Podcasts about Neville Chamberlain

As Foreign Secretary in Neville Chamberlain's Cabinet in 1937, Eden didn't believe in appeasing the German and Italian dictatorships or the militaristic Japanese regime. Instead, he wanted to confront their aggression head on. Faced with growing Japanese assertiveness, including the launching of an undeclared war on China in July 1937, Eden appealed to the US for help. He believed sending an Anglo-American naval force to the Western Pacific would demonstrate that the democracies were not spineless, but were prepared to stand up for what they believed in. Was this a viable alternative to Chamberlain's appeasement policy, now notorious for its failure in the face of fascism? In Eden's Alternative to Appeasement: The Anglo-American Strategy that Might Have Been, 1937–38 (Tithebarn Press, 2026), historian Malcolm Murfett tells the story, using a wide range of primary sources from the UK and US archives, of Eden's push to persuade Roosevelt's administration to be more assertive in the Pacific. He reveals the diplomatic dance both sides engaged in, each unsure of the other's reliability, of their own ability to commit, and tied up in their own internal struggles for policy dominance. We get a real insight into how two once-and-future allies managed each other's expectations, as well as the wider strategic parameters within which they were operating. With eerie echoes of our own times, Murfett explores the challenges involved in both international diplomacy, and foreign and security policy. How standing up for principles and values can become compromised by the requirements of Realpolitik, and logistical constraints. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

As Foreign Secretary in Neville Chamberlain's Cabinet in 1937, Eden didn't believe in appeasing the German and Italian dictatorships or the militaristic Japanese regime. Instead, he wanted to confront their aggression head on. Faced with growing Japanese assertiveness, including the launching of an undeclared war on China in July 1937, Eden appealed to the US for help. He believed sending an Anglo-American naval force to the Western Pacific would demonstrate that the democracies were not spineless, but were prepared to stand up for what they believed in. Was this a viable alternative to Chamberlain's appeasement policy, now notorious for its failure in the face of fascism? In Eden's Alternative to Appeasement: The Anglo-American Strategy that Might Have Been, 1937–38 (Tithebarn Press, 2026), historian Malcolm Murfett tells the story, using a wide range of primary sources from the UK and US archives, of Eden's push to persuade Roosevelt's administration to be more assertive in the Pacific. He reveals the diplomatic dance both sides engaged in, each unsure of the other's reliability, of their own ability to commit, and tied up in their own internal struggles for policy dominance. We get a real insight into how two once-and-future allies managed each other's expectations, as well as the wider strategic parameters within which they were operating. With eerie echoes of our own times, Murfett explores the challenges involved in both international diplomacy, and foreign and security policy. How standing up for principles and values can become compromised by the requirements of Realpolitik, and logistical constraints. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

As Foreign Secretary in Neville Chamberlain's Cabinet in 1937, Eden didn't believe in appeasing the German and Italian dictatorships or the militaristic Japanese regime. Instead, he wanted to confront their aggression head on. Faced with growing Japanese assertiveness, including the launching of an undeclared war on China in July 1937, Eden appealed to the US for help. He believed sending an Anglo-American naval force to the Western Pacific would demonstrate that the democracies were not spineless, but were prepared to stand up for what they believed in. Was this a viable alternative to Chamberlain's appeasement policy, now notorious for its failure in the face of fascism? In Eden's Alternative to Appeasement: The Anglo-American Strategy that Might Have Been, 1937–38 (Tithebarn Press, 2026), historian Malcolm Murfett tells the story, using a wide range of primary sources from the UK and US archives, of Eden's push to persuade Roosevelt's administration to be more assertive in the Pacific. He reveals the diplomatic dance both sides engaged in, each unsure of the other's reliability, of their own ability to commit, and tied up in their own internal struggles for policy dominance. We get a real insight into how two once-and-future allies managed each other's expectations, as well as the wider strategic parameters within which they were operating. With eerie echoes of our own times, Murfett explores the challenges involved in both international diplomacy, and foreign and security policy. How standing up for principles and values can become compromised by the requirements of Realpolitik, and logistical constraints. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/american-studies

As Foreign Secretary in Neville Chamberlain's Cabinet in 1937, Eden didn't believe in appeasing the German and Italian dictatorships or the militaristic Japanese regime. Instead, he wanted to confront their aggression head on. Faced with growing Japanese assertiveness, including the launching of an undeclared war on China in July 1937, Eden appealed to the US for help. He believed sending an Anglo-American naval force to the Western Pacific would demonstrate that the democracies were not spineless, but were prepared to stand up for what they believed in. Was this a viable alternative to Chamberlain's appeasement policy, now notorious for its failure in the face of fascism? In Eden's Alternative to Appeasement: The Anglo-American Strategy that Might Have Been, 1937–38 (Tithebarn Press, 2026), historian Malcolm Murfett tells the story, using a wide range of primary sources from the UK and US archives, of Eden's push to persuade Roosevelt's administration to be more assertive in the Pacific. He reveals the diplomatic dance both sides engaged in, each unsure of the other's reliability, of their own ability to commit, and tied up in their own internal struggles for policy dominance. We get a real insight into how two once-and-future allies managed each other's expectations, as well as the wider strategic parameters within which they were operating. With eerie echoes of our own times, Murfett explores the challenges involved in both international diplomacy, and foreign and security policy. How standing up for principles and values can become compromised by the requirements of Realpolitik, and logistical constraints.Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/british-studies Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

World War 2 did not begin in 1939 by accident. In this Road to WW2 documentary, Craig and Gaurav trace the causes of World War 2 from the Treaty of Versailles to Hitler's rise, Nazi Germany's rearmament, the Munich Agreement, and the collapse of appeasement across World War II Europe. From the wreckage of the Great War, a broken peace settled over the continent. The Treaty of Versailles left Germany humiliated, Italy restless, and the League of Nations too weak to stop what came next. Mussolini's March on Rome, the Locarno Treaties, the Great Depression, and the Nazi seizure of power turned a fragile recovery into a countdown. This episode follows the chain almost nobody stopped: the secret buildup of the Luftwaffe, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, the Spanish Civil War as a testing ground, the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan, the Anschluss with Austria, the Sudetenland crisis, and Neville Chamberlain's deal at Munich. Britain and France were not simply naive. They were buying time. Then Hitler broke the promise, swallowed the rest of Czechoslovakia in 1939, signed the Pact of Steel with Mussolini, and forced London and Paris to guarantee Poland. The next episode covers the invasion that finally started the war in Europe. If you enjoy deep World War 2 history with maps, photographs, and primary-source context, subscribe to the Pacific War Channel, check the Kings and Generals podcast, and join as a member for early access to upcoming battles, including Pearl Harbor and the wider WWII series. Don't forget I have a Youtube Membership: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCbp8JMZizR4zak9wpM3Fvrw/join or my Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel where you can get exclusive content like "What if Japan invaded the USSR during WW2?"

A report in the Globe and Mail says Canada is offering concessions to get a trade deal. Canadians and pundits aren't happy with the idea. Is it just a trial balloon or is Carney willing to pay the political price to reduce tariffs? Meanwhile, rolling back Trudeau's digital policies targeting tech giants is one concession Carney seems happy to make. But how will it impact Canadian media funding?Plus, Canada continues to scale back its peacekeeping efforts, and a crime wave hiding in new StatsCan data.Host: Jesse BrownCredits: James Nicholson (Producer), Kallan Lyons (Associate Producer and Fact Checking), Imogen Sayers, (Mixing and Mastering), Tristan Capacchione (Senior Production Supervisor), Jesse Brown (Editor)Guest: Harrison LowmanPhoto: Jolanda Flubacher, World Economic ForumFurther reading: Ottawa discussing trade concessions with U.S. in return for some tariff relief, sources say - The Globe and MailMaking concessions to get a trade deal when the public's in a fighting mood - The Globe and Mail Concession Carney faces his Neville Chamberlain moment - The Globe and MailCarney would rather concede to Trump than risk short-term economic pain — The Globe and MailDispatch from the Front Lines: No deal. - The LineFollow the Money All the Way to Mark Carney's Canada - BloombergOttawa hastens its retreat from online regulation - Marc EdgeCanada's Big Tech shakedown failed. Now Carney retreats in the face of American pressure - The HubCanada cuts its UN peacekeeping forces as it tilts to Europe and Indo-Pacific - The Globe and MailThe case of the misleading fall in crime rates - The Globe and Mail Sponsors: oxio: Head over to canadaland.oxio.ca and use code CANADALAND for your first month free! Douglas: Douglas is giving our listeners a FREE Sleep Bundle with each mattress purchase. Get the sheets, pillows, mattress and pillow protectors FREE with your Douglas purchase today. Visit douglas.ca/canadaland to claim this offer.BetterHelp: Visit BetterHelp.com/canadaland today to get 10% off your first month.Shopify: Sign up for your one-dollar-per-month trial today at Shopify.caIf you value this podcast, support us! You'll get premium access to all our shows ad free, including early releases and bonus content. You'll also get our exclusive newsletter, discounts on merch at our store, tickets to our live and virtual events, and more than anything, you'll be a part of the solution to Canada's journalism crisis, you'll be keeping our work free and accessible to everybody. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Last time we spoke about the ending of the Second Battle of Changsha. In late September and early October 1941, Chinese commander Chen Cheng planned an operation to retake Yichang, a strategic Yangtze River city whose control was essential for protecting the approach to Chongqing. Japanese forces were pulling back from Changsha, weakened by supply problems and casualties, which created an opportunity for Chen to intensify his campaign. Yichang had been captured by Japan in 1940, a defeat that Chen carried as a personal and political burden. He therefore moved to encircle the Japanese 13th Division inside Yichang and drive it to collapse. Although the Chinese held a clear manpower advantage—fourteen divisions against the encircled Japanese—progress was slowed by stubborn fighting from prepared, entrenched positions. The battle inside the city produced desperate close-quarters combat and heavy casualties, showing how the fate of Yichang and the wider defense of Chongqing were tightly linked.    #214 War hits the Pacific Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   The guns fell silent on October 9, 1941, as the Ninth War Zone's forces restored their pre-battle positions, marking the end of the Second Battle of Changsha. The balance sheet was grim on both sides, but it was China that bore the heavier cost. The Ninth Military Front suffered 70,672 killed, wounded, or missing. The concurrent Yichang offensive added a further 21,368 casualties to the Sixth Military Front, a force that outnumbered its Japanese opponents ten to one yet still failed to retake the city. By the time the dust settled, the Chinese army had lost nearly 100,000 men across both theatres. The Chinese command was frank, at least in private, about what had gone wrong. The Japanese had moved with a speed that recalled Blitzkrieg, advancing 130 kilometres in eleven days and withdrawing at twelve kilometres a day, catching the defenders perpetually off-balance. The 26th, 37th, 10th, and 74th Corps had been picked apart piecemeal rather than fighting in concert, the original plan to destroy the Japanese south of the Miluo River coming to nothing. Elite formations had paid a disproportionate price: the 74th Corps suffered 14,521 casualties, the 37th Corps 14,015, and the 58th Division alone lost 6,192 of its 11,907 men, nearly its entire fighting strength.   Yet none of this was the story the public would hear. On October 10th, China's National Day, radio stations announced the "Second Great Victory in Northern Hunan", the annihilation of over 40,000 enemy troops. Newspapers rushed out special editions. Congratulatory telegrams flooded in from government ministries and civic organizations. Senior officials seized on the moment: Sun Ke, Premier of the Executive Yuan, declared that the victory "laid the foundation for the counter-offensive and the recapture of Hankou and Guangzhou," while General Bai Chongxi called it "the pivotal moment for us to turn defeat into victory." Chiang Kai-shek, reading through the pages of triumphant commentary produced overnight by his propagandists, was reportedly impressed by their industry, if not convinced by their content. He had not wanted to call it a victory at all, but the political calculus was unavoidable: after four years of war, an exhausted nation needed the psychological sustenance that only "victory" could provide.   The gap between public performance and private reality was nowhere more visible than in the arrival of a twenty-two-member international press delegation on October 13th. Journalists from Britain, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Hong Kong, and major Chinese newspapers were flown to Changsha and carefully guided through selected battlefields, where they inspected mountains of war trophies and heard testimony from soldiers and civilians. They left satisfied, presenting their war souvenirs—swords, binoculars, Japanese military flags—to their audiences back home as proof of Chinese heroism and Japanese defeat. Both China and Japan were claiming victory simultaneously. The only conclusion the foreign press could draw was that one side was lying, and it was not the side that had shown them the evidence.   Chiang Kai-shek's real verdict came at the Third Nanyue Military Conference, held from October 16 to 21. His anger was withering. He condemned his generals for their obsession with defending sprawling outer perimeter lines while leaving city centres barely fortified, a mentality so rigid, he said, that the Japanese could announce the exact time of their advance and withdrawal in advance and still execute it on schedule without interference. "Generals, what a disgrace this is!" On the failure to capture prisoners, only 263 prisoners were claimed across the entire front, of whom only 16 names were actually published, he was almost incredulous: "We can definitely defeat the enemy, capture many enemy prisoners, and seize countless enemy weapons! Even if we cannot capture ten thousand prisoners, we should at least capture a thousand! If not a thousand, then at least a hundred! But now, you don't even have ten!" The conference handed down punishments to match the rhetoric. Liao Lingqi, commander of the shattered 58th Division, was sentenced to death for desertion and shot on October 22nd. His men were so outraged that three regimental commanders resigned in protest; the division was pulled from the order of battle entirely and given three months to rebuild. Li Yutang, commander of the 10th Corps, was dismissed—though the Third Battle of Changsha would begin before his replacement could take post, and he would be reinstated to play a key role in the city's defence.   On the Japanese side, the 11th Army acknowledged 1,670 killed, 5,184 wounded, and 14 missing, far fewer than Chinese claims, though post-war regimental histories suggest the true figure was higher. Lieutenant General Anami, who had championed the operation, found himself stung by the charge that the battle had served mainly as material for Chinese propaganda. On November 23rd, he reportedly reacted with visible displeasure when someone in his headquarters said as much aloud.  Anami's annoyance was easy enough to understand, but the accusation carried a troubling degree of accuracy. The Second Battle of Changsha had yielded no decisive strategic gain and no substantial alteration in the military balance. What it did generate, rather effectively, was a story and by the autumn of 1941, stories were one of the few things China still had in plentiful supply. The most consequential struggles were taking place not along the Miluo River, but in foreign ministries and embassies, in Washington and Moscow, in the messages passing between Chongqing and London, and in the increasingly strained calculations of statesmen trying to determine, amid rapidly changing circumstances, whom to support and for how long.   For Chiang Kai-shek, the challenge was never merely military. It was structural, and had been so from the outset. He had always seen clearly, precisely because he understood China's weakness, that Japan could not be defeated by China alone. The country lacked the industrial base, the logistical reach, and after four years of relentless attrition more and more the manpower needed to force a decisive result on the battlefield. China's survival depended on making its war inseparable from the wars of other powers. Since 1937, Chiang's diplomacy had pursued that single objective: convincing enough great powers that their interests were aligned with China's, and holding that coalition together long enough for Japan to be subdued. That effort turned out to be vastly more difficult than it ought to have been.   The problem started with the international order in which the war emerged. Chiang had hoped to assemble a concert of allies willing to help defend China against Japanese aggression. He was blocked not just by the reluctance of neutral states to aid China, but by the speed with which alliances shifted in the opening years of the Second World War. He had never welcomed the prospect of a general European conflict, correctly fearing that it would push China even further to the margins of world attention. Even so, he recognized that once the lines had hardened between the imperial democracies and fascism, new alignments might become possible. From his perspective, the growing amity between Berlin and Moscow was therefore disastrous. He had been eager to draw the USSR into war against Japan. Instead, the Soviets were now effectively aligned with the Nazis, who were themselves allied with Tokyo.   The world created after Versailles had already enraged many Chinese. After all, the May Fourth demonstrations of 1919 had arisen directly from the settlement reached at the Paris Peace Conference. Yet that older order had at least possessed recognizable anchors, especially the dominance of the two great European empires and the United States. Now those empires were weakening, and no one could say with confidence what the new geopolitical order would be. For all Chiang knew, Germany might emerge as Europe's new dominant power. The early years of the European war produced a bewildering spectacle of diplomatic realignment.   The Nationalist government had previously enjoyed a short-lived flirtation with Nazi Germany. In fact, Hitler's regime continued supplying Chiang with munitions in the first months of China's war against Japan. The Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 had theoretically joined Germany, Italy, and Japan into the Axis, but mutual distrust prevented them from forming anything like a fully coherent alliance. Chiang found it useful to imply to Western powers that he might be pushed into closer alignment with Germany, a particularly disturbing possibility for the USSR, which faced enemies in both Europe and Asia. But eventually the contradictions in German policy toward East Asia became too severe. In April 1938, Germany yielded to Japanese pressure and ended its support for China.   Britain offered little meaningful help. Neville Chamberlain became prime minister in May 1937 at the head of a Conservative-led National Government, and was quickly overwhelmed by the deteriorating European situation. If Czechoslovakia was for him a "far-off country of which we know nothing," China's fate was even more distant and obscure to many,  perhaps most  policymakers in London. The Nationalists had more success in cultivating the United States. At the Nine-Power Conference in Brussels in November 1937, the Chinese delegation failed to persuade Washington to impose sanctions on Japan and confront it directly. By the middle of 1938, however, American views were beginning to shift. As Japan pushed deeper into southern China, it became increasingly obvious that the occupied territory would be closed to foreign trade. In December 1938, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau arranged a private American loan of $25 million to China, to be repaid through shipments of tung oil, a varnish product whose real importance lay not in itself, but in what the arrangement signified: a quiet American expression of faith that Chongqing would survive. Chiang also held on to the hope of an even less likely partnership. He had become fiercely anti-Communist during the 1920s, yet in the early years of the anti-Japanese war his greatest hope still rested on Soviet entry into the conflict. Soviet advisers and pilots had aided China from 1937 to 1939, but the USSR never formally declared war on Japan. Still, as Japanese aggression in northern Asia intensified, it remained possible that the Soviets would eventually be drawn in.   Then, as so often happened whenever Chiang tried to impose some control over the course of the war, events beyond China's borders altered the struggle in fundamental ways. While Western attention remained fixed on Europe's darkening horizon, a battle with major consequences for East Asia unfolded on the frontiers of Outer Mongolia, Manchukuo, and the eastern Soviet Union. Throughout much of 1938 and early 1939, one faction within the Japanese Imperial Army sought to pressure the Soviets along their eastern frontier. The USSR appeared vulnerable; Stalin's paranoid purges had executed or exiled many of the Red Army's best officers. In May 1939, fighting broke out near Nomonhan between forces from Soviet-backed Mongolia and Japanese troops from Manchukuo. Within days, both sides had reinforced heavily, until nearly 60,000 Soviet troops faced about 40,000 soldiers from the Kwantung Army. Over the next four months, until mid-September, they fought a major battle ending in a decisive Japanese defeat and establishing the reputation of General Georgi Zhukov, who would later become one of Stalin's most celebrated wartime commanders. The much-derided Soviet Army had fought with formidable effectiveness, and the result was not only a ceasefire but also a nonaggression pact between the two sides, extinguishing, in one stroke, Chiang's hopes for a Chinese-Soviet military alliance. The final blow came after developments in northern Europe. In the Winter War of 1939–1940, the Soviet invasion of Finland led Britain and France to back a motion expelling the USSR from the League of Nations. China, then a member of the League Council, declined to use its veto to block the resolution. Stalin was enraged by Chiang's failure to prevent Soviet expulsion, and mutual suspicion thereafter poisoned relations between the two leaders for the rest of the war against Japan. China would now have to continue without further major Soviet backing.   By the spring of 1940, China's position had become deeply precarious. In March, senior Japanese negotiators sought an agreement with Chiang in Chongqing, while Wang Jingwei was trying to formalize his rival Nationalist government in Nanjing. This effort, known in Chinese as the Tong Operation, and in Japanese as Operation Kiri, led to talks in Hong Kong from March 7 to 10, 1940. Militarily, the Nationalists were in grave danger: the United States remained neutral, and Europe was in chaos. Indeed, that same spring, with France seemingly near collapse, the British government also sent out discreet feelers to explore the possibility of a negotiated peace with Germany. For China, Western assistance was nowhere in sight. The Japanese judged the moment favorable for pressing Chiang toward concessions. Faced with serious danger to his regime, Chiang allowed the door to negotiation to open just slightly.   As a consequence, the Japanese delayed full recognition of Wang Jingwei's new government. Through the summer and autumn of 1940, Tokyo remained uncertain about the defector. Prominent Japanese figures such as Count Arima Yoriyasu of the Privy Council said Wang's conduct demonstrated his untrustworthiness, and Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke continued to express interest in an agreement with Chongqing. Zhou Fohai captured the defectors' frustration, men who believed they had made the highest patriotic sacrifice when he wrote: "Chongqing sees us as collaborators, we see ourselves as heroes. We think only peace can save the country — that's why we think of ourselves as heroes. If we end up classed as heroes, then China and Japan will be at peace. If we end up classed as collaborators, then China and Japan will never be at peace."That formulation conveyed something genuine about the moral dizziness of the period. Most of the defectors were not men devoid of principles; they were men whose principles had carried them to a place that history would find exceptionally hard to pardon.   The "New Fourth Army Incident" brought to a close one of the most consequential years in modern Chinese political history. The battle of ideas unfolding in 1940 was already visible to informed contemporaries. Early in 1941, US Ambassador Nelson Johnson sent Washington a detailed assessment of the Chinese political situation in reply to another report passed along by Major Evans Carlson, an American officer who had made an extensive journey through the Chinese interior. The contrast between the two documents revealed a widening split in American views of China. Carlson, together with his travelling companion, the New Zealander Rewi Alley, had become increasingly sympathetic to the Communists after visiting their territories in 1938 and admiring their discipline. Carlson described the Nationalists as moving toward "fascism," and argued that American aid should be conditioned on Chiang's government being compelled to adopt more "democratic" institutions.   Johnson strongly disagreed. It was "only normal and natural," he wrote, that the Nationalists wanted to retain power, but during the war they had established the National Political Consultative Council, in which multiple parties, including the Communists, were represented. He also noted that the CCP could publish its own newspaper in Chongqing in a way that would have been impossible before the war. One might have expected the Nationalists to use the war as a justification "to extinguish . . . all political opposition," yet instead they had chosen to "muddle along." Johnson further thought that the influence of competing cliques inside the Nationalist Party had been overstated. Chiang Kai-shek, by contrast, had "grown in stature, as he has come to be recognized as the symbol of united resistance to Japanese encroachment"; ultimately, "it is he who makes the final decisions." Johnson did agree with Carlson that Chiang's regime was hesitant to encourage a broad-based popular movement animated by anything beyond anti-Japanese feeling, though he also pointed to Nationalist cooperative programs and county-level reforms. But he rejected the idea that American support should depend on sweeping political transformation. Chiang was committed to continuing the war against Japan, and Washington should back him in that effort. In a notably farsighted passage, Johnson wrote: "It is my view that since the fall of the Manchu dynasty and the collapse of the traditional Chinese concept of government the Chinese people have been feeling their way along toward a new evolving form of government. A definitive form of government has not yet been established and may not be established for decades; it may or may not be in the form of a democracy, but it will be a type of government that will be adapted to the needs of China and its people." The tension between these two American interpretations,  Carlson's idealized belief in the Communists and Johnson's pragmatic support for Chiang was more than a minor bureaucratic dispute. It foreshadowed a debate that would dominate American foreign policy for the next decade, and would still echo when the People's Republic was proclaimed in 1949.   The disastrous experience of 1940 seemed to cast doubt on whether any future for China existed outside the Japanese Empire. As 1941 wore on, another dreadful event shook the exhausted wartime capital. On June 5, Chongqing endured roughly five hours of bombing, driving the population into air-raid shelters. In one tunnel in the Shibati district, the conditions were even worse than usual. The large shelter was supposed to have lights and electric fans, but the generators had never been connected. Inside, the air was dark, hot, and suffocating. Around ten that evening, people began emerging from the tunnel when rumors spread that the Japanese were returning with poison-gas bombs. Air-raid wardens forced people back inside, even as others were still trying to come out. Bodies toppled over one another, and panic spread as people realized they could not breathe. Over the next few hours, hundreds died underground in the darkness. The exact number was never definitively established: the official figure was 461, though a contemporary police report placed it far higher, at 1,527. What rescuers remembered most vividly were the tortured expressions of the dead, people tangled together in each other's arms as they lost consciousness, clothing ripped to shreds by desperate hands clawing at one another, and bodies so drenched in sweat that they looked as though they had been soaked in water. One survivor, Tang Zhengchang, remembered a hand reaching out from a pile of corpses and pleading, "Sir, please help me . . ." The grip on Tang's shorts was so tight that it pulled them off; he escaped the tunnel naked from the waist down. Official descriptions of the disaster were softened. Even so, the tragedy deepened the city's gloom and in a place already saturated with grief, an added layer of darkness mattered a great deal.   Yet events elsewhere would soon offer the National Government a narrow margin of hope. Late in 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt won re-election as president of the United States. "I am not going to send your boys into any foreign wars," he had proclaimed during the campaign against Wendell Willkie. But Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull both understood that Nazi domination of Europe posed a grave challenge to American influence there. And with China's "Open Door" to trade effectively shut by Japanese occupation, it was becoming increasingly clear that strict neutrality might not remain viable. In a 1941 report on China's domestic and foreign situation, Ambassador Johnson noted that during Germany's sweeping victories across Europe in mid-1940, the Chinese had become anxious about whether the Allies would remain committed to their cause. Britain's refusal to surrender, however, together with continuing Soviet goodwill, lifted public morale in China. People now looked toward the United States and Britain for support and felt that "victory" was "virtually theirs."   Then, on June 22, 1941, the world awoke to news that roughly three million German soldiers were advancing into the Soviet Union. Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's invasion of the USSR, dramatically overturned the nonaggression that had governed relations between the two major European dictatorships for the previous two years. It transformed the war in Europe entirely. Less obviously, it also transformed the war in Asia. Thanks to intelligence leaks, Chiang Kai-shek had already realized that war between Germany and the USSR was likely. After the neutrality treaty between the USSR and Japan was signed on April 13, 1941, Chiang predicted that the United States would be drawn into the Asian war, and even that Japan might eventually reverse course and strike the Soviet Union. If that happened, China would become the critical Asian ally of both Washington and Moscow. Stalin had been caught off guard by the German assault — largely because he ignored increasingly urgent warnings from senior colleagues receiving intelligence from well-placed spies in Germany and the Comintern, eager to preserve its alliances, now pressed the Chinese Communists to cooperate more closely with the Nationalists. On June 23, 1941, the CCP Central Committee responded with a declaration that it would "persevere in the Anti-Japanese United Front, persevere in Nationalist-Communist cooperation," and would align itself with the British, the Americans, and others resisting the "fascist rulers" of the Axis.   In Chongqing and Yan'an, the German attack on the Soviet Union was interpreted as a hopeful sign that Japan's fortunes might be beginning to turn. In Nanjing, the reaction was different. On June 22, Zhou Fohai recorded in his diary that, although the outcome "cannot be predicted," members of the Nanjing regime "all believe Germany will win and will take Moscow within two months." Zhou speculated that Japan could not easily reconcile its neutrality treaty with the USSR and its membership in the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was supposed to unite the Axis against Soviet expansionism. Still, because Germany had struck first, Japan was under no formal obligation to help. Zhou also continued to view events through a lens he had never abandoned: that of Chinese nationalism. "If Chongqing joins the Allies and they win," he wrote, "then this is good for China." If they lost, it would be disastrous for Chiang Kai-shek; but because Wang Jingwei had established a government in Nanjing under Japanese sponsorship, China now had "a foot in both boats." It was a ruthless calculation, but not a wholly dishonorable one. Zhou was not merely advancing Japanese interests. He was hedging, wagering on multiple futures in the name of a China he believed would endure beyond whatever constellation of powers happened to dominate at the moment. Whether posterity would judge that conduct prudent or collaborative was a question he could neither settle nor live to see resolved to his satisfaction.   The summer of 1941 marked a major geopolitical turning point in the war. Until then, the conflicts in China and Europe had remained separate, if desperate, struggles on the Eurasian continent. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union now forced Japan to decide whether it too would enter war against the USSR. Debate in Tokyo was brief. Although some officials, including Foreign Minister Matsuoka, favored striking north before moving south, both the Kwantung Army and the Navy advised against helping Germany at least until Germany had succeeded in drawing substantial Soviet forces away from Siberia and into Europe. Konoye, once again prime minister, agreed. With the northern option set aside, Japanese leaders turned toward another great power instead: the United States. Japan's failure to gain further decisive momentum in China had fueled demands for broader regional expansion, especially into Southeast Asia, with its abundant oil, rubber, and other strategic resources. From 1940 onward, measures such as the pressure to close the Burma Road made it increasingly obvious that Tokyo had adopted a more aggressive posture in Asia. Unable to subdue China, Japanese policymakers chose instead to escalate the conflict still further.   Japanese political life had become ever more dominated by the unresolved war in China. As early as 1938, military expenditures consumed about 70 percent of the national budget, and that same year a National Mobilization Bill granted the government "total war control" over the zaibatsu, Japan's major industrial conglomerates. By 1940, the New Order was making itself felt throughout everyday life, with campaigns against luxury and extravagant consumption taking on new prominence. In February 1940, a parliamentarian was expelled from the Diet simply for daring to criticize the "holy war" in China. In such an atmosphere, retreat from imperial ambitions became increasingly unthinkable. That figure, 70 percent of the national budget devoted to the military is worth dwelling on, because it reveals something essential about the trap in which Japanese strategists had placed themselves. The war in China had not been won, yet abandoning it would have meant admitting a failure so severe that it would have shaken the ideological and institutional foundations of military supremacy in Japanese politics. The only apparent ways out required pushing further in: more conquest, more extraction, more expansion. The logic was brutally clear, and profoundly destructive.   The Roosevelt administration watched these developments with growing alarm. Though still formally neutral, the United States was already using Lend-Lease to provide major assistance to Britain and the Soviet Union in their struggles against Germany. It now expanded aid to China as well. On February 10, Roosevelt's representative Lauchlin Currie visited Chongqing to inform Chiang Kai-shek that the United States would soon provide $45 million in military equipment. General John Magruder, head of the small AMMISCA mission,  the American Military Mission in China had been sent to Chongqing in September 1941, as part of quiet preparation for possible Chinese entry into an alliance against Japan. The China branch of the OSS, precursor to the CIA, was led by General William "Wild Bill" Donovan, whom Roosevelt had dispatched to China in early 1941.   The Americans repeatedly tried to discourage Japan from moving south into Southeast Asia, but relations only grew more confrontational. Japan occupied the southern part of French Indochina, and in response the United States imposed an oil embargo in July 1941. The consequences were immense. Japan imported around 80 percent of its oil from the United States. Without that supply, its navy, the essential instrument for southern expansion  had reserves for perhaps eighteen months. The real question facing Tokyo, then, was not whether it must act, but how soon. Unable any longer to resist mounting military pressure for war, Konoye resigned on October 16 and was replaced as premier by General Tōjō Hideki. Tokyo accelerated its preparations for conflict with the Western powers. Planned targets included Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. I should note, if you want to learn about all of this history in more detail, you can go check out the pacific war channel on youtube. I have a chronological series that is just now talking about events like the Japanese invasion of french indochina and the road to pearl harbor.   Throughout the autumn of 1941, increasingly desperate negotiations took place between Japan and the United States. Washington insisted that Japan withdraw from China; Tokyo was equally firm that it would do no such thing. From the Japanese point of view, the demand to leave China was not a serious negotiating position but a demand for national humiliation a call to repudiate four years of war, vast casualties, and the ideological basis of Japanese militarism in a single diplomatic act. In the end, the gulf between the two positions could not be bridged.   While civilian and military leaders in Tokyo argued over the pace at which they should move toward war, few among Japan's rulers doubted that war was coming. At the imperial conference of November 5, it was formally agreed that if no satisfactory diplomatic solution had been reached by December 1, war would follow soon after. Talks in Washington between Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburō, diplomat Kurusu Saburō, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull led nowhere. On November 26, Hull delivered a note repeating the American position that Japan must withdraw from both China and Indochina. On December 1, the imperial conference resolved to go to war; the following day, the date of attack was fixed as December 8, December 7 by American time. In one sense, this was the culmination toward which the entire previous decade had been moving. The war in China had started as a localized conflict, then expanded into a continental one, and was now about to become something larger still: a truly global war, stretching from the North Atlantic to the western Pacific. China's long, lonely resistance would suddenly gain new dimensions and new allies,  though not the ones Chiang had spent four years trying to cultivate, and not under circumstances he would have chosen.   In the early morning of December 7, 1941, the US Pacific Fleet lay anchored at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, its sailors and officers still largely asleep as dawn crept across the Pacific. The attack did not come without warning signs,  American and Japanese diplomats had been locked in increasingly desperate negotiations throughout the autumn, each side hardening its position until no room remained to maneuver. Washington had demanded that Japan withdraw from China, a condition Tokyo viewed not as a serious opening offer but as a demand for national humiliation: a call to repudiate four years of brutal war, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the entire ideological foundation upon which Japanese militarism rested. No agreement was possible on those terms, and both sides privately knew it.   The strike force assembled in secret was formidable. Six aircraft carriers,  the Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku had sailed under strict radio silence across the North Pacific, launching their aircraft in two successive waves before the American base had any meaningful chance to respond. The first wave of approximately 183 planes swept in just before 8 a.m., targeting the rows of battleships moored along Battleship Row and the military airfields at Wheeler, Hickam, and Ford Island simultaneously, ensuring that American aircraft could not scramble in time to mount an effective defense. A second wave of roughly 170 planes followed less than an hour later, pressing the attack on damaged ships and harbor installations.   The destruction was staggering. The battleship Arizona suffered a catastrophic magazine explosion after a armor-piercing bomb penetrated her forward decks, killing nearly 1,177 of her crew in minutes, almost half of the total American dead from the entire attack. The Oklahoma capsized after being struck by multiple torpedoes. The West Virginia and California sank at their moorings. In total, seventeen vessels were damaged or destroyed, and the vast majority of military aircraft at the nearby airfields were caught on the ground and obliterated before they could take flight. Around 2,400 Americans were killed and another 1,100 wounded, making it the deadliest single attack on American soil or territory in the nation's history to that point.   Yet the attack was not a complete strategic success for Japan. The US Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers, the vessels that would ultimately decide the naval war in the Pacific happened to be at sea that morning and escaped unharmed. The harbor's fuel storage and repair facilities were also left largely intact, allowing the fleet to reconstitute faster than Japanese planners had anticipated. What Japan achieved in tactical devastation, it partly squandered in strategic miscalculation. The attack ended American neutrality instantly and irrevocably. The following day, President Roosevelt addressed Congress, calling December 7 "a date which will live in infamy," and within hours the United States declared war on Japan. For China, after more than four years of fighting alone, the blow that devastated Pearl Harbor paradoxically carried a thread of desperate hope at last, the great power Chiang Kai-shek had spent years trying to draw into the conflict had arrived, not under circumstances he would have chosen, but arrived nonetheless. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After years of fighting, China's situation darkened in 1941 with intense bombing of Chongqing and fears of poison-gas attacks. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June shifted alliances and pressured Japan toward wider war. Japan escalated plans for Southeast Asia, suffered an oil embargo, and negotiations with the United States broke down over withdrawing from China and Indochina. Then the Pearl Harbor attack began the Pacific War.

