opposing unilateral changes to the status quo, in my view, is almost paradoxical, because there has never been a status quo in the first place.  FASKIANOS: There has been some talk that Kevin McCarthy, the speaker of the House, is planning a trip to Taiwan. Given what happened with Speaker Pelosi, is that a—what do you think of that musing, to go to Taiwan, to actually do that?  LI: Mhm, yes. I think that's obviously been reported on. I think it's an area of close attention from everyone watching this space. I haven't seen any reports. All I can say is based on what I've seen reported in the media. And it seems like, based on—because of domestic preoccupations, that trip, whether it happens or not, is right now, at the moment, on the back burner. But I think that if he were to go, I think it would certainly precipitate a quite significant response from China. And I think whether that would be larger or smaller than what happened after Speaker Pelosi's visit, I think is something that is uncertain now.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. We'll go next to Autumn Hauge.  Q: Hi. I'm Autumn Hauge. I'm a student at Minnesota State University, Mankato.  So my question is, since a focus of the Biden administration's foreign policy is the relationship between the United States and China, and another focus is to invest and grow a presence in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically looking at the relationship between the United States and the Micronesian country of the Republic of Palau, whose government has openly shared their support for Taiwan, do you think that the United States' long history with the Republic of Palau, and their connection to their support—the Republic of Palau's support to Taiwan, halters the ability for the U.S. to grow a positive relation with China? Thank you.  LI: Great. Thanks for the question. It's a great question.  I am not an expert on Palau or its politics. I do know that Palau has enhanced its exchanges, it relationship with Taipei, over the last few years. I think we saw Palau's president, I think, visit Taipei. I think the U.S. ambassador to Palau actually visited Taipei. And there have been increasing—during COVID, there was a discussion of a travel bubble between Taiwan and Palau. So there's definitely been increasing exchange.  I think in general this has always been a key obstacle to U.S.-China relations, which is any country that still recognizes the Republic of China—that is the formal name of the government currently in Taiwan—I think presents a significant issue. Because for the PRC, recognition of the One China—what they call the One China Principle, the idea that there is one China, Taiwan is part of that China, and the legitimate government of China is the People's Republic of China, is a precondition for any diplomatic normalization with Beijing. And so I think certainly, you know, there are a small handful of countries that still recognize the ROC, but I think that they—you know, for those countries and their relationships with the PRC, of course, that's a significant hindrance.  In what you've seen in the U.S. government in the past few years is that for countries that derecognize Taipei and sort of switch recognition to Beijing, the PRC, there's been discussion—I think, there have been several bills introduced, in essence, to punish those countries. I don't necessarily think that those bills have ended up becoming law, but I think there is, given the current political dynamics, the sort of views on China in Washington, D.C., there is this sense that the U.S. needs to support countries that still recognize Taiwan, the ROC, and be able to provide support so that they don't feel pressured to switch their recognition.  My personal view is that I think that that is, on the whole, relatively insignificant. I won't say that it's completely not significant, but I think that in general issues around the Taiwan Strait, cross-strait relations, I think military issues, I think political issues related to exchanges between Taiwan and Beijing, I think those issues are much more important and much more critical to driving changes in the relationship across the Taiwan Strait.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to try and sneak in one last question from Wim Wiewel, who's a student at Portland State University.   Given your pessimism about cooperation combined with competition, what do you think is the long-term future for U.S.-China relations?  LI: OK. Well, thanks for the question. I'm not sure that I can provide a satisfying answer. And, in fact, I don't have the answer. You know, I think if anyone had the answer, then they should immediately tell the Biden administration that they've solved the problem.  Even though I am pessimistic about this current framework, just because of its demonstrated effects, I still think that in general the likelihood of a real war, which I think people have floated now—you know, Professor Graham Allison, who I used to work for, wrote a book called Destined for War? I still believe that the probability of all-out great-power conflict in a kinetic way, a military way, is still relatively low. I think that there are significant differences today compared to the era during World War I and World War II era.   I think that the degree of economic interdependence between China and not only the United States but the rest of the world, I think is a significant gamechanger in how countries position themselves vis-à-vis China. I think Europe is the great example here of how there are many countries that invest, have business relationships, have trade with China. And so therefore, their policy on China has been a little bit more calibrated than what the United States has been doing.   And so on the whole, I think most people still recognize that any great-power war between the United States and China would be utterly catastrophic. And I think that despite all the tensions that exist today, I think that that recognition, that consensus is pretty universally held, that a great-power war between the U.S. and China would be extremely bad. I think that is—that is probably something that is understood by Republican administrations, Democratic administrations, folks in Beijing, folks around the world, in the region. And so I think that, hopefully, that idea, that despite disagreements, despite political tensions, the need to prevent all-out global conflict is quite important, is a vital interest, I think, hopefully, to me, provides some optimism. And hopefully we'll be able to continue to carry our relationship with China through.  And I'm hopeful especially that all of you students, researchers, who hope to study, and write about, and even perhaps participate in American foreign policy, will continue to think. Because so much of the future of the U.S.-China relationship and U.S. foreign policy is going to be determined by your generation. So with that, I guess this would be a perfect place to stop. And I thank you for the question.   FASKIANOS: Absolutely. Well, Chris, this has been fantastic. I apologize to all of you. We had many more—many questions in the written part and raised hands. And I'm sorry that we could not get to all of them. We'll just have to have you back and continue to cover this issue. So we really appreciate your insights, Chris Li. So thank you again.  The next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, March 22, at 1:00 p.m. (EDT). Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly will lead a conversation on U.S. relations with South America. And in the meantime, please do learn more about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/careers. You can follow us at @CFR_academic, and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. And I'm sure you can also go to the Belfer Center for additional analysis by Chris Li. So I encourage you to go there as well.  Thank you all, again, for being with us, and we look forward to continuing the conversation on March 22. So thank you, all. Thanks, Chris.  LI: Thank you.  (END) 

Last week President Joe Biden was asked about his read of China's intention vis-à-vis Russian and Ukraine. He said that he did not see” China helping Russia with weapons and/or ammunition. This was, of course, after his Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken said that China was planning to do exactly that. And China, said that they were not considering it. Then for good measure Blinken threatened to have McDonalds leave China. It hardly seems like it, but it was just over half a century ago that the Vulcan proverb was born: Only Nixon could go to China. Which he did, after more than a year of secret meetings with Kissinger and his Chinese counterparts. Fifty-one years ago, Nixon and Zhou Enlai signed a document know as the Shanghai Communiqué. And for the past fifty-one years, it has guided American foreign policy towards the Peoples Republic of China… --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/plausibly-live/message

Mary Mags joins God to talk pestilence, the common cold, Jedi Mary Mags AI art, and lightsaber etiquette. On ‘Ask God,' you'll discover if God would rather hunt or be hunted by a vengeful orangutan, did Jesus have kids, will militant leftist unicorns become a thing, what's the deal with the book of Revelations, will God tell a bot its purpose in life, and why is God keeping Kissinger alive. On ‘TV Talk With Mary Mags,' they speculate about the hit movie ‘The VelociPastor,' and run down a list of favorite shows. Mark Wahlberg's forehead ash cross and ChatGPT writing church sermons are featured on ‘JFC LOL.” And finally, on ‘The GD News,' theocratic SATs, Ron DeSantis avoids talking about his corrupt past, and Tucker Carlson gets caught pushing election fraud B.S.  All that and more on… The God Pod: Have It Yahweh! After 6000 years of running the universe, God realized that Satan is kicking his butt, like, really bad. Over the centuries and despite lots of trying, God has not been able to smite the forces of evil. So, he started a podcast to do just that. Full of fun and heart, the God Pod is a twice-weekly opportunity for God to hang out with his fellow deities and maybe even meet some interesting humans. NEW EPISODES MONDAYS AND THURSDAYS Join our Discord chat server: https://discord.gg/7v3Cc4pjMC The God Pod is everywhere! https://linktr.ee/godpod Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 1971, Americans made two historic visits to China that would transform relations between the two countries. One was by US official Henry Kissinger; the other, earlier, visit was by the US table tennis team. Historians have mulled over the transcripts of Kissinger's negotiations with Chinese leaders. However, they have overlooked how, alongside these diplomatic talks, a rich program of travel and exchange had begun with ping-pong diplomacy.  Improbable Diplomats: How Ping-Pong Players, Musicians, and Scientists Remade US-China Relations (Cambridge UP, 2022) reveals how a diverse cast of Chinese and Americans – athletes and physicists, performing artists and seismologists – played a critical, but to date overlooked, role in remaking US-China relations. Based on new sources from more than a dozen archives in China and the United States, Pete Millwood argues that the significance of cultural and scientific exchanges went beyond reacquainting the Chinese and American people after two decades of minimal contact; exchanges also powerfully influenced Sino-American diplomatic relations and helped transform post-Mao China. Grant Golub is an Ernest May Fellow in History and Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and a PhD candidate in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research focuses on the politics of American grand strategy during World War II. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

