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On 25th December 1941, General Alan Brooke (or Alanbrooke) was appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the commanding officer of the British Army during the Second World War. His new boss, Winston Spencer Churchill was a hard taskmaster with high standards who had no problem with sacking generals. But, he had a helping hand in the form of General Pug Ismay, soldier, statesman and diplomat. Joining today are two historians, John Kiszely, the author of a biography of Ismay, and Gordon Corrigan, author of a book on Churchill. Today we discuss the dynamics between the three men and other generals such as Montgomery, Wavell and Auchinleck. John Kiszely Links Ismay: Soldier, Statesman, Diplomat, by John Kiszely Gordon Corrigan Links Blood, Sweat and Arrogance: The Myths of Churchill's War Aspects of History Links Latest Issue out - Annual Subscription to Aspects of History Magazine only $9.99/£9.99 Ollie on X Aspects of History on Instagram Get in touch: history@aspectsofhistory.com Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Last time we spoke about the battle of Wakde. Operation Tornado, the amphibious assault of Wakde island faced many logistical challenges, but not as much Japanese resistance. The landing at Arare was a large success, seeing the allies secure a beachhead before advancing inland. Through a combination of air, naval and ground attacks, the smaller Japanese force was pushed back. Likewise the islands of Liki and Niroemoar were taken with relative ease as well. Over in the Burma-India theater, the battle for Kohima was gradually seeing the Japanese fail to meet their objectives. Without ammunition or provision supplies flowing to them, the Japanese at Kohima had no hope of holding back the allies. Thus the Japanese were beginning to fall back and now were setting up a defense to stop the allies from entering central Burma. Meanwhile a siege was being erected against Myitkyina. This episode is the Siege of Myitkyina  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last time we saw General Stilwell had managed to seize the Myitkyina airstrip. Now allied forces were gradually securing northern Burma, pushing further towards Mogaung. The Japanese 18th Division were absolutely battered and barely holding on around Kamaing. However when the American-Chinese forces seized Myitkyina's airstrip, they had failed to quickly attack the main town, which the Japanese were reinforcing heavily. Now they were being attacked from both ends. This prompted General Stilwell to dispatch General Boatner with the task force to try and turn things around. Simultaneously, Stilwell had just received word of the Chindits abandonment of the Blackpool stronghold, outraged by this he ordered them to advance northwards to support the attack on Mogaung. Three brigades, the 111th, 14th and the 3rd West Africans were to advance north to support Calvert's 77th Brigade to take Mogaung. The Chindits were incredulous. Nonetheless, Lentaigne, pressed by Stilwell, sought to have his 3rd West Africans, the 14th and 111th Brigades squeeze the Japanese along the western flanks of the Mogaung valley, in which Mogaung occupied the lowest point of an inverted triangle, with the other two points being Kamaing on the top left and Myitkyina on the top right. With any luck, his three brigades could capture Kamaing, which occupied an enviable place on the Mogaung River. The 111th Brigade was to move north-east and operate in the Pahok-Sahmaw area, destroying dumps and blocking enemy movement. Thebattered men of the 111th Brigade struggled to cope with the march north, to the hills east of Lakhren and west of Mogaung. Conditions were appalling on the three-day march to Lakhren village. From there, the best approach to Mogaung would be identified. They were making for a waterlogged, mosquito-infested area north east of the Lake. This area was also alive with Japanese units. They were required to support 77th Brigade's attack on Mogaung, by pushing from the west as Calvert's command advanced from the south-east. However, 111th Brigade was spent after Blackpool and many men were forced to return to Lakhren village. There was also a new task for 14th Brigade – the capture of Taungni. With the casualties evacuated, 14th Brigade abandoned the Kyunsalai Pass and headed north towards Mogaung. The steamy swamps continued to take their toll within the ranks of the York and Lancaster columns. Dysentery was rife. Animals collapsed and were shot where they dropped. They reached Mokso on June 25. This much-used rallying point, consisting of four huts, was a sea of mud and detritus, decorated with black clouds of flies. Rations were being consumed rapidly in an area devoid of drop zones. Brigadier Brodie, 14th Brigade's Commander, responded to the extreme circumstances. His men, despite their dangerously poor condition, were still expected to harass the Japanese along the railway and support 77th Brigade's assault on Mogaung. He formed his columns into “Light Battle Groups”, free of heavy weapons and the wounded and sick, now lying together in the mud. Meanwhile, some Nigerian units were now struggling on the road to Lakhren along the reailway, as were the York and Lancaster sick – around 300 in all, 200 of whom were dangerously ill. On May 25th, the same day the Chindits had quit Blackpool, Stilwell ordered the Morris Force to seize Waingmaw, across the river from Myitkyina. Unfortunately, the Japanese had entrenched themselves at the town and enjoyed the luxury of a natural moat after heavy rains flooded the fields on the approaches to the town. Morrisforce was not a proper brigade, having only two columns of troops, to which a third from the 111th Brigade had been added 1,500 troops in total. It had been conceived to harass the Japanese on jungle areas. Now, they were up against fortified positions. The result was a bloodbath. Morrisforce then began to rapidly deplete in strength. By July 14th, it was to consist of exactly three platoons, roughly 120 men. On May 31st, Boatner then launched his first coordinated attack against Myitkyina seeing the 42nd regiment reach the Waingmaw ferry road. Built up twelve feet above the neighboring paddy fields, the road gave the Japanese a magnificent defensive position, which they exploited cleverly. The Chinese recoiled from this natural fortification but were able to beat off a Japanese counterattack. The 150th Regiment reached the riverbank and drew up in an arc about a sawmill in which the Japanese had a strongpoint. Meanwhile Colonel Hunter's 2nd battalion reinforced with engineers advanced to Radhapur where they were heavily counterattacked by the 114th Regiment. The next day, the inexperienced 236th Engineer Battalion was sent against Namkwi. The motive behind the 236th's attack was to contain the Japanese in the Namkwi area and introduce the battalion to combat under relatively easy conditions. One company of the 236th did succeed in entering Namkwi but instead of promptly consolidating to meet the inevitable Japanese counterattack fell out for a break. The Japanese counterattacked and drove the unwary engineers right back out of the village. Both the engineers and the 2600 replacements of the Galahad Unit that had recently arrived lacked adequate experience fighting the Japanese and as such suffered badly when fighting against them. Colonel Hunter's veteran Marauders, however, had suffered ample casualties and thus needed these green replacements in order to continue existing as a fighting force. Boatner tossed a last ditch effort on June 3rd, but his Chinese forces had suffered 320 casualties and their ammunition was running low. While he waited for supplies to build up, he used his green american troops to give them some experience, the Chinese meanwhile tunneled towards the Japanese still suffering heavy casualties. This allowed more Japanese troops to break through and reinforce Myitkyina, with a huge relief force of the 52rd Division soon on its way. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Matsuyama Yuzo of the depleted 56th Division was facing a deadly offensive of his own on the Yunnan front. After a series of negotiations between Chiang Kai-Shek and the Americans, it had been agreed, General Wei Lihuang's Y Force would cross the Salween River to attack the Tengchong and Longling areas. This would effectively allow the allies to link the Ledo Road with China, bypassing the heavy Japanese concentration along the Burma Road. Although the Americans had supplied the Y Force with artillery and ammunition, the Chinese had failed to bring the Y Force divisions up to strength, and many questioned their training. Regardless, General Wei planned to have elements of the 20th army group cross the Salween at several points before initiating a full assault against Tengchong once reinforcements had been ferried through. Further south, elements of the 11th Army Group would also cross the Salween to launch attacks on Pingda and Longling.  On the night of May 11th, the Chinese forces began to cross the Salween River against little Japanese resistance, since Matsuyama had decided not to defend the crossing sites, instead placing his main line of resistance along the ridge line some 10 miles west. The 198th Division was able to assemble in front of the Mamien Pass; the 36th division was successfully ferried through Mengka; the brand new 39th Division managed to secure the Hueijen bridge and the 76th and 88th Divisions were converging on Pingda for the attack. On May 12th, the 198th were making good progress against the Mamien Pass as the 36th had surrounded the Japanese outposts in the eastern end of the Tiantouzhai pass. However Colonel Kurashige Yasuyoshi had his 148th regiment launched two surprise night counterattacks. All that night, the Japanese quietly filtered down from a nearby ridge and assembled near the Chinese position. Attacking at dawn, they surprised the Chinese and almost wiped them out before aid came. When darkness came, the 36th were at their bivouac. That night, the Japanese attacked vigorously, overrunning the division command post and causing the flustered 36th Division to fall back to the Salween. At dawn, the 53rd Army commander, Maj. Gen. Chou Fu-cheng, pushed a regiment across the Salween and restored the situation by attacking the Japanese flank. General Chou was an aggressive and tenacious fighter, whom his Manchurian soldiers had nicknamed Old Board-Back, and who had the reputation of never having yielded an inch to the Japanese. But even Chou could not immediately restore the morale of the 36th Division, which for some weeks took no further part in the Ta-tang-tzu fighting, and the rest of the 53rd Army had to bear the burden of clearing the pass. In response to this, Lt General Zhou Fucheng of the 53rd Army pushed the 116th and 130th Divisions across the river to resume the advance towards Tiantouzhai. At the Mamien pass, the 592nd and 594th Regiments began clearing out the Japanese strongpoints while the 593rd Regiment moved west over mountain byways to emerge into the Shweli valley by the 16th, securing the western end of the pass and forcing Kurashige's men to withdraw into the fortified village of Shangzhaigongfang. To the south, the New 39th would be able to secure Hemushu by the 17th. Yet the Japanese under Colonel Matsui Hideji soon recovered from the initial surprise of the Chinese offensive and the 1st battalion, 113th regiment drove the Chinese from Hung-mu-shu. The Japanese exploited their success and pushed the entire New 39th Division back against the Salween. Further south, the 76th Division met outposts of the 1st battalion, 146th regiment and forced them back to the heights overlooking Ping-ka. Meanwhile the 88th Division from the north was fighting through a series of fortified villages as it headed south to join the 76th Division. By the 16th, thirteen villages were occupied in the area northeast of Ping-ka, but the Japanese, as they withdrew, received reinforcements. Strengthened by the 2nd battalion, 113th regiment, the Japanese did not attack the Chinese who were pursuing them, but moved south and hit the Chinese 228th Regiment south and west of Ping-ka.  Sensing the imminent danger from the north,  Matsuyama redirected the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 113th Regiment to reinforce Shangzhaigongfang, where Kurashige would continue to resist staunchly. Reports from the American liaison teams were not cheerful. Americans observing the Kaolikung Range actions found that Japanese fire was accurate and economical, and that the enemy's use of camouflage and concealment approached perfection. The Japanese revealed no disposition to surrender though they were heavily outnumbered, often surrounded, and had neither air support nor air supply. On the other hand, the Americans reported that the Chinese endlessly wasted manpower and ammunition in costly frontal attacks. They reported that relations with the Chinese were not always as friendly as had been hoped, and they believed there would have to be better cooperation between Chinese and Americans if the Japanese were to be defeated. The Chinese were described as merely tolerating the Americans' presence and as paying little attention to their advice. The liaison personnel freely admitted their own shortcomings, and by their reports suggested that patience was the most important quality for a liaison officer to cultivate when dealing with the Chinese. Matsuyama ha spread his forces widely, over a near 60 mile sector, thus he would be unable to perform mobile operations and was gradually shifting to a defense of the Kaolikung mountain range by the 20th. This allowed the 53rd Army to continue their advance and the New 39th to retake Hemushu. By late May, with the 198th Division apparently contained on the north, Kurashige then rushed with the 113th Regiment to reinforce the Tiantouzhai front, where they successfully stopped the 53rd Army on its tracks. Yet on June 1st, the 54th Army, emerged in the Shweli valley from Ta-tang-tzu pass to join the 593rd Regiment from the Ma-mien pass. Next day the Chinese occupied Chieh-tou village and began patrolling the Shweli valley. They took the advice of Y Force officers and donned Burmese clothes. So disguised, they found it easy to enter Japanese-held villages. When taken by surprise, the Japanese were willing to abandon many of their outer defenses. With TNT charges dropped by the 27th Troop Carrier's C-47's when the weather cleared, the 198th Division also blew up the last pillboxes at Chai-kung-tang on June 13th. When the last shots had been fired and the Chinese farmer boys of the 54th Army reported the area secure, there was bewilderment at finding only 75 Japanese bodies in defenses that must have been manned by at least 300 men, and shock and nausea when the Japanese kitchens revealed how the defenders had been able to prolong their stay. Pitiful and ghastly evidence showed that the Japanese had resorted to cannibalism when their rations failed. On June 14th the Japanese further quit Chiao-tou-chieh, leaving many stores to the 2nd Reserve and 36th Divisions. In the end, the Kurashige Detachment would pull back to Watien while the Inose Battalion retreated towards Kutungchieh. General Wei then ordered the 71st Army to cross the Salween, just below the Huitung Bridge to attack Longling while a containing force attacked the strong Japanese harrison at Lameng. 20,000 troops of the 71st would cross the river by June 5th. At this time the 76th division left a regiment to besiege Pinga while the bulk pushed on to attack Matsuyama's HQ at Mangshi, while the 9th Division crossed the Salween, cutting off Pingda's line of communication. On June 4th, the new 28th Division attacked Lameng and forced Major Kanemitsu Keijirous garrison to retreat into the Mount Song fortress where they would hold out for several months. While the New 28th held down Kanemitsu, the 87th Division continued towards Longling, joining up with the 88th on June 8th to begin a siege of the main Japanese position on the Yunnan front. The Japanese still held onto the Burma Road east of Lung-ling, but as of June 7th the 87th Division had covered about two thirds of the distance along the Burma Road from the river to Lung-ling. The Chinese had to deal with small Japanese tanks, which had some moral effect but failed to halt the Chinese advance. Indeed, the latter had been fairly swift, for the Chinese had surprised the Japanese, and had been able to ease their supply problems by the capture of some Japanese rice depots.  To meet the new crisis, Matsuyama dispatched the 1st battalion, 119th regiment to stop the 2nd army at Xiangdaxiang and then attack Longling from the south. Matsuyama ordered Colonel Matsui Hideji to immediately relieve Longling from the north; and for the Yamazaki Composite Group to keep the Mangshi-Longling road open. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Song Xilian, had been making some progress against Longling's two outer heights, the stout defenders would manage to repel the uncoordinated Chinese assaults for about a week. Four days of un-coordinated infantry attacks, with little artillery support, failed to carry the three mountains inside Lung-ling, and there was nothing to show for the heavy drain on the 71st Army's ammunition stocks. This gave more time for Matsuyama's reinforcements to arrive by June 14th. On the 15th Matsui launched a heavy attack, in coordination with the besieged defenders, successfully defeating the 71st Army and consequently driving the Chinese from the vicinity of Longling. The Japanese had thus been able to drive back 10000 Chinese effectives by an attack with only 1500.  Repeated attempts by American liaison personnel with the 71st Army to learn how a small Japanese garrison could drive back a Chinese army group only brought embarrassed smiles from Chinese officers. The Chinese finally related on June 25th that the 261st Regiment had bolted, and that the commanding general of the 87th Division had attempted suicide. When fuller details of the fighting around Longling were available, anger and annoyance spread from Y Force to the Generalissimo himself. Y Force personnel considered the Chinese decision to withdraw from Longling inexcusable because the 11th Army Group had sent forward no reinforcements to meet the initial Japanese counterattacks. Of 21 battalions in the Longling vicinity on June 14th, only 9 took part in the fighting. In describing the defensive attitude of the 259th Regiment, as an example of the conduct that had cost the chance of a speedy breakthrough into Burma, one American liaison officer wrote: "From the time that we crossed the river until we reached Longling, the regimental commander continually had his troops in the rear digging emplacements and trenches in the fear that they would have to retreat." Yet that is it for the Yunnan battle for now as we need to head over to the Kamaing area. General Tanaka's 18th Division were withdrawing with the 22nd and 38th division in hot pursuit. To the south the Seton Roadblock was being held by 112th Regiment, threatening to thwart Tanaka's plans. Coming to their aid, General Sun sent his 113th and 114th Regiments to descend upon Lawa, where General Aida began an unauthorized retreat on June 4th. The abandonment of Lawa severely affected the defense of Kamaing, thus General Aida was relieved of command and replaced with Colonel Imaoka Soshiro. Colonel Shoshiro immediately began to dig in at Lagawng. Meanwhile the bulk of the 55th and 56th regiments were holding onto the Nanyaseik area as General Liao's 65th regiment cut their withdrawal route off on June 1st. While the rest of the 22nd Division were applying pressure from the north, the heavily outnumbered Japanese had no choice but to quickly cut a trail southeast, finally withdrawing on june 7th. Their retreat was chaotic, both regiments lost contact with each other and with their subordinate units as they made separate ways towards Kamaing. It would only be the 3rd battalion, 56th regiment who would arrive at Kamaing by June 10th, most of the others would reach Lakatkawng in late june. While retreating, their artillery units were intercepted by the pursuing Chinese and the artillerymen chose to die with their guns. While the 22nd Division and 149th Regiment thus pushed towards Kamaing, General Sun had also sent the 113th Regiment to take Zigyun and the 114th Regiment to advance southwards and support the Chindit assault on Mogaung. The Chinese were able to encircle Kamaing from the west, north and east as the 149th Regiment then moving across the fields and into Kamaing to take the settlement on June 16th,  pushing Tanaka's battle-weary troops to the hills south and west of Kamaing. Meanwhile Brigadier Calbert was able to reach the Mogaung area by the start of June. 12 miles from Mogaung, Calvert's forward troops began to run into Japanese patrols and snipers. Despite taking losses, the 3/6th Gurkhas led by Colonel Claude Rome, who in his previous incarnation had been overlord of “Broadway,” pushed on, seizing the western heights overlooking Mogaung on May 31. On June 1st, Calvert's South Staffords linked up with Rome and the Gurkhas at the village of Loihinche. Other elements of the brigade reached the southern foothills of the heights, three miles south of the town, on June 2 and went straight into the fray. That same day, the Lancashire Fusiliers and the South Staffords also attacked Lakum (held by some ordnance troops and a field hospital). The leading force of Fusiliers was soon pinned down by heavy fire, the impasse only broken when a Bren gunner in the leading rifle section went wild, and ran “straight up the hill, firing from the hip and screaming curses at the Japanese.” Softening up the Japanese with airstrikes from Air Commando Mustangs, troops of the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers and 1st South Staffordshires attacked and wrested Lakum village away from Japanese and occupied the summit of the range of hills overlooking the city, to the northwest.  Calvert decided he would need to build a base akin to White City, where he could collect supplies and build an airstrip to take out the wounded. Calvert fixed his eye on the village of Lakum, occupying a strategic spot on the eastern foothills of the heights overlooking the Mogaung plain. Upon capturing the village, the Chindits would also find substantial ammunition, a field hospital and buildings which had obviously hosted several Japanese headquarters. The country leading up to Lakum, however, was hard stuff. It was in the midst of thick jungle intersected by deep ravines. The path proved difficult to follow as it sometimes wound along a ridge and sometimes went straight up or straight down. The place was a defender's paradise. “A handful of resolute men could hold successive hill-tops for hours against a large force such as ours overburdened with mules and heavy stores,”. In response to the new threat, Colonel Okada Hakuji rushed over with some units of his 128th Regiment to protect Mogaung, leaving his 1st Battalion to face the rapidly-approaching 114th Regiment and immediately recalling his 3rd Battalion from Seton. Alongside this General Honda ordered General Takeda to turn back from Myitkyina and instead secure the Moguang-Kameing area. Thus the chance to lift the siege of Myitkyina was lost. By June 3rd, the Chindits had built a new airstrip near the Tapaw Ferry, allowing airdrops of supplies and equipment to spill in. Calvert was now ready to launch his attack.  Early on June 8th, the 1st South Staffords set off to secure the Pinhmi. The village was defended by elements of 3rd battalion, 128th regiment who were also protecting some ammunition dumps in the area. The Staffords routed the Japanese and destroyed the dumps, clearing the way to the bridge. By now it was afternoon, and they stepped aside to let the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers move on to capture the 150-foot-long bridge. All seemed well until a hail of gunfire shattered the silence, tearing into the Fusiliers. Two companies were pinned down in the ditch while another was in the jungle further down. At about 6 pm, Calvert arrived at the front to confer with Major David Monteith of the attacking company. It was decided that two platoons, under the cover of a mortar barrage would dash across the bridge and secure the other bank. Calvert's mind went to the 4.2” mortars. He intended to use them to deadly effect now. Two platoons of Fusiliers moved in on the bridge, with one platoon attempting to move along the ditch, only to struggle against the thick, waist-high grass, as the second slipped off the road into the jungle. The mortars, about 60 yards behind them, began firing, slowly at first, but then as fast as the men could drop bombs into the tubes. The men, with fixed bayonets, charged across the bridge. The Japanese waited until the British were halfway across before opening fire. Tracers filled that little space, bullets tearing into flesh. The Chindits toppled left and right. Some crawled in their bellies, trying to get just far enough to throw their grenades upon the enemy positions. By 6.15, it was all over, the retreat was called. Calvert summoned US airstrikes. Mustangs swooped in, bombing and machine-gunning the enemy emplacements, but one Mustang mistakenly bombed a group of Fusiliers unloading mules. Because of the unexpected opposition, Calvert would instead direct his forces to ford the Wettauk Chaung and take Mahaung and Ywathitgale, which successfully fell on June 9. The following morning, a Gurkha company attacked towards Kyaingyi and the railway to create the impression that the main attack would come from this direction while the bulk of the 3/6th Gurkhas made a wide right flank advance to attack the bridge from the rear. At dawn on the 10th, Shaw's Gurkhas moved forward, waist deep in marsh water and mud. The bridge assault party was under the command of Captain Michael Allmand, a one-time cavalryman commissioned into the Indian Army in 1942 after escaping from Singapore. Allmand moved his men forward warily. The approaches to the bridge were narrow with the road up on a high embankment with swampy, tree-heavy low-ground flanking both sides. Coming in from the marsh, the Gurkhas set upon the bunkers at the bridge with grenades and small-arms fire, but the Japanese held their ground. At 10 am, they tried again, shooting and hurling grenades from amid waist-deep mud of the Wettauk. Allmand, who was close to shore charged. Throwing grenades to scatter the enemy, he closed in to kill three with his kukri. Rallied by his heroism, the Gurkhas rushed the remaining defenders, capturing the bridge. About 35 Japanese were killed at the bridge and the Gurkhas captured one medium machinegun and two light machineguns. In return, Chindit casualties in the encirclement and capture of the Pinhmi Bridge came to about 130 killed and wounded. By mid-afternoon, Calvert had deployed two battalions up on the Mogaung-Pinhmi Road, while a third occupied the bridge area. Conquering the brigade saw the Chindits suffer 130 casualties, while Okada's troops had also suffered heavy casualties, yet they had successfully delayed the Chindit advance for four days, which allowed Takeda to bring the bulk of his forces back into Mogaung. Knowing full well that the Japanese had been able to reinforce Mogaung, Calvert decided to wait for the arrival of the Chinese troops that Stilwell had sent to reinforce him; but in the meantime, he launched a successful attack against the courthouse on June 11, followed by a failed advance towards the river. To secure his right flank, Calvert had decided to send a company of South Staffords under a new replacement officer, Major “Archie” Wavell Jr, son of the venerable Viceroy, to secure the area between the road and the Mogaung River. The Staffords made good headway, but near the river, they came under heavy fire from entrenched Japanese. Wavell was hit in the wrist, the bullet almost taking the hand off; and he was then pulled out of the line and walked back to the field hospital near Gurkha village, clutching onto his hand, which was now hanging on by a sinew. That night, the surgeons at Gurkha Village were to remove the hand entirely. Wavell Jr's war was over. In the end, the Staffords also had to pull back towards the road after the loss of their commanding officer. By June 15th,  the Chinese had still not appeared, thus the Chindits ultimately had to withdraw to Pinhmi.  Back over at Myitkyina artillery was arriving by air. Two batteries plus one platoon of 75-mm. howitzers; two 105-mm., and two 155-mm. howitzers, were landed. All except two pieces with GALAHAD were kept under headquarters control. During the siege they fired 600 tons of ammunition, very rarely with massed fire. Boatner renewed his offensive on June 13th, sending almost all his forces to attack the town from all directions. The American-Chinese forces would struggle to make much progress against General Minakami's defenses. Utilizing a system of night attack and daylight defense, heavy casualties were consequently inflicted on the enemy and large supplies of weapons and ammunition were captured and used in the defense of the city. On June 12th the Japanese hit a platoon of K Company, New GALAHAD, so hard that the company broke and re-formed on the L Company line. The portion of the Japanese thrust that hit the perimeter next to the river made most of the men "take off," but two stayed in place and repelled the Japanese with an automatic rifle and a machine gun. To the west of this little break the Japanese worked their way in close but were stopped by grenades and small arms fire. As a result of the attacks, however, the 3rd Galahad Battalion had cut the Maingna ferry road and reached the Irrawaddy north of Myitkyina by June 17th, with the 150th and 88th Regiments also gaining up to 200 yards. The allies needed to capture the Myitkyina-Mogaung-Sumprabum road junction; but for such few gains, Boatner had lost many men and thus had to stop his attacks on June 18th. Stilwell ordered the end of all infantry attacks. Boatner replied that he would stop attacking Japanese positions until ". . . our troops are steadied and a favorable opportunity presents itself." There was reason for the troops to need steadying. A and B companies, 209th Engineers, were cut off from their main body by infiltrating Japanese. Trying to close in on them, Company C and Headquarters and Service Companies were in turn halted by Japanese. The condition of A and B Companies became critical during June 14th, for they had only one meal with them. Two of their men managed to work their way back to the block on the Sumprabum Road with news of their plight, but enemy small arms fire prevented airdrops. The isolated companies finally made their way back in small groups to the rest of the battalion over 15 and 16 June. The 3rd Battalion of GALAHAD reported trouble in effecting reorganization and enforcing orders. The Americans were not alone in their problems. Two companies of the Chinese 2/42nd which had made a small penetration into the Japanese lines on 14 June were wiped out by counterattack that night. These setbacks emphasized the nature of the Myitkyina fighting. The Allies held a ring of battalion and regimental strongpoints enclosing a similar Japanese system. Though the Allied strongpoints were close enough for the troops in one to sortie to the aid of another should that be needed, they were not so close that interlocking fire could be put down to close the gaps. Consequently, there was plenty of room for maneuver and ambush, and the inexperienced engineers and New GALAHAD troops often suffered at the hands of General Minakami's veterans. On the other hand, the Myitkyina Garrison did not emerge entirely unscathed, as they too suffered heavily, losing approximately 1000 men during the month of June alone. But that is all for today with the CBI theater as we now need to head over to New Guinea to start the Battle of Lone Tree Hill. After the fall of Wakde, General Tagami had sent Colonel Yoshino Naoyasu's 223rd Regiment to cross the Tor River inland to attack Arare while Colonel Matsuyama Soemon's 224th Regiment attacked the Toem area from the other side. In the meantime, General Doe's 163rd Regiment patrolled across Tementoe Creek and the Tor River, encountering heavy Japanese resistance at Maffin but successfully repelling some enemy counterattacks. While the 163rd strengthened its defenses on the Tor and at Arare, Doe would also see the arrival of Colonel Prugh Herndon's 158th Regiment on May 21. General Krueger's plan was to use this regiment in a vigorous overland drive toward Sarmi, aimed at throwing the enemy into the defensive and therefore securing the Wakde area. This decision was based upon scanty and incomplete information concerning Japanese strength and dispositions. The Japanese had no intention of abandoning Sarmi and the two airstrips between the town and the Tor without a desperate struggle.  The Americans were also finalizing their plans for an operation against Biak, codenamed Hurricane. General Fuller's plan was to land the 186th Regiment in the Bosnek area at 7:45 on May 27th to secure the Green Beaches and its two jetties. Once the two jetties were secured, LCI's bearing the 162nd Infantry, supporting troops, and the task force reserve were to move inshore and unload. LST's were also to move to the jetties when the beach area surrounding them had been cleared by the 186th Infantry. LCM's bearing artillery, tanks, and engineering equipment were to move to the beaches as soon as channels through the coral were found or made, or to the jetties in waves following the 186th Infantry's assault companies. As soon as it reorganized ashore, the 162nd Infantry was to advance rapidly west along the coast from Bosnek to seize the three airdromes. This drive was to be supported by eight tanks of the 603rd Tank Company and the 146th Field Artillery Battalion. The fields were to be repaired quickly to accommodate one fighter group and then expanded to receive an additional fighter group, a heavy bomber group, a reconnaissance group, a night fighter squadron, and one photo reconnaissance squadron. Mokmer Drome was to be the first field developed. Brigadier-General Edwin Patrick would also replace Doe in command of the Tornado Task Force, as the latter would resume its duties as assistant commander of the 41st Division. Admiral Fechteler's Task Force 77 was to provide naval support and cover the assault shipping. Naval fire support was to begin at H minus 45 minutes, 6:30. From that time until H Hour, cruisers and destroyers were to expend 400 rounds of 8-inch, 1,000 rounds of 6-inch, 3,740 rounds of 5-inch, and 1,000 rounds of 4.7-inch ammunition on targets in the airfield area west of the landing beaches. After H Hour the cruisers were to continue intermittent fire on the airfields, bombard targets of opportunity, and respond to calls for support from the forces ashore. Because there were many known or suspected Japanese gun emplacements along the south shore of Biak, counterbattery fire was to take precedence over all other types of fire. Bombardment of the landing beaches was also to begin at H minus 45 minutes. Five destroyers were to bombard the beaches and adjacent areas until H minus 30 minutes, when they were to move westward to join the cruisers firing on the airfield area. Then four other destroyers were to continue beach bombardment until H minus 3 minutes. Total ammunition allowance for beach bombardment was 4,900 rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch shells, while 40-mm. and 20-mm. ammunition was to be expended at the discretion of individual ship commanders. Rocket and automatic weapons fire from three rocket-equipped LCI's and two SC's was to provide close support for the assault waves. This fire was to begin at H minus 5 minutes and was to last until H Hour or until the initial wave was safely ashore. Meanwhile General Kenney would toss 52 B-24's to bomb the beaches just before the landings. Additionally, medium bombers and fighters from 5th Air Force would cover the force from the air; and from May 17th onwards, the bombings on Biak's airfields would increase sharply in violence to soften up its defenses. As elsewhere along the absolute defense zone perimeter, primary emphasis was laid upon the construction of airfields. Between December 1943 and the enemy invasion of Hollandia in April 1944, two of three projected fields on southern Biak were completed and put into operational use by planes of the Navy's 23rd Air Flotilla. Their usefulness ended almost immediately, however, when the enemy's vastly superior air forces began operating from Hollandia bases. As in the Wakde-Sarmi sector, the concentration of effort on airfield construction until the Hollandia invasion resulted in dangerously delaying the preparation of ground defenses against enemy amphibious attack. In the five weeks which elapsed between the Hollandia and Biak invasions, the Biak garrison forces, under able leadership and by dint of desperate effort, succeeded in organizing a system of strong cave positions, which proved highly effective after the enemy landing. However, time, equipment and manpower were so short that defensive preparations could not entirely be completed. Some 15-cm naval guns, brought to Biak immediately after the Hollandia invasion to strengthen the coast defenses, were still unmounted when the island was attacked. On May 23rd, the 158th advanced west from the Tor River Bridgehead. The advance of Company L met increasingly strong resistance. Japanese defenses were centered around three small, brush-bordered lakes near the beach about 1,800 yards west of the Tor. The rest of the 3rd Battalion, 158th Infantry, across the Tor before 1130, quickly moved forward to assist Company L, which had been pinned down along the main coastal track west of the lakes by Japanese machine gun and rifle fire. Company K pushed up to the left flank of Company L, while Company I moved toward L's rear. With the aid of mortar fire from the 81-mm. weapons of Company M, Companies K and L were able to push gradually forward during the afternoon, advancing on a front about 400 yards wide. Finding that the attack was not progressing as rapidly as he had expected, Colonel Herndon ordered his 1st Battalion across the Tor. The 1st Battalion did not start moving until 1400 and could not get far enough forward to join the attack before dark. Tanks would probably have been of great help to the 3rd Battalion, but by the time the mediums of the 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, moved across the Tor, the forward infantry troops had already halted for the night. In the end, Companies L and K would dig in for the night across the main coastal track about 400 yards east of Maffin.  The following morning, after an ineffective mortar and artillery bombardment, Herndon resumed the attack. Despite the lack of extended artillery support, Companies K and L moved out as planned at 7:30. Company L, on the right, advanced along the beach encountering only scattered rifle fire but Company K, on the main road, had hardly started when Japanese machine gun and rifle fire from concealed positions in a wooded area on the left front halted its advance. Unable to gain any ground, Company K called for tank support. Two tanks, together with a flamethrower detachment from Company B of the 27th Engineers, arrived at Company K's lines about 1000. With the flamethrowers and tanks blasting the way, the infantrymen overran the Japanese defenses, killing ten of the enemy and capturing two machine guns. The remainder of the Japanese force, probably originally some forty men strong, disappeared into the jungle south of the road, whence scattered rifle fire continued to harass Company K. Company L reached the outskirts of Maffin No. 1 about 1400. The movement had been slow, not as a result of Japanese opposition but because the battalion commander did not believe it prudent for Company L to advance far beyond Company K. Despite the return of two companies, most of Colonel Kato's engineers would have to withdraw behind the Tirfoam River against such heavy firepower. Captain Saito's reconnaissance unit, meanwhile, retreated to the jungles south of Maffin alongside one engineer company, which was under Kato himself.  Over the Tirfoam River, however, the Americans were again stopped by the tenacious engineers, which again forced Herndon to request tank support. As the tanks moved into position elements of the Right Sector Force, comprising Captain Saito's men of the 1st Battalion, 224th Infantry and an engineer company, charged out of the jungle. The Japanese were under Colonel Kato, Right Sector Force commander, who was killed as he personally led a small detachment against the American tanks. The enemy was quickly thrown back with heavy losses by the combined fire of the four tanks and Company L's riflemen and machine gunners. However, under cover of their infantry attack, the Japanese had dragged a 37-mm. anti-tank gun forward out of the jungle. As the enemy infantrymen withdrew to the southwest after the death of Colonel Kato, the anti-tank gun opened fire. It was soon destroyed and its crew killed, but not before three of the American tanks had been so damaged that they had to be withdrawn for repairs. Facing such heavy resistance, Herndon then sent his 1st Battalion to carry out a deep envelopment to the south across the Tirfoam, yet these troops would similarly be unable to break through by nightfall. After killing 28 men and wounded 75 others, Kato's force allowed Tagami to dispatch the 2nd Battalion, 223rd Regiment to reinforce the Ilier Mountains line. On the morning of May 25, Major Matsuoka Yasake also arrived there with an infantry company to assume command of the remainder of Kato's forces. Meanwnhile Yoshino had crossed the Tor River, 3 days behind schedule and to the east, Matsyuama was assembling on the right bank of the Tementoe River. Herndon relieved his 1st Battalion with the 3rd and then pushed west with the 2nd Battalion following behind them. The next objective for the 158th was Long Tree Hill. Lone Tree Hill, known to the Japanese as Mt. Ilier,  had been named for a single tree which was depicted on its crest by the map then employed by the Americans. Actually, the hill's coral mass was covered with dense rainforest and jungle undergrowth. Lone Tree Hill was about 175 feet high, 1200 yards long north to south, and 1100 yards wide east to west. The north side dropped steeply to a rocky shore on Maffin Bay. The hill's eastern slope was fronted by a short, violently twisting stream which was promptly dubbed the "Snaky River" by the 158th Regiment. The main road curved away from the beach to pass south of the Snaky River and Lone Tree Hill through a narrow defile. The southern side of this defile was formed by two noses of Mt. Saksin , a terrain feature about 100 feet higher than Lone Tree Hill. The more westerly of these noses was named "Hill 225", known to the Japanese as Mt. Sento after its height in feet. No name was given to the eastern ridge line, which pointed toward Lone Tree Hill from the southeast. There was a small native village at the eastern entrance to the defile and another at the pass's western outlet. Mt. Saksin was a name given to an indefinitely outlined hill mass which forms the northern extremity of the Irier Mountains, extending inland from the coast at Lone Tree Hill. The name Saksin was specifically applied to a prominent peak about 2,000 yards due south of Lone Tree. On or about May 23rd General Tagami had moved his headquarters into the Mt. Saksin area, apparently on the southwest side of the central peak.  Herndon forces continued the advance through the abandoned enemy positions, albeit without tank support, for they could not cross the fragile Tirfoam bridge. In the afternoon, the Americans were finally halted below the southernmost bend of the Snaky River, subjected to heavy machine-gun fire and an intermittent artillery bombardment. General Patrick, who had succeeded to the command of the TORNADO Task Force during the morning, was informed of the opposition encountered by the 1st Battalion. He ordered the advance stopped for the night and instructed the 158th Infantry to remain well east of the Snaky River so that American artillery could register on the native village and the defile without endangering the forward troops. Harassed by a few artillery shells, which by now had been recognized as originating from Japanese 70-mm. or 75-mm. weapons, the 1st Battalion pulled back about 500 yards east of the Snaky. A perimeter was set up with the battalion's left resting on the road and its right on the beach. The 2nd Battalion established a series of company perimeters back along the road to the east. Casualties for the day had been 22 men killed and 26 wounded, almost all in the 1st Battalion, while about 50 Japanese had been killed. When the attack orders for the day had been issued, it had been hoped that the 1st Battalion could reach the top of Lone Tree Hill before nightfall. Since the unexpectedly strong enemy opposition had prevented the realization of this hope, plans were made to continue the advance westward on the 26th. The ultimate objective was the east bank of the Woske River, 2,000 yards west of Lone Tree Hill, and the intermediate objective was the native village at the eastern entrance to the defile. The advance was to be preceded by naval shelling of the northern slopes of Lone Tree Hill from 6:30 to 7:00. A fifteen-minute artillery preparation was also to precede the advance, and the infantry was to start moving at 8:45. The next morning, naval fire started ten minutes late. Two destroyers lying offshore shelled the northern slopes of Lone Tree Hill and the Maffin Bay area, firing on known or suspected enemy defensive positions and assembly points. After a twenty-minute bombardment the two support vessels withdrew. Artillery fire did not begin until 8:30. The time lag gave the Japanese ample opportunity to prepare for the infantry attack which had been heralded by the destroyer fire. The artillery, aiming its shells into the defile and against the eastern slopes of Lone Tree Hill, ceased firing about 8:45. A few moments later the 1st Battalion, 158th Infantry, Company B again leading, started moving westward. The infantry's line of departure was nearly 1,000 yards east of the village at the southeast foot of Lone Tree Hill, and the advance had to be slow because the road ran through heavily jungled terrain. The enemy therefore had sufficient time to reoccupy positions in the defile and on Lone Tree Hill which might have been vacated during the American artillery barrage. The value of both the naval and artillery bombardment had been lost. Herndon's 1st Battalion moved once again against Lone Tree Hill. Company B moved forward to the point at which it had been held up the previous afternoon and was again stopped--this time by fire from the southeastern corner of Lone Tree Hill. Company D's heavy machine guns were brought up to spray a densely wooded area in front of the point rifle platoon. The fire dispersed the Japanese riflemen, and Company B moved forward again. Less than 100 yards of ground had been gained when the company again encountered machine gun and mortar fire originating in the native village. Company A, initially off the road to the right rear of Company B, turned north to the mouth of the Snaky River. One platoon crossed at the river mouth at 1030 but was quickly forced back to the east bank by Japanese machine gun fire from the rocky beach below the north face of Lone Tree Hill. Artillery support was called for, supplied, and proved successful in stopping the enemy fire, and about 1:50 all Company A crossed the Snaky. Orders were to move down the west side of that stream to establish contact with Company B and to send one platoon up the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill to probe enemy positions. Other efforts were meanwhile being made to scatter the Japanese opposing Company B. Company E moved up to the left flank of Company B and on the south side of the main road. The combined efforts of the two rifle companies proved insufficient to dislodge the Japanese from their positions at the eastern entrance to the defile, and the enemy fire forced the American units to seek cover. Company F was therefore ordered to pass through B's left flank and proceed to Hill 225 to take the Japanese positions from the rear. Company F's attack could not be started before dark and Company A, moving up the west side of the Snaky, was unable to relieve much of the pressure on Company B. Finally, Company A was forced for a second time to withdraw to the east bank of the river as a result of enemy fire from Lone Tree Hill. Tanks would have been of great help to Company B, but the bridge over the Tirfoam could not bear their weight, and the road west of the stream was in such disrepair that tanks probably could not have negotiated it. Only Company A would manage to cross the Snaky River through much effort, yet it would be unable to relieve the pressure from Company B's front and would have to retreat by the end of the day. To prevent further casualties from being inflicted by Japanese patrols, which were expected to roam around the flanks of the forward elements during the night, a semicircular perimeter was ultimately established. Although Herndon's attacks on May 26th had been completely unsuccessful, the 158th Regiment had located and probed some of the principal Japanese defenses in the area and could now be ready to launch a more effective assault.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Vinegar Joe was experiencing some major setbacks, but it looked like Myitkyina was as good as his. However the American officers' reports of how difficult the going was for the Chinese was quite disheartening. Over in New Guinea, the allies were yet again faced with a great obstacle, now in the form of One Tree Hill.

