Podcasts about aristotelian society

Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss Plato's Crito and Phaedo, his accounts of the last days of Socrates in prison in 399 BC as he waited to be executed by drinking hemlock. Both works show Socrates preparing to die in the way he had lived: doing philosophy. In the Crito, Plato shows Socrates arguing that he is duty bound not to escape from prison even though a bribe would open the door, while in the Phaedo his argument is for the immortality of the soul which, at the point of death, might leave uncorrupted from the 'prison' of his body, the one escape that truly mattered to Socrates. His example in his last days has proved an inspiration to thinkers over the centuries and in no small way has helped ensure the strength of his reputation.WithAngie Hobbs Professor of the Public Understanding of Philosophy at the University of SheffieldFiona Leigh Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at University College LondonAnd James Warren Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Corpus Christi College, CambridgeProducer: Simon TillotsonReading list:David Ebrey, Plato's Phaedo: Forms, Death and the Philosophical Life (Cambridge University Press, 2023)Dorothea Frede, ‘The Final Proof of the Immortality of the Soul in Plato's Phaedo 102a-107a' (Phronesis 23, 1978)W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4, Plato: The Man and his Dialogues, Earlier Period (Cambridge University Press, 2008) Verity Harte, ‘Conflicting Values in Plato's Crito' (Archiv. für Geschichte der Philosophie 81, 1999)Angie Hobbs, Why Plato Matters Now (Bloomsbury, forthcoming 2025), especially chapter 5 Rachana Kamtekar (ed.), Plato's Euthyphro, Apology and Crito: Critical Essays (Rowman and Littlefield, 2004)Richard Kraut, Socrates and the State (Princeton University Press, 1984)Melissa Lane, ‘Argument and Agreement in Plato's Crito' (History of Political Thought 19, 1998) Plato (trans. Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy), Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo and Phaedrus (Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 2017)Plato (trans. G. M. A. Grube and John Cooper), The Trial and Death of Socrates: Euthyphro Apology, Crito, Phaedo (Hackett, 2001) Plato (trans. Christopher Rowe), The Last Days of Socrates: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo (Penguin, 2010)Donald R. Robinson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Socrates (Cambridge University Press, 2011)David Sedley and Alex Long (eds.), Plato: Meno and Phaedo (Cambridge University Press, 2010)James Warren, ‘Forms of Agreement in Plato's Crito' (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 123, Issue 1, April 2023)Robin Waterfield, Why Socrates Died: Dispelling the Myths (Faber and Faber, 2010)In Our Time is a BBC Studios Audio Production

Before her death in 2017, Marilyn McCord Adams had a long and impressive career as a philosopher and theologian. While she had many interests both philosophical and theological, the problem of evil loomed ever-present in her thinking. I intend this video as an introduction to her views on the problem of evil; specifically on the notion of axiological defeat that features so heavily. Adams, M. M., & Sutherland, S. (1989). Horrendous evils and the goodness of God. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 63, 297-323.Adams, M. M. (2018). Horrendous evils and the goodness of God. Cornell University Press. Adams, M. M. (1999). Horrendous evils and the goodness of God. Cornell University Press. Adams, M. M. (2001). Afterward. In S. Davis (Ed.), Encountering Evil: Live options in theodicy (pp. 191-203). Louisville: Westminster John Knox. Adams, M. M. (2006). Christ and horrors: The coherence of Christology (Vol. 4). Cambridge University Press. Adams, M. M. (2013). Ignorance, instrumentality, compensation, and the problem of evil. Sophia, 52, 7-26. Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press.

In this podcast, Aristotelian Society officers Dr Jess Leech and Dr Ellie Robson talk to Peter Momtchiloff - commissioning editor for philosophy at Oxford University Press from 1993-2023. Following three decades in this role, we get Peter's thoughts on what he has seen and learned from his time at OUP including questions like: What are some of your most memorable encounters in the job? What are some of the biggest changes you've witnessed over 30 years – for good and for bad – in philosophy? Are there any common struggles for first time authors? How should you approach publishers? This podcast is an audio recording of an interview with Peter Momtchiloff - at the Aristotelian Society on 23rd July 2024.

In this podcast, Aristotelian Society officers Dr Jess Leech and Dr Ellie Robson talk to Peter Momtchiloff - commissioning editor for philosophy at Oxford University Press from 1993-2023. Following three decades in this role, we get Peter's thoughts on what he has seen and learned from his time at OUP including questions like: What are some of your most memorable encounters in the job? What are some of the biggest changes you've witnessed over 30 years – for good and for bad – in philosophy? Are there any common struggles for first time authors? How should you approach publishers? This podcast is an audio recording of an interview with Peter Momtchiloff - at the Aristotelian Society on 23rd July 2024.

WATCH: https://youtu.be/3WLdL5zT6eY Professor David Papineau is a British academic philosopher. He works as Professor of Philosophy of Science at King's College London and the City University of New York Graduate Center, and previously taught for several years at Cambridge University, where he was a fellow of Robinson College. He did a BSc in Mathematics at the University of Natal, followed by a BA and PhD in philosophy at Cambridge. After academic posts at Reading, Macquarie, Birkbeck, and Cambridge, he joined King's College London in 1990. From 2015-21 he spent half of each year at the Graduate Center of CUNY in New York. he was President of the Mind Association in 2009 and the Aristotelian Society in 2014. He has written widely on epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of science and mind. My books include: For Science in the Social Sciences (1979), Theory and Meaning (1990), Reality and Representation (1987), Philosophical Naturalism (1992), Thinking about Consciousness (2002), Philosophical Devices (2012), Knowing the Score (2017), and The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience (2021). TIMESTAMPS: (0:00) - Introduction (0:23) - History of the Mind-Body Problem (5:14) - Robert Lawrence Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness and Physicalism (9:43) - Illusionism (14:32) - Emergentism (16:46) - David's current thoughts about Consciousness (22:33) - Intelligence vs Consciousness (25:30) - Panpsychism (34:40) - Consciousness & Moral Standing (41:12) - Hard Problem or Easy Problems? (45:32) - Mary Thought Experiment Explained (58:59) - David's definition of Consciousness (1:05:37) - Will we ever solve the mind-body problem? (1:10:15) - David on Free Will & Daniel Dennett (1:15:25) - David's upcoming book: "Causes" (About causation, probabilities etc.) 1:18:50) - Conclusion EPISODE LINKS: - David's Website: https://www.davidpapineau.co.uk/ - David's Books: https://tinyurl.com/4e55a6k9 - David's Publications: https://tinyurl.com/47sdussx - David's X: https://twitter.com/davidpapineau CONNECT: - Website: https://tevinnaidu.com - Podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/drtevinnaidu - Twitter: https://twitter.com/drtevinnaidu - Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/drtevinnaidu - Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/drtevinnaidu - LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/drtevinnaidu ============================= Disclaimer: The information provided on this channel is for educational purposes only. The content is shared in the spirit of open discourse and does not constitute, nor does it substitute, professional or medical advice. We do not accept any liability for any loss or damage incurred from you acting or not acting as a result of listening/watching any of our contents. You acknowledge that you use the information provided at your own risk. Listeners/viewers are advised to conduct their own research and consult with their own experts in the respective fields.

#IrishNews #FreeMarket #WhatIsLibertarian Gerard Casey is a Irish academic who is Professor Emeritus at University College Dublin. He holds law degrees from the University of London and UCD, as well as a primary degree in philosophy from University College Cork, an MA and PhD from the University of Notre Dame and the higher doctorate, DLitt, from the National University of Ireland. He is a Fellow of Mises UK, an Associated Scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute. He is an Associate Editor of the Christian Libertarian Review. He is also a member of the Free Speech Union and Academics for Academic Freedom. He has previous been a member of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, the American Philosophical Association and The Aristotelian Society. He was active in Irish politics in the 1990s and led the Christian Solidarity Party between 1993 and 1999. He now holds libertarian and philosophically anarchistic views. He has appeared from time to time on radio and TV in Ireland and the UK, contributing to discussions on topical social and political issues. --------------------- GUEST LINKS: - Twitter (X): https://x.com/Casey5122dark - Mises Institute: https://mises.org/profile/gerard-n-casey - Amazon Book Store: https://t.co/HxlrfguONq --------------------------- RISE TO LIBERTY LINKS: - RTL Master Link: https://risetoliberty.com/links - RTL Merch Store: https://risetoliberty.store - RTL On Odysee: https://risetoliberty.com/odysee - RTL Telegram: https://risetoliberty.com/freespeech - Substack - Beware The Mockingbird!: https://risetoliberty.substack.com - AUDIO PLATFORMS: https://risetoliberty.com/audio - Gratuitas! Buy Coffee w/ Monero: https://risetoliberty.com/gratuitas-xmr - Nadeau Shave Company: https://nadeaushaveco.com **Use code: RISE15 for 15% off!**

In this episode, we discuss the role of criticism in science. When is criticism constructive as opposed to obsessive? What are the features of fair and useful scientific criticism? And should we explicitly teach junior researchers to both give and accept criticism?   Shownotes: Babbage, C. (1830). Reflections on the Decline of Science in England: And on Some of Its Causes. Prasad, Vinay, and John PA Ioannidis. "Constructive and obsessive criticism in science." European journal of clinical investigation 52.11 (2022): e13839. Lakatos, I. (1968, January). Criticism and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian society (Vol. 69, pp. 149-186). Aristotelian Society, Wiley. LOWI: https://lowi.nl/en/home/ As an independent advisory body it plays a role in the complaints procedure about alleged violations of principles of research integrity. Holcombe, A. O. (2022). Ad hominem rhetoric in scientific psychology. British Journal of Psychology, 113(2), 434–454. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12541 Daniel C. Dennett: I've Been Thinking https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393868050  Phillip Stark textbook chapter on logical fallacies: https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/SticiGui/Text/reasoning.htm  Gelman, A., & Tuerlinckx, F. (2000). Type S error rates for classical and Bayesian single and multiple comparison procedures. Computational Statistics, 15(3), 373–390. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001800000040 Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. Routledge. PubPeer: https://pubpeer.com  

Support me by becoming wiser and more knowledgeable – check out Isaiah Berlin's collection of books for sale on Amazon here: https://amzn.to/43JSBdO If you purchase a book through this link, I will earn a 4.5% commission and be extremely delighted. But if you just want to read and aren't ready to add a new book to your collection yet, I'd recommend checking out the ⁠⁠⁠Internet Archive⁠⁠⁠, the largest free digital library in the world. If you're really feeling benevolent you can buy me a coffee or donate over at ⁠https://ko-fi.com/theunadulteratedintellect⁠⁠. I would seriously appreciate it! __________________________________________________ Sir Isaiah Berlin (24 May/6 June 1909 – 5 November 1997) was a Russian-British social and political theorist, philosopher, and historian of ideas. Although he became increasingly averse to writing for publication, his improvised lectures and talks were sometimes recorded and transcribed, and many of his spoken words were converted into published essays and books, both by himself and by others, especially his principal editor from 1974, Henry Hardy. Born in Riga (now the capital of Latvia, then a part of the Russian Empire) in 1909, he moved to Petrograd, Russia, at the age of six, where he witnessed the revolutions of 1917. In 1921 his family moved to the UK, and he was educated at St Paul's School, London, and Corpus Christi College, Oxford. In 1932, at the age of twenty-three, Berlin was elected to a prize fellowship at All Souls College, Oxford. In addition to his own prolific output, he translated works by Ivan Turgenev from Russian into English and, during World War II, worked for the British Diplomatic Service. From 1957 to 1967 he was Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at the University of Oxford. He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1963 to 1964. In 1966, he played a critical role in creating Wolfson College, Oxford, and became its founding President. Berlin was appointed a CBE in 1946, knighted in 1957, and appointed to the Order of Merit in 1971. He was President of the British Academy from 1974 to 1978. He also received the 1979 Jerusalem Prize for his lifelong defence of civil liberties, and on 25 November 1994 he received the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws at the University of Toronto, for which occasion he prepared a "short credo" (as he called it in a letter to a friend), now known as "A Message to the Twenty-First Century", to be read on his behalf at the ceremony. An annual Isaiah Berlin Lecture is held at the Hampstead Synagogue, at Wolfson College, Oxford, at the British Academy, and in Riga. Berlin's work on liberal theory and on value pluralism, as well as his opposition to Marxism and communism, has had a lasting influence. Audio sources ⁠here⁠⁠ and here Full Wikipedia entry ⁠here⁠ Isaiah Berlin's books ⁠here --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/theunadulteratedintellect/support

W tej serii poznajemy podstawy metaetyki – dziedziny filozofii, której celem jest wyjaśnienie podstaw moralności. Podczas gdy etyka stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie CO jest moralne, metaetyka stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie DLACZEGO (I CZY) coś w ogóle może być moralne. W cz. 3 omówimy teorie obiektywistyczne i uniwersalistyczne (zakładające istnienie obiektywnej lub uniwersalnej moralności): intuicjonizm metaetyczny, naturalizm metaetyczny, teorię Bożego rozkazu, oraz subiektywizm idealnego obserwatora. ---> DIAGRAM: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1e8rFNgn8KFkWp6IKPFtY8u2ZXldDU7GB 
---> Podcast możesz wesprzeć na: Patronite – https://patronite.pl/filozofiapoprostu/description Buy Coffee – https://buycoffee.to/filozofiapoprostu To niezwykle pomocne i motywujące – dziękuję! :) Zapraszam też na sociale :) ---> Instagram: @filozofia_po_prostu https://www.instagram.com/filozofia_po_prostu/?hl=en ---> Facebook: Filozofia Po Prostu https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068611986622 ---> kontakt: filozofia.po.prostu.podcast@gmail.com Podcast powstaje dzięki niesamowitym Patronom i Patronkom: Bartłomiej Wachacz, Anna Limanowska, Pola Weryszko, Adrian Sokołowski, Patryk Neumann, Michał Semczyszyn, Magda Juraszewska, Przemek Łukasiński, Anita Włosek, Ewa Kamińska, Sebastian Cychowski, Michał Bukała, Michał Kruszewicz, Kuba Dziadosz, Alicja Zielińska, Magdalena Rutkowska, Agnieszka Myszkowska, Ewa Glu, Michał Klatka, Beata Kupczyńska, Karol Ciba, Paweł Jastrzębski, Piotr Juszczyński, Stefan Basista, Barbara Skobiej, Ela Petruk, Katarzyna Ergang, Kinga Kasińska, Michał Grązka, Piotr Romanowski, Rob Ak, Marcin Kweczlich, Nicolina Majewska, Marcin Maśkiewicz, Szymon Zawierucha, Małgośka Radkiewicz, Maciej Ruciński, Hania Ślęk, Michał Wojciak, Michał Śliwiński, Rafał Myrcik, Katarzyna Kwietniewska, Cezary Spustek, Mikołaj Gala, Bartosz Szarowar, Aleksandra Franczyk, Natalia Pietrzak, Kamil Gucwa, Michał Felerski, Brądzylians Fąfalny, Witold Barycki, Karol Głowacki, Elo Mordo, Dawid Dziedzic, Maciej Foremski, Ewa Dąbrowska, Maja Smolarz, Andrzej Manoryk, Dorota Uniewska, Bartlomiej Mej, Marek Paszkowski, Marcin Gryszko, Antoni Kania, Piotr Żmudziński, Bartosz Kolasa, Paweł Doligalski, Werka G, Maria Matyka, oraz Patroni i Patronki anonimowi. Dziękuję!

W tej serii poznajemy podstawy metaetyki – dziedziny filozofii, której celem jest wyjaśnienie podstaw moralności. Podczas gdy etyka stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie CO jest moralne, metaetyka stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie DLACZEGO (I CZY) coś w ogóle może być moralne. W cz. 2 omawiamy teorie anty-obiektywistyczne (odmawiające istnienia obiektywnej moralności): emotywizm, preskryptywizm, teorię błędu, relatywizm mówiącego, relatywizm jednostki, relatywizm kulturowy - a także przy okazji takie zagadnienia jak ewolucjonizm metaetyczny i quasi-realism. ---> DIAGRAM: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1e8rFNgn8KFkWp6IKPFtY8u2ZXldDU7GB ---> Podcast możesz wesprzeć na: Patronite – https://patronite.pl/filozofiapoprostu/description Buy Coffee – https://buycoffee.to/filozofiapoprostu To niezwykle pomocne i motywujące – dziękuję! :) Zapraszam też na sociale: ---> Instagram: @filozofia_po_prostu https://www.instagram.com/filozofia_po_prostu/?hl=en ---> Facebook: Filozofia Po Prostu https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068611986622 ---> kontakt: filozofia.po.prostu.podcast@gmail.com Podcast powstaje dzięki niesamowitym Patronom i Patronkom: Bartłomiej Wachacz, Anna Limanowska, Pola Weryszko, Adrian Sokołowski, Patryk Neumann, Michał Semczyszyn, Magda Juraszewska, Przemek Łukasiński, Anita Włosek, Ewa Kamińska, Sebastian Cychowski, Michał Bukała, Michał Kruszewicz, Kuba Dziadosz, Alicja Zielińska, Magdalena Rutkowska, Agnieszka Myszkowska, Ewa Glu, Michał Klatka, Beata Kupczyńska, Karol Ciba, Paweł Jastrzębski, Piotr Juszczyński, Stefan Basista, Barbara Skobiej, Ela Petruk, Katarzyna Ergang, Kinga Kasińska, Michał Grązka, Piotr Romanowski, Rob Ak, Marcin Kweczlich, Nicolina Majewska, Marcin Maśkiewicz, Szymon Zawierucha, Małgośka Radkiewicz, Maciej Ruciński, Hania Ślęk, Michał Wojciak, Michał Śliwiński, Rafał Myrcik, Katarzyna Kwietniewska, Cezary Spustek, Mikołaj Gala, Bartosz Szarowar, Aleksandra Franczyk, Natalia Pietrzak, Kamil Gucwa, Michał Felerski, Brądzylians Fąfalny, Witold Barycki, Karol Głowacki, Elo Mordo, Dawid Dziedzic, Maciej Foremski, Ewa Dąbrowska, Maja Smolarz, Andrzej Manoryk, Dorota Uniewska, Bartlomiej Mej, Marek Paszkowski, Marcin Gryszko, Antoni Kania, Piotr Żmudziński, Bartosz Kolasa, Paweł Doligalski, oraz Patroni i Patronki anonimowi. Dziękuję! OPRACOWANIA: Fisher, A. 2014. Metaethics: an introduction. Routledge. Miller, A. 2014. Contemporary metaethics: an introduction. John Wiley & Sons. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online 2023: https://plato.stanford.edu/, hasła z dziedziny metaetyki. WYBRANE TEKSTY ŹRÓDŁOWE: Ayer, A. J., 1946. “A Critique of Ethics”, in Language, Truth and Logic, London: Gollanz, 102–114. Blackburn, S., 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blackburn, S., 1998. Ruling Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boyd, R., 1988. “How to Be a Moral Realist,” in Essays on Moral Realism, G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), 181–228. Firth, R., 1952, “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12: 317–345. Foot, P., 1958, “Moral Beliefs”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59: 83–104. Hare, R. M., 1952. The Language of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hume, D., 1739. Treatise Concerning Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1888. Joyce, R., 2001. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mackie, J. L., 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, London: Penguin Books. Moore, G. E., 1903. Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rawls, J. 2001. Justice as fairness: A restatement. Harvard University Press. Rorty, R. 2013. Pragmatism, relativism, and irrationalism. The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series, 653-666. Singer, P. 1981. The expanding circle. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ​​Stevenson, C., 1937. “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms”, Mind, 46: 14–31.

W tym odcinku poznajemy podstawy metaetyki –dziedziny filozofii, której celem jest wyjaśnienie podstaw moralności. Podczas gdy etyka stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie CO jest moralne, metaetyka stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie DLACZEGO (I CZY) coś w ogóle może być moralne. Odcinek ten jest publikowany w częściach: w cz. 1. omawiamy podstawowe problemy i terminy dotyczące podstaw moralności (wstęp do teorii ;). ---> Podcast możesz wesprzeć na Patronite – o tutaj: https://patronite.pl/filozofiapoprostu/description To niezwykle pomocne i motywujące – dziękuję! :) Zapraszam też na sociale: ---> Instagram: @filozofia_po_prostu https://www.instagram.com/filozofia_po_prostu/?hl=en ---> Facebook: Filozofia Po Prostu https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068611986622 ---> kontakt: filozofia.po.prostu.podcast@gmail.com Podcast powstaje dzięki niesamowitym Patronom i Patronkom: Bartłomiej Wachacz, Anna Limanowska, Pola Weryszko, Adrian Sokołowski, Patryk Neumann, Michał Semczyszyn, Magda Juraszewska, Przemek Łukasiński, Anita Włosek, Ewa Kamińska, Sebastian Cychowski, Michał Bukała, Michał Kruszewicz, Kuba Dziadosz, Alicja Zielińska, Magdalena Rutkowska, Agnieszka Myszkowska, Ewa Glu, Michał Klatka, Beata Kupczyńska, Karol Ciba, Paweł Jastrzębski, Piotr Juszczyński, Stefan Basista, Barbara Skobiej, Ela Petruk, Katarzyna Ergang, Kinga Kasińska, Michał Grązka, Piotr Romanowski, Rob Ak, Marcin Kweczlich, Nicolina Majewska, Marcin Maśkiewicz, Szymon Zawierucha, Małgośka Radkiewicz, Maciej Ruciński, Hania Ślęk, Michał Wojciak, Michał Śliwiński, Rafał Myrcik, Katarzyna Kwietniewska, Cezary Spustek, Mikołaj Gala, Bartosz Szarowar, Aleksandra Franczyk, Natalia Pietrzak, Kamil Gucwa, Michał Felerski, Brądzylians Fąfalny, Witold Barycki, Karol Głowacki, Elo Mordo, Dawid Dziedzic, Maciej Foremski, Ewa Dąbrowska, Maja Smolarz, Andrzej Manoryk, Dorota Uniewska, Bartlomiej Mej, Marek Paszkowski, Marcin Gryszko, Antoni Kania, oraz Patroni i Patronki anonimowi. Dziękuję!

The partiality we display, insofar as we form and sustain personal attachments, is not normatively fundamental. It is a byproduct of the deference and responsiveness that are essential to our engagement with the world. We cannot form and sustain valuable personal relationships without seeing ourselves as answerable to the other participants in those relationships. And we cannot develop and sustain valuable projects without responding to the constraints imposed on our activities by the nature and requirements of those projects themselves. More generally, we cannot engage with the world without meeting it on its terms, and we cannot meet the world on its terms without responding differentially – or displaying partiality – with respect to the objects of our engagement. Partiality is thus a byproduct of engagement. We cannot engage with the world at all without exhibiting forms of partiality. Samuel Scheffler is University Professor in the Department of Philosophy at NYU. He works primarily in the areas of moral and political philosophy and the theory of value. His writings have addressed central questions in ethical theory, and he has also written on topics as diverse as equality, nationalism and cosmopolitanism, toleration, terrorism, immigration, tradition, death, and the future of humanity. Scheffler received his A.B. from Harvard and his Ph.D. from Princeton. From 1977-2008 he taught at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of six books: The Rejection of Consequentialism, Human Morality, Boundaries and Allegiances, Equality and Tradition, Death and the Afterlife (Niko Kolodny ed.), and Why Worry about Future Generations? He has received fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation and the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities, and he has been a Visiting Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. His first book was awarded the Matchette Prize of the American Philosophical Association. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a member of the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences and Letters, and a foreign member of the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters. He is currently at work on a book (tentatively) titled The Lives We Lead: Personal Attachment and the Passage of Time. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Scheffler's talk - "Partiality, Deference, and Engagement" - at the Aristotelian Society on 20th June 2022. This recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

At a climactic—and, indeed, incendiary—moment in Bernard Williams' classic essay, “Internal and External Reasons,” Williams says that those who advance moral criticisms by appealing to so-called external reasons are engaging in “bluff”. Williams thus alleges that condemning certain actions of others as somehow not only immoral, but also irrational or contrary to reason is nothing more than a kind of pretense. To say that a favorite pastime that so many of us happily engage in is empty, well—to use an American colloquialism—“them's fightin' words!” Indeed, in criticizing certain moral criticisms in this way, Williams' words are fightin' words about fightin' words. Why does Williams proffer these meta-fightin' words? Readers—and indeed perhaps Williams himself—have struggled to articulate a precise argument for this claim that there are no external reasons and that those who try to invoke them in criticism of others are engaging in bluff. Thus, the force of Williams' point has remained, at best, elusive, perhaps even to Williams himself. In this paper, I first want to defend Williams' claim that the appeal to external reasons is illegitimate. But I will do so from a perspective that is radically different from the ones usually at work in considering Williams' position. Indeed, this perspective is one that may or may not (probably not!) be in the spirit of Williams' actual reasons for rejecting external reasons, so it is important to keep in mind (as I will remind you from time to time) that I am not offering an interpretation of Williams here. The distinctive aspect of my approach is that I argue that a rationalist line of thought can support Williams' claims. To bring out this line of thought, I will examine the metaphysical commitments of those who engage in what Williams calls bluff. I will then reject those commitments on powerful and widely popular rationalist grounds. I will, in other words, endeavor to support Williams' charge of bluff by investigating what I call the metaphysics of bluff and by offering a rationalist critique of that metaphysics. Michael Della Rocca is Andrew Downey Orrick Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. He has published widely in early modern philosophy and in contemporary metaphysics. His most recent book, The Parmenidean Ascent (Oxford 2020), defends a radical form of monism in metaphysics, philosophy of action, epistemology, and philosophy of language. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Della Rocca's talk - "Moral Criticism and the Metaphyscis of Bluff" - at the Aristotelian Society on 6th June 2022. This recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

When we doubt a belief, we examine how things look from a perspective in which that belief is set aside. Sometimes we care about what that perspective recommends and, as a result, we abandon the belief we've been doubting. Other times we don't: we recognize that a perspective in which a certain belief is set aside recommends abandoning it, but we go on believing it anyway. Why is this? In this paper, I'll consider and then reject some proposals concerning when to defer to the perspective of doubt. I'll argue that ultimately the question of whether to defer to doubt on any given occasion can't be answered through rational deliberation aimed at truth or accuracy. If I'm right, this means that a certain challenge facing defeatist views about higher order evidence cannot be met: namely, providing a motivation for abandoning belief in cases of higher order evidence, but not becoming a global skeptic. Miriam Schoenfield received her PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2012 and is now an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin and an Affiliate Professor at the Dianoia Institute for Philosophy at Australian Catholic University. In addition to teaching at UT Austin, Miriam has served as a Bersoff fellow at New York University, an Associate Professor at MIT, and has taught philosophy in a number of different prison systems. She is the winner of the Marc Sanders Prize in Epistemology and the Young Epistemologist Prize. Her current research focuses on the ways in which Bayesian epistemology, and the aims of truth and accuracy, bear on debates about how to respond to evidence of our own irrationality. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Schoenfield's talk - "Deferring to Doubt" - at the Aristotelian Society on 30th May 2022. This recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

In the interpretation of Parmenides of Elea, there is a certain vulgate, one widely represented in general histories of philosophy and indeed assumed by philosophers broadly. The metaphysical tenor and thrust of the philosophy of Parmenides, according to this vulgate, is holistic monism: "all things are one," in Greek, hen to pan. As it may be recalled, Parmenides reached his metaphysical conclusions by initially reflecting on the language of to mē on or to ouk on (either of which may be translated as "what is not," or "non-being," or "not being"). Famously, or notoriously, he did rule that there is something conceptually and logically unacceptable in speaking or thinking of "not being." Ascribing that initial philosophical move to Parmenides is certainly beyond dispute. The vulgate, however, adds that he must also have reflected on the language of "different" (heteron) and "other" (allo); and then he proceeded to draw powerful metaphysical inferences in the following way: If, with respect to some A and some B, we are to hold that A is "different from" (or "other than") B, or vice versa, then we are committed to holding that "A is not B" and "B is not A." But if grasping "not-being" is inherently impossible, it should likewise count impossible that we should conceive more narrowly of "A's not being B," or of "B's not being A." Once distinctions of any sort are logically disallowed, the metaphysical conclusion seems inevitable: hen to pan, "all things are one." The epistemological corollary of holistic monism is that the world humans experience, fraught as it is with plurality and pervasively splintered by distinctions, is ultimately and fundamentally an illusion. Alexander P. D. Mourelatos is Professor Emeritus in Philosophy and in Classics at The University of Texas at Austin, where in 1967 he founded and for twenty years directed, the Joint Classics-Philosophy Graduate Program in Ancient Philosophy. He is the author of The Route of Parmenides (1970; 2nd edn., 2008), and editor of The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays 1974; 2nd edn., 1993). Scholarly articles of his have appeared in journals in: philosophy; classics; ; history of science; and linguistics. On more than 170 occasions, he has delivered invited lectures at academic venues in North and South America, Europe, and Australasia. He received all his academic degrees from Yale University (Ph.D., 1964), and has been awarded two honorary doctorates in his native Greece (University of Athens, 1994; University of Crete, 2017). Students of his and colleagues have presanted him with two collections in his honor: in 2002, Presocratic Philosophy—Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos; and in 2019, a special double issue of the periodical Philosophical Inquiry. He has held research appointments at: the University of Wisconsin, Madison; the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton, NJ); the Center for Hellenic Studies (Washington, DC, Harvard University); Cambridge University; and the Australian National University. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Mourelatos's talk - "Parmenides of Elea and Xenophanes of Colophon: the Conceptually Deeper Connections" - at the Aristotelian Society on 23rd May 2022. This recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

In this paper I give answers to two apparently unrelated questions and aim to convince you that these different concerns are, in fact, intertwined. The first question is, why is dualism so tenacious? The second is, what is really at issue in the debate between Burge and McDowell? Regarding the first question, various contemporary philosophers have cast Descartes as the originator of a pernicious idea about the radical difference between mind and body, an idea with weed-like tenacity, that many have attempted to dig out once and for all, but which always seems to grow back from fragments left in the soil. The problem with this diagnosis of dualistic thinking as the result of an individual philosopher's influence is that it fails to consider that there may be broader and still active causes of its appeal. What is left unconsidered is the possibility that dualism is symptomatic of the wider tendencies of the scientific culture that Descartes, amongst others, represents, and that it persists not because of the long shadow of one philosopher, but because the essentials of this intellectual culture remain. In Sections 2 and 3 I will argue that this is indeed the case, and that the mode of thought at issue is to do with the dominance of scientific idealisations in our thinking about nature, including human beings and their minds. In answer to the second question, Fish (2021) has examined the debate between Burge and McDowell over the alleged incompatibility of disjunctivism with the discoveries of perceptual science, and has compared it to a clash of Kuhnian paradigms. Miguens (2020) takes conflicting ideas about representations to be the main point of disagreement. I will argue instead that the point at issue is Burge's acceptance, and McDowell's rejection of the ‘Cartesian idealisation' of mind as a self-contained system. Fish's treatment of the controversy as a matter of competing research programmes, analogous to scientific ones, neglects the crucial particularity of the case, which is that McDowell's philosophy of perception declines to define its explanatory objects in the way most conducive to scientific research. For this reason, there is more of a tension with science than McDowell admits; but as I will ultimately argue, this does not invalidate disjunctivism. Mazviita Chirimuuta is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. Her current research interests include philosophy of perception, philosophy of neuroscience, and history of the mind/brain sciences. She received her PhD in Vision Science from the University of Cambridge in 2004. Following that she held post-docs in perceptual psychology, and in philosophy at Monash University and at Washington University in St. Louis. Between 2011-2020 she was Assistant then Associate Professor in History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. Her book Outside Colour: Perceptual Science and the Puzzle of Colour in Philosophy was published by MIT Press in 2015, and she is currently working on a monograph under contract with MIT Press, The Brain Abstracted: Simplification in the History and Philosophy of Neuroscience. The new book examines the various strategies that neuroscientists have used to produce simple models of formidably complex neural systems. Given that simplified representations, such as computational models, require departure from literal truth about the brain, the book will consider how to best interpret such abstractions when doing naturalistic philosophy of mind. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Chirimuuta's talk - "Disjunctivism and Cartesian Idealisation" - at the Aristotelian Society on 9th May 2022. This recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Common-sense (or folk) psychology holds that (generally) we do what we do for the reasons we have. This common-sense approach is embodied in claims like “I went to the kitchen because I wanted a drink” or “She took a coat because she thought it might rain and she hoped to stay dry”. However, the veracity of these common-sense psychological explanations has been challenged by experimental evidence (primarily from behavioural economics and social psychology) which appears to show that individuals are systematically irrational – that often we do not do what we do because of the reasons we have. Recently, some of the same experimental evidence has also been used to level a somewhat different challenge at the common-sense view, arguing that the overarching aim of reasoning is not to deliver better or more logical decisions for individual reasoners, but to improve group decision making or to protect an individual's sense of self. This paper explores the range of challenges that experimental work has been taken to raise for the common-sense approach and suggests some potential responses. Overall, I argue that the experimental evidence should not (currently) lead us to a rejection of individual rationality. Emma Borg is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Reading and Joint Director of the Reading Centre for Cognition Research. She has held a number of visiting and advisory positions, including the White Distinguished Fellow for Philosophy at the University of Chicago, and sitting on the Executive Committee of the Mind Association. Currently she serves on the Advisory Board of the Leverhulme Trust, and (due to her work in business ethics) as an Independent Advisor to the Professional Standards Committee of Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC). In the past, her research has focused on philosophy of language, particularly the semantics-pragmatics interface, but she currently holds a Leverhulme Trust Major Research Fellowship for work exploring our understanding of human action. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Borg's talk - "In Defence of Individual Rationality" - at the Aristotelian Society on 25th April 2022. This recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

This paper is about whether it is rational to intrinsically desire the vague. A proposition is inconsequential if neither it, nor its negation is rational to intrinsically desire. The objects of intrinsic desire are propositions, and the contradictory of propositional vagueness is propositional precision. Every vague proposition is not precise, and every precise proposition is not vague. The question to be pursued thus can be posed as follows: is every consequential proposition precise? Jack Spencer is Associate Professor of Philosophy at MIT. Before doing his PhD at Princeton, he studied philosophy and economics at University of Colorado, Boulder. Much of his research has been in metaphysics and decision theory. He is currently thinking about instantaneous rates-of-change, fundamentality, rationality and vagueness. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Spencer's talk - "Intrinsically Desiring the Vague" - at the Aristotelian Society on 21st March 2022. This recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Photography is highly valued as a recording medium. Traditionally it has been claimed that photography is fundamentally a causal recording process, and that every photograph is the causal imprint of the world in front of the camera. In this paper I seek to challenge that traditional view. I claim that it is based on a ‘single-stage' misconception of the process that defines photographs as mind-independent images and leaves no room for photographic depiction. I explain my objections to that view and propose an alternative, ‘multi-stage' account of the process, in which I argue that causal registration of light is not equivalent to recording and reproducing an image. The proposed account can explain how photography functions as an exemplary recording medium, without supposing that every photograph is a mind-independent causal imprint of the world. Intervention or non-intervention by photographers is a more complex matter than the traditional view allows. Using the framework of the multistage account, I describe three different ways that photographic pictures can be produced. Dawn Phillips studied at the University of Durham and wrote her PhD on Wittgenstein's say-show distinction. She held philosophy positions at Kent, Cork, Southampton, Oxford, and Warwick. In 2011 she became a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Hull and, also, became Dawn Wilson. Dawn has published on Wittgenstein early and late, particularly the Tractatus, including articles on logical analysis, clarity, symbolism, the picture theory of language and the expression of thought. With David Connearn, she co-authored an article about Wittgenstein's House in Skjolden and co-ordinated an international letters campaign for the conservation of the house and its legacy. She is interested in language, thought and image, particularly in art and aesthetics and the philosophy of photography. Her article, ‘Photography and Causation', launched a field of debate known as the ‘New Theory' of photography and was selected as one of twelve classic texts to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the British Journal of Aesthetics. She recently published ‘Invisible Images and Indeterminacy: Why we need a Multi-stage Account of Photography' and she is co-authoring, with Laure Blanc-Benon, the photography entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. She is writing a book titled Aesthetics and Photography for Bloomsbury, and articles on temporal representation, co-portraiture, and comparing photography with music. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Wilson's talk - "Reflecting, Registering, Recording and Representing: From Light Image to Photographic Picture" - at the Aristotelian Society on 7th March 2022. This recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Aesthetic beautification is a familiar artistic phenomenon: Even as they face death, heroes and heroines in operas still sing glorious music. Characters in Shakespearean tragedies still deliver beautifully eloquent speeches in the throes of despair. Even depicting suffering and horror, paintings can still remain a transfixing delight for the eyes. In such cases, the work of art represents or expresses something we would, in ordinary life, attribute a negative valence (suffering, horror, death, and the like), but it does so beautifully. Doubtless there is not a single explanation for what transpires in art of this sort or in our experience of it. With some aesthetically beautified art, its foremost goal might be giving aesthetic pleasure, and the beauty of the aesthetic form, even when depicting horrors, is in the service of this primary aim. In other art, the beautification might seek to be jarring and thought-provoking, highlighting a disconnect between the aesthetic frame and what is portrayed. These routes explain much of aesthetic beautification. But I am particularly interested in considering another more specific response still: finding ourselves somehow consoled by the beautification. I begin with some reflections on aesthetic beautification in general, and then turn to consider how beautification and consolation might be connected, and what to make of this. Andrew Huddleston is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick, where he is co-Director of the Centre for Research in Post-Kantian European Philosophy. He studied as an undergraduate at Brown and at Pembroke College, Cambridge, and did his PhD at Princeton under the supervision of Alexander Nehamas. Huddleston previously taught at Exeter College, Oxford and at Birkbeck College, University of London. He specializes in 19th and 20th Century European Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Ethics. His book Nietzsche on the Decadence and Flourishing of Culture (2019) was published by Oxford University Press, and he is presently at work on a book tentatively titled Art's Highest Calling: The Religion of Art in a Secular Age. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Huddleston's talk - "Aesthetic Beautification" - at the Aristotelian Society on 21 February 2022. This recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Nietzsche's attitude toward science is ambivalent: he remarks approvingly on its rigorous methodology and adventurous spirit, but also points out its limitations and rebukes scientists for encroaching onto philosophers' territory. What does Nietzsche think is science's proper role and relationship with philosophy? I argue that, according to Nietzsche, philosophy should set goals for science. Philosophers' distinctive task is to ‘create values', which involves two steps: (1) envisioning ideals for human life, and (2) turning those ideals into prescriptions for behaviour and societal organisation. To accomplish step (2), philosophers should delegate scientists to investigate what moral rules and social arrangements have best advanced this ideal in the past or might in the future. Rachel Cristy is a Lecturer in Philosophy at King's College London. She received her PhD in Philosophy from Princeton University and held a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Toronto's Centre for Ethics before coming to King's. She works on the history of late modern philosophy, primarily on Nietzsche, sometimes putting him in conversation with William James, one of the founders of American Pragmatism. She is especially interested in late modern philosophers' attitudes toward science, including both epistemological views (on its methods, its limitations, what sort of philosophical foundation it has or needs) and ethical views (on the proper place of science in the life of individuals and societies). She has also published on Kant's aesthetics as it relates to wine. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Cristy's talk - "Commanders and Scientific Labourers: Nietzsche on the Relationship Between Philosophy and Science" - at the Aristotelian Society on 31 January 2022. This recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Metaphysicians are in the business of making and defending modal claims – claims about how things must be or cannot be. Wittgenstein's opposition to necessity claims, along with his various negative remarks about ‘metaphysical' uses of language, makes it seem almost a truism that Wittgenstein was opposed to metaphysics. In this paper I want to make a case for rejecting that apparent truism. My thesis is that it is illuminating to characterise what Wittgenstein and Anscombe are doing in their philosophical writing as metaphysics without manufactured necessities. Doing so helps to articulate a sharper, more interesting, critique of contemporary metaphysical practices than therapeutic or linguistic framings of Wittgenstein's method make possible. It also allows us to place Anscombe in the context of a tradition of British metaphysics that emerged in the 1940s in an attempt to reverse the devastating impact on ethics of the new ‘analytical' philosophy. Rachael Wiseman is Senior Lecturer in Philosphy at University of Liverpool. She is the author of the Routledge Guidebook to Anscombe's Intention (Routledge, 2016) and, with Clare Mac Cumhaill, Metaphysical Animals (Chatto & Windus, 2022) — a joint philosophical biography of GEM Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley and Iris Murdoch. She is associate editor (for analytic philosophy) at British Journal for the History of Philosophy. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Wiseman's talk - "Metaphysics by Analogy" - at the Aristotelian Society on 17 January 2022. This recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

According to the doxastic wrongs thesis, merely entertaining certain beliefs about others can wrong them, even if one does not act on those beliefs. Beliefs based on socially salient characteristics such as race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, etc., and which turn out to be false and are negatively valenced are prime candidates for the charge of doxastic wronging. My aim, in this paper, is to show that a plausible, Kantian argument for the thesis licences extending the latter to cases in which the belief is true and/or positively valenced. I begin by setting out the doxastic wrong thesis in its general form. I then reject Mark Schroeder's argument for restricting it to false beliefs, and mount a positive, Kantian argument for including true beliefs within the ambit of the thesis. I end the paper by tackling some objections, in the course of which I extend the thesis to further cases. Cécile Fabre is Senior Research Fellow in Politics at All Souls College, Oxford, and Professor of Political Philosophy at the University of Oxford. She previous taught at the London School of Economics and the University of Edinburgh. She holds degrees from La Sorbonne University, the University of York, and the University of Oxford. Her research interests include theories of distributive justice, issues relating to the rights we have over our own body and, more recently, just war theory,and the ethics of foreign policy. This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Fabre's talk - "Doxastic Wrongs, Non-spurious Generalisations and Particularised Beliefs" - at the Aristotelian Society on 15 November 2021. This recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Heather Widdows is the John Ferguson Professor of Global Ethics and Pro-Vice Chancellor (Research and Knowledge Exchange) at the University of Birmingham. She is Deputy Chair of the Philosophy sub-panel for REF 2021 and was a member of the 2014 sub-panel. Her most recent book, Perfect Me: Beauty as an Ethical Ideal (2018), was described by Vogue as “ground-breaking” and listed by The Atlantic as one of the best books of 2018. She is author of The Connected Self: The Ethics and Governance of the Genetic Individual (2103), Global Ethics: An Introduction (2011), and The Moral Vision of Iris Murdoch (2005). She has co-edited, with Darrel Moellendorf, The Routledge Handbook of Global Ethics (2014). She co-runs the Beauty Demands Network and Blog and the #everydaylookism project. This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Widdows' talk - 'No Duty To Resist: Why individual resistance is an ineffective response to dominant beauty ideals' - at the Aristotelian Society on 18 October 2021. This recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

As the first talk for the 2021-22 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, this year's Presidential Address marks the official inauguration of Professor Robert Stern (University of Sheffield) as the 114th President of the Aristotelian Society. The Society's President is elected on the basis of lifelong, exemplary work in philosophy. The 114th Presidential Address was chaired by Bill Brewer (KCL), the 113th President of the Aristotelian Society. Robert Stern is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield, where he has been since 1989. Prior to that he did his BA and PhD at Cambridge, and held a research fellowship at St John's College Cambridge. His main research interests are in the history of philosophy – particularly Kant and Hegel, and also Kierkegaard, and more recently K. E. Løgstrup, Iris Murdoch, Emmanuel Levinas and Martin Luther. He connects these historical inquires with more systematic questions in metaphysics, epistemology and ethics, particularly topics such as realism vs idealism, the use of transcendental arguments, and the nature of moral obligation. His books include three works on Hegel; a collection of papers on Kant; a discussion of transcendental arguments; an investigation into Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard on obligation; and a study of Løgstrup. He has been a Fellow of the British Academy since 2019, and has served on the Executive Committee of the Aristotelian Society and as President of the British Philosophical Association, and is currently chair of the Philosophy sub-panel for REF2021. This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Stern's address - 'The Objectivity of Perception' - at the Aristotelian Society on 5 October 2020. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

This episode a two for one: I'll be discussing an exchange between Alexander Bird and Barbara Vetter that takes the form of two articles, one by each author, published in the proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in 2018.   Bird: https://academic.oup.com/aristoteliansupp/article-abstract/92/1/247/5032734 Vetter: https://academic.oup.com/aristoteliansupp/article-abstract/92/1/277/5032735Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/CondensedMatter)

Julia Borcherding is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Cambridge. Before moving to Cambridge, she was a Bersoff Faculty Fellow at New York University. Julia specializes in early modern philosophy, focusing on moral, epistemological and metaphysical themes and their intriguing interconnections. She has published on the philosophy of Leibniz, Conway, Cavendish, Arnauld and Spinoza. Her current book project The Metaphysics of Emotion investigates the underappreciated metaphysical dimensions of early modern accounts of love. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr. Borcherding's talk - '“I wish my Speech were like a Loadstone”: Cavendish on Love and Self-Love' - at the Aristotelian Society on 28 June 2021. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Michael Beaney (毕明安) is Regius Professor of Logic at the University of Aberdeen, Professor of the History of Analytic Philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin, and Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Tsinghua University in Beijing. Recent books include The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy (edited, OUP, 2013) and Analytic Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (OUP, 2017). While the main focus of his work has been on the history of analytic philosophy (especially the writings of Frege, Wittgenstein, Stebbing, and Collingwood), his research interests include philosophical methodology (with particular reference to analysis and creativity throughout the history of philosophy), historiography, philosophical translation (he has just completed a new translation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus for OUP), and Chinese philosophy (on which he has increasingly been working, especially ancient Chinese philosophy of language and logic). He was editor of the British Journal for the History of Philosophy from 2011 to 2020, and is general editor of a book series on the history of analytic philosophy (published by Palgrave Macmillan), and co-editor of a series entitled ‘BSHP New Texts in the History of Philosophy' (published by OUP). This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Beaney's talk - 'Swimming Happily in Chinese Logic' - at the Aristotelian Society on 21 June 2021. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Corine Besson is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sussex. She did her undergraduate degree in Philosophy and French Literature at the University of Geneva. She went to Oxford for her postgraduate studies, to first do a B.Phil, and then write a D.Phil. on the relation of second-order logic to the theory of meaning. Her research interests are in the philosophy of logic, epistemology, the philosophy of language, and the history of analytic philosophy. Her current work focuses mostly on how logic relates to reasoning — from foundational, normative and epistemological perspectives. She has just finished writing a book for Oxford University Press on the relevance of Lewis Carroll's regress argument (in his Mind 1895 paper ‘What the Tortoise Said to Achilles') to key debates in the philosophy of logic and reasoning. Its (working) title is: Logic, Reasoning and Regresses: A Defence of Logical Cognitivism. Corine also runs the Centre for Logic and Language (CeLL) at the Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, London, and, together with Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm), she holds a three year grant from the Bank of Sweden on The Foundations of Epistemic Normativity. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Besson's talk - 'Knowing How to Reason Logically' - at the Aristotelian Society on 7 June 2021. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Kenny Easwaran is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University. He did his PhD in the Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science at UC Berkeley, and then worked at the Australian National University and the University of Southern California before moving to Texas A&M. He has done work on the foundations of probability and decision theory, as well as on the social epistemology of axioms and proofs in mathematical reasoning. His current work focuses on analogies between different possible futures in decisions under uncertainty, the different individuals in social choices, and the different stages of the self in reasoning across time. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Easwaran's talk - 'A New Method for Value Aggregation' - at the Aristotelian Society on 24 May 2021. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Joseph Chan is Professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at The University of Hong Kong. He is Global Scholar and Visiting Professor at the University Center for Human Values of Princeton University in 2019-2021 spring semesters. His recent research interests span Confucian political philosophy, comparative political theory, democratic theory, social and political equality, and popular sovereignty. He is the author of Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times (Princeton, 2014) and co-edited with Melissa Williams and Doh Shin East Asian Perspectives on Political Legitimacy: Bridging the Empirical-Normative Divide (Cambridge, 2016). He has been published in numerous journals such as Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, History of Political Thought, the Journal of Democracy, Philosophy East and West, and China Quarterly. This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Chan's talk - 'Equality, Friendship, and Politics' - at the Aristotelian Society on 10 May 2021. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Ralf M. Bader is a professor of philosophy at the Université de Fribourg in Switzerland, where he holds the chair for ethics and political philosophy. His research focuses on ethics, meta-ethics, metaphysics, Kant, political philosophy and decision theory. He is also interested in neo-Kantian and early analytic philosophy, as well as the history of political thought. Previously, he was a Fellow of Merton College and an Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Oxford, as well as a Bersoff Assistant Professor and Faculty Fellow in the Philosophy Department at New York University. This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Bader's talk - 'Coincidence and Supervenience' - at the Aristotelian Society on 24 April 2021. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Helga Varden is Professor of Philosophy and Gender and Women Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She has held visiting positions at the University of Chicago, Northwestern University, and the University of St. Andrews, and she is an executive editor of the Journal of Canadian Philosophy. Her main research interests are Kant’s practical philosophy, legal-political philosophy and its history, feminist philosophy, and the philosophy of sex and love. In addition to her Sex, Love, and Gender: A Kantian Theory (Oxford University Press, 2020), Varden has published many articles on a range of classical philosophical issues including Kant’s answer to the murderer at the door, private property, care relations, political obligations, and political legitimacy, as well as on applied issues such as privacy, poverty, non-human animals, and terrorism. The talk delivered here—“Kant and Arendt on Barbaric and Totalitarian Evil”—on how theorize political evil, points both backward to a theme running through Sex, Love, and Gender and forward to a central theme in her new book project on Kant’s transformation of the social contract tradition. This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Varden's talk - 'Kant and Arendt on Barbaric and Totalitarian Evil' - at the Aristotelian Society on 22 March 2021. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Nicolas Cornell is Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. He works in normative ethics, contract law, and private law theory. His writing has appeared both in philosophy journals — including “The Possibility of Preemptive Forgiving” (Philosophical Review, 2017) and “Wrongs, Rights, and Third Parties” (Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2015) — and in law reviews — including “Competition Wrongs” (Yale Law Journal, 2020), and “A Complainant-Oriented Approach to Unconscionability and Contract Law” (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2016). He is currently working on a book manuscript on the relationship between rights and wronging, under contract with Harvard University Press. Prior to joining the faculty at Michigan, he was an assistant professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics at the Wharton School. He holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School, a Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard University. This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Cornell's talk - 'Gambling on Others and Relying on Others' - at the Aristotelian Society on 8 March 2021. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Mary-Louise Gill is David Benedict Professor of Classics and Philosophy at Brown University, and works on ancient Greek philosophy, especially Plato’s later metaphysics and method and Aristotle’s natural philosophy and metaphysics. She received her M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge, and previously taught at the University of Pittsburgh in Classics, Philosophy, and History & Philosophy of Science. She has held visiting positions at Dartmouth College, UCLA, UC Davis, Harvard, University of Paris-1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, and Peking University in Beijing; her fellowships include the Stanford Humanities Center, Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, and Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard. She is the author of Aristotle on Substance: the Paradox of Unity (Princeton, 1989), of an Introduction and co-translation Plato: Parmenides (Hackett, 1996), and of Philosophos: Plato’s Missing Dialogue (Oxford, 2012); and she coedited Self-Motion: From Aristotle to Newton (Princeton, 1994), Unity, Identity and Explanation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Oxford, 1994), and Companion to Ancient Philosophy (Blackwell, 2006). She is currently working on various aspects of Aristotle’s hylomorphism, including his treatment of mind and thought in De Anima, and the culmination of his metaphysics in Metaphysics Lambda on the relation between human and divine substance. This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Gill's talk - 'Aristotle’s Hylomorphism Reconceived' - at the Aristotelian Society on 22 February 2021. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Barbara Sattler is professor for ancient and medieval philosophy at Bochum University, and has taught at St. Andrews, Yale, and Urbana-Champaign before. The main areas of her research are issues in metaphysics and natural philosophy in the ancient Greek world, especially in the Presocratics, Plato, and Aristotle. She focuses on the philosophical processes through which central concepts of metaphysics and natural philosophy, such as space or speed, arise in Greek antiquity. By showing that such concepts were originally spelt out in ways significantly different from the way they are today, she aims to make us aware both of the rich conceptual basis we often take for granted, as well as to sketch out possible alternative understandings. She is the author of The Concept of Motion in Ancient Greek Thought – Foundations in Logic, Method, and Mathematics (CUP 2020), and is currently writing a book on ancient notions of space. This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Sattler's talk - 'Paradoxes as Philosophical Method and their Zenonian Origins' - at the Aristotelian Society on 1 February 2021. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

In the first episode of the Counterintuitive Series on the Governance Podcast, Professor Clare Chambers (University of Cambridge) defends the ideal of the marriage free state. She argues that for reasons of justice and equality, the state should not legally recognise - and therefore, privilege - any particular form of marriage. And until it ceases to do so, we must consider its actions unjust. Subscribe on iTunes and Spotify Subscribe to the Governance Podcast on iTunes and Spotify today and get all our latest episodes directly in your pocket. Follow Us For more information about our upcoming podcasts and events, follow us on facebook, twitter or instagram (@csgskcl). The Guest Clare Chambers is Professor of Political Philosophy and a Fellow of Jesus College. She came to Jesus College and to the Faculty of Philosophy in the University of Cambridge in 2006. Previously she held academic positions at the University of Oxford and the London School of Economics, and has twice been a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley. Prof Chambers is on leave from College duties from October 2018 until October 2021. During that time she has a Major Research Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust to work on a project titled Intact: The Political Philosophy of the Unmodified Body. Prof Chambers is a Council member of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, the UK's leading independent body informing policy and public debate about the ethical questions surrounding medical and biological innovations and research. She is also Editor-in-Chief of Res Publica, a journal of moral, legal, and political philosophy; a member of the Executive Committee of The Aristotelian Society; and the Secretary of the Britain and Ireland Association for Political Thought.

Lee Walters is an Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. Prior to joining Southampton, Lee studied philosophy at UCL and taught at Oxford. Lee’s main interests are in metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and philosophical Logic, with a particular emphasis on the philosophy of fiction. Lee has been an Associate Editor of Analysis; a trustee of the British Society of Aesthetics; has held a British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship; and has been a junior fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study, CEU, Budapest. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr. Walters' talk - 'The Linguistic Approach to Ontology' - at the Aristotelian Society on 18 January 2021. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Leigh K. Jenco is Professor of Political Theory at the London School of Economics. She received her PhD in political science at the University of Chicago, before teaching at Brown University and the National University of Singapore.  Her research works across the disciplinary platforms of political theory, global intellectual history, and Asian studies to demonstrate the value of Chinese thought for posing new questions of political life.  She has served as associate editor of the flagship journal American Political Science Review (2016-2020) and principal investigator for the Humanities in the European Research Area grant project "East Asian Uses of the European Past"  (2016-2019). She is the author of Changing Referents: Learning Across Space and Time in China and the West (Oxford UP, 2015),  and Making the Political: Founding and Action in the Political Theory of Zhang Shizhao (Cambridge UP, 2010). Most recently, with Megan Thomas and Murad Idris, she co-edited The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Political Theory (Oxford UP, 2020). This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Jenco's talk - 'Moral Knowledge and Empirical Verification in Late Ming China' - at the Aristotelian Society on 16 November 2020. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Adrian Haddock is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Stirling, and between 2017 and 2019 he was a Senior Research Fellow in the Forschungskolleg Analytic German Idealism (FAGI) at the University of Leipzig. His work centres on the idea of subjectivity, and on its significance for understanding the fundamental concerns of philosophy. He has written on action, perception, knowledge, and language. He is currently in the process of completing a book manuscript, entitled Subject and Object, and editing (with Rachael Wiseman) a collection of essays on the philosophy of G.E.M. Anscombe. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr Haddock's talk - 'The Wonder of Signs' - at the Aristotelian Society on 2 November 2020. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Tommy J. Curry is a Professor of Philosophy and holds the Personal Chair of Africana Philosophy and Black Male Studies at the University of Edinburgh. His research interests are 19th century ethnology, Critical Race Theory & Black Male Studies. He is the author of The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood (Temple University Press 2017), which won the 2018 American Book Award, and Another white Man’s Burden: Josiah Royce’s Quest for a Philosophy of Racial Empire (SUNY Press 2018), which recently won the Josiah Royce Prize for American Idealist Thought. He has also re-published the forgotten philosophical works of William Ferris as The Philosophical Treatise of William H. Ferris: Selected Readings from The African Abroad or, His Evolution in Western Civilization (Rowman & Littlefield 2016). In 2019 he became the editor of the first book series dedicated to the study of Black males entitled Black Male Studies: A Series Exploring the Paradoxes of Racially Subjugated Males on Temple University Press. Dr. Curry’s research has been recognized by Diverse as placing him among the Top 15 Emerging Scholars in the United States in 2018, and his public intellectual work earned him the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy’s Alain Locke Award in 2017. He is the past president of Philosophy Born of Struggle, one of the oldest Black philosophy organizations in the United States. This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Curry's talk - 'Must there be an Empirical Basis for the Theorization of Racialized Subjects in Race-Gender Theory?' - at the Aristotelian Society on 19 October 2020. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

As the first talk for the 2020-21 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, this year's Presidential Address marks the official inauguration of Professor Bill Brewer (King's College London) as the 113th President of the Aristotelian Society. The Society's President is elected on the basis of lifelong, exemplary work in philosophy. Please visit our Council page for further information regarding the Society's past presidents. The 113th Presidential Address will be chaired by Helen Steward (Leeds) - 112th President of the Aristotelian Society.

As the first talk for the 2020-21 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, this year's Presidential Address marks the official inauguration of Professor Bill Brewer (King's College London) as the 113th President of the Aristotelian Society. The Society's President is elected on the basis of lifelong, exemplary work in philosophy. Bill Brewer is Susan Stebbing Professor of Philosophy at King's College London, having previously been Research Fellow at King’s College Cambridge, Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at St. Catherine’s College, Oxford, and Professor of Philosophy at Warwick, and also a visiting professor at Brown and Berkeley. He is author of Perception and Reason (Oxford: OUP, 1999) and Perception and Its Objects (Oxford: OUP, 2011), and of many papers on perception, action, objects, and knowledge. He is co-editor of Spatial Representation (Oxford: OUP, 1999) and The Nature of Ordinary Objects (Cambridge: CUP, 2019). He works on Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, and Epistemology, and is currently returning to an abiding interest in the objectivity of perceptual experience. He is co-editor of Philosophy, the journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy. This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Brewer's address - 'The Objectivity of Perception' - at the Aristotelian Society on 5 October 2020. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Mayormente usamos palabras creyendo que nos permiten expresar nuestros pensamientos, pero es más probable que tenemos ciertos pensamientos y podemos conocer de cierta forma porque tenemos precisamente esas palabras. Pero bueno, palabras más, palabras menos, quizás existe la epistemología porque existe la cerveza... Abre este enlace para unirte a mi grupo de WhatsApp de Epistemología y Epistemología: https://chat.whatsapp.com/CYfVNiRE5XNDkXPiVTwQji ¿Quieres invitarle una Cerveza al Epistemólogo Ebrio? 🍻 Bien, puedes colaborar con el podcast sin problemas📲 Te prometemos que tu donación servirá para aumentar la calidad de los episodios 🎙️, o de la cerveza 🍺, lo que esté al alcance de la epistemología😉. Desde ya, muchas gracias por el buen trago.😍 Puedes donar 20 desde el siguiente link: http://mpago.li/2iKKcVQ Puedes donar 50 desde el siguiente link: http://mpago.li/1AQEjC4 Puedes donar 100 desde el siguiente link: http://mpago.li/2RhFCqg Puedes escucharlo desde la aplicación SPOTIFY: https://open.spotify.com/show/1uobRUSrFJp52FZdcsCOQe?si=68RLeyXWQaW3FLQw8VNwGQ Puedes escucharlo directamente desde IVOOX: https://ar.ivoox.com/es/podcast-educacion-para-jovenes-epistemologia-audio_sq_f1638689_1.html Puedes escucharlo directamente desde YOUTUBE: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCDaC646HXI5jCnkji4jBtMQ/featured?view_as=subscriber Puedes escucharlo directametne desde Google Podcast: https://podcasts.google.com/?feed=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuaXZvb3guY29tL2VkdWNhY2lvbi1wYXJhLWpvdmVuZXMtZXBpc3RlbW9sb2dpYS1hdWRpb19mZ19mMTYzODY4OV9maWx0cm9fMS54bWw&ep=14 Puedes escucharlo directamente desde APPLEPODCAST: https://podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/educaci%C3%B3n-para-j%C3%B3venes-epistemolog%C3%ADa-por-audio/id1448671719 Puedes escucharlo directamente desde DEEZER: https://www.deezer.com/uk/show/748972 Puedes escucharlo directamente desde CASTBOX: https://castbox.fm/channel/Epistem%C3%B3logo-Ebrio-id1929217?country=us Tenemos Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/epistemologoebrio Tenemos Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/epistemologoebrio/ Tenemos Twitter: https://twitter.com/paravano69 ¡Siempre puedes compartirlo o a tu peor enemigo o a tu mejor amigo! SALUD Y BUENAS CIENCIAS Música: The Thrill is Gone (Cover de Brooks96, 2014, Creative Commons, SoundCloud),   Audio-Memes: -- Bibliografía: Biasco I Bas, A. (2009) “Mil años de virtualidad: origen y evolución de un concepto contemporáneo”, en Eikasia, Nº 28, pp. 1-40. Black, M. (1966) Modelos y Metáforas, Tecnos: Madrid.          -- (1954) “Metaphor” en Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Nº 55, pp. 273–294. Deleuze, G. (2002) Diferencia y Repetición, Amorrurtu. Haack, S. (2019) “The Art Of Scientific Metaphors”, en ​Revista Portuguesa de Filosofía, Vol. LXXV, Nº 4, pp. 2049-2066       -- (1994) “`Dry Truth and Real Knowledge`: Epistemologies of Metaphor and Metaphor of Epistemologies”, en Aspects of Metaphor, Jaakko Hintikka: Boston.  Kalpokas, D. (2009) “Acción, percepción e inferencia”, Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia, pp. 266-271 Palma, H. (2015) Ciencia y metáfora: crítica de una razón incestuosa, Prometeo: Bs. As.       -- (2008) Metáforas y modelos científicos. El lenguaje en la enseñanza de las ciencias, Zorzal: Bs. As. Rosset, C. (2012) La elección de las palabras. Seguido por la Alegría y la Paradoja, Hueders.

Walter Dean works in philosophy of mathematics and mathematical and philosophical logic. He also has interests in theoretical computer science and the history and philosophy of computation. He is currently working on applications of Reverse Mathematics and computational complexity theory within philosophy and on the historical and foundational significance of Gödel’s completeness theorem. He is currently Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick where he convenes the Mathematics and Philosophy degree. Before coming to Warwick, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Paris 7, following a PhD in Computer Science at the City University of New York Graduate Center and a PhD in Philosophy from Rutgers. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr. Dean's talk - 'On Consistency and Existence in Mathematics' - at the Aristotelian Society on 15 June 2020. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Béatrice Han-Pile studied philosophy, history and literature at the Ecole Normale Supérieure (Paris) and was awarded a Fellowship from the Thiers Foundation while completing her doctoral thesis on Michel Foucault. Before coming to Essex, she taught in France at the Universities of Paris IV-Sorbonne, Reims and Amiens. She is the author of Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical (Stanford University Press, 2002). She has published mostly on Foucault, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, phenomenology (in particular Heidegger) and the philosophy of agency. In 2015-2018 she was Principal Investigator on a three-year AHRC-funded project on ‘The Ethics of Powerlessness: The Theological Virtues Today’ (EoP). She is currently working on medio-passive agency, both in itself and through the writings of early Christian thinkers (John Cassian and St Augustine) and of more recent authors such as Nietzsche, Foucault and Heidegger. She is also working on hope as a (medio-passive) virtue of powerlessness and on the conditions under which this theological virtue might afford us with appropriate ethical guidance in secular contexts. This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Han-Pile's talk - 'Two Puzzles in the Early Christian Constitution of the Self: Reflections on Foucault’s Interpretation of John Cassian' - at the Aristotelian Society on 8 June 2020. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Anna Mahtani is Associate Professor in philosophy at the London School of Economics. She did her PhD on vagueness at Sheffield, and then worked at Oxford and the Open University, before arriving at the LSE. She studies decision theory, formal epistemology, and the philosophy of language, and works at the intersection of these different disciplines. She is currently working on several projects: tracing the implications of Frege’s puzzle for various principles of welfare economics; analysing the phenomenon of ‘awareness growth’; and writing a book called The Objects of Credence. This podcast is an audio recording of Dr. Mahtani's talk - 'Dutch Book and Accuracy Theorems' - at the Aristotelian Society on 1 June 2020. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Maria Rosa Antognazza is Professor of Philosophy at King’s College London. Educated at the Catholic University of Milan, she has held research and visiting fellowships in Italy, Germany, Israel, Great Britain and the USA, including a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship, a two-year research fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust, and the Leibniz-Professorship at the University of Leipzig (Leibniz’s Alma Mater) in 2016. She served as Head of the King’s Philosophy Department from 2011/12 to 2014/15 and is the current Chair of the British Society for the History of Philosophy. Her research interests lie in the history of philosophy, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Her publications include Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation: Reason and Revelation in the Seventeenth Century (Yale University Press 2007); Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge University Press 2009; winner of the 2010 Pfizer Award); and Leibniz: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2016). She is the editor of The Oxford Handbook of Leibniz (Oxford University Press 2018) and of early modern texts including Hugo Grotius, The Truth of the Christian Religion, London, 1743 [Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics] (Liberty Fund 2012) and (with Howard Hotson) Alsted and Leibniz on God, the Magistrate and the Millennium (Harrassowitz Verlag 1999). In addition, she has contributed numerous articles and chapters to refereed journals and collective volumes. Most recently, she has been awarded the 2019-2020 Mind Senior Research Fellowship for work on her book Thinking with Assent: Renewing a Traditional Account of Knowledge and Belief (forthcoming with Oxford University Press). This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Antognazza's talk - 'The Distinction of Kind between Knowledge and Belief' - at the Aristotelian Society on 18 May 2020. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Derrick Darby is Henry Rutgers Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University, New Brunswick. He discovered his passion for philosophy growing up in New York City’s Queensbridge public housing projects, as he reports in his TEDx talk Doing the Knowledge. After getting his undergraduate degree at Colgate University, he earned his Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. His work in social and political philosophy has focused on rights, inequality, and democracy, and generally examines how the lived experience and history of race and anti-black racism connects with theoretical and normative philosophical questions. He is the author of Rights, Race, and Recognition (Cambridge University Press, 2009). His most recent book, co-authored with historian John L. Rury, is The Color of Mind: Why the Origins of the Achievement Gap Matter for Justice (University of Chicago Press, 2018). His op-eds have appeared in The New York Times, The Detroit Free Press, The Newark Star Ledger, and elsewhere. He is the founding organizer of the Social Justice Solutions Research Collaboratory at Rutgers and directs its renowned Summer Institute for Diversity in Philosophy. This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Darby's talk - 'Rights Externalism and Racial Injustice' - at the Aristotelian Society on 11 May 2020. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.

Nancy Cartwright is a methodologist and philosopher of the natural and human sciences, with special focus on causation, evidence and modelling. Her recent work has been on scientific evidence, objectivity and how to put theory to work. She is a Professor of Philosophy at Durham University and the University of California San Diego, having worked previously at Stanford University and the London School of Economics. Professor Cartwright is a former MacArthur fellow, a fellow of the British Academy and the Academy of Social Sciences, a member of the US National Academy of Sciences, the American Philosophical Society (the oldest honorary academic society in the US), the Academia Europeae and Leopoldina (the German Society for Natural Science). She has won the Hempel Prize for lifetime achievement in philosophy of science and with Elliott Sober, the Lebowitz Prize for Philosophical Achievement of the Phi Beta Kappa Society. She is Tsing Hua Honorary Distinguished Chair Professor in Taiwan and has been awarded honorary doctorates from the University of St Andrews and Southern Methodist University. Her latest books are Nature, the Artful Modeler and Improving Child Safety: deliberation, judgement and empirical research with Eileen Munro, Jeremy Hardie and Eleonora Montuschi. This podcast is an audio recording of Professor Cartwright's talk - 'Why Trust Science?' - at the Aristotelian Society on 27 April 2020. The recording was produced by the Backdoor Broadcasting Company.