Podcast appearances and mentions of Daron Acemoglu

Yesterday, the self-styled San Francisco “progressive” Joan Williams was on the show arguing that Democrats need to relearn the language of the American working class. But, as some of you have noted, Williams seems oblivious to the fact that politics is about more than simply aping other people's language. What you say matters, and the language of American working class, like all industrial working classes, is rooted in a critique of capitalism. She should probably read the New Yorker staff writer John Cassidy's excellent new book, Capitalism and its Critics, which traces capitalism's evolution and criticism from the East India Company through modern times. He defines capitalism as production for profit by privately-owned companies in markets, encompassing various forms from Chinese state capitalism to hyper-globalization. The book examines capitalism's most articulate critics including the Luddites, Marx, Engels, Thomas Carlisle, Adam Smith, Rosa Luxemburg, Keynes & Hayek, and contemporary figures like Sylvia Federici and Thomas Piketty. Cassidy explores how major economists were often critics of their era's dominant capitalist model, and untangles capitalism's complicated relationship with colonialism, slavery and AI which he regards as a potentially unprecedented economic disruption. This should be essential listening for all Democrats seeking to reinvent a post Biden-Harris party and message. 5 key takeaways* Capitalism has many forms - From Chinese state capitalism to Keynesian managed capitalism to hyper-globalization, all fitting the basic definition of production for profit by privately-owned companies in markets.* Great economists are typically critics - Smith criticized mercantile capitalism, Keynes critiqued laissez-faire capitalism, and Hayek/Friedman opposed managed capitalism. Each generation's leading economists challenge their era's dominant model.* Modern corporate structure has deep roots - The East India Company was essentially a modern multinational corporation with headquarters, board of directors, stockholders, and even a private army - showing capitalism's organizational continuity across centuries.* Capitalism is intertwined with colonialism and slavery - Industrial capitalism was built on pre-existing colonial and slave systems, particularly through the cotton industry and plantation economies.* AI represents a potentially unprecedented disruption - Unlike previous technological waves, AI may substitute rather than complement human labor on a massive scale, potentially creating political backlash exceeding even the "China shock" that contributed to Trump's rise.Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Full TranscriptAndrew Keen: Hello, everybody. A couple of days ago, we did a show with Joan Williams. She has a new book out, "Outclassed: How the Left Lost the Working Class and How to Win Them Back." A book about language, about how to talk to the American working class. She also had a piece in Jacobin Magazine, an anti-capitalist magazine, about how the left needs to speak to what she calls average American values. We talked, of course, about Bernie Sanders and AOC and their language of fighting oligarchy, and the New York Times followed that up with "The Enduring Power of Anti-Capitalism in American Politics."But of course, that brings the question: what exactly is capitalism? I did a little bit of research. We can find definitions of capitalism from AI, from Wikipedia, even from online dictionaries, but I thought we might do a little better than relying on Wikipedia and come to a man who's given capitalism and its critics a great deal of thought. John Cassidy is well known as a staff writer at The New Yorker. He's the author of a wonderful book, the best book, actually, on the dot-com insanity. And his new book, "Capitalism and its Critics," is out this week. John, congratulations on the book.So I've got to be a bit of a schoolmaster with you, John, and get some definitions first. What exactly is capitalism before we get to criticism of it?John Cassidy: Yeah, I mean, it's a very good question, Andrew. Obviously, through the decades, even the centuries, there have been many different definitions of the term capitalism and there are different types of capitalism. To not be sort of too ideological about it, the working definition I use is basically production for profit—that could be production of goods or mostly in the new and, you know, in today's economy, production of services—for profit by companies which are privately owned in markets. That's a very sort of all-encompassing definition.Within that, you can have all sorts of different types of capitalism. You can have Chinese state capitalism, you can have the old mercantilism, which industrial capitalism came after, which Trump seems to be trying to resurrect. You can have Keynesian managed capitalism that we had for 30 or 40 years after the Second World War, which I grew up in in the UK. Or you can have sort of hyper-globalization, hyper-capitalism that we've tried for the last 30 years. There are all those different varieties of capitalism consistent with a basic definition, I think.Andrew Keen: That keeps you busy, John. I know you started this project, which is a big book and it's a wonderful book. I read it. I don't always read all the books I have on the show, but I read from cover to cover full of remarkable stories of the critics of capitalism. You note in the beginning that you began this in 2016 with the beginnings of Trump. What was it about the 2016 election that triggered a book about capitalism and its critics?John Cassidy: Well, I was reporting on it at the time for The New Yorker and it struck me—I covered, I basically covered the economy in various forms for various publications since the late 80s, early 90s. In fact, one of my first big stories was the stock market crash of '87. So yes, I am that old. But it seemed to me in 2016 when you had Bernie Sanders running from the left and Trump running from the right, but both in some way offering very sort of similar critiques of capitalism. People forget that Trump in 2016 actually was running from the left of the Republican Party. He was attacking big business. He was attacking Wall Street. He doesn't do that these days very much, but at the time he was very much posing as the sort of outsider here to protect the interests of the average working man.And it seemed to me that when you had this sort of pincer movement against the then ruling model, this wasn't just a one-off. It seemed to me it was a sort of an emerging crisis of legitimacy for the system. And I thought there could be a good book written about how we got to here. And originally I thought it would be a relatively short book just based on the last sort of 20 or 30 years since the collapse of the Cold War and the sort of triumphalism of the early 90s.But as I got into it more and more, I realized that so many of the issues which had been raised, things like globalization, rising inequality, monopoly power, exploitation, even pollution and climate change, these issues go back to the very start of the capitalist system or the industrial capitalist system back in sort of late 18th century, early 19th century Britain. So I thought, in the end, I thought, you know what, let's just do the whole thing soup to nuts through the eyes of the critics.There have obviously been many, many histories of capitalism written. I thought that an original way to do it, or hopefully original, would be to do a sort of a narrative through the lives and the critiques of the critics of various stages. So that's, I hope, what sets it apart from other books on the subject, and also provides a sort of narrative frame because, you know, I am a New Yorker writer, I realize if you want people to read things, you've got to make it readable. Easiest way to make things readable is to center them around people. People love reading about other people. So that's sort of the narrative frame. I start off with a whistleblower from the East India Company back in the—Andrew Keen: Yeah, I want to come to that. But before, John, my sense is that to simplify what you're saying, this is a labor of love. You're originally from Leeds, the heart of Yorkshire, the center of the very industrial revolution, the first industrial revolution where, in your historical analysis, capitalism was born. Is it a labor of love? What's your family relationship with capitalism? How long was the family in Leeds?John Cassidy: Right, I mean that's a very good question. It is a labor of love in a way, but it's not—our family doesn't go—I'm from an Irish family, family of Irish immigrants who moved to England in the 1940s and 1950s. So my father actually did start working in a big mill, the Kirkstall Forge in Leeds, which is a big steel mill, and he left after seeing one of his co-workers have his arms chopped off in one of the machinery, so he decided it wasn't for him and he spent his life working in the construction industry, which was dominated by immigrants as it is here now.So I don't have a—it's not like I go back to sort of the start of the industrial revolution, but I did grow up in the middle of Leeds, very working class, very industrial neighborhood. And what a sort of irony is, I'll point out, I used to, when I was a kid, I used to play golf on a municipal golf course called Gotts Park in Leeds, which—you know, most golf courses in America are sort of in the affluent suburbs, country clubs. This was right in the middle of Armley in Leeds, which is where the Victorian jail is and a very rough neighborhood. There's a small bit of land which they built a golf course on. It turns out it was named after one of the very first industrialists, Benjamin Gott, who was a wool and textile industrialist, and who played a part in the Luddite movement, which I mention.So it turns out, I was there when I was 11 or 12, just learning how to play golf on this scrappy golf course. And here I am, 50 years later, writing about Benjamin Gott at the start of the Industrial Revolution. So yeah, no, sure. I think it speaks to me in a way that perhaps it wouldn't to somebody else from a different background.Andrew Keen: We did a show with William Dalrymple, actually, a couple of years ago. He's been on actually since, the Anglo or Scottish Indian historian. His book on the East India Company, "The Anarchy," is a classic. You begin in some ways your history of capitalism with the East India Company. What was it about the East India Company, John, that makes it different from other for-profit organizations in economic, Western economic history?John Cassidy: I mean, I read that. It's a great book, by the way. That was actually quoted in my chapter on these. Yeah, I remember. I mean, the reason I focused on it was for two reasons. Number one, I was looking for a start, a narrative start to the book. And it seemed to me, you know, the obvious place to start is with the start of the industrial revolution. If you look at economics history textbooks, that's where they always start with Arkwright and all the inventors, you know, who were the sort of techno-entrepreneurs of their time, the sort of British Silicon Valley, if you could think of it as, in Lancashire and Derbyshire in the late 18th century.So I knew I had to sort of start there in some way, but I thought that's a bit pat. Is there another way into it? And it turns out that in 1772 in England, there was a huge bailout of the East India Company, very much like the sort of 2008, 2009 bailout of Wall Street. The company got into trouble. So I thought, you know, maybe there's something there. And I eventually found this guy, William Bolts, who worked for the East India Company, turned into a whistleblower after he was fired for finagling in India like lots of the people who worked for the company did.So that gave me two things. Number one, it gave me—you know, I'm a writer, so it gave me something to focus on a narrative. His personal history is very interesting. But number two, it gave me a sort of foundation because industrial capitalism didn't come from nowhere. You know, it was built on top of a pre-existing form of capitalism, which we now call mercantile capitalism, which was very protectionist, which speaks to us now. But also it had these big monopolistic multinational companies.The East India Company, in some ways, was a very modern corporation. It had a headquarters in Leadenhall Street in the city of London. It had a board of directors, it had stockholders, the company sent out very detailed instructions to the people in the field in India and Indonesia and Malaysia who were traders who bought things from the locals there, brought them back to England on their company ships. They had a company army even to enforce—to protect their operations there. It was an incredible multinational corporation.So that was also, I think, fascinating because it showed that even in the pre-existing system, you know, big corporations existed, there were monopolies, they had royal monopolies given—first the East India Company got one from Queen Elizabeth. But in some ways, they were very similar to modern monopolistic corporations. And they had some of the problems we've seen with modern monopolistic corporations, the way they acted. And Bolts was the sort of first corporate whistleblower, I thought. Yeah, that was a way of sort of getting into the story, I think. Hopefully, you know, it's just a good read, I think.William Bolts's story because he was—he came from nowhere, he was Dutch, he wasn't even English and he joined the company as a sort of impoverished young man, went to India like a lot of English minor aristocrats did to sort of make your fortune. The way the company worked, you had to sort of work on company time and make as much money as you could for the company, but then in your spare time you're allowed to trade for yourself. So a lot of the—without getting into too much detail, but you know, English aristocracy was based on—you know, the eldest child inherits everything, so if you were the younger brother of the Duke of Norfolk, you actually didn't inherit anything. So all of these minor aristocrats, so major aristocrats, but who weren't first born, joined the East India Company, went out to India and made a fortune, and then came back and built huge houses. Lots of the great manor houses in southern England were built by people from the East India Company and they were known as Nabobs, which is an Indian term. So they were the sort of, you know, billionaires of their time, and it was based on—as I say, it wasn't based on industrial capitalism, it was based on mercantile capitalism.Andrew Keen: Yeah, the beginning of the book, which focuses on Bolts and the East India Company, brings to mind for me two things. Firstly, the intimacy of modern capitalism, modern industrial capitalism with colonialism and of course slavery—lots of books have been written on that. Touch on this and also the relationship between the birth of capitalism and the birth of liberalism or democracy. John Stuart Mill, of course, the father in many ways of Western democracy. His day job, ironically enough, or perhaps not ironically, was at the East India Company. So how do those two things connect, or is it just coincidental?John Cassidy: Well, I don't think it is entirely coincidental, I mean, J.S. Mill—his father, James Mill, was also a well-known philosopher in the sort of, obviously, in the earlier generation, earlier than him. And he actually wrote the official history of the East India Company. And I think they gave his son, the sort of brilliant protégé, J.S. Mill, a job as largely as a sort of sinecure, I think. But he did go in and work there in the offices three or four days a week.But I think it does show how sort of integral—the sort of—as you say, the inheritor and the servant in Britain, particularly, of colonial capitalism was. So the East India Company was, you know, it was in decline by that stage in the middle of the 19th century, but it didn't actually give up its monopoly. It wasn't forced to give up its monopoly on the Indian trade until 1857, after, you know, some notorious massacres and there was a sort of public outcry.So yeah, no, that's—it's very interesting that the British—it's sort of unique to Britain in a way, but it's interesting that industrial capitalism arose alongside this pre-existing capitalist structure and somebody like Mill is a sort of paradoxical figure because actually he was quite critical of aspects of industrial capitalism and supported sort of taxes on the rich, even though he's known as the great, you know, one of the great apostles of the free market and free market liberalism. And his day job, as you say, he was working for the East India Company.Andrew Keen: What about the relationship between the birth of industrial capitalism, colonialism and slavery? Those are big questions and I know you deal with them in some—John Cassidy: I think you can't just write an economic history of capitalism now just starting with the cotton industry and say, you know, it was all about—it was all about just technical progress and gadgets, etc. It was built on a sort of pre-existing system which was colonial and, you know, the slave trade was a central element of that. Now, as you say, there have been lots and lots of books written about it, the whole 1619 project got an incredible amount of attention a few years ago. So I didn't really want to rehash all that, but I did want to acknowledge the sort of role of slavery, especially in the rise of the cotton industry because of course, a lot of the raw cotton was grown in the plantations in the American South.So the way I actually ended up doing that was by writing a chapter about Eric Williams, a Trinidadian writer who ended up as the Prime Minister of Trinidad when it became independent in the 1960s. But when he was younger, he wrote a book which is now regarded as a classic. He went to Oxford to do a PhD, won a scholarship. He was very smart. I won a sort of Oxford scholarship myself but 50 years before that, he came across the Atlantic and did an undergraduate degree in history and then did a PhD there and his PhD thesis was on slavery and capitalism.And at the time, in the 1930s, the link really wasn't acknowledged. You could read any sort of standard economic history written by British historians, and they completely ignored that. He made the argument that, you know, slavery was integral to the rise of capitalism and he basically started an argument which has been raging ever since the 1930s and, you know, if you want to study economic history now you have to sort of—you know, have to have to address that. And the way I thought, even though the—it's called the Williams thesis is very famous. I don't think many people knew much about where it came from. So I thought I'd do a chapter on—Andrew Keen: Yeah, that chapter is excellent. You mentioned earlier the Luddites, you're from Yorkshire where Luddism in some ways was born. One of the early chapters is on the Luddites. We did a show with Brian Merchant, his book, "Blood in the Machine," has done very well, I'm sure you're familiar with it. I always understood the Luddites as being against industrialization, against the machine, as opposed to being against capitalism. But did those two things get muddled together in the history of the Luddites?John Cassidy: I think they did. I mean, you know, Luddites, when we grew up, I mean you're English too, you know to be called a Luddite was a term of abuse, right? You know, you were sort of antediluvian, anti-technology, you're stupid. It was only, I think, with the sort of computer revolution, the tech revolution of the last 30, 40 years and the sort of disruptions it's caused, that people have started to look back at the Luddites and say, perhaps they had a point.For them, they were basically pre-industrial capitalism artisans. They worked for profit-making concerns, small workshops. Some of them worked for themselves, so they were sort of sole proprietor capitalists. Or they worked in small venues, but the rise of industrial capitalism, factory capitalism or whatever, basically took away their livelihoods progressively. So they associated capitalism with new technology. In their minds it was the same. But their argument wasn't really a technological one or even an economic one, it was more a moral one. They basically made the moral argument that capitalists shouldn't have the right to just take away their livelihoods with no sort of recompense for them.At the time they didn't have any parliamentary representation. You know, they weren't revolutionaries. The first thing they did was create petitions to try and get parliament to step in, sort of introduce some regulation here. They got turned down repeatedly by the sort of—even though it was a very aristocratic parliament, places like Manchester and Leeds didn't have any representation at all. So it was only after that that they sort of turned violent and started, you know, smashing machines and machines, I think, were sort of symbols of the system, which they saw as morally unjust.And I think that's sort of what—obviously, there's, you know, a lot of technological disruption now, so we can, especially as it starts to come for the educated cognitive class, we can sort of sympathize with them more. But I think the sort of moral critique that there's this, you know, underneath the sort of great creativity and economic growth that capitalism produces, there is also a lot of destruction and a lot of victims. And I think that message, you know, is becoming a lot more—that's why I think why they've been rediscovered in the last five or ten years and I'm one of the people I guess contributing to that rediscovery.Andrew Keen: There's obviously many critiques of capitalism politically. I want to come to Marx in a second, but your chapter, I thought, on Thomas Carlyle and this nostalgic conservatism was very important and there are other conservatives as well. John, do you think that—and you mentioned Trump earlier, who is essentially a nostalgist for a—I don't know, some sort of bizarre pre-capitalist age in America. Is there something particularly powerful about the anti-capitalism of romantics like Carlyle, 19th century Englishman, there were many others of course.John Cassidy: Well, I think so. I mean, I think what is—conservatism, when we were young anyway, was associated with Thatcherism and Reaganism, which, you know, lionized the free market and free market capitalism and was a reaction against the pre-existing form of capitalism, Keynesian capitalism of the sort of 40s to the 80s. But I think what got lost in that era was the fact that there have always been—you've got Hayek up there, obviously—Andrew Keen: And then Keynes and Hayek, the two—John Cassidy: Right, it goes to the end of that. They had a great debate in the 1930s about these issues. But Hayek really wasn't a conservative person, and neither was Milton Friedman. They were sort of free market revolutionaries, really, that you'd let the market rip and it does good things. And I think that that sort of a view, you know, it just became very powerful. But we sort of lost sight of the fact that there was also a much older tradition of sort of suspicion of radical changes of any type. And that was what conservatism was about to some extent. If you think about Baldwin in Britain, for example.And there was a sort of—during the Industrial Revolution, some of the strongest supporters of factory acts to reduce hours and hourly wages for women and kids were actually conservatives, Tories, as they were called at the time, like Ashley. That tradition, Carlyle was a sort of extreme representative of that. I mean, Carlyle was a sort of proto-fascist, let's not romanticize him, he lionized strongmen, Frederick the Great, and he didn't really believe in democracy. But he also had—he was appalled by the sort of, you know, the—like, what's the phrase I'm looking for? The sort of destructive aspects of industrial capitalism, both on the workers, you know, he said it was a dehumanizing system, sounded like Marx in some ways. That it dehumanized the workers, but also it destroyed the environment.He was an early environmentalist. He venerated the environment, was actually very strongly linked to the transcendentalists in America, people like Thoreau, who went to visit him when he visited Britain and he saw the sort of destructive impact that capitalism was having locally in places like Manchester, which were filthy with filthy rivers, etc. So he just saw the whole system as sort of morally bankrupt and he was a great writer, Carlyle, whatever you think of him. Great user of language, so he has these great ringing phrases like, you know, the cash nexus or calling it the Gospel of Mammonism, the shabbiest gospel ever preached under the sun was industrial capitalism.So, again, you know, that's a sort of paradoxical thing, because I think for so long conservatism was associated with, you know, with support for the free market and still is in most of the Republican Party, but then along comes Trump and sort of conquers the party with a, you know, more skeptical, as you say, romantic, not really based on any reality, but a sort of romantic view that America can stand by itself in the world. I mean, I see Trump actually as a sort of an effort to sort of throw back to mercantile capitalism in a way. You know, which was not just pre-industrial, but was also pre-democracy, run by monarchs, which I'm sure appeals to him, and it was based on, you know, large—there were large tariffs. You couldn't import things in the UK. If you want to import anything to the UK, you have to send it on a British ship because of the navigation laws. It was a very protectionist system and it's actually, you know, as I said, had a lot of parallels with what Trump's trying to do or tries to do until he backs off.Andrew Keen: You cheat a little bit in the book in the sense that you—everyone has their own chapter. We'll talk a little bit about Hayek and Smith and Lenin and Friedman. You do have one chapter on Marx, but you also have a chapter on Engels. So you kind of cheat. You combine the two. Is it possible, though, to do—and you've just written this book, so you know this as well as anyone. How do you write a book about capitalism and its critics and only really give one chapter to Marx, who is so dominant? I mean, you've got lots of Marxists in the book, including Lenin and Luxemburg. How fundamental is Marx to a criticism of capitalism? Is most criticism, especially from the left, from progressives, is it really just all a footnote to Marx?John Cassidy: I wouldn't go that far, but I think obviously on the left he is the central figure. But there's an element of sort of trying to rebuild Engels a bit in this. I mean, I think of Engels and Marx—I mean obviously Marx wrote the great classic "Capital," etc. But in the 1840s, when they both started writing about capitalism, Engels was sort of ahead of Marx in some ways. I mean, the sort of materialist concept, the idea that economics rules everything, Engels actually was the first one to come up with that in an essay in the 1840s which Marx then published in one of his—in the German newspaper he worked for at the time, radical newspaper, and he acknowledged openly that that was really what got him thinking seriously about economics, and even in the late—in 20, 25 years later when he wrote "Capital," all three volumes of it and the Grundrisse, just these enormous outpourings of analysis on capitalism.He acknowledged Engels's role in that and obviously Engels wrote the first draft of the Communist Manifesto in 1848 too, which Marx then topped and tailed and—he was a better writer obviously, Marx, and he gave it the dramatic language that we all know it for. So I think Engels and Marx together obviously are the central sort of figures in the sort of left-wing critique. But they didn't start out like that. I mean, they were very obscure, you've got to remember.You know, they were—when they were writing, Marx was writing "Capital" in London, it never even got published in English for another 20 years. It was just published in German. He was basically an expat. He had been thrown out of Germany, he had been thrown out of France, so England was last resort and the British didn't consider him a threat so they were happy to let him and the rest of the German sort of left in there. I think it became—it became the sort of epochal figure after his death really, I think, when he was picked up by the left-wing parties, which are especially the SPD in Germany, which was the first sort of socialist mass party and was officially Marxist until the First World War and there were great internal debates.And then of course, because Lenin and the Russians came out of that tradition too, Marxism then became the official doctrine of the Soviet Union when they adopted a version of it. And again there were massive internal arguments about what Marx really meant, and in fact, you know, one interpretation of the last 150 years of left-wing sort of intellectual development is as a sort of argument about what did Marx really mean and what are the important bits of it, what are the less essential bits of it. It's a bit like the "what did Keynes really mean" that you get in liberal circles.So yeah, Marx, obviously, this is basically an intellectual history of critiques of capitalism. In that frame, he is absolutely a central figure. Why didn't I give him more space than a chapter and a chapter and a half with Engels? There have been a million books written about Marx. I mean, it's not that—it's not that he's an unknown figure. You know, there's a best-selling book written in Britain about 20 years ago about him and then I was quoting, in my biographical research, I relied on some more recent, more scholarly biographies. So he's an endlessly fascinating figure but I didn't want him to dominate the book so I gave him basically the same space as everybody else.Andrew Keen: You've got, as I said, you've got a chapter on Adam Smith who's often considered the father of economics. You've got a chapter on Keynes. You've got a chapter on Friedman. And you've got a chapter on Hayek, all the great modern economists. Is it possible, John, to be a distinguished economist one way or the other and not be a critic of capitalism?John Cassidy: Well, I don't—I mean, I think history would suggest that the greatest economists have been critics of capitalism in their own time. People would say to me, what the hell have you got Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek in a book about critics of capitalism? They were great exponents, defenders of capitalism. They loved the system. That is perfectly true. But in the 1930s, 40s, 50s, 60s, and 70s, middle of the 20th century, they were actually arch-critics of the ruling form of capitalism at the time, which was what I call managed capitalism. What some people call Keynesianism, what other people call European social democracy, whatever you call it, it was a model of a mixed economy in which the government played a large role both in propping up demand and in providing an extensive social safety net in the UK and providing public healthcare and public education. It was a sort of hybrid model.Most of the economy in terms of the businesses remained in private hands. So most production was capitalistic. It was a capitalist system. They didn't go to the Soviet model of nationalizing everything and Britain did nationalize some businesses, but most places didn't. The US of course didn't but it was a form of managed capitalism. And Hayek and Friedman were both great critics of that and wanted to sort of move back to 19th century laissez-faire model.Keynes was a—was actually a great, I view him anyway, as really a sort of late Victorian liberal and was trying to protect as much of the sort of J.S. Mill view of the world as he could, but he thought capitalism had one fatal flaw: that it tended to fall into recessions and then they can snowball and the whole system can collapse which is what had basically happened in the early 1930s until Keynesian policies were adopted. Keynes sort of differed from a lot of his followers—I have a chapter on Joan Robinson in there, who were pretty left-wing and wanted to sort of use Keynesianism as a way to shift the economy quite far to the left. Keynes didn't really believe in that. He has a famous quote that, you know, once you get to full employment, you can then rely on the free market to sort of take care of things. He was still a liberal at heart.Going back to Adam Smith, why is he in a book on criticism of capitalism? And again, it goes back to what I said at the beginning. He actually wrote "The Wealth of Nations"—he explains in the introduction—as a critique of mercantile capitalism. His argument was that he was a pro-free trader, pro-small business, free enterprise. His argument was if you get the government out of the way, we don't need these government-sponsored monopolies like the East India Company. If you just rely on the market, the sort of market forces and competition will produce a good outcome. So then he was seen as a great—you know, he is then seen as the apostle of free market capitalism. I mean when I started as a young reporter, when I used to report in Washington, all the conservatives used to wear Adam Smith badges. You don't see Donald Trump wearing an Adam Smith badge, but that was the case.He was also—the other aspect of Smith, which I highlight, which is not often remarked on—he's also a critic of big business. He has a famous section where he discusses the sort of tendency of any group of more than three businessmen when they get together to try and raise prices and conspire against consumers. And he was very suspicious of, as I say, large companies, monopolies. I think if Adam Smith existed today, I mean, I think he would be a big supporter of Lina Khan and the sort of antitrust movement, he would say capitalism is great as long as you have competition, but if you don't have competition it becomes, you know, exploitative.Andrew Keen: Yeah, if Smith came back to live today, you have a chapter on Thomas Piketty, maybe he may not be French, but he may be taking that position about how the rich benefit from the structure of investment. Piketty's core—I've never had Piketty on the show, but I've had some of his followers like Emmanuel Saez from Berkeley. Yeah. How powerful is Piketty's critique of capitalism within the context of the classical economic analysis from Hayek and Friedman? Yeah, it's a very good question.John Cassidy: It's a very good question. I mean, he's a very paradoxical figure, Piketty, in that he obviously shot to world fame and stardom with his book on capital in the 21st century, which in some ways he obviously used the capital as a way of linking himself to Marx, even though he said he never read Marx. But he was basically making the same argument that if you leave capitalism unrestrained and don't do anything about monopolies etc. or wealth, you're going to get massive inequality and he—I think his great contribution, Piketty and the school of people, one of them you mentioned, around him was we sort of had a vague idea that inequality was going up and that, you know, wages were stagnating, etc.What he and his colleagues did is they produced these sort of scientific empirical studies showing in very simple to understand terms how the sort of share of income and wealth of the top 10 percent, the top 5 percent, the top 1 percent and the top 0.1 percent basically skyrocketed from the 1970s to about 2010. And it was, you know, he was an MIT PhD. Saez, who you mentioned, is a Berkeley professor. They were schooled in neoclassical economics at Harvard and MIT and places like that. So the right couldn't dismiss them as sort of, you know, lefties or Trots or whatever who're just sort of making this stuff up. They had to acknowledge that this was actually an empirical reality.I think it did change the whole basis of the debate and it was sort of part of this reaction against capitalism in the 2010s. You know it was obviously linked to the sort of Sanders and the Occupy Wall Street movement at the time. It came out of the—you know, the financial crisis as well when Wall Street disgraced itself. I mean, I wrote a previous book on all that, but people have sort of, I think, forgotten the great reaction against that a decade ago, which I think even Trump sort of exploited, as I say, by using anti-banker rhetoric at the time.So, Piketty was a great figure, I think, from, you know, I was thinking, who are the most influential critics of capitalism in the 21st century? And I think you'd have to put him up there on the list. I'm not saying he's the only one or the most eminent one. But I think he is a central figure. Now, of course, you'd think, well, this is a really powerful critic of capitalism, and nobody's going to pick up, and Bernie's going to take off and everything. But here we are a decade later now. It seems to be what the backlash has produced is a swing to the right, not a swing to the left. So that's, again, a sort of paradox.Andrew Keen: One person I didn't expect to come up in the book, John, and I was fascinated with this chapter, is Silvia Federici. I've tried to get her on the show. We've had some books about her writing and her kind of—I don't know, you treat her critique as a feminist one. The role of women. Why did you choose to write a chapter about Federici and that feminist critique of capitalism?John Cassidy: Right, right. Well, I don't think it was just feminist. I'll explain what I think it was. Two reasons. Number one, I wanted to get more women into the book. I mean, it's in some sense, it is a history of economics and economic critiques. And they are overwhelmingly written by men and women were sort of written out of the narrative of capitalism for a very long time. So I tried to include as many sort of women as actual thinkers as I could and I have a couple of early socialist feminist thinkers, Anna Wheeler and Flora Tristan and then I cover some of the—I cover Rosa Luxemburg as the great sort of tribune of the left revolutionary socialist, communist whatever you want to call it. Anti-capitalist I think is probably also important to note about. Yeah, and then I also have Joan Robinson, but I wanted somebody to do something in the modern era, and I thought Federici, in the world of the Wages for Housework movement, is very interesting from two perspectives.Number one, Federici herself is a Marxist, and I think she probably would still consider herself a revolutionary. She's based in New York, as you know now. She lived in New York for 50 years, but she came from—she's originally Italian and came out of the Italian left in the 1960s, which was very radical. Do you know her? Did you talk to her? I didn't talk to her on this. No, she—I basically relied on, there has been a lot of, as you say, there's been a lot of stuff written about her over the years. She's written, you know, she's given various long interviews and she's written a book herself, a version, a history of housework, so I figured it was all there and it was just a matter of pulling it together.But I think the critique, why the critique is interesting, most of the book is a sort of critique of how capitalism works, you know, in the production or you know, in factories or in offices or you know, wherever capitalist operations are working, but her critique is sort of domestic reproduction, as she calls it, the role of unpaid labor in supporting capitalism. I mean it goes back a long way actually. There was this moment, I sort of trace it back to the 1940s and 1950s when there were feminists in America who were demonstrating outside factories and making the point that you know, the factory workers and the operations of the factory, it couldn't—there's one of the famous sort of tire factory in California demonstrations where the women made the argument, look this factory can't continue to operate unless we feed and clothe the workers and provide the next generation of workers. You know, that's domestic reproduction. So their argument was that housework should be paid and Federici took that idea and a couple of her colleagues, she founded the—it's a global movement, but she founded the most famous branch in New York City in the 1970s. In Park Slope near where I live actually.And they were—you call it feminists, they were feminists in a way, but they were rejected by the sort of mainstream feminist movement, the sort of Gloria Steinems of the world, who Federici was very critical of because she said they ignored, they really just wanted to get women ahead in the sort of capitalist economy and they ignored the sort of underlying from her perspective, the underlying sort of illegitimacy and exploitation of that system. So they were never accepted as part of the feminist movement. They're to the left of the Feminist Movement.Andrew Keen: You mentioned Keynes, of course, so central in all this, particularly his analysis of the role of automation in capitalism. We did a show recently with Robert Skidelsky and I'm sure you're familiar—John Cassidy: Yeah, yeah, great, great biography of Keynes.Andrew Keen: Yeah, the great biographer of Keynes, whose latest book is "Mindless: The Human Condition in the Age of AI." You yourself wrote a brilliant book on the last tech mania and dot-com capitalism. I used it in a lot of my writing and books. What's your analysis of AI in this latest mania and the role generally of manias in the history of capitalism and indeed in critiquing capitalism? Is AI just the next chapter of the dot-com boom?John Cassidy: I think it's a very deep question. I think I'd give two answers to it. In one sense it is just the latest mania the way—I mean, the way capitalism works is we have these, I go back to Kondratiev, one of my Russian economists who ended up being killed by Stalin. He was the sort of inventor of the long wave theory of capitalism. We have these short waves where you have sort of booms and busts driven by finance and debt etc. But we also have long waves driven by technology.And obviously, in the last 40, 50 years, the two big ones are the original deployment of the internet and microchip technology in the sort of 80s and 90s culminating in the dot-com boom of the late 90s, which as you say, I wrote about. Thanks very much for your kind comments on the book. If you just sort of compare it from a financial basis I think they are very similar just in terms of the sort of role of hype from Wall Street in hyping up these companies. The sort of FOMO aspect of it among investors that they you know, you can't miss out. So just buy the companies blindly. And the sort of lionization in the press and the media of, you know, of AI as the sort of great wave of the future.So if you take a sort of skeptical market based approach, I would say, yeah, this is just another sort of another mania which will eventually burst and it looked like it had burst for a few weeks when Trump put the tariffs up, now the market seemed to be recovering. But I think there is, there may be something new about it. I am not, I don't pretend to be a technical expert. I try to rely on the evidence of or the testimony of people who know the systems well and also economists who have studied it. It seems to me the closer you get to it the more alarming it is in terms of the potential shock value that there is there.I mean Trump and the sort of reaction to a larger extent can be traced back to the China shock where we had this global shock to American manufacturing and sort of hollowed out a lot of the industrial areas much of it, like industrial Britain was hollowed out in the 80s. If you, you know, even people like Altman and Elon Musk, they seem to think that this is going to be on a much larger scale than that and will basically, you know, get rid of the professions as they exist. Which would be a huge, huge shock. And I think a lot of the economists who studied this, who four or five years ago were relatively optimistic, people like Daron Acemoglu, David Autor—Andrew Keen: Simon Johnson, of course, who just won the Nobel Prize, and he's from England.John Cassidy: Simon, I did an event with Simon earlier this week. You know they've studied this a lot more closely than I have but I do interview them and I think five, six years ago they were sort of optimistic that you know this could just be a new steam engine or could be a microchip which would lead to sort of a lot more growth, rising productivity, rising productivity is usually associated with rising wages so sure there'd be short-term costs but ultimately it would be a good thing. Now, I think if you speak to them, they see since the, you know, obviously, the OpenAI—the original launch and now there's just this huge arms race with no government involvement at all I think they're coming to the conclusion that rather than being developed to sort of complement human labor, all these systems are just being rushed out to substitute for human labor. And it's just going, if current trends persist, it's going to be a China shock on an even bigger scale.You know what is going to, if that, if they're right, that is going to produce some huge political backlash at some point, that's inevitable. So I know—the thing when the dot-com bubble burst, it didn't really have that much long-term impact on the economy. People lost the sort of fake money they thought they'd made. And then the companies, obviously some of the companies like Amazon and you know Google were real genuine profit-making companies and if you bought them early you made a fortune. But AI does seem a sort of bigger, scarier phenomenon to me. I don't know. I mean, you're close to it. What do you think?Andrew Keen: Well, I'm waiting for a book, John, from you. I think you can combine dot-com and capitalism and its critics. We need you probably to cover it—you know more about it than me. Final question, I mean, it's a wonderful book and we haven't even scratched the surface everyone needs to get it. I enjoyed the chapter, for example, on Karl Polanyi and so much more. I mean, it's a big book. But my final question, John, is do you have any regrets about anyone you left out? The one person I would have liked to have been included was Rawls because of his sort of treatment of capitalism and luck as a kind of casino. I'm not sure whether you gave any thought to Rawls, but is there someone in retrospect you should have had a chapter on that you left out?John Cassidy: There are lots of people I left out. I mean, that's the problem. I mean there have been hundreds and hundreds of critics of capitalism. Rawls, of course, incredibly influential and his idea of the sort of, you know, the veil of ignorance that you should judge things not knowing where you are in the income distribution and then—Andrew Keen: And it's luck. I mean the idea of some people get lucky and some people don't.John Cassidy: It is the luck of the draw, obviously, what card you pull. I think that is a very powerful critique, but I just—because I am more of an expert on economics, I tended to leave out philosophers and sociologists. I mean, you know, you could say, where's Max Weber? Where are the anarchists? You know, where's Emma Goldman? Where's John Kenneth Galbraith, the sort of great mid-century critic of American industrial capitalism? There's so many people that you could include. I mean, I could have written 10 volumes. In fact, I refer in the book to, you know, there's always been a problem. G.D.H. Cole, a famous English historian, wrote a history of socialism back in the 1960s and 70s. You know, just getting to 1850 took him six volumes. So, you've got to pick and choose, and I don't claim this is the history of capitalism and its critics. That would be a ridiculous claim to make. I just claim it's a history written by me, and hopefully the people are interested in it, and they're sufficiently diverse that you can address all the big questions.Andrew Keen: Well it's certainly incredibly timely. Capitalism and its critics—more and more of them. Sometimes they don't even describe themselves as critics of capitalism when they're talking about oligarchs or billionaires, they're really criticizing capitalism. A must read from one of America's leading journalists. And would you call yourself a critic of capitalism, John?John Cassidy: Yeah, I guess I am, to some extent, sure. I mean, I'm not a—you know, I'm not on the far left, but I'd say I'm a center-left critic of capitalism. Yes, definitely, that would be fair.Andrew Keen: And does the left need to learn? Does everyone on the left need to read the book and learn the language of anti-capitalism in a more coherent and honest way?John Cassidy: I hope so. I mean, obviously, I'd be talking my own book there, as they say, but I hope that people on the left, but not just people on the left. I really did try to sort of be fair to the sort of right-wing critiques as well. I included the Carlyle chapter particularly, obviously, but in the later chapters, I also sort of refer to this emerging critique on the right, the sort of economic nationalist critique. So hopefully, I think people on the right could read it to understand the critiques from the left, and people on the left could read it to understand some of the critiques on the right as well.Andrew Keen: Well, it's a lovely book. It's enormously erudite and simultaneously readable. Anyone who likes John Cassidy's work from The New Yorker will love it. Congratulations, John, on the new book, and I'd love to get you back on the show as anti-capitalism in America picks up steam and perhaps manifests itself in the 2028 election. Thank you so much.John Cassidy: Thanks very much for inviting me on, it was fun.Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe

Will artificial intelligence help you do your job, or will it just straight-up do your job and leave you unemployable? Or will the future bring something else entirely — either between those two extremes or a world that we simply cannot imagine yet? And are we already starting to see signs of that future emerging? On this episode of The New Bazaar, Cardiff is joined by economist Nathan Goldschlag, Research Director at the Economic Innovation Group. Until recently, Nathan was Principal Economist at the U.S. Census Bureau's Center for Economic Studies, where among other things he led research on the impact of technology, including AI, on the economy. Any worthwhile list of the world's best economists on the subject of AI and work would have to include him. Cardiff and Nathan go through Nathan's own research* and also filter out the megaton of nonsense on the topic and discuss some of the work done by others — research, essays, meanderings — that they think is actually worth sharing with listeners. They discuss, among other things: How many businesses are now using AI to produce goods and servicesHow have things changed since the launch and popularization of large language modelsEconomic growth consequences of AIWhether “learn to code” is still good advice The skills that still matter To steer or not to steer the AI future* Nathan's research on AI was done in collaboration with a large team of researchers at the Center for Economic Studies at the U.S. Census Bureau including Emin Dinlersoz, Lucia Foster, David Beede, John Haltiwanger, Zach Kroff, Nikolas Zolas, Gary Anderson, and Eric Childress, along with program area partners including Kathryn Bonney, Cory Breaux, Cathy Buffington, and Keith Savage, as well as academic partners including Daron Acemoglu, Erik Brynjolfsson, Kristina McElheran, and Pascual Restrepo. Related links:The impact of AI on the workforce: Tasks versus jobs?Tracking Firm Use of AI in Real Time: A Snapshot from the Business Trends and Outlook Survey.The Rapid Adoption of Generative AI | NBERAnswering the Call of AutomationAI-2027.comTyler Cowen - the #1 bottleneck to AI progress is humansDriverless trucks are coming and unions aren't happy about itGenerative AI at Work Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

On this episode of the Energy Security Cubed Podcast, Kelly Ogle and Joe Calnan interview Charles St-Arnaud about what the failure of other sectors to make up for declining energy investment after 2014 tells us about the deep issues present in the Canadian economy. // For the intro, Kelly and Joe talk about the "Liberation Day" tariffs impact on oil prices and the potential for FID on LNG Canada Phase 2. // Guest Bio: - Charles St-Arnaud is Chief Economist at Alberta Central // Host Bio: - Kelly Ogle is Managing Director of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute - Joe Calnan is an Energy Security Analyst and Energy Security Forum Manager at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute // Reading recommendations: - "Why Nations Fail: The Origins Of Power, Prosperity, And Poverty", by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: https://www.indigo.ca/en-ca/why-nations-fail-the-origins-of-power-prosperity-and-poverty/9780307719225.html // Interview recording Date: April 7, 2025 // Energy Security Cubed is part of the CGAI Podcast Network. Follow the Canadian Global Affairs Institute on Facebook, Twitter (@CAGlobalAffairs), or on LinkedIn. Head over to our website at www.cgai.ca for more commentary. // Produced by Joe Calnan. Music credits to Drew Phillips.

Børsen og McKinsey & Co. holdt deres årlige topmøde forleden. På mødet talte blandt andre Jake Sullivan, USA's tidligere sikkerhedsrådgiver, Daron Acemoglu, nobelpristager og professor på M.I.T og Keyu Jin, professor på Harvard University. Samt 700 danske topchefer og ledere. Hvad var de mest interessante iagttagelser? Niels Lunde og Bjarne Corydon udveksler noter fra topmødet. Gæst: Bjarne Corydon, ansv. chefredaktør og adm. direktør, Børsen. 02.00: Geopolitik: Alt andet er underordnet. Giv din forretningsmodel et realitets-tjek før det er for sent. 11.41: USA og Donald Trump: ”Du kan virkelig mærke the chill i USA lige nu.” 18.29: USA og Europa: Forholdet er forandret for altid. Men glem alt om, at Europas våbenindustri kan løsrive sig fra USA. 26.24: Handelskrig: Ja, en ukontrolleret handelskrig er mulig. Told: Forstå Donald Trumps fire motiver. 29.30: Kunstig intelligens: Her er fejlen som mange virksomheder begår. 35.55: Kunstig intelligens: DeepSeek er et symbol på kinesisk innovation. 41.42: Niels' opsamling. Producer: Mie Hee Christensen.   De tre interviews, der omtales i optagelsen: Jake Sullivan: https://borsen.dk/nyheder/perspektiv/han-har-lige-vaeret-en-af-verdens-mest-magtfulde-nu-star-han-frem-med-alvorlig-advarsel-om-trump?b_source=borsen&b_medium=row_0&b_campaign=andrelaeser_news_list_1 Daron Acemoglu: https://borsen.dk/nyheder/perspektiv/nobelprisokonom-frygter-kollaps-i-usa-jeg-har-mange-sovnlose-naetter?b_source=borsen&b_medium=row_0&b_campaign=andrelaeser_news_list_5 Keyu Jin: https://borsen.dk/nyheder/perspektiv/topokonom-usa-vil-miste-pladsen-som-verdens-storste-okonomi?b_source=borsen&b_medium=row_4&b_campaign=perspektiv_news_3 Få Niels Lundes nyhedsbrev: Tilmelding på borsen.dk/nyhedsbreve

Frank Lavin talks about Indonesia and Southeast Asia with Gita Wirjawan, Visiting Scholar at Stanford University and former Minister of Trade for Indonesia. For insights on successful societies and successful lives, Gita recommends “Range” by David Epstein and “The Narrow Corridor” by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson.

Daron Acemoglu är kanske den av pristagarna som var mest tippad. Vi besöker honom vid MIT och hör om hur världens ekonomi vältes över ända för flera hundra år sedan, hur AI kan påverka arbetsmarknaden och kopplingen till fotbollsklubben Galatasaray. Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radio Play. Programmet sändes första gången 30/12-2024.Han skriver mängder av vetenskapliga artiklar och bästsäljande böcker om ekonomi och teknologi, och tidsspannet går från det tidigast möjliga till framtiden för arbetsmarknaden nu när AI väntas revolutionera de flesta branscher.Daron Acemoglu är den mest kände av årets tre mottagare av Riksbankens pris i ekonomisk vetenskap till Alfred Nobels minne, och hans intresse för den forskning som han nu belönas för väcktes redan i tonåren, påverkat av situationen i hans hemland Turkiet.Han belönas för sin forskning om varför arvet efter kolonialismen är en så viktig faktor bakom skillnader i välstånd mellan olika länder, och hur de länder som en gång i tiden var bland de rikaste nu blivit de fattigaste.Medverkande: Daron Acemoglu, professor vid MIT Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA.Reporter: Björn Gunérbjorn.guner@sr.seProducent: Lars Broströmlars.brostrom@sr.se

Is artificial intelligence going to put us all out of work? There have been a range of predictions about the economic impact of AI, ranging from the modest to the fantastical. Nobel Prize-winning MIT professor Daron Acemoglu joins David Rothkopf to get to bottom of what we can really expect out of the AI revolution.  This material is distributed by TRG Advisory Services, LLC on behalf of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in the U.S.. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

What comes first: the customer or the employee? In this episode, Kevin sits down with Stephan Meier to explore why putting workers first isn't just good ethics—it's good business. Stephan highlights how engaged, motivated employees directly impact company success. Drawing from his background in behavioral economics, he breaks down four key motivators for workers: purpose (shoot for the moon), autonomy (matter of trust), competence (just right tasks), and relatedness (working together works). Kevin and Stephan also discuss the future of work, both the challenges and opportunities. He offers practical examples of how AI-powered tools can align employee strengths with organizational needs. Listen For 00:00 Introduction 02:00 Meet Stephan Meier 07:00 The Employee-First Approach 11:00 The Business Case for Prioritizing Employees 19:00 The Four Pillars of Employee Engagement 25:00 The Role of Technology in the Future of Work 31:00 Leadership Mindset Shift 36:00 Fun Facts About Stephan 38:00 Book Recommendations Meet Stephan Stephan's Story: Stephan Meier is the author of the forthcoming book The Employee Advantage: How Putting Workers First Helps Business Thrive. He is the James P. Gorman Professor of Business Strategy at Columbia Business School and the chair of the Management Division. He is an award-winning teacher of classes in the MBA/EMBA program and executive education on strategy, Future of Work and Behavioral Economics. Previously he was a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank in Boston. His work has been published in the leading academic journals including the American Economic Review, Management Science, Psychological Science or Science Magazine, and has been profiled by the press such as The Economist, Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Neue Zürcher Zeitung. He holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Zurich. http://www.stephanmeier.com/ http://www.linkedin.com/in/stephan-meier-cbs https://www.stephanmeier.com/newsletter https://www.stephanmeier.com/lego-brick-by-brick-videos This Episode is brought to you by... Flexible Leadership is every leader's guide to greater success in a world of increasing complexity and chaos.  Book Recommendations The Employee Advantage: How Putting Workers First Helps Business Thrive by Stephan Meier Power and Progress by Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson Like this? The Leader's Role in Employee Engagement with Michael Lee Stallard Understanding the Employee Experience with Jacob Morgan Understanding Employee Engagement with Jacqueline Throop-Robinson Join Our Community If you want to view our live podcast episodes, hear about new releases, or chat with others who enjoy this podcast join one of our communities below. Join the Facebook Group Join the LinkedIn Group   Leave a Review If you liked this conversation, we'd be thrilled if you'd let others know by leaving a review on Apple Podcasts. Here's a quick guide for posting a review. Review on Apple: https://remarkablepodcast.com/itunes    Podcast Better! Sign up with Libsyn and get up to 2 months free! Use promo code: RLP  

Is artificial intelligence going to put us all out of work? There have been a range of predictions about the economic impact of AI, ranging from the modest to the fantastical. Nobel Prize-winning MIT professor Daron Acemoglu joins David Rothkopf to get to bottom of what we can really expect out of the AI revolution.  This material is distributed by TRG Advisory Services, LLC on behalf of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in the U.S.. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Following the success of last year's ⁠What About China ⁠-trilogy, I'm delighted to introduce a two-part series on the economic history of India. This series examines the origins of modern India by focusing on politics, poverty, and the experience of ordinary Indians from 1600 till today.The first episode covers the decline of the Mughals and the hugely controversial rule of the British East India Company and, later, the British Crown.One thing is clear: Most Indians lived in poverty when the British left. So, how much of Indian poverty was due to British policies? How much was shaped by deeper trends? And what should we make of those infamous railways?To tackle these questions, I'm joined by Bishnupriya Gupta, a professor of economics at the University of Warwick and one of the world's leading historians of the Indian economy. Her new book, ⁠An Economic History of India⁠, provides a uniquely objective and data-driven exploration of India's history, focusing on the well-being of ordinary people.In this episode, we discuss:Indian vs English living standards in 1600 / The impact of British colonialism on India's economy / The Great Famines of Bengal / What both imperial apologists and Indian nationalists get wrong about the British rule. In the end, Gupta also explains why Mahatma Gandhi's education might be a clue as to why India lagged behind East Asia in the 20th Century. Enjoy — and stay tuned for Part II on the era of Independence!MENTIONSBooks: An Economic History of India by Bishnupriya Gupta; The Great Divergence by Kenneth Pomerantz; Other scholars: Stephen Broadberry | Prasannan Parthasarathy | Nico Voigtländer & Hans-Joachim Voth | Indrajit Ray | Oded Galor (see episodes #12 and #13) On Humans episode: What About China (with Yasheng Huang, #44-46); Birth of Modern Prosperity (with Daron Acemoglu; Oded Galor, Brad DeLong; Branko Milanovic, after #40) Keywords: Mughal India | British colonialism | British Rad | East India Company | Indian nationalism | Indian deindustrialisation | Cotton trade | Indian railways | Primary vs higher education | Great Bengali faminesLINKSRead more at ⁠⁠⁠OnHumans.Substack.com⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠. You can also find On Humans on ⁠⁠⁠YouTube⁠⁠⁠ and ⁠⁠⁠BlueSky⁠⁠!Feeling generous? Join the wonderful group of my patrons at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Patreon.com/OnHumans⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠, ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠or get in touch for other ways to support!Email: ⁠⁠makela dot ilari at outlook dot com⁠⁠⁠

Countries with better institutions are more prosperous. A truism perhaps, but then why are they so hard to build and sustain? That is the question that Simon Johnson has sought to explain since the fall of communism and the basis for the research that won him the 2024 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. Johnson, a former IMF chief economist, now a professor at MIT in the Sloan School of Management, shares the award with James Robinson and Daron Acemoglu, who's also coauthor of his latest book Power and Progress, which challenges the assumption that technology equals progress. In this podcast, Johnson says when controlled by a select few, tech innovation can be self-serving and risk undermining the institutions that make it possible. Transcript: https://bit.ly/4b2V1aV

Sarah Stein Greenberg runs Stanford's d.school, which teaches design as a mode of problem solving. She and Steve talk about what makes her field different from other academic disciplines, how to approach hard problems, and why brainstorms are so annoying. SOURCE:Sarah Stein Greenberg, executive director of the Hasso Plattner Institute of Design at Stanford University. RESOURCES:Creative Acts for Curious People: How to Think, Create, and Lead in Unconventional Ways, by Sarah Stein Greenberg (2021).Noora Health.Civilla.Substantial.Rare.Sarah Stein Greenberg wildlife photography. EXTRAS:"Feeling Sound and Hearing Color," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2024)."Why Are Boys and Men in Trouble?" by People I (Mostly) Admire (2024)."What's Impacting American Workers?" by People I (Mostly) Admire (2024)."Richard Dawkins on God, Genes, and Murderous Baby Cuckoos," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2024)."The World's Most Controversial Ornithologist," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2024)."How PETA Made Radical Ideas Mainstream," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2024)."Pay Attention! (Your Body Will Thank You)," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2024)."How to Have Great Conversations," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2024)."Suleika Jaouad's Survival Mechanisms," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2024)."Daron Acemoglu on Economics, Politics, and Power," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2024)."Nobel Laureate Claudia Goldin on 'Greedy Work' and the Wage Gap," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2023)."A Rockstar Chemist and Her Cancer-Attacking 'Lawn Mower,'" by People I (Mostly) Admire (2022)."Daniel Kahneman on Why Our Judgment is Flawed — and What to Do About It," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2021)."Why Is Richard Thaler Such a ****ing Optimist?" by People I (Mostly) Admire (2021).

durée : 00:06:14 - La tech la première - Le prix Nobel d'économie américain Daron Acemoglu tire la sonnette d'alarme sur France Inter. La course à l'intelligence artificielle ne vise pas le bien commun, elle vise les profits des géants de la tech. Et le risque c'est d'avoir tous les inconvénients de l'IA sans les bénéfices…

Daron Acemoglu är kanske den av årets nobelpristagare som var mest tippad på förhand. Vi besöker honom vid MIT och hör om hur världens ekonomi vältes över ända för flera hundra år sedan, hur AI kan påverka arbetsmarknaden och om hans egen koppling till fotbollsklubben Galatasaray. Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radio Play. Han skriver mängder av vetenskapliga artiklar och bästsäljande böcker om ekonomi och teknologi, och tidsspannet går från det tidigast möjliga till framtiden för arbetsmarknaden nu när AI väntas revolutionera de flesta branscher.Daron Acemoglu är den mest kände av årets tre mottagare av Riksbankens pris i ekonomisk vetenskap till Alfred Nobels minne, och hans intresse för den forskning som han nu belönas för väcktes redan i tonåren, påverkat av situationen i hans hemland Turkiet. Han belönas för sin forskning om varför arvet efter kolonialismen är en så viktig faktor bakom skillnader i välstånd mellan olika länder, och hur de länder som en gång i tiden var bland de rikaste nu blivit de fattigaste.Medverkande: Daron Acemoglu, professor vid MIT Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA.Reporter: Björn Gunérbjorn.guner@sr.seProducent: Lars Broströmlars.brostrom@sr.se

Episode 142Happy holidays! This is one of my favorite episodes of the year — for the third time, Nathan Benaich and I did our yearly roundup of all the AI news and advancements you need to know. This includes selections from this year's State of AI Report, some early takes on o3, a few minutes LARPing as China Guys……… If you've stuck around and continue to listen, I'm really thankful you're here. I love hearing from you. You can find Nathan and Air Street Press here on Substack and on Twitter, LinkedIn, and his personal site. Check out his writing at press.airstreet.com. Find me on Twitter (or LinkedIn if you want…) for updates on new episodes, and reach me at editor@thegradient.pub for feedback, ideas, guest suggestions. Outline* (00:00) Intro* (01:00) o3 and model capabilities + “reasoning” capabilities* (05:30) Economics of frontier models* (09:24) Air Street's year and industry shifts: product-market fit in AI, major developments in science/biology, "vibe shifts" in defense and robotics* (16:00) Investment strategies in generative AI, how to evaluate and invest in AI companies* (19:00) Future of BioML and scientific progress: on AlphaFold 3, evaluation challenges, and the need for cross-disciplinary collaboration* (32:00) The “AGI” question and technology diffusion: Nathan's take on “AGI” and timelines, technology adoption, the gap between capabilities and real-world impact* (39:00) Differential economic impacts from AI, tech diffusion* (43:00) Market dynamics and competition* (50:00) DeepSeek and global AI innovation* (59:50) A robotics renaissance? robotics coming back into focus + advances in vision-language models and real-world applications* (1:05:00) Compute Infrastructure: NVIDIA's dominance, GPU availability, the competitive landscape in AI compute* (1:12:00) Industry consolidation: partnerships, acquisitions, regulatory concerns in AI* (1:27:00) Global AI politics and regulation: international AI governance and varying approaches* (1:35:00) The regulatory landscape* (1:43:00) 2025 predictions * (1:48:00) ClosingLinks and ResourcesFrom Air Street Press:* The State of AI Report* The State of Chinese AI* Open-endedness is all we'll need* There is no scaling wall: in discussion with Eiso Kant (Poolside)* Alchemy doesn't scale: the economics of general intelligence* Chips all the way down* The AI energy wars will get worse before they get betterOther highlights/resources:* Deepseek: The Quiet Giant Leading China's AI Race — an interview with DeepSeek CEO Liang Wenfeng via ChinaTalk, translated by Jordan Schneider, Angela Shen, Irene Zhang and others* A great position paper on open-endedness by Minqi Jiang, Tim Rocktäschel, and Ed Grefenstette — Minqi also wrote a blog post on this for us!* for China Guys only: China's AI Regulations and How They Get Made by Matt Sheehan (+ an interview I did with Matt in 2022!)* The Simple Macroeconomics of AI by Daron Acemoglu + a critique by Maxwell Tabarrok (more links in the Report)* AI Nationalism by Ian Hogarth (from 2018)* Some analysis on the EU AI Act + regulation from Lawfare Get full access to The Gradient at thegradientpub.substack.com/subscribe

En este episodio filosófico y revelador, reflexiono sobre una pregunta que me ha perseguido por años: ¿Por qué algunas personas y países alcanzan la riqueza mientras otros se quedan estancados? La respuesta está en crear valor a través de nuestro talento, en lugar de explotar recursos o especular con oportunidades pasajeras. Hago un recorrido histórico y cultural para entender cómo nuestras raíces latinoamericanas, influenciadas por la explotación durante la colonización, aún moldean nuestra manera de buscar éxito. Pero ojo, la historia no determina nuestro destino. Aquí te explico cómo puedes romper ese ciclo y apostar por un crecimiento financiero sostenible, basado en la innovación y el desarrollo de tus habilidades. Comparto ejemplos reales de cómo la especulación moderna (criptomonedas, activos digitales y otros atajos) puede ser una trampa que no genera riqueza duradera. La clave está en invertir en tu educación, tu talento y la creación de valor que realmente impacte al mundo.

Bevor es um scheinbar irrationales Anlegerverhalten in konjunkturell schweren Zeit geht, schalten wir zur Nobelpreisverleihung nach Stockholm und sprechen mit dem Wirtschaftspreisträger Daron Acemoglu.

James Robinson is winning the Nobel Prize for Economics this year alongside his co-author Daron Acemoglu and fellow economist, Simon Johnson.This is obviously extremely exciting for him, but as well selfishly, rather exciting for me… because in episode 24, James Robinson was one of the first people I ever interviewed for this podcast. James co-wrote an outrageously successful book in 2012 called - ‘Why Nations Fail' - which is the work for which James has won the Nobel Prize and as well, was the subject of this interview. Why Nations Fail introduces an extractive versus inclusive institutions framework that does an unreasonable amount of heavy lifting to explain the distributed economic prosperity between countries.And just fair warning, it is one of the first interviews I ever did, so it may feel quite a bit different to those more recently - but bare with me and endure my enthusiasm as James reveals where the catalyst for the inclusive/extractive framework comes from, a very hot take on corruption, James's work as a developmental economist and a whole lot more. It's also been a while since Ive made a general appeal for pumping that good juice. But if a Nobel Prize winner isn't a reason why, then there aren't any left. The ability for me to get the guests I want, and grow the show as I ambition, is all downstream of how many followers on Apple and Spotify I have, but as well, how many reviews on Apple and Spotify I have. So I ask, hat in hand, to please bring that Christmas cheer and pump a 5 star review into whichever platform it is that you listen on.

Nuno Palma é Professor Catedrático no Departamento de Economia da Universidade de Manchester, no Reino Unido, e Diretor do Arthur Lewis Lab for Comparative Development, da mesma universidade. Investigador do Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, e do Centre for Economic Policy Research, Londres. Galardoado com vários prémios internacionais, incluindo o Prémio Stiglitz, atribuído pela International Economic Association. Licenciado pela Universidade de Lisboa e doutorado pela London School of Economics. -> Apoie este podcast e faça parte da comunidade de mecenas do 45 Graus em: 45grauspodcast.com -> Deixe o seu email aqui para ser informado(a) do lançamento do Curso de Pensamento Crítico. _______________ Índice: (0:00) Introdução (4:13) Início | Livro do convidado: «As Causas do Atraso Português» | Evolução do PIB per capita de Portugal nos últimos séculos (8:36) A importância das instituições no desenvolvimento. | Prémio Nobel Economia 2024: Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson e James A. Robinson (13:42) Período entre 1640 e as Invasões Francesas de 1808-14 | Artigo sobre capacidade orçamental do Estado (26:01) O puzzle do fiasco da Monarquia Liberal (40:06) Primeira República | A. H. de Oliveira Marques (48:18) Estado Novo (1:03:50) Como é que uma ditadura pôde gerar desenvolvimento? (1:19:46) Transição para a democracia | O efeito do PREC (1:26:48) A Democracia | Worldwide Governance Indicators | O problema da Justiça  | Evolução do nr de alunos no ensino secundário (1:46:37) Como é que o aumento da escolarização não tem gerado crescimento? | Literacia financeira  1:53:46 Desigualdade | Maldição dos Fundos Europeus? ______________ Esta conversa foi editada por: DBF Estúdio

Çerçeve'nin yeni bölümünde Mert Söyler ve İlkan Dalkuç; Alp Buğdaycı ile Daron Acemoğlu'na Nobel getiren kurumlar üzerine çalışmalarını, politik ekonomiye katkılarını, Trump'ın ekonomi politikalarını konuşuyorlar.Alp Buğdaycı'nın Daktilo1984'teki yazıları

It's true that robots (and other smart technologies) will kill many jobs. It may also be true that newer collaborative robots (“cobots”) will totally reinvigorate how work gets done. That, at least, is what the economists are telling us. Should we believe them? SOURCES:David Autor, professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.James Rosenman, C.E.O. of Andrus on Hudson senior care community.Karen Eggleston, economist at Stanford University.Yong Suk Lee, professor of technology, economy, and global affairs at the University of Notre Dame. RESOURCES:"Robots and Labor in Nursing Homes," by Yong Suk Lee, Toshiaki Iizuka, and Karen Eggleston (NBER Working Paper, 2024)."Global Robotics Race: Korea, Singapore and Germany in the Lead," by International Federation of Robotics (2024)."Unmet Need for Equipment to Help With Bathing and Toileting Among Older US Adults," by Kenneth Lam, Ying Shi, John Boscardin, and Kenneth E. Covinsky (JAMA Internal Medicine, 2021)."Robots and Labor in the Service Sector: Evidence from Nursing Homes," by Karen Eggleston, Yong Suk Lee, and Toshiaki Iizuka (NBER Working Papers, 2021).The Work of the Future: Building Better Jobs in an Age of Intelligent Machines, by David Autor, David Mindell, Elisabeth Reynolds, and the MIT Task Force on the Work of the Future (2020)."Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets," by Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo (University of Chicago Press, 2020)."The Slowdown in Productivity Growth and Policies That Can Restore It," by Emily Moss, Ryan Nunn, and Jay Shambaugh (The Hamilton Project, 2020)."The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade," by David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson (NBER Working Papers, 2016)."Deregulation at Heart of Japan's New Robotics Revolution," by Sophie Knight and Kaori Kaneko (Reuters, 2014). EXTRAS:"What Do People Do All Day?" by Freakonomics Radio (2024)."Did China Eat America's Jobs?" by Freakonomics Radio (2017).

2025 está se aproximando e tem muita coisa na mesa das fintechs, bancos e mercado financeiro. Com tanta tecnologia nova (alguém falou IA?) e metas de ampliar o cenário de Open Finance, e dos outros Opens, o que podemos esperar de novidades para o próximo ano? Juliana Binatti, cofundadora e CPO da Pismo, conta o que viu na Money 20/20 e o que está na sua agenda.Links do episódioA página do LinkedIn de Juliana BinattiO livro "Acquired: Now What?", de Keno VigilO livro "People First: Creating and Leading People First Organizations", de Tony Taylor e Timothy KimO livro "Poder e progresso: Uma luta de mil anos entre a tecnologia e a prosperidade", de Daron Acemoglu e Simon JohnsonO livro "A tokenização do dinheiro: Como Blockchain, Stablecoin, CBDC e o DREX Mudaram O Futuro", de Gustavo Cunha A The Shift é uma plataforma de conteúdo que descomplica os contextos da inovação disruptiva e da economia digital.Visite o site www.theshift.info e assine a newsletter

Send us a textThis year's Nobel Prize winners in economics are Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, who wrote on the importance of inclusive institutions to economic growth. But what on earth are ‘inclusive institutions' and how do they differ from exclusive ones?Inclusive institutions are norms, either written or unwritten, about things like property rights, democracy, and the rule of law. But what other institutions are important to economic growth, if there are others?Some of this year's winners endorse a strong antitrust regime. How do you reconcile the importance of property rights to growth with a desire to limit and take down companies built upon those rights?At the time this episode was recorded, everyone in economics was talking about the Nobel Prize, both this year's winners and their research. But what other economists (and their work) should we be looking to? Today, I am excited to welcome David Henderson back to the podcast. Henderson is the Wall Street Journal's go-to writer when it comes to the Nobel in economics and an Emeritus Professor of Economics at the Naval Postgraduate School and a research fellow with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. His substack is titled I Blog to Differ, so go check it out! He answers questions just like these in our interview, so tune in to hear the answers!!Never miss another AdamSmithWorks update.Follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.

President-elect Donald Trump is preparing to select his top team ahead of his return to the White House, after vice president Kamala Harris vowed a "peaceful transfer of power". On this edition Newshour, we will examine how economic concerns among voters affected the result. We'll also speak to Nobel Prize winning economist Daron Acemoglu. Also in the programme: opposition parties in Germany call for snap elections after the collapse of the country's governing coalition; and Australia says it wants to ban under 16s from accessing social media.(Photo: President elect Donald Trump speaking from the 2024 US presidential election in Palm Beach County Convention Center on November 6, 2024. Credit: REUTERS/Callaghan O'Hare)

Sign up for a 14-day free trial and enjoy all the amazing features MyHeritage has to offer: https://bit.ly/EconomicsExplained_mh Why do some nations flourish while others remain trapped in poverty? This year's Nobel Prize in Economics goes to three economists whose groundbreaking work explores this question. Join us as we dive into the theories and insights of Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, who have helped shape policy across the globe with their research on economic growth and inequality. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with economist Robin Hanson about a) how much technological change our society will undergo in the foreseeable future, b) what form we want that change to take, and c) how much we can ever reasonably predict.Hanson is an associate professor of economics at George Mason University. He was formerly a research associate at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford, and is the author of the Overcoming Bias Substack. In addition, he is the author of the 2017 book, The Elephant in the Brain: Hidden Motives in Everyday Life, as well as the 2016 book, The Age of Em: Work, Love, and Life When Robots Rule the Earth.In This Episode* Innovation is clumpy (1:21)* A history of AI advancement (3:25)* The tendency to control new tech (9:28)* The fallibility of forecasts (11:52)* The risks of fertility-rate decline (14:54)* Window of opportunity for space (18:49)* Public prediction markets (21:22)* A culture of calculated risk (23:39)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationInnovation is Clumpy (1:21)Do you think that the tech advances of recent years — obviously in AI, and what we're seeing with reusable rockets, or CRISPR, or different energy advances, fusion, perhaps, even Ozempic — do you think that the collective cluster of these technologies has put humanity on a different path than perhaps it was on 10 years ago?. . . most people don't notice just how much stuff is changing behind the scenes in order for the economy to double every 15 or 20 years.That's a pretty big standard. As you know, the world has been growing exponentially for a very long time, and new technologies have been appearing for a very long time, and the economy doubles roughly every 15 or 20 years, and that can't happen without a whole lot of technological change, so most people don't notice just how much stuff is changing behind the scenes in order for the economy to double every 15 or 20 years. So to say that we're going more than that is really a high standard here. I don't think it meets that standard. Maybe the standard it meets is to say people were worried about maybe a stagnation or slowdown a decade or two ago, and I think this might weaken your concerns about that. I think you might say, well, we're still on target.Innovation's clumpy. It doesn't just out an entirely smooth . . . There are some lumpy ones once in a while, lumpier innovations than usual, and those boost higher than expected, sometimes lower than expected sometimes, and maybe in the last ten years we've had a higher-than-expected clump. The main thing that does is make you not doubt as much as you did when you had the lower-than-expected clump in the previous 10 years or 20 years because people had seen this long-term history and they thought, “Lately we're not seeing so much. I wonder if this is done. I wonder if we're running out.” I think the last 10 years tells you: well, no, we're kind of still on target. We're still having big important advances, as we have for two centuries.A history of AI advancement (3:25)People who are especially enthusiastic about the recent advances with AI, would you tell them their baseline should probably be informed by economic history rather than science fiction?[Y]es, if you're young, and you haven't seen the world for decades, you might well believe that we are almost there, we're just about to automate everything — but we're not.By technical history! We have 70-odd years of history of AI. I was an AI researcher full-time from '84 to '93. If you look at the long sweep of AI history, we've had some pretty big advances. We couldn't be where we are now without a lot of pretty big advances all along the way. You just think about the very first digital computer in 1950 or something and all the things we've seen, we have made large advances — and they haven't been completely smooth, they've come in a bit of clumps.I was enticed into the field in 1984 because of a recent set of clumps then, and for a century, roughly every 30 years, we've had a burst of concern about automation and AI, and we've had big concern in the sense people said, “Are we almost there? Are we about to have pretty much all jobs automated?” They said that in the 1930s, they said it in the 1960s — there was a presidential commission in the 1960s: “What if all the jobs get automated?” I jumped in in the late '80s when there was a big burst there, and I as a young graduate student said, “Gee, if I don't get in now, it'll all be over soon,” because I heard, “All the jobs are going to be automated soon!”And now, in the last decade or so, we've had another big burst, and I think people who haven't seen that history, it feels to them like it felt to me in 1984: “Wow, unprecedented advances! Everybody's really excited! Maybe we're almost there. Maybe if I jump in now, I'll be part of the big push over the line to just automate everything.” That was exciting, it was tempting, I was naïve, and I was sucked in, and we're now in another era like that. Yes, if you're young, and you haven't seen the world for decades, you might well believe that we are almost there, we're just about to automate everything — but we're not.I like that you mentioned the automation scare of the '60s. Just going back and looking at that, it really surprised me how prevalent and widespread and how serious people took that. I mean, you can find speeches by Martin Luther King talking about how our society is going to deal with the computerization of everything. So it does seem to be a recurrent fear. What would you need to see to think it is different this time?The obvious relevant parameter to be tracking is the percentage of world income that goes to automation, and that has been creeping up over the decades, but it's still less than five percent.What is that statistic?If you look at the percentage of the economy that goes to computer hardware and software, or other mechanisms of automation, you're still looking at less than five percent of the world economy. So it's been creeping up, maybe decades ago it was three percent, even one percent in 1960, but it's creeping up slowly, and obviously, when that gets to be 80 percent, game over, the economy has been replaced — but that number is creeping up slowly, and you can track it, so when you start seeing that number going up much faster or becoming a large number, then that's the time to say, “Okay, looks like we're close. Maybe automation will, in fact, take over most jobs, when it's getting most of world income.”If you're looking at economic statistics, and you're looking at different forecasts, whether by the Fed or CBO or Wall Street banks and the forecasts are, “Well, we expect, maybe because of AI, productivity growth to be 0.4 percentage points higher over this kind of time. . .” Those kinds of numbers where we're talking about a tenth of a point here, that's not the kind of singularity-emergent world that some people think or hope or expect that we're on.Absolutely. If you've got young enthusiastic tech people, et cetera — and they're exaggerating. The AI companies, even they're trying to push as big a dramatic images they can. And then all the stodgy conservative old folks, they're afraid of seeming behind the times, and not up with things, and not getting it — that was the big phrase in the Internet Boom: Who “gets it” that this is a new thing?I'm proud to be a human, to have been part of the civilization to have done this . . . but we've seen that for 70 years: new technologies, we get excited, we try them out, we try to apply them, and that's part of what progress is.Now it would be #teamgetsit.Exactly, something like that. They're trying to lean into it, they're trying to give it the best spin they can, but they have some self-respect, so they're going to give you, “Wow 0.4 percent!” They'll say, “That's huge! Wow, this is a really big thing, everybody should be into this!” But they can't go above 0.4 percent because they've got some common sense here. But we've even seen management consulting firms over the last decade or so make predictions that 10 years in the future, half all jobs would be automated. So we've seen this long history of these really crazy extreme predictions into a decade, and none of those remotely happened, of course. But people do want to be in with the latest thing, and this is obviously the latest round of technology, it's impressive. I'm proud to be a human, to have been part of the civilization to have done this, and I'd like to try them out, and see what I can do with them, and think of where they could go. That's all exciting and fun, but we've seen that for 70 years: new technologies, we get excited, we try them out, we try to apply them, and that's part of what progress is. The tendency to control new tech (9:28)Not to talk just about AI, but do you think AI is important enough that policymakers need to somehow guide the technology to a certain outcome? Daron Acemoglu, one of the Nobel Prize winners, has for quite some time, and certainly recently, said that this technology needs to be guided by policymakers so that it helps people, it helps workers, it creates new tasks, it creates new things for them to do, not automate away their jobs or automate a bunch of tasks.Do you think that there's something special about this technology that we need to guide it to some sort of outcome?I think those sort of people would say that about any new technology that seemed like it was going to be important. They are not actually distinguishing AI from other technologies. This is just what they say about everything.It could be “technology X,” we must guide it to the outcome that I have already determined.As long as you've said, “X is new, X is exciting, a lot of things seem to depend on X,” then their answer would be, “We need to guide it.” It wouldn't really matter what the details of X were. That's just how they think about society and technology. I don't see anything distinctive about this, per se, in that sense, other than the fact that — look, in the long run, it's huge.Space, in the long run, is huge, because obviously in the long run almost everything will be in space, so clearly, eventually, space will be the vast majority of everything. That doesn't mean we need to guide space now or to do anything different about it, per se. At the moment, space is pretty small, and it's pretty pedestrian, but it's exciting, and the same for AI. At the moment, AI is pretty small, minor, AI is not remotely threatening to cause harm in our world today. If you look about harmful technologies, this is way down the scale. Demonstrated harms of AI in the last 10 years are minuscule compared to things like construction equipment, or drugs, or even television, really. This is small.Ladders for climbing up on your roof to clean out the gutters, that's a very dangerous technology.Yeah, somebody should be looking into that. We should be guiding the ladder industry to make sure they don't cause harm in the world.The fallibility of forecasts (11:52)I'm not sure how much confidence we should ever have on long-term economic forecasts, but have you seen any reason to think that they might be less reliable than they always have been? That we might be approaching some sort of change? That those 50-year forecasts of entitlement spending might be all wrong because the economy's going to be growing so much faster, or the longevity is going to be increasing so much faster?Previously, the world had been doubling roughly every thousand years, and that had been going on for maybe 10,000 years, and then, within the space of a century, we switched to doubling roughly every 15 or 20 years. That's a factor of 60 increase in the growth rate, and it happened after a previous transition from forging to farming, roughly 10 doublings before.It was just a little over two centuries ago when the world saw this enormous revolution. Previously, the world had been doubling roughly every thousand years, and that had been going on for maybe 10,000 years, and then, within the space of a century, we switched to doubling roughly every 15 or 20 years. That's a factor of 60 increase in the growth rate, and it happened after a previous transition from forging to farming, roughly 10 doublings before.So you might say we can't trust these trends to continue maybe more than 10 doublings, and then who knows what might happen? You could just say — that's 200 years, say, if you double every 20 years — we just can't trust these forecasts more than 200 years out. Look at what's happened in the past after that many doublings, big changes happened, and you might say, therefore, expect, on that sort of timescale, something else big to happen. That's not crazy to say. That's not very specific.And then if you say, well, what is the thing people most often speculate could be the cause of a big change? They do say AI, and then we actually have a concrete reason to think AI would change the growth rate of the economy: That is the fact that, at the moment, we make most stuff in factories, and factories typically push out from the factory as much value as the factory itself embodies, in economic terms, in a few months.If you could have factories make factories, the economy could double every few months. The reason we can't now is we have humans in the factories, and factories don't double them. But if you could make AIs in factories, and the AIs made factories, that made more AIs, that could double every few months. So the world economy could plausibly double every few months when AI has dominated the economy.That's of the magnitude doubling every few months versus doubling every 20 years. That's a magnitude similar to the magnitude we saw before from farming to industry, and so that fits together as saying, sometime in the next few centuries, expect a transition that might increase the growth rate of the economy by a factor of 100. Now that's an abstract thing in the long frame, it's not in the next 10 years, or 20 years, or something. It's saying that economic modes only last so long, something should come up eventually, and this is our best guess of a thing that could come up, so it's not crazy.The risks of fertility-rate decline (14:54)Are you a fertility-rate worrier?If the population falls, the best models say innovation rates would fall even faster.I am, and in fact, I think we have a limited deadline to develop human-level AI, before which we won't for a long pause, because falling fertility really threatens innovation rates. This is something we economists understand that I think most other people don't: You might've thought that a falling population could be easily compensated by a growing economy and that we would still have rapid and fast innovation because we would just have a bigger economy with a lower population, but apparently that's not true.If the population falls, the best models say innovation rates would fall even faster. So say the population is roughly predicted to peak in three decades and then start to fall, and if it's falls, it would fall roughly a factor of two every generation or two, depending on which populations dominate, and then if it fell by a factor of 10, the innovation rate would fall by more than a factor of 10, and that means just a slower rate of new technologies, and, of course, also a reduction in the scale of the world economy.And I think that plausibly also has the side effect of a loss in liberality. I don't think people realize how much it was innovation and competition that drove much of the world to become liberal because the winning nations in the world were liberal and the rest were afraid of falling too far behind. But when innovation goes away, they won't be so eager to be liberal to be innovative because innovation just won't be a thing, and so much of the world will just become a lot less liberal.There's also the risk that — basically, computers are a very durable technology, in principle. Typically we don't make them that durable because every two years they get twice as good, but when innovation goes away, they won't get good very fast, and then you'll be much more tempted to just make very durable computers, and the first generation that makes very durable computers that last hundreds of years, the next generation won't want to buy new computers, they'll just use the old durable ones as the economy is shrinking and then the industry that commuters might just go away. And then it could be a long time before people felt a need to rediscover those technologies.I think the larger-scale story is there's no obvious process that would prevent this continued decline because there's no level at which, when you get that, some process kicks in and it makes us say, “Oh, we need to increase the population.” But the most likely scenario is just that the Amish and [Hutterites] and other insular, fertile subgroups who have been doubling every 20 years for a century will just keep doing that and then come to dominate the world, much like Christians took over the Roman Empire: They took it over by doubling every 20 years for three centuries. That's my default future, and then if we don't get AI or colonize space before this decline, which I've estimated would be roughly 70 years' worth more of progress at previous rates, then we don't get it again until the Amish not only just take over the world, but rediscover a taste for technology and economic growth, and then eventually all of the great stuff could happen, but that could be many centuries later.This does not sound like an issue that can be fundamentally altered by tweaking the tax code.You would have to make a large —— Large turn of the dial, really turn that dial.People are uncomfortable with larger-than-small tweaks, of course, but we're not in an era that's at all eager for vast changes in policy, we are in a pretty conservative era that just wants to tweak things. Tweaks won't do it.Window of opportunity for space (18:49)We can't do things like Daylight Savings Time, which some people want to change. You mentioned this window — Elon Musk has talked about a window for expansion into space, and this is a couple of years ago, he said, “The window has closed before. It's open now. Don't assume it will always be open.”Is that right? Why would it close? Is it because of higher interest rates? Because the Amish don't want to go to space? Why would the window close?I think, unfortunately, we've got a limited window to try to jumpstart a space economy before the earth economy shrinks and isn't getting much value from a space economy.There's a demand for space stuff, mostly at the moment, to service Earth, like the internet circling the earth, say, as Elon's big project to fund his spaceships. And there's also demand for satellites to do surveillance of the earth, et cetera. As the earth economy shrinks, the demand for that stuff will shrink. At some point, they won't be able to afford fixed costs.A big question is about marginal cost versus fixed costs. How much is the fixed cost just to have this capacity to send stuff into space, versus the marginal cost of adding each new rocket? If it's dominated by marginal costs and they make the rockets cheaper, okay, they can just do fewer rockets less often, and they can still send satellites up into space. But if you're thinking of something where there's a key scale that you need to get past even to support this industry, then there's a different thing.So thinking about a Mars economy, or even a moon economy, or a solar system economy, you're looking at a scale thing. That thing needs to be big enough to be self-sustaining and economically cost-effective, or it's just not going to work. So I think, unfortunately, we've got a limited window to try to jumpstart a space economy before the earth economy shrinks and isn't getting much value from a space economy. Space economy needs to be big enough just to support itself, et cetera, and that's a problem because it's the same humans in space who are down here on earth, who are going to have the same fertility problems up there unless they somehow figure out a way to make a very different culture.A lot of people just assume, “Oh, you could have a very different culture on Mars, and so they could solve our cultural problems just by being different,” but I'm not seeing that. I think they would just have a very strong interconnection with earth culture because they're going to have just a rapid bandwidth stuff back and forth, and their fertility culture and all sorts of other culture will be tied closely to earth culture, so I'm not seeing how a Mars colony really solves earth cultural problems.Public prediction markets (21:22)The average person is aware that these things, whether it's betting markets or these online consensus prediction markets, that they exist, that you can bet on presidential races, and you can make predictions about a superconductor breakthrough, or something like that, or about when we're going to get AGI.To me, it seems like they have, to some degree, broken through the filter, and people are aware that they're out there. Have they come of age?. . . the big value here isn't going to be betting on elections, it's going to be organizations using them to make organization decisions, and that process is being explored.In this presidential election, there's a lot of discussion that points to them. And people were pretty open to that until Trump started to be favored, and people said, “No, no, that can't be right. There must be a lot of whales out there manipulating, because it couldn't be Trump's winning.” So the openness to these things often depends on what their message is.But honestly, the big value here isn't going to be betting on elections, it's going to be organizations using them to make organization decisions, and that process is being explored. Twenty-five years ago, I invented this concept of decision markets using in organizations, and now in the last year, I've actually seen substantial experimentation with them and so I'm excited to see where that goes, and I'm hopeful there, but that's not so much about the presidential markets.Roughly a century ago there was more money bet in presidential betting markets than in stock markets at the time. Betting markets were very big then, and then they declined, primarily because scientific polling was declared a more scientific approach to estimating elections than betting markets, and all the respectable people wanted to report on scientific polls. And then of course the stock market became much, much bigger. The interest in presidential markets will wax and wane, but there's actually not that much social value in having a better estimate of who's going to win an election. That doesn't really tell you who to vote for, so there are other markets that would be much more socially valuable, like predicting the consequences of who's elected as president. We don't really have much markets on those, but maybe we will next time around. But there is a lot of experimentation going in organizational prediction markets at the moment, compared to, say, 10 years ago, and I'm excited about those experiments.A culture of calculated risk (23:39)I want a culture that, when one of these new nuclear reactors, or these nuclear reactors that are restarting, or these new small modular reactors, when there's some sort of leak, or when a new SpaceX Starship, when some astronaut gets killed, that we just don't collapse as a society. That we're like, well, things happen, we're going to keep moving forward.Do you think we have that kind of culture? And if not, how do we get it, if at all? Is that possible?That's the question: Why has our society become so much more safety-oriented in the last half-century? Certainly one huge sign of it is the way we way overregulated nuclear energy, but we've also now been overregulating even kids going to school. Apparently they can't just take their bikes to school anymore, they have to go on a bus because that's safer, and in a whole bunch of ways, we are just vastly more safety-oriented, and that seems to be a pretty broad cultural trend. It's not just in particular areas and it's not just in particular countries.I've been thinking a lot about long-term cultural trends and trying to understand them. The basic story, I think, is we don't have a good reason to believe long-term cultural trends are actually healthy when they are shared trends of norms and status markers that everybody shares. Cultural things that can vary within the cultures, like different technologies and firm cultures, those we're doing great. We have great evolution of those things, and that's why we're having all these great technologies. But things like safetyism is more of a shared cultural norm, and we just don't have good reasons to think those changes are healthy, and they don't fix themselves, so this is just another example of something that's going wrong.They don't fix themselves because if you have a strong, very widely shared cultural norm, and someone has a different idea, they need to be prepared to pay a price, and most of us aren't prepared to pay that price.If we had a healthy cultural evolution competition among even nations, this would be fine. The problem is we have this global culture, a monoculture, really, that enforces everybody.Right. If, for example, we have 200 countries, if they were actually independent experiments and had just had different cultures going different directions, then I'd feel great; that okay, the cultures that choose too much safety, they'll lose out to the others and eventually it'll be worn out. If we had a healthy cultural evolution competition among even nations, this would be fine. The problem is we have this global culture, a monoculture, really, that enforces everybody.At the beginning of Covid, all the usual public health efforts said all the usual things, and then world elites got together and talked about it, and a month later they said, “No, that's all wrong. We have a whole different thing to do. Travel restrictions are good, masks are good, distancing is good.” And then the entire world did it the same way, and there was strong pressure on any deviation, even Sweden, that would dare to deviate from the global consensus.If you look about many kinds of regulation, it's very little deviation worldwide. We don't have 200, or even 100, independent policy experiments, we basically have a main global civilization that does it the same, and maybe one or two deviants that are allowed to have somewhat different behavior, but pay a price for it.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.Micro Reads▶ Economics* The Next President Inherits a Remarkable Economy - WSJ* The surprising barrier that keeps us from building the housing we need - MIT* Trump's tariffs, explained - Wapo* Watts and Bots: The Energy Implications of AI Adoption - SSRN* The Changing Nature of Technology Shocks - SSRN* AI Regulation and Entrepreneurship - SSRN▶ Business* Microsoft reports big profits amid massive AI investments - Ars* Meta's Next Llama AI Models Are Training on a GPU Cluster ‘Bigger Than Anything' Else - Wired* Apple's AI and Vision Pro Products Don't Meet Its Standards - Bberg Opinion* Uber revenues surge amid robust US consumer spending - FT* Elon Musk in funding talks with Middle East investors to value xAI at $45bn - FT▶ Policy/Politics* Researchers ‘in a state of panic' after Robert F. Kennedy Jr. says Trump will hand him health agencies - Science* Elon Musk's Criticism of ‘Woke AI' Suggests ChatGPT Could Be a Trump Administration Target - Wired* US Efforts to Contain Xi's Push for Tech Supremacy Are Faltering - Bberg* The Politics of Debt in the Era of Rising Rates - SSRN▶ AI/Digital* Alexa, where's my Star Trek Computer? - The Verge* Toyota, NTT to Invest $3.3 Billion in AI, Autonomous Driving - Bberg* Are we really ready for genuine communication with animals through AI? - NS* Alexa's New AI Brain Is Stuck in the Lab - Bberg* This AI system makes human tutors better at teaching children math - MIT* Can Machines Think Like Humans? A Behavioral Evaluation of LLM-Agents in Dictator Games - Arxiv▶ Biotech/Health* Obesity Drug Shows Promise in Easing Knee Osteoarthritis Pain - NYT* Peak Beef Could Already Be Here - Bberg Opinion▶ Clean Energy/Climate* Chinese EVs leave other carmakers with only bad options - FT Opinion* Inside a fusion energy facility - MIT* Why aren't we driving hydrogen powered cars yet? There's a reason EVs won. - Popular Science* America Can't Do Without Fracking - WSJ Opinion▶ Robotics/AVs* American Drone Startup Notches Rare Victory in Ukraine - WSJ* How Wayve's driverless cars will meet one of their biggest challenges yet - MIT▶ Space/Transportation* Mars could have lived, even without a magnetic field - Big Think▶ Up Wing/Down Wing* The new face of European illiberalism - FT* How to recover when a climate disaster destroys your city - Nature▶ Substacks/Newsletters* Thinking about "temporary hardship" - Noahpinion* Hold My Beer, California - Hyperdimensional* Robert Moses's ideas were weird and bad - Slow Boring* Trading Places? No Thanks. - The Dispatch* The Case For Small Reactors - Breakthrough Journal* The Fourth Industrial Revolution and the Future of Work - Conversable EconomistFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

Since Daron Acemoglu just won the 2024 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences alongside MIT Sloan professor Simon Johnson and University of Chicago professor James Robinson, we're revisiting  this powerful episode featuring Acemoglu's insights from 2023. In his groundbreaking book Power and Progress, Acemoglu exposes how the elite have weaponized technology to tighten their grip on wealth and influence, and explains how we can ensure that technological progress works for everyone, not just the wealthy few. This episode originally aired on August 22, 2023. Daron Acemoglu is the Institute Professor of Economics at MIT, the university's highest faculty honor, and a 2024 Nobel laureate. For the last twenty-five years, he has been researching the historical origins of prosperity, poverty, and the effects of new technologies on economic growth, employment, and inequality. He is an author (with James Robinson) of The Narrow Corridor and the New York Times bestseller Why Nations Fail. Twitter: @NarrowCorridor Further reading:  Trio of professors win Nobel economics prize for work on post-colonial wealth Democracy is in a ‘tough stretch.' New Nobel winners explain how to strengthen it Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty Website: http://pitchforkeconomics.com Twitter: @PitchforkEcon, @NickHanauer, @civicaction Instagram: @pitchforkeconomics Threads: pitchforkeconomics YouTube: @pitchforkeconomics Substack: The Pitch

durée : 00:03:19 - Les Échos d'ailleurs - Cette semaine, l'économiste Esther Duflo nous fait découvrir les travaux de Daron Acemoglu portant sur l'intelligence artificielle.

Each weekend on Best Of The Gist, we listen back to an archival Gist segment from the past, then we replay something from the past week. This weekend, we listen back to an extended cut of Mike's 2023 interview with Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, who were then the recent authors of the new book Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity, and who won the 2024 Nobel Prize for Economics this past week. Then we replay Mike's recent treatise on when journalism achieves the goals of art, but doesn't quite tell the accurate story.    Produced by Joel Patterson and Corey Wara  Email us at thegist@mikepesca.com  To advertise on the show: https://advertisecast.com/TheGist  Subscribe to our ad-free and/or PescaPlus versions of The Gist: https://subscribe.mikepesca.com/  Follow Mike's Substack: Pesca Profundities | Mike Pesca | Substack  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Daron Acemoglu was just awarded the 2024 Nobel Prize in economics. Earlier this year, he and Steve talked about his groundbreaking research on what makes countries succeed or fail. SOURCES:Daron Acemoglu, professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. RESOURCES:The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2024.Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity, by Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023)."Economists Pin More Blame on Tech for Rising Inequality," by Steve Lohr (The New York Times, 2022)."America's Slow-Motion Wage Crisis: Four Decades of Slow and Unequal Growth," by John Schmitt, Elise Gould, and Josh Bivens (Economic Policy Institute, 2018)."A Machine That Made Stockings Helped Kick Off the Industrial Revolution," by Sarah Laskow (Atlas Obscura, 2017)."The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It's Automation," by Claire Cain Miller (The New York Times, 2016).Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012)."The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (American Economic Review, 2001)."Learning about Others' Actions and the Investment Accelerator," by Daron Acemoglu (The Economic Journal, 1993)."A Friedman Doctrine — The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits," by Milton Friedman (The New York Times, 1970). EXTRAS:"What's Impacting American Workers?" by People I (Mostly) Admire (2024)."'My God, This Is a Transformative Power,'" by People I (Mostly) Admire (2023)."New Technologies Always Scare Us. Is A.I. Any Different?" by Freakonomics Radio (2023)."How to Prevent Another Great Depression," by Freakonomics Radio (2020)."Is Income Inequality Inevitable?" by Freakonomics Radio (2017).

The question of why some countries are rich and some poor has been described as the most important question in economics. Perhaps that is why the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics to Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson for their work on the importance of institutions in the economic fortunes of nation states. Tim Harford explains the economic theory that underpins their award.Presenter: Charlotte McDonald Reporter: Tim Harford Producer: Bethan Ashmead Latham Series producer: Tom Colls Production co-ordinator: Katie Morrison Sound mix: Giles Aspen Editor: Richard Vadon

As China prepares a raft of stimulus measures to reboot the country's domestic economy, Adam and Cameron discuss whether or not the measures will be effective. Also on the show: Adam and Cameron continue their tradition of discussing the annual Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. The 2024 prize went to Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, whose work helped highlight differences in prosperity between nations. To learn more about their work, check out this paper by the three winners on the causes of long-run growth: https://www.nber.org/papers/w10481 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

durée : 00:58:52 - Entendez-vous l'éco ? - par : Aliette Hovine, Bruno Baradat - Lundi dernier, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson et James Robinson ont obtenu le prix Nobel d'économie pour leurs recherches sur la compréhension des différences de prospérité entre les nations. - réalisation : Françoise Le Floch - invités : Denis Cogneau; François Bourguignon Économiste, professeur émérite à l'Ecole d'économie de Paris, ancien vice-président de la banque mondiale.; Thierry Verdier

Daron Acemoglu has been awarded the 2024 Nobel-prize for Economic Science. This is a great testament to his impressive career. But the award was given for his early work on global inequality, together with Johnson and Robinson. The Swedish Riksbank did not pay attention to his new work on inequality within rich countries. Should we? And is his new theory even consistent with the old? I got to ask this from Acemoglu during our 2023 interview. I thought this would be a good time to re-post his answer. In this highlight, we also discuss: The hidden tragedy behind growing wages Is automation the problem? Why we need a more "pro-human" direction of technology Lessons from (an imperfect) Germany Why fixing the economy starts from celebrating humanity If you want to enjoy the full show, head to episode 26 of this feed. You can also read my essay breakdown of Acemoglu's theory here. Get these and other resources at ⁠OnHumans.Substack.com⁠. Thank you to all the patrons who make On Humans possible! You can join the club at Patreon.com/OnHumans⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠. You can get in touch for other ways to support at ⁠makela.ilari@outlook.com⁠⁠⁠. KEYWORDS Economics | economic history | wage-stagnation | wage growth | inequality | economic inequality | automation | AI | robotics | US economy | German economy | Nobel-prize | labour unions | worker power | Elon Musk | Tesla | car manufacturing | co-determination | humanity

We have always been a nation of drinkers — but now there are more daily users of cannabis than alcohol. Considering alcohol's harms, maybe that's a good thing. But some people worry that the legalization of cannabis has outpaced the research. (Part one of a four-part series.) SOURCES:Jon Caulkins, professor of operations research and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University.Yasmin Hurd, director of the Addiction Institute at Mount Sinai.Michael Siegel, professor of public health and community medicine at Tufts University.Tom Standage, deputy editor of The Economist.Ryan Stoa, associate professor of law at Louisiana State University. RESOURCES:"Cannabis Tops Alcohol as Americans' Daily Drug of Choice," by Christina Caron (The New York Times, 2024)."Deaths from Excessive Alcohol Use — United States, 2016–2021," by Marissa B. Esser, Adam Sherk, Yong Liu, and Timothy S. Naimi (Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 2024)."Nixon Started the War on Drugs. Privately, He Said Pot Was ‘Not Particularly Dangerous,'" by Ernesto Londoño (The New York Times, 2024)."A Brief Global History of the War on Cannabis," by Ryan Stoa (The MIT Press Reader, 2020).Craft Weed: Family Farming and the Future of the Marijuana Industry, by Ryan Stoa (2018)."How the Sugar Industry Shifted Blame to Fat," by Anahad O'Connor (The New York Times, 2016)."The Perils of Ignoring History: Big Tobacco Played Dirty and Millions Died. How Similar Is Big Food?" by Kelly D. Brownell and Kenneth E. Warner (The Milbank Quarterly, 2009).A History Of The World In Six Glasses, by Tom Standage (2005)."Cancer and Coronary Artery Disease Among Seventh-Day Adventists," by E. L. Wynder, F. R. Lemon, and I. J. Bross (Cancer, 1959). EXTRAS:"Why Is the Opioid Epidemic Still Raging?" series by Freakonomics Radio (2024)."Daron Acemoglu on Economics, Politics, and Power," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2024)."Let's Be Blunt: Marijuana Is a Boon for Older Workers," by Freakonomics Radio (2021)."What's More Dangerous: Marijuana or Alcohol?" by Freakonomics Radio (2014).

In today's episode for 17th October 2024, we tell you why Dr. Daron Acemoglu, Dr. Simon Johnson and Dr. James A. Robinson won the prestigious Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences ― commonly known as the Nobel Prize in Economics. Speak to Ditto's advisors now, by clicking the link here - https://ditto.sh/9zoz41

Siempre tratamos de buscar explicaciones a los procesos económicos a partir de nuestra propia realidad, sobre todo cuando no nos alcanza el dinero, los precios no bajan, no hay posibilidad de ahorro y nos ahogan los intereses de préstamos y tarjetas. Pero según lo sostiene James Robinson, ganador del Nobel de Economía 2024, hay poderosas razones estructurales: “la pobreza y la desigualdad en América Latina están profundamente arraigadas en el colonialismo y la explotación de los indígenas”. Él junto con Daron Acemoglu y Simon Johnson, recibirán el galardón por sus estudios en busca de respuestas a las razones entre la prosperidad de unos países y el lacerante rezago de otros. Por cierto que la suya, es una teoría determinista muy controversial, sobre todo cuando tras siglos de emancipación vivimos en economías más abiertas al comercio internacional, con atracción de inversiones e innovación y tecnología como aliados de la producción y generación de riqueza. Y hablando de desequilibrios debemos entender qué sucede con la pregonada "economía jaguar" costarricense y sus claras señales de mayor distorsión entre el gasto y la recaudación de impuestos. Claro que no es una sorpresa para nada lo que está ocurriendo. El asunto de la consolidación fiscal simplemente no se resuelve con discursos ni tampoco con recortes a mansalva que solo producen mayor inequidad y problemas de corto, mediano y largo plazo. El economista Jose Luis Arce nos recuerda que el ajuste fiscal quedó a medio camino y lo más preocupante es que los actores políticos no están haciendo nada para encarar la situación. Para resumirlo en una sola palabra: indolencia. Con Arce, Director de Análisis y Estrategia de CFS Capital conversamos en Hablando Claro.

Earlier this week, MIT's Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for their groundbreaking research on how institutions influence economic development and the historical roots of economic inequalities. But we at the Next Big Idea Club were into these guys over a year ago when we featured Daron and Simon's book "Power and Progress." To celebrate their Nobel, we thought we'd bring Simon back to share the big ideas from that book.

Daron Acemoglu ha ganado el Premio Nobel de Economía de 2024. Pero, más allá de sus méritos académicos, durante los últimos meses se ha caracterizado por defender la censura estatal en internet. Hazte miembro en: https://plus.acast.com/s/juanrallo. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This morning, the Nobel committee announced the winners of the economics prize: three economists focused on how social institutions affect poverty and wealth within and among countries. The winners were Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson of MIT and James A. Robinson at the University of Chicago. Today, we’ll discuss some of their research findings. Plus, how can cultural intelligence help companies bridge a divided workplace in the run-up to the election?

James Robinson, a political scientist and economist, is the Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies at The University of Chicago. Robinson is the co-author, with Daron Acemoglu, of Why Nations Fail and The Narrow Corridor.  Today, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences announced that it would award the 2024 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel to James Robinson, Daron Acemoglu, and Simon Johnson “for studies of how institutions are formed and affect prosperity.” In this week's conversation, originally released in 2019, Yascha Mounk and James Robinson discuss the importance of political institutions; the roots of freedom and prosperity; and how citizens can beat the historical odds to improve their countries. This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. Please do listen and spread the word about The Good Fight. If you have not yet signed up for our podcast, please do so now by following this link on your phone. Email: podcast@persuasion.community  Website: http://www.persuasion.community Podcast production by Jack Shields, and Brendan Ruberry Connect with us! Spotify | Apple | Google Twitter: @Yascha_Mounk & @joinpersuasion Youtube: Yascha Mounk LinkedIn: Persuasion Community Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This morning, the Nobel committee announced the winners of the economics prize: three economists focused on how social institutions affect poverty and wealth within and among countries. The winners were Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson of MIT and James A. Robinson at the University of Chicago. Today, we’ll discuss some of their research findings. Plus, how can cultural intelligence help companies bridge a divided workplace in the run-up to the election?

“There's nothing natural about 30-, 40-, 50- fold differences in income per capita in a globalised, connected world.” Daron Acemoglu, economic sciences laureate 2024, speaks about the root causes of persistent poverty among the poorest nations and how to build the types of inclusive institution that can support prosperity. In this conversation with the Nobel Prize's Adam Smith, recorded shortly after the prize announcement, Acemoglu also highlights the importance of democracy and his fears regarding AI, and how its misuse could result in a two-tier society. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The 2024 winners of the Nobel prize for Economics were announced this morning. One of the winners was the MIT economist Simon Johnson, who, as the co-author (with his MIT colleague Daron Acemoglu) of Power and Progress, appeared on KEEN ON just over a year ago to talk about technology & prosperity. Given that the prize was given to Johnson (and Acemoglu) for their work on explaining the gaps in prosperity between nations, we thought it worthwhile to rerun the interview from last year. Particularly since, if anything, the relationship between new technologies like AI and economic inequality is even more pertinent in 2024 than it was last year. SIMON JOHNSON is the Ronald A. Kurtz (1954) Professor of Entrepreneurship at the MIT Sloan School of Management, where he is head of the Global Economics and Management group. In 2007-08 he was chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, and he currently co-chairs the CFA Institute Systemic Risk Council. In February 2021, Johnson joined the board of directors of Fannie Mae. Johnson's most recent book, with Daron Acemoglu, Power and Progress: Our 1000-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity, explores the history and economics of major technological transformations up to and including the latest developments in Artificial Intelligence. His previous book, with Jonathan Gruber, Jump-Starting America: How Breakthrough Science Can Revive Economic Growth and the American Dream, explained how to create millions of good new jobs around the U.S., through renewed public investment in research and development. This proposal attracted bipartisan support.Named as one of the "100 most connected men" by GQ magazine, Andrew Keen is amongst the world's best known broadcasters and commentators. In addition to presenting KEEN ON, he is the host of the long-running How To Fix Democracy show. He is also the author of four prescient books about digital technology: CULT OF THE AMATEUR, DIGITAL VERTIGO, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER and HOW TO FIX THE FUTURE. Andrew lives in San Francisco, is married to Cassandra Knight, Google's VP of Litigation & Discovery, and has two grown children.Keen On is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe

Att förstå skillnader i välstånd mellan länder prisas med årets ekonomipris. Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radio Play. Varför är vissa länder rika och andra fattiga? Sveriges riksbanks pris i ekonomisk vetenskap till Alfred Nobels minne går till Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson och James A. Robinson för deras för studier av hur institutioner formas och påverkar välstånd. Hör Vetenskapsradions sändning på plats från tillkännagivandet av ekonomipriset 2024. Programledare: Camilla Widebeck och Kristian ÅströmProducent: Jonna Westin Vet@sverigesradio.se

David Autor took his first economics class at 29 years old. Now he's one of the central academics studying the labor market. The M.I.T. economist and Steve dissect the impact of technology on labor, spar on A.I., and discuss why economists can sometimes be oblivious. SOURCES:David Autor, professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. RESOURCES:"Does Automation Replace Experts or Augment Expertise? The Answer Is Yes," by David Autor (Joseph Schumpeter Lecture at the European Economic Association Annual Meeting, 2024).“Applying AI to Rebuild Middle Class Jobs,” by David Autor (NBER Working Paper, 2024).“New Frontiers: The Origins and Content of New Work, 1940–2018,” by David Autor, Caroline Chin, Anna Salomons, and Bryan Seegmiller (The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2024).“Bottlenecks: Sectoral Imbalances and the US Productivity Slowdown,” by Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, and Christina Patterson (NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 2024)."Good News: There's a Labor Shortage," by David Autor (The New York Times, 2021)."David Autor, the Academic Voice of the American Worker," (The Economist, 2019).“Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation,” by David Autor (The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2015).“The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market,” by David Autor and David Dorn (The American Economic Review, 2013).“The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States,” by David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson (The American Economic Review, 2013). EXTRAS:"What Do People Do All Day?" by Freakonomics Radio (2024)."Daron Acemoglu on Economics, Politics, and Power," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2024)."You Make Me Feel Like a Natural Experiment," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2022)."In Search of the Real Adam Smith," series by Freakonomics Radio (2022)."Max Tegmark on Why Superhuman Artificial Intelligence Won't be Our Slave," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2021)."Automation," by Last Week Tonight With John Oliver (2019).

How do the histories of countries set up the greater context in which they become rich or poor? Daron Acemoglu believes it boils down to whether or not they've been organized according to extractive or inclusive institutions. He joins to discuss his book, Why Nations Fail.

Change is scary. But sometimes it can all work out for the best. There's no guarantee of that, however, even when the change in question involves the introduction of a powerful new technology. Today's guest, Daron Acemoglu, is a political economist who has long thought about the relationship between economics and political institutions. In his most recent book (with Simon Johnson), Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity, he looks at how technological innovations affect the economic lives of ordinary people. We talk about how such effects are often for the worse, at least to start out, until better institutions are able to eventually spread the benefits more broadly.Support Mindscape on Patreon.Blog post with transcript: https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/podcast/2024/07/22/283-daron-acemoglu-on-technology-inequality-and-power/Daron Acemoglu received a Ph.D. in economics from the London School of Economics. He is currently Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a fellow of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the Econometric Society. Among his awards are the John Bates Clark Medal and the Nemmers Prize in Economics. In 2015, he was named the most cited economist of the past 10 years.Web pageGoogle Scholar publicationsWikipediaAmazon author pageSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Tech giants and beyond are set to spend an estimated $1 trillion on AI capex in coming years. Will this investment pay off? And if it doesn't, what does that mean for businesses and investors? MIT's Daron Acemoglu and Goldman Sachs Research's Jim Covello explain why reality may not match the hype on the latest episode of Goldman Exchanges, which explores the latest Top of Mind report, Gen AI: too much spend, too little benefit?

So you want to help people? That's great — but beware the law of unintended consequences. Three stories from the modern workplace.  SOURCES:Joshua Angrist, professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.Zoe Cullen, professor of business administration at Harvard Business School.Marina Gertsberg, senior lecturer in finance at the University of Melbourne. RESOURCES:"Is Pay Transparency Good?" by Zoë Cullen (Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2024)."DP18969 Economics Coauthorships in the Aftermath of MeToo," by Noriko Amano-Patino, Elisa Faraglia, and Chryssi Giannitsarou (CEPR Discussion Paper, 2024)."The Underground Economy of Company Reviews," by Shikhar Sachdev (Career Fair, 2023)."Why Did Gender Wage Convergence in the United States Stall?" by Peter Q. Blair and Benjamin Posmanick (NBER Working Paper, 2023)."The Unintended Consequences of #MeToo: Evidence from Research Collaborations," by Marina Gertsberg (SSRN, 2022)."Outsourcing Tasks Online: Matching Supply and Demand on Peer-to-Peer Internet Platforms," by Zoë Cullen and Chiara Farronato (Management Science, 2021)."Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency," by Zoe B. Cullen and Bobak Pakzad-Hurson (NBER Working Paper, 2021)."How Much Does Your Boss Make? The Effects of Salary Comparisons," by Zoë Cullen and Ricardo Perez-Truglia (NBER Working Paper, 2018)."Wall Street Rule for the #MeToo Era: Avoid Women at All Cost," by Gillian Tan and Katia Porzecanski (Bloomberg, 2018)."A Comprehensive Analysis of the Effects of US Disability Discrimination Laws on the Employment of the Disabled Population," by Patrick Button, Philip Armour, and Simon Hollands (NBER Working Paper, 2016)."Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act," by Daron Acemoglu and Joshua Angrist (Journal of Political Economy, 2001).