Podcasts about lbo

Legalstart, lancé en 2014 pour simplifier le juridique et l'administratif des entrepreneurs, se vend à LegalPlace. En 12 ans, près d'un million d'entre eux ont été accompagnés, de la création d'entreprise à la compta, au compte pro ou à la domiciliation. Une trajectoire assez rare dans la French Tech : peu de fonds au départ, une croissance autofinancée et rentable, puis un LBO avec ISAI en 2021. Aujourd'hui, Legalstart est racheté par son concurrent historique.Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Send us Fan MailAfter the largest IPO in history (SpaceX, ticker SPCX, priced at $135), only about 5% of the company — roughly $83 billion — is actually free to trade. Insiders are locked up, the banks that underwrote the deal can't lend shares to short sellers, and index funds are being forced to buy as SpaceX joins the Nasdaq-100 and the Russel. In this episode of The Wall Street Skinny, Jen and Kristen, both former Morgan Stanley investment bankers, break down how the IPO was engineered — and the question every SpaceX investor should be asking: what happens when all that locked-up stock can finally sell?First, we cover what is normal in an IPO so you can see what isn't. We cover price talk vs. the $135 take-it-or-leave-it pricing, the green shoe, perpetual futures, and the fast-track Nasdaq-100 inclusion pulling in billions of passive buying. We lay out the risks, meaning the the wall of supply coming. Unlike the standard 180-day lockup, SpaceX is staggering its release: the first ~$240-500+ billion of stock unlocks after the first earnings report around September, with more tranches every few weeks after that — over $1 trillion freely tradeable by December, on the way to a ~$2 trillion overhang once Elon Musk's one-year lockup rolls off.  But we also lay out why the passive buying actually helps dampen that supply PLUS why many institutional investors are NOT bearish on the stock despite the insane valuation.If you want to learn MORE from us, check out our Investment Banking & Private Equity Fundamentals course where we go deep into accounting, Excel and Financial modeling, valuation (DCF, comps etc.), M&A analysis and LBO analysis. https://thewallstreetskinny.com/investment-banking-private-equity-fundamentals/If you're just here to have fun, subscribe for more high finance explained through the lens of pop culture, markets, and your favorite shows.Shop our Self Paced Courses:Investment Banking & Private Equity Fundamentals HEREFixed Income Sales & Trading HERESubscribe to our Substack: https://substack.com/@thewallstreetskinny

Dans cet épisode, je reçois Dimitri Fotopoulos, partenaire chez Weinberg Capital Partners, pour une discussion autour des fonds de continuation en private equity : comment fonctionnent-ils, pourquoi sont-ils mal compris, et dans quels cas permettent-ils de prolonger la création de valeur d'un actif Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO) au-delà de la durée classique d'un fonds?Nous avons parlé :Du dilemme central du gestionnaire LBO : devoir céder un actif performant à contre-coeur uniquement parce que le fonds arrive à maturité, même quand la relation avec le management est excellente et que le potentiel de création de valeur n'est pas encore pleinement capturéDu principal préjugé sur les fonds de continuation, perçus comme un outil pour recycler des actifs qui peinent à trouver acheteur, alors que dans les faits, seuls les meilleurs actifs LBO peuvent se prêter à cet exercice sur le marché secondaireDu processus concret de mise en place d'un fonds de continuation : mandat d'une banque conseil spécialisée comme Lazard, due diligence complète avec book de valorisation, trois phases successives avec les lead investors du secondaire, les LPs existants et la syndicationDu double due diligence spécifique au marché secondaire : les investisseurs analysent autant le track record de l'équipe de gestion sur 10 à 20 ans que la qualité intrinsèque de l'actif lui-mêmeDe la structure de frais adaptée au format fonds de continuation, proche du co-investissement : environ 1% de management fees et 10% de carried interest, contre les 2% et 20% d'un fonds LBO classique diversifiéDes chiffres du marché secondaire en France : 12 milliards d'euros de transactions secondaires au total, dont 7 milliards attribués aux seuls fonds de continuation en 2025, selon le premier rapport France Invest publié sur le sujetDe la démocratisation du private equity auprès du wealth management, que Weinberg Capital Partners adresse via une équipe dédiée, avec la conviction que rendre cette classe d'actifs accessible est vertueux à condition de maintenir des garde-fous réglementaires rigoureux conformes aux exigences de l'AMFUn épisode technique mais très accessible, qui démystifie un outil encore mal compris et souvent mal jugé - et qui montre comment la contrainte structurelle d'un fonds peut devenir un levier de création de valeur supplémentaire.Recommandation de Dimitri : “Pour les succès des armes de la France" de Pierre de VilliersLiens utilesDimitri Fotopoulos: https://www.linkedin.com/in/dimitri-fotopoulos-9033583/ Weinberg Capital Partners: http://www.weinbergcapital.comFinscale est aussi disponible sur YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@finscale.***************************Finscale est bien plus qu'un podcast. Cet épisode est produit et animé par Solenne Niedercorn, fondatrice de Finscale.

Et si la véritable innovation ne se trouvait pas dans une ligne de code, mais dans les fibres d'un chêne centenaire ?

Mizzou basketball great Laurence Bowers joined us in studio this morning to talk about his Camp Bowers youth hoops camps coming lbosports.com and find out why LBo's legs got wet in a radio studio!

Mizzou basketball great Laurence Bowers joined us in studio this morning to talk about his Camp Bowers youth hoops camps coming lbosports.com and find out why LBo's legs got wet in a radio studio!

Parler d'argent n'est pas honteux. C'est même essentiel pour retenir ses meilleurs talents.Fidéliser une équipe clé, intéresser un manager au capital, ouvrir son capital à des investisseurs, structurer l'arrivée d'un repreneur dans un LBO (le LBO, c'est-à-dire le fait de racheter une entreprise en partie par emprunt bancaire)... autant de questions qui sont au cœur de la vie de nombreuses entreprises. Des questions que vous vous posez, que je me pose moi-même avec Gemmyo.Et pourtant, on ne connaît pas les règles. Alors on traite mal ces sujets ; voire on les ignore complètement, faute de savoir par où commencer.C'est pourquoi j'avais vraiment à cœur d'enregistrer cet épisode, réalisé en partenariat avec le Cabinet Scotto Partners. Isabelle Cheradame est l'une des références mondiales du management package ; le "manpack" ou le “MIP” pour les initiés. C'est précisément l'outil qui répond à toutes ces problématiques. Et comme tout outil puissant, il peut être très bien utilisé… ou très mal.Depuis 25 ans, Isabelle accompagne dirigeants, fondateurs et managers sur des moments décisifs : comment fidéliser une équipe clé, organiser sa gouvernance, ou encore structurer ses relations avec des investisseurs, en France comme à l'étranger.Dans cet épisode, elle nous donne les clés pour comprendre, négocier et sécuriser un package de dirigeant ; sans jargon, avec des exemples très concrets et les erreurs à absolument éviter. Un épisode à faire écouter à tout dirigeant qui envisage un LBO ou une ouverture de son capital, même minoritaire, à des investisseurs ou des salariés!Ce qui m'a marqué chez Isabelle, c'est son empathie. On n'imaginerait pas qu'une avocate puisse tisser des liens aussi forts avec ses clients ; et pourtant, j'ai vraiment senti au fil de notre conversation son attachement profond à accompagner ses clients dans les moments les plus décisifs de leur vie professionnelle.Mais je vous laisse découvrir tout ça par vous-même et laisse place à ma conversation avec Isabelle Cheradame.Bonne écoute ✨Chapitrage 00:00 – Pourquoi parler d'argent et de capital ?01:39 – Comment devient-on experte du management package ?06:05 – À quoi ressemble la vie d'une avocate associée ?12:21 – Qu'est-ce qu'un management package, concrètement ?14:41 – À qui s'adresse cet outil de fidélisation ?20:00 – Quels sont les risques fiscaux et financiers ?27:27 – Actions gratuites, PME, entreprises familiales : quelles options ?32:31 – LBO : que doit vérifier un dirigeant avant de signer ?47:24 – Les erreurs qui peuvent coûter très cher51:38 – Success stories, confiance et leçons de vie58:24 – Le crible du Podcast Notes et références de l'épisode ✨ Pour retrouver Isabelle Cheradame : Sur LinkedIn ✨ Pour retrouver Scotto Partners : Sur leur site✨ Les livres cités par Isabelle Cheradame : Dans les forêts de Sibérie de Sylvain Tesson*Liens affiliés FnacHébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

What happens when a $6.4 billion PE buyout becomes a cautionary tale for every SaaS operator, investor, and board member? In this episode, Dave "CAC" Kellogg and Ray "Growth" Rike break down Private Credit: what it is, how it works, and why it is showing up everywhere from venture rounds to leveraged buyouts. Then they walk through the Medallia deal step by step to show exactly how the model breaks.What we covered:Private credit 101: from venture debt to leveraged buyoutsPrivate credit is non-bank lending done by funds instead of banks, with a repayment-first mindset rather than a returns mindset. Capital deployment hit nearly $600 billion in 2024, up 78% from 2023, with 22 to 25% of that concentration in SaaS companies. Ray and Dave explain the difference between venture debt (lending to startups post-round) and direct lending (providing the "L" in LBO transactions), and why these structures have moved from niche to standard in software finance.How debt is priced and why it costs what it costsPrivate credit loans are floating-rate instruments priced at SOFR plus 500 to 800 basis points. In the zero-rate era that meant 6 to 9% all-in. Today it means 10 to 13%. Dave explains warrants as the "sweetener" (typically 5 to 15% of the loan amount, translating to under 2% equity ownership) and why the real economic driver is repayment, not upside. Ray frames the contrast with VC math: a lender who loses principal on one deal has no portfolio-level offset.The terms that matter: PIK, bullets, and covenantsPay-in-kind interest defers cash pain today by adding to the principal balance tomorrow. A $100M loan PIK-ing at 10% annually becomes $121M in two years and $133M in three. Bullet loans put the entire principal due at maturity, which for most companies means refinancing or a sale event. Dave's strongest language is reserved for covenants, which he calls the "third rail": liquidity, EBITDA, ARR growth, and coverage ratio thresholds that give lenders the right to call the loan if tripped. He argues these belong on page one of every board dashboard, every time.The Medallia case study: when all the assumptions move against youThoma Bravo acquired Medallia in 2021 for $6.4 billion at 9x revenue, with roughly $1.8 billion of debt backed by Blackstone, Apollo, and KKR. The deal was underwritten on continued growth and margin expansion toward 25% free cash flow. Instead, growth slowed, base rates rose more than 400 basis points, PIK interest compounded the balance from $1.8B to $2.2B, and EBITDA of $200M fell below annual interest expense of $300M. Interest coverage dropped below 1x. Thoma Bravo's $5 billion equity investment went to zero. Lenders took the keys via debt-for-equity conversion.Why these structures can look stable and then break fastThe Medallia deal was not unusual at entry. The problem was that PIK, rising rates, and slowing growth are individually manageable and jointly lethal. By March 2026, Blackstone was marking its first-lien Medallia debt at 60 cents on the dollar. Ray notes that between 2015 and 2025, more than 1,900 software companies were acquired by PE in deals worth over $440 billion, and 20 to 25% of all private credit went to SaaS. The exposure across the sector is large.The lesson Rory O'Driscoll would underlineDave closes with a line from Rory O'Driscoll: as soon as something becomes a formula, the play is probably over. Private credit for SaaS worked reliably for nearly a decade. The combination of higher rates, compressed multiples, and closed IPO and M&A windows revealed that the formula was underwriting a world that no longer existed. Senior debt gets paid first. When the debt is impaired, the equity is gone. The math does not negotiate.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Send us Fan MailMichael Burry just dumped all his GameStop shares. eBay reportedly deactivated Ryan Cohen's account. And the $56 billion "takeover" GameStop pitched on CNBC? It would actually have eBay shareholders paying for most of it themselves. We're back to break down the latest twists in the GameStop–eBay drama — and why this deal is structured unlike almost any takeover Wall Street has seen.In this episode, Kristen walks Jen (and you) through the rollover equity mechanics that make this look less like an LBO and more like a SPAC, the precedent Bill Ackman set when he paid $10 million to get the SEC to approve his SPARC, and why levering eBay up at 7–10x puts the combined company at material bankruptcy risk over the next few years. We also get into why eBay might actually want a version of this deal (just not this version), and whether a  private equity firm could step in with a cleaner bid, Shop our Self Paced Courses:Investment Banking & Private Equity Fundamentals HEREFixed Income Sales & Trading HERESubscribe to our Substack: https://substack.com/@thewallstreetskinny