Stampede/OVW/WWE Talent Wavell Starr Interview

No debería haber sido más que un frente secundario, un límite tranquilo que permitiera a Hitler desarrollar sus alucinados sueños en Europa y, sobre todo, en Rusia. Pero los desiertos del Norte de África al final se convirtieron en una de las zonas estratégicas más importantes para el desarrollo de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El control del Mediterráneo, el de los pozos petrolíferos de Oriente Medio, jugarse la posibilidad de que los aliados abrieran un nuevo frente en el Sur de Europa cuando la guerra comenzaba a torcerse, marcaron las casillas de este nuevo tablero de juego en la guerra total que se llevaba a cabo en el mundo. ¿Y sus piezas? Wavell, Montgomery, Auchinleck, las inmensas divisiones de tanques Panzer o los Crusader y Sherman aliados. Y por supuesto el Mariscal Rommel, el Zorro del Desierto, un auténtico genio militar que, quizá precisamente por su genialidad, abocó a Alemania a perderse aún más en una aventura imposible que les llevaría a la derrota definitiva. Desde las ardientes arenas del desierto del norte de África, bienvenidas a El Abrazo del Oso. Guión gracias a José Luis Garrido, Eduardo Moreno, Alberto Rodríguez Jarabo y David Lafuente con la colaboración de Ángel González y Cecilio Cardenete. Si te gusta el Abrazo del Oso y quieres acceder a más contenidos extra, puedes ayudarnos pinchando en el botón 'apoyar' aquí en iVoox. O pásate por www.patreon.com/elabrazodeloso ¡GRACIAS! www.elabrazodeloso.es Episodio remasterizado emitido originalmente en OMC Radio el 9 de abril de 2017. www.latostadora.com/elabrazodeloso Canal de Telegram para estar informado: https://t.me/+T6RxUKg_xhk0NzE0 Grupo abierto de Telegram para conversar con el equipo y la audiencia: https://t.me/+tBHrUSWNbZswNThk Twitch: https://www.twitch.tv/elabrazodeloso Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

Henry and Joe tackle the biggest question of their lives: what is Wavell Heights? We chat Scooby-Doo, sharehouses, and age gaps in dating. It is perhaps everything you have come to expect from this podcast.

