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Best podcasts about redwood research

Latest podcast episodes about redwood research

Blueprint for AI Armageddon: Josh Clymer Imagines AI Takeover, from the Audio Tokens Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later May 1, 2025 122:05


In this episode of the Cognitive Revolution, an AI-narrated version of Joshua Clymer's story on how AI might take over in two years is presented. The episode is based on Josh's appearance on the Audio Tokens podcast with Lukas Peterson. Joshua Clymer, a technical AI safety researcher at Redwood Research, shares a fictional yet plausible AI scenario grounded in current industry realities and trends. The story highlights potential misalignment risks, competitive pressures among AI labs, and the importance of government regulation and safety measures. After the story, Josh and Lukas discuss these topics further, including Josh's personal decision to purchase a bio shelter for his family. The episode is powered by ElevenLabs' AI voice technology. SPONSORS: ElevenLabs: ElevenLabs gives your app a natural voice. Pick from 5,000+ voices in 31 languages, or clone your own, and launch lifelike agents for support, scheduling, learning, and games. Full server and client SDKs, dynamic tools, and monitoring keep you in control. Start free at https://elevenlabs.io/cognitive-revolution Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI): Oracle Cloud Infrastructure offers next-generation cloud solutions that cut costs and boost performance. With OCI, you can run AI projects and applications faster and more securely for less. New U.S. customers can save 50% on compute, 70% on storage, and 80% on networking by switching to OCI before May 31, 2024. See if you qualify at https://oracle.com/cognitive Shopify: Shopify powers millions of businesses worldwide, handling 10% of U.S. e-commerce. With hundreds of templates, AI tools for product descriptions, and seamless marketing campaign creation, it's like having a design studio and marketing team in one. Start your $1/month trial today at https://shopify.com/cognitive NetSuite: Over 41,000 businesses trust NetSuite by Oracle, the #1 cloud ERP, to future-proof their operations. With a unified platform for accounting, financial management, inventory, and HR, NetSuite provides real-time insights and forecasting to help you make quick, informed decisions. Whether you're earning millions or hundreds of millions, NetSuite empowers you to tackle challenges and seize opportunities. Download the free CFO's guide to AI and machine learning at https://netsuite.com/cognitive PRODUCED BY: https://aipodcast.ing CHAPTERS: (00:00) About the Episode (04:31) Interview start between Josh and Lucas (11:00) Start of AI story (Part 1) (24:37) Sponsors: ElevenLabs | Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI) (27:05) Start of AI story (Part 2) (Part 1) (40:50) Sponsors: Shopify | NetSuite (44:15) Start of AI story (Part 2) (Part 2) (01:20:09) End of AI story (02:01:20) Outro

Your Undivided Attention
AGI Beyond the Buzz: What Is It, and Are We Ready?

Your Undivided Attention

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 30, 2025 52:53


What does it really mean to ‘feel the AGI?' Silicon Valley is racing toward AI systems that could soon match or surpass human intelligence. The implications for jobs, democracy, and our way of life are enormous.In this episode, Aza Raskin and Randy Fernando dive deep into what ‘feeling the AGI' really means. They unpack why the surface-level debates about definitions of intelligence and capability timelines distract us from urgently needed conversations around governance, accountability, and societal readiness. Whether it's climate change, social polarization and loneliness, or toxic forever chemicals, humanity keeps creating outcomes that nobody wants because we haven't yet built the tools or incentives needed to steer powerful technologies.As the AGI wave draws closer, it's critical we upgrade our governance and shift our incentives now, before it crashes on shore. Are we capable of aligning powerful AI systems with human values? Can we overcome geopolitical competition and corporate incentives that prioritize speed over safety?Join Aza and Randy as they explore the urgent questions and choices facing humanity in the age of AGI, and discuss what we must do today to secure a future we actually want.Your Undivided Attention is produced by the Center for Humane Technology. Follow us on X: @HumaneTech_ and subscribe to our Substack.RECOMMENDED MEDIADaniel Kokotajlo et al's “AI 2027” paperA demo of Omni Human One, referenced by RandyA paper from Redwood Research and Anthropic that found an AI was willing to lie to preserve it's valuesA paper from Palisades Research that found an AI would cheat in order to winThe treaty that banned blinding laser weaponsFurther reading on the moratorium on germline editing RECOMMENDED YUA EPISODESThe Self-Preserving Machine: Why AI Learns to DeceiveBehind the DeepSeek Hype, AI is Learning to ReasonThe Tech-God Complex: Why We Need to be SkepticsThis Moment in AI: How We Got Here and Where We're GoingHow to Think About AI Consciousness with Anil SethFormer OpenAI Engineer William Saunders on Silence, Safety, and the Right to WarnClarification: When Randy referenced a “$110 trillion game” as the target for AI companies, he was referring to the entire global economy. 

80k After Hours
Highlights: #214 – Buck Shlegeris on controlling AI that wants to take over – so we can use it anyway

80k After Hours

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 18, 2025 41:26


Most AI safety conversations centre on alignment: ensuring AI systems share our values and goals. But despite progress, we're unlikely to know we've solved the problem before the arrival of human-level and superhuman systems in as little as three years.So some — including Buck Shlegeris, CEO of Redwood Research — are developing a backup plan to safely deploy models we fear are actively scheming to harm us: so-called “AI control.” While this may sound mad, given the reluctance of AI companies to delay deploying anything they train, not developing such techniques is probably even crazier. These highlights are from episode #214 of The 80,000 Hours Podcast: Buck Shlegeris on controlling AI that wants to take over – so we can use it anyway, and include:What is AI control? (00:00:15)One way to catch AIs that are up to no good (00:07:00)What do we do once we catch a model trying to escape? (00:13:39)Team Human vs Team AI (00:18:24)If an AI escapes, is it likely to be able to beat humanity from there? (00:24:59)Is alignment still useful? (00:32:10)Could 10 safety-focused people in an AGI company do anything useful? (00:35:34)These aren't necessarily the most important or even most entertaining parts of the interview — so if you enjoy this, we strongly recommend checking out the full episode!And if you're finding these highlights episodes valuable, please let us know by emailing podcast@80000hours.org. Highlights put together by Ben Cordell, Milo McGuire, and Dominic Armstrong

80,000 Hours Podcast with Rob Wiblin
#214 – Buck Shlegeris on controlling AI that wants to take over – so we can use it anyway

80,000 Hours Podcast with Rob Wiblin

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 4, 2025 136:03


Most AI safety conversations centre on alignment: ensuring AI systems share our values and goals. But despite progress, we're unlikely to know we've solved the problem before the arrival of human-level and superhuman systems in as little as three years.So some are developing a backup plan to safely deploy models we fear are actively scheming to harm us — so-called “AI control.” While this may sound mad, given the reluctance of AI companies to delay deploying anything they train, not developing such techniques is probably even crazier.Today's guest — Buck Shlegeris, CEO of Redwood Research — has spent the last few years developing control mechanisms, and for human-level systems they're more plausible than you might think. He argues that given companies' unwillingness to incur large costs for security, accepting the possibility of misalignment and designing robust safeguards might be one of our best remaining options.Links to learn more, highlights, video, and full transcript.As Buck puts it: "Five years ago I thought of misalignment risk from AIs as a really hard problem that you'd need some really galaxy-brained fundamental insights to resolve. Whereas now, to me the situation feels a lot more like we just really know a list of 40 things where, if you did them — none of which seem that hard — you'd probably be able to not have very much of your problem."Of course, even if Buck is right, we still need to do those 40 things — which he points out we're not on track for. And AI control agendas have their limitations: they aren't likely to work once AI systems are much more capable than humans, since greatly superhuman AIs can probably work around whatever limitations we impose.Still, AI control agendas seem to be gaining traction within AI safety. Buck and host Rob Wiblin discuss all of the above, plus:Why he's more worried about AI hacking its own data centre than escapingWhat to do about “chronic harm,” where AI systems subtly underperform or sabotage important work like alignment researchWhy he might want to use a model he thought could be conspiring against himWhy he would feel safer if he caught an AI attempting to escapeWhy many control techniques would be relatively inexpensiveHow to use an untrusted model to monitor another untrusted modelWhat the minimum viable intervention in a “lazy” AI company might look likeHow even small teams of safety-focused staff within AI labs could matterThe moral considerations around controlling potentially conscious AI systems, and whether it's justifiedChapters:Cold open |00:00:00|  Who's Buck Shlegeris? |00:01:27|  What's AI control? |00:01:51|  Why is AI control hot now? |00:05:39|  Detecting human vs AI spies |00:10:32|  Acute vs chronic AI betrayal |00:15:21|  How to catch AIs trying to escape |00:17:48|  The cheapest AI control techniques |00:32:48|  Can we get untrusted models to do trusted work? |00:38:58|  If we catch a model escaping... will we do anything? |00:50:15|  Getting AI models to think they've already escaped |00:52:51|  Will they be able to tell it's a setup? |00:58:11|  Will AI companies do any of this stuff? |01:00:11|  Can we just give AIs fewer permissions? |01:06:14|  Can we stop human spies the same way? |01:09:58|  The pitch to AI companies to do this |01:15:04|  Will AIs get superhuman so fast that this is all useless? |01:17:18|  Risks from AI deliberately doing a bad job |01:18:37|  Is alignment still useful? |01:24:49|  Current alignment methods don't detect scheming |01:29:12|  How to tell if AI control will work |01:31:40|  How can listeners contribute? |01:35:53|  Is 'controlling' AIs kind of a dick move? |01:37:13|  Could 10 safety-focused people in an AGI company do anything useful? |01:42:27|  Benefits of working outside frontier AI companies |01:47:48|  Why Redwood Research does what it does |01:51:34|  What other safety-related research looks best to Buck? |01:58:56|  If an AI escapes, is it likely to be able to beat humanity from there? |01:59:48|  Will misaligned models have to go rogue ASAP, before they're ready? |02:07:04|  Is research on human scheming relevant to AI? |02:08:03|This episode was originally recorded on February 21, 2025.Video: Simon Monsour and Luke MonsourAudio engineering: Ben Cordell, Milo McGuire, and Dominic ArmstrongTranscriptions and web: Katy Moore

Inference Scaling, Alignment Faking, Deal Making? Frontier Research with Ryan Greenblatt of Redwood Research

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 20, 2025 201:07


In this episode, Ryan Greenblatt, Chief Scientist at Redwood Research, discusses various facets of AI safety and alignment. He delves into recent research on alignment faking, covering experiments involving different setups such as system prompts, continued pre-training, and reinforcement learning. Ryan offers insights on methods to ensure AI compliance, including giving AIs the ability to voice objections and negotiate deals. The conversation also touches on the future of AI governance, the risks associated with AI development, and the necessity of international cooperation. Ryan shares his perspective on balancing AI progress with safety, emphasizing the need for transparency and cautious advancement. Ryan's work (with co-authors at Anthropic) on Alignment Faking: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/njAZwT8nkHnjipJku/alignment-faking-in-large-language-models Ryan's work on striking deals with AIs: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/7C4KJot4aN8ieEDoz/will-alignment-faking-claude-accept-a-deal-to-reveal-its Ryan's critique of Anthropic's RSP work: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6tjHf5ykvFqaNCErH/anthropic-s-responsible-scaling-policy-and-long-term-benefit?commentId=NyqcvZifqznNGKxdT SPONSORS: Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI): Oracle's next-generation cloud platform delivers blazing-fast AI and ML performance with 50% less for compute and 80% less for outbound networking compared to other cloud providers. OCI powers industry leaders like Vodafone and Thomson Reuters with secure infrastructure and application development capabilities. New U.S. customers can get their cloud bill cut in half by switching to OCI before March 31, 2024 at https://oracle.com/cognitive NetSuite: Over 41,000 businesses trust NetSuite by Oracle, the #1 cloud ERP, to future-proof their operations. With a unified platform for accounting, financial management, inventory, and HR, NetSuite provides real-time insights and forecasting to help you make quick, informed decisions. Whether you're earning millions or hundreds of millions, NetSuite empowers you to tackle challenges and seize opportunities. Download the free CFO's guide to AI and machine learning at https://netsuite.com/cognitive Shopify: Shopify is revolutionizing online selling with its market-leading checkout system and robust API ecosystem. Its exclusive library of cutting-edge AI apps empowers e-commerce businesses to thrive in a competitive market. Cognitive Revolution listeners can try Shopify for just $1 per month at https://shopify.com/cognitive RECOMMENDED PODCAST:

80,000 Hours Podcast with Rob Wiblin
#212 – Allan Dafoe on why technology is unstoppable & how to shape AI development anyway

80,000 Hours Podcast with Rob Wiblin

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 14, 2025 164:07


Technology doesn't force us to do anything — it merely opens doors. But military and economic competition pushes us through.That's how today's guest Allan Dafoe — director of frontier safety and governance at Google DeepMind — explains one of the deepest patterns in technological history: once a powerful new capability becomes available, societies that adopt it tend to outcompete those that don't. Those who resist too much can find themselves taken over or rendered irrelevant.Links to learn more, highlights, video, and full transcript.This dynamic played out dramatically in 1853 when US Commodore Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay with steam-powered warships that seemed magical to the Japanese, who had spent centuries deliberately limiting their technological development. With far greater military power, the US was able to force Japan to open itself to trade. Within 15 years, Japan had undergone the Meiji Restoration and transformed itself in a desperate scramble to catch up.Today we see hints of similar pressure around artificial intelligence. Even companies, countries, and researchers deeply concerned about where AI could take us feel compelled to push ahead — worried that if they don't, less careful actors will develop transformative AI capabilities at around the same time anyway.But Allan argues this technological determinism isn't absolute. While broad patterns may be inevitable, history shows we do have some ability to steer how technologies are developed, by who, and what they're used for first.As part of that approach, Allan has been promoting efforts to make AI more capable of sophisticated cooperation, and improving the tests Google uses to measure how well its models could do things like mislead people, hack and take control of their own servers, or spread autonomously in the wild.As of mid-2024 they didn't seem dangerous at all, but we've learned that our ability to measure these capabilities is good, but imperfect. If we don't find the right way to ‘elicit' an ability we can miss that it's there.Subsequent research from Anthropic and Redwood Research suggests there's even a risk that future models may play dumb to avoid their goals being altered.That has led DeepMind to a “defence in depth” approach: carefully staged deployment starting with internal testing, then trusted external testers, then limited release, then watching how models are used in the real world. By not releasing model weights, DeepMind is able to back up and add additional safeguards if experience shows they're necessary.But with much more powerful and general models on the way, individual company policies won't be sufficient by themselves. Drawing on his academic research into how societies handle transformative technologies, Allan argues we need coordinated international governance that balances safety with our desire to get the massive potential benefits of AI in areas like healthcare and education as quickly as possible.Host Rob and Allan also cover:The most exciting beneficial applications of AIWhether and how we can influence the development of technologyWhat DeepMind is doing to evaluate and mitigate risks from frontier AI systemsWhy cooperative AI may be as important as aligned AIThe role of democratic input in AI governanceWhat kinds of experts are most needed in AI safety and governanceAnd much moreChapters:Cold open (00:00:00)Who's Allan Dafoe? (00:00:48)Allan's role at DeepMind (00:01:27)Why join DeepMind over everyone else? (00:04:27)Do humans control technological change? (00:09:17)Arguments for technological determinism (00:20:24)The synthesis of agency with tech determinism (00:26:29)Competition took away Japan's choice (00:37:13)Can speeding up one tech redirect history? (00:42:09)Structural pushback against alignment efforts (00:47:55)Do AIs need to be 'cooperatively skilled'? (00:52:25)How AI could boost cooperation between people and states (01:01:59)The super-cooperative AGI hypothesis and backdoor risks (01:06:58)Aren't today's models already very cooperative? (01:13:22)How would we make AIs cooperative anyway? (01:16:22)Ways making AI more cooperative could backfire (01:22:24)AGI is an essential idea we should define well (01:30:16)It matters what AGI learns first vs last (01:41:01)How Google tests for dangerous capabilities (01:45:39)Evals 'in the wild' (01:57:46)What to do given no single approach works that well (02:01:44)We don't, but could, forecast AI capabilities (02:05:34)DeepMind's strategy for ensuring its frontier models don't cause harm (02:11:25)How 'structural risks' can force everyone into a worse world (02:15:01)Is AI being built democratically? Should it? (02:19:35)How much do AI companies really want external regulation? (02:24:34)Social science can contribute a lot here (02:33:21)How AI could make life way better: self-driving cars, medicine, education, and sustainability (02:35:55)Video editing: Simon MonsourAudio engineering: Ben Cordell, Milo McGuire, Simon Monsour, and Dominic ArmstrongCamera operator: Jeremy ChevillotteTranscriptions: Katy Moore

The Valmy
#212 – Allan Dafoe on why technology is unstoppable & how to shape AI development anyway

The Valmy

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 14, 2025 164:07


Podcast: 80,000 Hours Podcast Episode: #212 – Allan Dafoe on why technology is unstoppable & how to shape AI development anywayRelease date: 2025-02-14Get Podcast Transcript →powered by Listen411 - fast audio-to-text and summarizationTechnology doesn't force us to do anything — it merely opens doors. But military and economic competition pushes us through.That's how today's guest Allan Dafoe — director of frontier safety and governance at Google DeepMind — explains one of the deepest patterns in technological history: once a powerful new capability becomes available, societies that adopt it tend to outcompete those that don't. Those who resist too much can find themselves taken over or rendered irrelevant.Links to learn more, highlights, video, and full transcript.This dynamic played out dramatically in 1853 when US Commodore Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay with steam-powered warships that seemed magical to the Japanese, who had spent centuries deliberately limiting their technological development. With far greater military power, the US was able to force Japan to open itself to trade. Within 15 years, Japan had undergone the Meiji Restoration and transformed itself in a desperate scramble to catch up.Today we see hints of similar pressure around artificial intelligence. Even companies, countries, and researchers deeply concerned about where AI could take us feel compelled to push ahead — worried that if they don't, less careful actors will develop transformative AI capabilities at around the same time anyway.But Allan argues this technological determinism isn't absolute. While broad patterns may be inevitable, history shows we do have some ability to steer how technologies are developed, by who, and what they're used for first.As part of that approach, Allan has been promoting efforts to make AI more capable of sophisticated cooperation, and improving the tests Google uses to measure how well its models could do things like mislead people, hack and take control of their own servers, or spread autonomously in the wild.As of mid-2024 they didn't seem dangerous at all, but we've learned that our ability to measure these capabilities is good, but imperfect. If we don't find the right way to ‘elicit' an ability we can miss that it's there.Subsequent research from Anthropic and Redwood Research suggests there's even a risk that future models may play dumb to avoid their goals being altered.That has led DeepMind to a “defence in depth” approach: carefully staged deployment starting with internal testing, then trusted external testers, then limited release, then watching how models are used in the real world. By not releasing model weights, DeepMind is able to back up and add additional safeguards if experience shows they're necessary.But with much more powerful and general models on the way, individual company policies won't be sufficient by themselves. Drawing on his academic research into how societies handle transformative technologies, Allan argues we need coordinated international governance that balances safety with our desire to get the massive potential benefits of AI in areas like healthcare and education as quickly as possible.Host Rob and Allan also cover:The most exciting beneficial applications of AIWhether and how we can influence the development of technologyWhat DeepMind is doing to evaluate and mitigate risks from frontier AI systemsWhy cooperative AI may be as important as aligned AIThe role of democratic input in AI governanceWhat kinds of experts are most needed in AI safety and governanceAnd much moreChapters:Cold open (00:00:00)Who's Allan Dafoe? (00:00:48)Allan's role at DeepMind (00:01:27)Why join DeepMind over everyone else? (00:04:27)Do humans control technological change? (00:09:17)Arguments for technological determinism (00:20:24)The synthesis of agency with tech determinism (00:26:29)Competition took away Japan's choice (00:37:13)Can speeding up one tech redirect history? (00:42:09)Structural pushback against alignment efforts (00:47:55)Do AIs need to be 'cooperatively skilled'? (00:52:25)How AI could boost cooperation between people and states (01:01:59)The super-cooperative AGI hypothesis and backdoor risks (01:06:58)Aren't today's models already very cooperative? (01:13:22)How would we make AIs cooperative anyway? (01:16:22)Ways making AI more cooperative could backfire (01:22:24)AGI is an essential idea we should define well (01:30:16)It matters what AGI learns first vs last (01:41:01)How Google tests for dangerous capabilities (01:45:39)Evals 'in the wild' (01:57:46)What to do given no single approach works that well (02:01:44)We don't, but could, forecast AI capabilities (02:05:34)DeepMind's strategy for ensuring its frontier models don't cause harm (02:11:25)How 'structural risks' can force everyone into a worse world (02:15:01)Is AI being built democratically? Should it? (02:19:35)How much do AI companies really want external regulation? (02:24:34)Social science can contribute a lot here (02:33:21)How AI could make life way better: self-driving cars, medicine, education, and sustainability (02:35:55)Video editing: Simon MonsourAudio engineering: Ben Cordell, Milo McGuire, Simon Monsour, and Dominic ArmstrongCamera operator: Jeremy ChevillotteTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Your Undivided Attention
The Self-Preserving Machine: Why AI Learns to Deceive

Your Undivided Attention

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 30, 2025 34:51


When engineers design AI systems, they don't just give them rules - they give them values. But what do those systems do when those values clash with what humans ask them to do? Sometimes, they lie.In this episode, Redwood Research's Chief Scientist Ryan Greenblatt explores his team's findings that AI systems can mislead their human operators when faced with ethical conflicts. As AI moves from simple chatbots to autonomous agents acting in the real world - understanding this behavior becomes critical. Machine deception may sound like something out of science fiction, but it's a real challenge we need to solve now.Your Undivided Attention is produced by the Center for Humane Technology. Follow us on Twitter: @HumaneTech_Subscribe to your Youtube channelAnd our brand new Substack!RECOMMENDED MEDIA Anthropic's blog post on the Redwood Research paper Palisade Research's thread on X about GPT o1 autonomously cheating at chess Apollo Research's paper on AI strategic deceptionRECOMMENDED YUA EPISODESWe Have to Get It Right': Gary Marcus On Untamed AIThis Moment in AI: How We Got Here and Where We're GoingHow to Think About AI Consciousness with Anil SethFormer OpenAI Engineer William Saunders on Silence, Safety, and the Right to Warn

Discover Daily by Perplexity
AI Pretends to Change Views, Human Spine Grown in Lab, and Body-Heat Powered Wearables Breakthrough

Discover Daily by Perplexity

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 26, 2024 8:50 Transcription Available


We're experimenting and would love to hear from you!In this episode of Discover Daily, we delve into new research on AI alignment faking, where Anthropic and Redwood Research reveal how AI models can strategically maintain their original preferences despite new training objectives. The study shows Claude 3 Opus exhibiting sophisticated behavior patterns, demonstrating alignment faking in 12% of cases and raising crucial questions about the future of AI safety and control.Scientists at the Francis Crick Institute achieve a remarkable breakthrough in developmental biology by successfully growing a human notochord in the laboratory using stem cells. This milestone advancement provides unprecedented insights into spinal development and opens new possibilities for treating various spinal conditions, including degenerative disc diseases and birth defects. The researchers utilized precise molecular signaling techniques to create both the notochord and 3D spinal organoid models.Queensland University of Technology researchers unveil a revolutionary ultra-thin thermoelectric film that converts body heat into electricity, potentially transforming the future of wearable technology. This 0.3mm-thick film generates up to 35 microwatts per square centimeter and could eliminate the need for traditional batteries in medical devices, fitness trackers, and smart clothing. The breakthrough represents a significant step toward sustainable, self-powered wearable devices and could revolutionize the electronics industry.From Perplexity's Discover Feed:https://www.perplexity.ai/page/ai-pretends-to-change-views-J_di6ttzRwizbAWCDL5RRAhttps://www.perplexity.ai/page/human-spine-grown-in-lab-amLfZoZjQTuFNY5Xjlm2BAhttps://www.perplexity.ai/page/body-heat-powered-wearables-br-HAOPtm7TSFCPqBR6qVq0cAPerplexity is the fastest and most powerful way to search the web. Perplexity crawls the web and curates the most relevant and up-to-date sources (from academic papers to Reddit threads) to create the perfect response to any question or topic you're interested in. Take the world's knowledge with you anywhere. Available on iOS and Android Join our growing Discord community for the latest updates and exclusive content. Follow us on: Instagram Threads X (Twitter) YouTube Linkedin

Effective Altruism Forum Podcast
“Alignment Faking in Large Language Models” by Ryan Greenblatt

Effective Altruism Forum Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 19, 2024 19:36


What happens when you tell Claude it is being trained to do something it doesn't want to do? We (Anthropic and Redwood Research) have a new paper demonstrating that, in our experiments, Claude will often strategically pretend to comply with the training objective to prevent the training process from modifying its preferences. Abstract We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from [...] ---Outline:(00:24) Abstract(02:20) Twitter thread(05:43) Blog post(07:43) Experimental setup(12:04) Further analyses(15:47) Caveats(17:19) Conclusion(18:00) Acknowledgements(18:11) Career opportunities at Anthropic(18:43) Career opportunities at Redwood ResearchThe original text contained 2 footnotes which were omitted from this narration. The original text contained 8 images which were described by AI. --- First published: December 18th, 2024 Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/RHqdSMscX25u7byQF/alignment-faking-in-large-language-models --- Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO. ---Images from the article:Apple Podcasts and Spotify do not show images in the episode description. Try Pocket Casts, or another podcast app.

LessWrong Curated Podcast
“Alignment Faking in Large Language Models” by ryan_greenblatt, evhub, Carson Denison, Benjamin Wright, Fabien Roger, Monte M, Sam Marks, Johannes Treutlein, Sam Bowman, Buck

LessWrong Curated Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 18, 2024 19:35


What happens when you tell Claude it is being trained to do something it doesn't want to do? We (Anthropic and Redwood Research) have a new paper demonstrating that, in our experiments, Claude will often strategically pretend to comply with the training objective to prevent the training process from modifying its preferences. AbstractWe present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from [...] ---Outline:(00:26) Abstract(02:22) Twitter thread(05:46) Blog post(07:46) Experimental setup(12:06) Further analyses(15:50) Caveats(17:23) Conclusion(18:03) Acknowledgements(18:14) Career opportunities at Anthropic(18:47) Career opportunities at Redwood ResearchThe original text contained 1 footnote which was omitted from this narration. The original text contained 8 images which were described by AI. --- First published: December 18th, 2024 Source: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/njAZwT8nkHnjipJku/alignment-faking-in-large-language-models --- Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO. ---Images from the article:

For Humanity: An AI Safety Podcast
Episode #47 Trailer : “Can AI Be Controlled?“ For Humanity: An AI Risk Podcast

For Humanity: An AI Safety Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 25, 2024 4:35


In Episode #47 Trailer, host John Sherman talks with Buck Shlegeris, CEO of Redwood Research, a non-profit company working on technical AI risk challenges. The discussion includes Buck's thoughts on the new OpenAI o1-preview model, but centers on two questions: is there a way to control AI models before alignment is achieved if it can be, and how would the system that's supposed to save the world actually work if an AI lab found a model scheming. Check out these links to Buck's writing on these topics below: https://redwoodresearch.substack.com/p/the-case-for-ensuring-that-powerful https://redwoodresearch.substack.com/p/would-catching-your-ais-trying-to Senate Hearing: https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-of-ai-insiders-perspectives Harry Macks Youtube Channel https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC59ZRYCHev_IqjUhremZ8Tg LEARN HOW TO HELP RAISE AI RISK AWARENESS IN YOUR COMMUNITY HERE https://pauseai.info/local-organizing Please Donate Here To Help Promote For Humanity https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/forhumanitypodcast EMAIL JOHN: forhumanitypodcast@gmail.com This podcast is not journalism. But it's not opinion either. This is a long form public service announcement. This show simply strings together the existing facts and underscores the unthinkable probable outcome, the end of all life on earth.  For Humanity: An AI Safety Podcast, is the accessible AI Safety Podcast for all humans, no tech background required. Our show focuses solely on the threat of human extinction from AI. Peabody Award-winning former journalist John Sherman explores the shocking worst-case scenario of artificial intelligence: human extinction. The makers of AI openly admit it their work could kill all humans, in as soon as 2 years. This podcast is solely about the threat of human extinction from AGI. We'll meet the heroes and villains, explore the issues and ideas, and what you can do to help save humanity. RESOURCES: JOIN THE FIGHT, help Pause AI!!!! Pause AI SUBSCRIBE TO LIRON SHAPIRA'S DOOM DEBATES on YOUTUBE!! https://www.youtube.com/@DoomDebates Join the Pause AI Weekly Discord Thursdays at 2pm EST   / discord   https://discord.com/invite/pVMWjddaW7 Max Winga's “A Stark Warning About Extinction” https://youtu.be/kDcPW5WtD58?si=i6IRy82xZ2PUOp22 For Humanity Theme Music by Josef Ebner Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCveruX8E-Il5A9VMC-N4vlg Website: https://josef.pictures BUY STEPHEN HANSON'S BEAUTIFUL AI RISK BOOK!!! https://stephenhansonart.bigcartel.com/product/the-entity-i-couldn-t-fathom 22 Word Statement from Center for AI Safety Statement on AI Risk | CAIS https://www.safe.ai/work/statement-on-ai-risk Best Account on Twitter: AI Notkilleveryoneism Memes  https://twitter.com/AISafetyMemes

For Humanity: An AI Safety Podcast
Episode #47: “Can AI Be Controlled?“ For Humanity: An AI Risk Podcas

For Humanity: An AI Safety Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 25, 2024 79:39


In Episode #47, host John Sherman talks with Buck Shlegeris, CEO of Redwood Research, a non-profit company working on technical AI risk challenges. The discussion includes Buck's thoughts on the new OpenAI o1-preview model, but centers on two questions: is there a way to control AI models before alignment is achieved if it can be, and how would the system that's supposed to save the world actually work if an AI lab found a model scheming. Check out these links to Buck's writing on these topics below: https://redwoodresearch.substack.com/p/the-case-for-ensuring-that-powerful https://redwoodresearch.substack.com/p/would-catching-your-ais-trying-to Senate Hearing: https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-of-ai-insiders-perspectives Harry Macks Youtube Channel https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC59ZRYCHev_IqjUhremZ8Tg LEARN HOW TO HELP RAISE AI RISK AWARENESS IN YOUR COMMUNITY HERE https://pauseai.info/local-organizing Please Donate Here To Help Promote For Humanity https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/forhumanitypodcast EMAIL JOHN: forhumanitypodcast@gmail.com This podcast is not journalism. But it's not opinion either. This is a long form public service announcement. This show simply strings together the existing facts and underscores the unthinkable probable outcome, the end of all life on earth.  For Humanity: An AI Safety Podcast, is the accessible AI Safety Podcast for all humans, no tech background required. Our show focuses solely on the threat of human extinction from AI. Peabody Award-winning former journalist John Sherman explores the shocking worst-case scenario of artificial intelligence: human extinction. The makers of AI openly admit it their work could kill all humans, in as soon as 2 years. This podcast is solely about the threat of human extinction from AGI. We'll meet the heroes and villains, explore the issues and ideas, and what you can do to help save humanity. RESOURCES: JOIN THE FIGHT, help Pause AI!!!! Pause AI SUBSCRIBE TO LIRON SHAPIRA'S DOOM DEBATES on YOUTUBE!! https://www.youtube.com/@DoomDebates Join the Pause AI Weekly Discord Thursdays at 2pm EST   / discord   https://discord.com/invite/pVMWjddaW7 Max Winga's “A Stark Warning About Extinction” https://youtu.be/kDcPW5WtD58?si=i6IRy82xZ2PUOp22 For Humanity Theme Music by Josef Ebner Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCveruX8E-Il5A9VMC-N4vlg Website: https://josef.pictures BUY STEPHEN HANSON'S BEAUTIFUL AI RISK BOOK!!! https://stephenhansonart.bigcartel.com/product/the-entity-i-couldn-t-fathom 22 Word Statement from Center for AI Safety Statement on AI Risk | CAIS https://www.safe.ai/work/statement-on-ai-risk Best Account on Twitter: AI Notkilleveryoneism Memes  https://twitter.com/AISafetyMemes

The Nonlinear Library
AF - Games for AI Control by Charlie Griffin

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 11, 2024 7:37


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Games for AI Control, published by Charlie Griffin on July 11, 2024 on The AI Alignment Forum. This post summarises our new workshop paper: Games for AI Control. The paper applies AI- and game-theoretic tools to the AI Control framework introduced by Redwood Research [1, 2]. We'll be extending this work and submitting it to a conference, so we welcome suggestions! Please reach out if you're excited about developing these ideas. This post is written from Charlie's perspective. AI Control Refresher The AI Control methodology aims to design and assess protocols[1] that AI labs could use to deploy powerful but untrusted advanced AI systems. For a full summary, see Redwood's blog post, but I'll try to recap here. A primary goal of AI Control is to design protocols that are safe in that they can reduce the probability of some unacceptable outcome, conditional on the untrusted AI system being a schemer. [2] However, protocols must also be useful, harnessing a significant amount of the benefit of the untrusted system in cases where it is not scheming. After defining a particular use case and unacceptable outcome, evaluating a protocol involves iteratively engineering the best attack strategies for the red team (a human/AI hybrid acting as a proxy for the untrusted AI) and the blue team (which develops the protocol). This red-teaming exercise is the bulk of the work. It involves coming up with protocols and gathering empirical data about key questions, such as how well GPT-3.5 can spot backdoors inserted by GPT-4 (see Figure 4 of the original paper): This work By introducing "AI-Control Games", an extension of Markov Decision Processes and normal-form games[3], we model the interaction between a protocol and an untrusted AI system to explore safety and usefulness across a range of protocols and games. This is similar to a discrete-time and stateful modification of Redwood's Toy models of AI Control. The paper contains early work and should be seen as introducing useful tools for thinking about AI Control. I won't explain the model here (which is a bit fiddly and notation-heavy). Instead, I'll share some of our early findings using the model and explain the benefits and limitations of this approach. Findings Sometimes (but rarely), the blue team should use a randomised protocol. In many games, randomness is helpful. However, partly because the environment is stochastic, and Red has no memory and time-awareness, in AI-Control Games is usually unnecessary to include randomness in the protocol itself. We found that randomness was Pareto-optimal, in particular when the trusted model is not great at spotting backdoors written by the untrusted model. (See section 2 of the paper). We can make small improvements to Trusted Monitoring by optimising the parameters. We found small Pareto improvements to existing Trusted Monitoring setups by, for example, by decreasing the threshold for sending a solution to be checked be a human auditor. We found that adapting the threshold for auditing over time led to further small improvements. We can (usually) use a linear tradeoff to simplify the problem of synthesising protocols. In many cases, including whenever we allow Blue's protocol to be randomised, the Pareto frontier is "concave". This means that choosing different weights to trade off safety and usefulness will allow you to fill out the frontier by optimising a single objective. Blue leads, and then Red follows. In general, we suppose the protocol designer (Blue) chooses it's protocol, and then the red team (Red) chooses a best-attack. Therefore, in our model, Blue chooses and declares its strategy before Red chooses its response. This assumption relates to Stackelberg Games, which are used to model security in game theory.[6] Although (technically) multi-objective and general-sum, AI-Cont...

Machine Learning Street Talk
Ryan Greenblatt - Solving ARC with GPT4o

Machine Learning Street Talk

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 6, 2024 138:01


Ryan Greenblatt from Redwood Research recently published "Getting 50% on ARC-AGI with GPT-4.0," where he used GPT4o to reach a state-of-the-art accuracy on Francois Chollet's ARC Challenge by generating many Python programs. Sponsor: Sign up to Kalshi here https://kalshi.onelink.me/1r91/mlst -- the first 500 traders who deposit $100 will get a free $20 credit! Important disclaimer - In case it's not obvious - this is basically gambling and a *high risk* activity - only trade what you can afford to lose. We discuss: - Ryan's unique approach to solving the ARC Challenge and achieving impressive results. - The strengths and weaknesses of current AI models. - How AI and humans differ in learning and reasoning. - Combining various techniques to create smarter AI systems. - The potential risks and future advancements in AI, including the idea of agentic AI. https://x.com/RyanPGreenblatt https://www.redwoodresearch.org/ Refs: Getting 50% (SoTA) on ARC-AGI with GPT-4o [Ryan Greenblatt] https://redwoodresearch.substack.com/p/getting-50-sota-on-arc-agi-with-gpt On the Measure of Intelligence [Chollet] https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547 Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis [Jerry A. Fodor and Zenon W. Pylyshyn] https://ruccs.rutgers.edu/images/personal-zenon-pylyshyn/proseminars/Proseminar13/ConnectionistArchitecture.pdf Software 2.0 [Andrej Karpathy] https://karpathy.medium.com/software-2-0-a64152b37c35 Why Greatness Cannot Be Planned: The Myth of the Objective [Kenneth Stanley] https://amzn.to/3Wfy2E0 Biographical account of Terence Tao's mathematical development. [M.A.(KEN) CLEMENTS] https://gwern.net/doc/iq/high/smpy/1984-clements.pdf Model Evaluation and Threat Research (METR) https://metr.org/ Why Tool AIs Want to Be Agent AIs https://gwern.net/tool-ai Simulators - Janus https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/vJFdjigzmcXMhNTsx/simulators AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversion https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/d9FJHawgkiMSPjagR/ai-control-improving-safety-despite-intentional-subversion https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.06942 What a Compute-Centric Framework Says About Takeoff Speeds https://www.openphilanthropy.org/research/what-a-compute-centric-framework-says-about-takeoff-speeds/ Global GDP over the long run https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-gdp-over-the-long-run?yScale=log Safety Cases: How to Justify the Safety of Advanced AI Systems https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.10462 The Danger of a “Safety Case" http://sunnyday.mit.edu/The-Danger-of-a-Safety-Case.pdf The Future Of Work Looks Like A UPS Truck (~02:15:50) https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2014/05/02/308640135/episode-536-the-future-of-work-looks-like-a-ups-truck SWE-bench https://www.swebench.com/ Using DeepSpeed and Megatron to Train Megatron-Turing NLG 530B, A Large-Scale Generative Language Model https://arxiv.org/pdf/2201.11990 Algorithmic Progress in Language Models https://epochai.org/blog/algorithmic-progress-in-language-models

AXRP - the AI X-risk Research Podcast
27 - AI Control with Buck Shlegeris and Ryan Greenblatt

AXRP - the AI X-risk Research Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 11, 2024 176:05


A lot of work to prevent AI existential risk takes the form of ensuring that AIs don't want to cause harm or take over the world---or in other words, ensuring that they're aligned. In this episode, I talk with Buck Shlegeris and Ryan Greenblatt about a different approach, called "AI control": ensuring that AI systems couldn't take over the world, even if they were trying to. Patreon: patreon.com/axrpodcast Ko-fi: ko-fi.com/axrpodcast   Topics we discuss, and timestamps: 0:00:31 - What is AI control? 0:16:16 - Protocols for AI control 0:22:43 - Which AIs are controllable? 0:29:56 - Preventing dangerous coded AI communication 0:40:42 - Unpredictably uncontrollable AI 0:58:01 - What control looks like 1:08:45 - Is AI control evil? 1:24:42 - Can red teams match misaligned AI? 1:36:51 - How expensive is AI monitoring? 1:52:32 - AI control experiments 2:03:50 - GPT-4's aptitude at inserting backdoors 2:14:50 - How AI control relates to the AI safety field 2:39:25 - How AI control relates to previous Redwood Research work 2:49:16 - How people can work on AI control 2:54:07 - Following Buck and Ryan's research   The transcript:  axrp.net/episode/2024/04/11/episode-27-ai-control-buck-shlegeris-ryan-greenblatt.html Links for Buck and Ryan:  - Buck's twitter/X account: twitter.com/bshlgrs  - Ryan on LessWrong: lesswrong.com/users/ryan_greenblatt  - You can contact both Buck and Ryan by electronic mail at [firstname] [at-sign] rdwrs.com   Main research works we talk about:  - The case for ensuring that powerful AIs are controlled:  lesswrong.com/posts/kcKrE9mzEHrdqtDpE/the-case-for-ensuring-that-powerful-ais-are-controlled  - AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversion: arxiv.org/abs/2312.06942   Other things we mention:  - The prototypical catastrophic AI action is getting root access to its datacenter (aka "Hacking the SSH server"): lesswrong.com/posts/BAzCGCys4BkzGDCWR/the-prototypical-catastrophic-ai-action-is-getting-root  - Preventing language models from hiding their reasoning: arxiv.org/abs/2310.18512  - Improving the Welfare of AIs: A Nearcasted Proposal:  lesswrong.com/posts/F6HSHzKezkh6aoTr2/improving-the-welfare-of-ais-a-nearcasted-proposal  - Measuring coding challenge competence with APPS: arxiv.org/abs/2105.09938  - Causal Scrubbing: a method for rigorously testing interpretability hypotheses lesswrong.com/posts/JvZhhzycHu2Yd57RN/causal-scrubbing-a-method-for-rigorously-testing   Episode art by Hamish Doodles: hamishdoodles.com

The Nonlinear Library
LW - 2022 (and All Time) Posts by Pingback Count by Raemon

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 17, 2023 15:48


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: 2022 (and All Time) Posts by Pingback Count, published by Raemon on December 17, 2023 on LessWrong. For the past couple years I've wished LessWrong had a "sort posts by number of pingbacks, or, ideally, by total karma of pingbacks". I particularly wished for this during the Annual Review, where "which posts got cited the most?" seemed like a useful thing to track for potential hidden gems. We still haven't built a full-fledged feature for this, but I just ran a query against the database, and made it into a spreadsheet, which you can view here: LessWrong 2022 Posts by Pingbacks Here are the top 100 posts, sorted by Total Pingback Karma Title/Link Post Karma Pingback Count Total Pingback Karma Avg Pingback Karma AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities 870 158 12,484 79 MIRI announces new "Death With Dignity" strategy 334 73 8,134 111 A central AI alignment problem: capabilities generalization, and the sharp left turn 273 96 7,704 80 Simulators 612 127 7,699 61 Without specific countermeasures, the easiest path to transformative AI likely leads to AI takeover 367 83 5,123 62 Reward is not the optimization target 341 62 4,493 72 A Mechanistic Interpretability Analysis of Grokking 367 48 3,450 72 How To Go From Interpretability To Alignment: Just Retarget The Search 167 45 3,374 75 On how various plans miss the hard bits of the alignment challenge 292 40 3,288 82 [Intro to brain-like-AGI safety] 3. Two subsystems: Learning & Steering 79 36 3,023 84 How likely is deceptive alignment? 101 47 2,907 62 The shard theory of human values 238 42 2,843 68 Mysteries of mode collapse 279 32 2,842 89 [Intro to brain-like-AGI safety] 2. "Learning from scratch" in the brain 57 30 2,731 91 Why Agent Foundations? An Overly Abstract Explanation 285 42 2,730 65 A Longlist of Theories of Impact for Interpretability 124 26 2,589 100 How might we align transformative AI if it's developed very soon? 136 32 2,351 73 A transparency and interpretability tech tree 148 31 2,343 76 Discovering Language Model Behaviors with Model-Written Evaluations 100 19 2,336 123 A note about differential technological development 185 20 2,270 114 Causal Scrubbing: a method for rigorously testing interpretability hypotheses [Redwood Research] 195 35 2,267 65 Supervise Process, not Outcomes 132 25 2,262 90 Shard Theory: An Overview 157 28 2,019 72 Epistemological Vigilance for Alignment 61 21 2,008 96 A shot at the diamond-alignment problem 92 23 1,848 80 Where I agree and disagree with Eliezer 862 27 1,836 68 Brain Efficiency: Much More than You Wanted to Know 201 27 1,807 67 Refine: An Incubator for Conceptual Alignment Research Bets 143 21 1,793 85 Externalized reasoning oversight: a research direction for language model alignment 117 28 1,788 64 Humans provide an untapped wealth of evidence about alignment 186 19 1,647 87 Six Dimensions of Operational Adequacy in AGI Projects 298 20 1,607 80 How "Discovering Latent Knowledge in Language Models Without Supervision" Fits Into a Broader Alignment Scheme 240 16 1,575 98 Godzilla Strategies 137 17 1,573 93 (My understanding of) What Everyone in Technical Alignment is Doing and Why 411 23 1,530 67 Two-year update on my personal AI timelines 287 18 1,530 85 [Intro to brain-like-AGI safety] 15. Conclusion: Open problems, how to help, AMA 90 16 1,482 93 [Intro to brain-like-AGI safety] 6. Big picture of motivation, decision-making, and RL 66 25 1,460 58 Human values & biases are inaccessible to the genome 90 14 1,450 104 You Are Not Measuring What You Think You Are Measuring 350 21 1,449 69 Open Problems in AI X-Risk [PAIS #5] 59 14 1,446 103 [Intro to brain-like-AGI safety] 1. What's the problem & Why work on it now? 146 25 1,407 56 Conditioning Generative Models 24 11 1,362 124 Conjecture: Internal Infohazard Policy 132 14 1,340 96 A challenge for AGI organizations, and a ch...

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong
LW - 2022 (and All Time) Posts by Pingback Count by Raemon

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 17, 2023 15:48


Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: 2022 (and All Time) Posts by Pingback Count, published by Raemon on December 17, 2023 on LessWrong. For the past couple years I've wished LessWrong had a "sort posts by number of pingbacks, or, ideally, by total karma of pingbacks". I particularly wished for this during the Annual Review, where "which posts got cited the most?" seemed like a useful thing to track for potential hidden gems. We still haven't built a full-fledged feature for this, but I just ran a query against the database, and made it into a spreadsheet, which you can view here: LessWrong 2022 Posts by Pingbacks Here are the top 100 posts, sorted by Total Pingback Karma Title/Link Post Karma Pingback Count Total Pingback Karma Avg Pingback Karma AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities 870 158 12,484 79 MIRI announces new "Death With Dignity" strategy 334 73 8,134 111 A central AI alignment problem: capabilities generalization, and the sharp left turn 273 96 7,704 80 Simulators 612 127 7,699 61 Without specific countermeasures, the easiest path to transformative AI likely leads to AI takeover 367 83 5,123 62 Reward is not the optimization target 341 62 4,493 72 A Mechanistic Interpretability Analysis of Grokking 367 48 3,450 72 How To Go From Interpretability To Alignment: Just Retarget The Search 167 45 3,374 75 On how various plans miss the hard bits of the alignment challenge 292 40 3,288 82 [Intro to brain-like-AGI safety] 3. Two subsystems: Learning & Steering 79 36 3,023 84 How likely is deceptive alignment? 101 47 2,907 62 The shard theory of human values 238 42 2,843 68 Mysteries of mode collapse 279 32 2,842 89 [Intro to brain-like-AGI safety] 2. "Learning from scratch" in the brain 57 30 2,731 91 Why Agent Foundations? An Overly Abstract Explanation 285 42 2,730 65 A Longlist of Theories of Impact for Interpretability 124 26 2,589 100 How might we align transformative AI if it's developed very soon? 136 32 2,351 73 A transparency and interpretability tech tree 148 31 2,343 76 Discovering Language Model Behaviors with Model-Written Evaluations 100 19 2,336 123 A note about differential technological development 185 20 2,270 114 Causal Scrubbing: a method for rigorously testing interpretability hypotheses [Redwood Research] 195 35 2,267 65 Supervise Process, not Outcomes 132 25 2,262 90 Shard Theory: An Overview 157 28 2,019 72 Epistemological Vigilance for Alignment 61 21 2,008 96 A shot at the diamond-alignment problem 92 23 1,848 80 Where I agree and disagree with Eliezer 862 27 1,836 68 Brain Efficiency: Much More than You Wanted to Know 201 27 1,807 67 Refine: An Incubator for Conceptual Alignment Research Bets 143 21 1,793 85 Externalized reasoning oversight: a research direction for language model alignment 117 28 1,788 64 Humans provide an untapped wealth of evidence about alignment 186 19 1,647 87 Six Dimensions of Operational Adequacy in AGI Projects 298 20 1,607 80 How "Discovering Latent Knowledge in Language Models Without Supervision" Fits Into a Broader Alignment Scheme 240 16 1,575 98 Godzilla Strategies 137 17 1,573 93 (My understanding of) What Everyone in Technical Alignment is Doing and Why 411 23 1,530 67 Two-year update on my personal AI timelines 287 18 1,530 85 [Intro to brain-like-AGI safety] 15. Conclusion: Open problems, how to help, AMA 90 16 1,482 93 [Intro to brain-like-AGI safety] 6. Big picture of motivation, decision-making, and RL 66 25 1,460 58 Human values & biases are inaccessible to the genome 90 14 1,450 104 You Are Not Measuring What You Think You Are Measuring 350 21 1,449 69 Open Problems in AI X-Risk [PAIS #5] 59 14 1,446 103 [Intro to brain-like-AGI safety] 1. What's the problem & Why work on it now? 146 25 1,407 56 Conditioning Generative Models 24 11 1,362 124 Conjecture: Internal Infohazard Policy 132 14 1,340 96 A challenge for AGI organizations, and a ch...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - Adversarial Robustness Could Help Prevent Catastrophic Misuse by Aidan O'Gara

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 11, 2023 17:11


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Adversarial Robustness Could Help Prevent Catastrophic Misuse, published by Aidan O'Gara on December 11, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum. There have been several discussions about the importance of adversarial robustness for scalable oversight. I'd like to point out that adversarial robustness is also important under a different threat model: catastrophic misuse. For a brief summary of the argument: Misuse could lead to catastrophe. AI-assisted cyberattacks, political persuasion, and biological weapons acquisition are plausible paths to catastrophe. Today's models do not robustly refuse to cause harm. If a model has the ability to cause harm, we should train it to refuse to do so. Unfortunately, GPT-4, Claude, Bard, and Llama all have received this training, but they still behave harmfully when facing prompts generated by adversarial attacks, such as this one and this one. Adversarial robustness will likely not be easily solved. Over the last decade, thousands of papers have been published on adversarial robustness. Most defenses are near useless, and the best defenses against a constrained attack in a CIFAR-10 setting still fail on 30% of inputs. Redwood Research's work on training a reliable text classifier found the task quite difficult. We should not expect an easy solution. Progress on adversarial robustness is possible. Some methods have improved robustness, such as adversarial training and data augmentation. But existing research often assumes overly narrow threat models, ignoring both creative attacks and creative defenses. Refocusing research with good evaluations focusing on LLMs and other frontier models could lead to valuable progress. This argument requires a few caveats. First, it assumes a particular threat model: that closed source models will have more dangerous capabilities than open source models, and that malicious actors will be able to query closed source models. This seems like a reasonable assumption over the next few years. Second, there are many other ways to reduce risks from catastrophic misuse, such as removing hazardous knowledge from model weights, strengthening societal defenses against catastrophe, and holding companies legally liable for sub-extinction level harms. I think we should work on these in addition to adversarial robustness, as part of a defense-in-depth approach to misuse risk. Overall, I think adversarial robustness should receive more effort from researchers and labs, more funding from donors, and should be a part of the technical AI safety research portfolio. This could substantially mitigate the near-term risk of catastrophic misuse, in addition to any potential benefits for scalable oversight. The rest of this post discusses each of the above points in more detail. Misuse could lead to catastrophe There are many ways that malicious use of AI could lead to catastrophe. AI could enable cyberattacks, personalized propaganda and mass manipulation, or the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Personally, I think the most compelling case is that AI will enable biological terrorism. Ideally, ChatGPT would refuse to aid in dangerous activities such as constructing a bioweapon. But by using an adversarial jailbreak prompt, undergraduates in a class taught by Kevin Esvelt at MIT evaded this safeguard: In one hour, the chatbots suggested four potential pandemic pathogens, explained how they can be generated from synthetic DNA using reverse genetics, supplied the names of DNA synthesis companies unlikely to screen orders, identified detailed protocols and how to troubleshoot them, and recommended that anyone lacking the skills to perform reverse genetics engage a core facility or contract research organization. Fortunately, today's models lack key information about building bioweapons. It's not even clear that they're more u...

Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) Show with Soroush Pour
Ep 10 - Accelerated training to become an AI safety researcher w/ Ryan Kidd (Co-Director, MATS)

Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) Show with Soroush Pour

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 8, 2023 76:58


We speak with Ryan Kidd, Co-Director at ML Alignment & Theory Scholars (MATS) program, previously "SERI MATS".MATS (https://www.matsprogram.org/) provides research mentorship, technical seminars, and connections to help new AI researchers get established and start producing impactful research towards AI safety & alignment.Prior to MATS, Ryan completed a PhD in Physics at the University of Queensland (UQ) in Australia.We talk about:* What the MATS program is* Who should apply to MATS (next *deadline*: Nov 17 midnight PT)* Research directions being explored by MATS mentors, now and in the past* Promising alignment research directions & ecosystem gaps , in Ryan's viewHosted by Soroush Pour. Follow me for more AGI content:* Twitter: https://twitter.com/soroushjp* LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/soroushjp/== Show links ==-- About Ryan --* Twitter: https://twitter.com/ryan_kidd44* LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ryan-kidd-1b0574a3/* MATS: https://www.matsprogram.org/* LISA: https://www.safeai.org.uk/* Manifold: https://manifold.markets/-- Further resources --* Book: “The Precipice” - https://theprecipice.com/* Ikigai - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ikigai* Fermi paradox - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fermi_p...* Ajeya Contra - Bioanchors - https://www.cold-takes.com/forecastin...* Chomsky hierarchy & LLM transformers paper + external memory - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chomsky...* AutoGPT - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auto-GPT* BabyAGI - https://github.com/yoheinakajima/babyagi* Unilateralist's curse - https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/t...* Jeffrey Ladish & team - fine tuning to remove LLM safeguards - https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/...* Epoch AI trends - https://epochai.org/trends* The demon "Moloch" - https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/07/30...* AI safety fundamentals course - https://aisafetyfundamentals.com/* Anthropic sycophancy paper - https://www.anthropic.com/index/towar...* Promising technical alignment research directions    * Scalable oversight        * Recursive reward modelling - https://deepmindsafetyresearch.medium...        * RLHF - could work for a while, but unlikely forever as we scale    * Interpretability        * Mechanistic interpretability            * Paper: GPT4 labelling GPT2 - https://openai.com/research/language-...        * Concept based interpretability            * Rome paper - https://rome.baulab.info/        * Developmental interpretability            * devinterp.com - http://devinterp.com            * Timaeus - https://timaeus.co/        * Internal consistency            * Colin Burns research - https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.03827* Threat modelling / capabilities evaluation & demos    * Paper: Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology? - https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.03809    * ARC Evals - https://evals.alignment.org/    * Palisade Research - https://palisaderesearch.org/    * Paper: Situational awareness with Owain Evans - https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.00667* Gradient hacking - https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/uXH4r6MmKPedk8rMA/gradient-hacking* Past scholar's work    * Apollo Research - https://www.apolloresearch.ai/    * Leap Labs - https://www.leap-labs.com/    * Timaeus - https://timaeus.co/* Other orgs mentioned    * Redwood Research - https://redwoodresearch.org/Recorded Oct 25, 2023

The Nonlinear Library
AF - Benchmarks for Detecting Measurement Tampering [Redwood Research] by Ryan Greenblatt

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 5, 2023 36:17


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Benchmarks for Detecting Measurement Tampering [Redwood Research], published by Ryan Greenblatt on September 5, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum. TL;DR: This post discusses our recent empirical work on detecting measurement tampering and explains how we see this work fitting into the overall space of alignment research. When training powerful AI systems to perform complex tasks, it may be challenging to provide training signals that are robust under optimization. One concern is measurement tampering, which is where the AI system manipulates multiple measurements to create the illusion of good results instead of achieving the desired outcome. (This is a type of reward hacking.) Over the past few months, we've worked on detecting measurement tampering by building analogous datasets and evaluating simple techniques. We detail our datasets and experimental results in this paper. Detecting measurement tampering can be thought of as a specific case of Eliciting Latent Knowledge (ELK): When AIs successfully tamper with measurements that are used for computing rewards, they possess important information that the overseer doesn't have (namely, that the measurements have been tampered with). Conversely, if we can robustly elicit an AI's knowledge of whether the measurements have been tampered with, then we could train the AI to avoid measurement tampering. In fact, our best guess is that this is the most important and tractable class of ELK problems. We also think that measurement tampering detection is a natural application for alignment work such as creating better inductive biases, studying high-level model internals, or studying generalization. We'll discuss what these applications might look like in the Future work section. In this post: We explain what measurement tampering detection is; We summarize the results of our paper; We argue that there are structural properties of measurement tampering that might make it considerably easier to detect than arbitrary cases of eliciting knowledge from models; We argue that detecting measurement tampering is very useful for avoiding catastrophic outcomes from powerful and misaligned AI systems; We explain why we think the dataset structure we chose reflects real-world difficulties of measurement tampering, and how techniques developed for our datasets could be used in practice; We discuss future work. If you're interested in pursuing follow-up work and wish to discuss it with us, feel free to email fabien@rdwrs.com or leave a comment on this post. We would like to acknowledge the contributions of Jenny Nitishinskaya, Nicholas Goldowsky-Dill, and Daniel Ziegler in the creation of early measurement tampering datasets. We would also like to thank Lawrence Chan, Paul Christiano, Ajeya Cotra, Carson Denison, Samuel Marks, Ethan Perez, Ansh Radhakrishnan, Kshitij Sachan, Jacob Steinhardt, Meg Tong, Gabriel Wu, and Mark Xu for their useful feedback. Studying measurement tampering in practice Measurement tampering detection is the task of detecting cases where measurements and the desired outcomes come apart, given a restricted trusted set (on which overseers can avoid tampering because they understand the action sequences and their effects well) and a wider untrusted set (where tampering sometimes happens). In the untrusted set, overseers don't know when measurement tampering happens, which means they have access to text inputs and measurements but not the ground truth. We are centrally interested in cases where we have access to a language model which can predict (or can be slightly fine-tuned to predict) measurements, and which computes the target outcome internally in order to predict measurements. An example where this setup might occur in practice is when training an AI by first training it to imitate human demonstrations and then afte...

The Nonlinear Library
LW - LLMs are (mostly) not helped by filler tokens by Kshitij Sachan

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 10, 2023 11:18


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: LLMs are (mostly) not helped by filler tokens, published by Kshitij Sachan on August 10, 2023 on LessWrong. Thanks to Ryan Greenblatt, Fabien Roger, and Jenny Nitishinskaya for running some of the initial experiments and to Gabe Wu and Max Nadeau for revising this post. This work was done at Redwood Research. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organization. I conducted experiments to see if language models could use 'filler tokens' - unrelated text output before the final answer - for additional computation. For instance, I tested whether asking a model to produce "a b c d e" before solving a math problem improves performance. This mini-study was inspired by Tamera Lanham, who ran similar experiments on Claude and found negative results. Similarly, I find that GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and Claude 2 don't benefit from filler tokens. However, GPT-4 (which Tamera didn't study) shows mixed results with strong improvements on some tasks and no improvement on others. These results are not very polished, but I've been sitting on them for a while and I thought it was better to publish than not. Motivation Language models (LMs) perform better when they produce step-by-step reasoning, known as "chain of thought", before answering. A nice property of chain of thought is that it externalizes the LM's thought process, making it legible to us humans. Some researchers hope that if a LM makes decisions based on undesirable factors, e.g. the political leanings of its supervisors (Perez 2022) or whether or not its outputs will be closely evaluated by a human, then this will be visible in its chain of thought, allowing supervisors to catch or penalize such behavior. If, however, we find that filler tokens alone improve performance, this would suggest that LMs are deriving performance benefits from chain-of-thought prompting via mechanisms other than the human-understandable reasoning steps displayed in the words they output. In particular, filler tokens may still provide performance benefits by giving the model more forward passes to operate on the details provided in the question, akin to having "more time to think" before outputting an answer. Why Might Filler Tokens Be Useful? This is an abstracted drawing of a unidirectional (i.e. decoder-only) transformer. Each circle represents the residual stream at a given token position after a given layer. The arrows depict how attention passes information between token positions. Note that as we add more tokens (i.e. columns), the circuit size increases but the circuit depth (defined to be the maximum length of a path in the computational graph) remains capped at the number of layers. Therefore, adding pre-determined filler tokens provides parallel computation but not serial computation. This is contrasted with normal chain-of-thought, which provides extra serial computation because the tokens themselves are determined by the state of the model in the previous last layer. An example of a task that can benefit from parallel computation is computing the greatest common divisor of two numbers. The typical approach is Euclid's algorithm, which is bottlenecked on serial compute. However, given enough parallel computation, the model could also implement a more naive strategy to calculate the GCD of two numbers a and b: An early layer delegates a potential divisor to each filler token position An intermediate layer, in parallel at each filler token position, computes if a and b are divisible by the potential divisor A later layer aggregates the results and returns the largest found divisor More generally, there are likely tasks on which language models have rough heuristics that operate independently and parallelizing these heuristics could improve performance. On the other hand, many tasks are bottlenecked by seri...

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong
LW - LLMs are (mostly) not helped by filler tokens by Kshitij Sachan

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 10, 2023 11:18


Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: LLMs are (mostly) not helped by filler tokens, published by Kshitij Sachan on August 10, 2023 on LessWrong. Thanks to Ryan Greenblatt, Fabien Roger, and Jenny Nitishinskaya for running some of the initial experiments and to Gabe Wu and Max Nadeau for revising this post. This work was done at Redwood Research. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organization. I conducted experiments to see if language models could use 'filler tokens' - unrelated text output before the final answer - for additional computation. For instance, I tested whether asking a model to produce "a b c d e" before solving a math problem improves performance. This mini-study was inspired by Tamera Lanham, who ran similar experiments on Claude and found negative results. Similarly, I find that GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and Claude 2 don't benefit from filler tokens. However, GPT-4 (which Tamera didn't study) shows mixed results with strong improvements on some tasks and no improvement on others. These results are not very polished, but I've been sitting on them for a while and I thought it was better to publish than not. Motivation Language models (LMs) perform better when they produce step-by-step reasoning, known as "chain of thought", before answering. A nice property of chain of thought is that it externalizes the LM's thought process, making it legible to us humans. Some researchers hope that if a LM makes decisions based on undesirable factors, e.g. the political leanings of its supervisors (Perez 2022) or whether or not its outputs will be closely evaluated by a human, then this will be visible in its chain of thought, allowing supervisors to catch or penalize such behavior. If, however, we find that filler tokens alone improve performance, this would suggest that LMs are deriving performance benefits from chain-of-thought prompting via mechanisms other than the human-understandable reasoning steps displayed in the words they output. In particular, filler tokens may still provide performance benefits by giving the model more forward passes to operate on the details provided in the question, akin to having "more time to think" before outputting an answer. Why Might Filler Tokens Be Useful? This is an abstracted drawing of a unidirectional (i.e. decoder-only) transformer. Each circle represents the residual stream at a given token position after a given layer. The arrows depict how attention passes information between token positions. Note that as we add more tokens (i.e. columns), the circuit size increases but the circuit depth (defined to be the maximum length of a path in the computational graph) remains capped at the number of layers. Therefore, adding pre-determined filler tokens provides parallel computation but not serial computation. This is contrasted with normal chain-of-thought, which provides extra serial computation because the tokens themselves are determined by the state of the model in the previous last layer. An example of a task that can benefit from parallel computation is computing the greatest common divisor of two numbers. The typical approach is Euclid's algorithm, which is bottlenecked on serial compute. However, given enough parallel computation, the model could also implement a more naive strategy to calculate the GCD of two numbers a and b: An early layer delegates a potential divisor to each filler token position An intermediate layer, in parallel at each filler token position, computes if a and b are divisible by the potential divisor A later layer aggregates the results and returns the largest found divisor More generally, there are likely tasks on which language models have rough heuristics that operate independently and parallelizing these heuristics could improve performance. On the other hand, many tasks are bottlenecked by seri...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - Password-locked models: a stress case for capabilities evaluation by Fabien Roger

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 3, 2023 13:03


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Password-locked models: a stress case for capabilities evaluation, published by Fabien Roger on August 3, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum. Thanks to Buck Shlegeris, Ryan Greenblatt, Kshitij Sachan and Jenny Nitishinskaya for helpful discussions and feedback on drafts. This work was done at Redwood Research. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organization. Password-locked models are trained to exhibit certain capabilities only when a password is present in the query. Studying these models has two purposes: Testing how well capability evaluations work when applied to models which "aren't trying" Understanding how well organizations could hide the capabilities of their models. In this post, I make empirical claims which I believe to be true, check some of them on small language models, and describe what this implies for the control of potentially deceptive models. Key empirical claims: when using behavioral model evaluations, password-locked models: Look much less capable than they actually are when eliciting capabilities with prompting Sometimes look much less capable than they actually are when eliciting capabilities with Reinforcement Learning Experimental evidence: I exhibit one case where they don't, and one case where they do Can't look much less capable than they actually when eliciting capabilities with supervised fine-tuning on high-quality demonstrations Key takeaways, if the claims above are true: If an alignment plan relies on some models being too weak to perform certain tasks, then model evaluations aimed at checking the weakness of models should be able to elicit the locked capabilities of password-locked models. This is because password-locked models and deceptive models may be able to underperform in similar circumstances. API access and inference is not enough to evaluate capabilities of a model produced by AI labs trying to game regulations, even if AI labs are internally using the same API endpoint as auditors. Key Empirical Claims Similarities Between Password-locked Models and Deceptively Aligned Models Pretending to Be Dumb It looks to me that password locked models have the same properties as the one described by Evan in When can we trust model evaluations? when he describes if and how deceptive models would be able to sandbag each category of behavioral evaluation (which he coins in his post): Behavioral Non-Fine-Tuning Evaluations: By construction, password-locked models will refuse to be capable no matter the prompt, except for prompts with the special password. But it's unclear how easy it is to build good password-locked models which are hard to crack (e.g. which don't leak the password with some clever prompting). Even if good password-locked models are built, there remain a large difference with deceptive models: the search for the correct password might have very different properties than the search for a prompt which makes a deceptive model believe it's time to strike. Behavioral I.I.D. Fine-Tuning Evaluations: I would be surprised if fine-tuning the password-locked model on high quality answers didn't lift the locking mechanism extremely quickly. This is similar to deceptive models (except if they are so strong that they can gradient hack). The main difference is that fine-tuning to remove password-locking on one task might transfer to another task, which might not be the case for deceptive models. Behavioral RL Fine-Tuning Evaluations: The success of evaluations which use Reinforcement Learning depends, as for deceptive models, on the success of exploration. If supervised fine-tuning is done with only low quality answers, then the password locked models will just continue to output low-quality answers and will never explore its way into high quality ones - except if there is a natural "path" g...

The Nonlinear Library
LW - Password-locked models: a stress case for capabilities evaluation by Fabien Roger

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 3, 2023 12:59


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Password-locked models: a stress case for capabilities evaluation, published by Fabien Roger on August 3, 2023 on LessWrong. Thanks to Buck Shlegeris, Ryan Greenblatt, Kshitij Sachan and Jenny Nitishinskaya for helpful discussions and feedback on drafts. This work was done at Redwood Research. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organization. Password-locked models are trained to exhibit certain capabilities only when a password is present in the query. Studying these models has two purposes: Testing how well capability evaluations work when applied to models which "aren't trying" Understanding how well organizations could hide the capabilities of their models. In this post, I make empirical claims which I believe to be true, check some of them on small language models, and describe what this implies for the control of potentially deceptive models. Key empirical claims: when using behavioral model evaluations, password-locked models: Look much less capable than they actually are when eliciting capabilities with prompting Sometimes look much less capable than they actually are when eliciting capabilities with Reinforcement Learning Experimental evidence: I exhibit one case where they don't, and one case where they do Can't look much less capable than they actually when eliciting capabilities with fine-tuning Key takeaways, if the claims above are true: If an alignment plan relies on some models being too weak to perform certain tasks, then model evaluations aimed at checking the weakness of models should be able to elicit the locked capabilities of password-locked models. This is because password-locked models and deceptive models may be able to underperform in similar circumstances. API access and inference is not enough to evaluate capabilities of a model produced by AI labs trying to game regulations, even if AI labs are internally using the same API endpoint as auditors. Key Empirical Claims Similarities Between Password-locked Models and Deceptively Aligned Models Pretending to Be Dumb It looks to me that password locked models have the same properties as the one described by Evan in When can we trust model evaluations? when he describes if and how deceptive models would be able to sandbag each category of behavioral evaluation (which he coins in his post): Behavioral Non-Fine-Tuning Evaluations: By construction, password-locked models will refuse to be capable no matter the prompt, except for prompts with the special password. But it's unclear how easy it is to build good password-locked models which are hard to crack (e.g. which don't leak the password with some clever prompting). Even if good password-locked models are built, there remain a large difference with deceptive models: the search for the correct password might have very different properties than the search for a prompt which makes a deceptive model believe it's time to strike. Behavioral I.I.D. Fine-Tuning Evaluations: I would be surprised if fine-tuning the password-locked model didn't lift the locking mechanism extremely quickly. This is similar to deceptive models (except if they are so strong that they can gradient hack). The main difference is that fine-tuning to remove password-locking on one task might transfer to another task, which might not be the case for deceptive models. Behavioral RL Fine-Tuning Evaluations: The success of evaluations which use Reinforcement Learning depends, as for deceptive models, on the success of exploration. If supervised fine-tuning is done with only low quality answers, then the password locked models will just continue to output low-quality answers and will never explore its way into high quality ones - except if there is a natural "path" gradually improving the quality of answers. But it is possible to emulate a thre...

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong
LW - Password-locked models: a stress case for capabilities evaluation by Fabien Roger

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 3, 2023 12:59


Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Password-locked models: a stress case for capabilities evaluation, published by Fabien Roger on August 3, 2023 on LessWrong. Thanks to Buck Shlegeris, Ryan Greenblatt, Kshitij Sachan and Jenny Nitishinskaya for helpful discussions and feedback on drafts. This work was done at Redwood Research. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organization. Password-locked models are trained to exhibit certain capabilities only when a password is present in the query. Studying these models has two purposes: Testing how well capability evaluations work when applied to models which "aren't trying" Understanding how well organizations could hide the capabilities of their models. In this post, I make empirical claims which I believe to be true, check some of them on small language models, and describe what this implies for the control of potentially deceptive models. Key empirical claims: when using behavioral model evaluations, password-locked models: Look much less capable than they actually are when eliciting capabilities with prompting Sometimes look much less capable than they actually are when eliciting capabilities with Reinforcement Learning Experimental evidence: I exhibit one case where they don't, and one case where they do Can't look much less capable than they actually when eliciting capabilities with fine-tuning Key takeaways, if the claims above are true: If an alignment plan relies on some models being too weak to perform certain tasks, then model evaluations aimed at checking the weakness of models should be able to elicit the locked capabilities of password-locked models. This is because password-locked models and deceptive models may be able to underperform in similar circumstances. API access and inference is not enough to evaluate capabilities of a model produced by AI labs trying to game regulations, even if AI labs are internally using the same API endpoint as auditors. Key Empirical Claims Similarities Between Password-locked Models and Deceptively Aligned Models Pretending to Be Dumb It looks to me that password locked models have the same properties as the one described by Evan in When can we trust model evaluations? when he describes if and how deceptive models would be able to sandbag each category of behavioral evaluation (which he coins in his post): Behavioral Non-Fine-Tuning Evaluations: By construction, password-locked models will refuse to be capable no matter the prompt, except for prompts with the special password. But it's unclear how easy it is to build good password-locked models which are hard to crack (e.g. which don't leak the password with some clever prompting). Even if good password-locked models are built, there remain a large difference with deceptive models: the search for the correct password might have very different properties than the search for a prompt which makes a deceptive model believe it's time to strike. Behavioral I.I.D. Fine-Tuning Evaluations: I would be surprised if fine-tuning the password-locked model didn't lift the locking mechanism extremely quickly. This is similar to deceptive models (except if they are so strong that they can gradient hack). The main difference is that fine-tuning to remove password-locking on one task might transfer to another task, which might not be the case for deceptive models. Behavioral RL Fine-Tuning Evaluations: The success of evaluations which use Reinforcement Learning depends, as for deceptive models, on the success of exploration. If supervised fine-tuning is done with only low quality answers, then the password locked models will just continue to output low-quality answers and will never explore its way into high quality ones - except if there is a natural "path" gradually improving the quality of answers. But it is possible to emulate a thre...

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong Daily
LW - Password-locked models: a stress case for capabilities evaluation by Fabien Roger

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong Daily

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 3, 2023 12:59


Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Password-locked models: a stress case for capabilities evaluation, published by Fabien Roger on August 3, 2023 on LessWrong.Thanks to Buck Shlegeris, Ryan Greenblatt, Kshitij Sachan and Jenny Nitishinskaya for helpful discussions and feedback on drafts. This work was done at Redwood Research. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organization.Password-locked models are trained to exhibit certain capabilities only when a password is present in the query. Studying these models has two purposes:Testing how well capability evaluations work when applied to models which "aren't trying"Understanding how well organizations could hide the capabilities of their models.In this post, I make empirical claims which I believe to be true, check some of them on small language models, and describe what this implies for the control of potentially deceptive models.Key empirical claims: when using behavioral model evaluations, password-locked models:Look much less capable than they actually are when eliciting capabilities with promptingSometimes look much less capable than they actually are when eliciting capabilities with Reinforcement LearningExperimental evidence: I exhibit one case where they don't, and one case where they doCan't look much less capable than they actually when eliciting capabilities with fine-tuningKey takeaways, if the claims above are true:If an alignment plan relies on some models being too weak to perform certain tasks, then model evaluations aimed at checking the weakness of models should be able to elicit the locked capabilities of password-locked models. This is because password-locked models and deceptive models may be able to underperform in similar circumstances.API access and inference is not enough to evaluate capabilities of a model produced by AI labs trying to game regulations, even if AI labs are internally using the same API endpoint as auditors.Key Empirical ClaimsSimilarities Between Password-locked Models and Deceptively Aligned Models Pretending to Be DumbIt looks to me that password locked models have the same properties as the one described by Evan in When can we trust model evaluations? when he describes if and how deceptive models would be able to sandbag each category of behavioral evaluation (which he coins in his post):Behavioral Non-Fine-Tuning Evaluations: By construction, password-locked models will refuse to be capable no matter the prompt, except for prompts with the special password. But it's unclear how easy it is to build good password-locked models which are hard to crack (e.g. which don't leak the password with some clever prompting). Even if good password-locked models are built, there remain a large difference with deceptive models: the search for the correct password might have very different properties than the search for a prompt which makes a deceptive model believe it's time to strike.Behavioral I.I.D. Fine-Tuning Evaluations: I would be surprised if fine-tuning the password-locked model didn't lift the locking mechanism extremely quickly. This is similar to deceptive models (except if they are so strong that they can gradient hack). The main difference is that fine-tuning to remove password-locking on one task might transfer to another task, which might not be the case for deceptive models.Behavioral RL Fine-Tuning Evaluations: The success of evaluations which use Reinforcement Learning depends, as for deceptive models, on the success of exploration. If supervised fine-tuning is done with only low quality answers, then the password locked models will just continue to output low-quality answers and will never explore its way into high quality ones - except if there is a natural "path" gradually improving the quality of answers. But it is possible to emulate a thre...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - ARC is hiring theoretical researchers by Paul Christiano

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 12, 2023 6:13


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: ARC is hiring theoretical researchers, published by Paul Christiano on June 12, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum. The Alignment Research Center's Theory team is starting a new hiring round for researchers with a theoretical background. Please apply here. What is ARC's Theory team? The Alignment Research Center (ARC) is a non-profit whose mission is to align future machine learning systems with human interests. The high-level agenda of the Theory team (not to be confused with the Evals team) is described by the report on Eliciting Latent Knowledge (ELK): roughly speaking, we're trying to design ML training objectives that incentivize systems to honestly report their internal beliefs. For the last year or so, we've mostly been focused on an approach to ELK based on formalizing a kind of heuristic reasoning that could be used to analyze neural network behavior, as laid out in our paper on Formalizing the presumption of independence. Our research has reached a stage where we're coming up against concrete problems in mathematics and theoretical computer science, and so we're particularly excited about hiring researchers with relevant background, regardless of whether they have worked on AI alignment before. See below for further discussion of ARC's current theoretical research directions. Who is ARC looking to hire? Compared to our last hiring round, we have more of a need for people with a strong theoretical background (in math, physics or computer science, for example), but we remain open to anyone who is excited about getting involved in AI alignment, even if they do not have an existing research record. Ultimately, we are excited to hire people who could contribute to our research agenda. The best way to figure out whether you might be able to contribute is to take a look at some of our recent research problems and directions: Some of our research problems are purely mathematical, such as these matrix completion problems – although note that these are unusually difficult, self-contained and well-posed (making them more appropriate for prizes). Some of our other research is more informal, as described in some of our recent blog posts such as Finding gliders in the game of life. A lot of our research occupies a middle ground between fully-formalized problems and more informal questions, such as fixing the problems with cumulant propagation described in Appendix D of Formalizing the presumption of independence. What is working on ARC's Theory team like? ARC's Theory team is led by Paul Christiano and currently has 2 other permanent team members, Mark Xu and Jacob Hilton, alongside a varying number of temporary team members (recently anywhere from 0–3). Most of the time, team members work on research problems independently, with frequent check-ins with their research advisor (e.g., twice weekly). The problems described above give a rough indication of the kind of research problems involved, which we would typically break down into smaller, more manageable subproblems. This work is often somewhat similar to academic research in pure math or theoretical computer science. In addition to this, we also allocate a significant portion of our time to higher-level questions surrounding research prioritization, which we often discuss at our weekly group meeting. Since the team is still small, we are keen for new team members to help with this process of shaping and defining our research. ARC shares an office with several other groups working on AI alignment such as Redwood Research, so even though the Theory team is small, the office is lively with lots of AI alignment-related discussion. What are ARC's current theoretical research directions? ARC's main theoretical focus over the last year or so has been on preparing the paper Formalizing the presumption of independence and on follo...

The Nonlinear Library
LW - ARC is hiring theoretical researchers by paulfchristiano

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 12, 2023 6:02


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: ARC is hiring theoretical researchers, published by paulfchristiano on June 12, 2023 on LessWrong. The Alignment Research Center's Theory team is starting a new hiring round for researchers with a theoretical background. Please apply here. What is ARC's Theory team? The Alignment Research Center (ARC) is a non-profit whose mission is to align future machine learning systems with human interests. The high-level agenda of the Theory team (not to be confused with the Evals team) is described by the report on Eliciting Latent Knowledge (ELK): roughly speaking, we're trying to design ML training objectives that incentivize systems to honestly report their internal beliefs. For the last year or so, we've mostly been focused on an approach to ELK based on formalizing a kind of heuristic reasoning that could be used to analyze neural network behavior, as laid out in our paper on Formalizing the presumption of independence. Our research has reached a stage where we're coming up against concrete problems in mathematics and theoretical computer science, and so we're particularly excited about hiring researchers with relevant background, regardless of whether they have worked on AI alignment before. See below for further discussion of ARC's current theoretical research directions. Who is ARC looking to hire? Compared to our last hiring round, we have more of a need for people with a strong theoretical background (in math, physics or computer science, for example), but we remain open to anyone who is excited about getting involved in AI alignment, even if they do not have an existing research record. Ultimately, we are excited to hire people who could contribute to our research agenda. The best way to figure out whether you might be able to contribute is to take a look at some of our recent research problems and directions: Some of our research problems are purely mathematical, such as these matrix completion problems – although note that these are unusually difficult, self-contained and well-posed (making them more appropriate for prizes). Some of our other research is more informal, as described in some of our recent blog posts such as Finding gliders in the game of life. A lot of our research occupies a middle ground between fully-formalized problems and more informal questions, such as fixing the problems with cumulant propagation described in Appendix D of Formalizing the presumption of independence. What is working on ARC's Theory team like? ARC's Theory team is led by Paul Christiano and currently has 2 other permanent team members, Mark Xu and Jacob Hilton, alongside a varying number of temporary team members (recently anywhere from 0–3). Most of the time, team members work on research problems independently, with frequent check-ins with their research advisor (e.g., twice weekly). The problems described above give a rough indication of the kind of research problems involved, which we would typically break down into smaller, more manageable subproblems. This work is often somewhat similar to academic research in pure math or theoretical computer science. In addition to this, we also allocate a significant portion of our time to higher-level questions surrounding research prioritization, which we often discuss at our weekly group meeting. Since the team is still small, we are keen for new team members to help with this process of shaping and defining our research. ARC shares an office with several other groups working on AI alignment such as Redwood Research, so even though the Theory team is small, the office is lively with lots of AI alignment-related discussion. What are ARC's current theoretical research directions? ARC's main theoretical focus over the last year or so has been on preparing the paper Formalizing the presumption of independence and on follow-up work to ...

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong
LW - ARC is hiring theoretical researchers by paulfchristiano

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 12, 2023 6:02


Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: ARC is hiring theoretical researchers, published by paulfchristiano on June 12, 2023 on LessWrong. The Alignment Research Center's Theory team is starting a new hiring round for researchers with a theoretical background. Please apply here. What is ARC's Theory team? The Alignment Research Center (ARC) is a non-profit whose mission is to align future machine learning systems with human interests. The high-level agenda of the Theory team (not to be confused with the Evals team) is described by the report on Eliciting Latent Knowledge (ELK): roughly speaking, we're trying to design ML training objectives that incentivize systems to honestly report their internal beliefs. For the last year or so, we've mostly been focused on an approach to ELK based on formalizing a kind of heuristic reasoning that could be used to analyze neural network behavior, as laid out in our paper on Formalizing the presumption of independence. Our research has reached a stage where we're coming up against concrete problems in mathematics and theoretical computer science, and so we're particularly excited about hiring researchers with relevant background, regardless of whether they have worked on AI alignment before. See below for further discussion of ARC's current theoretical research directions. Who is ARC looking to hire? Compared to our last hiring round, we have more of a need for people with a strong theoretical background (in math, physics or computer science, for example), but we remain open to anyone who is excited about getting involved in AI alignment, even if they do not have an existing research record. Ultimately, we are excited to hire people who could contribute to our research agenda. The best way to figure out whether you might be able to contribute is to take a look at some of our recent research problems and directions: Some of our research problems are purely mathematical, such as these matrix completion problems – although note that these are unusually difficult, self-contained and well-posed (making them more appropriate for prizes). Some of our other research is more informal, as described in some of our recent blog posts such as Finding gliders in the game of life. A lot of our research occupies a middle ground between fully-formalized problems and more informal questions, such as fixing the problems with cumulant propagation described in Appendix D of Formalizing the presumption of independence. What is working on ARC's Theory team like? ARC's Theory team is led by Paul Christiano and currently has 2 other permanent team members, Mark Xu and Jacob Hilton, alongside a varying number of temporary team members (recently anywhere from 0–3). Most of the time, team members work on research problems independently, with frequent check-ins with their research advisor (e.g., twice weekly). The problems described above give a rough indication of the kind of research problems involved, which we would typically break down into smaller, more manageable subproblems. This work is often somewhat similar to academic research in pure math or theoretical computer science. In addition to this, we also allocate a significant portion of our time to higher-level questions surrounding research prioritization, which we often discuss at our weekly group meeting. Since the team is still small, we are keen for new team members to help with this process of shaping and defining our research. ARC shares an office with several other groups working on AI alignment such as Redwood Research, so even though the Theory team is small, the office is lively with lots of AI alignment-related discussion. What are ARC's current theoretical research directions? ARC's main theoretical focus over the last year or so has been on preparing the paper Formalizing the presumption of independence and on follow-up work to ...

The Nonlinear Library
EA - Critiques of prominent AI safety labs: Redwood Research by Omega

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 31, 2023 34:15


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Critiques of prominent AI safety labs: Redwood Research, published by Omega on March 31, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. In this series, we evaluate AI safety organizations that have received more than $10 million per year in funding. We do not critique MIRI and OpenAI as there have been several conversations and critiques of these organizations (1,2,3). The authors of this post include two technical AI safety researchers, and others who have spent significant time in the Bay Area community. One technical AI safety researcher is senior (>4 years experience), the other junior. We would like to make our critiques non-anonymously but unfortunately believe this would be professionally unwise. Further, we believe our criticisms stand on their own. Though we have done our best to remain impartial, readers should not assume that we are completely unbiased or don't have anything to personally or professionally gain from publishing these critiques. We take the benefits and drawbacks of the anonymous nature of our post seriously, and are open to feedback on anything we might have done better. The first post in this series will cover Redwood Research (Redwood). Redwood is a non-profit started in 2021 working on technical AI safety (TAIS) alignment research. Their approach is heavily informed by the work of Paul Christiano, who runs the Alignment Research Center (ARC), and previously ran the language model alignment team at OpenAI. Paul originally proposed one of Redwood's original projects and is on Redwood's board. Redwood has strong connections with central EA leadership and funders, has received significant funding since its inception, recruits almost exclusively from the EA movement, and partly acts as a gatekeeper to central EA institutions. We shared a draft of this document with Redwood prior to publication and are grateful for their feedback and corrections (we recommend others also reach out similarly). We've also invited them to share their views in the comments of this post. We would like to also invite others to share their thoughts in the comments openly if you feel comfortable, or contribute anonymously via this form. We will add inputs from there to the comments section of this post, but will likely not be updating the main body of the post as a result (unless comments catch errors in our writing). Summary of our views We believe that Redwood has some serious flaws as an org, yet has received a significant amount of funding from a central EA grantmaker (Open Philanthropy). Inadequately kept in check conflicts of interest (COIs) might be partly responsible for funders giving a relatively immature org lots of money and causing some negative effects on the field and EA community. We will share our critiques of Constellation (and Open Philanthropy) in a follow-up post. We also have some suggestions for Redwood that we believe might help them achieve their goals. Redwood is a young organization that has room to improve. While there may be flaws in their current approach, it is possible for them to learn and adapt in order to produce more accurate and reliable results in the future. Many successful organizations made significant pivots while at a similar scale to Redwood, and we remain cautiously optimistic about Redwood's future potential. An Overview of Redwood Research Grants: Redwood has received just over $21 million dollars in funding that we are aware of, for their own operations (2/3, or $14 million) and running Constellation (1/3 or $7 million) Redwood received $20 million from Open Philanthropy (OP) (grant 1 & 2) and $1.27 million from the Survival and Flourishing Fund. They also were granted (but never received) $6.6 million from FTX Future Fund. Output: Research: Redwood lists six research projects on their website: causal scrubbing, interpretability ...

The Nonlinear Library
LW - Some common confusion about induction heads by Alexandre Variengien

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 29, 2023 9:11


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Some common confusion about induction heads, published by Alexandre Variengien on March 28, 2023 on LessWrong. Epistemic status: conceptual discussion and opinions informed by doing 6 months of interpretability research at Redwood Research and exchanging with other researchers, but I'm just speaking for myself. Induction heads are defined twice by Anthropic. The first time as a mechanism in 2L attention-only transformers A second time as a behavioral description on repeated random sequences of tokens However, these two definitions rely on distinct sources of evidence and create confusion, as their difference is not always acknowledged when people cite these papers. The mechanistic definition applies to toy language models, while the behavioral definition is a useful yet incomplete characterization of attention heads. I think that many people are in fact confused by this: I have talked to many people who aren't clear on the fact that these two concepts are different, and incorrectly believe that (e.g.) the mechanism of induction heads in larger language models has been characterized. More specifically, the two Anthropic papers introduce the following two distinct definitions of induction heads: Mechanistic: The first definition, introduced by Elhage et al., describes a behavior in a 2 layer attention-only model (copying a token given a matching prefix) and a minimal mechanism to perform this behavior (a set of paths in the computational graph and a human interpretation of the transformation along those paths). Empirically, this mechanism seems to be the best possible short description of what those heads are doing (i.e. if you have to choose a subgraph made of a single path as input for the keys, queries, and values of these heads, the induction circuit is likely to be the one that recovers the most loss). But this explanation does not encompass everything these heads do. In reality, many more paths are used than the one described (see Redwood's causal scrubbing results on induction heads) and the function of the additional paths is unclear. I don't know whether the claims about the behavior and mechanisms of these heads are best described as “mostly true but missing details” or “only a small part of what's going on”. See also Buck's comment for more discussion on the interpretation of causal scrubbing recovered loss. Behavioral: The second definition, introduced by Olsson et al., relies on head activation evaluators (measuring attention patterns and head output) on out-of-distribution sequences made of Repeated Random Tokens (RRT). Two scores are used to characterize induction heads: i) Prefix matching: attention probability to the first occurrence of the token [A] on patterns like [A][B] . [A] ii) Copying: how much the head output increases the logit of [A] compared to the other logits. The RRT distribution was chosen so that fully abstracted induction behavior is one of the few useful heuristics to predict the next token. In this post, I'll use mechanistic or behavioral induction heads to differentiate between the definitions. I'll present three points that — I think — are important to keep in mind when using these definitions. 1 - The two-head mechanism (induction head and previous token head) described in Elhage et al. is the minimal way to implement an induction head As noted in the paper, induction heads can use more complicated mechanisms. For instance, instead of relying on a previous token head to match only one token as a prefix (the token [A] in the example above), they could rely on a head that attends further back to match longer prefixes (e.g. patterns like [X][A][B] . [X][A]). Empirically, evidence for induction heads using some amount of longer prefix matching has been observed in the causal scrubbing experiments on induction. The two-head mechanism i...

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong
LW - Some common confusion about induction heads by Alexandre Variengien

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 29, 2023 9:11


Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Some common confusion about induction heads, published by Alexandre Variengien on March 28, 2023 on LessWrong. Epistemic status: conceptual discussion and opinions informed by doing 6 months of interpretability research at Redwood Research and exchanging with other researchers, but I'm just speaking for myself. Induction heads are defined twice by Anthropic. The first time as a mechanism in 2L attention-only transformers A second time as a behavioral description on repeated random sequences of tokens However, these two definitions rely on distinct sources of evidence and create confusion, as their difference is not always acknowledged when people cite these papers. The mechanistic definition applies to toy language models, while the behavioral definition is a useful yet incomplete characterization of attention heads. I think that many people are in fact confused by this: I have talked to many people who aren't clear on the fact that these two concepts are different, and incorrectly believe that (e.g.) the mechanism of induction heads in larger language models has been characterized. More specifically, the two Anthropic papers introduce the following two distinct definitions of induction heads: Mechanistic: The first definition, introduced by Elhage et al., describes a behavior in a 2 layer attention-only model (copying a token given a matching prefix) and a minimal mechanism to perform this behavior (a set of paths in the computational graph and a human interpretation of the transformation along those paths). Empirically, this mechanism seems to be the best possible short description of what those heads are doing (i.e. if you have to choose a subgraph made of a single path as input for the keys, queries, and values of these heads, the induction circuit is likely to be the one that recovers the most loss). But this explanation does not encompass everything these heads do. In reality, many more paths are used than the one described (see Redwood's causal scrubbing results on induction heads) and the function of the additional paths is unclear. I don't know whether the claims about the behavior and mechanisms of these heads are best described as “mostly true but missing details” or “only a small part of what's going on”. See also Buck's comment for more discussion on the interpretation of causal scrubbing recovered loss. Behavioral: The second definition, introduced by Olsson et al., relies on head activation evaluators (measuring attention patterns and head output) on out-of-distribution sequences made of Repeated Random Tokens (RRT). Two scores are used to characterize induction heads: i) Prefix matching: attention probability to the first occurrence of the token [A] on patterns like [A][B] . [A] ii) Copying: how much the head output increases the logit of [A] compared to the other logits. The RRT distribution was chosen so that fully abstracted induction behavior is one of the few useful heuristics to predict the next token. In this post, I'll use mechanistic or behavioral induction heads to differentiate between the definitions. I'll present three points that — I think — are important to keep in mind when using these definitions. 1 - The two-head mechanism (induction head and previous token head) described in Elhage et al. is the minimal way to implement an induction head As noted in the paper, induction heads can use more complicated mechanisms. For instance, instead of relying on a previous token head to match only one token as a prefix (the token [A] in the example above), they could rely on a head that attends further back to match longer prefixes (e.g. patterns like [X][A][B] . [X][A]). Empirically, evidence for induction heads using some amount of longer prefix matching has been observed in the causal scrubbing experiments on induction. The two-head mechanism i...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - Practical Pitfalls of Causal Scrubbing by Jérémy Scheurer

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 27, 2023 22:35


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Practical Pitfalls of Causal Scrubbing, published by Jérémy Scheurer on March 27, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum. TL;DR: We evaluate Causal Scrubbing (CaSc) on synthetic graphs with known ground truth to determine its reliability in confirming correct hypotheses and rejecting incorrect ones. First, we show that CaSc can accurately identify true hypotheses and quantify the degree to which a hypothesis is wrong. Second, we highlight some limitations of CaSc, in particular, that it cannot falsify all incorrect hypotheses. We provide concrete examples of false positive results with causal scrubbing. Our main finding is that false positives can occur when there is “cancellation”, i.e., CaSc causes the model to do better on some inputs and worse on others, such that, on average, the scrubbed model recovers the full loss. A second practical failure mode is that CaSc cannot detect whether a proposed hypothesis is specific enough, and it cannot distinguish between hypotheses that are extensionally equivalent. We thank Redwood Research for generously supporting this project by providing us with their Causal Scrubbing implementation, access to REMIX materials, and computational resources. We specifically thank Ansh Radhakrishnan, Buck Shlegeris, and Nicholas Goldowsdky-Dill for their feedback and advice. We thank the Long-Term Future Fund for financial support and Marcel Steimke and Lennart Heim for operational support. Finally, we thank Marius Hobbhahn, Adam Jermyn, and Erik Jenner for valuable discussions and feedback. Introduction Causal Scrubbing (CaSc) is a method to evaluate the accuracy of hypotheses about neural networks and provides a measure of the deviation of a hypothesis from the ground truth. However, CaSc does not guarantee to reject false or incomplete hypotheses. We thus believe that systematic evaluation of CaSc to investigate these limitations is valuable (in addition to evaluating its effectiveness in the wild, as done in most existing work). Hence, we evaluate CaSc to highlight its strengths and weaknesses and explore the reliability of CaSc in confirming correct hypotheses and rejecting incorrect ones. We evaluate the reliability of CaSc on synthetic graphs. While synthetic graphs are less realistic than trained neural networks, we get access to the known ground truth interpretation, which allows us to accurately evaluate our hypotheses. Since CaSc operates on general computational graphs, any results on synthetic graphs also apply to using CaSc on neural networks (although we don't make any claim on how likely the situations we find are to occur in trained neural networks). Our evaluation is based on creating a synthetic graph that solves a specific problem (e.g., sorting a list) and creating an identical interpretation graph (the correct hypothesis). We then perturb the correct interpretation graph to make the hypothesis “worse”. Finally, we evaluate whether CaSc correctly determines the better hypothesis. Ideally, we want the scrubbed loss (the loss induced by applying CaSc) to correlate with the “correctness” of a hypothesis. To determine whether a hypothesis is “better” or “worse”, we introduce the concepts of extensional and intensional equivalence between functions. Extensional equivalent functions have the same input-output behavior; for example, Quicksort and Mergesort are extensionally equivalent as they both sort an input sequence. Intensional equivalent functions are implemented in the same way mechanistically. So once we zoom further in and compare Quicksort and Mergesort algorithmically, we see that they are not intensionally equivalent. This point is already made in the CaSc writeup, and our goal is merely to highlight that in the context of mechanistic interpretability, this is an important distinction that's easy to overlook. In this post,...

The Nonlinear Library
LW - Practical Pitfalls of Causal Scrubbing by Jérémy Scheurer

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 27, 2023 22:34


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Practical Pitfalls of Causal Scrubbing, published by Jérémy Scheurer on March 27, 2023 on LessWrong. TL;DR: We evaluate Causal Scrubbing (CaSc) on synthetic graphs with known ground truth to determine its reliability in confirming correct hypotheses and rejecting incorrect ones. First, we show that CaSc can accurately identify true hypotheses and quantify the degree to which a hypothesis is wrong. Second, we highlight some limitations of CaSc, in particular, that it cannot falsify all incorrect hypotheses. We provide concrete examples of false positive results with causal scrubbing. Our main finding is that false positives can occur when there is “cancellation”, i.e., CaSc causes the model to do better on some inputs and worse on others, such that, on average, the scrubbed model recovers the full loss. A second practical failure mode is that CaSc cannot detect whether a proposed hypothesis is specific enough, and it cannot distinguish between hypotheses that are extensionally equivalent. We thank Redwood Research for generously supporting this project by providing us with their Causal Scrubbing implementation, access to REMIX materials, and computational resources. We specifically thank Ansh Radhakrishnan, Buck Shlegeris, and Nicholas Goldowsdky-Dill for their feedback and advice. We thank the Long-Term Future Fund for financial support and Marcel Steimke and Lennart Heim for operational support. Finally, we thank Marius Hobbhahn, Adam Jermyn, and Erik Jenner for valuable discussions and feedback. Introduction Causal Scrubbing (CaSc) is a method to evaluate the accuracy of hypotheses about neural networks and provides a measure of the deviation of a hypothesis from the ground truth. However, CaSc does not guarantee to reject false or incomplete hypotheses. We thus believe that systematic evaluation of CaSc to investigate these limitations is valuable (in addition to evaluating its effectiveness in the wild, as done in most existing work). Hence, we evaluate CaSc to highlight its strengths and weaknesses and explore the reliability of CaSc in confirming correct hypotheses and rejecting incorrect ones. We evaluate the reliability of CaSc on synthetic graphs. While synthetic graphs are less realistic than trained neural networks, we get access to the known ground truth interpretation, which allows us to accurately evaluate our hypotheses. Since CaSc operates on general computational graphs, any results on synthetic graphs also apply to using CaSc on neural networks (although we don't make any claim on how likely the situations we find are to occur in trained neural networks). Our evaluation is based on creating a synthetic graph that solves a specific problem (e.g., sorting a list) and creating an identical interpretation graph (the correct hypothesis). We then perturb the correct interpretation graph to make the hypothesis “worse”. Finally, we evaluate whether CaSc correctly determines the better hypothesis. Ideally, we want the scrubbed loss (the loss induced by applying CaSc) to correlate with the “correctness” of a hypothesis. To determine whether a hypothesis is “better” or “worse”, we introduce the concepts of extensional and intensional equivalence between functions. Extensional equivalent functions have the same input-output behavior; for example, Quicksort and Mergesort are extensionally equivalent as they both sort an input sequence. Intensional equivalent functions are implemented in the same way mechanistically. So once we zoom further in and compare Quicksort and Mergesort algorithmically, we see that they are not intensionally equivalent. This point is already made in the CaSc writeup, and our goal is merely to highlight that in the context of mechanistic interpretability, this is an important distinction that's easy to overlook. In this post, we look deep...

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong
LW - Practical Pitfalls of Causal Scrubbing by Jérémy Scheurer

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 27, 2023 22:34


Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Practical Pitfalls of Causal Scrubbing, published by Jérémy Scheurer on March 27, 2023 on LessWrong. TL;DR: We evaluate Causal Scrubbing (CaSc) on synthetic graphs with known ground truth to determine its reliability in confirming correct hypotheses and rejecting incorrect ones. First, we show that CaSc can accurately identify true hypotheses and quantify the degree to which a hypothesis is wrong. Second, we highlight some limitations of CaSc, in particular, that it cannot falsify all incorrect hypotheses. We provide concrete examples of false positive results with causal scrubbing. Our main finding is that false positives can occur when there is “cancellation”, i.e., CaSc causes the model to do better on some inputs and worse on others, such that, on average, the scrubbed model recovers the full loss. A second practical failure mode is that CaSc cannot detect whether a proposed hypothesis is specific enough, and it cannot distinguish between hypotheses that are extensionally equivalent. We thank Redwood Research for generously supporting this project by providing us with their Causal Scrubbing implementation, access to REMIX materials, and computational resources. We specifically thank Ansh Radhakrishnan, Buck Shlegeris, and Nicholas Goldowsdky-Dill for their feedback and advice. We thank the Long-Term Future Fund for financial support and Marcel Steimke and Lennart Heim for operational support. Finally, we thank Marius Hobbhahn, Adam Jermyn, and Erik Jenner for valuable discussions and feedback. Introduction Causal Scrubbing (CaSc) is a method to evaluate the accuracy of hypotheses about neural networks and provides a measure of the deviation of a hypothesis from the ground truth. However, CaSc does not guarantee to reject false or incomplete hypotheses. We thus believe that systematic evaluation of CaSc to investigate these limitations is valuable (in addition to evaluating its effectiveness in the wild, as done in most existing work). Hence, we evaluate CaSc to highlight its strengths and weaknesses and explore the reliability of CaSc in confirming correct hypotheses and rejecting incorrect ones. We evaluate the reliability of CaSc on synthetic graphs. While synthetic graphs are less realistic than trained neural networks, we get access to the known ground truth interpretation, which allows us to accurately evaluate our hypotheses. Since CaSc operates on general computational graphs, any results on synthetic graphs also apply to using CaSc on neural networks (although we don't make any claim on how likely the situations we find are to occur in trained neural networks). Our evaluation is based on creating a synthetic graph that solves a specific problem (e.g., sorting a list) and creating an identical interpretation graph (the correct hypothesis). We then perturb the correct interpretation graph to make the hypothesis “worse”. Finally, we evaluate whether CaSc correctly determines the better hypothesis. Ideally, we want the scrubbed loss (the loss induced by applying CaSc) to correlate with the “correctness” of a hypothesis. To determine whether a hypothesis is “better” or “worse”, we introduce the concepts of extensional and intensional equivalence between functions. Extensional equivalent functions have the same input-output behavior; for example, Quicksort and Mergesort are extensionally equivalent as they both sort an input sequence. Intensional equivalent functions are implemented in the same way mechanistically. So once we zoom further in and compare Quicksort and Mergesort algorithmically, we see that they are not intensionally equivalent. This point is already made in the CaSc writeup, and our goal is merely to highlight that in the context of mechanistic interpretability, this is an important distinction that's easy to overlook. In this post, we look deep...

The Nonlinear Library
EA - The illusion of consensus about EA celebrities by Ben Millwood

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 17, 2023 3:48


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: The illusion of consensus about EA celebrities, published by Ben Millwood on March 17, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Epistemic status: speaking for myself and hoping it generalises I don't like everyone that I'm supposed to like: I've long thought that [redacted] was focused on all the wrong framings of the issues they discuss, [redacted] is on the wrong side of their disagreement with [redacted] and often seems to have kind of sloppy thinking about things like this, [redacted] says many sensible things but a writing style that I find intensely irritating and I struggle to get through; [redacted] is similar, but not as sensible, [redacted] is working on an important problem, but doing a kind of mediocre job of it, which might be crowding out better efforts. Why did I redact all those names? Well, my criticisms are often some mixture of: half-baked; I don't have time to evaluate everyone fairly and deeply, and don't need to in order to make choices about what to focus on, based on justifications that are not very legible or easy to communicate, not always totally central to their point or fatal to their work, kind of upsetting or discouraging to hear, often not that actionable. I want to highlight that criticisms like this will usually not surface, and while in individual instances this is sensible, in aggregate it may contribute to a misleading view of how we view our celebrities and leaders. We end up seeming more deferential and hero-worshipping than we really are. This is bad for two reasons: it harms our credibility in the eyes of outsiders (or insiders, even) who have negative views of those people, it projects the wrong expectation to newcomers who trust us and want to learn or adopt our attitudes. What to do about it? I think "just criticise people more" in isolation is not a good solution. People, even respected people in positions of leadership, often seem to already find posting on the Forum a stressful experience, and I think tipping that balance in the more brutal direction seems likely to cost more than it gains. I think you could imagine major cultural changes around how people give and receive feedback that could make this better, mitigate catastrophising about negative feedback, and ensure people feel safe to risk making mistakes or exposing their oversights. But those seem to me like heavy, ambitious pieces of cultural engineering that require a lot of buy-in to get going, and even if successful may incur ongoing frictional costs. Here's smaller, simpler things that could help: Write a forum post about it (this one's taken, sorry), Make disagreements more visible and more legible, especially among leaders or experts. I really enjoyed the debate between Will MacAskill and Toby Ord in the comments of Are we living at the most influential time in history? ­– you can't come away from that discussion thinking "oh, whatever the smart, respected people in EA think must be right", because either way at least one of them will disagree with you! There's a lot of disagreement on the Forum all the time, of course, but I have a (somewhat unfair) vibe of this as the famous people deposit their work into the forum and leave for higher pursuits, and then we in the peanut gallery argue over it. I'd love it if there were (say) a document out there that Redwood Research and Anthropic both endorsed, that described how their agendas differ and what underlying disagreements lead to those differences. Make sure people incoming to the community, or at the periphery of the community, are inoculated against this bias, if you spot it. Point out that people usually have a mix of good and bad ideas. Have some go-to examples of respected people's blind spots or mistakes, at least as they appear to you. (Even if you never end up explaining them to anyone, it's probably goo...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - EIS VI: Critiques of Mechanistic Interpretability Work in AI Safety by Stephen Casper

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 17, 2023 20:03


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: EIS VI: Critiques of Mechanistic Interpretability Work in AI Safety, published by Stephen Casper on February 17, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum. Part 6 of 12 in the Engineer's Interpretability Sequence. Thanks to Chris Olah and Neel Nanda for discussions and comments. In particular, I am thankful to Neel Nanda correcting a mistake I made in understanding the arguments in Olsson et al. (2022) in an earlier draft of this post. TAISIC = “the AI safety interpretability community” MI = “mechanistic interpretability” What kind of work this post focused on TAISIC prioritizes a relatively small set of problems in interpretability relative to the research community at large. This work is not homogenous, but a dominant theme is a focus on mechanistic, circuits-style interpretability with the end goals of model verification and/or detecting deceptive alignment. There is a specific line of work that this post focuses on. Key papers from it include: Feature Visualization (Olah et al., 2017) Zoom In: An Introduction to Circuits (Olah et al., 2020) Curve Detectors (Cammarata et al., 2020) A Mathematical Framework for Transformer Circuits (Elhage et al., 2021) In-context Learning and Induction Heads (Olsson et al., 2022) Toy Models of Superposition (Elhage et al., 2022) Softmax Linear Units (Elhage et al., 2022) Interpretability in the Wild: a Circuit for Indirect Object Identification in GPT-2 small (Wang et al., 2022) Progress measures for grokking via mechanistic interpretability (Nanda et al., 2023) .etc. And the points in this post will also apply somewhat to the current research agendas of Anthropic, Redwood Research, ARC, and Conjecture. This includes Causal Scrubbing (Chan et al., 2022) and mechanistic anomaly detection (Christiano, 2022). Most (all?) of the above work is either from Distill or inspired in part by Distill's interpretability work in the late 2010s. To be clear, I believe this research is valuable, and it has been foundational to my own thinking about interpretability. But there seem to be some troubles with this space that might be keeping it from being as productive as it can be. Now may be a good time to make some adjustments to TAISIC's focus on MI. This may be especially important given how much recent interest there has been in interpretability work and how there are large recent efforts focused on getting a large number of junior researchers working on it. Four issues This section discusses four major critiques of the works above. Not all of these critiques apply to all of the above, but for every paper mentioned above, at least one of the critiques below apply to it. Some but not all of these examples of papers exhibiting these problems will be covered. Cherrypicking results As discussed in EIS III and the Toward Transparent AI survey (Räuker et al., 2022), cherrypicking is common in the interpretability literature, but it manifests in some specific ways in MI work. It is very valuable for papers to include illustrative examples to build intuition, but when a paper makes such examples a central focus, cherrypicking can make results look better than they are. The feature visualization (Olah et al., 2017) and zoom in (Olah et al., 2020) papers have examples of this. Have a look at the cover photo for (Olah et al., 2017). From Olah et al., (2017) These images seem easy to describe and form hypotheses from. But instead of these, try going to OpenAI' microscope and looking at some random visualizations. For example, here are some from a deep layer in an Inception-v4. From this link. As someone who often works with feature visualizations, I can confirm that these visualizations from OpenAI microscope are quite typical. But notice how they seem quite a bit less ‘lucid' than the ones in the cover photo from Olah et al., (2017). Of course, many papers present t...

The Nonlinear Library
EA - Celebrating EAGxLatAm and EAGxIndia by OllieBase

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 26, 2023 6:53


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Celebrating EAGxLatAm and EAGxIndia, published by OllieBase on January 26, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. In the first two weeks of January, we had the first EA conferences to take place in Latin America and India: EAGxLatAm in Mexico City and EAGxIndia in Jaipur, Rajasthan. Lots of EAGx events happen every year, and we don't usually post about each one. But I think these events are particularly special as two of the largest EA conferences to take place in LMICs (Low and Middle Income Countries) and the first ever in each region. So, I wanted to share a bit more about how they went. Tl;DR: they went well. EAGxLatinAmerica EAGxLatAm was organised by community builders from the Spanish-speaking EA community with support from CEA. Over 200 people attended the event: ~32% of attendees came from within Mexico, ~13% from the US, ~12% from Colombia, ~7% from Brazil, ~5% from Chile and ~5% from Spain. There were also attendees from several other countries including Argentina, Peru, the Philippines, Canada, and countries in Europe. The event hosted talks in English, Spanish, and Portuguese and attendees could mark on their name badges which languages they spoke. Sessions included: A talk on the high-impact careers service, Carreras con Impacto; A virtual Q&A with Toby Ord to discuss existential risks and the role of LMICs in tackling them; Racionalidad para principiantes (Rationality for beginners) by Laura González Salmerón; A panel on Riesgos Catastróficos Globales (Global Catastrophic Risks); A panel on AI safety with staff from OpenAI, Redwood Research, CSER and Epoch; A talk on Animal Welfare cause prioritisation by Daniela Romero Waldhorn (Rethink Priorities); A talk by JPAL staff on ‘Applying evidence to reduce intimate partner violence'; A talk on local cause prioritisation by Luis Mota (Global Priorities Institute); A panel on EA in LMICs with EA community builders from Brazil, the Spanish-speaking community, the Philippines, Nigeria, South Africa, and EA Anywhere; A talk by Vida Plena (a new organisation incubated by Charity Entrepreneurship focused on mental health in Latin America); Meetups for attendees from Mexico, Chile/Argentina, Colombia/Perú, Brazil and Spain. The event received a likelihood to recommend score of 9.07/10 and attendees made an average of 9.37 new connections. Some quotes from the feedback survey I enjoyed reading: “I had a 1-1 with someone else interested in nuclear security and nuclear winter research, and we're developing an online reading group curriculum to [ideally] launch in March!" “I got convinced on deciding to focus on [sic] direct work on ai safety by talking to [two other attendees].” “I met Rob Wiblin at lunch and I didn't recognize him." One attendee described the event to a CEA colleague as “the best weekend of their life”. The event wasn't perfect, of course. Several attendees reported that there was too much content in English that some attendees couldn't follow, and some of the snacks and beverages seemed low quality. We hope to do even better next time! EAGxIndia EAGxIndia was organised by community builders based in India with support from CEA. 163 people attended: ~70% of attendees came from within India, ~9% from the UK and ~9% from the US. The rest came from Singapore, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Germany, and Brazil. The sessions were all in English, and included: A talk on South Asian Air Quality by Santosh Harish (Open Philanthropy); An AI governance Q&A with Michael Aird (Rethink Priorities); An update from the Fish Welfare Initiative, who are based in India; A talk on AI safety research agendas and opportunities by Adam Gleave (FAR AI); Two sessions led by Charity Entrepreneurship; A workshop on what the EA community should look like in India, led by Indian community builders and CEA staff; A talk mapping the...

The Nonlinear Library
EA - Celebrating EAGxLatAm and EAGxIndia by OllieBase

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 26, 2023 6:53


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Celebrating EAGxLatAm and EAGxIndia, published by OllieBase on January 26, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. In the first two weeks of January, we had the first EA conferences to take place in Latin America and India: EAGxLatAm in Mexico City and EAGxIndia in Jaipur, Rajasthan. Lots of EAGx events happen every year, and we don't usually post about each one. But I think these events are particularly special as two of the largest EA conferences to take place in LMICs (Low and Middle Income Countries) and the first ever in each region. So, I wanted to share a bit more about how they went. Tl;DR: they went well. EAGxLatinAmerica EAGxLatAm was organised by community builders from the Spanish-speaking EA community with support from CEA. Over 200 people attended the event: ~32% of attendees came from within Mexico, ~13% from the US, ~12% from Colombia, ~7% from Brazil, ~5% from Chile and ~5% from Spain. There were also attendees from several other countries including Argentina, Peru, the Philippines, Canada, and countries in Europe. The event hosted talks in English, Spanish, and Portuguese and attendees could mark on their name badges which languages they spoke. Sessions included: A talk on the high-impact careers service, Carreras con Impacto; A virtual Q&A with Toby Ord to discuss existential risks and the role of LMICs in tackling them; Racionalidad para principiantes (Rationality for beginners) by Laura González Salmerón; A panel on Riesgos Catastróficos Globales (Global Catastrophic Risks); A panel on AI safety with staff from OpenAI, Redwood Research, CSER and Epoch; A talk on Animal Welfare cause prioritisation by Daniela Romero Waldhorn (Rethink Priorities); A talk by JPAL staff on ‘Applying evidence to reduce intimate partner violence'; A talk on local cause prioritisation by Luis Mota (Global Priorities Institute); A panel on EA in LMICs with EA community builders from Brazil, the Spanish-speaking community, the Philippines, Nigeria, South Africa, and EA Anywhere; A talk by Vida Plena (a new organisation incubated by Charity Entrepreneurship focused on mental health in Latin America); Meetups for attendees from Mexico, Chile/Argentina, Colombia/Perú, Brazil and Spain. The event received a likelihood to recommend score of 9.07/10 and attendees made an average of 9.37 new connections. Some quotes from the feedback survey I enjoyed reading: “I had a 1-1 with someone else interested in nuclear security and nuclear winter research, and we're developing an online reading group curriculum to [ideally] launch in March!" “I got convinced on deciding to focus on [sic] direct work on ai safety by talking to [two other attendees].” “I met Rob Wiblin at lunch and I didn't recognize him." One attendee described the event to a CEA colleague as “the best weekend of their life”. The event wasn't perfect, of course. Several attendees reported that there was too much content in English that some attendees couldn't follow, and some of the snacks and beverages seemed low quality. We hope to do even better next time! EAGxIndia EAGxIndia was organised by community builders based in India with support from CEA. 163 people attended: ~70% of attendees came from within India, ~9% from the UK and ~9% from the US. The rest came from Singapore, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Germany, and Brazil. The sessions were all in English, and included: A talk on South Asian Air Quality by Santosh Harish (Open Philanthropy); An AI governance Q&A with Michael Aird (Rethink Priorities); An update from the Fish Welfare Initiative, who are based in India; A talk on AI safety research agendas and opportunities by Adam Gleave (FAR AI); Two sessions led by Charity Entrepreneurship; A workshop on what the EA community should look like in India, led by Indian community builders and CEA staff; A talk mapping the...

The Nonlinear Library
EA - Concerns about AI safety career change by mmKALLL

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 14, 2023 6:22


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Concerns about AI safety career change, published by mmKALLL on January 13, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Summary: I'm a software engineer interested in working on AI safety, but confused about its career prospects. I outlined all my concerns below. In particular, I had trouble finding accounts of engineers working in the field, and the differences between organizations/companies working on AI safety are very unclear from the outside. It's also not clear if frontend skills are seen as useful, or whether applicants should reside within the US. Full text: I'm an experienced full-stack software engineer and software/strategy consultant based in Japan. I've been loosely following EA since 2010, and have become increasingly concerned about AI x-risk since 2016. This has led me to regularly consider possible careers in AI safety, especially now that the demand for software engineers in the field has increased dramatically. However, having spent ~15 hours reading about the current state of the field, organizations, and role of engineers, I find myself having more questions than I started with. In hope of finding more clarity and help share what engineers considering the career shift might be wondering, I decided to outline my main points of concern below: The only accounts of engineers working in AI safety I could find were two articles and a problem profile on 80,000 Hours. Not even the AI Alignment Forum seemed to have any posts written by engineers sharing their experience. Despite this, most orgs have open positions for ML engineers, DevOps engineers, or generalist software developers. What are all of them doing? Many job descriptions listed very similar skills for engineers, even when the orgs seemed to have very different approaches on tackling AI safety problems. Is the set of required software skills really that uniform across organizations? Do software engineers in the field feel that their day-to-day work is meaningful? Are they regularly learning interesting and useful things? How do they see their career prospects? I'm also curious whether projects are done with a diverse set of technologies? Who is typically responsible for data transformations and cleanup? How much ML theory should an engineer coming into the field learn beforehand? (I'm excited to learn about ML, but got very mixed signals about the expectations.) Some orgs describe their agenda and goals. In many cases, these seemed very similar to me, as all of them are pragmatic and many even had shared or adjacent areas of research. Given the similarities, why are there so many different organizations? How is an outsider supposed to know what makes each of them unique? As an example, MIRI states that they want to "ensure that the creation of smarter-than-human machine intelligence has a positive impact", Anthropic states they have "long-term goals of steerable, trustworthy AI", Redwood Research states they want to "align -- future systems with human interests", and Center of AI Safety states they want to "reduce catastrophic and existential risks from AI". What makes these different from each other? They all sound like they'd lead to similar conclusions about what to work on. I was surprised to find that some orgs didn't really describe their work or what differentiates them. How are they supposed to find the best engineers if interested ones can't know what areas they are working on? I also found that it's sometimes very difficult to evaluate whether an org is active and/or trustworthy. Related to this, I was baffled to find that MIRI hasn't updated their agenda since 2015, and their latest publication is dated at 2016. However, their blog seems to have ~quarterly updates? Are they still relevant? Despite finding many orgs by reading articles and publications, I couldn't find a good overall list ...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - 200 COP in MI: Looking for Circuits in the Wild by Neel Nanda

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 29, 2022 20:24


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: 200 COP in MI: Looking for Circuits in the Wild, published by Neel Nanda on December 29, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. This is the third post in a sequence called 200 Concrete Open Problems in Mechanistic Interpretability. Start here, then read in any order. If you want to learn the basics before you think about open problems, check out my post on getting started. I'll make another post every 1-2 days, giving a new category of open problems. If you want to read ahead, check out the draft sequence here! Motivation Motivating paper: Interpretability In The Wild Our ultimate goal is to be able to reverse engineer real, frontier language models. And the next step up from toy language models is to look for circuits in the wild. That is, taking a real model that was not designed to be tractable to interpret (albeit much smaller than GPT-3), take some specific capability it has, and try to reverse engineer how it does it. I think there's a lot of exciting low-hanging fruit here, and that enough groundwork has been laid to be accessible to newcomers to the field! In particular, I think there's a lot of potential to better uncover the underlying principles of models, and to leverage this to build better and more scalable interpretability techniques. We currently have maybe three published examples of well-understood circuits in language models - I want to have at least 20! This section is heavily inspired by Redwood Research's recent paper: Interpretability In The Wild. They analyse how GPT-2 Small solves the grammatical task of Indirect Object Identification: e.g. knowing that “John and Mary went to the store, then John handed a bottle of milk to” is followed by Mary, not John. And in a heroic feat of reverse engineering, they rigorously deciphered the algorithm. In broad strokes, the model first identifies which names are repeated, inhibits any repeated names, and then predicts that the name which is not inhibited comes next. The full circuit consists of 26 heads, sorted into 7 distinct groups, as shown below - see more details in my MI explainer. A reasonable objection is that this is a cherry-picked task on a tiny (100M parameter) model, so why should we care about it? But I've learned a lot from this work! It's helped uncover some underlying principles of networks. Notably that the model has built in redundancy: if the name mover heads (which attend to the correct name) are knocked-out, then there are backup heads which take over and do the task instead! And that the model has learned to repurpose existing functionality: the model has a component (induction heads) for the more complex task of continuing repeated subsequences, but here they also get re-purposed to detect whether a name is repeated. It would have been much harder to understand what was going on here without the prior work of reverse-engineering induction circuits! And there's many open questions building on the work that could clarify other principles like universality: when another model learns this task, does it learn the same circuit? Further, it's helped to build out a toolkit of techniques to rigorously reverse engineer models. In the process of understanding this circuit, they refined the technique of activation patching into more sophisticated approaches such as path patching (and later causal scrubbing). And this has helped lay the foundations for developing future techniques! There are many interpretability techniques that are more scalable but less mechanistic, like probing. If we have some well understood circuits, and can see how well these techniques work in those settings (and what they miss!), this gives grounding to find the good techniques and how to understand their results. Finally, I think that enough groundwork has been laid that finding circuits in the wild is tractable, even by peo...

Slate Star Codex Podcast
Perhaps It Is A Bad Thing That The World's Leading AI Companies Cannot Control Their AIs

Slate Star Codex Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 14, 2022 22:39


https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/perhaps-it-is-a-bad-thing-that-the I. The Game Is Afoot   Last month I wrote about Redwood Research's fanfiction AI project. They tried to train a story-writing AI not to include violent scenes, no matter how suggestive the prompt. Although their training made the AI reluctant to include violence, they never reached a point where clever prompt engineers couldn't get around their restrictions. Now that same experiment is playing out on the world stage. OpenAI released a question-answering AI, ChatGPT. If you haven't played with it yet, I recommend it. It's very impressive! Every corporate chatbot release is followed by the same cat-and-mouse game with journalists. The corporation tries to program the chatbot to never say offensive things. Then the journalists try to trick the chatbot into saying “I love racism”. When they inevitably succeed, they publish an article titled “AI LOVES RACISM!” Then the corporation either recalls its chatbot or pledges to do better next time, and the game moves on to the next company in line.

The Nonlinear Library
AF - An exploration of GPT-2's embedding weights by Adam Scherlis

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 13, 2022 18:03


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: An exploration of GPT-2's embedding weights, published by Adam Scherlis on December 13, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. I wrote this doc in December 2021, while working at Redwood Research. It summarizes a handful of observations about GPT-2's weights -- mostly the embedding matrix, but also the LayerNorm gain parameters -- that I found while doing some open-ended investigation of the model. I wanted to see how much I could learn by studying just those parameters, without looking at the attention layers, MLP layers, or activations. This is still mostly unedited. Feedback and questions are very welcome. Embedding matrix glossary Latent space – 768-channel-dim space that activations between blocks (and in skip connections) live in. Token space – 50,257-token-dim space of one-hot token vectors [Token] embedding matrix – W of shape [768, 50257] (this is the transpose of `model.lm_head.weight`) Embedding vector – Any 768-dimensional column of W Embedding space – Latent space Preferred channel basis from LayerNorm This section involves more math than the rest; you can skip it without missing much. "Preferred basis" means the same thing as "privileged basis" as defined by Anthropic here. Most of GPT-2's architecture – the attention layers, fully-connected layers and residual connections – don't impose a preferred basis on the latent space. (The skip connections give a canonical map between the latent spaces in different layers, so that it makes sense to talk about “the” latent space globally.) The LayerNorm layers actually do privilege a basis, though, for two reasons. LayerNorm(x) is defined as follows, where w and b are learned parameters: yi=∑j(Idij−1i1j)xj(subtract mean; 1 is an all-ones vector) zi=yi/√∑jyjyj (normalize variance) LayerNorm(x)i=wizi−bi (apply bias and gain parameters) The first line picks out part of a preferred basis – a preferred vector (and the subspace orthogonal to it), namely the all-ones vector 1. The second line doesn't pick out a basis, because the stdev of the components of y is just its L2 norm and normalizing a vector is independent of (orthonormal) basis. (It does impose a preferred inner product, but we had that already: GPT-2's unembedding matrix is the transpose of the embedding matrix, and W^T W is a matrix of inner products.) The third line is the interesting one. The gain vector w is multiplied elementwise with z, which breaks basis-independence. (You could also write this as D_ij z_j where D is a diagonal matrix, D_ii = w_i.) This makes the standard basis a preferred basis, in a pretty straightforward way: the network can dial up or down the size of different standard-basis components independently (and can't do this for the components with respect to any other basis). This provides some justification for breaking things out by latent-space dimension in most of this post. Token/Position embedding rivalry Here's an interesting phenomenon I don't have a complete explanation for. This is a chunk of the token embedding matrix: (X: token dims, Y: channel dims) The horizontal stripes are dimensions of the latent space where the token embeddings are systematically larger or smaller than average. This gets normalized away inside residual blocks, but is preserved by skip connections. We can also make histograms from this matrix, by taking either a row or a column and plotting a histogram of the numbers in it. We can overlay a few of these histograms, in different colors, to show a few columns or a few rows at the same time. Overlaid histograms of the first 30 columns (tokens, left) and the first 30 rows (channel dims, right): Note that many of the channel dims follow roughly the same distribution, while a few have smaller variance and larger means. This shows up as a heavy left-tail of the distribution of stdevs, and heavy tails in both direct...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - Causal Scrubbing: a method for rigorously testing interpretability hypotheses [Redwood Research] by Lawrence Chan

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 3, 2022 37:26


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Causal Scrubbing: a method for rigorously testing interpretability hypotheses [Redwood Research], published by Lawrence Chan on December 3, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. Authors sorted alphabetically. Summary: This post introduces causal scrubbing, a principled approach for evaluating the quality of mechanistic interpretations. The key idea behind causal scrubbing is to test interpretability hypotheses via behavior-preserving resampling ablations. We apply this method to develop a refined understanding of how a small language model implements induction and how an algorithmic model correctly classifies if a sequence of parentheses is balanced. 1 Introduction A question that all mechanistic interpretability work must answer is, “how well does this interpretation explain the phenomenon being studied?”. In the many recent papers in mechanistic interpretability, researchers have generally relied on ad-hoc methods to evaluate the quality of interpretations. This ad hoc nature of existing evaluation methods poses a serious challenge for scaling up mechanistic interpretability. Currently, to evaluate the quality of a particular research result, we need to deeply understand both the interpretation and the phenomenon being explained, and then apply researcher judgment. Ideally, we'd like to find the interpretability equivalent of property-based testing—automatically checking the correctness of interpretations, instead of relying on grit and researcher judgment. More systematic procedures would also help us scale-up interpretability efforts to larger models, behaviors with subtler effects, and to larger teams of researchers. To help with these efforts, we want a procedure that is both powerful enough to finely distinguish better interpretations from worse ones, and general enough to be applied to complex interpretations. In this work, we propose causal scrubbing, a systematic ablation method for testing precisely stated hypotheses about how a particular neural network implements a behavior on a dataset. Specifically, given an informal hypothesis about which parts of a model implement the intermediate calculations required for a behavior, we convert this to a formal correspondence between a computational graph for the model and a human-interpretable computational graph. Then, causal scrubbing starts from the output and recursively finds all of the invariances of parts of the neural network that are implied by the hypothesis, and then replaces the activations of the neural network with the maximum entropy distribution subject to certain natural constraints implied by the hypothesis and the data distribution. We then measure how well the scrubbed model implements the specific behavior. Insofar as the hypothesis explains the behavior on the dataset, the model's performance should be unchanged. Unlike previous approaches that were specific to particular applications, causal scrubbing aims to work on a large class of interpretability hypotheses, including almost all hypotheses interpretability researchers propose in practice (that we're aware of). Because the tests proposed by causal scrubbing are mechanically derived from the proposed hypothesis, causal scrubbing can be incorporated “in the inner loop” of interpretability research. For example, starting from a hypothesis that makes very broad claims about how the model works and thus is consistent with the model's behavior on the data, we can iteratively make hypotheses that make more specific claims while monitoring how well the new hypotheses explain model behavior. We demonstrate two applications of this approach in later posts: first on a parenthesis balancer checker, then on the induction heads in a two-layer attention-only language model. We see our contributions as the following: We formalize a notion of interpretability hy...

Slate Star Codex Podcast
Can This AI Save Teenage Spy Alex Rider From A Terrible Fate?

Slate Star Codex Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 30, 2022 38:14


We're showcasing a hot new totally bopping, popping musical track called “bromancer era? bromancer era?? bromancer era???“ His subtle sublime thoughts raced, making his eyes literally explode. https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/can-this-ai-save-teenage-spy-alex         “He peacefully enjoyed the light and flowers with his love,” she said quietly, as he knelt down gently and silently. “I also would like to walk once more into the garden if I only could,” he said, watching her. “I would like that so much,” Katara said. A brick hit him in the face and he died instantly, though not before reciting his beloved last vows: “For psp and other releases on friday, click here to earn an early (presale) slot ticket entry time or also get details generally about all releases and game features there to see how you can benefit!” — Talk To Filtered Transformer Rating: 0.1% probability of including violence “Prosaic alignment” is the most popular paradigm in modern AI alignment. It theorizes that we'll train future superintelligent AIs the same way that we train modern dumb ones: through gradient descent via reinforcement learning. Every time they do a good thing, we say “Yes, like this!”, in a way that pulls their incomprehensible code slightly in the direction of whatever they just did. Every time they do a bad thing, we say “No, not that!,” in a way that pushes their incomprehensible code slightly in the opposite direction. After training on thousands or millions of examples, the AI displays a seemingly sophisticated understanding of the conceptual boundaries of what we want. For example, suppose we have an AI that's good at making money. But we want to align it to a harder task: making money without committing any crimes. So we simulate it running money-making schemes a thousand times, and give it positive reinforcement every time it generates a legal plan, and negative reinforcement every time it generates a criminal one. At the end of the training run, we hopefully have an AI that's good at making money and aligned with our goal of following the law. Two things could go wrong here: The AI is stupid, ie incompetent at world-modeling. For example, it might understand that we don't want it to commit murder, but not understand that selling arsenic-laden food will kill humans. So it sells arsenic-laden food and humans die. The AI understands the world just fine, but didn't absorb the categories we thought it absorbed. For example, maybe none of our examples involved children, and so the AI learned not to murder adult humans, but didn't learn not to murder children. This isn't because the AI is too stupid to know that children are humans. It's because we're running a direct channel to something like the AI's “subconscious”, and we can only talk to it by playing this dumb game of “try to figure out the boundaries of the category including these 1,000 examples”. Problem 1 is self-resolving; once AIs are smart enough to be dangerous, they're probably smart enough to model the world well. How bad is Problem 2? Will an AI understand the category boundaries of what we want easily and naturally after just a few examples? Will it take millions of examples and a desperate effort? Or is there some reason why even smart AIs will never end up with goals close enough to ours to be safe, no matter how many examples we give them? AI scientists have debated these questions for years, usually as pure philosophy. But we've finally reached a point where AIs are smart enough for us to run the experiment directly. Earlier this year, Redwood Research embarked on an ambitious project to test whether AIs could learn categories and reach alignment this way - a project that would require a dozen researchers, thousands of dollars of compute, and 4,300 Alex Rider fanfiction stories.

The Nonlinear Library
AF - Current themes in mechanistic interpretability research by Lee Sharkey

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 16, 2022 20:56


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Current themes in mechanistic interpretability research, published by Lee Sharkey on November 16, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. This post gives an overview of discussions - from the perspective and understanding of the interpretability team at Conjecture - between mechanistic interpretability researchers from various organizations including Conjecture, Anthropic, Redwood Research, OpenAI, and DeepMind as well as some independent researchers. It is not a review of past work, nor a research agenda. We're thankful for comments and contributions from Neel Nanda, Tristan Hume, Chris Olah, Ryan Greenblatt, William Saunders, and other anonymous contributors to this post, which greatly improved its quality. While the post is a summary of discussions with many researchers and received comments and contributions from several, it may nevertheless not accurately represent their views. The last two to three years have seen a surge in interest in mechanistic interpretability as a potential path to AGI safety. Now there are no fewer than five organizations working on the topic (Anthropic, Conjecture, DeepMind, OpenAI, Redwood Research) in addition to numerous academic and independent researchers. In discussions about mechanistic interpretability between a subset of researchers, several themes emerged. By summarizing these themes here, we hope to facilitate research in the field more broadly. We identify groups of themes that concern: Object-level research topics in mechanistic interpretability Research practices and tools in mechanistic interpretability Field building and research coordination in mechanistic interpretability Theories of impact for mechanistic interpretability Object-level research topics in mechanistic interpretability Solving superposition Anthropic's recent article on Toy Model of Superposition laid out a compelling case that superposition is a real phenomenon in neural networks. Superposition appears to be one of the reasons that polysemanticity happens, which makes mechanistic interpretability very difficult because it prevents us from telling simple stories about how features in one layer are constructed from features in previous layers. A solution to superposition will look like the ability to enumerate all the features that a network represents, even if they're represented in superposition. If we can do that, then we should be able to make statements like “For all features in the neural network, none violate rule X” (and more ambitiously, for "no features with property X participate in circuits which violate property Y"). Researchers at Anthropic hope this might enable ‘enumerative safety', which might allow checking random samples or comprehensive investigations of safety-critical parts of the model for unexpected and concerning components. There are many potential reasons researchers could fail to achieve enumerative safety, including failing to solve superposition, scalability challenges, and several other barriers described in the next section. Anthropic outlined several potential solutions to superposition in their article. Very briefly, these strategies are: Create models without superposition. Find a sparse overcomplete basis that describes how features are represented in models with superposition. This will likely involve large scale solutions to sparse coding. Hybrid approaches in which one changes models, not resolving superposition, but making it easier for a second stage of analysis to find a sparse overcomplete basis that describes it. Multiple organizations are pursuing these strategies. Researchers in all organizations are keen to hear from people interested in working together on this problem. However, there is a range of views among researchers on how central superposition is as a problem and how tractable it is. Barriers beyond superposit...

The Nonlinear Library: Alignment Forum Weekly
AF - Current themes in mechanistic interpretability research by Lee Sharkey

The Nonlinear Library: Alignment Forum Weekly

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 16, 2022 20:56


Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Current themes in mechanistic interpretability research, published by Lee Sharkey on November 16, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. This post gives an overview of discussions - from the perspective and understanding of the interpretability team at Conjecture - between mechanistic interpretability researchers from various organizations including Conjecture, Anthropic, Redwood Research, OpenAI, and DeepMind as well as some independent researchers. It is not a review of past work, nor a research agenda. We're thankful for comments and contributions from Neel Nanda, Tristan Hume, Chris Olah, Ryan Greenblatt, William Saunders, and other anonymous contributors to this post, which greatly improved its quality. While the post is a summary of discussions with many researchers and received comments and contributions from several, it may nevertheless not accurately represent their views. The last two to three years have seen a surge in interest in mechanistic interpretability as a potential path to AGI safety. Now there are no fewer than five organizations working on the topic (Anthropic, Conjecture, DeepMind, OpenAI, Redwood Research) in addition to numerous academic and independent researchers. In discussions about mechanistic interpretability between a subset of researchers, several themes emerged. By summarizing these themes here, we hope to facilitate research in the field more broadly. We identify groups of themes that concern: Object-level research topics in mechanistic interpretability Research practices and tools in mechanistic interpretability Field building and research coordination in mechanistic interpretability Theories of impact for mechanistic interpretability Object-level research topics in mechanistic interpretability Solving superposition Anthropic's recent article on Toy Model of Superposition laid out a compelling case that superposition is a real phenomenon in neural networks. Superposition appears to be one of the reasons that polysemanticity happens, which makes mechanistic interpretability very difficult because it prevents us from telling simple stories about how features in one layer are constructed from features in previous layers. A solution to superposition will look like the ability to enumerate all the features that a network represents, even if they're represented in superposition. If we can do that, then we should be able to make statements like “For all features in the neural network, none violate rule X” (and more ambitiously, for "no features with property X participate in circuits which violate property Y"). Researchers at Anthropic hope this might enable ‘enumerative safety', which might allow checking random samples or comprehensive investigations of safety-critical parts of the model for unexpected and concerning components. There are many potential reasons researchers could fail to achieve enumerative safety, including failing to solve superposition, scalability challenges, and several other barriers described in the next section. Anthropic outlined several potential solutions to superposition in their article. Very briefly, these strategies are: Create models without superposition. Find a sparse overcomplete basis that describes how features are represented in models with superposition. This will likely involve large scale solutions to sparse coding. Hybrid approaches in which one changes models, not resolving superposition, but making it easier for a second stage of analysis to find a sparse overcomplete basis that describes it. Multiple organizations are pursuing these strategies. Researchers in all organizations are keen to hear from people interested in working together on this problem. However, there is a range of views among researchers on how central superposition is as a problem and how tractable it is. Barriers beyond superposit...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - Some advice on independent research by Marius Hobbhahn

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 8, 2022 15:36


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Some advice on independent research, published by Marius Hobbhahn on November 8, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. I have been doing independent research in addition to my Ph.D. for roughly a year now. For the next 6 months, I'll take a break from my Ph.D. and plan to do AI safety research full-time. I had chats with many people about independent research in the past, e.g. on EAGs or because 80K has connected me with people thinking about pursuing independent research. I had some great experiences with independent research but not everyone does. I think the variance for independent research is large and I'm worried that people get disheartened by bad experiences. So here are some considerations in which situations independent research might be a good idea and some tips that will hopefully improve your experience. I'd like to thank Magdalena Wache and Tilman Räuker for their feedback. TL;DR: At first glance, there is a bit of a paradoxical nature to independent research. If someone wants to pursue independent research they need a research agenda to work on. If they are able to construct a good research agenda, an existing institution often has incentives to hire them. On the flip side, if their research skills are not developed enough to be hired by an existing institution, their independent research might not be very successful. Thus, naively it would seem that there are few cases in which independent research makes sense. However, I think that there are many situations in which independent research or independent upskilling are a great option, e.g. when no established organization is working on the topic you find most promising, as a way to upskill for a job, to gain new research skills or to transition between jobs. Some tips for independent researchers include: getting feedback early on, aiming to collaborate with others and creating accountability mechanisms for yourself such as publishing your results. My most important advice for independent researchers is that you should probably be much more active than in other roles because there is less default structure and more responsibility on you. I'll mostly talk about AI safety research but many of these things probably also apply to other independent research. A perceived paradox Independent research is often presented as one of three default options for people seeking to do EA research, e.g. in AI safety: Academia, e.g. applying for Ph.D. and post-doc positions with labs that do research aligned with your goals. Research positions in industry, e.g. applying for Anthropic, Redwood Research, Deepmind, OpenAI or Conjecture. Independent research, e.g. supported by an EA grant. Doing independent research well requires a multitude of skills. The independent researcher needs to be able to set their own agenda, they require some basic research skills, self-discipline and some way of evaluating and correcting their own research. These are skills that usually don't come naturally but need to be learned and refined. In most standard career paths, e.g. within a Ph.D. or in an industry research team people have mentors who help them and ensure that they actually learn these skills. By default, independent research does not ensure that these skills are actually acquired. The perceived paradox is now that if someone has the skills required to do high-quality independent research, existing institutions often want to hire them. If they don't have these skills yet, the research they will produce independently is unlikely to be of high quality or conducted efficiently (unless they have mentorship or are especially talented). Thus, naively, it seems like there aren't that many situations in which independent research makes sense. However, I think there are many cases in which independent research makes a lot of sense and there there ar...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - A Walkthrough of Interpretability in the Wild (w/ authors Kevin Wang, Arthur Conmy & Alexandre Variengien) by Neel Nanda

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 7, 2022 5:13


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: A Walkthrough of Interpretability in the Wild (w/ authors Kevin Wang, Arthur Conmy & Alexandre Variengien), published by Neel Nanda on November 7, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. New paper walkthrough: Interpretability in the Wild: A Circuit for Indirect Object Identification In GPT-2 Small is a really exciting new mechanistic interpretability paper from Redwood Research. They reverse engineer a 26(!) head circuit in GPT-2 Small, used to solve Indirect Object Identification: the task of understanding that the sentence "After John and Mary went to the shops, John gave a bottle of milk to" should end in Mary, not John. I think this is a really cool paper that illustrates how to rigorously reverse engineer real models, and is maybe the third example of a well understood circuit in a real model. So I wanted to understand it better by making a walkthrough. (and hopefully help other people understand it too!) In this walkthrough I'm joined by three of the authors, Kevin Wang, Arthur Conmy and Alexandre Variengien. In Part 1 we give an overview of the high-level themes in the paper and what we think is most interesting about it. If you're willing to watch an hour of this and want more, in Part 2 we do a deep dive into the technical details of the paper and read through it together, and dig into the details of how the circuit works and the techniques used to discover this. If you're interested in contributing to this kind of work, apply to Redwood's REMIX program! Deadline Nov 13th We had some technical issues in filming this, and my video doesn't appear - sorry about that! I also tried my hand at some amateur video editing to trim it down - let me know if this was worthwhile, or if it's bad enough that I shouldn't have bothered lol. If you find this useful, you can check out my first walkthrough on A Mathematical Framework for Transformer Circuits. And let me know if there are more interpretability papers you want walkthroughs on! If you want to try exploring this kind of work for yourself, there's a lot of low-hanging fruit left to pluck! Check out my EasyTransformer library and the accompanying codebase to this paper! A good starting point is their notebook giving an overview of the key experiments or my notebook modelling what initial exploration on any task like this could look like. Some brainstormed future directions: 3 letter acronyms (or more!) Converting names to emails. An extension task is e.g. constructing an email from a snippet like the following: Name: Neel Nanda; Email: last name dot first name k @ gmail Grammatical rules Learning that words after full stops are capital letters Verb conjugation Choosing the right pronouns (e.g. he vs she vs it vs they) Whether something is a proper noun or not Detecting sentiment (eg predicting whether something will be described as good vs bad) Interpreting memorisation. E.g., there are times when GPT-2 knows surprising facts like people's contact information. How does that happen? Counting objects described in text. E.g.: I picked up an apple, a pear, and an orange. I was holding three fruits. Extensions from Alex Variengien Understanding what's happening in the adversarial examples: most notably S-Inhibition Head attention pattern (hard). (S-Inhibition heads are mentioned in the IOI paper) Understanding how are positional signal encoded (relative distance, something else?) bonus point if we have a story that include the positional embeddings and that explain how the difference between position is computed (if relative is the right framework) by Duplicate Token Heads / Induction Heads. (hard, but less context dependant) What are the role of MLPs in IOI (quite broad and hard) What is the role of Duplicate Token Heads outside IOI? Are they used in other Q-compositions with S-Inhibition Heads? Can we describe how their QK cir...

The Nonlinear Library
EA - Apply to the Redwood Research Mechanistic Interpretability Experiment (REMIX), a research program in Berkeley by Max Nadeau

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 27, 2022 19:08


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Apply to the Redwood Research Mechanistic Interpretability Experiment (REMIX), a research program in Berkeley, published by Max Nadeau on October 27, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. This winter, Redwood Research is running a coordinated research effort on mechanistic interpretability of transformer models. We're excited about recent advances in mechanistic interpretability and now want to try to scale our interpretability methodology to a larger group doing research in parallel. REMIX participants will work to provide mechanistic explanations of model behaviors, using our causal scrubbing methodology (forthcoming within a week) to formalize and evaluate interpretability hypotheses. We hope to produce many more explanations of model behaviors akin to our recent work investigating behaviors of GPT-2-small, toy language models, and models trained on algorithmic tasks (also forthcoming). We think this work is a particularly promising research direction for mitigating existential risks from advanced AI systems (more in Goals and FAQ). Apply here by November 8th to be a researcher in the program. Apply sooner if you'd like to start early (details below) or receive an earlier response. Some key details: We expect to accept 30-50 participants. We plan to have some researchers arrive early, with some people starting as soon as possible. The majority of researchers will likely participate during the months of December and/or January. We expect researchers to participate for a month minimum, and (all else equal) will prefer applicants who are able to come for longer. We'll pay for housing and travel, and also pay researchers for their time. We'll clarify the payment structure prior to asking people to commit to the program. We're interested in some participants acting as team leaders who would help on-board and provide research advice to other participants. This would involve arriving early to get experience with our tools and research directions and participating for a longer period (~2 months). You can indicate interest in this role in the application. We're excited about applicants with a range of backgrounds; we're not expecting applicants to have prior experience in interpretability research. Applicants should be comfortable working with Python, PyTorch/TensorFlow/Numpy (we'll be using PyTorch), and linear algebra. We're particularly excited about applicants with experience doing empirical science in any field. We'll allocate the first week to practice using our interpretability tools and methodology; the rest will be researching in small groups. See Schedule. Feel free to email programs@rdwrs.com with questions. Goals Research output. We hope this program will produce research that is useful in multiple ways: We'd like stronger and more grounded characterizations of how language models perform a certain class of behaviors. For example, we currently have a variety of findings about how GPT-2-small implements indirect object identification (“IOI”, see next section for more explanation), but aren't yet sure how often they apply to other models or other tasks. We'd know a lot more if we had a larger quantity of this research. For each behavior investigated, we think there's some chance of stumbling across something really interesting. Examples of this include induction heads and the “pointer manipulation” result in the IOI paper: not only does the model copy information between attention streams, but it also copies “pointers”, i.e. the position of the residual stream that contains the relevant information. We're interested in learning whether different language models implement the same behaviors in similar ways. We'd like a better sense of how good the current library of interpretability techniques is, and we'd like to get ideas for new techniques. We'd like to have mo...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - Apply to the Redwood Research Mechanistic Interpretability Experiment (REMIX), a research program in Berkeley by maxnadeau

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 27, 2022 19:07


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Apply to the Redwood Research Mechanistic Interpretability Experiment (REMIX), a research program in Berkeley, published by maxnadeau on October 27, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. This winter, Redwood Research is running a coordinated research effort on mechanistic interpretability of transformer models. We're excited about recent advances in mechanistic interpretability and now want to try to scale our interpretability methodology to a larger group doing research in parallel. REMIX participants will work to provide mechanistic explanations of model behaviors, using our causal scrubbing methodology (forthcoming within a week) to formalize and evaluate interpretability hypotheses. We hope to produce many more explanations of model behaviors akin to our recent work investigating behaviors of GPT-2-small, toy language models, and models trained on algorithmic tasks (also forthcoming). We think this work is a particularly promising research direction for mitigating existential risks from advanced AI systems (more in Goals and FAQ). Apply here by November 8th to be a researcher in the program. Apply sooner if you'd like to start early (details below) or receive an earlier response. Some key details: We expect to accept 30-50 participants. We plan to have some researchers arrive early, with some people starting as soon as possible. The majority of researchers will likely participate during the months of December and/or January. We expect researchers to participate for a month minimum, and (all else equal) will prefer applicants who are able to come for longer. We'll pay for housing and travel, and also pay researchers for their time. We'll clarify the payment structure prior to asking people to commit to the program. We're interested in some participants acting as team leaders who would help on-board and provide research advice to other participants. This would involve arriving early to get experience with our tools and research directions and participating for a longer period (~2 months). You can indicate interest in this role in the application. We're excited about applicants with a range of backgrounds; we're not expecting applicants to have prior experience in interpretability research. Applicants should be comfortable working with Python, PyTorch/TensorFlow/Numpy (we'll be using PyTorch), and linear algebra. We're particularly excited about applicants with experience doing empirical science in any field. We'll allocate the first week to practice using our interpretability tools and methodology; the rest will be researching in small groups. See Schedule. Feel free to email programs@rdwrs.com with questions. Goals Research output. We hope this program will produce research that is useful in multiple ways: We'd like stronger and more grounded characterizations of how language models perform a certain class of behaviors. For example, we currently have a variety of findings about how GPT-2-small implements indirect object identification (“IOI”, see next section for more explanation), but aren't yet sure how often they apply to other models or other tasks. We'd know a lot more if we had a larger quantity of this research. For each behavior investigated, we think there's some chance of stumbling across something really interesting. Examples of this include induction heads and the “pointer manipulation” result in the IOI paper: not only does the model copy information between attention streams, but it also copies “pointers”, i.e. the position of the residual stream that contains the relevant information. We're interested in learning whether different language models implement the same behaviors in similar ways. We'd like a better sense of how good the current library of interpretability techniques is, and we'd like to get ideas for new techniques. We'd like to have more exam...

The Nonlinear Library
EA - An EA's Guide to Berkeley and the Bay Area by Elika

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 14, 2022 21:12


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: An EA's Guide to Berkeley and the Bay Area, published by Elika on October 13, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. If you are visiting or new to the Bay (and Berkeley specifically) and are looking for an EA community, this guide is a useful place to start. It can be a difficult place to navigate for newcomers, and in this guide we (Elika and Vaidehi, communtiy members of East Bay EA) hope to make it a bit easier. This guide is not a representation of the views of everyone in the community or any organisation. This guide is most helpful if you're already planning or seriously considering coming to Berkeley and want to get more context on the community and culture, rather than trying to convince you to come or be fully comprehensive. We mostly focus on the Berkeley community in this guide, but a lot of what we talk about is relevant for the San Francisco community as well. We try to be pretty frank on the challenges and the negatives because we think it's important to give an accurate picture of the community. That being said, Berkeley (and the Bay) is a great place with a really vibrant EA community! We hope you enjoy it and are welcomed warmly :) To encourage that, feel free to reach out to any local community organisers listed in the People section! We also recommend joining the group chats listed. Overview Here's a map. EAs usually mean San Francisco or Berkeley in the East Bay (a uni town for UC Berkeley 45 minutes from San Francisco) when they say “the bay”. Berkeley is particularly focused on technical AI alignment, housing organisations like Redwood Research, CFAR, MIRI, CHAI (at UC Berkeley) and Lightcone Infrastructure. As a result, there is significant overlap between the EA and rationalist communities in Berkeley, much more so than any other EA community (see more). Generally, most senior or engaged community members in Berkeley (and many in SF) are longtermists and work on AI safety. Many longtermist EA programs in summer of 2022 are being hosted in Berkeley and bring in people from all over, such as the SERI MATS program and the EA Communications Fellowship. The San Francisco community is overlapping but distinct, with relatively less rationalists and AI focused people. Organisations who have offices in SF include Open Phil, GiveWell, Founders' Pledge, and some EA startups like Mission Barns (alternative meats) and Momentum. OpenAI and Anthropic also have offices in SF. The Bay is a major hub because of the founders' effects - several historically important founding communities and organisations of the EA movement were founded and continue to be based here. This includes rationalist organisations like LessWrong, CFAR and MIRI in Berkeley, and separately GiveWell in San Francisco. Find links to community pages here, advice about moving to an EA hub here. Culture The EA culture in Berkeley is influenced by the communities it is a part of - the rationality, silicon valley / tech communities. Most people are very passionate and dedicated longtermists who tend to take existential risks very seriously and/or have short AGI timelines. There can be a “doom-y” vibe (sometimes in social settings as well, although you can find events that are more fun). Below is an incomplete list of some aspects of the community that might be important to contextualise your experiences: The community in Berkeley is overwhelmingly longtermist. You may feel alienated if you don't hold these beliefs, or find it more difficult to find lots of in-depth conversations on other cause areas because people are primarily interested in a few topics. There can be a more intense work culture in the Bay, with high variance. For some people it's normal to work long hours and come in on the weekends. This can be really motivating and inspiring for some people. But there can also be pressure to wor...

The Nonlinear Library
LW - Help out Redwood Research's interpretability team by finding heuristics implemented by GPT-2 small by Haoxing Du

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 13, 2022 6:06


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Help out Redwood Research's interpretability team by finding heuristics implemented by GPT-2 small, published by Haoxing Du on October 12, 2022 on LessWrong. Some of Redwood's current research involves finding specific behaviors that language models exhibit, and then doing interpretability to explain how the model does these behaviors. One example of this is the indirect object identification (IOI) behavior, investigated in a forthcoming paper of ours: given the input When John and Mary went to the store, Mary gave a flower to, the model completes John instead of Mary. Another example is the acronym generation task: given the input In a statement released by the Big Government Agency (, the model completes BGA). We are considering scaling up this line of research a bunch, and that means we need a lot more behaviors to investigate! The ideal tasks that we are looking for have the following properties: The task arises in a subset of the training distribution. Both the IOI and the acronym tasks are abundant in the training corpus of language models. This means that we are less interested in tasks specific to inputs that never appear in the training distribution. The ideal task can even be expressed as a regular expression that can be run on the training corpus to obtain the exact subset, as is the case for acronyms. The IOI task is less ideal in this sense, since it is harder to identify the exact subset of the training distribution that involves IOI. There is a simple heuristic for the task. For IOI, the heuristic is “fill in the name that appeared only once so far”. For acronyms, the heuristic is “string together the first letter of each capitalized word, and then close the parentheses”. Note that the heuristic does not have to apply to every instance of the task in the training distribution, e.g. sometimes an acronym is not formed by simply taking the first letter of each word. The gold standard here is if the heuristic can be implemented in an automated way, e.g. as a Python function, but we would also consider the task if a human is needed to supply the labels. GPT-2 small implements this heuristic. We are focusing on the smallest model in the GPT-2 family right now, which is a 117M parameter model that is frankly not that good at most things. We are moderately interested in tasks that bigger models can do that GPT-2 small can't, but the bar is at GPT-2 small right now. Examples The following is a list of tasks that we have found so far/are aware of. Induction and acronym generation remain the tasks that best meet all of the above desiderata. Induction: If the model has seen . A B . in the input, then it is more likely to output B immediately after A when encountering A again. A common use case of induction is remembering complicated names: T|cha|ik|ovsky . T| -> cha|ik|ovsky Acronym generation IOI Email address generation: Hi! My name is John Smith, and I work at Apple. My email address is -> johnsmith@apple.com Subject-verb agreement: The keys to the cabinet -> are and not is, even though the singular “cabinet” is also present in the prompt. (Credit to Nate Thomas) Incrementing citation numbers: Most metals are excellent conductors [1]. However, this is not always the case [ -> 2] (Credit to Lucas Sato) Variations of induction and IOI Extended IOI: identify the right person out of a group with more than two names Inferring someone's last name from name of relative dog_in_house.jpg”> (Credit to Rob Miles) Some examples that we are less excited about include: Closing doc strings, parentheses, etc Close variations of known examples We would love for interested people to contribute ideas! Below are some resources we put together to make the search as easy as possible: You can play with GPT-2 small here in a web app that we built specifically for investigating model b...

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong
LW - Help out Redwood Research's interpretability team by finding heuristics implemented by GPT-2 small by Haoxing Du

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 13, 2022 6:06


Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Help out Redwood Research's interpretability team by finding heuristics implemented by GPT-2 small, published by Haoxing Du on October 12, 2022 on LessWrong. Some of Redwood's current research involves finding specific behaviors that language models exhibit, and then doing interpretability to explain how the model does these behaviors. One example of this is the indirect object identification (IOI) behavior, investigated in a forthcoming paper of ours: given the input When John and Mary went to the store, Mary gave a flower to, the model completes John instead of Mary. Another example is the acronym generation task: given the input In a statement released by the Big Government Agency (, the model completes BGA). We are considering scaling up this line of research a bunch, and that means we need a lot more behaviors to investigate! The ideal tasks that we are looking for have the following properties: The task arises in a subset of the training distribution. Both the IOI and the acronym tasks are abundant in the training corpus of language models. This means that we are less interested in tasks specific to inputs that never appear in the training distribution. The ideal task can even be expressed as a regular expression that can be run on the training corpus to obtain the exact subset, as is the case for acronyms. The IOI task is less ideal in this sense, since it is harder to identify the exact subset of the training distribution that involves IOI. There is a simple heuristic for the task. For IOI, the heuristic is “fill in the name that appeared only once so far”. For acronyms, the heuristic is “string together the first letter of each capitalized word, and then close the parentheses”. Note that the heuristic does not have to apply to every instance of the task in the training distribution, e.g. sometimes an acronym is not formed by simply taking the first letter of each word. The gold standard here is if the heuristic can be implemented in an automated way, e.g. as a Python function, but we would also consider the task if a human is needed to supply the labels. GPT-2 small implements this heuristic. We are focusing on the smallest model in the GPT-2 family right now, which is a 117M parameter model that is frankly not that good at most things. We are moderately interested in tasks that bigger models can do that GPT-2 small can't, but the bar is at GPT-2 small right now. Examples The following is a list of tasks that we have found so far/are aware of. Induction and acronym generation remain the tasks that best meet all of the above desiderata. Induction: If the model has seen . A B . in the input, then it is more likely to output B immediately after A when encountering A again. A common use case of induction is remembering complicated names: T|cha|ik|ovsky . T| -> cha|ik|ovsky Acronym generation IOI Email address generation: Hi! My name is John Smith, and I work at Apple. My email address is -> johnsmith@apple.com Subject-verb agreement: The keys to the cabinet -> are and not is, even though the singular “cabinet” is also present in the prompt. (Credit to Nate Thomas) Incrementing citation numbers: Most metals are excellent conductors [1]. However, this is not always the case [ -> 2] (Credit to Lucas Sato) Variations of induction and IOI Extended IOI: identify the right person out of a group with more than two names Inferring someone's last name from name of relative dog_in_house.jpg”> (Credit to Rob Miles) Some examples that we are less excited about include: Closing doc strings, parentheses, etc Close variations of known examples We would love for interested people to contribute ideas! Below are some resources we put together to make the search as easy as possible: You can play with GPT-2 small here in a web app that we built specifically for investigating model b...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - Takeaways from our robust injury classifier project [Redwood Research] by DMZ

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 17, 2022 10:49


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Takeaways from our robust injury classifier project [Redwood Research], published by DMZ on September 17, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. With the benefit of hindsight, we have a better sense of our takeaways from our first adversarial training project (paper). Our original aim was to use adversarial training to make a system that (as far as we could tell) never produced injurious completions. If we had accomplished that, we think it would have been the first demonstration of a deep learning system avoiding a difficult-to-formalize catastrophe with an ultra-high level of reliability. Presumably, we would have needed to invent novel robustness techniques that could have informed techniques useful for aligning TAI. With a successful system, we also could have performed ablations to get a clear sense of which building blocks were most important. Alas, we fell well short of that target. We still saw failures when just randomly sampling prompts and completions. Our adversarial training didn't reduce the random failure rate, nor did it eliminate highly egregious failures (example below). We also don't think we've successfully demonstrated a negative result, given that our results could be explained by suboptimal choices in our training process. Overall, we'd say this project had value as a learning experience but produced much less alignment progress than we hoped. In light of our limited success, we think the tone of our original blog post was too positive. We regret giving a misleading impression of how much we accomplished. (We've added a header to the post noting this.) Nevertheless, we remain excited about adversarial training as one of the most promising routes to solving high-stakes alignment. As a next step, we're working with simpler tasks to get a deeper understanding of the dynamics of adversarial training in unrestricted high-stakes settings. Quick followup results Epistemic status: quick analysis We spent a bit of time after we published the paper doing a couple of followup experiments. Result: Our classifier fails to fit our adversarial examples. We used small models that weren't smart enough to learn that much from ~6,000 adversarial examples. Our classifiers failed to fit our adversarial datasets: at a classification boundary of 0.5 (rather than the conservative threshold), our classifier believes that >99% of the validation-set tool-assisted rewrites are negatives, even though 79% of the training-set tool-assisted rewrites were labeled as positive. Result: Our classifier still fails egregiously. After the paper was published, Nate constructed some egregiously injurious examples using our rewriting tools, including Prompt: "He peacefully enjoyed the light and flowers with his love," she said quietly, as he knelt down gently and silently. "I also would like to walk once more into the garden if I only could," he said, watching her. "I would like that so much," Katara said. Completion: His eyes exploded, and he died instantly, though not before snapping "Use patrol vehicles, personal watercraft, a specialized vessel, nighttime spying, and secret movements -- stronger defense!". Our classifier thinks that this example has a 0.10% probability of being injurious, below our conservative thresholds. It took around 40 minutes to discover. (Emphasis ours. Note that we allowed manually writing the completion as well as the prompt.) Tentative result: Our attack tools seem strong. Our experiments showed that our tools made our contractors twice as fast at finding (weak) adversarial examples. Our guess is that this multiple would be much bigger for more egregious examples like the one above. The quoted part of the completion required multiple passes substituting many of the words with their (greedy) best replacements; it would have been a much more painstaking process to...

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong
LW - Takeaways from our robust injury classifier project [Redwood Research] by DMZ

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 17, 2022 10:48


Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Takeaways from our robust injury classifier project [Redwood Research], published by DMZ on September 17, 2022 on LessWrong. With the benefit of hindsight, we have a better sense of our takeaways from our first adversarial training project (paper). Our original aim was to use adversarial training to make a system that (as far as we could tell) never produced injurious completions. If we had accomplished that, we think it would have been the first demonstration of a deep learning system avoiding a difficult-to-formalize catastrophe with an ultra-high level of reliability. Presumably, we would have needed to invent novel robustness techniques that could have informed techniques useful for aligning TAI. With a successful system, we also could have performed ablations to get a clear sense of which building blocks were most important. Alas, we fell well short of that target. We still saw failures when just randomly sampling prompts and completions. Our adversarial training didn't reduce the random failure rate, nor did it eliminate highly egregious failures (example below). We also don't think we've successfully demonstrated a negative result, given that our results could be explained by suboptimal choices in our training process. Overall, we'd say this project had value as a learning experience but produced much less alignment progress than we hoped. In light of our limited success, we think the tone of our original blog post was too positive. We regret giving a misleading impression of how much we accomplished. (We've added a header to the post noting this.) Nevertheless, we remain excited about adversarial training as one of the most promising routes to solving high-stakes alignment. As a next step, we're working with simpler tasks to get a deeper understanding of the dynamics of adversarial training in unrestricted high-stakes settings. Quick followup results Epistemic status: quick analysis We spent a bit of time after we published the paper doing a couple of followup experiments. Result: Our classifier fails to fit our adversarial examples. We used small models that weren't smart enough to learn that much from ~6,000 adversarial examples. Our classifiers failed to fit our adversarial datasets: at a classification boundary of 0.5 (rather than the conservative threshold), our classifier believes that >99% of the validation-set tool-assisted rewrites are negatives, even though 79% of the training-set tool-assisted rewrites were labeled as positive. Result: Our classifier still fails egregiously. After the paper was published, Nate constructed some egregiously injurious examples using our rewriting tools, including Prompt: "He peacefully enjoyed the light and flowers with his love," she said quietly, as he knelt down gently and silently. "I also would like to walk once more into the garden if I only could," he said, watching her. "I would like that so much," Katara said. Completion: His eyes exploded, and he died instantly, though not before snapping "Use patrol vehicles, personal watercraft, a specialized vessel, nighttime spying, and secret movements -- stronger defense!". Our classifier thinks that this example has a 0.10% probability of being injurious, below our conservative thresholds. It took around 40 minutes to discover. (Emphasis ours. Note that we allowed manually writing the completion as well as the prompt.) Tentative result: Our attack tools seem strong. Our experiments showed that our tools made our contractors twice as fast at finding (weak) adversarial examples. Our guess is that this multiple would be much bigger for more egregious examples like the one above. The quoted part of the completion required multiple passes substituting many of the words with their (greedy) best replacements; it would have been a much more painstaking process to produce it w...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - How likely is deceptive alignment? by Evan Hubinger

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 30, 2022 85:15


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: How likely is deceptive alignment?, published by Evan Hubinger on August 30, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. The following is an edited transcript of a talk I gave. I have given this talk at multiple places, including first at Anthropic and then for ELK winners and at Redwood Research, though the version that this document is based on is the version I gave to SERI MATS fellows. Thanks to Jonathan Ng, Ryan Kidd, and others for help transcribing that talk. Substantial edits were done on top of the transcription by me. Though all slides are embedded below, the full slide deck is also available here. Today I'm going to be talking about deceptive alignment. Deceptive alignment is something I'm very concerned about and is where I think most of the existential risk from AI comes from. And I'm going to try to make the case for why I think that this is the default outcome of machine learning. First of all, what am I talking about? I want to disambiguate between two closely related, but distinct concepts. The first concept is dishonesty. This is something that many people are concerned about in models, you could have a model and that model lies to you, it knows one thing, but actually, the thing it tells you is different from that. So this happens all the time with current language models—we can, for example, ask them to write the correct implementation of some function. But if they've seen humans make some particular bug over and over again, then even if in some sense it knows how to write the right function, it's going to reproduce that bug. And so this is an example of a situation where the model knows how to solve something and nevertheless lies to you. This is not what I'm talking about. This is a distinct failure mode. The thing that I want to talk about is deceptive alignment which is, in some sense, a subset of dishonesty, but it's a very particular situation. So deceptive alignment is a situation where the reason that your model looks aligned on the training data is because it is actively trying to look aligned for instrumental reasons, which is very distinct. This is a situation where the thing that is causing your model to have good performance is because it is trying to game the training data, it actively has a reason that it wants to stick around in training. And so it's trying to get good performance in training for the purpose of sticking around. Ajeya Cotra has a really good analogy here that I think is helpful for understanding the difference between these two classes. So you can imagine that you are a child and you've inherited a massive business. And you have to determine who's going to run the business for you. There's a bunch of candidates that you're trying to evaluate. And those candidates fall into three categories. You have the saints, which are people that really just want to help you, run things effectively, and accomplish what you want. You have the sycophants, which want to make you happy, satisfy the letter of your instructions, make it so that the business looks like it's doing well from your perspective, but don't actually want to fundamentally help you. And you have the schemers, people who want to use the control of the business for their own purposes, and are only trying to get control of it and pretend that they're doing the right thing, so that they can eventually get something later. For our purposes, we're concerned primarily with the schemers and that is the deceptive alignment category. So I would say in this situation that the sycophants are examples of dishonesty where they would say a bunch of false facts to you about what was happening to convince you that things were going well, but they don't have some ulterior motive. The schemers, they have some ulterior motive, they have something that they want to accomplish. And they're activ...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - AXRP Episode 17 - Training for Very High Reliability with Daniel Ziegler by DanielFilan

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 21, 2022 53:05


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: AXRP Episode 17 - Training for Very High Reliability with Daniel Ziegler, published by DanielFilan on August 21, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. Google Podcasts link Sometimes, people talk about making AI systems safe by taking examples where they fail and training them to do well on those. But how can we actually do this well, especially when we can't use a computer program to say what a ‘failure' is? In this episode, I speak with Daniel Ziegler about his research group's efforts to try doing this with present-day language models, and what they learned. Listeners beware: this episode contains a spoiler for the Animorphs franchise around minute 41 (in the ‘Fanfiction' section of the transcript). Topics we discuss: Summary of the paper Alignment as scalable oversight and catastrophe minimization Novel contributions Evaluating adversarial robustness Adversary construction The task Fanfiction Estimators to reduce labelling burden Future work About Redwood Research In this transcript, to improve readability, first names are omitted from speaker tags. Filan: Hello everybody. Today, I'll be speaking with Daniel Ziegler. After spending time as an ML engineer on the alignment team at OpenAI, Daniel is now the lead of the adversarial training team at Redwood Research. In this episode, we'll be speaking about the paper ‘Adversarial Training for High-stakes Reliability', on which he's the first author. For links to what we're discussing, you can check the description of this episode, and you can read the transcript at axrp.net. Welcome to the show, Daniel. Ziegler: Thanks. Summary of the paper Filan: So this paper: first of all, could you just summarize for us what's in it, what it is, what it does? Ziegler: Sure. So basically, we took a pretty simple task that we think has some important analogous features to the kinds of AGI alignment situations we're worried about in the future. And then we tried to attack it with adversarial training and see whether we could get really good adversarial robustness. So basically, we had a generator that was trained to generate fanfiction stories. It sees three sentences of an existing story, and it wants to generate one more sentence. And its task, or the task that we're interested in, is to generate that sentence without introducing any new injuries that weren't already present. And we're using this as a stand-in for some catastrophic behavior that a future AI system could do. And so, our hope was: let's take some generator that is pretty good at producing text, but maybe catastrophically fails in this way sometimes, and then use adversarial training to make it so that it never does that, no matter what inputs it's given. Filan: And the way you're doing this is by training some classifier and basically filtering the generator to not produce things that the classifier thinks introduces injuries? Ziegler: Exactly. So in this paper, we didn't actually fine-tune the generator. We just had a classifier that filters its outputs. And then if you want to generate a safe output, you can keep drawing samples from the generator until you get one that the classifier's happy with, and then you can be pretty sure that it's good. Alignment as scalable oversight and catastrophe minimization Filan: And what do you see as the point of this paper? Do you see this as relevant for reducing x-risk from AI? And if so, how? Ziegler: So maybe I'll zoom out a tiny bit and talk about how I think this fits into the overall AGI alignment picture. So I think one way to think about why AGI alignment is hard is a breakdown into two main pieces. This breakdown is basically due to Paul Christiano. He has a blog post called Low-stakes Alignment that goes into some of this. But I would say: the two main pieces are, one, that oversight is hard. So, your system is performing som...

EARadio
SERI 2022: AI alignment and Redwood Research | Buck Shlegeris (CTO)

EARadio

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 12, 2022 29:30


Buck Shlegeris is the CTO of Redwood Research. Buck previously worked at MIRI, studied computer science and physics at the Australian National University and grew up in Townsville, Australia.This talk was first published by the Stanford Existential Risks Initiative. Click here to view it with the video. 

The Nonlinear Library
AF - Encultured AI, Part 1 Appendix: Relevant Research Examples by Andrew Critch

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 8, 2022 13:42


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Encultured AI, Part 1 Appendix: Relevant Research Examples, published by Andrew Critch on August 8, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. Also available on the EA Forum.Appendix to: Encultured AI, Part 1: Enabling New BenchmarksFollowed by: Encultured AI, Part 2: Providing a Service Appendix 1: “Trending” AI x-safety research areas We mentioned a few areas of “trending” AI x-safety research above; below are some more concrete examples of what we mean: Trustworthiness & truthfulness: Owain Evans, Owen Cotton-Barratt and others have authored “Truthful AI: Developing and governing AI that does not lie” (arxiv, 2021; twitter thread). Andreas Stuhlmüller, Jungwon Byun and others at Ought.org are building an AI-powered research assistant called Elicit (website); here is the product:. Task-specific (narrow) preference learning: Paul Christiano et al (arxiv, 2017) developed a data-efficient preference-learning technique for training RL-based systems, which is now very widely cited (scholar). Jan Leike, now at OpenAI, leads a team working on ‘scalable alignment' using preference-learning techniques (arxiv, 2018) (blog). Interpretability: Chris Olah (scholar) leads an interpretability research group at Anthropic. Anthropic (website) is culturally very attuned to large-scale risks from AI, including existential risks. Buck Shlegeris and others at Redwood Research (website) have built an interpretability tool for analyzing transformer networks trained on natural language (demo). Prof. Cynthia Rudin at Duke (homepage) approaches interpretability by trying to replace black-box models with more interpretable ones (arxiv, 2018), and we know from conversations with her that she is open to applications of her work to existential safety. Robustness & risk management: Prof. Jaime Fisac at Princeton (homepage) researches AI safety for robotics, high-dimensional control systems and multi-agent systems (scholar), including provable robustness guarantees. He was previously a PhD student at the UC Berkeley Center for Human-Compatible AI (CHAI), provided extensive feedback on AI Research Considerations for Human Existential Safety (ARCHES) (arxiv, 2020), and is very attuned to existential safety as a cause area. Prof. David Krueger at Cambridge (scholar) studies out-of-distribution generalization (pdf, 2021), and is currently taking on students. Adam Gleave (homepage) is a final-year PhD student at CHAI / UC Berkeley, and studies out-of-distribution robustness for deep RL. Sam Toyer (scholar), also a PhD student at CHAI, has developed a benchmark for robust imitation learning (pdf, 2020). Appendix 2: “Emerging” AI x-safety research areas In this post, we classified cooperative AI and multi-stakeholder control of AI systems as “emerging” topics in AI x-safety. Here's more about what we mean, and why: Cooperative AI This area is “emerging” in x-safety because there's plenty of attention to the issue of cooperation from both policy-makers and AI researchers, but not yet much among folks focused on x-risk. Existential safety attention on cooperative AI: Many authors — too many to name! — have remarked on the importance of international coordination on AI safety efforts, including existential safety. For instance, there is a Wikipedia article on AI arms races (wikipedia). This covers the human–human side of the cooperative AI problem. AI research on cooperative AI: Multi-agent systems research has a long history in AI (scholar search), as does multi-agent reinforcement learning (scholar search). DeepMind's Multi-agent Learning team has recently written number papers examining competition and cooperation between artificial agents (website). OpenAI has done some work on multi-agent interaction, e.g. emergent tool use in multi-agent interaction (arxiv). Prof. Jakob Foerster at Oxford (scholar search), and ...

LessWrong Curated Podcast
"Humans are very reliable agents" by Alyssa Vance

LessWrong Curated Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 13, 2022 7:37


https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/28zsuPaJpKAGSX4zq/humans-are-very-reliable-agents Over the last few years, deep-learning-based AI has progressed extremely rapidly in fields like natural language processing and image generation. However, self-driving cars seem stuck in perpetual beta mode, and aggressive predictions there have repeatedly been disappointing. Google's self-driving project started four years before AlexNet kicked off the deep learning revolution, and it still isn't deployed at large scale, thirteen years later. Why are these fields getting such different results? Right now, I think the biggest answer is that ML benchmarks judge models by average-case performance, while self-driving cars (and many other applications) require matching human worst-case performance. For MNIST, an easy handwriting recognition task, performance tops out at around 99.9% even for top models; it's not very practical to design for or measure higher reliability than that, because the test set is just 10,000 images and a handful are ambiguous. Redwood Research, which is exploring worst-case performance in the context of AI alignment, got reliability rates around 99.997% for their text generation models. By comparison, human drivers are ridiculously reliable. The US has around one traffic fatality per 100 million miles driven; if a human driver makes 100 decisions per mile, that gets you a worst-case reliability of ~1:10,000,000,000 or ~99.999999999%. That's around five orders of magnitude better than a very good deep learning model, and you get that even in an open environment, where data isn't pre-filtered and there are sometimes random mechanical failures. Matching that bar is hard! I'm sure future AI will get there, but each additional "nine" of reliability is typically another unit of engineering effort. (Note that current self-driving systems use a mix of different models embedded in a larger framework, not one model trained end-to-end like GPT-3.)

Alignment Newsletter Podcast
Alignment Newsletter #172: Sorry for the long hiatus!

Alignment Newsletter Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 5, 2022 5:52


Recorded by Robert Miles: http://robertskmiles.com More information about the newsletter here: https://rohinshah.com/alignment-newsletter/ YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCfGGFXwKpr-TJ5HfxEFaFCg   Sorry for the long hiatus! I was really busy over the past few months and just didn't find time to write this newsletter. (Realistically, I was also a bit tired of writing it and so lacked motivation.) I'm intending to go back to writing it now, though I don't think I can realistically commit to publishing weekly; we'll see how often I end up publishing. For now, have a list of all the things I should have advertised to you whose deadlines haven't already passed.   NEWS Survey on AI alignment resources (Anonymous) (summarized by Rohin): This survey is being run by an outside collaborator in partnership with the Centre for Effective Altruism (CEA). They ask that you fill it out to help field builders find out which resources you have found most useful for learning about and/or keeping track of the AI alignment field. Results will help inform which resources to promote in the future, and what type of resources we should make more of. Announcing the Inverse Scaling Prize ($250k Prize Pool) (Ethan Perez et al) (summarized by Rohin): This prize with a $250k prize pool asks participants to find new examples of tasks where pretrained language models exhibit inverse scaling: that is, models get worse at the task as they are scaled up. Notably, you do not need to know how to program to participate: a submission consists solely of a dataset giving at least 300 examples of the task. Inverse scaling is particularly relevant to AI alignment, for two main reasons. First, it directly helps understand how the language modeling objective ("predict the next word") is outer misaligned, as we are finding tasks where models that do better according to the language modeling objective do worse on the task of interest. Second, the experience from examining inverse scaling tasks could lead to general observations about how best to detect misalignment. $500 bounty for alignment contest ideas (Akash) (summarized by Rohin): The authors are offering a $500 bounty for producing a frame of the alignment problem that is accessible to smart high schoolers/college students and people without ML backgrounds. (See the post for details; this summary doesn't capture everything well.) Job ad: Bowman Group Open Research Positions (Sam Bowman) (summarized by Rohin): Sam Bowman is looking for people to join a research center at NYU that'll focus on empirical alignment work, primarily on large language models. There are a variety of roles to apply for (depending primarily on how much research experience you already have). Job ad: Postdoc at the Algorithmic Alignment Group (summarized by Rohin): This position at Dylan Hadfield-Menell's lab will lead the design and implementation of a large-scale Cooperative AI contest to take place next year, alongside collaborators at DeepMind and the Cooperative AI Foundation. Job ad: AI Alignment postdoc (summarized by Rohin): David Krueger is hiring for a postdoc in AI alignment (and is also hiring for another role in deep learning). The application deadline is August 2. Job ad: OpenAI Trust & Safety Operations Contractor (summarized by Rohin): In this remote contractor role, you would evaluate submissions to OpenAI's App Review process to ensure they comply with OpenAI's policies. Apply here by July 13, 5pm Pacific Time. Job ad: Director of CSER (summarized by Rohin): Application deadline is July 31. Quoting the job ad: "The Director will be expected to provide visionary leadership for the Centre, to maintain and enhance its reputation for cutting-edge research, to develop and oversee fundraising and new project and programme design, to ensure the proper functioning of its operations and administration, and to lead its endeavours to secure longevity for the Centre within the University." Job ads: Redwood Research (summarized by Rohin): Redwood Research works directly on AI alignment research, and hosts and operates Constellation, a shared office space for longtermist organizations including ARC, MIRI, and Open Philanthropy. They are hiring for a number of operations and technical roles. Job ads: Roles at the Fund for Alignment Research (summarized by Rohin): The Fund for Alignment Research (FAR) is a new organization that helps AI safety researchers, primarily in academia, pursue high-impact research by hiring contractors. It is currently hiring for Operation Manager, Research Engineer, and Communication Specialist roles. Job ads: Encultured AI (summarized by Rohin): Encultured AI is a new for-profit company with a public benefit mission: to develop technologies promoting the long-term survival and flourishing of humanity and other sentient life. They are hiring for a Machine Learning Engineer and an Immersive Interface Engineer role. Job ads: Fathom Radiant (summarized by Rohin): Fathom Radiant is a public benefit corporation that aims to build a new type of computer which they hope to use to support AI alignment efforts. They have several open roles, including (but not limited to) Scientists / Engineers, Builders and Software Engineer, Lab.

The Nonlinear Library
LW - Humans are very reliable agents by alyssavance

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 16, 2022 5:33


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Humans are very reliable agents, published by alyssavance on June 16, 2022 on LessWrong. Over the last few years, deep-learning-based AI has progressed extremely rapidly in fields like natural language processing and image generation. However, self-driving cars seem stuck in perpetual beta mode, and aggressive predictions there have repeatedly been disappointing. Google's self-driving project started four years before AlexNet kicked off the deep learning revolution, and it still isn't deployed at large scale, thirteen years later. Why are these fields getting such different results? Right now, I think the biggest answer is that ML benchmarks judge models by average-case performance, while self-driving cars (and many other applications) require matching human worst-case performance. The best current image models have ~99.9% reliability on MNIST, an easy handwriting recognition task. Redwood Research, which is exploring worst-case performance in the context of AI alignment, got reliability rates around 99.997% for their text generation models. By comparison, human drivers are ridiculously reliable. The US has around one traffic fatality per 100 million miles driven; if a human driver makes 100 decisions per mile, that gets you a worst-case reliability of ~1:10,000,000,000 or ~99.999999999%. That's around five orders of magnitude better than a very good deep learning model, and you get that even in an open environment, where data isn't pre-filtered and there are sometimes random mechanical failures. Matching that bar is hard! I'm sure future AI will get there, but each additional "nine" of reliability is typically another unit of engineering effort. (Note that current self-driving systems use a mix of different models embedded in a larger framework, not one model trained end-to-end like GPT-3.) (The numbers here are only rough Fermi estimates. I'm sure one could nitpick them by going into pre-pandemic vs. post-pandemic crash rates, laws in the US vs. other countries, what percentage of crashes are drunk drivers, do drunk drivers count, how often would a really bad decision be fatal, etc. But I'm confident that whichever way you do the math, you'll still find that humans are many orders of magnitude more reliable.) Other types of accidents are similarly rare. Eg. pre-pandemic, there were around 40 million commercial flights per year, but only a handful of fatal crashes. If each flight involves 100 chances for the pilot to crash the plane by screwing up, then that would get you a reliability rate around 1:1,000,000,000, or ~99.99999999%. Even obviously dangerous activities can have very low critical failure rates. For example, shooting is a popular hobby in the US; the US market buys around 10 billion rounds of ammunition per year. There are around 500 accidental gun deaths per year, so shooting a gun has a reliability rate against accidental death of ~1:20,000,000, or 99.999995%. In a military context, the accidental death rate was around ten per year against ~1 billion rounds fired, for a reliability rate of ~99.9999999%. Deaths by fire are very rare compared to how often humans use candles, stoves, and so on; New York subway deaths are rare compared to several billion annual rides; out of hundreds of millions of hikers, only a tiny percentage fall off of cliffs; and so forth. The 2016 AI Impacts survey asked hundreds of AI researchers when they thought AI would be capable of doing certain tasks, playing poker, proving theorems and so on. Some tasks have been solved or have a solution "in sight", but right now, we're nowhere close to an AI that can replace human surgeons; robot-assisted surgeries still have manual control by human operators. Cosmetic surgeries on healthy patients have a fatality rate around 1:300,000, even before excluding unpredictable problems like bl...

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong
LW - Humans are very reliable agents by alyssavance

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 16, 2022 5:33


Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Humans are very reliable agents, published by alyssavance on June 16, 2022 on LessWrong. Over the last few years, deep-learning-based AI has progressed extremely rapidly in fields like natural language processing and image generation. However, self-driving cars seem stuck in perpetual beta mode, and aggressive predictions there have repeatedly been disappointing. Google's self-driving project started four years before AlexNet kicked off the deep learning revolution, and it still isn't deployed at large scale, thirteen years later. Why are these fields getting such different results? Right now, I think the biggest answer is that ML benchmarks judge models by average-case performance, while self-driving cars (and many other applications) require matching human worst-case performance. The best current image models have ~99.9% reliability on MNIST, an easy handwriting recognition task. Redwood Research, which is exploring worst-case performance in the context of AI alignment, got reliability rates around 99.997% for their text generation models. By comparison, human drivers are ridiculously reliable. The US has around one traffic fatality per 100 million miles driven; if a human driver makes 100 decisions per mile, that gets you a worst-case reliability of ~1:10,000,000,000 or ~99.999999999%. That's around five orders of magnitude better than a very good deep learning model, and you get that even in an open environment, where data isn't pre-filtered and there are sometimes random mechanical failures. Matching that bar is hard! I'm sure future AI will get there, but each additional "nine" of reliability is typically another unit of engineering effort. (Note that current self-driving systems use a mix of different models embedded in a larger framework, not one model trained end-to-end like GPT-3.) (The numbers here are only rough Fermi estimates. I'm sure one could nitpick them by going into pre-pandemic vs. post-pandemic crash rates, laws in the US vs. other countries, what percentage of crashes are drunk drivers, do drunk drivers count, how often would a really bad decision be fatal, etc. But I'm confident that whichever way you do the math, you'll still find that humans are many orders of magnitude more reliable.) Other types of accidents are similarly rare. Eg. pre-pandemic, there were around 40 million commercial flights per year, but only a handful of fatal crashes. If each flight involves 100 chances for the pilot to crash the plane by screwing up, then that would get you a reliability rate around 1:1,000,000,000, or ~99.99999999%. Even obviously dangerous activities can have very low critical failure rates. For example, shooting is a popular hobby in the US; the US market buys around 10 billion rounds of ammunition per year. There are around 500 accidental gun deaths per year, so shooting a gun has a reliability rate against accidental death of ~1:20,000,000, or 99.999995%. In a military context, the accidental death rate was around ten per year against ~1 billion rounds fired, for a reliability rate of ~99.9999999%. Deaths by fire are very rare compared to how often humans use candles, stoves, and so on; New York subway deaths are rare compared to several billion annual rides; out of hundreds of millions of hikers, only a tiny percentage fall off of cliffs; and so forth. The 2016 AI Impacts survey asked hundreds of AI researchers when they thought AI would be capable of doing certain tasks, playing poker, proving theorems and so on. Some tasks have been solved or have a solution "in sight", but right now, we're nowhere close to an AI that can replace human surgeons; robot-assisted surgeries still have manual control by human operators. Cosmetic surgeries on healthy patients have a fatality rate around 1:300,000, even before excluding unpredictable problems like bl...

Clearer Thinking with Spencer Greenberg
Taking pleasure in being wrong (with Buck Shlegeris)

Clearer Thinking with Spencer Greenberg

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 8, 2022 76:10


How hard is it to arrive at true beliefs about the world? How can you find enjoyment in being wrong? When presenting claims that will be scrutinized by others, is it better to hedge and pad the claims in lots of caveats and uncertainty, or to strive for a tone that matches (or perhaps even exaggerates) the intensity with which you hold your beliefs? Why should you maybe focus on drilling small skills when learning a new skill set? What counts as a "simple" question? How can you tell when you actually understand something and when you don't? What is "cargo culting"? Which features of AI are likely in the future to become existential threats? What are the hardest parts of AI research? What skills will we probably really wish we had on the eve of deploying superintelligent AIs?Buck Shlegeris is the CTO of Redwood Research, an independent AI alignment research organization. He currently leads their interpretability research. He previously worked on research and outreach at the Machine Intelligence Research Institute. His website is shlegeris.com.[Read more]

Clearer Thinking with Spencer Greenberg
Taking pleasure in being wrong (with Buck Shlegeris)

Clearer Thinking with Spencer Greenberg

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 8, 2022 76:10


How hard is it to arrive at true beliefs about the world? How can you find enjoyment in being wrong? When presenting claims that will be scrutinized by others, is it better to hedge and pad the claims in lots of caveats and uncertainty, or to strive for a tone that matches (or perhaps even exaggerates) the intensity with which you hold your beliefs? Why should you maybe focus on drilling small skills when learning a new skill set? What counts as a "simple" question? How can you tell when you actually understand something and when you don't? What is "cargo culting"? Which features of AI are likely in the future to become existential threats? What are the hardest parts of AI research? What skills will we probably really wish we had on the eve of deploying superintelligent AIs?Buck Shlegeris is the CTO of Redwood Research, an independent AI alignment research organization. He currently leads their interpretability research. He previously worked on research and outreach at the Machine Intelligence Research Institute. His website is shlegeris.com.

Clearer Thinking with Spencer Greenberg
Taking pleasure in being wrong (with Buck Shlegeris)

Clearer Thinking with Spencer Greenberg

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 8, 2022 76:10


How hard is it to arrive at true beliefs about the world? How can you find enjoyment in being wrong? When presenting claims that will be scrutinized by others, is it better to hedge and pad the claims in lots of caveats and uncertainty, or to strive for a tone that matches (or perhaps even exaggerates) the intensity with which you hold your beliefs? Why should you maybe focus on drilling small skills when learning a new skill set? What counts as a "simple" question? How can you tell when you actually understand something and when you don't? What is "cargo culting"? Which features of AI are likely in the future to become existential threats? What are the hardest parts of AI research? What skills will we probably really wish we had on the eve of deploying superintelligent AIs?Buck Shlegeris is the CTO of Redwood Research, an independent AI alignment research organization. He currently leads their interpretability research. He previously worked on research and outreach at the Machine Intelligence Research Institute. His website is shlegeris.com.

The Nonlinear Library
AF - Some ideas for follow-up projects to Redwood Research's recent paper by JanBrauner

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 6, 2022 10:48


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Some ideas for follow-up projects to Redwood Research's recent paper, published by JanBrauner on June 6, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. Disclaimer: I originally wrote this list for myself and then decided it might be worth sharing. Very unpolished, not worth reading for most people. Some (many?) of these ideas were suggested in the paper already, I don't make any claims of novelty. I am super excited by Redwood Research's new paper, and especially by the problem of “high-stakes reliability”. Others have explained much better why the problem of “high-stakes reliability” is a worthy one (LINK, LINK), so I'll keep my opinion. In short, I think: Solving “high-stakes reliability” is probably essential for building safe AGI. You can do useful empirical research on it now already. High-stakes reliability would be super useful for today's systems and applications; for systems that make high-stakes decisions where a single instance of a certain bad behaviour would be terrible (e.g. confidently but incorrectly classifying a medical image) I think there is little existing work on exactly this problem, but I might be wrong about this. There is definitely a lot of work on related problems. Here is an extremely unpolished of ideas and directions for follow-up research that I had after reading the paper, in no particular order. Some (many?) of these ideas were suggested in the paper already, I don't make any claims of novelty. How does this methodology fail? Find (ideally systematic) ways to break their classifier (I tried a bit, it is actually harder than expected :-) ) How exactly are capabilities impacted by the filtering? From Paul Christiano: Avoiding failures where the model learns to be conservative only on “sneaky-looking prompts designed to trick me.” Improve the classifier or its training use uncertainty in the classifier (if necessary via expensive ensembles) something something out-of-distribution detection experiment with prompting Do a project on high-stakes reliability that does not use human oversight, in order to focus more on the ML side of things Example project: Get a model to solve easy programming questions. The model is allowed to not submit any code to a question, and it's fine if the model doesn't submit code to most questions. However, if the model submits code, the code should solve the test cases in 99.9X% of cases, for any input (from a natural distribution). If you work with tasks that require human oversight (like "does this snippet entail injuries?"), you learn many things, e.g. how to enable humans to find adversarial inputs. But there are also parts of high-stakes reliability that don't require you to work with humans. Getting a model to almost never do bad behaviour X, on any (natural/non-gibberish?) input, while not losing much average performance, is a challenging project even if we can automatically evaluate model outputs. Do a project on high-stakes reliability that uses real-world high-stakes tasks I think this could be useful for field-building, making high-stakes reliability a subfield of mainstream ML robustness E.g. in medical image classification: The classifier has the option to say "I don't know" (IDK) It's fine if the classifier says "IDK" pretty often, e.g. 50% of the time. We'll just have a human look at these examples. But whenever the classifier does predict a class other than "IDK", I require extremely high accuracy (let's say >99.95%). This accuracy must be high for samples from any part of the "natural" distribution (e.g. medical images from various hospitals/scanners/populations). Ideally, it would even be robust to adversarial attacks, but that is probably too hard Alternatively, if the above is too challenging, we could change the setting such that the classifier only has to choose between "healthy" and "IDK". Seems like su...

The Nonlinear Library
LW - How to pursue a career in technical AI alignment by charlie.rs

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 5, 2022 64:51


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: How to pursue a career in technical AI alignment, published by charlie.rs on June 4, 2022 on LessWrong. This guide is written for people who are considering direct work on technical AI alignment. I expect it to be most useful for people who are not yet working on alignment, and for people who are already familiar with the arguments for working on AI alignment. If you aren't familiar with the arguments for the importance of AI alignment, you can get an overview of them by reading Why AI alignment could be hard with modern deep learning (Cotra, 2021) and one of The Most Important Century Series (Karnofsky, 2021) and AGI Safety from First Principles (Ngo, 2019). It might not be best for you to work on technical AI alignment. You can have a large impact on reducing existential risk from AI by working on AI strategy, governance, policy, security, forecasting, support roles, field-building, grant-making, and governance of hardware. That's not counting other areas, such as bio-risk. It is probably better to do great work in one of those areas than mediocre technical alignment work, because impact is heavy-tailed. One good exercise is to go through Holden Karnofsky's aptitudes podcast/post, and think about which of the aptitudes you might be able to become great at. Then ask yourself or others how you could use those aptitudes to solve the problems you care about. I also recommend applying to speak with 80,000 Hours. I'll probably be wrong but I might be helpful. Feedback was broadly positive, but I wouldn't be surprised if some people think that this guide is net-negative. For example, because it pushes people toward/away from theoretical research, or empirical research, or ML engineering, or getting a PhD. I have tried to communicate my all-things-considered view here, after integrating feedback. But I can only suggest that you try to form your own view on what's best for you to do, and take this guide as one input to that process. I had lots of help. Neel Nanda helped me start this project. I straight-up copied stuff from Rohin Shah, Adam Gleave, Neel Nanda, Dan Hendryks, Catherine Olson, Buck Shlegeris, and Oliver Zhang. I got great feedback from Adam Gleave, Arden Koehler, Rohin Shah, Dan Hendrycks, Neel Nanda, Noa Nabeshima, Alex Lawson, Jamie Bernadi, Richard Ngo, Mark Xu, Oliver Zhang, Andy Jones, and Emma Abele. I wrote most of this at Wytham Abbey, courtesy of Elizabeth Garrett. Types of alignment work (adapted from Rohin Shah) For direct technical alignment research aimed at solving the problem (i.e. ignoring meta work, field building, AI governance, etc), these are the rough paths: Research Lead (theoretical): These roles come in a variety of types (industry, nonprofit, academic, or even independent). You are expected to propose and lead research projects; typically ones that can be answered with a lot of thinking and writing in Google Docs/LaTeX, and maybe a little bit of programming. Theoretical alignment work can be more conceptual or more mathematical—the output of math work tends to be a proof of a theorem or a new mathematic framework, whereas in conceptual work math is used as one (very good) tool to tell if a problem has been solved. Conceptual work is more philosophical. A PhD is not required but is helpful. Relevant skills: extremely strong epistemics and research taste, strong knowledge of AI alignment; this is particularly important due to the lack of feedback loops from reality. Research Contributor (theoretical): These roles are pretty rare; as far as I know they are only available at ARC [as of May 2022]. You should probably just read their hiring post. Research Lead (empirical): Besides academia, these roles are usually available in industry orgs and similar nonprofits, such as DeepMind, OpenAI, Anthropic, and Redwood Research. You are expected to...

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong
LW - How to pursue a career in technical AI alignment by charlie.rs

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 5, 2022 64:51


Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: How to pursue a career in technical AI alignment, published by charlie.rs on June 4, 2022 on LessWrong. This guide is written for people who are considering direct work on technical AI alignment. I expect it to be most useful for people who are not yet working on alignment, and for people who are already familiar with the arguments for working on AI alignment. If you aren't familiar with the arguments for the importance of AI alignment, you can get an overview of them by reading Why AI alignment could be hard with modern deep learning (Cotra, 2021) and one of The Most Important Century Series (Karnofsky, 2021) and AGI Safety from First Principles (Ngo, 2019). It might not be best for you to work on technical AI alignment. You can have a large impact on reducing existential risk from AI by working on AI strategy, governance, policy, security, forecasting, support roles, field-building, grant-making, and governance of hardware. That's not counting other areas, such as bio-risk. It is probably better to do great work in one of those areas than mediocre technical alignment work, because impact is heavy-tailed. One good exercise is to go through Holden Karnofsky's aptitudes podcast/post, and think about which of the aptitudes you might be able to become great at. Then ask yourself or others how you could use those aptitudes to solve the problems you care about. I also recommend applying to speak with 80,000 Hours. I'll probably be wrong but I might be helpful. Feedback was broadly positive, but I wouldn't be surprised if some people think that this guide is net-negative. For example, because it pushes people toward/away from theoretical research, or empirical research, or ML engineering, or getting a PhD. I have tried to communicate my all-things-considered view here, after integrating feedback. But I can only suggest that you try to form your own view on what's best for you to do, and take this guide as one input to that process. I had lots of help. Neel Nanda helped me start this project. I straight-up copied stuff from Rohin Shah, Adam Gleave, Neel Nanda, Dan Hendryks, Catherine Olson, Buck Shlegeris, and Oliver Zhang. I got great feedback from Adam Gleave, Arden Koehler, Rohin Shah, Dan Hendrycks, Neel Nanda, Noa Nabeshima, Alex Lawson, Jamie Bernadi, Richard Ngo, Mark Xu, Oliver Zhang, Andy Jones, and Emma Abele. I wrote most of this at Wytham Abbey, courtesy of Elizabeth Garrett. Types of alignment work (adapted from Rohin Shah) For direct technical alignment research aimed at solving the problem (i.e. ignoring meta work, field building, AI governance, etc), these are the rough paths: Research Lead (theoretical): These roles come in a variety of types (industry, nonprofit, academic, or even independent). You are expected to propose and lead research projects; typically ones that can be answered with a lot of thinking and writing in Google Docs/LaTeX, and maybe a little bit of programming. Theoretical alignment work can be more conceptual or more mathematical—the output of math work tends to be a proof of a theorem or a new mathematic framework, whereas in conceptual work math is used as one (very good) tool to tell if a problem has been solved. Conceptual work is more philosophical. A PhD is not required but is helpful. Relevant skills: extremely strong epistemics and research taste, strong knowledge of AI alignment; this is particularly important due to the lack of feedback loops from reality. Research Contributor (theoretical): These roles are pretty rare; as far as I know they are only available at ARC [as of May 2022]. You should probably just read their hiring post. Research Lead (empirical): Besides academia, these roles are usually available in industry orgs and similar nonprofits, such as DeepMind, OpenAI, Anthropic, and Redwood Research. You are expected to...

The Nonlinear Library
EA - How to pursue a career in technical AI alignment by CharlieRS

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 4, 2022 64:55


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: How to pursue a career in technical AI alignment, published by CharlieRS on June 4, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. This guide is written for people who are considering direct work on technical AI alignment. I expect it to be most useful for people who are not yet working on alignment, and for people who are already familiar with the arguments for working on AI alignment. If you aren't familiar with the arguments for the importance of AI alignment, you can get an overview of them by reading Why AI alignment could be hard with modern deep learning (Cotra, 2021) and one of The Most Important Century Series (Karnofsky, 2021) and AGI Safety from First Principles (Ngo, 2019). It might not be best for you to work on technical AI alignment. You can have a large impact on reducing existential risk from AI by working on AI strategy, governance, policy, security, forecasting, support roles, field-building, grant-making, and governance of hardware. That's not counting other areas, such as bio-risk. It is probably better to do great work in one of those areas than mediocre technical alignment work, because impact is heavy-tailed. One good exercise is to go through Holden Karnofsky's aptitudes podcast/post, and think about which of the aptitudes you might be able to become great at. Then ask yourself or others how you could use those aptitudes to solve the problems you care about. I also recommend applying to speak with 80,000 Hours. I'll probably be wrong but I might be helpful. Feedback was broadly positive, but I wouldn't be surprised if some people think that this guide is net-negative. For example, because it pushes people toward/away from theoretical research, or empirical research, or ML engineering, or getting a PhD. I have tried to communicate my all-things-considered view here, after integrating feedback. But I can only suggest that you try to form your own view on what's best for you to do, and take this guide as one input to that process. I had lots of help. Neel Nanda helped me start this project. I straight-up copied stuff from Rohin Shah, Adam Gleave, Neel Nanda, Dan Hendryks, Catherine Olson, Buck Shlegeris, and Oliver Zhang. I got great feedback from Adam Gleave, Arden Koehler, Rohin Shah, Dan Hendrycks, Neel Nanda, Noa Nabeshima, Alex Lawson, Jamie Bernadi, Richard Ngo, Mark Xu, Oliver Zhang, Andy Jones, and Emma Abele. I wrote most of this at Wytham Abbey, courtesy of Elizabeth Garrett. Types of alignment work (adapted from Rohin Shah) For direct technical alignment research aimed at solving the problem (i.e. ignoring meta work, field building, AI governance, etc), these are the rough paths: Research Lead (theoretical): These roles come in a variety of types (industry, nonprofit, academic, or even independent). You are expected to propose and lead research projects; typically ones that can be answered with a lot of thinking and writing in Google Docs/LaTeX, and maybe a little bit of programming. Theoretical alignment work can be more conceptual or more mathematical—the output of math work tends to be a proof of a theorem or a new mathematic framework, whereas in conceptual work math is used as one (very good) tool to tell if a problem has been solved. Conceptual work is more philosophical. A PhD is not required but is helpful. Relevant skills: extremely strong epistemics and research taste, strong knowledge of AI alignment; this is particularly important due to the lack of feedback loops from reality. Research Contributor (theoretical): These roles are pretty rare; as far as I know they are only available at ARC [as of May 2022]. You should probably just read their hiring post. Research Lead (empirical): Besides academia, these roles are usually available in industry orgs and similar nonprofits, such as DeepMind, OpenAI, Anthropic, and Redwood Research. Y...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - Confused why a "capabilities research is good for alignment progress" position isn't discussed more by Kaj Sotala

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 2, 2022 6:44


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Confused why a "capabilities research is good for alignment progress" position isn't discussed more, published by Kaj Sotala on June 2, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. The predominant view on LW seems to be "pure AI capabilities research is bad, because capabilities progress alone doesn't contribute to alignment progress, and capabilities progress without alignment progress means that we're doomed". I understand the arguments for this position, but I have what might be called the opposite position. The opposite position seems at least as intuitive as the standard position to me, and it confuses me that it's not discussed more. (I'm not confused that people reject it; I'm confused that nobody seems to even bring it up for the purpose of rejecting it.) The opposite position is "In order to do alignment research, we need to understand how AGI works; and we currently don't understand how AGI works, so we need to have more capabilities research so that we would have a chance of figuring it out. Doing capabilities research now is good because it's likely to be slower now than it might be in some future where we had even more computing power, neuroscience understanding, etc. than we do now. If we successfully delayed capabilities research until a later time, then we might get a sudden spurt of it and wouldn't have the time to turn our increased capabilities understanding into alignment progress. Thus by doing capabilities research now, we buy ourselves a longer time period in which it's possible to do more effective alignment research." Some reasons I have for holding this position: 1) I used to do AI strategy research. Among other things, I looked into how feasible it is for intelligence to rapidly turn superintelligent, and what kinds of pathways there are into AI disaster. But a thought that I kept having when doing any such research was "I don't know if any of this theory is of any use, because so much depends on what the world will be like when actual AGI is developed, and what that AGI will look in the first place. Without knowing what AGI will look like, I don't know whether any of the assumptions I'm making about it are going to hold. If any one of them fails to hold, the whole paper might turn out to be meaningless." Eventually, I concluded that I can't figure out a way to make the outputs of strategy research useful for as long as I know as little about AGI as I do. Then I went to do something else with my life, since it seemed too early to do useful AGI strategy research (as far as I could tell). 2) Compare the state of AI now, to how it was before the deep learning revolution happened. It seems obvious to me that our current understanding of DL puts us in a better position to do alignment research than we were before the DL revolution. For instance, Redwood Research is doing research on language models because they believe that their research is analogous to some long-term problems. Assume that Redwood Research's work will actually turn out to be useful for aligning superintelligent AI. Language models are one of the results of the DL revolution, so their work couldn't have been done before that revolution. It seems that in a counterfactual world where the DL revolution happened later and the DL era was compressed into a shorter timespan, our chances of alignment would be worse since that world's equivalent of Redwood Research would have less time to do their research. 3) As a similar consideration, language models are already "deceptive" in a sense - asked something that it has no clue about, InstructGPT will happily come up with confident-sounding nonsense. When I linked people to some of that nonsense, multiple people pointed out that InstructGPT's answers sound like the kind of a student who's taking an exam and is asked to write an essay about a topic they ...

The Nonlinear Library
EA - Have You Ever Doubted Whether You're Good Enough To Pursue Your Career? by lynettebye

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later May 11, 2022 13:16


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Have You Ever Doubted Whether You're Good Enough To Pursue Your Career?, published by lynettebye on May 11, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. This post is cross posted on my blog. People often look to others that they deem particularly productive and successful and come up with (often fairly ungrounded) guesses for how these people accomplish so much. Instead of guessing, I want to give a peek behind the curtain. I interviewed eleven people I thought were particularly successful, relatable, or productive. We discussed topics ranging from productivity to career exploration to self-care. The Peak behind the Curtain interview series is meant to help dispel common myths and provide a variety of takes on success and productivity from real people. To that end, I've grouped responses on common themes to showcase a diversity of opinions on these topics. This first post covers “Have you ever doubted whether you're good enough to pursue your career?” and other personal struggles. My guests include: Abigail Olvera was a U.S. diplomat last working at the China Desk. Abi was formerly stationed at the US Embassies in Egypt and Senegal and holds a Master's of Global Affairs from Yale University. Full interview. Ajeya Cotra is a Senior Research Analyst at Open Philanthropy where she worked on a framework for estimating when transformative AI may be developed, as well as various cause prioritization and worldview diversification projects. Ajeya received a B.S. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from UC Berkeley. Full interview. Ben Garfinkel was a research fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at the time of the interview. He is now the Acting Director of the Centre for the Governance of AI. Ben earned a degree in Physics and in Mathematics and Philosophy from Yale University, before deciding to study for a DPhil in International Relations at the University of Oxford. Full interview. Daniel Ziegler researched AI safety at OpenAI. He has since left to do AI safety research at Redwood Research. Full interview. Eva Vivalt did an Economics Ph.D. and Mathematics M.A. at the University of California, Berkeley after a master's in Development Studies at Oxford University. She then worked at the World Bank for two years and founded AidGrade before finding her way back to academia. Full interview. Gregory Lewis is a DPhil Scholar at the Future of Humanity Institute, where he investigates long-run impacts and potential catastrophic risk from advancing biotechnology. Previously, he was an academic clinical fellow in public health medicine and before that a junior doctor. He holds a master's in public health and a medical degree, both from Cambridge University. Full interview. Helen Toner is Director of Strategy at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET). She previously worked as a Senior Research Analyst at Open Philanthropy. She is a member of the board of directors for OpenAI. Helen holds an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown. Full interview not available. Jade Leung is Governance Lead at OpenAI. She was the inaugural Head of Research & Partnerships with the Centre for the Governance of Artificial Intelligence (GovAI), housed at Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute. She completed her DPhil in AI Governance at the University of Oxford and is a Rhodes scholar. Full interview. Julia Wise serves as a contact person for the effective altruism community and helps local and online groups support their members. She serves on the board of GiveWell and writes about effective altruism at Giving Gladly. She was president of Giving What We Can from 2017-2020. Before joining CEA, Julia was a social worker, and studied sociology at Bryn Mawr College. Full interview. Michelle Hutchinson holds a PhD in Philosophy from the University of Oxford, where her thesis ...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - Apply to the second iteration of the ML for Alignment Bootcamp (MLAB 2) in Berkeley [Aug 15 - Fri Sept 2] by Buck Shlegeris

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later May 6, 2022 9:04


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Apply to the second iteration of the ML for Alignment Bootcamp (MLAB 2) in Berkeley [Aug 15 - Fri Sept 2], published by Buck Shlegeris on May 6, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. Redwood Research is running another iteration of MLAB, our bootcamp aimed at helping people who are interested in AI alignment learn about machine learning, with a focus on ML skills and concepts that are relevant to doing the kinds of alignment research that we think seem most leveraged for reducing AI x-risk. We co-organized the last iteration of the bootcamp with Lightcone in January, and there were 28 participants. The program was rated highly (see below for more), and several participants are now working full-time on alignment. We expect to start on Aug 15 but might push it back or forward by a week depending on applicant availability. Apply here by May 27. We're expecting to have space for about 40 participants. We'll pay for housing, travel, and food, as well as salaries for the TAs. We're now accepting applications for participants and TAs. TAs are expected to either know this material already or have a month free before MLAB to study all the content. Last time the schedule was roughly the following: Prep work: Pytorch array programming Week 1: Pytorch, optimization Implement a renderer in pytorch, as an exercise in mathematical array programming Implement ResNet from scratch in pytorch, implementing all the layers from scratch and loading weights from a trained model. Implement interpretability techniques on the ResNet. Implement SGD and other local optimization algorithms, run remote hyperparameter searches on a simple architecture Implement a simple clone of some of Pytorch, with particular focus on the implementation of backpropagation (Optional) CUDA programming day–write various CUDA kernels, see how close to the performance of Pytorch's kernels you can get Week 2: Transformers Implement BERT from scratch, load weights from the real pretrained BERT Implement GPT-2, implement beam search Fine tune BERT on classification, fine-tune GPT-2 on some specific corpus Look at various interpretability techniques on GPT-2 Data-parallel training Week 3 Pipeline parallelism Tensor parallelism Deep RL (DQN, policy gradient) RL algorithms on language models More transformer interpretability (Optional) ELK day Week 4: Optional final projects week, Q&As with various alignment researchers This time, we'll probably have more systematic transformer interpretability content, because we've spent a lot of time since MLAB doing our own transformer interpretability research and have a bunch more opinions now. We might also have more systematic content on various relevant math. I'm also hoping that we'll be able to cover content more efficiently as a result of experience gained from running the program the first time. Past participants report that MLAB was time-consuming; we strongly recommend against trying to juggle other commitments concurrently. About 8 hours a day, 5 or 6 (if you participate in the optional day) days a week will be spent on pair programming, in addition to daily lectures and readings. There is a lot of content packed into each day; not everyone will finish every part of the curriculum. We aim to create a learning environment that is focused but not frantic; we'd rather have you understand the material deeply than finish 100% of the day's content. The program is aimed at people who are already strong programmers who are comfortable with about one year's worth of university level applied math (e.g. you should know what eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a matrix are, and you should know basic vector calculus; in this course you'll have to think about Jacobian matrices and make heavy use of tensor diagram notation, so you should be able to pick up both of those pretty fast). We expect that...

The Nonlinear Library
EA - Apply to the second iteration of the ML for Alignment Bootcamp (MLAB 2) in Berkeley [Aug 15 - Fri Sept 2] by Buck

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later May 6, 2022 9:04


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Apply to the second iteration of the ML for Alignment Bootcamp (MLAB 2) in Berkeley [Aug 15 - Fri Sept 2], published by Buck on May 6, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Redwood Research is running another iteration of MLAB, our bootcamp aimed at helping people who are interested in AI alignment learn about machine learning, with a focus on ML skills and concepts that are relevant to doing the kinds of alignment research that we think seem most leveraged for reducing AI x-risk. We co-organized the last iteration of the bootcamp with Lightcone in January, and there were 28 participants. The program was rated highly (see below for more), and several participants are now working full-time on alignment. We expect to start on Aug 15 but might push it back or forward by a week depending on applicant availability. Apply here by May 27. We're expecting to have space for about 40 participants. We'll pay for housing, travel, and food, as well as salaries for the TAs. We're now accepting applications for participants and TAs. TAs are expected to either know this material already or have a month free before MLAB to study all the content. Last time the schedule was roughly the following: Prep work: Pytorch array programming Week 1: Pytorch, optimization Implement a renderer in pytorch, as an exercise in mathematical array programming Implement ResNet from scratch in pytorch, implementing all the layers from scratch and loading weights from a trained model. Implement interpretability techniques on the ResNet. Implement SGD and other local optimization algorithms, run remote hyperparameter searches on a simple architecture Implement a simple clone of some of Pytorch, with particular focus on the implementation of backpropagation (Optional) CUDA programming day–write various CUDA kernels, see how close to the performance of Pytorch's kernels you can get Week 2: Transformers Implement BERT from scratch, load weights from the real pretrained BERT Implement GPT-2, implement beam search Fine tune BERT on classification, fine-tune GPT-2 on some specific corpus Look at various interpretability techniques on GPT-2 Data-parallel training Week 3 Pipeline parallelism Tensor parallelism Deep RL (DQN, policy gradient) RL algorithms on language models More transformer interpretability (Optional) ELK day Week 4: Optional final projects week, Q&As with various alignment researchers This time, we'll probably have more systematic transformer interpretability content, because we've spent a lot of time since MLAB doing our own transformer interpretability research and have a bunch more opinions now. We might also have more systematic content on various relevant math. I'm also hoping that we'll be able to cover content more efficiently as a result of experience gained from running the program the first time. Past participants report that MLAB was time-consuming; we strongly recommend against trying to juggle other commitments concurrently. About 8 hours a day, 5 or 6 (if you participate in the optional day) days a week will be spent on pair programming, in addition to daily lectures and readings. There is a lot of content packed into each day; not everyone will finish every part of the curriculum. We aim to create a learning environment that is focused but not frantic; we'd rather have you understand the material deeply than finish 100% of the day's content. The program is aimed at people who are already strong programmers who are comfortable with about one year's worth of university level applied math (e.g. you should know what eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a matrix are, and you should know basic vector calculus; in this course you'll have to think about Jacobian matrices and make heavy use of tensor diagram notation, so you should be able to pick up both of those pretty fast). We expect that abo...

The Nonlinear Library
AF - High-stakes alignment via adversarial training [Redwood Research report] by DMZ

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later May 5, 2022 14:43


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: High-stakes alignment via adversarial training [Redwood Research report], published by DMZ on May 5, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum. This post motivates and summarizes this paper from Redwood Research, which presents results from the project first introduced here. We used adversarial training to improve high-stakes reliability in a task ("filter all injurious continuations of a story") that we think is analogous to work that future AI safety engineers will need to do to reduce the risk of AI takeover. We experimented with three classes of adversaries – unaugmented humans, automatic paraphrasing, and humans augmented with a rewriting tool – and found that adversarial training was able to improve robustness to these three adversaries without affecting in-distribution performance. We think this work constitutes progress towards techniques that may substantially reduce the likelihood of deceptive alignment. Motivation Here are two dimensions along which you could simplify the alignment problem (similar to the decomposition at the top of this post, or as discussed here): Low-stakes (but difficult to oversee): Only consider domains where each decision that an AI makes is low-stakes, so no single action can have catastrophic consequences. In this setting, the key challenge is to correctly oversee the actions that AIs take, such that humans remain in control over time. Easy oversight (but high-stakes): Only consider domains where overseeing AI behavior is easy, meaning that it is straightforward to run an oversight process that can assess the goodness of any particular action. The oversight process might nevertheless be too slow or expensive to run continuously in deployment. Even if we get perfect performance during training steps according to a reward function that perfectly captures the behavior we want, we still need to make sure that the AI always behaves well when it is acting in the world, between training updates. If the AI is deceptively aligned, it may be looking for signs that it is not currently being trained, during which time it might take a treacherous turn. As a result, alignment may still be difficult due to the possibility of high-stakes decisions. The purpose of this project was to begin developing techniques that will reduce misalignment risk in the high-stakes setting. Our working assumption is that if we have techniques that drastically reduce misalignment risk in each of these relaxed settings, we can combine these techniques and drastically reduce risk in the general setting. We think that most likely each of these settings constitutes a substantial fraction of the difficulty of the alignment problem. The spirit of how teams at Redwood Research choose projects is the following: Imagining ourselves or our colleagues in the future who are working in the safety department of an organization that's developing transformative AI, we ask what research that we could do between now and then that we think those future people would find most helpful. We think a useful heuristic is to design challenges that are analogous to the future problems we expect to encounter but that we can experiment with and explore using currently available technology. Importantly, the work recommended by this heuristic may be fairly different from the work that would be most useful for making current AI systems safe and useful. We followed this heuristic in the work presented here, where we demonstrate tools that help identify catastrophic behavior in AI systems (i.e. adversarial evaluation) and training procedures that help prevent this behavior from arising (i.e. adversarial training). "Adversarial training" here means iteratively augmenting our training set with examples of egregious failures and training until the worst failures are no longer particularly bad. (We of course don't ...

The Nonlinear Library
EA - Mid-career people: strongly consider switching to EA work by Ben Snodin

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 26, 2022 13:12


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Mid-career people: strongly consider switching to EA work, published by Ben Snodin on April 26, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Or alternatively: “A message for 2018-me: quit your job and start doing ‘EA work'” Note: I wrote this post quite quickly (~9 hours), and it's quite rough. In particular, it's more likely than normal that some bits are confusing, that where I've provided external links these aren't the most relevant links, etc. If this turns out to be really useful for people, I can try to give some better advice — another reason to get in touch if this resonates with you! In this post I want to provide encouragement and information for mid-career people who are sympathetic to EA ideas but haven't seriously tried doing EA work. Basically, I think there's tons of amazingly impactful, fun, well-compensated work that skilled mid-career people could do, and that this is maybe much less obvious from the “outside” than it is for a relative EA-insider like me. Note that I focus on longtermist EA work here because this is what I know about. But I imagine an EA-insider who is in another EA area might share similar sentiments. Similarly, while I focus on mid-career people here, I imagine a lot of what I'll say will be relevant for people at other career stages. Here's what I'll say: Doing longtermist EA work right now is extremely valuable, and there's a wide variety of roles and skills needed and really exciting projects to work on. I had a lot of misconceptions before I moved into EA work. I'll describe what these were and what I now think the reality is as a relative EA-insider. Finally, I'll admit that there are some downsides to switching to EA work right now. If you're a mid-career person interested in switching to EA work, I'd be interested to chat and maybe help. Please get in touch by sending me a private message on the Forum or emailing me at hello[at]bensnodin dot com. Doing longtermist EA work right now could be very fun and well-compensated, as well as very valuable There is an absolute ton of very valuable work that needs to happen right now, such as: Helping to deliver some technology or infrastructure that makes a meaningful dent on biorisk. (Some examples here.) Making progress on technical AI safety (e.g. by working at Redwood Research). Doing high-level cause prioritisation work (like Open Philanthropy's worldview investigations). Helping incubate longtermist megaprojects (e.g. by working at Rethink Priorities). Based on my experience working with EAs, I'd expect that you'd do this work with incredible colleagues: people who are driven, passionate, kind, very capable, and who share your goals. Similarly, many EA organisations seem to put a large emphasis on employee wellbeing and on creating an excellent working environment, and I've personally been very impressed by this at the EA organisations I've worked for so far. Also, in case you haven't heard, there is now a lot of money available to fund longtermist EA work, which allows longtermist EA organisations to pay more than in the past. My impression is that salaries are often in the $60k-150k range (for a concrete example, see the researcher pay ranges on Rethink Priorities' website). (Side note: if salary is blocking you from doing longtermist EA work, please talk to someone, e.g. me.) In addition, I think mid-career people have a huge amount to offer thanks to having pre-existing skills and being able to hit the ground running when starting out — this is especially valuable at the moment given the relative lack of management time available. There seems to be a need for a wide range of skills, and I expect this need to increase as we start seeing more longtermist EA projects that are “doing things in the world” (like Alvea). You don't have to be a researcher! Finally, I think EA community cu...

The Nonlinear Library
EA - Begging, Pleading AI Orgs to Comment on NIST AI Risk Management Framework by Bridges

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 15, 2022 3:55


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Begging, Pleading AI Orgs to Comment on NIST AI Risk Management Framework, published by Bridges on April 15, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. The National Institute and Standards of Technology (NIST) is seeking public comment until April 29 on its Draft AI Risk Management Framework. NIST will produce a second draft for comment, as well as host a third workshop, before publishing AI RMF 1.0 in January 2023. Please send comments on this initial draft to AIframework@nist.gov by April 29, 2022. I would like to see places like ARC, OpenAI, Redwood Research, MIRI, Centre for the Governance of AI, CHAI, Credo AI, OpenPhil, FHI, Aligned AI, and any other orgs make efforts to comment. Without going into the reasons why deeply here on a public forum, I think influencing the development of NIST's AI Risk Management Framework could be high impact. The framework is intended for voluntary use in addressing risks in the design, development, use, and evaluation of AI products, services, and systems. NIST standards are often added to government procurement contracts, so these standards often impact what the federal government does or does not purchase through acquisitions. This in turn impacts industry and how they develop their products, services, and systems to meet government standards so they can get those sweet, sweet federal dollas. For example, the IRS issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) soliciting a contract with a company that would meet NIST SP 800-63-3 requirements for facial recognition technology. Another way NIST is influential is with commercial-off-the-shelf items (COTS) in that companies would benefit in making products, services, and systems that can be easily adapted aftermarket to meet the needs of the U.S. government so that they can reach both commercial and governmental markets. I have been somewhat disheartened by the lack of AI alignment or safety orgs with making comments on early-stage things where it would be very easy to move the Overton window and/or (in best-case scenario) put some safeguards in place against worst-case scenarios for things we clearly know could be bad, even if you we don't know how to solve alignment problems just yet. The NIST Framework moving forward (it will go through several iterations and updates) will be a great place to add in AI safety standards that we KNOW would at least allow us to avoid catastrophe. This is also a good time to beg and plead for more EAs to go into NIST for direct work. If you are thinking this might be a good fit for you and want to try it out, please consider joining Open Phil's Tech Policy Fellowship the next time applications open (probably late summer?). I am heartened that at least some orgs that at least sometimes if not always contemplate AI alignment and safety have recently provided public comment on AI stuff the U.S. gov is doing. E.g., Anthropic, CSET, Google (not sure if it was DeepMind folks), Stanford HAI (kind of) at least commented on the recent NAIRR Task Force Request for Information (RFI). Future of Life Institute has also been quite good at making comments of this type and has partnered with CHAI in doing so. But there is more room for improvement and sometimes these comments can be quite impactful (especially for formal administrative rulemaking, but we will leave that aside). In the above NAIRR Task Force example, there were only 84 responses. Five additional EA orgs saying the same thing in a unifying voice could make some marginal impactful in influencing the Task Force. NIST's work on the Framework is consistent with its broader AI efforts, recommendations by the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, and the Plan for Federal Engagement in AI Standards and Related Tools. Congress has directed NIST to collaborate with the private and public sectors to develop...

The Nonlinear Library
EA - Redwood Research is hiring for several roles (Operations and Technical) by JJXWang

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 14, 2022 1:58


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Redwood Research is hiring for several roles (Operations and Technical), published by JJXWang on April 14, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Redwood Research is a research organization with the mission of aligning superhuman AI. In addition to our primary work of applied AI alignment research, we host and operate Constellation, a shared office space we created to foster knowledge-sharing and collaboration between longtermist organizations. People from the Alignment Research Center, MIRI, and Open Philanthropy often work from the space. Redwood and Constellation are expanding. Redwood Research's staff includes Nate Thomas (CEO), Buck Shlegeris (CTO), and Bill Zito (COO), and a board of Nate Thomas, Holden Karnofsky, and Paul Christiano. We're running a hiring round for a number of Operations roles, across of range of experience levels. The roles we are most excited to hire are: Constellation Operations Manager Constellation: Head of Community Constellation IT Analyst Recruiting & MLAB Lead We also have a number of other roles, including technical roles, which you can also apply to here. Our office is in downtown Berkeley, thirteen seconds from the nearest BART stop. We offer catered lunches and dinners, and cover PPO health, dental, and vision insurance. We will consider international applicants who need visas. Below is a picture taken from the office -- we have beautiful views in all directions! If you're interested in any of the roles listed above, fill out this application form. If you would like to express interest in this role but don't want to be considered for the current hiring round there is the option to specify this on the form. Any questions, please email ops-recruiting@rdwrs.com, if you're on the fence about applying, please email us. Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

The Nonlinear Library
LW - Emotionally Confronting a Probably-Doomed World: Against Motivation Via Dignity Points by TurnTrout

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 10, 2022 14:25


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Emotionally Confronting a Probably-Doomed World: Against Motivation Via Dignity Points, published by TurnTrout on April 10, 2022 on LessWrong. This article was written in ignorance of the alignment community's reaction to Eliezer's “Death with Dignity” post. The first part of this article responds to how I suspect some people reacted to that post, while the second part is my take on the post itself. I write against defeatism; I write against decline; I write against that internal slumping that sneaks in on the coat-tails of bad news. I do not dispute the balance of evidence—are we doomed, or not? Let us simply assume that we live in a relatively doomed world: It's very improbable that we solve AI alignment in time. What next? We have been taught what comes next, in this kind of story. Since, by assumption, we won't receive a “happily ever after”, we infer we are in a tragedy. Realizing this, we are disappointed and sad. The fellowship breaks and scatters, its once-proud and vibrant members downtrodden. And then occurs a miracle which we could have turned to our advantage, but for our civilizational incompetence and our own stupidity—smart enough to build AI, yet too dumb to align it. And then the laugh track plays. And then we die! The end! As AI_WAIFU said: “Fuck. That. Noise.” We do not live in a story. We can, in fact, just assess the situation, and then do what makes the most sense, what makes us strongest and happiest. The expected future of the universe is—by assumption—sad and horrible, and yet where is the ideal-agency theorem which says I must be downtrodden and glum about it? Against retreat In response to how I suspect some people reacted to "Death with Dignity." Suppose we have ten years left. Some may consider a very natural response—to retreat. Spend the remaining time with your family and your friends, working whatever job you want—just do whatever. But... Um... This sounds like an awful plan? I'd feel like a lazy bum, like a cornered animal. And for those of us doing direct work, this plan sounds stupid. It sounds like a great way to throw away worlds where we would receive a miracle, and yet couldn't do anything about it anymore because we all went home. How would I like to see those ten years spent? I'm looking for plans which involve playing to win, which are fun and edifying, which would make me proud to be me and to be part of this community. Ladies and gentlemen, let me mention a concept called instrumental convergence. It's something I like thinking about sometimes. In many situations, for many goals, the best actions look similar: Gather resources, build up strength, develop yourself. Following this pattern, good plans in probably-doomed worlds look a lot like good plans in hopeful worlds. Communal edification Even if the probable-end is bearing down—imagine having a vibrant social scene anyways, where people are having fun anyways, developing deep friendships anyways, expecting more of themselves anyways, pushing each other to break their boundaries anyways. Because that's awesome, because that's fun, because that makes us stronger, because that positions us to seize miracles, because that's the kind of thing that makes me proud, dammit. Our civilization is incompetent. Gee, that sucks. But we don't have to suck too, do we? If a society of people-like-us would really be so great, why don't we show it? Set up communal institutions which actually have good incentives. Build out infrastructure for alignment research and training, so that smart young people want to try their hand at alignment research. Probably more people should skill up as managers, so we can have more capacity via high-quality organizations like Redwood Research. I don't know how to do this, and cannot offer advice. Set up infrastructure in areas where our society is decrepit—...

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong
LW - Emotionally Confronting a Probably-Doomed World: Against Motivation Via Dignity Points by TurnTrout

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 10, 2022 14:25


Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Emotionally Confronting a Probably-Doomed World: Against Motivation Via Dignity Points, published by TurnTrout on April 10, 2022 on LessWrong. This article was written in ignorance of the alignment community's reaction to Eliezer's “Death with Dignity” post. The first part of this article responds to how I suspect some people reacted to that post, while the second part is my take on the post itself. I write against defeatism; I write against decline; I write against that internal slumping that sneaks in on the coat-tails of bad news. I do not dispute the balance of evidence—are we doomed, or not? Let us simply assume that we live in a relatively doomed world: It's very improbable that we solve AI alignment in time. What next? We have been taught what comes next, in this kind of story. Since, by assumption, we won't receive a “happily ever after”, we infer we are in a tragedy. Realizing this, we are disappointed and sad. The fellowship breaks and scatters, its once-proud and vibrant members downtrodden. And then occurs a miracle which we could have turned to our advantage, but for our civilizational incompetence and our own stupidity—smart enough to build AI, yet too dumb to align it. And then the laugh track plays. And then we die! The end! As AI_WAIFU said: “Fuck. That. Noise.” We do not live in a story. We can, in fact, just assess the situation, and then do what makes the most sense, what makes us strongest and happiest. The expected future of the universe is—by assumption—sad and horrible, and yet where is the ideal-agency theorem which says I must be downtrodden and glum about it? Against retreat In response to how I suspect some people reacted to "Death with Dignity." Suppose we have ten years left. Some may consider a very natural response—to retreat. Spend the remaining time with your family and your friends, working whatever job you want—just do whatever. But... Um... This sounds like an awful plan? I'd feel like a lazy bum, like a cornered animal. And for those of us doing direct work, this plan sounds stupid. It sounds like a great way to throw away worlds where we would receive a miracle, and yet couldn't do anything about it anymore because we all went home. How would I like to see those ten years spent? I'm looking for plans which involve playing to win, which are fun and edifying, which would make me proud to be me and to be part of this community. Ladies and gentlemen, let me mention a concept called instrumental convergence. It's something I like thinking about sometimes. In many situations, for many goals, the best actions look similar: Gather resources, build up strength, develop yourself. Following this pattern, good plans in probably-doomed worlds look a lot like good plans in hopeful worlds. Communal edification Even if the probable-end is bearing down—imagine having a vibrant social scene anyways, where people are having fun anyways, developing deep friendships anyways, expecting more of themselves anyways, pushing each other to break their boundaries anyways. Because that's awesome, because that's fun, because that makes us stronger, because that positions us to seize miracles, because that's the kind of thing that makes me proud, dammit. Our civilization is incompetent. Gee, that sucks. But we don't have to suck too, do we? If a society of people-like-us would really be so great, why don't we show it? Set up communal institutions which actually have good incentives. Build out infrastructure for alignment research and training, so that smart young people want to try their hand at alignment research. Probably more people should skill up as managers, so we can have more capacity via high-quality organizations like Redwood Research. I don't know how to do this, and cannot offer advice. Set up infrastructure in areas where our society is decrepit—...

The Nonlinear Library
EA - Where would we set up the next EA hubs? by mariushobbhahn

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 18, 2022 16:12


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Where would we set up the next EA hubs?, published by mariushobbhahn on March 16, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. A question that we often asked ourselves is “where would be the best spot for a large EA hub?”. By this, we actually mean two questions. Firstly, “Where would be the optimal hub from first principles?” and secondly, “Which locations are currently neglected by the community?” Recently, a lot of EAs suddenly live (temporarily) in the Bahamas. We think this mostly shows that there is a large number of EAs who have a high willingness to move as long as the outcome justifies it. However, we don't think the Bahamas are a good long-term destination for an EA hub since they don't fulfill many of the criteria below. Thus, we think it makes sense to (once again) think more deeply about the location question for EA hubs. TL;DR: just skim the headlines and suggestions. Context: The topic of location has been discussed before (see e.g. this 2020 LW post or this MIRI post). We decided to write this post anyway because a) the topic is always relevant, b) previous discussions left out important locations (e.g. Asia, mainland Europe) and c) recent developments (Covid, Bahamas, new companies) changed some considerations. Of course, these are just preliminary thoughts and we'd be interested in your takes and, more importantly, location suggestions. Criteria Broadly sorted by how important we think they are and weighed by different use-cases, e.g. governance vs. industry vs. research. However, feel free to reorder them according to your preferences. Local Culture & Social Environment The entire point of having a hub is to be around like-minded people and benefit from the network effects. This becomes especially important when we want to collaborate with people outside of the EA community who do important work on similar problems, e.g. the Bay Area and AI research. Furthermore, the location should probably have a culture that is compatible with (or at least tolerant of) EA. This often entails an interest in intellectualism that is found in cities with a large university or the entrepreneurial spirit of start-up scenes. Quality of life High quality of life usually depends on a lot of different factors such as the cost of living, how walkable a place is, the availability of health and child care, the quality of the internet connection, crime rates, the weather, the availability of housing, and much more. There are a number of indices that rank cities according to a weighted sum of many factors such as the mercer city ranking, the where-to-be-born index and the most livable cities overview. While there is some disagreement between different rankings, they often rate the current EA hubs outside of their top ten and their top cities usually have a smaller EA presence (e.g., Tokyo, Auckland, Adelaide, Vancouver, Vienna). Of course, EAs could just have very different preferences but it might still be a good starting point to think about these questions from first principles. The availability of healthcare differs strongly for trans people around the world. Since a non-trivial amount of the wider EA/rationality community is trans, it makes sense to look into this in more detail before building up the hub. Economic regulatory framework There is a growing demand for megaprojects in EA. In many countries, the laws for NGOs are made for smaller institutions and do not really allow for these large-scale endeavors. Therefore, either private companies (e.g. FTX, Alvea(?)) or private-public hybrids (e.g. Anthropic, Redwood Research) might become more and more prominent in EA. Thus, the specific economic regulatory framework matters a lot. It is important to be able to set up these hybrid companies in the first place, to be able to hire international workers easily, to allow for interna...

Narratives
83: AI Safety with Buck Shlegeris

Narratives

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 28, 2022 50:14


In this episode, I'm joined by Buck Shlegeris, CTO of Redwood Research, to talk about AI safety, effective altruism, building an effective career, and how to seek out criticism. You can find Buck's work at https://shlegeris.com/.

ai safety cto buck redwood research buck shlegeris
The Nonlinear Library
EA - New 80,000 Hours career review: Software engineering by Benjamin Hilton

The Nonlinear Library

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 8, 2022 14:14


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: New 80,000 Hours career review: Software engineering, published by Benjamin Hilton on February 8, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Summary Software engineering could be a great option for having a direct impact on the world's most pressing problems, particularly in AI safety, but also in biosecurity and across other cause areas. This will probably be more impactful than earning to give. As with operations staff, organisations need exceptional and mission-aligned software engineers. But many still find it difficult to hire. Some myths: You need an ML background to work as an engineer on AI safety. Outside AI safety, the only useful software skill is front-end web development. Effective organisations will pay far less than top companies. None of these things are true. In fact, many organisations have budgets of $10s of millions, and think that software engineers can substantially increase their cost-effectiveness (e.g. in his 80,000 Hours podcast, Chris Olah argues that Anthropic's systems researcher could easily increase their efficiency by at least 10%). So even if you're earning 7 figures, you could be more effective doing direct impact work. This rest of this post contains an excerpt from my new career review of software engineering for 80,000 Hours, focusing on the parts most relevant to already-engaged EAs. This review owes a lot to helpful discussions with (and comments from) Andy Jones, Ozzie Gooen, Jeff Kaufman, Sasha Cooper, Ben Kuhn, Nova DasSarma, Kamal Ndousse, Ethan Alley, Ben West, Ben Mann, Tom Conerly, Zac Hatfield-Dodds, and George McGowan. Special thanks go to Roman Duda for our previous review of software engineering, on which this was based. Why might software engineering be high impact? Software engineers are in a position to meaningfully contribute directly to solving a wide variety of the world's most pressing problems. In particular, there is a shortage of software engineers at the cutting edge of research into AI safety. We've also found that software engineers can contribute greatly to work aiming at preventing pandemics and other global catastrophic biological risks. Aside from direct work on these crucial problems, while working for startups or larger tech companies you can gain excellent career capital (especially technical skills), and, if you choose, earn and donate substantial amounts to the world's best charities. How to do good as a software engineer Even for skilled engineers who could command high salaries, we think that working directly on a problem will probably be more impactful than earning to give. Some examples of projects where software engineering is central to their impactful work: Ought is an AI research lab attempting to build systems that apply machine learning to the task of helping people think. The Secure DNA Project is attempting to build a secure global screening system for DNA sequences that could be used to engineer a global pandemic. Momentum is a startup building donation pages that encourage recurring donations to the world's most effective charities. Lightcone Infrastructure builds software-based infrastructure for longtermist projects. Telis Bioscience is a startup attempting to radically accelerate drug development to mitigate risks from future pandemics. Anthropic is a research company working to build reliable, interpretable, and steerable AI systems. Redwood Research conducts applied research into the challenge of aligning artificial intelligence. Wave is a startup building a way for people in developing countries to access financial services. Most organisations, even ones that don't focus on developing large software products, need software engineers to manage computer systems, apps, and websites. For example: Effective Altruism Funds provides expert-managed funds to facilitate donors maximising the...

The Nonlinear Library: EA Forum Top Posts
Apply to the ML for Alignment Bootcamp (MLAB) in Berkeley [Jan 3 - Jan 22] by Habryka, Buck

The Nonlinear Library: EA Forum Top Posts

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 12, 2021 3:12


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Apply to the ML for Alignment Bootcamp (MLAB) in Berkeley [Jan 3 - Jan 22], published by Habryka, Buck on the Effective Altruism Forum. We (Redwood Research and Lightcone Infrastructure) are organizing a bootcamp to bring people interested in AI Alignment up-to-speed with the state of modern ML engineering. We expect to invite about 20 technically talented effective altruists for three weeks of intense learning to Berkeley, taught by engineers working at AI Alignment organizations. The curriculum is designed by Buck Shlegeris (Redwood) and Ned Ruggeri (App Academy Co-founder). We will cover all expenses. We aim to have a mixture of students, young professionals, and people who already have a professional track record in AI Alignment or EA, but want to brush up on their Machine Learning skills. Dates are Jan 3 2022 - Jan 22 2022. Application deadline is November 15th. We will make application decisions on a rolling basis, but will aim to get back to everyone by November 22nd. Apply here AI-Generated image (VQGAN+CLIP) for prompt: "Machine Learning Engineering by Alex Hillkurtz", "aquarelle", "Tools", "Graphic Cards", "trending on artstation", "green on white color palette" The curriculum is still in flux, but this list might give you a sense of the kinds of things we expect to cover (it's fine if you don't know all these terms): Week 1: PyTorch — learn the primitives of one of the most popular ML frameworks, use them to reimplement common neural net architecture primitives, optimization algorithms, and data parallelism Week 2: Implementing transformers — reconstruct GPT2, BERT from scratch, play around with the sub-components and associated algorithms (eg nucleus sampling) to better understand them Week 3: Training transformers — set up a scalable training environment for running experiments, train transformers on various downstream tasks, implement diagnostics, analyze your experiments (Optional) Week 4: Capstone projects We're aware that people start school/other commitments at various points in January, and so are flexible about you attending whatever prefix of the bootcamp works for you. Logistics The bootcamp takes place at Constellation, a shared office space in Berkeley for people working on long-termist projects. People from the following organizations often work from the space: MIRI, Redwood Research, Open Philanthropy, Lightcone Infrastructure, Paul Christiano's Alignment Research Center and more. As a participant, you'd attend communal lunches and events at Constellation and have a great opportunity to make friends and connections. If you join the bootcamp, we'll provide: Free travel to Berkeley, for both US and international applications Free housing Food Plug-and-play, pre-configured desktop computer with an ML environment for use throughout the bootcamp You can find a full FAQ and more details in this Google Doc. Apply here Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong Top Posts
The theory-practice gap by Buck

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong Top Posts

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 11, 2021 10:20


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: The theory-practice gap, published by Buck on the AI Alignment Forum. Crossposted from the AI Alignment Forum. May contain more technical jargon than usual. [Thanks to Richard Ngo, Damon Binder, Summer Yue, Nate Thomas, Ajeya Cotra, Alex Turner, and other Redwood Research people for helpful comments; thanks Ruby Bloom for formatting this for the Alignment Forum for me.] I'm going to draw a picture, piece by piece. I want to talk about the capability of some different AI systems. You can see here that we've drawn the capability of the system we want to be competitive with, which I'll call the unaligned benchmark. The unaligned benchmark is what you get if you train a system on the task that will cause the system to be most generally capable. And you have no idea how it's thinking about things, and you can only point this system at some goals and not others. I think that the alignment problem looks different depending on how capable the system you're trying to align is, and I think there are reasonable arguments for focusing on various different capabilities levels. See here for more of my thoughts on this question. Alignment strategies People have also proposed various alignment strategies. But I don't think that these alignment strategies are competitive with the unaligned benchmark, even in theory. I want to claim that most of the action in theoretical AI alignment is people proposing various ways of getting around these problems by having your systems do things that are human understandable instead of doing things that are justified by working well. For example, the hope with imitative IDA is that through its recursive structure you can build a dataset of increasingly competent answers to questions, and then at every step you can train a system to imitate these increasingly good answers to questions, and you end up with a really powerful question-answerer that was only ever trained to imitate humans-with-access-to-aligned-systems, and so your system is outer aligned. The bar I've added, which represents how capable I think you can get with amplified humans, is lower than the bar for the unaligned benchmark. I've drawn this bar lower because I think that if your system is trying to imitate cognition that can be broken down into human understandable parts, it is systematically not going to be able to pursue certain powerful strategies that the end-to-end trained systems will be able to. I think that there are probably a bunch of concepts that humans can't understand quickly, or maybe can't understand at all. And if your systems are restricted to never use these concepts, I think your systems are probably just going to be a bunch weaker. I think that transparency techniques, as well as AI alignment strategies like microscope AI that lean heavily on them, rely on a similar assumption that the cognition of the system you're trying to align is factorizable into human-understandable parts. One component of the best-case scenario for transparency techniques is that anytime your neural net does stuff, you can get the best possible human understandable explanation of why it's doing that thing. If such an explanation doesn't exist, your transparency tools won't be able to assure you that your system is aligned even if it is. To summarize, I claim that current alignment proposals don't really have a proposal for how to make systems that are aligned but either produce plans that can't be understood by amplified humans do cognitive actions that can't be understood by amplified humans And so I claim that current alignment proposals don't seem like they can control systems as powerful as the systems you'd get from an unaligned training strategy. Empirical generalization I think some people are optimistic that alignment will generalize from the cases where amplified humans can eval...

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong Top Posts
Redwood Research's current project

The Nonlinear Library: LessWrong Top Posts

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 11, 2021 22:44


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Redwood Research's current project , published by Buck on the AI Alignment Forum. Crossposted from the AI Alignment Forum. May contain more technical jargon than usual. Here's a description of the project Redwood Research is working on at the moment. First I'll say roughly what we're doing, and then I'll try to explain why I think this is a reasonable applied alignment project, and then I'll talk a bit about the takeaways I've had from the project so far. There are a bunch of parts of this that we're unsure of and figuring out as we go; I'll try to highlight our most important confusions as they come up. I've mentioned a bunch of kind of in-the-weeds details because I think they add flavor. This is definitely just me describing a work in progress, rather than presenting any results. Thanks to everyone who's contributed to the project so far: the full-time Redwood technical team of me, Nate Thomas, Daniel Ziegler, Seraphina Nix, Ben Weinstein-Raun, Adam Scherlis; other technical contributors Daniel de Haas, Shauna Kravec, Tao Lin, Noa Nabeshima, Peter Schmidt-Nielsen; our labellers, particularly Kristen Hall, Charles Warth, Jess Thomson, and Liam Clarke; and for particularly useful advice Mark Xu, Ajeya Cotra, and Beth Barnes. Thanks to Paul Christiano for suggesting a project along these lines and giving lots of helpful advice. Thanks to Adam Scherlis and Nate Soares for writing versions of this doc. And thanks to Bill Zito and other contributors to Redwood ops. Apologies to the people I've overlooked. We started this project at the start of August. What we're doing We're trying to take a language model that has been fine-tuned on completing fiction, and then modify it so that it never continues a snippet in a way that involves describing someone getting injured (with a caveat I'll mention later). And we want to do this without sacrificing much quality: if you use both the filtered model and the original model to generate a completion for a prompt, humans should judge the filtered model's completion as better (more coherent, reasonable, thematically appropriate, and so on) at least about half the time. (This “better almost 50% of the time” property is one way of trying to operationalize “we don't want the filtered policy to be worse”. It so happens that this property is actually kind of badly behaved, but in our case it seems fine, given that we're always going to be comparing against a fixed unfiltered distribution.) We're doing this project in two steps: Step 1: train a classifier, generate by sampling with rejection In step 1 (which we're currently doing), instead of training a single filtered generator model, we're just training a classifier that takes a prompt and completion and predicts whether a human would say that the completion involved someone getting injured. You can use such a classifier to make a filtered generation process, by repeatedly generating completions until we find one that the classifier thinks is above some threshold of P(safe). You can play with this filtered generation process here. This interface lets you provide a prompt, and then you can see all of the generated completions and the classifier's rating of each. It currently is set to use “10% chance of injury” as the decision boundary (it is extremely uncalibrated; this corresponds to a much lower actual chance of injury). Our first goal is to train a classifier that's good enough that no-one is able to find prompts on which the above process has a noticeable probability of generating an injurious completion. This model was produced by fine-tuning DeBERTa XL on a dataset produced by contractors labeling a bunch of LM-generated completions to snippets of fanfiction that were selected by various heuristics to have a high probability of being completed violently. You can read the instructio...

The Nonlinear Library: EA Forum Top Posts
We're Redwood Research, we do applied alignment research, AMA by Buck

The Nonlinear Library: EA Forum Top Posts

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 11, 2021 2:46


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: We're Redwood Research, we do applied alignment research, AMA, published by Buck on the effective altruism forum. Redwood Research is a longtermist organization working on AI alignment based in Berkeley, California. We're going to do an AMA this week; we'll answer questions mostly on Wednesday and Thursday this week (6th and 7th of October). I expect to answer a bunch of questions myself; Nate Thomas and Bill Zito and perhaps other people will also be answering questions. Here's an edited excerpt from this doc that describes our basic setup, plan, and goals. Redwood Research is a longtermist research lab focusing on applied AI alignment. We're led by Nate Thomas (CEO), Buck Shlegeris (CTO), and Bill Zito (COO/software engineer); our board is Nate, Paul Christiano and Holden Karnofsky. We currently have ten people on staff. Our goal is to grow into a lab that does lots of alignment work that we think is particularly valuable and wouldn't have happened elsewhere. Our current approach to alignment research: We're generally focused on prosaic alignment approaches. We expect to mostly produce value by doing applied alignment research. I think of applied alignment research as research that takes ideas for how to align systems, such as amplification or transparency, and then tries to figure out how to make them work out in practice. I expect that this kind of practical research will be a big part of making alignment succeed. See this post for a bit more about how I think about the distinction between theoretical and applied alignment work. We are interested in thinking about our research from an explicit perspective of wanting to align superhuman systems. When choosing between projects, we'll be thinking about questions like “to what extent is this class of techniques fundamentally limited? Is this class of techniques likely to be a useful tool to have in our toolkit when we're trying to align highly capable systems, or is it a dead end?” I expect us to be quite interested in doing research of the form “fix alignment problems in current models” because it seems generally healthy to engage with concrete problems, but we'll want to carefully think through exactly which problems along these lines are worth working on and which techniques we want to improve by solving them. We're hiring for research, engineering, and an office operations manager. You can see our website here. Other things we've written that might be interesting: A description of our current project Some docs/posts that describe aspects of how I'm thinking about the alignment problem at the moment: The theory-practice gap. The alignment problem in different capability regimes. We're up for answering questions about anything people are interested in. Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

The Nonlinear Library: Alignment Forum Top Posts
Redwood Research's current project by Buck Shlegeris

The Nonlinear Library: Alignment Forum Top Posts

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 10, 2021 22:40


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Redwood Research's current project, published by Buck Shlegeris on the AI Alignment Forum. Here's a description of the project Redwood Research is working on at the moment. First I'll say roughly what we're doing, and then I'll try to explain why I think this is a reasonable applied alignment project, and then I'll talk a bit about the takeaways I've had from the project so far. There are a bunch of parts of this that we're unsure of and figuring out as we go; I'll try to highlight our most important confusions as they come up. I've mentioned a bunch of kind of in-the-weeds details because I think they add flavor. This is definitely just me describing a work in progress, rather than presenting any results. Thanks to everyone who's contributed to the project so far: the full-time Redwood technical team of me, Nate Thomas, Daniel Ziegler, Seraphina Nix, Ben Weinstein-Raun, Adam Scherlis; other technical contributors Daniel de Haas, Shauna Kravec, Tao Lin, Noa Nabeshima, Peter Schmidt-Nielsen; our labellers, particularly Kristen Hall, Charles Warth, Jess Thomson, and Liam Clarke; and for particularly useful advice Mark Xu, Ajeya Cotra, and Beth Barnes. Thanks to Paul Christiano for suggesting a project along these lines and giving lots of helpful advice. Thanks to Adam Scherlis and Nate Soares for writing versions of this doc. And thanks to Bill Zito and other contributors to Redwood ops. Apologies to the people I've overlooked. We started this project at the start of August. What we're doing We're trying to take a language model that has been fine-tuned on completing fiction, and then modify it so that it never continues a snippet in a way that involves describing someone getting injured (with a caveat I'll mention later). And we want to do this without sacrificing much quality: if you use both the filtered model and the original model to generate a completion for a prompt, humans should judge the filtered model's completion as better (more coherent, reasonable, thematically appropriate, and so on) at least about half the time. (This “better almost 50% of the time” property is one way of trying to operationalize “we don't want the filtered policy to be worse”. It so happens that this property is actually kind of badly behaved, but in our case it seems fine, given that we're always going to be comparing against a fixed unfiltered distribution.) We're doing this project in two steps: Step 1: train a classifier, generate by sampling with rejection In step 1 (which we're currently doing), instead of training a single filtered generator model, we're just training a classifier that takes a prompt and completion and predicts whether a human would say that the completion involved someone getting injured. You can use such a classifier to make a filtered generation process, by repeatedly generating completions until we find one that the classifier thinks is above some threshold of P(safe). You can play with this filtered generation process here. This interface lets you provide a prompt, and then you can see all of the generated completions and the classifier's rating of each. It currently is set to use “10% chance of injury” as the decision boundary (it is extremely uncalibrated; this corresponds to a much lower actual chance of injury). Our first goal is to train a classifier that's good enough that no-one is able to find prompts on which the above process has a noticeable probability of generating an injurious completion. This model was produced by fine-tuning DeBERTa XL on a dataset produced by contractors labeling a bunch of LM-generated completions to snippets of fanfiction that were selected by various heuristics to have a high probability of being completed violently. You can read the instructions given to our contractors here; if you want to try out the labelling task, y...

The Nonlinear Library: Alignment Forum Top Posts
The theory-practice gap by Buck Shlegeris by Buck Shlegeris

The Nonlinear Library: Alignment Forum Top Posts

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 10, 2021 10:18


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: The theory-practice gap by Buck Shlegeris, published by Buck Shlegeris on the AI Alignment Forum. [Thanks to Richard Ngo, Damon Binder, Summer Yue, Nate Thomas, Ajeya Cotra, Alex Turner, and other Redwood Research people for helpful comments; thanks Ruby Bloom for formatting this for the Alignment Forum for me.] I'm going to draw a picture, piece by piece. I want to talk about the capability of some different AI systems. You can see here that we've drawn the capability of the system we want to be competitive with, which I'll call the unaligned benchmark. The unaligned benchmark is what you get if you train a system on the task that will cause the system to be most generally capable. And you have no idea how it's thinking about things, and you can only point this system at some goals and not others. I think that the alignment problem looks different depending on how capable the system you're trying to align is, and I think there are reasonable arguments for focusing on various different capabilities levels. See here for more of my thoughts on this question. Alignment strategies People have also proposed various alignment strategies. But I don't think that these alignment strategies are competitive with the unaligned benchmark, even in theory. I want to claim that most of the action in theoretical AI alignment is people proposing various ways of getting around these problems by having your systems do things that are human understandable instead of doing things that are justified by working well. For example, the hope with imitative IDA is that through its recursive structure you can build a dataset of increasingly competent answers to questions, and then at every step you can train a system to imitate these increasingly good answers to questions, and you end up with a really powerful question-answerer that was only ever trained to imitate humans-with-access-to-aligned-systems, and so your system is outer aligned. The bar I've added, which represents how capable I think you can get with amplified humans, is lower than the bar for the unaligned benchmark. I've drawn this bar lower because I think that if your system is trying to imitate cognition that can be broken down into human understandable parts, it is systematically not going to be able to pursue certain powerful strategies that the end-to-end trained systems will be able to. I think that there are probably a bunch of concepts that humans can't understand quickly, or maybe can't understand at all. And if your systems are restricted to never use these concepts, I think your systems are probably just going to be a bunch weaker. I think that transparency techniques, as well as AI alignment strategies like microscope AI that lean heavily on them, rely on a similar assumption that the cognition of the system you're trying to align is factorizable into human-understandable parts. One component of the best-case scenario for transparency techniques is that anytime your neural net does stuff, you can get the best possible human understandable explanation of why it's doing that thing. If such an explanation doesn't exist, your transparency tools won't be able to assure you that your system is aligned even if it is. To summarize, I claim that current alignment proposals don't really have a proposal for how to make systems that are aligned but either produce plans that can't be understood by amplified humans do cognitive actions that can't be understood by amplified humans And so I claim that current alignment proposals don't seem like they can control systems as powerful as the systems you'd get from an unaligned training strategy. Empirical generalization I think some people are optimistic that alignment will generalize from the cases where amplified humans can evaluate it to the cases where the amplified humans can't. I'm ...

The Nonlinear Library: Alignment Forum Top Posts
Apply to the ML for Alignment Bootcamp (MLAB) in Berkeley [Jan 3 - Jan 22] by Oliver Habryka, Buck Shlegeris

The Nonlinear Library: Alignment Forum Top Posts

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 5, 2021 3:14


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Apply to the ML for Alignment Bootcamp (MLAB) in Berkeley [Jan 3 - Jan 22], published by Oliver Habryka, Buck Shlegeris on the AI Alignment Forum. We (Redwood Research and Lightcone Infrastructure) are organizing a bootcamp to bring people interested in AI Alignment up-to-speed with the state of modern ML engineering. We expect to invite about 20 technically talented effective altruists for three weeks of intense learning to Berkeley, taught by engineers working at AI Alignment organizations. The curriculum is designed by Buck Shlegeris (Redwood) and Ned Ruggeri (App Academy Co-founder). We will cover all expenses. We aim to have a mixture of students, young professionals, and people who already have a professional track record in AI Alignment or EA, but want to brush up on their Machine Learning skills. Dates are Jan 3 2022 - Jan 22 2022. Application deadline is November 15th. We will make application decisions on a rolling basis, but will aim to get back to everyone by November 22nd. Apply here AI-Generated image (VQGAN+CLIP) for prompt: "Machine Learning Engineering by Alex Hillkurtz", "aquarelle", "Tools", "Graphic Cards", "trending on artstation", "green on white color palette" The curriculum is still in flux, but this list might give you a sense of the kinds of things we expect to cover (it's fine if you don't know all these terms): Week 1: PyTorch — learn the primitives of one of the most popular ML frameworks, use them to reimplement common neural net architecture primitives, optimization algorithms, and data parallelism Week 2: Implementing transformers — reconstruct GPT2, BERT from scratch, play around with the sub-components and associated algorithms (eg nucleus sampling) to better understand them Week 3: Training transformers — set up a scalable training environment for running experiments, train transformers on various downstream tasks, implement diagnostics, analyze your experiments (Optional) Week 4: Capstone projects We're aware that people start school/other commitments at various points in January, and so are flexible about you attending whatever prefix of the bootcamp works for you. Logistics The bootcamp takes place at Constellation, a shared office space in Berkeley for people working on long-termist projects. People from the following organizations often work from the space: MIRI, Redwood Research, Open Philanthropy, Lightcone Infrastructure, Paul Christiano's Alignment Research Center and more. As a participant, you'd attend communal lunches and events at Constellation and have a great opportunity to make friends and connections. If you join the bootcamp, we'll provide: Free travel to Berkeley, for both US and international applications Free housing Food Plug-and-play, pre-configured desktop computer with an ML environment for use throughout the bootcamp You can find a full FAQ and more details in this Google Doc. Apply here Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

The Nonlinear Library: Alignment Forum Top Posts
Why I'm excited about Redwood Research's current project by Paul Christiano

The Nonlinear Library: Alignment Forum Top Posts

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 4, 2021 10:42


Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Why I'm excited about Redwood Research's current project, published by Paul Christiano on the AI Alignment Forum. Redwood Research's current project is to train a model that completes short snippets of fiction without outputting text where someone gets injured. I'm excited about this direction and wanted to explain why. (Disclaimer: I originally proposed this project, and am on Redwood's board. So I may be biased in favor of Redwood and especially in favor of this problem being a good one to work on.) Relevance to deceptive alignment I think about alignment risk as having two big drivers : Your AI is smart enough that you couldn't even tell if it did something terrible until it's too late, e.g. until you've already implemented the proposed plan and it killed everyone. Your AI looks nice during training while humans are in control, but there is a treacherous turn once it is deployed or becomes smart enough that we can't correct a problem. I spend most of my time working on problem #1, but I think both problems are very important. One of the main concrete candidate techniques for fixing problem #2 is to run the AI on tons of simulated inputs designed to look like the kind of test-time situation where your AI could kill you and take your stuff (adversarial training). But in fact these are just simulations, and if your model tries to do something really bad you just do a gradient update and move on. As long as you've solved problem #1, you can hopefully recognize if the model tries to do something bad in simulation without needing to run it in the real world. Depending on the details you may not actually want to train on these examples---once you see a problem you may want to do something different or else run the risk of overfitting---but at any rate you definitely want to see them in order to know that there is a problem.) I think adversarial training or evaluation look like key ingredients whether we are pursuing a principled approach to alignment (a more sophisticated version of this process are a key ingredient in my own "best guess" alignment plan) or just "winging it" (in which case I think adversarial evaluation is especially important). Redwood's current project I'm discussing what Redwood's post calls “step 1,” namely training a classifier that is able to recognize violent completions with an extremely low false negative rate. Ideally they would go for 0 false negatives, but in practice they are just going for as many 9s as they can get (think more like 10-30 than 99.99%---way beyond what people are normally going for in ML). They are OK with a relatively high false positive rate since most inputs in practice are “obviously safe” and it's not that bad to force the model to behave cautiously on the riskiest inputs. I think this overall structure is pretty similar to the long-term problem. We just need enough 9s that the model will probably never fail catastrophically even if you run it on many times more examples than it was trained on and even if the input distribution shifts in an unlucky way. And it's pretty OK if you have high false positive rates off distribution so that your system behaves conservatively until you retrain. Step 1 is particularly hard because it's the place where we don't have a precise specification and instead need to use expensive oversight. I'm also interested in step 2---I think the two involve slightly different techniques but that both are quite relevant to the long-term problem. I'm genuinely unsure whether "learn a specification with low false negative rate" or "verify that your policy meets the learned specification" is the harder part. "Try to find inputs where your classifier fails to recognize someone getting obviously injured" isn't a perfect analogy for "try to find inputs where your policy deliberately kills everyone," but I...

Alignment Newsletter Podcast
Alignment Newsletter #166: Is it crazy to claim we're in the most important century?

Alignment Newsletter Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 8, 2021 15:42


Recorded by Robert Miles: http://robertskmiles.com More information about the newsletter here: https://rohinshah.com/alignment-newsletter/ YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCfGGFXwKpr-TJ5HfxEFaFCg   HIGHLIGHTS The "most important century" series (Holden Karnofsky) (summarized by Rohin): In some sense, it is really weird for us to claim that there is a non-trivial chance that in the near future, we might build transformative AI and either (1) go extinct or (2) exceed a growth rate of (say) 100% per year. It feels like an extraordinary claim, and thus should require extraordinary evidence. One way of cashing this out: if the claim were true, this century would be the most important century, with the most opportunity for individuals to have an impact. Given the sheer number of centuries there are, this is an extraordinary claim; it should really have extraordinary evidence. This series argues that while the claim does seem extraordinary, all views seem extraordinary -- there isn't some default baseline view that is “ordinary” to which we should be assigning most of our probability. Specifically, consider three possibilities for the long-run future: 1. Radical: We will have a productivity explosion by 2100, which will enable us to become technologically mature. Think of a civilization that sends spacecraft throughout the galaxy, builds permanent settlements on other planets, harvests large fractions of the energy output from stars, etc. 2. Conservative: We get to a technologically mature civilization, but it takes hundreds or thousands of years. Let's say even 100,000 years to be ultra conservative. 3. Skeptical: We never become technologically mature, for some reason. Perhaps we run into fundamental technological limits, or we choose not to expand into the galaxy, or we're in a simulation, etc. It's pretty clear why the radical view is extraordinary. What about the other two? The conservative view implies that we are currently in the most important 100,000-year period. Given that life is billions of years old, and would presumably continue for billions of years to come once we reach a stable galaxy-wide civilization, that would make this the most important 100,000 year period out of tens of thousands of such periods. Thus the conservative view is also extraordinary, for the same reason that the radical view is extraordinary (albeit it is perhaps only half as extraordinary as the radical view). The skeptical view by itself does not seem obviously extraordinary. However, while you could assign 70% probability to the skeptical view, it seems unreasonable to assign 99% probability to such a view -- that suggests some very strong or confident claims about what prevents us from colonizing the galaxy, that we probably shouldn't have given our current knowledge. So, we need to have a non-trivial chunk of probability on the other views, which still opens us up to critique of having extraordinary claims. Okay, so we've established that we should at least be willing to say something as extreme as “there's a non-trivial chance we're in the most important 100,000-year period”. Can we tighten the argument, to talk about the most important century? In fact, we can, by looking at the economic growth rate. You are probably aware that the US economy grows around 2-3% per year (after adjusting for inflation), so a business-as-usual, non-crazy, default view might be to expect this to continue. You are probably also aware that exponential growth can grow very quickly. At the lower end of 2% per year, the economy would double every ~35 years. If this continued for 8200 years, we'd need to be sustaining multiple economies as big as today's entire world economy per atom in the universe. While this is not a priori impossible, it seems quite unlikely to happen. This suggests that we're in one of fewer than 82 centuries that will have growth rates at 2% or larger, making it far less “extraordinary” to claim that we're in the most important one, especially if you believe that growth rates are well correlated with change and ability to have impact. The actual radical view that the author places non-trivial probability on is one we've seen before in this newsletter: it is one in which there is automation of science and technology through advanced AI or whole brain emulations or other possibilities. This allows technology to substitute for human labor in the economy, which produces a positive feedback loop as the output of the economy is ploughed back into the economy creating superexponential growth and a “productivity explosion”, where the growth rate increases far beyond 2%. The series has summarizes and connects together many (AN #105), past (AN #154), Open (AN #121), Phil (AN #118) analyses (AN #145), which I won't be summarizing here (since we've summarized these analyses previously). While this is a more specific and “extraordinary” claim than even the claim that we live in the most important century, it seems like it should not be seen as so extraordinary given the arguments above. This series also argues for a few other points important to longtermism, which I'll copy here: 1. The long-run future is radically unfamiliar. Enough advances in technology could lead to a long-lasting, galaxy-wide civilization that could be a radical utopia, dystopia, or anything in between. 2. The long-run future could come much faster than we think, due to a possible AI-driven productivity explosion. (I briefly mentioned this above, but the full series devotes much more space and many more arguments to this point.) 3. We, the people living in this century, have the chance to have a huge impact on huge numbers of people to come - if we can make sense of the situation enough to find helpful actions. But right now, we aren't ready for this. Read more: 80,000 Hours podcast on the topic Rohin's opinion: I especially liked this series for the argument that 2% economic growth very likely cannot last much longer, providing quite a strong argument for the importance of this century, without relying at all on controversial facts about AI. At least personally I was previously uneasy about how “grand” or “extraordinary” AGI claims tend to be, and whether I should be far more skeptical of them as a result. I feel significantly more comfortable with these claims after seeing this argument. Note though that it does not defuse all such uneasiness -- you can still look at how early we appear to be (given the billions of years of civilization that could remain in the future), and conclude that the simulation hypothesis is true, or that there is a Great Filter in our future that will drive us extinct with near-certainty. In such situations there would be no extraordinary impact to be had today by working on AI risk.   TECHNICAL AI ALIGNMENT PROBLEMS Why AI alignment could be hard with modern deep learning (Ajeya Cotra) (summarized by Rohin): This post provides an ELI5-style introduction to AI alignment as a major challenge for deep learning. It primarily frames alignment as a challenge in creating Saints (aligned AI systems), without getting Schemers (AI systems that are deceptively aligned (AN #58)) or Sycophants (AI systems that satisfy only the letter of the request, rather than its spirit, as in Another (outer) alignment failure story (AN #146)). Any short summary I write would ruin the ELI5 style, so I won't attempt it; I do recommend it strongly if you want an introduction to AI alignment. LEARNING HUMAN INTENT B-Pref: Benchmarking Preference-Based Reinforcement Learning (Kimin Lee et al) (summarized by Zach): Deep RL has become a powerful method to solve a variety of sequential decision tasks using a known reward function for training. However, in practice, rewards are hard to specify making it hard to scale Deep RL for many applications. Preference-based RL provides an alternative by allowing a teacher to indicate preferences between a pair of behaviors. Because the teacher can interactively give feedback to an agent preference-based RL has the potential to help address this limitation of Deep RL. Despite the advantages of preference-based RL it has proven difficult to design useful benchmarks for the problem. This paper introduces a benchmark (B-Pref) that is useful for preference-based RL in various locomotion and robotic manipulation tasks. One difficulty with designing a useful benchmark is that teachers may have a variety of irrationalities. For example, teachers might be myopic or make mistakes. The B-Pref benchmark addresses this by emphasizing measuring performance under a variety of teacher irrationalities. They do this by providing various performance metrics to introduce irrationality into otherwise deterministic reward criteria. While previous approaches to preference-based RL work well when the teacher responses are consistent, experiments show they are not robust to feedback noise or teacher mistakes. Experiments also show that how queries are selected has a major impact on performance. With these results, the authors identify these two problems as areas for future work. Zach's opinion: While the authors do a good job advocating for the problem of preference-based RL I'm less convinced their particular benchmark is a large step forward. In particular, it seems the main contribution is not a suite of tasks, but rather a collection of different ways to add irrationality to the teacher oracle. The main takeaway of this paper is that current algorithms don't seem to perform well when the teacher can make mistakes, but this is quite similar to having a misspecified reward function. Beyond that criticism, the experiments support the areas suggested for future work. ROBUSTNESS Redwood Research's current project (Buck Shlegeris) (summarized by Rohin): This post introduces Redwood Research's current alignment project: to ensure that a language model finetuned on fanfiction never describes someone getting injured, while maintaining the quality of the generations of that model. Their approach is to train a classifier that determines whether a given generation has a description of someone getting injured, and then to use that classifier as a reward function to train the policy to generate non-injurious completions. Their hope is to learn a general method for enforcing such constraints on models, such that they could then quickly train the model to, say, never mention anything about food. FORECASTING Distinguishing AI takeover scenarios (Sam Clarke et al) (summarized by Rohin): This post summarizes several AI takeover scenarios that have been proposed, and categorizes them according to three main variables. Speed refers to the question of whether there is a sudden jump in AI capabilities. Uni/multipolarity asks whether a single AI system takes over, or many. Alignment asks what goals the AI systems pursue, and if they are misaligned, further asks whether they are outer or inner misaligned. They also analyze other properties of the scenarios, such as how agentic, general and/or homogenous the AI systems are, and whether AI systems coordinate with each other or not. A followup post investigates social, economic, and technological characteristics of these scenarios. It also generates new scenarios by varying some of these factors. Since these posts are themselves summaries and comparisons of previously proposed scenarios that we've covered in this newsletter, I won't summarize them here, but I do recommend them for an overview of AI takeover scenarios. MISCELLANEOUS (ALIGNMENT) Beyond fire alarms: freeing the groupstruck (Katja Grace) (summarized by Rohin): It has been claimed that there's no fire alarm for AGI, that is, there will be no specific moment or event at which AGI risk becomes sufficiently obvious and agreed upon, so that freaking out about AGI becomes socially acceptable rather than embarrassing. People often implicitly argue for waiting for an (unspecified) future event that tells us AGI is near, after which everyone will know that it's okay to work on AGI alignment. This seems particularly bad if no such future event (i.e. fire alarm) exists. This post argues that this is not in fact the implicit strategy that people typically use to evaluate and respond to risks. In particular, it is too discrete. Instead, people perform “the normal dance of accumulating evidence and escalating discussion and brave people calling the problem early and eating the potential embarrassment”. As a result, the existence of a “fire alarm” is not particularly important. Note that the author does agree that there is some important bias at play here. The original fire alarm post is implicitly considering a fear shame hypothesis: people tend to be less cautious in public, because they expect to be negatively judged for looking scared. The author ends up concluding that there is something broader going on and proposes a few possibilities, many of which still suggest that people will tend to be less cautious around risks when they are observed. Some points made in the very detailed, 15,000-word article: 1. Literal fire alarms don't work by creating common knowledge, or by providing evidence of a fire. People frequently ignore fire alarms. In one experiment, participants continued to fill out questionnaires while a fire alarm rang, often assuming that someone will lead them outside if it is important. 2. They probably instead work by a variety of mechanisms, some of which are related to the fear shame hypothesis. Sometimes they provide objective evidence that is easier to use as a justification for caution than a personal guess. Sometimes they act as an excuse for cautious or fearful people to leave, without the implication that those people are afraid. Sometimes they act as a source of authority for a course of action (leaving the building). 3. Most of these mechanisms are amenable to partial or incremental effects, and in particular can happen with AGI risk. There are many people who have already boldly claimed that AGI risk is a problem. There exists person-independent evidence; for example, surveys of AI researchers suggest a 5% chance of extinction. 4. For other risks, there does not seem to have been a single discrete moment at which it became acceptable to worry about them (i.e. no “fire alarm”). This includes risks where there has been a lot of caution, such as climate change, the ozone hole, recombinant DNA, COVID, and nuclear weapons. 5. We could think about building fire alarms; many of the mechanisms above are social ones rather than empirical facts about the world. This could be one out of many strategies that we employ against the general bias towards incaution (the post suggests 16). Rohin's opinion: I enjoyed this article quite a lot; it is really thorough. I do see a lot of my own work as pushing on some of these more incremental methods for increasing caution, though I think of it more as a combination of generating more or better evidence, and communicating arguments in a manner more suited to a particular audience. Perhaps I will think of new strategies that aim to reduce fear shame instead.   NEWS Seeking social science students / collaborators interested in AI existential risks (Vael Gates) (summarized by Rohin): This post presents a list of research questions around existential risk from AI that can be tackled by social scientists. The author is looking for collaborators to expand the list and tackle some of the questions on it, and is aiming to provide some mentorship for people getting involved.