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Last time we spoke about the battle of Nanchang. After securing Hainan and targeting Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway corridors, Japan's 11th Army, backed by armor, air power, and riverine operations, sought a rapid, surgical seizure of Nanchang to sever eastern Chinese logistics and coerce Chongqing. China, reorganizing under Chiang Kai-shek, concentrated over 200,000 troops across 52 divisions in the Ninth and Third War Zones, with Xue Yue commanding the 9th War Zone in defense of Wuhan-Nanchang corridors. The fighting began with German-style, combined-arms river operations along the Xiushui and Gan rivers, including feints, river crossings, and heavy artillery, sometimes using poison gas. From March 20–23, Japanese forces established a beachhead and advanced into Fengxin, Shengmi, and later Nanchang, despite stiff Chinese resistance and bridges being destroyed. Chiang's strategic shift toward attrition pushed for broader offensives to disrupt railways and rear areas, though Chinese plans for a counteroffensive repeatedly stalled due to logistics and coordination issues. By early May, Japanese forces encircled and captured Nanchang, albeit at heavy cost, with Chinese casualties surpassing 43,000 dead and Japanese losses over 2,200 dead.    #187 The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Having seized Wuhan in a brutal offensive the previous year, the Japanese sought not just to hold their ground but to solidify their grip on this vital hub. Wuhan, a bustling metropolis at the confluence of the Yangtze and Han Rivers, had become a linchpin in their strategy, a base from which they could project power across central China. Yet, the city was far from secure, Chinese troops in northern Hubei and southern Henan, perched above the mighty Yangtze, posed an unrelenting threat. To relieve the mounting pressure on their newfound stronghold, the Japanese high command orchestrated a bold offensive against the towns of Suixian and Zaoyang. They aimed to annihilate the main force of the Chinese 5th War Zone, a move that would crush the Nationalist resistance in the region and secure their flanks. This theater of war, freshly designated as the 5th War Zone after the grueling Battle of Wuhan, encompassed a vast expanse west of Shashi in the upper Yangtze basin. It stretched across northern Hubei, southern Henan, and the rugged Dabie Mountains in eastern Anhui, forming a strategic bulwark that guarded the eastern approaches to Sichuan, the very heartland of the Nationalist government's central institutions. Historian Rana Mitter in Forgotten Ally described this zone as "a gateway of immense importance, a natural fortress that could either serve as a launchpad for offensives against Japanese-held territories or a defensive redoubt protecting the rear areas of Sichuan and Shaanxi". The terrain itself was a defender's dream and an attacker's nightmare: to the east rose the imposing Dabie Mountains, their peaks cloaked in mist and folklore; the Tongbai Mountains sliced across the north like a jagged spine; the Jing Mountains guarded the west; the Yangtze River snaked southward, its waters a formidable barrier; the Dahong Mountains dominated the center, offering hidden valleys for ambushes; and the Han River (also known as the Xiang River) carved a north-south path through it all. Two critical transport arteries—the Hanyi Road linking Hankou to Yichang in Hubei, and the Xianghua Road connecting Xiangyang to Huayuan near Hankou—crisscrossed this landscape, integrating the war zone into a web of mobility. From here, Chinese forces could menace the vital Pinghan Railway, that iron lifeline running from Beiping (modern Beijing) to Hankou, while also threatening the Wuhan region itself. In retreat, it provided a sanctuary to shield the Nationalist heartlands. As military strategist Sun Tzu might have appreciated, this area had long been a magnet for generals, its contours shaping the fates of empires since ancient times. Despite the 5th War Zone's intricate troop deployments, marked by units of varying combat prowess and a glaring shortage of heavy weapons, the Chinese forces made masterful use of the terrain to harass their invaders. Drawing from accounts in Li Zongren's memoirs, he noted how these defenders, often outgunned but never outmaneuvered, turned hills into fortresses and rivers into moats. In early April 1939, as spring rains turned paths to mud, Chinese troops ramped up their disruptions along the southern stretches of the Pinghan Railway, striking from both eastern and western flanks with guerrilla precision. What truly rattled the Japanese garrison in Wuhan was the arrival of reinforcements: six full divisions redeployed to Zaoyang, bolstering the Chinese capacity to launch flanking assaults that could unravel Japanese supply lines. Alarmed by this buildup, the Japanese 11th Army, ensconced in the Wuhan area under the command of General Yasuji Okamura, a figure whose tactical acumen would later earn him notoriety in the Pacific War, devised a daring plan. They intended to plunge deep into the 5th War Zone, smashing the core of the Chinese forces and rendering them impotent, thereby neutralizing the northwestern threat to Wuhan once and for all. From April onward, the Japanese mobilized with meticulous preparation, amassing troops equipped with formidable artillery, rumbling tanks, and squadrons of aircraft that darkened the skies. Historians estimate they committed roughly three and a half divisions to this endeavor, as detailed in Edward J. Drea's In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Employing a classic pincer movement, a two-flank encirclement coupled with a central breakthrough, they aimed for a swift, decisive strike to obliterate the main Chinese force in the narrow Suixian-Zaoyang corridor, squeezed between the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains. The offensive erupted in full fury on May 1, 1939, as Japanese columns surged forward like a tidal wave, their engines roaring and banners fluttering in the dust-choked air. General Li Zongren, the commander of the 5th War Zone, a man whose leadership had already shone in earlier campaigns like the defense of Tai'erzhuang in 1938, issued urgent orders to cease offensive actions against the Japanese and pivot to a defensive stance. Based on intelligence about the enemy's dispositions, Li orchestrated a comprehensive campaign structure, assigning precise defensive roles and battle plans to each unit. This was no haphazard scramble; it was a symphony of strategy, as Li himself recounted in his memoirs, emphasizing the need to exploit the terrain's natural advantages. While various Chinese war zones executed the "April Offensive" from late April to mid-May, actively harrying and containing Japanese forces, the 5th War Zone focused its energies on the southern segment of the Pinghan Railway, assaulting it from both sides in a bid to disrupt logistics. The main force of the 31st Army Group, under the command of Tang Enbo, a general known for his aggressive tactics and later criticized for corruption, shifted from elsewhere in Hubei to Zaoyang, fortifying the zone and posing a dire threat to the Japanese flanks and rear areas. To counter this peril and safeguard transportation along the Wuhan-Pinghan Railway, the Japanese, led by the formidable Okamura, unleashed their assault from the line stretching through Xinyang, Yingshan, and Zhongxiang. Mobilizing the 3rd, 13th, and 16th Divisions alongside the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades, they charged toward the Suixian-Zaoyang region in western Hubei, intent on eradicating the Chinese main force and alleviating the siege-like pressure on Wuhan. In a masterful reorganization, Li Zongren divided his forces into two army groups, the left and right, plus a dedicated river defense army. His strategy was a blend of attrition and opportunism: harnessing the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains, clinging to key towns like lifelines, and grinding down the Japanese through prolonged warfare while biding time for a counterstroke. This approach echoed the Fabian tactics of ancient Rome, wearing the enemy thin before delivering the coup de grâce. The storm broke at dawn on May 1, when the main contingents of the Japanese 16th and 13th Divisions, bolstered by the 4th Cavalry Brigade from their bases in Zhongxiang and Jingshan, hurled themselves against the Chinese 37th and 180th Divisions of the Right Army Group. Supported by droning aircraft that strafed from above and tanks that churned the earth below, the Japanese advanced with mechanical precision. By May 4, they had shattered the defensive lines flanking Changshoudian, then surged along the east bank of the Xiang River toward Zaoyang in a massive offensive. Fierce combat raged through May 5, as described in Japanese war diaries compiled in Senshi Sōsho (the official Japanese war history series), where soldiers recounted the relentless Chinese resistance amid the smoke and clamor. The Japanese finally breached the defenses, turning their fury on the 122nd Division of the 41st Army. In a heroic stand, the 180th Division clung to Changshoudian, providing cover for the main force's retreat along the east-west Huangqi'an line. The 37th Division fell back to the Yaojiahe line, while elements of the 38th Division repositioned into Liushuigou. On May 6, the Japanese seized Changshoudian, punched through Huangqi'an, and drove northward, unleashing a devastating assault on the 122nd Division's positions near Wenjiamiao. Undeterred, Chinese defenders executed daring flanking maneuvers in the Fenglehe, Yaojiahe, Liushuihe, Shuanghe, and Zhangjiaji areas, turning the landscape into a labyrinth of ambushes. May 7 saw the Japanese pressing on, capturing Zhangjiaji and Shuanghe. By May 8, they assaulted Maozifan and Xinji, where ferocious battles erupted, soldiers clashing in hand-to-hand combat amid the ruins. By May 10, the Japanese had overrun Huyang Town and Xinye, advancing toward Tanghe and the northeastern fringes of Zaoyang. Yet, the Tanghe River front witnessed partial Chinese recoveries: remnants of the Right Army Group, alongside troops from east of the Xianghe, reclaimed Xinye. The 122nd and 180th Divisions withdrew north of Tanghe and Fancheng, while the 37th, 38th, and 132nd Divisions steadfastly held the east bank of the Xianghe River. Concurrently, the main force of the Japanese 3rd Division launched from Yingshan against the 84th and 13th Armies of the 11th Group Army in the Suixian sector. After a whirlwind of combat, the Chinese 84th Army retreated to the Taerwan position. On May 2, the 3rd Division targeted the Gaocheng position of the 13th Army within the 31st Group Army; the ensuing clashes in Taerwan and Gaocheng were a maelstrom of fire, with the Taerwan position exchanging hands multiple times like a deadly game of tug-of-war. By May 4, in a grim escalation, Japanese forces deployed poison gas, a violation of international norms that drew condemnation and is documented in Allied reports from the era, inflicting horrific casualties and compelling the Chinese to relinquish Gaocheng, which fell into enemy hands. On May 5, backed by aerial bombardments, tank charges, and artillery barrages, the Japanese renewed their onslaught along the Gaocheng River and the Lishan-Jiangjiahe line. By May 6, the beleaguered Chinese were forced back to the Tianhekou and Gaocheng line. Suixian succumbed on May 7. On May 8, the Japanese shattered the second line of the 84th Army, capturing Zaoyang and advancing on the Jiangtoudian position of the 85th Army. To evade encirclement, the defenders mounted a valiant resistance before withdrawing from Jiangtoudian; the 84th Army relocated to the Tanghe and Baihe areas, while the 39th Army embedded itself in the Dahongshan for guerrilla operations—a tactic that would bleed the Japanese through hit-and-run warfare, as noted in guerrilla warfare studies by Mao Zedong himself. By May 10, the bulk of the 31st Army Group maneuvered toward Tanghe, reaching north of Biyang by May 15. From Xinyang, Japanese forces struck at Tongbai on May 8; by May 10, elements from Zaoyang advanced to Zhangdian Town and Shangtun Town. In response, the 68th Army of the 1st War Zone dispatched the 143rd Division to defend Queshan and Minggang, and the 119th Division to hold Tongbai. After staunchly blocking the Japanese, they withdrew on May 11 to positions northwest and southwest of Tongbai, shielding the retreat of 5th War Zone units. The Japanese 4th Cavalry Brigade drove toward Tanghe, seizing Tanghe County on May 12. But the tide was turning. In a brilliant reversal, the Fifth War Zone commanded the 31st Army Group, in concert with the 2nd Army Group from the 1st War Zone, to advance from southwestern Henan. Their mission: encircle the bulk of Japanese forces on the Xiangdong Plain and deliver a crushing blow. The main force of the 33rd Army Group targeted Zaoyang, while other units pinned down Japanese rear guards in Zhongxiang. The Chinese counteroffensive erupted with swift successes, Tanghe County was recaptured on May 14, and Tongbai liberated on May 16, shattering the Japanese encirclement scheme. On May 19, after four grueling days of combat, Chinese forces mauled the retreating Japanese, reclaiming Zaoyang and leaving the fields strewn with enemy dead. The 39th Army of the Left Army Group dispersed into the mountains for guerrilla warfare, a shadowy campaign of sabotage and surprise. Forces of the Right Army Group east of the river, along with river defense units, conducted relentless raids on Japanese rears and supply lines over multiple days, sowing chaos before withdrawing to the west bank of the Xiang River on May 21. On May 22, they pressed toward Suixian, recapturing it on May 23. The Japanese, battered and depleted, retreated to their original garrisons in Zhongxiang and Yingshan, restoring the pre-war lines as the battle drew to a close. Throughout this clash, the Chinese held a marked superiority in manpower and coordination, though their deployments lacked full flexibility, briefly placing them on the defensive. After protracted, blood-soaked fighting, they restored the original equilibrium. Despite grievous losses, the Chinese thwarted the Japanese encirclement and exacted a heavy toll, reports from the time, corroborated by Japanese records in Senshi Sōsho, indicate over 13,000 Japanese killed or wounded, with more than 5,000 corpses abandoned on the battlefield. This fulfilled the strategic goal of containing and eroding Japanese strength. Chinese casualties surpassed 25,000, a testament to the ferocity of the struggle. The 5th War Zone seized the initiative in advances and retreats, deftly shifting to outer lines and maintaining positional advantages. As Japanese forces withdrew, Chinese pursuers harried and obstructed them, yielding substantial victories. The Battle of Suizao spanned less than three weeks. The Japanese main force pierced defenses on the east bank of the Han River, advancing to encircle one flank as planned. However, the other two formations met fierce opposition near Suixian and northward, stalling their progress. Adapting to the battlefield's ebb and flow, the Fifth War Zone transformed its tactics: the main force escaped encirclement, maneuvered to outer lines for offensives, and exploited terrain to hammer the Japanese. The pivotal order to flip from defense to offense doomed the encirclement; with the counterattack triumphant, the Japanese declined to hold and retreated. The Chinese pursued with unyielding vigor. By May 24, they had reclaimed Zaoyang, Tongbai, and other locales. Save for Suixian County, the Japanese had fallen back to pre-war positions, reinstating the regional status quo. Thus, the battle concluded, a chapter of resilience etched into the chronicles of China's defiance. In the sweltering heat of southern China, where the humid air clung to every breath like a persistent fog, the Japanese General Staff basked in what they called a triumphant offensive and defensive campaign in Guangdong. But victory, as history so often teaches, is a double-edged sword. By early 1939, the strain was palpable. Their secret supply line snaking from the British colony of Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland was under constant disruption, raids by shadowy guerrilla bands, opportunistic smugglers, and the sheer unpredictability of wartime logistics turning what should have been a lifeline into a leaky sieve. Blockading the entire coastline? A pipe dream, given the vast, jagged shores of Guangdong, dotted with hidden coves and fishing villages that had evaded imperial edicts for centuries. Yet, the General Staff's priorities were unyielding, laser-focused on strangling the Nationalist capital of Chongqing through a relentless blockade. This meant the 21st Army, that workhorse of the Japanese invasion force, had to stay in the fight—no rest for the weary. Drawing from historical records like the Senshi Sōsho (War History Series) compiled by Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, we know that after the 21st Army reported severing what they dubbed the "secret transport line" at Xinhui, a gritty, hard-fought skirmish that left the local landscape scarred with craters and abandoned supply crates, the General Staff circled back to the idea of a full coastal blockade. It was a classic case of military opportunism: staff officers, poring over maps in dimly lit war rooms in Tokyo, suddenly "discovered" Shantou as a major port. Not just any port, mind you, but a bustling hub tied to the heartstrings of Guangdong's overseas Chinese communities. Shantou and nearby Chao'an weren't mere dots on a map; they were the ancestral hometowns of countless Chaoshan people who had ventured abroad to Southeast Asia, sending back remittances that flowed like lifeblood into the region. Historical economic studies, such as those in The Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China by Stephen Fitzgerald, highlight how these funds from the Chaoshan diaspora, often funneled through family networks in places like Singapore and Thailand, were substantial, indirectly fueling China's war effort by sustaining local economies and even purchasing arms on the black market. The Chao-Shao Highway, that dusty artery running near Shantou, was pinpointed as a critical vein connecting Hong Kong's ports to the mainland's interior. So, in early June 1939, the die was cast: Army Order No. 310 thundered from headquarters, commanding the 21st Army to seize Shantou. The Chief of the General Staff himself provided the strategic blueprint, a personal touch that underscored the operation's gravity. The Army Department christened the Chaoshan push "Operation Hua," a nod perhaps to the flowery illusions of easy conquest, while instructing the Navy Department to tag along for the ride. In naval parlance, it became "Operation J," a cryptic label that masked the sheer scale unfolding. Under the Headquarters' watchful eye, what started as a modest blockade morphed into a massive amphibious assault, conjured seemingly out of thin air like a magician's trick, but one with deadly props. The 5th Fleet's orders mobilized an impressive lineup: the 9th Squadron for heavy hitting, the 5th Mine Boat Squadron to clear watery hazards, the 12th and 21st Sweeper Squadrons sweeping for mines like diligent janitors of the sea, the 45th Destroyer Squadron adding destroyer muscle, and air power from the 3rd Combined Air Group (boasting 24 land-based attack aircraft and 9 reconnaissance planes that could spot a fishing boat from miles away). Then there was the Chiyoda Air Group with its 9 reconnaissance aircraft, the Guangdong Air Group contributing a quirky airship and one more recon plane, the 9th Special Landing Squadron from Sasebo trained for beach assaults, and a flotilla of special ships for logistics. On the ground, the 21st Army threw in the 132nd Brigade from the 104th Division, beefed up with the 76th Infantry Battalion, two mountain artillery battalions for lobbing shells over rugged terrain, two engineer battalions to bridge rivers and clear paths, a light armored vehicle platoon rumbling with mechanized menace, and a river-crossing supplies company to keep the troops fed and armed. All under the command of Brigade Commander Juro Goto, a stern officer whose tactical acumen was forged in earlier Manchurian campaigns. The convoy's size demanded rehearsals; the 132nd Brigade trained for boat transfers at Magong in the Penghu Islands, practicing the precarious dance of loading men and gear onto rocking vessels under simulated fire. Secrecy shrouded the whole affair, many officers and soldiers, boarding ships in the dead of night, whispered among themselves that they were finally heading home to Japan, a cruel ruse to maintain operational security. For extra punch, the 21st Army tacked on the 31st Air Squadron for air support, their planes droning like angry hornets ready to sting. This overkill didn't sit well with everyone. Lieutenant General Ando Rikichi, the pragmatic commander overseeing Japanese forces in the region, must have fumed in his Guangzhou headquarters. His intelligence staff, drawing from intercepted radio chatter and local spies as noted in postwar analyses like The Japanese Army in World War II by Gordon L. Rottman, reported that the Chongqing forces in Chaozhou were laughably thin: just the 9th Independent Brigade, a couple of security regiments, and ragtag "self-defense groups" of armed civilians. Why unleash such a sledgehammer on a fly? The mobilization's magnitude even forced a reshuffling of defenses around Guangzhou, pulling resources from the 12th Army's front lines and overburdening the already stretched 18th Division. It was bureaucratic overreach at its finest, a testament to the Imperial Staff's penchant for grand gestures over tactical efficiency. Meanwhile, on the Nationalist side, the winds of war carried whispers of impending doom. The National Revolutionary Army's war histories, such as those compiled in the Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Shi (History of China's War of Resistance Against Japan), note that Chiang Kai-shek's Military Commission had snagged intelligence as early as February 1939 about Japan's plans for a large-scale invasion of Shantou. The efficiency of the Military Command's Second Bureau and the Military Intelligence Bureau was nothing short of astonishing, networks of agents, double agents, and radio intercepts piercing the veil of Japanese secrecy. Even as the convoy slipped out of Penghu, a detailed report outlining operational orders landed on Commander Zhang Fakui's desk, the ink still fresh. Zhang, a battle-hardened strategist whose career spanned the Northern Expedition and beyond , had four months to prepare for what would be dubbed the decisive battle of Chaoshan. Yet, in a move that baffled some contemporaries, he chose not to fortify and defend it tooth and nail. After the Fourth War Zone submitted its opinions, likely heated debates in smoke-filled command posts, Chiang Kai-shek greenlit the plan. By March, the Military Commission issued its strategic policy: when the enemy hit Chaoshan, a sliver of regular troops would team up with civilian armed forces for mobile and guerrilla warfare, grinding down the invaders like sandpaper on steel. The orders specified guerrilla zones in Chaozhou, Jiaxing, and Huizhou, unifying local militias under a banner of "extensive guerrilla warfare" to coordinate with regular army maneuvers, gradually eroding the Japanese thrust. In essence, the 4th War Zone wasn't tasked with holding Chao'an and Shantou at all costs; instead, they'd strike hard during the landing, then let guerrillas harry the occupiers post-capture. It was a doctrine of attrition in a "confined battlefield," honing skills through maneuver and ambush. Remarkably, the fall of these cities was preordained by the Military Commission three months before the Japanese even issued their orders, a strategic feint that echoed ancient Sun Tzu tactics of yielding ground to preserve strength. To execute this, the 4th War Zone birthed the Chao-Jia-Hui Guerrilla Command after meticulous preparation, with General Zou Hong, head of Guangdong's Security Bureau and a no-nonsense administrator known for his anti-smuggling campaigns, taking the helm. In just three months, Zhang Fakui scraped together the Independent 9th Brigade, the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Guangdong Provincial Security Regiments, and the Security Training Regiment. Even with the 9th Army Group lurking nearby, he handed the reins of the Chao-Shan operation to the 12th Army Group's planners. Their March guidelines sketched three lines of resistance from the coast to the mountains, a staged withdrawal that allowed frontline defenders to melt away like ghosts. This blueprint mirrored Chiang Kai-shek's post-Wuhan reassessment, where the loss of that key city in 1938 prompted a shift to protracted warfare. A Xinhua News Agency columnist later summed it up scathingly: "The Chongqing government, having lost its will to resist, colludes with the Japanese and seeks to eliminate the Communists, adopting a policy of passive resistance." This narrative, propagated by Communist sources, dogged Chiang and the National Revolutionary Army for decades, painting them as defeatists even as they bled the Japanese dry through attrition. February 1939 saw Commander Zhang kicking off a reorganization of the 12th Army Group, transforming it from a patchwork force into something resembling a modern army. He could have hunkered down, assigning troops to a desperate defense of Chaoshan, but that would have handed the initiative to the overcautious Japanese General Staff, whose activism often bordered on paranoia. Zhang, with the wisdom of a seasoned general who had navigated the treacherous politics of pre-war China, weighed the scales carefully. His vision? Forge the 12th Army Group into a nimble field army, not squander tens of thousands on a secondary port. Japan's naval and air dominance—evident in the devastation of Shanghai in 1937, meant Guangdong's forces could be pulverized in Shantou just as easily. Losing Chaozhou and Shantou? Acceptable, if it preserved core strength for the long haul. Post-Xinhui, Zhang doubled down on resistance, channeling efforts into live-fire exercises for the 12th Army, turning green recruits into battle-ready soldiers amid the Guangdong hills. The war's trajectory after 1939 would vindicate him: his forces became pivotal in later counteroffensives, proving that a living army trumped dead cities. Opting out of a static defense, Zhang pivoted to guerrilla warfare to bleed the Japanese while clutching strategic initiative. He ordered local governments to whip up coastal guerrilla forces from Chao'an to Huizhou—melding militias, national guards, police, and private armed groups into official folds. These weren't elite shock troops, but in wartime's chaos, they controlled locales effectively, disrupting supply lines and gathering intel. For surprises, he unleashed two mobile units: the 9th Independent Brigade and the 20th Independent Brigade. Formed fresh after the War of Resistance erupted, these brigades shone for their efficiency within the cumbersome Guangdong Army structure. Division-level units were too bulky for spotty communications, so Yu Hanmou's command birthed these independent outfits, staffed with crack officers. The 9th, packing direct-fire artillery for punch, and the 20th, dubbed semi-mechanized for its truck-borne speed, prowled the Chaoshan–Huizhou coast from 1939. Zhang retained their three-regiment setup, naming Hua Zhenzhong and Zhang Shou as commanders, granting them autonomy to command in the field like roving wolves. As the 9th Independent Brigade shifted to Shantou, its 627th Regiment was still reorganizing in Heyuan, a logistical hiccup amid the scramble. Hua Zhenzhong, a commander noted for his tactical flexibility in regional annals, deployed the 625th Regiment and 5th Security Regiment along the coast, with the 626th as reserve in Chao'an. Though the Fourth War Zone had written off Chaoshan, Zhang yearned to showcase Guangdong grit before the pullback. Dawn broke on June 21, 1939, at 4:30 a.m., with Japanese reconnaissance planes slicing through the fog over Shantou, Anbu, and Nanbeigang, ghostly silhouettes against the gray sky. By 5:30, the mist lifted, revealing a nightmare armada: over 40 destroyers and 70–80 landing craft churning toward the coast on multiple vectors, their hulls cutting the waves like knives. The 626th Regiment's 3rd Battalion at Donghushan met the first wave with a hail of fire from six light machine guns, repelling the initial boats in a frenzy of splashes and shouts. But the brigade's long-range guns couldn't stem the tide; Hua focused on key chokepoints, aiming to bloody the invaders rather than obliterate them. By morning, the 3rd Battalion of the 625th Regiment charged into Shantou City, joined by the local police corps digging in amid urban sprawl. Combat raged at Xinjin Port and the airport's fringes, where Nationalist troops traded shots with advancing Japanese under the absent shadow of a Chinese navy. Japanese naval guns, massed offshore, pounded the outskirts like thunder gods in fury. By 2:00 a.m. on the 22nd, Shantou crumpled as defenders' ammo ran dry, the city falling in a haze of smoke and echoes. Before the loss, Hua had positioned the 1st Battalion of the 5th Security Regiment at Anbu, guarding the road to Chao'an. Local lore, preserved in oral histories collected by the Chaozhou Historical Society, recalls Battalion Commander Du Ruo leading from the front, rifle in hand, but Japanese barrages, bolstered by superior firepower—forced a retreat. Post-capture, Tokyo's forces paused to consolidate, unleashing massacres on fleeing civilians in the outskirts. A flotilla of civilian boats, intercepted at sea, became a grim training ground for bayonet drills, a barbarity echoed in survivor testimonies compiled in The Rape of Nanking and Beyond extensions to Guangdong atrocities. With Shantou gone, Hua pivoted to flank defense, orchestrating night raids on Japanese positions around Anbu and Meixi. On June 24th, Major Du Ruo spearheaded an assault into Anbu but fell gravely wounded amid the chaos. Later, the 2nd Battalion of the 626th overran spots near Meixi. A Japanese sea-flanking maneuver targeted Anbu, but Nationalists held at Liulong, sparking nocturnal clashes, grenade volleys, bayonet charges, and hand-to-hand brawls that drained both sides like a slow bleed. June 26th saw the 132nd Brigade lumber toward Chao'an. Hua weighed options: all-out assault or guerrilla fade? He chose to dig in on the outskirts, reserving two companies of the 625th and a special ops battalion in the city. The 27th brought a day-long Japanese onslaught, culminating in Chao'an's fall after fierce rear-guard actions by the 9th Independent Brigade. Evacuations preceded the collapse, with Japanese propaganda banners fluttering falsely, claiming Nationalists had abandoned defense. Yet Hua's call preserved his brigade for future fights; the Japanese claimed an empty prize. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese operations had yet again plugged up supply leaks into Nationalist China. The fall of Suixian, Zaoyang and Shantou were heavy losses for the Chinese war effort. However the Chinese were also able to exact heavy casualties on the invaders and thwarted their encirclement attempts. China was still in the fight for her life.

Last time we spoke about the Japanese invasion of Hainan. In early 1939, the Sino-Japanese War shifted from pitched battles to a grueling struggle over lifelines and logistics. Japan pursued a southward strategy (Nanshin-ron), aiming to choke Chinese resistance by isolating key railways and airbases. It seized Hainan in February to secure southern airfields and threaten Indochina routes, then targeted Nanchang to cut the vital Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway, crippling Free China's eastern supply lines. The Japanese used a blended-arms approach: concentrated armor, air support, and amphibious and river operations, focusing on rapid, strategic breakthroughs rather than large-scale frontal assaults. China, though battered, relied on a reconstituted defense around Wuhan and Nanchang, with the Ninth War Zone under Xue Yue delaying Japanese advances and preserving critical corridors south of the Yangtze. The campaign highlighted the war's broader human and political dimensions: massive casualties, forced labor, and internal political fragility within the Kuomintang, even as both sides sought to outlast the other.   #186 The Battle of Nanchang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. For the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1939 marked a transition from broad occupation tactics to a focused, politically driven military strategy aimed at breaking Nationalist cohesion and isolating key nodes. After the January 11, 1938 Imperial Conference, Tokyo framed the China Conflict as a contest of endurance and political attrition: hold occupied territories as strategic assets, push a narrow operational corridor between Anqing, Xinyang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang, and treat the broader east-of-line spaces as pacified. The aim was to deny resources to Chiang Kai-shek's regime while awaiting a more opportune political rupture, instead of pursuing indiscriminate conquest. By October 1938, the tactical center of gravity shifted toward Wuhan and the Yangtze corridor. General Headquarters acknowledged the need to adapt to a protracted war: emphasize political strategy alongside combat operations, bolster a new regime in areas under pressure, and gradually erode Chongqing's moral and material resolve. This shift produced a dual track: reinforce a centralized, secure core while permitting peripheral fronts to be leveraged against Chongqing.   In early 1939, Japan sought to consolidate gains through layered defenses and strategic war zones, aiming to blunt Chinese mobilization and disrupt critical logistics. The Ninth War Zone, commanded by Xue Yue, formed a defensive umbrella over Nanchang's northern approaches and the surrounding rail-and-river arteries. China's leadership, notably Chiang Kai-shek, pressed for preemption to seize the initiative: an ambitious plan from Xue Yue to strike by March 24, 1939, to prevent a river-crossing Japanese advance and to pin forces before they could entrench. Japan responded with Operation Ren, targeting the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway to sever lines of communication and isolate Nanchang. Okamura Yasuji reorganized heavy weapons into concentrated tank groups, supported by air power, while late-February 1939 movements staged feints and riverine maneuvers to complicate Chinese concentration around Nanchang. The objective was a rapid, surgical seizure of Nanchang to blind the southern airbase network, disrupt the critical rail spine, and push Chinese forces deeper inland, thereby tightening a blockade around southern China. Together, these shifts framed Nanchang not as an isolated objective but as the climactic hinge in a broader strategy of coercive pressure, air-ground mobility, and rail control. The city's fall would represent the culmination of a protracted contest to deny the Nationalist regime its logistical arteries and air superiority, paving the way for further Japanese consolidation and pressure along the Yangtze corridor. In the wake of the Japanese capture of Wuhan in late 1938, the city swiftly transformed into a pivotal stronghold for the Imperial Japanese Army. It became the new base for the 11th Army, occupying the former territories of the National Revolutionary Army's 5th and 9th War Zones. This shift not only consolidated Japanese control over central China but also positioned their forces to launch further offensives, exploiting the region's logistical and geographical advantages. As a key railway hub and the western terminus of the Zhejiang-Hunan Railway, Nanchang served as a vital supply artery connecting the Third and Ninth War Zones of the Nationalist forces. Its airfields further amplified its importance, posing a direct threat to Japanese shipping routes along the Yangtze River. Capturing Nanchang would sever Chinese supply lines, isolate key military districts, and pave the way for deeper incursions into southern China. Faced with this looming threat, the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek moved quickly to reorganize its defenses in the 9th War Zone. General Chen Cheng retained his nominal position as commander in chief, but the actual operational reins were handed to General Xue Yue, a seasoned tactician known for his defensive prowess. This restructuring aimed to streamline command and bolster resistance, yet it was hampered by persistent logistical challenges that rendered many changes ineffective on the ground. As tensions escalated in early 1939, Chinese forces began amassing near Nanchang in preparation for the inevitable clash. Over 200,000 troops from 52 divisions were mobilized, drawing from units across the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Area. This region alone housed more than 29 divisions organized into four army groups: the 1st, 19th, 30th, and 32nd. On paper, this formidable assembly included over 16,000 officers and 240,000 enlisted men, representing a significant concentration of Nationalist power.   Leading this defensive effort was General Chen Cheng as the overarching commander in chief, with General Xue Yue stepping in as the acting commander to oversee day-to-day operations. Within this structure, the 19th Army Group stood out under the command of General Luo Zhuoying, supported by Lieutenant General Luo Weixong as his chief of staff. Luo Zhuoying, in particular, emerged as a central figure, assuming overall command for much of the ensuing Battle of Nanchang. His leadership would be tested against the relentless advance of the Japanese Eleventh Army, setting the stage for one of the bloodiest engagements of the war. In July 1938, during their offensive against Wuhan, Japanese forces attempted to advance toward Nanchang but were halted by Chinese defenders along the Xiushui River. The Chinese had established strong, fortified positions that effectively barred the Japanese path. The impasse endured for the rest of the year, with both armies locked in a standoff on opposite sides of the river. By March of 1939, the 11th Army led by General Okamura Yasuji, part of the Central China Expeditionary Army of General Hata Shunroku comprised 3 divisions, the 6th, 101st and 106th, roughly 120,000 men supported by 130 tanks and tankettes, 200 pieces of artillery, 30 warships with 50 motor boats, a battalion of SNLF and several air squadrons.  On March 12,  the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Army issued orders to its directly subordinate 116th Division. This division was commanded to dispatch two key detachments: the Ishihara Detachment and the Murai Detachment, the latter composed meticulously of five battalions drawn from the 119th Brigade. Their mission was to conduct a thorough search along the eastern shore of Poyang Lake, supported by naval vessels that patrolled the waters with menacing precision. The purpose was multifaceted: to safeguard the integrity of land and water transportation routes and to protect the left flank of the main Japanese force as it prepared for larger operations. By March 15, these detachments had advanced without encountering any resistance from the Chinese army, allowing them to conclude their search operation successfully. Following this, they deployed the necessary troops at key points along the route, establishing garrisons that would serve as footholds for future advances. This reconnaissance was no mere stroll; it was a calculated probe into enemy territory, drawing lessons from prior engagements like the grueling Battle of Xuzhou in 1938, where intelligence gathering had proven crucial to Japanese successes. The Japanese soldiers boots sank into the marshy banks of Poyang Lake, China's largest freshwater body, covering over 3,500 square kilometers and teeming with reeds that could hide ambushes. The lack of opposition allowed the Japanese to fortify their positions, setting the stage for the preemptive strikes that would follow. The tempo of battle quickened on March 17, 1939, as the Japanese army launched its preemptive attack, a move designed to seize the initiative and disrupt Chinese preparations. The very next day, on March 18, the Murai Detachment departed from Xingzi aboard warships, navigating the treacherous waters to land near Wucheng, approximately 30 kilometers northeast of Yongxiu. Their objective was to assault the Chinese defenders in this area, but they encountered fierce resistance from the Chinese 32nd Army and other supporting units, turning the landing into a brutal contest of wills. Concurrently, the main forces of the Japanese 101st and 106th Divisions, bolstered by their artillery and tank units, advanced methodically toward the north bank of the Xiushui River. They occupied their respective attack starting points with precision, after which the artillery units began conducting test firings and further reconnaissance to gauge the strength of Chinese defenses. This phase echoed the Japanese tactics employed in the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, where combined arms operations had overwhelmed urban defenses. A Chinese defender's recollection "We watched the enemy approach like a dark cloud, our rifles ready, knowing that the river would soon run red with the blood of brothers." The climax of preparation erupted at exactly 16:30 on March 20, when the Japanese 11th Army issued orders to the commander of the 6th Artillery Brigade. This commander was directed to orchestrate all available artillery to bombard the positions held by the Chinese 49th and 79th Armies on the south bank of the Xiushui River. What ensued was a pre-general offensive artillery barrage that endured for more than three grueling hours, incorporating a large number of poison gas shells, a heinous weapon that flouted international conventions like the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Many defenders' positions were utterly destroyed in this onslaught, and several officers and soldiers, including the valiant Wang Lingyun, commander of the 76th Division, were poisoned by the toxic fumes, suffering agonizing effects that highlighted the barbarity of chemical warfare. At precisely 19:30 that evening, the 106th Division commenced its forced crossing of the Xiushui River at Qiujin. Later, on the night of the 20th, the 101st Division also initiated its crossing north of Tujiabu. The Xiushui River, measuring about 30 meters in width, had swollen by approximately 3 meters due to continual heavy rains, rendering the crossing exceedingly difficult for the Japanese troops who battled against the raging currents. Nevertheless, the flooding had an unintended benefit for the invaders: many defender positions were inundated, and most water obstacles were washed away by the deluge. Leveraging this, the two Japanese divisions broke through the defenders' front lines and executed continuous night attacks, establishing a beachhead that extended 2 kilometers deep by dawn on the 21st. This foothold provided essential cover for Japanese engineers to construct pontoon bridges amid the chaos. At around 8 a.m., the Japanese tank group crossed these pontoon bridges and launched an attack on the Dongshan garrison from the front of the 106th Division, then proceeded to circle around toward Nanchang along the west side of Nanxun Road. Historian Rana Mitter aptly describes such river crossings as "desperate gambles where nature itself became a combatant," underscoring how environmental factors often tipped the scales in Sino-Japanese confrontations.Chiang Kai-shek, monitoring these developments from his command center, would have felt the weight of impending crisis.   By 21:30 on March 22, the Japanese vanguard tank group had advanced to Fengxin and successfully occupied the Liaohe Bridge outside the South Gate. The sudden and ferocious tank attack caught the defending troops off guard, preventing them from withdrawing the 38 artillery pieces that had been deployed on the city's outskirts before they were forced into a hasty retreat. On March 23, the Japanese army fully occupied Fengxin. Simultaneously, a portion of the 101st Division launched a frontal assault along Nanxun Road. Under the protective cover of artillery, they crossed the Xiushui River and encountered fierce resistance from the Chinese 32nd Army at Tujiabu, resulting in a prolonged stalemate where neither side could gain a decisive advantage. Following the Japanese launch of their general offensive, the Guilin Headquarters of the National Government Military Commission, under Director Bai Chongxi, urgently ordered all units of the Ninth War Zone to hold their positions firmly on March 21. On the same day, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Gu Zhutong, commander-in-chief of the Third War Zone, with specific instructions to immediately transfer the 102nd Division to Nanchang to reinforce the city's defenses, placing it under the command of Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army Group. He also ordered the 16th and 79th Divisions to proceed to Dongxiang and Jinxian, southeast of Nanchang, to guard the southern bank of Poyang Lake and provide support for operations in Nanchang. Simultaneously, he commanded the 19th Army Group to deploy approximately two divisions of its strongest forces to strike key enemy points in the rear, including Mahuiling, Ruichang, Jiujiang, and De'an, with the aim of sabotaging railways and highways, cutting off enemy rear-area transportation, and preventing reinforcements from reaching the front. However, due to poor communication, slow troop movements, and inadequate coordination among units, these ambitious plans were not implemented, and the battlefield situation had already undergone significant changes by the time adjustments could be made. On the 23rd, Chiang Kai-shek came to realize that the Japanese army was resolutely determined to capture Nanchang, and thus he conceived the strategic idea of inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy before potentially abandoning the city. He specifically telegraphed Xue Yue, commander-in-chief of the Ninth War Zone; Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army Group; and Xiong Shihui, chairman of Jiangxi Province, with the following directive: "The key to this battle is not the gain or loss of Nanchang, but inflicting the greatest blow on the enemy. Even if Nanchang falls, all our armies should disregard everything and advance toward the designated targets, and decide on future operational plans in accordance with this policy." This telegram, preserved in wartime archives, exemplifies Chiang's shift toward a war of attrition, a tactic that would define much of China's resistance. On March 25, Chiang Kai-shek again telegraphed Bai Chongxi, Xue Yue, Luo Zhuoying, and Gu Zhutong, providing detailed instructions: "1. The main force of Luo's group should maintain focus on the Hunan-Jiangxi Highway, attack the enemy's right flank, and press them toward the Gan River. It is crucial to avoid having the main force operate with its back to the Gan River. (That is, the main force of the 19th Army Group should be moved to a mobile position west of the Gan River to avoid being forced to the Gan River and facing a decisive battle in an unfavorable situation.) 2. A necessary portion should be used to defend the Nanchang front. If necessary, resistance can be carried out gradually between the Fu and Gan Rivers to cover southern Jiangxi." On the very same day, the Japanese army defeated the 102nd Division, which had been reinforced from the Third War Zone, in engagements west of Nanchang. By March 26, the Japanese army had advanced to the vicinity of Shengmi Street on the left bank of the Gan River. They crossed the river that day, executing a maneuver to outflank Nanchang from the south and simultaneously cut off the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway, a critical supply line. The main force of the 101st Division also advanced to Shengmi Street via Wanbu and Huangxi on March 26, crossed the Gan River that evening, and launched a direct attack on Nanchang. Its 101st Brigade, moving along the Nanchang-Xuncheng Railway via Lehua and Jiaoqiao, reached the north bank of the Gan River northwest of Nanchang on the 26th. Upon discovering these Japanese advances, the 19th Army urgently ordered the 32nd Army to withdraw from Tujiabu on the Nanchang-Xuncheng Railway back to Nanchang to join the 102nd Division in defending the city. However, before the 32nd Army had fully withdrawn, the Japanese tank group and the 101st Brigade had already advanced to the Gan River bridges to the west and north of Nanchang, respectively. Although the defending forces managed to destroy the bridges to halt their progress west and north of the Gan River, the Japanese 101st Division had already penetrated into Nanchang from the south. The defenders found themselves outnumbered and with weak firepower compared to the invaders. After engaging in intense street fighting, they suffered heavy casualties and were ultimately ordered to retreat to Jinxian. On March 27, the Japanese 101st Division occupied Nanchang, marking a significant, albeit temporary, victory in their campaign. Eyewitness account "The city fell amid the thunder of guns and the wails of the wounded, a testament to the fragility of urban defenses against mechanized onslaught." Following the capture, on March 28, the Japanese 11th Army was ordered to ensure that the main force of the 101st Division would return to Nanchang and that the 106th Division would retake Fengxin, all in preparation for subsequent operations in Gao'an or areas west of Fengxin. By April 2, the Japanese army had occupied Gao'an City, further consolidating their hold on the region. Meanwhile the fighting extended to Wuning. Wuning is located on the north bank of the Xiushui River, approximately 80 kilometers west of the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway. This position holds immense strategic importance, backed by the formidable Mufu Mountains, and serves as a key point on the left flank of the Ninth War Zone's defense line in northern Jiangxi. The forces deployed here included the 72nd and 78th Armies of the 30th Army Group, along with the 8th and 73rd Armies of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Advance Army, all positioned along both banks of the Xiushui River under the unified command of Wang Lingji, commander-in-chief of the 30th Army Group. To bolster the defense of Nanchang, the Nationalist Government's Military Commission devised a plan to send a powerful force eastward from Wuning toward Qiujin and De'an, with the intent of harassing the rear and flanks of the enemy advancing south along the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway and disrupting their transportation networks. After carefully assessing the Chinese deployments and strategic intentions, the Japanese 11th Army also regarded Wuning as a crucial flank in its overall Nanchang campaign. Consequently, they dispatched their 6th Division to Wuning to contain and block the Chinese army, thereby ensuring the safety of its main force's right flank and facilitating the capture of Nanchang. On March 20, while the Japanese army was heavily engaged on the Nanxun Railway front, its 6th Division launched an attack westward along the north bank of the Xiushui River from Ruoxi (situated between Qiujin and Wuning). However, they encountered fierce resistance from the Chinese 73rd and 8th Armies, which resulted in slow and painstaking progress for the attackers. On the afternoon of the 21st, a portion of the 6th Division, under the protective cover of aircraft and artillery, crossed the Xiushui River east of Ruoxi, and the main force directed its assault toward Wuning, while its 36th Brigade targeted Yangzhou Street. The 30th Army Group, tasked with defending Wuning, mounted a tenacious resistance by leveraging the advantageous mountainous terrain, making the Japanese advance extremely difficult. After four days of fierce and unrelenting fighting, the Japanese were still unable to break through the defenders' positions. On the morning of March 23, under continued air and artillery cover, the Japanese army persisted in its fierce attack, repeatedly dropping incendiary and chemical bombs on Chinese positions. The defending forces suffered heavy losses as a result and were compelled to withdraw from Wucheng Town on the 24th, moving farther back to regroup. After occupying Wucheng, the Murai Detachment continued its operations to clear the Gan River and Xiushui River of obstacles and to remove mines that had been laid by the Chinese forces. By the 28th, they had advanced to the vicinity of Xinning Town, which is about 4 kilometers east of Wuning. Its 36th Brigade engaged in fierce fighting with the defending 19th Division at Yangzhou Street on the 24th and successfully captured Jing'an on the 27th; however, due to the conclusion of the Nanchang battle and the fact that its main force was blocked east of Wuning, it quickly returned and redirected its attack toward Wuning. Because the 73rd and 8th Armies had suffered heavy casualties from days of intense fighting, the 30th Army Group ordered the 72nd Army to assume the defense of northeast Wuning. The Japanese 6th Division concentrated its forces for a fierce and coordinated assault, and by the 29th, the defending forces had retreated to the south bank of the Xiushui River, allowing the Japanese army to occupy Wuning. After further intense fighting, by April 5, the Japanese 36th Brigade had advanced to the south bank of the Xiushui River.During this entire period, Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly telegraphed Bai Chongxi and Xue Yue, issuing orders for the 30th Army Group in Wuning and the 31st Army Group in Chongyang and Tongshan (commanded by Tang Enbo) to launch a counteroffensive regardless of the evolving situation in Nanchang. The objective was to flank and attack the enemy's rear, advancing toward Mahuiling, De'an, Yongxiu, and Ruichang on the Nanchang-Xunyi road, to cut off enemy transportation lines and block reinforcements. However, this plan was not implemented due to various logistical and coordination challenges.   After the Japanese army captured Nanchang, it maintained a tense standoff with the Third and Ninth War Zones of China along the southeast bank of Poyang Lake to the east, Xiangtang to the south, and Gao'an, Fengxin, and Wuning to the west. The Military Commission of the National Government made a calculated judgment that although the Japanese had occupied Nanchang, they had suffered heavy losses and had not yet had the opportunity to replenish their forces. The defending forces within the city were deemed insufficient, prompting the Commission to decide on launching a counteroffensive while the Japanese army was still in the process of consolidating its position. At the same time, it ordered each war zone to initiate the "April Offensive" (also known as the "Spring Offensive") with the goals of harassing and containing the Japanese army and preventing it from continuing to advance westward toward Changsha. The Military Commission specifically ordered the Ninth War Zone and the Third War Zone to plan and execute a counteroffensive against Nanchang. The forces designated for this operation were planned to include the 1st, 19th, and 30th Army Groups of the Ninth War Zone and the 32nd Army Group of the Third War Zone, totaling about 10 divisions, all under the unified command of Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army Group. On April 17, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed his detailed "Plan to Conquer Nanchang" to Bai Chongxi, the director of the Guilin Headquarters, and sought his opinion on the matter. The operational strategy outlined was: "First, use the main force to attack the enemy along the Nanchang-Xunyi Railway, effectively cutting off enemy communications, and then use a portion of the force to directly capture Nanchang. The attack is scheduled to begin on April 24th." The main content of its troop deployment was as follows: The 1st Army Group (Commander-in-Chief Gao Yin-huai), the 19th Army Group, and the 74th Army (Commander Yu Ji-shi) were ordered to advance through Fengxin and Dacheng toward the Nanchang-Xunyi Railway between Xiushui and Nanchang, thoroughly disrupting transportation, cutting off enemy reinforcements, and cooperating in the capture of Nanchang; the 49th Army of the 19th Army Group (Commander Liu Duo-quan) was ordered to advance gradually as the general reserve; the 32nd Army Group (Commander-in-Chief Shangguan Yun-xiang) was ordered to attack Nanchang from the east of the Gan River with three divisions, and to organize a regiment to seize Nanchang by surprise; the 30th Army Group (Commander-in-Chief Wang Ling-ji) was ordered to attack Wuning. On April 18, Bai Chongxi replied to Chiang Kai-shek, offering his own suggestions on troop deployment with slight modifications. He emphasized the critical need for a surprise attack and for disrupting and harassing the enemy's transportation and rear areas, as well as cutting off the enemy's communication lines. He also believed that the attack should be brought forward and carried out as soon as possible, at the latest around the 22nd. On April 21, the forces of the Ninth War Zone began their operations in earnest. The 1st Army Group, comprising the 184th Division of the 60th Army and the New 10th Division of the 58th Army, attacked Fengxin, while the New 11th Division of the 58th Army monitored the Japanese forces in Jing'an; the main force of the 74th Army attacked Gao'an, and parts of the 74th Army and the 49th Army crossed the Jinjiang River to the north, attacking Dacheng and Shengmijie. Fierce fighting continued until the 26th, when the Japanese retreated to the areas of Fengxin, Qiuling, and Wanshougong. The 19th Army Group captured strongholds such as Dacheng, Gao'an, and Shengmijie. However, progress thereafter became difficult, and the offensive stalled. Neither army group was able to advance to the Nanchang-Xunyi Railway as originally planned. On April 23, the 32nd Army Group of the Third War Zone, consisting of the 16th and 79th Divisions of the 29th Army, the 5th Reserve Division, and part of the 10th Reserve Division, crossed the Fu River and launched an attack on Nanchang. Fierce fighting persisted until the 26th, when they captured Shichajie (south of Nanchang) and advanced toward the city. On the 27th, the Japanese concentrated the main force of the 101st Division to launch a counterattack. Supported by heavy artillery and air power, they engaged in fierce fighting with the Chinese army in the southeastern and southern areas, repeatedly contesting villages and strongholds. Due to the heavy casualties sustained, Duan Langru, commander of the 79th Division, changed the offensive deployment on the night of April 28 and reported this alteration to the army and army group commanders. The commander-in-chief of the 32nd Army Group, citing unauthorized changes to the plan, reported to the Third War Zone for approval and requested the dismissal of Duan Langru. Eager to capture Nanchang and driven by strategic impatience, Chiang Kai-shek, upon hearing the report, issued a stern order on May 1: Duan Langru was to be executed in front of the army for delaying military operations, He Ping, commander of the 16th Division, was ordered to atone for his crimes by achieving success in battle, and Shangguan Yunxiang was sent to the front to supervise the battle personally, with a strict deadline of May 5 for capturing Nanchang. On May 2, the 102nd Division recaptured Xiangtang and then Shichajie. The 16th Division once captured Shatanbu, but it was subsequently taken back by Japanese reinforcements. Shangguan Yunxiang then committed the 26th Division into the battle. On May 4, they launched another concerted attack. By dusk on the 5th, the 5th Reserve Division had reached the outer perimeter of the city and destroyed the barbed wire defenses, but Japanese firepower was intensely concentrated, causing the division to suffer heavy casualties and rendering it unable to continue the assault. The 152nd Regiment of the 26th Division broke into Xinlong Airport at dawn on the 5th and destroyed three Japanese aircraft. The 155th Regiment broke into the railway station at 9:00 a.m. on the 5th, but was blocked by fierce Japanese firepower and a determined counterattack. On May 5, after Chiang Kai-shek had issued the order to capture Nanchang by May 5, Xue Yue, acting commander of the Ninth War Zone, held the belief that with troops not having been replenished after the defense of Nanchang and with weaponry far inferior to that of the enemy, it was impossible to capture Nanchang within the subjective timeframe set. However, he did not directly dissent to Chiang Kai-shek, and on May 3, he telegraphed Chen Cheng to express his views in detail. He wrote: "Attacks on Nanchang and Fengxin have continued for 11 days since April 23. Because our army's equipment cannot keep pace with the enemy's, and the enemy's heavy weapons, mechanized units, and aircraft can support their ground forces everywhere, it is quite difficult to destroy the enemy's strong positions. Now I have received the Chairman's telegram: our army's operational strategy is to wear down the enemy without being worn down by the enemy, to avoid the enemy's strength and attack their weaknesses, and to achieve a protracted war of resistance. Therefore, this attack on Nanchang is aimed at wearing down the enemy. Under the principle of avoiding the enemy's strength and attacking their weakness, we should lie in ambush in advance and launch a surprise attack from all sides, hoping to recapture Nanchang with the fastest and most agile means. However, the battle has already dragged on; a direct assault is impossible, and striking their weakness is also unattainable. Although the enemy's strength is waning, it is practically impossible to capture Nanchang before May 5. Besides strictly ordering all units to overcome all difficulties and continue the fierce attack at all costs, I intend to politely explain the above situation to Chiang Kai-shek during a telephone conversation." Chen Cheng forwarded Xue Yue's telegram in full to Chiang Kai-shek on May 5. At the time, Bai Chongxi, director of the Guilin Headquarters, also considered the order to capture Nanchang within a limited time to be unrealistic, and on May 5 he telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek and He Yingqin, subtly offering a different suggestion. He stated, "Our army's attack on the enemy must be unexpected to be effective. Now, the enemy in Nanchang is prepared, and our army has launched a ten-day attack and has exerted all its efforts. To consider morale and our highest strategic principles, it is proposed that one-third of our forces continue the siege of Nanchang, while the other two-thirds are reorganized. Outside, we should continue to publicize our aggressive strategy…" The aim of both telegrams was to "turn the enemy's own spear against his shield," hoping Chiang Kai-shek would alter his order to capture Nanchang within a specified time, citing the operational guidance as inconsistent with the broader strategic policy. Upon receiving the telegrams, Chiang Kai-shek also learned of the sacrifice of Commander Chen Anbao and the heavy casualties among the attacking troops. On May 6, the main force of the Japanese 106th Division, supported by aircraft and tanks, launched a pincer attack on the 29th Army in the suburbs of Nanchang and Liantang. By 5 PM, the 29th Army was encircled. Liu Yuqing, commander of the 26th Division, was wounded in the fighting, and army commander Chen Anbao and Xie Beiting, commander of the 156th Regiment, were killed in action. Based on the actual battlefield situation, Xu Zhixun, chief of staff of the 29th Army, and Liu Yuqing, realizing that capturing Nanchang was impossible, decided to break out toward Zhongzhouwei and Shichajie to avoid total annihilation and potential execution by Chiang Kai-shek for failure. A regiment of the 5th Reserve Division, disguised as civilians, had infiltrated the city but was forced to withdraw due to the lack of follow-up support. Finally, on May 9, Chiang Kai-shek issued an order to halt the attack on Nanchang. The Japanese army, having suffered heavy losses themselves, was also unable to mount an effective counterattack, and thus the Battle of Nanchang came to an end, leaving behind a legacy of valor and tragedy. In the Battle of Nanchang, China suffered more than 52,000 casualties, including over 43,000 deaths, while Japan sustained more than 24,000 casualties and over 2,200 deaths. Although the National Army eventually lost Nanchang, the engagement thwarted Japan's plan to crush the main Chinese force. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.   The Nanchang battle was a decisive Japanese victory, yet the Chinese did manage to halt the Japanese western advance and showcased their perseverance amid a growing strategic stalemate. Supplies were still leaking into Nationalist China, the Japanese would have to continuously find and plug them. The war for China was nowhere near over.

Last time we spoke about the climax of the battle of Lake Khasan. In August, the Lake Khasan region became a tense theater of combat as Soviet and Japanese forces clashed around Changkufeng and Hill 52. The Soviets pushed a multi-front offensive, bolstered by artillery, tanks, and air power, yet the Japanese defenders held firm, aided by engineers, machine guns, and heavy guns. By the ninth and tenth, a stubborn Japanese resilience kept Hill 52 and Changkufeng in Japanese hands, though the price was steep and the field was littered with the costs of battle. Diplomatically, both sides aimed to confine the fighting and avoid a larger war. Negotiations trudged on, culminating in a tentative cease-fire draft for August eleventh: a halt to hostilities, positions to be held as of midnight on the tenth, and the creation of a border-demarcation commission. Moscow pressed for a neutral umpire; Tokyo resisted, accepting a Japanese participant but rejecting a neutral referee. The cease-fire was imperfect, with miscommunications and differing interpretations persisting.    #185 Operation Hainan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After what seemed like a lifetime over in the northern border between the USSR and Japan, today we are returning to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Now I thought it might be a bit jarring to dive into it, so let me do a brief summary of where we are at, in the year of 1939. As the calendar turned to 1939, the Second Sino-Japanese War, which had erupted in July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and escalated into full-scale conflict, had evolved into a protracted quagmire for the Empire of Japan. What began as a swift campaign to subjugate the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek had, by the close of 1938, transformed into a war of attrition. Japanese forces, under the command of generals like Shunroku Hata and Yasuji Okamura, had achieved stunning territorial gains: the fall of Shanghai in November 1937 after a brutal three-month battle that cost over 200,000 Chinese lives; the infamous capture of Nanjing in December 1937, marked by the Nanjing Massacre where an estimated 300,000 civilians and disarmed soldiers were killed in a six-week orgy of violence; and the sequential occupations of Xuzhou in May 1938, Wuhan in October 1938, and Guangzhou that same month.  These victories secured Japan's control over China's eastern seaboard, major riverine arteries like the Yangtze, and key industrial centers, effectively stripping the Nationalists of much of their economic base. Yet, despite these advances, China refused to capitulate. Chiang's government had retreated inland to the mountainous stronghold of Chongqing in Sichuan province, where it regrouped amid the fog-laden gorges, drawing on the vast human reserves of China's interior and the resilient spirit of its people. By late 1938, Japanese casualties had mounted to approximately 50,000 killed and 200,000 wounded annually, straining the Imperial Japanese Army's resources and exposing the vulnerabilities of overextended supply lines deep into hostile territory. In Tokyo, the corridors of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Army Ministry buzzed with urgent deliberations during the winter of 1938-1939. The initial doctrine of "quick victory" through decisive battles, epitomized by the massive offensives of 1937 and 1938, had proven illusory. Japan's military planners, influenced by the Kwantung Army's experiences in Manchuria and the ongoing stalemate, recognized that China's sheer size, with its 4 million square miles and over 400 million inhabitants, rendered total conquest unfeasible without unacceptable costs. Intelligence reports highlighted the persistence of Chinese guerrilla warfare, particularly in the north where Communist forces under Mao Zedong's Eighth Route Army conducted hit-and-run operations from bases in Shanxi and Shaanxi, sabotaging railways and ambushing convoys. The Japanese response included brutal pacification campaigns, such as the early iterations of what would later formalize as the "Three Alls Policy" (kill all, burn all, loot all), aimed at devastating rural economies and isolating resistance pockets. But these measures only fueled further defiance. By early 1939, a strategic pivot was formalized: away from direct annihilation of Chinese armies toward a policy of economic strangulation. This "blockade and interdiction" approach sought to sever China's lifelines to external aid, choking off the flow of weapons, fuel, and materiel that sustained the Nationalist war effort. As one Japanese staff officer noted in internal memos, the goal was to "starve the dragon in its lair," acknowledging the limits of Japanese manpower, total forces in China numbered around 1 million by 1939, against China's inexhaustible reserves. Central to this new strategy were the three primary overland supply corridors that had emerged as China's backdoors to the world, compensating for the Japanese naval blockade that had sealed off most coastal ports since late 1937. The first and most iconic was the Burma Road, a 717-mile engineering marvel hastily constructed between 1937 and 1938 by over 200,000 Chinese and Burmese laborers under the direction of engineers like Chih-Ping Chen. Stretching from the railhead at Lashio in British Burma (modern Myanmar) through treacherous mountain passes and dense jungles to Kunming in Yunnan province, the road navigated elevations up to 7,000 feet with hundreds of hairpin turns and precarious bridges. By early 1939, it was operational, albeit plagued by monsoonal mudslides, banditry, and mechanical breakdowns of the imported trucks, many Ford and Chevrolet models supplied via British Rangoon. Despite these challenges, it funneled an increasing volume of aid: in 1939 alone, estimates suggest up to 10,000 tons per month of munitions, gasoline, and aircraft parts from Allied sources, including early Lend-Lease precursors from the United States. The road's completion in 1938 had been a direct response to the loss of southern ports, and its vulnerability to aerial interdiction made it a prime target in Japanese planning documents. The second lifeline was the Indochina route, centered on the French-built Yunnan-Vietnam Railway (also known as the Hanoi-Kunming Railway), a 465-mile narrow-gauge line completed in 1910 that linked the port of Haiphong in French Indochina to Kunming via Hanoi and Lao Cai. This colonial artery, supplemented by parallel roads and river transport along the Red River, became China's most efficient supply conduit in 1938-1939, exploiting France's uneasy neutrality. French authorities, under Governor-General Pierre Pasquier and later Georges Catroux, turned a blind eye to transshipments, allowing an average of 15,000 to 20,000 tons monthly in early 1939, far surpassing the Burma Road's initial capacity. Cargoes included Soviet arms rerouted via Vladivostok and American oil, with French complicity driven by anti-Japanese sentiment and profitable tolls. However, Japanese reconnaissance flights from bases in Guangdong noted the vulnerability of bridges and rail yards, leading to initial bombing raids by mid-1939. Diplomatic pressure mounted, with Tokyo issuing protests to Paris, foreshadowing the 1940 closure under Vichy France after the fall of France in Europe. The route's proximity to the South China Sea made it a focal point for Japanese naval strategists, who viewed it as a "leak in the blockade." The third corridor, often overlooked but critical, was the Northwest Highway through Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang province. This overland network, upgraded between 1937 and 1941 with Soviet assistance, connected the Turkestan-Siberian Railway at Almaty (then Alma-Ata) to Lanzhou in Gansu via Urumqi, utilizing a mix of trucks, camel caravans, and rudimentary roads across the Gobi Desert and Tian Shan mountains. Under the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1937 and subsequent aid agreements, Moscow supplied China with over 900 aircraft, 82 tanks, 1,300 artillery pieces, and vast quantities of ammunition and fuel between 1937 and 1941—much of it traversing this route. In 1938-1939, volumes peaked, with Soviet pilots and advisors even establishing air bases in Lanzhou. The highway's construction involved tens of thousands of Chinese laborers, facing harsh winters and logistical hurdles, but it delivered up to 2,000 tons monthly, including entire fighter squadrons like the Polikarpov I-16. Japanese intelligence, aware of this "Red lifeline," planned disruptions but were constrained by the ongoing Nomonhan Incident on the Manchurian-Soviet border in 1939, which diverted resources and highlighted the risks of provoking Moscow. These routes collectively sustained China's resistance, prompting Japan's high command to prioritize their severance. In March 1939, the South China Area Army was established under General Rikichi Andō (later succeeded by Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi), headquartered in Guangzhou, with explicit orders to disrupt southern communications. Aerial campaigns intensified, with Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers from Wuhan and Guangzhou targeting Kunming's airfields and the Red River bridges, while diplomatic maneuvers pressured colonial powers: Britain faced demands during the June 1939 Tientsin Crisis to close the Burma Road, and France received ultimatums that culminated in the 1940 occupation of northern Indochina. Yet, direct assaults on Yunnan or Guangxi were deemed too arduous due to rugged terrain and disease risks. Instead, planners eyed peripheral objectives to encircle these arteries. This strategic calculus set the stage for the invasion of Hainan Island, a 13,000-square-mile landmass off Guangdong's southern coast, rich in iron and copper but strategically priceless for its position astride the Indochina route and proximity to Hong Kong. By February 1939, Japanese admirals like Nobutake Kondō of the 5th Fleet advocated seizure to establish air and naval bases, plugging blockade gaps and enabling raids on Haiphong and Kunming, a prelude to broader southern expansion that would echo into the Pacific War. Now after the fall campaign around Canton in autumn 1938, the Japanese 21st Army found itself embedded in a relentless effort to sever the enemy's lifelines. Its primary objective shifted from mere battlefield engagements to tightening the choke points of enemy supply, especially along the Canton–Hankou railway. Recognizing that war materiel continued to flow into the enemy's hands, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army to strike at every other supply route, one by one, until the arteries of logistics were stifled. The 21st Army undertook a series of decisive occupations to disrupt transport and provisioning from multiple directions. To sustain these difficult campaigns, Imperial General Headquarters reinforced the south China command, enabling greater operational depth and endurance. The 21st Army benefited from a series of reinforcements during 1939, which allowed a reorganization of assignments and missions: In late January, the Iida Detachment was reorganized into the Formosa Mixed Brigade and took part in the invasion of Hainan Island.  Hainan, just 15 miles across the Qiongzhou Strait from the mainland, represented a critical "loophole": it lay astride the Gulf of Tonkin, enabling smuggling of arms and materiel from Haiphong to Kunming, and offered potential airfields for bombing raids deep into Yunnan. Japanese interest in Hainan dated to the 1920s, driven by the Taiwan Governor-General's Office, which eyed the island's tropical resources (rubber, iron, copper) and naval potential at ports like Sanya (Samah). Prewar surveys by Japanese firms, such as those documented in Ide Kiwata's Minami Shina no Sangyō to Keizai (1939), highlighted mineral wealth and strategic harbors. The fall of Guangzhou in October 1938 provided the perfect launchpad, but direct invasion was delayed until early 1939 amid debates between the IJA (favoring mainland advances) and IJN (prioritizing naval encirclement). The operation would also heavily align with broader "southward advance" (Nanshin-ron) doctrine foreshadowing invasions of French Indochina (1940) and the Pacific War. On the Chinese side, Hainan was lightly defended as part of Guangdong's "peace preservation" under General Yu Hanmou. Two security regiments, six guard battalions, and a self-defense corps, totaling around 7,000–10,000 poorly equipped troops guarded the island, supplemented by roughly 300 Communist guerrillas under Feng Baiju, who operated independently in the interior. The indigenous Li (Hlai) people in the mountainous south, alienated by Nationalist taxes, provided uneven support but later allied with Communists. The Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army, in cooperation with the Navy, to occupy and hold strategic points on the island near Haikou-Shih. The 21st Army commander assigned the Formosa Mixed Brigade to carry out this mission. Planning began in late 1938 under the IJN's Fifth Fleet, with IJA support from the 21st Army. The objective: secure northern and southern landing sites to bisect the island, establish air/naval bases, and exploit resources. Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondō, commanding the fleet, emphasized surprise and air superiority. The invasion began under the cover of darkness on February 9, 1939, when Kondō's convoy entered Tsinghai Bay on the northern shore of Hainan and anchored at midnight. Japanese troops swiftly disembarked, encountering minimal initial resistance from the surprised Chinese defenders, and secured a beachhead in the northern zone. At 0300 hours on 10 February, the Formosa Mixed Brigade, operating in close cooperation with naval units, executed a surprise landing at the northeastern point of Tengmai Bay in north Hainan. By 04:30, the right flank reached the main road leading to Fengyingshih, while the left flank reached a position two kilometers south of Tienwei. By 07:00, the right flank unit had overcome light enemy resistance near Yehli and occupied Chiungshan. At that moment there were approximately 1,000 elements of the enemy's 5th Infantry Brigade (militia) at Chiungshan; about half of these troops were destroyed, and the remainder fled into the hills south of Tengmai in a state of disarray. Around 08:30 that same day, the left flank unit advanced to the vicinity of Shuchang and seized Hsiuying Heights. By 12:00, it occupied Haikou, the island's northern port city and administrative center, beginning around noon. Army and navy forces coordinated to mop up remaining pockets of resistance in the northern areas, overwhelming the scattered Chinese security units through superior firepower and organization. No large-scale battles are recorded in primary accounts; instead, the engagements were characterized by rapid advances and localized skirmishes, as the Chinese forces, lacking heavy artillery or air support, could not mount a sustained defense. By the end of the day, Japanese control over the north was consolidating, with Haikou falling under their occupation.Also on 10 February, the Brigade pushed forward to seize Cingang. Wenchang would be taken on the 22nd, followed by Chinglan Port on the 23rd. On February 11, the operation expanded southward when land combat units amphibiously assaulted Samah (now Sanya) at the island's southern tip. This landing allowed them to quickly seize key positions, including the port of Yulin (Yulinkang) and the town of Yai-Hsien (Yaxian, now part of Sanya). With these southern footholds secured, Japanese forces fanned out to subjugate the rest of the island, capturing inland areas and infrastructure with little organized opposition. Meanwhile, the landing party of the South China Navy Expeditionary Force, which had joined with the Army to secure Haikou, began landing on the island's southern shore at dawn on 14 February. They operated under the protection of naval and air units. By the same morning, the landing force had advanced to Sa-Riya and, by 12:00 hours, had captured Yulin Port. Chinese casualties were significant in the brief fighting; from January to May 1939, reports indicate the 11th security regiment alone suffered 8 officers and 162 soldiers killed, 3 officers and 16 wounded, and 5 officers and 68 missing, though figures for other units are unclear. Japanese losses were not publicly detailed but appear to have been light.  When crisis pressed upon them, Nationalist forces withdrew from coastal Haikou, shepherding the last civilians toward the sheltering embrace of the Wuzhi mountain range that bands the central spine of Hainan. From that high ground they sought to endure the storm, praying that the rugged hills might shield their families from the reach of war. Yet the Li country's mountains did not deliver a sanctuary free of conflict. Later in August of 1943, an uprising erupted among the Li,Wang Guoxing, a figure of local authority and stubborn resolve. His rebellion was swiftly crushed; in reprisal, the Nationalists executed a seizure of vengeance that extended far beyond the moment of defeat, claiming seven thousand members of Wang Guoxing's kin in his village. The episode was grim testimony to the brutal calculus of war, where retaliation and fear indelibly etched the landscape of family histories. Against this backdrop, the Communists under Feng Baiju and the native Li communities forged a vigorous guerrilla war against the occupiers. The struggle was not confined to partisan skirmishes alone; it unfolded as a broader contest of survival and resistance. The Japanese response was relentless and punitive, and it fell upon Li communities in western Hainan with particular ferocity, Sanya and Danzhou bore the brunt of violence, as did the many foreign laborers conscripted into service by the occupying power. The toll of these reprisals was stark: among hundreds of thousands of slave laborers pressed into service, tens of thousands perished. Of the 100,000 laborers drawn from Hong Kong, only about 20,000 survived the war's trials, a haunting reminder of the human cost embedded in the occupation. Strategically, the island of Hainan took on a new if coercive purpose. Portions of the island were designated as a naval administrative district, with the Hainan Guard District Headquarters established at Samah, signaling its role as a forward air base and as an operational flank for broader anti-Chiang Kai-shek efforts. In parallel, the island's rich iron and copper resources were exploited to sustain the war economy of the occupiers. The control of certain areas on Hainan provided a base of operations for incursions into Guangdong and French Indochina, while the airbases that dotted the island enabled long-range air raids that threaded routes from French Indochina and Burma into the heart of China. The island thus assumed a grim dual character: a frontier fortress for the occupiers and a ground for the prolonged suffering of its inhabitants. Hainan then served as a launchpad for later incursions into Guangdong and Indochina. Meanwhile after Wuhan's collapse, the Nationalist government's frontline strength remained formidable, even as attrition gnawed at its edges. By the winter of 1938–1939, the front line had swelled to 261 divisions of infantry and cavalry, complemented by 50 independent brigades. Yet the political and military fissures within the Kuomintang suggested fragility beneath the apparent depth of manpower. The most conspicuous rupture came with Wang Jingwei's defection, the vice president and chairman of the National Political Council, who fled to Hanoi on December 18, 1938, leading a procession of more than ten other KMT officials, including Chen Gongbo, Zhou Fohai, Chu Minqi, and Zeng Zhongming. In the harsh arithmetic of war, defections could not erase the country's common resolve to resist Japanese aggression, and the anti-Japanese national united front still served as a powerful instrument, rallying the Chinese populace to "face the national crisis together." Amid this political drama, Japan's strategy moved into a phase that sought to convert battlefield endurance into political consolidation. As early as January 11, 1938, Tokyo had convened an Imperial Conference and issued a framework for handling the China Incident that would shape the theater for years. The "Outline of Army Operations Guidance" and "Continental Order No. 241" designated the occupied territories as strategic assets to be held with minimal expansion beyond essential needs. The instruction mapped an operational zone that compressed action to a corridor between Anqing, Xinyang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang, while the broader line of occupation east of a line tracing West Sunit, Baotou, and the major river basins would be treated as pacified space. This was a doctrine of attrition, patience, and selective pressure—enough to hold ground, deny resources to the Chinese, and await a more opportune political rupture. Yet even as Japan sought political attrition, the war's tactical center of gravity drifted toward consolidation around Wuhan and the pathways that fed the Yangtze. In October 1938, after reducing Wuhan to a fortressed crescent of contested ground, the Japanese General Headquarters acknowledged the imperative to adapt to a protracted war. The new calculus prioritized political strategy alongside military operations: "We should attach importance to the offensive of political strategy, cultivate and strengthen the new regime, and make the National Government decline, which will be effective." If the National Government trembled under coercive pressure, it risked collapse, and if not immediately, then gradually through a staged series of operations. In practice, this meant reinforcing a centralized center while allowing peripheral fronts to be leveraged against Chongqing's grip on the war's moral economy. In the immediate post-Wuhan period, Japan divided its responsibilities and aimed at a standoff that would enable future offensives. The 11th Army Group, stationed in the Wuhan theater, became the spearhead of field attacks on China's interior, occupying a strategic triangle that included Hunan, Jiangxi, and Guangxi, and protecting the rear of southwest China's line of defense. The central objective was not merely to seize territory, but to deny Chinese forces the capacity to maneuver along the critical rail and river corridors that fed the Nanjing–Jiujiang line and the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway. Central to this plan was Wuhan's security and the ability to constrain Jiujiang's access to the Yangtze, preserving a corridor for air power and logistics. The pre-war arrangement in early 1939 was a tableau of layered defenses and multiple war zones, designed to anticipate and blunt Japanese maneuver. By February 1939, the Ninth War Zone under Xue Yue stood in a tense standoff with the Japanese 11th Army along the Jiangxi and Hubei front south of the Yangtze. The Ninth War Zone's order of battle, Luo Zhuoying's 19th Army Group defending the northern Nanchang front, Wang Lingji's 30th Army Group near Wuning, Fan Songfu's 8th and 73rd Armies along Henglu, Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group guarding southern Hubei and northern Hunan, and Lu Han's 1st Army Group in reserve near Changsha and Liuyang, was a carefully calibrated attempt to absorb, delay, and disrupt any Xiushui major Japanese thrust toward Nanchang, a city whose strategic significance stretched beyond its own bounds. In the spring of 1939, Nanchang was the one city in southern China that Tokyo could not leave in Chinese hands. It was not simply another provincial capital; it was the beating heart of whatever remained of China's war effort south of the Yangtze, and the Japanese knew it. High above the Gan River, on the flat plains west of Poyang Lake, lay three of the finest airfields China had ever built: Qingyunpu, Daxiaochang, and Xiangtang. Constructed only a few years earlier with Soviet engineers and American loans, they were long, hard-surfaced, and ringed with hangars and fuel dumps. Here the Chinese Air Force had pulled back after the fall of Wuhan, and here the red-starred fighters and bombers of the Soviet volunteer groups still flew. From Nanchang's runways a determined pilot could reach Japanese-held Wuhan in twenty minutes, Guangzhou in less than an hour, and even strike the docks at Hong Kong if he pushed his range. Every week Japanese reconnaissance planes returned with photographs of fresh craters patched, new aircraft parked wing-to-wing, and Soviet pilots sunning themselves beside their I-16s. As long as those fields remained Chinese, Japan could never claim the sky. The city was more than airfields. It sat exactly where the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway met the line running north to Jiujiang and the Yangtze, a knot that tied together three provinces. Barges crowded Poyang Lake's western shore, unloading crates of Soviet ammunition and aviation fuel that had come up the river from the Indochina railway. Warehouses along the tracks bulged with shells and rice. To the Japanese staff officers plotting in Wuhan and Guangzhou, Nanchang looked less like a city and more like a loaded spring: if Chiang Kai-shek ever found the strength for a counteroffensive to retake the middle Yangtze, this would be the place from which it would leap. And so, in the cold March of 1939, the Imperial General Headquarters marked Nanchang in red on every map and gave General Okamura the order he had been waiting for: take it, whatever the cost. Capturing the city would do three things at once. It would blind the Chinese Air Force in the south by seizing or destroying the only bases from which it could still seriously operate. It would tear a hole in the last east–west rail line still feeding Free China. And it would shove the Nationalist armies another two hundred kilometers farther into the interior, buying Japan precious time to digest its earlier conquests and tighten the blockade. Above all, Nanchang was the final piece in a great aerial ring Japan was closing around southern China. Hainan had fallen in February, giving the navy its southern airfields. Wuhan and Guangzhou already belonged to the army. Once Nanchang was taken, Japanese aircraft would sit on a continuous arc of bases from the tropical beaches of the South China Sea to the banks of the Yangtze, and nothing (neither the Burma Road convoys nor the French railway from Hanoi) would move without their permission. Chiang Kai-shek's decision to strike first in the Nanchang region in March 1939 reflected both urgency and a desire to seize initiative before Japanese modernization of the battlefield could fully consolidate. On March 8, Chiang directed Xue Yue to prepare a preemptive attack intended to seize the offensive by March 15, focusing the Ninth War Zone's efforts on preventing a river-crossing assault and pinning Japanese forces in place. The plan called for a sequence of coordinated actions: the 19th Army Group to hold the northern front of Nanchang; the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Advance Army (the 8th and 73rd Armies) to strike the enemy's left flank from Wuning toward De'an and Ruichang; the 30th and 27th Army Groups to consolidate near Wuning; and the 1st Army Group to push toward Xiushui and Sandu, opening routes for subsequent operations. Yet even as Xue Yue pressed for action, the weather of logistics and training reminded observers that no victory could be taken for granted. By March 9–10, Xue Yue warned Chiang that troops were not adequately trained, supplies were scarce, and preparations were insufficient, requesting a postponement to March 24. Chiang's reply was resolute: the attack must commence no later than the 24th, for the aim was preemption and the desire to tether the enemy's forces before they could consolidate. When the moment of decision arrived, the Chinese army began to tense, and the Japanese, no strangers to rapid shifts in tempo—moved to exploit any hesitation or fog of mobilization. The Ninth War Zone's response crystallized into a defensive posture as the Japanese pressed forward, marking a transition from preemption to standoff as both sides tested the limits of resilience. The Japanese plan for what would become known as Operation Ren, aimed at severing the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway, breaking the enemy's line of communication, and isolating Nanchang, reflected a calculated synthesis of air power, armored mobility, and canalized ground offensives. On February 6, 1939, the Central China Expeditionary Army issued a set of precise directives: capture Nanchang to cut the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway and disrupt the southern reach of Anhui and Zhejiang provinces; seize Nanchang along the Nanchang–Xunyi axis to split enemy lines and "crush" Chinese resistance south of that zone; secure rear lines immediately after the city's fall; coordinate with naval air support to threaten Chinese logistics and airfields beyond the rear lines. The plan anticipated contingencies by pre-positioning heavy artillery and tanks in formations that could strike with speed and depth, a tactical evolution from previous frontal assaults. Okamura Yasuji, commander of the 11th Army, undertook a comprehensive program of reconnaissance, refining the assault plan with a renewed emphasis on speed and surprise. Aerial reconnaissance underlined the terrain, fortifications, and the disposition of Chinese forces, informing the selection of the Xiushui River crossing and the route of the main axis of attack. Okamura's decision to reorganize artillery and armor into concentrated tank groups, flanked by air support and advanced by long-range maneuver, marked a departure from the earlier method of distributing heavy weapons along the infantry front. Sumita Laishiro commanded the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade, with more than 300 artillery pieces, while Hirokichi Ishii directed a force of 135 tanks and armored vehicles. This blended arms approach promised a breakthrough that would outpace the Chinese defenders and open routes for the main force. By mid-February 1939, Japanese preparations had taken on a high tempo. The 101st and 106th Divisions, along with attached artillery, assembled south of De'an, while tank contingents gathered north of De'an. The 6th Division began moving toward Ruoxi and Wuning, the Inoue Detachment took aim at the waterways of Poyang Lake, and the 16th and 9th Divisions conducted feints on the Han River's left bank. The orchestration of these movements—feints, riverine actions, and armored flanking, was designed to reduce the Chinese capacity to concentrate forces around Nanchang and to force the defenders into a less secure posture along the Nanchang–Jiujiang axis. Japan's southward strategy reframed the war: no longer a sprint to reduce Chinese forces in open fields, but a patient siege of lifelines, railways, and airbases. Hainan's seizure, the control of Nanchang's airfields, and the disruption of the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway exemplified a shift from large-scale battles to coercive pressure that sought to cripple Nationalist mobilization and erode Chongqing's capacity to sustain resistance. For China, the spring of 1939 underscored resilience amid mounting attrition. Chiang Kai-shek's insistence on offensive means to seize the initiative demonstrated strategic audacity, even as shortages and uneven training slowed tempo. The Ninth War Zone's defense, bolstered by makeshift airpower from Soviet and Allied lendings, kept open critical corridors and delayed Japan's consolidation. The war's human cost—massive casualties, forced labor, and the Li uprising on Hainan—illuminates the brutality that fueled both sides' resolve. In retrospect, the period around Canton, Wuhan, and Nanchang crystallizes a grim truth: the Sino-Japanese war was less a single crescendo of battles than a protracted contest of endurance, logistics, and political stamina. The early 1940s would widen these fault lines, but the groundwork laid in 1939, competition over supply routes, air control, and strategic rail nodes, would shape the war's pace and, ultimately, its outcome. The conflict's memory lies not only in the clashes' flash but in the stubborn persistence of a nation fighting to outlast a formidable adversary. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese invasion of Hainan and proceeding operations to stop logistical leaks into Nationalist China, showcased the complexity and scale of the growing Second Sino-Japanese War. It would not merely be a war of territorial conquest, Japan would have to strangle the colossus using every means necessary.  

