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Susipžaįstame su spaudos publikacijomis kultūros tema.Pasaulio kultūros įvykių apžvalga.Lietuvos kompozitorių sąjunga paskelbė Lietuvos kompozitorių 2024 metų kūrinių penkioliktuką. Šiandien kviečiame susipažinti su Vykinto Baltako kūriniu „Cumulus“ simfoniniam pučiamųjų orkestrui.Minint Stasio Ušinsko 120-ąsias gimimo metines, Pakruojyje surengta paroda, pristatyta pagal jo brėžinius atkurta viena iš marionečių.Lietuvoje pristatyta pirmoji Baltijos šalyse palestiniečių poezijos rinktinė „Alyvmedžio garsai“.Penklioliktuosiuose „Ąžuolo“ apdovanojimuose pagrindinį „Ąžuolo“ kategorijos prizą pelnė Narvydas Naujalis, o „Gilės“ prizas atiteko Mildai Juodvalkytei.Zarasų rajono savivaldybės viešosios bibliotekos parodų salėje galima aplankyti kolekcininko Ramučio Petniūno retų knygų parodą iš asmeninės bukinistinės kolekcijos.Helsinkyje šiuolaikinio meno erdvėje „Myymälä2“ pristatoma Dalios Mikonytės, Adomo Žudžio, kompozitorės Marijos Jociūtės ir rašytojos Linos Simutytės projektas „Buitinė astronomija“.Domanto Razausko muzikinės naujienos.
JAV viceprezidentas Vance`as, kalbėdamas Miuncheno saugumo konferencijos Vašingtone organizuotame renginyje pasakė, kad Rusija kelia pernelyg daug sąlygų karui Ukrainoje užbaigti.Pirmajame balsavime konklavoje kardinolai neišrinko naujo popiežiaus. Virš Siksto koplyčios Vatikane trečiadienio vakarą pakilo juodi dūmai.Šiandien Šilutės rajone, Macikų kaime bus paminėtos antrojo pasaulinio karo pabaigos Europoje 80-osios metinės.Šiandien Seimas balsuos, ar riboti greičio matavimo prietaisų įrengimą keliuose.Kauno rajono Ramučių kaimo gyventojai skundžiasi intensyviu kvapu, sklindančiu iš šalia veikiančios medienos apdirbimo įmonės.Lietuviai socialiniuose tinkluose dalijasi įrašu, kuriame matomas visai greta kelio risnojantis lokys. Ar tikri šie vaizdai?Ved. Rūta Kupetytė
In this episode of Rich AF, host Charl Minnaar (The Yachting Investor) sits down with Ramu Tremblay, a Hawaii-based real estate expert and founder of Luxe Maui Properties. From realtor to short-term rental powerhouse, Ramu shares his journey into property investing, the early mistakes that shaped him, and practical strategies for building wealth through real estate. Expect real talk, big insights, and a few hilarious (and terrifying) stories from the world of property management.
this story stresses the value of speaking the truth. It is about two friends. Somu trusts Ramu and gives him money when Ramu was in trouble. Ramu conveniently forgot to repay the amount. When asked about the same he destroyed even the paper which he wrote as a promice to repay. This case is taken to the village elders. Did somu got the money? Or did ramu tell the truth? Please listen to the story and find out. The cover art is by 7 years old Abirami. She drew as she was listening to the narration. Hariom. This is Rajee Patti telling you Subhashitam kadhaigal.
'ചെറിയ മനുഷ്യരും വലിയ ലോകവും' 1961 മുതൽ 1973 വരെ മലയാളിയുടെ സംവേദനക്ഷമതയെ സമൂലം സ്വാധീനിക്കുകയും അതിനെ മുന്നോട്ടുനയിക്കുകയും ചെയ്തു. അത് ഓർമ്മകളായും ജീവൽകാലപ്രേരണകളായും ഇന്നും മലയാളിയിൽ ജീവിക്കുകയാണ്. ഇതിനുമുൻപിറങ്ങിയ രണ്ടു സമാഹാരങ്ങളിൽ ആകെയുള്ള അദ്ധ്യായങ്ങളുടെ അറുപതുശതമാനത്തോളം മാത്രമേ ഉണ്ടായിരുന്നുള്ളൂ . 'ചെറിയ മനുഷ്യരും വലിയ ലോകവും ' സമ്പൂർണ്ണ പതിപ്പ് പുറത്തുവരുന്നതിനുമുൻപുള്ള തിരനോട്ടം പോലൊരു പോഡ്കാസ്റ്റ് ആണിത്. പുതിയപതിപ്പിന്റെ കെട്ടിലും മട്ടിലും ഏകോപനം നടത്തുന്ന രാമു അരവിന്ദനുമായുള്ള സംഭാഷണമാണ് ഈ പോഡ്കാസ്റ്റ് . സ്നേഹപൂർവ്വം, എസ് . ഗോപാലകൃഷ്ണൻ .
Afrocentric Journalist Nabou Ramu brings the heat representing Gen-Z in a debate with Dominique about Trump v. Biden and third-party alternatives. Ramu says Black folk lack dignity in 2024. Nabou Ramu is the owner of Nabou Relations PR Firm, keep up with her byline on ESSENCE GU. Follow Nabou Ramu on IG @Nabou.Ramu and Dominique Diprima @diprimaradio. Saharah Ali leads us on a guided meditation, shares an affirmation and speaks on the "Planet Parade." www.saharahali.com
ESSENCE GU writer Nabou Ramu unpacks her inaugural article about Morehouse College's 2024 commencement speaker, President Joe Biden. She challenges "Reparationists" to have a vison when making political demands and becoming the change you want to see. Nabou Ramu, born Seynabou Clark, is an afrocentric journalist who covers all things art, culture, and business. Follow the griot on Instagram @nabou.ramu and Dominique Diprima @diprimaradio.
En este episodio reacciono a la convocatoria de la Federación de PR, porque no hace sentido, porque hace sentido y quiénes serían mis 12. ¡Que Disfrutes! --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/elramuopina/support
అందరికి శ్రీరామ నవమి శుభాకాంక్షలుOn the auspicious occasion of Sri rama navami your host Gayathri presents you Sri Rama Lera O Rama from the movie Sri Rama Rajyam. The song is originally composed maestro Ilayaraja and sung by Shreya Ghoshal and Ramu.--For more interesting topics, subscribe and stay tuned!Support "They said it" on Patreon - https://www.patreon.com/theysaidit---Follow us on:Facebook - https://www.facebook.com/theysaiditInstagram - https://www.instagram.com/theysaidit22/LinkedIn - https://www.linkedin.com/company/they-said-it/Click here to become a sponsor for a good cause :)---Listen to more episodes on RedCircle, Spotify, Apple podcast or Google podcast and on YouTube---Credits:Album art: CanvaPictures: https://shrirammandirayodhya.com/---#sriramanavami #ilayaraja #shreyaghoshal #NBK#theysaidittelugu #telugupodcast #softskills #telugucontentcreators #lifestyle #productivity #wellbeing #selfhelpSupport this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/they-said-it-telugu-podcast/donationsAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy
Last time we spoke about the defense of India. General Mutaguchi's megalomaniac dream of invading India was tossed into motion. Battles were raging over countless features and against formidable allied boxes such as the Lion Box. Yet Mutaguchi had relied far too heavily on seizing the allied supply depots while promising his subordinate commanders they would have ample supplies for their tasks. Those like General Sato became so angry with their superior they pretty much were acting insubordinate. The effort to take Kohima fully and thrust into India was falling apart battle by battle. Meanwhile within China, General Chennault's 14th air force was causing major problems for the Japanese, forcing them into action. Operation Ichi-Go was formed, a colossal offensive to neutralize airfields and perhaps end the China Problem once and for all. Meanwhile the Royal Navy received some breathing room in the mediterranean sea and were now moving into the Pacific Theater. This episode is Operation Ichi-Go Unleashed Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The Imperial Japanese Army, largely because of the losses incurred by the Imperial Japanese Navy and logistical constraints, was virtually powerless to stop the allied advance in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Imperial HQ predicted further losses in early 1944 and General Douglas MacArthur was expecting to sweep up the northern New Guinea coast so he could retake the Philippines. New Guinea was thus seen as a holding operation to delay the allied advance. With its shorter supply line, the Philippines was now being regarded as a good location to block MacArthur's advance towards the home islands. Everyone of course was still waiting for the decisive naval battle. But back on the mainland, the IJA were not dependent on the IJN, their logistical constraints were not the same at all. Hence suddenly in 1944, the IJA decided to unleash incredibly large and bold offensives in Burma, Northern India and of course in China. On New Years day of 1944, Chiang Kai-Shek cabled President FDR warning him that the strategy they and Stalin had agreed on at the Tehran Conference in November of 1943, fully emphasizing the European Front was leaving China open to a major attack. “Before long Japan will launch an all-out offensive against China.” Yet western intelligence disagreed with Chiang Kai-Shek's sentiment. While General Stilwell was completely focused on recapturing Burma, Chiang Kai-Sheks fears were about to be proven correct. In April of 1944, Operation Ichi-Go was launched. It was the largest military operation in Japanese history, it was also a last ditch effort to finally solve the so-called China Problem. It was obvious to the IJA, the IJN were losing the maritime war in the Pacific, thus they were determined to toss the dice in China. If they were successful, overland supply lines from Burma to Korea could be secured. In addition it would be a hell of a bargaining chip when negotiating with the Americans. If they could finally end Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang government, America would be facing the extremely formidable task of having to invade and reconquer China. Of course the immediate war aims were to knock out General Chennault's air force some he would not be able to bomb Formosa or the home islands. Emperor Hirohito recalled in his Dokuhaku Roku, post-war testament “One shred of hope remained—to bash them at Yunnan in conjunction with operations in Burma. If we did that we could deal a telling blow to Britain and America …” By early April General Hata had amassed 62,000 men, 52,000 Japanese and 10,000 collaborationist units alongside 800 tanks, 1550 artillery pieces, 250 aircraft, 15550 motorized vehicles and 100000 horses. This would turn into 150,000 troops, and believe it or not that was the advance guard of a campaign that would eventually involve 500,000 troops. They would be supplied with enough ammunition for two years. The IJA air force amassed 200 bombers with enough fuel for 8 months to support them. Over the next 9 months, battles would be fought over 3 regions, Henan in central China to the east of Nanjing; Hunan and Guangxi in south China east of Hong Kong and Guangdong province and south of the Yangtze River. While Ichi-Go was unleashed, Chiang Kai-Sheks crack troops, the Y-Force based out of Yunan province, alongside Merrill's marauders were busy fighting alongside Stilwell in northern Burma. In spite of the efforts to keep Ichi-Go secret, during early 1944, the Chinese began fortifying their defenses and redeployed troops on a large scale to strengthen their frontlines. Chiang Kai-Shek knew something was coming, but his commanders believed a large-scale Japanese offensive in China was impossible by this point of the war. The Japanese began carrying out a heavy bombardment campaign, targeting Henyang, Guilin, Chongqing and against the heavy concentration of Chinese troops advancing in the Yangtze river area. The aerial attacks greatly hampered the KMT's logistical lines. The Chinese reacted by unleashing their frontline artillery, destroying the Bawangcheng bridge on March 25th. The Japanese hastily went to work repairing the bridge as Lt General Uchiyama Eitaro's 12th army would need to cross as pertaining to Operation Kogo. Kogo was the first phase of the battle aimed at opening the Pinghan Railway that ran from Beijing to northern Wuhan. South of Beijing is the Yellow River, that runs southwest to east. Uchiyama's plan was initially to cross the Yellow River and secure the Zhengzhou area before driving south towards the Luohe area, where the Japanese would ultimately prepare for a drive towards Luoyang. On the night of April 17th, the main part of the 37th division crossed the Yellow River and advanced towards Zhongmu. The Japanese rapidly penetrated the defenders positions, taking them by surprise. Three KM's in front of Zhongmu, they waited for the 7th independent Mixed Brigade to follow up behind them. The 7th Independent Mixed Brigade had crossed the Yellow River at the same time as the 37th Division, attacking the flank of the enemy facing the crossing point of the main body of the Brigade. Shortly after dawn the main body of the Brigade began crossing the river at a point near the left flank of the 37th Division. On the 19th, part of the 37th Division attacked Zhangzhou, completely routing the Chinese defenders while the bulk of the Division advanced towards Lihezhen. Meanwhile the 110th Division advanced upon Bawangcheng with the 62nd Division and 9th Independent Brigade following behind them. The 62nd Division was accompanied by the 3rd Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade, setting out for Luohe with their tank support. The 110th División continued their advance towards Micunzhen, capturing the town by the 24th. On that same day the 9th Independent Brigade seized Sishuizhen, but would be unable to break through the 177th Division's defenses. After a breakthrough was made at Zhengzhou, the 3rd armored division and 4th cavalry Brigades tanks advanced past the infantry to puncture the Chinese formations, forcing a quick rout. Meanwhile the 62nd Division, 37th Division and 7th Brigade reached the east-west line of Lihezhen and prepared for an assault on Xuchang. The Chinese simply were unable to respond to this. Chiang Kai-Shek and his commanders assumed this was a punitive expedition and that the Japanese would sooner or later turn back as they had always done in the past. As such, only the 15th and 29th Armies were sent to reinforce Xuchang to contain the Japanese offensive. Yet on the other hand, Uchiyama had also decided to divert his tanks and cavalry northwest, preparing for the future attack on Luoyang. On the 30th, Uchiyama's forces began attacking Xuchang, shattering the Chinese defenses at extreme speed and fully occupying the city by May 1st. The 62nd Division encountered the 15th and 29th Armies at Yingqiaozhen, battering them so heavily, the Chinese were unable to reinforce the vital railway. Two infantry battalions and one field artillery battalion of the 37th Division and the 27th Division departed Xuchang to continue marching south in order to re-open the Beijing-Hankou railway. The North China Area Army estimated that Tang Enbo would assemble his main force near Yehhsien, planning to advance to Yencheng and then wheel to the northwest in order to capture this force. However, the main force of the 31st Army Group of General Tang Enbo turned its advance to the north. The Area Army, therefore, changed its plan and decided to turn toward Loyang directly after the capture of xuchang, rather than to wait until Yencheng was captured. Yet we will have to wait until next week to find out what happens to General Tang Enbo's forces as we are now traveling over to Burma. Don't worry Operation Ichi-Go is just starting. After the capture of Walawbum in early March, General Stilwell ordered Merrill's Marauders to perform a wide envelopment, to cut the Kamaing Road behind General Tanaka's 18th Division while the 22nd Division with tank support drove down the Kamaing Road from the north. Two Marauder battalions led by Lt Colonel Charles Hunter set out on March 12th, reaching Janpan 4 days later. Once there they received new orders from Stilwell to head south through the hills along the Warong trail, then make their way to Kamaian to block the road at Inkangahtawng. Meanwhile Merrills 1st battalion and their Chinese allies were facing strong enemy resistance. From bivouac areas in the hills northeast of Shaduzup, on the Kamaing Road, the 1st Battalion of the 5307th, followed by the 113th Regiment, moved out on the morning of 13 March to put the northern clamp across the Kamaing Road just south of the Jambu Bum, in the vicinity of Shaduzup. I & R Platoons followed some fresh footprints into an enemy bivouac and stirred up a hornet's nest of Japanese. There was brisk skirmishing, and though the Americans managed to cross the Numpyek Hka just beyond, the Japanese had been alerted and proceeded to delay them expertly. Lieutenant-Colonel William Osborne, commander of the 1st Battalion, decided to cut a fresh trail around the Japanese. This was painfully slow business, and waiting for an airdrop took another day. On 22 March, when Colonel Hunter to the south was one day's march from his goal, aggressive patrolling by Red Combat Team revealed that the Japanese had blocked every trail in the area through which Osborne had to pass, so again Osborne elected to make his own trail, this time over ground so rough that the mules had to be unloaded. The maneuver succeeded, and no Japanese were seen on 23 or 24 March. Osborne's march would have been greatly aided had he known Tilly's Kachin Rangers were in the same general area. By March 22nd they reached Hpouchye. Additionally the 22nd Division and Colonel Browns tanks had been halling it through the Jambu Bum, making slow progress against heavy enemy resistance because of a lack of tank-infantry coordination. It was difficult to coordinate infantry and tank action, because the tankers found it hard to distinguish their countrymen from the Japanese. A few such cases of mistaken identity and the 22nd's men were understandably reluctant to get too close to the tanks. I remember a circumstance in WW1, when the IJA were laying siege to the German concession of Tsingtao. There was a small British force sent to aid the Japanese and so much friendly firing occurred, the IJA forced the Brits to wear their greatcoats to distinguish them from the Germans. So you know, it happens. By March 20th, Stilwell's forces crossed the ridge, reaching Hkawnglaw Hka, but yet again the lack of tank-infantry coordination led them to pull back. Once over the Jambu Bum, the 22nd found the road down to be mined and blocked with fallen trees. Two days were lost in clearing the road, and then three battalions made a frontal attack, guiding on the road. Next day they tried a co-ordinated tank-infantry attack and the leading tank platoon reached the Hkawnglaw Hka about four miles south of Jambu Bum, destroying a few machine guns and taking four antitank pieces. But the infantry would not follow the tanks and dug in two miles short of the stream. The tanks patrolled till dark, then fell back to their own lines. Over in the east, Hunter's men departed Janpan and reached Inkangahtawng on March 23rd, setting up two road blocks. Hunter sent out patrols and quickly discovered Kamaing was wide open, yet the delay of Stilwell's others units would force General Merril to deny any attempts to attack south. Tanaka's reaction to the roads blocks were pretty intense. Beginning on he 24th, vigorous Japanese counterattack followed on another. The Morita Unit, about two companies strong were a hastily assembled force drawn from a battalion gun platoon, an engineer company, a medical company, and division headquarters; they were given two 75-mm. guns, placed under command of the 18th Division's senior adjutant, and rushed south to Inkangahtawng. Tanaka also ordered the 2nd battalion, 114th Regiment over at Kamaing to attack north along the Kumon Range. The attacks were so intense, Hunter's men were forced to pull back to the Manpin Area by March 24th. Meanwhile, Merrill's 1st Battalion advanced to Chengun Hka, placing them really close to Tanaka's headquarters at Shaduzup. To the north, the 64th and 66th Regiments managed to link up, but the relentless Chinese assaults continued to fail against the tenacious defenders costing the attackers many tanks and lives. It was the 2nd battalion, 66th's turn to lead on 21 March. Again the tanks got well ahead of the infantry. A combination of ambush and counterattack by the Japanese cost five tanks, and then the Japanese came on up the road, almost overrunning the battalion headquarters, which was saved by the courage of two engineer platoons that had been clearing the road. That night the 1st battalion, 64th, which had been making the enveloping move, came in from the east and cut the Kamaing Road, right in the segment held by the Japanese. A tank attack on the 23rd found Japanese antitank guns just south of a small stream north of the Hkawnglaw Hka that prevented the tanks from outflanking the position. The guns knocked out the three lead tanks in quick succession, blocking the road. After heavy fighting at the stream crossing, the tanks finally had to withdraw, leaving the derelicts. In the afternoon the two flanking battalions made their way up the road and joined the 66th. Unfortunately, the meeting of the 64th and 66th Regiments did not signal the end of Japanese resistance. Japanese and Chinese positions on the road were thoroughly intermingled, making movement in the immediate area extremely hazardous. An attempt to break the deadlock with the tanks failed when the device chosen to identify the Chinese infantry backfired. Both the Chinese and the Japanese waved white cloths at the tanks. The armor moved blithely on into a nest of Japanese antitank men, who destroyed five tanks with magnetic mines, effectively blocking the road. General Liao, the 22nd Division's commander, now cut a bypass road for the tanks around his west right flank. A tank platoon tried it, could not cross a ravine improperly prepared for tank crossing, came under artillery fire, and had to be withdrawn. General Liao then committed his 65th Regiment to the main attack, applying immense pressure, prompting Tanaka to order his frontline regiments to withdraw 10 kilometers. On March 28th, Merrill's 1st Battalion established themselves along the Nam Kawng Chaung on the Japanese rear, from where they would be able to attack Tanaka's headquarters. Surprised, the Japanese chose to bypass the roadblock and evacuated their position via a track to the west. This resulted in Japanese resistance softening up, allowing the 65th Regiment to secure Shaduzup by March 29. At the same time, Hunter's encircled Marauders were fiercely resisting the enemy attacks at Nhpum Ga, with his 3rd Battalion subsequently taking up positions at the Hsamshingyang airstrip to the north. The men were extremely fatigued, facing constant marches, dysentery, malaria and malnutrition. They fought on for 5 days under constant attack, successfully pushing back the relentless Japanese assaults. On its hilltop the garrison, though suffering no shortage of food or ammunition, aside from the monotony of diet which was itself a hardship, suffered from an acute shortage of water. There were no plaster casts for the wounded, and they took their sulfadiazine dry. The pack animals could not be protected from the Japanese fire. When dead, their carcasses could not be buried, and the stench and the carrion flies added more miseries to the battle. Sergeant Matsumoto, who had played an important part at Walawbum, was a pillar of strength to the garrison, constantly scouting between the lines, overhearing Japanese conversations, and informing Colonel McGee accordingly. On one occasion, when Matsumoto learned of plans to surprise a small salient at dawn, the Americans drew back their lines, booby-trapping the abandoned foxholes. Punctually the Japanese attacked, straight into the massed fire of the waiting Americans. Throwing themselves into the foxholes for cover, they set off the booby traps. Matsumoto completed the debacle by screaming "Charge!" in Japanese, causing a supporting platoon to throw itself on the American guns. An ailing General Merrill would be evacuated to Ledo, leaving Colonel Hunter to assume formal command of the Galahad Unit. He then sent his 3rd Battalion to counterattack, unsuccessfully attempting to clear the trail as the Japanese repelled all his assaults. Finally on April 4th, Hunter got a breakthrough. The Japanese were believed to be moving ever more troops up the Tanai and it was believed that the 1st Battalion, which had been ordered to aid, would not arrive for four more days at least. Hunter's reaction was to attack on the 4th with everyone but the sick and the mule skinners, with his large patrols called in and Kachins used to replace them. A fake fight, using carbines, which sounded like the Arisaka rifle, was staged to deceive the Japanese, and the air support made three passes at them. The first two were genuine, the last a feint which made the Japanese take cover, only to come out and find the American infantry on them. Hunter's force gained that day and came within 1,000 yards of the besieged. About this same time Capt. John B. George and a small party, sent north by Hunter to find the Chinese regiment which Hunter understood would support him in this area, met the 1st battalion, 112th regiment at Tanaiyang, about eight miles northeast. After an interval, presumably used to obtain permission to do so, its commander moved toward Hsamshingyang. His first element arrived at the airfield on 4 April and was used to guard a trail junction. Despite this increasing pressure the Japanese made a very heavy attack on the Nhpum Ga garrison, actually reaching the foxholes at one point, and being driven out by two soldiers using hand grenades. Over the next few days, the Marauders were reinforced by the 112th regiment and Merrill's 1st battalion, allowing Hunters men to crawl closer and closer to Nhpum Ga. By Easter Sunday, the Japanese vanished, leaving cooking fires and equipment. There was no pursuit, as Stilwell wanted no movement beyond Nhpum Ga as they were facing large supply issues at this time. The battalion of the 114th made its way to Myitkyina, where General Tanaka, anxious about the town, added it to the garrison. The 1st Battalion, 55th Regiment, however, withdrew towards the vicinity of Warong. The Marauders had suffered 59 deaths and 314 wounded during the Inkangahtawn roadblock engagement and the siege of Nhpum Ga. The Galahad Unit and 114th regiment suffered so heavily from exhaustion, the men would be very weakened for future engagements. Further to the south, Stilwell was concerned about the recently offensives aimed at Imphal and Kohima, but he was relieved somewhat, when at the Jorhat conference of April 3, attended by Slim, Lentaigne, Stilwell and Mountbatten, he was told the situation was under control and for him to continue his northern offensive. During the conference, Slim also notified the others he had decided to divert the Chindits 14th and 111th Brigades, further south to help out his 4th Corps. However Brigadiers Fergusson and Calvert argued strongly against it, not wanting to get tangled up in the battle for Imphal. Calvert instead wanted to preserve White City and Broadway whilst Fergusson wanted another attempt at Indaw. The Chindits were still formally under the command of Stilwell in May and he wanted them to hold firm at Indaw to prevent the flow of Japanese reinforcements going north. It was estimated the Chindists could endure roughly 90 days of this action and would need to pull out my mid-June. This estimation did not sit well with Stilwell. General Lentaigne wanted to abandon the strongholds around Indaw and move north closer to Stilwell's forces. Therefore, Calvert's brigade would be prepared to open the drive to the town of Mogaung by attacking Mohnyin. Before this could occur, General Hayashi would initiated a general attack against White City on the night of April 6. The attack began with a three hour artillery bombardment, then the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 4th Regiment; and 3rd battalion, 114th Regiment stormed Calvert's defenses. When the shelling died away, Hayashi's three infantry battalions attempting to punch a hole along the southeast perimeter of the stronghold, defended by the Lancashire Fusiliers, Gurkhas, and other West Africans of the 6th Nigerian Regiment. Secure behind a row of machine guns with a line of mortars behind them, the defenders opened fire. Bullets and projectiles whipped through the air, the bright flashes of tracers lending an ethereal air to the proceedings. Rounds poured into the attacking Japanese who began to suffer heavy casualties. Determined bands of Japanese brought up Bangalore torpedoes to destroy the wire, but all malfunctioned. The battle went on for most of the night. The Chindits fought like lions throughout the night and managed to toss back numerous enemy attacks. Then to their dismay 27 IJA medium bombers appeared, blowing holes in the wire. The Bofors engaged them, shot down six and claimed six probables. Desperate efforts were made to repair the defenses before the next attack came in. White City received over 100,000 yards of barbed wire and 600 50ft coils of Dannert wire. The wire was 20 yards thick in places and festooned with mines and booby-traps. Dakotas continued to pour reinforcements into White City. The transport planes were relegated to flights during dawn and dusk times, but they kept coming, concentrating reinforcements at White City. Fresh companies of troops materialized to take up station, until in the words of Lt. Norman Durant of the South Staffords, the place was a “complete babel, for it contained British troops, West Africans, Chinese, Burmans, a New Zealand RAF officer, Indians, and an American Neisei who acted as interpreter, or better said interrogator of prisoners. Large groups of West Africans from the 7th and 12th Nigerians landed, filling out the columns and battalions already at White City. As the planes continued to bring in reinforcements, Calvert managed to muster roughly seven battalions in and around “White City” against Hayashi. Over the next few nights, Calvert's defenders continued to repel Hayashi's attacks, until he was finally relieved by Brigadier Abdy Rickett's 3rd West African Brigade on April 10th. This allowed Calvert to lead a strike force against Hayashi's HQ at Mawlu from the south. While the Japanese continued their onslaught of White City, Calvert's strike force advanced to Thayaung, before effortlessly seizing Sepein on the 13th. Then the 7th Nigerians fell upon Mawlu, prompting the HQ staff to flee south in a rout. With Mawlu now in their hands, the Nigerians soon found themselves under heavy fire, pinned down for the next four hours under relentless Japanese firing and dive-bombing by Japanese aircraft that put in a surprise appearance. Soon, the Gurkhas at Sepein also reported that they were under fire from the main Japanese positions at the edge of the village, hidden under mounds of flowering lantana scrubs. The sight was inordinately beautiful and lethal, concealing hordes of Japanese infantry, whose gunfire twinkled through the red, yellow, purple and green of the scrub. Three Gurkha ground attacks failed to dislodge the defenders and the men were becoming dispirited. Calvert decided to withdraw. As dusk settled at Mawlu, Vaughn began to pull his troops out of Mawlu and under the cover of a mortar barrage, taking with him a large collection of vital documents and an even larger trove of Japanese ceremonial swords and military equipment, which would serve as presents for Air Commando and RAF aircrews at White City. While this was going on, Brigadier Brodies 14th Brigade were advancing to the Wuntho-Indaw railway where they managed to successfully attack the main bridge close to the Bonchaung Station, interdicting the 15th Division's lines of communication. To the northeast, Morris Force captured Myothit on April 9 and then continued to set up ambushes on the Bhamo-Lashio Road. Back at White City, Calvert decided to try and get behind the enemy from the flanks and hit them from the rear, pinning them against the stronghold's wire. On the night of April 16, the Nigerians prepared an ambush on the Mawlu-Henu road, subsequently killing 42 Japanese. Yet realizing his strike force had trapped 2000 Japanese, Calvert ordered his men to infiltrate forward while the West Africans at White City launched an attack. This was met by a vicious and chaotic Japanese response as Hayashi's men tried to break free. During these actions its estimated the Japanese suffered 700 casualties while Calvert suffered 70 men dead with 150 wounded. The last Japanese attack against White City occurred on April 17th. After this Calvert felt he could hold White City indefinitely, but Lentaigne was concerned with the looming monsoon season, so he ordered White City and Broadway to be abandoned on May 3rd in favor of a new stronghold codenamed Blackpool. The site chosen for Blackpool originally codenamed “Clydeside” was a stretch of hilly ground by the railway, near the village of Namkwin, some 32 km southwest of Mogaung. There was water and suitable places to build an airstrip and deploy the 25-pdr artillery guns when they got them. Beyond a large tract of paddy was a hill, which the troops christened “Blackpool Hill” which curved like the sharp-spined back of a wild boar, with the head down, fore-arms and legs extended sideways. The Blackpool position effectively blocked the railway and main road at Hopin, drawing closer to Stilwells forces. The 11th Brigade had already been dispatched to the north to establish Blackpool. The now rested 16th Brigade managed to capture the Indaw West airfield by April 27th, facing no opposition. Ferguson noted, “This second approach to Indaw was an anti-climax, and for two reasons. First, just before we went in we were told that even if we captured the airfield of Indaw West, no troops, no divisions would be available from India for flying in: all hands and the cook, it seemed, were tied up in the great battle for Manipur. We were to capture the field for two or three days and then to abandon it…. Secondly, it was early apparent that the birds had flown. The Queen's got right on to the airfield without a shot being fired.” Lentaigne also decided to abandon the Aberdeen stronghold, evacuating Ferguson's men along with other units. Meanwhile, by the end of April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had also decided that capture of Myitkyina was of vital importance to increase the Hump tonnage. This of course was heavily influenced by the new opportunity for land-based bombers in Chinese airfields to bomb Formosa, the Ryukyu islands, the philippines and the eastern Chinese coast. Now to capture the Moguang-Myitkyina area, Stilwell would receive the Ramgarh-trained 30th Division,the 50th and 14th Divisions, all of which were airlifted over the Hump in April. Stilwell's plan was to drive down the Mogaung valley on Kamaing with such vigor as to persuade General Tanaka that this was the principal effort. The final directive on the 23rd, was for the 22nd Division to attack, rather than hold, and to swing the 64th and 65th Regiments around General Tanaka's left flank, while the 66th Regiment fought down the road. Once again the 112th was told to block off Kamaing from the south. The orders directed the "22nd and 38th to be in Pakhren and Lawa areas by April 27. As Stillwell would remark in his diary “Now I've shot my wad,". Meanwhile the Marauder-Chinese force, now codenamed End Run would sneak east over the Kumon Range to attack Myitkyina directly. Tanaka's mission at this point was to hold Kamaing with all his strength until the rainy season while the 53rd Division, led by Lieutenant-General Kono Etsujiro moved to reinforce him. Elements of the 53rd Division began to sprinkle into the Indaw Area, but the Japanese HQ for northern Burma, from the newly activated 33rd Army led by Lt General Honda Masaki could not decide to commit them towards either Kamaiang or Myitkyina. Thus Tanaka's hopes for a counterattack were lost. Tanaka received two understrength regiments, the 146th and 4th in April and May, both of whom had suffered terrible losses against the Chindits the previous month. By mid-April General Sun's 38th Division was assembling in front of Tingring with the 114th regiment locked down in a fight with Tanaka's 55th regiment. After a visit to the Sun's command post on April 11th, Stilwell wrote in his diary: "At least it looks like a start! The piled-up inertia is terrible. . . ." On the next day the 114th Regiment relieved the 113th on the line of three villages all named Tingring. This move placed the 114th and 112th in line, the 112th to the east forming with its lines a small salient about Nhpum Ga. The 114th Regiment was operating in rugged terrain which was almost as much an obstacle as the delaying positions directly about Kamaing defended so skillfully by the Japanese. On at least one occasion the 114th lost its way and had to be located by aerial reconnaissance. The battle raged so heavily, it forced the 55th regiment to pull back, while the 114th regiment fought a Japanese rearguard from Hill 1725. By April 20th, they finally secured Tingring and quickly began a march south. On April 23, Stilwell ordered Liao to commence the drive south from Warazup, with the 22nd Division trying to make their way along Tanaka's extreme left flank. The Chinese forces were advancing slowly however, very apprehensive because Chiang Kai-Shek had ordered Generals Sun and Liao to be as cautious as possible. And that is all for today on the Burma front as we now need to jump over to New Guinea. The last time we were talking about New Guinea, General Shoge's 239th regiment at Madang were getting ready to cover the continued Japanese retreat to Hansa and Wewak. On the other side, General Vasey's men were in hot pursuit. To the east, the 58th/59th battalion and Shoge's 3rd Battalion were patrolling extensively in the Bonggu-Melamu area, playing a sort of game of hide and seek. Several patrols just missed one another in the Wenga, Barum, Damun, Rereo and Redu areas. There were also several clashes. For instance, on March 26, reports from local natives and police boys indicated that the Japanese were again approaching Barum, which had become the main trouble area, from the direction of Damun just to the north. Both sides engaged one another with fire, particularly mortar bombs, but the brush was a cursory one with neither side gaining any advantage. Exchange of fire and a few sporadic attacks by the Japanese continued for about five hours from 5 p.m. While Corporal Tremellen, in the leading section, was moving among his weapon-pits, with a Bren gun in his left hand and two magazines in his right, he was attacked but, not being able to bring his Bren into action, he bashed the Japanese over the head with the Bren magazines. This Japanese thus had the distinction of probably being the only one to be killed by the Bren magazine rather than what was inside it. This would all last until April 11th, when the Japanese had finally withdrawn back to Madang. To the west, the 57/60th Battalion departed from Kwato on April 5 to rapidly secure Aiyau. From there they immediately sending patrols towards the Bogadjim Plantation. At this point, however, General Morshead had finally decided that it was time for Vasey's 7th Division to get some rest, so General Boase's 11th Division would assume responsibility for all units in the Ramu Valley and the Finisterres on April 8. Over at Atherton, General Herring had also retired in February, so General Savige had been appointed to command his 1st Corps. When recommending Savige's appointment Blarney had written to the Minister for the Army: “Two officers have been considered for this vacancy, Major-General S. G. Savige and Major-General G. A. Vasey. Both have been very successful in command in New Guinea operations, and I have some difficulty in determining the recommendations to be submitted, since each is capable and very worthy of advancement to higher responsibilities. Having regard to their respective careers, however, I recommend that Major-General S. G. Savige be appointed.” The significance of Blameys final sentence is a matter for speculation. It could hardly refer to past careers since Vasey's experience in command was wider than that of Berryman, a contemporary who had recently become a corps commander, and no less than Savige's. Alongside this Blamey also decided to do a changeover of corps HQ, seeing Savige take over 2nd Corps in the New Guinea front On April 10, the 57/60th then managed to break through the Japanese bridge positions to the high ground beyond at Bau-ak while patrols reconnoitered Bwai on the Gori River. The attack on the 10th on the enemy position at Bridge 6—two step heavily-timbered spurs running down from each side of the Ioworo River and making a defile was described by Hammer as "a textbook operation and in actual fact it developed perfectly " . One platoon advanced down the road to "fix" the enemy positions while the remainder of the company encircled the enemy position to come in from the high ground to the north . In the first encounter the leading platoon lost two men killed and two wounded. While it engaged the enemy with fire the rest of the company with Lieutenant Jackson's platoon in the lead clambered into position and , later in the day, clashed with the enemy in a garden area on one of the spurs. For a while the Japanese held on, but the pressure of the Australians and the accurate fire from Private Hillberg's Bren in an exposed position in the enemy's rear forced them to withdraw . Towards dusk an Australian patrol moved down a track towards the road where a small Japanese band was found to be still resisting with machine-gun fire . The Australians did not attack for they were sure that the enemy would disappear during the night. As expected there were no signs of the Japanese next morning at Bridge 6 only bloody bandages and bloodstains on the tracks to remind the Australians of yesterday's fight. McCall occupied the area and sent patrols forward to Bau-ak, the last high ground overlooking Bogadjim. Two days later, Brigadier Hammer sent strong patrols forward to Bogadjim and Erima, which found no enemy resistance in front and managed to secure both important hubs by April 15. At this point, while the 18th Brigade began to be evacuated back to Australia, Brigadier Hammer decided to withdraw the 58th/59th Battalion and the 2/2nd Commando Squadron, as the 57/60th would be the only one to continue the advance to Madang. On April 17, however, General MacArthur instructed Savige that a brigade from General Ramsay's 5th Division should relieve the 32nd Division at Saidor in preparation for the Hollandia-Aitape operation's, so the 8th Brigade and portions of the 30th Battalion would be flown to Saidor five days later. Thus the 300 odd troops were carried over to Bogadjim as Savige ordered the 15th BRigade to rest up and for the 30th battalion to take Madang. Hammer was anxious to get there first, so he had immediately dispatched patrols to Amele and Madang on April 20th. Shoge was able to fully evacuate Madang and join his comrades as they fled for Hansa. Amele was secured by the 24th, but the Australians would find it very difficult to cross the Gogol River afterwards. After this the 30th battalion and Hammer's patrols landed at Ort and resumed their advance. Both units cleared the Japanese from the Huon Peninsula, before entering an abandoned Madang. During the Australian advance an enemy mountain gun fired a dozen shells, and there was a sudden burst of machine-gun fire and a couple of grenade explosions from somewhere in the Wagol area. The machine-gun fire did not appear to be directed at the Australians and the shells from the gun landed out to sea. In all probability this was the final defiant gesture by the rearguard of the 18th Army as it left its great base of Madang which had been in Japanese hands since 1942. Madang had been heavily hit by Allied air attacks and possibly some demolitions had been carried out by the retreating Japanese. The airfield was cratered and temporarily unserviceable; the harbor was littered with wrecks, but although the two wharves were damaged they could be repaired and Liberty ships could enter the harbor. The Australian advance through the Markham, Ramu and Faria Valleys was a tremendous ordeal. The 7th division suffered between September 18, 1943 and April 8, 1944 204 killed and 464 wounded while it was estimated the Japanese suffered 800 killed, 400 wounded and 800 died from disease. The occupation of Madang ended the Huon Peninsula and Ramu Valley campaigns. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 5th Division assembled at the Madang-Bogadjim area, fanning out patrols to the west and sending small detachment of the 30th Battalion to land on small islands off the coast, preparing a future advance against Alexishafen. Shoge's detachment rejoined its parent division, the the 41st Division over at the Hansa area, allowing General Katagiri's 20th Division to continue their advance to Wewak. The 51st Division who had already arrived at Wewak got to watch the allied airshow as Hansa and Wewak we bombed without mercy, seeing countless barges destroyed. This would hamper Katagiri's efforts to cross the Ramu and Sepik Rivers. Meanwhile General Nakai came across an alternative route in late April known as the Wangan-Garun–Uru-Kluk-Bien-Marienburg-Kaup route. This allowed the 20th Division to resume their march to Wewak. On April the 29th a barge carrying Katagiri was intercepted by a PT boat. General Katagiri was killed in the engagement, leaving Nakai to assume formal command of the Division. After May 1, the 41st Division then began to follow Nakai's route across the river, with all Japanese units leaving Hansa by May 15th and finally arriving at Wewak at the end of May after a 20-day movement. Meanwhile General Adachi's plan for the coming weeks of April was for the 20th Division to immediately head towards Aitape, while the 51st Division would reinforce Hollandia once the 41st Division had reached Wewak. As such, a force was created around the 66th regiment led by Major-General Kawakubo. They were dispatched on April 19th, but would fail to arrive on time and would have to turn back to defend Wewak. Additionally, Adachi personally sent a part of his units under direct command to reinforce Hollandia. Now after the neutralization of Hollandia and the Palaus, General Teramoto's remaining air units would have to move over to Manado and Genjem on April 15th, leaving only 25 serviceable aircraft from Major-General Inada Masazumi's 6th Air Division at Hollandia. After April 3rd, although plagued by bad weather, the 5th Air Force virtually owned the air over Hollandia. There would be only one resurgence of air opposition, on April 11th. The Japanese 14th Air Brigade staged a small fighter force to Wewak which, despite the loss of a Tony to the 8th Fighter Squadron, shot down three P-47s of the 311th Fighter Squadron, a new organization that had lately arrived from the United States and had only begun operations at Saidor on April 7. The enemy force perhaps had withdrawn to Hollandia by the next day, because some twenty enemy fighters pounced on a straggling B-24 there and shot it down. Aerial gunners of the 403rd Bombardment Squadron claimed destruction of one of the interceptors, and the 80th Fighter Squadron claimed eight others destroyed. In this action, Captain Richard I. Bong scored his twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh aerial victories, thus topping the score of twenty-six victories established by Rickenbacker in World War I. Promoted the same day to major, Bong was taken out of combat and returned to the United States on temporary duty at the suggestion of General Arnold, who feared adverse reaction among younger pilots if Bong were to be lost in combat after establishing such a record. Three were also small night attacks, combining 5th Air Force Liberators with Navy PB4Y's and Catalinas, made against Wakde Island during the early morning hours of 6, 13, and 16 April. These attacks seem to have been more profitable than similar missions against the Sentani airfields, probably because Wakde was only a small island easily identified by radar and so jammed with military objectives that a hit anywhere would be damaging. A captured Japanese diary recorded that the 6 April raid killed eleven men, destroyed a barracks, cratered the runway in five places, and destroyed or severely damaged ten planes. A daylight attack against Wakde by seven squadrons of Liberators was scheduled for 6 April, but weather forced its cancellation. The 24th and 41st Divisions were also carrying out their last rehearsals for Operation Reckless. Allied ground and amphibious forces had been engaged in final preparations and training for the coming assault and, on 8, 9, and 10 April, had undertaken last rehearsals. The 24th Division's rehearsal at Taupota Bay, on the coast of New Guinea south of Goodenough Island, was incomplete. Little unloading was attempted, and the area selected did not permit the employment of naval gunfire support. The 41st Division had a more satisfactory rehearsal, with realistic unloading and naval fire, near Lae, New Guinea. The Final loading began on April 10th, with the LCIs leaving their loading points six days later in order to allow the troops aboard to disembark at the Admiralty Islands for a day of exercising, resting, and eating. Ships carrying the Persecution Task Force, meanwhile, moved out of the Finschhafen area on April 18 and on the same day rendezvoused with the vessels bearing the 41st Division towards the Admiralties. All convoys under Admiral Barbey then moved north around the eastern side of the Admiralties and, at 7:00 on April 20th, the various troops assembled at a rendezvous point northwest of Manus Island. Thus, all seemed ready for the beginning of another amphibious assault. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Imperial Japanese Army tossed a final hail mary attempt to improve the war situation with the grand Ichi-Go offensive. If they could manage to seize their objectives, this would perhaps give them a better hand at the negotiating table. Because the allies certainly would not be keen on having to liberate most of China, it was a very bold strategy.
Video version: https://youtu.be/WDJ8y8yDJac?si=XKvhhKEwt8J-i8Gq In this episode, the 2 best friends, Zayaan & Sameer, share the difference between malayalam and english rap, Neeraj Madhav being destroyed by instagram comments, expose the dark side of english rap and the grammies, react to Imran Khan, how they lost their AirPods, Ramu's axe story, Zayaan's first crush, why FBI attacked Coca Cola, if coffee is overrated, Sameer's best love story movie plot, almost buying an Audi car and more. _____________________________________ Check out Sameer's Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/sameerroshan6/ Check out Zayaan's YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCBxNEbiHXcResh_5cA3Zt3Q
En este episodio reacciono a la convocatoria de 23 jugadores de la Federación de Baloncesto de Puerto Rico con un análisis de la lista, ausencias notables, nombres grandes que no veo haciendo el equipo y al final escojo mis 12. ¡Que Disfrutes! --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/elramuopina/support
Last time we spoke about the operations HA-GO, U-GO and the continued drive against Shaggy ridge. Lt General Mutaguchi Renya sought to invade India and was continuously scheming to drag the rest of the IJA on this rather insane endeavor. Yet the allies also tossed their own operations in the Burma theater greatly disrupting the Japanese planners and achieving numerous objectives. Over in New Guinea, Vasey launched an offensive against the Kankeiri saddle, designated operation cutthroat. Meanwhile General Nakano 's men were in a dire situation with the allied seizure of Sio and Saidor. Multiple Japanese units found themselves all doing the same thing, retreating further north. It seemed no matter what defensive lines they established, the allies kept their advance over land and periodically amphibious assaults their flanks and rear. The formidable defenses region of Shaggy ridge was not going to hold up against the allied advance much longer. This episode is The Fall of Shaggy Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The Australian advance overland and Saidor operation had paid great dividends over and above the establishment of forward military base construction. The allies had formed a giant wedge between a significant residue of the Japanese fleeing the Finschhafen area. General Adachi commanding the 18th area army was facing a nightmare. Prior to the American landing, he had visited the 51st division HQ at Kiari and then traveled overland to the 20th Division over at Sio. He was fully aware of the hardships facing both forces. Meanwhile news of the Saidor landings hit Rabaul creating a massive debate. Senior officers sought to bring over all available troops to try and retake the town. Others sought to save as many troops as possible for a defense of Wewak, considering it the next main allies target. General Imamura favored bypassing Saidor altogether and withdrawing over inland trails. Thus Adachi appointed General Nakano to take charge of the withdrawal to Madang, and ordered 8 other companies to cross the Ramu valley to Bogadjim to harass the Americans at Saidor. These were purely defensive maneuvers. The Japanese also faced the daunting task of how to evacuate large numbers of troops from the 20th and 51st divisions from the impending allied trap. Nakano took the lead getting the 20th to retreat up the coast while the 51st worked their war over the inland trails. Nakano would soon be forced to abandon the plans and ordered both to pull into the interior to retreat towards Madang, nearly 200 miles away. This would mean the exhausted, starving and sick Japanese had to battle through the jungles, ridges, rivers and other horrors of the Finisterre range. Meanwhile Saidor was easily secured by the 32nd division, the Australian 7th division advanced through the Ramu Valley and came face to face with Shaggy Ridge. Shaggy ridge had been transformed into a heavy fortified position with numerous nasty features such as the Kankeiri saddle, Pimple, Intermediate snipers pimple, Green snipers pimple, Prothero 1 and 2 and so forth. During the first weeks of January the Australians made very little headway against the honeycombed Japanese defenses. Their air forces were called in numerous times to plaster the ridgelines in a 3 day assault designated Operation Cutthroat. On the 18th of January, B-25s from Nadzab and Port Moresby would drop 500 lb bombs all over the defenses. On the 21st P-40s strafed and bombed the area and this was met with some reorganizing of the ground forces. The 15th and 18th brigades relieved the exhausted 21st and 25th. Brigadier F. O Chilton began the new job by opening heavy artillery up on Prothero I. Captain T. L James with the 2/2 pioneer battalion described the attack on January 20th “At 1000 hours we met 2/12 Infantry Battalion at the appointed rendezvous, where I met their CO., Lt.-CoI. C. F. Bourne. We did not stay long at the rendezvous but formed up and commenced the long approach march. It was a gruelling day. The long single file moved silently up the deep ravines, scaling cliff-faces with the aid of ropes and lawyer vines. It took us the entire day to cover the four mile approach. In one spot that was almost impossible to traverse—a steep-sided cliff—they rigged lawyer vines between trees to act as a handrail and allow us to pull ourselves up." Despite the harsh conditions and fierce resistance, the Australians got atop Canning saddle and then forded the Mene river and drew near the village. Colonel Matsumoto's men were now trapped between the 2/9th battalion advancing from the Pimple and the 2/12th battalion from Prothero 1. To the east there was the 2/10th battalion about a mile away from the main Japanese defensive position along the Kankeiri saddle. On the 22nd, the 2/12th dispatched D company who advanced between Prothero1 and Prothero 2. At 10:40am they began to fire their artillery upon Prothero 2 and at 11:15am a platoon tried to progress but was held down by Japanese snipers and machine gun fire. A company came through D company to advance along Shaggy ridge until 3:30 pm once they took were held down by Japanese fire. Then a single australian section rushed forward led by Bren gunner Private Bugg. His team hit a Japanese machine gun crew from just 30 yards away. He seized a toehold quickly upon Prothero 2. After some bitter fighting Prothero 2 had fallen into allied hands. Meanwhile to the south the 2/9th sent a patrol out on the 22nd who found pill-boxes at McCaughey's knoll occupied with Japanese gunners. At 10:45am as allied artillery hit Prothero 2, Captain Taylor led a company of the 2/9th and assaulted McCaughers knoll. They were quickly pinned down, but by 1:15pm word reached them that Prothero 2 was captured and that the entire battalion was to push along Shaggy ridge. During that afternoon Taylor took his company to the western side of Shaggy ridge, getting ready for a new flanking maneuver against McCaughey's knoll. The men fought their way up the knoll cleaning up pillbox one after another, capturing McCaugheys knoll by nightfall. It would cost them 8 men wounded. More than 100 dead Japanese were found over the Prothero-Shaggry ridge area when mop up crews did their work. Meanwhile 2/10th kept up the pressure in the east. On the 22nd A Company led by Lt Gunn seized a foothold on Faria Ridge and, prompting the enemy by late in the afternoon, to abandon Cam's Hill, which was occupied by the 2/10th by 5.20 p.m. During the night and early morning of january 23rd, two counter attacks were launched by the Japanese. At 2.40 the forward troops of A Company on the ridge were attacked from the south but the attack was repulsed with no casualties. After this the Australians moved down the track towards Kankeiri. Captain Haupt's B Company of the 2/12th advanced down the track from Prothero 2. By 6pm they were atop the saddle around Crater Hill when they came across a Japanese gun position containing 150 rounds of 75mm ammunition. Half an hour later they ran into some resistance from slopes atop Crater Hill. They would pull back to the Kankeiri saddle to dig in for the night. The 2/10th then dispatch D company led by Captain Kumnick to advance along the Faria Ridge. They made it 1500 yards before running into a well entrenched position that held them down with machine gun fire. During the night however the Japanese abandoned their entrenchments for Cam Hill allowing the 2/10th to establish itself in a position roughy 1200 yards southeast of Crater Hill the next day. On the 24th, the 2/9th took over the responsibility for Shaggy Ridge up to Prothero 2 allowing the 2/12 to advance up Kankeiri. Small patrols from company B of the 2/12th reached the top of Crater Hill that day finding an enemy position on the southern slopes. On the 25th, the 2/12th and 2/10th probed enemy defenses on all sides of Crater Hill looking for decent approaches to attack. This led to several skirmishes, seeing both sides suffer casualties. One patrol led by Lt Coles of the 2/2nd pioneers, surveyed the Paipa mule track along the valley of the Mindjim, firing upon small bands of retreating Japanese. The Australians gradually converged to attack Crater Hill, but Matsumoto's defenders put up a valiant effort to repel the assaults. On the 26, Brigadier Chilton ordered Companies C and D of the 2/9th and Companies C and B of the 2/12th to assault Crater Hill. This saw companies C and D of the 2/9th perform a outflanking maneuver to the north tip of the Mindjim valley to hit the enemy's right flank, while Companies C and B of the 2/12th held the enemy down. Captain A. Marshall's C company led off at 10.35 a.m, passing from Shaggy Ridge through Kankirei Saddle and then to the north, with Captain Taylor's D company following to provide flank protection. By midday Marshall reported that he had advanced some 600 yards and passed through several old and abandoned positions finding no enemy. Cautiously he pushed on, at 5 p.m. he reached the summit of 4100. The main enemy position was to the south between Marshall and the 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions. Leaving Taylor to occupy the summit of 4100 Marshall advanced south towards Crater Hill in an attempt to surprise the enemy from the rear . He met them about 300 yards south-east from the summit just at dusk. The leading platoon attacked along the usual razor-back but withdrew because of heavy machine-gun fire. At 7 p.m. Marshall sent Lieutenant White's platoon round the right flank but approach from this flank was also very difficult and White was killed. By the nighttime, they had successfully surrounded Matsumoto's weakened defenders. Matsumoto's defenders had established extremely formidable positions and had a large number of automatic weapons at their disposal. Matsumoto was ready alongside his men to make a final stand. Basically a siege of Crater Hill began and would only end after 5 brutal days. The first two days saw Chilton order the 2/9th take responsibility for the southern slopes of 4100 and Kankeiri saddle, while the 2/12th held Protheros and Shaggy ridge, and the 2/10th maintained pressure on the south-eastern slopes of Crater Hill. Skirmishes borke out everywhere, as the artillery smashed Crater Hill. Captain Whyte of the 2/4th field regiment fired 2000 shells, shattering trees, which unfortunately created more timber obstacles for the advancing Australians. At 9.30 a.m. on the 29th, 19 Kittyhawks dive-bombed Crater Hill, followed by ten minutes of artillery fire. At 1.30 p.m. the artillery laid down a barrage and machine-gun fire covered an assault on Crater Hill from the west by Captain Daunt's company of the 2/9th . The leading platoon attempted to rush the enemy position up a very steep and open slope but the Japanese, entrenched on a razor-back, were too strong and drove them back. The Australians also had the bad luck to be shelled by their own artillery. Each time they performed an assault, the stubborn Japanese held firm. Finally on the 30th with the help of some heavy rain Matsumoto decided to evacuate during the night. Matsumoto and the remnants of his force withdrew towards Yokopi and Kubenau valley. After dawn on the 31st, Australian patrols found Crater Hill abandoned and it was a horror show. They found a ghastly mess. At least 14 dead were found and evidence of burials alongside them. The 2/9th and 2/10th advanced occupying the hill on February 1st. With that, Shaggy Ridge and the Kankeiri saddle had finally fallen. Chilton sent out patrols to pursue the retreating Japanese and perform mop up operations. By February 6th his forces managed to seize Paipa and Amuson. The Australians had suffered 46 deaths, 147 wounded while the Japanese figures were estimated at around 500 casualties. Meanwhile, Brigadier Hammer had also carried out two operations during this time period. The first was a diversionary attack against the Spendlove Spur held by elements of the 5th company, 80th regiment. This was carried out by Captain Kennedy company of the 24th battalion, whom managed to surprise the Japanese and quickly seized Cameron's Knoll. On January 30th, the 57/60th battalion led by Lt Colonel Robert Marston departed Ketoba and along another company led by Captain McIntosh assaulted Orgoruna, Kesa and Koba. The Australians would find Orgoruna and Kesa undefended.. Lt Marston ordered Major Barker 's 8 company to patrol Koba, and they would enter Koba on February 1st finding nothing, so they pushed on towards Mataloi 2 . There were signs of very recent occupation and, 200 yards along the track , they were ambushed. Barker brought heavy fire down upon the Japanese ambush position and managed to capture Koba that night. On the morning of the 3rd, about 400 yards east of Koba, Barker again struck a Japanese ambush position. They quickly outflanked the enemy who withdrew through Mataloi 2 towards Mataloi 1 . By the time Mataloi 2 was occupied at 6.30 p.m., there was not enough time to hit Mataloi 1 nor to allow adequate consolidation of Mataloi 2 before dark. At 9.30 p.m. the Japanese counter-attacked from the direction of Matalo 1, commencing the assault with a heavy mortar bombardment. As Mataloi 2 could be defended from three sides, Barker decided that he could hold the area best from high ground to the south which would also be out of range of the enemy mortars. Accordingly he ordered a withdrawal and departed with his headquarters and one platoon. Apparently the orders did not reach the other platoons who were encircled while the remainder of the company was withdrawing to Koba. Long-range enemy machine-gun fire was directed at Kesa at the same time as the counterattack developed at Mataloi 2. The 57th/60th pulled out concluding their little raid. Now Brigadier Hammer's 15th were getting ready to pursue Matsumoto's detachment who were fleeing to Kwato. But that is all we have for New Guinea, as were are moving back over to New Britain. Last time we were over in New Britain, the Americans had captured Hill 660, and were unleashing patrols to try and figure out where the Japanese were concentrating. Now they sought to secure the Borgan Bay-Itni river line. Meanwhile on the other side, General Matsuda's battered men had begun a retreat heading east via the Aisalmipua-Kakumo trail towards Kopopo. They also received reinforcements in the form of the fresh 51st reconnaissance regiment who took up the job of rearguard. The Japanese knew the terrain better than their American counterparts, thus held distinct advantages. They knew good grounds to put up defenses and how long they could hold out in such places until they should retreat. The Americans did not enjoy good maps, they had to painstakingly explore where they went. They relied on native reports on where to go, but in the end they were like explorers jumping into jungles, atop mountains and a hell of a lot of swampy terrain. The rainforests could be so dense, patrols could be moving yards from another and not know it, imagine trying to find hypothetical objectives in such places? Thus an enormous amount of vital patrolling was performed, beginning on January 19th with Captain Ronald Slay's men of L Company 1st marines. They advanced past Mt. Gulu, Langla volcano and Munlulu before heading down the saddle of Mt. Tangi. They managed to ambush a group of 20 Japanese being led by 8 armed natives, who fled east after 6 Japanese were killed. Slay took his men across the east-west government trail, only finding some Japanese telephone wire, which was severed. On the 22nd two patrols each consisting of a reinforced company departed the airdrome perimeter to converge from two directions along the trail junction Captain Slay's men discovered. The first was elements of the 1st battalion, 1st marines led by Captain Nikolai Stevenson, the other was led by Captain Preston Parish with elements of the 7th marines who took landing crafts to Sag Sag, the terminus of the east-west Government trail. Parishes men would bivouac around 1.5 miles inland near Aipati on the 24th while Stevensons men headed south of Mt Gulu. Both patrols found no Japanese, but Parish gained some valuable intelligence from a native village, who indicated there had been several Japanese parties around. On the 23rd, Stevenson and his men ran into a concealed machine gun crew 30 yards near Mt Langla. The Americans scrambled to fight back at an enemy they could not see. They did not lose any men, but had no idea if they hit any Japanese either. They continued their advance afterwards and would be ambushed again, this time 1500 yards south of Mt Munlulu. This time they seemed to be facing a force of platoon strength. By the 25th Stevenson and his men were pulling back to Mt Gulu and were relieved by another incoming patrol led by Captain George Hunts K Company, 1st marines. Meanwhile Parish's patrol continued east as the natives had indicated to them where the Japanese might be retreating through. On January 27th Hunts company ran into Parish's and both shared information and went in opposite directions hoping to hunt down nearby Japanese units. Hunt set off to the location where Parish's men had run into a Japanese ambush previously, expecting to find at least 50 Japanese. At 7am on the 28th, Hunt's men came across an outpost line and engaged it for hours, seeing 15 casualties. Hunt pulled his men back out of mortar range and the Japanese swarmed upon them forcing the Americans to perform some heated rearguard actions. Overall these patrols amongst others allowed the Americans to get a better picture of the terrain and concentration of the enemy. For two weeks the American patrols searched for the enemy headquarters running into countless skirmishes, mostly against the forces of Colonel Sato Jiro. By the 27th, Matsuda had reached Kokopo and received new orders from General Sakai that he was to take the men further on towards Iboki. Colonel Sato was to again provide the rearguard. This allowed the Americans to seize Nakarop, a placed their translators had mistranslated from Japanese documents as “Egaroppu”. It had been the nerve center of General Matsuda's operations. They found countless abandoned tents in bivouac areas, the village contained native and Japanese built structures. There was a huge sign saying "Matsuda Butai Army Command Principal Place." There were traces of elaborate radio installations recently removed containing an American-made telephone switchboard labeled "Glory Division." It would turn out Matsuda's personal quarters, however, were actually located off the main trail roughly midway between Magairapua and Nakarop, its approaches so skillfully concealed that patrols did not find it until several days later. Well camouflaged bivouac areas also infested this entire region. With the capture of Matsuda's former headquarters, all patrols were combined into the Gilnit Group led by the legendary Colonel Chesty Puller. Puller pointed his force in the direction of the Borgen Bay-Itni River to clear it out. They departed Agulupulla on January the 30th as the 5th Marines relieved the 2nd battalion, 1st marines to attack the Iboki area. Attempts were made at leapfrogging, using landing craft to hit places hoping to trap Japanese during the advance. The landing craft were operated by the Boat Battalion, 533d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, of the Army's 2d Engineer Special Brigade. They were made available to carry out the amphibious phase, and the division's little Cub artillery spotter planes for observation and liaison. Rough seas frustrated the first landing attempt at Namuramunga on February 4th, forcing two patrols from the 2nd battalion to proceed overland from Old Natamo via a coastal track. They got as far as Mambak killing a few stragglers and taking 3 prisoners. The next day another patrol landed at Aliado and advanced down the coastal track to the mouth of the Gurissa river through Kokopo and Gorissi. By the 10th of february they managed to kill 16 stragglers and grabbed 6 prisoners who they brought back to the Borgen Bay perimeter. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion advanced into Gorissi by boat on the 12th and setup a radar station. They then dispatched a patrol to the EI river on the 16, finding it impassable. Another patrol was sent to leapfrog around the Arimega Plantation on the 19th. It was seized quickly and now the Americans were very close to Iboki. Meanwhile Sato reached Kokopo, but did not linger long and continued on to Karai-ai by February 12th. That day the 3rd battalion, 5th marines, aware of the Japanese course, set up an advance base at Gorissi. Now 20 miles separated the Japanese rearguards from their pursuers. Sato and his men would reach Iboki by February 16th, while the Marines were fording the El river, 30 miles behind. It would take them 5 additional days to reach Karai-ai. To the south Puller's group had reached Gilnit and Nigol on the 10th, finding no enemy. These actions saw the Americans secure the western half of New Britain. 2 days later, Company B of the 1st Marines landed on Rooke Island where they set up a radar installation. They also had to patrol the islands to see if any Japanese remained upon it. They fanned out, running into native villages who offered them fresh fruit. They would come across machine gun emplacements, abandoned bivouac areas and some medical stations, but no Japanese. The enemy had clearly evacuated the island All the way back over at the Arawe area, Major Komori had received new radios on February 5th enabling him to resume communications with the 17th divisional HQ. He received a gloomy report “At present, the airfield is covered with grass 4 to 5 [feet] high. The airfield, 200 m [sic] in width 800 m in length, will be serviceable only for small airplanes. However, it will take quite some time to develop it. Consequently, I believe that it will not be of great value.” Knowing about Matsuda's withdrawal, he began casting envious eyes in the same direction. On February 8, he hinted more broadly to that effect: “As has been reported, the value of Merkus airfield is so insignificant that it seems the enemy has no intention of using it… Due to damage sustained by enemy bombardments and to the increased number of patients, it becomes more and more difficult to carry out the present mission… It is my opinion that as the days pass, replenishment of supplies will become more and more difficult and fighting strength will be further diminished; our new line will be cut off and consequently leave us with no alternative but self-destruction.” Divisional HQhowever was not pleased with this and sent a telegraphic response the following day ordering him curtly to continue his mission. Komori would write in his diary that day "Wondered what to do about the order all night long. Could not sleep last night… I felt dizzy all day today." Fortunately for Komori, on February 17th Sato was ordered to occupy key positions at the Aria river's mouth to help supply him by land. This allowed Komori to begin his retreat north on the 24th while Sato evacuated the Iboki stores to Upmadung. Komori's departure would be just in the nick of time as the Americans dispatched two tank platoons to clear out the airfield area on the 27th. They would find zero enemy resistance and this would put an end to the Arawe operation. And that will be all for today for New Britain as we are going to be covering some big allied planning. Over in the southwest and south Pacific Areas, General Douglas MacArthur continued his plan to drive back towards the Philippines. This would be done via amphibious operations along the north coast of New Guinea. His next main target was the Vogelkop Peninsula, then the Palau Islands, then the invasion of Mindanao. This would also see the Japanese lines of communications to the Dutch East Indies cut off. Yet before all of this he needed to capture the Hansa Bay area of northeastern New Guinea and then Hollandia in the Dutch part of New Guinea. This action would allow his forces to bypass the Japanese stronghold at Wewak. Meanwhile there were the ongoing efforts to reduce Rabaul, and to continue that he still had to capture the Admiralty Island and Kavieng, which would completely cut off Rabaul. The planners for the south, southwest and central Pacific Areas met at Pearl Harbor on January 28th. However the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to delay MacArthur's invasion of the Admiralties and Kavieng pushed it to April 1st. They had determined it was better to prioritize the invasion of the Marshall islands in the central pacific. This delay would further delay most of the southwest pacific operations along the New Guinea coast. Meanwhile Admiral Kusaka and General Imamura had sent the bulk of the 230th regiment and the recently arrived 1st independent mixed regiment to New Ireland. The 2nd battalion, 1st independent mixed regiment was sent to the Admiralties on January 25th, joining up with Colonel Ezaki Yoshio's 51st transport regiment. Then the 1st battalion, 229th regiment was sent to the Admiralties on february 2nd. These were last ditch efforts by the Japanese to secure a very desperate lifeline for Rabaul. No offensive could be mounted for at least 3 months, thus the Japanese were given ample time to reinforce and strengthen their defenses. Admiral Halsey also had plans to invade the St Matthias Islands as a preliminary for the attack upon Kavieng, and this like MacArthur's plans were thrown into disarray. In view of all of this MacArthur suggested to Halsey a new plan, codenamed Operation Squarepeg, to seize the Green Islands and establish a new PT boat and or air base there. With that in hand they could project air and naval power further against Rabaul and perhaps even as far as Truk. However many of the officers did not believe any of this would significantly isolate Kavieng and Rabaul. Furthermore, they believed it doubtful that fighters stationed at a base in the Green Islands would even be able to cover Kavieng. Admiral Wilkinson, with the backing of Admiral Fitch and General Geiger, suggested that the proposal be abandoned, and that plans be laid for a landing either at Borpop or Boang Island. On 28 December, however, after analyzing the situation, Colonel William E. Riley, Admiral Halsey's War Plans officer, made the following observation: “There is no doubt but that the occupation of this area [Borpop] and the utilization of air facilities thereat would assist materially in the neutralization of both Rabaul and Kavieng. However, the grave possibility that such an operation would result in the employment of approximately two divisions and additional naval support, not now available and will--in all probability--not be made available in time for this type intermediate operation, makes it necessary to eliminate Borpop as a possible intermediate operation… Though Green Island is not as far advanced as Boang Island, yet it is quite possible to provide fighter cover for strikes on Kavieng. In addition, dive bombers, based on Green Island, can operate most effectively against shipping at Kavieng.”Thus Halsey elected to go ahead with Operation Squarepeg anyway because a fighter umbrella could be tossed over the Green Islands during an amphibious invasion, something that would not be possible for Boang or Borbop. Halsey's staff went to work planning the amphibious landing. It would be carried out by elements of General Barrowclough's 3rd New Zealand Division. PT 176 and PT 178 of Lieutenant-Commander LeRoy Taylor's Torokina Squadron conducted hydrographic reconnaissance of the islands on January 10th and discovered the southern channels near Barahun island were the most suitable. 300 men of the 30th New Zealand battalion led by Lt Colonel Frederick Cornwall got aboard the APDs Talbot, Waters and Dickerson, covered by the destroyers Fullam, Bennet, Guest and Hudson led by Captain Ralph Earle. They landed on Nissan Island and performed a survey finding a promising airfield site. They also discovered there were no more than 100 Japanese at a relay station alongside 1200 native Melanesians. Pretty sure I said this before in the series, but I will repeat it. Melanesians are one of the predominant indigenous inhabitants of the Melanesian islands that are found in the area spanning New Guinea to the Fiji Islands. Something pretty neat about them, along with some indigenous Australians, they are the few groups of non-Europeans to have blond hair. The Melanesians were so friendly to the New Zealanders and so hostile to the Japanese that it was decided to omit the usual preliminary naval and aerial bombardment for the landings. Now over in the Central Pacific plans to invade the Marshall were underway, even before the successful liberation of the Gilberts. The operation was codenamed Operation Flintlock, and Admiral Nimitz assigned the 4th Marine division, reinforced with the 22nd marine regiment and Army's 7th division to train intensively for amphibious warfare. They were deemed Tactical Group 1, led by Brigadier General Thomas Watson. They would be backed up by a whopping 23 aircraft carriers, 15 battleships, 18 cruisers and 109 destroyers. Yet things had certainly changed since 1942, the American Navy was packing overwhelming heat. Admiral Spruance, now commander of the 5th fleet, would hold the highest operational command for Operation Flintlock. Admiral Turner would be commanding task force 51 and the Joint Expeditionary Fleet and General Holland Smith would be commanding all the expeditionary troops. General Smith's position in the chain of command in relation to Admiral Turner was made much clearer than it had been during the Gilberts operation. Simply put he was put in direct command of all landing forces and garrison forces once they were ashore. The troop commanders of each of the landing forces, the 7th and 4th Marine Divisions, were expressly placed under Smith until such time as Admiral Spruance should determine that the capture and occupation phase of the operation had been completed. However, Smith's authority as commander of expeditionary troops had one limitation. It was recognized that "the employment of troops, including the reserve troops engaged in the seizure of objectives, is subject to the capabilities of the surface units to land and support them," thus any directives issued by Smith as to major landings or as to major changes in tactical plans had to have the approval of Turner before they could be issued. To this extent, the expeditionary troops commander was still subordinate to Turner. They would also be supported by Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher's fast carrier force, task force 58 and Admiral Hoovers land based air forces, including the 7th air force and other Navy air forces. So yeah, America was coming in overkill. Nimitz's original plan was to advance into the Marshalls by simultaneously hitting Kwajalein, Maloelap and Wotje. Together these contained 65% of the aircraft facilities in the island group, leaving the 35% remainder on Jaluit and Mille. Jaluit and Mille could be neutralized and bypassed. Yet after facing the difficulties during the Gilberts operation, Nimitz decided to also bypass Maloelap and Wotje as well, so he could concentrate all his forces against Kwajalein. General Smith and Admirals Spruance and Turner opposed this, arguing that sailing into Kwajalein would be too exposed if Maloelap and Wotje were left unoccupied. Nimitz 'new plan would see General Corlett's 7th division hit the southern group of islands in the atoll, including Kwajalein island, while Major General Harry Schmidt's 4th marines would hit Roi-Namur and the other northern islands of the atoll. Task Force 52, would transport the 7th Division while Rear Admiral Richard Conollys task force 53 transported the 4th marines. After some meetings, Spruance managed to secure the invasion of Majuro, which would be carried out by Lt Colonel Frederick Sheldon's “Sundance” Landing Force. They consisted of the 5th amphibious corps reconnaissance company, the 2nd battalion, 106th regiment and the 1st defense battalion. Spruance wanted to make the atoll a fleet base, so airfields could be constructed to help cover the line of communications to Kwajalein. To support the main landings, Mitschers fast carrier force was going to smash the enemy aircraft and air facilities at Wotje, Maloelap, Roi-Namur and Kwajalein while his vessels simultaneously coordinated with Turners cruisers and Rear Admiral Ernest Small's Neutralization group task force 50.15 to naval bombard them as well. The main threat that needed to be neutralized quickly was Eniwetoks airfield. Meanwhile Hoover's land based aircraft would help neutralize Mille and Jaluit and help smash the other islands and shipping. Throughout November and December, two atolls would receive more attacks than the others. Mille closest to the Gilberts, thus much more accessible, earned the lionshare of attention. Maloelap with its large air facilities had to be kept under constant surveillance and attack, thus she came second. Beginning on December 23rd, aircraft based out of the Gilberts began increasing air strikes against the Marshalls. On Mille between November 24th to December 18th, 106 heavy bombers dropped 122 tons of bombs over the runways and facilities. The next week bombers and fighters began attacking Mille's fuel dumps, leveled all buildings, destroyed 11 grounded aircraft and another 13 in the air. Mille was neutralized and the Japanese would abandon its airfield by January. The damage dished out to Maloelap was extensive, but not as crippling. Her runways were not entirely put out of operation. From January 11th to the 25th, B-25's destroyed her ground installations, but still her airfield remained operational. On January 26, 9 B-25s, followed by 12 P-40s, flew into Taroa for a low-level attack. The B-25s destroyed 9 interceptors on the ground and 5 more after they were airborne. The control tower and two other buildings on the airfield were set afire and four tons of bombs were dropped in fuel dump and dispersal areas, starting large fires. As the B-25s left the target to return to Makin they were chased by about 15 Japanese fighters. 30 miles south of Maloelap the 12 P-40s met the bomber formation and immediately engaged the enemy fighters, destroying11 of them and severely damaging 2 more. The strike of January 26 was decisive. Practically all of the remaining enemy air strength at Maloelap had been destroyed, and the once formidable base was rendered almost powerless to defend itself against air strikes, thus neutralized. Jaluit was subjected to 15 attacks reduced to rubble and Wotje was hit 14 times suffering extensive damage. Meanwhile Admiral Pownalls task force 58.1 and 58.3 consisting of 6 fast carriers, 5 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 3 of the new class of anti aircraft cruisers, and 12 destroyers hit Kwajalein on December 5th. That day saw her attacked by over 246 aircraft. As a result 19 Japanese interceptors and 4 bombers were destroyed at Roi-Namur, 7 cargo ships were destroyed at Kwajalein and extensive damage was inflicted upon both bases. Simultaneously, 29 aircraft hit Wotje where they destroyed 5 grounded aircraft, set fire to hangers, machine ships and barracks. Japanese interceptors attacked Pownall's carriers, though they were unable to inflict serious damage. Following these attacks, Hoover's aircraft continued to smash Kwajalein, tossing 10 attacks, dropping nearly 210 tons of bombs on the atoll. Roi-Namurs airfield still remained operation by January 29th however, though she only had 35 aircraft on Roi-Namur; 10 reconnaissance planes on Kwajalein; 13 aircraft on Maloelap; 12 on Wotje and 15 on Eniwetok. The Japanese did not have any effective air force to defend the Marshalls any more. The feeling of the men on the islands, was doom. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Finally the Australians had taken the formidable position known as Shaggy Ridge. The Japanese continued the harrowing marches going north as their enemy would not let up. In the Marshalls the IJA and IJN personnel were inflicted the full might of American's wartime productivity, and they all knew Uncle Sam was coming to pay them a visit soon.
Last time we spoke about the landing at Saidor and continuation of advances upon New Guinea and New Britain. Operation Michaelmas was a huge success, isolating countless Japanese and threatening those trying to retreat further north. Taking advantage of the new front on New Guinea, the Australians began pushing more so upon the features across Shaggy Ridge and towards Sio. General Adachi frantically shifted units around in an effort to plug up the multiple advancing allied units, but in the end there was little to be done as the Japanese were pushed further and further north. Features were taken upon Shaggy Ridge and Sio fell nearly uncontested. Over in New Britain, General Rupertus triumphed over the Airdrome and his Marines were expanding their perimeters. Katayama made a bold attack against an enemy he overestimated at it certainly did not pan out for his men at suicide creek. This episode is The battle for Shaggy Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. A while back I covered the start of the Chinese-Indian offensive into the Hukawng Valley and Arakan regions. When I did so it was almost entirely from the allied viewpoint, but what of the IJA war planners? The Burma campaign has been arguably a complete disaster for the allies, the Japanese steamrolled all the way through, claiming vast amounts of territory and key cities and ports, so what really did they need to do but garrison it all? After Wingate unleashed operation Longcloth, the relatively idle Japanese raised the idea of potentially attacking India. Lt General Mutaguchi Renya, the victor of the Singapore campaign in 1942 was made a commander in Burma and wargamed the possibility of attacking India to try and earn support from his superiors at Tokyo General HQ. It was his belief, they could brush past the British in Assam and reach the gateway into India, and he expected the Indians to rise up and greet them with open arms. A lot of money and effort had been spent on Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army. The fall of India would be an absolutely devastating blow to the British Empire in Asia and in 1942 there was even the belief the Japanese could link up with their German allies in the middle east. But that was 1942, before Stalingrad and Kursk, 1944 was a very very different geopolitical situation. This however did not stop Mutaguchi from continuing his plans to invade India. Lt General Hanaya Tadashi, commanding the Arakan front was given the task of convincing the British that the counterattack in Arakan was the appearance of the main army earmarked to conquer India, thus leading General Slim to send up reserves from Imphal. The operation was codenamed HA-GO and it was intended to be a fent to mask the real attack upon Imphal designated Operation U-GO. Now let me dig a bit deeper into how this all came about. Until now, General Stilwell had been able to build much of the Ledo Road practically unmolested. Yet by early August, General Kawabe Mazakazu's Burma Area Army was preparing for a counter offensive. Kawabe actually did not trust Mutaguchi and suspected the man was harboring megalomaniac designs to invade India, which he was 100% right about. The “counter offensive” was really just the beginnings of Operation U-GO and it had been sold to Tokyo HQ as a pre-emptive strike to disable the 14th Army and make it unable to invade Burma. Thus General Mutaguchi's 15th Army was given the task of destroying any hostile elements in the Imphal region and to establish a strong defensive line. From December 22nd to the 26th, Mutaguchi held a conference pushing for the possibility of launching Operation U-GO and developed detailed missions for each division which would participate by means of a war game. At the same time Kawabe sold the operation HA-GO the diversionary attack in Arakan, with Lt General Hanaya Tadashi's 55th Division earmarked to pin down as many of the enemy's units as possible and to draw the British reserves away from the main offensive. When General Christisons offensive kicked off, this forced Kawabe to reinforce Hanaya with the 54th division, and this in turn established the 29th Army under the command of General Sakurai on January 6th. The 29th Army was under the overall command of the Burma Area Army, and its HQ was initially situated in Moulmein. It was assigned to defend the coastal region of Arakan and the lower Irrawaddy valley and consisted at first of the 55th Division in Arakan, the 54th Division in reserve in Prome, and various garrison units including the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade in Moulmein. It also controlled the 11th Shipping Detachment of Major-General Suzuki Gisaburo, consisting of the 11th Shipping Engineer Regiment and the 3rd Sea Transport Battalion. It had roughly 1,105 men, 85 large landing barges, 54 small landing barges, 47 motored sampans, two armored boats, 10 fishing boats, one messenger boat and one speed boat. The 11th Shipping Detachment was stationed at Taungup and its main supply depot was at Prome. Meanwhile after the capture of Maungdaw, the 5th Indian division of Major General Harold Briggs was ordered to attack the main Japanese defenses at Razabil. Razabil's defenses were quite formidable, it dominating the crossroads and road linking Maungdaw with the Tunnels and Buthidaung located 3 miles eastwards, forming the 15th Indian Corps immediate objective following Maungdaw's capture. It was dubbed by its Japanese commander “The Golden Fortress of the Mayu Range”. It was centered on the railway tunnels running through the Mayu Range and at Point 551 to the east with a further forward position at Point 1301. These powerful defenses, built carefully exploiting the rugged mountainous terrain, were tunneled deep into the hills and consisted of bunkers, trenches and other fire positions located amidst dense jungle and camouflaged with customary Japanese skill. The main outworks at Letwedet to the east and at Razabil to the west of the Mayu Range were major fortresses in their own right, requiring careful reduction before the main position could be tackled. With both bastions in direct line of sight from the Tunnels, accurate supporting artillery could be called down with ease, moreover, adding to the problems already facing troops assaulting trenches and bunkers dug into the hillsides invulnerable to all but direct hits by medium artillery. The offensive against Razabil was codenamed Operation Jonathan, but it would be delayed until the corps artillery became available. At the same time the 7th Indian division seized the initiative on January 18th and launched an attack against the 55th division's position between Letwedet and Htindaw. The 9th company, 143rd infantry regiment was defending a hill east of Htindaw and stood their ground against repeated attacks until January 24th. The Japanese strongpoints were well dug in on the tops of narrow ridges. On January 26th, Major General Briggs ordered the 161st brigade, with support in the form of Lee-Grant tanks, artillery and aerial bombardment to attack the Tortoise defended by 1st battalion, 143rd regiment in the Razabil area. The Tortoise was a horseshoe defensive position that dominated the highway. It was an elaborate system of bunkers, trenches and all the typical Japanese goodies. For the boys in Burma it would be the first time for most to face such a thing, as Slim wrote in his memories “This was the first time we had assaulted an elaborate, carefully prepared position that the Japanese meant to hold to the last." The attack opened up with 12 Vultee Vengeance dive bombers of the 3rd Tactical air force, 12 Mitchell medium bombers and 16 Liberator heavy bombers of the Strategic air force followed up by even more dive bombers. It was a visually spectacular event and to those observing from the ground looked devastating. However little to no damage was inflicted on the strongly constructed Japanese defenses burrowed so deeply into the hillsides. Similarly the mountain artillery regiment and batter from a field regiment did little damage with their bombardment as well. The Japanese had simply pulled back 1000 yards during the bombardments and by the time the allies surged forward came back to man their positions. When the Indians began their assault, the fire coming down the steep and jungle clad hillsides was absolutely devastating. The Lee-Grant tanks fired from the valley floor and managed to destroy all the identified bunkers, but the exposed Indian troops suffered massive casualties. It was virtually impossible to keep the defenders heads down long enough to advance even 50 yards towards the summit. Things got even worse when the men reached the defensive lines for the Lee-Grant tanks had to lift their fire lest they hit their own men. By the end of the day, only a toehold had been secured over the lower slopes of Razabil ridge. The assault carried on for 3 more days, with intense tank and artillery fire from different directions supporting the infantry as closely as possible. The only immediate effect of the bombardment and indirect fire by 25 pounders and 3.7 howitzers was to destroy the vegetation over the hillsides, thus exposing more and more of the Japanese defensive works. During the intense battle, the Lee-Grant medium tank proved itself a real solution in providing effective covering fire for infantry and soon new techniques were evolving. The Japanese defenses were mainly built over the summit of steep, thick, jungle covered hills and the Lee-Grants provided fire support from positions in the paddy fields below them. Their 75mm guns effectively destroyed or at the least neutralized bunker positions. A procedure was quickly developed for providing cover during the last stages of infantry assaults. Tanks would use high explosive shells to clear the vegetation, than delayed action high explosive shells to break up the front of visible bunkers, then armor piercing shells to enable the infantry to advance close behind the creeping barrage as shrapnel was not flying everywhere. All combined this showed the potential of armor vehicles in jungle warfare, when most claimed they had little practical use in such climats. Despite such developments, the casualties were mounting, little progress was being made. On January 28th, the 123rd brigade attacked Japanese positions on the secondary hill of Wrencat and its smaller neighbor hill Wrenkitten, probably the best hill names I have read on this podcast as of yet haha. These were located on the lower western foothills of the Mayu range. They were extremely steep, cone shaped features with fortified circular trenches around their heads, bunkers, and bamboo jungle. Firing from positions on the valley floor the Lee-Grants and 5.5 inch artillery were able to destroy the bunkers and switch to armor piercing rounds to perform creeping barrages for the infantry. Despite the tank and artillery support, the Japanese were throwing a ton of mortar, grenade and machine gun fire. An officer of the 123rd brigade involved in the fight had this to say 'It appears from our experience that consolidation on the objective which normally consists of a series of deeply constructed bunkers connected one with the other is extremely difficult in the very limited time that the enemy allow.' The failures against the Tortoise and Wrencat, prompted General Christison to call off the attack against Razabil by January30th. Christison regrouped his corps artillery and tanks to instead support the 7th divisions assault against Buthidaung and Letwedet. Meanwhile further to the north, General Tanaka had brought 6300 men of the 55th and 56th regiments to the Hukawng valley by early January. He wanted to counterattack in strength, but General Mutaguchi believed he could not spare additional motor transport units to give the necessary logistical support to the 18th division since preparations were already going on for operation U-GO. Thus, Tanaka ordered his men to perform a delaying action down the Hukawng valley with the primary objective of holding Kamaing, the ridge line separating Hukawng valley from Mogaung valley. Tanaka weighed his orders and the looming monsoon season that hit the area in May or June. Against Tanaka, Stilwell sought to continue his offensive after successfully taking Yupbang Ga. Stilwell now looked towards Taihpa Ga and convinced both General Wingate and Admiral Mountbatten to unleash the Galahad long penetration unit into the Hukawng valley. On January 4, 1944, Frank Merrill abruptly relieved a disappointed Brink. Despite having a background with cavalry, like Brink, Merrill understood the Japanese strength, but unlike Brink he respected the chain of command. General Sun met with Stilwell and and it was agreed the bulk of the 114th regiment should swing widely around Tanaka's left flank while the 113th regiment wheeled to the south to hit Tanaka's front along the Tanai Hka. Further north the 2nd battalion ,112th regiment would also advance east across the Tarung Hka to secure Warang Ga; the 65th regiment would continue their advance towards Taro, fording the Tanai river by January 9th; south of Kantau, the 3rd battalion, 114th regiment ran into two Japanese companies. The jungle made it difficult for the Chinese forces to organize themselves. The battalion split into 4 fragments and no two of them were in contact. The supporting 6th battery could not fire until fields of fire were cut and while that was being carried out, the Japanese companies performed infiltration maneuvers and quickly surrounded the battery. Fighting for their guns and lives between the 9th and 11th of January the Chinese cannoneers managed to save both. The battalion was nearly wiped out from these Japanese tactics, but thankfully on January 12th, the regimental HQ arrived and reformed the battalion to launch a concerted attack that managed to gradually push back the Japanese. 3 days later the 2nd battalion arrived allowing the 114th regiment to force a crossing of the Sanip Hka by January 16th. Meanwhile the 1st battalion, 113th regiment forded the Tarung river near Yupbang Ga and sent patrols north to occupy Tabawng GA on January 13th. From there they advanced southeast to Kaduja Ga then to Brangbram Hka where they formed a line extending to the junction with the Tanai bank by mid january. On January 21st, the Chinese broke through the Japanese lines north of Brangbram Hka and made it to Ningru Ha less than one mile downstream from Taihpa Ga. Simultaneously, the battered 112th regiment swung wide going north east to Warang Ga. By the end of January the 113th continued their advance upon Taihpa Ga where they would meet stronger Japanese resistance. They began fighting within 1,500 yards of Taihpa Ga. Artillery support, the 4th and 5th Batteries, was then brought up. The next 1,000 yards between the 113th regiment and Taihpa Ga took two days to cross; then they spent a week in what was called "preparations for attack." General Sun's men were now approaching the Japanese strongpoint in the area, and Japanese resistance was more freely offered, with heavy shelling by 75- and 150-mm. pieces. At Taihpa Ga, the Kamaing Road crossed the Tanai on a long gravel bar which bullock carts could use quite well. At this point was the village itself, a humble collection of bashas, long since burnt out. About 800 yards upstream was a ferry across a stretch of fairly deep water. The Japanese used this ferry to bring supplies across the Tanai, rather than the vulnerable and easily spotted gravel bar. Here they had their strongpoint, well prepared and stubbornly defended. Further to the west, the 65th regiment advance was much slower than expected for Stilwell. Upon reaching the Hukawng Valley, the 65th's commander, despite means more than ample for his mission, contracted the same lethargy that had hastened the demise of the 112th Regiment. Stilwell was greatly frustrated by the delay a few more weeks with Colonel Fu, so he ordered Colonel Liao to relieve him. Stilwell wrote in his diary "Told Liao this included division commanders unless they watched their step. Also that Fu really should be shot. Liao took it OK though it shook him up." On January 22, General Sun was told about this affair, but the news softened somewhat by the presentation of a silk banner for the victory at Yupbang Ga, a dramatic contrast of the respective awards for lethargy and vigor. Having made his point, and hoping that he had given the Chinese a healthy shock, Stilwell restored Fu to his command by January 26. Fu's later performance in combat was rated as excellent. The Chinese managed to encircle the passive 3rd battalion, 55th regiment on January 23rd, and by the 25th the last Japanese pockets were wiped out. On the 26th the Chinese reached Ahawk Hka and on the 28th crossed the Taro river and occupied Taro on the 30th. This effectively cut behind Tanaka's flank. The bulk of the 112th now was close enough to the 113th to aid them so Sun began an attack against Taihpa Ga on the 30th. The Japanese held on stubbornly for days and would quietly withdrew on the night of February 4th. Tanaka concluded the loss of the Taro plain meant "the failure of the whole division in its operations along the Tanai". Thus Tanaka decided there was no point in continuing the fighting there. Over at Sanip, Sun ordered the 3rd battalion, 114th regiment to rest. However Stilwell thought this was close to disobedience of his orders, because he wanted Sun to move quickly and cut behind the 18th Division. On January 13, he had spoken very bluntly to Sun, asking him what orders he gave the 114th Regiment and if there had been any word from Chongqing to slow the operation. Stilwell told Sun that if he could not exercise the commands that Peanut had given him, he would resign and report the whole affair to the US Government. "Regardless of what anyone else may say, I assure you that my report will be fully believed in Washington." General Sun was confronted with the prospect that Chinese lethargy in north Burma might mean withdrawal of all US help from China. Stilwell, Sun was told, had been alone in his fight to convince the United States that the Chinese Army was worth helping. "If I am double-crossed by the people I am trying to help I am through for good and I will recommend very radical measures." Stilwell closed by saying that he had done his part; would Sun reciprocate? But despite Stilwell's arguments and threats, General Sun did not meet Stilwell's ideas of how a dynamic field commander should conduct himself. Thus the 114th gradually began to dislodge the Japanese from their positions along the river bank, taking care to annihilate all pockets behind. Stilwell was satisfied with the progress of his offensive and established the northern combat area command on February 1st. This organization would be led by Brigadier General Haydon Boatner and would include American, British and Indian units entering North Burma. But that is all for the wild Burma front as we now need to travel over to New Guinea. Last time we were in New Guinea, Brigadier Chilton's 18th brigade had just completed their advance upon Shaggy Ridge and Brigadier Hammer's 15th brigade had just relieved the 25th brigade on January 7th. Thus two brigades were flown in and two were flown out, showcasing how far the allied New Guinea air forces had increased their efficiency during the war. The New Guinea force was now under the command of General Milford, though Vasey still retained his task of "contain hostile forces in the Bogadjim-Ramu area by vigorous action of fighting patrols against enemy posts”. The division's role was still to prevent enemy penetration into the Ramu-Markham valley from Madang and protect the Gusap airfield and the various radar installations the instruction added that the division would "create the impression of offensive operations against Bogadjim Road by vigorous local minor offensive action". This was to be done by holding in strength with two brigades a "line of localities" from Toms' Post on the right to the Mene River on the left, the boundary between the 18th on the right and the 15th on the left being a line from Bebei through Herald Hill to Kankirei Saddle. In addition the 18th Brigade would "by raids and harassing tactics ensure that no major Jap withdrawal takes place undetected and occupy the Mindjim-Faria divide and the high ground to the north and south of it as the administrative position permits". The 15th Brigade would hold the Yogia-Mene River area, delay any enemy advance up the Ramu from the Evapia River, patrol to the Solu River, and deny the 5800 and 5500 Features to the enemy. Despite this, Vasey was preparing to assault the Kankirei saddle with the fresh 18th brigade. Designated Operation Cutthroat, the seizure of the Kankieri saddle and ultimately that of Shaggy Ridge, Vasey planned to launch an attack against Mount Prothero which was being defended by the 6th company, 78th regiment. He would attack it from the south, preceded by a diversionary attack against Cam's saddle. Brigadier Chilton realized however, that frontal attacks along Shaggy Ridge would not be able to achieve surprise, so he instead wanted to attempt a wide encircling maneuver on the left flank via Canning's saddle to attack Prothero directly. The 18th brigade spent the early part of January patrolling to see if it was possible to advance through Canning's saddle to Prothero 1 while simultaneously and stealthily building a road to Canning's in preparation for the coming offensive. The possibility of occupying Prothero from Canning's Saddle had been suggested to Chilton by Lt-Colonel Lang of the 2/2nd Pioneers, after a patrol performed by Captain McInnes. Captain McInnes had found an approach along a steep, razor backed spur within a short distance of Prothero's summit where they could hear Japanese. Meanwhile the 2/9th battalion had sent a patrol that found a possible track from McGullough's ridge vie Geyton's Hill to the Mene River. Going up the river bed led one to Canning's saddle. Two companies of the 2/12th spent a few days constructing a track going to the Mene River and they took special precautions to prevent the enemy from finding out. Reconnaissance patrols in general were careful to avoid contact with the enemy and so was the case around Prothero. The jeep track was hurriedly pushed to Guy's Post, existing tracks were improved and shorter and better tracks constructed to improve the supply routes to Shaggy Ridge and Mainstream; reserves of supplies in forward areas were built up, thus enabling a concentration of as many natives as possible to carry for the attacking battalion on the left, and arrangements were made for a limited air dropping at Canning's Saddle at an appropriate time. To support the upcoming attack, 9 long and two short 25 pounders of the 2/4th field regiment were brought up along with 7000 shells. The guns had to be dragged forward to the Lakes-Guy's Post area. Lt Colonel Charles Bourne's 2/12th battalion was to head the attack. Chilton also planned to have Lt Colonel Charles Geard's 2/10th battalion perform a diversionary attack through Cam's saddle. After Protharo 1 was captured, the 2/10th were to exploit north to Kankieri and south to the Mainstream area; while Lt Colonel Clement Cummins 2/9th battalion attacked northwest along Shaggy Ridge to join up with the 2/12th. By January 18th, the 4000 yard track to Geyton's Hill was complete, allowing the 18th brigade to advance. On that same day, B-25 Mitchell bombers unleashed their cannons and bombed the enemy positions at the junction of Mainstream, the Faria and Shaggy ridge. They dropped 60 delayed action bombs over the Faria river valley and some modified Mitchells sporting 75mm cannons mounted on their chins fired upon the crest of ridges. This cannon, the same used by Sherman tanks, was quite a formidable weapon in the air. To enable its fire, the nose of the B-25G model had to be shortened and the cannon breech positioned behind the pilot from where it could be loaded by the navigator for firing. To fire it the pilot would press a button on his control wheel. The weapon would prove inefficient against shipping, but it would be a lot more successful at hitting ground targets. Over three successive days from 18 to 20 January the Mitchells flew 180 sorties against Shaggy Ridge, firing 135 rounds of 75 mm at the ridge as well as dropping around 200 tons of bombs. The aircraft also fired about 90,000 rounds of .50 caliber. The machine-gun salvos were particularly devastating. From his accompanying Boomerang, Alex Miller-Randle recalled ‘Mitchells strip the trees of Shaggy Ridge clean and shatter the limbs and trunks to matchsticks'. D-day was the 20th, seeing the 2/10th on the right and 2/12th on the left. Captain Kumnicks company of the 2/10th advanced to Grassy Patch and over on the left a party of the 2/12th led by Major Fraser took vanguard. All of the preliminary actions were completed back on the 19th when Captain Gunn's A company of the 2/10th advanced from Tom's Post for Sprogg's ridge via a Japanese mule track. Later Captain Humnicks D company would use the same track. On the left the 2/12th battalion and B and D company of the 2/2nd Pioneers advanced along the new line of communication to Geyton's. At 8:45am Captain Gunn's company advanced from Sprogg's ridge to attack Cam's Saddle, followed 30 minutes later by Captain Kumnick's company. Operation Cutthroat opened up with artillery and B-25 mitchell bombardments against the Protheros and Kankirei Saddle. By 11 a .m. Captain Gunn was 300 yards from an enemy position on Cam's Saddle while artillery shelled the position until 12.30 pm when the Australians found that the enemy had withdrawn. Farther on, Captain Gunn's men would be pinned down by Japanese defending the western end of the saddle as Japanese patrols ambushed a signal line party 500 yards behind. Gunn initially tried to outflank the enemy, but then withdrew 200 yards and dug in for the night astride the mule track. At the same time, the 2/12th battalion reached Canning's Saddle by 3:30pm. The next morning, the 2/12th began to silently creep along the razor back ridge towards Prothero 1 with Cameron's C Company taking the lead. At this point Fraser had Captain Cameron's C Company, Captain Geason's A Company and Captain Thomas's D company enveloping the ridge. They nearly achieved surprise, but the Japanese discovered their advance and rapidly turned their mountain gun upon them causing many casualties. Despite the mountain guns fire, Lt Braithwaites 8th Platoon charged the Japanese and captured the mountain gun upon Prothero 1. The action cost 11 Australian lives with another 44 wounded. The 2/12th had thus captured the key point in the Japanese defenses upon Shaggy Ridge. After the loss of the mountain gun position, Colonel Matsumoto ordered his men to pull back closer to Kankirei. In the process the 2/10th were able to capture Cam's Saddle. On that same day the 2/9th began their attack, sending A Company to envelope the Green Sniper's Pimple defended by a platoon of the 78th regiment. A Company managed to seize the position using stealth and would be met by failed counterattacks. By the end of the day the Japanese defenders were now sandwiched between the 2/9th to the south and the 2/12th to the north, while the 2/10th were advancing from the east. Way further to the east, General Nakano's men were in an even more dire situation. After the evacuation of Sio, the Japanese were forced to retreat day and night under heavy rainfall, hindered by rough terrain and allied aerial attacks. Lieutenant General Yoshihara Kane, Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, recalled this of the march: “The most wearing part was that with these ranges, when they climbed to the craggy summit they had to descend and then climb again, and the mountains seemed to continue indefinitely, until they were at the extreme of exhaustion. Especially when they trod the frost of Nokobo Peak they were overwhelmed by cold and hunger. At times they had to make ropes out of vines and rattan and adopt "rock-climbing" methods; or they crawled and slipped on the steep slopes; or on the waterless mountain roads they cut moss in their potatoes and steamed them. In this manner, for three months, looking down at the enemy beneath their feet, they continued their move. Another thing which made the journey difficult was the valley streams, which were not usually very dangerous. At times, however, there was a violent squall, for which the Finisterres are famous during the rainy season; then these valley streams for the time being flowed swiftly and became cataracts. Then there were many people drowned... General Shoge was swept away by one of these streams on one occasion but fortunately managed to grasp the branch of a tree which was near the bank and was able to save one of his nine lives.” The men were malnourished, fatigued, but kept going day by day anticipating an abundant food supply at Gali. When they reached Gali in late January they would find nothing there. This anguish was just the beginning. The base had been shelled by allied warships and bombed by allied aircraft. General Muroya was injured on January 17th during the bombardment. Luckily for the Japanese there was no offensive towards Gali. Since the Saidor landing, General Martin's men were busy expanding the perimeter with outposts extending towards Sel and Bilau. Martin was reinforced with the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 128th regiment on January 16th. Although Martin believed launching an eastern attack upon the withdrawing enemy would provide an excellent opportunity to destroy some of their divisions, General Kreuger refused to permit such a thing. This was because the 32nd division was required for an upcoming offensive in the Hansa Bay area. Meanwhile General Nakai had brought the bulk of his detachment over to the Mot River area and established a strong outpost on Gabumi. Nakai also sent the 3rd battalion 239th regiment to Bilau to try and contest the control of its outpost. On January 12, the Japanese attacked Biliau, forcing the Americans to retreat behind the river. 30 Americans then tried to retake the outpost the following day but were repelled by the Japanese. On January 15th, the Japanese withdrew, allowing the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to occupy it on January 20. Another Japanese attack on January 26 would force them to retreat; and two days later, the Americans were successfully ambushed when they tried to reoccupy the outpost. Nakano's men had thus successfully carried out a fighting withdrawal from Lae. They had suffered horribly for it, crossing unbelievable difficult terrain, with basically no supplies, apart from what meager amounts could be airdropped or brought over via submarine. Yet now they needed to break through towards Madang, and there were 3 possible options of doing so. Number 1, they could advance along the coast, but this one was disregarded immediately because they would have to break directly through the new American defenses. Number 2, codenamed A would be an advance inland through Cabutamon, Monara, Sibog and Bilau towards Mindiri. Option 3 codenamed B was an advance even further inland crossing over the foothills of the Finisterre, through Nokopo, Kwembum, Yugayuga, Gabumi and Singor towards Mindiri. Nakano elected to send the 20th division over plan A while his division would advance in 3 echelons over plan B. On January 23rd, the 51st division departed Gali along the B route while the 1st battalion, 115th regiment and General Katagiri's 20th division would advance along the A route. Katagiri's 80th regiment and 20th engineer regiment tried the best they could, but the march was only advancing a single kilometer per day. Katagiri's troops had to cut through dense jungle and were facing strong enemy patrols along their route. Facing greater difficulties than expected, Katagiri decided to follow Nakano's 51st division along the A route in the end. Yet unbeknownst to him, the 3rd battalion, 126th regiment had just established new outposts at Sibog and Paramusi on January 22nd. From there they were sending out patrols to Langani and Sindaman. The Americans still could not break through Nakai's defenses at Gabumi giving the Japanese some relief. The bulk of Nakano's forces were withdrawing smoothly, seeing just sporadic harassment from American patrols. On the 1st of February, the 1st battalion, 115th regiment finally made contact with Nakai's forces at Gabumi while the bulk of the 51st division advanced through Yugayuga. A week later, Nakano himself reached Gabumi and began advancing towards Madang. By the 16th of February, the 1st battalion, 115th regiment reached Madang and the 20th division had successfully pulled out of Gabumi. Late February would see 1667 men in total arrive at Madang, 5469 would reach Singor and 1235 would reach Gabumi. Thus 80% of Nakano's strength had effectively withdrawn. Nakai also managed to collect 500 patients that had been abandoned at Yugayuga and brought them over to Madang by March 1st. It seemed once again, Nakano's men had escaped doom. On the other side, Brigadier Cameron had begun his advance towards Saidor on January 25th. His 4th battalion led by Lt Colonel Percy Crosky, with a Papuan company reached Kiari on January 28th. Without taking a break they continued towards Singor the next day, then Malasanga and Crossingtown by the 31st. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese were slowly but surely losing their hold over Shaggy Ridge. With the loss of the vital artillery position it was just a matter of time before the Australians took over the area, meanwhile Nakano's great retreat was a success, but one does not win a war moving backwards.
Last time we spoke about the aftermath of the Arawe landing and the drive towards Sio. The Komori detachment did everything they could to bottle up the new American beachhead at Arawe. Meanwhile after the fall of Wareo, the Australians decided it was time to drive towards Sio. General Katagiri had just got his men to Sio, but would have little time to prepare defenses as the Australians were quick on their heels. Likewise the Australians were also expanding past Dumpu, seeing multiple patrols fan out, probing for where the Japanese were massing their forces. In Tokyo, Hideki Tojo invited Japan's allies for the east asian conference, reiterating Pan-Asia unity against the west. Yet for all the talk, in reality Japan sought to dominate its Asian allies, really as a means to an end. In Cairo the allies held a conference of their own, trying to keep Chiang Kai-Shek in the fold. This episode is Landings at Cape Gloucester Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. General Douglas MacArthur faced daunting challenges during the Pacific War. One of these challenges was in the shape of Rabaul, one of Japan's strong points from which she exerted force in the region. To neutralize Rabaul, MacArthur sought to seize some airfields in Western New Britain, but to do this would also require securing control over the Vitiaz strait between New Britain and New Guinea. General HQ sought to use airfields at Cape Gloucester and on the south coast to help neutralize Rabaul. Thus Operation Dexterity was born. It was to be twin landings against originally Gasmata, but then for necessity changed to Arawe and Cape Gloucester. This was but a cog in the major plan within MacArthur's mind to return to the Philippines, one could argue within a greater plan for the white house. The landings at Arawe were largely successful and with that in hand General Krueger felt his Alamo Force could now launch operation backhander. The battle-hardened 1st Marine division was earmarked for the landings against Cape Gloucester. It was to be their first action after a prolonged period of rest and recuperation in South Australia following their heroic campaign on Guadalcanal. The 1st marines were now under the command of Major-General Rupertus. You probably could not ask for better men for the job, they were well refreshed physically, mentally and militarily. They had acquired an enormous amount of experience on Guadalcanal and with it a high degree of morale. The marines began training with the new types of landing crafts available to them, things they did not have during the Gaudalcanal days. Meanwhile Krueger carried out a programme of reconnaissance based on aerial photography, mosaics, older maps and some amphibious patrolling. There were 3 Australian officers who played key roles aiding in the effort. The first was Major John V. Mather, AIF, a former labor contractor in the Solomons who had been attached to the 1st Division for the Guadalcanal operation. He remained an integral component of the D-2 Section, where his proficiency with Pidgin English and grasp of native psychology proved most useful. The second was Sub-Lieutenant Andrew Kirkwall-Smith, RANVR, one of the versatile islanders who could turn his hand to nearly anything, and who had been a coastwatcher in the Cape Gloucester region at the time the Japanese first moved in. The third man and the one most more familiar with the ground and inhabitants was the Reverend William G. Wiedeman, who had operated the Anglican Mission at Sag Sag for several years prior to the war and, like Kirkwall-Smith, he was a commissioned Navy lieutenant to give military status to his present activities. A number of amphibious patrols was performed by the Alamo scouts. The first patrol was led by 1st Lieutenant John D. Bradbeer, who set out for New Britain's western coast by PT boat on September 24th. Around midnight, he cut the motors off on his PT boat around a mile off Grass Point, and his scouts paddled in from there in an inflated rubber boat, landing on a beach at the mouth of the second stream to the south at 0100 on the 25th. After hiding their craft with great care, they proceeded inland through dense secondary jungle growth up the western slopes of Mt. Tangi. There they found enemy defenses in the vicinity of Aisega. After this they turned northward heading through heavy foliage to the upper Gima River and there interrogated the inhabitants. The natives had been excluded from the airdrome area and the coast since the previous July, but they had some information to impart. There was a motor road connected Ongaia and the airdrome, and 12 to 14 Anti aircraft guns were emplaced between these two points; radio stations were located at Aisega, the airdrome, Sakar Island and Rooke Island; barge traffic was heavy on the Itni River and along the coast. Relations between the native population and the Japanese had deteriorated to a low level, although a few quislings still operated in the area. The natives related that the enemy expected an invasion of the Cape Gloucester region. Finally, they retraced their steps; and in the early morning hours of 6 October the Alamo Scouts climbed on board the waiting torpedo boat and returned to Goodenough Island to make their report. The next significant patrol was carried out on the night of 14 October by Captain W. A. Money, AIF, two other Australians, a Marine sergeant and six natives went ashore about one mile south of Higgins Point on Rooke and remained there until the early hours of 26 October. Captain Money reported there were few Japanese on the island, which doubtlessly influenced the later decision to defer a landing there. Shortly before midnight on November 20th two PT boats throttled down to a halt just south of Dorf Point on New Britain's west coast. Eleven men aboard had the general mission of reconnoitering the beach for an offensive landing, but more specifically they were to study beach approaches, beach conditions and inland terrain between Potni and Sumeru. They were commanded by Major Mather. With plans carefully laid the men stealthily made their way ashore, but luck under such conditions could not always hold up, and the Japanese became aware of the patrol's presence almost as soon as it reached the beach. Thirty minutes after leaving the PT boats, they were back on board, but in that time they had obtained enough information to declare the beach unfavorable for a landing operation. The significant patrol occurred on the night of 21 December, and was done to study two beaches at Tauali. Once again Major Mather acted as overall commander. Splitting the patrol into two seven-man groups, Bradbeer took the first on a reconnaissance of "South Beach" while First Lieutenant Joseph A. Fournier of the 1st Marines took the other for a look at "North Beach." The patrol recommended the latter as the more favorable of the two for a landing. It was duly labeled Green Beach, and 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, made its D-Day amphibious operation there. Such amphibious patrolling helped Krueger figure out where not to land. Meanwhile the 7th fleet had just come under the command of Admiral Kinkaid and was assigned the naval responsibility for the Gloucester landing. Admiral Barbey would have at his disposal 12 destroyers, taking the USS Conyngham as his flagship, 3 minesweepers, 10 APDs, 16 LCIs and 24 LSTs for the main landings; with another two destroyers 14 LCMs, 12 LCTs and two rocket DUKWs for the secondary landing on Beach Green at Tauali. Covering them would by Admiral Crutchley's task force 74 consisting of 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers and two rocket LCI's. The 1st echelon carried by the APDs Stringham, Crosby, Kilty, Dent and Ward was the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines; and APDs Brooks, Gilmer, Sands, Humphreys and Noa would carry the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. The 2nd Echelon of six LCIs would carry the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines; and four LCIs for the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. The 3rd Echelon was seven LSTs, each carrying 500 troops of 1st Marines and 150 tons of supply, escorted by destroyers Drayton, Lamson, Mugford and Bagley. The 4th Echelon was seven LSTs, each carrying 480 troops of 1st and 7th Marines and 150 tons of supply The 5th Echelon was five LSTs, each carrying 240 troops of 12th Defense Battalion and 250 tons of supply. And the 6th Echelon was five LSTs, each carrying 250 Marine engineers and 250 tons of supply. For air support, General Kenney assigned Brigadier-General Frederic Smith's 1st Air Task Force (FATF). The FATF contained about ⅓ of all the squadrons in the allied air force. It had flown fighter and bomber missions for all ground operations excluding those in the Ramu valley. To support the coming offensive, between November 19th to December 13th, 1241 tons of bombs were dropped over Brogen Bay. For the next 11 days, daylight bombings were intensified with over 1207 bomber sorties being performed, dropping more than 2684 tons of bombs.Their favored point of attack was Target Hill because it was so easily discerned. Gun positions at the airstrip were also given attention, with eighty 2,000-lb. bombs being dropped on 17 December. A few direct hits were claimed on gun positions. Bunkers and supply dumps, protected from view by the lush jungle growth, were fairly safe from air attacks, but the lines of supply suffered heavily. Daylight runs were not all that was performed, simultaneously the allies introduced harassing night tactics as well, to keep the enemy under additional mental strain. You see the Japanese anti-aircraft teams and pilots tried to sleep at night, but the B-24's would continuously drop bombs, grenades and even beer bottles over bivouac areas simply to keep them dazed. On December 21st, a final rehearsal was carried out at Cape Sudest and 3 days later, Colonel Julian Frisbie's 7th marines boarded Barbey's vessels at Buna Harbor. On Christmas day at 6am the convoy was moving. At 4pm the convoy rendezvous with Colonel William Whaling's 1st marines at Cape Cretin while the 2nd battalion reinforced with H battery of the 11th marines proceeded to Beach Green in their own smaller convoy. However, as they made their way towards their objective, the main convoy was spotted by a Japanese reconnaissance plane. The convoy would arrive at its destination unmolested. Commander of the southeast area fleet, Admiral Jinichi Kusaka had incorrectly assessed the convoy was bound for Arawe bearing reinforcements and as a result ordered a heavy air strike against the Arawe area instead of Cape Gloucester. At 6am on the 26th Crutchley's cruisers and destroyers began a naval bombardment followed up an hour later with Smith's B-24's, B-25's and A-20's. The 5th air force had tossed B-24's from Dobadura who dropped their payloads all the way from Target Hill to Cape Gloucester. The B-25 medium bombers followed this dropping their heavier loads and the A-20's focused on the landing areas making sure to strafe the beaches until the first wave would be just 500 yards away. For the next hour and a half the landing craft launched towards the beaches. Two LCI's outfitted with multiple rocket launchers led the first wave. A considerable amount of smoke screen was set over the area, hindering some of the landing craft from finding their marks. One group carrying elements of the 3rd battalion, 7th marines missed their beach altogether and hit the shore some 300 yards further west. The 3rd battalion led by Lt Colonel William Williams landed at Yellow at 7:46, with Lt Colonel John Weber's 1st battalion doing the same at Yellow 2. The men charged down the lowered ramps of their LCVP's seeing marines find unmanned trenches, abandoned guns and a handful of scared shipping engineers cowering in dugouts, too stunned by the naval and aerial bombardments to fight or flee. The allies had achieved tactical surprise as Matsuda was not expecting an invasion to come to these beaches. Major-General Iwao Matsuda's had deployed his 53rd regiment around the Tsurubu airdrome and Natamo Point. Storming forward, the 3rd battalion reached a region known as the “damp plat” which according to one Marine “was 'damp' up to your neck”. To the Japanese this was known as “swamp forest” and it held some of the most treacherous terrain, thus the Japanese did not expect the enemy to come by it. The forward momentum was beginning to peter out as men were wading through thick mud, with vines tearing at their bodies. A heavy congestion hit the beaches, greatly hamping the unloading process. As the men advanced, trees literally fell around them, rotten to the core from the bombing. The first marine casualty would actually be a result of a falling tree. Meanwhile the 1st battalion advanced towards Target Hill and Silimati Point. Company B seized their key elevation points by noon. Behind these men came the first echelon of LSTs bearing the 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel Odell Conoley. They beached their LCI's and drove straight inland some 900 yards through mud and water all the way up to the center of the new beachhead perimeter on a patch of dry ground. At 2:30 after the LST's were pulling out a force of 25 Vals and 63 Zeros emerged at low altitude who made a very fast bombing and strafe run against the beaches and shipping. The back and forth firing from the Japanese aircraft and allied forces was intense. A formation of FATF B-25s, coming in at treetop level, suddenly found themselves snarled up with the Japanese flight almost directly over the beach. In the excitement, two were shot down by friendly fire and two seriously damaged before the gunners aboard the LSTs could cool their trigger fingers. Possibly because they wanted to jettison their explosives, or possibly because they mistook their target, the B-25s then proceeded to bomb and strafe the Silimati point position occupied by 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, killing one officer and wounding 14 enlisted Marines. One correspondent had this to say "the most inexcusable small scale blunder of the war." The Japanese attacked Barbey's vessels covering the retreat of the first echelon of LSTs tangling with allied CAP. The destroyer Brownson was sunk, destroyers Lamson, Shaw and Mugford were damaged and two LSTs were driven off. 13 vals and 4 zeros were destroyed, for the allies it was 4 fighters and 3 B-25's. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion was still securing its right flank as Whaling's 1st Marines supported by Sherman tanks were coming up behind on LCI's. Their commander landed at 10:15 with the division command post in operation ashore within the hour as the 1st marines drove towards the airdrome. Lt Colonel Joseph Hankins 3rd battalion ran into one of Colonel Sumiya's roadblocks. It consisted of 4 fortified bunkers with machine guns and a system of rifle trenches manned by 1st, 2nd and 1st Machine-Gun Companies of the 53rd Regiment. The assault was quickly shattered. K company lost its commander and executive officer in a matter of minutes. Everything seemed to go wrong. Bazooka rockets did not explode in the soft earth covering the bunkers; flamethrowers malfunctioned and an LVT carrying ammunition got wedged between two trees. The Japanese defenders were so amped up seeing the chaos, they rushed out of their bunkers trying to swarm the trapped LVT. They managed to kill two men manning its machine guns, but the driver refused to lose his head and skillfully drove the vehicle right over the nearest bunker providing infantry to storm behind him with grenades. The daring LVT maneuver allowed the men to take the bunkers, stealing victory out of the chaos. Behind them was Whaling's 1st battalion led by Lt Colonel Walker Reaves who were bogged down in the damp flat. Whaling quickly changed his plan of advance as a result. He ordered his 3rd battalion to advance in a column along the narrow shelf of firm ground while the 1st battalion covered their left rear, speeding up the progress. Yet as the 3rd battalion moved out to expand their perimeter westwards, Sumiya's men began infiltrating unoccupied gaps, forcing Colonel Julian Frisbie to recall his Marines and wait for reserves to pull up. By nightfall Frisbies Marines had secured the beachhead. The landing was so well scheduled that the big LSTs began dropping their ramps on the beaches 40 minutes after the first assault waves had landed. By 1pm, they had unloaded and cleared the area to make way for the second echelon. However, close encroachment of the "damp flat" greatly curtailed the area available for dump dispersal and necessitated some hurried improvising by the Shore Party. According to an officer of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion: “The true cause of the traffic congestion can be attributed directly to Army personnel who manned 150 odd 6x6 trucks with preloaded cargo. These drivers had been scraped up from an artillery regiment in New Guinea and supplied with salvaged trucks into which had been loaded practically all the supplies. The trucks theoretically were to discharge their cargo at the dumps, return to the LSTs they had debarked from and return to New Guinea for the second load. The plan failed in one respect, as there were no immediate dump areas to unload the trucks in due to the "Damp Flat." It was decided to leave the cargo in the trucks until dump areas were established. This caused consternation in the ranks of the Army drivers, who consequently abandoned their trucks in an effort to get back on the LSTs… This naturally left 150 trucks stranded on the beach exits for quite a time. Eventually the trucks were unloaded by Marines and proved to be a big aid to transportation starved organizations.” Meanwhile Whalings battalions set up their own perimeter for the night with both flanks on the beach, a technique they repeated each evening until the airdrome was captured. Further to the west Lt Colonel James Masters 2nd battalion, 1st marines with H battery of the 11th marines codenamed STONEFACE group landed at Beach Green at 8:35. By 10am they had established a perimeter; E company held the left, G company the center and F company the right. The H battery unit was unable to emplace its 75mm pack howitzer satisfactorily on the rugged jungle terrain so they reorganized themselves into 3 platoons of infantry and took up a mobile reserve at the front line. Stoneface's task was to cut off the coastal road. When Masters men looked around they found the beach completely unoccupied, numerous positions had been abandoned with their weapons. Masters figured the defenders must have fled to the hills during the bombardment, so he ordered patrols to fan out. The only contact made that day was a small group roughly 1000 yards north of the beachhead near the village of Sumeru seeing a small firefight. Yet unbeknownst to Masters, Sumiya had sent a provisional unit consisting of elements of the 3rd and 4th companies, 53rd regiment with the 3rd battalion ,23rd field artillery regiment to drive out the marines via a secondary road east of Mount Talawe. The force was led by 1st Lt Takeda, and was thus called the Takeda Provisional battalion For Barbey the first day saw 13,000 troops and 7600 tons of materials landed on either side of the cape. However many men had landed in swamps so dense and deep that maneuvering out of such areas was quite difficult. General Matsuda was well aware of this and seized the opportunity. Matsuda ordered Colonel Katayama to leave token garrisons at Aisega, Nigol and Cape Bushing while he brought the bulk of his 141st regiment to Magairapua, this would take until December 30th to occur. Yet Matsuda had made one mistake, he thought he was facing just 2500 men. How the 65th brigade staff came to this conclusion is unknown. Perhaps it was became the smoke screen during the landings had made visual observation limited; perhaps the loss of Target Hill so fast also limited further observation of the enemy. The Marines had achieve tactical surprise by landing on undefended beaches, but other than that, they did not do all that much on the first day, perhaps the lack of activity also factored in Matsuda's head. The only real fight of the day had been a brief affair at the roadblock where the invaders, instead of throwing infantry frontally against powerful bunkers in the glorious banzai manner, had awaited supporting weapons to knock out the position. Perhaps to Matsuda this spelled weakness or timidity, or both. Regardless, like most Japanese commanders Matsuda was obsessed by the then-current Japanese doctrine of "annihilate-at-the-water's-edge," so he ordered his own major assault unit hurled in an all-out attack against the center of the invaders' perimeter. Thus instead of reinforcing Sumiyas forces at the airdrome, or withdrawing forces to more defensible areas like Borgen Bay, or even waiting for Katayam's troops to arrive, Matsuda decided to make a daring attack directly at the center of the marine perimeter with only his 2nd battalion, 52rd regiment. At 3am on December 27, the Japanese attacked the sector held by the 2nd battalion, 7th marines, during one of the worst monsoon storms the Americans had ever seen. Because of the storm, many of the Japanese failed to find gaps existing on each side of the battalions flanks. Thus instead the Japanese hurled themselves frontally against very well dug in positions. By 7am, the surviving Japanese finally began to pull out, Matsuda's men suffered 200 deaths with over 100 wounded. The Marines suffered 8 deaths and 45 wounded, added together for the day the total loss for the Americans was 28 deaths and 68 wounded. After Matsuda's terrible defeat, Whaling's battalions resumed their drive towards the airdrome. While they advanced in columns along the road, patrols were sent into the jungle to hunt down the enemy, but they encountered no resistance. The 1st marines were able to dig in for the night after advancing 5000 yards. To the east, Frisbie's 2nd battalion had expanded their perimeter towards the bank of Suicide Creek where they would continue to face short and sharp attacks by Matsuda's 2nd battalion. Despite the heavy punishment he was served, Matsuda continued to believe in the destroyer-at-the-water's edge tactics. His men began constructing defensive positions, bunkers, trenches, rifle pits and so forth, so close to the American lines the Americans could hear them doing it. Meanwhile the engineers of the 17th marines performed their own work, widening the Japanese coastal road to allow the movement of supplies. Despite their valiant work, the volume of traffic was immense, coupled with the storm made the narrow coastal road a logistical nightmare. The next morning the Marines expected to encounter some heavy resistance. The marine artillery crews increased their rate of fire and General Kenney's aircraft bombed Colonel Sumiya's strongpoints. With tank support, Whaling resumed his advance at 11am, with Company I finally hitting the first enemy positions about 12:15. They ran into a Japanese strong point consisting of a system of mutually supporting bunkers and rifle trenches, well armed with anti-tank guns and 75mm guns. The way forward was littered with land mines and barbed wire. The defenders enjoyed an added advantage in the heavy jungle lying a short distance inland which limited the tanks' field of maneuver to the comparatively narrow area directly to their front, facing the flank of the Japanese position which thus became, in effect, a defense in depth for the entire extent of its east-west length: approximately 300 yards. At 12:00, I Company was fired upon with small arms from the front, followed by 75mm shells along the road area. 15 minutes later the leading elements led by Captain Carl Conron began attacking the fortifications alongside the tanks. They were facing the 2nd Company, 53rd Regiment and the 1st Machine Gun Company, 53rd Regiment and the strong point was quickly nicknamed Hell's Point. Later it would be renamed Terzi Point in honor of Company K's commanding officer who died on the landing day. Within the heavy rain, the tanks surged forward and smashed Sumiya's bunkers, while A company dashed to the left, emerging from kunai grass just 500 yards from the bunkers. Enjoying excellent cover, the defenders' fire successfully stopped the American advance, although the Marines themselves also easily broke up two Japanese frontal assaults and one attempt to turn their flank. Ammunition began to run low, forcing A company to withdraw at around 3:45. Yet K Company closer to the beach held enormous firepower in the form of Sherman tanks that obliterated 12 bunkers rather quickly. In the words of Company K's commander: “I was given three tanks (the other two were out of action, one with engine trouble and one with a jammed breech of its 75) to accomplish this mission. I put one squad of the Second Platoon behind each tank and deployed the Third Platoon to set up a skirmish line behind the tanks. We encountered twelve huge bunkers with a minimum of twenty Japs in each. The tanks would fire point blank into the bunkers, if the Japs stayed in the bunkers they were annihilated, if they escaped out the back entrance (actually the front as they were built to defend the beach) the infantry would swarm over the bunker and kill them with rifle fire and grenades. By the time we had knocked out twelve bunkers the Second Platoon . . . were out of ammunition and had been replaced by the Third Platoon and they too were out or down to a clip of ammunition per man. I called a halt and sent for the First Platoon. By the time the First Platoon arrived and ammunition was resupplied forty-five minutes had elapsed. We continued the attack and found two more bunkers but the enemy had in the meantime escaped.” The immense power of the tanks forced the defenders to retreat. During this action the 1st marines suffered 17 deaths and 52 wounded and claimed to have counted 300 Japanese corpses. The capture of Hell's Point enabled the Americans to establish a position at Blue Beach to reduce the distance for supplies. General Rupertus command post was also moved there by Deemer 28th. The next day the American advance was delayed until the arrival of Colonel John Seldens 5th marines. General Rupertus feared he might be outnumbered at the airdrome so he played it safe. During the fighting at Hell's Point, a curious misadventure befell Corporal Shigeto Kashida of the 1st Machine Gun Company. The trench in which he was defending suddenly caved in, burying him helpless up to the neck. An astonished Marine, observing Shigeto's apparently disembodied head blinking at him, paused to debate whether to shoot or shovel, which dilemma was resolved by the arrival of an intelligence officer who ordered the corporal disinterred and made prisoner. Shigeto painted a depressing picture of his battalion's situation, but he mentioned the original plan for the 2nd Battalion was to reinforce the 1st, something that might still be accomplished; he also mentioned the presence somewhere in the vicinity of the 141st and 142d Regiments, possibly within striking distance. Since Colonel Sumiya had conducted withdrawals following every action to date, it could be presumed that a good part of his force remained intact. Thus Rupertus was right in his belief the Japanese may have large numbers at the airdrome. The 1st Battalion under Major William H. Barba and the 2nd Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis W. Walt got aboard 9 APD's at Cape Sudest and arrived off Cape Gloucester during the morning. However during the transit, there was a large storm that caused some confusion, leading some elements to land at Yellow 2 and others at Beach Blue. General Rupertus planned for the 1st Marines to continue their advance along the coastal road while the 5th Marines would perform a wide sweep on the left flank to attack airstrip No.2. At 3pm following the artillery and aerial bombardment, the Marines launched a fierce offensive. The 2nd battalion, 5th marines attacked simultaneously with the 1st Marines along the coast road and both ground immediately inland. Major William H. Barba's 1st Battalion was just struggling out of the swamp and jungle near the line of departure. The unexpected terrain difficulties, however, kept the plan from being carried out. Both battalions sent out patrols in an effort to establish contact, but a combination of darkness and unfamiliar territory prevented positive results. Supported by tanks, artillery, mortars and rocket launchers, Whaling's 1st Battalion successfully reached the eastern end of Strip No. 2 at 5:55 and immediately commenced setting up a defensive perimeter. The 3rd battalion followed behind and extended the perimeter to the left, with Selden's 2nd battalion arriving at 7:25pm extending the perimeter around airstrip No 1 towards the beach. It seemed Colonel Sumiya realized the futility of attempting a defense upon the open ground against American armor, so he pulled his units away towards Razorback Hill from which they could launch harassment maneuvers against the new American perimeter. The Japanese had begun firing artillery and mortars into the airdrome. The Marines, somewhat astonished by such goings-on, called for mortar and artillery support of their own. They reported that, according to their best estimates, the enemy had reoccupied the defenses in at least full company strength. The marines were formulating a plan to deal with the menace and the Japanese took advantage of the lull time to launch a banzai charge that failed to gain any ground. The Japanese continued their harassment, until the Marines received some tank support to launch an offensive. Platoons from different units got together to perform a sweeping maneuver, advancing 300 yards from the defensive line. They ran into bunkers, foxholes and trenches manned by Japanese. The marines mopped them up with grenades and automatic weapons, then at 11:30 suddenly all the fighting ceased. No more enemy seemed to remain near the front. The marines had suffered 13 deaths and 19 wounded, but counted 150 dead Japanese. With more tanks on hand, the Marines gradually pushed the Japanese to flee back towards Razorback Hill. Meanwhile, because of the repeated attacks, Colonel Masters men had been patrolling, trying to pinpoint where the Japanese were concentrated. At 1:55am on December 30th, the 3rd and 4th companies of the 54th regiment had discovered an excellent approach towards the Marine perimeter. As was always the favored Japanese strategy, to concentrate force against a narrow sector, they chose to attack at this place called Coffin Corner, a natural causeway connected to ridges. The two companies attacked under the cover of a storm. The Japanese unleashed mortars and machine gun fire and quickly overran a machine gun position, but G company launched a counter attack pushing them back. The battle raged for nearly 5 hours, but by 7am it ceased. The marines had 6 deaths, 17 wounded and would count 89 Japanese dead with another 5 captured. Yet that concludes the action in Cape Gloucester for today, for now we need to jump back to New Guinea. Back on December 8th, General Nakai commenced an offensive against Kesawai, dispatching the Saito Volunteer unit for the task. The unit had the aid of native guides who gave them detailed information on the terrain, allowing the Japanese to infiltrate behind a forward Papuan platoon led by Lt C.E Bishop. They explode all of their booby-traps, allowing the 1st battalion, 78th regiment to advance behind them into Kesawai 2 without much difficult, annihilating the Papuan platoon and securing the eastern portion of the highland. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion crossed the Boku River and captured Koropa, cutting off the commandos at Isaria; the 2nd battalion, 239th regiment crossed the Boku river and assaulted the commando position at Ketoba, but the Australians resisted until nightfall before withdrawing towards Isariba. Nakai's enveloping maneuver was a success, forcing the commandos and Papuans to withdraw towards the Evapia River. On December 9th, Brigadier Eather ordered A and C companies of the 2/25th battalion to advance forward as the commands pulled back towards the Mene River. Meanwhile at 7:15am at Isariba, the Japanese had begun a series of attacks. The attacks were repelled with vicker guns, grenades and a quick air strike from 20 Kittyhawks and Boomerangs that bombed and strafed the attackers. The 2/25th companies arrived at Evapia and one of their patrols managed to ambush several Japanese parties over the next few days. On December 12th, Nakai arrived at Kesawai where he ordered his 1st and 3rd battalions, 78th regiment to attack the 2/25th positions by nightfall. C Company's machine gun fire managed to halt the enemy assault from the north, but another came from the south. A Company found itself surrounded as the Japanese managed to get between the two Australian companies, firing their Woodpeckers from multiple directions. It was a 5 hour battle until the Australians repelled the enemy who gradually pulled back west. At 5am on the 13th, the Australians were running low on ammunition and were forced to withdraw. The 2/25th advanced through think jungle and deep swamps, by 8am they had managed to get to safety after suffering 5 deaths and 14 wounded but killing an estimated 67 Japanese. The companies withdrew east of the Evapia River, rejoining the rest of their battalion. Nakai expected his enemy was attempting an offensive against Madang and ordered his men to return to their former defensive positions, leaving token garrisons at Koropa and Kesawai. Because of the heated attacked, General Vasey worried it was preliminary to something much bigger, so he ordered the 2/16th battalion to perform punitive attack along Shaggy Ridge and Eather's 2/33rd battalion would retake Kesawai. The 2/33rd Battalion advanced under the cover of darkness to the 5800 Feature to attack any Japanese there, and to move the Papuans across the Evapia to establish a patrol base for the Koben-Koropa-Solu River area . With three of his companies Colonel Cotton of the 2/33rd moved off an hour and a half after midnight on the 18th-19th December towards the summit of the 5800 Feature arriving just before dawn . At 2.10 p.m. a section made contact with the enemy about 700 yards south of the highest pinnacle on 5800. The patrol withdrew while the artillery fired 120 rounds. By 5 p.m. the enemy had had enough and withdrew enabling one company to occupy the pinnacle . Next day the battalion patrolled the whole area and found evidence of Japanese occupation and a hasty withdrawal. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The allies finally unleashed operation backhander, the amphibious assault of Cape Gloucester. The 1st Marines had a long rest after Guadalcanal and would now be the spearhead to reconquer New Britain. However the Japanese were not going to just roll over easily.
Last time we spoke about landings against Arawe, the continuation of the Bougainville campaign and some new action in the CBI theater. Despite a rubber boat disaster, the operation against Arawe went off successfully seeing another allied landing taking the Japanese by surprise. Now the Japanese would be forced yet again to launch a counter attack hoping to dislodge the allied forces from a new beachhead. Over on Bougainville the Marines performed some assaults against hills such as Hellzapoppin ridge to expand the perimeter enough so the Army boys would have an easier time of taking over. Over in the CBI theater, the onion man Wingate was given the task of expanding his chindits and the Americans wanted their very own chindit force. Stilwell decided the time was ripe to unleash a minor offensive in Burma and soon saw what looked like a weakened Japanese perimeter was in fact very strong. This episode is Drive on Sio Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last time we saw General Cunningham's men successfully landing at Arawe where they hoped to build a new PT boat base. Troop A was supposed to land an hour before the main landing to cut the coastal road near Umtingalu village and Troop B would land at Pilelo island to cover the main passage to the harbor. Troop A was a disaster. Their 15 rubber boats were met with 25 mm dual purpose guns that sank 12 boats, killed 12 men and wounded another 70. Troop B was more successful landing on Pilelo and capturing the radio station before engaging in a fire fight. For the main landing at House FIreman Beach, there was little resistance. Sporadic machine gun fire was silenced by rockets as the men landed. The Japanese tossed some air strikes to hit further landings and convoys, but allied CAP managed to limit the damage. A few days after the landing, the Komori Detachment reached the village of Didmop along the Pulie River where they paused to reorganize and rally the incoming survivors fleeing the landing area. The difficult terrain and river crossings prevented Komori and his men from assembling into offensive positions until December 25th. Meanwhile back on the 18th, the 1st battalion, 141st regiment began an advance from the Itni region aboard 7 barges. Unfortunately for them, two LCVP's bearing 19 men on patrol had been sent by Cunningham to Cape Peiho. The two forces ran into another and after an exchange of gunfire the US soldiers abandoned their LCVP's and retreated back along the Arawe coast. Another patrol traveling by LCVP was also fired upon by Japanese barges near Umtingalu that same day, but was able to return to Cape Merkus. On Christmas night, 100 men of the Komori detachment assaulted the main line of defense across the neck of the peninsula. The inexperienced American cavalrymen of the 112th managed to repel, albeit with some difficulty. The attack prompted General Cunningham to believe Komori was in charge of the lead element of a much larger force, most likely enroute from Gasmata. He therefore requested reinforcements and General Krueger responded by dispatching a company of the 158th infantry by PT Boats. Meanwhile the lack of results from the attack prompted Komori to defer further attacks until the arrival of Major Tobuse's battalion. On the 27th, allied intelligence indicated the Japanese had retaken Meselia and Umtingalu, prompting Cunningham to withdraw all outposts and patrols within the main line of defense. The 2nd battalion, 158th regiment were sent to reinforce the beachhead while Komori and Tobuse finally made contact with another. The first order of business to contain the growing American perimeter. Both commanders believed the Americans sought to repair the unserviceable Lupin Aerodrome. 700 yards from the US line the Japanese established a series of alternate positions taking advantage of the terrain and concealment making it difficult to spot. Cunningham would remark "This is not an organized position in the accepted sense of the word, it consists apparently of shallow trenches and deep fox holes… The ground is covered with a thick green mat about 12 to 18 inches in depth which makes observation absolutely impossible… Officers and men… report that they have not seen a single Japanese and that they are unable to locate machine guns firing on them from a distance of 10 to 20 yards.” From these positions the Japanese harassed the Americans using mortar and automatic weapons fire. Whenever the Americans tried to pinpoint where the fire was coming from the Japanese would simply switch positions to another. Within these parameters only limited skirmishing was carried out for the next few days. On January 4th, Komori reported repulsing a strong American and two days later received his first citation from Emperor Hirohito for his heroic achievement. Meanwhile a much frustrated Cunningham began sending reports to Krueger he could not spot the enemy and was convinced continued attacks would simply result in further casualties. By January the 9th he reported 75 dead, 57 wounded and 14 missing. He requested Kreuger send him some tanks and on the 9th he received the 1st marine division's 1st tank battalion from Finschhafen. The 1st Tank Battalion had been left behind at Finschhafen because of transportation shortage and limited range for tank operations in the inhospitable terrain of the Cape Gloucester region. Eventually Rupertus would also release the rest of the tank company then in reserve at Cape Gloucester to help out. The Marine tanks and Army infantry quickly worked out the details of how they would go about combined operations. The morning of January 16th kicked off with a squadron of B-24's followed by another of B-25s bombing the Japanese positions. This was followed up by artillery and mortars and then two 5 tank platoons began their assault against a 500 yard front. Behind the tanks were infantry of the 158th and despite the swampy terrain and thick vegetation, the tank-infantry stormed forward. The Japanese resisted ferociously, grounding two tanks that had to be destroyed lest the Japanese seize them later. The Americans destroyed the enemy's positions, crushing numerous automatic weapons and a 75mm mountain gun. But the Americans had no orders to hold any positions, so they destroyed and pulled back to their perimeter for the night. The following morning the Americans resumed the attacks with flamethrowers eliminating small pockets of resistance still remaining. Komori still obsessed with defending Lupin aerodrome to the last man ordered a withdrawal, but not before radioing to the brigade HQ "fight till the glorious end to defend the airfield" which earned him a second Imperial citation on February 7. During these actions the Americans suffered 20 dead, 40 wounded and two tanks. For Komori's men they had 116 dead and 117 wounded. For the next 3 weeks the fighting would deteriorate into a matter of patrol skirmishes, with Komori triumphantly reported back to HQ how the airfield was still in Japanese hands. The reality however was the Japanese were heavily outnumbered and lost control of the air and sea. How many men Komori commanded remains difficult to figure out as no documents were captured after the operation. It appears unlikely there were more than 1000 under his command. Early in the operation the Japanese were supplied by airdrop, often during daylight in view of the Americans. Yet as the Americans tightened their grip over the sea and air more, Komori became increasingly dependent on the trickle of supplies coming over the tortuous trail from Iboki. Carrying and distributing these supplies imposed still more of a drain on his manpower, and he withdrew his headquarters to Didmop to give more attention to this phase, leaving direct defense of the airfield to Major Tobuse. Yet that is all for Arawe for today, because we need to travel back over to New Guinea. Wareo had fallen and now the Australians were advancing upon Fortification Point as General Katagiri's 20th division were retreating towards the northern coast. The 20th division would arrive at Zagaheme and Orarako on the 22nd and 25th respectively. With these movements occurring the Australians now felt the time was ripe to launch an offensive against Sio. On December 20th, General Wootten ordered the 20th brigade to advance through the 4th brigade's positions and begin a rapid pursuit towards Sio. The next day, Brigadier Windeyer had his men advance towards Wandokai while Wootten was reorganizing his forces to allow the coastal advance to continue. Meanwhile the 24th brigade took over the Gusika-Wario-Sattelberg area; the 4th brigade took over the Fortification Point-Masaweng River area; the 26th brigade advance down the coast and would be ferried to the mouth of the Masaweng to support Windeyer's advance. The Australians enjoyed the advantage of aerial support in the form of Bostons, Mitchells, Marauders, Airacobras and Thunderbolts who continuously hammered the Japanese with bombs and strafing runs. Alongside this allied PT boats harassed the Japanese barge fleet, between the 9th and 13th they would sink 23 barges along the coast, mostly south of Sio. Despite the air and sea support the overland advances were particularly rough on the men. From fortification point to Kapugara gorge the coastal track ran along a flat kunai ledge some hundred yards wide, between the sea on each side with sharp coral terraces. They had little cover along the line of the advance. There were also few natives inhabiting the area. The men of the 20th brigade were not in great condition when they began the pursuit. They were stricken with malaria and Colonel Simpson anticipated the enemy might hit their left flank so he dispatched two companies to travel parallel with the main coastal advance and those guys had some even rougher terrain to travel. There was little water to be had along the coast and the long kunai fields increased the heat exponentially. The men occupied Hubika on the 22nd without opposition. The allied engineers would find the gorge beyond Hubika would prevent any progress by the tanks, so the troops would have to proceed without their support. By nightfall the 2/13th battalion would advance another 3000 yards facing no opposition. They got around 1500 yards past Wandokai when suddenly mortar and artillery fire rained down upon them. This was Captain Yoshikawa's 1st battalion, 80th regiment who unleashed a bombardment for 2 hours upon the advancing Australians. Though it appeared like there was a major fight on their hands, it was only rearguard actions. Yoshikawa and his men were retreating towards Ago that night. Christmas would see Windeyer receive the gift of further artillery reinforcements for his advance. The 62nd battery and 2/12th field regiment came over and on Boxing day Colonel Miyake would decide to abandon Ago and continue the retreat towards Kanomi. On the night of the 26th a company from a boat battalion of the 592nd EBSR, alongside an Australian radar detachment landed on Long Island. This was Operation Sanatogen, the mission was to set up a radar station and observation post on Long Island to help with the landing at Saidor and thwart Japanese barge movements. The Japanese had never placed a garrison on Long Island, but it was used as a staging point for barges moving between Rabaul and Wewak. At 9am on the 27th, 18 Mitchells and 12 Bostons bombed and strafed the Walingai and Kanomi areas before Windeyers resumed his advance. The 2/13th advanced through Ago and occupied Walingai unopposed by the end of the day. The next day saw Australian patrols running into Japanese positions around Kanomi. At 11:15am a patrol of the 2/13th was fording a creek when they were fired upon. The patrol saw at least 14 Japanese retreating north around Blucher Point as they fired vicker guns and mortars upon them. During the afternoon the allied began a heavy artillery bombardment. The speed at which the Australians were advancing was providing results as the Japanese were forced to further withdraw towards Kalasa. Yet the Australians were stretching their logistical lines forcing Wootten to halt the forward units for 2 days. The two day delay allowed General Katagiri to get his men past Kalasa and reach Sio without any hindrance. On new years eve the 2/15th resumed their advance finding slight resistance around Nanda. At 5:30pm the 2/15th were fired upon by a few bands of Japanese and responded with artillery fire forcing them away. To avoid unnecessary casualties the Australians halted at the last creek before Nanda and resumed the march on new years day. The 2/15th then passed through Kwamkwam and captured Sialum Island during the afternoon of the 2nd. Sialum lies around half way between Fortification Point and Sio and it afforded the Australians a decent area to build a large supply dump on its sheltered. Yet the advance to Sio was not the only one going on, on New Guinea. Since the battle of John's Koll and Trevor's Ridge, General Nakai's detachment were forced to withdraw farther back into the hills. The Nakai detachment were now clinging to Shaggy Ridge the Kankirei Saddle and the area between the Faria River, Madang and Bogadjim. At Kankirei, Nakai dispatched Captain Ohata Masahiko's 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion, 26th Field Artillery Regiment. General Nakai told Ohata that ‘the enemy is extremely sensitive to the use of artillery fire arms so that the artillerymen are expected to cooperate closely with the infantry men until the very end”.Ohata recalled “I realized what was expected from our commander, and he also said please take good care of your life. It took more than twenty years to train one artillery officer, but a gun is only material. We can replace the gun, but not an artilleryman.' There is a very reasonable explanation for Nakai's order. The IJA artillery field manual indicated their field guns were more valuable than artillerymen. In article 10 it said ‘The gun is the life of the Artillery. Therefore, the Artilleryman must live and die with the gun, and share the honor and shame together with the guns. One must continue to fight until the end'. Nakai at this time prohibited suicide and it seems was trying to save the lives of his artillerymen, lest they die for the sake of their guns. The main Japanese position was at Shaggy Ridge, a 4 mile long spur dotted by several rocky outcrops where the Japanese troops established numerous strong points. From the Pimple, a large rocky peak rising around half way along the crest of Shaggy ridge, the Japanese found it extremely sturdy to defend. The feature often saw a mist envelope it adding to its defensive capabilities. As the Japanese clung to their heights, the Australians were busy developing their new main base at Dumpu. Airstrips, roads, bridge, culverts and numerous buildings were being worked on and with the recent acquisition of the Ramu valley they were also building a forward air base at Gusap. The only major offensive against Shaggy Ridge came in late October. In accordance with Vasey's advice, Brigadier Dougherty prepared to attack the southernmost peak of Shaggy Ridge on the 20th. For three days from the 17th Dougherty's patrols crept as near as they could, and early on the 20th, Captain Whyte the F.O.O. of the 54th Battery, directed the fire of his guns on to the Japanese position. At midday forward units reported that they were within five yards of a four-strand barbed-wire fence; the Japanese position on a kunai covered Pinnacle was about 30 yards away. Between the enemy position and his men, there was a steep gully about 100 feet deep with precipitous slopes on both flanks . The Japanese hand cut fire lanes through the kunai and were dug in and heavily bunkered from the cliff face. Through the clever use of artillery fire, the Australians tricked the Japanese into retiring temporarily to gain shelter. The artillerymen varied the rate of fire so it was never the same, while platoons stormed specific ridges, gaining ground without casualties.To defend his western flank, General Vasey dispatched the 2/7th to Kesawai 1 and the 2/6th to Kesawai 2. Yet the role of the 7th division for the time being was really limited to patrol activities. On 23rd October a section of the 2/2nd Commando Squadron led by Lieutenant Doig crossed the Ramu and moved up the Urigina Track next day, seeking a way east to the Mataloi-Orgoruna area. Lt Doig entered this new territory on the 25th and by 9 a.m. trees across the track near Orgoruna suggested that the Japanese might be in possession. Between 25th and 31st October Captain Haydon's company of the 2/25th Battalion tried to reach the Japanese track between Paipa and Kankirei. After moving up the Evapia River and then through rugged unmapped country for 4 days the patrol leader was forced to return as he realized that it would be impossible for him to reach his objective without further rations. On the 29th the 2/7th Commando Squadron, an engineer, Captain Gossip of the 2/6th Field Company, and two others left to patrol a road from the Ramu Valley across the Finisterre Ranges towards the Japanese road. This patrol returned on 1st November reporting that there was no possibility of making a road from the Kesawai area towards the Japanese roadhead. Lieutenant Maxwell of the 2/6th Commando Squadron, performed a three-day reconnaissance towards Yokopi , walked right into an enemy defensive position on the first day out, saw five Japanese looking at him from about 20 yards away, and retired before they could fire at him. Sergeant Berrell of the Papuan Battalion led his section, three men from the 21st Brigade, and 50 native carriers on a 13 days' patrol into the ranges to patrol enemy movement in the Kankirei area. He returned on 11th November without having found a worthwhile observation post near Kankirei. On the 20th October MacAdie sent a patrol from the 2/2nd Squadron to Josephstaal to find out whether the Japanese were there, and whether a strip could be constructed. Accompanied by Sergeant-Major England of Angau, Lieutenant Green's small patrol of five troopers, 32 native carriers and five police boys left for Sepu where it remained until setting out on the main journey on 3rd November. The route chosen by Green and England did not follow the known native tracks as the Australians wished to avoid any contact with Japanese patrols. The journey would take nine days. Over at Atemble, where the Japanese were known to be in some strength, was bypassed and, although there were tracks of Japanese horsemen at Sambanga and reports from natives that the Japanese did occasionally patrol the area between Atemble and Josephstaal and Madang, there were no encounters. On 13th November Green arrived at Josephstaal, which was not occupied and which had only been visited occasionally by small enemy patrols in recent months. The patrol returned to base on 26th November. On December 2nd a patrol of 42 men from the 2/33rd Battalion led by Lieutenant Scotts set out, urged on by Eather's hope that it would be able to blaze a track into the heart of the Japanese defenses at Kankirei from the west and get a prisoner. Moving up the Mene River Valley and across the 5500 Feature, Scott established a base on a steep ridge. The next day he moved down a spur to some native huts where the dense jungle was replaced by kunai and then crossed into another spur, where they established an observation post. Meanwhile a patrol from the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion was attempting to observe the Kankirei Saddle area from the east. On the 7th Lieutenant White led out eight Pioneers, two Angau warrant-officers and 20 natives from Bob's Post following the Japanese Mule Track north to Toms' Post. Next day the patrol moved on along a well-surveyed track, and, about 1,500 yards beyond Toms' Post, saw a strong enemy position ahead on a high feature astride the track. On the 9th and the morning of the 10th White tried to work round to the north of the enemy position to carry out his original task, but dwindling rations, heavy rain, and rugged country forced his return to the track. Accompanied by two men White then advanced along the track but after 20 minutes he came under heavy fire. The three men ran back down the hill which they had been climbing but White was hit by machine-gun fire and fell. All of these patrol actions helped prevent the Japanese from penetrating south and figured out generally where the Japanese were in numbers. On November 9th Vasey relieved the 21st brigade at the front with the 25th brigade. Along with this the 2/6th commando squadron and a Papuan company were sent to reinforce the front while the 2/7th command squadron was withdrawn. And with that, after nearly 10 months since Lt Rooke and his platoon of the 2/7th battalion had arrived on the airstrip at Bena, the Bena Force ceased to exist. They had 12 deaths, 16 wounded and 5 men missing but claimed to have killed over 230 Japanese. They helped build the Garoka airfield; over 78 miles of motor transport road between Bena and Garoka, Sigoiya, Asaloka and Kainantu and produced maps of completely unknown areas In his final report MacAdie wrote: “The force fulfilled its task. Every enemy patrol which crossed the Ramu River was driven back with casualties, and very determined enemy attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties. In addition the enemy lost many men in ambushes on tracks north of the Ramu River... There is no doubt that the enemy regarded this force as a menace to his flank, and little doubt that the size of the force was grossly overestimated.” Now the 2/2nd Commando Squadron would assume the responsibility for the defense of the Bena-Garoka area. November would see the start of an intense hide and seek artillery duel. The Australian artillery was attempting to neutralize the Japanese 75mm guns. Captain Ohata's had placed two gun emplacements on the outskirts of Shaggy ridge in a position that protected the ridgeline in the front. The first emplacement were not entirely concealed and thus quickly became a target. Fortunately the guns survived as the Australian fire hit their shields mostly. Captain Ohata thought he could conceal their muzzle flashes by firing lower. The second gun emplacement was completely covered by shelter yet Ohata would remark ‘However the footsteps of the soldiers who were coming in from the behind the position were spotted by the search airplane. We were indeed astonished by their way of finding the gun position.' By the end of November General Nakai was preparing to hit Kesawai and counterattack towards Dumpu. In early December patrols from the 2/16th were probing Shaggy Ridge. Vasey intended to perform a diversion to attract the Japanese attention away from other pending operations in New Guinea and New Britain. An idea was floated around to have Brigadier Dougherty raid Kankirei, but that's it for New Guinea as major events were unfolding for the CBI theater. Over in Tokyo, on November 5th and 6th the Greater East Asia Conference was being held. Attendees included Hideki Tojo for Japan, Zhang Jinghui for Manchukuo, Wang Jingwei for the Republic of China based in Nanjing, Ba Maw for Burma, Subhas Chandra Bose for Free India, Jose P Laurel for the Philippines and Wan Waithayakon for Thailand. Notable exclusions would be that of Korea and Taiwan, whom the Japanese had annexed and did not want to give any political autonomy to. There was also Vietnam and Cambodia who were not invited so as to not offend the Vichy French government who was still claiming French Indochina to be under their rule. There was also Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, but Japan figured they would be simply annexing these regions as their natural resources were now the lifeblood of the empire. Of the attendee's, Suhas Chandra Bose was only present as an observer as India was still a British colony and the representative of Thailand under strict orders from Plaek Phibunsongkhram was to emphasize on every possible occasion that Thailand was not under Japanese domination, but in fact an allied nation. You might be asking why did Plaek Phibunsongkhram not attend such a grand event himself, well he actually feared if he were to leave Bangkok he would be ousted. Hideki Tojo made a grand speech, greeting each of the participants and praising the spiritual essence of Asia in opposition to the materialistic civilization of the west. To give you a taste of this meeting here are some of the dialogue amongst participants. Tōjō Hideki stated in his speech: "It is an incontrovertible fact that the nations of Greater East Asia are bound in every respect by ties of an inseparable relationship". Ba Maw of Burma stated: "My Asian blood has always called out to other Asians… This is not the time to think with other minds, this is the time to think with our blood, and this thinking has brought me from Burma to Japan." Jose Laurel of the Philippines in his speech claimed that "the time has come for the Filipinos to disregard Anglo-Saxon civilization and its enervating influence… and to recapture their charm and original virtues as an Oriental people." Subhas Chandra Bose of India declared: "If our Allies were to go down, there will be no hope for India to be free for at least 100 years". Overall the meeting was characterized by praise of solidarity and condemnation of western imperialism, but in terms of how Asia was going to come together and economic development and such, there really was no meat to any of it. Tojo simply kept reiterating how great Pan-Asianism was against the evils of the white devils. Yet for all the talk of asian unity, the Japanese governments actions were anything but that. The Japanese viewed themselves as racially superior to that of the other asian nations. They saw themselves as the Great Yamato Race and that they were destined to rule over the other asian peoples, similar to a father and son relationship. To actually go off the script so to say, I happen to have covered this topic extremely thoroughly in a 4 part series I did on my patreon about General Ishiwara Kanji. You see, Hideki Tojo's main military/political rival was Ishiwara Kanji, and all of the greater east asian stuff was literally stolen from Ishiwara. Ishiwara, for those unfamiliar, is someone I believe had an unprecedented impact on global history. Ishiwara pretty much single handedly began WW2 I would argue. He was a very bizarre figure who came to the realization after WW1 that the entire world would be engulfed in what he called “the final war”. To prepare Japan against this apocalypse he believed Japan had to seize Manchuria for her resources, to empower the empire so it could face the United States. He also believed it was absolutely necessary to ally with China and that everything needed to be done to create a harmony between the two peoples. Ironically after Ishiwara caused the invasion of Manchuria, it all in his view got out of hand and he was tossed aside by people like Tojo. He spent the entire war openly criticizing Tojo and the policies of Japan while trying to create this Pan-Asian league, and Tojo simply copied what he was doing, gave it a different name and made sure to eliminate the elements about allying with China and stopping the war with her. Ishiwara is a fascinating figure and to be honest I was so happy with the 4 part series I told on my patreon I might be releasing it on my Youtube channel and on my personal podcast server soon. Now back to the conference, in the words of Indian Historian Panjaj Mishara “the Japanese had revealed how deep the roots of anti-Westernism went and how quickly Asians could seize power from their European tormentors”. Tokyo hoped that a major demonstration of Pan-Asianism would lead China to broker peace with Japan and thus join them in a war against the west. A major theme of the conference was that Chiang Kai-Shek was not a proper asian and that no Asian would ally themselves to the white devils. As you can imagine the speeches made by Tojo emphasized how evil Britain and the United states were, yet at the same time praised Nazi Germany. Here are parts of Tojo's speech. “The need of upholding international justice and of guaranteeing world peace is habitually stressed by America and Britain. They mean thereby no more and no less than the preservation of a world order of their own, based upon division and conflict in Europe and upon the perpetuation of their colonial exploitation of Asia. They sought to realize their inordinate ambition in Asia through political aggression and economic exploitation; they brought on conflict among the various peoples; they tried to destroy their racial integrity under the fair name of education and culture. Thus, they have to this day threatened constantly the existence of the nations and people of Asia, disturbed their stability, and suppressed their natural and proper development. It is because of their notion to regard East Asia as a colony that they harp upon the principles of the open door and equal opportunity simply as a convenient means of pursuing their sinister designs of aggression. While constantly keeping their own territories closed to us, the peoples of Asia, thus denying us the equality of opportunities and impeding our trade, they sought solely their own prosperity. The Anglo-American ambition of world hegemony is indeed a scourge of mankind and the root of the world's evils.” “As regards the situation in Europe, we are very glad that our ally, Germany, has still further solidified her national unity and, with conviction in modern times. As regards the situation in Europe, we are very glad that our ally, Germany, has still further solidified her national unity and, with conviction in sure victory, is advancing to crush the United States and Britain and to construct a new Europe. The War of Greater East Asia is truly a war to destroy evil and to make justice manifest. Ours is a righteous cause. Justice knows no enemy and we are fully convinced greater of our ultimate victory.” Meanwhile the allies held the Sextant Conference in Cairo between November 22-26th. This conference established China's status as one of the four world powers, kind of a cheeky jab at Japan and a means to sway Chiang Kai-Shek from surrendering. At the conference plans were made for an offensive in Burma codenamed Operation Champion with sub operations Tarzan and Buccaneer. Lord Mountbatten presented three plans of action. First Operation Tarzan called for 4 Indian divisions of the British 14th army group's 15th army to concentrate their forces in Chittagong and cross the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line in mid-January. The next year they would capture the Burmese coast in order to defend Chittagong and occupy Sittwe on the Burmese coast. Then three divisions of the 4th Army, would assemble at Imphal and move east with the objective of destroying Japanese lines of communication and advancing to Arak and various parts of Sidon in northern Burma. In March, the Chindits long-range infiltration force would be parachuted into Burma, behind the Japanese lines while the Chinese Expeditionary Force (CEF) in India would cross the Ho Kang Valley and advance eastward into Myitkyina. The Chindit special forces would then support the Chinese forces and occupy Bhamo in April, while the Yunnan Army would begin operations on March 15 and advance to Lashio in April to join the British forces at Lashio and Bhamo. In the Bay of Bengal, a massive amphibious offensive would also be launched, with 3,000 British and American long-range infiltration troops participating. Operation Musket would see the capture of Cape Sumatra and Operation Buccaneer was to be an amphibious operation to seize the Andaman Islands in order to cut off the Japanese supply lines. Chiang kai-shek expressed support for Tarzan, but once again insisted for it to be coupled with a massive naval operation in the Bay of Bengal. Though the British were reluctant to do this, US pressure eventually convinced them to land on the Andamans. The Chiefs of Staff then agreed to drive Japan out of Burma and reopen land links with China, with Stilwell conducting the ground attack in the north and Mountbatten commanding the amphibious landings in the south. The American delegation told Chiang kai-shek that for the following six months, only 8900 tons of supplies could be flown to China via the Hump route each month, even though Chiang continuously pushed for 10000 tons. In the end, President Roosevelt promised to increase the airlift supply to China to 12000 tons, and also promised that B-29 Superfortress bombers would bomb Japan from Chinese bases. By the way if you are interested in the beginnings of the bombing campaigns against the Japanese home islands, please check out the podcast I did with Dave from the cold war channel over on my youtube channel. It is actually B-29's operating in India and China that kicked it all off, and its not often talked about. Many of the resolutions and promises, would not be really implemented. Politically, many arrangements were also made for the postwar international situation. Roosevelt and Churchill supported the territorial claims of the Republic of China, such as returning Taiwan and Manchuria to the Republic of China and deciding to allow Korea to become independent "in due course". The Cairo Declaration, however, made no specific mention of the future of the Ryukyu Islands. China of course wanted them, but the US believed that the Ryukyu Islands could be left to Japan after the war if they were completely demilitarized. It was also agreed between China and the US that Lushun would be used as a public military port for the Americans after the war, and that Dalian would become a free port. Roosevelt also consulted Chiang kai-shek on the possibility of the abolition of the Japanese imperial system along with the emperor, Hirohito, but Chiang kai-shek mentioned that the cause of the war was the Japanese warlords, and that the issue could be left to the Japanese people to decide for themselves after the war. The Americans did not want France to return to Indochina and offered Chiang kai-shek control of French Indochina; but he publicly declined, as Chiang kai-shek strongly advocated the independence of Korea and wanted to assist in the independence of Vietnam. Roosevelt firmly supported Chiang kai-sheks efforts to end imperialism in East Asia. To end the conference off, on December 1, the Allies issued the Cairo Declaration, demanding Japan's unconditional surrender and the return of all occupied lands. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And so the drive to Sio was raging on, the Japanese were not being given a moment to breathe as they continued their withdrawal further north. Back over in Japan, Tojo was trying to win over China, but the allies were making sure to keep Chiang Kai-shek firmly in the fold in a 4d game of global chess.
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Last time we spoke about the defense of Finschhafen. Finschhafen was a enormous staging camp for the allies now. The Japanese could not sit idly by allowing such a strategic location to be in allied hands. General Katagiri launched a major counter offensive, kicked off with signal fires from Sattelberg. He sent a force of raiders to try and neutralise some heavy allied artillery, but it ended in failure. Having not neutralised their big guns, the rest of the counter offensive fell to pieces. The Japanese would officially report 422 killed, 662 wounded. For the Australians they had 228 casualties of which 49 were dead. With the counter offensive done with, the allies now would go back on the offensive. The next large target was going to be the stronghold of sattelberg, but the Japanese were not going to make it easy on the allies. But today we are going to be jumping into some new places. This episode is the invasion of the treasury islands Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. For quite some time now we have been focusing on the New Guinea campaign, such as the offensives against Finschhafen and the Ramu valley. Today we are going to enter a new phase of the Pacific War. With the incoming invasions of the Gilbert and Marshall islands, the Northern Solomons and Western New Britain, General Douglas MacArthur and Admirals Hasley and Nimitz were going to turn up the heat. Admiral Halsey had just seized Vila, Barakoma, Munda and Rendova, gaining their valuable airfields for the forces of General Twinings AirSols to utilise. Within the central Solomons, Bougainville was finally within range of allied land-based aircraft. Lae, Salamaua and Finschhafen were taken, thus Operation Cartwheel would begin a new phase. Back in July, plans were formed for General Vandegrifts 1st Marine Amphibious corps to seize airfields sites at Buin and Kahili, the important Japanese anchorage at Tonolei Harbor, and the Faisi and Ballale islands in the neighboring Shortlands. That same month, the 43rd and 37th divisions were involved in the New Georgia campaign. Of the 5 divisions remaining under his control, Admiral Halsey planned to use the fresh and unblooded 3rd Marine division and the Army's 25th division for the invasion. He sought to keep the 2nd marine division and 3rd new zealand division in training for the conquest of Rabaul. Yet things had changed. Because of the intense resistance on New Georgia, the 25th division had to be committed. Then the decision to strike Makin and Tarawa in the Gilbert islands removed the 2nd marine division from Hasley's south pacific area. These changes ultimately dictated he would need a substitution, and it was to be the 37th division, whom had suffered 1100 casualties on New Georgia already. Nevertheless the 37th was in better condition than the 25th. The 3rd marine divisions task went unchanged. Major General Allen Turnage's 3rd Marine division was going to spearhead the invasion of Bougainville, with a launch date set for September. On top of this Halsey had received some reports indicating the Japanese were heavily reinforcing the Shortland Islands. He decided to bypass them and hit the Treasury island and Choiseul. It is also possible Halsey sought to perform these actions hoping to lure out the Japanese fleet into a major engagement. The treasury islands and Choiseul were lightly garrisoned, but held airfields that could be turned against Bougainville. Meanwhile , General MacArthur was planning the next stepping stone towards the Philippines. His overall plan was to break the Bismarcks Barrier through a series of aggressive leaps along the New Guinea-Mindanao axis. New Guinea as we are all quite familiar with by now, is a logistical nightmare. Lush jungles, raging rivers, cold mountains, every time of geographical nightmare was present. Thus to traverse the western landmass of it only on land was not exactly desired. What MacArthur's logistical team sought was to secure the 50 mile expanse of sea lying between New Guinea and New Britain. With that in hand Admiral Barbey's 7th Amphibious force would be able to transport troops along the coast, a significantly easier method than having the poor boys battle through the jungle. Rooke Island split the sea into the Vitiaz Strait and the narrower Dampier Strait. General Wootten's 9th Australian division were currently fighting for control of Vitiaz, but there had been no effort to date to hit the Dampier. MacArthur decided to capture Kavieng and the Admiralty Islands, because they represented enemy aerial threats against his westwards push through New Guinea. Closing in on the end of the year he also planned to amphibious assault Cape Gloucester, the northwestern point of New Britain which commanded the Dampier Strait. In hindsight the wisdom of landing at Cape Gloucester seems rather dubious. It was not necessary to seize the point in order to make use of the Vitiaz or Dampier strait. The Japanese did not have big artillery on the western end of New Britain to command the channel, the islands infrastructure was largely undeveloped. The only way the Japanese could interfere with the allied use of either strait was by torpedo boats, something they did not have many of. There of course was aircraft based on New Britain as well, but that would be neutralised by Kenney's AirSols. MacArthur planned to have the AirSols hit Rabaul continuously; to seize the Green Islands, the Admiralty Islands and Kavieng. The Western New Britain operation was codenamed Operation Dexterity which would be sub divided into Operations Lazaretto and Backhander. There would be a staggered attack first hitting Gasmata performed by the 2nd battalion, 228th regiment. They would establish an air base in the southern coast of the island, this was operation Lazaretto. Operation Backhander would be the invasion of Cape Gloucester. Some of the landings could be carried out in November, but MacArthur chose to wait until the new airfields were established in the Markham and Ramu valleys as they would provide close air support for the amphibious operations. On September the 10th, Admiral Hasley sent staff to present his plan for the invasion to Bougainville to MacArthur's staff. Halsey would be surprised to find MacArthur opposed using all their aircraft to strike Rabaul before the invasion of western New Britain. MacArthur proposed instead to continue heavy airstrikes against all Japanese airfields on Bougainville throughout October. Then in late October, Halsey's forces could occupy the Treasury islands and possibly northern Choiseul. Northern Choiseul could provide radar coverage and PT boat bases. On the 1st of November, Halsey's forces could then begin landing on Bougainville to form a beachhead before constructing a new airfield to host the AirSols so they could hit Rabaul just in time to take some pressure off MacArthur's troops advancing in New Guinea and New Britain. Thus MacArthur was determined to make the main goal of the operation not the securance over the entirety of Bougainville, but just a portion of it where an aerodrome could be established then used to batter Rabaul. Halsey was presented two options for his landing site: there was Kieta Harbor sitting on the northeast coast and Empress Augusta Bay on the southwest coast. Kieta seemed the better location from which to launch air strikes against Rabaul. Kieta also held a protected harbor, requiring Halsey's forces to move up the longer outside passage to secure Choiseul first. Empress Augusta Bay was on an exposed side of the island during an approaching monsoon season. It was closer to Rabaul and would only require the securing of the Treasury islands first. After further reconnaissance there was indications airfields could be constructed midway up the west coast of Bougainville at Cape Torokina on Empress Augusta Bay. Halsey chose it for the landing site stating on September 22nd “it's Torokina. Now get on your horses!” The operation against Cape Torokina was codenamed Cherryblossom and its task was handed to the hero of Guadalcanal, General Vandegrift who formed the plans but it would not be he who lead the operation. Vandegrit was promoted to commandant of the Marines, the first serving marine to become a four star general, he had to depart for Washington. His replacement was Major General Charles Barrett the former commander of the 3rd Marine division. Barret was given command of the 1st Marine Amphibious corps and the responsibility over operation Cherryblossom. His mission statement read “land in the vicinity of Cape Torokina, seize and occupy and defend a beachhead including Torata Island and adjacent island— 3,750 yards west of Cape Torokina—allowing approximately 2,250 yards inland from the beach and 3,600 yards east of Cape Torokina. To prepare and continue the attack in coordination with the 37th Infantry on arrival.” However the mission statement was to be his last major contribution to the war. On October 8th Barrett accidentally fell from the third floor of the officers quarters at Noumea and suffered a cerebral haemorrhage. He soon died afterwards and was recorded as an accidental death, but there was heavy speculation it was in fact a suicide. Thus the job fell to Major General Roy Geiger, the director of the marine aviation corp in washington. For the naval aspect of the mission Hasley had to do with what he had on hand. He would not be receiving any significant naval reinforcements, because Admiral Nimitz feared that any vessels lent to the 3rd fleet would not be able to come back in time to help with the invasion of the Gilberts. What Halsey could count on was task force 38 commanded by Rear Admiral Frederick Sherman built around carrier Saratoga and later joined by the Princeton; Admiral Merrills task for 39 comprised of cruiser division 12 and destroyer division 23; and Task force 31 commanded by Admiral Wilkinson consisting of three destroyer squadrons, transports and covering ships. It would be Admiral Wilkinson who would bring over the 3rd marine division, the 1st brigade and 3rd New Zealand division to invade the Treasury islands. Rear Admiral George Fort would take the reigns of the first offensive and Wilkinson would looked over the Torokina landings. Wilkinson would have 12 Attack transports and Amphibious cargo ships for the landings, just enough to get every echelon with their equipment over. The 3rd Marine division was reinforced with the 3rd marine defence battalion, the 198th coast artillery, the 2nd provisional marine raider regiment and the 1st marine parachute regiment. After landing at Cape Torokina they would later be reinforced by General Beightlers 37th division. The 29th, 34th and 36th New Zealander battalions of the 8th brigade group led by Brigadier Robert Row would hit the Treasury islands and help establish long range radar stations and a landing craft staging area. There was a final last minute change to the overall plan made by Halsey. They decided not to attempt seizing northern Choiseul but to instead send a marine raiding party around 656-725 men of the US 2nd Parachute battalion led by Lt Colonel Victor Krulak there to persuade the Japanese to divert forces to Choiseul from southern Bougainville. To support the operation General Kenny's 5th air force would smash the airfields in Rabaul while the AirSols 489 aircraft would hit airfields in and around Bougainville. General Twinning tactics were to harass the Japanese every day, so he launched a total of 158 flights in October, comprising 3259 sorties and land and naval targets in Hahili, Kara, Ballale, Buka, Bonis and Choiseul. The result of this incredible air campaign was 5 Japanese airfields pulverized, 136 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed at the cost of 26 allied aircraft shot down. Meanwhile on October 12th, Kenney launched a raid using 349 aircraft smashing airstrips, shipping and supply dumps. The 6000-ton IJN transport Keisho Maru was sunk alongside two smaller craft. On the 18th 54 B-25's took off from Dobodura, but only caused minor damage. On October the 23rd, 24th and 25th daylight raids consisting of 45 B-242's, 62 B-25's and 61 B-24's respectively managed to shoot down 9 enemy planes, destroyed 25 aircraft on the ground and damaged another 27. On October 29th, he tossed a raid at Vunakanau's airdrome using 41 liberators covered by 75 P-38's and managed to destroy around 10 aircraft. The enemies attention was certainly diverted away from Rabaul. Now the Japanese knew an invasion of Bougainville was coming. They believed the main target of such an offensive would be first against the Shortlands or Kahili. General Kanda's 6th division was deployed to reinforce these places. His 1st battalion, 45th regiment was placed at Kieta, the rd battalion and 4th south sea garrison was sent to reinforce Bougainville while the rest were sent to the Shortland islands. Bougainville was given north/south/east/west sectors garrisoned by numerous forces under Kanda. Admiral Koga also launched Operation RO, a plan devised to strengthen Rabaul. Koga's intelligence indicated the Pacific Fleet was on a warpath, so he decided to take the entire combined fleet from Truk to Eniwetok, which Koga considered a good advance position where he could sortie and annihilate the enemy in a decisive naval battle. The combined fleet stayed a week in the uncomfortable and lonely lagoon until they departed having not found the allied pacific fleet. By October 24th the combined fleet travelled back to Truk while the aircrews of carriers Zuikaku, Shokaku and Zuiho reinforced Rabaul. 82 Zeros, 45 D3As, 40 B5Ns and 6 Yokosuka D4Y reconnaissance planes. 192 trained air crews in total would be in Rabaul by November 1st. They were just in time to intercept one of Kenney's raids consisting of 75 b-25's and 80 p-38s. The Japanese airmen claimed to have downed 9 B-25s, 10 P-38s at the cost of 20 aircraft and 3 small vessels. Koga alerted the 12th air fleet who were in Japan to prepare to head over to Rabaul, but instead of also sending the 8th fleet, he kept them back, still thinking a decisive naval battle would be on the menu soon in the central pacific. General Sakai's 17th division were transported to New Britain in late september. Their first echelon comprising of the 53rd regiment arrived on october 5th and immediately began to move west to reinforce Cape Gloucester and the 3rd battalion went to northern Bougainville. The remainder of the 17th division would arrive between November 5th and 12th, though the auxiliary cruiser Kurita Maru caring the 1st battalion, 81st regiment was sunk by the USS Grayson. 1087 men, most of the battalion, were lost. The invasion of the Treasuries codenamed Operation Goodtime. They would establish a staging area, an advanced naval base at Blanche Harbor and a radar station on the north coast of Mono Island. It was hoped the assault on the Treasuries would confused the Japanese as to where the major effort would actually be. At this time there was a short supply of assault forces throughout the Pacific and the Bougainville invasion was mere days away. Thus it was difficult to comprehend why an entire brigade would be used to subdue a tiny enemy garrison on one small island. It has been theorised that Halsey and Vandegrift were reluctant to use some untried New Zealand troops in the more ambitious undertaking, but were also under pressure from their Anzac allies to see some action. For whatever reason the Treasury island operation would be one of the few examples of Allied overkill during the mid Pacific War. The 8th Brigade had limited shipping available to them. They would have eight destroyer transports, eight LCIs, two LSTs, eight LCMs, three LCTs and two APCs, under the command of Admiral Fort who was using the USS Raton as his flagship. The 34th battalion was going to land on the north side of Stirling Island to secure a nearby airfield; the 29th and 36th battalions would land abreast near Falami Point on southern Mono and Major George Logan D company of the 34th, designated Logan force would land at the mouth of the Soanotalu River to establish a radar station with the help of 20 seabees. The USS Pringle and Philip would perform a bombardment to help. The operation was set into motion on October 27th when the convoy departed guadalcanal and the Russells. George Fort's destroyers approached Blanche Harbor during a storm and began their bombardment. The assault waves raced through the harbor in two columns. As was suspected the 34th met zero resistance, they immediately went to work sending out patrols to make certain if there were any Japanese on the island they would not get to surprise them. Mortars were set up on the nearby Watson island, cool theres an island bearing my name to support the landings on Mono. The landings on Mono met very little resistance, basically just a bunch of surprised Japanese naval troops who offered some half hearted gunfire before withdrawing. The New Zealanders went to work establishing a perimeter as the Japanese began opening fire using mortars which managed to knock out two LST's killing 2 and wounding 30 men. Interesting to note this was the first amphibious assault launched by Kiwi's since the horrible Gallipoli campaign of 1916 and it was the second combat operation undertaken by Kiwi's during the Pacific War. The real resistance would come in the form of a air raid consisting of 25 vals who bombed the beachhead and support ships. The destroyers Cony took two hits; eight crewmen were killed and ten wounded. An allied fighter patrol managed to shoot down 12 vals during the raid. To their north, the Logan force faced no difficult landing at the mouth of the Soanotalu river. They quickly formed a 150 yard perimeter and began working on the radar station. By the end of the day, all but one LST had successfully unloaded and cleared Blanche harbor, however during the night the New Zealanders tossed back numerous counter attacks, particular around the Saveke river. By the 28th the Japanese survivors were retreating north in the hope of escaping to Bougainville, but along the way they ran into the Logan Force. On October 29th during the late afternoon, 20 Japanese attacked the western part of the Logan Forces perimeter. They were easily beaten off with mortars and rifle fire, leaving 5 dead Japanese behind. The next day saw some intermittent firing against concealed Japanese. Scouts eventually figured out there was a larger number of Japanese to the west of the perimeter, but the area between Soanotalu and Malasi was clear of the enemy. November began with the rest of the brigade coming over. The radar station was already up and running and the Logan Force had built themselves a small blockhouse near the landing barge. That said blockhouse immediately became the objective of the Japanese, since it represented the only hope of them escaping the island. As Brigadier Row's men began to occupy the central and northern parts of Mono, the Japanese began to infiltrate the Logan Forces perimeter. On the night of November 1st, the main breech was made across the News Zealanders line. A ton of Japanese had infiltrated the lines and managed to cut telephone wires from the blockhouse to the company HQ. Soon after this was accomplished a concerted attack was made against the blockhouse. 6 New Zealanders and 3 Americans defended it. They had automatic weapons, some 50 and 30 cal machine guns, but they were soon put out of action by the attacking Japanese who could have numbered between 70-100 men. The fight for the blockhouse would continue until dawn, with the surviving defenders beating off numerous attacks, mainly by tossing grenades. Captain Kirk, Sergeant DD Hannafin were both killed during the fight. Command of the blockhouse then fell to a cook of D Company, Private J.E Smith. By daybreak the Japanese finally were beaten off as the 3 remaining survivors were all wounded. 26 Japanese had been killed trying to overrun the blockhouse and seize the landing craft. Elsewhere across the perimeter the Japanese attacked throughout the night seeing another 15 dead Japanese in the western section and 9 in the east. It was to be there best chance at taking the blockhouse, for the next few days their attacks were much smaller and by November 4th, New Zealander patrols were fanning out and killing or capturing stragglers. The last significant action on Mono would be on November 6th when a dozen Japanese were routed from a cave during a two hour firefight east of Soanatalu. Operation Goodtime resulted in the annihilation of a Japanese garrison roughly 200 men strong, but it came at a cost. 40 New Zealanders and 12 Americans were killed with 174 wounded. The allies got their supply bases and radar station. Over on Choiseul, Operation Blissful was about to kick off. In an attempt to make the Japanese believe the Shortland islands were the target for their offensive, General Vandegrift tossed Lt Colonel Victor Krulaks 2nd Parachute battalion, roughly 656 men at a beach near the village of Voza. On October 27th the men and their equipment were loaded onto 8 LCMS and during the night the paratroopers were transferred over to four destroyer transports, the Kilty, Ward, Crosby and McKean, the same ships that had just been used to transport the New Zealanders for Operation Goodtime. Forts destroyers provided escort as the Paramarine landed at Voza shortly after midnight without any resistance. During the morning of the 28th they began unloading supplies from landing crafts that had been concealed on a smaller island offshore. Once landed they carried them up a narrow trail leading from the beach a mile northwest of Voza upon some high ground which would be their first base camp. Nearly a hundred friendly natives helped the marines carry the equipment up the beach and they also helped guide the men. Allied radio broadcasting finally alerted the Japanese to the imminent danger to southern Bougainville as Krulaks men began establishing their perimeter. The morning of the 29th brought an enemy strafing attack upon them and the native guides reported to Krulak that there was a barge staging base at Sangigai, the main Japanese position on Choiseul bay, garrisoned by around 150 men. Krulak decided that was to be the first objective, he sent out patrols going north and south. In the north Lt Averill with the help of native guides discover considerable evidence of the Japanese presence, abandoned equipment and rations, but no Japanese. In the south two patrols scouted the Japanese base near Sangigai. Krulak led one of the patrols personally and managed to surprise some Japanese who were unloading a barge. They killed 7 Japanese and sunk the barge before pulling out. The other patrol group ran into a Japanese platoon and got into a skirmish seeing another 7 dead Japanese. Thus Krulak got his confirmation there indeed was a Japanese base at Sangigai. Early on the 30th, Krulak requested an air strike at it arrived at 6am. 12 Avengers with 26 fighter escorts hit Sangigai. Unfortunately some of the planes mistook the marines at Voza for the enemy and strafed them as well. No marines were killed but one of their boats was sunk, that Krulak had planned to use. As a result of the boat getting sunk, Companies E and 5 departed Voza overland to hit Sangigai. A Japanese outpost along the Vagara river opened fire on the paratroopers, but was easily overwhelmed. Krulak then divided his forces to perform a two pronged assault. Company E led by Captain Robert Manchester would advance along the coastline to hit the Japanese from the north, while Krulak with Company F would move inland to hit them from the rear. Company E quickly advanced along the coast and began shelling the town with mortars and rockets during the afternoon, only to find out it was abandoned. The Japanese had taken up a new position on some high grounder in the interior. So the paramarines began destroying and looting the village. Meanwhile company F were advancing through rough terrain to try and secure some high ground near Sangigai where the retreating Japanese were just passing through. The Japanese literally walked right into F company and a hour long fight broke out. The Japanese outnumbered F company and as Krulak would later report “the outcome appeared to be in question, until the Japs destroyed their chances by an uncoordinated banzai charge which was badly cut up by our machine guns. Seventy-two Japs were killed and an undetermined number wounded. Marine losses were 6 killed, 1 missing and 12 wounded." The marines had 6 deaths, 12 wounded and one man missing. Krulak was wounded as well as F companies commander Spencer Pratt. The Japanese suffered a devastating 72 casualties Back over at E company after plundering the village they came across some documents and Krulak reported "The one that fascinated me, it was a chart that portrayed the minefields around southern Bougainville. When I reported this, the night after the Sangigai attack, I saw my first flash message. I had never seen one before. It came back and said, "Transmit at once the coordinates of the limits of the minefields and all channels as shown going through it." So we laboriously encoded the critical locations and sent them off. To an armada going into that area this is not incidental information. This is necessary information. Halsey in true Halsey fashion was not satisfied to know where the minefields were; he, before the Torokina landings, sent in a minelayer there and dropped mines in the entrance ways to those channels and they got two Japanese ships.” E company then retired to the Vagara river and was later evacuated by boat back to the Voza area. F company followed suite but was delayed by the heavy engagement they had. The men stayed to bury their dead. The friendly natives reported a Japanese concentration to the north near the Warrior River, so Krulak sent a strong patrol up by boat to check it out. On November 1, the large patrol of 87 paratroopers from Company G, led by Major Warner Bigger, headed north by landing craft towards Nukiki with orders "destroy the southern outposts of CHOISEUL BAY, and if possible to shell the Jap supply depot on GUPPY ISLAND." Major Bigger began an overland march along the eastern bank of the river and after crossing the warrior, their native guides became lost so they all had to bivouac for the night. In the early morning of November 2nd, Biggers men found themselves surrounded by Japanese who began infiltrating their perimeter from the rear. Bigger had the men continue north along the beach where the surprise attacked a small enemy outpost of 4 men. They managed to kill 3 of 4, but the last man ran away, thus the element of surprise was gone. Bigger knew the jig was up he could not hope to attack the main objective so instead he ordered the men to go shell Guppy island. G Company setup some 60mm mortars in the water and fired 143 rounds at the island setting up two large fires, one looked to have hit a fuel dump. The Japanese were taken by surprise there and only offered resistance in the form of some poorly directed machine gun bursts. On the way back G company had to fight their way through because of the infiltrators. Krulak was notified of the situation and alerted a PT boat base at Vella Lavella. Lt Arthur Berndtson had 5 PT boats under his command there, 2 were already assigned to other missions, another was under repair. PT 59 only had ⅓ tanks worth of fuel, but her commander, Lt John F Kennedy, yes he is back in action, agreed to rescue the boys. Kennedy believed he had enough fuel to get to Choiseul and another boat could tow them back to base. Despite overheating the engines, at around 9:30 PT 59 escorted a small convoy to Voza and Bigger's men were off loaded. The PT-59 ran out of fuel on the return trip down the slot and was towed back to Lambu Lambu Cove. By this point the landings at Cape Torokina had been carried out, so a diversion was not really needed anymore. Furthermore the Japanese were moving in on the base camp from all directions. On the night of November 3rd, just in the nick of time, 3 LCIs from Vella Lavella arrived to successfully load Krulaks paratroopers and got them out of there before dawn of the 4th. The Paratroopers had been outnumbered 6-1. They managed to kill an estimated 143 Japanese, destroyed a major staging base at Sangigai, sunk two barges and destroyed a considerable amount of enemy fuel and supplies on Guppy island. The cost was 13 dead and 13 wounded. Krulaks after action report mentioned evidence that the Japanese had sent reinforcements from the Shortland islands to counter the Choiseul operation. On November 1st, the day of the Cape Torokina landings, the Japanese had sent a large bomer force south to Choiseul hunting a reported Task Force. The Japanese found nothing, and by the time they diverted back to Empress Augusta Bay, the landings were done, American fighters were ready to deal with them. It seems the Japanese had been greatly confused from all the activity around Bougainville, particularly from many intercepted messages. Its hard to say how successful the Choiseul raid actually was. It's possible the Japanese fell for the diversion, but no one really knows. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The diversionary raids may or may not have had an effect on the landings at Cape Torokina. Regardless the multiple operations were all successful and the Japanese seemed none the wiser. Now the stranglehold over Bougainville would begin.
Last time we spoke about operation Se-Go and the continued drive on Finschhafen. The evacuation of Kolombangara, designated operation Se-Go showcased how the Japanese were becoming experts at large scale evacuations. Nearly 10,000 men were safely evacuated from Kolombangara at the cost of some barges. Then in New Guinea, the Allies became aware the taking of Finschhafen was not going to be a cake walk. In fact Wootten sent word to the other commanders that he believed he was facing the full 20th division at Finschhafen. The other commanders were sending their men through the Ramu and Markham valleys finding rearguards everywhere they looked. Rivers and ridges were being taken at a quick pace and Finschhafen was technically seized, but certainly not secured. Now the allies would have to attack the stronghold of Sattelberg. And Today we are going to see some action upon land and sea. This episode is the naval battle of Vella Lavella Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The Japanese had accomplished another astounding evacuation, managing to pull out nearly 10,000 men from the marooned and isolated Kolombangara. They managed this with limited craft and boldly under the nose of the enemy who enjoyed superiority over land, air and sea. Yet as you can imagine this certainly showcases how the tide of the war in the south pacific had decisively turned. Japanese naval operations were becoming increasingly concerned with evacuating troops as their positions grew hopeless. The campaign for the central solomons was falling apart for Japan, the invasion of Bougainville was imminent. However because of the evacuation of Kolombangara, one of its results would be the establishment of a staging base for barges and landing craft over at Horaniu, the northeast shore of Vella Lavella. Now in last episode we spoke about the actions of the Tsuruya unit who were busy delaying Brigadier Potter's New Zealander forces. The Japanese had their backs against the wall at Marquana Bay, holding by just a threat. They had little food or ammunition left with no possibility of re-supply or reinforcements. Despite insufficient resources, Admiral Samejima was determined to rescue the doomed Tsuruya unit. Samejima managed to convince Admiral Kusaka to carry out yet another evacuation, this time of Vella Lavella, slated for the night of October 6th. Before dawn on the 6th, Admiral Ijuin departed Rabaul with 9 destroyers divided into three groups. The first group led by Admiral Ijuin consisted of the Akigumo, Isokaze, Kazagumo and Yugumo. The 2nd group led by Captain Kanaoka Kunizo was aboard Fumizuki accompanied by Yunagi and Matsukaze and a transport unit of 6 barges, 30 folding boats and the transport Usaka Maru. The third group was led by Captain Hara Tameichi aboard the Shigure with Samidare as backup. A fourth group led by Commander Nakayama Shigoroku consisting of 5 subchasers, 3 vedettes and a barge would also depart Buin to help. Ijuin was to be the strike unit, Kanaoka the transport unit and Hara the Guard unit. Ijuin planned to have Kanaoka and Hara standing off Marquana Bay supported by the incoming 4th unit led by Shigoroku. Further support would be given in the form of 8 floatplanes that would try to bomb Potter's men with 20 zeros providing air cover. During the morning of the 6th, Admiral Wilkinson received reports the Japanese might be attempting an evacuation of Choiseul. At that time his 10th echelon was underway transporting the IMAC advance base to Vella Lavella, leaving the only available force Captain Frank Walker with destroyers Selfridge, Chevalier and O'Bannon. Walker was just returning from a run up the slot passing by the Russells on his way home. Wilkinson sent word to Walker to pay specific attention to the coast of Choiseul as he passed around. During that afternoon, Admiral Halsey sent an alert to Wilkinson that the Tokyo Express was definitely about to make a run, but it was not to Choisuel, instead it was to Marquana bay. Wilkinson dispatched 3 destroyers from the 10th echelon, Ralph Talbot, Taylor and LaVallete with Commander Harold Larson to reinforce Walker around Sauka point to try and intercept the Japanese. Shortly after sending the orders, Walk received further intelligence. At 7:30pm he learnt that an unknown number of destroyers, 3 torpedo boats and 6 subchasers were enroute, expected to be in the area by 10:30 with an embarkation time of 11:30. At 9:02 he was told that possibly 9 destroyers were coming. A few minutes later another report passed on by some B-25's attacking buin stated they spotted 4 IJN destroyers or possibly Jintsu-class cruisers. Thus pretty uncertain of what was actually out there, Walker's crews were warned to expect the worse and they would sound General Quarters by 7pm. 40 minutes later the 938th seaplanes began harassing them. At 9:50 Walker announced over the TBS “When we round the corner close the gap and be ready for anything. I want to get the fish off without guns if possible.” Wilkinson's reinforcements only made it to the rendezvous point by 11:40, leading Walker to have to start the battle alone. Since the days of John Paul Jones, American naval lore had honored and applauded commanders who unleashed bold attacks on superior enemy forces, but in this case Walker would prove to be too rash. Walker took his force around the north coast of Vella Lavella that night and began scouting the area finding no sign of the enemy. Meanwhile Ijuins strike force followed by Hara and Kanaoka proceeded to their staging point arrived at 10pm. Minutes later a scout plan reported 4 cruisers and 3 destroyers northeast of Vella Lavella on a western course. The plane most certainly saw the Selfridge, Chevalier and O'Bannon coming up the slot but mistook them as cruisers. Ijuin ordered Konaoka to take his group west towards the Shortlands while he and Hara turned back to meet the enemy. However Hara's force were a bit further west and having difficulty due to mist causing lack of visibility. at 10:30 the Americans made their first radar contact of the enemy and 5 minutes later lookouts aboard the Kazagumo sighted the Americans to their south. Consequently, Ijuin had just turned to port heading southwest to cross Walker's bows, but he misjudged the distance and instead opened the range. Walker responded by increasing his forces speed to 30 knots to try and head off the enemy. Upon seeing this, Ijuin changed his course at 10:45 to south-southeast to close the range, then at 10:48 ordered a 45 degree turn south. These maneuvers actually worked to the Americans advantage, and upon seeing he was presenting an easier target, Ijuin ordered another simultaneous turn to port which staggered his ships in line abreast on a course opposite and nearly parallel to Walker with their range rapidly closing. The maneuvering blunder allowed the Americans to pull up to the nearest group of 4 IJN destroyers and launch a half salvo of torpedoes. Most of the torpedoes were fired at the Yagumo which was being mistaken as a possible cruiser. Commander Osako Higashi aboard the Yagumo ordered 8 torpedoes to be launched before the guns began to fire. The Americans opened fire with their guns after the torpedoes turning Yagumo into a burning wreck quickly. Ijuin tried to course correct again going south then west. But by this point, Hara had just made it to the battle at 11:01 the Americans saw his forces to their southwest and closed in to engage. This put Hara ahead and parallel to Walker giving the Americans the perfect position to launch another salvo of torpedoes. At the same time one of Yagumo's torpedoes hit Chevalier detonating her No 2 Gun Magazine, blowing the ship in two. Her brigade and aft section swung across O'Bannon's path forcing O'Bannon to ram into her starboard engine room. The force of the collision was mitigated by Commander Donald MacDonald who ordered an emergency full speed astern when he saw the explosion on Chevalier. Two minutes later a torpedo, most likely fired from Chevalier, hit Yagumo. At 11:06, one of Hara's destroyers landed a torpedo hit on the Selfridge, shearing off her bow and wrecking everything from the bridge forward. In just 5 minutes, 104 American sailors were dead and 66 were wounded. Both sides continued the brawl, at 11:17 Ijuin still taking a westward course, ordered torpedoes to be fired at what he thought were cruisers, probably the O'Bannon and Chevalier. He received a claim that one was sunk, so he decided to break off the battle and head for home. Meanwhile Geoerge Peckham aboard the Selfridge believed he had been hit by torpedo boats and wildly ordered men to track where they might be. It was an age old naval case of both sides fighting ghosts ships basically. Meanwhile Commander Nakayama's group began to approach Marquana bay from the north and Wilkinsons reinforcements group led by Larson were arriving from the south as well. At 10:55 Larson had received ordered from Walker to execute “William” which was the codename for torpedoes and “dog” was naval gunfire. Larsons group passed Yagumo who was undergoing her death throes and by 11:40 the group was in the battle area. Larson could not make out a contact on enemy ships and by midnight simply headed for Marquana bay, seeing nothing but crippled ships. Chevalier was beyond saving so she was scuttled, Selfridge was able to be repaired by 3:15am and would make a slow but safe journey home. Walker notified COMAIRSOLS they needed air cover as Nakayama's group passed east of the battle area but did not engage. Japanese barges began to load men as the 938ht floatplane harassed the New Zealanders artillery. Many New Zealanders reported hearing naval gunfire and what sounded like barges scraping against reefs. By 3:10am, Nakayama left for Buin with all 589 men of the Tsuruya unit. The Americans captured 74 survivors of the Yagumo who were marooned at Biloa, while 27 others would make their way to Buin using motorized whaleboats. Ijuin had lost 179 men dead with 74 captured. On October 8th, Potter's men determined the Japanese were indeed gone so they began occupying Marquana bay. Thus ended the battle of Vella Lavella. The 1st battalion, 27th regiment landed at Ringi Cover on southern Kolombangara on October 6th finding 49 abandoned artillery pieces and some scattered Japanese who had been left behind. By October 15th Admiral Hasley declared operation Toenails terminated. Two days prior the Japanese had likewise terminated operation Se-go. Admiral Samejima would be forced to carry the blame for the loss of the central solomons. He went on the record to say this “The relations between the Army and Navy units in this area were extremely harmonious and satisfactory, and the foregoing is due to the character and judgment of Maj-Gen. Sasaki and Rear Admiral Ōta. However, because of my inexperience in commanding land operations, there were times when I failed to dispatch appropriate orders to Maj-Gen. Sasaki in conducting our operations. And the fact that there is evidence that I left the operations up to the arbitrary decisions of Maj-Gen. Sasaki to some degree clearly reveals the folly of placing a Naval Commander like me in charge of land operations involving Army and Navy units.” In the end his forces managed to hold back the enemy for nearly two months and he had pulled off a pretty incredible evacuation. Operation Toenails was a success for the allies managing to secure 4 new airbases at Munda, Segi, Ondonga and Barakoma. These acquisitions would have a huge impact on future campaigns against Bougainville and Rabaul. Admiral Halsey would receive some criticism for underestimating both the terrain and enemy during operation Toenails. Major General Harmon went on the record to say “Munda is a tough nut –much tougher in terrain, organization of the ground and determination of the Jap than we had thought,. The Japanese agreed; an intelligence report dated 11 August stated that the “reasons for the slow advance of the enemy in Munda, etc, are due to the courage of our forces and the difficult fighting in the jungle.” The allies learned some important lessons such as the necessity of adequate medial support; the implementation of effective evacuation procedures; close air support for ground troops; the effectiveness of naval gunfire support or lack thereof it; and the 3 most effective weapons against the Japanese; the 155mm gun, tanks and dive bombers. These 3 weapons would be put into effect on Bougainville. The central solomons campaign saw 995 US Army, 192 marine and 500 US navy death with 4407 wounded. The New Zealanders and Fijians received 200 casualties. For the Japanese it was estimated 4000 died with 4500 wounded. Now we need to head over to New Guinea. General Vasey's men were preparing for an assault against Dumpu, while being harassed by the infilitration specialists of the Saito Unit. The Saito units had performed infilitrations against Dakisaria and Marawasa. On October 2nd, while the bulk of the 21st and 25th brigades were establishing bridgeheads to cross the Gusap and Tunkaat river. The 2/7th independent company at this time were trying to cross the Ramu into Kaigulin where a Japanese outpost was. The outpost was guarded by the Saito unit, 80 men of the 10th company, 78th regiment supported by the 3rd company. The Saito unit gave them hell, forcing the commandos to cross the Ramu elsewhere trying to hook around their right flank. They managed to pull the flanking maneuver and in the battle killed 6 Japanese. Interestingly Lt R.D Watts decapitated a Japanese using a katana he had acquired in a previous battle, a case of the turntables. I am now realizing when I make this dumb joke many of you might not have watched the office, I must sound even dumber than I am. The following day, Brigadier Dougherty ordered his men to only patrol as he was waiting for Brigadier Eather's forces to assemble in the Bumbum area. Yes, there is a place called Bumbum, I thought Nuk Nuk would be my favorite New Guinea area, I was wrong. On the morning of October 4th, Dougherty ordered the 2/14th towards Wampun and the 2/16th to capture Dumpu. By 2pm, Captain C.L McInnes lead a company of the 2/14th to find Wampun deserted which was expected. However the men had marched all day in the heat, without any water. McInnes company was sent to Karam to search for water. Another company followed McInnes company soon after and a mile or so out they came across a banana plantation. They saw some troops cutting down banana leaves and assumed it was McInnes men, however these were actually Japanese of the Saito Unit. The forward patrol were carelessly advancing towards the banana plantation when bursts of machine gun and rifle fire hit Colonel Honner and Sergeant Pryor. Pyror wounded in his chin and chest tried to drag his commanding officer back, but Honnor had taken a shot to the leg and could only crawl. Honnor began screaming to his men to figure out the position of the enemy and this led Private Bennet to lead a small party to do so. The Japanese continued to fire upon them and Honnor was hit in his hand to add to his misery. Luckily for them the 2/14th sent a rescue party to extricate Honnor. Honnor was moved to safety by 5pm as Colonel O'Day prepared to attack the Japanese at the banana planation. At 6pm O'day led two platoons to rush their position where they killed 11 troops and a Japanese officers, driving the rest to flee into the jungle. The next morning they would also kill a few stragglers, the action cost 7 australian lives of the 2/14th while killing an estimated 26 Japanese and taking a single prisoner. Meanwhile the 2/16th had successfully crossed the Surinam River without facing any opposition. They sent a platoon ahead led by Lt Scott to check out Dumpu. At 4:40pm he reported back that it seemed Dumpu was still occupied. Major Symington led forward a company to prepare to attack Dumpu, but when they reached its outskirts they could visibly see Japanese fleeing the area. Thus Dougherty's men grabbed Dumpu without a fight. General Vasey believed 78th regiment had failed to relieve pressure on the retreating 51st division, but unbeknownst to him, General Nakano's men were already marching through the formidable Saruwaged range. The range had an altitude of 3000 meters where temperatures fell below 10 degrees. Anyone who tried to start a fire from the moss-covered wood would find it unbelievably difficult. Many men reported heating gunpowder from rifles to start fires. A lot of rifles were burnt away because of this. Their rations ran out quickly, leading to starving men turning upon the dead….and even the living. Private Kitamoto Masamich recalled “seeing three soldiers had pinned a trooper to the ground while one of them stabbed him in the heart with his bayonet. I watched shocked as the remaining three soldiers cut slices of the dead trooper's thigh and began to devour the human flesh. I shouted at them as flies swarmed about their faces… They had become mad with hunger and fatigue.' Kitamoto covered the corpse and moved on. Cannibalism reared its ugly head often for the Japanese, particularly in some parts of Burma by late 1945. Until now the 7th division was enjoying a pretty uninterrupted advance to Dumpu. The Benabena was pretty secure as well, but General Nakai was establishing strong defensive positions along the Kankirei saddle. This would soon turn the campaign in the Ramu valley and Finisterre range into a gritty holding operation. In the meantime, the allies were being directed towards the FInschhafen campaign, with General Herring ordering Vasey to hold the Dumpu-Marawasa area. There he was to establish a new landing strip at Dumpu and to not make any large advances. Only the 2/27th battalion of Lt Colonel John Bishop would be allowed to advance into the Finisterre foothills. Dougherty hoped the 2/27th might reach Kumbarum within the Finisterre foothills and during a torrential rainstorm they overran the area with no opposition. Bishops men patrolled around and found the enemy was occupying the key feature guarding the exists of the Faria and Uria rivers from some mountains northwest of Kumbarum. Under the cover of rain, Lt King took 8 men to scramble up the feature which panicked the Japanese there causing them to flee without a fight. Thus it was named King's Hill and would become an important tactical position and observation post. Apparently Kings men had come up just when two battalions were changing their troops dispositions, and a platoon guarding King's Hill had retired before even seeing the allied forces. Regardless a company was sent to the Boganon mountain area, that rose some 41000 feet. The torrential rain caused a ton of delays for the construction of the new landing strip. In the meantime the 21st brigade patrolled as much as they could. The 2/16th and 2/14th patrolled west of the Mosia river finding no enemy. On the 6th, the 25th brigade sent patrols in all directions north of the Ramu Valley. They found signs of the enemy recently leaving the Boparimpum area; the same at Koram. Just a bit north of Koram, it looked like there was a Japanese outpost on some high ground. Patrols took care near this outpost as it was expected Japanese snipers were there, but when further prodded it seemed abandoned. The 2/2nd independent company patrolled the area of Sepu towards the Waimeriba crossing of the Ramu finding only signs the enemy had recently vacated the area. A small patrol skirmished with the enemy between Saus and Usini. Kesawai would be found unoccupied on the 5th. Overall it was concluded the Japanese had abandoned the Ramu Valley entirely. On the 6th, Generals Vasey and Wootten received a signal that the 2/2nd, 2/4th, 2/6th and 2/7th independent companies would become cavalry commando squadrons which did not sit well with the experienced commandos. Since the beginning of 1943, the term “commando” had been increasingly used to describe a member of an independent company. The term was quite alien to the Australian Army, and the tasks undertaken by independent companies since the beginning of the pacific war were not at all like that of what British commandos did. In the short space of two years, the independent companies had built up a proud tradition and the men regarded the term “independent company” as a much better description of what they did than the terms “cavalry” or “commando” and thus resented the change of title. The next day, Dougherty's 2/16th battalion occupied Bebei and the 2/27th battalion cautiously investigated the upper reaches of the Uria and Faria river valleys. When the men went past the Faria river towards some high ground they suddenly came across a party of 8 Japanese. A fight broke out as they killed 3 of the 8 Japanese receiving no casualties themselves. The Japanese looked to be withdrawing and the Australians dug in for the night in a place designated Guy's Post atop Buff's Knoll. These prodding actions prompted Nakai to order the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment to launch a counterattack against Buff's Knoll. An hour after midnight during a particularly rainy night, a Japanese platoon charged up the knoll. The first attack lasted about half and hour before petering out. The Australian company consolidated around Guy's Post established a defensive perimeter through out the night. However the night attack ultimately failed for the Japanese as they were not familiar with the terrain and the heavy rain made a mess of their advance. On the morning of October 8th, the Japanese tried to push again while the 2/27th consolidated their position in the Faria area. The Japanese barely budged the Australians and on October 9th, Colonel Bishop ordered the company to advance forward astride the main Japanese route going east towards the Kankiryo saddle. The man at Guy's Post followed them an hour or so behind as they skirmished with Japanese towards Trevors ridge and John's knoll. They would kill roughly 11 Japanese as they occupied both Trevors ridge and Johns knoll. Yet this is all for today on New Guinea as we are going to travel back to the CBI theater who we have not talked about in some time. Going way back to 1942, the Japanese empire had been at its zenith forcing the allies to come up with some special operations such as the Chindits. Our old onion necklace wearing friend Brigadier Wingate was running that show, but General Blamey also created his “inter-allied Services Department” known as the ISD. They were a military intelligence unit formed around several British special operations officers who had escaped Singapore before it hell. Inside the ISD later named the Services Reconnaissance Department, a raiding/commando unit was formed called the Z special unit. They were primarily Australian, but also held some British, Dutch, New Zealander, Timorese and Indonesian members. After escaping places like Singapore, and Sumatra, British Captain Ivan Lyon joined the units and became one of their leaders. He devised a plan to attack Japanese shipping in Singapore Harbor. His plan designated Operation Jaywick, called for traversing to the harbor in a vessel disguised as an Asian fishing boat. Then they were to use folboats or folding canoes to get over to enemy ships and attach limpet mines to them. Lyon was promoted to Major and began rigorous training 17th volunteers at Camp X, a clifftop overlooking Refuge Bay to the north of Sydney. The men worked for weeks digging, breaking rock and clearing scrub around the campsite and parade ground, which worked as prelude to the long, and progressively longer days they would spent canoeing. There were plenty of route marches across rocky hills which Lyon said “consisted of point-to-point walking or scrambling, compass work, stalking and attacks'. The men were tested on elementary navigation, chart reading, tide tables, visual signaling with semaphore and morse and the use of prismatic compasses on land and sea. They trained using a variety of weapons such as Owen sub machine guns, Brens, Lewis guns, all with the view to shoot down enemy aircraft. The practiced unarmed combat, grenade tossing, limpet mining and gelignite. They also received numerous lectures on ship engines. By early 1943, the 17 men had been reduced to 10. They were then given a captured Japanese coastal fish carrier named the Krait which was powered by a Deutz four cylinder engine, had a beam of 11 feet and a range of 8000 miles with a max speed of 6.5 knots. They modified the vessel to increase her storage capacity. On August 4th, the Krait departed Cairns en route to the submarine base at Exmouth Gulf on the northwest corner of Australia. On September 2nd, Lyon's commandos began their long and dangerous voyage sailing through the Lombok strait to Singapore. None of the men knew about the plan prior to the attack nor their destination. It was on the third day that Lyon gathered the men to disclose the truth. ‘He said, “Righto, do you know where we're going?”'Some of the men said they believed it was Surabaya in East Java. After Lyon revealed their destination, Moss Berryman recalled ‘They couldn't believe it when they were told they were going to Singapore “to blow up a few ships”'Lyon could see one or two of the men were stunned at the thought of going so deep inside enemy territory. Jones recalled ‘Nobody expected to be going that far and there was sort of talk about how dangerous it was,'. Lyon reassured the men that wasn't the case. ‘This is not a dangerous trip, it's an experience.' But for anyone who didn't fancy it, Lyon said he understood and he would ‘drop you off at the first island we come to and if you're there when we come back we'll pick you up'. It was a smart psychological play as he knew on one would dare lose face in front of his mates. Lyon stared at their faces and they returned his gaze. No one moved. They were all fully committed. Their safety depending on maintaining the disguise of a local fishing boat, so the raiders stained their skin brown with dye to appear more Asiatic, I guess its sort of like the prime minister of my country on Halloween. Cramped on the Krait, the commandos reached the Java sea and passed the south west corner or Borneo getting 50 miles off her coast by September 14th. The enemy's high activity in the area forced Lyon to detour towards Panjang island with the intention of making their way to Durian island. Yet when they approached Durian island they spotted a observation post so they turned back to Panjang which lies approximately 25 miles south of Singapore. On september 20th, 6 men on 3 canoes carrying 9 limpet mines each departed the Krait enroute to Singapore harbor. The raiders passed through Bulan and the Batam islands on september 22nd, reaching Donas island the next day. On the 24th Lyon sighted 13 sizable ships in the harbor, so he told the men they would be hitting them that night. Lyon distributed cyanide pills to all the men and told them ‘I leave it up to yourselves to decide what you want to do. But I can tell you now that if you get caught you won't have a very good time of it. They're not known for being gentlemen, the Japanese. Don't delude yourselves in thinking you are tough enough to resist interrogation. You could be tortured enough to give away the whole story. You may not be able to do anything about it. Above all, they had to think of their mates on the Krait. If they fell into enemy hands, the Japanese would want to know how we arrived in Singapore' The men rowed through the capricious tide, but it soon forced them back towards Dongas, instead they moved to Suber island the next day. On the night of september 26th, Lyon's raiders departed again, Canoe 1 held Lyon and Huston; Canoe 2 Davidson and falls and Canoe 3 Page and jones. Canoe 2 would hit the north shipping in Keppel Harbor while 1 and 3 would hit examination anchorage and the wharf at Pulau Bukon. Canoe 2 had the strongest men and was given the additional task of returning to Pompong to rendezvous with the Krait Canoe 2 steered through an anchored ketch on the edge of the main channel, continuing between the islands of Biakang Mati and Tekukor. They arrived to Keppel Harbor and set their sights on a 6000 ton cargo ship sitting low in the water, indicating she had a full load. The found a second target, also a 6000 ton cargo vessel and a third ship of similar proportions, though the last looked not fully loaded. At 1:15am they attached the last of their 9 limpet mines, 3 per ship and made their escape towards Panjang. The other two canoes had a much easier paddle from Subar. The tide was running east to west, allowing them to go with ease to their target. The paddled together until 9:30 when they separated. At Pulau Bukom an older freighter was mined amidship and around the engine rooms. Then they spotted a modern freighter with engines after and 3 sets of goalpost masts and another 6000 ton old freighter. Over in Examination Anchorage nothing suitable was found, so the raiders mined a tanker even though it was probably impossible to sink with mines. All 4 ships were mined, the men ate some chocolate rations and made their escape towards Dongas. The ships combined comprised around 39000 tons between them. On the way back, the exhausted commandos heard the distant explosions and the chaos that erupted in Singapore. When dawn broke, in Examination anchorage one ship was partially submerged, while two more would sink and 3 were heavily damaged including the tanker Shosei Mary. Canoe 2 and 3 waited until the commotion died down before returning to Panjang, reuniting with everyone aboard the Krait by October 2nd. Their return back to Australia was relatively uneventful, except for one tense incident in the Lombok strait when a IJN minesweeper approached their ship. The commandos remained cool and the minesweeper simply carried on. The Japanese would retaliate for what happened during Operation Jaywick. On October 10th, the Kempeitai, those are military police of the IJA for those of you who dont know, you can sort of picture the Gestapo, but not quite the same. They went to Changi Prison in Singapore and began reading out a list of civilian names. These named men were taken away for interrogation, torture and in many cases execution. Over the course of 6 months, 50 Europeans and Australians suffered a brutal inquisition. They were beaten with knotted ropes, electrically shocked, had nails driven into the feet, the old cigarettes burnt onto their hands, arms and on their genitals ouch. They were waterboarded and in total 16 men would die. But no credible information was taken from any of them. The Japanese were far more brutal to the Malays and Chinese. Countless were tortured, interrogated and many executed with their severed heads put on posts around the city. After it was all said and done the Kempeitai filled a report speculating the raid had been carried out by two chinese and one Malay. They didn't believe it and their superiors did not either. The 6 months of horror is known as the Double Tenth Massacre. There was another unit formed known as the M special Unit, which was a joint Australian, New Zealand, Dutch and British reconnaissance unit formed as a successor to the Coastwatchers. Their role was to gather intelligence on Japanese shipping and troop movements. To do this, small teams were landed behind enemy lines by sea, air and land. One of their first operations was Locust led by Lt Jack Fryer. A group of 4 men departed Benabena overland on January 21st and advance to Lumi airstrip. They formed a base camp thee and began observing the Japanese. In conjunction to Locust was operation Whiting, which was a team of 5 Dutchmen led by Sergeant Huibert Staverman who also departed Benabena to establish a coast-watching station in the hills above Hollandia, reaching Aitape by mid september. Unfortunately the operation would be a catastrophe as the Dutch were ambushed around Aitape. Sergeant Staverman, Corporal D.J Topman, privates H Pattiwal, M Reharing and radio operator Sergeant Len Siffleet were publicly executed at Eitape beach on October 24th of 1943. Another important development was the Japanese seizure of Macau. Unlike the case of Portuguese held Timor taken in 1942, the Japanese has respected Portuguese neutrality in Macau. However there was a huge influx of Chinese, American and European refugees coming from Guangdong and Hong Kong and this aroused Japanese suspicions. After the fall of Hong Kong, the British had established a clandestine support organization inside Macau trying to gain intelligence on the Japanese in an effort rescue the prisoners from Hong Kong. British army aid group known as BAAG, was under the command of Lt Colonel Lindsay Tasman Ride. They operated out of Hong Kong, Waichow, Guilin, Sanbu, Kaiping, Kunming and other places. They had planned out escape routes from Macau for local Chinese using the route through Shekki or via the sea to a place called To Fuk. Guangzhouwan was another escape route that wealthy Chinese and other nationalities with resources could buy passage through. Another route used a heavily armed motor junk that went to the north west point of Macau, Kong CHung and took them as far as Sam Fau. From there with aid, they could get to Guilin and then Chongqing. But then a blockade was imposed on the Chinese mainland. Macau's survival depended upon receiving rice and fuel from places like Vichy controlled Indochina and Guangzhouwan, but after the Japanese occupied them Macau suffered critical food shortages. Macau's ships were not allowed to be used by Portuguese to carry food and thus were dependent on foreign ships. On the night of August 18th, the British ship Sian, under Portuguese protection was commandeered by a combined fleet of Japanese and pro-Japanese Chinese run ships, which illegally entered Macau's inner harbor. There was a shootout leading to 20 dead British sailors and the Japanese allegedly discovered that the ship was transporting a shipment of illegal weapons to be sold to the NRA. The next morning Lt General Tanaka Hisakzu of the 23rd army ordered troops across the border who clashed briefly with Macau police forces before Lisbon ordered them to not resist. Governor Mauricio Teixeira was forced to collaborate with the Japanese who starting in September demanded the installation of Japanese advisors or full blown military occupation. The result was Macau becoming a protectorate. The isolated port city became a center for smuggling and black market activities…which it kinda still is today haha. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Vella Lavella was over, the Japanese yet again proved themselves experts at the art of evacuation. The battle for Finschhafen was not over by any means and now the allies were cautiously proceeding forward lest they repeat any mistakes learnt in Buna-Gona, Lae and Salamaua.