Last time we spoke about the aftermath of the battle for Attu. The American victory over Attu meant the end of the Aleutian campaign for the Japanese, Tokyo decided to pull everyone out. Over 6000 Japanese needed evacuation from Kiska and it would be very tricky for the Japanese to get past Admiral Kinkaids blockade. Then we finished up the West Hubei offensive, with a part of it being known colloquially as the Rice Bowl Campaign. The Japanese had brutalized the Chinese, but we're stopped short of invading Chongqing or Sichuan. Thus for the Chinese it was a victory, but at the same time the Japanese had secured exactly what they wanted, stealing vast amounts of property, notably rice. Vessels left Yichang and sailed further west through the riverways acquiring large sums of goods to help the China war cause. Today we are diving back into the south Pacific. This episode is Operation Cartwheel starts rolling Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  So honestly for awhile now we have been hitting the North Pacific and China theaters, which certainly was a change of pace, but as you can imagine these events do not simply move along in a vacuum. Yes a lot was going on in the other theaters and this episode is going to be tackling a lot of different events so buckle up buckos. First we are going to talk about Operation Cartwheel. The ULTRA intelligence that brought Yamamoto's death was not the only information the Americans received in April. A lifeboat bearing a list of the names of 40,000 active Japanese officers washed ashore after the battle of the Bismarck Sea. Using this Cryptographers were able to match each name to radio signals from Japanese army units, ensuring General MacArthurs intelligence remained as operationally up to date as it could be. At the same time William Bull Hasley showed to on April 15th to Brisbane to meet with MacArthur and the two hit it off. Halsey would later write this about their first encounter. “Five minutes after I reported, I felt as if we were lifelong friends. I have seldom seen a man who makes a quicker, stronger, more favorable impression. He was then sixty-three, but he could have passed as fifty. His hair was jet black; his eyes were clear; his carriage erect….My mental picture poses him against the background of these discussions; he is pacing his office, almost wearing a groove between his large, bare desk and the portrait of George Washington that faced it; his corncob pipe is in his hand (I rarely saw him smoke it): and he is making his points in a diction I have never heard surpassed. “ Both men would hammer out a plan on April 26th, it was a revision to MacArthur's Elkton plan, this one would be known as Elkton III, but it was soon to be coded as Operation Cartwheel.  The plan consisted of 13 amphibious landings in just 6 months with MacArthur and Halsey providing maximum support to each others efforts. The first phase of the plan would see MacArthur seizing Woodlark and the Kirwina islands while Hasley invaded New Georgia. Phase 2 would commence 2 months after the start of the offensive where MacArthur would capture Lae, Salamaua and Finschhafen. Phase 3 would be the seizure of the Shortland islands and Bougainville in the south pacific. In December MacArthur would seize Cape Gloucester in Western New Britain and shortly after that they would seize Rabaul. Halsey's forces would knock out Japanese air bases on Buka, allowing MacArthurs men to clear the northwestern half of New Guinea. By January of 1944, MacArthur and Halsey figured they would be ready for the final assault on Rabaul which was their ultimate objective for victory. MacArthur resisted sending details of their joint plan to Washington, probably fearing the Europe first obsessed chiefs of staff would veto their ambitious thrust. He told them only that he anticipated that the first move toward Woodlark and Kirwina would start in June. However this was too slow for Admiral King. King wanted his protege Admiral Nimitz to begin a thrust into the central pacific, heading through the Marshalls in November and proposed shifting the Marine 1st and 2nd divisions, the ones that fell under MacArthurs and Halsey's command to help with the Marshalls offensive, this alongside two bomber groups promised to General Kenney. MacArthur was very pissed off and he sent a distressed message to George Marshall damning the entire central Pacific strategy as a quote “unnecessary and even wasteful diversion from what should be the main pacific strategy”,  that being MacArthur's own.”. He added in “from a broad strategic viewpoint, I am convinced that the best course of offensive action in the Pacific is a movement from Australia through New Guinea to Mindanao. Air supremacy is essential to success, for the southwestern strategy where large numbers of land-based aircraft are utterly essential and will immediately cut the enemy lines from japan to his conquered territory to the southward. Pulling any additional heavy bombers groups would in my opinion, collapse the offensive effort in the southwest pacific area…in my judgment the offensive against Rabaul should be considered the main effort, and it should not be nullified or weakened ”. But King was adamant. There would indeed be a thrust through the central pacific led by the navy with its main axis passing through the Marshalls and Marianas towards Japan,which might I remind you listening, bypasses the Philippines. It of course was a strategy completely at odds with MacArthurs. Marshall supported King, as did the other Joint Chiefs. But in the end MacArthurs whining forced King to relent on the transfer of the two marine divisions and the bomber groups, thus MacArthur revealed his timetable for operation Cartwheel. He told them he planned to take Kiriwna and Woodlark in the Trobriand Island around June 30th. The advance on New Georgia would start on the same date, and in September the First Cavalry and 3 Australian divisions would begin operations against the Madang-Salamaua area. Meanwhile MacArthur's 43rd division would invade southern Bougainville on October 15th, while the 1st Marines and 32nd division would invade Cape Gloucester on December 1st.  For all of these amphibious landings, there were no serious problems when it came to shipping and landing craft….that is for Nimitz designated areas. However at the beginning of 1943, MacArthur had practically no amphibious equipment nor experts in these types of operations. The only units available to him were the Army's engineering special boat brigade which had very few small craft. The man who would be responsible for the amphibious assaults during much of the coming campaigns was to be Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey. On January 10th, 1943 he took command of the forces that would later be designated the 7th Amphibious force. Barbey from the offset established good relations with MacArthur…because well anyone who worked with MacArthur had to. He had nearly nothing to work with in the beginning, but started with establishing bases at Toobul Bay, near the mouth of the Brisbane river and Point Stephens. MacArthur had requested more small craft and transports as early as mid 1942, but because of the European and central pacific being a priority, little had come his way. Before the equipment came, MacArthur was receiving American and Australian troops, so he got Barbey's team to improvise. They began training the troops in debarking from larger ships down cargo nets to smaller landing craft. However Barbey had no attack transports (APA), which was the key to this kind of operation. To solve this they rigged nets from cliffs, boy that must have been fun. The first Landing ship tanks LSTs and Landing craft tanks LCTs would not arrive until mid january, and on Easter Sunday 13 Landing craft infantry's LCI's were delivered, giving them very little time before the first operations were to begin to train the crews on how to use them.  Now on the other side Halsey had his own three phase operation. Part 1 saw the invasion of New Georgia, part 2 was the seizure of Buin and Rekata Bay if possible and last 3 was the seizure of Kieta and the neutralization of Buka. Phase 1 was codenamed Operation Toenails. Halsey described the operation to Nimitz as “a infiltration and staging operation”. The operation would see simultaneous landings at Wickham Anchorage to hit its landing craft base; Segi point for its airfield site; Viru Harbor for its small craft base and Rendova Harbor which would serve as a new base to stage troops for a future attack upon Munda. This would all occur on June 30th. The main force assigned to Operation Toenails was General Hester's 43rd division. Admiral Turner and his Task Force 31 were in charge of the amphibious landings while Admiral Fitch would toss 1182 aircraft to give them aircower and Admiral's Ainsworth and Merrill's Task force 36 would provide further naval support. On the other side, interservice coordination between the Japanese Generals and Admirals remained intermittent and largely ad hoc, when it was not hostile. General Imamura's 8th area army HQ at Rabaul stood above Hyakutake's 17th Army, comprising 3 divisions spread over the SOlomons and New Britain, and General Hatazo Adachi's 8th Army had 3 divisions on New Guinea. Troop reinforcements were arriving in Rabaul bolstering the garrison at one point to 90,000 men. Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka remained in command of navy forces at Rabaul and held responsibility for the defense of the central solomons. Admiral Mineichi Koga had succeeded the slain Yamamoto as commander in chief of the combined fleet, based at Truk. Nowhere in the theater was there a blended command, the army and navy had to coordinate their operations through a meticulous process of “nemawashi / digging around the roots” for a consensus. The Japanese moved new air units into the theater, including more of the elite carrier aircrews that had trained and honed their skills prior to the war, but the loss ratios in air combat was ruining them.  As a result of the devastating loss during the battle of the Bismarck Sea, the Japanese were forced to change plans. USAAF and RAAF aircraft based at Port Moresby and Milne Bay had slaughtered an entire convoy of Japanese transports attempting to land troops in the Lae-Slaamaua area using a new technique called “skip bombing”. Imperial General HQ set up a joint Army/Navy investigation board to study the disaster, seeing the IJA accused the IJN of being too focused on the Solomons rather than on New Guinea. The Army argued New Guinea was vital for the national defenses and proposed that if a retreat became necessary, it would be as a direct result of the navy's lack of support. If this were to happen they would have to pull back and create a defensive line from northwest New Guinea to Timor. The Navy's representatives argued that the Huon Peninsula must be held or its loss would swing open the western gate to Rabaul, forcing the combined fleet to withdraw from Truk. Well the fighting eventually resulted in an ultimatum with both sides agreeing the army/navy operations should focus on eastern New Guinea. It was decided that both the army and navy would literally operate as one unit, because that would go well. The Central solomons were still under the overall responsibility of the 8th fleet, now commanded by Vice Admiral Baron Samejima Tomoshige with some IJA units placed under naval command according to agreements made between General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka. It seems the Japanese could get along once and awhile, as just like Halsey and MacArthur, Imamura and Kusaka developed a deep friendship. Both of their staffs ate lunch together once or twice a week, where southeast area affairs were discussed informally and their respective staffs got to know another personally. Kusaka went on the record to say Imamura was a very great person. Many army units would be sent to reinforce the New Georgia defenses and by late May the bulk of the 229th regiment arrived to Munda, and the 13th regiment went to Vila by late June. Imamura placed both regiments under the command of Major General Sasaki Noboru's southeast detachment who responded directly to Samejima. Samejima's first orders were to arrange the responsibilities between General Sasaki's southeast detachment and Admiral Ota's 8th combined SNLF, seeing Sasaki in charge of Munda and Ota in charge of the Enogai and Bairoko area's. If the situation arose, command would be unified under the senior officer on New Georgia, General Sasaki. Ota would also have responsibility for coastal artillery defense, radio communications, and barge operations. Admiral Koga in his new role as commander of the combined fleet, preemptively sent move of his forces back to the home islands in preparation to reinforce Attu. But as the fate of the Aleutians became sealed by late May, Koga decided to concentrate the combined Fleet at Truk, so it would be primed and ready for a decisive naval battle with the Americans. Without the aid of Koga's carriers, Kusaka had launched another air counteroffensive after I-Go, this one taking place in June. The aim was yet again to prevent the Americans from invading the central solomons . Kusaka began tossing waves of Bety's against American shipping east of San Cristobal and night raids over guadalcanal. Simultaneously he also unleashed Operation SO; a major offensive to smash allied air power in the Solomon islands; and operation SE: which targeted airfields and shipping. He sent 105 Zeros to sweep and bomb the enemy airfields with a new type of gasoline bomb. Operation SE began with 25 Val dive bombers attacking US shipping in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area and Operation SO began on June 7th with 81 Zeros led by Lt Commander Shindo Saburo assaulting the Russels. However the Russel group ran right into 104 allied fighters who shot down 9 Zeros. A follow up attack was made on the 12th with 74 Zeros led by Lt Miyano Zenjiro, this time the Japanese lost 7 fighters but took down 6 American. As usual the Japanese pilots made wild claims, stating the first attack saw 41 American fights shot down and the second attack 24.  Kusaka launched the main attack of Operation SE on June 16th led by Lt commander Saburo consisting of 24 Vals and 70 Zero escorts who swung south of the Russells, turning at Beaufort Bay. Yet again they were intercepted, this time by 74 allied fighters over BEaufort Bay and the ensuing ari battle rolled over the mountainous spine of guadalcanal. This time the Japanese lost 15 Zeros and 13 Vals while only shooting down 6 allied fighters. The Japanese lost first rate pilots such as Lt Miyano who had scored a total of 16 kills during the war. Again Japanese veteran pilots were being bled dry severely affecting the nation's airpower. Despite their waves being intercepted nearly every time, the Vals were able to press through with their attacks and managed to hit the cargo ships Caleno and LST-340. But such results were hardly worth the cost, so Kusaka began to urgently request reinforcements. The carrier Ryhuo would lend her bombers to replace the lost ones, arriving on the 2nd of July. The losses taught the Japanese pilots some bitter lessons and never again would the fly over guadalcanal during daylight as the American CAP was far to powerful. Over in New Guinea, General Blamey was laying out his plan for the capture of Lae, codenamed Operation Postern which was approved by MacArthurs headquarters. Before the allies would invade Woodlark and Kiriwana, MacArthur proscribed the seizure of Lae and the Markham and Ramu valley. The Markham operations were to be based on Port Moresby while the north coast operations would be staged from Buna and Milne Bay. The invasion of Woodlark and Kiriwana islands codenamed Operation Chronicle would be entrusted to Lt General Walter Kruegers 6th army. The islands northeast of the Papuan coast would allow the allies to have air bases closer to Japanese targets in the Solomons and around Rabaul, thus Blamey had devised his plan to secure the northeastern part of New Guinea. The first phase of his plan was Lae and the Markham and Ramu Valleys; the 2nd phase was to seize a shore base within 60 miles of Lae, he chose Nassau Bay. Nassau Bay would help with the supply problems in the Wau-Mubo-Bobdubi area, as all the supplies were being flown in from Port Moresby. The mountains were serious obstacles for transport aircraft, not to mention the Japanese fighters that could spring out of nearby Lae. Taking Nassau Bay would greatly shorting supply lines for allied troops fighting in the Salamaua region and also allow a junction to be made with General Saviges forces operating at Mubo The 162nd American Regiment led by Colonel Archibald MacKechnie would help hit Nassau Bay, they would be known as the MacKechnie force. They would seize the high ground around Goodiew Junction and Mount Tambu and the ridges running down therefrom to the sea, allowing the Australians to link up with the 15th brigade at Bobdubi and the American landing force at Nassau. D-day for the Nassau Landing was set for June 30th and it was all going to act as a feint, hoping to lure Japanese forces from Lae to Salamaua.  Now the last time we left off in New Guinea, General Savige had launched a limited offensive against the Japanese at Mubo and Bobdubi ridge. General Nakano was certain Salamaua was the main allied target and this prompting him on the 29th to order Major General Chuichi Muroya to lead the 51st division to fortify it. In the process Muroya's men expelled Warfe's commandos from the northern ridge. To the east of Mubo, Brigadier Moten was trying to take the Pimple, but his 17th brigade would be performing more patrolling than actual attacks throughout the later half of May. Eventually Savige would relieve the exhausted 2/7th battalion with the 2/6th battalion led by Lt Colonel Frederick Wood who would begin an advance on May the 27th. Meanwhile Nakano had brought more reinforcements to defend Mubo and launched a strong counterattack in early May, nearly breaking through towards the main Australian camp at Lababia ridge. On May 23rd Nakano received two battalions of the 66th regiment and began to work out a plan for assembling supplies and ammunition in the Mubo area to prepare for an offensive. Men would move at night in a single file along the narrow jungle trails carrying the materials by hand, through mud and rain. The main train was a slope on Komiatum ridge known to the Japanese as Regret Hill as the hard working soldiers became more exhausted with each passing day marching along it. The Japanese sought to clear out Lababia ridge as far as Guadagasal, thus securing Mubo. On June 3rd, allied patrols discovered Nakano had reoccupied Markham point which forced Savige to keep the bulk of the 24th away from the action at Bobdubi and Mubo. From their camp at the bank of the Markham Savige ordered patrols to investigate the Nadzab area. On June 14th, a 3 man patrol came across friendly natives at the village of Gabsonkek who informed them of the Japanese activity in the area. They said "that the Japs come to the village every day between 10:00 and 12:00 hours taking everything in sight—pigs, fowls, fruit, etc., without paying; they take native girls back to Lae if they can catch them. The guides would not proceed farther to Ngasawapum because Japan man come up Big Road, cut us off", and they would not go to Narakapor because they claimed there were too many Japs and two big guns". The patrol went back to camp by the 18th informing command. A second patrol was made, led by Lt Dave Burke who forded the Tabali River to get to Nassau Bay. Their report indicated the area was suitable for landing and road construction. To further prepare for the American landings, the Australians began building a footbridge over the Bitoi River and blazed a track up to Bitoi Ridge. On Lababia Ridge the main defensive position withdrew to a junction on the Jap Tracks where it would be easier to counter enemy encirclement attempts. Reports came in from forward platoons that there was considerable enemy activity along the Komiatum-Mubo track. This was Nakano's 66th regiment carrying the food and ammunition in preparation for the upcoming offensive. In response to this, Savige ordered Brigadier Frank Hosking of the 15th brigade to assume command of the Bobdubi ridge area and to begin harassing the Japanese supply route. Meanwhile the 58th/59th battalion relieved the 2/3rd independent company at Hote and a party of Warfe's commando's were sent to attack the Komiatum-Mubo track. However disaster struck as the Australians ran into their own booby-traps on June 16th suffering a number of casualties. By June 20th, the commando's established ambush positions along a ridge near the junction of Stephens Track and the Komiatum Track. They successfully ambushed some Japanese later that day, killing a few men and capturing valuable documents about the arrival of Nakano's 66th regiment. However by this point Nakano's units were already assembling in front of Lababia ridge and the offensive was about to begin. Now we gotta finish up the episode talking about some developments in India. After the disastrous first Arakan Campaign, Marshal Wavell was to receive a promotion, and by promotion I mean he was kicked upstairs as they say, succeeded Lord Linlithgow as the new Viceroy of India. But until then he began looking into training his forces in jungle warfare as the bitter lessons learned at Arakan proved the men were very unprepared. Wavell also wanted to investigate what the hell had happened during the disaster, so he sent Major General Roland Richardson in late May to head a infantry committee at New Delhi for the task. The committee's report about the Arakan campaign found the troops fighting spirit was fundamentally sound, but the major problems that affected their combat performance were more about the over expansion of the army in India. The army mobilization had been rushed, they barely met basic training and the supplying of their sheer numbers was a catastrophe. There were also issues regarding their low status, inferior pay for the infantry, which further deprived them of skilled and well educated recruits.  Yet above all else the Infantry committee found their lack of jungle training to be the most egregious issue. As observed “This is the most urgent problem facing us, and one which requires prompt and energetic action if results are to be produced in time for the winter campaigning season.” The lack of jungle training severely undermined their ability to fight efficiently and ultimately led to the breakdown of infantry battalions in the Arakan. And of course there was the ever present unseen enemy, that of malaria, alongside an assortment of other ailments that were wreaking havoc on the men. But many of these problems could not be tackled until June 20th, when General Claude Auchinleck was officially appointed as the new Commander in Chief in India. For General Slim this was excellent news and certainly worked in his favor alongside the sacking of Irwin. The “Auk” as he was called, had always been a Slim supporter and was the one who recommended him to Wavell for advancement when Wavell was Commander in Chief of the middle east back in 1941. The Auk had wanted to retain Slim in the middle east and fought hard to dissuade Wavell from taking him over to Burma. Churchill never held Wavell ever in high regard and was tired of his quasi-academic effusions and preferred a “fighting general” in Burma. Alongside the Auk, Irwin was replaced with General George Giffard, and Slim had this to say of the replacement.  “The new Army Commander had a great effect on me. A tall, goodlooking man in the late fifties, who had obviously kept himself physically and mentally in first-class condition, there was nothing dramatic about him in either appearance or speech. He abhorred the theatrical, and was one of the very few generals, indeed men in any position, I have known who really disliked publicity . . . But there was much more to General Giffard than good taste, good manners and unselfishness. He understood the fundamentals of war – that soldiers must be trained before they can fight, fed before they can march, and relieved before they are worn out. He understood that front-line commanders should be spared responsibilities in the rear, and that soundness of organization and administration is worth more than specious short-cuts to victory” Auckinleck went to work from the offset of his new command by improving the welfare, health and feeding of the Indian army to foster improved morale. General Giffard as the new commander of the Eastern Army had Major General Temple Gurdon to oversee some reforms for training and the development of new doctrines. A lot of effort was made to conduct intensive collective training under jungle conditions. The men would train near Nasik, Ranchi, Dehradun and in the Jhansi-Nowgong-lalitpur region. Commanders low to high were given a chance at handling units to improve standards of staff work, practice combined army tactics and build team spirit. Auchinleck also initiated a policy of active patrolling at Assam and Arakan to gather intelligence and maintain touch with the Japanese as to destroy the feeling that they were super soldiers.    I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A lot of chess pieces were moved around the board this week. Bitter lessons had been learnt in multiple theaters of the war and now it came time to reorganize and try new things to ultimately bring the war against Japan to a closer end. 

Last time we spoke about Operation Vengeance, the assassination of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. When the decrypted intelligence hit Admiral Nimitz desk about the vulnerability of his Japanese rival, he wondered what he should do. Was it moral? Would it even benefit the allies, Yamamoto was arguably losing the war on his own? In the end he ordered the hit and sent the job over to Admiral Halsey who enthusiastically took the bull by the horns. A special squadron of P-38 Lightnings were sent over to perform an extremely precise interception of Yamamoto's G4M Betty aircraft enroute to Ballale airfield on Bougainville. Yamamoto's aircraft was shot down killing him and all those aboard it. The death of the admiral was hidden from the Japanese public for an entire month and upon learning of it the Japanese people all mourned. It was a terrible moment for the Japanese, one of the greatest had fallen, how would the rest of the war play out?  This episode is the Japanese counteroffensive in Arakan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Before we jump back into the CBI theater some action was heating up in New Guinea. The Okabe detachment was defeated during the battle of Wau seeing the Australians controlling the area from Waipali to Buibaining and much of the Mubo Valley. However the Japanese remained resilient and would not give up Mubo without a fight. Vigorous patrolling and ambushes were all the Australians could perform, because they did not have the necessary numbers to launch a major offensive. In early March General MacKay sent word to Blamey, advising him he believed the Japanese might try another shot to seize Wau. He believed even with the projected arrival of the 4th and 15th brigades they would still be outnumbered by the Japanese. MacKay estimated the Japanese had roughly 7500 men in the Lae-Salamaua area and were maintaining a formidable defense in the Mubo region. Therefore he wanted to continue to restrict their activity to patrols to prevent the Japanese from surprising Wau again and allowing vital time to build up the defenses. The attack on Mubo in January had not accomplished its objectives, but it did show the Japanese at Lae and Salamaua how much of a hornet's nest they had stirred up by attacking Wau. The Japanese were not done however and hoped to launch a counteroffensive. They planned to bring the 51st division in a large convoy across the Bismarck Sea. But as we saw in a previous episode this was met with catastrophe during the battle of the bismarck sea, denying the reinforcements, equipment and supplies the Japanese at Mubo desperately needed. 800 units, mostly from the 102 regiment held various positions at Mubo and they could not hope to launch a counteroffensive.  The supply situation in New Guinea remained a nightmare for both sides. In January Blamey authorized the construction of a new jeep trail going from Bulldog to Wau and it would take months to complete the 68 mile path. By April the Australians improved their situation in the Mubo area by occupying the heights called Saddle and Vicker's ridge. They began placing artillery on the heights and on the 20th began to bombard the Japanese position on Green Hill. On the 23rd, Major General Stanley Savige of the 3rd division established his Headquarters at Bulolo. Kanga force had been officially dissolved, thus henceforth the 3rd division was responsible for offensives in the Wau-Lae-Markham area. For months the focus had been on reinforcing Wau, expecting a major Japanese offensive. But the Australians had also maintained a small force 11 miles from Salamaua guarding the entrance to the Markham valley. The 2/3rd independent company was occupying in the vicinity of Missim village along the Francisco river between the Powerhouse and Salamaua. In early april they began performing reconnaissance of the area. On the 21st the ambushed a column of 60 Japanese managing to kill over 20 of them and wounding 15. Soon after their commander was notified by Moten that they were going to launch an offensive against Mubo finally set for the 24th. The offensive against Mubo was actually part of something grander. General Blamey planned to capture Lae forming a plan codenamed Operation postern which was quickly approved by General MacArthur. For the plan to work, the allies needed to trick General Adachi that Salamaua was the primary target for a major offensive. Thus to accomplish this, the Australians had the ⅔ independent company operate just a few miles from Salamaua. General Stanley Savige would not even be aware of these grander planes until June of 1943. Postern called for a large pincer movement, involving an amphibious assault east of Lae and an airborne assault near Nadzab 50 kms to the west of Lae. Planning for Postern had begun in May, with Generals Blamey and Herring proposing to seize Nadzab as soon as possible with Brigadier Eather's 25th Brigade and a parachute battalion, while the 9th Australian Division, now under the command of Major-General George Wooten, was to take Lae in early August. Nadzab was an obvious target, undefended and of immense value, not only for the Lae operation but also for extending the range of Allied air power. In the meantime Blamey had various forces drive the Japanese from key areas, but not to attack Salamaua directly. The Japanese were going to be in for a major surprise. But now we are turning over to the CBI theater. Last time we were speaking about General Irwins Arakan disaster and the mad onion man Wingate's operation Longcloth. Irwins blunders had cost countless lives and provided General Koga's 55th division ample time to regroup. By March 20th, Wavell, Irwin and Lloyd were accepting they would have to withdraw the forces to the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line. Wavell was incredibly pissed off and decided to make Lloyd a scapegoat. Lloyd was dismissed and replaced by Major General Lomax who was ordered to simply carry on doing what Lloyd had been doing. Lomax came just in time to meet General Koga's counteroffensive which practically annihilated the 47th brigade. Irwin looking to blame anyone and anything but himself, shifted the blame to the brigade itself rather than his tactical blunders and tried again to bring Slim into his mess. The British forces were forced to flee east of the Mayu river and this severely beat India morale which was already horrible to begin with.   Now how bad was morale? By early April morale had plummeted to an all time new low. This was because of the series of terrible defeats, terrible casualties and growing more from malaria. The 6th brigade wsa evacuating 50 men due to malaria a day. Despite using mepacrine as a suppressive treatment alongside anti-moquito nets, cream and wearing long clothes at night, in 8 weeks the 6th brigade lost half its total strength. Desertions were on the rise from many units, causing the British commanders a lot of anxiety over their loyalty.  General's Slim and Lomax met at Chittagong as Koga was sweeping everything before him. Both generals scoured over the maps and agreed, Koga's next logical step was an assault on the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line. To meet this attack, Slim and Lomax devised a stratagem for catching Koga in a box along the Mayu peninsula. The box was to involve 6 battalions, two on the ridges of the Mayu hills, two along the mayu river and two in the hills south of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road. The idea was to let the Japanese advance through the most likely location, some tunnels on a disused railway track. Once the Japanese were along the tunnels, they would close the lid on the box using a force of brigade level strength. The hope was to achieve a perfect encirclement, chasing the legendary glory of Hannibal's victory at the battle of Cannae. To do this they had exhausted and unbelievably demoralized men and would have to achieve a scheme of geometric perfection.  The troops Lomax came to command were shaken badly, malaria riden battalions, departing the disastrous Arakan campaign at the point of exhaustion. There were no trained formations available in India to replace them, thus they would have to be retained in combat. By early April, Lomax had skillfully managed to stabilize the front at the Maungdaw-Buthidaung. On April 14th Marshall Wavell had appointed General Slim's 15th corps to lead the British-Indian forces retreat. The Japanese sensing weakness amongst the allied forces continued their advance. On April 24th, the Japanese reached the British defenses at Buthidaung and Maungdaw. The 55th indian Brigade held the first attack at Kanthe while carefully preparing their entrapment box strategy, pushing the Japanese advance along the spine of the Mayu mountains; however it all went to shit. Two demoralized battalions gave way to Japanese pressure, breaking the box. This forced everything to come undone and soon the British-Indian forces were yet again performing a fighting withdrawal going north.  It was reported that the fighting efficiency was so low by April 28th, the men of the 8/13th frontier force regiment had literally fired off all their ammunition at an imaginary opponent, and when they actually were attacked the next day they had no option but to retreat. The withdrawal culminated with the capture of Buthidaung on May 9th. The 55th brigade narrowly escaped annihilation by abandoning their vehicles and heavy equipment while limping by foot over some jungle covered hills to safety. Five days later the port of Maungdaw was evacuated and the British-Indian defenders began to take up defensive positions in the open rice-field country near Cox's Bazar. As General Slim noted “Our only hope of stabilizing the front, if the Japanese really pushed us, was to hold the rice-field country. Our men were still untrained for the jungle; they feared it more than they did the enemy. We had to select areas where we could give our troops reasonable fields of fire and open maneuver.‘It was too much like 1942 over again, with the added bitterness that this time we had been defeated by forces smaller than our own.” Slim was very better about the entire ordeal. To make matters worse, the men only pulled out after Slim's incessant pressure applied to Lomax, because Irwin was counter arguing they should toss the kitchen sink for a siege strategy. All the way over in London Sir Winston Churchill had this to say “‘This campaign goes from bad to worse, and we are being completely outfought and outmanoeuvred by the Japanese. Luckily the small scale of the operations and the attraction of other events has prevented public opinion being directed upon this lamentable scene.” Churchill was writing at a time, after the Anglo-American victory in North Africa and the crushing soviet victory at Stalingrad. It was obvious to Churchill and the other allied leadership, Europe was won. Churchill was furious with Wavell, a man he never really liked. The Americans likewise were not happy with Wavell. Meanwhile Irwin kept blaming everyone except himself, even sending reports of how cowardly his troops were. Irwins last absurdity was to signal a recommendation that General Slim by removed from commanding the 15th corps. But Wavell, under severe criticism of himself by this point was determined that Irwin would be canned. Slim was ordered to report to Irwin's HQ. Slim told his colleagues around him he was about to be dismissed as he made his way. When he got to Irwin he was met with this ‘You're not sacked. I am.' Upon hearing this, Slim remarked: ‘I think this calls for the opening of a bottle of port or something if we have one.'   The British-Indians forces had  916 dead, 2889 wounded and 1252 missing; the Indian high command had suffered another heavy blow, with the myth of Japanese superiority, excellence and skill as a jungle fighter being strongly reinforced in the minds of British and Indian troops, something that gravely affected their morale General Slim held a rather remarkable ability, mental toughness with some extraordinary resistance to stress. The frustrations of all the defeats and the constant shuffling between HQs and the front was a lot to bear. Slim actually found something positive about the Arakan disaster. The British battle casualties were high, but they could have been a hell of a lot higher, given Irwins insistance to perform endless frontal attacks. The British had learnt valuable lessons about the Japanese and the lack of their own training in specific areas. There had been over 7500 cases of malaria and they were only truly learning on the spot how to deal with the pesky disease. Troops heanceforth would be routinely issued with mosquito nets, repellents and by autumn of 1943 a wonder drug was developed, Mepacrine which significantly helped with the symptoms of malaria.  But by far and large the most significant long term development in 1942-1943 was the gradual reasseration of allied air superiorirty. By the end of 1942, 150 new airfields were constructed, RAF pilots and aircraft began to arrive to them in large numbers and the Americans had sent 10,000 air force personnel to serve in the CBI theater. Heavy B-24 Liberator bombers began to appear at the battlefront for the first time and in November of 1942 some made the spectacular 2760 mile return trip after bombing Bangkok. The Japanese quickly realized their proposed Burma-Siam railway was very vulnerable. When the war in the middle east came to a close in early 1943, the US army airforce transferred a ton of their heavy bombers to the far east. Bombing raids on Bangkok, Rangoon and Mandalay were increased significantly by Christmas of 1942. The Japanese were gradually losing their air superiorirty and this was deeply troubling for them.  During the Arakan campaign a Japanese colonel issued the following orders ‘There must be no fear of aircraft. As long as you are not discovered you must seek to remain so. If once our position is revealed, the enemy planes must be shot down. It is not permissible to suppose that our soldiers are no match for aircraft.' The Japanese were forced to yield the skies over Arakan even though they had taken its ground. The RAG would conduct search and destroy missions over Thaitkido, Buthidaung, Sinho and Akyab island in June. 6 Hurricanes would escort some Blenheim bombers on a long range raid against Ramree island, even though they were not safe. Allied air superiority would eventually become the crucial factor to win the struggle over Burma. Now we cant talk about Burma without talking a bit more about the mad onion man Wingate. While the Arakan campaign was coming to its disastrous conclusion, Operation Longcloth had reached its own. The last remaining columns made their way back to allied territory. 2182 returned out of the original 3000 men that entered Burma; an estimated 818 men had been killed, taken prisoner or died of disease. There was a ton of criticism tossed at the operation and the effectiveness of the Chindits, but the operation was moderately successful. To be brutally honest, the Burma campaign had basically no success stories except for the Chindits, thus it got inflated quite heavily. Wavell was very pleased with the performance of Wingate's forces, so much so he put in an order to form the new Long Range Penetration group, the 111th Indian Brigade. Wavell handpicked their commander, Brigadier William Lentaigne who would come to hate Wingate and Wingate hated him haha. The success of the Chindits would be tossed in all the major headlines of every newspaper from England to India. The British had to do something to raise morale and the Chindits kind of just fell into it. Now one last major event that occurred during all of this was a major conference. Wavell had been flown to Washington to partake in the Trident Conference which was carried from May 12-25th. The main focus of the conference was on the European theater, in fact there was an obsession over the Mediterranean cross channel invasion plans. When it came to theaters like Burma there was little interest. In fact Churchill would often only talk about Singapore when the east was brought up, showcasing full and well he only sought to revitalize the prestige of the British empire over other things. Churchill was quite in favor of bypassing Burma which he viewed as only being beneficial to China, a subject he could not understand why FDR obsessed over. It seemed the Churchill FDR regarded China as the emerging dominant power in the far east, while he only regarded CHina as a pacific power, ignoring China's claims over Tibet, Mongolia and northeastern Burma, and of course Churchill would completely ignore any mention of Hong Kong. FDR was seen to be extremely Pro-Chiang Kai-shek, almost maniac by British accounts. The British began to adopt a machiavellian stance of supporting Chiang Kai-shek and Chennault's airpower idea, thinking it would surely fail, which served Britain just fine.  Meanwhile, Vinegar Joseph Stilwell also at the Trident conference, kept trying to persuade his president that Chiang Kai-Shek was cunning and quite evil. He stressed the danger of American becoming a solitary atlas bearing the burden of the world because the British were outplaying them. He underlined Chiang Kai-sheks ambitions to get rid of him and replace him with a “yes man”, so he could acquire lendlease material for his own ends without any pushbacks. Stilwell recommended sending US troops to the CBI theater; to get Chiang Kai-shek to make specific commitments and stop wiggling around issues and above all to stop Chiang Kai-sheks stab-in-the-back secret diplomacy antics. Stilwell would find the British at Trident very unimpressed with him and his opinions. Stilwell also chose to bitterly argue with Field Marshal Alanbrooke, the chief of the imperial staff and a rampant Americanphobe. It got so bad, George Marshall told Stimson ‘Stilwell shut up like a clam and made an unfavourable impression.'  During the conference FDR did ask Stilwell in private what he thought of Chiang Kai-shek to which Stilwell said ‘He's a vacillating, tricky, undependable old scoundrel who never keeps his word.' By contrast Chennault, when asked a similar question, replied: ‘Sir, I think the generalissimo is one of the two or three greatest military and political leaders in the world today. He has never broken a commitment or promise made to me.' Meanwhile Chiang Kai-sheks representatives including his wife were threatening to pull out of Burma and to make a separate peace with Japan, unless the British finally took action to seize Rangoon. Instead it was agreed, more supplies would be tossed over the Hump and for the future operation Anakim to be shelved, to which Stilwell argued that if the allies waited another year before launching a land-based campaign, China would collapse.  Trident was chaotic as hell. Admiral King slammed the table with his fists many times violently supporting Marshall and Stilwell. King and Marshall wanted the land route to China open, but the British kept tossing their support for the Hump operations. Stilwell was not having a good time, but then he had a surprising victory. Stilwell met with Churchill privately, complaining about the abysmal situation in Burma, and Churchill 100% agreed with his criticisms. Churchill acknowledged the high command in India was terrible and that he was going to replace Wavell. As Stilwell wrote after the experience.   “With Wavell in command, failure was inevitable; he had nothing to offer at any meeting except protestations that the thing was impossible, hopeless, impractical. Churchill even spoke of it as silly. The Limeys all wanted to wait another year. After the Akyab fiasco, the four Japanese divisions in Burma have been scared to death. The inevitable conclusion was that Churchill has Roosevelt in his pocket. That they are looking for an easy way, a short cut for England, and that no attention must be diverted from the Continent at any cost. The Limeys are not interested in the war in the Pacific, and with the President hypnotised they are sitting pretty. Roosevelt wouldn't let me speak my piece. I interrupted twice but Churchill kept pulling away from the subject and it was impossible.' Thus Wavell was as they say “kicked up stairs”, promoted to viceroy of India and replaced as commander in India with Sir Claude Auchinleck. Stilwell returned to China and participated on a celebrity tour arranged by George Marshall to heighten his profile. Once that was done, Stilwell fell into a depression writing this  “‘Back to find Chiang same as ever – a grasping, bigoted, ungrateful little rattlesnake.Any Jap threat will put the Peanut in an uproar, and if they are wise they will repeat their attempt, for this if for no other reason. And if they seriously want to gain the game, they can attack Kunming or Chungking, or both, with five divisions on either line and finish the matter. If we sting them badly enough in the air, they are almost sure to try it . . . The Peanut's promise of picked men for India is so much wind; last year 68% of the men sent were rejected for trachoma or skin disease . . . This is going beyond all bounds. This insect, this stink in the nostrils, superciliously inquires what we will do, who are breaking our backs to help him, supplying everything – troops, equipment, planes, medical, signal, motor services, setting up his goddam SOS, training his lousy troops, backing his dastardly chief of staff, and general staff, and he the Jovian dictator, who starves his troops and is the world's worst ignoramus, picks flaws in our preparations and hems and haws about the Navy, God save us.” Stilwell's frustration was a bit understandable as Chiang Kai-shek had still not replied to FDR about if or when he could commit forces into Burma again. Stilwell was baffled by his nations continued support of what he saw as a fascist regime in China, while simultaneously fighting the fascist regimes in Europe. What Stilwell really wanted was to be made field commander in China, and if he ever got that position, the first thing he would do was cancel the lendlease. Things were not going so well for the married couple of Vinegar Joe and Peanut. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Things were not going well in Burma to say the least. Well except for the Chindits minor success, but that simply could not overcome the incredible low morale of the far east allied forces in the face of what seemed an unstoppable Japanese goliath. 

Recorded late last year....I spoke to Brett who is a Senior High School Geography Teacher and project manager at Wavell State High School just north of Brisbane, who specialises in using geospatial technologies in the classroom. Listen in to this amazing Teacher about how he shares his passion for GIS with his students. Brett hails from Kingaroy, Queensland and grew up in Kumbia. Growing up, Brett wanted to be a Cowboy but then though HPE Teacher would be a better option. He has been in education for 21 years and holds a BA (Geography/Literature) & BEd (Secondary Education). He has won two prestigious awards, in 2021the  QCT TeachX Innovation Award and this year the EQ Showcase Met Regional Teacher of the Year. In his spare time Brett enjoys Golf and GIS. You can find Brett on LinkedIn You can contact me at: ⁠https://www.petacox.com⁠  ⁠@definingboundaries⁠: https://www.instagram.com/definingboundaries/?hl=en  ⁠@surveygeekgirl⁠: https://www.instagram.com/surveygeekgirl/?hl=en  ⁠LinkedIn⁠: https://www.linkedin.com/in/peta-cox  Music by Paul Greene: ⁠https://www.instagram.com/greenepaul/ ⁠ Red Shelf Records/Sounds Delicious Australia: ⁠https://www.instagram.com/soundsdeliciousaustralia/

Last time we spoke about the battle of Komandorski islands. Admirals Kinkaid and McMorris began a naval blockade of Attu and Kiska putting the IJN in a terrible bind. They could either give up the Aleutians, or they would have to reinforce them, either of which came at huge costs. Admiral Hosogaya had no choice but to try and breach the allied blockade to get the much needed reinforcements to the frozen islands. Hosogaya's fleet was superior in numbers and firepower to that of McMorris when they fatefully met in the frigid northern seas. Yet by a stroke of luck, a single man fired a High Explosive shell during the heat of battle causing Hosogaya to make a terrible blunder. Under the impression allied airpower was about to attack them, Hosogaya backed off, losing the chance to claim a major victory. And today we are going to venture, behind the desk so to speak.  This episode is the Pacific Military Conference: MacArthur vs King Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Now before we jump into the real war of the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur vs Admiral Ernest King, I first want to jump over the good old CBI theater. Interesting to mention I recently did a livestream, gaming with a friend of mine, answering some audience questions from you dear old audience members and others from my Youtube channel and Fall and Rise of China Podcast. One guy asked me “how important was the CBI theater?” and it really got me thinking on the spot. Honestly when Americans talk about the Pacific War, two things immediately come to mind, naval battles and island warfare. China gets overshadowed despite literally being the lionshare of fighting against the Japanese, I mean hell they kept like 30+ divisions in China out of 50 or so. But even more than that you hardly hear about Burma or India, they are always the quote en quote benchwarmers compared to lets say your Guadalcanal's or Iwo Jima's. As I said to the audience member on the livestream, its hard to quantify something, but honestly tossing %'s around you could argue the CBI was a hard 50-60% of the war effort, because it did the most important thing necessary to win a way, it drained Japan of men/resources. So lets jump into it a bit shall we? So the last time we were talking about the disastrous First Arakan Campaign. The British launched their offensive and saw heavy resistance at Rathedaung and Donbaik. General Irwin continuously made blunders. When Wavell made an inspection of the battlefields later on he commented how Irwin's forces had “fought in penny packets”. Basically what he was getting out with this little jab, was unlike conventional battles, take for example the famous battle of Alamein. Instead this offensive consisted of hundreds of chance encounters, dozens of disparate set piece clashes, hand-to-hand conflicts, frontal attacks, ambushes, desperate defenses, bombing raids, all of which had been minutely chronicled, but the details of them were quite the mystery. General Slim when asked described it all ‘as an epic that ran across great stretches of wild country; one day its focal point was a hill named on no map; next a miserable unpronounceable village a hundred miles away. Columns, brigades, divisions, marched and counter-marched, met in bloody clashes and reeled apart, weaving a confused pattern hard to unreal”.  Now the beginning of the first arakan offensive seemed to go well. Despite the logistical nightmares, Lloyd enjoyed the advantages of both air superiority and numerical superiority. But the Japanese built their defenses knowing full well what was coming to hit them. The Japanese made no attempt to hold onto the lines between Maungdaw and Buthidaung, nor resist the British forces at Kyauktaw. Lloyd began sending optimistic reports, such as on Christmas Day when the enemy pulled out of Ratheduang. And so the British continued along the peninsula until they came a few miles north of a point of Donbaik, sitting on the coast of the Bay of Bengal. It was here, General Koga had dug in and waited for his enemy. It was to be here, after showcasing the Japanese superior jungle fighting tactics, their roadblocks and amphibious hooks, that they would unleash a new unsuspecting weapon, that of the bunker. General Slim described it as such “‘For the first time we had come up against the Japanese “bunkers” – from now on to be so familiar to us. This was a small strong-point made usually of heavy logs with four to five feet of earth, and so camouflaged in the jungle that it could not be picked out at even fifty yards without prolonged searching. These bunkers held garrisons varying from five to twenty men, plentifully supplied with medium and light machine guns.' The bunkers were impervious to field guns and medium bombs. They also had crossing fire lanes, thus for one force to attack a bunker they would be fired upon by 2 more. The redoubt at Donbaik was situated alongside a “chaung”, which was a natural anti-tank position, having steep sides up to 9 feet high up on the bunkers. On January 7th of 1943, the forces got their first taste of these defenses and were tossed back with heavy casualties. For days a pattern emerged of men throwing themselves at the bunkers, only to be butchered. It was so bad, both Wavell and Irwin were forced to come visit Llyod on the 10th, just to tell him “you must take Donbaik at all cost”. And so Llyod asked for tanks, and he was given them. But to Slims horror the man only asked for one troop of them, prompting Slim to object stating “the more you use the fewer you lose”. His argument was sound and simple, if you were going to utilize tanks, you tried to do so en masse to overwhelm, otherwise the resources would be vulnerable and most likely lost. His objections were tossed aside, and half a squadron of tanks, merely 8 hit the bunkers. The british attacks were beaten off all he same. Now Koga knew he had to fight off the enemy until at least the end of march to receive some decent reinforcements. Thus he determined to hold out; he needed to perform a counterattack. Meanwhile his counterpart Irwin was determined that overwhelming infantry numbers on narrow fronts could achieve victory. And as one contemporary analysis called it “an idea rich in casualties”. Koga brought up the bulk of his 55th division to Akyab and on March 7th the 213th regiment attacked the Kaladan Valley, driving away the V force. Then the 112th regiment attacked the 123rd and 55th Indian brigades north of Rathedaung who were forced to pull back to Zedidaung. This left the 47 indian brigade trapped at the Hwitze bridgehead and the Japanese carried out wide outflanking maneuvers and infiltration attacks against the British lines. In response Irwin tried to toss another assault against Donbaik, which had just been further reinforced by Koga. On March 18th, the 6th brigade of Brigadier Ronald Cavendish launched a front attack on a very narrow front, despite multiple advice given by other commanders stating he should try to outflank the Japanese along the mountain crest. His force made little progress and suffered heavy casualties for their efforts. Meanwhile the 213th regiment secured the eastern side of the Mayu river and the 112th regiment was preparing to cross it. In early March Irwin was doing something aside from tossing his men into a meatgrinder, he began covering his ass. Sensing defeat was staring him in the face, in his desperation he tried to coopt his hated rival, General Slim into sharing some of his blame to come. He sent Slim to Maungdaw to see Lloyd and report on the situation there. When Slim asked him if this meant he was now in operational control, Irwin said absolutely not, he just wanted Slim's assessment of the situation over there. Irwin did however add in, that Slim might gain operational control in the future, but only when Irwin said so and even in that case, Irwin would be retaining administrative control. Well Slim found the Lloyds men's morale was at an all time low. He advised Lloyd to abandon the idiotic frontal assaults and instead to try and flank the enemy through the jungles. Lloyd argued that was too unfeasible and because of Irwins ordered overruled Slim. Thus Slim returned to Irwin with a useless report. Up until this point Wavell pretty much had no idea what was going on. He continued to urge action from Irwin, so Irwin ordered action from Lloyd and the result was just more disaster. By March 20th Wavell, Irwin and Lloyd all accepted they would have to withdraw the forces to the Maundaw-Buthidaung line. Wavell was livid at his subordinates writing “It seemed to me to show a complete lack of imagination, and was neither one thing nor the other. An attack in real depth with determined soldiers like the 6th Brigade would, I am sure, have accomplished something, though it has cost us casualties. But to use one battalion at a time, and that usually only deploying one company, seems to me to be poor tactics. With the Japanese in a pocket like that, I cannot believe that a plan could not have been made to eat them up; it looked to me like practically ideal for covering machine gun and mortar fire from a flank.” On the night of the 24th, the 112th regiment crossed the Mayu river, marched along narrows paths and jungle to get to the crest of the supposedly impassable Mayu range. The following days say lines of communications to Kyaukpandu severed, the enemy captured the mountain crest near Atet Nanra on the 39th and in response to this Lloyd sent the 47th and 6th brigades to retreat west before they were encircled. This of course was in contradiction to direct ordered he had received to wait until the monsoon season had broke before pulling out. Thus Irwin was forced to countermand Lloyd's order. Wavell was livid over his insubordination blundering of things and sought to toss Lloyd under the bus. Thus Irwin was discreetly told to sack Lloyd, and before doing so he took direct command of the 14th indian division.  Lloyd was replaced by Major General C.E.N Lomax who was promptly ordered to carrying on doing the exact same things Lloyd had done. The 26th Indian division and Lomax were sent to bolster the peninsula, Lomax was going to assume command of all the Arakan forces when he got there, but until then Irwin had to run the show. Koga was not letting up of course and the 112th regiment managed to build a roadblock north of Indian village b April 3rd, successfully cutting the lines of communication of the 47th and 6th brigades. Simultaneously the 143rd regiment burst into the area advancing northwards up the Mayu River valley. The Japanese were soon infiltrating British positions at Indin village and overran the HQ of the 6th brigade capturing its commander, Cavendish in the process. However one of Cavendishes last orders before being grabbed was for the British artillery to open fire on Indian, which they did, taking the Japanese completely by surprise. It caused significant casualties on the Japanese, but also the British, killing Cavendish in the end. With the 47th brigade practically annihilated by Koga's forces, Irwin began to launch himself into a frenzy of blame-shifting. He argued the brigade, not his own tactical ideas, was alone to blame and yet again he tried to drag Slim into the mess. This time he told Slim to hold himself in readiness to take over operational control and to move his HQ to Chittagong. But again Irwin reminded him he would not have administrative control of operations nor operational direction until Irwin said so. Slim met with Irwin in Calcutta on April 5th, having been recalled from leave in the small hours, something Irwin did often to him. That evening he dined with Lloyd at the Bengal Club and heard his side of the story, which the man remarkably told without any bitterness of his shabby treatment. After this Slim had a meeting with Lomax at Chittagong. The 6th brigade narrowly escaped annihilation by retreating along a beach road and the 47th brigade avoided the same by destroying their own heavy equipment, broke out into small parties and ran for their lives cross-country to the beach, thus ceasing to be a fighting force.   Following that initial catastrophe, Lomax and Slim devised a stratagem for catching Koga's men in a box along the Mayu peninsula. The box would involve 6 battalion, 2 on the ridges of the Mayu hills, 2 along the mayu river and 2 on the hills due south of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road. The idea was that the Japanese would be bound to utilize the tunnels on a disused railway track, dismantled for years. They would be led into a box on their way to the tunnels and then the lid of the box would be shut by a force of brigade strength. It was in many ways an attempt to replicate Hannibals famous victory at the battle of Cannae, every generals dream since ancient times. Lomax and Slim were going to used their tired and greatly demoralized men to carry out a scheme of geometrical perfection. But that is all for this week at the CBI theater.   Now as we all know, during the Pacific War General MacArthur and Admiral King both laid out their own plans for the drive towards Japan. This led to a compromise plan that held 3 phases: Phase 1 was to seize Guadalcanal; phase 2 was to drive up the central solomons and New Guinea; lastly phase 3 was to neutralize Rabaul. Now as much as MacArthur and King hated another, they both understood Rabaul was a crucial lynchpin for both their plans. Working together did not always go so well as you might imagine. Take for example Admiral Halsey who continuously found himself in the middle. At one point in early February  he was forced to go meet MacArthur to request reinforcements, because Operation KE made the allies think a major offensive was on its way. MacArthur argued that his heavy bombers were too few and that he could not promise much support as he believed an impending offensive was about to be launched in his own area. Now Halsey was one of the few men, a Navy man no less, that MacArthur did not hate, so if he was going to jerk him around, you can tell he was being difficult to work with. All of these difficulties emphasized the two services and two area commands needed to better coordinate. And thus a conference was called to hammer out the fine details of how they would all play nice together.   Now meeting all in person was not feasible so the commanders sent their representatives to Washington to present their plans. On March 12th, the Pacific Military conference was held with representatives from each Pacific area command: Lt-General George Kenney, Major General Richard Sutherland and Brigadier-General Stephen Chamberlin represented MacArthurs Southwest command; Lt-General Millard Harmon, Major-General Nathan Twining, Captain Miles Browning and Brigadier-Genreal De Witt Peck represented Halsey's south pacific command; Lt-General Delos Emmons, Rear-admiral Raymond Spruance, Brigader-General Leonard Boyd and Captain Forrest Sherman represented Nimitz Central Pacific command.   Now small side note here, since MacArthur could not make this conference I still wanted to toss my good old 2 cents at the man. While all of this was going on, Richard Sutherland had been sent on another mission to Washington by MacArthur. Richard sutherland was sent to meet Arthur Vandenburg, a senior Republican senator. They met informally at the home of Clare Booth Luce, a strongly anti-Roosevelt republican. She was also the wife of Henry Luce, the man in control of the Time-Life media conglomerate. The purpose of the meeting was to discern how much republican support MacArthur could expect if he ran for President in 1944. Vandenburg was onboard for it and a month later MacArthur would send another aid over bearing a note to the senator stating “I am most grateful to you for your complete attitude of friendship. I can only hope that I can someday reciprocate”.   Vandenburg and his allies  drafted MacArthur for the republican nomination as MacArthur met with his public relations staff, better called his court. One of his court members, Colonel Lloyd Lehrbas was disgusted by open discussions of MacArthur winning the presidency and running the war from washington. Lehrbas was a former newspaper editor who now reviewed press releases in MacArthur's name. MacArthur kept the man on his staff specifically because of his media connections. Vandenburg found strong support for MacArthur amongst the arch-conservatives. The republican party was going to nominate two candidates: Wendell Wilkie and Thomas Dewey, but Vandenburg was trying to sneak MacArthur in as a third. However there was a specific group of republicans who adamantly opposed MacArthur's nomination, veterans who had served under him during the Pacific War and before. Vandenburg tried to get a better picture by sending representatives to canvas the troops in the Pacific theater for their thoughts. The consistent response was overly negative about MacArthur.   In early 1944, a private conversation between MacArthur and Congressman Arthur Miller of Nebraska was leaked to the public. It revealed MacArthurs plot behind the scenes to run for presidency and this forced MacArthur to back pedal heavily. On April 30th of 1944 his staff released a statement from MacArthur stating  “I request that no action be taken that would link my name in any way with the nomination. I do not covet it nor would I accept it”. Yeah, MacArthur would try two more times to run. But anyways now that you know that little tid bit information on my favorite figure lets carry on.   The Pacific Military conference lasted until march 28th, conducted under the supervision of the joint staff planners, headed by Rear-Admiral Charles Cooke and Major-General Albert Wedemeyer. Now MacArthur's team came to the conference with a plan in hand, codenamed Elkon. Elkon was a town in Maryland, a famous destination for quick marriages, and the operation was to be a two-pronged offensive. It called for the seizure of the New Britain, New Ireland and New Guinea area which would be based on phase 2 and 3 of the July 2 directive. That being the two approaches heading for Rabaul: one proceeding along the northern coast of New Guinea and the other through the Solomons. This ambitious plan called for first seizing airfields on the Huon Peninsula and New Georgia, then air bases on New Britain and Bougainville, then the seizure of Kavieng and finally Rabaul would be isolated enough to be invaded.   The first week of the conference became a arm-wrestling match between Sutherland and the other join chiefs, especially General Marshall who squabled over the details of Elkton. Admiral King and the navy were quite hostile to the plan, but rather shocking to some, William Bull Halsey was a large supporter of MacArthurs plan. Halsey's team argued the plan did not overstretch their resources and in fact Halsey was finding working with MacArthur was enormously benefiting the Pacific War effort. Halsye and MacArthur were a lethal combo, but King was hard pressed because the truth was they simply did not have the necessary resources for MacArthur's plan. So as you can imagine compromises were made. Macarthurs initial calculations for the plan to work required 12 and ⅔ divisions and 30 air groups for the southwest pacific area, while 10 divisions and 15 air groups were needed in Hasleys south area.    The joint chiefs responded by asking what the pacific representatives thought they could accomplish in 1943 with the best reinforcements washington could deliver. Sutherland and Halsey's team agreed task two: taking northeastern New Guinea, Madang-Salamua-Huon gulf triangle, Bougainville, New Georgia, Cape Gloucester and New Britain could be taken, but they would probably run out of resources to take Rabaul. The joint chiefs said to forget about Rabaul for the time being and focus on taking the Bismarck Archipelago. MacArthur began writing from Brisbane he thought this idea to be a huge mistake “We are already committed to the campaign in New Guinea….If at the same time we enter upon a convergent attack on the New Georgia group, we have committed our entire strength without assurance of accomplishment of either objective.” This led Hasley to agree to wait for his attack on New Georgia until MacArthur had achieved his objectives of taking the islands of Kiriwina, Woodlark and the Trobriand islands. When proposed back to the joint chiefs, to everyone's amazement King accepted the revised Elkon plan with little compliant. The final directive went out on March 28th, officially canceling the 3 stage drive to rabaul. Instead the objectives for 1943 would be first Woodlark and Kiriwina, then the Madang-Salamaua-Finschhafen triangle and New Britain, and finally the Solomons + southern Bougainville. For the first time in the Pacific war, there was an agreed-to strategy for winning in the southwest pacific. In the mind of MacArthur, who you can imagine was only thinking about the Philippines, he had achieved his plan to direct the war where he wanted it and he had a surprising naval ally in Bull Halsey. The Elkon plan would eventually be called operation Cartwheel   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Cartwheel was greenlit and it showcased MacArthur could under extremely rare circumstances, make peace with his true enemy during the Pacific War, the United States Navy. Yes MacArthur would be able to direct the war, at least for a bit, to where he wanted it, the Philippines.

