Podcast appearances and mentions of lily hay newman

When former national security advisor Mike Waltz had a picture taken of him last week, he didn't expect for the whole world to see that he was using TeleMessage, a messaging app similar to Signal. Now the app has been hacked, with portions of data linked to government entities like Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and companies like Coinbase. Today on the show, we're joined by WIRED senior writer Lily Hay Newman to discuss what this incident tells us about the growing vulnerabilities in government communications. Articles mentioned in this episode: Mike Waltz Has Somehow Gotten Even Worse at Using Signal The Signal Clone the Trump Admin Uses Was Hacked   The Signal Clone Mike Waltz Was Caught Using Has Direct Access to User Chats You can follow Zoë Schiffer on Bluesky @zoeschiffer, and Lily Hay Newman @lhn.  Learn about your ad choices: dovetail.prx.org/ad-choices

Merriam-Webster's Word of the Day for November 29, 2024 is: obfuscate • AHB-fuh-skayt • verb To obfuscate something is to make it more difficult to understand. Obfuscate can also mean “to be evasive, unclear, or confusing.”  // The revised wording of the rule obfuscates its meaning. // They allege that the company's representative lied and obfuscated when answering questions about the report. See the entry > Examples: “‘I firmly believe that cyber-insecurity is fundamentally a policy problem,' says Brett Callow, a threat analyst at the security firm Emsisoft. ‘We need standardized and uniform disclosure and reporting laws, prescribed language for those disclosures and reports, regulation and licensing of negotiators. Far too much happens in the shadows or is obfuscated by weasel words. It's counterproductive and helps only the cybercriminals.'” — Lily Hay Newman, WIRED, 5 Dec. 2023 Did you know? “Hello darkness, my old friend / I've come to talk with you again.” So begins the classic 1960s Simon and Garfunkel song “The Sound of Silence,” which was written by Paul Simon with a seemingly oxymoronic title that has obfuscated—that is, confused—ten thousand people, maybe more (probably a lot more) in the decades since. It confuses us too, but we're not above being oxymoronic ourselves when we say that darkness, our old friend, shines a helpful light on the meaning of the word obfuscate. When obfuscate first came into use in the early 16th century, it was with the meaning “to throw into shadow.” This makes sense, since the word comes from the Latin obfuscāre (“to obscure or darken”) which itself comes in part from fuscus (“dark-colored”). The word was used for both figurative and literal darkening before developing the even more figurative senses of “to make more difficult to understand,” “to be evasive or unclear,” and “to confuse,” which in modern use are now more common.

Another day, another data breach, am I right? Companies including AT&T, Ticketmaster, and UnitedHealth have all made headlines recently after hackers left millions of customers’ data vulnerable. Lily Hay Newman, a writer covering information security, digital privacy and hacking for Wired, says data breaches like these have been a growing issue for more than a decade. On the show today, Newman explains steps you can take after you’ve been impacted by a breach (beyond signing up for free credit monitoring) and what you can do proactively to protect your data. Plus, what cybercriminals actually do with your data and how cyberattacks have evolved. Then, we’ll get into how a PAC funded by Elon Musk is collecting information on would-be voters. Plus, we’ll workshop a name for Vice President Kamala Harris’ economic platform and hear about Olympic speed climbing. Here’s everything we talked about today: “The Sweeping Danger of the AT&T Phone Records Breach” from Wired “Ticketmaster Confirms Data Breach. Here's What to Know.” from The New York Times “AT&T says criminals stole phone records of ‘nearly all’ customers in new data breach” from TechCrunch “What's Behind the Increase in Data Breaches?” from The Wall Street Journal “Here's how much your personal information is worth to cybercriminals – and what they do with it” from The Conversation “How an Elon Musk PAC is using voter data to help Trump beat Harris in 2024 election” from CNBC “Forget Apple, the biggest loser in the Google search ruling could be Mozilla and its Firefox web browser” from Fortune “U.S. climber Sam Watson smashes men’s speed world record with 4.75-second qualification run” from NBC Olympics Make Me Smart is headed to Boston! You can find details about the live event and how to get early bird tickets here.

Another day, another data breach, am I right? Companies including AT&T, Ticketmaster, and UnitedHealth have all made headlines recently after hackers left millions of customers’ data vulnerable. Lily Hay Newman, a writer covering information security, digital privacy and hacking for Wired, says data breaches like these have been a growing issue for more than a decade. On the show today, Newman explains steps you can take after you’ve been impacted by a breach (beyond signing up for free credit monitoring) and what you can do proactively to protect your data. Plus, what cybercriminals actually do with your data and how cyberattacks have evolved. Then, we’ll get into how a PAC funded by Elon Musk is collecting information on would-be voters. Plus, we’ll workshop a name for Vice President Kamala Harris’ economic platform and hear about Olympic speed climbing. Here’s everything we talked about today: “The Sweeping Danger of the AT&T Phone Records Breach” from Wired “Ticketmaster Confirms Data Breach. Here's What to Know.” from The New York Times “AT&T says criminals stole phone records of ‘nearly all’ customers in new data breach” from TechCrunch “What's Behind the Increase in Data Breaches?” from The Wall Street Journal “Here's how much your personal information is worth to cybercriminals – and what they do with it” from The Conversation “How an Elon Musk PAC is using voter data to help Trump beat Harris in 2024 election” from CNBC “Forget Apple, the biggest loser in the Google search ruling could be Mozilla and its Firefox web browser” from Fortune “U.S. climber Sam Watson smashes men’s speed world record with 4.75-second qualification run” from NBC Olympics Make Me Smart is headed to Boston! You can find details about the live event and how to get early bird tickets here.

Another day, another data breach, am I right? Companies including AT&T, Ticketmaster, and UnitedHealth have all made headlines recently after hackers left millions of customers’ data vulnerable. Lily Hay Newman, a writer covering information security, digital privacy and hacking for Wired, says data breaches like these have been a growing issue for more than a decade. On the show today, Newman explains steps you can take after you’ve been impacted by a breach (beyond signing up for free credit monitoring) and what you can do proactively to protect your data. Plus, what cybercriminals actually do with your data and how cyberattacks have evolved. Then, we’ll get into how a PAC funded by Elon Musk is collecting information on would-be voters. Plus, we’ll workshop a name for Vice President Kamala Harris’ economic platform and hear about Olympic speed climbing. Here’s everything we talked about today: “The Sweeping Danger of the AT&T Phone Records Breach” from Wired “Ticketmaster Confirms Data Breach. Here's What to Know.” from The New York Times “AT&T says criminals stole phone records of ‘nearly all’ customers in new data breach” from TechCrunch “What's Behind the Increase in Data Breaches?” from The Wall Street Journal “Here's how much your personal information is worth to cybercriminals – and what they do with it” from The Conversation “How an Elon Musk PAC is using voter data to help Trump beat Harris in 2024 election” from CNBC “Forget Apple, the biggest loser in the Google search ruling could be Mozilla and its Firefox web browser” from Fortune “U.S. climber Sam Watson smashes men’s speed world record with 4.75-second qualification run” from NBC Olympics Make Me Smart is headed to Boston! You can find details about the live event and how to get early bird tickets here.

We'd love to hear your thoughts on the podcast. Take this survey. The cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike says a global Microsoft systems outage is not due to a cyber attack, but a software glitch. Wired's Lily Hay Newman tells us more. Then, in his speech Thursday night at the RNC, Trump called for healing discord and division, but he also painted a dark picture of the country. The New York Times' Adam Nagourney joins us. And, young conservatives who want to get their party to engage on climate attended the RNC this year. NPR's Ximena Bustillo reports.Plus, do you have any inner voice or monologue? Chances are you do, but new research shows some of us might not have one at all. Lead researcher Gary Lupyan explains the findings.Learn more about sponsor message choices: podcastchoices.com/adchoicesNPR Privacy Policy

A bill is quickly moving through Congress that supposedly would “ban TikTok.” While it is clearly aimed at TikTok, this bill is really about creating a new Presidential power to remove Americans' access to apps, websites, games and other entire tech platforms. In this episode, using the text of the bill itself, we examine how exactly this new censorship power would work if the bill passes the Senate and becomes law. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes The Not a TikTok Ban Bill Drew Harwell et al. March 13, 2024. The Washington Post. David E. Sanger. March 13, 2024. The New York Times. Aamer Madhani. March 8, 2024. AP News. Opposition to the bill Jenna Leventoff. March 13, 2024. ACLU. Access Now et al. March 12, 2024. ACLU. How we got here Dan Primack. March 12, 2024. Axios. Samantha Delouya and Brian Fung. November 30, 2023. CNN. Emily Baker-White. August 21, 2023. Forbes. November 20, 2023. Reuters. Brian Fung. December 30, 2022. CNN. James K. Jackson. February 14, 2020. Congressional Research Service. Grindr Echo Wang. May 13, 2019. Reuters. Jeff Farrah. April 15, 2019. TechCrunch. ByteDance Lily Kuo and Annabelle Timsit. March 13, 2024. The Washington Post. April 16, 2023. TikTok. Censorship and Spying Jonathan Vanian. January 22, 2024. CNBC. May 16, 2023. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs. Marielle Descalsota. December 27, 2022. Business Insider. Lily Hay Newman. May 7, 2019. Wired. Israel and AIPAC Camille Bressange. March 16, 2024. The Wall Street Journal. Kate Linthicum. March 13, 2024. The Los Angeles Times. Celine Alkhaldi et al. March 8, 2024. CNN. December 3, 2023. Velshi on MSNBC. Rep. Mike Gallagher. November 1, 2023. The Free Press. Mater Dei High School. TikTok September 20, 2021. BBC. The Bill Audio Sources House Floor March 13, 2024 Clips 19:00 Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY): There was there were some people who were legitimately concerned that this was an overly broad bill and they got an exclusion written into the bill that I want to read. It says the term "covered company" does not include an entity that operates a website or application, whose primary purpose is to allow users to post product reviews, business reviews, or travel information and reviews. Why is this exception in the bill? Why did somebody feel like they needed this exception if the bill itself only covers social media applications that foreign adversaries are running now? 21:15 Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ): While this bill establishes a national security framework that could apply to other applications, much of the public attention is focused on TikTok. 23:15 Rep. Michael Gallagher (R-WI): Mr. Speaker, TikTok is a threat to our national security because it is owned by ByteDance, which does the bidding of the Chinese Communist Party. We know this because ByteDance's leadership says so and because Chinese law requires it. This bill, therefore, would force TikTok to break up with the Chinese Communist Party. It does not apply to American companies. It only applies to companies subject to the controlof foreign adversaries defined by Congress. It says nothing about election interference and cannot be turned against any American social media platform. It does not impact websites in general. The only impacted sites are those associated with foreign adversary apps, such as TikTok.com. It can never be used to penalize individuals. The text explicitly prohibits that. It cannot be used to censor speech. It takes no position at all on the content of speech, only foreign adversary control of what is becoming the dominant news platform for Americans under 30. 25:55 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): This divestment requirement is not new. It's not without precedent. When the app Grindr, a popular LGBTQ app, was acquired by a Chinese company, and the United States government determined that sensitive data of LGBTQ members of the military and US government officials got into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, they required divestment. This happened quickly. Why? Because Grindr was a very valuable social media company. The same is true with regard to TikTok, and there will be no disruption to users, just as there was with Grindr. 27:25 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Last week, under the leadership of the Chairwoman and the Ranking Member, they brought up for consideration our bill before the House Energy and Commerce Committee. On the morning of that vote, TikTok, delivered a push notification and a pop up to thousands of users across the country. They used geolocation data targeting minor children to then force them to call congressional offices in order to continue using the app. And in doing so, these children called and they asked the question: what is Congress? And what is a Congressman? This influence campaign illustrates the need for this bill. 29:20 Rep. Warren Davidson (R-OH): The people sponsoring this bill today claim that the real issue is ownership. But who owns this company? It's not 100% owned by Bytedance. 60% of it's owned by investors, including American investors. 20% are owned by the founders and 20% are owned by over 7000 employees. The company's headquarters is not in China, it's in Singapore. And the American user data isn't housed in China. It's housed in Texas, controlled by a database owned by Oracle. 30:20 Rep. Warren Davidson (R-OH): So if we think we can address the privacy concerns, what's left to address? Frankly, content moderation. Remember, before Elon Musk bought the crime scene at Twitter, it was all a conspiracy theory that these algorithms were silencing and canceling people. You guys are crazy. Now when Elon Musk bought Twitter, he did keep it operating with 80% fewer employees. But what we found is a lot of the employees were trying to do content moderation, shape who sees what and how they see it, which algorithms are used, how does it promote certain people and, and filter others? So really, what you're saying here is if you're not fully engaged with America's three letter agencies in content moderation, we plan to 'TikTok' you. And this bill isn't just limited to TikTok. It's a coercive power that can be applied to other apps like Telegram, Tor. Things that provide privacy would be targeted by this bill. 34:20 Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA): First of all, this is not a ban on TikTok. I'm a grandmother of teenagers, I understand the entertainment value, the educational value, communication value, the business value for some businesses on this. This is not an attempt to ban TikTok. Its an attempt to make TikTok better. Tic Tac Toe. A winner, a winner. 41:00 Brett Guthrie (R-KY): I was asked, does this just affect TikTok? And no, it's any foreign adversary, or any app that is owned, controlled or unduly influenced by any foreign adversary. We must protect our national security and help keep America's private data out of the hands of our foreign adversaries. I urge support of this bill, and I yield back. 51:55 Rep. Larry Bucshon (R-IN): After hearing from national security experts last week, it is clear the prolific use of media platforms controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and other foreign adversaries poses a danger to our country. 53:15 Rep. Sydney Kamlager-Dove (D-CA): This bill would greatly expand the Executive's authority to ban tech companies with zero congressional oversight. I cannot sign a blank check to some future president who would easily and dangerously weaponize this legislation to profit in silence. 55:20 Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL): We aren't banning a company, as the high paid lobbyists for Bytedance - which is owned by China - would lead you to believe. We aren't infringing on constitutionally protected speech or growing the size of government. All we're saying is, Break up with the Chinese Communist Party. 1:02:30 Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY): Who's going to be prosecuted by this bill? Is it Bytedance or TikTok? Will they be taken to court? No. I mean, they're the target of this, but how do you elicit or effect a ban on them? By prosecuting Americans? The only way you can ban TikTok and the other companies from being here is to say what this bill says, which is the government will bring a civil action suit against you, if you so much as host them here. If you have an app store that allows them to be here, you're an American or an American company and you will be the target of this bill. Those are the only people who can be pursued under this bill and I know it's in order to go after TikTok, or so they say. Music by Editing Production Assistance

Genetic testing companies like 23andMe and Ancestry offer a pretty enticing prospect. Just mail off a little bit of your spit in a tube and the company's lab can reveal the details of your ethnic background and trace the many branches of your family tree. The popularity of such tests means these genomics and biotechnology companies hold a whole lot of very personal data about their customers, and hackers tend to see their databases as targets ripe for the picking. Earlier this month, the private data of millions of 23andMe customers was stolen and put up for sale on hacker forums. Most troublingly, the data gathered targeted specific ethnic groups, including Ashkenazi Jews and people of Chinese descent. This week on Gadget Lab, we talk with WIRED senior writer Lily Hay Newman about the 23andMe hack, what it means for the people who were directly affected, and whether it's a good idea to give companies access to your genetic material and history in the first place. Show Notes: Read more from Lily about the 23andMe hack and some updates on how it has gotten even worse. Follow all of WIRED's cybersecurity coverage. Recommendations: Lily recommends Taylors of Harrogate Yorkshire Tea, specifically the flavor Malty Biscuit Brew. Lauren recommends Pasta e Ceci. Mike recommends the episode of the New York Times podcast Popcast titled, “Do We Need Album Reviews Anymore?” Lily Hay Newman can be found on social media @lilyhnewman. Lauren Goode is @LaurenGoode. Michael Calore is @snackfight. Bling the main hotline at @GadgetLab. The show is produced by Boone Ashworth (@booneashworth). Our theme music is by Solar Keys. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

There are hot takes, and then there are truly hoth takes. In this episode, Wired security reporter Lily Hay Newman returns to Hoth Takes to defend one of the most controversial Star Wars claims we've ever heard: that The Book of Boba Fett was a good TV show. Lily loved how the show played with different forms of storytelling, and she came away from it with a newfound interest in Boba Fett. But here on Hoth Takes, she has some explaining to do. How does she respond to Eric and Grace's complaints about the Din Djarin and Grogu interludes and the unceremonious slaughter of the Tusken Raiders? What does she have to say about the mod parlor's cheap resurrection trick? And what can she possibly mean by comparing The Book of Boba Fett to Star Trek: Deep Space Nine?

Original Air Date 4/2/2022 Today we take a look at the modern reality of cyber war. It's not the mass destruction of attacks that were imagined to look like a "Cyber Pearl Harbor" but the much more subtle cyber attacks that often fly under the radar and live in the grey area in attempts to inflict harm without provoking counterattack. Be part of the show! Leave us a message or text at 202-999-3991 or email Jay@BestOfTheLeft.com  Transcript BestOfTheLeft.com/Support (Get AD FREE Shows and Bonus Content) SHOW NOTES Ch. 1: Andy Greenberg - Longform - Air Date 12-11-19 Andy Greenberg is a senior writer for Wired. His new book is Sandworm. “I kind of knew I was never going to get access to Sandworm, which is the title of the book - so it was all about drawing a picture around this invisible monster.” Ch. 2: How America's gas got hacked - Today, Explained - Air Date 5-12-21 The largest-known ransomware attack on American energy infrastructure is driving up gas prices and creating shortages. Wired's Lily Hay Newman says Colonial Pipeline might be a turning point for cybersecurity. Ch. 3: Is Russia at War with the West? Part 1 - The Inquiry - Air Date 11-21-18 There are currently a number of serious allegations made in the West against Russia. They include the attempted murder of the former spy Sergei Skripal on British soil; interference in the 2016 US election; the hacking of the American electricity grid. Ch. 4: How prepared is the U.S. to fend off cyber warfare? Better at offense than defense, author says - PBS NewsHour - Air Date 8-6-18 Sanger joins Judy Woodruff to discuss the threats and realities, how the U.S. wages cyber warfare, and how prepared the U.S. is to stop attacks. Ch. 5: Is Russia at War with the West? Part 2 - The Inquiry - Air Date 11-21-18 Ch. 6: Russia Perfected Its Cyberwarfare In Ukraine — America Could Pay The Price - Think | NBC News - Air Date 11-23-19 Russia has been practicing cyberwar in a real-life test lab — Ukraine. Andy Greenberg, author of 'Sandworm', recounts how Russia went from repeatedly shutting down Ukraine's infrastructure to unleashing worms that caused billions of dollars in damage. Ch. 7: Is World War III Already Here? - Your Undivided Attention - Air Date 1-3-22 Warfare has changed so fundamentally, that we're currently in a war we don't even recognize. It's the war that Russia, China, and other hostile foreign actors are fighting against us — weaponizing social media to undermine our faith in each other MEMBERS-ONLY BONUS CLIP(S) Ch. 8: The Hackers Who Took Down the Colonial Pipeline - What Next: TBD | Tech, power, and the future - Air Date 5-21-21 Last week, a hacker group called DarkSide shut down the Colonial Pipeline, which supplies 45 percent of the fuel consumed on the East Coast. Gas prices skyrocketed, people started hoarding gas, and DarkSide walked away with over $4 million in Bitcoin. VOICEMAILS Ch. 9: Puberty blockers experimental? - Maria in Pennsylvania FINAL COMMENTS Ch. 10: Final comments on the deception and logical fallacies at the heart of critiques of gender affirming care MUSIC (Blue Dot Sessions): Opening Theme: Loving Acoustic Instrumental by John Douglas Orr  Voicemail Music: Low Key Lost Feeling Electro by Alex Stinnent Closing Music: Upbeat Laid Back Indie Rock by Alex Stinnent   Produced by Jay! Tomlinson Visit us at BestOfTheLeft.com Listen Anywhere! BestOfTheLeft.com/Listen Listen Anywhere! Follow at Twitter.com/BestOfTheLeft Like at Facebook.com/BestOfTheLeft Contact me directly at Jay@BestOfTheLeft.com

Recent Star Wars projects like Obi-Wan Kenobi and Andor have shown us the strengths and weaknesses of the Imperial surveillance state. But how effective are the Empire's cameras, databases, and scanners, and how well do storytellers justify the failure of this technology to snare our heroes and stamp out the Rebellion? In this episode, Wired security reporter Lily Hay Newman joins Eric and Grace to discuss the depiction of surveillance in Star Wars. We discuss how the franchise has to adhere to its roots in the technological imagination of the 1970s, how the scale of the galaxy and the complexity of the Imperial bureaucracy might undermine an effective panopticon, and how mod parlors and other tricks can defeat surveillance. Plus, Grace and Eric offer some creative explanations for why Imperial security cameras aren't constantly alerting Darth Vader to Luke Skywalker's location.

TikTok's influence is expanding well beyond the social sphere. The app is increasingly being used for the types of internet searches one would normally rely on a web search engine for. The video-based social app might not seem like the best place to find answers to your burning questions, but many users have made it their tool of choice for finding bars and restaurants to visit, movies to watch, or clothes to wear. It's a trend that has companies like Google more than a little concerned. The popularity of the app has also raised the hackles of US lawmakers, who have cited security concerns about the app and have even introduced legislation calling for a wholesale national TikTok ban. This week on Gadget Lab, WIRED's Lily Hay Newman joins us to discuss why all the kids are using TikTok for search and dig into whether the app's ownership by a Chinese firm really makes it a national security threat. Show Notes Read Lauren's story about her week of using TikTok for search. Here's Lily on TikTok's security threats. Follow all of WIRED's coverage of TikTok. Recommendations Lily recommends the essay collection "You Are Not Expected to Understand This": How 26 Lines of Code Changed the World, edited by Torie Bosch. Lauren recommends the book I'm Glad My Mom Died by Jennette McCurdy. Mike recommends the classic seasons of the show Doctor Who, which you can find on BritBox. Lily Newman can be found on Twitter @lilyhnewman. Lauren Goode is @LaurenGoode. Michael Calore is @snackfight. Bling the main hotline at @GadgetLab. The show is produced by Boone Ashworth (@booneashworth). Our theme music is by Solar Keys. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Twitter doesn't work like it used to. Under new ownership, the site is operating with half its usual staff and an entirely new set of executive pressures. As a result, Twitter has become a more unstable platform. As features break, security measures lapse, and personnel struggle to keep up, Twitter is likely to also become more vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. This week on Gadget Lab, WIRED security writer Lily Hay Newman joins the show to talk about what could happen if Twitter gets breached by hackers. Show Notes Read Lily's story about the problems with Twitter's SMS two-factor authentication. Read all of WIRED's recent Twitter coverage. Recommendations Lily recommends Wicked protein bars, specifically the maple flavor. Lauren recommends Andy Greenberg's book Tracers in the Dark. (WIRED has published a few excerpts.) Mike recommends the show The Sandman on Netflix. Lily Newman can be found on Twitter @lilyhnewman. Lauren Goode is @LaurenGoode. Michael Calore is @snackfight. Bling the main hotline at @GadgetLab. The show is produced by Boone Ashworth (@booneashworth). Our theme music is by Solar Keys. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Farming has gotten quite tech-savvy. These days, there are all sorts of Wi-Fi-enabled, app-controlled, and autonomously piloted machines out there doing the tilling and harvesting. The biggest player in the high-tech farming field is John Deere, a company which keeps very tight control over who can modify or repair its tractors and other farm equipment. The company's policies have drawn ire from advocates in the right-to-repair movement, who think that if you buy something, you should be able to fix it, upgrade it, or modify it without having to jump through the company's hoops. Recently, a white-hat hacker discovered a way to jailbreak John Deere tractors, allowing all sorts of non-company sanctioned access to the devices. It's a big move that has implications for the security of the food supply and for the repairability of devices across the world. This week on Gadget Lab, WIRED senior writer Lily Hay Newman joins us to discuss the latest John Deere hack and what it means for the broader right-to-repair movement. Show Notes Read Lily's story about the jailbreak of John Deere tractors. Read Andy Greenberg's story about getting hacked while driving a Jeep at 70 mph. Here's Lily on what happened when a ransomware attack hit JBS meat processing facilities. Follow all of WIRED's security and right-to-repair coverage. Recommendations Lily recommends wearing N95 masks, in particular the very stylish Kimberly Clark duckbill mask. Lauren recommends the New Yorker interview with Ocean Vuong, author of poetry collection Night Sky with Wounds and the novel On Earth We're Briefly Gorgeous. Mike recommends the music of Patrice Rushen. Lily Newman can be found on Twitter @lilyhnewman. Lauren Goode is @LaurenGoode. Michael Calore is @snackfight. Bling the main hotline at @GadgetLab. The show is produced by Boone Ashworth (@booneashworth). Our theme music is by Solar Keys. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

You're listening to Lingo Phoenix's word of the day for March 2. Today's word is collaboration, spelled c-o-l-l-a-b-o-r-a-t-i-o-n. The stress mark in this word falls on the fourth syllable. col‧lab‧o‧ra‧tion /kəˌlæbəˈreɪʃən/ ●○○ noun the situation of two or more people working together to create or achieve the same thing Here's the word used in a sentence: The new airport is a collaboration between two of the best architects in the country. The two playwrights worked in close collaboration (with each other) on the script. col‧lab‧o‧rate /kəˈlæbəreɪt/ ●○○ verb [intransitive] The two nations are collaborating on several satellite projects. He was suspected of collaborating with the occupying army. Getting groups like the NRA and ACLU to collaborate on governing a national gun registry may seem truly outlandish. — Lily Hay Newman, Wired, "This Encrypted Gun Registry Might Bridge a Partisan Divide," 29 Jan. 2021 The Latin prefix com-, meaning "with, together, or jointly," is a bit of a chameleon - it has a tricky habit of changing its appearance depending on what it's next to. If the word it precedes begins with "l," "com-" becomes "col-." In the case of collaborate, com- teamed up with laborare ("to labor") to form Late Latin collaborare ("to labor together"). Colleague, collect, and collide are a few more examples of the "com-" to "col-" transformation. Other descendants of laborare in English include elaborate,- _laboratory, and labor itself. —merriam-webster.com With your word of the day, I'm Mohammad Golpayegani. Join our Telegram channel @lingophoenix to make sure you never miss an episode of Lingo Phoenix's Word of the Day.

Air Date 4/2/2022 Today we take a look at the current iteration of the cynical culture wars being waged by conservative Republicans against LGBTQ kids for political gain. The current wave of anti-trans and anti-gay legislation sprouting across the country is not about protecting kids and is absolutely nothing new. Be part of the show! Leave us a message at 202-999-3991 or email Jay@BestOfTheLeft.com  Transcript Join our Discord community! (What's Discord?) BestOfTheLeft.com/Support (Get AD FREE Shows and Bonus Content) Check out Democracy Decoded where you get your podcasts! SHOW NOTES Ch. 1: Andy Greenberg - Longform - Air Date 12-11-19 Andy Greenberg is a senior writer for Wired. His new book is Sandworm. “I kind of knew I was never going to get access to Sandworm, which is the title of the book - so it was all about drawing a picture around this invisible monster.” Ch. 2: How America's gas got hacked - Today, Explained - Air Date 5-12-21 The largest-known ransomware attack on American energy infrastructure is driving up gas prices and creating shortages. Wired's Lily Hay Newman says Colonial Pipeline might be a turning point for cybersecurity. Ch. 3: Is Russia at War with the West? Part 1 - The Inquiry - Air Date 11-21-18 There are currently a number of serious allegations made in the West against Russia. They include the attempted murder of the former spy Sergei Skripal on British soil; interference in the 2016 US election; the hacking of the American electricity grid. Ch. 4: How prepared is the U.S. to fend off cyber warfare? Better at offense than defense, author says - PBS NewsHour - Air Date 8-6-18 Sanger joins Judy Woodruff to discuss the threats and realities, how the U.S. wages cyber warfare, and how prepared the U.S. is to stop attacks. Ch. 5: Is Russia at War with the West? Part 2 - The Inquiry - Air Date 11-21-18 Ch. 6: Russia Perfected Its Cyberwarfare In Ukraine — America Could Pay The Price - Think | NBC News - Air Date 11-23-19 Russia has been practicing cyberwar in a real-life test lab — Ukraine. Andy Greenberg, author of 'Sandworm', recounts how Russia went from repeatedly shutting down Ukraine's infrastructure to unleashing worms that caused billions of dollars in damage. Ch. 7: Is World War III Already Here? - Your Undivided Attention - Air Date 1-3-22 Warfare has changed so fundamentally, that we're currently in a war we don't even recognize. It's the war that Russia, China, and other hostile foreign actors are fighting against us — weaponizing social media to undermine our faith in each other MEMBERS-ONLY BONUS CLIP(S) Ch. 8: The Hackers Who Took Down the Colonial Pipeline - What Next: TBD | Tech, power, and the future - Air Date 5-21-21 Last week, a hacker group called DarkSide shut down the Colonial Pipeline, which supplies 45 percent of the fuel consumed on the East Coast. Gas prices skyrocketed, people started hoarding gas, and DarkSide walked away with over $4 million in Bitcoin. VOICEMAILS Ch. 9: Puberty blockers experimental? - Maria in Pennsylvania FINAL COMMENTS Ch. 10: Final comments on the deception and logical fallacies at the heart of critiques of gender affirming care MUSIC (Blue Dot Sessions): Opening Theme: Loving Acoustic Instrumental by John Douglas Orr  Voicemail Music: Low Key Lost Feeling Electro by Alex Stinnent Closing Music: Upbeat Laid Back Indie Rock by Alex Stinnent   Produced by Jay! Tomlinson Visit us at BestOfTheLeft.com Listen Anywhere! BestOfTheLeft.com/Listen Listen Anywhere! Follow at Twitter.com/BestOfTheLeft Like at Facebook.com/BestOfTheLeft Contact me directly at Jay@BestOfTheLeft.com

Even if you aren't familiar with Okta, you've probably used it. The digital login system is used by thousands of companies across the world to manage employee logins to various cloud services. Which makes it a real problem when that system, and all that login info, gets hacked. This week on Gadget Lab, WIRED senior writer Lily Hay Newman joins the show to tell us about the group behind the recent Okta hack, how the hackers took control of such a vast system, and what happened in the aftermath. Show Notes:  Read all Lily's stories about the Lapsus$ Okta hack. This episode was recorded and scheduled shortly before news broke that two teenagers in the UK have been charged in connection with the hacks. Recommendations:  Lily recommends setting up two-factor authentication on all your services. (Here's how!) Mike recommends the podcast Poog with Kate Berlant and Jacqueline Novak. Lily Hay Newman can be found on Twitter @lilyhnewman. Michael Calore is @snackfight. Lauren Goode is @LaurenGoode. Bling the main hotline at @GadgetLab. The show is produced by Boone Ashworth (@booneashworth). Our theme music is by Solar Keys. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Whether it's compromised emails, phishing attacks, ransomware or more, IT security risks are a key concern for businesses today. When might passwords disappear in favor of biometrics? What is “smishing” and how could it impact you? In this episode, WIRED magazine senior writer Lily Hay Newman shares her expertise on trends happening in the field of information security and digital privacy, and why she advocates disclosing data breaches to improve IT safety for all businesses.  Topics include: 2:36 - The tenor of tech reporting 7:28 - Why passwords are problematic 10:26 - Vulnerabilities in multi-factor authentication 15:29 - Biometrics can still carry risk 22:22 - Why reporting ransomware attacks is wise 26:55 - Compromised emails are top concern 28:48 -"Smishing" a new threat 32:05 - Reducing your personal "attack surface" Resources: How can your Small Business improve your data security? Learn more at with our article "What is Cyber Security and What Does it Mean for Your Business?" at www.paychex.com/articles/management/cyber-security-and-a-secure-business. Concerned how to protect your business data while employees work from home? Find tips at: www.paychex.com/articles/management/cyber-security-tips-working-from-home. Send us topics and guests you'd like to hear at payx.me/thrivetopics. DISCLAIMER: The information presented in this podcast, and that is further provided by the presenter, should not be considered legal or accounting advice, and should not substitute for legal, accounting, or other professional advice in which the facts and circumstances may warrant. We encourage you to consult legal counsel as it pertains to your own unique situation(s) and/or with any specific legal questions you may have.

This week, Hurricane Ida swept through the southern US, hitting Louisiana and parts of Mississippi especially hard. The storm disabled the power grid across Louisiana, including heavily populated areas like New Orleans, and officials say it could be weeks before power is fully restored. It's not the first disaster to reveal how woefully unprepared our infrastructure is for weathering disasters—and it won't be the last. This week on Gadget Lab, we talk with WIRED senior writer Lily Hay Newman about what caused the power problems in New Orleans, and how humanity can prepare for unexpected disasters (like solar flares) that might come in the near future. Show Notes:  Read Lily's story about the power outages in New Orleans. Also read her story about how solar storms could cause an internet apocalypse. Recommendations:  Lily recommends upgrading from your iPhone 6S (or earlier), since Apple is about to stop supporting security updates on older phones. Lauren recommends the August 31 episode of The New York Times' podcast The Daily, about America's final hours in Afghanistan. Mike recommends the show Justified, which you can watch on Hulu. Lily Newman can be found on Twitter @lilyhnewman. Lauren Goode is @LaurenGoode. Michael Calore is @snackfight. Bling the main hotline at @GadgetLab. The show is produced by Boone Ashworth (@booneashworth). Our theme music is by Solar Keys. If you have feedback about the show, or just want to enter to win a $50 gift card, take our brief listener survey here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Congress has conducted at least eleven bipartisan hearings to investigate the security failures that permitted a mob of American citizens to riot inside the Capitol Building and successfully disrupt Congress while they certified the 2020 election results on January 6, 2021. In this episode, hear key highlights pulled from over 30 hours of testimony to understand exactly what happened that day. Executive Producer: Forrest Pttman Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Click here to contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Click here to support Congressional Dish for each episode via Patreon Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536 Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes Q: Into the Storm, HBO CD226: Lame Duck Bills H.R.1090 - District of Columbia National Guard Home Rule Act S.964 - Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2021 H.R.4192 - Confronting the Threat of Domestic Terrorism Act S.2043 - Jabara-Heyer NO HATE Act H.R.4187 - Domestic Terrorism Penalties Act of 2019 Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act U.S. Department of the Treasury Articles/Documents Article: 587 people have been charged in the Capitol insurrection so far. This searchable table shows them all. by Madison Hall, Skye Gould, Rebecca Harrington, Jacob Shamsian, Azmi Haroun, Taylor Ardrey, and Erin Snodgrass, Insider, July 23, 2021 Article: Tampa man, 20, admits intending to block Congress with Oath Keepers in new Capitol riot guilty plea by The Washington Post, July 20, 2021 Article: Tampa man, 20, admits intending to block Congress with Oath Keepers in new Capitol riot guilty plea by The Washington Post, July 19, 2021 Article: What were the Capitol rioters thinking on Jan. 6? by The Washington Post, July 19, 2021 Article: “You're Gonna Have a Fucking War”: Mark Milley's Fight to Stop Trump from Striking Iran by Susan B. Glasser, The New Yorker, July 15, 2021 Article: To Trump's hard-core supporters, his rallies weren't politics. They were life. by The Washington Post, July 15, 2021 Article: Michael Flynn posts video featuring QAnon slogans By Marshall Cohen, CNN, July 7, 2021 Article: Latest alleged Oath Keeper arrested in Capitol riot turned over body armor and firearm by The Washington Post, July 2, 2021 Article: ‘Zip Tie Guy' and His Mother Plead Not Guilty to New Charges in U.S. Capitol Siege by Aaron Keller, Law & Crime, June 23, 2021 Article: Man charged with bringing molotov cocktails to Capitol on Jan. 6 has Texas militia ties, contacted Ted Cruz's office, court papers allege by The Washington Post, May 24, 2021 Article: Maryland man, indicted for bringing gun to Capitol riot, could face decades in prison by Jordan Fischer, Eric Flack, Stephanie Wilson, WUSA9, May 18, 2021 Article: DC medical examiner confirms causes of death of 4 who died in Jan. 6 Capitol riot By Kelli Dugan, Cox Media Group National Content Desk, 11NEWS, April 7, 2021 Article: The lawyer for the 'QAnon Shaman' wants to use Trump's speech before the insurrection as part of his defense by Jacob Shamsian, Insider, March 1, 2021 Two Members of the Proud Boys Indicted for Conspiracy, Other Charges Related to the Jan. 6 Riots By United States Department of Justice, January 29, 2021 Article: Former Army captain arrested after live-streaming Capitol riot By Kyle Rempfer, AirForceTimes, January 22, 2021 Article: 'Trump said I could': One possible legal defense for accused rioters. By Teri Kanefield and Mark Reichel, The Washington Post, January 11, 2021 Article: Did 5 People Die During Jan. 6 Capitol Riot? by Alex Kasprak, Snopes, January 7, 2021 Article: FBI focuses on whether some Capitol rioters intended to harm lawmakers or take hostages by The Washington Post, January 7, 2021 Article: Trump's supporters think they're being patriotic. And that's the problem. by Christine Adams, The Washington Post, January 7, 2021 Article: Capitol riot: Army vet who tended bar accused by FBI of conspiring in insurrection  by AMSNBS, 2021 Article: All 10 living former defense secretaries: Involving the military in election disputes would cross into dangerous territory by The Washington Post, January 3, 2021 Article: 'I just want to find 11,780 votes': In extraordinary hour-long call, Trump pressures Georgia secretary of state to recalculate the vote in his favor by The Washington Post, January 3, 2021 Article: Capitol riots by The Washington Post, 2021 Article: Another MAGA Rally To Take Place In D.C. On The Day Congress Declares Election Results by Matt Blitz, WAMU 88.5, November 27, 2020 Article: Trump's Election Attack Ends December 14—Whether He Knows It or Not by Lily Hay Newman, Wired, November 27, 2020 Additional Resources U.S.A. v. Mark Grods U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, June 28, 2021 Defense Timeline for January 6th Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of the Security, Planning and Response Failures on January 6 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Committee on Rules and Administration U.S.A. v. Christopher Alberts U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, January 27, 2021 U.S.A. v. Lonnie Leroy Coffman U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, January 11, 2021 U.S.A. v. Ethan Nordean, Joseph Biggs, Zachary Rehl and Charles Donohue U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, January 8, 2021 Video: Seeking Information: Pipe Bombs in Washington, D.C. F.B.I., January 5, 2021 Sound Clip Sources Hearing: USCP OVERSIGHT FOLLOWING JANUARY 6 ATTACK, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, June 16, 2021 Watch on C-SPAN Witnesses: Michael Bolton Inspector General of the US Capitol Police Transcript: 36:40 Michael Bolton: To me the biggest failure is that because we have allowed certain elements within the Capitol Police to be autonomous, they conduct their own training, okay? That's the issue. Whereas you if you have a Training Services Bureau and let's call it an office of training that is fully incorporated, they handle all the training they conducted. They make sure you get the training, they hold your officials accountable, your people doing your training, guess what, we're sending a letter to the chief and they can no longer work until they get required or what have you. Hearing: The Capitol Insurrection: Unexplained Delays and Unanswered Questions (Part II), House Committee on Oversight and Reform, June 15, 2021 Watch on Youtube Witnesses: Lt. General Walter Piatt Director of the Army Staff General Charles Flynn Commanding General of the US Army Pacific Chris Wray FBI Director Transcript: 30:41 Lt. General Walter Piatt: My involvement with our response to this emergency began shortly after entering the Secretary of the Army's office at 2:20pm to provide a report of a suspicious package. While I was there, a panic call came in reporting several explosions in the city. To understand the situation, to indentify, what was needed from the army Secretary McCarthy convened a conference call. During this call DC and Capitol authorities frantically requested urgent and immediate support to the Capitol. We all immediately understood the gravity of the situation. Secretary McCarthy went down the hall to seek approval from the Acting Secretary of Defense. Before departing, she directed me to have the staff prepare a response. I communicated this on the conference call. But those are more and more convinced that I was denying their request, which I did not have the authority to do. Despite clearly stating three times that we are not denying your request, we need to prepare a plan for when the Secretary of the Army gains approval. 1:46:02 General Charles Flynn: There's four things in planning that we could have done. And we should have done. The first one there should have been clearly a lead federal agency designated. The second one is we should have had an integrated security plan. The third one is and much of this has been talked about already is information and intelligence sharing on criminal activities before the sixth of January. And then the fourth one would have been, we should have pre-federalized certain National Guard forces so that they could have immediately been moved to the Capitol and had those authorities in place before this happened. 2:09:30 Rep. Kweisi Mfume (MD): So that's what we are trying to do, keep our republic and to keep it from those who tried to overthrow this government who wanted to kill members of Congress, who wanted to hang Mike Pence. 2:43:37 Rep. Michael Cloud (TX): You mentioned domestic terrorism that this would qualify as that, would the riots that we saw across the cities for nights and nights and weeks and weeks on even months on end, qualify as domestic terrorism as well? Chris Wray: We've been treating both as domestic terrorism and investigating both through our Joint Terrorism Task Force. 2:51:19 Chris Wray: Among the things that we've taken away from this experience are a few. One, as you heard me say in response to an earlier question, we need to develop better human sources, right, because if we can get better human sources, then we can better separate the wheat from the chaff in social media. Two, we need better data analytics. The volume, as you said, the volume of this stuff is, is just massive, and the ability to have the right tools to get through it and sift through it in a way that is, again, separating the wheat from the chaff is key. And then the third point that I would make is we are rapidly having to contend with the issue of encryption. So what I mean by that is, yes, there might be chatter on social media. But then what we have found and this is true in relation to January 6th, in spades, but it was also true over the summer in some of the violence that occurred there. Individuals will switch over to encrypted platforms for the really significant, really revealing communications. And so we've got to figure out a way to get into those communications or we're going to be constantly playing catch up in our effort to separate as I said, the wheat from the chaff on social media. 3:01:00 Chris Wray: We consider the attack on capital on January 6 to be a form of domestic terrorism. 3:16:00 Chris Wray: As for social media, I think there's, there's it's understandable that there's a lot of confusion on this subject we do not we have very specific policies that Ben at the Department for a long time that govern our ability to use social media and when we have an authorized purpose and proper predication, there's a lot of things we can do on social media. And we do do and we aggressively do but what we can't do, what we can't do on social media is without proper predication, and an authorized purpose, just monitor, just in case on social media. Now, if the policies should be changed to reflect that, that might be one of the important lessons learned coming out of this whole experience. But that's not something that that currently the FBI has the either the authority or certainly the resources frankly, to do. 4:06:00 Rep. Pat Fallon (TX): Has anyone been charged with inciting an insurrection? Chris Wray: I think I responded to an earlier question. I don't believe that that has been one of the charges us so far. But again, with that many cases, I want to build a little room for the fact that I might not know all the cases. Rep. Pat Fallon (TX): So right as of right now, the answer would be no, fair to say? Chris Wray: That's my understanding. Rep. Pat Fallon (TX): Okay. Has anybody been charged with sedition to your knowledge? Chris Wray: Same answer. Rep. Pat Fallon (TX): Okay. No, again, Has anybody been charged with treason? Chris Wray: I don't believe so. Rep. Pat Fallon (TX): Okay, has anyone been charged with illegal possession of a firearm inside the Capitol? On that day? Chris Wray: I believe there has been at least one instance of someone arrested with a firearm in the Capitol. And there have been a number of arrests of individuals either en route to the Capitol or near the Capitol for the for the siege. 4:11:00 Rep. James Comer (KY): On December 31, Mayor browser requested DC National Guard assistance with the planned protest for January fifth and sixth, correct? Lt. General Walter Piatt: Correct, sir. Rep. James Comer (KY):And was that request for assistant ultimately approved by the Secretary of Army? Lt. General Walter Piatt: It was approved by the Acting Secretary of Defense as well. Rep. James Comer (KY):Were restrictions placed on that authority upon the request of Mayor browser and if so, what were those restrictions? Lt. General Walter Piatt: She had requested that they be unarmed and it did not take a place in any law enforcement activities. Hearing: The Capitol Insurrection: Unexplained Delays and Unanswered Questions, Committee on Oversight and Reform, May 12, 2021 Watch on Youtube Witnesses: Chris Miller Former Acting Secretary of Defense Robert Contee Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department Transcript: 00:22 Rep. Carolyn Maloney (NY): Today the committee will examine one of the darkest days in our nation's history. The January 6th insurrection at the United States Capitol. On that day, a violent mob incited by shameless lies told by a defeated president launched the worst attack on our republic since the Civil War. 00:42 Rep. Carolyn Maloney (NY): We watched as the temple of our democracy, a building whereas familiar with as our own homes, was overrun by a mob bent on murdering the Vice President and members of Congress. 21:21 Chris Miller: I want to remind you and the American public that during that time, there was irresponsible commentary by the media about a possible military coup or that advisors the president were advocating the declaration of martial law. I was also very cognizant of the fears and concerns about the prior use of the military in June 2020 response to protests in the White House. And just before the electoral college certification 10 former Secretaries of Defense signed an op-ed published in The Washington Post warning of the dangers of politicizing inappropriately using the military. No such thing was going to occur and my watch, but these concerns and hysteria about them nonetheless factored into my decisions regarding the appropriate and limited use of our armed forces to support civilian law enforcement during the electoral college certification. My obligation to the nation was to prevent a constitutional crisis. Historically, military responses to domestic protests have resulted in violations of American civil rights and even in the case the Kent State protests of the Vietnam War, tragic deaths. In short, I fervently believe the military should not be utilized in such scenarios, other than as a last resort, and only when all other assets had been expended. 26:02 Chris Miller: I stand by every decision I made on January 6th and the following days. I want to emphasize that our nation's armed forces are to be deployed for domestic law enforcement only when all civilian assets are expended and only as the absolute last resort. To use them for domestic law enforcement in any other manner is contrary to the constitution and a threat to the Republic. I ask you this consider what the response in Congress in the media had been if I had unilaterally deployed 1000s of troops into Washington DC that morning against the Express wishes of the Mayor and the Capitol Police who indicated they were prepared. 40:52 Rep. Carolyn Maloney (NY): Mr. Miller, you were the Acting Secretary of Defense on January 6th, did President Trump as the commander in chief of the US Armed Forces call you during the January 6 attack to ensure the capital was being secured? Mr. Miller? Chris Miller: No, I had all the authority I needed from the president to fulfill my constitutional duties. Rep. Carolyn Maloney (NY): Did you speak with President Trump at all as the attack was unfolding? Chris Miller: On January 6th? yes. Chris Miller: No, I did not. I didn't need to I had all the authority I needed and knew what had to happen. I knew what had to happen. Rep. Carolyn Maloney (NY): Did you speak with Vice President Pence during the attack? Yes or no? Chris Miller: Yes. Rep. Carolyn Maloney (NY): According to a defense department timeline, it was Vice President Pence and not President Trump, who called during the siege to say the Capitol was not secure. And to give you the direction to quote, 'clear the Capitol.' What specifically did Vice President Pence say to you that day? Chris Miller: Vice President's not in the chain of command, he did not direct me to clear the capital. I discussed very briefly with him the situation. He provided insights based on his presence there, and I notified him or I informed him that by that point, the District of Columbia National Guard was being fully mobilized and was in coordination with local and federal law enforcement to assist in clearing the Capitol. 1:05:28 Chris Miller: I think I'd like to modify my original assessment. Rep. Stephen Lynch (MA): Why am I not surprised about that? Chris Miller: Based on as Chief Contee said, we are getting more information by the day by the minute about what happened and the highlight some other observations that were made. It's clear now that there were organized... Although we're going to find out through the Department of Justice process in the law, and the legal system, it seems clear that there was some sort of conspiracy where there were organized assault elements that intended to assault the Capitol that day. Rep. Stephen Lynch (MA): Reclaiming my time, I'm just asking you the same question you've answered before. Did did the President's remarks incite members to march, the people in the crowd to march on the Capitol, or did they not? Chris Miller: Well, he clearly said offered that they should march on the Capitol. So it goes without saying that his statement resulted in that... Rep. Stephen Lynch (MA): Reclaiming my time. Let me just share with the committee what you have said before. This is your quote. This is your quote. What anyone? Would anybody have marched on the Capitol and tried to overrun the Capitol without the president speech? I think it's pretty much definitive. That would not have happened. Rep. Stephen Lynch (MA): I think now, I would say that this is not the unitary factor at all. What's that? Chris Miller: I would like to offer I have reassessed. It was not the unitary factor at all. There was no...it's seems clear there was an organized conspiracy with assault elements. Rep. Stephen Lynch (MA): In your testimony for today. Reclaiming my time again, for your written testimony for today. For today, this morning, you stated the following about the President's quote, I personally believe his comments encouraged the protesters that day. So this is that this is that there's a very recent reversal of your of your testimony. Chris Miller: Absolutely not. That's ridiculous. Rep. Stephen Lynch (MA): You're ridiculous. Chris Miller: Thank you for your, your thoughts. I also want to highlight... Rep. Stephen Lynch (MA): No wait a minute, reclaiming my time, reclaiming my time. 2:06:30 Rep. Glenn Grothman (WI): Has there been any progress made it all on on? Who would have put these bombs there? Robert Contee: No arrests have been made no suspects identified, working without partners on the federal side. There's been surveillance videos that have been released publicly showing that individual placing the pipe bombs, but no arrests have been made at this point. 3:01:05 Rep. Andrew Clyde (GA): Watching the TV footage of those who entered the Capitol and walked through Statuary Hall showed people in an orderly fashion staying between the stanchions and ropes, taking videos and pictures. You know, if you didn't know the TV footage was a video from January the sixth, you would actually think it was a normal tourist visit. 3:12:18 Sen. Hank Johnson (GA): Were you ordered to delay deployment of troops? Chris Miller: 110% Absolutely not. No, that is not the case. 4:41:42 Chris Miller: If we had a valid request and a necessary requests from your body, I guarantee you that the Department of Defense would have been there in strength as required. Rep. Mike Quigley (IL): So when you would acknowledge we lost the battle we lost for the first time since 1814... Chris Miller: Horrifying. Rep. Mike Quigley (IL): And it was everybody else's fault but DoD. Chris Miller: I absolutely disagree with the statement that it was... Rep. Mike Quigley (IL) I'm paraphrasing you the only way that makes sense when you say 'you wouldn't do anything differently, you wouldn't do anything differently.' Okay, that implies what I'm saying that it was everybody else's fault in your mind, because it was a catastrophic failure. Chris Miller: And I just had an obligation to protect and defend the Constitution and guarantee that the armed forces were used appropriately, and not in a manner that would be seen as extraconstitutional. Rep. Mike Quigley (IL) Look, the Constitution is not a treaty of surrender. It affords you the opportunity to do what's necessary to defend the people in the democracy of the United States. I mean, if looked upon the destruction afterwards, looking back, you say, 'well, at least I defended the Constitution' is another perverse way of looking at this. Nothing was DoDs fault. And at least you did, in your own mind, defend what you thought was right for the Constitution. Never mind how many people got hurt and how much damage was done to our government in the meantime. Chris Miller: I will absolutely take that on and take that as a compliment. Because the armed forces of the United States was completely prepared and ready to respond to any valid request from any department or agency or local or federal law enforcement office. Rep. Mike Quigley (IL) You lost and you don't have the Intellectual fortitude to own up to your part of the responsibility. And I get it, a lot of people screwed up, you're one of them. I yield scaled back. Madam Chairman. Chris Miller: I respectfully disagree in that. Rep. Mike Quigley (IL) I was in the room, you weren't. Hearing: State and Local Responses to Domestic Terrorism: The Attack on the U.S. Capitol and Beyond, House Committee on Homeland Security: Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism, March 24, 2021 Watch on Youtube Witnesses: Dana Nessel Attorney General, Michigan Aaron Ford Attorney General, Nevada John Chisholm District Attorney, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. Transcript: 07:19 Rep. Elissa Slotkin (MI): The post 9/11 era of security where the threats come from abroad is over. In the 20 years of the post 9/11 era, they came to an end on January 6th, the new reality is that we have to come to terms with is that it's our extremists here at home, seeking to explain internal divisions that pose the greatest threat. Hearing: JANUARY 6 ATTACK ON THE CAPITOL, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Committee on Rules and Administration, March 3, 2021 Day 2 (March 3, 2021) Day 2, Part 2 (March 3, 2021) Witnesses: Robert Salesses Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and Global Security at the U.S. Department of Defense Major General William Walker Commanding General of the DC National Guard Jill Sanborn Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division Federal Bureau of Investigation U.S. Department of Justice Transcript: 06:42 Sen. Gary Peters (MI): But the January 6 attack must mark a turning point. There can be no question that the domestic terrorist threat and cluding violence driven by white supremacy and anti government groups is the gravest terrorist threat to our homeland security. Moving forward, the FBI, which is tasked with leading our counterterrorism efforts, and the Department of Homeland Security, which ensures that state and local law enforcement understands the threats that American communities face must address this deadly threat with the same focus and resources and analytical rigor that they apply to foreign threats such as ISIS and Al Qaeda. 30:19 Robert Salesses: Over the weekend of January 2nd and third, my staff contacted the Secret Service, the Park Police, the marshal service, the FBI, the Capitol Police to determine if they planned to request DoD assistance. None of these law enforcement agencies indicated a need for DoD or DC National Guard Support. 30:45 Robert Salesses: After consultation with the Department of Justice, the Acting Secretary of Defense approved the DC government request for National Guard personnel to support 30 traffic control points and six metro stations from January 5th to the sixth. The Acting Secretary also authorized a 40 person quick reaction force to be readied at Joint Base Andrews. 31:17 Robert Salesses: On January 5, the Acting Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army received a letter from the mayor of DC, stating MPD is prepared and coordinated with its federal partners, namely the Park Police, the Capitol Police and the Secret Service. Based on these communications with federal and local civilian authorities DoD determined that no additional military support was required on January 5th, and 6th. 32:20 Robert Salesses: At approximately 2:30pm, the Secretary of the Army met with the Acting Secretary of Defense and other senior leaders of the Defense Department. After this meeting, the Acting Secretary of Defense determined that all available forces of the DC National Guard were required to reinforce the DC Metropolitan Police and the US Capitol Police and ordered the full mobilization of the DC National Guard at 3:04pm. 33:08 Robert Salesses: After reviewing the DC National Guard's missions, equipping and responsibilities to be performed at the Capitol Complex and supported the Metropolitan Police and Capitol Police, and conferring with the DC Metropolitan Police at their headquarters, at 4:10pm, the Secretary of the Army received the Acting Secretary of Defense's approval at 4:32 and ordered the DC National Guard forces to depart the armory for the Capitol Complex 49:59 Major General William Walker: The District of Columbia National Guard provides support to the Metropolitan Police Department, the United States Park Police, the United States Secret Service, and other federal and district law enforcement agencies in response to planned rallies, marches, protest, and other large scale first amendment activity on a routine basis. The standard component of such support is the stand up of a off site quick reaction for us, an element of guardsmen held in reserve with civil disturbance response equipment, helmets, shields, battons, etc. They are postured to quickly respond to an urgent and immediate need for assistance by civil authorities. The Secretary of the Army's January 5th letter to me withheld that authority for me to employ a quick reaction force. Additionally, the Secretary of the Army's memorandum to me required that a concept of operation be submitted to him before the employment of a quick reaction force. I found that requirement to be unusual, as was the requirement to seek approval to move guardsmen supporting the Metropolitan Police Department to move from one traffic control point to another. 54:50 Major General William Walker: So the memo was unusual in that it required me to seek authorization from the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense, to essentially even protect my guardsmen. So no civil disturbance equipment could be authorized, unless it was came from the Secretary of Defense, now the Secretary of the Army, to his credit, did tell me that I could have force protection equipment with the guardsmen. So we do have helmets. shin guards, vest, we did have that with us. But that came from the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary of Defense told me I needed his permission to to escalate to have that kind of protection. 55:50 Major General William Walker: What it says, without my personal authorization, the District of Columbia National Guard has not authorized the following to be issued weapons, ammunition bayonets, batons or ballistic protection equipment such as helmets and body armor. Now, again, to be clear, the Secretary of the Army told me to go ahead and issue that equipment. So we never were going to have weapons or ammunition and we no longer have bayonets. But we do have ballistic protection equipment, helmets body armor, and so I did have that with each guardsmen. 57:02 Major General William Walker: And at that time, Chief Conte and Chief Soon passionately pleaded for District of Columbia National Guard to get to the Capitol with all deliberate speed. So the Army senior leaders did not think that it'd look good. It would be a good optic, they further stated that it could incite the crowd. So their best military advice would be to the Secretary of the Army who could not get on the call. So we wanted the Secretary of the Army to join the call, but he was not available. We were told that he was with the Secretary of Defense and not available. But the Army Senior leadership, expressed to Chief Conte, Chief Sohn, Dr. Mitchell, the deputy mayor and others on the call, that it would not be their best military advice to have uniform guardsmen on the Capitol. 58:26 Sen. Gary Peters (MI): General Walker was the issue of optics ever brought up by army leadership when the DC National Guard was deployed during the summer of 2020. Was that discussed? Major General William Walker: It was never discussed. The week of June it was never discussed July 4, when we were supporting the city was never discussed August 28th when we supported the city. Sen. Gary Peters (MI): Did you think that was unusual? Major General William Walker: I did. 1:00:32 Major General William Walker: So I had them ready to go shortly after the phone call. So I brought, at 1500, I directed that the quick reaction for us that was based at Andrews Air Force Base, leave the base, get to the armory at all deliberate speed. I had a police escort bring them to the armory. They returned to the Armory in about 20 minutes. So we had them sitting there waiting. And then, in anticipation of a green light, a go, we put guardsmen on buses, we brought them inside the armory, so nobody would see them putting on the equipment and getting on the buses, and then we just waited to get the approval. And that's why we were able to get to the Capitol in about 18 minutes. Sen. Gary Peters (MI): What time were they on the buses Ready to go? Do you recall? Major General William Walker: By five o'clock, but at five o'clock, I decided, hey, you know, there's got to be an approval coming. So get on the buses, get the equipment on, get on the buses and just wait. And then a few minutes after that we did get the approval. I was on a secure video conference when the army leadership conveyed to me that the Secretary of Defense had authorized the employment of the National Guard at the Capitol. So my timeline has 1708, 5:08pm is when is when we wrote down that we had approval and read was about eight people in the office with me when I got that. Sen. Gary Peters (MI): How many guardsmen were ready. You said write a video earlier and they have gotten 155. So you could have sent 155 much, much earlier, what would have been the impact of sending those 155 right around that two o'clock timeframe? Major General William Walker: Well, based on my experience with the summer and I have 19 years, I have 39 years in the National Guard, and I was in the Florida guard Hurricane Andrew I've been involved in civil disturbances. So I believe that number could have made a difference. We could have helped extend the perimeter and help push back the crowd. 1:13:49 Robert Salesses: The only decision makers on the sixth of January were the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy. There was a chain of command from the Secretary of Defense, to Secretary McCarthy to General Walker. That was the chain of command. 1:15:39 Sen. Rob Portman (OH): This morning, you have testified that you received this letter from our secretary McCarthy on January 5, so just the day before the attack on the Capitol. In that letter, did Secretary McCarthy prohibit you from employing the National Guard's quick reaction force without his authorization? Major General William Walker: So I have the letter in front of me, and his letter does not but it is the Secretary of Defense says that I have to use it as a last resort. But the Secretary of the Army told me and it's, I have the letter that I couldn't not use the quick reaction force. It would it would he with I'll just read it. Yeah, 'I withhold authority to approve employment of the District of Columbia National Guard quick reaction force, and will do so only as a last resort, in response to a request from an appropriate civil authority. I will require a concept of operation prior to authorizing employment of a civil- of a quick reaction for it. 1:16:05 *Major General William Walker:** Now a quick reaction force normally is a command was tool to go help either a civilian agency, but more typically to help the National Guardsmen who are out there in need, need assistance. 1:16:58 Major General William Walker: Just to be clear, the Secretary of Defense said I could use it as a last resort, right. But the Secretary of the Army says that I could only use it after he gave me permission. And only then after a concept of operation. Sen. Rob Portman (OH): Right, and we talked about the chain of command earlier, so your chain of command is both of these gentlemen. In other words, you you didn't have the authority to deploy that quick reaction force based on either the letter or the earlier memo that went from the Secretary of Defense, Acting Secretary defense to the Secretary of the Army. Is that correct? Major General William Walker: Yes, sir. 1:17:23 Sen. Rob Portman (OH): Yeah, I also thought it was odd and I think you said was unusual and very prescriptive that the January 5th letter required the Secretary of the Army to approve the movement of deployed guardsmen from one traffic control point to another. Did you find that unusual? Major General William Walker: In 19 years I never had that before happened. So on that day, the Metropolitan Police as they would any other day requested that a traffic control point move one block, one block over. No traffic was where they were. So they wanted the traffic control point to move one block. I had to get permission. I told him, I'll get back to you. I contacted Lieutenant General Piatt, who contacted Secretary of the Army, I had to explain where that contractor control point was in relationship to the Capitol. And only then did I get permission to move the three national guardsmen supporting the Metropolitan... Sen. Rob Portman (OH): These are three unarmed National Guardsmen who are helping with traffic control in parts of that Metropolitan Police can do other things. And they were not permitted to move a block away without getting permission from the Secretary of the Army. Is that true? Major General William Walker: That's correct. Yeah. 1:18:52 Sen. Rob Portman (OH): That January 4th memorandum from Acting Secretary Miller to the Army Secretary required the personal approval of the Secretary of Defense for the National Guard to be issued riot gear. Is that correct? Major General William Walker: That's correct. But but the secretary army told me to go ahead and put it into vehicles. So I give him credit for that. 1:19:08 Major General William Walker: Normally for a safety and force protection matter, a commander would would be able to authorize his guardsmen to protect themselves with helmet and protective equipment. 1:25:57 Sen. Roy Blunt (MO): General Walker if the restrictions on your authorities hadn't been put in place by DoD, what would you have done when Chief Sund called you at 1:49 on January 6, with an urgent request for National Guards assistance? Major General William Walker: I would have immediately pulled all the guardsmen that were supporting the Metropolitan Police Department. They had the gear in the vehicles, I would have had them assemble in the armory, and then get on buses and go straight to the armory and report to the most ranking Capitol Police Officer they saw and take direction. And just let me add this, so one of my Lieutenant Colonel's on his own initiative, went to the Capitol, anticipating that we were going to be called, so he would have been there and he met with Deputy Chief Carroll of the Metropolitan Police Department who asked them, where is the National Guard? How come they're not here? And this Colonel said, Well, I'm sure they're coming. And I'm here to scout out where they're going to be when they get here. So that was the plan. I would have sent them there immediately. As soon as I hung up, my next call would have been to my subordinate commanders, get every single guardsman in this building, and everybody that's helping the Metropolitan Police. We mission them to the Capitol without delay. 1:32:11 Robert Salesses: That's when the Secretary of Defense made the decision at 4:32. As general Walker has pointed out, because I've seen all the timelines, he was not told that till 5:08 that's what Sen. Roy Blunt (MO): How's that possible? Mr. Salesses, do you think that the decision in the moment we were in was made at 4:32 and the person that had to be told, wasn't told for more than half an hour after the decision was made? Robert Salesses: Senator, I think that's that's an issue. 1:37:13 Sen. Maggie Hassann (NH): Looking back now, what might have made a difference in being able to move against some of those individuals sooner? Jill Sanborn: Yeah, I think that's great question. I think it's twofold. So it's the complexity of trying to gather the right intelligence that helps us predict indicators and warnings. And I spoke earlier about while there's a volume out there of rhetoric, trying to figure out that intent is very challenging for us in the intel community because it happens on private comms and encryption. So that's one aspect. And then the other aspect is of the people that we were investigating. So predicated investigations, we don't necessarily have the ability to mitigate the threat they might pose by travel if we don't have a charge. And so I think you're tracking that we were aware of some of our subjects that intended to come here. We took over action by going and talking them and trying to get them to not come and that worked in the majority of our already predicated cases. 1:49:46 To review the timeline at 1:49 Chief Sund contacted you. At 2:15 the capital was breached. I think in your testimony you said you had available 340 DC National Guard troops Is that correct? Major General William Walker: Sir, it was actually half of that. So, so half were on the streets helping the Metropolitan Police Department. The other half would have came in to relieve them, but we would have called them in to come in. 1:50:33 Sen. Ron Johnson (WI): How quickly could have you gotten? How many people to the Capitol? Major General William Walker: 20 minutes? Sen. Ron Johnson (WI): How many people? Major General William Walker: 150 1:56:47 Jill Sanborn: We're seeing people that got caught up in the moment got caught up in the sort of the energy etc. and made their way into the captain on those are probably the ones that you're seeing the charges simply of trespassing and then we're definitely seeing that portion that you're pointing out which is small groups and cells now being charged with conspiracy that coalesced either on site or even days or weeks prior and had sort of an intent that day and they to probably caught people up in the energy. PART 2 23:00 Jill Sanborn: The piece of information we received, again, was a non attributable posting to a message board. And so very raw, very unvetted, we actually didn't receive that information until late, very late in the afternoon on the fifth and almost into the evening. And because of our emphasis on we need any intelligence, even though it was raw and attributed, and unvetted, the Norfolk office quickly wrote that up specifically in a document following our processes to disseminate that. So a situation information report is for the intentional purpose of sharing that with state and local partners. Not only did they write that up, because they knew how important that was to get that information out into the hands of folks that might need it, our state and local partners, within 40 minutes, they sent an email to the Washington field office with that information and Washington Field Office also then followed up with an email to all Task Force officers. And so several different mechanisms were happened here. And you know, we'd like to use the phrase 'belt and suspenders' we didn't want to make sure that one method of communication failed. So we wrote it up in the document for dissemination. We sent it in an email to all taskforce officers in the National Capitol Region, and that does include Washington Metro as well as Capitol. But again, not wanting to rely on those two mechanisms only it was then briefed verbally in a command post and interagency command post that we were doing briefings every couple of hours, though, that every agency in that command post have what we call a common operating picture. Knowing what all of us knew at any given time, it was briefed at 8pm on the evening of the fifth, and then taking it one step further, because we didn't want to limit our aperture to just the National Capital Region, because there's collection opportunity out there for all state and local partners and federal partners to help us, we loaded that suspicious information report into what we call the Leap Portal. And that is accessible by all state and local partners. So we really tried in various ways to make sure that we did not rely on one communication mechanism and really tried to rely on several so that the information would get to the right people. 34:46 Sen. Rand Paul (KY): We can talk all we want about January sixth, but really it's the decision making leading up to that. Someone made a bad judgment call and we need to be better prepared. If we're gonna fix this in the future, it isn't about calling the National Guard out quicker. It's about having 1000 people standing there before the riot happens to the riot doesn't happen. Hearing: U.S. Capitol Police and House Sergeant at Arms, Security Failures on January 6, House Committee on Appropriations: Subcommittee on Legislative Branch, February 25, 2021 Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Timothy Blodgett Acting Sergeant at Arms; U.S. House of Representatives Yogananda D. Pittman, Acting Chief of Police, U.S. Capitol Police. Transcript: 09:11 ** Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler (CA):** The United States Capitol Police Force is not meant to be an army, expecting 1600 officers to hold back an unruly mob of eight to 10,000 people, many of whom were armed and had their own homemade explosive devices or had came with or weaponized, everyday items. It's not a position we should ever have to be in. 20:51 Yogananda D. Pittman: There's evidence that some of those who stormed the Capitol were organized. But there's also evidence that a large number were everyday Americans who took on a mob mentality because they were angry and desperate. It is the conduct of this latter group that the department was not prepared for. Hearing: Dollars Against Democracy: Domestic Terrorist Financing in the Aftermath of Insurrection, Committee on Financial Services, February 25, 2021 Watch on YouTube Witnesses Iman Boukadoum Senior Manager, The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights Lecia Brooks Executive Director of the Southern Poverty Law Center Daniel Glaser Global Head Jurisdictional Services and Head of Washington, DC Office at K2 Integrity Senior Advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies Board member at the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority Former Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Department of the Treasury Daniel Rogers Co-Founder and Chief Technical Officer at Global Disinformation Index Daveed Gertenstein-Ross CEO of Valens Global Transcript: 03:28 Rep. Jim Himes (CT): In the wake of the attacks of September 11th, we recast the entire federal government and worked feverishly to defund terrorist streams. To effectively disrupt domestic extremist groups, we need to better understand their financing. 03:54 Rep. Jim Himes (CT): Unlike ISIS, for example, these organizations are not pyramid shaped where funding comes from a handful of easily disruptable areas. An online fundraising drive for a legitimate charity, and one that helps support an extremist group can look very similar. 04:57 Rep. Jim Himes (CT): We need to conscientiously be mindful of the civil liberties concerns at play here. Unlike international extremist groups, law enforcement is constrained by the Constitution when dealing with domestic extremists, balancing the desire to give law enforcement the tools necessary to disrupt these groups with the need to respect the rights of all Americans and the Constitution to which we have all pledged an oath is essential. 05:36 Rep. Jim Himes (CT): While we all live through a brutal event on January 6th, undertaken by right wing extremists, no location on the political spectrum has a monopoly on extremism or violence. 10:08 Rep. Maxine Waters (CA): We're here against the backdrop of the January 6th insurrection. A deplorable yet predictable display of white supremacists such as the Proud Boys, the oathkeepers QAnon and others and nationalist violence incited by President Trump against the members of this body and against democracy itself. 12:51 Iman Boukadoum: Last month violent insurrection heavily fueled by white supremacy and white nationalism shocked the world. 13:52 Iman Boukadoum: We know, however, that even well intentioned national security laws are invariably weaponized against black, brown and Muslim communities. And that white nationalist violence is not prioritized making that policy failure the fundamental reason for what transpired on January 6th, not lack of legal authority. For this reason we oppose any legislation that would create new charges for domestic terrorism or any enhanced or additional criminal penalties. The federal government, including the Treasury Department, has many tools at its disposal to investigate. And also the FBI and DOJ have 50 statutes, at least 50 statutes and over a dozen criminal statutes, 50 terrorism related statutes, excuse me and over a dozen criminal statutes that they can use. They just need to use them to target white nationalist violence. 19:33 Lecia Brooks: Today, some white nationalist groups and personalities are raising funds through the distribution of propaganda itself. In November SPLC researchers reported that dozens of extremist groups were earning 1000s of dollars per month on a popular live streaming platform called D-Live. 20:21 Lecia Brooks: Crowdfunding is also being exploited by hate groups to earn money in this new decentralized landscape. Crowdfunding sites played a critical role in the capital insurrection, providing monetary support that allowed people to travel to Washington DC. They've also played a crucial role in raising hundreds of 1000s of dollars in legal fees for extremists. 20:43 Lecia Brooks: The violent insurrection at the US Capitol on January 6 should serve as a wake up call for Congress, the Biden administration, Internet companies, law enforcement and public officials at every level. 23:11 Daniel Glaser: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to talk about how the US government can employ similar tools and strategies against white nationalists and other domestic terrorist groups as it has employed against global jihadist groups over the past two decades. 23:33 Daniel Glaser: During my time at the Treasury Department, I fought to cut off funding to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and Hezbollah, as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bush Administration, and eventually as the Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing in the Obama Administration. My primary responsibility was to lead the design and implementation of strategies to attack the financial networks of these groups and other threats to our country's national security. And while we should never let down our guard with respect to those still potent terrorist organizations, it has become tragically clear that there are domestic extremist groups that in some ways present an even greater threat to our ideals and our democracy. We have the responsibility to target those groups with the same determination, creativity and sense of purpose that we displayed in the years following 9/11. 27:42 Daniel Glaser: Potential measures in Treasury's toolbox include the issuance of guidance to financial institutions on financial type policies, methodologies and red flags, the establishment of public private partnerships the use of information sharing authorities and the use of geographic targeting orders. Taken together these measures will strengthen the ability of financial institutions to identify, report and impede the financial activity of domestic extremist groups and will ensure that the US financial system is a hostile environment for these groups. 30:10 Daniel Rogers: These groups leverage the Internet as a primary means of disseminating their toxic ideologies and soliciting funds. One only needs to search Amazon or Etsy for the term q anon to uncover shirts, hats, mugs, books and other paraphernalia that both monetize and further popular popularized the domestic violent extremist threat. Images from that fateful day last month are rife with sweatshirts that say, Camp outfits that until recently were for sale on websites like Teespring and cafe press. As we speak at least 24 individuals indicted for their role in the January 6 insurrection, including eight members of the proud boys have used crowdfunding site gifts and go to raise nearly a quarter million dollars in donations. And it's not just about the money. This merchandise acts as a sort of team jersey that helps these groups recruit new members and form further hatred towards their targets. We analyze the digital footprints of 73 groups across 60 websites, and 225 social media accounts and their use of 54 different online fundraising mechanisms, including 47 payment platforms and five different cryptocurrencies, ultimately finding 191 instances of hate groups using online fundraising services to support their activities. The funding mechanisms including included both primary platforms like Amazon, intermediary platforms, such as Stripe or Shopify crowdfunding sites like GoFundMe, payments facilitators like PayPal, monetized content streaming services, such as YouTube, super chats, and cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin. All of these payment mechanisms were linked to websites or social media accounts on Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, telegram, LinkedIn, Pinterest, gab, picshoot and others. The sheer number of companies I just mentioned, is the first clue to the scale and the scope of the problem. 31:40 Daniel Rogers: We also found that a large fraction of the groups we studied have a tax exempt status with the IRS, a full 100% of anti muslim groups. 75% of anti-immigrant groups, and 70% of anti LGBTQ groups have 501-C-3 or 501-C-4 status. Over 1/3 of the militia groups that we identified, including the oathkeepers, whose leadership was recently indicted on charges related to January 6, have tax exempt status. This status gives them access to a whole spectrum of charity fundraising tools, from Facebook donations to amazon smile, to the point where most of the most common fundraising platform we identified across all of our data was Charity Navigator. 32:30 Daniel Glaser: I think it's important to remember that if you want to be able to use a cryptocurrency in the real economy, to any scale, it at some point doesn't need to be converted into actual fiat currency into dollars. That's the place where the Treasury Department does regulate cryptocurrencies. 42:10 Daniel Glaser: Cryptocurrency exchanges are regarded as money service businesses. They have full customer due diligence requirements. They have full money laundering program requirements, they have reporting requirements. The US Treasury Department just last month, issued a proposed rule relating to unhosted wallets of cryptocurrencies. And that's out for notice and comment. Right now. It addresses the particular issue of, of wallets that are not hosted on a particular exchange. And I think it's an important rule that's out there and I do encourage people to take a look at it, the comment period closes in May, and then hopefully, Treasury will be able to take regulatory action to close that particular vulnerability. 42:46 Rep. Jim Himes (CT): Mr. Glaser, you you, though suggested something new that I'd like to give you a maybe 30 seconds, 42 seconds I have left to elaborate on you said you were taught you were hopeful for sanctions like authorities against domestic actors. You did not to constitutional civil liberties concerns. But give us another 30 seconds on exactly what you mean. And perhaps most importantly, what sort of fourth amendment overlay should accompany such authority? Daniel Glaser: Well, thank you, thank you for the question. The fact is, the Treasury Department really does not have a lot of authority to go after purely domestic groups in the way that it goes after global terrorist organizations that simply doesn't have that authority. You could imagine an authority that does allow for the designation of domestic organizations, it would have to take into account that, the constitutional restrictions. When you look when you read the a lot of the court decisions, there's concerns could be addressed in the statute, there's concerns. A lot of the scrutiny is heightened because sanctions are usually accompanied with acid freezes. But you could imagine sanctions that don't involve asset freezes that involve transaction bounds that involve regulatory type of requirements that you see in Section 311 of the Patriot Act. So there's a variety of ways that both the due process standards could be raised from what we see in the global context. 44:37 Daniel Rogers: The days leading up to the insurrection, the oathkeepers founder Stuart Rhodes appeared on a podcast and solicited charitable donations to the oathkeepers Educational Fund. It can only be presumed that these funds which listeners were notably able to deduct from their federal taxes, went to transporting and lodging members of the group slated to participate in the ensuing riots. 46:06 Rep. French Hill (AZ): Daveed Gertenstein-Ross: In looking at the draft legislation that the majority noticed with this hearing, one bill stuck out to me and I think it's a good follow up for your from your most recent exchange. It seeks to amend title 31 to require the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a program to allow designated employees of financial institutions to access classified information related to terrorism, sedition, and insurrection. Now, over the past three congresses, we've talked about the concept of a fusion center, not unlike we do in monitoring cyber risk and cyber crimes for this terror finance arena. We've never been able to come ashore on it legislatively. So I found that interesting. However, I'm concerned that when you deputize bank employees without any oversight, as to how the information would be protected or if there's really even a need for that. 46:53 Rep. French Hill (AZ): Could you describe how banks share information with law enforcement today and how they provide feedback on how we might change these protocols or if they're if that protocol change is necessary. Daveed Gertenstein-Ross: Thank you ranking member, there are four primary ways that banks share information now. The first is suspicious activity reports or the SAR. Financial institutions have to file these documents with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network or FinCEN. When there's a suspected case of money laundering or fraud, the star is designed to monitor activity and finance related industries that are out of the ordinary are a precursor to illegal activity, or can threaten public safety. Second, there's law enforcement's 314 a power under the Patriot Act, in which obtains potential lead information from financial institutions via fincen. Third, law enforcement can use its subpoena power, if a court issues a subpoena pursuant to an investigation, or to an administrative proceeding and forth where there are blocked assets pursuant to OFAC authorities, sanctions or otherwise, banks are required to report block assets back to OFAC. The information sharing in my view is currently quite effective. Treasury in particular has a very strong relationship with the US financial institutions. 48:24 Rep. French Hill (AZ): On 314 in the Patriot Act, is that a place where we could, in a protected appropriate way make a change that relates to this domestic issue? Or is that, in your view, too challenging? Daveed Gertenstein-Ross: No, I think it's a place where you could definitely make a change. The 314-A process allows an investigator to canvass financial institutions for potential lead information that might otherwise never be uncovered. It's designed to allow disparate pieces of information to be identified, centralized and evaluated. So when law enforcement submits a request to Finicen, to get information from financial institutions, it has to submit a written certification that each individual or entity about which the information is sought is engaged in or reasonably suspected of engaging in terrorist activity or money laundering. I think that in some cases 314-A, may already be usable, but I think it's worth looking at the 314-A process to see if in this particular context, when you're looking at domestic violent extremism, as opposed to foreign terrorist organizations, there are some tweaks that would provide ability to get leads in this manner. 1:15:15 Iman Boukadoum: What we submit is that the material support for terrorism statute, as we know, there are two of them. There's one with an international Nexus that is required. And there's one that allows for investigating material support for terrorism, domestic terrorism, in particular, as defined in the patriot act with underlying statutes that allows for any crimes that take place within the United States that have no international nexus. And we believe that that second piece of material support for terrorism statute has been neglected and can be nicely used with the domestic terrorism definition as laid out in the Patriot Act. And we hope that statutory framework will be used to actually go after violent white nationalists and others. 1:50:25 Daniel Rogers: I think there are a number of regulatory fronts that all kind of go to the general problem of disinformation as a whole. And I don't know that we have the time to get into all of them here, but I think they, they certainly fall into three three big categories, with the one most relevant to today's discussion being this idea of platform government and platform liability, that, you know, our data is showing how what a key role, these sorts of platforms play in facilitating the activities of these groups. And the fact that the liability is so nebulous or non existent through things like Section 230 and whatnot, which what we found is that there's there's already policies in place against all of these hate and extremist groups, but they're just simply not enforced. And so updating that kind of platform liability to help drive enforcement I think is one of the key areas that that that we can focus on. Hearing: JANUARY 6 ATTACK ON THE CAPITOL, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Committee on Rules and Administration, February 23, 2021 Day 1 C-SPAN Witnesses Captain Carneysha Mendoza Field Commander of the United States Capitol Police Special Operations Division Robert Contee Acting Chief of Police for the Metropolitan Police Department Paul Irving Former Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives Michael Stenger Former Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper of the Senate Transcript: 27:11 Captain Carneysha Mendoza: On January 6th, we anticipated an event similar to the million MAGA March that took place on November 14th, where we would likely face groups fighting among one another. 39:21 Robert Contee: MPD is prohibited by federal law from entering the Capitol or its grounds to patrol, make arrests or served warrants without the consent request of the Capitol Police board. 39:32 Robert Contee: The President of the United States not the Mayor of the District of Columbia controls the DC National Guard. 39:57 Robert Contee: Since Mayor Bowser declared a public health emergency last March, the district has not issued permits for any large gatherings. Although the district and MPD take pride in facilitating the exercise of first amendment rights by all groups, regardless of their beliefs. None of the public gatherings on January 5th and sixth were issued permits by the city. 47:13 Steven Sund: The intelligence that we based our planning on indicated that the January six protests were expected to be similar to the previous MAGA rallies in 2020, which drew 10s of 1000s of participants. 55:33 Paul Irving: We began planning for the protests of January 6th in December 2020. The planning relied on what we understood to be credible intelligence provided by various state and federal agencies, including a special event assessment issued by the Capitol Police on January 3rd. The January 3rd assessment forecast at the pros tests were ‘expected to be similar to the previous million MAGA March rallies that had taken place in November and December 2020.' Every Capitol Police daily intelligence report between January 4 and January 6, including on January 6th forecast the chance of civil disobedience or arrest during the protests as remote to improbable. 56:29 Paul Irving: The Chiefs plan took on an all hands on deck approach whereby every available sworn Capitol Police employee with police powers was assigned to work on January 6th. That meant approximately 1200 Capitol Police officers were on site, including civil disturbance units and other tactical teams. I also understood that 125 National Guard troops were on notice to be standing by for a quick response. The Metropolitan Police Department was also on 12 hour shifts, with no officers on day off or leave. And they staged officers just north of the Capitol to provide immediate assistance if required. The plan was brief to multiple law enforcement partners. Based on the intelligence we all believed that the plan met the threat. 1:00:57 Steven Sund: I actually just in the last 24 hours, was informed by the department that they actually had received that report. It was received by what we call, it's one of our sworn members that's assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force, which is a task force with the FBI. They received it the evening of the fifth, reviewed it and then forwarded over to an official at the Intelligence Division over at the US Capitol Police Headquarters. Sen. Amy Klobuchar (MN): And so you hadn't seen it yourself? Steven Sund: No, ma'am. It did not go any further than that. Sen. Amy Klobuchar (MN): Okay. And then was it sent to the House and Senate Sergeant in Arms? I don't believe that went any farther than from over to the sergeant at the intelligence. Sen. Amy Klobuchar (MN): And Mr. Irving. Mr. Stanger, Do you did you get that report beforehand? Mr. Stanger, Did you get the report? Michael Stenger: No. Sen. Amy Klobuchar (MN): Okay, Mr. Irving? Paul Irving: I did not Sen. Amy Klobuchar (MN): Okay. 1:05:36 Sen. Klobuchar: Mr. Sund, you stated in your written testimony that you first made a request for the Capitol Police board to declare an emergency and authorized National Guard support on Monday January 4th, and that request was not granted. Steven Sund: That is correct, ma'am. 1:05:47 Sen. Klobuchar: Your testimony makes clear that the current structure of the Capitol Police corps resulted in delays in bringing in assistance from the National Guard. Would you agree with that? That's one of the things we want to look at. Steven Sund: Yes, ma'am. 1:06:02 Sen. Klobuchar: Do you think that changes are needed to make clear that the Capitol Police Chief has the authority to call in the National Guard? Steven Sund: I certainly do. I think in an exigent circumstances, there needs to be a streamlined process for the Capitol Chief of Police for the Capitol Police to have authority. 1:07:23 Sen. Klobuchar: Mr. Sund your written testimony states that you had no authority to request t

The largest-known ransomware attack on American energy infrastructure is driving up gas prices and creating shortages. Wired's Lily Hay Newman says Colonial Pipeline might be a turning point for cybersecurity. Transcript at vox.com/todayexplained. Support Today, Explained by making a financial contribution to Vox! bit.ly/givepodcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Facebook, Apple, and Google may have very different approaches to user privacy, but they do have something in common: All three companies are currently being investigated for antitrust violations. Facebook is being accused of allowing its market dominance to erode its data privacy protections. Apple and Google are being investigated, in part, for enforcing their own privacy safeguards at the expense of competitors—Apple because of the changes in iOS 14.5, and Google because of coming updates to its Chrome browser. It's a messy, complicated tangle of events. The situation also reveals the sphere of incredible power these companies operate in, where even tiny software changes can affect the data of billions of users. This week on Gadget Lab, WIRED cybersecurity writer Lily Hay Newman and WIRED politics writer Gilad Edelman join us to talk about how giant tech companies handle your privacy. Show Notes:  Read Lily’s story about ad tracking in iOS 14.5 here. Read Gilad’s story about how privacy and antitrust are on a collision course here. Read the New York Times story about the beef between Mark Zuckerburg and Tim Cook here. Recommendations:  Lily recommends hugs. Gilad recommends unbuttoning one more button on your shirt than you normally do. Lauren recommends the show Call My Agent. Mike recommends crushed calabrian chilis. Lily Hay Newman can be found on Twitter @lilyhnewman. Gilad Edelman is @GiladEdelman. Lauren Goode is @LaurenGoode. Michael Calore is @snackfight. Bling the main hotline at @GadgetLab. The show is produced by Boone Ashworth (@booneashworth). Our theme music is by Solar Keys. If you have feedback about the show, or just want to enter to win a $50 gift card, take our brief listener survey here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Last weekend, a user in a hacking forum published the personal data of about 500 million Facebook users: their email addresses, phone numbers, birthdays and more. In a blog post Tuesday, Facebook said the recent data leak wasn’t a hack, but was from “malicious actors” scraping and saving publicly available information in 2019. Meghan McCarty Carino speaks with Wired senior writer Lily Hay Newman. Even she has a hard time keeping track of all the data leaks from Facebook.

Last weekend, a user in a hacking forum published the personal data of about 500 million Facebook users: their email addresses, phone numbers, birthdays and more. In a blog post Tuesday, Facebook said the recent data leak wasn’t a hack, but was from “malicious actors” scraping and saving publicly available information in 2019. Meghan McCarty Carino speaks with Wired senior writer Lily Hay Newman. Even she has a hard time keeping track of all the data leaks from Facebook.

Last weekend, a user in a hacking forum published the personal data of about 500 million Facebook users: their email addresses, phone numbers, birthdays and more. In a blog post Tuesday, Facebook said the recent data leak wasn’t a hack, but was from “malicious actors” scraping and saving publicly available information in 2019. Meghan McCarty Carino speaks with Wired senior writer Lily Hay Newman. Even she has a hard time keeping track of all the data leaks from Facebook.

Last weekend, a user in a hacking forum published the personal data of about 500 million Facebook users: their email addresses, phone numbers, birthdays and more. In a blog post Tuesday, Facebook said the recent data leak wasn’t a hack, but was from “malicious actors” scraping and saving publicly available information in 2019. Meghan McCarty Carino speaks with Wired senior writer Lily Hay Newman. Even she has a hard time keeping track of all the data leaks from Facebook.

We knew it might be an Election Day unlike any other. But after last Tuesday, it soon became evident that this year’s US presidential race would culminate in an election week. On this week’s Get WIRED podcast, we talk to Gilad Edelman, Lily Hay Newman, and Emma Grey Ellis about why the forecasting polls were so wrong (again), how we know we can trust the election results, and why people keep spinning up conspiracy theories online. Also: Election Memes. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today, we’re going to talk about voting: how to do it safely and correctly, and efforts to assure that the results are accurate and that the election is conducted fairly. The 2020 election ends two weeks from tomorrow. More than 28 million people around the country - about 20% of eligible voters - have already cast their ballots, either in person, by mail, or by depositing them at official drop boxesas. Democrats have outvoted Republicans by a 2-1 margin in early voting, so far. For Maryland voters, tomorrow (Tuesday, Oct. 20) is the deadline to request a mail-in ballot online for the November election. Tom's first guest today is Nikki Charlson. She’s the Deputy Administrator at the Maryland State Board of Elections. She joins us on Zoom to explain what Maryland voters need to know about mail-in balloting, early in-person voting and election-day balloting... President Trump, Attorney General Bill Barr and a long list of Republican political leaders have been warning for months that the heavy reliance on mail-in balloting because of the pandemic this election season is inviting massive voter fraud. As a result, the President has said, the election results might not be legitimate. Tom's next guest is Lily Hay Newman, a senior writer at WIRED Magazine, covering information security, digital privacy, and hacking. Her piece in this month’s WIRED -- called How We’ll Know the Election Wasn’t Rigged -- shows that fraud is the last thing absentee voters need to worry about. Lily Hay Newman joins Tom on Zoom… In a remarkable break with norms and traditions, President Trump has repeatedly suggested that he might not accept the results of the November 3rd election. Such a scenario has raised widespread alarm that the prospects of a peaceful transfer of presidential power and the democratic process itself could be threatened. In response, a broad array of more than 100 grassroot groups, from Indivisible to Move On.org and Republicans for Rule of Law have formed a coalition they call Protect the Results. It’s mobilizing thousands of people to counter any illegitimate challenges to the election outcome. One of the leaders of the coalition is Sean Eldridge, the founder and executive director of Stand Up America, a pro-democracy and voting rights group. He is Tom's final guest today, and he joins us on Zoom. If you still have questions about how to vote, and about some of the candidates and issues on the ballot, come to WYPR.ORG and check out our WYPR Voting Guide.

Craig discusses PCI DSS Compliance in businesses and the increasing problem with Android ransomware. For more tech tips, news, and updates, visit - CraigPeterson.com --- Trojan Malware Targets Trump Supporters Nmap 7.90 released: New fingerprints, NSE scripts, and Npcap 1.0.0 Tyler Technologies finally paid the ransom to receive the decryption key 5G in the US averages 51Mbps while other countries hit hundreds of megabits Apple’s T2 security chip has an unfixable flaw Verizon Payment Security Report is a Wake-up Call: Time to Refocus on PCI DSS Compliance Android Ransomware Has Picked Up Some Ominous New Trick --- Automated Machine-Generated Transcript: Craig Peterson: [00:00:00] If you have a business that takes credit cards if you. Ever go into a business or use a business online that takes credit cards. There are some special rules that you need to follow called the PCI standards. We'll talk about it. Hi, welcome back. This is Craig Peterson here. Verizon. I'm not sure if you've seen these before, but Verizon has security reports. It has a number of different reports and they tend to all come out annually and here within the last couple of weeks, Verizon released their payment security report for this year,. It is an annual report and it's having a look at how organizations are maintaining compliance with something called the payment card industry data security standard, or PCI DSS. Now we have a client I'm thinking of right now that's a small a doctor's office and they, of course, have to take credit cards and they had their credit card processing suspended by the credit card processor. I'm thinking of another one as well, which is a pizza joint.  They too had credit card processing threatened for suspension. In their case, they had a couple of weeks to clean up their act and both cases. They pulled us in to help straighten things out. But what was interesting about the doctor's office is they sent a physical copy of the PCI agreement, the payment card industry agreement, so that if they wanted to accept credit cards, they had to sign this agreement. Now,  first of all, in this day and age, that's remarkable in and of itself, right? We get PDFs, but how many of us just pencil whip, PDFs, or click whip, I guess PDFs, most of us. It's really rare that we read the contract and it's interesting to know too, that not only was it a physical copy, but this thing it was hundreds and hundreds of pages long. It was huge. It was absolutely huge. So they had to sign a physical copy of this thing. What happens is if you are accepting the payment cards, in other words, credit cards, and someone reports that there is an unauthorized charge on that card. The guys and gals at the payment card industry, start to look at your business. Now we had a case right here by my house. It was a Wendy's,I think it was and apparently, the manager of the Wendy's and the employees were skimming credit cards. So you'd go in, you'd give them the credit card. They'd run it and give you the card back. Wow. They didn't just run it for your lunch. They made a copy of the credit card. Okay. Now that's part of the reason we've got these smart chips on credit cards. Europe is way ahead of us on using those smart cards. And frankly, it's a risk, right? It's risk tolerance. How much risk tolerance does Visa or MasterCard or whoever have and how much risk tolerance do the businesses have that accept the cards and then how much risk tolerance do you have? In this case with Wendy's, they got a lot of complaints about that Wendy's store, where the cards we're all used at some point over the course of the last number of weeks and were used elsewhere as well.  The owners of the cards had reported some of these transactions at other places as not right being made by them. Now the credit card companies will go ahead and give you a credit on your bill, so you don't have to pay that contested portion. But then, and they start looking into it a little bit more seriously. In the case of the doctor's office, they did get suspended at least for a short while. The pizza joint,  we got them up to standards within the two week period that they had. So they didn't get suspended. Because what would happen to a business if that card is card processing suspended, it'd be really bad. Now you and I, we have to deal with the fallout as consumers because we used our card and the card might've been duplicated by someone working in that store. Our card number may be stored on a computer. In the case of another doctor's office, that's exactly what was happening. The card number was being stored. then that information was then being sent off for processing, and then they would repeatedly enter the card information. Now there are some sites that have these virtual terminals that you can use, which is really great, where you are typing in the card number. But remember if your computer has a keystroke tracker, a key logger on it, and you're typing in credit card numbers. That's easily recognizable and you're going to get in trouble with the payment card industry, It's a very bad thing all the way around. So be very careful. There are a whole bunch of security instances where this has happened and the Verizon payment security report is showing businesses just are not compliant. According to the data that they gathered here in 2019, less than 30% of organizations achieved compliance during interim compliance validation. That's like the pizza shop I was talking about, all we had to do with them was move them up to prosumer hardware. We had to get them to upgrade some of their software on their computers and change the software they were using because OMG. It was just crazy, the software. I couldn't believe what it was doing, but we got them all in all setup, all taken care of her. But less than 30% of the businesses that had to comply during the interim compliance validation period did not meet the compliance. My bottom line here is to start now because Man oh Man applying quick fixes instead of creating and executing an overall strategy is really going to affect your compliance with PCI or any of the other standards out there, any of them. Just like the pizza shop and the doctor's office, I just mentioned, in both cases, we had to upgrade their systems, move things around, split up their network, have better encryption on the Wi-Fi, split off a customer network. So there's no way for any of them to get back and forth, and firewall some of their internal systems. So keep that in mind as well. We're not going to get into the whole electronic voting thing, which also showed up in this Verizon report. We only have a couple more minutes, so let's get into the Android, part here. this is an important one as well because we're seeing some new tricks. Wired has an article by Lily Hay Newman saying she's calling them foreboding. Isn't it? here's what's happening. First of all, it's far more common on PCs, but as some of the newer research is showing that mobile ransomware has undergone an, a real evolution here. We've seen it to the point recently where you go to a website and that website now uses your Android phone to start Bitcoin mining. Remember that? So if your Android phone is getting like really hot. It might be making money for somebody else they're using your computing power, but there's a lot of other things that are harmful. Now, of course, in Bitcoin mining, it could burn up your Android phone and that's happened more than once. This silly thing gets so hot, it just melts down. But along with all kinds of types of PC malware used in these types of attacks against hospitals, municipal government, and any institution that can't tolerate downtime. There's another platform that's really getting hit hard recently with ransomware and that's android phones. New research from Microsoft is also showing the criminal hackers are really putting time and resources into refining mobile ransomware tools. So why do you invest money? Because you're making money? So the fact that they're investing money into coming up with new ransomware tools means. It's making the money. People are paying the ransoms. There is some new software you might not be familiar with it. Of course, Microsoft has a windows defender. It's been on windows for a bit. Now it's actually quite good. Microsoft also has released Microsoft defender for Linux, which really shocked me. I haven't tried it yet. And Microsoft defender on mobile. They've looked at a lot of different Android ransomware families, and apparently, they've added some really clever tricks, including a new note delivery mechanism. They've got improved techniques to avoid detection and they've even got machine learning built into the ransomware, that's attacking Android phones. That can be used to really fine-tune the attacks for different peoples android devices. So be extra careful out there, everybody. We talked about in the first hour an attack that's going on right now, that's primarily directed at Republicans, but I think a lot of Democrats and independents would also open these emails and opening these files it's a very dangerous place out there. Use filters, use some of the anti-malware software. On an iPhone, there really isn't any.  You certainly don't need it as much, at least at this point. On Android, however, there is some great anti-ransomware software and you might just try Microsoft defender, which is a basic stopgap for you. But, do be careful out there, everybody. All right. So keep an eye out for my emails. We've got more coming out here. I'm trying to go up to two a week, maybe even three a week, doing a little training. You might have noticed the last three weeks, my emails have looked different and I dropped some of the information in it because I think it was just visually confusing. So make sure you are on my email list. Get my newsletter. Get all of this free training. All of this information that you need as a home user or a business user, or a business owner. Go to Craig peterson.com/subscribe. Craig Peterson that's SON.com/subscribe and have a great week. --- More stories and tech updates at: www.craigpeterson.com Don't miss an episode from Craig. Subscribe and give us a rating: www.craigpeterson.com/itunes Follow me on Twitter for the latest in tech at: www.twitter.com/craigpeterson For questions, call or text: 855-385-5553

Whether you're prepared for it or not, the United States is hurtling toward another presidential election. Like just about everything in 2020, the voting process has been disrupted by the pandemic. More people than ever are planning to avoid polling places and vote by mail. This has led to a very loud, very political debate about public safety, potential voter fraud, and the role technology plays in the voting process. This week on Gadget Lab, we talk with WIRED senior writer Lily Hay Newman about election security and why the US is so far behind other countries when it comes to online voting. Show Notes:  Read Lily’s guide on how to vote by mail here. Read more about the partisan hand-wringing about mail-in voting here. Follow all of WIRED’s 2020 election coverage here. Recommendations:  Lily recommends The US Election Assistance Commission’s state-by-state registration and voting guide. Mike recommends the memoir Year of the Monkey by Patti Smith. Lauren recommends these long sleeve stretch-knit bamboo pajamas from Cozy Earth. LIly Hay Newman can be found on Twitter @lilyhnewman. Lauren Goode is @LaurenGoode. Michael Calore is @snackfight. Bling the main hotline at @GadgetLab. The show is produced by Boone Ashworth (@booneashworth). Our executive producer is Alex Kapelman (@alexkapelman). Our theme music is by Solar Keys. If you have feedback about the show, or just want to enter to win a $50 gift card, take our brief listener survey here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

A package showing up on your doorstep normally gives you a little hit of excitement. But for one Massachusetts couple last year, the arrival of each new package triggered feelings of anxiety and dread. This week on Gadget Lab, we talk about the cyberstalking campaign that six former eBay employees allegedly launched against the married owners of a news website that’s often critical of the ecommerce industry. It’s a twisted tale featuring shipments of live roaches, a pig’s head mask, unwanted pornography, and a whole lot of bad feelings. WIRED’s own Brian Barrett joins us for the first half of the show to tell us about all the terrible antics the former eBayers have been charged with carrying out. Later in the episode, we’re joined by WIRED’s Lily Hay Newman to discuss a new, previously unknown Russian internet group that’s been spreading disinformation online. Secondary Infektion, as the group is known, has for years been trying to disrupt elections, sow discord among European nations, and spread nationalist Russian propaganda using thousands of temporary social media accounts. A new report from researchers at Graphika outlines the group’s activities. Show Notes:  Brian Barrett’s story about the alleged eBay harassment scandal is here. Also read Lily on Grafika’s report about Secondary Infektion. Recommendations:  Lily recommends keeping your tattoos and clothing logos hidden during public protests. Brian recommends Alabama Booksmith, which sells signed first editions of books. Mike recommends the Black Lives collection streaming for free on the Criterion Channel. Lauren recommends Duolingo for learning new languages. Brain Barrett can be found on Twitter @BrBarrett. Lily is @lilyhnewman. Lauren Goode is @LaurenGoode. Mike is @snackfight. Bling the main hotline at @GadgetLab. The show is produced by Boone Ashworth (@booneashworth). Our executive producer is Alex Kapelman (@alexkapelman). Our theme music is by Solar Keys. If you have feedback about the show, or just want to enter to win a $50 gift card, take our brief listener survey here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Across the world, millions of people have gathered to protest police brutality and systemic racism after an officer in Minneapolis killed George Floyd, an unarmed black man. Amid the outpouring of grief and support, tech companies like Google, Amazon, and Reddit have issued statements backing protestors and the Black Lives Matter movement. But these same companies also provide platforms and services that prop up communities of hate and help law enforcement disproportionately track and convict people of color. This week on Gadget Lab, a conversation with WIRED senior writers Sidney Fussell and Lily Hay Newman about hypocrisy in tech, police surveillance, and how to safely exercise your right to protest. Show Notes:  Read Sidney’s story about tech companies’ relationships with law enforcement here. Read Lily and Andy Greenberg’s tips for how to protect yourself from surveillance while protesting here. Read Lauren Goode and Louryn Strampe’s story about what to bring and what to avoid at a demonstration here. Follow all of WIRED’s protest coverage here. Recommendations:  Sidney recommends the documentary LA 92 about the aftermath of the Rodney King killing. Lily recommends Mission Darkness Faraday bags from MOS Equipment. Lauren recommends this Google doc of anti-racism resources. Mike recommends donating to Campaign Zero and Grassroots Law Project. Sidney Fussell can be found on Twitter @sidneyfussell. Lily Hay Newman is @lilyhnewman. Lauren Goode is @LaurenGoode. Michael Calore is @snackfight. Bling the main hotline at @GadgetLab. The show is produced by Boone Ashworth (@booneashworth). Our executive producer is Alex Kapelman (@alexkapelman). Our theme music is by Solar Keys. If you have feedback about the show, or just want to enter to win a $50 gift card, take our brief listener survey here. How to Listen You can always listen to this week's podcast through the audio player on this page, but if you want to subscribe for free to get every episode, here's how: If you're on an iPhone or iPad, open the app called Podcasts, or just tap this link. You can also download an app like Overcast or Pocket Casts, and search for Gadget Lab. If you use Android, you can find us in the Google Play Music app just by tapping here. We’re on Spotify too. And in case you really need it, here's the RSS feed. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

About the guest:https://www.eur.nl/people/wytske-van-der-wagenPapers mentioned in this episode:Wytske van der Wagen, The Significance of ‘Things’ in Cybercrime: How to Apply Actor-network Theory in (Cyber)criminological Research and Why it Matters, Journal of Extreme Anthropology, Volume 3 Number 1, 2019Assistant Professor at Erasmus University, Department of CriminologyDOI: https://doi.org/10.5617/jea.6895Wytske van der Wagen, Wolter Pieters, From Cybercrime to Cyborg Crime: Botnets as Hybrid Criminal Actor-Networks, The British Journal of Criminology, Volume 55, Issue 3, May 2015, Pages 578–595,https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azv009van der Wagen, W., & Pieters, W. (2018). The hybrid victim: Re-conceptualizing high-tech cyber victimization through actor-network theory. European Journal of Criminology. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370818812016Wytske van der Wagen, From cybercrime to cyborg crimeAuthors Manuscript version:https://www.rug.nl/research/portal/files/61493330/Chapter_1.pdfExtract from:van der Wagen, W. (2018). From cybercrime to cyborg crime: An exploration of high-tech cybercrime,offenders and victims through the lens of Actor-Network Theory. [Groningen]: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen.https://www.rug.nl/research/portal/en/publications/from-cybercrime-to-cyborg-crime(f3a5c5e0-ff0f-4dad-ac6c-2bc91d96a1b4).htmlOther:The Samy Kamkar MySpace WormGreatest Moments in Hacking History: Samy Kamkar Takes Down Myspace5 minute Video from MotherBoard.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DtnuaHl378M~~~~~That EternalBlue thing that became crimewareThe Leaked NSA Spy Tool That Hacked the World by Lily Hay Newman on Wired.com (03/07/2018)https://www.wired.com/story/eternalblue-leaked-nsa-spy-tool-hacked-world/WannaCry – Important lessons from the first NSA-powered ransomware cyberattackBy Pierluigi Paganini, May 16, 2017http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/59154/cyber-crime/wannacry-nsa-powered-ransomware-cyberattack.html~~~~The BredoLab BotnetBredolab: Jail for man who masterminded botnet of 30 million computersby Graham Cluley, 23 MAY 2012https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/05/23/bredolab-jail-botnet/ Wikipedia on the BedoLab botnethttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bredolab_botnet~~~~~Sorry for the Pronunciation of Kubernētēs, I tried, but I am not sure than I managed more than a "foreign word" accent.If all you have is a hammer, all you see is nails, but every tool's a hammer.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_the_instrumenthttps://www.goodreads.com/book/show/43319933-every-tool-s-a-hammer 

In the first segment [1:39-16:17], hosts Eric Jaffe and Vanessa Quirk discuss this week's top stories: Can America’s cities be engines of opportunity again? (NYT Editorial board) https://nyti.ms/364AZLN / What opportunity looks like (David Leonhardt and Yaryna Serkez, NYT) https://nyti.ms/2LyiMgg)  Needed: Main Street Regenerators (Bruce Katz, Frances Kern Mennone, Michael Saadine, and Colin Higgins, New Localism) https://bit.ly/2AoHDk7 Why online voting isn’t safe yet (Lily Hay Newman, Wired) https://bit.ly/3dT9x6t In the second segment [16:44 - 23:26], the hosts ask housing expert Carol Galante why it’s time for cities to embrace density. (NYT) https://nyti.ms/3bDC3au And in the final segment [23:31 - 26:16], the hosts share what made them smile this week. German cafe asks customers to wear ‘noodle hats’ (Ewan Somerville, Evening Standard) https://bit.ly/2LvsuzR Philly makes it easier to turn blocks into playgrounds (Catalina Jaramillo, WHYY) https://bit.ly/2yQRHCk

Host Molly Wood speaks with Lily Hay Newman, a reporter at Wired, about the recent surge of phishing emails. Newman says with the distraction of the pandemic, people online are more vulnerable to hackers asking for information like login credentials. Some of these messages, she adds, are disguised as fast-food coupons, making it challenging to detect the fraud.

Host Molly Wood speaks with Lily Hay Newman, a reporter at Wired, about the recent surge of phishing emails. Newman says with the distraction of the pandemic, people online are more vulnerable to hackers asking for information like login credentials. Some of these messages, she adds, are disguised as fast-food coupons, making it challenging to detect the fraud.

Ben and Dave discuss the policy and privacy issues surrounding the global coronavirus pandemic, and later in the show our interview with Lily Hay Newman. She is a senior writer at WIRED, and we’ll be discussing browser privacy. Links to stories: U.S. Government, tech industry discussing ways to use smartphone location data to combat coronavirus DOJ asks Congress for broad new powers amid Covid-19. Schumer says, “Hell no.” Thanks to our sponsor, KnowBe4.

This week on Gadget Lab, WIRED senior writer and former show host Arielle Pardes drops by to talk about how Silicon Valley has ruined work culture. Then WIRED senior writer Lily Hay Newman comes on for a conversation about cybersecurity, encryption, and the hacker’s mom who infiltrated a prison. Show Notes:  Read Arielle’s story about work culture here. Read Lily’s story about how a hacker’s mom broke into a prison here. All of WIRED’s cybersecurity coverage can be found here. Recommendations:  Lily recommends Dangerzone, an application made by Micah Lee that takes PDFs you receive and basically scrubs them to make sure they’re clean before re-saving a safe version. Lauren recommends the book Whistleblower by Susan Fowler. Mike recommends Acid for the Children, a memoir by Red Hot Chili Peppers bassist Flea. Lily Hay Newman can be found on Twitter @lilyhnewman. Arielle Pardes is @pardesoteric. Lauren Goode is @LaurenGoode. Michael Calore is @snackfight. Bling the main hotline at @GadgetLab. The show is produced by Boone Ashworth (@booneashworth). Our consulting executive producer is Alex Kapelman (@alexkapelman). Our theme music is by Solar Keys. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

From fledgling startups to automotive giants like General Motors, there’s a whole lot of companies looking to develop fully self-driving cars. But that goal is still a long way from reality. The world is a messy, unpredictable place, and it turns out that robots aren’t that great at handling the array of variables that come up when trying to move around in it. This week on the Gadget Lab podcast, WIRED transportation writer Alex Davies joins Mike, Arielle, and Lauren to talk about why it’s so difficult to program a fully autonomous vehicle, and how the companies making them have adjusted to the challenge. Show Notes: Read more from Alex Davies on GM’s robo-taxis, the startup developing self-driving vans for Walmart, and bike lane-bound autonomous delivery vehicles. Arielle has more on the Google Pixel 4’s gesture controls here. Lauren details Intel’s new processor line here. Read more from Lily Hay Newman about the Capital One security breach and the hacker who didn’t cover her tracks here. Recommendations: For all the baseball fans out there, Alex recommends MLB TV. Mike recommends letting a robotic-exoskeleton make you dance as part of the art project Inferno. Lauren recommends Workin’ Moms on Netflix. Arielle recommends Huji, the app that turns your phone into a disposable camera. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The currently legal ability of obscenely rich people to bribe lawmakers and law enforcers is the source of many - if not all - of our political problems. In this episode, get an update on the few democracy-enhancing bills that have moved in this Congress and Jen speaks to Sam Fieldman - the National Counsel at Wolf-PAC - who explains how we can constitutionally end the role of money in politics by going around Congress. Joe Briney joins Jen for the thank you's. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Click here to contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Click here to support Congressional Dish for each episode via Patreon Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536 Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! ______________________________________________________ Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD129:The impeachment of John Koskinen CD192: H.R. 1 Outline Recommended Reading Article: Ensuring elections 'free from foreign intrusion' by John Sarbanes and Brian Frosh, Baltimore Sun, July 3, 2019 Article: Alexander-Murrary Bill, by Donald Shaw, ReadSludge.com, June 10, 2019. Article: Microsoft and Election Guard by Whitney Webb, MPN News, May 24, 2019. Document: Ballot-Marking Devices (BMDs) Cannot Assure the Will of the Voters    SSRN, May 21, 2019 Article: DHS to Assess Risks Posed to Ballot-Marking Devices by Mark Niese, GovTech, May 2, 2019. Article: DHS, FBI say election systems in all 50 states were targeted in 2016 by Sean Gallagher, ARS Technica, April 10, 2019. Article: Amid Election Integrity Criticism, Georgia Governor Signs Bill to Replace Voting Machines by Greg Bluestein and Mark Niesse, Governing, April 5, 2019.  Article: Firm’s close ties to Georgia stir concerns about voting system purchase by Mark Niesse, Atlanta Journal, January 30, 2019 Article: “Our best friend in this debate is the public,” House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) told reporters on Friday. by Ella Nilsen, Vox, January 04, 2019. Article: How the GOP is using the Help America Vote Act to block voting, by Thom Hartmann, Salon.com, November 23, 2018. Article: The Latest: Some Georgia Statewide Races Too Close to Call  U.S. News, November 7, 2018. Article: VOTING MACHINES ARE STILL ABSURDLY VULNERABLE TO ATTACKS by Lily Hay Newman, Wired, September 28, 2018. Article: Top Voting Machine Vendor Admits It Installed Remote-Access Software on Systems Sold to States by Kim Zetter, Vice News, July 17, 2018. Article: Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Ran—and Won—as a Movement Candidate, by DD Guttenplan, The Nation, June 27, 2018. Article: Voting machine vendor treated election officials to trips to Vegas, elsewhere  by Greg Gordon, Amy Renee Leiker, Jamie Self and Stanley Dunlap, McClatchy DC Bureau, June 21, 2018. Document: LD-2 Lobbying Report Disclosure Form Secretary of the Senate Office of Public Records, 2018 Data: Lobbying Spending Data:Lobbyists representing Election Systems & Software, 2018  OpenSecrets.org, 2018. Article: The Fraud Behind Article V Convention Opposition  by Sam Fieldman, Medium.com, October 12, 2017. Article: Some Machines Are Flipping Votes, But That Doesn't Mean They're Rigged  by Pam Fessler, NPR, October 26, 2016. Document: 2012 REDMAP Summary Report  Redistricting Majority Project, January 4, 2013. Document: Report on Proper Use of Campaign Funds and Resources  Committee on Ethics, January 4, 2013. Document: Title 36 organizations  Every CRSRReport.com, June 17, 2011.  _____________________________________________________ Bill Outline H.R. 2722: SAFE Act Sponsor: Zoe Lofgren of northern California 74 pages Passed the House on June 27, 2019 225-184 Only GOP yes: Newbie Rep. Brian Mast - 38 year old wounded Afghanistan war veteran representing the Palm Beach area Went to the Committee on Rules and Administration in the Senate Title 1: Financial Support for Election Infrastructure Subtitle A: Voting System Security Improvement Grants Sec. 102: Paper ballot requirements “The voting system shall require the use of an individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot of the voters’ vote that shall be marked and made available for inspection and verification by the voter before the voter’s vote is cast and counted, which shall be counted by hand or read by an optical character recognition device or other counting device." “The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity to correct any error on the paper ballot…” Recounts: The paper ballot “shall constitute the official ballot and shall be preserved and used as the official ballot for purposes any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal office in which the voting system is used.” Sec. 104: Durability and readability requirements for ballots Ballots must be on “durable” paper, which means it is capable of withstanding multiple recounts by hand without compromising the fundamental integrity of the ballots” and they must maintain readability for 22 months. Sec. 105: Recycled Paper Ballots must be printed on recycled paper starting on January 1, 2021. Sec. 107: These rules will apply “for any election for Federal office held in 2020 or any succeeding year.” Grandfathered equipment: Districts using machines that print paper ballots with the votes already tallied can use those machines until 2022, but they must offer every voter the opportunity to vote using a blank paper ballot, which are not allowed to be designated as provisional. Sec. 111:Grants for equipment changes Federal tax money will be given to states to replace their voting system, if needed. Grant amount: At least $1 per the average number of people who voted in the last two elections To use these grants, the states can only buy voting equipment from a vendor “owned and controlled by a citizen or permanent resident of the United States” The vendor must tell government officials if they get any part of their election infrastructure parts from outside the United States Authorizes (but doesn’t appropriate) $600 million for 2019 and $175 million for each even number election year through 2026 Subtitle B:Risk-Limiting Audits Sec. 121: Risk-limited audits required for all elections for Federal office State election officials will make the rules for how these will be done Sec. 122: Federal government will pay for audits Authorizes “such sums as are necessary” Title II: Promoting Cybersecurity Through Improvements in Election Administration Sec. 201: Voting system cybersecurity requirements Vote counting machine rules Machines that count ballots must be built so that "it’s mechanically impossible for the device to add or change the vote selections on a printed or market ballot” The device must be “capable of exporting its data (including vote tally data sets and cast vote records) in a machine-readable, open data standards format” The device’s software’s source code, system build tools, and compilation parameters must be given to certain Federal and State regulators and “may be shared by any entity to whom it has been provided… with independent experts for cybersecurity analysis.” The devise must have technology that allows “election officials, cybersecurity researchers, and voters to verify that the software running on the device was built from a specific, untampered version of the code” that was provided to Federal and State regulators. Loophole for moles: The Director of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security can waive any of the requirements other than the first one that prohibits machines that can change votes. The waivers can be applied to a device for no more than two years. The waivers must be publicly available on the Internet. Not effective until November 2024 election. Ballot marking machines and vote counters can’t use or “be accessible by any wireless, power-line, or concealed communication device” or “connected to the Internet or any non-local computer system via telephone or other communication network at any time.” Effective for the 2020 general election and all elections after Ballot marking devices can’t be capable of counting votes States may submit applications to Federal regulators for testing and certification the accuracy of ballot marking machines, but they don’t have to. Sec. 202: Testing of existing voting systems 9 months before each regularly scheduled general election for Federal offices, “accredited laboratories” will test the voting system hardware and software with was certified for use in the most recent election. If the hardware and software fails the test, it “shall” be decertified. Effective for the 2020 General Election. Sec. 203: Requiring use of software and hardware for which information is disclosed by manufacturer “In the operation of voting systems in an election for Federal office, a State may only use software for which the manufacturer makes the source code… publicly available online under a license that grants a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable license to all intellectual property rights in such source code…." …except that the manufacturer may prohibit people from using the software for commercial advantage or “private monetary compensation” that is unrelated to doing legitimate research. States “may not use a voting system in an election for Federal office unless the manufacture of the system publicly discloses online the identification of the hardware used to operate the system” If the voting system is not widely-used, the manufacture must make the design “publicly available online under a license that grants a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable license to all intellectual property rights…” Effective for the 2020 General election Sec. 204: Poll books will be counted as part of voting systems for these regulations Effective January 1, 2020 Title III: Use of voting machines manufactured in the United States Sec. 301: Voting machines must be manufactured in the United States HR 391: White House Ethics Transparency Act of 2019 Pdf of the bill Reported June 12, 2019 out of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform 23-16 On January 28, 2017 - a week after taking office - President Trump issued an executive order that requires all executive agency appointees to sign and be contractually obligated to a pledge that… The appointee won’t lobby his/her former agency for 5 years after leaving Will not lobby the administration he/she previously worked for Will not, after leaving government, “engage in any activity on behalf of any foreign government or foreign political party which, were it undertaken on January 20, 2017, would require me to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938” Will not accept gifts from registered lobbyists Will recuse themselves from any matter involving their former employers for two years from the date of their appointment If the appointee was a lobbyist before entering government, that person will not work on any matter that they had lobbied for for 2 years after the appointment BUT Section 3 allows waivers: “The President or his designee may grant to any person a waiver of any restrictions contained in the pledge signed by such person.” Sec. 2: Requires any executive branch official who gets a waiver to submit a written copy to the Director of the Office of Government Ethics and make a written copy of the waiver available to the public on the website of the agency where the appointee works. Backdated to January 20, 2017 (President Trump’s inauguration) H.R. 745: Executive Branch Comprehensive Ethics Enforcement Act of 2019 Reported March 26, 2019 out of the Committee on Oversight and Reform 18-12 Pdf of the bill  Sec. 2: Creates a transition ethics program Requires the President-elect to give Congress a list of everyone in consideration for security clearance within 10 days of the applications submission and a list of everyone granted security clearance within 10 days of their approval. Requires the transition team to create and enforce an “ethics plan” that needs to describe the role of registered lobbyists on the transition team, the role of people registered as foreign agents, and which transition team members of sources of income which are not known by the public Transition team members must be prohibited by the ethics plan from working on matters where they have “personal financial conflicts of interest” during the transition and explain how they plan to address those conflicts of interest during the incoming administration. The transition team ethics plan must be publicly avail on the website of the General Services Administration Transition team members need to submit a list of all positions they have held outside the Federal Government for the previous 12 months -including paid and unpaid positions-, all sources of compensation that exceed $5,000 in the previous 12 months, and a list of policy issues worked on in their previous roles, a list of issues the team member will be recused from as part of the administration. Transition team members that do not comply will not be granted any access to the Federal department or agency that isn’t open to the public. S. 195 : Creates a transition ethics program: Access to Congressionally Mandated Reports Act Pdf of the bill   Reported 4/10/19 out of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. On Senate Calendar Sec. 2: Definitions “Congressionally mandated report” means a report that is required to be submitted to Congress by a bill, resolution, or conference report that becomes law. Does NOT include reports required from 92 nonprofit corporations labeled as “Patriotic and National Organizations” (“Title 36 corporations”) Sec. 3: Website for reports 1 year after enactment, there needs to be a website “that allows the public to obtain electronic copies of all congressionally mandated reports in one place” If a Federal agency fails to submit a report, the website will tell us the information that is required by law and the date when the report was supposed to be submitted The government can’t charge a fee for access to the reports The reports can be redacted by the Federal agencies Resources Twitter Link: Rachel Maddow Twitter Link  Twitter. Employment Profile: Employment History for Richardson, Sean J OpenSecrets.org Employment Profile: Employment History for Jen Olson  OpenSecrets.org Email Link: Sam Fieldman Email at Wolf-PAC   PDF Email: Email with Eli Baumwell of the W.V. ACLU Volunteer Link: Volunteer for Wolf-PAC Resource Link: Article V Wolf-PAC Resource Link Documentary: Wolf Pac Documentary Congressional Dish Interview: Interview with Sam Fieldman from Wolf-PAC Preet Bharara Podcast: Taking Trump to Court (with David Cole) YouTube Video: Wolf PAC Call for Volunteers - Get Money Out of Politics! YouTube Video: Mike Monetta On Why Wolf-PAC Is Making A Movie YouTube Video: Wolf PAC Resolution Passes New Jersey Senate  YouTube Video: Fight Against Money In Politics: Cenk Uygur (Wolf-PAC Presentation) YouTube Video: Republican Vermont Representative Vicky Strong YouTube Video: Americans for Prosperity testify in New Jersey YouTube Video: Hawaii Senate Judiciary Hearing on 2018 SCR 76, Wolf-PAC YouTube Video: Cenk Uygur's Speech at The Conference to Restore the Republic YouTube Video: Article V Debate Document: Case Docket: Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n Document: Brief by ACLU in support of Citizens United Document: Brief by former members of the ACLU in support of neither party Document: Essay on Term Limits Document: Article V of the US Constitution - Overview Document: Virginia Plan (First draft of the Constitution) Document: Full Text of Congressional Regulations on Article V Document: 1984 Version of Congressional Regulations on Article V Document: 1987 Version of Congressional Regulations on Article V  Document: Congressional Record Archive Copy of Congressional Regulations on Article V Document: The Fix It America Constitutional Amendment Document: Take Back our Republic Document: Role of Congress Document: American Promise 28th Amendment Document: United for the People Amendments Reference Website: Massachusetts Commission Govtrack: H.R. 2722 Document: H.R. 391 Document: H.R. 745 Document: H.R. 745 Document: H.R. 964 Document: S. 195   Sound Clip Sources Watch on C-Span: House floor debate on HR 2722 June 27,2019 sound clip transcripts pdf Watch on C-Span: William Barr Testifies on Mueller Report Before Senate Judiciary Committee May 1, 2019 1:57:55 Sen. Amy Klocuchar (MN): For the last two years, Senator Lankford and I, on a bipartisan bill with support from the ranking and the head of the intelligence committee; have been trying to get the Secure Elections Act passed. This would require backup paper ballots. If anyone gets federal funding for an election, it would require audits, um, and it would require better cooperation. Yet the White House, just as we were on the verge of getting a markup in the rules committee (getting it to the floor where I think we would get the vast majority of senators), the White House made calls to stop this. Were you aware of that? Attorney General William Barr: No. Sen. Amy Klocuchar (MN): Okay, well that happened. So what I would like to know from you as our nation’s chief law enforcement officer if you will work with Senator Lankford and I to get this bill done? Because otherwise we are not going to have any clout to get backup paper ballots if something goes wrong in this election. Attorney General William Barr: Well, I will… I will work with you, uh, to, uh, enhance the security of our election and I’ll take a look at what you’re proposing. I’m not familiar with it. Sen. Amy Klocuchar (MN): Okay. Well, it is the bipartisan bill. It has Senator Burr and Senator Warner. It’s support from Senator Graham was on the bill. Senator Harris is on the bill and the leads are Senator Lankford and myself, and it had significant support in the house as well. Hearing: Committee on Oversight and Reform:Strengthening Ethics Rules for the Executive Branch, February 6, 2019 Watch on Youtube *28:00 Rep Jordan (OH): 2013 we learned that the IRS targeted conservative for their political beliefs during the 2012 election cycle systematically for a sustained period of time. They went after people for their conservative beliefs, plan in place, targeted people. They did it. The gross abuse of power would have continued, if not for the efforts of this committee. 2014 the Obama Administration doubled down and attempted to use the IRS rule making process to gut the ability of social welfare organizations to participate in public debate. Congress has so far prevented this regulation from going into effect, but HR 1 would change that. Hearing: Judiciary Committee For The People Act Of 2019, January 29, 2019  Witness: Sherrilyn Ifill - President and Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Watch on YouTube 32:00 Sherrilyn Ifill: Well before the midterm election, in fact, Georgia officials began placing additional burdens on voters, particularly black and Latino voters, by closing precincts and purging. Over half a million people from the voter rolls the voter purge, which removed 107,000 people, simply because they did not vote in previous elections and respond to a mailing was overseen by the Republican candidate for governor Brian Kemp, who was also the secretary of state. LDF and a chorus of others called on him to recuse himself from participating in the election. But he refused.  ______________________________________________________ Community Suggestions See Community Suggestions HERE. Cover Art Design by Only Child Imaginations ______________________________________________________ Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)

The great irony in the sport of surfing is that the process of making a surfboard puts a great deal of strain on the environment. The various chemicals and materials used to assemble boards, leashes, and wetsuits end up polluting the waterways, and defiling the very beaches that surfers rely on. A number of organizations and companies are dedicated to reversing this trend through something called the Ecoboard project. The certification program establishes manufacturing and sourcing guidelines that let people create boards that are gentler on the oceans and perform as well as traditional surfboards. One such company is Firewire Surfboards. We’re joined on today’s show by Firewire CEO Mark Price to talk about ecoboards, sustainability, and surfing in general. Also on the show, the hosts cover the latest news about products from Amazon and Google, and also give a preview of what to expect from Apple’s WWDC developer conference that takes place next week. Show Notes: Find Firewire’s website here. Also check out the Sustainable Surf project. Read Lauren on Amazon’s new privacy initiative and what to expect from WWDC. Also read Lily Hay Newman on Google’s Project Strobe. Recommendations: Mike tells us about Wu-Tang Clan: Of Mics and Men on Showtime. Arielle recommends Turo, and Lauren wants you to watch season two of Fleabag on Amazon Prime Video. Michael Calore can be found at @snackfight. Lauren Goode is @laurengoode. Arielle Pardes can be found at @pardesoteric. Bling the main hotline at @GadgetLab. Our theme song is by Solar Keys. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Google’s Project Stream, first unveiled last October, gave gamers a taste of what it would be like to stream heavy games directly from the cloud – from a Chrome browser, even. That effort has now evolved into something much, much more ambitious. At the Game Developers Conference in San Francisco this week, Google formally announced Stadia. Stadia is Google’s bet on next-generation gaming: It exists entirely in the cloud, with a physical, WiFi-enabled controller that connects to whatever computer you’re playing on. WIRED’s Peter Rubin was at GDC this week for Google’s big reveal, and he joins the latest Gadget Lab episode to talk about how Stadia is supposed to work when it launches later this year. The Gadget Lab team also discuss how Google is taking aim at Microsoft’s and Amazon’s cloud gaming services, and tries to answer the most important question of all: Is streaming and capturing 4K games totally going to destroy our Google Drive subscriptions? Show notes: You can read Peter Rubin’s story on Stadia here. Lily Hay Newman’s story on Facebook’s latest security mess is here. Recommendations: Peter recommends Whole Foods 365 granola bars. Arielle recommends the latest Voyages issue of The New York Times Magazine. Lauren recommends reading WIRED’s stories this week about Apple’s hardware updates, specifically the iPad Mini review if you’re in the market for a tiny iPad. Mike recommends this recent New Yorker article about Shen Yun.  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

It's Black Hat and DefCon conference time again, when the world's top security researchers descend on the den of iniquity that is Las Vegas in August and try to scare the bejeezus out of people with new research into ominous hacks. Hooray! WIRED's been there for a few days already. Lily Hay Newman discovered that several mobile credit card readers are rife with bugs, potentially leaving you exposed.

Author of the Frank Adversego Thriller Series Interview starts at 11:14 and ends at 35:51 “Alexa's pretty primitive. I think it's very concerning from a cybersecurity point of view, because people have already learned how to spoof Alexa. Just a few days ago they came up with the equivalent of a dog whistle-type command that you couldn't hear, but Alexa could. Someone could turn it on and off.” News “An Amazon Echo recorded a family's conversation, then sent it to a random person in their contacts, report says” by Hamza Shaban at The Washington Post - May 24, 2018 “Don't Freak Out About That Amazon Alexa Eavesdropping Situation” by Lily Hay Newman at Wired - May 24, 2018 “HBG, Amazon Partner on Narrative Content for Echo Device” by Calvin Reid at Publishers Weekly - May 22, 2018 “Are ebooks dying or thriving? The answer is yes” by Thu-Huong Ha at Quartz - May 13, 2018 Tech Tip Use Household Profiles to Share Your Fire Tablet - Amazon.com Interview with Andrew Updegrove The Frank Adversego Thrillers by Andrew Updegrove at Amazon.com The Blockchain Affair (chapter by chapter, beginning with Prologue and Chapter 1) Andrew-Updegrove.com Content Books on Artificial Intelligence recommended by Andy Updegrove: Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies 1st Edition by Nick Bostrom Thinking Machines: The Quest for Artificial Intelligence--and Where It's Taking Us Next by Luke Dormehi The Quest for Artificial Intelligence by Nils J. Nilsson Podcast interviews with James and Deborah Fallows, authors of Our Towns: A 100,000 Mile Journey into the Heart of America: Max Linsky of the Longform Podcast, Ezra Klein of The Ezra Klein Show, John Dickerson of the CBS This Morning Podcast, Sam Wang of the WooCast Politics & Polls podcast, and Chuck Todd of Meet the Press podcast. Next Week's Guest Nick Wingfield, former tech reporter at The New York Times, currently senior editor at The Information Outro Thanks to Stephen Campbell of The Author Biz podcast for generously helping me meet the deadline for the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that went into effect in Europe today. I modeled my new Privacy Policy and Cookies Policy on Stephen's website. Music for my podcast is from an original Thelonius Monk composition named "Well, You Needn't." This version is "Ra-Monk" by Eval Manigat on the "Variations in Time: A Jazz Perspective" CD by Public Transit Recording" CD. Please Join the Kindle Chronicles group at Goodreads!

Back in July, WIRED security writer Lily Hay Newman assessed the year in hacks and breaches and found, "the first six months of 2017 have seen an inordinate number of cybersecurity meltdowns. And they weren't just your standard corporate breaches. It's only July, and already there's been viral, state-sponsored ransomware, leaks of spy tools from US intelligence agencies, and full-on campaign hacking.

This is a special preview of Hacking Mr. Robot, a members-only podcast series. To listen to Fred Kaplan and Lily Hay Newman’s seasonlong discussion of the technological world the show portrays, join Slate Plus at Slate.com/MrRobot. You can try it free for two weeks. Fred also reviewed the season premiere here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Does the GOP’s 2016 candidate need to figuratively lose the primaries to win the general? On The Gist, Slate’s Reihan Salam shares which Republican candidates stood out at the Iowa Freedom Summit, and which ones decided not to show. Plus, Slate’s Lily Hay Newman joins us to discuss why Windows 9 got skipped, and Internet Explorer got stuck. For the Spiel, winter weather is snow joke. Today’s sponsors: Acura, the presenting sponsor of the 2015 Sundance Film Festival. Check out the all new Acura TLX at acura.com or test drive one for yourself at your local Acura dealer. Also, Squarespace, the all-in-one platform that makes it fast and easy to create your own professional website, portfolio, and online store. Get a free trial and 10 percent off your first purchase when you visit Squarespace.com and enter offer code GIST. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices