Podcasts about china japan

Sam Faddis is a retired CIA operations officer, published author, and national security commentator. He talks the CIA being the boogeyman, escalation in Venezuela, Cuba's involvement, why Russia can't sustain the war with Ukraine, China/Japan and much more. PLEASE SUBSCRIBE LIKE AND SHARE THIS PODCAST!!!   Watch Show Rumble- https://rumble.com/v72lwhe-are-we-starting-a-war-with-venezuela-sam-faddis.html YouTube- https://youtu.be/KJuAg8cIf5s   Follow Me X- https://x.com/CoffeeandaMike IG- https://www.instagram.com/coffeeandamike/ Facebook- https://www.facebook.com/CoffeeandaMike/ YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/@Coffeeandamike Rumble- https://rumble.com/search/all?q=coffee%20and%20a%20mike Substack- https://coffeeandamike.substack.com/ Apple Podcasts- https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/coffee-and-a-mike/id1436799008 Gab- https://gab.com/CoffeeandaMike Locals- https://coffeeandamike.locals.com/ Website- www.coffeeandamike.com Email- info@coffeeandamike.com   Support My Work Venmo- https://www.venmo.com/u/coffeeandamike Paypal- https://www.paypal.com/biz/profile/Coffeeandamike Substack- https://coffeeandamike.substack.com/ Patreon- http://patreon.com/coffeeandamike Locals- https://coffeeandamike.locals.com/ Cash App- https://cash.app/$coffeeandamike Buy Me a Coffee- https://buymeacoffee.com/coffeeandamike Bitcoin- coffeeandamike@strike.me   Mail Check or Money Order- Coffee and a Mike LLC P.O. Box 25383 Scottsdale, AZ 85255-9998   Follow Sam X- https://x.com/RealSamFaddis Substack- https://andmagazine.substack.com/   Sponsors Vaulted/Precious Metals- https://vaulted.blbvux.net/coffeeandamike McAlvany Precious Metals- https://mcalvany.com/coffeeandamike/ Independence Ark Natural Farming- https://www.independenceark.com/  

In this 56th edition of The World According to Irina Tsukerman, the bi-weekly geopolitical series on KAJ Masterclass LIVE, we break down escalating US –Venezuela tensions, the next phase of the Gaza plan, the Ukraine leadership crisis, and the China–Japan standoff reshaping Indo-Pacific strategy. Irina explains the forces driving these conflicts — from shifting war doctrines and intelligence rivalries to oil power plays and regional alignments. Viewers will walk away with a clear, fact-driven understanding of how today's flashpoints could redefine global security and the balance of power.About the guestIrina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security lawyer, geopolitical analyst, editor of The Washington Outsider, and president of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security and strategic advisory. Her writings and commentary have appeared in diverse US and international media and have been translated into over a dozen languages.Connect with Irina here:https://www.thewashingtonoutsider.com/https://www.linkedin.com/in/irina-tsukerman-4b04595/Catch up on earlier episodes in the playlist here:https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLt7IEKOM1t1tKItNEVaStzsqSChTCGmp6Watch all our global politics content here:https://rumble.com/c/kajmasterclasshttps://www.youtube.com/@kajmasterclassPolitics=========================================

In this special live pod, Ray and Jim were joined by two distinguished guests: Former Japanese Ambassador to Australia Shingo Yamagami and Bonnie Glaser, Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. Together, they unpack China's escalating diplomatic offensive against Japan following PM Sanae Takaichi's recent statements about Taiwan.​What Sparked the CrisisEp. 114 centers on Takaichi's remarks in the Japanese Diet, where she responded to a hypothetical question about a Taiwan blockade scenario. She stated that if China imposed a blockade around Taiwan and the U.S. intervened, Japan could classify the situation as an "existence-threatening situation" under its national security legislation-potentially allowing deployment of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Shingo emphasized this was not a policy change but a restatement of Japan's longstanding legal framework established a decade ago. Nevertheless, Beijing has reacted fiercely, labeling her comments an "unacceptable intervention" in China's domestic affairs.​China's Strategic CalculusBonnie explained that China's strong reaction stems from multiple factors: Xi Jinping's perceived loss of face after meeting Takaichi at the APEC summit, the 80th anniversary of WW2 amplifying anti-Japanese narratives, and concerns about Japan's military buildup in its Southwest Islands. China's broader message, she notes, is "kill the chicken to scare the monkey"-punishing Japan to deter other nations from challenging Beijing's red lines on Taiwan. China is also testing whether the United States will stand firmly behind its allies, seeking to drive wedges in the U.S.-Japan and other alliances.​The Stakes for Japan and the RegionShingo underscored Taiwan's vital strategic importance to Japan. If Taiwan falls under CCP control, the entire East China Sea would become contested territory, potentially forcing U.S. forces to retreat from Okinawa and fundamentally weakening Japan's defense posture. As former Prime Minister Abe famously stated: "A Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency." Shingo also discussed the shocking details about a Chinese consul general's social media post threatening that Takaichi's "dirty neck will be chopped off"-unprecedented diplomatic intimidation that has only strengthened Japanese public support for the new prime minister, whose approval ratings have surged into the mid-70s.​The One China Policy vs. One China PrincipleThe discussion clarifies a critical distinction often misunderstood: The U.S. "One China policy" and those of other Western nations are fundamentally different from China's "One China principle." Neither the U.S. nor Japan has ever agreed that Taiwan is part of China-they merely "acknowledged" or "understood and respected" Beijing's position. China is now aggressively pushing countries to abandon their individual policies and adopt its principle, which holds Taiwan as an "inalienable" part of China.​Looking AheadBoth guests anticipate a prolonged chill in China-Japan relations. However, Shingo noted that China's economic vulnerabilities limit its coercion options-Beijing needs Japanese investment for its struggling economy. If Takaichi maintains her popularity and secures a strong political mandate, China may eventually be forced to engage with her government, as it did with the long-serving Abe administration. Glaser warns that China sees opportunity in a perceived U.S. decline and will continue pressuring allied coalitions, making unity among democratic partners more essential than ever.​

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China's ambassador to the United Nations on Monday delivered another letter to the United Nations chief, rejecting what Beijing calls Japan's "unreasonable arguments" over Taiwan and reiterating its position on the issue.中国驻联合国大使周一再次致函联合国秘书长，驳斥日本就台湾问题提出的所谓“无理主张”，并重申中方立场。In the letter, Fu Cong, China's permanent representative to the UN, said China "firmly opposes" Japan's letter to the UN and called it "dodging the key issues, while groundlessly accusing China and seeking to shift blame."在信函中，中国常驻联合国代表傅聪表示，中方“坚决反对”日本致联合国的信函，称其“回避关键问题，同时无端指责中国并试图推卸责任”。The latest move comes amid an exchange of letters between the two missions. Fu recently sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, prompting a response from Japan's UN ambassador Kazuyuki Yamazaki, who also wrote to the UN.最新动向发生在两国驻外使团互换信函之际。傅聪最近致函联合国秘书长安东尼奥·古特雷斯，日本驻联合国大使山崎和之随即作出回应，也向联合国发函。Fu said the direct cause of the "serious differences" between the two countries was the recent remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on Nov 7, who suggested during a Diet session that a "Taiwan contingency" could constitute a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan and implied possible military involvement.傅聪表示，两国出现“严重分歧”的直接原因在于日本首相高市早苗11月7日在国会会议上的言论。她当时暗示“台湾突发状况”可能构成日本的“生存威胁”，并暗示可能采取军事行动。Fu said such remarks challenge the outcomes of World War II, undermine the post-war international order and violate the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.傅聪说此类言论挑战第二次世界大战的成果，破坏战后国际秩序，违反《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则。In its letter to the UN, Japan has said that it adheres to its "consistent position". Fu urged Japan to clarify what it calls its "consistent position" on Taiwan. "The Japanese side has continued to evade the question and has yet to give China a direct answer. Can the Japanese side provide the international community with a complete and accurate explanation of its 'consistent position' on the Taiwan question?"日本在致联合国的信函中表示坚持其“一贯立场”。傅聪立言敦促日本澄清其所谓对台湾问题的“一贯立场”。他表示：“日方持续回避问题，至今未向中方作出直接答复。日方能否向国际社会完整准确地说明其在台湾问题上的'‘一贯立场'？”The ambassador cited the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender as legal instruments confirming China's sovereignty over Taiwan.傅聪援引《开罗宣言》、《波茨坦公告》和《日本投降书》作为确认中国对台湾拥有主权的法律文书。He also referred to the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, which states that "the Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China" and "The Government of Japan fully understands and respects" China's stand that Taiwan is "an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China".他还援引了1972年《中日联合声明》，其中声明“日本政府承认中华人民共和国政府是中国唯一合法政府”，并“充分理解和尊重”中国关于台湾是“中华人民共和国领土不可分割一部分”的立场。Fu also rejected Japan's claim in its letter saying that Japan adheres to a "passive defense strategy, which is exclusively defense-oriented", and asserts that Takaichi's remarks were grounded in this position.傅聪也驳斥了日本在信函中声称日本坚持“纯粹以防御为导向的被动防御战略”的说法，并强调高市早苗的言论正是基于这一立场。"Takaichi linked Japan's 'survival-threatening situation' with a 'Taiwan contingency', implying the use of force against China. This clearly goes beyond its claim of 'passive defense strategy' that is 'exclusively defense-oriented'. The Japanese side's arguments are self-contradictory and are intended to mislead the international community," Fu said.傅聪指出：“高市将日本‘生存威胁'与‘台湾突发状况'挂钩，暗示对华动武。这显然超越了其所谓‘纯粹防御型'的‘被动防御战略'主张。日方论调自相矛盾，意在误导国际社会。”He also warned Japan's attempts to "expand its military capabilities and revive militarism". Fu said Japan had increased defense spending for many years, adjusted arms-export principles and was debating nuclear-related policies.他还警示道日本企图“扩大军事能力、复活军国主义”。傅聪指出，日本多年来不断增加国防开支，调整武器出口原则，并正在讨论核相关政策。"Takaichi's erroneous words and deeds have severely undermined the mutual trust between China and Japan and damaged the political foundation of China-Japan relations," Fu said.傅聪表示：“高市早苗的一系列错误言行严重破坏了中日之间的相互信任，损害了中日关系的政治基础。”Japan should "clearly reaffirm the one-China principle, faithfully uphold the spirit of the four political documents between the two countries and its political commitments, immediately retract the erroneous remarks, and take practical steps to honor its commitments to China," he said, warning that the Japanese side should "bear all the consequences arising therefrom".日本应“明确重申一个中国原则，恪守两国间四份政治文件的精神及其政治承诺，立即收回错误言论，并采取切实措施履行对中国的承诺”，傅聪警告称日方应“承担由此产生的全部后果”。Fu asked that his latest letter be circulated as an official document of the UN General Assembly under agenda item 120.傅聪要求将其最新信函作为联合国大会正式文件，列入议程第120项进行分发。Munir Akram, a seasoned diplomat and former permanent representative of Pakistan to the United Nations in New York and Geneva, told China Daily in a recent exclusive interview in New York that Takaichi's remarks on Taiwan were "not appropriate".资深外交官、巴基斯坦前常驻联合国纽约和日内瓦代表穆尼尔·阿克拉姆近日在纽约接受《中国日报》独家专访时表示，高市早苗关于台湾问题的言论“不恰当”。"I think everybody realizes how sensitive China is on the issue of the one-China principle and on any indication of encouragement of separatism from Taiwan," Akram said. "It is my hope that good sense will prevail, and that our friends in Japan will have realized that perhaps this was not the most appropriate way to address an issue China considers to be internal."穆尼尔·阿克拉姆表示：“我认为所有人都清楚中国对一个中国原则的敏感性，以及对任何鼓励台湾分裂行为的表态的警惕。我希望理性能够占上风，我们的日本朋友能够意识到，这种方式或许并非处理中国视为内政问题的最佳途径。”"It is difficult to understand why the remark was made because, both from a legal point of view and from a historical point of view, Japan of all countries should have been more careful because of the history involved," he said.他表示：“很难理解为何会发表此番言论，因为无论从法律角度还是历史角度来看，日本这个国家本应因涉及的历史问题而更加谨慎。”shift blame推卸责任contingencyn./kənˈtɪn.dʒən.si/不测事件，意外事件

Prof. Kim Byung-joo of International Relations at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies will talk about persistent China-Japan tensions, Trump's Intervention, and South Korea's position in the matter.

On the International News Review... Saturday Mornings Show” host Glenn van Zutphen and co-host Neil Humphreys welcome Bloomberg News Editor Joanna Ossinger to unpack the headlines dominating Asia. We begin in Hong Kong, where tragedy has struck with the death toll rising to over 130 after the devastating Tai Po fire. Officials now admit fire alarms were not working properly, raising urgent questions about safety standards and accountability. Next, we turn to Thailand, where “once in 300 years” rainfall has triggered catastrophic floods across Southeast Asia. Joanna explains the scale of the disaster and its implications for climate resilience in the region. Closer to home, Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s remarks on the China-Japan spat over Taiwan have sparked a wave of online barbs and spin from Chinese netizens. We explore what this reaction reveals about regional sensitivities and Singapore’s longstanding diplomatic stance. And finally, a bizarre story from Bangkok: temple staff were stunned when a woman, believed dead, began moving inside her coffin moments before cremation.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

We talk President Lai Ching-te's proposal for a NT$1.25trillion special defense budget, the ongoing China-Japan spat over Taiwan from a Taiwan perspective and criticism of ruling handed down by the High Court in child sex images case. -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Uploaded every Friday, Nikkei Asia News Roundup delivers a collection of articles from Nikkei's English language media, Nikkei Asia. ・A selection of news headlines ・A glimpse into a notable story for deeper understanding   ・A highlight of our best stories Today we focus on:"China-Japan tensions, South Korea's instant noodle boom" ・You can read more at: https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Podcast/Podcast-News-Roundup

The island’s diplomatic space may be shrinking but it wants to engage the world on its own terms. Synopsis: Every fourth Friday of the month, The Straits Times will now analyse the hottest political and trending talking points, alternating between its Malaysia and Greater China bureaus. For November, host and deputy foreign editor Albert Wai connects with Taiwan correspondent Yip Wai Yee. They discuss Taiwan’s foreign policy preoccupations and the implications of the Beijing-Tokyo spat over remarks made by Japanese leader Sanae Takaichi on cross-strait tensions. Up against an increasingly dominant China, Taiwan is adopting what it calls “integrated diplomacy” as it seeks to buttress relations with like-minded partners. At the same time, the normalisation of so-called grey-zone tactics by the mainland against the island carries risks for Taiwan’s societal resilience and its ability to respond in the event of an actual attack. All eyes are on the next round of talks between American President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the first half of 2026, as this could have far-reaching implications on Taiwan’s role on the global stage. Highlights (click/tap above): 1:49 Taipei’s “integrated diplomacy” 4:12 China-Japan spat over Taiwan 7:46 Shift in approach for cross-strait ties 10:35 What’s at stake when Trump and Xi meet in 2026 13:51 Leverage in tariff talks with the US 15:22 Grey-zone tactics 19:27 Breakthrough at European parliament 21:31 China Taipei or Chinese Taipei? Read more: https://str.sg/s4A7 Register for Asian Insider newsletter: https://str.sg/stnewsletters Host: Albert Wai (albertw@sph.com.sg) Produced and edited by: Fa’izah Sani Executive producer: Ernest Luis Follow Asian Insider Podcast on Fridays here: Channel: https://str.sg/JWa7 Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWa8 Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaX Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg SPH Awedio app: https://www.awedio.sg --- Follow more ST podcast channels: All-in-one ST Podcasts channel: https://str.sg/wvz7 Get more updates: http://str.sg/stpodcasts The Usual Place Podcast YouTube: https://str.sg/4Vwsa --- Get The Straits Times app, which has a dedicated podcast player section: The App Store: https://str.sg/icyB Google Play: https://str.sg/icyX --- #STAsianInsiderSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The island’s diplomatic space may be shrinking but it wants to engage the world on its own terms. Synopsis: Every fourth Friday of the month, The Straits Times will now analyse the hottest political and trending talking points, alternating between its Malaysia and Greater China bureaus. For November, host and deputy foreign editor Albert Wai connects with Taiwan correspondent Yip Wai Yee. They discuss Taiwan’s foreign policy preoccupations and the implications of the Beijing-Tokyo spat over remarks made by Japanese leader Sanae Takaichi on cross-strait tensions. Up against an increasingly dominant China, Taiwan is adopting what it calls “integrated diplomacy” as it seeks to buttress relations with like-minded partners. At the same time, the normalisation of so-called grey-zone tactics by the mainland against the island carries risks for Taiwan’s societal resilience and its ability to respond in the event of an actual attack. All eyes are on the next round of talks between American President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the first half of 2026, as this could have far-reaching implications on Taiwan’s role on the global stage. Highlights (click/tap above): 1:49 Taipei’s “integrated diplomacy” 4:12 China-Japan spat over Taiwan 7:46 Shift in approach for cross-strait ties 10:35 What’s at stake when Trump and Xi meet in 2026 13:51 Leverage in tariff talks with the US 15:22 Grey-zone tactics 19:27 Breakthrough at European parliament 21:31 China Taipei or Chinese Taipei? Read more: https://str.sg/s4A7 Register for Asian Insider newsletter: https://str.sg/stnewsletters Host: Albert Wai (albertw@sph.com.sg) Produced and edited by: Fa’izah Sani Executive producer: Ernest Luis Follow Asian Insider Podcast on Fridays here: Channel: https://str.sg/JWa7 Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWa8 Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaX Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg SPH Awedio app: https://www.awedio.sg --- Follow more ST podcast channels: All-in-one ST Podcasts channel: https://str.sg/wvz7 Get more updates: http://str.sg/stpodcasts The Usual Place Podcast YouTube: https://str.sg/4Vwsa --- Get The Straits Times app, which has a dedicated podcast player section: The App Store: https://str.sg/icyB Google Play: https://str.sg/icyX --- #STAsianInsiderSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Japan's stance on the Taiwan question has long defined its relations with China. Japan must reaffirm its commitment to the four important documents which are the bedrock of bilateral relations. However, it has purposely maintained strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan question.日本在台湾问题上的立场长期决定着中日关系的走向。日本必须重申其对构成两国关系基础的四个重要政治文件的承诺。然而，日本在台湾问题上刻意保持战略模糊。As a result, the Taiwan question has remained a persistent pivot, shaped by Japan's post-war legal positioning, its domestic political constraints and, above all, its reliance on the United States-Japan security alliance.因此，台湾问题一直是中日关系的关键点，受日本战后法律定位、国内政治约束，尤其是对美日同盟依赖的共同影响。After World War II, Japan accepted the Potsdam Proclamation and its requirement to restore Taiwan to China. But in practice, it followed the US-led "Treaty of San Francisco" signed in 1951, which had been signed without the participation of representatives from China. That "treaty" required Japan only to "renounce" Taiwan, without specifying its return to China. Using this omission as an excuse, Japan claimed it did not have the legal authority to define "Taiwan's status".二战后，日本接受《波茨坦公告》及其“台湾归还中国”的要求。但在实践中，日本却遵循1951年美主导的《旧金山和约》——该“和约”签署时并无中国的参与。该“和约”要求日本“放弃”台湾，但并未明确台湾应归还中国。日本借此漏洞声称其无权定义“台湾地位”。The position was blatantly contradictory. Japan was simultaneously agreeing to adhere to the Potsdam Proclamation while relying on a so-called "treaty" that obscured what Potsdam had made explicit. This dual-track approach was driven not by legal logic, but by strategic calculation.这种立场明显自相矛盾。日本一方面声称遵守波茨坦公告，另一方面又依赖一个刻意模糊其明确内容的所谓“和约”。这种“双轨策略”源于战略算计，而非法律逻辑。Another key factor in Japan's Taiwan policy is the US-Japan security framework during the Cold War. During the early Cold War, the US regarded Taiwan as a critical strategic asset.影响日本台湾政策的另一关键因素是冷战时期的美日安全框架。在早期冷战中，美国将台湾视为重要战略资产。As China and Japan sat down to normalize ties in the 1970s, the US was deeply concerned about how Japan would address the Taiwan question in the negotiations. Tokyo repeatedly reassured Washington that the US-Japan alliance would not be affected and that the US would have access to bases for "Taiwan-related operations".当中日于上世纪70年代讨论邦交正常化时，美国高度关注日本在谈判中如何处理台湾问题。东京反复向华盛顿保证，美日同盟不会受影响，美国仍可使用驻日基地进行“涉台行动”。Even after normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations, Japanese officials stated that including Taiwan within the "Far East" framework served US strategic interests.即便中日实现邦交正常化，日本官员仍声称将台湾纳入“远东”框架符合美国战略利益。After the Cold War, Japan further strengthened these security linkages. The 1997 and 2015 revisions in the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation broadened bilateral roles in regional contingencies, widely interpreted as including the Taiwan island.冷战结束后，日本进一步强化了这些安全联动。《日美防卫合作指针》于1997年和2015年的修订扩大了双方在地区突发事件中的角色，普遍被解读为涵盖台湾地区。Japan's 2015 security legislation tried to provide so-called "legal grounds" for supporting US military operations in a "crisis in Taiwan".日本2015年的安保法试图为日本在“台湾有事”时支持美国军事行动提供所谓“法律依据”。In 2021, for the first time since 1969, Japan and the US issued a joint statement expressing concerns over peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.2021年，美日首次自1969年以来在联合声明中对台湾海峡的和平与稳定表示关切。The recent provocative remarks by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi have severely damaged ties with China.日本首相高市早苗近期的挑衅性言论严重损害了中日关系。Speaking in the Japanese Diet, she claimed that a "Taiwan contingency" would constitute a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan — the most explicit formulation ever made by a serving Japanese leader.她在国会中声称，“台湾有事”将构成日本的“存亡危机事态”——这是日本在任领导人迄今最明确的表述。Her statement not only breaks with Tokyo's long-standing strategic ambiguity but also signals a shift toward treating Taiwan as a core element of Japan's national security, which is a blatant violation of China's internal affairs.此言论不仅突破东京长期坚持的战略模糊，更表明日本正将台湾视为其国家安全核心要素，公然干涉中国内政。Japan's dual-track approach of offering political assurances to China while aligning with the US regional strategy during past US administrations has given Tokyo flexibility, but also created inconsistencies.日本过去以对华政治保证与配合美国地区战略并行的“双轨模式”虽为东京带来灵活性，却也造成了明显矛盾。Japan claims it abides by the Potsdam Proclamation but relies on the "San Francisco Peace Treaty", which China regards as invalid.日本声称遵守《波茨坦公告》，却依赖中国明确视为无效的《旧金山和约》。Japan reassures China that it does not support Taiwan independence and upholds the one-China principle, yet expands the scope of US-Japan military cooperation in ways that could involve Japan in "Taiwan contingencies".日本安抚中国，声称不支持“台独”并坚持一个中国原则，但同时不断扩大可能使其卷入“台湾有事”的美日军事合作范围。However, as the Chinese leadership and the incumbent US administration reaffirm the importance of managing the Taiwan question responsibly, Japan's increasingly explicit security framing stands in sharp contrast.然而，在中美领导层均强调负责任管控台湾问题的重要性之际，日本愈发明确的安全定位形成鲜明对比。Rather than reducing tensions, Tokyo's new rhetoric risks injecting additional uncertainty into an issue that the world's two major countries are actively seeking to stabilize.东京的新言论非但不会缓和局势，反而可能向这一中美共同努力稳定的问题注入更多不确定性。Fortunately on Nov 24, President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump held a phone conversation in which the Taiwan question was a central focus.所幸的是，11月24日，习近平主席与美国总统特朗普通话，台湾问题成为核心议题。President Xi elaborated on China's principled position, stressing that the restoration of Taiwan to China is an integral part of the post-war international order.习近平主席阐明了中方原则立场，强调台湾回归中国是战后国际秩序的重要组成部分。President Trump responded by expressing the US side's understanding of Taiwan's significance to China, signaling that even amid strategic competition, Washington acknowledges the sensitivity and centrality of the issue.特朗普总统表示美方理解台湾对中国的重要性，显示出即使在战略竞争中，美国也承认这一问题的敏感性和核心地位。Hopefully, the phone call between the Chinese and US top leaders, followed by another call between President Trump and Prime Minister Takaichi, has clearly conveyed China's unshakable stance on the Taiwan question to the Japanese politicians.希望中美元首的通话，以及随后特朗普总统与高市早苗的通话，已向日本政界清晰传达了中国在台湾问题上的坚定立场。Additionally, President Trump can demonstrate his political acumen by influencing Japan, encouraging the Japanese politician to correct her missteps.此外，特朗普总统也可通过劝导日本纠正其错误言论来展现政治智慧。For Japan, strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan question is a shield. From Japanese politicians' perspective, an explicit acknowledgment that Taiwan is part of China may undermine Japan's post-war "security architecture" and its flexibility to maneuver in the region's shifting geopolitical landscape.对日本而言，台湾问题上的战略模糊是一种“保护伞”。从其政界角度看，明确承认“台湾属于中国”可能冲击日本战后“安全架构”，削弱其在地区地缘政治变化中的操作空间。However, if Japan fully implements the latest remarks, it will be seen as a blatant infringement on China's integrity of sovereignty and territory, given that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.然而，如果日本真正落实其最新言论，则将被视为公然侵犯中国主权和领土完整，因为台湾是中国不可分割的一部分。Such statements, made on the 80th anniversary of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931-45), are evoking strong memories among the Chinese people of Japan's military past and also remind the people of the Asia-Pacific region of Japan's wartime atrocities in the region.在中国人民抗日战争（1931–45）80周年之际发表此类言论，更激起中国人民对日本军国主义历史的强烈记忆，也提醒亚太地区民众注意日本战争暴行的历史。It is crucial for Takaichi to retract her misguided remarks, especially at this highly sensitive time, as they risk paving the way for a revival of militarism that can threaten regional peace.在当前高度敏感的时期，高市早苗必须撤回其错误言论，因为这类言辞可能助长军事主义复活，威胁地区和平。The author is director-general of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and chairman of the Chinese Association for Japanese Studies.The views don't necessarily represent those of China Daily.normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations实现外交关系正常化internal affairs内政Potsdam Proclamation《波茨坦公告》San Francisco Peace Treaty《旧金山和约》blatantly contradictory明显自相矛盾

China bestraft Japan, Trump wittert eine Chance. Den „Tagesanbruch" gibt es auch zum Nachlesen unter [t-online.de/tagesanbruch](https://www.t-online.de/tagesanbruch) Anmerkungen, Lob und Kritik gern an podcasts@t-online.de Den „Tagesanbruch“-Podcast gibt es immer montags bis samstags gegen 6 Uhr zum Start in den Tag – am Wochenende mit einer tiefgründigeren Diskussion. Verpassen Sie keine Folge und abonnieren Sie uns bei [Spotify](https://open.spotify.com/show/3v1HFmv3V3Zvp1R4BT3jlO?si=klrETGehSj2OZQ_dmB5Q9g), [Apple Podcasts](https://itunes.apple.com/de/podcast/t-online-tagesanbruch/id1374882499?mt=2), [Amazon Music](https://music.amazon.de/podcasts/961bad79-b3ba-4a93-9071-42e0d3cdd87f/tagesanbruch-von-t-online) oder überall sonst, wo es Podcasts gibt. Wenn Ihnen der Podcast gefällt, lassen Sie gern eine Bewertung da.

Die neue japanische Premierministerin Takaichi schlägt hohe Wellen. Sie sagte Anfang November den Mitgliedern der Diet, dem japanischen Parlament, dass ein militärischer Konflikt um Taiwan als Bedrohung für die Existenz Japans angesehen werden könnte, was  „kollektive Selbstverteidigung“ ermöglichen würde. Damit könnte sich Tokio an der Seite von US-Streitkräften an militärischen Aktionen gegen China beteiligen. VonWeiterlesen

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's refusal to retract her erroneous remarks on theTaiwan question, together with Tokyo's accelerating military buildup near China's doorstep, threatens to push China-Japan relations to a dangerous inflection point.日本首相高市早苗拒绝收回其在台湾问题上的错误言论，加之东京正在中国家门口加速军事扩张，这一态势可能将中日关系推向危险的转折点。By linking the Taiwan question to a "survival-threatening situation" and implying the possibility of Japan's armed intervention in the Taiwan Strait, Tokyo has not only touched China's red line but also shaken thepolitical foundation of bilateral relations.日本政府将台湾问题与“生存威胁”挂钩，并暗示日本可能对台湾海峡采取武装干预，此举不仅触碰了中国的红线，更动摇了双边关系的政治根基。Takaichi's remarks encapsulate a policy orientation that contradicts thesolemn commitments the Japanese government has made regarding the Taiwan question in the four political documents between China and Japan, which leave no room for ambiguity or misinterpretation.高市早苗的言论所体现的政策取向与日本政府在《中日四项政治文件》中就台湾问题作出的庄严承诺相悖，这些文件不留任何模棱两可或误解的余地。As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized on Sunday, if Japan persists in its own way and keeps making the same mistakes, all countries and people who advocate justice have the right to reexamine Japan's historical crimes and the responsibility to resolutely prevent theresurgence of Japanese militarism.正如中国外交部长王毅周日强调的，如果日本一意孤行、重蹈覆辙，所有主张正义的国家与人民都有权重新审视日本的历史罪行，更有责任坚决防止日本军国主义死灰复燃。Recent developments have reinforced the gravity of the situation. Japan's Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has announced that Tokyo will proceed with thedeployment of intermediate-range missiles on Yonaguni Island—barely 110 kilometers from China's Taiwan region—and the rapid expansion of Japan Self-Defense Forces' facilities across the Ryukyu Islands.近期一系列事态发展进一步凸显了局势的严峻性。日本防卫大臣小泉进次郎宣布，东京将推进在距中国台湾地区仅110公里的与那国岛部署中程导弹，并加速在琉球群岛全境扩建日本自卫队设施。These moves, as Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said on Monday, are a deliberate attempt to create regional tension and provoke military confrontation. They come alongside Japan's first export of lethal weapons since the relaxation of arms export rules and renewed discussions within the Liberal Democratic Party on revising the three non-nuclear principles upheld by Japan and further increasing its defense spending.正如中国外交部发言人毛宁周一所言，这些举动是蓄意制造地区紧张局势、挑起军事对抗的行径。与此同时，日本在放宽武器出口规则后首次出口致命武器，自民党内部也重新讨论修改日本奉行的“三无核原则”，并进一步增加国防开支。The Potsdam Declaration clearly prohibits Japan from rearming and Japan's pacifist Constitution establishes the exclusive defense-oriented principle. High vigilance from the international community is imperative given Tokyo's obvious intent to brush this principle aside.《波茨坦公告》明确禁止日本重新武装，而日本和平宪法确立了以防卫为宗旨的排他性原则。鉴于东京方面明显有意无视这一原则，国际社会必须保持高度警惕。The moves Japan has taken since Takaichi took office last month all demonstrate Japan is trying to break free from the bounds imposed on it by the postwar arrangement that sought to prevent a repeat of its aggression. The international community therefore has every reason to ask—what exactly is Japan seeking to achieve?自上月高市早苗上任以来，日本采取的一系列举措都表明，该国正试图摆脱战后为防止其侵略历史重蹈覆辙而设定的桎梏。因此，国际社会完全有理由追问：日本究竟意欲何为？China has noted Japan mentioning its "consistent position" on the Taiwan question, but as the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman asked, what exactly is this so-called "consistent position"? Can Japan fully and publicly articulate it? If Japan merely reiterates the concept of "an unchanged position", while remaining vague about its specific content and constantly overstepping its boundaries with its actions, then such reiteration is empty rhetoric.中方注意到日方提及在台湾问题上的“一贯立场”，但正如外交部发言人所问，所谓“一贯立场”究竟是什么？日本能否完整、公开地阐述？如果日本只是重复“立场不变”的概念，对具体内容含糊其辞，同时不断以行动越界，那么这种重复不过是空话。Sino-Japanese relations cannot be built on ambiguity, provocation or historical amnesia, which would only become a prelude to repeated history.中日关系不能建立在模糊不清、挑衅和历史遗忘之上，这些只会成为历史重演的前奏。The historical parallel is chilling. The use of pretexts such as "survival-threatening situation" has been a recurring tactic of Japanese militarism—from its 1931 invasion of Northeast China to the expansion of its aggression across Asia and the attack on Pearl Harbor. As the Chinese nation marks the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931-45) and the World Anti-Fascist War, the alarm cannot be ignored. It seems the only thing the Takaichi government learns from history is that it learns nothing from history.历史的相似性令人不寒而栗。日本军国主义屡屡以“生存威胁”等借口为由发动侵略——从1931年侵占中国东北，到在亚洲扩张侵略，再到袭击珍珠港。值此中华民族迎来抗日战争暨世界反法西斯战争胜利八十周年之际，这般警钟不容忽视。高市早苗政府从历史中汲取的唯一教训，似乎就是“不汲取任何教训”。Japan's current stance also tramples on historical facts. For half a century, Japan forcibly occupied China's Taiwan island, inflicting enormous suffering on the local population. Taiwan's restoration to China is explicitly affirmed in the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender. Taiwan is China's inalienable territory—this is not only a matter of sovereignty but also an integral part of the postwar international order. Japan is the least qualified to make irresponsible remarks on Taiwan, and any attempt to interfere will not be tolerated.日本当前的立场也践踏了历史事实。半个世纪以来，日本强占中国台湾岛，给当地民众造成巨大苦难。《开罗宣言》《波茨坦公告》和《日本投降书》都明确确认台湾回归中国。台湾是中国不可分割的领土——这不仅是主权问题，也是战后国际秩序的重要组成部分。日本最无资格对台湾问题妄加评论，任何干涉企图都绝不容忍。The consequences of Japan's wrongful words and deeds are already emerging. The Chinese people's outrage is real, and it is affecting bilateral exchanges—from declining tourist flows and canceled flights to a reduced market for Japanese products. These are the natural results of public indignation toward provocations that harm China's core interests.日本的妄言妄行已然引发后果。中国人民的愤慨是真实的，正影响着双边交流。从游客减少、航班取消到日本商品市场萎缩，这些都是公众对损害中国核心利益的挑衅行为感到愤慨的自然结果。If Japan truly wants "constructive and stable ties" with China as Tokyo claims, the Takaichi government must first retract the erroneous remarks, take earnest steps to honor its commitments, and stop crossing China's red line on the Taiwan question. Merely asserting that its position has not changed while acting in direct contradiction to that claim will only escalate tensions.如果日本真心希望与中方建立“建设性稳定关系”，正如其一再宣称的那样，高市早苗政府首先必须收回错误言论，切实履行承诺，停止在台湾问题上触碰中国红线。仅声称立场未变却采取与之相悖的行动，只会加剧紧张局势。Taiwan question台湾问题political foundation of bilateral relations双边关系政治基础solemn commitment郑重承诺deployment of intermediate-range missiles中程导弹部署resurgence n./rɪˈsɝː.dʒəns/复苏；兴起；再次兴起；死灰复燃

Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump held a phone call touching on the Taiwan question on Monday. That was followed by President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi holding their first phone call since the Japanese PM sparked a major diplomatic fallout with China over her remarks on Taiwan. Beijing has issued a series of strong and coordinated diplomatic responses over Takaichi's refusal to retract her Taiwan remarks, with China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi warning that Japan has "crossed a red line." How seriously has Japan miscalculated China's red lines? And what do these developments mean for regional stability and world order?

Our expert guest explains why he predicts both men will seek good vibes in 2026. Synopsis: Every third Friday of the month, The Straits Times gets its US bureau chief to analyse the hottest political and trending talking points. In this episode, US bureau chief Bhagyashree Garekar hosts her special guest - Harvard Professor Graham Allison - who tells her how he manages to read Trump right, by taking him seriously, looking at his patterns amid all his statements, and noticing the trend lines. Prof Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University where he has taught for five decades. He is a leading analyst of national security with special interests in nuclear weapons, Russia, China, and decision-making. He has also written books, including Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, published in 2017. He also had another book out earlier in 2013 - Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States and the World - which has been a bestseller in the US and abroad. Highlights (click/tap above): 2:31 How well do Trump & Xi vibe? Getting a sense of their agendas for 2026 7:34 What do Trump and Xi want from each other? 9:31 Will Trump get hawkish on China ahead of 2026 election? 13:52 Why is Trump muted on China-Japan spat over Taiwan? 18:50 Why Trump is different from any other US president 21:48 How today’s China looks at today’s America 24:43 Will China be the world’s sole superpower? Read Bhagyashree Garekar’s articles: https://str.sg/whNo Follow Bhagyashree Garekar on LinkedIn: https://str.sg/gD6E Sign up for ST’s weekly Asian Insider newsletter: https://str.sg/sfpz Host: Bhagyashree Garekar (bhagya@sph.com.sg) Produced and edited by: Fa’izah Sani Executive producer: Ernest Luis Follow Asian Insider Podcast on Fridays here: Channel: https://str.sg/JWa7 Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWa8 Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaX Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg SPH Awedio app: https://www.awedio.sg --- Follow more ST podcast channels: All-in-one ST Podcasts channel: https://str.sg/wvz7 Get more updates: http://str.sg/stpodcasts The Usual Place Podcast YouTube: https://str.sg/4Vwsa --- Get The Straits Times app, which has a dedicated podcast player section: The App Store: https://str.sg/icyB Google Play: https://str.sg/icyX --- #STAsianInsiderSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Our expert guest explains why he predicts both men will seek good vibes in 2026. Synopsis: Every third Friday of the month, The Straits Times gets its US bureau chief to analyse the hottest political and trending talking points. In this episode, US bureau chief Bhagyashree Garekar hosts her special guest - Harvard Professor Graham Allison - who tells her how he manages to read Trump right, by taking him seriously, looking at his patterns amid all his statements, and noticing the trend lines. Prof Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University where he has taught for five decades. He is a leading analyst of national security with special interests in nuclear weapons, Russia, China, and decision-making. He has also written books, including Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, published in 2017. He also had another book out earlier in 2013 - Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States and the World - which has been a bestseller in the US and abroad. Highlights (click/tap above): 2:31 How well do Trump & Xi vibe? Getting a sense of their agendas for 2026 7:34 What do Trump and Xi want from each other? 9:31 Will Trump get hawkish on China ahead of 2026 election? 13:52 Why is Trump muted on China-Japan spat over Taiwan? 18:50 Why Trump is different from any other US president 21:48 How today’s China looks at today’s America 24:43 Will China be the world’s sole superpower? Read Bhagyashree Garekar’s articles: https://str.sg/whNo Follow Bhagyashree Garekar on LinkedIn: https://str.sg/gD6E Sign up for ST’s weekly Asian Insider newsletter: https://str.sg/sfpz Host: Bhagyashree Garekar (bhagya@sph.com.sg) Produced and edited by: Fa’izah Sani Executive producer: Ernest Luis Follow Asian Insider Podcast on Fridays here: Channel: https://str.sg/JWa7 Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWa8 Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaX Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg SPH Awedio app: https://www.awedio.sg --- Follow more ST podcast channels: All-in-one ST Podcasts channel: https://str.sg/wvz7 Get more updates: http://str.sg/stpodcasts The Usual Place Podcast YouTube: https://str.sg/4Vwsa --- Get The Straits Times app, which has a dedicated podcast player section: The App Store: https://str.sg/icyB Google Play: https://str.sg/icyX --- #STAsianInsiderSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Kim So-young, Assistant Professor at the Faculty of International Studies, Nagoya University of Commerce & Business, will talk about the background of the deterioration in China–Japan relations, the responses by both countries, and the impact on neighboring nations.

Tensions brewing between China and Japan due to PRC's response to Japanese PM's comments about 'survival-threatening situation' pertaining to conflict in the Taiwan Strait.  What's happening here? Over-reaction? Playing to domestic constituencies? Nationalism at play? Chinese envoy to NZ wrote a warning letter to NZ MPs that attended Taiwan's national day reception in Wellington.  Wolf-warrior at play again? Principal-agent issues?  Misunderstanding of how Westminster system works?  Fallout of the US government shutdown and Epstein files is the resignation announcement of big MAGA supporter Marjorie Taylor-Greene.

This week, Walter and Jeremy discuss the China-Japan spat, Mohammed bin Salman's visit to the White House, China's lead in scientific paper and patent production, and the apparent rise of Orthodox Christianity among young conservative American men.

China and Japan’s tensions have deepened dramatically, following Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s parliamentary remark that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could trigger a Japanese military response. Although Tokyo insists the comment did not reflect a policy shift, Beijing has interpreted it as a fundamental challenge to the political foundations of the bilateral relationship. China’s reaction has moved quickly from diplomatic displeasure to concrete economic signals. Advisories urging Chinese citizens to cancel travel to Japan, halts on seafood imports, and warnings of broader trade restrictions have reminded Tokyo of Beijing’s proven willingness to deploy economic coercion. On The Big Story, Hongbin Jeong speaks to Denny Roy, Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, to examine how China-Japan tensions have escalated and what this means for regional stability.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Trump wipes the slate clean of murder for Mohammed bin Salman because ‘things happen'. The Epstein files move a big step closer to being released and what it's like reporting on the ground in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Plus, the comment that sent China-Japan relations plummeting.

Japan under Sanae Takaichi is flagrantly crossing diplomatic red lines. By claiming that "a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency," she is signaling potential intervention in China's internal affairs — a blatant violation of the One-China principle and the foundation of China-Japan relations. Beijing has responded firmly, while Takaichi remains unwilling to retract her irresponsible remarks. What is Japan really up to? How badly has it misread China's resolve — and what happens next?

Asia correspondent Katie Silver spoke to Lisa Owen about the impact a diplomatic row between China and Japan is having on travel between the two nations.

China's Foreign Ministry has confirmed that Premier Li Qiang will not meet one-on-one with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on the sidelines of the upcoming G20 Summit, as the political atmosphere between the two countries has suffered a great impact from Tokyo's persistence in not withdrawing Takaichi's provocative comments regarding Taiwan.中国外交部证实，李强总理不会在即将举行的二十国集团（G20）峰会期间与日本首相高市早苗举行单独会晤。由于东京方面坚持不收回高市早苗关于台湾问题的挑衅言论，两国政治氛围受到严重影响。"A meeting with the Japanese leader is not on Premier Li Qiang's agenda," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said on Monday in Beijing at a daily news briefing.中国外交部发言人毛宁周一在北京的例行记者会上表示：“李强总理的行程中没有安排与日本领导人的会晤。”Takaichi infuriated China after she publicly suggested on Nov 7 Japan's possible military intervention in Taiwan Strait affairs, making her the first incumbent Japanese prime minister to say so in the country's parliament.高市早苗11月7日公开暗示日本可能军事干预台湾海峡事务，此举激怒中国，使她成为日本首位在国会发表此类言论的现任首相。Media outlets in Japan said that Japan-China ties are worsening rapidly and that great attention is being paid to whether there will be a Li-Takaichi meeting at the G20 Summit in South Africa to help break the impasse.日本媒体称中日关系正急剧恶化，各方高度关注李强与高市早苗是否会在南非二十国集团峰会上会晤以打破僵局。"Li's not meeting with Takaichi is a solemn, righteous response to her hazardous remarks that have crossed the line about the Taiwan question and have damaged the political foundation of China-Japan ties," said Wang Peng, a research fellow at Huazhong University of Science and Technology's Institute of State Governance.华中科技大学国家治理研究院研究员王鹏表示：“李强总理不与高市早苗会面，是对其在台湾问题上越界发表危险言论、损害中日关系政治基础的严肃而正义的回应。”While Takaichi's remarks have raised criticism in Japan, some Japanese politicians claimed that China has "overreacted" to her comments.尽管高市早苗的言论在日本引发批评，但部分日本政界人士声称中国对她的言论“反应过度”。Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara defended Takaichi's remarks by saying that the Japanese government's position on the Taiwan question "remains unchanged" and aligns with the China-Japan Joint Statement in 1972, one of the four landmark political documents that have underpinned the bilateral ties.日本内阁官房长官木原稔为高市早苗的言论辩护，称日本政府对台湾问题的立场“始终如一”，并符合1972年《中日联合声明》——该声明是支撑两国关系的四大里程碑式政治文件之一。In response, Mao, the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, said on Monday that Takaichi's remarks "seriously contradict the spirit of the four political documents between China and Japan".对此，外交部发言人毛宁周一表示，高市早苗的言论“严重违背中日四份政治文件的精神”。The clear provisions on the Taiwan question in the four political documents "constitute solemn commitments made by the Japanese government, which has a legal effect under international law and leaves no room for ambiguity or misinterpretation", Mao said.毛宁指出，四项政治文件中关于台湾问题的明确规定“构成日本政府作出的庄严承诺，具有国际法效力，不容含糊其辞或曲解”。"Whichever political party or person is in power in Japan, they must always abide by the commitment of the Japanese government on the Taiwan question," she said.毛宁表示：“无论日本哪个政党或人物执政，都必须始终遵守日本政府在台湾问题上的承诺。”She once again urged Japan to approach history and relations with China in a responsible way, stop crossing the line and playing with fire, retract the wrongful remarks and act seriously to honor Japan's commitments to China.她再次敦促日本以负责任的态度对待历史和中日关系，停止越界和玩火行为，收回不当言论，切实履行对中国的承诺。Su Xiaohui, an associate research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, said the strong protests made so far and countermeasures taken by Beijing should prompt Takaichi "to start reconsidering what she has done".中国国际问题研究院副研究员苏晓辉表示，迄今为止强烈的抗议以及北京采取的反制措施，应当促使高市早苗“开始重新考虑自己的所作所为”。The Japanese officials' responses so far show that Tokyo "does feel the pressure from Beijing although it has not made a fundamental change in its stance", Su said.苏晓辉表示，日本官员迄今的回应表明，东京方面“确实感受到来自北京的压力，尽管其立场尚未发生根本性转变”。Also on Monday, Masaaki Kanai, head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, arrived in Beijing for a visit.同样在周一，日本外务省亚洲大洋洲局局长金井正彰抵达北京进行访问。Unnamed Japanese government sources told Japanese media, including Kyodo News Agency, that Kanai planned to meet with the Chinese side on Tuesday.日本政府匿名消息人士向共同社等日本媒体透露，金井正彰计划于周二与中国方面会晤。Lyu Chao, dean of Liaoning University's Institute of America and East Asia Studies, noted that Kanai is "an influential China hand at the Japanese Foreign Ministry".辽宁大学美国与东亚研究所所长吕超指出，金井正彰是“日本外务省一位颇具影响力的中国问题专家”。"Tokyo has downplayed the serious impact of Takaichi's remarks, and there is no way Japan can gloss it over at the Tuesday talks," Lyu said.吕超表示：“东京方面淡化了高市早苗言论的严重影响，但日本在周二的会谈中绝无可能对此轻描淡写。”As the announcement of the results of a China-Japan joint opinion poll and the Beijing-Tokyo Forum have been postponed at the request of China, Mao, the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, said that Takaichi's remarks have seriously eroded the political foundation of China-Japan relations and poisoned public opinion.由于中日联合民调结果及北京-东京论坛的发布应中方要求推迟，外交部发言人毛宁表示，高市早苗的言论严重侵蚀中日关系的政治基础，毒化了舆论环境。"The environment and conditions for the joint opinion poll have changed enormously, so how much the results reflect reality and the timing of the announcement need to be reconsidered," Mao said.毛宁表示：“联合民调的环境和条件已发生巨大变化，因此其结果反映现实的程度以及公布时机都需要重新考虑。”The responsibility lies completely in the wrong remarks of the Japanese leader, she added.她补充道，责任完全在于日本领导人的不当言论。

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This week in the markets: Investors harvest gains after a six-month rally; the UK struggles to price in Budget speculation; and Asian markets are hit by China/Japan tensions. Fidelity’s Tom Stevenson reviews the stories moving markets.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Singapore shares dipped earlier today as regional markets traded mixed. The Straits Times Index was down 0.1% at 4,541.61 points at 2.07pm Singapore time, with a value turnover of S$647.57M seen in the broader market. In terms of companies to watch, we have ST Engineering, after its wholly owned unit agreed to sell its entire 49 per cent interest in Shanghai Technologies Aerospace Company (Starco) for a 680.5 million yuan cash consideration. Elsewhere, from how Singapore’s key exports expanded by 22.2 per cent year on year in October, to how Japan’s economy shrank almost 2 per cent in the three months through September, more economic and international headlines remained in focus. Plus, what heightened China-Japan tensions mean for Japanese tourism and retail counters today, as well as a look ahead to Nvidia and Walmart’s earnings out mid-week. On Market View, Money Matters’ finance presenter Chua Tian Tian unpacked the developments with David Kuo, Co-founder, The Smart Investor.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

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Allied AI Competition and Submarine Requests. Scott Harold examines the crucial role of allies Japan and South Korea in the AI competition against China. Japan is developing locally tailored AI models built on US technology for use in Southeast Asia. South Korea aims to become the third-largest AI power, offering reliable models to counter China's untrustworthy technology. Harold also discusses South Korea's surprising request for nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines to track Chinese and North Korean vessels, signaling a greater public willingness to contribute to China deterrence.

Chinese President Xi Jinping's meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, upon request, on the sidelines of the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Gyeongju, the Republic of Korea, on Friday was an opportunity for the two sides to build constructive, stable bilateral relations.中国国家主席习近平周五应日本首相高市早苗请求，在韩国庆州举行的亚太经合组织领导人非正式会议期间与其会晤，为双方构建建设性、稳定的双边关系提供了契机。Takaichi did acknowledge the importance of China-Japan relations and that the two neighbors share a responsibility to ensure regional and global peace and prosperity. And she did express Japan's desire to maintain high-level exchanges, enhance communication, and promote cooperation to advance a strategic relationship of mutual benefit, which aligns with the broader goal of fostering a constructive and stable partnership.高市早苗表示承认中日关系的重要性，并表示两国作为邻国共同肩负着维护地区和世界和平繁荣的责任。她也的确表达了日本希望保持高层交流、加强沟通、促进合作以推进互利共赢的战略关系，这符合建立建设性稳定伙伴关系的总体目标。Takaichi also said that, on the Taiwan question, Japan will abide by its position stated in the 1972Japan-China Joint Statement.高市早苗同时表示，在台湾问题上，日本将恪守1972年《中日联合声明》所载立场。However, actions must align with words. Takaichi's meeting with some "officials" of Taiwan island during the APEC meeting, and her reference on social media to one of them with the title given him by the secessionist-minded Lai Ching-te authorities, contradicted what she said.高市早苗并未做到言行必须一致。高市早苗在APEC会议期间会见台湾岛某些“官员”，并在社交媒体上使用台独分子赖清德当局授予其中一人的头衔。高市早苗的言行与其表态相悖。These words and deeds violate the one-China principle, the spirit of the four political documents between China and Japan, and the basic norms of international relations, and send a wrong signal to the "Taiwan independence" forces.这些言行违反一个中国原则、中日四项政治文件精神及国际关系基本准则，向“台独”势力发出错误信号。In the 1972 joint statement, the Japanese government stated that it fully understands and respects the stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and the Japanese government firmly maintains its stand underArticle 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.1972年联合声明中，日本政府声明充分理解并尊重中华人民共和国政府关于台湾是中国不可分割一部分的立场，并坚守《波茨坦公告》第八条所载立场。That Takaichi posted on social media photos of her chatting with the Taiwan "officials" during the APEC meeting makes her actions even more egregious in nature and in impact.高市早苗在社交媒体发布其于APEC会议期间与台湾“官员”交谈的照片，使她的行为性质和影响更为恶劣。China has made serious demarches and protests to Japan over the Japanese leader's wrongful comments and actions concerning Taiwan, a spokesperson for Chinese Foreign Ministry said on Saturday.中国外交部发言人周六表示，中方已就日方领导人有关台湾问题的错误言论和行为向日方提出严正交涉和抗议。In their meeting, Xi particularly stressed to the Japanese leader that the new Cabinet in Japan should establish a correct perception of China, honor the dedication and hard work by the older generations of leaders in both countries and people from different sectors of the two societies, and stay committed to the general direction of peace, friendship and cooperation.会晤中，习近平特别向日方领导人强调，日本新内阁应树立正确的中国观，尊重两国历代领导人及社会各界人士的付出与努力，坚持和平友好合作的大方向。The Japanese leader's reckless move and remarks suggest that she cares little about China's core concerns, and she does not understand the essence of the four political documents between the two countries. To establish a correct perception of relations, she should review these documents as they lay out clear provisions on the Taiwan question and related history.日方领导人的轻率言行表明其漠视中方核心关切，未能理解两国四份政治文件的实质。要建立正确认知，她应当重温这些文件，其中对台湾问题及相关历史有明确规定。Given the fact that Taiwan was under the colonial rule of Japan for 50 years before its return to China at the end of World War II and that this year marks the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931-45), it is remarkably insensitive and irresponsible for the Japanese prime minister to have a meeting with those of the Lai authorities.鉴于台湾在二战结束回归中国前曾遭日本殖民统治50年，且今年正值中国人民抗日战争胜利80周年（1931-1945），日本首相与赖清德当局会面实属极度缺乏敏感性且极不负责任之举。Takaichi and her Cabinet should reflect on and address these wrongdoings, take concrete measures to undo the negative impact, stop interfering in China's internal affairs, and act on Takaichi's remarks at her Friday meeting with Xi on building a constructive and stable relationship with China.高市早苗及其内阁应深刻反思并纠正这些错误行径，采取切实措施消除负面影响，停止干涉中国内政，践行其周五会见习近平时关于构建建设性稳定关系的承诺。As Xi said, the Murayama Statement is a serious introspection of Japan's history of aggression and makes apologies to victim countries, and its spirit should be honored by Japan.正如习近平所言，《村山谈话》是对日本侵略历史的深刻反省，是对受害国的正式道歉，其精神应得到日本尊重。Takaichi needs to be reminded that the Taiwan question is China's internal affair and at the core of China's core interests. How it is handled bears on the political foundation of China-Japan relations.高市早苗有必要被提醒：台湾问题是中国内政，事关中国核心利益。如何处理该问题关乎中日关系的政治基础。In their meeting, Xi said that the two countries should focus on the big picture, seek common ground while reserving differences, build consensus and manage disagreements, and make sure the relationship will not be defined by problems or differences.会晤中习近平强调，两国应着眼大局，求同存异，凝聚共识，妥善处理分歧，确保双边关系不被问题或分歧定义。If the Takaichi government turns a deaf ear to these calls and adopts a saying-one-thing-doing-another approach to bilateral ties, it will be wasting the hard-earned opportunity to build constructive, stable bilateral relations with China.若高市政府对这些呼吁充耳不闻，在双边关系中采取言行不一的策略，将白白浪费来之不易的机遇——即与中国建立建设性、稳定双边关系的机会。Japan-China Joint Statement《中日联合声明》 words and deeds言行Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation《波茨坦公告》第八条Murayama Statement《村山谈话》

Dive into a riveting conversation with Professor Yoichiro Sato, Japan's expert on foreign and security policy. Explore the Quad's evolving role, India-Japan ties, China's maritime strategy, and the delicate balance of military and economic cooperation in Asia.00:35- About Prof Yoichiro SatoProfessor Sato is a professor at the Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University.He is an expert analyst of Foreign and Security Policy, Japan, US, Indo-Pacific.He has published more than 10 academic books and countless articles and book chapters in academic journals. 

① In a phone call with his Japanese counterpart, China's foreign minister called for jointly advancing the strategic relationship of mutual benefit and building constructive bilateral ties. With Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in office, what is the outlook of China-Japan ties? (00:52) ② US President Donald Trump has met with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung as part of the final leg of his trip across Asia. What is Trump gaining from South Korea? (15:03) ③ How can China accelerate green transition during its next five-year plan? (24:45) ④ The Shanghai Stock Exchange has unveiled the first batch of enterprises listed on its newly created sci-tech growth tier. We take a look at how China's capital market is nurturing tech innovation (33:54) ⑤ Why has the peace talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Istanbul ended without a deal? (43:13)

China and Japan agreed on Tuesday to advance constructive and stable bilateral relations as Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a telephone conversation with his Japanese counterpart, Toshimitsu Motegi, a week after the inauguration of Japan's new cabinet.日本新内阁就职一周之际，中国国务委员兼外交部长王毅于周二同日本外相茂木敏充（Toshimitsu Motegi）举行电话会谈，双方就推动中日关系朝着建设性、稳定方向发展达成一致。Wang told Motegi that China is willing to work with Japan to continue observing the principles and following the direction set in thefour political documents between the two nations, and jointly advance the strategic relationship of mutual benefit.王毅外长在通话中表示，中方愿同日本方面一道，继续恪守中日四个政治文件所确立的原则与方向，携手推进互利共赢的战略伙伴关系。作为中共中央政治局委员，王毅还向茂木敏充再次出任日本外相表示祝贺。Wang, who is also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, congratulated Motegi on his reappointment as Japan's foreign minister.作为中共中央政治局委员，王毅还向茂木敏充再次出任日本外相表示祝贺。China's policy toward Japan remains "consistent and stable", Wang said, expressing Beijing's readiness to work with Tokyo to build a constructive and stable relationship that meets the demands of the new era.谈及中国对日政策，王毅明确指出，中方对日政策始终保持“一贯性与稳定性”，愿与日方共同构建契合新时代要求的建设性稳定双边关系。China has noted the positive signals sent by the new Japanese cabinet, he said, emphasizing thathigh-level exchanges are important for the development of bilateral ties. It is hoped that the new cabinet of Japan will make a good start and take the right steps in engaging with China, he added.王毅表示，中方已注意到日本新内阁释放的积极信号，并重申高层交往是推动双边关系发展的重要纽带，期待日本新内阁在对华交往中开好局、起好步，作出符合两国共同利益的正确选择。Wang underscored that historical issues and the Taiwan question bear on the foundation of China-Japan ties and the basic trust between the two countries, saying that he hopes Tokyo would work with Beijing to uphold the political foundation of bilateral relations and facilitate their improvement and development.王毅特别强调，历史问题与台湾问题直接关乎中日关系的政治根基，也影响着两国间的基本信任。他希望日方同中方相向而行，共同维护好双边关系的政治基础，为中日关系的改善与发展注入动力。Motegi said that Japan and China are shouldering increasingly significant international responsibilities in the wake of profound changes in the global landscape. He emphasized that Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi attaches great importance to Japan-China relations, and the Japanese side never intends todecouple from the Chinese side.茂木敏充在通话中回应称，当前全球格局正经历深刻变革，中日两国在国际舞台上肩负的责任日益重要。他表示，日本首相高市早苗（Sanae Takaichi）高度重视中日关系，日方从未有与中方“脱钩”的意图。Motegi expressed the hope that both sides would enhance exchanges at all levels, expand mutually beneficial cooperation, properly manage differences and fully advance a constructive and stable strategic relationship of mutual benefit.茂木敏充同时提议，双方应进一步加强各层级交流互动，扩大互利合作领域，以建设性方式妥善管控分歧，全面推进建设性、稳定且互利共赢的战略伙伴关系。Lyu Yaodong, a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of Japanese Studies, said the relationship between Asia's two largest economies have been strained in recent years due to Japan's stance on historical issues and the Taiwan question.中国社会科学院日本研究所研究员吕耀东在接受分析时指出，近年来，受日本在历史问题上的态度及涉台立场影响，中日这两个亚洲最大经济体之间的关系始终处于紧张状态。China sent a clear message through Tuesday's phone call, he said. "The message is that Japan's new cabinet must adhere to the four political documents and actprudently on historical and Taiwan-related issues."他认为，此次中日外长通话传递出明确信号：“日本新内阁必须严格恪守中日四个政治文件精神，在历史问题和台湾问题上保持审慎态度，切实采取符合双边关系根本利益的行动。”Four political documents of China and Japan中日四个政治文件，是《中日联合声明》（1972年）、《中日和平友好条约》（1978年）、《中日联合宣言》（1998年）和《中日关于全面推进战略互惠关系的联合声明》（2008年）的总称。High-level exchanges高层交往decouple/ˌdiːˈkʌp.əl/v.脱钩prudently/ˈpruː.dənt.li/adv.审慎地

In this week's episode of China Insider, Miles Yu reviews the Chinese Communist Party's fourth plenum, including the newly announced five-year development plan and appointment of Zhang Shengmin as the new Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission. Next, Miles covers the latest developments from the ASEAN summit in Malaysia including the US-China trade deal framework, and previews the upcoming APEC summit as President Trump plans to meet with Xi Jinping in South Korea. Finally, Miles circles back on Japan's elections for Prime Minister, and outlines the potential impact PM-elect Sanae Takaichi will have on China-Japan relations and the current Indo-Pacific landscape. China Insider is a weekly podcast project from Hudson Institute's China Center, hosted by China Center Director and Senior Fellow, Dr. Miles Yu, who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world's future.

Explore the rich spiritual traditions of Asia!

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attends the ASEAN Plus Three Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Malaysia, urging efforts to advance regional integration (01:13). U.S. President Donald Trump announces a 35-percent tariff for goods imported from Canada starting August 1st (09:26). Safeguarding the diversity of human civilizations for world peace and development is the central theme of the Global Civilizations Dialogue Ministerial Meeting in Beijing (16:19).

  Last time we spoke about China's preparations for War. In December 1936, the tension in China reached a boiling point as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek was captured by his own commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on fighting communists instead of the encroaching Japanese forces, the generals sought a unified response to Japanese aggression. After being held in Xi'an, Chiang reluctantly agreed to collaborate with the Chinese Communist Party, marking a significant shift in strategy against Japan. Amidst the rising chaos, Chiang's government reviewed historical military strategies and prepared for a prolonged conflict. However, they faced challenges, including inadequate supplies and a lack of modern equipment compared to the Japanese. By 1937, China was ill-prepared for war, with Chiang later expressing regret about their military readiness. Despite these setbacks, the alliance formed with the communists laid a foundation for a united Chinese front against the brutalities of the Sino-Japanese War that would follow.   #153 Japan Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So in the last episode we talked about how China was preparing itself for war, now its time for Japan. Since Japan's invasion of North China, Japanese field armies had promoted a series of autonomous zones in northern China. Officers from the Kwantung Army, skeptical of China's capacity to modernize, believed that the vast region would inevitably fragment into regional factions. This policy effectively maintained a weak and divided China, which served Japan's to defend Manchukuo. However many Japanese military leaders frequently pointed to the threat posed by the KMT's five-year plan, initiated in 1933 with assistance from German military advisors, aimed at modernizing and expanding the national army. To counter what they perceived as a Chinese threat, the field armies advocated for a preemptive war to dismantle Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Any attempt by Tokyo to alter the military's China policy faced vigorous opposition from the Kwantung Army, which, in February 1937, pushed for intensified covert actions to expel the KMT from northern China and supported a preemptive war to secure strategic areas for future operations against the Soviet Union. At a March meeting in Tokyo, staff officers from the China Garrison and Kwantung armies insisted that any concessions to China would be a grave mistake and would likely yield only temporary outcomes. In early spring 1937, Prince Konoe Fumimaro inherited a China policy fraught with competing views, however, there was consensus that China must not distract the empire from its preparations against the USSR. The end goal was clear, but the means to achieve it remained uncertain. The cabinet's approval of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" in August 1936 indicated a need for stability as the army and navy reconfigured Japan's war machine. The challenge lay in aligning long-term strategic goals with practical short-term interests in northern China without upsetting the existing balance of power. Expanding demands propelled the army's contingency planning, which had traditionally focused on safeguarding Japanese interests and the approximately 13,000 Japanese citizens residing in the region. Tokyo typically responded to serious incidents by deploying troops from homeland garrisons to address localized emergencies and then withdrawing them. However, by the mid-1930s, the growing Soviet threat to Manchukuo rendered this doctrine obsolete. Incidents in northern China gained strategic importance as they diverted resources from the Kwantung Army's preparations against the Soviet Union. Disruptions in northern China hindered access to essential raw materials necessary for army modernization and rearmament, while hostile Chinese forces threatened the Kwantung Army's strategic left flank in the event of war with the Soviets. With these considerations in mind, the army revised its operational war plans, assuming that northern China would serve as Japan's strategic rear area for operations against the USSR. In 1911 Japan's plan for general war mandated thirteen divisions to occupy southern Manchuria, capture Beijing, and subsequently occupy Zhejiang and Fujian. Limited contingency operations in northern China required two divisions to secure rail communications from Beijing to the coast. In the weeks following the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the General Staff in Tokyo drafted plans to counter a Sino-Soviet alliance, anticipating a 2 month campaign involving 15-16 divisions, with the majority engaged against the Soviet Red Army. 2 divisions were designated to secure northern China, while smaller units would monitor the Inner Mongolian front to protect Japan's western flank in Manchuria. After further refinement, the General Staff identified three contingencies for China in early 1932: maintaining the traditional mission of safeguarding Japanese interests and citizens with a standard two-division force; ensuring a secure line of communication between the Chinese capital and the sea with the China Garrison Army, which consisted of approximately 1,700 officers and men, reinforced by one division; and, in a worst-case scenario of all-out war, deploying three divisions to reinforce the Kwantung Army, along with 7 additional divisions and 3 cavalry brigades to suppress resistance in northern China and the Shandong Peninsula, while two additional divisions secured key areas in central China. Between 1932-1936, China received less attention as the General Staff focused on the Soviet military buildup in the Far East. Anxiety, stemming from the Soviet buildup in the Far East, was a pervasive concern reflected in the draft rearmament plan submitted to the throne on May 21, 1936, as part of the national budget formulation process. The army proposed countering the Soviet threat by enhancing Japanese strategic mobility in Manchukuo through the renovation and expansion of airfields, ports, roads, and rail infrastructure, and by constructing army air force arsenals, storage depots, and medical facilities. The positioning of Japanese divisions in eastern Manchuria suggested their wartime objectives, with the Kwantung Army relying on a mobile independent mixed brigade composed of armored car and mounted cavalry units stationed in Gongzhuling, central Manchuria, as its immediate response force for contingencies in northern China. Major units were not concentrated in western Manchuria, where they would be expected to deploy before any planned invasion of northern China. Nevertheless, General Staff planners remained vigilant regarding developments in China, where the resurgence of nationalism, Communist movements advancing north of the Yellow River in February 1936, and the spread of anti-Japanese sentiments across northern China raised the specter of limited military operations escalating into full-scale warfare. China's improving military capabilities would likely hinder Japanese forces from accomplishing their objectives. For example, around Shanghai, Chinese defenses were bolstered by extensive, in-depth, and permanent fortifications. In mid-September 1936, the General Staff in Tokyo issued orders to preempt significant outbreaks in northern China by repositioning a division in Manchukuo closer to the boundary. If hostilities broke out, the China Garrison Army, supported by Kwantung Army units, would launch punitive operations against Chinese forces as necessary. Higher headquarters expected local commanders to act swiftly and decisively, employing rapid maneuvers and shock tactics to address outbreaks with minimal force. Given that no alternative responses were considered, Japanese operational planning for northern China relied on an all-or-nothing approach to force deployment, even for minor incidents. Yet, the senior leadership of the army remained deeply divided over its China policy. Influenced by Ishiwara, the General Staff wanted to avoid military actions that could lead to a full-scale war with China, focusing instead on advancing the army's extensive rearmament and modernization program. In contrast, a majority of high-ranking officers in the Army Ministry and General Staff, particularly within the 2nd Operations Section and the Kwantung Army, favored forceful action against China, believing it necessary to quell rising anti-Japanese sentiments. Drawing from past experiences, these officers anticipated that the Chinese would quickly capitulate once hostilities commenced. This lack of a unified military strategy reflected broader disagreements among the army's leadership regarding operations in China. While operational planning called for the permanent occupation of large regions in northern and central China, the General Staff aimed to contain outbreaks to maintain focus on Soviet threats. There was a clear absence of long-term operational planning; instead, the army concentrated on initial battles while relegating planning for prolonged combat operations to contingent circumstances. In summary, the Japanese army preferred to avoid military force to address Chinese issues whenever feasible but was equally unwilling to concede to Chinese demands. Since 1914, Tosui Koryo or “Principles of Command” had served as the foundational doctrine for senior Japanese army commanders and staff officers engaged in combined arms warfare at the corps and army levels. The advent of new weapons, tactics, and organizational changes during World War I compelled all major military forces to reassess their existing military doctrines across strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions. In response, Japan modified the Principles of Command to blend its traditional post-Russo-Japanese War focus on the intangible factors in battle with the newest concepts of modern total war. A revision in 1918 recognized the significance of “recent great advances in materiel” for total warfare, yet it maintained that ultimate victory in battle relied on dedication, patriotism, and selfless service. In the 1920s, the General Staff's Operations Section, led by Major General Araki Sadao, who would become the leader of the Kodoha faction, had produced the most significant and impactful revision of the Principles. A staunch anti-communist and ideologue who valued the intangible elements of combat, Araki appointed Lieutenant Colonel Obata Toshishiro and Captain Suzuki Yorimichi as the principal authors of the manual's rewrite. Obata, a Soviet expert, was strongly influenced by German General Count Alfred von Schlieffen's classic theories of a “war of annihilation,” while Suzuki, the top graduate of the thirtieth Staff College class, shared Araki's focus on “spiritual” or intangible advantages in warfare. Both men were brilliant yet arrogant, working in secrecy to create a doctrine based on what Leonard Humphreys describes as “intense spiritual training” and bayonet-led assaults to counter the opponent's material superiority.  The latest version of the Principles of Command preserved the operational concept of rapid Japanese mobile offensive operations, aiming to induce a decisive battle or “kaisen” early in the campaign. It reaffirmed the sokusen sokketsu or “rapid victory' principle of rapid warfare. Attaining these goals relied exclusively on offensive action, with the army expecting commanders at all levels to press forward, defeat enemy units, and capture key territories. The troops were indoctrinated with a spirit of aggression and trained to anticipate certain victory. The emphasis on offensive action was so pronounced that Araki eliminated terms like surrender, retreat, and defense from the manual, believing they negatively affected troop morale. This aggressive mindset also infused the Sento Koryo or “Principles of Operations”, first published in 1929 as a handbook for combined arms warfare tailored for division and regimental commanders. The manual emphasized hand-to-hand combat as the culminating stage of battle, a principle regarded as unchanging in Japanese military doctrine since 1910. Senior commanders were expected to demonstrate initiative in skillfully maneuvering their units to encircle the enemy, setting the stage for climactic assaults with cold steel. Infantry was deemed the primary maneuver force, supported by artillery. To complement rapid infantry advances, the army developed light and mobile artillery. Operationally, encirclement and night attacks were vital components of victory, and even outnumbered units were expected to aggressively envelop enemy flanks. In assaults against fortified positions, units would advance under the cover of darkness, avoiding enemy artillery fire and positioning themselves for dawn attacks that combined firepower with shock action to overwhelm enemy defenses. In encounters with opposing forces, commanders would maneuver to flank the enemy, surround their units, and destroy them. If forced onto the defensive, commanders were expected to seize opportunities for decisive counterattacks to regain the initiative. These high-level operational doctrines were distilled into tactical guidelines in the January 1928 edition of the Infantry Manual or “Hohei Soten”, which saw a provisional revision in May 1937 . Both editions opened with identical introductions emphasizing the necessity for a rapid victory through the overpowering and destruction of enemy forces. Infantry was identified as the primary arm in combined arms warfare, and soldiers were taught to rely on cold steel as fundamental to their attacking spirit. The 1928 Infantry Manual underscored the commander's role in instilling a faith in certain victory or “hissho shinnen”, drawing from the glorious traditions of Japanese military history. The 1928 infantry tactics employed an extended skirmish line with four paces between soldiers. Individual initiative in combat was generally discouraged, except under exceptional circumstances, as success relied on concentrating firepower and manpower on narrow frontages to overwhelm defenders. An infantry company would create a skirmish line featuring two light machine gun squads and four rifle squads, preparing for a bayonet-driven breakthrough of enemy defenses. For the final assault, the infantry company would line up along a 150-yard front, likely facing casualties of up to 50% while breaching the enemy's main defensive line. Historical analysis reveals the shortcomings of these tactics. During World War I, armies constructed extensive, multi-layered defenses, trenches, pillboxes, and strong points, each independent yet all covered by artillery. If assaulting infantry suffered heavy losses breaching the first line, how could they successfully prosecute their assault against multiple defense lines? The 1937 revision elaborated on new tactics to overcome entrenched Soviet defenses, drafted in anticipation of arms and equipment that were either in development or production but not yet available for deployment. This became official doctrine in 1940, but as early as summer 1937, units from the China Garrison Army were field-testing these new tactics. The provisional manual adopted combat team tactics, forming an umbrella-like skirmish formation. This involved a light machine gun team at the forefront with two ammunition bearers flanking it to the rear. Behind the machine gun team were riflemen arranged in a column formation, maintaining six paces between each. The light machine gun provided cover fire as the formation closed in on the enemy for hand-to-hand combat. Increased firepower expanded the assault front to 200 yards. The combination of wider dispersion and night movement aimed to reduce losses from enemy artillery fire while the infantry advanced through successive lines of resistance. Commanders at the platoon level were responsible for leading the final assault into enemy lines, with increased tactical responsibility shifting from platoon to squad leaders, allowing for greater initiative from junior officers and non-commissioned officers. This emphasis on broader dispersal and fluidity on the battlefield required frontline infantry to exhibit aggressiveness and initiative. Contrary to popular belief, the Japanese military did not solely rely on the bayonet or an offensive spirit during engagements with Chinese forces. They effectively employed superior firepower and modern equipment within their combined arms framework, using heavy weapons and artillery to soften enemy positions before launching infantry attacks. Without such firepower, unsupported infantry attacks would have struggled to achieve their objectives. In January 1937, the Imperial Japanese Army consisted of approximately 247,000 officers and men, organized in a structure comprising seventeen standing infantry divisions, four tank regiments, and fifty-four air squadrons equipped with a total of 549 aircraft. The China Garrison Army and the Taiwan Garrison Army each included two infantry regiments, while a separate independent mixed brigade was stationed in Manchuria. Two divisions were permanently based in Korea, with four more assigned on a rotating basis to the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo. The remainder of the forces were stationed in the Japanese home islands. A substantial pool of reservists and partially trained replacements was available to mobilize, enabling the expansion of peacetime units to their wartime strength as needed. Conscription provided the primary source of enlisted manpower for the army, though a handful of young men volunteered for active duty. For conscription purposes, Japan was divided into divisional areas, which were further subdivided into regimental districts responsible for conscription, mobilization, individual activations, and veteran affairs within their jurisdictions. Typically, conscripts served with the regiment associated with their region or prefecture. However, the Imperial Guards regiments in Tokyo selected conscripts from across the nation, as did the Seventh Infantry Division, which recruited from the sparsely populated Hokkaido area and from regular army units stationed in Korea, China, and Taiwan. Draftees from Okinawa Prefecture usually served with Kyushu-based regiments. All males reaching the age of 20 underwent an army-administered pre-induction physical examination conducted between December 1 and January 30 of the following year. This evaluation classified potential conscripts into three categories: A “suitable for active duty”, B1, and B2, while others were deemed unfit for the demands of military life. In 1935, 29.7% of those examined received A classifications, while 41.2% were graded as B1 or B2. Among the 742,422 individuals eligible for conscription in 1937, approximately 170,000 were drafted, amounting to 22.9% of the cohort; this figure had remained relatively consistent since the post-Russo-Japanese War years. Within the conscripted group, 153,000 men were classified as A and an additional 17,000 as B. Conscripts served for two years of active duty, with variations based on their military specialty and any prior civilian military training. After their discharge, they were subject to a lengthy reserve obligation. In total, 470,635 individuals fell into the B category, being otherwise fit for service but excess to the army's active personnel needs. These men were assigned to the First Replacement Pool, where they underwent around 120 days of basic military training, primarily focused on small arms usage and fundamental tactics. Regular officers and NCOs led the training in their respective regimental districts. Following their initial training, the army called these replacements and reservists to active duty annually for several days of refresher training. Army leaders regarded discipline as the cornerstone of military effectiveness. Basic training emphasized the necessity of unquestioning obedience to orders at all levels. Subsequent training focused on fieldcraft, such as utilizing terrain strategically to surprise or encircle the enemy. However, training exercises often lacked diversity due to the limited maneuver areas available in Japan, leading to predictable solutions to field problems. The training regimen was rigorous, merging strict formal discipline and regulated corporal punishment with harsh informal sanctions and unregulated violence from leaders to instill unwavering compliance to orders. As an undergrad taking a course specifically on the Pacific War, it was this variable my professor argued contributed the most to the atrocities performed by the Japanese during WW2. He often described it as a giant pecking order of abuse. The most senior commanders abused, often physically their subordinates, who abused theirs, going through the ranks to the common grunts who had no one else but civilians and the enemy to peck at so to speak. Of course there were a large number of other variables at play, but to understand that you outta join my Patreon Account over at the www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel , where I made a fan favorite episode on “why the Japanese army performed so many atrocities”. In there I basically hit a big 10 reason list, well in depth, I highly recommend it! As the concept of the “Imperial Army” and the cult of the emperor gained prominence, appeals to imperial symbols and authority bolstered this unquestioning obedience to superiors, who were seen as the conduits of the emperor's will. It was during this period that the term kogun or “imperial army” gained favor over kokugun or “national army”, reflecting a deliberate effort by military authorities to forge a direct connection between the military and the imperial throne. The 1937 Japanese infantry division was structured as a square formation, with a peacetime strength established at approximately 12,000 officers and men organized into two brigades, each comprising about 4,000 personnel, formed from two infantry regiments, about 2,000 men each. The division included a field artillery regiment, an engineer regiment, and a transport battalion as organic units. Each infantry regiment was composed of three battalions, approximately 600 men each, which contained three rifle companies, 160 men each and a weapons platoon. A rifle company consisted of three rifle platoons and one light machine gun platoon. Regiments also included infantry assault gun platoons, and battalions contained a heavy machine gun company. Upon mobilization, a fourth infantry company augmented each battalion, along with reserve fillers, nearly 5,000 personnel assigned as transport and service troops, raising the authorized wartime strength of an infantry division to over 25,000 officers and men.  Reforms implemented in 1922 reduced personnel numbers in favor of new and improved weapons and equipment. Among these advancements, the 75 mm Type 90 field artillery piece, which boasted increased range and accuracy, was integrated into the forces in 1930, along with the 105 mm Type 10 howitzer and 75 mm pack mountain artillery which could be disassembled for transport using pack animals. These became standard artillery components for divisions. The emphasis on light, mobile, and smaller-caliber field artillery enabled swift deployment during fast-moving engagements. By minimizing the size of the baggage train, infantry and artillery units could quickly set up off the march formation and maneuver around enemy flanks. Army leaders further streamlined road march formations by eliminating the fourth artillery battery from each regiment, thus sacrificing some firepower for enhanced speed and mobility. Heavier artillery pieces were still used in set-piece battles where mobility was less critical. In a typical 1936 division, the field artillery regiment, equipped with Type 90 field artillery or lighter Type 94 mountain artillery, had thirty-six guns. Training focused on quality rather than quantity, reflecting the conservative doctrine of “one-round-one-hit”. Live-fire training was infrequent due to the scarcity of artillery firing ranges in Japan. Ammunition stockpiles were inadequate for anticipated operational needs; government arsenals produced over 111,000 artillery shells in 1936, which was fewer than one-tenth of the quantities specified in wartime consumption tables. Similar industrial shortcomings also hampered advancements in motorization and armor. Motorization proved costly and relied on foreign supply, presenting challenges given the inferior road networks in Manchuria, northern China, and the Soviet Far East. Military estimates suggested a need for 250,000 trucks to fully motorize the army, a goal beyond the capabilities of the nascent Japanese automotive industry, which produced fewer than 1,000 cars annually until 1933. Japanese tanks, described as “handcrafted, beautifully polished, and hoarded” by Alvin Coox, suffered from shortages similar to heavy artillery and ammunition. The army prioritized light weighing ten tons or less and medium tanks sixteen tons or less due to the necessity of deploying armor overseas, size and weight were crucial for loading and unloading from transport ships. Smaller tanks were also more suitable for the terrains of northern China and Manchuria, as they could traverse unbridged rivers using pontoons or ferries. The Japanese industrial base, however, struggled to mass-produce tanks; by 1939, factories were producing an average of only twenty-eight tanks of all models per month. Consequently, in 1937, foot soldiers remained as reliant on animal transport for mobility as their ancestors had been during the Russo-Japanese War. Despite enjoying technological and material superiority over disorganized Chinese forces, these deficiencies in heavy artillery, armor, and vehicles would prove catastrophic against more formidable opponents. Another significant factor constraining Japanese industry's capacity to produce tanks, trucks, and artillery was the 1936 decision to expand the army's air wing and homeland air defense network. This policy diverted resources, capital, and technology away from the army's ground forces. The nascent Japanese Army Air Force or “JAAF” aimed to support ground operations through reconnaissance, bombing enemy bases, and achieving air superiority. However, direct support for ground operations was limited, and Japanese military planners did not anticipate that aerial bombardment could supplement or replace artillery bombardments. The expanded air arm's strategic mission centered on executing preemptive air strikes against Soviet air bases in the Far East to thwart potential air attacks on Japan. By the mid-1930s, the army had approximately 650 aircraft, roughly 450 of which were operational. The JAAF emphasized rigorous training that prioritized quality over quantity, producing only about 750 pilots annually up until December 1941. Basic flight skills were developed through this training, while specialized tactical instruction was deferred to newly established pilot units. According to logistics doctrine, Japanese maneuver units typically operated within a 120 to 180-mile radius of a railhead to facilitate resupply and reinforcement. A field train transport unit was responsible for moving supplies daily from the railhead to a division control point for distribution. The division established a field depot to manage the transfer of supplies from field transport to company and lower-echelon units. At the depot, transport troops would hand over supplies to a combat train that ferried ammunition, rations, and equipment directly to frontline units. Horse-drawn wagons and pack animals were the primary means of transportation. Each wartime division included a transport battalion, which varied in size from approximately 2,200 to 3,700 personnel, depending on the type of division supported. The division typically carried enough supplies for one day. Upon mobilization, the logistical framework was reinforced with the addition of an ordnance unit, a field hospital, a sanitation unit, and additional field and combat trains. The size of the transport regiment grew from around 1,500 officers and men with over 300 horses to nearly 3,500 troops and more than 2,600 animals. In the battalion, one company generally transported small-arms ammunition while two companies handled artillery shells and two others carried rations; this arrangement was flexible based on operational needs. Pack horses and dray horses were assigned to each company to carry or tow infantry assault artillery, mortars, artillery ammunition, and rations. Infantry soldiers carried minimal rations, approximately two and a half pounds, primarily rice, along with tinned condiments and salt. Consequently, the field train included a field kitchen stocked with fresh vegetables, rice or bread, soy sauce, and pickles. Each evening, a forward echelon train distributed supplies received from the field transport unit to the combat unit's bivouac area. When combat seemed imminent, a section of the transport battalion would move forward to deliver essential combat supplies, ordnance, equipment, medical supplies, directly to frontline units. These units would also handle resupply, medical evacuation, and repair of ordnance and equipment once fighting commenced.  On the evening of September 18, 1936, the fifth anniversary of the Manchurian Incident, Chinese troops from the Twenty-Ninth Army clashed with Japanese soldiers from the Seventh Company's rear-guard medical unit at Fengtai. When a Japanese officer arrived on horseback, a Chinese soldier struck his horse, prompting the Chinese troops to retreat to their barracks. Major Ichiki Kiyonao, the battalion commander, ordered an emergency assembly, surrounded the Chinese encampment, and demanded that Chinese authorities surrender the aggressors immediately. To defuse the situation, Major General Kawabe Masakazu, the brigade commander and Ichiki's superior, instructed Regimental Commander Mutaguchi to resolve the incident swiftly. Mutaguchi negotiated an agreement that required the Chinese to apologize, punish those responsible, withdraw from the vicinity of the Japanese barracks, and maintain a distance of two miles. Although Mutaguchi and Ichiki wanted to disarm the Chinese forces, they ultimately complied with Kawabe's wishes and allowed the Chinese to retain their weapons “in the spirit of Bushido.” Later, the Chinese claimed the Japanese had refrained from disarming them due to their fear of the strength and influence of the 29th Army. This insult infuriated Mutaguchi, who vowed not to make any further concessions and promised to eliminate the anti-Japanese provocateurs decisively if another incident occurred. He warned his officers against allowing an “overly tolerant attitude toward the Chinese” to undermine the prestige of the imperial army and emphasized the need for swift, decisive action to prevent such incidents in the future. Tensions were further exacerbated by large-scale Japanese field exercises conducted from late October to early November. These maneuvers, the largest ever executed by Japanese forces in China, mobilized about 6,700 active-duty and reserve troops for a series of complex battle drills, night maneuvers, and tactical field problems. During these exercises, Japanese troops were quartered in Chinese homes. Although local residents were compensated for any damage caused, the exercises nonetheless heightened tensions between the two sides. The fallout from the Suiyuan Fiasco in December 1936, coupled with a tumultuous summer and fall, led to rising anti-Japanese sentiment and prompted Tokyo to caution the Kawabe brigade against actions that might escalate the already precarious situation. In March 1937, during the annual personnel assignments, Ishiwara was promoted to major general and appointed chief of the 1st Department Operations of the General Staff. However, Army Vice Minister Umezu, a hardliner regarding China and a rival of Ishiwara, successfully maneuvered the Hayashi cabinet into approving the command choices for army and navy ministers, overriding Ishiwara's proposals. General Sugiyama Hajime, another hawk on China, replaced the terminally ill General Nakamura Kotaro as army minister shortly after Nakamura's appointment and remained in that position until June 1938. Lieutenant General Imai Kiyoshi, army vice chief of staff and an Ishiwara supporter, was also battling a terminal illness that rendered him largely ineffective during his short five-month tenure from March to August 1937. Imai was expected to play a crucial role in high command because the army chief of staff, Prince Kan'in, had been appointed in 1931 as a figurehead due to internal factions preventing agreement on a candidate. Ishiwara further complicated his conciliatory approach by selecting Colonel Muto Akira, a known hardliner who believed force was the only means to resolve the Japan-China conflict, for the vital position of chief of Operations Section within the General Staff. From Kwantung Army headquarters, Commanding General Ueda Kenkichi and his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki, advocated for a preemptive war against China to serve the Kwantung Army's interests. In contrast, the China Garrison Army, under Lieutenant General Tashiro and his chief of staff, adopted a more moderate stance, aligning with central headquarters' policy of restraint. The China Garrison Army estimated the 29th Army to consist of 15,000–16,000 troops, with its main strength centered around Peking and an additional 10,000 troops in the surrounding area. Starting in spring 1937, Japanese units began observing tactical indicators suggesting that the Chinese were preparing for war. These indicators included increased guard presence at Peking's gates in June, bolstering units near the Marco Polo Bridge to over two battalions, preparing new fighting positions, digging trenches and constructing concrete pillboxes near the Marco Polo Bridge, infiltrating agents into Japanese maneuver areas for intelligence on night tactical exercises, and heightened strictness among Chinese railroad guards evident since late June. Nevertheless, the Japanese commanders did not view China as a formidable opponent. They believed that Chinese armies would quickly disintegrate due to what they perceived as a lack of fighting spirit and ineffective leadership. By 1937, Japan's national policy was shifting away from the persistent and aggressive efforts of field armies to undermine Chinese political authority in northern China toward a more conciliatory stance. This shift resulted in increased tensions between field armies and the General Staff in Tokyo, leading to substantial fractures among senior officers regarding the “solution” to their so-called China problem. Those tensions broke the camels back that year.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese grossly underestimated their enemy and their own logistical capabilities. There was to say “too many cooks in the kitchen” of the Japanese military and competing visions ultimately were leading Japan and China into an official full blown war. Japan assumed they could bully China until it was so fragmented it would be a simple matter of grabbing the pieces it liked, that was not to be the case at all.   

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① In March, China's manufacturing activity expanded at its fastest pace in one year. We explore the factors that contributed to this expansion. (00:47)② China, Japan and South Korea have held their first ministerial economic dialogue in five years, agreeing to boost trade cooperation. Will the three sides ever reach a trilateral free trade agreement? (14:06)③ The 1945 Battle of Iwo Jima between the US and Japan was one of the bloodiest battles in the Pacific theater of the Second World War, but US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has praised the Japanese who fought in the battle. How dangerous is his behavior? (25:00)④ China has issued its first operation certificates for autonomous passenger drones. What does this move say about China's development of the low-altitude economy? (32:54)⑤ We take a look at the annual Zhongguancun Forum held in Beijing and the opportunities for global science and tech cooperation available at the event. (43:56)

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has urged China and Japan to provide more stability and certainty to the world by enhancing mutual trust and cooperation.

Commentary by Dr.  Jian'an Wang

Three tech executives stood beside President Donald Trump at the White House last week and pledged to spend $500 billion to build AI data centers. Two of them are household names in the U.S. The third isn't as well known: Masayoshi Son, the chairman and CEO of SoftBank. But Son has long been a global power player in tech and, when it comes to Trump, a shrewd political player as well. On POLITICO Tech, journalist Lionel Barber, who wrote a biography about Son called “Gambling Man,” joins host Steven Overly to share more of Son's story, and explain why his latest embrace of Trump sends a message to both Washington and Beijing. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

①China and Japan have reached a 10-point consensus on people-to-people and cultural exchanges. How does this pave the way for stronger bilateral ties? (00:47)②A delegation of young people from Taiwan, led by former Kuomintang Chair Ma Ying-jeou, is wrapping up a tour to Chinese mainland. How significant are the exchanges for cross-strait relations? (14:40)③Israel and Hamas are accusing each other of sabotaging a ceasefire deal. What exactly is behind the stalemate in the talks? (24:25)④South Korean opposition files impeachment motion against prime minister and acting leader Han Duck-soo. (31:39)⑤An interview with WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (40:25)

Between December 1937 and January 1938 on of the great crimes of Japan's war against China occurred at the Chinese capital of Nanjing. Determined to break Chiang Kai Shek's nationalist forces, the Japanese murdered tens of thousands of captured soldiers and proceeded to slaughter the civilian population. The Japanese army went of the rampage, killing children and raping the city's female population. In 1985 a permanent memorial hall to the horrors inflicted on the city and on China by Japan was unveiled in the city and this podcast hears from Keith Lowe's Prisoners of History as the historian explores the memorial hall and explores its significance the the questions that arise from contested historical memory.I will be running a livestream Q&A for students on Wednesday November 20th. You can access it here, subscribe to the channel to get your reminder.Help the podcast to continue bringing you history each weekIf you enjoy the Explaining History podcast and its many years of content and would like to help the show continue, please consider supporting it in the following ways:If you want to go ad-free, you can take out a membership hereOrYou can support the podcast via Patreon hereOr you can just say some nice things about it here Become a member at https://plus.acast.com/s/explaininghistory. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

When East Asia opened itself to the world in the nineteenth century, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean intellectuals had shared notions of literature because of the centuries-long cultural exchanges in the region. As modernization profoundly destabilized cultural norms, they ventured to create new literature for the new era. Satoru Hashimoto offers a novel way of understanding the origins of modern literature in a transregional context, drawing on Chinese-, Japanese-, and Korean-language texts in both classical and vernacular forms. He argues that modern literature came into being in East Asia through writerly attempts at reconstructing the present's historical relationship to the past across the cultural transformations caused by modernization. Hashimoto examines writers' anachronistic engagement with past cultures that were deemed obsolete or antithetical to new systems of values, showing that this transnational process was integral to the emergence of modern literature. A groundbreaking cross-cultural excavation of the origins of modern literature in East Asia featuring remarkable linguistic scope, Afterlives of Letters: The Transnational Origins of Modern Literature in China, Japan, and Korea (Columbia UP, 2023) bridges Asian studies and comparative literature and delivers a remapping of world literature. Satoru Hashimoto is assistant professor of comparative thought and literature at the Johns Hopkins University. He has published in English, Japanese, Chinese, and French on topics in comparative literature, aesthetics, and thought engaging East Asian and European traditions. He is on the editorial board of the Journal of World Literature. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

When East Asia opened itself to the world in the nineteenth century, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean intellectuals had shared notions of literature because of the centuries-long cultural exchanges in the region. As modernization profoundly destabilized cultural norms, they ventured to create new literature for the new era. Satoru Hashimoto offers a novel way of understanding the origins of modern literature in a transregional context, drawing on Chinese-, Japanese-, and Korean-language texts in both classical and vernacular forms. He argues that modern literature came into being in East Asia through writerly attempts at reconstructing the present's historical relationship to the past across the cultural transformations caused by modernization. Hashimoto examines writers' anachronistic engagement with past cultures that were deemed obsolete or antithetical to new systems of values, showing that this transnational process was integral to the emergence of modern literature. A groundbreaking cross-cultural excavation of the origins of modern literature in East Asia featuring remarkable linguistic scope, Afterlives of Letters: The Transnational Origins of Modern Literature in China, Japan, and Korea (Columbia UP, 2023) bridges Asian studies and comparative literature and delivers a remapping of world literature. Satoru Hashimoto is assistant professor of comparative thought and literature at the Johns Hopkins University. He has published in English, Japanese, Chinese, and French on topics in comparative literature, aesthetics, and thought engaging East Asian and European traditions. He is on the editorial board of the Journal of World Literature. Li-Ping Chen is a teaching fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

#JAPAN: Hawks. Lance Gatling, principal of Nexial Research based in Tokyo, @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill https://thehill.com/opinion/4890957-china-japan-missile-attack/   1950 typhon Tokyo