Podcasts about Yasukuni Shrine

Last time we spoke about Operation Chahar. In the turbulent year of 1935, tensions surged in North China as the Kwantung Army defied Tokyo's orders, encroaching deeper into Chahar province. This period was marked by widespread anti-Japanese sentiments, fueled by local revolts and the assassination of pro-Japanese figures, which infuriated Japanese authorities. On May 20, the Kwantung Army launched an offensive against a bandit group led by Sun Yungqin, seeking to exert control over the demilitarized regions established by earlier agreements. Their swift victory forced the resignation of local officials opposing Japanese interests. As chaos escalated, the Chinese government, under pressure to appease Japan, dismantled anti-Japanese factions and dismissed key leaders. The climax in this saga came with the signing of the He-Umezu Agreement, stripping China of authority in Hubei and Chahar, signaling Japan's increasing dominance and setting the stage for further exploitation of the region.   #150 The February 26 Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. While this podcast is supposed to be given through the Chinese perspective, I apologize but yet again I need to jump over to the Japanese side. You see, a very pivotal moment during the Showa era would occur in the year of 1936. I think it's crucial to understand it, and the underlying issues of it, to better understand what we will be stuck in for the unforeseeable future, the Second Sino-Japanese War. I've briefly mentioned the two factions within the Japanese military at this time, but now I'd really like to jump into them, and a major incident that made them collide. In the aftermath of WW1, 2 prominent factions emerged during this tumultuous period: the Kodoha, or Imperial Way Faction, and the Toseiha, or Control Faction. Each faction represented distinct visions for Japan's future, deeply influencing the nation's course leading up to World War II. The Kodoha rose to prominence in the 1920s, driven by a fervent belief in Japan's divine destiny and its right to expand its imperial reach across Asia. This faction was characterized by its adherence to traditional Japanese values, rooted in the samurai ethos. They viewed the Emperor as the embodiment of Japan's spirit and sought to return to the moral foundations they believed had been eroded by “Western influence”. The Kodoha was often critical of the West, perceiving the encroachment of Western thought and culture as a threat to Japan's unique identity. Their ideology emphasized a robust military force, advocating for aggressive campaigns in regions like Manchuria and China to assert Japan's dominance. Contrasting sharply with the Kodoha, the Toseiha began to emerge as a more dominant political force in the late 1930s. The Toseiha embraced a pragmatic approach, advocating for a disciplined military that could engage effectively with the complexities of modern warfare. They recognized the importance of retaining some traditional values while also integrating Western military techniques. Rather than rejecting Western influence entirely, the Toseiha believed in adapting to global shifts to ensure Japan's strength and security. The Toseiha's moderation extended to their governance strategies, as they prioritized political stability and control over radical ideology. They saw this approach as crucial for creating a robust state capable of managing Japan's expansionist ambitions without provoking the backlash that Kodoha tactics elicited. Their more calculated approach to military expansion included securing partnerships and pursuing diplomatic solutions alongside military action, thereby presenting a less confrontational image to the world. Now after Manchuria was seized and Manchukuo was ushered in, many in the Japanese military saw a crisis emerge, that required a “showa restoration' to solve. Both factions aimed to create military dictatorships under the emperor. The Kodoha saw the USSR as the number one threat to Japan and advocated an invasion of them, aka the Hokushin-ron doctrine, but the Toseiha faction prioritized a national defense state built on the idea they must build Japans industrial capabilities to face multiple enemies in the future. What really separated the two, was the Kodoha sought to use a violent coup d'etat to make ends meet, whereas the Toseiha were unwilling to go so far. The Kodoha faction was made up mostly of junior and youthful officers, typically country boys as we would call them. These were young men whose families were not the blue bloods, farmer types. They viewed the dramatic changes of Japan in light of their own family experiences, many were impoverished by the dramatic changes. A very specific thing these Kodoha boys hated were the Zaibatsu. The Zaibatsu were large Japanese business conglomerates, primarily active from the Meiji period until WW2. They combined various industries, including banking, manufacturing, and trading. Prominent examples included Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. The reason they hated the Zaibatsu was because they believed they were influenced by western thought and that they super succeeded the authority of the emperor. More or less you can think of it as “we hate the fat cats who are really running things”.   Now the Toseiha faction were willing to work with the Zaibatsu to make Japan stronger. Basically they believed them to just be a necessary evil, you had to play ball to get things rolling. Random note, Hirohito's brother Prince Chichibu sympathized with the Kodoha faction and repeatedly counseled his brother that he should implement direct imperial rule even if it meant suspending the constitution, aka a show restoration. Hirohito believed his brother who was active in the IJA at the time was being radicalized. Now I cant go through the entire history of it, but this time period is known as the “government by assassination” period for Japan. Military leaders in the IJA, IJN and from within the Kodoha and Toseiha factions kept assassinating politicians and senior officers to push envelopes forward. Stating all of that, I now want to talk about the February 26th incident and I will add I am using a specific source, simply because it's my favorite. That is Herbert P Bix's Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. In late 1934, several officers from the Imperial Way faction at the Army Cadet School were arrested for plotting a coup. Although there were no immediate repercussions, the following year, two of the same Kodoha officers, named Isobe Asaichi and Muranaka Takaji were arrested again for distributing a document accusing Toseiha faction officers, like Major General Nagata Tetsuzan, of previously drafting coup plans against the government. This time, the army's upper echelons responded firmly, condemning Isobe and Muranaka's accusations as acts of disloyalty, resulting in both officers losing their commissions. Meanwhile, other Imperial Way officers sought retaliation against Nagata, who was rumored to be planning a major purge to eliminate factionalism within the army. Tatsukichi Minobe was a Japanese statesman and scholar of constitutional law and in the 1930s he began a movement bringing up the very real issue with the Meiji constitution in relation to the role of the emperor. In August 1935, amid a populist movement denouncing Minobe's interpretation of the constitution, Lt colonel Aizawa Saburo from Kodoha faction entered Nagata's office and fatally attacked him with his katana. This marked a significant escalation in the military struggle over state reform and the push for increased military funding, which was intertwined with the movement against Minobe. Meanwhile anti- Prime Minister Okada factions within the army, continuing to use slogans like “kokutai clarification” and “denounce the organ theory,” intensified their attacks on the emperor's advisers and hereditary peers. Senior generals from the Kodoha faction arranged a public court-martial for Aizawa, held by the 1st Division, a group heavily populated by Kodoha officers based in Tokyo. When Aizawa's trial commenced on January 12, 1936, his defense team transformed it into an emotional condemnation of the Okada cabinet, the court entourage, and Minobe's constitutional theories. This strategy garnered support across the nation, even reaching unexpected places like the imperial palace, where Dowager Empress Teimei Kogo, a staunch rightist, expressed sympathy for Aizawa. However, before the trial could progress, a military mutiny disrupted proceedings in the capital. Shockwaves rippled through the army after Army Minister Hayashi dismissed Kodoha member General Mazaki from his position overseeing military education and ordered the transfer of the 1st Division to Manchuria, which ignited the largest army uprising in modern Japanese history. The uprising was orchestrated through a series of meetings held from February 18 to 22 by key individuals including Nishida, Yasuhide Kurihara, Teruzō Andō, Hisashi Kōno, Takaji Muranaka, and Asaichi Isobe. Their plan was relatively straightforward: the officers would assassinate the most prominent adversaries of the kokutai, seize control of the administrative center of the capital and the Imperial Palace, and present their demands, which included the dismissal of certain officials and the establishment of a new cabinet led by Mazaki. They did not establish long-term goals, believing that those should be determined by the Emperor. However, it is suspected that they were prepared to replace Hirohito with Prince Chichibu if necessary. The young Kodoha officers felt they had at least implicit support from several influential Imperial Japanese Army officers after making informal inquiries. This group included figures such as Araki, Minister of War Yoshiyuki Kawashima, Jinzaburō Mazaki, Tomoyuki Yamashita, Kanji Ishiwara, Shigeru Honjō, as well as their immediate superiors, Kōhei Kashii and Takeo Hori. Later, Kawashima's successor as Minister of War remarked that if all the officers who had endorsed the rebellion were forced to resign, there would not have been enough high-ranking officers left to replace them. To articulate their intentions and grievances, the young officers prepared a document titled "Manifesto of the Uprising" “Kekki Shuisho”, which they intended to present to the Emperor. Although the document was authored by Muranaka, it was written under the name of Shirō Nonaka, the highest-ranking officer involved in the plot. The document aligned with Kokutai Genri-ha ideals, criticizing the genrō, political leaders, military factions, zaibatsu, bureaucrats, and political parties for jeopardizing the kokutai with their selfishness and disregard for the Emperor, and emphasized the need for direct action: “Now, as we face immense foreign and domestic challenges, if we do not eliminate the disloyal and unjust who threaten the kokutai, if we do not remove the villains obstructing the Emperor's authority and hindering the Restoration, the Imperial vision for our nation will come to naught [...] Our duty is to purge the malevolent ministers and military factions surrounding the Emperor and eradicate their influence; we shall fulfill this mission.” Seven targets were selected for assassination for "threatening the kokutai". Keisuke Okada served as Prime Minister, where he notably advocated for the London Naval Treaty and supported the "organ theory" of the kokutai. His actions reflect a commitment to international agreements and specific ideological principles at the time. Saionji Kinmochi, a Genrō and former Prime Minister, also supported the London Naval Treaty. However, his influence extended further, as he played a role in prompting the Emperor to establish inappropriate cabinets, impacting political stability. Makino Nobuaki, the former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Foreign Minister, was another key figure who supported the London Naval Treaty. He notably prevented Prince Fushimi from voicing protests to the Emperor during this period, and he established a court faction in collaboration with Saitō, further entrenching political alliances. In his capacity as Grand Chamberlain, Kantarō Suzuki supported the London Naval Treaty but faced criticism for "obstructing the Imperial virtue," suggesting tensions between political decisions and traditional values. Saitō Makoto, who served as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and former Prime Minister, was involved in advocating for the London Naval Treaty and played a significant role in Mazaki's dismissal. He, too, formed a court faction with Makino, indicating the intricacies of court politics. Takahashi Korekiyo, as Finance Minister and former Prime Minister, engaged in party politics with the aim of diminishing military influence. His approach was focused on maintaining the existing economic structure amid the shifting political landscape. Finally, Jōtarō Watanabe, who replaced Mazaki as Inspector General of Military Education, supported the "organ theory" of the kokutai yet faced criticism for refusing to resign, despite being considered unsuitable for his position. On the night of February 25, Tokyo experienced a heavy snowfall, which uplifted the rebel officers as it evoked memories of the 1860 Sakuradamon Incident. During this event, political activists known as shishi assassinated Ii Naosuke, the chief advisor to the Shōgun, in the name of the Emperor. The rebel forces, organized into six groups, began mobilizing their troops and departing from their barracks between 3:30 and 4:00 AM. At 5:00 AM, they launched simultaneous attacks on key targets, including Okada, Takahashi, Suzuki, Saito, the Ministry of War, and the headquarters of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. At around five o'clock on the morning of February 26, 1936, a rebellion erupted, fueled by the long-standing tensions surrounding the kokutai issues that had plagued 1935. Twenty-two junior officers led over 1,400 armed soldiers and non-commissioned officers from three regiments of the 1st Division and an infantry unit of the Imperial Guards in a mutiny in snow-covered Tokyo. The attack on Okada involved a contingent of 280 men from the 1st Infantry Regiment, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Yasuhide Kurihara. The troops encircled the Prime Minister's Residence and compelled its guards to open the gates. Upon entering the compound, they attempted to locate Prime Minister Okada but were met with gunfire from four policemen stationed there. All four policemen were killed, wounding six rebel soldiers in the process. However, the shots served as a warning for Okada, prompting his brother-in-law, Colonel Denzō Matsuo, to help him find refuge. Matsuo, who closely resembled Okada, was eventually discovered by the soldiers and killed. After comparing Matsuo's wounded face to a photograph of the prime minister, the attackers mistakenly believed they had accomplished their mission. Okada managed to escape the following day, but this information was kept confidential, and he did not play any further role in the events. After Matsuo's death, Kurihara's men took up guard positions around the compound, reinforced by sixty soldiers from the 3rd Imperial Guard. In another key operation, Captain Kiyosada Kōda led a group of 160 men to seize control of the Minister of War's residence, the Ministry of War, and the General Staff Office. Upon entering the Minister's residence at 6:30 AM, they demanded to see Minister Kawashima. Once admitted, they read their manifesto aloud and presented a document detailing several demands, including: A prompt resolution to the situation that would further "advance the cause of the Restoration." A call to prevent the use of force against the Righteous Army. The arrest of Kazushige Ugaki (Governor-General of Korea), Jirō Minami (commander of the Kwantung Army), Kuniaki Koiso (commander of the Korean Army), and Yoshitsugu Tatekawa for their roles in undermining military command. The immediate dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Akira Mutō, Colonel Hiroshi Nemoto, and Major Tadashi Katakura from the Imperial Japanese Army for promoting "factionalism." The appointment of Araki as the new commander of the Kwantung Army. Ugaki, who served as Minister of War during two separate terms, had overseen significant reductions and modernization efforts within the army. He had also failed to support the March Incident plotters, who had hoped to install him as Prime Minister. Minami, Mutō, Nemoto, and Katakura were all influential members of the Tōsei-ha faction; Katakura had been partly responsible for reporting on the Military Academy Incident. Later that morning, Isobe encountered Katakura outside the Ministry of War and shot him non-fatally in the head. During this tumultuous period, several officers sympathetic to the rebels, including General Mazaki, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, and General Ryū Saitō, joined the uprising. Saitō praised the young officers' spirit and encouraged Kawashima to accept their demands. Shortly before 9:00 am, Kawashima indicated he needed to speak with the Emperor and left for the Imperial Palace. Meanwhile, Captain Hisashi Kōno led a team of seven, comprised mostly of civilians, to attack Makino Nobuaki, who was staying at Kōfūsō, part of the ryokan Itōya in Yugawara, Kanagawa Prefecture, with his family. Arriving at 5:45 am, they stationed two men outside while entering the inn with weapons drawn. Inside, policemen opened fire, leading to a lengthy exchange of gunfire. A policeman managed to alert Makino and his party of the danger, guiding them to a rear exit. Although the assassins fired at the escaping group, Makino successfully evaded capture. Kōno sustained a gunshot wound to the chest, and one policeman, Yoshitaka Minagawa, was killed. As Kōno was evacuated from the scene, the assailants set fire to the building. Hearing a gunshot, Kōno assumed that Makino had shot himself inside. After his recovery at a nearby military hospital, Kōno and his team were arrested by military police. Around 10:00 am, Kurihara and Nakahashi loaded a fleet of three trucks with sixty men and drove from the Prime Minister's Residence to the offices of the Asahi Shimbun, a significant liberal newspaper. They stormed the building, ordering the evacuation of employees and declaring their actions as "divine retribution for being an un-Japanese newspaper." The rebels then overturned and scattered the newspaper's type trays, containing 4,000 different characters, temporarily halting its publication. Following this attack, the men distributed copies of the uprising's manifesto to nearby newspapers before returning to the Prime Minister's Residence. On another front, 1st Lieutenant Motoaki Nakahashi of the 3rd Imperial Guard gathered 135 men and, under the pretext of paying respects at Yasukuni Shrine, marched to Takahashi Korekiyo's residence. There, he divided his forces, sending one group to attack while the other remained to guard the entrance. After breaking into the compound, Nakahashi and Lieutenant Kanji Nakajima found Takahashi in bed, where Nakahashi shot him while Nakajima delivered a fatal sword strike. Takahashi died without waking. Once his target was eliminated, Nakahashi regrouped with the soldiers and proceeded to the Imperial Palace, aiming to secure it. Entering through the western Hanzō Gate at 6:00 am, Nakahashi informed Major Kentarō Honma, the palace guard commander, that he had been dispatched to reinforce the gates due to earlier attacks. Honma, already aware of the uprisings, accepted Nakahashi's arrival. He was assigned to help secure the Sakashita Gate, the primary entrance to the Emperor's residence. Nakahashi planned to signal nearby rebel troops at police headquarters once he controlled access to the Emperor. However, he struggled to contact his allies, and by 8:00 am, Honma learned of his involvement in the uprising and ordered him, at gunpoint, to vacate the palace grounds. Nakahashi complied and returned to join Kurihara at the Prime Minister's Residence, while his soldiers remained at the gate until relieved later that day, preventing their inclusion in the government's official count of rebel forces. Elsewhere, 1st Lieutenant Naoshi Sakai led a detachment of 120 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment to Saitō Makoto's home in Yotsuya. After surrounding the policemen on guard, five soldiers entered the residence and found Saitō and his wife, Haruko, in their bedroom. They shot Saitō dead, prompting Haruko to plead for her life, saying, "Please kill me instead!" While they pulled her away, she was unwittingly wounded by stray gunfire. Following Saitō's assassination, two officers directed another group to target General Watanabe, while the remaining men moved to strategically position themselves northeast of the Ministry of War. In Kōjimachi, Captain Teruzō Andō commanded 200 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment to assault Suzuki's residence across from the Imperial Palace. After disarming the police on duty, they located Suzuki in his bedroom and shot him twice. When Andō moved to deliver the coup de grâce with his sword, Suzuki's wife implored to be allowed to do it herself, believing her husband to be fatally wounded. Andō obliged and, apologizing for the act, explained it was for the nation's sake. After saluting Suzuki, the soldiers left to guard the Miyakezaka junction north of the Ministry of War. Following the assault on Saitō, a party of twenty men, led by 2nd Lieutenants Tarō Takahashi and Yutaka Yasuda, headed to Watanabe's residence in Ogikubo after 7:00 AM. Despite the two-hour delay since previous attacks, no measures had been taken to alert Watanabe. As they attempted to storm the front entrance, military police inside opened fire, wounding Yasuda and another soldier. The troops then gained entry through the rear, confronting Watanabe's wife outside their bedroom. After shoving her aside, they found Watanabe using a futon as cover. He opened fire, prompting one soldier to retaliate with a light machine gun. Takahashi then rushed in and fatally stabbed Watanabe, witnessed by his nine-year-old daughter, Kazuko, who hid nearby. The soldiers departed, taking their wounded to a hospital before positioning themselves in northern Nagatachō. In a significant move, Captain Shirō Nonaka led nearly a third of the rebel forces, comprising 500 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment, to assault the Tokyo Metropolitan Police headquarters. Their objective was to secure communication equipment and prevent dispatch of the police's Emergency Service Unit. Meeting no resistance, they quickly occupied the building, possibly due to a strategic decision to leave the situation in the military's hands. After securing the police headquarters, 2nd Lieutenant Kinjirō Suzuki led a small group to attack Fumio Gotō's residence, the Home Minister's, but found that Gotō was not home, thus allowing him to escape. This attack appeared to result from Suzuki's independent decision, rather than a coordinated effort among the officers. Despite all of these actions, the Kodoha boys had failed to secure the Sakashita Gate to the palace, which allowed the palace to maintain communication with the outside world, and they neglected to address potential naval interventions. At the Yokosuka naval base, Rear Adm. Yonai Mitsumasa and his chief of staff, Inoue Shigeyoshi, positioned marines to defend the Navy Ministry and prepared warships in Tokyo Bay to suppress the rebellion. By the morning of February 28, after unsuccessful negotiations through sympathetic officers at army headquarters, the commander under martial law transmitted an imperial order to disperse. Most troops returned to their barracks, one officer committed suicide, and the remaining leaders surrendered, resulting in the uprising ending with minimal further violence. Nevertheless, martial law in Tokyo continued for nearly five months. The rebel officers had initially planned for General Kawashima, a staunch ally of the Kodoha, to relay their intentions to the emperor, who they assumed would issue a decree for a “Showa restoration.” Despite their radical objectives of overthrowing the political order, the mutineers, like other military and civilian extremists of the 1930s, sought to operate within the imperial framework and maintain the kokutai. They believed the emperor was under the control of his advisers and lacked a genuine will of his own. Once the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain were removed, they expected the emperor to appoint General Mazaki as prime minister, a leader they believed would reinforce the military and effectively address the China issue. At the onset of the insurrection, they had a real chance of success. The Tokyo military police commander, General Kashii Kohei, sympathized with their cause, and the emperor's chief aide, General Honjo, was related to rebel officer Capain Yamaguchi Ichitaro. Support for the mutineers was present at military bases nationwide. Historian Hata Ikuhiko notes that the rebels contacted General Honjo by both phone and written message before attacking the Okada cabinet. As the first in the imperial entourage to learn of the mutiny, Honjo could have warned the intended targets but chose not to do so. By the time he arrived at court at 6:00 am. on the 26th, key advisors like Chief Secretary Kido, Imperial Household Minister Yuasa Kurahei, and Vice Grand Chamberlain Hirohata Tadakata were already aware of the potential danger. Suzuki was murdered, and the emperor was deeply affected, awakening to the news at 5:40 am from the chamberlain on night duty, Kanroji Osanaga. He learned that his old ministers had been attacked and a coup was underway. Upon receiving this information, Hirohito resolved to suppress the uprising. He was outraged by the killing of his ministers and feared that the rebels might use his brother, Prince Chichibu, to force him to abdicate. He donned his army uniform and summoned Honjo, ordering him to “end it immediately and turn this misfortune into a blessing.” Hirohito adopted a strategy proposed by Kido, who had acted swiftly earlier that morning, instructing Honjo to assess the Imperial Guard Division's potential actions if the mutineers advanced on the Palace. Kido aimed to prevent the establishment of a new provisional cabinet until the mutiny was fully quelled. At 9:30 am Army Minister Kawashima, who had previously met with one of the rebel officers, arrived at court. He urged the emperor to form a cabinet that would “clarify the kokutai, stabilize national life, and fulfill national defense.” Surprised by Kawashima's tone, Hirohito reprimanded him for not prioritizing the suppression of the mutiny. He also expressed his frustration to Chief of the Navy General Staff Prince Fushimi, dismissing him when he inquired about forming a new cabinet. Later that day, Kawashima met with the Supreme Military Council, consisting mainly of army officers sympathetic to the rebels. The council decided to attempt persuasion before relaying the emperor's orders a move contrary to Hirohito's directive. According to historian Otabe Yuji, an “instruction” was issued to the rebel officers at 10:50 am, acknowledging their motives and suggesting the emperor might show them leniency. This message was communicated to the ringleaders by martial law commander General Kashii. That evening, when members of the Okada cabinet came to submit their resignations, Hirohito insisted they remain in power until the mutiny was resolved. On February 27, the second day of the uprising, Hirohito announced “administrative martial law” based on Article 8 of the Imperial Constitution. This invoked his sovereign powers to address the crisis while freeing him from needing cabinet approval for his actions. Hirohito displayed remarkable energy throughout the subsequent days, sending chamberlains to summon Honjo for updates and threatening to lead the Imperial Guard Division himself when dissatisfied with the reports. Honjo, however, resisted the emperor's demands and exhibited sympathy for the rebels. During the uprising, Hirohito met with Prince Chichibu, who had recently returned from Hirosaki. Their discussions reportedly led Chichibu to distance himself from the rebels. However, rumors of his sympathy for them persisted, leading to concerns about potential conflicts within the imperial family. On the second day, Rear Admiral Yonai and his chief of staff demonstrated their loyalty to Hirohito. By February 29, the fourth day of the uprising, Hirohito had reasserted his authority, troops were returning to their barracks, and most rebel leaders were captured. Seventeen of these leaders were court-martialed and executed in July without legal representation. Shortly after, during the obon festival, Hirohito allegedly instructed a military aide to secure seventeen obon lanterns for the palace. This action, though secret, may have provided him some personal comfort amidst the turmoil. An investigation following the mutiny revealed that the rebels' sense of crisis was amplified by the recent general elections, which had shown an anti-military sentiment among voters. Despite their populist rhetoric, most ringleaders were not motivated by the agricultural depression; their goal was to support the kokutai by advocating for increased military rearmament. During this period, military spending steadily rose from 3.47% of GNP in 1931 to 5.63% in 1936. Intriguingly, the ringleaders and their senior commanders shared a desire for state control over production to mobilize resources fully for total war. While united in this goal, their ideas about how to achieve a “Showa restoration” varied greatly, with some leaders, like Isobe, calling for complete economic consolidation and a return to strong state power. The February mutiny reinforced Hirohito's belief in the constitutional framework that underpinned his military authority. He became increasingly cautious about decisions that could compromise his command and developed closer ties to the army's Control faction, justifying military spending increases. Yet, the memory of the mutiny left him feeling uncertain about the throne's stability. Now you know me, whenever I can bring up Hirohito's involvement in the war related times I gotta do. After WW2, in an apparent effort to downplay his role as supreme commander, Hirohito provided a deliberately distorted account of the February events. “I issued an order at that time for the rebel force to be suppressed. This brings to mind Machida Chuji, the finance minister. He was very worried about the rebellion's adverse effect on the money market and warned me that a panic could occur unless I took firm measures. Therefore I issued a strong command to have [the uprising] put down. As a rule, because a suppression order also involves martial law, military circles, who cannot issue such an order on their own, need the mutual consent of the government. However, at the time, Okada's whereabouts were unknown. As the attitude of the Army Ministry seemed too lenient, I issued a strict order. Following my bitter experiences with the Tanaka cabinet, I had decided always to wait for the opinions of my advisers before making any decision, and not to go against their counsel. Only twice, on this occasion and at the time of the ending of the war, did I positively implement my own ideas. Ishiwara Kanji of the Army General Staff Office also asked me, through military aide Chojiri [Kazumoto], to issue a suppression order. I don't know what sort of a person Ishiwara is, but on this occasion he was correct, even though he had been the instigator of the Manchurian Incident. Further, my chief military aide, Honjo, brought me the plan drafted by Yamashita Hobun, in which Yamashita asked me to please send an examiner because the three leaders of the rebel army were likely to commit suicide. However, I thought that sending an examiner would imply that they had acted according to their moral convictions and were deserving of respect. . . . So I rejected Honjo's proposal, and [instead] issued the order to suppress them. I received no report that generals in charge of military affairs had gone and urged the rebels to surrender.”  On February 26, when Hirohito ordered the immediate suppression of the rebels, his anger was directed not only at the insurgents who had assassinated his closest advisors but also at senior army officers who were indecisive in executing the crackdown. The following day, in addition to his role as Minister of Commerce and Industry, Machida took on the responsibilities of finance minister. Concerns over economic panic and confusion contributed to the emperor's sense of urgency, despite not being the primary motivation for his actions. Hirohito believed that every hour of delay tarnished Japan's international reputation. Since the Manchurian Incident, the emperor had frequently clashed with the military regarding encroachments on his authority, though never about fundamental policy issues. At times, he had managed to assert his political views during policy discussions, similar to his earlier influence under the Hamaguchi cabinet. The February 26 mutiny highlighted to Hirohito and Yuasa his privy seal from March 1936 to June 1940, and the first lord keeper of the privy seal to attend court regularly the necessity of fully exercising the emperor's supreme command whenever the situation demanded it. Even when faced with opposition from Honjo, Hirohito managed to gain support and assert his authority through a decisive approach. His resolution marked the end of a period during which alienated “young officers” attempted to leverage his influence as a reformist figure to challenge a power structure they could not manipulate effectively. However, Hirohito learned how to adeptly manage that establishment in most situations. The decision-making process within the government was characterized by secrecy, indirect communication, vague policy drafting, and information manipulation, creating a landscape of confusion, misunderstanding, and constant intrigue aimed at achieving consensus among elites. This was the modus operandi in Tokyo and a reflection of how the emperor operated. Once again, Hirohito reminded the tightly-knit elite that he was essential to the functioning of the system. On May 4, 1936, during his address at the opening ceremony of the Sixty-ninth Imperial Diet, while Tokyo remained under martial law, Hirohito closed the chapter on the February mutiny. Initially, he contemplated sending a strong message of censure to the military, but after considerable deliberation over three months, he ultimately chose to issue a brief, innocuous statement: “We regret the recent incident that occurred in Tokyo.” The response from his audience of Diet members and military officials was one of startled awe, with some privately expressing disappointment. Once again, at a critical juncture, Hirohito avoided an opportunity to publicly rein in the military through his constitutional role. Nonetheless, due to his behind-the-scenes actions, the drift in domestic policy that had characterized Japan since the Manchurian Incident came to an end. In the following fourteen months, the emperor and his advisors largely aligned with the army and navy's demands for increased military expansion and state-driven industrial development. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. So some very unruly young Japanese officers got the bright idea of forcing a showa restoration by killing all the culprits they believed held their emperor hostage. Little did they know, this event spelt the end of the Kodoha faction and rise of the Toseiha faction. Henceforth the military was even more in charge and would get even more insane.   