Last time we spoke about the surrender of Japan. Emperor Hirohito announced the surrender on August 15, prompting mixed public reactions: grief, shock, and sympathy for the Emperor, tempered by fear of hardship and occupation. The government's response included resignations and suicide as new leadership was brought in under Prime Minister Higashikuni, with Mamoru Shigemitsu as Foreign Minister and Kawabe Torashiro heading a delegation to Manila. General MacArthur directed the occupation plan, “Blacklist,” prioritizing rapid, phased entry into key Japanese areas and Korea, while demobilizing enemy forces. The surrender ceremony occurred aboard the Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, with Wainwright, Percival, Nimitz, and UN representatives in attendance. Civilians and soldiers across Asia began surrendering, and postwar rehabilitation, Indochina and Vietnam's independence movements, and Southeast Asian transitions rapidly unfolded as Allied forces established control. This episode is the Aftermath of the Pacific War Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Pacific War has ended. Peace has been restored by the Allies and most of the places conquered by the Japanese Empire have been liberated. In this post-war period, new challenges would be faced for those who won the war; and from the ashes of an empire, a defeated nation was also seeking to rebuild. As the Japanese demobilized their armed forces, many young boys were set to return to their homeland, even if they had previously thought that they wouldn't survive the ordeal. And yet, there were some cases of isolated men that would continue to fight for decades even, unaware that the war had already ended.  As we last saw, after the Japanese surrender, General MacArthur's forces began the occupation of the Japanese home islands, while their overseas empire was being dismantled by the Allies. To handle civil administration, MacArthur established the Military Government Section, commanded by Brigadier-General William Crist, staffed by hundreds of US experts trained in civil governance who were reassigned from Okinawa and the Philippines. As the occupation began, Americans dispatched tactical units and Military Government Teams to each prefecture to ensure that policies were faithfully carried out. By mid-September, General Eichelberger's 8th Army had taken over the Tokyo Bay region and began deploying to occupy Hokkaido and the northern half of Honshu. Then General Krueger's 6th Army arrived in late September, taking southern Honshu and Shikoku, with its base in Kyoto. In December, 6th Army was relieved of its occupation duties; in January 1946, it was deactivated, leaving the 8th Army as the main garrison force. By late 1945, about 430,000 American soldiers were garrisoned across Japan. President Truman approved inviting Allied involvement on American terms, with occupation armies integrated into a US command structure. Yet with the Chinese civil war and Russia's reluctance to place its forces under MacArthur's control, only Australia, Britain, India, and New Zealand sent brigades, more than 40,000 troops in southwestern Japan. Japanese troops were gradually disarmed by order of their own commanders, so the stigma of surrender would be less keenly felt by the individual soldier. In the homeland, about 1.5 million men were discharged and returned home by the end of August. Demobilization overseas, however, proceeded, not quickly, but as a long, difficult process of repatriation. In compliance with General Order No. 1, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters disbanded on September 13 and was superseded by the Japanese War Department to manage demobilization. By November 1, the homeland had demobilized 2,228,761 personnel, roughly 97% of the Homeland Army. Yet some 6,413,215 men remained to be repatriated from overseas. On December 1, the Japanese War Ministry dissolved, and the First Demobilization Ministry took its place. The Second Demobilization Ministry was established to handle IJN demobilization, with 1,299,868 sailors, 81% of the Navy, demobilized by December 17. Japanese warships and merchant ships had their weapons rendered inoperative, and suicide craft were destroyed. Forty percent of naval vessels were allocated to evacuations in the Philippines, and 60% to evacuations of other Pacific islands. This effort eventually repatriated about 823,984 men to Japan by February 15, 1946. As repatriation accelerated, by October 15 only 1,909,401 men remained to be repatriated, most of them in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the Higashikuni Cabinet and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru managed to persuade MacArthur not to impose direct military rule or martial law over all of Japan. Instead, the occupation would be indirect, guided by the Japanese government under the Emperor's direction. An early decision to feed occupation forces from American supplies, and to allow the Japanese to use their own limited food stores, helped ease a core fear: that Imperial forces would impose forced deliveries on the people they conquered. On September 17, MacArthur transferred his headquarters from Yokohama to Tokyo, setting up primary offices on the sixth floor of the Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Building, an imposing edifice overlooking the moat and the Imperial palace grounds in Hibiya, a symbolic heart of the nation.  While the average soldier did not fit the rapacious image of wartime Japanese propagandists, occupation personnel often behaved like neo-colonial overlords. The conquerors claimed privileges unimaginable to most Japanese. Entire trains and train compartments, fitted with dining cars, were set aside for the exclusive use of occupation forces. These silenced, half-empty trains sped past crowded platforms, provoking ire as Japanese passengers were forced to enter and exit packed cars through punched-out windows, or perch on carriage roofs, couplings, and running boards, often with tragic consequences. The luxury express coaches became irresistible targets for anonymous stone-throwers. During the war, retrenchment measures had closed restaurants, cabarets, beer halls, geisha houses, and theatres in Tokyo and other large cities. Now, a vast leisure industry sprang up to cater to the needs of the foreign occupants. Reopened restaurants and theatres, along with train stations, buses, and streetcars, were sometimes kept off limits to Allied personnel, partly for security, partly to avoid burdening Japanese resources, but a costly service infrastructure was built to the occupiers' specifications. Facilities reserved for occupation troops bore large signs reading “Japanese Keep Out” or “For Allied Personnel Only.” In downtown Tokyo, important public buildings requisitioned for occupation use had separate entrances for Americans and Japanese. The effect? A subtle but clear colour bar between the predominantly white conquerors and the conquered “Asiatic” Japanese. Although MacArthur was ready to work through the Japanese government, he lacked the organizational infrastructure to administer a nation of 74 million. Consequently, on October 2, MacArthur dissolved the Military Government Section and inaugurated General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, a separate headquarters focused on civil affairs and operating in tandem with the Army high command. SCAP immediately assumed responsibility for administering the Japanese home islands. It commandeered every large building not burned down to house thousands of civilians and requisitioned vast tracts of prime real estate to quarter several hundred thousand troops in the Tokyo–Yokohama area alone. Amidst the rise of American privilege, entire buildings were refurbished as officers' clubs, replete with slot machines and gambling parlours installed at occupation expense. The Stars and Stripes were hoisted over Tokyo, while the display of the Rising Sun was banned; and the downtown area, known as “Little America,” was transformed into a US enclave. The enclave mentality of this cocooned existence was reinforced by the arrival within the first six months of roughly 700 American families. At the peak of the occupation, about 14,800 families employed some 25,000 Japanese servants to ease the “rigours” of overseas duty. Even enlisted men in the sparse quonset-hut towns around the city lived like kings compared with ordinary Japanese. Japanese workers cleaned barracks, did kitchen chores, and handled other base duties. The lowest private earned a 25% hardship bonus until these special allotments were discontinued in 1949. Most military families quickly adjusted to a pampered lifestyle that went beyond maids and “boys,” including cooks, laundresses, babysitters, gardeners, and masseuses. Perks included spacious quarters with swimming pools, central heating, hot running water, and modern plumbing. Two observers compared GHQ to the British Raj at its height. George F. Kennan, head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, warned during his 1948 mission to Japan that Americans had monopolized “everything that smacks of comfort or elegance or luxury,” criticizing what he called the “American brand of philistinism” and the “monumental imperviousness” of MacArthur's staff to the Japanese suffering. This conqueror's mentality also showed in the bullying attitudes many top occupation officials displayed toward the Japanese with whom they dealt. Major Faubion Bowers, MacArthur's military secretary, later said, “I and nearly all the occupation people I knew were extremely conceited and extremely arrogant and used our power every inch of the way.” Initially, there were spasms of defiance against the occupation forces, such as anonymous stone-throwing, while armed robbery and minor assaults against occupation personnel were rife in the weeks and months after capitulation. Yet active resistance was neither widespread nor organized. The Americans successfully completed their initial deployment without violence, an astonishing feat given a heavily armed and vastly superior enemy operating on home terrain. The average citizen regarded the occupation as akin to force majeure, the unfortunate but inevitable aftermath of a natural calamity. Japan lay prostrate. Industrial output had fallen to about 10% of pre-war levels, and as late as 1946, more than 13 million remained unemployed. Nearly 40% of Japan's urban areas had been turned to rubble, and some 9 million people were homeless. The war-displaced, many of them orphans, slept in doorways and hallways, in bombed-out ruins, dugouts and packing crates, under bridges or on pavements, and crowded the hallways of train and subway stations. As winter 1945 descended, with food, fuel, and clothing scarce, people froze to death. Bonfires lit the streets to ward off the chill. "The only warm hands I have shaken thus far in Japan belonged to Americans," Mark Gayn noted in December 1945. "The Japanese do not have much of a chance to thaw out, and their hands are cold and red." Unable to afford shoes, many wore straw sandals; those with geta felt themselves privileged. The sight of a man wearing a woman's high-buttoned shoes in winter epitomized the daily struggle to stay dry and warm. Shantytowns built of scrap wood, rusted metal, and scavenged odds and ends sprang up everywhere, resembling vast junk yards. The poorest searched smouldering refuse heaps for castoffs that might be bartered for a scrap to eat or wear. Black markets (yami'ichi) run by Japanese, Koreans, and For-mosans mushroomed to replace collapsed distribution channels and cash in on inflated prices. Tokyo became "a world of scarcity in which every nail, every rag, and even a tangerine peel [had a] market value." Psychologically numbed, disoriented, and disillusioned with their leaders, demobilized veterans and civilians alike struggled to get their bearings, shed militaristic ideologies, and begin to embrace new values. In the vacuum of defeat, the Japanese people appeared ready to reject the past and grasp at the straw held out by the former enemy. Relations between occupier and occupied were not smooth, however. American troops comported themselves like conquerors, especially in the early weeks and months of occupation. Much of the violence was directed against women, with the first attacks beginning within hours after the landing of advance units. When US paratroopers landed in Sapporo, an orgy of looting, sexual violence, and drunken brawling ensued. Newspaper accounts reported 931 serious offences by GIs in the Yokohama area during the first week of occupation, including 487 armed robberies, 411 thefts of currency or goods, 9 rapes, 5 break-ins, 3 cases of assault and battery, and 16 other acts of lawlessness. In the first 10 days of occupation, there were 1,336 reported rapes by US soldiers in Kanagawa Prefecture alone. Americans were not the only perpetrators. A former prostitute recalled that when Australian troops arrived in Kure in early 1946, they “dragged young women into their jeeps, took them to the mountain, and then raped them. I heard them screaming for help nearly every night.” Such behaviour was commonplace, but news of criminal activity by occupation forces was quickly suppressed. On September 10, 1945, SCAP issued press and pre-censorship codes outlawing the publication of reports and statistics "inimical to the objectives of the occupation." In the sole instance of self-help General Eichelberger records in his memoirs, when locals formed a vigilante group and retaliated against off-duty GIs, 8th Army ordered armored vehicles into the streets and arrested the ringleaders, who received lengthy prison terms. Misbehavior ranged from black-market activity, petty theft, reckless driving, and disorderly conduct to vandalism, arson, murder, and rape. Soldiers and sailors often broke the law with impunity, and incidents of robbery, rape, and even murder were widely reported. Gang rapes and other sex atrocities were not infrequent; victims, shunned as outcasts, sometimes turned to prostitution in desperation, while others took their own lives to avoid bringing shame to their families. Military courts arrested relatively few soldiers for these offenses and convicted even fewer; Japanese attempts at self-defense were punished severely, and restitution for victims was rare. Fearing the worst, Japanese authorities had already prepared countermeasures against the supposed rapacity of foreign soldiers. Imperial troops in East Asia and the Pacific had behaved brutally toward women, so the government established “sexual comfort-stations” manned by geisha, bar hostesses, and prostitutes to “satisfy the lust of the Occupation forces,” as the Higashikuni Cabinet put it. A budget of 100 million yen was set aside for these Recreation and Amusement Associations, financed initially with public funds but run as private enterprises under police supervision. Through these, the government hoped to protect the daughters of the well-born and middle class by turning to lower-class women to satisfy the soldiers' sexual appetites. By the end of 1945, brothel operators had rounded up an estimated 20,000 young women and herded them into RAA establishments nationwide. Eventually, as many as 70,000 are said to have ended up in the state-run sex industry. Thankfully, as military discipline took hold and fresh troops replaced the Allied veterans responsible for the early crime wave, violence subsided and the occupier's patronising behavior and the ugly misdeeds of a lawless few were gradually overlooked. However, fraternisation was frowned upon by both sides, and segregation was practiced in principle, with the Japanese excluded from areas reserved for Allied personnel until September 1949, when MacArthur lifted virtually all restrictions on friendly association, stating that he was “establishing the same relations between occupation personnel and the Japanese population as exists between troops stationed in the United States and the American people.” In principle, the Occupation's administrative structure was highly complex. The Far Eastern Commission, based in Washington, included representatives from all 13 countries that had fought against Japan and was established in 1946 to formulate basic principles. The Allied Council for Japan was created in the same year to assist in developing and implementing surrender terms and in administering the country. It consisted of representatives from the USA, the USSR, Nationalist China, and the British Commonwealth. Although both bodies were active at first, they were largely ineffectual due to unwieldy decision-making, disagreements between the national delegations (especially the USA and USSR), and the obstructionism of General Douglas MacArthur. In practice, SCAP, the executive authority of the occupation, effectively ruled Japan from 1945 to 1952. And since it took orders only from the US government, the Occupation became primarily an American affair. The US occupation program, effectively carried out by SCAP, was revolutionary and rested on a two-pronged approach. To ensure Japan would never again become a menace to the United States or to world peace, SCAP pursued disarmament and demilitarization, with continuing control over Japan's capacity to make war. This involved destroying military supplies and installations, demobilizing more than five million Japanese soldiers, and thoroughly discrediting the military establishment. Accordingly, SCAP ordered the purge of tens of thousands of designated persons from public service positions, including accused war criminals, military officers, leaders of ultranationalist societies, leaders in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, business leaders tied to overseas expansion, governors of former Japanese colonies, and national leaders who had steered Japan into war. In addition, MacArthur's International Military Tribunal for the Far East established a military court in Tokyo. It had jurisdiction over those charged with Class A crimes, top leaders who had planned and directed the war. Also considered were Class B charges, covering conventional war crimes, and Class C charges, covering crimes against humanity. Yet the military court in Tokyo wouldn't be the only one. More than 5,700 lower-ranking personnel were charged with conventional war crimes in separate trials convened by Australia, China, France, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Of the 5,700 Japanese individuals indicted for Class B war crimes, 984 were sentenced to death; 475 received life sentences; 2,944 were given more limited prison terms; 1,018 were acquitted; and 279 were never brought to trial or not sentenced. Among these, many, like General Ando Rikichi and Lieutenant-General Nomi Toshio, chose to commit suicide before facing prosecution. Notable cases include Lieutenant-General Tani Hisao, who was sentenced to death by the Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal for his role in the Nanjing Massacre; Lieutenant-General Sakai Takashi, who was executed in Nanjing for the murder of British and Chinese civilians during the occupation of Hong Kong. General Okamura Yasuji was convicted of war crimes by the Tribunal, yet he was immediately protected by the personal order of Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek, who kept him as a military adviser for the Kuomintang. In the Manila trials, General Yamashita Tomoyuki was sentenced to death as he was in overall command during the Sook Ching massacre, the Rape of Manila, and other atrocities. Lieutenant-General Homma Masaharu was likewise executed in Manila for atrocities committed by troops under his command during the Bataan Death March. General Imamura Hitoshi was sentenced to ten years in prison, but he considered the punishment too light and even had a replica of the prison built in his garden, remaining there until his death in 1968. Lieutenant-General Kanda Masatane received a 14-year sentence for war crimes on Bougainville, though he served only four years. Lieutenant-General Adachi Hatazo was sentenced to life imprisonment for war crimes in New Guinea and subsequently committed suicide on September 10, 1947. Lieutenant-General Teshima Fusataro received three years of forced labour for using a hospital ship to transport troops. Lieutenant-General Baba Masao was sentenced to death for ordering the Sandakan Death Marches, during which over 2,200 Australian and British prisoners of war perished. Lieutenant-General Tanabe Moritake was sentenced to death by a Dutch military tribunal for unspecified war crimes. Rear-Admiral Sakaibara Shigematsu was executed in Guam for ordering the Wake Island massacre, in which 98 American civilians were murdered. Lieutenant-General Inoue Sadae was condemned to death in Guam for permitting subordinates to execute three downed American airmen captured in Palau, though his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in 1951 and he was released in 1953. Lieutenant-General Tachibana Yoshio was sentenced to death in Guam for his role in the Chichijima Incident, in which eight American airmen were cannibalized. By mid-1945, due to the Allied naval blockade, the 25,000 Japanese troops on Chichijima had run low on supplies. However, although the daily rice ration had been reduced from 400 grams per person per day to 240 grams, the troops were not at risk of starvation. In February and March 1945, in what would later be called the Chichijima incident, Tachibana Yoshio's senior staff turned to cannibalism. Nine American airmen had escaped from their planes after being shot down during bombing raids on Chichijima, eight of whom were captured. The ninth, the only one to evade capture, was future US President George H. W. Bush, then a 20-year-old pilot. Over several months, the prisoners were executed, and reportedly by the order of Major Matoba Sueyo, their bodies were butchered by the division's medical orderlies, with the livers and other organs consumed by the senior staff, including Matoba's superior Tachibana. In the Yokohama War Crimes Trials, Lieutenant-Generals Inada Masazumi and Yokoyama Isamu were convicted for their complicity in vivisection and other human medical experiments performed at Kyushu Imperial University on downed Allied airmen. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, which began in May 1946 and lasted two and a half years, resulted in the execution by hanging of Generals Doihara Kenji and Itagaki Seishiro, and former Prime Ministers Hirota Koki and Tojo Hideki, for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace, specifically for the escalation of the Pacific War and for permitting the inhumane treatment of prisoners of war. Also sentenced to death were Lieutenant-General Muto Akira for his role in the Nanjing and Manila massacres; General Kimura Heitaro for planning the war strategy in China and Southeast Asia and for laxity in preventing atrocities against prisoners of war in Burma; and General Matsui Iwane for his involvement in the Rape of Nanjing. The seven defendants who were sentenced to death were executed at Sugamo Prison in Ikebukuro on December 23, 1948. Sixteen others were sentenced to life imprisonment, including the last Field Marshal Hata Shunroku, Generals Araki Sadao, Minami Hiro, and Umezu Shojiro, Admiral Shimada Shigetaro, former Prime Ministers Hiranuma Kiichiro and Koiso Kuniaki, Marquis Kido Koichi, and Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro, a major instigator of the second Sino-Japanese War. Additionally, former Foreign Ministers Togo Shigenori and Shigemitsu Mamoru received seven- and twenty-year sentences, respectively. The Soviet Union and Chinese Communist forces also held trials of Japanese war criminals, including the Khabarovsk War Crime Trials, which tried and found guilty some members of Japan's bacteriological and chemical warfare unit known as Unit 731. However, those who surrendered to the Americans were never brought to trial, as MacArthur granted immunity to Lieutenant-General Ishii Shiro and all members of the bacteriological research units in exchange for germ-w warfare data derived from human experimentation. If you would like to learn more about what I like to call Japan's Operation Paper clip, whereupon the US grabbed many scientists from Unit 731, check out my exclusive podcast. The SCAP-turn to democratization began with the drafting of a new constitution in 1947, addressing Japan's enduring feudal social structure. In the charter, sovereignty was vested in the people, and the emperor was designated a “symbol of the state and the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people in whom resides sovereign power.” Because the emperor now possessed fewer powers than European constitutional monarchs, some have gone so far as to say that Japan became “a republic in fact if not in name.” Yet the retention of the emperor was, in fact, a compromise that suited both those who wanted to preserve the essence of the nation for stability and those who demanded that the emperor system, though not necessarily the emperor, should be expunged. In line with the democratic spirit of the new constitution, the peerage was abolished and the two-chamber Diet, to which the cabinet was now responsible, became the highest organ of state. The judiciary was made independent and local autonomy was granted in vital areas of jurisdiction such as education and the police. Moreover, the constitution stipulated that “the people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights,” that they “shall be respected as individuals,” and that “their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall … be the supreme consideration in legislation.” Its 29 articles guaranteed basic human rights: equality, freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin, freedom of thought and freedom of religion. Finally, in its most controversial section, Article 9, the “peace clause,” Japan “renounce[d] war as a sovereign right of the nation” and vowed not to maintain any military forces and “other war potential.” To instill a thoroughly democratic ethos, reforms touched every facet of society. The dissolution of the zaibatsu decentralised economic power; the 1945 Labour Union Law and the 1946 Labour Relations Act guaranteed workers the right to collective action; the 1947 Labour Standards Law established basic working standards for men and women; and the revised Civil Code of 1948 abolished the patriarchal household and enshrined sexual equality. Reflecting core American principles, SCAP introduced a 6-3-3 schooling system, six years of compulsory elementary education, three years of junior high, and an optional three years of senior high, along with the aim of secular, locally controlled education. More crucially, ideological reform followed: censorship of feudal material in media, revision of textbooks, and prohibition of ideas glorifying war, dying for the emperor, or venerating war heroes. With women enfranchised and young people shaped to counter militarism and ultranationalism, rural Japan was transformed to undermine lingering class divisions. The land reform program provided for the purchase of all land held by absentee landlords, allowed resident landlords and owner-farmers to retain a set amount of land, and required that the remaining land be sold to the government so it could be offered to existing tenants. In 1948, amid the intensifying tensions of the Cold War that would soon culminate in the Korean War, the occupation's focus shifted from demilitarization and democratization toward economic rehabilitation and, ultimately, the remilitarization of Japan, an shift now known as the “Reverse Course.” The country was thus rebuilt as the Pacific region's primary bulwark against the spread of Communism. An Economic Stabilisation Programme was introduced, including a five-year plan to coordinate production and target capital through the Reconstruction Finance Bank. In 1949, the anti-inflationary Dodge Plan was adopted, advocating balanced budgets, fixing the exchange rate at 360 yen to the dollar, and ending broad government intervention. Additionally, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was formed and supported the formation of conglomerates centered around banks, which encouraged the reemergence of a somewhat weakened set of zaibatsu, including Mitsui and Mitsubishi. By the end of the Occupation era, Japan was on the verge of surpassing its 1934–1936 levels of economic growth. Equally important was Japan's rearmament in alignment with American foreign policy: a National Police Reserve of about 75,000 was created with the outbreak of the Korean War; by 1952 it had expanded to 110,000 and was renamed the Self-Defense Force after the inclusion of an air force. However, the Reverse Course also facilitated the reestablishment of conservative politics and the rollback of gains made by women and the reforms of local autonomy and education. As the Occupation progressed, the Americans permitted greater Japanese initiative, and power gradually shifted from the reformers to the moderates. By 1949, the purge of the right came under review, and many who had been condemned began returning to influence, if not to the Diet, then to behind-the-scenes power. At the same time, Japanese authorities, with MacArthur's support, began purging left-wing activists. In June 1950, for example, the central office of the Japan Communist Party and the editorial board of The Red Flag were purged. The gains made by women also seemed to be reversed. Women were elected to 8% of available seats in the first lower-house election in 1946, but to only 2% in 1952, a trend not reversed until the so-called Madonna Boom of the 1980s. Although the number of women voting continued to rise, female politicisation remained more superficial than might be imagined. Women's employment also appeared little affected by labour legislation: though women formed nearly 40% of the labor force in 1952, they earned only 45% as much as men. Indeed, women's attitudes toward labor were influenced less by the new ethos of fulfilling individual potential than by traditional views of family and workplace responsibilities. In the areas of local autonomy and education, substantial modifications were made to the reforms. Because local authorities lacked sufficient power to tax, they were unable to realise their extensive powers, and, as a result, key responsibilities were transferred back to national jurisdiction. In 1951, for example, 90% of villages and towns placed their police forces under the control of the newly formed National Police Agency. Central control over education was also gradually reasserted; in 1951, the Yoshida government attempted to reintroduce ethics classes, proposed tighter central oversight of textbooks, and recommended abolishing local school board elections. By the end of the decade, all these changes had been implemented. The Soviet occupation of the Kurile Islands and the Habomai Islets was completed with Russian troops fully deployed by September 5. Immediately after the onset of the occupation, amid a climate of insecurity and fear marked by reports of sporadic rape and physical assault and widespread looting by occupying troops, an estimated 4,000 islanders fled to Hokkaido rather than face an uncertain repatriation. As Soviet forces moved in, they seized or destroyed telephone and telegraph installations and halted ship movements into and out of the islands, leaving residents without adequate food and other winter provisions. Yet, unlike Manchuria, where Japanese civilians faced widespread sexual violence and pillage, systematic violence against the civilian population on the Kuriles appears to have been exceptional. A series of military government proclamations assured islanders of safety so long as they did not resist Soviet rule and carried on normally; however, these orders also prohibited activities not explicitly authorized by the Red Army, which imposed many hardships on civilians. Residents endured harsh conditions under Soviet rule until late 1948, when Japanese repatriation out of the Kurils was completed. The Kuriles posed a special diplomatic problem, as the occupation of the southernmost islands—the Northern Territories—ignited a long-standing dispute between Tokyo and Moscow that continues to impede the normalisation of relations today. Although the Kuriles were promised to the Soviet Union in the Yalta agreement, Japan and the United States argued that this did not apply to the Northern Territories, since they were not part of the Kurile Islands. A substantial dispute regarding the status of the Kurile Islands arose between the United States and the Soviet Union during the preparation of the Treaty of San Francisco, which was intended as a permanent peace treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers of World War II. The treaty was ultimately signed by 49 nations in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, and came into force on April 28, 1952. It ended Japan's role as an imperial power, allocated compensation to Allied nations and former prisoners of war who had suffered Japanese war crimes, ended the Allied post-war occupation of Japan, and returned full sovereignty to Japan. Effectively, the document officially renounced Japan's treaty rights derived from the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and its rights to Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores, the Kurile Islands, the Spratly Islands, Antarctica, and South Sakhalin. Japan's South Seas Mandate, namely the Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands, and Caroline Islands, had already been formally revoked by the United Nations on July 18, 1947, making the United States responsible for administration of those islands under a UN trusteeship agreement that established the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. In turn, the Bonin, Volcano, and Ryukyu Islands were progressively restored to Japan between 1953 and 1972, along with the Senkaku Islands, which were disputed by both Communist and Nationalist China. In addition, alongside the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan and the United States signed a Security Treaty that established a long-lasting military alliance between them. Although Japan renounced its rights to the Kuriles, the U.S. State Department later clarified that “the Habomai Islands and Shikotan ... are properly part of Hokkaido and that Japan is entitled to sovereignty over them,” hence why the Soviets refused to sign the treaty. Britain and the United States agreed that territorial rights would not be granted to nations that did not sign the Treaty of San Francisco, and as a result the Kurile Islands were not formally recognized as Soviet territory. A separate peace treaty, the Treaty of Taipei (formally the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty), was signed in Taipei on April 28, 1952 between Japan and the Kuomintang, and on June 9 of that year the Treaty of Peace Between Japan and India followed. Finally, Japan and the Soviet Union ended their formal state of war with the Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, though this did not settle the Kurile Islands dispute. Even after these formal steps, Japan as a nation was not in a formal state of war, and many Japanese continued to believe the war was ongoing; those who held out after the surrender came to be known as Japanese holdouts.  Captain Oba Sakae and his medical company participated in the Saipan campaign beginning on July 7, 1944, and took part in what would become the largest banzai charge of the Pacific War. After 15 hours of intense hand-to-hand combat, almost 4,300 Japanese soldiers were dead, and Oba and his men were presumed among them. In reality, however, he survived the battle and gradually assumed command of over a hundred additional soldiers. Only five men from his original unit survived the battle, two of whom died in the following months. Oba then led over 200 Japanese civilians deeper into the jungles to evade capture, organizing them into mountain caves and hidden jungle villages. When the soldiers were not assisting the civilians with survival tasks, Oba and his men continued their battle against the garrison of US Marines. He used the 1,552‑ft Mount Tapochau as their primary base, which offered an unobstructed 360-degree view of the island. From their base camp on the western slope of the mountain, Oba and his men occasionally conducted guerrilla-style raids on American positions. Due to the speed and stealth of these operations, and the Marines' frustrated attempts to find him, the Saipan Marines eventually referred to Oba as “The Fox.” Oba and his men held out on the island for 512 days, or about 16 months. On November 27, 1945, former Major-General Amo Umahachi was able to draw out some of the Japanese in hiding by singing the anthem of the Japanese infantry branch. Amo was then able to present documents from the defunct IGHQ to Oba ordering him and his 46 remaining men to surrender themselves to the Americans. On December 1, the Japanese soldiers gathered on Tapochau and sang a song of departure to the spirits of the war dead; Oba led his people out of the jungle and they presented themselves to the Marines of the 18th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Company. With great formality and commensurate dignity, Oba surrendered his sword to Lieutenant Colonel Howard G. Kirgis, and his men surrendered their arms and colors. On January 2, 1946, 20 Japanese soldiers hiding in a tunnel at Corregidor Island surrendered after learning the war had ended from a newspaper found while collecting water. In that same month, 120 Japanese were routed after a battle in the mountains 150 miles south of Manila. In April, during a seven-week campaign to clear Lubang Island, 41 more Japanese emerged from the jungle, unaware that the war had ended; however, a group of four Japanese continued to resist. In early 1947, Lieutenant Yamaguchi Ei and his band of 33 soldiers renewed fighting with the small Marine garrison on Peleliu, prompting reinforcements under Rear-Admiral Charles Pownall to be brought to the island to hunt down the guerrilla group. Along with them came former Rear-Admiral Sumikawa Michio, who ultimately convinced Yamaguchi to surrender in April after almost three years of guerrilla warfare. Also in April, seven Japanese emerged from Palawan Island and fifteen armed stragglers emerged from Luzon. In January 1948, 200 troops surrendered on Mindanao; and on May 12, the Associated Press reported that two unnamed Japanese soldiers had surrendered to civilian policemen in Guam the day before. On January 6, 1949, two former IJN soldiers, machine gunners Matsudo Rikio and Yamakage Kufuku, were discovered on Iwo Jima and surrendered peacefully. In March 1950, Private Akatsu Yūichi surrendered in the village of Looc, leaving only three Japanese still resisting on Lubang. By 1951 a group of Japanese on Anatahan Island refused to believe that the war was over and resisted every attempt by the Navy to remove them. This group was first discovered in February 1945, when several Chamorros from Saipan were sent to the island to recover the bodies of a Saipan-based B-29. The Chamorros reported that there were about thirty Japanese survivors from three ships sunk in June 1944, one of which was an Okinawan woman. Personal aggravations developed from the close confines of a small group on a small island and from tuba drinking; among the holdouts, 6 of 11 deaths were the result of violence, and one man displayed 13 knife wounds. The presence of only one woman, Higa Kazuko, caused considerable difficulty as she would transfer her affections among at least four men after each of them mysteriously disappeared, purportedly “swallowed by the waves while fishing.” According to the more sensational versions of the Anatahan tale, 11 of the 30 navy sailors stranded on the island died due to violent struggles over her affections. In July 1950, Higa went to the beach when an American vessel appeared offshore and finally asked to be removed from the island. She was taken to Saipan aboard the Miss Susie and, upon arrival, told authorities that the men on the island did not believe the war was over. As the Japanese government showed interest in the situation on Anatahan, the families of the holdouts were contacted in Japan and urged by the Navy to write letters stating that the war was over and that the holdouts should surrender. The letters were dropped by air on June 26 and ultimately convinced the holdouts to give themselves up. Thus, six years after the end of World War II, “Operation Removal” commenced from Saipan under the command of Lt. Commander James B. Johnson, USNR, aboard the Navy Tug USS Cocopa. Johnson and an interpreter went ashore by rubber boat and formally accepted the surrender on the morning of June 30, 1951. The Anatahan femme fatale story later inspired the 1953 Japanese film Anatahan and the 1998 novel Cage on the Sea. In 1953, Murata Susumu, the last holdout on Tinian, was finally captured. The next year, on May 7, Corporal Sumada Shoichi was killed in a clash with Filipino soldiers, leaving only two Japanese still resisting on Lubang. In November 1955, Seaman Kinoshita Noboru was captured in the Luzon jungle but soon after committed suicide rather than “return to Japan in defeat.” That same year, four Japanese airmen surrendered at Hollandia in Dutch New Guinea; and in 1956, nine soldiers were located and sent home from Morotai, while four men surrendered on Mindoro. In May 1960, Sergeant Ito Masashi became one of the last Japanese to surrender at Guam after the capture of his comrade Private Minagawa Bunzo, but the final surrender at Guam would come later with Sergeant Yokoi Shoichi. Sergeant Yokoi Shoichi survived in the jungles of Guam by living for years in an elaborately dug hole, subsisting on snails and lizards, a fate that, while undignified, showcased his ingenuity and resilience and earned him a warm welcome on his return to Japan. His capture was not heroic in the traditional sense: he was found half-starving by a group of villagers while foraging for shrimp in a stream, and the broader context included his awareness as early as 1952 that the war had ended. He explained that the wartime bushido code, emphasizing self-sacrifice or suicide rather than self-preservation, had left him fearing that repatriation would label him a deserter and likely lead to execution. Emerging from the jungle, Yokoi also became a vocal critic of Japan's wartime leadership, including Emperor Hirohito, which fits a view of him as a product of, and a prisoner within, his own education, military training, and the censorship and propaganda of the era. When asked by a young nephew how he survived so long on an island just a short distance from a major American airbase, he replied simply, “I was really good at hide and seek.”  That same year, Private Kozuka Kinshichi was killed in a shootout with Philippine police in October, leaving Lieutenant Onoda Hiroo still resisting on Lubang. Lieutenant Onoda Hiroo had been on Lubang since 1944, a few months before the Americans retook the Philippines. The last instructions he had received from his immediate superior ordered him to retreat to the interior of the island and harass the Allied occupying forces until the IJA eventually returned. Despite efforts by the Philippine Army, letters and newspapers left for him, radio broadcasts, and even a plea from Onoda's brother, he did not believe the war was over. On February 20, 1974, Onoda encountered a young Japanese university dropout named Suzuki Norio, who was traveling the world and had told friends that he planned to “look for Lieutenant Onoda, a panda, and the abominable snowman, in that order.” The two became friends, but Onoda stated that he was waiting for orders from one of his commanders. On March 9, 1974, Onoda went to an agreed-upon place and found a note left by Suzuki. Suzuki had brought along Onoda's former commander, Major Taniguchi, who delivered the oral orders for Onoda to surrender. Intelligence Officer 2nd Lt. Onoda Hiroo thus emerged from Lubang's jungle with his .25 caliber rifle, 500 rounds of ammunition, and several hand grenades. He surrendered 29 years after Japan's formal surrender, and 15 years after being declared legally dead in Japan. When he accepted that the war was over, he wept openly. He received a hero's welcome upon his return to Japan in 1974. The Japanese government offered him a large sum of money in back pay, which he refused. When money was pressed on him by well-wishers, he donated it to Yasukuni Shrine. Onoda was reportedly unhappy with the attention and what he saw as the withering of traditional Japanese values. He wrote No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War, a best-selling autobiography published in 1974. Yet the last Japanese to surrender would be Private Nakamura Teruo, an Amis aborigine from Formosa and a member of the Takasago Volunteers. Private Nakamura Teruo spent the tail end of World War II with a dwindling band on Morotai, repeatedly dispersing and reassembling in the jungle as they hunted for food. The group suffered continuous losses to starvation and disease, and survivors described Nakamura as highly self-sufficient. He left to live alone somewhere in the Morotai highlands between 1946 and 1947, rejoined the main group in 1950, and then disappeared again a few years later. Nakamura hinted in print that he fled into the jungle because he feared the other holdouts might murder him. He survives for decades beyond the war, eventually being found by 11 Indonesian soldiers. The emergence of an indigenous Taiwanese soldier among the search party embarrassed Japan as it sought to move past its imperial past. Many Japanese felt Nakamura deserved compensation for decades of loyalty, only to learn that his back pay for three decades of service amounted to 68,000 yen.   Nakamura's experience of peace was complex. When a journalist asked how he felt about “wasting” three decades of his life on Morotai, he replied that the years had not been wasted; he had been serving his country. Yet the country he returned to was Taiwan, and upon disembarking in Taipei in early January 1975, he learned that his wife had a son he had never met and that she had remarried a decade after his official death. Nakamura eventually lived with a daughter, and his story concluded with a bittersweet note when his wife reconsidered and reconciled with him. Several Japanese soldiers joined local Communist and insurgent groups after the war to avoid surrender. Notably, in 1956 and 1958, two soldiers returned to Japan after service in China's People's Liberation Army. Two others who defected with a larger group to the Malayan Communist Party around 1945 laid down their arms in 1989 and repatriated the next year, becoming among the last to return home. That is all for today, but fear not I will provide a few more goodies over the next few weeks. I will be releasing some of my exclusive podcast episodes from my youtube membership and patreon that are about pacific war subjects. Like I promised the first one will be on why Emperor Hirohito surrendered. Until then if you need your fix you know where to find me: eastern front week by week, fall and rise of china, echoes of war or on my Youtube membership of patreon at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel.

Gabriel Custodiet speaks with Roger Huang about his insider views of the current political, moral, and technological soul and abilities of China.    GUEST → https://x.com/Rogerh1991 → https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerhuang/ → https://chinabitcoinbook.com/ → https://www.amazon.com/Would-Mao-Hold-Bitcoin-Techno-Nationalist/dp/B0D7672L8X/r   MENTIONED → https://www.amazon.com/Age-Ambition-Chasing-Fortune-Truth/dp/0374535272 (Age of Ambition) → https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/30/chinas-age-of-malaise  → https://www.amazon.com/AI-Superpowers-China-Silicon-Valley/dp/132854639X  → https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/13/confucius-comes-home  → https://www.amazon.com/China-21st-Century-Everyone-Needs/dp/0190659084 → https://www.amazon.com/stores/Jeffrey-N.-Wasserstrom/author/B001IQWGPW → https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Wang_Yue → https://www.amazon.com/China-Ten-Words-Yu-Hua/dp/0307739791 → https://www.amazon.com/China-History-John-Keay/dp/0465025188 WATCHMAN PRIVACY → https://watchmanprivacy.com (Including privacy consulting) → https://twitter.com/watchmanprivacy → https://escapethetechnocracy.com/ CRYPTO DONATIONS →8829DiYwJ344peEM7SzUspMtgUWKAjGJRHmu4Q6R8kEWMpafiXPPNBkeRBhNPK6sw27urqqMYTWWXZrsX6BLRrj7HiooPAy (Monero) →https://btcpay0.voltageapp.io/apps/3JDQDSj2rp56KDffH5sSZL19J1Lh/pos (BTC) Timeline 00:00 – Introduction 1:40 – Guest background 3:20 – What did China learn from the USSR? 12:15 – China's mass material rise in early 21st century 22:20 – The spiritual void of China 37:05 – The state of Hong Kong 45:10 – Best privacy practices while visiting or living in China 55:40 – DeepSeek 1:11:30 – Book recommendations 1:16:30 – Final thoughts   Music by Karl Casey @ White Bat Audio

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/biography

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge UP, 2016) is a revisionist study of the career of General He Yingqin, one of the most prominent military officers in China's Nationalist period (1928-49) and one of the most misunderstood figures in twentieth-century China.  Western scholars have dismissed He Yingqin as corrupt and incompetent, yet the Chinese archives reveal that he demonstrated considerable success as a combat commander and military administrator during civil conflicts and the Sino-Japanese War. His work in the Chinese Nationalist military served as the foundation of a close personal and professional relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he worked closely for more than two decades. Against the backdrop of the Nationalist revolution of the 1920s through the 1940s, Peter Worthing analyzes He Yingqin's rise to power alongside Chiang Kai-shek, his work in building the Nationalist military, and his fundamental role in carrying out policies designed to overcome the regime's greatest obstacles during this turbulent period of Chinese history.

Chapter 1:Summary of The Rape of Nanking"The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II" by Iris Chang, published in 1997, is a historical account of the horrific massacre in Nanking (now Nanjing), China, during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The book details the events that occurred in 1937, when the Japanese Imperial Army captured Nanking, then the capital of Nationalist China. Over the span of six weeks, Japanese soldiers committed widespread atrocities, including mass executions, rapes, looting, and other forms of extreme violence against civilians and unarmed soldiers.Chang describes the brutalities using extensive research, including survivors' testimonies, photographs, and documents, highlighting both the scale and cruelty of the massacre. The author estimates that approximately 300,000 people were killed and tens of thousands of women were raped, making it one of the most devastating massacres of the 20th century.The book also discusses the international response to the atrocities, noting how a small group of Western expatriates and missionaries established the Nanking Safety Zone to shelter and protect Chinese civilians. Despite their efforts, the suffering and loss were immense."The Rape of Nanking" serves not only as a reminder of a dark chapter in history but also as an examination of the psychological and sociological underpinnings of such human atrocities. Chang criticizes the Japanese government's reluctance to fully acknowledge the incident and calls for greater recognition and understanding of the massacre. Her narrative aims to ensure that the atrocities committed in Nanking are neither forgotten nor repeated. The book has contributed significantly to discussions about historical memory and justice.Chapter 2:The Theme of The Rape of Nanking"The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II" by Iris Chang is a non-fiction book published in 1997 that provides a detailed account of the Nanking Massacre, a six-week period of horrific violence and atrocities committed by the Japanese army in the Chinese city of Nanking (now Nanjing) beginning in December 1937 during the Second Sino-Japanese War.Key Plot Points:1. Invasion of Nanking: The book begins with the context of the Japanese invasion of China and the strategic and symbolic importance of Nanking, then the capital of Nationalist China.2. The Fall of Nanking: Details the siege and eventual fall of Nanking to Japanese forces. Despite attempts at defense by Chinese troops, the city succumbed to the better-equipped Japanese army.3. The Massacre Begins: Following the capture of the city, Japanese soldiers began an unrestrained attack on both soldiers and civilians, which included mass executions, rapes, and widespread looting.4. The Safety Zone: A group of Westerners and a few sympathetic Japanese established the Nanking Safety Zone, which tried to shelter Chinese civilians from the atrocities. The efforts and struggles of these individuals, including John Rabe, a German businessman and Nazi Party member, who played a leading role in trying to protect the civilians, are highlighted.5. The International Response: The book also discusses the lack of a strong international response to the massacre and the world's focus on the events unfolding in Europe leading up to World War II.6. Aftermath and Denial: Post-war, the book chronicles the Chinese struggle for recognition of the massacre, the ongoing denial by certain segments of Japanese society, and the challenges faced by historians and survivors in memorializing the event.Character Development:Given that it's a historical account, the book doesn't feature traditional character development. However, it does provide deep profiles of key figures involved in the event, illustrating their moral choices, courage, or cruelty. Figures such as John Rabe...

Gabriel Custodiet speaks with Roger Huang about the past and present of China's technological control over its people. His book is Would Mao Buy Bitcoin?   GUEST LINKS → https://chinabitcoinbook.com/ → https://x.com/Rogerh1991 → Nostr: loki@verified-nostr.com → https://chinabitcoinbook.com/?p=126 (A Comprehensive Guide to e-CNY/Digital Yuan)   WATCHMAN PRIVACY → https://watchmanprivacy.com (Including privacy consulting) → https://twitter.com/watchmanprivacy → https://escapethetechnocracy.com/   CRYPTO DONATIONS →8829DiYwJ344peEM7SzUspMtgUWKAjGJRHmu4Q6R8kEWMpafiXPPNBkeRBhNPK6sw27urqqMYTWWXZrsX6BLRrj7HiooPAy (Monero) →https://btcpay0.voltageapp.io/apps/3JDQDSj2rp56KDffH5sSZL19J1Lh/pos (BTC)   Music by Karl Casey @ White Bat Audio   Timeline 00:00 – Introduction 1:10 – Who is Roger Huang? 4:00 – Cultural Revolution and build-up to present China 13:25 – Is China a Socialist/Communist state? 19:17 – Understanding China's currency situation 25:20 – How do visitors to China use Chinese currency? 29:10 – Is it okay for successful Chinese to leave China? 35:45 – Social credit score? 42:15 – Hukou system in China 45:55 – Chinese Bitcoiners vs Western Bitcoiners 56:25 – Final thoughts

Last time we spoke about the Northern Warlords and their respective factions. We covered the three big names, Duan Qirui and his Anhui clique; Wu Peifu and his Zhili cliques and Zhang Zuolin and his Fengtian clique. We also went into the smaller ones like Yan Xishan's Shanxi clique, Feng Yuxiang's Guominjun clique, the Ma clique of the three Ma's, Ma Bufang, Ma Hongkui and Ma Hongbin known as the Xibei San Ma “thee Ma of the northwest”; the Xinjiang clique of Yang Zengxin and we barely scratched the surface of the Manchu Resotrationist clique of Zhang Xun. There was over 100 warlords, its really difficult to pick and choose who to delve into the most. However, there were two warlords who were bitter rivals, in a comedic fashion might I add. One was hailed as the good Christian warlord, the other a devilish monster. Today we are going to tell the tales of these two figures.   #95 Feng Yuxiang, Zhang Zongchang: the Angel and Devil   Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Feng Yuxiang was born in Zhili province, today Hebei in 1882. His parents were poor, his father joined the Qing army to make ends meet. At the age of only 10 he joined the Huai Army alongside his father. He earned a uniform and food but no salary as his rank was “Fu Bing”, deputy soldier. By the age of 16 he proved himself capable and became a regular. Unlike his colleagues who gambled their money away, Feng saved his money and even used portions of it to help out soldiers in need, particularly Fu Bing's. Because of this he became quite popular amongst his comrades. He did not gamble nor drink alcohol. In 1902 he joined Yuan Shikai's guard units and rose through the ranks becoming a company commander. From there he was transferred to the 3rd division, a crack one of Yuan Shikai's soon to be Beiyang Army.  During the Xinhai Revolution Feng Yuxiang joined the Luanzhou uprising against the Qing, supporting the revolutionaries in the South. The uprising was suppressed by the Beiyang army and Feng was imprisoned by Yuan Shikai. Once Yuan Shikai stole the presidency of the Republic, Feng was released and he took back his military position while supporting Yuan Shikai's regime. By 1914 he became a brigade commander and helped supress uprisings in Henan and Shaanxi. It was also during this year Feng Yuxiang developed a curiosity about Christianity. He converted to Christianity, being baptiszed into the Methodist Episcopal Church. When Yuan Shikai declared himself emperor, this ushered in the Anti-Yuan resistance. Feng Yuxiang helped supress anti-yuan forces of General Cai E in Sichuan, but in the process, began secrely negotiating with Cai E. He formed an agreement to “put on a show” rather than actually fight. After Yuan Shikai's death, Feng Yuxiang was deprived command of the 16th Mixed Brigade, something he had come to see as his personal property. He managed to stay in touch with its officers who remained loyal to him personally. Now it gives away further episodes to dvevle deep into the following years, but what I will say, Feng Yuxiang played important roles in critical moments of the wars during China's warlord Era. To be blunt, Feng Yuxiang was a real game of thrones little finger kind of guy if you get the reference. He always looked where the wind was blowing and was quick to switch sides turning the sides of one clique against another. He would found the Guominjun Clique, a sort of little borther to the Kuomintang, but its powerbase was located in the north rather than the south. Feng Yuxiang's career as a warlord began right after Yuan Shikai's death, but he certainly set himself apart from other warlords. Feng Yuxiang would receive a lot of western press for his rather, very different methodology compared to the other warlords. In a lot of ways, he was similar to a public school headmaster in England. He forbade his men from smoking tobacco or opium, from drinking alcohol and he forced them all to study the bible. He forbade prostitution, gambling and selling drugs. He quickly earned the nickname “the Christian General”. He had a reputation of baptizing his troops with fire hoses, though this has been highly contested. Indeed he was a hardcore Christian and actively promoting Christianity while showing no tolerance for other religions in China. For exmaple in 1927 when entering Henan Province he launched a cmapaign to supress Buddhism by expelling over 300,000 monastic members and confisciating hundreds of Buddhist monasteries for military purposes. In 1923 a British Protestant Missionary, Marshall Broomhall said this of him “The contrast between Cromwell's Ironsides and Charles's Cavaliers is not more striking than that which exists in China to-day between the godly and well-disciplined troops of General Feng and the normal type of man who in that land goes by the name of soldier ... While it is too much to say that there are no good soldiers in China outside of General Feng's army, it is none the less true that the people generally are as fearful of the presence of troops as of brigand bands”. Feng Yuxiang required his troops to take part in sports, gymastics and hardcore marches. Any illiterates were forced to learn to read and write, many were also trained in trades so they would not simply leave the army and become bandits. Feng looked at Christianity as a means of providing morale and disciplin for his army, he often told foreign missionaries  'Remember that your chief work is not to try to convert the rank and file of my army, but to use your strength in trying to get all my officers filled with the Spirit of God, for as soon as that takes place, the lowest private in the army will feel the effects of it”. Feng Yuxiangs was closely intouch with his troops often stopping to chat with them about their living conditions. He reduced corporal punishments, encouraged singing patriotic songs. One of the oddest things that I came across when I was making my Warlord Era content on the Pacific War Channel was video's of Feng Yuxiang personally checking the fingernails of his troops. He was pretty hardcore about cleanliness, I guess “cleanliness is next to godliness”. Alright that is a lot of information about the good toe shoes Christian General Feng Yuxiang, now let me talk about Zhang Zongchang, the Dogmeat General. Zhang Zongchang was born in 1881 in Yi county, present day Laizhou in Shandong. He grew up in an impoverished village, his father was a trumpeter, a headshaver and a rampant alcoholic. His mother exorcized evil spirits. . . Yeah she was basically a witch, oh and she left Zhang and his dad chasing another man. The family moved to Manchuria when Zhang was in his teens and he immediately got involved in petty crime around Harbin. Zhang would work as a pickpocket, bouncer, prospector and bandit throughout his life. He ended up doing some work as a laborer in Siberia amongst the Russians, picking up some Russian in the process, something that would really help his career out later. He then became a Honghuzi bandit roaming the Manchurian countryside when the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 hit. During the war he served as a Imperial Russian Army auxiliary, interestingly enough his future boss who was also a Honghuzi did the same for the Japanese. After the war he went back to his Honghuzi lifestyle, becoming the leader of a local bandit gang.   During the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, Zhang was leading his Honghuzi as a sort of revolutionary desperados gang. He then went to Jiangsu and joined the Green Standard Army where he impressed his commander officer Cheng Dechuan so much so he made Zhang his successor…or Zhang threatened the guy who knows. Thus for a little while Zhang was leading a small cavalry detachment under the Division commander Leng Yuqin, battling Honghuzi groups. During the second revolution of 1913, Zhang became the divisional commander when Leng died. There was an issue with his division, the revolutionary General Feng Guozhang did not like them, probably because they were criminals, so he reduced their role in the revolution to being a symbolic unit. Zhang responded to this by murdering the revolutionary Chen Qimei in Shanghai in 1916, proving his loyalty and reliability to Feng Guozhang. Feng Guozhang later became vice president of the new Republic, appointing Zhang as the commander of his personal guard. As China's Warlord Era began in 1918, Zhang like every other big guy, looked for the best strongman to follow. In 1922 he turned his attention to a new rising star, the tiger of manchuria, Zhang Zuolin.   There is a famous story, that Zhang Zuolin was celebrating his birthday in 1922, seeing countless people showering him with gifts trying to earn his favor. Zhang Zongchang apparently sent him two empty coolie baskets and did not show up in person. Zhang Zuolin was baffled by this at first, until he realized the empty baskets implied Zhang Zongchang was a man willing to shoulder any heavy responsibilities that Zhang Zuolin would entrust to him. This apparently worked like a charm as Zhang Zongchang was rewarded a position within his army.   Zhang Zongchang's time in Siberia and work under the Russians during the Russo-Japanese war paid off as he managed to secure White Russian Mercenaries. These were refugee veterans of the Russian Civil War who had been straddling the Manchurian/Soviet borders. Zhang hired thousands of them, organizing them into units, including Cossack bodyguards. He even recruited woman on a large scale, the first Chinese general to do so. The women mostly served as nurses and one regiment was exclusively white Russian women. The white russians trained their Chinese counterparts resulting in excellent medical, a significant boost for morale and combat capability. The white russians were crucial to Zhang Zongchang's rise as they knew how to build and operate armored trains giving the warlord a huge edge.    Now just like with Feng Yuxiang, I don't wanna give away future parts of the warlord era story, just know Zhang Zongchang greatly impressed Zhang Zuolin and would be rewarded military governorship over Shandong Province. As the Military governor of Shandong, this is where you hear about him being a monster. For those who don't know, Shandong has a long spanning history of being where trouble starts in China. Zhang's mismanagement of Shandong was legendary, to call it one of Shandong's darkest times is an understatement. For example it is said one of his favorite hobbies was “to split melons”, that was bashing in the skulls of people with rifle butts. He also liked to hang people and their severed heads from telephone poles. He would reign over Shandong until 1928 and it was 3 very hard years for the people there. Basically he did what all corrupt officials had done historically in China, he fleeced the population of his province. He implemented excessive taxes and starved public institutions of funds. The provincial education system collapsed in 1927 and the provincial economy was stagnant as all hell, save for the black market. To fight the economic collapse he printed money as fast as it could be printed and became nearly valueless, reminds me a lot of my nation's leader today.   Now any criticism of Zhang Zonghcang or the Fengtian governance would lead to imprisonment and resistance led to more split melons, seeing severed heads hung everywhere. For example if a newspaper criticized his regime, Zhang literally had the editors shot. Things got so bad for the peasants of Shandong,  they formed a group called the Red Spear Militia, branding red-tasseled spears, but not too many firearms. These men and women were completely outgunned trying desperately to resist Zhang Zongchangs tyranny, and tyrannical it was.    He imposed an incredible amount of taxes on the people, taxes on rice, tobacco, firewood, dogs, rickshaws, livestock, brothels, military pensions, opium pipe lighters, honestly anything that could be taxed he taxed. He once forcefully collected donations for a shrine; that shrine was a bronze statue of himself. He extorted money from banks, misappropriated his troops wages, because he was paying them in worthless printed money and gave a monopoly to the opium dealers. In fact he was the personal benefactor for drug lords and arms dealers, the black market was his chocolate factory.   Shandong was so bad, a very young Vinegar Joseph Stilwell visited the area when he was serving as a young military attache at the US legation in Peking. He said the dead and dying littered the streets and the only thing the citizens of Shandong had to eat were crushed soya-bean cakes usually fed to pigs. There were abandoned children everywhere, carts of animals seized by warlord troops and houses literally torn down for the troops firewood. Poverty and famine was rampant.   Now the devastation of Shandong was far removed from Zhang Zongchang however as he kept his quarters in the capital of Jinan (Capital in eastern Shandong). His HQ was described to be more like a medieval court full of extravagant entertainment. He had elaborate feasts, secured French champaign, scotch and his favorite Cuban cigars. He entertained artists, writers, entertainers, arms dealers, drug kingpins, western journalists and such. He loved to play poker with other minor warlords and they were high stakes games, sometimes he would walk away losing 30-50 thousands at a sitting. The poker games were always played with silver dollars and not the useless money he printed for his troops and the citizens of Shandong.    One of his more famous recurring guests was Madame Wellington Koo, this was the wife of one of the most famous Chinese politicians of the age, Wellington Koo was the frontrunner at the Paris Peace conference for China. Now Mr. Wellington Koo's wife had this to say about Zhang “Zhang Zongchang was so delightfully outrageous that he was disarming. There were many stories about him. He was called “old eighty-sin” some said he was the height of a pile of 86 dollars, other said that figure represented the length of a certain portion of his anatomy. When I visited him my Pao Pei and Chow Chow would come with me and Zhang would roar at the servants “never mind what you give Madame Koo to eat. But be sure her dogs get the very best or you'll suffer for it”.   Now why this guy is so famous today is of course because of his nicknames and infamous lifestyle. His most famous nickname was the “Dogmeat General”, and its said to be based on his fascination with the domino game Pai Jiu. Others say his favorite brand of tonic was known as dogmeat. And of course there was the rumor he ate a meal of black chow chow dog every day, as it was popularly believed at the time that this boosted a man's vitality. But if you noticed the quote from Madame Wellington Koo, I think he may have been a dog lover. But the part about the man's vitality fits this guy to the core.    He was of course known by the populace of Shandong as “Monster”, but there was also  nicknames like “the lanky general or general with three long legs” were certainly something he publicized heavily. His nickname “old 86” referred to the length of his penis being 86 mexican silver dollars, there was also a nickname “72-cannon Zhang” referring to that length. I mean the man was 6 foot 6, people described him quote “with the physique of an elephant, the brain of a pig and the temperament of a tiger”.    Alongside his penis propaganda, he was a legendary womanizer. Take his other nickname for example “the general of three don't-knows”: he did not know how many women, how many troops, or how much money he had. I think that nickname fits him better than the nickname he gave himself “the Great General of Justice and Might”.    He had a ton of concubines. The exact number of concubines he had has variously been reported between 30-50, but historians have a hard time trying to fix the numbers as Zhang himself allegedly did not know. Allegedly his concubines were from 26 different nationalities, each with her own washbowl marked with the flag of her nation. He was also said to give his concubines numbers since he could not remember their names nor speak their various languages. Many of these women he married, he was a polygamist after all. There was known to be Chinese, Japanese, Russian, Korean, Mongolians and at least one American amongst Zhang's women.   Zhang was semi-literate, whenever people asked where he was educated he would say “the college of the green forest” a euphemism for banditry. Despite being semi-literate Zhang Zongchang is famously known for his poetry, most notably his Poem on Bastards:   You tell me to do this, He tells me to do that. You're all bastards, Go fuck your mother. Untitled They ask me how many women I have. To be honest, I don't know either. Yesterday, a boy called me dad. I don't know who his mother was.     Praying or Rain   The sky god is also named Zhang Why does he make life hard for me If it doesn't rain in three days I'll demolish your temple Then I'll have cannons bombard your mom     It should be noted a lot of the poetry attributed to Zhang Zongchang may have been fabricated by a political opponent named Han Fuju who took over Shandong Province after him.  Zhang Zongchang despite being a brutal tyrant by all means, did reward his inner circle well, he had a lot of very loyal officers around him. Zhang Zongchang traveled with a teakwood coffin planted atop a car during his campaigns. He had this done to signify his willingness to die in combat, the old “I win or come back on a shield” idea. During of his failed campaigns, Zhang Zongchang paraded himself sitting in the coffin while smoking a cuban cigar.    So as you can imagine, Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Zuolin were quite different characters to say the least. Yet both these men were born under very similar conditions. Both were born into poverty, both joined the military and were raised through the ranks with the help of patrons. Both became warlords leading cliques that allied themselves to larger cliques. Both men avoided silver bullets, the term silver bullet was used during this era to refer to being assassinated by a subordinate who was bribed by a rival warlord. To avoid such a fate, one had to make sure to conserve the loyalty of their officers, which both men did by very different means. Feng used Christianity like a glue to bind his soldiers together. He provided missionaries to encourage conversion. If christianity did not work, he employed nationalism. In the mid 1920's he became very hostile to the unequal treaties that Europe and Japan plagued China with. He began indoctrinating his men with anti-imperialistic literature and ironically began brushing shoulders with the anti-religious Soviet Union. The USSR would become his main benefactor, earning him a second nickname “the red general”. Zhang Zongzhang was much more akin to other warlords at keeping silver bullets at bay. He paid his inner circle in silver, he made sure the pockets of his best men were always full. He allowed every evil corrupt thing imaginable to occur under his subordinates hands. Zhang Zongchang was a ruthless tyrannical monster who focused on his own power above all.   Both warlords had to navigate the extremely complex alliance and rivalry system amongst the warlords. Feng Yuxiang aligned himself with the Yuan Shikai, then against Yuan Shikai, then again for Yuan Shiaki, with the Zhili clique, the Kuomintung, Communists and basically whoever looked to be winning at the time. Chiang Kai-shek said of him “the so-called Christian General was a master in the art of deception”. This was extremely true, Feng Yuxiang was a hell of a backstabber, his career actually was propelled by it. Zhang Zongchang tossed his lot in with Banditz, then Russians, then with the Fengtian Clique out of necessity, brushing shoulders with the Japanese by proxy. Zhang Zongchang really did not have any large ideology, he went with the flow as long as it benefited him. In many ways both men sort of just did what they did to empower their positions.    The people living under their rule could not have had a more different experience. Under Feng Yuxiang, Christian beliefs were enforced, a more progressive outlook was present. He did a lot to improve the living conditions of ordinary people under his control. He promoted education heavily, healthcare, infrastructure development. He was insane about discipline and thwarting corruption. He stopped gambling, smoking, drug trafficking, prostitution, he really was a man of law and order. Zhang Zongchang was the complete opposite, it was as if he was trying to outdo the devil himself. Zhang Zongchang, ruled with an iron fist, extracting resources from the population through taxation, extortion, and forced labor, while enriching himself and his inner circle. Under Zhang the common people starved, they were pillaged, raped, abused in all manners. Zhang took away funds from education, infrastructure (unless it was a statue of himself), from anything that would benefit the people. Zhang loved to smoke cigars, drank excessively, had 50 concubines, and was literally bestfriends with the black market of China.   Inevitably given their spheres of influence both warlords would run into each other in the 1920s. Feng Yuxiang's powerbase was around Shanxi and Hebei while Zhang Zongchang was firmly in Shandong. These territories border another, producing frequent clashes over strategic resources, trade routes and territorial disputes. While Feng Yuxiang betrayed many cliques, he more or less stuck to the Kuomintang. At one point Feng Yuxiang even joined the Fengtian clique to only betray them. Zhang Zongchang remained loyal to the Fengtian clique, pretty much until his death. By the way his death would be at the hands of an officer who served Feng Yuxiang, so I guess Feng won in the end haha.    Most warlords were ostentatious in their dress and lifestyle, but Feng Yuxiang was quite an exception to this. Numerous photographs show warlords sporting glittering uniforms copied from other nations. For example, Zhang Zuolin wore a large gold braid, numerous decorations, giant gleaming buckles, shoulder pads and white gloves. He had a small peaked cap suggesting he was modeling himself on a Russian Tsar. Chiang Kai-Shek favored an american style officers uniform with a high peaked cap. Many warlords liked French-styled kepis, British ww1 uniforms with sam Brown belts or helmets with enormous plumes. Pull up a picture of Zhang Zongchang and its absolutely ridiculous. He has giant shoulder pads, large medal star decorations, a giant belt, a large ribbon cross over, double golden braids, white gloves, basically he looks like hes trying to out do Zhang Zuolin. But Feng Yuxiang while a warlord wore the same plain dress as his soldiers.    If you read contemporary or older books on the warlords, you immediately notice the authors favor Feng Yuxiang and talk about him positively, while strongly villianizing Zhang Zongchang. Put simply the propaganda wars that were going on during China's Warlord Era were exactly that, Feng Yuxiang made sure he was presented as a good Christian General, while Zhang Zongchang really seemed to bask in being the bad boy or base General. Hell Zhang Zongchang publicized most of what was said about him himself! In the end they were two cogs in a very large machine and they played their parts. During for however long this warlord era lasts on the podcast, we will come to learn about as many of the warlords as I possibly can cover. They are colorful characters who had a profound effect on the formation of Nationalist China and the People's republic of China.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus were the tales of the good Christian General Feng Yuxiang and the basest warlord, Zhang Zongchang. We will further tell the tales of their ventures in the battles of China's Warlord Era, but in the next episode we are going to meet the Southern faction Warlords!

Parks M. Coble's book The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War (Cambridge UP, 2023) revisits one of the most stunning political collapses of the twentieth century. When Japan surrendered in September 1945, Chiang Kai-shek seemed triumphant—one of the Big Four Allied leaders of the war and head of a government firmly allied with the United States. Yet less than four years later he would be forced into a humiliating exile in Taiwan. It has long been recognized that hyperinflation was a critical factor in this collapse. As revenues plummeted during the war against Japan, Chiang's government simply printed currency to cover its debts resulting in rapid inflation. When World War II ended it was assumed that with eastern China returned, ports opened, and financial support from the U.S. assured, the currency could be stabilized. But in fact, Chiang was obsessed with defeating the communists and the printing presses accelerated the production of banknotes which rapidly lost value. Why didn't the nationalist government tackle the issue of hyperinflation before it was too late? The fundamental flaw of the Chiang government was that he centralized all authority in his own hands and established overlapping and competing agencies. This approach fostered bureaucratic infighting which he alone could resolve. In the financial realm the competing elements were within his wife's family, her brother T. V. Soong (Song Ziwen) and brother-in-law H. H Kung (Kong Xiangxi). The new archival records reveal a bitter and often very petty rivalry between the two men that started in the 1930s and continued even after they were in exile in the United States after 1949. The tragedy for China was that both men ultimately bent to Chiang's wishes to provide money and suppressed any effort to alter the policy. T. V. Soong especially recognized the dangers of the inflationary policy, but his ambition and jealousy of his brother-in-law led him to cave when under pressure to produce more currency. Records in the Hoover Archives show how little understanding Chiang had of finance and how little interest he had dealing with it. The structure of the Chiang government meant that almost nothing could be done without sustained attention from the leader. Thus in 1947 when the collapse of the fabi (legal tender) currency was imminent, Chiang waited a year before authorizing a replacement currency, the disastrous gold yuan. My study suggests that the most important factor in the collapse of the Chiang government was its organization as an authoritarian system designed for control but ineffective at getting things done. Parks M. Coble is the James L. Sellers Professor of History at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Dong Wang is collection editor of Asian Studies books at Lived Places Publishing (New York & the UK), H-Diplo review editor, incoming visiting fellow at Freie Universität Berlin, research associate at Harvard Fairbank Center (since 2002), a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, director of the Wellington Koo Institute for Modern China in World History (Germany & USA), and an elected Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Parks M. Coble's book The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War (Cambridge UP, 2023) revisits one of the most stunning political collapses of the twentieth century. When Japan surrendered in September 1945, Chiang Kai-shek seemed triumphant—one of the Big Four Allied leaders of the war and head of a government firmly allied with the United States. Yet less than four years later he would be forced into a humiliating exile in Taiwan. It has long been recognized that hyperinflation was a critical factor in this collapse. As revenues plummeted during the war against Japan, Chiang's government simply printed currency to cover its debts resulting in rapid inflation. When World War II ended it was assumed that with eastern China returned, ports opened, and financial support from the U.S. assured, the currency could be stabilized. But in fact, Chiang was obsessed with defeating the communists and the printing presses accelerated the production of banknotes which rapidly lost value. Why didn't the nationalist government tackle the issue of hyperinflation before it was too late? The fundamental flaw of the Chiang government was that he centralized all authority in his own hands and established overlapping and competing agencies. This approach fostered bureaucratic infighting which he alone could resolve. In the financial realm the competing elements were within his wife's family, her brother T. V. Soong (Song Ziwen) and brother-in-law H. H Kung (Kong Xiangxi). The new archival records reveal a bitter and often very petty rivalry between the two men that started in the 1930s and continued even after they were in exile in the United States after 1949. The tragedy for China was that both men ultimately bent to Chiang's wishes to provide money and suppressed any effort to alter the policy. T. V. Soong especially recognized the dangers of the inflationary policy, but his ambition and jealousy of his brother-in-law led him to cave when under pressure to produce more currency. Records in the Hoover Archives show how little understanding Chiang had of finance and how little interest he had dealing with it. The structure of the Chiang government meant that almost nothing could be done without sustained attention from the leader. Thus in 1947 when the collapse of the fabi (legal tender) currency was imminent, Chiang waited a year before authorizing a replacement currency, the disastrous gold yuan. My study suggests that the most important factor in the collapse of the Chiang government was its organization as an authoritarian system designed for control but ineffective at getting things done. Parks M. Coble is the James L. Sellers Professor of History at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Dong Wang is collection editor of Asian Studies books at Lived Places Publishing (New York & the UK), H-Diplo review editor, incoming visiting fellow at Freie Universität Berlin, research associate at Harvard Fairbank Center (since 2002), a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, director of the Wellington Koo Institute for Modern China in World History (Germany & USA), and an elected Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Parks M. Coble's book The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War (Cambridge UP, 2023) revisits one of the most stunning political collapses of the twentieth century. When Japan surrendered in September 1945, Chiang Kai-shek seemed triumphant—one of the Big Four Allied leaders of the war and head of a government firmly allied with the United States. Yet less than four years later he would be forced into a humiliating exile in Taiwan. It has long been recognized that hyperinflation was a critical factor in this collapse. As revenues plummeted during the war against Japan, Chiang's government simply printed currency to cover its debts resulting in rapid inflation. When World War II ended it was assumed that with eastern China returned, ports opened, and financial support from the U.S. assured, the currency could be stabilized. But in fact, Chiang was obsessed with defeating the communists and the printing presses accelerated the production of banknotes which rapidly lost value. Why didn't the nationalist government tackle the issue of hyperinflation before it was too late? The fundamental flaw of the Chiang government was that he centralized all authority in his own hands and established overlapping and competing agencies. This approach fostered bureaucratic infighting which he alone could resolve. In the financial realm the competing elements were within his wife's family, her brother T. V. Soong (Song Ziwen) and brother-in-law H. H Kung (Kong Xiangxi). The new archival records reveal a bitter and often very petty rivalry between the two men that started in the 1930s and continued even after they were in exile in the United States after 1949. The tragedy for China was that both men ultimately bent to Chiang's wishes to provide money and suppressed any effort to alter the policy. T. V. Soong especially recognized the dangers of the inflationary policy, but his ambition and jealousy of his brother-in-law led him to cave when under pressure to produce more currency. Records in the Hoover Archives show how little understanding Chiang had of finance and how little interest he had dealing with it. The structure of the Chiang government meant that almost nothing could be done without sustained attention from the leader. Thus in 1947 when the collapse of the fabi (legal tender) currency was imminent, Chiang waited a year before authorizing a replacement currency, the disastrous gold yuan. My study suggests that the most important factor in the collapse of the Chiang government was its organization as an authoritarian system designed for control but ineffective at getting things done. Parks M. Coble is the James L. Sellers Professor of History at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Dong Wang is collection editor of Asian Studies books at Lived Places Publishing (New York & the UK), H-Diplo review editor, incoming visiting fellow at Freie Universität Berlin, research associate at Harvard Fairbank Center (since 2002), a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, director of the Wellington Koo Institute for Modern China in World History (Germany & USA), and an elected Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

Parks M. Coble's book The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War (Cambridge UP, 2023) revisits one of the most stunning political collapses of the twentieth century. When Japan surrendered in September 1945, Chiang Kai-shek seemed triumphant—one of the Big Four Allied leaders of the war and head of a government firmly allied with the United States. Yet less than four years later he would be forced into a humiliating exile in Taiwan. It has long been recognized that hyperinflation was a critical factor in this collapse. As revenues plummeted during the war against Japan, Chiang's government simply printed currency to cover its debts resulting in rapid inflation. When World War II ended it was assumed that with eastern China returned, ports opened, and financial support from the U.S. assured, the currency could be stabilized. But in fact, Chiang was obsessed with defeating the communists and the printing presses accelerated the production of banknotes which rapidly lost value. Why didn't the nationalist government tackle the issue of hyperinflation before it was too late? The fundamental flaw of the Chiang government was that he centralized all authority in his own hands and established overlapping and competing agencies. This approach fostered bureaucratic infighting which he alone could resolve. In the financial realm the competing elements were within his wife's family, her brother T. V. Soong (Song Ziwen) and brother-in-law H. H Kung (Kong Xiangxi). The new archival records reveal a bitter and often very petty rivalry between the two men that started in the 1930s and continued even after they were in exile in the United States after 1949. The tragedy for China was that both men ultimately bent to Chiang's wishes to provide money and suppressed any effort to alter the policy. T. V. Soong especially recognized the dangers of the inflationary policy, but his ambition and jealousy of his brother-in-law led him to cave when under pressure to produce more currency. Records in the Hoover Archives show how little understanding Chiang had of finance and how little interest he had dealing with it. The structure of the Chiang government meant that almost nothing could be done without sustained attention from the leader. Thus in 1947 when the collapse of the fabi (legal tender) currency was imminent, Chiang waited a year before authorizing a replacement currency, the disastrous gold yuan. My study suggests that the most important factor in the collapse of the Chiang government was its organization as an authoritarian system designed for control but ineffective at getting things done. Parks M. Coble is the James L. Sellers Professor of History at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Dong Wang is collection editor of Asian Studies books at Lived Places Publishing (New York & the UK), H-Diplo review editor, incoming visiting fellow at Freie Universität Berlin, research associate at Harvard Fairbank Center (since 2002), a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, director of the Wellington Koo Institute for Modern China in World History (Germany & USA), and an elected Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

Parks M. Coble's book The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War (Cambridge UP, 2023) revisits one of the most stunning political collapses of the twentieth century. When Japan surrendered in September 1945, Chiang Kai-shek seemed triumphant—one of the Big Four Allied leaders of the war and head of a government firmly allied with the United States. Yet less than four years later he would be forced into a humiliating exile in Taiwan. It has long been recognized that hyperinflation was a critical factor in this collapse. As revenues plummeted during the war against Japan, Chiang's government simply printed currency to cover its debts resulting in rapid inflation. When World War II ended it was assumed that with eastern China returned, ports opened, and financial support from the U.S. assured, the currency could be stabilized. But in fact, Chiang was obsessed with defeating the communists and the printing presses accelerated the production of banknotes which rapidly lost value. Why didn't the nationalist government tackle the issue of hyperinflation before it was too late? The fundamental flaw of the Chiang government was that he centralized all authority in his own hands and established overlapping and competing agencies. This approach fostered bureaucratic infighting which he alone could resolve. In the financial realm the competing elements were within his wife's family, her brother T. V. Soong (Song Ziwen) and brother-in-law H. H Kung (Kong Xiangxi). The new archival records reveal a bitter and often very petty rivalry between the two men that started in the 1930s and continued even after they were in exile in the United States after 1949. The tragedy for China was that both men ultimately bent to Chiang's wishes to provide money and suppressed any effort to alter the policy. T. V. Soong especially recognized the dangers of the inflationary policy, but his ambition and jealousy of his brother-in-law led him to cave when under pressure to produce more currency. Records in the Hoover Archives show how little understanding Chiang had of finance and how little interest he had dealing with it. The structure of the Chiang government meant that almost nothing could be done without sustained attention from the leader. Thus in 1947 when the collapse of the fabi (legal tender) currency was imminent, Chiang waited a year before authorizing a replacement currency, the disastrous gold yuan. My study suggests that the most important factor in the collapse of the Chiang government was its organization as an authoritarian system designed for control but ineffective at getting things done. Parks M. Coble is the James L. Sellers Professor of History at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Dong Wang is collection editor of Asian Studies books at Lived Places Publishing (New York & the UK), H-Diplo review editor, incoming visiting fellow at Freie Universität Berlin, research associate at Harvard Fairbank Center (since 2002), a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, director of the Wellington Koo Institute for Modern China in World History (Germany & USA), and an elected Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/biography

Parks M. Coble's book The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War (Cambridge UP, 2023) revisits one of the most stunning political collapses of the twentieth century. When Japan surrendered in September 1945, Chiang Kai-shek seemed triumphant—one of the Big Four Allied leaders of the war and head of a government firmly allied with the United States. Yet less than four years later he would be forced into a humiliating exile in Taiwan. It has long been recognized that hyperinflation was a critical factor in this collapse. As revenues plummeted during the war against Japan, Chiang's government simply printed currency to cover its debts resulting in rapid inflation. When World War II ended it was assumed that with eastern China returned, ports opened, and financial support from the U.S. assured, the currency could be stabilized. But in fact, Chiang was obsessed with defeating the communists and the printing presses accelerated the production of banknotes which rapidly lost value. Why didn't the nationalist government tackle the issue of hyperinflation before it was too late? The fundamental flaw of the Chiang government was that he centralized all authority in his own hands and established overlapping and competing agencies. This approach fostered bureaucratic infighting which he alone could resolve. In the financial realm the competing elements were within his wife's family, her brother T. V. Soong (Song Ziwen) and brother-in-law H. H Kung (Kong Xiangxi). The new archival records reveal a bitter and often very petty rivalry between the two men that started in the 1930s and continued even after they were in exile in the United States after 1949. The tragedy for China was that both men ultimately bent to Chiang's wishes to provide money and suppressed any effort to alter the policy. T. V. Soong especially recognized the dangers of the inflationary policy, but his ambition and jealousy of his brother-in-law led him to cave when under pressure to produce more currency. Records in the Hoover Archives show how little understanding Chiang had of finance and how little interest he had dealing with it. The structure of the Chiang government meant that almost nothing could be done without sustained attention from the leader. Thus in 1947 when the collapse of the fabi (legal tender) currency was imminent, Chiang waited a year before authorizing a replacement currency, the disastrous gold yuan. My study suggests that the most important factor in the collapse of the Chiang government was its organization as an authoritarian system designed for control but ineffective at getting things done. Parks M. Coble is the James L. Sellers Professor of History at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Dong Wang is collection editor of Asian Studies books at Lived Places Publishing (New York & the UK), H-Diplo review editor, incoming visiting fellow at Freie Universität Berlin, research associate at Harvard Fairbank Center (since 2002), a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, director of the Wellington Koo Institute for Modern China in World History (Germany & USA), and an elected Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

Parks M. Coble's book The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War (Cambridge UP, 2023) revisits one of the most stunning political collapses of the twentieth century. When Japan surrendered in September 1945, Chiang Kai-shek seemed triumphant—one of the Big Four Allied leaders of the war and head of a government firmly allied with the United States. Yet less than four years later he would be forced into a humiliating exile in Taiwan. It has long been recognized that hyperinflation was a critical factor in this collapse. As revenues plummeted during the war against Japan, Chiang's government simply printed currency to cover its debts resulting in rapid inflation. When World War II ended it was assumed that with eastern China returned, ports opened, and financial support from the U.S. assured, the currency could be stabilized. But in fact, Chiang was obsessed with defeating the communists and the printing presses accelerated the production of banknotes which rapidly lost value. Why didn't the nationalist government tackle the issue of hyperinflation before it was too late? The fundamental flaw of the Chiang government was that he centralized all authority in his own hands and established overlapping and competing agencies. This approach fostered bureaucratic infighting which he alone could resolve. In the financial realm the competing elements were within his wife's family, her brother T. V. Soong (Song Ziwen) and brother-in-law H. H Kung (Kong Xiangxi). The new archival records reveal a bitter and often very petty rivalry between the two men that started in the 1930s and continued even after they were in exile in the United States after 1949. The tragedy for China was that both men ultimately bent to Chiang's wishes to provide money and suppressed any effort to alter the policy. T. V. Soong especially recognized the dangers of the inflationary policy, but his ambition and jealousy of his brother-in-law led him to cave when under pressure to produce more currency. Records in the Hoover Archives show how little understanding Chiang had of finance and how little interest he had dealing with it. The structure of the Chiang government meant that almost nothing could be done without sustained attention from the leader. Thus in 1947 when the collapse of the fabi (legal tender) currency was imminent, Chiang waited a year before authorizing a replacement currency, the disastrous gold yuan. My study suggests that the most important factor in the collapse of the Chiang government was its organization as an authoritarian system designed for control but ineffective at getting things done. Parks M. Coble is the James L. Sellers Professor of History at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Dong Wang is collection editor of Asian Studies books at Lived Places Publishing (New York & the UK), H-Diplo review editor, incoming visiting fellow at Freie Universität Berlin, research associate at Harvard Fairbank Center (since 2002), a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, director of the Wellington Koo Institute for Modern China in World History (Germany & USA), and an elected Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.

From the 1950s to the 1970s, Philippine Chinese were Southeast Asia's most exemplary Cold Warriors among overseas Chinese. During these decades, no Chinese community in the region was more vigilant in identifying and rooting out suspected communists from within its midst; none was as committed to mobilizing against the People's Republic of China as the one in the former US colony. Ironically, for all the fears of overseas Chinese communities' ties to the PRC at the time, the example of the Philippines shows that the "China" that intervened the most extensively in any Southeast Asian Chinese society during the Cold War was the Republic of China on Taiwan.  Kung Chien Wen's Diasporic Cold Warriors: Nationalist China, Anticommunism, and the Philippine Chinese, 1930s-1970s (Cornell UP, 2022) tells the story of the Philippine Chinese as pro-Taiwan, anticommunist partisans, tracing their evolving relationship with the KMT and successive Philippine governments over the mid-twentieth century. Throughout, he argues for a networked and transnational understanding of the ROC-KMT party-state and demonstrates that Taipei exercised a form of nonterritorial sovereignty over the Philippine Chinese with Manila's participation and consent. Challenging depoliticized narratives of cultural integration, he also contends that, because of the KMT, Chinese identity formation and practices of belonging in the Philippines were deeply infused with Cold War ideology. Drawing on archival research and fieldwork in Taiwan, the Philippines, the United States, and China, Diasporic Cold Warriors reimagines the histories of the ROC, the KMT, and the Philippine Chinese, connecting them to the broader canvas of the Cold War and postcolonial nation-building in East and Southeast Asia. Kung Chien Wen is an Assistant Professor in History at the National University of Singapore. His research straddles the fields of Chinese migration and diaspora, the Cold War and decolonisation in Southeast Asia, and modern China and Taiwan in the world. Benjamin Goh is a MPhil in World History Candidate at the University of Cambridge. He focuses on global youth and education histories in Southeast Asia and is presently working on his dissertation that explores world history-making at the University of Malaya in the 1950s and 1960s. He tweets at @BenGohsToSchool. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

From the 1950s to the 1970s, Philippine Chinese were Southeast Asia's most exemplary Cold Warriors among overseas Chinese. During these decades, no Chinese community in the region was more vigilant in identifying and rooting out suspected communists from within its midst; none was as committed to mobilizing against the People's Republic of China as the one in the former US colony. Ironically, for all the fears of overseas Chinese communities' ties to the PRC at the time, the example of the Philippines shows that the "China" that intervened the most extensively in any Southeast Asian Chinese society during the Cold War was the Republic of China on Taiwan.  Kung Chien Wen's Diasporic Cold Warriors: Nationalist China, Anticommunism, and the Philippine Chinese, 1930s-1970s (Cornell UP, 2022) tells the story of the Philippine Chinese as pro-Taiwan, anticommunist partisans, tracing their evolving relationship with the KMT and successive Philippine governments over the mid-twentieth century. Throughout, he argues for a networked and transnational understanding of the ROC-KMT party-state and demonstrates that Taipei exercised a form of nonterritorial sovereignty over the Philippine Chinese with Manila's participation and consent. Challenging depoliticized narratives of cultural integration, he also contends that, because of the KMT, Chinese identity formation and practices of belonging in the Philippines were deeply infused with Cold War ideology. Drawing on archival research and fieldwork in Taiwan, the Philippines, the United States, and China, Diasporic Cold Warriors reimagines the histories of the ROC, the KMT, and the Philippine Chinese, connecting them to the broader canvas of the Cold War and postcolonial nation-building in East and Southeast Asia. Kung Chien Wen is an Assistant Professor in History at the National University of Singapore. His research straddles the fields of Chinese migration and diaspora, the Cold War and decolonisation in Southeast Asia, and modern China and Taiwan in the world. Benjamin Goh is a MPhil in World History Candidate at the University of Cambridge. He focuses on global youth and education histories in Southeast Asia and is presently working on his dissertation that explores world history-making at the University of Malaya in the 1950s and 1960s. He tweets at @BenGohsToSchool. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

From the 1950s to the 1970s, Philippine Chinese were Southeast Asia's most exemplary Cold Warriors among overseas Chinese. During these decades, no Chinese community in the region was more vigilant in identifying and rooting out suspected communists from within its midst; none was as committed to mobilizing against the People's Republic of China as the one in the former US colony. Ironically, for all the fears of overseas Chinese communities' ties to the PRC at the time, the example of the Philippines shows that the "China" that intervened the most extensively in any Southeast Asian Chinese society during the Cold War was the Republic of China on Taiwan.  Kung Chien Wen's Diasporic Cold Warriors: Nationalist China, Anticommunism, and the Philippine Chinese, 1930s-1970s (Cornell UP, 2022) tells the story of the Philippine Chinese as pro-Taiwan, anticommunist partisans, tracing their evolving relationship with the KMT and successive Philippine governments over the mid-twentieth century. Throughout, he argues for a networked and transnational understanding of the ROC-KMT party-state and demonstrates that Taipei exercised a form of nonterritorial sovereignty over the Philippine Chinese with Manila's participation and consent. Challenging depoliticized narratives of cultural integration, he also contends that, because of the KMT, Chinese identity formation and practices of belonging in the Philippines were deeply infused with Cold War ideology. Drawing on archival research and fieldwork in Taiwan, the Philippines, the United States, and China, Diasporic Cold Warriors reimagines the histories of the ROC, the KMT, and the Philippine Chinese, connecting them to the broader canvas of the Cold War and postcolonial nation-building in East and Southeast Asia. Kung Chien Wen is an Assistant Professor in History at the National University of Singapore. His research straddles the fields of Chinese migration and diaspora, the Cold War and decolonisation in Southeast Asia, and modern China and Taiwan in the world. Benjamin Goh is a MPhil in World History Candidate at the University of Cambridge. He focuses on global youth and education histories in Southeast Asia and is presently working on his dissertation that explores world history-making at the University of Malaya in the 1950s and 1960s. He tweets at @BenGohsToSchool. Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/southeast-asian-studies

From the 1950s to the 1970s, Philippine Chinese were Southeast Asia's most exemplary Cold Warriors among overseas Chinese. During these decades, no Chinese community in the region was more vigilant in identifying and rooting out suspected communists from within its midst; none was as committed to mobilizing against the People's Republic of China as the one in the former US colony. Ironically, for all the fears of overseas Chinese communities' ties to the PRC at the time, the example of the Philippines shows that the "China" that intervened the most extensively in any Southeast Asian Chinese society during the Cold War was the Republic of China on Taiwan.  Kung Chien Wen's Diasporic Cold Warriors: Nationalist China, Anticommunism, and the Philippine Chinese, 1930s-1970s (Cornell UP, 2022) tells the story of the Philippine Chinese as pro-Taiwan, anticommunist partisans, tracing their evolving relationship with the KMT and successive Philippine governments over the mid-twentieth century. Throughout, he argues for a networked and transnational understanding of the ROC-KMT party-state and demonstrates that Taipei exercised a form of nonterritorial sovereignty over the Philippine Chinese with Manila's participation and consent. Challenging depoliticized narratives of cultural integration, he also contends that, because of the KMT, Chinese identity formation and practices of belonging in the Philippines were deeply infused with Cold War ideology. Drawing on archival research and fieldwork in Taiwan, the Philippines, the United States, and China, Diasporic Cold Warriors reimagines the histories of the ROC, the KMT, and the Philippine Chinese, connecting them to the broader canvas of the Cold War and postcolonial nation-building in East and Southeast Asia. Kung Chien Wen is an Assistant Professor in History at the National University of Singapore. His research straddles the fields of Chinese migration and diaspora, the Cold War and decolonisation in Southeast Asia, and modern China and Taiwan in the world. Benjamin Goh is a MPhil in World History Candidate at the University of Cambridge. He focuses on global youth and education histories in Southeast Asia and is presently working on his dissertation that explores world history-making at the University of Malaya in the 1950s and 1960s. He tweets at @BenGohsToSchool. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/intellectual-history

From the 1950s to the 1970s, Philippine Chinese were Southeast Asia's most exemplary Cold Warriors among overseas Chinese. During these decades, no Chinese community in the region was more vigilant in identifying and rooting out suspected communists from within its midst; none was as committed to mobilizing against the People's Republic of China as the one in the former US colony. Ironically, for all the fears of overseas Chinese communities' ties to the PRC at the time, the example of the Philippines shows that the "China" that intervened the most extensively in any Southeast Asian Chinese society during the Cold War was the Republic of China on Taiwan.  Kung Chien Wen's Diasporic Cold Warriors: Nationalist China, Anticommunism, and the Philippine Chinese, 1930s-1970s (Cornell UP, 2022) tells the story of the Philippine Chinese as pro-Taiwan, anticommunist partisans, tracing their evolving relationship with the KMT and successive Philippine governments over the mid-twentieth century. Throughout, he argues for a networked and transnational understanding of the ROC-KMT party-state and demonstrates that Taipei exercised a form of nonterritorial sovereignty over the Philippine Chinese with Manila's participation and consent. Challenging depoliticized narratives of cultural integration, he also contends that, because of the KMT, Chinese identity formation and practices of belonging in the Philippines were deeply infused with Cold War ideology. Drawing on archival research and fieldwork in Taiwan, the Philippines, the United States, and China, Diasporic Cold Warriors reimagines the histories of the ROC, the KMT, and the Philippine Chinese, connecting them to the broader canvas of the Cold War and postcolonial nation-building in East and Southeast Asia. Kung Chien Wen is an Assistant Professor in History at the National University of Singapore. His research straddles the fields of Chinese migration and diaspora, the Cold War and decolonisation in Southeast Asia, and modern China and Taiwan in the world. Benjamin Goh is a MPhil in World History Candidate at the University of Cambridge. He focuses on global youth and education histories in Southeast Asia and is presently working on his dissertation that explores world history-making at the University of Malaya in the 1950s and 1960s. He tweets at @BenGohsToSchool. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

The Meddlers: Sovereignty, Empire, and the Birth of Global Economic Governance (Harvard University Press, 2022) presents a pioneering history that traces the origins of global economic governance—and the political conflicts it generates—to the aftermath of World War I. International economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank exert incredible influence over the domestic policies of many states. These institutions date from the end of World War II and amassed power during the neoliberal era of the late twentieth century. But as Jamie Martin shows, if we want to understand their deeper origins and the ideas and dynamics that shaped their controversial powers, we must turn back to the explosive political struggles that attended the birth of global economic governance in the early twentieth century. In The Meddlers, Dr. Jamie Martin tells the story of the first international institutions to govern the world economy, including the League of Nations and Bank for International Settlements, created after World War I. These institutions endowed civil servants, bankers, and colonial authorities from Europe and the United States with extraordinary powers: to enforce austerity, coordinate the policies of independent central banks, oversee development programs, and regulate commodity prices. In a highly unequal world, they faced a new political challenge: was it possible to reach into sovereign states and empires to intervene in domestic economic policies without generating a backlash? Dr. Martin follows the intense political conflicts provoked by the earliest international efforts to govern capitalism—from Weimar Germany to the Balkans, Nationalist China to colonial Malaya, and the Chilean desert to Wall Street. The Meddlers shows how the fraught problems of sovereignty and democracy posed by institutions like the IMF are not unique to late twentieth-century globalization, but instead first emerged during an earlier period of imperial competition, world war, and economic crisis. Jamie Martin is Assistant Professor of History and of Social Studies at Harvard University. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

The Meddlers: Sovereignty, Empire, and the Birth of Global Economic Governance (Harvard University Press, 2022) presents a pioneering history that traces the origins of global economic governance—and the political conflicts it generates—to the aftermath of World War I. International economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank exert incredible influence over the domestic policies of many states. These institutions date from the end of World War II and amassed power during the neoliberal era of the late twentieth century. But as Jamie Martin shows, if we want to understand their deeper origins and the ideas and dynamics that shaped their controversial powers, we must turn back to the explosive political struggles that attended the birth of global economic governance in the early twentieth century. In The Meddlers, Dr. Jamie Martin tells the story of the first international institutions to govern the world economy, including the League of Nations and Bank for International Settlements, created after World War I. These institutions endowed civil servants, bankers, and colonial authorities from Europe and the United States with extraordinary powers: to enforce austerity, coordinate the policies of independent central banks, oversee development programs, and regulate commodity prices. In a highly unequal world, they faced a new political challenge: was it possible to reach into sovereign states and empires to intervene in domestic economic policies without generating a backlash? Dr. Martin follows the intense political conflicts provoked by the earliest international efforts to govern capitalism—from Weimar Germany to the Balkans, Nationalist China to colonial Malaya, and the Chilean desert to Wall Street. The Meddlers shows how the fraught problems of sovereignty and democracy posed by institutions like the IMF are not unique to late twentieth-century globalization, but instead first emerged during an earlier period of imperial competition, world war, and economic crisis. Jamie Martin is Assistant Professor of History and of Social Studies at Harvard University. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

The Meddlers: Sovereignty, Empire, and the Birth of Global Economic Governance (Harvard University Press, 2022) presents a pioneering history that traces the origins of global economic governance—and the political conflicts it generates—to the aftermath of World War I. International economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank exert incredible influence over the domestic policies of many states. These institutions date from the end of World War II and amassed power during the neoliberal era of the late twentieth century. But as Jamie Martin shows, if we want to understand their deeper origins and the ideas and dynamics that shaped their controversial powers, we must turn back to the explosive political struggles that attended the birth of global economic governance in the early twentieth century. In The Meddlers, Dr. Jamie Martin tells the story of the first international institutions to govern the world economy, including the League of Nations and Bank for International Settlements, created after World War I. These institutions endowed civil servants, bankers, and colonial authorities from Europe and the United States with extraordinary powers: to enforce austerity, coordinate the policies of independent central banks, oversee development programs, and regulate commodity prices. In a highly unequal world, they faced a new political challenge: was it possible to reach into sovereign states and empires to intervene in domestic economic policies without generating a backlash? Dr. Martin follows the intense political conflicts provoked by the earliest international efforts to govern capitalism—from Weimar Germany to the Balkans, Nationalist China to colonial Malaya, and the Chilean desert to Wall Street. The Meddlers shows how the fraught problems of sovereignty and democracy posed by institutions like the IMF are not unique to late twentieth-century globalization, but instead first emerged during an earlier period of imperial competition, world war, and economic crisis. Jamie Martin is Assistant Professor of History and of Social Studies at Harvard University. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/european-studies

The Meddlers: Sovereignty, Empire, and the Birth of Global Economic Governance (Harvard University Press, 2022) presents a pioneering history that traces the origins of global economic governance—and the political conflicts it generates—to the aftermath of World War I. International economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank exert incredible influence over the domestic policies of many states. These institutions date from the end of World War II and amassed power during the neoliberal era of the late twentieth century. But as Jamie Martin shows, if we want to understand their deeper origins and the ideas and dynamics that shaped their controversial powers, we must turn back to the explosive political struggles that attended the birth of global economic governance in the early twentieth century. In The Meddlers, Dr. Jamie Martin tells the story of the first international institutions to govern the world economy, including the League of Nations and Bank for International Settlements, created after World War I. These institutions endowed civil servants, bankers, and colonial authorities from Europe and the United States with extraordinary powers: to enforce austerity, coordinate the policies of independent central banks, oversee development programs, and regulate commodity prices. In a highly unequal world, they faced a new political challenge: was it possible to reach into sovereign states and empires to intervene in domestic economic policies without generating a backlash? Dr. Martin follows the intense political conflicts provoked by the earliest international efforts to govern capitalism—from Weimar Germany to the Balkans, Nationalist China to colonial Malaya, and the Chilean desert to Wall Street. The Meddlers shows how the fraught problems of sovereignty and democracy posed by institutions like the IMF are not unique to late twentieth-century globalization, but instead first emerged during an earlier period of imperial competition, world war, and economic crisis. Jamie Martin is Assistant Professor of History and of Social Studies at Harvard University. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/economics

The Meddlers: Sovereignty, Empire, and the Birth of Global Economic Governance (Harvard University Press, 2022) presents a pioneering history that traces the origins of global economic governance—and the political conflicts it generates—to the aftermath of World War I. International economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank exert incredible influence over the domestic policies of many states. These institutions date from the end of World War II and amassed power during the neoliberal era of the late twentieth century. But as Jamie Martin shows, if we want to understand their deeper origins and the ideas and dynamics that shaped their controversial powers, we must turn back to the explosive political struggles that attended the birth of global economic governance in the early twentieth century. In The Meddlers, Dr. Jamie Martin tells the story of the first international institutions to govern the world economy, including the League of Nations and Bank for International Settlements, created after World War I. These institutions endowed civil servants, bankers, and colonial authorities from Europe and the United States with extraordinary powers: to enforce austerity, coordinate the policies of independent central banks, oversee development programs, and regulate commodity prices. In a highly unequal world, they faced a new political challenge: was it possible to reach into sovereign states and empires to intervene in domestic economic policies without generating a backlash? Dr. Martin follows the intense political conflicts provoked by the earliest international efforts to govern capitalism—from Weimar Germany to the Balkans, Nationalist China to colonial Malaya, and the Chilean desert to Wall Street. The Meddlers shows how the fraught problems of sovereignty and democracy posed by institutions like the IMF are not unique to late twentieth-century globalization, but instead first emerged during an earlier period of imperial competition, world war, and economic crisis. Jamie Martin is Assistant Professor of History and of Social Studies at Harvard University. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/finance

The Meddlers: Sovereignty, Empire, and the Birth of Global Economic Governance (Harvard University Press, 2022) presents a pioneering history that traces the origins of global economic governance—and the political conflicts it generates—to the aftermath of World War I. International economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank exert incredible influence over the domestic policies of many states. These institutions date from the end of World War II and amassed power during the neoliberal era of the late twentieth century. But as Jamie Martin shows, if we want to understand their deeper origins and the ideas and dynamics that shaped their controversial powers, we must turn back to the explosive political struggles that attended the birth of global economic governance in the early twentieth century. In The Meddlers, Dr. Jamie Martin tells the story of the first international institutions to govern the world economy, including the League of Nations and Bank for International Settlements, created after World War I. These institutions endowed civil servants, bankers, and colonial authorities from Europe and the United States with extraordinary powers: to enforce austerity, coordinate the policies of independent central banks, oversee development programs, and regulate commodity prices. In a highly unequal world, they faced a new political challenge: was it possible to reach into sovereign states and empires to intervene in domestic economic policies without generating a backlash? Dr. Martin follows the intense political conflicts provoked by the earliest international efforts to govern capitalism—from Weimar Germany to the Balkans, Nationalist China to colonial Malaya, and the Chilean desert to Wall Street. The Meddlers shows how the fraught problems of sovereignty and democracy posed by institutions like the IMF are not unique to late twentieth-century globalization, but instead first emerged during an earlier period of imperial competition, world war, and economic crisis. Jamie Martin is Assistant Professor of History and of Social Studies at Harvard University. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Meddlers: Sovereignty, Empire, and the Birth of Global Economic Governance (Harvard University Press, 2022) presents a pioneering history that traces the origins of global economic governance—and the political conflicts it generates—to the aftermath of World War I. International economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank exert incredible influence over the domestic policies of many states. These institutions date from the end of World War II and amassed power during the neoliberal era of the late twentieth century. But as Jamie Martin shows, if we want to understand their deeper origins and the ideas and dynamics that shaped their controversial powers, we must turn back to the explosive political struggles that attended the birth of global economic governance in the early twentieth century. In The Meddlers, Dr. Jamie Martin tells the story of the first international institutions to govern the world economy, including the League of Nations and Bank for International Settlements, created after World War I. These institutions endowed civil servants, bankers, and colonial authorities from Europe and the United States with extraordinary powers: to enforce austerity, coordinate the policies of independent central banks, oversee development programs, and regulate commodity prices. In a highly unequal world, they faced a new political challenge: was it possible to reach into sovereign states and empires to intervene in domestic economic policies without generating a backlash? Dr. Martin follows the intense political conflicts provoked by the earliest international efforts to govern capitalism—from Weimar Germany to the Balkans, Nationalist China to colonial Malaya, and the Chilean desert to Wall Street. The Meddlers shows how the fraught problems of sovereignty and democracy posed by institutions like the IMF are not unique to late twentieth-century globalization, but instead first emerged during an earlier period of imperial competition, world war, and economic crisis. Jamie Martin is Assistant Professor of History and of Social Studies at Harvard University. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Meddlers: Sovereignty, Empire, and the Birth of Global Economic Governance (Harvard University Press, 2022) presents a pioneering history that traces the origins of global economic governance—and the political conflicts it generates—to the aftermath of World War I. International economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank exert incredible influence over the domestic policies of many states. These institutions date from the end of World War II and amassed power during the neoliberal era of the late twentieth century. But as Jamie Martin shows, if we want to understand their deeper origins and the ideas and dynamics that shaped their controversial powers, we must turn back to the explosive political struggles that attended the birth of global economic governance in the early twentieth century. In The Meddlers, Dr. Jamie Martin tells the story of the first international institutions to govern the world economy, including the League of Nations and Bank for International Settlements, created after World War I. These institutions endowed civil servants, bankers, and colonial authorities from Europe and the United States with extraordinary powers: to enforce austerity, coordinate the policies of independent central banks, oversee development programs, and regulate commodity prices. In a highly unequal world, they faced a new political challenge: was it possible to reach into sovereign states and empires to intervene in domestic economic policies without generating a backlash? Dr. Martin follows the intense political conflicts provoked by the earliest international efforts to govern capitalism—from Weimar Germany to the Balkans, Nationalist China to colonial Malaya, and the Chilean desert to Wall Street. The Meddlers shows how the fraught problems of sovereignty and democracy posed by institutions like the IMF are not unique to late twentieth-century globalization, but instead first emerged during an earlier period of imperial competition, world war, and economic crisis. Jamie Martin is Assistant Professor of History and of Social Studies at Harvard University. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Communist China, Nationalist China, and Japan... again... and from Russia's point of view: Drawing the sword: Is Japan getting ready to move against China?… The post NEWS AND VIEWS FROM THE NEFARIUM AUGUST 25 2022 appeared first on The Giza Death Star.

Welcome to the Instant Trivia podcast episode 561, where we ask the best trivia on the Internet. Round 1. Category: Wood Lives! 1: In song, it's asked to "weep for me". a willow. 2: Film with line "A boy who won't be good might just as well be made of wood". Pinocchio. 3: Completes John Heywood's line from 1546: "You can't see the wood...". for the trees. 4: Shade tree with heart-shaped leaves of the genus Tilia, TV actor Hal might be found under one. linden. 5: The annual Berkshire Summer Music Festival is held on this estate in Lenox, Mass.. Tanglewood. Round 2. Category: Multi-Million Selling Albums 1: With over 25 million sold, 1 in every 11 Americans has this 1982 Michael Jackson album. "Thriller". 2: This group's "1962-1966" album has sold 13 million copies, its "1967-1970" album, 14 million. The Beatles. 3: At 10 million, the top-selling "Unplugged" album is this guitarist's. Eric Clapton. 4: His 1993 "Doggystyle" has been scooped up by 4 million buyers. Snoop Doggy Dogg. 5: She's the only woman in country music to have 2 albums sell over 10 million copies each. Shania Twain. Round 3. Category: Tell It To The Marines 1: In the Mexican War the Marines raised the flag over the National Palace, known by this phrase in their hymn. "From The Halls of Montezuma". 2: The Marine Corps motto, it means "Always Faithful". Semper Fidelis. 3: Ground troops are based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina and this camp near San Diego. Camp Pendleton. 4: During the Spanish-American War, the Marines were the first Americans to land in Cuba, seizing this bay. Guantanamo Bay. 5: The conquest of this Pacific island in February and March 1945 was the largest all-Marine battle in U.S. history. Iwo Jima. Round 4. Category: George Bush 1: George met her at a 1941 Christmas dance, became engaged to her in 1943 and married her in 1945. Barbara Pierce. 2: He chose Bush as his running mate though they disagreed on cutting taxes, abortion and the E.R.A.. Ronald Reagan. 3: As U.S. ambassador to this organization in 1971, Bush worked to keep Nationalist China from expulsion. United Nations. 4: As president, Bush sent troops into Panama to overthrow this dictator. Manuel Noriega. 5: Bush's father, Prescott, represented this state in the U.S. Senate from 1952 to 1963. Connecticut. Round 5. Category: Noble Nicknames 1: The Red,the Great,the Terrible. Ivan. 2: Rufus,the Silent,the Conqueror,of Orange. William. 3: The Mad,the Cruel,the Great. Peter. 4: The Fowler,the Wrangler,the Navigator. Henry. 5: The Simple,the Bald,the Fat,the Bold. Charles. Thanks for listening! Come back tomorrow for more exciting trivia! Special thanks to https://blog.feedspot.com/trivia_podcasts/

China is often accused of breaking international rules and norms. Just last week at Mansion House, Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said: 'Countries must play by the rules. And that includes China'. So what are its transgressions, and what are its goals for the international system? My guests and I try to answer this question in this episode through looking at China's attitude to and involvement in international organisations, past and present. Professor Rana Mitter, a historian at the University of Oxford and author of  China's Good War , points out that there's a fundamental difference in China's approach compared to, say, Russia. 'Russia perceives itself as, essentially, a country that is really at the end of its tether in terms of the international system. Whereas China still sees plenty of opportunities to grow and expand its status'. To that end, China is actually a member of dozens of international organisations, most notably – as we discuss in the episode – sitting on the United Nations Security Council, which gives it veto power on UN resolutions (though, Yu Jie, senior  research fellow at Chatham House, points out that China is most often found abstaining rather than vetoing). It wants a seat at the table,  but it also frequently accuses our existing set of international norms and rules as designed by the West. To begin with, then, China is seeking to rewrite the rules in its own favour – Jie gives the example of China's ongoing campaign to increase its voting share in the IMF, on the basis of its huge economy. 'It's not exactly overthrowing the existing international order wholesale, but choosing very carefully which parts China wants to change.' This multilateral engagement has a historical basis. Nationalist China was keen to be seen as an equal and respected partner in the international community, and Rana points out – something I'd never thought of before – that China after the second world war 'was a very very unusual sort of state… Because it was the only state, pretty much, in Asia, that was essentially sovereign… Don't forget that 1945 meant liberation for lots of European peoples, but for lots of Asian peoples – Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaya, wherever you want to name – they basically went back into European colonialism'. This (together with its then-alliance with the United States)  gave the Republic of China a front row seat in the creation of the United Nations and, before then, the League of Nations. It didn't take long for Communist China to start building links with the rest of the world, either. Mao  'had not spent decades fighting out in the caves and fields of China to simply become a plaything of Stalin', Rana points out, making its multilateral relations outside of the alliance with the USSR vitally important. After it split with Moscow, and before the rapprochement with the US, the Sixties was a time of unwanted isolationism,  ' which is well within living memory of many of the top leaders', says Rana, adding more to its present day desire to have as much sway as possible in the world, which still comes through international organisations. Finally, my guests bust the myth – often propagated by Beijing – that China had no role in the writing of today's international laws, pointing out that Chinese and other non-western thinkers played a major role in the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . What's more, do western ideas have no place in guiding and governing China? After all, Karl Marx was certainly not Chinese, and that doesn't seem to bother his Chinese Communist believers.

China is often accused of breaking international rules and norms. Just last week at Mansion House, Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said: 'Countries must play by the rules. And that includes China'. So what are its transgressions, and what are its goals for the international system? My guests and I try to answer this question in this episode through looking at China's attitude to and involvement in international organisations, past and present. Professor Rana Mitter, a historian at the University of Oxford and author of  China's Good War , points out that there's a fundamental difference in China's approach compared to, say, Russia. 'Russia perceives itself as, essentially, a country that is really at the end of its tether in terms of the international system. Whereas China still sees plenty of opportunities to grow and expand its status'. To that end, China is actually a member of dozens of international organisations, most notably – as we discuss in the episode – sitting on the United Nations Security Council, which gives it veto power on UN resolutions (though, Yu Jie, senior  research fellow at Chatham House, points out that China is most often found abstaining rather than vetoing). It wants a seat at the table,  but it also frequently accuses our existing set of international norms and rules as designed by the West. To begin with, then, China is seeking to rewrite the rules in its own favour – Jie gives the example of China's ongoing campaign to increase its voting share in the IMF, on the basis of its huge economy. 'It's not exactly overthrowing the existing international order wholesale, but choosing very carefully which parts China wants to change.' This multilateral engagement has a historical basis. Nationalist China was keen to be seen as an equal and respected partner in the international community, and Rana points out – something I'd never thought of before – that China after the second world war 'was a very very unusual sort of state… Because it was the only state, pretty much, in Asia, that was essentially sovereign… Don't forget that 1945 meant liberation for lots of European peoples, but for lots of Asian peoples – Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaya, wherever you want to name – they basically went back into European colonialism'. This (together with its then-alliance with the United States)  gave the Republic of China a front row seat in the creation of the United Nations and, before then, the League of Nations. It didn't take long for Communist China to start building links with the rest of the world, either. Mao  'had not spent decades fighting out in the caves and fields of China to simply become a plaything of Stalin', Rana points out, making its multilateral relations outside of the alliance with the USSR vitally important. After it split with Moscow, and before the rapprochement with the US, the Sixties was a time of unwanted isolationism,  ' which is well within living memory of many of the top leaders', says Rana, adding more to its present day desire to have as much sway as possible in the world, which still comes through international organisations. Finally, my guests bust the myth – often propagated by Beijing – that China had no role in the writing of today's international laws, pointing out that Chinese and other non-western thinkers played a major role in the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . What's more, do western ideas have no place in guiding and governing China? After all, Karl Marx was certainly not Chinese, and that doesn't seem to bother his Chinese Communist believers.

*Written and researched by Conrad FranzResources: CLICK HERE to JOIN our Turley Talks Christmas Party Live Stream Monday night Dec 20th at 7 PM EST for the most patriotic Christmas EVER! https://bfcm.turleytalks.com/super-bundlesIt's time to CHANGE AMERICA and Here's YOUR OPPORTUNITY To Do Just That! https://change.turleytalks.com/PatriotSwitch.comGet your own MyPillow here. Enter my code TURLEY at checkout to get a DISCOUNT: https://www.mypillow.com/turleyGet Your Brand-New PATRIOT T-Shirts and Merch Here: https://store.turleytalks.com/What is CRT? Where does CRT come from? Download your FREE guide from Dr. Steve Turley and find out WHY Americans are turning against CRITICAL RACE THEORY!!! https://www.turleytalks.com/wokeBecome a Turley Talks Insiders Club Member and get your first week FREE!!: https://insidersclub.turleytalks.com/welcomeFight Back Against Big Tech Censorship! Sign-up here to discover Dr. Steve's different social media options …. but without the censorship! https://www.turleytalks.com/en/alternative-media.com Thank you for taking the time to listen to this episode.  If you enjoyed this episode, please subscribe and/or leave a review.Do you want to be a part of the podcast and be our sponsor? Click here to partner with us and defy liberal culture!If you would like to get lots of articles on conservative trends make sure to sign-up for the 'New Conservative Age Rising' Email Alerts. 

In this episode of the New Ideal podcast, Ben Bayer interviews Scott McDonald, an international relations PhD candidate at Tufts University and an expert on Chinese political theory and foreign policy. Among the topics covered: Scott McDonald's background and current work on the subject of Taiwan;The current state of relations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC);The pragmatism that led to America's decision to withdraw diplomatic recognition of Taiwan;The consequences of America's betrayal of Taiwan for its broader foreign policy;How Taiwan adopted American values in spite of this betrayal;The prospects of war in the Taiwan Strait;The likely consequences of a war between the PRC and Taiwan;The influence of Chinese philosophy on PRC geopolitical decisions;The “social metaphysics” (second-handedness) of Chinese philosophy;The pragmatism and altruism of current American foreign policyAyn Rand's comments on the values betrayed by American policy on Taiwan. Mentioned in the discussion is Ayn Rand's essay “The Shanghai Gesture,” a three-part article in the Ayn Rand Letter published in March and April of 1972. In that essay, Rand analyzes Richard Nixon's historic trip to China as a philosophic defeat. Of particular relevance is the following remark about the importance of U.S.-Taiwan relations: No, this is not an appeal for another senseless, altruistic war, this time to defend Taiwan. Taiwan can take care of itself, if we do not turn deserter. It is not a policeman's gun, but his firmness that keeps peace in a neighborhood and protects it from gangsters. Our token military presence has kept Taiwan peacefully safe for twenty-two years. Our withdrawal could precipitate a war involving the entire Pacific. (Does anyone remember the consequences of the Allies' withdrawal from the Sudetenland and the Ruhr?) And whatever our view of Nationalist China, we do not have the right to bargain its lives away as pawns in secret negotiations for some undisclosed policy of our own. This podcast was recorded on October 15, 2021, and posted to YouTube on November 10, 2021. Listen to the discussion below. Listen and subscribe from your mobile device on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Spotify or Stitcher. Watch archived podcasts here. https://youtu.be/baqwdOWhjrU Podcast audio:

Team:COACH GARY HERE. THIS IS EPISODE 19 OF THE ‘BRICK AND BLOCK PODCAST' AND                FEATURES THE AUDIO VERSION OF MY JANUARY 2020 COLUMN written for MASONRY MAGAZINE. YOU PROBABLY KNOW THE COLUMN AS ‘FULL CONTACT PROJECT MANAGER'. THE TITLE OF THE COLUMN YOU ARE ABOUT TO HEAR IS: Looking Forward by Knowing the Past                                                                  …Remembering the Rest of the Story Team— WARNING: THIS PODCAST RUNS COUNTER TO WHAT MANY COLLEGE PROFESSORS BELIEVE. PROCEED AT YOUR OWN RISK!NOTE: This article was originally written, a couple of years ago, to provide some history of December 7, 1941. It is even more important this year, as you should hear much talk about that date, now 80 years ago, this December. It's critical you get the whole story, as opponents of Western Civilization may be doing their best to tarnish, trample…and torpedo the reality of the 2nd World War.Look, as you can tell, I'm about fed up with the “Egghead” class, changing language, changing history, changing values, changing beliefs…heck, changing genders, making this stuff up as they go along. It's time for some sanity and perspective, which is what “Coach Gary” is about to deliver. Stand by!All things considered, in some respects, this might be one of the most important podcasts I've ever done. But, then again…all of my podcasts are important! So…dig in!We begin immediately,     and by immediately,   I mean once I remind everyone that you can find our podcast website at BRICK AND BLOCK PODCAST DOT COM (repeat). As I've said before, I'm a big proponent of having websites that support your business, and I've got an excellent example of one: Masonry Contractor Special Website. You'll see it there. That's what you're looking for. It's mobile friendly, modern, fast, bullet proof, BEAUTIFUL, cutting edge, DONE FOR YOU, and practically free! You'll love this one. Check it out.Of course, if you're not a masonry contractor, we have very similar websites, but in your specialty. So…check it out.OKAY, TEAM.    HANG ON, BUCKLE UP… LISTEN UP,  AND PREPARE TO MOVE UP. And now, Episode 19Looking Forward by Knowing the Past                                               …Remembering The Rest of the StoryBy Coach Gary Micheloni “Those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it.” (Winston Churchill, 1948 and George Santayana, 1905)For absolute certainty, there will be no shortage of articles and messages this time of year about “20-20 vision” and that sort of thing! But I ask you to invest a few moments right now and look at my little offering, because it just might be super-significant for you in this uncertain world and industry we find ourselves. Stuff always happens but you need to hang in there because ‘the rest of the story' might just be right around the corner… to the part where the cavalry arrives and the good guys win. That's the theme for the New Year because that's my hope and expectation. Check it out.For the past 20+ years now I have been meeting for breakfast with the same group of guys the first Saturday of each month. It is amazing to me the amount of wisdom coming from them, on all sorts of subjects and ideas, and I hope you have the same kind of people in your life. They are among my most important mentors— my coaches.So, when “Coach Mark” approached me and said that our group of guys would be meeting on December 7th next and wondered if I might want to share something about the significance of that day. I agreed, provided we could go into the lessons learned and the leadership attached to that significant day. What does it all mean--for that time, and for ours, going forward?President Franklin D. Roosevelt summed up things this way: “Yesterday, December 7, 1941, a date which will live in infamy, the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan...I regret to tell you that many American lives have been lost. In addition, American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu…”Pretty bad stuff, right? But let's not miss “the rest of the story.” Is the cavalry on its way? Is there going to be a ‘rest of the story?' Let's take a look.Those two sentences from FDR were the facts, and they are terrible. But those facts are only part of the story, which is far more profound, much larger, and more significant. The story does not end there. In fact, it doesn't even begin there! Because where it actually begins has everything to do with — not where it ends, but where it is heading. You knowing what that heading is, has everything to do with how your business, community, and family grow, We're talking about the history of our country because it is the driving force of your legacies, be it business, community or family going forward. Do not miss this!In your experience, you know that things often go wrong, “unsolvable” problems present themselves, seemingly impossible issues arise. Things are going along well and then, out of the blue, bad stuff happens. In this case, Pearl Harbor is attacked “out of the blue,” the enemy seeking to destroy the US Pacific Fleet. In fact, on that Sunday morning, 9 US battleships were in port. The enemy thought it had accomplished its mission, but it miscalculated — you'll learn why in a moment. But the lesson here is that life situations, which might cripple the unwitting, will not take you down— provided you understand your legacy, and how critical it is to pass this along to others and that they might do the same. So, let's go to the beginning of the story. What i0s this uniquely American legacy that redeems us from the bad and gets us to the good? Let's start here.America was settled by people seeking freedom of religion, the press, for the right to own property, and a desire to be governed by the rule of law— not ruled according to the dictations and might of kings. In this country, for the first time ever in the history of the world, we solemnly believed and resolved that the king was no longer to be the law. But that law, itself, was to be king. This turned civilization on its head!To make this happen, Americans picked a fight with the mightiest nation on earth at the time, to instill into its people and install into its government, the sanctity that these rights, held by most people, were ‘God-given.' A formal Declaration of Independence was written and then signed by 57 men each pledging, “Our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.” It would cost many of them exactly that. In 1776 this Revolution, tenuous at first and unlikely to succeed, overcame the impossible and the miraculous came to pass. Tens of thousands of lives were taken, wounded, or captured to make this a reality. Never forget: this is our legacy.In 1861, a great Civil War was fought to decide the issue of slavery. President Abraham Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863, freeing— on paper, at least the slaves in rebelling states. April 9, 1865, the south surrendered. April 14, 1865, Lincoln was assassinated. Over four years, more than 620,000 soldiers from both sides cast ‘the ultimate vote,” as did President Lincoln. The law was settled. At great cost, the nation moved on. Our legacy of freedom was preserved.  Fast forward to 1941 and the specter of world war. The US and Japan had ongoing diplomatic negotiations and peace talks up through December 6, in Washington DC. With talks scheduled to continue the following week. Sunday was supposed to be an off day. This now brings us back to the events of December 7th, 1941:7:55 a.m, the first wave of 183 Japanese fighters, bombers and torpedo bombers attacked Pearl Harbor.8:10 a.m. a 1,800-pound bomb lands in the USS Arizona's forward ammunition magazine. The ship explodes and sinks with 1,000+ men trapped inside.Torpedoes hit the USS Oklahoma with about 400 sailors aboard; she loses balance, rolls to her side and sinks. 8:54 a.m. the second wave of 170 planes attacked. The battle was over before 10:00 a.m.In its wake, 2,403 service members were killed, 1,178 wounded, 169 US Army Air Corps and Navy planes destroyed. 19 vessels were damaged, nearly half of which were sunk, fully or partially. Every battleship in Pearl Harbor had sustained significant damage: the USS Arizona, Oklahoma, California, West Virginia, Utah, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Nevada. Pretty bad stuff, right? Do things get better?Know that all but the Arizona, Oklahoma, and Utah were eventually salvaged and repaired so that six battleships were returned to service.The Japanese ambassadors left town on December 8th!December 9, 1941, Americans begin to enlist in record numbers. During the course of the war, over 16 million Americans served, from a US population of 140 million — 11% of all Americans fought in WW2. (By comparison, 1% during the Iraq war.) Every family had a stake in this fight, either in the military or in support of it. (My mom and at least one of my aunts became welders in an aircraft plant!)February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt issues Executive Order 9066, and 110,000 Japanese-Americans are forced to leave their homes and are interred in 10 detention camps until December 1944. April 2, 1942, USS Hornet steams from San Francisco with 16 B-25 Mitchell bombers lashed to her flight deck. The 80 crew members aboard had trained on land-based runways to get airborne within 467 ft (length of the Hornet flight deck). All were volunteers. It was considered to be a suicide mission.April 8, 1942, all 16 bombers, led by Lt. Col. James Doolittle, successfully launched from the Hornet for a surprise air attack on Tokyo by US bombers. All hit targets, doing little damage, but proving to the Japanese that their island was not invulnerable to attack by the U.S. — a huge, needed a psychological boost to the Allies, as the war was going badly. One plane landed in Russia, 15 toward Nationalist China. All ran short on fuel and either crash-landed or crew bailed out. Three crewmen killed, 8 captured, tortured and starved. This bravery is a part of the DNA in our legacy. April 19, 2019, Lt. Richard Cole, last surviving member of this raid, dies at age 103! 77 years plus one day.0May 1942. War going well for Japan, which wanted to get US into a fight for Midway Island in order to lure US aircraft carriers, defeat them, which would ultimately destroy the US Pacific Fleet. (Carriers were much more important to the Fleet than battleships.) May 28th, largest Japanese fleet ever leaves it bases and heads to sea, commanded by Admiral Yamamoto, who is confident of victory but does not know that the US has cracked their intelligence code and is aware of their plans of possible attack on Midway. June 1942, US Admiral Chester Nimitz puts a task force together. Desperately in need of carriers, has to allow USS Yorktown to go to Pearl Harbor for two+ weeks of emergency repairs. But Nimitz has a plan: 1400 shipyard workers move onto the ship, en masse, work around the clock and complete the repairs in 72 hours. She rejoins the task force! The Battle of Midway rages four days, June 4-June 7, 1942. Japan had 4 carriers, 3 cruisers, 12 destroyers, 248 carrier aircraft, and 16 floatplanes. The US had 3 carriers, 8 cruisers, 15 destroyers, 233 carrier aircraft, 127 land-based aircraft, and 16 subs.LOSSES: Japan— 4 carriers sunk; 1 cruiser sunk and 1 damaged; 248 aircraft destroyed, 3,057 KIA, 37 capturedUS— 1 carrier sunk (Yorktown); 1 destroyer sunk (Hammann), 150 aircraft destroyed; 307 service members KIA.Midway was widely considered the turning point of the war and the largest naval battle in history. Japan was unable to replenish its war materials easily, while the US industrial might could supply our needs.February 1, 1943, 442nd Regimental Combat Team created was composed entirely of Japanese-Americans, some of whom had family members in detention camps. Serving in Italy, France, and Germany, its motto was “Go for Broke.” By April 1943, it had a fighting complement of 4,000 men, with some 14,000 total serving overall. In less than two years, its members were awarded 9,486 purple hearts, 4,000 Bronze Stars, 21 of its members were awarded the Medal of Honor. It is the most decorated unit in US military history. A family friend of mine had a brother KIA while she and the rest of her family remained in a camp. Amazing. Sad. True. Part of our legacy as Americans of all stripes.While all of this is going on in the Pacific, the Allies simultaneously and successfully launch the largest amphibious landing in the history of warfare: Operation Overlor2d, also known as D-Day, the landing at Normandy (June 6-August 30, 1944). A few months later, the Battle of the Bulge (December 16, 1944 to Jan 25, 1945).May 8, 1945, VE Day (Victory in Europe) August 6, 1945, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Pres. Truman calls for Japan to surrender, warning of further destruction. Japan rejects.August 9, 1945, the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki.August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced surrender. September 2, 1945, (VJ Day— Victory over Japan) Japan signs unconditional surrender aboard USS Missouri This is who we are. This is why when you get down you know you're going to get back up. It's in our DNA. It is the legacy of our country. More than that: it is your legacy, and that's ‘the rest of the story!' YOU CAN REACH OUT TO US BY EMAIL: BrickAndBlockPodcast@gmail.com (SPELL OUT THE WORD “AND”: A. N. D.)  Brick And BlockPodcast@gmail.comPodcast Website: BrickAndBlockPodcast.com Remember—I've got that website example there for you to check As a favor:BE SURE AND SUBSCRIBE TO THE PODCAST. IT'S IMPORTANT.WE WANT YOU TO JOIN US FOR THE NEXT EPISODE. NOW…FOR THE BRICK AND BLOCK PODCAST…THIS IS COACH GARY… THANKS FOR STOPPING BY. 

Welcome to the Instant Trivia podcast episode 159, where we ask the best trivia on the Internet. Round 1. Category: Prefixes 1: "Anti-" means "against; "ante-" means this. before. 2: This thoroughly modern prefix means "one thousandth". milli-. 3: A prefix meaning "after" is found in this word meaning an after-death examination. postmortem. 4: This prefix that means "first" or "primitive" is found before "plasm" and "zoa". proto-. 5: When this prefix precedes "active", it means "backwards"; by itself it refers to the style of an earlier time. retro-. Round 2. Category: Near Disasters 1: On Sept. 8, 2001 Erin became the Atlantic season's first of these, but stayed mostly out at sea. hurricane. 2: In 1919 the lonely keeper of one of these helped save all 21 crewmen from fire on the steamer Frank O'Connor. a lighthouse. 3: A possible nuclear war was averted (for the moment) in June 2002 talks between India and this country. Pakistan. 4: In July 2002 9 men were dramatically rescued from a flooded mine in this state. Pennsylvania. 5: In 1907 this financier kept the stock market afloat by locking bankers in his library until they raised $25 million. J.P. Morgan. Round 3. Category: "Moo" 1: The song "That's Amore" is on the soundtrack to this 1987 Cher film. Moonstruck. 2: This adjective means "purely academic" or "irrelevant". Moot. 3: This stir-fried Chinese dish that contains shredded pork, scallions and egg is rolled in a thin pancake. Moo shu pork. 4: It's another name for a person born under the sign of Cancer. Moonchild/moonchildren. 5: This Cab Calloway song includes the lines "Hi-De-Hi-De-Hi-De-Hi!" and "Ho-De-Ho-De-Ho-De-Ho!". "Minnie The Moocher". Round 4. Category: Español 1: The Spanish "calabozo" and the cowboy variation calaboose both mean thse. jail. 2: Any Spanish pier or wharf, or a certain waterfront area in San Francisco. embarcadero. 3: This day of the week is domingo. Sunday. 4: This pet is un perro. a dog. 5: You'll find these, los escritorios, in the classroom. a desk. Round 5. Category: Historic Occasions 1: Name shared by an American film made in 1903 and a British crime committed in 1963. The Great Train Robbery. 2: James Marshall found this Jan. 24, 1848, days before California was handed over to the U.S.. Gold. 3: The 1851 Lopez Expedition, a disasterous attempt to free this island, was an early version of the Bay of Pigs. Cuba. 4: In 1798, in this African country, Napoleon said, "Soldiers...forty centuries look down upon you". Egypt. 5: This man died April 5, 1975, after a quarter of a century leading Nationalist China on Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek. Thanks for listening! Come back tomorrow for more exciting trivia!

The line that separated Nationalist China from the People's Republic was not a bright one. In 1949, when the Communists took over, many fled Shanghai — but many more remained.Read the article by James Carter: https://supchina.com/2021/05/26/when-chinas-nationalist-government-lost-shanghai/Narrated by Kaiser Kuo.

As the Wuhan regime collapses, so does the united front. Soviet advisors leave China, Chinese Communists go underground. The purge strikes Wuhan.Further reading:C. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928Anna Louise Strong, China’s MillionsVera Vladimirovna Vishnyakova-Akimova, Two Years in Revolutionary China, 1925-1927C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927Tony Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist PartySome names from this episode:M. N. Roy, Indian Comintern agentWang Jingwei, Leader of the Guomindang LeftFeng Yuxiang, Christian warlordVasily Blyukher, Soviet general and military genius, chief of Soviet military mission to aid the GuomindangZotov, Blyukher’s code clerk, died of poisoningMikhail Borodin, Comintern agent and political head of Soviet mission to aid the GuomindangHe Jian, Nationalist generalT. V. Soong, Wuhan government finance ministerChen Duxiu, Communist general secretary until July 12, 1927Zhou Enlai, Member of temporary standing committee of Communist Politburo appointed in July 1927Zhang Guotao, Member of temporary standing committee of Communist Politburo appointed in July 1927Li Lisan, Member of temporary standing committee of Communist Politburo appointed in July 1927Song Qingling, Guomindang Left leader and widow of Sun YatsenDeng Yanda, Head of the Guomindang peasant bureauEugene Chen, Guomindang foreign ministerGregory Voitinsky, Chairman of the Far Eastern Bureau of the CominternSupport the show (https://www.paypal.com/donate?hosted_button_id=DACDMMMEASJVJ)

The question of what sort of revolution the Nationalist revolution will be creates a fundamental division within the Guomindang.Further reading:C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927C. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928Stuart Schram, ed., Mao’s Road to Power, vol. 2: National Revolution and Social Revolution, December 1920-June 1927Alexander Pantsov, The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution, 1919-1927Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to 2000Some names from this episode:Mikhail Borodin, Comintern agent and head of Soviet mission to aid the GuomindangTang Shengzhi, Hunan warlord who sided with the National Revolutionary Army and contested leadership with Chiang Kai-shekPeng Pai, Communist peasant organizerKarl Radek, provost of Sun Yatsen University in Moscow Support the show (https://www.paypal.com/donate?hosted_button_id=DACDMMMEASJVJ)

Summations of the Second Uprising on several different levels; the continuing inability of the Shanghai Regional Committee of the Communist Party to control the ‘dog-beating’ squads; and some thoughts on the problem of the inevitability of errors being made in revolutionary armed struggle and Mao’s thinking on that problem.Further reading:Steve Smith, A Road Is Made: Communism in Shanghai, 1920-1927C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927Stuart Schram, ed., Mao’s Road to Power, vol. 2: National Revolution and Social Revolution, December 1920-June 1927Allyn and Adele Rickett, Prisoners of LiberationSome names from this episode:Qu Qiubai, Communist Central Committee member and head of propagandaZhou Enlai, Head of the military commission of the Communist Central CommitteeLi Baozhang, the commander of the garrison of warlord troops in ShanghaiSupport the show (https://www.paypal.com/donate?hosted_button_id=DACDMMMEASJVJ)

Where we continue to follow the insurrectionary journey of the Shanghai Communists.Further reading:Steve Smith, A Road Is Made: Communism in Shanghai, 1920-1927C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927Some names from this episode:Chen Duxiu, General Secretary of the Communist PartySun Chuanfang, Leader of warlord coalition in China’s southeastZhang Zongchang, Shandong warlordLi Baozhang, the commander of the garrison of warlord troops in ShanghaiZhou Enlai, Communist commissar who left Whampoa to aid the Shanghai military commissionNiu Yongjian, Veteran Nationalist operative who came to Shanghai in 1926Support the show (https://www.paypal.com/donate?hosted_button_id=DACDMMMEASJVJ)

The tension between maintaining the united front and mobilizing the peasants for revolution finds expression in a crucial debate over strategy at the end of 1926.Further reading:C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927Tony Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist PartyStuart Schram, ed., Mao’s Road to Power, vol. 2: National Revolution and Social Revolution, December 1920-June 1927Some names from this episode:Mikhail Borodin, Comintern agent and head of Soviet mission to aid the GuomindangGregory Voitinsky, Chairman of the Far Eastern Bureau of the CominternChen Duxiu, General Secretary of the Communist PartyWang Jingwei, Main leader of the Guomindang leftSupport the show (https://www.paypal.com/donate?hosted_button_id=DACDMMMEASJVJ)

Debate breaks out within the Communist Party and the Comintern over how to assess the balance of forces and relate to the developing revolutionary situation engendered by the mass movements in Hunan and Hubei in late 1926.Further reading:C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927Tony Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist PartyArif Dirlik, “Mass Movements and the Left Kuomintang”Steve Smith, A Road Is Made: Communism in Shanghai, 1920-1927Daniel Kwan, Marxist Intellectuals and the Chinese Labor Movement: A Study of Deng Zhongxia, 1894-1933Some names from this episode:Mikhail Borodin, Comintern agent and head of Soviet mission to aid the GuomindangWang Jingwei, Main leader of the Guomindang leftChen Gongbo, Close follower of Wang JingweiSun Chuanfang, leader of warlord coalition which held east China before being defeated during the Northern ExpeditionVasily Blyukher, Soviet general purported to be de facto commander-in-chief of Northern ExpeditionTang Shengzhi, Hunan warlord who sided with the National Revolutionary Army and contested leadership with Chiang Kai-shekGregory Voitinsky, Chairman of the Far Eastern Bureau of the CominternSupport the show (https://www.paypal.com/donate?hosted_button_id=DACDMMMEASJVJ)

Mass upheaval in Hunan and elsewhere after people are liberated from warlord rule.Further reading:C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927Yokoyama Suguru, “The Peasant Movement in Hunan”Stuart Schram, ed., Mao’s Road to Power, vol. 2: National Revolution and Social Revolution, December 1920-June 1927A name from this episode:Wu Peifu, Northern warlord

Examining the role of both organized and unorganized mass support for the Northern Expedition in its first phase, the offensive from Guangdong to Wuhan from May to October 1926. Further reading:Donald Jordan, The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926-1928C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927Some names from this episode:Mikhail Borodin, Comintern agent and head of Soviet mission to aid the GuomindangChen Duxiu, General Secretary of the Communist PartySun Zhongshan/Sun Yatsen, Founding leader of the GuomindangWu Peifu, Northern warlordGregory Voitinsky, Comintern representative in China at various points

How the Communist Party took the formula of "Haifeng + armed self-defense" and set out to organize the peasants of Guangdong, and beyond.Further Reading:Pang Yong-pil, “Peng Pai: From Landlord to Revolutionary”Yuan Gao, “Revolutionary Rural Politics: The Peasant Movement in Guangdong and Its Social-Historical Background, 1922–1926”Robert Marks, Rural Revolution in South China: Peasants and the Making of History in Haifeng County, 1570-1930Roy Hofheinz, The Broken Wave: The Chinese Communist Peasant Movement, 1922-1928Fernando Galbiati, P’eng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng SovietGerald Berkley, “The Canton Peasant Movement Training Institute”C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927Elizabeth Perry, Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945Some names from this episode:Peng Pai, Communist peasant organizerChen Jiongming, Warlord dominant in Haifeng region until 1925Li Zhongkai, Leader of Guomindang left, assassinated in 1925Li Dazhao, Co-founder of the Communist Party

Tensions come to a head between Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Jingwei and General Kuibyshev, as a Soviet plot backfires spectacularly.Further Reading:C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927Wu Tien-wei, “Chiang Kai-shek's March Twentieth Coup d'Etat of 1926”Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945Some names from this episode:Mikhail Borodin, Comintern agent and head of Soviet mission to aid the GuomindangWang Jingwei, Leader of Guomindang government in Guangdong in late 1925 and early 1926Dai Jitao, Right-wing Guomindang ideologueNikolay Kuibyshev, Soviet general and head of military mission in Guangdong in late 1925 and early 1926Victor Rogachev, Soviet general and adviser to Chiang Kai-shekLi Zhilong, Communist in Guomindang navyHu Hanmin, Leader of Guomindang right-wing, spent a period of exile in the USSRAndrei Bubnov, Headed Soviet military inspection mission to ChinaGeneral V. A. Stepanov, Headed Soviet military mission after Kuibyshev left and before Blyukher returnedVasily Blyukher, Soviet general whose return was requested by Chiang Kai-shekChen Duxiu, General Secretary of the Communist Party

In March 1942, Japan seized control of the lower region of Burma by taking the city of Rangoon. Rangoon, now known as Yangon, was Burma's administrative and commercial capital. The city was a crucial communication and industrial center in Burma and had the only port capable of handling troopships. Perhaps most importantly, strategically, the Burma Road began in Rangoon and allowed for a steady stream of military aid to be transported from Burma to Nationalist China. This supply route was essential for both Chiang Kai Shek's armies as well as allied forces in the region. As a result, the fall of Rangoon to the Japanese had significant consequences. References 1. Bernstein, Marc D. “The 17th Indian Division in Burma: Disaster on the Sittang.” Warfare History Network, 14 Nov. 2018, https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/the-17th-indian-division-in-burma-disaster-on-the-sittang/. 2. “Burma, 1942.” U.S. Army Center of Military History, 3 Oct. 2003, 3. https://history.army.mil/brochures/burma42/burma42.htm. 4. Hickey, Michael. “The Burma Campaign 1941 - 1945.” BBC, 17 Feb. 2011, https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/burma_campaign_01.shtml. 5. McLynn, Frank. The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942-45. Yale University Press, New Haven, 2008. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/pacific-atrocities-education/support

Mao as acting head of propaganda for the Guomindang.Further Reading:C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927Stuart Schram, ed., Mao’s Road to Power, vol. 2: National Revolution and Social Revolution, December 1920-June 1927Some names from this episode:Wang Jingwei, Leader of Guomindang government in Guangdong in late 1925 and early 1926Mikhail Borodin, Comintern agent and head of Soviet mission to aid the GuomindangChen Duxiu, General Secretary of the Communist PartyGregory Voitinsky, Comintern representative in China at various pointsDai Jitao, Right-wing Guomindang ideologue

The Hong Kong strike, the assassination of Liao Zhongkai, and the Second Eastern Expedition.Further Reading:C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941Some names from this episode:Chiang Kai-shek, Japan-trained military officer, close confidant of Sun YatsenDeng Zhongxia, Communist labor leader, involved in Hong Kong strikeWang Jingwei, Potential heir apparent to Sun Yatsen as leader of GuomindangLiao Zhongkai, Potential heir apparent to Sun Yatsen as leader of GuomindangHu Hanmin, Potential heir apparent to Sun Yatsen as leader of Guomindang (further to Right than the other two)Chen Jiongming, Southern warlord, ally and then enemy of Sun YatsenMikhail Borodin, Comintern agent and head of Soviet mission to aid the GuomindangZhou Enlai, Communist head of the Whampoa Academy political department, leading commissar on Second Eastern ExpeditionVictor Rogachev, Soviet general and adviser to Chiang Kai-shek

The National Revolutionary Army battles the warlords for supremacy in Guangdong, while the British and French escalate tensions by massacring supporters of a strike which shut down Hong Kong.Further Reading:C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927Some names from this episode:Chiang Kai-shek, Japan-trained military officer, close confidant of Sun YatsenVasily Blyukher, Soviet general who led military mission to aid GuomindangZhou Enlai, Communist head of the Whampoa Academy political departmentWang Jingwei, Potential heir apparent to Sun Yatsen as leader of GuomindangLiao Zhongkai, Potential heir apparent to Sun Yatsen as leader of GuomindangHu Hanmin, Potential heir apparent to Sun Yatsen as leader of Guomindang (further to Right than the other two)Mikhail Borodin, Comintern agent and head of Soviet mission to aid the GuomindangSun Zhongshan/Sun Yatsen, leader of the Guomindang, died in March 1925Chen Jiongming, Southern warlord, ally and then enemy of Sun Yatsen

The first year of the Soviet military alliance with the Guomindang, including the creation of the Whampoa Military Academy, the formation of the National Revolutionary Army, and the crushing of the Merchant Corps.Further Reading:C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941Some names from this episode:Mikhail Borodin, Comintern agent and head of Soviet mission to aid the GuomindangChiang Kai-shek, Japan-trained military officer, close confidant of Sun YatsenChen Jiongming, Southern warlord, ally and then enemy of Sun YatsenDeng Zhongxia, Leading Communist labor organizerGregory Voitinsky, Comintern representative in China at various points, much more wary of Sun Yatsen and the Guomindang than BorodinSun Zhongshan/Sun Yatsen, leader of the Guomindang

As both the Guomindang and the Communist Party benefit from their collaboration, tensions build.Further reading:Tony Saich, The Origins of the First United Front in ChinaSteve Smith, A Road Is Made: Communism in Shanghai, 1920-1927Alexander Pantsov, The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution, 1919-1927C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927Arif Dirlik, “Mass Movements and the Left Kuomintang”Some names from this episode:Sun Zhongshan/Sun Yatsen, leader of the GuomindangMikhail Borodin, Comintern agent and head of Soviet mission to aid the GuomindangChen Jiongming, Southern warlord, ally and then enemy of Sun YatsenChiang Kai-shek, Japan-trained military officer, close confidant of Sun YatsenLev Karakhan, Soviet ambassador to China beginning in 1923Gregory Chicherin, Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign AffairsChen Duxiu, General Secretary of the Communist Party

The victory of the CCP over the KMT was a bit of a shock to many, it was by no means obvious that they were going to win and actually by all accounts they should have lost. Chiang Kai-shek had the bigger army, more money, control of the cities, and at least the tacit support of the USA, who were hell bent on stopping the spread of communism now that they didn’t have to pretend to be friends with the USSR anymore. Despite the KMT’s numerous advantages, there were factors both internal and external to the party that led to their downfall, including the state of China’s society and economy after the war, the way the military behaved on both sides, as well as international relations. Did the CCP politically and militarily outmaneuver the KMT, or were they better able to reach the people and therefore win as a result of overwhelming popular support? By the end of this episode, we’ll have a better understanding of whether the founding of the PRC was more a failure of the KMT or the victory of the CCP.

In this episode, Emily Matson and I will be delving deep into the subtle yet monumental change that was made to the Chinese official curriculum a few years ago. In 2017, the government announced that the official start date for the War of Resistance Against Japan should be change from 1937 to 1931 in all textbooks. This not only goes against previous Chinese historical beliefs, but also the internationally recognised start date for the conflict. Emily and I discuss how and why this change may have come about (we have no definitive answers, only theories unfortunately) as well as the implications of this change for Chinese political, social, and cultural future. We also go off on a tangent about the purpose of history education and give some advice as to how to avoid ideological heritage and get properly informed on topics that interest you!Emily Matson is a PhD student in the Corcoran History Department, University of Virginia. Her focus is on modern East Asian history, and her areas of interest include Sino-Japanese relations, China's national identity, and Chinese patriotic education.

In the last two episodes we covered the Communist regime in Yan’an during the period 1941-1945, and how they went about solidifying their control over CCP controlled areas, spreading their ideology through movements and campaigns. Of course, we also covered the Communists’ involvement in WWII, but generally speaking, the CCP was not at the forefront of the fighting during the war with Japan. Most of frontline fighting was done by Nationalist soldiers under the leadership of Chiang, and with the help of the allied forces, though the extent to which any fighting was actually done has often been called into question. China’s role in WWII and its importance in holding down the Japanese has been a sore point for China, which has claimed it never received the recognition it deserved from the major powers, especially considering the losses suffered and the tragedies wrought among the Chinese people. Hopefully in this episode I can provide you with enough detail for you to decide for yourself whether the Chinese war effort was of global import, or should be relegated to the annals of national memory. So, today we’ll be discussing what happened to trigger full blown war with Japan in 1937, how this evolved into WWII, how China’s Nationalist government survived and under what guise, and China’s bitter struggle against Japan until the end of the war in 1945.

This is the last episode on the Nanjing decade, so far we’ve covered culture, economics, feminism, and academia, and I wanted to leave this episode till last because I feel it ties all the other threads together really nicely. We’ve gotten a few glimpses of the Nationalist Party’s governance and policy formulation in a few areas, and how they tried to exert control over different areas of Chinese life, but we haven’t addressed the topic of KMT politics in and of itself. Although in recent years many aspects of the Nanjing decade have been reevaluated in a more positive light, one negative connotation that seems to have stuck is the accusation that the KMT were fascists. Although, actually the KMT themselves may not have actually viewed this as a negative label at the time. In fact, there is evidence to show that they actively strove to model themselves on other successful fascistic regimes at the time, taking inspiration from Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany in particular. So in this episode we’re going to be reviewing the evidence, taking a look at the ideology of the Nationalists, as well as examining some of their major social policies and campaigns, to see to what extent the term fascist can be applied to the Nanjing government.

War or Peace? 1950 Fateful Year, 1950/12/21 1) Nationalist China seated in UN, Malek departed, absent when Korean War began (2) "Communism" - Berlin, France, Japan, Union Square in New York, spy Gubitchev deported (3) "Korea Invaded" - MacArthur, savage war of attrition on narrow beachhead, scores died, atrocities, rapidly narrowing perimeter, but 12 nations rallied, led by Canada, Inchon landing, air cover of B-29s dropping bombs, allies pushed north, "then, it happened" and UN armies forced into retreat, paid heavily in casualties, Chosin resorvoir (4) "Atom Bomb" - symbol of modern destruction, pilgrims to Rome, men of all faith prayed for peace, UN symbol of man's hope for tomorrow (complete newsreel) source link https://archive.org/details/1950-12-21_War_or_Peace copyright link https://creativecommons.org/licenses/publicdomain/