Send us Fan Mail

60 Milliarden Euro an notleidenden Krediten, Hunderte Mittelständler mit auslaufenden Finanzierungen und Banken, die regulatorisch längst an ihre Grenzen stoßen: Der Druck auf den deutschen Unternehmensmarkt wächst. Und doch bleibt die entscheidende Frage oft unbeantwortet – wer schließt die Lücke, wenn der klassische Bankkredit nicht trägt und ein Einstieg von Finanzinvestoren nicht gewünscht ist?Mein Gast ist Henrik Felbier, Mitgründer der CREDION AG. Mit ihm spreche ich darüber, wie er vom Sanierungsberater zum alternativen Finanzierer wurde, warum Kredit eine eigenständige Anlageklasse ist und wie CREDION dort Kapital bereitstellt, wo Banken systembedingt aussteigen müssen.Wir beleuchten in dieser Episode:wie Henrik zum Sanierer wurde,warum Banken in Krisen an ihre Grenzen stoßen,wie ein Insolvenzfall die Idee zu CREDION lieferte,welche Rolle CREDION bei Nachfolge und Krise übernimmt,warum der Private-Debt-Markt trotz Zinswende weiter wächst,und vieles mehr...Viel Spaß beim Hören!***Timestamps(00:00:00) Intro(00:02:32) Begrüßung & Werdegang(00:04:27) Einstieg ins Sanierungsgeschäft(00:12:23) Warum Sanierung funktioniert(00:16:35) Erfolg trotz Big Four(00:21:23) Vom Sanieren zum Finanzieren(00:23:37) Grenzen der Banken & Regulatorik(00:33:50) Gründungsidee CREDION(00:36:49) Kredit vs. Eigenkapital(00:38:25) EK vs. FK: Interessen & Strukturen(00:41:02) CREDION als Brückenfinanzierer(00:47:21) Investorenstruktur(00:52:46) Assets under Management(00:54:14) Dealauswahl & Mindestvolumen(00:59:29) Chancen- & Distressed-Finanzierungen(01:01:04) CREDION Spezialisierung(01:03:50) LBO- & Nachfolge-Finanzierungen(01:12:43) Private Debt Markt & Ausblick***Alle Links zur Folge:Kai Hesselmann auf LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/kai-hesselmann-dealcircle/CLOSE THE DEAL auf LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/closethedeal-podcastHenrik Felbier auf LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/henrik-felbier-3279921a/CREDION auf LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/credion-ag/Website CLOSE THE DEAL: https://dealcircle.com/ClosetheDeal/***DUB.de und AMBER sind die Plattformen für sichere Unternehmensnachfolgen. Schaut vorbei, wenn ihr euer Unternehmen schnell, sicher und kostenfrei zum Verkauf inserieren wollt oder als Käufer auf der Suche nach passenden Deals seid:www.dub.dewww.amber.deals***Du bist M&A-Berater im Small- oder Midcap-Segment und suchst einen Überblick über alle relevanten Deals? Jetzt schnell den

Send us Fan MailIn Part 3 of our Caesars Palace Coup series, we're back with Sujeet Indap of the Financial Times — co-author of the definitive book on the $30 billion LBO disaster — to connect the dots between 2008's creditor-on-creditor violence and the private credit tremors rattling markets right now. Caesars itself is back on the auction block, with Tilman Fertitta's Golden Nugget circling alongside a potential management buyout involving Tom Reeg and Carl Icahn. We dig into what a 2.0 deal would actually look like, why existing bondholders could get layered all over again, and how the Vici REIT spinoff reshaped the entire capital structure in ways most headlines completely miss when they quote the "$7 billion" offer price.But the bigger story is what's happening across private credit broadly. In the last few weeks alone, Blue Owl permanently gated a perpetual fund, Blackstone partners had to backstop redemptions, and BlackRock, Cliffwater, and Apollo have all gated funds. We push Sujeet on the question every allocator is wrestling with: is this a contained correction or the early innings of something systemic? We get into why first-lien recoveries have collapsed, why loan-only capital structures and uni-tranche debt have changed what "senior secured" actually means, the PIK toggle canary that's quietly ticking up, and why the alt managers trading at 40x forward earnings may have priced in a growth story that's about to meet its first real credit cycle.We also cover the fascinating bifurcation playing out in real time — record investment-grade issuance from Amazon, Honeywell, and others on one end, while BDCs gate retail investors on the other — and what it means for the push to get private credit into 401(k)s. Plus: the $80 million Wachtell-to-Kirkland lawyer poaching that Sujeet wrote about and why it might be the most underrated leading indicator of the next debt crisis. Shop our Self Paced Courses:Investment Banking & Private Equity Fundamentals HEREFixed Income Sales & Trading HERESubscribe to our Substack: https://substack.com/@thewallstreetskinny

Send us Fan MailThis is Part II of our Caesars Palace deep dive, and honestly, this is where things get truly unhinged. If Part I was the setup — the $30 billion LBO, the financial crisis, and the private equity firms scrambling to keep the lights on — this episode is the masterclass in what happens when the knives come out. We're breaking down the mechanics of distressed debt investing, restructuring, and bankruptcy. Above all, we'll explain how Apollo essentially invented a new playbook for stripping creditor rights that the entire industry now uses as standard operating procedure. How do you move billions in assets out of a dying company and into a clean entity without the creditors being able to stop you? Who determines the value of what's being transferred when nobody is representing the other side? And how does Britney Spears end up at the literal center of a multibillion-dollar restructuring that kept this whole thing alive way longer than it should have survived?And the biggest question of all (why we think this episode is mandatory listening right now): what happens when this playbook gets deployed AGAIN, today? We're already seeing the early signs: record levels of corporate debt coming due, earnings getting squeezed by higher rates, and redemption requests piling up. So what does creditor-on-creditor violence actually look like in practice? How do the alliances form and break? Why did the investors who got screwed the hardest in the Caesars saga end up being the biggest winners by the time the dust settled? And if you're sitting in any kind of debt instrument right now, how do you know whether you're the one holding the cards or the one about to get shut out in the cold?Stay tuned for Part III, the conclusion of this 3-part series, where we'll be interviewing author and Financial Times reporter Sujeet Indap!Shop our Self Paced Courses:Investment Banking & Private Equity Fundamentals HEREFixed Income Sales & Trading HERESubscribe to our Substack: https://substack.com/@thewallstreetskinny

De Coca-Cola à Viasat : comment un financier change de secteur et crée de la valeur sous LBO - Gilles CaumartinGilles Caumartin a passé 15 ans en finance, entre la France et Londres, en passant par Coca-Cola, L'Oréal et Inmarsat racheté depuis par Viasat, concurrent direct de Starlink sur la connectivité satellite. Un parcours riche qui couvre: le FMCG, la tech B2B, l'expatriation, la croissance sous LBO, et l'intégration post-acquisition par un groupe américain West Coast.Dans cet épisode, on commence par ce qu'est un bon business partner selon lui et le fait que notre rôle, c'est de travailler pour la boîte, pas pour protéger notre carrière.On parle ensuite de l'expatriation au UK. Gilles est parti à 29 ans, en 2015, sur un poste à Londres chez Coca-Cola. Il explique ce qui l'a poussé à sauter le pas, les pièges à éviter quand on arrive, les codes culturels à décoder pour travailler avec des Anglais, les fourchettes de salaire par rapport à Paris, et l'impact du Brexit sur un marché de l'emploi qui est aujourd'hui beaucoup plus compliqué à intégrer depuis l'extérieur.Vient ensuite la question du produit. Gilles défend qu'il faut avoir une vraie appétence pour ce que vend la boîte pour pouvoir tenir sur la durée et être un bon business partner. Une carrière, c'est un marathon. Travailler sur quelque chose qui ne vous intéresse pas finit par se voir dans la qualité du travail.Le passage du FMCG à la tech B2B chez Inmarsat est un des moments les plus concrets de l'échange. Cycles de décision radicalement différents, logique de volume contre logique de deals long terme, et la manière dont Gilles a transposé son expérience data et opérationnelle de Coca-Cola dans un environnement satellite pour créer des métriques de pricing qui n'existaient pas.Sur la croissance sous LBO, Inmarsat est passé de 50 à 100 millions d'euros de chiffre d'affaires en trois ans, Covid compris. Gilles raconte la pression du fonds, les équipes ultra lean, les arbitrages entre projets, et les décisions dures qu'on ne peut pas éviter quand on est une petite structure qui doit délivrer.L'épisode se termine sur l'intégration post-acquisition par Viasat, la gestion du décalage horaire avec la West Coast américaine, le choc des référentiels comptables entre US GAAP et FRS, et ce que ça demande concrètement de garder le fil dans ce genre de contexte.Je m'appelle Jonathan Plateau. Je suis passé par EY, Valeo et Safran et j'essaye d'engager des échanges et des réflexions sur nos métiers de la finance.Ma mission : vous offrir une expérience éducative, divertissante et parfois surprenante.Ce podcast est fait pour les directeurs financiers (DAF, CFO), les contrôleurs de gestion, qu'ils soient juniors ou confirmés, et qui souhaitent profiter des échanges entre pairs pour enrichir leur pratique de la finance au quotidien et tendre vers le business partner.Joignez-vous à notre communauté passionnée qui explore chaque facette du contrôle de gestion et du business partner.N'oubliez pas que la finance, c'est aussi une question de mindset !N'hésitez pas à partager vos interrogations sur nos discussions ou sur le podcast. Vous pouvez me contacter sur LinkedIn directement.https://www.linkedin.com/in/jonathan-plateau-1980b610/Vous aimerez cette émission si vous aimez aussi : Coonter (Les Geeks des chiffres) • CFO Radio • Une Cession Presque Parfaite • Voie des comptables • Parlons Cash • Le nerf de la guerre • Feedback by la fée • Radio KPMGHébergé par Ausha. Visitez ausha.co/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Bienvenue dans ce nouvel épisode de Private Equity Vox !

Send us Fan MailPrivate credit is the crisis everyone's watching, but the real story -- and the one no one has been focused on -- is what private equity is doing behind the scenes.In Part 1 of our 3-part series, Kristen and Jen break down the $30 billion leveraged buyout of Caesars by Apollo and TPG, the deal that became the blueprint for what we now call "creditor-on-creditor violence" and flipped everything everyone thought they knew about the relationship between debt and equity investors on its head.This also happens to be the ultimate Private Equity & LBO deep dive as we start with the basics: what an LBO actually is, how it works, why private equity firms started to do club deals back in 2006/7 (hint...size) and how capital structures work at a high level.From there, Jen and Kristen walk through the actual structure of the Caesars deal — $6B in equity from Apollo, TPG, and 30+ co-investors (everyone from Goldman Sachs to the Michael J. Fox Foundation to Bob Kraft), $7B in bank loans, $6B in bridge-to-high-yield bonds, and $6.5B in commercial mortgage-backed securities sitting at the PropCo level. They explain what an OpCo/PropCo mean in laymen's terms, why it let Apollo juice leverage, why club deals fell out of favor in favor of co-invest structures, and how today's mega-LBOs (Electronic Arts, the Ellison family's Warner Bros. Discovery play) stack up against what was historic in 2007.This series is based on The Caesars Palace Coup by Sujeet Indap and Max Frumes — not sponsored, just genuinely one of the best case studies out there on LBOs and distressed debt investing. Stay tuned for Part 2, where Jen and Kristen get into everything that went wrong, the asset-transfer shenanigans, and the birth of creditor-on-creditor violence and how Britney Spears was the linchpin that kept it all together...until it all unraveled with the biggest names in investing, Apaloosa, Eliott, Oak Tree, Oak Hill, Paulson and more got in the ring. In Part 3, we sit down with Sujeet Indap of the Financial Times to talk about what the Caesars deal means for the private credit market today, and what exactly is going on with Caesars who is back in the news with Carl Icahn and billionaire Tilman Fertitta out with competing offers.For a 14 day FREE Trial of Macabacus, click HEREShop our Self Paced Courses:Investment Banking & Private Equity Fundamentals HEREFixed Income Sales & Trading HEREWealthfront.com/wss. This is a paid endorsement for Wealthfront. May not reflect others' experiences. Similar outcomes not guaranteed. Wealthfront Brokerage is not a bank. Rate subject to change. Promo terms apply. If eligible for the boosted rate of 4.15% offered in connection with this promo, the boosted rate is also subject to change if base rate decreases during the 3 month promo period.The Cash Account, which is not a deposit account, is offered by Wealthfront Brokerage LLC ("Wealthfront Brokerage"), Member FINRA/SIPC. Wealthfront Brokerage is not a bank. The Annual Percentage Yield ("APY") on cash deposits as of 11/7/25, is representative, requires no minimum, and may change at any time. The APY reflects the weighted average of deposit balances at participating Program Banks, which are not allocated equally. Wealthfront Brokerage sweeps cash balances to Program Banks, where they earn the variable APY. Sources HERE. 

Dans ce nouvel épisode de Consulting Insider, Arnaud Caldichoury reçoit Vincent Redrado, fondateur et CEO de DNG, cabinet de conseil en stratégie et opérations spécialisé dans le secteur du consumer.Ensemble, ils explorent les mutations profondes du marché du conseil : de la nécessité de l'ultra-spécialisation à l'intégration de l'IA générative dans les processus de délivrabilité, jusqu'aux montages financiers comme le LBO pour engager les collaborateurs.Vincent analyse également pourquoi les délais de décision des clients s'allongent et comment un cabinet peut rester agile dans un contexte macroéconomique incertain.Au programme :L'expertise de niche : pourquoi le conseil généraliste perd de sa superbe,L'impact de l'IA sur la délivrabilité : gagner 30% de temps sur la forme pour se concentrer sur le fond,Le consultant comme "Business Partner" : l'introduction de variables à la performance dans les missions,Stratégie de croissance : l'équilibre entre croissance organique et développement international (ouverture de DNG Espagne),Modèle capitalistique : associer les talents au capital pour passer les plafonds de verre.Cet épisode s'adresse aux leaders du conseil, de l'audit et des ESN qui cherchent à anticiper les transformations de leur métier et à découvrir de nouveaux leviers de croissance et d'engagement pour leurs équipes.Bonne écoute !Pour aller plus loin :Découvrir Napta : La meilleure solution SaaS de staffing 360° pour vous et vos équipes.Suivez nous sur LinkedinHébergé par Ausha. Visitez ausha.co/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Die Finanzinvestoren hocken auf ihren Portfoliounternehmen, weil die Preise nicht stimmen. Gleichzeitig macht die weltpolitische Lage das Investieren unsicherer denn je. Trotzdem erlauben sich unsere Gesprächspartner in unserem Podcast einen ziemlich optimistischen Ausblick auf das laufende Jahr.

De 50 à 100M€ en 3 ans : ce qu'un DAF doit vraiment faire en phase de croissance avec Gilles CaumartinQuand une boîte double son chiffre d'affaires en trois ans sous LBO, malgré le Covid, ça ne ressemble pas vraiment à ce qu'on apprend en école de commerce. Gilles Caumartin l'a vécu de l'intérieur chez Inmarsat, sur la partie wi-fi embarqué pour les compagnies aériennes, avec une équipe finance réduite à l'essentiel et une pression du fonds qui ne laisse pas beaucoup de place à l'hésitation.Dans cet extrait, il raconte ce que ça veut vraiment dire d'être le financier d'une structure en forte croissance. Pas la version propre et processée. La version où tu arbitres entre trois projets que tout le monde veut lancer, où les ressources ne suivent pas, où le fonds te dit d'accélérer le matin et de couper les coûts l'après-midi.La première erreur à éviter selon lui : dire oui à tout. Dans un contexte de croissance, le rôle du financier n'est pas de valider chaque demande des équipes produit ou ingénierie. C'est de comprendre assez finement le business pour dire non au bon moment, orienter vers le bon projet parmi trois possibles, et expliquer pourquoi avec des arguments qui tiennent la route face au board.Il parle aussi de la réalité des équipes lean. Chez Inmarsat, Gilles avait un analyste et une comptable. Pas plus. Quand l'analyste n'était toujours pas opérationnel après trois mois, la décision a été prise vite. Pas par cruauté, mais parce qu'une équipe de trois personnes n'a pas la marge pour absorber une sous-performance.Ce que Jonathan Plateau ajoute à cet échange est intéressant aussi : dans un grand groupe, on peut survivre longtemps sans vraiment délivrer. Dans un LBO, ce n'est pas possible. Ce n'est pas le même état d'esprit, ce n'est pas le même niveau de pression, et ce n'est pas fait pour tout le monde.Si vous êtes DAF, contrôleur de gestion ou FP&A dans une structure en croissance, en cours de cession ou sous fonds, cet extrait vous donnera des repères concrets sur ce que le rôle demande vraiment dans ce type d'environnement.Je m'appelle Jonathan Plateau. Je suis passé par EY, Valeo et Safran et j'essaye d'engager des échanges et des réflexions sur nos métiers de la finance.Ma mission : vous offrir une expérience éducative, divertissante et parfois surprenante.Ce podcast est fait pour les directeurs financiers (DAF, CFO), les contrôleurs de gestion, qu'ils soient juniors ou confirmés, et qui souhaitent profiter des échanges entre pairs pour enrichir leur pratique de la finance au quotidien et tendre vers le business partner.Joignez-vous à notre communauté passionnée qui explore chaque facette du contrôle de gestion et du business partner.N'oubliez pas que la finance, c'est aussi une question de mindset !N'hésitez pas à partager vos interrogations sur nos discussions ou sur le podcast. Vous pouvez me contacter sur LinkedIn directement.https://www.linkedin.com/in/jonathan-plateau-1980b610/Vous aimerez cette émission si vous aimez aussi : Coonter (Les Geeks des chiffres) • CFO Radio • Une Cession Presque Parfaite • Voie des comptables • Parlons Cash • Le nerf de la guerre • Feedback by la fée • Radio KPMGHébergé par Ausha. Visitez ausha.co/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

“Technicals for high yield post-Covid have been very strong, with pretty limited net new supply, minimal downgrades, strong demand given elevated base rates and pretty reasonable credit spread,” says John McClain, Goldman Sachs Asset Management's global co-head of High Yield and Bank Loans. “We're seeing some net new supply from areas like data-center debt,” and “large LBO bonds that are coming over the next couple of weeks, in conjunction with a couple of decent sized cap stacks migrating to high yield will probably lead to some indigestion in the marketplace.” McClain joins Bloomberg Intelligence's Noel Hebert on the latest Credit Crunch podcast to discuss data-center vs. software issuance, private credit knock-on effects and where to find value in the current market. The Credit Crunch podcast is part of BI's FICC Focus series.

Katie and Matt discuss a legendary lost Money Stuff podcast episode, Paramount buying Warner Bros., rights offerings, LBO risks, deal discipline, breakup fees, BCRED, OBDC II, twisting arms at Blackstone, Credit Suisse toxic asset bonuses, liquidity premiums, short memories, XOVR and SpaceX liquidity. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Pendant des années, on a appris à modéliser presque tous les risques dans un deal :

Our Chief Fixed Income Strategist Vishy Tirupattur and U.S. Head of Credit Strategy Vishwas Patkar discuss the implications of private credit's exposure to the software industry.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Vishy Tirupattur: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I am Vishy Tirupattur, Morgan Stanley's Chief Fixed Income Strategist. Vishwas Patkar: I'm Vishwas Patkar, Morgan Stanley's U.S. Head of Credit Strategy. Vishy Tirupattur: While potential disruption from AI has been a key driver for markets [in the] last few weeks, the focus of investor agenda has been in the software sector. On today's podcast, we will talk about software in the credit markets and its implications. It's Monday, March 2nd at 10am in New York. Vishwas, let's start by understanding how the exposure in software manifests in the credit markets. How does it compare to software, say, in the equity market? Vishwas Patkar: Yeah, so the software exposure in credit markets is large, and understandably that's why investors are closely watching what's happening with software in the equity market. But what's interesting and important for investors to note is the exposure in credit is very different from what it is in equities. So, for instance, a good chunk of exposure in the credit market is around private issuers. So, we estimate about 80 percent of companies are private in the whole sample set that we looked at. And that's largely a function of the fact that software is not a big part of the more liquid spaces like Investment Grade and High Yield. But it is heavily represented in the more opaque parts of the market, like leveraged loans, CLOs, and, you know, BDCs. So, our analysis found that about 25 percent of BDC portfolios are in software, closely followed by private credit CLOs. And leveraged loan market was about 16 percent. So, that's an important distinction to keep in mind versus the equity market. The second thing I would flag is – because the software sector grew a lot in the loan market through the LBO wave of 2020 and 2021, it has a weaker credit quality skew to it than the overall market. So about 50 percent of borrowers in the sector are rated B - or lower. So, that's the lowest rungs of the rating spectrum. Many of these software deals were underwritten with higher leverage than the broad market. And as a result of that you also have more front-loaded maturities in the sector, which brings the risks of refinancing, if some of this disruption persists. But Vishy, that's a nice segue to you. Over the past couple of years, you looked at the private credit market in depth and that's where I think the exposure we found is the highest in BDCs, you know, which is the public face of private credit. So, in your assessment, what is the risk of software to private credit, given all of the headlines that are popping up? Vishy Tirupattur: Public face of private credit – Vishwas, that's a great line. BDCs – business development corporations for those who are not familiar – are companies that invest in the debt of small and medium sized companies, sourced through non-bank channels. BDCs fund themselves through equity and debt issuance. So, if you look at the portfolios of BDCs to look at their exposure to software, there's a wide variation across the various BDC portfolios. What makes the assessment of these software risks in BDCs challenging is that many of these companies are private companies without the reporting obligations of public companies. So, no earnings reports, no 10-Ks or cues or broadly publicly available financials look at. So, in effect, these companies need to be re underwritten to evaluate which of these companies would be disrupted from AI; and which companies could actually benefit from AI and see their margins expand. So, in the context of BDCs, liability spreads are something we are watching closely. BDC liability spreads have widened but we think more needs to happen there. The clearing levels need to wait for the full resolution of the companies that benefit and that get hurt by disruption that is still awaited. So, we expect credit spreads of BDCs to remain volatile for some time to come. Vishwas Patkar: Okay. So, seems like this is a significant, or at least a non-trivial risk factor for credit markets, given the growth of the sector, leverage, the skew and quality. But Vishy, do you think this could be systemic for risk markets at large? Vishy Tirupattur: So, I do think that this is a significant risk, but I don't think it's a systemic risk. The amount of leverage in BDC is fairly small. About 2x is the kind of leverage. You compare that to the kind of leverage that existed in the financial system before the financial crisis – that's orders of magnitude smaller risk. And also the linkage to the banking system comes through the back leverage provided to the non-bank lenders. But this leverage is substantially risk remote with very high subordination levels. So, my conclusion here is this is a significant risk but not a systemic risk. So let me turn the same question to you, Vishwas. Taking on a sort of historical perspective as well as a macro perspective, how do you see this risk manifesting in the broader credit space? Vishwas Patkar: Yeah, so I would agree with you Vishy, that we need to see a valuation reset. We think spreads should go wider because of disruption concerns, even if they affect a relatively narrow part of the market. But a lot of that's happening against issuance that's rising. But I would say the risk of systemic concerns really emerging is relatively low. if you look at historical cycles where credit has been the weak link in the economy, those are typically characterized by a lot of corporate re-leveraging. So, think about the late 1990s or from 2004 to 2007 or the early 2000-teens. These are all cycles where corporates were being very aggressive, adding a lot of debt. And you know, when the economy slowed, credit became the source of some default and downgrade concerns. We haven't really seen that type of credit cycle play out at all in the past few years. If you look at corporate debt to GDP, for example, it's gone down each of the last five years. Balance sheet corporate leverage has been flat or actually gone lower in spots. M&A activity, which is usually a good indicator of corporate aggressiveness, still remains below trend. So, I think we have had a fairly restrained credit cycle where in place fundamentals are quite strong. And that's why I think the systemic contagion from any credit spread weakness, I think could be relatively muted. Vishy Tirupattur: So, the key takeaway from us is that software and credit is a significant risk but is not quite systemic risk. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

Send a textKristen and Jen tackle two major stories in this double emergency episode. First, Kristen breaks down latest update in the Warner Bros saga — how Paramount outbid Netflix with a $31/share offer, why Netflix walked away, and what the deal means financially. They cover the cursed history of Warner Bros. M&A deals, the staggering leverage Paramount is taking on (potentially the largest LBO ever), the accretion/dilution math that made this a non-starter for Netflix, and why it's an existential move for Paramount. They also get into the ticking fee structure, the $7 billion breakup fee, and why so many people are nervous about this outcome.Jen then covers the weekend's military action in the Middle East and how it's hitting markets on Monday. She walks through the relatively muted equity reaction, the split between defense stocks and travel names, the divergence between WTI and Brent crude, and why treasuries initially rallied before selling off. The yield curve is bare flattening as the market prices out near-term Fed cuts, since sustained oil price shocks would feed through to broader inflation beyond just energy. Gold is catching a bid as the classic risk-off trade, while Europe looks more vulnerable than the US to prolonged disruption given its energy dependence.Coming later this week: episodes recorded at the I Connections conference, including an Investor Relations 101 conversation and a look at where allocators are directing capital this year, with equity long/short and macro funds gaining ground over last year's private credit buzz.To subscribe to our substack click HEREFor a 14 day FREE Trial of Macabacus, click HEREShop our Self Paced Courses: Investment Banking & Private Equity Fundamentals HEREFixed Income Sales & Trading HERE Wealthfront.com/wss. This is a paid endorsement for Wealthfront. May not reflect others' experiences. Similar outcomes not guaranteed. Wealthfront Brokerage is not a bank. Rate subject to change. Promo terms apply. If eligible for the boosted rate of 4.15% offered in connection with this promo, the boosted rate is also subject to change if base rate decreases during the 3 month promo period.The Cash Account, which is not a deposit account, is offered by Wealthfront Brokerage LLC ("Wealthfront Brokerage"), Member FINRA/SIPC. Wealthfront Brokerage is not a bank. The Annual Percentage Yield ("APY") on cash deposits as of 11/7/25, is representative, requires no minimum, and may change at any time. The APY reflects the weighted average of deposit balances at participating Program Banks, which are not allocated equally. Wealthfront Brokerage sweeps cash balances to Program Banks, where they earn the variable APY. Sources HERE.

Bienvenue dans ce nouvel épisode de Private Equity Vox !

Ready to build freedom faster? Join the Ditch Wall Street: Build Freedom Faster with Vending, Real Estate & Infinite Banking Masterclass on February 10, 2026 (1:00–4:00 PM CT). Learn from Anthony Faso & Cameron Christiansen, Mike Hoffmann, and Dustin Heiner.

F2 is the AI platform for private markets investors, automating due diligence and portfolio monitoring workflows with agentic AI. After building ARK into a digital banking platform that scaled from tens of millions to tens of billions in loan volume, Donald Muir developed AI technology to automate debt placement on ARK's marketplace. When upmarket institutional lenders requested access to the AI for their entire deal flow—not just ARK's marketplace deals—Donald recognized the technology's standalone value. In this episode of BUILDERS, Donald shares how he's commercializing enterprise-grade AI for an industry where he personally spent years in the private equity bullpen, and how F2 is addressing the reliability and trust barriers that prevent AI adoption in high-stakes financial decision-making. Topics Discussed How F2 emerged from ARK's internal need to automate debt marketplace screening memos The technical approach to eliminating hallucination in Excel-based financial analysis Replicating private equity's "super day" interview format to prove AI capability with live deal data Sales team composition: hiring ex-finance professionals instead of traditional sales reps AI's role in evolving private equity analysts from menial tasks to system operators Product roadmap from due diligence to portfolio monitoring to deal syndication platform Maintaining operational independence while preserving strategic alignment with ARK GTM Lessons For B2B Founders Solve your own hardest problem first, then productize: Donald built F2's core technology to scale ARK's debt marketplace, focusing on the most difficult engineering challenge—reliable financial analysis of unstructured Excel data—because the marketplace required it. This resulted in technology that foundation models still haven't replicated over a year later. The aha moment came when institutional lenders wanted the AI for all their deal flow, not just marketplace transactions. Organic internal development created category-leading capabilities and validated product-market fit before commercialization. B2B founders should identify which internal operational challenges, if solved, could become standalone products serving the broader market. Design sales processes that mirror how your ICP evaluates talent: Donald replicated private equity's "super day" format where analyst candidates receive a data room, laptop without internet access, and three hours to produce an LBO model and investment thesis. F2 runs identical timed tests—customers send live deal data rooms under NDA, F2 generates investment committee memos using their templates, and presents same-day results. This proves the AI can perform at the standard funds use to evaluate human analysts they hire 18 months before start dates. B2B founders selling into industries with rigorous talent evaluation processes should reverse-engineer those frameworks into product demonstrations that speak to buyer expectations. Prioritize credibility over sales experience in technical markets: Donald's entire sales team consists of ex-finance professionals who lived in the seat—no traditional salespeople. These reps can screen-share investment memos created that morning and discuss them authentically with MDs and principals using industry-specific language. After 4.5 years running go-to-market at ARK, Donald teaches sales methodology to domain experts rather than teaching domain expertise to salespeople. For deals averaging half a billion dollars flowing through the platform, buyer credibility outweighs sales polish. B2B founders in specialized verticals should evaluate whether domain fluency or sales pedigree matters more for their specific buyer personas and deal complexity. Engineer for auditability before optimizing for speed: F2 focused on eliminating hallucination and achieving mathematical accuracy—solving what Donald calls the "reliability and trust" gap—before addressing workflow efficiency. The company name references the F2 keystroke used to audit Excel calculations at 3 AM in the PE bullpen. This positioning directly addresses the barrier preventing AI adoption for investment decisions: LLMs hallucinate, can't do math, and lack auditability. Only after proving the AI produces auditable, trustworthy output did F2 layer on speed benefits. B2B founders building for high-stakes decision environments should identify the fundamental trust barrier and make it the core technical focus before feature expansion. Leverage institutional knowledge as competitive differentiation: Beyond automating existing workflows, F2 enables firms to pipe in decades of institutional knowledge via API—instantly benchmarking new deals against thousands of historical transactions by vertical, revenue size, leverage levels, and management quality. This transforms screening memos from isolated analyses into context-rich evaluations informed by complete firm history. The AI doesn't just work faster; it has comprehensive context that individual analysts manually searching SharePoint folders could never access. B2B founders should identify where accumulated institutional data creates compounding value beyond point-in-time automation. // Sponsors: Front Lines — We help B2B tech companies launch, manage, and grow podcasts that drive demand, awareness, and thought leadership. www.FrontLines.io The Global Talent Co. — We help tech startups find, vet, hire, pay, and retain amazing marketing talent that costs 50-70% less than the US & Europe. www.GlobalTalent.co // Don't Miss: New Podcast Series — How I Hire Senior GTM leaders share the tactical hiring frameworks they use to build winning revenue teams. Hosted by Andy Mowat, who scaled 4 unicorns from $10M to $100M+ ARR and launched Whispered to help executives find their next role. Subscribe here: https://open.spotify.com/show/53yCHlPfLSMFimtv0riPyM

The Leveraged Buyout (LBO) is one of the most powerful and high-stakes tools in modern finance. It is the primary engine of the private equity (PE) industry, where a massive amount of debt is used to acquire a company, with the goal of restructuring it for a highly profitable exit.In this episode of Corporate Finance Explained on FinPod, we unpack the mechanics of the LBO, explore why debt is used as a management tool, and analyze the technical hurdles that separate multi-billion dollar wins from high-profile bankruptcies.The Fundamental Structure: Leverage as an EngineAn LBO is an acquisition funded by a small sliver of equity (usually 30%) and a massive layer of debt (usually 70%).The "Mortgage" Analogy: Much like buying a home with a small down payment, the PE firm uses leverage to control a much larger asset. However, in an LBO, the target company assumes the debt used for its own purchase, using its own assets as collateral. Magnifying Returns: Leverage acts as an amplifier. If a firm invests $10M in equity and the company's value grows by 50%, the return on that initial "small" equity check can skyrocket to 200% or 300% upon exit.The 4 Drivers of the LBO ModelBeyond just magnifying profit, the LBO structure forces a specific type of corporate behavior:Enhanced Equity Returns: Using "Other People's Money" (OPM) to minimize the sponsor's initial capital outlay.Disciplined Cash Flow Focus: Debt acts as a "deadline." Management is forced to ruthlessly cut waste and optimize operations to meet mandatory quarterly interest and principal payments.Strategic Flexibility: Taking a company private removes the "quarterly earnings" pressure of the public markets, allowing for long-term, painful restructurings (e.g., the Dell pivot).Multiple Expansion: The goal is to buy at a lower multiple (e.g., 6x EBITDA) and sell at a higher one (e.g., 8x EBITDA) after transforming the business into a lean, predictable machine.Success vs. Failure: Real-World Case StudiesThe Triumphs (Hilton & Dell):Hilton Hotels: Blackstone acquired Hilton in 2007, just before the financial crisis. Success came through digital transformation and a relentless focus on streamlining costs, proving that operational rigor, not just financial engineering, dictates success.Dell Technologies: Private capital allowed Michael Dell to execute a painful pivot from low-margin PCs to high-margin enterprise software without the public market "slaughtering" the stock price.The Cautionary Tale (Toys "R" Us):Took on over $5B in debt in 2005. As a low-margin, cyclical retail business, it couldn't generate enough cash to both service the debt and invest in e-commerce modernization. The debt didn't amplify success; it strangled the ability to adapt.The LBO Analytical ToolkitFinance teams stress-test deals using the LBO Model, which centers on several key technical mechanics:Debt Tranches: Modeling senior debt (low risk/cost, secured) vs. subordinated and mezzanine debt (higher risk/interest, unsecured). Cash Flow Coverage: Lenders obsess over the Debt-to-EBITDA ratio (how many years of cash flow it takes to pay off debt) and the Interest Coverage Ratio. The Exit Strategy: Success is modeled based on IRR (Internal Rate of Return), which is driven by EBITDA growth, debt pay-down, and exit multiple expansion.6 Elements of an Attractive LBO TargetStable, Predictable Cash Flow: Ideally "subscription-like" or defensive.Durable Competitive Advantage: To protect margins during the hold period.Operational Improvement Potential: A clear "fat-to-trim" or optimization thesis.Reasonable Leverage: Avoiding the "Toys R Us" trap of over-leveraging cyclical businesses.Clean Exit Strategy: A clear vision for a sale or IPO from Day 1.Realistic Assumptions: Stress-tested models that account for market downturns.

This week on Business Buying Strategies, we return to the behind-the-scenes recording of a live seminar where Jonathan Jay walks an audience of ambitious entrepreneurs through his proven approach to buying and growing businesses without using their own cash. Whether you're just getting started or you've tried the "DIY" route with limited results, this is a must-listen for anyone who wants a safer, smarter way to buy businesses. Jonathan breaks down: ✅ Why confidence matters more than cash — and how to build it ✅ What a leveraged buyout (LBO) really means in practical terms ✅ How to buy using seller finance, asset finance, invoice finance, and even the target business's own cash✅ Why he refuses to let clients sign personal guarantees — and what to do instead ✅ The truth about "no money down" deals — and why that term is misleading ✅ How to structure a deal that reduces risk and gets the seller paid ✅ Why most "rookie buyers" fail to get past deal sourcing — and how to go all the way to completion You'll also learn about the concept of the "deal jigsaw" — Jonathan's approach to combining multiple finance methods into one seamless, no-risk deal structure. Plus: How to pay yourself a deal fee at completion Why seller credibility is everything — and what to watch out for The 21-step roadmap Jonathan teaches to take you from ambition to acquisition How to secure exclusivity with sellers (and push away the competition) What to say during discovery calls and face-to-face meetings to maintain control of the process And why the best deals come from off-market businesses, not brokers Whether you're looking to make your first acquisition or scale through multiple deals, this episode delivers the strategic clarity most buyers never get.

Private equity is entering a period of adjustment after decades of expansion fueled by falling interest rates and abundant capital. That long-running tailwind reversed beginning in 2022, when interest rates rose sharply, disrupting deal activity, slowing exits, and bringing renewed attention to a long-standing vulnerability in private markets: liquidity. Industry reports have highlighted softer fundraising, longer holding periods, and growing pressure on pension funds and other long-term investors to generate cash distributions. At the same time, advances in AI, cloud computing, and on-demand development talent are lowering the cost of building companies, reshaping how entrepreneurship and private capital intersect.So, what happens to private equity—and to entrepreneurs—when liquidity dries up, valuations adjust quietly, and technology makes it cheaper than ever to build a business?Welcome to the fourth and final episode of our mini-series on the alternative asset market. Tuesdays with Morrisey host Adam Morrisey welcomes Dr. Ken Wiles, a clinical professor of finance and the Executive Director of the Private Equity Center at the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin. In this episode, we explore the evolution of private equity from the early LBO era to today's liquidity constraints, and why Dr. Ken believes this is the best time in history to be an entrepreneur.With decades of experience spanning investment banking, software, restructuring, and academia, Dr. Ken brings a rare blend of practitioner and academic insight into private markets.Top TakeawaysDr. Ken explains how lower discount rates, the development of the junk bond market, and abundant inefficiencies in the 1980s created the perfect runway for PE to grow from a niche into a $22T asset class.When the Fed raised rates at the fastest pace in its history, valuations dropped sharply. Unlike public markets, however, private-market declines play out quietly. Fundraising slowed, deal flow fell, and many firms extended maturities, restructured portfolios, or “extended and pretended” — largely out of view of anyone outside the industry.“Liquidity doesn't matter until it does and then it's the only thing that matters.” According to Dr. Ken, liquidity is the biggest risk in private equity today. Pension plans, which provide two-thirds of all PE capital, aren't receiving distributions as quickly. Without liquidity, returns fall, fundraising slows, and many funds will struggle to raise their next fund, which may lead to consolidation across PE and VC.Dr. Ken sees the rise of new technologies leading to a new golden age in entrepreneurship. “This is the  greatest period to be an entrepreneur or have an idea in history. It's amazing. Thanks to AI, cloud infrastructure, and on-demand development talent, the cost of building a company has collapsed. Tasks that once required millions and large teams can now be executed by small groups in weeks. Barriers to entry have never been lower.”Topics CoveredThe origins and evolution of private equityThe impact of interest rates on four decades of private equity returnsThe 2022–2024 “private market crash” no one sawLiquidity challenges and their impact on pensions and fundsHow private credit prevented a maturity crisisManipulated unicorn valuations and extend-and-pretend dynamicsThe new economics of entrepreneurship in an AI-enabled worldCollege students, AI, and modern career preparationThe shrinking operating costs of building softwareEntrepreneurship through acquisition and the rise of search fundsWhy more businesses will be built with smaller teamsThe growing consolidation of trades, CPA firms, and local service businessesThe future of private equity, venture capital, and public markets interplayDr. Ken Wiles is a Clinical Professor of Finance at the University of Texas at Austin and Executive Director of the Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst Center for Private Equity Finance at McCombs, where he focuses on private equity, valuation, and corporate finance. He brings decades of practitioner experience as a former COO and CFO of multiple companies, including firms taken public and one sold to Oracle, as well as a leader of restructuring, investment banking, and asset management firms. Widely published in leading academic and practitioner journals and a former chair of the Nevada Economic Forum, Dr. Ken also serves on investment committees and boards, bridging academic insight with real-world private market expertise.

Dans cet épisode, je reçois Nicolas Macquin, président et cofondateur d'Archinvest, pour une plongée passionnante dans l'envers du décor du private equity et de l'émergence d'un nouveau modèle d'accès aux marchés privés pour les investisseurs privés.Nous avons parlé :De son parcours de 25 ans, des débuts du private equity artisanal en Europe à la montée en puissance de stratégies plus sophistiquées.De l'évolution majeure du private equity en deux décennies: d'un métier d'artisans et de relations à une industrie mondialisée, professionnalisée et digitalisée. De la genèse d'Archinvest, société de gestion née du constat qu'il était essentiel de faciliter l'accès au private equity pour les investisseurs privés.De son expérience unique avec la diaspora française – un réseau mondial d'entrepreneurs expatriés extrêmement résilients et créatifs, souvent derrière des succès colossaux aux États-Unis ou en Asie.De la construction d'un portefeuille non coté : diversification, choix des stratégies, liquidité, risques, allocation long terme et arbitrages entre LBO, dette privée, secondaire et co-investissement.De l'importance de la confiance, de la pédagogie et de l'accompagnement pour les conseillers en gestion de patrimoine et family offices encore hésitants face à cette classe d'actifs.De la question de la liquidité : fonds fermés, évolution vers le semi-liquide, limites structurelles du modèle et état réel du marché secondaire.Un échange riche en retours d'expérience qui éclaire la transformation profonde du private equity, son ouverture au retail et la manière dont un nouvel acteur comme Archinvest cherche à démocratiser l'accès à des gérants d'excellence tout en restant fidèle à l'ADN d'investisseurs.En fin d'épisode, la recommandation de Nicolas :“Les Cavaliers” de Joseph KesselLiens utiles: Nicolas Macquin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/nicolas-macquin/ Archinvest: https://www.archinvest.am/ ***************************AvertissementArchinvest est une société de gestion agréée par l'AMF sous le numéro GP-202221. L'investissement dans les fonds Archinvest est réservé exclusivement aux investisseurs avertis tels que définis dans la documentation juridique des fonds Archinvest.Un investissement dans un fonds peut comporter des risques significatifs, notamment de perte totale ou partielle de capital, du fait, entre autres, de la nature des investissements que le fonds envisage de réaliser. Il ne peut donc y avoir aucune assurance que le taux de rendement attendu du fonds puisse être atteint ou même que le fonds puisse, à son terme, restituer aux porteurs de parts le montant du capital qu'ils ont versé. Les performances passées ne sont notamment pas un indicateur fiable de performances futures. Les investisseurs doivent donc posséder les capacités et les moyens financiers d'accepter les risques et l'absence de liquidité qui sont les caractéristiques des investissements décrits dans cette présentation.Toutes les informations présentées sont des opinions et interprétations propres à Archinvest. Les critères d'investissement et les règles de fonctionnement des fonds présentés par Archinvest sont disponibles sur demande dans la documentation juridique qui prévaut sur les termes de la présente vidéo.Cette vidéo est un support commercial.***************************Finscale, c'est bien plus qu'un podcast. C'est un écosystème qui connecte les acteurs clés du secteur financier à travers du Networking, du coaching et des partenariats.

FNaF 2 crushes box office expectations, proving (again) that game IP owns Hollywood. We break down Matthew Ball's take on the EA/PIF deal, why 93% ownership signals a sports-media empire play, not an LBO, and why the press got the story wrong.Then: the Nex Playground, a $200 kids' console that quietly outsold PS5 in November. Is this the next underserved frontier in family gaming?We also tear into UA financing schemes masquerading as “cohort funding.” Spoiler: the effective interest rates rhyme with credit-card debt, and studios have died using them.Call of Duty launches an apology tour for Black Ops 7 and vows to stop annualized crunch. We assess the odds.And we close with AppLovin beating Google on Android e-commerce ads, inside Google's own OS. A massive signal for the future of UA as e-comm competition starts eating the gaming pie.

Vincent Klingbeil fait partie de ces personnes ambitieuses et profondément humaines. Ancien avocat d'affaires, il se lance dans l'aventure entrepreneuriale et revend sa première société Ametix au groupe La Poste pour près de 30 millions d'euros. Le vendredi, il signe la cession, le lundi, il crée European Digital Group. Avec EDG, Vincent veut réunir les meilleurs spécialistes du Digital IT. Son objectif, acquérir et fédérer les entreprises du marché comme personne ne l'a encore fait. En 6 ans les statistiques sont époustouflantes : 2 600 collaborateurs, 320 millions d'euros de chiffre d'affaires et 50 millions d'EBITDA. Son modèle unique l'est tout autant avec 300 collaborateurs actionnaires du groupe et 50 entrepreneurs associés. Pour réussir, Vincent Klingbeil a su s'entourer des fonds les plus prestigieux afin de construire un écosystème capable de peser durablement sur la scène européenne. Il démarre avec Montefiore, l'un des fonds les plus performants d'Europe avec ses 20% de TRI par an puis plus récemment avec Latour Capital. Deux mastodontes qui ne misent pas uniquement sur les bilans, mais sur la force intérieure de ceux qui les construisent. Des investisseurs capables de reconnaître, en un regard, la rareté d'un entrepreneur qui exécute vite, juste et loin. Et c'est précisément ce regard-là qu'ils portent sur Vincent, car sa manière de penser l'entreprise dépasse le simple cadre du business. Pour lui, l'entrepreneuriat est une suite d'équations à résoudre. Comme une partie d'échecs, un juste équilibre entre instinct, analytique, émotions et vision stratégique. Son ambition est simple : faire grandir son groupe avec ceux qui l'entourent grâce à un épanouissement total. Dans cet épisode, il partage son histoire, la réalité du modèle LBO, la puissance de l'actionnariat salarié et l'ambition internationale d'EDG, aujourd'hui présent dans dix pays. Bonne écoute !===========================

Sean Mooney, Doug McCormick, and Lloyd Metz dissect the gap between textbook valuation methods and what actually happens when private equity firms decide what to pay for a business. They compare DCF models to LBO models, debate the usefulness of terminal value assumptions, and explain why market-based approaches trump theoretical frameworks. The conversation reveals how deal psychology, credit availability, and real-world capital structures shape valuation decisions far more than any spreadsheet ever could.For more information on the podcast, visit bestbutneverfinal.buzzsprout.com and embark on your journey to private equity excellence today.Visit us on LinkedIn at https://www.linkedin.com/company/best-but-never-final-podcast/Visit us on Instagram at https://www.instagram.com/bestbutneverfinal/For information on HCI Equity Partners, go to https://www.hciequity.comFor information on ICV Partners, go to https://www.icvpartners.comFor information on BluWave, go to https://www.bluwave.net

Katie and Matt discuss JPMorgan’s new headquarters, in-office pubs, in-office gyms, the JPMorgan District, specialist fine-tuning of AI models, pls fix memes, crushing investment banking analysts’ hopes and dreams, the craft of building LBO models, credit cockroaches and indirect lending.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Take 20% off an annual Storm subscription through 10/22/2025 to receive 100% of the newsletter's content. Thank you for your support of independent ski journalism.WhoPhill Gross, owner, and Mike Solimano, CEO of Killington and Pico, VermontRecorded onJuly 10, 2025About KillingtonClick here for a mountain stats overviewOwned by: Phill Gross and teamLocated in: Killington, VermontYear founded: 1958Pass affiliations: Ikon Pass: 5 or 7 combined days with PicoReciprocal partners: Pico access is included on all Killington passesClosest neighboring ski areas: Pico (:12), Saskadena Six (:39), Okemo (:40), Quechee (:44), Ascutney (:55), Storrs (:59), Harrington Hill (:59), Magic (1:00), Whaleback (1:02), Sugarbush (1:04), Bromley (1:04), Middlebury Snowbowl (1:08), Arrowhead (1:10), Mad River Glen (1:11)Base elevation: 1,165 feet at Skyeship BaseSummit elevation: 4,142 feet at top of K-1 gondola (hike-to summit of Killington Peak at 4,241 feet)Vertical drop: 2,977 feet lift-served, 3,076 hike-toSkiable Acres: 1,509Average annual snowfall: 250 inchesTrail count: 155 (43% advanced/expert, 40% intermediate, 17% beginner)Lift count: 20 (2 gondolas, 2 six-packs, 4 high-speed quads, 5 fixed-grip quads, 2 triples, 1 double, 1 platter, 3 carpets - view Lift Blog's inventory of Killington's lift fleet; Killington plans to replace the Snowdon triple with a fixed-grip quad for the 2026-27 ski season)History: from New England Ski HistoryAbout PicoClick here for a mountain stats overviewOwned by: Phill Gross and teamLocated in: Mendon, VermontYear founded: 1934Pass affiliations: Ikon Pass: 5 or 7 combined days with KillingtonReciprocal partners: Pico access is included on all Killington passes; four days Killington access included on Pico K.A. PassClosest neighboring ski areas: Killington (:12), Saskadena Six (:38), Okemo (:38), Quechee (:42), Ascutney (:53), Storrs (:57), Harrington Hill (:55), Magic (:58), Whaleback (1:00), Sugarbush (1:01), Bromley (1:00), Middlebury Snowbowl (1:01), Mad River Glen (1:07), Arrowhead (1:09)Base elevation: 2,000 feetSummit elevation: 3,967 feetVertical drop: 1,967 feetSkiable Acres: 468Average annual snowfall: 250 inchesTrail count: 58 (36% advanced/expert, 46% intermediate, 18% beginner)Lift count: 7 (2 high-speed quads, 2 triples, 1 doubles, 2 carpets - view Lift Blog's inventory of Pico's lift fleet)History: from New England Ski HistoryWhy I interviewed themThe longest-tenured non-government ski area operator in America, as far as I know, is the Seeholzer family, owner-operators of Beaver Mountain, Utah since 1939. Third-generation owner Travis Seeholzer came on the pod a few years back to trace the eight-decade arc from this dude flexing 10-foot-long kamikaze boards to the present:Just about every ski area in America was hacked out of the wilderness by Some Guy Who Looked Like That. Dave McCoy at Mammoth or Ernie Blake at Taos or Everett Kircher at Boyne Mountain, swarthy, willful fellows who flew airplanes and erected rudimentary chairlifts in impossible places and hammered together their own baselodges. Over decades they chiseled these mountains into their personal Rushmores, a life's work, a human soul knotted to nature in a built place that would endure for generations.It's possible that they all imagined their family name governing those generations. In the remarkable case of Boyne, they still do. But the Kirchers and the Seeholzers are ski-world exceptions. Successive generations are often uninterested in the chore of legacy building. Or they try and say wow this is expensive. Or bad weather leads to bad financial choices by our cigar-smoking, backhoe-driving, machete-wielding founder and his sons and daughters never get their chance. The ski area's deed shuffles into the portfolio of a Colorado Skico and McCoy fades a little each year and at some point Mammoth is just another ski area owned by Alterra Mountain Company.It's tempting to sentimentalize the past, to lament skiing's macro-transition from gritty network of founder-kingpin fifes to set of corporate brands, to conclude that “this generation” just doesn't have the tenacity of a Blake or a McCoy. But the America where a fellow could turn up with a dump truck and a chainsaw and flatten raw forest into a for-profit business with minimal protest is gone. Every part of the ski ecosystem is more regulated, complicated, and expensive than it's ever been. The appeal of running such a machine - and the skillset necessary to do so - is entirely different from that of sculpting your own personal snow Narnia from scratch. We will always have family-owned ski areas (we still have hundreds), and an occasional modern founder-disruptor like Mount Bohemia's Lonie Glieberman will materialize like a new X-man. But ski conglomerates have probably always been inevitable, and are probably largely the industry's future. They are best suited, in most cases, to manage, finance, and maintain the vast machinery of our largest ski centers (and also to create a ski landscape in which not all ski area operators are Some Guy Who Looked Like That).Killington demonstrates this arc from rambunctious founder to corporate vassal as well as any mountain in the country. Founded in 1958 by the wily and wild Pres Smith, the ski area's parent company, Sherburne Corp., bought Sunday River, Maine in 1973 and Mount Snow, Vermont in 1977. The two Vermont mountains became S-K-I in 1984, bought five more ski areas, and merged with four-resort LBO in 1996 to become the titanic American Skiing Company. Unfortunately ASC turned out to be skiing's Titanic, and one of the company's last acts before dissolution was to sell Killington and Pico to Utah-based Powdr in 2007.The Beast had been tamed, at least on paper. Corporate ownership of some sort felt as stapled to the mountain as Killington's 3,000 snowguns. And mostly, well, it didn't matter. Other than Powdr's disastrous attempts to shorten the resort's famously long seasons, Killington never lost its feisty edge. Over the decades the ski area modernized, masterplanned, and shed skier volume while increasing its viability as a business. Modern Killington wasn't the kingdom of a charismatic and ever-present founder, but it was a pretty good ski area.And then, suddenly, shockingly, Powdr sold both Killington and Pico last August. And they didn't sell the ski areas to Vail or Alterra or Boyne or to anyone who owned any ski areas at all. Instead, a group of local investors - led by Phill Gross and Michael Ferri, longtime Killington homeowners who ran a variety of non-ski-related businesses - bought the mountains. After 51 years as part of a multi-mountain ownership group, Killington (its relationship to neighboring Pico notwithstanding), was once again independent.It was all so improbable. Out-of-state operators had purchased five of Vermont's large ski areas in recent years: Colorado-based Vail Resorts bought Stowe in 2017, Okemo in 2018, and Mount Snow in 2019; Denver-based Alterra claimed Sugarbush in 2019; and Utah-based Pacific Group Resorts added Jay Peak to their small portfolio in 2022. Very few ski areas have ever entered the corporate matrix and re-emerged as independents. Grand Targhee, Wyoming; Waterville Valley, New Hampshire; and Mountain Creek, New Jersey (technically owned by multimountain operator Snow Partners) are exceptions spun off from larger companies. But mostly, once a larger entity absorbed a ski area, it stays locked in the multimountain universe forever.So what would this mean? For the largest and busiest mountain in the eastern United States to be independent? Did this, along with Powdr's intentions to sell Mount Bachelor (since rescinded), Eldora (sale in process), and Silver Star (no update), mark a reversal in the consolidation trend that had gathered 30 percent of America's ski areas under the umbrella of a multi-mountain operator? Did Killington's group of wealthy-but-not-Bezos-wealthy investors set an alternate blueprint for large-mountain ownership, especially when considered alongside the sale of Jackson Hole to a similar group the year before? Had the Ikon Pass – that harbinger of mass-market pass domination that had forced the we-better-join-them sales of Crystal Mountain, Washington and Sugarbush – inadvertently become a reliable revenue pipeline that made independence more viable? And would Killington, well-managed and constantly improving, backslide under cowboy owners who want to Q-Burke the place in their image?We're a year in now, and we have some clarity on these questions, along with two new chairlifts (Superstar this year, Snowdon next), 1,000 new snowguns, a revitalized Skyeship Gondola, and progressing plans on the East's first true ski village. Locals seem happy, management seems happy, the owners seem happy. Easy enough, Gross points out in our interview, when winter hits deep like the last one did. But can we keep the party going indefinitely? It was time for a check-in.What we talked aboutA strong first winter under independent ownership; what spring skiing off Canyon lift told us about the importance of Superstar; “it's an incredibly complex operation”; letting the smart people do their jobs; Killington's surprise spin-off from a multi-mountain operator; “our job is to keep the honeymoon going”; Superstar's six-pack upgrade; why six-packs are probably Killington's lift-upgrade future; why Pico is demolishing the Bonanza lift for a covered carpet; why Superstar won't have bubbles; where bubbles might make sense in a future lift; why ski areas can no longer run snowmaking under newly constructed chairlifts; why Superstar is a Doppelmayr machine after Killington installed a brand-new Leitner-Poma six at Snowdon in 2018; long- and short-term Superstar impacts to Killington's long season; long-term thoughts around early-season walkway access to North Ridge; Skyeship Gondola upgrades, including $5 million in new cabins; what 1,000 new snowguns means in practice; why Killington sold the Wobbly Barn; considering Killington as a business and investment; how Killington is a different financial beast from other Vermont ski areas; how close Killington was to going unlimited on Ikon Pass; Phill's journey to buying Killington; Devil's Fiddle and why sometimes things that don't make sense financially make sense anyway; “we want to own this for generations to come”; a village layout and timeline update – “we want to make sure that this is something that's additive to the ski experience” even if you don't own within it; “Great Gulf wants this [village] to be competitive for the western resorts”; “we don't want to change what Pico is”; how piping water over from Killington has reinvigorated and stabilized Pico; why Killington and Pico remained on Ikon Pass post-sale and probably will for the foreseeable future; is Ikon helping big ski areas stay independent?; Killington's steady rise in lift ticket prices; future lift upgrades and why the Snowdon Triple is next up for a replacement.What I got wrong* File “opinionation” under LOL I'm Dumb Talking Is Hard* I said that former Killington owner Powdr had “just sold” Eldora, but that's not accurate: in July, the town of Nederland, Colorado, announced their intent to purchase the ski area. The sales process is ongoing.Podcast NotesOn previous Killington podsOn Gross' purchase of Killington and PicoOn ANSI chairlift standardsWe get a bit in the weeds with a reference to “ANSI standards” for chairlifts. ANSI is the American National Standards Institute, a nonprofit organization that sets voluntary but widely adopted standards for everything from office furniture to electrical systems to safety signage in the United States. The ANSI standard for lifts, according to a blog post describing the code's 2022 update, is “developed by the National Ski Areas Association (NSAA), [and] establishes standard requirements for the design, manufacture, construction, operation, and maintenance of passenger ropeways.” On Killington's long seasonsKillington often opens in October (though it has not done so since 2018), and closes in June (three straight years before a deliberately truncated 2024-25 season to begin demolition of the Superstar chair). List of Killington open and close dates since 1987-88.On Win Smith and Killington and SugarbushOn Killington's villageThe East needs more of this:On Killington's peak lift ticket pricesPer New England Ski History:The Storm explores the world of lift-served skiing year round. Join us. Get full access to The Storm Skiing Journal and Podcast at www.stormskiing.com/subscribe

With Morgan Stanley's European Leveraged Finance Conference underway, our Head of Corporate Credit Research Andrew Sheets joins Chief Fixed Income Strategist Vishy Tirupattur to discuss private credit, M&A activity and AI infrastructure.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript ----- Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Head of Corporate Credit Research at Morgan StanleyVishy Tirupattur: And I'm Vishy Tirupattur, Morgan Stanley's Chief Fixed Income Strategist.Andrew Sheets: Today, as we're hosting the Morgan Stanley European Leveraged Finance Conference, a discussion of three of the biggest topics on the minds of credit investors worldwide.It's Thursday, October 16th at 4pm in London.Vishy, it's so great to catch up with you here in London. I know you've been running around the world, quite literally, talking to investors about some of the biggest debates in credit – and that's exactly what we wanted to talk. We're here at Morgan Stanley's European Leveraged Finance Conference. We're talking with investors about the biggest debates, the biggest developments in credit markets, and there are really kind of three topics that stand out.There's what's going on with private credit? What's going on with the merger and acquisition, the M&A cycle? And how are we going to fund all of this AI infrastructure?And so maybe I'll throw the first question to you. We hear a lot about private credit, and so maybe just for the listener who's looking at a lot of different things. First, how do you define it? What are we really talking about when we're talking about private credit?Vishy Tirupattur: So, Andrew, when we talk about private credit, the most common understanding of private credit is lending by non-banks to small and medium sized companies. And we probably will discuss a bit later that this definition is actually expanding much beyond this narrow definition. So, when you think about private credit and spend time understanding what is the credit in private credit, what it boils down to is on average, on a leveraged basis, the credit in private credit is comparable to, say CCC to B - on a coverage basis to the public markets.So, the credits in the private credit market are weaker. But on the other hand, the quality of covenants in these deals is significantly better compared to the public credit markets. So, that's the credit in private credit.Andrew Sheets: So, Vishy, with that in mind then, what is the concern in this market? Or conversely, where do people see the opportunity?Vishy Tirupattur: So, the concern in this market comes from the opaqueness in these deals. Many of these private credit borrowers are not public filers. So not much is well known about what the underlying details are. But in a sense, a good part of the public markets, whether it's in high yield bonds or in the public, broadly syndicated leveraged loans are also not public filers. So, there is information asymmetry in those markets as well.So, the issue is not the opaqueness of private markets, but opaqueness in credit in general. But that said, when you look at the metrics of leverage, coverage, cash on balance sheet…Andrew Sheets: Because we can get some kind of high-level sense of what is in these portfolios...Vishy Tirupattur: Yeah. And we look at all those metrics, and we look at a wide range of metrics. We don't get to the conclusion that we are at a precipice of some systemic risk exposure in credit. On the other hand, there are idiosyncratic issues. And these idiosyncratic issues have always been there and will remain there. And we would expect that the default rates are sticky around these levels, which are slightly above the long-term average levels, and we expect that to remain.Andrew Sheets: So, you may see more dispersion within these portfolios. These are weaker, more cyclical, more levered companies. But overall, this is not something that we think at the moment is going to interrupt the credit cycle or the broader markets dynamic.Vishy Tirupattur: Absolutely. That is exactly where we come down to.So, Andrew, let me throw another question back at you. There's a lot of talk of growing M&A, growing LBO activity. And that could potentially lead to some challenges on the credit front. How do you look at it?Andrew Sheets: So, I'd like to actually build upon your answer from private credit, right? Because I think a lot of the questions that we're getting from investors are around this question of how far along in this always, kind of, cyclical process; ebb and flow of lending aggressiveness are we? And, you know, this is a cycle that goes back a hundred years – of lenders becoming more conservative and tighter with lending. And then as times get good, they become somewhat looser. And initially that's fine. And then eventually something, something happens.And so, I think we've seen the development of new markets like private credit that have opened up new lending opportunities and then also new questions. And I think we've also seen this question come up around M&A and corporate activity.And as we start to see headlines of very large leveraged buyouts or LBOs, as we start to see more merger and acquisition – M&A – activity coming back; something we've at Morgan Stanley been believers in. Are we really starting to see the things that we saw in the year 2000, or in the year 2007, when you saw very active capital markets actually coinciding with kind of near the peak of equity markets near the top of major market cycles.And in short, we do not think we're there yet. If we look at the actual volumes that we're seeing, we're actually a little bit below average in terms of corporate activity. There's really been a dearth of corporate activity after COVID. We're still catching up. Secondly, the big transactions that we're seeing are still more conservatively structured, which isn't usually what you see right at the end. And so, I think between these two things with still a lot of supportive factors for more corporate activity, we think we have further to go.Vishy Tirupattur: On that point, Andrew, I think if you look at the LBOs that are happening today versus the LBOs that happened in the 2007 era, the equity contribution is dramatically different. You know, equity to debt, these LBOs that are happening today [are] of a substantially higher amount of equity contribution compared to the LBOs we saw pre-Financial Crisis…Andrew Sheets: That's such a great point. And the listener may not know this, but Vishy and I were working together at Morgan Stanley prior to the Financial Crisis, and we were working in credit research when a lot of these LBOs were happening, and…Vishy Tirupattur: And I used to be tall and good looking.Andrew Sheets: (laughs) And they were just very different. We're still not there. If you go back and pull the numbers, you're looking at transactions still that are far more conservative than what we saw then. So, you know, this activity is cyclical, and I think we do have to watch deregulation, right? You saw a lot of regulations come in after the Financial Crisis that led to more conservative lending. If those regulations get rolled back, we could really move back towards more aggressive lending. But we haven't quite seen that yet.Vishy Tirupattur: Absolutely not.Andrew Sheets: And Vishy, maybe the third question that comes up a lot. We've covered private credit, which is very topical. We've covered kind of corporate aggressiveness. But maybe the icing on the cake. The biggest question is AI – and is AI spending?And it just feels like every day you come into the office and there's another headline on CNBC or Bloomberg about another mega AI funding deal. And the question is, okay, where's all that money going to come from?And maybe some of it comes from these companies themselves. They're very profitable, but credit might have to fill in some of the gaps. And you and some of our colleagues have done a lot of work on this. Where do you think kind of the lending story and the borrowing story fits into this broader AI theme?Vishy Tirupattur: Our estimate of simply data center related CapEx requirements are close to $3 trillion. You add the power required for the data centers and add another $300-400 billion. So, a lot of this CapEx will come from – roughly about half might come from the operating cash flows of the hyperscalers. But the rest, so [$]1.5 trillion plus, has to come through various channels of credit.So, unsecured corporate credit, we think will play a fairly small role in this. Of that [$]1.5 trillion plus, maybe [$]200 billion to come from unsecured credit issuance by these hyperscalers, and perhaps some of the securitized markets, such as ABS and CMBS that rely on stabilized cash flows may be another 1[$]50 billion. But a different version of private credit, what we will call ABF or asset based finance, will play a very big role. So north of [$]800 billion we think will come from that kind of a private credit version of investment grade, or a private credit markets developing. So, this market is very much in the developmental mode.So, one way or the other, for AI to go from where it is today to substantially improving productivity and the earnings of companies that has to go through CapEx; and that CapEx needs to go through credit markets.Andrew Sheets: And I think that is so fascinating because, right Vishy, so much of the spending is still ahead of us. It hasn't even really started, if you look at the numbers.Vishy Tirupattur: Absolutely. We are in the early stages of this CapEx cycle. We should expect to see a lot more CapEx and that CapEx train has to run through credit markets.Andrew Sheets: So, Vishy, there's obviously a lot of history in financial markets of larger CapEx booms, and some of them work out well, and some of them don't. I mean, if you are trying to think about some of the dynamics of this funding for AI and data centers more broadly versus some of these other CapEx cycles that investors might be familiar with. Are there some similar dynamics and some key differences that you try to keep in mind?Vishy Tirupattur: So, in terms of similarities, you know, they're big numbers, whichever way you cut it, these numbers are going to be big dollar numbers.But there are substantial differences between the most recent CapEx boom that we saw towards the end of the late 90s, early 2000s; we saw a massive telecom boom, telecom related CapEx. The big difference is that spending was done by – predominantly by companies that had put debt on their balance sheet. They were already very leveraged. They were just barely investment grade or some below investment grade companies with not much cash on their balance sheet.And you contrast that with today's world, much of this is being done by highly rated companies; the hyperscalers or between, you know, A+ to AAA rated companies, with a lot of cash on their balance sheets and with very little outstanding debt on their part.On top of that, the kind of channels that exist today, you know, data center, ABS and CMBS, asset-based finance, joint venture kind of financing. All of these channels were simply not available back then. And the fact that they all are available today means that this risk of CapEx is actually much more widely distributed.So that makes me feel a lot better about the evolution of this CapEx cycle compared to the most recent one we saw.Andrew Sheets: Private credit, a rise in M&A and a very active funding market for AI. Three big topics that are defining the credit debate today. Vishy, thanks for taking the time to talk.Vishy Tirupattur: Andrew, always fun to hang with youAndrew Sheets: And thank you for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us review wherever you listen and tell a friend or colleague about us today.

Linktree: ⁠https://linktr.ee/Analytic⁠Join The Normandy For Additional Bonus Audio And Visual Content For All Things Nme+! Join Here: ⁠https://ow.ly/msoH50WCu0K⁠Join Analytic Dreamz on Notorious Mass Effect for a deep dive into EA's historic $55 billion buyout by Saudi PIF, Silver Lake, and Affinity Partners. Analytic Dreamz unpacks the largest private equity LBO ever, with $20B debt and $210/share premium. Explore EA's $7.5B revenue, franchises like EA Sports FC, and risks of layoffs, microtransaction focus, and creative stagnation. Analytic Dreamz breaks down analyst views, gamer backlash, ethical concerns, and AI-driven shifts, offering a data-rich look at gaming's biggest deal and its impact on the $500B industry. Support this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/analytic-dreamz-notorious-mass-effect/donationsAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

structure and context of a potential $55 billion leveraged buyout (LBO) of the major gaming company Electronic Arts (EA), which could become one of the largest LBOs in history. It explains the mechanics of the deal, including fundamental concepts like private equity and going private, often using the analogy of a house mortgage to clarify the role of equity versus debt financing. Key players in the purchasing consortium are identified, notably Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF) and private equity firm Silver Lake, with the text also detailing the deal size, the per-share premium offered to shareholders, and the anticipated closing timeline. Finally, the text explores the rationale for the acquisition, focusing on EA's stable franchises and the potential for greater flexibility away from public market scrutiny, while also discussing the significant risks and criticisms, such as the heavy debt burden and regulatory concerns related to foreign investment.

Episode 112: Topics discussed: The LBO of Electronics Arts.  Games discussed: Battlefield 6 Beta, Battlefield 1 (2016) and Metal Garden Metal Garden: https://store.steampowered.com/app/3539440/Metal_Garden/ EA's 10-K: https://ir.ea.com/financials/sec-filings/sec-filings-details/default.aspx?FilingId=18460069 Songs: Battlefield One, Mud And Blood (from Battlefield 1 Original Soundtrack), Metal Garden OST 04 - Lesser Titanomachy and Metal Garden OST 05 - Descend to Ceiling (from Metal Garden OST).   Join the Discord: https://discord.gg/vG2PgRpY55 Sticky Buttons Blog: https://stickybuttonsblog.pika.page/ Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCSJvGgcb44cEp6nQrMxCz1g TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@thestickybuttonspod?_t=ZT-8yMoXlJRAsQ&_r=1 Blake can be found on Instagram, Bluesky and Twitch @ handheldblake   Please consider subscribing to the Patreon, any support goes a long way to helping the show grow! https://www.patreon.com/thestickybuttonspod This show was founded in 2019 by Blake McKean and Brandon Prenz

【政治、利益與權力的遊戲】特朗普女婿引入沙地主權基金槓桿收購美國第三大遊戲開發商 EA ，也是近來動作頻頻的銀湖資本（Silver Lake）被點名入股美國 TikTok 後又一大交易。Q1：本次收購案的標的和作價為何？A1： 此次合併收購的標的是遊戲公司 EA Sports，作價為 550 億美金 。Q2：收購方的主要參與者是哪些？ A2： 這次收購由多方撮合與參與，包括：* 傑瑞德·庫什納 (Jared Kushner) (特朗普的女婿)，透過其設立的 Affinity Partners 基金 。* 銀湖資本 (Silver Lake) 。* 沙地阿拉伯國家主權投資基金 。Q3：這宗交易有何特別之處？A3： 除了涉及美國前總統的女婿外，它是一宗 槓桿收購 (Leveraged Buyout, LBO) 。其中，200 億美金的資金是透過融資借貸而來由摩根大通 (JP Morgan) 貸款，並以被收購公司 EA 作為抵押品 。這將使 EA 增加 200 億的負債 。Q4：收購方對 EA 的投資策略為何？A4： 參與的基金，特別是銀湖資本，通常不會「坐貨」太久，其目的主要是想賺取差價，而非長期投資。他們會考慮「善價而沽」並設有退出策略 (exit strategy) 。Q5：槓桿收購（LBO）對 EA 的盈利能力有何影響？A5： 雖然 EA 去年盈利超過 11 億美金 ，但加上 200 億美金的債務後，每年需支付的利息將大幅壓縮其盈利能力 。Q6：遊戲行業在媒體領域的重要性如何？A6： 遊戲行業在當今的整個媒體行業中是一個非常重要的元素，例如迪士尼 (Disney) 也需要與遊戲開發商合作 。遊戲市場也已高度整合 (consolidate)，例如主要的平台集中在索尼 (Sony) 的 PlayStation 和任天堂 (Nintendo) 的 Switch 。Q7：這次收購案在監管上可能面臨哪些問題？A7： 這次收購涉及多方對不同領域（如 TikTok、EA Sports、多個遊戲開發商）的控制，屬於橫向收購 。從法規上來說，這類收購比起垂直併購更可能構成市場支配地位，很容易觸發反壟斷調查 。同時，由於涉及外資（沙地），也需通過美國外資投資委員會 (CFIUS) 的國家安全審核 。Q8：沙地阿拉伯積極收購遊戲資產的戰略意圖是什麼？A8： 沙地主權基金近年非常積極收購電競專案，並在多家電玩公司如卡普空 (Capcom)、任天堂 (Nintendo) 等持有股份 。雖然沙地可能透過軟實力來推動產業並提升國家形象，但暫時未見到玩電競的人會因此對阿拉伯國家改觀 。最終，這場政治博弈很可能仍需從商業角度來理解 。 This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit leesimon.substack.com/subscribe

(0:00) Bestie intros! (1:53) EA acquired for $55B in biggest LBO ever, why PE is in trouble (17:42) IPO market, SPAC 2.0 (27:41) The AI rollup opportunity (36:01) Sacks joins the show! (38:27) OpenAI and Meta launch short-form video apps: "AI Slop" or the future of content? (45:04) Open source AI: DeepSeek's new model, pressure on US AI industry (1:05:11) State AI regulation frenzy: States' rights vs Federal control, overregulation Follow the besties: https://x.com/chamath https://x.com/Jason https://x.com/DavidSacks https://x.com/friedberg Follow on X: https://x.com/theallinpod Follow on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/theallinpod Follow on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@theallinpod Follow on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/allinpod Intro Music Credit: https://rb.gy/tppkzl https://x.com/yung_spielburg Intro Video Credit: https://x.com/TheZachEffect Referenced in the show: https://apnews.com/article/ea-electronic-arts-video-game-silver-lake-pif-d17dc7dd3412a990d2c0a6758aaa6900 https://www.ign.com/articles/xbox-game-pass-ultimate-price-rises-to-30-a-month-microsoft-adds-more-day-one-games-and-throws-in-fortnite-crew-and-ubisoft-classics-to-help-justify-the-cost https://x.com/Jason/status/1973461806585966655 https://www.npr.org/2025/09/05/nx-s1-5529404/anthropic-settlement-authors-copyright-ai https://x.com/scaling01/status/1972650237266465214 https://www.insidetechlaw.com/blog/2025/09/californias-transparency-in-frontier-artificial-intelligence-act https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/google-withdraws-rezoning-proposal-for-468-acre-data-center-project-in-franklin-township-indianapolis

Send us a textTwo days into a government shutdown, we break down what it actually means for markets when key data go dark—like today's missing non-farm payrolls—and how that uncertainty can ricochet through trading desks, air travel, the SEC/IPO pipeline, and year-end seasonals. We walk through the historical playbook (rates, dollar, risk) and how we're thinking about positioning when the Fed is flying with fewer instruments.Then we unpack the freshly announced largest-ever LBO and stack it up against 2007's TXU: equity checks vs. leverage, private credit's outsized role, and why a single-bank underwrite changes the risk map. We also separate real CLO mechanics from internet myth and ask the only question that matters: are we replaying '07—or writing a new script?Finally, Jen dives deeper into the growing conversation about moving the Fed's focus away from fed funds toward repo/GC-SOFR—what that shift would change and why it's gaining traction now. Housekeeping: our Fixed Income Sales & Trading self-paced course presale is live (Part 1: Bond Math now; Derivatives next; Macro/Relative Value after), live Financial Modeling Bootcamps run at the end of October, and Kristen's 3-Statement Modeling course targets late November. Bonus: we preview our interview with a $60B quant equities head on integrating systematic strategies into real portfolios. For a 14 day FREE Trial of Macabacus, click HERE Access the free replay of the Masterclass here!Presale access for our newly launched Fixed Income self-paced course here: https://thewallstreetskinny.com/fixed-income-sales-trading-investing/#fixed-income-sales For 20% off Deleteme, use the code TWSS or click the link HERE! Sign up for our LIVE Virtual Bootcamps! 2-Day Financial Modeling Bootcamp Master the technical Excel and accounting skills essential for investment banking, private equity, and fundamental investing. (Learn more HERE) Global Markets & Investing PlaybookA one-day crash course on the financial ecosystem, perfect for anyone seeking a big-picture understanding of how global markets and Wall Street fit together. Our content is for informational purposes only. You should not construe any such information or other material as legal, tax, investment, financial, or other advice. (Learn more HERE)

Electronic Arts (EA) is going private in a $55 billion deal that values the company at a 35% premium to its pre-announcement price. Martin Yang breaks down the massive LBO, which he considers a fair and compelling offer for shareholders. Martin believes the deal is a one-off opportunity driven by EA's strong and stable free cash flow generation, growth trajectory, and solid domination in sports games. Martin thinks going private could benefit EA by allowing it to stay on a longer-term investment cycle for new content and reducing pressure to deliver short-term growth.======== Schwab Network ========Empowering every investor and trader, every market day. Subscribe to the Market Minute newsletter - https://schwabnetwork.com/subscribeDownload the iOS app - https://apps.apple.com/us/app/schwab-network/id1460719185Download the Amazon Fire Tv App - https://www.amazon.com/TD-Ameritrade-Network/dp/B07KRD76C7Watch on Sling - https://watch.sling.com/1/asset/191928615bd8d47686f94682aefaa007/watchWatch on Vizio - https://www.vizio.com/en/watchfreeplus-exploreWatch on DistroTV - https://www.distro.tv/live/schwab-network/Follow us on X – https://twitter.com/schwabnetworkFollow us on Facebook – https://www.facebook.com/schwabnetworkFollow us on LinkedIn - https://www.linkedin.com/company/schwab-network/ About Schwab Network - https://schwabnetwork.com/about

L'épisode que vous allez écouter est une rediffusion d'un épisode initialement sorti le 4 octobre 2024.“On fournit des prestations de communication hyper fortes aux marques. On est capable de mettre leur hero product dans la main d'une cliente qui aura toute son attention dessus”.Laurent Kretz rencontre Quentin Reygrobellet, cofondateur et président de Blissim (anciennement JolieBox et BirchBox). Il nous partage les coulisses de cette aventure entrepreneuriale qui s'étale sur 13 années (rachats, LBO, rebranding). Quentin nous explique aussi comment il s'est imposé comme la première offre de beauty discovery par abonnement en France et en Europe. Avec lui, on décrypte aussi la force de sa plateforme dans le retail media pour aider les marques à gagner en notoriété, lancer de nouveaux produits et collecter des avis qualifiés.Dans ce nouvel épisode du Panier, vous trouverez des clés pour :00:00:00 - Intro00:07:00 - Collecter des avis qualifiés de ses abonnés et aider les marques à capitaliser dessus ; 00:12:15 - Nouer un partenariat avec le leader américain pour toucher plus facilement les US ;00:20:15 - Racheter et rebrander sa propre marque ; 00:34:55 - Se transformer en retail media pour aider les marques partenaires à gagner en notoriété ; 00:46:40 - Expériencialiser la découverte de chaque box pour générer du contenu sur les réseaux sociaux ; 00:57:00 - Offrir le meilleur ROI de tous les médias confondus pour les marques beauté ; 01:01:20 - Travailler sa base de clients pour réactiver ceux qui se sont désabonnés ; 01:10:00 - Ouvrir sa propre boutique pour pouvoir travailler avec de grandes marques en s'adaptant à leurs exigences de distribution. Et quelques dernières infos à vous partager : Suivez Le Panier sur Instagram lepanier.podcast !Inscrivez- vous à la newsletter sur lepanier.io pour cartonner en e-comm ! Écoutez les épisodes sur Apple Podcasts, Spotify ou encore Podcast AddictLe Panier est un podcast produit par Cosa, du label Orso Media.Distribué par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Earlier in June, Ares priced its first direct lending CLO, the second of its kind of Europe, but with a twist — it is priced in sterling.The last 12 months have been a busy time for the private credit giant, as they also completed a €30bn fundraise in Europe and opened a new office in Milan.In this episode of Cloud 9fin, senior private credit reporter Synne Johnsson chats with Andrea Fernandez, partner in Ares's investor relations and product management team for European direct lending, and Mike Dennis, Ares's co-head of European credit. They discuss the firm's newest CLO, how to deploy €30bn in a dried up LBO market and what opportunities Italy has to offer.Have any feedback for us? Send a note to podcast@9fin.com.

Need to explain an LBO in a private equity or investment banking interview? In this episode, we break it down in the simplest way possible. We'll show you how to explain an LBO step by step, draw parallels to real estate to help make the concept stick, and walk through the key math behind the model. Whether you're prepping for PE or IB interviews, this is the practical breakdown you need to stand out. Want help securing an offer from a top tier firm on Wall Street? Apply here: wallstmastermind.com/applyutm_source=podcastep360

Are the tradeoffs that highly successful executives make — prioritizing wealth and recognition over family and a more grounded life — truly worth it? That's the central question that prompted Butch Meily to write From Manila to Wall Street, a memoir reflecting on his time nearly 40 years ago as a close aide to the brilliant but often brash Reginald F. Lewis, the first African-American to build a billion-dollar company. Lewis was a trailblazing businessman and investor who, in the 1980s, bulldozed through racial barriers. Financier and philanthropist Michael Milken described him as “the Jackie Robinson of American business.” Although Lewis died of a brain tumor at age 50 in 1993, the actionable insights gleaned from Lewis's business life remain relevant to this day, chief among them his motto: “Keep going no matter what.” Lewis reached extraordinary heights, bringing Meily along with him. Nevertheless, the lives of both men serve as a cautionary tale of the price each paid for their achievements. Their enduring legacy: build boldly, lead wisely — but never forget to live. [A native of the Philippines, Meily currently serves as president of the Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation, a private-sector disaster management organization. Earlier in his career, he worked in public relations for both Burson-Marsteller and Howard J. Rubenstein Associates.] Monday Morning Radio is hosted by the father-son duo of Dean and Maxwell Rotbart. Photo: Rene S. “Butch” Meily, From Manila to Wall StreetPosted: June 2, 2025 Monday Morning Run Time: 47:30 Episode: 13.48 Pick up a copy of All You Can Eat Business Wisdom for yourself Fun, well organized, and brimming with useful information, this is a book that some will want to read cover-to-cover and others will treat as a reference book to look up subjects as needed; either way, it's a delight.  — Kirkus Reviews

Our Head of Corporate Credit Research and Head of Retail Consumer Credit discuss what choppy demand and tariff risk could mean for sectors that depend on consumer spending.----- Transcript -----Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Head of Corporate Credit Research at Morgan Stanley.Jenna Gianelli: I'm Jenna Gianelli, Head of Retail Consumer Credit, here at Morgan Stanley.Andrew Sheets: And today on this episode, we're going to discuss the outlook for the retail and consumer sectors.It's Wednesday, Jan 29th at 9 am in New York.So, Jenna, it's great to talk with you, and it's really great to talk about the retail and consumer sectors heading into 2025, because it's such an important part of the investor debate. On the one hand, a lot of economic data in the U.S. seems strong, including a very low unemployment rate. And yet, we're also hearing a lot about cost-of-living pressures on consumers, lower consumer confidence, and investor concern that the consumer is just not going to be able to hold up in this higher rate environment. And then you can layer on uncertainty from the new administration. Will we see tariffs? How large will they be? And how will retailers, which often import a lot of their goods, handle those changes?So, maybe just kind of starting off at a 40, 000-foot view, how are you thinking about consumer dynamics going into 2025?Jenna Gianelli: Of course. So, I think that that choppy consumer demand environment is actually one of the strongest pillars of our more cautious view, going into next year. How the sector, performed last year was not in tandem with kind of what the macro headlines suggested. The macro headlines were quite positive, and the consumer was, you know, seemingly strong. But there was a lot going on under the hood when you looked at different dichotomies, right? So, if you looked at the high-end versus the low-end, if you looked at goods versus services. And then within, you know, certain categories, there were categories that were, you know, really quite strong based on what the consumer was prioritizing – goods, essentials, personal care, beauty, right? And then there were others that they really shied away from.So, I think what we're going to see in 2025 is quite a bit more of that. When we think that the high-end will continue to be resilient, that pressure on the low-income consumer will continue. But actually moderate potentially as into [20]25, as we think about lower interest rates, potentially, you know, lesser immigration and so less competition for jobs at the lower income level. So maybe even some tailwinds, but it's really an alleviation of pressure and easier compares. But we do expect overall some deceleration, right? Because we had a lot of pent-up demand, especially on the high-end.So, we are expecting services, demand to slow, in 2025 and goods actually to hold up relatively well. So, we really are focused on what's going on at the individual category level and the different types of consumers that we're looking at.Andrew Sheets: And as you think about some of those, you know, subcategories that you, you cover, maybe just a minute on a couple that you think will perform the best over this year and some that you think might face the biggest challenges.Jenna Gianelli: There are some that have been under relative pressure, in [20]23 and [20]24 where we might actually see some, you know, relief. Now, depending on the direction of rates in the housing market, we could see and expect to see an uptick in bigger ticket spending, durables, home related, that have been under, you know, some pressure.And also, you know, categories where, you know, the consumer, they're arguably discretionary. But maybe they pulled back because there was a big surge in demand just post-COVID. Pet in our universe is actually one example of those, where it's been a bit depressed and we actually expect to see, you know, some recovery into next year; also tied to housing right as new house formation starts.So, but again, a lot of that is predicated on the, you know, housing direction of rates and some of these other macro factors. I'd say, irrespective of the more macro influences, we do still expect that essentials – grocery, and certain categories like a beauty, pockets of apparel and brands, right? It really comes down to the brands, the brand heat, the brand relevance. If it's relevant to the consumer, they're going to spend on it. And so, that's where we really focus on the micro level; our picks of which brands are resonating, which categories are resonating. Which is, those are some of the, you know, the few that we're expecting, either a recovery in or still, you know, relative, outperformance.I'd say on the laggard side, which is probably the next piece of that question. I mean, look, there's still a lot of secular headwinds at play. And so, you know, from a department store perspective outside of event risk or idiosyncratic risk, we're still generally expecting department stores and kind of traditional specialty apparel, mall-based, with not a lot of channel diversification to still generally underperform and see similar trends they've seen the last few years.Andrew Sheets: So, Jenna, your sector is sitting at the center of this kind of very interesting economic debate over how healthy the consumer really is. And, you know, it's also sitting at the center of the policy debate because tariffs are a dynamic that could dramatically affect retailers depending on how large they are and how they're implemented.So how do you think about tariff risk? And can you give some sense of how you think about exposure of your sector to those dynamics?Jenna Gianelli: So, tariffs and policy risk and the uncertainty, is one of the big reasons. And when we think about, you know, retail – and particularly discretionary retail – why we're more cautious on the space into [20]25. Tariffs is the biggest piece of that. The degrees of exposure across our universe, varying degrees to a very wide range, right? So, we have some that are minimal, you know, let's say 5 per cent out of, you know, China sourcing some up to 70 per cent out of China sourcing. And then you layer in, well, what about goods from Canada and Mexico and what if there's a universal tariff?And so, the range of outcomes, is, you know, so significant. And so, what we are advocating to investors is that we go in with the expectation that tariffs are a – an uncertain, but certain threat, right? And not completely minimizing them within a portfolio but reducing the ones that do tend to have those higher, you know, exposures.I'd say the range from when we stress tested the earnings headwinds potential. I mean, it was anything from call it down 10 per cent EBITDA to down 60-70 per cent EBITDA in the most draconian scenarios. And so, I think taking a very prudent approach, assuming that there will be some level of tariffs phased in, you know; if we look back to the 2018 timeframe – different sets of goods, different times, different rates and go from there.Andrew Sheets: So, Jenna, we've talked about the economy. We've talked about some of the policy and tariff risk potentially impacting consumer and retail. You know, a third really key strategic theme for us is more corporate activity, more M&A. And again, I think this is where your sector is so interesting because you were already kind of in the center of some of these debates, last year with corporate activity.So, can you talk a little bit about how you see that? And again, you also have this interesting dynamic that some of the targets of M&A activity in your sector were some of the businesses that were kind of struggling, that were kind of seen as some of these laggards. And so how does that just represent different investor views of their prospects? How do you think people should think about that going forward?Jenna Gianelli: So, look, I think M&A could have positive risk for 2025 and also negative risk for some of our companies. And it really depends, at least from a credit perspective, how we think about some of their indentures and bond language and likelihood of pro forma capital structures.But I think without getting, you know, too deep into that, our expectation is that M&A will increase. We know that there is private equity capital on the sidelines to the extent that rates, even if we're in a little bit of a higher for longer, if the expectation is that we do on the year [20]25 in a slightly lower regime, at least we have some stability or visibility on the rate front. Which should, you know, spur more corporate activity.And then also, I think, look, just equity valuations, right? I mean, our universe, particularly when you think about – the size of the equity check that you need to come in at and the valuations are a bit cheaper because across our universe, we did see some underperformance last year.So, I think those are the kind of main drivers of why we'll see the activity pick up on the underperforming pieces of the space. There are still pockets of value that I think private equity sponsors are seeing. The ones that have come up most notably are real estate, right? And, you know, we saw…Andrew Sheets: Because these retailers often own a large…Jenna Gianelli: Many of the department stores own a significant amount of their real estate. 20, 20, 40, 50 per cent depending on your, you know, assumptions and how you value this real estate. But even with conservative LTV assumptions, there is lending capability here. And I think so that's, you know, one piece of it, those that have multi-banner assets that appeal to different consumer cohorts, that have maybe a solid private label portfolio.When you think about intellectual property, there are real assets, for certain retailers. And so, I think that's what, you know, private equity historically has seen as the play. Now, how that manifests throughout the space? You know, from an LBO perspective; I do still think that getting a really large LBO for a traditional, you know, mature type of retailer could be challenging, but there are creative ways to get these deals done.And again, I think because of what we have is some legacy indentures, traditional, more investment grade style capital structures, there might be flexibility to approach, you know, LBOs in a more creative way – without having to access the capital markets in such a big way as maybe you would traditionally think.Andrew Sheets: And so, this would be examples of private equity firms coming in, doing an LBO or a leveraged buyout where you can actually almost take advantage of the borrowing that company has already done in the market…Jenna Gianelli: Yes. Keep the debt outstanding.Andrew Sheets: ... at attractive levels.Jenna Gianelli: Exactly. Exactly.Andrew Sheets: So, Jenna, it's so great to talk to you. Well, it's always great to talk to you, but it's so great to talk to you now because I do think, you know, as we, we look into 2025, I think there's always a lot of focus on, you know, the direction of markets, you know. Will rates go up or down? Will equities go up or down? But I think what's so clear talking to you about your sector is that there are all these themes that are really about dispersion. That we see, you know, really different trends by the type of consumer segment and sub segment; that we see very different trends by how exposed companies are to tariffs, right? You mentioned anything from, your earnings could be down 10 per cent to 60 per cent. And, you know, very different dynamics, you know, winners and losers from M&A.And so, I do think it just highlights that this is a year where, from the strategy side, we think spreads are kind of more range bound. But there does seem to be a lot of dispersion within the sector. And there seems like, well, there's going to be plenty that's going to keep you busy.Jenna Gianelli: I hope so.Andrew Sheets: Great. Jenna, thanks for taking the time to talk.Jena Gianelli: Thank you, Andrew.Andrew Sheets: Great. And thanks for listening. If you enjoyed the show, leave us a review wherever you listen, and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.