Podcasts about udt

Avui parlem de la Mostra de Ranxets, la prèvia de la Fira de la Salut i la derrota de la UDT a Montblanc. podcast recorded with enacast.com

Avui parlem de l'increment de preus dels centres educatius que depenen de l'Ajuntament, la detenció d'un home per una plantació de marihuana i el darrer resultat de la UDT. podcast recorded with enacast.com

Avui parlem de la programació de l'Espai Jove, la crida per formar part del jurat del Carnaval i l'empat de la UDT a Altafulla podcast recorded with enacast.com

Avui parlem de l'aprovació de les ordenances fiscals per al 2025, l'enquesta de valoració sobre la Fira de la Cervesa Artesana i el resultats de la UDT d'aquest cap de setmana. podcast recorded with enacast.com

The audio of this podcast was originally posted on 11/2/23. This is the video version. We are posting this again because one of the most common questions we get have to due with drug testing. We often hear from pain patients who were dismissed from their doctor for failing their drug test. They say there is no way the test is right. Ed Brown gives some possible explanations. Edward Brown's Bio: Edward G. Brown is a chemistry expert with over twenty-five years of laboratory research experience, over 5 years of patent work experience and over twenty years of experience assisting attorneys in chemistry cases as chemistry expert and expert witness.  His technical and academic background includes the following: B.S. degree in chemistry from the University of California, Berkeley; Ph.D. in chemistry from the University of California, Davis; In addition, Dr. Brown received post-doctoral research fellowships from the University of Auckland, NZ and Yale University; he pursued chemical analysis and chemistry research related to methodology development in organic chemistry at those institutions. Dr. Brown has also worked in a number of biochemical and pharmaceutical companies during his career as a research chemist, staff scientist and senior research scientist; he currently provides clients with in-lab contract medicinal chemistry research expertise as well as patent drafting and expert witness services. He is a coauthor on over twenty chemistry articles and is a co-inventor on ten U.S. patents.  He has testified in both state and federal courts as a chemistry expert in both criminal and patent litigation cases. His expertise as a medicinal chemistry expert in criminal drug cases has expanded over the years and includes advising in cases involving: methamphetamine and amphetamine analysis, manufacture, possession and sale; fentanyl, opioid and opiate analysis, possession and sale; cocaine analysis, possession and sale; LSD analysis, possession and sale; MDMA and MDA analysis, manufacture, possession and sale; benzodiazepine analysis, possession and sale; analysis, possession and sale of synthetic cannabinoids; and in hemp, THC and marijuana cases. Dr. Brown currently advises attorneys and other clients in criminal, patent and litigation cases as a medicinal chemistry expert and consultant in Durham, NC. His webpage can be found at: ⁠www.ExpertChemistryServices.com⁠ The Doctor Patient Forum is a national non profit organization fighting for the rights of pain patients and their providers. We bring awareness to the untreated pain and patient abandonment crisis. We are also knows as Don't Punish Pain Rally. ⁠https://www.patreon.com/thedoctorpatientforum⁠ ⁠https://www.thedoctorpatientforum.com/⁠ #thedoctorpatientforum  #dontpunishpainrally #chronicpain #opioids #chronicpainpatient #patientabandonment #harmreduction #chronicillness #medicalgaslighting #dpfpatreon #pain #opioideliminationindustry #opioidelimination #patreon #thedoctorpatientforumpatreon #harmreduction #medicalgaslighting #UDT #drugtest #toxscreen The information contained in this podcast is not to be considered medical or legal advice

Today I sit down with the smallest Navy SEAL ever!  Former U.S. Navy SEAL David Brown was the unlikeliest of candidates for the world's most grueling military selection process. Standing just 5' 3" and weighing 110 pounds, he was unlike any of the others around him who aspired to be SEALs. But through dogged determination and an iron will, he overcame every obstacle that life put in front of him to achieve his dream of becoming a SEAL.  David Brown's life has been one of perseverance, tenacity, and achievement—from childhood adventures, to love lost and found, to BUD/S, the Teams, an exciting career at NCIS, and then a steady climb to the top echelons of Federal law enforcement. And  Goliathis his story through military life and what comes after—the good and the bad.  Told with raw honesty and unwavering courage, And Goliath is more than just a memoir— it's a testament to the power of perseverance. David's inspirational tale reveals how facing your own Goliaths can lead you to live your biggest life possible.  Author Bio With more than three decades of experience with the federal government, including active-duty military service and Special Agent positions with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division, and The Department of Interior Office of Inspector General David W. Brown has opened a new chapter in his pursuit of happiness and authored his first book.  After seven years of active duty in the US Navy as a UDT/SEAL and twenty-eight years as a federal Special Agent, David decided to write the book he had been contemplating for decades. Deploying with UDT-21 and SEAL Team 4 worldwide gave him unforgettable experiences and enough material for several SEAL-type books. Still, it was the reason he became a SEAL and Special Agent that was the real story. In his last years as a federal agent, he met and worked with Bob Gettlin at the Department of Interior Office of Inspector General. Together, they developed several extremely successful internal communication initiatives and training modules at the OIG. Their successful partnership and friendship as federal employees followed them into retirement, And Goliath is their latest successful collaboration.        Show Sponsors:Horton's Quality K9 Gearwww.hortonsk9.comSmall Batch Cigarwww.smallbatchcigar.comUse the code "dogsofwar" for a 10% discount and free shipping at checkout!

Avui parlem del Pla de Transport Alternatiu pel tall del servei ferroviari, el balanç de la Fira d'Indians i el debut a lliga de la UDT. podcast recorded with enacast.com

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Morotai. After capturing the Marianas and Sansapor, the Allies planned to invade the Palaus and Halmahera. The Japanese stationed the 14th Division at Palau and the 32nd Division at Halmahera. General Ishii, with 11,000 troops, defended Halmahera's nine airfields, while Major Kawashima led 500 Formosans on Morotai. Meanwhile Colonel Nakagawa commanded the forces at Peleliu with extensive defenses, emphasizing attrition tactics. The Allies planned Operation Stalemate for Peleliu and Angaur, with General Geiger's corps set to land on September 15. Aerial reconnaissance and submarine missions informed their strategy. At Morotai, Operation Tradewind was executed by General Krueger's 31st Division. Supported by air and naval bombardment, Allied troops swiftly secured key areas, encountering minimal Japanese resistance. These operations were part of broader Allied strategies involving coordinated air support and subsequent invasions in the region. This episode is the Invasion of the Palau Islands Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In last weeks episode we talked about the plans and preparations for the invasion of Palau. General Rupertus' 1st Marine Division was assigned to assault Peleliu while General Mueller's 81st Division would conduct a dual-pronged landing on Angaur. Meanwhile, Admiral Hoover's land-based aircraft, General Kenney's Allied Air Forces, and Admiral Mitscher's carrier-based aircraft carried out an extensive neutralization program against Japanese airfields within range of Palau. When fighter planes of three fast carrier groups started sweeping over the Palaus on September 6, they found that the efforts of the Southwest Pacific's land-based bombers had succeeded in eliminating many ground targets. Nevertheless, fighters and bombers of the three groups started full-scale attacks on all the principal islands in the Palaus the next day. There was no air opposition, nor had there been any on the 6th. On the 8th, because observable targets were scarce, the weight of attack was reduced, and the carriers began preparing to move to Philippine waters. During their three days at the Palaus, the carrier-based planes flew about 1470 sorties, causing extensive damage to ammunition and supply dumps, barracks, warehouses, and a number of miscellaneous buildings. The groups claimed destruction of only four enemy aircraft, while losing eight of their own. Admiral Fort's slower-moving tractor groups, responsible for transporting both divisions to the islands, departed Guadalcanal with their respective screening forces on the morning of September 4. Four days later, fast transports and LSDs also set out to rendezvous with them in the early hours of September 15 after an uneventful voyage. In the interim, Admiral Davison's carrier group launched a final sweep over the Palaus on September 10. The next day, Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf's Western Fire Support Group and Rear Admiral Ralph Ofstie's escort carriers arrived to begin the naval gunfire bombardment. Over the following three days, approximately 2,200 tons of naval projectiles were successfully fired on Peleliu. While Japanese positions pinpointed by the fire support ships were generally destroyed, many hidden by natural or man-made camouflage remained intact, as did those in areas not accessible to naval gunfire. Minesweepers cleared the 670 mines laid by the Japanese in the Peleliu-Angaur region and at least 240 more in the Kossol Passage. Nearly 175 mines were destroyed in the four days leading up to the landings, with the remaining mines marked at the cost of one minesweeper. Underwater demolition teams also began clearing obstacles from the landing beaches on September 12, providing the Japanese with clues about the Allied landing plans, leading them to hastily lay many land mines in the last few days. By 05:15 on September 15, Fort's transports had finally gathered off the Palaus and taken their assigned positions in the transport areas, ready for the landings to begin. Under clear skies, the small craft and amphibian vehicles of the assault waves formed up without difficulty and moved toward the reefs in front of Peleliu's White and Orange Beaches. At 05:30, Oldendorf's cruisers and destroyers started the pre-landing bombardment of the beaches, which was scheduled to cease at 07:50 to allow the carriers to conduct a final sweep. Ten minutes later, the first assault wave began advancing, supported by an LCI rocket barrage and aerial strafing attacks. However, the pre-landing bombardment had been inefficient, leaving many Japanese positions intact. Artillery and mortar fire quickly targeted the American amtracs, with several LVTs taking direct hits. Approximately 26 were destroyed during the landings, their burning hulks cluttering the beaches. Despite the smoke from Japanese fire and burning amtracs, the first wave reached the shore at 08:32. Colonel Chesty Puller's 1st Marines landed on the left, Colonel Harold Harris' 5th Marines in the center, and Colonel Herman Hanneken's 7th Marines on the right. For those of you interested, a rather famous marine was with Harris's 5th marines this day. Serving with K Company, 3rd battalion, 5th Marines was Eugene Sledge, the author of “with the Old Breed” probably the most famous Pacific War book of all time. If you are a fan of the HBO series: the Pacific, it was based loosely off this book amongst others. I think overall with the Old Breed does an outstanding job, particularly for when it was written, to showcase the brutal reality of the war in the Pacific. Eugene Sledge did not sugar coat things or gloss over terrible things he saw his fellow marines do, such as ripping out gold teeth from dead or even alive Japanese as well as taking human trophies like skulls or hands. Here is a passage: We learned that our battalion would leave Peleliu as soon as a ship was available to transport us back to Pavuvu. By day we rested and swapped souvenirs, but we had to be on the alert at night for possible Japanese movement. To the south we could hear the constant rattle of machine guns and the thud of mortars and artillery as the 81st Infantry Division kept up the pressure around the Umurbrogol Pocket. “Have you gone Asiatic?” I gasped. “You know you can't keep that thing. Some officer'll put you on report sure as hell,” I remonstrated as I stared in horror at the shriveled human hand he had unwrapped. “Aw, Sledgehammer, nobody'll say anything. I've got to dry it in the sun a little more so it won't stink,” he said as he carefully laid it out on the rock in the hot sun. He explained that he thought a dried Japanese hand would be a more interesting souvenir than gold teeth. So when he found a corpse that was drying in the sun and not rotting, he simply took out his kabar and severed the hand from the corpse, and here it was, and what did I think? “I think you're nuts,” I said. “You know the CO will raise hell if he sees that.” “Hell no, Sledgehammer, nobody says anything about the guys collecting gold teeth, do they?” he argued. “Maybe so,” I said, “but it's just the idea of a human hand. Bury it.” He looked grimly at me, which was totally out of character for his amiable good nature. “How many Marines you reckon that hand pulled the trigger on?” he asked in an icy voice. I stared at the blackened, shriveled hand and wondered about what he said. I thought how I valued my own hands and what a miracle to do good or evil the human hand is. Although I didn't collect gold teeth, I had gotten used to the idea, but somehow a hand seemed to be going too far. The war had gotten to my friend; he had lost (briefly, I hoped) all his sensitivity. He was a twentiethcentury savage now, mild mannered though he still was. I shuddered to think that I might do the same thing if the war went on and on Its a gripping read, highly recommend it, especially for quote en quote normie friends you might want to get into the Pacific War. Back to the story.Rupertus' objectives for the first day were to push inland 300 yards to objective line O-1, then attack and capture O-2. Landing simultaneously with the fourth wave were the division's tanks (M-4 Shermans). Because of their excellent waterproofing for the operation, they successfully negotiated the reef, where the worst of the underwater obstacles had been removed by UDTs, and continued toward land in six parallel columns led by their respective LVT guides. The enemy fire, however, proved so intense that over half of 30 tanks organic to the division suffered from one to four hits during the 10 minutes necessary to cross the reef. In the 1st Marines' zone, for example, only one of the assigned tanks escaped being hit during the trip ashore. only three, however, were completely knocked out of action. "Thus within a half hour after the initial landing the infantry had full tank support--a record unsurpassed in any previous Marine landing in the Central Pacific, except for the Marshalls." To make matters worse, no sooner had the lead elements of 3/1 landed and advanced less than 100 yards inland, than they found themselves confronted by a most formidable natural obstacle, a rugged coral ridge, some 30ft high. This had not shown up on any maps. Worse, the face of this ridge (christened "The Point" by the Marines) was honeycombed with caves and firing positions which the Japanese had blasted into the coral and had turned into excellent defensive positions which resisted all initial assaults. Even after tanks arrived to support the assault troops attempting to storm the northern portion of the ridge, they stumbled into a wide, deep anti-tank ditch, dominated by the ridge itself. Here they came under severe and accurate enfilading fire and were pinned down for hours. The loss of much communication equipment further left Puller and Rupertus unaware of the situation on the left flank. A major effort was then launched to assault The Point from the rear.  It became apparent to the Marines that The Point was unassailable from the front and so eventually units fought inland and assaulted The Point from the rear. These units, commanded by Capt George P. Hunt, fought their way along The Point for nearly two hours, during which time they succeeded in neutralizing all of the enemy infantry protecting the major defensive blockhouses and pill boxes. The principal defense installation was a reinforced concrete casement built into the coral, mounting a 25mm automatic cannon, which had been raking the assault beaches all morning. This blockhouse was taken from above by Lieutenant William L. Willis, who dropped a smoke grenade outside the blockhouse's embrasure, to cover the approach of his men, and Corporal Anderson who launched a rifle grenade through the firing aperture. This disabled the gun and ignited the ammunition inside the blockhouse. After a huge explosion, the fleeing Japanese defenders were mown down by waiting Marine riflemen. Hunt's surviving 32 men remained isolated on The Point for the next 30 hours, constantly under attack from Japanese infiltrators. Meanwhile, Puller's 2nd Battalion pushed inland about 350 yards against moderate resistance. Despite this success, the 1st Marines' front was divided by two huge gaps. Puller's 1st Battalion was then committed to support the Marines on the left, successfully gaining a foothold on the southern area of The Point, but still unable to close the critical gaps. In the center, Harris' 1st Battalion advanced through coconut groves that provided ample cover, successfully reaching O-1 to link up with Puller's 2nd Battalion in front of the airfield by 09:30. On the right, however, Harris' 3rd Battalion and Hanneken's 3rd Battalion experienced a confused landing and made no progress, with only Harris' Company I reaching O-1 an hour after landing. At 10:30, the two battalions began pushing inland. Harris' Company K rapidly advanced deep into Peleliu's interior under the cover of fairly dense scrub, while the 7th Marines used a large anti-tank ditch to move forward in relative safety. Again I thought it give more flavor if I took a passage from this moment when K Company advanced from Sledge:  We started to move inland. We had gone only a few yards when an enemy machine gun opened up from a scrub thicket to our right. Japanese 81mm and 90mm mortars then opened up on us. Everyone hit the deck; I dove into a shallow crater. The company was completely pinned down. All movement ceased. The shells fell faster, until I couldn't make out individual explosions, just continuous, crashing rumbles with an occasional ripping sound of shrapnel tearing low through the air overhead amid the roar. The air was murky with smoke and dust. Every muscle in my body was as tight as a piano wire. I shuddered and shook as though I were having a mild convulsion. Sweat flowed profusely. I prayed, clenched my teeth, squeezed my carbine stock, and cursed the Japanese. Our lieutenant, a Cape Gloucester veteran who was nearby, seemed to be in about the same shape. From the meager protection of my shallow crater I pitied him, or anyone, out on that flat coral Hanneken soon faced strong opposition, leading him to pause his troops and request tank support in the afternoon. The requested tank support became somewhat confused by an unexpected coincidence: the flank battalions of the two assaulting regiments in the center and right were both the 3rd (3/5 and 3/7) with both containing Companies I, K, and L. The unfortunate tank commanders looking for 3/7 who had wandered into 3/5 area due to obstacles - in particular the large anti-tank ditch on Orange 3 - enquired of a body of troops they encountered "is this Company I, 3rd Battalion?" Hearing the right answer in the wrong place, they proceeded to operate with these troops, who were in fact Company I of 3/5 and not Company I of 3/7. Happily, this was one of those confusions of battle that helped more than it hindered. The confusion resulted in a gap between the two regiments as 3/7 paused to take stock of the situation, whereas 3/5 was actually pushing ahead. In an effort to re-establish contact with 3/5, Company L of the 7th Marines worked patrols further and further to the left until its foremost patrol emerged on the southern edge of the airfield. This was completely out of its regimental zone of action and several hundred yards to the rear of the units it was looking for. By this time, Harris' 2nd Battalion and Hanneken's 1st Battalion had landed, with Harris' battalion pushing vigorously northeast, while Hanneken's battalion dealt with fierce Japanese resistance and a dense swamp to the south as they advanced toward O-1. Concerned about the slow progress on the right and the heavy casualties suffered by Hanneken's forces, Rupertus decided to land the divisional reconnaissance company. However, the reserve 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines could not be disembarked until the next day.  One major Japanese counterattack occurred at around 16:50hrs on D-Day, consisting of a tank-infantry sortie in force across the northern portion of the airfield. This attack had been expected by the Marines, especially those of the 5th Marines facing open ground in front of the airfield, and accordingly the regimental commanders had brought up artillery and heavy machine guns as well as tanks to support that area. Increase in Japanese artillery and mortar fire in that area was the first indication that something was brewing. Soon after Japanese infantry was observed advancing across the airfield, not as a fanatical, drunken banzai charge but as a coolly disciplined advance of veteran infantrymen. A Navy air observer spotted Japanese tanks forming east of the ridges above the airfield with more infantry riding on them. These tanks moved forward, passing through the Japanese infantry advancing across the airfield and some 400 yards in front of the Marine lines. For a moment, but only for a moment, the Japanese counter-attack looked like a serious coordinated movement. Then the formation went to pieces. Inexplicably, the Japanese tank drivers opened their throttles wide and raced towards the Marine lines. Charging like the proverbial "Bats outa Hell," with the few infantry atop the tanks clinging on for dear life, they left their accompanying infantry foot support supp far behind. No positive account exists of what happened thereafter. The tanks involved in the charge numbered between 13 and 17 (insufficient pieces were left afterwards to give a definite count) and headed for the Marine lines, cutting diagonally across the front of 2/1, who subjected them to murderous flanking fire from all weapons, small arms, light and heavy machine guns, 37mm antitank guns and artillery. Two of the Japanese tanks veered off into the lines of 2/1, hurtling over a coral embankment and crashing into a swamp, the escaping crews were quickly disposed of by the Marines. Meantime, the remaining tanks came under heavy fire from the marines of 1/5, while the advancing Japanese infantry was subjected to fire and bombing from a passing Navy dive bomber. The tanks and their riding infantry were decimated as they passed right through the Marine lines which simply closed behind them. At 17:00, a heavy mortar barrage struck Harris' 3rd Battalion's command post, causing the Marine companies to lose cohesion, though they eventually formed a defensive line along the airfield's edge. Under this barrage Eugene Sledge had this to say: Under my first barrage since the fast-moving events of hitting the beach, I learned a new sensation: utter and absolute helplessness. The shelling lifted in about half an hour, although it seemed to me to have crashed on for hours. Time had no meaning to me. (This was particularly true when under a heavy shelling. I never could judge how long it lasted.) Orders then came to move out and I got up, covered by a layer of coral dust. I felt like jelly and couldn't believe any of us had survived that barrage. By the end of the day, despite 210 men killed and 901 wounded, the progress of the beach expansion was disappointing. Again Eugene Sledge has a passage about getting through the first heat of combat on D-day at Peleliu: We had to be alert constantly as we moved through the thick sniper-infested scrub. We received orders to halt in an open area as I came upon the first enemy dead I had ever seen, a dead Japanese medical corpsman and two riflemen. The medic apparently had been trying to administer aid when he was killed by one of our shells. His medical chest lay open beside him, and the various bandages and medicines were arranged neatly in compartments. The corpsman was on his back, his abdominal cavity laid bare. I stared in horror, shocked at the glistening viscera bespecked with fine coral dust. This can't have been a human being, I agonized. It looked more like the guts of one of the many rabbits or squirrels I had cleaned on hunting trips as a boy. I felt sick as I stared at the corpses. A sweating, dusty Company K veteran came up, looked first at the dead, and then at me. He slung his M1 rifle over his shoulder and leaned over the bodies. With the thumb and forefinger of one hand, he deftly plucked a pair of hornrimmed glasses from the face of the corpsman. This was done as casually as a guest plucking an hors d'oeuvre from a tray at a cocktail party. “Sledgehammer,” he said reproachfully, “don't stand there with your mouth open when there's all these good souvenirs laying around.” He held the glasses for me to see and added, “Look how thick that glass is. These sonsabitches must be half blind, but it don't seem to mess up their marksmanship any.” He then removed a Nambu pistol, slipped the belt off the corpse, and took the leather holster. He pulled off the steel helmet, reached inside, and took out a neatly folded Japanese flag covered with writing. The veteran pitched the helmet on the coral where it clanked and rattled, rolled the corpse over, and started pawing through the combat pack. The veteran's buddy came up and started stripping the other Japanese corpses. His take was a flag and other items. He then removed the bolts from the Japanese rifles and broke the stocks against the coral to render them useless to infiltrators. The first veteran said, “See you, Sledgehammer. Don't take any wooden nickels.” He and his buddy moved on. I hadn't budged an inch or said a word, just stood glued to the spot almost in a trance. The corpses were sprawled where the veterans had dragged them around to get into their packs and pockets. Would I become this casual and calloused about enemy dead? I wondered. Would the war dehumanize me so that I, too, could “field strip” enemy dead with such nonchalance? The time soon came when it didn't bother me a bit. During the night, coordinated local counterattacks were repelled with relative ease, thanks to the support from naval gunfire and the artillery of the 11th Marines. However, the enemy's resistance, which was not the frenzied banzai charges of previous encounters, began to suggest that the prolonged and organized opposition Rupertus had anticipated might indeed persist for a longer time. Meanwhile, with the 3rd Battalion, 15th Regiment cut off to the south, Nakagawa chose to withdraw most of his forces to the ridgelines and high ground north of the airfield, aiming to hold out as long as possible. The 1st Marine Division, enduring a night of harassment from Japanese mortar and artillery fire, faced heavy resistance from these ridgeline defenses on September 16. Despite this, after landing on Peleliu at 09:50, Rupertus made significant progress that day. His only adjustment was to order the reserve 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines to support Puller's beleaguered 1st Marines to "maintain momentum." On the right flank, the 7th Marines pressed their hold on the southern part of the island despite heavy resistance and thick scrub, capturing all but two small promontories at the southern tip, where isolated defenders established their final positions. In the center, the 5th Marines cleared most of the remaining airfield area and set up defenses at night in a hangar and shop area on the field's north side, while Puller's 2nd Battalion secured the northwestern section of the airfield, including several headquarters buildings and barracks. On the left flank, the 1st Marines struggled to advance against the determined and well-coordinated resistance from Nakagawa's main defenses, which were concentrated around the Umurbrogol Mountains. Only after intense fighting and with the help of tanks did the Marines manage to capture a 500-yard stretch of the ridge. By nightfall, at the cost of approximately 30 additional men killed and 115 wounded, the division had established a perimeter extending over 3,000 yards from north to south, and about 2,000 yards deep at its farthest point. Over the course of two days, the Americans suffered nearly 1,500 casualties, with more than 1,000 from Puller's 1st Marines alone. Despite these losses, the crucial objective—the Peleliu airfield area—had been secured. The Japanese defenses had been divided, with two small pockets in the south and the main stronghold in the central ridges. Feeling that operations were progressing well and possibly aiming to keep Peleliu an all-Marine endeavor, Rupertus decided not to request reinforcements from the 81st Division. Consequently, General Mueller's forces were set to proceed with landings on Angaur the next day. Rear-Admiral William Blandy, commanding the Angaur Attack Group, reported that based on air and naval bombardments, hydrographic surveys, and UDT activities, a successful landing on Angaur appeared achievable. Admiral Fort and General Geiger thus approved the decision. Meanwhile, Major Goto Ushio had stationed his 1,400 men from the reinforced 1st Battalion, 59th Regiment in four defensive sectors with a small reserve in the center. Expecting the Americans to land on the well-prepared Green Beaches to the southeast, he had fortified that area with his strongest coastal defenses. However, the Americans anticipated this and chose instead to land Colonel Benjamin Venable's 322nd Regiment on Red Beach to the north and Colonel Robert Dark's 321st Regiment on Blue Beach to the east. In the early hours of September 17, Blandy positioned his forces off Angaur and at 0530 the Angaur Fire Support Group started its bombardment, employing for the most part slow, methodical area fire rather than shooting at specific targets. The fire was characterized by the 81st Division as being "very satisfactory," and it accounted for about 40 percent of all naval shells thrown at Angaur from 12 through 17 September.  Due to a delay in the arrival of support aircraft, the shore bombardment continued past the scheduled time while General Mueller's assault troops boarded the landing craft and amphibian vehicles meant to take them ashore. By 08:00, the LVT assault waves began positioning themselves at the line of departure, while the 323rd Regiment executed a feint at Green Beach to distract the Japanese from the actual landing sites. Ten minutes later, the assault waves moved toward the shore, supported by LCI rocket fire, ongoing bombardments, and strafing planes that had also arrived late. Despite encountering only light mortar and small-arms fire, Dark's forces successfully landed on Blue Beach at 08:31, just one minute behind schedule. Venable's first wave, however, was delayed and arrived at Red Beach six minutes late. Subsequent waves landed throughout the day amid light resistance but faced challenges such as traffic congestion and limited beach space. By 16:45, all tanks of the 710th Tank Battalion were ashore, and the 316th and 906th Field Artillery Battalions had successfully landed at Red Beach by nightfall. The artillery for Blue Beach was landed the following day. Additionally, Venable's reserve 2nd Battalion landed by 11:30, and Dark's reserve 1st Battalion arrived by 13:00. After landing, Mueller's green regiments began advancing inland about 300 yards to their first phase line, quickly becoming entangled in dense scrub forests teeming with Japanese machine guns and snipers. On Blue Beach, Dark's troops proceeded cautiously at first, but by noon they had secured Rocky Point, Cape Ngariois, and established a beachhead approximately 1200 yards long and 350 yards deep. Meanwhile, Venable's 1st Battalion moved swiftly north and inland through less dense undergrowth to secure its designated beachhead area. The 3rd Battalion bypassed some enemy bunkers set in jagged coral and proceeded south and west, successfully linking up with the 1st Battalion but falling short of reaching Cape Ngatpokul. With two secure beachheads and a 700-yard gap along the first phase line between regiments, Mueller ordered the 322nd Regiment to extend its right flank onto the second phase line about 400 yards inland and to continue pushing south with its left flank towards the sister regiment. By 14:30, the advances resumed, with Venable's 1st Battalion pushing westward against light resistance into increasingly rough terrain along the coast and into a densely overgrown basin near the north end of Lake Aztec. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion engaged in patrol actions against isolated Japanese positions to secure the coastal area between the two landing beaches, though little progress was made. Dark's forces also struggled, hindered by difficult terrain and mounting Japanese resistance. Ignoring the gap between regiments, Mueller ordered Venable's 3rd Battalion to advance to the second phase line. The battalion moved along railroad beds without encountering opposition, reaching the objective by nightfall. Simultaneously, Dark attempted to advance to the second phase line but made little progress before having to dig in. Goto, on the other hand, chose not to launch an immediate mass counterattack, believing that the 81st Division might land at other beaches. Instead, he deployed a company-strength mobile reserve for a counterattack, but this effort was disrupted by air and naval gunfire before it could commence. By late afternoon, realizing that the Americans had firmly established themselves ashore, Goto began moving his units and withdrew the southern defense force to the northwest hills for a final stand. To cover this movement, he ordered a night counterattack by two companies. At 05:50 on September 18, enemy infantry emerged from cover below Rocky Point and attacked Dark's Company B, pushing the Americans back about 75 yards before being halted by a heavy concentration of fire. Meanwhile, small groups of Japanese forces repeatedly assaulted the defensive line south of Lake Aztec, near the boundary between the 1st and 3rd Battalions. Despite their efforts, they failed to exploit the gap between regiments and withdrew to the northwest hills shortly after dawn. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus the Marines were yet again storming new islands that would see them experience some of the worst horrors of WW2. A young enlisted man, Eugene Sledge would get his first experience of combat on Peleliu, and from there would begin to write a book that would captivate the minds of many in America, post WW2.

Last time we spoke about the end of Operation Dan. In Yunnan, by late July, General Wei's Y Force worked to eliminate Japanese garrisons at Tengchong, Mount Song, Pingda, and Longling. The 33rd Army prepared for Operation Dan, anticipating resistance from General Honda's garrisons until September. The fall of Myitkyina prompted Honda to expedite his plans. Reinforcements were expected in Mandalay by September. General Matsuyama's forces, cut off and surrounded, provided support only through radio messages. At Tengchong, Colonel Kurashige vowed to defend against relentless attacks. Chinese forces, after intense fighting and bombing raids, breached the city's defenses. Despite heavy casualties, the Japanese resisted fiercely. Major Kanemitsu's garrison defended Moung Song with dwindling supplies. The Chinese forces employed siege tactics and underground mines to break Japanese strongholds. The Chinese launched coordinated attacks, capturing key positions and ultimately compelling Japanese retreats.  This episode is the Invasion of Morotai Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  After the Marianas fell and Sansapor was captured, the Allies set their sights on their next objectives: the Palaus and Halmahera, slated for simultaneous invasion by mid-September. The Japanese had stationed the 14th Division at Palau and the 32nd Division at Halmahera as their primary defenses. The Halmahera-Morotai area had not assumed much importance to the Japanese until early 1944, when they began to develop Halmahera as a focal point for the defense of the southern approaches to the Philippines. In addition to the 32d Division, the Japanese had on Halmahera innumerable service organizations, and they completed or had under construction nine airfields on the island, most of them in northern Halmahera. On that island they concentrated nearly 30,000 men, including at least 11,000 combat troops.  On Halmahera, General Ishii commanded approximately 11,000 troops to safeguard nine airfields, despite having already lost most of their air power. Meanwhile, Morotai Island was defended by around 500 Formosans of the 2nd Raiding Unit, led by Major Kawashima Takenobu. General Ishii planned to counterattack from Halmahera if the Allies landed on Morotai, but soon realized Allied air and naval superiority would foil these efforts. Following their defeat in the Marianas, Tokyo reassigned the Bonin Area Group directly under its command and placed the Palau Area Group under the Southern Army, leaving General Mugikura's 31st Army to defend Truk and other isolated outposts. General Inoue fortified Palau with elaborate defenses along the coast and inland, manned by 21,000 Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops, 7,000 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) personnel, and 10,000 laborers.  The IJN had by 1944 constructed numerous reinforced concrete blockhouses and bunkers plus dug an extensive tunnel system near the end of the northeast peninsula as well as taking full advantage of Peleliu's natural caves. This elaborate, multi-level tunnel system could shelter 1000 troops. These defenses, tunnels, the airfield, and the many support facilities were built by the 204th, 214th, and 235th Construction Battalions, mostly manned by Koreans and Okinawans. Detachments of the guard forces manned eight 120mm dual-purpose, and about three 200mm coast defense guns. There was no ammunition for the 200mm short guns nor did any ships report being fired on by coast defense guns. The 114th and 126th Anti-aircraft Units manned single and twin-barreled 25mm automatic guns (estimated at 30) and 13.2mm machine guns. A dozen 20mm cannons, removed from destroyed aircraft, were set up on makeshift mounts, mostly around the airfield. His strategy emphasized prolonged attrition over suicidal charges, aiming to exhaust the American forces. In preparation for the intense pre-landing bombardment, Inoue instructed his troops to utilize natural terrain features like coral caves and sinkholes, tactics that proved effective against the advancing Allies.Based in Koror, the Japanese commander stationed Colonel Nakagawa Kunio's 2nd Regiment on Peleliu, the reinforced 1st Battalion of the 59th Regiment on Angaur, and deployed the 15th and 59th Regiments across Babelthuap and other islands. Major-General Yamaguchi Takeo's 53rd Independent Mixed Brigade defended the central islands, complemented by 4,000 personnel from the Imperial Japanese Navy on Peleliu.  Prior to General Inoue's arrival in the Palaus, the defense of the Palaus had been under the command of Vice-Admiral Ito Yoshioka. Upon his arrival on Koror, where he established his headquarters, Inoue appointed Colonel Nakagawa Kunio as Peleliu's new commander, with his 2nd Regiment (Reinforced). Nakagawa was a most able commander, possibly one of Japan's finest defensive tacticians, in the same league as General Kuribayashi on Iwo Jima. Nakagawa would make full use of all his defenses and troops on Peleliu, making the Americans pay dearly for every inch, as he had been ordered to do. Although a very capable commander, the appointment of an Army colonel over a Navy vice-admiral caused a great rift between the Army and Navy on Peleliu, which deteriorated into farce. To resolve matters and calm the Navy down somewhat, Inoue sent Major-General Murai Kenjiro from his headquarters on Koror Island to Peleliu to provide the Army with sufficient rank to satisfy the vice-admiral's honor, although the defense of Peleliu seems, to practical purposes, to have remained in the hands of Nakagawa. It appears that Murai, after inspecting Nakagawa's defensive works and battle plans for the defense of Peleliu, was content to let Nakagawa continue without interference from himself, lending only the weight of his rank to acquire the required cooperation of the Navy elements on Peleliu. Nakagawa, divided the island into four defense sectors, each manned by an infantry battalion. His 1st Battalion, alongside the 14th Division Tank Unit and Engineer Company, served as a mobile reserve for counterattacks against potential landings. Meanwhile, Admirals Nimitz and Halsey had been planning Operation Stalemate, targeting Palau since May 29. Originally slated for September 8, General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps would assault Peleliu and Angaur, with General Hodge's 24th Corps landing on Babelthuap.  Intelligence was gathered by aerial reconnaissance photographs. Also, in June 1944 the submarine USS Seawolf (SS-197) carried out photographic reconnaissance of the invasion landing beaches. A further reconnaissance was carried out by the submarine USS Burrfish (SS-312) on Peleliu and Yap beaches. An 11-man reconnaissance group of underwater demolition team (UDT) frogmen landed on the Peleliu beaches from the Burrfish for closer investigation relating to water depth, location of potholes and sandbars, and obstacles. With thousands of Japanese on the island they understandably did not reconnoiter inland, and the rugged terrain of the interior would come as an unpleasant surprise to the Marines. A similar operation was carried out on the Yap invasion beaches, but this time only two of a five-man reconnaissance team made it back to the pick-up point. After several unsuccessful attempts to locate their missing comrades the remaining two men returned to the Burrfish. After this incident, Admiral Nimitz banned any further missions of this type. Given delays in the Guam operation, Operation Stalemate was canceled on July 7, replaced by Stalemate II.  An unusual staff arrangement was established to plan Stalemate II. IIIAC was committed to take Guam under General Geiger. The IIIAC staff would thus be unable to plan the Palaus operation, which it was to execute. Consequently, Major General Julian Smith, designated to command the Expeditionary Troops, was tasked to plan the operation using his own small staff augmented by some IIIAC staff officers. This temporary planning staff was designated X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps. It would plan the operation and IIIAC would execute it – an awkward arrangement, but necessary in order to maintain the increasing tempo of operations. As Commander, Expeditionary Troops, Smith was also to be in control of all ground action in the western Carolines; a position roughly analogous to that of General Krueger of ALAMO Force in the Southwest Pacific. X-Ray was finally dissolved on August 15, 1944. This revised plan scheduled Geiger's forces to land on Peleliu with the 1st Marine Division and on Angaur with the 81st Division on September 15, while the 77th Division remained in floating reserve and the 5th Marine Division in area reserve. Then, on October 8th, the 24th Corps planned to launch an assault on the islands of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines. This was aimed at securing an additional airfield and fully neutralizing Truk and the remaining islands in the group. For this operation, Halsey divided his 3rd Fleet into two main echelons: his Task Force 30, which included covering forces such as Admiral Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force (now Task Force 38), and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 31, the Joint Expeditionary Force. At Peleliu, General Rupertus' 1st Marine Division was to land with five battalions advancing over the White and Orange Beaches on the southwest coast. The 1st Marines were to land on the left, pushing up the western shore to clear Japanese forces from ridges overlooking the airfield; the 5th Marines would land in the center to secure the airfield; and the 7th Marines on the right to capture the southern end of the island. Meanwhile, at Angaur, Major-General Paul Mueller's 81st Division planned a two-pronged amphibious assault. The 322nd Regiment was to land on Red Beach on the northeast coast, while the 321st Regiment would land on Blue Beach about 2000 yards to the southeast. Both forces would then push inland to secure a first phase line approximately 300 yards from the beaches, before continuing their advance west and south. The reserve 323rd Regiment was tasked with a feint landing at Beach Black on the northwest coast, with potential deployment to Ulithi if the Palau operations proved successful. Meanwhile, General MacArthur aimed to establish an airbase in the Halmahera area, strategically positioned between the Vogelkop and Mindanao. This location would provide crucial flank protection against Japanese forces in the Dutch East Indies and support land-based operations for the upcoming invasion of Mindanao. Optimistically, in mid-June, MacArthur had tentatively scheduled the invasion of Mindanao for October 25. Nimitz, however, believed that MacArthur's hope of reaching Mindanao by October 25 was too optimistic. During conferences at Pearl Harbor in July, called at the suggestion of Nimitz to coordinate Southwest and Central Pacific plans for the Morotai, Palau, and Mindanao operations, Southwest Pacific planners learned that less amphibious craft and assault shipping could be made available to them than had previously been anticipated. Moreover, restudy of range and weather factors made it appear somewhat risky to depend upon the ability of Morotai-based aircraft to provide air support for Southwest Pacific forces on Mindanao after carriers had to leave the latter area and before airdromes could be developed there. To obtain adequate land-based air support for the Mindanao invasion force, MacArthur returned to discarded plans to seize air-base sites on the Talaud Islands, about equidistant from Morotai and Sarangani Bay, Mindanao, where the first landings in the Philippines were then scheduled to take place. The employment of amphibious means for the Talaud operation would delay preparations for Mindanao, as would the development of airdromes on the Talauds. Finally, to have the invasion of Mindanao take place much before the middle of November would involve a conflict in timing with anticipated employment of assault shipping and carrier support by Admiral Nimitz for the occupation of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines, an operation scheduled for the first week in October. MacArthur therefore revised his program to call for the invasion of Morotai on September 15, the Talauds on October 15, and Mindanao on November 15. As Allied carriers were engaged in the Palau operation, MacArthur needed a target within range of fighters and medium bombers stationed at Sansapor. Thus, Morotai Island was chosen for Operation Tradewind due to its perceived light defenses and ample space for airfield and light naval base facilities. General Krueger selected the 31st Division and the 126th Regiment, totaling approximately 28,000 troops under the overall command of General Hall's 11th Corps, for this operation. Admiral Barbey's Task Force 77, comprising 12 destroyers, 2 APAs, 5 APDs, 1 LSD, 39 LCIs, 12 LSTs, and 12 LCTs, along with a covering force led by Admiral Berkey and an escort carrier force under Rear-Admiral Thomas Sprague, facilitated the amphibious movement. Additionally, Vice-Admiral John McCain's fast carrier group provided support. Anticipating minimal resistance, the landings were planned near prospective airfield sites on the Doroeba Plain in southwest Morotai. General Hall's strategy involved the 155th and 167th Regiments landing on Red Beach on the southwestern coast to swiftly capture the abandoned Pitoe Drome and secure the new Pitoe Airfield site. Meanwhile, the 124th Regiment landed at White Beach, about 1500 yards to the south, to secure the Gila Peninsula and the Wama Airfield site. The reserve 126th Regiment was scheduled to land the following day, with its 1st Battalion initially supporting the 124th Regiment's operations at the beachhead. Both the Palau and Morotai operations were supported by a coordinated strategic air support program. Admiral Hoover's land-based aircraft were tasked with neutralizing Japanese airfields at various islands including Yap, Woleai, Truk, Ponape, Pagan, Bonin, and Marcus Islands. Concurrently, General Kenney's Allied Air Forces reinforced these efforts and targeted enemy air centers in Palau, Mindanao, western Dutch New Guinea, Halmahera, the Talaud Islands, the Moluccas, the Celebes, and the Arafura Sea islands. Additionally, Mitscher's fast carriers embarked on an ambitious campaign, launching strikes from the Bonin and Volcano Islands to the Palaus and Mindanao between late August and the start of the invasions.  This strike had a twofold objective: the temporary neutralization of Japanese airfields on those island groups and, more important, the creation of a diversion on the north preceding stronger attacks against targets in the Philippines and western Carolines. Carrier action in the latter area was to begin on 6 September, with strikes on the Palaus, Yap, and Ulithi. The bulk of the carrier forces was to leave the western Carolines on the afternoon of the 8th to take up positions off Mindanao. Japanese airfields on Mindanao presented difficult targets because they were scattered over that large island, but it was believed that the cluster of airfields and associated installations in the Davao area would provide profitable targets for carrier-based aircraft attacks. The Davao and Sarangani Bay areas, as well as Japanese shipping routes from Davao to Zamboanga and thence north toward Manila, were also expected to provide profitable targets. Strikes against airdromes and shipping in the Mindanao area were to be carried out on 9 and 10 September, while on the 10th and 11th part of the carrier force was to hit the Palaus and Yap-Ulithi again. Rear-Admiral Ralph Davison's carrier-launched aircraft struck Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima from August 31 to September 2. The Fast Carrier Task Force continued with strikes on Yap and the Palaus from September 6 to 8, and on Mindanao from September 9 to 10. Enemy air resistance was surprisingly weak throughout these operations, prompting Halsey to redirect plans for a follow-up attack on Mindanao to the Central Philippines. While the Japanese forces in the Philippines hastened to complete preparations against anticipated Allied invasion, enemy carrier-borne aircraft served sudden warning on September 9 that the date of this invasion was fast drawing near. In the first large-scale air operation by the Allies against the Philippines, an estimated 400 carrier planes staged a devastating ten-hour offensive against southern Mindanao, concentrating their attacks on Davao, Sarangani, Cagayan and Digos. Since Japanese air patrols had failed to discover the enemy task force, the attacks achieved complete surprise and inflicted widespread and severe damage to ground installations, airfields, anchorages, and lines of communication. Reconnaissance units of the 1st Air Fleet immediately flew off search missions, which revealed that the attacks originated from three enemy naval task groups boldly maneuvering in the waters southeast of Mindanao. As per the Sho-Go directives, however, the 1st Air Fleet withheld retaliatory action pending further developments. Ground and naval units in the Davao area were nevertheless ordered on the alert to meet the possible contingency that an invasion attempt would follow the air strikes, and the Japanese armed forces throughout southern Mindanao became tense with expectancy. A feeling of nervousness gripped the weak local forces at Davao and rapidly spread to the large Japanese civilian colony. A wave of wild rumors swept the city. On September 10, a second series of heavy enemy raids aggravated this state of alarm. The city and harbor were reduced to a shambles and communications paralyzed. Panic and civil disorder broke out.  Less than 48 hours after the termination of the raids on Mindanao, the enemy struck again; this time in the central Philippines. On the morning of 12 September, a navy radar picket station on Suluan Island, in Leyte Gulf, broadcast over the general air-warning net that a vast formation of enemy carrier planes was heading westward toward the Visayas. Since the Suluan Island lookout was only about twenty minutes' flying time from Cebu, the air forces there could not be alerted quickly enough to put up an effective defense. By 0920 the enemy planes were already swarming over the Cebu airfields, where the main fighter strength of the First Air Fleet was based following its transfer from Davao. Although the attacks extended over the entire Visayan area and later took in Tawitawi, in the Sulu Archipelago, the Cebu fields appeared to be the principal objective. In the three days over which this air offensive continued, the First Air Fleet suffered damage to 50 Zero fighters on Cebu alone, while in other areas 30 additional aircraft of all types were rendered non-operational. Flight personnel suffered numerous casualties, and training was disrupted. Heavy damage was also sustained by Army air units. The 13th Air Brigade, made up of Type I fighters, was so hard hit that it had to be ordered back to Japan for regrouping, while the 45th Fighter­bomber Regiment was reduced to half strength. In addition, 11 transports totalling 27,000 gross tons and 13 naval combat vessels were sent to the bottom of Cebu harbor.The unexpected weakness in enemy air defenses led Nimitz to reconsider bypassing Yap and Mindanao, instead focusing forces on an early invasion of Leyte. McCain's group continued with attacks on Zamboanga, the Talauds, and Menado en route to Morotai. Meanwhile, between September 1 and 14, Kenney's aircraft conducted heavy raids on Japanese air bases within range of Morotai, effectively isolating the island. Targeted locations included Halmahera, the northern Celebes, Ceram, western New Guinea, and Mindanao. After rehearsals and preparations were completed, Barbey's convoy departed Aitape on September 9. Two days later, they rendezvoused at Maffin Bay with the majority of General Persons' 31st Division. The entire convoy departed the area on September 12, joined the next day by the covering force and escort carriers. The voyage proceeded smoothly, and Barbey successfully reached Morotai on the morning of September 15. Meanwhile, McCain's carrier aircraft conducted a bombing and strafing mission over Japanese air bases in the Manado area, destroying 28 enemy aircraft. Kenney's bombers also struck Japanese air installations on Batjan Island, while Berkey's cruisers and destroyers shelled enemy positions along Galela Bay. Barbey's surface warships conducted a bombardment of the landing area. During the naval and air bombardment, assault ships moved into their assigned positions west of the landing beaches efficiently and without confusion. The initial waves formed quickly and landed the 155th and 167th Regiments on Red Beach at 08:30, followed by the 124th Regiment on White Beach one minute later. Encountering no opposition, the troops swiftly reorganized on shore and advanced toward their objectives inland. By 13:00, the 167th Regiment had secured Pitoe Drome, and by 15:00, Colonel Starr's 1st Battalion had secured Gila Peninsula. Other units also advanced inland, establishing the 2000-yard beachhead line. Although there were some minor skirmishes, the Japanese could not mount significant resistance against the overwhelming Allied force and retreated into Morotai's rugged interior. The day's action resulted in seven wounded among the 124th Regiment and the loss of twelve Japanese soldiers, with one captured. Beach conditions, however, proved unexpectedly poor, severely hindering the unloading efforts. Consequently, starting on September 16, all the LSTs, along with numerous LCTs and LCMs, had to be unloaded at Blue Beach, a favorable landing spot on Pitoe Bay's shores. Simultaneously, as the reserve 126th Regiment was disembarking, Persons resumed advancing inland against minimal opposition. Swiftly, they secured a perimeter around the Pitoe Drome area, spanning over 7000 yards wide and approximately 5000 yards deep. Following this, American patrols were dispatched to eliminate small Japanese groups, radar stations and observation posts were established on various offshore islands and Morotai's coastline, and efforts were made to expand the perimeter to the Sabatai River to accommodate additional bivouacs and supply installations.  Leaving Morotai behind, attention shifts to Burma to explore the aftermath of Operation U-Go. Following the decisive victories at Imphal-Kohima, General Slim opted to pursue retreating Japanese forces toward the Chindwin River, despite the need for rest among his weary British-Indian divisions. Consequently, the 23rd Division spearheaded the pursuit to Tamu, at the head of the Kabaw Valley, where Major-General Charles Fowkes' 11th East African Division took over in early August. Meanwhile, to the south, General Evans' 5th Division pressed toward Tiddim, encountering stubborn resistance from General Tanaka's 33rd Division. Slim's strategy aimed for both divisions to eliminate remaining Japanese forces west of the Chindwin and converge at Kalemyo. Subsequently, the Tiddim road would be abandoned as a supply route in favor of the Kabaw Valley and aerial resupply drops. As a result, the 31st Division, now led by Lieutenant-General Kawata Tsuchitaro, successfully reached Sittaung. Their mission was to cover the withdrawal of other units in the region. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division faced challenges as it conducted delaying actions along the Tiddim road, with the added threat of East African forces potentially cutting off their withdrawal route towards Yazagyo. Japanese delaying tactics were always the same, and the means of dealing with them was also always the same. A crater would be found beyond which the lead infantry would come under fire and would have to be filled or covered using a Valentine bridgelayer, while air strikes would break up the blocking position to allow tanks from 3rd Carabiniers forward to support them. To disrupt Tanaka's communications south of the road, an ad hoc light unit, the Lushai Brigade, was deployed. By mid-August, General Mutaguchi ordered his forces to commence withdrawal towards the Zibyu Range. The 15th and 31st Divisions were directed to cross the Chindwin River by August 25, despite shortages of small boats. At the beginning of the crossing operation, a serious setback was experienced. It had been planned to bring small boats upstream to the crossing area with supplies for the Army and to utilize the same boats to evacuate casualties and heavy weapons south to Kalewa. Because of the enemy air activity over the Chindwin River, it was impossible to bring the boats to the crossing points. As a result, approximately 3000 sick and wounded were forced to cross the river and continue to the rear on foot with increasingly heavy death losses. By August 31, they were expected to reach the eastern bank of the Chindwin, with the 15th Division consolidating along the Pinbon-Pinlebu line by the end of September and the 31st Division reaching Shwebo by mid-October. By the end of August, key command changes occurred following the setbacks of Operation U-Go. Lieutenant-General Katamura Shihachi replaced General Mutaguchi as commander of the 15th Army, while Lieutenant-General Kimura Heitaro took over from General Kawabe as commander of the Burma Area Army. Kimura Heitaro, noted for his strategic flexibility and acumen, subsequently directed the 33rd Army to secure a defensive line from Lashio to Mandalay, safeguarding the right flank of the 15th Army. The 15th Army, in turn, was tasked with holding the Irrawaddy River from Mandalay to Pakkoku, while the 28th Army was assigned to defend the Yenangyaung oilfields, the Arakan coast, and the Rangoon delta. Meanwhile, on September 12, the 33rd Division crossed the Manipur River and proceeded with their retreat towards the Kabaw valley. They left the 215th Regiment to guard the rear at Tonzang, while units of the 5th Division infiltrated the area between Tonzang and Kalemyo to disrupt Tanaka's withdrawal and mount significant attacks against the 215th. By September 20, the Japanese forces were forced back to Tiddim, where the 214th Regiment covered the retreat of the rest of the division. Simultaneously, the 26th King's African Rifles moved east from Tamu to Sittang, crossing the Chindwin River on September 8 to assess enemy strength across the river and prepare bridgeheads for a broader crossing. Encountering unexpectedly strong resistance, they were compelled to retreat back across the river. Under persistent pressure, the Japanese evacuated Tiddim on the night of October 6. Tanaka consolidated his division in the Kalemyo-Kalewa area by the end of October, while pursuing forces captured Fort White and Kennedy Peak. On October 10, the 4th King's African Rifles launched an assault on Leik Ridge, suffering significant casualties but ultimately securing the main hill twelve days later. Meanwhile, after withdrawing from Mogaung, the 53rd Division regrouped at Mawhun by September 10, where they successfully defended against enemy units until the end of the month. They then retreated towards Pinwe and came under the command of the 15th Army on October 5. Following the Quebec conference in September, a strategic overview of Burma emerged: the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved two plans. The first, codenamed Dracula, proposed an amphibious assault on Rangoon with a target date of March 15, 1945. The second plan, Capital, aimed at the conquest of north and central Burma, with General Slim suggesting an overland capture of Rangoon as part of the operation. Initially skeptical, the Americans reluctantly agreed to Dracula, contingent on ensuring that northern Burma received adequate resources. However, due to Allied setbacks at Arnhem and during the Battle of the Bulge, it became clear that reinforcements from the European theater could not be spared for the Rangoon offensive. Consequently, it was announced that the operation would need to be postponed until after the 1945 monsoon season. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After intense Allied operations in the Pacific, including the capture of the Marianas and Sansapor, attention turned to the Palaus and Halmahera. Japanese defenses were formidable, with significant troop concentrations and elaborate fortifications. Despite setbacks, Allied forces meticulously planned and executed operations, paving the way for further strategic advances in the region.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: In Defense of Open-Minded UDT, published by Abram Demski on August 12, 2024 on The AI Alignment Forum. A Defense of Open-Minded Updatelessness, with applications to alignment. This work owes a great debt to many conversations with Sahil, Martín Soto, and Scott Garrabrant. Sahil and I will have a public discussion about this this Wednesday (August 14) at 11am EDT; join via this link. You can support my work on Patreon. Iterated Counterfactual Mugging On a Single Coinflip Iterated counterfactual mugging on a single coinflip begins like a classic counterfactual mugging, with Omega approaching you, explaining the situation, and asking for your money. Let's say you buy the classic UDT idea, so you happily give Omega your money. Next week, Omega appears again, with the same question. However, Omega clarifies that it has used the same coin-flip as last week. This throws you off a little bit, but you see that the math is the same either way; your prior still assigns a 50-50 chance to both outcomes. If you thought it was a good deal last week, you should also think it is a good deal this week. You pay up again. On the third week, Omega makes the same offer again, and once again has used the same coinflip. You ask Omega how many times it's going to do this. Omega replies, "forever". You ask Omega whether it would have continued coming if the coin had landed heads; it says "Of course! How else could I make you this offer now? Since the coin landed tails, I will come and ask you for $100 every single week going forward. If the coin had landed heads, I would have simulated what would happen if it had landed tails, and I would come and give you $10,000 on every week that simulated-you gives up $100!" Let's say for the sake of the thought experiment that you can afford to give Omega $100 once a week. It hurts, but it doesn't hurt as much as getting $10,000 from Omega every week would have benefited you, if that had happened.[1] Nonetheless, I suspect many readers will feel some doubt creep in as they imagine giving Omega $100 week after week after week. The first few weeks, the possibility of the coin landing heads might feel "very real". Heck yeah I want to be the sort of person who gets a 50% chance of 10K from Omega for a (50% chance) cost of $100! By the hundredth week, though, you may feel yourself the fool for giving up so much money for the imaginary benefit of the "heads" world that never was. If you think you'd still happily give up the $100 for as long as Omega kept asking, then I would ask you to consider a counterlogical mugging instead. Rather than flipping a coin, Omega uses a digit of the binary expansion of π; as before, Omega uses the same digit week after week, for infinitely many counterlogical muggings. Feeling uneasy yet? Does the possibility of the digit of π going one way or the other continue to feel "just as real" as time passes? Or do you become more sympathetic to the idea that, at some point, you're wasting money on helping a non-real world? UDT vs Learning Updateless Decision Theory (UDT) clearly keeps giving Omega the $100 forever in this situation, at least, under the usual assumptions. A single Counterfactual Mugging is not any different from an infinitely iterated one, especially in the version above where only a single coinflip is used. The ordinary decision between "give up $100" and "refuse" is isomorphic to the choice of general policy "give up $100 forever" and "refuse forever".[2] However, the idea of applying a decision theory to a specific decision problem is actually quite subtle, especially for UDT. We generally assume an agent's prior equals the probabilities described in the decision problem.[3] A simple interpretation of this could be that the agent is born with this prior (and immediately placed into the decision problem). This isn't v...

Last time we spoke about beginning of the bombing campaign against Japan. The Japanese 11th Army faced setbacks at Hengyang due to resilient Chinese defenses and supply shortages. Reinforced by General Xue Yue, Chinese forces launched effective counterattacks, regaining some territories before being pushed back. By July 20, the Japanese resumed their offensive but faced heavy resistance and were paused. American air raids on Japan and Manchuria intensified under General Arnold's orders, despite logistical challenges. In Burma, Allied forces under General Stilwell made slow but steady advances, capturing strategic positions and repelling Japanese counterattacks. The Chindits, severely depleted, were eventually evacuated. In Yunnan, Chinese forces encircled and assaulted Japanese positions, achieving significant gains despite heavy resistance and logistical issues.  This episode is the Invasion of Guam and Tinian Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today our week begins with the ongoings of Operation Forager. By late July, American plans for the invasions of Guam and Tinian were finalized. General Cates' 4th Marine Division was assigned to land on Tinian's White Beaches, while General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps planned two amphibious landings nearly seven miles apart to trap the Japanese in a double envelopment. General Obata, who had relocated his headquarters to Guam, commanded several troops on these islands. On Tinian, Colonel Ogata Keiji's forces included the 50th Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 135th Regiment, the tank company of the 18th Regiment, and the 56th Naval Guard Unit, totaling 8,039 men. Similar to Saipan, he divided Tinian into three sectors, with most troops defending Tinian Town and Asiga Bay. The 1st Battalion of the 135th Regiment, supported by Ogata's artillery, formed the Mobile Counterattack Force, ready to respond swiftly to landings. This left only Ogata's 3rd Company to defend the northwest coast where the Americans planned to land. Meanwhile, General Takashina's 29th Division was assigned to Guam and reinforced by Major-General Shigematsu Kiyoshi's 48th Independent Mixed Brigade and Colonel Kataoka Ichiro's 10th Independent Mixed Regiment. Takashina's units fortified the landward neck of the Orote Peninsula and established strong positions on the beaches of Agat, Asan, Tumon, and Agaña Bays. The main fortified area ran along the west coast from Tumon Bay to Facpi Point and included, of course, Orote Peninsula. Other fortified beaches, on the south and east coasts from Merizo to Pago Bay, had been abandoned before W Day, their defenders having moved to the north. Outside the main fortified area, the airfields were provided local defense by anti-aircraft and dual-purpose guns. The most notable and certainly the most effective fortifications on the island were constructed across the neck of Orote Peninsula, which contained a fairly elaborate system of trenches and foxholes arranged in depth, together with large numbers of pillboxes and heavy-caliber weapons. Outside of Orote, the prepared defenses were generally hastily constructed and often incomplete. The typical beach defense was arranged, from the seaward side, in four parallel lines: first were obstacles and mines on the fringing reef offshore; second came beach obstacles and tank traps; third were trenches, machine-gun positions, pillboxes, heavy weapons, artillery, and coast defense guns on the beaches or immediately inland; and, finally, came the machine-guns, heavy weapons, and artillery emplaced on the high ground inland. Insufficient advantage was taken of the high ground, and except on Orote little provision was made for defense in depth. Even as late as the five-week period of pre-invasion bombardment, the Japanese continued to work frantically on improving offshore obstacles and beach defenses, to the neglect of positions in the rear.They also had three tank companies in reserve to strike the beachhead alongside the infantry. Additionally, the 54th Naval Guard Unit, equipped with coastal defense and anti-aircraft guns, secured many positions with reinforced concrete. The Japanese set up specific defense sectors on this island. Shigematsu's brigade and Colonel Ohashi Hikoshiro's 18th Regiment held the Asan Beaches and the Agaña and Tumon Bays. Colonel Suenaga Tsunetaro's 38th Regiment defended the Agat Beaches, while Kataoka's forces manned the southern defenses. Additionally, Takashina had a mobile reserve behind the Fonte Plateau, which included five infantry companies, one naval unit, and one tank company. Only Ohashi's 2nd Battalion was positioned at Guam's northern end, while Kataoka's 1st Battalion was deployed to Rota Island. The Americans conducted the longest preliminary air and sea bombardment of the war against Guam, beginning on June 16 after the invasion of Saipan. This bombardment intensified after July 8, when American warships launched the greatest single naval bombardment program of the war, coordinated with Admiral Mitscher's carrier aircraft. Over the next 13 days, a total of 836 rounds of 16-inch, 5422 of 14-inch, 3862 of 8-inch, 2430 of 6-inch, and 16214 of 5-inch shells were fired at Guam's main defenses.  At the invasion of Roi-Namur Admiral Conolly had earned the sobriquet "Close-in Conolly" for his insistence that warships cruise close to shore when firing at land targets. At Guam, he reaffirmed his right to the title, but more important was the systematic procedure he introduced for coordinating naval gunfire and aerial bombardment and checking the results of each. A target board of six officers, representing the air, gunnery, and intelligence sections of the staff, was set up to assign primary missions for air strikes and naval gunfire and assess the damages daily before designating the next day's targets. Aerial photographs were taken each morning and on the basis of these damage was assessed and new targets were assigned. In these operations, the admiral's staff was aided by the presence aboard Appalachian of General Geiger who, as commanding general of the landing force, naturally had the greatest personal concern about the accuracy both of the bombardment and of the damage reports submitted afterward. In the final three days before the landing, Mitscher's planes conducted 1430 bombing sorties and 614 strafing attacks, dropping a total of 1131 tons of bombs, depth charges, and rockets, while losing only 16 aircraft. Despite the extensive bombardment, positions reinforced with coral and concrete remained in good condition. Anti-aircraft artillery and harbor installations suffered minimal damage, power installations in caves were unharmed, and communications were not interrupted. The intensity of the attacks on the western defenses suggested a likely amphibious landing there, prompting Takashina to abandon the ineffective southern and northern defenses. Meanwhile, Conolly's vessels, carrying Geiger's Southern Landing Forces, departed Eniwetok for Guam between July 11 and 18, arriving successfully by July 21. Between July 14 and 17, three underwater demolition teams scouted the landing beaches, and under the protection of LCI gunboats, they removed 640 obstacles from the Northern Beaches and 300 from the Southern Beaches. On the morning of July 21, in excellent weather conditions, the Americans began a preliminary bombardment. Admirals Conolly and Reifsneider directed the shelling of Asan and Agat beaches, respectively, while Admiral Mitscher's carrier aircraft bombed and strafed the fourteen miles of coastline from Agaña to Bangi Point. At 07:40, the assault waves crossed their departure lines under the cover of rocket fire from LCI gunboats. Eight minutes before landing, when the vehicles were 1200 yards from shore, Conolly's warships launched a final massive bombardment, and Mitscher's fighters provided covering strafing attacks. These attacks were to be shifted inland as the troops approached the shore. Despite the intense bombardment from ships and aircraft, the Japanese managed to target the assault waves, destroying nine amtracs from the 3rd Marine Division. Nevertheless, the waves of vehicles advanced, and at 08:28, the first LVTs landed, two minutes ahead of schedule. Further south, shore fire was even heavier, hitting one LCI gunboat and destroying 13 amtracs. However, the landing formation held, and the troops landed on schedule. Despite numerous concrete pillboxes still manned by the Japanese, both assault regiments advanced rapidly. Colonel Merlin Schneider's 22nd Marines successfully captured Agat amid strong resistance but were eventually halted at a hill position northwest of the town. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Alan Shapley's 4th Marines cleared Bangi Point and Hill 40, setting up a roadblock supported by five tanks on Harmon Road. By the end of the day, General Shepherd had established a beachhead approximately 1300 to 2300 yards deep, at the cost of around 350 casualties and 24 lost LVTs. At 08:30, the infantrymen of Lt. Col. Robert D. Adair's 2nd Battalion were climbing down cargo nets from their transports into the bobbing landing craft that were to carry them to the edge of the reef. By 10:30 all boats were in position near the line of departure waiting for the signal to go in. For three and a half hours they circled impatiently. At last, at 14:05, came the message to proceed to the beach and assemble in an area 300 yards inland from Gaan Point. Unfortunately, no amphibian tractors were on hand to transport Adair's men over the reef and onto the shore line, and of course their LCVPs were too deep-drafted to negotiate either the reef or the shallow waters inland of it. Over the sides of their boats the men climbed, and waded the rest of the way in water at least waist deep. Some lucky few were able to pick up rides in Marine LVTs on the landward side of the reef, but most stumbled in over the rough coral bottom, cutting their shoes en route and occasionally falling into deep potholes. Luckily, no enemy fire impeded their progress, and except for the dousing they got and the exhaustion they suffered the troops of the 2nd Battalion, 305th Regiment completed their ship-to-shore movement without injury.To the north, Colonel Edward Craig's 9th Marines advanced steadily against fairly heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, securing a beachhead about 1500 yards deep. Colonel Arthur Butler's 21st Marines, facing only moderate opposition but difficult terrain, cleared Asan Town and gained a foothold on the face of the Fonte Plateau. On the left flank, Colonel William Hall's 3rd Marines encountered the heaviest resistance from two complex cave defense systems on Chonito Cliff and Bundschu Ridge. Hall's men cleared Chonito Cliff and Adelup Point after several costly assaults and heavy casualties, but progress against Bundschu Ridge was limited, resulting in a 200-yard-wide gap between the 3rd and 21st Marines. Nevertheless, General Turnage secured a beachhead approximately 1600 by 4000 yards and had landed all division infantry, artillery, and support units, at the cost of 105 killed, 536 wounded, and 56 missing. Upon receiving the alert of enemy landings, Takashina promptly mobilized his reserve units to the Fonte Plateau in an attempt to contain Turnage's Marines within their limited beachhead. Throughout the night, he initiated several fragmented counterattacks, all of which were easily thwarted, resulting in significant Japanese casualties. In the southern sector, the 4th and 22nd Marines heroically fended off numerous well-coordinated counterattacks, managing to destroy four enemy tanks and eliminate Colonel Suenaga along with his 38th Regiment. By July 22, Geiger's forces began to expand their footholds on the beaches. In the northern front, Hall's assault on the Bundschu Ridge faced formidable resistance. Despite some Marines reaching the ridge with support from 20mm and 40mm fire, they were compelled to withdraw due to intense mortar shelling. Unbeknownst to them, their relentless attack forced the Japanese to abandon the position, albeit at a significant cost to the 3rd Marines, which suffered up to 615 casualties and was unable to sustain the advance. Meanwhile, Butler's 21st Marines encountered difficulty clearing the ravine separating them from the 3rd Marines, necessitating the deployment of their reserve 1st Battalion to support the depleted 2nd Battalion. On the right flank, Craig's 9th Marines encountered minimal resistance as they swiftly secured the Piti Navy Yard, followed by the landing of the 3rd Battalion on Cabras Island after extensive naval and aerial bombardment. The only significant engagement during the night was a Japanese bayonet charge backed by mortar fire, which Butler's 1st Battalion successfully repelled, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. To the south, following the night landings, the 305th Regiment underwent reorganization while Tanzola's 2nd Battalion relieved Shapley's 2nd Battalion. Schneider's 22nd Marines encountered moderate resistance as they moved northward after crossing the Ajuya River. Despite lacking tank support, they advanced until halting approximately 250 yards north of RJ 5. Simultaneously, Shapley's 4th Marines launched an assault towards Mount Alifan's steep slopes, successfully neutralizing entrenched enemy positions using demolitions and grenades, though hindered by rugged terrain. Eventually, a platoon reached the summit, finding no enemy presence. Tanzola's 1st and 3rd Battalions then advanced along Harmon Road towards the Maanot Pass, navigating eroded hills and dense vegetation to secure the O-a high ground line.  The 306th Infantry Regiment's landing on the White Beaches required the entire day because of communications problems and landing craft shortages. It was not until the next day that the 4th Marines was fully replaced by the 306th. 3rd Amphibious Corps Artillery was landing over White 1 at this same time, as was the 77th Division Artillery, leading to a great deal of congestion, especially when coupled with the landing of smaller units, supplies, and ammunition. Most artillery battalions were in-place by nightfall as was the 9th Defense Battalion deployed along the beaches. The defense battalions, besides providing air defense and direct fire support on ground targets, were positioned to engage any Japanese counter-landing attempts on the beachhead. The 77th Division, with the 305th on the right (center of the beachhead) and the 306th on the left, would secure the southern portion allowing the 4th Marines to move north with the 22nd Marines to seal off the neck of Orote Peninsula. They continued their advance beyond Harmon Road and Maanot Pass, securing commanding positions overlooking Orote Peninsula. Meanwhile, Schneider's 22nd Marines, initially advancing rapidly against scattered resistance, encountered intense enfilade fire from hills surrounded by rice paddies while attempting to maneuver across the neck of Orote Peninsula. This compelled them to withdraw approximately 400 yards to a line of hills south of Old Agat Road. Further to the north, Hall's 3rd Marines eventually discovered that the Bundschu Ridge had been deserted. However, following their clean-up operations, they were not in a condition to advance any further. Craig's 3rd Battalion successfully secured Cabras Island and then relieved the 2nd Battalion on the mainland. Meanwhile, Butler's 21st Marines faced challenges in bridging the gap with the 3rd Marines and encountered limited progress against well-fortified enemy pillboxes on the plateau's slopes. Turnage initiated the first contact attempt with Shepherd's brigade on July 24th, but the 30-man patrol was forced to retreat due to enemy fire. Despite Butler's 2nd Battalion's efforts to close the gap by attacking up the ravine, they were repeatedly hindered by heavy machine-gun fire from caves on the cliff sides. Although both the 3rd and 9th Marines managed to enhance their positions, Turnage's casualties rose to 2034 since the initial landing. Further south, Shepherd, in response to the formidable defense on the neck of the Orote Peninsula, instructed Schneider to advance the 1st and 3rd Battalions in company columns along the Agat-Sumay Road. The objective was to penetrate the enemy lines and seize the O-2 Line from the coast to Apra Harbor, while the 2nd Battalion shifted to occupy strategic high ground near Atantano from its position on the Old Agat Road. This maneuver not only flanked the Japanese strongholds guarding the rice paddies but also established a barrier across the neck of Orote, securing the beachhead line in front of the brigade. Following an extensive air, artillery, and naval bombardment, Schneider's primary thrust along the Agat-Sumay Road encountered determined resistance but successfully advanced to the R-2 Line. The 1st Battalion then spread out to the right, while the 3rd Battalion veered further east across the hills, swiftly capturing the fortified positions around the rice paddies that had posed significant challenges the previous day. By nightfall, the 1st Battalion had reached the O-2 Line, but the 3rd Battalion halted 400 yards short of its target, prompting Shapley's 2nd Battalion to fill the breach between them. After repulsing a vigorous counterattack, the 2nd Battalion pushed forward with minimal opposition and secured Atantano. Consequently, by the end of July 24, Shepherd had firmly established his beachhead and contained the enemy on the Orote Peninsula, albeit with casualties totaling 200 killed, 748 wounded, and 97 missing. General Bruce, with the remainder of the 77th Division, assumed control of most of the beachhead perimeter, while Shepherd's Marines readied for the capture of Orote. Subsequently, after repelling several tank-led counterattacks resulting in the destruction of 12 Japanese tanks, they sealed off the peninsula entirely on July 25. By afternoon, approximately 2500 troops under Commander Tamai Asaichi were confined to the eight square miles of Orote Peninsula. Meanwhile, Turnage pressed his forces to secure the objective beachhead definitively. Accordingly, the 9th Marines progressed southward along the Apra Harbor shoreline towards the Aguada River, reaching the midpoint before being compelled to retreat to the Laguas River due to Craig's stretched lines. Meanwhile, the 21st Marines faced formidable defenses at the Mount Chachao-Aluton-Tenjo complex, managing to establish defensive positions just shy of Mount Tenjo Road after slow progress. Simultaneously, the beleaguered 3rd Marines, with reinforcements from Craig's 2nd Battalion, launched a determined assault, overcoming moderate resistance and mortar fire to seize Mount Tenjo Road and gain a vantage point. Despite the extended frontline, troops stationed on the newly captured high ground could finally survey the terrain ahead by nightfall. As Takashina consolidated his forces on the plateau, he prepared for a coordinated counterattack aimed at dividing and conquering the enemy. The 48th Independent Mixed Brigade planned to strike Turnage's left flank before pivoting northeast to target Hall's rear. Meanwhile, the 18th Regiment aimed to assault Butler's positions and advance toward the coast to establish a new defensive line, targeting the enemy's headquarters, artillery, and supply units. Additionally, elements of the 10th Independent Mixed Regiment were tasked with exploiting an 800-yard gap between the 9th and 21st Marines, protected only by the 3rd Reconnaissance Company. In a desperate move following a failed attempt to evacuate by barge, Tamai opted for a nighttime banzai charge with his trapped 2500-strong force, seeking to break free from the Orote Peninsula and join Takashina's troops at Fonte. After dusk, the intermittent showers that had been falling all day became more frequent. A heavy downpour hampered organization of the brigade's defense for the night. On the other hand, the pitch blackness and the unpleasant weather aided the Japanese in making preparations for their supreme effort. Marines in the front lines could hear screaming, yelling, laughter, and the breaking of bottles as the Japanese made final arrangements. At times so much clamor could be heard that reports reached the command post that the assault had started. Afterwards someone aptly said that the confusion "sounded like New Year's Eve in the Zoo." While the enemy made ready and drank, Marine artillerymen laid down normal barrages along the swamp's edge and at all other points of possible penetration. Shortly before midnight the Japanese commanders felt that their men had reached the proper emotional state, and the assault began. Sake-crazed attackers swarmed from the cover of the mangroves in front of the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines. Led by flag-waving, sword-swinging officers, the enlisted men stumbled forward, carrying everything conceivable. Unsteady hands clutched pitchforks, sticks, ballbats, and pieces of broken bottles, together with the normal infantry weapons. The assault faced formidable resistance from Marine forces, particularly Shapley's 1st Battalion, which alone accounted for 256 enemy casualties.  When the surging Japanese mass came within range, Marine forward observers and company commanders gave the order to commence firing. Brigade, 77th Division, and corps artillery, 37mm guns, 81mm and 60mm mortars, machine guns, rifles, and grenades saturated the entire area. At one time officers brought the fire of the Pack Howitzer Battalion, 22d Marines, to within 35 yards of 3/22's front lines in an at tempt to stop the swarming horde. One weapons company lieutenant reported: "Arms and legs flew like snowflakes. Japs ran amuck. They screamed in terror until they died." But in a powerful attack it is inevitable that some men will seep through the blocking fire. Company L, 3/22, received the brunt of the subsiding attack and repulsed it before too much damage could be done. Those Japanese who survived fled to the momentary safety of the swamp. But observers shifted the artillery fire and between midnight and 0200 some 26,000 shells took a heavy toll of the remaining peninsular defenders. On the right flank of the 22d Marines a second counterattack hit. The Island War describes the action quite vividly: “. . . At its height, flares revealed an out-of-this-world picture of Nipponese drunks reeling about in our forward positions, falling into foxholes, tossing aimless grenades here and there, yelling such English phrases as they had managed to pick up, and laughing crazily, to be exterminated in savage close-in fighting. Succeeding waves were caught in a deadly cross-fire. Not until dawn did this attack finally dwindle out, at which time more than four hundred bodies were counted in front of the position.” In contrast to the frenzied close quarter action in the 3/22 zone, the platoon from Company A (1/4) that filled the gap between the two regiments participated in a shooting gallery affair with the Japanese. Enemy troops made no attempt at a concerted attack, and the platoon plus artillery, without the loss of a single Marine, killed 256 Imperial soldiers. This fantastic figure was verified by officers from regiment the following morning. Despite the intense machine-gun and artillery fire, some Japanese managed to infiltrate Marine positions, engaging in fierce hand-to-hand combat. However, by dawn, the Japanese offensive had been halted, with most remaining enemy forces eliminated, leaving Tamai with no option but to defend Orote Peninsula to the end. Meanwhile, Takashina's main assault, launched on July 26 at 04:00, faced initial success in overrunning Company B positions but was ultimately contained by the relentless machine-gun fire of the 1st Battalion.  Major Maruyama's men (2/18) advanced noisily, shouting, "Wake up American and die." The initial impetus of the assault passed completely over Company B in the center, previously reduced to about 50 men, and streamed through the gap down a draw toward the cliff. Despite the breakthrough, companies held the shoulders of the penetration and Lieutenant Colonel Williams ordered the units to refuse their flanks to the cliff. Company A on the left, commanded by Captain William G. Shoemaker, rallied in the face of the withering fire and overwhelming numbers. Shoemaker pulled back his right platoon to deny his flank to the enemy and to permit regrouping for a local counterattack. Company C (Captain Henry M. Helgren, Jr.) also successfully refused its flank to protect the position and immediately began firing into the onrushing Japanese. Tanks parked in the rear of the Marine positions took a great toll as the intruders surged through the widening gap. One report described the rush on the tanks as resembling a horde of ants. It went on to say of the Nipponese: “Savagely they swarmed upon the mechanized vehicles, oblivious of the vicious machine-gun fire, and frantically pounded, kicked, and beat against the turrets in an attempt to get the crew within. When this seemed futile they leaped to the ground and continued their wild rush down the draw to the rear areas. . .” Demolition charges were forgotten in the mad scramble to reach deeper into Marine-held territory. Machine gunners of 1/21 had a field day. Never had they seen such lucrative targets, but grenades and bayonets soon silenced the Marines as enemy soldiers overran the gun positions. Many of the Japanese were killed as they moved through the lines and into the ravine. Although some of the infiltrating Japanese got down the cliff to attack the battalion command post and Butler's mortar platoons, killing most of the mortarmen before being repelled by service troops, To the left, Craig's tenacious 2nd Battalion, in its exposed position, received the brunt of Shigematsu's attack, yet it managed to defeat seven determined counterattacks without losing any ground. Nonetheless, though they killed 950 Japanese, they suffered 50% casualties as well. Looking right, Ohashi's 3rd Battalion hit Butler's 3rd; and although two machine-guns were initially captured, their attack ended up being rapidly repelled. Consequently, the Japanese slid along the front and attacked down the vulnerable 800-yard gap, successfully defeating a strong roadblock to set up a dangerous line on the high ground behind Butler's 3rd Battalion.  The lack of a swiftly organized regimental reserve line led to approximately 70 Japanese infiltrating into the Division Hospital area, where they were eventually repelled by a pioneer force. The first warning came about 6:30 when corpsmen reported that a number of enemy soldiers could be seen on the high ground to the right of the hospital. Division headquarters immediately ordered Lieutenant Colonel George O. Van Orden (Division Infantry Training Officer) to take command of two companies of pioneers standing by for just such an eventuality and clear the enemy from the hard-pressed area. At the hospital, doctors ordered patients to evacuate the tents and go to the beach. Onlookers saw a pathetic sight as half-clothed, bandaged men hobbled down the coast road helping the more seriously wounded to safety. 41 of the patients grabbed rifles, carbines, hand grenades, and whatever else they could find and joined the battle. The hospital doctors, corpsmen, and pajama-clad patients presented a rare sight as they formed a defensive line around the tents. It was a solid line, however, and one that held until the recently organized reinforcements arrived. Only one patient was wounded during the fighting, but one medical officer and one corpsman later died of wounds. The casualty list also included one medical officer, one dental officer, one Navy warrant officer, 12 corpsmen, and 16 Marines from the medical companies wounded in action. This does not include those casualties suffered by Van Orden's force. After cleaning out the assigned area, Van Orden proceeded up the Nidual River Valley in pursuit of the fleeing Japanese. The attack had pushed the enemy back to the hill at the head of the ravine by 11:00, but a request to send a Marine patrol to the ridge to determine the hostile strength was denied. Other plans had already been made for the assault of this dominating terrain. It was from this high ground that Major Yukioka's men paralyzed the operation of 3/21's CP and threatened the flank of both the 9th and 21st Marines. While this action was taking place, the 12th Marines CP and several of its battalions were engaged in stopping the suicide squad attacks. In order to have these parties in position to make their foray in conjunction with the all-out offensive, enemy commanders had ordered the groups to infiltrate behind Marine lines on the night of 24-25 July. With typical Japanese patience, the raiders lay hidden in caves all day. As soon as darkness came on the night of 25-26 July they started firing random shots into the headquarters of the 12th Marines and began to move in small groups down the Asan Valley. A hand grenade duel went on during the early hours of darkness, but some of the intruders sought the safer confines of a cave not 20 feet from the headquarter's fire direction center. The artillerymen's perimeter defense held, and only one of the enemy succeeded in getting through to the guns. He was killed in the 3d Battalion's area before he could do any damage. In the five-hour long fighting around the regimental headquarters, 17 explosive-laden Japanese died. Most of them carried packs containing about 20 pounds of TNT with ready detonators, while others carried magnetic mines. With the coming of daylight, patrols went out to clean up any troops that might cause trouble later in the day. Men of the 12th Marines killed approximately 50-60 more enemy soldiers and drove the remainder into other areas where they were liquidated one by one. Despite the initial success of Takashina's well-coordinated counterattack, by noon, his forces had suffered defeat, marking the breaking of the backbone of Japanese resistance on Guam. Marine casualties were significant, with around 166 killed, 645 wounded, and 34 missing between July 25 and 27. Consequently, the 9th Marines retreated approximately 1500 yards to establish better defensive positions, and a battalion of Colonel Stephen Hamilton's 307th Regiment was deployed near Piti Navy Yard. However, the focus now shifted to covering the invasion of Tinian. While naval guns had intermittently harassed Tinian since June 11, the preliminary bombardment of Saipan's sister island commenced on June 20, with the first Army artillery battery targeting northern Tinian. By July 9, the 531st Field Artillery Battalion had fired a total of 7571 rounds. Following the fall of Saipan, the remaining 24th Corps Artillery and Marine howitzers intensified the bombardment, maintaining a continuous round-the-clock schedule and expending a total of 24,536 rounds on northern Tinian. For the most part, 14th Corps Artillery confined its efforts to the area north of the line between Gurguan Point and Masalog Point, while aircraft restricted their efforts to the southern half of the island. Naval ships were assigned any targets on Tinian deemed unsuitable to either of the other two arms. Coordination of the three supporting arms was assigned to the corps artillery representative attached to General Schmidt's staff. In one instance, an artillery air observer discovered three 140-mm. coastal defense guns on Masalog Point that were within easy firing range of White Beaches 1 and 2, but were masked from field artillery. The battleship Colorado was called in and, with its main batteries adjusted by an airborne artillery observer, succeeded in neutralizing or destroying the enemy weapons. Because the spotting plane was not in direct radio contact with the ship, it was necessary for the plane to submit its spotting data to the artillery post by radio, whence they were relayed by telephone to General Schmidt's headquarters, and in turn by radio on another frequency to the firing ship. In spite of this somewhat complicated system of communications, the time lag was so slight as to be insignificant. Meanwhile, starting from June 22, the P-47s belonging to the 318th Fighter Group maintained a relentless barrage on the airfields at Ushi, Gurguan Point, and just east of Tinian Town through constant strafing and bombing, further devastating the town to ruins. Beginning on July 15, naval gunfire operations were reinstated, with Admiral Hill's cruisers and destroyers delivering destructive bombardment daily against Tinian's harbor defenses. Then, on July 22, two P-47s dropped the first napalm bombs used in the Pacific war on Tinian, proving highly effective in incinerating canefields, underbrush, and enemy personnel located in open trenches and dugouts. The following day, Hill intensified preparatory fire with a formidable naval force comprising three battleships, two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and sixteen destroyers, positioned strategically to shell Tinian from all directions. However, there was no attempt to focus on the White Beaches to mislead the Japanese about the actual landing point. Throughout the rainy night, destroyers and cruisers maintained control over crucial road junctions while an UDT conducted a last-minute underwater reconnaissance, albeit unsuccessfully attempting to detonate recently discovered mines due to adverse weather conditions. At dawn on July 24, Hill's transports carrying the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions finally departed from Tanapag Harbor for the short journey to Tinian, successfully reaching their designated areas by 06:00. Simultaneously, the onslaught of artillery, air raids, and naval bombardment persisted over the Japanese defenses, intensifying into a full-scale onslaught by 07:00, with particular focus on the White Beaches. Additionally, efforts were made to neutralize mines on White 2, although these attempts proved futile. As the assault waves took shape, General Watson's Marines effectively executed the demonstration near Tinian Town without suffering any casualties. This demonstration effectively held the defenders in place, preventing them from deploying northward. However, a cleverly concealed Japanese battery managed to inflict significant damage on the battleship Colorado and the destroyer Norman Scott, resulting in the loss of 62 lives and 245 wounded before being neutralized. At 07:17, the initial landing wave crossed the designated line and began the 3000-yard journey to the beach, supported by intense pre-landing bombardment and rocket fire from LCI gunboats.  At about the same moment small-caliber fire--estimated variously as 50-caliber, 20mm and 40mm--began falling around the LST's. Its source could not be located because of the pall of smoke and dust that cloaked the island. Regarding this incident the logistics officer of the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, aboard one of the LST's in the area, recalled: “The fire . . . wounded two or more Navy enlisted men of the crew of the vessel, and possibly a couple of Marines belonging to the landing team. . . . My recollection concerning the Marines who were wounded is hazy . . . the incident created a stir and speculation concerning the source of the fire, but everyone soon settled down to the business at hand.” Despite encountering the sporadic small-caliber fire, the LVTs successfully reached the narrow beaches by 07:50. Upon landing, Company E of the 24th Marines swiftly engaged and eliminated a small beach-defense unit on White 1, while the remainder of the battalion made landfall. On White 2, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 25th Marines landed simultaneously but faced a delay in advancing due to the need for engineers to clear 100 horned mines that had destroyed three LVTs. Subsequently, Colonel Batchelder's Companies G and I circumvented two enemy blockhouses and initiated an inland attack, while other units subdued strongpoints. However, the presence of additional mines and staunch resistance from caves and ravines prevented them from reaching their objective at the O-1 Line and Mount Maga. Meanwhile, Colonel Hart's 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 24th Marines successfully advanced to the O-1 Line amid minimal opposition. Later in the day, reserve and artillery battalions were landed, along with Colonel Jones' 23rd Marines, although their landing was delayed due to communication issues. This delay proved beneficial due to heavy congestion on White 2 at the time. By nightfall, Colonel Wallace's 1st Battalion, along with the 2nd and 4th Tank Battalions, under Hill's command, successfully disembarked 15614 men ashore. General Cates, anticipating Japanese counterattacks, directed his troops to halt at 16:30 to fortify defenses, achieving a beachhead spanning about 7000 yards. This came at a cost of 15 Marines killed and 225 wounded. Ogata, as expected by Cates, immediately ordered counterattacks with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 50th Regiment and mobilized the Mobile Counterattack Force. While Japanese probes commenced at 22:30, the major assaults, marked by fierce banzai charges, began after midnight.  The attack on the left came first and lasted longest. At 2:00, men of the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, straining their eyes through the black moonless night, suddenly saw a compact group of Japanese a short 100 yards away. The Marines opened fire. The compact group became a screaming mass of attackers as the first Marine bullets and shells found targets. Now the shadows were alive with about 600 leaping Japanese naval troops, loaded with aggressive spirit, requiring no instructions to make their screaming charge. Marines called flares into action; the battlefield became light. Marines needed no orders either: the 37mm guns sprayed canister; machine guns cut into the enemy area with grazing fire; rifles pounded out at sighted or suspected targets; mortars crunched into the defilade areas; artillery crashed steadily behind the Japanese to shatter and destroy any reinforcement group. The tightly packed foe was a choice target for all these weapons, and hundreds of shells lashed his ranks. At no time did the enemy penetrate the 1st Battalion; but extremely heavy pressure against Company A, the unit that bore the brunt, caused the battalion commander to reinforce it with engineers, corpsmen, communicators, naval gunfire liaison and shore party personnel. The fight continued hot and heavy until about 0545, when dawn and the vigor of the enemy effort broke simultaneously. Medium tanks from Company B, 4th Tank Battalion, entered the fray at this time and stopped all further thrusts at the Marines' lines. Many Japanese, convinced that all was lost, committed suicide with grenades. While armored amphibians afloat fired on enemy groups hiding along the coast, Marines of the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, mopped up the area to their front, an activity completed by 0700. They counted 476 Japanese bodies, most of them within 100 yards of Company A's lines. Although no figures are available for Marine casualties in this action, the battalion commander estimated that ". . . Company A was reduced to about 30 men with usable weapons before the enemy was repulsed." Ogata's infantrymen struck Cates' center thirty minutes later, yet their efforts were thwarted by intense small-arms, mortar, and 37mm fire. Despite briefly breaching the line through weak points, they were ultimately defeated by rear elements after prolonged and heavy fighting.  This time, though many of the attackers fell forward of the lines, others penetrated a weak spot at the boundary between the two Marine regiments. About 200 Japanese poured through this spot before the flow could be stopped. After pausing in a swamp behind the lines, the enemy force speared out in two prongs: one straight into the beachhead toward U. S. artillery positions, the other turning west into the 25th Marines' rear areas. The latter group of Japanese attained first contact when they met a well-prepared support platoon from the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines. Positioned to contain just such a penetration as had occurred, the Marines quickly eliminated this Japanese threat, killing 91 in a brief, violent skirmish. The other prong pushed deep into the rear of the beachhead, finally reached the 75mm howitzer firing positions of the 2d Battalion, 14th Marines. Battery D, firing a mission for the 24th Marines, suddenly found itself beset from the front by many determined Japanese. Marines not actively engaged in servicing the howitzers rallied to the defense of their positions with small arms, while the remainder continued firing an artillery mission for the 24th Regiment. Later, as pressure mounted, all hands turned to the task of stopping the Japanese close at hand. At this juncture the .50-caliber machine guns of the other two batteries (E and F) of the battalion levelled a heavy volume of enfilading fire into the area forward of besieged Battery D. This fire, in the words of the battalion executive officer, "literally tore the Japanese . . . to pieces." To reinforce Battery D in its bitter fight, Company C, 8th Marines, arrived at 0445. But by then the situation was well in hand; the Japanese had faltered and stopped before the deluge of small-arms fire. Morning revealed about 100 dead Japanese in the area, while the artillerymen had lost but two of their number--both killed manning a .50-caliber machine gun with Battery D. The only Japanese penetration of the night had shattered itself against a prepared rear area. Up at the front, meanwhile, Marines of the 25th Regiment and the right (2d) battalion of the 24th Regiment, fought off a series of frontal rushes upon their positions. In each case the Japanese were stopped at the barbed wire forward of the Marines' lines. The all-night firing had taken a heavy toll of the Marines' ammunition stocks, however, and by shortly before daylight there was concern along the lines that another heavy attack might exhaust supplies. Dawn came first. Attached tanks moved up at once to range the area forward of the lines. They blasted points of resistance with their 75mm guns, killing or chasing such few Japanese as had survived the night melee. Nearly 500 Japanese were killed in the attacks against the center of the beachhead and in the skirmishes behind the lines following the penetration. The third and last major enemy effort struck the extreme right (south) flank of the beachhead at 3:30. The 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, in position along the coast, bore the brunt of this thrust, although the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines, also figured prominently in the action. Moving north along the coastal road, the enemy force consisted of five or six light tanks (about half of those available to the Japanese at Tinian) with infantrymen riding and following on foot. First warning of the enemy move came when Marine listening posts stationed along the road a short distance forward of the lines reported enemy tanks rumbling in from the south. With the tanks an estimated 400 yards in front of the lines, Marine artillery opened up. The tanks came on. Ready for just this situation, U. S. ships began firing illuminating shells over the area, virtually turning night into day. Bazookas, 75mm half-tracks, and 37mm guns attached to three battalions now went into action. One of the 37mm platoons, positioned astride the coral road, leveled point-blank fires into the enemy armor. Even so, one fast-moving tank weathered a 37mm hit and drove through the front lines into rear areas before a Marine bazookaman finished it off. An officer present on the scene described the action as he saw it: “The three lead tanks broke through our wall of fire. One began to glow blood-red, turned crazily on its tracks, and careened into a ditch. A second, mortally wounded, turned its machine guns on its tormentors, firing into the ditches in a last desperate effort to fight its way free. One hundred yards more and it stopped dead in its tracks. The third tried frantically to turn and then retreat, but our men closed in, literally blasting it apart. . . . Bazookas knocked out the fourth tank with a direct hit which killed the driver. The rest of the crew piled out of the turret, screaming. The fifth tank, completely surrounded, attempted to flee. Bazookas made short work of it. Another hit set it afire, and its crew was cremated.” Thus, five tanks stood immobile on the field of battle. If a sixth accompanied this incursion, it escaped, since there was no trace of it the following morning when Marines moved through the area. Despite the fact that their armor was gone, enemy foot soldiers from the 1st and 2d Battalions, 50th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry, pressed toward the Marines. The fighting that ensued was close-in and savage, but the Japanese never cracked the tight defense. The few who seeped through the lines met a quick end at the hands of the 23d Marines' reserve (1st Battalion), positioned to provide depth in this precise area. The operations officer of the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, described the weird termination of the Japanese activities: “. . . as it began to get light, Jap bodies began to fly ten to fifteen feet in the air in the area in front of our lines. . . . We knew that hand grenades did not have the power to blow a man's body that high and could not figure out what was happening. [Later] we moved out to mop up. . . . It turned out that about fifty percent of the dead Japs carried magnetic mines and had obviously been ordered to break through our lines and destroy the tanks in the rear of us. . . . The Japs who were wounded and unable to flee were placing the tank mines under their bodies and tapping the detonators.” Daylight revealed that the enemy had expended 267 men and five tanks (of 12 on the island) against the right flank of the beachhead with no success. By the end of the night's counterattacks, 1241 Japanese bodies lay scattered along Cates' front, with the 1st Battalion, 135th Regiment virtually decimated, while Marine casualties numbered less than 100. Reflecting on the engagement, they later concluded: "It was there and then that [we] broke the Jap's back in the battle for Tinian". This assessment proved accurate, as Ogata's forces began retreating towards the southern end of the island. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Similar to the experience invading Saipan, Guam and Tinian proved to be literal horror shows. The savagery of the Island hoping campaign had increased ten-fold. The Japanese hoped by inflicted as much pain as possible, the Americans might simply come to the peace table, but was there any real chance of that?