En este episodio analizo en detalle el primer sorteo que les compartí en mis redes a mitad de septiembre. Además, vamos sobre las reglas del sorteo, las posibles sedes, que podemos esperar el día del sorteo y mucho más. ¡Que Disfrutes! --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/elramuopina/support
Last time we spoke about the Huon Gulf offensive. The Japanese until now had not considered their losses at Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona as irretrievable, but with the loss of Salamaua and Lae there was a brutal realization they were going to have to pull back their defensive line. The absolute defense line was established as the entire empire of the rising sun took two steps back. Meanwhile General Douglas MacArthur and the allied war planners decided to revise operation Cartwheel. The enemy was in disarray and this provided an opportunity to keep them off balance and maintain the momentum. They decided to launch an offensive against the Huon Peninsula, to hit places like Finschhafen. The offensive began with another bang as forces landed and advanced to seize immediate objectives to the misery of the retreating Japanese. This episode is Drive to Finschhafen Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Before we leap back over to New Guinea, we first need to talk about some developments in the Solomons. Admirals Kusaka and Samejima were about to launch Operation Se-Go, the evacuation of Kolombangara. Now after the battle of Vella Lavella, Brigadier Potter's 35th battalion was closing in on the Marquana Bay area by September 26th. Potter sent two New Zealander Platoons as a vanguard. To face them, Captain Tsuruya had organized his meager forces and successfully surrounded the New Zealander Platoons. This began a fight for the New Zealander's survival that would last until October 2nd. Worried about the fate of his two platoons, Potter ordered Lt Seward with 3 companies to rescue the platoons. Seward described the endeavor as running straight into a hornets nest. They ran straight into some Japanese machine gun positions, which they nicknamed Machine Gully, and it cost them 18 dead and 10 wounded. Tsuruya managed to halt their advance using Machine Gully, which was a dense rainforest concealing his men. On October 2nd, the two platoons were finally rescued. The horrible casualties prompted Potter to halt attacks until every landing craft could bring over the 37th battalion from Tambala bay to hit the other side. The 37ths movement down the rugged coast would be sluggish, giving the Japanese ample time to prepare for the evacuation of the Tsuruya unit. Meanwhile General Sasaki and Admiral Ota were getting their forces ready for the evacuation. Each unit was responsible for its supply and had to carry enough rations to last until october 5th. All the troops had to carry their weapons and as much ammunition as they could, while medical supplies were divided amongst them. Mountains guns, quick fire guns, heavy machine guns could be disassembled and carried if possible, everything else was to be destroyed. And I mean everything, even street signs were destroyed. Sasaki moved all the wounded to the north shore of Kolombangara who were to be the first loading onto the destroyers. Ota was in charge of all matters related to the embarkation such as communications; locating hiding places for the barges and loading which would take place between September 28-30th. They were expecting to evacuate 7660 men in all. Operation Se-Go began on the 27th, as General Yoshimura's barges headed for Kolombangara in separate groups and Admiral Ijuin prepared his force of 11 destroyers to run towards the northern coast the following day. Only one of Yoshimuras groups led by Commander Tanegashima were intercepted as they headed down the slot. 5 destroyers, the USS Claxton, Spence, Dyson, Foote and Charles Ausburne led by Captain Martin Gillan pounced on the force destroying 4 barges, but the rest eventually escaped to Kolombangara by the 28th with the other groups. Ota hid the barges as he awaited Ijuins destroyers. Ijuin's force were spotted by a PBY due northeast of Green Island, prompting Generals Moore and Twining to launch an air raid. A strike force of radar equipped B-24's of the 394th bombardment squadron intercepted Ijuin's destroyers as they were passing Bougainville strait. None of their bombing attempts found a hit luckily for Ijuin. Meanwhile the barges began to depart up the slot towards Choiseul seeing zero opposition. At Tuki point the barges awaited the destroyers before the loading process began. The only major mishap would occur when the commander of the barges carrying 735 men from Jack Harbor to board the Amagiri steered too widely, missed the signal light from the destroyers and began heading for Vella Lavella. By the time they figured out the mistake and returned to the loading area, the destroyers were gone, with only 1950 men aboard. With the 1950 men aboard, Ijuin's destroyers made their first dash, but would be intercepted again, this time by 27 B-24's. The strike was thwarted by Zero fighter escorts and bad weather allowing Ijuin to arrive safely at Buka by the 29th. After this, the Americans were now fully alert to what was going on and responded by bombing Choiseul. At 9:15am on the 29th, Kakasa was attacked by 17 Dauntless, 12 Avengers and 56 fighter escorts. Destroyers Patterson, McCalla, Foote and Ralph Talbot led by Captain Frank R Walker were sent up the slot to hunt barges as well. On september 29th, Tanegashima headed for Choiseul with 11 barges carrying 1100 men. At 10:30 the Americans found them. There was no moon that night, and frequent rain squalls dotted the slot. Upon seeing the Americans, Tanegashima ordered the barges to scatters and Walker detached McCalla to hunt a small group while the rest of his force hit a larger one. Yano, whose battalion was on the barges recalled his barge running at full speeds as shells flew all around them. No barge was sunk or seriously damaged as they made a quick escape. Thus the first stage of operation Se-Go saw the rescue of over 6000 men, relying on the combination of surprise and gambling to be honest. But 25 barges were lost in the process. For stage 2 Samejima would reinforce the surviving 43 barges and 5 vedettes with 3 torpedo boats and two other armed boats. Yoshimura and Ijuin planned to toss 3 destroyers Kazagumo, Yugumo and Akigumo to be a diversion for the Americans. On the other side, Admiral Halsey ordered Admiral Merill's task force 39 consisting of Light cruisers Montpelier and Denver; and destroyers Eaton, Waller, Cony, Renshaw, Spence, Claxton, Dyson, Selfridge and Charles Ausburne, to sweep the slot. Commander Chandler with four destroyers, Pringle, Saufley, Radford and Greyson was in the lead, followed by Merrill with two cruisers and nine destroyers. On the night of October 1st, while Yoshimura's barges were leaving Choiseul en route to Kolombangara. The Americans spotted the decoy destroyers northwest of Choiseul at 9:20 via a VP-54 Black Cat that began tailing the force as it heading in the direction of Vella Lavella. Now Merill had orders to not risk his cruisers unless heavy Japanese units were found, so he turned back and allowed Wilkinson's destroyers to advance. The American chased the decoy towards Vella Lavella as Yoshimura's barges went by relatively unmolested, though a small group of barges would be fired upon by US destroyers, losing 2 in the process. On the morning of October 2nd, Ijuin departed Rabaul with 9 destroyers and at Vila, the Yokosuka 7th guns would fire their last rounds before moving towards the coast. That night, Ijuin approached Kolombangara as Tanegashima awaited with 2100 men to be transported onto the destroyers. They managed to load 145 men by 10:35, but then the destroyers were forced to pull back as Americans had been spotted in the slot. Tanegashima nonetheless, headed for Sumbe Head with the rest, 600 men in all. Commander Harold O. Larson with three destroyers, Ralph Talbot, Taylor and La Vallette dashed across the slot to hit barges. Largson located the barges and began firing upon them when Ijuin's destroyers appeared at 10:42. The Americans closed in on the Japanese and fired torpedoes at 11:25 scoring no hits. They then opened fire with their guns targeting the Minazuki. The Japanese scattered, prompting a chase, but it fell into nothing by midnight. In the end the Americans managed to sink 5 of Tanegashima barges. With that the Japanese had successfully completed operation Se-Go rescuing 4000 men in the second stage, for a near total of 10,000 men in all. The Japanese had truly proved themselves capable evacuatee's if that is a word, with the evacuation of Guadalcanal, Kiska and Kolombangara. That's all for the Solomon's as now we need to venture back to Green Hell. Poor General Adachi's 18th army was not giving a single break. Just a week after the fall of Lae, General MacArthur's southwest pacific area had launched two new offensives aimed at the Ramu Valley and Finschhafen. Operation Cartwheel had initially scheduled an offensive against the Huon Peninsula to take place 6 weeks after the taking of Lae, but MacArthur pushed this forward due to intelligence indicating the Japanese were in the process of sending heavy reinforcements from Madang to aid Ramu Valley and Finschhafen. The first objectives for the allies were Kaiaput and Dumpu in the Markham and Ramu valleys where airfields could be constructed to help General Kenney extend his arm. Lack of air and naval capability meant the Japanese would be forced to march nearly 200 miles to reach places like Finschhafen with reinforcements, giving MacArthur ample room to hit the port before they could. Now in the previous episode we saw Brigadier Windeyer successfully land is forces at Scarlet Beach, with the 2/17th advancing further to secure the Song River area; the 2/15th captured Katika and the 2/13th were advancing southwards towards Heldsbach and Tareko. Just like at Lae, the Japanese were taken completely off guard by the landings, prompting General Adachi to order General Yamada to hit the enemy at the most opportune moment while General Katagiri's 20th division were quickly dispatched on 20 large barges for a coastal advance. Katagiri's men reached Sio by barge on September 21st and from there he dispatched his 2nd battalion, 79th regiment with 3 machine gun platoons and an artillery company to the Kalasa-Kelanoa area while the rest would concentrate around the Sio area until september 30th. Yamada ordered his forces to concentrate at the Sattelberg mountains, a important point 1000 meters above sea level which dominated the Finschhafen area. It was hoped holding such a point would allow a launching pad for future counter offensives. Meanwhile Windeyer ordered the 2/15th battalion to lead an advance towards the Bumi river while the 2/13th consolidated at the Heldsbach plantation Launch Jetty area. Yet Wootten also gave Windeyer that task of securing Sattelberg, so he ordered Lt Main's company of the 2/17th with an additional platoon for the job. On September 24th, Main signaled “Coy less one pl now approx 3 miles along main track and proceeding to Sattelberg. Patrol P.I.B moving ahead of coy”. Sattelberg was an interesting spot to defend. It was initially a 19th century German mission, about 5 miles inland with a height of 3150 feet. It offered a birds eye few of the coastal area making it a particularly important point. Allied intelligence misjudged how inaccessible it was and there was the belief its occupation was merely a method of guarding one's right flank. Yamada's men were easily able to slip into Sattelberg via the Tirimoro, Gurunkor and Kunawa, this certainly would not be the same case for the allied forces. On September 22, the 22nd battalion had departed Hopoi. They marched through a swampy terrain towards Wideru without opposition. By 8am on the 23rd, they saw their first signs of the Japanese occupation. They also ran into locals who began reporting to them the Japanese had spent the night at Buiengim. At 1:35pm they reached Bua where leading troops had a small skirmish with a Japanese outpost which quickly withdrew. By 4pm part of the Australian forces seized a steep ridge where the track cut around 250 yards east of Bua. When it began to get dark they began to be fired upon from a mountain gun. The fire was coming from an area near the mouth of the Mongi river. Meanwhile the 2/15th battalion were advancing along a coastal track with its leading platoon reaching the mouth of the Bumi by midday. The river looked to be fordable, what they didnt know was two mixed companies of the 85th naval garrison had fortified and wired positions on its southern bank. When the Australians began crossing they were fired upon, prompting Lt Shrapnel to order 6 3 inch mortars to be brought up to support the Bumi crossing. The battalion continued their advance along the foothills of the Kreutberg Range. This was the first time any units of the 9th division apart from the 2/24th battalion and some individual companies had done any hill-climbing on New Guinea. It was a very tough initiation. There was no track and zero water, the force had to cut their way for about 800 yards through dense jungle and then go up a slope so steep that any man carrying a heavy load had to have it passed up to him. Several tin hats clattered down the hillside and the stretcher bearers left all but two stretchers going half way up. The unsexy stuff about war, but terrain can be just as much of an enemy to you and your objective than the actual enemy. They reached the crest of the ridge, took a breather and then began advancing south. The next day the 2/13th began to join them, allowing the 2/15th to move off towards the Bumi. However to their amazement, upon reaching the river at 10am, they found it unoccupied on the southbank. Barbed wire was seen, but no Japanese. Then as they advanced some more they were fired upon, it was a deception. A company led by Captain Snell was ordered to cross the river to create a beachhead on the opposite bank. The men entered the waist deep water further down, seeing one man killed by enemy fire. Bullets were flying around as the Australians were providing cover fire. As the men crossing went further down they found an area not occupied by the enemy and formed a bridgehead. From there more men were able to safely get across. However the position under pouring rain forced the Australians to improvise. They had a supply issue and needed better access, so they cut a track around the foothills to the bridgehead positions. The difficulty was that the rain had really begun to kick in and it was causing enormous delays. Windeyer ordered a jeep track to be established from the coastal track due north of Kamloa to the bridgehead to compensate. A platoon of the 2/3rd pioneers and some men of the 2/17t7, 2/13th and 2/15th were employed to carry supplies along the current path until the track was made to their misery. On September 25th Lt Mair led a patrol of the 2/13th out to deal with some troublesome enemy mortars to the east. At around 9am they found a Japanese outpost 20 feet above them. They were fired upon losing 2 men dead and 4 wounded. The enemy was firing from some bunkers and foxholes with barbed wire coming up from the river. Other patrols were made prodding the area as the 2/3rd field company and the pioneers of the 2/15th finished cutting the new jeep track. When the track was completed, Windeyer ordered the men to not advance south of the Bumi for another two days to allow more supplies to be brought up near the river crossing. Back over at Scarlet beach, Japanese aircraft were striking them early in the morning as allied aircraft hit airfields on New Britain. At 12:30pm on September 24th, a Japanese airforce of 12 bombs and 20 Zeros hit Australian positions at the north end of the airstrip. Artillery pieces that had been pounding Kakakog and the Salankaua plantation areas were hit hard. 60 or so bombs were dropped leading to 18 gunner casualties and the 2/3rd field company had 14 deaths and 19 wounded. Despite the airstrikes, by September 25th there was something worse to worry about emerging from the west. After the 2/17th began its advance to Sattelberg which Papuan infantryman had reported was unoccupied, it soon became apparent this was false. After passing 800 yards beyond Jivevaneng, the same papuan infantry could visually see the Sattelberg area was anything but unoccupied, it was heavily fortified. Now the 2/17th were still on the merry way to Sattelberg none the wiser, in fact they reached Jivevaneng and mistook it to be Sattelberg, not realizing they had to cross a place called Coconut Ridge to get to Sattelberg. Windeyer received brand new reports from the Papuans that Sattelberg was heavily fortified while simultaneously the 2/17th vanguard patrols ran into some forward defensive lines around Sattelberg. The 2/17th patrols were hit hard by mortars and grenades forced to pull back quickly. Windeyer decided he was stretched to thin in the area so he ordered everyone to pull back to Jivevaneng. The Japanese now saw the Australian presence on the Sattelberg Road, General Yamada planned an offensive against Heldsbach to cut the enemy off north of Arndt Point. Meanwhile by 2pm, Colonel Grace of the 2/13th was ordered to seize Snell's Hill a high ground southeast of the bridgehead. By 9am some platoons were patrolling the area, when Lt Webb's platoon ran 400 yards into a Japanese position sitting on a Spur controlling a track from Tirimoro. Lt Webb reported it in prompting Colonel Grace to call in for support. The men would be facing around 150 men of Yamadas 85th naval garrison. Two companies of the 2/15th took up the job and would begin by literally falling and tumbling 150 yards from their assembly line. They were tripping over vines, bamboo and heavy timber descending down a valley. When they got 450 yards from the slope of Snell's Hill they were pretty exhausted. However Yamada's naval troops gave them no time to take breath as they began lobbing grenades down at them. Luckily the grenade shower was rather ineffective. The Australians used cover fire as they could not hope to toss grenades them themselves lest they tumble back down upon their charging men. The Australians charged up the slope bayonets fixed and as they came to its summit, many of the Japanese turned and fled. Sergeant Fink took his men through a kunai patch to try and hit the Japanese rear, managing to clear some machine gun nests in the process. During his sweeping maneuver 10 casualties were inflicted upon the Australians. Finks men drew a lot of the enemy fire, relieving pressure from the others who led a frontal and left wing attack. Over on the left wing Captain Stuarts men charged through some kunai grass overrunning two 13 mm machine gun nests. 40-50 Japanese panicked upon seeing this and ran back to an observation post. Soon the Australian platoons began to consolidate and applied pressure. Stuarts advanced in what he termed “an extended line-desert formation, not in a file according to orthodox jungle tactics”. Three 13mm guns were captured, 7 LMGS, a ton of mortars and rifles and 52 Japanese would be buried on the summit. It was an intense actions seeing potentially 100 casualties inflicted by the 2/15th who in return had 3 deaths and 7 wounded. While the 2/15th had been tackling Snell Hill, the 2/13th tried to cut across the Tirimoro track to another high ground called Starvation Hill. Around 5 minutes after the Snell battle started, some gunfire could be seen coming over from the other high ground. A few platoon of the 2/13th were immediately ordered to check it out. As the men advanced along the Tirimoro track they came across thick vegetation along the slope going up to Starvation Hill. Companies 7 and 8 of the 238th were defending Starvation Hill and they held a great field of fire looking down. The men began to crawl through it going up along the slope. Men were on their hands and knees going through thick bamboo, the progress was slow and noisy because the bamboo would make sharp snapping sounds. The two leading platoons took what cover they could as a storm of fire erupted. Japanese LMG's were opening up forcing the Australians to try and pull back safely 150 yards and hunker down for the night. 9 men were cut down during the mayhem. Over in the north, Yamada ordered the 3rd battalion, 80th regiment to hit Scarlet Beach. Enroute to Scarlet beach was Major Pike's company of the 2/17th who were guarding the approaches to the beach from Katika. Pike had sent a small patrol out and 2500 yards to the west they ran into patrols of Yamada's force. At around midday, 30 Japanese attacked a position west of Katika held by Lt McLeod. Two Japanese were killed, including an officer who had a marked map and what looked like an operation order on him. To the south Windeyer received a report of what was going on and ordered Pike to send out a stronger patrol to hit and locate the enemy so their artillery could fire upon them. A platoon went out in the afternoon and after 2000 yards or so found the enemy and ordered the artillery fire in. The platoon was met with heavy fire, leading Sergeant Brightwell to be shot dead as the men pulled back to Katika. Thus Yamada's plans to hit Scarlet Beach quickly dissolved into back and forth patrol skirmishes in the Sattelberg and Katika areas. The new threat to the west, forced Windeyer to request reinforcements. Reluctantly, General MacArthur and Admirals Barbey and Carpender authorized the sending of reinforcements to an area they had assumed had a small enemy presence. General Herring met with Barbey aboard the Conyngham informing him Finschhafen would required an additional brigade. Barbey declined to transport the extra troops to Finschhafen on the grounds it was against MacArthurs orders. Apparently MacArthur's planners felt that Finschhafen was going to be a pushover and they had pretty much considered the operation won and down already. Herring then asked Carpender to help transport the additional units, but was amazed to discover that the Americans would not comply unless the matter went first to MacArthur. None the less Carpender planned to transport the units via small craft staging out of Lae when Finschhafen was cleared. Then Windeyers urgent requests for reinforcements came in, indicated things were not won and down and Finschhafen had not fallen. Herring then sent a secret signal to Blamey and MacArthur pleaded for additional help, which finally secured him the 2nd battalion of the 43rd regiment by the end of the month. Back over at Jivevaneng on the 27th telephone lines to Zag were suddenly cut and one of hte 2/17th's patrols made contact with the Japanese. The 2/17th at Jivevaneng opened fire with artillery upon the Sattelberg area and along the main track. Then after dusk a platoon of screaming Japanese apparently screaming Tojo charged the Jivevaneng defensive lines. 6 of them were killed in the attack. Windeyer ordered what became known as the Sattelforce, two companies of the 2/17th led by Lt Main and Lt Pike to take control of the Sattelberg track and the tracks leading back to the beachhead. On the 28th, Sattelforce began probing, but between 3-8pm a company of Japanese made three consecutive attacks against them. All the attacks were coming from the front and left flank, seeing screaming Japanese charging madly upon them. Main's company was soon running low on ammunition and they feared a dawn attack was approaching. Main estimated the enemy had suffered up to 60 casualties at this point. During the morning of the 29th, Main's assumption about a dawn attack came true, as they were hit by a Japanese platoon, but after this the Japanese retired. Main's men found 30 dead Japanese after performing a intense defense in a rather isolated position. The 2/43rd battalion landing at Scarlet beach at 3:30am and their commander Lt Joshua was immediately ordered “you will relieve the troops known as Sattelforce…This relief to be completed as speedily as possible to enable 2/17 battalion to concentrate for operations against Finschhafen”. 13 Hours later they did just that. On september 27th, Windeyer ordered the 2/13th to exploit the gains made by the 2/15th to capture Kakakog, while the 2/15th would attack the Salankaua Plantation. Back over at Starvation Hill, Mortar Sergeant Chown led a patrol, getting as close as possible to the hill. A telephone wire was carried up and Chowne found himself an observation point at the edge of a bamboo patch, just 20 yards or so near the Japanese. Despite being dangerously close to the enemy, he directed 3 inch mortar fire down upon them. He only had 15 mortar bombs, thus this led him to be so critical with his positioning. Before firing them off he sent word to the other Platoon leaders that an attack could be made. A platoon led by Sergeant McVey advanced to the edge of the bamboo ready to pounce. Chown lined up McVeys men called the mortar fire and they charged up the slope. The Japanese were caught by complete surprise seeing the enemy suddenly on top of them. Many of the Japanese fled at the offset, thus Starvation Hill was captured with pinpoint precision. Unbeknownst to the Australians, the only Japanese atop Starvation were rearguards as the 7th and 8th companies of hte 238th regiment had already withdrawn over to Sattelberg that morning. The next day, the 2/13th made their way cautiously over to Kakakog. Their objectives were three demolished buildings known as the “triangle” and the remains of the Kakakog hospital designated “the city”. These were found on the west and east ends of Kakakog respectively. D Company led by Lt Cribb and A company led by Lt Cooper crossed over a spur on their way to hit the triangle. Cribb took the left and Cooper the right as they advanced upon the objective. They were met with a heavy bombardment, but the aim was apparently so bad the men joked “we were under more danger from falling coconuts than the gunnery itself”. Their attack only got 300 yards past Snell's Hill by september 29th. The next day the men continued to advance, and now the enemy's artillery took a toll upon them causing them to halt. Two other companies led by Lt stuart and Colbin were penetrating east of the Ilebbe Creek without any opposition. They got within 50 yards of the Salankaua Plantation but had to cross a bridge to close the distance. To ford the river was just as dangerous as attempting the bridge leading the companies to launch smaller patrols to prod out options. It quickly became apparent by the late afternoon the element of surprise was lost. Luckily for the frustrated men, the Salvation Army and YMCA were up with the troops. The religious and welfare organizations looked after the mens physical and spiritual comfort. After the war there were few Australian ex-soldiers who would not put a coin in a Salvo's box when it was passed around the pub or street corner, as it brought back memories of their aid during the fighting. One soldier who fought across the Bumi wrote “Another army came down to the Bumi—its weapons a coffee urn, its captain a Good Samaritan. Proudly he hoisted his unit's flag… He came not to reproach us for past sins or preach of the men we might have been. It is ideal, practical Christianity; he succoured the wounded and sick, revived the tired and weary; his was a happy little half-way tavern for those that passed.” The next day, the 2/17th were relieved and would advance south, while the 2/13th came up for another assault against Kakakog. At 6:20am Colvin reported back to Windeyer there was going to be delays as the men needed to first take some higher ground. Windeyer back over in Scarlet beach decided he would come over to see it for himself. In the meantime some patrols were poking around the Triangle and to their surprise they saw no sign of the enemy. When Windeyer arrived it was decided the men would attack from the northwest. The 2/13th hit the Triangle while the 2/17th hit Salankaua plantation. On October 1st they were supported by an aerial strike at 11am followed up by artillery. For some reason know one ever found out why, this all began at 10:35am instead. 10 Vultee Vengeances and 8 Bostons bombed and strafed Salankaua plantation and Kakakog, doing little damage, but keeping the Japanese hunkered down. As the aircraft disappeared the infantry had run to their assembly points just in the nick of time to be ready to advance under artillery barrage. When one platoon got 250 yards near the City, grenades and mortar fire occurred. The australians could now see the enemy was hiding in the area and waiting for them to advance. As men forded the Ilebbe creek they were fired upon heavily suffering a few casualties before the men dispersed for cover. Instead of continuing across many changed direction and joined the assault upon the Triangle. The Australians were getting pinned down in every sector, seeing men trying to hide behind anything they could. The situation seemed desperate, then suddenly Lt Crawford took charge of the situation and organized a bayonet fixed direct attack across the Ilebbe. Crawford ordered the men to toss their grenades over the top of two platoons charging over the creek in an attempt to rush the enemy post on the other side. One Private Rolfe stood up at the bank of the creek and began firing his Bren from the hip providing wild cover fire. The men charged over the creek, being fired upon by Japanese snipers from tree tops. Despite their firepower, the Japanese were unable to stop the bayonet charge as the Australians ran them down. Crawford was wounded during the action, but they practically annihilated the entire outpost, bayonetting many Japanese. Due east of them near the Salankaua plantation, the men began to take out the tree top snipers. 12 2 inch mortars helped keep the pressure and momentum going. The Creek area was secured seeing 50 dead Japanese at the cost of 27 Australians. With the Ilebbe Creek cleared out, the pressure increased against the Triangle and City. Artillery was raining down upon them, likewise heavy fire was coming back from Kakakog ridge. By 3pm the Australians found themselves pinned down again. Yet again they had to halt their attack and dig in for the night as they had 10 deaths and 70 wounded, though they estimated that they had killed between 80-100 Japanese atop Kakakog ridge. The casualties would force the Japanese to abandon the Salankaua plantation. Meanwhile after advancing to Kasanga, the 22nd battalion was able to seize Timbulum and Logaweng without opposition and were now preparing to cross the Mape River. On October 2nd, the 2/13th would find Kakakog ridge abandoned, but they very cautiously checked every nock and cranny upon it expecting Japanese ambush. A forward patrol went to the triangle and saw signs of an evacuation, numerous dead Japanese and abandoned equipment everywhere. The 2/17th likewise found the mouth of the Bumi unoccupied and easily secured a bridgehead before finding Salanakaua plantation unoccupied as well. With the enemy gone, the 2/15th were set forward towards Simbang and the 2/17th towards Kolem. With that, Finschhafen had fallen. It was a bitter fight, but by early October it was evident the enemy were yielding the coastal stip to assemble further west at the peak of Sattelberg which dominated the entire area. The 2/17th had already found out the hard way what it was to approach Sattelberg, and now the 2/43rd were trying to rescue one of their companies pinned down at Jivevaneng. Though Finschhafen was theirs, it was by no means secure. Papuan infantry and friendly locals were sending reports the Japanese were entering the wareo-sattelberg area from the north. The cost for this victory had been 73 Australians killed, 285 wounded and 301 sick. To the west at Kaiapit, the Australians were consolidating their position along the Markham valley and preparing to resume their advance on Ramu. Brigadier Dougherty's brigade were flown over to Kaiapit to relieve King's valiant commandos. Meanwhile General Nakai ordered the Saito unit to infiltrate and raid the Australians position. The 80 men of the Saito unit were led by Captain Morisada who organized his men into 4 smaller attack groups. Back on September 23rd, 3 Saito groups carried out their first operation, successfully blowing up the billet of a commanding officer and setting fire to a entire kunai patch that delayed an Australian advance. Meanwhile the bulk of the Nakai detachment withdrew back to the Ramu valley where they established fortifications at the Kankirei Mountains. Kankieri means “summit of joy” and was named so on June of 1943 when troops of the 20th division reached its peak to look down upon Ramu valley, cheering as they did because they had just completed the road from Madang. However by late september the Australians now looked to be approaching said road to Madang. By the 23rd the 2/16th battalion captured Antiragen and the Umi river crossing. The next day was quite a handful for them alongside the 2/6th independent company. Both had patrols probing the Sagerak when they ran into some Japanese rearguard. 2 inch mortars and rifles pushed the rearguard to pull back and soon some patrols were moving on towards Narawapum. Meanwhile a papuan company was patrolling its northern foothills trying to find a fast route for the Australians to take to catch up to the Japanese in the Boana-Wantoat areas. Around midday the 2/16th and 2/6th were crossing the Umi to secure some high ground south of Sagerak. They clashed with around 20 Japanese carrying full packs in the Narawapum area causing them to flee. All of these Japanese forces were from the 1st battalion, 78th regiment, struggling to estalbish decent delaying actions. General Vasey then appointed a new objective, Dumpu, where he hoped to catch General Nakano's men whom he assumed were retreating up the Ramu Valley towards Bogadjim. In reality, Nakano's 51st division were withdrawing through the Saruwaged Range, whose track deteriorated as it went up the upper reaches of the Sanem river. Private Kitamoto who was traveling with the 51st would recall “After we escaped the clutches of the enemy we were confronted by nature. Here the living had to walk across the dead to stay on the track. Using the dead bodies as stepping stones and clinging to the slippery lichen covered rocks, the men made their way up the mountain. Fresh red blood ran from the mouth of the dead when they were stepped on and their glassy eyes stared us in the face. Approaching 4000 meters, the cold bit hard into the light summer uniforms the soldiers wore but the exhausted men could not stop to sleep or they would freeze to death. The screaming voices of the men who slipped from the log bridges to their death in the canyons below, and the wailing cries of the men who could move no more and were asking for help. It was a sense of hell, something quite out of this world.' Under the belief there was a strong enemy presence covering the withdrawal, possibly the full 20th division, Dougherty decided to order the 2/16th back across the Umi river on september 25th. At the same time, Nakai had ordered the bulk of his 78th regiment to take up a position in the Gurumbu-Kankirei area; for the 1st battalion, 26th field artillery regiment to defend the seashore in the Erima area; and for the 2rd battalion 78th regiment to advance into the Yokopi mountain area to defend Kesawai. Meanwhile the last battalion of the 21st brigade had just arrived to Kaiapit, so Vasey ordered Brigaider Eathers 25th brigade to be the next one flown in. General Herring had decided to place the Bena Force under Vasey's command, which was ordered to cross the Ramu and assault Dumpu and Kesawai. For the next few days, heavy patrolling was conducted at Dumpu, the upper Ramu valley, Kaiapit, Sagerak and eventually past the Umi. Patrols would find no enemy at Kaiapit, nor Sagerak, this prompted Dougherty to believe there were no enemy east of the Umi. On september 28th, Dougherty ordered the 2/16th battalion to recross the river and successfully began occupying Sagerak as the rest of the brigade made their way over after. On the 29th, the 21st brigade were advancing west, taking Wankon Hill and Marawasa facing no opposition. On that same day, some Australian commandos of the Bena Froce led by Captain Dexter were advancing west of Kesawai where they established a new abmush position. The Australians tried to lure the Japanese to the ambush area with 3 men boldly coming over to the Japanese base, drawing their attention. The 3 men ran back to the ambush position and wondered if it worked, and soon 60 Japanese appeared. Their commanding officers were within 30 yards of the ambush are, when the Australians opened fire. The Australians had taken a semi circle position and the effect was like “a reaper's sycthe”. A larger group of Japanese then rapidly came over once they heard the gunfire and the Australians were soon running low on ammunition. Dexter was wounded, another man was killed, so they began a quick withdraw, racing back for the Ramu in broad daylight. While this was going on Eathers forces were beginning to assemble at Kaiapit. On September 30th, Dougherty's units advance to the Gusap River which divided Markham and Ramu. In the battalions report of the crossing of the Gusap, they described it as such "It was a complete surprise to most of the battalion to learn that during the day's march—actually just before reaching Arifagan Creek—they had crossed the divide between the Markham and Ramu River basins. The divide was impossible to pinpoint on the ground as the gradients were imperceptible. The only visible indication that a divide had been crossed was that rivers were now flowing in the opposite direction from the Markham drainage basin." It was at this point Vasey realized he might not be facing the full strength of the 20th division as he received a report Wootten was apparently fighting them over at Finschhafen. Upon looking over the matter, Blamey and Herring decided to not heavily commit to Markham and Ramu Valleys, but instead prioritize the battle for Finschhafen. The commanders met at Lae on October 1st, where Herring agreed to allow Vasey to push towards Dumpu, but he would not allow him to remove the whole of two independent companies from the Benabena plateau. Vasey ordered Dougherty and Eather to concentrate on the Gusap area and for the 2/7th independent company to scout the Bumbum area. God I love new guinea. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese pulled off another incredible evacuation, similar to that of Guadalcanal and Kiska with operation Se-Go. Over on Green Hell the battle for Finschhafen was turning out not to be a pushover, and it was looking like another major offensive was afoot.
Last time we spoke about the conclusion to the Lae-Salamaua campaign. Operation postern was unleashed with a bang. The Japanese were taken by complete surprise when the allies landed in the Lae Area. General Nakano frantically withdrew the forces from Salamaua over to Lae having been duped by the allied deception. Despite their fighting withdrawal, the Japanese not only lost Lae to the surprise attack, but ironically lost Salamaua at the same time. It was a race for the allied divisions to see who would seize both objectives. As the allies marched into Salamaua they realized it was so desolated, it probably would not be of use as a forward base, but Lae would prove extremely beneficial. Ultimately Nakano managed to get 8000 or more men out of the mayhem, now marching north for salvation, but the allies were not done yet. This episode is Huon Peninsula Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Before we venture back to the boys on Green Hell, there had been some developments in the Solomons. On September 18th, Admiral Wilkinson brought over the first units of General Barrowcloughs 3rd division, the 35th and 37th battalions of the 14th brigade. They were brought over to Les Gill's plantation located at Joroveto north of Barakoma and they landed without any conflicts. Unbeknownst to them however, Admiral Sakamaki had launched an airstrike of 12 vals and 48 zeros. Luckily the allies tossed an interception in the form of 17 F4U Corsairs, 6 Hellcats and 4 P-40's which ran into them just over Baga island as Admiral Wilkinsons escorts force of 7 destroyers were making their escape. The air battle spread towards the east where the landing area was, but no shipping was damaged as the allies claimed to have knocked out 15 enemy aircraft at the cost of 3 Corsairs. Once he got ashore, Barrowclough assumed command of the Northern Landing force and set up his HQ on the eastern coast of Vella Lavella. In response, Wilkinson spread his fighter cover more thinly and scattered his LSTs away from Barakoma's anti-aircraft guns. On September 25th a large convoy carrying the 30th battalion, 14th brigade and some marines and Seabee units arrived at Ruravai. They began establishing an advance Marine base for an upcoming operation against Bougainville. This prompted Sakamaki to launch another air strike, this time of 8 vals and 40 zeros. Brigadier General James Moore had roughly 20 fighters to cover the convoy, but some of the vals managed to slip past them. At 11:13, 12 Hellcats intercepted the enemy, leading to dogfights with the Zeros, but two minutes later the Vals had come out from hiding in front of the sun. The vals were targeting the IMAC landing site at Ruravai where the 77th seabees had been clearing a beach area. The marines had some 40mm guns already set up when the Vals struck. Two bombs hit LST-167 forcing it vessel to beach itself while the rest of the bombs scattered across the beach killing 32 men and wounding 58. Sakamaki followed this up with another air strike on October 1st consisting of 8 vals and a dozen zeros again against Ruravai. The 1st marine parachute battalion was landing at the time, as Sakamaki's bombers successfully evaded allied rader and fighter patrols to hit the LSTs. LST-334 took a hit and near miss causing damage but no casualties. LST-448 was hit twice leaving her bursting into flames, killing 52 men with many more wounded. LAST-448 was hit again leading to her sinking while under tow. It was some pretty devastating air strikes, but it was also to be the last as the Japanese were in the midst of evacuating their troops from New Georgia and the 26th air flotilla was withdrawing from Buin. To the northwest, Fijina commandos ha discovered the Horaniu defense force were now scattered in an area between Tambala Bay and Marquana Bay. Barrowclough decided to order Bridagider Leslie Potter's 14th brigade to take out the enemy there. Potter planned to take the 35th battalion and his HQ up the western coast to Matu Soroto Bay while the 37th battalion would land at Doveli cover on the northern coast, hoping to trap the Japanese between both forces. On September 21st, Captain Tsuruya Yoshio had just arrived from Buin to take command of the rather disorganized Vella Lavella forces and began concentrating at Marquana Bay establishing a defensive perimeter. Potter's forces successfully landed at the designated points by september 24th and prepared their advance for the next day. Meanwhile Admiral Samejima and Kusaka were planning the evacuation of Kolombangara. To help them General Imamura was tossing over Major General Yoshimura Masayoshi's 2nd shipping detachment alongside 30 barges. Plans were quickly formed back in early september for Yoshimura to carrying out the evacuation in two stages beginning on September 28th and October 20th via the Choiseul route. Admiral Ijuin proposed using the 8th fleet destroyers for both transport and cover. Kusaka approved the plans and granted an additional 6 destroyers for Ijuins task, taken from the combined fleet, while also arranging some air cover from Sakamaki over Choiseul. The operation designated Se-gō, was mostly complete. Yoshimure assumed command over the Barges designated the 17th army sea battle unit, while under command of Samejima. He would have ultimately at his disposal 70 barges. Yoshimura had armed the barges usually with heavy machine guns and trained the crews to expect attacks from American destroyers and PT boats. He also outfitted them with repair tools. One of the largest problems he faced was how to move 70 barges and 9 small naval vedettes to the forward bases while keeping them hidden from enemy aircraft. The NGAF would confirm this problem on September 20th, when 8 Corsairs were patrolling and came across some barges. They managed to destroy 5 out of the 8 they found. Yoshimura recalled “it was an inauspicious start to the operation”. But he carried on none the less. Leaving buin on september 23rd, they arrived at Sumbe Head by the 25th where the 8th fleet sent a detachment of the Kure 7th to establish a base of operations. Kusaka flew into Vila to meet with General Sasaki and Admiral ota, landing in the midst of exploding shells. To prepare for the withdrawal Sakai had established 3 boarding points along Kolombangara; Jack harbor, Tuki point and Hambare harbor. At the same time he tried to conceal his intentions by increasing patrols and firing off the Yokosuka 7th guns against the enemy. Alongside this he had demolition teams blowing up all the airfield installations, which was mingling with General Barker's artillery. Construction units were beginning to cut trails to the boarding points. Against them was Admiral Halsey who held intelligence indicated the Japanese were planning to either reinforce or evacuate Kolombangara. Halsey send Admiral Merrills task force 39 to move up the Slot while Admiral Wilkinsons destroyers would swing south up Vella Gulf with the objective of catching the enemy between them. Halsey called it a “mouse trap”. On september 25th however, both the USS Columbia and Clevland reported sighting torpedo wakes, indicating a possible submarine force prompting Halsey to pull back the cruisers before the mousetrap was sprung, leaving only Wilkinsons destroyers to pounce on the evacuating Japanese. But thats all for the solomon's for now as we are jumping back to Green Hell. Salamaua and Lae had fallen. General Adachi was now determined to hold the Finisterre range, the Ramu Valley and the Huon Peninsula. He ordered Nakai detachment consisting of the 78th regiment less one company and a battalion of the 26th field artillery regiment led by Major General Nakai Masutaro to take up a position at Kaiapit. Masutaro's boys were to try and help halt the enemy pursuing General Nakano's fleeing 51st division. To make matters worse, although the original orders were for the fleeing men to carry their weapons, the Japanese progressively began to abandon their equipment as they fled. Rifle ammunition was the first to go, followed by helmets, then rifles. Kitamoto Masamichi ordered his engineers to gather as many of the abandoned rifles as they could and use their files to erase the chrysanthemum insignia off them. For those of you who don't know, the chrysanthemum is the symbol of the emperor, so they were going to literally waste time and resources to mitigate what they thought was a disgrace. Men also dropped rice, personal belongings, clothes, whatever they had to in order to survive. The logical thing to do is survive, not take time to file off the symbol of your emperor off the rifles. Major Shintani's 1st battalion of the 80th regiment apparently carried all their weapons across the Saruwaged, including 4 heavy machine guns. Shintani had told his men “the soldier who abandons his arms will be shot to death”. Shintani actually died during the crossing of the Saruwaged, but his men carried on his orders. Some of you might know already, but I am a Dad Carlin fanboy and he said it quite right in his piece on the pacific war about the Japanese. They did everything to the extreme. You just don't see the same radical behavior from the other belligerents of WW2. I find we often mock the Japanese naivety about believing their spirit would overcome the material difference, but by hell come high water they tried. They marched north via the Markham valley while General Katagiri's 20th division was sent to help defend Finschhafen. The Japanese had to shuffle their strategic plans at this point. Thus far they had not regarded the losses of Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona as irretrievable, always believing a decisive victory could be obtained allowing for their recapture. Now after losing Lae-Salamaua, the central solomons and the Aluetians, a brutal realization had dawned on them. With a new thrust into the central pacific, they now saw their perimeter was overextended and they needed to withdraw it. This created what became known as the absolute zone of national defense also called the absolute defense line. Tokyo drew the new perimeter line from western New Guinea through the Carolines to the Marianas, leaving most of the southeast area on the outpost line. The main goal was to build strong fortifications along the perimeter while General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka held the enemy at bay as long as possible. General Imamura kept his 38th division to defend Rabaul and dispatched the 65th independent mixed brigade to Tuluvu. The 65th were ordered to develop a shipping point there and to maintain its airfield. Back on September 5th, Imamura sent Major General Matsuda Iwao to assume command of all the forces at Tuluvu which at that time consisted of the 65th brigade and the 4th shipping detachment, thus together they would be designated the Matsuda detachment. They were going to defend the coasts of western New Britain. Lt general Sakai Yasuchi's 17th division were dispatched from Shanghai to Rabaul to reinforce New Britain while Lt General Kanda Masatane's 6th division were sent to Bougainville to defend it at all dost. The 2nd battalion, 238th regiment would defend gasmata and the 51st transport regiment were deployed at Lorengau in the Admiralties. Now back over with the allies, when Lae was captured with such ease, this caused General Douglas MacArthur's HQ to revise the Cartwheel schedule. Originally it was planned to hit Finschhafen, the primary Japanese base for barge traffic. This was supposed to occur around 6 weeks after the fall of Lae. But like I said, because of Lae's quick capture, combined with some intelligence indicating the Japanese were heavily reinforcing Finschhafen and the Ramu Valley, MacArthur decided to order and immediate operation to secure the villages of Kaiaput and Dumpu in the Markham and Ramu valleys and to construct airfields for Kenney. Allied intelligence indicated the number of Japanese defending the immediate area of Finschhafen was roughly 350 men, providing MacArthur and his staff some optimism. It would be later discovered General Adachi had 5000 available men there. On September 17th MacArthur ordered Admiral Brabey to begin amphibious attack plans for Finschhafen to commence as soon as possible. The Markham and Ramu valleys were like a giant corridor some 115 miles long running from southeast and northwest, separating the Huon Peninsula from the rest of New Guinea. From end to end of the river corridor were large mountains rising on the north and south. The valley itself was flat kunai grass land, very suitable for airfields. General Vasey's 7th division were earmarked to advance along the Markham and Ramu valleys as far as Dumpu. Dumpu would provide General Kenney with airfields required to isolate the Huon Peninsula. From there Kenney could hit Japanese supply convoys moving between Madang, Wewak and Hansa Bay. Meanwhile General Wootten's 9th division were given the task of amphibiously assaulting Finschhafen before exploiting along the coast to Sio and Saidor. Yet before any major operations could be unleashed there was still work to be done at Lae. General Milford's 5th division was given the task of cleaning up Lae so it could become a major forward base of operations. On September 22nd Milford moved his HQ to Lae. The western boundary between the new Lae Fortress and 7th division would be a line running north and south through Nadzab. The southern boundary would go as far as Nassau bay. Milford had the 15th, 29th and 4th brigade at his disposal. Milfords men immediately set to work clearing the interior approaches to the town of Lae against any possible Japanese counterattack while simultaneously aiding in the pursuit of the fleeing Japanese. The successful evacuation by the Japanese of Salamaua and then Lae had shocked the Australian commanders despite the fact they had been informed as early as May of intense Japanese patrol activities along the interior trails. A young Australian officer had earlier reported that the Japanese were surveying interior trails for a possible retreat across the mountains. On September 8th they acquired a order of evacuation document leaving no doubt how the Japanese were going to withdraw north. Mildfords HQ deduced the line of retreat was going to be from the Melambi river, Boana, Melasapipi, Iloka and Ulap. However this would prove to be deception on the part of General Nakano who changed the direction of the march to a steep trail along the east side of the Atzera range towards Sio. Going back to the Quadrant Conference held in Quebec city between August 17th and August 24th, the allies had decided to make some major changes to Operation cartwheel. The main focus was now shifting to the Central Pacific and the Joint chiefs of staff planned to employ the 1st and 2nd marine divisions. For the southwest and south pacific areas this meant the central thrust was going to take a bunch of warships, transport ships and cargo ships. MacArthur was livid at the idea two marine divisions would basically prevent him from his objective of Rabaul. Thus in Quebec, it was decided to neutralize Rabaul rather than capture it. MacArthur also brought up the question of invading the southern philippines, but received no answer. He feared that even if the idea was approved, it might be handed over to Admiral Nimitz. Thus to bypass Rabaul, MacArthur's forces would seize Kavieng and the Admiralties. MacArthur would also have to neutralize Wewak and liberate the valuable Vogelkop Peninsula along New Guinea's northern coast. Back over in New Guinea, General Nakano's men were continuing their withdrawal with the Australians in hot pursuit. On September 17th, th 2/14th battalion crossed the Atzera Range to capture Boana. The Japanese 30th independent engineer regiment and 51st engineer regiment were constructing a small bridge across the busu river using jungle wood. General Nakano had rejoined his HQ with the second echelon of men and he had such a rough time marched he had to be carried by four soldiers. On September 18th the 2/24th battalion reached Musom and Gawam. The Japanese defending Markham point had been completely cut off as of september 14th, receiving no supplies from Lae nor any information about the fact Lae and Salamaua had fallen into enemy hands. On the night of september 16th, 100 men of the 2nd battalion 328th regiment evacuated from Markham point, retreating towards to coast trying to get to Salamaua or Finschhafen. On the 18th, Captain Proctors company of the 15ht battalion were at Labu when they saw a group of 30 armed Japanese trying to escape in folding boats across the Labu lagoon. His company fired upon them forcing the Japanese to quickly row away and flee into the jungle. At 5:10am the next day the Japanese returned to attack Proctors company, trying to break out of what had become an encirclement. Three consecutive attacks were made, with the third reaching the edge of Proctors defensive perimeter when the fighting fell into hand to hand combat. The Japanese were driven off after they had 13 deaths, including their commanding officer. The rest of the Japanese would disperse into the jungle or die to future mop up operations. The next day Boana was taken and now the 2/14th were being held up by a Japanese rearguard on the upper reaches of the Busu. On September 20th, Nakano's first echelon finally crossed the Busu river and by the 22nd the other 3 echelons did likewise. In pursuit, a platoon of the 2/24th began to hit the Japanese at Kwapsanek, but Wootten's forces ultimately failed to catch the Japanese rearguard. In the end the Australians prepared to launch a new offensive against the Ramu valley and Finschhafen, the pursuit units were gradually called back allowing Naknao's men to reach the north coast almost unmolested. General Blamey predicted the remnants of the enemy would need “to escape the hardship of the mountain tracks”. I believe he was quite right on that one. The men of Colonel Watanabe's 14th field artillery regiment continued their march going up the range carrying their single mountain gun towards Lumbaip and then Kemen. Kane Yoshihara noted the officers and men “clung on to the rocks with truly formidable spirit”. General Nakano recalled “I was deeply stirred by their sense of responsibility but could not overlook their suffering”. Nakano ordered the last of the regiments guns to be abandoned. He recalled “the gunners with tears in their eyes, bade a formal farewell as they did so”. Colonel Watanabe would survive the trek alongside 280 of his men. There was a saying amongst the Japanese armed forces that “Java is heaven, Burma is Hell, but you never come back alive from New Guinea”. An American soldier once referred to New Guinea as ‘a green hell on earth”. The conditions were so horrible a veteran of the 32nd division went on the record to say “If I owned New Guinea and I owned hell, I would live in hell and rent out New Guinea”. Vasey and Blamey decided the next objective would be Kaiapit as they believed Naknao was retreating through the Markham and Ramy valleys. They earmarked Captain Gordon King's 2/6th independent company to quickly capture the village before the Japanese could get there. On september 17th, King's company flew over from Port Moresby landed at Sangan on the western bank of the Leron River. Two platoons from Captain John Chalf's Papuan infantry battalion company also reached the western bank of the leron that day coming overland from Chivasing. They would act as a screen ahead of King's men. Kings men began their march for Kaiapit and against them would be Major General Nakai Masutaro who had departed from Bogadjim with the 78th regiment on september 7th. He dispatched the 3rd battalion and Morisada company towards Kaiapit while the bulk of his forces advanced towards Nadzab where they planned to hit its airfield. The Takano Platoon, a reconnaissance unit were the only ones able to reach Kaiapit by September 19th just as the Australians were approaching. King have strict orders to the men that no movement was to be on the track to the village itself as it was believed the enemy would be covering such an approach. Instead the men came through kunai patches, bringing their 2 inch mortars close in to hit the enemy. The mortars began to smash the enemy forward positions sending Japanese fleeing or dying at their posts. The Australians then began to pin down the defenders using grenades and rushed their positions. Japanese treetop snipers unleashed hell, but soon the Australians began firing upon the treelines and village huts where they were hiding. The storming of the village was intense and fast seeing 30 dead Japanese and the rest fleeing. King lost 3 men dead with 7 wounded for the assault. The Australians quickly went to work creating a defensive perimeter placing booby traps everywhere they could. Vasey's decision to swiftly hit the village had paid off big time. The following morning, 300 men led by Major Yonekura Tsuneo arrived to Kaiapit, under the belief it was still in Japanese hands. Just before dawn of September 20th, the Australian commando's saw the incoming Japanese column and immediately opened fire upon them. The Japanese erupted into pure chaos as men of all ranks bunched up and milled about in confusion. Some of the men could be heard screaming in Japanese “we are Japanese let us through!”. Others soon realized Kaiapit was in Australian hands. Thousand of rounds were fired back at the Australians, but their positions were well concealed. King watched as the confused enemy did exactly what he taught his men not to do, shooting at shadows, wasting ammunition and firing high “In all that enormous activity of firing, nobody got hit nobody got hurt at all”. The situation came as a shock to King as well, because the sheer volume of return fire indicated it was a considerably large force. Some of King's men wanted to advance, but he advised caution. Platoon leader Watson waited for King's signal for when he could advance and King recalled “each second seeming like a minute as the Japanese gathered in the half light. Watson was standing up there, looking back to me waiting”. When King dropped his arm, Watson blew his whistle and his men charged. Lt Bob Scott of section 7 recalled “we killed over a hundred Japanese in the first 100 yards”. Scotts group had cut down Yonekura and his command group in the first wave of Australian fire. Lt Bob Balderstone of section 9 sent his men into the right flank as Lt Jack Elsworthy's section 9 took up the left flank. The Australians had seized the moment and inflicted hellish pain on the Japanese. Watson's platoon lost 8 men killed, 14 wounded. King tossed another platoon through the right flank to grab Mission Hill which dominated the battlefield. As the men advanced, they drove off Japanese in their path and would seize the deserted hill. Once it was captured the Australians had a bird's eye view that allowed them to better direct their forces. Seeing the hill secured, Watson judged the time was ripe to continue the advance so he ordered Balderstone and Elsworthy's sections forward. Balderstone was hiding behind a coconut palm when a bullet nicked his right arm prompting him to scream out “who did that!”. It was not a serious wound, but he was fired up and he yelled to his men to surge forward. Balderstone personally tackled a Japanese machinegunner afterwards. After clearing some machinegun positions below mission hill, the enemy was becoming surrounded. The casualties had become so severe the Japanese began to rout in disorder towards Antiragen and Narawapum. It was an incredible victory for King, they buried 214 Japanese and believed many more were dying or wounded. General Vasey arrived around midday and walked over the corpse strewn battlefield to Mission hill stating ‘My God, my God, my God,'. The scale of the carnage and size of the force against a single Australian company was incredible. Gordon King was resting a wounded leg on a shady spot atop the hill when Vasey approached him. King struggled to get to his feet and Vasey said ‘No, no, sit down,' But King stood up to talk nonetheless. Vasey told him to get the first available aircraft out before adding, ‘Gordon, I promise that you'll never be left out on a limb like this again.' Vasey then returned to his plane, which headed back down the Markham Valley. Some months later, Vasey told King, ‘We were lucky, we were very lucky.' King replied, ‘Well, if you're inferring that what we did was luck, I don't agree with you, Sir. Because I think we weren't lucky, we were just bloody good.' For this victory King had lost 14 men dead, 23 wounded, it was something out of a Rambo film. Brigadier Dougherty's 21st brigade were beginning to land at Kaiapit on september 21st. Kings victory allowed Vasey to bring a fresh bridge into position to keep the advance going against Markham and Ramu valleys. The Yonekura battalion had nearly been wiped out to a man, thus General Nakai ordered the 1st battalion to rescue the battered force. Most of the Morisada company were unscathed as they did not engage in the battle at Kaiapit, alongside them were some stragglers left behind and around 40 men who managed to escape the carnage. Aided by the rescue battalion they managed to withdrew back towards Marawasa by September 24th. A volunteer unit was formed under Captain Morisada named the Saito unit, which consisted of around 80 men from the 10th company 78th regiment. They would work as a special infiltration unit who would begin raiding operations. Back over at Lae, Generals, Blamey, Herring and Wootten began to plan their offensive against Finschhafen. Towards midnight on the 17th, Herring arrived to Lae by PT boat for a meeting with Wootten. Wootten had warned Blamey and Herring that he might be required to carry out an attack on Finschhafen at short notice, leading Wooten to order Brigadier Windeyer to look at Finschhafen on the map because it might be of interest to him soon. Before Herrings arrival, plans were already being formed. At 9am of the 18th, Windeyer and his staff attended a 9th division conference at the HQ on the Bunga river. There Herring outlined a plan for the capture of the Finschhafen-Langemak Bay-dreger Harbor area with a quick swoop which would gain control over the eastern coast of the Huon peninsula and thereby Vitiaz strait. Windeyers 20th brigade would be join General Heavy's 532nd engineer boat and shore regiment and Admiral Brbey's landing craft armada to perform an amphibious assault against Scarlet Beach. Scarlet beach was on the southern part of the Song River just due north of Finschhafen where it was believed the Japanese would not be expecting a landing. From there it was possible they would be able to cut off the Japanese supply lines. Wootten and Blamey tossed up an additional brigade, but the available crafts: 4 destroyer transports, 15 LCI's and 3 LSTs were only capable of lifting a single brigade. In the end the decision was made that after the landings, the 22nd battalion would advance round the south coast of the Huon Peninsula to try and deceive the Japanese as to where the real direction of the threat was coming from. Windeyer planned to hit the beachhead with two battalions, the 2/17ths on the right and the 2/13th on the left. Once the beachhead was secured, the 2/15th would advance south along the main road towards Finschhafen. Additionally an expedition would be launched from G Beach on the night of September 21sst to also land at Scarlet Beach the following morning. To support the landings a large air armada of both American and Australian planes would protect the convoy during the daylight. General Kenney would be tossing air strikes against Cape Gloucester with Liberators, while the RAAF hit Gasmata with Kittyhawks and Bostons and Mitchells against Finschhafen. All of the key airfields and supply points between Wewak and Finschhafen would get smashed. Barbeys destroyers likewise would bombardment Finschhafen as well. To meet the boys coming to the beaches was Major General Yamada Eizo commanding the 1st shipping detachment, a naval force based around the 85th naval garrison. Around 1200 men were stationed at Finschhafen, many of them however were barge operators and mechanics. But there were some combat units; Major Shigeru Tashiros 2 battalion, 238th regiment had companies 7 and 8 at Finschhafen with company 5 at Tami islands. Additionally there was the bulk of the 80th regiment coming over from Madang via the coastal road that would arrive just in time to meet the Australian offensive. In the end Yamada's combat strength would be roughly 4000 men strong. On September 10th, after the allies landings at Lae and Nadzab, General Katagiri marched the rest of his forces from Madang to Finschhafen in a grueling advance along the coast. The first elements of his 79th regiment assembled at Gali by September 21st. Because of all of this, Madang was left pretty much undefended. The 239th regiment was chosen to reinforce the base, departing Wewak on October 3rd. Over in Finschhafen, Yamada began deploying the bulk of his forces at Logaweng; with 4 companies holding the Mongi river's mouth and two mixed companies of about 50 engineers and 300 naval personnel holding the Bumi river. To the north, Yamada could only deploy company 9th company of the 80th regiment towards the Song River to secure Sattelberg. Looking at it all on paper it seemed the Australians were set to face little resistance. On the afternoon of September 21st, Barbey's force of 8 LCM's and 15 LCV's departed Lae for Scarlet Beach. Windeyer's landing plan called for two companies of th 2/17th battalion were going to land on the right beach while two companies from the 2/13th would land on the left. While the rest of the brigade landed, the right companies would hit North Hill and the left companies would hit Arndt Point. Barbey's convoy arrived off Scarlett Beach at 4:45am and the barges began to lower. After an 11 minute bombardment by destroyers Perkins, Drayton, Smith, Lamson and Flusser the barges began to speed over to the shore. However due to the darkness of the night, the whole wave landed a bit further south than intended and as a result the 4 assaulting companies were landed not only on the wrong beaches but also got mixed with other groups. This caused a fit of confusion as a platoon of the 2/13th drew fire from some machine gun nests near the mouth of the Song River. They quickly engaged the enemy with grenades and small arms, gradually silencing the two enemy posts. When the 2/17th battalion began to become organized in the area the platoon moved further south to rejoin its company. This all resulted in a failure to secure Scarlet Beach, forcing the second wave to veer further left and beach near Siki Cove under heavy enemy fire. But the LCI's of the 2nd and 3rd waves responded to the heavy fire with their 20 mm guns sending the Japanese fleeing. After that Scarlet beach was secured. Funny enough, if it was not for the misstep landing further south, the operation would have seen more casualties amongst the Australians, as the Japanese machine guns proved to be sited in a deadly position to hit Scarlet Beach. As the remaining waves disembarked, Lt Gibb's platoon of the 2/17th advanced inland and were soon met by some machine gun nests. Within half an hour of combat, the platoon killed 7 Japanese and sent the rest fleeing. Other platoons of the 2/17th began to advance up the Song River fighting only limited skirmishes. The 2/13th meanwhile were sending two companies towards Siki Cove where they had to clear a few pillboxes taking some Japanese prisoners. Windeyers forces then launched an attack against Katika. Makes me think of the show Vikings haha (do a Floki thing). A company led by Lt Pike passed through Katika at 6:45am, heading for some high ground beyond. There Pike's men ran into some strong resistance. Another platoon led by Lt Birmingham ran into a Japanese position who tossed a ton of well directed grenades their way killing 3 men and wounding 7. Pike's platoon stormed some huts seeing the Japanese begin a encirclement maneuver against him. Luckily the encirclement was thwarted with the help of another platoon led by Lt Cribb. Companies of the 2/17th and 2/13th were led by Pike and Cribb respectively and both found themselves close against one another. Cribb informed Pike he would launch a bombardment upon the enemy holding some high grounds allowing Pikes men to make a hook maneuver to hit the enemy. Under the cover of 15 3 inch mortars they hit the Japanese, ultimately taking the village at the cost of many men. While Scarlet Beaches defensive perimeter was being consolidated, the 2/13th advanced south towards Heldsbac and Tareko as Barbey's destroyers were attacked by an air strike. 20 bombers, 10 torpedo bombs and 40 fighters had come over from Rabaul to hit the landing beach. Three American fighter squadrons were waiting to intercept them, successfully shooting down 10 bombers and 29 fighters, while losing 3 lightnings. Likewise the destroyers anti aircraft fire managed to take down 9 torpedo bombers, without receiving any significant hits back. Scarlet Beach was now in allied hands. 5300 troops, 180 vehicles, 32 guns and 180 tons of supplies had been landed successfully. The cost amounted to 20 dead australians, 65 wounded and 9 men missing. For the Americans 8 engineers were killed with 42 wounded. Yet again the rapid pace of the allies had caught the Japanese off guard upsetting their plans to reinforce Finschhafen. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landing at Scarlet beach was a large success. The Japanese had planned to reinforce Finschhafen with 5000 troops, but now they had been caught completely off guard and would only have a fraction of the troops they wanted to support the area. In New Guinea, when it rains it pours.
It's rare to find someone who can speak with expertise on one topic let alone three or four, but we're lucky enough to have Ramu Thiagarajan, Senior Investment Advisor for State Street, to do just that. Ramu and colleagues have published a recent paper on the prospects for de-dollarization, a topic of great interest in both markets and geopolitics that we discuss this week. But equally interesting and important is the expansive background from which Ramu works, marrying academic finance with real-world practice in building his multi-asset outlook, a process we detail in building up to his recent work.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Last time we spoke about the beginning of mop up operations after the fall of Munda, the amphibious invasion of Vella Lavella and the fall of Kiska. New Georgia was a lost cause for the Japanese with the fall of Munda and now all efforts were being made to perform a withdrawal while buying time for forces to be brought over to places like Bougainville. Admiral Halsey ultimately choose to bypass Kolombangara and targeting Vella Lavella, which saw a successful amphibious invasion with a minor naval scuffle during the process. Then the Americans and Canadians invaded Kiska at long last. Although there were numerous reports that the island was abandoned it was decided to go forward with the invasion, at minimum it would be good training for the men. All they found were booby traps and some abandoned dogs as they ushered in the conclusion to the aleutian islands campaign. This episode is Into the Central Pacific Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. So its been nearly a year since the start of the allied offensive in the Pacific. Way back when the Japanese were trying to recover from the Midway disaster, the Americans had no idea if they could manage a major land victory. For nearly a year, the allied campaigns in New Guinea and the Solomons showcased what both sides were capable of. But the US Navy wanted something else, they wanted a drive through the central pacific. Now to begin a thrust into the central pacific meant performing two parallel Pacific campaigns north and south of the equator. Admiral Nimitz did not yet possess the naval, specifically carrier forces required to wage a central pacific offensive, hell legions of troops required months of amphibious training, is was an enormous feat. Admiral Halsey likewise never ceased calling for reinforcements to carry his fight through the central and northern solomons. Ever since the Casablanca Conference, Admirals King and Nimitz had been analyzing the idea of a central thrust in the pacific. They were looking specifically at a thrust in the direction of Truk-Guam and to hit the Marshall Islands. The victory over Guadalcanal had allowed the allies to secure lines of communication and supply to Australia and King presumed Rabaul would fall in 1943. On June 10th King began demanding hard deadlines for a central pacific campaign stating “In order that effective momentum of offensive operations can be attained and maintained, firm timing must be set up for all areas.” The joint chiefs of staff four days later told Nimitz to prepare an invasion of the Marshall Islands with a tentative sailing date of November 15th, 1943. As for the direct thrust, King declared "establishing a base in the northwestern Marshalls and then proceeding to Truk and the Marianas." To pull this off MacArthur was expected to release the 1st marine division in time to participate in the operation with most of Halsey's naval and amphibious forces as well. As you can imagine MacArthur was outraged and objected the demands of his Cartwheel campaign to preclude any transfer of troops or ships from his theater to Nimitz. MacArthur wanted covering support from the Pacific Fleet's new fast carrier task forces to help raid Rabaul, Truk and other Japanese bases on a southern route. Halsey likewise was anxious about withdrawing aircraft from the south pacific area to support operations north of the equator. He warned Nimitz on June 25th that if airpower were diverted from the drive on Rabaul “it would seriously jeopardize our chances of success at what appears to be the most critical stage of the campaign.” Without borrowing forces from the south pacific, Nimitz could not realistically tackle the Marshalls until early 1944 and many members of the planning staff counseled patience. They argued to Nimitz, the new offensive should await the arrival of a large fleet of Essex carriers. By February or March of 1944, they predicted a much expanded 5th fleet could simply steam into the Marshalls and seize 4 or 5 of the largest Japanese bases simultaneously. If the combined fleet came out to fight, such an American force would willingly and confidently give them battle. But King simply wanted action in 1943, he insisted the northern line of attack be opened before the final assault on Rabaul. This would prevent the enemy from concentrating their defenses against either prong of the westward advance. Enemy territory simply had to be taken, somewhere in the central pacific by the end of the year. There was a lot of arguing going about. The joint chiefs had clearly intimated that the Philippines were to be approached through the central pacific, but MacArthur concluded that a drive through the Marshalls and Carolines would have to occur without land-based air support, thus it would be slow and extremely costly to naval power and shipping. MacArthur argued the central pacific route was unwise and thought after Rabaul was captured it should be southwest pacific forces advancing along the north coast of New Guinea and onwards to the Philippines. This would require the neutralization of various islands like Palaus and others in the Banda and Arafura seas to protect their flanks. This long range plan that he prepared was designated RENO. Now all of this of course was intended to cut Japan off from her vast riches in the Dutch East Indies, the thing keeping her war machine alive. The British also had their own desires who applied much pressure onto their American allies, prompting General Marshall to assure them that a Gilberts-Marshalls-Carolines campaign would be undertaken “with the resources available in the theater”. DuringQuadrant conference, the British chiefs had agreed to back King's demand for resources in the central Pacific in return for more forces against Nazi Germany. However during the Trident conference in May, which was not concerned so much with the Pacific strategy, the joint chiefs of staff submitted a plan titled “the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan” which called for a large, sustained air offensive against the home islands in preparation for an invasion. For this all to occur, China had to be maintained, and that meant the Americans and British would need to right their way into China finding a good secure port to move materials properly, most likely this would be Hong Kong. In the meantime the Americans, British and Chinese would work together to recapture Burma to try and drive through the strait of Malacca to Hong Kong via a series of amphibious operations. The Americans would also attempt a drive through the Celebes sea to Hong Kong from the central pacific aided by some subsidiary efforts from the south and southwest pacific areas, good luck getting a penny from MacArthur. The Central Pacific was the most advantageous and logical route because it was shorter than the southern route, it would require less ships, less troops, less supplies and the bases in the Marshalls, Marianas and Carolines would isolate Japan from her overseas empire. The Japanese would only be able to mount limited air and ground forces on the islands in the central pacific, but nonetheless the American planners were forced to make twin drives along the central and southern axes. It has been argued, President FDR was swayed by Marshall's insistent demands for a southern push, because MacArthur held considerable political weight and could have been made a republican nominee for presidency in 1944. There were positives to running twin operations of course. For one thing it would prevent the Japanese from being able to guess the time and place of forthcoming advances keeping them off balance. It also allowed for opportunities for mutual support. Some of the operations would require a behemoth amount of resources, take for example the estimations they ran for the capture of the Bismarck Archipelago which was required to secure the line of communications to Australia and provide access to the Celebes sea. They estimated it would require 7 divisions, 5 of which needed to be amphibious units. If Rabaul fell or was neutralized, perhaps the division numbers would be less. The Marshall operation would require two reinforced amphibious divisions, 4 heavy bombardment and two fighter groups of land based aircraft. On top of that was the naval aspect, they estimated that they needed four battleships, three more auxiliary carriers, twelve cruisers, sixty-three destroyers, twenty-four attack transports, forty-four tank landing ships (LST's), plus landing craft. Garrison forces would include one reinforced division, 10 defense battalions, 545 planes, and 18 motor torpedo boats. For the Carolines, the Combined Chiefs estimated that they would require 3 reinforced amphibious divisions, 2 heavy bomber groups, 10 carriers of the Enterprise and Essex classes, 7 auxiliary carriers, 4 modern battleships, 9 old battleships, 31 cruisers, 108 destroyers, 20 submarines, 45 attack transports, 15 attack cargo ships, 6 LSD's , 3 headquarters ships, and miscellaneous auxiliaries. To garrison the islands would take two reinforced divisions and three defense battalions, plus aircraft. Talk about a shopping list. By the end of the year it was expected that one Marine and 3 Army divisions would be allocated to the Central Pacific while the South Pacific would gain 2 marines, 5 US Army and 1 New Zealand division and in the southwest pacific 4 US infantry, 1 US airborne, 1 US marine and 11 Australian divisions. So calculated all that, the Joint chiefs estimated 2 more divisions would be needed for the Marshalls, 2 more for the Carolines and 3 more for New Guinea. The strategic plan got the stamp of approval by the combined chiefs of staff on May 22nd. For the planned central pacific offensive, Nimitz decided his first objective would be the Marshall Islands. Their seizure was essential to extend the line of communication to the Celebes sea and to shorten the routes to Australia. From the Marshalls, land-based aircraft could support naval operations against the enemy's communication lines and there was always the possibility that by hitting the Marshalls, this would lure the combined fleet out for a fight. By July 20th, it was decided that instead of directly hitting the Marshalls, which would be extremely costly requiring a large force, they would instead capture Nauru and the Gilbert Islands as a preliminary springboard to invade the Marshalls. There had been two competing suggestions debated at CINCPAC HQ. Captain Forrest Sherman the chief of staff to Vice admiral John Henry Towers advocated to recapture Wake Islands and employ it as a springboard to invade the Marshalls. Wake was around 500 miles south of the Marshalls. Admiral Spruance favored opening a campaign south and east where the fleet could count on greater land-based air support from rear bases in the south pacific. He was the one advocating to invade the Gilberts, which were 600 miles southeast of the Marshalls. Spruance persuaded Nimitz who persuaded King thus, the Gilberts won the day. Code named Operation Galvanic, was the offensive to simultaneously invade the Ellice Islands, Gilbert Islands and Nauru by November 15th 1943. For Galvanic, Nimitz would have at his disposal all surface forces of the Pacific Fleet, the air forces of the pacific excluding those in the south and southwest pacific areas, elements of the 7th air force, the 2nd marine division of Major General Julian Smith over in New Zealand currently performing amphibious training, 3 aviation engineer or construction battalions, a port battalion and 3 marine defense battalions. The 7th air force led by Major General Willis Hale had already carried out some reconnaissance and bombing missions against Nauru and the Gilberts back in January, February and April. In spite of some heavy interception they managed to hit the runway on Nauru and a local phosphate plant as well as some installations on Tarawa. The 7th air force were utilizing air bases on Canton and Funafuti which were the only ones in range of the Gilberts. To seize the Ellice islands and build new airfields, Nimitz ordered the 5th and 7th defense battalions and 2nd airdrome battalion accompanied by the 16th naval construction battalion to conduct neutralization and reconnaissance. Nimitz sought to build new airfields at Nukufetau and Nanomea which were around 600 miles south and 350 miles east of Tarawa. On August the 18th an advance survey party landed at Nanomea determining it to hold no enemy presence thus the first elements of the 7th defense battalion began occupying it 10 days later. On August the 22nd an advance party of the 2nd Airdrome battalion landed at Nukufetau finding no enemy presenced allowing the remainder of the battalion to follow suit 5 days later. Transforming the atolls into air bases was rapid work. By September 7th a 5000 foot airstrip was operational on Nanomea, by the end of the month a full squadron of aircraft were operating from it. Over on Nukufetau work was slower, but its strip would be operation by October 9th. Back on August 11th, the 804th aviation engineer battalion was sent to develop Baker island, a already american held island 480 miles east of the Gilberts. They began their work on September 1st, taking a week to build a strip capable of supporting fighters. All of this gave Nimitz and Hale the bases they needed to prepare Operation Galvanic. Now over in the southwest pacific, Generals MacArthur and Blamey were continuing their planned invasion of Lae codenamed Operation Postern. By early 1943, MacArthur had devised plans that made Blamey the commander of “allied land forces” only in name. As we have seen, the creation of the Alamo Force led by General Krueger was MacArthurs attempt at seizing overall command. This led Blamey to gradually realized his only functions would be that of the commander of Australian military forces. MacArthur would reconstitute the United States Army Forces in the Far East USAFFE, for his command in the Philippines with himself as its commander. Now the original date for operation Postern was August 1st and it was to have two stages: the first was an amphibious assault neat the Lae coast and the second was an air-ground operation against Nadzab airfield to its west, this would prevent the enemy from reinforcing Lae overland. The Amphibious operation would be carried out by General Vasey's 7th division, who would depart Milne Bay and move north of Buna to land near Lae utilizing small landing craft. Admiral Barbey estimated it would require 65 LCVPS (landing craft, vehicle personnel or Higgins boats) and LCTs from the 2nd engineer special brigade. To train for the operation the 7th would be sent to trinity beach near Cairns. However continuous outbreaks of malaria led it being believed the unit could not be used without endangering the civilian population. Major General George Wooten's 9th division not yet exposed to the conditions on Green Hell and malaria free ended up taking the amphibious role. After two weeks of amphibious training with higgins boats. The 9th moved to Milne bay by August 12th and would be followed by General Heavy's units who would help further train them at Morobe. Now I had mentioned the second part was an air-ground operation, originally it was to consist of the 2/503rd american parachute battalion to take the airfield. Then the 25th and 21st brigades of the 7th division were to cross the Markham river and assist the parachute battalion to occupy the area. But it would turn out, when they arrived to Markham, the Australians first had to advance through the Bulldog road to reach Wau, and although a ton of work had been done on it the Bulldog road had not reached Markham river yet. At first General Berryman boldly said to General Kenney that he would be him a bottle of whisky that a jeep could simply cover the gap to the road by august the 1st, he lost the bet. Thus it was decided transport aircraft would be required to take the 7th division directly from Port Moresby into the overgrown landing ground at Nadzab. The parachute battalion would not receive any support from Markham. MacArthur decided to instead employ the full 503rd parachute regiment led by COlonel Kenneth Kinsler to hit Nadzab on August 8th. Now thanks in a large part to cooperation between Generals Vasey, Herring, Whitehead and Kenney the planning for the operation went well. Extensive air and land reconnaissance of the area was the key to success. With all the preparation done, D-day for the 9th division's amphibious assault was scheduled for September 1st, Z day for the 7th divisions operation against Nadzab would be September 2nd. Like all good operations, a diversion was going to be implemented. General Savige's forces had been conducting a series of attacks in the Salamaua area for months. The “Salamaua magnet” had successfully convinced General Nakano the allies intended to hit Salamaua. Nakano also believed holding Salamaua would keep Lae safe. General Adachi would go on the record to state, orders given to him and other forces was to hold Salamaua as long as possible, probably until the last man if it came down to it. Adachi knew if Salamaua fell, Lae was pretty much a lost cause. The irony of course was this all led to troops being pulled away from Lae to bolster Salamaua, when Lae was in fact the target. Air supremacy over the Huon Gulf was going to be a necessity for Operation Postern to succeed. Generals Berryman and Kenney needed to acquire new airfields that would be used to neutralize Wewak and Madang, two key Japanese air bases. The allies began building airfields at Benabena and Tsili Tsili which could act as advanced fighter bases and refueling points. Benabena already had a functioning airstrip, but Whitehead wanted to develop it further, Kenney was concerned as he knew the Japanese were aware of the site. Kenney wanted to divert the enemy's attention away from the airfield being built at Tsili Tsili which the Japanese did not know about yet. The Japanese were tossing wave after wave of air raids against Benabena, doing minimal damage. Meanwhile a military road was being constructed from Bogadjim on the northern coast up the valley of Mindjim river to Yaula and Yokopi and it was intended to extend past the Finisterre range into the Ramu Valley. On August 1st the New Guinea force HQ estimated the road would reach Ramu Valley within 8 weeks. THe development of the road and other activity in the Ramu valley was drawing attention from the Japanese, thus the 2/2nd independent company as sent to reinforce the 2/7th at Benabena. As this occurred, the secret construction work at Tsili Tsili raged on using some innovative ideas. The construction workers were using camouflage and careful timing of flights to hide the existence of Tsili Tsili's airfield, and managing to do this successfully for two months. An enormous amount of air transport and equipment was allocated for the task. The 871st airborne engineers battalion were sent in to hammer the job out and soon 3 dry weather runways were operational by september. Over on the Japanese side, they were reorganizing their air forces in New Guinea. After receiving alarming reports of enemy airfields being constructed at Mount Hagen and Benabena, knowing full well these would threaten their airfields at Wewak and Madang, it was decided the air strength of New Guinea would be bolstered by the 7th air division of Lt General Sudo Einosuke. From June 19th onwards, aircraft of the 7th division began arriving at Wewak from the Dutch East Indies. The 6th air division had moved its HQ from Rabual to Wewak on July 9th of 1943, 324 aircraft strong. The 7th air division brought another 156 aircraft, alongside this the 4th air army was brought over to Rabaul on August 6th placed under the command of General Imamura's 8th area army. Additionally to support the defense of Wewak and Madang, General Adachi was planning to toss 3000 soldiers under Lt General Katagiri Shigeru's 20th division against Benabena while Lt General Mano Goro's 41st division would occupy Mount Hagen. Such operations were scheduled to begin in early september. A detachment of the 30th independent engineer regiment of Lt Kitamoto Masamichi were sent over to Kaiapit alongside patrols further into the Ramu valley. They gradually occupied Dumpu and Wesa. But the increasing allied threat to Salamaua and Lae prompted Adachi to postpone the Benabena attack until August 1st and as a result Lae's airbase was being abandoned. Since early july, Lae was facing a substantial issue maintaining aviation fuel, it had been a point of refueling for aircraft going between Rabaul and other airfields like Madang and Wewak. Alongside this, Lae was within allied medium bomber range, and the threat prompted the Japanese to build 3 new airfields on the northwestern coast of New Guinea at But, Dagua and the Boram Plantation. It was the 20th and 41st divisions who ended up providing most of the labor to construct these airfields. On August 14th Tsili Tsili saw its first two squadrons of P-39 Airacobras of the 35th fighter group led by Lt Colonel Malcolm Moore. These arrived just in time to meet the beginning enemy attacks. Japanese aircraft had finally spotted the secret airfield during some reconnaissance flights on August 11th. On the morning of August 15th, 7 Ki-48 Lilly's escorted by 36 Ki-43 Oscars attacked Tsili Tsili. The bombers were intercepted immediately and all were shot down by 26 Airacobras and 3 Lightnings. However the Oscars managed to shoot down two C-47's of the 21st troop carrier squadron. The other C-47's scrambled to escape back to Port Moresby by flying at treetop level. The allied fighters then intercepted the Oscars lading to 3 Oscars being downed at the cost of 4 Airacobras. The following day saw another raid, but Thunderbolts and Lightnings intercepted the raiders downing some 15 Oscars. After receiving such a blow, the Japanese commanders at Wewak decided to conserve further air strength. Unbeknownst to them the situation was far more dire than they thought. You see the Japanese commanders did not believe the enemy fighters and medium bombers had the range to hit Wewak. To geek out a bit, when such aircraft like Mitchells first arrived in Australia, they were equipped with a lower turret. Now when they began performing operations in New Guinea, it required low altitude flying and thus the turrets became useless, so they were removed and replaced with forward firing guns at the nose. General Kenney's air depot at Townsville working tireless to modify 172 Mitchells between July and September of 1943. The removal of the large turrets allowed for an additional square shaped 11,500 liter metal fuel tank to be installed, which was suspended by hooks from a bomb shackle. These fuel tanks gave the aircraft an extra two hours flying time, just enough to give them the range to hit Wewak. These tanks were very vulnerable to catching fire during combat or from crash landings so they were made dischargeable. A minor innovation, that made all the difference. On August 1th aerial photographs indicated the Japanese had 8 medium bombers, 31 light bombers, 69 fighters at Wewak and Boram plus 34 medium and 34 light bombs with 23 fighters at Dagua and But. Thus Kenney elected to hit them and he had at his disposal two heavy bomber groups the 43rd and 90th bomb groups with 64 bombers alongside two medium groups, the 3rd attack group and 38th bomb groups with 58 modified mitchells. Kenney's plan was to toss 8 squadrons of heavy bombers for night raids against Wewaks 4 airfields followed up by 5 squadrons of Mitchells. Fighter could refuel at Tsili Tsili to help escort and boy would they, an unprecedented 99 fighter escorts would take part in the raids. On the night of August 16th the first raid occurred seeing 12 B-17 and 38 Liberators take off from Port Moresby, all but two reached Wewak by midnight. For 3 hours Colonels Harry Hawthorne and Aruther Rogers led the 43rd and 90th bombardment groups to pound the 4 airfields causing tremendous damage. Countless aircraft tried to take off the next day at Boram only to fail due to damage. The next morning, two squadrons of Mithcells of Lt COlonel Brian O'Neill's 38th bomb group left Port Moresby to hit Dagua and But while two squadrons of Colonel Donald Hall's 3rd attack group would hit Wewak and Boram. They would be employing some new toys, the first parachute retarded fragmentation bombs or also called Parafrags. They had been developed from standard 10 kg fragmentation bombs which were carried in a honeycomb rack in the bomb bay. A small parachute slowed and straightened out the course of the bomb allowing the bomber to get out of the blast range before it exploded. Further work was also going into the development of “daisy-cutter” bombs, which were bombs wrapping with wire to iron rods onto them to produce a ground level fragmentation effect when used with a ground proximity fuse. Nerd stuff. The 3rd group bombers ended up catching some newly arrived Japanese aircraft perfectly lined up on each side of the runways. The Mitchells strafed them before dropping 786 10 kg paragraph bombs, annihilating 60 aircraft. Meanwhile the 38th group Mitchells faced some issues discharging their auxiliary fuel tanks, leading to only 3 bombers reaching Dagua and none to But. The 3 who reached Dagua strafed and low level bombed it with 105 ten kg parafrags destroying and damaged at least 17 aircraft and intercepting a single Oscar. Not a bad haul at all for just 3 Mitchells. The following day, Kenney tried to repeat the raids, but this time only half of the 49 heavy bombers reached their targets and the bombing was quite inaccurate. However, most of the 62 Mitchell's reached the target this time, but they would be pounced upon by Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft fire from an enemy that was waiting for them. A flight led by Major Ralph Cheli, commanding the 405th bomb squadron was jumped by nearly a dozen Oscars. Cheli's plane was badly hit, his right engine and wing catch fire. Yet despite this Cheli led his flight across Dagua airfield before crashing into the ocean. He was captured and sent to Rabaul where he would later be executed. For this brave action Cheli was awarded the Medal of Honor. In the end 15 Oscars were destroyed at the cost of 2 lightnings and 1 mitchell. Two additional raids were conducted on August 20th and 21st. The 5th air force claimed to have destroyed 20 enemy aircraft on the 20th and 70th on the final day, half of which were shot down in air combat by the Lightnings. An estimated 174 Japanese aircraft were put out of action during these attacks, almost 90% of which came from Wewaks total air strength around 200 strong. Even before it had a chance to derail the battle for Lae, the 4th air army had been completely annihilated. Wewak was neutralized, the door was open to smash Lae. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A ton of planning was raging on and now there was to finally be twin operations to thrust into the central pacific and south pacific. With some new toys, Kenney's airforces had all but smashed what the Japanese had created to defend Lae. Now the door was wide open for Lae to be assaulted.
I am honored to present Prashantha Ramu on this week's episode! Prashantha is a yoga teacher living in Mysuru, India who is passionate about the power of yoga to heal and transform lives. Listen as he shares his life as a yogi and feel the positive vibrations he has to give.Visit Prashanth on his website here: https://prashanthayoga.com/Follow him on Instagram @prashantha.yoga here: https://www.instagram.com/prashantha.yoga/?hl=enDuring this conversation we speak about:How he got introduced to yoga? Growing up in a rural village. Inspiration from his father. Yoga is in the soil and in the air.His experience working in the tech world. How technical knowledge helps in teaching yoga. How technology can improve spiritual connections. Why should we practice yoga? Thanks for listening to this episode. Check out:
En este episodio reacciono a la convocatoria de 14 jugadores de la Federación de Baloncesto de Puerto Rico con un análisis de cada jugador, ausencias más notables y quienes serían mis cortes. ¡Que Disfrutes! --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/elramuopina/support
Hello Everyone , This is a fabulous moral story of a boy . He is an innocent guy . He works hard to follow the instructions of his brother . Listen to the full story and get to know about the moral of the story .
This episode covers the last 14 paragraphs of chapter 4 from: “A Christlike miracle by Lahiri Mahasaya...” To “...Kebalananda taught me a diviner syntax” In this episode, we explore a miraculous incident in the presence of Lahiri Mahasaya and Swami Kebalananda. Ramu, a blind disciple, approached the guru seeking sight. With unwavering faith and guidance, Ramu's vision was restored within a week, allowing him to witness the beauty of the world for the first time. These miracles exemplify Lahiri Mahasaya's selfless surrender to the Prime Healing Power and the lasting impact of his teachings. Join us as we delve into the transformative experiences, focussing on the term ‘Christlike', karma, humility, Edwin Arnold and a review of Chapter 4. 0:00 Nik's experience of the AoY; 4:35 Christlike miracles; 17:43 Ramu's Fortune and Karma; 30:02 The Miracle; 1:04:08 Incarnation of Humility; 1:23:00 Arnold's Gita vs Guruji's Gita; 1:20:43 Summary and reflections of Chapter 4. Links discussed in the podcast: https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/history/miraclesofjesus_1.shtml Discourse 20, The Second Coming of Christ, Paramahansa Yogananda. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edwin_Arnold Homework for next episode— Read, absorb and make notes on the first 17 paragraphs of chapter 5 from: “To every thing there is a season,” To “...companion dismissed the ornate dignity.” #autobiographyofayogi #autobiographylinebyline #paramahansayogananda Autobiography of a Yogi awake.minute Self-Realization Fellowship #SRF
Last time we spoke about the aftermath of the battle for Attu. The American victory over Attu meant the end of the Aleutian campaign for the Japanese, Tokyo decided to pull everyone out. Over 6000 Japanese needed evacuation from Kiska and it would be very tricky for the Japanese to get past Admiral Kinkaids blockade. Then we finished up the West Hubei offensive, with a part of it being known colloquially as the Rice Bowl Campaign. The Japanese had brutalized the Chinese, but we're stopped short of invading Chongqing or Sichuan. Thus for the Chinese it was a victory, but at the same time the Japanese had secured exactly what they wanted, stealing vast amounts of property, notably rice. Vessels left Yichang and sailed further west through the riverways acquiring large sums of goods to help the China war cause. Today we are diving back into the south Pacific. This episode is Operation Cartwheel starts rolling Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. So honestly for awhile now we have been hitting the North Pacific and China theaters, which certainly was a change of pace, but as you can imagine these events do not simply move along in a vacuum. Yes a lot was going on in the other theaters and this episode is going to be tackling a lot of different events so buckle up buckos. First we are going to talk about Operation Cartwheel. The ULTRA intelligence that brought Yamamoto's death was not the only information the Americans received in April. A lifeboat bearing a list of the names of 40,000 active Japanese officers washed ashore after the battle of the Bismarck Sea. Using this Cryptographers were able to match each name to radio signals from Japanese army units, ensuring General MacArthurs intelligence remained as operationally up to date as it could be. At the same time William Bull Hasley showed to on April 15th to Brisbane to meet with MacArthur and the two hit it off. Halsey would later write this about their first encounter. “Five minutes after I reported, I felt as if we were lifelong friends. I have seldom seen a man who makes a quicker, stronger, more favorable impression. He was then sixty-three, but he could have passed as fifty. His hair was jet black; his eyes were clear; his carriage erect….My mental picture poses him against the background of these discussions; he is pacing his office, almost wearing a groove between his large, bare desk and the portrait of George Washington that faced it; his corncob pipe is in his hand (I rarely saw him smoke it): and he is making his points in a diction I have never heard surpassed. “ Both men would hammer out a plan on April 26th, it was a revision to MacArthur's Elkton plan, this one would be known as Elkton III, but it was soon to be coded as Operation Cartwheel. The plan consisted of 13 amphibious landings in just 6 months with MacArthur and Halsey providing maximum support to each others efforts. The first phase of the plan would see MacArthur seizing Woodlark and the Kirwina islands while Hasley invaded New Georgia. Phase 2 would commence 2 months after the start of the offensive where MacArthur would capture Lae, Salamaua and Finschhafen. Phase 3 would be the seizure of the Shortland islands and Bougainville in the south pacific. In December MacArthur would seize Cape Gloucester in Western New Britain and shortly after that they would seize Rabaul. Halsey's forces would knock out Japanese air bases on Buka, allowing MacArthurs men to clear the northwestern half of New Guinea. By January of 1944, MacArthur and Halsey figured they would be ready for the final assault on Rabaul which was their ultimate objective for victory. MacArthur resisted sending details of their joint plan to Washington, probably fearing the Europe first obsessed chiefs of staff would veto their ambitious thrust. He told them only that he anticipated that the first move toward Woodlark and Kirwina would start in June. However this was too slow for Admiral King. King wanted his protege Admiral Nimitz to begin a thrust into the central pacific, heading through the Marshalls in November and proposed shifting the Marine 1st and 2nd divisions, the ones that fell under MacArthurs and Halsey's command to help with the Marshalls offensive, this alongside two bomber groups promised to General Kenney. MacArthur was very pissed off and he sent a distressed message to George Marshall damning the entire central Pacific strategy as a quote “unnecessary and even wasteful diversion from what should be the main pacific strategy”, that being MacArthur's own.”. He added in “from a broad strategic viewpoint, I am convinced that the best course of offensive action in the Pacific is a movement from Australia through New Guinea to Mindanao. Air supremacy is essential to success, for the southwestern strategy where large numbers of land-based aircraft are utterly essential and will immediately cut the enemy lines from japan to his conquered territory to the southward. Pulling any additional heavy bombers groups would in my opinion, collapse the offensive effort in the southwest pacific area…in my judgment the offensive against Rabaul should be considered the main effort, and it should not be nullified or weakened ”. But King was adamant. There would indeed be a thrust through the central pacific led by the navy with its main axis passing through the Marshalls and Marianas towards Japan,which might I remind you listening, bypasses the Philippines. It of course was a strategy completely at odds with MacArthurs. Marshall supported King, as did the other Joint Chiefs. But in the end MacArthurs whining forced King to relent on the transfer of the two marine divisions and the bomber groups, thus MacArthur revealed his timetable for operation Cartwheel. He told them he planned to take Kiriwna and Woodlark in the Trobriand Island around June 30th. The advance on New Georgia would start on the same date, and in September the First Cavalry and 3 Australian divisions would begin operations against the Madang-Salamaua area. Meanwhile MacArthur's 43rd division would invade southern Bougainville on October 15th, while the 1st Marines and 32nd division would invade Cape Gloucester on December 1st. For all of these amphibious landings, there were no serious problems when it came to shipping and landing craft….that is for Nimitz designated areas. However at the beginning of 1943, MacArthur had practically no amphibious equipment nor experts in these types of operations. The only units available to him were the Army's engineering special boat brigade which had very few small craft. The man who would be responsible for the amphibious assaults during much of the coming campaigns was to be Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey. On January 10th, 1943 he took command of the forces that would later be designated the 7th Amphibious force. Barbey from the offset established good relations with MacArthur…because well anyone who worked with MacArthur had to. He had nearly nothing to work with in the beginning, but started with establishing bases at Toobul Bay, near the mouth of the Brisbane river and Point Stephens. MacArthur had requested more small craft and transports as early as mid 1942, but because of the European and central pacific being a priority, little had come his way. Before the equipment came, MacArthur was receiving American and Australian troops, so he got Barbey's team to improvise. They began training the troops in debarking from larger ships down cargo nets to smaller landing craft. However Barbey had no attack transports (APA), which was the key to this kind of operation. To solve this they rigged nets from cliffs, boy that must have been fun. The first Landing ship tanks LSTs and Landing craft tanks LCTs would not arrive until mid january, and on Easter Sunday 13 Landing craft infantry's LCI's were delivered, giving them very little time before the first operations were to begin to train the crews on how to use them. Now on the other side Halsey had his own three phase operation. Part 1 saw the invasion of New Georgia, part 2 was the seizure of Buin and Rekata Bay if possible and last 3 was the seizure of Kieta and the neutralization of Buka. Phase 1 was codenamed Operation Toenails. Halsey described the operation to Nimitz as “a infiltration and staging operation”. The operation would see simultaneous landings at Wickham Anchorage to hit its landing craft base; Segi point for its airfield site; Viru Harbor for its small craft base and Rendova Harbor which would serve as a new base to stage troops for a future attack upon Munda. This would all occur on June 30th. The main force assigned to Operation Toenails was General Hester's 43rd division. Admiral Turner and his Task Force 31 were in charge of the amphibious landings while Admiral Fitch would toss 1182 aircraft to give them aircower and Admiral's Ainsworth and Merrill's Task force 36 would provide further naval support. On the other side, interservice coordination between the Japanese Generals and Admirals remained intermittent and largely ad hoc, when it was not hostile. General Imamura's 8th area army HQ at Rabaul stood above Hyakutake's 17th Army, comprising 3 divisions spread over the SOlomons and New Britain, and General Hatazo Adachi's 8th Army had 3 divisions on New Guinea. Troop reinforcements were arriving in Rabaul bolstering the garrison at one point to 90,000 men. Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka remained in command of navy forces at Rabaul and held responsibility for the defense of the central solomons. Admiral Mineichi Koga had succeeded the slain Yamamoto as commander in chief of the combined fleet, based at Truk. Nowhere in the theater was there a blended command, the army and navy had to coordinate their operations through a meticulous process of “nemawashi / digging around the roots” for a consensus. The Japanese moved new air units into the theater, including more of the elite carrier aircrews that had trained and honed their skills prior to the war, but the loss ratios in air combat was ruining them. As a result of the devastating loss during the battle of the Bismarck Sea, the Japanese were forced to change plans. USAAF and RAAF aircraft based at Port Moresby and Milne Bay had slaughtered an entire convoy of Japanese transports attempting to land troops in the Lae-Slaamaua area using a new technique called “skip bombing”. Imperial General HQ set up a joint Army/Navy investigation board to study the disaster, seeing the IJA accused the IJN of being too focused on the Solomons rather than on New Guinea. The Army argued New Guinea was vital for the national defenses and proposed that if a retreat became necessary, it would be as a direct result of the navy's lack of support. If this were to happen they would have to pull back and create a defensive line from northwest New Guinea to Timor. The Navy's representatives argued that the Huon Peninsula must be held or its loss would swing open the western gate to Rabaul, forcing the combined fleet to withdraw from Truk. Well the fighting eventually resulted in an ultimatum with both sides agreeing the army/navy operations should focus on eastern New Guinea. It was decided that both the army and navy would literally operate as one unit, because that would go well. The Central solomons were still under the overall responsibility of the 8th fleet, now commanded by Vice Admiral Baron Samejima Tomoshige with some IJA units placed under naval command according to agreements made between General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka. It seems the Japanese could get along once and awhile, as just like Halsey and MacArthur, Imamura and Kusaka developed a deep friendship. Both of their staffs ate lunch together once or twice a week, where southeast area affairs were discussed informally and their respective staffs got to know another personally. Kusaka went on the record to say Imamura was a very great person. Many army units would be sent to reinforce the New Georgia defenses and by late May the bulk of the 229th regiment arrived to Munda, and the 13th regiment went to Vila by late June. Imamura placed both regiments under the command of Major General Sasaki Noboru's southeast detachment who responded directly to Samejima. Samejima's first orders were to arrange the responsibilities between General Sasaki's southeast detachment and Admiral Ota's 8th combined SNLF, seeing Sasaki in charge of Munda and Ota in charge of the Enogai and Bairoko area's. If the situation arose, command would be unified under the senior officer on New Georgia, General Sasaki. Ota would also have responsibility for coastal artillery defense, radio communications, and barge operations. Admiral Koga in his new role as commander of the combined fleet, preemptively sent move of his forces back to the home islands in preparation to reinforce Attu. But as the fate of the Aleutians became sealed by late May, Koga decided to concentrate the combined Fleet at Truk, so it would be primed and ready for a decisive naval battle with the Americans. Without the aid of Koga's carriers, Kusaka had launched another air counteroffensive after I-Go, this one taking place in June. The aim was yet again to prevent the Americans from invading the central solomons . Kusaka began tossing waves of Bety's against American shipping east of San Cristobal and night raids over guadalcanal. Simultaneously he also unleashed Operation SO; a major offensive to smash allied air power in the Solomon islands; and operation SE: which targeted airfields and shipping. He sent 105 Zeros to sweep and bomb the enemy airfields with a new type of gasoline bomb. Operation SE began with 25 Val dive bombers attacking US shipping in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area and Operation SO began on June 7th with 81 Zeros led by Lt Commander Shindo Saburo assaulting the Russels. However the Russel group ran right into 104 allied fighters who shot down 9 Zeros. A follow up attack was made on the 12th with 74 Zeros led by Lt Miyano Zenjiro, this time the Japanese lost 7 fighters but took down 6 American. As usual the Japanese pilots made wild claims, stating the first attack saw 41 American fights shot down and the second attack 24. Kusaka launched the main attack of Operation SE on June 16th led by Lt commander Saburo consisting of 24 Vals and 70 Zero escorts who swung south of the Russells, turning at Beaufort Bay. Yet again they were intercepted, this time by 74 allied fighters over BEaufort Bay and the ensuing ari battle rolled over the mountainous spine of guadalcanal. This time the Japanese lost 15 Zeros and 13 Vals while only shooting down 6 allied fighters. The Japanese lost first rate pilots such as Lt Miyano who had scored a total of 16 kills during the war. Again Japanese veteran pilots were being bled dry severely affecting the nation's airpower. Despite their waves being intercepted nearly every time, the Vals were able to press through with their attacks and managed to hit the cargo ships Caleno and LST-340. But such results were hardly worth the cost, so Kusaka began to urgently request reinforcements. The carrier Ryhuo would lend her bombers to replace the lost ones, arriving on the 2nd of July. The losses taught the Japanese pilots some bitter lessons and never again would the fly over guadalcanal during daylight as the American CAP was far to powerful. Over in New Guinea, General Blamey was laying out his plan for the capture of Lae, codenamed Operation Postern which was approved by MacArthurs headquarters. Before the allies would invade Woodlark and Kiriwana, MacArthur proscribed the seizure of Lae and the Markham and Ramu valley. The Markham operations were to be based on Port Moresby while the north coast operations would be staged from Buna and Milne Bay. The invasion of Woodlark and Kiriwana islands codenamed Operation Chronicle would be entrusted to Lt General Walter Kruegers 6th army. The islands northeast of the Papuan coast would allow the allies to have air bases closer to Japanese targets in the Solomons and around Rabaul, thus Blamey had devised his plan to secure the northeastern part of New Guinea. The first phase of his plan was Lae and the Markham and Ramu Valleys; the 2nd phase was to seize a shore base within 60 miles of Lae, he chose Nassau Bay. Nassau Bay would help with the supply problems in the Wau-Mubo-Bobdubi area, as all the supplies were being flown in from Port Moresby. The mountains were serious obstacles for transport aircraft, not to mention the Japanese fighters that could spring out of nearby Lae. Taking Nassau Bay would greatly shorting supply lines for allied troops fighting in the Salamaua region and also allow a junction to be made with General Saviges forces operating at Mubo The 162nd American Regiment led by Colonel Archibald MacKechnie would help hit Nassau Bay, they would be known as the MacKechnie force. They would seize the high ground around Goodiew Junction and Mount Tambu and the ridges running down therefrom to the sea, allowing the Australians to link up with the 15th brigade at Bobdubi and the American landing force at Nassau. D-day for the Nassau Landing was set for June 30th and it was all going to act as a feint, hoping to lure Japanese forces from Lae to Salamaua. Now the last time we left off in New Guinea, General Savige had launched a limited offensive against the Japanese at Mubo and Bobdubi ridge. General Nakano was certain Salamaua was the main allied target and this prompting him on the 29th to order Major General Chuichi Muroya to lead the 51st division to fortify it. In the process Muroya's men expelled Warfe's commandos from the northern ridge. To the east of Mubo, Brigadier Moten was trying to take the Pimple, but his 17th brigade would be performing more patrolling than actual attacks throughout the later half of May. Eventually Savige would relieve the exhausted 2/7th battalion with the 2/6th battalion led by Lt Colonel Frederick Wood who would begin an advance on May the 27th. Meanwhile Nakano had brought more reinforcements to defend Mubo and launched a strong counterattack in early May, nearly breaking through towards the main Australian camp at Lababia ridge. On May 23rd Nakano received two battalions of the 66th regiment and began to work out a plan for assembling supplies and ammunition in the Mubo area to prepare for an offensive. Men would move at night in a single file along the narrow jungle trails carrying the materials by hand, through mud and rain. The main train was a slope on Komiatum ridge known to the Japanese as Regret Hill as the hard working soldiers became more exhausted with each passing day marching along it. The Japanese sought to clear out Lababia ridge as far as Guadagasal, thus securing Mubo. On June 3rd, allied patrols discovered Nakano had reoccupied Markham point which forced Savige to keep the bulk of the 24th away from the action at Bobdubi and Mubo. From their camp at the bank of the Markham Savige ordered patrols to investigate the Nadzab area. On June 14th, a 3 man patrol came across friendly natives at the village of Gabsonkek who informed them of the Japanese activity in the area. They said "that the Japs come to the village every day between 10:00 and 12:00 hours taking everything in sight—pigs, fowls, fruit, etc., without paying; they take native girls back to Lae if they can catch them. The guides would not proceed farther to Ngasawapum because Japan man come up Big Road, cut us off", and they would not go to Narakapor because they claimed there were too many Japs and two big guns". The patrol went back to camp by the 18th informing command. A second patrol was made, led by Lt Dave Burke who forded the Tabali River to get to Nassau Bay. Their report indicated the area was suitable for landing and road construction. To further prepare for the American landings, the Australians began building a footbridge over the Bitoi River and blazed a track up to Bitoi Ridge. On Lababia Ridge the main defensive position withdrew to a junction on the Jap Tracks where it would be easier to counter enemy encirclement attempts. Reports came in from forward platoons that there was considerable enemy activity along the Komiatum-Mubo track. This was Nakano's 66th regiment carrying the food and ammunition in preparation for the upcoming offensive. In response to this, Savige ordered Brigadier Frank Hosking of the 15th brigade to assume command of the Bobdubi ridge area and to begin harassing the Japanese supply route. Meanwhile the 58th/59th battalion relieved the 2/3rd independent company at Hote and a party of Warfe's commando's were sent to attack the Komiatum-Mubo track. However disaster struck as the Australians ran into their own booby-traps on June 16th suffering a number of casualties. By June 20th, the commando's established ambush positions along a ridge near the junction of Stephens Track and the Komiatum Track. They successfully ambushed some Japanese later that day, killing a few men and capturing valuable documents about the arrival of Nakano's 66th regiment. However by this point Nakano's units were already assembling in front of Lababia ridge and the offensive was about to begin. Now we gotta finish up the episode talking about some developments in India. After the disastrous first Arakan Campaign, Marshal Wavell was to receive a promotion, and by promotion I mean he was kicked upstairs as they say, succeeded Lord Linlithgow as the new Viceroy of India. But until then he began looking into training his forces in jungle warfare as the bitter lessons learned at Arakan proved the men were very unprepared. Wavell also wanted to investigate what the hell had happened during the disaster, so he sent Major General Roland Richardson in late May to head a infantry committee at New Delhi for the task. The committee's report about the Arakan campaign found the troops fighting spirit was fundamentally sound, but the major problems that affected their combat performance were more about the over expansion of the army in India. The army mobilization had been rushed, they barely met basic training and the supplying of their sheer numbers was a catastrophe. There were also issues regarding their low status, inferior pay for the infantry, which further deprived them of skilled and well educated recruits. Yet above all else the Infantry committee found their lack of jungle training to be the most egregious issue. As observed “This is the most urgent problem facing us, and one which requires prompt and energetic action if results are to be produced in time for the winter campaigning season.” The lack of jungle training severely undermined their ability to fight efficiently and ultimately led to the breakdown of infantry battalions in the Arakan. And of course there was the ever present unseen enemy, that of malaria, alongside an assortment of other ailments that were wreaking havoc on the men. But many of these problems could not be tackled until June 20th, when General Claude Auchinleck was officially appointed as the new Commander in Chief in India. For General Slim this was excellent news and certainly worked in his favor alongside the sacking of Irwin. The “Auk” as he was called, had always been a Slim supporter and was the one who recommended him to Wavell for advancement when Wavell was Commander in Chief of the middle east back in 1941. The Auk had wanted to retain Slim in the middle east and fought hard to dissuade Wavell from taking him over to Burma. Churchill never held Wavell ever in high regard and was tired of his quasi-academic effusions and preferred a “fighting general” in Burma. Alongside the Auk, Irwin was replaced with General George Giffard, and Slim had this to say of the replacement. “The new Army Commander had a great effect on me. A tall, goodlooking man in the late fifties, who had obviously kept himself physically and mentally in first-class condition, there was nothing dramatic about him in either appearance or speech. He abhorred the theatrical, and was one of the very few generals, indeed men in any position, I have known who really disliked publicity . . . But there was much more to General Giffard than good taste, good manners and unselfishness. He understood the fundamentals of war – that soldiers must be trained before they can fight, fed before they can march, and relieved before they are worn out. He understood that front-line commanders should be spared responsibilities in the rear, and that soundness of organization and administration is worth more than specious short-cuts to victory” Auckinleck went to work from the offset of his new command by improving the welfare, health and feeding of the Indian army to foster improved morale. General Giffard as the new commander of the Eastern Army had Major General Temple Gurdon to oversee some reforms for training and the development of new doctrines. A lot of effort was made to conduct intensive collective training under jungle conditions. The men would train near Nasik, Ranchi, Dehradun and in the Jhansi-Nowgong-lalitpur region. Commanders low to high were given a chance at handling units to improve standards of staff work, practice combined army tactics and build team spirit. Auchinleck also initiated a policy of active patrolling at Assam and Arakan to gather intelligence and maintain touch with the Japanese as to destroy the feeling that they were super soldiers. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A lot of chess pieces were moved around the board this week. Bitter lessons had been learnt in multiple theaters of the war and now it came time to reorganize and try new things to ultimately bring the war against Japan to a closer end.
Breve análisis de los 3 rivales de Puerto Rico, itinerario del Mundial y palabras de Arroyo/Nelson, entre otras cosas. ¡Que Disfrutes! --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/elramuopina/support
Are you ready to learn about real estate investing? Tune in to Learn or Be Learned and meet your host, Shiva Dhanasekar, as she kicks off an exciting new video podcast season featuring a six-episode mini-series on real estate and real estate investing. In this series, two experienced realtors, Ramu Velu from Velu Holdings LLC and Nithin Thomas from Nithin Thomas Consulting Co., share their wealth of knowledge and advice on buying your first home, investing in rental properties, and scaling your investments for maximum profit. Throughout the miniseries, the speakers discuss important topics including the differences between single-family and multifamily real estate, the importance of understanding your comfort level, goals, and timeline, and the various options available for investing in real estate. They also provide helpful tips on how to build equity, recycle capital through exits, and work with a team of professionals to maximize your investments. The hosts caution that certain investment avenues, like house flipping and Airbnb, can be high risk and require extensive research. However, they also offer insights on which home renovations can add value to your property and which ones are simply personal preferences. Time Stamps [00:02:45] Real Estate Investing: Single-family vs Multifamily Homes [00:03:43] Real Estate Investment and House Hacking [00:07:18] Investment Options for Rental Properties [00:10:48] Real Estate Exit Strategies [00:14:11] Real Estate Investing: Understanding Terminology and Market Trends [00:17:34] Investing in Real Estate: Team and Strategies [00:20:57] House flipping and wholesaling [00:24:35] Home renovations with good ROI [00:28:36] Buying New vs. Used Homes: Pros and Cons [00:31:57] Understanding the Risks of Airbnb Investing [00:35:55] Syndication vs Single Family Investments [00:39:27] Signing Off of the Miniseries and Both Realtors Socials Noteworthy Quotes from the Episode [00:02:53] "Anything past 4 homes is legally classified as an apartment" - Ramu Velu [00:05:24] "The more you do THIS, the easier it becomes to buy more homes." - Ramu Velu [00:15:29] "It's like, okay. So if I'm cash flowing by this much in the year, I can save up that cash flow, get the next down payment put together for the next property, then recycle, recycle, recycle, and the thing just grows eventually. That's how you build a portfolio but it just depends on the markets honestly." - Nithin Thomas [00:17:05] "You wanna be the investor that buys it before it blows up, which is why you need a..." (the quote is cut off, but it implies the importance of being ahead of the market and having a good understanding of the industry. - Nithin Thomas Links to the Guests and Resources Mentioned (if any) Ramu Velu's Instagram Nithin Thomas Instagram My Information Podcast Link Page: www.solo.to/shivadhana Instagram: @shivadhana Email | shivadhana@dhanastudios.com Video Podcast on YouTube: Click Here for YouTube Channel Apple Ratings & Reviews: Click Here for Apple Podcasts Show Notes, Tips & More: Click Here for Linkedin Page Contact Me or Be a Guest: Click Here for Podcast Website Share a link to my podcast: Click Here for a Link to Podcast Platform Selections Hashtags #realestateinvesting #househacking #rentalproperties #syndications #propertymanagement #flippinghouses #homerenovations #newvsusedhomes #Airbnbinvesting #passiveinvesting #ROI #Texasinvesting #realtorrecommendations #podcastrecommendations #LearnorBelearned #realestatepodcast --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/shivadhana/message
Jennifer Chow, Rob Osler and Harini NagendraShow NotesOn this episode we finish our interviews with nominees for the Agatha Awards which will begiven at Malice Domestic this year.We first talked with Jennifer Chow who is nominated for her book “Death By Bubble Tea”(Berkley) for Best Contemporary Novel.When Yale Yee discovers her cousin Celine is visiting from Hong Kong, she is obliged to playtour guide to a relative she hasn't seen in twenty years. Not only that, but her father thinks it's awonderful idea for them to bond by running a food stall together at the Eastwood Village NightMarket. Yale hasn't cooked in years, and she hardly considers Celine's career as a social mediainfluencer as adequate experience, but because she's just lost her job at her local bookstore,she feels she has no choice.Yale and Celine serve small dishes and refreshing drinks, and while business is slow, iteventually picks up thanks to Celine's surprisingly useful marketing ideas. They're quite shockedthat their bubble tea, in particular, is a hit--literally--when one of their customers turns up dead.Yale and Celine are prime suspects due to the gold flakes that Celine added to the sweet drinkas a garnish. Though the two cousins are polar opposites in every way, they must work togetherto find out what really happened to the victim or the only thing they'll be serving is time.We talked then with Rob Osler who is nominated for a Best First Novel for his book “Devil'sChew Toy” (Level Best).Seattle teacher and part-time blogger Hayden McCall wakes sporting one hell of a shiner, withthe police knocking at his door. It seems that his new crush, dancer Camilo Rodriguez, hasgone missing and they suspect foul play. What happened the night before? And where isCamilo?Determined to find answers, pint-sized, good-hearted Hayden seeks out two of Camilo's friends—Hollister and Burley—both lesbians and both fiercely devoted to their friend. From them,Hayden learns that Camilo is a “Dreamer” whose parents had been deported years earlier, andwhose sister, Daniela, is presumed to have returned to Venezuela with them. Convinced that thecops won't take a brown boy's disappearance seriously, the girls join Hayden's hunt for Camilo.The first clues turn up at Barkingham Palace, a pet store where Camilo had taken a part-timejob. The store's owner, Della Rupert, claims ignorance, but Hayden knows something is up. Andthen there's Camilo's ex-boyfriend, Ryan, who's suddenly grown inexplicably wealthy. WhenHayden and Hollister follow Ryan to a secure airport warehouse, they make a shockingconnection between him and Della—and uncover the twisted scheme that's made both of themrich.The trail of clues leads them to the grounds of a magnificent estate on an island in PugetSound, where they'll finally learn the truth about Camilo's disappearance—and the fate of hisfamily.And Finally, we talked with Harini Nagendra who is nominated for a Best First Novel for her book:The Bangladore Detective's Club” (Constable)Solving crimes isn't easy.Add a jealous mother-in-law and having to wear a flowing sari into the mix, and you've got aproblem.When clever, headstrong Kaveri moves to Bangalore to marry doctor Ramu, she's resignedherself to a quiet life.But that all changes the night of the party at the Century Club, where she escapes to the gardenfor some peace - and instead spots an uninvited guest in the shadows. Half an hour later, theparty turns into a murder scene.When a vulnerable woman is connected to the crime, Kaveri becomes determined to save herand launches a private investigation to find the killer, tracing his steps from an illustrious brothelto an Englishman's mansion. She soon finds that sleuthing in a sari isn't as hard as it seemswhen you have a talent for maths, a head for logic and a doctor for a husband.And she's going to need them all as the case leads her deeper into a hotbed of danger, seditionand intrigue in Bangalore's darkest alleyways . . .We congratulate each and every nominee and wish them all the best of luck with their writingand in life.TRIVIALast week's question was:Which author used the following pseudonyms in their career. Deanna Dwyer, K. R. Dwyer,Aaron Wolfe, David Axton, Brian Coffey, John Hill, Leigh Nichols, Owen West, Richard Paige,and Anthony North?a. Dean Koontzb. James Pattersonc. John LeCarred. Michael ConnellyThe answer is a. Dean Koontz. Known pseudonyms used by Koontz during his career includeDeanna Dwyer, K. R. Dwyer, Aaron Wolfe, David Axton, Brian Coffey, John Hill, Leigh Nichols,Owen West, Richard Paige, and Anthony North. As Brian Coffey, he wrote the "Mike Tucker"trilogy (Blood Risk, Surrounded, Wall of Masks) in acknowledged tribute to the Parker novels ofRichard Stark (Donald E. Westlake). Many of Koontz's pseudonymous novels are now availableunder his real name. Many others remain suppressed by Koontz, who bought back the rights toensure they could not be republished; he has, on occasion, said that he might revise some forrepublication, but only three have appeared — Demon Seed and Invasion were both heavilyrewritten before they were republished, and Prison of Ice had certain sections bowdlerised.This week's question is:P.D. James began her writing career while she worked where?a. A schoolb. a Law firmc. a factoryd. a hospitalTune in next week for the answer.
In this real estate mini-series, host Shiva Dhanasekar is joined by experienced realtors Ramu Velu and Nithin Thomas to discuss real estate investing mindsets. The six-episode series is filled with valuable tips, advice, and mindsets that will inspire you to take the leap into real estate investing. In this particular episode, the trio emphasizes the importance of understanding personal goals when investing in real estate. They discuss how single-family homes are a popular rental choice among investors because they want to know the potential Return on Investment (ROI) after expenses, and how cash flow is important in determining ROI. Additionally, the speakers shed light on how real estate investments, like those of McDonald's, appreciate over time, providing a hedge against inflation. Moreover, owning a home is an important part of the American dream, providing a sense of ownership and pride that other investments do not. The government provides FHA loans to help first-time and young homebuyers purchase homes when they cannot afford them. Furthermore, the speakers explore the various avenues for investing in real estate, including single and multi-family homes, warehouses, short-term rentals, and more. They explain the distinction between commercial and residential properties, as well as the difference between single-family and multi-family homes. Time Stamps [03:42] Real Estate Investing Tips [07:20] The Appeal of Homeownership and Real Estate [11:05] Investing in Real Estate vs. Domain Names Noteworthy Quotes from the Episode [02:41] "Something interesting I heard was the idea that McDonald's is not a business in the food industry. It's a real estate company." - Shiva Dhanasekar [05:22] "The value of your land keeps going up. Right? So the value of your business keeps going up. So although your cash flow is relatively consistent, the value keeps going up. And that's 1 of the main reasons why a lot of people are very interested in real estate." - Ramu Velu [08:55] It's real easy to brag about the number of homes you have rental units you have or something. Because it's more tangible to people. Well, I live in a home. I have 1 home. Wow. You have 3. Tell me more." - Ramu Velu [10:24] Shiva: "So do you guys think, at any point, we might switch in in society to more digital real estate?" Ramu: "Truth be told, I don't know what that is. Like, if it's digital, does it mean it exists?" Links to the Guests and Resources Mentioned (if any) Ramu Velu's Instagram Nithin Thomas Instagram My Information Podcast Link Page: www.solo.to/shivadhana Instagram: @shivadhana Email | shivadhana@dhanastudios.com Video Podcast on YouTube: Click Here for YouTube Channel Apple Ratings & Reviews: Click Here for Apple Podcasts Show Notes, Tips & More: Click Here for Linkedin Page Contact Me or Be a Guest: Click Here for Podcast Website Share a link to my podcast: Click Here for a Link to Podcast Platform Selections Hashtags #LernerBLearned #videoPodcast #realestateinvesting #realestatepodcast #investinggoals #McDonaldsRealEstate #singlefamilyhomes #homeownershipdream #intangibleinvestments #digitalrealestate #domainname #multifamilyhomes #AirbnbInvesting #commercialrealestate #podcastinghub #podcastinglife #podcastersofinstagram #podcastingtips #podcastlove #podcastnetwork #podcastshow #podcastcommunity #podcasting --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/shivadhana/message
Are you interested in adopting a successful real estate investment mindset? Tune in to the Learn or Be Learned podcast miniseries "Tapping into Money Psychology and Real Estate", hosted by the dynamic Shiva Dhanasekar. Joining her are two highly experienced guests, Ramu Velu from Velu Holdings LLC and Nithin Thomas from Nithin Thomas Consulting Co, who bring a wealth of knowledge and insights to the table. Together, they dive into a six-episode mini-series that delves into the world of real estate investing, highlighting the importance of delivering value to clients and doing the job right. Throughout the mini-series, the speakers offer practical advice on a range of topics, such as the importance of transparency and building credibility in the agreement between a buyer and realtor, understanding the buyer's criteria and preferences, and being well-prepared with financial information. The speakers also share their expertise on the investment side of real estate and discuss which upgrades can improve home value. Despite some minor technical errors during recording, the mini-series has been a remarkable project that promises to engage and enlighten listeners. In this captivating episode, the speakers reveal that sometimes all a client needs is the confidence to trust their brokerage. This mini-series marks Learn or Be Learned's first-ever video podcast and is the culmination of their hard work and dedication. So, get ready to be captivated by the world of real estate investing and mindset with these insightful and experienced speakers. Be sure to stay tuned for the next episode, where you'll discover even more about the investment side of real estate. Timestamps [00:00:00] Intro to Miniseries: Real Estate Investing Mindset [00:03:05] Signing a Buyer Representation Agreement in Real Estate [00:06:35] The Importance of Buyer Representation Agreements [00:10:26] Tips for Preparing and Buying a House [00:14:16] Importance of Client Criteria in Real Estate [00:17:21] How to Prepare for a Home Purchase [00:20:59] Upgrading Your Home for Real Estate Investment This Episode's Noteworthy Quotes [00:09:48] "Borrowed credibility is totally fine. You have to until you build your own. And the system is very important." - Nithin Thomas This quote highlights the importance of building credibility in the real estate industry, and how borrowing credibility can be a helpful tool to get started. [00:12:28] "There are more things to a home than the building itself. Location, location, location, right, that there's 3 rules of real estate." - Ramu Velu This quote emphasizes the importance of location when it comes to buying a home, which is something that can't be changed or easily fixed. [00:13:31] "Planning ahead is very important and look past just what does the home look like on the outside?" - Ramu Velu This quote encourages buyers to think beyond the surface-level appearance of a home and consider the long-term implications and potential issues that may arise. Links to the Guests and Resources Mentioned (if any) Ramu Velu's Instagram Nithin Thomas Instagram My Information Podcast Link Page: www.solo.to/shivadhana Instagram: @shivadhana Email | shivadhana@dhanastudios.com Video Podcast on YouTube: Click Here for YouTube Channel Apple Ratings & Reviews: Click Here for Apple Podcasts Show Notes, Tips & More: Click Here for Linkedin Page Contact Me or Be a Guest: Click Here for Podcast Website Share a link to my podcast: Click Here for a Link to Podcast Platform Selections Hashtags #LearnerBLearned #realestateinvesting #realtors #buyerrepresentationagreement #credibility #socialproof #buyingahome #futureplanning #specificlotsize #competitivehousingmarket #homeupgrades #luxuryhomes #increasedvalue #realestateinvestment #podcastingtips --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/shivadhana/message
Join host Shiva Dhanasekar on Learn or Be Learned as he tackles the tough but exciting world of real estate investing mindset with a fantastic group of guests. In episode 3 of the miniseries, realtors Ramu Velu from Velu Holdings LLC and Nithin Thomas from Nithin Thomas Consulting Co. discuss everything potential homebuyers need to know to prepare for purchasing their next home. From prequalification to the importance of putting down a significant down payment, the hosts cover it all. They even advise potential buyers to prioritizing owning a home over a car! Throughout the podcast, they emphasize the importance of finding a good realtor who will guide the buyer in the right direction to make their dream home a reality. Don't miss out on this episode and many others like it to come on Learn or Be Learned! Timestamps [00:00:00] Real Estate Investing Mindset Mini-Series [00:03:33] Navigating Prequalification for Home Buying [00:06:53] Financing for Home vs. Car Purchase [00:10:27] Benefits of 5% Down Payment on Conventional Loans [00:14:12] Co-borrowers for loans and building credit [00:17:37] Navigating Mortgage Loans and Realtors [00:21:00] The Importance of Realtor Intentions [00:23:59] Finding the Right Full-Service Realtor [00:26:34] Choosing a Realtor Based on Experience and Qualifications Notable Quotes [14:03] You might have a parent that'll cosign the home for you. And what does that mean? That means they are a co borrower. If you fail to pay, they are liable to pay. - Ramu Velu [17:42] Your FICO score, your Credit Karma, credit score are not the same level of scores that are gonna pull up when you apply for a mortgage loan. They use much strictor standards. - Ramu Velu [25:13] Those who can ask you that 1 way that I find out if a realtor is really really, like, into into the thick and thin, is if you look at their shoes, if it's polished all the time, that could be an intention that it may maybe not may not be going out as much. If your shoes are dirty, that that could be also an intention. - Nithin Thomas [26:10] This is typically it it sounds like this is the middle man. This is the person that is going to connect you with the dream that you're looking for. Right, with the expertise that they have. They're the ones that are kind of guiding you in the direction that you want to go, but don't know where to start. - Shiva Dhana [28:49] If you're looking for your realtor to be your buddy, that is not a qualification for employment. Right? How buddy buddy you are with your realtor does not speak anything about the quality of the job that they're going to do or how well they will meet your needs. - Ramu Velu Links to the Guests and Resources Mentioned (if any) Ramu Velu's Instagram Nithin Thomas Instagram My Information Podcast Link Page: www.solo.to/shivadhana Instagram: @shivadhana Email | shivadhana@dhanastudios.com Video Podcast on YouTube: Click Here for YouTube Channel Apple Ratings & Reviews: Click Here for Apple Podcasts Show Notes, Tips & More: Click Here for Linkedin Page Contact Me or Be a Guest: Click Here for Podcast Website Share a link to my podcast: Click Here for a Link to Podcast Platform Selections Hashtags #LearnOrBeLearned #RealEstateInvestingMindset #HomeBuyingTips #RealtorRepresentation #CreditScore #MortgageApplication #CreativeFinancing #ConventionalLoan #CoBorrower #QualityService #FindingTheRightRealtor #FullServiceAgent #VettingProcess #Experience #Qualifications #CommunicationStyle --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/shivadhana/message
Get ready for an exciting new episode of the Learn or Be Learned Podcast MINISERIES: TAPPING INTO MONEY PYSCHOLOGY AND REAL ESTATE! Our guests, including Ramu Velu from Velu Holdings LLC and Nithin Thomas from Nithin Thomas Consulting Co., explore the fascinating concept of abundance versus scarcity mindsets and how adopting an abundance mindset can lead to greater success and happiness. They also discuss the importance of understanding the end goal rather than just achieving a certain number of results, as well as the impact of technology on the real estate industry. Through their conversations, guests share the importance of contribution, building relationships, and creating memorable experiences that last 30 years and beyond. Don't miss out on this thought-provoking and informative episode, as we explore these fascinating topics and more. Tune in now to Learn or Be Learned! Time Stamps [00:00] The Mindset of Real Estate Investing [03:52] Understanding Net Promoter Scores to Measure Customer Satisfaction and Passion for Services [07:06] Improving Customer Satisfaction Through Respect for Time. [10:04] The Benefits of Real Estate Investing – Satisfaction, Contribution and Creativity [13:53] Real Estate and Navigating Major Life Events [17:40] The Impact of Technology on the Real Estate Industry [20:48] Main Topic: Real Estate Agents Helping Clients Identify Their Needs [24:08] The Importance of Asking the Right Questions When Making Progress Notable Quotes [07:06] "Net Promoter Score is how many people are net promoting your business with good messages as opposed to a negative score." - Ramu Velu [08:45] "Those memories, those conversations because that will eventually blossom up. You know, you talk about not basing you mentioned not basing people's satisfaction on a number, but on the memories and the conversations that you have with them." - Nithin Thomas [18:23] "That technology does not exist yet. To do that. And until it gets to be very very smart AI, where you're duplicating a human's brain and analysis capacity, you cannot do it with simple algorithms." - Nithin Thomas [25:06] "Your brain is a very complicated computer. It will find a great answer for what's wrong with you. If you ask yourself, what can I do to feel better? Your brain is a very good computer. It will find a great answer to make yourself feel better. The answer is typically a byproduct of the question." - Ramu Velu Links to the Guests and Resources Mentioned (if any) Ramu Velu's Instagram Nithin Thomas Instagram My Information Podcast Link Page: www.solo.to/shivadhana Instagram: @shivadhana Email | shivadhana@dhanastudios.com Video Podcast on YouTube: Click Here for YouTube Channel Apple Ratings & Reviews: Click Here for Apple Podcasts Show Notes, Tips & More: Click Here for Linkedin Page Contact Me or Be a Guest: Click Here for Podcast Website Share a link to my podcast: Click Here for a Link to Podcast Platform Selections Relevant Hashtags #LearnOrBeLearned #RealEstate #ScalingMoney #NetPromoterScore #CustoerSatisfaction #RespectTime #ContributionToSociety #DigitalNomads #UniqueContribution #MajorMilestones #YouTube #MarketValue #HumanInteraction #Realtor #IntelligentAlgorithms #LuxuriousValue #McKinseyCompany #QuestionMatter #WhatsWrongWithMe #WhatCanIDo #UnderstandQuestion #BuyAHome #TuneIn Thank you so much for listening, and I hope to hear from you :) --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/shivadhana/message
Interview with Kanna and Ramu Sunkara the owners of Re-U-Zip
"Pilot Run with two of my favorite Texas Realtors. Join us as we explore the growth mindset and learn why real estate is such a powerful tool. With special guests Ramu Velu and Nithin Thomas, we will demystify the role of a realtor and the psychology behind investing and making money." - Shiva Dhanasekar Summary In this episode, Shiva is joined by two special guests: Nithin Thomas of NT Consulting and Ramu Velu of Velu Holdings LLC. Together, they discuss real estate as a good career choice. Ramu notes that despite real estate's occasional "bad brand rep.," it is responsible for creating the most number of millionaires in America. He emphasizes that those in the real estate business genuinely care about people, making it an attractive opportunity. Ramu also adds that it takes a certain mindset to succeed in the industry, but that there is also reward in terms of status and money if you contribute to society. However, they also warn potential investors of the pitfalls of the business. They caution against cutting corners, as it rarely pays off in the long run. They also advise potential buyers to find out what works for them and ensure their convictions about a property match up with reality. At the end of the podcast, Shiva and his guests offer a few parting words: Scarcity should NOT be the default mentality, and there is an opportunity for investors of all backgrounds. If you're looking for an inspiring and informative podcast about real estate, tune in to this episode of LBL E64 MS1 with host Shiva Dhanasekar, and guests Nithin Thomas and Ramu Velu. Time Stamps 03:37 - The Benefits of Real Estate Investing for Creating Wealth 07:05 - The Importance of Building Connections with Homebuyers 10:11 - The Benefits of Investing in Real Estate 13:46 - Real Estate: Is it Right for Everyone? 16:48 - The Benefits of Working with an Experienced Realtor 20:03 - Understanding and Navigating the Scarcity Trap in Gaming Notable Quotes "Most number of millionaires made in the United States are made through real estate." - Ramu Velu "You cannot exist without being integrated into real estate. It's something that you live in and around." - Ramu Velu "My vision is to bridge and do it just 1 step closer to the dreams. And you think about it, it's like so it it makes sense to me. So I realized this is where I will, like, wake up in the morning and, you know, I will have a reason to get up." - Nithin Thomas Links to the Guests and Resources Mentioned (if any): Ramu Velu's Instagram Nithin Thomas Instagram Hashtags #PodcastLove #RealEstate101 #Realtormindset #RealEstateGateway #RealtorsAdvice #RealEstateGame #RealEstateScarcity #RealEstateWealth #RealEstateGrowth #RealEstateInvesting #RealEstateMarket #InvestmentGoals #RealEstateEssentials #RealEstateWisdom #RealEstateStrategies #RealEstateSavvy #PassionforRealEstate #PeopleAreKey #RealEstateDreams #RealEstateSuccess #RealEstateProfessionals #RealEstateInvestingTips --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/shivadhana/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/shivadhana/support
Conversación que tuve con Paco de los Clecas del Deporte acerca de mis experiencias en el partido entre boricuas y quisqueyanos en la 2da ronda del Clásico Mundial de Béisbol del 2017. ¡Que Disfrutes! --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/elramuopina/support
En este episodio reacciono a la convocatoria de 24 jugadores de la Federación de Baloncesto de Puerto Rico con un análisis de cada jugador, las ausencias más notables y al final escojo los 12. ¡Que Disfrutes! --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/elramuopina/support
Un poco de mis vivencias en PR: asistir a las canchas del BSN y ver el Equipo Nacional jugar local por primera vez en 15 años. Mi encuentro con Barea, Molusco y Chente, y muchas cosas más. ¡Que Disfrutes! --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/elramuopina/support
En este episodio reacciono a la convocatoria de 24 jugadores de la Federación de Baloncesto de Puerto Rico con un corto análisis de cada jugador, las ausencias más notables y al final escojo mis 12. ¡Que Disfrutes! --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/elramuopina/support
RRR (2022)This is the epic story of Ramu (Allur Sitarama Raju) and Bheem (NT Rama Rao Jr), two fierce soldiers on opposite sides of a long-running conflict in India one hundred years ago between the local residents and their British colonizers. Ramu reports to the British military and is on a mission to find the lead revolutionary who has been hiding in nearby forests - that revolutionary happens to be Bheem. Of course, they become friends at one point starting to fight together unaware of the other one's roots…..and what results is a CRAZY 3+ hour extravagance of action, fantasy, dancing, revolution, and tigers defying gravity. :o Come learn about this deliriously entertaining Tollywood smash which not only took India but the rest of the world by storm this year! It was directed by S.S. Rajamouli and it's quite the ride….Host: Geoff Gershon Editors: Geoff and Ella GershonProducer: Marlene Gershonhttps://livingforthecinema.com/Facebook:https://www.facebook.com/Living-for-the-Cinema-Podcast-101167838847578Instagram:https://www.instagram.com/livingforthecinema/Letterboxd:https://letterboxd.com/Living4Cinema/
En este episodio reacciono a la convocatoria de 24 jugadores de la Federación de Baloncesto de Puerto Rico con un corto análisis de las historias más significativas de este grupo. ¿Qué significa para Barea?, ¿cuantos jóvenes harán el equipo? y ausencias notables entre otras cosas. ¡Que Disfrutes! --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/elramuopina/support
When clever, headstrong Kaveri moves to Bangalore to marry doctor Ramu, she's resigned herself to a quiet life.But that all changes the night of the party at the Century Club, where she escapes to the garden for some peace - and instead spots an uninvited guest in the shadows. Half an hour later, the party turns into a murder scene.When a vulnerable woman is connected to the crime, Kaveri becomes determined to save her and launches a private investigation to find the killer, tracing his steps from an illustrious brothel to an Englishman's mansion. She soon finds that sleuthing in a sari isn't as hard as it seems when you have a talent for maths, a head for logic and a doctor for a husband.And she's going to need them all as the case leads her deeper into a hotbed of danger, sedition and intrigue in Bangalore's darkest alleyways . . .Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/houseofmysteryradio. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.
Observaciones del Ramu, eficiencia ofensiva y defensiva, jugadores más destacados, lo mejor y menos mejor de cada equipo y mucho más. ¡Que Disfrutes! --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/elramuopina/support
Repaso y analizo todas las movidas realizadas por los equipos en la temporada muerta del BSN. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/elramuopina/support
Mi reacción a los 12 escogidos con análisis de cada jugador, estadísticas, retornos y ausencias más significativas. Al final mis pronósticos de ambos partidos. ¡Que Disfrutes! --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/elramuopina/support