In 1971, Americans made two historic visits to China that would transform relations between the two countries. One was by US official Henry Kissinger; the other, earlier, visit was by the US table tennis team. Historians have mulled over the transcripts of Kissinger's negotiations with Chinese leaders. However, they have overlooked how, alongside these diplomatic talks, a rich program of travel and exchange had begun with ping-pong diplomacy.  Improbable Diplomats: How Ping-Pong Players, Musicians, and Scientists Remade US-China Relations (Cambridge UP, 2022) reveals how a diverse cast of Chinese and Americans – athletes and physicists, performing artists and seismologists – played a critical, but to date overlooked, role in remaking US-China relations. Based on new sources from more than a dozen archives in China and the United States, Pete Millwood argues that the significance of cultural and scientific exchanges went beyond reacquainting the Chinese and American people after two decades of minimal contact; exchanges also powerfully influenced Sino-American diplomatic relations and helped transform post-Mao China. Grant Golub is an Ernest May Fellow in History and Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and a PhD candidate in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research focuses on the politics of American grand strategy during World War II. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In 1971, Americans made two historic visits to China that would transform relations between the two countries. One was by US official Henry Kissinger; the other, earlier, visit was by the US table tennis team. Historians have mulled over the transcripts of Kissinger's negotiations with Chinese leaders. However, they have overlooked how, alongside these diplomatic talks, a rich program of travel and exchange had begun with ping-pong diplomacy.  Improbable Diplomats: How Ping-Pong Players, Musicians, and Scientists Remade US-China Relations (Cambridge UP, 2022) reveals how a diverse cast of Chinese and Americans – athletes and physicists, performing artists and seismologists – played a critical, but to date overlooked, role in remaking US-China relations. Based on new sources from more than a dozen archives in China and the United States, Pete Millwood argues that the significance of cultural and scientific exchanges went beyond reacquainting the Chinese and American people after two decades of minimal contact; exchanges also powerfully influenced Sino-American diplomatic relations and helped transform post-Mao China. Grant Golub is an Ernest May Fellow in History and Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and a PhD candidate in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research focuses on the politics of American grand strategy during World War II. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/music

In 1971, Americans made two historic visits to China that would transform relations between the two countries. One was by US official Henry Kissinger; the other, earlier, visit was by the US table tennis team. Historians have mulled over the transcripts of Kissinger's negotiations with Chinese leaders. However, they have overlooked how, alongside these diplomatic talks, a rich program of travel and exchange had begun with ping-pong diplomacy.  Improbable Diplomats: How Ping-Pong Players, Musicians, and Scientists Remade US-China Relations (Cambridge UP, 2022) reveals how a diverse cast of Chinese and Americans – athletes and physicists, performing artists and seismologists – played a critical, but to date overlooked, role in remaking US-China relations. Based on new sources from more than a dozen archives in China and the United States, Pete Millwood argues that the significance of cultural and scientific exchanges went beyond reacquainting the Chinese and American people after two decades of minimal contact; exchanges also powerfully influenced Sino-American diplomatic relations and helped transform post-Mao China. Grant Golub is an Ernest May Fellow in History and Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and a PhD candidate in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research focuses on the politics of American grand strategy during World War II. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/american-studies

In 1971, Americans made two historic visits to China that would transform relations between the two countries. One was by US official Henry Kissinger; the other, earlier, visit was by the US table tennis team. Historians have mulled over the transcripts of Kissinger's negotiations with Chinese leaders. However, they have overlooked how, alongside these diplomatic talks, a rich program of travel and exchange had begun with ping-pong diplomacy.  Improbable Diplomats: How Ping-Pong Players, Musicians, and Scientists Remade US-China Relations (Cambridge UP, 2022) reveals how a diverse cast of Chinese and Americans – athletes and physicists, performing artists and seismologists – played a critical, but to date overlooked, role in remaking US-China relations. Based on new sources from more than a dozen archives in China and the United States, Pete Millwood argues that the significance of cultural and scientific exchanges went beyond reacquainting the Chinese and American people after two decades of minimal contact; exchanges also powerfully influenced Sino-American diplomatic relations and helped transform post-Mao China. Grant Golub is an Ernest May Fellow in History and Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and a PhD candidate in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research focuses on the politics of American grand strategy during World War II. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

In 1971, Americans made two historic visits to China that would transform relations between the two countries. One was by US official Henry Kissinger; the other, earlier, visit was by the US table tennis team. Historians have mulled over the transcripts of Kissinger's negotiations with Chinese leaders. However, they have overlooked how, alongside these diplomatic talks, a rich program of travel and exchange had begun with ping-pong diplomacy.  Improbable Diplomats: How Ping-Pong Players, Musicians, and Scientists Remade US-China Relations (Cambridge UP, 2022) reveals how a diverse cast of Chinese and Americans – athletes and physicists, performing artists and seismologists – played a critical, but to date overlooked, role in remaking US-China relations. Based on new sources from more than a dozen archives in China and the United States, Pete Millwood argues that the significance of cultural and scientific exchanges went beyond reacquainting the Chinese and American people after two decades of minimal contact; exchanges also powerfully influenced Sino-American diplomatic relations and helped transform post-Mao China. Grant Golub is an Ernest May Fellow in History and Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and a PhD candidate in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research focuses on the politics of American grand strategy during World War II. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/sports

Hey guys, have you been frustrated when the "conspiracy theorist!" slur is screeched? The slur that shuts down rational debate? It's an increasing problem for sure, as it stifles debate and debases the public dialogue. Well, I spent considerable time developing an engineering-level logical tool in order to finally resolve the issue. I believe that it will REALLY help anyone to sort the 'conspiracy theory' chaff from the 'actual collusion' wheat. Please do comment below with suggestions on honing the tool, for even more accuracy in debunking the nonsense theories - but more importantly highlighting the real thing! The tool template is here for download (just click twice to accept WeTransfer - all good): https://we.tl/t-7h8ji5f2er NOTE: My extensive research and interviewing / video/sound editing, business travel and much more does require support - please consider helping if you can with monthly donation to support me directly, or one-off payment: https://www.paypal.com/donate?hosted_button_id=69ZSTYXBMCN3W - alternatively join up with my Patreon - exclusive Vlogs/content and monthly zoom meetings with the second tier upwards: https://www.patreon.com/IvorCummins Resources discussed in this tutorial: Swine Flu Debacle article 2010: https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/reconstruction-of-a-mass-hysteria-the-swine-flu-panic-of-2009-a-682613.html Excellent Historical Analysis of Rockefeller Foundation, Kissinger, Pandemic and Climate Strategies - all the way to the WEF and Covid19 https://rumble.com/v1p0yhd-why-covid-and-climate-ruined-our-world-the-full-explanation.html LOCKSTEP Planning Document: https://www.nommeraadio.ee/meedia/pdf/RRS/Rockefeller%20Foundation.pdf PanData WHO Review: https://www.pandata.org/wp-content/uploads/PANDA_WHO_Review.pdf Excellent 20 minute on the Globalization 'conspiracy' problem: https://inproportion2.talkigy.com/globalism_megatrend_beneath.html

In 1971, Americans made two historic visits to China that would transform relations between the two countries. One was by US official Henry Kissinger; the other, earlier, visit was by the US table tennis team. Historians have mulled over the transcripts of Kissinger's negotiations with Chinese leaders. However, they have overlooked how, alongside these diplomatic talks, a rich program of travel and exchange had begun with ping-pong diplomacy.  Improbable Diplomats: How Ping-Pong Players, Musicians, and Scientists Remade US-China Relations (Cambridge UP, 2022) reveals how a diverse cast of Chinese and Americans – athletes and physicists, performing artists and seismologists – played a critical, but to date overlooked, role in remaking US-China relations. Based on new sources from more than a dozen archives in China and the United States, Pete Millwood argues that the significance of cultural and scientific exchanges went beyond reacquainting the Chinese and American people after two decades of minimal contact; exchanges also powerfully influenced Sino-American diplomatic relations and helped transform post-Mao China. Grant Golub is an Ernest May Fellow in History and Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and a PhD candidate in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research focuses on the politics of American grand strategy during World War II. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

The Buttered Biscuit is one of the most compelling success stories on the Northwest Arkansas food scene, growing from concept to four booming restaurants in about four years. Sam Russell, co-founder, co-owner and CEO, and Hunter Kissinger, director of operations, called the Heaping Spoonful hotline to explain how their mini-chain has gotten so large so quickly -- and where they're headed from here.