靖国神社に集団参拝する「みんなで靖国神社に参拝する国会議員の会」のメンバー、２２日午前、東京都千代田区超党派の「みんなで靖国神社に参拝する国会議員の会」は２２日、東京・九段北の靖国神社を春季例大祭に合わせて集団で参拝した。 Some 70 lawmakers of both chambers of Japan's parliament on Tuesday visited together war-related Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo during its spring festival.

靖国神社の春季例大祭に合わせて石破茂首相が奉納した真榊、２１日午前、東京都千代田区石破茂首相は２１日、東京・九段北の靖国神社に祭具の真榊を奉納した。 Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba made a "masakaki" ritual tree offering to Yasukuni Shrine at the start of the war-related Tokyo shrine's spring festival on Monday.

Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba made a "masakaki" ritual tree offering to Yasukuni Shrine at the start of the war-related Tokyo shrine's spring festival on Monday.

首相官邸に入る石破茂首相、１８日午前、東京・永田町石破茂首相は、東京・九段北の靖国神社で２１～２３日に開催予定の春季例大祭に合わせた参拝を行わない方針だ。 Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has no plans to visit Yasukuni Shrine during the war-related Tokyo shrine's spring festival next week, people close to him said Friday.

Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has no plans to visit Yasukuni Shrine during the war-related Tokyo shrine's spring festival next week, people close to him said Friday.

最高裁、東京都千代田区旧日本軍の軍人・軍属として戦死した父親の情報を無断で靖国神社に提供され、合祀されたとして、韓国籍の原告らが国に損害賠償などを求めた訴訟の上告審判決が１７日、最高裁第２小法廷であった。 Japan's Supreme Court dismissed on Friday an appeal filed by South Korean plaintiffs in a lawsuit to seek damages from the Japanese government over the enshrinement of their fathers at war-related Yasukuni Shrine, finalizing a high court ruling against them.

Japan's Supreme Court dismissed on Friday an appeal filed by South Korean plaintiffs in a lawsuit to seek damages from the Japanese government over the enshrinement of their fathers at war-related Yasukuni Shrine, finalizing a high court ruling against them.

東京地裁、東京都千代田区靖国神社で５月、石柱に英語で「Ｔｏｉｌｅｔ」と落書きしたとして、器物損壊と礼拝所不敬の罪に問われた中国籍の姜卓君被告の判決が２５日、東京地裁であった。 Tokyo District Court on Wednesday sentenced a Chinese man to eight months in jail for vandalizing Tokyo's war-related Yasukuni Shrine.

Tokyo District Court on Wednesday sentenced a Chinese man to eight months in jail for vandalizing Tokyo's war-related Yasukuni Shrine.

落書きを目隠しされた靖国神社の名を記した石柱、８月１９日、東京都千代田区靖国神社で８月、石柱に「厠所」などの落書きがあった事件で、警視庁は２１日、器物損壊と礼拝所不敬の疑いで、中国籍の１０代少年の逮捕状を取得した。 The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department has obtained an arrest warrant for a Chinese youth in his 10s over graffiti at the Japanese capital's war-related Yasukuni Shrine, investigative sources said Thursday.

The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department has obtained an arrest warrant for a Chinese youth in his 10s over graffiti at the Japanese capital's war-related Yasukuni Shrine, investigative sources said Thursday.

靖国神社の秋季例大祭が１９日、終了した。 No Japanese cabinet ministers, including Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, were seen to have visited war-linked Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo during its three-day autumn festival that ended on Saturday.

In this episode of The Korea Pro Podcast, John is joined by Joon Ha, Korea Pro's junior news reporter, to discuss recent developments in South Korean literature, diplomacy and international relations. The duo begin by celebrating Han Kang's Nobel Prize in Literature, making her the second Korean to receive a Nobel Prize. Joon Ha highlights the international acclaim for Han's work and the role of translators in bringing Korean literature to a global audience. They also touch on the controversial blacklisting of cultural figures, including Han, during the Park Geun-hye administration. The conversation then shifts to last week's meeting between South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba in Laos. John and Joon Ha analyze the leaders' efforts to continue the rapprochement process while navigating domestic political sensitivities, particularly in light of Ishiba's ceremonial offering to the Yasukuni Shrine. The duo then discusses former U.S. President Donald Trump's claims about South Korea's financial contributions for U.S. troop presence. They examine the potential implications for U.S.-ROK relations if Trump were to win the upcoming U.S. presidential election, considering the recent negotiations of the 12th Special Measures Agreement. Looking ahead, John notes the anticipated meeting between Yoon and ruling People Power Party leader Han Dong-hoon, discussing the potential impact of recent by-election victories on their relationship and party dynamics. About the podcast: The Korea Pro Podcast is a weekly 15-minute conversation hosted by Editorial Director Jeongmin Kim (@jeongminnkim) and Editor John Lee (@koreanforeigner), diving deep into the most pressing stories shaping South Korea — and dissecting the most complicated ones for professionals monitoring ROK politics, diplomacy, culture, society and technology. Uploaded every Friday. This episode was recorded on Oct. 17, 2024 Audio edited by Gaby Magnuson

Vandalism at Yasukuni Shrine; Financial Services Agency to Revise Supervisory Guidelines, & more… English news from Japan for August 19th, 2024. Transcription available at https://japandailynews.com/2024/08/19/news.html

靖国神社を参拝に訪れた木原稔防衛相、１５日午前、東京都千代田区自民党の木原稔防衛相、新藤義孝経済再生担当相、高市早苗経済安全保障担当相は終戦記念日の１５日午前、東京・九段北の靖国神社を参拝した。 Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida made a "tamagushi" ritual offering at Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo on Thursday, the 79th anniversary of the country's surrender in World War II.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida made a "tamagushi" ritual offering at Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo on Thursday, the 79th anniversary of the country's surrender in World War II.

靖国神社の石柱と鳥居など、東京都千代田区靖国神社の石柱が落書きされた事件で、警視庁公安部は９日、器物損壊と礼拝所不敬の疑いで、中国籍の職業不詳、姜卓君容疑者、埼玉県朝霞市宮戸、を逮捕した。 Tokyo's Metropolitan Police Department on Tuesday arrested a 29-year-old Chinese national for alleged vandalism at Yasukuni Shrine in the Japanese capital earlier this year.

Tokyo's Metropolitan Police Department on Tuesday arrested a 29-year-old Chinese national for alleged vandalism at Yasukuni Shrine in the Japanese capital earlier this year.

In this episode, we welcome back anti-woke/anti-anti-woke scholar, Mike Burke, to discuss the recent incident at Yasaka Shrine; an unrelated issue involving a Chinese man urinating on and defacing Yasukuni Shrine; and the most controversial game in Ubisoft's library, Assassin's Creed Shadows, featuring Yasuke, the so-called first black samurai.LINKS! Japanese hospitality wears thin as overtourism takes toll ”八坂神社騒動” に新展開！

靖国神社を参拝に訪れた高市早苗経済安全保障担当相、２３日午後、東京都千代田区高市早苗経済安全保障担当相は２３日昼、春季例大祭が行われている東京・九段北の靖国神社を参拝した。 Some 90 Japanese lawmakers Tuesday visited together war-related Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo during its three-day spring festival from Sunday.

With Godzilla Minus One tearing up the American and global box office, it's time for another EMERGENCY PODCAST. This week we are joined by two amazing scholars of Japanese social and cultural history in Bill Tsutsui and Akiki Takenaka. We talk about our first impressions of the film, where it fits into Godzilla and WWII lore, and the history of Godzilla himself. This is such a cool conversation and I'm so excited to bring it to you.About our guests:Bill Tsutsui is an award-winning scholar and teacher, an experienced academic leader,and an outspoken supporter of the public humanities, international education,and more inclusive, accessible colleges and universities.  He researches, writes, and speaks widely on Japanese economic and environmental history, Japanese popular culture (especially the Godzilla movies), Japanese-American identity, and issues in higher education.  He is highly opinionated about BBQ, proud to have once driven the Zamboni at an NHL game, and slightly embarrassed to be Level 40 in Pokemon Go. Find him at https://www.billtsutsui.com/ Akiko Takenaka specializes in social and cultural history of modern Japan. Her research involves memory and historiography of the Asia-Pacific War, gender and peace activism, and history museums. Her teaching interests include gender, war and society, nationalism, memory studies, and visual culture. Prior to coming to UK, she has taught as a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Chicago and the University of Michigan.Professor Takenaka's first book, entitled Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan's Unending Postwar (University of Hawai'i Press, Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University), explores Yasukuni Shrine as a physical space, object of visual and spatial representation, and site of spatial practice in order to highlight the complexity of Yasukuni's past and critique the official narratives that postwar debates have responded to. Her second book project Mothers Against War: Gender, Motherhood, and Peace Activism in Postwar Japan is under advance contract with the University of Hawai'i Press. Her research has been funded by long-term research fellowships by Fulbright and the Japan Foundation. Find her on twitter at @ata225