Op 10 mei 1940 wordt Winston Churchill premier van Groot-Brittannië. Op dezelfde dag begint Duitsland de aanval op West-Europa en belandt Churchill direct in de grootste crisis van zijn politieke carrière.In deze aflevering volgen we zijn eerste weken als premier. Terwijl Frankrijk dreigt te vallen en het Britse leger vast komt te zitten bij Duinkerken, ontstaat binnen de Britse regering een moeilijke discussie: moet Groot-Brittannië blijven vechten of zoeken naar een uitweg?We luisteren naar de beroemde toespraken van Churchill en ontdekken hoe hij stap voor stap zijn land probeert te overtuigen van één boodschap:We Shall Never Surrender.Stel ons een vraag of vertel ons iets leuks! We kunnen reageren :)Nationaal Monument OranjehotelBezoek het Nationaal Monument Oranjehotel in Scheveningen en ontdek de verhalen van de duizenden Nederlanders die hier tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog gevangen zaten. Een indrukwekkende historische plek die laat zien wat vrijheid werkelijk betekent.  Support the showRondleiding GrebbebergHierbij de link naar de rondleiding op de Grebbeberg van 27 juni!Klik hier!Word Historicus lid van De Geschiedenisreis!Heb je genoten van deze aflevering? Als Historicus lid krijg je nog veel meer! Ontvang exclusieve toegang tot extra afleveringen, diepgaande analyses en verhalen die je nergens anders hoort. Tegenwoordig via Petje.Af en daarmee is iDeal betaling mogelijk.Klik hier om naar onze Petje Af website te gaan!Social MediaFacebookgroep: Groep van geschiedenis enthousiastelingenSubstack: Nieuwsbrief met kaarten, foto's en artikelen als ondersteuning bij iedere aflevering.Instagram: Blijf op de hoogte van alle nieuwtjesAdverteren in onze podcast? Mail naar leethijsgeschiedenisreis@gmail.com

Air Date - 24 June 2026Join Host Marc Lainhart – The Intuitive Prospector™ this Wisdom Wednesday as Marc welcomes Mr. Alan Winter to the show for his first interview. Novelist, historian, and academic whose work brings the past into urgent conversation with the present moment. “I was meant to study history. I love learning about the past to understand the present. I love taking what might be seemingly disparate facts and weaving them into tales about the human spirit. This passion enables me to craft meaningful stories that, by turns, engage, teach, and entertain readers while jumping off today's headlines.” -Alan WinterWhen Ashes Cried completes the trilogy of an amnesiac German soldier, Friedrich Richard, whose story begins in Wolf, when he is sent to Pasewalk Hospital for treatment to restore his lost memory. There, he befriends the patient in the next bed: Adolf Hitler. Friedrich becomes the readers' eyes and ears as Hitler and his inner circle rise to power. In Sins of the Fathers, we witness how Germany spirals into a black hole of terror as it expels its Jews and prepares for war. Friedrich and top-level German military leaders are set to launch a coup d'état when Neville Chamberlain flies to Munich to appease Hitler. Chamberlain unwittingly saves Hitler's life and sows the seeds for World War II.Please join us for another inspiring, encouraging, educational, healing, motivational, and transformational show! “Prospecting to discover the diamond within and the many hidden gems all around us!”#AlanWinter #MarcLainhart #InspiredLivingAbout the AuthorAlan Winter is an accomplished novelist, historian, and academic whose work brings the past into urgent conversation with the present. A graduate of Rutgers with honors in history, with advanced degrees from NYU and Columbia, he has authored seven novels, including collaborations with former federal judge Herbert J. Stern. His screenplay Polly earned recognition at the Austin Film Festival, while Savior's Day was named a Kirkus Best Book Selection. Alongside his literary career, Alan has published over twenty scientific articles and serves on the faculty of Long Island University. Known for blending deep historical research with compelling storytelling, he writes stories that both educate and challenge readers to confront uncomfortable truths.WEBSITE: https://alanwinter.com/Visit the Inspired Living show page https://omtimes.com/iom/shows/inspired-living-radio/Connect with Marc Lainhart at http://www.marclainhart.com/Subscribe to our Newsletter https://omtimes.com/subscribe-omtimes-magazineConnect with OMTimes on Facebook https://www.facebook.com/Omtimes.Magazine/ and OMTimes Radio https://www.facebook.com/ConsciousRadiowebtv.OMTimes/X/Twitter: https://twitter.com/OmTimes/Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/omtimes/LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/2798417/Pinterest: https://www.pinterest.com/omtimes/

The MOU commits the United States to ensuring a $300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran, lifting all sanctions regardless of type, releasing all frozen Iranian assets, and allowing immediate oil sales upon signing. Iran's nuclear program and enriched uranium stockpile are left entirely unaddressed. Israel was excluded from the negotiations and is not a party to the agreement. The signing ceremony is scheduled for Friday. Critics cited in this video span the political spectrum, from Hudson Institute fellow Josh Block to Fox News contributor Andy McCarthy, who compared the deal to Neville Chamberlain's capitulation before World War II, to National Review editor Philip Klein, who called it money for nothing. Even Ben Domenech, husband of Meghan McCain, acknowledged the deal failed to achieve any of the stated objectives before spinning it as a win. The second story covers federal prosecutors in Minneapolis announcing a 94-page indictment against 15 individuals allegedly affiliated with Antifa. Hawk notes that Antifa is not a formal organization, that 75 percent of the Minnesota U.S. Attorney's Office staff quit earlier this year, and that the marquee piece of evidence presented at the press conference was a Facebook post reading "we need to become ungovernable." Half of similar cases brought by this DOJ have already been dismissed. SUPPORT & CONNECT WITH HAWK- Support on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/mdg650hawk - Hawk's Merch Store: https://hawkmerchstore.com - Connect on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@mdg650hawk7thacct - Connect on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@hawkeyewhackamole - Connect on BlueSky: https://bsky.app/profile/mdg650hawk.bsky.social - Connect on Substack: https://mdg650hawk.substack.com - Connect on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/hawkpodcasts - Connect on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/mdg650hawk - Connect on Twitch: https://www.twitch.tv/mdg650hawk ALL HAWK PODCASTS INFO- Additional Content Available Here: https://www.hawkpodcasts.comhttps://www.youtube.com/@hawkpodcasts- Listen to Hawk Podcasts On Your Favorite Platform:Spotify: https://spoti.fi/3RWeJfyApple Podcasts: https://apple.co/422GDuLYouTube: https://youtube.com/@hawkpodcastsiHeartRadio: https://ihr.fm/47vVBdPPandora: https://bit.ly/48COaTB

Last time we spoke about the end of the battle of khalkin gol. In the summer of 1939, the Nomonhan Incident escalated into a major border conflict between Soviet-Mongolian forces and Japan's Kwantung Army along the Halha River. Despite Japanese successes in July, Zhukov launched a decisive offensive on August 20. Under cover of darkness, Soviet troops crossed the river, unleashing over 200 bombers and intense artillery barrages that devastated Japanese positions. Zhukov's northern, central, and southern forces encircled General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, supported by Manchukuoan units. Fierce fighting ensued: the southern flank collapsed under Colonel Potapov's armor, while the northern Fui Heights held briefly before falling to relentless assaults, including flame-throwing tanks. Failed Japanese counterattacks on August 24 resulted in heavy losses, with regiments shattered by superior Soviet firepower and tactics. By August 25, encircled pockets were systematically eliminated, leading to the annihilation of the Japanese 6th Army. The defeat, coinciding with the Hitler-Stalin Pact, forced Japan to negotiate a ceasefire on September 15-16, redrawing borders. Zhukov's victory exposed Japanese weaknesses in mechanized warfare, influencing future strategies and deterring further northern expansion.   #192 The Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Despite the fact this technically will go into future events, I thought it was important we talk about a key moment in Sino history. Even though the battle of changkufeng and khalkin gol were not part of the second sino-Japanese war, their outcomes certainly would affect it.  Policymaking by the Soviet Union alone was not the primary factor in ending Moscow's diplomatic isolation in the late 1930s. After the Munich Conference signaled the failure of the popular front/united front approach, Neville Chamberlain, Adolf Hitler, and Poland's Józef Beck unintentionally strengthened Joseph Stalin's position in early 1939. Once the strategic cards were in his hands, Stalin capitalized on them. His handling of negotiations with Britain and France, as well as with Germany, from April to August was deft and effective. The spring and summer negotiations among the European powers are well documented and have been examined from many angles. In May 1939, while Stalin seemed to have the upper hand in Europe, yet before Hitler had signaled that a German–Soviet agreement might be possible, the Nomonhan incident erupted, a conflict initiated and escalated by the Kwantung Army. For a few months, the prospect of a Soviet–Japanese war revived concerns in Moscow about a two-front conflict. Reviewing Soviet talks with Britain, France, and Germany in the spring and summer of 1939 from an East Asian perspective sheds fresh light on the events that led to the German–Soviet Nonaggression Pact and, more broadly, to the outbreak of World War II. The second week of May marked the start of fighting at Nomonhan, during which negotiations between Germany and the USSR barely advanced beyond mutual scrutiny. Moscow signaled that an understanding with Nazi Germany might be possible. Notably, on May 4, the removal of Maksim Litvinov as foreign commissar and his replacement by Vyacheslav Molotov suggested a shift in approach. Litvinov, an urbane diplomat of Jewish origin and married to an Englishwoman, had been the leading Soviet proponent of the united-front policy and a steadfast critic of Nazi Germany. If a settlement with Hitler was sought, Litvinov was an unsuitable figure to lead the effort. Molotov, though with limited international experience, carried weight as chairman of the Council of Ministers and, more importantly, as one of Stalin's closest lieutenants. This personnel change seemed to accomplish its aim in Berlin, where the press was instructed on May 5 to halt polemical attacks on the Soviet Union and Bolshevism. On the same day, Karl Schnurre, head of the German Foreign Ministry's East European trade section, told Soviet chargé d'affaires Georgi Astakhov that Skoda, the German-controlled Czech arms manufacturer, would honor existing arms contracts with Russia. Astakhov asked whether, with Litvinov's departure, Germany might resume negotiations for a trade treaty Berlin had halted months earlier. By May 17, during discussions with Schnurre, Astakhov asserted that "there were no conflicts in foreign policy between Germany and the Soviet Union and that there was no reason for enmity between the two countries," and that Britain and France's negotiations appeared unpromising. The next day, Ribbentrop personally instructed Schulenburg to green-light trade talks. Molotov, however, insisted that a "political basis" for economic negotiations had to be established first. Suspicion remained high on both sides. Stalin feared Berlin might use reports of German–Soviet talks to destabilize a potential triple alliance with Britain and France; Hitler feared Stalin might use such reports to entice Tokyo away from an anti-German pact. The attempt to form a tripartite military alliance among Germany, Italy, and Japan foundered over divergent aims: Berlin targeted Britain and France; Tokyo aimed at the Soviet Union. Yet talks persisted through August 1939, with Japanese efforts to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alignment continually reported to Moscow by Richard Sorge. Hitler and Mussolini, frustrated by Japanese objections, first concluded the bilateral Pact of Steel on May 22. The next day, Hitler, addressing his generals, stressed the inevitability of war with Poland and warned that opposition from Britain would be crushed militarily. He then hinted that Russia might "prove disinterested in the destruction of Poland," suggesting closer ties with Japan if Moscow opposed Germany. The exchange was quickly leaked to the press. Five days later, the first pitched battle of the Nomonhan campaign began. Although Hitler's timing with the Yamagata detachment's foray was coincidental, Moscow may have found the coincidence ominous. Despite the inducement of Molotov's call for a political basis before economic talks, Hitler and Ribbentrop did not immediately respond. On June 14, Astakhov signaled to Parvan Draganov, Bulgaria's ambassador in Berlin, that the USSR faced three options: ally with Britain and France, continue inconclusive talks with them, or align with Germany, the latter being closest to Soviet desires. Draganov relayed to the German Foreign Ministry that Moscow preferred a non-aggression agreement if Germany would pledge not to attack the Soviet Union. Two days later, Schulenburg told Astakhov that Germany recognized the link between economic and political relations and was prepared for far-reaching talks, a view echoed by Ribbentrop. The situation remained tangled: the Soviets pursued overt talks with Britain and France, while Stalin sought to maximize Soviet leverage. Chamberlain's stance toward Moscow remained wary but recognized a "psychological value" to an Anglo–Soviet rapprochement, tempered by his insistence on a hard bargain. American ambassador William C. Bullitt urged London to avoid the appearance of pursuing the Soviets, a view that resonated with Chamberlain's own distrust. Public confidence in a real Anglo–Soviet alliance remained low. By July 19, cabinet minutes show Chamberlain could not quite believe a genuine Russia–Germany alliance was possible, though he recognized the necessity of negotiations with Moscow to deter Hitler and to mollify an increasingly skeptical British public. Despite reservations, both sides kept the talks alive. Stalin's own bargaining style, with swift Soviet replies but frequent questions and demands, often produced delays. Molotov pressed on questions such as whether Britain and France would pledge to defend the Baltic states, intervene if Japan attacked the USSR, or join in opposing Germany if Hitler pressured Poland or Romania. These considerations were not trivial; they produced extended deliberations. On July 23, Molotov demanded that plans for coordinated military action among the three powers be fleshed out before a political pact. Britain and France accepted most political terms, and an Anglo-French military mission arrived in Moscow on August 11. The British commander, Admiral Sir Reginald Plunket-Ernle-Erle-Drax, conducted staff talks but could not conclude a military agreement. The French counterpart, General Joseph Doumenc, could sign but not bind his government. By then, Hitler had set August 26 as the date for war with Poland. With that looming, Hitler pressed for Soviet neutrality, or closer cooperation. In July and August, secret German–Soviet negotiations favored the Germans, who pressed for a rapid settlement and made most concessions. Yet Stalin benefited from keeping the British and French engaged, creating leverage against Hitler and safeguarding a potential Anglo–Soviet option as a fallback. To lengthen the talks and avoid immediate resolution, Moscow emphasized the Polish issue. Voroshilov demanded the Red Army be allowed to operate through Polish territory to defend Poland, a demand Warsaw would never accept. Moscow even floated a provocative plan: if Britain and France could compel Poland to permit Baltic State naval operations, the Western fleets would occupy Baltic ports, an idea that would have been militarily perilous and diplomatically explosive. Despite this, Stalin sought an agreement with Germany. Through Richard Sorge's intelligence, Moscow knew Tokyo aimed to avoid large-scale war with the USSR, and Moscow pressed for a German–Soviet settlement, including a nonaggression pact and measures to influence Japan to ease Sino–Japanese tensions. On August 16, Ribbentrop instructed Schulenburg to urge Molotov and Stalin toward a nonaggression pact and to coordinate with Japan. Stalin signaled willingness, and August 23–24 saw the drafting of the pact and the collapse of the Soviet and Japanese resistance elsewhere. That night, in a memorandum of Ribbentrop's staff, seven topics were summarized, with Soviet–Japanese relations and Molotov's insistence that Berlin demonstrate good faith standing out. Ribbentrop reiterated his willingness to influence Japan for a more favorable Soviet–Japanese relationship, and Stalin's reply indicated a path toward a détente in the East alongside the European agreement: "M. Stalin replied that the Soviet Union indeed desired an improvement in its relations with Japan, but that there were limits to its patience with regard to Japanese provocations. If Japan desired war she could have it. The Soviet Union was not afraid of it and was prepared for it. If Japan desired peace—so much the better! M. Stalin considered the assistance of Germany in bringing about an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as useful, but he did not want the Japanese to get the impression that the initiative in this direction had been taken by the Soviet Union."  Second, the assertion that the Soviet Union was prepared for and unafraid of war with Japan is an overstatement, though Stalin certainly had grounds for optimism regarding the battlefield situation and the broader East Asian strategic balance. It is notable that, despite the USSR's immediate diplomatic and military gains against Japan, Stalin remained anxious to conceal from Tokyo any peace initiative that originated in Moscow. That stance suggests that Tokyo or Hsinking might read such openness as a sign of Soviet weakness or confidence overextended. The Japanese danger, it would seem, did not disappear from Stalin's mind. Even at the height of his diplomatic coup, Stalin was determined not to burn bridges prematurely. On August 21, while he urged Hitler to send Ribbentrop to Moscow, he did not sever talks with Britain and France. Voroshilov requested a temporary postponement on the grounds that Soviet delegation officers were needed for autumn maneuvers. It was not until August 25, after Britain reiterated its resolve to stand by Poland despite the German–Soviet pact, that Stalin sent the Anglo–French military mission home. Fortified by the nonaggression pact, which he hoped would deter Britain and France from action, Hitler unleashed his army on Poland on September 1. Two days later, as Zhukov's First Army Group was completing its operations at Nomonhan, Hitler faced a setback when Britain and France declared war. Hitler had hoped to finish Poland quickly in 1939 and avoid fighting Britain and France until 1940. World War II in Europe had begun. The Soviet–Japanese conflict at Nomonhan was not the sole, nor even the principal, factor prompting Stalin to conclude an alliance with Hitler. Standing aside from a European war that could fracture the major capitalist powers might have been reason enough. Yet the conflict with Japan in the East was also a factor in Stalin's calculations, a dimension that has received relatively little attention in standard accounts of the outbreak of the war. This East Asian focus seeks to clarify the record without proposing a revolutionary reinterpretation of Soviet foreign policy; rather, it adds an important piece often overlooked in the "origins of the Second World War" puzzle, helping to reduce the overall confusion. The German–Soviet agreement provided for the Soviet occupation of the eastern half of Poland soon after Germany's invasion. On September 3, just forty-eight hours after the invasion and on the day Britain and France declared war, Ribbentrop urged Moscow to invade Poland from the east. Yet, for two more weeks, Poland's eastern frontier remained inviolate; Soviet divisions waited at the border, as most Polish forces were engaged against Germany. The German inquiries about the timing of the Soviet invasion continued, but the Red Army did not move. This inactivity is often attributed to Stalin's caution and suspicion, but that caution extended beyond Europe. Throughout early September, sporadic ground and air combat continued at Nomonhan, including significant activity by Kwantung Army forces on September 8–9, and large-scale air engagements on September 1–2, 4–5, and 14–15. Not until September 15 was the Molotov–Togo cease-fire arrangement finalized, to take effect on September 16. The very next morning, September 17, the Red Army crossed the Polish frontier into a country collapsed at its feet. It appears that Stalin wanted to ensure that fighting on his eastern flank had concluded before engaging in Western battles, avoiding a two-front war. Through such policies, Stalin avoided the disaster of a two-front war. Each principal in the 1939 diplomatic maneuvering pursued distinct objectives. The British sought an arrangement with the USSR that would deter Hitler from attacking Poland and, if deterred, bind Moscow to the Anglo–French alliance. Hitler sought an alliance with the USSR to deter Britain and France from aiding Poland and, if they did aid Poland, to secure Soviet neutrality. Japan sought a military alliance with Germany against the USSR, or failing that, stronger Anti-Comintern ties. Stalin aimed for an outcome in which Germany would fight the Western democracies, leaving him freedom to operate in both the West and East; failing that, he sought military reassurance from Britain and France in case he had to confront Germany. Of the four, only Stalin achieved his primary objective. Hitler secured his secondary objective; the British and Japanese failed to realize theirs. Stalin won the diplomatic contest in 1939. Yet, as diplomats gave way to generals, the display of German military power in Poland and in Western Europe soon eclipsed Stalin's diplomatic triumph. By playing Germany against Britain and France, Stalin gained leverage and a potential fallback, but at the cost of unleashing a devastating European war. As with the aftermath of the Portsmouth Treaty in 1905, Russo-Japanese relations improved rapidly after hostilities ceased at Nomonhan. The Molotov–Togo agreement of September 15 and the local truces arranged around Nomonhan on September 19 were observed scrupulously by both sides. On October 27, the two nations settled another long-standing dispute by agreeing to mutual release of fishing boats detained on charges of illegal fishing in each other's territorial waters. On November 6, the USSR appointed Konstantin Smetanin as ambassador to Tokyo, replacing the previous fourteen-month tenure of a chargé d'affaires. Smetanin's first meeting with the new Japanese foreign minister, Nomura Kichisaburö, in November 1939 attracted broad, favorable coverage in the Japanese press. In a break with routine diplomatic practice, Nomura delivered a draft proposal for a new fisheries agreement and a memo outlining the functioning of the joint border commission to be established in the Nomonhan area before Smetanin presented his credentials. On December 31, an agreement finalizing Manchukuo's payment to the USSR for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway was reached, and the Soviet–Japanese Fisheries Convention was renewed for 1940. In due course, the boundary near Nomonhan was formally redefined. A November 1939 agreement between Molotov and Togo established a mixed border commission representing the four parties to the dispute. After protracted negotiations, the border commission completed its redemarcation on June 14, 1941, with new border markers erected in August 1941. The resulting boundary largely followed the Soviet–MPR position, lying ten to twelve miles east of the Halha River. With that, the Nomonhan incident was officially closed.  Kwantung Army and Red Army leaders alike sought to "teach a lesson" to their foe at Nomonhan. The refrain recurs in documents and memoirs from both sides, "we must teach them a lesson." The incident provided lessons for both sides, but not all were well learned. For the Red Army, the lessons of Nomonhan intertwined with the laurels of victory, gratifying but sometimes distracting. Georgy Zhukov grasped the experience of modern warfare that summer, gaining more than a raised profile: command experience, confidence, and a set of hallmarks he would employ later. He demonstrated the ability to grasp complex strategic problems quickly, decisive crisis leadership, meticulous attention to logistics and deception, patience in building superior strength before striking at the enemy's weakest point, and the coordination of massed artillery, tanks, mechanized infantry, and tactical air power in large-scale double envelopment. These capabilities informed his actions at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, and ultimately Berlin. It is tempting to wonder how Zhukov might have fared in the crucial autumn and winter of 1941 without Nomonhan, or whether he would have been entrusted with the Moscow front in 1941 had he not distinguished himself at Nomonhan. Yet the Soviet High Command overlooked an important lesson. Despite Zhukov's successes with independent tank formations and mechanized infantry, the command misapplied Spanish Civil War-era experience by disbanding armored divisions and redistributing tanks to infantry units to serve as support. It was not until after Germany demonstrated tank warfare in 1940 that the Soviets began reconstituting armored divisions and corps, a process still incomplete when the 1941 invasion began. The Red Army's performance at Nomonhan went largely unseen in the West. Western intelligence and military establishments largely believed the Red Army was fundamentally rotten, a view reinforced by the battlefield's remoteness and by both sides' reluctance to publicize the defeat. The Polish crisis and the outbreak of war in Europe drew attention away from Nomonhan, and the later Finnish Winter War reinforced negative Western judgments of Soviet military capability. U.S. military attaché Raymond Faymonville observed that the Soviets, anticipating a quick victory over Finland, relied on hastily summoned reserves ill-suited for winter fighting—an assessment that led some to judge the Red Army by its performance at Nomonhan. Even in Washington, this view persisted; Hitler reportedly called the Red Army "a paralytic on crutches" after Finland and then ordered invasion planning in 1941. Defeat can be a stronger teacher than victory. Because Nomonhan was a limited war, Japan's defeat was likewise limited, and its impact on Tokyo did not immediately recalibrate Japanese assessments. Yet Nomonhan did force Japan to revise its estimation of Soviet strength: the Imperial Army abandoned its strategic Plan Eight-B and adopted a more defensive posture toward the Soviet Union. An official inquiry into the debacle, submitted November 29, 1939, recognized Soviet superiority in materiel and firepower and urged Japan to bolster its own capabilities. The Kwantung Army's leadership, chastened, returned to the frontier with a more realistic sense of capability, even as the Army Ministry and AGS failed to translate lessons into policy. The enduring tendency toward gekokujo, the dominance of local and mid-level officers over central authority, remained persistent, and Tokyo did not fully purge it after Nomonhan. The Kwantung Army's operatives who helped drive the Nomonhan episode resurfaced in key posts at Imperial General Headquarters, contributing to Japan's 1941 decision to go to war. The defeat of the Kwantung Army at Nomonhan, together with the Stalin–Hitler pact and the outbreak of war in Europe, triggered a reorientation of Japanese strategy and foreign policy. The new government, led by the politically inexperienced and cautious General Abe Nobuyuki, pursued a conservative foreign policy. Chiang Kai-shek's retreat to Chongqing left the Chinese war at a stalemate: the Japanese Expeditionary Army could still inflict defeats on Chinese nationalist forces, but it had no viable path to a decisive victory. China remained Japan's principal focus. Still, the option of cutting Soviet aid to China and of moving north into Outer Mongolia and Siberia was discredited in Tokyo by the August 1939 double defeat. Northward expansion never again regained its ascendancy, though it briefly resurfaced in mid-1941 after Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union. Germany's alliance with the USSR during Nomonhan was viewed by Tokyo as a betrayal, cooling German–Japanese relations. Japan also stepped back from its confrontation with Britain over Tientsin. Tokyo recognized that the European war represented a momentous development that could reshape East Asia, as World War I had reshaped it before. The short-lived Abe government (September–December 1939) and its successor under Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa (December 1939–July 1940) adopted a cautious wait-and-see attitude toward the European war. That stance shifted in the summer of 1940, however, after Germany's successes in the West. With Germany's conquest of France and the Low Countries and Britain's fight for survival, Tokyo reassessed the global balance of power. Less than a year after Zhukov had effectively blocked further Japanese expansion northward, Hitler's victories seemed to open a southern expansion path. The prospect of seizing the resource-rich colonies in Southeast Asia, Dutch, French, and British and, more importantly, resolving the China problem in Japan's favor, tempted many in Tokyo. If Western aid to Chiang Kai-shek, channeled through Hong Kong, French Indochina, and Burma could be cut off, some in Tokyo believed Chiang might abandon resistance. If not, Japan could launch new operations against Chiang from Indochina and Burma, effectively turning China's southern flank. To facilitate a southward advance, Japan sought closer alignment with Germany and the USSR. Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka brought Japan into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, in the hope of neutralizing the United States, and concluded a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union to secure calm in the north. Because of the European military situation, only the United States could check Japan's southward expansion. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appeared determined to do so and confident that he could. If the Manchurian incident and the Stimson Doctrine strained U.S.–Japanese relations, and the China War and U.S. aid to Chiang Kai-shek deepened mutual resentment, it was Japan's decision to press south against French, British, and Dutch colonies, and Roosevelt's resolve to prevent such a move, that put the two nations on a collision course. The dust had barely settled on the Mongolian plains following the Nomonhan ceasefire when the ripples of that distant conflict began to reshape the broader theater of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The defeat at Nomonhan in August 1939, coupled with the shocking revelation of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, delivered a profound strategic blow to Japan's imperial ambitions. No longer could Tokyo entertain serious notions of a "northern advance" into Soviet territory, a strategy that had long tantalized military planners as a means to secure resources and buffer against communism. Instead, the Kwantung Army's humiliation exposed glaring deficiencies in Japanese mechanized warfare, logistics, and intelligence, forcing a pivot southward. This reorientation not only cooled tensions with the Soviet Union but also allowed Japan to redirect its military focus toward the protracted stalemate in China. As we transition from the border clashes of the north to the heartland tensions in central China, it's essential to trace how these events propelled Japan toward the brink of a major offensive in Hunan Province, setting the stage for what would become a critical confrontation. In the immediate aftermath of Nomonhan, Japan's military high command grappled with the implications of their setback. The Kwantung Army, once a symbol of unchecked aggression, was compelled to adopt a defensive posture along the Manchurian-Soviet border. The ceasefire agreement, formalized on September 15-16, 1939, effectively neutralized the northern front, freeing up significant resources and manpower that had been tied down in the escalating border skirmishes. This was no small relief; the Nomonhan campaign had drained Japanese forces, with estimates of over 18,000 casualties and the near-total annihilation of the 23rd Division. The psychological impact was equally severe, shattering the myth of Japanese invincibility against a modern, mechanized opponent. Georgy Zhukov's masterful use of combined arms—tanks, artillery, and air power—highlighted Japan's vulnerabilities, prompting internal reviews that urged reforms in tank production, artillery doctrine, and supply chains. Yet, these lessons were slow to implement, and in the short term, the primary benefit was the opportunity to consolidate efforts elsewhere. For Japan, "elsewhere" meant China, where the war had devolved into a grinding attrition since the fall of Wuhan in October 1938. The capture of Wuhan, a major transportation hub and temporary capital of the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek, had been hailed as a turning point. Japanese forces, under the command of General Shunroku Hata, had pushed deep into central China, aiming to decapitate Chinese resistance. However, Chiang's strategic retreat to Chongqing transformed the conflict into a war of endurance. Nationalist forces, bolstered by guerrilla tactics and international aid, harassed Japanese supply lines and prevented a decisive knockout blow. By mid-1939, Japan controlled vast swaths of eastern and northern China, including key cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing, but the cost was immense: stretched logistics, mounting casualties, and an inability to fully pacify occupied territories. The Nomonhan defeat exacerbated these issues by underscoring the limits of Japan's military overextension. With the northern threat abated, Tokyo's Army General Staff saw an opening to intensify operations in China, hoping to force Chiang to the negotiating table before global events further complicated the picture. The diplomatic fallout from Nomonhan and the Hitler-Stalin Pact further influenced this shift. Japan's betrayal by Germany, its nominal ally under the Anti-Comintern Pact—fostered distrust and isolation. Tokyo's flirtations with a full Axis alliance stalled, as the pact with Moscow revealed Hitler's willingness to prioritize European gains over Asian solidarity. This isolation prompted Japan to reassess its priorities, emphasizing self-reliance in China while eyeing opportunistic expansions elsewhere. Domestically, the Hiranuma cabinet collapsed in August 1939 amid the diplomatic shock, paving the way for the more cautious Abe Nobuyuki government. Abe's administration, though short-lived, signaled a temporary de-escalation in aggressive posturing, but the underlying imperative to resolve the "China Incident" persisted. Japanese strategists believed that capturing additional strategic points in central China could sever Chiang's lifelines, particularly the routes funneling aid from the Soviet Union and the West via Burma and Indochina. The seismic shifts triggered by Nomonhan compelled Japan to fundamentally readjust its China policy and war plans, marking a pivotal transition from overambitious northern dreams to a more focused, albeit desperate, campaign in the south. With the Kwantung Army's defeat fresh in mind, Tokyo's Imperial General Headquarters initiated a comprehensive strategic review in late August 1939. The once-dominant "Northern Advance" doctrine, which envisioned rapid conquests into Siberia for resources like oil and minerals, was officially shelved. In its place emerged a "Southern Advance" framework, prioritizing the consolidation of gains in China and potential expansions into Southeast Asia. This pivot was not merely tactical; it reflected a profound policy recalibration aimed at ending the quagmire in China, where two years of war had yielded territorial control but no decisive victory over Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. Central to this readjustment was a renewed emphasis on economic and military self-sufficiency. The Nomonhan debacle had exposed Japan's vulnerabilities in mechanized warfare, leading to urgent reforms in industrial production. Tank manufacturing was ramped up, with designs influenced by observed Soviet models, and artillery stockpiles were bolstered to match the firepower discrepancies seen on the Mongolian steppes. Logistically, the Army General Staff prioritized streamlining supply lines in China, recognizing that prolonged engagements demanded better resource allocation. Politically, the Abe Nobuyuki cabinet, installed in September 1939, adopted a "wait-and-see" approach toward Europe but aggressively pursued diplomatic maneuvers to isolate China. Efforts to negotiate with Wang Jingwei's puppet regime in Nanjing intensified, aiming to undermine Chiang's legitimacy and splinter Chinese resistance. Japan also pressured Vichy France for concessions in Indochina, seeking to choke off aid routes to Chongqing. War plans evolved accordingly, shifting from broad-front offensives to targeted strikes designed to disrupt Chinese command and supply networks. The China Expeditionary Army, under General Yasuji Okamura, was restructured to emphasize mobility and combined arms operations, drawing partial lessons from Zhukov's tactics. Intelligence operations were enhanced, with greater focus on infiltrating Nationalist strongholds in central provinces. By early September, plans coalesced around a major push into Hunan Province, a vital crossroads linking northern and southern China. Hunan's river systems and rail lines made it a linchpin for Chinese logistics, funneling men and materiel to the front lines. Japanese strategists identified key urban centers in the region as critical objectives, believing their capture could sever Chiang's western supply corridors and force a strategic retreat. This readjustment was not without internal friction. Hardliners in the military lamented the abandonment of northern ambitions, but the reality of Soviet strength—and the neutrality pacts that followed—left little room for debate. Economically, Japan ramped up exploitation of occupied Chinese territories, extracting coal, iron, and rice to fuel the war machine. Diplomatically, Tokyo sought to mend fences with the Soviets through the 1941 Neutrality Pact, ensuring northern security while eyes turned south. Yet, these changes brewed tension with the United States, whose embargoes on scrap metal and oil threatened to cripple Japan's ambitions. As autumn approached, the stage was set for a bold gambit in central China. Japanese divisions massed along the Yangtze River, poised to strike at the heart of Hunan's defenses. Intelligence reports hinted at Chinese preparations, with Xue Yue's forces fortifying positions around a major provincial hub. The air thickened with anticipation of a clash that could tip the balance in the interminable war—a test of Japan's revamped strategies against a resilient foe determined to hold the line. What unfolded would reveal whether Tokyo's post-Nomonhan pivot could deliver the breakthrough so desperately needed, or if it would merely prolong the bloody stalemate. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In 1939, the Nomonhan Incident saw Soviet forces under Georgy Zhukov decisively defeat Japan's Kwantung Army at Khalkin Gol, exposing Japanese weaknesses in mechanized warfare. This setback, coupled with the Hitler-Stalin Nonaggression Pact, shattered Japan's northern expansion plans and prompted a strategic pivot southward. Diplomatic maneuvers involving Stalin, Hitler, Britain, France, and Japan reshaped alliances, leading to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in 1941. Japan refocused on China, intensifying operations in Hunan Province to isolate Chiang Kai-shek.   

