Podcasts about china japan

Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940. 

The tech gap between China and the West is closing fast. But why did the land that invented paper and gunpowder ever fall behind? Debin Ma is the world's leading economic historian of East Asia. In this fourth episode of our Great Divergence series, he approaches the making of the modern world from an eastern perspective. We discuss why China fell behind, why Japan modernised early, and why East Asia has experienced so many economic miracles. We also discuss China's recent transformation – a transformation that Ma has witnessed firsthand. LINKS AND REFERENCESDo you prefer reading to listening? You can find⁠ a summarised essay ⁠of this conversation, with a bibliography, at our series page:⁠ ⁠https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/news/podcasts/⁠⁠GREAT DIVERGENCE: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLDThis episode is part of a series produced by Warwick University's⁠ ⁠CAGE Research Centre⁠⁠ in collaboration with⁠ ⁠On Humans⁠, searching for explanations to why Western Europe and North America emerged as the most affluent and technologically advanced regions of the modern world. Guided by six expert guests, including a winner of the 2025 Nobel Prize in economics, we approach this topic with balance and breadth, exploring everything from colonialism and fossil fuels to science and technology. 1 | Why the West? Colonies, fossil fuels, and lessons from China (Kenneth Pomeranz)2 | Why did so many inventions come from Europe? (Joel Mokyr)3 | Why did the Industrial Revolution happen in Britain? (Robert Allen)  4 | A view from the East: China, Japan, and the other paths to prosperity (Debin Ma)5 | The big picture: Measuring the origins of the modern world (Bishnupriya Gupta and Stephen Broadberry)NAMES MENTIONEDJoseph Needham | Kenneth Pomeranz | Joel Mokyr | Robert Allen | Francis Fukuyama | Jared Rubin | Yin Weiwen | Kaiser Kuo | Deng Xiaoping | Yasheng Huang KEYWORDSEconomics | History | Global Economic History | Industrial Revolution | Chinese history | Japanese history | Developmental Economics | Needham Puzzle | Needham Question | Qianlong Emperor | Macartney embassy | Meiji Japan | Iwakura mission |  Age heaping | Comparative development | State capacity | Modern fiscal state | History of taxation | Industrial Policy | History of Technology | Human capitalINFOGuest: Debin Ma (Fudan University and All Souls College, University of Oxford)   ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Host: Ilari Mäkelä (⁠⁠⁠On Humans⁠⁠⁠)Contact: ⁠greatdivergencepod@gmail.com

Japan is expanding its security role across the Asia-Pacific, raising new questions about regional stability and strategic balance. Is this a natural response to changing conditions, or a deliberate effort to reshape the regional order? What risks could this shift bring for neighboring countries? In this edition of The Hub, experts explore Japan's recent diplomatic and defense outreach, discuss changes to arms export policies, and examine how regional partners are responding. They delve into the historical context behind today's security dynamics, look into domestic political drivers in Japan, and assess the broader implications for China-Japan relations and the future of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.

We look at Slovak PM Robert Fico’s spat with the Baltics over Moscow and Slovenia’s coalition talks collapse. Plus: How Iran is affecting aviation, China-Japan tensions over Taiwan and Salone del Mobile’s first preview day.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

① China has released a list of its ten major scientific breakthroughs in 2025. What do they tell us about the focus of the country's scientific research? (00:56) ② A conversation with Jonathan Choi Koon-shum, Chairman of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, on cooperation between Hong Kong and Hainan. (14:18) ③ China has lodged a protest with Japan after a Japanese Self-Defense Force officer broke into the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo. To what extent is the intrusion related to the current trajectory of China-Japan relations? (24:57) ④ Ghana's president has criticized the US government for normalizing the erasure of Black history, warning such policies could have ripple effects elsewhere. Does he have a point? (33:56) ⑤ Humanoid robot maker Unitree has filed for an IPO application on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, looking to raise over $610 million. How could capital markets help China's humanoid robotics industry to develop? (42:36)

In this week's Chemical Watch News & Insight podcast from Enhesa, we look at recent updates to chemical laws in China, Japan and Vietnam. Asia desk editor Dr Kerry Hebden joins the podcast to talk about changes to Japan's Chemical Substances Control Law, some of which are due to take effect next month. Kerry also talks about Japan's transition from the 6th version of the UN's Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals to GHS 9. Asia desk senior reporter Uzair Aftab also joins us to discuss what's ahead for Vietnam after the country adopted its new Law on Chemicals last summer. In addition, Uzair talks about China, its new Law on the Safety of Hazardous Chemicals and how the country hopes to become a world powerhouse for cosmetics.  Tune in to learn more. And then come back to see all the latest headlines from Enhesa's Chemical Watch News & Insight. Have a podcast idea or a comment to share? Let us know by emailing the editor at Terry.Hyland@Enhesa.com. 

We bieden onze excuses aan. We moeten het namelijk wéér over die debiele importheffingen van president Trump hebben. Nu het Amerikaanse hooggerechtshof een streep heeft gezet door eerdere heffingen, moet de Amerikaanse regering een list verzinnen. En dat doet het nu met een nieuw onderzoek. Een onderzoek naar landen als China, Japan en ook naar Europa. En de uitkomst is zo goed als zeker: nieuwe heffingen. Waardoor we ons weer kunnen opmaken voor een economische aanval. Over aanvallen gesproken, we hebben het ook over de Iran oorlog. Dag 13 van het conflict in het Midden-Oosten. De olieprijs steeg weer verder, nu meerdere olietankers werden aangevallen. Al blijft Trump volhouden dat 'ie aan het winnen is.In deze aflevering gaat het ook over mode. We hebben het over een modereus die al drie jaar lang record op record breekt: Inditex, het bedrijf achter merken als Zara en Pull & Bear. Met als klapstuk de cijfers van vorig jaar: 40 miljard aan omzet en een winst van ruim 6 miljard euro. Ongekend voor een kledingbedrijf (dat kenners omschrijven als een techbedrijf dat kleren verkoopt). Te gast: Robbert Manders van Antaurus van het Antaurus Europe Fund BNR Beurs is een journalistiek onafhankelijke productie, mede mogelijk gemaakt door Saxo. Over de makers: Jelle Maasbach is presentator van BNR Beurs en freelance financieel journalist. Zijn favoriete aandeel om over te praten is Disney, maar daar lijkt hij de enige in te zijn. Sinds de eerste uitzending van BNR Beurs is 'ie er bij. Maxim van Mil is presentator van BNR Beurs en journalist bij BNR, waar hij zich focust op de financiële markten en ontwikkelingen in de tech-wereld. Je krijgt hem het meest enthousiast als hij kan praten over ASML, of oer-Hollandse bedrijven zoals Ahold of ABN Amro. Jorik Simonides is presentator van BNR Beurs, economieredacteur en verslaggever bij BNR. Hij wordt er vooral blij van als het een keer níet over AI gaat. Milou Brand is presentator van BNR Beurs, freelance podcastmaker en columnist bij het Financieele Dagblad. Jochem Visser is presentator van BNR Beurs, maakt Beursnerd XL en is redacteur bij BNR Zakendoen en de podcast Onder Curatoren. Vraag hem naar obscure zaken op financiële markten en hij vertelt je waarom het eigenlijk nóg leuker is dan je al dacht. Over de podcast: Met BNR Beurs ga je altijd voorbereid de nieuwe beursdag in. We praten je in een kleine 25 minuten bij over alle laatste ontwikkelingen op de handelsvloer. We blijven niet alleen bij de AEX of Wall Street, maar vertellen je ook waar nog meer kansen liggen. En we houden het niet bij de cijfers, maar zoeken ook iedere dag voor je naar duiding van scherpe gasten en experts. Of je nu een ervaren belegger bent of net begint met je eerste stappen op de beurs, de podcast biedt waardevolle inzichten voor je beleggingsstrategie. Door de focus op zowel de korte termijn als de lange termijn, helpt BNR Beurs luisteraars om de ruis van de markt te scheiden van de essentie. Van Musk tot Microsoft en van Ahold tot ASML. Wij vertellen je wat beleggers bezighoudt, wie de markten in beweging zet en wat dat betekent voor jouw beleggingsportefeuille.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

You can send a text, include contact info to get a response. You probably know that by the middle of the 19th century, the  British dominated India.  The British introduced railroads and electricity, public health and infrastructure, and a population boom began.  By the end  Victoria became the Empress.  But before the French Revolution the British footprint in India was relatively small.  It was during the revolutionary wars and the Napoleonic wars that British control and domination greatly expanded, from early footholds in Bengal and Madras.The China trade was responsible of one six of British state revenue during this period so it was of vital importance.  Also, tea had an interesting property, the people who drank it did not need to dedicate so much grain to small beer production, allowing tea to change the supply and demand equation for grain, during a critical period.There is also the argument that the Chinese authorities contributed to the opium trade by not allowing any legal trade.  The drain of silver into the immensity of China is a problem that was going to be solved, whenever the right product was found.The Tokugawa were prompted to make serious reforms by embarrassments  caused by young Pellew and the Russian under Rezanhov.The Vietnam story of Gia Long and Bishop Pigneau is probably the most interesting.Oman and Muscat reinforce the idea of the struggle between imperialism and the pursuit of profits for the East India company.  imperialism is expensive.  The company lost money, and doubled its debt during one of the periods we are discussing.  

Asian stocks, off to their best-ever start to a year, took a breather Wednesday with Japanese equities slipping amid rising tensions with China. Also, President Donald Trump said Venezuela would relinquish as much as 50 million barrels of oil to the US, declaring it would be sold with the proceeds benefitting both countries. For more on the market action, we turn to Garfield Reynolds, Bloomberg's Team Leader for Markets Live Asia. And, we go to Las Vegas next, where the Consumer Electronics Show is underway. And Bloomberg had a chance to catch up with Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, Siemans AG CEO Roland Busch, and Advanced Micro Devices CEO Lisa Su. They all spoke to Bloomberg's Ed Ludlow. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

China announced on Tuesday an immediate ban on exporting dual-use items to Japan, in response to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's erroneous remarks hinting at the possibility of military intervention in the Taiwan Strait.中国于周二宣布，立即禁止向日本出口军民两用物品，以此回应日本首相高市早苗有关暗示可能军事干预台湾海峡的错误言论。These remarks "constitute gross interference in China's internal affairs, seriously violate the one-China principle, and are extremely egregious in both nature and impact", a spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce said on Tuesday.商务部发言人于周二表示，上述言论 “严重干涉中国内政，严重违反一个中国原则，性质恶劣、影响极坏”。In order to safeguard national security and interests, as well as fulfill international nonproliferation obligations, China decided to strengthen control over dual-use item exports to Japan, the ministry said in its first announcement of the year.商务部在其本年度首份公告中指出，为维护国家安全和利益，履行防扩散国际义务，中国决定加强对向日本出口军民两用物品的管控。Dual-use items refer to products, software and technologies that have legitimate civilian uses, but can also be adapted for military purposes, such as the development of weapons of mass destruction or the enhancement of conventional military capabilities. The list covers items from chemicals and drones to high-tech computers and software.军民两用物品是指既有合法民用用途，又可被改造用于军事目的的产品、软件和技术，例如可用于大规模杀伤性武器研发或提升常规军事能力的相关物品。该清单涵盖的品类从化学品、无人机，到高科技计算机及软件等。The country prohibits the export of all dual-use items to Japanese military users, for Japan's military use, and for any other end-users and end-use purposes that help enhance Japan's military capabilities, according to the announcement.公告明确，中国禁止向日本军事用户出口任何军民两用物品，禁止任何军民两用物品用于日本军事用途，同时禁止向其他任何有助于提升日本军事能力的最终用户出口，或用于此类最终用途。Stringent export controls and licensing requirements for dual-use items represent an established international norm.对军民两用物品实施严格的出口管制及许可要求，是一项公认的国际准则。The United States' Export Control Reform Act and the European Union's Dual-Use Regulation, for instance, mandate that the export of sensitive technologies or materials, including those with potential military applications, must be subject to proper licensing and authorization procedures.例如，美国《出口管制改革法案》和欧盟《军民两用物品条例》均规定，敏感技术或物资（包括具有潜在军事应用价值的相关品类）的出口，必须经过规范的许可和审批程序。China is also considering tightening export permit reviews for certain rare earth-related items to Japan, due to Takaichi's recent erroneous remarks on Taiwan and her continued refusal to retract them, a source familiar with the matter told China Daily on Tuesday.一位知情人士于周二向《中国日报》透露，鉴于高市早苗近期就台湾问题发表错误言论且拒不收回，中国正考虑收紧部分稀土相关物品对日本的出口许可审核。On April 4 last year, the Ministry of Commerce, along with the General Administration of Customs, issued an announcement on export control measures for seven categories of medium and heavy rare earth-related items — samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium.去年 4 月 4 日，商务部会同海关总署发布公告，对钐、钆、铽、镝、镥、钪、钇等七类中重稀土相关物品实施出口管制措施。According to Tokyo-headquartered Nomura Research Institute, heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium, used for electric vehicle motors in Japan, are almost 100 percent sourced from China. Any restrictions on those supplies would pose significant challenges to the Japanese economy.总部位于东京的野村综合研究所指出，日本电动汽车电机所使用的镝、铽等重稀土，几乎 100% 依赖从中国进口。此类稀土供应若受限，将对日本经济构成重大挑战。The institute estimates that if China's restrictions on rare earth exports to Japan were to last for three months, it would result in losses of about 660 billion yen ($4.2 billion), reducing nominal and real GDP by 0.11 percent annually. If the restrictions continued for a year, losses could reach about 2.6 trillion yen, leading to a 0.43 percent decline in both nominal and real GDP as noted by the institute.该研究所测算，若中国对日本的稀土出口限制持续三个月，日本将遭受约 6600 亿日元（折合 42 亿美元）的损失，其名义国内生产总值和实际国内生产总值年均降幅将达 0.11%；若限制持续一年，损失规模或将达到约 2.6 万亿日元，导致日本名义和实际国内生产总值均下降 0.43%。Beijing has sent Tokyo a clear message that it cannot expect to continue benefiting from China's vast market and resources while challenging China's core interests, said Chen Wenling, former chief economist at the China Center for International Economic Exchanges.中国国际经济交流中心前首席经济学家陈文玲表示，中方已向日方发出明确信号：日方不能指望在挑战中国核心利益的同时，还能持续从中国广阔的市场和丰富的资源中获益。"The one-China principle and noninterference in China's internal affairs form an unbreachable prerequisite for China-Japan cooperation,"Chen said.陈文玲强调：“一个中国原则和不干涉中国内政，是中日开展合作不可逾越的前提。”Tetsuro Homma, executive vice-president of Panasonic, said that China is not only a consumer market or a manufacturing powerhouse, but also an innovation and engineering hub.松下电器常务副社长本间哲朗表示，中国不仅是一个消费市场和制造业大国，更是一个创新和工程技术中心。"For Japanese companies, strengthening collaboration with Chinese supply chain partners is crucial. It enables us to deliver quality products to global consumers at more competitive prices,"Homma said.本间哲朗称：“对于日本企业而言，加强与中国供应链合作伙伴的协作至关重要。这能让我们以更具竞争力的价格，向全球消费者提供优质产品。”dual-use /ˌdjuːəl ˈjuːs/ adj. 军民两用的nonproliferation /ˌnɒnprəˌlɪfəˈreɪʃn/ n. 防扩散；不扩散rare earth /ˌreə ˈɜːθ/ n. 稀土prerequisite /ˌpriːˈrekwəzɪt/ n. 前提；先决条件

Santa Barbara City Councilman Oscar Gutierrez chats with Santa Barbara News-Press Editor Joshua Molina about why he supports a rent stabilization ordinance in Santa Barbara. He also explains why he backs the plan to build housing at Paseo Nuevo. Gutierrez recently took trips to Japan and China and shares what he learned there. Joshua Molina is.the editor of the Santa Barbara News-Press and a journalism instructor at Santa Barbara City College. He speaks with community leaders and interesting people to talk about housing, education, business, politics, culture and the most important issues of the day. Support his podcast at santabarbaratalks.com and follow him at motownjoshnews on Instagram

In this special year-end edition, hosts Ray Powell and Jim Carouso reflect on a transformative 2025 in the Indo-Pacific, examining the dramatic shift from conventional diplomacy to hard power politics under the Trump 2.0 administration. The episode provides a comprehensive review of the podcast's most impactful conversations, from national government leaders to topical experts, while analyzing the year's major geopolitical developments.Trump 2.0 and the Hard Power PivotJim and Ray discuss how the year began with U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel's appearance, marking the podcast's first sitting ambassador interview. Following President Trump's January inauguration, 2025 witnessed a fundamental reorientation of American Indo-Pacific policy away from soft power initiatives toward military deterrence and economic leverage through tariffs. They discuss how this approach disrupted established norms and international agreements, with potential Supreme Court challenges to executive power looming in 2026.China's Gray Zone and Political Warfare CampaignsGray zone and political warfare emerged as a dominant theme, with a topical episode featuring the RAND Corporation's Todd Helmus becoming the year's most downloaded audio content. The hosts recall what they learned about China's comprehensive political warfare strategy, which treats peacetime as a mere continuation of conflict through non-military means. Notable coverage included the extraordinary incident where two Chinese Coast Guard vessels collided near Scarborough Shoal, producing the year's top video episode as Beijing's propagandists struggled for four days to craft a narrative blaming the Philippines for a setback they couldn't admit to.Regional Flashpoints and ConflictsThe podcast provided critical context for unexpected conflicts, including the India-Pakistan and Thailand-Cambodia border wars. These complex, multi-generational disputes were unpacked by regional experts like Indian strategic analyst Nitin Gokhale and former Cambodian Ambassador Pou Sothirak.The Trump-Modi Relationship UnravelsWhat began as a seemingly stable partnership deteriorated rapidly in 2025, with Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin providing blunt analysis of an unexpectedly cooling U.S.-India relationship. The Trump administration's surprising pivot toward Pakistan represented a stunning reversal from Trump 1.0 policies, raising questions about Quad's future effectiveness and regional security cooperation.Transnational Crime and Human TraffickingInvestigative reporting by the Washington Post's Sue-Lin Wong exposed the exponential expansion and brutal reality of scam compounds across Myanmar, Cambodia and the Philippines, where human trafficking victims are forced into “pig-butchering” and cryptocurrency fraud operations. We also featured Washington Post reporter Rebecca Tan discussing the methamphetamine crisis fueled by Chinese precursor chemicals flowing through lawless Myanmar territories into markets across Asia.Historic Interviews and Podcast Milestones2025 brought unprecedented access, including interviews with Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro and the podcast's first head-of-state guest, Palau's President Surangel Whipps Jr. Documentary filmmaker Baby Ruth Villarama also came on to discuss Beijing's failed attempt to suppress her West Philippine Sea documentary, while North Korean defector Timothy Cho shared his harrowing escape story.​The hosts also recall the podcast's experiments with live broadcasts covering Australia's election results and China-Japan tensions.2026 OutlookMonthly listenership quadrupled in 2025, establishing the podcast as the leading Indo-Pacific affairs platform. As 2026 approaches, the hosts anticipate continued geopolitical turbulence, Supreme Court tariff decisions and evolving great power competition dynamics across the region.

Why the US is backing Japan after Chinese radars locked on to Japanese jets at the weekend. And: Belgrade is finally getting a metro – but will it arrive on time? See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Tensions between China and Japan have spiked since November 7 when Japan's newly elected prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, said in the Japanese parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be a situation threatening Japan's survival. Under Japan's 2015 security laws, that suggests Japan's self-defense forces could be activated to respond. The following day, the Chinese consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted that China had no choice but to cut off the prime minister's head. China-Japan relations have since plummeted. China's top diplomat, Wang Yi, stated that Takaichi had “crossed a red line that should not have been touched.” China has taken retaliatory actions, restricting tourism to Japan and banning imports of Japanese seafood, among other actions. Why has Beijing reacted so strongly and how far are China-Japan relations likely to deteriorate?Joining us today to discuss the latest episode in China-Japan relations is Professor Akio Takahara. Professor Takahara is a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Tokyo Woman's Christian University and an Emeritus Professor at the University of Tokyo. He is also an Honorary Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis.Timestamps:[00:00] Introduction[02:07] The State of China-Japan Relations Pre-Dispute[02:49] Beijing's Reaction and Intended Audience[05:42] Continuity in Takaichi's Stance [10:31] Why a Chinese Takeover of Taiwan is Existential to Japan [13:03] China's Signals and Restraint[16:30] Recommendations for De-escalation[19:18] Senkaku Islands Dispute in Connection to Taiwan Dispute[22:04] Beijing's Potential Claims on Okinawa[24:23] View in Japan of the US Reaction[26:36] Takaichi's Support in Japan

PREVIEW — Steve Yates (Heritage Foundation) — Beijing's "Wolf Warrior" Aggression and Regional Economic Threat. Yates analyzes Beijing's escalating "wolf warrior" diplomatic aggression directed at Japan and the broader Indo-Pacific region, characterizing this as systematic coercive pressure combining military intimidation with economic and informational warfare. Yates argues that China's blended military and civilian-sector capabilities threaten control over approximately 50% of global container shipping traffic and maritime commerce, transforming this geopolitical conflict from an internal Chinese regional matter into a pressing global economic and security crisis affecting international commerce, supply chains, and energy security. Yates warns that Beijing's coercive strategy represents a fundamental threat to rules-based international commerce and global economic stability transcending bilateral China-Japan relations.

World news in 7 minutes. Thursday 11th December 2025.Today: Argentina congress. Chile presidential polls. Brazil China space lab. Venezuela Nobel speech. Ukraine elections. Russia US nuclear treaty. Morocco building collapse. Benin Togo coup suspect. China Japan radar dispute. South Korea religious probe. UNESCO Italian cuisine.With Juliet MartinSEND7 is supported by our amazing listeners like you.Our supporters get access to the transcripts written by us every day.Our supporters get access to an English worksheet made by us once per week. Our supporters get access to our weekly news quiz made by us once per week. We give 10% of our profit to Effective Altruism charities. You can become a supporter at send7.org/supportContact us at podcast@send7.org or send an audio message at speakpipe.com/send7Please leave a rating on Apple podcasts or Spotify.We don't use AI! Every word is written and recorded by us!Since 2020, SEND7 (Simple English News Daily in 7 minutes) has been telling the most important world news stories in intermediate English. Every day, listen to the most important stories from every part of the world in slow, clear English. Whether you are an intermediate learner trying to improve your advanced, technical and business English, or if you are a native speaker who just wants to hear a summary of world news as fast as possible, join Stephen Devincenzi, Niall Moore and Juliet Martin every morning. Transcripts, worksheets and our weekly world news quiz are available for our amazing supporters at send7.org. Simple English News Daily is the perfect way to start your day, by practising your listening skills and understanding complicated stories in a simple way. It is also highly valuable for IELTS and TOEFL students. Students, teachers, TEFL teachers, and people with English as a second language, tell us that they use SEND7 because they can learn English through hard topics, but simple grammar. We believe that the best way to improve your spoken English is to immerse yourself in real-life content, such as what our podcast provides. SEND7 covers all news including politics, business, natural events and human rights. Whether it is happening in Europe, Africa, Asia, the Americas or Oceania, you will hear it on SEND7, and you will understand it.For more information visit send7.org/contact or send an email to podcast@send7.org

In this episode, geopolitical analyst Jason Baidya breaks down some of the biggest turning points that shaped our modern world. We explore what Nepalis think about geopolitics, the aftermath of World War 1 and World War 2, and how these global conflicts continue to influence our world today. Jason analyzes the Venezuela crisis, the rise of China's soft power through apps and video games, and how technological advancement has reshaped influence and global strategy. A major part of the conversation dives into the current China–Japan conflict, examining regional tensions and their global impact. We also discuss the push for de-dollarisation, the shifting dynamics of global currency power, and how nations are responding to US dominance. From the Cuban Missile Crisis to Operation Northwoods, we revisit historical moments that reveal how geopolitical strategies evolve. Jason offers a clear and grounded perspective on global power shifts, South Asian geopolitics, and the forces shaping the future. If you're interested in China's rise, global currency wars, or a deeper understanding of past and present conflicts, this conversation offers an insightful, easy-to-understand breakdown of geopolitics in today's world. GET CONNECTED WITH Jason Baidya: Facebook - https://www.facebook.com/jason.baidya.5/ Twitter - https://x.com/JasonDBaidya   SPONSOR : College partner : Model Institute of Technology Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/mitnepal/ MIT: https://mitnepal.edu.np/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/MITechCollege  

"I was at a tourism conference in Hangzhou in 2018, where Chinese companies showed how they were using AI to personalise travel for users. That's nearly eight years ago." In 2025, AI became a strategic commercial tool in all sectors, including travel and tourism. But it isn't widely understood just how effectively embedded AI already is in China's tourism sector, and how far ahead its leading players are to much of the world. On the final show of 2015, Gary welcomes back Joao Romao, Associate Professor at Yasuda Women's University in Japan, to debate the shifting Geopolitics of Travel in Asia six years after the first cases of Covid-19 were discovered in Wuhan, China. Joao is the author of Economic Geography of Tourism, which places contemporary tourism in the context of global economic, technological, societal, environmental and political challenges. We discuss the evolving AI-in-travel landscape and the multiplicity of post-Covid variables shaping travel decision making.  We analyse how Covid savaged the value of the Yen leading to a surge of inbound tourism, while making outbound travel expensive from Japan. And we dive into the implications for regional travel of icy bilateral relations between China-Japan. Plus, we look at the Middle East's investment-driven approach to tourism growth, and how this might impact South East Asian destinations in future. Meanwhile, what is the Circuit of Proximity, and why does it matter? And what did governments across Asia learn about their travel economies during the Covid shutdowns - and are those learnings are being effectively applied six years later?

Tensions deepen between Washington and Brussels as the U.S. pushes Europe to take over NATO defense by 2027. Japan accuses Chinese jets of radar lock near Okinawa. Coffee growers reconsider the maligned robusta bean. Plus, young workers turn to trade jobs to stay 'AI-proof'. Listen to Morning Bid podcast ⁠⁠here⁠⁠. Sign up for the Reuters Econ World newsletter ⁠⁠here⁠⁠.  Listen to the Reuters Econ World podcast ⁠⁠here⁠⁠. Visit the Thomson Reuters Privacy Statement for information on our privacy and data protection practices.  You may also visit megaphone.fm/adchoices to opt out of targeted advertising. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Japan owes an explanation to China and the international community as to why it is unwilling to clearly state the commitments it has made in the past and its legal obligations, Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian said on Thursday.日本外交部发言人林剑周四表示，日本应向中国和国际社会解释，为何其不愿明确阐述过去作出的承诺及其法律义务。Lin made the remark at a daily news conference in Beijing, when asked about the comments Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made on Wednesday in Japan's Upper House about the China-Japan Joint Statement of 1972.林剑在北京举行的例行记者会上作出上述表态。当时他被问及日本首相高市早苗周三在日本参议院就《1972年中日联合声明》发表的言论。As a landmark political document underpinning China-Japan ties, the statement's Article 3 states that "the Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China", and "the Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand".作为奠定中日关系基础的标志性政治文件，该声明第三条明确指出：“中华人民共和国政府重申，台湾是中华人民共和国领土不可分割的一部分”，并称“日本国政府充分理解并尊重这一立场”。While some Japanese media outlets claimed that Takaichi specifically cited this stand on Wednesday, Lin clarified on Thursday and said the reports have been proved to be inaccurate as Beijing has verified what exactly Takaichi said.尽管一些日本媒体声称高市早苗在周三具体引用了这一立场，但林剑周四澄清称，经中方核实，这些报道已被证明不准确。Takaichi merely said that "the Japanese government's basic position regarding Taiwan remains as stated in the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, and there has been no change to this position", and nothing more, Lin said.林剑表示，高市早苗只说了“日本政府在台湾问题上的基本立场与《1972年中日联合声明》中所述一致，并未发生变化”，除此之外并无更多表述。Based on her remarks on Wednesday, Lin asked whether Takaichi "can accurately and fully articulate that position".基于高市早苗的表态，林剑质问其“是否能够准确、完整地阐述该立场”。"Why is the Japanese side unwilling to clearly state the commitments it has made and its legal obligations? What is the logic and motive driving this attitude? The Japanese side owes China and the international community an explanation," he said.他说：“为什么日方不愿明确说明其所作承诺及法律义务？其背后的逻辑和动机是什么？日方必须向中国和国际社会作出解释。”Liu Jiangyong, a professor of Japanese studies at Tsinghua University, said the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship — signed by the two countries in 1978 and approved by their highest legislative bodies — is a legal document that recognizes the principles and contents of the 1972 statement, and the treaty makes it clear that the statement underpins peaceful, friendly bilateral relations.清华大学日本研究专家刘江永教授表示，《中日和平友好条约》于1978年由两国签署并经各自最高立法机构批准，是一份确认1972年声明原则与内容的法律文件，该条约明确规定该声明是两国和平友好关系的基础。"As Article 98 of Japan's Constitution says 'the treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed', it is the obligation of the Japanese government and Japanese lawmakers to faithfully abide by the contents of the 1972 statement and 1978 treaty," he added.他补充说：“日本宪法第98条规定‘日本缔结的条约及国际法规则必须被忠实遵守'，因此日本政府和国会议员有义务严格遵守1972年声明和1978年条约的内容。”On Nov 7, Takaichi made provocative comments at a parliamentary debate, talking of Tokyo's possible military intervention in Taiwan.11月7日，高市早苗在国会辩论中发表挑衅性言论，提及东京可能对台湾进行军事干预。Lin, the spokesman, said that China's stance is very clear.林剑表示，中方立场非常明确。"We urge the Japanese side to reflect on and correct its wrongdoing, and retract Prime Minister Takaichi's erroneous remarks," Lin said. "This is an issue of principle. The facts and Japan's commitments are written down in black and white in historical records."他表示：“我们敦促日方反思并纠正错误言行，撤回高市首相的错误言论。这是原则问题。事实和日本的承诺都白纸黑字写在历史文献里。”JointStatement联合声明inalienable/ɪnˈeɪliənəbl/不可分割的underpin/ˌʌndəˈpɪn/奠定基础/支撑provocative comments挑衅性言论in black and white白纸黑字

Sam Faddis is a retired CIA operations officer, published author, and national security commentator. He talks the CIA being the boogeyman, escalation in Venezuela, Cuba's involvement, why Russia can't sustain the war with Ukraine, China/Japan and much more. PLEASE SUBSCRIBE LIKE AND SHARE THIS PODCAST!!!   Watch Show Rumble- https://rumble.com/v72lwhe-are-we-starting-a-war-with-venezuela-sam-faddis.html YouTube- https://youtu.be/KJuAg8cIf5s   Follow Me X- https://x.com/CoffeeandaMike IG- https://www.instagram.com/coffeeandamike/ Facebook- https://www.facebook.com/CoffeeandaMike/ YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/@Coffeeandamike Rumble- https://rumble.com/search/all?q=coffee%20and%20a%20mike Substack- https://coffeeandamike.substack.com/ Apple Podcasts- https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/coffee-and-a-mike/id1436799008 Gab- https://gab.com/CoffeeandaMike Locals- https://coffeeandamike.locals.com/ Website- www.coffeeandamike.com Email- info@coffeeandamike.com   Support My Work Venmo- https://www.venmo.com/u/coffeeandamike Paypal- https://www.paypal.com/biz/profile/Coffeeandamike Substack- https://coffeeandamike.substack.com/ Patreon- http://patreon.com/coffeeandamike Locals- https://coffeeandamike.locals.com/ Cash App- https://cash.app/$coffeeandamike Buy Me a Coffee- https://buymeacoffee.com/coffeeandamike Bitcoin- coffeeandamike@strike.me   Mail Check or Money Order- Coffee and a Mike LLC P.O. Box 25383 Scottsdale, AZ 85255-9998   Follow Sam X- https://x.com/RealSamFaddis Substack- https://andmagazine.substack.com/   Sponsors Vaulted/Precious Metals- https://vaulted.blbvux.net/coffeeandamike McAlvany Precious Metals- https://mcalvany.com/coffeeandamike/ Independence Ark Natural Farming- https://www.independenceark.com/  

In this 56th edition of The World According to Irina Tsukerman, the bi-weekly geopolitical series on KAJ Masterclass LIVE, we break down escalating US –Venezuela tensions, the next phase of the Gaza plan, the Ukraine leadership crisis, and the China–Japan standoff reshaping Indo-Pacific strategy. Irina explains the forces driving these conflicts — from shifting war doctrines and intelligence rivalries to oil power plays and regional alignments. Viewers will walk away with a clear, fact-driven understanding of how today's flashpoints could redefine global security and the balance of power.About the guestIrina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security lawyer, geopolitical analyst, editor of The Washington Outsider, and president of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security and strategic advisory. Her writings and commentary have appeared in diverse US and international media and have been translated into over a dozen languages.Connect with Irina here:https://www.thewashingtonoutsider.com/https://www.linkedin.com/in/irina-tsukerman-4b04595/Catch up on earlier episodes in the playlist here:https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLt7IEKOM1t1tKItNEVaStzsqSChTCGmp6Watch all our global politics content here:https://rumble.com/c/kajmasterclasshttps://www.youtube.com/@kajmasterclassPolitics=========================================

In this special live pod, Ray and Jim were joined by two distinguished guests: Former Japanese Ambassador to Australia Shingo Yamagami and Bonnie Glaser, Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. Together, they unpack China's escalating diplomatic offensive against Japan following PM Sanae Takaichi's recent statements about Taiwan.​What Sparked the CrisisEp. 114 centers on Takaichi's remarks in the Japanese Diet, where she responded to a hypothetical question about a Taiwan blockade scenario. She stated that if China imposed a blockade around Taiwan and the U.S. intervened, Japan could classify the situation as an "existence-threatening situation" under its national security legislation-potentially allowing deployment of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Shingo emphasized this was not a policy change but a restatement of Japan's longstanding legal framework established a decade ago. Nevertheless, Beijing has reacted fiercely, labeling her comments an "unacceptable intervention" in China's domestic affairs.​China's Strategic CalculusBonnie explained that China's strong reaction stems from multiple factors: Xi Jinping's perceived loss of face after meeting Takaichi at the APEC summit, the 80th anniversary of WW2 amplifying anti-Japanese narratives, and concerns about Japan's military buildup in its Southwest Islands. China's broader message, she notes, is "kill the chicken to scare the monkey"-punishing Japan to deter other nations from challenging Beijing's red lines on Taiwan. China is also testing whether the United States will stand firmly behind its allies, seeking to drive wedges in the U.S.-Japan and other alliances.​The Stakes for Japan and the RegionShingo underscored Taiwan's vital strategic importance to Japan. If Taiwan falls under CCP control, the entire East China Sea would become contested territory, potentially forcing U.S. forces to retreat from Okinawa and fundamentally weakening Japan's defense posture. As former Prime Minister Abe famously stated: "A Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency." Shingo also discussed the shocking details about a Chinese consul general's social media post threatening that Takaichi's "dirty neck will be chopped off"-unprecedented diplomatic intimidation that has only strengthened Japanese public support for the new prime minister, whose approval ratings have surged into the mid-70s.​The One China Policy vs. One China PrincipleThe discussion clarifies a critical distinction often misunderstood: The U.S. "One China policy" and those of other Western nations are fundamentally different from China's "One China principle." Neither the U.S. nor Japan has ever agreed that Taiwan is part of China-they merely "acknowledged" or "understood and respected" Beijing's position. China is now aggressively pushing countries to abandon their individual policies and adopt its principle, which holds Taiwan as an "inalienable" part of China.​Looking AheadBoth guests anticipate a prolonged chill in China-Japan relations. However, Shingo noted that China's economic vulnerabilities limit its coercion options-Beijing needs Japanese investment for its struggling economy. If Takaichi maintains her popularity and secures a strong political mandate, China may eventually be forced to engage with her government, as it did with the long-serving Abe administration. Glaser warns that China sees opportunity in a perceived U.S. decline and will continue pressuring allied coalitions, making unity among democratic partners more essential than ever.​

(00:42) Na een opvallende uitspraak van de Japanse premier Takaichi over Taiwan, is China een diplomatiek tegenoffensief begonnen. Van een negatief reisadvies tot een importstop op Japanse vis, probeert China Japan onder druk te zetten. Ondertussen lijkt de Amerikaanse president Trump gevoelig te zijn voor de Chinese retoriek. Wat zegt dat alles over de toekomst van Taiwan? Hierover Casper Wits, sinoloog en japanoloog aan de Universiteit van Leiden. (16:14) Dichter aan het Front: het verhaal van Yarina Niet alleen mannen, maar ook veel vrouwen vechten aan het front in Oekraïne. Yarina Chronohuz is zo een vechter. Naast dat ze leidinggeeft aan een team soldaten die drones lanceert, is zij ook dichter. Verslaggever Michiel Driebergen ging met haar mee op een militaire missie voor de podcast “Dichter aan het front”. Presentatie: Sophie Derkzen.

Listen to the December 3rd, 2025, daily headline round-up and find all the top news that you need to know.

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China's ambassador to the United Nations on Monday delivered another letter to the United Nations chief, rejecting what Beijing calls Japan's "unreasonable arguments" over Taiwan and reiterating its position on the issue.中国驻联合国大使周一再次致函联合国秘书长，驳斥日本就台湾问题提出的所谓“无理主张”，并重申中方立场。In the letter, Fu Cong, China's permanent representative to the UN, said China "firmly opposes" Japan's letter to the UN and called it "dodging the key issues, while groundlessly accusing China and seeking to shift blame."在信函中，中国常驻联合国代表傅聪表示，中方“坚决反对”日本致联合国的信函，称其“回避关键问题，同时无端指责中国并试图推卸责任”。The latest move comes amid an exchange of letters between the two missions. Fu recently sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, prompting a response from Japan's UN ambassador Kazuyuki Yamazaki, who also wrote to the UN.最新动向发生在两国驻外使团互换信函之际。傅聪最近致函联合国秘书长安东尼奥·古特雷斯，日本驻联合国大使山崎和之随即作出回应，也向联合国发函。Fu said the direct cause of the "serious differences" between the two countries was the recent remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on Nov 7, who suggested during a Diet session that a "Taiwan contingency" could constitute a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan and implied possible military involvement.傅聪表示，两国出现“严重分歧”的直接原因在于日本首相高市早苗11月7日在国会会议上的言论。她当时暗示“台湾突发状况”可能构成日本的“生存威胁”，并暗示可能采取军事行动。Fu said such remarks challenge the outcomes of World War II, undermine the post-war international order and violate the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.傅聪说此类言论挑战第二次世界大战的成果，破坏战后国际秩序，违反《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则。In its letter to the UN, Japan has said that it adheres to its "consistent position". Fu urged Japan to clarify what it calls its "consistent position" on Taiwan. "The Japanese side has continued to evade the question and has yet to give China a direct answer. Can the Japanese side provide the international community with a complete and accurate explanation of its 'consistent position' on the Taiwan question?"日本在致联合国的信函中表示坚持其“一贯立场”。傅聪立言敦促日本澄清其所谓对台湾问题的“一贯立场”。他表示：“日方持续回避问题，至今未向中方作出直接答复。日方能否向国际社会完整准确地说明其在台湾问题上的'‘一贯立场'？”The ambassador cited the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender as legal instruments confirming China's sovereignty over Taiwan.傅聪援引《开罗宣言》、《波茨坦公告》和《日本投降书》作为确认中国对台湾拥有主权的法律文书。He also referred to the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, which states that "the Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China" and "The Government of Japan fully understands and respects" China's stand that Taiwan is "an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China".他还援引了1972年《中日联合声明》，其中声明“日本政府承认中华人民共和国政府是中国唯一合法政府”，并“充分理解和尊重”中国关于台湾是“中华人民共和国领土不可分割一部分”的立场。Fu also rejected Japan's claim in its letter saying that Japan adheres to a "passive defense strategy, which is exclusively defense-oriented", and asserts that Takaichi's remarks were grounded in this position.傅聪也驳斥了日本在信函中声称日本坚持“纯粹以防御为导向的被动防御战略”的说法，并强调高市早苗的言论正是基于这一立场。"Takaichi linked Japan's 'survival-threatening situation' with a 'Taiwan contingency', implying the use of force against China. This clearly goes beyond its claim of 'passive defense strategy' that is 'exclusively defense-oriented'. The Japanese side's arguments are self-contradictory and are intended to mislead the international community," Fu said.傅聪指出：“高市将日本‘生存威胁'与‘台湾突发状况'挂钩，暗示对华动武。这显然超越了其所谓‘纯粹防御型'的‘被动防御战略'主张。日方论调自相矛盾，意在误导国际社会。”He also warned Japan's attempts to "expand its military capabilities and revive militarism". Fu said Japan had increased defense spending for many years, adjusted arms-export principles and was debating nuclear-related policies.他还警示道日本企图“扩大军事能力、复活军国主义”。傅聪指出，日本多年来不断增加国防开支，调整武器出口原则，并正在讨论核相关政策。"Takaichi's erroneous words and deeds have severely undermined the mutual trust between China and Japan and damaged the political foundation of China-Japan relations," Fu said.傅聪表示：“高市早苗的一系列错误言行严重破坏了中日之间的相互信任，损害了中日关系的政治基础。”Japan should "clearly reaffirm the one-China principle, faithfully uphold the spirit of the four political documents between the two countries and its political commitments, immediately retract the erroneous remarks, and take practical steps to honor its commitments to China," he said, warning that the Japanese side should "bear all the consequences arising therefrom".日本应“明确重申一个中国原则，恪守两国间四份政治文件的精神及其政治承诺，立即收回错误言论，并采取切实措施履行对中国的承诺”，傅聪警告称日方应“承担由此产生的全部后果”。Fu asked that his latest letter be circulated as an official document of the UN General Assembly under agenda item 120.傅聪要求将其最新信函作为联合国大会正式文件，列入议程第120项进行分发。Munir Akram, a seasoned diplomat and former permanent representative of Pakistan to the United Nations in New York and Geneva, told China Daily in a recent exclusive interview in New York that Takaichi's remarks on Taiwan were "not appropriate".资深外交官、巴基斯坦前常驻联合国纽约和日内瓦代表穆尼尔·阿克拉姆近日在纽约接受《中国日报》独家专访时表示，高市早苗关于台湾问题的言论“不恰当”。"I think everybody realizes how sensitive China is on the issue of the one-China principle and on any indication of encouragement of separatism from Taiwan," Akram said. "It is my hope that good sense will prevail, and that our friends in Japan will have realized that perhaps this was not the most appropriate way to address an issue China considers to be internal."穆尼尔·阿克拉姆表示：“我认为所有人都清楚中国对一个中国原则的敏感性，以及对任何鼓励台湾分裂行为的表态的警惕。我希望理性能够占上风，我们的日本朋友能够意识到，这种方式或许并非处理中国视为内政问题的最佳途径。”"It is difficult to understand why the remark was made because, both from a legal point of view and from a historical point of view, Japan of all countries should have been more careful because of the history involved," he said.他表示：“很难理解为何会发表此番言论，因为无论从法律角度还是历史角度来看，日本这个国家本应因涉及的历史问题而更加谨慎。”shift blame推卸责任contingencyn./kənˈtɪn.dʒən.si/不测事件，意外事件

On the International News Review... Saturday Mornings Show” host Glenn van Zutphen and co-host Neil Humphreys welcome Bloomberg News Editor Joanna Ossinger to unpack the headlines dominating Asia. We begin in Hong Kong, where tragedy has struck with the death toll rising to over 130 after the devastating Tai Po fire. Officials now admit fire alarms were not working properly, raising urgent questions about safety standards and accountability. Next, we turn to Thailand, where “once in 300 years” rainfall has triggered catastrophic floods across Southeast Asia. Joanna explains the scale of the disaster and its implications for climate resilience in the region. Closer to home, Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s remarks on the China-Japan spat over Taiwan have sparked a wave of online barbs and spin from Chinese netizens. We explore what this reaction reveals about regional sensitivities and Singapore’s longstanding diplomatic stance. And finally, a bizarre story from Bangkok: temple staff were stunned when a woman, believed dead, began moving inside her coffin moments before cremation.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

We talk President Lai Ching-te's proposal for a NT$1.25trillion special defense budget, the ongoing China-Japan spat over Taiwan from a Taiwan perspective and criticism of ruling handed down by the High Court in child sex images case. -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Uploaded every Friday, Nikkei Asia News Roundup delivers a collection of articles from Nikkei's English language media, Nikkei Asia. ・A selection of news headlines ・A glimpse into a notable story for deeper understanding   ・A highlight of our best stories Today we focus on:"China-Japan tensions, South Korea's instant noodle boom" ・You can read more at: https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Podcast/Podcast-News-Roundup

The island’s diplomatic space may be shrinking but it wants to engage the world on its own terms. Synopsis: Every fourth Friday of the month, The Straits Times will now analyse the hottest political and trending talking points, alternating between its Malaysia and Greater China bureaus. For November, host and deputy foreign editor Albert Wai connects with Taiwan correspondent Yip Wai Yee. They discuss Taiwan’s foreign policy preoccupations and the implications of the Beijing-Tokyo spat over remarks made by Japanese leader Sanae Takaichi on cross-strait tensions. Up against an increasingly dominant China, Taiwan is adopting what it calls “integrated diplomacy” as it seeks to buttress relations with like-minded partners. At the same time, the normalisation of so-called grey-zone tactics by the mainland against the island carries risks for Taiwan’s societal resilience and its ability to respond in the event of an actual attack. All eyes are on the next round of talks between American President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the first half of 2026, as this could have far-reaching implications on Taiwan’s role on the global stage. Highlights (click/tap above): 1:49 Taipei’s “integrated diplomacy” 4:12 China-Japan spat over Taiwan 7:46 Shift in approach for cross-strait ties 10:35 What’s at stake when Trump and Xi meet in 2026 13:51 Leverage in tariff talks with the US 15:22 Grey-zone tactics 19:27 Breakthrough at European parliament 21:31 China Taipei or Chinese Taipei? Read more: https://str.sg/s4A7 Register for Asian Insider newsletter: https://str.sg/stnewsletters Host: Albert Wai (albertw@sph.com.sg) Produced and edited by: Fa’izah Sani Executive producer: Ernest Luis Follow Asian Insider Podcast on Fridays here: Channel: https://str.sg/JWa7 Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWa8 Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaX Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg SPH Awedio app: https://www.awedio.sg --- Follow more ST podcast channels: All-in-one ST Podcasts channel: https://str.sg/wvz7 Get more updates: http://str.sg/stpodcasts The Usual Place Podcast YouTube: https://str.sg/4Vwsa --- Get The Straits Times app, which has a dedicated podcast player section: The App Store: https://str.sg/icyB Google Play: https://str.sg/icyX --- #STAsianInsiderSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The island’s diplomatic space may be shrinking but it wants to engage the world on its own terms. Synopsis: Every fourth Friday of the month, The Straits Times will now analyse the hottest political and trending talking points, alternating between its Malaysia and Greater China bureaus. For November, host and deputy foreign editor Albert Wai connects with Taiwan correspondent Yip Wai Yee. They discuss Taiwan’s foreign policy preoccupations and the implications of the Beijing-Tokyo spat over remarks made by Japanese leader Sanae Takaichi on cross-strait tensions. Up against an increasingly dominant China, Taiwan is adopting what it calls “integrated diplomacy” as it seeks to buttress relations with like-minded partners. At the same time, the normalisation of so-called grey-zone tactics by the mainland against the island carries risks for Taiwan’s societal resilience and its ability to respond in the event of an actual attack. All eyes are on the next round of talks between American President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the first half of 2026, as this could have far-reaching implications on Taiwan’s role on the global stage. Highlights (click/tap above): 1:49 Taipei’s “integrated diplomacy” 4:12 China-Japan spat over Taiwan 7:46 Shift in approach for cross-strait ties 10:35 What’s at stake when Trump and Xi meet in 2026 13:51 Leverage in tariff talks with the US 15:22 Grey-zone tactics 19:27 Breakthrough at European parliament 21:31 China Taipei or Chinese Taipei? Read more: https://str.sg/s4A7 Register for Asian Insider newsletter: https://str.sg/stnewsletters Host: Albert Wai (albertw@sph.com.sg) Produced and edited by: Fa’izah Sani Executive producer: Ernest Luis Follow Asian Insider Podcast on Fridays here: Channel: https://str.sg/JWa7 Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWa8 Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaX Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg SPH Awedio app: https://www.awedio.sg --- Follow more ST podcast channels: All-in-one ST Podcasts channel: https://str.sg/wvz7 Get more updates: http://str.sg/stpodcasts The Usual Place Podcast YouTube: https://str.sg/4Vwsa --- Get The Straits Times app, which has a dedicated podcast player section: The App Store: https://str.sg/icyB Google Play: https://str.sg/icyX --- #STAsianInsiderSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Japan's stance on the Taiwan question has long defined its relations with China. Japan must reaffirm its commitment to the four important documents which are the bedrock of bilateral relations. However, it has purposely maintained strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan question.日本在台湾问题上的立场长期决定着中日关系的走向。日本必须重申其对构成两国关系基础的四个重要政治文件的承诺。然而，日本在台湾问题上刻意保持战略模糊。As a result, the Taiwan question has remained a persistent pivot, shaped by Japan's post-war legal positioning, its domestic political constraints and, above all, its reliance on the United States-Japan security alliance.因此，台湾问题一直是中日关系的关键点，受日本战后法律定位、国内政治约束，尤其是对美日同盟依赖的共同影响。After World War II, Japan accepted the Potsdam Proclamation and its requirement to restore Taiwan to China. But in practice, it followed the US-led "Treaty of San Francisco" signed in 1951, which had been signed without the participation of representatives from China. That "treaty" required Japan only to "renounce" Taiwan, without specifying its return to China. Using this omission as an excuse, Japan claimed it did not have the legal authority to define "Taiwan's status".二战后，日本接受《波茨坦公告》及其“台湾归还中国”的要求。但在实践中，日本却遵循1951年美主导的《旧金山和约》——该“和约”签署时并无中国的参与。该“和约”要求日本“放弃”台湾，但并未明确台湾应归还中国。日本借此漏洞声称其无权定义“台湾地位”。The position was blatantly contradictory. Japan was simultaneously agreeing to adhere to the Potsdam Proclamation while relying on a so-called "treaty" that obscured what Potsdam had made explicit. This dual-track approach was driven not by legal logic, but by strategic calculation.这种立场明显自相矛盾。日本一方面声称遵守波茨坦公告，另一方面又依赖一个刻意模糊其明确内容的所谓“和约”。这种“双轨策略”源于战略算计，而非法律逻辑。Another key factor in Japan's Taiwan policy is the US-Japan security framework during the Cold War. During the early Cold War, the US regarded Taiwan as a critical strategic asset.影响日本台湾政策的另一关键因素是冷战时期的美日安全框架。在早期冷战中，美国将台湾视为重要战略资产。As China and Japan sat down to normalize ties in the 1970s, the US was deeply concerned about how Japan would address the Taiwan question in the negotiations. Tokyo repeatedly reassured Washington that the US-Japan alliance would not be affected and that the US would have access to bases for "Taiwan-related operations".当中日于上世纪70年代讨论邦交正常化时，美国高度关注日本在谈判中如何处理台湾问题。东京反复向华盛顿保证，美日同盟不会受影响，美国仍可使用驻日基地进行“涉台行动”。Even after normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations, Japanese officials stated that including Taiwan within the "Far East" framework served US strategic interests.即便中日实现邦交正常化，日本官员仍声称将台湾纳入“远东”框架符合美国战略利益。After the Cold War, Japan further strengthened these security linkages. The 1997 and 2015 revisions in the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation broadened bilateral roles in regional contingencies, widely interpreted as including the Taiwan island.冷战结束后，日本进一步强化了这些安全联动。《日美防卫合作指针》于1997年和2015年的修订扩大了双方在地区突发事件中的角色，普遍被解读为涵盖台湾地区。Japan's 2015 security legislation tried to provide so-called "legal grounds" for supporting US military operations in a "crisis in Taiwan".日本2015年的安保法试图为日本在“台湾有事”时支持美国军事行动提供所谓“法律依据”。In 2021, for the first time since 1969, Japan and the US issued a joint statement expressing concerns over peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.2021年，美日首次自1969年以来在联合声明中对台湾海峡的和平与稳定表示关切。The recent provocative remarks by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi have severely damaged ties with China.日本首相高市早苗近期的挑衅性言论严重损害了中日关系。Speaking in the Japanese Diet, she claimed that a "Taiwan contingency" would constitute a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan — the most explicit formulation ever made by a serving Japanese leader.她在国会中声称，“台湾有事”将构成日本的“存亡危机事态”——这是日本在任领导人迄今最明确的表述。Her statement not only breaks with Tokyo's long-standing strategic ambiguity but also signals a shift toward treating Taiwan as a core element of Japan's national security, which is a blatant violation of China's internal affairs.此言论不仅突破东京长期坚持的战略模糊，更表明日本正将台湾视为其国家安全核心要素，公然干涉中国内政。Japan's dual-track approach of offering political assurances to China while aligning with the US regional strategy during past US administrations has given Tokyo flexibility, but also created inconsistencies.日本过去以对华政治保证与配合美国地区战略并行的“双轨模式”虽为东京带来灵活性，却也造成了明显矛盾。Japan claims it abides by the Potsdam Proclamation but relies on the "San Francisco Peace Treaty", which China regards as invalid.日本声称遵守《波茨坦公告》，却依赖中国明确视为无效的《旧金山和约》。Japan reassures China that it does not support Taiwan independence and upholds the one-China principle, yet expands the scope of US-Japan military cooperation in ways that could involve Japan in "Taiwan contingencies".日本安抚中国，声称不支持“台独”并坚持一个中国原则，但同时不断扩大可能使其卷入“台湾有事”的美日军事合作范围。However, as the Chinese leadership and the incumbent US administration reaffirm the importance of managing the Taiwan question responsibly, Japan's increasingly explicit security framing stands in sharp contrast.然而，在中美领导层均强调负责任管控台湾问题的重要性之际，日本愈发明确的安全定位形成鲜明对比。Rather than reducing tensions, Tokyo's new rhetoric risks injecting additional uncertainty into an issue that the world's two major countries are actively seeking to stabilize.东京的新言论非但不会缓和局势，反而可能向这一中美共同努力稳定的问题注入更多不确定性。Fortunately on Nov 24, President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump held a phone conversation in which the Taiwan question was a central focus.所幸的是，11月24日，习近平主席与美国总统特朗普通话，台湾问题成为核心议题。President Xi elaborated on China's principled position, stressing that the restoration of Taiwan to China is an integral part of the post-war international order.习近平主席阐明了中方原则立场，强调台湾回归中国是战后国际秩序的重要组成部分。President Trump responded by expressing the US side's understanding of Taiwan's significance to China, signaling that even amid strategic competition, Washington acknowledges the sensitivity and centrality of the issue.特朗普总统表示美方理解台湾对中国的重要性，显示出即使在战略竞争中，美国也承认这一问题的敏感性和核心地位。Hopefully, the phone call between the Chinese and US top leaders, followed by another call between President Trump and Prime Minister Takaichi, has clearly conveyed China's unshakable stance on the Taiwan question to the Japanese politicians.希望中美元首的通话，以及随后特朗普总统与高市早苗的通话，已向日本政界清晰传达了中国在台湾问题上的坚定立场。Additionally, President Trump can demonstrate his political acumen by influencing Japan, encouraging the Japanese politician to correct her missteps.此外，特朗普总统也可通过劝导日本纠正其错误言论来展现政治智慧。For Japan, strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan question is a shield. From Japanese politicians' perspective, an explicit acknowledgment that Taiwan is part of China may undermine Japan's post-war "security architecture" and its flexibility to maneuver in the region's shifting geopolitical landscape.对日本而言，台湾问题上的战略模糊是一种“保护伞”。从其政界角度看，明确承认“台湾属于中国”可能冲击日本战后“安全架构”，削弱其在地区地缘政治变化中的操作空间。However, if Japan fully implements the latest remarks, it will be seen as a blatant infringement on China's integrity of sovereignty and territory, given that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.然而，如果日本真正落实其最新言论，则将被视为公然侵犯中国主权和领土完整，因为台湾是中国不可分割的一部分。Such statements, made on the 80th anniversary of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931-45), are evoking strong memories among the Chinese people of Japan's military past and also remind the people of the Asia-Pacific region of Japan's wartime atrocities in the region.在中国人民抗日战争（1931–45）80周年之际发表此类言论，更激起中国人民对日本军国主义历史的强烈记忆，也提醒亚太地区民众注意日本战争暴行的历史。It is crucial for Takaichi to retract her misguided remarks, especially at this highly sensitive time, as they risk paving the way for a revival of militarism that can threaten regional peace.在当前高度敏感的时期，高市早苗必须撤回其错误言论，因为这类言辞可能助长军事主义复活，威胁地区和平。The author is director-general of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and chairman of the Chinese Association for Japanese Studies.The views don't necessarily represent those of China Daily.normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations实现外交关系正常化internal affairs内政Potsdam Proclamation《波茨坦公告》San Francisco Peace Treaty《旧金山和约》blatantly contradictory明显自相矛盾

Die neue japanische Premierministerin Takaichi schlägt hohe Wellen. Sie sagte Anfang November den Mitgliedern der Diet, dem japanischen Parlament, dass ein militärischer Konflikt um Taiwan als Bedrohung für die Existenz Japans angesehen werden könnte, was  „kollektive Selbstverteidigung“ ermöglichen würde. Damit könnte sich Tokio an der Seite von US-Streitkräften an militärischen Aktionen gegen China beteiligen. VonWeiterlesen

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's refusal to retract her erroneous remarks on theTaiwan question, together with Tokyo's accelerating military buildup near China's doorstep, threatens to push China-Japan relations to a dangerous inflection point.日本首相高市早苗拒绝收回其在台湾问题上的错误言论，加之东京正在中国家门口加速军事扩张，这一态势可能将中日关系推向危险的转折点。By linking the Taiwan question to a "survival-threatening situation" and implying the possibility of Japan's armed intervention in the Taiwan Strait, Tokyo has not only touched China's red line but also shaken thepolitical foundation of bilateral relations.日本政府将台湾问题与“生存威胁”挂钩，并暗示日本可能对台湾海峡采取武装干预，此举不仅触碰了中国的红线，更动摇了双边关系的政治根基。Takaichi's remarks encapsulate a policy orientation that contradicts thesolemn commitments the Japanese government has made regarding the Taiwan question in the four political documents between China and Japan, which leave no room for ambiguity or misinterpretation.高市早苗的言论所体现的政策取向与日本政府在《中日四项政治文件》中就台湾问题作出的庄严承诺相悖，这些文件不留任何模棱两可或误解的余地。As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized on Sunday, if Japan persists in its own way and keeps making the same mistakes, all countries and people who advocate justice have the right to reexamine Japan's historical crimes and the responsibility to resolutely prevent theresurgence of Japanese militarism.正如中国外交部长王毅周日强调的，如果日本一意孤行、重蹈覆辙，所有主张正义的国家与人民都有权重新审视日本的历史罪行，更有责任坚决防止日本军国主义死灰复燃。Recent developments have reinforced the gravity of the situation. Japan's Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has announced that Tokyo will proceed with thedeployment of intermediate-range missiles on Yonaguni Island—barely 110 kilometers from China's Taiwan region—and the rapid expansion of Japan Self-Defense Forces' facilities across the Ryukyu Islands.近期一系列事态发展进一步凸显了局势的严峻性。日本防卫大臣小泉进次郎宣布，东京将推进在距中国台湾地区仅110公里的与那国岛部署中程导弹，并加速在琉球群岛全境扩建日本自卫队设施。These moves, as Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said on Monday, are a deliberate attempt to create regional tension and provoke military confrontation. They come alongside Japan's first export of lethal weapons since the relaxation of arms export rules and renewed discussions within the Liberal Democratic Party on revising the three non-nuclear principles upheld by Japan and further increasing its defense spending.正如中国外交部发言人毛宁周一所言，这些举动是蓄意制造地区紧张局势、挑起军事对抗的行径。与此同时，日本在放宽武器出口规则后首次出口致命武器，自民党内部也重新讨论修改日本奉行的“三无核原则”，并进一步增加国防开支。The Potsdam Declaration clearly prohibits Japan from rearming and Japan's pacifist Constitution establishes the exclusive defense-oriented principle. High vigilance from the international community is imperative given Tokyo's obvious intent to brush this principle aside.《波茨坦公告》明确禁止日本重新武装，而日本和平宪法确立了以防卫为宗旨的排他性原则。鉴于东京方面明显有意无视这一原则，国际社会必须保持高度警惕。The moves Japan has taken since Takaichi took office last month all demonstrate Japan is trying to break free from the bounds imposed on it by the postwar arrangement that sought to prevent a repeat of its aggression. The international community therefore has every reason to ask—what exactly is Japan seeking to achieve?自上月高市早苗上任以来，日本采取的一系列举措都表明，该国正试图摆脱战后为防止其侵略历史重蹈覆辙而设定的桎梏。因此，国际社会完全有理由追问：日本究竟意欲何为？China has noted Japan mentioning its "consistent position" on the Taiwan question, but as the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman asked, what exactly is this so-called "consistent position"? Can Japan fully and publicly articulate it? If Japan merely reiterates the concept of "an unchanged position", while remaining vague about its specific content and constantly overstepping its boundaries with its actions, then such reiteration is empty rhetoric.中方注意到日方提及在台湾问题上的“一贯立场”，但正如外交部发言人所问，所谓“一贯立场”究竟是什么？日本能否完整、公开地阐述？如果日本只是重复“立场不变”的概念，对具体内容含糊其辞，同时不断以行动越界，那么这种重复不过是空话。Sino-Japanese relations cannot be built on ambiguity, provocation or historical amnesia, which would only become a prelude to repeated history.中日关系不能建立在模糊不清、挑衅和历史遗忘之上，这些只会成为历史重演的前奏。The historical parallel is chilling. The use of pretexts such as "survival-threatening situation" has been a recurring tactic of Japanese militarism—from its 1931 invasion of Northeast China to the expansion of its aggression across Asia and the attack on Pearl Harbor. As the Chinese nation marks the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931-45) and the World Anti-Fascist War, the alarm cannot be ignored. It seems the only thing the Takaichi government learns from history is that it learns nothing from history.历史的相似性令人不寒而栗。日本军国主义屡屡以“生存威胁”等借口为由发动侵略——从1931年侵占中国东北，到在亚洲扩张侵略，再到袭击珍珠港。值此中华民族迎来抗日战争暨世界反法西斯战争胜利八十周年之际，这般警钟不容忽视。高市早苗政府从历史中汲取的唯一教训，似乎就是“不汲取任何教训”。Japan's current stance also tramples on historical facts. For half a century, Japan forcibly occupied China's Taiwan island, inflicting enormous suffering on the local population. Taiwan's restoration to China is explicitly affirmed in the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender. Taiwan is China's inalienable territory—this is not only a matter of sovereignty but also an integral part of the postwar international order. Japan is the least qualified to make irresponsible remarks on Taiwan, and any attempt to interfere will not be tolerated.日本当前的立场也践踏了历史事实。半个世纪以来，日本强占中国台湾岛，给当地民众造成巨大苦难。《开罗宣言》《波茨坦公告》和《日本投降书》都明确确认台湾回归中国。台湾是中国不可分割的领土——这不仅是主权问题，也是战后国际秩序的重要组成部分。日本最无资格对台湾问题妄加评论，任何干涉企图都绝不容忍。The consequences of Japan's wrongful words and deeds are already emerging. The Chinese people's outrage is real, and it is affecting bilateral exchanges—from declining tourist flows and canceled flights to a reduced market for Japanese products. These are the natural results of public indignation toward provocations that harm China's core interests.日本的妄言妄行已然引发后果。中国人民的愤慨是真实的，正影响着双边交流。从游客减少、航班取消到日本商品市场萎缩，这些都是公众对损害中国核心利益的挑衅行为感到愤慨的自然结果。If Japan truly wants "constructive and stable ties" with China as Tokyo claims, the Takaichi government must first retract the erroneous remarks, take earnest steps to honor its commitments, and stop crossing China's red line on the Taiwan question. Merely asserting that its position has not changed while acting in direct contradiction to that claim will only escalate tensions.如果日本真心希望与中方建立“建设性稳定关系”，正如其一再宣称的那样，高市早苗政府首先必须收回错误言论，切实履行承诺，停止在台湾问题上触碰中国红线。仅声称立场未变却采取与之相悖的行动，只会加剧紧张局势。Taiwan question台湾问题political foundation of bilateral relations双边关系政治基础solemn commitment郑重承诺deployment of intermediate-range missiles中程导弹部署resurgence n./rɪˈsɝː.dʒəns/复苏；兴起；再次兴起；死灰复燃

Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump held a phone call touching on the Taiwan question on Monday. That was followed by President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi holding their first phone call since the Japanese PM sparked a major diplomatic fallout with China over her remarks on Taiwan. Beijing has issued a series of strong and coordinated diplomatic responses over Takaichi's refusal to retract her Taiwan remarks, with China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi warning that Japan has "crossed a red line." How seriously has Japan miscalculated China's red lines? And what do these developments mean for regional stability and world order?

Our expert guest explains why he predicts both men will seek good vibes in 2026. Synopsis: Every third Friday of the month, The Straits Times gets its US bureau chief to analyse the hottest political and trending talking points. In this episode, US bureau chief Bhagyashree Garekar hosts her special guest - Harvard Professor Graham Allison - who tells her how he manages to read Trump right, by taking him seriously, looking at his patterns amid all his statements, and noticing the trend lines. Prof Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University where he has taught for five decades. He is a leading analyst of national security with special interests in nuclear weapons, Russia, China, and decision-making. He has also written books, including Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, published in 2017. He also had another book out earlier in 2013 - Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States and the World - which has been a bestseller in the US and abroad. Highlights (click/tap above): 2:31 How well do Trump & Xi vibe? Getting a sense of their agendas for 2026 7:34 What do Trump and Xi want from each other? 9:31 Will Trump get hawkish on China ahead of 2026 election? 13:52 Why is Trump muted on China-Japan spat over Taiwan? 18:50 Why Trump is different from any other US president 21:48 How today’s China looks at today’s America 24:43 Will China be the world’s sole superpower? Read Bhagyashree Garekar’s articles: https://str.sg/whNo Follow Bhagyashree Garekar on LinkedIn: https://str.sg/gD6E Sign up for ST’s weekly Asian Insider newsletter: https://str.sg/sfpz Host: Bhagyashree Garekar (bhagya@sph.com.sg) Produced and edited by: Fa’izah Sani Executive producer: Ernest Luis Follow Asian Insider Podcast on Fridays here: Channel: https://str.sg/JWa7 Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWa8 Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaX Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg SPH Awedio app: https://www.awedio.sg --- Follow more ST podcast channels: All-in-one ST Podcasts channel: https://str.sg/wvz7 Get more updates: http://str.sg/stpodcasts The Usual Place Podcast YouTube: https://str.sg/4Vwsa --- Get The Straits Times app, which has a dedicated podcast player section: The App Store: https://str.sg/icyB Google Play: https://str.sg/icyX --- #STAsianInsiderSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Our expert guest explains why he predicts both men will seek good vibes in 2026. Synopsis: Every third Friday of the month, The Straits Times gets its US bureau chief to analyse the hottest political and trending talking points. In this episode, US bureau chief Bhagyashree Garekar hosts her special guest - Harvard Professor Graham Allison - who tells her how he manages to read Trump right, by taking him seriously, looking at his patterns amid all his statements, and noticing the trend lines. Prof Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University where he has taught for five decades. He is a leading analyst of national security with special interests in nuclear weapons, Russia, China, and decision-making. He has also written books, including Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, published in 2017. He also had another book out earlier in 2013 - Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States and the World - which has been a bestseller in the US and abroad. Highlights (click/tap above): 2:31 How well do Trump & Xi vibe? Getting a sense of their agendas for 2026 7:34 What do Trump and Xi want from each other? 9:31 Will Trump get hawkish on China ahead of 2026 election? 13:52 Why is Trump muted on China-Japan spat over Taiwan? 18:50 Why Trump is different from any other US president 21:48 How today’s China looks at today’s America 24:43 Will China be the world’s sole superpower? Read Bhagyashree Garekar’s articles: https://str.sg/whNo Follow Bhagyashree Garekar on LinkedIn: https://str.sg/gD6E Sign up for ST’s weekly Asian Insider newsletter: https://str.sg/sfpz Host: Bhagyashree Garekar (bhagya@sph.com.sg) Produced and edited by: Fa’izah Sani Executive producer: Ernest Luis Follow Asian Insider Podcast on Fridays here: Channel: https://str.sg/JWa7 Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWa8 Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaX Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg SPH Awedio app: https://www.awedio.sg --- Follow more ST podcast channels: All-in-one ST Podcasts channel: https://str.sg/wvz7 Get more updates: http://str.sg/stpodcasts The Usual Place Podcast YouTube: https://str.sg/4Vwsa --- Get The Straits Times app, which has a dedicated podcast player section: The App Store: https://str.sg/icyB Google Play: https://str.sg/icyX --- #STAsianInsiderSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This week, Walter and Jeremy discuss the China-Japan spat, Mohammed bin Salman's visit to the White House, China's lead in scientific paper and patent production, and the apparent rise of Orthodox Christianity among young conservative American men.

Trump wipes the slate clean of murder for Mohammed bin Salman because ‘things happen'. The Epstein files move a big step closer to being released and what it's like reporting on the ground in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Plus, the comment that sent China-Japan relations plummeting.

Japan under Sanae Takaichi is flagrantly crossing diplomatic red lines. By claiming that "a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency," she is signaling potential intervention in China's internal affairs — a blatant violation of the One-China principle and the foundation of China-Japan relations. Beijing has responded firmly, while Takaichi remains unwilling to retract her irresponsible remarks. What is Japan really up to? How badly has it misread China's resolve — and what happens next?

Asia correspondent Katie Silver spoke to Lisa Owen about the impact a diplomatic row between China and Japan is having on travel between the two nations.

Your daily news in under three minutes. At Al Jazeera Podcasts, we want to hear from you, our listeners. So, please head to https://www.aljazeera.com/survey and tell us your thoughts about this show and other Al Jazeera podcasts. It only takes a few minutes! Connect with us: @AJEPodcasts on X, Instagram, Facebook, and YouTube

This week in the markets: Investors harvest gains after a six-month rally; the UK struggles to price in Budget speculation; and Asian markets are hit by China/Japan tensions. Fidelity’s Tom Stevenson reviews the stories moving markets.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

World news in 7 minutes. Monday 17th November 2025Today : Ecuador referendum. Chile election. Mexico, Philippines protests. US tariffs cut. DRC peace deal. Ethiopia Marbug. China Japan tension. India explosion. Ukraine Russian oil targets. Europe Claudia. Spain Rubiales. Germany no auction. And sheep.SEND7 is supported by our amazing listeners like you.Our supporters get access to the transcripts and vocabulary list written by us every day.Our supporters get access to an English worksheet made by us once per week.Our supporters get access to our weekly news quiz made by us once per week.We give 10% of our profit to Effective Altruism charities. You can become a supporter at send7.org/supportContact us at podcast@send7.org or send an audio message at speakpipe.com/send7Please leave a rating on Apple podcasts or Spotify.We don't use AI! Every word is written and recorded by us!Since 2020, SEND7 (Simple English News Daily in 7 minutes) has been telling the most important world news stories in intermediate English. Every day, listen to the most important stories from every part of the world in slow, clear English. Whether you are an intermediate learner trying to improve your advanced, technical and business English, or if you are a native speaker who just wants to hear a summary of world news as fast as possible, join Stephen Devincenzi, Juliet Martin and Niall Moore every morning. Transcripts, vocabulary lists, worksheets and our weekly world news quiz are available for our amazing supporters at send7.org. Simple English News Daily is the perfect way to start your day, by practising your listening skills and understanding complicated daily news in a simple way. It is also highly valuable for IELTS and TOEFL students. Students, teachers, TEFL teachers, and people with English as a second language, tell us that they use SEND7 because they can learn English through hard topics, but simple grammar. We believe that the best way to improve your spoken English is to immerse yourself in real-life content, such as what our podcast provides. SEND7 covers all news including politics, business, natural events and human rights. Whether it is happening in Europe, Africa, Asia, the Americas or Oceania, you will hear it on SEND7, and you will understand it.Get your daily news and improve your English listening in the time it takes to make a coffee.For more information visit send7.org/contact or send an email to podcast@send7.org

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Allied AI Competition and Submarine Requests. Scott Harold examines the crucial role of allies Japan and South Korea in the AI competition against China. Japan is developing locally tailored AI models built on US technology for use in Southeast Asia. South Korea aims to become the third-largest AI power, offering reliable models to counter China's untrustworthy technology. Harold also discusses South Korea's surprising request for nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines to track Chinese and North Korean vessels, signaling a greater public willingness to contribute to China deterrence.

Dive into a riveting conversation with Professor Yoichiro Sato, Japan's expert on foreign and security policy. Explore the Quad's evolving role, India-Japan ties, China's maritime strategy, and the delicate balance of military and economic cooperation in Asia.00:35- About Prof Yoichiro SatoProfessor Sato is a professor at the Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University.He is an expert analyst of Foreign and Security Policy, Japan, US, Indo-Pacific.He has published more than 10 academic books and countless articles and book chapters in academic journals. 

① In a phone call with his Japanese counterpart, China's foreign minister called for jointly advancing the strategic relationship of mutual benefit and building constructive bilateral ties. With Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in office, what is the outlook of China-Japan ties? (00:52) ② US President Donald Trump has met with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung as part of the final leg of his trip across Asia. What is Trump gaining from South Korea? (15:03) ③ How can China accelerate green transition during its next five-year plan? (24:45) ④ The Shanghai Stock Exchange has unveiled the first batch of enterprises listed on its newly created sci-tech growth tier. We take a look at how China's capital market is nurturing tech innovation (33:54) ⑤ Why has the peace talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Istanbul ended without a deal? (43:13)

In this week's episode of China Insider, Miles Yu reviews the Chinese Communist Party's fourth plenum, including the newly announced five-year development plan and appointment of Zhang Shengmin as the new Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission. Next, Miles covers the latest developments from the ASEAN summit in Malaysia including the US-China trade deal framework, and previews the upcoming APEC summit as President Trump plans to meet with Xi Jinping in South Korea. Finally, Miles circles back on Japan's elections for Prime Minister, and outlines the potential impact PM-elect Sanae Takaichi will have on China-Japan relations and the current Indo-Pacific landscape. China Insider is a weekly podcast project from Hudson Institute's China Center, hosted by China Center Director and Senior Fellow, Dr. Miles Yu, who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world's future.