Last time we spoke a bit about the ongoings of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Mao Zedong's Fourth Army faced off against the IJA in the western Hubei area causing significant casualties to both sides. The engagement was a mixed one with both sides claiming victory, and it seems it was a tactical draw. Over in the Solomons, Halsey had fixated his eyes on Munda and this prompted him to perform a naval bombardment of it and Vila-Stanmore. Some very unlucky Japanese aboard two destroyers ran right into the Americans enroute to bombard the airstrips and this led to their terrible defeat at the battle of Blackett Strait. The small and short battle showcased the Japanese were being bled and things were only going to continue to get worse for the empire of the rising sun. But today we are venturing back to Burma to talk about the Chindits so grab your onions.  This episode is Operation Longcloth Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A few weeks ago we began the story about Wingate and the Chindits. The first task given to the Chindits was Operation Longcloth which Wingate did not like as a title because it did not hold the grandiloquence he sought. Now a major rationale for Operation Longcloth was to help relieve some pressure from places like Fort Hertz, the last remaining British outpost left in Burma. Fort Hertz was around 60 miles south of the Chinese border manned by Karen levies and was on the brink of collapse. The fort was maintained as an outpost originally by the Myitkyina Battalion, but after the Japanese pushed the allies out of Burma it began to see many retreating allied troops who would garrison it. The military authorities within India however had no direct contact with the fort during most of the summer of 1942. Luckily for the allies, the Japanese did not continue their advance towards the northern Burmese border, most likely because they did not believe a allied outpost could be maintained in such a remote place. To get a picture of what the hell was going on at the Fort, the 153rd Gurkha Indian Parachute Battalion led by Lt Colonel James Owen Merion Roberts were parachuted into upper burma to investigate the state of the Myitkyina area on July 3rd of 1942. Alongside this on August 12th of 1942, Major Hopkins of the 50th Indian Parachute battalion overflew Fort Hertz and discovered unexpectedly that it was still in British hands. Lt Colonel Roberts had reached the fort some days prior and figured out the landing strip near the fort was still usable. The Fort Hertz airstrip served as an emergency landing strip for aircraft flying over the Hump to get supplies into China. The same airstrip was naturally also a supply line for Fort Hertz. The day after the discovery of the usable airstrip was made, a party led by Captain G.E.C Newland of the 153rd indian parachute battalion dropped into Fort Hertz with engineering supplies and they quickly went to work repairing the airstrip. By the 20th the airstrip was fully functional and Lt Colonel Gamble was sent to be the new commander of the area followed by a company of the 7/9th Jat regiment. A special force was created called the Northern Kachin Levies. They were made up of member of the Kachin people under the command of British officers. Originally Colonel Gamble was their leader and they helped various British Indian army units in the area to engage the Japanese and rally locals to their cause. Now way back at the beginning of the war, Chiang Kai-shek sought the construction of a road from Ledo to Assam that would cut through the mountains, forests and rivers of northern Burma to link it with the Burma road at Lungling on the Chinese side. This was to be a colossal amount of work, Chiang kai-shek estimated it would be built in 5 months, while Stilwell's team of experts believed it would take 2.5 years. The British were wary about the Ledo road because it destroyed their private shipping monopoly by allowing the Chinese direct access to India. However washington forced them to accept it, despite Britain trying to obstruct its construction by claiming they would perform a amphibious assault to recapture rangoon to reopen its road to China. Wavell argued that even if the Ledo road was complete it would be too costly to maintain, but washington was adamant about it, so they took full responsibility for its construction and cost. The Ledo road would be agonizingly slow to construct. It would take all of 1943 for the road to be cut from Ledo to assam to Shingbwiyang in Burma, just 103 miles in all. This was not surprising given it consisting of 100,000 cubic feet of earth that had to be removed along a track that ran as high as 4500 feet over the Patka range through thick jungle. The workforce consisted of 15,000 us troops, of which 60% were african-american and 35,000 locals. Churchill famously described the Ledo Road as “a road that would be open only when there was no longer any need for it”.   Chennault likewise eager to do anything to increase his funding for the airforces in CHina began argued that the road used up precious resource that would never provide the 65,000 tons of supplies over the Hump that his pilots could deliver. A lot of the allied analysts crunched the numbers and agreed with Chennault, and even General Slim added his agreement to the mater, stating they should better focus on simply retaking burma by military means and thus the road to china would be open. General Slim actually had a lot to say in the matter and wrote this   “I agreed with Stilwell that the road could be built. I believed that, properly equipped and efficiently led, Chinese troops could defeat Japanese if, as should be the case with his Ledo force, they had a considerable numerical superiority. On the engineering side I had no doubts. We had built roads over country as difficult, and with much less technical equipment than the Americans would have . . . Thus far Stilwell and I were in complete agreement, but I did not hold two articles of his faith. I doubted the overwhelming war-winning value of this road, and, in any case, I believed it was starting from the wrong place. The American amphibious strategy in the Pacific, of hopping from island to island would, I was sure, bring much quicker results than an overland advance across Asia with a Chinese army yet to be formed. In any case, if the road was to be really effective, its feeder railway should start from Rangoon, not Calcutta.”   Regardless the Ledo Road was to be built, all 1072 miles of it . Back in December of 1942, the 45th american engineer regiment and the 823rd aviation battalion, two african-american units arrived to begin the first segment of the colossal project connecting Ledo to Hukawng Valley. To build these 103 miles had the men led by Major General Raymond Wheeler braving the difficult Pangsau Pass of 3727 feet before dropping 700 feet to Shingbwiyang. By January 20th of 1943, construction was being done on a 24 hour basis at a rate of 3 quarters of a mile a day. By February 18th Wheeler was given command of the defense of the Ledo sector and despite Wavell's engineer in chief giving a skeptical estimate that the next 45 miles of the road would only be done by March 1st, on February 28th they crossed the Burmese border.   Meanwhile the 18th division led by General Mutaguchi Renya was given the responsibility of defending northern Burma. General Mutaguchi was a victor of the Singapore campaign. In fact the 18th division was something of an elite division having fought in China, Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines and now Burma. The logistics as you can imagine for his forces all the way in Northern Burma were not good. The men were greatly fatigued by the heavy fighting and lack of everything, so Mutaguchi was content simply garrisoning the region. He deployed a single regiment, the 114th in Hukawng Valley, the 55th in the Indaw area and the 56th in Myitkyina. Mutaguchi's men were plagued by Kachin levies performing guerilla warfare. Soon he was forced to deploy his men to embark on vigorous patrolling north of the area of Myitkyina, leaving his 19th division vulnerable to attrition and without much in terms of replacements for casualties. In the words of Private Fujino Hideo: “Our enemy was not actually British, Chinese, nor Indians but the Kachins. They were quicker than monkeys and talented in shooting … After the eight month occupation, the punitive force at Sumprabum suffered heavy damage and the casualties from the Kachins' guerrilla tactics … In the course of the campaign, the killed and wounded amounted to a great number.”    By february the situation prompted Mutaguchi to redirect his attention towards the Kachin state where he planned to send the 114th regiment to attack Fort Hertz and Hkalak Ga, one of the important bases for which the Kachin levies operated. This also happened to be a place the Kachin levies screened for the building of the Ledo road. Thus in order to save everything, Wavell had gone along with allowing Wingate to launch operation Longcloth in an effort to prevent the offensive against Fort Hertz, the Ledo Road and the Hump air route.   Now the last time we were talking about the Chindits they had scored a success attacking Pinlebu and demolishing major parts of the Bongyaung railway. Wingate 10 miles north of Wuntho had established an HQ in the Bambwe Taung hills and was faced with a large decision, to carry on across the Irrawaddy or to retire back to India. Being Wingate he carried on. However while the Japanese at first were a bit bewildered by the attacks, they soon figured out what kind of force they were facing and set out to search and destroy them. The success of the railway demolition had thus created new perils. The Japanese were gathering in number to the rear of the Chindits. The No 1 column in the southern force that had survived the multiple disasters had blown up the railway bridge at Kyaikthin and crossed the Irrawady at Taguang on their own initiative. By March 10th, they had no time to lose as the Japanese were in hot pursuit. The people of Tigyaing welcomed the British and made boats available for their crossing. Fergusson and the No 5 Column got across by nightfall just before a JApanese column appeared on the westen bank to smash them. Learning the enemy had occupied Tigyaing, Calvert with the No 3 column crossed 5 miles downriver. Then on march 13th they were ambushed. Calvert tried to hold the Japanese off with rearguard actions, while his main body crossed some islands midstream and luckily for the men the Japanese did not press their attack or else the entire column likely would have been annihilated. The Japanese were uncertain of the numbers of this new enemy and were being cautious, again they had been fooled into believing the force facing them might be large. Regardless of getting the majority to safety, 7 of Calverts men were killed with 6 wounded who had to be left on an island. Calvert left a note with the 6 wounded men directed towards the Japanese commander asking him to treat the 6 wounded men in accordance with the code of bushido.   Meanwhile Wingate and the main body of the northern force, around 1200 men left Bambwe Taung and came to a major tributary of the Irrawaddy called Shweli on March 17th. Here the river was so wide it made ropes and dinghies useless and the crossing had to be made by boats. The danger was that the approach to the stream was over open paddy fields, where they could easily be spotted. On top of this intelligence had revealed the far shore was held by units of the Burmese Liberation Army. When Wingate sent across an envoy to treat with them, the fearless warrior of the BLA promptly decamped. Wingates men crossed at once, but yet again their mules gave them trouble. 40 mules had to be left behind, while the rest were tethered to boats waddling across. They crossed during the night of March 17th and all got over by sunset. With Calvert and Fergusson well ahead of him, Wingate signaled the forces to march for the Gokteik viaduct so they could demolish it,thus severing the Mandalay-Lashio road.    Calvert turned south towards Mytison, while Fergusson was ordered to rejoin Wingates force. However Calvert was unaware of this order thinking Fergusson was backing him up as he approached Mytison. Without the extra man power, when he got to Mytison he knew he could not hope to take it head on, so he prepared an ambush. He called the RAF in to bomb the town while his men laid a trap along the Nam Mit river. A japanese patrol walked right into the ambush and lost 100 men. Calvert reported ‘We let fly with everything we had and a lot of Japs could never have known what hit them. It was one of the most one-sided actions I have ever fought in.' For this great feat, the paid with the lives of around 6 Gurkhas. Calvert's group continued on receiving an airdrop on the 19th, a 10 ton dump of supplies that would be the largest drop of the entire expedition. With their supplies in hand they trekked up the hills to prepare for their assault against Gokteik, but they suddenly received an order to return to India. Calverts force were too far south of the main body and would have to achieve the objective on their own initiative, thus he could not hope to ignore them. Calverts men turned back, but made sure to demolition a railway in their retreat. Wingate sent Calvert word that he should get out as fast as possible in order to bring the most survivors he could for quote ‘we can get new equipment and wireless sets. But it will take twenty five years to get another man. These men have done their job, their experience is at a premium.' Calvert and the No 3 column reached the Chindwin on april 14th crossing it without opposition and were the first out of Burma. Calvert and his column were the real success story of Operation Longcloth.   As for Wingate, according to those in his company he came into a “down period” for his bipolar cycle. Many accounts refer to him at this time as “luth suspendu” highly strung, irritable and irrational. During the crossing of the irrawaddy, an officer had reported to Wingate he had a snag and apparently Wingate reacted by throwing himself to the ground in a cry of exasperation despair. Wingates biographer had this to say about the minor event “it was one among a hundred evidences of his impersonality at continual variance with his egotism' he left no record of exactly where he crossed the Irrawaddy. He seems to have concentrated on the negative and discounted the amazing run of luck the Chindits had enjoyed so far – crossing the Chindwin, cutting the railway in 70 different places, crossing the Irrawaddy, all without significant losses – suspecting that, in the words of one of his sergeants, ‘there must be a catch somewhere'. It seems Wingate did not know his men were at their limits and he made the cardinal mistake of funneling his columns together, perfect to bring them into a death trap. Instead of spreading them over a wide area, he compressed them within 15 miles of each other in a king of peninsula surrounded by the Shweli and Irrawaddy rivers, making it much easier for their japanese pursuers to find them. The Chindits were also on a terrain mainly made up of paddy fields rather than jungle, thus they were particularly visible to the enemy. A Japanese spotter plane detected the No 5 column at one point and basically all the Japanese needed to do was take the roads from Mytison to Male where they could have encircled them. But suddenly Wingate realized his predicament and ordered his men to break out of the Shweli loop. This was to be easier said than done. The men were slow, due to hunger, their boots were worn out, they had not had a supply drop in many days. No 5 column had gone 48hours without food and it was becoming apparent Wingates force was too large to be supplied by air.    Back over in Imphal the 4th corps whose role was to provide logistical back up for the CHindits were greatly puzzled by Wingates plans once he had crossed the Irrawaddy. The signaled to know what exactly his intentions were and Wingate replied that his destination was the Kachin hills, from where he would launch an attack against the Lashio-Bhamo road. The 4th corps gently reminded Wingate that such a distance meant they would be unable to supply him by air and suggested he try to instead attack Shwebo west of the Irrawaddy. It was clear they wanted him to go there, but Wingate responded the men could not get back across the Irrawaddy as the Japanese had stolen all their boats and were patrolling the access routes. To this the 4th corps ordered him to end his operation and make their withdrawal back to India. It was actually the order that prompted Wingate to sent his message to Calvert when he did, while he also sent word to Fergusson to rendezvous with him at Baw, where Wingate hoped to get all his men a supply drop before making the journey home. Ferguson's column were in really bad shape, they had no water and began sucking the fluid from any green bamboo stems they could find. They butchered their mules for meat and made stews of monkeys, rats, locusts and cockroaches. They were ridden with lice and leeches. The leeches were particularly bad, as when a man pulled one off, the parasite's head would get stuck in the skin creating an infected oozing sore. Fergusson sent word via radio to Wingate stating a bitter bible verse ‘I can count all my bones: they stare and gloat over me. (Psalms 22:17).'   It was a mistake to send the bible thumper Wingate such a message as he quickly responded back a quote from St John's gospel ‘Consider that it is expedient one man should die for the greater good of all people.'. It seems Wingate was overconfident about the supply drops, having success prior by allowing some of his forces to attack Japanese garrisons while other oversaw aerial drops had driven the CHindits to take it all for granted. At Baw disaster struck. Wingate launched an attack hoping the RAF would support him, but the pilots could not make out friend from foe and ended up flying off after only dropping a third of the supplies. Fergusson finally rendezvous with Wingate at Shaukpin Chuang river on march 25th. Wingate told the men he thought the Japanese commander was pressed to do everything he could to annihilate them all just to save face at this point. Wingate held a conference with the officers where Fergusson recounted it as being ‘the last reunion of a very happy band of brothers before setting out on the perilous homeward journey, which many of them did not survive'. Knowing the Japanese would block their passage across the irrawaddy, Wingate decided to try a bluff. He would march back to Inywa and cross at the identical point of the eastward crossing. They would have to kill all their remaining animals to make the traverse lightly armed, and once across they would to split up into small groups to try and sabotage more railway installations on their way back to India. Wingate arranged for the drops to be made south of the Shweli loop in the hopes of persuading the Japanese that was where the brigade was to buy his men time. He sent No 1 column eastwards to the Kachin hills, basically to their doom to save the rest of his brigade.   All the columns would endure a terrible march back to Inywa. The mules were slaughtered as they went, and the Japanese were hot on their heels. Colonel Tomotoki Koba had set up 3 defensive lines between the Chindits and the border to India: the first position was at the Irrawaddy, the second along the Mu valley and the third following the line of the Chindwin. Meanwhile the Japanese hot on their trail's purpose was to drive them into the trap. Wingate tried to toss the enemy off the scene by using feints and decoys, including ordering Fergussons No 5 column to attack the village of Hintha, halfway between Baw and Inywa. The feints it seems worked as the Japanese never caught up to them, missing the opportune chance to trap the Chindits in the Shweli loop. The main body of the Chindits reached Inywa at 4pm on the 28th and their luck had not run out. While the Japanese had stolen their boats over the Irrawaddy, they had neglected to do so on the Shweli. The Chindits gathered the boats they could and crossed the river. No 7 column was first followed by 2 and then 8. 8 was fired upon by the enemy halfway across, fortunately the Japanese force was quite small and lacked heavy machine guns. Even so their mortars, rifles and light automatics was enough to drive many of the CHindits into the jungle as the No 7 column was left on its own to flee. Wingate tried to secure a bivouac 10 mile south east of Inywa and divided his columns into 5 dispersal groups arranged for supply drops. From that point on, they were on their own initiatives.    Fergusson's No 5 column suffered heavily during their fight at Hintha and having lost his radios equipment they were own their own. Fergusson decided to take his men to the Kachin hills the closest sanctuary it seemed. But when they tried to cross the Shweli it turned into a nightmare. Many of his men were swept away during a flood as were many mules. 46 men were abandoned on a sandbank in the middle of the river as the Japanese began to attack. Fergussons recalled ‘the decision which fell on me there was as cruel as any which could fall on the shoulders of a junior commander'. Fergusson's group staggered on, starving and dehydrated and would limp to Imphal by april 26. Column 5 had suffered tremendously, only 95 survived the ordeal out of 318 men. Column 7 managed to get 150 of his men to China and flew back to India. All the dispersed groups had terrible tales to tell about atrocities committed by the Japanese, or treachery on the part of Burman villagers. Men spoke of having to struggle to stay away, hiding in caves while the enemy hunted them down like dogs. Rice and buffalo meat were rare luxuries for them, more often than naught they ate python and nettles. But here we have to end to story, for the next time we come back to the Chindits we will conclude Operation longcloth and the daring retreat back to India by the Chindits. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The onion eating madman Wingate took his men dangerously into the fray and many of the paid dearly for it. Their success brought the anger of the Japanese bearing upon them, how many would survive the trek back to India? 

Last time we spoke about the first adventure of the Chindits. Eccentric and quite literally madman Wingate was championed by Wavell to create a guerrilla unit to perform operations in Burma. Wingate soon readjusted the group to be a long range penetration group known as the Chindits. Their purpose was to disrupt the Japanese behind their front lines. The eccentric Wingate proved to be capable of turning men into onion wearing jungle warriors and they marched into the jungle to sabotage railway lines to hinder the Japanese. Their first mission was met with tremendous disaster after disaster, but surprisingly by the end they had achieved their goal of blowing up some railway. We finished off by talking about a lesser known allied partner during the Pacific War, Free France. The Japanese had ignored them for a long time, but eventually enough was enough and they seized Guangzhouwan from Free France thus ending their position in China. But today we are venturing back to the Aleutians. This episode is Landing at Amchitka and Invasion of the Russels Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Now the last time we were in the Aleutians, the Americans had taken Adak back on August 30th of 1942. There they began building a new airfield from which they could continue to reclaim the Aleutian island chain. However the Japanese did not give up on their northern possessions and reoccupied Attu Island by late October. The Japanese acted so boldly because they believed the Amerians were not able to construct an airtstip yet on the neighboring island of Amchitka. Also during October, Kiska was reinforced by massive amounts of anti-aircraft weapons and an impressive underground network of bunkers. Now initially the plan for the Aleutians for the Japanese was simply a large feint that would see them gradually withdrawing to the northern Kuriles while bleeding the americans of lives and resources. However all the American activity in the north was surprising Japanese high command and they now were beginning to believe the Americans sought to hop along the Aleutian island chain all the way to the home islands to potentially invade Japan from the north, a rather insane war strategy to be sure. As a result, the Japanese high command decided not to abandon the Aleutians for the winter and on November 1st, the formulated a joint plan to strengthen the defenses of Kiska and Attu by February of 1943. They also sought to create a seaplane base at the unoccupied island of Shemya. Now on the other side, the US army planned to occupy Tanaga along with Atka after the Adak base was established, but for the time being this was not a pressing issue. What was a pressing issue was a concern that the Japanese might seize Amchitka, 60 miles east of Kiska. Admiral Nimitz directed Theobald to preempt any such occupation and for Colonel Talley to go with a party of Alaskan scouts to go to the island to see if it was possible to build an airfield there. The Alaskan scouts landed on the island having to hid, while Japanese reconnaissance aircraft flew overhead. They found test holes all over the island that had been made by Japanese patrols. Contrary to the Japanese reports, the Alaskan scouts determined Amchitka was long, narrow and flat, except of course for a volcano at one end, but this indicated it could operate an airfield. Given the viability of the island and the presence of the Japanese holes testing its viability likewise, the race was on. Thus Admiral Nimitz approved the invasion of Amchitka codenamed Operation Longview. General Marshall approved the plan to advance upon Amchitka and agreed to assign troops for an invasion. While planning for the Amchitka occupation was underway, major changes in command structure also were going on. On January 4th of 1943, Theobald was transferred out of his command assumed by Rear Admiral Thomas Kincaid. Likewise Theobalds second in command, rear admiral W.W Smith was also replaced by rear admiral Charles McMorris. Kincaid was a combat veteran who liked action and was more to Buckner's liking as he immediately went on the offensive, arranging for a task force to deliver the Army's Amchitka occupation forces of 2000 men led by Brigadier General Lloyd Jones. Beginning in early November upon discovering the Japanese reoccupation of Attu, General Butler sent missions against the island. Colonel William Eric Eareckson led the airforce to hit Attu, successfully destroying several beach installations, sank a cargo ship and took out 9 Zero fighters at Holtz Bay. During the first 6 months of 1943, Attu and Kiska would be attacked by the 11th air force who would hit the islands with over 3,000,000 pounds of bombs. In July Kiska alone would be hit by 900,000 pounds of bombs. Liberators, mitchells, dauntless, lightnings and warhawks took part in the aerial attacks making the islands untenable. This is quite a lesser known aspect of the Pacific War. The American airfield on Adak was little more than 200 miles away from the Japanese on Kiska and nearly twice that distance from Attu. Any day weather permitted it, American aircraft departed from Adak to strike at the Japanese, it was grueling work fighting the Japanese and mother nature.  Over on the Japanese side on November 23rd the first Shemya convoy departed from Paramushiro, carrying 1100 troops of the 303rd independent battalion escorted by the light cruisers Abukuma, Kiso, Tama and the destroyers Hacuoshimo, Wakaba and Usugumo led by Admiral Hosogaya. But before the convoy was able to get to the island, the Americans sent a wave of B-24's on November 27th which managed to sink the transport Cherrybourne Maru just off Attu waters. Hosogaya began receiving reports indicating a North Pacific task force was in the vicinity as well. This prompted Hosogaya to postpone the Shemya landings and return back to Paramushiro. Ironically there was no American task force in the north pacific as Admiral Theobald had literally taken the majority of warships with him for the invasion of North Africa.  Eareckson's constant aerial attacks forced Hosogaya to consolidate his vessels at all times and prompted him to take the entire convoy to Kiska landing the troops there on December 2nd. On December 18th, Earecksons aerial forces smashed Amchitka, destroying every building on the island. Mere hours after the report of the damage, General Buckner decided to send the Alaska scouts in. The Alaska Scouts, were also known as Castner's Cutthroats, led by Colonel Lawrence Castner. The scouting expedition showed further signs the Japanese had been on the island recently doing the same type of work as them. Thus operation longview's timetable had to be increased. The scouts reported a fighter strip could be built up in 2 to possibly 3 weeks and a main airfield in 3-4 months time. By the end of the year the 11th air force had managed to take down 50 enemy planes in combat and lost around a dozen in the combat. However, over 80 other aircraft had been lost to a multitude of other causes, such as good old mother nature. Operating in the far reaches of the north was extremely dangerous, and the weather seemed to be taking a heavier toll than the Japanese. In spite of mother nature, Eareckson's bombers continued their work using rather innovative means. Eareckson pioneering a low-level bombing technique to raid the enemy and thwart the effects of the unpredictable Aleutian weather. To overcome the shortness of the daylight cycle, he was forced to bomb at night and to do so he would use a single plane that preceded the main force by a minute to drop incendiary bombs to illuminate the area. It was a very Japanese type of strategy, perhaps he was learning from his enemy. As I had mentioned the 11th air force would literally drop more than a million pounds of bombs over Attu, Kiska and other islands under Earecksons command. Earecksons personally was in the air ever flyable day of the campaign excluding one brief October mission to the States. On January 4th, Admiral Kinkaid, an American admiral who had seen action in more big naval battles than anyone else, finally arrived at Kodiak to replace Theobald. The day after, Kinkaid ordered the full troop landings on Amchitka to be executed. Butler was very pleased to have a “fighting admiral”. Heavy cruiser Indianapolis, light cruisers Detroit, Raleigh and 7 destroyers led by Admiral McMorris were to do the job. Yet mother nature did not comply, the weather became severe forcing the americans to postpone the operation for a few days. Meanwhile Butler sent a reconnaissance over Amchitka and more air strikes against Attu and Kiska. These runs led to the sinking of the freighter Montreal Maru off the Komandorski islands, hey I am from Montreal and the Kotohiro Maru off Attu.  Because of the nonstop pressure from the 11th air fleet, the Japanese were only able to pull off 8 resupply runs for Kiska and 4 for Attu between December 17th to January 30th. Basically it was similar to the situation on Guadalcanal, trying to stop the Japanese from receiving provisions. By the night of January 11th the weather continued to look bad, but as the storms slacked just a bit, Admiral McMorris decided to depart with the 2100 Engineer and army troops led by Brigadier General Lloyd Jones. It was a risk to be sure, you could not trust any windows of decent weather to be open for very long. McMorris also ordered the destroyer Worden to take a detachment of Alaska Scouts led by Lt COlonel William Verback to hit Constantine harbor. The destroyer blasted through the surf at the harbor mouth shortly before dawn, successfully landing Verbeck's scouts. But as the Worden made her departure from the harbor mouth a brutal current smashed her onto a pinnacle rock, leaving her powerless. The destroyer Dewey was sent racing off to assist her, but the Worden would capsize and kill 14 of her crew before the rescue could be made. Like I said, mother nature was taking a heavier toll than the Japanese. Verbecks scouts did a full reconnaissance of the island finding no Japanese forces, so the rest of the convoy came in. They came ashore the same way they had come ashore at Adak, wading through icy surf. They were soaked with ice water and oil. It was miserable, but Amchitka was quickly secured. The American engineers went to work immediately to construct the new airfield. They would have 12 days before a Japanese aircraft emerged to the scene, it was a floatplane which reported their presence back to Kiska. The men made good use of the 12 days and it was the same story as what occurred on Adak before. Men toiling without rest in winter rain and wind, in the bitter cold surf of Constantine harbor, wading through black Aleutian mud, climbing over rocks and heavy tundra. They unloaded, carried ashore, stored and protected their arms, ammunition, food, fuel and other equipment, even the smallest of kindling. Her in the Aleutians, the soldiers bodily needs were more than that in a place like the south pacific, I can assure you I live in a place where we get the nasty combination of ice rain and snow, its not fun to be out in that. The Japanese commanders were shocked by the unexpected occupation of Amchitka which lay only 50 miles from their main base at Kiska. The Japanese began their own series of air strikes against Amchitka hoping to hinder the construction of the airfield. They knew if the American completed an airfield the already relentiles air attacks would increase. The Japanese air raids caused considerable damage over the course of the following days, but the american engineers performed miracles and managed to complete the Amchitka runway by the end of January, allowing a P-40 squadron to be landed on January 28th. After this the Japanese bombing missions became more sporadic until February 18th when they ceased. Just like the Americans, mother nature was just as cruel to the Japanese and they simply could not spare anymore aircraft bombing Amchitka, they had to have a reserve to defend themselves. Now additional air forces were joining the daily raids against Kiska using Amchitka as a launch pad. The Japanese were being whittled down slowly but surely in the north. Yet we need to leave the north and head back south to the Solomons. After the epic conclusion of the Guadalcanal campaign, culminating with the success of Operation KE, the Japanese Empire now had to switch to the defensive. During Operation KE, on February the 1st, the Americans received a cascade of sighting reports from coastwatchers and scouting aircraft. Some 20 Japanese destroyers had headed down the slot and a small Japanese infantry force was landed in the Russell Islands. Likewise allied flights over the Japanese held anchorage off Buin noted a sharp increase in the number of ships. Now the third run of Operation KE took place on the night of February 7th and lifted 1796 men off Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands. This prompted Admirals Nimitz and Halsey to commence their campaign to move up the solomons and thwart any Japanese incursions moving down them. In January they wanted to hit the Japanese base at Munda, but lacked the necessary forces for such an operation. One place in the solomons they could perform an operation against was the Russell Islands to the southeast. Admiral Halsey decided it would be advantageous to seize the Russell Islands and develop them while preventing their use to the Japanese. Thus operation Cleanslate was born. The idea behind it was simple, take the island away from Japanese use, further limited the Japanese operational capacity in the solomons and the Russell Islands could be used as a launching pad to hit other places like New Georgia. As Air Force historian Kramer Rohfleisch put it “for allied operations worked in such a way, that each fresh base became a successive cancer in the structure of the enemy's defense lines, sending out its tentacles and relentlessly destroying the equipment and personnel opposing it”. Operation Cleanslate was to be the first step in the conquest of the central and northern solomon islands, all to culminate with the final drive against the stronghold of Rabaul. By the end of January Halsey received permission from Nimitz to proceed with the invasion. The americans would dispatch an infantry battalion and anti-aircraft units from Guadalcanal into 2 destroyers to occupy the Russell Islands. Likewise the Japanese quickly beat them to the punch by landing around 400 troops as indicated by their aerial reconnaissance. As we know however, this was not a reinforcement of the island, but a part of Operation KE. The 17th army sought to use the Russell islands as a backup extraction point if the destroyers failed to get the men off Guadalcanal. Halsey was forced to postpone Operation Cleanslate, believing the Japanese were going to put up a large fight for the Russell Islands. In early february the Americans still were unaware the Japanese had evacuated Guadalcanal, but Hasley finally kicked off Operation Cleanslate regardless on the 7th. The 103rd and 169th regiments of Major General John Hester along with the 3rd marine raider battalion, anti aircraft units from the 10th and 11th marine defense battalions and ACORN 3: a naval engineering force of the 35th naval construction battalion.  Admiral Turner was given command of the operations with his task force 64 consisting of 8 destroyers, 5 minesweepers, 12 tank landing craft and a number of barges and torpedo boats. He was going to receive assistance from Admiral Fitch's land based aircraft to cover the transports and 2 other task forces. Task force 18 led by Admiral Giffen consisting of heavy cruisers Wichita, Louisville and 3 destroyers and Task force 68 led by Rear Admiral Aaron Merrill consisting of light cruisers Montpelier, Cleveland, Denver, Columbia and 4 destroyers. The other task forces would be in close proximity just in case things got dicey. Of course unbeknownst to the Americans the Japanese had evacuated the Russell Islands by the 10th closing off Operation KE. Australians and New Zealand coastwatcher alongside US army, marine and naval air reconnaissance saw a ton of abandoned equipment on the Russell Islands, which Halsey ignored as he was deadset to carry out Operation Cleanslate as planned, fearing the enemy might try to reinforce the islands still. On February the 20th the first echelon of the Russells Occupation force departed Guadalcanal under strict radio silence. It was an uneventful trip and the transports were divided into 3 groups to hit their landing sites. The 10rd regiment landed on Banika easily taking control over the island. The 3rd marine raider battalion did the same at Pavuvu. The landings went unopposed, but the Marines quickly found out that the 10 man rubber rafts used for their landings had motor issues. Alongside this the 169th field artillery battalion somehow managed to get lost and took over 19 hours to land instead of 2, but by the end of the day the islands were firmly in American hands. The men began digging themselves into defensive positions. As soon as reports came in that the islands were secure, Halsey began pouring Seabees into the islands and supplied their 2 new fighter strips with lavish amounts of ammunition and aviation fuel in anticipation of expanding the air operations in the central solomons. But the Russell Islands were at the absolute limit of Hasleys designated border, technically they were over that border. No more westward progress could occur without good old General MacArthurs blessing. So the men simply set to work, and by the end of hte month over 9000 soldiers were in the Russells and the construction of a new airbase was occurring in Banika and a torpedo boat base at Wernham Cove. Upon learning of the American seizure of the Russells, the Japanese launched a surprise air strike. 12 Vals and 25 zeros struck the unfinished airfield and torpedo boat base on March 6th without any warning. They caused little damage, but would just be the beginning of a 3 month long campaign of night air attacks. By late may the airfield at Banika alongside the torpedo boat base, a training center and staging area for the future operation against new georgia. Operation Cleanslate may have been lackluster when it came to combat, but acted as a great practice run for what was to be the future of island hoping warfare in the solomons. The landing craft tank veterans of operation cleanslate would help teach others, increasing Americans amphibious capabilities. The American also learned a very valuable lesson when it came to loading and landing operations. They had certainly come a long way from the earlier experience of operation Watchtower. Now back to the issue of Hasley's operation stepping on the toes of MacArthur's area. Upon taking the Russell Islands, Halsey had his eyes on Munda Point, where there was a new Japanese fighter strip in New Georgia, around 120 miles to the west. The terrain looked suitable for a large bomber field, something highly desired. But MacArthur stood in the way, so they were going to have to talk. A face to face summit was made in early april, forcing Halsey to cross the Coral sea to present himself to the general at the AMP building in Brisbane. There was no reason to believe this was going to be a warm meeting. Halsey to this point had certainly not appreciated MacArthur's credit snatching communiques. In fact one aide to Halsey had referred to General MacArthur as quote “a self-advertising son of a bitch”. MacArthur had also declined an invitation from Admiral Nimitz to attend a command conference in Noumea in September of 1942, a slight insult if you were. He instead sent Sutherland and Kenney in his place to which one of Nimitz staff officers remarked “MacArthur found himself unable to be present”. When Halsey met MacArthur face to face, believe or not they instantly took a liking to another. Within just 5 minutes Halsey wrote “I felt as if we were lifelong friends. I have seldom seen a man who makes a quicker, stronger, more favorable impression. He was then 63 years old, but he could have passed as 50. His hair was jet black; his eyes were clear; his carriage was erect. If he had been wearing civilian clothes, I still would have known at once that he was a soldier”. MacArthur was equally impressed writing about Halsey  “He was of the same aggressive type as John Paul Jones, David Farragut, and George Dewey. His one thought was to close with the enemy and fight him to the death. . . . I liked him from the moment we met, and my respect and admiration increased with time.” In the year that followed the admiral and general would effectively coordinate their operations in the south pacific. As Kenney and Kinkaid had learned, and as Halsey was in turn, MacArthur was accustomed to deference but did not bristle at well reasoned opposition. MacArthur could yield to sound arguments. Of course heated arguments occurred between the two men. Halsey's long term chief of staff, Robert Carney witnessed one in 1943 where he said “The admiral, with his “chin sticking out a foot,” told MacArthur that he was placing his “personal honor . . . before the security of the United States and the outcome of the war!” MacArthur responded “Bull, that's a terrible indictment. That's a terrible thing to say. But, I think in my preoccupation, I've forgotten some things. . . . You can go on back now. The commitment will be met.” Imagine that, MacArthur almost admitting a mistake, that goes to show the character of Halsey. What they were arguing about was Hasley proposing to attack New Georgia and it turned out to be inline with MacArthurs thinking. MacArthur approved the operation on the spot and it would intersect with his own plans for an offensive up the north coast of New Guinea.  Because of the seizure of the Russell Island's, D-Day for the invasion of New Georgia would be originally set for May 15th, but would get postponed to June 30th. However that is far into the future for us!   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Amchitka and the Russell Islands were taken unopposed and with relative ease. The Americans were being cautious in their actions, but little by little they were breaking down Japan's new defensive posture, a few islands down and many more to come.

Last time we spoke about the successful execution of operation KE and the battle of Wau. Operation KE was a success and the Japanese had managed to evacuate 10652 men. Simultaneously while Operation KE was going on, the Japanese had refocused on New Guinea and sought to secure their important bases at Lae and Salamaua. In order to secure them the Japanese commenced a new offensive, this time aimed at Wau which held a significant airfield that could be used to threaten Lae and Salamaua. The Japanese managed to land significant forces to hit Wau, but the Australians tenaciously held them back long enough to get reinforcements to Wau to push the Japanese back. The Japanese offensive turned into a catastrophic failure, yet despite being pushed back the Japanese would regroup and plan another offensive to take Wau. But for today we are diving back into the CBI theater. This episode is the First Chindits Expedition: Operation Longcloth  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    The story of Operation Longcloth and the actions that will take place in Burma require us to talk about some notable figures, one who is to put it frankly, a very bizarre but fascinating man. Orde Wingate was born into a military family in February of 1903, his father was a religious fundamentalist who became a member of the Plymouth Brethren. Wingate and his 6 siblings experienced a very repressed childhood and were kept away from other children for fear of spiritual contamination and would endure a regime of religious mania spending entire days reading and memorizing the Old Testament. For Orde, the religious indoctrination was accompanied by a spirit-shrinking spartan regime, something like a secular boot camp. When his family moved to Godalming, in 1916, Orde was sent to a Charterhouse school. He was very much an outsider there and did not mix with the other children nor participated in any sports. Then in 1921 he was accepted into the Royal Military academy at Woolwich, training as an officer in the Royal Artillery. At this point he suffered a salient trauma, Wingate began breaking all the rules and underwent a ritual known as “running”. The other military students summoned Wingate from his room, stripped him naked and had him run between lines of senior students who whacked him with knotted towels before he was tossed into a tank of icy water, it was the good old running the gauntlet. Wingate would stare the other boys right in the eyes and define them to do their worst to him. Many were intimidated by this and ceased hitting him as a result. Then Wingate would toss himself into the icy water tank. Wingate had thus shown himself to be a student of note at an early age.  By 1923 Wingate received his commission as a gunnery officer and a post at Salisbury Plain where he soon gained a reputation for being a skilled horseman and particularly good at the fox hunt.  But many who knew of him described him to have a dark side, yet again he always broke the rules and conventions. This became more of an issue by 1926 when he took a post at the military school of Equitation where he became very alienated by his peers and superiors by his arrogant insubordination. But Wingate enjoyed a powerful patronage for at this point in his life his fathers first cousin, “Cousin Rex”, Sir Reginald Wingate, the former Governor-General of Sudan and High commissioner in Egypt took him under his wing. Wingate took leave and began studying Arabic at the London School of Oriental and African Studies and then served in Sudan and Ethiopia. He also carried on a 5 year affair with a woman named Enid Peggy Jelley, to whom he got secretly engaged. But after 6 years after boarding the liner Cathay at Port Said, returning for his marriage to Peggy, he fell in love with a 16 year old girl named Lorna Paterson who was traveling home from Australia. As soon as he got home to Peggy he notified her he was in love with another.    Wingate married Lorna in 1935, a woman 13 years younger. In 1936 Wingate became an intelligence officer with the British Mandate in Palestine and almost immediately became an ardent Zionist, though he was not himself Jewish. Palestine at this time had an enormous Jewish population since the end of the first world war and a large influx of those fleeing Nazi Germany in the 1930s. The Arab population saw them as a future threat and guerilla groups sprang up. Archibald Wavell the newly arrived commander in chief in Palestine had Wingate form the Special Night Squads (SNS) to combat Arab terrorism. Wingate was an early proponent of using paramilitary actions at night to induce a unique and singular terror in his enemies. He got the SNS to use slavering dogs, a very calculated piece of cruelty since the animals were regarded as unclean by Muslims. The SNS were basically legitimizing Zionist counterterrorism, using Jewish thugs to strike back at Arab thugs.  Wingate performed war crimes and horrible atrocities while leading the SNS and was recalled. This should have been the end to his career, but Wavell and Sir Edmund Ironside kept making up excuses to cover for criticisms against him. These two men managed to get Wingate back into the game by 1941 where he was brought over to Ethiopia to help fight against the Italians. Backed by Wavell, he attempted another go at the SNS, this time named the Gideon Force, a band of irregulars made up of British, Sudanese, Ethiopians and some ex SNS. Wingates force proved spectacularly successful and this time with no controversy. But still because of his tactlessness and insubordination, Wingate ended up getting whisked out of Ethiopia at the end of hostilities.  Wingate found himself in Cairo in a major depression, he tried to kill himself with a Ethiopian knife but was saved by a man who drove him to the hospital. There is considerable evidence to suggest Wingate was bipolar and had experienced an acute episode of downswing for his manic-depression. Wingates enemies and critiques were delighted at the news of his downfall and hoped he would be court-martialed and tossed into an asylum, but Wingates backers prompted him up yet again. His suicide attempt was attributed to delirium induced by malaria, but as Churchill's personal physician Lord Moran would write in his diary about Wingate ‘Wingate seemed to be hardly sane . . . in medical jargon a borderline case.'  Wingate was certainly a bizarre person, he was also an exhibitionist and extremely eccentric as many sources put it. He was careless in dress, always unkempt, had zero respect for military convention and hierarchy and expected his superiors to satisfy his every whim. When General Auchinlack succeeded Wavell as commander in chief in the middle east he met Wingate who came to his office in shorts, with a dirty solar topi and a greasy blue jacket. Wingate loved to go around camps naked, often appearing out of a shower nude to bark orders at other men. He liked to wear an alarm clock around his wrist that would go off on odd occasions for no particular reason that anyone could figure out. He was rarely seen with his trademark Wolseley helmet and fly whisk. He carried on a string around his neck a raw onion which he occasional snacked upon, cant make that one up people. He had a lot of food fads which he imposed upon his subordinates, such as vegetarianism. He rarely changed his clothes and thought doing laundry was unnecessary.  Wingate went through a limbo period until 1942 where Wavell asked for his services to help in South-East Asia. Originally Wingate was told he would be training Chiang kai-sheks forces guerrilla warfare and he was quite unenthusiastic for 2 reasons. 1) such an endeavor he deemed to be like teaching one's grandmother to suck eggs. 2) he wondered what the point was of sending a Middle East expert to the CBI theater? Yet as of February the 27th Wingate found himself departing to be the liberator of Delhi with the rank of major. It would take 3 weeks for him to get over to Wavell and by that time Rangoon had fallen. Wavell told him that his job had thus changed, now he would be in charge of all guerilla operations against the Japanese within Burma.Wingate was sent to Maymyo east of Mandalay to take over the Bush Warfare School being run by another colorful character named Michael Mad Mike Calvert. Calvert was coming back to Maymyo, returning from a failed operation and found Wingate sitting at his desk. Calvert glared at him and asked who he was and calmly Wingate simply stated his name. And would you know it, they got on perfectly fine and even became friends. The two men both decided their first task should be to go down to see Slim at Prome. Slim had met Wingate back in East Africa in 1940, both men serving under Wavell against the Italians. Upon discussing the matters of organized guerilla groups, Slim agreed to some of Wingates ideas but doubted his Ethiopian experience would be relevant for the task. As Slim was becoming very aware, jungle warfare in Burma was a special type of beast. Wingate was very impressed by Slim and said of the man ‘There is only one soldier worthy of the name East of Suez. He is a bad-tempered little terrier by the name of Slim.' When Chiang Kai-shek was departing back to China after a visit in March, Wingate managed to take a seat on the plan alongside him, hoping to learn about warfare in Burma from the generalissimo. However their aircraft was chased by Japanese fighters, ruining times for conversation. Wingate was informed at Chongqing that he would not be receiving Chinese fighters for his programs as they were now going to Stillwell as a result of the catastrophe in Burma. When he returned to Burma he was informed by Calvert they had sent 100 Bush warfare people into the Irrawaddy and only 11 survived, things were chaotic to say the least. Wingate then took Calvert for a week long car tour of the Burmese frontier making careful notes of animals, insects, reptiles, and terrain details. In Delhi on april 24th, Wingate announced he no longer had any interest on training a guerrilla group, but instead wanted to create a more proactive long-range penetration (LRP0 group. He had 3 major motifs for this, 1) the Japanese troops behind the lines had to be inferior to those as the front, thus the British should get behind. 2) They needed to use communications based on radio and supplied by air. 3) They had to cut the Japanese supply lines and destroy their arms dumps, thus typing up disproportionate numbers of the enemy. He continuously made his case to his superiors and many thought him nuts to think he could train men for jungle warfare in just 8 weeks time. But Wingate kept pushing for it, insisting also that all the men must be volunteers and that he needed at minimum 3000 men.  The finer points of his idea brought up the need to supply special units with airdrops, not a particularly new idea, but certainly a gung-ho one. His superiors wanted to outright reject his ideas, but Wavell yet again was championing his cause. Wingate won out the day and it was agreed to allocate men to his project. The 77th Indian brigade was formed and it was certainly a motley collection. The main British component was the 13th battalion of the King's liverpool regiment raised in Glasgow, Manchester and Liverpool in 1941. These were older, married men with no dreams of martial glory, typically employed in the coastal defense of Britain then suddenly shipped to India after the Japanese went supernova in the east. They displayed a lack of enthusiasm for Wingates ideas, many of them were also too old for jungle combat. Wingate rejected 250 of them off the bat and Wavell gave permission to fill the gaps with other units. The rest would come from two oriental units,the first being the 2nd battalion Burma rifles. These were mainly warriors from anti-Japanese hill tribes, the Kachins, Chins, Karens and such, those personally affected by Japans aggression and eager for payback. They were eager and better yet, they taught Wingate a lot about jungle warfare. The other were Gurkhas whom always held high regard amongst the British, though Wingate thought them arrogant, ill-disciplined and overrated. I find that truly bizarre, because all literature i have ever read about Gurkha's troops has been nothing, but praise and something out of a Rambo film. One historian of the Gurkhas said of Wingate ‘Wingate was the only officer in 130 years of service ever to criticise the performance of Gurkha soldiers, characterising them as mentally unsuited for their role as Chindits. Of course the same might be said of Wingate.' Likewise the Gurkhas found Wingate arrogant, overly domineering and someone who paid little heed to them who had vastly more experience fighting in Burma. They also really did not like him because of his rude and autocratic treatment of them.  Wingate divided his force into 8 columns each commanded by a major and each given 15 horses and 100 mules. The columns would be sustained by airdrops, thus an RAF signaling section was attached to each. They trained in the central provinces of India and in the Saugur jungle due south of Gwalior. Within the jungle training the idea was to hit the men with every possible scenario they might face, to push them to the absolute limit. They endured hell. Encounters with giant snakes, mosquitoes, leeches, days filled with half rations deliberately to simulate living off airdrops. Men collapsed from heat, marching with full packs through vegetation. When the monsoons hit, they were marching through mud, rivers and torrential rain. Many days began at 6am with half an hours bayonet drill, followed by unarmed combat. After breakfast they learnt woodcraft, map reading, compass reading, how to forage and distinguish poisonous plants. They learnt how to blow up bridges, lay ambushes, how to storm airfields, how to properly clear paths in jungles, it was grueling.  From the beginning of the training programme there were sickness levels allegedly as high as 70%. Wingate was ruthless, in the case of those saying they were suffering from dysentery, he ordered his officers into the bathrooms to inspect the mens stools to prove if they were lying. Amongst many of his enemies, the Medical Corps would be a large one. Wingate continued to alienate himself and made more and more enemies. At one point Wingate misunderstood the Burmese word for Lion “chinthe” as Chindit and declared it to be the name of his LRP group henceforth, thus they became known as the Chindits. His Burmese aide, Sao Man Hpa told him the word made no sense in Burmese, to which Wingate told the man Chinthe made no sense in English.  Wingate defeated the 70 percent rate of illness, bringing down to a 3 percent, via brutal methodology, most genuinely ill men simply carried on too afraid to be punished. Wingates eccentric qualities spread amongst the men, like his necessity to wear shorts in the rain, to eat raw onions, and to keep a bunch of buffalo to milk because he believed their milk had salubrious qualities. Wingate should have been sacked at countless times, but the rubicon had been crossed and he was expected to lead his men by 1943. By December of 1942, the Chindits and Wingate were ready for action. They had been trained to carry 70 pounds on a march, were equipped with tropical uniform: army bots, mosquito nets, mess tins, sterilizing kits, each man had a rifle or Bren gun plus 50 rounds of .303 ammunition and 6 days worth of rations. The rations were 12 wholemeal biscuits, 2 ounces of nuts and raisins, 2 ounces of cheese, 4 ounces of dates, 2 ounces of chocolate, 20 cigarettes (which greatly annoyed Wingate as he deemed smoking a major hinderance), tea, sugar, powdered milk, salt and vitamin C tablets. The mules of his forces carried 3 inch mortars, ammunition, wireless radio sets and batteries. His force of 8000 were divided into 8 columns of around 400 men each: consisting of 3 rifle platoons, a support platoon with 2-3 inch mortars, 2 Vickers medium machine guns, a mule transport platoon and an RAF air liaison detachment. In addition he had 10 platoons for reconnaissance, scouting and sabotage operations. Now originally Wingates force was supposed to be part of a 3 pronged offensive, utilizing conventional British forces attacking Akyab and the ARakan while the Ledo and Yunnan forces led by Stilwell would secure northern Burma and reopen the land route to China. As we all know during this series, Burma was a colossal mess. Originally 4 Corps would assault Sitang and Kalewa while 15 Corps attacked Akyab and Arakan, but shortages in labour, transport and lack of skilled hands led to the cancellation of the major project. Even worse, Chiang Kai-Shek, greatly pissed off by the decisions made during the Casablanca conference, refused to sanction a Chinese expedition from Yunnan. With all hopes for the great 1943 offensive dashed, Wavell had to consider whether the Chindits were even relevant anymore. Wavell arrived to Wingates HQ on February 7th after countlessly telling the man things were simply postponed. In a 2 hour meeting Wingate fought bitterly to send his men into the fray, but Wavell stated he could not be party to the pointless waste of lives. Wingate made multiple arguments for sending his boys in, 1) cancellation would boost defeatism in the Indian army: 2) it was essential for the British to overcome their current ignorance of Japanese jungle fighting: 3) Fort Hertz, the remaining British outpost in Burma was in desperate need of relief: 4) without a Chindit crossing, the Japanese would dominate the jungle on either side of the Chindwin river: 5) the 77th brigade was not pitch perfect and any delay would be catastrophic to morale: 6) An attack by the 77th brigade would impair and set back Japanese preparations for an offensive. Wavell apparently impressed by Wingates enthusiasm agreed to let the Chindits have their day. The Chindits were not directed south-east to help with the Arakan operation, instead their assignments were to be to cut two railways, one between Myitkyina and Mandalay in northern Burma and the other, the Mandalay-Lashio line. The codename of the operation was Longcloth, which annoyed Wingate because it held no grandiloquence he sought.  In early february the 7 Chindit columns marched south east from Imphal to Moreh on the Assam/Burma border. Once across the border they split into 2 groups, the southern group consisting of columns 1 and 2, around 1000 men and 250 mules which was a feint to throw off the Japanese and the Northern group consisting of columns 3,4,5,7 and 8, around 2000 men and 850 mules who would destroy the railways. Small patrols were sent across the Chindwin marching some 30 miles into enemy territory and coming back without any incident, however doing that with 3000 men was another matter entirely. On February 13th, an advance party of the Northern group crossed at Tonhe around 50 miles north to act as a a doubled bluff to cover for the southern groups feint. Meanwhile a disinformation party with the southern group marched south and ordered a huge quantity of supplies from a village known to be aiding the Japanese, providing a great ruse. The second wave of 2000 men from the Northern group crossed the Chindwin unopposed on the 14th.  Crossing the Chindwin was not easy, while elephants and bullocks swam across with ease, the pack mules proved very skittish, most likely fearing crocodiles. Getting them to the far bank was a nightmare. The southern group also had its problems with their mule. They had the first task of ambushing a 250 strong Japanese garrison at Maingnyaung on the 18th, but ran into a skirmish with a Japanese patrol before they made it there. The enemy was thus alerted and bombarded them with mortars, this spooked the mules and the caused a stampede. Many mules were lost in the jungle, the element of surprise with it and the fiasco cost the southern group a delay of 3 days. The southern group slowly pulled away from the hill country east of the Chindwin, making for the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway. By the night of the 3rd of March they were ambushed in the Mu valley. It was a utter disaster. Radios, ciphers and most of their equipment were lost. Column 2 was almost annihilated, column 1 limped on to the banks of the Irrawady awaiting final orders from Wingate, who instead kept blaming their commander, Major Burnett. As for column 2 he said “the disaster to No. 2 Column, was easily avoidable and would never have taken place had the commander concerned understood the doctrines of penetration”.  Meanwhile Wingate and the Northern group rendezvoused 5 miles inland from the Chindwin and received their parachute drops. Wingate then pondered his options, he could make for Tonmakeng where intelligence reported no enemy presence and wait for the next supply drop and attack the 200 strong Japanese garrison at Sinlamaung or they could bypass it and head into the Mu valley. He kept the men marching and some of his scouts reported a Japanese garrison was at a gold mining village called Metkalet 15 miles east of the Chindwin near Tonmakeng. He ordered columns 3 and 5 under Calvert and Fergusson to attack at once. Then another disaster struck. Fergusson's column got stuck in a swamp and scouts returned again with a new report that no Japanese garrison was in Matkalet after all. So Wingate and Calvert directed the columns to Tonmakeng. Wingates thinking was it was better to strike at an enemy strength he knew, rather than the Mu valley which was an unknown. They reached Tonmakeng without further incident by february 22nd and learnt a Japanese garrison was at Sinlamaung, 10 miles away so WIngate dispatched 3 columns to attack it while the rest of the men waiting for a supply drop expected 3 days away. Disaster struck. The 3 columns were unable to locate Sinlamaung after 3 days and when they finally found it on the 25th, the Japanese garrison had just pulled out. Wingate met with his officers and they decided to march to Zibyutaungdan with Calverts column 3 in the lead. On March 1st they made it to Zibyutaungdan and then proceeded to descend into the Mu Valley. Wingate then ordered the Northern group to disperse into its columns and rendezvous later at the Irrawaddy or beyond. He also dispatched an advance party across the Irrawaddy to the Kachin highlands northeast of Mandalay to try and raise a guerrilla force among the pro-british people there.  By the night of March 3rd disaster struck. At the very same time the southern group was being ambushed, column 4 walked into an ambush, 2 miles west of Pinbon. Major R.B Bromhead, a descendant of the Bromhead famous for fighting the Zulu at Rorke's drift in 1879, did his best to get his panicked mules with their Gurkha handlers to disperse and regroup at a rendezvous point hoping to get help from columns 7 and 8, but while trying to do so, the men were attacked again and by the time they reached the rallying point columns 7 and 8 had moved on. With no food or radios and just a handful of mules left, the column had no choice but to retreat back to India. Within a days time, columns 2 and 4 were broken and on their way back to India. Wingate was livid, his credibility was at stake, but fortunately for him and his men the Japanese assumed when they whipped out Column 2 they had destroyed the entire invasion effort. By March 6th, Calvert and Fergussons columns were within striking distance of the Wuntho-Indaw railway. Calvert and Fergusson hatched a bold and daring plan to assault what was a 800 strong garrison at Pinlebu. They spoke with Major Walter Scott leading Column 8 and told him to attack Punlebu while they supervised a massive supply drop north-east of the town. The idea was that the attackers and supply collectors would support another. Doing so they would set up roadblocks to the north and east of Pinlebu and call upon the RAF to bombard the town, making the Japanese believe they were facing a huge force. The attack turned into an amazing success. The Japanese were quickly confused as Calvert and Fergusson had the railway line demolished. It was a bloody fight, but the line was blown up in several places. The Japanese counterattacked in force trying to stop the demolition. Calverts men also mined 2 railway bridges, one of them a 3-span 120 footer. In the bloody mayhem, Calvert and Fergussons men killed about a third of the Pinlebu defenders and cut railway lines in 70 separate places. During the evening Fergussons column no 5 blew up the 40 foot rail bridge at Bongyaung gorge, leading also to hundreds of rock and rubble going over railway lines around the gorge. Now 10 mites north of Wuntho, Wingate established his HQ in the Babwe Taung hills. He had a tough decision to make, should he retreat back to India or press further and cross the Irrawaddy? Wingate even considered turning his HQ into a new fort like Fort Hertz, to try and push the Japanese to give up the Irrawaddy towns. Wingate as you probably have guessed went with option number 2, despite how unbelievably dangerous it was. The Japanese were hard on their tail as the Chindits made their way trying to cross the Irrawady river. This is where I have to leave our story of the Chindits, but they will come back throughout the war.  We need to make a small detour to speak about the Casablanca conference that took place from January 14 to the 24th. Chiang Kai-Shek had been begging the Americans and British for more aid. FDR told Chiang Kai-shek he would champion his demands to Churchill at the Casablanca Conference, but Churchill brushed this all aside. The conference ended with two large decisions, the first being the controversial doctrine of unconditional surrender. The allies were now confident after the success of operation Torch, the victories at Alamein and at Stalingrad that the Germans were on the run. But over in southeast asia, the Japanese looked impregnable. Thus the 2nd decision made was basically to keep the Europe First course steaming ahead, the Pacific was simply second banana. But for America, the situation in the Pacific had distinctly changed, they had won the initiative and now sought to consolidate their conquests in the east. Admiral King applied considerable pressure to the matter, in private he began urging that if the Pacific did not get 30% of allied resource quote “it would necessitate the US regretfully withdrawing from the commitments in the European theater”. Admiral King wanted to continue the momentum in the Pacific by seizing the Solomones, the eastern New Guinea-Rabaul area, capture back Kiska and the Attu islands in the Aleutians begin operations in the Gilberts, Marshalls, Carolines, take Truk and extend the occupation of New Guinea to the Dutch borders. The British opposed this as they continued to argue the best course was to defeat Germany first then devote all resources against Japan. Now as for the CBI theater, plans were continuing for Operation Anakim and the Burma offensive, but the British were not looking to extend their commitments in the theater very much. They argued that the depleted condition of the eastern fleet prevented them from carrying on a naval supremacy campaign in the Bay of Bengal, and this led Chiang Kai-shek to refuse to support an offensive through northern burma, because of the lack of British naval forces at hand. Thus operation Anakim looked like it was only going to get off in late 1943. For all the failures of the conference, FDR did try to remedy the situation as best as he could with their Chinese allies. FDR made it known he wanted to treat China as a great power that the allies would help build up for the current war and postwar. He also acknowledged the dramatic need to keep supply routes to China open. Stilwell advised 5000 tons of supplies be sent over the Hump per month as a goal to hit by February of 1943, this would require 140 aircraft during good weather and 300 aircraft during monsoon seasons. But Washington at this time could only spare 75 aircraft, another disappointment to Chiang Kai-shek. Another important side aspect to the Casablanca conference was brought forward by Generals Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud who were vying to become recognized partners to the allies with their Free French Forces. Until this point, the Japanese had a pretty awkward relationship with their technical ally, Vichy France. This awkward situation led them to simply ignore the Free French forces and by proxy they decided to not touch the French concession of Guangzhouwan which had declared itself part of Free France. French Indochina of course was fully invaded prior to 1941 and remained under nominal Vichy French control, but Guangzhouwan was beginning to stick out like a sore thumb. Chiang Kai-shek recognized Free France's authority over Guangzhouwan and many Chinese forces of the 4th Area Army led by General Zhang Fukui fled into the concession to escape the Japanese. This drew Tokyo's attention and they finally decided to put an end to the Free French presence in China. The 23rd army of General Sakai lent 2 battalions of the 23rd independent mixed brigade from Hong Kong to go over to the Luichow Peninsula. They landed at the village of Peichatsun on February 17th and began skirmishing with some Chinese defenders. They soon overwhelmed the defenders and seized the towns of Hsinlaitsun and Haikang, forcing the Chinese to withdraw towards Suichi. From there the Japanese continued north, seizing Suichi and Chihkan. After these seizures, the Japanese had fully encircled the French concession of Guangzhouwan. The Japanese and representatives of Guangzhouwan soon fell into negotiations and the Free French were forced to declare the concession an open city, allowing the Japanese to occupy it without a fight.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The eccentric or better said madman Wingate got his wish to send the Chindits into the fray, despite just about no one other than Wavell wanting him to do so. With Onions wrapped around their necks they made their first strike against a Japanese railway and it was a surprising mixed success. 

Last time we spoke about the First Arakan Campaign. General Slim and Lt General Irwin Noel were beginning to have a budding bromance, but Noel simply wanted to see other people and it led to disaster. All jokes aside, Noels attempts to keep Slim away from military campaign seems to have really hurt the war effort in the CBI theater. Slims men and the Chinese forces who came to India received terrible treatment from their comrades and on top of this a political crisis was brewing in India. Noel's operation sent men to Foul Point where they got a taste of Japanese bunker defenses. Rather ironically Wavell compared the failure at Foul Point to the fierce battle fought by the Australians and Americans over in Buna-Gona stating“It seems quite clear that we are facing a form of ‘Buna' and ‘Gona.' And today we will be returning to Green Hell and Starvation island.

When Svechen and Hamley were writing about the operational level of war, it is doubtful they envisaged the number of staff and headquarters that would result from their musings. Their reason to exist is often purported to be scale, complexity, or pace in war today but this might all be just hype from academics and their acolytes. Remove the operational level staffs and processes, says Wilf Owen, and militaries can become leaner, smarter and less bureaucratic. He might just have a point.

Overview of the REC Conference (Speakers are named in the audio)Long-term effects of strength training: research and findingsGood to Go: What the Athlete in All of Us Can Learn from the Strange Science of Recovery by Christine AschwandenRecovery as a businessDoes more recovery work = the ability to train more?Top recovery methodsHow to use social mediaYour brand as a businessTime-efficient strategies for trainingMulti-joint vs. single-joint exercises of hypertrophyThe minimum effective dose for increases in strengthProtein around a workout and how beneficial is supplementing proteinTraining to failure and hypertrophy gainsHormone hypothesisThe role of effort with supervision in resistance training: failure vs. non-failureReview on variations of exerciseMentioned article: Does Lifting Boost Testosterone – at T-NationThe Flex Diet Podcast is brought to you by the Flex Diet Certification. Go to https://flexdiet.com/ for 8 interventions on nutrition and recovery. The course will open again in June 2022.Speaker InformationDr James FisherDr Brad Broenfeld (Schoenfeld)Dr Stu PhillipsDr James SteeleAndrew CoatesKristin Rowell Luke CarlsonDiscover Strength Dr PakChristie AschwandenSelected ReferencesAndroulakis-Korakakis, P., Michalopoulos, N., Fisher, J. P., Keogh, J., Loenneke, J. P., Helms, E., . . . Steele, J. (2021). The Minimum Effective Training Dose Required for 1RM Strength in Powerlifters. Front Sports Act Living, 3, 713655. doi:10.3389/fspor.2021.713655Angleri, V., Damas, F., Phillips, S. M., Selistre-de-Araujo, H. S., Cornachione, A. S., Stotzer, U. S., . . . Libardi, C. A. (2022). Resistance training variable manipulations are less relevant than intrinsic biology in affecting muscle fiber hypertrophy. Scand J Med Sci Sports, 32(5), 821-832. doi:10.1111/sms.14134Barbalho, M., Coswig, V. S., Steele, J., Fisher, J. P., Giessing, J., & Gentil, P. (2020). Evidence of a Ceiling Effect for Training Volume in Muscle Hypertrophy and Strength in Trained Men - Less is More? Int J Sports Physiol Perform, 15(2), 268-277. doi:10.1123/ijspp.2018-0914Behm, D. G., Alizadeh, S., Hadjizedah Anvar, S., Hanlon, C., Ramsay, E., Mahmoud, M. M. I., . . . Steele, J. (2021). Non-local Muscle Fatigue Effects on Muscle Strength, Power, and Endurance in Healthy Individuals: A Systematic Review with Meta-analysis. Sports Med, 51(9), 1893-1907. doi:10.1007/s40279-021-01456-3Burd, N. A., Mitchell, C. J., Churchward-Venne, T. A., & Phillips, S. M. (2012). Bigger weights may not beget bigger muscles: evidence from acute muscle protein synthetic responses after resistance exercise. Appl Physiol Nutr Metab, 37(3), 551-554. doi:10.1139/h2012-022Burd, N. A., Moore, D. R., Mitchell, C. J., & Phillips, S. M. (2013). Big claims for big weights but with little evidence. Eur J Appl Physiol, 113(1), 267-268. doi:10.1007/s00421-012-2527-1Burd, N. A., West, D. W., Staples, A. W., Atherton, P. J., Baker, J. M., Moore, D. R., . . . Phillips, S. M. (2010). Low-load high volume resistance exercise stimulates muscle protein synthesis more than high-load low volume resistance exercise in young men. PLoS One, 5(8), e12033. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012033Carlson, L., Gschneidner, D., Steele, J., & Fisher, J. P. (2022). Short-term supervised virtual training maintains intensity of effort and represents an efficacious alternative to traditional studio-based, supervised strength training. Physiol Behav, 249, 113748. doi:10.1016/j.physbeh.2022.113748Farrow, J., Steele, J., Behm, D. G., Skivington, M., & Fisher, J. P. (2021). Lighter-Load Exercise Produces Greater Acute- and Prolonged-Fatigue in Exercised and Non-Exercised Limbs. Res Q Exerc Sport, 92(3), 369-379. doi:10.1080/02701367.2020.1734521Gomes, G. K., Franco, C. M., Nunes, P. R. P., & Orsatti, F. L. (2019). High-Frequency Resistance Training Is Not More Effective Than Low-Frequency Resistance Training in Increasing Muscle Mass and Strength in Well-Trained Men. J Strength Cond Res, 33 Suppl 1, S130-S139. doi:10.1519/JSC.0000000000002559Grgic, J., Lazinica, B., Mikulic, P., Krieger, J. W., & Schoenfeld, B. J. (2017). The effects of short versus long inter-set rest intervals in resistance training on measures of muscle hypertrophy: A systematic review. Eur J Sport Sci, 17(8), 983-993. doi:10.1080/17461391.2017.1340524Grgic, J., Schoenfeld, B. J., Davies, T. B., Lazinica, B., Krieger, J. W., & Pedisic, Z. (2018). Effect of Resistance Training Frequency on Gains in Muscular Strength: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. Sports Med, 48(5), 1207-1220. doi:10.1007/s40279-018-0872-xHenselmans, M., & Schoenfeld, B. J. (2014). The effect of inter-set rest intervals on resistance exercise-induced muscle hypertrophy. Sports Med, 44(12), 1635-1643. doi:10.1007/s40279-014-0228-0Iversen, V. M., Norum, M., Schoenfeld, B. J., & Fimland, M. S. (2021). No Time to Lift? Designing Time-Efficient Training Programs for Strength and Hypertrophy: A Narrative Review. Sports Med, 51(10), 2079-2095. doi:10.1007/s40279-021-01490-1Lim, C., Nunes, E. A., Currier, B. S., McLeod, J. C., Thomas, A. C. Q., & Phillips, S. M. (2022). An Evidence-based Narrative Review of Mechanisms of Resistance Exercise-induced Human Skeletal Muscle Hypertrophy. Med Sci Sports Exerc. doi:10.1249/MSS.0000000000002929McKendry, J., Stokes, T., McLeod, J. C., & Phillips, S. M. (2021). Resistance Exercise, Aging, Disuse, and Muscle Protein Metabolism. Compr Physiol, 11(3), 2249-2278. doi:10.1002/cphy.c200029Mitchell, C. J., Churchward-Venne, T. A., West, D. W., Burd, N. A., Breen, L., Baker, S. K., & Phillips, S. M. (2012). Resistance exercise load does not determine training-mediated hypertrophic gains in young men. J Appl Physiol (1985), 113(1), 71-77. doi:10.1152/japplphysiol.00307.2012Morton, R. W., Oikawa, S. Y., Wavell, C. G., Mazara, N., McGlory, C., Quadrilatero, J., . . . Phillips, S. M. (2016). Neither load nor systemic hormones determine resistance training-mediated hypertrophy or strength gains in resistance-trained young men. J Appl Physiol (1985), 121(1), 129-138. doi:10.1152/japplphysiol.00154.2016Morton, R. W., Sonne, M. W., Farias Zuniga, A., Mohammad, I. Y. Z., Jones, A., McGlory, C., . . . Phillips, S. M. (2019). Muscle fibre activation is unaffected by load and repetition duration when resistance exercise is performed to task failure. J Physiol, 597(17), 4601-4613. doi:10.1113/JP278056Nunes, E. A., Colenso-Semple, L., McKellar, S. R., Yau, T., Ali, M. U., Fitzpatrick-Lewis, D., . . . Phillips, S. M. (2022). Systematic review and meta-analysis of protein intake to support muscle mass and function in healthy adults. J Cachexia Sarcopenia Muscle, 13(2), 795-810. doi:10.1002/jcsm.12922Nunes, J. P., Schoenfeld, B. J., Nakamura, M., Ribeiro, A. S., Cunha, P. M., & Cyrino, E. S. (2020). Does stretch training induce muscle hypertrophy in humans? A review of the literature. Clin Physiol Funct Imaging, 40(3), 148-156. doi:10.1111/cpf.12622Phillips, S. M. (2014). A brief review of critical processes in exercise-induced muscular hypertrophy. Sports Med, 44 Suppl 1, S71-77. doi:10.1007/s40279-014-0152-3Phillips, S. M., & Van Loon, L. J. (2011). Dietary protein for athletes: from requirements to optimum adaptation. J Sports Sci, 29 Suppl 1, S29-38. doi:10.1080/02640414.2011.619204Santos, W., Vieira, C. A., Bottaro, M., Nunes, V. A., Ramirez-Campillo, R., Steele, J., . . . Gentil, P. (2021). Resistance Training Performed to Failure or Not to Failure Results in Similar Total Volume, but With Different Fatigue and Discomfort Levels. J Strength Cond Res, 35(5), 1372-1379. doi:10.1519/JSC.0000000000002915Saric, J., Lisica, D., Orlic, I., Grgic, J., Krieger, J. W., Vuk, S., & Schoenfeld, B. J. (2019). Resistance Training Frequencies of 3 and 6 Times Per Week Produce Similar Muscular Adaptations in Resistance-Trained Men. J Strength Cond Res, 33 Suppl 1, S122-S129. doi:10.1519/JSC.0000000000002909Schoenfeld, B. J. (2010). The mechanisms of muscle hypertrophy and their application to resistance training. J Strength Cond Res, 24(10), 2857-2872. doi:10.1519/JSC.0b013e3181e840f3Schoenfeld, B. J., Contreras, B., Krieger, J., Grgic, J., Delcastillo, K., Belliard, R., & Alto, A. (2019). Resistance Training Volume Enhances Muscle Hypertrophy but Not Strength in Trained Men. Med Sci Sports Exerc, 51(1), 94-103. doi:10.1249/MSS.0000000000001764Schoenfeld, B. J., Grgic, J., Contreras, B., Delcastillo, K., Alto, A., Haun, C., . . . Vigotsky, A. D. (2019). To Flex or Rest: Does Adding No-Load Isometric Actions to the Inter-Set Rest Period in Resistance Training Enhance Muscular Adaptations? A Randomized-Controlled Trial. Front Physiol, 10, 1571. doi:10.3389/fphys.2019.01571Schoenfeld, B. J., Grgic, J., & Krieger, J. (2019). How many times per week should a muscle be trained to maximize muscle hypertrophy? A systematic review and meta-analysis of studies examining the effects of resistance training frequency. J Sports Sci, 37(11), 1286-1295. doi:10.1080/02640414.2018.1555906Schoenfeld, B. J., Ogborn, D., & Krieger, J. W. (2017a). The dose-response relationship between resistance training volume and muscle hypertrophy: are there really still any doubts? J Sports Sci, 35(20), 1985-1987. doi:10.1080/02640414.2016.1243800Schoenfeld, B. J., Ogborn, D., & Krieger, J. W. (2017b). Dose-response relationship between weekly resistance training volume and increases in muscle mass: A systematic review and meta-analysis. J Sports Sci, 35(11), 1073-1082. doi:10.1080/02640414.2016.1210197Schoenfeld, B. J., Ogborn, D. I., & Krieger, J. W. (2015). Effect of repetition duration during resistance training on muscle hypertrophy: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Sports Med, 45(4), 577-585. doi:10.1007/s40279-015-0304-0Schoenfeld, B. J., Pope, Z. K., Benik, F. M., Hester, G. M., Sellers, J., Nooner, J. L., . . . Krieger, J. W. (2016). Longer Interset Rest Periods Enhance Muscle Strength and Hypertrophy in Resistance-Trained Men. J Strength Cond Res, 30(7), 1805-1812. doi:10.1519/JSC.0000000000001272Steele, J., Androulakis-Korakakis, P., Carlson, L., Williams, D., Phillips, S., Smith, D., . . . Fisher, J. P. (2021). The Impact of Coronavirus (COVID-19) Related Public-Health Measures on Training Behaviours of Individuals Previously Participating in Resistance Training: A Cross-Sectional Survey Study. Sports Med, 51(7), 1561-1580. doi:10.1007/s40279-021-01438-5West, D. W., Burd, N. A., Staples, A. W., & Phillips, S. M. (2010). Human exercise-mediated skeletal muscle hypertrophy is an intrinsic process. Int J Biochem Cell Biol, 42(9), 1371-1375. doi:10.1016/j.biocel.2010.05.012West, D. W., Burd, N. A., Tang, J. E., Moore, D. R., Staples, A. W., Holwerda, A. M., . . . Phillips, S. M. (2010). Elevations in ostensibly anabolic hormones with resistance exercise enhance neither training-induced muscle hypertrophy nor strength of the elbow flexors. J Appl Physiol (1985), 108(1), 60-67. doi:10.1152/japplphysiol.01147.2009West, D. W., Cotie, L. M., Mitchell, C. J., Churchward-Venne, T. A., MacDonald, M. J., & Phillips, S. M. (2013). Resistance exercise order does not determine postexercise delivery of testosterone, growth hormone, and IGF-1 to skeletal muscle. Appl Physiol Nutr Metab, 38(2), 220-226. doi:10.1139/apnm-2012-0397 

I denne episode kan vi præsentere historien om Wavell fortalt af de 3 founders Emil Lucas Degn Mortensen, Casper Hvilshøj Christiansen & Hjalmar Kærn. Wavell er et lydbrand der nu bruger alle sine kræfter på at levere produkter der skal gøre god lyd tilgængeligt for alle. Og bl.a. den idé købte de to løver Jan Lehrmann og Christian Arnstedt sig ind på. Meeen mon ikke også det var drivkraften og passionen, som de 3 unge iværksættere udstrålede, som løverne forelskede sig lidt i.For der skal ikke herske tvivl om, at Wavell går i mod store giganter og på det her tidspunkt stadig er i et meget tidligt stadie i virksomheden. Episoden er produceret af PodTribe Media og er bragt til dig i samarbejde med Relatel og Lunar. Din vært er Mark Anthony og podcasten er mixet og klippet sammen af Ugli Fruit Productions See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

World War One History: The Palestine Campaigns by AP Wavell (Preview) Chapter One Preview Starts 0:07:33 Chapter one of my next book release. The Palestine Campaigns by AP Wavell as well as a small introduction to the Field Marshal (then Colonel) himself. many thanks   Become a patron at Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/user?u=5191748

Join Okie Podcast as i have Wavell Starr on the show. In pro wrestling wavell is known as the first nation sensation, and is also the co owner of new initiative Kisik with reconciliation in sport. join us a we talk about wavell growing up in regina and how he started wrestling and all the work he has done throughout his life and what he's up to now. thank you for listening everyone. Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

It was a blast hanging out with Janelle during her Long Beach visit and hopefully first of many. We talk about launching her clothing line Stellari! We also talk music elitism, fashion, working at Riot Games, living in Japan and of course the world of conspiracy theories! Webs: https://stellari.com/ Twitter: thejanellemj Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/6rFQ0aTnPqi6k1PI2mkgHF?si=pdn_QMymQhGMJE7EBKidbw Apple: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/across-the-bar-with-c-los/id1542832088 Twitter: xxxClosxxx IG: thisisclos

When Mum suggested scuba diving they were all so excited! What could possibly go wrong?! When all the kids end up alone at sea who ends up saving the day? See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

On today's Defence Deconstructed Podcast, we feature a discussion with Brigadier Nicholas Orr about defence in the United Kingdom. Defence Deconstructed is part of the CGAI Podcast Network and today's episode is brought to you by the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries (CADSI). Subscribe to and rate the CGAI Podcast Network on your podcast app! Participant Bios: - Brigadier Nicholas Orr: The United Kingdom's Defence Advisor to Canada. Host Bio: 

- Dave Perry (host): Senior Analyst and Vice President with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Recommended Readings:
 - "Other Men's Flowers" by A.P. Wavell (https://www.amazon.ca/Other-Mens-Flowers-P-Wavell/dp/0224607502/) Related Links: 

- "An In-Service Support Opportunity" [CGAI Policy Perspective] by Ian Mack (https://www.cgai.ca/an_in_service_support_opportunity) Recording Date: 30 June 2020 Follow the Canadian Global Affairs Institute on Facebook, Twitter (@CAGlobalAffairs), or on Linkedin. Head over to our website at www.cgai.ca for more commentary. Produced by Jay Rankin. Music credits to Drew Phillips.

6-13-2020

Although the British are unprepared to defend Burma, Wavell believes that the Japanese may have extended themselves too far with this invasion. But it’s wishful thinking as the 3 most southern British airfields quickly fall. With the invaders coming ever closer to Rangoon, it’s up to the Flying Tigers and RAF pilots at Rangoon to give hope to the Allies. And these men will deliver impressive defeats to the Japanese Air Arm. But the Japanese and Thai ground troops are still getting closer to the Burmese capital, where the Lend Lease material is waiting. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Japanese determine that Burma must be occupied to protect their new possession of Malaya. It's up to Chiang Kai-Shek, American Gen. Joe Stilwell and British Gen. Wavell to stop them. The problem is the Allies don't trust each other, in regards to Burma's future. Churchill doesn't care about China right now, but FDR needs the massive country to stay in the fight. Or else the many Japanese divisions in China might be turned on Australia and the US General Staff have determined that Australia has to hold out, to serve as a base. From their Gen. Douglas MacArthur will plan his return to the Philippines. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Friends of Wavell Room take to the chat channels to hash out this whole warrior ethos thing. The post Wavell Chats: Warrior Ethos appeared first on Wavell Room.

La llegada de Erwin Rommel al norte de África supuso un duro varapalo para los británicos. El astuto comandante alemán inflingió contundentes derrotas al general Wavell, que fue destituido por orden del Primer Ministro británico Winston Churchill. El general Auchinleck tomó el relevo de Wavell al frente de las fuerzas británicas en el norte de África. Por otra parte, el Primer Ministro Churchill, consciente del gran talento militar de Rommel, decidió que era necesario eliminar al general alemán. Para ello, se preparó la Operación Flipper, un golpe de mano para secuestrar o asesinar a Rommel si no era posible su captura. Gracias al novelista y colaborador habitual de BHM, David López Cabia conoceremos en profundidad esta operación de comandos británicos tras las líneas enemigas que describe en su último libro “Sangre y Fuego en Tobruk”. Sin más dilación os invito a escuchar este programa y a echar un vistazo a los libros: https://bellumartishistoriamilitar.blogspot.com/2018/03/enigma-y-el-desastre-de-dieppe.html https://bellumartishistoriamilitar.blogspot.com/2018/03/indeseables-novela.html Créditos Musicales: - “Army of the Nile march” de Kenneth Alford - “Were gonna hang out the washing on the Siegfried line” de The Two Leslies No olvidéis suscribiros al canal, si aún no lo habéis hecho. Si queréis ayudarnos, dadle a “me gusta” (el corazón a la derecha de Ivoox) y también dejadnos comentarios. De esta forma ayudaréis a que los programas sean conocidos por más gente. Y compartidos con vuestros amigos y conocidos. ESTAMOS EN TODAS LAS REDES SOCIALES, BUSCANOS ¿Queréis contactar con nosotros? Puedes escribirnos a bellumartishistoriamilitar@gmail.com Nuestra página principal es: https://bellumartishistoriamilitar.blogspot.com

Despite a 3 to 1 advantage in men, Archibald Percival, GOC Malay, is pushed by Churchill and ABDACOM Commander Gen. Wavell to defy the Japanese in trying to take Singapore. Yet Gen. Yamashita will continue defying the odds with audacity and speed. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Bringing up the Australian 8th Infantry Division, it's hoped these fresh troops can stop the Japanese 25th Army from taking Johore and thus capturing all of the Malayan Peninsula. Yet Percival and Wavell are already thinking of abandoning the peninsula and focusing on the island of Singapore. Even then, Churchill wants the island fortress held until there is protracted fighting among the ruins of Singapore City. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

If you’ve ever read about the British experience in the Deserts of North Africa during WWII, one name usually gets a mention somewhere in the narrative, that of Eric Dorman-Smith, often refered to as ‘chink’. He can be a divisive character, sometimes portrayed as a far thinking military genius whose ideas were ignored or misunderstood. To others he represents what was problematic with both the senior British commanders Wavell and Auchinleck, whose fortunes rose and fell; he was symptomatic of retreat, reorganisation, confusion and poor leadership. The curious thing about Dorman-Smith is so little is directly written about him, he is a footnote in the books of other desert leaders and often only gets a brief mention in histories of the North Africa Campaign. So hopefully in this episode we’ll shed some light on ‘chink’. Joining me today is James Colvin.  James is currently working on a history of the 8th army pre the battle of Alamein, which will be published by Helion next year (I’ll keep you all posted when it’s released).    

People all over the world are taking to the streets in protest against their governments for different reasons.  Professor Paul Rogers from the University of Bradford explains why this is happening now and what it could mean for the future. President Trump is pulling America out of the Paris climate change agreement. Paul Osbourne explains what the Australian newspaper black-out has to do with defence. Why the Defence Secretary Ben Wallace has concerns about the Royal Navy fleet. And military thinking outside the box with The Wavell Room. Join the debate on Twitter @bfbssitrep

Photo: Andrew Blanchard

William Franklin talks about the First World War career of Archibald Wavell.

Recorded at our second fringe event; this time at CHACR's GAP conference in 2018.

Live audio from #WavellTalks at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference 2018 - An intro by Assistant Chief of the General Staff General Sir Rupert Jones and concepts on why we fight, drugs for performance enhancement, decision point tactics and the importance of diversity.

Our first campaign that we will look at is from Malaya. We detail some of the key people in the Malaya Campaign: LT Gen Percival AVM Pulford LT Gen Heath MAJ Gen Gordon Heath LT Gen Yamashita We look at the numbers for both sides.  Yamashita was fighting significantly outnumbered, so how did he make up the numbers? Armoured warfare - who had the advantage with tanks? In late 1941 the war is going quite badly for the Allies, the Germans are at the gates of Moscow. The Royal Navy sends Prince of Wales and Repulse to defend Singapore and Malaya.  After Japanese landings, Force Z moves out to defeat the Japanese only to be sunk.  Churchill describes it as the greatest naval disaster ever in the history of the Royal Navy. The Japanese fight at Jitra and win.  Within the first 100 hours, they have achieved control of the air, control of the sea and started to dominate on the land. Yamashita pushes aggressively south down Malaya.  A series of major withdrawals continue.  He leapfrogs down the Western coast of Malaya outflanking the Allies out of prepared defences. Wavell takes command of the ABDA command and he orders a 150 mile retreat.  We look at COL Tsuji, the God of Operations and how he prepared the strategy for the Japanese attack.  Wavell meets MAJ GEN Bennett and likes the aggressive spirit that he displays.  An inexperienced divisional staff takes over command of 3 divisions. The Battle of Muar is fought and lost and significant casualties are suffered by the Allies. The situation is so bad in the air that unarmed flying club planes are used for recon. The Japanese advanced 740 km in one month and 1 month and 23 days with a force ratio of 1:2, not the expected 3:1.  How did they manage such a marked victory?

¿Quieres ser mecenas de El Abrazo del Oso y formar parte de nuestra comunidad exclusiva? Pásate por www.patreon.com/elabrazodeloso No debería haber sido más que un frente secundario, un límite tranquilo que permitiera a Hitler desarrollar sus alucinados sueños en Europa y, sobre todo, en Rusia. Pero los desiertos del Norte de áfrica al final se convirtieron en una de las zonas estratégicas más importantes para el desarrollo de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El control del Mediterráneo, el de los pozos petrolíferos de Oriente Medio, jugarse la posibilidad de que los aliados abrieran un nuevo frente en el Sur de Europa cuando la guerra comenzaba a torcerse, marcaron las casillas de este nuevo tablero de juego en la guerra total que se llevaba a cabo en el mundo. ¿Y sus piezas? Wavell, Montgomery, Auchinleck, las inmensas divisiones de tanques Panzer o los Crusader y Sherman aliados. Y por supuesto el Mariscal Rommel, el Zorro del Desierto, un auténtico genio militar que, quizá precisamente por su genialidad, abocó a Alemania a perderse aún más en una aventura imposible que les llevaría a la derrota definitiva. Desde las ardientes arenas del desierto del norte de África, bienvenidas a El Abrazo del Oso. Guión gracias a José Luis Garrido, Eduardo Moreno, Alberto Rodríguez Jarabo y David Lafuente. Programa originalmente emitido en OMC Radio (www.omcradio.org) el 9 de abril de 2017. Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

Jonathan Wavell from California joins us while overseas to record Episode 38 of Tales from the Fandom. Recommended by Andie Jay from Episode 5, I recorded with Jonathan in mid August when our schedules matched up. We first talk about Star Wars.  Back when Han shot first and there were no special editions.  We talk lightsaber color, Disney taking over the franchise, characters and more. After that, Jonathan, who is known for his Captain America and Agent Coulson cosplays, talk about the Marvel Cinematic Universe.  The current movies out, which ones we loved, how Iron Man started it all and the upcoming slate of movies and what we hope to see. The video game franchise Halo is next.  Jonathan talks about how the Halo games have evolved, what draws him to that series specifically and more. We finish with a conversation about cosplay.  Find out why Jonathan got into cosplay and how it has evolved to another level.  He offers suggestions about how to get into it if you're interested and what he does to bring that next level of authenticity to his cosplays. You can find Jonathan at: https://www.instagram.com/jwave001/ https://www.facebook.com/Jwave

En febrero de 1942 el mariscal Wavell llamo al excéntrico coronel Orde Wingate a Birmania con la misión de organizar una guerra de guerrillas para oponerse a la invasión japonesa. Wingate era un experto en el mando de fuerzas irregulares, había destacado en la invasión de Etiopía al mando de la Fuerza Gideon, y antes de eso en la organización de guerrillas judías en Palestina. Llegó a Birmania en marzo, y aunque no tuvo tiempo de poner en práctica sus planes, y se vio obligado a retirarse a la India con el resto del ejército británico, le sirvió para conocer el país y diseñar el tipo de operaciones que pondría en práctica al año siguente. En la India propuso a Wavell la creación de una unidad especialmente entrenada para la guerra en la jungla que llevase a cabo incursiones de largo alcance como forma de mantener la presión sobre las fuerzas japonesas en Birmania. Su teoría era que una unidad podía permanecer por tiempo indefinido tras las líneas enemigas, en la jungla, siendo abastecida por aire, mientras atacaba sin descanso las comunicaciones y las bases de aprovisionamiento del enemigo.

En febrero de 1942 el mariscal Wavell llamo al excéntrico coronel Orde Wingate a Birmania con la misión de organizar una guerra de guerrillas para oponerse a la invasión japonesa. Wingate era un experto en el mando de fuerzas irregulares, había destacado en la invasión de Etiopía al mando de la Fuerza Gideon, y antes de eso en la organización de guerrillas judías en Palestina. Llegó a Birmania en marzo, y aunque no tuvo tiempo de poner en práctica sus planes, y se vio obligado a retirarse a la India con el resto del ejército británico, le sirvió para conocer el país y diseñar el tipo de operaciones que pondría en práctica al año siguente. En la India propuso a Wavell la creación de una unidad especialmente entrenada para la guerra en la jungla que llevase a cabo incursiones de largo alcance como forma de mantener la presión sobre las fuerzas japonesas en Birmania. Su teoría era que una unidad podía permanecer por tiempo indefinido tras las líneas enemigas, en la jungla, siendo abastecida por aire, mientras atacaba sin descanso las comunicaciones y las bases de aprovisionamiento del enemigo.

With the failure of Operation Battle Axe and the bloody victory in Syria, Churchill finally rids himself of C in C Gen. Archibald Wavell. And wants his replacement, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck to attack Rommel forth with. Yet the two operations have taken away half of the Western Desert Force's tanks. No matter, Churchill wants action, but Auchinleck wants time. Picture-Auchinleck. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

C in C M.E. Wavell gives into pressure from Churchill to attack Rommel, before the tanks and planes of Convoy Tiger can be off loaded. Next, the situation in Iraq comes to a head and we start the story of Crete and the end of Wavell. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Rommel is ready to have another crack at Tobruk, but Berlin is focused on Operation Barbarossa. Yet, Rommel gets permission to move ahead and finish off the British holdout. Meanwhile, Wavell's dire prediction about the Middle East starts to come true as elements of the Iraqi Government side with the Axis. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The British 13th Corps continues pushing west, now it’s Tobruk’s turn. The situation in East Africa causes only more tension between Wavell and Churchill. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices