Podcast appearances and mentions of al udeid

La semana pasada Donald Trump realizó la primera gira internacional de su segundo mandato. Visitó Arabia Saudí, Qatar y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos. Este viaje, centrado en acuerdos comerciales y asuntos geopolíticos de primer nivel como la cuestión de Siria, supone un punto de inflexión en tanto que Trump se mostró dispuesto a dialogar. Algo llamativo ya que, al menos en este ámbito, su postura es realista y libre de los maximalismos de su primer trimestre en el cargo. De forma un tanto sorprendente dejó a Israel en un segundo plano. Lo que no fue sorprendente en absoluto fue su silencio por el respeto a los derechos humanos en aquella región, pero eso ya estaba previsto y es coherente con lo que ya hizo en su primer mandato. El periplo comenzó en Riad, donde Trump fue recibido por el príncipe heredero Mohammed bin Salman. Arabia Saudí comprometió 600.000 millones de dólares en inversiones en EEUU enfocadas en defensa, tecnología y energía. Un foro de inversión reunió a líderes empresariales como Larry Fink de BlackRock y Jane Fraser de Citigroup, subrayando la importancia que el presidente dio al apartado económico de la gira. En Riad se reunió con el presidente interino sirio, Ahmed al-Sharaa, en un encuentro histórico. Anunció el levantamiento de sanciones a Siria para impulsar su estabilización tras la caída de Bashar al-Assad. Esta decisión, respaldada por Arabia Saudí y Qatar, fue elogiada por las cancillerías europeas, pero criticada por Israel, que considera a al-Sharaa un exyihadista. En Doha Trump fue agasajado por el emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. Qatar firmó acuerdos por 243.000 millones de dólares que incluyen la adquisición de más de 200 aviones Boeing. Desde la base aérea Al Udeid, la mayor instalación militar estadounidense en Oriente Medio, Trump reiteró su prioridad de “terminar conflictos, no iniciarlos”, aunque advirtió que no dudaría en usar el poder militar si fuera necesario. Propuso una “zona de libertad” en Gaza, un concepto vago que ha generado infinidad de especulaciones, pero evitó hablar de la guerra aún en curso en la franja. La gira culminó en Abu Dabi, donde el Gobierno de los Emiratos anunció una inversión de 440.000 millones de dólares en el sector energético estadounidense a lo largo de la próxima década. Trump visitó la Gran Mezquita y la Casa de la Familia Abrahámica tratando de proyectar una imagen de cooperación cultural. Poco antes, en su discurso en Riad, condenó el intervencionismo estadounidense del pasado, y eso fue bien recibido entre los líderes políticos del golfo Pérsico, pero alarmó a defensores de los derechos humanos. Un aspecto notable fue la exclusión de Israel del itinerario, lo que revela que hay tensiones latentes con su primer ministro, Benjamin Netanyahu. Trump ignoró las objeciones israelíes para levantar las sanciones a Siria y negociar con Hamás con el objetivo de liberar al rehén estadounidense Edan Alexander. Todo de forma directa y dejando a un lado a los israelíes. Además, avanzó que quiere reiniciar las conversaciones nucleares con Irán mediadas por Omán, lo que ha provocado nuevas fricciones con Israel, que teme un acuerdo favorable a Teherán. La gira, salteada por una serie de aciertos, supone el regreso al pragmatismo que caracterizó a su primer mandato, más centrado en la estabilidad económica que en decisiones rupturistas y problemáticas como la guerra comercial contra todo el mundo. En La ContraRéplica: 0:00 Introducción 3:57 Oportunidad para Irán 28:58 Uranio en España 35:10 Inteligencia artificial en China · Canal de Telegram: https://t.me/lacontracronica · “Contra la Revolución Francesa”… https://amzn.to/4aF0LpZ · “Hispanos. Breve historia de los pueblos de habla hispana”… https://amzn.to/428js1G · “La ContraHistoria de España. Auge, caída y vuelta a empezar de un país en 28 episodios”… https://amzn.to/3kXcZ6i · “Lutero, Calvino y Trento, la Reforma que no fue”… https://amzn.to/3shKOlK · “La ContraHistoria del comunismo”… https://amzn.to/39QP2KE Apoya La Contra en: · Patreon... https://www.patreon.com/diazvillanueva · iVoox... https://www.ivoox.com/podcast-contracronica_sq_f1267769_1.html · Paypal... https://www.paypal.me/diazvillanueva Sígueme en: · Web... https://diazvillanueva.com · Twitter... https://twitter.com/diazvillanueva · Facebook... https://www.facebook.com/fernandodiazvillanueva1/ · Instagram... https://www.instagram.com/diazvillanueva · Linkedin… https://www.linkedin.com/in/fernando-d%C3%ADaz-villanueva-7303865/ · Flickr... https://www.flickr.com/photos/147276463@N05/?/ · Pinterest... https://www.pinterest.com/fernandodiazvillanueva Encuentra mis libros en: · Amazon... https://www.amazon.es/Fernando-Diaz-Villanueva/e/B00J2ASBXM #FernandoDiazVillanueva #iran #trump Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

President Trump's Art of the Deal is brilliant, but are Radical Islamist-sympathizers on the same page? Today, TheTerrorist Therapist® Carole Lieberman, M.D., poses the question: can Trump's clever logic overcome the illogical religious zeal that drives terrorists to rape and murder? It's the nagging question underlying his recent trip to the Middle East.President Trump visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. He met with their leaders, as well as the leader of Syria. He was given a royal welcome - with horses, camels, hair flip dancers, and dined on delicacies in fine palaces. He made billions of dollars worth of trade agreements benefitting America. But, each of these countries and leaders have a ‘mixed bag' ofpositive and negative relations with the U.S. For example, Trump made lucrative deals with Saudi Arabia and even  arranged for an Arabian leopard to be exhibited at an American zoo, while victims of 9/11 are still pursuing a lawsuit against the Saudis for their role in this attack. Trump made similar gains in Qatar. As an ally, they continue to  host our troops at the Al Udeid Air base; but, as an enemy, they also host the leaders of Hamas. The United Arab Emirates has a more positive history, in that it signed the Abraham Accords, which Trump has continued to try to convince these other leaders to sign. You will hear about the risks and benefits at each of the stops on his itinerary. The Prophet Muhammad said, “War is deceit.” So, can we trust these countries? Is Qatar's gift of a flying palace for Air Force 1 a Trojan horse and a risk to Trump's life? I hope not. These are risky times, but Trump is nonetheless working hard to fulfill his promises to bring about world peace. 

