Podcasts about Taiwan Relations Act

Whoever is elected the next president will have to deal with the same problem: how to avoid war with China while protecting Taiwan. Chinese President Xi Jinping recently declared the need to ‘comprehensively strengthen training and preparation for war.” This is likely because China is getting ready to invade Taiwan - with one top US admiral testifying Xi Jiping is planning to invade by 2027. . Another document published by the DOD titled The Ambitious Dragon states that China will invade Taiwan by 2030. China is beefing up its military big time. Their official defense budget increased by more than 15% over the last few years to more than $220 billion. Sure, a war anywhere in the world isn't great, but why would this be such a big deal to the U.S. ? Well, we guaranteed them protection back in 1979 with The Taiwan Relations Act. In short, if China goes to war with Taiwan, it's going to war with the United States. *** Thanks for listening to Overnight Opinions, a recurring news show on topics the mainstream media isn't telling you. Here you'll get current events blended with spicy commentary directed at our elected leaders. You can check out Ladies Love Politics website to read a transcript/references of this episode at www.ladieslovepolitics.com. Be sure to follow the Ladies Love Politics channel on TikTok, Instagram, YouTube, Truth Social, Brighteon Social, Threads, and Twitter. Content also available on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Spotify, and wherever else you stream podcasts. Background Music Credit:Music: Hang for Days - Silent Partner https://youtu.be/A41A0XeU2ds

Dr. Shao-cheng (Michael) Sun is an Associate Professor at the Citadel. He is a veteran of the Taiwanese army, retiring as a full colonel.   Dr. Sun is the author of “Hedging China Threat: US-Taiwan Relations Since 1949.“ His research interests are East Asian security and politics, U.S.-China relations, and U.S. security policy in Asia. He teaches East Asian Affairs and International Politics. He explained the importance of the Taiwan Relations Act between the US and Taiwan, and the One-China Policy, which the US has supported since the Carter Administration.  Is it feasible to turn Taiwan into a relationship similar to Hong Kong's in the 1997 Agreement, which is different from the Taiwanese situation?  If there were an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait, it could radically upend the economic systems around the world, create physical devastation, plus a simulated war exercise showed the US Navy would suffer severe losses.

American investment plays a vital role in Taiwan's economy. The US ranks as Taiwan's second-largest source of foreign direct investment, and is also its second-largest trading partner. Beyond these impressive figures, the U.S. stands as Taiwan's most significant strategic ally. Following the latest edition of AmCham's annual White Paper, we talked to AmCham Chairperson Dan Silver on why U.S. businesses remain optimistic about Taiwan's growth and opportunities despite rising geopolitical tensions. 06:50 - AmCham's role in shaping the Taiwan Relations Act 16:05 - Why does AmCham publish a Taiwan White Paper each year? 26:04 - Why should Taiwanese people care about what this White Paper has to say? 33:55 - Why do most U.S. businesses remain bullish on investing in Taiwan? Host: Kwangyin Liu Guest: Dan Silver, Chairperson of AmCham in Taiwan Producers: Weiru Wang, Billy Wu ＊Read more about how AmCham Taiwan facilitated the birth of Taiwan Relations Act: https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=3336 ＊Share your thoughts: bill@cw.com.tw 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/cledx9shs004801v3cmkogc7e/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

中国中心主任余茂春分析为什么"台湾关系法"远比被中共曲解的"三个公报"重要, 以及台湾关系法45周年之际的重新评估与展望, 决定中共武力攻台的四大因素和美台军事合作的必要和需改进之处.[English]Title: Reassessing the Taiwan Relations Act 45 years later and the 4 factors impacting China's decision to invade TaiwanDescription: In this episode for Chinese-speaking listeners, China Center's director Miles Yu explains why the Taiwan Relations Act is far more important than the Three Communiques that are often misinterpreted by the CCP. He also offers a new assessment of the Taiwan Relations Act 45 years later. Moreover, Miles analyzes the 4 factors impacting the CCP's decision to invade Taiwan and why it's imperative to improve and enhance U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation.

Shane Leary joins Miles Yu to discuss the forthy-fifth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. They then turn to Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's state visit to Washington, and the resulting developments in the relationships among the United States, Japan, and the Philippines. Finally, they discuss why the Biden administration's attempts at reconciliation and cooperation with China have failed, and where US strategy vis-à-vis China is heading.  

It's been 45 years since the US made certain promises to Taiwan in the form of the Taiwan Relations Act, so what exactly has the US committed to provide? Eric Gomez discusses the strategic ambiguity of those American promises. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The landmark Taiwan Relations Act, signed into law 45 year ago today, has become the most pivotal guideline for the complex U.S.-Taiwan and U.S.-China relations. It's a cornerstone and foundational document that demonstrates America's institutional resilience and balanced approach to diplomacy. In this in-depth conversation with Shane Leary, Dr. Miles Yu, director of China Center at Hudson Institute, shares his critical analysis of the Act's legal and military protections of Taiwan, its historical context, far-reaching impact, salient limitations, and the need to revise or even redraft a new legislative act to reflect new geopolitical reality. in this in-depth conversation.

In this episode of This Week Explained, Tiana and Kervin discuss the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and Poland's decision to prioritize domestic issues. They delve into the recent conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which quickly reached a peace deal, and explore the implications of the situation. The hosts also touch on recent coups in African nations and the potential breakaway of three countries from the ECOWAS. Finally, they tackle the escalating tensions between China and Taiwan, with China sending a record number of planes towards the island this year. Tune in for insightful analysis on these major global events.----------------------Get your discount on a brand new BlendJet2 by going to our link: https://zen.ai/analytics12subscribe and follow us: https://linktr.ee/AucoinAnalyticsMilitary Influencers Conference: https://militaryinfluencer.com/---------------------Disclaimer:The views and opinions expressed on the podcast 'This Week Explained' are those of the hosts and guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization or entity. The information provided on the podcast is for general informational purposes only and should not be considered professional advice or a substitute for independent research and analysis. Each individual listener should research and identify their own opinions based on facts and logic before making any decisions based on the information provided on the podcast. The podcast hosts and guests are not responsible for any actions taken by individuals based on the information provided on the podcast.

Taiwan's status in the world has never been clear and neither has the United States' position on the issue. In this Congressional Dish, via footage from the C-SPAN archive dating back into the 1960s, we examine the history of Taiwan since World War II in order to see the dramatic shift in Taiwan policy that is happening in Congress - and in law - right now. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the show notes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd272-what-is-taiwan Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD259: CHIPS: A State Subsidization of Industry CD187: Combating China Taiwan History and Background “In Focus: Taiwan: Political and Security Issues” [IF10275]. Susan V. Lawrence and Caitlin Campbell. Updated Mar 31, 2023. Congressional Research Service. “Taiwan taps on United Nations' door, 50 years after departure.” Erin Hale. Oct 25, 2021. Aljazeera. “China must 'face reality' of Taiwan's independence: Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen.” Stacy Chen. Jan 16, 2020. ABC News. “Taiwan weighs options after diplomatic allies switch allegiance.” Randy Mulyanto. Sep 26, 2019. Aljazeera. U.S.-Taiwan Relationship Past “The Taiwan Relations Act” [Pub. L. 96–8, § 2, Apr. 10, 1979, 93 Stat. 14.] “22 U.S. Code § 3301 - Congressional findings and declaration of policy.” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Current “China moves warships after US hosts Taiwan's Tsai.” Rupert Wingfield-Hayes. Apr 6, 2023. BBC News. “Speaker Pelosi's Taiwan Visit: Implications for the Indo-Pacific.” Jude Blanchette et al. Aug 15, 2022. Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Pelosi in Taiwan: Signal or historic mistake?” Aug 4, 2022. DW News. “China threatens 'targeted military operations' as Pelosi arrives in Taiwan.” News Wires. Feb 8, 2022. France 24. “Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan would be 'ill-conceived' and 'reckless.'” Dheepthika Laurent. Feb 8, 2022. France 24. Presidential Drawdown Authority “Use of Presidential Drawdown Authority for Military Assistance for Ukraine.” Apr 19, 2023. U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. U.S. China Relationship “America, China and a Crisis of Trust.” Thomas L. Friedman. Apr 14, 2023. The New York Times. Laws H.R.7776: James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 Full Text Outline of Taiwan Provisions TITLE X - GENERAL PROVISIONS Subtitle G - Other Matters Sec. 1088: National Tabletop Exercise By the end of 2023, the Secretary of Defense is to assess the viability of our domestic critical infrastructure to identify chokepoints and the ability of our armed forces to respond to a contingency involving Taiwan, including our armed forces' ability to respond to attacks on our infrastructure. TITLE XII - MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS Subtitle E - Matters Relating to the Indo-Pacific Region Sec. 1263: Statement of Policy on Taiwan “It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the security of thepeople of Taiwan.” Fait accompli is defined as, “the resort to force by the People's Republic of China to invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.” Sec. 1264: Sense of Congress on Joint Exercises with Taiwan Congress wants the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command to carry out joint military exercises with Taiwan in “multiple warfare domains” and practice using “secure communications between the forces of the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign partners” Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in 2024. RIMPAC is a multinational maritime exercise, now the world's largest, that has happened 28 times since 1971. The last one took place in and around Hawaii and Southern California in the summer of 2022. 26 countries, including the US, participated. TITLE LV - FOREIGN AFFAIRS MATTERS Subtitle A - Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act PART 1 - IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ENHANCED DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN Sec. 5502: Modernizing Taiwan's Security Capabilities to Deter and, if necessary, Defeat Aggression by the People's Republic of China Grants: Expands the purpose of the State Department's Foreign Military Financing Program to “provide assistance including equipment, training, and other support, to build the civilian and defensive military capabilities of Taiwan” Authorizes the State Department to spend up to $100 million per year for 10 years to maintain a stockpile of munitions and other weapons (authorized by Sec. 5503). Any amounts that are not obligated and used in one year can be carried over into the next year (which essentially makes this a $1 billion authorization that expires in 2032). The stockpile money is only authorized if the State Department certifies every year that Taiwan has increased its defense spending (requirement is easily waived by the Secretary of State). Authorizes $2 billion per year for the Foreign Military Financing grants each year for the next 5 years (total $10 billion in grants). The money is expressly allowed to be used to purchase weapons and “defense services” that are “not sold by the United States Government” (= sold by the private sector). No more than 15% of the weapons for Taiwan purchased via the Foreign Military Financing Program can be purchased from within Taiwan Loans: Also authorizes the Secretary of State to directly loan Taiwan up to $2 billion. The loans must be paid back within 12 years and must include interest. The Secretary of State is also authorized to guarantee commercial loans up to$2 billion each (which can not be used to pay off other debts). Loans guaranteed by the US must be paid back in 12 years. Sec. 5504: International Military Education and Training Cooperation with Taiwan Requires the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to create a military training program with Taiwan by authorizing the Secretary of State to train Taiwan through the International Military Education and Training Program. The purposes of the training include enhancements of interoperability between the US and Taiwan and the training of “future leaders of Taiwan”. The training itself can include “full scale military exercises” and “an enduring rotational United States military presence” Sec. 5505: Additional Authorities to Support Taiwan Authorizes the President to drawdown weapons from the stocks of the Defense Department, use Defense Department services, and provide military education and training to Taiwan, the value of which will be capped at $1 billion per year The President is also given the “emergency authority” to transfer weapons and services in “immediate assistance” to Taiwan specifically valued at up to $25 million per fiscal year. Sec. 5512: Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations “The Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations.” “The increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People's Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan” “As set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained.” The US should continue to support Taiwanese defense forces by “supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support an asymmetric strategy.” Support should also include “Exchanges between defense officials and officers of the US and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act.” PART 3 - INCLUSION OF TAIWAN IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Sec. 5516: Findings “Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati, have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China” “Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health Assembly, the decision making body of the World Health Organization, as an observer annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has increasingly resisted Taiwan's participation in the WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.” “United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 does not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people at the United Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to represent the people of Taiwan.” Sec. 5518: Strategy to Support Taiwan's Meaningful Participation in International Organizations By the end of Summer 2023, the Secretary of State must create a classified strategy for getting Taiwan included in 20 international organizations. The strategy will be a response to “growing pressure from the PRC on foreign governments, international organizations, commercial actors, and civil society organizations to comply with its ‘One-China Principle' with respect to Taiwan.” PART 4 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS Sec. 5525: Sense of Congress on Expanding United States Economic Relations with Taiwan “Taiwan is now the United States 10th largest goods trading partner, 13th largest export market, 13th largest source of imports, and a key destination for United States agricultural exports.” Audio Sources Evaluating U.S.-China Policy in the Era of Strategic Competition February 9, 2023 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Witnesses: Wendy Sherman, Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State Ely Ratner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense Clips 17:40 Wendy Sherman: We remain committed to our long standing One China Policy and oppose any unilateral changes to the cross-strait status quo. Our policy has not changed. What has changed is Beijing's growing coercion. So we will keep assisting Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability. 41:30 Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL): I want to get a little broader because I think it's important to understand sort of the strategic vision behind our tactics on everything that we do. So if we go back to the late 80s, early 90s, end of the Cold War, and the gamble at the time was, if we created this international economic order, led by the US and the West, built on this global commitment to free trade, that this notion of that this trade and commerce would bind nations together via trade, via commerce and international interest and economic interest, that it would lead to more wealth and prosperity, that it would lead to democracy and freedom, basically domestic changes in many countries, and that it would ultimately ensure peace. The famous saying now seems silly, that no two countries with McDonald's have ever gone to war. That's obviously no longer the case. But the point being is that was the notion behind it. It was what the then Director General of the WTO called a "world without walls," rules-based international order. Others call it globalization. And basically, our foreign policy has been built around that, even though it's an economic theory it basically, is what we have built our foreign policy on. I think it's now fair to say that we admitted China to the World Trade Organization, Russia as well, I think it's now fair to say that while wealth certainly increased, particularly in China through its export driven economy, massive, historic, unprecedented amount of economic growth in that regard, I don't think we can say either China or Russia are more democratic. In fact, they're more autocratic. I don't think we can say that they're more peaceful. Russia has invaded Ukraine now twice, and the Chinese are conducting live fire drills off the coast of Taiwan. So I think it's fair to say that gamble failed. And we have now to enter -- and I think the President actually hinted at some of that in his speech the other night -- we're now entering a new era. What is that new era? What is our vision now for that world, in which not just the global international order and World Without Walls did not pacify or buy nations, but in fact, have now placed us into situations where autocracies, through a joint communique, are openly signaling that we need to reject Western visions of democracy and the like. So, before we can talk about what we're going to do, we have to understand what our strategic vision is. What is the strategic vision of this administration on what the new order of the world is? The Future of War: Is the Pentagon Prepared to Deter and Defeat America's Adversaries? February 7, 2023 House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies, and Innovation Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Chris Brose, Author Rear Admiral Upper Half Mark Montgomery (Ret.), Senior Director, Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, Foundation for Defense of Democracies Peter Singer, Strategist at New America and Managing Partner of Useful Fiction LLC Clips 1:16:30 Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery: We don't have weapons stowed in Taiwan. In the last National Defense Authorization Act you authorized up to $300 million a year to be appropriated for Taiwan-specific munitions. The appropriators, which happened about seven days later, appropriated $0. In fact, almost all of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, which you all pushed through the NDAA, ended up not being appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act that passed eight days later. 30:10 Chris Brose: Nothing you do in this Congress will make larger numbers of traditional ships, aircraft and other platforms materialized over the next several years. It is possible, however, to generate an arsenal of alternative military capabilities that could be delivered to U.S. forces in large enough quantities within the next few years to make a decisive difference. Those decisions could all be taken by this Congress. The goal would be to rapidly field what I have referred to as a "moneyball military," one that is achievable, affordable and capable of winning. Such a military would be composed not of small quantities of large, exquisite, expensive things, but rather by large quantities of smaller, lower cost, more autonomous consumable things, and most importantly, the digital means of integrating them. These kinds of alternative capabilities exist now, or could be rapidly matured and fielded in massive quantities within the window of maximum danger. You could set this in motion in the next two years. The goal would be more about defense than offense, more about countering power projection than projecting power ourselves. It would be to demonstrate that the United States, together with our allies and partners, could do to a Chinese invasion or a Chinese offensive what the Ukrainians, with our support, have thus far been able to do to their Russian invaders: degrade and deny the ability of a great power to accomplish its objectives through violence, and in so doing to prevent that future war from ever happening. After all, this is all about deterrence. All of this is possible. We have sufficient money, technology, authorities, and we still have enough time. If we are serious, if we make better decisions now, we can push this looming period of vulnerability further into the future. The Pressing Threat of the Chinese Communist Party to U.S. National Defense February 7, 2023 House Armed Services Committee Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., USN (Ret.), Former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Dr. Melanie W. Sisson, Foreign Policy Fellow, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology Clips 28:15 Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL): China is the most challenging national security threat America has faced in 30 years. If we fail to acknowledge that and take immediate action to deter it, the next 30 years could be devastating for our nation. Under President Xi, the Chinese Communist Party has nearly tripled its defense spending in the last decade alone. The PLA has gone from an obsolete force barely capable of defending its borders to a modern fighting force capable of winning regional conflicts. The CCP now controls the largest army and navy in the world, with a goal of having them fully integrated and modernized by 2027. The CCP is rapidly expanding its nuclear capability; they have doubled their number of warheads in two years. We estimated it would take them a decade to do that. We also were just informed by the DOD [that] the CCP now has more ICBM launchers than the United States. The CCP is starting to outpace us on new battlefields as well. They have leapfrogged us on hypersonic technology, they are fielding what we are still developing. They are making advances in AI and quantum computing that we struggle to keep pace with. Finally, their rapid advances in space were one of the primary motivations for us establishing a Space Force. The CCP is not building these new and advanced military capabilities for self defense. In recent years, the CCP has used its military to push out its borders, to threaten our allies in the region, and to gain footholds on new continents. In violation of international law, the CCP has built new and commandeered existing islands in the South China Sea, where it has deployed stealth fighters, bombers and missiles. It continues to intimidate and coerce Taiwan, most recently by surrounding the island with naval forces and launching endless fighter sorties across its centerline. In recent years, the CCP has also established a space tracking facility in South America to monitor U.S, satellites, as well as an overseas naval base miles from our own on the strategically vital Horn of Africa. These are just a few destabilizing actions taken by the CCP. They speak nothing of the CCPs Belt and Road debt trap diplomacy, it's illegal harvesting of personal data and intellectual property, it's ongoing human rights abuses, and its advanced espionage efforts, the latter of which came into full focus for all Americans last week when the Biden administration allowed a CCP spy balloon to traverse some of our nation's most sensitive military sites. Make no mistake, that balloon was intentionally lost as a calculated show of force. 44:15 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: Since 1979, the United States has adopted a constellation of official positions, together known as the One China policy, that allow us to acknowledge but not to accept China's perspective that there is one China and that Taiwan is part of China. Under the One China policy, the United States has developed robust unofficial relations with the government and people of Taiwan consistent with our interest in preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. US policy is guided by an interest in ensuring cross-strait disputes are resolved peacefully and in a manner that reflects the will of Taiwan's people. This has required the United States to deter Taiwan from declaring independence, and also to deter the CCP from attempting unification by force. The 40 year success of the strategy of dual deterrence rests upon the unwillingness of the United States to provide either an unconditional commitment to Taipei that it will come to its defense militarily, or an unconditional commitment to Beijing that we will not. The U.S. national security interest in the status of Taiwan remains that the CCP and the people of Taiwan resolve the island's political status peacefully. Dual deterrence therefore remains U.S. strategy, reinforced by U.S. declaratory policy which is to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by either side. 45:28 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: The modernization of the PLA has changed the regional military balance and significantly enough that the United States no longer can be confident that we would decisively defeat every type of PLA use of force in the Taiwan Strait. This fact, however, does not necessitate that the US abandon the strategy of dual deterrence and it doesn't mean that the United States should seek to reconstitute its prior degree of dominance. Posturing the U.S. military to convince the CCP that the PLA could not succeed in any and every contingency over Taiwan is infeasible in the near term and likely beyond. The PLA is advances are considerable and ongoing, geography works in its favor, and history demonstrates that it's far easier to arrive at an overconfident assessment of relative capability than it is to arrive at an accurate one. Attempting to demonstrate superiority for all contingencies would require a commitment of forces that would inhibit the United States from behaving like the global power that it is with global interests to which its military must also attend. This posture, moreover, is not necessary for dual deterrence to extend its 40 year record of success. We can instead encourage the government of Taiwan to adopt a defense concept that forces the PLA into sub-optimal strategies and increases the battle damage Beijing would have to anticipate and accept. 46:45 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: U.S. military superiority in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean allows us to threaten the maritime shipping upon which China depends for access to energy, global markets, and supply chains. The inevitable damage a use of force would cause to the global economy and the imposition of sanctions and restricted access to critical inputs needed to sustain China's economic development and the quality of life of its people, moreover, would certainly compound China's losses. 1:04:50 Adm. Harry B. Harris: We're going to share the crown jewel of America's military technology, the nuclear submarine and the nuclear reactors, with another country and that's Australia. We have not done that with any other country, except for the UK, back in the late 50s, and into the 60s. So here we have the two countries with with that capability, the United States and the UK, and we're going to share that with Australia. It's significant. But it's only going to going to be significant over the long term if we follow through. So it's a decade long process. You know, some people the CNO, Chief of Naval Operations, has said it could be 30 years before we see an Australian nuclear submarine underway in the Indian Ocean. I said that if we put our hearts and minds to it, and our resources to it, and by ours, I mean the United States', the UK's and Australia's, we can do this faster than that. I mean we put a man on the moon and eight years, and we developed a COVID vaccine in one year. We can do this, but we're going to have to put our shoulders to the task for Australia, which has a tremendous military. For them to have the long reach of a nuclear submarine force would be dramatic. It would help us dramatically. It would change the balance of power in the Indian Ocean, and it will make Australia a Bluewater navy. They are our key ally in that part of the world and I'm all for it. 1:32:05 Adm. Harry B. Harris: I think this issue of strategic clarity versus strategic ambiguity is critical, and we have been well served, I'll be the first to say that, by the policy of strategic ambiguity with Taiwan over the past 44 years, but I think the time for ambiguity is over. I think we have to be as clear about our intent with regard to what would happen if the PRC invades Taiwan as the PRC is clear in its intent that it's ultimately going to seize Taiwan if need. 1:41:25 Adm. Harry B. Harris: I used to talk about during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, almost every branch of the U.S. government understood that the Soviet Union was the threat. You know, I used to joke even a park ranger, Smokey Bear, would tell you that the Soviets were the bad guys. We didn't have that comprehensive unified view of the PRC. You know, State Department looked at as in negotiation, DOD look at it as a military operation, Commerce looked at it as a trading partner, and Treasury looked at it as a lender. So we didn't have this unified view across the government. But I think now we are getting to that unified view and I think the Congress has done a lot to get us in that position. 1:49:45 Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): We have the capability to block the transmission of information from the balloon back to China, don't we? Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr.: We do. Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): And in this type of an environment do you think it's probably likely that we did that? Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr.: I would only guess, but I think General van Herk said that -- Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): Well you can't see any reason why we wouldn't do that, right? U.S.-Taiwan Relations March 14, 2014 House Foreign Affairs Committee Witnesses: Kin Moy, [Former] Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State Clips 7:20 [Former] Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY): Taiwan is a flourishing multiparty democracy of over 20 million people with a vibrant free market economy. It is a leading trade partner of the United States alongside much bigger countries like Brazil and India. Over the past 60 years, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has undergone dramatic changes, but Taiwan's development into a robust and lively democracy underpins the strong U.S.-Taiwan friendship we enjoy today. 14:00 Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA): I think that it's important that we provide Taiwan the tools to defend itself, but Taiwan needs to act as well. Taiwan spends less than $11 billion on its defense, less than 1/5 per capita what we in America do, and God blessed us with the Pacific Ocean separating us from China. Taiwan has only the Taiwan Strait. On a percentage of GDP basis, Taiwan spends roughly half what we do. So we should be willing to sell them the tools and they should be willing to spend the money to buy those tools. 1:11:50 Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX): I think Chris Smith raised the issue of a One China policy. Does it not bother you that that exists, that there are statements that people have made, high level officials, that said they they agreed on one China policy? Does the administration not view that as a problem? Kin Moy: Our one China policy is one that has existed for several decades now. Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX): Okay. Well, I take that as a no, but let me follow up with what Jerry Connolly said. So you haven't sold submarines yet, you don't take Beijing into account. People around the world watch us. Words and actions have consequences. Would you agree that y'all would be okay with a one Russia policy when it comes to Crimea and the Ukraine? Is that akin to the same kind of ideology? Kin Moy: Well, I can't speak to those issues. But again, we are obligated to provide those defense materials and services to Taiwan and we have been through several administrations, I think very vigilant in terms of providing that. U.S.-China Relations May 15, 2008 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Witnesses: Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations Harry Harding, Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University, 1995-2009 Clips 1:46:42 Richard N. Haass: The bottom line is China is not yet a military competitor, much less a military peer. Interestingly, I think Chinese leaders understand this. And they understand just how much their country requires decades of external stability so that they can continue to focus their energies and their attention on economic growth and political evolution. China is an emerging country, but in no way is it a revolutionary threat to world order as we know it. 1:47:20 Richard N. Haass: We alone cannot bring about a successful us Chinese relationship. What the Chinese do and say will count just as much. They will need to begin to exercise restraint and patience on Taiwan. There can be no shortcuts, no use of force. We, at the same time, must meet our obligations to assist Taiwan with its defense. We can also help by discouraging statements and actions by Taiwan's leaders that would be viewed as provocative or worse. 2:03:47 Harry Harding: Now with the support and encouragement of the United States, China has now become a member of virtually all the international regimes for which it is qualified. And therefore the process of integration is basically over, not entirely, but it's largely completed. And so the issue, as Bob Zoellick rightly suggested, is no longer securing China's membership, but encouraging it to be something more, what he called a "responsible stakeholder." So this means not only honoring the rules and norms of the system, but also enforcing them when others violate them, and assisting those who wish to join the system but who lack the capacity to do so. It means, in other words, not simply passive membership, but active participation. It means accepting the burdens and responsibilities of being a major power with a stake in international peace and stability, rather than simply being a free rider on the efforts of others. Now, China's reacted to the concept of responsible stakeholding with some ambivalence. On the one hand, it appreciates that the United States is thereby seeking a positive relationship with China. It suggests that we can accept and even welcome the rise of Chinese power and Beijing's growing role in the world. It certainly is seen by the Chinese as preferable to the Bush administration's earlier idea that China would be a strategic competitor of the United States, as was expressed during the campaign of 2000 and in the early months of 2001. However, Beijing also perceives, largely correctly, that America's more accommodative posture as expressed in this concept is conditional. China will be expected to honor international norms and respect international organizations that it did not create and it may sometimes question. And even more worrying from Beijing's perspective is the prospect that it's the United States that is reserving the right to be the judge as to whether Chinese behavior on particular issues is sufficiently responsible or not. Taiwanese Security August 4, 1999 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Witnesses: David “Mike” M. Lampton, Founding Director, Chinese Studies Program, Nixon Center Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State Caspar W. Weinberger, Former Secretary, Department of Defense James Woolsey, Former Director, CIA Clips 9:00 Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE): Taiwan security, in my view, flows from its democratic form of government's growing economic, cultural and political contacts with the mainland and, ultimately, the United States' abiding commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. In my opinion, we should concentrate on strengthening those areas rather than spend time pre-authorizing the sales of weapon systems, some of which don't even exist yet. 20:10 Stanley Roth: There are three pillars of the [Clinton] administration's policy. First, the administration's commitment to a One China policy is unchanged. Regardless of the position of the parties, we have not changed our policy. The President has said that both publicly and privately. Second, we believe that the best means to resolve these issues is by direct dialogue between the parties themselves. We have taken every opportunity, including on my own trip to Beijing last week with Ken Lieberthal from the NSC, to urge the PRC to continue this dialogue. It strikes us that it's precisely when times are difficult that you need to dialogue, and to cancel it because of disagreements would be a mistake. China has not yet indicated whether or not these talks will continue in the Fall, as had been previously anticipated, but they put out a lot of hints suggesting that it wouldn't take place, and we are urging them to continue with this dialogue. Third point that is integral to our position. We have stressed again, at every opportunity, the importance of a peaceful resolution of this issue and the President has made that absolutely clear, as did Secretary Albright in her meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Tong in Singapore last week, as did Ken Leiberthal and I in our meetings in Beijing. But China can have no doubts about what the United States' position is, with respect to peaceful resolution of this issue. 1:29:15 Caspar Weinberger: So I don't think that we should be hampered by or felt that we are in any way bound by what is said by the communique, nor should we accept the argument that the communique sets the policy of the United States. 1:32:50 Caspar Weinberger: There are two separate states now, with a state-to-state relationship, and that the unification which was before emphasized, they repeated again in the statement of Mr. Koo, the head of their Trans- Strait Negotiating Committee, that the unification might come when China itself, the mainland, changes, but that that has not been the case and it is not now the case. 1:41:15 David “Mike” Lampton: Once both the mainland and Taiwan are in the WTO, each will have obligations to conduct its economic relations with the other according to international norms and in more efficient ways than now possible. 1:45:20 James Woolsey: The disestablishment of large, state-owned enterprises in China over the long run will bring some economic freedoms, I believe, that will quite possibly help change China and Chinese society and make it more conducive over time to political freedoms as well. But in the short run, the unemployment from the disestablishment of those enterprises can lead to substantial instability. U.S.-Taiwan Relations February 7, 1996 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Witness: Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State Clips 16:45 Winston Lord: The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 forms the basis of US policy regarding the security of Taiwan. Its premise is that an adequate defense in Taiwan is conducive to maintaining peace and security while differences remain between Taiwan and the PRC. I'm going to quote a few sections here because this is a very important statement of our policy. Section two B states, "It is the policy of the United States to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area, and of grave concern to the United States. To provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character, and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the socioeconomic system of the people on Taiwan." Section three of the TRA also provides that the "United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self defense capability." 18:00 Winston Lord: The key elements of the US policy toward the Taiwan question are expressed in the three joint communiques with the PRC as follows. The United States recognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China. The US acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan as part of China. In 1982, the US assured the PRC that it has no intention of pursuing a policy of two Chinas, or one China, one Taiwan. Within this context, the people the US will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The US has consistently held that the resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter to be worked out peacefully by the Chinese themselves. A sole and abiding concern is that any resolution be peaceful. 19:30 Winston Lord: The U.S. government made reciprocal statements concerning our intentions with respect to arms sales to Taiwan, that we did not intend to increase the quantity or quality of arms supplied, and in fact intended gradually to reduce the sales. At the time the joint communique was signed, we made it clear to all parties concerned that our tensions were premised on the PRC's continued adherence to a policy of striving for peaceful reunification with Taiwan. 21:30 Winston Lord: The basic inventory of equipment which Taiwan has or will have in its possession will, in our view, be sufficient to deter any major military action against Taiwan. While arms sales policy aims to enhance the self defense capability of Taiwan, it also seeks to reinforce stability in the region. We will not provide Taiwan with capabilities that might provoke an arms race with the PRC or other countries in the region. 21:55 Winston Lord: Decisions on the release of arms made without proper consideration of the long term impact. both on the situation in the Taiwan Strait and on the region as a whole, would be dangerous and irresponsible. If armed conflict were actually breakout in the Taiwan Strait, the impact on Taiwan, the PRC, and indeed the region, would be extremely serious. The peaceful, stable environment that has prevailed in the Taiwan Strait since the establishment of our current policy in 1979 has promoted progress and prosperity on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The benefits to Taiwan and the PRC have been obvious and I outline these in my statement. All of these achievements would be immediately put at risk in the event of conflict in the Strait. Conflict would also be costly to the United States and to our friends and allies in the region. Any confrontation between the PRC and Taiwan, however limited in scale or scope, would destabilize the military balance in East Asia and constrict the commerce and shipping, which is the economic lifeblood of the region. It would force other countries in the region to reevaluate their own defense policies, possibly fueling an arms race with unforeseeable consequences. It would seriously affect the tens of thousands of Americans who live and work in Taiwan and the PRC. Relations between the US and the PRC would suffer damage regardless of the specific action chosen by the President, in consultation with Congress. For all these reasons, we are firmly determined to maintain a balanced policy, which is best designed to avoid conflict in the area. Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)

In this Part 13 installment, in what I can tell you now, will be a 15-Part series, we look at some of the main events from 1977-1987. This was the final decade in the life of Chiang Ching-Kuo. He ended martial law and set Taiwan on the course that we all recognize today. In this episode, we'll look at the Zhongli Incident, the rise of Xu Xinliang 许信良 and a more emboldened political opposition, the normalization of relations between the US and PRC, and the subsequent Taiwan Relations Act. Other things mentioned in Part 13 include the founding of the Hsinchu Science Park and the birth of TSMC, the semiconductor company so often mentioned in the news. We'll finish off with the killing of dissident writer Henry Liu (江南) in Daly City, California. The final two episodes will focus on more recent events. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this Part 13 installment, in what I can tell you now, will be a 15-Part series, we look at some of the main events from 1977-1987. This was the final decade in the life of Chiang Ching-Kuo. He ended martial law and set Taiwan on the course that we all recognize today. In this episode, we'll look at the Zhongli Incident, the rise of Xu Xinliang 许信良 and a more emboldened political opposition, the normalization of relations between the US and PRC, and the subsequent Taiwan Relations Act. Other things mentioned in Part 13 include the founding of the Hsinchu Science Park and the birth of TSMC, the semiconductor company so often mentioned in the news. We'll finish off with the killing of dissident writer Henry Liu (江南) in Daly City, California. The final two episodes will focus on more recent events. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this Part 13 installment, in what I can tell you now, will be a 15-Part series, we look at some of the main events from 1977-1987. This was the final decade in the life of Chiang Ching-Kuo. He ended martial law and set Taiwan on the course that we all recognize today. In this episode, we'll look at the Zhongli Incident, the rise of Xu Xinliang 许信良 and a more emboldened political opposition, the normalization of relations between the US and PRC, and the subsequent Taiwan Relations Act. Other things mentioned in Part 13 include the founding of the Hsinchu Science Park and the birth of TSMC, the semiconductor company so often mentioned in the news. We'll finish off with the killing of dissident writer Henry Liu (江南) in Daly City, California. The final two episodes will focus on more recent events. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this Part 13 installment, in what I can tell you now, will be a 15-Part series, we look at some of the main events from 1977-1987. This was the final decade in the life of Chiang Ching-Kuo. He ended martial law and set Taiwan on the course that we all recognize today. In this episode, we'll look at the Zhongli Incident, the rise of Xu Xinliang 许信良 and a more emboldened political opposition, the normalization of relations between the US and PRC, and the subsequent Taiwan Relations Act. Other things mentioned in Part 13 include the founding of the Hsinchu Science Park and the birth of TSMC, the semiconductor company so often mentioned in the news. We'll finish off with the killing of dissident writer Henry Liu (江南) in Daly City, California. The final two episodes will focus on more recent events. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This week, host Elisa welcomes on Jude Blanchette, China expert at The Center for Strategic and International Studies. With a background in China's political history and the influence of the CCP, Jude unpacks China's latest political moves, how we got to the present dynamic, and what we might expect from China in the future. Beginning with Taiwan, why is the island so important to both China and the U.S.? What are China's current goals with Taiwan, and what threats does this pose to us? And looking to the West, how has Xi's relationship with Putin and China's faux neutrality towards the war in Ukraine changed the global superpower dynamic? Jude Blanchette is Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): https://www.csis.org/people/jude-blanchette References: H.R. 2479 Taiwan Relations Act: https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479 C.H.Wong, K.Zhai, J.T. Areddy. “China's Xi Jinping Takes Rare Direct Aim at U.S. in Speech.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 6 Mar. 2023: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mcTVSYfJaf6qNGueGrL6A4x0GDEUw78T/view?usp=share_link Person, and Laurie Chen. “Factbox: What Is China's New Government Restructuring Plan?” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 8 Mar. 2023: https://drive.google.com/file/d/14CDtz9Xk-oHXbg-6s1qufEzokEHNOljF/view?usp=share_link

A note from Talking Taiwan host Felicia Lin:   1979 was a crucial year for Taiwan. In January of that year the United States changed its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing and in December of that same year the Kaohsiung Incident happened. Speaking with my guest, Dr. Mark Chen, for this episode made me realize that there are many people to thank for the important work that they did back then to safeguard Taiwan and the people of Taiwan.   Dr. Mark Chen (陳唐山 ) has spent much of his life dedicated to doing advocacy work for Taiwan both in the U.S. and in Taiwan. Listeners of this podcast may recall his name being mentioned in episode 199 when I spoke with Gerrit van der Wees about the Taiwan Relations Act.   When the United States formally recognized the communist People's Republic of China and severed its diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979, Mark Chen and others reached out to U.S. congressmen and senators to express the concerns of the people of Taiwan. As a result, he and several others were invited to testify in front of the U.S Congress as the Taiwan Relations Act was being drafted. The act passed in April of 1979. Later that same year when the Kaohsiung Incident happened on December 10th Dr. Chen and overseas Taiwanese were galvanized to call for further investigation into the matter and to put international pressure on the Kuomintang government to release those charged and arrested in connection with the Kaohsiung Incident.   Dr. Chen also shared how the advocacy work being done for Taiwan at the time led to the formation of FAPA (the Formosan Association for Public Affairs) in 1982. This year marks the 40th anniversary of FAPA.   In part one of my interview with him we focus on the work he's done for Taiwan in the U.S.- which started when he was a student at the University of Oklahoma.   Dr. Chen has been the president of the Taiwanese Association of America, World Federation of Taiwanese Associations, and the Formosan Association of Public Affairs.   In part two of my interview with Mark Chen, we'll talk about his work in Taiwan as an elected official and public servant, and his current work as the chairman of the Prospect Foundation.   Here's a little preview of what we talked about in this podcast episode: How the education Dr. Chen received when Taiwan was ruled by the Japanese influenced him How the arrival of the Kuomintang in Taiwan in 1945 at the end of World War II was without the consent of the Taiwanese people and changed things overnight for the people of Taiwan How the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang government was focused on retaking China at the time and a lot of this rhetoric ended up being taught in schools The impact of the 228 massacre on the people of Taiwan How subject matter taught in schools changed under the Kuomintang How Mark and many of his peers were able to study in the U.S.  with the financial assistance of scholarships How an exit visa was needed to be able to leave Taiwan which was still under martial law at the time His involvement with Taiwanese student groups as a university student was forbidden by the Kuomintang government in Taiwan at the time Why his Taiwan passport was confiscated after sending it to the Taiwan embassy in Houston to be renewed; making him stateless When an ad about the 228 massacre that was to run to the University Oklahoma newspaper was denied publication, Dr. Chen who was a young student at the university, appealed directly to the university's president who agreed to publish the ad When the U.S. cut its official relationship with Taiwan in 1979, Taiwan was known as “Free China” under the rule of the Chiang Kai-shek government, as opposed to “Red China” which refers to the People's Republic of China How Dr. Chen and others in the Taiwanese American community worked to inform members of the U.S. Congress about the importance of the U.S. maintaining a relationship with Taiwan, and understanding the perspectives of the Taiwanese people How Dr. Chen was blacklisted for being involved with organizing Taiwanese student organizations not allowed to return to Taiwan for father's funeral How Dr. Chen, Peng Ming-min and others were invited to testify to the U.S. Congress about on behalf of the people of Taiwan that there should be freedom and democracy in Taiwan, this formed the basis for the Taiwan Relations Act On January 1, 1979 U.S. President Jimmy Carter switched the U.S.'s diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China How Dr. Chen asked the American Institute in Taiwan office in Washington D.C. to investigate the Kaohsiung Incident which happened on December 10, 1979 Dr. Chen was the chairperson of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations when he personally went to visit the chairman of Amnesty International in London to appeal of their help in calling for the release of those arrested due to the Kaohsiung Incident How Dr. Chen and others informed U.S. Senator Edward (Ted) Kennedy about the Kaohsiung Incident and what was happening in Taiwan at the time What led to FAPA (Formosan Association for Public Affairs) being established in 1982 When U.S. President Jimmy Carter officially recognized the People's Republic of China, the annual 20,000 immigration quota that the U.S. had allotted for Taiwan would switch over to China, Dr. Chen, Chai Trong-rong and others started lobbying for the immigration quota They reached out to Senator Ted Kennedy, Senator Claiborne Pell, Congressman Jim Leach and Congressman Stephen Solarz, about the immigration quota and a bill was passed that allowed the U.S. to allot Taiwan an annual immigration quota of 20,000 The success of recovering the U.S. immigration quota for Taiwan led to the idea to form FAPA (Formosan Association for Public Affairs) FAPA was modeled after AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) The first president of FAPA was Chai Trong-rong and Dr. Mark Chen was the second   Related Links: To view all related links for this article, click link below: https://talkingtaiwan.com/dr-mark-chen-advocate-for-taiwan-in-both-the-u-s-and-taiwan-ep-212/

Nu doet Joe Biden het alweer: zeggen dat Amerikaanse troepen Taiwan zullen verdedigen als China het eiland aanvalt. Dat zou oorlog met China betekenen, met een twijfelachtige internationaal-juridische onderbouwing. Sterker nog: als senator heeft Biden zich tegen Amerikaans militair ingrijpen verzet.  Dit keer kwam de opwinding door uitspraken die hij deed in een TV-interview met Sixty Minutes. Amerika houdt zich aan de overeenkomst over Taiwan, maar als China aanvalt, stuurt hij het leger. China reageerde woest – opnieuw, al raken we eraan gewend.  Hoe zit het nou precies met die Taiwan Relations Act? Daarin staat dat de VS Taiwan van wapens voorzien om zich teweer te kunnen stellen tegen dreiging vanuit China. Terwijl in de wet is opgenomen dat er geen formele diplomatieke betrekkingen zijn, luidt de tekst dat ‘in overleg met het Congres, gepaste actie' kan worden overwogen. Militair ingrijpen wordt niet genoemd.  George Bush jr. zei in 2001, ook in een TV-interview, dat hij welk middel dan ook zou inzetten om Taiwan te verdedigen dus ook de krijgsmacht. Senator Joe Biden reageerde met een opinieartikel in de Washington Post, waarin hij haarfijn uiteenzette dat de Taiwan Wet niet kan worden gezien als een vrijbrief voor het sturen van troepen.  De kronkel in het verhaal is de erkenning van het ‘één-land'-beginsel', dat stelt dat China en Taiwan bij elkaar horen. Het is en blijft moeilijk te begrijpen dat de westerse landen, die allemaal zeggen zich druk te maken over Taiwan, China niet de diplomatieke middelvinger geven door het eiland als onafhankelijke staat te erkennen. Nu spreekt Biden met dubbele tong. Tegen China: Taiwan en China zijn één. Tegen Taiwan: als dat andere deel van het land jullie aanvalt, sturen wij de cavalerie.  Het doel is om China te weerhouden van het inlijven van Taiwan. Zinloos, want dat China de dolende provincie, zoals ze Taiwan noemen, met rust zal laten is uitgesloten. Voortdurend wordt de vraag gesteld wanneer de inlijving komt. Een betere vraag is hoe de inlijving wordt uitgevoerd. Niet door een invasie, al is het alleen al omdat ook China aan Oekraïne ziet hoe lastig dat is. Maar wel met een blokkade van het luchtverkeer en de wateren rondom het eiland. Amerika stuurt dan ongetwijfeld vliegdekschepen. Maar komen die echt in actie? Het is ijdele hoop om daarop te rekenen. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

US President Joe Biden has again said the US would defend Taiwan in the event of an attack by China. Asked in a CBS interview if US troops would defend the island, Mr Biden said: "Yes, if in fact, there was an unprecedented attack." The remarks prompted the White House to clarify that the official US policy - which doesn't commit to military action on Taiwan - had not changed. Beijing said it "deplores and firmly opposes" Mr Biden's pledge of action. The foreign ministry said it had lodged "stern representations" with Washington over the remarks, broadcast in a CBS 60 Minutes interview on Sunday. Taiwan is a self-ruled island off the coast of eastern China that Beijing claims as part of its territory. Washington has always walked a diplomatic tightrope over the issue. On the one hand it adheres to the One China policy, a cornerstone of its relationship with Beijing. Under this policy, the US acknowledges that there is only one Chinese government, and has formal ties with Beijing rather than Taiwan. But it also maintains close relations with Taiwan and sells arms to it under the Taiwan Relations Act, which states that the US must provide the island with the means to defend itself.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

US President Joe Biden has again said the US would defend Taiwan in the event of an attack by China. Asked in a CBS interview if US troops would defend the island, Mr Biden said: "Yes, if in fact, there was an unprecedented attack." The remarks prompted the White House to clarify that the official US policy - which doesn't commit to military action on Taiwan - had not changed. Beijing said it "deplores and firmly opposes" Mr Biden's pledge of action. The foreign ministry said it had lodged "stern representations" with Washington over the remarks, broadcast in a CBS 60 Minutes interview on Sunday. Taiwan is a self-ruled island off the coast of eastern China that Beijing claims as part of its territory. Washington has always walked a diplomatic tightrope over the issue. On the one hand it adheres to the One China policy, a cornerstone of its relationship with Beijing. Under this policy, the US acknowledges that there is only one Chinese government, and has formal ties with Beijing rather than Taiwan. But it also maintains close relations with Taiwan and sells arms to it under the Taiwan Relations Act, which states that the US must provide the island with the means to defend itself.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

We chat about one of Jesus' parables. In it Jesus tells the story of an estate manager who was fired by the owner. He was accused of wasting the owner's money. Facing unemployment and bankruptcy, he cuts deals with the folk that owe his boss money. His boss finds out about his trickery. So what does he do? He praises him! Whhaattt! We also chat about The Taiwan Relations Act and also football.

หมายเหตุประเพทไทยสัปดาห์นี้ ต่อศักดิ์ จินดาสุขศรี และปองขวัญ สวัสดิภักดิ์ ทำความเข้าใจกรณีแนนซี เพโลซี ประธานสภาผู้แทนราษฎรสหรัฐอเมริกาเยือนไต้หวันเมื่อต้นเดือนสิงหาคมที่่ผ่านมา นำมาสู่ความไม่พอใจและการเผชิญหน้าทางทหารของจีนปักกิ่ง ทั้งนี้เพโลซีซึ่งมีบทบาทสนับสนุนขบวนการเรียกร้องประชาธิปไตยจีนในอดีต ได้แสดงทัศนะไว้ใน Washington Post ถึงจุดประสงค์การเยือนไต้หวันว่า หนึ่ง สหรัฐอเมริกาต้องส่งสัญญาณปกป้องไต้หวัน และเป็นไปตามกฎหมาย Taiwan Relations Act (1979) และสอง สหรัฐอเมริกาสนับสนุนพาร์ทเนอร์ที่เป็นประชาธิปไตยที่กำลังเผชิญภัยคุกคามจากระบอบอำนาจนิยม นอกจากนี้ยังมีสาเหตุอื่นประกอบด้วยรวมทั้งเรื่อง Semiconductor ซึ่งเป็นอุตสาหกรรมเชิงยุทธศาสตร์ที่สำคัญกับสหรัฐอเมริกาทั้งในด้านเศรษฐกิจและความมั่นคง #หมายเหตุประเพทไทย #taiwanstrait #nancypelosi

Some 43 years ago, the United States Congress overwhelmingly passed — and President Jimmy Carter signed into law — the Taiwan Relations Act, one of the most important pillars of U.S. foreign policy in the Asia Pacific. The Taiwan Relations Act set out America's commitment to a democratic Taiwan, providing the framework for an economic and diplomatic relationship that would quickly flourish into a key partnership. It fostered a deep friendship rooted in shared interests and values: self-determination and self-government, democracy and freedom, human dignity and human rights. And it made a solemn vow by the United States to support the defense of Taiwan: “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means … a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Today, America must remember that vow. We must stand by Taiwan, which is an island of resilience. Taiwan is a leader in governance: currently, in addressing the covid-19 pandemic and championing environmental conservation and climate action. It is a leader in peace, security and economic dynamism: with an entrepreneurial spirit, culture of innovation and technological prowess that are envies of the world.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Some 43 years ago, the United States Congress overwhelmingly passed — and President Jimmy Carter signed into law — the Taiwan Relations Act, one of the most important pillars of U.S. foreign policy in the Asia Pacific. The Taiwan Relations Act set out America's commitment to a democratic Taiwan, providing the framework for an economic and diplomatic relationship that would quickly flourish into a key partnership. It fostered a deep friendship rooted in shared interests and values: self-determination and self-government, democracy and freedom, human dignity and human rights. And it made a solemn vow by the United States to support the defense of Taiwan: “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means … a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Today, America must remember that vow. We must stand by Taiwan, which is an island of resilience. Taiwan is a leader in governance: currently, in addressing the covid-19 pandemic and championing environmental conservation and climate action. It is a leader in peace, security and economic dynamism: with an entrepreneurial spirit, culture of innovation and technological prowess that are envies of the world.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

A note from Talking Taiwan host Felicia Lin:   In June I spoke with Gerrit van der Wees about an article that he wrote about U.S. President Biden's remarks about Taiwan when he was in Tokyo in May.   Just last week, Gerrit wrote a very timely article about the controversy over the U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi's plans to visit Taiwan.  In April Pelosi had planned to visit Taiwan as part of a tour to the Indo Pacific region but had to cancel because she contracted COVID-19.   Last week Pelosi left with a delegation for Asia, but made no mention of visiting Taiwan. There had been speculation that the Chinese would attack if U.S. fighter jets escorted Pelosi's plane into Taiwan, and in a phone conversation with U.S. president Joe Biden, Chinese president Xi Jinping warned Biden against “playing with fire” over Taiwan.   In his piece for the Taipei Times, Gerrit stated that it is essential that Pelosi stands her ground and pushes through with her plan to visit Taiwan. We'll share Gerrit's Taipei Times article and a few others about this situation on our website for this episode.   In my interview with Gerrit I asked him to explain in detail what the Taiwan Relations Act is, and what it tells us about the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan. We also talked about the so-called U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity, how his work on the Taiwan Communique evolved from 1980 to 2016, and his thoughts on the war in Ukraine, and how it relates to China and Taiwan.   About Gerrit van der Wees   Gerrit van der Wees is a former Dutch diplomat. From 1980 through 2016, he served as chief-editor of “Taiwan Communiqué.” Also, from 2005 through 2016 he was liaison for the Senate and the State Department at FAPA-HQ.  He currently teaches the History of Taiwan at George Mason University and Current issues in East Asia at George Washington University's Elliott School for International Affairs.   This episode of Talking Taiwan has been sponsored by NATWA, the North America Taiwanese Women's Association.   NATWA was founded in 1988, and its mission is:   to evoke a sense of self-esteem and enhance women's dignity, to oppose gender discrimination and promote gender equality, to fully develop women's potential and encourage their participation in public affairs, to contribute to the advancement of human rights and democratic development in Taiwan, to reach out and work with women's organizations worldwide to promote peace for all.   To learn more about NATWA visit their website: www.natwa.com     Here's a little preview of what we talked about in this podcast episode:   U.S. President Joe Biden's remarks on the U.S.'s willingness to help defend Taiwan The Taiwan Relations Act, the document that contains US commitments to (help) defend Taiwan, and its first two clauses How U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken referred to the second clause of the Taiwan Relations Act in a speech he made at the end of May What the second clause of the Taiwan Relations Act says and means The background of the Taiwan Relations Act How Harvey Feldman of the East Asia Pacific desk of the U.S. State Department was involved in initially drafting the Taiwan Policy Act How in 1979 the U.S. Congress started drafting the Taiwan Relations Act which had security clauses and a human rights clause embedded within it How Senator Ted Kennedy, Senator Claiborne Pell, and Congressman Jim Leach were instrumental in drafting the Taiwan Relations Act and getting it passed in April 1979 The establishment of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) in January 1979 Mark Chen's (陳唐山) work with Senators and Congressmen to ensure that the Taiwan Relations Act took into consideration the native Taiwanese perspective The Taiwan Communique and why it was established How news from and about Taiwan while under martial law was obtained, communicated and printed in the Taiwan Communique How dangwai (outside party) magazines: Měilì dǎo aka Formosa Magazine (美麗島) and Bāshí niándài aka 1980s (8十年代) were sources of information for the Taiwan Communique How the George Washington University library has a complete collection of dangwai magazines from Taiwan The censorship of postal mail that was received in and sent out from Taiwan during the martial law era After the Taiwan democratized in the early 1990s the focus of the Taiwan Communique shifted to working to gain more international recognition for Taiwan What the “One China Policy” means from the perspective of the U.S. and China How the “One China Policy” which was based on the 1970s, a time in which Beijing and Taipei that claimed to be the government of China How things have changed since the 1970s, which requires an adjustment in policy to reflect current times What makes the Taiwan Relations Act so unique How Taiwan meets all the requirements of a nation state according to the Montevideo Convention of 1933 How Montevideo Convention states that the existence of an independent state does not depend on the recognition of other states When the United States of America declared independence in 1776 there were no other countries that recognized the new government in Washington D.C. for two years For the first 25 years of the United States of America it was only recognized by seven countries The Taiwan Travel Act Why the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan is not a policy How the term “strategic ambiguity” dates back to the mid-1990s Robert Suettinger's 2003 book, Beyond Tiananmen Gerrit's thoughts on the war in Ukraine and what China is taking away from the situation Gerrit's observations on how the war in Ukraine has impacted the people of Taiwan Things that Taiwan need to reconsider about its military strategy   Related Links: To view all related links for this article, click link below: https://talkingtaiwan.com/gerrit-van-der-wees-the-past-and-present-state-of-u-s-taiwan-relations-ep-199/  

Highlights:     “Biden is clearly confused here and White House officials had to backtrack big time from what Biden said, simply restating their continued commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act which emphatically does not necessitate the commitment to send US troops, only aid and equipment.” “Ukrainian President Zelensky was lauded by Klaus Schwab at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos. He continued his crusade to start World War 3 by calling on the world's economic elite to hit Russia with even more sanctions and urged all World Economic Forum related firms to quit doing business entirely with Russia.”“Russia can't win in Ukraine because that will give China the green light to invade Taiwan. And so we have to send $40 billion of your money to the most corrupt nation in Europe so that China will learn that they can't invade Taiwan. Now, this is so wrong at so many levels.” “He who controls food and fuel control the world. What China is seeing and the whole world is seeing is the radical limitations inherent in the Davos and DC strategy that if you control finance, you control the world… America no longer controls the world.”“While our political elite continues to think that their mission is to bless the world with American-style democracy, particularly its woke version, more and more populations are telling them in no uncertain terms: ‘Shove it!'. We don't want it!” Timestamps:     [02:13] Biden's latest blunder and the issue with Taiwan and China[05:57] China's reaction and other people's tweets regarding Biden's statement [07:30] What Zelensky is doing with the WEF in Davos[09:00] How both Taiwan and Ukraine are interrelated[11:57] What's really going on here with our permanent political class, Ukraine, and ChinaResources:  Get your own MyPillow here. Enter my code TURLEY at checkout to get a DISCOUNT: https://www.mypillow.com/turleySupport this channel. Get Your Brand-New PATRIOT T-Shirts and Merch Here: https://store.turleytalks.com/Ep. 978 New POLL Spells DISASTER for Dems as Biden PLUMMETS to LOWEST APPROVAL EVER!!!!It's time to CHANGE AMERICA and Here's YOUR OPPORTUNITY To Do Just That! https://change.turleytalks.com/PatriotSwitch.comBecome a Turley Talks Insiders Club Member and get your first week FREE!!: https://insidersclub.turleytalks.com/welcomeFight Back Against Big Tech Censorship! Sign-up here to discover Dr. Steve's different social media options …. but without censorship! https://www.turleytalks.com/en/alternative-media.com Thank you for taking the time to listen to this episode.  If you enjoyed this episode, please subscribe and/or leave a review.Do you want to be a part of the podcast and be our sponsor? Click here to partner with us and defy liberal culture!If you would like to get lots of articles on conservative trends make sure to sign-up for the 'New Conservative Age Rising' Email Alerts. 

China on Tuesday welcomed a virtual meeting between President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden as raising hopes for better relations, while the U.S. was more muted on the talks as the world's two biggest powers sought to ratchet down more than a year of tensions.The leaders appeared to put aside the language of acrimony in their first formal meeting since Biden took office. Xi greeted the U.S. leader as his “old friend,” and Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said the exchange was candid and constructive.“If China-U.S. relations cannot return to the past, they should face the future,” Zhao said, calling the meeting “conducive to increasing positive expectations ... for U.S.-China relations.”However, both sides held firm to their positions on the issues that divide Washington and Beijing, with Xi warning that the U.S. and Taiwan are playing with fire over the self-governing island that China considers part of its territory.The two nations were aiming to end a sharp deterioration in relations that accelerated under former U.S. President Donald Trump and had festered since Biden became president in January. The video conference, which lasted more than three hours, took place Tuesday morning in Beijing and Monday evening in Washington.Both Biden and Xi seemed determined to lower the temperature in what for both sides is their most significant — and frequently turbulent — relationship on the global stage.“As I've said before, it seems to me our responsibility as leaders of China and the United States is to ensure that the competition between our countries does not veer into conflict, whether intended or unintended,” Biden told Xi at the start of the meeting.The White House set low expectations for the meeting, and no major announcements were made. Still, White House officials said the two leaders had a substantive exchange.Xi echoed Biden's cordial tone in his opening remarks, saying, “China and the United States need to increase communication and cooperation.”The positive tone sets an example for officials in both countries to try to identify common ground rather than find fault with each other, whether on trade, climate change, or geopolitical issues such as Afghanistan and North Korea, said Wang Huiyao, president of the Center for China and Globalization, a think tank in Beijing,“I see this dialogue as a stabilizer of the bilateral relation," he said. “I don't expect this one summit to bring us back to the good old days, but certainly it stops the downward spiral.”The two leaders had an extended discussion on Taiwan, the U.S. said. Tensions have heightened as China has recently dispatched a growing number of fighter jets toward the island, while the U.S. and its allies sail warships though the Taiwan Strait.Xi blamed the tensions on Taiwan seeking U.S. support to achieve independence and some on the American side using Taiwan to contain China, a Chinese statement on the meeting said.“Such moves are extremely dangerous, just like playing with fire. Whoever plays with fire will get burnt,” the statement said.White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan said Biden reminded Xi that he voted as a senator for the Taiwan Relations Act that went into effect in 1979, legislation that shapes the parameters of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.“So he understands deeply, firsthand, that the act makes clear that any effort to shape Taiwan's future by other than peaceful means is of grave concern to the United States,” said Sullivan, speaking at a webinar hosted by the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank, on Tuesday.Chinese military forces held exercises last week near Taiwan in response to a visit by a U.S. congressional delegation to the island.The White House said Biden reiterated the U.S. will abide by its longstanding “One China” policy, which recognizes Beijing as the government of China but allows informal relations and defense ties with Taipei. Biden also made clear the U.S....

A virtual meeting between the leaders of China and the United States on Tuesday comes as the two nations' ties arrive at a "key crossroads" and is a major event concerning not only bilateral ties but also international relations, the Foreign Ministry said on Monday.11月15日，外交部发言人赵立坚主持例行记者会。会上，赵立坚表示，“当前中美关系正处于关键十字路口”，此次两国领导人视频会晤“是中美关系的一件大事，也是国际关系的一件大事”。The people of China and the US, as well as the international community hope the meeting will yield results that benefit both countries and the world, said Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian.赵立坚表示：“中美两国人民和国际社会都希望会晤取得对两国和世界都有利的结果。”President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden will have a candid, in-depth and full exchange of views on strategic issues concerning the future of bilateral relations and other important issues, Zhao said.赵立坚表示：“根据双方商定，习近平主席将同拜登总统就事关中美关系未来的战略性问题以及双方共同关心、关切的重要问题坦诚、深入、充分交换意见。”The US should strengthen talks and cooperation with China, manage differences effectively, handle sensitive issues properly, discuss with China the way for the two major countries to get along while respecting each other and bring bilateral relations back to the right track of sound and steady development, Zhao said.赵立坚表示：“希望美方同中方相向而行，加强对话合作，有效管控分歧，妥处敏感问题，探讨新时期中美作为世界大国相互尊重、和平共处的相处之道，推动中美关系重回健康稳定发展的正确轨道。”The US has further complicated bilateral ties with recent actions encouraging "Taiwan independence" forces. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke recently of US "interest in peace and stability "across the Taiwan Straits and "commitments" to Taiwan.最近，美方频频鼓动“台独”势力，致使双边关系复杂化；美国国务卿布林肯也不断提及美国政府“关注台湾海峡的和平与稳定”以及对台湾的“承诺”。Zhao said that the US statements on the Taiwan question had been distorted and regressed over the past 40 years, "and deviated from the consensus it reached with China when the two countries established diplomatic ties". He added that the one-China principle and the three China-US joint communiques are important political consensus between the two countries and form the political foundation of bilateral ties.赵立坚表示：“美方40多年来在台湾问题上的表述已经走样、走味、倒退，背离了中美建交时美方与中方达成的共识。美方应该遵守的是一个中国原则和中美三个联合公报，这是中美两国的重要政治共识，也是中美关系的政治基础。”The so-called "Taiwan Relations Act" and the "Six Assurances" the US made in 1982 were "a pure concoction by some forces in the US "running counter to the three China-US joint communiques, and are "illegal and void", Zhao said.赵立坚补充称：“所谓‘与台湾关系法'也好，所谓对台‘六项保证'也罢，它们纯粹是美国内一些势力炮制出来的，都与中美三个联合公报背道而驰”，都是“非法、无效的”。The root of the current tension across the Taiwan Straits lies in the fact that the Democratic Progressive Party-led authorities and separatist forces in Taiwan have been colluding with external forces to seek "Taiwan independence", Zhao added, emphasizing that China's reunification is an unstoppable trend, and that it is the consensus of the international community to stick to the one-China principle.赵立坚表示：“一段时间以来，民进党当局和‘台独'分裂势力推行‘去中国化'，搞‘一中一台'、‘两个中国'，勾连外部势力大搞谋‘独'挑衅活动，这是台海和平稳定的最大威胁，也是当前台海局势紧张的根源。”他强调：“中国统一是不可阻挡的历史潮流，坚持一中原则是国际社会普遍共识。”"Any kind of behavior to support and embolden 'Taiwan independence' forces is interference in China's domestic affairs and goes against the peace and stability of the Straits," he said, urging the US to observe the one-China policy and the three China-US joint communiques and deal with the Taiwan question properly.赵立坚表示：“一切为‘台独'撑腰打气的行径都是对中国内政的干涉，都不利于维护台海和平与稳定。美方应恪守一个中国原则和中美三个联合公报规定，慎重妥善处理台湾问题，以免损害中美关系和台海和平稳定。”yield英 [jiːld]；美[jiːld] n.产出；产量；利润v. 催生；产出；提供；放弃；缴出distort英 [dɪˈstɔːt]；美[dɪˈstɔːrt] vt. （使）变形；（使）扭曲；失真；曲解deviate英 [ˈdiːvieɪt]；美[ˈdiːvieɪt] vi. 背离；违背；偏离concoction英 [kənˈkɒkʃn]；美[kənˈkɑːkʃn] n.混合物；调配物collude英 [kəˈluːd]；美[kəˈluːd] vi. 勾结；串通；密谋

US President Joe Biden says the United States would come to Taiwan's defence if the island were attacked by China, in comments that appeared to be a departure from a longstanding US policy of strategic ambiguity.The White House told reporters that US policy on Taiwan had not changed.A spokesperson says the US defence relationship with Taiwan is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act. A spokesperson added that they will uphold their commitment under the Act and continue to support Taiwan's self-defence.

US President Joe Biden says the United States would come to Taiwan's defence if the island were attacked by China, in comments that appeared to be a departure from a longstanding US policy of strategic ambiguity.The White House told reporters that US policy on Taiwan had not changed.A spokesperson says the US defence relationship with Taiwan is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act. A spokesperson added that they will uphold their commitment under the Act and continue to support Taiwan's self-defence.

US President Joe Biden says the United States would come to Taiwan's defence if the island were attacked by China, in comments that appeared to be a departure from a longstanding US policy of strategic ambiguity.The White House told reporters that US policy on Taiwan had not changed.A spokesperson says the US defence relationship with Taiwan is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act. A spokesperson added that they will uphold their commitment under the Act and continue to support Taiwan's self-defence.

In local news, the Watauga Democrat reports that Boone's Greenway Skatepark has begun construction. One of the organizers of the project, J. P. Pardy, owner of Recess Skate and Snow shop on 105, estimates the project will take a couple months to complete. This is exciting news for high country skaters as Watauga County has been without a skatepark since 2017. In state and national news, the Charlotte based company Bank of America has raised their minimum wage to $21 an hour for US hourly employees. The company has consistently raised their minimum wage since 2017, when their minimum was $15 an hour. Bank of America says its next step in their plan is to raise the minimum wage to $25 an hour by 2025. Chief of human resources, Sheri Bronstein, says that the company's goal is to focus on responsible growth and that requires providing a great place to work, according to the The Watauga Democrat In world news, NPR reports that tensions between Taiwan and China are worse than they've been in more than 40 years. In four days, close to 150 military jets entered Taiwan's air defense zone. No shots have been fired but the increasing harassment and threat of war raises alarms in the US due to the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 that states the US recognizes Beijing over Taipei as long as China doesn't attack the island. The agreement also states that the US sells arms to Taiwan and will help defend the island. The presidents of both countries have agreed to abide by the Taiwan agreement amid tensions. Today's weather is brought to you by booneweather.com. Expect a high of 66 with a low of 55 with morning fog and scattered showers throughout the day.

President Biden says U.S. agrees to abide by 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and the 'One China Principle'; Taiwan's Defense Minister says Taiwan-China relations at worst point in 40 years; CIA sends message to workforce about threats to informants after a string of deaths. 

A note from Talking Taiwan host Felicia Lin:   My guest on this episode of Talking Taiwan is Eric Chang, a writer for Taiwan News. On April 18th we spoke about China’s April 12th incursion into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, the largest one to date at the time. We also spoke about the longstanding military threat that China poses for Taiwan and the Asia Pacific region, what this means for Taiwan, how Taiwan has responded, the U.S.’s response and why it matters, and how the support and cooperation from neighboring countries is essential to keeping peace in the region.   Here’s a little preview of what we talked about in this podcast episode:   The difference between a country’s airspace and ADIZ (air defense identification zone) When Taiwan’s ADIZ was set up When China’s ADIZ was set up How China’s air intrusions increased during the last year of Trump’s presidency What prompted China’s April 12th incursion into Taiwan’s ADIZ U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent comments about Taiwan The Taiwan Relations Act What the median line is When Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense started to publicly report China’s incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ How many incursions there have been this year by China to Taiwan’s ADIZ The significance of Alex Azar (24th U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary) and Keith Krach’s (Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment) visits to Taiwan Taiwan’s response to China’s incursions What damage China can do to Taiwan with their fighter planes The strategy/motivation behind China’s incursions The war of attrition Gray zone tactics China’s history of military aggression aimed at Taiwan China’s reaction to Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996 How willing China is to attack Taiwan How concerned people in Taiwan are about the China’s military threat China’s increasing military aggression in the Asia region Taiwan’s defense abilities The new multimission amphibious ships that Taiwan recently launched Asymmetric warfare capabilities and how Taiwan can defend itself U.S. arms sales to Taiwan How the Biden administration has reacted to China’s April 12th incursion How Taiwan can benefit from cooperation and intelligence sharing with neighboring countries in the Asia Pacific region Good sources to learn about Taiwan’s military situation   Related Links:   Eric Chang on Twitter: https://twitter.com/ahbying   Taiwan reports largest incursion yet by Chinese air force: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-reports-largest-incursion-yet-by-chinese-air-force-2021-04-12/   25 Chinese military aircraft intrude into Taiwan’s ADIZ: https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4175573?fbclid=IwAR3m993hnw9io6q-IOayFBd2ljslUV4HgENika9nj2hshgFrPlAerfXlw_w   The Taiwan Relations Act: https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/taiwan-relations-act/   Biden sends unofficial delegation to Taiwan in ‘personal signal’: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-delegation-idUSKBN2C02MS   U.S.  President Biden and Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s April 16th meeting in Washington D.C.: https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/17/biden-and-japans-suga-project-unity-against-chinas-assertiveness.html   Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996 and China’s missile tests aimed at Taiwan: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Taiwanese_presidential_election                                                                                                                              Ian Easton – Project 2049 Institute: https://project2049.net/author/ianeaston/   U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken calls Taiwan ‘country’: https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4148761   Taiwan launches new amphibious vessel with anti-ship missiles: https://bit.ly/3no5Xa9   Taiwan’s National Ministry of Defense on Twitter: https://twitter.com/mondefense   Taiwan’s National Ministry of Defense’s real-time updates of military activity around its borders: https://bit.ly/3nnkK4U   Focus Taiwan: https://focustaiwan.tw/

The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the Coronabus both enacted laws aiming to stop China from advancing their Belt and Road economic system that may soon be able to compete with the "rules based international order", which the United States has been leading the implementation of since the end of WWII. In this episode, learn about the NDAA's most significant changes, including a new U.S. military build up in China's neighborhood: The Pacific Deterrence Initiative. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Click here to contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Click here to support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536 Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Recommended Episodes CD218: Minerals are the New Oil CD187: Combating China Bills National Defense Authorization Act for 2021 Bill Text Sec. 158: Expansion of Economic Order Quantity Contracting Authority for F-35 Aircraft Program Doubles the amount of money allowed to be spent on longer term contracts from $574 million to over $1 billion TITLE VII - ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED MATTERS Subtitle D - Industrial Base Matters Sec. 841: Additional Requirements Pertaining to Printed Circuit Boards Beginning January 1, 2023, the Defense Department will be prohibited from buying printed circuit boards that are either fully or partially manufactured in North Korea, China, Russia, or Iran. The Defense Secretary has the ability to waive these restrictions TITLE X - GENERAL PROVISIONS Subtitle E - Miscellaneous Authorities and Limitations Sec. 1052: Expenditure of Funds for Department of Defense Clandestine Activities that Support Operational Preparation of the Environment Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to spend up to $15 million from the Operations and Maintenance account "in any fiscal year for clandestine activities for any purpose the Secretary determines to be proper for preparation of the environment for operations of a confidential nature." Intelligence activities are excluded. This authority can be delegated for expenses up to $250,000. The Defense Secretary has to tell Congress about these expenditures in a report due once per year at the end of the year. Sec. 1053: Sale or Donation of Excess Department of Defense Personal Property for Law Enforcement Activities Prohibits the military from transferring free bayonets, grenades (but they can still transfer stun and flash bang grenades), weaponized tanks, and weaponized drones to domestic law enforcement. Sec. 1062: Limitation on Provision of Funds to Institutions of Higher Education Hosting Confucius Institutes Beginning in 2023, Defense Department funding - except for funding given directly to students - can be given to an college or university that hosts a Confucius Institute. "Confucius Institute" is defined as "a cultural institute directly or indirectly funded" by the Chinese government. The Defense Secretary has the ability to waive this prohibition. This was based on a bill co-authored by Rep. Anthony Gonzalez of Ohio and Rep. Donna Shalala of Fl Sec. 1064: Requirements for Use of Federal Law Enforcement Personnel, Active Duty Members of the Armed Forces, and National Guard Personnel in Support of Federal Authorities to Respond to Civil Disturbances Whenever a member of the armed forces, including the National Guard, respond to a civil disturbance, each individual has to display their name and the name of the Federal entity they are representing. This won't apply to individuals who don't wear uniforms when performing their regular duties or who are performing undercover operations. TITLE XII - MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS Subtitle B - Matters Relating to Afghanistan and Pakistan Sec. 1215: Limitation on Use of Funds to Reduce Deployment to Afghanistan Prohibits troop levels in Afghanistan from being reduced below 2,000 until the Defense Secretary submits a report Subtitle C - Matters Relating to Syria, Iraq, and Iran Sec. 1221: Extension and Modification of Authority to Provide Assistance to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Reauthorizes the Department of Defense military assistance for training, equipment, supplies, and support for the Government of Iraq and "other local security forces" for combatting ISIL and security the territory of Iraq until December 31, 2021 but cuts the funding to $322.5 million, down from $645 million. The original funding amount t was over $1.6 billion in 2016. Sec. 1222: Extension and Modification of Authority to Provide Assistance to Vetted Syrian Groups and Individuals Reauthorizes the Department of Defense assistance for training, equipment, supplies, support, stipends, and facilities for "vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals" until December 31, 2021 Subtitle E - Matters Relating to Europe and NATO Sec. 1241: Determination and Imposition of Sanctions with Respect to Turkey's Acquisition of the S-400 Air Defense System In response to Turkey's decision to buy an air defense system from Russia on July 12, 2019, the President "shall" impose five or more sanctions on each person who participated in buying that system. The sanctions were required to be implemented by the end of January 2021. The sanctions are allowed to be removed after one year if the S-400 air defense system has been removed from Turkey Sec. 1246: Report on United States Military Force Posture in Southeastern Europe By the end of 2021, the Secretary of Defense has to submit a classified report with an unclassified summary describing the military postures of Russia and China in southeastern Europe and assess the cost, feasibility, and infrastructure requirements of increasing US Armed Forces in Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and other locations. Subtitle F - Matters Relating to the Indo-Pacific Region Sec. 1251: Pacific Deterrence initiative Requires the Secretary of Defense to create a Pacific Deterrence Initiative to improve the force posture in the Indo-Pacific region, primarily west of the International Date Line The purpose is to... Strengthen the presence of the US Armed Forces in the region Pre-position equipment, weapons, and fuel. Perform exercises, training, and experiments Build the militaries of allies and partners and enhance cooperation with them Authorizes over $2.2 billion Sec. 1252: Extension and Modification of Prohibition on Commercial Export of Certain Covered Munitions Items to the Hong Kong Police Force Extends the prohibition on export licenses being issued to send weapons to the Hong Kong police force that was enacted on November 27, 2019 until December 31, 2021 and expands the prohibition on exports to include "crime control items". Sec. 1260: Statement of Policy and Sense of Congress on the Taiwan Relations Act 'The Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations" "Any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." We will "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan" It is US policy to continue selling weapons to Taiwan, including weapons for air defense, undersea warfare, intelligence, surveillance, anti-armor, anti-ship, and coastal defense systems. US policy is to perform joint military exercises with Taiwan. Sec. 1260E: Sense of Congress on the Aggression of the Government of China Along the Border with India and its Growing Territorial Claims Congress says that... "continued military aggression by the Government of China along the border with India is a significant concern" "attempts by the Government of China to advance baseless territorial claims, including those in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and with respect to Bhutan, are destabilizing and inconsistent with international law." Subtitle G: Sudan Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020 Sec. 1263: Statement of Policy It is United States policy to... "support a civilian-led political transition in Sudan that results in a democratic government..." "support the implementation of Sudan's constitutional charter for the transitional period" (which began on August 17, 2019 and is effective for 39 months, which would be November 17, 2022) Part of our strategy is "promoting economic reform, private sector engagement, and inclusive economic development..." and "supporting improved development outcomes, domestic resource mobilization, and catalyzing market-based solutions to improve access to health, education, water and sanitations, and livelihoods..." Sec. 1264: Support for Democratic Governance, Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Fundamental Freedoms Authorizes the President to "provide assistance" authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which allows him to use money from the State Department's Economic Support Fund, and development assistance in agriculture, health, education, housing, counter-drug operations, disaster relief, energy, technology, natural resources, and technical assistance for the government and/or central bank. Authorizes $20 million per year in 2021 and 2022 Sec. 1265: Support for Development Programs Authorizes the President to "provide assistance" using the same authorities from Section 1264 and the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (BUILD Act) ,which created the United States International Development Finance Corporation, to "promote economic growth, increase private sector productivity and advance market-based solutions to address development challenges" Authorizes $80 million per year for 2021 and 2022 Sec. 1266: Support for Conflict Mitigation Authorizes the President to "provide assistance" using the same authorities from Section 1264 and money for international military education and training and money for peacekeeping operations to "support civil society and other organizations", for "professional training of security force personnel", and to support provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 and Abyei protocol. Authorizes $20 million per year for 2021 and 2022 Sec. 1267: Support for Accountability for War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and Genocide in Sudan Authorizes the President to "provide assistance" using the same authorities from Section 1264 to assist investigators to document violations of human rights committed by the former President Omar al-Bashir and the Transitional Military Council since June 30, 1989. Authorizes $10 million per year for 2021 and 2022. Sec. 1270E: Repeal of Sudan Peace Act and the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act Effective January 1, 2020 (backdated), repeals the Sudan Peace Act and the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act Subtitle H - United States Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act of 2020 Sec. 1273: Security Assistance for Israel The United States will give Israel at least $3.3 billion per year from the Foreign Military Financing Program from 2021 through 2028 (at least $26.4 billion). The amount used to be capped; this law changed it so that is a minimum payment. Sec. 1275: Rules Governing the Transfer of Precision-Guided Munitions to Israel Above the Annual Restriction Authorizes the President to transfer precision-guided missiles from our reserves to Israel The authority to transfer our missiles to Israel will expire at the beginning of 2024 TITLE LVXXXIV - MISCELLANEOUS Subtitle C - Arctic Sec. 8421: Coast Guard Arctic Prioritization Congress is concerned that "Russia and China have conducted military exercises together in the Arctic, have agreed to connect the Northern Sea Route, claimed by Russia, with China's Maritime Silk Road, and are working together in developing natural gas resources in the Arctic." TITLE XCIV - SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY MATTERS Subtitle B - Other Matters Sec. 9414: Study on Chinese Policies and Influence in the Development of International Standards for Emerging Technologies The Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology will conduct a study that can include... How China's role in international standards setting organizations has grown over the last 10 years China's standardization strategy outlined in "Chinese Standard 2035" An examination of whether international standards for technology are being designed to promote Chinese interests outlined in the "Made in China 2025" plan Recommendations on how the United States can "mitigate" China's influence in setting standards and increase the United States public and private sector participation in the standards setting institutions TITLE XCVII - FINANCIAL SERVICES MATTERS Subtitle C - Other Matters Sec. 9723: Accountability for World Bank Loans to China Makes it the policy of the United States to disqualify China from receiving World Bank loans designed for low and middle income countries. This was a bill written by Rep. Anthony Gonzalez of Ohio TITLE XCIX - CREATING HELPFUL INCENTIVES TO PRODUCE SEMICONDUCTORS FOR AMERICA Sec. 9902: Semiconductor Incentives The Secretary of Commerce has to create a program that provides tax money to "a private entity, a consortium of private entities,, or a consortium of public and private entities..." to incentivize them to invest in creating, assembling, testing, packaging, or researching semiconductors in the United States. The money can not be given to "a foreign entity of concern" Tax money for any individual project is capped at $3 billion, but that limit can be waived with the recommendation of the Defense Secretary, the Director of National Intelligence, and the President. Sec. 9905: Funding for Development and Adoption of Measurably Secure Semiconductors and Measurably Secure Semiconductors Supply Chains Authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to create a "Multilateral Semiconductors Security Fund" The fund would be used to create "measurably secure semiconductor supply chains" The Secretary of State can use money in the fund to give to foreign governments on the condition that those countries enact restrictions on exports to China. The Secretary of State is encouraged, but not required, to establish transparency requirements for subsidies or other financial benefits given to semiconductors inside or outside the participating countries and "promote harmonized treatment and verification processes for items being exported to a country considered a national security risk by a country participating". Coronabus Outline Bill Text DIVISION B - COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2021 TITLE V - GENERAL PROVISIONS Sec. 526: Prohibits NASA, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), or the National Space Council (NSC) from working with, contracting from, or coordinating "in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company" unless the activities are "specifically authorized" by a law enacted after the Coronabus. This can be waived if NASA, the OSTP, or NSC consults with the FBI and finds that the cooperation would "pose no risk of resulting in the transfer of technology, data, or other information with national security or economic security implications to China or a Chinese-owned company." DIVISION K - DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT TITLE VII: GENERAL PROVISIONS Insecure Communications Networks Sec. 7030: State Department funds must be used to advance the adoption of 5G in countries receiving our tax money and prevent the creation of communications networks, including 5G, promoted by China "and other state-backed enterprises that are subject to undue or extrajudicial control by their country of origin." East Asia and the Pacific $1.482 billion must be spent implementing the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Asia Reassurance Initiative of 2018. Requires at least $300 million in additional money to be spent on a new Countering Chinese Influence Fund Sec. 7043: Funding for China's neighbors... Almost $135 million was appropriated for the government of Burma before the military coup. At least $85 million is appropriated for the government of Cambodia, conditioned on Cambodia "verifiably maintaining the neutrality of Ream Naval Base, other military installations in Cambodia, and dual use facilities such as the Dara Sakor development project. There is no certification required for "democracy, health, education, and environment programs, programs to strengthen the sovereignty of Cambodia, and programs to educate and inform the people of Cambodia of the influence activities of the People's Republic of China in Cambodia." At least $80 million will be given to Laos At least $3 million from the "Democracy Fund" will be given to Hong Kong for "democracy and internet freedom programs for Hong Kong, including legal and other support for democracy activists" as long as none of this money goes to the Chinese government. Prohibits counter-drug money for the Philippines, "except for drug demand reduction, maritime law enforcement, or transnational interdiction." At least $170 million will be given to Vietnam Europe and Eurasia Requires at least $290 million to be spent on the Countering Russian Influence Fund Latin America and the Caribbean Sec. 7045: Requires over $500 million to be available for "assistance" for Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, which can be spent on the Central America Regional Security Initiative. Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras can only get 50% of their allotted funding unless the Secretary of State certifies that the governments are taking actions against corruption, enacting reforms, informing their citizens that it’s dangerous to come to the United States, enhancing border security, and “resolving disputes involving the confiscation of real property of United States entities.” Those three countries are also ineligible for foreign military financing. The Caribbean Requires at least $74.8 million to be spent on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Venezuela Requires at least $33 million to be spent on "democracy programs" in Venezuela Bilateral Economic Assistance Adds an additional $700 million to the Economic Support Fund, available until September 30, 2022 for Sudan. DIVISION Z - ENERGY ACT OF 2020 Sec. 7003: Monitoring Mineral Investments Under Belt and Road Initiative of People's Republic of China The Director of National Intelligence, starting in the beginning of 2022 and every year after, will have to conduct a detailed report on China's investments in minerals and if their investments have increased their control over the global supply of those minerals. DIVISION FF - OTHER MATTER TITLE III - FOREIGN RELATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROVISIONS Subtitle B - Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 Sec. 314: Taiwan's Inclusion in International Organizations Congress finds that... "China's attempts to dictate the terms of Taiwan's participation in international organizations has, in many cases, resulted in Taiwan's exclusion from such organizations even when statehood is not a requirement..." Makes it US policy to advocate for Taiwans inclusion in international organizations that do not require statehood, including the United Nations, World Health Assembly, and others. Subtitle F - The United States Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act Sec. 352: By the beginning of July, the Secretary of State has to submit a five year strategy to Congress for changing the governing, economic, and security structures of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Economically, the priorities must include: "Supporting market-based solutions to eliminate constraints to inclusive economic growth" "Identifying... a role for relevant United States agencies and United States private sector in supporting efforts to increase private sector investment..." Security priorities must include: "Implementing the Central America Regional Security Initiative" The strategy can be created in partnership with "civil society and the private sector in the United States, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras." The strategy will have to be posed on the State Department's website, but it is allowed to be partially classified. Sec. 353: By the beginning of July, President Biden has to submit a list of people who will be sanctioned for their actions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Sanctions will prohibit the targets from traveling to the United States. The authority to impose these sanctions will expire at the beginning of 2024. https://www.congress.gov/116/cprt/HPRT42770/CPRT-116HPRT42770.pdf#page= National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 Bill Text Sec. 1251: Authorized the “Indo-Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative” to “increase the presence and capabilities” of the United States Armed Forces in the region by building new infrastructure, “enhance the storage and pre-positioning in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region of equipment of the United States Forces”, and with military training and exercises with allies. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 2019 Bill Text Sec. 1252: Amends the NDAA for 2016, which authorized the South China Sea Initiative providing military equipment and training to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, to change the name of the program to the “Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative” and expands the authorization to include the Indian Ocean in addition to the South China Sea and the countries of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Adds India to the list of countries allowed to be paid for expenses, along with Brunei, Singapore, and Taiwan. Extends the expiration date from September 30, 2020 to December 31, 2025. Sec. 1253: Changes the name of the military build-up authorized in NDAA 2018 from the “Indo-Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative” to the “Indo-Pacific Stability Initiative”. Changes the activities authorized to include an increase in “rotational and forward presence” of the US Armed Forces and adds the prepositioning of “munitions” in addition to equipment. Expands the options for funding by removing the requirement that funding come “only” from a section 1001 transfer authority. Section 1001 transfer authority allows the shifting of up to $4.5 billion. Requires a 5 year plan be submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense by March 1, 2019. Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 Outline [Bill Text](https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ409/PLAW-115publ409.pdf Sec. 2: Findings The "United States-backed international system" is being challenged by: China constructing islands in the South China Sea and challenging US economic interests North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities ISIS "Without strong leadership from the United States, the international system, fundamentally rooted in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment of the United States, regional, and global interests." TITLE I: UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION Sec. 101: Policy The United States policy for the region... "Promotes American prosperity and economic interests by advancing economic growth and development of a rules-based Indo-Pacific economic community" Sec. 102: Diplomatic Strategy We will support... The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation East Asia Summit We want... Freedom of navigation under international law Expansions of security and defense cooperation with allies and partners Denuclearization of North Korea "To develop and grow the economy through private sector partnerships between the United States and Indo-Pacific partners" To pursue trade agreements and "build a network of partners in the Indo-Pacific committed to free markets" TITLE II - PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION Sec 201: Authorization of Appropriations $1.5 billion per year from 2019 through 2023 ($7.5 billion total) The money can be used for... Foreign military financing Foreign military education and training Counterterrorism partnership programs "To encourage responsible natural resource management in partner countries, which is closely associated with economic growth" Military and Coast Guard training exercises Expanding cooperation with Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka "Multilateral engagements" with Japan, Australia, and India Intelligence The goal is to counter "China's influence to undermine the international system" Sec. 205: United States-ASEAN Strategic Partnership The goal of our commitment to ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) is to "build a strong, stable politically cohesive, economically integrated, and socially responsible community of nations that has common rules, norms, procedures, and standards which are consistent with international law and the principles of a rules-based Indo-Pacific community." Sec. 209: Commitment to Taiwan To enforce all existing commitments to Taiwan made by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and the 3 joint communiques and the Six Assurances agreed to by President Reagan in July 1982 The United States "should" regularly transfer weapons to Taiwan "that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People's Republic of China." TITLE III: PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION Sec. 301: Findings By 2030, 66% of the global middle class will be living in Asia and 59% of middle class consumption will take place in Asia The United States has free trade agreements in effect with Australia, Singapore, and Korea The member states of ASEAN represent the fifth largest economy in the world Sec. 302: Indo-Pacific Trade Negotiations, Multilateral Agreements, and Regional Economic Summits Congress supports "full implementation of the World Trade Organization's Trade Facilitation Agreement by Indo-Pacific countries" Sec. 304: Trade Capacity Building and Trade Facilitation Authorizes "such sums as may be necessary" for the President to produce a trade facilitation strategy that levels the playing field for American companies competing in the Indo-Pacific region. TITLE IV - PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION Sec. 409: Authorization of Appropriations Authorizes $210 million per year from 2019 through 2025 (over $1 billion total) to "promote democracy, strengthen civil society... etc" in the Indo-Pacific region. This money can be used to promote democracy and the "rule of law" inside of China. Articles/Documents Article: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor—Hard Reality Greets BRI’s Signature Initiative, By David Sacks, Council on Foreign Relations, March 30, 2021 Article: An Alliance of Autocracies? China Wants to Lead a New World Order., By Steven Lee Myers, The New York Times, March 29, 2021 Article: China and Russia Agree to Explore the Moon Together, By Steven Lee Myers, The New York Times, March 10, 2021 Article: Russia, Belarus ink five-year strategic military partnership plan for first time, By Tass, March 2, 2021 Article: The U.S. Air Force Just Admitted The F-35 Stealth Fighter Has Failed, By David Axe, Forbes, February 23, 2021 Article: Chip Crisis Flummoxes Congress in a World Where U.S. Output Lags, By Laura Davison and Jarrell Dillard, MSN, Bloomberg, February 21, 2021 Article: Cambodia-China Golden Dragon Military Exercise postponed, By Chea Vanyuth, Khmer Times, February 2, 2021 Document: China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiative: Economic Issues, By Karen M. Sutter, Andres B. Schwarzenberg, and Michael D. Sutherland, The Congressional Research Service, January 21, 2021 Article: Defense Bill Includes Two Landmark Transparency Provisions, By Tim Stretton, POGO, January 21, 2021 Article: NicaNotes: Unelectable coup mongers, By Fabrizio Casari, Alliance for Global Justice, January 14, 2021 Document: Taiwan: Political and Security Issues, By Susan V. Lawrence, The Congressional Research Service, January 4, 2021 News Release: Cambodia: Hun Sen and His Abusive Generals, Human Rights Watch, October 22, 2020 Article: Cambodian PM Says Ream Naval Base Not Just for China, By The Defense Spot, October 7, 2020 Article: The Real F-35 Problem We Need to Solve, By Scott Cooper, Defense One, September 29, 2020 Article: Russia, China launch massive 'Caucasus 2020' military exercises, By Jan van der Made, Rfi, September 21, 2020 Article: China says it will join Russian military exercises this month along with Iran, Belarus and others, By CBS News, September 10, 2020 Document: China’s National Security Law for Hong Kong: Issues for Congress, By Susan V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin, The Congressional Research Service, August 3, 2020 Article: India-China border standoff turns deadly for first time in decades, By Arshad R. Zargar, CBS News, June 16, 2020 Article: Chinese troops challenge India at multiple locations in eastern Ladakh, standoff continues, By Snehesh Alex Philip, The Print, May 24, 2020 Article: When It Comes to Supersonic Flight, the F-35’s Wings Are Clipped, By Kyle Mizokami, Popular Mechanics, April 29, 2020 Article: Cambodia, China kick off Golden Dragon exercise despite coronavirus, Vietnam News, March 15, 2020 Article: Joint Cambodia-China ‘Golden Dragon’ Military Drills to Proceed, Despite Threat of Coronavirus, Reported by RFA’s Khmer Service, Translated by Sovannarith Keo, Written in English by Joshua Lipes, Radio Free Asia, March, 2020 Press Release: Gonzalez introduces new bill to curb World Bank funding to China, Anthony Gonzalez, November 13, 2019 Article: Deal for Naval Outpost in Cambodia Furthers China’s Quest for Military Network, By Jeremy Page, Gordon Lubold and Rob Taylor, The Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2019 Document: Cambodia: Background and U.S. Relations, By Thomas Lum, The Congressional Research Service, January 28, 2019 Document: Taiwan: Issues for Congress, By Susan V. Lawrence and Wayne M. Morrison, The Congressional Research Service, October 30, 2017 Additional Resources Hun Sen, Britannica Aegis Ashore Lockheed Martin Sound Clip Sources Hearing: Secretary Blinken: The Biden Administration’s Priorities for U.S. Foreign Policy, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 10, 2021 Watch on YouTube Watch on C-SPAN Transcript: 40:53 Antony Blinken: So on Nord Stream II, a couple of things at the outset, just to be very, very clear, President Biden thinks it's a bad idea. He said so repeatedly, I share his his view. It violates the European Union's own energy security principles. It jeopardizes the economic and strategic situation for Ukraine, for Poland as well. And so he opposes it. We oppose it will continue to do so. I've been on the job, I think, five weeks. The pipeline is 95% complete. It started construction started in 2018. So I wish we didn't find ourselves in a situation with a pipeline that's virtually complete. 1:06:17 Antony Blinken: We have to deal with the drivers of migration, to your point. And I think there is real opportunity there to do that. When President Biden was Vice President, as you may remember, he led an effort, very successful effort, a bipartisan effort with Congress to secure significantly more resources to help Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador deal with some of these drivers, whether it came to security, whether it came to corruption, whether it came to economic opportunity, and we did this in a way that was simply not simply throwing money at the problem, but demanding concrete reforms from these countries, that actually materially improved the situation for people there and took away some of the incentives for them to come to the United States. We now have a proposal with additional resources over four years to do that, and to do that in a, I think, potentially effective way. 1:10:35 Antony Blinken: First we have in President Biden, as you know, someone who believes strongly in NATO, in the Alliance, the most successful alliance in history and something as he see that he sees as the glue that joins us to to Europe and so this is something as you know, he spent a lot of time on himself in the past and he's doing so now as well. 1:12:37 Antony Blinken: When we see democracy being challenged by China or by Russia, one of the things that they're trying to do constantly, is not just to divide us from other democracies, but of course, to divide us from ourselves, and in particular, to try to make the case that the system that we all believe in and are dedicating our lives to professionally doesn't work and that their systems are better. 1:13:09 Antony Blinken: Demonstrate together, that democracy actually delivers for our people and for other democracies. That is the single best answer and response to this effort by autocratic countries around the world to try to make the case that democracy doesn't deliver an autocracy does. So I hope we can work on that together because that's the path to success. 1:13:43 Rep. Joe Wilson (SC): The International Criminal Court has taken actions leading to the unjustified prosecution of American Israeli nationals despite neither country being a member of the court. Most recently, the ICC issued a ruling that had jurisdiction to try Israelis for alleged war crimes in Palestine. I appreciate your statement opposing the recent moves by the ICC. What are the steps the State Department are taking to counter these recent actions? And how will you work to prevent ICC prosecutions of Americans or Israelis?Antony Blinken: Thank you for the question. I appreciate it. We of course share the goal, the broad goal of accountability for international atrocity crimes. That's not the issue. In the case that you raise, as well as the attempt to assert jurisdiction over American troops in Afghanistan, we have strongly opposed those assertions of jurisdiction. It's been our view, it remains our view that jurisdiction is reserved when a state consents to it or if there's a referral by the United Nations Security Council. Neither is true in the case of of Israel and the Palestinian matter that you just mentioned, or is it true in the case of Afghanistan, we have the capacity ourselves to provide accountability when those issues arise. And so we will continue to make clear our opposition, I think the question for us, and it's an appropriate one is how can we most effectively do that and that's something that we're looking at right now. 1:15:37 Rep. Joe Wilson (SC): My youngest son served in Afghanistan. So identify as a family member of the threats of ICC what they could mean to the American people. 1:16:30 Antony Blinken: We applaud the steps that have been taken toward normalization with Israel by a number of countries including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco. These are very important and we want to build on them. 1:16:50 Rep. Joe Wilson (SC): But unfortunately then we go to Nordstrom, too. And that is a Do you agree that Nord Stream II pipeline is a Russian malign influence project, if completed, that would threaten European and US security? Antony Blinken: Yes, I think as we've we were discussing a little bit earlier, we we oppose the president opposes Nordstrom, who has been clear about this for some time. So have I, and unfortunately, the pipeline is, you know, is 95% complete. But we are making clear that we, we stand against its completion. We issued an initial report and sanctioned the the leading pipeline, ship, and we continue to review other possibilities for sanctions going forward.Rep. Joe Wilson (SC): And I appreciate you actually referenced the threat to Poland. What about threat is already on with the aggression in Ukraine.Antony Blinken: There are two and this is something that I worked on a lot when I was last in, in the Obama administration. We strongly stand against Russia's attempted annexation of Crimea, we stand strongly against its aggression in the Donbass in eastern Ukraine, and we are strongly in support of Ukraine, we intend to strengthen that support, whether its security, economic, or its efforts to strengthen its own democracy, which are vitally important because one of the challenges as you know, for Ukraine is it has to face aggression from the outside from from Russia, but it also has to deal on the inside with its own challenges, including the problem of corruption. We're determined to work on all of that.Rep. Joe Wilson (SC): Another alternative would be as Azerbaijan to Bulgaria, the Black Sea with pipelines that I urge you to make every effort on that. I yield back. 2:54:30 Antony Blinken: First when it comes to the the Houthis, just to be very clear, we we see them as a bad actor that has tried to overrun Yemen, interrupted a peace, effort and led by the United Nations, committed acts of aggression against Saudi Arabia, as well as atrocities of one kind or another, in Yemen itself, and of course, have helped create an environment where we have the worst humanitarian crisis in the world right now. And that's precisely why we took the action we did in terms of lifting the designation on the entity itself. We continue to have designations against individual who the leaders, including some that we've imposed recently, but we wanted to make sure that nothing that the United States was doing, made the provision of humanitarian assistance to Yemen even more difficult than it already is. And it was our judgment, that was those designations, that designation of the group was having that effect, but we stand strongly for the proposition that we have to deal with the Houthis and also try to advance current efforts to end the war. Hearing: The State of Democracy Around the World, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 10, 2021 Watch on YouTube Speakers: Madeleine K. Albright, former Secretary of State Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Peter Biar Ajak, National Endowment for Democracy, all of Washington, D.C.; Wai Hnin Pwint Thon, Burma Campaign UK, Geneva, Switzerland Nathan Law, former Hong Kong Legislative Council Member, London, United Kingdom. Transcript: 35:54 Ambassador Paula J Dobriansky: Venezuela is a flashpoint for Chinese and Russian investment and malign influence. both nations have invested billions into Venezuela taking advantage of its economic and political weakness, its vast petroleum resources and their close relationships with a corrupt Maduro regime. Russian arms manufacturers sold $4 billion worth of weapons to Venezuela over the last 10 years, and China has invested some 67 billion in Venezuela since 2007. These instruments have propped up an illegitimate government and have undermined prospects for democracy. 37:07 Ambassador Paula J Dobriansky: Russia and China have expanded investments in Africa as well. In 2003, annual Chinese direct investment in Africa was just 75 million, but by 2009, it reached 2.7 billion. Through its One Belt One Road Initiative. China is offering fragile democracies in Africa, new rail lines, highways and other infrastructure projects. African nations are finding that these projects have left them with massive debt and a lack of control. Russia is also increasing its investments in Africa to especially its military presence. It's striving to create a Red Sea naval logistics facility in Sudan. 40:49 Madeleine Albright: And I do think that there's no question that China is our biggest problem, and that they are out there, hustling in every single way. And I have made very clear that with the Belt and Road policies that they are undertaking, the Chinese must be getting very fat because the belt keeps getting larger and larger. And some of it does have to do with the fact that we have been absent and they are filling a vacuum and so we need to make clear that we need to be back and really do need to make clear in so many ways that we are a leader in restoring and building democracy in other countries. 1:13:46 Sen. Chris Coons (DE): Senator Cornyn and I have a bipartisan bill about strengthening civics education within the United States. In recent surveys, there's as many young Americans who support and believe in socialism as believe in capitalism. There's profound doubts about democracy, particularly after the events of January 6th, and the disinformation, about the value and legitimacy of free and open societies that we've lived through. It's my hope that on a bipartisan basis, we can move a renewed investment in civics education to strengthen our own democracies, you've both spoken to. 1:48:30 Peter Biar Ajak: The United States need to send a clear message to here, there is repression of our people will no longer be tolerated, nor any further delay of elections. We should sanction perpetrators of gross human rights violations like which, while urging the African Union to urgently set up the hybrid court on South Sudan to end impunity. If Kiran doesn't hold the election on time, he's already illegitimate regime will have expired since he was never elected by our people. This will necessitate a new political paradigm to ensure a successful transition to democracy. Despite severe depression, our people made it clear in the recently concluded national dialogue that Kiran Machar must exit the political scene. I hope the United States, this committee will stand with our people. Hearing: National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in the Indo-Pacific, House Committee on Armed Services, March 10, 2021 Watch on YouTube Speakers: David F. Helvey, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Affairs, Department of Defense Admiral Philip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command General Robert B. Abrams, U.S. Army, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea Transcript: 31:54 Admiral Philip S. Davidson: The threat as it's developed in the western Pacific has moved in a way in which we need to have better integrated air and missile defense capability on Guam in order to defend it. What you have in place right now is fad radar, which only has 120 degree wide look at threats in the region and in fact, it's oriented on North Korea. And it's meant to defend against rogue shot of intermediate range from North Korea. We supplement that with an Aegis destroyer. As we look at the expanse of Chinese weapon systems, and their employment of air and maritime forces in the region. We need a 360 degree defense now of Guam, and must be able to meet the ballistic missile threat that can come from PRC land as well as PRC ships. But it also should meet the 360 degree threat around Guam that comes from circumnavigations of Guam by PRC naval assets, including submarines that could shoot land attack cruise missiles, for example. As well as bomber approaches, and its ability to shoot land attack cruise missiles as well. We have to be able to defend against all those threats. Aegis Ashore is a proven technology that you have today at sea and you have it ashore in Romania and Poland to help in the defense of Europe. That system would enable all the capabilities that you have today and begin to meet the threats in the future. As China develops hypersonic weapons during the course of this decade., clearly there's going to be a need to have space sensing associated with that. You're still gonna have to have an interceptor to meet the threat. In my view, that's going to rectify that by bridging Aegis Ashore with our space capability that is to come. 49:14 David F. Helvey: And the reality is that we're not asking nations to choose between the United States or China. In fact, we welcome and encourage all nations across the Indo Pacific to maintain peaceful, productive relations with all of their neighbors, China included. Framing the strategic competition that we find ourselves in with China, as a choice between us or China, or as a choice between nations is really a false choice. The choice that our allies and our partners and everyone in the region faces is between supporting the existing international order, the existing system that's free and open. It's the system that we helped to create that we've supported, and that we believe has benefited everybody in the region, including in particular, including China. And the alternative now that China is presenting, which is a closed system in a more authoritarian governance model. So it's a competition between systems, that's a choice between systems. Do you want to choose a free and open system? Or do you want to choose a closed and authoritarian one? And so we're only asking countries to do their part to uphold the international laws, rules and norms, which support their interests, which they've benefited from, and helped to provide for security and prosperity for all of us. And so that's that's the ask that we've got our allies and our partners. 57:27 Rep. Joe Courtney (CT): Admiral Davidson on page 35 of your testimony you set forth China's sort of brazen, repeated violations of the Law of the Sea treaty. And mentioned the fact that at South China Sea geographic features were renamed with, I guess, Chinese names. Can you flesh that out a little bit what that means in terms of, you know, maritime territorial claims, and the impact in terms of freedom of navigation? Admiral Philip S. Davidson: Well, the Chinese are trying to basically impose Chinese national law on the international regime that provides for the freedom of navigation and freedom of the seas. We've spoken quite a bit about the Chinese use of lawfare. This is, one of the methodologies in which they do it. It's not just the naming, or renaming of features that have had long standing names in the region. It's the redefinition of what they might be. Because, rocks, is slits, islands all have very specific navigational rights associated with them, as well as their continued militarization of the features that they built out early in the last decade. Their continued militarization is to frankly, deter not only the United States, but truly cow, all of our allies and partners in the region, and certainly the South China Sea claimants from their absolute rights to operate and those rights that they enjoy for economic resource extraction of freedom of the seas, freedom of the airways, etc.Rep. Joe Courtney (CT): Well, thank you for that answer. Because, again, as you point out, this isn't just about sort of names. It's also about sort of territorial claims and what that means to the rules based system that has been so successful over the last 75 years. 1:29:46 Rep. Scott DesJarlais (IA): Admiral Davidson What do you consider the most likely potential target of Chinese aggression or military action in the next five to 10 years? Admiral Philip S. Davidson: Given what they've said both publicly and over time, and certainly during the tenure of Chairman Xi Jinping. I would say Taiwan is the first. Hearing: United States Indo-Pacific Command, Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 9, 2021 Transcript: 4:23 Sen. Jack Reed (RI): At his confirmation hearing Secretary Austin accurately described china as the pacing threat for the department of defense under president Xi Jinping china has moved away from greater integration with the liberal world order and instead created a style of authoritarian capitalism that it now seeks to explore throughout the region and the world additionally China seeks to co op international institutions or create parallel organization to support its strategic interest. 8:23 Sen. Roger Wicker (MS): China invested in military capabilities many americans naively assumed that China's entry into the WTO and the global integration of its economy would somehow make the Chinese communist party more friendly and open to the west. The result now is america's military advantage and the credibility of our deterrent is eroding that is why the 2021 NDAA was the toughest bill on china ever with several national security committees involved and that is specifically why this committee put the Pacific Deterrence Initiative or PDI into last year's NDAA to stop aggression from the Chinese Communist Party. 18:50 Admiral Philip S. Davidson: I think the Pacific deterrence initiative funded in FY21 for about $2.2 billion was a good first start. I recognize that the committee has put a cap of $5.5 billion on the fund going forward. 22:45 Admiral Philip S. Davidson: i'm quite encouraged by the potential power of an organization like the quad my brain in my view India Japan Australia in the United States that's a diamond of democracies that could bring so much more not only to the region but to the globe not not in terms of security alone, but in terms of how we might approach you know the global economy, critical technologies like telecommunications and 5G, collaboration on the international order, just much to be done diplomatically and economically and I have great hope that our ministerial level meetings with the clot as it's known and returned we'll build into something much bigger for the sake of the globe. 24:24 Sen. Roger Wicker (MS): With regard to the projected 2025. It shows that at that point, China will have three aircraft carriers to our one in the region. Is that correct? Admiral Philip S. Davidson: Yes, sir. Sen. Roger Wicker (MS): And then with regard to amphibious assault ships, it's projected in 2025, that we'll have six to our two. Admiral Philip S. Davidson:* Yes, sir. **Sen. Roger Wicker (MS): And then with regard to modern multi warfare, combatant ships 50 for two hours, six, is that correct? Admiral Philip S. Davidson:* Yes, sir. **Sen. Roger Wicker (MS): And what is the significance of that last figure Admiral? Admiral Philip S. Davidson: Really, the three charts work together, Senator, one to show the change in capability and capacity that the Chinese have undertaken during the course of the 21st century. And the relatively static nature of our own forward positioned forces. As I described, our effort to do a deterrence to sustain a deterrence posture and the reason it's so important on our ability to respond in time and without question, you know, is this an old novel in the 70s is to say, the importance of us presence forward is incredibly important, perfect speed is being there. And it's to show that if we don't make changes in our posture forward, that that it will demonstrate that the Chinese have much greater capacity than we have. 26:42 Admiral Philip S. Davidson: But the important factor here is time. It takes almost three weeks to respond from the west coast of the United States and 17 days to respond from Alaska to get all the way to the first island chain and to conduct operations within the second islands. 28:26 Admiral Philip S. Davidson: Certainly advocating for Aegis Ashore and Guam the mission partner environment as well as the Pentek. That the Pacific Range Improvements that I seek for our structure in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and so forth. 35:43 Sen. Deb Fisher (NE): Last year, the strategic forces subcommittee authorized and additional $77 million to begin fielding a persistent air and missile defense system on Guam. Unfortunately, this funding was removed in conference and replaced with language requiring the department to study the issue. Can you walk us through the need for this system? 38:24 Admiral Philip S. Davidson: In partnership with the Missile Defense Agency we believe that the aegis assures system as is being put to sea right now and has been constructed previously in Romania and Poland delivers the kind of capabilities that would meet the threat that's excellent here by mid decade and we'll help us pace the threat into the future. 1:03:35 Admiral Philip S. Davidson: I worry that they're accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules based international order which they've long said that they want to do that by 2050, I'm worried about them moving that target closer. Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then and i think the threat is manifest during this decade in fact in the next six years. 1:05:58 Sen. Maizie Hirono (HI): I noticed that you significantly increased the requested amount from last year's PDI report to this year's report to strengthen our allies and partners over the next five years in the region from over $300 million to about $2.8 billion, can you discuss your rationale for the significant increase and what that additional funding is intended to do or where will it go?Admiral Philip S. Davidson: Well you hope you highlighted the key aspects ma'am it's to enhance and make improvements in our joint exercise program and that's principally because not only the united states but our key allies and partners Japan, Korea, Australia is just three examples are buying important capabilities that match ours integrated air missile defense for example fifth generation fighters like the F35 they're being actually delivered in the theater we've got to advance our exercise capabilities or excuse me our exercise program in a way that allows us to exercise those capabilities deliberately. 1:34:07 Sen. Tim Scott (SC): My first question is about Taiwan. I think you agree that it we've got to prevent Communist China from Controlling taiwan is a strategic necessity for the united states and the loss would devastate our ability and and the ability of japan to counter china's aggression does you agree with that and rightAdmiral Philip S. Davidson: As a combatant commander out there in the Indo-Pacific I have an obligation to you know support the Taiwan Relations Act and and in a geostrategic sense i think it's critically important to the united states global status, yes. 1:44:04 Admiral Philip S. Davidson: The Aegis Ashore is a system that's in fact already been developed we we have built and are employing one actually already in Romania and there's one building and imminently operational in Poland as well and it's to help nato with the defense of Europe it is essentially a radar the command and control the information technology communications conductivity and the interceptors missiles that are capable of defeating ballistic missile cruise missile threats in and around today you know an aegis ashore system on Guam fixed site on Guam would enable 360 degree defense of Guam from any military attacks from china whether they come by sea by air or by ballistic missile in the future it is technology that is available today we've built it ashore we've built it at sea and it's our you know it's our number one priority for funding in Guam. 2:13:13 Sen. Mark Kelly (NJ): You know a couple of questions here about command and control, communications. And we rely heavily on satellites to do that. And in in January of 2007, China conducted an anti anti satellite test against one of their own non operational weather satellites, with a kinetic Kill vehicle. And it's been reported that in the year since China has an operational capability that can attack satellites in low Earth orbit and that they're developing the capability that goes all the way out to geosynchronous orbit. So how does this affect the strategic balance of power in the region from your perspective?Admiral Philip S. Davidson: Thanks for that, Senator. Yes, both China and Russia have demonstrated capability to disrupt satellites, testing capabilities on their own assets in the past, as you've articulated, it clearly, I think demonstrates that space which we've long considered a domain and which would be unthreatened for the United States. The potential is there actually, for it to be threatened. We have to build resiliency into our space apparatus that happens with other space assets. It happens with creating airborne and other terrestrial alternatives to fulfill that. And it changes the calculus in space as well. We have to recognize that again, this goes back to some earlier comments I made about to turn theory we were not going to be able to play defense alone, in this particular regard. If we can't demonstrate to others, that their capabilities and space might be at risk, then, you know, we run the risk of a deterrence failure. That's that the space layer is critically important to how we sense in the strategic nuclear deterrent, how we communicate across the Joint Force, and even how we sense and distribute information to the conventional forces as well. Its resiliency is incredibly important to us. Hearing: Global Security Challenges and Strategy, Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 2, 2021 Speakers: Thomas Wright, The Brookings Institution Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, USA (Ret.), former United States National Security Advisor, Stanford University Hoover Institution, both of Washington, D.C. Transcript: Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster: The most significant flashpoint now that that could lead to a large scale war is Taiwan. And I think that has to do with really Xi Jinping's belief that he has a fleeting window of opportunity that's closing. And he wants to his view, make China whole again, you see this with the extension of the party's repressive arm into Hong Kong. And this horrible genocidal campaign in Shinjang, Taiwan is the next big prize. And so I think what we have to be able to do is have four position capable forces. Because what Xi Jinping wants to do with what would be the largest land grabs, so to speak in history, if he succeeds in the South China Sea, is to weaponize the South China Sea and just make it too difficult for us to be able to employ forces inside of that inner island chain. So you know, if you have four position forces there, that automatically transforms denied space with China with the PLA, The People's Liberation Army when it comes to deny space. Twitter Update: Ned Price rattle off a regime change rant revamping Trump's policy on Venezuela, Anya Parampil February 3, 2021 Hearing: Secretary of State Confirmation Hearing, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 19, 2021 Watch on C-SPAN Transcript: 24:50 Sen. Jim Risch (OH): After our conversations earlier today and after hearing our opening statements, Senator Menendez's input net regard, as you can see here and a whole lot of daylight between us on most of these issues, certainly, almost none whatsoever when it comes to objectives, strategy and how to get there. 34:06 Antony Blinken: Both the President Elect and I believe that we have to restore Congress's traditional role as a partner in our foreign policy making, in recent years, across administration's of both parties, Congress's voice and foreign policy has been diluted and diminished. That doesn't make the executive branch stronger. It makes our country weaker. President Elect Biden believes and I share his conviction that no foreign policy can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people. You are the representatives of the American people. You provide that advice and consent. 39:20 Antony Blinken: First President Elect Biden is committed to the proposition that Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon. And we share I know that goal across this committee. An Iran with a nuclear weapon, or on the threshold of having one with the capacity to build one on short order would be in Iran that is even more dangerous than it already is, when it comes to all of the other malicious activities that's engaged in, whether it is support for terrorism, whether it is fueling and feeding it's proxies, whether it is destabilizing the region. An Iran with a nuclear weapon, or with a threshold capacity to build one is in Iran that would act potentially with even greater impunity than it already is. So I think we have an urgent responsibility to do whatever we can to prevent Iran from acquiring or getting a weapon or getting close to the capacity to having the fissile material to break out on short notice. In my judgment, the JCPOA, for whatever its limitations, was succeeding on its own terms in blocking Iran's pathways to producing fissile material for a nuclear weapon on short order. It also featured and a feature that continues the most intrusive inspections and monitoring regime in the history of arms control. The challenge we face now is that we pulled out of the agreement, Iran is now taking steps to undo the various constraints that were imposed on it by the agreement. And so it has increased his stockpile of low enriched uranium, it is now enriching at a higher level. It is deploying centrifuges in ways that were prohibited under the agreement. The result is based on public reporting. The breakout time, the time it would take Iran to produce enough fissile material for one weapon has gone from beyond a year as it was under the JCPOA to about three or four months based at least on public reporting. And that potentially brings us right back to the crisis point that we were reaching before the deal was negotiated. And so the President Elect believes that if Iran comes back into compliance, we would too. But we would use that as a platform with our allies and partners who would once again be on the same side with us to seek a longer and stronger agreement. And also, as you and the chairman have rightly pointed out, to capture these other issues, particularly with regard to missiles and Iran's destabilizing activities. That would be the objective. 53:46 Sen. Ron Johnson (WI): Okay, one of the things that Congress did unanimously is we approved $300 million of lethal defensive weaponry for Ukraine. The Obama administration never implemented, the Trump administration did. Do you still disagree with providing that lethal defensive weaponry or do you think and, over time now, that's been proven to be the correct decision by Congress and the Trump administration? Antony Blinken: Senator, I support providing that lethal defensive assistance to Ukraine. In fact, I had the opportunity to write exactly that in the New York Times about three years ago. 1:14:09 Antony Blinken: There's been a strong and long bipartisan commitment to Taiwan. Taiwan Relations Act, also that communicates with China, and part of that commitment is making sure that Taiwan has the ability to defend itself against aggression. And that is a commitment that will absolutely endure. In a Biden administration, we will make sure that Taiwan has the ability to do that. I would also like to see Taiwan playing a greater role around the world, including in international organizations. When those organizations don't require the status of a country to be a member, they should become members. When it does, there are other ways that they can participate. 1:35:15 Sen. Marco Rubio (FL): Is it your view that our stance towards Venezuela should change in essence, that we should no longer recognize Juan Guido and an intern in negotiations with Maduro? Antony Blinken: No, it does not. I very much agree with you, Senator, first of all, with regard to a number of the steps that were taken toward Venezuela in recent years, including recognizing Mr. Guido, recognizing the National Assembly as the only democratically elected institution in Venezuela, seeking to increase pressure on the regime, led by a brutal dictator in Maduro. 1:46:21 Antony Blinken: First senator, we need to be clear eyed about the Houthis. They overthrew a government in Yemen. They engaged in a path of aggression through the country. They directed aggression toward Saudi Arabia, they've committed atrocities and human rights abuses. And that is a fact. What's also a fact though is that the the Saudi led campaign in Yemen, pushback against the Houthi aggression, has contributed to what is by most accounts, the worst humanitarian situation that we face, anywhere in the world. And one aspect of that situation is that about 80% of the Yemeni population right now is in areas controlled by the Houthis. And whether we like it or not, we have to find ways to get assistance to them, if we're going to do anything about addressing this situation. And so my concern, deep concern about the the designation that was made is that, at least on its surface, it seems to achieve nothing particularly practical in advancing the efforts against the Houthis. And to bring them back to the negotiating table, while making it even more difficult than it already is to provide humanitarian assistance to people who desperately need it. So I think we would propose to review that immediately, to make sure that what we are doing is not impeding the provision of humanitarian assistance, even under these difficult circumstances, I recognize that some have talked about carve outs for American providers of humanitarian assistance. The problem there is that if the ca

Huang Jie survives recall. Forex reserves hit record high. Protest against Myanmar coup. CTS, PTS and Homeplus team up to grab Channel 52. US survey shows increasing support for defending Taiwan militarily. Japanese lawmakers call for local Taiwan Relations Act.

Huang Jie survives recall. Forex reserves hit record high. Protest against Myanmar coup. CTS, PTS and Homeplus team up to grab Channel 52. US survey shows increasing support for defending Taiwan militarily. Japanese lawmakers call for local Taiwan Relations Act.

Watch the video-friendly edition: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8KXpA6aqxt0 -- At the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War (1927 - 1949) in which the Republic of China led by then Chairman Chiang Kai-shek (Chiang Chung-cheng) was along with the remnants of his Nationalist Government and Army defeated and forced during "The Great Retreat" to relocate to the island of Taiwan by the victorious forces of the Chinese Communist Party led by then Chairman Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and his People's Liberation Army (PLA) which was the paramilitary wing of the CCP (and is now the official army of Modern China). The latter would establish itself at the end of the war as the sovereign ruler of mainland China and the former despite ambitions to restore its former territorial holdings, would go on to accept and adapt to its new reality, which to this day has been in defiance to the political prerogatives of Mao and his successors who to this day have been determined to finish off what to them is at most an illegitimate rump state that is from the perspective of policymakers in Beijing as now really nothing more than a "renegade province." What initially was under Chiang & his son a continuation of the political system of the mainland ROC (i.e. a de jure unitary parliamentary republic which in practice was de facto an autocratic, military dictatorship) would increasingly go following the end of the latter's tenure as President to develop as an increasingly distinct polity from that of its mainland counterpart with a younger population of native Taiwanese who despite being ethnically of Han stock, due to political & cultural factors, identify as being of their own nation and separate from the Chinese nation-state despite inheriting from Chiang and his ilk the claimed status of being the sovereign of mainland China, which to this day in 2020 has not been reformed or abolished. Even though millions of anti-Communist Chinese mainlanders fled along with the ROC and its armed forces in the mid 20th century, the younger generations of Taiwan have been favoring localization of the state and favor a brand of Taiwanese Nationalism which opts for a society more akin to the Western-style democratic states. Despite Taiwan having its own independent government and alternate political system as previously mentioned since 1949 (and never being de jure administered by the PRC), Beijing with its "One China Policy" is in no mood (for reasons I explained in this segment and will expound upon more in the future) to tolerate the existence of an ethnically Han Chinese polity that stands as a viable alternative to the PRC and its rise as one of the preeminent contemporary great powers. What further complicates this situation is the United States and its relationship with Taiwan, which much to the chagrin of Beijing, due to the geostrategic location and its history with the ROC, Washington has vowed through informal diplomatic agreements (see: Taiwan Relations Act) to come to the defense of Taipei and has especially under the current Administration of President Trump been increasingly expanding its commercial and military support of Taipei in spite of the constant ire of Beijing. Taiwan which under its current President, Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) stands in 2020 at a pivotal juncture following the re-election of Tsai in January, who is a staunch advocate of Taiwanese Independence and is collaborating with the Trump Admin. to resist escalating pressure from China to restore control of the island state by any & all means it can muster. What will happen next? -- CONNECT: @TJC: http://twitter.com/TJC @GetNuanced: http://twitter.com/GetNuanced Map: http://shorturl.at/zFNR8 Store: http://www.PeachiLabs.com/ Website: http://www.GetNuanced.com/ -- Thanks for listening! --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/getnuanced/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/getnuanced/support

—What happened to the activists in Hong Kong? Yesterday, police arrested 10 people in Hong Kong under a new national security law. The purge has begun with the media owner of Apple Daily, Jimmy Lai. His company's senior executive Mark Simon said in a tweet that "Jimmy Lai is being arrested for collusion with foreign powers at this time.” On that night, 23 year-old activist, Agnes Chow was detained by police. Later a statement was posted on her Facebook, says she was arrested over “clouding with foreign forces,” under the National Security Law. President of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen showed a disappointment over the surge in Hong Kong, saying the arrests “further eroding Hong Kong's freedom of the press, rule of the law, human rights and democracy.” This comment came after the meeting with a high-profile US figure visiting Taiwan. —When did this diplomatic relationship start between US and Taiwan? Since 2018, US has embolden the tie between Taiwan by introducing acts such as Taiwan Relations Act and Taiwan Travel Act. Plus, Taiwan is buying military equipments from US over the decade. Yesterday, US health secretary, Alex Azar, has met Taiwan's president, Tsai Ing-wen for the meeting over the response to the COVID-19 crisis while Taiwanese airforce detected unknown fighter jets, allegedly from China, at the Taiwanese side of the border. BBC reported that Azar stated “three overarching themes” for the visit. “The first is to recognise Taiwan as an open and democratic society, executing a highly successful and transparent Covid-19 response,” he said. “The second is to reaffirm Taiwan as a long partner and friend of the United States. “The third is to note that Taiwan deserves to be recognised as a global health leader with an excellent track record of contributing to international health." Despite the successful handling on COVID-19, Taiwan is not a member of WHO. In response to the meeting, President Tsai posted on Twitter. “Working together, we can prove that democracy is the best system to overcome global challenges,” she said. —So, what Abe said, or did not say on Hong Kong? Last month, PM Shizo Abe and Australia PM Scott Morrison held a video meeting on Hong Kong's security. Since then, no comments. Japan's position over China is double standard. On one side, the economy is important when it comes to the tourism and other industries. On the other side, a nationalist population support Shinzo Abe on the security issue. Abe has been passive to China, he will be passive. Japan itself has no intention to involve in the humanitarian problem in Hong Kong. It is about the international politics, rather than the domestic politics. China carrying out political purge in Hong Kong -ABC https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-11/agnes-chow-arrested-hong-kong-china-security-laws/12544476 US angers China with high-profile Taiwan visit - BBC https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53719333 Taiwan–United States relations https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan–United_States_relations Trade War Vox https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iwa3vLoeNmQ Chinese Consulate in Houston -PBS News Hour https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-55YTqufAVo Agnes Chow Facebook https://www.facebook.com/agneschowting/

C'est le grand titre de La Croix ce matin qui constate en effet que « depuis maintenant dix semaines, le pouvoir doit trancher entre liberté, sécurité sanitaire et intérêts économiques. Le tout dans un brouillard complet. » En effet, pointe le quotidien catholique, « aucun scientifique ne peut se prononcer de manière définitive sur le retour d’une deuxième vague épidémique ou la création d’un vaccin. Bien malin serait le commentateur capable d’anticiper la reprise, ou non, de la contestation des gilets jaunes. Et quel économiste saurait prédire l’arbitrage des Français entre épargne et consommation dans les semaines à venir ? (…) Face à la menace, 'le réflexe de tout individu est de s’arrêter et d’évaluer la situation, avant de repartir ou de prendre la fuite', assure la chercheuse Marie-Claire Villeval, spécialiste d’économie comportementale. Les ménages s’arrêtent de consommer et les chefs d’entreprise d’investir. Les décisions sont remises à plus tard. Un luxe que les gouvernants ne peuvent pas se permettre, s'exclame La Croix. Il va bien falloir trancher, dans les heures ou les jours qui viennent, sur le fait de savoir si tous les élèves vont reprendre les cours, si les restaurants rouvrir et si les Français pouvoir se déplacer au-delà des 100 km. Comme il a fallu trancher sur le confinement… et le rythme du déconfinement. » Déconfinement : phase 2 Justement, cette semaine le gouvernement devrait apporter des précisions sur la suite du déconfinement et les grandes vacances. Ça va être « la semaine de toutes les annonces », s'exclame Le Courrier Picard en première page. « Le Premier ministre, Édouard Philippe, devrait annoncer les arbitrages sur la deuxième phase du plan de déconfinement, jeudi, à l’issue d’un conseil de défense réuni par Emmanuel Macron à l’Élysée. Au menu notamment : la réouverture des bars et restaurants, qui trépignent de recevoir à nouveau des clients ou encore l’élargissement des 100 km. » Au menu également, la réouverture des parcs et jardins en zone rouge. Brouillard politique... Autres incertitudes, cette fois sur le plan politique. « Emmanuel Macron est en quête de solutions pour se relancer », pointe Le Figaro. Comment ? « Dans son entourage, on évoque, pêle-mêle, 'la convocation du Congrès à Versailles, un remaniement gouvernemental, un référendum et même une dissolution de l’Assemblée nationale'. (…) Des macronistes en vue vont encore plus loin, poursuit Le Figaro : ils évoquent le scénario explosif d’un référendum suivi d’une démission du chef de l’État. Lequel s’engagerait dans la foulée à se représenter. Une sorte de 'reset'. L’opposition serait prise de court avec une campagne se déroulant en 2021. Reste que cette formule constituerait un saut dans l’inconnu. » Raoult droit dans ses bottes En ces temps d'incertitudes, il y en a qui ont des certitudes... C'est le cas du professeur Didier Raoult. « Raoult persiste et signe », lance La Provence en Une. Le célèbre médecin marseillais a vivement réagi hier « à la publication de la récente étude parue dans The Lancet, étude qui remet en cause l’efficacité du traitement à l’hydroxy-chloroquine qu'il prône, concluant à sa dangerosité. L’OMS a d'ailleurs suspendu les essais cliniques. (…) 'Je ne vais pas changer d’avis à cause d’une étude foireuse', affirme le professeur Raoult. 'Je ne sais pas si ailleurs l’hydroxy-chloroquine tue, mais ici elle sauve des vies', persifle encore le médecin marseillais. Précisant qu’en cas de surdosage, 'c’est sûr, on peut se suicider avec l’hydroxy-chloroquine. Mais le Doliprane tue beaucoup plus, c’est la première cause d’intoxication dans le monde'. » Voilà pour la réaction du professeur Raoult, à lire donc dans La Provence. Le débat n'est sans doute pas terminé... Chine-USA : le bras-de-fer Autre grande interrogation, cette fois sur le plan mondial : comment va tourner la confrontation entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine ? « La dégradation des relations entre les deux puissances rivales, très nette depuis l’arrivée à la Maison Blanche de Donald Trump, s’est encore accélérée avec la pandémie du Covid-19, constate Libération. Entre propagande et accusations teintées de complotisme, les deux pays se considèrent désormais comme des ennemis. » Les sujets de friction sont nombreux, note le journal : il y a le bras de fer sur Hongkong, le relance de la guerre commerciale, le différend sur Taïwan, la répression sur les Ouïghours, et bien sûr les accusations mutuelles sur la pandémie de coronavirus. Alors, « un conflit militaire entre les deux géants est-il possible ? » Libération a posé la question à Nadège Rolland, chercheuse sur les questions politiques et de sécurité en Asie au National Bureau of Asian Research aux États-Unis. Oui, répond-elle. Tout pourrait se jouer autour de Taïwan : « il est très difficile de savoir si l’équipe chinoise au pouvoir veut vraiment faire un coup de force pour obtenir la 'réunification'. (…) Mais Pékin joue un jeu extrêmement dangereux et fait peut-être une erreur de calcul, affirme la chercheuse. Car Washington est toujours engagé par le Taiwan Relations Act de 1979 à protéger l’île. Le fait que cette dernière soit un modèle de démocratie est revenu sur le devant de la scène durant l’épidémie, et c’est crucial pour l’opinion publique américaine. » Alors, conclut Nadège Rolland, « intervenir demanderait une logistique gigantesque, mais ce n’est pas impossible. »

This teleforum provides a wide-ranging discussion on the recent developments in the China-Taiwan relationship. It explores the role that the United States may have in light of Taiwan Relations Act obligations and regional stability to provide both assurance and support to our ally, Taiwan, while - at the same time - examining concerns over the range of Chinese reactions. Featuring: -- Dr. June Teufel Dreyer, Professor of Political Science, University of Miami, Coral Gables-- Prof. Julian Ku, Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Faculty Director of International Programs, and Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University-- Moderator: Saul Newsome, Attorney, Newsome International Law, LLC

This teleforum provides a wide-ranging discussion on the recent developments in the China-Taiwan relationship. It explores the role that the United States may have in light of Taiwan Relations Act obligations and regional stability to provide both assurance and support to our ally, Taiwan, while - at the same time - examining concerns over the range of Chinese reactions. Featuring: -- Dr. June Teufel Dreyer, Professor of Political Science, University of Miami, Coral Gables-- Prof. Julian Ku, Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Faculty Director of International Programs, and Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University-- Moderator: Saul Newsome, Attorney, Newsome International Law, LLC

Welcome to the first episode. Today, we discuss the changing landscape of Asia-Pacific security, its implications on Taiwan, and the role that partners like the U.S. plays. Today's guest is Dr. Kharis Templeman - a political scientist and an advisor on the Taiwan Democracy and Security Project at Stanford University. Hosted by J.R. Wu - Chief of the Secretariat for INDSR (Institute for National Defense and Security Research) in Taiwan. Wu is a former journalist with nearly two decades of media experience in the US and Asia. She has led news bureaus for Reuters and Dow Jones. At INDSR, Wu advises the institute’s leadership, handles international outreach with external stakeholders, and supports project management. Support the show by donating on patron.com/Taiwan | Follow us on Twitter @ghostislandme.EPISODE CREDIT | J.R. Wu, Host | Emily Y. Wu @emilyywu, Producer, Editor | Sam Robbins @helloitissam, Research | Thomas Lee, Brand Design | Music license MB01ZAK7RWFCG4W | a Ghost Island Media production | www.ghostisland.media

What are the details of the "Shanghai Communiqué," the joint diplomatic declaration by President Nixon and China's leadership, after the American President's historic trip to China in February 1972? And why is it relevant today? To examine this consequential document, we are joined by Martin B. Gold, author, attorney, lecturer at George Washington University, and floor advisor and counsel to the offices of senate majority leader Bill Frist and Howard Baker. He is the author of several books, including "Senate Procedure and Practice" and "A Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act." Interview by Jonathan Movroydis. Read the Shanghai Communiqué: https://cdn.nixonlibrary.org/01/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/19110408/Joint-Communique.pdf Read the Transcript: https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2019/10/podcast-martin-g…nghai-communique/

In this, the 40th year of the Taiwan Relations Act, it bears evaluating the state of the Taiwan-US relationship. There are many positive signs, arms sales, significant unofficial diplomatic contact, and a peak in Congressional activity. There are also signs of reserve on the part of the US administration, including uncertainty over the sale of F-16 fighter jets that have been under consideration for more than 10 years, a failure to pick up on the idea of a US-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement, and a low key opening of the new American Institute in Taiwan. On the other side of the relationship, Taipei is election season, with a range of possible outcomes. So where are US-Taiwan relations to day and where are they headed in the short to medium term. Please join us for an assessment, led by Deputy Foreign Minster Szu-chien Hsu and a discussion with leading experts on the relationship from both sides of the relationship. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

"Taiwan Relations Act at 40: Where We've Been, and What's Next?" Panel Discussion B: "TRA - New Opportunities."

"Taiwan Relations Act at 40: Where We've Been, and What's Next?" Panel Discussion A: "TRA - Foundation for Progress."

"Taiwan Relations Act at 40: Where We've Been, and What's Next?" Panel Discussion A: "TRA - Foundation for Progress."

"Taiwan Relations Act at 40: Where We've Been, and What's Next?" Panel Discussion B: "TRA - New Opportunities."

U.S.-Taiwan relations have long been an ingenious balancing act of "strategic ambiguity." What does the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act entail and why is it important, not only to Taiwan, but to U.S.-China relations and indeed security across Asia? Legendary China expert Jerome Cohen unpacks the history of Taiwan since 1895, its current situation and legal status, and what this could mean for Asia and the United States.

U.S.-Taiwan relations have long been an ingenious balancing act of "strategic ambiguity." What does the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act entail and why is it important, not only to Taiwan, but to U.S.-China relations and indeed security across Asia? Legendary China expert Jerome Cohen unpacks the history of Taiwan since 1895, its current situation and legal status, and what this could mean for Asia and the United States.

Where did President Nixon’s historic trip to China in 1972 and official normalization between the two countries in 1979 leave Taiwan, the small and thriving Asian democracy that had been a staunch ally of the United States in the Cold War era. On this edition of the podcast we speak with Martin B. Gold. Mr. Gold is author of "A Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act: Bridging the Straight." His book examines the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which defined U.S.-Taiwan relations after the United States diplomatic recognition of China. It analyzes how the legislation was shaped after extensive hearings, lengthy debates, and shared disagreement in Congress eventually achieved broad consensus. Gold is an an attorney in Washington and on the faculty of at the Graduate School of Political Management at George Washington University. He knows the subject well because he worked as a senior staffer for a decade when this all took place. First for Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and then Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker (R-TN). Senator Orrin Harch of Utah says this of "A Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act:" “Gold reminds us of a time when policies were crafted and ideas were considered based on both particular interests and arguments in favor of the common good.” Interview by Jonathan Movroydis.

In this episode we assess the status of U.S.-Taiwan relations. CSIS Senior Associate Dr. Robert Wang discusses how relations between Washington and Taipei have changed since 1979, reviews the Taiwan Relations Act (2:39), and explains how young people are playing a pivotal role in shaping Taiwan’s democracy (4:36). He also describes how Taiwan’s economic slowdown gives China additional leverage in cross-strait relations (8:42), examines U.S. policy options to aid Taiwan from his recent report (11:06), and evaluates the implications for U.S. standing in the region (16:42). Hosted by Will Colson. Audio edited by Frances Burkham. Written and produced by Jeffrey Bean.