Podcast appearances and mentions of wang huning

立法院 lì fǎ yuàn - Legislative Yuan (Taiwan's parliament)立委(立法委員) lì wěi (lì fǎ wěi yuán) - legislator國民黨 guó mín dǎng - Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan's main opposition party民進黨 mín jìn dǎng - Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan's ruling party民眾黨 mín zhòng dǎng - Taiwan People's Party (TPP)多數 duō shù - majority法案 fǎ àn - bill; proposal國會改革法案 guó huì gǎi gé fǎ àn - congressional reform bill花東交通三法 huā dōng jiāo tōng sān fǎ - three transportation bills for Hualien and Taitung更有力的監督政府 gèng yǒu lì de jiān dū zhèng fǔ - more effective government oversight濫權 làn quán - abuse of power審判權 shěn pàn quán - judicial power行政處分權 xíng zhèng chǔ fèn quán - administrative penalty power五權分立 wǔ quán fēn lì - five-branch separation of powers (Taiwan system)考試院 kǎo shì yuàn - Examination Yuan (Taiwan's branch in charge of civil service exams)監察院 jiān chá yuàn - Control Yuan (for auditing and oversight)審查過程 shěn chá guò chéng - review process充分 chōng fèn - sufficient; thorough用人數壓過去 yòng rén shù yā guò qù - push through by majority numbers立法凌駕行政 lì fǎ líng jià xíng zhèng - legislation overriding the executive branch衝突 chōng tú - conflict; clash阻擋 zǔ dǎng - to block; to obstruct搶下了主席台 qiǎng xià le zhǔ xí tái - seized the speaker's podium一口氣通過了 yì kǒu qì tōng guò le - passed in one go爭議 zhēng yì - controversy公民團體 gōng mín tuán tǐ - civic groups集結抗議 jí jié kàng yì - gather to protest發起連署 fā qǐ lián shǔ - launch a petition罷免 bà miǎn - recall (from office)藍營 lán yíng - the “blue camp” (KMT and allies)訴求 sù qiú - demand; appeal中共代理人 zhōng gòng dài lǐ rén - Chinese Communist Party proxy中共政協主席 zhōng gòng zhèng xié zhǔ xí - Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference王滬寧 Wáng Hùníng - Wang Huning (top CCP official)高層 gāo céng - high-ranking official統戰 tǒng zhàn - united front (political strategy by CCP)頭號人物 tóu hào rén wù - top figure; key player被台灣社會質疑 bèi tái wān shè huì zhí yí - questioned by Taiwanese society賣台 mài tái - betray Taiwan to China政權 zhèng quán - regime; political power舔共 tiǎn gòng - to flatter or appease the Chinese Communist Party賴清德 Lài Qīngdé - Lai Ching-te (Taiwan's current president)搞台獨 gǎo tái dú - push for Taiwan independence靠攏美國 kào lǒng měi guó - align with the U.S.製造社會對立 zhì zào shè huì duì lì - create social division綠色恐怖 lǜ sè kǒng bù - “green terror” (term used to criticize the DPP)獨裁極權 dú cái jí quán - dictatorship and authoritarianism加速台獨 jiā sù tái dú - accelerate Taiwan independence不擇手段地謀獨 bù zé shǒu duàn de móu dú - seek independence by any means necessary---If you've been learning Chinese and feel like you want a bit more support, I'd love to help!

中国の王滬寧・全国政治協商会議主席と握手する公明党の斉藤鉄夫代表、２３日、北京の人民大会堂【北京時事】中国を訪問中の公明党の斉藤鉄夫代表は２３日、共産党序列４位の王滬寧・全国政治協商会議主席と北京の人民大会堂で会談した。 Tetsuo Saito, head of Japanese junior ruling party Komeito, met with the Communist Party of China's fourth-ranking Wang Huning on Wednesday and confirmed the importance of free trade.

Tetsuo Saito, head of Japanese junior ruling party Komeito, met with the Communist Party of China's fourth-ranking Wang Huning on Wednesday and confirmed the importance of free trade.

National political advisers have been urged to serve the country's major tasks and work to improve people's livelihoods through high-quality consultation and suggestions, in order to further promote China's modernization drive.Wang Huning, chairman of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the country's top political advisory body, made the remarks while delivering a speech to around 2,100 national political advisers at the closing meeting of its third session in Beijing on Monday.President Xi Jinping, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, and other leaders attended the meeting, which was held at the Great Hall of the People.National political advisers should focus on key and difficult issues in deepening reform, promoting high-quality development, ensuring and improving people's livelihoods, and maintaining social stability in carrying out surveys and making suggestions and proposals, Wang said.The CPPCC should strengthen the mechanism for reflecting public opinion, connecting with the people, and serving the people, enhancing the unity of Chinese people at home and abroad, he added.A resolution on the work report of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC National Committee, a resolution on a report on how the proposals from political advisers have been handled since the previous annual session, a report on the examination of new proposals, and a political resolution on the third session of the 14th CPPCC National Committee were approved at the meeting.Samuel Yung Wing-ki, a member of the CPPCC National Committee from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, said, "At this meeting, I have gained a deep understanding of the country's major policies and development direction, and I have also felt the country's emphasis on Hong Kong."Hong Kong should leverage its advantages in international exchanges and the "one country, two systems" policy to attract more talent to develop in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, he said.Jin Hua, a national political adviser from Qinghai province, said that at this year's two sessions she wore the traditional attire of the Mongolian ethnic group that she had got married in, as she considered the meeting to be a major event for the country."I am most proud that I can use my platform to bring the livelihood-related facts of the ethnic group to the national level. Then I can deliver good policies to our ethnic minority areas," she said.Yang Yuni, another national political adviser and a post-1995 member of the Hani ethnic group, said that she will make efforts to combine artificial intelligence with ethnic minority songs and dances to attract more young people to the protection of intangible cultural heritage, thereby assisting in vitalizing rural areas.

Voice of GO(r)D is very happy to once again bring you Mr Andy Hickman, aka @Shagbark_Hick, the boondock philosopher, amblin' traveler, and stealth camping enthusiast behind the legendary Hickman's Hinterlands Substack. Since Andy was last a guest on the show, I've finally met him in person, and we enjoyed a very long road trip together last October with writer and 'machine' critic Mr Paul Kingsnorth. Andy discusses life in what he calls 'Machinic' America, and how the machine influences nearly everything about our society, interactions with others, and the mindsets it creates that trap us in various ways of thinking and relating to the world. Since recording this discussion in April, Andy has since met his father for the first time, and is about to be married to the lovely Keturah Lamb - its the wedding of the year and I'm looking forward to celebrating with them - maybe I will see you there. You can find Andy on Twitter https://x.com/shagbark_hick and if you aren't yet a reader of his, head on over to Substack and avail yourself of some of the finest writing you will lay eyes on in Year of Our Lord 2024 - https://shagbark.substack.com/ You can find Paul Kingsnorth writing over at The Abbey of Misrule - https://paulkingsnorth.substack.com/ and you can find an article discussing the book 'America Against America' by Wang Huning that Andy had mentioned here - https://scholars-stage.org/american-nightmares-wang-huning-and-alexis-de-tocqueville-dark-visions-of-the-future/ Feel free to contact this show! Questions, comments, suggestions, corrections and Hate Mail are welcomed and strongly encouraged! gordilocks@protonmail.com You ought to subscribe to my Substack as well, and never miss an episode of Voice of GO(r)D nor any of my written content. https://autonomoustruckers.substack.com/

«El gobernante debe ser el hombre más humilde de un país». Antúnez compartía una entrevista de 1972 con Santiago Bernabéu. La cita coincide con la experiencia de Martín después de varios años viviendo en Shanghái. El Partido Comunista Chino es el reflejo de una sociedad que funciona de forma vertical, tiene éxito porque se adapta al pueblo chino. Martín escribe con el objetivo de entender un poco mejor esa enigmática sociedad. A pesar de los haters, sus tuits honestos bien merecen un follow. Kapital es posible gracias a sus colaboradores: ¿Imaginas tener en tus manos el poder de impulsar tu carrera? Evoluciona al profesional que quieres ser con Nuclio Learning, la plataforma para profesionales y empresas que te permitirá seguir aumentando tu conocimiento con cursos de formación continua online impartidos por expertos en activo. Inscríbete y accede al conocimiento que acelerará tu trayectoria profesional con objetivos claros y aprendizaje práctico. Para formar a tus empleados o evolucionar como profesional en Management, Finanzas, Marketing, Recursos Humanos, Ventas, Producto y Tecnología, tu futuro está a un solo clic. Aprovecha un descuento del 25% con el cupón KAPITAL24. Mantente siempre actualizado con los cursos Nuclio Learning. Para obtener un préstamo y comprar una propiedad de 150.000 euros, necesitas una entrada de 30.000. No solo esto. Para pagar los impuestos y las pequeñas reformas, necesitarás 25.000 más. ¿Tienes 55.000 euros? Si es así, bien. Si no, Equito App. Equito te permite invertir en inmuebles desde 100 euros, recibiendo dividendos por tus alquileres cada mes. La plataforma pronto llegará a los 100.000 usuarios activos. ¿Te unes? Invierte de manera sencilla y sin complicaciones con Equito App. Índice: 2:05 Escribir hilos para entender la China. 12:54 Adelantamiento por la derecha. 21:45 El Partido Comunista solo es el reflejo de esa sociedad. 29:03 Estructuras verticales dentro de las empresas. 43.19 Elecciones a nivel regional. 48:47 Un sistema educativo superior. 58:58 La meritocracia de Xi Jinping. 1:08.21 Los valores del confusionismo. 1:10:28 Prejuicios al llegar a Shanghái. 1:14:49 El discurso de despedida de Reagan. 1:30:40 Sensaciones en Dubai. 1:34:31 En contra de los procesos homogeneizadores. 1:41:57 El marco europeo dominante. 1:52:25 Recuperar la humildad de nuestros abuelos. 1:57:21 Ruta gastronómica por Sichuan. Apuntes: Guía turística de China. Martín Puñal. Biografía de Xi Jinping. Martín Puñal. Figuras políticas chinas. Martín Puñal. America against America. Wang Huning. When China rules the world. Martin Jacques. Her. Spike Jonze. The farewell. Lulu Wang.

China's top political adviser, Wang Huning, called on Monday for the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference to make full use of its role as a specialized advisory body, focusing on providing wisdom for the country's modernization goals.Wang, chairman of the 14th CPPCC National Committee, made the remarks while delivering a work report to around 2,100 national political advisers at the opening of the second session of the 14th National Committee of the CPPCC in Beijing, raising the curtain on this year's two sessions, China's biggest annual political event.President Xi Jinping, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, and other Chinese leaders attended the opening meeting, held at the Great Hall of the People. At the meeting, the agenda for the session was reviewed and approved.This year marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China and the CPPCC, and it is a crucial year for achieving the goals of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25).Wang said that upholding the leadership of the CPC has always been the fundamental political principle of the CPPCC since the political advisory body was founded, and it remains the fundamental guarantee for the development and progress of its cause.He stressed the need for the CPPCC to act as a specialized consultative body, closely focusing on the major decisions and initiatives of the CPC Central Committee, national strategic needs and significant practical issues in its advisory role."The CPPCC should leverage its group advantages, conduct extensive investigations and research, and gain a deep understanding of the vivid experiences created in practice, the desires and demands of the people, as well as the difficulties and obstacles in policy implementation," he said.Over the past 12 months, the CPPCC National Committee conducted 94 consultations for advisers and officials to exchange ideas.Wang also emphasized the role of the CPPCC in external exchanges and in promoting the concept of building a community with a shared future for mankind, telling China's stories and spreading the country's voice to the world.After listening to the report, Zhang Yi, a national political adviser and a lawyer from Shanghai, said, "I was greatly encouraged, especially by the call for us advisers to provide suggestions in line with the central tasks of the Party and the country and fulfill our duties for the people."Zhang said that this year's conference is crucial for achieving the goals set in the 14th Five-Year Plan, particularly in relation to China's economic development and legal construction.He said that he would make suggestions regarding the effective regulation of artificial intelligence through legislation, after conducting research over the past year.Tsoi Wing-sing, a national political adviser from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, said that in-depth research is crucial in formulating proposals, and this year he would propose a way to leverage Hong Kong's advantages in promoting China's experience in green finance on the global stage.Reporter: Zhang Yi, Yang Yang

www.goodluckgabe.life    The Perils of Audience Capture How influencers become brainwashed by their audiences The Man Who Ate Himself In 2016, 24 year old Nicholas Perry wanted to be big online. He started uploading videos to his YouTube channel in which he pursued his passion—playing the violin—and extolled the virtues of veganism. He went largely unnoticed.   A year later, he abandoned veganism, citing health concerns. Now free to eat whatever he wanted, he began uploading mukbang videos of himself consuming various dishes while talking to the camera, as if having dinner with a friend.   These new videos quickly found a sizable audience, but as the audience grew, so did their demands. The comments sections of the videos soon became filled with people challenging Perry to eat as much as he physically could. Eager to please, he began to set himself torturous eating challenges, each bigger than the last. His audience applauded, but always demanded more. Soon, he was filming himself eating entire menus of fast food restaurants in one sitting.   In some respects, all his eating paid off; Nikocado Avocado, as Perry is now better known, has amassed over six million subscribers across six channels on YouTube. By satisfying the escalating demands of his audience, he got his wish of blowing up and being big online. But the cost was that he blew up and became big in ways he hadn't anticipated. Top: Nicholas Perry when he first started making mukbang videos. Bottom: Perry transformed by his audience's desires into Nikocado. Nikocado, moulded by his audience's desires into a cartoonish extreme, is now a wholly different character from Nicholas Perry, the vegan violinist who first started making videos. Where Perry was mild-mannered and health conscious, Nikocado is loud, abrasive, and spectacularly grotesque. Where Perry was a picky eater, Nikocado devoured everything he could, including finally Perry himself. The rampant appetite for attention caused the person to be subsumed by the persona.   We often talk of "captive audiences," regarding the performer as hypnotizing their viewers. But just as often, it's the viewers hypnotizing the performer. This disease, of which Perry is but one victim of many, is known as audience capture, and it's essential to understanding influencers in particular and the online ecosystem in general.   Lost in the Looking Glass Audience capture is an irresistible force in the world of influencing, because it's not just a conscious process but also an unconscious one. While it may ostensibly appear to be a simple case of influencers making a business decision to create more of the content they believe audiences want, and then being incentivized by engagement numbers to remain in this niche forever, it's actually deeper than that. It involves the gradual and unwitting replacement of a person's identity with one custom-made for the audience.   To understand how, we must consider how people come to define themselves. A person's identity is being constantly refined, so it needs constant feedback. That feedback typically comes from other people, not so much by what they say they see as by what we think they see. We develop our personalities by imagining ourselves through others' eyes, using their borrowed gazes like mirrors to dress ourselves.   Just as lacking a mirror to dress ourselves leaves us disheveled, so lacking other people's eyes to refine our personalities leaves us uncouth. This is why those raised in isolation, like poor Genie, become feral humans, adopting the character of beasts.   Put simply, in order to be someone, we need someone to be someone for. Our personalities develop as a role we perform for other people, fulfilling the expectations we think they have of us. The American sociologist Charles Cooley dubbed this phenomenon “the looking glass self.” Evidence for it is diverse, and includes the everyday experience of seeing ourselves through imagined eyes in social situations (the spotlight effect), the tendency for people to alter their behavior when in the presence of pictures of eyes (the watching-eye effect), and the tendency for people in virtual spaces to adopt the traits of their avatars in an attempt to fulfill expectations (the Proteus effect).   When we lived in small tight-knit communities, the looking glass self helped us to become the people our loved ones needed us to be. The “Michelangelo phenomenon” is the name given to the semi-conscious cycle of refinement and feedback whereby lovers who genuinely care what each other think gradually grow closer to their partner's original ideal of them.   The problem is, we no longer live solely among those we know well. We're now forced to refine our personalities by the countless eyes of strangers. And this has begun to affect the process by which we develop our identities.   Gradually we're all gaining online audiences, and we don't really know these people. We can only gauge who they are by what some of them post online, and what people post online is not indicative of who they really are. As such, the people we're increasingly becoming someone for are an abstract illusion.   When influencers are analyzing audience feedback, they often find that their more outlandish behavior receives the most attention and approval, which leads them to recalibrate their personalities according to far more extreme social cues than those they'd receive in real life. In doing this they exaggerate the more idiosyncratic facets of their personalities, becoming crude caricatures of themselves.   The caricature quickly becomes the influencer's distinct brand, and all subsequent attempts by the influencer to remain on-brand and fulfill audience expectations require them to act like the caricature. As the caricature becomes more familiar than the person, both to the audience and to the influencer, it comes to be regarded by both as the only honest expression of the influencer, so that any deviation from it soon looks and feels inauthentic. At that point the persona has eclipsed the person, and the audience has captured the influencer.   The old Greek legends tell of Narcissus, a youth so handsome he became besotted by his own reflection. Unable to look away from his image in the surface of the waters, he fell still forever, and was transformed by the gods into a flower. Similarly, as influencers glimpse their idealized online personas reflected back at them on screens, they too are in danger of becoming eternally besotted by how they appear, and in so doing, forgetting who they were, or could be.   III. The Prostitution of the Intellect Audience capture is a particular problem in politics, due to both phenomena being driven by popular approval. On Twitter I've watched many political influencers gradually become radicalized by their audiences, starting off moderate but following their increasingly extreme followers toward the fringes.   One example is Louise Mensch, a once-respectable journalist and former Conservative politician who in 2016 published a story about Trump's alleged ties to Russia, which went viral. She subsequently gained a huge audience of #NotMyPresident #Resist types, and, encouraged by her new, indignant audience to uncover more evidence of Trump's corruption, she appears to have begun to view herself as the one who'd prove Russiagate and bring down the Donald. The immense responsibility she felt to her audience seems to have motivated her to see dramatic patterns in pure noise, and to concoct increasingly speculative conspiracy theories about Trump and Russia, such as the claim that Vladimir Putin assassinated Andrew Breitbart, the founder of Breitbart News, so his job would go to Trump ally Steve Bannon. When her former allies, such as the hacker known as "the Jester," expressed concern over her new trajectory toward fringe theories, she doubled down, accusing all her critics of being Trump shills or Putin shills.   Another, more recent victim of audience capture is Maajid Nawaz. I've always liked Maajid, and as someone who once worked with the organization he founded, the counter terrorism think-tank Quilliam, I'm aware of how careful and considered he can be. Unfortunately, since the pandemic, he's been different. His descent began with him posting a few vague theories about the virus being a fraud perpetrated on an unsuspecting public, and after his posts went viral he found himself being inundated with new "Covid-skeptic" followers, who showered him with new leads to chase.   In January, after he lost his position at the radio show LBC due to his increasingly careless theories about a secretive New World Order, he implied his firing was part of the conspiracy to silence the truth, and urged his loyal followers to subscribe to his Substack, as this was now his family's only source of income. His new audience proved to be generous with both money and attention, and his need to meet their expectations seems to have spurred him, consciously or unconsciously, to double down on his more extreme views. Now almost everything he writes about, from Covid to Ukraine, he somehow ties to the shadowy New World Order.   Motivated by his audience to continually uncover new truths about the conspiracy, Maajid has been forced to scrape the barrel of claims. His recent work is his wildest yet, combining common tropes like resurrected Nazi eugenics programs, satanic rituals, and the Bilderberg meeting. Among the fields he now relies on for his evidence are... numerology.   Twitter avatar for @MaajidNawaz Maajid أبو عمّار  @MaajidNawaz British MPs have begun voting on a motion of ‘no confidence' in the UK Parliament against Prime Minister Johnson.    The vote commenced at:   6pm, on the 6th day, of the 6th month.    No joke.    آل عمران:[54] وَمَكَرُوا وَمَكَرَ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ خَيْرُ الْمَاكِرِينَ  Twitter avatar for @MaajidNawaz Maajid أبو عمّار  @MaajidNawaz 3 of our British MPs were at this dodgy af global Bilderberg meeting:   Michael Gove (con) Tom Tugendhat (con) David Lammy (lab)   Their attendance alone must be remembered if they ever seek leadership of their respective political parties and hence try to become PM of Britain https://t.co/EKohVzfaiN 6:52 PM ∙ Jun 6, 2022 957 Likes 287 Retweets There is clear value in investigating the corruption that pervades the misty pinnacles of power, but by defining himself by his audience's view of him as the uncoverer of a global conspiracy, Maajid has ensured he'll see evidence of the conspiracy in all things. Instead of performing real investigation, he is now merely playing the role of investigator for his audience, a role that requires drama rather than diligence, and which can lead only to his audience's desired conclusions.   Muddying the Waters to Obscure the Reflection Maajid, Mensch, and Perry are far from the only victims of audience capture. Given how fundamental the looking glass self is to the development of our personalities, every influencer has likely been affected by it to some degree. And that includes me.   I'm no authority on the degree to which my mind has been captured by you, my audience. But I do suspect that audience capture affects me far less than most influencers because I've taken specific steps to avoid it. I was aware of the pitfall long before I became an influencer. I wanted an audience, but I also knew that having the wrong audience would be worse than having no audience, because they'd constrain me with their expectations, forcing me to focus on one tiny niche of my worldview at the expense of everything else, until I became a parody of myself.   It was clear to me that the only way to resist becoming what other people wanted me to be was to have a strong sense of who I wanted to be. And who I wanted to be was someone immune to audience capture, someone who thinks his own thoughts, decides his own destiny, and above all, never stops growing.   I knew there were limits to my desired independence, because, whether we like it or not, we all become like the people we surround ourselves with. So I surrounded myself with the people I wanted to be like. On Twitter I cultivated a reasonable, open-minded audience by posting reasonable, open-minded tweets. The biggest jumps in my follower count came from my megathreads of mental models, which cover so many topics from so many perspectives that the people who appreciated them enough to follow me would need to be willing to consider new perspectives. Naturally these people came to view me as, and expected me to be, an independent thinker as open to learning and growing as themselves.   In this way I ensured that my brand image—the person that my audience expects me to be—was in alignment with my ideal image—the person I want to be. So even though audience capture likely does affect me in some way, it only makes me more like the person I want to be. I hacked the system.   My brand image is, admittedly, diffuse and weak. My Twitter bio is “saboteur of narratives,” and few people can say for sure what I'm about, other than vague things like “thinker” or “dumb fuck.” And that's how I like it. My vagueness makes me hard to pigeonhole, predict, and capture.   For this same reason, I'm suspicious of those with strong, sharply delineated brands. Human beings are capricious and largely formless storms of idiosyncrasies, so a human only develops a clear and distinct identity through the artifice of performance.   Nikocado has a clear and distinct identity, but its clarity and distinctness make it hard to escape. He may be a millionaire with legions of fans, but his videos, filled with complaints-disguised-as-jokes about his poor health, hardly make him seem happy.   Unfortunately, salvation seems out of reach for him because his audience, or at least the audience he imagines, demands he be the same as he was yesterday. And even if he were to find the strength to break character and be himself again, he's been acting for so long that stopping would only make him feel like an imposter.   This is the ultimate trapdoor in the hall of fame; to become a prisoner of one's own persona. The desire for recognition in an increasingly atomized world lures us to be who strangers wish us to be. And with personal development so arduous and lonely, there is ease and comfort in crowdsourcing your identity. But amid such temptations, it's worth remembering that when you become who your audience expects at the expense of who you are, the affection you receive is not intended for you but for the character you're playing, a character you'll eventually tire of. So the next time you find yourself in the limelight of other people's gazes, remember that being someone often means being fake, and if you chase the approval of others, you may, in the end, lose the approval of yourself TikTok is a Time Bomb The ultimate weapon of mass distraction   For thousands of years, humans sought to subjugate their enemies by inflicting pain, misery, and terror. They did this because these were the most paralyzing emotions they could consistently evoke; all it took was the slash of a sword or pull of a trigger. But as our understanding of psychology has developed, so it has become easier to evoke other emotions in complete strangers. Advances in the understanding of positive reinforcement, driven mostly by people trying to get us to click on links, have now made it possible to consistently give people on the other side of the world dopamine hits at scale. As such, pleasure is now a weapon; a way to incapacitate an enemy as surely as does pain. And the first pleasure-weapon of mass destruction may just be a little app on your phone called TikTok. I. The Smiling Tiger TikTok is the most successful app in history. It emerged in 2017 out of the Chinese video-sharing app Douyin and within three years it had become the most downloaded app in the world, later surpassing Google as the world's most visited web domain. TikTok's conquest of human attention was facilitated by the covid lockdowns of 2020, but its success wasn't mere luck. There's something about the design of the app that makes it unusually irresistible. Other platforms, like Facebook and Twitter, use recommendation algorithms as features to enhance the core product. With TikTok, the recommendation algorithm is the core product. You don't need to form a social network or list your interests for the platform to begin tailoring content to your desires, you just start watching, skipping any videos that don't immediately draw your interest. Tiktok uses a proprietary algorithm, known simply as the For You algorithm, that uses machine learning to build a personality profile of you by training itself on your watch habits (and possibly your facial expressions.) Since a TikTok video is generally much shorter than, say, a YouTube video, the algorithm acquires training data from you at a much faster rate, allowing it to quickly zero in on you. The result is a system that's unsurpassed at figuring you out. And once it's figured you out, it can then show you what it needs to in order to addict you. Since the For You algorithm favors only the most instantly mesmerizing content, its constructive videos—such as “how to” guides and field journalism—tend to be relegated to the fringes in favor of tasty but malignant junk info. Many of the most popular TikTokers, such as Charli D'Amelio, Bella Poarch, and Addison Rae, do little more than vapidly dance and lip-sync. Individually, such videos are harmless, but the algorithm doesn't intend to show you just one. When it receives the signal that it's got your attention, it doubles down on whatever it did to get it. This allows it to feed your obsessions, showing you hypnotic content again and again, reinforcing its imprint on your brain. This content can include promotion of self-harm and eating disorders, and uncritical encouragement of sex-reassignment surgery. There's evidence that watching such content can cause mass psychogenic illness: researchers recently identified a new phenomenon where otherwise healthy young girls who watched clips of Tourette's sufferers developed Tourette's-like tics. A more common way TikTok promotes irrational behavior is with viral trends and “challenges,” where people engage in a specific act of idiocy in the hope it'll make them TikTok-famous. Acts include licking toilets, snorting suntan lotion, eating chicken cooked in NyQuil, and stealing cars. One challenge, known as “devious licks”, encourages kids to vandalize property, while the “blackout challenge,” in which kids purposefully choke themselves with household items, has even led to several deaths, including a little girl a few days ago.   As troublesome as TikTok's trends are, the app's greatest danger lies not in any specific content but in its general addictive nature. Studies on long term TikTok addiction don't yet exist for obvious reasons, but, based on what we know of internet addiction generally, we can extrapolate its eventual effects on habitual TikTokers. There's a substantial body of research showing a strong association between smartphone addiction, shrinkage of the brain's gray matter, and “digital dementia,” an umbrella term for the onset of anxiety and depression and the deterioration of memory, attention span, self-esteem, and impulse control (the last of which increases the addiction). These are the problems caused by internet addiction generally. But there's something about TikTok that makes it uniquely dangerous. In order to develop and maintain mental faculties like memory and attention span, one needs to practice using them. TikTok, more than any other app, is designed to give you what you want while requiring you to do as little as possible. It cares little who you follow or what buttons you click; its main consideration is how long you spend watching. Its reliance on machine learning rather than user input, combined with the fact that TikTok clips are so short they require minimal memory and attention span, makes browsing TikTok the most passive, uninteractive experience of all major platforms. If it's the passive nature of online content consumption that causes atrophy of mental faculties, then TikTok, as the most passively used platform, will naturally cause the most atrophy. Indeed many habitual TikTokers can already be found complaining on websites like Reddit about their loss of mental ability, a phenomenon that's come to be known as “TikTok brain.” If the signs are becoming apparent already, imagine what TikTok addiction will have done to young developing brains a decade from now. TikTok's capacity to stupefy people, both acutely by encouraging idiotic behavior, and chronically by atrophying the brain, should prompt consideration of its potential use as a new kind of weapon, one that seeks to neutralize enemies not by inflicting pain and terror, but by inflicting pleasure. Last month FBI Director Chris Wray warned that TikTok is controlled by a Chinese government that could “use it for influence operations.” So how likely is it that one such influence operation might include addicting young Westerners to mind-numbing content to create a generation of nincompoops? The first indication that the Chinese Communist Party is aware of TikTok's malign influence on kids is that it's forbidden access of the app to Chinese kids. The American tech ethicist Tristan Harris pointed out that the Chinese version of TikTok, Douyin, is a “spinach” version where kids don't see twerkers and toilet-lickers but science experiments and educational videos. Furthermore, Douyin is only accessible to kids for 40 minutes per day, and it cannot be accessed between 10pm and 6am. Has the CCP enforced such rules to protect its people from what it intends to inflict on the West? When one examines the philosophical doctrines behind the rules, it becomes clear that the CCP doesn't just believe that apps like TikTok make people stupid, but that they destroy civilizations. II. Seven Mouths, Eight Tongues China has been suspicious of Western liberal capitalism since the 1800s, when the country's initial openness led to the Western powers flooding China with opium. The epidemic of addiction, combined with the ensuing Opium Wars, accelerated the fall of the Qing Dynasty and led to the Century of Humiliation in which China was subject to harsh and unequal terms by Britain and the US. Mao is credited with eventually crushing the opium epidemic, and since then the view among many in China has been that Western liberalism leads to decadence and that authoritarianism is the cure. But one man has done more than anyone to turn this thesis into policy. His name is Wang Huning, and, despite not being well known outside China, he has been China's top ideological theorist for three decades, and he is now member number 4 of the seven-man Standing Committee—China's most powerful body. He advised China's former leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and now he advises Xi Jinping, authoring many of his policies. In China he is called “guoshi” (国师: literally, “teacher of the nation”).   Wang refuses to do press or to even speak with foreigners, but his worldview can be surmised from the books he wrote earlier in his life. In August 1988, Wang accepted an invitation to spend six months in the US, and traveled from state to state noting the way American society operates, examining its strengths and weaknesses. He recorded his findings in the 1991 book, America Against America, which has since become a key CCP text for understanding the US. The premise of the book is simple: the US is a paradox composed of contradictions: its two primary values—freedom and equality—are mutually exclusive. It has many different cultures, and therefore no overall culture. And its market-driven society has given it economic riches but spiritual poverty. As he writes in the book, “American institutions, culture and values oppose the United States itself.” For Wang, the US's contradictions stem from one source: nihilism. The country has become severed from its traditions and is so individualistic it can't make up its mind what it as a nation believes. Without an overarching culture maintaining its values, the government's regulatory powers are weak, easily corrupted by lobbying or paralyzed by partisan bickering. As such, the nation's progress is directed mostly by blind market forces; it obeys not a single command but a cacophony of three hundred million demands that lead it everywhere and nowhere. In Wang's view, the lack of a unifying culture puts a hard limit on the US's progress. The country is constantly producing wondrous new technologies, but these technologies have no guiding purpose other than their own proliferation. The result is that all technological advancement leads the US along one unfortunate trajectory: toward more and more commodification. Wang writes: “Human flesh, sex, knowledge, politics, power, and law can all become the target of commodification… Commodification, in many ways, corrupts society and leads to a number of serious social problems. These problems, in turn, can increase the pressure on the political and administrative system.” Thus, by turning everything into a product, Western capitalism devours every aspect of American culture, including the traditions that bind it together as a nation, leading to atomization and polarization. The commodification also devours meaning and purpose, and to plug the expanding spiritual hole that this leaves, Americans turn to momentary pleasures—drugs, fast food, and amusements—driving the nation further into decadence and decay. For Wang, then, the US's unprecedented technological progress is leading it into a chasm. Every new microchip, TV, and automobile only distracts and sedates Americans further. As Wang writes in his book, “it is not the people who master the technology, but the technology that masters the people.” Though these words are 30 years old, they could easily have been talking about social media addiction. Wang theorized that the conflict between the US's economic system and its value system made it fundamentally unstable and destined for ever more commodification, nihilism, and decadence, until it finally collapses under the weight of its own contradictions. To prevent China's own technological advancement leading it down the same perilous path, Wang proposed an extreme solution: neo-authoritarianism. In his 1988 essay, “The Structure of China's Changing Political Culture,” Wang wrote that the only way a nation can avoid the US's problems is by instilling “core values”—a national consensus of beliefs and principles rooted in the traditions of the past and directed toward a clear goal in the future. Such a consensus could eventually ward off nihilism and decadence, but cultivating it would in turn require the elimination of nihilism and decadence. This idea has been central to President Xi's governance strategy, which has emphasized “core socialist values” like civility, patriotism, and integrity. So how has the push for these socialist core values affected the CCP's approach to social media? The creator of TikTok and CEO of Bytedance, Zhang Yiming, originally intended for the content on TikTok and its Chinese version, Douyin, to be determined purely by popularity. As such, Douyin started off much like TikTok is now, with the content dominated by teenagers singing and dancing. In April 2018, the CCP began action against Zhang. Its media watchdog, the National Radio and Television Administration, ordered the removal from Chinese app stores of Bytedance's then-most popular app, Toutiao, and its AI news aggregator, Neihan Duanzi, citing their platforming of “improper” content. Zhang then took to social media to offer a groveling public apology, stating: "Our products took the wrong path, and content appeared that was incommensurate with socialist core values." Shortly after, Bytedance announced it would recruit thousands more people to moderate content, and, according to CNN, in the subsequent job ads it stated a preference for CCP members with “strong political sensitivity.” The CCP's influence over Bytedance has only grown since then. Last year, the Party acquired a “golden share” in Bytedance's Beijing entity, and one of its officials, Wu Shugang, took one of the company's three board seats. The CCP's intrusion into Bytedance's operations is part of a broader strategy by Xi, called the “Profound Transformation”, which seeks to clear space for the instituting of core socialist values by ridding China of “decadent” online content. In August 2021, a statement appeared across Chinese state media calling for an end to TikTok-style “tittytainment” for fear that “our young people will lose their strong and masculine vibes and we will collapse.” In the wake of that statement, there have been crackdowns on “sissy-men” fashions, “digital drugs” like online gaming, and “toxic idol worship.” Consequently, many online influencers have been forcibly deprived of their influence, with some, such as the movie star Zhao Wei, having their entire presence erased from the Chinse web. For Xi and the CCP, eliminating “decadent” TikTok-style content from China is a matter of survival, because such content is considered a herald of nihilism, a regression of humans back to beasts, a symptom of the West's terminal illness that must be prevented from metastasizing to China. And yet, while cracking down on this content domestically, China has continued to allow its export internationally as part of Xi's “digital Silk Road” (数字丝绸之路). TikTok is known to censor content that displeases Beijing, such as mentions of Falun Gong or Tiananmen Square, but otherwise it has free rein to show Westerners what it wants; “tittytainment” and “sissy men” are everywhere on the app. So why the hypocritical disparity in rules? Is the digital Silk Road intended as poetic justice for the original Silk Road, whereby the Western powers preached Christian values while trafficking chemical TikTok—opium—into China? Since Wang and Xi believe the West is too decadent to survive, they may have opted to take the Taoist path of wu wei (無為), which is to say, sit back and let the West's appetites take it where they will. But there's another, more sinister and effective approach they may have adopted. To understand it, we must consider one final piece of the puzzle: an amphetamine-fueled philosopher who lived in my hometown. III. The Matricide Laboratory At first glance the British philosopher Nick Land could hardly be more different from Wang Huning. Wang rose to prominence by being dour, discreet, and composed, while Land rose to prominence by ranting about cyborg apocalypses while out of his mind on weed and speed. In the late 1990s Land moved into a house once owned by the Satanist libertine Aleister Crowley (half a mile from where I grew up), and there he apparently binged on drugs and scrawled occult diagrams on the walls. At nearby Warwick University where he taught, his lectures were often bizarre (one infamous “lesson” consisted of Land lying on the floor, croaking into a mic, while frenetic jungle music pulsed in the background.)   Land and Wang were not just polar opposites in personality; they also operated at opposite ends of the political spectrum. While Wang would go on to be the top ideological theorist of the Chinese Communist Party, Land would become the top theorist (with Curtis Yarvin) of the influential network of far-right bloggers, NRx. And yet, despite their opposite natures, Land and Wang would develop almost identical visions of liberal capitalism as an all-commodifying, all devouring force, driven by the insatiable hunger of blind market forces, and destined to finally eat Western civilization itself. Land viewed Western liberal capitalism as a kind of AI that's reached the singularity; in other words, an AI that's grown beyond the control of humans and is now unstoppably accelerating toward inhuman ends. As Land feverishly wrote in his 1995 essay, “Meltdown:” “The story goes like this: Earth is captured by a technocapital singularity as renaissance rationalitization and oceanic navigation lock into commoditization take-off. Logistically accelerating techno-economic interactivity crumbles social order in auto-sophisticating machine runaway.” Land's drug-fueled prose is overwrought, so to simplify his point, Western capitalism can be compared to a “paperclip maximizer,” a hypothetical AI programmed by a paperclip business to produce as many paperclips as possible, which leads it to begin recycling everything on earth into paperclips (commodities). When the programmers panic and try to switch it off, the AI turns them into paperclips, since being switched off would stop it fulfilling its goal of creating as many paperclips as possible. Thus, the blind application of short term goals leads to long term ruin. Land believed that, since the runaway AI we call liberal capitalism commodifies everything, including even criticisms of it (which are necessarily published for profit), it cannot be opposed. Every attack on it becomes part of it. Thus, if one wishes to change it, the only way is to accelerate it along its trajectory. As Land stated in a later, more sober writing style: “The point of an analysis of capitalism, or of nihilism, is to do more of it. The process is not to be critiqued. The process is the critique, feeding back into itself, as it escalates. The only way forward is through, which means further in.” —A Quick-and-Dirty Introduction to Accelerationism (2017) This view, that the current system must be accelerated to be transformed, has since become known as “accelerationism.” For Land, acceleration is not just a destructive force but also a creative one; he came to believe that all democracies accelerate toward ruin but a visionary despot unfettered by the concerns of the masses could accelerate a country to prosperity. Land's own life followed the same course he envisioned for the liberal West; following years of high productivity, he fell into nihilism and the decadence of rampant drug use, which drove him to a nervous breakdown. Upon recovering in 2002, he embraced authoritarianism, moved to Shanghai, and began writing for Chinese state media outlets like China Daily and the Shanghai Star. A few years after Land moved to China, talk of accelerationism began to emerge on the Chinese web, where it's become known by its Chinese name, jiasuzhuyi (加速主义). The term has caught on among Chinese democracy advocates, many of whom view the CCP as the runaway AI, hurtling toward greater tyranny; they even refer to Xi as “Accelerator-in-Chief” (总加速师). Domestically, Chinese democracy activists try to accelerate the CCP's authoritarianism ad absurdum; one tactic is to swamp official tip-off lines with reports of minor or made-up infractions, with the intent of breaking the Party by forcing it to enforce all of its own petty rules. As for the CCP itself, it's known to have viewed former US president Donald Trump as the “Accelerator-in-Chief,” or, more accurately, “Chuan Jianguo” (川建国: literally “Build China Trump”) because he was perceived as helping China by accelerating the West's decline. For this reason, support of him was encouraged. The CCP is also known to have engaged in jiasuzhuyi more directly; for instance, during the 2020 US race riots, China used Western social media platforms to douse accelerant over US racial tensions. But the use of TikTok as an accelerant is a whole new scale of accelerationism, one much closer to Land's original, apocalyptic vision. Liberal capitalism is about making people work in order to obtain pleasurable things, and for decades it's been moving toward shortening the delay between desire and gratification, because that's what consumers want. Over the past century the market has taken us toward ever shorter-form entertainment, from cinema in the early 1900s, to TV mid-century, to minutes-long YouTube videos, to seconds-long TikTok clips. With TikTok the delay between desire and gratification is almost instant; there's no longer any patience or effort needed to obtain the reward, so our mental faculties fall into disuse and disrepair. And this is why TikTok could prove such a devastating geopolitical weapon. Slowly but steadily it could turn the West's youth—its future—into perpetually distracted dopamine junkies ill-equipped to maintain the civilization built by their ancestors. We seem to be halfway there already: not only has there been gray matter shrinkage in smartphone-addicted individuals, but, since 1970 the Western average IQ has been steadily falling. Though the decline likely has several causes, it began with the first generation to grow up with widespread TVs in homes, and common sense suggests it's at least partly the result of technology making the attainment of satisfaction increasingly effortless, so that we spend ever more of our time in a passive, vegetative state. If you don't use it, you lose it. And even those still willing to use their brains are at risk of having their efforts foiled by social media, which seems to be affecting not just kids' abilities but also their aspirations; in a survey asking American and Chinese children what job they most wanted, the top answer among Chinese kids was “astronaut,” and the top answer among American kids was “influencer.” If we continue along our present course, the resulting loss of brainpower in key fields could, years from now, begin to harm the West economically. But, more importantly, if it did it would help discredit the very notion of Western liberalism itself, since there is no greater counterargument to a system than to see it destroy itself. And so the CCP would benefit doubly from this outcome: ruin the West and refute it; two birds with one stone (or as they say in China, 箭双雕: one arrow, two eagles.) So, the CCP has both the means and the motive to help the West defeat itself, and part of this could conceivably involve the use of TikTok to accelerate liberal capitalism by closing the gap between desire and gratification. Now, it could be argued that we have no hard evidence of the CCP's intentions, only a set of indications. However, ultimately the CCP's intentions are irrelevant. Accelerationism can't alter an outcome, only hasten it. And TikTok, whether or not it's actively intended as a weapon, is only moving the West further along the course it's long been headed: toward more effortless pleasure, and resulting cognitive decline. The problem, therefore, is not China, but us. America Against America. If TikTok is not a murder weapon, then it's a suicide weapon. China has given the West the means to kill itself, but the death wish is wholly the West's. After all, TikTok dominated our culture as a result of free market forces—the very thing we live by. Land and Wang are correct that the West being controlled by everyone means it's controlled by no one, and without brakes or a steering wheel we're at the market's mercy. Of course, democracies do have some regulatory power. Indian lawmakers banned TikTok in 2020, and US lawmakers are now considering the same. However, while this may stop the theft of our data, it won't stop the theft of our attention; if TikTok is banned then another short-form video site will just take its place. Effortless dopamine hits are what consumers want, and capitalism always tries to give consumers what they want. Anticipating the demand, YouTube has added its own TikTok-style “YouTube Shorts” format, and Twitter recently implemented its own version of TikTok's For You algorithm. The market is a greater accelerator than China could ever hope to be. So what's the solution? Land and Wang may be right about the illness, but they're wrong about the cure. It's true that we in the West have little left of the traditions that once tied us together, and in their absence all that unites us are our animal hungers. But Wang's belief that meaning and purpose can be miraculously imposed on us all by a strongman leader is just a fantasy that has littered history with failed experiments. Sure, democracies are vulnerable because there's no one controlling their advancement, but autocracies are vulnerable precisely for the opposite reason: they're controlled by people, which is to say, by woefully myopic apes. China is currently suffering from the myopia of Xi's zero-covid policy, which has ravaged the country's economy, and from the disastrous one-child policy that's led to China's current population crisis. For all our problems, we'd be unwise to exchange the soft tyranny of dopamine for the hard tyranny of despots. That leaves only one solution: the democratic one. In a democracy responsibility is also democratized, so parents must look out for their own kids. There's a market for this, too: various brands of parental controls can be set on devices to limit kids' access (though many of these, including TikTok's own controls, can be easily bypassed.) But ultimately these are short term measures. In the long term the only way to prevent digital dementia is to raise awareness of the neurological ruin wrought by apps like TikTok, exposing their ugliness so they fall out of fashion like cigarettes. If the weakness of liberalism is its openness, then this is also its strength; word can travel far in democracies. We'll surely sound like alarmists; TikTok destroys so gradually that it seems harmless. But if the app is a time-bomb that'll wreck a whole generation years from now, then we can't wait till its effects are apparent before acting, for then it will be too late. The clock is ticking. Tik. Tok…   I just shit and cum. FAQ What does this mean? The amount of shit (and cum) on my computer and floor has increased by one. Why did you do this? There are several reasons I may deem a comment to be worthy of feces or ejaculation. These include, but are not limited to: Being gay Dank copypasta bro, where'd you find it walter Am I going to shit and cum too? No - not yet. But you should refrain from shitposting and cumposting like this in the future. Otherwise I will be forced to shit and cum again, which may put your shitting and cumming privileges in jeopardy. I don't believe my comment deserved being shit and cum at. Can you un-cum it? Sure, mistakes happen. But only in exceedingly rare circumstances will I put shit back into my butt. If you would like to issue an appeal, shoot me a hot load explaining what I got wrong. I tend to respond to retaliatory ejaculation within several minutes. Do note, however, that over 99.9% of semen dies before it can fertilize the egg, and yours is likely no exception. How can I prevent this from happening in the future? Accept the goopy brown and white substance and move on. But learn from this mistake: your behavior will not be tolerated in my mom's basement. I will continue to shit and cum until you improve your conduct. Remember: ejaculation is privilege, not a right.   I just came in your asshole. I just came in your asshole. FAQ What does this mean? A large load of baby gravy has been transferred from my testicles into your rectum. Why did I do this? There are several reasons why I came in your ass. These include, but are not limited to: Your comment turned me on You are cute Your dad was too busy How did I do this? I rammed your rectum with my handsome hog until I turned you into a frosting factory. Why am I telling you about this? Your ass will be leaking cum for at least 36 hours and may be a slipping hazard. Also you might be gay. How can you avoid this in the future? Unless you stop looking so breedable in the near future, you can't. I will always find a way to fill your tight little boyhole

President Xi Jinping stressed the importance of building a new system for a higher-standard open economy at a key meeting on Tuesday.Xi, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, made the remarks while presiding over a meeting of the Central Commission for Comprehensively Deepening Reform under the 20th CPC Central Committee.Xi, who is head of the commission, called for greater institutional opening-up in key areas of international exchange and cooperation, such as investment, trade, finance and innovation.He also said that efforts must be made to further reform systems and mechanisms and refine relevant policies and measures in order to bring China's level of opening-up to new heights.The meeting said that it is necessary to perfect top-level design of the new system, expand market access and improve the business environment in the country.China must fully leverage its comprehensive advantages, attract global resources by promoting domestic circulation and enhance the quality and level of its trade and investment cooperation, the meeting's participants said.They also called for the building of a new system of an open economy at a higher level to be closely integrated with the Belt and Road Initiative and other national strategies.The meeting also adopted a policy document to promote the gradual transition from dual control over the amount and intensity of energy consumption to dual control over the amount and intensity of carbon emissions.It was noted at the meeting that persistent efforts must be made to create the conditions for this transition and to strike a balance between development and carbon emission reduction according to the actual situation.Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC in 2012, China has prioritized the pursuit of green and low-carbon development, leading to a sharp increase in the country's energy use efficiency and the continuous reduction of carbon dioxide emissions.The country has set a target of hitting peak emissions before 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality before 2060.Policymakers at the meeting also stressed the need to reform the salary system in colleges, universities and research institutes in an effort to encourage innovation.Salary distribution must be closely related to performance and tilt toward those who are deeply engaged in teaching and scientific research and those making outstanding contributions to difficult and crucial tasks, they said.They also said that those who are engaged in teaching fundamental disciplines and conducting cutting-edge research, and those making breakthroughs in core technologies in key fields should be better supported in terms of the salary system.The meeting's participants underscored the importance of strengthening supervision of salary management to ensure that country's funds are used where they are most needed.The meeting's participants called for efforts to further reform systems related to the gas and oil market, step up market supervision, regulate market order and promote fair competition.It is important to deepen the reform of the oil and gas reserve system and make good use of the emergency and regulatory capabilities of the reserves, they said.Li Qiang, Wang Huning and Cai Qi, who are members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and deputy heads of the commission, attended the meeting.Reporter: Mo Jingxi

英语新闻｜送别江泽民同志The nation was in deep sorrow on Monday as it said a final farewell to Jiang Zemin, with top leaders, family members and thousands of people paying tribute in Beijing to the former Chinese leader, who passed away in Shanghai on Wednesday at the age of 96.前国家领导人江泽民同志于上周三在上海逝世，享年96岁。周一，举国上下沉浸在深深的悲痛之中。最高领导人、江泽民同志家属和成千上万的群众一起在北京向江泽民同志表达敬意。President Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders bade farewell to Jiang and escorted his remains to Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery in Beijing for cremation on Monday, as people in the capital lined the streets along the route of the cortege in honor of the late Chinese leader.周一，国家主席习近平和其他国家领导人为江泽民同志送别，并护送江泽民同志的遗体到八宝山革命公墓火化。首都民众在沿途的街道上排起长队，悼念这位已故的国家领导人。Xi and other leaders paid their solemn tribute to Jiang at the Chinese PLA General Hospital, where a black banner reading "Eternal glory to Comrade Jiang Zemin "and a large portrait of Jiang were displayed.习近平主席和其他领导人前往中国人民解放军总医院隆重悼念江泽民同志。中国人民解放军总医院告别室上方悬挂着黑底白字横幅，上面写着：“江泽民同志永垂不朽”，横幅下方正中是江泽民同志的大幅彩色遗像。A flag of the Communist Party of China was draped over Jiang's body, which rested among flowers and cypresses, with a four-member honor guard standing solemnly beside him.江泽民同志的遗体安卧在鲜花翠柏丛中，身上覆盖着鲜红的中国共产党党旗。4名礼兵持枪肃立，守护在两旁。In front of the body lay a basket of flowers presented by Wang Yeping, Jiang's wife, on behalf of the whole family. A ribbon on the basket read: "You will live in our hearts forever".江泽民同志遗体前摆放着江泽民同志的夫人王冶坪率全家敬献的花篮，花篮的缎带上写着：“你永远活在我们心中”。Flower baskets presented by Xi and other senior leaders, the CPC Central Committee, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the State Council, the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Central Military Commission, non-CPC political parties, mass organizations and people from all walks of life in Beijing were also displayed in the room.告别室内摆放着习近平、李克强、栗战书、汪洋、李强、赵乐际、王沪宁、韩正、蔡奇、丁薛祥、李希、王岐山、胡锦涛和中共中央、全国人大常委会、国务院、全国政协、中央军委、各民主党派和全国工商联、各人民团体、首都各界群众敬献的花圈。Wearing black armbands and with white flowers pinned to their chests, Xi, Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Han Zheng, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, Li Xi, Wang Qishan and former Chinese leader Hu Jintao stood in silent tribute and bowed three times in front of Jiang's body to pay their respects and honor the memory of the late Chinese leader.习近平、李克强、栗战书、汪洋、李强、赵乐际、王沪宁、韩正、蔡奇、丁薛祥、李希、王岐山、胡锦涛等，胸佩白花、臂戴黑纱缓步来到告别室，在江泽民同志的遗体前肃立。习近平等向江泽民同志的遗体三鞠躬，表达对江泽民同志的崇高敬意和深切缅怀。They expressed deep condolences to Jiang's wife and other family members.习近平等向江泽民同志的夫人王冶坪和亲属表示深切慰问。At 10:15 am, Jiang's casket was carried out to a hearse by an honor guard of eight, accompanied by Xi and other senior leaders.10时15分，8名礼兵荷灵，伴着哀乐缓缓走出告别室。习近平等护送江泽民同志的遗体上灵车。The hearse, escorted by the leaders, members of the office of Comrade Jiang Zemin's Funeral Committee and Jiang's family, then proceeded to Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery.在习近平等党和国家领导同志，治丧委员会办公室成员和江泽民同志亲属的护送下，灵车徐徐驶向八宝山革命公墓。As it made its slow, somber journey, it passed through streets lined with crowds of people from all walks of life in deep grief as they stood in silence in honor of the late leader.从中国人民解放军总医院到八宝山，首都各界群众纷纷来到沿途道路两旁，送别敬爱的江泽民同志，表达对江泽民同志的深切哀思。At 10:45 am, the hearse arrived at the cemetery, where the leaders and Jiang's family bade their final farewell to the late Chinese leader.上午10时45分，灵车驶进八宝山革命公墓。在大礼堂，习近平等和江泽民同志亲属向江泽民同志作最后的诀别。Xi and other Chinese leaders had either visited Jiang when he was in the hospital or offered their condolences to his family after he passed away.习近平及其他国家领导人均在江泽民同志住院时进行了探望，或在江泽民同志去世后向他的家人表示了慰问。An official letter addressed to the nation praised Jiang as an outstanding leader whose high prestige is acknowledged by all members of the Party, the entire military and the Chinese people.告全党全军全国各族人民书中高度赞扬江泽民是一位杰出的领导人。他的崇高威望得到了全党全军和全国各族人民的认可。The core of the CPC's third generation of central collective leadership, Jiang served as the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee from 1989 to 2002.江泽民同志是中共第三代领导集体的核心，于1989年至2002年担任中共中央总书记。记者：徐伟bade英[beɪd]；美[beɪd]v.说（问候话）cypress英[ˈsaɪprəs]；美[ˈsaɪprɪs]n.柏树condolence英[kənˈdəʊləns]；美[kənˈdoʊləns]n.吊唁

สถานการณ์การเมืองล่าสุดของประเทศจีนหลังจาก ‘สี จิ้นผิง' (Xi Jinping) ได้รับเลือกให้ดำรงตำแหน่งเลขาธิการใหญ่ของพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์จีนติดต่อกันเป็นสมัยที่ 3 ภายในการประชุมคณะกรรมการกลางพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์จีน ชุดที่ 20 แบบเต็มคณะครั้งแรก ที่จัดขึ้นเมื่อวันที่ 16-22 ตุลาคม 2022 ณ หอประชุมประชาชน กรุงปักกิ่ง หมายความว่าประธานาธิบดีสีจะยังคงรักษาตำแหน่งผู้มีอำนาจสูงสุดบนแผนดินมังกรต่อไปเป็นวาระที่ 3 อีกอย่างน้อย 5 ปี แม้จะมีวัยแตะหลักเกษียณราชการแล้วก็ตาม นอกจากนี้ การประชุมดังกล่าวทางคณะกรรมการกลางของพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์จีน (Communist Party of China: CCP) ยังมีมติเห็นชอบแต่งตั้งให้ สี จิ้นผิง ดำรงตำแหน่งเป็นประธานคณะกรรมาธิการการทหารส่วนกลาง (Central Military Commission) รวมถึงมีการแต่งตั้ง 7 คณะกรรมการถาวรประจำกรมการเมืองชุดใหม่ (Politburo) ที่มีสี จิ้นผิง เป็นหนึ่งในนั้น อีกหนึ่งประเด็นที่น่าสนใจคือ สุนทรพจน์ความยาว 104 นาที ที่เกี่ยวโยงถึงนโยบายการปกครองสาธารณรัฐประชาชนจีนในอนาคต โดยมีใจความสำคัญทั้งหมด 5 ข้อ คือ 1. จุดยืนต่อไต้หวันและฮ่องกงที่เน้นเป็นไปอย่าง ‘สันติ' แต่พร้อมใช้ ‘กำลัง' หากจำเป็น ดั่งเช่นการกวาดล้างเหล่านักศึกษา รวมไปถึงผู้เห็นต่างทางการเมือง 2. สัญญาว่าจะปรับเปลี่ยนกฎระเบียบด้านเศรษฐกิจ เพื่อกระจายความมั่งคั่งของประชาชนทุกระดับ ตามนโยบายแก้ไขเศรษฐกิจชะลอตัวและความเหลื่อมล้ำ 3. ประเด็นกำจัดนักการเมืองคอร์รัปชันจะยังคงเข้มงวดต่อไป หลังที่ผ่านมามีนักการเมืองที่ถูกสอบสวนมากถึงหลักล้านราย และส่วนใหญ่มักเป็นฝั่งที่อยู่ตรงข้ามกับประธานาธิบดีสี 4. นโยบายการเมืองต่างประเทศมีท่าทีเป็นไปอย่างแข็งกร้าว พร้อมที่จะขยายอิทธิพลต่อไป และเตือนประชาคมโลกว่าอย่าคิดแทรกแซง เพราะถือเป็นเรื่องการเมืองภายในของจีน พร้อมปฏิเสธข้อกล่าวหาที่จีนกำลังก่ออาชญากรรมมนุษย์ต่อชาวอุยกูร์ ในเขตปกครองตนเองซินเจียงอุยกูร์ (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) 5. ด้านสิ่งแวดล้อม ตั้งเป้าจะเป็นประเทศที่ปล่อยคาร์บอนเป็นศูนย์ภายในปี 2060 และยินดีสนับสนุนงบประมาณในด้านพลังงานทดแทน อย่างไรก็ดี นัยสำคัญที่นานาชาติจับตามองกลับไม่ใช่นโยบายข้างต้น แต่เป็น ‘การควบรวมอำนาจ' แบบเบ็ดเสร็จในมือ สี จิ้นผิง ตั้งแต่โครงสร้างบริหารภายในพรรค โดยเฉพาะสมาชิกโปลิตบูโร ที่เป็นคนใกล้ชิดของตนแทบทั้งสิ้น ไล่ตั้งแต่ จ้าว เล่อจี้ (Zhao Leji) หัวหน้าคณะกรรมการกลางเพื่อการสอบวินัย, ไช่ ฉี (Cai Qi) เลขาธิการพรรคประจำกรุงปักกิ่ง, หวัง ฮู่หนิง (Wang Huning) เลขาธิการคนที่ 1 ประจำสำนักเลขาธิการพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์, ติง เซวียเสียง (Ding Xuexiang) ผู้อำนวยการสำนักงานทั่วไปพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์, หลี่ ซี (Li Xi) เสนาธิการพรรคประจำมณฑลกวางตุ้ง และหลี่ เฉียง ( (Li Qiang) เลขาธิการพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์ประจำนครเซี่ยงไฮ้ มือขวาคนสนิทที่ถูกวางตัวให้ขึ้นดำรงตำแหน่งเป็นนายกรัฐมนตรีคนต่อไป แม้ที่ผ่านมาจะถูกโจมตีว่าล้มเหลวในการจัดการปัญหาโควิด-19 ช่วงล็อกดาวน์ ปี 2021 ขณะที่ด้านกองกำลังทหารก็สามารถกุมไว้ได้เรียบร้อยเช่นกัน และเมื่อปรากฏภาพอดีตประธานาธิบดีฯ หู จิ่นเทา (Hu Jintao) ถูกหิ้วปีกเชิญตัวออกจากที่ประชุม หลังต้องการดูเอกสารฉบับหนึ่งที่อยู่ในมือของ สี จิ้นผิง ที่คาดการณ์ว่าเป็นรายละเอียดรายชื่อตำแหน่งโปลิตบูโรชุดใหม่ ที่ไร้วี่แววพรรคพวกจากฝั่งหู จิ่นเทา ยิ่งแสดงออกชัดเจนถึงความอหังการ หวังมุ่งเป้าล้างขั้วอำนาจเก่าอย่างแท้จริง และส่งผลให้สี จิ้นผิง กลายเป็นผู้นำประเทศที่มีบารมีทัดเทียมยุคท่านผู้นำเหมา เจ๋อตุง (Mao Tse-tung)

Tectonische verschuivingen voltrekken zich. En anders dan veel mensen dachten - zoals fans van Brexit - is de Europese Unie hierbij eerder centrum van gebeurtenissen dan een gemarginaliseerd randverschijnsel. Een cruciale speler is China, waar Xi Jinping een derde termijn als president kreeg en nu voor het leven kan aanblijven.Dat is waarom de ingewikkelde, gevoelige en geopolitieke relatie van Europa met China ineens een hoofdthema is geworden op EU-toppen. Hóe gevoelig, dat bleek wel uit de reis van bondskanselier Olaf Scholz naar Beijing. En uit een opmerkelijke brief van het kabinet Rutte IV aan de Tweede Kamer. Jaap Jansen en PG Kroeger duiken daarom in actualiteit, historie en het perspectief voor de komende jaren en decennia.Het bezoek van Scholz gaf nog voor hij vertrok al gedoe. Collega-leiders in de EU waren zeer kritisch en zelfs in zijn eigen kabinet was er sprake van een soort opstand tegen zijn Chinabeleid. Vooral Emmanuel Macron was opnieuw des duivels. Niettemin verliep het bezoek gunstiger dan velen hadden verwacht. Xi Jinping gebruikte de Kanzler vrij opzichtig om zijn eigen nieuwe status vet te onderstrepen. Dat leverde wel iets op: een scherpe waarschuwing aan Vladimir Poetin. Een even opmerkelijke als behendige zet van de Chinese leider.Geen wonder dat binnen de EU het debat over China voluit is opengebarsten. En dat debat tendeert ernaar het eerdere concept van 'strategische autonomie' veel dieper en veel breder te gaan zien. Streven naar 'een weerbare Unie op het wereldtoneel' is het parool. PG brengt de elementen bijeen die in Europa nu meer en meer als één geheel worden gezien in plaats van als losse dossiers. Van Frans Timmermans' klimaatbeleid tot bescherming van ASML, de relaties met India en mogelijk zelfs met de Verenigde Staten een herneming van de eerder vastgelopen TTIP-onderhandelingen.Laat nu juist over zo'n 'whole government approach' het kabinet nét een brief aan de Kamer hebben gestuurd. Wat daarin staat - en zeker ook wat niét - verdient precieze bestudering. Jaap noteert alvast dat het woord China er slechts eenmaal in voorkomt.Alle reden dus om Xi's nieuwe almacht nader te verkennen. En dan blijkt al snel dat die macht ook opvallend kwetsbaar is. Niet alleen vanwege Nancy Pelosi's bezoek aan Taiwan. De verlamming van de economie, het schrappen van het subtiele machtsevenwicht dat Deng Xiaoping aanbracht en de bevolkingskrimp bedreigen die almacht. Daarom moeten we vooral letten op een nieuw lid van het Politburo, Wang Huning. PG vertelt over zijn ongebruikelijke achtergrond en de bijzondere spotnaam die hij kreeg in bloggend China: 'Guóshï'. ***Deze aflevering is mede mogelijk gemaakt door donaties van luisteraars die we hiervoor hartelijk danken. Word ook vriend van de show!Heb jij belangstelling om in onze podcast te adverteren of ons te sponsoren? Dat zou helemaal mooi zijn! Stuur voor informatie een mailtje naar adverteren@dagennacht.nlEen van onze adverteerders is Bamigo. Korting op je eerste bestelling krijg je met code: bron25***Hieronder nog meer informatie. Op Apple kun je soms niet alles lezen. De complete tekst vind je altijd hier***Verder lezenRené van Rijckevorsel - Hoe Europa nog altijd rode loper uitrolt voor China (EW)***Verder luisteren302 - De Frans-Duitse motor hapert. Gesprek met Bondsdaglid Otto Fricke300 - Ethische politiek: het bijzondere Nederland met zijn 'moreel hoogstaande opvattingen'299 - Dramatische verschuivingen in de wereldpolitiek. Europa heeft eindelijk een telefoonnummer290 - Bondskanselier Olaf Scholz en de razendsnelle ontwikkeling van de EU262 - Waarom India - ook voor Nederland - steeds belangrijker wordt258 - De kille vriendschap tussen Rusland en China250 - Nixon in China: de week die de wereld veranderde225 - Nixon in China: Henry Kissinger's geheime (en hilarische) trip naar Beijing245 - Oompje neemt de trein – de reis die China naar de 21e eeuw bracht221 - Madam Speaker: de spijkerharde charme van Nancy Pelosi220 - China's nieuwe culturele revolutie58 - PG over 70 jaar China, de Volksrepubliek van Mao, Deng en Xi30 - Rob de Wijk: het gevaar van China en Trump ** PG: Baudet, Delors en Thatcher25 - Kim Putters: Smeulende kwesties in een welvarend land ** PG: Hoe China ondanks boycot toch zaken wilde doen met Nederland24 - Ties Dams over China's nieuwe keizer Xi Jinping10 - Bram van Ojik (GroenLinks) over onze relatie met China***Tijdlijn00:00:00 – Deel 100:33:55 – Advertentie Bamigo + Deel 200:49:09 – Deel 301:15:40 – Einde Zie het privacybeleid op https://art19.com/privacy en de privacyverklaring van Californië op https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Episode Notes:A discussion recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally.Links:John Culver: How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan - Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceTranscript:Bill: Welcome back to the very occasional Sinocism podcast. Today we are going to talk about the recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally. So we have a lot of experience here to help us understand what just happened. Chris, welcome back and thanks for taking the time.Chris: My pleasure. Always fun to be with you, Bill.Bill: Great. Well, why don't we jump right in. I'd like to talk about what you see as the most important outcomes from the Congress starting with personnel. What do you make of the leadership team from the central committee to the Politburo to the Standing Committee and what does that say about.Chris: Yeah, well, I, think clearly Xi Jinping had a massive win, you know, with personnel. I think we see this particularly in the Politburo Standing Committee, right, where on the key portfolios that really matter to him in terms of controlling the key levers of power inside the system. So we're talking propaganda, obviously, Uh, we're talking party bureaucracy, military less so, but security services, you know, these, these sort of areas all up and down the ballot he did very well.So that's obviously very important. And I think obviously then the dropping of the so-called Communist Youth League faction oriented people in Li Keqiang and Wang Yang and, and Hu Chunhua being  kind of unceremoniously kicked off the Politburo, that tells us that. He's not in the mood to compromise with any other  interest group.I prefer to call them rather than factions. Um, so that sort of suggests to us that, you know, models that rely on that kind of an analysis are dead. It has been kind of interesting in my mind to see how quickly though that, you know, analysts who tend to follow that framework already talking about the, uh, factional elements within Xi's faction, right?So, you know, it's gonna be the Shanghai people versus the Zhijiang Army versus the Fujian people. Bill: people say there's a Tsinghua factionChris: Right. The, the infamous, non infamous Tsinghua clique and, and and so on. But I think as we look more closely, I mean this is all kidding aside, if we look more closely at the individuals, what we see is obviously these people, you know, loyalty to Xi is, is sort of like necessary, but not necessarily sufficient in explaining who these people are. Also, I just always find it interesting, you know, somehow over. Wang Huning has become a Xi Jinping loyalist. I mean, obviously he plays an interesting role for Xj Jinping, but I don't think we should kid ourselves in noting that he's been kind of shunted aside Right by being pushed into the fourth position on the standing committee, which probably tells us that he will be going to oversee the Chinese People's Consultative Congress, which is, you know, kind of a do nothing body, you know, for the most part. And, um, you know, my sense has long been, One of Xi Jinping's, I think a couple factors there with Wang Huning.Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.One is, you know, yes, he is very talented at sort of taking their very, uh, expansive, um, theoretical ideas and coming up with snappy, um, snappy sort of catchphrases, right? This is clearly his, um, his sort of claim to fame. But, you know, we had that article last year from the magazine, Palladium that kind of painted him as some sort of an éminence grise or a Rasputin like figure, you know, in terms of his role.Uh, you know, my sense has always been, uh, as one contact, put it to me one time. You know, the issue is that such analyses tend to confuse the musician with the conductor. In other words,  Xi Jinping.  is pretty good at ideology, right? And party history and the other things that I think the others had relied on.I think the second thing with Wang Huning is, um, in a way XI can't look at him I don't think, without sort of seeing here's a guy who's changed flags, as they would say, right? He served three very different leaders, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and now Xi , um, and, and continued on and I think at some level, uh, and we look at the rest of the appointments where it appears that, uh, loyalty was much more important than merit.Um, where that's also a question mark. So there's those issues I think on the Politburo. You know, you mentioned the, the Tsinghua clique it was very interesting. You had shared with me, uh, Desmond Shum of Red Roulette fame's Twitter stream sort of debunking, you know, this, this Tsinghua clique and saying, well, it turns out in fact that the new Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining can't stand Chen Xi, even though, you know, they both went to Tsinghua and were there at the same time and so on.Um, you know, who knows with Desmond Shum, but I think he knows some things, right? And, and, and it just a reminder to us all, I think, how little we understand right, about these relationships, especially now, uh, with Xi's concentration of power. And also a situation where we've had nearly three years of covid isolationBill: Right. And so it's really hard to go talk to people, even the fewer and fewer numbers, people who, who know something and can talk. Back to the standing committee. I, I think certainly just from friends and contacts the biggest surprise you know, I think, uh was Li Keqiang and Wang Yang not sticking around. And as that long explainer said without naming them they were good comrades who steps aside for the good of the party in the country,Chris: Because that happens so often,Bill: whatever that means. Um, but really the, the bigger surprise was that, oh, Cai Qi showing up. Who I think when you look at the standing committee, I think the general sense is, okay, the, these people are all, you know, not, they're loyal, but they're also competent, like Li Qiang, Chris: Right, Bill: The likely new premier number two on the standing committee is pretty competent. The Shanghai lockdown, disaster aside, Cai Qi on the other hand, was just, looks more like, it's just straight up loyalty to Xi. I think he was not really on anybody's short list of who was gonna make it on there. And so, it does feel like something happened, right?Chris: Yeah. Well, um, a couple things there. I think, um, one, let's start with the. The issue you raised about the economic team cuz I think that's actually very important. Um, you know, I, at some level, sometimes I feel like I'm sort of tiring my, of my role as official narrative buster or a windmill tilter.Uh, whether, whether it's pushback from Li Keqiang or the myth of the savior premier as I was calling it, which, uh, we didn't see, or that these norms actually aren't very enduring and it's really about power politics. I, I think I'm kind of onto a new one now, which is, you know, Xi Jin ping's new team of incompetent sycophants.Right? That's kind of the label that's, uh, come out in a lot of the takes, uh, since the Congress. But to your point, I mean, you know, Li Qiang has run the three most important economic powerhouses on China's east coast, either as governor or as party chief. Right. He seems to have had a, a good relationship with both.Private sector businesses and, and foreign, you know, people forget that, you know, he got the Tesla plant built in Shanghai in a year basically. Right. And it's, uh, responsible for a very significant amount of, of Tesla's total input of vehicles. Output of vehicles. Excuse me. Um, likewise, I hear that Ding Xuexiang, even though we don't know a lot about him, uh, was rather instrumental in things.Breaking the log jam with the US uh, over the de-listing of Chinese ADRs, uh, that he had played an important role in convincing Xi Jinping it would not be a good idea, for example, to, uh, you know, we're already seeing, uh, sort of decoupling on the technology side. It would not be a good idea to encourage the Americans to decouple financially as well. So the point is I think we need to just all kind of calm down, right? And, and see how these people perform in office. He Lifeng, I think is perhaps, you know, maybe more of a question mark, but, But here too, I think it's important for us to think about how their system worksThe political report sets the frame, right? It tells us what. Okay, this is the ideological construct we're working off of, or our interpretation, our dialectical interpretation of what's going on. And that, I think the signal there was what I like to call this fortress economy, right? So self-sufficiency and technology and so on.And so then when we look at the Politburo appointments, you can see that they align pretty closely to that agenda, right? These people who've worked in state firms or scientists and you know, so on and forth.Bill: Aerospace, defenseChris: Yeah, Aerospace. Very close alignment with that agenda. I'm not saying this is the right choice for China or that it even will be successful, I'm just saying it makes sense, you know,Bill: And it is not just sycophants it is actually loyal but some expertise or experience in these key sectors Chris: Exactly.  Yeah, and, and, and, and of interest as well. You know, even people who have overlapped with Xi Jinping. How much overlap did they have? How much exposure did they have? You know, there's a lot of discussion, for example, about the new propaganda boss, Li Shulei being very close to Xi and likewise Shi Taifeng.Right? Uh, both of whom were vice presidents at the party school when, when Xi also was there. Um, but remember, you know, he was understudy to Hu Jintao at the time, you know, I mean, the party school thing was a very small part of his portfolio and they were ranked lower, you know, amongst the vice presidents of the party school.So how much actual interaction did he have? So there too, you know, I think, uh, obviously. , yes these people will do what Xi Jinping wants them to do, but that doesn't mean they're not competent. On Cai Qi, I agree with you. I think it's, it's, it's difficult. You know, my speculation would be a couple of things.One, proximity matters, right? He's been sitting in Beijing the last five years, so he is, had the opportunity to, uh, be close to the boss and, and impact that. I've heard some suggestions from contacts, which I think makes some. He was seen as more strictly enforcing the zero Covid policy. Right. In part because he is sitting in Beijing than say a Chen Min'er, right.Who arguably was a other stroke better, you know, candidate for that position on the Politburo standing committee. And there, you know, it will be interesting to see, you know, we're not sure the musical chairs have not yet finished. Right. The post party Congress for people getting new jobs. But you know, for example, if Chen Min'er stays out in Chongqing, that seems like a bit of a loss for him.Bill: Yeah, he needs to go somewhere else if he's got any hope of, um, sort of, But so one thing, sorry. One thing on the Politburo I thought was really interesting, and I know we've talked about offline, um, is that the first time the head of the Ministry State Security was, was. Promoted into the Politburo - Chen Wenqing.  And now he is the Secretary of the Central Political Legal Affairs Commission, the party body that oversees the entire security services system and legal system. and what do you think that says about priorities and, and, and where Xi sees things going?Chris: Well, I think it definitely aligns with this concept of Xi Jiping's of comprehensive national security. Right. We've, we've seen and heard and read a lot about that and it seems that the, uh, number of types of security endlessly proliferate, I think we're up to 13 or 14Bill: Everything is National Security in Xi's China.Chris: Yeah. Everything is, is national security. Uh, that's one thing I think it's interesting perhaps in the, in the frame of, you know, in an era where they are becoming a bigger power and therefore, uh, have more resources and so on. You know, is that role that's played by the Ministry of State Security, which is, you know, they have this unique role, don't they?They're in a way, they're sort of the US' Central Intelligence Agency and, and FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation combined, and that they do have that internal security role as well, but, They are the foreign civilian anyway, uh, foreign intelligence collection arm. So perhaps, you know, over time there's been some sense that they realized, yes, cyber was great for certain things, but you still need human intelligence.Uh, you know, we don't know how well or not Chen Wenqing has performed, but you know, obviously there, this has been a relentless campaign, you know, the search for spies and so on and so forth. Um, I also think it says something about what we seem to be seeing emerging here, which is an effort to take what previously were these, you know, warring, uh, administrative or ministerial factions, right, of the Ministry of Public Security MPS, the MSS, uh, and even the party's, uh, discipline watchdog, the, uh, Central Commission on Discipline inspection, you know, in an effort to sort of knit those guys into one whole.And you know, it is interesting.Chen wending has experience in all three of those. He started off, I think as a street cop. Um, he did serve on the discipline inspection commission under, uh, Wang Qishan when things were, you know, really going  in that department in the early part of, Xi's tenure and then he's headed, uh, the Ministry of State Security.I think, you know, even more interesting probably is. The, uh, formation of the new secretariat, right? Where we have both Chen Wenqing on there and also Wang Xiaohong as a minister of Public Security, but also as a deputy on the CPLAC, right? And a seat on the secretariat. And if we look at the, um, The gentleman who's number two in the discipline inspection, uh, space, he was a longtime police officer as well.So that's very unusual. You know, uh, his name's escaping me at the moment. But, um, you know, so in effect you have basically three people on the Secretariat with security backgrounds and, you know, that's important. It means other portfolios that might be on the secretariat that have been dumped, right? So it shows something about the prioritization, uh, of security.And I think it's interesting, you know, we've, we've often struggled to understand what is the National Security Commission, how does it function, You know, these sort of things. And it's, it's still, you know, absolutely clear as mud. But what was interesting was that, you know, from whatever that early design was that had some aspect at least of looking a bit like the US style, National Security Commission, they took on a much more sort of internal looking flavor.And it had always been my sort of thought that one of the reasons Xi Jinping created this thing was to break down, you know, those institutional rivalries and barriers and force, you know, coordination on these, on these institutions. So, you know, bottom line, I think what we're seeing is a real effort by Xi Jinping to You know, knit together a comprehensive, unified, and very effective, you know, stifling, really security apparatus. And, uh, I don't expect to see that change anytime soon. And then, you know, as you and I have been discussing recently, we also have, uh, another Xi loyalist Chen Yixin showing up as Chen Wenqing's successor right at the Ministry of State SecurityBill: And he remains Secretary General of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission too.Chris: Exactly. So, you know, from, from a, a sheet home where Xi Jinping five years ago arguably had very loose control, if at all, we now have a situation where he's totally dominant. Bill: I think the, the official on the Secretariat, I think it's Liu Jinguo.Chris: That's the one. Yes. Thank you. I'm getting old…Bill: He also has, has a long history of the Ministry of Public Security system. Um, but yeah, it does, it does seem like it's a, it's a real, I mean it, I I, I don't wanna use the word securitization, but it does like this is the indication of a, of a real, sort of, it just sort of fits with the, the general trend  towards much more focus on national security. I mean, what about on the, the Central Military Commission? Right? Because one of the surprises was, um, again, and this is where the norms were broken, where you have Zhang Youxia, who should have retired based on his age, but he's 72, he's on the Politburo he stays as a vice chair of the CMCChris: Yep. Yeah, no, at, at, at the rip old age of 72. It's a little hard, uh, to think of him, you know, mounting a tank or something  to go invade Taiwan or whatever the, you know, whatever the case may be. But, you know, I, I think here again, the narratives might be off base a little bit, you know, it's this issue of, you know, well he's just picked, you know, these sycophantic loyalists, He's a guy who has combat experience, right?And that's increasingly rare. Um, I don't think it's any surprise that. That himself. And, uh, the, uh, uh, gentleman on the CMC, uh, Li, who is now heading the, um, Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also has Vietnam combat experience, not from 79, but from the, uh, the border incursions that went on into the80s. Um, so it's not that surprising really.But, but obviously, you know, Zhang Youxia is very close to Xi Jinping, their father's fought together, right? Um, and they have that sort of, uh, blood tie and Xi is signaling, I want, uh, I. Political control and also technologically or, or, um, you know, operationally competent people. I think the other fascinating piece is we see once again no vice chairman from the political commissar iatside of the PLA.I think that's very interesting. You know, a lot of people, including myself, were betting that Miao HuaWould, would, would get the promotion. He didn't, you know, we can't know. But my sense is in a way, Xi Jiping is still punishing that side of the PLA for Xu Caihou's misdoings. Right. You know, and that's very interesting in and of itself.Also, it may be a signal that I don't need a political commissar vice chairman because I handle the politicsBill: And, and, and he, yeah. And in this, this new era that the, the next phase of the Xi era, it, it is, uh, everybody knows, right? It's, it's all about loyalty to Xi.Chris: we just saw right, uh, today, you know, uh, yet, yet more instructions about the CMC responsibilities, Chairman, responsibility systems. Bill: Unfortunately they didn't release the full text but it would be fascinating to see what's in there.Chris: And they never do on these things, which is, uh, which is tough. But, um, you know, I think we have a general sense of what would be in it, . But, but even that itself, right, you know, is a very major thing that people, you know, didn't really pick up. Certain scholars, certainly like James Mulvenon and other people who are really good on this stuff noticed it. But this shift under Hu Jintao was a CMC vice chairman responsibility system. In other words, he was subletting the operational matters certainly to his uniformed officers, Xi Jinping doesn't do thatBill: Well, this, and here we are, right where he can indeed I mean, I, I had written in the newsletter, um, you know, that she had, I thought, I think he ran the table in terms of personnel.Chris: Oh, completely. Yeah.Bill: And this is why it is interesting he kept around folks like Wang Huning, but we'll move on. The next question I had really was about Xi's report to the party Congress and we had talked, I think you'd also, um, you've talked about on our previous podcasts, I mean there, there seems to be a pretty significant shift in the way Xi is talking about the geopolitical environment and their assessment and how they see the world. Can you talk about a little bit?Chris: Yeah, I mean, I think definitely we saw some shifts there and, uh, you know, you and I have talked a lot about it. You know, there are problems with word counting, right? You know, and when you look at the thing and you just do a machine search, and it's like, okay, well security was mentioned 350 times or whatever, but, but the, you know, in what context?Right. Um, and, uh, our, uh, mutual admiration society, the, uh, the China Media project, uh, I thought they did an excellent piece on that sort of saying, Remember, it's the words that go around the buzzword that matter, you know, just as much. But what we can say unequivocally is that two very important touchstones that kind of explain their thinking on their perception of not only their external environment, but really kind of their internal environment, which had been in the last several political reports, now are gone. And those are this idea of China's enjoying a period of strategic opportunity and this idea that peace and development are the underlying trend of the times. And, you know, on the period of strategic opportunity, I think it's important for a couple reasons. One, just to kind of break that down for our listeners in a way that's not, you know, sort of, uh, CCP speak, , uh, the, the basic idea was that China judged that it's external security environment was sufficiently benign, that they could focus their energies on economic development.Right? So obviously that's very important. I also think it was an important governor, and I don't think I've seen anything out there talking about its absence in this, uh, political report on this topic, It was a, it was an important governor on sort of breakneck Chinese military development, sort of like the Soviet Union, right?In other words, as long as you were, you know, sort of judging that your external environment was largely benign, you. Didn't really have a justification to have a massive defense budget or to be pushy, you know, in the neighborhood, these sort of things. And people might poo poo that and sort of say, Well, you know, this is all just rhetoric and so on. No, they actually tend to Bill: Oh, that's interesting. Well, then that fits a little bit, right, Cuz they added the, the wording around strategic deterrence in the report as well  which is seen as a, you know, modernizing, expanding their nuclear forces, right?Chris: Exactly, right. So, you know, that's, uh, an important absence and the fact that, you know, the word, again, word searching, right. Um, strategic and opportunity are both in there, but they're separated and balanced by this risks and challenges, languages and, and so on. Bill: Right the language is very starkly different. Chris: Yeah. And then likewise on, on peace and development. This one, as you know, is, is even older, right? It goes back to the early eighties, I believe, uh, that it's been in, in these political reports. And, uh, you know, there again, the idea was sort of not only was this notion that peace and economic development were the dominant, you know, sort of trend internationally, globally, they would be an enduring one. You know, this idea of the trend of the times, right? Um, now that's missing. So what has replaced it in both these cases is this spirit of struggle, right? Um, and so that's a pretty stark departure and that in my mind just sort of is a real throwback to what you could call the period of maximum danger for the regime in the sixties, right? When they had just split off with the Soviets and they were still facing unremitting hostility from the west after the Korean War experience and, and so on. So, you know, there's definitely a, a decided effort there. I think also we should view the removal of these concepts as a culmination of a campaign that Xi Jinping has been on for a while.You know, as you and I have discussed many times before, from the minute he arrived, he began, I think, to paint this darker picture of the exterior environment. And he seems to have always wanted to create a sort of sense of urgency, certainly maybe even crisis. And I think a big part of that is to justifying the power grab, right? If the world outside is hostile, you need, you know, a strongman. Bill: Well that was a lot of the propaganda going into the Party of Congress about the need for sort of a navigator helmsman because know, we we're, we're closest we have ever been to the great rejuvenation, but it's gonna be really hard and we need sort of strong leadership right. It was, it was all building to that. This is why Ci needs to stay for as long as he wants to stay.Chris: and I think we saw that reflected again just the other day in this Long People's Daily piece by Ding Xuexing, right, Where he's talking again about the need for unity, the throwback, as you mentioned in your newsletter to Mao's commentary, there is not to be lost on any of us you know, the fact that the Politburo standing committee's. Uh, first field trip is out to Yan'an, right? I mean, you know, these are messages, right? The aren't coincidental.Bill: No, it, it is. The thing that's also about the report that's interesting is that while there was, speaking of word counts, there was no mention of the United States, but it certainly feels like that was the primary backdrop for this entire discussion around. So the, the shifting geopolitical, uh, assessments and this broader, you know, and I think one of the things that I, and I want to talk to as we get into this, a little bit about US China relations, but is it she has come to the conclusion that the US is implacably effectively hostile, and there is no way that they're gonna get through this without some sort of a broader struggle?Chris: I don't know if they, you know, feel that conflict is inevitable. In fact, I kind of assume they don't think that because that's pretty grim picture for them, you know? Um, but I, I do think there's this notion that. They've now had two years to observe the Biden administration. Right? And to some degree, I think it's fair to say that by certain parties in the US, Xi Jinping, maybe not Xi Jinping, but a Wang Qishan or some of these characters were sold a bit of a bag of goods, right?Oh, don't worry, he's not Trump, he's gonna, things will be calmer. We're gonna get back to dialogue and you know, so on and so forth. And that really hasn't happened. And when we look at. Um, when we look at measures like the recent, chip restrictions, which I'm sure we'll discuss at some point, you know, that would've been, you know, the, the wildest dream, right of certain members of the Trump administration to do something that, uh, that's that firm, right? So, um, I think the conclusion of the Politburo then must be, this is baked into the cake, right? It's bipartisan. Um, the earliest we'll see any kind of a turn here is 2024. I think they probably feel. Um, and therefore suddenly things like a no limits partnership with Russia, right, start to make more sense. Um, but would really makes sense in that if that is your framing, and I think it is, and you therefore see the Europeans as like a swing, right, in this equation. This should be a great visit, right, for Chancellor Scholz, uh, and uh, I can't remember if it was you I was reading or someone else here in the last day or so, but this idea that if the Chinese are smart, they would get rid of these sanctions on Bill: That was me. Well, that was in my newsletterChris: Yeah. Parliamentary leaders and you know, Absolutely. Right. You know, that's a no brainer, but. I don't think they're gonna do it , but, but you know, this idea definitely that, and, and when they talk in the political report, you know, it, it's, it's like, sir, not appearing in this film, right, from Money Python, but we know who the people who are doing the bullying, you know, uh, is and the long armed jurisdiction and , so on and so forth and all, I mean, all kidding aside, I think, you know, they will see something like the chip restrictions effectively as a declaration of economic war. I don't think that's going too far to say that.Bill: It goes to the heart of their sort of technological project around rejuvenation. I mean, it is, it is a significant. sort of set of really kind of a, I would think, from the Chinese perspective aggressive policies against them,Chris: Yeah, and I mean, enforcement will be key and we'll see if, you know, licenses are granted and how it's done. And we saw, you know, already some, some backing off there with regard to this US person, uh, restriction and so on. But, but you know, it's still pretty tough stuff. There's no two ways aboutBill: No, and I, I wonder, and I worry that here in DC. You know, where the mood is very hawkish. If, if people here really fully appreciate sort of the shift that's taking, that seems to be taking place in Beijing and how these actions are viewed.Chris: Well, I, I think that's a really, you put your hand on it really, really interesting way, Bill, because, you know, let's face it really since the Trump trade war started, right? We've all analysts, you know, pundits, uh, even businesses and government people have been sort of saying, you know, when are the Chinese gonna punch back? You know, when are they going to retaliate? Right? And we talk about rare earths and we talk about Apple and TeslaBill: They slapped some sanctions on people but they kind of a jokeChris:  And I guess what I'm saying is I kind of worry we're missing the forest from the trees. Right. You know, the, the, the work report tells us, the political report tells us how they're reacting. Right. And it is hardening the system, moving toward this fortress economy, you know, so on and so forth. And I wanna be real clear here, you know, they're not doing this just because they're reacting to the United States. Xi Jinping presumably wanted to do this all along, but I don't think we can say that the actions they perceive as hostile from the US aren't playing a pretty major role in allowing him to accelerate.Bill: Well, they called me. Great. You justifying great Accelerationist, right? Trump was called that as well, and, and that, that's what worries me too, is we're in. Kind of toxic spiral where, where they see us doing something and then they react. We see them do something and we react and, and it doesn't feel like sort of there's any sort of a governor or a break and I don't see how we figure that out.Chris: Well, I think, you know, and I'm sure we'll come to this later in our discussion, but you know, uh, yes, that's true, but you know, I'm always deeply skeptical of these inevitability memes, whether it's, you know, Thucydides trap or, you know, these other things. Last time I checked, there is something called political agency, right?In other words, leaders can make choices and they can lead if they want to, right? They have an opportunity to do so at in Bali, and you know, we'll have to see some of the, you know, early indications are perhaps they're looking at sort of a longer meeting. So that would suggest maybe there will be some discussion of some of these longstanding issues.Maybe we will see some of the usual, you know, deliverable type stuff. So there's an opportunity. I, I think one question is, can the domestic politics on either side allow for seizing that opportunity? You know, that's an open.Bill: Interesting. There's a couple things in the party constitution, which I think going into the Congress, you know, they told us they were gonna amend the Constitution. There were expectations that it, the amendments were gonna reflect an increase in Xi's power, uh, things like this, this idea of the two establishments, uh, which for listeners are * "To establish the status of Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Party's Central Committee and of the whole Party"* "To establish the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era"The thinking, and I, I certainly believe that, I thought that they would write that in. There was some talk that, uh, Xi Jinping Thought the longer version would be truncated to just Xi Jinping thought. that possibly he might get, a, a sort of another title like People's Leader. None of those happened. One thing that did happen, What's officially translated by the Chinese side in English as the two upholds- “Uphold the 'core' status of General Secretary Xi Jinping within the CC and “Uphold the centralized authority of the Party” those were written in. And so the question is, was there some kind of pushback or are we misreading we what mattered? And actually the two upholds are more important than the two of establishes.Chris: Well, I, and I think it, this may be a multiple choice answer, right? There might be elements of all the above in there. Uh, you know, I think it is important that he didn't get the truncation to Xi Jinping thought. You have to think that that was something he was keen on. In retrospect, it may be that it was something akin. I've always felt, you know, another thing that was on the table that didn't happen was reestablishing the party chairmanship. My view had always been he was using that largely as a bargaining chip. That, you know, in some ways it creates more trouble than it's worth you. If you're gonna have a chairman, you probably have to have vice chairman and what does that say about the succession? I mean, of course he could have, you know, a couple of geezers on there.  as vice chairman too. , But I, my view was always is he was holding that out there to trade away. Right. You know, at, at the last minute. Um, maybe that's what happened with Xi Jinping thought. I don't know.You know, uh, there have been some media articles, one of which, You and I were discussing yesterday from, uh, the Japanese, uh, publication Nikkei, you know, that suggested that, you know, the elders had, this was their last gasp, right? So the Jiang Zemins and the Zeng Qinghongs and Hu Jinataos, so on. Um, I'm a little skeptical of that. It is possible. Uh, but, um, I, I'd be a little skeptical of that. You know, it's, it's not at all clear that they had any kind of a role, you know, even at Beidaihe this year and so on, Jiang Zemin didn't even attend the Party Congress so clearly, you know, he must be pretty frail or he thought it was not with his time. You know, a little hard to say, but, you know, I kind of struggle with the notion that, you know, the 105 year old Song Ping gets up on a chair or something and starts,  starts making trouble. Right. You know, uh, the poor man's probably lucky if he stays awake during the meeting. Bill: One question, and again, because of the, just, you know, how much more opaque Chinese politics are than the really I think they've ever been. Um, but just one question. It mean, is it possible, for example, that you know, it's more important to get the personnel done. It's more, and then once you get your, you stack the central committee, you get the politburo, you get the standing committee, that these things are sort of a next phase.Chris: yeah, it's entirely possible and, and I think it, it, it does dovetail with this idea that, you know, another reflection from both the political report and the lineup in my mind, is Xi Jinping is a man in a hurry. Right? And he's kind of projected that, as you said, the great accelerator since he arrived.But I think he sees this next five years is really fundamental, right in terms of breaking through on these chokepoint technologies as they call them. You know, these sort of things. And so maybe therefore having the right people in place to handle, you know, uh, speedier policy, execution, you know, was more important.Likewise, I mean, he's sort of telegraphing, He's gonna be around for a while, right? No successor, no visible successor anywhere. Bill: A successor would need likely need five years on the standing committee. So we're looking at ten more years.Chris: Yes, exactly. And so there will be time. The other thing is, um, Xi Jinping is a, is a sort of determined fellow, right? You know, so of interest, even before the 19th Party Congress, I'd been hearing very strong rumors that the notion of lingxiu was out there, that he was contemplating it, right? And so then we see the buildup with, uh, Renmin lingxiu and so on and so forth.And, you know, it didn't happen clearly at the 19th. It didn't happen. But it doesn't mean it won't, you know, at some point. And I think it's really important also to think about, you know, We just saw a pretty serious, um, enterprise of the, you know, quote unquote norm busting, right? So what's to say that mid-course in this five years, he doesn't, uh, hold another sort of extraordinary conference of party delegates like them, Deng Xiaoping did in 1985, right, to push through some of these. You never know, right? In other words, these things don't necessarily have to happen. Just at Party Congresses. So my guess is, you know, this isn't over yet. Uh, but you know, at some level, given how the system was ramping up with those articles about Navigator and the people's leader stuff and so on, you know, that's usually a tell, and yet it didn't happen. And, and so something interesting there. Bill: now they're in the mode of, they're out with these sort of publicity, propaganda education teams where they go out throughout the country and talk about the spirit of the party Congress and push all the key messaging. Um, you know, so far none of those People's leader truncation have happened in that, which is I think an area where some people thought, Well, maybe that could sort of come after the Congress.Chris: What is interesting is it's all two establishments all the time in those discussions, so that's been very interesting since it didn't make it into the, uh, into the document. I guess the other thing is, At some level, is it sort of a distinction without a difference? You know, I, I haven't done the work on this to see, but my guess is short of, you know, the many times they've just junked the entire constitution and rewritten it, this is probably the most amendments there have been, you know, in the to at one time. You know, to the 1982 constitution, and most of them are his various buzzwords. Right. Um, and you know, I think you've been talking about this in the newsletter, there may very well be, uh, something to this issue of, you know, which is the superior thought two establishments or to upholds/safeguards?Bill: and even if the two establishes were superior and then it didn't go in, then somehow it will be theoretically flipped to what got in the ConstitutionChris: I mean, I guess the, the, the thing though where we, it's fair to say that maybe this wasn't his ideal outcome. To me, there's been a very clear and you know, structured stepwise approach on the ideology from the word go. Right? And the first was to create right out of the shoot, this notion of, you know, three eras, right?The, Mao period, Deng  and those other guys we don't talk about it anymore, period.  and Xi Jinping's new era, right? And then that was. You know, sort of crystallized right at the 19th Party Congress when you know, Xi Jinping thought for horribly long name went into the Constitution. And so, you know, the next step kind of seemed like that should be it.And as we've discussed before, you know, if he's able to get just Thought, it certainly enhances his ability to stay around for a very long time and it makes his diktats and so on even more unquestionable. But you know, you can say again, matter of prioritization. With a team where there's really no visible or other opposition, does it really matter? You know, in other words, no one's gonna be questioning his policy ideas anyway.Bill: Just an aside, but on  his inspection, the new standing committee will go on group trip right after the Party Congress and the first trip sends key messages. And group went to Yan'an, you know, they went, they went to the caves. Um, and you know, in the long readout or long CCTV report of the meeting, the visit, there was a section where the tour guide or the person introducing some of the exhibits talked about how the, the famous song, the East Is Red was,  by a person, written by the people sort of spontaneously, and it w it definitely caused some tittering about, well, what are they trying to signal for?You know, are we gonna be seeing some  Xi songs? there's some kind of really interesting signaling going on that I don't think we quite have figured out how to parse Chris: My takeaway on all this has been, I, I need to go back and do a little more book work on, you know, what was, what was the content of the seventh party Congress? What were the outcomes? I mean, I have the general sense, right? Like you, I immediately, you know, started brushing up on it. But, you know, Xi delivered a, an abridged work report. Right, A political report, which is exactly what Mao did then. I mean, in other words, they're not kidding around with the parallelism here. The question is what's the message?Bill: Just for background, at the visit last week to Yan'an, and the first spot that was in the propaganda was the, the, site of the seventh party Congress which is where…to be very simplistic, the seventh party was really moment, you know, as at the end of the Yan'am rectification came in, it was the moment where sort of Mao fully asserted his dominance throughout the system. Mao Thought etc. Right? The signaling, you could certainly, could certainly take a view that, you know, he doesn't do these things by coincidence, and this is. This is signaling both of, you know, can through anything because they, livedin caves and ended up beating the Japanese and then won the Civil War. You know this, and we can, and by the way, we have a dominant leader. I mean, there are ways, again, I'm being simplistic, but the symbolism was not, I think one that would, for example, give a lot of confidence to investors, which I think is, you know, one, one of the many reasons we've seen until the rumors earlier this week, a, pretty big selloff in the, in the Hong Kong and manland stock markets rightChris: most definitely. And I think, you know, this is the other thing about, about what I was trying to get at earlier with, uh, forest and trees, right? You know, in other words, . Um, he's been at this for a while too. You know, there's a reason why he declared a new long march right in depths of the trade war with Trump.Bill: And a new historical resolution, only the third in historyChris: Yeah. And they have been stepwise building since then. And this is the next building block.Bill: The last thought, I mean, he is 69. He's. 10 years younger than President Joe Biden. He could go, he could be around for a long timeBill: well just quickly, cause I know, uh, we don't have that much more time, but I, you say anything about your thoughts on Hu Jintao and what happened?My first take having had a father and a stepfather had dementia was, um, you know, maybe too sympathetic to the idea that, okay, he's having some sort of a senior cognitive moment. You know, you can get. easily agitated, and you can start a scene. And so therefore, was humiliating and symbolic at the end of the Communist Youth League faction, but maybe it was, it was benign as opposed to some of the other stuff going around. But I think might be wrong so I'd love your take on that.  Chris: Well, I, I think, you know, I, I kind of shared your view initially when I watched the, uh, I guess it was an AFP had the first, you know, sort of video that was out there and, you know, he appeared to be stumbling around a bit. He definitely looked confused and, you know, like, uh, what we were discussing earlier on another subject, this could be a multiple choice, you know, A and B or whatever type scenario as well.We don't know, I mean, it seems pretty well established that he has Parkinson's, I think the lead pipe pincher for me though, was that second longer one Singapore's channel, Channel News Asia put out. I mean, he is clearly tussling with Li Zhanshu about something, right. You know that that's. Yes, very clear. And you know, if he was having a moment, you know, when they finally get him up out of the chair and he seems to be kind of pulling back and so on, you know, he moves with some alacrity there,  for an 80 year old guy. Uh, I don't know if he was being helped to move quickly or he, you know, realized it was time to exit stage.Right. But I think, you know, as you said in your newsletter, I, we probably will never know. Um, but to me it looked an awful lot like an effort by Xi Jinping to humiliate him. You know, I mean, there was a reason why they brought the cameras back in at that moment, you know? Unless we believe that that just happened spontaneously in terms of Hu Jintao has his freak out just as those cameras were coming back in the stone faces of the other members of the senior leadership there on the rostrum and you know, Wand Hunting, pulling Li Zhanshu back down kind of saying basically, look buddy, this is politics, don't you don't wanna, that's not a good look for you trying to care for Hu Jintao. You know, I mean obviously something was going on, you know? No, no question. Bill: Right. And feeds into  the idea that Hu Chunhua, we all expected that he at least be on the Politburo again, and he's, he's off, so maybe something, something was going Chris: Well, I, I think what we know from observing Xi Jinping, right? We know that this is a guy who likes to keep people off balance, right? Who likes to keep the plate spinning. He, this is definitely the Maoist element of his personality, you know, whether it's strategic disappearances or this kind of stuff. And I think it's entirely plausible that he might have made some last minute switches right, to, uh, the various lists that were under consideration that caused alarm, you know, among those who thought they were on a certain list and  and no longer were.Bill: and then, and others who were smart enough to realize that if he made those switches, they better just go with it.Chris: Yeah, go along with it. Exactly. I mean, you know, in some ways the most, aside from what happened to Hu Jintao, the, the most, um, disturbing or compelling, depending on how you wanna look at it, part of that video is when Hu Jintao, you know, sort of very, um, delicately taps Li Keqiang on the shoulder. He doesn't even look at it, just keeps looking straight ahead. Uh, and that's tough. And as you pointed out in the newsletter and elsewhere, you know, how difficult must have that have been for Hu Jintao's son Hu Haifeng, who's in the audience watching this all go on? You know, it's, uh, it's tough. Bill: And then two two days later attends a meeting where he praises Xi to high heaven.Chris: Yeah, exactly. So, so if the darker narrative is accurate, I guess one thing that concerns me a bit is, as you know, well, I have never been a fan of these, uh, memes about comparing Xi Jinping to either Stalin or Mao in part because I don't see him as a whimsical guy. They were whimsical people. I think because of his tumultuous upbringing, he understands the problems with that kind of an approach to life, but this was a very ruthless act. If that more malign, you know, sort of definition is true and that I think that says something about his mentality that perhaps should concern us if that's the case. Bill: It has real implications, not just for domestic also potentially for its foreign policy.Chris: Absolutely. I mean, what it shows, right to some degree, again, man in a hurry, this is a tenacious individual, right?  if he's willing to do that. And so if you're gonna, you know, kick them in the face on chips and, you know, things like that, um, you should be taking that into consideration.Bill: And I think preparing for a more substantive response  that is more thought out and it's also, it happened, it wasn't very Confucian for all this talk Confucian definitely not. and values. One last question, and it is related is what do you make of this recent upsurge or talk in DC from various officials that PRC has accelerated its timeline to absorb Taiwan, because nothing in the public documents indicates any shift in that timeline.Chris: No. Uh, and well, first of all, do they, do they have a timeline? Right? You know, I mean, the whole idea of a timeline is kind of stupid, right? You don't, if you're gonna invade somewhere, you say, Hey, we're gonna do it on on this date. I mean, 2049. Okay. Bill: The only timeline that I think you can point to is is it the second centenary goal and, and Taiwan getting quote unquote, you know, returning Taiwan to the motherland's key to the great rejuvenation,Chris: Yeah, you can't have rejuvenation without it. Bill: So then it has to be done by 2049. 27 years, but they've never come out and specifically said 27 years or 2049. But that's what No. that's I think, is where the timeline idea comes from.Chris: Oh yes, definitely. And, and I think some confusion of. What Xi Jinping has clearly set out and reaffirmed in the political report as these important, um, operational benchmarks for the PLA, the People's Liberation Army to achieve by its hundredth anniversary in 2027. But that does not a go plan for Taiwan make, you know, And so it's been confusing to me trying to understand this. And of course, you know, I, I'm joking, but I'm not, you know, if we, if we listen now to the chief of naval operations of the US Navy, you know, like they're invading tomorrow, basically.My former colleague from the CIA, John Culver's, done some very, you know, useful public work on this for the Carnegie, where he sort his endowment, where he sort of said, you know, look, there's certain things we would have to see, forget about, you know, a D-day style invasion, any type of military action that, that you don't need intelligence methods to find out. Right. You know, uh, canceling, uh, conscription, demobilization cycles, you know, those, those sort of things. Um, we don't see that happening. So I've been trying to come to grips with why the administration seems fairly seized with this and and their public commentary and so on. What I'm confident of is there's no smoking gun you know, unlike, say the Russia piece where it appears, we had some pretty compelling intelligence. There doesn't seem to be anything that says Xi Jinping has ordered invasion plans for 2024, you know, or, or, or even 2027. Um, so I'm pretty confident that's not the case. And so then it becomes more about an analytic framework. And I, from what I can tell, it's seems to be largely based on what, uh, in, you know, the intelligence community we would call calendar-int.. calendar intelligence. In other words, you know, over the next 18 months, a lot of stuff's going to happen. We're gonna have our midterm elections next week. It's pretty likely the Republicans get at least one chamber of Congress, maybe both.That would suggest that things like the Taiwan Policy Act and, you know, really, uh, things that have, uh, Beijing's undies in a bunch, uh, you know, could really come back on, uh, the radar pretty forcibly and pretty quickly. Obviously Taiwan, nobody talks about it, but Taiwan's having municipal elections around the same time, and normally that would be a very inside Taiwan baseball affair, nobody would care. But the way that KMT ooks like they will not perform, I should say,  in those municipal elections. They could be effectively wiped out, you know, as a, as a sort of electable party in Taiwan. That's not a good news story for Beijing.And then of course we have our own presidential in 2024 and Taiwan has a presidential election in 24 in the US case.I mean, look, we could end up with a President Pompeo, right? Or a President DeSantis or others who. Been out there sort of talking openly about Taiwan independence and recognizing Taiwan. And similarly, I think whoever succeeds, uh, President Tsai in Taiwan, if we assume it will likely be a a, a Democratic Progressive party president, will almost by definition be more independence oriented.So I think the administration is saying there's a lot of stuff that's gonna get the Chinese pretty itchy, you know, over this next 18 month period. So therefore we need to be really loud in our signaling to deter. Right. And okay. But I think there's a risk with that as well, which they don't seem to be acknowledging, which is you might create a self-fulfilling prophecy.I mean, frankly, that's what really troubles me about the rhetoric. And so, for example, when Secretary Blinken last week or the before came out and said  Yeah, you know, the, the, the Chinese have given up on the status quo. I, I, I've seen nothing, you know, that would suggest that the political report doesn't suggest. Bill: They have called it a couple of times  so-called status quo.Chris: Well, Fair enough. Yeah. Okay. That's, that's fine. Um, but I think if we look at the reason why they're calling it the so-called status quo, it's because it's so called now because the US has been moving the goalposts on the status quo.Yeah. In terms of erosion of the commitment to the one China policy. And the administration can say all at once, they're not moving the goal post, but they are, I mean, let's just be honest.Bill: Now, and they have moved it more than the Trump administration did, don't you think?Chris: Absolutely. Yeah. Um, you know, no president has said previously we will defend Taiwan  multiple times. Right. You know, um, and things like, uh, you know, Democracy, someone, I mean, this comes back also to the, the framing, right, of one of the risks I think of framing the relationship as democracy versus autocracy is that it puts a very, uh, heavy incentive then for the Biden administration or any future US administration to, you know, quote unquote play the Taiwan card, right, as part of said competition.Whereas if you don't have that framing, I don't think that's necessarily as automatic. Right? In other words, if that's the framing, well Taiwan's a democracy, so we have to lean in. Right? You know? Whereas if it's a more say, you know, straight realist or national interest driven foreign policy, you might not feel that in every instance you've gotta do that,Bill: No, and and I it, that's an interesting point. And I also think too that, um, I really do wonder how much Americans care, right? And, and whether or not we're running the risk of setting something up or setting something in motion that, you know, again, it's easy to be rhetorical about it, but that we're frankly not ready to deal withChris: Well, and another thing that's interesting, right, is that, um, to that point, Some of the administration's actions, you know, that are clearly designed to show toughness, who are they out toughing? You know, in some cases it feels like they're out toughing themselves, right? I mean, obviously the Republicans are watching them and so on and all of that.Um, but you know, interesting, uh, something that came across my thought wave the other day that I hadn't really considered. We're seeing pretty clear indications that a Republican dominated Congress after the midterms may be less enthusiastic about support to Ukraine, we're all assuming that they're gonna be all Taiwan support all the time.Is that a wrong assumption? You know, I mean, in other words, Ukraine's a democracy, right? And yet there's this weird strain in the Trumpist Wing of the Republican party that doesn't wanna spend the money. Right. And would that be the case for Taiwan as well? I don't know, but you know, the point is, I wonder if the boogieman of looking soft is, is sort of in their own heads to some degree.And, and even if it isn't, you know, sometimes you have to lead. Bill: it's not clear the allies are listening. It doesn't sound like the Europeans would be on board withChris: I think very clearly they're not. I mean, you know, we're about to see a very uncomfortable bit of Kabuki theater here, aren't we? In the next couple of days with German Chancellor Sholz going over and, um, you know, if you, uh, read the op-ed he wrote in Politico, you know, it's, it's painful, right? You can see him trying to, uh, Trying to, uh, you know, straddle the fence and, and walk that line.And, and obviously there are deep, deep divisions in his own cabinet, right? You know, over this visit, the foreign minister is publicly criticizing him, you know, and so on. So I think this is another aspect that might be worrisome, which is the approach. You know, my line is always sort of a stool, if it's gonna be stable, needs three legs, right.And on US-China relations, I think that is, you know, making sure our own house is in order. Domestic strengthening, these guys call it, coordinating with allies and partners, certainly. But then there's this sort of talking to the Chinese aspect and through a policy, what I tend to call strategic avoidance, we don't.Talk to them that much. So that leg is missing. So then those other two legs need to be really strong. Right. Um, and on domestic strengthening, Okay. Chips act and so on, that's good stuff. On allies and partners, there seems to be a bit of an approach and I think the chip restrictions highlight this of, look, you're either for us or against us.Right? Whereas I think in, you know, the good old Cold War I, we seem to be able to understand that a West Germany could do certain things for us vis-a-vis the Soviets and certain things they couldn't and we didn't like it and we complained, but we kind of lived with it, right? If we look at these chip restrictions, it appears the administration sort of said, Look, we've been doing this multilateral diplomacy on this thing for a year now, it's not really delivering the goods. The chips for framework is a mess, so let's just get it over with and drag the allies with us, you know? Um, and we'll see what ramifications that will have.Bill: Well on that uplifting note, I, I think I'm outta questions. Is there anything else you'd like to add?Chris: Well, I think, you know, something just to consider is this idea, you know, and maybe this will help us close on a more optimistic note. Xi Jinping is telling us, you know, he's hardening the system, he's, he's doing this fortress economy thing and so on. But he also is telling us, I have a really difficult set of things I'm trying to accomplish in this five years.Right? And that may mean a desire to signal to the us let's stabilize things a bit, not because he's having a change of heart or wants a fundamental rapprochement, so on and so forth. I don't think that's the case, but might he want a bit of room, right? A breathing room. Bill: Buy some time, buy some spaceChris: Yeah, Might he want that? He might. You know, and so I think then a critical question is how does that get sorted out in the context of the negotiations over the meeting in Bali, if it is a longer meeting, I think, you know, so that's encouraging for that. Right. To some degree. I, I, I would say, you know, if we look at what's just happened with the 20th party Congress and we look at what's about to happen, it seems with our midterms here in the United States, Who's the guy who's gonna be more domestically, politically challenged going into this meeting, and therefore have less room to be able to seize that opportunity if it does exist.Exactly. Because I, I think, you know, the, the issue is, The way I've been framing it lately, you know, supposedly our position is the US position is strategic competition and China says, look, that's inappropriate, and we're not gonna sign onto it and forget it.You know, my own view is we kind of have blown past strategic competition where now in what I would call strategic rivalry, I think the chip restrictions, you know, are, are a giant exclamation point, uh, under that, you know, and so on. And my concern is we're kind of rapidly headed toward what I would call strategic enmity.And you know, that all sounds a bit pedantic, but I think that represents three distinct phases of the difficulty and the relationship. You know, strategic enmity is the cold, the old Cold War, what we had with the Soviets, right? So we are competing against them in a brass tax manner across all dimensions. And if it's a policy that, you know, hurts us, but it hurts them, you know, 2% more we do it, you know, kind of thing. I don't think we're there yet. And the meeting offers an opportunity to, you know, arrest the travel from strategic rivalry to strategic enmity. Let's see if there's something there/Bill: And if, and if we don't, if it doesn't arrest it, then I think the US government at least has to do a much better job of explaining to the American people why we're headed in this direction and needs  to do a much better job with the allies cuz because again, what I worry about is we're sort of heading down this path and it doesn't feel like we've really thought it through.You know, there are lots of reasons  be on this path, but there's also needs to be a much more of a comprehensive understanding of the, of the costs and the ramifications and the solutions and have have an actual sort of theory of the case about how we get out the other side of this in a, in a better way.Chris: Yeah, I think that's important. I want to be real, um, fair to the administration. You know, they're certainly more thoughtful and deliberative than their predecessor. Of course, the bar was low, but, um, you know, they, they seem to approach these things in a pretty. Dedicated and careful manner. And I think they really, you know, take, take things like, uh, looking at outbound investment restrictions, you know, my understanding is they have been, you know, seeking a lot of input about unintended consequences and so on. But then you look at something like the chips piece and it just seems to me that those in the administration who had been pushing for, you know, more there for some time, had a quick moment where they basically said, look, this thing's not working with multilaterally, Let's just do it, you know? And then, oh, now we're seeing the second and third and other order consequences of it. And the risk is that we wind up, our goal is to telegraph unity to Beijing and shaping their environment around them as the administration calls it. We might be signaling our disunity, I don't know, with the allies, and obviously that would not be a good thingBill: That's definitely a risk. Well, thanks Chris. It's always great to talk to you and Thank you for listening to the occasional Sinocism podcast. Thank you, Chris.Chris: My pleasure. Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit sinocism.com/subscribe

This week on Sinica, our friends at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs invited us for a live show taping before a small group. Kaiser is joined by Lizzi Lee, MIT-trained economist-turned-reporter who hosts the Chinese-language show "Wall Street Today" as well as The China Project's "Live with Lizzi Lee," both on Youtube; and by Damien Ma, who heads the Paulson Institute's in-house think tank MacroPolo. These two top-shelf analysts of Chinese politics break down what was important — and what was just a sideshow — at the 20th Party Congress, and offer their knowledgeable perspectives on the individuals named to key posts and what this likely means for China's direction. Don't miss this one!2:40 – Findings from MacroPolo's “fantasy PBSC” experiment 8:18 – Did China watchers overemphasize Xi Jinping's political constraints? 12:31 – Support for Li Qiang across different political factions17:23 – The changing factional composition of Chinese elite politics20:20 – Return of the technocrats23:27 – “Generation-skipping” in China's recent political promotions28:26 – The selection of Cai Qi32:46 – Li Shulei as a successor to Wang Huning 37:07 – The future of China's economic leadership39:52 – Selection of the vice premiers 41:18 – The future of China's diplomatic core45:28 – The Hu Jintao episode49:22 – Revising the “Zero-COVID” policy51:17 – Reassessing China's intentions vis-à-vis Taiwan A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com.Recommendations: Lizzi: Prestige, Manipulation, and Coercion: Elite Power Struggles in the Soviet Union and China after Stalin and Mao by Joseph TorigianDamien: Slouching Towards Utopia by Brad DeLongKaiser: "Taiwan, the World-Class Puzzle," a Radio Open Source podcast hosted by Christopher LydonSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

英语新闻｜Xi: Strive in unity to fulfill key goalsXi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, led the new top leadership of the CPC to Yan'an, an old revolutionary base in Shaanxi province, on Thursday, and vowed to carry on the founding spirit of the Party and strive in unity to fulfill the goals and tasks set by the 20th CPC National Congress.10月27日，中共中央总书记习近平带领中共中央政治局常委前往陕西延安瞻仰延安革命纪念地，强调要弘扬伟大建党精神，弘扬延安精神，坚定历史自信，增强历史主动，发扬斗争精神，为实现党的二十大提出的目标任务而团结奋斗。The trip, which took place five days after the conclusion of the 20th CPC National Congress, is considered to be a demonstration of the CPC top leadership's strong resolve to carry on the Party's fine traditions to make new progress on the new journey toward realizing national rejuvenation.此行距党的二十大闭幕不到一周，宣示了新一届中央领导集体赓续红色血脉、传承奋斗精神，在新的赶考之路上向历史和人民交出新的优异答卷的坚定信念。Led by Xi, the other six newly elected members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee — Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang and Li Xi —visited the site where the seventh CPC National Congress was held in 1945, a former residence of late Chinese leader Mao Zedong, and an exhibition at the Yan'an Revolutionary Memorial Hall, featuring the history of the time during which the CPC Central Committee was based in Yan'an, from 1935 to 1948. 习近平带领中共中央政治局常委李强、赵乐际、王沪宁、蔡奇、丁薛祥、李希瞻仰1945年召开的中共七大会址，参观毛泽东等老一辈革命家旧居，并在延安革命纪念馆参观《伟大历程——中共中央在延安十三年历史陈列》。从1935年到1948年，以延安为中心的陕甘宁边区是中共中央所在地，是中国人民抗日战争的政治指导中心和中国人民解放斗争的总后方。Xi, who is also Chinese president and chairman of the Central Military Commission, said that the trip was made to recollect the glorious period in which the Party developed in Yan'an, reminisce about the marvelous achievements of the older generation of revolutionaries,carry on the great founding spirit of the Party, and firm up historical confidence in order to strive in unity in fulfilling the goals and tasks set out at the 20th CPC National Congress.习近平强调，要重温革命战争时期党中央在延安的峥嵘岁月，缅怀老一辈革命家的丰功伟绩。要弘扬伟大建党精神，弘扬延安精神，坚定历史自信，增强历史主动，发扬斗争精神，为实现党的二十大提出的目标任务而团结奋斗。Calling Yan'an a shrine of China's revolution and the cradle of New China, Xi said that the Yan'an spirit fostered by the older generation of revolutionaries has become aninvaluable source of inspiration for the Party and should be passed on from generation to generation.习近平表示，延安是中国革命的圣地、新中国的摇篮。延安用五谷杂粮滋养了中国共产党发展壮大，支持了中国革命走向胜利。延安和延安人民为中国革命事业作出了巨大贡献，我们要永远铭记。The Yan'an spirit calls for being firmin the right political direction, emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts, serving the people wholeheartedly, and developing self-reliant and pioneering efforts.习近平强调，在延安时期形成和发扬的光荣传统和优良作风，培育形成的以坚定正确的政治方向、解放思想实事求是的思想路线、全心全意为人民服务的根本宗旨、自力更生艰苦奋斗的创业精神为主要内容的延安精神，是党的宝贵精神财富，要代代传承下去。“Being firm in the right political direction” is the essence of the Yan'an spirit, Xi said. He urged the whole Party to stay firm in the right political direction, resolutely adhere to the theories, principles and strategies of the Party, resolutely implement the policies and decisions of the CPC Central Committee and continue to advance the great cause opened up by the older generation of revolutionaries.习近平指出，坚定正确的政治方向是延安精神的精髓。全党同志要坚持正确政治方向，坚决贯彻党的基本理论、基本路线、基本方略，坚决落实党中央决策部署，把老一辈革命家开创的伟大事业继续推向前进。It was in Yan'an that the Party made“serving the people wholeheartedly” its fundamental purpose and incorporated it into the Party Constitution, Xi said.习近平指出，延安时期，党提出全心全意为人民服务的根本宗旨并写入党章。The whole Party should fulfill the CPC's fundamental purpose and maintain close bonds with the people, uphold the people-centered development philosophy, make real efforts to promote common prosperity and enable more achievements of the nation's modernization drive to benefit all the people in a much fairer manner, he said.习近平强调，全党同志要站稳人民立场，践行党的宗旨，贯彻党的群众路线，保持党同人民群众的血肉联系，自觉把以人民为中心的发展思想贯穿到各项工作之中，扎实推进共同富裕，让现代化建设成果更多更公平惠及全体人民。Xi called for carrying on the traditionof self-reliance and hard work, being courageous to advance self-reform, andfirmly exercising rigorous governance over the Party in order to ensure that the CPC will always be the strong leadership core of socialism with Chinesecharacteristics.习近平强调，全党同志要大力弘扬自力更生、艰苦奋斗精神，勇于推进党的自我革命，坚定不移推进全面从严治党始终保持党的先进性和纯洁性，确保党始终成为中国特色社会主义事业的坚强领导核心。He also urged the entire Party to carry forward the spirit of struggle and resolutely overcome difficulties and challenges.习近平强调，全党同志要发扬斗争精神、提高斗争本领，坚决战胜前进道路上的各种困难和挑战。记者：曹德胜 Shrine 英 [ʃraɪn] ；美 [ʃraɪn] n. 圣地；具有重要意义的地方 Cradle 英 [ˈkreɪd(ə)l] ；美 [ˈkreɪd(ə)l] n. 摇篮；策源地，发源地 Emancipate 英 [ɪˈmænsɪpeɪt]；美 [ɪˈmænsɪpeɪt] v. 解放；使不受（法律、政治或社会的）束缚

Given the opaque nature of the leadership changes prior the 20th Party Congress, the announcement of the composition of the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee will surely surprise many observers of Chinese elite politics. In conversation with National Committee President Stephen Orlins, Cheng Li provides fresh insights into the main surprises on the personnel front. In addition, Dr. Li discusses whether the appointments reveal any shifts in the balance of power and factional fault lines in Zhongnanhai, what the new leadership suggests about the trajectory of domestic and foreign policy, and what Xi Jinping might have signaled regarding future political succession. This webinar was conducted at 10:00 a.m. on October 26, 2022, three days after the conclusion of the Party Congress. 3:05 What is the structure of the Chinese Communist Party? 7:07 Who will be on the Politburo Standing Committee? 10:20 What are the surprises coming out of the 20th Party Congress? 23:31 What will China's foreign policy and economy teams look like? 31:03 How many Politburo members are foreign-educated? 32:59 What are Xi Jinping's priorities in his next term? 38:30 What happened to Hu Chunhua and Hu Jintao? 42:45 Is Qin Gang's ascension to Foreign Minister attributed to his relationship with Xi Jinping? 51:01 What will be the role of the State Council? 55:08 What are the implications for the Taiwan Affairs Office? 58:23 How has China's middle class responded to these appointments? About the speaker: https://www.ncuscr.org/event/20th-party-congress/ Subscribe to the National Committee on YouTube for video of this interview. Follow us on Twitter (@ncuscr) and Instagram (@ncuscr).

英语新闻｜Principles of congress vital, Xi emphasizesXi Jinping, generalsecretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, has called forresolutely carrying out the goals and tasks laid out by the 20th CPC NationalCongress in order to strive for new successes in building a modern socialistcountry in all respects.中共中央总书记习近平强调，要坚定不移把党的二十大提出的目标任务落到实处，奋力夺取全面建设社会主义现代化国家新胜利。He made theremark on Tuesday while presiding over the first group study session of thePolitical Bureau of the 20th CPC Central Committee. He called for fullystudying, understanding and implementing the guiding principles of the 20th CPCNational Congress, which concluded on Saturday.二十届中共中央政治局10月25日下午就学习贯彻党的二十大精神进行第一次集体学习。中共中央总书记习近平在主持学习时强调，全党要在全面学习、全面把握、全面落实上下功夫。Xi said thatthe congress generated a series of significant achievements in political,theoretical and practical fields, mapped out important principles and strategicmeasures for the development of the Party and the country on the new journey inthe new era, and proposed political declarations and action guidelines for theParty to unite and lead the people in building a modern socialist country inall respects and comprehensively advancing national rejuvenation.习近平总书记强调，党的二十大在政治上、理论上、实践上取得了一系列重大成果，就新时代新征程党和国家事业发展制定了大政方针和战略部署，是我们党团结带领人民全面建设社会主义现代化国家、全面推进中华民族伟大复兴的政治宣言和行动纲领。During themeeting, newly elected members of the Standing Committee of the PoliticalBureau of the 20th CPC Central Committee — Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning,Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang and Li Xi — presented their thoughts about the guidingprinciples of the 20th CPC National Congress.李强、赵乐际、王沪宁、蔡奇、丁薛祥、李希就深刻领会和贯彻落实党的二十大精神谈了体会。They saidthat the congress charted the courseand provided fundamental guidelines for the endeavors of the Party and thecountry on the new journey in the new era. They all vowed to firmly uphold Xi'score position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole, anduphold the authority and centralized and unified leadership of the CPC CentralCommittee with Xi at the core.他们表示，党的二十大为新时代新征程党和国家事业发展指明了前进方向、提供了根本遵循。要坚决维护习近平总书记党中央的核心、全党的核心地位，维护以习近平同志为核心的党中央权威和集中统一领导。Addressingthe study session, Xi said that studying, publicizing and implementing theguiding principles of the 20th CPC National Congress is and will continue to bea top political task for the whole Party and the country.习近平总书记在主持学习时发表了讲话。他指出，学习宣传贯彻党的二十大精神是当前和今后一个时期全党全国的首要政治任务。He urgedbearing in mind the country's practices in deepening reform and opening-up,advancing high-quality development and effectively dealing with major risks andchallenges in studying the guiding principles of the congress, in order to gainan in-depth understanding of the historical, theoretical and practical logic ofthe fundamental policies and strategic arrangements laid out by the congressfor the cause of the Party and the country.习近平总书记强调，联系我们深化改革开放、推动高质量发展、有效应对重大风险挑战的具体实践，深刻领悟党的二十大关于党和国家事业发展大政方针和战略部署的历史逻辑、理论逻辑、实践逻辑。In terms ofunderstanding the strategic measures unveiled at the congress, Xi underlined the need to take into consideration the newstrategic opportunities, new strategic tasks, new strategic stage, newstrategic requirements and new strategic environment the country is facing, anddeeply understand the difficulties and complexities in achieving the goals andtasks in building a modern socialist country in all respects.习近平总书记强调，要全面把握党的二十大作出的各项战略部署，紧密联系我国发展面临的新的战略机遇、新的战略任务、新的战略阶段、新的战略要求、新的战略环境，深刻认识实现全面建设社会主义现代化国家各项目标任务的艰巨性和复杂性，增强贯彻落实的自觉性和坚定性。Whilestressing full implementation of the guiding principles of the 20th CPCNational Congress, Xi urged concrete actions with clear timetables and roadmaps to forge ahead in adown-to-earth manner.习近平总书记强调，贯彻落实党的二十大精神要有针对性地拿出落实的具体方案，制定明确的时间表、施工图，扎扎实实向前推进。The membersof the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee should take the lead inupholding the authority of the CPC Central Committee and its centralized,unified leadership, Xi said, urging them to carry forward the fighting spiritand have courage to overcome various difficulties. 习近平指出，政治局的同志们尤其要带头维护党中央权威和集中统一领导，要发扬斗争精神，勇于克服各种困难。记者：曹德胜Chart英[tʃɑːt]；美[tʃɑːrt]v. 制订计划Forge英[fɔːdʒ]；美[fɔːrdʒ]v. 艰苦干成；努力加强Unveil英[ˌʌnˈveɪl]；美[ˌʌnˈveɪl]v. 展示，介绍

El sábado pasado asistimos a una purga en vivo y en directo en el curso del XX Congreso del partido comunista chino. El congreso se encontraba ya en su recta final, los compromisarios celebraban la ceremonia de clausura y se disponían a votar cuando sucedió algo que nadie esperaba. A la izquierda de Xi Jinping se encontraba sentado Hu Jintao, ex secretario general del partido y presidente de China entre 2003 y 2013. Todo transcurría con normalidad cuando en el estrado aparecieron dos hombres vestidos de traje negro y mascarilla que invitaron al exmandatario a abandonar la sala. Hu Jintao no se esperaba algo así porque mostró sorpresa y se negó a levantarse. Por el gesto que ponía ante aquello, no entendía muy bien lo que estaba sucediendo. Los hombres le tomaron por los brazos y le apartaron de la mesa. Entretanto Xi Jinping miraba al frente como si a su lado no estuviera pasando nada. Hu Jintao siguió resistiéndose en la medida de sus fuerzas –es un hombre de avanzada edad–, pero a nadie parecía importarle que el personal de seguridad se lo estuviese llevando. Li Zhanshu y Wang Huning, dos pesos pesados del comité central del partido, sentados junto a Hu Jintao parecían preocupados. Zhanshu trató de ayudarle pero Huning se lo impidió tirando de su chaqueta. Ya de pie, Hu Jintao se dirigió a Xi Jinping dándole una palmadita en la espalda, pero no obtuvo respuesta. En cuestión de un par de minutos todo había concluido. Es un misterio lo que sucedió y nadie, salvo Xi Jinping, conoce la causa. Lo que si sabemos es que en ese preciso instante se iba a proceder a la votación del informe del comité central y una enmienda a los estatutos del partido. Ambos se aprobaron por unanimidad y sin una sola abstención. Los analistas hacen cábalas, pero pocos se creen la excusa oficial aducida por el partido, que asegura que Hu Jintao no se encontraba bien y que por eso fue acompañado a abandonar el Gran Salón del Pueblo. Pero, por las imágenes que todos hemos podido ver, el afectado no parecía tener la intención de marcharse. La cuestión es por qué Xi Jinping quiso escenificar la purga a través de televisión cuando bien podría haberla hecho a puerta cerrada. Hu Jintao cumplirá 80 años dentro de dos meses y podrían haberle apartado de forma mucho más discreta como siempre se ha hecho dentro del partido comunista chino. Es posible que Xi Jinping quisiese que la humillación a su antecesor fuese pública, que la viese todo el mundo para dejar claro quién manda allí y, ya de paso, para enterrar definitivamente la era de Hu Jintao, que concluyó hace diez años y en la que Xi Jinping tuvo un papel estelar ya que fue su vicepresidente durante cinco años entre 2008 y 2013. Lo cierto es que el estilo de Gobierno de Hu Jintao fue muy distinto al de Xi Jinping. Hu Jintao buscaba el consenso entre las diferentes facciones del partido y nunca llegó a acumular tanto poder como el que actualmente tiene Xi Jinping, pero llevaba muchos años fuera del Gobierno, no constituía ya un peligro para nadie. Quizá Xi Jinping buscaba ejemplarizar y qué mejor cabeza para transmitir el mensaje que la de su predecesor. En La ContraRéplica: - Los motivos de la guerra - Apaciguamiento nuclear - La crisis de la televisión · Canal de Telegram: https://t.me/lacontracronica · “La ContraHistoria de España. Auge, caída y vuelta a empezar de un país en 28 episodios”… https://amzn.to/3kXcZ6i · “Lutero, Calvino y Trento, la Reforma que no fue”… https://amzn.to/3shKOlK · “La ContraHistoria del comunismo”… https://amzn.to/39QP2KE Apoya La Contra en: · Patreon... https://www.patreon.com/diazvillanueva · iVoox... https://www.ivoox.com/podcast-contracronica_sq_f1267769_1.html · Paypal... https://www.paypal.me/diazvillanueva Sígueme en: · Web... https://diazvillanueva.com · Twitter... https://twitter.com/diazvillanueva · Facebook... https://www.facebook.com/fernandodiazvillanueva1/ · Instagram... https://www.instagram.com/diazvillanueva · Linkedin… https://www.linkedin.com/in/fernando-d%C3%ADaz-villanueva-7303865/ · Flickr... https://www.flickr.com/photos/147276463@N05/?/ · Pinterest... https://www.pinterest.com/fernandodiazvillanueva Encuentra mis libros en: · Amazon... https://www.amazon.es/Fernando-Diaz-Villanueva/e/B00J2ASBXM #FernandoDiazVillanueva #china #hujintao Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

Xi Jinping was elected general secretary of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) at the committee's first plenary session held on Sunday, according to a communique.The session, presided over by Xi, was attended by 203 members of the 20th CPC Central Committee and 168 alternate members.Xi was also named chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission at the session.The members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee elected at the session are Xi Jinping, Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang and Li Xi.Also elected were members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the session, which endorsed the members of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat nominated by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.The session named the members of the Central Military Commission.The session approved the secretary, deputy secretaries and members of the Standing Committee of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) elected at the first plenary session of the 20th CCDI.来源：新华社

Misha talks with Habi Zhang, of Purdue University, about her contention that Chinese want security, not freedom.  Habi talks about how Confucianism shaped Chinese views of politics.  They also discuss CCP theorist Wang Huning and how the West misunderstood China.

Misha talks with Habi Zhang, of Purdue University, about her contention that Chinese want security, not freedom.  Habi talks about how Confucianism shaped Chinese views of politics.  They also discuss CCP theorist Wang Huning and how the West misunderstood China.

I spoke to Chang Che of SupChina for a fascinating conversation on Wang Huning, the strategist behind Xi Jinping & the Modern CCP We discuss Wang's role in crafting China's authoritarianism to implement capitalist reforms, how Wang's writings convinced party leaders that America would ultimately collapse, the current state of Nihilism in both the US and China amongst young people, and the contrasting legacy of China's 'Covid-Zero' and America's "Covid for Everyone". For more w. Chang please read his work on Sup China here: https://supchina.com/author/changche/ You can also find a website of all his writings here: https://changnche.com/ Music by Prod Riddiman: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hyLbRJEFSa8

In 1991, a young Chinese academic published America against America, a look at the contradictions and paradoxes he observed while traveling there. His book was largely forgotten until last year when it went viral for its observations on US cultural decline, becoming a hot topic on Chinese-language forums. It was no less fascinating for who its author was. Wang Huning is today one of the top leaders in the CCP and a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Freelance journalist Chang Che (@Changxche) sat down to talk with me about the book and what it tells us about Chinese interpretations of US - and Western - culture.We also discussThe Shanghai lockdownWhy the teaching of Western classical civilization took off in China......But also makes very little mention of religionThe CCP take on the US culture wars and rewriting curriculumsCHECK OUT THE CHINATALK SUBSTACK! https://chinatalk.substack.comSupport us on Patreon! https://www.patreon.com/ChinaTalkChang's Wang Huning Article: https://www.newyorker.com/books/second-read/how-a-book-about-americas-history-foretold-chinas-futureChang's western classics education article: https://supchina.com/2022/01/13/china-looks-to-the-western-classics/Outro Music: 锦上添花 FREESTYLE by 盛宇 Damnshine https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZRaoDr1Cbbg Get bonus content on Patreon See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

In 1991, a young Chinese academic published America against America, a look at the contradictions and paradoxes he observed while traveling there. His book was largely forgotten until last year when it went viral for its observations on US cultural decline, becoming a hot topic on Chinese-language forums. It was no less fascinating for who its author was. Wang Huning is today one of the top leaders in the CCP and a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Freelance journalist Chang Che (@Changxche) sat down to talk with me about the book and what it tells us about Chinese interpretations of US - and Western - culture.We also discussThe Shanghai lockdownWhy the teaching of Western classical civilization took off in China......But also makes very little mention of religionThe CCP take on the US culture wars and rewriting curriculumsCHECK OUT THE CHINATALK SUBSTACK! https://chinatalk.substack.comSupport us on Patreon! https://www.patreon.com/ChinaTalkChang's Wang Huning Article: https://www.newyorker.com/books/second-read/how-a-book-about-americas-history-foretold-chinas-futureChang's western classics education article: https://supchina.com/2022/01/13/china-looks-to-the-western-classics/Outro Music: 锦上添花 FREESTYLE by 盛宇 Damnshine https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZRaoDr1Cbbg Get bonus content on Patreon See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

英语新闻∣Xi calls for building green nationPresident Xi Jinping called on Wednesday for comprehensive efforts to promote environmental conservation to make greater contributions to advancing global environmental and climate governance and enhancing harmony between man and nature.Xi, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, made the remarks while joining Beijing residents in a voluntary tree-planting activity in the Chinese capital's Daxing district. This year marks the 41st anniversary of the country's voluntary tree-planting activity.Xi has participated in the tree-planting activity in Beijing every year since he became general secretary of the CPC Central Committee in November 2012. While planting saplings of different types of trees, Xi talked with officials and people on-site also taking part.Xi said that he participated in the tree-planting activity every year to make his contribution to building a beautiful China and encourage the whole of society, especially young people, to promote ecological advancement so that China's environment will be even better.He commended the nation's efforts in afforestation since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, saying that the Party has led the Chinese people in making historic progress and achieving eye-catching miracles in environmental conservation.Xi stressed the importance of upholding the concept that lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets, highlighting the nation's efforts to promote ecological advancement, increase afforestation and improve people's living environment. The vision of building a beautiful China is turning into a reality, he said.However, Xi noted, conservation and rehabilitation to achieve the fundamental improvement of the environment is a long-term task and still requires arduous efforts.Noting that forests and grasslands are of fundamental and strategic significance to the country's ecological security, Xi said China has entered a key period in improving its environment.He reaffirmed the need to unswervingly implement the new development philosophy, put the environment first while firmly sticking to the green development path, and make greater efforts in the integrated protection and management of mountains, rivers, forests, farmlands, lakes, grasslands and deserts.He called for scientifically promoting afforestation nationwide and raising the quantity and quality of forest and grassland resources in order to increase carbon sinks.Saying that planting trees and protecting nature are traditional virtues of the Chinese nation, Xi urged efforts to further advance voluntary afforestation activities nationwide.He urged Party and government officials at various levels to assume their responsibilities in work in tree-planting and ecological advancement to enable the people to enjoy a better living environment.Other leaders, including Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, Han Zheng and Wang Qishan, also took part in the activitycommend英[kəˈmend]；美[kəˈmend]v. 赞扬; 推荐; 被接受afforestation英[əˌfɒrɪˈsteɪʃn]；美[əˌfɔrɪˈsteɪʃn]n. 造林，造林地区eye-catching英[ˈaɪ kætʃɪŋ]；美[ˈaɪ kætʃɪŋ]adj. 引人注目的; 显著的arduous英[ˈɑːdjuəs]；美[ˈɑːrdʒuəs]adj. 努力的; 艰巨的; 难克服的; 陡峭的

Wang Huning is arguably the world's most influential and powerful intellectual. And you've probably never heard of him, as he has sat quietly at the top of China's power structure, advising three presidents over 30 years. The architect of many of China's most significant contemporary ideological and strategic efforts, he's deeply studied in the philosophy and ways of the west. Long before Robb's own analysis that the west is amidst a monumental breakdown he called a “Great Release”, Huning came to the conclusion that the decadence of the United States, its culture and capitalism will lead it to ruin, and China must be steered in a different, and in some ways more integral, direction. The stakes couldn't be higher: to understand this century, we have to understand the geopolitical and philosophical power struggle between China and the United States and the differing global “Operating Systems” they're fighting for. And to better understand that struggle, we have to better understand whether the cognition of China's leaders are integral or not: are they capable of bringing the Teal “Power to Integrate” to bear on the world system? For that answer, we must look to Wang Huning. Join Robb as he holds an impromptu commentary-monologue on a recent profile of Wang Huning published in Palladium Magazine: https://palladiummag.com/2021/10/11/the-triumph-and-terror-of-wang-huning/

In Episode #90, we are joined by Karim Anjarwalla, Managing Partner at Anjarwalla & Khanna. We discuss: Karim's work as an international business lawyer in Kenya, where he was recently recognized as the Kenyan Lawyer of the Year One transaction that was significant enough to move the Kenyan currency against the USD Kenya as the most open sub-Saharan economy to foreign investors The activities of private equity funds like Helios, African Best, DPI, and many others that are focused solely on African investments The attractiveness of Nairobi vs. Johannesburg The African Growth and Opportunities Act The Africa Continental Free Trade Area Nairobi, Lagos, Cairo, and Johannesburg as hubs for fintech and agritech How the new generation of successful African entrepreneurs approach their wealth and social responsibility to solve deep-seated social problems in Africa How African lawyers are perceived by their clients as trusted advisors beyond legal skills The vast difference in the regulatory experience of civil servants How investors and businesses should not make the mistake of treating Africa as one market Listening, and watching recommendations from: Karim Tanzania Nobel Prize for Literature (Abdul Razak Gurna) Theelephant.info Visit Bofa Beach Kilifi Jonathan Grantchester (Amazon Prime / BBC / PBS) Fred The Triumph and Terror of Wang Huning by N.S. Lyons, Palladium (Oct. 11, 2021)

Misha talks with David Ownby and Matt Johnson, of “Reading the China Dream” on the Chinese Republic of Letters, modern Chinese thinkers, and the influence of Wang Huning, lead ideologist and intellectual of the CCP.

Misha talks with David Ownby and Matt Johnson, of "Reading the China Dream" on the Chinese Republic of Letters, modern Chinese thinkers, and the influence of Wang Huning, lead ideologist and intellectual of the CCP.

Episode Notes:Today, we're going to talk about US-China relations, the upcoming Sixth Plenum , Xi Jinping, and what we might expect for the next year heading into the 2022 20th Party Congress among other topics. I'm really pleased that our first guest for the Sinocism Podcast is Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China strategies Group, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic International Studies and former senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. 4:45 on US-China relations - I think their assessment is that it's working. In other words, by maintaining that sort of very strict line, they've gotten Madam Meng of Huawei fame home. They've gotten the trade discussions going again. They've got the US saying, "Well, we might lengthen the timeline for you to implement phase one." In other words, it's working from their perspective.13:30 on the 6th Plenum - The first I think is that, it would represent, I think the net evolution in what I call Xi Jinping's further development of his leadership supremacy. And, I use those terms very deliberately because often times, the shorthand we see in describing this as references to Xi's consolidation of power. Well, in my mind that took place very early on in his tenure. 30:00 on the economy and heading towards the 2022 20th Party Congress - Equally important in my mind is how little the leadership and the economic technocrats seem to be rattled by that fact. In other words, we're not seeing the stimulus wave. We're not seeing monetary policy adjustments in a significant way. There's a lot of study as she goes. And, that could change. We've got the central economic work conference, obviously in December, which will give us a sense of how they're thinking about next year. But like so many other things, I think we as watchers and the investment community and others, we're slow to sometimes break with old narratives. One of which is you must welcome a party Congress with very high growth. And every signal coming out of the leadership is that, they're not playing that game anymore. I think that's fairly strong.37:00 On US-China relations - I think if you're a senior US policymaker, your working assumption has to be that China's more likely to get it right than to get it wrong, even if they only get it 30% right or 40%, something like that…Chris Johnson:Xi is here and will be here for the foreseeable future. And therefore there won't be any change in the policies largely that he's articulated.Links: More about Chris Johnson and his China Strategies Group here.Transcript:Bill Bishop:Today, we're going to talk about US-China relations, the upcoming Sixth Plenum , Xi Jinping, and what we might expect for the next year heading into the 2022 20th Party Congress among other topics. I'm really pleased that our first guest for the Sinocism Podcast is Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy, China strategies Group, senior fellow at the center for strategic international studies and former senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. Welcome, Chris.Chris Johnson:Great to be here, Bill.Bill Bishop:Chris, welcome. I think today, what I really like to start out with is just an overview where you see the state of US-China relations and how the new administration, I mean it's 10 months now or thereabouts, but how the new administration is doing and how the Xi Jinping administration is reacting.Chris Johnson:Great. Yeah. Well, it's obviously a unique time in US-China relations. I guess, if I had to characterize it in a phrase, I would say, things are a bit of a mess. I think, if we start, it's useful to start at a sort of high order level and then work our way down in terms of thinking about the relationship. So I think at the highest order, one of the things that strikes me is that arguably for the first time, since normalization of relations, really, we're in this strange position where I think both countries, both leaders and perhaps increasingly, even both peoples, aren't overly keen to engage with one another.Chris Johnson:I think, we've had times in the past during the last several decades where maybe one side or the other was feeling that way, but not both. And the sense that I get in terms of the leader to leader view is, both Xi Jinping and President Biden are kind of looking at each other and saying, "I've got a lot going on at home. I'm very focused on what's happening domestically. I know the other guys out there and I need to pay attention to what he's doing, and right now it's all just his. But, if I can kind of keep him at arm's length, that's okay with me." And I think we're kind of seeing that really on both sides of the fence.Chris Johnson:I think for Xi Jinping, it's a little more intense in that it's hard to see where the good outcomes are for him and trying to lean in toward the relationship and so on, because he's kind of getting what he wants to some degree without doing. So, as to your question about how the administration is doing, I think to be fair, I think we have to say probably about as well as they could given both the domestic constraints, what we might call China's own attitudes and approach toward the relationship right now.Chris Johnson:On the domestic side, by constraints, I mean, the administration from my perspective seems to have an almost neurologically fearful stance of being seen as weak on China. Obviously that comes out of four years of the Trump administration and its approach toward China, stories and tales and recreations of history about how engagement was a failure and how the Obama administration was somehow a main sort of group that failed to understand the reality of the relationship and therefore blew it and a lot of those people are back now. And I think that contributes to this fear. And I think the practical impact of that is that, it's inhibited the administration from doing what I think they need to do, which is to have sort of an objective racking and stacking of what they believe China's global ambitions actually are. And then I think critically beyond that, which of those ambitions the US can live with, because in my assessment, we're going to have to live with at least some of them.Chris Johnson:And then to be fair to the administration, I think that same needed exercise has been hamstrung by China's own approach, which at least so far, I think we could probably characterize as an unflinching resistance that the US must adjust it's as they like to call it hostile attitude, if progress is going to be made. And, it's my sense that there's really little chance of progress of China's unwilling to move off of that stance. But at the same time, I think their assessment is that it's working. In other words, by maintaining that sort of very strict line, they've gotten Madam Meng of Huawei fame home. They've gotten the trade discussions going again. They've got the US saying, "Well, we might lengthen the timeline for you to implement phase one." In other words, it's working from their perspective.Bill Bishop:And, they presented two lists to Deputy Secretary of State Sherman. And, it certainly seems like there are some of the things on that list that are being worked through. To follow up though, what do you think the administration is doing around Taiwan? Because it seems like over the last couple of weeks, we've had quite a push from Secretary of State Lincoln and others on Taiwan and sort of whether or not it's giving them, returning them to the UN or in a seat or at least giving them more participation in UN bodies. What do you think is driving that and what do you think realistically, the administration believes the outcome's going to be because it certainly seems to be touching the most sensitive point on the Chinese side?Chris Johnson:Yeah. Well, my sense of it is that, regardless of the administration's intention, and I'm not entirely sure what the intention is, the results in Beijing are the same, which is to say that there would be a perception there that the US is unilaterally making a change to what they see as the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, which is the US adherence to the One China Policy. And, if you're sitting in Beijing's shoes and you're hearing, you're seeing things in the press, you're hearing the president himself say, "Well, we will defend Taiwan." Oops. We didn't mean to say that, but it wasn't, but I didn't misspeak, and these sort of things, and a lot of that has to do with the domestic. Look, the Chinese have never doubted that the US would probably mount some kind of a defense. So, it's not really that issue if the Chinese were to attack. It's the accumulation of what they see as salami slicing erosion of the US commitment to the One China Policy.Chris Johnson:And so in my mind, the only relevant element here is not really the motivations, but what's going on in Xi Jinping's mind. Can he see all of this activity and basically respond by making the appropriate judgment about this erosion in the One China Policy and then quietly taking the appropriate adjustments on war planning and on other things? Or does he feel that with the accumulation of these things, whether it's the debate over whether or not to break with strategic ambiguity, changing the name of Taiwan's defacto embassy in Washington, all these sort things, does he feel that he needs to do something demonstrative now to kind of reset the balance, which was really the motivation behind their military exercises in 1995, '96, for example, when [inaudible 00:07:53] came to the United States?Bill Bishop:And of course back then, they had far less capability as they do now. I mean, certainly, I've heard different things and looked at different reports, but it does sound like the PLA has advanced quite rapidly around in areas that they would be able to bring to bear, to deal with Taiwan from their perspective. And that the US, I think is ... One of the things I worry about is just that there's certainly in some quarters in DC, it seems like there's a belief in the US military power that may not be fully rooted in the new realities of the sort of PLA modernization campaign that really has, I think, dramatically accelerated and did much more efficient under Xi Jinping.Chris Johnson:Yeah, definitely. And primarily to the degree, there's been a chief innovation under Xi's leadership. They've finally taken the steps to address what we might call the software issues. In other words, the technology, the hardware, the shiny kit has been being developed since that '95, '96 period. And they've got some very interesting and capable systems now. But the software, the ability to actually conduct joint operations, these sort of things was always a fall down point for them. And then massive restructuring of the PLAs force structure, much along the lines of sort of Goldwater-Nichols that Xi launched early in his tenure is now bearing a lot of fruit and making them more capable from that sort of software side of things as well.Bill Bishop:And that restructuring, that was something that the PLA or that they talked about doing before but had never, no other leader had been able to push it through.Chris Johnson:Correct.Chris Johnson:Even Deng Xiaoping, who himself tried to do sort of a similar restructuring in the aftermath of Tiananmen and in the aftermath of the Yang period.Bill Bishop:That's interesting. I remember we talked when she convened the second Gutian meeting with all the generals that look clearly in retrospect was the kickoff to I think, a massive corruption crackdown inside the PLA.Chris Johnson:No. I call it political shock and awe which was the twin aspect of force restructuring and the anti-corruption campaign in the military, which basically the back of the PLAs political power in the system from my perspective.Bill Bishop:Interesting. So, well now moving on to politics, we have the Sixth Plenum. That starts in on the 8th of November, I believe. Can you talk a bit about why those plenums are important and what might be especially interesting about this one? Because, one of the things that we keep hearing about, and certainly there are rumors, but there's also, I think, some certainly the way they describe the agenda for the plenum in the official Xinhua release a couple weeks ago. It sure sounds like they're going to push through a third historical resolution.Chris Johnson:Yeah. No, my sense is that's a forgotten conclusion pretty much at this point. To your first question about why plenums are important. In my mind, I think they're employing both mechanically and substantively. Mechanically, having one once a year, since the reform and opening period started really, and really per the requirement in the party's constitution, that happened once a year. That has been fundamental, I think, to signaling both domestic audiences and international audiences that things in China are relatively stable. So, just look at the brouhaha that that occurred, for example, in this current central committee cycle that we're in the 19th central committee where Xi Jinping snuck in effectively an extra plenum early in the process in early 2018 to get the changes to the constitution about term limits put out there, which then meant they had to advance the third plenum from its normal position in that fall, after a party Congress to the usual second plenum, which manages the national people's Congress changes, personnel changes and so on.Chris Johnson:And then, a perception that the fourth plenum therefore had been delayed because it was more than a year before it actually took place. And you'll recall as well. And we talked a about it at the time, all the speculation. Oh, this means Xi Jinping's in trouble and so on and so forth, non-sense from my point of view. So, that's the mechanical aspect.Chris Johnson:Substantively, obviously I think they're important because outside of the political work report that the sitting party general secretary delivers at the five yearly party congresses, the decision documents as they're usually called that come out of the plenums really reflect the most authoritative venue for the party leadership to signal their priorities, their preoccupations and the policies, of course. And of course, there have been some very important plenums in the party's history, most notably the third plenum of the 11th central committee, which at least the official version is that's when reform and opening was launched. There's a lot of debate about whether that's true or not.Chris Johnson:But, turning to the upcoming six plenum, I think they have made it, as I said, a moment ago, pretty clear that there will be a history resolution. Obviously, there's only been two previous ones in the history of the party. One in 1945 and the other by Mao Zedong and the other in 1981 from Deng Xiaoping, largely closing the book on the mount period, and the culture revolution and so on. So from my perspective, if they do do it this time and I think they will, it it's important for several reasons. The first I think is that, it would represent, I think the net evolution in what I call Xi Jinping's further development of his leadership supremacy. And, I use those terms very deliberately because often times, the shorthand we see in describing this as references to Xi's consolidation of power. Well, in my mind that took place very early on in his tenure.Chris Johnson:I think, he's been there for a good long while. And so, this is just about further articulating his leadership supremacy. And indeed I think, his genius really from the beginning was to frame the party's history in these three distinct eras, each roughly 30 years from the founding of the PRC to Mao's death, Deng's reform, an opening period, and now Xi Jinping's so-called new era. And in fact, I think his signature political achievement, among many political achievements that he's had, has been to canonize that framing these three epics under the banner of Xi Jinping thought with on Chinese characteristics for the new era, so long I can never remember. Let's just call it Xi Thought for shorthand. Yes. And I think, he used it to both effectively erase his two immediate predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao from history, which is important and also simultaneously to vault past Deng Xiaoping in the pantheon of ideology by getting the autonomous thought. And of course, the next iteration will be to truncate Xi Jinping thought for horribly long name.Bill Bishop:Well, and there are multiple variants. There's thought on diplomacy. There's thought on economics. There's thought on law. Chris Johnson:All of that. And I think, the other thing is this ideological crowning, obviously, the significance of it lies in the codification and probably the legitimization then of the sum of all of his actions and pronouncements since he came to power and the equating of those developments and those statements with the party's line. And as you and I have discussed many times, to criticize Xi now then is not just to attack the man, but to attack the party itself. That's very dangerous. And if you're going to do it, you better get it right.Bill Bishop:To that point, isn't that part of his political genius, because he must have, that must have been by design, right?Chris Johnson:Oh, absolutely. It was completely by design and there was a reason I think why Xi, amongst recent leaders, was the one who, if you spoke to people for example, in the party, the central committee department for party history research, they would say when he was vice president leader in training, he actually cared about party history. Jiang and Hu didn't really care, or at least it wasn't a priority for them. It was very meaningful for Xi Jinping, I think for those reasons. And so, this new history resolution, I think, is important in helping him continue this process toward the next revolution, which is to truncate Xi Jinping thought.Chris Johnson:I think, in terms of the substance of a new resolution, it's my sense that there's a tension, not just in Xi's mind, but perhaps in the leadership circles of the people who are working on this thing, between a desire to make that document, only celebratory and forward looking, in other words, why the new era is so amazing versus a desire to tidy up, if you will, some of the bits from history that he doesn't like with criticism, which of course in a very similar fashion to say, Deng Xiaoping 1981 when criticizing the excesses of the cultural revolution. So in my mind, there's two aspects where that criticism could come to the fore, which are very valuable. The first is, will he do in effect to Deng what Deng did to Mao, which is to criticize the excesses of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening policies.Bill Bishop:Which would be including criticizing then at least indirectly Hu and Jiang who are still alive.Chris Johnson:Well, we'll come back to that in a minute because I think it's a separate animal, but on the reform and opening piece, it very much relates obviously to common prosperity, to the new development concept. I'm seeing right over the last several months, but I think there's a separate aspect from that kind of economic excesses. There is this line. It was a very fascinating. You never want to put too much emphasis on one piece of propaganda, but I believe it was the 24th of September, People's Daily had their latest iteration in the Xi Jinping thought question and answer series. And, it was about kind of party leadership and so on and so forth. And there was a fascinating line in there in my mind, which was the quote was especially after the 18th party Congress in view of quote, the neglect dilution and weakening of the party's leadership for a period of time.Chris Johnson:Now, what period of time is he talking about? He's talking about the tenures of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. So once again, further re-raising them from history, boosting his own stature and creating a justification for him to certainly rule for a third term. And, who knows beyond that?Bill Bishop:And, having a historical resolution, the third one then really does create the third era, right?Chris Johnson:No. It formalizes the kickoff, if you will, of that new era. Yeah.Bill Bishop:And that's why, I struggle with sort of lots of the rumors. Xi's weak. Xi's up or he's down or there's the latest one is he won't travel abroad because he is worried about a coup. "Hey, it's Chinese politics." Maybe it's true, but it seems a little bit of a stretch to me. But, I look at, again, back to his ... You hear lots of things. And certainly, when I was in Beijing and sort of the, probably not now but back then, the Beijing chattering class. He was never the smart guy. He was always kind of slow. And yet, here we are. And here he is. And so I think, he may not be the best educated of Chinese leaders in some formal perspective, but he certainly seems to be as politically savvy as Deng or Mao.Bill Bishop:I mean, he certainly seems to have surpassed Jiang and Hu, but I think one of the things too, back to this question of, is he weak or will he be around? What's going to happen to the 20th plenum? One of the things I go back to is, when he got, Xi Jinping fought and appended, whatever you want behind it, it's a 19 party congress. Doesn't that basically mean though, that as long as Xi's alive, he's kind of the man? [crosstalk 00:20:16] Even, if someone else has the job title, unless the party changes his line and gets rid of Xi's thought, which seems like it would be extremely difficult for a whole bunch of reasons, ultimately as long as he's breathing, isn't he caught up kind of running the show.Chris Johnson:Yes.Bill Bishop:Or, is that too simplistic?Chris Johnson:Very much the case. And in fact, again, his interest in not just Chinese communist party history, but the communist movements history, you can have no Khruschev secret speech. If you do these sort of things, at least while he's alive, to your point. And I think, that's a very important aspect of what he's trying to do here. He's creating the conditions for him to be able to engage in, to steal Barry Naughton’s term for the economy, grand steer edge of the entire system, and I think, that's a very, very important aspect. And just to your point on the intellectual stuff, because I think it's important, there's a difference between book smarts and political street fighting skills. And probably, his education was disrupted. So probably, he may not be God's gift to intellect, but there's no question in my mind that from a political acumen point of view, he's a genius, a tactical genius.Bill Bishop:And, if you think about what his primary book education was when he was in his most formative years, it was Mao thought.Chris Johnson:Yeah. No, definitely. And, I just want to come back to that too, because I think it's so important on what could be the meaning, if you will, of this new history resolution, which is that Xi Jinping clearly has a problem with the period of the nineties and what I actually like to call the early naughties in both of their-Bill Bishop:Otherwise known as the Go-Go Years..Chris Johnson:and being naughty. Yeah. The wild west days. And I think, he feels also that the period in the run up to when he took power ahead of the party Congress in 2012, he in many ways saw that as the period of maximum danger for the party. And so, this will be criticized. There's no way in my mind there won’t be some mention of our friends Bo Xilai,and the characters that were purged at that time, maybe not specifically, but in the sideline propaganda and so on, I'm sure will come up.Bill Bishop:So, because one thing when you talked about the resolution, I mean, and what will be in it and sort of how do you balance the sort of criticism or judgment on the past 30 years with forward looking, I found it interesting in yesterday's People's Daily. I had it in the newsletter yesterday, was that very long piece by the sort of the pen name for the People's Daily theory department on Chinese style modernization, which was very forward looking, but also very global looking in terms of talking about how China has created this new style modernization and how it can be a sort of applicable to other countries. And so, tying that back a little bit to your earlier comment about sort of trying to understand, as you said, the administration's rack and stack, how do we sort of go through what we think they're global, the PRCs global ambitions are and what can we live with what we can, what do you think their global ambitions are?Chris Johnson:Well, there are a series of them in their region, certainly, and we can talk. There's endless debate about whether it extends globally and if so, on what timeline, but they certainly want to be seen as a major superpower. No question. I often like to say that their goal in the region certainly, and I think increasingly globally, is that they want countries when a country is thinking of doing something significant in terms of its policies, the leadership and Xi Jinping himself would like that country's leadership to think about how Xi Jinping's going to react to this in the same moment that they think about how will the US react to this? That's what they're after.Chris Johnson:And in my mind, as to whether it is a desire to subvert the rules based global international order and so on, I'm much more skeptical, I think, than a lot of our colleagues on that in part, because implicit in that is this notion of them sitting around in the Politburo meetings, stroking long beards and looking 50 years into the future. They have an inbox too, and they're not infallible nor are they press the end all the time. And, I just think that, it's too much of a teleological view, from my point of view, but that's certainly one of them.Chris Johnson:And I think, this ties to the history resolution bill, because, Xi, in my mind, needs or wants kind of three things from that. The first is, he too needs to create a justification for staying in power. The reality is, no one can stop what he's trying to do next year, or at least that's my opinion, but what they can do is build leverage for the horse trading for all the other positions that will be in play. If he can be criticized, as someone I spoke to about this situation put it to me, even Mao had to launch the cultural revolution to take control over the party again. In other words, even someone of his stature had to do that.Chris Johnson:Second, and it touches on what we were just discussing is his obsession with China breaking through the middle income trap to further prove the legitimacy of the country. And that means breaking from the old economic model. And third, also relevant to our comments just now is, he sees all of this as intimately bound to what we might call the global narrative competition with the US. In other words, if he can be seen as breaking through the middle income trap, doing a better job than the west on income and equality and so on, he sees that paying tremendous dividends for elevating China system.Bill Bishop:At least so for on dealing with COVID. It's paid dividends.Chris Johnson:Absolutely. Yeah. And, indeed further legitimizing the notion that they have found some third way between capitalism and socialism that not just works for them, but increasingly could be exportable.Bill Bishop:Right. So, it's not like everyone has to become a Marxist, Leninist exactly country, or people's dictatorship, but we have this China, this China solution, I think they call it. And certainly, one thing that's interesting too, I think is, and it hasn't gotten a lot of attention yet in more mainstream media, is this global development initiative that she announced at his speech to the UN in September, which now he is regularly bringing up in his calls with developing countries.Bill Bishop:And, it looks to me like it's effectively taking, it's a way of packaging up their lessons from the poverty alleviation campaign that they declared victory in early this year, and trying to take that global. And quite honestly, the world needs more positive development and if China's offering something that's reasonably attractive in the US or Europe isn't, then how can the US criticize these countries for signing onto it?Chris Johnson:No. I'm mean, increasingly, we always want to say, "Well, nobody wants to sign on to their model" or "It doesn't work in other places", but increasingly, what's the narrative that they're touting? One of it is, "Hey, we brought X hundred million people out of poverty." That's very attractive to some other countries. We have a system that works. We have a system that is tolerant of various and sundry approaches, doesn't insist that you change your governance structure or that you support human rights or avoid graft, and things like this. It's very attractive. But the global development initiative, I think in my mind, increasingly, it's sort of an agglomeration of the BRI aspects. And then, there's been so much attention of recent weeks about, particularly Wang Huning's dream weaving of cultural hegemony and all of these sort of//.Bill Bishop:I think people are a bit overindexing a bit on Wang Huning. [crosstalk 00:28:22] important.Chris Johnson:I know they are. I mean, the line I like to use is they're confusing the musician with the conductor.Bill Bishop:Okay. Oh, so you must be up to date on Xi Jinping thought on music. That's good.Chris Johnson:Exactly. Eventually.Bill Bishop:So, I mean, back to the plenum, moving forward from the next year to the 20th party Congress. I mean, normally, the year before a party Congress is a very, very politically sensitive and difficult year where you have the entire system is geared towards the party Congress and basically one not screwing up. And two, anticipating where the people or persons making the decisions on promotions want you to go in terms of policies. And so, in some way, usually it kind of freezes the system. Is there some risk of a fairly difficult year with China? Because, you've got clearly the economy is, I don't want to say struggling, but it's clearly not doing as well as they hoped.Bill Bishop:They seem to continue to be pushed pretty hard on the third tough battle of reducing financial risks. And specifically, I think evergrande is the poster child of that right now. But, what do you think she believes needs to happen over the next year? And what do you think that means for sort of the stuff, a lot of investors feel worried about around real estate, common prosperity? I mean, it just feels like for the first time in a while, things on the economic side at least look a little bit rickety right now.Chris Johnson:No. I agree with that general assessment. Equally important in my mind is how little the leadership and the economic technocrats seem to be rattled by that fact. In other words, we're not seeing the stimulus wave. We're not seeing monetary policy adjustments in a significant way. There's a lot of study as she goes. And, that could change. We've got the central economic work conference, obviously in December, which will give us a sense of how they're thinking about next year. But like so many other things, I think we as watchers and the investment community and others, we're slow to sometimes break with old narratives. One of which is you must welcome a party Congress with very high growth. And every signal coming out of the leadership is that, they're not playing that game anymore. I think that's fairly strong.Chris Johnson:This also comes back to the issue though of what I mentioned earlier about the politics. It's been quite striking to me given what a momentous occasion is happening next year, how little in the analysis of the crackdowns, the tech lash, these sort of things, property sector, how little attention's being paid to the political dimension. So for example, if you look at sort of this issue that I raised a moment ago of the danger for Xi is not someone's going to stop him or unseat him, but this issue of ... I think, my sense is he views the model of the changeover next year as being the ninth party Congress where I believe there was something like 80% turnover in the central committee.Bill Bishop:This was the 1969 during the middle of the cultural revolution.Chris Johnson:Yeah, in the midst of cultural revolution.Bill Bishop:And, the eighth party Congress was not five years before it was. There was quite a gap.Chris Johnson:Yeah. Huge gap. Yeah. And so, if he would like to sweep away that kind of level of changeover, that means getting rid of a lot of the dead wood of the other constituent groups, let's call them. And I think, his ability to do that is closely tied to whether they can criticize and what are the KPIs that he has put out for himself for this current term, and you just raised them. It's poverty alleviation, environmental improvement, and "guarding against financial risk". I think, we can say on the first two, he's done very well. On the third, it's a bit of a disaster.Chris Johnson:So the message, and I'm told that this was sort of some of the discussion on the margins of Beidaihe this year was that, you've got a year or arguably eight months because of the way the system does these things to get that grade on financial risk from a C-, D+ to an A, and poor Liu He in the role of having to figure out how to make that happen operationally. And I think to your point, oftentimes, we do get that paralysis as everybody's kind of looking over their shoulder. But if anything, I think these guys are more inclined to show they're overfulfilling the plan, if you will, in terms of representation and implementation. So, the risk in my mind is not that the various crackdowns will calm down or smooth out, it's that in their zeal to look like they're doing what the boss wants them to do to hopefully be promoted, they might badly over correct. And that I think, has applications for how they handle Evergrande and many of the other associated crackdowns.Bill Bishop:That's an interesting point. And, one of the things I wonder about because it just seems like she has been quite skillful at finding opportunity and what looks like messes. And, if we're looking at an evaluation in the last 30 years, sort of the historical resolution idea, certainly there's a lot to criticize about the economic model. I mean, they criticize it on a regular basis in terms of trying to transition the new development concept. It's an effectively saying the old model doesn't work anymore. And, one of the biggest problems we created was this massive debt problem for China. Is there a cynical way of looking at it and saying, "Okay, if we have this, we being sort of see the top of the party, we have a fair amount of confidence because we've done a lot, so much work on hardening the system and the stability maintenance system that we can tolerate more stress than people think"?Bill Bishop:And, by letting these things get really stressed, does that help remove some of the dead wood in terms of sort of surfacing officials who might be promotable to actually look like they were somehow culpable for some of the decisions that led to things like ever grand or some of these other messes, and then that clears the way for other personnel moves?Chris Johnson:I think, that's certainly part of it. I think, that might be adopting to sort of micro of a frame on it. I think where it's important is, from the perspective of, again, this is Xi's political genius, from my perspective, is the layering of these narratives in the buildup toward a major change or a major development. So, why in the depths of the trade war? Did you start talking about a new long march? And hardship and sacrifice and all of these things, they're preparing the ground. In some reason, why are they maintaining a COVID zero approach? There's lots of reasons. But one of the reasons in my mind is if indeed you feel you must fundamentally break with that old, dirty economic model, which was largely export led, and you want dual circulation to work and you want these things, why not keep the border closed and force the system to transition because it must?Chris Johnson:So, there's a number of these things where I think, again, I don't like to claim that it's all some master plan, but I think there's a lot of thought that's gone into some of these things.Bill Bishop:But clearly, things like the energy crisis, I mean, they clearly have ... There are a lot of moving parts that can blow up pretty quickly. And so I think, to your earlier point, the politics are always in command in China. I think they're more in command now, but it does just feel like the risks or the downside risks on the economy are greater than they've been in a while.Chris Johnson:Yeah. I mean, my sense is, again, what do the officials and particularly the economic technocrats see as the greatest risk? I think they think the great as risk is overdoing it, not underdoing it at this stage.Bill Bishop:Interesting. So, well, thanks. Anything else you want to talk about?Chris Johnson:No, I think I kind of covered the waterfront. I mean, I guess in summation, I would just say and it maybe kind of comes back nicely to US-China relationship and so on. Discussing what we've just been discussing, I think if you're a senior US policymaker, your working assumption has to be that China's more likely to get it right than to get it wrong, even if they only get it 30% right or 40%, something like that.Chris Johnson:Xi is here and will be here for the foreseeable future. And therefore there won't be any change in the policies largely that he's articulated. And if we have those as our working assumptions, I think we will find ourselves framing a better policy. And I guess, if it doesn't go that way, you could be "pleasantly surprised" or whatever you want to say. But is it really a pleasant surprise if you have a leadership crisis in China?Chris Johnson:I mean, this is another thing I think just in conclusion that I find very striking in the absence of information. And I think, one of the challenges for us as watchers, when a collective leadership system like we had before goes away, each one of those collective, all seven or nine, depending on the timeframe of the standing committee members, they all had coteries under them and so on and so forth. In other words, there was a lot of places to tap in to get insight and compare notes. And so, with Xi Jinping, it's a very small circle, clearly. Even Kurt Campbell and other US officials have discussed their frustration with not being able to get in the inner circle.Chris Johnson:And therefore, people just find themselves going to these memes such as, well, they're will inevitably be a succession crisis when Xi Jinping leaves the scene. In my mind, the biggest opportunity for a massive succession crisis in the history of the PRC was Mao's death. And yet, they managed to find a way largely through Deng Xiaoping. But I think in general, because there was a collective understanding that this whole thing's going to unravel if we don't get it together, China's not so worried about that, nor am I worried about an imminent invasion of Taiwan, but that's probably another podcast.Bill Bishop:That was a whole different podcast. And so ... No. Well, look, thank you so much. It's really great as always to talk to you. And, I do hope I can get you back on as a guest at some point.Chris Johnson:Always glad to do so. Anytime, Bill. And, your newsletter in my mind is the best thing out there in terms of keeping me up to speed and subsequently informed every day.Bill Bishop:Thank you. I didn't pay him to say that just to be clear. But, great. Thank you, Chris. Get full access to Sinocism at sinocism.com/subscribe

This week on Sinica, we present a deep-dive into the worldview of China's leading Party theorist, Wáng Hùníng 王沪宁. Wang — the only member of the Politburo Standing Committee who has not run a province or provincial-level municipality — is believed to have been the thinker behind ideas as central (and as ideologically distinct) as Jiāng Zémín's 江泽民 signature “Three Represents,” which brought capitalists into the Chinese Communist Party; Hú Jǐntāo's 胡锦涛 “Scientific Outlook on Development” that focused on social harmony; and Xí Jìnpíng's “Chinese Dream” that aimed at the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” While much of Wang's life since he entered government has been hidden from view, his earlier writings contain many ideas that appear to have shaped Party policy across the tenure of three Party general secretaries over a period of nearly three decades, and offer clues about what still might be in store. Kaiser is joined by Joseph Fewsmith III, an eminent professor of political science at Boston University; the intellectual historian Timothy Cheek, professor of history at the University of British Columbia, whose work has focused on establishment intellectuals in the PRC; and Matthew Johnson, principal and founder of the China-focused consultancy AltaSilva LLC, who has studied and written about Wang extensively.4:31 – An outline of Wang Huning's career8:36 – Wang Huning's personality and temperament12:28 – Wang speaks16:45 – Wang as an example of post-charismatic leadership loyalty24:02 – Wang's America Against America31:04 – Wang Huning's concepts of cultural security and cultural sovereignty46:36 – Wang and Document Number Nine55:39 – Chinese conceptions of democracyA transcript of this podcast is available on SupChina.com.Recommendations:Matt: The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control by Karl Deutsch; and The Logic of Images in International Relations by Robert Jervis.Joe: Now that more Americans recognize that China is not becoming "more like us," they need a deeper understanding of China, and not one just rooted in hostility and militarism.Tim: In Memory of Memory by Maria Stepanova.Kaiser: River of Stars by Guy Gavriel KaySee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, we present a talk delivered on October 19 by Kaiser at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas, as part of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations China Town Hall. In this 30-minute speech, Kaiser offers his views on Xí Jìnpíng's 习近平 "Red New Deal," discusses the many lenses through which China is viewed, and argues that the changes now afoot in China constitute a major historic shift — and perhaps even the end of the modern period in China's history.We'll be back next week with a conversation about Wáng Hùníng 王沪宁, the Chinese Communist Party's leading theorist, featuring three leading scholars on modern China's politics and intellectual history: Timothy Cheek of the University of British Columbia, Joseph Fewsmith III of Boston University, and Matthew Johnson, a historian who now runs a China-focused consultancy but has made Wang Huning a major focus of his work.A transcript of this episode is available on SupChina.com.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, called upon the whole Party on Tuesday to make persistent efforts to serve the people and forever maintain close ties with the people as he conferred the top honor of the Party on its outstanding members.In a grand ceremony held at the Great Hall of the People, Xi hailed the 29 recipients of the July 1 Medal, some posthumously, as outstanding representatives of CPC members on all fronts.They are a vivid example of the noble quality and lofty spirit of CPC members as they firm up their ideals, live up to the Party's fundamental mission, fight with dedication and serve the people with clean conduct, said Xi, who is also China's president and chairman of the Central Military Commission.▲ Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, confers the July 1 Medal, the Party's highest honor, on Ma Maojie in Beijing on Tuesday. Ma, born in September 1935, helped People's Liberation Army soldiers cross the Yangtze River in a key battle against Kuomintang forces in April 1949 and contributed to the PLA's victory in the battle. Feng Yongbin/China DailyThis is the first time the medal was awarded, as the CPC is set to celebrate its centenary on Thursday.In his speech, Xi briefly recalled the Party's history over the past century, during which he said the CPC led the people to blaze a great path, established a great cause, forged a great spirit and accumulated precious experience.Over the past 100 years, generations of CPC members have worked hard and made selfless contributions in the pursuit of national independence and the liberation of the people, as well as in striving for a prosperous and strong country and the people's well-being, he said.To maintain staunch faith is to stay true to the Party's original aspiration and dedicate everything, even one's precious life, to the cause of the Party and the people, said Xi.Xi urged all Party members to regard their faith in Marxism and their belief in socialism with Chinese characteristics as their lifelong pursuit.Xi urged all Party members to regard their faith in Marxism and their belief in socialism with Chinese characteristics as their lifelong pursuit.He called on all Party members to adhere to a people-centered position and put the people first."The greater our cause is, the more challenging it is, and the greater the responsibility we need to assume," Xi said, urging all Party members to maintain high morale, work diligently, tackle challenges and continue the fine traditions of hard work and plain living, and to put the interests of the people above personal interests."Communists can only win the hearts of the people by virtue of their strong personality," he said.Xi noted that the recipients of the July 1 Medal are everyday people who are heroes. They come from the people and are deeply rooted in the people, he said, adding that they are humble, unassuming and dedicated people.He called on Party members to learn from the deeds and the spirit of the medal recipients.Through their actions they have proved that every Party member can make accomplishments in the great cause of national rejuvenation as long as they have firm ideals and beliefs, resolute willpower and steadfast perseverance, he added."This is a new era that calls for heroes and will surely give rise to heroes. If the Communist Party of China always wants to be the vanguard of the era and the backbone of the nation, its members must be held to the highest standards," Xi said.He highlighted the need to encourage Party members to always remember the Party's character and fundamental purpose and its original inspirations and mission and to fight without complacency and enduringly.Zhang Guimei, a recipient of the medal and the founder of a high school that offers free education for girls in a less-developed area in Yunnan province, said at the ceremony that the medal was a great encouragement to her."What we did was merely what many CPC members are doing every day, and yet the Party and the people have given us such a great honor," she said, adding that she will continue to devote herself to the cause of education.Before the award ceremony, Xi and other leaders met recipients of the titles of outstanding Party members, exemplary Party workers and model community-level Party organizations from across the country, and had a group photo taken with them.The meeting to award these titles was held on Monday and was attended by Wang Huning and Zhao Leji, members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.记者：徐伟

Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, joined around 20,000 people on Monday evening to watch a grand gala in Beijing in celebration of the centenary of the CPC's founding.▲ An art performance titled "The Great Journey" is held in celebration of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC) at the National Stadium in Beijing, capital of China, on the evening of June 28, 2021. Photo/XinhuaMembers of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji and Han Zheng, as well as Vice-President Wang Qishan, were also among Party and State leaders who watched the gala at National Stadium, also known as the Bird's Nest.Shortly before 8 pm, Xi and other senior leaders walked into the stadium amid warm applause throughout the venue.Along with music and songs, fireworks displaying "100" lit up the night sky over the stadium. A shining Party emblem was shown on the stage, kicking off the grand gala event.▲ Fireworks are seen above the National Stadium in Beijing, capital of China, on the evening of June 28, 2021. Photo/XinhuaCalled The Great Journey, the four-part gala performance was presented in the style of a large-scale theater production. Through music and dance, stage plays, marching, dramas and documentary video, the performance vividly presented the CPC's 100-year endeavor in leading the people in pursuing revolution, construction and reform.It celebrated China's historic achievements as well as the transformations that have taken place under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Xi at its core since the 18th National Congress of the CPC in 2012. The event also highlighted the promising future of fully realizing a modern socialist country.Part one displayed the great struggle and painstaking efforts that the Chinese people, under the leadership of the CPC, made to achieve victories in the revolutionary period, the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931-45) and the War of Liberation (1946-49) before the founding of the People's Republic of China.Part two reflected on the heroes and role models in the period of socialist revolution and construction as well as the Chinese People's Volunteer Army entering the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to help in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea (1950-53).▲ Fireworks are seen above the National Stadium in Beijing, capital of China, on the evening of June 28, 2021. Photo/XinhuaPart three showed the great achievements China has made since the CPC adopted the reform and opening-up policy in the late 1970s, including Hong Kong's and Macao's return to the motherland and the Chinese people's solidarity to win the battle against the SARS epidemic in 2003.Part four showed how socialism with Chinese characteristics entered the new era under the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, particularly the country's achievements in elimination of absolute poverty, its people's war against the COVID-19 pandemic, and its strong commitment to advancing the building of a community with a shared future for mankind.The gala came to a climax with fireworks lighting up the sky again amid applause and cheers.记者：曹德胜图片来源：新华网

« Suivre le Parti, pour toujours », c'est le slogan officiel des festivités qui se tiendront en juillet pour célébrer le centenaire du Parti communiste chinois (PCC). Cet anniversaire s'accompagne d'un retour aux sources maoïstes avec une mise en valeur de la révolution culturelle, quitte à tourner le dos à la vision de Deng Xiaoping qui avait su allier ouverture économique et maintien du monopole du Parti communiste. Une réécriture de l'histoire à l'initiative de Xi Jinping qui provoque crispations et critiques feutrées.    Entretien avec Alex Payette spécialiste du parti-État chinois, co-fondateur et PDG du groupe Cercius, une société de conseil en intelligence stratégique et géopolitique RFI : Dans quelles dispositions, le PCC fête-t-il ses 100 ans ?   Alex Payette : Si on regarde ce qui s'est passé depuis 2013, on peut dire que le parti a eu des jours un peu plus ensoleillés, dirons-nous. Actuellement, avec le renouveau de la campagne anticorruption et son lot de purges, la lutte des factions autour de la personne de Xi Jinping, les conditions ne sont pas réunies pour une célébration. Le parti va chercher à masquer cela durant les festivités au cours du mois de juillet.   Que veut cacher le Parti communiste chinois ?   Ce sont des problèmes de famille que l'on essaye toujours de mettre sous le tapis. Le souci c'est que l'on fait face à une situation qui ne s'est pas présentée depuis longtemps : absence de succession, retour d'un discours plus idéologique que l'on essayait pourtant d'éviter depuis la période de Deng Xiaoping et même de Jiang Zemin qui s'étend jusqu'à 2015. Des références plus fréquentes à la révolution culturelle et aux années maoïstes que certains ne voulaient pas voir ressurgir et qui créent un malaise au sein du parti État. Malheureusement, cela isole encore plus un Xi Jinping déjà très seul au sommet du parti-État et interroge sur la réaction qui pourrait être la sienne. Cette réorientation idéologique en faveur de la révolution culturelle (1966-1968) se fait à l'initiative de Xi Jinping ? Oui, en grande partie à l'initiative de Xi Jinping, mais ce n'est pas nécessairement lui qui a mené la réflexion, même s'il avait envie d'un virage à gauche, vers des idéaux maoïstes. Il faut plutôt regarder parmi les gens qui ont écrit les discours de Xi Jinping depuis les années 1980-90, comme Wang Huning et Li Shulei. Wang Huning c'est l'actuel idéologue du Parti communiste et architecte des idées qui sont déployées à l'intérieur du parti. Il fait partie de ceux qui ont structuré le virage vers la gauche, remis au goût du jour des discours qui rappellent ceux des années 1960 et 1970, une période romantique dans l'esprit de certains. Le PCC a connu des périodes de rupture au fil de sa longue histoire, avec par exemple la révolution culturelle, la combinaison ouverture économique et maintien du monopole du parti par Deng Xiaoping. C'est la révolution culturelle qui est aujourd'hui mise en avant. L'objectif est-il de donner une vision cohérente et unifiée de l'histoire du parti ?  C'est certain qu'à l'aube du centenaire, il faut absolument recentraliser l'histoire du parti, réunifier autour d'un seul narratif. Contrôler son histoire c'est extrêmement important, car ça permet d'exclure ceux qui ne sont pas d'accord, d'identifier de possibles poches de résistance à l'intérieur du parti. Mais le problème c'est que ce retour aux idées maoïstes est plus présent dans les discours que dans la réalité. On ne reverra plus aujourd'hui quelqu'un avec la prestance d'un Mao. Xi Jinping n'a pas le panache pour cela. Donc la révolution culturelle est mise en valeur, idéalisée dans les discours, mais sans concrétisation réelle, car la situation sociale a complètement changé. C'est en raison de ces tiraillements que la publication par l'ancien Premier ministre Wen Jiabao d'un article intitulé « Ma mère », a été tant remarqué ? Wen Jiabao est pourtant un retraité de la politique qui a perdu de son influence, mais l'article publié à Macao a été censuré à Pékin.  Pour faire court, les tensions entre Xi et Wen Jiabao datent de l'entrée de Xi au Politburo en 2007. Les deux hommes s'affrontaient déjà sur l'interprétation de la révolution culturelle. Dans son article publié le 25 mars dernier, Wen Jiabao raconte ce que sa mère et son père ont dû subir pendant la révolution culturelle. Certes, la critique est indirecte, mais quand il écrit qu'il n'est pas d'accord avec le style de leadership, avec les idées véhiculées, entre les lignes, c'est une critique de la révolution culturelle et il vise directement Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping ne peut admettre que d'anciens membres du Politburo se mettent soudainement à critiquer la direction du parti et même le parti lui-même. C'est inacceptable pour lui.   Dans cette lettre, Wen Jiabao écrit « la Chine devrait être un pays rempli d'équité et de justice, où l'on respecterait la volonté du peuple ».   Ce n'est pas la première fois qu'il le dit, il l'a déjà fait, je pense, en 2010 et même en 2012, avant de quitter la politique. Ce sont les idéaux d'anciens réformateurs, qui ont connu des gens comme Zhao Ziyang, d'anciens Premiers ministres tels que Hu Yaobang, des responsables des années 1980 qui étaient à Tiananmen, qui ont fait partie de la frange des réformateurs. Pour Wen Jiabao, c'est naturel de revendiquer des valeurs plus universelles, mais le simple fait de l'écrire signifie, si on le prend au premier degré, que les préoccupations de lutte anti-pauvreté, de lutte pour l'équité sociale revendiquées par Xi Jinping depuis 2013 ne sont que de l'affichage. La Chine a été présentée comme une menace, à plusieurs reprises ces derniers jours, à l'issue du sommet de l'Otan, de la réunion du G7, notamment. Pékin a riposté en affirmant que la Chine n'était pas la menace décrite. Ce qui est en jeu, c'est l'image de la Chine à l'extérieur. On a relevé les propos prononcés le 1er juin par Xi Jinping. Il a appelé de ses vœux « une image fiable, aimable et respectueuse de la Chine ». On s'est interrogé sur le sens de cette déclaration. Faut-il y voir une remise en cause de la diplomatie des « loups combattants », la politique étrangère agressive en vigueur depuis environ 4 ans ?  Pas nécessairement. Quand on fait face à une structure aussi imposante que l'État léniniste, ou ce que l'on peut appeler le parti-État chinois, il faut comprendre que lorsqu'on lance un programme, on ne peut pas faire marche arrière. En raison de cette lourdeur, aucun discours de Xi ne pourra être suivi d'un changement drastique. En revanche, il faut s'intéresser aux mots prononcés. D'une certaine façon, il dit « on a fait du bon travail en défendant la Chine, mais on est allés trop loin ». Il explique que l'on pourrait faire mieux en aidant les gens à comprendre le parti, le modèle chinois. Mais de là à dire que c'était trop, qu'il faut s'excuser, ça, ce n'est pas envisageable. Donc, il y aura peut-être des ajustements pour apporter un autre type de narratif sur la scène internationale, mais pas de changement soudain de cap… ce serait étonnant.   Mais la diplomatie des « loups combattants » ne fait pas l'unanimité au sein des diplomates chinois.   En effet, mais encore une fois les diplomates sont des cadres du parti de troisième zone, si je peux m'exprimer ainsi, qui relaient les éléments de langage qui leur sont fournis. Qu'ils soient d'accord ou non, la structure et les mécanismes de promotion font que la loyauté s'impose autrement les chances d'avancement diminuent. Au sein du Politburo, c'est certain qu'il y a des membres qui ne sont pas d'accord et qui pointent du doigt Wang Huning. Par exemple, lors de la guerre commerciale avec les États-Unis, il a été critiqué pour son manque d'expérience concrète en matière de gestion, d'administration du politique. Sa légitimité a été mise en cause. Ce genre de discours flotte encore aujourd'hui. Au sein du ministère des Affaires étrangères, un certain nombre de diplomates se rapprochent de l'âge de la retraite. Il faut s'attendre à des changements prochains ?  La guerre commerciale avec les États-Unis a brouillé les cartes de la transition au sein du ministère des Affaires étrangères. Décision a été prise en période de tension de conserver en place les gens détenteurs de la mémoire institutionnelle, considérés comme plus aptes à régler les dossiers. Le souci c'est que les choses ne se sont pas déroulées comme prévu. Avec la diplomatie guerrière, le virage à gauche, la transition Trump-Biden, il est certain que le parti a été pris de court, n'a pas eu le temps d'effectuer les changements envisagés. Ces promotions qui n'ont pas eu lieu provoquent un embouteillage. On s'attend à une transition soit un peu avant le congrès de l'automne 2022, car ça pourrait faciliter des promotions au Politburo, soit en mars 2023, date du grand remaniement ministériel. Mais il y a des embouteillages, des gens qui devaient être promus, qui ne l'ont pas été et ça provoque des tensions. Vous y faisiez référence, le congrès du PCC est prévu à l'automne 2022 et provoque déjà des crispations. Pour Xi Jinping, le choix qui s'offre à lui est triple : prendre sa retraite, renoncer à l'un de ses sièges ou accepter un troisième mandat ce qui serait inédit. Un dilemme, car chaque choix présente son corollaire de difficultés.    Tout à fait, s'il reste, il bloque le système, provoque le déraillement de tout le mécanisme de promotion, et mécontente ceux en attente d'avancement, même au sein de son entourage proche. S'il venait à se séparer d'un seul siège, ce qui est possible, ou même de deux, il pourrait soit garder la commission militaire centrale, comme Jiang Zemin ou même Deng Xiaoping, ce qui serait peut-être l'idéal pour lui, ou bien garder le siège du parti et confier les autres postes à Li Qiang ou Chen Min'er (chef du Parti communiste de la ville-province de Chongqing) considérés comme des successeurs potentiels. Mais dans le même temps, est-ce qu'il peut tout quitter d'un coup ? La réponse est non, car la campagne anticorruption a suscité du mécontentement. Or, pour partir l'esprit tranquille, il faut s'assurer que les gens ne sont pas trop fâchés contre vous. Dans le cas présent, on comprend bien que Xi Jinping se retrouve dans une situation délicate. S'il part, les mécontents pourraient provoquer un retour de balancier, s'il quitte partiellement ses postes, ceux qui vont assurer la transition pourraient être victimes des tensions internes au parti ou bien pas suffisamment forts pour tenir la ligne. S'il décide de rester, il suscitera des tensions au sein du parti qui seront autant de mises à l'épreuve de ses relations avec son entourage. On voit déjà des ballons d'essai avec des informations qui surgissent de nulle part qui concernent l'entourage de Xi, mais aussi Liu He et son fils. Mais ses choix sont limités par ceux qui ont été faits dès 2013, donc il se retrouve prisonnier de la structure.   La volonté de Joe Biden de convaincre les alliés des États-Unis d'adopter une ligne dure à l'égard de la Chine constitue-t-elle un autre facteur de tension ?   Il est certain que si les Européens venaient à constituer un front uni avec Joe Biden cela deviendrait encore plus compliqué pour Xi, d'autant qu'il n'y a pas de consensus sur la ligne à tenir. Donc les uns sanctionnent les autres et vice versa, on appelle cela « le tango des offusqués », qui a pour conséquence d'isoler de plus en plus la Chine.  

The Man Behind China's Raging Nationalist Campaigns Against the US

The Man Behind China's Raging Nationalist Campaigns Against the US

The Man Behind China's Raging Nationalist Campaigns Against the US

读书嘉宾：原中国国际广播电台（现中央广播电视总台国广）英语播音员/主持人。英文文本：New Era, New Initiatives, New AchievementsThe First Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee has just elected a new central leadership. I was re-elected general secretary of the Central Committee. I see this as approval of my work, and a spur to further endeavors.Now, I wish to present to you the other six Standing Committee members elected at the session: LiKeqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji and Han Zheng. Amongthem, Li Keqiang was a member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee of the 18th CPC Central Committee, and the other five colleagues were members of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee. You can learn more about them from the media. So I have no need to elaborate.Here on behalf of the newly-elected central leadership, I wish to extend our heartfelt thanks to all the members of the Party for the great trust they have placed in us. We will work diligently to carry out our duties, fulfill our mission and merit their trust.Over the past five years,we have set out a broad agenda. Some tasks have been completed while others need further work. This Party congress has set new goals and new tasks; we must make coordinated efforts to see them through.Following decades of hard work, socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era. In this new context, we must undertake new initiatives, and more importantly, achieve greater success. The coming five years between the 19th and the 20th CPC national congresses are a period in which the time frames of the Two Centenary Goals will converge. We must deliver the First Centenary Goal; we must also embark on the journey towards the Second Centenary Goal. As I look ahead to the next five years, I see several important junctures.In 2018 we will mark the 40th anniversary of the launch of reform and opening up. Reform and opening up is a crucial move that is shaping China's future. Forty years of reform and opening up has made it possible for our people to lead decent, comfortable lives. Reviewing our experience and building on a strong momentum, we will continue to modernize the state governance system and capacity, achieve deeper all-round reform, and open China still wider to the world. We will see that re form and opening up complement and reinforce each other. It is my conviction that the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will become a reality in the course of reform and opening up.In 2019, we will celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. We will act on the new development philosophy, and strive for sustained and healthy economic growth that benefits people in China and all around the world. We will continue our efforts to accomplish all the tasks laid down in the 13th Five-year Plan,develop a new blueprint for China's future, and see all our endeavors bear fruit. These efforts will contribute towards a more prosperous and stronger People's Republic.In 2020, we will achieve moderate prosperity in all respects throughout the country. This is a society to be enjoyed by each and every one of us. On the march towards common prosperity, no one will be left behind. We will mobilize the whole Party and the whole country in the resolute push to deliver on our pledge – eradicating poverty in China. The aspiration of the people to live a better life must always be the focus of our efforts. We must remain committed to the people-centered philosophy of development, strive to guarantee and improve living standards, make steady progress towards enhancing our people's sense of gain, happiness and security, and realize common prosperity for all our people. I have no doubt that our people's lives will further improve year after year.In 2021, we will mark the centenary of the CPC. For the Party that champions the cause of lasting prosperity of the Chinese nation, this centenary sees us in the prime of life. As the world's largest political party,the CPC must behave in a way commensurate with its status. History makes it abundantly clear that our Party is equally capable of leading the people to spearhead a great social revolution and engaging in significant self-reform.We, as its members, must always be youthful in spirit, and forever be the servant of the people, the vanguard of the times, and the backbone of our nation. Exercising full and rigorous governance over the Party is a journey to which there is no end. We should never entertain the idea of slowing our pace or halting our step for a break; rather, we must continue to rid ourselves of any contaminant that erodes the Party's fabric, make great efforts to foster a healthy political environment of integrity, and generate waves of positive energy throughout our Party, which build to a mighty nationwide force driving China's development and progress.The CPC and the Chinese people have gone through trials and tribulations. These experiences have taught us that peace is precious and development must be valued. With confidence and pride, the Chinese people will be steadfast in upholding our country's sovereignty, security and development interests. We will also work with other nations to build a global community of shared future, and make a new and greater contribution to the noble cause of peace and development for all humanity.The people are the creators of history. It is to them that we owe all our achievements. As long as we keep close ties with the people and rely on them, we can and will have boundless strength to forge ahead whatever the circumstances.As a Chinese saying goes, it is better to see once than to hear a hundred times. We encourage members of the media to visit and see more of China. We hope that after this congress, you will continue to follow China's development and changes, and acquaint yourselves with and report on more dimensions of China. We do not need lavish praise from others. But we do welcome objective reporting and constructive suggestions, for this is our motto,“Not bent on praise for its bright colors, but on leaving its fragrance to all.”

Om Kinas ökade inflytande i världen. Varför byggs en ny Sidenväg? Vad krävs för att få låna en panda? Och hur mycket ideologi sipprar med när Kina investerar i unga afrikaner och latinamerikaner? Vad har det kinesiska kommunistpartiet för ambitioner i omvärlden? Ser man till president Xi Jinpings tal från kommunistpartiets kongress i höstas är det både luddigt och tydligt. Han säger där att "man sett ett uppsving i Kinas internationella inflytande, kapacitet att inspirera i världen och makt att forma". Hur gör Kina det? Handlar det inte längre bara om win-win när Kina investerar i världen utan om en tydlig strategi att sprida en positiv bild av Kina som ska bidra till ett maktskifte på den globala arenan? Om man vill försöka förstå Kinas i ambitioner i omvärlden nu så finns det en person att hålla extra koll på: Wang Huning, som i höstas valdes in i politbyråns ständiga utskott. Han beskrivs ofta som "hjärnan" bakom alla de tre senaste presidenterna, som troligen varit med och utarbetat idéerna bakom Kinas dröm om större inflytande. Konflikt ringde upp akademikerna Miles Kahler, Washington University, och Jean-Pierre Cabestan, HKBU, som träffat och jobbat med honom, innan han tog steget in i Partiets slutna cirkel, och Haig Patapan, Griffith University, som försöker förstå hans roll idag. Vad betyder Kinas gigantiska projekt att bygga en ny Sidenväg för landets ambitioner i omvärlden? Kina-kännaren Nadège Rolland kom i år ut med en bok där hon försökte svara på den frågan. Vad innebär det som brukar kallas "Kinas pandadiplomati"? Nästa år har Finland och Danmark blivit lovade pandor. Vad avgör om ett land får låna en panda? Och varför har Sverige ännu inte fått ta emot någon? Hör Kerstin Lundgren, Centerpartiets talesperson i utrikesfrågor, om hot och påtryckningar på svenska politiker som är aktiva i Tibetfrågan. Och Jerker Hellström, Asienexpert på Foi, om varför de universella mänskliga rättigheterna tystas ner när de nordiska länderna knyter allt närmre band till Kina. De senaste åren har ju Kina gjort allt större investeringar både i Afrika och Latinamerika - genom frikostiga lån och generösa gåvor byggs det allt från vägar och hamnar till sportarenor och parlamentsbyggnader. Men frågan är om det kinesiska engagemanget i utvecklingsländer håller sig strikt affärsmässigt eller om det sipprar in ideologi och inflytande i de allt tätare relationerna. Radions Latinamerikakorrespondent Lotten Collin träffar den colombianska journalisten Dominique Rodriguez och Camilo Rozo, Colombias arbetsministerium, som varit på en kunskapsresa i Kina finansierad av det kommunistiska ungdomsförbundet. Hör också Benjamin Creutzfeldt, sinolog, specialiserad på relationerna mellan Kina och Latinamerika. Programledare: Robin Olin robin.olin@sverigesradio.se Producent: Anja Sahlberg anja.sahlberg@sverigesradio.se