မေ လ ၁၅ ရက်၊ ကြာသပတေး ညချမ်း ဘီဘီစီမြန်မာပိုင်း ရေဒီယို အစီအစဉ် - လက်ရှိ အာဆီယံဥက္ကဋ္ဌ မလေးရှားနိုင်ငံအနေနဲ့ ဒေသတွင်းမှာ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်ကို လေယာဉ်ဆီ ရောင်းချတာနဲ့ လွှဲပြောင်းတာတွေကို တားမြစ်နိုင်ရေး အတွက် အရေးပေါ် အစီအမံတွေ ဆောင်ရွက်သင့်ပြီလို့ နိုင်ငံတကာ လေ့လာစောင့်ကြည့်ရေး အဖွဲ့ (Fortify Rights) က တိုက်တွန်း - မြန်မာ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်ရဲ့ လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုတွေကြောင့် ကလေးသူငယ်တွေ အများစု ပါဝင်တဲ့ လူပေါင်း ၂၀ ကျော် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းထဲက စာသင်ကျောင်း တစ်ခုမှာ အစုလိုက် အပြုံလိုက် သေဆုံးရသလို၊ ရခိုင်မှာ ဆိုရင်လည်း ၂ ရက်အတွင်း လူတွေ အနည်းဆုံး ဒါဇင်ကျော် သေဆုံးခဲ့ရတဲ့ ဖြစ်ရပ်တွေ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ အပြီး အခုလို ဆော်ဩမှုမျိုး ထွက်ပေါ်လာတာ ဖြစ် - ငလျင်ဒဏ် အပြင်းအထန် ခံစားခဲ့ရတဲ့ ဒေသတွေ အပါအဝင်၊ နိုင်ငံတဝန်းမှာ လာမယ့်ဇွန်လ ၂ ရက်နေ့ ကျရင် အခြေခံပညာကျောင်းတွေ ပြန်ဖွင့်တော့မှာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဒါပေမဲ့လည်း ငလျင်ဒဏ်သင့်ခဲ့တဲ့ ဒေသတွေမှာတော့ စာသင်ကျောင်းတွေ အနည်းနဲ့အများ ဆိုသလို ထိခိုက် ပျက်စီးထားတာတွေဟာ ထောင်နဲ့ချီ ရှိနေပါတယ်။ အဲဒီစာသင်ကျောင်းတွေကို ကျောင်းဖွင့်ချိန်အမီ ပြန်လည် ပြင်ဆင် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်မှာပါလား။ ငလျင်ကြောင့် စိတ်ပိုင်း ရုပ်ပိုင်း မလုံမခြုံ ဖြစ်နေရတဲ့ မိဘတွေ အနေနဲ့ သားသမီးတွေကို ကျောင်းလွှတ်ဖို့ အသင့်ရှိရဲ့လား … - ရန်ကုန်မြို့၊ သီလဝါ ဘက်စုံသုံး နိုင်ငံတကာဆိပ်ကမ်း စီမံကိန်းကနေ ဂျပန် ကုမ္ပဏီကြီး သုံးခု ထွက်ခွာဖို့ ပြင်ဆင်နေတယ်လို့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံထဲက နိုင်ငံရပ်ခြား စီးပွားရေး ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုတွေကို စောင့်ကြည့်နေတဲ့ Justice For Myanmar အဖွဲ့ က ထုတ်ပြန်ပါတယ်။ ဘယ် လုပ်ငန်းတွေ လုပ်နေတဲ့ ဂျပန် ကုမ္ပဏီတွေ ဘာ့ကြောင့် ထွက်ခွာကြတာပါလဲ … - အင်အားပြင်း ငလျင်ကြီး လှုပ်ခတ်ပြီးတဲ့နောက် ငလျင်ဒဏ် အပြင်းအထန် ခံခဲ့ရတဲ့ မန္တလေးမြို့မှာ ငလျင် လှုပ် ခတ်ပြီး တစ်လကျော်ကြာတဲ့ အချိန်ထိ အသေးစား အလတ်စား စက်မှု၊ လက်မှု လုပ်ငန်းတွေ အားလုံး ထဲက ထက်ဝက်ကျော် ရပ်ဆိုင်းနေပြီး ပြန်လည်ထူထောင်ဖို့အတွက် လိုအပ်ချက်တွေ များတယ်လို့ လုပ်ငန်းရှင်တွေက ပြောပါတယ်။ အမရပူရမြို့နယ်ကို ကြည့်ရင်လည်း နာမည်ကျော် ရိုးရာ ယက်ကန်း လုပ်ငန်းတချို့ပါ ပြန်လည် မလည်ပတ်နိုင်သေးတဲ့ အခြေအနေမျိုး ရှိနေပါတယ် … စတဲ့ ဘီဘီစီ သတင်းလွှာတွေနဲ့ - မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ သမိုင်းမှာ ပုဂံခေတ် နောက်ပိုင်း နန်းစိုက်ခဲ့ကြတဲ့ စစ်ကိုင်း-အင်း၀- မန္တလေး ဒေသမှာ သမိုင်း၀င် အုတ်အဆောက်အအုံတွေ နည်းပါးတာဟာ ငလျင်ဘေးကို စိုးရိမ်လို့ မဆောက်ကြတာလား၊ ငလျင်ကြောင့် သမိုင်းဆိုင်ရာမှာ ဘယ်လို ထိခိုက်ခဲ့သလဲ၊ စစ်ကိုင်း-မန္တလေး ငလျင်တကြောက သမိုင်း၀င် အပျက်အစီး နေရာတွေကို သွားရောက် ကြည့်ရှုခဲ့တဲ့ သမိုင်းပါမောက္ခ ဦးနီတွတ်နဲ့ ဘီဘီစီ မေးမြန်းခန်းကိုလည်း တင်ဆက် ပေးထားပါတယ်။ - ထိပ်တန်း နိုင်ငံတကာ သတင်းတွေမှာတော့ …. ယူကရိန်း သမ္မတ ဇလန်းစကီး တူရကီ နိုင်ငံ မြို့တော် အန်ကာရာကို ရောက်လာပါတယ်။ ရုရှားသမ္မတ ပူတင်ကတော့ တူရကီကို သူကိုယ်တိုင် လိုက်မလာပဲ သူ့ရဲ့ ကိုယ်စားလှယ် အဖွဲ့ကို စေလွှတ်လိုက်ပါတယ်။ ဒါဟာ မစ္စတာ ဇလန်စကီးနဲ့ လူချင်း တိုက်ရိုက်တွေ့ပြီး စကားပြောတာမျိုး မလုပ်ဖို့ ရုရှားသမ္မတက ဆုံးဖြတ်ခဲ့တာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အဲဒီ လူစားထိုး အဖွဲ့က ဘာတွေကို ဘယ်လောက် ဆုံးဖြတ်နိုင်မလဲ ဆိုတာ မသိတဲ့ အတွက်၊ ယူကရိန်း အနေနဲ့လည်း ဘာဆက်လုပ်မလဲ ဆိုတာကို အိမ်ရှင် တူရကီ သမ္မတ ရာဂျစ် တိုင်ရိ(ပ) အာဒိုအန်နဲ့ သူ စကားပြောပြီးမှ ဆုံးဖြတ်မယ်လို့ အန်ကာရာကို အရောက်မှာပဲ သမ္မတ ဇလန်စကီးက ပြောပါတယ်။ - အမေရိကန် သမ္မတ ထရမ့်ဟာ အရှေ့အလယ်ပိုင်း ဒေသမှာ အကြီးဆုံး အမေရိကန် စစ်အခြေစိုက် စခန်း ဖြစ်တဲ့ အယ်လာဒိ(ဒ) Al Udeid လေတပ် စခန်းကို သွားရောက် ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အယ်လာဒိ(ဒ) လေတပ်စခန်းဟာ ကာတာနိုင်ငံမြို့တော် ဒိုဟာရဲ့ အနောက်တောင်ဘက် သဲကန္တရမှာ အခြေစိုက် တည်ရှိပါတယ်။ သူ ဦးစားပေး ဆောင်ရွက်နေတဲ့ အရာတွေဟာ စစ်ပွဲတွေကို ချုပ်ငြိမ်းစေရေး ဖြစ်ပြီး၊ အသစ် အသစ်တွေ စတင်ဖို့ မဟုတ်ဘူးလို့ သမ္မတ ထရမ့်က အဲဒီမှာ ရှိနေတဲ့ အမေရိကန် စစ်သားတွေကို ပြောပါတယ်။ သမ္မတ ထရမ့်ဟာ ပင်လယ်ကွေ့ ဒေသ နိုင်ငံတွေဆီ ၄ ရက်တာ ခရီးစဉ် လှည့်လည်နေတာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဆော်ဒီကနေ ကာတာကို ရောက်လာခဲ့ပြီးတဲ့နောက်၊ ယူအေအီး နိုင်ငံဆီ ခရီးဆက်မှာ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ - ဂါဇာမှာ ရှိတဲ့ ဆေးရုံ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်း သတင်းရင်းမြစ်တွေ ရဲ့ အဆိုအရ၊ ဂါဇာနေရာ အနှံ့ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့တဲ့ အစ္စရေးရဲ့ လေကြောင်း တိုက်ခိုက်မှုတွေကြောင့် ပါလက်စတိုင်း ၆၂ ယောက် ထက်မနည်း သေဆုံးခဲ့ရတယ်လို့ ဆိုပါတယ်။အိုးအိမ်စွန့်ခွာ ထွက်ပြေး သူတွေ ယာယီ ခိုလှုံ နေထိုင်ရာ ခန်းယူနစ်မြို့ ဝန်းကျင်က နေရာတွေမှာပါ တိုက်ခိုက်ခံရတဲ့ ဖြစ်ပြီး၊ အဲဒီ နေရာတွေမှာ လူအများစု သေဆုံးခဲ့ရတာ ဖြစ်တယ်လို့လည်း ပြောကြပါတယ်။ ဘီဘီစီရဲ့ ရေဒီယိုအစီအစဉ်တွေကို အင်တာနက်ဝက်ဘ်ဆိုက်နဲ့ ပေါ့ဒ်ကတ်စ်တွေကနေလည်း နားဆင် နိုင်ပါတယ်။ ----- ဘီဘီစီရဲ့ ရေဒီယိုအစီအစဉ်တွေကို အင်တာနက်ဝက်ဘ်ဆိုက်နဲ့ ပေါ့ဒ်ကတ်စ်တွေကနေလည်း နားဆင် နိုင်ပါတယ်။ ညပိုင်းအစီအစဉ် ပေါ့ဒ်ကတ်စ် နားဆင်ရန် https://bbc.in/36H8bsY ညပိုင်း ထုတ်လွှင့်မှု နားဆင်ရန် https://bbc.in/2TSNLYZ အသံလွှင့်နေစဉ် တိုက်ရိုက်နားဆင်ရန် - https://bbc.in/36EzLXM #ဘီဘီစီမြန်မာပိုင်း #ရေဒီယို

S3E17 Air Force Lt Col Owen Freeland My guest today is Air Force Lt Col Owen Freeland.  He attended high school in Biloxi, MS and joined the Air Force in 1997 as a Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory or PMEL Airman.  His first assignment was to Mountain Home AFB, ID in 1998.  In 2000, he cross-trained to communications, got married, went to tech school at Keesler AFB, MS and was then assigned to Peterson AFB, CO.  In 2003, he put a package in for Officer Candidate School (OCS) and was commissioned as a 33S Communications Officer.  After attending OCS at Maxwell AFB, AL and Basic Comm Officer training back at Keesler, he was assigned to Offutt AFB, NE.  In 2008, he was deployed to Al Udeid and was promoted to Captain after his return.  He was next assigned to USAFCENT at Shaw AFB, SC.  In 2012, he deployed to Afghanistan for a year.  After returning in 2013, he was  assigned to Ft. Meade, MD.  There he was promoted to Major and was selected to attend Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth in 2016.  In 2017, he was selected to command a Cyber Detachment at Ft. Meade.  After command he was assigned to CYBERCOM Staff.  He was promoted to Lt Col in 2019 and was assigned to USSPACECOM at Peterson SFB in 2022.  LtCol Freeland is set to retire in 2024.

Heather R. King serves as a certified preparation and integration coach for Heroic Hearts Project and SCA Integration. She possesses a unique blend of discipline and communication skills enabling her to create a safe and supportive environment for clients, empowering them on their paths to recovery, growth, and a renewed sense of purpose. She served in the U.S. Air Force as a “crew chief” on B-1s and C-130s. She had multiple deployments to Diego Garcia, Guam, and Al-Udeid in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Global War on Terrorism. After earning a M.P.S. in Strategic Public Relations from George Washington University, she went to work for a VA hospital in Tennessee. As a storyteller, Heather saw firsthand the gaps in services for Veterans with PTSD. This ignited a passion to make a positive impact in the lives of fellow veterans. Heather has confronted and conquered her own battles with PTSD and alcoholism, ultimately achieving sobriety in 2016. In her journey towards healing, she sought out psychedelic therapy in 2020, and the transformative results inspired her to dedicate her efforts to providing support and resources to veterans looking to explore psychedelic medicines for spiritual and emotional growth. https://heroicheartsproject.org

On today's Air Force Report Staff Sergeant Traci Keller tells us about an Airman whose heritage is breaking cultural barriers at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar.

« Tương lai kinh tế đặt ở Trung Quốc » : Năm 2009 Cheikh Hamad ben Khalifa al Thani, cố lãnh đạo Qatar đã thấy rõ điều đó. Nhưng Doha vẫn lệ thuộc vào Hoa Kỳ về mặt an ninh để tự vệ trước những đối thủ trong khu vực như Ả Rập Xê Út hay Bahrain, Các Tiểu Vương Quốc Ả Rập Thống Nhất. Cuộc đối đầu Mỹ-Trung khiến bài toán của Doha thêm phần nan giải.   Tương tự như rất nhiều các đồng minh châu Á và châu Âu của Hoa Kỳ, chính quyền Doha rất sợ sẽ phải chọn đứng về phe nào khi đã mở rộng hợp tác với Trung Quốc về thương mại và thậm chí là cả trong lĩnh vực quân sự, nhưng an ninh lại hoàn toàn lệ thuộc vào Mỹ. Liệu Qatar có đang rời xa quỹ đạo của Mỹ để ngả vào vòng tay Trung Quốc hay không ? Chìa khóa tăng trưởng đặt tại Bắc Kinh Là một quốc gia với chưa đầy ba triệu dân, có diện tích bằng 1/3 so với Đài Loan, nhờ có dầu khí, (đem về đến hơn 60 % GDP và chiếm 85 % tổng kim ngạch xuất khẩu), Qatar thiết lập được kênh đối thoại đặc biệt với Trung Quốc. Tương tự như nhiều nước trong Vịnh Ba Tư, Qatar đã trở thành một mắt xích không thể thiếu trong dự án « Một Vành Đai, Một Con Đường » của Bắc Kinh. Từ năm 2014 nhờ một hiệp định hợp tác, Trung Quốc được mời tham gia vào kế hoạch « Tầm Nhìn Quốc Gia Qatar 2030 ». Qua đó hai tập đoàn dầu khí PetroChina và Sinopec đầu tư, mở rộng các hoạt động tại mỏ khí đốt North Field của Qatar. Trả lời RFI tiếng Việt, chuyên gia về Trung Đông, Jean- Loup Samaan thuộc Đại Học Quốc Gia Singapore và Viện Quan Hệ Quốc Tế Pháp IFRI nhấn mạnh đến sự gắn kết càng lúc càng chặt chẽ giữa Qatar và Trung Quốc về mặt thương mại và kinh tế. Ông cũng là tác giả bài tham luận mang tựa đề Qatar trước sự kình địch Mỹ-Trung : Thế lưỡng nan của một vương quốc trong vùng Vịnh, đăng trên trang mạng của IFRI tháng 11/2021. Jean-Loup Samaan : « Thoạt đầu, trao đổi chủ yếu giới hạn trong lĩnh vực khí đốt. Doha là một trong những nguồn cung cấp quan trọng của Trung Quốc, bảo đảm khoảng 35 % nguồn khí đốt nhập khẩu của nước này. Tuy nhiên trong những năm gần đây, mậu dịch giữa Trung Quốc và Qatar, từng bước, mở rộng ra nhiều lĩnh vực. Trung Quốc đầu tư vào Qatar, một số tập đoàn của Trung Quốc tham gia vào các công trình trùng tu cơ sở hạ tầng cho quốc gia trong vùng Vịnh này, nâng cấp các hải cảng và thậm chí Hoa Vi đang trở thành một trong những đối tác chính của Qatar để xây dựng hệ thống mạng 5G ». Từ 2000 đến 2020 tổng trao đổi mậu dịch hai chiều đang từ 50 triệu đô la nhảy vọt lên tới 10 tỷ. Bên cạnh vế mậu dịch, Doha và Bắc Kinh còn thúc đẩy quan hệ trong hai lĩnh vực khác là ngoại giao và quân sự. Lãnh đạo Qatar hiện nay, Cheikh Tamim ben Hamad al Thani lên cầm quyền năm 2013 cùng lúc với chủ tịch Tập Cận Bình và ông đã hai lần công du Bắc Kinh. Hợp tác quân sự Qatar-Trung Quốc Điều cộng đồng quốc tế ít biết đến hơn là hợp tác giữa Doha với Bắc Kinh về mặt quân sự. Năm 2017 ít lâu sau khi bị các nước láng giềng là Ả Rập Xê Út, Các Tiểu Vương Quốc Ả Rập Thống Nhất và Bahrain phong tỏa với lý do Qatar bao che cho quân khủng bố, Doha đã ký kết với Bắc Kinh một thỏa thuận « chống khủng bố ». Giới quan sát coi đây là một bước ngoặt quan trọng và là một tín hiệu mạnh. Song còn quá sớm để kết luận rằng Qatar ngả về phía Trung Quốc, kể cả về quân sự. Jean-Loup Samaan : « Hợp tác quân sự giữa hai nước đã bắt đầu có, nhưng vẫn còn ở mức độ khiêm tốn và chúng ta cần căn cứ vào những số liệu để thấy rõ được điều đó. Các dịch vụ mua bán trang thiết bị quân sự giữa Trung Quốc với Qatar trong 10 năm qua ước tính lên tới khoảng hơn một trăm triệu đô la. Ít hơn rất nhiều so với hàng ngàn tỷ đô la mà Doha chi ra để mua trang thiết bị quân sự của Mỹ hay của Pháp và thậm chí là cả của Nga. Ngay cả hợp tác với Nga cũng quan trọng hơn nhiều so với đối tác Trung Quốc trong lĩnh vực này. Tuy nhiên một số yếu tố khiến Washington không được thoải mái. Ví dụ như hồi năm 2017 chính quyền Doha đã phô trương tên lửa đạn đạo Trung Quốc và khi đó mọi người mới vỡ lẽ là Qatar đã âm thầm mua vũ khí Trung Quốc. Thứ nhất Qatar trang bị vũ khí của Trung Quốc và thứ hai là đã không hề thông báo trước với Washington. Về khối lượng, số vũ khí mua của Trung Quốc không nhiều nhưng thái độ úp mở đó của chính quyền Doha gây tranh cãi và đừng quên rằng kèm theo việc sắm vũ khí Trung Quốc còn có cả một thông điệp có lẽ Qatar muốn gửi tới Hoa Kỳ bởi vì một hợp đồng mua bán vũ khí không bao giờ là một cử chỉ hời hợt. Câu hỏi kế tiếp là sau Qatar liệu các quốc gia khác trong khu vực có chuyển sang trang bị vũ khí Trung Quốc hay không ». Trong bài nghiên cứu, đăng trên trang mạng của viện IFRI Jean-Loup Samaan nói rõ hơn : Doha mua tên lửa đạn đạo tầm ngắn loại SY-400 của Trung Quốc tuy nhiên theo số liệu của Viện Nghiên Cứu Hòa Bình Quốc Tế SIPRI trong giai đoạn 2010-2020, Qatar mua vào 118 triệu đô la vũ khí của Trung Quốc. Con số này không thấm vào đâu với hơn 3 tỷ đô la với Mỹ trong cùng thời kỳ. 70 % vũ khí và trang thiết bị quân sự của Qatar là hàng « made in USA ». Nói cách khác, hợp tác quân sự giữa Qatar và Trung Quốc trước mắt mang tính tượng trưng. Tuy nhiêu câu hỏi đặt ra là cả Doha lẫn Bắc Kinh muốn gì và có thể cho rằng Qatar đang chuyển hướng lao vào quỹ đạo Trung Quốc hay không ? Jean-Loup Samaan : « Thực ra về phía Bắc Kinh, rõ ràng là Trung Quốc muốn bắt rễ vào Vịnh Ba Tư, khu vực từ trước đến nay vẫn được xem là sân sau của Hoa Kỳ. Thắt chặt quan hệ với Qatar cho phép củng cố thêm uy tín, mở rộng ảnh hưởng với khu vực mà ai cũng nghĩ là Trung Quốc không chen chân được tới. Nhìn từ phía Doha, cũng có nhiều lý do giải thích cho việc hợp tác, kể cả về quân sự với Bắc Kinh. Trước hết, Qatar trang bị tên lửa Trung Quốc có nghĩa là mua vào những loại vũ khí mà Mỹ, vì những lý do khác nhau, từ chối cung cấp cho quốc gia này và một số nước khác trong vùng Vịnh. Washington tránh xuất khẩu vũ khí cho nhiều nước Ả Rập do không muốn những loại vũ khí đó có thể đe dọa đến an ninh của Israel. Thành thử, nhập khẩu vũ khí Trung Quốc cũng có thể là một cách để cảnh cáo Hoa Kỳ rằng Doha có thể tìm được một giải pháp thay thế và giải pháp thay thế đó có thể là Trung Quốc. Đây là động lực thứ nhì khiến Qatar quay sang Bắc Kinh. Tuy nhiên khó khẳng định là Qatar đã nghiêng về phía Trung Quốc vì nhiều lẽ. Thứ nhất về mặt ngoại giao, Doha luôn tỏ ra rất thận trọng. Điều này đã được chứng minh qua những hồ sơ khác nhau. Thứ hai, Qatar vẫn nằm trong quỹ đạo của Hoa Kỳ. Đừng quên rằng đây là trung tâm của bộ chỉ huy Mỹ tại Trung Đông. Trong cuộc đọ sức Mỹ-Trung, Qatar trong thế quan sát : Xem Trung Quốc có đề xuất gì không về mặt quân sự trong bối cảnh Hoa Kỳ chủ trương ngừng đóng vai trò sen đầm thế giới. Điểm thứ nhì là bản thân Trung Quốc cũng rất thận trọng. Chưa bao giờ Bắc Kinh bày tỏ nguyện vọng thay thế Mỹ trong vùng Vịnh. Trung Quốc không muốn thay thế Hoa Kỳ để bảo đảm an ninh cho các quốc gia trong vùng bởi đó là một nước cờ vừa tốn kém vừa đầy rủi ro. Điểm thứ ba nữa là Doha thừa biết Trung Quốc không phải là điểm tựa về mặt an ninh và cũng không thể trông chờ vào Bắc Kinh như là Qatar đang dựa vào Mỹ trong lĩnh vực quân sự. Không có chuyện Trung Quốc điều quân sang vùng Vịnh trong trường hợp Qatar bị tấn công. Thành thử đây là một giai đoạn khá sôi động và rất thú vị để quan sát những chuyển biến trong quan hệ giữa Qatar với hai siêu cường là Mỹ và Trung Quốc. Tuy nhiên theo tôi đến một lúc nào đó Doha sẽ phải chọn đứng về phía nào, không thể duy trì mãi thái độ mập mờ giữa hai đối tác chiến lược ». Trung Quốc chưa thể soán ngôi Hoa Kỳ Cũng trong bài nghiên cứu nói về thế đi dây của Qatar trong cảnh Mỹ và Trung Quốc đối đầu, Jean-Loup Samaan đưa ra nhiều yếu tố cho thấy Qatar vẫn trong quỹ đạo của Mỹ. Trước hết về kinh tế, thương mại, đành rằng Trung Quốc đã trở thành đối tác hàng đầu, nhưng Mỹ vẫn là một « bạn hàng không hể thiếu » của Doha. Tổng trao đổi mậu dịch hai chiều với Mỹ năm 2019 đạt 7 tỷ đô la -với Trung Quốc là 10 tỷ. Kế tới, khác với Mỹ, Trung Quốc không chỉ trích Qatar vi phạm nhân quyền. Nhưng hồ sơ người Duy Ngô Nhĩ là cái gai trong quan hệ ngoại giao giữa Doha với Bắc Kinh. Điểm thứ ba, như ông Samaan vừa giải thích, về mặt chiến lược và an ninh, Qatar biết rõ không thể trông cậy vào Trung Quốc. Cuối cùng, song song với việc mở rộng giao thương với Trung Quốc, Qatar liên tục thắt chặt quan hệ với đồng minh truyền thống là Hoa Kỳ. Năm 2013 Doha và Washington triển hạn thêm 10 năm Hiệp định hợp tác phòng thủ được ký nết năm 1992. Mỹ từ năm 2002 lập trung tâm chỉ huy tại Qatar và quốc gia vùng Vịnh này cũng là nơi hơn 10.000 quân nhân Mỹ đồn trú trong khuôn viên căn cứ không quân Al Udeid. Năm 2017 khi bị các nước láng giềng phong tỏa, Doha đã vững tâm nhờ có điểm tựa là Hoa Kỳ. Gần đây nhất cộng đồng quốc tế thấy rõ Qatar đóng vai trò then chốt trên hồ sơ Afghanistan cả về mặt ngoại giao lẫn hậu cần. Cũng căn cứ quân sự Al Udeid của Qatar là địa điểm đón hơn 40.000 người Mỹ và các cộng tác viên của Hoa Kỳ di tản khỏi Afghanistan hồi tháng 8/2021. Vào lúc Nhà Trắng dưới chính quyền Trump kỳ kèo đòi các đối tác quân sự đóng góp nhiều hơn, chia sẻ gánh nặng với Mỹ, thì Doha dễ dàng đề nghị đài thọ toàn bộ khoản tốn kém 1,8 tỷ đô la để nâng cấp căn cứ không quân của Mỹ tại Al Udeid. Jean-Loup Samaan đại học Singapore và chuyên gia thuộc Viện Quan Hệ Quốc Tế Pháp kết luận : Doha không hề xa cách Washington để ngả về phía Bắc Kinh mà trái lại Qatar đã thắt chặt thêm quan hệ với Hoa Kỳ đặc biệt là trong giai đoạn từ 2017 đến 2021 khi chính quyền của ông Cheikh Tamim bị ba nước láng giềng chung quanh phong tỏa. Chính dưới áp lực của Mỹ mà Ả Rập Xê Út gần đây đã « miễn cưỡng » làm hòa với Qatar. Dù vậy tác giả bài nghiên cứu mang tựa đề Qatar trước sự kình nghịch Mỹ-Trung : thế lưỡng nan của một vương quốc trong vùng Vịnh  nhìn nhận khó thể đoán trước những thay đổi trong chiến lược của Qatar giữa hai ông khổng lồ là Mỹ và Trung Quốc. « Một phần lớn câu trả lời tùy thuộc vào những cân nhắc tại Washington về chính sách của Mỹ tại Trung Đông ». Điều hiển nhiên nhất hiện tại là liên hệ ngày càng khắng khít giữa Qatar với Trung Quốc về kinh tế, đầu tư và thương mại. Kèm theo đó sẽ là những « ảnh hưởng về phương diện ngoại giao và quân sự » trong tương lai.

Today, my guest is U.S. Air Force MSgt (Ret) Jimmy Smith.  Jimmy grew up in Arkansas and joined the Air Force in 1994 as a 1N5, Electronic Signals Intelligence Exploitation.  His first assignment was to Wright-Patterson AFB, OH with the then National Air Intelligence Center.  Later, he was assigned to Misawa, Japan as an F-16 targeteer.  Throughout his career, he deployed to Saudi Arabia as well as four deployments to Al Udeid, Qatar.  He retired after his last assignment at Defense Intelligence Agency-Charlottsville in 2016.

In this episode of What's The Deid we discuss the ways to cut down on our over-consumption of electricity and water.

On the sixth episode of What's The Deid we discuss leadership principals with on of Al Udied's commanding officers.

On the fifth episode of What's The Deid we explore the importance of mentorship, what to look for in a mentor, and how to become a mentor.

On the 4th episode of What's the Deid we explore all the service offered, who is supported, and common deployment issues seen by the Mental Health clinic offers at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar.

On the 7th episode of What's The Deid we explore what it means to have influence and how others influence you.

Today's story: Airmen, Sailors and Soldiers participate in a joint training exercise with coalition partners at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar.

  Trump's speech to the UN – why it's a game-changer… Is the Ministry of Defence considering reducing the size of the Royal Marines? Three years of Op Shader, Sitrep goes behind the scenes at Al Udeid? British Forces are suffering from a recruitment crisis – so should we bring back national service? Guests: Former Director General of the Royal United Services Institute Professor Michael Clarke. TOPICS TRUMP/UN Former Director General of the Royal United Services Institute Professor Michael Clarke. HURRICANE MARIA Forces News reporter Rebecca Ricks on board RFA Mount Bay. ROYAL MARINES - CUTS Major General Julian Thompson, former RM commander, Deborah Haynes the Defence Editor at The Times and former Director General of the Royal United Services Institute Professor Michael Clarke. AL UDEID /OP SHADER Forces News reporter  Simon Newton goes behind the scenes. CONSCRIPTION Elisabeth Braw, a non-resident Senior fellow at the Atlantic Council & former Director General of the Royal United Services Institute Professor Michael Clarke.

The crisis in Qatar marks a major turning point in the battle against the Khazarian mafia. Ostensibly Saudi Arabia and other oil exporting states decided to try to blockade Qatar â??because it was supporting terrorism.â?? In reaction to this move, US President Donald Trump showed the world he was not in charge of the US by first supporting the blockade and then being forced by the Pentagon to change his stance 180 degrees the next day. What is really going on here is that Qatar reached a deal with Iran to export gas from its massive gas fields not West in exchange for worthless Euros or US dollars but rather East to places like India and China in exchange for their currencies. The US House of Whores, oops! I mean House of Representatives. reacted to this development by passing new sanctions against Russia that basically amounted to telling Europe to buy expensive American gas instead of cheap Russian gas. The Germans and Austrian reacted by telling the Americans to buzz off. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40299760 These developments show clearly the old regime is falling apart with splits between Washington and the EU becoming more pronounced by the day. The Khazarian mafia controlled Saudis and their Israeli partners in crime have seen their entire plan for an â??Arab Nato,â?? blow up in their faces. True Muslim countries like Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and others together with super powers like Russia and China lined up to support Qatar, leaving the Saudi Israel alliance isolated. India and Pakistan have shown they are with Russia and China by joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, something Iran is expected to do next year. The US military, for its part, showed it was against the Khazarian mafia by staging joint military drills with Qatar last week even as China staged drills with Iran. Pentagon sources explain â??The US military needs Qatar because of the Al Udeid airbase.â?? The Pentagon sources did not mention the fact Qatar also offered to buy $12 billion worth of US military jets to help keep the Pentagon financed. In any case, the airbase also functions to ensure that madman Satanist Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and his fellow Khazarian mobsters do not get any chance start World War 3, the sources say. A more direct message would be â??SURRENDER OR DIE.â?? The battle to remove the Khazarians from all levers of control in Washington DC is also intensifying. The fake blame everything on Russia campaign by the Khazarians is blowing up with even Khazarian owned corporate propaganda media stooges starting to expose it as completely bogus. The following twitter storm issued by Donald Trump summarizes quite well how the power struggle in DC is going: â??You are witnessing the single greatest WITCH HUNT in American political history â?? led by some very bad and conflicted people! They made up a phony collusion with the Russians story, found zero proof, so now they go for obstruction of justice on the phony story. Nice I am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director! Witch Hunt Why is that Hillary Clintons family and Dems dealings with Russia are not looked at, but my non-dealings are? Crooked H destroyed phones w/ hammer, â??bleachedâ?? emails, & had husband meet w/AG days before she was cleared- & they talk about obstruction? A.G. Lynch made law enforcement decisions for political purposesâ?¦gave Hillary Clinton a free pass and protection. Totally illegal!â?? Pentagon sources say the next stage in the battle against the Khazarian mafia hold-outs in DC will begin with the arrest of Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, special counsel Robert Mueller as well as

Jacob L. Shapiro and Kamran Bokhari make sense of the numerous geopolitical developments that occurred in the world's most volatile region this week. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0 TRANSCRIPT: Jacob L. Shapiro: Hello everyone and welcome to another Geopolitical Futures podcast. I am joined this week by Kamran Bokhari, thanks for joining us Kamran. Kamran Bokhari: Good to be here. JLS: What we're going to do this week is we're going to try and sort out some of the mess that's been going on in the Middle East. It's been a very chaotic week in the Middle East and we thought we'd take a step back and try to explain it to listeners in about 30 or 40 minutes. It's a tall task but we'll see how we go. Kamran, I think the first thing that you might be able to help out with our listeners understanding is understanding a little bit more about the history of Qatar – the history of Qatar's relationships in the region, how it's always sort of been on the outside looking in – but what exactly Saudi Arabia, and the states that Saudi Arabia's convinced to go along with this diplomatic isolation of Qatar, are seeing that upsets them so much. KB: So ever since 1995, when the father of the current emir of Qatar took power, his name was Sheikh Hamad Al Thani, and he actually overthrew his father in '95 and ousted him and took power. Qatar has been on a strange trajectory. I say strange because it's not normal for the Arab world or more specifically the Persian Gulf Arab world, the Khaleejis, to behave in this way. I am referring to an openness for lack of a better term. I mean Al Jazeera was started by the current emir's father and it became sort of the standard bearer of 24/7 news in the Arab world. That made a lot of traditional Arab leaders, both Republican regimes and of course the monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, very, very uncomfortable because it was not the way that they had ran their political economies. There's no concept of having discourse. But to make matters worse this new regime post-1995 began with a very what I would call pragmatic approach to the region. It could afford to do because it is the world's largest LNG exporter, that brings in a lot of money. The population, those who are Qatari nationals, is very small – less than 300,000 people. In fact, there are more expats in that country, which is also true for a number of other GCC states. But in the case of Qatar, what happened is that this allowed for the regime to flirt with all sorts of radical political forces ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood to more radical elements along the Islamist spectrum. And even give air time to what we used to call secular left-wing Arab nationalists and it began a policy of opening to Iran, developing a relationship that was out of step with the GCC consensus, if you will. And steering towards an independent foreign policy. And a lot of people say, Qatar has been punching above its weight when it comes to foreign policy. It's a tiny, little state. But it's been trying to play major league geopolitics. That's a fair assessment. But I would say that the Qataris are cut from a different cloth if we are to compare them to the rest of the Arab regimes. JLS: Yes, although I think one thing that you perhaps left out was that there's a regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command in Qatar and that Qatar is for all intents and purposes it's sort of in the U.S. camp in the region, or generally has been. And that the U.S. has been able to use Qatar at times in order to have unofficial dialogue with some of these groups that are considered beyond the pale for normal political discourse, right? KB: Absolutely, that's important to note that when Qatar is reaching out to these unsavory characters, from the point of view of the region and the international community, it's not doing so in defiance of the West, it's doing so in concert with its great power ally, the United States. And mind you, that base at Al Udeid where the U.S. Central Command has a major hub in the region, in fact, the regional hub is based in Qatar of Central Command, and that happened after 9/11 and the decision of the United States government, the Bush administration, to pull out of Saudi Arabia. There was a huge base in Saudi Arabia, and Qatar offered space so it was just a minor relocation. At the same time, there are relations between the Qatari government and Israel. There are a lot of rumors about the nature of it. Nobody officially denies or rejects it. But it's well known that there's some form of relationship there. So, Qatar has been reaching out to all sorts of entities and Qatar is the one Arab state that also sees eye-to-eye with Turkey in the region. And so it's had a really diversified foreign policy portfolio. JLS: I want to bring it back to Turkey in a minute but I'll just ask one more thing about Qatar which is that you know you've pointed out that they've always been reaching out to these different groups and they've always had a more independent foreign policy. I think that one of the things that we were discussing internally was that it was very hard to read whether Qatar had simply done something that had gone too far beyond the pale for Saudi Arabia or whether this had sort of been planned for a while and that this is really more of a reflection of the Saudis weakening and not being willing to tolerate Qatar breaking ranks. I noticed recently that Qatar actually asked a lot of people from Hamas, who nominally are based in Qatar, to leave. And it seems like Qatar has actually done some things and has been very open to trying to solve of this diplomatic spat, especially in terms of the United States. So do you think that Qatar actually did something, that it flirted with Iran in a serious way, that both Saudi Arabia and even perhaps the United States didn't mind Saudi Arabia sort of dinging Qatar on the head and saying, nah, that's too far? Or do you think that this really has more to do with Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia trying to consolidate control at the diplomatic level in the same way that Saudi Arabia wasn't going to tolerate internal unrest in a country like Bahrain in 2011? KB: I think it's the latter. I don't see the Qataris doing anything new. The Iranian relationship has been there, there's more made out of it in terms of the public discourse than there is actually. The whole idea of support for Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, that's old stuff, that's been going along for a long time. I haven't seen anything fresh that would suggest that the Qataris crossed some sort of red line. I think it's a lingering dispute and if we go back to 2014, for the better part of that year, the Saudis and the Bahrainis and the UAE, they downgraded diplomatic relations in that year in the spring. And it was not until the fall that they had an agreement of sorts, which was never made public, but according to the reports Qatar had agreed to scale back its involvement with all these groups and not encourage them to where that damaged the interests of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and others. And so, I think that that's a long-standing dispute and I think that now Saudi Arabia is getting desperate because things are not going well for Saudi Arabia. And the last thing it wants is one of its own GCC members doing things that undermine its collective efforts. So, number one, and I think this is foremost, is Iran. If you go back to the Trump visit that was like three weeks ago to Riyadh and there was a gala event attended not just by Middle Eastern leaders but also from the wider Muslim majority countries. It was very clear that Saudi Arabia had finally got the United States to where it wants to be. Remember that under the Obama administration, the Saudis had a terrible relationship with Washington. Under Trump, they know think that they now have Washington where they want it to be and they want to move forward in isolating Iran. And Qatari dealings with Iran really poke holes into the Saudi strategy. So, I think that this is a case of the Saudis not being able to take it anymore and saying you know enough is enough. If the Qataris are not behaving, we have to up the pressure to twist their arm. JLS: Yeah and I think this is a move that could really backfire on Saudi Arabia. You already see it backfiring a little bit in the sense that they were able to assemble an impressive coalition of countries in this diplomatic offensive against Qatar, but they have not really been able to extend the diplomatic offensive outside of its immediate vicinity and outside of those countries that are immediately dependent on it. And even some of the other GCC states have not gone along to the same extent that Saudi Arabia and the Emiratis and the others have gone to. But you bring up good points with Iran and Turkey and this is another reason why I think this might backfire on the Saudis, which is because if Qatar is looking at this and if Qatar is trying to establish some kind of independence of action, Saudi Arabia is really on a downward slope. Especially when you consider that oil prices right now are continuing to go down and that Saudi has basically proven ineffective in getting the price of oil to come back up and that really is the source of Saudi power. Qatar, as you said, has a close relationship with Turkey. Qatar as you also said also has a closer relationship with Iran than perhaps any of the other Arab countries in the region. You brought up the specific point of the fact that Qatar and Turkey have seen eye to eye for a while right now. I know that there's a lot of stuff there in terms of the political ideology that both Qatar and Turkey favor that you can shed some light on. So how about you go a little bit more in depth into how Turkey and Qatar see the region in the same way, and what is the way in which they've been trying to reshape the region, not just recently but for many years now? KB: From the point of view of the Qataris, they're not so much in ideological sync with the Islamists, they take a more pragmatic view. Unlike Egypt, unlike Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab states, the Qataris say, look, you know we can't dial the clock back. And what do I mean by that is that the Saudis are using tools that used to be effective back in the day, pre-Arab Spring, where there was no opposition of any sorts to the regimes in the region. And Qatar looks at that and says that thing, that tool kit, that approach is useless because it only makes matters worse. Qatar says, look, these forces, the Hamases of this world, the Muslim Brotherhoods of this world, they are a reality and we can't wish them away and we can't suppress them because it only makes matters worse and we need to somehow reach out to them in order for, and this is based on my conversations with Qatari officials over the years, their view is that these are realities and if we don't control them, if we just leave them to their own devices, then they will do things that will undermine the interests of the region and the security of the regimes. So it's sort of flipping the Saudi argument on its head. The Saudis say well you need to keep them under lock and key and that's the way to go. As far as Turkey is concerned, Turkey is more ideologically in tune with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas because the ruling AKP party comes from an Islamist heritage although it's not an Islamist party, its roots lie in Islamism. So there's a meeting of minds. And Qatar realizes that it's a small country and the rest of the Arab states are not really getting it. And they realize that if there's going to be a counterweight to Iran, it's going to be Turkey. And the Qataris have accepted the fact that the Arabs do not have any intrinsic power of their own in the region and therefore they must piggyback on Turkey and hence that relationship. So it's a convergence of interests and ideas. JLS: Yeah, although I want to push back a little bit because I think you're right that Qatar reaches out to a lot of different groups that other countries in the region and most countries in the world wouldn't do business with, right? But I don't think when it comes to more Muslim Brotherhood-oriented groups that Qatar sees them sort of as redheaded stepchildren that it's going to let into Qatar. I think there, Qatar has actually more of an affinity to some of those groups and has used some of those groups in order to push Qatar's influence throughout the region, which is why I suggested that perhaps Turkey and Qatar see more eye to eye ideologically. Do you think I am taking that too far or would you agree with that assessment? KB: I think that your argument has some merit to it, and actually a lot of merit to it, but when I was saying ideologically I was meaning the ideology of the ruling family or the regime in Qatar. They're not Islamists. They don't share those ideologies. If you go to Qatar you know it's fairly Westernized and it's fairly open and so it's not necessarily Islamist but they see these actors as, what you just said, tools to pursue their foreign policy agenda, to be able to have influence. And in my conversations, I did feel that the Qataris really believe that there is no way around these actors. Qatar has sort of, in a self-styled manner, appropriated this task of bringing reconcilable – what they call reconcilable – Islamists to the mainstream. And so that's also a foreign policy offering that Doha sort of says that this what we can do for the world. And they find reception in circles in Washington. Back in 2013, the United States Department of Defense dealt with certain Islamist factions within the Syrian rebel landscape in order to find common ground because of the fear that we're not going to get secular Syrian nationalists under the banner of the Free Syrian Army. And that was mediated by Qatar. And if you look at the Taliban relationship, clearly that was very openly Qatar helping the United States deal with the Taliban. It didn't go too far because of other complications, but nonetheless, it's a great example of how Qatar is trying to say: this is our value proposition that we bring to this region and to great powers who are stakeholders in this region. JLS: Yes, although the flip side of that is it means Qatar is playing with fire. I mean I really, I was really struck by what you said that the ruling family is not Islamist. But that Qatar thinks of using the Islamist groups as tools in order to develop Qatar's power or to protect Qatar's position. I cannot think of a more secular entity that used Islamists that didn't have the Islamists come back to bite them in the end. We have seen over and over and over, whether it was the United States, whether it was Saudi Arabia, whether it was Turkey, it doesn't really matter if the country itself was Muslim or if it's Western or not. It's very, very difficult to control Islamist groups once they get going. So the idea that Qatar is going to be able to use these Islamist groups when they want to use them and is not going to face backlash from them, especially because Qatar is playing such a dual game and is really dealing with all sides. It seems to me that that's, I don't want to say shortsighted and I don't even say it's not going to work. I just can't think of another example of that actually working in the long term for a country's foreign policy. Can you come up with any examples? KB: I can't, and you are absolutely right. I mean this is almost like they are holding up and trying to balance two parallel universes. And it's difficult. But I think that, if we look at it geopolitically, from their point of view, they have no other choice. They have to do this and I think what gives them a bit of hope is that they're a small country. They have enough money to where people don't indulge in politics so this is not going to undermine them domestically anytime soon. But yes, for the region, this could all blow up in their face. And I actually believe that it will. Because there's just no way, given the scale of chaos in the region, that somehow the Qataris will be able to fine tune these Islamist proxies to where they will live in a Muslim democracy of sorts. I just don't see that happening. So you are absolutely right. I don't disagree with that. I was just trying to explain the perspective of the Qataris. JLS: Yeah, but that also explains the perspective of not just the Saudis but even the Emiratis and Bahrain and some of these other groups, for whom, they see Qatar messing around with the Islamists and are sort of asking themselves what on Earth are you doing? We've already seen what happens when we mess with these things and now is a time to close ranks and tighten up against this, not to invite them into our own space. But that's a good segue way into a second… KB: I just want to point out one thing and for our listeners, the UAE making this case is more genuine. But the Saudis accusing the Qataris of doing this is like the kettle calling the pot black or vice versa. The Saudis are still playing with this fire, so they don't have the argument. So yes, they are not with Hamas, they're not with the Muslim Brotherhood, but they are the biggest exporter of Salafism and jihadism on the planet. JLS: Yes, and it's a good segue way into you know sort of the other major developments that have been changing things in the Middle East this week, which is ISIS, which Saudi Arabia you know you can't directly prove that they had a role in helping ISIS develop, but certainly Saudi Arabia and some of the groups that it was funding and some of the things that it was doing when it was involved in Syria supporting different proxies, had a role in the Islamic State coming to the prominence that it has. But you know we saw two major things from the Islamic State this week. We saw, first of all, that the Islamic State is finally coming under some serious existential pressure in its self-declared caliphate. Raqqa has really been the capital and center and focal point of ISIS operations, but you've got the Syrian Democratic Forces, who are made up mostly of Syrian Kurds under the YPG group (there are so many acronyms here that it's sometimes hard to keep track of) but we'll say the SDF, those are the Syrian Kurds and they are U.S. backed, and then we've also seen, surprisingly, the Syrian army has been moving on multiple fronts to get closer to Raqqa. The result of all this is that the Islamic State's position in Raqqa is pretty weak and we've seen them pulling back and we've seen some relative successes for the U.S.-backed forces as they get closer to the city. That was one major development we saw this week. And then the other major development was really the unprecedented IS attack they claimed in Iran. So, I want to tackle both of those things. Maybe let's start with the second one first because I know you were looking at this very closely. Talk about why this is such a big deal and why this isn't just another ISIS terrorist attack in the region. What are the greater implications of ISIS hitting Iran the way that they did? KB: I would begin by saying that this is not something that ISIS just sort of said – oh, well I want to attack Iran tomorrow and let's do it. This is something that speaks to the sophistication, especially as an intelligence entity, of ISIS. The Islamic State has been cultivating these assets for a while, and not just in Iran. We see this happening in as far-flung areas as the Philippines as well. So this is something that's been in the works for a while. They've devoted a certain amount of resources to this project. I suspect that over the years that they've been based in Iraq and they've had proximity to Iran that they were cultivating this. And they saw an opening in Kurdistan, and I am talking about the Iranian province of Kurdistan, and there's more than one province where Iranian Kurds live and they're mostly Sunni and over the years what I've learned is that is Salafism and even jihadist ideology has made its way into the Iranian Kurdish community. And the Kurds are, there's an alienation that they feel, as an ethnic community as well, from Tehran and there is this sort of deep resentment that ISIS really exploited and was able to set up at least this cell. I suspect that this isn't just one cell. There are probably others that ISIS has in its tool kit and will activate at some point in the future, so this is not the last attack in Iran. But what is significant is that Iran is not an Arab state. One of the biggest sectors of the Iranian state is the security sector. There are multiple organizations that deal with security. You know in my visit to Iran, I noticed these guys working firsthand, and they're obsessed with security. They're obsessed with security because they fear Israeli penetration, U.S. penetration, Saudi penetration and so this is not an open, if you will, arena where ISIS could just jump in and say, you know, we're gonna send in suicide bombers. It had to do a lot of work to be able to penetrate that and that speaks to ISIS' capabilities and sophistication. As for the implications, I mean look, ISIS has gamed all of these things out. We tend to look in the open sources, when you read stuff there is this assumption that somehow these are all sort of disconnected attacks that are not linked to some strategic objective. And at Geopolitical Futures, that's what we talk about is, we can't look at events as sort of randomly taking place or taking place as some entity hates another entity. There is a strategic objective. The strategic objective of ISIS is to, a) survive, especially now that it's under pressure, that you just mentioned. You know it's in the process of losing Raqqa. It'll take a long time, but that process has begun. At the same time, so there's that threat but there's also an opportunity. The opportunity is that the sectarian temperature in the region is at an all-time high and this would explain the timing of this attack. ISIS would like nothing more than for Iran and Saudi Arabia to go at each other because, a) it gives them some form of respite. You know, they're not the focus, and it undermines the struggle against ISIS. And b) it creates more opportunity for ISIS to exploit. The more there's sectarianism, the more the Saudis go and fight with Iran and vice versa, the more space there is for ISIS to grow. So I think that this attack in Iran has very deep implications moving forward. JLS: Those are all good points and I want to draw special attention to one of the points you made and then ask you to play what you're saying forward a little bit. First thing, I just want to point out is that you were talking about the Iranian Kurds and how they had somehow been radicalized and there was a sense of disenchantment, or disenchantment is probably not even strong enough, but an antagonism with the current regime in Tehran. And I just want to point out that it's very difficult to speak of the Kurds as a monolith. I think often times people say the word the Kurds and they think of you know just all the Kurds in the Middle East and they're all the same. But we really have to think of in terms of – there are Kurds in Iran, there are Kurds in Iraq, there are Kurds in Syria, there are Kurds in Turkey. They have different religious affiliations, different ideological affiliations, sometimes are speaking different languages that are almost unintelligible to each other. So I try very hard in my writing and when I am speaking about these types of things to be very specific about when I am talking about the Kurds and I thought one of the things you did there was you brought up was just how complicated that situation is and that, of course, has relevance throughout the region. We saw that the Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdistan Regional Government are talking about an independence referendum and maybe we can get to that in a little bit. But you gave a really good explanation of why this is extremely important from Iran's perspective. But what do you think Iran is going to do? What response does this mean Iran is going to have to make? What is the next step for Iran both in terms of, you know, Qatar, which it had some sort of relationship with and it can certainly see this diplomatic offensive led by Saudi Arabia as a diplomatic move against Iran, and then second of all this move by ISIS. What are the practical concrete things that Iran is going to have to do to respond here in the next couple weeks? KB: With regards to Qatar, what we have is a situation where its own GCC allies, its fellow Arab states, have shunned Doha. And so Doha right now needs a lot of friends. The United States has not de-aligned from Qatar and joined the Saudi bandwagon, so that's good. It's forging some sort of a relationship today, the Qatari foreign minister is in Moscow, so there's a Russian angle to that as well. We've already talked about Turkey. At this stage, it wouldn't hurt, necessarily, for Qatar to reach out or benefit from Iranian assistance, but it has to be very careful. It doesn't want to do something with Iran or get too close, especially now, and give a bigger stick to the Saudis with which Riyadh can beat Doha. And so, I think from a Qatari point of view, it's essential that they strike a balance when it comes to Iran. Conversely the Iranians, this is a great opening. And they would like to exploit this to the extent that it is possible. But I think that the Iranians are no illusion as to their limitations. They know that – they'll milk this for whatever it's worth. But they're not under the illusion that somehow Qatar will join them and be part of their camp. That's actually taking it too far. I don't think that they can rely on Qatar. But from the Iranian point of view, so long as Qatar is at odds and defying Saudi Arabia, that's good enough. They don't need more from Qatar and they will milk that to the extent that it is possible. As far as ISIS is concerned, I think that there are two things here. One is that both of them will benefit ISIS, both moves that the Iranians make will benefit ISIS. First is that there is an imperative for the government, for the security establishment, to make sure that this doesn't happen again or at least begin to neutralize, before it grows. There's a sizeable Sunni population in Iran. It's not just the Kurds, there's a sizeable Turkmen population in the northeast near Turkmenistan and there are some of the Arabs, not a majority, but a minority of the Arabs in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan, the Ahwazi Arabs as they are called. They are, a minority of them and a significant one, are Sunnis as well. And then you have the big province in the southeast, that's Sistan and Baluchistan, and that province is majority Sunni and ethnically Baluch and already has a jihadist problem and there's cross-border terrorism that takes place where Baluch jihadist rebels go to Pakistan and then you know from there they have a sanctuary that they come in and they strike at the Iranian security forces. They've been pretty successful over the years in killing some very high-ranking IRGC commanders. So from Iran's point of view, this is a lot of vulnerability. So the Sunnis are suspect right now after what happened. I mean it's not easy and I've been to the Khomeini shrine and I can tell you that it's not something, it's not just a cake walk that you can get in there and do all this kind of stuff, let alone parliament. And so from the Iranian point of view, they feel very terrified right now because they used to think they're safe. And this is sort of really a wake-up call for them. So they're gonna go after the Sunnis. The more they go after the Sunnis, the more they are gonna create resentment, not just within their borders, but sectarian tensions are going to rise. And ISIS is going to say, see we told you, and they will have more recruits to go fight the “evil” Iranians and the “evil” Shiites. But at the same time, the Iranians do not think that this is ISIS alone. They deeply believe, at least their security establishment, and I saw a report yesterday where the Iranian intelligence minister was urging caution, saying, let's not jump to conclusions and let's not accuse the Saudis just yet. Let the investigation finish. But the security establishment and the hawks are convinced that there is, even though ISIS is involved, that there is a Saudi footprint in this attack and they'll give you evidence and they'll point to Saudi intent to undermine their country. And so they're gonna go after Saudi Arabia. They're gonna retaliate. It's horrible to predict another bombing, but if a bomb went off inside Saudi Arabia, I would not be surprised that it, you know, Iran somehow retaliated in that shape or form. I am not sure if it will. But I'm just saying that if it does that, then I wouldn't be surprised, because the Iranians, they're not going to just accept this. They have to retaliate and respond. The more they retaliate, they set into motion, they trigger a broader conflict. I am not saying the two sides are going to go to war, but it's going to an ugly proxy battle at least in the immediate future. JLS: In many ways, that proxy battle has already been going on. I think what you are talking about is going to be a real worsening of the situation and unfortunately, that's the way things are going in the Middle East right now. The last thing I want to touch on before we break is the Islamic State, because we've sort of been talking about them in a roundabout way when we talk about all these other issues, but for a long time, the Islamic State, and when I say long time I mean maybe the past two or three years, the Islamic State really has been the center of gravity I think in the Middle East. And I think one of the reasons we're seeing all of these things happening on the periphery is that the force of IS as the center of gravity is actually weakening because IS itself is actually weakening. Now I know that that doesn't mean that ISIS is going to disappear, but I think it does mean that the Islamic State as a strong territorial entity that can threaten some of the different states in the region from a conventional point of view, is actually weakening. So can you talk a little bit about what it means for the Islamic State to have come under such pressure at its capital in Raqqa and what Islamic State's activities are going to look like going forward? We know they're going to pull back a little bit and try and get strength in numbers and some strategic depth but ultimately they are outnumbered and they're outgunned. So they're probably going to have to go back to some tactics of blending back into the population and waiting really for a lot these sectarian dynamics that we're talking about right now to overwhelm the region once more so that they can take advantage of the power vacuum. KB: So I would compare what is happening to ISIS to what happened to the Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11. They lost the cities, and for a while, they were an incoherent entity, but they weren't decimated or eliminated, they just were lying low. And they were slowly rebuilding themselves. And now they are at a point where – and I would say it's not just now, it's been the case all along, at least since 2003 – that they exist in ungoverned spaces outside the cities. See we have this perception that if you don't hold a city then you're not a serious player. That may be true at one level, but at another level, it just means that you are operating in an area where the good guys can't project power, at least not effectively, and you exist. So I think – I don't see necessarily just ISIS devolving into an insurgent movement or a terrorist organization – I think that the so-called caliphate is going to shift into a rural area. And this is not something that is a setback from an ISIS point of view, because I don't think that ISIS ever believed – I mean it's a serious player and they've been here before, it was not as big as what they have, I mean I'm talking about their holdings, but in Iraq, they have been driven out of cities before. They've been in the desert, in the rural areas, only to come back because the underlying political, economic, social circumstances really don't get addressed and its enemies start fighting with each other, providing the room for ISIS to once again revive itself. I think that it remains to be seen how quickly ISIS can be pushed out of Raqqa, pushed out of Deir al-Zour, into the desert. And even when it does go there, it's going to still have a space and the time to continue its activities, perhaps not as effectively as it has since Mosul. I think that ISIS knew this would come, ISIS did not believe that – you know, now they have Mosul, now they have Raqqa, now they have Deir al-Zour – that they're not going to see reversals. I think theirs is a very long game and they will go back and forth. And so I think that we need to be cautious when we talk about progress against ISIS. JLS: Is there anything that can be done to solve the underlying political and social circumstances that create ISIS and give ISIS fuel to continue running? KB: That would require the Iranians and the Saudis sitting at a table sharing drinks and having food, and you know that's not happening. So, if that's not happening, and I don't think that there's any power on Earth that can fix those underlying sectarian tensions. I mean if you just look at the Sunnis in Iraq. I mean, there's this big euphoria about how Mosul is no longer in ISIS hands. And I'm saying, well that is true and it is a victory and an important one. But I'm looking at a year, two years, three years down the line. The Sunnis are completely a shattered community in Iraq. They fight with each other. ISIS existed because there's no Sunni core, no Sunni mainstream in Iraq. Ωnd they're losing territory, especially now if the Kurds are moving towards independence, they'll lose territory to the Kurds. They have already lost ground to the Shiites. This is probably the first time, the price of removing ISIS from Mosul is Shiite control over Iraq's second largest city, which was majority Sunni and a majority of Sunnis and Kurds. Now you have a Shiite-dominated military force along with militias that are going to make sure that ISIS doesn't come back, and they're going to engage in some very brutal activities. And that's going to pour you know gasoline on the fire of sectarianism that's already burning. And that's, from an ISIS point of view, another opportunity to exploit and they're looking forward to it. And that's sort of the irony in all of this. JLS: Well it's not a hopeful note to end the week on but unfortunately, it's the reality. Thank you for joining us Kamran, and thank you, everyone, for listening. If you enjoyed this podcast, I encourage you to visit us at geopoliticalfutures.com. I also encourage you to email us with comments, critiques, suggestions for topics and anything else you want. You can just email us at comments@geopoliticalfutures.com. I'm Jacob Shapiro, I'm the director of analysis, and we'll see you out here next week.

A tanker aircrew off loads over 70,000 lbs of fuel to a NATO E-3 AWACS during a combat sortie over northern Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Includes sound bites from Capt. Dorothy Ellis, KC-135 Aircraft Commander, 92nd Air Refueling Suadron, Fairchild AFB, Wa. Hometown: Moore, SC; 1st Lt. Robert Dobbins, Co-Pilot, 909th Air Refueling Squadron, Kadena AB, Japan. Hometown: Hobe Sound, Fla. and SrA Shawna Sims, Boom Operator, 92nd Air Refueling Suadron, Fairchild AFB, Wa. Hometown: Lufkin, Tx. Also available in high definition.

Almost every part of the Air Force mission depends on a steady supply of fuel. SSgt Dustin Roberts shows us how the fuels laboratory keeps up the important job of quality testing.

Without planes being able to safely enter and exit, an air base wouldn't have much of a mission. Staff Sgt. Dustin Roberts takes us to the air traffic controllers who make sure Al Udeid stays on course. Includes soundbites from Senior Airman Rachael Plantz, air traffic controller, and Capt. Joseph Clark, air field flight commander.

welcome to Syria The Truth, our episode title for today is: Qatar: US Proxy in America’s Terror War in Syria By Phil Greaves. Global Research, July 01, 2013 A recent report in the New York Times (NYT) claims, through trusted “sources”, that Qatar began weapons shipments to opposition militants in Syria at the same time they “increased” support for Al Qaeda linked militants fighting Colonel Gaddafi in Libya in 2011. Gaddafi was ousted (murdered) in October 2011; one must assume that any “increase” in Qatari efforts to arm the militants in Libya were delivered long in advance of Gaddafi’s ouster, meaning the synonymous shipments to “rebels” in Syria also commenced well before October 2011. This information again sheds further light on a timeline of events in Syria that have been purposefully obscured within mainstream media to suit certain actors agendas, and to enable the false and misleading narrative of “Assad killing peaceful protesters” to become dominant in the discourse surrounding the Syrian conflict. As was revealed earlier this year – known by many for much longer – it has been Qatar at the forefront of efforts to arm and fund the insurgency in Syria. As the resilience of the Assad regime and the Syrian Army prolonged the Syrian conflict far beyond the timeframe the backers of the insurgency foresaw; more and more evidence has become available as to the exact nature of this US-led proxy-war, and the ideologies of the militants fighting it. In turn, timelines have constantly been altered, misinformed and manipulated to suit the desired narratives of actors who claim to be on the side of “freedom and democracy”. In sum, previous to the aforementioned NYT article, there had been no reports – in mainstream press at least – of any arms shipments or covert state activity against Syria before “early 2012″. Now that timeline has once again been revised, to at least the same time of an “increase” of Qatari covert policy in Libya; which would have necessarily come before the fall of Gaddafi in October 2011. The latest “revelation” in the NYT seems to be an intentional leak, designed to pass responsibility for the extremist dominated insurgency currently destroying Syria, onto Qatar’s doorstep. Considering the timing of this report, and several others in recent mainstream media that have pointed the finger at Qatar being the main sponsor of the Syrian insurgency, it also begs the question: was there more to the Qatari Emir’s, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (and his trusted and longtime Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani’s) recent departure and handover of power to his son Tamim than meets the eye? A slap on the wrist from the US for Qatar’s destructive foreign policy maybe? Who knows, it seems most knowledgable Middle East analysts really have no clue as to why the Emir chose to suddenly step down and relinquish power. If there is one message coming from this unprecedented handover in the Western press it is this: “what goes on in Qatar, stays in Qatar”. The NYT cites a “Western diplomat” (anonymous of course) who states that Qatar: “punch immensely above their weight,… They keep everyone off-balance by not being in anyone’s pocket… Their influence comes partly from being unpredictable,” Again, this seems to be a desired caveat to remove culpability from Western actors, and is highly likely the same “source” that provided the leak on Qatar’s covert actions. What is counterintuitive to the theory that Qatar acts of its own accord in such instance; is the fact that Qatar’s military and intelligence apparatus is entirely built and run by the United States. Qatar and the US have held an intimate relationship on all things military since the early 90′s. Qatar is also the Forward Operations center of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), and the US Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC). The US enjoys the luxury of the use of three airbases in the tiny nation of Qatar, one of which (Al Udeid) is the prime location of Qatari arms flights to Syria. Considering this close military relationship; it would be foolish to believe the United States would be unaware of Qatari covert activity, particularly when one also considers the broad and global spying and SIGINT powers we now all know the Pentagon, and US government have at their disposal. It should also be noted that Doha acts as a primary base in the region for US diplomacy, as the Taliban can happily attest to. Furthermore – as covered extensively in a previous article – once Gulf covert arms shipments to Syrian “rebels” became public knowledge, the Obama administration made distinct efforts in the media to portray the CIA as the key “coordinator” and oversight of the shipments to allay concerns of weapons ending up in the “wrong hands”. The US, through the CIA has been using its logistic, diplomatic, and military power to bypass international laws and help to organise a multi-national covert arms supply chain to “rebels” in Syria. Furthermore, in a recent interview for The National Interest given by renowned former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, – a declared advocate of the US policy of arming Osama Bin-Laden and fellow ideologues in the Afghan-Soviet war of the 80′s – went as far as to openly admit the joint US-Saudi-Qatari policy of orchestrating the Syrian crisis, but refrained from revealing an explicit timeline: (my emphasis) In late 2011 there are outbreaks in Syria produced by a drought and abetted by two well-known autocracies in the Middle East: Qatar and Saudi Arabia. He [Obama] all of a sudden announces that Assad has to go—without, apparently, any real preparation for making that happen. Then in the spring of 2012, the election year here, the CIA under General Petraeus, according to The New York Times of March 24th of this year, a very revealing article, mounts a large-scale effort to assist the Qataris and the Saudis and link them somehow with the Turks in that effort. Was this a strategic position? Yet contrary to this long-revealed policy, the NYT claims: “The United States has little leverage over Qatar on the Syria issue because it needs the Qataris’ help on other fronts.” For the NYT to claim the US has no control of arms shipments from a key ally is disingenuous at best, outright propaganda at worst. Moreover, the CIA has been in direct “consultation” with Qatar on arms shipments, and who exactly those arms should be sent to, (vetted “moderates” of course!!) as Qatari officials stated in this Reuters article from May this year: (my emphasis) “There’s an operations room in the Emir’s diwan (office complex), with representatives from every ministry sitting in that room, deciding how much money to allocate for Syria’s aid,” the Qatari official said. There’s a lot of consultation with the CIA, and they help Qatar with buying and moving the weapons into Syria, but just as consultants,” Are we seriously supposed to believe that Qatar, a tiny resource-rich nation that is totally dependent on US militarism and diplomatic protection is acting of its own accord, without any US assistance, right under the US military’s nose? The NYT report goes on to state: (my emphasis) “Qatar’s covert efforts to back the Syrian rebels began at the same time that it was increasing its support for opposition fighters in Libya trying to overthrow the government of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi…The Obama administration quietly blessed the shipments to Libya of machine guns, automatic rifles, mortars and ammunition, but American officials later grew concerned as evidence grew that Qatar was giving the weapons to Islamic militants there.” The Obama administration was fully aware of who Qatar were arming, and sending special forces to fight alongside in Libya. It was exactly the same variety of militants and extremist ideologues that are currently waging war upon the Syrian State. Islamic radicals had used Benghazi as a base since the very start of the Libyan “revolution”, and the US knew they formed the core of the militia Qatar were shipping arms to in efforts to oust Gaddafi. The Obama administration’s concern of MANPADS falling into the “wrong hands” (a la Afghanistan) is belied by Obama’s tacit approval of his Gulf allies’ policy of allowing tonnes of arms, explosives and military materiel to extremist dominated militia. A few MANPADS simply increases the likelihood of blowback upon a civilian target, and the consequent exposure; which is the Obama administration’s major concern. As the NYT report states, one of the shipments of MANPADS that has entered Syria, came from the very same former Gaddafi stockpiles of Eastern bloc weapons looted by Qatari backed militants in Libya. In summary, the current media leaks on arms shipments to Syria can be construed as the Obama administration attempting to build plausible deniability. The constant revision of the Syrian timeline also points to the retroactive smoke-screen being applied to US-led covert policies that have already been exposed. Indeed, this tactic of using client states to gain deniability of US aggression is nothing new. The policy has provided the United States with the ultimate get-out-clause through decades of subversion and aggression upon sovereign nations. If – as is the current trajectory in Syria – the militants that the United States ad its clients foment, fund and arm, become an uncontrollable monster and fail to achieve the desired short-term objectives; the US can simply disassociate and point the finger to one of its lesser allies, on this occasion, that finger seems to point directly at the former Emir of Qatar. One wonders if in twenty years time US “diplomats” will portray the same vacant regret for their role in the creation of Jabhat al Nusra and fellow ideologues; as they do now for their role in the creation of Al Qaeda itself. As the United States continues its divisive and destructive policies to desperately cling to hegemony; the mantra of “lessons have been learned” is more hollow than ever. Phil Greaves is a UK based writer/analyst, focusing on UK/US Foreign Policy and conflict analysis in the Middle East post WWII. Thats All every body, thanks for listening. Goodnight and goodbye