Découvrez les réponses à vos questions les plus fréquentes sur Academia Christiana, son histoire, l'affaire de la dissolution et nos projets futurs. Dans cette vidéo, nous abordons en détail les circonstances de la dissolution de notre association, les événements à venir et notre engagement continu en faveur de la formation et de la transmission des valeurs chrétiennes. Restez informés et impliqués dans notre démarche de reconstruction et de développement. Abonnez-vous pour ne rien manquer !

Inden vi er tilbage efter sommerferien med endnu flere afsnit om de eventyrere, der gjorde dét, alle andre troede var umuligt får I lige en lille sommerfortælling. Nærmere bestemt Bjørns egen yndlingslejrbålshistorie, som han ofte har læst op for både kammerater og sine børn, når han har været på shelter- eller telttur.Historien er fra Eventyrenes klubs bog ”24 fortællinger fra Det Runde Bord” og er skrevet af Bjørns gode venner Eske og Rane Willerslev.Vi er 1992 og Eske og Rane er taget på ekspedition til Kamchatka i Russisk Fjernøsten for at studere de oprindelig folk, tjukterne, som Rane faktisk tidligere har fortalt om her i DenYderste Grænse.Den følgende historie er et uddrag fra kapitlet: ”Udtømningsapparatet og andre fortællinger fra Sibirien”.

This month, host Paul Wirkus, MD, FAAP and Patrick Cartwright, MD will be talking about pediatric urology. The first week, listen in on a conversation about the pediatricians role in managing UDT and timely referrals.  Have a question? Email questions@vcurb.com. You questions will be answered in week four.For more information about available credit visit vCurb.com.ACCME Accreditation StatementThis activity has been planned and implemented in accordance with the accreditation requirements and policies of the Colorado Medical Society through the joint providership of Kansas Chapter, American Academy of Pediatrics and Utah Chapter, AAP.  Kansas Chapter, American Academy of Pediatrics is accredited by the Colorado Medical Society to provide continuing medical education for physicians. AMA Credit Designation StatementKansas Chapter, American Academy of Pediatrics designates this live activity for a maximum of 1.0 AMA PRA Category 1 Credits™. Physicians should claim only the credit commensurate with the extent of their participation in the activity.

The talk of artificial intelligence, or AI, dominates conversation and intimidates business leaders who fear change. In our 100th episode, SFBJ Editor-in-Chief Mel Melendez invites UDT CEO Henry Fleches to ease concerns about AI, and offer his insight and advice on adoption of the technology.

De Spelletjes Vrienden kletsen over bordspellen. Welke spellen vinden ze geweldig en welke spellen vinden ze helemaal niks? Ze delen top 10's, vertellen over hun wishlist en beantwoorden vragen van luisteraars. Tussendoor proberen ze ook zélf een spel te maken. Maar dat blijkt makkelijker gezegd dan gedaan... - Meer over ons vind je op www.despelletjesvrienden.nl.Linkje naar de spellen vind je in de beschrijving op https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UdT_ip_ZZtk (omdat het hier niet past).

Avui parlem del Memorial Esteve Cañellas, les consultes sobre la platja de gossos i els horts de Cal Dània i la victòria de la UDT contra el Roda de Berà podcast recorded with enacast.com

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: UDT1.01: Plannable and Unplanned Observations (3/10), published by Diffractor on April 12, 2024 on LessWrong. The Omnipresence of Unplanned Observations Time to introduce some more concepts. If an observation is "any data you can receive which affects your actions", then there seem to be two sorts of observations. A plannable observation is the sort of observation where you could plan ahead of time how to react to it. A unplanned observation is the sort which you can't (or didn't) write a lookup-table style policy for. Put another way, if a policy tells you how to map histories of observations to actions, those "histories" are the plannables. However, to select that policy in the first place, over its competitors, you probably had to do some big computation to find some numbers like "expected utility if I prepare a sandwich when I'm in the kitchen but not hungry", or "the influence of my decisions in times of war on the probability of war in the first place", or "the probability distribution on what the weather will be if I step outside", or "my own default policy about revealing secret information". These quantities affect your choice of action. If they were different, your action would be different. In some sense you're observing these numbers, in order to pick your action. And yet, the lookup-table style policies which UDT produces are phrased entirely in terms of environmental observations. You can write a lookup-table style policy about how to react to environmental observations. However, these beliefs about the environment aren't the sort of observation that's present in our lookup table. You aren't planning in advance how to react to these observations, you're just reacting to them, so they're unplanned. Yeah, you could shove everything in your prior. But to have a sufficiently rich prior, which catches on to highly complex patterns, including patterns in what your own policy ends up being... well, unfolding that prior probably requires a bunch of computational work, and observing the outputs of long computations. These outputs of long computations that you see when you're working out your prior would, again, be unplanned observations. If you do something like "how about we run a logical inductor for a while, and then ask the logical inductor to estimate these numbers, and freeze our policy going forward from there?", then the observations from the environment would be the plannables, and the observations from the logical inductor state would be the unplanned observations. The fundamental obstacle of trying to make updatelessness work with logical uncertainty (being unsure about the outputs of long computations), is this general pattern. In order to have decent beliefs about long computations, you have to think for a while. The outputs of that thinking also count as observations. You could try being updateless about them and treat them as plannable observations, but then you'd end up with an even bigger lookup table to write. Going back to our original problem, where we'll be seeing n observations/binary bits, and have to come up with a plan to how to react to the bitstrings... Those bitstrings are our plannable observations. However, in the computation for how to react to all those situations, we see a bunch of other data in the process. Maybe these observations come from a logical inductor or something. We could internalize these as additional plannable observations, to go from "we can plan over environmental observations" to "we can plan over environmental observations, and math observations". But then that would make our tree of (plannable) observations dramatically larger and more complex. And doing that would introduce even more unplanned observations, like "what's the influence of action A in "world where I observe that I think the influence of action A...

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: UDT1.01: Plannable and Unplanned Observations (3/10), published by Diffractor on April 12, 2024 on LessWrong. The Omnipresence of Unplanned Observations Time to introduce some more concepts. If an observation is "any data you can receive which affects your actions", then there seem to be two sorts of observations. A plannable observation is the sort of observation where you could plan ahead of time how to react to it. A unplanned observation is the sort which you can't (or didn't) write a lookup-table style policy for. Put another way, if a policy tells you how to map histories of observations to actions, those "histories" are the plannables. However, to select that policy in the first place, over its competitors, you probably had to do some big computation to find some numbers like "expected utility if I prepare a sandwich when I'm in the kitchen but not hungry", or "the influence of my decisions in times of war on the probability of war in the first place", or "the probability distribution on what the weather will be if I step outside", or "my own default policy about revealing secret information". These quantities affect your choice of action. If they were different, your action would be different. In some sense you're observing these numbers, in order to pick your action. And yet, the lookup-table style policies which UDT produces are phrased entirely in terms of environmental observations. You can write a lookup-table style policy about how to react to environmental observations. However, these beliefs about the environment aren't the sort of observation that's present in our lookup table. You aren't planning in advance how to react to these observations, you're just reacting to them, so they're unplanned. Yeah, you could shove everything in your prior. But to have a sufficiently rich prior, which catches on to highly complex patterns, including patterns in what your own policy ends up being... well, unfolding that prior probably requires a bunch of computational work, and observing the outputs of long computations. These outputs of long computations that you see when you're working out your prior would, again, be unplanned observations. If you do something like "how about we run a logical inductor for a while, and then ask the logical inductor to estimate these numbers, and freeze our policy going forward from there?", then the observations from the environment would be the plannables, and the observations from the logical inductor state would be the unplanned observations. The fundamental obstacle of trying to make updatelessness work with logical uncertainty (being unsure about the outputs of long computations), is this general pattern. In order to have decent beliefs about long computations, you have to think for a while. The outputs of that thinking also count as observations. You could try being updateless about them and treat them as plannable observations, but then you'd end up with an even bigger lookup table to write. Going back to our original problem, where we'll be seeing n observations/binary bits, and have to come up with a plan to how to react to the bitstrings... Those bitstrings are our plannable observations. However, in the computation for how to react to all those situations, we see a bunch of other data in the process. Maybe these observations come from a logical inductor or something. We could internalize these as additional plannable observations, to go from "we can plan over environmental observations" to "we can plan over environmental observations, and math observations". But then that would make our tree of (plannable) observations dramatically larger and more complex. And doing that would introduce even more unplanned observations, like "what's the influence of action A in "world where I observe that I think the influence of action A...

Seeing Haitians storm south Florida beaches is not uncommon. The timing of the Haitian uprising is suspicious considering the southern border invasion underway.Matt Bracken was commissioned in the US Navy through the NROTC program at UVA, and then graduated from Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL training class 105 in Coronado California. He served on east coast UDT and SEAL teams, taking a Naval Special Warfare detachment to Beirut in 1983. Mr. Bracken left active duty after Lebanon, upon completion of his obligated military service, but he remained in an active reserve status through the remainder of the 1980s. Since then he has lived in Florida, Virginia, South Carolina, Guam and California. In 1993 Mr. Bracken finished building a 48-foot steel sailing cutter of his own design, on which he has done extensive ocean cruising, including a solo voyage 9,000 miles from Panama to Guam and two Panama Canal transits.Follow Matt Bracken:https://enemiesforeignanddomestic.com/https://twitter.com/TheMattBrackenSubscribe to Freedom First Network on Rumble to watch all of our shows LIVE: https://rumble.com/c/freedomfirstnetwork Elevate your meals with Freedom First Beef… even if you find yourself in the middle of the apocalypse! Use code FFN for 15% off and enjoy high-quality beef whenever you crave it – today or tomorrow! https://freedomfirstbeef.com Be ready for anything life throws your way with The Wellness Company's Medical Emergency Kit. Order today using code FFN for a 10% discount at https://twc.health/ffn. Protect your financial future with precious metals! Schedule your consultation with Our Gold Guy today and take control of your financial destiny!  https://ourgoldguy.com Unleash the spirit of liberty in every cup with Freedom First Coffee's Founders Blend. Order now using code RIGHTNOW and savor the unparalleled taste of freedom in every patriotic sip. https://freedomfirstcoffee.com

Matt Bracken graduated from Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL training class 105 in Coronado California. He served on east coast UDT and SEAL teams, taking a Naval Special Warfare detachment to Beirut in 1983. Mr. Bracken left active duty after Lebanon, upon completion of his obligated military service, but he remained in an active reserve status through the remainder of the 1980s. Since then he has lived in Florida, Virginia, South Carolina, Guam and California. Matt is a self-described freedomista who loves ocean sailing for the pure freedom it permits. He is a constitutionalist who believes in the original intent of the founding fathers of our country. He lives with his family in North Florida and longs for the wide blue ocean. The KunstlerCast theme music is the beautiful Two Rivers Waltz written and performed by Larry Unger

 Dans cette séance de foire aux questions, Armel et Victor répondent à toutes vos interrogations sur nos UDT, notre public, la vie spirituelle lors de nos évènements et l'engagement à l'année au sein d'Academia Christiana. ❓N'hésitez pas à nous poser vos questions en commentaire de cette vidéo.

Last time we spoke about Operation Hailstone, the continued drive upon Madang and the horrible massacre during the Indian Ocean Raid of 1944. Operation Hailstone saw what was once called the Gibraltar of the Pacific, Truk nearly annihilated. The demoralized and understrength Japanese could not hope to contest the air strikes and naval bombardment. Vice-Admiral Kobayashi Masami was held responsible for the defeat and was relieved of his command. Over on New Guinea the Australians were continuing their drive to Madang, killing and taking prisoner all the Japanese they could along the way. Then over in the Indian Ocean, Vice-Admiral Takasu Shiro unleashed a raid against allied shipping, a rarity for the Japanese. Unfortunately the raid devolved into a singular attack against the British steamer Behar. A needless and cruel massacre was performed aboard the Tone, killing 65 to a possible 100 people. Such actions would only see justice after the war. This episode is the battle of Eniwetok Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Operation Flintlock was a huge success, Kwajalien was seized incredibly fast and the invasion of Majuro saw no Japanese even on the atoll. Because of this the allied war planners had to shuffle the schedule and thus was born Operation Hailstone and the invasion of Eniwetok. Eniwetok had been originally slabbed for May, but it seemed obvious the Japanese power in the Marshalls was crumbling a lot faster than anticipated. Consequently, Admiral Nimitz knew it would be necessary to capture the atoll to give shelter to all the ships he intended to deploy westward in the drive against the Japanese inner empire. Since it now seemed Brigadier-General Thomas Watson's 8000 reserve troops of the 22nd Marines and the 106th Regiment would no longer be required, Admirals Spruance and Hill began preparing them for the invasion of Eniwetok.  The operation was codenamed Catchpole and the war planners would only have 12 days to prepare. Moving up the invasion of Eniwetok required stripping the new garrisons of Kwajalein Island and Roi-Namur of manpower and supplies. The landing boat crews were greens, not trained with the troops. General Watson reported “the infantry, amphibian tractors, amphibian tanks, tanks, aircraft, supporting naval ships, and most of the staffs concerned had never worked together before.” Nevertheless, the forces available for the operation would be plentiful and well equipped. Having gone through the horribly bloody assault on Tarawa, Admiral Hill was relieved to have a large number of amtracs. The Army's 708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion would sail with 119 LVTs, most of which were the heavily armored newer models. As Hill would remark later “At Eniwetok, I felt like a millionaire, but at Tarawa, I was a pauper.” Admiral Hill would have at his disposal 5 attack transports, 1 transport, 2 attack cargo ships, 1 cargo ship, 1 LSD, 2 APDs, 6 LCIs and 9 LSTs to carry General Watson's Tactical Group 1, consisting of the 22nd marines and 106th regiment led by Colonel John Walker. Further support came in the form of 3 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers and 7 destroyers of Rear-Admiral Jesse Oldendorf's task force 51.17; 3 escort carriers and 3 destroyers of Rear-Admiral Van Ragsdale task group 53.6; and Rear-Admiral Samuel Ginder's carrier  task force 58.4. The plan was to first land two scout companies;  the Reconnaissance Company, V Amphibious Corps, against  Camellia and Canna Islands southeast of Engebi; and the scout company D, 4th Marine Tank Battalion against Zinnia Island northwest of Engebi to prevent any escape of the enemy from Engebi in that direction. The scout would secure Camellia and Canna allowing the 2nd Separate Pack Howitzer Battalion with their 75-mm pack howitzers to deploy on Camellia, and the 104th Field Artillery Battalion with their 105-mm. howitzers to deploy on Canna. The artillery would then be used to support the next day's attack against Engebi. The job of  hitting Engebi was given to the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 22nd Marines of Colonel John Walker. His 3rd Battalion would be kept in regimental reserve. The two battalions were to be supported by medium tanks of the 2nd Separate Tank Company, and a platoon from the Cannon Company, 106th Infantry, with two 105-mm, self-propelled guns. Lastly Colonel Russell Ayers' 106th Regiment would hit Eniwetok Island; and once it was captured, the infantry would take Parry Island along with the 22nd Marines.  Defending against them would by General Nishida's 1st amphibious brigade; organized from the 3rd Independent Garrison Unit. It had 3 1,036-man mobile battalions, a 76-man machine-cannon unit with 6 20mm guns, 66-man tank unit with 9 Type 95 light tanks, a 243-man engineer unit, a 139-man signal unit, and 190-man medical unit. The mobile battalions had a 103-man 1st Company while the other 2 had 197 men, plus a 155-man mortar company, a 121-man artillery company with 3 75mm mountain guns, 2 37mm anti-tank guns, and a 66-man engineer platoon. These units had recently been brought over alongside his HQ.  250 IJN personnel and 1115 troops were deployed on Parry, about 692 soldiers, 500 IJN personnel and 61 men of the 61st Guard Unit would Engebi;  and only 779 troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Hashida Masahiro, commander of the 1st Mobile Battalion  would defend Eniwetok. In the 6 weeks following the Kwajalein assault, the Japanese had been constructing defenses on the lagoon side based on reports they received from the Kwajalein attack, yet there was not enough time to make much progress. The 3 defended islands of Eniwetok Atoll had no naval-manned defenses, other than two 120mm coast defense guns and two 13.2mm twin machine-guns on Engebi's north corner. 3 75mm and 28 20mm anti-aircraft guns had been delivered, but were not even emplaced. The 1st Amphibious Brigade arrived less than a month and a half before the American would land with barely any time to dig in. While significant construction materials had been delivered, there was not nearly enough time to make much progress. Defenses would be mainly dugouts, trenches, and foxholes. The brigade deployed its infantry weapons more or less equally. Engebi was expected to be the most heavily defended, but instead the most troops were actually on Parry. On February 15th, Hill's scout group sailed out from Kwajalein lagoon while Operation Hailstorm smashed Truk. Meanwhile Ginder's carriers proceeded directly to Eniwetok and on February 16th launched a series of preliminary strikes. The strike completely destroyed all the buildings upon the atoll, neutralized her airfield and destroyed 14 aircraft on the ground. Naval bombardment of Engebi, Eniwetok, Parry and Japtan Islands began in the early morning hours of February 17, and was joined by more air strikes after dawn. Simultaneously, Hill's force arrived off Eniwetok's southeast coast. As the surface ship bombarded the islands, amtracs launched and landed by 1:30pm against Camellia and Canna. After securing Canna and Camellia by 2pm, the Reconnaissance Company landed, against no opposition, on the 3 islands northwest of Camellia and on 2 small unnamed islands west of Canna. These landings were made to offer security to the artillery units against possible Japanese infiltration during the night. Hill then landed his 2 artillery battalion to support the invasion of Engebi. Engebi's total weapon strength came to 2 flame throwers, 13 grenade dispatchers, 12 light machine guns, 4 heavy machine guns, 2 37-mm. guns, 1 50-mm. mortar, 11 81-mm. mortars, 1 20-mm. automatic gun, 2 20-mm. cannons, 2 mountain guns, 3 light tanks, and 2 12-cm. coast defense guns. Colonel Yano predicted that a heavy bombardment would precede the amphibious landings, he accordingly planned to concentrate his defensive system on the lagoon shore of this triangularly shaped island. The Japanese defenders were ordered to "...lure the enemy to the water's edge and then annihilate him with withering fire and continuous attacks." Most of the prepared defenses and over half of the brigade detachment were concentrated at the center of the lagoon shore. The approach to this strong point was flanked by the fire of 2 75-mm. mountain guns on the northwest corner and 2 20-mm. machine cannon in the southern part of the concentration itself, as well as 2 37-mm. guns emplaced on the southern tip. Frontal fire could be delivered by the 20-mm. automatic guns and the three tanks, each mounting 37-mm. guns. Hill deployed UDT-1 frogmen to first clear obstacles and mines while D Company , 4th Tank Battalion secured Zinnia and 4 other islets west of Engebi in the early morning of February 18. At 6:55 Colorado and Louisville began shelling the northern and eastern part of Enegbi. Tennessee and Pennsylvania moved at dawn to deliver close-range destructive fire against beach defenses from flanking positions on each side of the boat lanes. At 7:20 destroyers, Phelps and Hall, moved into position as direct support ships, but because of the smoke and dust rising from the island, Hall was unable to fire. Just before 8:00 the naval guns ceased fire to allow a half-hour air strike to take place. This was completed ahead of schedule and naval fire was resumed at 8:11 and increased steadily in intensity until just before the first troops landed. Shortly after the air strike was lifted, artillery on Canna and Camellia joined the naval guns and began to fire on the beaches at maximum rate until just after the first wave landed at 8:44, whereupon the artillery barrage was lifted inland to the center of the island for another five minutes. Thereafter, because of the smallness of the island, very few call missions were fired. All of the gunfire detonated the main ammunition dump on Engebi as Colonel Walker's amtracs made their way to the island covered by LCI gunboats. Many of the LCI rockets fell short forcing some amtracs off course, while quite a few would break down as they had been worn out by the attack on Kwajalein. Despite the technical difficulties, the first assault waves hit the beaches at 8:43. The 2nd Battalion hit Beach Blue 3 with G Company  on the left, F Company  in the center and e Company  on the right; and the 1st Battalion hit Beach White 1 with B Company  on the left, A Company  in the center and C Company  on the right. On the left, the 2nd Battalion pushed forward rapidly, bypassing isolated points of resistance and quickly overran the airfield by 10:30. F Company managed to swing towards Weasel Point on the west corner with remarkable speed. On the right, the 1st Battalion quickly split up with A Company  advancing north to New Point and C Company  towards Skunk Point on the southeast corner.  The Japanese put up a stiff fight against them, as their spider-hole defenses on the gap between the 2 companies were covered by the dense brush and palms. As a result, the 3rd Battalion would land at Beach White 1 at 09:55 and quickly advanced with tanks to clear the various tunnels and covered foxholes that resisted them. The Japanese were slowly forced northward along the island's eastern shore, eventually becoming isolated and cut down. By 1:10, Weasel and Newt Points had been cleared; and at 2:50, about 6 hours after the initial landing, General Watson declared the island secured. 6 minutes later, C Company captured Skunk Point; and by 6:30, the 1st Battalion secured their half of Engebi. The assault had been executed so fast that even the veteran IJA defenders were unable to offer any meaningful organized resistance. Bypassed Japanese troops and infiltrators did cause difficulties through the night, but mopping-up continued and Engebi was formally secured at 8:00 on February 19. American losses were 85 dead and missing and 521 wounded against the 1280 Japanese killed and 16 taken prisoner.   For the assault against Eniwetok, new intelligence indicated that the island was more heavily defended than expected, so Watson would reinforce the 106th Regiment with Walker's reserve 3rd Battalion and some Marine tanks. What they would be facing on Eniwetok was a total of 2 flame throwers, 13 grenade dischargers, 12 light machine guns, 2 heavy machine guns, 1 50-mm. mortar, 11 81-mm. mortars, 1 20-mm. automatic gun, 3 20-mm. cannons, and 3 light tanks. The Eniwetok garrison was divided into 5 forces, 3 on the lagoon shore, 1 placed so as to cut off the narrow eastern neck of the island, and 1 to be held in reserve. The 3 lagoon shore forces were to place their weapons so as to obtain interlocking bands of fire over the surface of the lagoon. The force in the east was to protect the rear of the 3 lagoon shore forces from any American units landing on the northern tip of the island. The reserve force was placed to the rear of the forces on the lagoon shore, near the western tip of the island. The defenses of the island consisted mostly of foxholes and trenches, which were better constructed and better camouflaged than those at Parry. After the capture of Kwajalein, the Japanese had begun construction of concrete pillboxes on the southwest tip of the island and had dug additional foxholes. Land mines were also found on Eniwetok. Colonel Ayers' new plan was to land his two battalions abreast. 1st Battalion would land on the right on Yellow Beach 2 and was charged with making the main effort to the west to clear the lower end of the island. The 3rd Battalion would land on Yellow Beach 1 and form a covering line just east of a road that bisected the island from the lagoon to the ocean shore. For the assault, the infantrymen lacked field artillery support; and although Eniwetok had also been subjected to naval bombardment on February 18, it had only received a fraction of the bombardment targeted against Engebi and Parry. A total of 1,179.7 tons of naval shells had been fired on Engebi, 944.4 tons were to be used on Parry, but Eniwetok received only 204.6 tons altogether. At 8:10am on the 19th, carrier planes began to bomb and strafe the beaches and LCI gunboats followed this up with a last-minute rocket attack against the landing areas. Meanwhile, although the arrival of the marine tanks was delayed by choppy seas and a 9-foot embankment just inland halted the amphibian tanks, but the Americans would manage to hit the Yellow beaches at 9:16. The 3rd Battalion landed on Beach Yellow 1 with L Company on the left, K Company on the right, and I Company following as reserve. Upon landing, L Company, followed by I Company pivoted east along the pier while K Company  pushed across the island to reach the opposite coast at 10:30. On the right, however, the 1st Battalion encountered dense spider-hole defenses as C and B Companies attempted to push across the island while A Company  attacked southwest along the coast. By noon,  the front line of the 1st Battalion was in the shape of an S, extending from the lagoon to the ocean.  The Japanese at this point made a bit of an unexpected move. As the Americans penetrated further inland, the Japanese began abandoning their positions and launched a 400 man counterattack. The Japanese managed to break through before getting completely cut down causing some havoc, but by 12:45 were beaten back. The American casualties were very high during the fight. Because of the strong resistance, Ayers ordered his 3rd battalion to attack east and for the reserves marines to land and relieve the left half of the 1st battalion's lion. The American attack to the west resumed with A Company  on the right wing making slow progress through the enemy positions near the lagoon, but the mingled elements of C and B Companies even after being reorganized and supported by 3 Cannon Company guns, could not push through the line taken up by the enemy at the end of his counterattack. Although it steadily reduced the Japanese positions, the attacking force was unable to move forward. By 2:25, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines landed, passing through Ayers' 1st Battalion one hour later. Both battalions then launched a concerted attack towards the southwest end at 3:15, yet the Marines would soon lag behind, their advance delayed by the rugged terrain and the lack of adequate illumination and tank support. While the fight for Eniwetok was underway, the Amphibious Reconnaissance Company occupied Japtan by nightfall after first securing 10 unoccupied islets on the atoll's eastern rim while the scout tank battalion secured eight islets on Eniwetok's eastern rim, successfully subduing the enemy resistance on Rigilli. This would allow Watson to have some much-needed artillery support for the attack against Parry. On Parry the Japanese were able to construct very few installations and gun positions above ground in the short time that the brigade was there. With very few exceptions, the defenses consisted mostly of foxholes and trenches. These fell into two categories, the old and the new. The old foxholes and trenches were located on the ocean side, were well constructed, and often lined with rocks or coconut logs. Relying on their estimate of American amphibious tactics as demonstrated at Tarawa, the Japanese had recently undertaken heavier defenses on the lagoon side. These were freshly and hastily constructed, and therefore much inferior. All entrenchments were well camouflaged. A typical strong point consisted of a spider-web pattern of entrenchments. In the center of the web was a large personnel shelter lined and covered with coconut logs. Strips of corrugated iron and a thick layer of sand were placed over the log roof. The center was surrounded by a circle of foxholes ten to fifteen feet apart, mostly roofed over with corrugated iron. These holes were connected with one another by narrow trenches or tunnels. The trenches and tunnels on the outer edge of the web were in turn joined by radial trenches and tunnels to the shelter or control foxhole in the center of the position. The entire web was extremely well camouflaged and very difficult to locate. Parry was honeycombed with positions of this sort. Back to the action to deny the enemy an opportunity for the customary aggressive night tactics, Ayers ordered  a night attack at 6:50. At 3:33 on February 20, Ayers' 1st Battalion therefore managed to reach the western end of the island, though the Marines were still 100 yards to their left rear. The Japanese, meanwhile, attempted to probe and infiltrate through the night, finally counterattacking at 09:10. The 3rd Battalion, 22d Marines, found one of the main enemy defenses, manned by a strong and determined force, at the southwestern corner of the island in its zone. A combined force of light and medium tanks, 5 guns from the Cannon Company, 106th Infantry, and a supporting rifle company from the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, joined the Marines in destroying the enemy during the day. The 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, mopped up its zone. The next day, after the withdrawal of the Marines, the battalion ran a line across the island from the pier and mopped up to the western end. A Company , at the right, finished first and returned to the battalion area near the landing beach. B Company , in the center, reached the end of the island a little later and then went for a swim. C Company , on the ocean side, found 22 of the enemy in hiding and destroyed them in a firefight that sent some bullets over the heads of B Companies swimmers. B Company  came out of the water, dressed, and rejoined the fight. The western end of Eniwetok Island was finally clear of Japanese. By 2:45, the stronghold was finally reduced and the western end of Eniwetok was at last secured. To the east, Ayers' 3rd Battalion also attempted to continue its attack during the night, but this proved futile as the troops lacked the confidence and experience for such a difficult task. As such, the battalion halted at 4:30, about a third of the way from the island's north end. They resumed their attack at 7:00 on the 21st, finally reached the north end at 4:30. The island was finally declared secure at 5:21, with the Americans losing 37 killed and 94 wounded against 800 Japanese killed and 23 taken prisoner. Because action had been bogged down at Eniwetok, the assault on Parry was delayed until the island was reduced and Walker's 3rd Battalion could re-embark as the regimental reserve. In the meantime, aerial, naval and artillery shells had pounded Parry for three days . Naval bombardment dropped on Parry totaled 944.4 tons, considerably more than the weight delivered on Eniwetok Island; the weight of artillery shells came to 245 tons, and aerial bombs added 99 tons more. Meanwhile while the rest of the 22nd Marines were brought from Engebi to southern Eniwetok. By this point the expedition was running low on ammunition and weapons. Naval and artillery shells were carefully apportioned. From all the ships, available grenades and demolition charges were gathered. To supplement them, 775 grenades and 1,500 percussion caps were flown in from Kwajalein while the attack was in progress. Other units surrendered BAR's and rifles to equip the 22nd Marines. In addition, the Marines had found the M1 carbine, with which many men had armed themselves, to be a less than effective combat weapon, and M1 rifles and Browning Automatic rifles were redistributed from 106th Infantry units to replace them. For the last assault of the operation Catchpole, Walker planned was to land two battalions abreast directly against the defenders' strongpoints; and after seizing the beachhead, tanks and infantry were to press forward to the ocean side of the island. Battleships Tennessee and Pennsylvania took positions only 1,500 yards north of the landing area and not only mauled it with their big guns but also hit it with their 40-mm. automatic weapons batteries. From the other side of the boat lanes, the heavy cruisers Indianapolis and Louisville and the destroyer Hailey also fired. Smoke and dust blew out over the lagoon without masking the target for the battleships but with serious consequences for the other three warships and for the landing craft that started ashore at 8:45. 3 LCI's that approached through the haze with the first wave to fire rockets were hit by 5-inch shells from Hailey, killing 13 and wounding 47. Some LVTs landed outside the designated beaches, thus widening the front and making necessary the suspension of artillery fire in their vicinity. Other tractors crisscrossed or fell behind, so that the landing teams had difficulty in reorganizing on the beaches. While the tractors made their 15-minute run from the line of departure, two formations of planes bombed Parry in the last of 219 sorties made during the 6 days of action at Eniwetok Atoll. This time they only bombed the island, omitting strafing runs because of the type of defense trench systems on Parry Island.At 09:00, Walker's 1st battalion landed at 09.00hrs on Green 1 just north of the island's central portion, with Companies B, C, and A in line left to right. It was 200yds too far south, only landing on the extreme south edge of its assigned beach. The 2nd Battalions landed at 9.00 on Green 2 near Parry's northwest corner, but 200yds farther south than intended, with part of the battalion landing on about two-thirds of Green 3 to the south. Mines were encountered on the beach, causing some casualties. In the line were, from left to right, companies G, F, and E. The first troops struck Green Beaches 2 and 3 at 9:00, with a wave of tractors and one of LCM's carrying medium tanks directly behind them. Heavy machine gun and mortar fire greeted the marines at the water's edge. As they tried to form an assault line, enfilading machine gun fire also struck them from a concealed position on the pier at the right. The machine guns were silenced by grenades and by shells from the amphibian tanks. Then the assault passed inland. Some of the enemy in trenches and foxholes in the dune line on the beach, men who had survived the bombardment, were overcome in hand-to-hand fighting. Thankfully, shells from the amphibian tanks managed to silence the Japanese guns, which allowed the Americans to move inland and to land their medium tanks behind the battalions. The defense plans for Parry outlined that about one half of the troops were disposed at the water's edge, where they were to be grouped into strong points about 140 feet apart. The defense of the beaches was to be supported by mountain guns, 20-mm. automatic guns, and other weapons. The mountain guns and 20-mm's were to fire first. Light and heavy machine guns were to fire on landing craft before and after they reached the underwater obstacles. Next, mortars and grenade throwers were to deliver concentrated fire against the enemy at the beaches and were to cover the sectors between fortified areas and strong points. To facilitate the employment of artillery and heavy weapons, the order called for fields of fire to be cleared through coconut groves. The order gave quite explicit instructions for measures against tanks: "Destroy enemy tanks when they are stopped by obstacles by means of hollow charge anti-tank rifle grenades, close-in attack, land mines, water mines, and Molotov cocktails. Especially at night, have a part of the force attack them." The order made it very clear that the brigade was not expected to survive an American assault once it had established a beachhead. Any troops remaining after the Americans had landed in force were to assemble in a central area. Then, the order continued, "...sick and wounded who cannot endure the battle will commit suicide. [Others]... will reorganize, return to battle as a unit, and die fighting.” 3 dug-in Japanese light tanks decided to attack, rather than earlier when the infantry were vulnerable. Yet the Shermans immediately destroyed them before they inflicted any damage, so Walker's battalions would be allowed to push forward against the retreating enemy. While Companies G and F swung left to reach the north end by 1:30, E Company  drove straight across to reach the ocean shore by 12:00. Then, as the Marines were consolidating, a group of 200 Japanese were discovered marching north and were wiped out within minutes. Over on the right, B Company reached the ocean coast at 11:55, while Companies C and A swung south and  successfully reached Valentine Pier by 1:30. Walker's reserve 3rd Battalion  landed at 10:00, immediately advancing south while clearing bypassed enemy pockets. After artillery bombardment, the attack south was launched at 1:30. Pressing through thick underbrush, both battalions achieved rapid progress as they overran a series of trench and foxhole defenses. The battalions were 450 yards from the island's southern tip when they halted for the night.Walker decided to declare the end of enemy resistance at 19:30, radioing Brigadier General Walker, "I present you with the island of Parry at 7.30." The Only slight enemy activity that existed anymore was occasional sniping, which would be swiftly cleared by 09:30 on February 23. For the capture of Parry, Marine casualties were 73 dead and missing and 261 wounded against 1300 Japanese killed, including General Nishida, and 66 captured. In total, American casualties during the Battle of Eniwetok came to 313 killed, 879 wounded and 77 missing. The Japanese had lost their entire garrison, with 3380 killed and 105 captured. Between March 7 and April 5, Walker would then conduct Operation Flintlock Jr., carrying 29 successful landings, securing 14 mostly unoccupied atolls and killing over 100 Japanese at the cost of two Marines killed. Other detachments would finally occupy the Erikub, Aur and Ujelang Atolls by the end of April, leaving only Mille, Maloelap, Jaluit and Wotje bypassed and unoccupied, in addition to the Japanese presence at Kosrae, Wake and Nauru.  Over on Jaluit Rear-Admiral Masuda Nisuke commanded the 13,000 personnel and beginning on March 4th, the 4th Marine Base Defense Aircraft Wing, headquartered on Majuro, and the 7th Air Force commenced a concerted campaign to neutralize the Japanese garrisons, which continued until the war's end. Navy Aviation and Army Air Forces had previously destroyed most Japanese aircraft on these islands. The 13,000 tons of aerial-delivered ordnance, coupled with frequent naval shelling, killed 2,564 Japanese and 4,876 died of disease and starvation; the Marines sprayed oil over the garrisons' gardens. Fighter-bomber units deploying to the Pacific would first serve in this role, perfecting their bombing techniques before moving forward to support other operations as new units replaced them. The Japanese survivors would finally surrender on September 2, 1945. As the American commander took stock of what they had achieved in the Marshalls, their confidence and self-assurance rose to new heights. In less than 3 months' time, the tragic and costly lessons of Tarawa had been refined and integrated into amphibious planning and doctrine, and the results had been tremendous. To the extent that further improvement was needed, it was in the details of execution rather than any deficiency in the plans themselves. Holland Smith concluded in his final report, “In the attack of coral atolls, very few recommendations can be made to improve upon the basic techniques previously recommended and utilized in Flintlock.” Over in Tokyo there was shock and incomprehension at the speed and ‘low cost' of the US victory over the Marshall Islands. The implications for Japan's future were dire. As Ichiro Koyose, the permanent Director of Japan's Imperial Rule Association said in an address, “The Marshall Islands are the frontporch entrance to Tokyo … The enemy is probably finally thinking of some such thing as bombing Tokyo in deadly earnest …” Yet that is it for today on the Marshall Island front as we are going to be diving back into Burma. The Japanese had launched their main offensive on the Arakan at the start of February, successfully infiltrating through the British positions to cut off their rear. By cutting the Indians' supply lines off, the Japanese expected to force them back into disarray; but these were not the same men they had been fighting for years. The Indian troops were better trained and ready to put up a real fight. This was seen when they faced Japanese attack after attack, using their all-round defensive brigade boxes, also referred to as "baby tortoise" or "beehive" tactics. This baffled Japanese,and soon they would leave the invaders effectively encircled and running out of supplies, as they themselves depended on what supplies could trickle to them over jungle trails. With increasing 'fanatical' desperation, the Japanese  began to press home attacks seeking to secure vitally needed stockpiled supplies of food, arms and ammunition upon which their offensive depended. In the Sinzweya area, the 112th Regiment made a night attack on the 9th, successfully breaking through the southwest corner of the enemy's perimeter defense in the Sinzweya Basin. Although the Regiment was successful in firing an ammunition dump and doing great damage, the enemy's employment of tanks forced it to draw back without further exploiting the breakthrough. On the morning of the 10th, Major General Sakurai met Colonel Tanabashi on Hill 315, due northeast of Sinzweya, and encouraged him to press the enemy more aggressively. The failure of the 112th to achieve a signal success appeared, however, to have so depressed morale that the Regiment was reluctant to repeat its attack. The 7th Indian Division, kept its morale high despite the intense fighting, rapidly mounting casualties and increasing exhaustion. They continued to fight on until the advanced Japanese units had exhausted their own food and ammunition. Whenever possible, the British-Indian troops also struck back against Japanese positions and harried their already tenuous supply lines. Furthermore, the massive firepower of the British mountain, field and medium artillery inflicted massive casualties on the attacking Japanese infantry. Firing from positions within each brigade box, carefully concerted artillery fire plans thus rained death upon Japanese troops scattered in the jungle throughout the divisional area. As such, the 71st Brigade would successfully recaptured Taung Bazaar on February 10, and was steadily advancing southwards towards the Ngakyedauk Pass. That same day, General Giffard realized that there was no possibility of 15th Corps being able to reach the Indin-Rathedaung line before the pre-monsoon swell made amphibious operations impossible, so he recommended canceling the Akyab assault. He placed the 36th Indian Division under the 14th Army, allotted the 50th Brigade to 4th Corps and ordered the 25th Indian Division towards Chittagong. General Slim, however, realized that the Japanese plans had miscarried, so he directed General Christison to resume the offensive against the Tunnels-Buthidaung position as soon as he had cleared the land communications to his forward divisions.    Consequently, as the 29th Brigade of the36th division was arriving at Bawli, Christison sent the bulk of the 26th Indian Division to destroy the enemy in the Kalapanzin valley behind the 7th Division. By the13th, patrols from both divisions successfully linked up near Taung Bazar; but at the same time, the Japanese were bringing reinforcements for their attacks at Sinzweya. The Japanese offensive reached its climax on February 14 when General Sakurai called for an all-out attack that evening. The attack was courageous and managed to achieve some initial gains, but it was also uncoordinated, suicidal and unsuccessful, ending with the Indians reinforcing the Admin Box the following day. Meanwhile elements of the 5th Indian Division, regrouped and battered away against a heavily fortified Japanese roadblock at the summit of the Ngakyedauk Pass. Thus, the Japanese tactical and administrative position quickly went from bad to worse around Sinzweya, as pressure steadily mounted against its vastly outnumbered troops. After a few days of bitter fighting the Japanese finally abandoedn their positions at Kyaukyit and Pyinshe Kala and began occupying areas covering the routes back to their main positions.  By the 20th, the strength of the Japanese striking force had  shrunk to 400 men increasingly-debilitated by lack of sleep and shortages of food. On the 23th, after a short but sharp fight, a battalion of 89th Brigade from the east and 123rd Brigade from the west linked up at Ngakyedauk Pass and by evening had firmly secured it. The following day, as soon as the 500 casualties from Sinzweya had been evacuated, the pass was opened to normal traffic and air supply of the 7th Division ceased. As Geoffrey Evans later wrote with obvious pride: “For eighteen days the British and Indian troops, most of them belonging to the administrative services, had withstood the determined attacks of trained Japanese infantry supported by guns and air. It spoke volumes for the war in which the junior leaders had carried out their task and the stout-heartedness of their men.” At this point, General Hanaya recognized the inevitable and ordered the Ha-Go offensive to be abandoned. The shattered remnants of Sakurai's command subsequently withdrawing in small parties. The last attack on Sinzweya, made on the 22nd, ended in failure. On the following night, acting on his own responsibility, Colonel Tanabashi withdrew his main force to Kreingyaung, leaving the 8th Company of the 112th Infantry at Ngakyedauk Pass and the 2nd Battalion of the 112th on a small hill south of Sinzweya. Upon receiving a report of Tanabashi's withdrawal, Major General Sakurai was really pissed off but realized that the move was undoubtedly inevitable, being forced by lack of food and supplies. At the suggestion of General Sakurai, the Division commander determined to suspend the offensive and ordered the Sakurai Unit to withdraw to the line of the Buthidaung-Maungdaw Road. Moving units into the line to cover the withdrawal, the movement south began on the night of 24 February and was completed by 1 March. The 1st Battalion of the 213th Infantry, which had been holding positions in the vicinity of the road between Ngangyaung and Maunghnama since 6 February, left its positions on the night of the 25th and, after breaking through the enemy lines, returned safely on 3 March. Many units were trapped, however, between units of the 26th and 36th Divisions advancing from the north and 5th Division from the east through the Ngakyedauk Pass upon the anvil of the boxes. In the end, the Battle of Ngakyedauk Pass cost 15th Corps 3506 casualties, but it also marked the turning point in the Burma Front. The Japanese lost 3106 killed and 2229 wounded, in what would be the first time that they met well trained British-Indian formations in battle and the first time that their enveloping tactics, aimed at cutting their opponents' line of communications, failed to produce the results they expected. Not only had operation HA-GO been an abysmal failure, but it materially undermined the Japanese ability to resist further British attacks. By March 5th, the 15th Corps had completely recovered and resumed its own offensive against the now disorganized and weakened Japanese forces in Arakan. Although the Japanese staged a remarkable recovery and still offered dogged resistance, the 5th Division would capture Razabil on March 12th and the 7th Division would seize Buthidaung and later mop up the Letwedet Fortress in late March.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle in the Marshalls absolutely shocked the Japanese in its speed, efficiency and low cost for the American forces. Now the Japanese feared the Americans would soon be in range to hit the home islands with their dreaded bombers. In the Burma Front, the former Japanese super soldiers were now realizing the Indian Army could no longer be pushed around.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Shaggy Ridge, some hardcore patrolling on New Britain and major planning for the invasion of the Marshalls. The Australians seized the Kankeiri saddle, the Prothero's, Crater Hill and countless other features until finally at last the Japanese had been dislodged from the area. Meanwhile over on New Britain, the Americans were expanding their perimeter and unleashing wave after wave of patrols, trying to figure out where the Japanese were concentrating. It was tireless work, without any good maps in a horribly difficult climate with menacing terrain. The commanders of the central, south and southwest pacific all met to finalize big plans, that would now involved the invasion of the Marshall islands. It seems Dougey boy MacArthur was delivered some setbacks for his grand advance to the Philippines, as the Central Pacific was stealing the drivers seat.  This episode is Operation Flintlock: The Invasion of the Marshalls  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In spite of General Douglas MacArthur's attempted hijacking of the strategic control over the Pacific campaign, by trying to have the US Navy's Central Pacific campaign pretty much aborted, it did not pan out. MacArthur had made multiple arguments against their Central plans, stating Nimitz choice of route was “time consuming and expensive in our naval power and shipping” which was really a self-serving argument flying in the face of actual evidence. MacArthur pointed out all the problems faced during the invasion of Tarawa, such as the high casualty rates. The Marines had jumped 2500 miles from New Zealand to hit Tarawa at the cost of 4 days of fighting. Yet Australian soldiers and American GI's would take nearly a year and a half, through nearly continuously fighting to make the 300 mile journey from Port Moresby to Madang. Operation Cartwheel proved to be extremely laborious, time consuming and costly in terms of materials and men. But from MacArthur's point of view the lives lost were largely Australian and perhaps as some Historians might point out “were politically expendable to a person like MacArthur”. Kind of a hit point to make, that one came from Francis Pike's Hirohito's War, go after him not me folks. It was also self evident the supply lines of ships from the west coast of the US to Nimitz Pacific fleet and their Marines, some 5000 or so miles from San Diego to Kwajalein atoll, was shorter than the long route going from the US west coast to Australia then to New Guinea, a colossal 9108 mile trip. By mid 1943 the supply line to MacArthur was nearly double that of Nimitz in distance with increased dangers of IJN submarines prowling about, though as I have said numerous times, the IJN only really figured out the capability of merchant hitting in the late years of the war.  Well in spite of all of that MacArthur gave Brigadier-General Frederick Osborn and MacArthurs trusty lackey Sutherland going to Washington to fight on his behalf against the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they elected to commit themselves to the Central Pacific thrust. It had been a strategic decision based on logistical and strategy…well logic? The 1943 Cairo conference ended just as Tarawa was captured, thus driving the nail in the coffin so to say. The next target on the way to the Marianas was thus the Marshall islands, way back in the old days they were property of the German empire, that Japan had stolen with ease. Ever since 1938, the Japanese banned any non Japanese ships from the region, thus US intelligence was pretty lax on them. MAGIC intercepts began to give clues as to how the Japanese deployed their troops on the Marshall islands however. This led the allied war planners to leave some “to wither on the vine” like Wotje. It was decided the main target would be Kwajalein. The 380 mile lagoon made it one of the largest in the world, quite beautiful also. Some like Rear Admiral Turner, questioned the risks of going straight into the heart of the Marshall islands, calling the move “too aggressive and dangerous and reckless!” But Nimitz and Spruance were adamant, well this was before Tarawa. The bitter lessons learnt on Tarawa prompted Spruance to determine that “Kwajalein would be struck with violent, overwhelming force and swiftly applied”. For the invasion of the Marshalls, codenamed Operation Flintlock, the first phase was to be the capture of Kwajalein, earmarked by General Corlett's 7th division against the southern group of islands in the atoll that included Kawjalein. General Schmidt's 4th marine division would capture Roi-Namur and the northern islands in the atoll. Furthermore prior to these attacks, Colonel Sheldon's Sundance Landing Force would hit Majuro Atoll. Because of the experiences gained during the invasion of the Gilberts, a far greater quantity and variety of amphibious equipment had been made available to the Central Pacific forces. Now the attack force commanders would not have to rely on the faulty communications systems of battleships to maintain proper radio liaison between ship and shore and ship and air. Two newly constructed headquarters ships, each equipped with the latest developments in radio and radar gear and unburdened by gunfire support duties, were provided for the operation. Several improvements were also made in the techniques of softening up the enemy defenses before the first troops touched shore. The US Navy changed their bombardment tactics based on the experience at Tarawa and now used armor piercing shells and fired from closer ranges. These all added would increase the quantity and accuracy of firepower to be delivered before the invasion. To provide a last-minute saturation of the beaches, two new, or rather modified, forms of older types of amphibious equipment were also introduced. The first of these was the amphibian tank LVT-A, which was just the standard amphibian tractor equipped with extra armor plating and mounting a 37-mm gun housed in a turret. The second was the LCI gunboat, an LCI converted into a gunboat by the addition of three 40-mm guns and banks of 4.5-inch rocket launchers.  Admiral Turner's plan called for extensive pre-landing bombardment both from surface ships and from aircraft. Most of the Marshall's airfields had been successfully neutralized by Admiral Hoover's aircraft over the prior months. To complete preliminary operations, Admiral Mitschers Fast Carrier force launched a heavy strike on January 29 and 30th. On the 30th, eight of Mitschers battleships, accompanied by about a dozen destroyers, were to deliver a dawn bombardment against Kwajalein Island and Roi-Namur. The object was to destroy aircraft, coast defense guns, and personnel, and to render the airfields temporarily useless. At the same time, two advance units of cruisers and destroyers from Turner's task force were to bombard the airfields at Wotje and Maloelap. These dawn bombardments were to be followed by air strikes against each of the objectives. After the strikes were completed the surface ships would again take up the bombardment and maintain a steady fire until about noon. Then on the 31st, initial landings would begin against Carlson (Enubuj), lying  northwest of Kwajalein Island; Ivan (Mellu) and Jacob (Ennuebing) Islands, lying southwest of Roi-Namur. For southern Kwajalein, three other small islands in addition to Carlson were to be captured during the preparatory phase of the operation. These were Carlos (Ennylabegan), Carter (Gea), and Cecil (Ninni) Islands, all lying north of Carlson. On some of these islands artillery could be emplaced for the main assault. On February 1st, battleships, cruisers and destroyers would conduct a monster bombardment in support of the main landings and air strikes would begin 45 minutes before the men hit the beaches. There would be a cease to the carnage 25 minutes before to allow the smaller islands to deploy their artillery to help support the main assault. With this tremendous bombardment by aircraft, surface ships, and artillery, all to be executed before the first troops hit the shore line, it was hoped that the bitter experience of Tarawa would not be repeated. For the attack on Kwajalein Island, Corlett decided to land on a narrow front on the beaches at the western extremity, as the reef and surf conditions were more favorable there. He had at his disposal 79 amphibian tanks and 95 amphibian tractors that would transport the first 4 waves to hit the southern beaches. The first with great secrecy would be a pre-dawn landing against Carter and Cecil islands, by one platoon of the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop. The reconnaissance troop was embarked on two high-speed transports (APD's), along with two platoons of Company B, 111th Infantry. After this the 17th regiment led by Col. Wayne C. Zimmerman would land on Carlos and Carlson islands. The 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, would hit Carlos while the 2nd Battalion, 17th Infantry, hit Carlson. The 3rd Battalion, 17th Infantry was to be held in reserve, ready to go to the aid of either landing team. While the capture of Carlson Island was in progress, the division artillery, loaded for the most part on amphibious trucks, was to debark and proceed to a rendezvous area offshore. Upon a signal from the commander of the Carlson landing force, the guns were to be moved ashore and into position. This was all done to secure General Arnold's artillery, whom on the night of the D-day along the 145th field artillery battalions would deliver interdictory fire from Carlson on all the principal fortified areas of Kwajalein Island and place counter-battery fire on any enemy artillery that might be emplaced on Burton. They were also to fire general support missions for the infantry. Finally, the 184th on the left and 32nd Regiment on the right would land abreast and advance up the axis of the island. If things looked like they were going well enough and the reserve 17th regiment would not be necessary, they would instead capture the remaining islands of Beverly (South Gugegwe), Berlin (North Gugegwe), Benson, and Bennett (Bigej) Islands in the eastern chain. There was a hell of a lot of fire power they would face as well. On Kwajalein, 4 12.7-cm, dual-purpose twin-mount guns were divided into batteries of 2, one located at each end of the island. Each battery was protected by 7.7-mm. and 13-mm. machine guns along the nearby beaches. Near each gun were 2 150-cm. searchlights. In addition, the northern end of the island was guarded by a twin-mount dual-purpose 13-mm machine gun on the lagoon shore. Several 7.7-mm. machine guns were in position on the western end and other heavy machine guns were scattered about the center of the island, some mounted on wooden sleds for easy movement to critical points. On the ocean shore were 6 8-cm. dual-purpose guns, divided into 2 batteries of 3 guns each. One battery was east of the tank ditch and the other was opposite the center of the airfield. The first had a 360-degree traverse and could fire either to seaward or landward. The other formed the nucleus of a strongpoint composed of a semicircle of rifle pits facing the beach supported by one heavy and one 13-mm. machine gun, and also included an observation tower, a range finder, and a 110-cm. searchlight. 2 other 8-cm. guns were in position on the lagoon shore, and the blockhouse on the main pier (Nob Pier), which jutted out into the lagoon near the northern tip of the island, had a 13-mm. dual-purpose gun on its roof and firing ports on the ground floor allowing machine guns to fire in all directions. For the attack on Roi-Namur, Schmidt's 1st phase was to capture the 5 islets near Roi-Namur. The Ivan Landing Group was commanded by Brig. General James L. Underhill, consisting of the 25th Marines under Col. Samuel C. Cumming; the 14th Marines Artillery and Company D of the 4th Tank Battalion. They would seize Jacon and Ivan islands to allow the 3rd and 4th Battalions of the 14th Marine Regiment artillery to deploy. Then they would hit Albert, Allen and Abraham islands where the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 14th Marine Regiment artillery would deploy. For the main landings Schmidt chose to perform a orthodox amphibious maneuver, simply landing two regiments abreast on a broad front over the lagoon shore. The 23rd marines would hit Roi's red beach 2 and 3 and the 24th marines would hit Namur's Green beaches 1 and 2. The 3rd and final phase would see the capture of the remaining islands in the northern Kwajaleins.  Now that was all for the Americans, but what about the defenders? Admiral Akiyama had recently been reinforced with a number of IJA units such as the 3rd South Sea Garrison from Wake; the 1st South Seas detachment from Mille and Jaluit and the 1st Amphibious mobile brigade from Eniwetok. The reinforcements were deployed mostly on the periphery, as Kwajalien, Jaluit, Maloelap and Wotje had sizable naval garrisons already. The hub of the Japanese military in the Marshalls was at Kwajalein and its main air base at Roi. If you pull out a map, which I do hope many of you do during this entire podcast series haha, especially for Burma it gets really confusing, trust me I know your pain. You can see Kwajalein lies far to the west, with Jaluit, Mille, Maloelap and Wotje kind of acting as buffers. If you were a Japanese commander you would most likely assume any invasion attempt would hit outer islands first and leave Kwajalein as the last one. A quote from one commander, Chikataka Nakajima makes this point "There was divided opinion as to whether you would land at Jaluit or Mille. Some thought you would land on Wotje but there were few who thought you would go right to the heart of the Marshalls and take Kwajalein.” The three most heavily defended islands were Roi-Namur, Kwajalein and Burton in that order of strength. The defenses of Roi-Namur were organized around a series of seven strong points, 4 on Roi and 3 on Namur, all on the ocean side. Starting from the southwest tip of Roi, the first was located along the southern shore of the west coast. The second and third were to the south and north of the northwest taxi circle. The fourth was on both sides of the wire and stone barriers next to the northeast taxi circle. The fifth, sixth, and seventh were on the northwest, north, and east tips of Namur, respectively. From the lagoon side the approaches were covered mostly by nothing heavier than 7.7-mm. machine guns. Wire entanglements were found at two points—on the beach around the northeast taxi circle on Roi, and on the narrow bit of land connecting Roi with Namur. The beach around the northeast taxi circle also boasted a tank obstacle in the form of large rocks jutting out of a rock wall. Anti-tank ditches had been dug throughout the two islands. On Kwajalein, there was a concrete sea wall along most of the ocean shore and around the northern and western ends of the island. The section at the northern end had posts set into it, probably to act as a tank barricade. East of the area cleared for the airfield was a tank ditch extending halfway across the island, and three smaller tank ditches ran between the ocean shore and the road in the vicinity of the airfield. The lagoon shore was protected by a two-strand barbed-wire fence at the water's edge. The large tank ditch was supported by trenches, rifle pits, and machine guns. At this point in the war, the Japanese tactical doctrine still stressed beach-line defense that would hinder a proper defense in depth. The Japanese doctrine to fortify beaches would gradually change as a result of the Gilbert-Marshall campaign. IJA General HQ research groups abandoned beach defenses for internal defenses to thwart naval and aerial bombardments, but also to favor concealed positions to thwart flamethrower and grenade attacks. Actually to side track just a bit, there is a book I rather like “The Battle for Okinawa” by Colonel Hiromichi Yahara. If you are interested in how some of the Japanese commanders decided to change to defense in depth, Colonel Yahara was a good case study and the book is interesting. Akiyama had roughly 5000 men on Kwajalein. 930 of these were IJA units, the 1st Company, 3rd Mobile Battalion, plus 2nd and 4th Companies of the 2nd Mobile Battalion of the 1st Amphibious Mobile Brigade. The IJA forces were led by Colonel Asu Tarokichi, commander of the 2nd Mobile Battalion. There also was 250 SNLF of the Yokosuka 4th; 1150 naval troops from the 61st Guard Unit and Akiyama's headquarters. The rest were not considered combat effective, mostly comprising laborers and logistical units. Most of these units were at Kwajalein itself, with some 345 troops and over 2000 air personnel of the 24th Air Flotilla at Roi-Namur. Three lookout stations were also established on Bennett, Carter and Carlos Islands while an air unit of the 952nd and 160 men defended Burton. By January 20th, all the preparations were complete in the Hawaiian islands for the grand invasion of the Marshalls. 2 days later, the task forces departed. At dawn on the 29th, the 4 task groups of Task Force 58 and the Neutralization Group arrived to their first assembly positions Aircraft carriers Enterprise, Yorktown, and Belleau Wood successfully neutralized Taroa while while Essex, Intrepid, and Cabot bombed and strafed Roi-Namur. Aircraft from Essex, Intrepid, and Cabot bucked northeasterly winds to bomb and strafe once more the important airfield at that base. Ninety-two enemy planes were based on Roi airfield when the attack developed. Command of the air was seized by American planes at the outset and after 8am, no enemy planes were seen airborne over Roi-Namur. Numerous hits were made on runways, hangars, fuel dumps, and gun positions. Additionally, carriers Saratoga, Princeton, and Langley sent multiple strikes against Wotje, managing to neutralize its airfield. Finally Admiral Sherman's carriers Cowpens, Monterey, and Bunker Hill launched strikes against Kwajalein. Her airfield and buildings were bombed on the first strike, then she was subjected to strafing and bombing. During the evening Admiral Sherman's group moved northwestward toward Eniwetok to be in position to launch an attack at dawn of D minus 1. It was not just the navy that smashed the Marshalls, the Army also got a taste. At Kwajalein one flight of seven B-24s dropped fifteen tons of bombs on Roi-Namur and three more tons on Kwajalein Island during the morning and early afternoon. As the carrier planes retired at dusk another seven heavy bombers arrived for a night attack, dropping twenty tons of bombs on Kwajalein Island. At Wotje, flying through heavy overcast, one flight of three B-24s dropped seven tons of bombs, causing fires and damaging the runways. A few hours later a flight of nine B-25s dropped three tons of bombs on the island in a low-level attack and strafed and sank a small cargo vessel in the lagoon. During this late attack carrier planes from the task force mistakenly intercepted the B-25s and shot down two before it was realized they were American planes. Maloelap, Jaluit, and Mille also received land-based attacks during the day. At Taroa, two and a half tons of bombs were dropped by B-25s, which then joined carrier planes in strafing the island. At Jaluit, attack bombers and fighters dropped seven tons of bombs and afterwards strafed the island. Mille was covered all day by twenty fighters, flying in flights of four. Planes that had been scheduled to strike these targets but that were unable to get through because of weather or mechanical difficulty flew over Mille on the way back to American bases in the Gilberts and dropped their bomb loads on the islands of that atoll.The Neutralization group shelled Wotje and Maloelap, leaving the last operational airfield on Eniwetok. Sherman's fighters and bombers hit the atoll during the morning of the 30th, destroying nearly all its buildings and runways, though a few aircraft managed to escape. The rest of the day would see more carrier strikes and surface bombardments against the Marshalls' atolls while the landing forces made their final approach towards Kwajalein. Meanwhile, Admiral Hill's attack group detached from the main task force, heading for Majuro Atoll. At 11pm 1st Lt. Harvey C. Weeks led a recon platoon on rubber boats to Calalin island, becoming the first Americans to land on any territory the Japanese had possessed prior to WW2. The rest of the recon company led by Captain James Jones landed on Dalap, Uliga and Darrit Islands. Finally, Majuro Island itself. They would find the Japanese had abandoned the atoll perhaps over a year earlier. At the same time Sheldon's landing force occupied Darrit and Dalop without any opposition and the 1st defense battalion soon arrived to take up garrison duties. To the northwest, the Destroyer transports Overton carrying Troop A and Manley carrying Troop B raced past Turners task force to hit Carter and Cecil islands. Troop B successfully landed on Carter at 6:20am, rapidly securing the island after killing her 20 defenders. Troop A accidently landed on Chauncey Islet at 5:45am and upon realizing they had landed on the wrong island, they left a detachment of 61 infantrymen and then re-embarked at 9:29am. Finally, Troop A landed on Cecil at 12:35pm, finding zero opposition there. On Chauncey, however, the Americans discovered a force of over 100 Japanese hidden in the islet's center. Half of the enemy force was killed but the Americans would eventually have to withdraw after losing two men. The desperate Japanese would continue to resist until eventually being annihilated a few days later. With the lagoon's entrance secured, Colonel Zimmerman transferred his two assault battalions to amphibious tractors and sent them towards Carlos and Carlson Islands.  While Kwajalein, Burton and everly islands were under heavy bombardment, the 1st battalion, 17th regiment landed on Carlos unopposed at 9:10am. From there they quickly attacked the 25 man garrison. To their south, the 2nd battalion landed on the northeastern end of Carlson at 9:12am under some heavy artillery fire coming out of Kwajalein that was quickly suppressed by air and naval bombardment. The men expected fierce resistance, but the Japanese fled, leaving 21 Koreans to be taken prisoner. Honestly pretty good outcome for those poor Koreans. Then General Arnold landed his 5 artillery battalions who got their guns ready by nightfall. Further north, Brigadier Generals James Underhill began operations against Ivan and Jacob islands to secure even more artillery positions. After the preparatory bombardment the marines got aboard their amtracs with a lot of difficulty. Before the operation, landing team commanders had estimated that their debarkation interval would be about sixty minutes, but this did not pan out. Once the troops were loaded in their assigned landing craft they had to make their way through choppy seas to the LST area for transfer to amphibian tractors. At this juncture all semblance of control broke down. Landing craft were about two hours late in reaching the LST area. Choppy seas and a headwind were partly responsible for the delays. Boat control officers left the tractors in frantic search for the landing craft and failed to return in time to lead the LVTs to the line of departure. Tractors were damaged or swamped while milling around their mother LSTs waiting for the troops to show up. Radios in LVTs were drowned out. One LST weighed anchor and shifted position before completing the disembarkation of all its tractors. The elevator on another broke down so that those LVTs loaded on the topside deck could not be disembarked on time. In short, almost every conceivable mishap occurred to delay and foul up what, under even the best of circumstances, was a complicated maneuver. Despite the issues, by 9:17 the amtracs were surging forward while LCI gunboats fired rocket barrages. B Company of the 25th marines hit Jacobs at 9:52, easily overrunning the island within 15 minutes. Ivan island had a much rougher surf alongside bad reef conditions that slowed down the amtracs. Company D, 4th light tank battalion managed to land at 9:55am, with Company C of the 25th marines landing on the opposite side of the shore at 10:15am followed by Company A. They linked up and began advancing inland, rapidly destroying a token defense force and securing the entire island by 11:45. During the early afternoon, the 3rd battalion, 14th marines landed at Jacob Island aboard LVT's, while the 4th battalion landed on Ivan aboard LCMs. At this point the lagoon entrance was secured, so the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 25th marines re-embarked to land on Albert and Allen. Rough seas delayed them, but the marines were once again on the move. LCI gunboats performed rocket barrages as the 3rd battalion landed on Albert at 3:12, while the 2nd battalion hit Allen 3 minutes later. Both islets were quickly cleared, while G Company landed on the unoccupied Andrew island. The 3rd battalion then assaulted Abraham island at 6:24, securing it by 7:15. With that, the Americans had secured a chain surrounding Roi-Namur and the first phase of the operation was done. Now the Americans would perform the main landings. Late during the night, Arnolds artillery and Turner's warships bombarded Kwajalein and Burton while 3 destroyers kept up a barrage upon Roi-Namur. Under the cover of darkness, frogmen of Underwater Demolition Team 1 scouted Roi-Namur and UDT 2 scouted Kwajalein's beaches. These men made sure there were no obstacles or mines in the way of their landing objectives. This was the first use of UDT's during the Pacific War. Early on February 1st Kwajalein was hit with an unprecedented bombardment. During one period two shells per second were hitting specific targets or areas in the path of the assault troops. The 14-inch naval shells of the battleships were most effective in piercing and destroying reinforced concrete structures. From the cruisers and destroyers, 8-inch and 5-inch shells ploughed into bunkers and tore up the thick growth of pandanus and palm trees. All together that day, nearly 7,000 14-inch, 8-inch, and 5-inch shells were fired by supporting naval vessels at Kwajalein Island alone, and the bulk of these were expended against the main beaches before the landing. The field artillery on Carlson also joined in the preparatory fire. Its total ammunition expenditure against Kwajalein was about 29,000 rounds. The results of all this expenditure of explosives were devastating. The damage was so intensive that it is impossible to determine the relative effectiveness of the three types of bombardment. The area inland of Red Beaches was reduced almost completely to rubble. Concrete emplacements were shattered, coconut trees smashed and flattened, the ground pock-marked with large craters, coral ripped to splinters. From the carriers Enterprise, Yorktown, Belleau Wood, Manila Bay, Corregidor, and Coral Sea eighteen dive bombers and fifteen torpedo bombers struck the western part of Kwajalein Island while as many fighters strafed the area with machine guns and rockets. All together ninety-six sorties were flown from the carriers in support of the troop landing on Kwajalein Island. As one observer reported, "The entire island looked as if it had been picked up to 20,000 feet and then dropped.” After 36000 rounds of naval gunfire and artillery, along with sizable air attacks, pummeled the island, LCI gunboats were on the move, tossing rockets into the mix. At 9am, Turner unleashing his landing force. Colonel Curtis O'Sullivans 184th regiment headed towards Beach Red 1, while Colonel Marc Logie's 32nd regiment hit Beach Red 2. Each beach was covered by a strongpoint, though these were mostly obliterated, with only a few pillboxes surviving. Both regiments landed at 9:30am, finding weak opposition, allowing their artillery support to start smashing 200 yards ahead of their positions. The americans were met with light mortars and automatic fire from some surviving pillboxes, but many were able to take shelter behind the wrecked ruins of a seawall. Meanwhile as more Amtracs pulled up they were hampered by wreckage and debris, causing a congestion. The reefs also hindered where they could approach, but by 11:22 the first four waves of both battalions were ashore, all with 15 minutes. They then began to advance inland against light resistance. Logie's 1st battalion managed to reach the western edge of the west area by 11:30. Meanwhile O'Sullivan's 3rd Battalion came face to face with a network of several pillboxes still containing live Japanese in spite of the heavy preliminary bombardment. These were silenced in short order in a series of almost simultaneous actions in which many varieties of weapons were used. Two infantrymen of Company K, Pvt. Parvee Rasberry and Pfc. Paul Roper had landed near the left of Red Beach 1 and had run about 25 yards inland when they came under fire from one of the pillboxes in the area. Quickly taking shelter in a shell hole, they started lobbing grenades at the enemy position about fifteen yards ahead. The Japanese merely threw the grenades back and the volley kept up until a flame thrower was brought forward. That, too, proved ineffective; the flames only hit the box and bounced back. Finally, Private Rasberry got out of his foxhole, crawled to within about five yards of the pillbox and threw in a white phosphorus smoke grenade. This flushed several Japanese from their cover into open positions where they could be taken under rifle fire. Those who weren't hit ran back to the pillbox. Rasberry threw white phosphorous grenades until he had none left, by which time about eight of the enemy had been killed. At this juncture, T. Sgt. Graydon Kickul of Company L was able to crawl up to the pillbox and on top of it. He emptied his M1 rifle into it, killing the remainder of the Japanese inside. To make doubly certain that the job was done, an amphibian tank was then brought forward to fire both its flame thrower and its 37-mm. gun into the aperture. Meanwhile Logie's 1st battalion got within 250 yards of Wilma road by 12:20. An hour later they fell upon a network of pillboxes. To the north O'Sullivan's 3rd battalion ran into tough resistance again, but managed to link up with Logie's men at Wilma Road by 2:50pm. Behind the battalions were follow up battalions who mopped up the area and the reserves secured the beachheads. Logie and O'Sullivans men then fought their way to Kwajaleins airfield. Lucky for them the Japanese had not established a defensive line across the width of the island, instead the bulk of them retired eastward, for their commander Admiral Akiyama had run into an early tragedy. Akiyama had left his bunker to observe the front line and was killed by an artillery shell. At 3:25, the 1st battalion was relieved by the 2nd battalion who began attack against the strongpoint at Canary Some of these positions, which extended along each side of Wallace Road, were defended by Japanese who ducked and crawled through rubble heaps and bunkers in such a way that Lt. John L. Young, commanding Company E, became convinced that they were using connecting tunnels. For an hour the fighting persisted, but not more than ten enemy dead could be counted above ground. Company E continued through a litter of small works, moving so slowly that it was necessary to commit Company F, which undertook a flanking movement at the left. The maneuver was intended to cut the strong point off, but the company promptly ran into fire that slowed its advance to about fifty yards in thirty minutes. It then became clear that the whole movement had been stopped. The attack was consequently broken off at 1800 and defensive positions were organized for the night. To the north, O'Sullivan's 3rd Battalion ran into large underground shelters and defenses. Their advance was temporarily blocked by a fuel dump ignited by artillery fire, but they eventually pushed on another 500 yards before halting at 18:00 for the night.  Meanwhile Logie's 2nd battalion broke off their attack halfway up the length of an unfinished runway and dug in for the night.  By the end of February 1st, approximately 450 of the dead Japanese were counted  in the zone of the 184th, and this regiment also was responsible for the capture of ten of the eleven prisoners taken. A large share of the enemy casualties was attributed to the heavy bombardment from ships and aircraft and from artillery based on Carlson. Estimates made by assault troops and by others, including doctors following the assault, indicated that the preparatory bombardment caused from 50 to 75 percent of all Japanese casualties on Kwajalein Island. It truly was a colossal bombardment. The Americans suffered 21 deaths and 87 wounded. Over on Roi-Namur, Admiral Conolly's LSTs entered the lagoon at first light to provide the amtracs an easier ride. Naval ships, artillery and aircraft began smashing the island. The marines saw some delays, but Colonel Colonel Louis Jones' 23rd Marines began their run to Roi at 11:50. Covering them, amphibian tanks sought hull defilade positions and concentrated their 37mm fire on the Wendy Point blockhouse, which could deliver flanking fire on the assault waves. The 1st and 2nd Battalions hit the beaches at 11:57 landed and immediately began to push 300 yards inland. Meanwhile Colonel Franklin Hart's 24th Marines bound for Namur were assigned the tractors of the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion that had participated in the preceding day's actions. The troubles that had beset the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion on D-Day were titanic. They had been launched too far from the line of departure in the first place. They had to buck adverse winds and unexpectedly choppy seas. Radio failures had tremendously complicated the problem of control, causing still further delay and much unnecessary travel through the water. All of this spelled excessive fuel consumption and many of the tractors ran out of gas before the day was over. For an LVT to run out of fuel in a choppy sea was usually disastrous. This model, the LVT-2, shipped water easily and its bilge pumps could not be manually operated. Thus, when the gasoline supply was gone the vehicle could not be pumped out and usually sank. In addition, many of the tractors of the 10th Battalion had not been released from their duties on D-Day until after dark, were unable to get back to their mother LSTs for refueling, and had spent the night on various outlying islands. Thus, as the hour for descending on Namur approached, the 24th Marines could muster only 62 of the 110 tractors that had been assigned to them and a hurried call was sent out for LCVPs to make up the difference. After some scrambling, the 2nd and 3rd battalions were reorganized and on their way to Namur. Hart's 2nd battalion hit Beach Green 2 at 11:55. They faced anti-tank ditches across the narrow beach, causing a large congestion. Hart's 3rd battalion made it to Green 1 at 12 and his K and I companies immediately advanced north. Meanwhile Jone's battalions secured Wendy Point facing no opposition. Encourage by the lack of resistance, the Marines began a rather disordered dash across the island. The stormed across the runway without orders and all guns blazing. Tanks and infantry hastily charged in the disorder, successfully driving the surviving and terrified Japanese north. Jones managed to gain control over his units and brought them back to assembly points to coordinate further attacks. The “re-assault” of Roi kicked off at 3:30 against a dazed enemy still trying to recover from the first attack. The 2nd battalion pushed north towards Estelle point while the 3rd battalion hit Nancy point. Enemy resistance was being rapidly annihilated, Estelle point was secure by 5pm, while Nancy Point would be taken by 6pm. After Nancy point was secured, Jones declared Roi secure. Meanwhile Harts F company unknowingly breached a torpedo warhead bunker and began throwing satchel charges into the hole. The structure was obliterated by a massive explosion that would detonate two other ammunition bunkers nearby. Blocks of concrete, palm trees, wood, torpedo warheads, and other debris rained down over the island, covering most of the island with smoke and dust. 20 Marines were killed and 100 were wounded. The enormous explosion disrupted the 2nd battalions assault, causing a delay. Hart's 3rd battalion enjoyed more success, but heavier resistance as the Japanese defenders took advantage of all the rubble and dense brush tossed around to hide behind. By 7:30pm, Hart ordered his men to dig in and during the night the Japanese began their classic infiltration tactics. The green troops amongst the men began indiscriminately firing throughout the night. The next morning, light tanks broke a Japanese counter attack, as the Marines advanced 50 yards. Hart then launched his main attack at 9am,with the 3rd Battalion rapidly securing Nora Point by 11:00am. Tank support for the 2nd Battalion arrived an hour late, but they still managed to push towards Natalie Point by 12:15, where the two battalions linked up. Mop up operations continued in the rear, but the island was declared secure at 2:18. For their first operation, Schmidt's 4th Marine Division suffered 206 killed, 617 wounded and 181 missing. 3472 Japanese would be found dead, with 51 captured and 40 Korean laborers surrendered.  To the south, after aerial, artillery and naval bombardment, Corlett launched a tank supported attack at 7:15am. O'Sullivans 2nd battalion advanced north against weak resistance while Logie's 2nd Battalion continued to fight through the Canary strongpoint. Advancing through destroyed pillboxes with tanks at the forefront, O'Sullivans men were able to reach Carl Road on the eastern end of the airfield by 10:40am. Meanwhile Logie's men reduced the Canary and advanced rapidly until they reached the deadly Cat strongpoint. Here they faced tiers of well-concealed defensive works, taking many lives until they also reached Carl Road at 10:40. The Americans were now facing the main defensive system of the island. In front of it lay a deep tank trap, connected to long rifle trenches. Beyond this was anti-tank ditches and an elaborate organized set of defensive positions called Corn strongpoint. They were in for a hell of a time. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Flintlock went off with a terrifying bang seeing the combined firepower of land, air and sea tossed against the Marshall islands. The Americans had made easy and quick work of the smaller islands, but now we're face to face with a truly formidable defensive position that was sure to cause them real headaches. 

Jean-Pierre Maugendre, président de Renaissance Catholique, est l'invité de Victor Aubert pour ce nouvel entretien d'Academia Christiana qui porte sur l'histoire du combat pour la Messe traditionnelle. Jean-Pierre Maugendre nous explique la naissance du mouvement traditionaliste après la promulgation du Nouvel Ordo Missae et pourquoi celui-ci a pris une telle importance en France. Il revient également sur la rupture de 1988 et les initiatives politiques chrétiennes qui se sont développées en parallèle de ce mouvement. C'est également l'occasion de présenter les grandes figures et les grands auteurs de ce mouvement et d'avoir des recommandations de lecture sur ce sujet. Il est aussi question du bilan du colloque sur l'avenir de la messe traditionnelle qui s'est tenu en 2022 et sur la prochaine UDT organisée par Renaissance Catholique du 13 au 16 juillet en Touraine.

We often hear from pain patients who were dismissed from their doctor for failing their drug test. They say there is no way the test is right. Ed Brown gives some possible explanations. Edward Brown's Bio: Edward G. Brown is a chemistry expert with over twenty-five years of laboratory research experience, over 5 years of patent work experience and over twenty years of experience assisting attorneys in chemistry cases as chemistry expert and expert witness.  His technical and academic background includes the following: B.S. degree in chemistry from the University of California, Berkeley; Ph.D. in chemistry from the University of California, Davis;   In addition, Dr. Brown received post-doctoral research fellowships from the University of Auckland, NZ and Yale University; he pursued chemical analysis and chemistry research related to methodology development in organic chemistry at those institutions.   Dr. Brown has also worked in a number of biochemical and pharmaceutical companies during his career as a research chemist, staff scientist and senior research scientist; he currently provides clients with in-lab contract medicinal chemistry research expertise as well as patent drafting and expert witness services.   He is a coauthor on over twenty chemistry articles and is a co-inventor on ten U.S. patents.  He has testified in both state and federal courts as a chemistry expert in both criminal and patent litigation cases.   His expertise as a medicinal chemistry expert in criminal drug cases has expanded over the years and includes advising in cases involving: methamphetamine and amphetamine analysis, manufacture, possession and sale; fentanyl, opioid and opiate analysis, possession and sale; cocaine analysis, possession and sale; LSD analysis, possession and sale; MDMA and MDA analysis, manufacture, possession and sale; benzodiazepine analysis, possession and sale; analysis, possession and sale of synthetic cannabinoids; and in hemp, THC and marijuana cases.   Dr. Brown currently advises attorneys and other clients in criminal, patent and litigation cases as a medicinal chemistry expert and consultant in Durham, NC. His webpage can be found at: www.ExpertChemistryServices.com The Doctor Patient Forum is a national non profit organization fighting for the rights of pain patients and their providers. We bring awareness to the untreated pain and patient abandonment crisis. We are also knows as Don't Punish Pain Rally. https://www.patreon.com/thedoctorpatientforum https://www.thedoctorpatientforum.com/ #thedoctorpatientforum  #dontpunishpainrally #chronicpain #opioids #chronicpainpatient #patientabandonment #harmreduction #chronicillness #medicalgaslighting #dpfpatreon #pain #opioideliminationindustry #opioidelimination #patreon #thedoctorpatientforumpatreon #harmreduction #medicalgaslighting #UDT #drugtest #toxscreen The information contained in this podcast is not to be considered medical or legal advice --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/the-doctor-patient-forum/message

“Of all the strange breeds that mighta come along, it was their bad luck to get me.”In the years during and after World War II, the exploits of US Navy frogmen captured the American imagination. Seeking to showcase them on the silver screen, Hollywood producers worked closely with the Navy starting in 1950 to develop the film The Frogmen. The Navy provided extensive support, training actors using real frogmen drills and equipping them with state-of-the-art gear. Filming underwater presented huge challenges with the bulky cameras of the time. Join us – Pete Wright and Andy Nelson – as we continue our 1952 Academy Award Best Cinematography Black-and-White Nominees series with a conversation about Lloyd Bacon's 1951 film The Frogmen.Released in 1951, The Frogmen gave audiences an unprecedented look into the adventures of these elite naval commandos – the Underwater Demolitions Team, or UDT. A major part of our conversation was about the underwater filming used extensively throughout the movie. We were impressed by how they shot underwater action, since this was brand new and innovative in 1951. While the pacing seems slow now, those scenes must have been thrilling for audiences when it first came out. We speculated that the underwater cinematography is probably why it got the Oscar nomination.We also talked a lot about the dynamic between Richard Widmark as the new commander and Dana Andrews as the chief who questions his leadership. Their contentious relationship drives much of the conflict and drama as they gradually gain mutual respect.Some key scenes stand out that represent the film's strengths to us. Disarming the live torpedo ratchets up the tension and shows Widmark's courage. The rope transfer between ships demonstrates the Navy's technical input. Planting the prank sign highlights real rivalries between units. And even though the final underwater fight pushes the action beyond historical truth, it's clear that it's designed for drama and emphasizes what the UDT was actually doing when the film was released.Overall, we found The Frogmen to be enjoyable but not that memorable. The underwater footage remains the main appeal today, though perhaps military fans would be more inclined to revisit it. The film could use a restoration. But Widmark's performance and the naval insight still make it worth watching. We have a great time talking about it, so check it out then tune in. The Next Reel – when the movie ends, our conversation begins!Join the conversation with movie lovers from around the world on The Next Reel's Discord channel!Film SundriesLearn more about supporting The Next Reel Film Podcast through your own membership. Watch this on Apple or Amazon, or find other places at JustWatch Theatrical trailer Poster artwork Flickchart Letterboxd Read more about the results of the WGA strike here.Learn more about the SAG-AFTRA strike here.Visit our WATCH PAGE to rent or purchase movies we've talked about on the show. By doing so, you get to watch the movie and help us out in the process as a portion comes back our way. All of the movies from our current season are in there, and we're continuing to add more from our back catalog. Enjoy!Want to upgrade your Letterboxd account? Use our promo code to get a discount and help us out in the process!Join the conversation with movie lovers from around the world on The Next Reel's Discord channel!Here's where you can find us around the internet: The Web Letterboxd Facebook Instagram X YouTube Flickchart Check out poster artwork for movies we've discussed on our Pinterest page Pete  Andy We spend hours every week putting this show together for you, our dear listener, and it would sure mean a lot to us if you considered becoming a member. When you do, you get early access to shows, ad-free episodes, and a TON of bonus content. To those who already support the show, thank you. To those who don't yet: what are you waiting for?Become a Member here: $5 monthly or $55 annuallyWhat are some other ways you can support us and show your love? Glad you asked! You can buy TNR apparel, stickers, mugs and more from our MERCH PAGE. Or buy or rent movies we've discussed on the show from our WATCH PAGE. Or renew or sign up for a Letterboxd Pro or Patron account with our LETTERBOXD MEMBERSHIP DISCOUNT.

“Of all the strange breeds that mighta come along, it was their bad luck to get me.”In the years during and after World War II, the exploits of US Navy frogmen captured the American imagination. Seeking to showcase them on the silver screen, Hollywood producers worked closely with the Navy starting in 1950 to develop the film The Frogmen. The Navy provided extensive support, training actors using real frogmen drills and equipping them with state-of-the-art gear. Filming underwater presented huge challenges with the bulky cameras of the time. Join us – Pete Wright and Andy Nelson – as we continue our 1952 Academy Award Best Cinematography Black-and-White Nominees series with a conversation about Lloyd Bacon's 1951 film The Frogmen.Released in 1951, The Frogmen gave audiences an unprecedented look into the adventures of these elite naval commandos – the Underwater Demolitions Team, or UDT. A major part of our conversation was about the underwater filming used extensively throughout the movie. We were impressed by how they shot underwater action, since this was brand new and innovative in 1951. While the pacing seems slow now, those scenes must have been thrilling for audiences when it first came out. We speculated that the underwater cinematography is probably why it got the Oscar nomination.We also talked a lot about the dynamic between Richard Widmark as the new commander and Dana Andrews as the chief who questions his leadership. Their contentious relationship drives much of the conflict and drama as they gradually gain mutual respect.Some key scenes stand out that represent the film's strengths to us. Disarming the live torpedo ratchets up the tension and shows Widmark's courage. The rope transfer between ships demonstrates the Navy's technical input. Planting the prank sign highlights real rivalries between units. And even though the final underwater fight pushes the action beyond historical truth, it's clear that it's designed for drama and emphasizes what the UDT was actually doing when the film was released.Overall, we found The Frogmen to be enjoyable but not that memorable. The underwater footage remains the main appeal today, though perhaps military fans would be more inclined to revisit it. The film could use a restoration. But Widmark's performance and the naval insight still make it worth watching. We have a great time talking about it, so check it out then tune in. The Next Reel – when the movie ends, our conversation begins!Join the conversation with movie lovers from around the world on The Next Reel's Discord channel!Film SundriesLearn more about supporting The Next Reel Film Podcast through your own membership. Watch this on Apple or Amazon, or find other places at JustWatch Theatrical trailer Poster artwork Flickchart Letterboxd Read more about the results of the WGA strike here.Learn more about the SAG-AFTRA strike here.Visit our WATCH PAGE to rent or purchase movies we've talked about on the show. By doing so, you get to watch the movie and help us out in the process as a portion comes back our way. All of the movies from our current season are in there, and we're continuing to add more from our back catalog. Enjoy!Want to upgrade your Letterboxd account? Use our promo code to get a discount and help us out in the process!Join the conversation with movie lovers from around the world on The Next Reel's Discord channel!Here's where you can find us around the internet: The Web Letterboxd Facebook Instagram X YouTube Flickchart Check out poster artwork for movies we've discussed on our Pinterest page Pete  Andy We spend hours every week putting this show together for you, our dear listener, and it would sure mean a lot to us if you considered becoming a member. When you do, you get early access to shows, ad-free episodes, and a TON of bonus content. To those who already support the show, thank you. To those who don't yet: what are you waiting for?Become a Member here: $5 monthly or $55 annuallyWhat are some other ways you can support us and show your love? Glad you asked! You can buy TNR apparel, stickers, mugs and more from our MERCH PAGE. Or buy or rent movies we've discussed on the show from our WATCH PAGE. Or renew or sign up for a Letterboxd Pro or Patron account with our LETTERBOXD MEMBERSHIP DISCOUNT.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: UDT shows that decision theory is more puzzling than ever, published by Wei Dai on September 13, 2023 on LessWrong. I feel like MIRI perhaps mispositioned FDT (their variant of UDT) as a clear advancement in decision theory, whereas maybe they could have attracted more attention/interest from academic philosophy if the framing was instead that the UDT line of thinking shows that decision theory is just more deeply puzzling than anyone had previously realized. Instead of one major open problem (Newcomb's, or EDT vs CDT) now we have a whole bunch more. I'm really not sure at this point whether UDT is even on the right track, but it does seem clear that there are some thorny issues in decision theory that not many people were previously thinking about: Indexical values are not reflectively consistent. UDT "solves" this problem by implicitly assuming (via the type signature of its utility function) that the agent doesn't have indexical values. But humans seemingly do have indexical values, so what to do about that? The commitment races problem extends into logical time, and it's not clear how to make the most obvious idea of logical updatelessness work. UDT says that what we normally think of different approaches to anthropic reasoning are really different preferences, which seems to sidestep the problem. But is that actually right, and if so where are these preferences supposed to come from? 2TDT-1CDT - If there's a population of mostly TDT/UDT agents and few CDT agents (and nobody knows who the CDT agents are) and they're randomly paired up to play one-shot PD, then the CDT agents do better. What does this imply? Game theory under the UDT line of thinking is generally more confusing than anything CDT agents have to deal with. UDT assumes that the agent has access to its own source code and inputs as symbol strings, so it can potentially reason about logical correlations between its own decisions and other agents' as well defined mathematical problems. But humans don't have this, so how are humans supposed to reason about such correlations? Logical conditionals vs counterfactuals, how should these be defined and do the definitions actually lead to reasonable decisions when plugged into logical decision theory? These are just the major problems that I was trying to solve (or hoping for others to solve) before I mostly stopped working on decision theory and switched my attention to metaphilosophy. (It's been a while so I'm not certain the list is complete.) As far as I know nobody has found definitive solutions to any of these problems yet, and most are wide open. Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: UDT shows that decision theory is more puzzling than ever, published by Wei Dai on September 13, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum. I feel like MIRI perhaps mispositioned FDT (their variant of UDT) as a clear advancement in decision theory, whereas maybe they could have attracted more attention/interest from academic philosophy if the framing was instead that the UDT line of thinking shows that decision theory is just more deeply puzzling than anyone had previously realized. Instead of one major open problem (Newcomb's, or EDT vs CDT) now we have a whole bunch more. I'm really not sure at this point whether UDT is even on the right track, but it does seem clear that there are some thorny issues in decision theory that not many people were previously thinking about: Indexical values are not reflectively consistent. UDT "solves" this problem by implicitly assuming (via the type signature of its utility function) that the agent doesn't have indexical values. But humans seemingly do have indexical values, so what to do about that? The commitment races problem extends into logical time, and it's not clear how to make the most obvious idea of logical updatelessness work. UDT says that what we normally think of as different approaches to anthropic reasoning are really different preferences, which seems to sidestep the problem. But is that actually right, and if so where are these preferences supposed to come from? 2TDT-1CDT - If there's a population of mostly TDT/UDT agents and few CDT agents (and nobody knows who the CDT agents are) and they're randomly paired up to play one-shot PD, then the CDT agents do better. What does this imply? Game theory under the UDT line of thinking is generally more confusing than anything CDT agents have to deal with. UDT assumes that the agent has access to its own source code and inputs as symbol strings, so it can potentially reason about logical correlations between its own decisions and other agents' as well defined mathematical problems. But humans don't have this, so how are humans supposed to reason about such correlations? Logical conditionals vs counterfactuals, how should these be defined and do the definitions actually lead to reasonable decisions when plugged into logical decision theory? These are just the major problems that I was trying to solve (or hoping for others to solve) before I mostly stopped working on decision theory and switched my attention to metaphilosophy. (It's been a while so I'm not certain the list is complete.) As far as I know nobody has found definitive solutions to any of these problems yet, and most are wide open. Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Tonight's guests are Harold Dunnigan and Duncan Smith. Harold was born on Oct. 11, 1930, in Fall River, Massachusetts, and was raised in Santa Monica, California. He enjoyed surfing at Malibu Beach alongside surfing heroes Buzzy Trent, Matt Kivlin, and Peter Cole, then later became Santa Monica Lifeguard. In 1950, he joined the Navy and graduated from UDTR/A class 6 — for you young bucks, that's BUD/S class 6. Harold would serve during the Korean War with UDT-1 and after the war enrolled in the UDT/SEAL reserve program. He would remain there for many years, including being recalled to active duty as an elderly SEAL during the Gulf War in the 1990s. He used to crush guys in PT and even participated in two water training jumps at the age of 60.  Harold is also an avid reader and felt it was important to be well-read. He's mentored many children and young adults as a school administrator and lifeguard. Some of Harold's students went on to create the famous Baywatch series as well as the movie Predator. Duncan served more than 30 years in the SEAL Teams before retiring as a captain. Duncan is instrumental in bringing Harold's story to this podcast as it took much convincing to get Harold to open up about his time in the Navy. While we mostly focus on Harold's life story, Duncan adds great points throughout the conversation, including discussing an interesting book tradition that's developed into a prized memento. At the end of the show, Duncan shares his important work with the SEAL Family Foundation and what they do to support SEALs and their families.  Here is Episode 29 with Harold Dunnigan and Duncan Smith.

PADI Club has two trips planned for 2023. The first trip is to Belize running July 29 to August 5 and the second trip is in October to Bonaire. That trip will run from October 7 - 14. The History of Diving Museum has a new exhibit - Aquanauts to Astronauts. This exhibit opened on May 20, 2023 and runs through December 31, 2023 and will educate folks on the unique relationship between diving and space exploration. The latest edition of Alert Diver from Divers Alert Network is out. A great publication with a wealth of information. In this edition you can learn about protecting Hawaiian fishes, crime scene investigation and unique ways to share air in an emergency. There is something for everyone in this edition. Commentary My non-profit - Scuba Educational Alliance of Connecticut is in the midst of teaching an open water class for one of our local high schools. Listen how rewarding this course has been for both the students and me. In this episode of Sea Hunt - Mike and his UDT buddy Sam Carter are working on salvaging a wreck that they have found when they encounter underwater pirates. A reverse booby trap trips up the pirates and Mike and Sam must save one of the bad guys.

The Late Night History podcast returns in 2023 with Cmdr. Robert “RJ” Thomas. RJ served 32 years in the US Navy (30 of those years within Naval Special Warfare).  In this episode we discuss RJ's life story. It began growing up hunting on his family's cattle ranch in central California. He had always wanted to become a US Navy frogman, but back in the early 1960s, one had to go to the fleet before arriving at UDT training. Eventually, RJ would pass UDT training and become a frogman. After that, he moved to SEAL Team 2 and deployed to Vietnam. RJ is most known as a Navy Cross recipient of the Vietnam War. At the time, he was the among the best shooters in the Navy. His skills were tested after his helicopter was shot down and he had to defend the crash site with only a M1911 handgun.  RJ tells this story. However, as we do on this show, we also cover the history of Naval Special Warfare through RJ's eyes. We discussed his tours with UDT-22 using the SDVs, his experiences with SEAL Team 2 in Vietnam, and later, his career as an officer, which included an exchange program with the Australian SAS. Beyond his deployments, RJ is also a competitive shooter and was instrumental in the development of the SEAL sniper courses as well the .50 caliber sniper rifles, .300 win mags, and other SEAL Team specific gear. This is an episode that you don't want to miss!

Greetings Bad-Ass Backyard Gardeners! The ever-witty and future pop-star Karen returns to UDT and we chat about what's blooming our gardens, what's died, and what is just being plain pokey. Plus, find out the unique way Karen aerates her lawn, how Christy made an unintended birdfeeder, and why bears are like cats. Then, we take our grubby hands and dig into the beautiful bug everyone loves to hate.   Founder of Phyllom Bio Products and ever-wise, John Libs, comes back to continue our ever-growing series on organic Japanese Beetles mitigation. Learn all about this garden enemy and why Spring is a great time to plan your attack. Then we discuss the benefits of soap & water, neem oil, milky spore, traps and grubGONE!  So, unless you want to hope for a flock of crows to descend into your yard at just the right moment, this is the podcast for you. Surprise! Edith sent a letter to Mailbag (Ring Ring!) and we giggle at all her updates – and sympathize why sometimes, despite our best efforts, things just don't grow. Ah well, we have laughs, joy and inspiration to help!  Let's all smell like dirt, OK? Check out grubGONE! & beetleGONE! Support UDT by joining our Garden Party and get fun rewards! Get a UDT Coffee Mug or other cool Merch! Visit our website for pix, good info and Upside Down Dictionary Click here to write to us!  Learn How to Winter Sow! Don't Know Your Zone? Find it HERE

I heard about my guest during my first season in Turks and I did not meet him until 28 years later! So, as you can imagine, I am very excited to have him on the podcast! His first season was in Club Med Eleuthera in 1983 as a Sailing G.O. He worked for Club Med from 1983 to 2020 and held positions such as Sailing & Windsurfing, Public Relations, Chief of Sports, Chief of Village to Director of Training and Corporate HR in Miami and Director of UDT. Still don't know who I am talking about? You have either all worked with him, or you know his name, as it is synonymous with Club Med. Of course, I can only be talking about the one and only, legendary, Howard McCarley!! Up until Chief of Sports, Howard worked in villages such as Ixtapa, Playa Blanca, Sonora Bay, Fort Royal, Île Maurice, Eilat, Luxor & Hurgada and Copper Mountain. Howard first heard about Club Med from a couple that he was giving windsurfing lessons to in California. It turned out that this couple frequented Club Med and told him all about it. Howard applied and drove down to the Scottsdale office to be interviewed by none other than CDV Sylvio de Bortoli, who was going on a recruitment drive. Howard helped open the beautiful village of Sonora Bay in 1984, with CDV Michel Proriol and we fondly reminisce over windsurfing on the Red Sea in Eilat. Howard shares with us which Chief of Village he modeled himself after and who became his mentor and ends the interview talking about his Chief of Sports stage in France. Please enjoy this first part of the interview. Hopefully, Howard will return in the near future for the second part! **My First Season podcast has always been ad-free and free to listen to and is available on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Samsung Podcasts, Podbean App, Podchaser, Spotify, Amazon Music/Audible, TuneIn + Alexa, iHeartRadio, PlayerFM, Pandora and Listen Notes. And if you like what you hear, please leave a review at Apple podcasts.

The MisFitNation Welcomes David Young owner of Public Safety UAS and Law Enforcement Professional to the show Welcome to our Take it Home Thursday show this week.  We are glad you are back with us and look forward to hearing your thoughts on this chat.  We started the week off by releasing a great Chat with US Navy, UDT 11 Vietnam Veteran Joseph Lipari  followed by a Live chat with John Katsavos and now we bring you the Owner of Public Safety UAS David Young As owner and founder of Public Safety UAS, David's operational experience, personal crisis management and Drone technology expertise has allowed him to develop training courses designed specifically for Public Safety personnel in mind. These classes cover current industry trends and drone technologies while providing critical, relevant information for first responders, emergency management and public safety officials. With over 9 years of law enforcement experience specializing in complex violent crime investigations and tactics, David incorporates an educational philosophy grounded on area expertise while stressing the importance of safety and efficiency. An engaging teacher, he successfully consults and establishes Drone- team operational procedures for numerous government agencies. Check out Public Safety UAS Here: https://www.facebook.com/psuasi/ This is a chat you will not want to miss.  Enjoy episode 244 of The MisFitNation! All of our latest episodes and videos can be found here: https://www.themisfitnation.com This episode YouTube:  https://youtube.com/live/3Dw4vP_Up3E Support us here:   https://ko-fi.com/themisfitnationpodcast #uas #safety #leo #publicsafety #fireUAS #policeuas #entrepreneur #firstresponder #solutions #veteran #ptsd #findthegood #aboutfaceradio #electracast #pickedcherries #vetsinpodcasting #vetsinradio Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The MisFitNation Welcomes US Navy Vietnam Veteran, UDT 11 member Joseph Lipari Welcome to our Top it off Tuesday show this week.  We are glad you are with us. Joseph Lipari is a Veteran of The US Navy.  He was a member of UDT 11 and trained to become a member of Seal Team 1. He served in Vietnam with UDT 11 and did not get the nod for Seal Team 1. He did learn from his time with the UDT. He has had an amazing journey since his days on the team, you will enjoy his story.  This is a chat you will not want to miss.  Enjoy episode 243 of The MisFitNation! All of our latest episodes and videos can be found here: https://www.themisfitnation.com This episode YouTube:  https://youtu.be/x7iFhpJirOQ Support us here: https://ko-fi.com/themisfitnationpodcast #UDT #UDT11 #navy #veteran #vietnam #frogmen #chiropractor #stillserving #resilience #mentalhealth #ptsd #findthegood #aboutfaceradio #electracast #pickedcherries #vetsinpodcasting #vetsinradio Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Three reasons to cooperate, published by paulfchristiano on December 24, 2022 on LessWrong. In this post I'll discuss three reasons to cooperate in a truly one-shot prisoner's dilemma: Kindness: You care about the other player. Correlation. Your decision is correlated with the other player's decision. Reciprocity. Your decision is correlated with the other player's belief about your decision. Kindness makes common sense, but correlation and reciprocity are often lumped together under “weird acausal stuff.” I think they are worth distinguishing because they work quite differently. I'll talk about details of correlation and reciprocity, and then argue that most incentives to cooperate in the true prisoner's are likely to come from interactions of multiple mechanisms. Setup: the true prisoner's dilemma Imagine that one day our civilization sees another through a wormhole—we've never met before, and we are far enough away from each other that after today we will never meet again. From each civilization, a single person is chosen to play a game. The two players then play a one-shot prisoner's dilemma with survival as the stakes. Each player chooses to cooperate in which case they die with probability 1%, or defect in which case the other play dies with probability 2%. If both players cooperate they each die with 1% chance, if both defect they each die with 2% chance. No matter what the other player does, you have a lower probability of death if you defect. In this post we analyze reasons that you might cooperate anyway. I will not discuss the incentives to make commitments in advance based on the possibility that we may play a prisoner's dilemma in the future (even though I think those incentives are important). I will analyze the question mostly for an agent who uses EDT or UDT. You could just as well replace the ratio 2%/1% with any X>1, and ask “how large does X need to be before I'd cooperate?” I think it is pretty robust that you should cooperate at some sufficiently large scale (unless you specifically want the other player to die) and so this is ultimately a quantitative question. For this post I'll just keep X=2 and leave it up to the reader to generalize. Kindness The most boring reason to cooperate is that I don't want the other player to die. That might be because I value their life and experiences for its own sake, in the same way that I value mine. Or it could be that I mostly care about other consequences of survival—the effect a death will have on the people around us, the things we will accomplish if we survive, and so on—and I think their survival will have nearly as many good consequences as mine. Let K be how much I value the other player's survival. If K > 0.5 then I should cooperate. (Since then 2% K > 1%.) Correlation When my deliberation begins, I'm not sure what I'll end up deciding. I'm also not sure what the other player will decide. Those two unknown quantities are slightly correlated because our decisions have some common structure: what happens when someone is whisked away from their everyday life and spends a day deciding how nice to be to someone from an alien civilization? A causal decision theorist doesn't care about this correlation, but an evidential decision theorist considers it a reason to cooperate. We can measure the strength of the correlation as C = P(they cooperate | I cooperate) – P(they cooperate | I defect). If C > 0.5 then I should cooperate. Smaller correlations give us a partial reason to cooperate, and they combine linearly with kindness: if K + C > 0.5 I should cooperate. It's really hard to estimate C. It's probably not zero but it's plausible that it's extremely small. Much of the correlation is likely to be screened off by other stuff I've seen (e.g. observing other people playing the prisoner's dilemma). The effectiv...

Mark has struggled with his weight for 14 years, since work took priority for him he wasn't taking full ownership of his health and weight and it spiralled out of control. When he realised that his clothes didn't fit him anymore, he realised it was time for a lifestyle change. After seeing multiple successes from our online posts, he decided to jump in again with UDT, this is his story.

Claudia and Bev speak with a pain provider, Kelly. Kelly gives tips for interacting with your pain provider. What to do. What not to do. UDT's are discussed. Spinal Cord Stimulators. ESI's. Kelly is an active member of ASPMN - American Society for Pain Management Nursing and has been certified since 2016 and awarded AP-PMN - Advanced Practice Pain Management Nursing status in 2020. There are fewer than 100 APRN's nationwide with this designation. Links from the episode: Opioid Induced Hyperalgesia - from our debunking lies section Disclaimer: The information in this episode is not to be considered medical or legal advice --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/the-doctor-patient-forum/message

September 16, 2022Mark, Ray, and Scott discuss Pediatric Urology Coding and some of its nuances.  Also, they answer 2 pediatric urology coding questions: Case was for non-palpable testis(UDT) so plan was laparoscopic approach for UDT and, at time of laparoscopy, no intraabdominal testis found, so an open exploration with separate incision was done and atrophic testis found in canal. billed as diagnostic laparoscopy (49320)and as no testis found in abdomen, separate orchiectomy billed from separate incision. (54520)-- can this be billed?  Same day procedure but testis not in abdomen to do planned lap approach but needed to have UDT addressed.Is there/what is appropriate code for artificial erection at time of surgery for possible chordee in boy but no chordee found?  An artificial erection needs to be done to prove or disprove chordee-- tissue needs to be dissected down to get appropriate erection test so not just circumcision but no chordee found after complete dissection.  Currently, using 54250 as there really isn't a specific peds urology code. Suggestions? Test Your Knowledge - What is your urology coding score?https://www.prsnetwork.com/uroscore Free Urology Coding Training For Residentshttps://www.prseducationfoundation.orgUrology Advanced Coding and Reimbursement Seminar  - Registration OpenLas Vegas, NV - December 2-3, 2022New Orleans, LA - January 27-28, 2023Register Now  Compliance PlansQuestions or need help, please send us an email: info@prsnetwork.com   Join the discussion:Urology Coding and Reimbursement Group - Join for free and ask your questions, and share your wisdom.Click Here to Start Your Free Trial of AUACodingToday.com 

NEW BOOK TELLS THE UNTOLD TRUE STORY OF THE WORLD WAR II FROGMEN WHO GAVE RISE TO THE NAVY SEALS With echoes of  Unbroken, the derring-do and bravado of The Right Stuff; and the battle-forged camaraderie of  Band of Brothers, Into Enemy Waters by award-winning journalist Andrew Dubbins (Aug. 23, 2022, Diversion Books) details the origins and heroic missions of World War II's elite unit of Navy frogmen, told through the eyes of one of its last living members, 95-year-old George Morgan. Morgan was just a wiry, 17-year-old lifeguard from New Jersey when he joined the Navy's new combat demolition unit, tasked to blow up enemy coastal defenses ahead of landings by Allied forces. His first assignment: Omaha Beach on D-Day  When he returned stateside, Morgan learned that his service was only beginning. Outfitted with swim trunks, a dive mask, and fins, he was sent to Hawaii and then deployed to the Pacific as a member of the pioneering Underwater Demolition Teams. GIs called them “half fish, half nuts.” Today, we call them Navy SEALs. Led by maverick Naval Reserve Officer Draper Kauffman, Morgan would spend the fierce final year of the war swimming up to enemy controlled beaches to gather intel and detonate underwater barriers. He'd have to master the sea, muster superhuman grit, and overcome the demons of Omaha Beach. Moving closer to Japan, the enemy's island defenses were growing more elaborate and its soldiers more fanatical. From the black sand beaches of Iwo Jima, to the shark infested reefs of Okinawa, to the cold seas of Tokyo Bay, teenaged George Morgan was there before most, fighting for his life. And for all of us. For more information: AndrewDubbins.com.

“Frogmen” was the nickname given to the members of the newly formed Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) during World War II. Their fellow service members called them “Half Fish, Half Nuts”. They were the predecessors of today's Navy SEAL teams. George Morgan The history of the formation of these special units is the subject of a new book by award winning journalist & author Andrew Dubbins. It is called “Into Enemy Waters; a World War II Story of the Demolition Divers Who Became the Navy SEALs”. Much of the book is based upon the personal experiences of one of the last living original Frogmen George Morgan. Draper Kaufman is credited as the being the “father of the Navy SEALs”. Although the son of a Navy Admiral, Kaufman was denied a commission from the Naval Academy due to poor eyesight. He volunteered with the American Ambulance Corps in France prior to the US entering the war. He then volunteered with the Royal British Navy where he gained valuable experience defusing bombs during the London blitz. When Admiral Nimitz asked Draper why he wasn't in the US Navy, He replied that our Navy didn't want him because of his eyesight.  Nimitz resolved THAT issue immediately. The Frogmen of UDT would see action in some of the most famous battles of World War II including D-Day, Iwo Jima, Okinawa and even the waters of Tokyo Bay gathering intelligence for an invasion that never took place. Very often they would swim long distances to the enemy beaches armed with only a knife, their demolition tools and their bravery. Dubbins shares the creativity Kaufman and the original Frogmen used in developing techniques and tools, versions of which are still in use today.  Kaufman insisted on recruiting strong swimmers as he felt it was easier to train a man to use explosives than to swim. Upon reflection, George Morgan jokes that it was probably a mistake he told the recruiter he was a lifeguard.  George also shares firsthand accounts of the terror of war and bravery of his fellow UDT Frogmen. TAKEAWAY: It took a particular type of bravery for George Morgan to help Andrew on this project. It caused him to recall bad memories that he had been trying to forget for decades.

Today on Good Morning Crypto…  We will be discussing… Fidelity and Blackrock are backing USDC with over 400 Million, as Circle CEO Jeremy Allaire revealed their reserves consist of 100% US assets. We break down the potential of USDC becoming the digital dollar.  Flare Networks is set to go LIVE this July, opening the door for DeFi within the XRP ecosystem, as Ripple's legal team is hiring 2 new attorneys for its battle against the SEC.   Hedera network (HBAR) is integrating leading digital assets and stablecoins on their blockchain, (BTC, ETH, USDC, UDT) and VeChain looks poised for massive price appreciation as they're using DLT to change the supply chain forever.  With 2023 being the year of institutional adoption, Kevin O'leary is calling for bearish markets until after midterm elections and regulation for crypto.  We'll also be speaking with our special guest on the evolution of digital assets breaking down for our listeners why this next bull run will be one for the history books.  // Tony Edwards (Thinking Crypto) Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjpkwsuHgYx9fBE0ojsJ_-w/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/ThinkingCrypto1 // Linqto https://www.linqto.com/?cjevent=b65ecbbec46011ec81b91b3a0a1c0e10 //// T H E 3 T W A R R I O R A C A D E M Y // Join the 3T Warrior Academy: https://3twarrior.com/warrioracademy?affiliate_id=3827481 // Join our Free Discord: https://3twarrior.com/discord49541345 //// F O L L O W T H E T E A M // Official Good Morning Crypto https://linktr.ee/3tGMCrypto Twitter: https://twitter.com/3tGMCrypto // Abs  Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/Abs3t/ // Mario | Node Defender https://linktr.ee/nodedefender Twitter: https://twitter.com/NodeDefender Youtube: https://youtube.com/channel/UCnld-Xvam562HFQDOIBwymw Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/NodeDefender/ // Johnny Krypto https://linktr.ee/johnnykrypto Twitter: https://twitter.com/JohnnyKrypto00 YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCm-qyQNf1rnUaw6u20mKCVw // Gonzo Twitter: https://twitter.com/gonzo_3t Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/gonzo_3t/ // Selman Twitter: https://twitter.com/SelmanGee YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/c/GeeInvesting // NFTtones: https://linktr.ee/NFTtones // Billy Twitter: https://twitter.com/WadkinsBilly TikTok: @Homeless2Humbled Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/homeless2humbled_ //// #Crypto #CryptoNews #Bitcoin #BTC #Ethereum #ETH #XRP #CryptoCurrency #Finance #Talkshow #NewsShow #money #finance #Metaverse Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today on Good Morning Crypto…  We will be discussing… Fidelity and Blackrock are backing USDC with over 400 Million, as Circle CEO Jeremy Allaire revealed their reserves consist of 100% US assets. We break down the potential of USDC becoming the digital dollar.  Flare Networks is set to go LIVE this July, opening the door for Defi within the XRP ecosystem, as Jed McCaleb continues to sell.  Hedera network (HBAR) is integrating leading digital assets and stablecoins on their blockchain, (BTC, ETH, USDC, UDT) allowing other currencies to utilize its efficiency and carbon neutrality.   Ripple is changing the world. After partnering with the Digital Pound Foundation last fall, Central banks are moving faster than ever to accelerate global payments. With Ripple taking center stage, could XRP be the source of global liquidity?  And Jim Cramer announced “digital assets have zero underlying value”, From bear to bull and then back to bear, our industry experts explain why this bear market could be the buying opportunity of a lifetime.  // Linqto https://www.linqto.com/?cjevent=b65ecbbec46011ec81b91b3a0a1c0e10 //// T H E 3 T W A R R I O R A C A D E M Y // Join the 3T Warrior Academy: https://3twarrior.com/warrioracademy?affiliate_id=3827481 // Join our Free Discord: https://3twarrior.com/discord49541345 //// F O L L O W T H E T E A M // Official Good Morning Crypto https://linktr.ee/3tGMCrypto Twitter: https://twitter.com/3tGMCrypto // Abs  Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/Abs3t/ // Mario | Node Defender https://linktr.ee/nodedefender Twitter: https://twitter.com/NodeDefender Youtube: https://youtube.com/channel/UCnld-Xvam562HFQDOIBwymw Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/NodeDefender/ // Johnny Krypto https://linktr.ee/johnnykrypto Twitter: https://twitter.com/JohnnyKrypto00 YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCm-qyQNf1rnUaw6u20mKCVw // Gonzo Twitter: https://twitter.com/gonzo_3t Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/gonzo_3t/ // Selman Twitter: https://twitter.com/SelmanGee YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/c/GeeInvesting // NFTtones: https://linktr.ee/NFTtones // Billy Twitter: https://twitter.com/WadkinsBilly TikTok: @Homeless2Humbled Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/homeless2humbled_ //// #Crypto #CryptoNews #Bitcoin #BTC #Ethereum #ETH #XRP #CryptoCurrency #Finance #Talkshow #NewsShow #money #finance #Metaverse Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Decision theory and dynamic inconsistency, published by paulfchristiano on July 3, 2022 on LessWrong. Here is my current take on decision theory: When making a decision after observing X, we should condition (or causally intervene) on statements like “My decision algorithm outputs Y after observing X.” Updating seems like a description of something you do when making good decisions in this way, not part of defining what a good decision is. (More.) Causal reasoning likewise seems like a description of something you do when making good decisions. Or equivalently: we should use a notion of causality that captures the relationships relevant to decision-making rather than intuitions about physical causality. (More.) “How much do I care about different copies of myself?” is an arbitrary question about my preferences. If my preferences change over time, it naturally gives rise to dynamic inconsistency unrelated to decision theory. (Of course an agent free to modify itself at time T would benefit by implementing some efficient compromise amongst all copies forked off after time T.) In this post I'll discuss the last bullet in more detail since I think it's a bit unusual, it's not something I've written about before, and it's one fo the main ways my view of decision theory has changed in the last few years. (Note: I think this topic is interesting, and could end up being relevant to the world in some weird-yet-possible situations, but I view it as unrelated to my day job on aligning AI with human interests.) The transparent Newcomb problem In the transparent version of Newcomb's problem, you are faced with two transparent boxes (one small and one big). The small box always contains $1,000. The big box contains either $10,000 or $0. You may choose to take the contents of one or both boxes. There is a very accurate predictor, who has placed $10,000 in the big box if and only if they predict that you wouldn't take the small box regardless of what you see in the big one. Intuitively, once you see the contents of the big box, you really have no reason not to take the small box. For example, if you see $0 in the big box, you know for a fact that you are either getting $0 or $1,000. So why not just take the small box and walk away with $1,000? EDT and CDT agree about this one. I think it's genuinely non-obvious what you should do in this case (if the predictor is accurate enough). But I think this is because of ambiguity about what you want, not how you should make decision. More generally, I think that the apparent differences between EDT and UDT are better explained as differences in preferences. In this post I'll explain that view, using transparent Newcomb as an illustration. A simple inconsistent creature Consider a simple creature which rationally pursues its goals on any given day—but whose goals change completely each midnight. Perhaps on Monday the creature is trying to create as much art and beauty as possible; on Tuesday it is trying to create joy and happiness; on Wednesday it might want something different still. On any given day we can think of the creature as an agent. The creature on Tuesday is not being irrational when it decides to pursue joy and happiness instead of art and beauty. It has no special reason to try to “wind back the clock” and pursue the same projects it would have pursued on monday. Of course on Monday the creature would prefer to arrest this predictable value drift—it knows that on Tuesday it will be replaced with a new agent, one that will stop contributing to the project of art and beauty. The creature on Monday ought to make plans accordingly, and if they had the ability to change this feature of themselves they would likely do so. It's a matter of semantics whether we call this creature a single agent or a sequence of agents (one for each day)...

Neil was carrying too much weight, he felt self conscious about his belly and he felt like he needed to nip it in the bud before it got too bad, over the last 2 to 3 years it was getting harder and had to buy bigger clothes.    He tried cutting back before on foods without much success always putting weight back on, when he made a commitment to himself with UDT and got accountable, huge changes finally happened in his life. 

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The Marines wouldn't take Marcinco because he lacked a high school diploma, so he went back, graduated and joined the Navy instead.  He qualified for a UDT team that would was later developed into the first US Navy SEAL team.  He deployed to Vietnam several times and by the late 1960s, return as a battle hardened veteran.  Now as an officer, Marcinco's experience and education were valuable in choosing the perfect anti-terrorism team the Navy had to offer.  The first sailors of this top secret tier 1 special ops team were later known as SEAL Team Six.  Marcinco would later go on to command Red Cell, another black ops team that would test the Navy's vulnerability to infiltration.  After 30 years of active duty, Marcinco retired but he was far from finished with life.  Listen to this incredible story of Rogue Warrior, Dick Marcinco.

Retired Army Colonel and Navy SEAL Bob Adams, M.D. sits down with John R Miles to talk about being your own best advocate in life. He discusses why this is so vital through the viewpoint of over 30 years as a doctor and applying the lessons he learned from BUD/S and his 12 years as a SEAL. Like this? Please subscribe, and join me on my new platform for peak performance, life coaching, and personal growth: https://passionstruck.com/. Please post a screenshot of your listening on Instagram & tag us so we can thank you personally! Thank you for Watching the Passion Struck podcast. Dr. Robert (Bob) Adams is a family physician with the UNC health system. He entered medical school after serving as an elite Navy SEAL for 12 years. He is the author of SIX DAYS OF IMPOSSIBLE - NAVY HELL WEEK – and The book SWORDS AND SAINTS - A DOCTOR'S JOURNEY - A must-read for future doctors and those wishing for change. He graduated from the Naval Academy, BUD/S class 81, obtained his MBA from James Madison University, and went to medical school at Wake Forrest. New Interviews with the World's GREATEST high achievers will be posted every Tuesday with a Momentum Friday inspirational message! Colonel Bob Adams Show Notes 0:00 Teaser from Dr. Bob Adams 2:05 Dr. Bob Adams Episode Introduction 4:31 His path to becoming a Navy SEAL 8:35 The difference between UDT and SEALs 10:51 Biggest Lesson Learned in BUD/S Training 16:29 Why he never hit the wall during Hell Week 18:56 How the Lone Survivor accurately depicts SEAL valor 22:45 His advice for Naval Academy Midshipmen 27:29 Why he became an Army physician 33:07 How he became the Delta Force Flight Surgeon 36:12 His book about Navy SEAL Hell Week 41:40 Why he believes we need to be our own best advocate 48:32 Why it isn't easy to trust agencies like the CDC 55:56 His third book featuring letters from the civil war ENGAGE WITH BOB ADAMS MD *Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/buds81/ *LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/drbobmd/ *SEALS AND SAINTS website: https://swordsandseals.com/ *SIX DAYS OF IMPOSSIBLE: https://www.sealhellweek.com/   ENGAGE WITH JOHN R. MILES * Subscribe to my channel: https://www.youtube.com/c/JohnRMiles * Leave a comment, 5-star rating (please!) * Support me: https://johnrmiles.com * Twitter: https://twitter.com/Milesjohnr * Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Johnrmiles.c0m​. * Medium: https://medium.com/@JohnRMiles​ * Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/john_r_miles ABOUT JOHN R. MILES * https://johnrmiles.com/my-story/ * Guides: https://johnrmiles.com/blog/ * Coaching: https://passionstruck.com/coaching/ * Speaking: https://johnrmiles.com/speaking-business-transformation/ * Gear: https://www.zazzle.com/store/passion_struck PASSION STRUCK *Subscribe to Podcast: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-passion-struck-podcast/id1553279283 *Website: https://passionstruck.com/ *About: https://passionstruck.com/about-passionstruck-johnrmiles/ *Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/passion_struck_podcast *LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/passionstruck *Blog: https://passionstruck.com/blog/