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Sovereign debt crises have surged since the end of the Bretton Woods system and currently threaten a lost decade for many countries across the world. Indermit Gill, in the World Bank Group's 2024 International Debt Report, describes the situation in many of the poorest countries as a ‘metastasising solvency crisis that continues to be misdiagnosed as a liquidity problem'. Despite their severe socioeconomic consequences, no comprehensive legal framework exists to address these crises—arguably the most significant gap in international economic law.This lecture, based on Dr Karina Patrício Ferreira Lima's forthcoming book Governing Sovereign Debt Crises: The Case for International Sovereign Insolvency Law (Hart Publishing), makes the case for creating such a mechanism under international law. The book challenges prevailing narratives that attribute sovereign debt crises solely to debtor states' mismanagement or misfortunes, instead arguing that sovereign insolvency is a systemic feature of the international monetary system. Current solutions—voluntary, ad hoc, and fragmented—fail to equitably allocate losses across an increasingly diversified sovereign creditor base, leaving many creditors worse off. At the same time, debtor states and their populations remain vulnerable to macroeconomic crises and enduring austerity, which often lead to long-term economic stagnation.The book adopts a legal political economy approach to illustrate how power asymmetries among stakeholders and the absence of enforceable rules perpetuate inefficiencies and inequities in resolving sovereign debt crises. Drawing on the legal theory of finance, insolvency law, and common resource governance theory, it illustrates how these governance failures result in a dual tragedy: a tragedy of the commons and a tragedy of the anticommons. The lecture will also examine the growing complexity of sovereign debt markets, including the diversification of creditor types, the erosion of ‘gentlemen's agreements,' and the limitations of initiatives like the Paris Club and the G20's Common Framework for debt treatments. It concludes by arguing that only international sovereign insolvency rules can resolve the delays, inefficiencies, and inequities that plague sovereign debt restructuring, while exploring avenues for implementing such a proceeding and discussing the role of domestic law in a well-functioning international sovereign debt architecture.Dr Karina Patrício Ferreira Lima is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Leeds. Her research focuses on the intersection of law, finance, and sovereign debt within the broader context of global economic governance. Her research portfolio covers the legal governance of sovereign debt crises, the law and policy of international financial institutions, and the macroeconomic impact of financial law and regulation.Dr Patrício advises public entities, NGOs, and leading law firms on various aspects of financial and monetary law, including sovereign debt restructuring, financial regulation, and the governance of international financial institutions. Her work has been recognised with prestigious awards, including the 2022 Society of International Economic Law-Hart Prize and the 2022 John H. Jackson Prize, conferred by the Journal of International Economic Law. She also serves as a peer reviewer for top law and social sciences journals globally.

Sovereign debt crises have surged since the end of the Bretton Woods system and currently threaten a lost decade for many countries across the world. Indermit Gill, in the World Bank Group's 2024 International Debt Report, describes the situation in many of the poorest countries as a ‘metastasising solvency crisis that continues to be misdiagnosed as a liquidity problem'. Despite their severe socioeconomic consequences, no comprehensive legal framework exists to address these crises—arguably the most significant gap in international economic law.This lecture, based on Dr Karina Patrício Ferreira Lima's forthcoming book Governing Sovereign Debt Crises: The Case for International Sovereign Insolvency Law (Hart Publishing), makes the case for creating such a mechanism under international law. The book challenges prevailing narratives that attribute sovereign debt crises solely to debtor states' mismanagement or misfortunes, instead arguing that sovereign insolvency is a systemic feature of the international monetary system. Current solutions—voluntary, ad hoc, and fragmented—fail to equitably allocate losses across an increasingly diversified sovereign creditor base, leaving many creditors worse off. At the same time, debtor states and their populations remain vulnerable to macroeconomic crises and enduring austerity, which often lead to long-term economic stagnation.The book adopts a legal political economy approach to illustrate how power asymmetries among stakeholders and the absence of enforceable rules perpetuate inefficiencies and inequities in resolving sovereign debt crises. Drawing on the legal theory of finance, insolvency law, and common resource governance theory, it illustrates how these governance failures result in a dual tragedy: a tragedy of the commons and a tragedy of the anticommons. The lecture will also examine the growing complexity of sovereign debt markets, including the diversification of creditor types, the erosion of ‘gentlemen's agreements,' and the limitations of initiatives like the Paris Club and the G20's Common Framework for debt treatments. It concludes by arguing that only international sovereign insolvency rules can resolve the delays, inefficiencies, and inequities that plague sovereign debt restructuring, while exploring avenues for implementing such a proceeding and discussing the role of domestic law in a well-functioning international sovereign debt architecture.Dr Karina Patrício Ferreira Lima is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Leeds. Her research focuses on the intersection of law, finance, and sovereign debt within the broader context of global economic governance. Her research portfolio covers the legal governance of sovereign debt crises, the law and policy of international financial institutions, and the macroeconomic impact of financial law and regulation.Dr Patrício advises public entities, NGOs, and leading law firms on various aspects of financial and monetary law, including sovereign debt restructuring, financial regulation, and the governance of international financial institutions. Her work has been recognised with prestigious awards, including the 2022 Society of International Economic Law-Hart Prize and the 2022 John H. Jackson Prize, conferred by the Journal of International Economic Law. She also serves as a peer reviewer for top law and social sciences journals globally.

Sovereign debt crises have surged since the end of the Bretton Woods system and currently threaten a lost decade for many countries across the world. Indermit Gill, in the World Bank Group's 2024 International Debt Report, describes the situation in many of the poorest countries as a ‘metastasising solvency crisis that continues to be misdiagnosed as a liquidity problem'. Despite their severe socioeconomic consequences, no comprehensive legal framework exists to address these crises—arguably the most significant gap in international economic law.This lecture, based on Dr Karina Patrício Ferreira Lima's forthcoming book Governing Sovereign Debt Crises: The Case for International Sovereign Insolvency Law (Hart Publishing), makes the case for creating such a mechanism under international law. The book challenges prevailing narratives that attribute sovereign debt crises solely to debtor states' mismanagement or misfortunes, instead arguing that sovereign insolvency is a systemic feature of the international monetary system. Current solutions—voluntary, ad hoc, and fragmented—fail to equitably allocate losses across an increasingly diversified sovereign creditor base, leaving many creditors worse off. At the same time, debtor states and their populations remain vulnerable to macroeconomic crises and enduring austerity, which often lead to long-term economic stagnation.The book adopts a legal political economy approach to illustrate how power asymmetries among stakeholders and the absence of enforceable rules perpetuate inefficiencies and inequities in resolving sovereign debt crises. Drawing on the legal theory of finance, insolvency law, and common resource governance theory, it illustrates how these governance failures result in a dual tragedy: a tragedy of the commons and a tragedy of the anticommons. The lecture will also examine the growing complexity of sovereign debt markets, including the diversification of creditor types, the erosion of ‘gentlemen's agreements,' and the limitations of initiatives like the Paris Club and the G20's Common Framework for debt treatments. It concludes by arguing that only international sovereign insolvency rules can resolve the delays, inefficiencies, and inequities that plague sovereign debt restructuring, while exploring avenues for implementing such a proceeding and discussing the role of domestic law in a well-functioning international sovereign debt architecture.Dr Karina Patrício Ferreira Lima is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Leeds. Her research focuses on the intersection of law, finance, and sovereign debt within the broader context of global economic governance. Her research portfolio covers the legal governance of sovereign debt crises, the law and policy of international financial institutions, and the macroeconomic impact of financial law and regulation.Dr Patrício advises public entities, NGOs, and leading law firms on various aspects of financial and monetary law, including sovereign debt restructuring, financial regulation, and the governance of international financial institutions. Her work has been recognised with prestigious awards, including the 2022 Society of International Economic Law-Hart Prize and the 2022 John H. Jackson Prize, conferred by the Journal of International Economic Law. She also serves as a peer reviewer for top law and social sciences journals globally.

Sam One | Club Session | Ep 256 Live Set @ Cox Bar Paris August 16 2024 Podcast Link PODCAST | house4you Website: https://www.house4youmusic.com Youtube: https://youtube.com/@house4youmusic Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/house4youmusic/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/house4youmusic Buy my Music: https://www.feiyr.com/x/BUJEY Playlist: La Touche Retrofract Dark Matter VINYL ONLY A1 Daniel Broesecke Sometimes (Coqui Selection Remix) Audiowhores Helvetic Nerds - Walk On (Original Mix) (bacauhousemafia.blogspot.com) Helvetic Nerds Unity (Marco Grandi Rmx) Marco Berto & Nae:Tek Rolling Stoned feat Tasha (Original Mix) Lost Desert Island Letters (Original Mix) Nick Curly Esperanza Frankie In the Beginning (Original Mix) Athea Passion (Cubed Remix 2020) The Cube Guys Comfort Zone (Extended Mix) Sowel Catcall (Original Mix) Mr. Lekka Lift Me Up (Original Mix) SUNANA, CHERIAN Acid Is The Answer (Original Mix) Rossweisse, DJ Dan Magic Place (Extended Mix) Discosteps, Beau Soleil The Real Life (David Penn Extended Remix) Raven Maize, Dave Lee ZR Forest Love (Jose Dicaro Remix) David Fritz

listen to the world's most prominent news highlights. Presented by Mr. Amal Jayasinghe, AFP Journalist, and the world news critic - මේ සතියේදී ලෝකය පුරා සිදුවුණු විශේෂිතම සිදුවීම් කිහිපය පිළිබඳව සාකච්චා කිරීමට 'ලොව වටා' විදෙස් විත්ති සමාලෝචනය සමඟින් අප සමඟ සම්බන්ද වුයේ AFP ප්‍රවෘති ජාලයේ මාධ්‍යවේදී, විදෙස් විත්ති වාර්තාකරු අමල් ජයසිංහ මහතා.

Bozidar Djelic is a Managing Director, and Head of Lazard for Central and Eastern Europe, CIS (ex-Soviet Union), and Turkey. Mr. Djelic advises countries, corporations, and financial institutions on their development programs, financing options, and strategic transactions. He advised the Polish e-commerce giant, Allegro, on its IPO, the Spanish utility Naturgy on the sale of its electricity distribution assets in Moldova, the Serbian electricity incumbent EPS on its strategic options, a Chinese infrastructure player for a highway concession in Romania, and the Ukrainian Naftogaz on the disposal of its Egyptian onshore oil fields. He advised a Bulgarian telco on its sale, a Serbian bank on its privatization, the Croatian government on its oil assets, a Turkish construction Group for its inaugural Eurobond issuance, a French bank for the sale of its Slovene and North Macedonian subsidiaries, the Polish air transport PGL/LOT for the takeover of Condor holiday carrier, a Baltic food retailer on its CEE expansion, a Ukrainian agribusiness company on its sale, a PE fund for the disposal of its cable assets in Albania. Mr. Djelic has more than 25 years of experience in the public and private sectors across transition countries, including eight years as a senior member of the Serbian government. He was Deputy Prime Minister between 2007 and 2011, during which time he led negotiations for the country's entry into the European Union and absorption of EU funds. He negotiated the macroeconomic and investment program of the country with all major international financial institutions and other creditors. During this time he also served as Minister of Science and Technological Development. In 2012 he ran for President of the London-based EBRD and is a well-known personality across transition countries. Between 2013 and 2016 he was an independent non-executive director of Bank of Georgia. From 2001 to 2004, he was Minister of Finance and Economy of Serbia. He led a far-reaching multi-year stabilization and restructuring program, and deep banking sector reforms. He concluded a 66%, two-step, debt reduction deal with the Paris Club, and negotiated with the London Club and other multilateral and bilateral creditors. He also led the privatization of the tobacco, banking, and insurance sectors. He was the Chairman of the Belgrade Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2004. He helped secure funding for the Iron Gate hydropower station revitalization. Between 2005 and 2007, Mr. Djelic served as Credit Agricole's Director for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and was the head of its Ukrainian (Index Bank) and Serbian (Meridian) subsidiaries. From 1993 to 2001, he was a Partner of McKinsey & Company in the Paris and Silicon Valley offices, specializing in financial institutions, media, and technology. Between 1990 and 1993, he lived in Warsaw and Moscow, advising the Polish and the Russian governments on their macro and privatization programs and the setting up of the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Mr. Djelic holds an MBA from the Harvard Business School, an MPA from the J.F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and an MA in Economics from the School of High Social Studies in Paris. He is a graduate of the French business school HEC and the Institute of Political Studies (summa cum laude).

Three news stories summarized & contextualized by analytic journalist Colin Wright.Russia mourns victims of concert shootingSummary: On Sunday, Russia marked a day of mourning for the victims of an attack on a concert hall on the outskirts of Moscow, during which at least 133 people were killed and more than 150 were injured; responsibility for the attack has been claimed by the regional wing of the Islamic State extremist group.Context: Details are still being collected and assessed, and the Russian government has said the official death toll will likely continue to rise, but it would seem that four gunmen opened-fire with automatic weapons at the Crocus City Hall concert venue on Friday of last week, just as people were arriving and taking their seats for a sold out show; Russian officials say they've caught the four gunmen, alongside seven other individuals who may have been involved, that the gunmen seemed to be trying to escape into Ukraine following the attack, and that they believe Ukraine was somehow involved—a claim that Ukrainian leadership denies; US intelligence sources warned of a potential terrorist attack in Moscow two weeks earlier, telling US citizens in the city to avoid large crowds.—ReutersOne Sentence News is a reader-supported publication. To support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.Biden signs final bill to fund the government, ending shutdown fearsSummary: US President Biden signed a $1.2 trillion spending package on Saturday after Congress rushed a series of votes to finalize the legislation, narrowly avoiding a government shutdown.Context: These sorts of last-minute spending bill passages have become common in recent years, in part because of divisions between Democrats and Republicans, but also because of rifts between conventional conservative Republicans and more radical members of their party; those latter rifts sparked a series of eyebrow-raising announcements over the weekend, including the implementation of the initial steps to oust the Republican House Speaker, brought by a Republican Representative, an announcement by the retiring chair of the House China Select Committee, a Republican from Wisconsin, that he would be vacating his seat next month, which will leave House Republicans with a majority of just one seat, a decision by another early-retiring House Republican to sign a petition circulated by Democrats to force a vote on sending aid to Ukraine on his way out of office, and a statement by the Republican House Oversight and Accountability Chair in which he indicated that his inquiry into the President through which his party hoped to secure an impeachment, wasn't going anywhere and would end without a vote.—The New York TimesSomalia secures 99% debt cancellation from Paris Club creditor nationsSummary: In mid-March, the Paris Club—a group of countries that issue debt to other countries—announced that they would be cancelling 99% of the debt they are owed by Somalia.Context: This cancellation of billions of dollars in debt is the consequence of Somalia completing the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, which involved implementing IMF-delineated economic reforms that make it less likely a country receiving debt-relief will fall back into extreme debt; this cancellation will reduce Somalia's foreign debt-load so that it's equivalent to less than 6% of the country's GDP, compared to the 64% of GDP it was at in late-2018.—ReutersUS stock markets are by far the biggest in the world, but it's notable (and made more evident in this visualization) that the seven biggest companies in US markets (the “Magnificent Seven” stocks: Amazon, Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Meta, NVIDIA, and Tesla) are themselves bigger (in terms of value) than the second-largest stock market leader in the world, China.—Visual Capitalist~$100 millionEstimated value of the deal YouTuber MrBeast (Jimmy Donaldson) made with Amazon's MGM to produce a reality TV game show (called “Beast Games”) for their streaming service.The show will reportedly have 1,000 contestants and a $5 million prize.Other attempts to bring YouTubers over to more mainstream media platforms haven't gone terribly well, but MrBeast is very big and popular, earning $600-700 million via his YouTube channel each year, already, so those involved are hoping they can defy the odds.—The Washington PostTrust Click Get full access to One Sentence News at onesentencenews.substack.com/subscribe

Ce dimanche 10 décembre, Yassine Riahi, le chef du Lordy's Paris Club à paris livre sa recette de cheescake, léger et citronné.

Tamar Gutner, associate professor of international affairs at American University's School of International Service, leads the conversation on the international financial architecture. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to today's discussion of the Fall 2023 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Thank you for joining us. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic if you would like to share them with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have Tamar Gutner with us to discuss the international financial architecture. Dr. Gutner is an associate professor at American University's School of International Service, and expert on the performance of international organizations and their roles in global governance. In 2019, she held a CFR Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the International Monetary Fund's Independent Evaluation Office. She is the author of International Organizations in World Politics, published by CQ Press; and Banking on the Environment: Multilateral Development Banks and Their Environmental Performance in Central and Eastern Europe, published by MIT Press. And she recently completed a book manuscript on the birth and design of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and its role in the landscape of development banks. So, Dr. Gutner, thank you very much for being with us today. I thought we could begin by having you outline for us the various change-related proposals and activities facing the World Bank, other multilateral development banks, and the International Monetary Fund. Just a small question, but—(laughter)—over to you. GUTNER: Thank you. Thank you, Irina, for introducing me, and thank you for having me as part of this seminar. I think these seminars are just a fantastic way for scholars, professors, students, and others to engage with these important issues, and I'm really excited to see so many people from around the world and professors and students and I see some colleagues in the audience. So I'm really looking forward to engaging with all of you. Right, so this is a critical time for the IMF and the World Bank and other development banks because their importance has been heightened by the need for them to respond to the various crises and challenges that we're facing now. Many of these, as you know, are quite difficult to solve, like climate change. And the world is also dealing with the ongoing economic and social and health repercussions from the pandemic, the repercussions of Russia's invasion of Ukraine including food insecurity. And we're also living in a time when a lot more countries are at high risk of debt distress, and it's a time when it's becoming clear that progress toward achieving the Sustainable Development Goals are stalling. We also have major geopolitical tensions, which is an issue as well. So the IMF and the World Bank are leading international organizations in this scenario today. The IMF has been called the center of the global financial safety net. And the World Bank, meanwhile, is the leading multilateral source of climate finance, and is also playing a huge role in responding to various development challenges that impact its borrowing countries. And also, the regional development banks are addressing these issues as well. So for people who support multilateralism, there's widespread agreement that no one state or actor can solve any of these cross-border issues on their own. And that means we're living in a time when cooperation and multilateral action is absolutely essential, and these people agree we need more to be done to address these issues. But we're also living in a time when many states have inward-looking politics, where there's rising nationalism and populism. And this has produced people and leaders who either don't see the value of international organizations (IOs) like the World Bank and IMF or they see them as contrary to national interests. The IOs themselves—the international organizations themselves—also struggle with relevance sometimes and mixed performance sometimes. And the IMF and World Bank constantly face criticism. They're always being criticized. But I think one important thing to remember is that there's no consensus among the critics. There are always people who want them to do more. There are people who want them to be abolished. So when you're exploring the kind of critiques of these organizations it's important to keep that in mind, just they're coming from different actors and they have different thoughts. And, meanwhile, these institutions themselves, they have—it's tricky for them because they have a tough job. They have to be responsive to their member-state shareholders, who don't always agree with each other. They have to try to be responsive to other stakeholders, for example civil society actors; they don't always agree with each other or with their member states. And so these institutions are constantly being pulled in different directions and they have to navigate that. To their credit, they do try to adapt and adjust, not always effectively. And there's also variation in what they've done well and haven't done well. But it's precisely at this time today with these international crises that the Bank and the Fund and the other MDBs—multilateral development banks—have to try to do better. And what I want to do is offer you a brief overview of some of their efforts to do so and some of the challenges that face these efforts. So I'll begin with the World Bank, which is in the midst of a process to figure out how to update its mission, its vision, its strategy, and its operating model. And this is a process that has been driven by shareholders, including the G20 members, and lots of other consultations. Last fall—well, first of all, I want to say there are a number of proposals on the table on how to reform the World Bank and other MDBs, and they have in common calling for these institutions to do a lot more to address climate change and other global public goods. And some of them call for more effort to better engage with private capital and to rethink how these institutions, which are in part banking institutions, how they can maximize the impact of their capital. So last fall the World Bank embarked on what's been called an evolution roadmap to think through ideas for what should be done. This came out late last year amid calls for the Bank to be bigger and better. And this initiative was launched by U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen a year ago, and she led an effort with other non-borrowing and borrowing countries to call for the whole multilateral development bank system to evolve. As she put it, the world has changed and we need these vital institutions to change along with it. So the idea underlying all of these proposals is for MDBs to be more innovative and efficient. India made MDB evolution a priority in its presidency of the G20 this year, and there have been different expert panels that have also called for radically reformed and strengthened multilateral development banks. So what's interesting for this audience is this evolution roadmap process will eventually turn into the World Bank's strategy, its corporate strategy, and the latest version of it will be discussed next week at the IMF-World Bank annual meetings in Marrakesh. So if you're interested in following that, keep your eyes on the news. And the latest version is seeking approval for measures that will allow the World Bank to boost its lending by $100 billion. So this—the document circulating now for the development—the Joint Ministerial Committee of the World Bank and IMF—and we'll see what happens with it. And I'm happy to talk more about the document itself in the Q&A. These efforts to reform the World Bank are also impacting other regional development banks. So, for example, the Asian Development Bank recently announced it, too, will lend an additional $100 billion over the next ten years by relaxing some of its risk rules for its banking, how it manages its assets, without jeopardizing its triple-A credit rating. The IMF also has been trying to change and adapt in recent years. It's not directly part of this evolution framework that's focusing on MDBs, but the IMF has really turned attention to climate change and also to gender and inequality. And it's essentially pushing forward a kind of a slow change in thinking where economists, and finance ministers, and central bank leaders have realized that these issues are essential to macroeconomic stability. So climate change has become a more visible focus of the IMF's work, its work in surveillance, its capacity development activities, and its general work with countries. Its first strategy for mainstreaming gender was adopted in July 2022. And, like the World Bank, it has also created a number of mechanisms to respond to the pandemic. So it has a new resilience and sustainability trust. And the goal of it is to help low-income member states to address climate change and issues like pandemic preparedness. And it also has a new food shock window to offer emergency financing for countries facing food insecurity as a result of everything going on today. So this is—it's interesting to watch both of these institutions. The IMF typically has a harder time changing because it's a more rigid, set in its ways organization. But it, too—it's not your grandmother's IMF anymore. But all of these efforts are going to face their own sets of challenges. And I want to briefly highlight a few of them before we have our Q&A. So in the World Bank's roadmap, which is also being called a new playbook, the question is: Is it a zero-sum game to balance more focus on global public goods like climate change with individual countries' own development priorities? And there are many people who say, no problem. Kristalina Georgieva, the managing director of the IMF, when talking about this balancing issue, she said: Well, we can chew gum and walk at the same time. But these goals may have areas of overlap, where a country's own development issues do coincide with these global public goods, but there may be areas where they do not. And that's something that has to be worked out. There's also some criticism in civil society and other actors about asking the multilateral banks to do much more to engage with the private sector. First of all, this idea has been around for a while, this idea of turning billions and trillions, for example, was part of the 2015 UN Financing for Development Conference. And it hasn't really come through. So it's a difficult issue to do. There's going to be more work on it. But some organizations actually are concerned about potential negative effects of prioritizing incentives for private finance to provide co-financing to development efforts, because private sector goals are not always the same as public goals, right? So there's some areas of tension. And finally, I just want to flag that all of these organizations are calling for more collaboration. Collaboration is almost the magic wand that will help all these efforts to work out better. And, in fact, if you look at the IMF's new annual report, which was just published, it lists on its front page “committed to collaboration.” But, in fact, it's not that easy for these organizations to collaborate. And I'm happy to break that down a little bit more. And so this great emphasis on something that can be difficult will be something that these organizations have to grapple with. I'm happy to talk about more of the issues in our Q&A, but I think I should stop here and open it up to questions or comments. FASKIANOS: Thank you, Tammi. That was fantastic. So we're going to go to all of you for your questions. (Gives queuing instructions.) OK, so I'm going to take the first question from Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome. Q: Thank you. Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome. I'm a professor of political science at Brooklyn College. And I'm just wondering about this financial architecture that is much criticized, as you said. And I'm wondering the extent to which the criticism informs new decisions that are taken. So the criticisms about people who say the organization should be abolished is coming from the Global South, where there's been feeling since the 1970s that these organizations are not sufficiently sympathetic or understanding of the challenges faced by the countries that had unsustainable debt, and are still in a deeper state of unsustainable debt today. So how is the global architecture on these—in these organizations dealing with these challenges? I heard for the first time, like, in the last five years—Lagarde, I think it was—that said, oh, we made mistakes in some of the advice that we were giving. So who pays for those mistakes? People's lives are damaged, economies are wrecked. And you know, so what are the—what's the good of these changes, really? GUTNER: Yeah, thank you so much for that question, because that's a really good reflection on some of the harsh criticism that these institutions face. And I also would not be someone who says they do everything right, because they don't. But it has been interesting to watch some of the ways that they've evolved. So, for example, they do interact much more with civil society than they used to. I mean, it used to be in the old days when the IMF and World Bank had their annual meetings, civil society actors would protest outside on the street in Washington, DC. And I would tell my students, feel free to go down there but please maybe try not to get arrested, you know? So there were—there were very large protests. Now, when they have the annual meeting, civil society actors are in—are part of it. They're engaged in seminars. They're engaged in discussion. The institutions have strengthened some of their accountability measures, although I could argue some of them are also still weak. But there have been changes. So for example, the IMF now addresses and thinks about social protection, which it didn't used to do, and social safety nets, which it didn't used to do in the past. So you can argue that these changes aren't enough, and they're too late, and it's still harmful. But I think there is evidence that they do try to evolve and adapt, maybe not perfectly. And also, it's really difficult to change a huge institution. It's like turning a large ship. You know, it doesn't happen quickly. But the narrative today is different from the past. I mean, there is—there is more focus on climate change, for example. Which you can argue some countries, it's not really their priority. But even that's changing. More countries, more developing countries, are realizing that issues of climate change are related to them, whether it's through natural disasters, you know, hurricanes, floods, mud—you know, all of this. So I think it's—I think this criticism is still out there. And it exists. The institutions are imperfect. But they do—they do slowly try to adjust and adapt. And if you dig into it, if you go into detail, you'll find that they do a better job in some issues than others, in some countries than others, in some periods of time than others. So as a scholar I would argue that you—it's hard to make a blanket statement about them without kind of unpacking, you know, specific cases and over time. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Jon-Paul Maddaloni, a military professor at the U.S. Naval War College: For the World Bank, what is the definition of creditworthy? Is this a debt-to-GDP ratio? Is there a standard here that may be part of the developing world grievance against the World Bank? GUTNER: So there are complex ways of assessing that. But basically, one of the major ones is to decide if a country is eligible for IBRD loans, which are International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the main part of the World Bank, which are loans that have to be repaid. And if a country is relatively less creditworthy or poor countries can access grants, or no-interest loans, or concessional funding from the World Bank's arm that's called IDA, the International Development Association—or, Agency. (Laughs.) I just—I just call it IDA. So if you're—if you're able to access IDA funding, you're relatively less creditworthy. The World Bank also has other facilities to offer—both the bank and also the IMF—capacity development, which is just money given for technical assistance. And those are the different categories for the World Bank. So countries can change category. So if a country becomes more economically stronger, it can graduate from IDA concessional financing. If it becomes weaker, it can access that financing. And there are some countries which can get a blend. In other words, they're creditworthy enough to be able to take some amount of loans, but not enough so that all of their financing can be a loan form. So these are some of the ways that the World Bank responds to different categories of creditworthiness. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. I'm going to take the next question from Fordham's International Political Economy and Development Program. They have a raised hand. If you can just say who you are. (Laughter.) Q: Thank you for being with us today. I'm Genevieve, part of the Fordham IPED Program. My question is, what are some specific examples of how a country's national political landscape and private interests cause these setbacks for cross-sectoral collaboration in these development banking efforts? And how do these large banking institutions work around corruption, for example? GUTNER: I'm sorry. Can you repeat the first part about collaboration—cross-sectoral collaboration? Q: Yeah. What are some specific examples of how a country's national political landscape and private interests cause setbacks for cross-sectoral collaboration for these development banks? And then we could take corruption as an example. GUTNER: So I'm not 100 percent sure what you mean by the—by the cross-sectoral collaboration. When I'm focusing on collaboration, or when the narrative is focusing on collaboration, it's really focusing more on collaboration between, for example, the World Bank and IMF. How do they collaborate? And the answer to that is, they haven't collaborated well for almost eighty years. But that's not—what I think you're asking is, what happens between these institutions and the national level? Well, one issue—the issue of corruption has become much more widely discussed in both the World Bank and the IMF. In the past, it was seen as a domestic political issue, which is really outside their articles of agreement. They're not supposed to get involved in these domestic political issues. But there's much more awareness today that corruption—for example, in the IMF—corruption impacts a government's health—the fiscal health, their ability to have money to spend on development. And the same is true for the World Bank. So there's much more attention on these issues. The institutions still have to navigate carefully so that they don't look like they're getting involved in politics, even though they can't really avoid it. But so corruption is much higher on the priority list. And it can impact a country's ability to get funding from either institutions. So from the World Bank, and they have—they have lists of companies they won't work with in procurement, for example, who are barred from engaging in procurement. And it's part of discussions. It shows up in the partnership—the framework documents that both countries produce for individual countries. So a kind of a—this is a long way to say, it's on the radar and it matters. But a lot of the collaboration issues are related to how the institutions work with each other. But also in country, I should add, that in some countries the donors collaborate on the ground. So they meet together and they try to make sure they're not overlapping. There's—it doesn't always work very well. You know, in some cases it works better than others. But for the institutions to collaborate more with each other, they have faced many challenges in doing that. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Joshua McKeown, associate provost and director of the international education at State University of New York at Oswego: For context, how much lending does the World Bank do in comparison with regional development banks? GUTNER: Well, I guess it depends. I don't have all that data at my fingertips, but the World Bank in the last—in—let's see, I do have the World Bank data at my fingertips. Let me just pull it up. See where I had it. The World Bank in its current annual report, the IBRD committed $38 and a half billion in 2023. IDA committed $34 billion. The regional banks are much smaller, so the World Bank tends to be the largest. But there's also a lot of variation across the regional banks as well. Now it's important to say that they will often cofinance projects with each other. So the regional banks will engage with the World Bank, and they'll have shared projects, and they'll work together. There are times where they also will compete with each other on occasion. They might both be interested in funding an airport—building an airport somewhere. And one of them may offer more attractive terms than the other. But the competition is not kind of a serious problem, because basically wherever you look in the world, there's almost an infinite demand for infrastructure finance. You know, show me a city that doesn't need a new metro, or the roads repaired, right? So there's a lot of demand out there for these banks to be able to do what they do. And but that has to be tempered with the, on the other side, how much debt can an individual country take on? And that's where we're seeing more serious problems today. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Samia Abdulle from Professor Fazal's class. And she is at the University of Minnesota: How has COVID-19 renewed the debate about the World Bank's role in international development? GUTNER: That's a great question, because when it comes to crisis, member states turn to these institutions right away. And this is a little separate from your question, but before the global financial crisis, for example, the IMF and the World Bank had seen their demand for their services drop dramatically. There were questions about the legitimacy of the IMF. Then the global financial crisis hit and, boom, they were kind of the go-to organizations to help respond to these issues. So the World Bank and the IMF both responded pretty rapidly to the pandemic. And they each came up with new facilities, they got money out the door quickly, they relaxed some of their conditions. So they both had a kind of a robust response. Now, there are people who are saying, well, it was not enough. It should have been more. But, you know, they did a lot. And in an emergency situation, also, you have to remember, they all had to work at home as well. So everybody was working at home. Nobody could travel, but yet they got a lot of money out the door quickly, in different kinds of ways. And I think what we're going to have to revisit down the road is, did any of that money disappear? You know, where—was there accountability for all this money, because it was moved out the door so quickly. And the head of the IMF, Kristalina Georgieva, would say: Just save your receipts. (Laughs.) Just save your receipts. But that's going to be something to see, what happened with this money, where did it actually go, how did accountability work? But the World Bank alone got $30 billion—it dispersed $30 billion in fifteen months at the beginning of the pandemic in emergency support. So they really did step up. And whether it was enough or not is a matter of opinion. But they moved—they did move quickly. And I should just add, since you asked about—I just want to add one thing. The World Bank was involved in getting people access to vaccines, helping weak health infrastructures in countries, and all kinds of issues related to the pandemic. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. So I'm going to take the next written question from Yiagadeesen Samy, who's the director of the School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Canada: You already covered the AIIB in your opening remarks, and we will be circulating this transcript in the video later, but let's look at the second part of the question. Can you comment a little bit on whether the proposed changes to MDBs are a reaction to China's growing influence? And if so, what your views are about the changing geopolitical economic dynamics? GUTNER: It's so great people are asking these simple questions. (Laughs.) FASKIANOS: I know! GUTNER: Yes. FASKIANOS: Keeping you on your toes! (Laughs.) GUTNER: Yes. So let me preface by saying this: China has different strategies in development banking. On one side, you have the AIIB, for example. On the other side, the Belt and Road Initiative. The AIIB is not—in my research, it's cut from the same cloth as other development banks. It's not a threat. It's a part of the landscape of development banks. It's part of the community. It was designed by an international group of experts. In fact, the person who wrote the AIIB's articles of agreement was an American. And the person who designed the AIIB's environmental and social framework was an American. So it was a—it was a real international effort. And in fact, the World Bank helped the AIIB get set up. So the World Bank volunteered staff and gave the AIIB advice on things like vacation policy and office furniture. This is the Beijing office of the World Bank. And the World Bank even ran the AIIB treasury at the beginning, and it cofinanced projects. So the AIIB is cut from the same cloth as development banks. Now, it does have some differences. It's has—it's much smaller. It has a staff under four hundred. The World Bank is ten thousand, for example. And so there are some people who think it might have spurred the World Bank to pay more attention to doing more on infrastructure, which it had moved away from a little bit because that's the AIIB's focus. But the Belt and Road is something different. It's a bilateral initiative. It's an umbrella for Chinese financial institutions to lend money for infrastructure. It's not actually an organization. It's just an umbrella term. And there are differences, because the banks lending under the Belt and Road, Chinese institutions, they don't follow global norms on environmental and social framework, on safeguards. They're not transparent. We can't—we don't know how the loan is structured. They don't report the lending numbers to the Paris Club, for example. So there's a real difference between China's strategy in the AIIB and China's strategy in the Belt and Road, which reflects the different natures. There's not one Chinese strategy. So I think, in a way, the existing development banks help the AIIB more, and their staff help the AIIB more. The Belt and Road is a separate thing. But what I think is going to be interesting is to see if the borders, the boundaries between what is done following global norms, and rules, and procedures, if there's any kind of crossover with what's inside those borders and what's outside those borders. So for example, the AIIB is hosting a facility to help countries better design infrastructure projects that might be undertaken under Belt and Road. And so we just have to keep an eye on that. But it's not—it's not a bleak or black and white picture, the way some people describe it. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. A good follow up question from Steven Shinkel, who's the military professor of national security affairs at U.S. Naval War College: Can you compare the relative use of concessional loans between the World Bank and China? What about loan forgiveness, especially in regions such as Africa and South America? GUTNER: Right. So most of the Chinese lending under Belt and Road is not concessional. Most of it is not concessional. And often interest rates are higher than a comparative loan, even from the IBRD, even non-concessional lending. So they will often charge higher interest rates, but they will have less conditionality. So a country trying to decide who to take a loan from will have to weigh that. Do we want a lower interest rate loan from the World Bank that might have more policy conditionality, we might have to adjust our policy, we might have to think about environmental impacts more? Or do we want a slightly more expensive loan from a Chinese lending institution, but it doesn't have any strings attached? So that's kind of the part of the decision-making that borrowers have to go through. On debt—the second part was on, I'm sorry, the question disappeared. On debt? FASKIANOS: Oh, sorry. Yes, the second question is: What about loan forgiveness, especially in regions such as Africa and South America? GUTNER: Well, that's something that's being widely discussed right now, because Chinese institutions haven't been as comfortable about that, or as used to that. And they're—you know, they're being pushed by other institutions. Hey, you have to take a haircut too. We all have to—we all have to do that. There is a little bit of that going on. But it's something—I mean, if you read the article suggested in the email about this talk by Deborah Brautigam, she really unpacks that in great detail. And she makes an argument that there's some kind of learning and give and take that's happening and we need to see more of it. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Next question from Lindsey McCormack, who's a graduate student at CUNY Baruch College: There's a lot of activity in the U.S. and Europe with new disclosure standards on climate and social impacts of corporations. How do the multilateral development banks relate to this activity? Are they seeing more pressure to discuss—oh, sorry—disclose climate and social impacts of their lending? GUTNER: Yes. (Laughs.) Yes. Now, they already do a lot. They already have environmental and social safeguards. And they've all moved away from funding oil and gas, or mostly oil and some gas. So they're moving away from that. And they're all working together, actually—I mean, I think it's an important example of networking—of the network of MDBs—that they're all moving toward meeting—complying with the Paris Agreement and showing how they're doing that. Now, some of this is how they measure things, and how they label things, and how they account for things. So there's still some debate on whether they're doing enough. But there's, for sure, pressure from NGOs and others. And the banks are moving in that direction. And they're—they're proudly touting how their projects comply. A high percentage of their projects are complying with the Paris Agreement. But there's still some interesting criticism coming out. So, for example, there was a recent report by a German NGO that said the World Bank's private sector lending arm, the IFC—that the IFC was making loans for trade support where that money might go into oil and gas. But you can't tell, right? So they were calling for more transparency on how the IMF is—how the IFC is doing trade credits. So that's something that's very recent. You can look that up and read more about it. FASKIANOS: Just to follow on, how are the multilateral development banks structured? And how effective do you think they are? GUTNER: Structured in terms of what? I mean, I can talk generally in case—so they— FASKIANOS: Yeah, I think corporate structure. GUTNER: So they have—they all have board of governors, which are all the top relevant officials of their member states, typically the finance minister or the central bank head. And they meet once or twice a year. And they make the big decisions. So one thing that's important to realize is a lot of these countries are members of a lot of development bank—there's a lot of overlap in membership. And that's also a way to cross-fertilize ideas, and policies, and things like that. They all have boards of directors, which are more engaged with the day-to-day business. And the—voting is based on your shareholding in the development bank. And that is based broadly on your economic strength. So the economically stronger companies have—stronger countries have a larger share and more voting power. And then you have the presidents of these organizations that have an important leadership role. And then you have the staff. So that's basically the structure of these development banks. And meeting next week are the board of governors and the directors in Marrakech for the World Bank and IMF. And you can see how they engage with staff and how they help set the strategic tone for the institutions. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. And I just want to remind everybody to raise your hand if you want to ask a question. Everybody's a little bit shy today, or else Tammi's been so thorough that you have no questions. (Laughter.) But I have more questions. But first, I'm going to go to Don Habibi, who is a professor at the University of North Carolina Wilmington: With yesterday's stock market plunge and political instability in the U.S., how much concern should we have over the multitrillion-dollar national debt? GUTNER: So that's not an issue that directly impacts the international financial institutions, the IMF, and the World Bank, right now. I mean, the U.S. is the largest shareholder of both, and they both—or, the World Bank has a AAA credit rating. So it's not really—we might be concerned over national debt, but so far it's not having a big impact on the dollar. So far, it's not having a big impact on investment. So there's always kind of some concern, but it's not—it's not translating into anything that's making people nervous about how these organizations operate. But, you know, one place to look for an answer, I'll tell you this, is when the IMF does surveillance, it does—which are its reports on the economic health of individual member states. It does these surveillance reports even on the rich countries. It does them for everyone. So I would suggest you look for the latest article for surveillance report that the IMF has done on the United States, and see what it has to say about concerns about debt. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. You recently completed a book manuscript on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Some policymakers and scholars have argued it is a threat to the World Bank. Can you talk about if you agree with that or disagree? GUTNER: Oh, right. So I answered a little bit of that earlier, actually, which is: I don't think it's a threat because I think it's cut from the same cloth as these other development banks in terms of it has similar policies, it has similar governance rules. The World Bank—it's signed MOUs, memoranda of understanding, with all these other development banks. It cooperates with them. It cofinances projects with them. So I think the narrative of the AIIB being a threat is not correct. Could something change in the future? Who knows. But there has been a recent scandal at the AIIB. And we don't know how that will yet be resolved, where this past summer the Canadian director of communications resigned dramatically, suddenly, arguing that Communist Party committees were somehow involved in the work of the bank. And we—so, Canada froze its membership. So that's a bit of a scandal and a crisis at the AIIB. And Canada is doing its own report on what happened. So I kind of think we have to see what comes out of that report. If Canada decided to leave the AIIB, would it impact any other members? Too early to say. But so far, there's nothing directly threatening about its work. It's walked and talked and behaved like other development banks. It does have some differences. It has a nonresident board, which was seen as a cost-saving measure. You know, why have all these people sit around and cost a lot of money? But there are some civil society actors who think that that could produce less accountability. If the board is not there, you know, the bank has more kind of autonomy to do—more independence. So there are some differences. But so far, it's been just another member of the multilateral development bank system. FASKIANOS: Thank you. All right. We have more hands raised, which I'm very excited about. Tanisha Fazal, who is the Weinstein chair of international studies at University of Richmond: You mentioned the difficulties of collaboration between IMF and the World Bank. Can you please elaborate on what you see as the primary obstacles to collaboration between MDBs? GUTNER: Yes. I'm happy to talk about that. So that was the topic of my year—my Council on Foreign Relations fellowship at the International Monetary Fund's Independent Evaluation Office. And we were evaluating Bank-Fund collaboration. And I was part of the overall evaluation, which you can find online. And I also wrote a separate paper on the history of Bank-Fund collaboration. And I found it to be absolutely fascinating, because these two institutions were created together at the Bretton Woods Conference. And they're called the Bretton Woods twins. They're literally across the street from each other. There's an underground passage that connects the two. They interact all the time. They have a joint orchestra. I don't know if anybody knew that. (Laughs.) They used to share a library. So there's a lot of—if any two organizations should be able to work closely together, it's these two, right? This should be your best case, and yet they've struggled for their entire existence. And I think one of the obstacles is that over time their issues have overlapped. So an example of that is today, when the IMF is doing more on climate change, gender, and inequality, which traditionally is the work of the Bank. So their work has kind of—over time, given the issues facing the world, it's kind of naturally overlapped. And what I found that was very interesting is in over twenty-five different formal attempts the two institutions produced to collaborate with each other—memos and announcements by the heads of the institutions—for decades, what they meant by collaboration was turf delineation. Collaboration meant you stay out of my territory. (Laughs.) I don't think of that as collaboration. It's working together on a common objective, right? So that was what they meant by it, and for many years what they—what the solution was, that the institution that's not in charge of this issue should yield to the judgment of the other one—the yield to the judgment one. So I think turf overlap has been a problem. But even when they make an effort, often they have different incentives, they have different budget cycles, they have different—you know, it's just not that easy. And the IMF's latest strategy for collaboration has been when IMF staff encounter an issue that they don't have expertise in, they should leverage the expertise of the World Bank and other partners. Well, that, to me, sounds like one-way collaboration, which is an oxymoron, right? That if the IMF needs help, it should call the IMF and get help—I mean, call the World Bank and get help. But for the World Bank, they might be busy. (Laughs.) So those kinds of challenges persist. There have been times where they do create a truly collaborative effort, like the HIPC Initiative, or the FSAPs, or the PRSP—sorry for all the acronyms—but where they—where they have a shared work program and shared guidance and shared expectations. Those have tended to work better than big umbrella exhortations by the leaders saying: Collaborate! You know, do more collaboration. Those have tended to work better, but they also run into individual problems. So really, the upshot is, even though you would expect collaboration to be the easiest and make most sense between these two institutions, in fact, it's often been a struggle. And some people found, when I mentioned the IMF's resilience trust, that's something that would normally have been undertaken by the World Bank. So they have not—they have had challenges collaborating, and those continue. FASKIANOS: Thank you. And I need to correct the record, my apologies. So that question was from Tanisha Fazal, who is an associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota. So the next question is from Sandra Joireman, who is the Weinstein chair of international studies at University of Richmond. So my apologies. So this this question is from Sandra: Some of the previous efforts to address the environmental impacts of certain projects were ineffective. Do you think new efforts to address the environment and climate challenge change will be better? If so, why? GUTNER: So I'm guessing you're referring to the World Bank? And, yes, there's a whole long history of the Bank addressing environmental issues. And it really started in the 1980s, when NGOs identified projects that had gone horribly wrong and caused enormous environmental degradation. Like the Polonoroeste highway in Brazil. It was a famous—infamous example. And the Narmada dam in India. These are infamous examples. But when you look over the years, there have been improvements to what kinds of things the Bank can lend money to, how strong the environmental and social safeguards are. So when I look at the whole history of the World Bank and environment, I basically see it is not a one-way trajectory, and as forward or backward. I see it as more zigzag steps, some forward steps, some backward steps, some forward steps, some backward steps. So overall, because climate change is becoming one—it's about to become a major part of the Bank's mission and vision. So before it was shared prosperity and poverty reduction, and now it's going to—if it's all approved next week—it will be shared prosperity, poverty reduction, and a livable planet. So climate change is kind of moving the front row and center. And that will make it harder for the Bank to fund projects that can be criticized. It will make it much more important that it follows these solid environmental and social framework rules. So I think it's a move in the right direction. But as I mentioned earlier, we're still seeing criticism from NGO about things slipping through the cracks, like trade finance, right? Or another area that's weak is the World Bank—the IFC and the World Bank will sometimes lend money to financial intermediaries. So it's like—it's like lending money to a local bank that then lends it out for something else. And there's been less oversight about how that money is on lent, and whether that can go for something that's damaging to climate change or the environment. So they're moving in the right direction. I think there's been progress. I think there's been backward steps and forward steps over the whole arc of the World Bank's efforts in this area. And I think there's still going to be some criticism as they address some of these areas where there's slippage. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question, a raised hand from Sheri Fink. So, Sheri, if you can say who you are and accept the unmute prompt. Q: Oh, I'm sorry. I think I pressed the wrong button. I didn't mean to raise my hand. Sorry about that. FASKIANOS: OK. No problem. All right. I will take the next question from Eric Muddiman, master's student at Norman Paterson School of International Affairs in Ottawa, Canada: In terms of mobilizing more private capital and development, there has been discussion on MDBs' role in mitigating risk. Private sector are not allowed to invest in BB/BBB ZIP code investments from a regulatory perspective. Are there concrete proposals advancements in these discussions? GUTNER: Yes. Do I know what they all are? No. It's kind of a live discussion. And I know, in the new World Bank—the latest version of the evolution roadmap, there's talk about creating, like, a lab—an innovation lab, or a private sector lab, to try to do more. Some of the banks have hubs in some areas where they—areas in the developing world where they might have better access to private sector actors. And they're trying to engage with private sector actors in conferences and find ways of discussing project ideas. So that's not as concrete as you like, perhaps, but there are efforts to think about this. And there was a seminar at the spring meetings with private sector actors who are also saying that they felt they could do more to engage colleagues and find ways to bring the private sector and public sector together. So there are initiatives, seminars, hubs, labs. You know, all of this stuff is kind of lively and happening right now. And I do think it will be interesting to see what, if anything, catches on. Because, as I mentioned earlier, this discussion has been going on even before 2015, but the turning billions into trillions discussion. And it just hasn't worked out that well, because of these issues like risk, right? Private sector actors may not want to involve in countries where the risk is too great and where countries don't have capacity, where they have weaker capacity. So there are many challenges in this area. And just a variety of activities and ideas being put forward to try to respond. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next, a raised hand for Walton Brown. You can accept the unmute. There you go, Walton. Q: So I too—I didn't intend to hit anything. I'm so sorry. FASKIANOS: OK. That's OK. GUTNER: You can still ask a question. (Laughter.) FASKIANOS: That's OK! You can still ask a—exactly, Tammi. We can—we can still—we love hearing from you all. So, all right. Well, we will continue on— Q: And my phone is troubled. FASKIANOS: Phone is troubled. (Laughs.) No problem. That's just fine. OK, so I'm going to go next to—let's see, we've got several who don't have affiliations, but let me go to Holley Hansen: A lot of previous questions have focused on the World Bank or IMF operations. But going back to your original remarks, there also been discussion on how internal rules and procedures, such as voting, leave stakeholders out of the decision-making process. What major suggested reforms to internal decision-making do you think are viable? And what are the pros and cons of changing those rules? GUTNER: Well, the voting is part of internal decision-making. So the voting is part of that. And the real issue has been, how can—well, one of the real issues is shouldn't China have a greater stake? Shouldn't China have a higher stake? Because China is now the number-three largest stakeholder in the World Bank and the IMF, after the U.S., number one, and Japan, number two. But its stake, at around 6 percent, is really less than it should be if you follow the kind of formula they use to calculate a state's economic strength. It's been calculated that really it should be more like 12 percent, right? So part of the discussion is how to give developing countries, and especially China, more weight in governance through the—through the voting share. And that's an ongoing discussion. Right now, in today's kind of more tense political—global political environment, it's hard to imagine the U.S. supporting something like that at this juncture of time, although there have been reports that the managing director of the IMF is open to it. So I think this is going to be one of the issues that is discussed in Marrakesh next week, what to do with these voting shares? But they do adjust them every so often. So China did move up from having a lower ranking to now being number three in the IMF and World Bank. So it does happen over time. Internal decision-making is a whole complicated other kind of issue. And these development banks, you know, they all face internal decision-making challenges. They all face kind of common tensions. So one of them is how you balance authority between the country—people who work in the country and people who work on sectoral issues. So how do you—who should—who should have more decision-making authority, the country level or the sector level? There are decision-making issues and tensions between the public sector lending arms of these development banks and the private sector lending arms, because they have different incentives and different goals. So there have been challenges inside these development banks with kind of internal silos and where power and authority should be held. And it's hard to come up with what the right answer is. You know, there are pros and cons to giving more power to the country or more power to the sector. And in fact, these banks restructure from time to time. And if you look at kind of the history of the restructuring of some of the major development banks, they sort of move back and forth between where they think authority should be located. So these issue—it's a whole other can of worms than voting power on the board of directors. But it's important, because it can affect their performance. It can affect their performance and their ability to function effectively. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the last question. We have several quick questions from Fordham again. Let's see. There you go. Q: OK, thank you. So in the worst case scenario that the U.S. and China engage in conflict in Taiwan, how would the World Bank respond to the economic shocks of this in geographically vulnerable neighboring countries, such as Vietnam, Laos, and the Philippines? GUTNER: That's a tough question. Thank you for ending this with a really tough question. We're not supposed to say I don't know. (Laughs.) We're supposed to have—that's a tough one, because, again, China is number three at the World Bank. So if China—couldn't—most of the time voting doesn't happen. Most of the time, it's consensus. So it's hard to predict. I mean, you'd have to unpack a lot of different things there. You'd have to unpack what kind of—what would the World Bank normally do? Would it normally—would it affect development lending to neighboring countries? I mean, it's interesting to look at the case of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and how—what the response to that has been, because Russia's a member of all these institutions too. But the development banks mostly froze lending to Russia. Also, the AIIB did, because it had to comply—to comply with these sanctions. So Russia lending has been frozen. And these institutions are all giving money to Ukraine to help Ukraine rebuild. So there is kind of a situation that can be—that can be used to compare, to kind of get ideas about what might happen, right? And even at the AIIB, Russia is number three largest shareholder in the AIIB. It's China, India, and Russia. And the AIIB immediately froze lending to Russia. So we could—we could kind of play out different scenarios, but there's a lot of unknowns in that case. And I do think looking at the response of MDBs to Russia's invasion of Ukraine could provide some useful lessons. FASKIANOS: Tammi, we are at the end of our time. And I apologize that we couldn't get to all the questions. I wonder if you could just take a minute. You were awarded a CFR Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars, which allowed you to work—be placed in a government office. So if you could just take a minute to talk about that experience and encourage other professors to apply. The deadline's coming up. It's the end of October. So it just would be great for you to just give us your— GUTNER: Absolutely, yes. All the professors in the audience, please apply for this, because it's a special, invaluable experience. When you're—when you're studying something, and you have the opportunity to be an insider for a year, I can't even tell you how much you learn. I learned being—and it's a two-way street. They benefit from the expertise of the scholars who are coming in because we bring a different perspective. We bring different analytical and methodological tools. And I just can't tell you how much I learned that I could never find out as an outsider, including the IMF-World Bank orchestra, or the—(laughs)—yeah, actually, maybe some outsiders know that. But really, to open up the black box of an organization and see firsthand about how things work internally, what the culture's like, how things get done, what happens in the hallways. I mean, all that stuff, all of those kinds of details really enhanced my scholarship and shaped my research direction, working on these issues of collaboration, for example. So if any of you are considering applying, please feel free to get in touch with me if you have any questions about the fellowship. I'd be happy to discuss it with you. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Thank you for that, and for your amazing insights into these issues. And to all of you for your great questions. You can follow Dr. Gutner on X, the app formerly known as Twitter, at @TGutner. And for the students on this call, CFR has paid internships. So to learn more about the internships you can go to—and also the fellowships—you can go to CFR.org/careers. Follow us at @CFR_Academic, and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. And the next Academic Webinar will take place on Wednesday, October 11, at 1:00 p.m. (EDT). Landry Signé, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, will talk about Africa on the global stage. So, again, thank you to Tamar Gutner. And to all of you, have a great rest of your day. GUTNER: Thanks for having me. And thanks to everyone for attending. (END)

In June, Zambia reached what's been described as a landmark debt restructuring deal that for the first time brought together the country's bilateral creditors including China, traditional Paris Club lenders and bondholders.While the deal is no doubt unprecedented, it also reveals that China was very effective in successful in getting the parties to agree to many of its demands.Matt Mingey, a senior analyst at the consultancy Rhodium Group, is among the world's foremost experts on Chinese lending and debt issues. He joins Eric & Cobus from Washington, D.C. to discuss whether China is, in fact, setting the agenda for debt restructurings in the Global South.JOIN THE DISCUSSION:Twitter: @ChinaGSProject| @stadenesque | @eric_olander |@mattmingeyFacebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProjectYouTube: www.youtube.com/@ChinaGlobalSouthFOLLOW CAP IN FRENCH AND ARABIC:Français: www.projetafriquechine.com | @AfrikChineعربي: www.akhbaralsin-africia.com | @AkhbarAlSinAfrJOIN US ON PATREON!Become a CAP Patreon member and get all sorts of cool stuff, including our Week in Review report, an invitation to join monthly Zoom calls with Eric & Cobus, and even an awesome new CAP Podcast mug!www.patreon.com/chinaafricaprojectSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In June, Zambia reached what's been described as a landmark debt restructuring deal that for the first time brought together the country's bilateral creditors including China, traditional Paris Club lenders and bondholders.While the deal is no doubt unprecedented, it also reveals that China was very effective in successful in getting the parties to agree to many of its demands.Matt Mingey, a senior analyst at the consultancy Rhodium Group, is among the world's foremost experts on Chinese lending and debt issues. He joins Eric & Cobus from Washington, D.C. to discuss whether China is, in fact, setting the agenda for debt restructurings in the Global South.JOIN THE DISCUSSION:Twitter: @ChinaGSProject| @stadenesque | @eric_olander |@mattmingeyFacebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProjectYouTube: www.youtube.com/@ChinaGlobalSouthFOLLOW CAP IN FRENCH AND ARABIC:Français: www.projetafriquechine.com | @AfrikChineعربي: www.akhbaralsin-africia.com | @AkhbarAlSinAfrJOIN US ON PATREON!Become a CAP Patreon member and get all sorts of cool stuff, including our Week in Review report, an invitation to join monthly Zoom calls with Eric & Cobus, and even an awesome new CAP Podcast mug!www.patreon.com/chinaafricaproject

This week we talk about the IMF, the Paris Club, and Pakistan.We also discuss the international monetary system, sovereign debt, and debt traps.Show notes/transcript: letsknowthings.com This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe

This week we talk about the IMF, the Paris Club, and Pakistan.We also discuss the international monetary system, sovereign debt, and debt traps.Support the show: patreon.com/letsknowthings / letsknowthings.com/support / understandary.comShow notes/transcript: letsknowthings.com ★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

Ghana receives the financial assurance it needs from the Paris Club after the meeting of the official Creditors Committee, chaired by China and France, paving way for the Board of the International Monetary Fund(IMF) to approve of the country's pending $3 billion loan-support programme. The Creditors Committee will negotiate with the Government on the terms of restricting the claims which are going to be finalized in a Memorandum of Understanding(MoU). This loan will help Ghana in debt restructuring and minimize the balance of payment deficit and open doors for more investors.

Timestamps[02:01] China and International Bailout Activities[04:33] China and the G20 Common Framework[07:34] Debt Service Suspension Initiative[09:42] Definition of a “Haircut” in Finance[10:00] IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings[12:37] Beijing's Demands for Write-Downs[16:18] Japan, India, and France Establishing a Creditors Committee[18:43] Chinese Participation in the Paris Club[22:08] Role of Geopolitical Competition in Debt Relief

Ghana's Restructuring: Why the Mess? Sovereign debt restructurings seem to be stuck in quicksand. The various players (IMF, China, commercial creditors, Paris Club, arbitration award holders, etc) each point to the others as the reason for the lack of progress. And the much ballyhooed Common Framework seems to have made little impact. Chelsey Dulaney of the Wall Street Journal joins us to talk about the state of things globally and to help dispel our confusion about what is going on in Ghana. Producer: Leanna Doty

Paris Club for 10-year moratorium on Colombo debt, Hyderabad university professor booked for alleged molestation of Thai student, Umran Malik replaces injured Mohammed Shami for Bangladesh ODI and other top news in this bulletin.

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Correction: The PM referred to the coordination with Paris Club and some Arab states back in the early 1990s, which had resulted in the debt relief of USD43 billion of Egypt's external debt through a multi-year program that is still in effect, including a debt-investment swap, but did not refer to a "recently reached agreement" on this regard.The state ownership policy document is “nearly final.” The government has amended about 30% of the document after receiving feedback from private sector representatives through public consultations.The government wants to work with the private sector to establish an industrial development strategy within three months.The state IPO program is alive and well, but there have been three years of exceptional circumstances that have hit the EGX hard, the PM said, adding that the government is taking this time to do its due diligence and value state assets appropriately.The Egyptian Competition Authority is working on developing a competitive neutrality index through which it can measure the success of its strategy to promote and enforce competitive neutrality.The Communications Ministry plans to restructure incentives to foreign companies to get them to set up shop or export their digital operations in Egypt.The government is looking into introducing a scheme that would grant foreigners long-term Egyptian residency permits if they invest in property in Egypt.New currency derivatives are expected to be ready within months to allow investors to hedge against the risk of further currency depreciation.Filling station Wataniya and bottled water company Safi will see a private stake sale before year end, Sovereign Fund of Egypt CEO said.ORHD received a preliminary non-binding offer from OCDI for the potential acquisition of the entire share capital of ORHD's subsidiary, Orascom for Real Estate S.A.E. (ORE), the owner of O West. ORHD owns 70% of ORE. The non-binding offer includes an indicative and preliminary equity value purchase price of EGP2.46 billion for 100% of ORE. ORHD's Board has granted OCDI exclusivity to commence the due diligence process. The non-binding offer price implies EGP1.7 billion for ORHD's 70% stake in ORE.ABUK 1Q22/23 net profit increased to EGP2,777 million (+33% QoQ , +115% YoY).RTVC received a preliminary offer from the National Company for Hotels and Touristic Services (Tolip) to acquire RTVC's Stella Sharm Hotel for EGP700.0 million. ALCN 1Q22/23 net profit increased by 98.7% YoY and 0.3% QoQ to record EGP669 million.China reported economic growth of 3.9% for 3Q2022, which was higher than analysts expected and might inject some fresh optimism into oil markets with regard to demand. Still, 3Q2022 growth figure remains below the government's target of 5.5%. However, it was a substantial improvement over 2Q2022, when GDP growth stood at 0.4%.New and Renewable Energy Authority will receive bids for the construction of a 20 MW solar power plant in Hurghada till end of January. The tender includes the implementation of a solar PV-battery system with a capacity of 30 MW.RAYA acquired a stake of 10.27% in its subsidiary, Raya Haier Electric, at a transaction value of EGP47.7 million, bringing its ownership in the company to 100%.Pharma giant Novartis signed a licensing agreement allowing local manufacturers in seven countries, including Egypt, to make the oral medicine Nilotinib.Weekly Commodities Update |   | Last Price | WoW Change, % | Brent, USD/bbl | 92.9 | 0.4% | Diesel-HSFO Spread, USD/ton | 754.8 | -1.3% | Egypt Urea, USD/ton | 760.0 | 0.0% | Polyethylene, USD/ton | 1,160.0 | 0.0% | Polypropylene, USD/ton | 1,030.0 | 0.0% | Steel/Iron Ore Spreads, USD/ton | 470.6 | -4.0% | LME Aluminum Cash Price, USD/ton | 2,188.5 | -1.8% | Egyptian Retail Cement,

Club Session Ep 221 Sam One Set @Soulful Sunday Djoon Paris Website: www.house4youmusic.com Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/house4youmusic/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/house4youmusic Buy Our Music: https://www.feiyr.com/x/BS3VW Playlist: Get Together (Jovonn's BND Remix) Jovonn Deep Into My Sleep (Black Sonix Dub) Harold Matthews Jr, Black Sonix Found My Light (Atjazz Remix) Atjazz, Imaani Glory (Atjazz 2022 Rework) Halo, Atjazz, Maiya H O M E (Atjazz Astro Remix) Tomahawk Bang Something (Soledrifter Remix) DJ Fudge, Barbie Mak Respect feat Kathy Brown & Harry Dennis (Atjazz Extended Remix) I-Robots I Knee'd Osunlade Kalimba (Original Mix) The Deepshakerz Fortitude (Extended Mix) DJEFF Dj Cndo - Bazoom Base 2 Let God Work (Sahib Muhammad & DJ Spen's Afro Infusion) Wayne Williams, DJ Spen, Richard Burton, Tasha LaRae Everything Will Be Okay (feat. Ms Seddy) Cuebur Pop It And Shake It (Hallex M Remix) Peven Everett Trust Is Key (Original Mix) Chaos In The CBD Cascades Of Colour (Manoo's Dubeat) Ananda Project, Gaelle Adisson Body Resonance (MoBlack Remix) Pastaboys Sam One - Saint Just Irma Test Promo

The Chief Judge of the Federal High Court Abuja, Justice John Tsoho, has set aside a consent judgment in favor of Panic Alert Security Systems Limited against the Nigeria Governors' Forum. Justice Tsoho held that the said consent judgment was entered without jurisdiction in its entirety. The company is one of the beneficiaries of the payment of $418 million to consultants and is said to be for payment for professional services in the Paris Club refund to State Governments. The state governors had accused the Attorney-general of the Federation (AGF), Abubakar Malami, of alleged involvement in the controversial payment By the ruling, all approvals by the AGF, the president, the minister of finance, the Accountant-General of the Federation, and the Debt Management Office (DMO) arising from, related to, or concerning Panic Alert's claims have been voided.

SITE INTERNET : https://paris.notaires.fr/fr Radio Immo, première webradio d'information immobilière

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Nigerian State governments have asked the Federal Government to refrain from deducting from funds accruing to them and all local government councils as liquidation for the alleged $418 million London/Paris Club loan refund-related judgment debts. The state governments say they were not parties to any suit on the London/Paris Club refund and were thus not liable to any person or entity in any judgment debt being relied on by the federal government. The document was signed by leaders of the body of attorneys-general of the federation on behalf of all the state attorneys-general.

2022.03.01 一週財經聚焦： 一， 二月23日，國際金融協會（IIF）發佈的《全球債務監測》報告顯示，2021年全球債務總額首次突破300兆美元，達到了303兆美元的歷史新高。其中八成債務來自新興市場國家，我們要怎麼解讀疫情過後的主權債務問題？ 二， 二月24日，G7領導人就俄羅斯全面入侵烏克蘭舉行了視頻峰會。會後一同發表了聯合聲明。美國總統拜登也在同一天宣佈了一系列旨在削弱俄羅斯經濟、軍事和精英的新制裁措施。 解讀： 1， Reuters Emerging markets drive global debt to record $303 trillion 新興市場讓全球債務達到了創紀錄的303兆美元 2， FT Emerging markets: all risk and few rewards? 新興市場：全部的風險以及幾乎沒有的報酬 3， WSJ Sri Lankan Officials Met With Bankers in Bid to Solve Debt Crisis 斯里蘭卡官員與銀行家們會面尋求解決債務的危機 國際金融協會： Institute of International Finance 全球唯一和最具影響力的全球性金融業協會，總部設在美國華盛頓。其成員包括世界所有的主要商業銀行和金融投資機構，以及資產管理公司、養老基金、評級機構和保險公司等，共計400多家。 成立於1983年，最初的目的是應對上個世紀80年代初不斷擴大的拉丁美洲國家債務危機而設立的。 國際金融協會的數據顯示，2021年全球債務比2020年增加10兆美元。去年全球債務與GDP之比達到了350%左右，另外去年新增的債務八成來自新興市場國家，新興市場國家的債務比2020年增加8.5兆美元，已經超過了95兆美元。 報告顯示不少新興國家今年開始升息，將讓這些國家進行再融資時面對龐大的壓力。 國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）總裁Kristalina Georgieva日前也談到了低收入國家的債務困境問題。她呼籲G20政策制定者通過加強合作盡早結束新冠疫情、促進世界經濟復甦，同時確保各國安全度過貨幣政策緊縮週期。 Georgieva呼籲G20政策制定者在促進世界經濟復甦方面把握幾大優先事項： 1， 其中之一是，確保各國安全度過貨幣政策緊縮週期。美國等主要發達經濟體收緊貨幣政策引發全球金融環境突然收緊，新興市場和發展中國家必須為國際資本流動可能逆轉做好準備。為此，一些借款國應在條件有利時延長債務償還期限，同時避免進一步增加外幣債務。 2， 與此同時，要關注財政可持續性，幫助低收入國家解決債務問題。Georgieva表示，IMF預計約60%的低收入國家已處於債務困境，這些經濟體需要更多國內收入、贈款、優惠融資等，以便快速解決債務問題。 確實，今年1月底正當全球關注美國通膨率飆高、美元指數揚升時，阿根廷悄悄地與國際貨幣基金（IMF）達成了570億美元的貸款協商，以避免迫在眉睫的債務違約。 年初，世界銀行亦表示，接受國際開發協會（IDA）援助的低收入國家，今年應償還債務高達350億美元，較2020年增加45％，可能會出現新的主權債務危機，亟須重組其債務或面臨重組風險，在在顯示全球貧困國家的「無序違約」（disorderly defaults）風險正在上升。 暫不論各國政經體制的差異，單是這兩年大環境的變化，就已讓這些國家難以擺脫債務壓力劇增的困境。 1， 首先，新冠疫情重創低疫苗接種率的貧窮國家，使其社會運作受阻、經濟動能疲弱； 2， 其次，通膨壓力遽升下，各國央行在疫情期間推出的寬鬆貨幣政策將逐步退場，升息已是必然趨勢，高利率成本更不利於開發中國家，特別是貧窮國家的債務償還。加上美國聯準會啟動升息箭在弦上，美元利率上升將使開發中國家貨幣對美元貶值，在該等國家外債多數以美元標示下，美元升值將使其面臨更大的償債壓力。 就債權結構來看，20世紀下半葉，由全球最富裕的22個國家組成、專門為負債國和債權國提供債務安排、債務重組、債務減免、債務撤銷等事宜的「巴黎俱樂部（Paris Club）」，影響力大不如前。 相較於十年前，低收入國家的公共雙邊外部債務有高達三分之二來自巴黎俱樂部的貸款，如今這些國家債務攀升至2,000億美元，巴黎俱樂部借出的貸款卻不到三分之一，取而代之的是中國資金。而且，隨著中國債權國的角色愈來愈吃重，這些國家對求助巴黎俱樂部有所顧忌，以免對中國造成困擾。 再者，對債台高築的中低收入國家而言，其所處的主權債務市場普遍存在資訊不公開且不透明的情況，徒增日後雙方協商還款談判過程的複雜度等，不僅阻礙了其向國際金融市場的融資管道，也削弱了市場投資者信心，並容易使借貸雙方政府的貪腐叢生，徒增金融不穩定風險。例如兩年前西方債權人試圖透過談判解決尚比亞債務問題，但該國拒絕披露對中債務，使西方債權人對其存在一定程度的不信任，也讓該國債務的重組甚難取得進展。 事實上，Covid-19在全球各地危害著政府公共財政。然而，許多新興經濟體從一開始就負債累累。他們被迫在應對疫情上投入了更多的資金，但它們的稅收收入卻大幅下降了，接著他們很快就積累了不可持續的債務。現在，隨著斯里蘭卡、尚比亞和其他幾個經濟體的主權債務賬單的陸續到期，危機初露端倪，這些國家即將接受考驗。 這是一場主權償付能力的危機，而不僅僅是流動性危機，並沒有辦法蒙混過關。國際貨幣基金組織IMF 伴隨著債務重組的這個調整計劃，是一個明智的前進之路。斯里蘭卡政府越早接受不可避免的情況，痛苦就可以越小。處理這種情況就是IMF之所以存在的原因。 然而，為了減少貸款，它還需要在重組150億美元的外債方面取得進展。想這樣做在一定程度上必須取決於中國，在過去20年中，中國通過多家國有銀行成為新興經濟體的一大債權人。北京拒絕接受任何有關其貸款為新興經濟體製造「債務陷阱」的說法。中國是否願意在尚比亞和斯里蘭卡的債務進行消減，將是最重要的一個考驗。 正如世界銀行在其新的《世界發展報告》中指出的那樣，尋求債務重組的國家現在平均有20多個不同的債權人，這還不包括債券的持有人。它們可能還包括一些非傳統的貸款人，比如已經提前支付多年的一些大宗商品必須交付的交易費用。我們需要的是一個現代的巴黎俱樂部和倫敦俱樂部：一個所有債權人都能聚在一起共同分擔痛苦的框架。在形式上來說，這是存在的。 G20有一個債務重組框架，運作與官方債權人組成的巴黎俱樂部（Paris Club）類似，而所謂的集體行動條款在理論上允許私人債券持有人在其中進行協調。 由於很多政府難以償還其對中國進出口銀行和中國國家開發銀行等的債務，中國對很多窮國的貸款熱潮正在惡化之中。那麼，中國將如何處理這些處於違約邊緣的國家？它是否會表現出按照這些發展中國家對自己期待的慷慨 ？還是會堅持拿回自己的債權主張 ？ 好消息是一項對中國債務重組進行統計的新論文發現，當面對無法償還的債務人時，中國基本上只是選擇了順其自然。 世界銀行以及基爾世界經濟研究所（Kiel Institute for The World Economy）的三個學者一篇新論文統計了自2000年以來261起和中國有關的債務減免或重新談判的案例。其中仍然包括了中國商務部推進的149次取消或重新安排的小額無息貸款，另外28個是作為G20應對疫情的一部分，向沒有嚴重債務危機的國家延長了支付的期限。最後的84個則採取了適當的債務重組 當然，疫情可能會迫使中國不得不從寬容走向寬恕。否則，論文的作者擔心債務「積壓」可能會進一步抑制窮國的經濟增長。中國已經加入了G20的債務減免的「共同框架」，旨在使其與巴黎俱樂部保持一致。在成為貧窮國家的大型貸款國的過程中，中國遵循了這個俱樂部主要經濟大國的腳步。它當然也倒霉的重復了一些他們曾經犯下的錯誤。現在，它必須接受這些原則，抹去過去的一些錯誤。而且，現在這個世界沒有人會願意做中國的保護貼。 解讀： 1， BBC Ukraine conflict: Kyiv braces for Russian assault 烏克蘭衝突：基輔為俄羅斯的襲擊做好準備 2， WSJ U.S. Companies Say They Are Monitoring Impact of Russia-Ukraine Crisis 美國企業界表示，他們正在密切關注俄羅斯-烏克蘭危機的影響 3， CNBC Russian invasion of Ukraine to further strain U.S. chip supply for auto, tech industries 俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭使美國的晶片供應進一步緊張 由2021年3月開始綿延至今的烏克蘭危機，終於在經歷俄羅斯軍隊的反覆演習、美國不懷好意的刺激開戰、法德領導人的不停磋商以及美俄領導人的虛偽峰會後，迎來了一個九彎十八拐的高潮轉折。 眼下的俄軍行動仍然撲朔迷離，但無論情勢如何變化，我相信普丁正在刻意改變過去的地緣政治平衡，在全球疫情仍在肆虐、區域分化越演越烈之際，普丁顯然也厭倦了過往那種對西方頻頻示好的虛與委蛇。情勢還會怎麼發展？說實話沒人說得準，但烏克蘭與美國顯然已無力控制，眼下的烏克蘭已被民粹裹脅，極難在政治上做出智慧的決斷；美國則除了表態譴責與制裁外，除了袖手旁觀似乎也是無計可施。 但我更關心的是烏克蘭危機對全球經濟會有什麼樣的影響？以及它又可以給身在台灣的我們什麼借鏡 ？ 站在我的角度，地緣政治一直是世界政治的一個特徵，但全球經濟和金融市場卻始終對此視若無睹。從中國和美國之間的對峙，到拉丁美洲的民粹主義崛起和中東的緊張局勢，企業與投資人只是繼續我行我素，只因為他們深信再差的經濟後果都可以被成功遏制。 但這次的俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭確實可能打破這個模式，因為它將導致全球這個第11大經濟體以及最大的大宗商品生產國與世隔絕。隨著更嚴厲制裁的實施，最直接的全球影響將是更高的通貨膨脹、更低的經濟增長和對金融市場的持續乾擾。而長期影響將是讓全球供應鏈和一體化金融體系的進一步衰弱。 1，大宗商品： 先從大宗商品的衝擊開始。俄羅斯不僅是歐洲天然氣的主要供應商，也是全球最大的石油生產國之一，它更是鎳、鋁和鈀等工業金屬的主要供應來源。這些商品的價格在2022年以來已經處於上漲的趨勢，現在則非常可能還會進一步上漲。布倫特原油在2月24日上午已經突破了每桶100美元的價格，歐洲天然氣價格更是一口氣上漲了30%。商品供應可能還會受到兩種方式的破壞。 如果管道或黑海港口等有形基礎設施遭到了破壞，它們的運輸可能會中斷。或者，西方開始對俄羅斯大宗商品綜合體實施更嚴厲的制裁，可能會阻止西方企業從俄羅斯購買到商品。 2，科技與金融： 第二個衝擊則與科技和全球金融體系有關。美國會對俄羅斯科技企業實施更嚴厲的華為式制裁，並將俄羅斯最大的兩家銀行，俄羅斯的Sberbank和VTB列入黑名單，或試圖切斷俄羅斯與SWIFT的聯繫。 這將拖累俄羅斯的經濟增長，並激怒俄羅斯國內的消費者，並阻礙資金流入和流出俄羅斯。俄羅斯當然會受傷，但俄羅斯的財政需求很可能將轉向中國。對全球經濟而言，隨著自然資源價格的上漲，通貨膨脹很可能會更高，這會加劇全球央行面臨的困境，而且隨著市場動蕩的打擊信心，企業投資可能會嘎然停止。 3，全球分裂： 更長期的影響將是加速全球經濟的分裂。俄羅斯將被迫向東傾斜，更多地依賴與中國的貿易和金融聯繫。在西方，越來越多的政客和企業會問，全球化的一個關鍵原則——你應該與所有人進行貿易，而不僅僅是與地緣政治盟友進行貿易——是否仍然有效，這不僅會發生在俄羅斯身上，其他的獨裁國家也會有所轉變。中國將積極研究西方對俄羅斯的制裁效應，然後更加積極推動自給自足的建設。入侵烏克蘭可能不會在今天引發全球的一個經濟危機，但它將改變未來幾十年全球經濟體系運行的方式。 4，對台灣影響： 而對台灣來說，普丁口中宣示的：烏克蘭長期以來一直是屬於俄羅斯的一部分，是歷史上不可分割的一塊，大家不會覺得和中國大陸對台灣的口徑有著那麼一絲耳熟能詳的感覺嗎？ 但烏克蘭和台灣之間的差異比相似之處更能說明烏克蘭的困境不會在台灣複製，首先是美國的支持程度，大多數美國人在地圖上找不到烏克蘭，烏克蘭不過是美國第67大貿易夥伴。但台灣是美國的第九大貿易夥伴，也是全球供應鏈核心中的半導體超級大國。 而且台灣位於西太平洋「第一島鏈」核心，是美國在該地區的主要盟友日本最關鍵的緩衝區。因此，在台灣議題上，《經濟學人》認為美國對它自己在亞洲信譽的在乎會遠遠超過對遠在歐洲烏克蘭的關注。失去台灣將意味著美國自第二次世界大戰以來領導的亞洲區安全秩序的一個終結，並將讓該地區的大國角色讓位給了中國。 這個結論靠不靠譜我不予置評，因為政治從來不是靠邏輯推斷可以確認的。但今天，烏克蘭的大火看似離我們仍遠，但它衍生的火苗肯定會飄向亞洲，我們擺脫不了由此衍生出來的全球經濟以及科技、金融的後續效應，更不可能永遠抱著隔岸觀火的心態做出事不關己的反應，普丁的棋局末手，我認為只有時間才能夠告訴我們答案。 5，對產業影響： 隨著俄羅斯的政治與軍事動作，各國陸續宣佈制裁措施。美國總統拜登更明言將針對人工智慧、量子計算與航空航太等戰略性產業，實施技術、軟體出口管制，或與盟國制定新版的「外國直接產品規則」，禁止相關企業向俄羅斯出口用於軍事及國家安全的產品，確保使用美國技術或軟體的外國產品也能受到美國監管。 在上述三個主要戰略性產業，美國在人工智慧與量子計算領域發展皆居全球首位，反觀俄羅斯的技術發展仍屬萌芽階段，故美國若對俄羅斯提出技術出口管制，預期將可發揮部分效果；在航空航太領域，美俄兩國之間互有優勢，以低軌衛星為例，美國用戶端數量有近九成屬於民營的商用衛星，俄羅斯則有五成用於軍事用途，美國制裁效果不明顯。 對台灣產業而言，這三個戰略產業的發展，亦屬於起步階段，若要配合美國出口管制政策，宣示意味較高。 不過，我國在半導體產業則具有關鍵地位，掌握多數先進製程產能。因高階運算晶片是AI運算、航太、軍事、資安等應用的核心，必須仰賴先進製程，我國產業未來恐需配合美國政策進行出口管制。 俄羅斯並非我國資訊電子產業的主要出口國家，我國半導體產業、通訊產業與資訊硬體產業出口至俄羅斯的金額比重甚低（皆低於0.5%），對我國出口影響有限。 但在另一方面，我國產業恐將面臨上游供應端的衝擊，主因為半導體製造過程中，部分特殊氣體與材料的供應主要來自俄羅斯與烏克蘭。 對產業界而言，過去三年以來接連面對前述的國際局勢變動，加上新冠肺炎疫情，業者所面臨的系統性風險既多且雜，對其因應環境變動的能力是一大考驗。 如何有效掌握國際政經局勢的變化，管理可能的風險，甚至超前部署、掌握潛在商機，已成為重要的競爭力來源之一，無怪乎台積電已開始關注和延攬國際關係、政治經濟相關人才。 在世界朝兩大強權分立、對抗的演進趨勢下，產業界面臨的政經風險恐非短期現象，建議產、官、學、研各界應進一步建立系統性的觀察、預測體系，提升我國產業因應相關系統性風險的能耐。 《經濟學人》推薦 這是一期讓人可以一目瞭然的封面設計，我們在鮮黃的封底前看見的就是黑色的普丁側面剪影，只是在兇狠的表情上，你可以看見經濟學人用坦克點出了普丁腦中在想什麼？用戰鬥機指明了普丁的不顧一切。上面一排黑色字體 Where will he stop 他會在哪裡停止？ Where will he stop? 他會在哪裡停下來？ Vladimir Putin's war 普丁的戰爭 Russia's president has launched an assault on his neighbour. History will judge him harshly 俄羅斯總統對其鄰國發動了襲擊。歷史將對他作出嚴厲的評判 衝突的發生常常需要一個長期的累積，但戰爭中的第一次突襲發生往往還是令人感到震驚。無論你對這場戰鬥下了多大的決心，但現實總會有所不同。莫斯科時間2月24日上午5點40分，俄羅斯向烏克蘭境內的目標發射了第一枚巡航導彈。在接下來的九個小時內，經濟學人決定撕毀原來的封面故事報道，改而重新關注這個可能是第二次世界大戰以來發生在歐洲的最大戰火，以及它背後所告訴我們的那個令人厭惡現實。從去年年底以來，經濟學人一直在文章和封面上關注著俄羅斯對烏克蘭和西方世界所採取的步步進逼，經濟學人也將繼續在相關應用程序app、網站和雜誌中密切關注俄羅斯的後續行動。本週，隨著俄羅斯軍隊從三個方向湧入了烏克蘭國土，經濟學人決定將封面故事再次聚焦在俄羅斯總統普丁。這場衝突完全是他一手造成的。這場戰爭不是不能避免，這就是普丁自導自演的一個衝突。在接下來的可能戰鬥和苦難中，烏克蘭和俄羅斯的大量鮮血將流淌而出，但每一滴都將沾滿普丁的雙手。普丁對鄰國這個擁有主權的國家發動了一個沒有理由的攻擊。他痴迷於抵禦西方的聯盟組織。他踐踏了支撐21世紀和平的原則。這就是為什麼世界必須為他的侵略付出沈重的代價。 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/story/cl07kwdxj0wp60861zxta8jpv?m=comment Powered by Firstory Hosting

PODCAST NO.# 243 -- ♤ -- PIK-FEIN presents... ROBIN HIRTE @ SONDERSPUR PODCAST - FRANKFURT -♠♤♠ ⎯⎯ ♠♤♠⎯⎯ ♠♤♠⎯⎯ ♠♤♠⎯⎯♠♤⎯⎯ ♠♤♠⎯⎯ - ARTIST - ...INFOs... - ROBIN HIRTE DJ Robin wurde am 11.Oktober 1972 in Stuttgart geboren. Als Sohn eines Opernsängers wuchs er in einer sehr musikalischen Familie auf. Sein Bruder ist Gitarrist und seine Schwester Gesangslehrerin. Mit 11 Jahren kam Robin in die Jugendhausdisco und als er die bunten Lichter und die Plattenspieler sah wusste er: DAS IST MEIN DING ! 3 Monate später wurde er in der Discogruppe aufgenommen und war ab dann regelmäßig als DJ bei Jugendhausdiscos, Schulparties oder Geburtstagen im näheren Umfeld gebucht. Mit 15 Jahren gewann Robin einen DJ Contest in der Tanzschule Haag in Stuttgart und war ab dann dort Resident. Mit 16 half er einem (kranken) Freund einen "New Wave" Abend im legendären Stuttgarter Club "Roxy" zu spielen - der Chef und Haupt-DJ waren so begeistert, dass sie ihn ab sofort für den Samstag (Durchlauf bis zu 2.500 Gäste) engagierten. Der Style war Mixed Music und somit musste er sich in allen Genres gut auskennen. Von da an war Robin in sämtlichen Stuttgarter Clubs als DJ tätig, wie z.B. Oz, Boa, Perkins Park, Musicland, Nachtwerk, Monument usw... 1993 lernte Robin die Liebe zu Trance und der elektronischen Musik kennen und war in den folgenden Jahren als Techno DJ gebucht und als Resident in den angesagtesten Läden der Umgebung unterwegs. Wie z.B.: Skylab, Zenit, OZ, TOY, Ohm, Paris Club, Stomp, Nexus 6, Störung 1998 startete er im Tonstudio als Musikproduzent und hat mittlerweile unzählige Veröffentlichungen unter seinem bürgerlichen Namen Robin Hirte veröffentlicht und war als international erfolgreicher DJ unterwegs. Er spielte auf der Love Parade Berlin, Streetparade Zürich, war gebucht in Mexico, Frankreich, England, Polen, Holland, Belgien und in sämtlichen deutschen Clubs unterwegs. 2014 hat sich Robin wieder auf seine Wurzeln besonnen und mit Hilfe seiner alten Roxy DJ Kollegen wieder angefangen auf Hochzeiten zu spielen, da er einfach wieder eine Herausforderung brauchte. Seit 2015 ist Robin für AIDA Cruises als DJ auf den Weltmeeren unterwegs und bespielt hier wieder alle Genres. Egal ob eine Schlagerparty auf dem Pooldeck oder eine Dance und Hiphop Party im Club. Mit DJ Robin wird Jede Party zum Erlebnis. BOKKING & MORE https://www.facebook.com/robin.hirte.official/ https://www.beatport.com/artist/robin-hirte/89809 https://soundcloud.com/robinhirte Da er nicht das ganze Jahr auf dem Schiff unterwegs ist, kann man DJ Robin in seinen freien Monaten als DJ für seine Feier buchen. DANKE DIR VIELMALs mein LIEBER.. für dieses STÜCK GEBALLER... WAHNSINNS Set !!! PASST SITZT & QUIETSCHT genau das richtige auf der SONDERSPUR !!! LASST ES EUCH.... GUUT GEHE & VIEL SPASS BEIM GENIEßEN !!! ...LET THE GEBALLER ENTERTAIN YOUUUUUUU !!!

On today's episode of the Dailies, the following headlines were brought to keep you abreast of the latest happening across the nation, with some of them incisively treated by our seasoned analyst: · Fuel marketers predict N170/litre, claim supply drop; NNPC disagrees. · ASUU may withdraw strike threat, Gbajabiamila, others intervenes · AMCON empowered to sell debtor-firms,VIPs' assets as Buhari signs bill · Court stops minister, AG-F from deducting $419m Paris Club refund · States get FG's N656bn support · Gbajabiamila meets Buhari, says president supports direct primaries. · Set up independent inquiry on justice Odili's invasion, Falana tells Buhari. · Buhari to Blinken: FG awiaits #EndSARS panel report from states. · Yoruba Nation: FG wants to blackmail me- Akintoye

On today's episode of the Dailies, the following headlines were brought to keep us abreast of the latest happening, with some of them incisively treated by our seasoned analyst: · US To Lagos, FG: Act On #EndSARS Panel Report · Direct Primary Easier To Manipulate By Governors ― Ortom · $5.8 Mambila project: Firm waives $500m penalty for Nigeria, FG celebrates · 10-Yr-Old Boy, 4 Adults Die As Gas Explosion Rocks Lagos · Unilorin expels 400l student who beats lecturer to stupor · Killing in Sokoto needless violence- Buhari · 25-year-old lady, five others jailed 141 years for drug trafficking in Edo, Ogun · NASU threatens strike over alleged bias in payment of allowances · Governors insist on litigation to end Paris Club refund row · Ekiti, Osun governorship: APC pegs nomination, expression of interest forms at N22.5m · Why ASUU cannot go on stike- Ngige These and many more…

The Nigeria Governors' Forum says the Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation, Abubakar Malami, was working against the public's interest by insisting on the payment of $418 million to private consultants from the accounts of state governments. The consultants are claiming a percentage of Paris Club refunds as payment of services they said they rendered to the states and local government. The spokesman of the Office of the Attorney-General of the Federation, Umar Gwandu, says the AGF suggested the states and local governments had acted in bad faith for taking the case to court. The NGF, says the AGF's actions raise questions of propriety and the spirit of justice.

The Nigeria Governors' Forum says the Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation, Abubakar Malami, was working against the public's interest by insisting on the payment of $418 million to private consultants from the accounts of state governments. The consultants are claiming a percentage of Paris Club refunds as payment of services they said they rendered to the states and local government. The spokesman of the Office of the Attorney-General of the Federation, Umar Gwandu, says the AGF suggested the states and local governments had acted in bad faith for taking the case to court. The NGF, says the AGF's actions raise questions of propriety and the spirit of justice.

The Nigeria Governors' Forum says the Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation, Abubakar Malami, was working against the public's interest by insisting on the payment of $418 million to private consultants from the accounts of state governments. The consultants are claiming a percentage of Paris Club refunds as payment of services they said they rendered to the states and local government. The spokesman of the Office of the Attorney-General of the Federation, Umar Gwandu, says the AGF suggested the states and local governments had acted in bad faith for taking the case to court. The NGF, says the AGF's actions raise questions of propriety and the spirit of justice.

The Sovereign Debt Acronym Show DSA, SDR, DSSI. Sovereign debt insiders love to throw acronyms around in conversation to make us outsiders feel like, well . . . outsiders. Even the non-acronyms aren't exactly self-explanatory. Who knew the Paris Club isn't really a night club where sovereign debt folks hang out at after work? Aitor Erce, superstar sovereign debt scholar and veteran of multiple key institutions in the international financial apparatus (Bank of Spain, ESM) joins us to discuss the history and contemporary relevance of these institutions and to offer some critiques of how they function. We also talk about proposals to increase IMF allocations of SDRs in response to the covid crisis. And while we have Aitor, we ask how all of these acronyms – SDRs, DSAs, etc. -- play into the G20's Common Framework. All in all, lots to talk about. We will need to have Aitor back.

Rorshok's weekly ten-minute update of stuff happening in Argentina. Locally produced vaccines, AstraZeneca vaccines arrive, vaccination goals, travel expectations and regulations, cinemas and theatres reopening at limited capacity, inflation updates, the crypto revolution, unemployment in Latin America, Lower House Speaker Sergio Massa shares a long dinner with a former US President, an agreement with the Paris Club, snowfall in Córdoba, and much more! Thanks for tuning in! We want to know why you are listening, how you found us, and your life story! Thoughts? Recommendations? Important stuff we missed we might have missed, or topics you want us to cover? Things we got wrong in your humble opinion? Email us at podcast@rorshok.com. Like what you hear? Subscribe, share, and tell your buds.

Argentina breathes a sigh of relief after the country reached a deal with the Paris Club of international creditors to extend the repayment period for the bulk of its $2.4 billion worth of debt. Without the agreement, the country would have defaulted at the end of July. Plus, Morgan Stanley is reportedly planning to bar unvaccinated staff and clients from entering its offices in New York starting next month and to lift some Covid-19 restrictions in return.

David Riley is Partner and Chief Investment Strategist of BlueBay Asset management – a USD70bn fixed income fund. Before Bluebay, David was global head of Fitch’s Sovereign and Supranational Group, responsible for more than 130 ratings of the world’s largest fixed-income issuers. Prior to Fitch, David was at HM Treasury where he advised on international economic and debt issues, including representing the UK at international debt restructuring negotiations at the Paris Club of Official Creditors. In this podcast, we discuss: How sustainable are US and developed market debt? Will the reflation trade continue for 2021? Peak pessimism on Euro-area. Dollar trend. Will corporates start defaulting? Impact of higher rates on credit. Which EM markets look attractive? The impact of ESG on the asset management industry. Books that influenced David: Fooled By Randomness (Taleb), Thinking, Fast and Slow (Kahneman), Trade Wars Are Class Wars (Klein, Pettis), Balance Sheet Recession (Koo).

Kenya: The Treasury Secretary yesterday confirmed that the sovereign had managed to secure an arrangement with China where it will delay payment of interest to the tune of US$245m for debt due in 1H21. The relief follows the Paris Club of creditors which agreed to suspend US$300m worth of interest payments. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Marcus receives a lesson in sovereign bond trading from Jim Croft. Meanwhile, Zambia's Finance Minister has appealed for an interest-payment holiday from holders of its $3 billion in Eurobonds. Croft, who participated in the call between the Finance minister and bondholders, tells Marcus the reaction of bondholders. The ratings agency Fitch believes that its recent downgrade of Zambia's rating could herald a series of sovereign defaults in sub-Saharan Africa. ‘'The share of African countries with government interest payments relative to revenue above 30% is now higher than before the debt-reduction initiatives at the start of the millennium, which saw low-income countries' debt burdens forgiven by Paris Club creditors,'' Fitch has said Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or position of Africa Practice and its management.

Seven months in to the worsening African debt crisis and still there's no prospect for any meaningful relief in sight. The situation grows even more dire by the day as more countries struggle to pay for rising healthcare costs brought on by the COVID019 outbreak while at the same continue to service their loans.All of the continent's major creditors including China, G20 countries, bondholders, the Paris Club and multilateral lenders like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund all have programs intended to help resolve the situation but none, so far, have done very much to ease the crisis.Alonso Soto is covering the African debt story for Bloomberg News where he's an Abuja-based correspondent. Alonso joins Eric & Cobus to provide an update on the debt relief situation and insights from his conversations with dozens of sources on what to expect through the end of the year.JOIN THE DISCUSSION:Facebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProject Twitter: @eolander | @stadenesque | @alonsosotojSUPPORT THIS PODCAST. BECOME A SUBSCRIBER TO THE CHINA AFRICA PROJECT.Your subscription supports independent journalism. Subscribers get the following:1. A daily email newsletter of the top China-Africa news.2. Access to the China-Africa Experts Network3. Unlimited access to the CAP's exclusive analysis content on chinaafricaproject.comSubscribe today and get two-weeks free: www.chinaafricaproject.com/subscribe

In this episode, I talk with Governor Dr Reza Baqir who became the 20th Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan in May 2019. He took the helm as Pakistan embarked on an ambitious reform plan which included an IMF programme. Before that, he was an 18-year veteran of the IMF and previously also worked at the World Bank. He was the Head of the IMF's Office in Egypt and Senior Resident Representative from 2017 to 2019. He has also held positions as IMF Mission Chief for Romania and Bulgaria, Division Chief of the IMF's Debt Policy Division, and Head of the IMF delegation to the Paris Club. His research has been published in top journals of the economics profession, including the Journal of Political Economy and the Quarterly Journal of Economics. In this podcast we discuss: 1. The state of Pakistan’s economy and financial markets before COVID hit 2. The reasons for and status of the IMF programme 3. How Pakistan’s markets behaved over COVID 4. The transition from a fixed FX regime to market-determined FX regime 5. The path of FX reserves 6. How the State Bank has shifted to an expected inflation target 7. COVID policies outside of cutting rates 8. Longer-term goals of boosting exports, financial inclusion and raising saving rates 9. How global institutions have responded to the COVID crisis versus GFC 10. The role of debt reduction rather than debt rescheduling for EM

Scott Morris is a Senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, where he directs the US Development Policy Program and co-directs the Sustainable Development Finance Program. He previously served as deputy assistant secretary for development finance and debt at the Treasury Department under the Obama Administration. In that capacity, he led US engagement with the multilateral development banks, as well as US participation in the Paris Club of official creditors. In this interview, Mr. Morris explains how development finance institutions like the World Bank interact with the U.S. Congress and adapt to the ever more complex situations in international economics. As the World Bank’s largest shareholder, the U.S. maintains a unique influence in shaping its agenda, and Congress has an important role both in funding U.S. contributions to the World Bank and in overseeing U.S. participation in the institution. Has the U.S. involvement been beneficial to the growth and credibility of the organization? Why not let it become more independent from U.S. influence? What role will international financial institutions play in the future of development economics? Will their roles be further diminished or become more dominant as more focus is being put on “localization” and “decentralization?” We also touch on his March presentation at Julis-Rabinowitz Center annual conference, where he started with a look at debt in low-income countries. 44% percent of low income countries are now either at high risk of debt distress or in debt distress, up from 21% just five years ago. During this time, China has emerged as the dominant creditor to the riskiest low-income countries, while the amount of low-income country debt held by development finance institutions and Paris Club lenders has decreased dramatically.

Zambia has asked the Paris Club of creditor nations to let it suspend principal and interest payments on debts to all its official creditors from May to the end of December. In a statement, Zambia's Finance Ministry told the Paris Club that the country remains committed to servicing debt payments that fell due before May 1. The request for the suspension was made in a letter to the Paris Club. The statement notes that Zambia has been listed among countries eligible for relief under the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), which aims to help nations respond to COVID-19 health challenges and economic shocks. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

West Coast Cookbook & Speakeasy is Now Open! 8am-9am PT/ 11am-Noon ET for our especially special Daily Specials, Smothered Benedict Wednesdays!Starting off in the Bistro Cafe, Susan Rice criticized the Hungarian prime minister for using the pandemic in an illegal power grab.Then, on the rest of the menu, Trump's rollback of the 1918 Migratory Bird Treaty Act could kill billions of birds; New Yorkers cheer the city's health care workers from their windows every day at 7 pm, but Trump keeps accusing them of being thieves every day at his virus pressers; and, Trump wants to send ventilators abroad as US patients are forced to share.After the break, we move to the Chef's Table where furloughed crews from Scandinavian airline SAS are taking a three-day course in basic hospital duties to help Sweden battle the pandemic; and, the Paris Club of creditor nations agreed to cancel $1.4 billion of Somalia debt.All that and more, on West Coast Cookbook & Speakeasy with Chef de Cuisine Justice Putnam.Bon Appétit!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~"To those of us who believe that all of life is sacred every crumb of bread and sip of wine is a Eucharist, a remembrance, a call to awareness of holiness right where we are. I want all of the holiness of the Eucharist to spill out beyond church walls, out of the hands of priests and into the regular streets and sidewalks, into the hands of regular, grubby people like you and me, onto our tables, in our kitchens and dining rooms and backyards.” -- Shauna Niequist "Bread and Wine: A Love Letter to Life Around the Table with Recipes"~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Show Notes & Links: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2020/4/1/1933243/-West-Coast-Cookbook-amp-Speakeasy-Daily-Special-Smothered-Benedict-Wednesdays

The Paris Club of creditor nations has agreed to restructure Somalia’s debt, including immediately canceling 1.4 billion dollars owed by the country. The decision cancels 67% of the debts owed to Paris Club creditors by Somalia. It came after more than nine hours of discussions by videoconference. Somali Finance Minister, Abdirahman Beileh, called the decision a big step forward for his country. Belleh said the Somali government would hold separate bilateral discussions with the creditors to finalize the process. He said his government would continue the economic reforms it had undertaken over the past eight years to enable the debt relief. Somalia is the 37th country to qualify for debt relief under the HIPC process. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/newscast-africa/support Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Somalia has been granted debt relief of more than a billion dollars by the so-called Paris Club, a group that includes the US and Norway, among other countries, as well as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The African nation has worked hard for several years to qualify for the debt cancellation, which now paves the way for the war-torn country to rebuild its economy. Mahad Ahmed unpacked this story with us from Mogadishu. He's the CEO of the International Bank of Somalia. #Somalia #IMF #Debt

There are growing calls for international lenders to cancel or at least reschedule significant portions of Africa’s debt as economies one after across the continent another sink into recession as a result of the worsening COVID-19 outbreak. Earlier this month, Ethiopian Prime Minister sounded the alarm when he called on international lenders to forgive African debt. He later received support from Senegalese President Macky Sall, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and even major creditors including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.What’s interesting though is that neither Prime Minister Abiy nor any of his counterparts directly addressed the Chinese in their appeals. Considering that China owns 20% of the debt in Africa and is the largest bilateral creditor in a number of the continent’s major economies, Beijing’s plays a disproportionately important role in this discussion.China’s outsized role in the African debt issue highlights the fact that this is now a much more complicated issue than it was back in the day when it was just a small group of Western lenders, known as the Paris Club, that could make these decisions on their own. Today, Africans have borrowed extensively from private capital markets, the Chinese and others making it far more difficult for a small group of U.S. and European leaders to decide what to do on their own.Tim Jones is following the African debt relief issue closely in his role as the Head of Policy for the Jubilee Debt Campaign, a London-based NGO that advocates for debt relief and fair lending practices in developing countries. He joins Eric & Cobus to discuss the complexities involved in the current debt relief debate in Africa amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.JOIN THE DISCUSSION:Facebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProject Twitter: @eolander | @stadenesque | @tim_jones6 | @dropthedebtSUPPORT THIS PODCAST. BECOME A SUBSCRIBER TO THE CHINA AFRICA PROJECT.Your subscription supports independent journalism. Subscribers get the following:1. A daily email newsletter of the top China-Africa news.2. Access to the China-Africa Experts Network3. Unlimited access to the CAP's exclusive analysis content on chinaafricaproject.comSubscribe today and get two-weeks free: www.chinaafricaproject.com/subscribe

DJ Jay-C is from Salzburg, Austria. He frequently performs at the City Beats club in Salzburg, the Paris Club in Klagenfurt, and at the Blue Chip in Innsbruck. Follow DJ Jay-C on Instagram: @djjaycofficial See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Paul Buitink talks with George Papaconstantinou, author, professor and Greek Minister of Finance during the first bail out years 2009-2011. Papaconstantinou was persona non grata in Greece for taking difficult measures and imposing austerity. 10 years later the Greeks have a more balanced view. Should he have arranged debt restructuring from the start? Papaconstantinou says it was impossible. The Greek banks would have been wiped out. When he started as a Minister the deficit turned out to be close to 16% instead of 6%. He agrees that the bailout money went primarily to German and French banks. Debt to GDP is over 180% but there is no immediate problem due to low interest rates and long maturities of the debt. Debt restructuring should take place though in the future. Perhaps via the Paris Club rules. Nominal haircut is politically unfeasible, more reduction in net present value (NVP) is. You can call that voter deceit. Papaconstantinou expects new QE but Greece will probably not be part soon due to not being investment grade. The new government, despite being the same party that fooled Greece in the past, has new leadership and takes promising steps. No people from the former leadership were ever tried and also in the new government there is clientelism. So the new government has two faces. After the crisis no real soul-searching has taken place. Papaconstantinou doubts whether lessons were learned. Banks are still fragile. He blames Syriza. No political party wants Grexit at the moment. The country is in a post-bailout area but still suffers from the crisis, although things go better. Other things discussed are negative interest rates, the Lagarde list, his new book Whatever it Takes about the future of the eurozone, Brexit and migration.

Directeur du forum économique franco japonais Paris Club et président de la délégation japonaise de la Renaissance française, Sumihiko Seto est l'invité exceptionnel de café Asuka. Au programme : son ouvrage publié au Japon "Pourquoi la France est-elle résiliente aux chocs ? Modèle d'un état-nation hybride soutenable", son regard sur les économies et les sociétés japonaise, allemande et française et en particulier la place de la femme.

Community Cookbooks: Inspiring Twain Restaurant's Midwestern Menu Join husband and wife team Chef Tim Graham and Sommelier Rebekah Graham’s of Twain (2445 N. Milwaukee Ave.). Logan Square’s new Midwestern-inspired restaurant, as they discuss community cookbooks with Greater Midwest Foodways Alliance. Influenced by the couple’s extensive collection of spiral-bound women’s club cookbooks from the 1940s through the present as well as Tim’s central Missouri upbringing, Twain marks passage from the past to the present with family recipes passed down through generations focusing on delicious, approachable dishes with modern twists and fun presentations. Named after prolific author Samuel Clemens’ famous pen name, Mark Twain. Married in 2010, Tim and Rebekah Graham are industry veterans. Tim’s eyes were first opened to his passion for the restaurant industry at Les Bourgouis, a small French istro attached to a winery located on the bluffs of the Missouri River near his hometown of Columbia, Missouri. He worked at Tru, where in five years he climbed the ranks to executive chef, earning a 2008 StarChefs Rising Stars Award. He then left Tru to work with renowned Chef J. Joho at Brasserie Jo and Paris Club before moving on to open Travelle in The Langham Chicago. Rebekah, originally from Salt Lake City, moved to New York in her twenties where she took her first mesmerizing sip of wine. Relocating to Chicago in 1999, she continued her journey through the beverage landscape, focusing on beer, before travelling to wine country in the United States and Europe and working at a winery in Tuscany, Italy. She also became interested in spirits as well, working in Taos, New Mexico where she designed her first cocktail program. Upon returning to Chicago in 2006 she worked at the legendary Pump Room before joining One Off Hospitality and opening Publican in 2008. Eventually going on to manage the highly lauded beer and wine program at the restaurant, she left in 2016 to open Twain with Tim, which is their first restaurant that they are operating together. This program is hosted by the Greater Midwest Foodways. The Greater Midwest Foodways Alliance is dedicated to celebrating, exploring and preserving the American Midwest’s unique food traditions and their cultural contexts. Recorded at Bethany Retirement Community on January 12, 2019. Image by Michael Gebert of Fooditor. https://culinaryhistorians.org/community-cookbooks-inspiring-twain-restaurants-midwestern-menu/

This panel session, the fourth of the Africa's rising debt conference, addresses the following key questions: - How effective has the implementation of collective action clauses been and what further improvements can be made? - What challenges does the evolving financing landscape pose to sovereign debt restructuring, particularly the Paris Club and market-based approaches, and what are some possible solutions? - What incremental steps can be taken to improve the architecture for sovereign debt restructuring to assess legitimacy of debt claims, deal with creditor coordination, address aggressive litigation strategies by 'vulture funds' against sovereign debtors, and link debt restructurings to SDG financing needs and human rights?

Philippe Grandbois is our Bar Manager at THE PARIS CLUB Duesseldorf. Together with Marc Hermann he runs the operations of the Bar. But also, he was part of me pre opening team and we developed great Highballs for the PARIS CLUB. It is about Frinching…

Philippe Grandbois is our Bar Manager at THE PARIS CLUB Duesseldorf. Together with Marc Hermann he runs the operations of the Bar. But also, he was part of me pre opening team and we developed great Highballs for the PARIS CLUB. It is about Frinching - French Drinking. Cause we only serve french products in Duesseldorf. And WINEBALLS - who really need Spritz in 2018 anymore ;) This episode is in english and I hope you do not mind. -- Ich würde mich freuen, wenn Sie mir eine Bewertung im iTunes Store geben : https://itunes.apple.com/de/podcast/empfehlungen-eines-trinkers-trinkabenteuer-von-und/id1323277650?mt=2 Um Missverständnissen vorzubeugen: Ich trinke gerne. Ich mag den Genuss. Aber: Es gilt für den Genuss von Alkohol, wie bei so vielen Genussmitteln, geniessen Sie moderat ! Alkoholmissbrauch ist gesundheitsgefährdend. Genießen Sie also in Maßen! Empfehlungen eines Trinkers / www.trinken.jrgmyr.net ist eine Produktion von Joerg Meyer • jrgmyr und dem bureau.jrgmyr Impressum und Kontakt: www.trinken.jrgmyr.net/impressum Joerg Meyer • jrgmyr auf Facebook: www.facebook.com/jrgmyr Joerg Meyer • jrgmyr auf instagram: www.instagram.com/jrgmyr

Paul was joined at the Expert Series by Scott Morris of the Center for Global Development in Washington, D.C. to discuss the debt dynamics of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The fifth anniversary of the announcement of the BRI sees the program mired in suspicion, exaggeration, and unviability. The discussion, based off the findings of the Center’s work published in March 2018, covers China’s new role as a sovereign creditor, the Chinese financial architecture, debt considerations of countries with Belt and Road funding, the actual scale of BRI, the commercial viability of many projects and some of the political issues surrounding the program. The Q&A section examines in detail issues that China’s absence from the Paris Club creates.

Bonjour ou Bonsoir à tous et toutes Voici pour vous sans doute l'un des plus gros tubes légendaires de la formation musicale Chic Et des inséparables Bernard Edwards et Nile Rodgers Good Times Un single extrait de l'album Risqué sortit en 1979 Sur Atlantic Records https://itunes.apple.com/fr/album/risque/id300994537# Et que je vous proposes ici dans une version revisitée par mes soins Façon Club Deep House ,Soulful House Que je laisses à vôtre entière appréciation D'ores et déjà merci pour l'accueil que vous donnerez à ce remix Love & Peace in the world !!!!

PARIS CLUB SESSION BEFOR MIX BY SAM ONE www.house4you.fr www.djsamone.com

You will have the opportunity to immerse themselves in the underground each of them and enjoy the deep vibrations of sound. A few years ago The New York Times and Le Monde were declaring the death of clubbing in Paris. It was a dark moment for a city that has at times stood alongside London, New York and Berlin as one of the capitals of electronic music. With names like Laurent Garnier, Daft Punk and Justice leading the way, Paris has seemingly always been flashpoint for a unique spin on house and techno. Paris is a city of cafes and bars. This is not the best place to play. Paris Club culture collapsed and we remember the time when 5 years ago there occurred a unique event. In fact, Paris is really a very small town. The houses are very close to each other, and if you suddenly decided to throw a party, the neighbors called the police because the noise prevents them from sleeping and the police will arrest you. There used to complain at all, even at the smallest reason. Paris club scene may not be similar to what happens in Berlin or London. This is the cultural capital of France. You should take a look at the large number of museums and dedicate a lot of time to look at this beautiful city. If you visit the night clubs in other European cities, while in Paris it will make you feel outside of this circle. Of course, in Paris, it is worth noting a few great clubs such as the Rex Club, Social Club or the Point Ephemere. Certainly if you find an open space where you can turn on loud music then you have a chance to have a good party but it is not quite easy. However, there is one of the most popular series of parties Die Nacht that occur every time a new location. You can always find interesting events outside the city. It's a shift in attitude that has made Paris fun again, and that is why today in the podcast you will hear the vibration of underground clubs in Paris. Thank you for the information provided: www.residentadvisor.net