Podcasts about szilard

Szilard confronts Maiza and the duel on the train continues as we're reaching the ending of Baccano. We talk about: Jurassic World Evolution 2, Clair Obscur, MGS5, Louis Theroux, Clusterfuck, KH1 Has Destroyed Ashley, MMOLB, Baseball Names, Blue Prince, Firo Is Not The Main Character, We Can't Pronounce Szilard, Too Dumb, Is Crystal The Rail Tracer, Splot'd, Immortal Torture Strats,

In prior episodes, I have interviewed many people about the history of physics and physics-adjacent topics such as nuclear disarmament. Many of the physicists we have discussed also made forays into biology. Today I explore this transition of physicists working in biology with William Lanouette. Bill is a writer and public policy analyst who has specialized in the history of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons.

During a desert thunderstorm outside Tucson, Lydia Millet joined the Novel Dialogue conversation with hosts John Plotz and Emily Hyde, with Emily playing the role of critic. Lydia—author more than a dozen novels and story collections and recently the nonfictional We Loved it All (Norton, 2024)—also works at the Center for Biological Diversity. Wild creatures gambol, flap, swim, and crawl their way through her writing and her conversation: we begin in the Garden of Eden but quickly learn that for Lydia human exceptionalism is the original sin, one that continues to bedevil us in “the nuclear era” (or did she say error?). As thunder cracks overhead, she muses on salvation in an exhausted world and the busy lives of Gambel's Quail. In her recent novels, Lydia has worked to balance the intensely personal with our more communal aspirations: without gossip, she wonders, how do you avoid polemic and the maudlin? Emily praises Lydia's humor and asks us to consider how a joke—the earnest set-up followed by a sudden deflation—can reconcile our fears and hopes for the future, the daily here-and-now with the magnificent unknowability of the world. Is it humor, comedy, satire, wit? Lydia is “just trying make myself laugh.” She worries, in her life as well as in her writing, about the BS impulse to pretend everything's ok inside “this emergency, this critical life support dilemma.” We also learn that Lydia will never write historical fiction, despite having a tantalizing family connection to Mark Twain. Mentions: Lydia Millet, We Loved it All (2024), A Children's Bible (2020), Mermaids in Paradise (2014), Oh Pure and Radiant Heart (2005) Center for Biological Diversity Gambel's quail Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard: the three nuclear scientists who vanish from 1945 only to appear in 2003 in Millet's novel Oh Pure and Radiant Heart Rachel Carson Elizabeth Kolbert Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) Oscar Wilde Mark Twain Francis Millet and Archibald Butts Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

During a desert thunderstorm outside Tucson, Lydia Millet joined the Novel Dialogue conversation with hosts John Plotz and Emily Hyde, with Emily playing the role of critic. Lydia—author more than a dozen novels and story collections and recently the nonfictional We Loved it All (Norton, 2024)—also works at the Center for Biological Diversity. Wild creatures gambol, flap, swim, and crawl their way through her writing and her conversation: we begin in the Garden of Eden but quickly learn that for Lydia human exceptionalism is the original sin, one that continues to bedevil us in “the nuclear era” (or did she say error?). As thunder cracks overhead, she muses on salvation in an exhausted world and the busy lives of Gambel's Quail. In her recent novels, Lydia has worked to balance the intensely personal with our more communal aspirations: without gossip, she wonders, how do you avoid polemic and the maudlin? Emily praises Lydia's humor and asks us to consider how a joke—the earnest set-up followed by a sudden deflation—can reconcile our fears and hopes for the future, the daily here-and-now with the magnificent unknowability of the world. Is it humor, comedy, satire, wit? Lydia is “just trying make myself laugh.” She worries, in her life as well as in her writing, about the BS impulse to pretend everything's ok inside “this emergency, this critical life support dilemma.” We also learn that Lydia will never write historical fiction, despite having a tantalizing family connection to Mark Twain. Mentions: Lydia Millet, We Loved it All (2024), A Children's Bible (2020), Mermaids in Paradise (2014), Oh Pure and Radiant Heart (2005) Center for Biological Diversity Gambel's quail Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard: the three nuclear scientists who vanish from 1945 only to appear in 2003 in Millet's novel Oh Pure and Radiant Heart Rachel Carson Elizabeth Kolbert Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) Oscar Wilde Mark Twain Francis Millet and Archibald Butts Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/literary-studies

La costruzione della Bomba Atomica fu un processo rapido che utilizzò tutta una serie di scoperte scientifiche. Andiamo a vedere come si arrivò alla costruzione del più potente ordigno che l'umanità avesse mai visto.Per sostenerci: https://associazioneatelier.it/Per contatti: associazioneatelier@gmail.comBrani citati:Alla fiera dell'est (A. Branduardi)

Nel 1983 l'umanità rischiò l'estinzione. Come si arrivò a quel punto? E chi ci salvò?Per sostenerci: https://associazioneatelier.it/Per contatti: associazioneatelier@gmail.comCanzoni accennate in questo podcast:La bomba (D. Silvestri)

Things happen. Or they don't. How then should we make sense of claims that something might happen?If all these claims do is express doubt, then the puzzle can be easily resolved. But if the claims capture some objective feature of the world, what is it?Our guest is Alastair Wilson, a professor of philosophy at the University of Leeds. He takes chance seriously, in particular, he is a realist about our modal claims (claims like “either candidate could win” or “if Szilard hadn't got Spanish flu, the atom bomb would not have been invented”) may be true or false, not just opinions or expressions of ignorance.Alastair does this by connecting our modal talk to Everettian quantum mechanics. He argues that modal claims are assertions about the many worlds within the universal wavefunction. If in all worlds where Szilard did not succumb to Spanish flu, the atom bomb was never invented, then this claim would be true.It is a bold and fascinating way of bringing physics and metaphysics together. What can happen, what is possible, what could have been? These become questions for natural science. Alastair's website Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Questionable Narratives of "Situational Awareness", published by fergusq on June 17, 2024 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Introduction This is a response to the Situational Awareness essay series by Leopold Aschenbrenner. As a disclaimer, I am an AI pessimist, meaning that I don't believe there is evidence for AGI appearing any time soon. I do also believe that even if you are an AI optimist, you should view Aschenbrenner's text critically, as it contains numerous flawed arguments and questionable narratives, which I will go through in this post. The text has numerous dubious technical claims and flawed arguments, including misleading statements regarding RLHF[1], uncited claims of human intelligence[2], use of made-up units such as OOM[3] without any serious technical argumentation, use of made-up charts that extrapolate these made-up units, claims that current models could be "unhobbled"[4], and baseless claims such as that current AI is at the level of a preschooler or a high school student[5]. I have given some thoughts on these in the footnotes, although I don't consider myself the best person to criticize them. Instead, I will be focusing more on the narrative structure of the text, which I think is more important than the technical part. After reading this text, it gave me heavy propaganda-vibes, as if it were a political piece that tries to construct a narrative that aims to support certain political goals. Its technical argumentation is secondary to creating a compelling narrative (or a group of narratives). I will first go through the two most problematic narratives, the conspiracy-esque and US-centric narratives. Then, I will talk a bit about the technological narrative, which is the main narrative of the text. I stress that I don't necessarily believe that there is any malign intent behind these narratives, or that Aschenbrenner is trying to intentionally mislead people with them. However, I believe they should be pointed out, as I think these narratives are harmful to the AI safety community. The concepts of AGI and intelligence explosion are outlandish and suspicious to people not accepting them. Using narratives often utilized by bad-faith actors makes it easier for readers to just discard what is being said. Conspiracy narratives The text opens with a description of how the writer is part of a very small group of enlightened people who have learned the truth: Before long, the world will wake up. But right now, there are perhaps a few hundred people, most of them in San Francisco and the AI labs, that have situational awareness. Through whatever peculiar forces of fate, I have found myself amongst them. [...] Perhaps they will be an odd footnote in history, or perhaps they will go down in history like Szilard and Oppenheimer and Teller. If they are seeing the future even close to correctly, we are in for a wild ride. This invokes a conspiracy theory narrative that the world is "asleep" and must "wake up", and only a small group of conspirators and enlightened individuals know what is really going on. This is then compared to real-life "conspiracies" such as the Manhattan project to draw credibility for such narratives while ignoring the clear differences to them, such that the Manhattan project was a highly-organized goal-directed attempt to construct a weapon, which is not remotely similar to the decentralized actors currently developing AI systems. Later in the text, a hypothetical "AGI Manhattan Project" is described, further trying to frame the current AI discussion as being similar to the discussion that happened the couple of years before the Manhattan project in real life. Again, this ignores the fact that AI is being researched by thousands of people across the world, both in universities and in companies, and it has clear commercial value, wh...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: [Linkpost] Situational Awareness - The Decade Ahead, published by MathiasKB on June 5, 2024 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Leopold Aschenbrenner's newest series on Artificial Intelligence is really excellent. The series makes very strong claims, but I'm finding them to be well-argued with clear predictions. Curious to hear what people on this forum think. The series' introduction: You can see the future first in San Francisco. Over the past year, the talk of the town has shifted from $10 billion compute clusters to $100 billion clusters to trillion-dollar clusters. Every six months another zero is added to the boardroom plans. Behind the scenes, there's a fierce scramble to secure every power contract still available for the rest of the decade, every voltage transformer that can possibly be procured. American big business is gearing up to pour trillions of dollars into a long-unseen mobilization of American industrial might. By the end of the decade, American electricity production will have grown tens of percent; from the shale fields of Pennsylvania to the solar farms of Nevada, hundreds of millions of GPUs will hum. The AGI race has begun. We are building machines that can think and reason. By 2025/26, these machines will outpace many college graduates. By the end of the decade, they will be smarter than you or I; we will have superintelligence, in the true sense of the word. Along the way, national security forces not seen in half a century will be unleashed, and before long, The Project will be on. If we're lucky, we'll be in an all-out race with the CCP; if we're unlucky, an all-out war. Everyone is now talking about AI, but few have the faintest glimmer of what is about to hit them. Nvidia analysts still think 2024 might be close to the peak. Mainstream pundits are stuck on the willful blindness of "it's just predicting the next word". They see only hype and business-as-usual; at most they entertain another internet-scale technological change. Before long, the world will wake up. But right now, there are perhaps a few hundred people, most of them in San Francisco and the AI labs, that have situational awareness. Through whatever peculiar forces of fate, I have found myself amongst them. A few years ago, these people were derided as crazy - but they trusted the trendlines, which allowed them to correctly predict the AI advances of the past few years. Whether these people are also right about the next few years remains to be seen. But these are very smart people - the smartest people I have ever met - and they are the ones building this technology. Perhaps they will be an odd footnote in history, or perhaps they will go down in history like Szilard and Oppenheimer and Teller. If they are seeing the future even close to correctly, we are in for a wild ride. Let me tell you what we see. Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org

In episode 77, I interviewed William Lanouette about Leo Szilard's work on the atom bomb, with a discussion of the roles that Szilard played until the end of World War II. Today, in part two of my interview with Bill, we focus on Szilard's achievements after the war. Bill is a writer and public policy analyst who has specialized in the history of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. He received an A.B. in English with a minor in Philosophy at Fordham College in 1963, and M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science at the London School of Economics and the University of London in 1966 and 1973, respectively. Bill then worked as a journalist for Newsweek, The National Observer, and National Journal, and he was the Washington Correspondent for The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He has also written for The Atlantic, The Economist, Scientific American, The New York Herald Tribune, The Washington Post, and many other outlets. Bill also worked as a Senior Analyst for Energy and Science Issues at the US Government Accountability Office. Bill's first book was Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard, the Man Behind the Bomb, published by Scribner's in 1992, with later editions published by the University of Chicago Press and Skyhorse Publications. Bill also published, in 2021, The Triumph of the Amateurs: The Rise, Ruin, and Banishment of Professional Rowing in The Gilded Age.