------------------------------- 通勤學英語VIP加值內容與線上課程 ------------------------------- 通勤學英語VIP訂閱方案：https://open.firstory.me/join/15minstoday 社會人核心英語有聲書課程連結：https://15minsengcafe.pse.is/554esm ------------------------------- 15Mins.Today 相關連結 ------------------------------- 歡迎針對這一集留言你的想法： 留言連結 主題投稿/意見回覆 : ask15mins@gmail.com 官方網站：www.15mins.today 加入Clubhouse直播室：https://15minsengcafe.pse.is/46hm8k 訂閱YouTube頻道：https://15minsengcafe.pse.is/3rhuuy 商業合作/贊助來信：15minstoday@gmail.com ------------------------------- 以下是此單集逐字稿 (播放器有不同字數限制，完整文稿可到官網) ------------------------------- Topic: Covid-Inspired ‘Silent Cut Haircutting Service Gains Popularity in Japan Devised by a Tokyo hair salon during the Covid-19 pandemic to prevent the spread of the coronavirus, the ‘Silent Cut' service is becoming increasingly popular in Japan. 在武漢肺炎（Covid-19）疫情期間，日本東京一家髮廊為防止病毒傳播而推出「無聲剪髮」服務，在日本愈來愈受歡迎。 As a way of curbing the spread of the coronavirus during the Covid-19 pandemic, authorities in Japan started promoting “no conversation” or “less conversation” policies in schools, shops and supermarkets. One Tokyo salon decided to implement the ‘silent cut' service and it proved so popular that others quickly followed suit. 做為在Covid-19大流行期間遏制冠狀病毒傳播的一種方式，日本當局開始提倡在學校、商店和超市「不交談」或「少交談」。東京一家髮廊決定實施「無聲剪髮」服務。事實證明，這項服務非常受歡迎，其他髮廊也紛紛跟進。 As it turns out, hairstylists prefer the silent cut as well, with many claiming that they were taught to chat up clients in their apprenticeship. 事實證明，髮型師也更喜歡無聲剪髮，許多髮型師表示，他們在學徒期間需要學習如何與客人搭訕。 Next Article Topic: We're hiring: Babies wanted for Japan nursing home 我們正在招聘：日本療養院需要嬰兒 A nursing home in southern Japan is “hiring” babies for a very important job — to keep its elderly residents company and make them smile. 日本南部一間療養院正在招聘嬰兒，擔任非常重要的職位──陪伴年長居民、讓他們開心。 A job advert pinned to the wall informs would-be workers they will be compensated for their services in diapers and powdered milk. 一個釘在牆上的工作廣告告知未來的員工，他們將會收到尿布和配方奶做為服務報酬。 New recruits at the facility in Kitakyushu must be under four years old, and their guardians have to sign a contract stipulating that the babies and toddlers can show up for work “whenever they feel like it.” 這間北九州機構的新成員必須小於4歲，而且他們的監護人必須簽署一份合約，明文規定嬰兒和學步幼童可以依照他們的意願，想上班的時候再出現。 More than 30 babies have been signed up so far, tasked with lifting the spirits of more than 100 residents who are mostly in their 80s. 至今已有超過30名嬰兒報名，他們被賦予提升逾百名居民興致的任務，這些居民大多超過80歲。Source article: https://features.ltn.com.tw/english/article/paper/1555385 Next Article Topic: What's behind strained China-Japan relations Japan and China on Thursday last week marked the 50th anniversary of the 1972 normalization of their ties, but there isn't much of a celebratory mood. Improved ties between Asia's two biggest economies are considered vital to the region's stability and prosperity, but they remain at odds over disputed East China Sea islands and China's growing military and economic assertiveness in the region. Here are the key issues in the often strained relations between these powerhouse neighbors: 日本和中國上週四慶祝一九七二年兩國關係正常化五十週年，但並沒有太多慶祝的氣氛。亞洲最大的兩個經濟體間關係之改善，咸認攸關亞洲的穩定與繁榮，但對於有領土爭端的東海島嶼，以及中國軍事和經濟上在該區域愈趨強勢，兩國的立場仍然分歧。這兩個鄰近的強國經常處於緊張的關係，以下是其中幾個關鍵問題： TERRITORIAL DISPUTES A huge source of contention is an uninhabited group of Tokyo-controlled, Beijing-claimed East China Sea islands called Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. Japan insists that the islands, which once hosted a Japanese seafood factory, are part of its territory, both historically and by international law. China says they were stolen by Japan in 1895 and should have been returned at the end of World War II. The disputed islands are surrounded by rich fishing grounds and undersea oil deposits, and Japan accuses China of suddenly making its territorial claims after the undersea resources were found in a 1969 United Nations report. The 1972 normalization communique did not deal with the issue, but the dispute intensified after Japan's government in 2012 nationalized the Senkaku islands, leading to violent protests across China. Chinese coast guard and fishing boats are regularly found in the area, routinely intruding on Japanese waters. 領土爭端 一個主要的爭論是東京所控制、北京聲稱擁有主權的東海無人島群，在日本稱為尖閣諸島，在中國稱為釣魚島。日本堅稱，日本曾在這些島嶼設有海產工廠，無論就歷史或國際法而言，這些島都是日本領土的一部分。中國說這些島是在一八九五年被日本偷走，日本應該在二戰結束時將其歸還。這些有爭端的島嶼，周圍環繞著富饒的漁場，海底石油儲量豐沛，日本指責中國是在一九六九年聯合國報告發現海底資源後才忽然提出領土主張。一九七二年的兩國關係正常化公報並未處理此問題，但日本政府二○一二年將尖閣諸島國有化後，爭端愈演愈烈，在中國各地引發了暴力抗議。中國海岸警衛隊及漁船常在此區域出現，經常侵犯日本水域。 FEAR OF TAIWAN EMERGENCY Japan, along with its security ally the US, has openly criticized increased Chinese activities in the South China Sea. Tokyo has also pushed for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. China claims Taiwan, a self-governing democracy, and has threatened to annex it by force if necessary. With a US-China trade war and naval tensions on the rise in the area, Japan is increasingly worried about Taiwan emergencies. China's increased joint military drills with Russia near Japanese coasts have also irked Japan. Tokyo is shifting its military posture toward southwestern Japan, including Okinawa and remote islands just east of Taiwan. China staged major military drills in areas surrounding Taiwan in August in an angry response to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's Taipei visit, and fired five ballistic missiles into waters near Okinawa. Fear of conflict over Taiwan adds to Japan's urgent efforts to reinforce its military capabilities and boost its budget. Japan is currently revising its national security strategy, which is expected to call for the possession of preemptive strike capabilities that opponents say would violate the country's pacifist constitution. With Japan's westernmost island just east of Taiwan, “It is increasingly difficult to see how a Taiwan military contingency would not affect at a minimum the waters and airspace around Japanese territory,” said Amanda Hsiao, senior analyst for China at the Crisis Group. 對台灣緊急狀況的恐懼 日本及其安全盟友美國公開批評中國在南海的活動增加。東京也推動了台灣海峽的和平及穩定。中國聲稱擁有台灣──一個自治的民主國家──的主權，並威脅在必要時以武力吞併台灣。隨著中美貿易戰及該地區海軍緊張局勢的加劇，日本越來越擔憂台灣出現緊急狀況。中國在日本沿海附近增加與俄國的聯合軍演也激怒了日本。東京正將其軍事布局轉向日本西南部，包括沖繩及台灣以東的偏遠島嶼。八月，中國在台灣周邊舉行大規模軍事演習，做為美國眾議院議長南希．裴洛西訪問台北的憤怒回應，並向沖繩附近海域發射了五枚彈道飛彈。對台灣衝突的恐懼讓日本更急迫地加強其軍事能力及增加預算。日本目前正在修訂國家安全戰略，預計將要求擁有先發制人的攻擊能力，反對者稱這將違反日本的和平憲法。日本最西端的島嶼就在台灣以東，因此「越來越難看出台灣的軍事意外事件如何不會對日本領土周遭的水域及空域造成一丁點影響」，國際危機組織中國問題高級分析師蕭嫣然表示。 WARTIME HISTORY The two countries were at war, starting with clashes in the 1930s, until Japan's defeat in 1945. Japanese atrocities during the Sino-Japanese war include the Rape of Nanking, the use of chemical and biological weapons and grisly human medical experiments in Manchuria, where Japan's imperial army had a secret biological weapons unit. Japan also took nearly 40,000 Chinese laborers to Japanese mines and factories, where many died of malnutrition and abuse. In the 1972 communique, China waived the right to war compensation, which some experts say was in exchange for Japan's apology and recognition of China as the only legal government. Japan, however, has provided official development aid totaling 3.6 trillion yen ($US25 billion) to China over the past four decades. 戰時歷史 從一九三○年代的衝突開始，直到一九四五年日本戰敗，中日兩國是處於戰爭狀態。中日戰爭期間日本的暴行包括南京大屠殺、使用化學及生物武器，以及在滿洲進行駭人的人體醫學實驗。日本帝國陸軍在滿洲有一個秘密的生物武器部隊。日本還將近四萬名中國勞工帶到日本的礦山及工廠，其中許多人死於營養不良和受虐。在一九七二年的公報中，中國放棄了獲得戰爭賠償的權利，一些專家稱這是為了換取日本的道歉及承認中共是唯一合法中國政府。然而，在過去四十年中，日本官方向中國提供了總計三點六兆日元（兩百五十億美元）的發展援助。 YASUKUNI SHRINE China considers Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine — which honors 2.5 million war dead, including convicted war criminals — as a symbol of Japan's wartime militarism. Beijing views visits by Japanese ministers and lawmakers to the Tokyo shrine as indicative of a lack of remorse over Japan's wartime aggression. China, along with South Korea, which Japan colonized from 1910 to 1945, routinely protests against such visits. 靖國神社 中國將東京的靖國神社——它供奉兩百五十萬名戰爭死難者，包括被定罪的戰犯——視為日本戰時軍國主義的象徵。北京認為，日本部長和議員參拜東京靖國神社表示對日本的戰時侵略缺乏悔意。中國以及日本在一九一○年至一九四五年期間所殖民的韓國經常抗議此類參訪。 ECONOMIC SECURITY As a top US ally and a major trade partner with China, Japan is in a delicate situation and must balance its position between the two superpowers. China has been more assertive about pressing other governments to embrace Chinese-led initiatives, including a trade group called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Japan, along with the US, is seeking ways to stand up to increasing Chinese economic influence in the region. Tokyo also wants to reinforce economic security with other democracies in areas such as supply chains and the protection of sensitive technologies, apparently as a counter to China. Yasuo Fukuda, a former Japanese prime minister who is an active proponent of better ties with China, says friction between Japan and China largely stems from US-China trade issues. “The question is whether global trade works better by excluding China,” he said. 經濟安全 作為美國的頂尖盟友和中國的主要貿易夥伴，日本處境微妙，必須平衡其在兩個超級大國之間的地位。中國在敦促其他政府接受中國主導的倡議方面更加自信，其中包括一個名為「區域全面經濟夥伴關係」的貿易組織。日本與美國一道，正想方設法抵禦中國在該地區日益增加的經濟影響力。東京還希望與其他民主國家在供應鍊和敏感技術保護等領域加強經濟安全，這顯然是為了對抗中國。 日本前首相福田康夫積極支持改善與中國的關係，他表示，日中之間的摩擦主要源於美中貿易問題。「問題是排除中國後全球貿易是否會更好」，他表示。Source article: https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/lang/archives/2022/10/04/2003786373 Next Article Topic: Japan's cats and dogs get wearable fans to beat scorching heat A Tokyo clothing maker has teamed up with veterinarians to create a wearable fan for pets, hoping to attract the anxious owners of dogs - or cats - that can't shed their fur coats in Japan's blistering summer weather. 一間東京製衣廠與獸醫組隊為寵物製造一款穿戴式風扇，希望能吸引焦慮不安的狗狗或貓咪飼主，因 為牠們無法在日本炎熱的夏季脫下毛皮大衣。 The device consists of a battery-operated, 80-gramme fan that is attached to a mesh outfit and blows air around an animal's body. 這款裝置由電池供電運作，80公克重的風扇附著在網格服裝上，在動物的身體周圍吹風。 Rei Uzawa, president of maternity clothing maker Sweet Mommy, was motivated to create it after seeing her own pet exhausted every time it was taken out for a walk in the scorching summer heat. 成衣製造商Sweet Mommy負責人鵜澤璃看見她自己的寵物每次在炎熱夏天高溫下的戶外散步之後筋疲力盡，因而有了製作這款衣服的動機。 After the rainy season in Tokyo ended in late June, the Japanese capital suffered the longest heatwave on record with temperatures up to 35 degrees Celsius for nine days. 東京雨季在6月底結束之後，日本首都迎來史上最久的熱浪，連續9天氣溫高達攝氏35度。 "I usually use dry ice packs. But I think it's easier to walk my dog if we have this fan," said Mami Kumamoto, 48, owner of a miniature poodle and a terrier. 飼養一隻迷你貴賓和一隻梗犬的48歲熊本麻美（譯音）說「我通常使用冰袋。但是我認為有了這款風扇，遛狗會比較輕鬆。」 Next Article Topic: World's oldest person dies in Japan aged 119 全球最年長人士在日本過世 享年119歲 A Japanese woman believed to have been the world's oldest person has died aged 119, public broadcaster NHK said on Monday, reporting the death of Kane Tanaka. 公共廣播機構「日本放送協會」週一報導田中加子的死訊說，據信是全球最年長者的一位日本女性以119歲過世。 Born on Jan. 2, 1903 - the year of the Wright Brothers' first controlled flight of their motor-driven airplane - Tanaka was confirmed by Guinness World Records in 2019 as the oldest living person. 田中生於1903年1月2日──萊特兄弟以他們的引擎驅動的飛機進行首次受控飛行的那年──在2019年獲金氏世界紀錄證實為還活著的最年老人士。 She died of old age at a hospital in Fukuoka city, western Japan, on April 19, NHK said. During her life, she had been partial to chocolate and fizzy drinks, NHK said. 日本放送協會說，她於4月19日在日本西部福岡市一家醫院因年邁過世。她這輩子特別喜歡巧克力和氣泡飲料。 Japan has a dwindling and rapidly ageing population. As of last September, the country had 86,510 centenarians, and nine out of every 10 were women. （Reuters） 日本人口不斷減少並快速老化。截至去年9月，該國有8萬6510名人瑞，而且每10人中有9人是女性。Source article: https://features.ltn.com.tw/english/article/paper/1538125 ; https://features.ltn.com.tw/english/article/paper/1514547

In Japan, Yasukuni Shrine is home to many WWII soldiers considered war criminals by many people in the world. You could say they have found peace in death. But what about the living soldiers who fought alongside those interred at Yasukuni? How do they forget the horrors of war? Are they allowed to forget?C.S. Fuqua's books include Fatherhood ~ Poems of Parenthood, Walking After Midnight ~ Collected Stories, Big Daddy's Fast-Past Gadget, Native American Flute ~ A Comprehensive Guide, and White Trash & Southern ~ Collected Poems. His work has appeared in publications such as Year's Best Horror Stories XIX, XX and XXI, Pudding, The Horror Show, Pearl, Chiron Review, Christian Science Monitor, The Old Farmer's Almanac, The Writer, and Honolulu Magazine.You can read "Contrition" at https://www.kaidankaistories.com.Website: kaidankaistories.comFollow us on: Twitter/XInstagramFacebook

The Japanese government estimates the visitors between January and June exceeded 10 million, 21-times the number from the year before. This rebound saw international travelers return to Haneda Airport's Terminal 2 on Wednesday, following its three-year closure due to the pandemic. Meanwhile, Japan's prestigious Akutagawa Prize for Literature has been awarded for the very first time to a disabled author with Saou Ichikawa picking up the top prize. Across town and one of the largest festivals of the year took place at Yasukuni Jinja (Shrine) opposite Kitanomaru Koen, a national park also home to many of museums. Yasukuni and park are a short walk from the Imperial Palace which also descends into darkness as night falls while an exhibition by the New York based artist Tyler Cobern across town at Fig. in Otsuka centers around ideas of actual and spiritual darkness. Notebook visits Yasukuni late one afternoon and listens to the sound of summer and the few people there soaking up the sun. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

A parade of yamahoko floats passed through Kyoto on Monday during the city's annual Gion Festival, held in all its glory for the first time in almost four years. Meanwhile, a man died after being run over by a dashi float on Saturday at the Hakata Gion Yamakasa summer festival being held in the city of Fukuoka, southwest Japan. Temperatures over the weekend soared, reaching almost 35 degrees Celsius in more than 150 different parts of Japan, with temperatures in one city reaching almost 40. And Saturday marked the 40th anniversary of the iconic Family Computer or Famicom, produced by Japanese video game maker Nintendo. With last weekend widely acknowledged to be the start of summer, with Gion matsuri in Kyoto, Matama matsuri at Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine and others this July, Notebook caught one bon odori dance and the sound of Japanese fencing, also known as kendo.  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Japanese activists are calling for the return of Chinese cultural relics looted by Japan during the country's wars in China, as a civil group advocating the restoration underlines that returning these relics is the responsible thing to do.日本相关人士要求日本政府主动归还在侵华战争期间掠夺的中国文物，倡导归还文物的日本民间团体强调，归还这些文物才是负责任的做法。Kazuo Morimoto, representative of the association for promoting the return of Chinese cultural properties, said that recent years have witnessed France and other European countries returning looted cultural relics to their former colonial countries in Africa and Asia.“中国文物返还运动推进会”的代表森本和男表示，近年来，法国和其他欧洲国家正向非洲、亚洲前殖民地国家归还掠夺文物。"There has been a wave of returning looted cultural relics around the world, but this momentum is still weak in Japan," Morimoto told the Global Times on Sunday, stressing that Japan has barely mentioned its wartime looting and destruction of cultural relics.4月23日，森本和男向《环球时报》表示：“世界上出现归还掠夺文物的风潮，但这股势头在日本仍然很弱。”森本还强调，日本几乎没有提及其战时掠夺、破坏文物的行为。"The Japanese government concealed this disgraceful history from the people after World War II so many people in Japanese society do not know about it. As a Japanese, I'm ashamed of that."“在二战后，日本政府向日本人民隐瞒了这段不光彩的历史，以至于日本社会很多人对此一无所知。作为一个日本人，我对此感到很羞愧。”The association held a rally on Saturday in Tokyo, urging the Japanese government to return Chinese cultural relics plundered during the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) and the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (1931-45).4月22日，“中国文物返还运动推进会”在东京组织集会，要求日本政府主动归还甲午战争、日俄战争、日本全面侵华战争期间掠夺至日本的中国文物。The civil group was founded to encourage Japan to return Chinese cultural relics, achieve "historical reconciliation" between the two countries, and further promote the development of bilateral relations.“中国文物返还运动推进会”的成立是为了促进日本归还中国文物，实现中日“历史和解”，并进一步促进中日双边关系的发展。The civil group initially called for the return of three Chinese stone lions that were looted from the Sanxue Temple in Haicheng, Northeast China's Liaoning province. Two of these lions are now located outside the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo and the other is in the Yamagata Aritomo Memorial Museum in the Tochigi prefecture.“中国文物返还运动推进会”最初要求归还从中国辽宁省海城市三学寺掠夺的三尊中国石狮子。其中两尊石狮子现在位于东京的靖国神社外，另一尊位于栃木县的山县有朋纪念馆。Atsushi Koketsu, emeritus professor at Yamaguchi University of Japan and also co-representative of the association, told the Global Times that it had held talks with the Yasukuni Shrine, which stated: "It is necessary to re-investigate what happened at that time."“中国文物返还运动推进会”联合代表、日本山口大学名誉教授纐缬厚在集会上表示，推进会已与靖国神社举行会谈，对方表示：“有必要重新调查当时发生的事。”The civil groups also sent two petitions to the museum, but they were unanswered, Koketsu told the Global Times.纐缬厚向《环球时报》表示，“中国文物返还运动推进会”曾两次向山县有朋纪念馆送去有关返还文物的请愿书，但均未收到回复。The organization has also called for the return of the Tang Dynasty (618-907) Honglujing Stele, which was looted from Lüshun in Liaoning and is now located in the Imperial Palace in Tokyo.“中国文物返还运动推进会”还呼吁归还从辽宁旅顺掠夺的唐鸿胪井刻石，该碑现在位于东京的日本皇宫。However, the Imperial Household Agency of Japan which oversees matters concerning the Japanese imperial family was not forthcoming when reached by the association concerning the return of the stele.然而，当“中国文物返还运动推进会”就归还鸿胪井刻石一事与负责管理日本皇室事务的日本宫内厅交涉时，对方并没有主动提供帮助。There is good news as well. Koketsu said that some members of the Japanese Parliament have expressed their support and are willing to help mediate the issue.还有一个好消息。纐缬厚表示，日本国会部分议员已表示支持，愿意帮忙沟通斡旋。"We will continue to hold rallies and seminars this year to raise awareness among more Japanese people and urge the Japanese government to return Chinese cultural relics looted by Japan as soon as possible," he said. "We have this determination."纐缬厚说：“我们今年将继续举行集会和研讨会，唤起更多日本人的关注，敦促日本政府尽早归还被日本掠夺的中国文物。我们有这样的决心。”Morimoto told the Global Times that these issues should have been resolved in the last century and not have been left to the next generation, adding that Japanese society needs to face history.森本和男向《环球时报》表示，这些问题原本应该在上个世纪被解决，但却被拖到了现在，绝不能再留给下一代，他还补充道，日本社会需要正视历史。He also said that calling for the Japanese government to return looted Chinese cultural relics is not just a responsibility but something that must be done.森本和男还表示，敦促政府早日归还中国文物是日本人的责任，这是必须要做的事情。Relic英/ˈrelɪk/ 美/ˈrelɪk/n.遗物，遗迹Loot英/luːt/ 美/luːt/v.（尤指在战争或暴乱中）抢劫，掠夺

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida made a ritual 'masakaki' tree offering at Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine on Friday, much to the irritation of China and South Korea which see the shrine as a symbol of Japan's militaristic past. Tottori Prefectural Government is planning to prohibit the use of AI chatbot ChatGPT while Russian authorities have banned an former residents of the disputed Northern Territories campaigning for Japanese sovereignty. The animated film “The First Slam Dunk” has smashed box offices in mainland China, and as polling boxes close in nationwide local elections, we wander the streets of Tokyo and listen as politicians & neighbouring street singers compete for attention. — Substack: notebookpodcast.substack.com Instagram: @notebook_pod Twitter: @notebook_pod — Get in touch: notebook.podcast@gmail.com Leave a message: speakpipe.com/notebook — Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

歡迎留言告訴我們你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/cl81kivnk00dn01wffhwxdg2s/comments Topic: Covid-Inspired ‘Silent Cut Haircutting Service Gains Popularity in Japan Devised by a Tokyo hair salon during the Covid-19 pandemic to prevent the spread of the coronavirus, the ‘Silent Cut' service is becoming increasingly popular in Japan. 在武漢肺炎（Covid-19）疫情期間，日本東京一家髮廊為防止病毒傳播而推出「無聲剪髮」服務，在日本愈來愈受歡迎。 As a way of curbing the spread of the coronavirus during the Covid-19 pandemic, authorities in Japan started promoting “no conversation” or “less conversation” policies in schools, shops and supermarkets. One Tokyo salon decided to implement the ‘silent cut' service and it proved so popular that others quickly followed suit. 做為在Covid-19大流行期間遏制冠狀病毒傳播的一種方式，日本當局開始提倡在學校、商店和超市「不交談」或「少交談」。東京一家髮廊決定實施「無聲剪髮」服務。事實證明，這項服務非常受歡迎，其他髮廊也紛紛跟進。 As it turns out, hairstylists prefer the silent cut as well, with many claiming that they were taught to chat up clients in their apprenticeship. 事實證明，髮型師也更喜歡無聲剪髮，許多髮型師表示，他們在學徒期間需要學習如何與客人搭訕。 Next Article Topic: We're hiring: Babies wanted for Japan nursing home 我們正在招聘：日本療養院需要嬰兒 A nursing home in southern Japan is “hiring” babies for a very important job — to keep its elderly residents company and make them smile. 日本南部一間療養院正在招聘嬰兒，擔任非常重要的職位──陪伴年長居民、讓他們開心。 A job advert pinned to the wall informs would-be workers they will be compensated for their services in diapers and powdered milk. 一個釘在牆上的工作廣告告知未來的員工，他們將會收到尿布和配方奶做為服務報酬。 New recruits at the facility in Kitakyushu must be under four years old, and their guardians have to sign a contract stipulating that the babies and toddlers can show up for work “whenever they feel like it.” 這間北九州機構的新成員必須小於4歲，而且他們的監護人必須簽署一份合約，明文規定嬰兒和學步幼童可以依照他們的意願，想上班的時候再出現。 More than 30 babies have been signed up so far, tasked with lifting the spirits of more than 100 residents who are mostly in their 80s. 至今已有超過30名嬰兒報名，他們被賦予提升逾百名居民興致的任務，這些居民大多超過80歲。Source article: https://features.ltn.com.tw/english/article/paper/1555385 Next Article Topic: What's behind strained China-Japan relations Japan and China on Thursday last week marked the 50th anniversary of the 1972 normalization of their ties, but there isn't much of a celebratory mood. Improved ties between Asia's two biggest economies are considered vital to the region's stability and prosperity, but they remain at odds over disputed East China Sea islands and China's growing military and economic assertiveness in the region. Here are the key issues in the often strained relations between these powerhouse neighbors: 日本和中國上週四慶祝一九七二年兩國關係正常化五十週年，但並沒有太多慶祝的氣氛。亞洲最大的兩個經濟體間關係之改善，咸認攸關亞洲的穩定與繁榮，但對於有領土爭端的東海島嶼，以及中國軍事和經濟上在該區域愈趨強勢，兩國的立場仍然分歧。這兩個鄰近的強國經常處於緊張的關係，以下是其中幾個關鍵問題： TERRITORIAL DISPUTES A huge source of contention is an uninhabited group of Tokyo-controlled, Beijing-claimed East China Sea islands called Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. Japan insists that the islands, which once hosted a Japanese seafood factory, are part of its territory, both historically and by international law. China says they were stolen by Japan in 1895 and should have been returned at the end of World War II. The disputed islands are surrounded by rich fishing grounds and undersea oil deposits, and Japan accuses China of suddenly making its territorial claims after the undersea resources were found in a 1969 United Nations report. The 1972 normalization communique did not deal with the issue, but the dispute intensified after Japan's government in 2012 nationalized the Senkaku islands, leading to violent protests across China. Chinese coast guard and fishing boats are regularly found in the area, routinely intruding on Japanese waters. 領土爭端 一個主要的爭論是東京所控制、北京聲稱擁有主權的東海無人島群，在日本稱為尖閣諸島，在中國稱為釣魚島。日本堅稱，日本曾在這些島嶼設有海產工廠，無論就歷史或國際法而言，這些島都是日本領土的一部分。中國說這些島是在一八九五年被日本偷走，日本應該在二戰結束時將其歸還。這些有爭端的島嶼，周圍環繞著富饒的漁場，海底石油儲量豐沛，日本指責中國是在一九六九年聯合國報告發現海底資源後才忽然提出領土主張。一九七二年的兩國關係正常化公報並未處理此問題，但日本政府二○一二年將尖閣諸島國有化後，爭端愈演愈烈，在中國各地引發了暴力抗議。中國海岸警衛隊及漁船常在此區域出現，經常侵犯日本水域。 FEAR OF TAIWAN EMERGENCY Japan, along with its security ally the US, has openly criticized increased Chinese activities in the South China Sea. Tokyo has also pushed for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. China claims Taiwan, a self-governing democracy, and has threatened to annex it by force if necessary. With a US-China trade war and naval tensions on the rise in the area, Japan is increasingly worried about Taiwan emergencies. China's increased joint military drills with Russia near Japanese coasts have also irked Japan. Tokyo is shifting its military posture toward southwestern Japan, including Okinawa and remote islands just east of Taiwan. China staged major military drills in areas surrounding Taiwan in August in an angry response to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's Taipei visit, and fired five ballistic missiles into waters near Okinawa. Fear of conflict over Taiwan adds to Japan's urgent efforts to reinforce its military capabilities and boost its budget. Japan is currently revising its national security strategy, which is expected to call for the possession of preemptive strike capabilities that opponents say would violate the country's pacifist constitution. With Japan's westernmost island just east of Taiwan, “It is increasingly difficult to see how a Taiwan military contingency would not affect at a minimum the waters and airspace around Japanese territory,” said Amanda Hsiao, senior analyst for China at the Crisis Group. 對台灣緊急狀況的恐懼 日本及其安全盟友美國公開批評中國在南海的活動增加。東京也推動了台灣海峽的和平及穩定。中國聲稱擁有台灣──一個自治的民主國家──的主權，並威脅在必要時以武力吞併台灣。隨著中美貿易戰及該地區海軍緊張局勢的加劇，日本越來越擔憂台灣出現緊急狀況。中國在日本沿海附近增加與俄國的聯合軍演也激怒了日本。東京正將其軍事布局轉向日本西南部，包括沖繩及台灣以東的偏遠島嶼。八月，中國在台灣周邊舉行大規模軍事演習，做為美國眾議院議長南希．裴洛西訪問台北的憤怒回應，並向沖繩附近海域發射了五枚彈道飛彈。對台灣衝突的恐懼讓日本更急迫地加強其軍事能力及增加預算。日本目前正在修訂國家安全戰略，預計將要求擁有先發制人的攻擊能力，反對者稱這將違反日本的和平憲法。日本最西端的島嶼就在台灣以東，因此「越來越難看出台灣的軍事意外事件如何不會對日本領土周遭的水域及空域造成一丁點影響」，國際危機組織中國問題高級分析師蕭嫣然表示。 WARTIME HISTORY The two countries were at war, starting with clashes in the 1930s, until Japan's defeat in 1945. Japanese atrocities during the Sino-Japanese war include the Rape of Nanking, the use of chemical and biological weapons and grisly human medical experiments in Manchuria, where Japan's imperial army had a secret biological weapons unit. Japan also took nearly 40,000 Chinese laborers to Japanese mines and factories, where many died of malnutrition and abuse. In the 1972 communique, China waived the right to war compensation, which some experts say was in exchange for Japan's apology and recognition of China as the only legal government. Japan, however, has provided official development aid totaling 3.6 trillion yen ($US25 billion) to China over the past four decades. 戰時歷史 從一九三○年代的衝突開始，直到一九四五年日本戰敗，中日兩國是處於戰爭狀態。中日戰爭期間日本的暴行包括南京大屠殺、使用化學及生物武器，以及在滿洲進行駭人的人體醫學實驗。日本帝國陸軍在滿洲有一個秘密的生物武器部隊。日本還將近四萬名中國勞工帶到日本的礦山及工廠，其中許多人死於營養不良和受虐。在一九七二年的公報中，中國放棄了獲得戰爭賠償的權利，一些專家稱這是為了換取日本的道歉及承認中共是唯一合法中國政府。然而，在過去四十年中，日本官方向中國提供了總計三點六兆日元（兩百五十億美元）的發展援助。 YASUKUNI SHRINE China considers Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine — which honors 2.5 million war dead, including convicted war criminals — as a symbol of Japan's wartime militarism. Beijing views visits by Japanese ministers and lawmakers to the Tokyo shrine as indicative of a lack of remorse over Japan's wartime aggression. China, along with South Korea, which Japan colonized from 1910 to 1945, routinely protests against such visits. 靖國神社 中國將東京的靖國神社——它供奉兩百五十萬名戰爭死難者，包括被定罪的戰犯——視為日本戰時軍國主義的象徵。北京認為，日本部長和議員參拜東京靖國神社表示對日本的戰時侵略缺乏悔意。中國以及日本在一九一○年至一九四五年期間所殖民的韓國經常抗議此類參訪。 ECONOMIC SECURITY As a top US ally and a major trade partner with China, Japan is in a delicate situation and must balance its position between the two superpowers. China has been more assertive about pressing other governments to embrace Chinese-led initiatives, including a trade group called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Japan, along with the US, is seeking ways to stand up to increasing Chinese economic influence in the region. Tokyo also wants to reinforce economic security with other democracies in areas such as supply chains and the protection of sensitive technologies, apparently as a counter to China. Yasuo Fukuda, a former Japanese prime minister who is an active proponent of better ties with China, says friction between Japan and China largely stems from US-China trade issues. “The question is whether global trade works better by excluding China,” he said. 經濟安全 作為美國的頂尖盟友和中國的主要貿易夥伴，日本處境微妙，必須平衡其在兩個超級大國之間的地位。中國在敦促其他政府接受中國主導的倡議方面更加自信，其中包括一個名為「區域全面經濟夥伴關係」的貿易組織。日本與美國一道，正想方設法抵禦中國在該地區日益增加的經濟影響力。東京還希望與其他民主國家在供應鍊和敏感技術保護等領域加強經濟安全，這顯然是為了對抗中國。 日本前首相福田康夫積極支持改善與中國的關係，他表示，日中之間的摩擦主要源於美中貿易問題。「問題是排除中國後全球貿易是否會更好」，他表示。Source article: https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/lang/archives/2022/10/04/2003786373 Next Article Topic: Japan's cats and dogs get wearable fans to beat scorching heat A Tokyo clothing maker has teamed up with veterinarians to create a wearable fan for pets, hoping to attract the anxious owners of dogs - or cats - that can't shed their fur coats in Japan's blistering summer weather. 一間東京製衣廠與獸醫組隊為寵物製造一款穿戴式風扇，希望能吸引焦慮不安的狗狗或貓咪飼主，因 為牠們無法在日本炎熱的夏季脫下毛皮大衣。 The device consists of a battery-operated, 80-gramme fan that is attached to a mesh outfit and blows air around an animal's body. 這款裝置由電池供電運作，80公克重的風扇附著在網格服裝上，在動物的身體周圍吹風。 Rei Uzawa, president of maternity clothing maker Sweet Mommy, was motivated to create it after seeing her own pet exhausted every time it was taken out for a walk in the scorching summer heat. 成衣製造商Sweet Mommy負責人鵜澤璃看見她自己的寵物每次在炎熱夏天高溫下的戶外散步之後筋疲力盡，因而有了製作這款衣服的動機。 After the rainy season in Tokyo ended in late June, the Japanese capital suffered the longest heatwave on record with temperatures up to 35 degrees Celsius for nine days. 東京雨季在6月底結束之後，日本首都迎來史上最久的熱浪，連續9天氣溫高達攝氏35度。 "I usually use dry ice packs. But I think it's easier to walk my dog if we have this fan," said Mami Kumamoto, 48, owner of a miniature poodle and a terrier. 飼養一隻迷你貴賓和一隻梗犬的48歲熊本麻美（譯音）說「我通常使用冰袋。但是我認為有了這款風扇，遛狗會比較輕鬆。」 Next Article Topic: World's oldest person dies in Japan aged 119 全球最年長人士在日本過世 享年119歲 A Japanese woman believed to have been the world's oldest person has died aged 119, public broadcaster NHK said on Monday, reporting the death of Kane Tanaka. 公共廣播機構「日本放送協會」週一報導田中加子的死訊說，據信是全球最年長者的一位日本女性以119歲過世。 Born on Jan. 2, 1903 - the year of the Wright Brothers' first controlled flight of their motor-driven airplane - Tanaka was confirmed by Guinness World Records in 2019 as the oldest living person. 田中生於1903年1月2日──萊特兄弟以他們的引擎驅動的飛機進行首次受控飛行的那年──在2019年獲金氏世界紀錄證實為還活著的最年老人士。 She died of old age at a hospital in Fukuoka city, western Japan, on April 19, NHK said. During her life, she had been partial to chocolate and fizzy drinks, NHK said. 日本放送協會說，她於4月19日在日本西部福岡市一家醫院因年邁過世。她這輩子特別喜歡巧克力和氣泡飲料。 Japan has a dwindling and rapidly ageing population. As of last September, the country had 86,510 centenarians, and nine out of every 10 were women. （Reuters） 日本人口不斷減少並快速老化。截至去年9月，該國有8萬6510名人瑞，而且每10人中有9人是女性。Source article: https://features.ltn.com.tw/english/article/paper/1538125 ; https://features.ltn.com.tw/english/article/paper/1514547 Powered by Firstory Hosting

Oliver is joined by Daniel Milne, Senior Lecturer at Kyoto University's Institute for Liberal Arts and Sciences (ILAS), to discuss what happens when we memorialise past conflicts through the Kyoto Buddhist temple Ryōzen Kannon. Daniel and I explore how the meaning of monuments to war dead change over time, and compare Ryōzen Kannon's approach with that of the national war memorial site of Yasukuni Shrine. Read Daniel's article with David Moreton, 'Remembering and Forgetting the War Dead at Ryōzen Kannon: A Site of Entangled and Transnational War Memories'. IMAGE AND AUDIO CREDITS Intro-outro music: jasonszklarek / MotionElements.com [L] The enormous Ryōzen Kannon Bodhisattva statue that gives the temple its namesake. Photograph by Oliver Moxham, 2018. [R] Stained glass window from within the Memorial Hall for the Unknown Soldier of WWII at Ryōzen Kannon. Photograph by Oliver Moxham, 2018. Copyright © 2023 Oliver Moxham, ℗ 2023 Oliver Moxham. May be freely distributed for education purposes. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/beyond-japan/message

歡迎留言告訴我們你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/cl81kivnk00dn01wffhwxdg2s/comments 每日英語跟讀 Ep.K457: What's behind strained China-Japan relations Japan and China on Thursday last week marked the 50th anniversary of the 1972 normalization of their ties, but there isn't much of a celebratory mood. Improved ties between Asia's two biggest economies are considered vital to the region's stability and prosperity, but they remain at odds over disputed East China Sea islands and China's growing military and economic assertiveness in the region. Here are the key issues in the often strained relations between these powerhouse neighbors: 日本和中國上週四慶祝一九七二年兩國關係正常化五十週年，但並沒有太多慶祝的氣氛。亞洲最大的兩個經濟體間關係之改善，咸認攸關亞洲的穩定與繁榮，但對於有領土爭端的東海島嶼，以及中國軍事和經濟上在該區域愈趨強勢，兩國的立場仍然分歧。這兩個鄰近的強國經常處於緊張的關係，以下是其中幾個關鍵問題： TERRITORIAL DISPUTES A huge source of contention is an uninhabited group of Tokyo-controlled, Beijing-claimed East China Sea islands called Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. Japan insists that the islands, which once hosted a Japanese seafood factory, are part of its territory, both historically and by international law. China says they were stolen by Japan in 1895 and should have been returned at the end of World War II. The disputed islands are surrounded by rich fishing grounds and undersea oil deposits, and Japan accuses China of suddenly making its territorial claims after the undersea resources were found in a 1969 United Nations report. The 1972 normalization communique did not deal with the issue, but the dispute intensified after Japan's government in 2012 nationalized the Senkaku islands, leading to violent protests across China. Chinese coast guard and fishing boats are regularly found in the area, routinely intruding on Japanese waters. 領土爭端 一個主要的爭論是東京所控制、北京聲稱擁有主權的東海無人島群，在日本稱為尖閣諸島，在中國稱為釣魚島。日本堅稱，日本曾在這些島嶼設有海產工廠，無論就歷史或國際法而言，這些島都是日本領土的一部分。中國說這些島是在一八九五年被日本偷走，日本應該在二戰結束時將其歸還。這些有爭端的島嶼，周圍環繞著富饒的漁場，海底石油儲量豐沛，日本指責中國是在一九六九年聯合國報告發現海底資源後才忽然提出領土主張。一九七二年的兩國關係正常化公報並未處理此問題，但日本政府二○一二年將尖閣諸島國有化後，爭端愈演愈烈，在中國各地引發了暴力抗議。中國海岸警衛隊及漁船常在此區域出現，經常侵犯日本水域。 FEAR OF TAIWAN EMERGENCY Japan, along with its security ally the US, has openly criticized increased Chinese activities in the South China Sea. Tokyo has also pushed for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. China claims Taiwan, a self-governing democracy, and has threatened to annex it by force if necessary. With a US-China trade war and naval tensions on the rise in the area, Japan is increasingly worried about Taiwan emergencies. China's increased joint military drills with Russia near Japanese coasts have also irked Japan. Tokyo is shifting its military posture toward southwestern Japan, including Okinawa and remote islands just east of Taiwan. China staged major military drills in areas surrounding Taiwan in August in an angry response to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's Taipei visit, and fired five ballistic missiles into waters near Okinawa. Fear of conflict over Taiwan adds to Japan's urgent efforts to reinforce its military capabilities and boost its budget. Japan is currently revising its national security strategy, which is expected to call for the possession of preemptive strike capabilities that opponents say would violate the country's pacifist constitution. With Japan's westernmost island just east of Taiwan, “It is increasingly difficult to see how a Taiwan military contingency would not affect at a minimum the waters and airspace around Japanese territory,” said Amanda Hsiao, senior analyst for China at the Crisis Group. 對台灣緊急狀況的恐懼 日本及其安全盟友美國公開批評中國在南海的活動增加。東京也推動了台灣海峽的和平及穩定。中國聲稱擁有台灣──一個自治的民主國家──的主權，並威脅在必要時以武力吞併台灣。隨著中美貿易戰及該地區海軍緊張局勢的加劇，日本越來越擔憂台灣出現緊急狀況。中國在日本沿海附近增加與俄國的聯合軍演也激怒了日本。東京正將其軍事布局轉向日本西南部，包括沖繩及台灣以東的偏遠島嶼。八月，中國在台灣周邊舉行大規模軍事演習，做為美國眾議院議長南希．裴洛西訪問台北的憤怒回應，並向沖繩附近海域發射了五枚彈道飛彈。對台灣衝突的恐懼讓日本更急迫地加強其軍事能力及增加預算。日本目前正在修訂國家安全戰略，預計將要求擁有先發制人的攻擊能力，反對者稱這將違反日本的和平憲法。日本最西端的島嶼就在台灣以東，因此「越來越難看出台灣的軍事意外事件如何不會對日本領土周遭的水域及空域造成一丁點影響」，國際危機組織中國問題高級分析師蕭嫣然表示。 WARTIME HISTORY The two countries were at war, starting with clashes in the 1930s, until Japan's defeat in 1945. Japanese atrocities during the Sino-Japanese war include the Rape of Nanking, the use of chemical and biological weapons and grisly human medical experiments in Manchuria, where Japan's imperial army had a secret biological weapons unit. Japan also took nearly 40,000 Chinese laborers to Japanese mines and factories, where many died of malnutrition and abuse. In the 1972 communique, China waived the right to war compensation, which some experts say was in exchange for Japan's apology and recognition of China as the only legal government. Japan, however, has provided official development aid totaling 3.6 trillion yen ($US25 billion) to China over the past four decades. 戰時歷史 從一九三○年代的衝突開始，直到一九四五年日本戰敗，中日兩國是處於戰爭狀態。中日戰爭期間日本的暴行包括南京大屠殺、使用化學及生物武器，以及在滿洲進行駭人的人體醫學實驗。日本帝國陸軍在滿洲有一個秘密的生物武器部隊。日本還將近四萬名中國勞工帶到日本的礦山及工廠，其中許多人死於營養不良和受虐。在一九七二年的公報中，中國放棄了獲得戰爭賠償的權利，一些專家稱這是為了換取日本的道歉及承認中共是唯一合法中國政府。然而，在過去四十年中，日本官方向中國提供了總計三點六兆日元（兩百五十億美元）的發展援助。 YASUKUNI SHRINE China considers Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine — which honors 2.5 million war dead, including convicted war criminals — as a symbol of Japan's wartime militarism. Beijing views visits by Japanese ministers and lawmakers to the Tokyo shrine as indicative of a lack of remorse over Japan's wartime aggression. China, along with South Korea, which Japan colonized from 1910 to 1945, routinely protests against such visits. 靖國神社 中國將東京的靖國神社——它供奉兩百五十萬名戰爭死難者，包括被定罪的戰犯——視為日本戰時軍國主義的象徵。北京認為，日本部長和議員參拜東京靖國神社表示對日本的戰時侵略缺乏悔意。中國以及日本在一九一○年至一九四五年期間所殖民的韓國經常抗議此類參訪。 ECONOMIC SECURITY As a top US ally and a major trade partner with China, Japan is in a delicate situation and must balance its position between the two superpowers. China has been more assertive about pressing other governments to embrace Chinese-led initiatives, including a trade group called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Japan, along with the US, is seeking ways to stand up to increasing Chinese economic influence in the region. Tokyo also wants to reinforce economic security with other democracies in areas such as supply chains and the protection of sensitive technologies, apparently as a counter to China. Yasuo Fukuda, a former Japanese prime minister who is an active proponent of better ties with China, says friction between Japan and China largely stems from US-China trade issues. “The question is whether global trade works better by excluding China,” he said. 經濟安全 作為美國的頂尖盟友和中國的主要貿易夥伴，日本處境微妙，必須平衡其在兩個超級大國之間的地位。中國在敦促其他政府接受中國主導的倡議方面更加自信，其中包括一個名為「區域全面經濟夥伴關係」的貿易組織。日本與美國一道，正想方設法抵禦中國在該地區日益增加的經濟影響力。東京還希望與其他民主國家在供應鍊和敏感技術保護等領域加強經濟安全，這顯然是為了對抗中國。 日本前首相福田康夫積極支持改善與中國的關係，他表示，日中之間的摩擦主要源於美中貿易問題。「問題是排除中國後全球貿易是否會更好」，他表示。Source article: https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/lang/archives/2022/10/04/2003786373 Powered by Firstory Hosting

Chinese envoy Yue Xiaoyong says Afghanistan is in urgent need of its foreign reserves to rebuild the country (1:03). The Chinese Embassy in Japan says it has lodged serious representation after Japanese officials sent offerings to the Yasukuni Shrine (10:30). Quanzhou's cuisine embodies strong Chinese traditions with influences from other cultures (22:55).

China has expressed opposition to a Japanese official's visit to the Yasukuni shrine for war dead in Tokyo.

A version of this essay was published by firstpost.com at https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/requiem-for-a-japanese-statesman-who-loved-india-abe-shinzo-10896211.htmlAbe Shinzo will be remembered as Asia’s greatest 21st century statesman. He recognized early that the Indo-Pacific will (re)occupy center stage as it did throughout most of history, barring a brief Atlanticist interregnum. And then he did something about it, by proposing the Quad and the “free and open Indo-Pacific”. He realized that China would revert to imperialism, and would have to be contained.Abe-san understood that America would withdraw into its comfort zone (“Fortress America”) as its economic and military dominance diminished. It was up to Asians to defend themselves, and not depend on cross-Pacific partnerships. This may have driven his nationalist sentiments. Japan, with its proud history, could not forever be anybody’s junior partner. It would have to assert itself, and it could no longer be hobbled by the pacifist Article 9 imposed by the US, that prevented it from arming itself. All of this has come to pass, more or less. After Obama’s content-free “pivot to Asia”, Biden’s obsessions with Russia, Ukraine and AUKUS, and China’s consistent saber-rattling along its entire periphery, it is evident that the old “liberal, rules-based international order” with its Euro-American bias can no longer protect Asia’s democracies. A muscular Quad, or even an ‘Asian NATO’ is necessary.This is critical for India’s very survival, and Abe helped turn around Japan’s official attitude towards India. Even his grandfather, former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, had been positive towards India, but Abe-san turned out to be a true friend. Under him, relations bloomed; and from a stance of anger at India’s Pokhran blasts, Japan has now become India’s most, and in fact only, trusted partner. This endeared Japan’s longest-serving PM, Abe-san, to many Indians. He believed in India, and it showed. So much so that some of us are in personal mourning. India has lost its best friend, and in a world where it has no friends, that is a tremendous loss: even after he resigned the PM position on health grounds, Abe-san continued to generate goodwill for Indo-Japanese partnerships. The last time the death of a foreign leader affected Indians so much was when John F Kennedy was assassinated in 1963.Prime Minister Modi put it well in a personal note, “My friend, Abe-san” https://www.narendramodi.in/my-friend-abe-san-563044. He also declared a day of national mourning. Among his greatest gifts to us and his most enduring legacy, and one for which the world will always be indebted, is his foresight in recognizing the changing tides and gathering storm of our time and his leadership in responding to it. Long before others, he, in his seminal speech to the Indian Parliament in 2007, laid the ground for the emergence of the Indo-Pacific region as a contemporary political, strategic and economic reality - a region that will also shape the world in this century.There is a starkly different, and possibly grossly unfair, characterization of Abe-san in the US media, as some kind of ultra-nationalist. The left-leaning NPR was positively churlish. But then this goes back to the Manichean/Abrahamic “with us or against us” dualism put about by US sources. They portray Japan as being particularly wicked, with Pearl Harbor as Original Sin, and the “Yellow Peril” as being particularly dangerous, deserving of the ultimate horror of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.Remarkably enough, this was along the same lines as the vitriol from China.I can understand China being extraordinarily mean. That’s just par for the course. But an American outlet saying this is a little surprising, that too a public-sector, publicly-funded, non-commercial entity. Are there wheels within wheels?But wait, here’s more:Growing up in India, I too was subject to this negative barrage, but I had the advantage of reading Malayalam translations of Tanizaki, Kawabata and Lady Murasaki in my teenage days. I understood Japan as a unique but Dharmic civilization with integrity and codes of honor. Later, I read about Subhas Bose’s perspective on imperial Japan, and its support for the Indian National Army. Many years later, I went to Nair-san’s Indian restaurant on the Ginza in Tokyo: he had been Rash Behari Bose’s interpreter. The dichotomy of reactions persists. The Western-Chinese narrative against Japan was one of convenience; on the one hand, the Chinese realized that they just needed to shout “Rape of Nanjing”, and the Japanese would give them money to shut them up. On the other hand, the famous “liberal rules-based international order” (see my deconstruction thereof at ) consistently tried to keep Japan down as a low-caste vassal even when it was the world’s second largest economy.There was an enormous fuss about the fact that Abe-san visited the Yasukuni Shrine, the memorial to Japan’s war dead. I could never quite understand this. Every country is entitled to remember its warriors, and most do, with gratitude. Why is it that Japan, alone, was prohibited from doing so? In 2019, I visited the shrine myself. It is a stately, mournful, quiet place of introspection. It has a magnificent torii, a museum, and a shrine. It is pure gaslighting to claim this place is somehow loathsome.And it has a memorial to Justice Radhabinod Pal, the Indian jurist who was part of the War Crimes Tribunal post World War II. He was the only dissenting voice in what he more or less said was a kangaroo court. Its intention, from the victors’ point of view, was to extract revenge rather than to arrive at the truth about the war. If some Japanese military men were deemed war criminals, were William Calley of My Lai and Henry Kissinger who ordered the carpet-bombing of neutral Cambodia any less?It was an honor for me to stand before Justice Pal’s memorial. Many older Japanese are grateful to Justice Pal for what he did then; Abe-san, though he was born a few years after the trials, may have heard from his grandfather Kishi-san about it. There are several other connections to India. I used to visit Japan frequently on business in the 1990s, and I found a number of links old and new. Kabuki, for example, is rather similar to Kathakali in concept. Sanskrit is still chanted in Japan’s Buddhist temples, and they write it in the Siddham script that is extinct in India, but seen in temples in Japan.I found actual Devanagari written on the Peace Bell in Hiroshima: it is one of the sutras that constitute prayers for the dead. In Nara, where Abe-san was assassinated, there is the famous great bronze Buddha in the Todaiji temple. In the adjacent park, where a lot of tame deer roam, there is also a reproduction of the Ashoka Stambha, the Lion Capital of Sarnath, the emblem of the sovereign republic of Bharat/India.The links between India and Japan go back a long way, at least to Daruma, or Bodhi Dharma, the preceptor of the Zen school of Buddhism, who took kalari payat and Buddhist philosophy to the Shaolin monastery in China, around 500 CE. He was reputedly a Pallava prince, who embarked from Muziris or Kodungallur in Kerala. There is the famous Zen koan, “Why did Bodhi Dharma go east?”.Is that why Abe-san came west to India? To repay an ancient debt? Moksham praptirastu, Abe-san. You were a good man. We miss you. 1150 words, Jul 9, 2022 This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com

小額贊助支持本節目： https://pay.firstory.me/user/ck7onaujhi4bo0873ousw9pbc 近千位上班族共學的英文線課《賓狗陪你練英聽｜三週征服全英文聽力》 https://bit.ly/3FOfhx3

This week, join the Krewe as they explore the summertime festival scene in Japan. What are some essentials to enjoy at any given summer festival? What is the Japanese government doing to help support the preservation of these cultural traditions? Find out this, along with a month-by-month breakdown of some of the top festivals to check out while in Japan. Who knows what's in store for international tourists in 2022, but it never hurts to be prepared for festival season, even if it's for summer 2023... BUT LET'S HOPE FOR SOONER!! ------ About the Krewe ------The Krewe of Japan Podcast is a weekly episodic podcast sponsored by the Japan Society of New Orleans. Check them out every Friday afternoon around noon CST on Apple, Google, Spotify, Amazon, Stitcher, or wherever you get your podcasts.  Want to share your experiences with the Krewe? Or perhaps you have ideas for episodes, feedback, comments, or questions? Let the Krewe know by e-mail at kreweofjapanpodcast@gmail.com or on social media (Twitter: @kreweofjapan, Instagram: @kreweofjapanpodcast, Facebook: Krewe of Japan Podcast Page, & the Krewe of Japan Youtube Channel). Until next time, enjoy!------ Festivals ------June: Yosakoi Soran Festival (Sapporo, early June), Atsuta Festival (Nagoya, June 5), Sanno Matsuri (Tokyo, mid-June)July: Gion Matsuri (Kyoto, all throughout July), Tenjin Festival (Osaka, July 24-25), Shirakata Tenmangu Festival (Matsue, July 24-25), Sumidagawa Fireworks Festival (Tokyo, last Saturday in July), Soma Nomaoi (Soma, last week of July)August: Nebuta Matsuri (Aomori, August 2-7), Awa Odori (primarily Tokushima, mid-August), Bon Odori (nationwide, mid-August), Tanabata (Sendai, August 7; elsewhere, July 7)

Why has Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine become such a lightning rod for the memory wars in Japan about the Asia-Pacific War?  Akiko Takenaka, author of Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan's Unending Postwar, helps us understand how the meaning of Yasukuni has changed over time and why it has become the nation's most controversial memory site.  

For this episode, we are going to the island nation of Japan. It is one of my favorite countries. I am fortunate to have lived there for several years, I still try to keep with the language as best I can, and I still keep in touch with many Japanese friends. So, I am well aware of the controversial nature of this topic. This episode will not take a side in the controversy. It will just give an historical presentation on Yasukuni Shrine (靖國神社) and attempt to answer the following question, why is it so controversial? Please visit my YouTube channel:https://www.youtube.com/c/ThreeMinutesofHistory/videosPlease visit the YouTube channel of the talented Marielle Mimes:https://www.youtube.com/c/MarielleMimes/videos

Last two times we explored the history of Yasukuni shrine from its establishment to the modern day. Today we are going to take a peek at the belief system that was cultivated by the Yasukuni Shrine establishment, the Japanese Army and the The National/Imperial Government.Outline: State Use of Death RitualsBasic Shinto CosmologyBuddhism and SHinto relations Buddhism and Shinto SeparateThe Two people who separated themLegal Problems for having Shinto FuneralsThe legal privileges of War time ShintoRituals as Buddhist How Shinto Adopted these ritualsFuneral RitesTypes of Ghosts / SpiritsEarly Public Funerals Later Public Funerals Changing of public opinionSchoolsPropaganda - Forced compliance   To Dream of Dreams (Book) David M. O'Brien and Yasuo ŌgoshiYasukuni Shrine (Book) Dr. Akiko Takenaka A Year in the Life of a Shinto Shrine https://escholarship.org/content/qt7zb9f29b/qt7zb9f29b.pdf?t=n4oxscIn Credible Discourse Website Music Credits: New Intro: http://shw.in/sozai/japan.php Tsuzdumi Japan 3 Closing: Escaping_like_Indiana_Jones by Komiku

The post war period is the first time that the Japanese government was forced to separate from religion, not for selfless reasons but according to its own laws and to preserve the existence of the Japanese State. Today we are going to explore how Yasukuni and its branches navigated the post war separation of State and Religion. We are going to look at some of the Legal cases that set precedent and how the vast majority of the government has tried to ignore those rulings.Further Reading:  To Dream of Dreams (Book) David M. O'Brien and Yasuo ŌgoshiYasukuni Shrine (Book) Dr. Akiko TakenakaA Year in the Life of a Shinto Shrine https://escholarship.org/content/qt7zb9f29b/qt7zb9f29b.pdf?t=n4oxscIn Credible Discourse Website Music Credits: New Intro: http://shw.in/sozai/japan.php Tsuzdumi Japan 3 Closing: Escaping_like_Indiana_Jones by Komiku

Today we explore the origin and early history of the Yasukuni Shrine. What is Yasukuni? Simply put it is a shrine dedicated to peace and the soldiers of Japan. It's name translates to Peaceful Land Shrine (Yasukuni Jinja) and despite the name it is the most controversial Shinto Shrine there is. This is because is has continuously been at the center of post war / post Japanese colonization politics. How did it come about? Was it always the center of Japanese militant nationalism? Lets find out!   In Credible Discourse WebsiteKyoto Memorial Shrine  Further Reading: Yasukuni Shrine (Book) A Year in the Life of a Shinto Shrine  Music Credits: New Intro: http://shw.in/sozai/japan.php  Tsuzdumi Japan 3 

Starbucks Korea promises to improve working conditions for baristas-Supreme court rules on child custody rights of divorced multicultural family-Japanese PM Fumio Kishida visits Yasukuni Shrine-트럭시위 이후 처우 개선 약속한 스타벅스 코리아-한국어 서툴러서 양육권 박탈한다는 법원 결정 뒤집은 대법-일본 기시다 총리의 야스쿠니 신사 방문Guest: Steven Borowiec, Journalist based in SeoulSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Oliver is joined by Dr Rumi Sakamoto, Senior Lecturer in Asian Studies at the University of Auckland, to discuss remembering the kamikaze and the role of affect in war memory. Rumi shares with us how the image of the kamikaze has gone from one of shunned fanaticism to self-sacrificing heroism in popular culture through Japan's post-war history. Looking at their representation in the Yūshūkan Museum of War at Yasukuni Shrine, Rumi also unpacks how affect can draw out a desired emotional response from visitors regardless of their preconceptions of kamikaze and how emotion can lend authenticity to historically problematic narratives. Recommended documentary, Wings of Defeat Image and audio credits Intro-outro music: jasonszklarek / MotionElements.com [L] Shinichi Ishimaru (1922-1945) at the Kanoya Air Base - 日本海軍報道班員 [R] Chinese tourists at Yasukuni Shrine - 靖国神社の中国人旅行者 by Toshihiro Gamo Copyright © 2021 Oliver Moxham, ℗ 2021 Oliver Moxham. May be freely distributed in a classroom setting. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/beyond-japan/message

What's the big deal with the Liberal Democratic Party's leadership election, and who is likely to win? Why is Yasukuni Shrine so controversial? Aaron and Parker discuss a 90-year-old sentenced to prison for vehicular manslaughter, Japan household assets hitting a record high, and 70g of matsutake mushrooms that fetched $7,600 at a local produce auction.

#PopVultures Ep 52: China cancels Little Swallow Vicki Zhao, Word Of Honor star Zhang Zhehan and cracks down on entertainment industry 48:21 mins Synopsis: The Straits Times examines the ins and outs of pop culture in the Asian entertainment and Hollywood scene. In this episode, host Jan Lee is joined by The Straits Times' China correspondent Aw Cheng Wei as they discuss the recent spate of state-sanctioned cancellations of A-list celebrities in China. They delve into two case studies. The first is popular boys' love drama Word Of Honor star Zhang Zhehan, who was erased off the face of Chinese entertainment after photos of him visiting Japan's controversial Yasukuni Shrine surfaced. Yasukuni Shrine houses Class A war criminals from World War II. The second is the abrupt and mysterious cancellation of Vicki Zhao, best known for her role in seminal period drama My Fair Princess, which has fuelled vigorous speculation. They share their thoughts on the Chinese authorities' efforts to clamp down on celebrities who are seen as stepping out of line. Next, they discuss China's increasing efforts to clean up its entertainment scene, after it shut down idol production competitions, curtailed fan clubs and voting activities on social media, condemned toxic fandom culture, criticised the popularity of boys love dramas and "effeminate" male stars. They share their thoughts and insights on what considerations have fuelled this industry-wide clampdown. Here's a quick look at what they cover: A brief introduction on China's recent entertainment earthquake (0:42) A rundown of the cancellation of Zhang Zhehan and Vicki Zhao (4:08) Jan and Cheng Wei reflect on these two cases and the differing ways Chinese celebrities can be cancelled (10:21) A brief introduction of Chinese authorities' recent moves in cleaning up its entertainment industry (25:12) Jan and Cheng Wei share their thoughts on what is behind the heightened restrictions, curbs and censorship in Chinese entertainment (27:25) Produced by: Jan Lee (janlee@sph.com.sg) & Penelope Lee Edited by: Penelope Lee & Hadyu Rahim Subscribe to #PopVultures Podcast series and rate us on your favourite audio apps: Channel: https://str.sg/JWad Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWaA Google Podcasts: https://str.sg/Ju47  Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaP  Website: http://str.sg/stpodcasts Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg Follow Jan Lee on Instagram: https://str.sg/Jbxc Read Jan Lee's stories: https://str.sg/Jbxp --- Discover more ST podcast series: Green Pulse Podcast: https://str.sg/JWaf Health Check Podcast: https://str.sg/JWaN ST Sports Talk Podcast: https://str.sg/JWRE Life Weekend Picks Podcast: https://str.sg/JWa2 #PopVultures Podcast: https://str.sg/JWad Bookmark This! Podcast: https://str.sg/JWas Lunch With Sumiko Podcast: https://str.sg/J6hQ Discover BT Podcasts: https://bt.sg/pcPL Follow our shows then, if you like short, practical podcasts! See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

#PopVultures Ep 52: China cancels Little Swallow Vicki Zhao, Word Of Honor star Zhang Zhehan and cracks down on entertainment industry 48:21 mins Synopsis: The Straits Times examines the ins and outs of pop culture in the Asian entertainment and Hollywood scene. In this episode, host Jan Lee is joined by The Straits Times' China correspondent Aw Cheng Wei as they discuss the recent spate of state-sanctioned cancellations of A-list celebrities in China. They delve into two case studies. The first is popular boys' love drama Word Of Honor star Zhang Zhehan, who was erased off the face of Chinese entertainment after photos of him visiting Japan's controversial Yasukuni Shrine surfaced. Yasukuni Shrine houses Class A war criminals from World War II. The second is the abrupt and mysterious cancellation of Vicki Zhao, best known for her role in seminal period drama My Fair Princess, which has fuelled vigorous speculation. They share their thoughts on the Chinese authorities' efforts to clamp down on celebrities who are seen as stepping out of line. Next, they discuss China's increasing efforts to clean up its entertainment scene, after it shut down idol production competitions, curtailed fan clubs and voting activities on social media, condemned toxic fandom culture, criticised the popularity of boys love dramas and "effeminate" male stars. They share their thoughts and insights on what considerations have fuelled this industry-wide clampdown. Here's a quick look at what they cover: A brief introduction on China's recent entertainment earthquake (0:42) A rundown of the cancellation of Zhang Zhehan and Vicki Zhao (4:08) Jan and Cheng Wei reflect on these two cases and the differing ways Chinese celebrities can be cancelled (10:21) A brief introduction of Chinese authorities' recent moves in cleaning up its entertainment industry (25:12) Jan and Cheng Wei share their thoughts on what is behind the heightened restrictions, curbs and censorship in Chinese entertainment (27:25) Produced by: Jan Lee (janlee@sph.com.sg) & Penelope Lee Edited by: Penelope Lee & Hadyu Rahim Subscribe to #PopVultures Podcast series and rate us on your favourite audio apps: Channel: https://str.sg/JWad Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWaA Google Podcasts: https://str.sg/Ju47  Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaP  Website: http://str.sg/stpodcasts Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg Follow Jan Lee on Instagram: https://str.sg/Jbxc Read Jan Lee's stories: https://str.sg/Jbxp --- Discover more ST podcast series: Green Pulse Podcast: https://str.sg/JWaf Health Check Podcast: https://str.sg/JWaN ST Sports Talk Podcast: https://str.sg/JWRE Life Weekend Picks Podcast: https://str.sg/JWa2 #PopVultures Podcast: https://str.sg/JWad Bookmark This! Podcast: https://str.sg/JWas Lunch With Sumiko Podcast: https://str.sg/J6hQ Discover BT Podcasts: https://bt.sg/pcPL Follow our shows then, if you like short, practical podcasts! See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

#PopVultures Ep 52: China cancels Little Swallow Vicki Zhao, Word Of Honor star Zhang Zhehan and cracks down on entertainment industry 48:21 mins Synopsis: The Straits Times examines the ins and outs of pop culture in the Asian entertainment and Hollywood scene. In this episode, host Jan Lee is joined by The Straits Times' China correspondent Aw Cheng Wei as they discuss the recent spate of state-sanctioned cancellations of A-list celebrities in China. They delve into two case studies. The first is popular boys' love drama Word Of Honor star Zhang Zhehan, who was erased off the face of Chinese entertainment after photos of him visiting Japan's controversial Yasukuni Shrine surfaced. Yasukuni Shrine houses Class A war criminals from World War II. The second is the abrupt and mysterious cancellation of Vicki Zhao, best known for her role in seminal period drama My Fair Princess, which has fuelled vigorous speculation. They share their thoughts on the Chinese authorities' efforts to clamp down on celebrities who are seen as stepping out of line. Next, they discuss China's increasing efforts to clean up its entertainment scene, after it shut down idol production competitions, curtailed fan clubs and voting activities on social media, condemned toxic fandom culture, criticised the popularity of boys love dramas and "effeminate" male stars. They share their thoughts and insights on what considerations have fuelled this industry-wide clampdown. Here's a quick look at what they cover: A brief introduction on China's recent entertainment earthquake (0:42) A rundown of the cancellation of Zhang Zhehan and Vicki Zhao (4:08) Jan and Cheng Wei reflect on these two cases and the differing ways Chinese celebrities can be cancelled (10:21) A brief introduction of Chinese authorities' recent moves in cleaning up its entertainment industry (25:12) Jan and Cheng Wei share their thoughts on what is behind the heightened restrictions, curbs and censorship in Chinese entertainment (27:25) Produced by: Jan Lee (janlee@sph.com.sg) & Penelope Lee Edited by: Penelope Lee & Hadyu Rahim Subscribe to #PopVultures Podcast series and rate us on your favourite audio apps: Channel: https://str.sg/JWad Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWaA Google Podcasts: https://str.sg/Ju47  Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaP  Website: http://str.sg/stpodcasts Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg Follow Jan Lee on Instagram: https://str.sg/Jbxc Read Jan Lee's stories: https://str.sg/Jbxp --- Discover more ST podcast series: Green Pulse Podcast: https://str.sg/JWaf Health Check Podcast: https://str.sg/JWaN ST Sports Talk Podcast: https://str.sg/JWRE Life Weekend Picks Podcast: https://str.sg/JWa2 #PopVultures Podcast: https://str.sg/JWad Bookmark This! Podcast: https://str.sg/JWas Lunch With Sumiko Podcast: https://str.sg/J6hQ Discover BT Podcasts: https://bt.sg/pcPL Follow our shows then, if you like short, practical podcasts! See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Transgression: who is she? Is she real? Is she dead? OK and Lucia are back to their roots, being ON ONE. Covering a range of topics that all make sense together I swear. We start with the Laura Kipnis essay “Transgression, an Elegy” which is difficult to separate from Kipnis herself, the fucking harper’s letter … Continue reading "135 – Zombie Transgression"

Transgression: who is she? Is she real? Is she dead? OK and Lucia are back to their roots, being ON ONE. Covering a range of topics that all make sense together I swear. We start with the Laura Kipnis essay “Transgression, an Elegy” which is difficult to separate from Kipnis herself, the fucking harper’s letter … Continue reading "135 – Zombie Transgression"

The China Association of Performing Arts has called for a boycott of Chinese actor Zhang Zhehan after photos of him taken at Tokyo's notorious Yasukuni Shrine, a symbol of Japan's past militarism, spread online, sparking outrage among netizens.中国演出行业协会要求会员单位对中国演员张哲瀚进行从业抵制，此前张哲瀚在东京象征着日本军国主义的靖国神社拍摄的照片在网上流传，激起网民愤怒。"Zhang's behavior was seriously inappropriate, and it not only hurt the nation's feelings, but also served as a bad influence on young fans," the association said in a notice issued Sunday.该协会在周日发布的一份公告中称：“张哲瀚的行为存在严重不当，不仅伤害民族感情，而且对其受众中的青少年群体带来恶劣的不良影响。”The Sina Weibo micro-blogging platform closed the actor's personal and studio accounts on Sunday.新浪微博微博平台周日关闭了该演员的个人账号和工作室账号。"As a public figure who has a large number of fans and draws a great deal of attention online, it is the most basic professional quality to have a correct view of history and values," it said in a notice.“作为一个拥有大量粉丝并在网上引起广泛关注的公众人物，树立正确的历史观，是一项基本的职业素养，”公告中表示。Photos emerged on social media on Tuesday showing Zhang attending a wedding ceremony in 2019 at the Nogi Shrine in Tokyo, where imperial Japanese army general Maresuke Nogi is honored. Netizens also found pictures of him posing in 2018 at the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Class-A Japanese war criminals who committed atrocities during World War II.周二，社交媒体上出现了一些照片显示，张哲瀚参加了2019年在东京乃木神社举行的婚礼。网友们还发现了他在2018年在靖国神社摆姿势拍的照片。靖国神社供奉着二战期间犯下滔天战争罪行的甲级日本战犯。The association said Yasukuni is a spiritual tool and symbol of Japanese militarism and also the place where Japanese right-wing forces "deny history and beautify the war of aggression".该协会说，“靖国神社是日本军国主义发动对外侵略战争的精神工具和象征，是日本国内右翼势力否定历史、美化侵略战争的场所。”"For artists engaged in cultural work, a correct view of history is a basic professional quality, and ignorance is not an excuse," it said.“对从事文化工作的演艺人员而言，树立正确的历史观，是一项基本的职业素养，无知不是借口。”The association said members were required to boycott Zhang according to relevant regulations. It called on performers to study more, improve their understanding and never waver on national dignity.该协会表示，根据相关规定，会员单位必须对张哲瀚进行从业抵制。协会提醒广大演艺从业人员加强学习，提高认识，不要动摇民族尊严。"History must not be forgotten, and the bottom line must not be loosened. Whoever crosses the line will be punished," it said.“历史不容忘却，底线不容松动。过线者，必受惩戒。”公告中说到。The China Culture Administration Association issued a statement on Friday that criticized Zhang for lacking respect for history and having a bad influence on the country's youth.中国文化管理协会于上周五发文称，张哲瀚对历史缺乏敬畏，对全国青少年群体产生不良影响。Chinese media also criticized Zhang over the weekend for his ignorance of history and national suffering.上周末，中国媒体还批评张哲瀚对历史和民族苦难浑然不觉。Zhang apologized on his Weibo account on Friday, saying he felt "ashamed for being ignorant" after the pictures triggered anger and criticism among netizens.张哲瀚于上周五在微博上道歉，称在照片引发网民的愤怒和批评后，他“为曾经无知的自己而羞愧”。Zhang, 30, gained popularity after starring in the hit TV drama Word of Honor, which was broadcast in February.现年30岁的张哲瀚在主演了今年2月播出的热门电视剧《山河令》后，广受欢迎。The criticism of Zhang led to more than two dozen brands terminating their cooperation with him.张哲瀚被多家媒体批评后，二十多个品牌终止了与他的合作。More than 25 companies have announced they have ended contracts with Zhang, including food brand Hsu Fu Chi, drink brand Wahaha, beverage maker Coca-Cola, Danish jewelry brand Pandora and the Chinese branch of Japanese food manufacturer Ezaki Glico.超过25家公司宣布，他们已终止与张哲瀚的合作，包括食品品牌徐福记，饮料品牌娃哈哈，饮料制造商可口可乐，丹麦珠宝品牌潘多拉和日本食品制造商江崎格力高中国分公司等。1.boycott美 ['bɔɪ.kɑt] 英 ['bɔɪ.kɒt]v.抵制；拒绝购买（或使用、参加）n.（对某事物的）抵制网络：联合抵制；杯葛；联合拒绝购买2.notorious美 [nə'tɔriəs] 英 [nəʊ'tɔːriəs]adj.声名狼藉的；臭名昭著的网络：美人计；匪帮说唱传奇；声名狼籍的3.militarism美 ['mɪlɪtə.rɪzəm] 英 ['mɪlɪtə.rɪz(ə)m]n.军国主义网络：黩武主义；军阀主义；军事主义4.atrocity美 [ə'trɑsəti] 英 [ə'trɒsəti]n.（尤指战争中的）残暴行为网络：凶恶；残暴的行为；残忍5.Yasukuni Shrine靖国神社

Today we're taking a trip to Japan. Today's episode may contain some talk that could be hard for some to listen to. We will be discussing suicide in parts of today's episode. While we normally have a pretty lax, “we don't care who we piss off or trigger” kind of attitude, we all agree that mental health and suicide are serious issues and we do not want anyone who may already have some problems to listen to something we are discussing and to make any said problems worse. We joke around and have fun and there will be jokes and fuckery in this episode, BUT, we will not make jokes about suicide or mental health. We will try and find some levity to shake off the darker situations, but will do our best to also be respectful when needed. We say this all the time and this is another great spot for this message, please if you are having any sort of thoughts of suicide and depression please reach out to someone that you can talk to. There are many many excellent resources for those who need them.   With that being said, in today's episode we are talking about Japan's Aokigahara Forest, also known as the suicide forest. We are going to go through the history of the forest and we are also going to talk about some of the tales of spirits and monsters in the forest. Also we'll get into some spooky stories, of course, because that's what we do here!    Due to the high level of stress faced by the Japanese, Japan is seen as one of the top countries with high suicide rates. According to a report by The Guardian, depression, serious illness and debt are among the common reasons one seeks to end their life.    Historically suicide has been viewed differently in Japan than the way we see it now. Most people today will remark how selfish or cowardly suicide is. Japan historically has had the view that suicide was an honorable thing.   Back in the feudal era in Japan, committing suicide was seen as an act of honour. Samurai warriors would rather commit suicide, or known as seppuku sometimes referred to as Harakiri (ritual disemboweling) than fall into the hands of their enemy – a way to uphold their honor and dignity. It was also used as a form of capital punishment for samurai who had committed serious offenses, or performed because they had brought shame to themselves. It  was later practiced by other Japanese people during the Shōwa period (particularly officers near the end of World War II) to restore honor for themselves or for their families. The ceremonial disembowelment, which is usually part of a more elaborate ritual and performed in front of spectators, consists of plunging a short blade like a tantō into the belly and drawing the blade from left to right, slicing the belly open. Some practitioners of seppuku allowed themselves to die slowly, but they usually enlisted the help of a “kaishakunin,” or second, who would lop off their head with a katana as soon as they made their initial cut. The goal was generally not to take the head off in one swing, rather most of the way off on the first swing with the second bringing down a very light cut allowing the head to fall into the hands of the deceased. Among other rituals, the doomed individual often drank sake, they were only allowed a specific number of sips, and composed a short “death poem” before taking up the blade. In each case, it was considered an act of extreme bravery and self-sacrifice that embodied Bushido, the ancient warrior code of the samurai. There was even a female version of seppuku called “jigai,” which involved cutting the throat using a tanto. Japanese Tanto knives (or short swords) are characterized by their dagger-like design. The tanto knife first appeared around the year 900. Seppuku fell out of favor with the decline of the samurai in the late-19th century, but the practice didn't disappear entirely. Japanese General Nogi Maresuke disemboweled himself in 1912 out of loyalty to the deceased Meiji Emperor, and many troops later chose the sword over surrender during World War II. Perhaps the most famous case in recent history concerns Yukio Mishima, a renowned novelist and Nobel Prize nominee who committed ritual seppuku in 1970 after leading a failed coup against the Japanese government. On October 25, 1944, the Empire of Japan employed kamikaze bombers for the first time. (Kamikazi bombers were named after the “divine wind” that had destroyed the Mongol fleet in the thirteenth century, thus saving Japan from invasion.) The tactic was part of the ferocious Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history, which took place in the Pacific Ocean near the Philippines. Kamikaze strikes against Allied warships continued throughout World War II.   Kamikaze pilots deliberately crashed specially made planes directly into enemy warships, which resulted in suicide. It was a desperate policy. Motoharu Okamura, who commanded a kamikaze squadron, remarked that by 1944, “I firmly believe that the only way to swing the war in our favor is to resort to crash-dive attacks with our planes. There is no other way. Provide me with 300 planes and I will turn the tide of war.” In these kamikaze attacks, more than 3,000 Japanese pilots were killed, and there were more than 7,000 casualties among American, Australian, and British personnel. Flight Lieutenant Haruo Araki wrote the following letter to his wife before his last flight:                                Shigeko,   Are you well? It is now a month since that day. The happy dream is over. Tomorrow I will dive my plane into an enemy ship. I will cross the river into the other world, taking some Yankees with me. When I look back, I see that I was very cold-hearted to you. After I had been cruel to you, I used to regret it. Please forgive me.   When I think of your future, and the long life ahead, it tears at my heart. Please remain steadfast and live happily. After my death, please take care of my father for me.   I, who have lived for the eternal principles of justice, will forever protect this nation from the enemies that surround us.   Commander of the Air Unit Eternity   Haruo Araki   WOW!   The reason we wanted to include this letter is that last line. He referred to himself as living for the eternal principles of justice. He says he will forever protect his nation from the enemies that surround them. This goes to show that there was still a sense of pride in the fact that you are committing suicide for the cause. It was seen as a strength not a weakness historically. On the other side of the coin, the Allies, steeped in the Judaeo-Christian tradition of the sanctity of life, the apparent willingness of Japanese servicemen like Araki to carry out suicide attacks was profoundly shocking. But then, as scholars of the kamikaze point out, the word suicide in Japanese does not always have the same “immoral connotation” that it has in English. Two versions—jiketsu (self-determination) and jisai (self-judgement)—“suggest an honorable or laudable act done in the public interest.” There is, moreover, no ethical or religious taboo regarding suicide in Japan's traditional religion of Shintoism.  To surrender, on the other hand, was seen as dishonourable, hence the contempt the Japanese felt for prisoners of war. Japanese soldiers believed that when they fell on the field of battle they would become kami, or gods, and join the nation's spirits at the Shinto shrine of Yasukuni in Tokyo. Hence the typical farewell from members of the Shimpū (Divine Wind) Special Attack Corps: “I'll meet you at the Yasukuni Shrine!”  Nowadays, many have chosen to end their life not for honourable reasons, but mainly because they could not fit into society. In Japan today, suicide is considered a major social issue. In 2017, the country had the seventh highest suicide rate in the OECD, at 14.9 per 100,000 persons, and in 2019 the country had the second highest suicide rate among the G7 developed nations.  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is “an international organisation that works to build better policies for better lives.”, as per their website. Seventy percent of suicides in Japan are male, and it is the leading cause of death in men aged 20–44. After peaking in 2003, suicide rates have been gradually declining, falling to the lowest on record (since 1978) in 2019. Monthly suicide rates in Japan increased by 16% between July and October 2020, due to a number of reasons attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic. What is driving these big divide rates?  As of 2020, the leading motive, with 49% of suicides was "Health issues". However because the category for health issues includes both mental (like depression) and physical issues, it is not possible to distinguish between the two. The second most commonly listed motive for suicides was "Financial/Poverty related issues" (e.g., Too much debt, Poverty), which was a motive in 17% of suicides. The third motive is "Household issues" (e.g., disagreements in the family) listed in 15% of suicides.   By occupation, 59.3% of suicide victims were in the broad "Not Employed" category, which is not to be confused with the colloquialism "unemployed" (as in those who are seeking but unable to find a job). The "Not Employed" category also includes pensioners, homemakers and others. While the teenage suicide rate in Japan is lower than the OECD country average, teenage suicide rates have been the only category to increase slightly in recent years, despite the significant drop in overall suicide rates over the past decade.   Many who decide to commit suicide will chose a place where it is hidden and not easy to be found to spend their last moment. And for the Japanese, Aokigahara Forest is one of the most common locations. It is also known as the world's second-most common location to commit suicide. The most common location is the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, California, in the US. Aokigahara is located at the northwest base of the country's highest mountain, Mount Fuji. Due to its high density of trees, Aokigahara is also known as a Jukai – which simply means a “sea of trees'. The tree cover is so thick that, even at noon, you will hardly find a bright spot in the forest. Aokigahara is also known as Japan's Demon Forest, and the “perfect place to die”. Many Japanese believe that the forest is haunted and dare not go nearby. This 35-sq km, around 14 sq mile, forest is cold, rocky, and contains some 200 caves, of which a few, such as the Ice Cave and Wind Cave, have been popular among tourists. Because of the rocky area and thick trees, Aokigahara's surroundings are almost identical, making it the perfect journey for those who are making a one-way trip. For trekkers and hikers, they often carry along plastic tape to mark their way so that they will find the way out again.    Let's find out a bit more about the forest itself, because well, nerd shit. It formed out of a devastating volcanic eruption that occurred in the year 864. Which was ironically, chainsaw's second birthday. The nickname “Sea of Trees" captures the full grandeur of how this wind-swept forest appears from the mountain with its treetops rolling like waves. The trees in the forest do bear an exotic, gnarled appearance because they grew out of hardened lava. Their roots could not penetrate to the usual depth. The flow of the lava left the ground with an uneven surface before hardening, where it is not unusual to see trees partially uprooted, along with gaping holes—cave-like recesses—that have formed in the ground. Aokigahara has been falsely portrayed as a place where navigational compasses go haywire. Needles of magnetic compasses will move if placed directly on the lava, aligning with the rock's natural magnetism, kind of like moody, except the exact opposite, which varies in iron content and strength by location. However, a compass behaves as expected when held at a normal height. The forest has a variety of conifers and broadleaf trees and shrubs. Deeper in the forest there are many aromatic flowering plants. There are also many mosses, liverworts and ferns. Aside from the immense savings of plant life that choke the forest, it is home to plenty of wildlife. Some of the animals you may encounter include the Asian black bear, deer, fox, Japanese mink and Japanese squirrel, boar, and wild rabbit. Also the forest is a great place to see tits! That's right my friends, they have many kinds of tits including willow tits, long tailed tits, and of course the great tits.   So why is this such a popular place for people to end their lives? Well as stated earlier it is a very quiet place that offers up dense cover to help conceal things that are going on. Essentially it's peaceful and you can be alone away from prying eyes. Not only that, there was a mystery novel called “Kuroi Jukai” (translated as Black Sea of Trees) written by Seicho Matsumoto in 1960. The novel ends romantically with the lovers committing suicide in the forest, which revitalized the Suicide Forest's popularity among those who wanted to end their life. Also Wataru Tsurumui's controversial 1993 bestseller, The Complete Suicide Manual, is a book that describes various modes of suicide and even recommends Aokigahara as the perfect place to die. Apparently this book is also a common find in the forest, usually not too far away from a suicide victim and their belongings. Undoubtedly, the most common method of suicide in the forest is hanging. It's not uncommon for officials to find abandoned cars at the trail heads, empty campsites throughout the forest, strings and ropes left by people who venture off path to help find their way back, and sadly the body's of those who decided to enter the first and never come out. There are signs along the trails urging people to seek help if they are having issues and contemplating suicide. The signs read, “Your life is something precious that was given to you by your parents” and “Think about your parents, siblings, and children once more. Do not be troubled alone.” The signs end with a helpline telephone number, hoping the lost souls who seek to die would call for help. There are people who hike the forest in hopes of finding people and stopping them before it's too late. One man has found over 100 bodies in his time in the forest. With all of this death surrounding it, is it any wonder that there are tales of Hauntings and strange things happening here. There are also stories of demons that inhabit the forest. And with that being said and most of the heavy lifting being done, let's get into what we come here for every week… Creepy shit!    The most common tale of the forest being inhabited by something evil had to do with the Yurei. Yurei are thought to be spirits barred from a peaceful afterlife. Ukiyo-e artist Maruyama Ōkyo created the first known example of the now-traditional yūrei, in his painting The Ghost of Oyuki. Ukiyo-e is a genre of Japanese art which flourished from the 17th through 19th centuries. The Zenshō-an in Tokyo houses the largest single collection of yūrei paintings which are only shown in August, the traditional month of the spirits. Yurei are seen in white clothing believed to signify the white burial kimono used in Edo period burial rituals. They have long black wild hair. They generally lack legs and feet and the haha typically dangle at the wrists. The arms are usually held stretched out or at the sides stretched out at just the elbow. The Yurei are often accompanied by hitodama, which are floating flames. They can be various colors such as blue, green or purple. So Yurei is actually somewhat of a catch all phrase for ghosts. There are actually different types of Yurei. There's Onryo, which are vengeful ghosts who come back to scene a wrong doing done to them, Goryo, which are spirits of the high class and aristocrats which are also vengeful usually for having been martyred. There are Ubume which are mother ghosts who either died in childbirth or left children behind when they passed, they come back to care for the child and often bring sweets to them. There are several others as well including Funayurei which are the ghosts of those who died at sea and Zashiki-warashi which are the ghosts of children. There are more but you get the point. According to legend, people bring their family members during famine to the forest and leave them to die there, in order to save their food for other family members. Those left in the forest would slowly die due to starvation, turning them into yurei. The belief in yurei continues to today. When a body is found in Aokigahara, forest guardians place it in a room next to the forest before being sent to authorities. Legend has it that if the body is left alone in the room, its yurei move around screaming in the room. Hence, forest guards will play rock-paper-scissors to determine who the unlucky companion to the body is.    Also in Japanese legend, aside from the Yurei, the forest is said to be haunted by demons. So there's that. Demons are always good to have around. So knowing that there are possibly ribs of ghosts and demons hanging around, let's get into some creepy stories from the forest!    During a VICE documentary that takes a tour of the forest, an extremely creepy curse is found. There's a Jack Skellington-like doll with his face cut off, nailed upside down to a tree as a sort of inverted crucifixion. According to the documentary's guide, Azusa Hayano, "They nailed this character upside down as a symbol of contempt for society. No, it's more like a curse. The curse is nailed in." Apparently, it's not that uncommon for visitors to leave a curse on the world they're leaving behind.   This next story was written for a Japanese newspaper:   Jun 26, 2011 I am walking through Aokigahara Jukai forest, the light rapidly fading on a mid-winter afternoon, when I am stopped dead in my tracks by a blood-curdling scream. The natural reaction would be to run, but the forest floor is a maze of roots and slippery rocks and, truth be told, I am lost in this vast woodland whose name, in part, translates as “Sea of Trees.”   Inexplicably, I find myself moving toward the sound, searching for signs of life. Instead, I find death.   The source of that scream remains a mystery as, across a clearing, I see what looks like a pile of clothes. But as I approach, it becomes apparent it's more than just clothes I've spotted.   In a small hollow, just below a tree, and curled up like a baby on a thick bed of dead leaves, lies a man, his thinning gray hair matted across his balding cranium. His pasty upper torso is shirtless, while his legs are covered only by black long johns — with blue-striped boxers sticking out above the waistband — and a pair of woolly socks.   Under his bent legs a pair of slacks, a white shirt and a jacket have been spread out as a cushion at his final resting place. Scattered around are innumerable documents, a briefcase and other remnants of a former life. Nearer to him are items more closely related to his demise: empty packets of prescription pills, beer cans, and bottles of liquor…   The article goes on but this is the end of the story for our creepy purposes...   The man had been dead for some time so there's no way he could have produced the scream. So where did it come from? A demon or Yurei trying to draw the man in?   The destination truth television show filmed an episode in the forest and may have caught a Yurei on camera. A man was hanging out in a spot alone and in a clip on you tube he says that he thought he saw something so he checked the camera. After checking the camera he notices a shape that seems to rise up from the ground. It's white and human-like. It's there for a couple seconds and then send to disappear back into the ground. Now what it was we can't say, it could have been a yurei or honestly it looks just as much like someone dressed in white standing up from behind a bush then crouching back down. Given the forest legend though… We won't rule out ghosts.    We found this next story buried in a message board. There have been many stories of people who have had their guide lines cut while they were exploring the forest. This is an account of one of those incidents. It was written by an anonymous person so take it how you will!         "While on vacation me and my friend decided to check out the suicide forest. We were told the best thing to do would be to get on a tour and check out the caves as well. We didn't really want to do a touristy thing though. We decided to hike out there ourselves. We read up on dinner things about the area and decided we would bring along a bunch of Paracord to string along so we wouldn't get lost. We got there in the late afternoon and found a trailhead and parked. Immediately we were struck with an eerie feeling and the signs at the beginning of the trail and in various places saying not to commit suicide and get help didn't help. We set off on the trail to check it out. We walked for about 15 minutes and found a spot in the dense forest that we thought would be a good spot to head in. My friend tied the Paracord to a tree a few feet in and we set off. The further we got in the creepier it got. It was very quiet. You couldn't hear animals or birds or other people. There was not much light coming through but we could still see ok. After about an hour of exploring and letting out our line, which actually ended up being two large bundles of Paracord tied together, we decided to head back. We reeling in the line and heading back the way we came. At some point we started to hear a rustling. We thought this was strange cus we hadn't seen any animals but hey .. We're in a forest so who knows. But it soon became evident that something was actually following us! We were both spooked and picked up the pace. The rustling got louder but then whatever it was it seemed to take off ahead of us. We were both somewhat relieved… That is until a few minutes later when we got to a point where the Paracord had been shredded and the shredded end wrapped around a random tree! We couldn't find the other end of the cord and we started to freak out. Then… We heard the rustling again, but we could not see anything. We started to look around for the other end of the cord. As we were looking the rustling seemed to come from all around us. We kept getting more scared and my friend started crying and freaking out about being lost and telling about how we're going to end up dead like the rest of them. The rustling got louder and louder and then all of a sudden… Nothing. No rustling, no noise, nothing. We both stood there looking around. That's when I saw it. I saw a shadowy white figure off a little into the first. I thought I was seeing things at first. I rubbed my eyes and looked again and it was still there. At this point I lost it and started screaming. My friend turned around to see what I was screaming at and saw it too. It started to move towards us. It wasn't walking though it was like… Floating. As it came closer I see that the figure had no bottom half… It was basically a floating torso. You couldn't see the face as whatever it was had long wild hair. My friend started screaming as well and we both started frantically looking for the other end of our line. As the figure came closer we finally found the end of the cord and started moving as fast as we could. The figure continued to follow us, matching our speed. After what seemed like hours of moving as fast as we could through the forest with thing following us we finally came to where we started and could see the main trail. We ran on to the main trail and ran all the way to the car without looking back. Neither of us said a word on the way back to the hotel. To this day we don't talk about it. In my head I truly think that whatever that figure was trying to trap us in that forest. That figure still haunts me"   Creepy!!!   Locals in the area that reporters have spoken too, classic they have become used to the stories and they are not worried for the most part. Despite these statements there are still reports of locals hearing blood curdling screams at all hours from the forest. Some locals claim to see Nthe Yurei from time to time as well.    There are numerous stories of people that may not have necessarily seen anything but definitely get the heavy sad feeling when they visit as well as the feeling that something or someone is watching them. Then of course there are those with the unfortunate story of coming upon a body which is probably the worst story you can bring home.    By all accounts the forest is a beautiful place to visit and most people have no issues there. Regardless, take heed when exploring and please be respectful to the place that many have lost their lives.    Movies: https://www.imdb.com/search/title/?countries=jp&keywords=japanese-horror-film&sort=user_rating&title_type=feature

Ken Ruoff’s Japan’s Imperial House in the Postwar Era, 1945-2019 (Harvard UP, 2020), is a revised and expanded version of the author’s The People’s Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995 (2003). The book is an extensive and detailed treatment of the Japanese imperial institution as it enters a new era, Reiwa, with the abdication of the Heisei emperor (Akihito) in 2019. In addition to The People’s Emperor’s discussions of the creation of the postwar imperial institution as a “constitutional symbolic monarchy,” the continued (clandestine) role of Hirohito in politics, the postwar emperors’ approach to Japan’s war responsibility, the “massification” of the imperial family as a kind of model “middle-class” household for the postwar, and various forms of resistance from conservatives, Japan’s Imperial House adds two new chapters and an extensive and important addendum to one other. The two new chapters, respectively, provide a retrospective on the Heisei era (1989-2019) and an overview of the challenges facing the imperial line with Akihito’s son, Naruhito, now on the Chrysanthemum Throne as the Reiwa emperor. The addendum is to chapter 5, which discusses the ways in which anti-democratic and otherwise revanchist forces in postwar Japan coopted the playbook of democratic organizing to achieve (largely symbolic) victories. As we discuss in the interview, Ruoff returns to this topic because his analysis turned out to presage the tactics and successes of Nippon Kaigi, Japan’s most influential nongovernmental ultra-conservative lobbying group, during the Abe Shinzō regime. Terms and names perhaps unfamiliar to some listeners that get bandied about in our discussion include tennō (sovereign, emperor), Yoshida Shigeru (influential early postwar prime minister), Kobayashi Yoshinori (an often-controversial manga artist), and Yasukuni Shrine (which has enshrined prominent Class-A war criminals in addition to the general war dead since March 1978). Nathan Hopson is an associate professor of Japanese and East Asian history in the Graduate School of Humanities, Nagoya University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Ken Ruoff’s Japan’s Imperial House in the Postwar Era, 1945-2019 (Harvard UP, 2020), is a revised and expanded version of the author’s The People’s Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995 (2003). The book is an extensive and detailed treatment of the Japanese imperial institution as it enters a new era, Reiwa, with the abdication of the Heisei emperor (Akihito) in 2019. In addition to The People’s Emperor’s discussions of the creation of the postwar imperial institution as a “constitutional symbolic monarchy,” the continued (clandestine) role of Hirohito in politics, the postwar emperors’ approach to Japan’s war responsibility, the “massification” of the imperial family as a kind of model “middle-class” household for the postwar, and various forms of resistance from conservatives, Japan’s Imperial House adds two new chapters and an extensive and important addendum to one other. The two new chapters, respectively, provide a retrospective on the Heisei era (1989-2019) and an overview of the challenges facing the imperial line with Akihito’s son, Naruhito, now on the Chrysanthemum Throne as the Reiwa emperor. The addendum is to chapter 5, which discusses the ways in which anti-democratic and otherwise revanchist forces in postwar Japan coopted the playbook of democratic organizing to achieve (largely symbolic) victories. As we discuss in the interview, Ruoff returns to this topic because his analysis turned out to presage the tactics and successes of Nippon Kaigi, Japan’s most influential nongovernmental ultra-conservative lobbying group, during the Abe Shinzō regime. Terms and names perhaps unfamiliar to some listeners that get bandied about in our discussion include tennō (sovereign, emperor), Yoshida Shigeru (influential early postwar prime minister), Kobayashi Yoshinori (an often-controversial manga artist), and Yasukuni Shrine (which has enshrined prominent Class-A war criminals in addition to the general war dead since March 1978). Nathan Hopson is an associate professor of Japanese and East Asian history in the Graduate School of Humanities, Nagoya University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

Ken Ruoff's Japan's Imperial House in the Postwar Era, 1945-2019 (Harvard UP, 2020), is a revised and expanded version of the author's The People's Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995 (2003). The book is an extensive and detailed treatment of the Japanese imperial institution as it enters a new era, Reiwa, with the abdication of the Heisei emperor (Akihito) in 2019. In addition to The People's Emperor's discussions of the creation of the postwar imperial institution as a “constitutional symbolic monarchy,” the continued (clandestine) role of Hirohito in politics, the postwar emperors' approach to Japan's war responsibility, the “massification” of the imperial family as a kind of model “middle-class” household for the postwar, and various forms of resistance from conservatives, Japan's Imperial House adds two new chapters and an extensive and important addendum to one other. The two new chapters, respectively, provide a retrospective on the Heisei era (1989-2019) and an overview of the challenges facing the imperial line with Akihito's son, Naruhito, now on the Chrysanthemum Throne as the Reiwa emperor. The addendum is to chapter 5, which discusses the ways in which anti-democratic and otherwise revanchist forces in postwar Japan coopted the playbook of democratic organizing to achieve (largely symbolic) victories. As we discuss in the interview, Ruoff returns to this topic because his analysis turned out to presage the tactics and successes of Nippon Kaigi, Japan's most influential nongovernmental ultra-conservative lobbying group, during the Abe Shinzō regime. Terms and names perhaps unfamiliar to some listeners that get bandied about in our discussion include tennō (sovereign, emperor), Yoshida Shigeru (influential early postwar prime minister), Kobayashi Yoshinori (an often-controversial manga artist), and Yasukuni Shrine (which has enshrined prominent Class-A war criminals in addition to the general war dead since March 1978). Nathan Hopson is an associate professor of Japanese and East Asian history in the Graduate School of Humanities, Nagoya University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Ken Ruoff’s Japan’s Imperial House in the Postwar Era, 1945-2019 (Harvard UP, 2020), is a revised and expanded version of the author’s The People’s Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995 (2003). The book is an extensive and detailed treatment of the Japanese imperial institution as it enters a new era, Reiwa, with the abdication of the Heisei emperor (Akihito) in 2019. In addition to The People’s Emperor’s discussions of the creation of the postwar imperial institution as a “constitutional symbolic monarchy,” the continued (clandestine) role of Hirohito in politics, the postwar emperors’ approach to Japan’s war responsibility, the “massification” of the imperial family as a kind of model “middle-class” household for the postwar, and various forms of resistance from conservatives, Japan’s Imperial House adds two new chapters and an extensive and important addendum to one other. The two new chapters, respectively, provide a retrospective on the Heisei era (1989-2019) and an overview of the challenges facing the imperial line with Akihito’s son, Naruhito, now on the Chrysanthemum Throne as the Reiwa emperor. The addendum is to chapter 5, which discusses the ways in which anti-democratic and otherwise revanchist forces in postwar Japan coopted the playbook of democratic organizing to achieve (largely symbolic) victories. As we discuss in the interview, Ruoff returns to this topic because his analysis turned out to presage the tactics and successes of Nippon Kaigi, Japan’s most influential nongovernmental ultra-conservative lobbying group, during the Abe Shinzō regime. Terms and names perhaps unfamiliar to some listeners that get bandied about in our discussion include tennō (sovereign, emperor), Yoshida Shigeru (influential early postwar prime minister), Kobayashi Yoshinori (an often-controversial manga artist), and Yasukuni Shrine (which has enshrined prominent Class-A war criminals in addition to the general war dead since March 1978). Nathan Hopson is an associate professor of Japanese and East Asian history in the Graduate School of Humanities, Nagoya University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

Ken Ruoff’s Japan’s Imperial House in the Postwar Era, 1945-2019 (Harvard UP, 2020), is a revised and expanded version of the author’s The People’s Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995 (2003). The book is an extensive and detailed treatment of the Japanese imperial institution as it enters a new era, Reiwa, with the abdication of the Heisei emperor (Akihito) in 2019. In addition to The People’s Emperor’s discussions of the creation of the postwar imperial institution as a “constitutional symbolic monarchy,” the continued (clandestine) role of Hirohito in politics, the postwar emperors’ approach to Japan’s war responsibility, the “massification” of the imperial family as a kind of model “middle-class” household for the postwar, and various forms of resistance from conservatives, Japan’s Imperial House adds two new chapters and an extensive and important addendum to one other. The two new chapters, respectively, provide a retrospective on the Heisei era (1989-2019) and an overview of the challenges facing the imperial line with Akihito’s son, Naruhito, now on the Chrysanthemum Throne as the Reiwa emperor. The addendum is to chapter 5, which discusses the ways in which anti-democratic and otherwise revanchist forces in postwar Japan coopted the playbook of democratic organizing to achieve (largely symbolic) victories. As we discuss in the interview, Ruoff returns to this topic because his analysis turned out to presage the tactics and successes of Nippon Kaigi, Japan’s most influential nongovernmental ultra-conservative lobbying group, during the Abe Shinzō regime. Terms and names perhaps unfamiliar to some listeners that get bandied about in our discussion include tennō (sovereign, emperor), Yoshida Shigeru (influential early postwar prime minister), Kobayashi Yoshinori (an often-controversial manga artist), and Yasukuni Shrine (which has enshrined prominent Class-A war criminals in addition to the general war dead since March 1978). Nathan Hopson is an associate professor of Japanese and East Asian history in the Graduate School of Humanities, Nagoya University. Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/japanese-studies

Religion is at the heart of such ongoing political debates in Japan as the constitutionality of official government visits to Yasukuni Shrine, yet the very categories that frame these debates, namely religion and the secular, entered the Japanese language less than 150 years ago. To think of religion as a Western imposition, as something alien to Japanese reality, however, would be simplistic. As this in-depth study shows for the first time, religion and the secular were critically reconceived in Japan by Japanese who had their own interests and traditions as well as those received in their encounters with the West. It argues convincingly that by the mid-nineteenth century developments outside of Europe and North America were already part of a global process of rethinking religion. The Buddhist priest Shimaji Mokurai (1838–1911) was the first Japanese to discuss the modern concept of religion in some depth in the early 1870s. In his person, indigenous tradition, politics, and Western influence came together to set the course the reconception of religion would take in Japan.  Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan (University of Hawaii Press, 2016) begins by tracing the history of the modern Japanese term for religion, shūkyō, and its components and exploring the significance of Shimaji’s sectarian background as a True Pure Land Buddhist. Shimaji went on to shape the early Meiji government’s religious policy and was essential in redefining the locus of Buddhism in modernity and indirectly that of Shinto, which led to its definition as nonreligious and in time to the creation of State Shinto.  Finally, the work offers an extensive account of Shimaji’s intellectual dealings with the West (he was one of the first Buddhists to travel to Europe) as well as clarifying the ramifications of these encounters for Shimaji’s own thinking. Concluding chapters historicize Japanese appropriations of secularization from medieval times to the twentieth century and discuss the meaning of the reconception of religion in modern Japan. Highly original and informed, Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan not only emphasizes the agency of Asian actors in colonial and semicolonial situations, but also hints at the function of the concept of religion in modern society: a secularist conception of religion was the only way to ensure the survival of religion as we know it today. In this respect, the Japanese reconception of religion and the secular closely parallels similar developments in the West. Hans Martin Krämer is professor of Japanese studies at the Center for Asian and Transcultural Studies, Heidelberg University. Samee Siddiqui is a former journalist and currently a PhD Candidate at the Department of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. You can find him on twitter @ssiddiqui83 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/buddhist-studies

Religion is at the heart of such ongoing political debates in Japan as the constitutionality of official government visits to Yasukuni Shrine, yet the very categories that frame these debates, namely religion and the secular, entered the Japanese language less than 150 years ago. To think of religion as a Western imposition, as something alien to Japanese reality, however, would be simplistic. As this in-depth study shows for the first time, religion and the secular were critically reconceived in Japan by Japanese who had their own interests and traditions as well as those received in their encounters with the West. It argues convincingly that by the mid-nineteenth century developments outside of Europe and North America were already part of a global process of rethinking religion. The Buddhist priest Shimaji Mokurai (1838–1911) was the first Japanese to discuss the modern concept of religion in some depth in the early 1870s. In his person, indigenous tradition, politics, and Western influence came together to set the course the reconception of religion would take in Japan.  Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan (University of Hawaii Press, 2016) begins by tracing the history of the modern Japanese term for religion, shūkyō, and its components and exploring the significance of Shimaji’s sectarian background as a True Pure Land Buddhist. Shimaji went on to shape the early Meiji government’s religious policy and was essential in redefining the locus of Buddhism in modernity and indirectly that of Shinto, which led to its definition as nonreligious and in time to the creation of State Shinto.  Finally, the work offers an extensive account of Shimaji’s intellectual dealings with the West (he was one of the first Buddhists to travel to Europe) as well as clarifying the ramifications of these encounters for Shimaji’s own thinking. Concluding chapters historicize Japanese appropriations of secularization from medieval times to the twentieth century and discuss the meaning of the reconception of religion in modern Japan. Highly original and informed, Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan not only emphasizes the agency of Asian actors in colonial and semicolonial situations, but also hints at the function of the concept of religion in modern society: a secularist conception of religion was the only way to ensure the survival of religion as we know it today. In this respect, the Japanese reconception of religion and the secular closely parallels similar developments in the West. Hans Martin Krämer is professor of Japanese studies at the Center for Asian and Transcultural Studies, Heidelberg University. Samee Siddiqui is a former journalist and currently a PhD Candidate at the Department of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. You can find him on twitter @ssiddiqui83 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Religion is at the heart of such ongoing political debates in Japan as the constitutionality of official government visits to Yasukuni Shrine, yet the very categories that frame these debates, namely religion and the secular, entered the Japanese language less than 150 years ago. To think of religion as a Western imposition, as something alien to Japanese reality, however, would be simplistic. As this in-depth study shows for the first time, religion and the secular were critically reconceived in Japan by Japanese who had their own interests and traditions as well as those received in their encounters with the West. It argues convincingly that by the mid-nineteenth century developments outside of Europe and North America were already part of a global process of rethinking religion. The Buddhist priest Shimaji Mokurai (1838–1911) was the first Japanese to discuss the modern concept of religion in some depth in the early 1870s. In his person, indigenous tradition, politics, and Western influence came together to set the course the reconception of religion would take in Japan.  Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan (University of Hawaii Press, 2016) begins by tracing the history of the modern Japanese term for religion, shūkyō, and its components and exploring the significance of Shimaji’s sectarian background as a True Pure Land Buddhist. Shimaji went on to shape the early Meiji government’s religious policy and was essential in redefining the locus of Buddhism in modernity and indirectly that of Shinto, which led to its definition as nonreligious and in time to the creation of State Shinto.  Finally, the work offers an extensive account of Shimaji’s intellectual dealings with the West (he was one of the first Buddhists to travel to Europe) as well as clarifying the ramifications of these encounters for Shimaji’s own thinking. Concluding chapters historicize Japanese appropriations of secularization from medieval times to the twentieth century and discuss the meaning of the reconception of religion in modern Japan. Highly original and informed, Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan not only emphasizes the agency of Asian actors in colonial and semicolonial situations, but also hints at the function of the concept of religion in modern society: a secularist conception of religion was the only way to ensure the survival of religion as we know it today. In this respect, the Japanese reconception of religion and the secular closely parallels similar developments in the West. Hans Martin Krämer is professor of Japanese studies at the Center for Asian and Transcultural Studies, Heidelberg University. Samee Siddiqui is a former journalist and currently a PhD Candidate at the Department of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. You can find him on twitter @ssiddiqui83 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/intellectual-history

Religion is at the heart of such ongoing political debates in Japan as the constitutionality of official government visits to Yasukuni Shrine, yet the very categories that frame these debates, namely religion and the secular, entered the Japanese language less than 150 years ago. To think of religion as a Western imposition, as something alien to Japanese reality, however, would be simplistic. As this in-depth study shows for the first time, religion and the secular were critically reconceived in Japan by Japanese who had their own interests and traditions as well as those received in their encounters with the West. It argues convincingly that by the mid-nineteenth century developments outside of Europe and North America were already part of a global process of rethinking religion. The Buddhist priest Shimaji Mokurai (1838–1911) was the first Japanese to discuss the modern concept of religion in some depth in the early 1870s. In his person, indigenous tradition, politics, and Western influence came together to set the course the reconception of religion would take in Japan.  Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan (University of Hawaii Press, 2016) begins by tracing the history of the modern Japanese term for religion, shūkyō, and its components and exploring the significance of Shimaji’s sectarian background as a True Pure Land Buddhist. Shimaji went on to shape the early Meiji government’s religious policy and was essential in redefining the locus of Buddhism in modernity and indirectly that of Shinto, which led to its definition as nonreligious and in time to the creation of State Shinto.  Finally, the work offers an extensive account of Shimaji’s intellectual dealings with the West (he was one of the first Buddhists to travel to Europe) as well as clarifying the ramifications of these encounters for Shimaji’s own thinking. Concluding chapters historicize Japanese appropriations of secularization from medieval times to the twentieth century and discuss the meaning of the reconception of religion in modern Japan. Highly original and informed, Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan not only emphasizes the agency of Asian actors in colonial and semicolonial situations, but also hints at the function of the concept of religion in modern society: a secularist conception of religion was the only way to ensure the survival of religion as we know it today. In this respect, the Japanese reconception of religion and the secular closely parallels similar developments in the West. Hans Martin Krämer is professor of Japanese studies at the Center for Asian and Transcultural Studies, Heidelberg University. Samee Siddiqui is a former journalist and currently a PhD Candidate at the Department of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. You can find him on twitter @ssiddiqui83 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/religion

Religion is at the heart of such ongoing political debates in Japan as the constitutionality of official government visits to Yasukuni Shrine, yet the very categories that frame these debates, namely religion and the secular, entered the Japanese language less than 150 years ago. To think of religion as a Western imposition, as something alien to Japanese reality, however, would be simplistic. As this in-depth study shows for the first time, religion and the secular were critically reconceived in Japan by Japanese who had their own interests and traditions as well as those received in their encounters with the West. It argues convincingly that by the mid-nineteenth century developments outside of Europe and North America were already part of a global process of rethinking religion. The Buddhist priest Shimaji Mokurai (1838–1911) was the first Japanese to discuss the modern concept of religion in some depth in the early 1870s. In his person, indigenous tradition, politics, and Western influence came together to set the course the reconception of religion would take in Japan.  Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan (University of Hawaii Press, 2016) begins by tracing the history of the modern Japanese term for religion, shūkyō, and its components and exploring the significance of Shimaji’s sectarian background as a True Pure Land Buddhist. Shimaji went on to shape the early Meiji government’s religious policy and was essential in redefining the locus of Buddhism in modernity and indirectly that of Shinto, which led to its definition as nonreligious and in time to the creation of State Shinto.  Finally, the work offers an extensive account of Shimaji’s intellectual dealings with the West (he was one of the first Buddhists to travel to Europe) as well as clarifying the ramifications of these encounters for Shimaji’s own thinking. Concluding chapters historicize Japanese appropriations of secularization from medieval times to the twentieth century and discuss the meaning of the reconception of religion in modern Japan. Highly original and informed, Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan not only emphasizes the agency of Asian actors in colonial and semicolonial situations, but also hints at the function of the concept of religion in modern society: a secularist conception of religion was the only way to ensure the survival of religion as we know it today. In this respect, the Japanese reconception of religion and the secular closely parallels similar developments in the West. Hans Martin Krämer is professor of Japanese studies at the Center for Asian and Transcultural Studies, Heidelberg University. Samee Siddiqui is a former journalist and currently a PhD Candidate at the Department of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. You can find him on twitter @ssiddiqui83 Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/japanese-studies

Religion is at the heart of such ongoing political debates in Japan as the constitutionality of official government visits to Yasukuni Shrine, yet the very categories that frame these debates, namely religion and the secular, entered the Japanese language less than 150 years ago. To think of religion as a Western imposition, as something alien to Japanese reality, however, would be simplistic. As this in-depth study shows for the first time, religion and the secular were critically reconceived in Japan by Japanese who had their own interests and traditions as well as those received in their encounters with the West. It argues convincingly that by the mid-nineteenth century developments outside of Europe and North America were already part of a global process of rethinking religion. The Buddhist priest Shimaji Mokurai (1838–1911) was the first Japanese to discuss the modern concept of religion in some depth in the early 1870s. In his person, indigenous tradition, politics, and Western influence came together to set the course the reconception of religion would take in Japan.  Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan (University of Hawaii Press, 2016) begins by tracing the history of the modern Japanese term for religion, shūkyō, and its components and exploring the significance of Shimaji’s sectarian background as a True Pure Land Buddhist. Shimaji went on to shape the early Meiji government’s religious policy and was essential in redefining the locus of Buddhism in modernity and indirectly that of Shinto, which led to its definition as nonreligious and in time to the creation of State Shinto.  Finally, the work offers an extensive account of Shimaji’s intellectual dealings with the West (he was one of the first Buddhists to travel to Europe) as well as clarifying the ramifications of these encounters for Shimaji’s own thinking. Concluding chapters historicize Japanese appropriations of secularization from medieval times to the twentieth century and discuss the meaning of the reconception of religion in modern Japan. Highly original and informed, Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan not only emphasizes the agency of Asian actors in colonial and semicolonial situations, but also hints at the function of the concept of religion in modern society: a secularist conception of religion was the only way to ensure the survival of religion as we know it today. In this respect, the Japanese reconception of religion and the secular closely parallels similar developments in the West. Hans Martin Krämer is professor of Japanese studies at the Center for Asian and Transcultural Studies, Heidelberg University. Samee Siddiqui is a former journalist and currently a PhD Candidate at the Department of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. You can find him on twitter @ssiddiqui83 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/biography

Religion is at the heart of such ongoing political debates in Japan as the constitutionality of official government visits to Yasukuni Shrine, yet the very categories that frame these debates, namely religion and the secular, entered the Japanese language less than 150 years ago. To think of religion as a Western imposition, as something alien to Japanese reality, however, would be simplistic. As this in-depth study shows for the first time, religion and the secular were critically reconceived in Japan by Japanese who had their own interests and traditions as well as those received in their encounters with the West. It argues convincingly that by the mid-nineteenth century developments outside of Europe and North America were already part of a global process of rethinking religion. The Buddhist priest Shimaji Mokurai (1838–1911) was the first Japanese to discuss the modern concept of religion in some depth in the early 1870s. In his person, indigenous tradition, politics, and Western influence came together to set the course the reconception of religion would take in Japan.  Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan (University of Hawaii Press, 2016) begins by tracing the history of the modern Japanese term for religion, shūkyō, and its components and exploring the significance of Shimaji’s sectarian background as a True Pure Land Buddhist. Shimaji went on to shape the early Meiji government’s religious policy and was essential in redefining the locus of Buddhism in modernity and indirectly that of Shinto, which led to its definition as nonreligious and in time to the creation of State Shinto.  Finally, the work offers an extensive account of Shimaji’s intellectual dealings with the West (he was one of the first Buddhists to travel to Europe) as well as clarifying the ramifications of these encounters for Shimaji’s own thinking. Concluding chapters historicize Japanese appropriations of secularization from medieval times to the twentieth century and discuss the meaning of the reconception of religion in modern Japan. Highly original and informed, Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan not only emphasizes the agency of Asian actors in colonial and semicolonial situations, but also hints at the function of the concept of religion in modern society: a secularist conception of religion was the only way to ensure the survival of religion as we know it today. In this respect, the Japanese reconception of religion and the secular closely parallels similar developments in the West. Hans Martin Krämer is professor of Japanese studies at the Center for Asian and Transcultural Studies, Heidelberg University. Samee Siddiqui is a former journalist and currently a PhD Candidate at the Department of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. You can find him on twitter @ssiddiqui83 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

After talking about nuclear warfare, Yasukuni Shrine, AI Art and political weirdos, comedian Saku Yanagawa (www.sakuyanagawa.com) joins the show to talk about the comedy world and how the coronavirus is affecting the industry and his plans to keep going.We finish the show with taxi drivers cleaning graves, top ten companies of 2010 and 2020, and ramen face masks.Japan WUT? Podcast is available everywhere, especially:★Japan WUT? iTunes: https://podcasts.apple.com/jp/podcast/japan-wut-podcast/id1489848400?l=en ★Japan WUT? Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/77v5NR6YqKw7DizDA1jOMj ★Japan WUT? Official Site: www.matthewpmbigelow.com ★Facebook Page: https://www.facebook.com/JapanWUT/ #Japan #Podcast #Comedy #Tokyo #Culture

The Confederate flag is a widely known and highly debated symbol in the U.S. To many, the Confederate flag is a shrine to the fallen southern soldiers from the Civil War. Those flying the flag today claim that they do so to honor their ancestors and the freedom and independence they fought for. To others, however, the Confederate flag is associated with the painful history of slavery and the subsequent white supremacist movements that adopted the flag because of their alignment with the values of the Confederacy. Whatever the motives may be, flying the Confederate flag in public has sparked a lot of controversy in America. References Confederate Flag 1. Scott Eric Kaufman (9 July 2015). “What tradition does the Confederate flag represent? Is it slavery, rape, genocide, treason, or all of the above?" Salon. 2. Ta-Nehisi Coates (22 June 2015). "What this Cruel War Was Over." The Atlantic. 3. Coski 2005, pp. 92–94 4. Geoghegan, Tom (August 30, 2013). "Why do People Still Fly the Confederate Flag?" BBC News. Retrieved October 30, 2013. Yasukuni Shrine 1. Nelson, John. "Social Memory as Ritual Practice: Commemorating Spirits of the Military Dead at Yasukuni Shinto Shrine". Journal of Asian Studies 62, 2 (May 2003): 445–467. 2. Ponsonby-Fane, Richard. (1963). Vicissitudes of Shinto. Kyoto: Ponsonby Memorial Society. OCLC 36655 3. Pye, Michael: "Religion and Conflict in Japan with Special Reference to Shinto and Yasukuni Shrine". Diogenes 50:3 (2003), S. 45–59. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/pacific-atrocities-education/support

Show Notes In this episode: Space-Okinawa, society has a short memory, was childhood ever sacred?, nuclear allegory, fancy uniforms, and mutually assured Gundams.You can read more about the Battle of Okinawa in these pages. While estimates of the number of Tekketsu Kinnotai boys (middle-school aged conscripts) vary, we are going with the 1,780 local Okinawan estimate given by their Peace Museum.Wikipedia has a good overview of the use of child soldiers in WWII generally, including the fact that the International Criminal Court did not make use of child soldiers a war crime until 1998 (and they define "child" as "under the age of fifteen years."Further reading about Yasukuni Shrine and the controversies around it.Did you know the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan "has lasted longer than any other alliance between two great powers since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia"?The essay I mention, that discusses anime portrayals of childhood, is: Ito, Mizuko. “Migrating Media: Anime Media and the Childhood Imagination.” Designing Modern Childhoods: History, Space, and the Material Culture of Children, by Marta Gutman and Ning De Coninck-Smith, Rutgers University Press, 2008, p. 301.These Prussian uniforms are reminiscent of the uniforms on Zeon's rank-and-file, while all Zeon soldiers, including the officers, wear helms inspired by the coal-scuttle-shaped helmets of the German Empire circa WWI.Char's uniform is more specific, harkening back to the uniforms of Prussian cavalry officers circa 1868. Note in particular the collar (like the Zeon uniforms it is a stand-up style, in red with gold detailing), the similarly decorated cuffs, the epaulets, and the single-breasted tunic-style jacket. While none of these features is unique to Prussian cavalry officers or Zeon, the combination of all of them in one uniform is quite rare.You can subscribe to the Mobile Suit Breakdown for free! on fine Podcast services everywhere and on YouTube, follow us on twitter @gundampodcast, check us out at gundampodcast.com, email your questions, comments, and complaints to gundampodcast@gmail.com.The intro music is WASP by Misha Dioxin, and the outro is Long Way Home by Spinning Ratio, both licensed under Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 license. Both have been edited for length. Mobile Suit Breakdown provides critical commentary and is protected by the Fair Use clause of the United States Copyright law. All Gundam content is copyright and/or trademark of Sunrise Inc., Bandai, or its original creator. Mobile Suit Breakdown is in no way affiliated with or endorsed by Sunrise Inc. or Bandai or any of its subsidiaries, employees, or associates and makes no claim to own Gundam or any of the copyrights or trademarks related to it. Copyrighted content used in Mobile Suit Breakdown is used in accordance with the Fair Use clause of the United States Copyright law. Any queries should be directed to gundampodcast@gmail.comFind out more at http://gundampodcast.com

Hi everyone. My name is Norm Nakamura and I run Tokyo Lens. I recently had the opportunity to play the Tsugaru Shamisen at Mitama Matsuri at Yasukuni Shrine. But how did I do? The video linked to today’s Podcast: https://youtu.be/VuVCcKySEP0 Also... So much love to all of those of you asking how you can support Tokyo Lens! I want to be able to be in a position where I can definitely give more than I receive. So It will take some time to get a system set up. For now though, if you do any shopping on Amazon, feel free to click through from my affiliate links! Then you can support just by doing your regular shopping! Thank you all Or grab something here! www.redbubble.com/people/tokyolens www.amazon.com/shop/tokyolens Gear: ------------------------ Filmed on this: amzn.to/2eYRvX0 Edited on this: amzn.to/2mqxTLN With this lens. amzn.to/2u8YgHY And this Mic: amzn.to/2uO5wuG

Akiko Takenaka’s new book looks carefully at Yasukuni Shrine as a war memorial, examining its role in waging war, honoring the dead, promoting peace, and building a modern national identity. Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan’s Unending Postwar (University of Hawaii Press, 2015) pays special attention to the significance of memory and spatial practice in shaping Yasukuni as belief, site, and issue. The chapters guide readers from the pre-history of Yasukuni tracing the origin of an important myth that developed around Yasukuni Shrine during the Asia-Pacific War: the idea that dying for the emperor would result in enshrinement at Yasukuni as a god through the very different uses of the space as a venue for popular entertainments and celebrations, the popularization of beliefs associated with the shrine outside of Tokyo and the nationalization of the Yasukuni myth, the practices associated with Yasukuni during total war mobilization during the Asia-Pacific War, the politics and legalities of enshrinement at Yasukuni, and postmemory at Yasukuni today. Its a clear and compelling study of an important issue that will be of interest to many readers. Enjoy! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Akiko Takenaka’s new book looks carefully at Yasukuni Shrine as a war memorial, examining its role in waging war, honoring the dead, promoting peace, and building a modern national identity. Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan’s Unending Postwar (University of Hawaii Press, 2015) pays special attention to the significance of... Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Akiko Takenaka’s new book looks carefully at Yasukuni Shrine as a war memorial, examining its role in waging war, honoring the dead, promoting peace, and building a modern national identity. Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan’s Unending Postwar (University of Hawaii Press, 2015) pays special attention to the significance of memory and spatial practice in shaping Yasukuni as belief, site, and issue. The chapters guide readers from the pre-history of Yasukuni tracing the origin of an important myth that developed around Yasukuni Shrine during the Asia-Pacific War: the idea that dying for the emperor would result in enshrinement at Yasukuni as a god through the very different uses of the space as a venue for popular entertainments and celebrations, the popularization of beliefs associated with the shrine outside of Tokyo and the nationalization of the Yasukuni myth, the practices associated with Yasukuni during total war mobilization during the Asia-Pacific War, the politics and legalities of enshrinement at Yasukuni, and postmemory at Yasukuni today. Its a clear and compelling study of an important issue that will be of interest to many readers. Enjoy! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Akiko Takenaka’s new book looks carefully at Yasukuni Shrine as a war memorial, examining its role in waging war, honoring the dead, promoting peace, and building a modern national identity. Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan’s Unending Postwar (University of Hawaii Press, 2015) pays special attention to the significance of memory and spatial practice in shaping Yasukuni as belief, site, and issue. The chapters guide readers from the pre-history of Yasukuni tracing the origin of an important myth that developed around Yasukuni Shrine during the Asia-Pacific War: the idea that dying for the emperor would result in enshrinement at Yasukuni as a god through the very different uses of the space as a venue for popular entertainments and celebrations, the popularization of beliefs associated with the shrine outside of Tokyo and the nationalization of the Yasukuni myth, the practices associated with Yasukuni during total war mobilization during the Asia-Pacific War, the politics and legalities of enshrinement at Yasukuni, and postmemory at Yasukuni today. Its a clear and compelling study of an important issue that will be of interest to many readers. Enjoy! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Akiko Takenaka’s new book looks carefully at Yasukuni Shrine as a war memorial, examining its role in waging war, honoring the dead, promoting peace, and building a modern national identity. Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan’s Unending Postwar (University of Hawaii Press, 2015) pays special attention to the significance of... Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/japanese-studies

Akiko Takenaka’s new book looks carefully at Yasukuni Shrine as a war memorial, examining its role in waging war, honoring the dead, promoting peace, and building a modern national identity. Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan’s Unending Postwar (University of Hawaii Press, 2015) pays special attention to the significance of memory and spatial practice in shaping Yasukuni as belief, site, and issue. The chapters guide readers from the pre-history of Yasukuni tracing the origin of an important myth that developed around Yasukuni Shrine during the Asia-Pacific War: the idea that dying for the emperor would result in enshrinement at Yasukuni as a god through the very different uses of the space as a venue for popular entertainments and celebrations, the popularization of beliefs associated with the shrine outside of Tokyo and the nationalization of the Yasukuni myth, the practices associated with Yasukuni during total war mobilization during the Asia-Pacific War, the politics and legalities of enshrinement at Yasukuni, and postmemory at Yasukuni today. Its a clear and compelling study of an important issue that will be of interest to many readers. Enjoy! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Akiko Takenaka’s new book looks carefully at Yasukuni Shrine as a war memorial, examining its role in waging war, honoring the dead, promoting peace, and building a modern national identity. Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan’s Unending Postwar (University of Hawaii Press, 2015) pays special attention to the significance of memory and spatial practice in shaping Yasukuni as belief, site, and issue. The chapters guide readers from the pre-history of Yasukuni tracing the origin of an important myth that developed around Yasukuni Shrine during the Asia-Pacific War: the idea that dying for the emperor would result in enshrinement at Yasukuni as a god through the very different uses of the space as a venue for popular entertainments and celebrations, the popularization of beliefs associated with the shrine outside of Tokyo and the nationalization of the Yasukuni myth, the practices associated with Yasukuni during total war mobilization during the Asia-Pacific War, the politics and legalities of enshrinement at Yasukuni, and postmemory at Yasukuni today. Its a clear and compelling study of an important issue that will be of interest to many readers. Enjoy! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Sheila Smith (Council on Foreign Relations) gives a talk for the Asian Studies Centre on 24th November 2015. No country feels China's rise more deeply than Japan. CFR Senior Fellow Sheila A. Smith will discuss her new book, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China. Smith explores the policy issues testing the Japanese government as it tries to navigate its relationship with an advancing China through intricate case studies of visits by politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine, conflicts at the East China Sea boundary, concerns about food safety, and strategies of island defense. Sheila A. Smith, an expert on Japanese politics and foreign policy, is senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). She joined CFR from the East-West Center in 2007, where she directed a multinational research team in a cross-national study of the domestic politics of the U.S. military presence in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Smith was on the faculty of the department of international relations at Boston University (1994–2000), and on the staff of the Social Science Research Council (1992–1993). She has been a visiting researcher at two leading Japanese foreign and security policy think tanks, the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Research Institute for Peace and Security, and at the University of Tokyo and the University of the Ryukyus. Smith teaches as an adjunct professor at the Asian Studies Department of Georgetown University and serves on the board of its Journal of Asian Affairs. She earned her PhD degree from the department of political science at Columbia University.

We've discussed this subject before, but some subjects demand further exploration, especially those which can be part of our daily life.  Every spiritual path and every society has some version of ghosts.  The noun used might differ, but it's quite possible to come up with a definition which encompasses all of them, from the soldiers still fighting at Gettysburg to your recently departed relative to the spirits at Yasukuni Shrine in Japan.  Once realize who they can be, it is easy enough to see how important they are.  And from there, we can learn to deal with them.  And what we learn here can apply elsewhere, too!NOTE: I see that there is question in Snopes about one item I featured in comment.  I go with the best information I have at the time, and anyone who would call for walls might call for special ID.Blessed Be!

The general consensus, not just here in China but around the world, is that the Japanese leadership is pursuing a path which amounts to something of a whitewash of the country's wartime past. From seemingly endorsing the denial of comfort women to an attempt to give international recognition to kamikaze pilots, the administration of Shinzo Abe is winning few friends and allies at the moment. China, South Korea and America are deeply worried that the Japanese may be trying to revise and revive nationalist sentiments which proved to be so deadly and destructive during the years in the run-up and during the Second World War. This has been capped by Abe's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine which is akin to paying homage to mass murderers and rapists. But what are the reasons for Japan's revival of nationalist sentiments? And could the territorial dispute with China lead to something more troublesome in an already volatile region? - Zhang Baohui, Professor of political Science, Lingnan University, Hong Kong - Mel Gurtov, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Portland State University; Editor-in-Chief, Asian Perspective - Jia Xiudong, Senior Research Fellow from China Institute of International Studies

Chinese and Korean communities in Australia are planning to erect a statue to commemorate the plight of so-called comfort women during World War II. Our Australian correspondent Wang Xiao has more. Reporter Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine last December, where the tablets of 14 Class A Criminals of War of World War II are kept. Abe's actions have been met with strong indignation from Chinese and Korean people living in Australia. Recently, these communities held a joint meeting and set up an "Anti Japanese war crimes Alliance" to protest the Japanese prime minister's behavior. Yang Dongdong, coordinator of Chinese communities in Australia, the group has several demands. "First, we ask the Australian governments at all levels take a stand on Shinzo Abe's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine; second, the issue of comfort women, and third, the application of the original files about the Nanking Massacre for the list of world heritage. We urge Japan to apologize to its victims in neighboring countries." Along with the open letter, the Chinese and Korean communities are going to erect a statue honoring comfort women, a euphemism for the sex slaves conscripted into Japanese military brothels during World War II. Sang Doo Ok, leader of the Korean community, says it aims to keep people focused on a history that should not be forgotten. Over 200 thousand women of different nationalities, including Korean, Chinese and Philippine origin, were forced into sex slavery and human trafficking by the Japanese military. The prostitution corps involved women from across the globe, with many from occupied countries. The "comfort stations" also involved a small number of women from Holland and Australia. Mr Ok says the statue presents true history to Chinese and Korean migrants as well as local Australians. Nearly 700 thousand Chinese migrants and 150-thousand Korean descendants are living in Australia, and in Sydney there are 450 thousand and 100 thousand respectively. Most people in these communities have signed the open letter, and have agreed to cooperate long-term against the revival of militarism by Japanese right-wing forces.

The Japan Podcast Episode - 071 Your browser does not support the audio element. Right Click to [Download]The holidays are upon us and with that we had to do a new episode to the best podcast about Japan.  In this episode we talk about all the latest news and happenings in Japan. Show Notes:"The Yank" is buying a houseNew Podcast LogoEmperor Akihito's 80th BirthdayKei Cars Killing Japan's Auto Industry?What the heck is "Chaku - Uta"??Weekly Chaku - Uta RankingKentucky Fried SnacksJapan to spend more on military "Self Defense"Abe Goes to Yasukuni Shrine and Pisses Everyone OffOshima Yuko Graduation from AKB48Koda Kumi New CDAsians Love Japanese Porn (like everyone else :-)Mountain Dew Snack in Japan

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. The inaugural lecture of The Tetsuo Najita Distinguished Lecture Series in Japanese Studies, by Professor Tetsuya Takahashi, University of TokyoProfessor Takahashi's writings, including his 2005 bestseller, The Yasukuni Issue, make unmistakably clear that the role of the Shrine is antithetical to democratic values in Japan and to reconciliation with Asia, which requires acknowledgment of the harms inflicted through colonialism and war. The subject of his lecture is Japan at a crossroads today, its hard-won postwar democratic values at stake as never before.Professor Takahashi teaches philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Tokyo. He specializes in contemporary European philosophy and has been particularly interested in the ethical aspects of the work of Jacques Derrida.

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. The inaugural lecture of The Tetsuo Najita Distinguished Lecture Series in Japanese Studies, by Professor Tetsuya Takahashi, University of TokyoProfessor Takahashi's writings, including his 2005 bestseller, The Yasukuni Issue, make unmistakably clear that the role of the Shrine is antithetical to democratic values in Japan and to reconciliation with Asia, which requires acknowledgment of the harms inflicted through colonialism and war. The subject of his lecture is Japan at a crossroads today, its hard-won postwar democratic values at stake as never before.Professor Takahashi teaches philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Tokyo. He specializes in contemporary European philosophy and has been particularly interested in the ethical aspects of the work of Jacques Derrida.

Professor Takahashi's writings, including his 2005 bestseller, The Yasukuni Issue, make unmistakably clear that the role of the Shrine is antithetical to democratic values in Japan and to reconciliation with Asia, which requires acknowledgment of the harms inflicted through colonialism and war. The subject of his lecture is Japan at a crossroads today, its hard-won postwar democratic values at stake as never before. Professor Takahashi teaches philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Tokyo. He specializes in contemporary European philosophy and has been particularly interested in the ethical aspects of the work of Jacques Derrida. Sponsored by the Japan Committee of the Center for East Asian Studies and the Center for International Studies.

Professor Takahashi's writings, including his 2005 bestseller, The Yasukuni Issue, make unmistakably clear that the role of the Shrine is antithetical to democratic values in Japan and to reconciliation with Asia, which requires acknowledgment of the harms inflicted through colonialism and war. The subject of his lecture is Japan at a crossroads today, its hard-won postwar democratic values at stake as never before. Professor Takahashi teaches philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Tokyo. He specializes in contemporary European philosophy and has been particularly interested in the ethical aspects of the work of Jacques Derrida. Sponsored by the Japan Committee of the Center for East Asian Studies and the Center for International Studies.