No digan que no avisamos. Henry Kissinger, a punto de cumplir 100 años. ¿Quiénes son los pelotudos ("tontos") que se creen inteligentes? La estrategia de Kissinger para mantenerse en el poder. Su historia de vida. ¿Quiénes son los asistentes a Davos 2023? La versión "argenta" de Kissinger. ¿Cuál es la Agenda 2030? Terroristas financiados por grupos multinacionales. Capitalistas con lo propio y socialistas con lo ajeno. Relacionados: Podcast AFR Nº 356: El Instituto Tavistock y la Nueva Edad Media (parte 1) https://alfilodelarealidad.com/podcast-afr-no-356-el-instituto-tavistock-y-la-nueva-edad-media-parte-1/ Podcast AFR Nº 357: El Instituto Tavistock y la Nueva Edad Media (parte 2) https://alfilodelarealidad.com/podcast-afr-no-357-el-instituto-tavistock-y-la-nueva-edad-media-parte-2/ No digan que no avisamos https://alfilodelarealidad.com/no-digan-que-no-avisamos/ Más sobre los Illuminati https://alfilodelarealidad.com/?s=illuminati Nueva plataforma de cursos (https://miscursosvirtuales.net). * * * Programa de Afiliados * * * iVoox comparte con AFR un pequeño porcentaje si usas uno de estos enlaces: * Disfruta de la experiencia iVoox sin publicidad, con toda la potencia de volumen, sincronización de dispositivos y listas inteligentes ilimitadas: Premium anual https://www.ivoox.vip/premium?affiliate-code=68e3ae6b7ef213805d8afeeea434a491 Premium mensual https://www.ivoox.vip/premium?affiliate-code=7b7cf4c4707a5032e0c9cd0040e23919 * La mejor selección de podcasts en exclusiva con iVoox Plus Más de 50.000 episodios exclusivos y nuevos contenidos cada día. ¡Suscríbete y apoya a tus podcasters favoritos! Plus https://www.ivoox.vip/plus?affiliate-code=258b8436556f5fabae31df4e91558f48 Más del mundo del misterio en nuestro portal: alfilodelarealidad.com

00:30 A harcsának vagy a kutyának drukkolsz? Szily László cikke Gaiusról, akit a harcsában találtak. 04:30 Hogy táplálkozik a harcsa? Harcsafogás Oklahomában. Minden az egérúszásról, ami valójában pocokúszás. 08:40 Neked mi a kutyaevési krédód? Winkler Róbert megöli a saját közönségét. 09:52 Menjenek-e az oroszok az olimpiára? Bede Márton cikke a kérdésről. A nagy orosz állami doppingprogram. Az Orosz Olimpiai Bizottság nótája. 14:02 Szíria és Mianmar ott lehet az olimpián? Irak? A veszteseket nem hívják meg. Coubertin báró tényleg meghalt 1937-ben. 17:10 Apartheid és olimpia. Tommie Smith és John Carlos felemeli az öklét 1968-ban. Kényszerítsük a NOB-ot a vörös vonalhoz! Talán azért nem ebbe bukik bele Putyin. 25:34 Csányi Sándor, Nagy-Magyarország és az UEFA. A román és a szlovák MLSZ-t ki vezeti? A magát megbüntető Craiova. 29:08 Welcome to Wrexham. Lehet-e manipulálni egy futballbajnokságot? 32:20 Winkler Róbert lebuktatja a valóságshowkat. Észak-Walestől a Kiskunságon át Monzáig. Mennyi közpénz van Berlusconiban? 36:05 A Red Bull inkább magának csinál médiát. Baumgartner kiugrik a francból. Interjú Andrey MIrrel. 40:08 Gárdi Balázs és a Red Bull. Gárdi Balázs a Kapitóliumon. Gárdi Balázs Afganisztánban. 41:28 Kissinger legújabb kalandjai. Ki akar itt még náci lenni? Antiszemita betlehemezés. G.I. Bill. Német cseberből harvardi vederbe. 46:10 Ukrán korrupció a magyar kormánypropagandában és a valóságban. Ihor Kolomojszkij. Magyar korrupciós győzelem. 49:37 Hogy az istenben jut Márki-Zay Péter az eszedbe? Mennyiben felelős Bede Márton Márki-Zay Péterért? És a rossz tanácsadói? A jászberényi balos áttörés. 52:36 A dnyiprói ribancpfofa. Hány ezer éve él itt ki? Jan Slota undorító, szőrös lovakról beszélt.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

With his 100th birthday quickly approaching, it seemed like the perfect time to discuss the wicked and psychotic career of one of the worst human beings of the entire 20th century: Henry Kissinger. From advocating for tactical nuclear strikes as a normal matter of foreign policy to spraying Agent Orange and napalm on an entire country of civilians in Vietnam to authorizing the State Department to use food as a weapon against “Lesser-Developed Countries”, Kissinger has shown the world that he is a blood-thirsty maniac with visions of world domination occupying his mind. How much different would the world be today if Henry Kissinger had never been allowed to implement his diabolical vision for humanity will never be known, but his crimes against humanity should not be allowed to be sanitized by the corrupt mainstream media. Sponsors: Emergency Preparedness Food: www.preparewithmacroaggressions.com Chemical Free Body: https://www.chemicalfreebody.com and use promo code: MACRO C60 Purple Power: https://c60purplepower.com/ Promo Code: MACRO Wise Wolf Gold & Silver: www.Macroaggressions.gold True Hemp Science: https://truehempscience.com/ Haelan: https://haelan951.com/pages/macro Solar Power Lifestyle: https://solarpowerlifestyle.com/ Promo Code: MACRO LegalShield: www.DontGetPushedAround.com Coin Bit App: https://coinbitsapp.com/?ref=0SPP0gjuI68PjGU89wUv Macroaggressions Merch Store: https://www.teepublic.com/stores/macroaggressions?ref_id=22530 LinkTree: linktr.ee/macroaggressions Books: HYPOCRAZY: https://amzn.to/3AFhfg2 Controlled Demolition on Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B08M21XKJ5 Purchase "The Octopus Of Global Control" Amazon: https://amzn.to/3aEFFcr Barnes & Noble: https://bit.ly/39vdKeQ Online Connection: Link Tree: https://linktr.ee/Macroaggressions Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/macroaggressions_podcast/ Discord Link:  https://discord.gg/4mGzmcFexg Website: www.theoctopusofglobalcontrol.com Facebook: www.facebook.com/theoctopusofglobalcontrol Twitter: www.twitter.com/macroaggressio3 Twitter Handle: @macroaggressio3 YouTube: www.youtube.com/channel/UCn3GlVLKZtTkhLJkiuG7a-Q Apple Podcasts: https://apple.co/2LjTwu5

00:26 NER és környezetvédelem. Bede Márton cikke. Hazaárulózták az főispánt. Létforgatag podcast Győrffy Dórával. 04:00 A hatalom nehézségei a környezetvédelemmel. A tatai népszavazás. A Sólyom Lászlót elnökké választó bánáti bazsarózsa. Nimbyzmus. 08:04 Mégis mi ebben a kormány oldaláról a ráció? Autóipar vagy atomerőmű? Xenofóba vs. gazdasági fejlődés. 12:25 Orbán Balázs uralná a gondolkodást. 14:20 László és Béla. A black metalos Kövér László. Mayhem a buszmegállóban, tényleg Euronymus és Necrobutcher azok. Varg Vikernes francia farmja. 18:35 Még hány évig kell hatalmon lennie a Fidesznek ahhoz, hogy összeérjenek ideológiailag a vikingekkel? És hogy az istenben jutottunk ide? 20:30 Hány óra elolvasni egy könyvet? Kissinger nehezen denácifikál. 24:10 Ahhoz képest még nem is vagyunk teljesen nácik. Gazdasági fellendülés és Hitler.  Gazdasági válság és Gyurcsány. 27:20 Német kulturális ajánló. Wolfszeit. Az ember, aki mindent látni akart. Heinz Stücke világot lát. 31:10 A bicikli minden falat lebont. Bicikliző menekültek Oroszországból Norvégiába. 33:15 Köszönjük Scott Galloway Adrift című könyvét, akárki is küldte. 33:47 Bocuse D'Or-bronzérem. 36:30 A Bocuse D'Or abszurditása. Miért jobb ez a szakácsolimpiánál? Miért olyan, mint egy haute couture divatbemutató? 40:08 Mennyi pénzt rak a skandináv jóléti állam a csúcsgasztronómiába? SIRHA = Salon international de la restauration de l'hôtellerie et de l'alimentation. 43:20 Mekkora szerepe van a magyar sikerben Rasmus Kofoednak? Meilleur Ouvrier de France. Kings of Pastry. 49:50 A nagy spanyol Bocuse-balhé. Kinek éri meg ez egyáltalán? Mennyit lehet magyar étteremben ételre költeni? Salt Bae-nek derogál a Bocuse. 54:05 Uj Péter rasszista viccet talál a Hollán Ernő utcában. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Episode 2431 of the Vietnam Veteran News Podcast will feature an interview produced by a friend of this podcast Andy Pham. The interview will explore the background behind a soon to be published book titled: Fire and Rain: Nixon, Kissinger … Continue reading →

CHAT GPT, OPEN AI, the MetaVerse, virtual reality("VR"), transhumanism, and artificial intelligence ("AI") are all buzzwords we have heard a lot of recently. Particularly CHAT GPT. But what is all of this stuff? Should we take it seriously? The best approach is to run away from it all! No. It is currently an approach, but it differs from the one we promote. In this episode, Logos confronts some of the profound questions and propositions of the rising technological revolution. Serious questions we consider, and you should too: What is technology? Is progress always positive? What distinguishes a man from a machine with a highly sophisticated information network? Are machines morally culpable? Like most of our stuff, this discussion is just that; a discussion. As such, we invite you to dialogue with these concepts and realities emerging around us. Above all, to bring them into contact with THE divine Truth of Jesus Christ. There must be something good, true, and beautiful about said advancement, but they are all rooted in something, in someONE. What are we to make of these developments? Enjoy, and God Bless!Attached are links to some of the sources we used: Books- Virtually You: The Dangerous Powers of the E-Personality by Elias Aboujaoude MD- Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology by Neil Postman- The Age of AI: And Our Human Future by Kissinger, Schmidt, and HuttenlocherVideos/ Articles- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V-hB-4fnqtM- https://theimaginativeconservative.org/2022/10/can-technology-save-world-joseph-pearce.html- https://www.ncregister.com/blog/pope-francis-and-the-killer-robots- https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/2/28/21157760/pope-vatican-artificial-intelligence- https://openai.com/about/- https://www.businessinsider.com/everything-you-need-to-know-about-chat-gpt-2023-1Support the show

Pozornosť ľudí, ktorí podrobne sledujú dianie v ukrajinskej vojne, sa v poslednom týždni upínala viac na Nemecko ako na samotnú Ukrajinu. Tam sa v piatok stretli zástupcovia asi 50tich štátov vrátane Slovenska, ktorí sľúbili obrovskú vojenskú pomoc Ukrajine, a v Berlíne prebieha politický spor o to, či vláda umožní iným štátom poslať nemecké tanky Leopard ukrajinskej armáde. Vypočujte si Ukrajinský spravodaj, súhrn toho najpodstatnejšieho, čo sa za uplynulý týždeň udialo vo vojne na Ukrajine. Správy pripravil Matúš Krčmárik, načítala ich Ľubica Melcerová. _ Podporte podcasty denníka SME kúpou prémiového predplatného a užívajte si podcasty bez reklamy na webe SME.sk alebo v mobilnej aplikácii SME.sk. Prémiové predplatné si kúpite na predplatne.sme.sk/podcast – Ak máte pre nás spätnú väzbu, odkaz alebo nápad, napíšte nám na dobrerano@sme.sk – Všetky podcasty denníka SME nájdete na sme.sk/podcasty – Odoberajte aj denný newsletter SME.sk s najdôležitejšími správami na sme.sk/brifing – Ďakujeme, že počúvate podcast Ukrajinský spravodaj a Dobré ráno.

A tartalomjegyzék visszatér! 00:40 RSG vagy RG vagy RSV? 01:45 Tamás Gáspár Miklós. Herczeg Márk TGM-nekrológja. 11:25 TGM beárazza az SZFE kancellárját. TGM beárazza Lovasi Andrást 12:26 Henry Kissinger életrajza. A gond Niall Fergusonnal és a még el sem indult antiwoke egyetem. 18:58 Kissinger gyermekkora és kedvenc futballcsapata. 22:05 De nem inkább az áldozataival kellene mindig kezdeni? 24:40 Kissinger nagy putyinügyi pálfordulása és davosi távbeszéde. Orbán Viktor Habermas, Kissinger és a pápa közé helyezi magát. 28:40 Putyin békeharca. Különleges hadművelettel a békéért. 29:15 Matthieu Aikins könyve és afgánnak eladható ábrázata. Vámbéry Ármin álruhában. Richard Burton álruhában körülmetélteti magát. 34:50 Hogy visznek át a csempészek Törökországból Görögországba? 37:30 Koszos legyen egy menekült? Nyilas Gergely kirgizként a menekültáradatban. A hagyományos afgán férfiöltözet. Günther Walraff, a gastarbeiter. 40:15 Vietnámi hatalomváltás élőben a Wikipédián. A vietnámi Pintér Sándor ellátogat Karl Marxhoz és Salt Bae-hez. 44:40 Ki végzi leginkább szabadban a dolgát? Klotyóprogram Indiában. A gatyába vizelő elnököt beleszámították? 48:31 A perui kapcsolat és a kilengő inka. Bede Márton cikke a visszatéréssel fenyegető perui autokráciáról. 52:40 Mario Vargas Llosa megbékél a fujimorismóval. Mario Vargas Llosa szakít Enrique Iglesias anyukájával. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

What can we expect in the coming weeks as reports claim Putin is preparing a massive offensive? Colonel Douglas Macgregor is back to deliver his expert breakdown of the evolving conflict in Ukraine. Might we see a false flag event disrupting the grain infrastructure of Ukraine? How dire is the loss of life facing the two nations? Will Washington cave to mounting pressure to supply tanks; what about Germany? Why did Kissinger change his tune on Ukraine's NATO membership? When will the offensive begin and what will it entail? Is there a possibility of electronic warfare; are satellites potential targets? How has the Biden Administration escalated the conflict, and will they continue fueling the flames of war? Why does Russia hold an advantage in terms of ammunition? Could Russia sabotage the tank deliveries? How has Zelensky nullified his own generals? Macgregor and Savage dive into all the details as Europe faces a historic mobilization, not seen since World War II. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Eric and Eliot welcome John Maurer, Professor of Strategy and Security Studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Air University in Alabama and author of Competitive Arms Control, Nixon, Kissinger and SALT, 1969-1972 (Yale University Press, 2022). They discuss the competitive and cooperative approaches to arms control, interagency deliberations and conflicts in the Nixon Administration, the motivations and policies of Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and especially Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. They also talk about the action-reaction model of the arms races and the role of arms control in providing arms race stability and crisis stability to the superpower nuclear arms competition. They conclude with a discussion about how the Nixon Administration's experience with arms control illuminates the subsequent history of Cold War arms control, as well as how that history augurs for the future of arms control in the very different circumstances of today's great power competition. Shield of the Republic is a Bulwark podcast co-sponsored by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. Email us with your feedback at shieldoftherepublic@gmail.com. Competitive Arms Control: Nixon, Kissinger, and SALT, 1969-1972 (https://www.amazon.com/Competitive-Arms-Control-Kissinger-1969-1972/dp/0300247559) Book Review Roundtable: Cult of the Irrelevant by John Maurer, et al (https://tnsr.org/roundtable/book-review-roundtable-cult-of-the-irrelevant/) John Maurer in War on the Rocks (https://warontherocks.com/author/john-maurer/) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Davos may attract some of the world's wealthiest people but DSR continues to attract the best foreign policy and national security thinkers and analysis. David Rothkopf talks with David Sanger of the New York Times and Rosa Brooks of Georgetown University about Kissinger's remarks at Davos and other foreign policy issues cropping up around the world. Should Ukraine join NATO? Will Sweden and Finland actually join NATO? How should the U.S. handle the new (old) government in Israel? Find out in this wide-ranging conversation. Don't miss it. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On January 27th, 1973 the U.S. signed a peace treaty that ended its war in Vietnam so Scott and Scott and Bob got together to discuss the last stages of the war, the peace treaty, and some of the lessons and legacies of Vietnam. The last phase of the war is not discussed as much as the earlier period, so we went into some detail about the last big battles of the war like the Easter Offensive. We discussed the background to negotiations before 1972 and the ways in which Kissinger and Nixon engaged in deceptive diplomacy--reneging on agreements and actually escalating the war. We also corrected the historical record on the so-called Christmas Bombings, which Americans have been told forced the North Vietnamese to make concessions and sign the peace treaty but in reality which were condemned globally and forced the U.S. to agree to terms which had been on the table much earlier. Finally we discussed the legacy of Vietnam, and pondered the questions "who actually won the Vietnam War?" ------------------------------------ Outro- "Green and Red Blues" by Moody Links// "A Christmas Tale, by Richard Nixon" https://afflictthecomfortable.org/201... Why Is There No Antiwar Movement? (https://bit.ly/3XBnsoA) The "Christmas bombing" of 1972 — and why that misremembered Vietnam War moment matters (http://bit.ly/3GDIsUA) Follow Green and Red// G&R Linktree: https://linktr.ee/greenandredpodcast https://greenandredpodcast.org/ Vietnam 50 Years Later Labor Podcast Network We've recently become a member of the Labor Podcast Network! Check them out here:https://www.laborradionetwork.org/ Support the Green and Red Podcast// Become a Patron at https://www.patreon.com/greenredpodcast Or make a one time donation here: https://bit.ly/DonateGandR This is a Green and Red Podcast (@PodcastGreenRed) production. Produced by Bob (@bobbuzzanco) and Scott (@sparki1969). “Green and Red Blues" by Moody. Editing by Scott.

Davos may attract some of the world's wealthiest people but DSR continues to attract the best foreign policy and national security thinkers and analysis. David Rothkopf talks with David Sanger of the New York Times and Rosa Brooks of Georgetown University about Kissinger's remarks at Davos and other foreign policy issues cropping up around the world. Should Ukraine join NATO? Will Sweden and Finland actually join NATO? How should the U.S. handle the new (old) government in Israel? Find out in this wide-ranging conversation. Don't miss it. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Giải Nobel Hòa bình năm 1973 được trao cho nhà ngoại giao hàng đầu của Hoa Kỳ Henry Kissinger và Lê Đức Thọ của Bắc Việt, một trong những phần thưởng gây tranh cãi nhất trong lịch sử của Nobel Hòa bình, được trao với sự hiểu biết đầy đủ rằng cuộc chiến tranh Việt Nam lúc đó khó có thể kết thúc sớm, theo các tài liệu mới công bố. Xem thêm: https://bit.ly/3wSHe49 Tin tức đáng chú ý khác: Bộ Ngoại giao Mỹ khởi động chiến dịch kêu gọi phóng thích tù nhân chính trị, trong đó có Phạm Đoan Trang. Báo cáo HRW toàn cầu 2023: Việt Nam gia tăng đàn áp các tổ chức phi chính phủ. Quân đội Ukraine phủ nhận tin Soledar thất thủ. Dân Bắc Kinh bác chuyện chia sẻ dữ liệu COVID với thế giới. Đài Loan tập trận chứng tỏ sẵn sàng quân sự trước Tết Nguyên đán. HRW kêu gọi chủ tịch ASEAN hành động về Myanmar. ‘Xe năng lượng mặt trời' đầu tiên của Ấn Độ ra mắt thị trường. Nếu không vào được VOA, xin hãy dùng đường link https://bit.ly/VOATiengViet3 để vượt tường lửa.

Giải Nobel Hòa bình năm 1973 được trao cho nhà ngoại giao hàng đầu của Hoa Kỳ Henry Kissinger và Lê Đức Thọ của Bắc Việt, được trao với sự hiểu biết đầy đủ rằng cuộc chiến tranh Việt Nam lúc đó khó có thể kết thúc sớm, theo các tài liệu mới công bố.

Der russische Präsident Wladimir Putin ist bereit, den Ukraine-Krieg durch Diplomatie zu beenden. Auch Alt-US-Außenminister Henry Kissinger warnt vor Eskalation. Web: https://www.epochtimes.de Probeabo der Epoch Times Wochenzeitung: https://bit.ly/EpochProbeabo Twitter: https://twitter.com/EpochTimesDE YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC81ACRSbWNgmnVSK6M1p_Ug Telegram: https://t.me/epochtimesde Gettr: https://gettr.com/user/epochtimesde Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/EpochTimesWelt/ Unseren Podcast finden Sie unter anderem auch hier: iTunes: https://podcasts.apple.com/at/podcast/etdpodcast/id1496589910 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/277zmVduHgYooQyFIxPH97 Unterstützen Sie unabhängigen Journalismus: Per Paypal: http://bit.ly/SpendenEpochTimesDeutsch Per Banküberweisung (Epoch Times Europe GmbH, IBAN: DE 2110 0700 2405 2550 5400, BIC/SWIFT: DEUTDEDBBER, Verwendungszweck: Spenden) Vielen Dank! (c) 2022 Epoch Times

2022 has finally ended.  Some of it bad, some of it splendid.    There was Russia's invasion.    And Ukraine's self-defense.    The west lobbed isolation  against Moscow's offense.    This was also the year America closed the door   despite a generation of fighting    its 20-year-war  We saw economic turmoil   And those who could not tweet   We debated inflation  And whether small investors could beat the street   We debated food, SATs, and if the Classics were overrated   Aliens, and whether Britain's Monarchy should be abated   Affirmative action, cancel culture, and if Trump should be indicted,  Unions, public radio, and what information disorder has ignited.   Gene editing and digital dollars were fresh to the palette.   We debated adaptation, and whether your Tesla helps the planet,  And of course there was Roe, and if AI does more harm than good,  Kissinger, Covid, and just how we all withstood   midterms elections  and if globalization backfired  soft landings, and cities, and if democracy is mired   in existential threat.     OK...hold on, that's not cheery.    We can't end this year leaving you tired and weary.    So here's to you listeners and watchers of debate  Who at times may have wondered what is the fate   Of a discourse that is broken   Or at least a bit hobbled.   When listening to a nation that yells and a people who squabble.   Fear not, dear listeners, we say with some hope.   We do in fact have a way you can cope.   Real debate and discussion offers intellectual cheer.   And so with that we wish you safe holidays….  … and a happy new year.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Canary Cry News Talk #574 - 12.21.2022 - Recorded Live to Tape TOTAL PSYOPICS | Intel War Wiles, Woke Stanford, Gel Bot, 2100 Supercomputer A Podcast that Deconstructs Mainstream Media News from a Biblical Worldview Harvard: Index of MSM Ownership (Harvard.edu) Logos Bible: Aliens Demons Doc (feat. Dr. Heiser, Unseen Realm) A Podcast that Deconstructs Mainstream Media News from a Biblical Worldview Harvard: Index of MSM Ownership (Harvard.edu) Logos Bible: Aliens Demons Doc (feat. Dr. Mike Heiser, Unseen Realm)   This Episode was Produced By: Executive Producer Anon Y Mouse** Natalie T** Christine S**   Producers Marita R, Puddin22, Sir Morv Knight of the Burning Chariots, Sir LX Protocol V2 Knight of the Berrean Protocol, Dame Gail Canary Whisperer and Lady of X's and O's, Runksmash, Sir Darrin Knight of the Hungr Panda's, DrWhoDunDat, Sir Casey the Shield Knight, Veronica D, Sir Scott Knight of Truth   Audio Production Kalub LittleOwen   Visual Art Sir Dove Knight of Rusbeltia Sir Darrin Knight of the Hungry Panda's   Microfiction Stephen S - “They will gladly give me their fertilized eggs for just one perfect specimen.” “And what of the rest?” “They will become my army of three foot minions!” “Or how about, the next special entre at Le Pierre's” “How delicious!” agrees Dr. Diablo.   CLIP PRODUCER Emsworth, FaeLivrin   TIMESTAPERS Jackie U, Jade Bouncerson, Christine C, Pocojoyo, Joelle S   SOCIAL MEDIA DOERS Dame MissG of the OV and Deep Rivers   LINKS HELP JAM   REMINDERS Clankoniphius   SHOW NOTES HELLO, RUN DOWN CALLED IT/WOKE Stanford releases guide against ‘harmful language' — including the word ‘American' (NY Post)    DAY JINGLE/PERSONAL/EXEC.   FLIPPY Creepy-crawly gel robots being trained to root out disease in body (NY Post)   BEING WATCHED* Police seize on Covid 19 tech to expand global surveillance (AP) → CCR 015: Surveillance State (July 2012) → CCR 002: Internet Tracking and Utah Data Center (March 2012)   TRUMP (Note) Trump Tax Return is Worse than Nothing Burger (Fox, ABC)   RUSSIA/UKRAINE/BIDEN Congress Proposes More Than $44 Billion for Ukraine (NY Times) Zelensky Visits White House (Politico)   PARTY TIME: http://CANARYCRY.PARTY BREAK 1: TREASURE: https://CanaryCryRadio.com/Support   COVID/WACCINE PSYOP: *Conspiracy theorist plotted to firebomb phone/TV radio masts, believed UK was 'controlled by Israel', C19 shot was 'planned genocide' - convicted terrorist faces jail (DailyMail)  → Appeals Court Says U.S. Cannot Mandate Federal Contractor COVID Vaccines (US News) → Regular exercise protects against fatal covid, a new study shows (Wapo)   CRISPR/DNA He Jenkui is back in action (Wired) → CCR 014, GM Babies (July 2012)   BREAK 3: TALENT   DAYS OF NOAH Earth could face a mass EXTINCTION by 2100: Supercomputer (DailyMail)  → CCR 025, Sentient World Simulation (August 2012)   BREAK 4: TIME END     ADDITIONAL STORIES Kim Jong-un's Sister Threatens to Launch ICBM Towards America in Unhinged Rant (Breitbart)  North Korea accuses Japan of planning invasion (Times UK)  Biden in newly surfaced video: Iran nuclear deal is "dead" (Axios)  Scenes from a celebration of the same-sex marriage law — at Mar-a-Lago (Politico)  Trump addresses Log Cabin Republicans at Mar-a-Lago gala (LA Blade)  Jan. 6 committee unveils criminal referrals against Trump (The Hill)  FTX warns it will claw back political donations and contributions (Coin Telegraph)  Patriot Games: U.S. Missiles Head for Ukraine, and Pressure on Israel Mounts (Haaretz) (Archive)  Ukraine War: Russia's 2nd Regiment Of Avangard Hypersonic Missile, With ‘Mach 27' Speed, Takes Up Combat Duty (EurAsian Times)  Repair of two $2.1 billion B-2 Spirit nuke bombers will take several years (Gagadget)  Polish police chief in hospital after gift from Ukrainian officials explodes (BBC)  Kissinger Calls for Negotiated Peace in Ukraine, Kyiv Dismisses Proposal (VOA)  Kyiv slams Kissinger over call to negotiate with Russia for peace (Al Jazeera)  UK's PM Sunak to announce $304m in new military aid for Ukraine (Al Jazeera)  US to send precision bomb kits Patriot missiles in next Ukraine aid package, officials say (CNN)  Where is Putin? Russian leader may be hatching ‘Noah's Ark' escape (Times UK) (Archive)  No conclusive evidence Russia is behind Nord Stream attack (WaPo) (Archive)  Twitter Aided the Pentagon in its Covert Online Propaganda Campaign (Intercept)  Elizabeth Warren's Fin Surveillance Bill is Disaster for Privacy, Civil Liberties (CoinDesk) Lawmakers unveil a $1.7 trillion U.S. spending bill as shutdown deadline looms (NPR) → Elon poll $1.7 omnibus (Twitter) ‘Our grandkids will grow up in world dramatically worse off' if we don't fix climate change (CNBC) World order on verge of cliff - first Israeli national intel assessment (JPost)  Scientists 3D-print biomedical devices, ‘open up new possibilities' (SCMP) (Archive)  Ukrainian soldiers receive 'bionic' prostheses in Mexico (Reuters) The viral AI avatar app Lensa undressed me—without my consent (MIT)  Generative AI is changing everything. But what's left when the hype is gone? (MIT)  What Does It Mean to Align AI With Human Values? (Quanta Magazine) 

Kissingerův plán. Zeman dál zahřívá své kukaččí vejce pro Ústavní soud. Strop na plyn. Příliš pozdě jaderná energetika vzatá na milost. Soumrak samozvaných soudců.

How do you tap into intrinsic motivation when the assignments (or jobs) are boring or feel irrelevant? Andrew and David talk about the role of challenge in intrinsic motivation, including why being challenged is key to innovation and improvement. TRANSCRIPT 0:00:02.7 Andrew Stotz: My name is Andrew Stotz and I will be your host as we continue our journey into the teachings of Dr. W. Edwards Deming. Today, I'm continuing my discussion with David P. Langford, who has devoted his life to applying Dr. Deming's philosophy to education and he offers us his practical advice for implementation. Today's topic is the role of challenge in intrinsic motivation. David, take it away. 0:00:30.6 David P. Langford: Hello, Andrew. Good to be back. 0:00:33.2 AS: Good to see you. 0:00:33.3 DL: So how challenging is challenge, that's really what we're after about here today. So this is part four in a five-part podcast series we've been doing on intrinsic motivation, and so when I first encountered the concept of intrinsic motivation and it's actually when I was getting my undergraduate degree and I was so intrigued about it, but even like today, there was no training in it, there was no real... There was just, "Here it is, and yeah, intrinsic motivation is really good, so good luck with that." And all the training was around extrinsic motivation, how to motivate people, and it's the same today. I get calls and I get emails and stuff, and people always wanna know, can't we use bonuses and can't we use this and... You can use those kinds of things. I always think of the phrases that Dr. Deming had, he said, "The destruction has to start somewhere." [laughter] 0:01:40.2 DL: And people would ask him about those kinds of things like, yeah, you could do that, but... You're on the road to destruction. So I've been trying to explain the five researched key elements of intrinsic motivation that Deming talked about, and how do you actually change the system, whether that's a business or a school or a classroom, or whatever it might be. So you have people becoming more intrinsically motivated, so we've gone through a couple. So we talked about control or autonomy in the situation, we talked a lot about, in podcast number two, about cooperation, and then podcast number three is support, and now we're gonna talk about the role of challenge in intrinsic motivation. So, it's not so easy as just to like flip a switch and say, "Okay, now we're gonna intrinsically motivate people." It is a complex thinking that has to take place in management to create an environment where people can be intrinsically motivated, right? 0:02:51.2 AS: Yeah. 0:02:51.9 DL: And usually, if you find people looking like they're not motivated, Deming talked about probably 94% to 98% of the reason they're not motivated to come to work, is the work itself, the job. So when we start to talk about challenge, you wanna think about the job itself, is the job that say you're having a student do... If I tell people, "Memorize these 10 spelling words for Friday," well, yeah, for some students, that could be really challenging, for others, it's just sheer boredom of, "Why are we doing this? Where did this come from? There's no real challenge to it." So, you can take just about anything that you have that you want people to do... 0:03:39.6 DL: And in fact, Deming was actually a master of this, he went into some of the most mundane manufacturing places in the world where people are just sitting all day long and doing the same darn thing all over and over, thousands of times, and then leaving and then, how do you motivate those people? Well, let's just pay them more, let's do this or that or the other thing. And it didn't work. And the Hawthorne Studies showed that, oh yeah, you could turn the lights off and productivity goes up, or you could turn the lights on, productivity... Or you have music, or you can do all these kinds of things, but what they discovered was that it was the fact that management actually cared. [chuckle] That made the difference, and they were actually doing and trying to do something to improve the working environment is what was really discovered through that. But, Deming was the master of going in and teaching people to use their brains and to begin to improve their own situation. And that's a challenge. I'm sitting here doing this all day long, the same tedious task all day long, but all of a sudden somebody gives me the keys to improve this situation, make a change here, do something... 0:04:57.2 DL: And that's where PDSA came from, or originally PDCA was Dr. Shewhart. But Plan-Do-Study-Act, make a plan, do it, study it and act on it, did it work? It could be just that simple of a process. Now if we get together with a few other people and we study the process of what's happening, and we're given the authority or the control or autonomy, like we talked about earlier, to actually make a change, ah, well, that's pretty challenging. That's pretty interesting. And in my work with education, over and over and over when I go in and start working with people and teaching them this same kind of concept, I hear all the time administrators saying that, "We got dead wood on our staff," or, "We've got people that just don't care," or... Well, it's probably because you taught them to do that, or somebody previously taught them to do that because that's not normal if people are acting like that, etcetera, and yes, they have to make money, and yes, they have to live, and so they'll just learn to quit work, but keep the job. [chuckle] And I'll show up every day and do what I'm supposed to do, but it doesn't mean I'm gonna put in any extra effort in or any thinking or anything else, so... 0:06:21.0 AS: I can imagine a listener or a viewer listening to this and thinking to themselves, "Yeah, let's do a challenge. Let's do a competition." [laughter] 0:06:29.1 AS: Not realizing that when you're talking about challenge, and when talking about intrinsic motivation, it's not about a challenge to compete for a spelling contest or something, it's a different type of challenge, so tell us more about what kind of challenges people respond to. 0:06:46.7 DL: Yeah, so some of the ways that you can get challenge into a mundane task or a situation is you wanna think about excitement, how can I bring a level of excitement into this situation? And well, how do you get excitement going? Well, you have to think about the level of difficulty. And so, in neuroscience, there's actually sort of a learning zone. So, too much challenge, I'm gonna be overwhelmed, I'll be frustrated, I'll get the deer in the headlights look, I just can't do anything. Too little challenge, I got boredom going on. So there's a learning zone where the challenge has to be just right, and the problem, especially with teachers, is teachers are always trying to assess that with the students that they're working with, right? They're trying to set the level of challenge, but what I learned over the last 40 years is, the only person that can really know what is challenging is the individual himself, even like kindergarten, first grade, second grade students know if something is challenging or not, and when you set up a situation where they can sort of choose the level of challenge involved with that, you get a level of excitement that you didn't get before because the level of difficulty is there. 0:08:20.2 DL: So, I think we talked a little bit in one of the previous podcasts about gaming and video games, and so many education institutes, institutions, they wanna ban gaming and they wanna ban all those kind of stuff, but why are those things so addicting? Why are kids spending so much time on that? Because they're setting the level of challenge. They're setting the level of excitement that they can handle, and if they go up too many levels too fast, this game becomes so overwhelming and so difficult that they just can't cope with it, and so will end up just quitting or backing down a level or two until they sort of master that and move forward. So, being cognizant of that level of difficulty and getting the individual to understand how to set that level of difficulty is where it's really at. I remember the story of, I think it's Secretary of State with, I think it was Nixon administration or something... Anyway, there were some... 0:09:26.4 AS: Kissinger. 0:09:30.0 DL: Yes, Kissinger. You got it. Yes. See, there's a level of challenge for you and you win. [laughter] But, Kissinger wanted some kind of a plan or a military plan or something from one of the generals about something that they were doing or whatever, and gave him a timeline, and so the general came back with a plan, and Kissinger listened patiently to the plan and said, "General, is that the best you can do?" General thought for a while and said, "Well, actually, no. Given the time and resources we had, etcetera, we thought, well, this is the best we can do." "Well, why don't you go back and re-look at it and do it again, and see if that's the best you can do." Well, the general came back two or three more times and each time Kissinger said, "General, is that really the best you can do?" And finally the general said, "By golly, we worked on this, and I believe this is the best we could do at this point in time." Kissinger said, "Okay, that's all I wanted." [laughter] 0:10:29.8 AS: I'll read it. 0:10:30.0 DL: That's right. He just really wanted to know. So even in schools, kids learn to play the game of learning really quick. How do you get through school? By giving a teacher what they want. You don't get through school if you're super innovative... Well, you'll get through school, but you're not gonna probably get the As and master stuff if you're actually being innovative all the time and thinking outside of the box, and I think it was even Einstein got a D in physics or math or something because he kept challenging... 0:11:01.4 AS: Messing around. 0:11:03.0 DL: Yeah, he kept challenging the teacher's theories all the time. Well, that's not the way to get through school. You wanna give people the answers they expect, right? 0:11:15.8 AS: Yeah. I have a... 0:11:17.5 DL: That's the level of challenge that we're talking about. 0:11:20.3 AS: Right. I have an experience when I was 18, and I went to work in this factory, and it was a plastic molding factory back when plastic molding was done in America, and it was a very mundane job, and I would go crazy all day long waiting for the break and it would just drive me nuts. And I would be thinking about stuff all the time, and the way the company did it is they gave us three months, and at the end of three months, they'd tell us whether they're gonna keep us or not, and I started the job with a couple of other guys, some of them didn't survive, but this one guy did survive, and it was the night before we had the decision date, and I said... I asked him... We were talking about it and he asked me, "What do you think?" I said, "Man, I hope they don't offer me a job 'cause this is just gonna kill me, this is just... There is no challenge in this job." And I was like... 0:12:13.2 DL: I don't care how much they pay me. 0:12:14.5 AS: Yeah, exactly. Which I felt like must be the same answer that he was gonna give, but he gave a very different answer. He said, "Oh, I hope I get this job." And I was like, "Why?" And he said, "Because I just... I like it, I know exactly what to do. I don't have to bring the job home, I'm not facing all this stress and I can deal with that." And that was a wake-up call when I later became a supervisor at Pepsi, I was able to understand that different people have different objectives from work and different things they want from it, and some people want a big challenge and some people don't necessarily. So my question to you is, how do you handle different people that have different willingness or desire to take on challenge? 0:12:57.7 DL: Yeah, and Deming talked about that a lot in his seminars too, and one of the responses I often remember was, he said, "Sometimes people are just not in the right job." So, maybe there's another job within the company that would be much more challenging for them, but... 'Cause everybody has their own expertise that they bring to a situation, whether that's in a classroom or a job or management or whatever it might be, people have this level of expertise and maybe you're not just... You're just not being challenged to use your level of thinking and background and expertise in a new way. 0:13:40.2 AS: But in this case, that guy may not... I don't know if that would have changed anything 'cause what he was looking for from the job was not necessarily challenge. He wasn't a bad employee. In fact, he got the job in the next day, and... 0:13:54.3 DL: Well, there's two different kinds of stresses, right? There's eustress and there's distress, right? So eustress is when you are challenged by the job, and you're like, "Oh, yeah. This is great. This job's really challenging. I gotta figure this stuff out and I gotta work through this," or distress like, "These people are trying to kill me," or, "This is a... This is no fun for me. I don't like this at all. It's not something I wanna be doing," right? So a manager has to be acutely aware of who they're working with. And part of that happens in the hiring process, are you asking the right questions? And we have the phrase, "Do you have the right people on the bus?" Well, do you actually know what the bus is? What do you really want them to be doing? 0:14:46.3 AS: In fact, the person that was in trouble in that case was me. They probably... Yeah... If I had an education and I had more understanding of the world, I could have said, "Hey, could I try something else?" But I didn't have that understanding. One of the things I was thinking about that you said earlier that made me think about this situation was also that there's one thing that that other guy would respond to. And that is identifying errors or mistakes or problems because everybody is frustrated by that and because they gotta repeat their work and they just don't like that. So you could, I guess, argue that in fact, continuous improvement is something that people will be... Feel the excitement of that challenge about. 0:15:34.9 DL: Yeah, and I've encountered that with educators as well. I've had teachers just come up and tell me flat out, "I don't wanna have to think. Just tell me what to do, and I'll go do it." The problem with that is all of a sudden you're faced with, say 30 students, coming from random variation in the system coming in, and all of a sudden you're challenged with dealing with a level that you've never had to deal with before, right? And if you haven't learned to think and change and adapt and understand that situation, you're just gonna blame the individuals. "We just need some new kids here," right? Well, that's like you get that... You're in a band and you get feedback from the audience that, "Well, what you're doing really sucks," and you're thinking, "Whoa! I just need a different audience." [laughter] 0:16:37.6 AS: That's why I go to talk to my mom, 'cause she always applauds. [laughter] 0:16:41.8 DL: Yeah. There you go. So another way we can get challenged is through just novelty. So too much sameness does the opposite of challenge and it puts people into boredom and stuff. I always tell people, "If you don't believe me, just go to a local church and watch what happens after about 20 minutes of one method, one person talking, everybody just sitting there listening. And then you start to see a whole audience of people nodding their heads in agreement. But really, they're just trying to keep their heads up, their eyes open," right? And this is the same thing in a classroom. Past 10 minutes, if you're doing the same lecture format, the same thing all the time, there's no novelty there. There's nothing to look forward to. There's no challenge, or... 0:17:31.5 DL: I remember I was in a Master's Degree statistics class and it was a 3-hour class, two times a week at night, and the first class was just all lecture. This guy lectured on statistics and so everybody got it. And I remember it was not a very big class, only about 12 students, but the next class, there were only half as many there and when he got ready to start the class, these people would all get their tape recorders out and just punch all these tape recorders because students all realized that there's no point in me sitting here if that's all we're gonna do is just sit and listen for three hours, right? And the professor didn't care either. He didn't care if you're there or not. So that's kinda the opposite of challenge. 0:18:22.6 AS: When I see those heads nodding in my classroom, I always basically say, "Everybody come up to the board. I'm gonna show you something," and then I just do the next lecture with everybody standing." [chuckle] 0:18:35.1 DL: Yeah, so that's really good. So how do you get novelty? You can get novelty through music, adding color, and what you just described, adding movement. Change the situation and then watch how the behavior changes instead of leaving the situation alone and expecting a different behavior, which is, insanity kind of a thing. So you're exactly right. As soon as you see that, you should be changing the situation immediately. Do something different. 0:19:02.5 AS: I've been teaching an ethics class, and that's kind of known for being really sleepy. So what I do is I created a... This is gonna sound kind of funny, a cheat sheet for my ethics class. But basically I teach a little bit and then I tell the students, "Okay, write this down on your cheat sheet." So they have to do a physical activity and then after that we go back to a little bit of a lecture. And then I say, "Okay, now take a quiz question." Then they do that and then we look at the scores and see what they understood, and what they didn't, and basically by doing this type of thing, I'm trying to bring variety, novelty is the word you use. And yeah, and if I didn't do that in that topic, it's gonna be all sleepy, sleepyheads. 0:19:48.4 DL: Yeah, sometimes people interpret that as "Oh, alright, we're going to do an ice breaker." No, that's not novelty. Just a lot of people just look at that and just say, "Oh, just skip the icebreaker," right? 0:20:02.1 AS: Yeah. 0:20:02.2 DL: You have to bring novelty to the learning situation. So I remember when I was in college, I had a class called the Assassination of American Presidents. Fantastic class, but I remember one time we were talking about eyewitness accounts in murder cases and assassinations like that. And while the professor starts to talk about this and he's going through his points and stuff, probably he could never do it today, but these two people burst into the room with masks over their heads, demanded something from the professor, and actually got one of the students and pulled them out of the classroom with them, etcetera. And then while everybody's sitting there in panic, the professor says, "Okay, I want you to take out a piece of paper, write down everything that you saw." 0:20:53.9 DL: 80% of the students in that class swore up and down that these two masked individuals had guns and were holding people hostage. And then they had... He had the mask, people come back in. None of us got it right, because the adrenaline was there and there's novelty and all this kind of stuff, but it turns out these two guys had bananas in their hands, but we were all sure that they were guns and... But that's the problem with that, but that was so novel that every time you went to class, there was something, and then by the third class, you're kind of wary that there's some trick... Is there some trick to this or not? 0:21:39.5 DL: But still, you're paying attention, because there's something going on there. By the way, to get it challenging is to make sure it's compelling. And Deming talked a lot about the purpose of an organization and the aim, etcetera. But is the work more compelling than just the work itself? You think about... Like building the space shuttle is a good example. Well, I'm not just putting in rivets in the side of this space shuttle. I'm actually creating something that's a national heritage and we're doing something that's never been done before and... The work is compelling in that sense. Also, think about... I think Deming talked one time about most of the work in manufacturing during World War II was being done by women, as men were in the army for the most part, and they worked in teams, they communicated, they had fun in their work, but the work was also compelling. You knew you're actually building that airplane for your uncle in the South Pacific. And if you had errors in it or problems that that plane wasn't gonna fly right, you could be... Your family member could be in trouble. So, sometimes that has to be explicit that you have to understand how to make work compelling. 0:23:11.6 AS: Yeah. And I'm gonna wrap it up and then I want to also hear kind of a final word from you about a challenge to the listeners and the viewers to think about how to make things compelling. But let me go through a couple of things that we learned from this discussion. Of course, we're at part four of five part of intrinsic motivation. And right now, we're talking about the idea of challenge. And what was interesting that you said from the beginning was that, we don't get any training on intrinsic motivation, we get all this training on extrinsic motivation. Okay, here's how you do this and here's how you do the scores and here's how you do the competition. And what you also said is that it takes some complex thinking to think about creating an environment of challenge. And you also mentioned that too much challenge for some people could be overwhelming and too little would be boredom and so you've got to try to judge that for the students and people involved. 0:24:13.9 AS: And then you talked about also different types of stress and how are people responding to that stress? And I think that... When I think about that, I think about a lot of managers just wanna deliver stress. You didn't hit your numbers or whatever. And then just to wrap it up, you talked about the idea of how novelty in making things not the same all the time, whether it's music, color, emotion, whatever that is, can bring some excitement and some challenge. And then I think you wrapped it up with what really brings the most powerful challenge is to understand the aim or the purpose of what you're doing. And that purpose basically is what can raise your level of challenge. So if there's anything to add, please add it, and otherwise, let's give everybody a little challenge to bring challenge into their classroom, starting from after listening to this podcast. 0:25:14.5 DL: Yeah, I'd say just the last thing I would add to that is that, you can always get a level of challenge by having creativity involved in the process. So we're studying the Pythagorean theorem in mathematics, and so the creativity is you're to go home and apply the Pythagorean theorem in some way and come back and present it to the rest of the class. Well, that's a much different challenge than do Problems A through Z, and just come back with the answers. But thinking about introducing a level of creativity into the work is very challenging, so... 0:25:55.2 AS: So what would be a challenge for the listeners that they could bring into their own life, their own classroom, their own workplace? 0:26:05.9 DL: Yeah. It really doesn't matter what workplace we're talking about. Once you understand that these are the factors that create intrinsic motivation, you can start looking at your environment and say, "Okay, how could I make this more challenging? Could I add a level of excitement to this that was probably never even there before, a level of novelty? Or could I make this work compelling or add creativity?" I grew up on a farm in Colorado, and I used to sometimes hate that, I'd have to go out with my father to build a fence or something. And one of the first things he would say is, "Okay, so what are we trying to do here?" "Just tell me what to do." Well, what are we trying to do here, and go through this, and then why do we need to build the fence in this way?" And I'd go, "Well, 'cause its stock gets out and... " "What happens if stock gets out?" And he was doing with five whys stuff just intuitively, but after a few years, he could just say, "Hey, go out and build this fence 'cause you know how to do it," and the challenge was much greater of figuring it out on my own and having to work that through. So even something so simple as that can have a level of challenge to it. So think about how you can make just about anything you do, challenging. 0:27:28.0 AS: Great challenge for all of us. What is the purpose of what we're doing and let's bring that out. Well David, on behalf of everyone at Deming Institute, I wanna thank you again for your discussion. And for listeners, remember to go to deming.org to continue your journey, and listeners can learn more about David at langfordlearning.com. This is your host Andrew Stotz, and I will leave you with one of my favorite quotes from Dr. Deming, "People are entitled to joy in work."

Part 2 of 2 – While many have had their eyes on the midterms and the World Cup, hundreds have been killed during protests in the Islamic Republic. This week, host Elisa continues our Iran series with guest Dr. Roham Alvandi, Associate Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Together they discuss the critical shifts in Iran's governing structures from the coup in 1953 to the revolution in 1979. What shifted in Iran to allow for the revolution in 1979? And today, as the country progresses into increased political and cultural upheaval, what do we see happening next?  Dr. Roham Alvandi is Associate Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science:https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-history/people/academicstaff/alvandi/alvandi References: Alvandi, Roham. Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah the United States and Iran in the Cold War. Oxford University Press, 2016: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/nixon-kissinger-and-the-shah-9780190610685?prevSortField=9&q=*&resultsPerPage=100&lang=en&cc=gb# Alvandi, Roham. The Age of Aryamer: Late Pahlavi Iran and Its Global Entanglements. The Gingko Library, 2018:https://www.gingko.org.uk/publishing/books/the-age-of-aryamehr/?fbclid=IwAR0Xbu7sDHE8wbin2QUeMxaAfVMa32U24FUrsUY3FEScx3XPFM_NzgOfrVQ

Champion jockey Damien Oliver joins Racing Pulse The Verdict to discuss his win on Kissinger in the Pakenham Cup for Lindsey Smith Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

While many have had their eyes on the midterms and the World Cup, hundreds have been killed during protests in the Islamic Republic. This week, host Elisa continues our Iran series with guest Dr. Roham Alvandi, Associate Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Together they discuss the critical shifts in Iran's governing structures from the coup in 1953 to the revolution in 1979. How did U.S. involvement play a role in these early coups? How did the Iranian view of the Pahlavis change between the 50's and 60's? And how did U.S. counsel, particularly under Henry Kissinger, change our relationship with Iran? Dr. Roham Alvandi is Associate Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science: https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-history/people/academicstaff/alvandi/alvandi References: Alvandi, Roham. Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah the United States and Iran in the Cold War. Oxford University Press, 2016: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/nixon-kissinger-and-the-shah-9780190610685?prevSortField=9&q=*&resultsPerPage=100&lang=en&cc=gb# Alvandi, Roham. The Age of Aryamer: Late Pahlavi Iran and Its Global Entanglements. The Gingko Library, 2018: https://www.gingko.org.uk/publishing/books/the-age-of-aryamehr/?fbclid=IwAR0Xbu7sDHE8wbin2QUeMxaAfVMa32U24FUrsUY3FEScx3XPFM_NzgOfrVQ

In this second edition of our look at the relationship Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon had with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin , we take a little detour to listen to some of the current thoughts of Dr. Henry Kissinger, who is now 99 years old and out with yet another book. This time a book that chronicles the great examples of leadership he has seen up-close.  The book is titled "Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategies"  "In Leadership, Kissinger analyses the lives of six extraordinary leaders through the distinctive strategies of statecraft, which he believes they embodied. After the Second World War, Konrad Adenauer brought defeated and morally bankrupt Germany back into the community of nations by what Kissinger calls “the strategy of humility.” Charles de Gaulle set France beside the victorious Allies and renewed its historic grandeur by “the strategy of will.” During the Cold War, Richard Nixon gave geostrategic advantage to the United States by “the strategy of equilibrium.” After twenty-five years of conflict, Anwar Sadat brought a vision of peace to the Middle East by a “strategy of transcendence.” Against the odds, Lee Kuan Yew created a powerhouse city-state, Singapore, by “the strategy of excellence.” And, though Britain was known as “the sick man of Europe” when Margaret Thatcher came to power, she renewed her country's morale and international position by “the strategy of conviction.” " - From the book description for "Leadership"  Here is a link https://smile.amazon.com/dp/0593587065/ref=cm_sw_em_r_mt_dp_04W7PHVB27WHRSESNDP1 Then we get to hear both Dr Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon working with Ambassador Dobrynin in an example of the very leadership in which Dr. Kissinger chronicled in his new , outstanding book.  Two calls during the final days of the Vietnam War in 1972 - 1973. https://youtu.be/lGSEqGDNjfI.   Principles by Ray Dalio is the source of the two current interviews with Henry Kissinger and Ray Dalio from YouTube Questions or comments at , Randalrgw1@aol.com , https://twitter.com/randal_wallace , and http://www.randalwallace.com/Please Leave us a review at wherever you get your podcastsThanks for listening!!

Parasites are known contributors to human disease and suffering, spanning a wide range of organisms. Dr. Jessie Kissinger from the University of Georgia has spent the last two decades curating genomic data from hundreds of parasites, their vectors and hosts. The information helps researchers generate hypotheses about parasites, and presents a fertile resources for comparing genomes and understanding similarities and differences across this diverse set of organisms. VEuPathDB.org  (Vector and Eukaryotic Pathogens Resource Center)ClinEpiDB.org (Clinical and Epidemiological resource with DIY analyses and many BGMF studies) @jcklab   (Dr. Kissinger twitter)mango.ctegd.uga.edu  (lab website)