Perhaps the most overlooked scientist who played critical roles in the development of the atomic bomb was Leo Szilard. With us to explore Szilard's numerous contributions to science and society is William Lanouette. Bill is a writer and public policy analyst who has specialized in the history of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. He received an A.B. in English with a minor in Philosophy at Fordham College in 1963, and M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science at the London School of Economics and the University of London in 1966 and 1973, respectively. Bill then worked as a journalist for Newsweek, The National Observer, and National Journal, and he was the Washington Correspondent for The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He has also written for The Atlantic, The Economist, Scientific American, The New York Herald Tribune, The Washington Post, and many other outlets. Bill also worked as a Senior Analyst for Energy and Science Issues at the US Government Accountability Office. Bill's first book was Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard, the Man Behind the Bomb, published by Scribner's in 1992, with later editions published by the University of Chicago Press and Skyhorse Publications. Bill also published, in 2021, The Triumph of the Amateurs: The Rise, Ruin, and Banishment of Professional Rowing in The Gilded Age. In this episode, we discuss all things Szilard: the man, the war, the bomb, the innovations, the collaborations, the accusations of espionage, the conflicts, and even the Martians.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Reflections on "Making the Atomic Bomb", published by boazbarak on August 17, 2023 on LessWrong. [Cross posted on windowsontheory; see here for my prior writings] [it appears almost certain that in the immediate future, it would be] possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium by which vast amounts of power and large quantities of new radium-like elements would be generated.- Letter from Albert Einstein (prepared by Leo Szilard) to F.D. Roosevelt, August 1939 Do you know, Josef Vassarionovich, what main argument has been advanced against uranium? "It would be too good if the problem could be solved. Nature seldom proves favorable to man." - Letter from Georgi Flerov to Joseph Stalin, April 1942. I've heard great things about Richard Rhodes' "The Making of the Atomic Bomb." Finally, on vacation, I managed to read it. (Pro-tip: buy the Kindle version - the hard copy is far too big to lug around.) It's as great as people say. Can't recommend it enough. I can't remember when, if ever, I've read a book that combines so well popular science and history. Indeed, the Atomic bomb is the one setting where the precise details of the smallest particles have profoundly impacted human history. Here are some quick thoughts after reading the book. (Warning: spoilers below for people who don't know how WWII ended.) The level of investment in the Manhattan Project was truly staggering. I knew it but didn't fully grasp this. This is not just the numbers ($2B, which was almost 1 percent of GDP at the time) but also the project's sheer size, employing more than 100,000 people, and the massive construction of buildings, factories, and roads at multiple sites. As just one example, when they didn't have enough copper, the treasury department lent the project 15,000 tons of silver to be used in the electromagnetic separation plant (to be later melted and returned after the war). Much of this cost was due to the compressed schedule. The staggering cost was mainly due to the need to get the bomb done in time to use in the war. Time and again, whenever the project faced a choice between approaches A, B, or C, they chose to pursue all three in parallel, so if two failed, they could still go ahead. Whenever there was a choice between saving money or time, they opted for the latter. The fact that the cost was primarily due to time is also evidenced by the fact that, following the war, many countries could set up their own atomic bomb programs or reach the threshold of doing so at a much lower cost. This seems to be a general principle in technological innovation: the cost of achieving a new advance decreases exponentially in time. Thus, achieving X transitions over time from being impossible to being inevitable. This is related to Bill Gates' famous quote that in technology, we tend to overestimate progress in two years and underestimate progress in ten years. The Manhattan Project was trying to achieve the Atomic bomb just at the cusp of it being possible. The project got going when General Groves was appointed (September 1942), and it took a little less than three years until the successful test (July 1945). Of course, they could have started much earlier: Einstein and Szilard sent their famous letter to Roosevelt in August 1939. The "impossible vs. inevitable" phenomenon is manifested in another way. The U.S. drastically underestimated how long it would take for the Soviet Union to achieve the bomb (even considering the Soviet advantages due to spying, which the Americans should at least have partially anticipated as well). The government fully trusted the scientists on the science. The project was authorized primarily based on pen and paper calculations. At the time the project was approved, no chain reaction had been demonstrated, and the total quantity of Uranium 23...

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Reflections on "Making the Atomic Bomb", published by boazbarak on August 17, 2023 on LessWrong. [Cross posted on windowsontheory; see here for my prior writings] [it appears almost certain that in the immediate future, it would be] possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium by which vast amounts of power and large quantities of new radium-like elements would be generated.- Letter from Albert Einstein (prepared by Leo Szilard) to F.D. Roosevelt, August 1939 Do you know, Josef Vassarionovich, what main argument has been advanced against uranium? "It would be too good if the problem could be solved. Nature seldom proves favorable to man." - Letter from Georgi Flerov to Joseph Stalin, April 1942. I've heard great things about Richard Rhodes' "The Making of the Atomic Bomb." Finally, on vacation, I managed to read it. (Pro-tip: buy the Kindle version - the hard copy is far too big to lug around.) It's as great as people say. Can't recommend it enough. I can't remember when, if ever, I've read a book that combines so well popular science and history. Indeed, the Atomic bomb is the one setting where the precise details of the smallest particles have profoundly impacted human history. Here are some quick thoughts after reading the book. (Warning: spoilers below for people who don't know how WWII ended.) The level of investment in the Manhattan Project was truly staggering. I knew it but didn't fully grasp this. This is not just the numbers ($2B, which was almost 1 percent of GDP at the time) but also the project's sheer size, employing more than 100,000 people, and the massive construction of buildings, factories, and roads at multiple sites. As just one example, when they didn't have enough copper, the treasury department lent the project 15,000 tons of silver to be used in the electromagnetic separation plant (to be later melted and returned after the war). Much of this cost was due to the compressed schedule. The staggering cost was mainly due to the need to get the bomb done in time to use in the war. Time and again, whenever the project faced a choice between approaches A, B, or C, they chose to pursue all three in parallel, so if two failed, they could still go ahead. Whenever there was a choice between saving money or time, they opted for the latter. The fact that the cost was primarily due to time is also evidenced by the fact that, following the war, many countries could set up their own atomic bomb programs or reach the threshold of doing so at a much lower cost. This seems to be a general principle in technological innovation: the cost of achieving a new advance decreases exponentially in time. Thus, achieving X transitions over time from being impossible to being inevitable. This is related to Bill Gates' famous quote that in technology, we tend to overestimate progress in two years and underestimate progress in ten years. The Manhattan Project was trying to achieve the Atomic bomb just at the cusp of it being possible. The project got going when General Groves was appointed (September 1942), and it took a little less than three years until the successful test (July 1945). Of course, they could have started much earlier: Einstein and Szilard sent their famous letter to Roosevelt in August 1939. The "impossible vs. inevitable" phenomenon is manifested in another way. The U.S. drastically underestimated how long it would take for the Soviet Union to achieve the bomb (even considering the Soviet advantages due to spying, which the Americans should at least have partially anticipated as well). The government fully trusted the scientists on the science. The project was authorized primarily based on pen and paper calculations. At the time the project was approved, no chain reaction had been demonstrated, and the total quantity of Uranium 23...

https://www.learninglanguageswithtexts.com/post/das-manhattan-projekt-a2 Transkript: Das Manhattan-Projekt war ein großes Forschungsprojekt während des Zweiten Weltkrieges mit dem Ziel, eine Atombombe zu bauen. Auslöser war die Befürchtung, dass Deutschland bereits an einer solchen Bombe arbeitete. Unter der Leitung von General Groves und dem Physiker Oppenheimer wurde es zu einem der größten Geheimprojekte. Vorgeschichte: Schon vor dem Krieg hatte Einstein den US-Präsidenten Roosevelt auf die Gefahren der Atombombe aufmerksam gemacht. Daraufhin wurde das Uranium Committee gegründet, das die Möglichkeiten einer Atombombe untersuchte. Manhattan Projekt: Als die USA in den Krieg eintraten, wurde aus dem Uranium Committee das Manhattan Projekt unter General Groves. Es war nach dem Hauptquartier in Manhattan benannt und hatte zum Ziel, eine mächtige Bombe zu bauen. Wissenschaft: Die Entwicklung der Bombe erforderte große Fortschritte in der Kernphysik. Bedeutende Wissenschaftler wie Fermi und Szilard trugen dazu bei. 1942 wurde der erste Kernreaktor, Chicago Pile-1, in Betrieb genommen. Produktion: Neben der Forschung war die Materialproduktion eine große Herausforderung. Anlagen wurden gebaut, um genügend spaltbares Material herzustellen. Los Alamos: Hier entstand das Forschungszentrum für den Bau der Bombe. Unter der Leitung von Oppenheimer arbeiteten viele Spitzenwissenschaftler daran. Erster Test: 1945 wurde die erste Atombombe getestet, kurz darauf fielen Bomben auf Hiroshima und Nagasaki, was zum Ende des Krieges beitrug, aber viele Menschenleben kostete. Folgen: Das Projekt markierte den Beginn des Atomzeitalters. Es hatte weitreichende Folgen, von der Gründung der Internationalen Atomenergie-Organisation bis hin zu weltweiten Debatten über Atomwaffen. Vermächtnis: Das Manhattan-Projekt demonstrierte die Kraft der Kernenergie, löste aber auch Besorgnis über die Verbreitung von Atomwaffen aus. Fazit: Das Manhattan-Projekt war wichtig für das Ende des Krieges und markierte den Beginn einer neuen Ära. Es zeigt, wie Wissenschaft die Welt beeinflusst, hat aber auch kontroverse Folgen.

It's July 20th. This day in 1945, a petition signed by 70 scientists working on the development of nuclear weapons is circulating in Washington — a petition arguing against the plans to drop weapons on Japan. Jody, Niki, and Kellie discuss the Szilard Petition, how it reflected the deep moral wrestling taking place among the scientific community, and why it ultimately did not make it to President Truman's desk. Sign up for our newsletter! We'll be sending out links to all the stuff we recommended later this week. Find out more at thisdaypod.com This Day In Esoteric Political History is a proud member of Radiotopia from PRX. Your support helps foster independent, artist-owned podcasts and award-winning stories. If you want to support the show directly, you can do so on our website: ThisDayPod.com Get in touch if you have any ideas for future topics, or just want to say hello. Our website is thisdaypod.com Follow us on social @thisdaypod Our team: Jacob Feldman, Researcher/Producer; Brittani Brown, Producer; Khawla Nakua, Transcripts; music by Teen Daze and Blue Dot Sessions; Audrey Mardavich is our Executive Producer at Radiotopia

It was a tremendous honor & pleasure to interview Richard Rhodes, Pulitzer Prize winning author of The Making of the Atomic BombWe discuss* similarities between AI progress & Manhattan Project (developing a powerful, unprecedented, & potentially apocalyptic technology within an uncertain arms-race situation)* visiting starving former Soviet scientists during fall of Soviet Union* whether Oppenheimer was a spy, & consulting on the Nolan movie* living through WW2 as a child* odds of nuclear war in Ukraine, Taiwan, Pakistan, & North Korea* how the US pulled of such a massive secret wartime scientific & industrial projectWatch on YouTube. Listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or any other podcast platform. Read the full transcript here. Follow me on Twitter for updates on future episodes.Timestamps(0:00:00) - Oppenheimer movie(0:06:22) - Was the bomb inevitable?(0:29:10) - Firebombing vs nuclear vs hydrogen bombs(0:49:44) - Stalin & the Soviet program(1:08:24) - Deterrence, disarmament, North Korea, Taiwan(1:33:12) - Oppenheimer as lab director(1:53:40) - AI progress vs Manhattan Project(1:59:50) - Living through WW2(2:16:45) - Secrecy(2:26:34) - Wisdom & warTranscript(0:00:00) - Oppenheimer movieDwarkesh Patel 0:00:51Today I have the great honor of interviewing Richard Rhodes, who is the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb, and most recently, the author of Energy, A Human History. I'm really excited about this one. Let's jump in at a current event, which is the fact that there's a new movie about Oppenheimer coming out, which I understand you've been consulted about. What did you think of the trailer? What are your impressions? Richard Rhodes 0:01:22They've really done a good job of things like the Trinity test device, which was the sphere covered with cables of various kinds. I had watched Peaky Blinders, where the actor who's playing Oppenheimer also appeared, and he looked so much like Oppenheimer to start with. Oppenheimer was about six feet tall, he was rail thin, not simply in terms of weight, but in terms of structure. Someone said he could sit in a children's high chair comfortably. But he never weighed more than about 140 pounds and that quality is there in the actor. So who knows? It all depends on how the director decided to tell the story. There are so many aspects of the story that you could never possibly squeeze them into one 2-hour movie. I think that we're waiting for the multi-part series that would really tell a lot more of the story, if not the whole story. But it looks exciting. We'll see. There have been some terrible depictions of Oppenheimer, there've been some terrible depictions of the bomb program. And maybe they'll get this one right. Dwarkesh Patel 0:02:42Yeah, hopefully. It is always great when you get an actor who resembles their role so well. For example, Bryan Cranston who played LBJ, and they have the same physical characteristics of the beady eyes, the big ears. Since we're talking about Oppenheimer, I had one question about him. I understand that there's evidence that's come out that he wasn't directly a communist spy. But is there any possibility that he was leaking information to the Soviets or in some way helping the Soviet program? He was a communist sympathizer, right? Richard Rhodes 0:03:15He had been during the 1930s. But less for the theory than for the practical business of helping Jews escape from Nazi Germany. One of the loves of his life, Jean Tatlock, was also busy working on extracting Jews from Europe during the 30. She was a member of the Communist Party and she, I think, encouraged him to come to meetings. But I don't think there's any possibility whatsoever that he shared information. In fact, he said he read Marx on a train trip between Berkeley and Washington one time and thought it was a bunch of hooey, just ridiculous. He was a very smart man, and he read the book with an eye to its logic, and he didn't think there was much there. He really didn't know anything about human beings and their struggles. He was born into considerable wealth. There were impressionist paintings all over his family apartments in New York City. His father had made a great deal of money cornering the markets on uniform linings for military uniforms during and before the First World War so there was a lot of wealth. I think his income during the war years and before was somewhere around $100,000 a month. And that's a lot of money in the 1930s. So he just lived in his head for most of his early years until he got to Berkeley and discovered that prime students of his were living on cans of god-awful cat food, because they couldn't afford anything else. And once he understood that there was great suffering in the world, he jumped in on it, as he always did when he became interested in something. So all of those things come together. His brother Frank was a member of the party, as was Frank's wife. I think the whole question of Oppenheimer lying to the security people during the Second World War about who approached him and who was trying to get him to sign on to some espionage was primarily an effort to cover up his brother's involvement. Not that his brothers gave away any secrets, I don't think they did. But if the army's security had really understood Frank Oppenheimer's involvement, he probably would have been shipped off to the Aleutians or some other distant place for the duration of the war. And Oppenheimer quite correctly wanted Frank around. He was someone he trusted.(0:06:22) - Was the bomb inevitable?Dwarkesh Patel 0:06:22Let's start talking about The Making of the Bomb. One question I have is — if World War II doesn't happen, is there any possibility that the bomb just never gets developed? Nobody bothers.Richard Rhodes 0:06:34That's really a good question and I've wondered over the years. But the more I look at the sequence of events, the more I think it would have been essentially inevitable, though perhaps not such an accelerated program. The bomb was pushed so hard during the Second World War because we thought the Germans had already started working on one. Nuclear fission had been discovered in Nazi Germany, in Berlin, in 1938, nine months before the beginning of the Second World War in Europe. Technological surveillance was not available during the war. The only way you could find out something was to send in a spy or have a mole or something human. And we didn't have that. So we didn't know where the Germans were, but we knew that the basic physics reaction that could lead to a bomb had been discovered there a year or more before anybody else in the West got started thinking about it. There was that most of all to push the urgency. In your hypothetical there would not have been that urgency. However, as soon as good physicists thought about the reaction that leads to nuclear fission — where a slow room temperature neutron, very little energy, bumps into the nucleus of a uranium-235 atom it would lead to a massive response. Isidore Rabi, one of the great physicists of this era, said it would have been like the moon struck the earth. The reaction was, as physicists say, fiercely exothermic. It puts out a lot more energy than you have to use to get it started. Once they did the numbers on that, and once they figured out how much uranium you would need to have in one place to make a bomb or to make fission get going, and once they were sure that there would be a chain reaction, meaning a couple of neutrons would come out of the reaction from one atom, and those two or three would go on and bump into other Uranium atoms, which would then fission them, and you'd get a geometric exponential. You'd get 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, and off of there. For most of our bombs today the initial fission, in 80 generations, leads to a city-busting explosion. And then they had to figure out how much material they would need, and that's something the Germans never really figured out, fortunately for the rest of us. They were still working on the idea that somehow a reactor would be what you would build. When Niels Bohr, the great Danish physicist, escaped from Denmark in 1943 and came to England and then United States, he brought with him a rough sketch that Werner Heisenberg, the leading scientist in the German program, had handed him in the course of trying to find out what Bohr knew about what America was doing. And he showed it to the guys at Los Alamos and Hans Bethe, one of the great Nobel laureate physicists in the group, said — “Are the Germans trying to throw a reactor down on us?” You can make a reactor blow up, we saw that at Chernobyl, but it's not a nuclear explosion on the scale that we're talking about with the bomb. So when a couple of these emigres Jewish physicists from Nazi Germany were whiling away their time in England after they escaped, because they were still technically enemy aliens and therefore could not be introduced to top secret discussions, one of them asked the other — “How much would we need of pure uranium-235, this rare isotope of uranium that chain reacts? How much would we need to make a bomb?” And they did the numbers and they came up with one pound, which was startling to them. Of course, it is more than that. It's about 125 pounds, but that's just a softball. That's not that much material. And then they did the numbers about what it would cost to build a factory to pull this one rare isotope of uranium out of the natural metal, which has several isotopes mixed together. And they figured it wouldn't cost more than it would cost to build a battleship, which is not that much money for a country at war. Certainly the British had plenty of battleships at that point in time. So they put all this together and they wrote a report which they handed through their superior physicists at Manchester University where they were based, who quickly realized how important this was. The United States lagged behind because we were not yet at war, but the British were. London was being bombed in the blitz. So they saw the urgency, first of all, of eating Germany to the punch, second of all of the possibility of building a bomb. In this report, these two scientists wrote that no physical structure came to their minds which could offer protection against a bomb of such ferocious explosive power. This report was from 1940 long before the Manhattan Project even got started. They said in this report, the only way we could think of to protect you against a bomb would be to have a bomb of similar destructive force that could be threatened for use if the other side attacked you. That's deterrence. That's a concept that was developed even before the war began in the United States. You put all those pieces together and you have a situation where you have to build a bomb because whoever builds the first bomb theoretically could prevent you from building more or prevent another country from building any and could dominate the world. And the notion of Adolf Hitler dominating the world, the Third Reich with nuclear weapons, was horrifying. Put all that together and the answer is every country that had the technological infrastructure to even remotely have the possibility of building everything you'd have to build to get the material for a bomb started work on thinking about it as soon as nuclear fusion was announced to the world. France, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, even Japan. So I think the bomb would have been developed but maybe not so quickly. Dwarkesh Patel 0:14:10In the book you talk that for some reason the Germans thought that the critical mass was something like 10 tons, they had done some miscalculation.Richard Rhodes 0:14:18A reactor. Dwarkesh Patel 0:14:19You also have some interesting stories in the book about how different countries found out the Americans were working on the bomb. For example, the Russians saw that all the top physicists, chemists, and metallurgists were no longer publishing. They had just gone offline and so they figured that something must be going on. I'm not sure if you're aware that while the subject of the Making of the Atomic Bomb in and of itself is incredibly fascinating, this book has become a cult classic in AI. Are you familiar with this? Richard Rhodes 0:14:52No. Dwarkesh Patel 0:14:53The people who are working on AI right now are huge fans of yours. They're the ones who initially recommended the book to me because the way they see the progress in the field reminded them of this book. Because you start off with these initial scientific hints. With deep learning, for example, here's something that can teach itself any function is similar to Szilárd noticing the nuclear chain reaction. In AI there's these scaling laws that say that if you make the model this much bigger, it gets much better at reasoning, at predicting text, and so on. And then you can extrapolate this curve. And you can see we get two more orders of magnitude, and we get to something that looks like human level intelligence. Anyway, a lot of the people who are working in AI have become huge fans of your book because of this reason. They see a lot of analogies in the next few years. They must be at page 400 in their minds of where the Manhattan Project was.Richard Rhodes 0:15:55We must later on talk about unintended consequences. I find the subject absolutely fascinating. I think my next book might be called Unintended Consequences. Dwarkesh Patel 0:16:10You mentioned that a big reason why many of the scientists wanted to work on the bomb, especially the Jewish emigres, was because they're worried about Hitler getting it first. As you mentioned at some point, 1943, 1944, it was becoming obvious that Hitler, the Nazis were not close to the bomb. And I believe that almost none of the scientists quit after they found out that the Nazis weren't close. So why didn't more of them say — “Oh, I guess we were wrong. The Nazis aren't going to get it. We don't need to be working on it.”?Richard Rhodes 0:16:45There was only one who did that, Joseph Rotblat. In May of 1945 when he heard that Germany had been defeated, he packed up and left. General Groves, the imperious Army Corps of Engineers General who ran the entire Manhattan Project, was really upset. He was afraid he'd spill the beans. So he threatened to have him arrested and put in jail. But Rotblat was quite determined not to stay any longer. He was not interested in building bombs to aggrandize the national power of the United States of America, which is perfectly understandable. But why was no one else? Let me tell it in terms of Victor Weisskopf. He was an Austrian theoretical physicist, who, like the others, escaped when the Nazis took over Germany and then Austria and ended up at Los Alamos. Weisskopf wrote later — “There we were in Los Alamos in the midst of the darkest part of our science.” They were working on a weapon of mass destruction, that's pretty dark. He said “Before it had almost seemed like a spiritual quest.” And it's really interesting how different physics was considered before and after the Second World War. Before the war, one of the physicists in America named Louis Alvarez told me when he got his PhD in physics at Berkeley in 1937 and went to cocktail parties, people would ask, “What's your degree in?” He would tell them “Chemistry.” I said, “Louis, why?” He said, “because I don't really have to explain what physics was.” That's how little known this kind of science was at that time. There were only about 1,000 physicists in the whole world in 1900. By the mid-30s, there were a lot more, of course. There'd been a lot of nuclear physics and other kinds of physics done by them. But it was still arcane. And they didn't feel as if they were doing anything mean or dirty or warlike at all. They were just doing pure science. Then nuclear fission came along. It was publicized worldwide. People who've been born since after the Second World War don't realize that it was not a secret at first. The news was published first in a German chemistry journal, Die Naturwissenschaften, and then in the British journal Nature and then in American journals. And there were headlines in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune, and all over the world. People had been reading about and thinking about how to get energy out of the atomic nucleus for a long time. It was clear there was a lot there. All you had to do was get a piece of radium and see that it glowed in the dark. This chunk of material just sat there, you didn't plug it into a wall. And if you held it in your hand, it would burn you. So where did that energy come from? The physicists realized it all came from the nucleus of the atom, which is a very small part of the whole thing. The nucleus is 1/100,000th the diameter of the whole atom. Someone in England described it as about the size of a fly in a cathedral. All of the energy that's involved in chemical reactions, comes from the electron cloud that's around the nucleus. But  it was clear that the nucleus was the center of powerful forces. But the question was, how do you get them out? The only way that the nucleus had been studied up to 1938 was by bombarding it with protons, which have the same electric charge as the nucleus, positive charge, which means they were repelled by it. So you had to accelerate them to high speeds with various versions of the big machines that we've all become aware of since then. The cyclotron most obviously built in the 30s, but there were others as well. And even then, at best, you could chip a little piece off. You could change an atom one step up or one step down the periodic table. This was the classic transmutation of medieval alchemy sure but it wasn't much, you didn't get much out. So everyone came to think of the nucleus of the atom like a little rock that you really had to hammer hard to get anything to happen with it because it was so small and dense. That's why nuclear fission, with this slow neutron drifting and then the whole thing just goes bang, was so startling to everybody. So startling that when it happened, most of the physicists who would later work on the bomb and others as well, realized that they had missed the reaction that was something they could have staged on a lab bench with the equipment on the shelf. Didn't have to invent anything new. And Louis Alvarez again, this physicist at Berkeley, he said — “I was getting my hair cut. When I read the newspaper, I pulled off the robe and half with my hair cut, ran to my lab, pulled some equipment off the shelf, set it up and there it was.” So he said, “I discovered nuclear fission, but it was two days too late.” And that happened all over. People were just hitting themselves on the head and saying, well, Niels Bohr said, “What fools we've all been.” So this is a good example of how in science, if your model you're working with is wrong it doesn't lead you down the right path. There was only one physicist who really was thinking the right way about the uranium atom and that was Niels Bohr. He wondered, sometime during the 30s, why uranium was the last natural element in the periodic table? What is different about the others that would come later? He visualized the nucleus as a liquid drop. I always like to visualize it as a water-filled balloon. It's wobbly, it's not very stable. The protons in the nucleus are held together by something called the strong force, but they still have the repellent positive electric charge that's trying to push them apart when you get enough of them into a nucleus. It's almost a standoff between the strong force and all the electrical charge. So it is like a wobbly balloon of water. And then you see why a neutron just falling into the nucleus would make it wobble around even more and in one of its configurations, it might take a dumbbell shape. And then you'd have basically two charged atoms just barely connected, trying to push each other apart. And often enough, they went the whole way. When they did that, these two new elements, half the weight of uranium, way down the periodic table, would reconfigure themselves into two separate nuclei. And in doing so, they would release some energy. And that was the energy that came out of the reaction and there was a lot of energy. So Bohr thought about the model in the right way. The chemists who actually discovered nuclear fusion didn't know what they were gonna get. They were just bombarding a solution of uranium nitrate with neutrons thinking, well, maybe we can make a new element, maybe a first man-made element will come out of our work. So when they analyzed the solution after they bombarded it, they found elements halfway down the periodic table. They shouldn't have been there. And they were totally baffled. What is this doing here? Do we contaminate our solution? No. They had been working with a physicist named Lisa Meitner who was a theoretical physicist, an Austrian Jew. She had gotten out of Nazi Germany not long before. But they were still in correspondence with her. So they wrote her a letter. I held that letter in my hand when I visited Berlin and I was in tears. You don't hold history of that scale in your hands very often. And it said in German — “We found this strange reaction in our solution. What are these elements doing there that don't belong there?” And she went for a walk in a little village in Western Sweden with her nephew, Otto Frisch, who was also a nuclear physicist. And they thought about it for a while and they remembered Bohr's model, the wobbly water-filled balloon. And they suddenly saw what could happen. And that's where the news came from, the physics news as opposed to the chemistry news from the guys in Germany that was published in all the Western journals and all the newspapers. And everybody had been talking about, for years, what you could do if you had that kind of energy. A glass of this material would drive the Queen Mary back and forth from New York to London 20 times and so forth, your automobile could run for months. People were thinking about what would be possible if you had that much available energy. And of course, people had thought about reactors. Robert Oppenheimer was a professor at Berkeley and within a week of the news reaching Berkeley, one of his students told me that he had a drawing on the blackboard, a rather bad drawing of both a reactor and a bomb. So again, because the energy was so great, the physics was pretty obvious. Whether it would actually happen depended on some other things like could you make it chain react? But fundamentally, the idea was all there at the very beginning and everybody jumped on it. Dwarkesh Patel 0:27:54The book is actually the best history of World War II I've ever read. It's about the atomic bomb, but it's interspersed with the events that are happening in World War II, which motivate the creation of the bomb or the release of it, why it had to be dropped on Japan given the Japanese response. The first third is about the scientific roots of the physics and it's also the best book I've read about the history of science in the early 20th century and the organization of it. There's some really interesting stuff in there. For example, there was a passage where you talk about how there's a real master apprentice model in early science where if you wanted to learn to do this kind of experimentation, you will go to Amsterdam where the master of it is residing. It's much more individual focused. Richard Rhodes 0:28:58Yeah, the whole European model of graduate study, which is basically the wandering scholar. You could go wherever you wanted to and sign up with whoever was willing to have you sign up. (0:29:10) - Firebombing vs nuclear vs hydrogen bombsDwarkesh Patel 0:29:10But the question I wanted to ask regarding the history you made of World War II in general is — there's one way you can think about the atom bomb which is that it is completely different from any sort of weaponry that has been developed before it. Another way you can think of it is there's a spectrum where on one end you have the thermonuclear bomb, in the middle you have the atom bomb, and on this end you have the firebombing of cities like Hamburg and Dresden and Tokyo. Do you think of these as completely different categories or does it seem like an escalating gradient to you? Richard Rhodes 0:29:47I think until you get to the hydrogen bomb, it's really an escalating gradient. The hydrogen bomb can be made arbitrarily large. The biggest one ever tested was 56 megatons of TNT equivalent. The Soviet tested that. That had a fireball more than five miles in diameter, just the fireball. So that's really an order of magnitude change. But the other one's no and in fact, I think one of the real problems, this has not been much discussed and it should be, when American officials went to Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the war, one of them said later — “I got on a plane in Tokyo. We flew down the long green archipelago of the Japanese home island. When I left Tokyo, it was all gray broken roof tiles from the fire bombing and the other bombings. And then all this greenery. And then when we flew over Hiroshima, it was just gray broken roof tiles again.” So the scale of the bombing with one bomb, in the case of Hiroshima, was not that different from the scale of the fire bombings that had preceded it with tens of thousands of bombs. The difference was it was just one plane. In fact, the people in Hiroshima didn't even bother to go into their bomb shelters because one plane had always just been a weather plane. Coming over to check the weather before the bombers took off. So they didn't see any reason to hide or protect themselves, which was one of the reasons so many people were killed. The guys at Los Alamos had planned on the Japanese being in their bomb shelters. They did everything they could think of to make the bomb as much like ordinary bombing as they could. And for example, it was exploded high enough above ground, roughly 1,800 yards, so that the fireball that would form from this really very small nuclear weapon — by modern standards — 15 kilotons of TNT equivalent, wouldn't touch the ground and stir up dirt and irradiate it and cause massive radioactive fallout. It never did that. They weren't sure there would be any fallout. They thought the plutonium and the bomb over Nagasaki now would just kind of turn into a gas and blow away. That's not exactly what happened. But people don't seem to realize, and it's never been emphasized enough, these first bombs, like all nuclear weapons, were firebombs. Their job was to start mass fires, just exactly like all the six-pound incendiaries that had been destroying every major city in Japan by then. Every major city above 50,000 population had already been burned out. The only reason Hiroshima and Nagasaki were around to be atomic bombed is because they'd been set aside from the target list, because General Groves wanted to know what the damage effects would be. The bomb that was tested in the desert didn't tell you anything. It killed a lot of rabbits, knocked down a lot of cactus, melted some sand, but you couldn't see its effect on buildings and on people. So the bomb was deliberately intended to be as much not like poison gas, for example, because we didn't want the reputation for being like people in the war in Europe during the First World War, where people were killing each other with horrible gasses. We just wanted people to think this was another bombing. So in that sense, it was. Of course, there was radioactivity. And of course, some people were killed by it. But they calculated that the people who would be killed by the irradiation, the neutron radiation from the original fireball, would be close enough to the epicenter of the explosion that they would be killed by the blast or the flash of light, which was 10,000 degrees. The world's worst sunburn. You've seen stories of people walking around with their skin hanging off their arms. I've had sunburns almost that bad, but not over my whole body, obviously, where the skin actually peeled blisters and peels off. That was a sunburn from a 10,000 degree artificial sun. Dwarkesh Patel 0:34:29So that's not the heat, that's just the light? Richard Rhodes 0:34:32Radiant light, radiant heat. 10,000 degrees. But the blast itself only extended out a certain distance, it was fire. And all the nuclear weapons that have ever been designed are basically firebombs. That's important because the military in the United States after the war was not able to figure out how to calculate the effects of this weapon in a reliable way that matched their previous experience. They would only calculate the blast effects of a nuclear weapon when they figured their targets. That's why we had what came to be called overkill. We wanted redundancy, of course, but 60 nuclear weapons on Moscow was way beyond what would be necessary to destroy even that big a city because they were only calculating the blast. But in fact, if you exploded a 300 kiloton nuclear warhead over the Pentagon at 3,000 feet, it would blast all the way out to the capital, which isn't all that far. But if you counted the fire, it would start a mass-fire and then it would reach all the way out to the Beltway and burn everything between the epicenter of the weapon and the Beltway. All organic matter would be totally burned out, leaving nothing but mineral matter, basically. Dwarkesh Patel 0:36:08I want to emphasize two things you said because they really hit me in reading the book and I'm not sure if the audience has fully integrated them. The first is, in the book, the military planners and Groves, they talk about needing to use the bomb sooner rather than later, because they were running out of cities in Japan where there are enough buildings left that it would be worth bombing in the first place, which is insane. An entire country is almost already destroyed from fire bombing alone. And the second thing about the category difference between thermonuclear and atomic bombs. Daniel Ellsberg, the nuclear planner who wrote the Doomsday machine, he talks about, people don't understand that the atom bomb that resulted in the pictures we see of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, that is simply the detonator of a modern nuclear bomb, which is an insane thing to think about. So for example, 10 and 15 kilotons is the Hiroshima Nagasaki and the Tsar Bomba, which was 50 megatons. So more than 1,000 times as much. And that wasn't even as big as they could make it. They kept the uranium tamper off, because they didn't want to destroy all of Siberia. So you could get more than 10,000 times as powerful. Richard Rhodes 0:37:31When Edward Teller, co-inventor of the hydrogen bomb and one of the dark forces in the story, was consulting with our military, just for his own sake, he sat down and calculated, how big could you make a hydrogen bomb? He came up with 1,000 megatons. And then he looked at the effects. 1,000 megatons would be a fireball 10 miles in diameter. And the atmosphere is only 10 miles deep. He figured that it would just be a waste of energy, because it would all blow out into space. Some of it would go laterally, of course, but most of it would just go out into space. So a bomb more than 100 megatons would just be totally a waste of time. Of course, a 100 megatons bomb is also a total waste, because there's no target on Earth big enough to justify that from a military point of view. Robert Oppenheimer, when he had his security clearance questioned and then lifted when he was being punished for having resisted the development of the hydrogen bomb, was asked by the interrogator at this security hearing — “Well, Dr. Oppenheimer, if you'd had a hydrogen bomb for Hiroshima, wouldn't you have used it?” And Oppenheimer said, “No.” The interrogator asked, “Why is that?” He said because the target was too small. I hope that scene is in the film, I'm sure it will be. So after the war, when our bomb planners and some of our scientists went into Hiroshima and Nagasaki, just about as soon as the surrender was signed, what they were interested in was the scale of destruction, of course. And those two cities didn't look that different from the other cities that had been firebombed with small incendiaries and ordinary high explosives. They went home to Washington, the policy makers, with the thought that — “Oh, these bombs are not so destructive after all.” They had been touted as city busters, basically, and they weren't. They didn't completely burn out cities. They were not certainly more destructive than the firebombing campaign, when everything of more than 50,000 population had already been destroyed. That, in turn, influenced the judgment about what we needed to do vis-a-vis the Soviet Union when the Soviets got the bomb in 1949. There was a general sense that, when you could fight a war with nuclear weapons, deterrence or not, you would need quite a few of them to do it right. And the Air Force, once it realized that it could aggrandize its own share of the federal budget by cornering the market and delivering nuclear weapons, very quickly decided that they would only look at the blast effect and not the fire effect. It's like tying one hand behind your back. Most of it was a fire effect. So that's where they came up with numbers like we need 60 of these to take out Moscow. And what the Air Force figured out by the late 1940s is that the more targets, the more bombs. The more bombs, the more planes. The more planes, the biggest share of the budget. So by the mid 1950s, the Air Force commanded 47% of the federal defense budget. And the other branches of services, which had not gone nuclear by then, woke up and said, we'd better find some use for these weapons in our branches of service. So the Army discovered that it needed nuclear weapons, tactical weapons for field use, fired out of cannons. There was even one that was fired out of a shoulder mounted rifle. There was a satchel charge that two men could carry, weighed about 150 pounds, that could be used to dig a ditch so that Soviet tanks couldn't cross into Germany. And of course the Navy by then had been working hard with General Rickover on building a nuclear submarine that could carry ballistic missiles underwater in total security. No way anybody could trace those submarines once they were quiet enough. And a nuclear reactor is very quiet. It just sits there with neutrons running around, making heat. So the other services jumped in and this famous triad, we must have these three different kinds of nuclear weapons, baloney. We would be perfectly safe if we only had our nuclear submarines. And only one or two of those. One nuclear submarine can take out all of Europe or all of the Soviet Union.Dwarkesh Patel 0:42:50Because it has multiple nukes on it? Richard Rhodes 0:42:53Because they have 16 intercontinental ballistic missiles with MIRV warheads, at least three per missile. Dwarkesh Patel 0:43:02Wow. I had a former guest, Richard Hanania, who has a book about foreign policy where he points out that our model of thinking about why countries do the things they do, especially in foreign affairs, is wrong because we think of them as individual rational actors, when in fact it's these competing factions within the government. And in fact, you see this especially in the case of Japan in World War II, there was a great book of Japan leading up to World War II, where they talk about how a branch of the Japanese military, I forget which, needed more oil to continue their campaign in Manchuria so they forced these other branches to escalate. But it's so interesting that the reason we have so many nukes is that the different branches are competing for funding. Richard Rhodes 0:43:50Douhet, the theorist of air power, had been in the trenches in the First World War. Somebody (John Masefield) called the trenches of the First World War, the long grave already dug, because millions of men were killed and the trenches never moved, a foot this way, a foot that way, all this horror. And Douhet came up with the idea that if you could fly over the battlefield to the homeland of the enemy and destroy his capacity to make war, then the people of that country, he theorized, would rise up in rebellion and throw out their leaders and sue for peace. And this became the dream of all the Air Forces of the world, but particularly ours. Until around 1943, it was called the US Army Air Force. The dream of every officer in the Air Force was to get out from under the Army, not just be something that delivers ground support or air support to the Army as it advances, but a power that could actually win wars. And the missing piece had always been the scale of the weaponry they carried. So when the bomb came along, you can see why Curtis LeMay, who ran the strategic air command during the prime years of that force, was pushing for bigger and bigger bombs. Because if a plane got shot down, but the one behind it had a hydrogen bomb, then it would be just almost as effective as the two planes together. So they wanted big bombs. And they went after Oppenheimer because he thought that was a terrible way to go, that there was really no military use for these huge weapons. Furthermore, the United States had more cities than Russia did, than the Soviet Union did. And we were making ourselves a better target by introducing a weapon that could destroy a whole state. I used to live in Connecticut and I saw a map that showed the air pollution that blew up from New York City to Boston. And I thought, well, now if that was fallout, we'd be dead up here in green, lovely Connecticut. That was the scale that it was going to be with these big new weapons. So on the one hand, you had some of the important leaders in the government thinking that these weapons were not the war-winning weapons that the Air Force wanted them and realized they could be. And on the other hand, you had the Air Force cornering the market on nuclear solutions to battles. All because some guy in a trench in World War I was sufficiently horrified and sufficiently theoretical about what was possible with air power. Remember, they were still flying biplanes. When H.G. Wells wrote his novel, The World Set Free in 1913, predicting an atomic war that would lead to world government, he had Air Forces delivering atomic bombs, but he forgot to update his planes. The guys in the back seat, the bombardiers, were sitting in a biplane, open cockpit. And when the pilots had dropped the bomb, they would reach down and pick up H.G. Wells' idea of an atomic bomb and throw it over the side. Which is kind of what was happening in Washington after the war. And it led us to a terribly misleading and unfortunate perspective on how many weapons we needed, which in turn fermented the arms race with the Soviets and just chased off. In the Soviet Union, they had a practical perspective on factories. Every factory was supposed to produce 120% of its target every year. That was considered good Soviet realism. And they did that with their nuclear war weapons. So by the height of the Cold War, they had 75,000 nuclear weapons, and nobody had heard yet of nuclear winter. So if both sides had set off this string of mass traps that we had in our arsenals, it would have been the end of the human world without question. Dwarkesh Patel 0:48:27It raises an interesting question, if the military planners thought that the conventional nuclear weapon was like the fire bombing, would it have been the case that if there wasn't a thermonuclear weapon, that there actually would have been a nuclear war by now because people wouldn't have been thinking of it as this hard red line? Richard Rhodes 0:48:47I don't think so because we're talking about one bomb versus 400, and one plane versus 400 planes and thousands of bombs. That scale was clear. Deterrence was the more important business. Everyone seemed to understand even the spies that the Soviets had connected up to were wholesaling information back to the Soviet Union. There's this comic moment when Truman is sitting with Joseph Stalin at Potsdam, and he tells Stalin, we have a powerful new weapon. And that's as much as he's ready to say about it. And Stalin licks at him and says, “Good, I hope you put it to good use with the Japanese.” Stalin knows exactly what he's talking about. He's seen the design of the fat man type Nagasaki plutonium bomb. He has held it in his hands because they had spies all over the place. (0:49:44) - Stalin & the Soviet programDwarkesh Patel 0:49:44How much longer would it have taken the Soviets to develop the bomb if they didn't have any spies? Richard Rhodes 0:49:49Probably not any longer. Dwarkesh Patel 0:49:51Really? Richard Rhodes 0:49:51When the Soviet Union collapsed in the winter of ‘92, I ran over there as quickly as I could get over there. In this limbo between forming a new kind of government and some of the countries pulling out and becoming independent and so forth, their nuclear scientists, the ones who'd worked on their bombs were free to talk. And I found that out through Yelena Bonner, Andrei Sakharov's widow, who was connected to people I knew. And she said, yeah, come on over. Her secretary, Sasha, who was a geologist about 35 years old became my guide around the country. We went to various apartments. They were retired guys from the bomb program and were living on, as far as I could tell, sac-and-potatoes and some salt. They had government pensions and the money was worth a salt, all of a sudden. I was buying photographs from them, partly because I needed the photographs and partly because 20 bucks was two months' income at that point. So it was easy for me and it helped them. They had first class physicists in the Soviet Union, they do in Russian today. They told me that by 1947, they had a design for a bomb that they said was half the weight and twice the yield of the Fat Man bomb. The Fat Man bomb was the plutonium implosion, right? And it weighed about 9,000 pounds. They had a much smaller and much more deliverable bomb with a yield of about 44 kilotons. Dwarkesh Patel 0:51:41Why was Soviet physics so good?Richard Rhodes 0:51:49The Russian mind? I don't know. They learned all their technology from the French in the 19th century, which is why there's so many French words in Russian. So they got good teachers, the French are superb technicians, they aren't so good at building things, but they're very good at designing things. There's something about Russia, I don't know if it's the language or the education. They do have good education, they did. But I remember asking them when they were working, I said — On the hydrogen bomb, you didn't have any computers yet. We only had really early primitive computers to do the complicated calculations of the hydrodynamics of that explosion. I said, “What did you do?” They said, “Oh, we just used nuclear. We just used theoretical physics.” Which is what we did at Los Alamos. We had guys come in who really knew their math and they would sit there and work it out by hand. And women with old Marchant calculators running numbers. So basically they were just good scientists and they had this new design. Kurchatov who ran the program took Lavrentiy Beria, who ran the NKVD who was put in charge of the program and said — “Look, we can build you a better bomb. You really wanna waste the time to make that much more uranium and plutonium?” And Beria said, “Comrade, I want the American bomb. Give me the American bomb or you and all your families will be camp dust.” I talked to one of the leading scientists in the group and he said, we valued our lives, we valued our families. So we gave them a copy of the plutonium implosion bomb. Dwarkesh Patel 0:53:37Now that you explain this, when the Soviet Union fell, why didn't North Korea, Iran or another country, send a few people to the fallen Soviet Union to recruit a few of the scientists to start their own program? Or buy off their stockpiles or something. Or did they?Richard Rhodes 0:53:59There was some effort by countries in the Middle East to get all the enriched uranium, which they wouldn't sell them. These were responsible scientists. They told me — we worked on the bomb because you had it and we didn't want there to be a monopoly on the part of any country in the world. So patriotically, even though Stalin was in charge of our country, he was a monster. We felt that it was our responsibility to work on these things, even Sakharov. There was a great rush at the end of the Second World War to get hold of German scientists. And about an equal number were grabbed by the Soviets. All of the leading German scientists, like Heisenberg and Hans and others, went west as fast as they could. They didn't want to be captured by the Soviets. But there were some who were. And they helped them work. People have the idea that Los Alamos was where the bomb happened. And it's true that at Los Alamos, we had the team that designed, developed, and built the first actual weapons. But the truth is, the important material for weapons is the uranium or plutonium. One of the scientists in the Manhattan Project told me years later, you can make a pretty high-level nuclear explosion just by taking two subcritical pieces of uranium, putting one on the floor and dropping the other by hand from a height of about six feet. If that's true, then all this business about secret designs and so forth is hogwash. What you really need for a weapon is the critical mass of highly enriched uranium, 90% of uranium-235. If you've got that, there are lots of different ways to make the bomb. We had two totally different ways that we used. The gun on the one hand for uranium, and then because plutonium was so reactive that if you fired up the barrel of a cannon at 3,000 feet per second, it would still melt down before the two pieces made it up. So for that reason, they had to invent an entirely new technology, which was an amazing piece of work. From the Soviet point of view, and I think this is something people don't know either, but it puts the Russian experience into a better context. All the way back in the 30s, since the beginning of the Soviet Union after the First World War, they had been sending over espionage agents connected up to Americans who were willing to work for them to collect industrial technology. They didn't have it when they began their country. It was very much an agricultural country. And in that regard, people still talk about all those damn spies stealing our secrets, we did the same thing with the British back in colonial days. We didn't know how to make a canal that wouldn't drain out through the soil. The British had a certain kind of clay that they would line their canals with, and there were canals all over England, even in the 18th century, that were impervious to the flow of water. And we brought a British engineer at great expense to teach us how to make the lining for the canals that opened up the Middle West and then the West. So they were doing the same thing. And one of those spies was a guy named Harry Gold, who was working all the time for them. He gave them some of the basic technology of Kodak filmmaking, for example. Harry Gold was the connection between David Greenglass and one of the American spies at Los Alamos and the Soviet Union. So it was not different. The model was — never give us something that someone dreamed of that hasn't been tested and you know works. So it would actually be blueprints for factories, not just a patent. And therefore when Beria after the war said, give us the bomb, he meant give me the American bomb because we know that works. I don't trust you guys. Who knows what you'll do. You're probably too stupid anyway. He was that kind of man. So for all of those reasons, they built the second bomb they tested was twice the yield and half the way to the first bomb. In other words, it was their new design. And so it was ours because the technology was something that we knew during the war, but it was too theoretical still to use. You just had to put the core and have a little air gap between the core and the explosives so that the blast wave would have a chance to accelerate through an open gap. And Alvarez couldn't tell me what it was but he said, you can get a lot more destructive force with a hammer if you hit something with it, rather than if you put the head on the hammer and push. And it took me several years before I figured out what he meant. I finally understood he was talking about what's called levitation.Dwarkesh Patel 0:59:41On the topic that the major difficulty in developing a bomb is either the refinement of uranium into U-235 or its transmutation into plutonium, I was actually talking to a physicist in preparation for this conversation. He explained the same thing that if you get two subcritical masses of uranium together, you wouldn't have the full bomb because it would start to tear itself apart without the tamper, but you would still have more than one megaton.Richard Rhodes 1:00:12It would be a few kilotons. Alvarez's model would be a few kilotons, but that's a lot. Dwarkesh Patel 1:00:20Yeah, sorry I meant kiloton. He claimed that one of the reasons why we talk so much about Los Alamos is that at the time the government didn't want other countries to know that if you refine uranium, you've got it. So they were like, oh, we did all this fancy physics work in Los Alamos that you're not gonna get to, so don't even worry about it. I don't know what you make of that theory. That basically it was sort of a way to convince people that Los Alamos was important. Richard Rhodes 1:00:49I think all the physics had been checked out by a lot of different countries by then. It was pretty clear to everybody what you needed to do to get to a bomb. That there was a fast fusion reaction, not a slow fusion reaction, like a reactor. They'd worked that out. So I don't think that's really the problem. But to this day, no one ever talks about the fact that the real problem isn't the design of the weapon. You could make one with wooden boxes if you wanted to. The problem is getting the material. And that's good because it's damned hard to make that stuff. And it's something you can protect. Dwarkesh Patel 1:01:30We also have gotten very lucky, if lucky is the word you want to use. I think you mentioned this in the book at some point, but the laws of physics could have been such that unrefined uranium ore was enough to build a nuclear weapon, right? In some sense, we got lucky that it takes a nation-state level actor to really refine and produce the raw substance. Richard Rhodes 1:01:56Yeah, I was thinking about that this morning on the way over. And all the uranium in the world would already have destroyed itself. Most people have never heard of the living reactors that developed on their own in a bed of uranium ore in Africa about two billion years ago, right? When there was more U-235 in a mass of uranium ore than there is today, because it decays like all radioactive elements. And the French discovered it when they were mining the ore and found this bed that had a totally different set of nuclear characteristics. They were like, what happened? But there were natural reactors in Gabon once upon a time. And they started up because some water, a moderator to make the neutrons slow down, washed its way down through a bed of much more highly enriched uranium ore than we still have today. Maybe 5-10% instead of 3.5 or 1.5, whatever it is now. And they ran for about 100,000 years and then shut themselves down because they had accumulated enough fusion products that the U-235 had been used up. Interestingly, this material never migrated out of the bed of ore. People today who are anti-nuclear say, well, what are we gonna do about the waste? Where are we gonna put all that waste? It's silly. Dwarkesh Patel 1:03:35Shove it in a hole. Richard Rhodes 1:03:36Yeah, basically. That's exactly what we're planning to do. Holes that are deep enough and in beds of material that will hold them long enough for everything to decay back to the original ore. It's not a big problem except politically because nobody wants it in their backyard.Dwarkesh Patel 1:03:53On the topic of the Soviets, one question I had while reading the book was — we negotiated with Stalin at Yalta and we surrendered a large part of Eastern Europe to him under his sphere of influence. And obviously we saw 50 years of immiseration there as a result. Given the fact that only we had the bomb, would it have been possible that we could have just knocked out the Soviet Union or at least prevented so much of the world from succumbing to communism in the aftermath of World War II? Is that a possibility? Richard Rhodes 1:04:30When we say we had the bomb, we had a few partly assembled handmade bombs. It took almost as long to assemble one as the battery life of the batteries that would drive the original charge that would set off the explosion. It was a big bluff. You know, when they closed Berlin in 1948 and we had to supply Berlin by air with coal and food for a whole winter, we moved some B-29s to England. The B-29 being the bomber that had carried the bombs. They were not outfitted for nuclear weapons. They didn't have the same kind of bomb-based structure. The weapons that were dropped in Japan had a single hook that held the entire bomb. So when the bay opened and the hook was released, the thing dropped. And that's very different from dropping whole rows of small bombs that you've seen in the photographs and the film footage. So it was a big bluff on our part. We took some time after the war inevitably to pull everything together. Here was a brand new technology. Here was a brand new weapon. Who was gonna be in charge of it? The military wanted control, Truman wasn't about to give the military control. He'd been an artillery officer in the First World War. He used to say — “No, damn artillery captain is gonna start World War III when I'm president.” I grew up in the same town he lived in so I know his accent. Independence, Missouri. Used to see him at his front steps taking pictures with tourists while he was still president. He used to step out on the porch and let the tourists take photographs. About a half a block from my Methodist church where I went to church. It was interesting. Interestingly, his wife was considered much more socially acceptable than he was. She was from an old family in independence, Missouri. And he was some farmer from way out in Grandview, Missouri, South of Kansas City. Values. Anyway, at the end of the war, there was a great rush from the Soviet side of what was already a zone. There was a Soviet zone, a French zone, British zone and an American zone. Germany was divided up into those zones to grab what's left of the uranium ore that the Germans had stockpiled. And there was evidence that there was a number of barrels of the stuff in a warehouse somewhere in the middle of all of this. And there's a very funny story about how the Russians ran in and grabbed off one site full of uranium ore, this yellow black stuff in what were basically wine barrels. And we at the same night, just before the wall came down between the zones, were running in from the other side, grabbing some other ore and then taking it back to our side. But there was also a good deal of requisitioning of German scientists. And the ones who had gotten away early came West, but there were others who didn't and ended up helping the Soviets. And they were told, look, you help us build the reactors and the uranium separation systems that we need. And we'll let you go home and back to your family, which they did. Early 50s by then, the German scientists who had helped the Russians went home. And I think our people stayed here and brought their families over, I don't know. (1:08:24) - Deterrence, disarmament, North Korea, TaiwanDwarkesh Patel 1:08:24Was there an opportunity after the end of World War II, before the Soviets developed the bomb, for the US to do something where either it somehow enforced a monopoly on having the bomb, or if that wasn't possible, make some sort of credible gesture that, we're eliminating this knowledge, you guys don't work on this, we're all just gonna step back from this. Richard Rhodes 1:08:50We tried both before the war. General Groves, who had the mistaken impression that there was a limited amount of high-grade uranium ore in the world, put together a company that tried to corner the market on all the available supply. For some reason, he didn't realize that a country the size of the Soviet Union is going to have some uranium ore somewhere. And of course it did, in Kazakhstan, rich uranium ore, enough for all the bombs they wanted to build. But he didn't know that, and I frankly don't know why he didn't know that, but I guess uranium's use before the Second World War was basically as a glazing agent for pottery, that famous yellow pottery and orange pottery that people owned in the 1930s, those colors came from uranium, and they're sufficiently radioactive, even to this day, that if you wave a Geiger counter over them, you get some clicks. In fact, there have been places where they've gone in with masks and suits on, grabbed the Mexican pottery and taken it out in a lead-lined case. People have been so worried about it but that was the only use for uranium, to make a particular kind of glass. So once it became clear that there was another use for uranium, a much more important one, Groves tried to corner the world market, and he thought he had. So that was one effort to limit what the Soviet Union could do. Another was to negotiate some kind of agreement between the parties. That was something that really never got off the ground, because the German Secretary of State was an old Southern politician and he didn't trust the Soviets. He went to the first meeting, in Geneva in ‘45 after the war was over, and strutted around and said, well, I got the bomb in my pocket, so let's sit down and talk here. And the Soviet basically said, screw you. We don't care. We're not worried about your bomb. Go home. So that didn't work. Then there was the effort to get the United Nations to start to develop some program of international control. And the program was proposed originally by a committee put together by our State Department that included Robert Oppenheimer, rightly so, because the other members of the committee were industrialists, engineers, government officials, people with various kinds of expertise around the very complicated problems of technology and the science and, of course, the politics, the diplomacy. In a couple of weeks, Oppenheimer taught them the basics of the nuclear physics involved and what he knew about bomb design, which was everything, actually, since he'd run Los Alamos. He was a scientist during the war. And they came up with a plan. People have scoffed ever since at what came to be called the Acheson-Lilienthal plan named after the State Department people. But it's the only plan I think anyone has ever devised that makes real sense as to how you could have international control without a world government. Every country would be open to inspection by any agency that was set up. And the inspections would not be at the convenience of the country. But whenever the inspectors felt they needed to inspect. So what Oppenheimer called an open world. And if you had that, and then if each country then developed its own nuclear industries, nuclear power, medical uses, whatever, then if one country tried clandestinely to begin to build bombs, you would know about it at the time of the next inspection. And then you could try diplomacy. If that didn't work, you could try conventional war. If that wasn't sufficient, then you could start building your bombs too. And at the end of this sequence, which would be long enough, assuming that there were no bombs existing in the world, and the ore was stored in a warehouse somewhere, six months maybe, maybe a year, it would be time for everyone to scale up to deterrence with weapons rather than deterrence without weapons, with only the knowledge. That to me is the answer to the whole thing. And it might have worked. But there were two big problems. One, no country is going to allow a monopoly on a nuclear weapon, at least no major power. So the Russians were not willing to sign on from the beginning. They just couldn't. How could they? We would not have. Two, Sherman assigned a kind of a loudmouth, a wise old Wall Street guy to present this program to the United Nations. And he sat down with Oppenheimer after he and his people had studied and said, where's your army? Somebody starts working on a bomb over there. You've got to go in and take that out, don't you? He said, what would happen if one country started building a bomb? Oppenheimer said, well, that would be an act of war. Meaning then the other countries could begin to escalate as they needed to to protect themselves against one power, trying to overwhelm the rest. Well, Bernard Baruch was the name of the man. He didn't get it. So when he presented his revised version of the Acheson–Lilienthal Plan, which was called the Baruch Plan to the United Nations, he included his army. And he insisted that the United States would not give up its nuclear monopoly until everyone else had signed on. So of course, who's going to sign on to that deal? Dwarkesh Patel 1:15:24I feel he has a point in the sense that — World War II took five years or more. If we find that the Soviets are starting to develop a bomb, it's not like within the six months or a year or whatever, it would take them to start refining the ore. And to the point we found out that they've been refining ore to when we start a war and engage in it, and doing all the diplomacy. By that point, they might already have the bomb. And so we're behind because we dismantled our weapons. We are only starting to develop our weapons once we've exhausted these other avenues. Richard Rhodes 1:16:00Not to develop. Presumably we would have developed. And everybody would have developed anyway. Another way to think of this is as delayed delivery times. Takes about 30 minutes to get an ICBM from Central Missouri to Moscow. That's the time window for doing anything other than starting a nuclear war. So take the warhead off those missiles and move it down the road 10 miles. So then it takes three hours. You've got to put the warhead back on the missiles. If the other side is willing to do this too. And you both can watch and see. We require openness. A word Bohr introduced to this whole thing. In order to make this happen, you can't have secrets. And of course, as time passed on, we developed elaborate surveillance from space, surveillance from planes, and so forth. It would not have worked in 1946 for sure. The surveillance wasn't there. But that system is in place today. The International Atomic Energy Agency has detected systems in air, in space, underwater. They can detect 50 pounds of dynamite exploded in England from Australia with the systems that we have in place. It's technical rather than human resources. But it's there. So it's theoretically possible today to get started on such a program. Except, of course, now, in like 1950, the world is awash in nuclear weapons. Despite the reductions that have occurred since the end of the Cold War, there's still 30,000-40,000 nuclear weapons in the world. Way too many. Dwarkesh Patel 1:18:01Yeah. That's really interesting. What percentage of warheads do you think are accounted for by this organization? If there's 30,000 warheads, what percentage are accounted for? Richard Rhodes 1:18:12All.Dwarkesh Patel 1:18:12Oh. Really?  North Korea doesn't have secrets? Richard Rhodes 1:18:13They're allowed to inspect anywhere without having to ask the government for permission. Dwarkesh Patel 1:18:18But presumably not North Korea or something, right? Richard Rhodes 1:18:21North Korea is an exception. But we keep pretty good track of North Korea needless to say. Dwarkesh Patel 1:18:27Are you surprised with how successful non-proliferation has been? The number of countries with nuclear weapons has not gone up for decades. Given the fact, as you were talking about earlier, it's simply a matter of refining or transmuting uranium. Is it surprising that there aren't more countries that have it?Richard Rhodes 1:18:42That's really an interesting part. Again, a part of the story that most people have never really heard. In the 50s, before the development and signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was 1968 and it took effect in 1970, a lot of countries that you would never have imagined were working on nuclear weapons. Sweden, Norway, Japan, South Korea. They had the technology. They just didn't have the materials. It was kind of dicey about what you should do. But I interviewed some of the Swedish scientists who worked on their bomb and they said, well, we were just talking about making some tactical

A Hungarian family who have been operating two successful businesses on the Kapiti Coast has had their residency application declined by Immigration New Zealand. The family now has 42 days to present their case to a tribunal to determine whether or not they can stay in the country. A petition launched to help the family stay in New Zealand has received overwhelming support with over 44,000 signatures. Szilard Laszlo, one of the family members affected, has described the approval process as a 'nightmare'. LISTEN ABOVESee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

When Leo Szilard conceived of the idea of a nuclear chain reaction in 1933 he immediately tried to suppress his own discovery culminating in 1945 with the Szilard petition which advocated a demonstration of the atomic bomb rather than its use in warfare. Szilard knew only too well the awesome destructive power of what he had discovered and knowing what we do about what happened next, what then should we make of the field of genetic engineering, a field of research that has instigated a self-imposed moratorium on four separate occasions in the last 50 years? Professor Matthew Cobb from the University of Manchester is author of 'The Genetic Age: Our Perilous Quest To Edit Life' - he joins Jonathan to discuss.

It's Episode 2 of Jet Fuel: The Jets Discord Podcast! This week, hosts Joe Rivera and Matt "King Sliz" Szilard discuss all things Jets early preseason, including Zach Wilson, preseason Game 1 vs. the Eagles, the upcoming matchup vs. the Falcons and much more!

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Are you really in a race? The Cautionary Tales of Szilárd and Ellsberg, published by HaydnBelfield on May 19, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. OR The Tragedy of the Einstein Letter and the Gaither Report; Cautionary Lessons from the Manhattan Project and the ‘Missile Gap'; Beware Assuming You're in an AI Race; The illusory Atomic Gap, the illusory Missile Gap and the AGI Gap Summary In both the 1940s and 1950s, well-meaning and good people – the brightest of their generation – were convinced they were in an existential race with an expansionary, totalitarian regime. Because of this belief, they advocated for and participated in a ‘sprint' race: the Manhattan Project to develop a US atomic bomb (1939-1945); and the ‘missile gap' project to build up a US ICBM capability (1957-1962). These were both based on a mistake, however - the Nazis decided against a Manhattan Project in 1942, and the Soviets decided against an ICBM build-up in 1958. The main consequence of both was to unilaterally speed up dangerous developments and increase existential risk. Key participants, such as Albert Einstein and Daniel Ellsberg, described their involvement as the greatest mistake of their life. Our current situation with AGI shares certain striking similarities and certain lessons suggest themselves: make sure you're actually in a race (information on whether you are is very valuable), be careful when secrecy is emphasised, and don't give up your power as an expert too easily. I briefly cover the two case studies, discuss the atmosphere at RAND, then draw the comparison with AGI and explain my three takeaways. This short piece is mainly based on Richard Rhodes' The Making of the Atomic Bomb and Daniel Ellsberg's The Doomsday Machine. It was inspired by a Slack discussion with Di Cooke. The ‘atomic gap', the Einstein-Szilárd Letter, and the Manhattan Project Here is a rough timeline of some key events around the Manhattan Project: 12 September 1933: Szilárd conceives the idea of a nuclear chain reaction, and keeps it a secret for the next six years. 2 August 1939: Einstein-Szilárd letter to Roosevelt advocates for setting up a Manhattan Project. 1 September 1939: Nazi invasion of Poland. 9 October 1941: Roosevelt approves the atomic program, subsequently Manhattan Project receives serious funding (eventually, 0.4% of GDP). June 1942: Hitler decides against an atomic program for practical reasons. December 1942: First chain reaction in Chicago. Szilard notes “I shook hands with Fermi and I said I thought this day would go down as a black day in the history of mankind.” 30 April 1945: Hitler kills himself. 7 May 1945: Nazi surrender. July 1945: Szilárd petition (signed by 70 scientists) calls for the bomb to be used only after Japan had refused to surrender, and for the decision to be made by Truman personally – and reiterated the original intention was to defend against the Nazis. 6 and 9 August 1945: The USA bombs Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 29 August 1949: First successful Soviet nuclear test. The Manhattan Project (and other US projects like the Apollo program) was a ‘sprint' project, in which the peak year funding reached 0.4% of GDP (Stine, 2009, see also Grace, 2015). Why did nuclear scientists like Szilárd, who kept the chain reaction secret and opposed nuclear weapons for decades after the war, advocate for and participate in the Manhattan Project? In Ellsberg's words: “How could he? The answer is he believed, even before others, that they were racing Hitler to the attainment of this power. It was German scientists, after all, who had first accomplished the fission of a heavy element. There seemed no reason to suppose that Germany could not stay ahead of any competitors in harnessing this unearthly energy to Hitler's unlimited ambitions for conquest. The specter of a possible Germ...

Faltando apenas um episódio para acabar a temporada, Baccano resolve muitos conflitos mas deixa outras pontas abertas. O que Szilard queria? Qual era a missão de Vino? Essas e outras perguntas ficam na nossa cabeça durante o episódio. Não deixe de seguir o Kanshow do Twitter e no Instagram!Gosta do nosso trabalho? Considere se tornar um apoiador!Capa por Sol Biegler.

A festa no Alveare vira um enterro! A aparição de Szilard deixa Maiza e Firo desconcertados. Enquanto isso no trem, Chane e Ladd lutam enquanto Vino se diverte com Czeslaw. E em 1932, os Gandor recebem uma visita inesperada. Não deixe de seguir o Kanshow no Twitter e no Instagram! Gosta do nosso trabalho? Considere se tornar um apoiador! Capa por Sol Biegler.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Precognition, published by jasoncrawford on the LessWrong. This is a linkpost for It's almost impossible to predict the future. But it's also unnecessary, because most people are living in the past. All you have to do is see the present before everyone else does. To be less pithy, but more clear: Most people are slow to notice and accept change. If you can just be faster than most people at seeing what's going on, updating your model of the world, and reacting accordingly, it's almost as good as seeing the future. We see this in the US with covid: The same people who didn't realize that we all should be wearing masks, when they were life-saving, are now slow to realize/admit that we can stop wearing them. For a dramatic historical example (from The Making of the Atomic Bomb), take Leo Szilard's observations of 1930s Germany: Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933. . In late March, Jewish judges and lawyers in Prussia and Bavaria were dismissed from practice. On the weekend of April 1, Julius Streicher directed a national boycott of Jewish businesses and Jews were beaten in the streets. “I took a train from Berlin to Vienna on a certain date, close to the first of April, 1933,” Szilard writes. “The train was empty. The same train the next day was overcrowded, was stopped at the frontier, the people had to get out, and everybody was interrogated by the Nazis. This just goes to show that if you want to succeed in this world you don't have to be much cleverer than other people, you just have to be one day earlier.” How to be earlier 1. Independent thinking. If you only believe things that are accepted by the majority of people, then by definition you'll always be behind the curve in a changing world. 2. Listen to other independent thinkers. You can't pay attention to everything at once or evaluate every area. You can only be the first to realize something in a narrow domain in which you are an expert. But if you tune your intellectual radar to other independent thinkers, you can be in the first ~1% of people to realize a new fact. Seek them out, find them, and follow them. I was taking covid precautions in late February 2020, about three weeks ahead of official “lockdown” measures—but only because I was tuned in to the people who were six weeks ahead. But: 3. Distinguish independent thinkers from crackpots. Both are “contrarian”; only one has any hope of being right. This is an art, honed over decades. Pay attention to both the source's evidence and their logic. Credentials are relevant, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient. 4. Read broadly; seek out and adopt concepts and frameworks that help you understand the world (e.g.: exponential growth, network effects, efficient frontiers). Finally: 5. Learn how to make decisions in the face of uncertainty. Even when you see the present earlier, you won't see it with full clarity, nor will you be able to predict the future. You'll just have a set of probabilities that are closer to reality than most people's. To return to the covid example: in January/February 2020, even the people farthest ahead of the curve weren't certain whether there would be a pandemic or how bad it would be. They just knew that the chances were double-digit percent, before it was even on most people's radar. Find low-cost ways to avoid extreme downside, and low-investment opportunities for extreme upside. For example, when a pandemic might be starting, it makes sense to stock up on supplies, move meetings to phone calls, etc.—these are cheap insurance. In some fantasy worlds, there are superheroes with “pre-cognition”, able to see the immediate future. They're always one step ahead. But since most people are a few steps behind reality, you don't need pre-cognition—just independent thinking. Thanks for listening. to h...

Tracing the history of the atomic bomb to the research into nuclear fission in the early 20th century. Scientists Einstein and Szilard warn President FDR of the possibility of Germany building an atomic weapon. Project Manhattan is conceived in the US and in 1945, a successful test is carried out with the Plutonium Bomb.

In December 1938, a frustrated nuclear physicist named Leo Szilard wrote a letter to the British Admiralty telling them that he had given up on his greatest invention — the nuclear chain reaction. "The idea of a nuclear chain reaction won’t work. There’s no need to keep this patent secret, and indeed there’s no need to keep this patent too. It won’t work." — Leo Szilard What Szilard didn’t know when he licked the envelope was that, on that very same day, a research team in Berlin had just split the uranium atom for the very first time. Within a year, the Manhatta Project would begin, and by 1945, the first atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. It was only four years later — barely a decade after Szilard had written off the idea as impossible — that Russia successfully tested its first atomic weapon, kicking off a global nuclear arms race that continues in various forms to this day. It’s a surprisingly short jump from cutting edge technology to global-scale risk. But although the nuclear story is a high-profile example of this kind of leap, it’s far from the only one. Today, many see artificial intelligence as a class of technology whose development will lead to global risks — and as a result, as a technology that needs to be managed globally. In much the same way that international treaties have allowed us to reduce the risk of nuclear war, we may need global coordination around AI to mitigate its potential negative impacts. One of the world’s leading experts on AI’s global coordination problem is Nicolas Miailhe. Nicolas is the co-founder of The Future Society, a global nonprofit whose primary focus is encouraging responsible adoption of AI, and ensuring that countries around the world come to a common understanding of the risks associated with it. Nicolas is a veteran of the prestigious Harvard Kennedy School of Government, an appointed expert to the Global Partnership on AI, and advises cities, governments, international organizations about AI policy.

Wie blickt eigentlich ein international erfahrener Tech-Experte auf die IT der deutschen Energie- und EVU-Branche? Wie baut so ein Mensch den Tech-Stack für sein Energie-Startup zusammen? Was würde er machen als IT-Leiter in einem ganz normalen Stadtwerk? Und was können deutsche EVUs vielleicht davon lernen, damit die IT nicht länger ein limitierender Faktor bleibt, sondern ein Möglichmacher-Werkzeug, um schnell und unkompliziert neue Produktideen auszuprobieren und auf den Weg zu bringen?

The Bomb explores the scientific and political events that led to the development of the atomic bomb. The story focusses on scientist Leo Szilard and his role in the discovery of nuclear fission. The Bomb follows Szilard, a Hungarian exile, to his work in Berlin, London, New York and Chicago. The story also highlights his attempts to stop the use of nuclear energy in warfare.Emily Strasser is the narrator of The Bomb. Her personal connection to the development of the atomic bomb if familial in nature; Emily’s grandfather was a chemist on the Manhattan Project. The Manhattan Project was a secret US government initiative during World War II to develop an atomic weapon before the Germans did the same.Emily has researched and written about nuclear arms. Her work also considers the powerful effects of state regimes of secrecy, institutional structures and individual choice and action. Her personal journey to come to terms with her grandfather’s work along with her passion for meaningful change make her more than just a narrator. Listeners can expect to be asked to do more than think.In this episode of MetaPod, we talk to Emily about what it was like to work with the BBC on The Bomb. We also hear her personal stories and opinions on the threats and choices that we face today, such as climate change and cyber warfare.

Guide Live B2B Jam Session_ Szilard Vajda See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

We at Eficode value results. As we work with our customers, we see that sharing our experience and expertise spins them forward. However, it wouldn’t mean that there was only one truth that helped everyone. We sometimes see strong differing viewpoints about the means by which our customers should help themselves, and these differences extend to our customer base. To express these alternative points of view, we decided to host a debate between a few esteemed specialists. We discussed what is keeping software enterprises from scaling up, and touched upon some possible solutions. If you get excited about things like Agile, Continuous everything, DevOps, value stream mapping, or theory of constraint, we're sure you will enjoy this conversation by Kalle Mäkelä and Szilard Szell from Finland, and Henrik Høegh from Denmark. Kalle kicks off the discussion, and after that, it’s truly a free flow. Let’s tune in! Blogs by Kalle: -DevOps - An infinite mindset: https://hubs.ly/H0xNxGs0 -Agile vs. DevOps: the grand debate: https://hubs.ly/H0xNCfJ0 Blogs by Szilard & the 5G team: -How to realize the full value of 5G with organizational transformation: https://hubs.ly/H0xNCjC0 -How to improve 5G business agility and time to market with automation: https://hubs.ly/H0xNxMc0 Podcast with Henrik: -DevSecOps talks, Theory of Constraint - ep.#14: https://www.devsecops.fm/episodes/theory-of-constraint/ -Chocolate driven development: https://www.chocolatedrivendevelopment.com/blog/categories/theory-of-constraints Keywords: Agile, DevOps, Lean, value stream, theory of constraint, software architecture, scaling, SAFe, cloud native, manifesto, continuous everything, microservices

The definitive history of nuclear weapons and the Manhattan Project. From the turn-of-the-century discovery of nuclear energy to the dropping of the first bombs on Japan, Richard Rhodes's Pulitzer Prize–winning book details the science, the people, and the sociopolitical realities that led to the development of the atomic bomb. This sweeping account begins in the 19th century, with the discovery of nuclear fission, and continues to World War Two and the Americans' race to beat Hitler's Nazis. That competition launched the Manhattan Project and the nearly overnight construction of a vast military-industrial complex that culminated in the fateful dropping of the first bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Reading like a character-driven suspense novel, the book introduces the players in this saga of physics, politics, and human psychology—from FDR and Einstein to the visionary scientists who pioneered quantum theory and the application of thermonuclear fission, including Planck, Szilard, Bohr, Oppenheimer, Fermi, Teller, Meitner, von Neumann, and Lawrence. From nuclear power's earliest foreshadowing in the work of H.G. Wells to the bright glare of Trinity at Alamogordo and the arms race of the Cold War, this dread invention forever changed the course of human history, and The Making of The Atomic Bomb provides a panoramic backdrop for that story. Richard Rhodes's ability to craft compelling biographical portraits is matched only by his rigorous scholarship. Told in rich human, political, and scientific detail that any reader can follow, The Making of the Atomic Bomb is a thought-provoking and masterful work.

Time is running out. As Manhattan Project scientists test the world’s first nuclear bomb, Leo Szilard knows it’s the last chance to stop the US government from dropping the bomb on Japanese civilians. Working with colleagues at Chicago’s Met Lab, Szilard does all he can to alert the US President. But will his message get there in time? #thebomb

The FBI pursues Leo Szilard as he loses control of the project to create a nuclear bomb. With his influence waning, the leaders of the Manhattan Project now threaten his liberty. But as the world’s first nuclear bomb comes within touching distance, Szilard fears it might soon be used on a city in Japan. #thebomb

27 Haziran 2019 tarihli sabah kaydında, 1898-1964 yılları arasında yaşamış Macar asıllı fizikçi Leo Szilard ile ilgili yaşanmış bir olay paylaşılmıştır.

This week Brian speaks to Dr. Szilard Voros of G3 Therapeutics about everything involving COVID-19.  Right when the Corona Virus started to show itself as a large potential threat, Dr. Voros and his team were already on it!  Dr. Voros has a special way of explaining these highly complex issues so everybody can understand. This is a don't miss episode with real information so tune in! For more info on G3 Therapeutics, head over to: www.g3therapeutics.com www.expertdojo.com

This week Asher, Sam, and Raph watch Akira and discuss the morality of technological advancement, military coups, and psychic children. Follow us on Twitter @robothauspod @CaseofPiles @HighlyAfiligent @AsherLack @HaveaCoolPenis

This week Asher, Sam, and Raph watch Akira and discuss the morality of technological advancement, military coups, and psychic children. Follow us on Twitter @robothauspod @CaseofPiles @HighlyAfiligent @AsherLack @HaveaCoolPenis

Szilard Gyorfi is the Founder and CEO of BlueFX.net. Website: www.BlueFX.net Sponsor: www.ActionVFX.com provides the best stock footage elements for professional Visual Effects. From Explosions, Fire, and Smoke, Muzzle Flashes and Bullet shells and Gun FX, to Debris and Particles, they have your assets covered. Available in 4K. 100% Royalty-Free.

Ádámosi-Sipos Szilárddal beszélgettünk ma, egy biztositási karrendező és zenész, aki basszusgitározik egy zenekarban a hostjunk Ryan Lane-nel, a Valami leszben.

Entrega 153 de HDO, adelantada primera entrega de la temporada 2016-17. En el podcast se escucha música del joven cuarteto nórdico Festen (Festen, Clean Feed), Szilard Mezei Septet (Polar, Not Two), The Sync -con Fred Lonberg-Holm, Mike Reed, Eve Risser y Sylvaine Hélary- (The Bridge Sessions 02, The Bridge), y Jones Jones –con Larry Ochs, Mark Dresser y Vladimir Tarasov- (The Moscow Improvisations, Not Two). Pachi Tapiz, 2016 HDO es un podcast editado, producido, mantenido y presentado por Pachi Tapiz Toda la información de HDO 153 en http://www.tomajazz.com/web/?p=25976 Toda la información de HDO en http://www.tomajazz.com/web/?cat=13298

Szilard Tibor Toth on ungarlasest filoloog, kes elab ja töötab Narvas. Omapäraseks teeb selle tõsiasja fakt, et Szilard õpetab seal eesti keelt. Nii Kolledžis, Kutseõppekeskuses kui mujalgi. Ungarlane tunneb meie keele vastu suurt huvi ja leiab, et sellel on perspektiivi. Narvas aga olevat põnev - nii töö kui kultuurielu poolest. Juttu ajas Haldi Normet-Saarna, helirežissöör oli Maris Tombach. 'Kuula 8. augustil kell 17.05.

Szilard Tibor Toth on ungarlasest filoloog, kes elab ja töötab Narvas. Omapäraseks teeb selle tõsiasja fakt, et Szilard õpetab seal eesti keelt. Nii Kolledžis, Kutseõppekeskuses kui mujalgi. Ungarlane tunneb meie keele vastu suurt huvi ja leiab, et sellel on perspektiivi. Narvas aga olevat põnev - nii töö kui kultuurielu poolest. Juttu ajas Haldi Normet-Saarna, helirežissöör oli Maris Tombach. 'Kuula 8. augustil kell 17.05.

The UC San Diego Library Channel presents a talk by William Lanouette, author of “Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard.” Lanouette explains how Szilard’s fear of German dominance of nuclear research in the 1930’s inspired the Manhattan Project, which led to the creation of the atomic bomb used by the United States in World War II. Szilard could see its potential for mass destruction in the wrong hands and became a strong advocate for nuclear arms control and disarmament. Szilard spent his final days as a founding member of the Salk Institute for Biological Studies in San Diego. Series: "Library Channel" [Public Affairs] [Science] [Show ID: 28013]

The UC San Diego Library Channel presents a talk by William Lanouette, author of “Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard.” Lanouette explains how Szilard’s fear of German dominance of nuclear research in the 1930’s inspired the Manhattan Project, which led to the creation of the atomic bomb used by the United States in World War II. Szilard could see its potential for mass destruction in the wrong hands and became a strong advocate for nuclear arms control and disarmament. Szilard spent his final days as a founding member of the Salk Institute for Biological Studies in San Diego. Series: "Library Channel" [Public Affairs] [Science] [Show ID: 28013]

The UC San Diego Library Channel presents a talk by William Lanouette, author of “Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard.” Lanouette explains how Szilard’s fear of German dominance of nuclear research in the 1930’s inspired the Manhattan Project, which led to the creation of the atomic bomb used by the United States in World War II. Szilard could see its potential for mass destruction in the wrong hands and became a strong advocate for nuclear arms control and disarmament. Szilard spent his final days as a founding member of the Salk Institute for Biological Studies in San Diego. Series: "Library Channel" [Public Affairs] [Science] [Show ID: 28013]

The UC San Diego Library Channel presents a talk by William Lanouette, author of “Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard.” Lanouette explains how Szilard’s fear of German dominance of nuclear research in the 1930’s inspired the Manhattan Project, which led to the creation of the atomic bomb used by the United States in World War II. Szilard could see its potential for mass destruction in the wrong hands and became a strong advocate for nuclear arms control and disarmament. Szilard spent his final days as a founding member of the Salk Institute for Biological Studies in San Diego. Series: "Library Channel" [Public Affairs] [Science] [Show ID: 28013]

Lisa Jardine learned the story of Leo Szilard from her father who regarded him as an exemplary figure in science. Szilard, an Hungarian physicist, helped to develop the atom bomb, but later fought against its use. His story provides lessons about the relationship between science and human values - even though the version of the tale Lisa was taught turns out not to have been entirely true.Producer: Sheila Cook.

Hosts: Vincent Racaniello and Philip I. Marcus Vincent travels to the University of Connecticut to meet up with Professor Philip I. Marcus to discuss his development of the single cell cloning technique in the early 1950s. Links for this episode: Cloning with X-irradiated feeder cells (PNAS) Philip I. Marcus in the lab (jpg) Cloning with capillary tubes (jpg) Cloning platform (jpg) VRR holding 1950s glass plate of clones (jpg) HeLa clones (jpg) Cloning cylinder (jpg) TWiV on Facebook Coming soon: video of this episode Send your virology questions and comments (email or mp3 file) to twiv@twiv.tv, or call them in to 908-312-0760. You can also post articles that you would like us to discuss at microbeworld.org and tag them with twiv.

In this episode, the first of a two-part interview with anthropologist Carel Van Schaik about the role of culture in boosting intelligence in animals; historian and writer William Lanouette discusses an upcoming History Channel program about the roles of Einstein and Leo Szilard in the beginning of the nuclear age; and Scientific American editor-in-chief John Rennie reports on a recent sustainable development conference. Plus, test your knowledge about some recent science in the news.