Marc Cox talks with Hans von Spakovsky about international and domestic legal issues, starting with the UK's response to Iran compared to Neville Chamberlain's appeasement and the influence of extremist emigration. They pivot to U.S. concerns, covering potential Supreme Court rulings on the Voting Rights Act, tariffs, parental rights in schools regarding gender transition, and recent immigration court standards. Hans emphasizes the limits of federal overreach, the strategic legal maneuvers of the Trump administration, and the broader implications for American governance and freedom. Hashtags: #HansVonSpakovsky #VotingRights #SupremeCourt #Tariffs #ImmigrationLaw #ParentalRights #IranPolicy #USLaw #TrumpAdministration #LegalAnalysis

What does Jesse think of Neville Chamberlain? Getting rid of RINOs takes time. Why go to taco bell when there are all these different tex mex places. Follow The Jesse Kelly Show on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@TheJesseKellyShowSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

[00:30] Peace Derangement Syndrome (55 minutes) President Donald Trump's Board of Peace is now official. This is a modern-day Neville Chamberlain moment—a spectacle of delusion based on a shortsighted view of world history and human nature. Bible prophecy reveals the inevitable end of man's peace initiatives.

PREVIEW FOR LATER TONIGHT THE FAILED OSTER CONSPIRACY OF 1938 Colleague Charles Spicer. Charles Spicer discusses the 1938 Oster Conspiracy, a plot by Hitler's opponents to utilize police and army units to arrest him. This coup depended on Hitler attacking Czechoslovakia, but Neville Chamberlain's arrival and appeasement policy destroyed the conspirators' necessary casus belli, ruining a vital chance to stop the coming war. 0CT0BER 16, 1946. NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES CONVICTION HANGED ALFRED JODL. LAST WORDS, "I GREET MY FUHRER."

We are used to thinking about Christmas in the story of a little baby. But was Jesus just the "meek and mild" person who came to die on the Cross for our sins? That story is true, but there's much more, and it shows in current events. The evil at Brown University and Bondi Beach are just the opening evil acts. The responses to those acts are just as evil.

Illegals ushered into America by Democrats and shielded from accountability are getting welfare of $84,000 per your while working under the table. In CA alone over $20 billion was sent in welfare payments to people dead, in jail, including death row inmates.But Democrats tell you illegals are great for the economy. These are the same people who allow spies in our midst.Former lieutenant governor and current governor Kathy Hochul just got a starring role in what might be the most brazen example of political obedience since Neville Chamberlain waved a white flag at Hitler. According to trial evidence presented against Linda Sun, a former top New York state official accused of being a Chinese agent, Hochul was “much more obedient” than Andrew Cuomo. That's right. A Chinese spy literally bragged about controlling the governor's office, and she did it with glee.Linda Sun's name might not be familiar outside Albany, but her influence certainly should be.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Nicolle Wallace revisits Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene's history of staunch loyalty to the MAGA movement, which rose her to popularity. It's a movement that Greene has publicly broken with, especially regarding the release of the Epstein files. Later, Nicolle is joined by military experts who comment on Special Envoy Steve Witkoff's 28-point-plan to end the war in Ukraine, a proposal that Trump has demanded Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky sign by Thursday. Ukraine was not involved in the creation of this plan, and The New York Times writes that the 28 points “read like they had been drafted in the Kremlin.”For more, follow us on Instagram @deadlinewhTo listen to this show and other MS NOW podcasts without ads, sign up for MS NOW Premium on Apple Podcasts.  For more from Nicolle, follow and download her podcast, “The Best People with Nicolle Wallace,” wherever you get your podcasts.To listen to this show and other MS podcasts without ads, sign up for MS NOW Premium on Apple Podcasts. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

From Restraint to Ruin - The Birth of the Bombing WarAt the dawn of World War II in 1939, a fragile consensus existed among the warring powers. Spurred by an appeal from President Roosevelt, leaders like Neville Chamberlain and even Hitler gave public undertakings to abstain from the horror of aerial attacks on civilians. There was a genuine, if naïve, belief that the looming conflict could be "humanised," and that the bomber would be restricted to purely military targets.But how did this initial restraint crumble into the devastating strategic bombing campaigns that would define the war? In this episode, we delve into Richard Overy's "The Bombing War" to explore the complex factors that shaped Britain's approach to aerial warfare in the crucial early years of 1939-1942.Join us as we uncover the story of a nation caught between its self-image as a "civilised" power and the brutal necessities of total war. We'll examine why RAF Bomber Command was initially held back, not just by political and legal niceties, but by its own operational unreadiness. Discover how the unique, independent institutional culture of Bomber Command—a force designed solely to attack—fostered a doctrine that would eventually target the enemy's home front, leading to the destruction of cities like Hamburg, Cologne, and Dresden under the infamous command of Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris.If you liked this episode, listen to: https://shows.acast.com/explaininghistory/episodes/the-politics-of-rearmament-in-britain-1936Go Deeper: Visit our website at www.explaininghistory.org for articles and detailed explorations of the topics discussed.▸ Join the Conversation: Our community of history enthusiasts discusses episodes, shares ideas, and continues the conversation. Find us on:Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/groups/ExplainingHistoryPodcast/Substack: https://theexplaininghistorypodcast.substack.com/▸ Support the Podcast: Explaining History is a listener-supported production. Your contribution helps us cover the costs of research and keep these conversations going. You can support the show and get access to exclusive content by becoming a patron.Support on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/explaininghistoryExplaining History helps you understand the 20th Century through critical conversations and expert interviews. We connect the past to the present. If you enjoy the show, please subscribe and share.▸ Support the Show & Get Exclusive ContentBecome a Patron: patreon.com/explaininghistory▸ Join the Community & Continue the ConversationFacebook Group: facebook.com/groups/ExplainingHistoryPodcastSubstack: theexplaininghistorypodcast.substack.com▸ Read Articles & Go DeeperWebsite: explaininghistory.org Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Pace per il nostro tempo", disse il primo ministro britannico Neville Chamberlain al ritorno in patria sventolando come un trofeo il testo dell'accordo con la Germania, la Francia e l'Italia sulla questione dei Sudeti. In realtà gli accordi di Monaco di fine settembre 1938 ridisegnarono gli equilibri europei in previsione della guerra. A fronte dell'illusione inglese, della sconfitta francese e del ridimensionamento del ruolo di Mussolini, l'unico vero vincitore della conferenza fu Hitler. Il quale, messo da parte il Piano Verde di invasione della Boemia, vide soddisfatte in parte le sue mire espansionistiche e si sarebbe sentito autorizzato a chiedere sempre di più.

In questo episodio con il professor Riccardo Brizzi parleremo di incidenti insoliti e bizzarri capitati ai potenti della storia contemporanea. Ripercorreremo episodi surreali e momenti imbarazzanti legati ad alcuni leader mondiali del secolo scorso: il Presidente Francese Paul Deschanel e la sua misteriosa caduta dal treno, Jimmy Carter e l'attacco del coniglio assassino, Neville Chamberlain e l'ombrello "ostinato"…

En 1938, Winston Churchill se bat pour empêcher le Premier ministre Neville Chamberlain de livrer la Tchécoslovaquie à Hitler.Mention légales : Vos données de connexion, dont votre adresse IP, sont traités par Radio Classique, responsable de traitement, sur la base de son intérêt légitime, par l'intermédiaire de son sous-traitant Ausha, à des fins de réalisation de statistiques agréées et de lutte contre la fraude. Ces données sont supprimées en temps réel pour la finalité statistique et sous cinq mois à compter de la collecte à des fins de lutte contre la fraude. Pour plus d'informations sur les traitements réalisés par Radio Classique et exercer vos droits, consultez notre Politique de confidentialité.Hébergé par Ausha. Visitez ausha.co/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

En 1938, Winston Churchill se bat pour empêcher le Premier ministre Neville Chamberlain de livrer la Tchécoslovaquie à Hitler.Mention légales : Vos données de connexion, dont votre adresse IP, sont traités par Radio Classique, responsable de traitement, sur la base de son intérêt légitime, par l'intermédiaire de son sous-traitant Ausha, à des fins de réalisation de statistiques agréées et de lutte contre la fraude. Ces données sont supprimées en temps réel pour la finalité statistique et sous cinq mois à compter de la collecte à des fins de lutte contre la fraude. Pour plus d'informations sur les traitements réalisés par Radio Classique et exercer vos droits, consultez notre Politique de confidentialité.Hébergé par Ausha. Visitez ausha.co/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

SEASON 4 EPISODE 12: COUNTDOWN WITH KEITH OLBERMANN A-Block (1:45) SPECIAL COMMENT: I suppose it could've been worse. Rather than reacting to Russia’s drone attack on Poland the way he did (“What’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace with drones? Here we go!”) Trump could’ve done the Martin Sheen bit from “Dead Zone” where as the messianic psychopath president Greg Stillson he starts World War 3 and announces “The missiles are flying hallelujah, hallelujah.” "What’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace…?” Seriously, jackass? That’s your JOB, you great decaying pile of burger grease. YOU are supposed to KNOW “what’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace?” and if you DON’T, get out, turn the government over to a general or an ex-general or somebody who understands that your owner Putin PLAYED YOU AGAIN, and that when everybody, everybody in this country with an IQ greater than 47 said that we have to support Ukraine because if we do not stop Putin in Ukraine his next stop was Poland and you twisted your bulbous face into that stupid 45-degree angled smirk, you were WRONG and everybody else in AMERICA – all 340,111,000 of us – WE were RIGHT. There are 10,000 American troops IN Poland. What would have happened if mere DEBRIS from one of the drones destroyed in the air hit a U-S base, or ONE U-S soldier? Would Trump have tweeted out a shrug emoji? Does it even register any more that even in the narrowest of views of this disaster – Trump IS the commander-in-chief and he is RESPONSIBLE for keeping American soldiers safe. ANYBODY NOTICE THAT GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S OLD LAWYER went on CNN and admitted that there was a quid pro quo that got her moved from a high-octane Florida prison to Club Fed in Texas? Now there’s ANOTHER Trumpstein cover-up? AND LASTLY, No I’m not in favor of shooting commentators. Or politicians. Or anybody. But my god, this is America. All we have done for virtually all our history is shoot political opponents. Add to it THIS America that MAGA wanted, where the military is politicized, and politics are militarized, and Trump has spent a decade stochastically encouraging terrorism against, and assassination of, his opponents, where conservatives REPEATEDLY call for the killing of Trump’s opponents. Trump was shot a year ago and not one of his supporters was willing to support meaningful gun restrictions. You can have many reactions to the death of Charlie Kirk and I hope sorrow and disgust are among them for you as they are for me - but surprise shouldn’t be one of them. Kirk himself said in April 2023: "You will never live in a society when you have an armed citizenry and you won't have a single gun death. That is nonsense. It's drivel. But I am -- I think it's worth it. I think it's worth to have a cost of, unfortunately, some gun deaths every single year so that we can have the Second Amendment to protect our other God-given rights. That is a prudent deal." B-Block (30:13) THE WORST PERSONS IN THE WORLD: The online poster who says it's ok for JD Vance to boast about war crimes because his mother was an addict. We started, writes an Andrew Klavan, to lose our civil rights as a result of the civil war. And to prostitute yourself as Jeff Shell has: from liberal anti-Trump head of NBC to installing a political officer inside CBS News to rat on journalism and anti-Trump facts. What a waste of life. C-Block (42:07) 24 YEARS SINCE 9/11: Apart from applying the "midpoint" rule to really sense how long ago something was (9/11 was the "midpoint" between September 1977 and today) there is one story that has stayed with me permanently. The man's name was Tomas Reyes, he wasn't anywhere near the World Trade Center - but he was supposed to be. How I came to meet him as part of my reporting on that horrible day.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

To celebrate the kickoff to the 2025 NFL season (Eagles -7.5 vs the Cowboys), we begin in the obvious place with a discussion of Orson Hyde's letter to the Missouri Republican in 1861, providing commentary on the Civil War. They read an email from a litner who shares how she used to be afraid of Church history and how the podcast has given her confidence in the face of anti-Mormon garbage, and Richard shares his feelings on the idea of putting Gospel and Church history topics “on a shelf”…spoiler alert, he doesn't like the expression.   Kristy's KorneЯ (Last Minute Lesson Prep): We ran out of time. There is no way your Sunday School teacher will be getting D&C 94 through 97. Use any of the three-part rerelease from D&C 93 last week, and you should be in great shape.    Standard of Truth Tour dates for the summer of 2027: ⁠ https://standardoftruth.com/tours Our 2026 tours are sold out, but if you would like to join us in the future, here is a link to our 2027 tours: ⁠ Sign up for our free monthly email: ⁠ ⁠https://standardoftruthpodcast.substack.com⁠   If you have any questions or possible topics of discussion for upcoming podcasts, please email us at: ⁠⁠questions@standardoftruthpodcast.com   Rex's Elders Quorum President's Show Notes: •00:01:20 – Richard's new glasses, carrots, and “big carrot conspiracy” •00:03:40 – Football season talk (NFL & College) •00:09:20 – Listener mailbag begins •00:09:36 – Testimony of Emer Harris and family connections •00:15:00 – Listener Danica's email on family faith struggles and church history fears •00:25:00 – Richard's thoughts on “putting things on the shelf” vs. gaining testimony •00:31:00 – Discussion of Lyman Johnson's regret and the value of faith •00:35:00 – Dawson's email introducing Orson Hyde's Civil War commentary •00:37:00 – Civil War Prophecy context: hindsight bias and the problem of interpreting prophecy. •00:39:00 – Challenges of Second Coming prophecies and people's tendency to over-interpret. •00:40:30 – Specifics of Joseph Smith's prophecy: slavery, South Carolina, and secession. •00:43:00 – Why hindsight makes the Civil War “seem obvious,” but it wasn't. •00:45:00 – South Carolina newspapers downplaying fears of a large-scale war. •00:47:00 – Border state (Missouri) newspapers hoping for compromise to avoid war. •00:51:00 – Virginia's “scandalous” call for 10,000–20,000 militia—later dwarfed by actual numbers. •00:53:00 – Historical context: the Nullification Crisis and its contrast with Joseph's prophecy. •00:55:00 – War of 1812 Hartford Convention—New England nearly seceding. •01:00:00 – Hindsight bias analogy: Neville Chamberlain's “peace for our time.” •01:02:00 – Why critics' arguments against Joseph Smith's prophecy are hollow. •01:05:00 – Civil War prophecy in early manuscripts and the Pearl of Great Price (1851). •01:07:00 – Prophecy credibility, critics' weak arguments, and final remarks.

What are the essential skills for a life in politics? In an age of TikTok soundbites, can a single speech in Parliament still change minds and topple a government? Ed Balls and George Osborne dive into the art of political craft, taking questions on the real-world impact of parliamentary debates, the secrets to managing a ministerial diary, and the constant balancing act between cabinet duties and constituency work.They discuss historic interventions that shaped the nation, from Edward Heath's decisive speech on capital punishment to the Cromwellian phrase, “In the name of God, go,” which was famously used against Neville Chamberlain and Boris Johnson. They also share personal anecdotes about their first days as MPs, the importance of punctuality in a crisis, and the surprising truth about the bottled water in the Chancellor's office.Plus, find out which cabinet job is surprisingly one of the "easier ones" to manage and what really happens in the MPs' exclusive tea room.To get episodes early and ad-free, join Political Currency Gold or the Kitchen Cabinet:

The earliest known use of the saying, “may you live in interesting times” is from the early 20th century. A 1936 speech by Sir Austen Chamberlain (brother of Neville Chamberlain) is often cited. He claimed it was an old Chinese curse, but he probably picked it up secondhand. Later, during the mid-20th century, it spread widely in English writing and speeches, particularly in political and diplomatic contexts.  Well no matter the real origin as we will see today it can indeed be a curse. Today who pays for protest damages and who should, Trumps 180 on Ukraine security guarantees, republicans … Continue reading →

SEASON 4 EPISODE 5: COUNTDOWN WITH KEITH OLBERMANN A-Block (1:45) SPECIAL COMMENT: THE DISASTA IN ALASKA The Disasta in Alaska - starring the cheeseburger-eating surrender monkey. We have, to quote Churchill, suffered a defeat, without a war. Because we forget we don’t MERELY have an evil, deranged president, we have an evil, deranged president who is also a moron. Now, Trump - Putin’s butt boy, his errand carrier - will deliver Putin’s message to Zelensky in Washington. He will be accompanied by EU President von der Leyen, NATO Secretary General Rutte, Presidents Macron of France and Stubb of Finland, Prime Ministers Starmer of the U-K and Meloni of Italy, and Chancellor Merz of Germany. Trump will be accompanied by a large selection of mirrors. I suspect Trump will parrot what he remembers of Putin's message (whatever Trump's staff didn't leave on the printer of the business center at the Hotel Captain Cook in Anchorage) and tell Zelensky that the way to achieve an end to the war in Ukraine is: to lose. The best thing Zelensky and the Europeans could say in response would be to state that they are withdrawing their recognition of the government of the United States of America because it is just too effing stupid. From the Disasta in Alaska to the Occupied territory of Washington, D.C. And don’t forget what Trump today DOUBLING the number of National Guard in DC with new recruits from Ohio, West Virginia, and South Carolina (all of them, far more violent than DC) means: It means he’s read his cratering polls number and declared war on the United States of America. Also: we rejoin the Trumpstein Cover-up Scandal, already in progress. B-Block (30:02) THE WORST PERSONS IN THE WORLD: International Fop Piers Morgan FINALLY does a journalism - posts a meme of Trump on his way to meet Putin and Trump is wearing kneepads - and then DELETES the first journalism of his life? Pam Bondi proudly admits The Deep State has defeated her fascist DOJ with nothing more than a Sweet Onion Chicken Teriyaki Sub. And the battle of the most overrated people in their field: neither CNBC's Andrew Ross Sorkin nor House Democratic mis-Leader Hakeem Jeffries repeat Andrew Cuomo's canard that Democratic NYC mayor nominee Zohran Mamdani lives in a rent-CONTROLLED apartment when he, like HALF of all NYC renters (myself included) lives in a rent-STABILIZED apartment. Sorkin repeats this FOUR times, Jeffries doesn't correct him, and Jeffries who is theoretically a congressman from New York STILL refuses to endorse his own party's nominee, chosen by its MEMBERS, for mayor OF New York. Sorkin should be fired and Jeffries should resign. C-Block (43:00) THINGS I PROMISED NOT TO TELL: Somebody wrote last week that Aaron Sorkin's HBO "Newsroom" version of some of what happened to Countdown on MSNBC was the worst fictionalization of journalism in the English language. I think that's an exaggeration. It wasn't nearly that good.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

We’ve been doing these shows where we don’t book any guests, where we fill the hour with your calls. And your calls have been interesting and surprising and amusing. This hour, the conversation winds around to the bilateral meeting in Alaska between Presidents Trump and Putin, the bilateral and multilateral meetings in Washington DC with Presidents Trump and Zelenskyy, our Mark Twain show, President Trump possibly one day getting the Nobel Peace Prize, ABBA possibly one day getting the Nobel Peace Prize, comparisons between Neville Chamberlain and Trump … Anything. (Seemingly) everything. These shows are fun for us, and they seem to be fun for you, too. So we did another one.Support the show: http://www.wnpr.org/donateSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

La première partie de l'émission d'aujourd'hui sera consacrée à l'actualité. Nous commencerons par évoquer une rencontre très attendue entre les présidents russe et américain. La réunion aura lieu demain en Alaska, mais elle fait déjà beaucoup parler. Trump va-t-il se laisser manipuler par Poutine… une fois de plus ? Prend-il le risque de devenir un Neville Chamberlain face à un Poutine version Hitler ? Ensuite, direction le Moyen-Orient. À ce jour, 147 pays reconnaissent l'État de Palestine. Et pourtant, cette reconnaissance arrive bien trop tard, et reste largement insuffisante. Dans notre section science et technologie, nous évoquerons une étude alarmante sur le nombre croissant d'articles scientifiques frauduleux. Et pour conclure cette première partie de l'émission, nous analyserons une récente enquête de Gallup qui révèle une tendance mondiale encourageante : le bien-être est en hausse. Jamais autant de personnes ne se sont senties aussi épanouies dans leur vie. Sur 142 pays, la part de ceux qui se disent épanouis n'a cessé de croître ces dix dernières années, tandis que celle des personnes en souffrance est tombée à seulement 7 %.    Le reste de l'émission d'aujourd'hui sera consacré à la langue et à la culture françaises. La leçon de grammaire portera sur The imperfect tense - the verbs of the first group. Cette semaine nous parlerons du petit village de Coulonces en Normandie qui reçoit périodiquement une visite insolite : un chevalier en armure y apparaît et disparaît depuis deux ans. Nous terminerons avec l'expression Avoir le bras long. Elle nous permettra d'évoquer une page intéressante de l'histoire de France avec le destin contrarié de Nicolas Fouquet, le surintendant des Finances de Louis XIV. - Les relations entre Trump et Poutine : un remake du pacte Chamberlain/Hitler ? - Les intentions récentes de reconnaître la Palestine sont jugées insuffisantes - Une étude alerte sur le nombre énorme de fausses publications scientifiques - Le bien-être au niveau mondial est en hausse, sauf dans les pays occidentaux les plus riches - Un petit village de Normandie reçoit de nouveau la visite d'un chevalier en armure - L'histoire de Nicolas Fouquet, le ministre des Finances de Louis XIV

La prima parte della puntata di oggi sarà dedicata all'attualità. Apriremo con l'attesissimo incontro tra i Presidenti di Russia e Stati Uniti, che si terrà domani in Alaska. Ma già ora non mancano gli spunti di discussione. Siamo certi che Trump non si stia lasciando manipolare da Putin… ancora una volta? Rischia forse di fare la fine di Neville Chamberlain, che negli anni '30 cedette troppo a Hitler? Poi ci sposteremo in Medio Oriente: sono già 147 i Paesi che riconoscono lo Stato di Palestina, ma questo riconoscimento arriva troppo tardi e in misura del tutto insufficiente. Nella sezione dedicata a scienza e tecnologia, parleremo di uno studio che lancia l'allarme sull'aumento preoccupante di articoli scientifici falsi. Concluderemo la prima parte con l'analisi di un recente sondaggio Gallup, che registra un'impennata del benessere a livello globale: mai come oggi così tante persone si dichiarano soddisfatte della propria vita. In 142 Paesi, la percentuale di chi afferma di “stare bene” è cresciuta costantemente nell'ultimo decennio, mentre quella di chi soffre è scesa al 7%.   La seconda parte della puntata è dedicata alla lingua e alla cultura italiana. L'argomento grammaticale di oggi è Interrogative Adverbs, Adjectives, and Pronouns: Gli interrogativi. Ne troverete numerosi esempi nel dialogo che seguirà, incentrato sui risultati di uno studio che getta nuova luce sulla Sacra Sindone di Torino, una delle reliquie più enigmatiche e controverse della storia.   In chiusura, ci soffermeremo sull'espressione idiomatica di oggi: Mettere i puntini sulle i. Il dialogo in cui la useremo prende spunto da una misura senza precedenti: la Regione Sicilia intende offrire una serie di incentivi fiscali per attrarre soprattutto pensionati e imprenditori, invitandoli a trasferirsi sull'isola per viverci o investire. - Gli accordi di Trump con Putin ricordano il patto di Chamberlain con Hitler? - Le recenti intenzioni di riconoscere lo Stato di Palestina sono ritenute insufficienti - Uno studio statistico mette in guardia contro l'enorme numero di articoli scientifici falsi - Il benessere globale è in crescita, ma non nei Paesi occidentali più ricchi - La Sindone di Torino: reliquia o capolavoro Medievale? - Casa, sole e sconti fiscali: il piano della Sicilia ispirato al Portogallo

La primera parte del programa de hoy la dedicaremos a discutir la actualidad. Comenzaremos con la muy esperada reunión entre los presidentes de Rusia y de Estados Unidos en Alaska. La reunión es mañana, pero todavía hay mucho de que hablar. ¿Está dejando Trump que Putin lo manipule… de nuevo? ¿Se arriesga Trump a ser el Neville Chamberlain por el Hitler de Putin? Después pasaremos al Medio Oriente. Ya hay 147 países que reconocen el Estado de Palestina. Pero este reconocimiento llega demasiado tarde. En el segmento de ciencia y tecnología del programa, discutiremos un estudio que advierte del alarmante aumento de los artículos falsos de investigación científica. Y concluiremos la primera parte del programa analizando una encuesta reciente de Gallup, que apunta a un aumento del bienestar a nivel global. Hay más gente que nunca que asegura estar prosperando en la vida. En los 142 países encuestados, el porcentaje de gente que asegura estar prosperando ha crecido de forma continua durante la última década, mientras que el porcentaje de quienes sufren ha bajado a solo un 7 por ciento. La segunda parte del episodio de hoy la dedicaremos a la lengua y la cultura españolas. La primera conversación incluirá ejemplos del tema de gramática de la semana, Other ways to Express Future. En esta conversación hablaremos de la historia de la migración en España y discutiremos qué ventajas tiene para el futuro del país. Y, en nuestra última conversación, aprenderemos a usar una nueva expresión española, Sin prisa, pero sin pausa. La usaremos para comprender cómo se hizo la Transición española. Es decir, el paso de la dictadura del General Franco a la democracia después de la muerte del dictador. Un cambio que, hoy en día, aún se discute si se hizo bien. ¿Recuerdan las negociaciones de Trump con Putin al pacto de Chamberlain con Hitler? Las intenciones recientes de reconocer Palestina se consideran insuficientes Un estudio estadístico advierte sobre la enorme cantidad de artículos falsos de investigación científica que se producen El bienestar global está aumentando, excepto en los países occidentales más ricos Envejecimiento de la población en Europa La Transición española

Im ersten Teil unseres Programms geht es wie immer um aktuelle Ereignisse. Wir beginnen mit dem mit Spannung erwarteten Treffen zwischen dem russischen und dem US-amerikanischen Präsidenten in Alaska. Das Treffen findet erst morgen statt, aber schon jetzt gibt es viel darüber zu diskutieren. Lässt sich Trump – erneut – von Putin manipulieren? Riskiert Trump, der Neville Chamberlain zu Putins Hitler zu werden? Danach sprechen wir über den Nahen Osten. Bereits 147 Länder erkennen den Staat Palästina an. Diese Anerkennung ist jedoch nicht genug und kommt viel zu spät. In unserem Wissenschafts- und Technologie-Thema sprechen wir heute über eine Studie, die vor der alarmierenden Zunahme gefälschter wissenschaftlicher Forschungsarbeiten warnt. Und wir beenden den ersten Teil des Programms mit einer Analyse einer aktuellen Gallup-Umfrage, die einen weltweiten Anstieg des Wohlbefindens zeigt. Mehr Menschen als je zuvor sagen, dass sie ein erfülltes Leben haben. In 142 Ländern ist der Anteil der Menschen, die sagen, dass es ihnen gut geht, in den letzten zehn Jahren stetig gestiegen. Der Anteil derjenigen, die leiden, ist dagegen auf 7 Prozent gesunken. Der Rest des Programms ist der deutschen Sprache und Kultur gewidmet. Die heutige Grammatiklektion konzentriert sich auf den Subjunctive Mood (Konjunktiv 1), und es wird um den durchschnittlichen Deutschen gehen. Wir sprechen darüber, wie alt er ist, wie viel er verdient, wann er heiratet und wann er Kinder hat. Es gibt einige Unterschiede zwischen dem durchschnittlichen Mann und der durchschnittlichen Frau. Die deutsche Dating-Kultur ist das ideale Thema, um die Redewendung dieser Woche – Sich ein Herz fassen – zu erläutern. Wir sprechen darüber, wer wie oft welche Dating-App nutzt und wie erfolgreich das als Taktik ist. Dating-Apps haben in Deutschland einen riesigen Markt. Gibt es historische Parallelen zwischen Trumps Umgang mit Putin und Chamberlains Pakt mit Hitler? Neue Absichten zur Anerkennung Palästinas sind nicht ausreichend Statistische Studie warnt vor einer enormen Anzahl gefälschter wissenschaftlicher Forschungsarbeiten Das Wohlergehen steigt weltweit, außer in den wohlhabenderen westlichen Ländern Der Durchschnittsdeutsche Die deutsche Dating-Kultur

In this episode of One Decision, former MI6 Chief Sir Richard Dearlove and former CIA Director Leon Panetta bring a level of insight into the Trump–Putin summit you won't find anywhere else. With decades of intelligence briefings, Cold War strategy, and high-stakes negotiations behind them, they assess whether Alaska is a bold bid for peace or a dangerous gamble. They discuss the lack of diplomatic groundwork, the dangers of excluding Kyiv, and the historical warning from Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Adolf Hitler — plus what this meeting could mean for NATO unity and Taiwan.

Im ersten Teil unseres Programms geht es wie immer um aktuelle Ereignisse. Wir beginnen mit dem mit Spannung erwarteten Treffen zwischen dem russischen und dem US-amerikanischen Präsidenten in Alaska. Das Treffen findet erst morgen statt, aber schon jetzt gibt es viel darüber zu diskutieren. Lässt sich Trump – erneut – von Putin manipulieren? Riskiert Trump, der Neville Chamberlain zu Putins Hitler zu werden? Danach sprechen wir über den Nahen Osten. Bereits 147 Länder erkennen den Staat Palästina an. Diese Anerkennung ist jedoch nicht genug und kommt viel zu spät. In unserem Wissenschafts- und Technologie-Thema sprechen wir heute über eine Studie, die vor der alarmierenden Zunahme gefälschter wissenschaftlicher Forschungsarbeiten warnt. Und wir beenden den ersten Teil des Programms mit einer Analyse einer aktuellen Gallup-Umfrage, die einen weltweiten Anstieg des Wohlbefindens zeigt. Mehr Menschen als je zuvor sagen, dass sie ein erfülltes Leben haben. In 142 Ländern ist der Anteil der Menschen, die sagen, dass es ihnen gut geht, in den letzten zehn Jahren stetig gestiegen. Der Anteil derjenigen, die leiden, ist dagegen auf 7 Prozent gesunken. Der Rest des Programms ist der deutschen Sprache und Kultur gewidmet. Die heutige Grammatiklektion konzentriert sich auf den Subjunctive Mood (Konjunktiv 1), und es wird um den durchschnittlichen Deutschen gehen. Wir sprechen darüber, wie alt er ist, wie viel er verdient, wann er heiratet und wann er Kinder hat. Es gibt einige Unterschiede zwischen dem durchschnittlichen Mann und der durchschnittlichen Frau. Die deutsche Dating-Kultur ist das ideale Thema, um die Redewendung dieser Woche – Sich ein Herz fassen – zu erläutern. Wir sprechen darüber, wer wie oft welche Dating-App nutzt und wie erfolgreich das als Taktik ist. Dating-Apps haben in Deutschland einen riesigen Markt. Gibt es historische Parallelen zwischen Trumps Umgang mit Putin und Chamberlains Pakt mit Hitler? Neue Absichten zur Anerkennung Palästinas sind nicht ausreichend Statistische Studie warnt vor einer enormen Anzahl gefälschter wissenschaftlicher Forschungsarbeiten Das Wohlergehen steigt weltweit, außer in den wohlhabenderen westlichen Ländern Der Durchschnittsdeutsche Die deutsche Dating-Kultur

If ever a politician got a bum rap it's Neville Chamberlain. He has gone down in history as the British prime minster whose policy of appeasement in the 1930s allowed the Nazis to flourish unopposed. He has never been forgiven for ceding part of Czechoslovakia to Hitler in the Munich Agreement of September 1938, and for returning home triumphantly declaring “peace for our time”. The very word “appeasement” is now synonymous with him, signifying a craven refusal to stand up to bullies and aggressors. What a contrast to Winston Churchill, the man who took over as prime minister and who has ever since been credited with restoring Britain's backbone. But is the standard verdict on Chamberlain a fair one? After all, memories of the slaughter of the First World War were still fresh in the minds of the British, who were desperate to avoid another conflagration. And anyway what choice did Chamberlain have in 1938? There's a good case for arguing that the delay in hostilities engineered at Munich allowed time for military and air power to be strengthened. --- If you'd like to become a Member and get access to all our full ad free conversations, plus all of our Members-only content, just visit intelligencesquared.com/membership to find out more. For £4.99 per month you'll also receive: - Full-length and ad-free Intelligence Squared episodes, wherever you get your podcasts - Bonus Intelligence Squared podcasts, curated feeds and members exclusive series - 15% discount on livestreams and in-person tickets for all Intelligence Squared events  ...  Or Subscribe on Apple for £4.99: - Full-length and ad-free Intelligence Squared podcasts - Bonus Intelligence Squared podcasts, curated feeds and members exclusive series … Already a subscriber? Thank you for supporting our mission to foster honest debate and compelling conversations! Visit intelligencesquared.com to explore all your benefits including ad-free podcasts, exclusive bonus content and early access. … Subscribe to our newsletter here to hear about our latest events, discounts and much more. https://www.intelligencesquared.com/newsletter-signup/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Neville Chamberlain fue un político que lidió con Adolf Hitler antes de la guerra, convencido de terminar todo conflicto con la diplomacia, ¿lo logró? Te contamos su historia.

This week on Mid-Atlantic, Roifield Brown hosts a packed panel to break down Donald Trump's latest economic gamble: a 10% blanket import tariff and steeper levies on select countries, with China squarely in the crosshairs. The result? Global market chaos, retaliatory threats, and international alarm bells over the US's role in the rules-based economic order.Joining from across the Atlantic and the US are Logan Phillips in D.C., Michael Donahue in L.A., and Cory Bernard in Manchester. The panel weighs whether the tariff plan is part of a coherent economic strategy or just political theatre aimed at riling up Trump's base — spoiler: coherence is not in attendance. More than just a trade war, this marks a serious erosion of trust in the US as a trading partner. The dollar might be strong, but America's brand value? Not so much.The second half turns sharply towards the UK's options in a world where the US is a geopolitical liability. Roifield pitches a Commonwealth-centric economic bloc as a post-Brexit survival strategy — cue a full-on diplomatic skirmish. What follows is a clash of economic realism, nostalgia, and pride as the panel debates whether Britain should grovel, realign, or get louder. Yes, tempers flare. And yes, someone gets called Neville Chamberlain.Five Standout Quotes:“This was not Team Trump's best moment. It's like trying to put out a fire with gasoline.” – Logan Phillips“If you know tariffs are coming and then vanishing, there's billions to be made — and lost. That's terrifying.” – Michael Donahue“Brand America just took a six-trillion-dollar hit. But it's the trust deficit that really stings.” – Roifield Brown“Trump won't lose his base until their wallets feel it. If they can't feed their families, that's the break.” – Cory Bernard“I'm not giving away the Sudetenland — I'm trying to build a coalition against economic lunacy.” – Roifield Brown Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Pontius Pilate knew Jesus was innocent, yet he chose to placate the people rather than release Him. But the courage he lacked, you can show today. Notes: Focus verses - John 18, 19 By definition, a coward is someone who lacks the courage to face difficult or painful things. Pontius Pilate saw an angry crowd that threatened his position.He was more afraid of the consequences than he was of God. #1 The Prefect Meets the PerfectJohn 18:28-38 Jesus, the PERFECT Son of God stands before Pontius Pilate, the Roman appointed PREFECT Governor of Judea. Prefect Governor means he was a military focused governor. The religious leaders knew exactly what they were doing when they brought Jesus to Pilate. The man known for using power harshly becomes hesitant and weak when confronted by Jesus. “What is truth?” Jesus was the incarnation of truth. Read verse 37.Jesus came to bring truth. Truth divides. Like Pilate, we all must make a decision regarding Jesus. Neutrality is not an option. Pilate attempts to appeal to the crowd logically, in an attempt to get Jesus released. #2 Pilate BlinksJohn 18:39-19:6 Just like Neville Chamberlain blinked in the face of tyranny, Pilate blinks in the face of Truth. He knows Jesus is innocent.But instead of releasing Jesus, he tries to placate the people. Pilate offers the crowd a choice: Jesus or Barabbas. No better picture of the gospel than this right here. The cross Barabbas was to die on was already constructed, the arrangements were made, and he had hours left to live. Barabbas was guilty, but Jesus was innocent. This is what Jesus has done for us.We’ve committed a crime by violating God’s commands, we’re guilty, and the penalty is death. But God made a way for us to be delivered out of death, out of our guilt, and that’s what Jesus ultimately did on the cross. 2 Corinthians 5:21 Jesus took Barabbas’ place on that cross. The crowd chooses Barabbas. Pilate didn’t need any Passover custom to release an innocent man, he just needed to do what was right. When the crowd decided against Jesus, he thought he might have one more trick up his sleeve. He released Barabbas, and scourged Jesus in hopes it'd satisfy the angry crowd. Pilate brought Jesus out one final time. He thought that if he give the crowd a little bit of what they want they’ll be happy, they’ll change their minds, they’ll reverse course.Pilate blinked. He thought he could use diplomacy and compromise to get himself out of a difficult position. Compromise doesn’t calm the mob, it fuels it. Compromise is part of life.But when it comes to THE Truth, when it comes to Christ, compromise should not be part of the equation. To compromise on who Jesus is, is to invent another Jesus. Only the real Jesus saves. Pilate’s appeasement of the crowd is not just a political failure—it’s a picture of what happens when leaders, Christians, and even churches try to compromise truth to satisfy the demands of culture. If you play both sides, offering a little truth, softened by a lot of concession and mix in some human empathy, and you end up with the crucifixion. A complete and utter rejection of everything Jesus is and was. We cannot untether EMPATHY from TRUTH. Just because someone feels a certain way does not mean we abandon truth. As Christians we are called to offer COMPASSION not COMPROMISE. Let’s bring this message to a close now. Read John 19:12–16 #3 Pilate judged the Judge. Pilate crucifies Him.The fear of man outweighed the fear of God. Jesus threatened to disrupt Pilate’s cushy role, and so he gave in to peer pressure and he judged the Judge. In Revelation 20 at the Great White Throne judgement, the judged will face the Judge. Pilate symbolically washed his hands of Jesus.But you cannot wash yourself of your sins. You either receive Him or reject Him. “You are either for me or against me.” Have you trusted Jesus as Savior and made Him the Lord of your life? The courage that Pilate lacked, you can show today. Jesus said "Everyone who acknowledges me publicly here on earth, I will also acknowledge before my Father in heaven" (Matthew 10:32 NLT) We are just like Barabbas.Guilty and headed for judgement.But Jesus came in, not accidentally, but intentionally and took that punishment we deserved and He died on a cross for our sin. Like those soldiers around Jack Lucas, he dove on those grenades and absorbed their destruction, that’s what Jesus did for us!He absorbed God’s righteous judgement and drank the cup of His wrath that was going to be poured out on us because of our spiritual rebellion against God. --- Learn more about Greg Laurie and Harvest Ministries at harvest.org. This podcast is supported by the generosity of our Harvest Partners.Support the show: https://harvest.org/supportSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Pontius Pilate knew Jesus was innocent, yet he chose to placate the people rather than release Him. But the courage he lacked, you can show today. Notes: Focus verses - John 18, 19 By definition, a coward is someone who lacks the courage to face difficult or painful things. Pontius Pilate saw an angry crowd that threatened his position.He was more afraid of the consequences than he was of God. #1 The Prefect Meets the PerfectJohn 18:28-38 Jesus, the PERFECT Son of God stands before Pontius Pilate, the Roman appointed PREFECT Governor of Judea. Prefect Governor means he was a military focused governor. The religious leaders knew exactly what they were doing when they brought Jesus to Pilate. The man known for using power harshly becomes hesitant and weak when confronted by Jesus. “What is truth?” Jesus was the incarnation of truth. Read verse 37.Jesus came to bring truth. Truth divides. Like Pilate, we all must make a decision regarding Jesus. Neutrality is not an option. Pilate attempts to appeal to the crowd logically, in an attempt to get Jesus released. #2 Pilate BlinksJohn 18:39-19:6 Just like Neville Chamberlain blinked in the face of tyranny, Pilate blinks in the face of Truth. He knows Jesus is innocent.But instead of releasing Jesus, he tries to placate the people. Pilate offers the crowd a choice: Jesus or Barabbas. No better picture of the gospel than this right here. The cross Barabbas was to die on was already constructed, the arrangements were made, and he had hours left to live. Barabbas was guilty, but Jesus was innocent. This is what Jesus has done for us.We’ve committed a crime by violating God’s commands, we’re guilty, and the penalty is death. But God made a way for us to be delivered out of death, out of our guilt, and that’s what Jesus ultimately did on the cross. 2 Corinthians 5:21 Jesus took Barabbas’ place on that cross. The crowd chooses Barabbas. Pilate didn’t need any Passover custom to release an innocent man, he just needed to do what was right. When the crowd decided against Jesus, he thought he might have one more trick up his sleeve. He released Barabbas, and scourged Jesus in hopes it'd satisfy the angry crowd. Pilate brought Jesus out one final time. He thought that if he give the crowd a little bit of what they want they’ll be happy, they’ll change their minds, they’ll reverse course.Pilate blinked. He thought he could use diplomacy and compromise to get himself out of a difficult position. Compromise doesn’t calm the mob, it fuels it. Compromise is part of life.But when it comes to THE Truth, when it comes to Christ, compromise should not be part of the equation. To compromise on who Jesus is, is to invent another Jesus. Only the real Jesus saves. Pilate’s appeasement of the crowd is not just a political failure—it’s a picture of what happens when leaders, Christians, and even churches try to compromise truth to satisfy the demands of culture. If you play both sides, offering a little truth, softened by a lot of concession and mix in some human empathy, and you end up with the crucifixion. A complete and utter rejection of everything Jesus is and was. We cannot untether EMPATHY from TRUTH. Just because someone feels a certain way does not mean we abandon truth. As Christians we are called to offer COMPASSION not COMPROMISE. Let’s bring this message to a close now. Read John 19:12–16 #3 Pilate judged the Judge. Pilate crucifies Him.The fear of man outweighed the fear of God. Jesus threatened to disrupt Pilate’s cushy role, and so he gave in to peer pressure and he judged the Judge. In Revelation 20 at the Great White Throne judgement, the judged will face the Judge. Pilate symbolically washed his hands of Jesus.But you cannot wash yourself of your sins. You either receive Him or reject Him. “You are either for me or against me.” Have you trusted Jesus as Savior and made Him the Lord of your life? The courage that Pilate lacked, you can show today. Jesus said "Everyone who acknowledges me publicly here on earth, I will also acknowledge before my Father in heaven" (Matthew 10:32 NLT) We are just like Barabbas.Guilty and headed for judgement.But Jesus came in, not accidentally, but intentionally and took that punishment we deserved and He died on a cross for our sin. Like those soldiers around Jack Lucas, he dove on those grenades and absorbed their destruction, that’s what Jesus did for us!He absorbed God’s righteous judgement and drank the cup of His wrath that was going to be poured out on us because of our spiritual rebellion against God. --- Learn more about Greg Laurie and Harvest Ministries at harvest.org. This podcast is supported by the generosity of our Harvest Partners.Support the show: https://harvest.org/supportSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

What is an oligarchy, exactly? Is the US entering a period similar to post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s? What do Russian oligarchs have to do with proven interference in the 2016 US election?  Julian digs into Russian history to explore parallels with modern-day America. Meet Vladislav Surkov, the architect of both Putin's 25-year rule over what Surkov has dubbed “sovereign democracy,” and the global propaganda strategies generating our post-truth ecosystem of disinformation and conspiracies. There's a reason why politics feels like theater these days, why democracy seems like a pipe dream.  While MAGA has a fascism fetish, Putin's invasion of Ukraine might be a better match for Hitler on the verge, with Trump and Co acting as macho-clown versions of Neville Chamberlain. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

SEASON 3 EPISODE 107: COUNTDOWN WITH KEITH OLBERMANN A-Block (1:45) SPECIAL COMMENT: He has to go. And Minority Whip Katherine Clark. And Caucus Chair Pete Aguilar. And for that matter, Gavin Newsom has to go. Because after these standard-issue moderate Democrats vanished on election night they have suddenly reappeared 125 days later to address the REAL issue: Democratic House members who actually DID something to protest Trump - even just something symbolic like Al Green did, or those who supported him did. Jeffries and the others called them to a "come to Jesus" meeting to warn them never to ignore his "Dear Colleague" letter again, that the way to stand up to Trump lighting the county and the world on fire is to hold up mincing little pickle ball paddles with mild words on them and especially to coordinate outfits while not clapping. Out. Jeffries, Clark, Aguilar. And anybody else who doesn't realize that the last people capable of piercing Trump's bubble are Democrats at his speeches to Congress, and the media which has failed at the task even more than the Dems have. We need civil disobedience and instead Jeffries is warning Democrats, and 10 Democrats are joining the fascists, in punishing Democrats. And Newsom? His comments about trans athletes are bad enough. That he did them during a podcast with Charlie Kirk, arranged by Newsom's ex-wife Kim Guilfoyle, is far worse. I mean Newsom's judgment was already in doubt (he married Kim Guilfoyle FFS), but this is insanity. The nation is ablaze and the Dems are sending strongly worded notes. The media continues to collapse.It believed Trump's lies about pressuring Russia while he was in fact increasing his demands of Ukraine to include Zelensky resigning. And when Trump told a reporter he couldn't ask a certain question the White House Correspondents Association continued its policy of not commenting. And golly why did Trump think he could publicly threaten Nicolle Wallace and Rachel Maddow? Well, because of Joe Scarborough, obvs. B-Block (38:00) THE WORST PERSONS IN THE WORLD: Stephen A. Smith is not running for president, but keep asking him. Happily he IS showing he doesn't understand the first thing about any of this. His newest political crush? Candace Owens. Meanwhile Musk doesn't understand sports or America. And the Prime Minister of New Zealand fired a diplomat for reminding Britain that Trump is simply doing now what they did to Czechoslovakia in 1938. C-Block (49:20) THURBER SPECIAL: Thurber House in Columbus, Ohio, needs about $200,000 to keep going. The least we can do is raise consciousness. So for the first time since the election here is not just one but two Thurber stories: my favorite ("A Box To Hide In") and my late father's ("I Went To Sullivant." See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

His critics say President Trump is selling out Ukraine just as Franklin Delano Roosevelt supposedly sold out Poland at the 1945 Yalta Conference. Some historians have compared Trump's "appeasement" of Putin to Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler in 1938. Or, as Democrats contend, Donald Trump is betraying the Cold War legacy of Ronald Reagan. What if none of these historical episodes can be applied to today's crisis, as Ukraine defends itself against a nuclear-armed Russia? In this episode, historian Sergey Radchenko of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies compares and contrasts the past and present. Recommended reading: To Run the World: The Kremlin's Cold War Bid for Global Power by Sergey Radchenko The Talks That Could Have Ended the War in Ukraine by Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko (article in Foreign Affairs)

SEASON 3 EPISODE 105: COUNTDOWN WITH KEITH OLBERMANN A-Block (1:45) SPECIAL COMMENT: Trump has just lost World War Three. Trump listens to Musk maybe because he recognizes Musk is more insane than he is. Musk literally wants to own and rule the world. Musk just demanded this country withdraws from NATO. Other Muskers and Trumpers are following. If we leave NATO its remaining members will turn into a private hunting ground for Putin, or China, or both. Eventually he or they will run out of European countries to destroy and subsume and he or they will turn to destroying us. As Senator Chris Murphy said yesterday: "The White House has become an arm of the Kremlin." It's that simple. Trump is the Russian Commissar of America. And he's already lost World War Three - and evidently so have the British. Back home, Prime Minister Starmer did the unthinkable, met Zelensky not at the front door of Number 10 but he went INTO Downing Street to embrace him on the sidewalk. The front page of yesterday’s far right tabloid the Daily Mail headlined “outrage over U-S President’s humiliation of Zelensky” and insisted “Now stop the state visit for Bully Trump.” Demanded the British WITHDRAW their invitation for Trump to go there. But within hours their ambassador here undid all of that. Lord Peter Mandelson went on ABC This Week here and called for a “very radical re-set” that “has to consist of the United States and Ukraine getting back on the same page and President Zelensky giving his unequivocal backing to the initiative that Trump is taking to end the war and to bring a just and lasting peace to Ukraine.” Europe's nations “need to back the calls for a ceasefire and by the way I think that Ukraine should be the first to commit to a ceasefire and defy the Russians to follow." Hey, Lord Mendacious? Forgotten already? Zelensky already signed a cease-fire with Putin. Signed in 2019. Putin broke it in 2022. 200,000 guys named Lord Gaseous and Sir Toby Belch and they sent the one who sounds most like Neville Chamberlain. The British are defending Zelensky but their Ambassador just surrendered to Hitler. I mean Trump. No, Hitler. It’s impossible to believe the Prime Minister hasn’t fired Mandelson already (“recalled” is the polite term; “vaporized” would be the accurate one). Regardless the schism is present and the schism is a repeat, a throwback, a re-enactment of 1938, where as Churchill said the British leaders had a choice between shame and war. They have chosen shame, they will get war later. The war THEY got later was World War Two. The war WE will get later will be World War THREE. We will have to go to war – the real thing, none of this Iraq bullshit – the real thing, millions dead – not just to free Europe and all the other places who thought we understood that the world is simply successfully managed tension between the forces of more-or-less-good and the forces of the Putins, Hitlers, Musks, Trumps, Chamberlains, and Mandelsons… not just to free them but to save whatever’s left of this nation after the headstart Trump and Musk are giving, right now, as we speak, to Putin and China. Thus I’ll repeat what I said in the bulletin after the pre-planned performative and nauseating ambush of Zelensky last Friday: Trump has not only imperiled the freedom of the United States of America AND the existence of Ukraine AND the independence of all the nations of Europe he has also lost all moral right to keep power in this country and he must lose that power. B-BLOCK (25:00) POSTSCRIPTS TO THE NEWS: So. HOW does he non-violently lose power (and it must be non-violent, albeit probably unconventional)? I have the beginnings of ideas: a shadow cabinet, weekly press conferences to co-opt the Sunday and Monday news cycles, a huge multi-faceted protest at Trump's speech to Congress tomorrow. Aggressive behavior. Maybe the Democrats can do it, maybe not. Also: some thoughts on Trump pardoning and baseball seeking to reinstate Pete Rose, the alleged pedophile and child rapist. C-BLOCK (48:00) THE WORST PERSONS IN THE WORLD: Andy Ogles just proposed a law that will fire anybody who altered the FBI evidence on Jeffrey Epstein. So you want a law forcing the firing of Kash Patel and Trump? Cool! Trump stooge Ed Martin wants to prosecute something that never happened. And we've missed the true meaning of the Jeff Bezos launch of Katy Perry, Lauren Sanchez and Gayle King on Blue Origin: BEZOS WANTS TO SEND HIS OWN GIRLFRIEND INTO SPACE LOL.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

SEASON 3 EPISODE 99: COUNTDOWN WITH KEITH OLBERMANN A-Block (1:44) SPECIAL COMMENT: There's a small problem (naturally) that Trump overlooked (of course) when he misquoted (evergreen) the probably-apocryphal (saw that coming) Napoleon quote "He who saves his country does not violate any law.” The problem should be obvious. What if I think I'm saving my country FROM Trump? What if you think you are saving your country FROM Trump? Set aside for a moment the implicit stochastic call to terrorism or just law-breaking from Trump to his supporters. What about his message to them? Us? You? Me? Did he just indemnify all of us? Seems kind of dangerous. On the other hand, seems like something that somebody who has slipped fully into a delusion of universal support would say. The implications are, like Trump and Musk, just staggering. ALSO WHY IT'S TIME FOR A NEWS BOYCOTT OF THE WHITE HOUSE: Again, I don't have enough space or words to tell you how much this won't happen, but the response to the White House attempt to dictate what the Associated Press gets to write (and open the path to telling you what YOU get to write) should be obvious and unanimous: don't send any reporters to the White House or Air Force One until the AP is restored. And I'm sure The Washington Vichy Post and The New York Bothsidesist Times and CNN (Certainly Not News) will be right out front. On the other hand, there IS a good media pushback idea: A Democratic Shadow Press Secretary,. B-Block (31:25) THE WORST PERSONS IN THE WORLD: Some Dominican voters in Reading, PA, who according to the Mayor there voted for Trump because they just assumed when he said he'd deport "illegals" he'd give them amnesties because they're good people. Mark Zuckerberg is back, suppressing ads for the ever-controversial (checks notes) Invictus Games. And Jim Vandehei and Mike Allen praise the "masculinity" of Musk and Trump even though the four of them don't have enough masculinity to fill up a thimble. C-Block (40:00) THINGS I PROMISED NOT TO TELL: A confession. I didn't lie when I said why I discontinued the 2016-17 GQ Series "The Resistance." Nor did I tell the entire truth. I will now. It involves a threat against me, an inadvertent meeting with old SportsCenter friends, a deep hatred of the topic of Trump, and the firing of a loyal colleague.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

On 17th September 1938, in Munich, one of the most extraordinary meetings in history took place. Neville Chamberlain launched an extraordinary and unprecedented diplomatic coup. Boarding a plane, he set off to meet Adolf Hitler in a desperate attempt to prevent war over Czechoslovakia, following the Nazis' territorial incursions into Czechoslovakia. Little did he know that Hitler was already planning to launch a full blown war on the first of October - just two weeks later. Chamberlain, in his own mind the man of the hour, boldly wrestling the fate of Europe back under control, left with the goodwill of the British public behind him. Arriving at the Berghoff, Hitler's fabled eerie, the two men talked and debated for three hours. Finally, Hitler agreed not to precipitate military action while Chamberlain discussed the situation with his Cabinet. Ominously, both men were delighted by the turn of events. Upon returning home, Chamberlain declared himself convinced of Hitler's reliability, despite knowing full well of the atrocities he had already committed. Finally, in September 1938, another totemic emergency meeting of the main European powers took place in Munich, and an agreement - the consequences of which would change the world - was reached. Chamberlain would return to Britain a hero, but given the war that would follow, should he instead have been cast as a traitor? Join Tom and Dominic as they discuss the Munich Agreement: one of the most discussed, and infamous diplomatic instances in history, which has forever since shaped the way that Western nations have addressed international affairs. Had Neville Chamberlain delayed war with Germany, or inevitably doomed Czechoslovakia and Poland to the ruthless ravages of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi party? _______ Twitter: @TheRestHistory @holland_tom @dcsandbrook Producer: Theo Young-Smith Assistant Producer: Tabby Syrett Editor: Jack Meek Executive Producers: Jack Davenport + Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Throughout the course of the 1930s, Adolph Hitler's Nazi party has overwhelmingly, terrifyingly seized power in Germany. Now, Hitler's vile ambitions have turned to Czechoslovakia. On the 12th of September 1938 at the Nazi Party Congress in Nuremberg, he rabidly defended the supposed interests of the German speaking minority in Czechoslovakia, claiming that they had been ravaged and tortured by their cruel Czech overlords, but not so. In reality, Hitler is preparing the ground for the invasion and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia - what he sees as a crucial step towards the creation of a new German dominion in central and eastern Europe. In so doing, he is setting Europe upon the road to an increasingly imminent Second World War. With Nazism driven above all by the shattering experience of the First World War, a hunger for war burns at the very centre of the Nazi's ambitions. For Hitler, it is personal - the German economy is in meltdown and with it, his frayed mental and physical state. Was it possible, then, that at this crucial juncture in 1938, the outcome of war could be prevented? Certainly, Britain's Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, was determined to make it so… Join Tom and Dominic for the opening episode in their next series on the Nazis' road to the Second World War. With European politics in turmoil, Adolph Hitler hungry for war, and Neville Chamberlain desperate to appease him, will there be peace in our time? At Munich, one of the most controversial diplomatic instances in history, the fate of the world will be decided. ______ Twitter: @TheRestHistory @holland_tom @dcsandbrook Producer: Theo Young-Smith Assistant Producer: Tabby Syrett Editor: Jack Meek Executive Producers: Jack Davenport + Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

“Master Jan Hus, preacher of the Holy Scriptures from the chapel of Bethlehem, was also present at this council, who in his preaching continuously criticized and exposed the hypocrisy, pride, miserliness, fornication, simony, and other sins of the clergy, in order to bring the priesthood back to the apostolic life. He was immensely hated by these pestiferous clerics.”This is how Laurence of Brezova introduced the great reformer and Czech national hero Jan Hus in his 15th century chronicle of the Hussite uprising. Why should we care about the trials and tribulations of another holy man railing against corrupt prelates and the subsequent “quarrel in a faraway country, between people of whom we know nothing”. Well, that quote itself should be reason enough. It is from Neville Chamberlain speech of September 27, 1938 weighing the importance of protecting Czechoslovakia against an expansionist Nazi Germany. But Jan Hus is interesting beyond his status as a towering figure in Czech history. When he came to Prague in 1390 he was just another ambitious young man from a modest background who wanted to rise up in the world on the back of intelligence and hard work. But by the time he leaves for his fate at the Council of Constance in 1414 he has been excommunicated, exiled and unwillingly or willingly be come he face of a brewing revolt against king and clergy. This is a story about collapsing certainties and emerging truths, about individual beliefs and institutional order. About what the community of the faithful is supposed to be and who is in and who is out. And its tentacles reach deep into the next centuries…The music for the show is Flute Sonata in E-flat major, H.545 by Carl Phillip Emmanuel Bach (or some claim it as BWV 1031 Johann Sebastian Bach) performed and arranged by Michel Rondeau under Common Creative Licence 3.0.As always:Homepage with maps, photos, transcripts and blog: www.historyofthegermans.comFacebook: @HOTGPod Twitter: @germanshistoryInstagram: history_of_the_germansReddit: u/historyofthegermansPatreon: https://www.patreon.com/HistoryofthegermansTo make it easier for you to share the podcast, I have created separate playlists for some of the seasons that are set up as individual podcasts. they have the exact same episodes as in the History of the Germans, but they may be a helpful device for those who want to concentrate on only one season. So far I have:The Ottonians Salian Emperors and Investiture ControversyFredrick Barbarossa and Early HohenstaufenFrederick II Stupor MundiSaxony and Eastward Expansion

PREVIEW: BERGHOF: Conversation with author Charles Spicer, "Coffee with Hitler," re the origin of the meeting place called Berghof, built for NSDAP Führer Hitler near Berchtesgaden on the Austrian-German border -- where Hitler invited, before the war, David Lloyd George and eventually Neville Chamberlain. More tonight and tomorrow. 1850 Berchtesgaden

On Thursday's Mark Levin Show, President Biden is re-arming our terrorist enemies in the Middle East through his appeasement, and as a result, the war in the Middle East has expanded because of our unwillingness to take out military sites in Iran. Iran has come out from behind Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, and has now seized an oil tanker in the Gulf of Oman with U.S. interest. Biden has learned what Neville Chamberlain learned before World War 2; you cannot re-arm your enemies and survive. In three years, Biden has destroyed our border, our currency, our economy, and peace in the Middle East. American Marxists are on the loose and have the run of academia, the media, and the executive branch, and they are burning down as many institutions and customs in record time. Also, Hunter Biden is being portrayed as the victim by the leftist media because of his drug addiction, and yet not a word is said about Hunter's victims and the young women who were abused and trafficked. Hunter shook down China and Ukraine to pocket millions of dollars by using his father's name and laundered it through shell corporations, and Joe is even worse because he is hiding behind his son. If Hunter wasn't doing anything wrong, why wouldn't he involve Joe and talk about his business dealings? Finally, Fani Willis' lover went to the White House twice before Willis brought charges against Trump, and also secretly colluded with the January 6 committee. Joe Biden and his henchmen at the DOJ are behind every single case against Donald Trump, and yet the Democrat media will never talk about the corruption. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices