Podcasts about china japan

In this week's show, Claudia Tumba and Martin Sketchley have a chat about teaching English in China, Japan and Korea.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's latest "softened" remarks on China represent a calculated attempt at rhetorical maneuvering. If Takaichi genuinely seeks dialogue with Beijing, she must start from retracting her erroneous and dangerous remarks on the Taiwan question. Otherwise, she is merely misleading the Japanese public and the international community to deflect growing criticism.日本首相高市早苗近期对华释放的一系列所谓缓和言论，不过是精心算计的话术博弈。倘若她真心希望同中方开展对话，首要之举便是收回其在台湾问题上发表的错误且危险言论。如若不然，她只是在蒙蔽日本民众与国际社会，借此转嫁外界日益增多的批评之声。During the question-and-answer session at a news conference in Tokyo on Monday, Takaichi said her government had "consistently promoted a strategic mutually beneficial relationship with China and built a constructive and stable relationship". She also claimed that she looked forward to the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Economic Leaders' Meeting to be held in China later this year as an opportunity for dialogue.周一，高市早苗在东京记者会问答环节称，日本政府“始终致力于推进中日战略互惠关系，构建富有建设性、稳定的双边关系”。她还表示，期待今年下半年在中国举办的亚太经合组织领导人非正式会议能够成为中日对话契机。Such statements ring hollow when she continues to evade the reasons why relations have soured and seeks to shift the blame onto others.然而日方始终回避中日关系恶化的根源、一味推诿责任，这番说辞听来空洞乏味、毫无诚意。During Monday's news conference, when a TBS reporter claimed in his question that Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi "had held talks" with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Manila, Takaichi responded that "Japan was engaging with China at various levels", including through Motegi, and would continue communicating with the Chinese side.周一记者会上，日本TBS电视台一名记者提问时称，日本外务大臣茂木敏充在马尼拉举行的东盟外长会期间同中国外长王毅举行了会谈。对此高市早苗回应称，日本正通过茂木敏充等渠道同中方开展各层级沟通，后续还将持续与中方交流。However, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian had twice made it clear, the latest being on Monday, that no contact had taken place between the two foreign ministers in Manila.但中国外交部发言人林剑已两次明确表态（周一刚刚再度重申），两国外长并未在马尼拉进行任何会面接触。It is absurd for the Japanese side to continue playing word games and pretend that communication between the two sides remains normal.日方一味玩弄文字游戏、谎称双边沟通一切如常，这种做法十分荒唐。While dialogue between China and Japan is indeed necessary, the preconditions for that are clearly defined.中日之间固然需要对话，但对话有着明确的前提条件。Takaichi's remarks on the Taiwan question in November last year crossed China's red line and triggered the downward spiral in bilateral relations. Not to mention that the series of China-targeted moves her government has taken in various fields ever since have further hurt bilateral ties.去年11月，高市早苗在台湾问题上的表态触碰中方红线，致使中日关系持续走低。此后，其内阁在诸多领域接连出台针对中国的举措，更是让双边关系雪上加霜。While claiming to be advancing a mutually beneficial relationship and seeking a stable relationship with China, Tokyo simultaneously accelerates the revision of its national security strategy, expands military preparations targeting China, establishes quasi-alliance networks internationally against China, and tries to instigate proxy conflicts. Such moves will only further damage its credit and China-Japan relations.日本一边嘴上宣称要推进中日互惠合作、谋求双边关系稳定，一边加紧修订国家安全战略、扩充针对中国的军备建设、在国际上搭建反华准同盟体系，还蓄意煽动代理人冲突。这类行径只会不断透支自身信誉，持续破坏中日关系。Takaichi's relentless pursuit of a neo-militarist agenda, such as lifting the ban on the export of lethal weapons, has also contributed to her declining approval ratings, amid her failure to address the cost-of-living issues that are most concerning to ordinary Japanese people.高市早苗执意推行新军国主义议程（例如解除杀伤性武器出口禁令），加之无力解决日本民众最为关切的生活成本难题，其民众支持率持续下滑。Takaichi's exacerbation of both domestic and international challenges for Japan means it is only natural she should be losing public support, especially after more and more Japanese people see through her dangerous policy.高市早苗不断让日本深陷国内外双重困境，失去民众支持实属必然；如今越来越多日本民众已然看透其危险施政方针。Even as Takaichi claims to be repairing ties with China, Japanese media have revealed that right-wing forces in Japan are using paid recruits and large-scale AI-generated content to mass-produce disinformation, in a deliberate attempt to distort the history of Japan's aggression against China.即便高市早苗口口声声说要修复中日关系，日本媒体却披露：日本右翼势力雇佣写手、借助人工智能大规模编造虚假信息，蓄意歪曲日本侵华历史。To put China-Japan relations back on a stable track, the Takaichi government must abandon its neo-militarist trajectory, adopt a correct view of history and approach China's development with reason and restraint. To that end, it needs to move beyond rhetorical maneuvers. Such duplicity — saying one thing while doing another — will only continue to drain the credibility of the Takaichi government.想要让中日关系重回稳定发展轨道，高市内阁必须摒弃新军国主义发展路线，树立正确历史观，理性克制地看待中国发展。日方不能只停留在话术层面，言行不一的两面派做法只会持续消耗本届内阁的公信力。Tokyo has to demonstrate, through genuine action, a sincere commitment to regional peace and stability. Only then can it begin to rebuild the trust of its neighbors and the broader international community.日本唯有拿出实实在在的行动，展现维护地区和平稳定的诚意，才有可能重新赢得周边邻国以及国际社会的信任。rhetorical maneuvering /rɪˈtɒrɪkl məˈnuːvərɪŋ/话术博弈；言辞算计deflect /dɪˈflekt/转移（批评、指责）；转嫁ring hollow听上去空洞无物、缺乏诚意neo-militarist /ˌniːəʊ ˈmɪlɪtərɪst/新军国主义的duplicity /djuːˈplɪsəti/两面派；言行不一；口是心非exacerbation /ɪɡˌzæsəˈbeɪʃn/加剧；恶化

China's suspension of rare earth exports to Japan has now entered its seventh month, with shipments in June again falling to a fraction of their level a year earlier. The restrictions are one sign of a broader collapse in relations between the two countries since Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took office last fall. The relationship, long marked by tension, deteriorated sharply after Takaichi said that Chinese military action against Taiwan would "threaten Japan's survival." Since then, ties have continued to worsen. William Yang, senior Northeast Asia analyst at the International Crisis Group, joins Eric to explain the politics driving this increasingly dangerous confrontation and why its consequences will be felt across Asia.

In this episode of the ChinaPower Podcast, Dr. Kristi Govella joins us to discuss the latest developments in China-Japan relations amid rising tensions between the two countries following Prime Minister Takaichi's comments on Taiwan last November. Building on a CSIS commentary published late last year, she examines how China has increased economic, diplomatic, and military pressure on Japan, how Tokyo has responded, and what these developments reveal about the future of the relationship. The conversation also explores Japan's growing cooperation with the United States and other partners and the prospects for de-escalation.  Kristi Govella is senior adviser and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She is also associate professor of Japanese politics and international relations at the University of Oxford. 

As China-Japan relations remain strained over Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's erroneous remarks on Taiwan and her administration's accelerated military buildup, Japan's economy is increasingly feeling the pinch, with critical mineral exports from China plunging, supply chains buckling under pressure and billions in potential GDP losses looming, experts said.专家表示，因日本首相高市早苗涉台错误言论及其政府加速扩军，中日关系持续紧张，日本经济承压加剧：中国关键矿产对日出口大幅下滑、供应链承压失灵，国内生产总值或将面临数百亿规模的潜在损失。What is truly pushing Japanese businesses into difficulty is not China's lawful measures to safeguard national security, but the systemic risks spawned by Japan's own misguided security trajectory, they added.专家补充称，真正让日本企业陷入困境的并非中国维护国家安全的合法举措，而是日本自身走偏的安保路线滋生出的系统性风险。According to the General Administration of Customs, China's exports of rare earth magnets to Japan plummeted 34.6 percent to 123 metric tons in May compared with April, while monthly shipments have remained below 200 metric tons for three consecutive months.海关总署数据显示，5月中国稀土永磁对日出口量环比大跌34.6%，仅123吨，对日月度出口量已连续三个月低于200吨。Since the start of 2026, China has banned shipments of dual-use items and technologies, including rare earth elements, to Japan. Such items and technologies have both civilian and military applications.2026年以来，中国已禁止向日本出口稀土等军民两用物项及相关技术，这类物资和技术可同时用于民用与军事领域。The ban came on the heels of a downward spiral in China-Japan relations, triggered by Takaichi's remarks and her administration's military-related moves.高市早苗相关言论及其政府一系列军事动作致使中日关系持续恶化，在此背景下中方出台上述出口禁令。China's tighter export controls have prompted Japan to take unprecedented steps. Recently, All-Nippon News Network reported that Japan has launched its first-ever program to extract rare earth elements from discarded household air-conditioners.中国收紧出口管制倒逼日本推出前所未有的应对举措。据全日本新闻网近期报道，日本首次启动从废旧家用空调中提取稀土的专项项目。Mitsubishi Electric, the Japanese company spearheading that recycling initiative, was added to China's export control list in late June for its involvement in defense electronics, radar and missile systems.牵头该回收项目的日本三菱电机，因涉足军工电子、雷达及导弹系统研发，于6月底被列入中国出口管制清单。The June decision, which imposed a total ban on dual-use item exports to 20 Japanese entities and implemented heightened scrutiny against 20 others, followed a similar decision in February that targeted 40 Japanese entities.今年2月中方已将40家日本机构纳入管制范围，6月新规进一步全面禁止向20家日本实体出口军民两用产品，并对另外20家实体实施从严审查。Shen Yi, a professor at Fudan University's School of International Relations and Public Affairs, said, "The Japanese government's bet that it can continue its military expansion and provocative rhetoric without paying a real price is doomed to fail."复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院教授沈逸表示：“日本政府妄想一边持续扩军、发表挑衅言论，一边不用付出实质代价，这种盘算注定落空。”Shen noted that China accounts for roughly 70 percent of global rare earth mining and over 90 percent of smelting and separation capacity, giving the nation's policy tools the weight to alter Japanese corporate calculations.沈逸指出，中国稀土开采量约占全球70%，冶炼分离产能超全球90%，相关政策足以改变日本企业的经营布局。China boosts self-reliance中国加快产业链自主可控进程Experts said that Japan's attempts to leverage its edge in the semiconductor sector through potential export controls will ultimately prove futile, as foreign restrictions are only accelerating China's push for self-reliance, turning what was meant as a chokehold into a catalyst for domestic substitution.专家称，日本试图依托半导体优势实施出口限制的做法终将徒劳无功，外部打压反而加速中国自主研发，原本用来扼制中国的手段，反倒成为国产替代的助推力。For instance, there is "significant progress" in the domestic production potential of photoresist, the light-sensitive material essential for etching microscopic circuits onto silicon wafers, sources from leading Chinese chipmakers such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp and Huahong Group told China Daily.中芯国际、华虹集团等国内头部芯片企业相关人士向《中国日报》透露，用于在硅片上蚀刻微电路的感光材料光刻胶，国产量产能力已取得重大突破。Jiangsu Nata Opto-electronic Material Co, which developed one of China's first high-end deep ultraviolet photoresists, said the company's revenue from the product exceeded 10 million yuan ($1.5 million) in 2024, and it maintained a stable supply in 2025.国内首批高端深紫外光刻胶研发企业江苏南大光电表示，该产品2024年营收突破1000万元（折合150万美元），2025年实现稳定供货。According to data from Japanese research company Global Net, last year, three Chinese chip equipment manufacturers ranked among the world's top 20 by sales volume for the first time.日本调研机构环球网数据显示，去年有三家中国半导体设备厂商首次跻身全球销量前二十。This marks a sharp rise from just one company in 2022, prior to stricter restrictions imposed by the United States, underscoring China's accelerated progress in bolstering the domestic supply chain.对比美国出台严苛限制前的2022年仅有一家上榜，该数据大幅提升，凸显中国完善本土供应链的步伐持续加快。Roger Sheng, vice-president of research at US market research company Gartner, noted that the technological gap between Chinese companies and international industry leaders is continuously narrowing.美国市场研究机构高德纳研究副总裁盛陵海指出，中国企业与国际行业龙头之间的技术差距正在持续缩小。"This progress has provided strong support for domestic chip manufacturers in their technological upgrades and production expansion efforts, even amid restrictions on access to Japanese technology and equipment," Sheng said.盛陵海表示：“即便在日本相关技术与设备受限的环境下，上述技术突破仍为国内芯片厂商技术升级、扩产增效提供了有力支撑。”With the exception of lithography machines, domestic tools are now being increasingly used in Chinese semiconductor factories, he said, citing the example of Naura Technology becoming a key equipment provider for another Chinese company's advanced memory chips.他举例称，除光刻机以外，国产设备正大量应用于国内晶圆厂，北方华创已成为国内某企业先进存储芯片产线的核心设备供应商。erroneous /ɪˈrəʊniəs/错误的，不正确的plummet /ˈplʌmɪt/暴跌，大幅下降dual-use /ˌdjuːəl ˈjuːz/军民两用的photoresist /ˌfəʊtəʊrɪˈzɪst/光刻胶futile /ˈfjuːtaɪl/徒劳的，无效的lithography /lɪˈθɒɡrəfi/光刻（技术）

Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940. 

The tech gap between China and the West is closing fast. But why did the land that invented paper and gunpowder ever fall behind? Debin Ma is the world's leading economic historian of East Asia. In this fourth episode of our Great Divergence series, he approaches the making of the modern world from an eastern perspective. We discuss why China fell behind, why Japan modernised early, and why East Asia has experienced so many economic miracles. We also discuss China's recent transformation – a transformation that Ma has witnessed firsthand. LINKS AND REFERENCESDo you prefer reading to listening? You can find⁠ a summarised essay ⁠of this conversation, with a bibliography, at our series page:⁠ ⁠https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/news/podcasts/⁠⁠GREAT DIVERGENCE: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLDThis episode is part of a series produced by Warwick University's⁠ ⁠CAGE Research Centre⁠⁠ in collaboration with⁠ ⁠On Humans⁠, searching for explanations to why Western Europe and North America emerged as the most affluent and technologically advanced regions of the modern world. Guided by six expert guests, including a winner of the 2025 Nobel Prize in economics, we approach this topic with balance and breadth, exploring everything from colonialism and fossil fuels to science and technology. 1 | Why the West? Colonies, fossil fuels, and lessons from China (Kenneth Pomeranz)2 | Why did so many inventions come from Europe? (Joel Mokyr)3 | Why did the Industrial Revolution happen in Britain? (Robert Allen)  4 | A view from the East: China, Japan, and the other paths to prosperity (Debin Ma)5 | The big picture: Measuring the origins of the modern world (Bishnupriya Gupta and Stephen Broadberry)NAMES MENTIONEDJoseph Needham | Kenneth Pomeranz | Joel Mokyr | Robert Allen | Francis Fukuyama | Jared Rubin | Yin Weiwen | Kaiser Kuo | Deng Xiaoping | Yasheng Huang KEYWORDSEconomics | History | Global Economic History | Industrial Revolution | Chinese history | Japanese history | Developmental Economics | Needham Puzzle | Needham Question | Qianlong Emperor | Macartney embassy | Meiji Japan | Iwakura mission |  Age heaping | Comparative development | State capacity | Modern fiscal state | History of taxation | Industrial Policy | History of Technology | Human capitalINFOGuest: Debin Ma (Fudan University and All Souls College, University of Oxford)   ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Host: Ilari Mäkelä (⁠⁠⁠On Humans⁠⁠⁠)Contact: ⁠greatdivergencepod@gmail.com

Japan is expanding its security role across the Asia-Pacific, raising new questions about regional stability and strategic balance. Is this a natural response to changing conditions, or a deliberate effort to reshape the regional order? What risks could this shift bring for neighboring countries? In this edition of The Hub, experts explore Japan's recent diplomatic and defense outreach, discuss changes to arms export policies, and examine how regional partners are responding. They delve into the historical context behind today's security dynamics, look into domestic political drivers in Japan, and assess the broader implications for China-Japan relations and the future of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.

We look at Slovak PM Robert Fico’s spat with the Baltics over Moscow and Slovenia’s coalition talks collapse. Plus: How Iran is affecting aviation, China-Japan tensions over Taiwan and Salone del Mobile’s first preview day.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

① China has released a list of its ten major scientific breakthroughs in 2025. What do they tell us about the focus of the country's scientific research? (00:56) ② A conversation with Jonathan Choi Koon-shum, Chairman of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, on cooperation between Hong Kong and Hainan. (14:18) ③ China has lodged a protest with Japan after a Japanese Self-Defense Force officer broke into the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo. To what extent is the intrusion related to the current trajectory of China-Japan relations? (24:57) ④ Ghana's president has criticized the US government for normalizing the erasure of Black history, warning such policies could have ripple effects elsewhere. Does he have a point? (33:56) ⑤ Humanoid robot maker Unitree has filed for an IPO application on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, looking to raise over $610 million. How could capital markets help China's humanoid robotics industry to develop? (42:36)

In this week's Chemical Watch News & Insight podcast from Enhesa, we look at recent updates to chemical laws in China, Japan and Vietnam. Asia desk editor Dr Kerry Hebden joins the podcast to talk about changes to Japan's Chemical Substances Control Law, some of which are due to take effect next month. Kerry also talks about Japan's transition from the 6th version of the UN's Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals to GHS 9. Asia desk senior reporter Uzair Aftab also joins us to discuss what's ahead for Vietnam after the country adopted its new Law on Chemicals last summer. In addition, Uzair talks about China, its new Law on the Safety of Hazardous Chemicals and how the country hopes to become a world powerhouse for cosmetics.  Tune in to learn more. And then come back to see all the latest headlines from Enhesa's Chemical Watch News & Insight. Have a podcast idea or a comment to share? Let us know by emailing the editor at Terry.Hyland@Enhesa.com. 

We bieden onze excuses aan. We moeten het namelijk wéér over die debiele importheffingen van president Trump hebben. Nu het Amerikaanse hooggerechtshof een streep heeft gezet door eerdere heffingen, moet de Amerikaanse regering een list verzinnen. En dat doet het nu met een nieuw onderzoek. Een onderzoek naar landen als China, Japan en ook naar Europa. En de uitkomst is zo goed als zeker: nieuwe heffingen. Waardoor we ons weer kunnen opmaken voor een economische aanval. Over aanvallen gesproken, we hebben het ook over de Iran oorlog. Dag 13 van het conflict in het Midden-Oosten. De olieprijs steeg weer verder, nu meerdere olietankers werden aangevallen. Al blijft Trump volhouden dat 'ie aan het winnen is.In deze aflevering gaat het ook over mode. We hebben het over een modereus die al drie jaar lang record op record breekt: Inditex, het bedrijf achter merken als Zara en Pull & Bear. Met als klapstuk de cijfers van vorig jaar: 40 miljard aan omzet en een winst van ruim 6 miljard euro. Ongekend voor een kledingbedrijf (dat kenners omschrijven als een techbedrijf dat kleren verkoopt). Te gast: Robbert Manders van Antaurus van het Antaurus Europe Fund BNR Beurs is een journalistiek onafhankelijke productie, mede mogelijk gemaakt door Saxo. Over de makers: Jelle Maasbach is presentator van BNR Beurs en freelance financieel journalist. Zijn favoriete aandeel om over te praten is Disney, maar daar lijkt hij de enige in te zijn. Sinds de eerste uitzending van BNR Beurs is 'ie er bij. Maxim van Mil is presentator van BNR Beurs en journalist bij BNR, waar hij zich focust op de financiële markten en ontwikkelingen in de tech-wereld. Je krijgt hem het meest enthousiast als hij kan praten over ASML, of oer-Hollandse bedrijven zoals Ahold of ABN Amro. Jorik Simonides is presentator van BNR Beurs, economieredacteur en verslaggever bij BNR. Hij wordt er vooral blij van als het een keer níet over AI gaat. Milou Brand is presentator van BNR Beurs, freelance podcastmaker en columnist bij het Financieele Dagblad. Jochem Visser is presentator van BNR Beurs, maakt Beursnerd XL en is redacteur bij BNR Zakendoen en de podcast Onder Curatoren. Vraag hem naar obscure zaken op financiële markten en hij vertelt je waarom het eigenlijk nóg leuker is dan je al dacht. Over de podcast: Met BNR Beurs ga je altijd voorbereid de nieuwe beursdag in. We praten je in een kleine 25 minuten bij over alle laatste ontwikkelingen op de handelsvloer. We blijven niet alleen bij de AEX of Wall Street, maar vertellen je ook waar nog meer kansen liggen. En we houden het niet bij de cijfers, maar zoeken ook iedere dag voor je naar duiding van scherpe gasten en experts. Of je nu een ervaren belegger bent of net begint met je eerste stappen op de beurs, de podcast biedt waardevolle inzichten voor je beleggingsstrategie. Door de focus op zowel de korte termijn als de lange termijn, helpt BNR Beurs luisteraars om de ruis van de markt te scheiden van de essentie. Van Musk tot Microsoft en van Ahold tot ASML. Wij vertellen je wat beleggers bezighoudt, wie de markten in beweging zet en wat dat betekent voor jouw beleggingsportefeuille.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

You can send a text, include contact info to get a response. You probably know that by the middle of the 19th century, the  British dominated India.  The British introduced railroads and electricity, public health and infrastructure, and a population boom began.  By the end  Victoria became the Empress.  But before the French Revolution the British footprint in India was relatively small.  It was during the revolutionary wars and the Napoleonic wars that British control and domination greatly expanded, from early footholds in Bengal and Madras.The China trade was responsible of one six of British state revenue during this period so it was of vital importance.  Also, tea had an interesting property, the people who drank it did not need to dedicate so much grain to small beer production, allowing tea to change the supply and demand equation for grain, during a critical period.There is also the argument that the Chinese authorities contributed to the opium trade by not allowing any legal trade.  The drain of silver into the immensity of China is a problem that was going to be solved, whenever the right product was found.The Tokugawa were prompted to make serious reforms by embarrassments  caused by young Pellew and the Russian under Rezanhov.The Vietnam story of Gia Long and Bishop Pigneau is probably the most interesting.Oman and Muscat reinforce the idea of the struggle between imperialism and the pursuit of profits for the East India company.  imperialism is expensive.  The company lost money, and doubled its debt during one of the periods we are discussing.  

Asian stocks, off to their best-ever start to a year, took a breather Wednesday with Japanese equities slipping amid rising tensions with China. Also, President Donald Trump said Venezuela would relinquish as much as 50 million barrels of oil to the US, declaring it would be sold with the proceeds benefitting both countries. For more on the market action, we turn to Garfield Reynolds, Bloomberg's Team Leader for Markets Live Asia. And, we go to Las Vegas next, where the Consumer Electronics Show is underway. And Bloomberg had a chance to catch up with Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, Siemans AG CEO Roland Busch, and Advanced Micro Devices CEO Lisa Su. They all spoke to Bloomberg's Ed Ludlow. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

China announced on Tuesday an immediate ban on exporting dual-use items to Japan, in response to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's erroneous remarks hinting at the possibility of military intervention in the Taiwan Strait.中国于周二宣布，立即禁止向日本出口军民两用物品，以此回应日本首相高市早苗有关暗示可能军事干预台湾海峡的错误言论。These remarks "constitute gross interference in China's internal affairs, seriously violate the one-China principle, and are extremely egregious in both nature and impact", a spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce said on Tuesday.商务部发言人于周二表示，上述言论 “严重干涉中国内政，严重违反一个中国原则，性质恶劣、影响极坏”。In order to safeguard national security and interests, as well as fulfill international nonproliferation obligations, China decided to strengthen control over dual-use item exports to Japan, the ministry said in its first announcement of the year.商务部在其本年度首份公告中指出，为维护国家安全和利益，履行防扩散国际义务，中国决定加强对向日本出口军民两用物品的管控。Dual-use items refer to products, software and technologies that have legitimate civilian uses, but can also be adapted for military purposes, such as the development of weapons of mass destruction or the enhancement of conventional military capabilities. The list covers items from chemicals and drones to high-tech computers and software.军民两用物品是指既有合法民用用途，又可被改造用于军事目的的产品、软件和技术，例如可用于大规模杀伤性武器研发或提升常规军事能力的相关物品。该清单涵盖的品类从化学品、无人机，到高科技计算机及软件等。The country prohibits the export of all dual-use items to Japanese military users, for Japan's military use, and for any other end-users and end-use purposes that help enhance Japan's military capabilities, according to the announcement.公告明确，中国禁止向日本军事用户出口任何军民两用物品，禁止任何军民两用物品用于日本军事用途，同时禁止向其他任何有助于提升日本军事能力的最终用户出口，或用于此类最终用途。Stringent export controls and licensing requirements for dual-use items represent an established international norm.对军民两用物品实施严格的出口管制及许可要求，是一项公认的国际准则。The United States' Export Control Reform Act and the European Union's Dual-Use Regulation, for instance, mandate that the export of sensitive technologies or materials, including those with potential military applications, must be subject to proper licensing and authorization procedures.例如，美国《出口管制改革法案》和欧盟《军民两用物品条例》均规定，敏感技术或物资（包括具有潜在军事应用价值的相关品类）的出口，必须经过规范的许可和审批程序。China is also considering tightening export permit reviews for certain rare earth-related items to Japan, due to Takaichi's recent erroneous remarks on Taiwan and her continued refusal to retract them, a source familiar with the matter told China Daily on Tuesday.一位知情人士于周二向《中国日报》透露，鉴于高市早苗近期就台湾问题发表错误言论且拒不收回，中国正考虑收紧部分稀土相关物品对日本的出口许可审核。On April 4 last year, the Ministry of Commerce, along with the General Administration of Customs, issued an announcement on export control measures for seven categories of medium and heavy rare earth-related items — samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium.去年 4 月 4 日，商务部会同海关总署发布公告，对钐、钆、铽、镝、镥、钪、钇等七类中重稀土相关物品实施出口管制措施。According to Tokyo-headquartered Nomura Research Institute, heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium, used for electric vehicle motors in Japan, are almost 100 percent sourced from China. Any restrictions on those supplies would pose significant challenges to the Japanese economy.总部位于东京的野村综合研究所指出，日本电动汽车电机所使用的镝、铽等重稀土，几乎 100% 依赖从中国进口。此类稀土供应若受限，将对日本经济构成重大挑战。The institute estimates that if China's restrictions on rare earth exports to Japan were to last for three months, it would result in losses of about 660 billion yen ($4.2 billion), reducing nominal and real GDP by 0.11 percent annually. If the restrictions continued for a year, losses could reach about 2.6 trillion yen, leading to a 0.43 percent decline in both nominal and real GDP as noted by the institute.该研究所测算，若中国对日本的稀土出口限制持续三个月，日本将遭受约 6600 亿日元（折合 42 亿美元）的损失，其名义国内生产总值和实际国内生产总值年均降幅将达 0.11%；若限制持续一年，损失规模或将达到约 2.6 万亿日元，导致日本名义和实际国内生产总值均下降 0.43%。Beijing has sent Tokyo a clear message that it cannot expect to continue benefiting from China's vast market and resources while challenging China's core interests, said Chen Wenling, former chief economist at the China Center for International Economic Exchanges.中国国际经济交流中心前首席经济学家陈文玲表示，中方已向日方发出明确信号：日方不能指望在挑战中国核心利益的同时，还能持续从中国广阔的市场和丰富的资源中获益。"The one-China principle and noninterference in China's internal affairs form an unbreachable prerequisite for China-Japan cooperation,"Chen said.陈文玲强调：“一个中国原则和不干涉中国内政，是中日开展合作不可逾越的前提。”Tetsuro Homma, executive vice-president of Panasonic, said that China is not only a consumer market or a manufacturing powerhouse, but also an innovation and engineering hub.松下电器常务副社长本间哲朗表示，中国不仅是一个消费市场和制造业大国，更是一个创新和工程技术中心。"For Japanese companies, strengthening collaboration with Chinese supply chain partners is crucial. It enables us to deliver quality products to global consumers at more competitive prices,"Homma said.本间哲朗称：“对于日本企业而言，加强与中国供应链合作伙伴的协作至关重要。这能让我们以更具竞争力的价格，向全球消费者提供优质产品。”dual-use /ˌdjuːəl ˈjuːs/ adj. 军民两用的nonproliferation /ˌnɒnprəˌlɪfəˈreɪʃn/ n. 防扩散；不扩散rare earth /ˌreə ˈɜːθ/ n. 稀土prerequisite /ˌpriːˈrekwəzɪt/ n. 前提；先决条件

Santa Barbara City Councilman Oscar Gutierrez chats with Santa Barbara News-Press Editor Joshua Molina about why he supports a rent stabilization ordinance in Santa Barbara. He also explains why he backs the plan to build housing at Paseo Nuevo. Gutierrez recently took trips to Japan and China and shares what he learned there. Joshua Molina is.the editor of the Santa Barbara News-Press and a journalism instructor at Santa Barbara City College. He speaks with community leaders and interesting people to talk about housing, education, business, politics, culture and the most important issues of the day. Support his podcast at santabarbaratalks.com and follow him at motownjoshnews on Instagram

In this special year-end edition, hosts Ray Powell and Jim Carouso reflect on a transformative 2025 in the Indo-Pacific, examining the dramatic shift from conventional diplomacy to hard power politics under the Trump 2.0 administration. The episode provides a comprehensive review of the podcast's most impactful conversations, from national government leaders to topical experts, while analyzing the year's major geopolitical developments.Trump 2.0 and the Hard Power PivotJim and Ray discuss how the year began with U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel's appearance, marking the podcast's first sitting ambassador interview. Following President Trump's January inauguration, 2025 witnessed a fundamental reorientation of American Indo-Pacific policy away from soft power initiatives toward military deterrence and economic leverage through tariffs. They discuss how this approach disrupted established norms and international agreements, with potential Supreme Court challenges to executive power looming in 2026.China's Gray Zone and Political Warfare CampaignsGray zone and political warfare emerged as a dominant theme, with a topical episode featuring the RAND Corporation's Todd Helmus becoming the year's most downloaded audio content. The hosts recall what they learned about China's comprehensive political warfare strategy, which treats peacetime as a mere continuation of conflict through non-military means. Notable coverage included the extraordinary incident where two Chinese Coast Guard vessels collided near Scarborough Shoal, producing the year's top video episode as Beijing's propagandists struggled for four days to craft a narrative blaming the Philippines for a setback they couldn't admit to.Regional Flashpoints and ConflictsThe podcast provided critical context for unexpected conflicts, including the India-Pakistan and Thailand-Cambodia border wars. These complex, multi-generational disputes were unpacked by regional experts like Indian strategic analyst Nitin Gokhale and former Cambodian Ambassador Pou Sothirak.The Trump-Modi Relationship UnravelsWhat began as a seemingly stable partnership deteriorated rapidly in 2025, with Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin providing blunt analysis of an unexpectedly cooling U.S.-India relationship. The Trump administration's surprising pivot toward Pakistan represented a stunning reversal from Trump 1.0 policies, raising questions about Quad's future effectiveness and regional security cooperation.Transnational Crime and Human TraffickingInvestigative reporting by the Washington Post's Sue-Lin Wong exposed the exponential expansion and brutal reality of scam compounds across Myanmar, Cambodia and the Philippines, where human trafficking victims are forced into “pig-butchering” and cryptocurrency fraud operations. We also featured Washington Post reporter Rebecca Tan discussing the methamphetamine crisis fueled by Chinese precursor chemicals flowing through lawless Myanmar territories into markets across Asia.Historic Interviews and Podcast Milestones2025 brought unprecedented access, including interviews with Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro and the podcast's first head-of-state guest, Palau's President Surangel Whipps Jr. Documentary filmmaker Baby Ruth Villarama also came on to discuss Beijing's failed attempt to suppress her West Philippine Sea documentary, while North Korean defector Timothy Cho shared his harrowing escape story.​The hosts also recall the podcast's experiments with live broadcasts covering Australia's election results and China-Japan tensions.2026 OutlookMonthly listenership quadrupled in 2025, establishing the podcast as the leading Indo-Pacific affairs platform. As 2026 approaches, the hosts anticipate continued geopolitical turbulence, Supreme Court tariff decisions and evolving great power competition dynamics across the region.

Why the US is backing Japan after Chinese radars locked on to Japanese jets at the weekend. And: Belgrade is finally getting a metro – but will it arrive on time? See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Tensions between China and Japan have spiked since November 7 when Japan's newly elected prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, said in the Japanese parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be a situation threatening Japan's survival. Under Japan's 2015 security laws, that suggests Japan's self-defense forces could be activated to respond. The following day, the Chinese consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted that China had no choice but to cut off the prime minister's head. China-Japan relations have since plummeted. China's top diplomat, Wang Yi, stated that Takaichi had “crossed a red line that should not have been touched.” China has taken retaliatory actions, restricting tourism to Japan and banning imports of Japanese seafood, among other actions. Why has Beijing reacted so strongly and how far are China-Japan relations likely to deteriorate?Joining us today to discuss the latest episode in China-Japan relations is Professor Akio Takahara. Professor Takahara is a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Tokyo Woman's Christian University and an Emeritus Professor at the University of Tokyo. He is also an Honorary Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis.Timestamps:[00:00] Introduction[02:07] The State of China-Japan Relations Pre-Dispute[02:49] Beijing's Reaction and Intended Audience[05:42] Continuity in Takaichi's Stance [10:31] Why a Chinese Takeover of Taiwan is Existential to Japan [13:03] China's Signals and Restraint[16:30] Recommendations for De-escalation[19:18] Senkaku Islands Dispute in Connection to Taiwan Dispute[22:04] Beijing's Potential Claims on Okinawa[24:23] View in Japan of the US Reaction[26:36] Takaichi's Support in Japan

PREVIEW — Steve Yates (Heritage Foundation) — Beijing's "Wolf Warrior" Aggression and Regional Economic Threat. Yates analyzes Beijing's escalating "wolf warrior" diplomatic aggression directed at Japan and the broader Indo-Pacific region, characterizing this as systematic coercive pressure combining military intimidation with economic and informational warfare. Yates argues that China's blended military and civilian-sector capabilities threaten control over approximately 50% of global container shipping traffic and maritime commerce, transforming this geopolitical conflict from an internal Chinese regional matter into a pressing global economic and security crisis affecting international commerce, supply chains, and energy security. Yates warns that Beijing's coercive strategy represents a fundamental threat to rules-based international commerce and global economic stability transcending bilateral China-Japan relations.

World news in 7 minutes. Thursday 11th December 2025.Today: Argentina congress. Chile presidential polls. Brazil China space lab. Venezuela Nobel speech. Ukraine elections. Russia US nuclear treaty. Morocco building collapse. Benin Togo coup suspect. China Japan radar dispute. South Korea religious probe. UNESCO Italian cuisine.With Juliet MartinSEND7 is supported by our amazing listeners like you.Our supporters get access to the transcripts written by us every day.Our supporters get access to an English worksheet made by us once per week. Our supporters get access to our weekly news quiz made by us once per week. We give 10% of our profit to Effective Altruism charities. You can become a supporter at send7.org/supportContact us at podcast@send7.org or send an audio message at speakpipe.com/send7Please leave a rating on Apple podcasts or Spotify.We don't use AI! Every word is written and recorded by us!Since 2020, SEND7 (Simple English News Daily in 7 minutes) has been telling the most important world news stories in intermediate English. Every day, listen to the most important stories from every part of the world in slow, clear English. Whether you are an intermediate learner trying to improve your advanced, technical and business English, or if you are a native speaker who just wants to hear a summary of world news as fast as possible, join Stephen Devincenzi, Niall Moore and Juliet Martin every morning. Transcripts, worksheets and our weekly world news quiz are available for our amazing supporters at send7.org. Simple English News Daily is the perfect way to start your day, by practising your listening skills and understanding complicated stories in a simple way. It is also highly valuable for IELTS and TOEFL students. Students, teachers, TEFL teachers, and people with English as a second language, tell us that they use SEND7 because they can learn English through hard topics, but simple grammar. We believe that the best way to improve your spoken English is to immerse yourself in real-life content, such as what our podcast provides. SEND7 covers all news including politics, business, natural events and human rights. Whether it is happening in Europe, Africa, Asia, the Americas or Oceania, you will hear it on SEND7, and you will understand it.For more information visit send7.org/contact or send an email to podcast@send7.org

In this episode, geopolitical analyst Jason Baidya breaks down some of the biggest turning points that shaped our modern world. We explore what Nepalis think about geopolitics, the aftermath of World War 1 and World War 2, and how these global conflicts continue to influence our world today. Jason analyzes the Venezuela crisis, the rise of China's soft power through apps and video games, and how technological advancement has reshaped influence and global strategy. A major part of the conversation dives into the current China–Japan conflict, examining regional tensions and their global impact. We also discuss the push for de-dollarisation, the shifting dynamics of global currency power, and how nations are responding to US dominance. From the Cuban Missile Crisis to Operation Northwoods, we revisit historical moments that reveal how geopolitical strategies evolve. Jason offers a clear and grounded perspective on global power shifts, South Asian geopolitics, and the forces shaping the future. If you're interested in China's rise, global currency wars, or a deeper understanding of past and present conflicts, this conversation offers an insightful, easy-to-understand breakdown of geopolitics in today's world. GET CONNECTED WITH Jason Baidya: Facebook - https://www.facebook.com/jason.baidya.5/ Twitter - https://x.com/JasonDBaidya   SPONSOR : College partner : Model Institute of Technology Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/mitnepal/ MIT: https://mitnepal.edu.np/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/MITechCollege  

"I was at a tourism conference in Hangzhou in 2018, where Chinese companies showed how they were using AI to personalise travel for users. That's nearly eight years ago." In 2025, AI became a strategic commercial tool in all sectors, including travel and tourism. But it isn't widely understood just how effectively embedded AI already is in China's tourism sector, and how far ahead its leading players are to much of the world. On the final show of 2015, Gary welcomes back Joao Romao, Associate Professor at Yasuda Women's University in Japan, to debate the shifting Geopolitics of Travel in Asia six years after the first cases of Covid-19 were discovered in Wuhan, China. Joao is the author of Economic Geography of Tourism, which places contemporary tourism in the context of global economic, technological, societal, environmental and political challenges. We discuss the evolving AI-in-travel landscape and the multiplicity of post-Covid variables shaping travel decision making.  We analyse how Covid savaged the value of the Yen leading to a surge of inbound tourism, while making outbound travel expensive from Japan. And we dive into the implications for regional travel of icy bilateral relations between China-Japan. Plus, we look at the Middle East's investment-driven approach to tourism growth, and how this might impact South East Asian destinations in future. Meanwhile, what is the Circuit of Proximity, and why does it matter? And what did governments across Asia learn about their travel economies during the Covid shutdowns - and are those learnings are being effectively applied six years later?

Tensions deepen between Washington and Brussels as the U.S. pushes Europe to take over NATO defense by 2027. Japan accuses Chinese jets of radar lock near Okinawa. Coffee growers reconsider the maligned robusta bean. Plus, young workers turn to trade jobs to stay 'AI-proof'. Listen to Morning Bid podcast ⁠⁠here⁠⁠. Sign up for the Reuters Econ World newsletter ⁠⁠here⁠⁠.  Listen to the Reuters Econ World podcast ⁠⁠here⁠⁠. Visit the Thomson Reuters Privacy Statement for information on our privacy and data protection practices.  You may also visit megaphone.fm/adchoices to opt out of targeted advertising. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Sam Faddis is a retired CIA operations officer, published author, and national security commentator. He talks the CIA being the boogeyman, escalation in Venezuela, Cuba's involvement, why Russia can't sustain the war with Ukraine, China/Japan and much more. PLEASE SUBSCRIBE LIKE AND SHARE THIS PODCAST!!!   Watch Show Rumble- https://rumble.com/v72lwhe-are-we-starting-a-war-with-venezuela-sam-faddis.html YouTube- https://youtu.be/KJuAg8cIf5s   Follow Me X- https://x.com/CoffeeandaMike IG- https://www.instagram.com/coffeeandamike/ Facebook- https://www.facebook.com/CoffeeandaMike/ YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/@Coffeeandamike Rumble- https://rumble.com/search/all?q=coffee%20and%20a%20mike Substack- https://coffeeandamike.substack.com/ Apple Podcasts- https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/coffee-and-a-mike/id1436799008 Gab- https://gab.com/CoffeeandaMike Locals- https://coffeeandamike.locals.com/ Website- www.coffeeandamike.com Email- info@coffeeandamike.com   Support My Work Venmo- https://www.venmo.com/u/coffeeandamike Paypal- https://www.paypal.com/biz/profile/Coffeeandamike Substack- https://coffeeandamike.substack.com/ Patreon- http://patreon.com/coffeeandamike Locals- https://coffeeandamike.locals.com/ Cash App- https://cash.app/$coffeeandamike Buy Me a Coffee- https://buymeacoffee.com/coffeeandamike Bitcoin- coffeeandamike@strike.me   Mail Check or Money Order- Coffee and a Mike LLC P.O. Box 25383 Scottsdale, AZ 85255-9998   Follow Sam X- https://x.com/RealSamFaddis Substack- https://andmagazine.substack.com/   Sponsors Vaulted/Precious Metals- https://vaulted.blbvux.net/coffeeandamike McAlvany Precious Metals- https://mcalvany.com/coffeeandamike/ Independence Ark Natural Farming- https://www.independenceark.com/  

In this 56th edition of The World According to Irina Tsukerman, the bi-weekly geopolitical series on KAJ Masterclass LIVE, we break down escalating US –Venezuela tensions, the next phase of the Gaza plan, the Ukraine leadership crisis, and the China–Japan standoff reshaping Indo-Pacific strategy. Irina explains the forces driving these conflicts — from shifting war doctrines and intelligence rivalries to oil power plays and regional alignments. Viewers will walk away with a clear, fact-driven understanding of how today's flashpoints could redefine global security and the balance of power.About the guestIrina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security lawyer, geopolitical analyst, editor of The Washington Outsider, and president of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security and strategic advisory. Her writings and commentary have appeared in diverse US and international media and have been translated into over a dozen languages.Connect with Irina here:https://www.thewashingtonoutsider.com/https://www.linkedin.com/in/irina-tsukerman-4b04595/Catch up on earlier episodes in the playlist here:https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLt7IEKOM1t1tKItNEVaStzsqSChTCGmp6Watch all our global politics content here:https://rumble.com/c/kajmasterclasshttps://www.youtube.com/@kajmasterclassPolitics=========================================

In this special live pod, Ray and Jim were joined by two distinguished guests: Former Japanese Ambassador to Australia Shingo Yamagami and Bonnie Glaser, Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. Together, they unpack China's escalating diplomatic offensive against Japan following PM Sanae Takaichi's recent statements about Taiwan.​What Sparked the CrisisEp. 114 centers on Takaichi's remarks in the Japanese Diet, where she responded to a hypothetical question about a Taiwan blockade scenario. She stated that if China imposed a blockade around Taiwan and the U.S. intervened, Japan could classify the situation as an "existence-threatening situation" under its national security legislation-potentially allowing deployment of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Shingo emphasized this was not a policy change but a restatement of Japan's longstanding legal framework established a decade ago. Nevertheless, Beijing has reacted fiercely, labeling her comments an "unacceptable intervention" in China's domestic affairs.​China's Strategic CalculusBonnie explained that China's strong reaction stems from multiple factors: Xi Jinping's perceived loss of face after meeting Takaichi at the APEC summit, the 80th anniversary of WW2 amplifying anti-Japanese narratives, and concerns about Japan's military buildup in its Southwest Islands. China's broader message, she notes, is "kill the chicken to scare the monkey"-punishing Japan to deter other nations from challenging Beijing's red lines on Taiwan. China is also testing whether the United States will stand firmly behind its allies, seeking to drive wedges in the U.S.-Japan and other alliances.​The Stakes for Japan and the RegionShingo underscored Taiwan's vital strategic importance to Japan. If Taiwan falls under CCP control, the entire East China Sea would become contested territory, potentially forcing U.S. forces to retreat from Okinawa and fundamentally weakening Japan's defense posture. As former Prime Minister Abe famously stated: "A Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency." Shingo also discussed the shocking details about a Chinese consul general's social media post threatening that Takaichi's "dirty neck will be chopped off"-unprecedented diplomatic intimidation that has only strengthened Japanese public support for the new prime minister, whose approval ratings have surged into the mid-70s.​The One China Policy vs. One China PrincipleThe discussion clarifies a critical distinction often misunderstood: The U.S. "One China policy" and those of other Western nations are fundamentally different from China's "One China principle." Neither the U.S. nor Japan has ever agreed that Taiwan is part of China-they merely "acknowledged" or "understood and respected" Beijing's position. China is now aggressively pushing countries to abandon their individual policies and adopt its principle, which holds Taiwan as an "inalienable" part of China.​Looking AheadBoth guests anticipate a prolonged chill in China-Japan relations. However, Shingo noted that China's economic vulnerabilities limit its coercion options-Beijing needs Japanese investment for its struggling economy. If Takaichi maintains her popularity and secures a strong political mandate, China may eventually be forced to engage with her government, as it did with the long-serving Abe administration. Glaser warns that China sees opportunity in a perceived U.S. decline and will continue pressuring allied coalitions, making unity among democratic partners more essential than ever.​

(00:42) Na een opvallende uitspraak van de Japanse premier Takaichi over Taiwan, is China een diplomatiek tegenoffensief begonnen. Van een negatief reisadvies tot een importstop op Japanse vis, probeert China Japan onder druk te zetten. Ondertussen lijkt de Amerikaanse president Trump gevoelig te zijn voor de Chinese retoriek. Wat zegt dat alles over de toekomst van Taiwan? Hierover Casper Wits, sinoloog en japanoloog aan de Universiteit van Leiden. (16:14) Dichter aan het Front: het verhaal van Yarina Niet alleen mannen, maar ook veel vrouwen vechten aan het front in Oekraïne. Yarina Chronohuz is zo een vechter. Naast dat ze leidinggeeft aan een team soldaten die drones lanceert, is zij ook dichter. Verslaggever Michiel Driebergen ging met haar mee op een militaire missie voor de podcast “Dichter aan het front”. Presentatie: Sophie Derkzen.

Listen to the December 3rd, 2025, daily headline round-up and find all the top news that you need to know.

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On the International News Review... Saturday Mornings Show” host Glenn van Zutphen and co-host Neil Humphreys welcome Bloomberg News Editor Joanna Ossinger to unpack the headlines dominating Asia. We begin in Hong Kong, where tragedy has struck with the death toll rising to over 130 after the devastating Tai Po fire. Officials now admit fire alarms were not working properly, raising urgent questions about safety standards and accountability. Next, we turn to Thailand, where “once in 300 years” rainfall has triggered catastrophic floods across Southeast Asia. Joanna explains the scale of the disaster and its implications for climate resilience in the region. Closer to home, Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s remarks on the China-Japan spat over Taiwan have sparked a wave of online barbs and spin from Chinese netizens. We explore what this reaction reveals about regional sensitivities and Singapore’s longstanding diplomatic stance. And finally, a bizarre story from Bangkok: temple staff were stunned when a woman, believed dead, began moving inside her coffin moments before cremation.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

We talk President Lai Ching-te's proposal for a NT$1.25trillion special defense budget, the ongoing China-Japan spat over Taiwan from a Taiwan perspective and criticism of ruling handed down by the High Court in child sex images case. -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

The island’s diplomatic space may be shrinking but it wants to engage the world on its own terms. Synopsis: Every fourth Friday of the month, The Straits Times will now analyse the hottest political and trending talking points, alternating between its Malaysia and Greater China bureaus. For November, host and deputy foreign editor Albert Wai connects with Taiwan correspondent Yip Wai Yee. They discuss Taiwan’s foreign policy preoccupations and the implications of the Beijing-Tokyo spat over remarks made by Japanese leader Sanae Takaichi on cross-strait tensions. Up against an increasingly dominant China, Taiwan is adopting what it calls “integrated diplomacy” as it seeks to buttress relations with like-minded partners. At the same time, the normalisation of so-called grey-zone tactics by the mainland against the island carries risks for Taiwan’s societal resilience and its ability to respond in the event of an actual attack. All eyes are on the next round of talks between American President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the first half of 2026, as this could have far-reaching implications on Taiwan’s role on the global stage. Highlights (click/tap above): 1:49 Taipei’s “integrated diplomacy” 4:12 China-Japan spat over Taiwan 7:46 Shift in approach for cross-strait ties 10:35 What’s at stake when Trump and Xi meet in 2026 13:51 Leverage in tariff talks with the US 15:22 Grey-zone tactics 19:27 Breakthrough at European parliament 21:31 China Taipei or Chinese Taipei? Read more: https://str.sg/s4A7 Register for Asian Insider newsletter: https://str.sg/stnewsletters Host: Albert Wai (albertw@sph.com.sg) Produced and edited by: Fa’izah Sani Executive producer: Ernest Luis Follow Asian Insider Podcast on Fridays here: Channel: https://str.sg/JWa7 Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWa8 Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaX Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg SPH Awedio app: https://www.awedio.sg --- Follow more ST podcast channels: All-in-one ST Podcasts channel: https://str.sg/wvz7 Get more updates: http://str.sg/stpodcasts The Usual Place Podcast YouTube: https://str.sg/4Vwsa --- Get The Straits Times app, which has a dedicated podcast player section: The App Store: https://str.sg/icyB Google Play: https://str.sg/icyX --- #STAsianInsiderSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The island’s diplomatic space may be shrinking but it wants to engage the world on its own terms. Synopsis: Every fourth Friday of the month, The Straits Times will now analyse the hottest political and trending talking points, alternating between its Malaysia and Greater China bureaus. For November, host and deputy foreign editor Albert Wai connects with Taiwan correspondent Yip Wai Yee. They discuss Taiwan’s foreign policy preoccupations and the implications of the Beijing-Tokyo spat over remarks made by Japanese leader Sanae Takaichi on cross-strait tensions. Up against an increasingly dominant China, Taiwan is adopting what it calls “integrated diplomacy” as it seeks to buttress relations with like-minded partners. At the same time, the normalisation of so-called grey-zone tactics by the mainland against the island carries risks for Taiwan’s societal resilience and its ability to respond in the event of an actual attack. All eyes are on the next round of talks between American President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the first half of 2026, as this could have far-reaching implications on Taiwan’s role on the global stage. Highlights (click/tap above): 1:49 Taipei’s “integrated diplomacy” 4:12 China-Japan spat over Taiwan 7:46 Shift in approach for cross-strait ties 10:35 What’s at stake when Trump and Xi meet in 2026 13:51 Leverage in tariff talks with the US 15:22 Grey-zone tactics 19:27 Breakthrough at European parliament 21:31 China Taipei or Chinese Taipei? Read more: https://str.sg/s4A7 Register for Asian Insider newsletter: https://str.sg/stnewsletters Host: Albert Wai (albertw@sph.com.sg) Produced and edited by: Fa’izah Sani Executive producer: Ernest Luis Follow Asian Insider Podcast on Fridays here: Channel: https://str.sg/JWa7 Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWa8 Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaX Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg SPH Awedio app: https://www.awedio.sg --- Follow more ST podcast channels: All-in-one ST Podcasts channel: https://str.sg/wvz7 Get more updates: http://str.sg/stpodcasts The Usual Place Podcast YouTube: https://str.sg/4Vwsa --- Get The Straits Times app, which has a dedicated podcast player section: The App Store: https://str.sg/icyB Google Play: https://str.sg/icyX --- #STAsianInsiderSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Die neue japanische Premierministerin Takaichi schlägt hohe Wellen. Sie sagte Anfang November den Mitgliedern der Diet, dem japanischen Parlament, dass ein militärischer Konflikt um Taiwan als Bedrohung für die Existenz Japans angesehen werden könnte, was  „kollektive Selbstverteidigung“ ermöglichen würde. Damit könnte sich Tokio an der Seite von US-Streitkräften an militärischen Aktionen gegen China beteiligen. VonWeiterlesen

Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump held a phone call touching on the Taiwan question on Monday. That was followed by President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi holding their first phone call since the Japanese PM sparked a major diplomatic fallout with China over her remarks on Taiwan. Beijing has issued a series of strong and coordinated diplomatic responses over Takaichi's refusal to retract her Taiwan remarks, with China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi warning that Japan has "crossed a red line." How seriously has Japan miscalculated China's red lines? And what do these developments mean for regional stability and world order?

Our expert guest explains why he predicts both men will seek good vibes in 2026. Synopsis: Every third Friday of the month, The Straits Times gets its US bureau chief to analyse the hottest political and trending talking points. In this episode, US bureau chief Bhagyashree Garekar hosts her special guest - Harvard Professor Graham Allison - who tells her how he manages to read Trump right, by taking him seriously, looking at his patterns amid all his statements, and noticing the trend lines. Prof Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University where he has taught for five decades. He is a leading analyst of national security with special interests in nuclear weapons, Russia, China, and decision-making. He has also written books, including Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, published in 2017. He also had another book out earlier in 2013 - Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States and the World - which has been a bestseller in the US and abroad. Highlights (click/tap above): 2:31 How well do Trump & Xi vibe? Getting a sense of their agendas for 2026 7:34 What do Trump and Xi want from each other? 9:31 Will Trump get hawkish on China ahead of 2026 election? 13:52 Why is Trump muted on China-Japan spat over Taiwan? 18:50 Why Trump is different from any other US president 21:48 How today’s China looks at today’s America 24:43 Will China be the world’s sole superpower? Read Bhagyashree Garekar’s articles: https://str.sg/whNo Follow Bhagyashree Garekar on LinkedIn: https://str.sg/gD6E Sign up for ST’s weekly Asian Insider newsletter: https://str.sg/sfpz Host: Bhagyashree Garekar (bhagya@sph.com.sg) Produced and edited by: Fa’izah Sani Executive producer: Ernest Luis Follow Asian Insider Podcast on Fridays here: Channel: https://str.sg/JWa7 Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWa8 Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaX Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg SPH Awedio app: https://www.awedio.sg --- Follow more ST podcast channels: All-in-one ST Podcasts channel: https://str.sg/wvz7 Get more updates: http://str.sg/stpodcasts The Usual Place Podcast YouTube: https://str.sg/4Vwsa --- Get The Straits Times app, which has a dedicated podcast player section: The App Store: https://str.sg/icyB Google Play: https://str.sg/icyX --- #STAsianInsiderSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Our expert guest explains why he predicts both men will seek good vibes in 2026. Synopsis: Every third Friday of the month, The Straits Times gets its US bureau chief to analyse the hottest political and trending talking points. In this episode, US bureau chief Bhagyashree Garekar hosts her special guest - Harvard Professor Graham Allison - who tells her how he manages to read Trump right, by taking him seriously, looking at his patterns amid all his statements, and noticing the trend lines. Prof Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University where he has taught for five decades. He is a leading analyst of national security with special interests in nuclear weapons, Russia, China, and decision-making. He has also written books, including Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, published in 2017. He also had another book out earlier in 2013 - Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States and the World - which has been a bestseller in the US and abroad. Highlights (click/tap above): 2:31 How well do Trump & Xi vibe? Getting a sense of their agendas for 2026 7:34 What do Trump and Xi want from each other? 9:31 Will Trump get hawkish on China ahead of 2026 election? 13:52 Why is Trump muted on China-Japan spat over Taiwan? 18:50 Why Trump is different from any other US president 21:48 How today’s China looks at today’s America 24:43 Will China be the world’s sole superpower? Read Bhagyashree Garekar’s articles: https://str.sg/whNo Follow Bhagyashree Garekar on LinkedIn: https://str.sg/gD6E Sign up for ST’s weekly Asian Insider newsletter: https://str.sg/sfpz Host: Bhagyashree Garekar (bhagya@sph.com.sg) Produced and edited by: Fa’izah Sani Executive producer: Ernest Luis Follow Asian Insider Podcast on Fridays here: Channel: https://str.sg/JWa7 Apple Podcasts: https://str.sg/JWa8 Spotify: https://str.sg/JWaX Feedback to: podcast@sph.com.sg SPH Awedio app: https://www.awedio.sg --- Follow more ST podcast channels: All-in-one ST Podcasts channel: https://str.sg/wvz7 Get more updates: http://str.sg/stpodcasts The Usual Place Podcast YouTube: https://str.sg/4Vwsa --- Get The Straits Times app, which has a dedicated podcast player section: The App Store: https://str.sg/icyB Google Play: https://str.sg/icyX --- #STAsianInsiderSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This week, Walter and Jeremy discuss the China-Japan spat, Mohammed bin Salman's visit to the White House, China's lead in scientific paper and patent production, and the apparent rise of Orthodox Christianity among young conservative American men.

Trump wipes the slate clean of murder for Mohammed bin Salman because ‘things happen'. The Epstein files move a big step closer to being released and what it's like reporting on the ground in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Plus, the comment that sent China-Japan relations plummeting.

Japan under Sanae Takaichi is flagrantly crossing diplomatic red lines. By claiming that "a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency," she is signaling potential intervention in China's internal affairs — a blatant violation of the One-China principle and the foundation of China-Japan relations. Beijing has responded firmly, while Takaichi remains unwilling to retract her irresponsible remarks. What is Japan really up to? How badly has it misread China's resolve — and what happens next?

Asia correspondent Katie Silver spoke to Lisa Owen about the impact a diplomatic row between China and Japan is having on travel between the two nations.

Your daily news in under three minutes. At Al Jazeera Podcasts, we want to hear from you, our listeners. So, please head to https://www.aljazeera.com/survey and tell us your thoughts about this show and other Al Jazeera podcasts. It only takes a few minutes! Connect with us: @AJEPodcasts on X, Instagram, Facebook, and YouTube

This week in the markets: Investors harvest gains after a six-month rally; the UK struggles to price in Budget speculation; and Asian markets are hit by China/Japan tensions. Fidelity’s Tom Stevenson reviews the stories moving markets.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

World news in 7 minutes. Monday 17th November 2025Today : Ecuador referendum. Chile election. Mexico, Philippines protests. US tariffs cut. DRC peace deal. Ethiopia Marbug. China Japan tension. India explosion. Ukraine Russian oil targets. Europe Claudia. Spain Rubiales. Germany no auction. And sheep.SEND7 is supported by our amazing listeners like you.Our supporters get access to the transcripts and vocabulary list written by us every day.Our supporters get access to an English worksheet made by us once per week.Our supporters get access to our weekly news quiz made by us once per week.We give 10% of our profit to Effective Altruism charities. You can become a supporter at send7.org/supportContact us at podcast@send7.org or send an audio message at speakpipe.com/send7Please leave a rating on Apple podcasts or Spotify.We don't use AI! Every word is written and recorded by us!Since 2020, SEND7 (Simple English News Daily in 7 minutes) has been telling the most important world news stories in intermediate English. Every day, listen to the most important stories from every part of the world in slow, clear English. Whether you are an intermediate learner trying to improve your advanced, technical and business English, or if you are a native speaker who just wants to hear a summary of world news as fast as possible, join Stephen Devincenzi, Juliet Martin and Niall Moore every morning. Transcripts, vocabulary lists, worksheets and our weekly world news quiz are available for our amazing supporters at send7.org. Simple English News Daily is the perfect way to start your day, by practising your listening skills and understanding complicated daily news in a simple way. It is also highly valuable for IELTS and TOEFL students. Students, teachers, TEFL teachers, and people with English as a second language, tell us that they use SEND7 because they can learn English through hard topics, but simple grammar. We believe that the best way to improve your spoken English is to immerse yourself in real-life content, such as what our podcast provides. SEND7 covers all news including politics, business, natural events and human rights. Whether it is happening in Europe, Africa, Asia, the Americas or Oceania, you will hear it on SEND7, and you will understand it.Get your daily news and improve your English listening in the time it takes to make a coffee.For more information visit send7.org/contact or send an email to podcast@send7.org

Head to DRINKAG1.com/adv to get a FREE Welcome Kit with an AG1 Flavor Sampler and a bottle of Vitamin D3 plus K2, when you first subscribe!Guess it fell down... and we know why. LAST CHANCE - HAND MACHINE GHOST - LIMITED RUN! - https://thechinashow.threadless.comSupport the show here and see the Monday Exclusive show Xiaban Hou! https://www.patreon.com/advpodcastsSign up for the sticker giveaway!https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScdk5BnaNwlkH8yjt-wgUwq6xWBZIgusPRM5ifELKgPdKxLHg/viewform?usp=headerCartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember Uhttps://soundcloud.com/nocopyrightsoundsTrack : Cartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember USome Sources - Casey Jones - Professional Engineerhttps://youtu.be/OFLv9aXJPV0?si=-9K6L1pMa8nMM_g6Jeffostroff https://youtu.be/X9Q7_dyUYXw?si=RKXvgKgXLfo7lBlfColored sand in Australian schools asbestos https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0qpvq3v3xeohttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-11-11/china-banks-issue-phantom-loans-to-hit-targets-in-slow-economyHow the US overtook China as Africa's biggest foreign investorhttps://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2yl88wd3loChip restrictions are working - https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/china-us-ai-chip-restrictions-effect-275a311eChina's EV industry is imploding - https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2025/11/china-electric-cars-market/684887/China Japan relations get worsehttps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/11/12/china-japan-relations-takaichi-taiwan/Beheading threat https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/11/10/chinese-official-japan-taiwan-row/https://youtu.be/OMPbikJqhAc?si=_M-taQHKpdB--MaVhttps://mynews13.com/fl/orlando/space/2025/11/08/chinese-rocket-seen-reentering-atmosphere-from-floridaRocket Florida https://youtu.be/_mSpcnJ72Bw?si=EL0Uke1MBBO3e2HrThis video features copyrighted material used for commentary and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Allied AI Competition and Submarine Requests. Scott Harold examines the crucial role of allies Japan and South Korea in the AI competition against China. Japan is developing locally tailored AI models built on US technology for use in Southeast Asia. South Korea aims to become the third-largest AI power, offering reliable models to counter China's untrustworthy technology. Harold also discusses South Korea's surprising request for nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines to track Chinese and North Korean vessels, signaling a greater public willingness to contribute to China deterrence.

Dive into a riveting conversation with Professor Yoichiro Sato, Japan's expert on foreign and security policy. Explore the Quad's evolving role, India-Japan ties, China's maritime strategy, and the delicate balance of military and economic cooperation in Asia.00:35- About Prof Yoichiro SatoProfessor Sato is a professor at the Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University.He is an expert analyst of Foreign and Security Policy, Japan, US, Indo-Pacific.He has published more than 10 academic books and countless articles and book chapters in academic journals. 

In this week's episode of China Insider, Miles Yu reviews the Chinese Communist Party's fourth plenum, including the newly announced five-year development plan and appointment of Zhang Shengmin as the new Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission. Next, Miles covers the latest developments from the ASEAN summit in Malaysia including the US-China trade deal framework, and previews the upcoming APEC summit as President Trump plans to meet with Xi Jinping in South Korea. Finally, Miles circles back on Japan's elections for Prime Minister, and outlines the potential impact PM-elect Sanae Takaichi will have on China-Japan relations and the current Indo-Pacific landscape. China Insider is a weekly podcast project from Hudson Institute's China Center, hosted by China Center Director and Senior Fellow, Dr. Miles Yu, who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world's future.

  Last time we spoke about China's preparations for War. In December 1936, the tension in China reached a boiling point as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek was captured by his own commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on fighting communists instead of the encroaching Japanese forces, the generals sought a unified response to Japanese aggression. After being held in Xi'an, Chiang reluctantly agreed to collaborate with the Chinese Communist Party, marking a significant shift in strategy against Japan. Amidst the rising chaos, Chiang's government reviewed historical military strategies and prepared for a prolonged conflict. However, they faced challenges, including inadequate supplies and a lack of modern equipment compared to the Japanese. By 1937, China was ill-prepared for war, with Chiang later expressing regret about their military readiness. Despite these setbacks, the alliance formed with the communists laid a foundation for a united Chinese front against the brutalities of the Sino-Japanese War that would follow.   #153 Japan Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So in the last episode we talked about how China was preparing itself for war, now its time for Japan. Since Japan's invasion of North China, Japanese field armies had promoted a series of autonomous zones in northern China. Officers from the Kwantung Army, skeptical of China's capacity to modernize, believed that the vast region would inevitably fragment into regional factions. This policy effectively maintained a weak and divided China, which served Japan's to defend Manchukuo. However many Japanese military leaders frequently pointed to the threat posed by the KMT's five-year plan, initiated in 1933 with assistance from German military advisors, aimed at modernizing and expanding the national army. To counter what they perceived as a Chinese threat, the field armies advocated for a preemptive war to dismantle Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Any attempt by Tokyo to alter the military's China policy faced vigorous opposition from the Kwantung Army, which, in February 1937, pushed for intensified covert actions to expel the KMT from northern China and supported a preemptive war to secure strategic areas for future operations against the Soviet Union. At a March meeting in Tokyo, staff officers from the China Garrison and Kwantung armies insisted that any concessions to China would be a grave mistake and would likely yield only temporary outcomes. In early spring 1937, Prince Konoe Fumimaro inherited a China policy fraught with competing views, however, there was consensus that China must not distract the empire from its preparations against the USSR. The end goal was clear, but the means to achieve it remained uncertain. The cabinet's approval of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" in August 1936 indicated a need for stability as the army and navy reconfigured Japan's war machine. The challenge lay in aligning long-term strategic goals with practical short-term interests in northern China without upsetting the existing balance of power. Expanding demands propelled the army's contingency planning, which had traditionally focused on safeguarding Japanese interests and the approximately 13,000 Japanese citizens residing in the region. Tokyo typically responded to serious incidents by deploying troops from homeland garrisons to address localized emergencies and then withdrawing them. However, by the mid-1930s, the growing Soviet threat to Manchukuo rendered this doctrine obsolete. Incidents in northern China gained strategic importance as they diverted resources from the Kwantung Army's preparations against the Soviet Union. Disruptions in northern China hindered access to essential raw materials necessary for army modernization and rearmament, while hostile Chinese forces threatened the Kwantung Army's strategic left flank in the event of war with the Soviets. With these considerations in mind, the army revised its operational war plans, assuming that northern China would serve as Japan's strategic rear area for operations against the USSR. In 1911 Japan's plan for general war mandated thirteen divisions to occupy southern Manchuria, capture Beijing, and subsequently occupy Zhejiang and Fujian. Limited contingency operations in northern China required two divisions to secure rail communications from Beijing to the coast. In the weeks following the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the General Staff in Tokyo drafted plans to counter a Sino-Soviet alliance, anticipating a 2 month campaign involving 15-16 divisions, with the majority engaged against the Soviet Red Army. 2 divisions were designated to secure northern China, while smaller units would monitor the Inner Mongolian front to protect Japan's western flank in Manchuria. After further refinement, the General Staff identified three contingencies for China in early 1932: maintaining the traditional mission of safeguarding Japanese interests and citizens with a standard two-division force; ensuring a secure line of communication between the Chinese capital and the sea with the China Garrison Army, which consisted of approximately 1,700 officers and men, reinforced by one division; and, in a worst-case scenario of all-out war, deploying three divisions to reinforce the Kwantung Army, along with 7 additional divisions and 3 cavalry brigades to suppress resistance in northern China and the Shandong Peninsula, while two additional divisions secured key areas in central China. Between 1932-1936, China received less attention as the General Staff focused on the Soviet military buildup in the Far East. Anxiety, stemming from the Soviet buildup in the Far East, was a pervasive concern reflected in the draft rearmament plan submitted to the throne on May 21, 1936, as part of the national budget formulation process. The army proposed countering the Soviet threat by enhancing Japanese strategic mobility in Manchukuo through the renovation and expansion of airfields, ports, roads, and rail infrastructure, and by constructing army air force arsenals, storage depots, and medical facilities. The positioning of Japanese divisions in eastern Manchuria suggested their wartime objectives, with the Kwantung Army relying on a mobile independent mixed brigade composed of armored car and mounted cavalry units stationed in Gongzhuling, central Manchuria, as its immediate response force for contingencies in northern China. Major units were not concentrated in western Manchuria, where they would be expected to deploy before any planned invasion of northern China. Nevertheless, General Staff planners remained vigilant regarding developments in China, where the resurgence of nationalism, Communist movements advancing north of the Yellow River in February 1936, and the spread of anti-Japanese sentiments across northern China raised the specter of limited military operations escalating into full-scale warfare. China's improving military capabilities would likely hinder Japanese forces from accomplishing their objectives. For example, around Shanghai, Chinese defenses were bolstered by extensive, in-depth, and permanent fortifications. In mid-September 1936, the General Staff in Tokyo issued orders to preempt significant outbreaks in northern China by repositioning a division in Manchukuo closer to the boundary. If hostilities broke out, the China Garrison Army, supported by Kwantung Army units, would launch punitive operations against Chinese forces as necessary. Higher headquarters expected local commanders to act swiftly and decisively, employing rapid maneuvers and shock tactics to address outbreaks with minimal force. Given that no alternative responses were considered, Japanese operational planning for northern China relied on an all-or-nothing approach to force deployment, even for minor incidents. Yet, the senior leadership of the army remained deeply divided over its China policy. Influenced by Ishiwara, the General Staff wanted to avoid military actions that could lead to a full-scale war with China, focusing instead on advancing the army's extensive rearmament and modernization program. In contrast, a majority of high-ranking officers in the Army Ministry and General Staff, particularly within the 2nd Operations Section and the Kwantung Army, favored forceful action against China, believing it necessary to quell rising anti-Japanese sentiments. Drawing from past experiences, these officers anticipated that the Chinese would quickly capitulate once hostilities commenced. This lack of a unified military strategy reflected broader disagreements among the army's leadership regarding operations in China. While operational planning called for the permanent occupation of large regions in northern and central China, the General Staff aimed to contain outbreaks to maintain focus on Soviet threats. There was a clear absence of long-term operational planning; instead, the army concentrated on initial battles while relegating planning for prolonged combat operations to contingent circumstances. In summary, the Japanese army preferred to avoid military force to address Chinese issues whenever feasible but was equally unwilling to concede to Chinese demands. Since 1914, Tosui Koryo or “Principles of Command” had served as the foundational doctrine for senior Japanese army commanders and staff officers engaged in combined arms warfare at the corps and army levels. The advent of new weapons, tactics, and organizational changes during World War I compelled all major military forces to reassess their existing military doctrines across strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions. In response, Japan modified the Principles of Command to blend its traditional post-Russo-Japanese War focus on the intangible factors in battle with the newest concepts of modern total war. A revision in 1918 recognized the significance of “recent great advances in materiel” for total warfare, yet it maintained that ultimate victory in battle relied on dedication, patriotism, and selfless service. In the 1920s, the General Staff's Operations Section, led by Major General Araki Sadao, who would become the leader of the Kodoha faction, had produced the most significant and impactful revision of the Principles. A staunch anti-communist and ideologue who valued the intangible elements of combat, Araki appointed Lieutenant Colonel Obata Toshishiro and Captain Suzuki Yorimichi as the principal authors of the manual's rewrite. Obata, a Soviet expert, was strongly influenced by German General Count Alfred von Schlieffen's classic theories of a “war of annihilation,” while Suzuki, the top graduate of the thirtieth Staff College class, shared Araki's focus on “spiritual” or intangible advantages in warfare. Both men were brilliant yet arrogant, working in secrecy to create a doctrine based on what Leonard Humphreys describes as “intense spiritual training” and bayonet-led assaults to counter the opponent's material superiority.  The latest version of the Principles of Command preserved the operational concept of rapid Japanese mobile offensive operations, aiming to induce a decisive battle or “kaisen” early in the campaign. It reaffirmed the sokusen sokketsu or “rapid victory' principle of rapid warfare. Attaining these goals relied exclusively on offensive action, with the army expecting commanders at all levels to press forward, defeat enemy units, and capture key territories. The troops were indoctrinated with a spirit of aggression and trained to anticipate certain victory. The emphasis on offensive action was so pronounced that Araki eliminated terms like surrender, retreat, and defense from the manual, believing they negatively affected troop morale. This aggressive mindset also infused the Sento Koryo or “Principles of Operations”, first published in 1929 as a handbook for combined arms warfare tailored for division and regimental commanders. The manual emphasized hand-to-hand combat as the culminating stage of battle, a principle regarded as unchanging in Japanese military doctrine since 1910. Senior commanders were expected to demonstrate initiative in skillfully maneuvering their units to encircle the enemy, setting the stage for climactic assaults with cold steel. Infantry was deemed the primary maneuver force, supported by artillery. To complement rapid infantry advances, the army developed light and mobile artillery. Operationally, encirclement and night attacks were vital components of victory, and even outnumbered units were expected to aggressively envelop enemy flanks. In assaults against fortified positions, units would advance under the cover of darkness, avoiding enemy artillery fire and positioning themselves for dawn attacks that combined firepower with shock action to overwhelm enemy defenses. In encounters with opposing forces, commanders would maneuver to flank the enemy, surround their units, and destroy them. If forced onto the defensive, commanders were expected to seize opportunities for decisive counterattacks to regain the initiative. These high-level operational doctrines were distilled into tactical guidelines in the January 1928 edition of the Infantry Manual or “Hohei Soten”, which saw a provisional revision in May 1937 . Both editions opened with identical introductions emphasizing the necessity for a rapid victory through the overpowering and destruction of enemy forces. Infantry was identified as the primary arm in combined arms warfare, and soldiers were taught to rely on cold steel as fundamental to their attacking spirit. The 1928 Infantry Manual underscored the commander's role in instilling a faith in certain victory or “hissho shinnen”, drawing from the glorious traditions of Japanese military history. The 1928 infantry tactics employed an extended skirmish line with four paces between soldiers. Individual initiative in combat was generally discouraged, except under exceptional circumstances, as success relied on concentrating firepower and manpower on narrow frontages to overwhelm defenders. An infantry company would create a skirmish line featuring two light machine gun squads and four rifle squads, preparing for a bayonet-driven breakthrough of enemy defenses. For the final assault, the infantry company would line up along a 150-yard front, likely facing casualties of up to 50% while breaching the enemy's main defensive line. Historical analysis reveals the shortcomings of these tactics. During World War I, armies constructed extensive, multi-layered defenses, trenches, pillboxes, and strong points, each independent yet all covered by artillery. If assaulting infantry suffered heavy losses breaching the first line, how could they successfully prosecute their assault against multiple defense lines? The 1937 revision elaborated on new tactics to overcome entrenched Soviet defenses, drafted in anticipation of arms and equipment that were either in development or production but not yet available for deployment. This became official doctrine in 1940, but as early as summer 1937, units from the China Garrison Army were field-testing these new tactics. The provisional manual adopted combat team tactics, forming an umbrella-like skirmish formation. This involved a light machine gun team at the forefront with two ammunition bearers flanking it to the rear. Behind the machine gun team were riflemen arranged in a column formation, maintaining six paces between each. The light machine gun provided cover fire as the formation closed in on the enemy for hand-to-hand combat. Increased firepower expanded the assault front to 200 yards. The combination of wider dispersion and night movement aimed to reduce losses from enemy artillery fire while the infantry advanced through successive lines of resistance. Commanders at the platoon level were responsible for leading the final assault into enemy lines, with increased tactical responsibility shifting from platoon to squad leaders, allowing for greater initiative from junior officers and non-commissioned officers. This emphasis on broader dispersal and fluidity on the battlefield required frontline infantry to exhibit aggressiveness and initiative. Contrary to popular belief, the Japanese military did not solely rely on the bayonet or an offensive spirit during engagements with Chinese forces. They effectively employed superior firepower and modern equipment within their combined arms framework, using heavy weapons and artillery to soften enemy positions before launching infantry attacks. Without such firepower, unsupported infantry attacks would have struggled to achieve their objectives. In January 1937, the Imperial Japanese Army consisted of approximately 247,000 officers and men, organized in a structure comprising seventeen standing infantry divisions, four tank regiments, and fifty-four air squadrons equipped with a total of 549 aircraft. The China Garrison Army and the Taiwan Garrison Army each included two infantry regiments, while a separate independent mixed brigade was stationed in Manchuria. Two divisions were permanently based in Korea, with four more assigned on a rotating basis to the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo. The remainder of the forces were stationed in the Japanese home islands. A substantial pool of reservists and partially trained replacements was available to mobilize, enabling the expansion of peacetime units to their wartime strength as needed. Conscription provided the primary source of enlisted manpower for the army, though a handful of young men volunteered for active duty. For conscription purposes, Japan was divided into divisional areas, which were further subdivided into regimental districts responsible for conscription, mobilization, individual activations, and veteran affairs within their jurisdictions. Typically, conscripts served with the regiment associated with their region or prefecture. However, the Imperial Guards regiments in Tokyo selected conscripts from across the nation, as did the Seventh Infantry Division, which recruited from the sparsely populated Hokkaido area and from regular army units stationed in Korea, China, and Taiwan. Draftees from Okinawa Prefecture usually served with Kyushu-based regiments. All males reaching the age of 20 underwent an army-administered pre-induction physical examination conducted between December 1 and January 30 of the following year. This evaluation classified potential conscripts into three categories: A “suitable for active duty”, B1, and B2, while others were deemed unfit for the demands of military life. In 1935, 29.7% of those examined received A classifications, while 41.2% were graded as B1 or B2. Among the 742,422 individuals eligible for conscription in 1937, approximately 170,000 were drafted, amounting to 22.9% of the cohort; this figure had remained relatively consistent since the post-Russo-Japanese War years. Within the conscripted group, 153,000 men were classified as A and an additional 17,000 as B. Conscripts served for two years of active duty, with variations based on their military specialty and any prior civilian military training. After their discharge, they were subject to a lengthy reserve obligation. In total, 470,635 individuals fell into the B category, being otherwise fit for service but excess to the army's active personnel needs. These men were assigned to the First Replacement Pool, where they underwent around 120 days of basic military training, primarily focused on small arms usage and fundamental tactics. Regular officers and NCOs led the training in their respective regimental districts. Following their initial training, the army called these replacements and reservists to active duty annually for several days of refresher training. Army leaders regarded discipline as the cornerstone of military effectiveness. Basic training emphasized the necessity of unquestioning obedience to orders at all levels. Subsequent training focused on fieldcraft, such as utilizing terrain strategically to surprise or encircle the enemy. However, training exercises often lacked diversity due to the limited maneuver areas available in Japan, leading to predictable solutions to field problems. The training regimen was rigorous, merging strict formal discipline and regulated corporal punishment with harsh informal sanctions and unregulated violence from leaders to instill unwavering compliance to orders. As an undergrad taking a course specifically on the Pacific War, it was this variable my professor argued contributed the most to the atrocities performed by the Japanese during WW2. He often described it as a giant pecking order of abuse. The most senior commanders abused, often physically their subordinates, who abused theirs, going through the ranks to the common grunts who had no one else but civilians and the enemy to peck at so to speak. Of course there were a large number of other variables at play, but to understand that you outta join my Patreon Account over at the www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel , where I made a fan favorite episode on “why the Japanese army performed so many atrocities”. In there I basically hit a big 10 reason list, well in depth, I highly recommend it! As the concept of the “Imperial Army” and the cult of the emperor gained prominence, appeals to imperial symbols and authority bolstered this unquestioning obedience to superiors, who were seen as the conduits of the emperor's will. It was during this period that the term kogun or “imperial army” gained favor over kokugun or “national army”, reflecting a deliberate effort by military authorities to forge a direct connection between the military and the imperial throne. The 1937 Japanese infantry division was structured as a square formation, with a peacetime strength established at approximately 12,000 officers and men organized into two brigades, each comprising about 4,000 personnel, formed from two infantry regiments, about 2,000 men each. The division included a field artillery regiment, an engineer regiment, and a transport battalion as organic units. Each infantry regiment was composed of three battalions, approximately 600 men each, which contained three rifle companies, 160 men each and a weapons platoon. A rifle company consisted of three rifle platoons and one light machine gun platoon. Regiments also included infantry assault gun platoons, and battalions contained a heavy machine gun company. Upon mobilization, a fourth infantry company augmented each battalion, along with reserve fillers, nearly 5,000 personnel assigned as transport and service troops, raising the authorized wartime strength of an infantry division to over 25,000 officers and men.  Reforms implemented in 1922 reduced personnel numbers in favor of new and improved weapons and equipment. Among these advancements, the 75 mm Type 90 field artillery piece, which boasted increased range and accuracy, was integrated into the forces in 1930, along with the 105 mm Type 10 howitzer and 75 mm pack mountain artillery which could be disassembled for transport using pack animals. These became standard artillery components for divisions. The emphasis on light, mobile, and smaller-caliber field artillery enabled swift deployment during fast-moving engagements. By minimizing the size of the baggage train, infantry and artillery units could quickly set up off the march formation and maneuver around enemy flanks. Army leaders further streamlined road march formations by eliminating the fourth artillery battery from each regiment, thus sacrificing some firepower for enhanced speed and mobility. Heavier artillery pieces were still used in set-piece battles where mobility was less critical. In a typical 1936 division, the field artillery regiment, equipped with Type 90 field artillery or lighter Type 94 mountain artillery, had thirty-six guns. Training focused on quality rather than quantity, reflecting the conservative doctrine of “one-round-one-hit”. Live-fire training was infrequent due to the scarcity of artillery firing ranges in Japan. Ammunition stockpiles were inadequate for anticipated operational needs; government arsenals produced over 111,000 artillery shells in 1936, which was fewer than one-tenth of the quantities specified in wartime consumption tables. Similar industrial shortcomings also hampered advancements in motorization and armor. Motorization proved costly and relied on foreign supply, presenting challenges given the inferior road networks in Manchuria, northern China, and the Soviet Far East. Military estimates suggested a need for 250,000 trucks to fully motorize the army, a goal beyond the capabilities of the nascent Japanese automotive industry, which produced fewer than 1,000 cars annually until 1933. Japanese tanks, described as “handcrafted, beautifully polished, and hoarded” by Alvin Coox, suffered from shortages similar to heavy artillery and ammunition. The army prioritized light weighing ten tons or less and medium tanks sixteen tons or less due to the necessity of deploying armor overseas, size and weight were crucial for loading and unloading from transport ships. Smaller tanks were also more suitable for the terrains of northern China and Manchuria, as they could traverse unbridged rivers using pontoons or ferries. The Japanese industrial base, however, struggled to mass-produce tanks; by 1939, factories were producing an average of only twenty-eight tanks of all models per month. Consequently, in 1937, foot soldiers remained as reliant on animal transport for mobility as their ancestors had been during the Russo-Japanese War. Despite enjoying technological and material superiority over disorganized Chinese forces, these deficiencies in heavy artillery, armor, and vehicles would prove catastrophic against more formidable opponents. Another significant factor constraining Japanese industry's capacity to produce tanks, trucks, and artillery was the 1936 decision to expand the army's air wing and homeland air defense network. This policy diverted resources, capital, and technology away from the army's ground forces. The nascent Japanese Army Air Force or “JAAF” aimed to support ground operations through reconnaissance, bombing enemy bases, and achieving air superiority. However, direct support for ground operations was limited, and Japanese military planners did not anticipate that aerial bombardment could supplement or replace artillery bombardments. The expanded air arm's strategic mission centered on executing preemptive air strikes against Soviet air bases in the Far East to thwart potential air attacks on Japan. By the mid-1930s, the army had approximately 650 aircraft, roughly 450 of which were operational. The JAAF emphasized rigorous training that prioritized quality over quantity, producing only about 750 pilots annually up until December 1941. Basic flight skills were developed through this training, while specialized tactical instruction was deferred to newly established pilot units. According to logistics doctrine, Japanese maneuver units typically operated within a 120 to 180-mile radius of a railhead to facilitate resupply and reinforcement. A field train transport unit was responsible for moving supplies daily from the railhead to a division control point for distribution. The division established a field depot to manage the transfer of supplies from field transport to company and lower-echelon units. At the depot, transport troops would hand over supplies to a combat train that ferried ammunition, rations, and equipment directly to frontline units. Horse-drawn wagons and pack animals were the primary means of transportation. Each wartime division included a transport battalion, which varied in size from approximately 2,200 to 3,700 personnel, depending on the type of division supported. The division typically carried enough supplies for one day. Upon mobilization, the logistical framework was reinforced with the addition of an ordnance unit, a field hospital, a sanitation unit, and additional field and combat trains. The size of the transport regiment grew from around 1,500 officers and men with over 300 horses to nearly 3,500 troops and more than 2,600 animals. In the battalion, one company generally transported small-arms ammunition while two companies handled artillery shells and two others carried rations; this arrangement was flexible based on operational needs. Pack horses and dray horses were assigned to each company to carry or tow infantry assault artillery, mortars, artillery ammunition, and rations. Infantry soldiers carried minimal rations, approximately two and a half pounds, primarily rice, along with tinned condiments and salt. Consequently, the field train included a field kitchen stocked with fresh vegetables, rice or bread, soy sauce, and pickles. Each evening, a forward echelon train distributed supplies received from the field transport unit to the combat unit's bivouac area. When combat seemed imminent, a section of the transport battalion would move forward to deliver essential combat supplies, ordnance, equipment, medical supplies, directly to frontline units. These units would also handle resupply, medical evacuation, and repair of ordnance and equipment once fighting commenced.  On the evening of September 18, 1936, the fifth anniversary of the Manchurian Incident, Chinese troops from the Twenty-Ninth Army clashed with Japanese soldiers from the Seventh Company's rear-guard medical unit at Fengtai. When a Japanese officer arrived on horseback, a Chinese soldier struck his horse, prompting the Chinese troops to retreat to their barracks. Major Ichiki Kiyonao, the battalion commander, ordered an emergency assembly, surrounded the Chinese encampment, and demanded that Chinese authorities surrender the aggressors immediately. To defuse the situation, Major General Kawabe Masakazu, the brigade commander and Ichiki's superior, instructed Regimental Commander Mutaguchi to resolve the incident swiftly. Mutaguchi negotiated an agreement that required the Chinese to apologize, punish those responsible, withdraw from the vicinity of the Japanese barracks, and maintain a distance of two miles. Although Mutaguchi and Ichiki wanted to disarm the Chinese forces, they ultimately complied with Kawabe's wishes and allowed the Chinese to retain their weapons “in the spirit of Bushido.” Later, the Chinese claimed the Japanese had refrained from disarming them due to their fear of the strength and influence of the 29th Army. This insult infuriated Mutaguchi, who vowed not to make any further concessions and promised to eliminate the anti-Japanese provocateurs decisively if another incident occurred. He warned his officers against allowing an “overly tolerant attitude toward the Chinese” to undermine the prestige of the imperial army and emphasized the need for swift, decisive action to prevent such incidents in the future. Tensions were further exacerbated by large-scale Japanese field exercises conducted from late October to early November. These maneuvers, the largest ever executed by Japanese forces in China, mobilized about 6,700 active-duty and reserve troops for a series of complex battle drills, night maneuvers, and tactical field problems. During these exercises, Japanese troops were quartered in Chinese homes. Although local residents were compensated for any damage caused, the exercises nonetheless heightened tensions between the two sides. The fallout from the Suiyuan Fiasco in December 1936, coupled with a tumultuous summer and fall, led to rising anti-Japanese sentiment and prompted Tokyo to caution the Kawabe brigade against actions that might escalate the already precarious situation. In March 1937, during the annual personnel assignments, Ishiwara was promoted to major general and appointed chief of the 1st Department Operations of the General Staff. However, Army Vice Minister Umezu, a hardliner regarding China and a rival of Ishiwara, successfully maneuvered the Hayashi cabinet into approving the command choices for army and navy ministers, overriding Ishiwara's proposals. General Sugiyama Hajime, another hawk on China, replaced the terminally ill General Nakamura Kotaro as army minister shortly after Nakamura's appointment and remained in that position until June 1938. Lieutenant General Imai Kiyoshi, army vice chief of staff and an Ishiwara supporter, was also battling a terminal illness that rendered him largely ineffective during his short five-month tenure from March to August 1937. Imai was expected to play a crucial role in high command because the army chief of staff, Prince Kan'in, had been appointed in 1931 as a figurehead due to internal factions preventing agreement on a candidate. Ishiwara further complicated his conciliatory approach by selecting Colonel Muto Akira, a known hardliner who believed force was the only means to resolve the Japan-China conflict, for the vital position of chief of Operations Section within the General Staff. From Kwantung Army headquarters, Commanding General Ueda Kenkichi and his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki, advocated for a preemptive war against China to serve the Kwantung Army's interests. In contrast, the China Garrison Army, under Lieutenant General Tashiro and his chief of staff, adopted a more moderate stance, aligning with central headquarters' policy of restraint. The China Garrison Army estimated the 29th Army to consist of 15,000–16,000 troops, with its main strength centered around Peking and an additional 10,000 troops in the surrounding area. Starting in spring 1937, Japanese units began observing tactical indicators suggesting that the Chinese were preparing for war. These indicators included increased guard presence at Peking's gates in June, bolstering units near the Marco Polo Bridge to over two battalions, preparing new fighting positions, digging trenches and constructing concrete pillboxes near the Marco Polo Bridge, infiltrating agents into Japanese maneuver areas for intelligence on night tactical exercises, and heightened strictness among Chinese railroad guards evident since late June. Nevertheless, the Japanese commanders did not view China as a formidable opponent. They believed that Chinese armies would quickly disintegrate due to what they perceived as a lack of fighting spirit and ineffective leadership. By 1937, Japan's national policy was shifting away from the persistent and aggressive efforts of field armies to undermine Chinese political authority in northern China toward a more conciliatory stance. This shift resulted in increased tensions between field armies and the General Staff in Tokyo, leading to substantial fractures among senior officers regarding the “solution” to their so-called China problem. Those tensions broke the camels back that year.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese grossly underestimated their enemy and their own logistical capabilities. There was to say “too many cooks in the kitchen” of the Japanese military and competing visions ultimately were leading Japan and China into an official full blown war. Japan assumed they could bully China until it was so fragmented it would be a simple matter of grabbing the pieces it liked, that was not to be the case at all.