Podcasts about Schwarzman Scholars

Exploring New Horizons: Namit Choksi's Global Pathway | Diasporaa Podcast Episode 5 Welcome to Diaspora, the show where we share the remarkable stories of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent. In this episode, host Aditya Mehta interviews Dr. Namit Choksi, a highly accomplished doctor, public health expert, and entrepreneur from Bombay, India. Namit recounts his journey from growing up in Bombay to earning degrees from prestigious institutions like Harvard and MIT. He delves into his experiences with launching medical devices, participating in the Schwarzman Scholars program in China, and working in venture capital and biotech startups. Namit also shares his challenges with the US visa process and the significant impact of mentorship and relationships on his career. Don't miss his inspiring story and valuable advice for new immigrants. Tune in to hear about his travels, meetings with global dignitaries, and the innovative work he's passionate about. 00:00 Introduction to Diaspora and Host Aditya Mehta 00:39 Meet Dr. Namit Choksi: A Multifaceted Scholar 01:30 Catching Up: Wedding Memories and Global Connections 02:29 Namit's Journey: From Bombay to Harvard 03:24 Innovations in Healthcare: From Harvard to Global Impact 04:18 Venturing into China: The Schwarzman Scholars Program 07:42 Impact and Mentorship: Shaping Namit's Career 11:32 Internship with Indian Railways: Policy and Public-Private Partnerships 13:48 Medical Training: The Scale and Pace of Learning in India 15:21 Schwarzman Scholars Program: A Year in China 21:45 Building Relationships: The Key to Success 25:53 Post-Schwarzman: Joining Northern Light Venture Capital 26:52 The Origin of Perfect Day 28:01 Perfect Day's Innovative Products 30:05 Balancing Work and an MIT MBA 32:15 Comparing MIT and Schwarzman Programs 33:22 Navigating the US Visa System 43:23 Meeting Influential Leaders 49:52 Fun Food and Drink Choices 52:47 Conclusion and Farewell List of Resources: G 20 Youth summit: https://g20.org/track/youth-y20/ Indian railways: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Railways Lex Fridman's Interview of Prime Minister Narendra Modi: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZPUtA3W-7_I Lifeline Express Train: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lifeline_Express Masala Thums Up: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CF3FDFexSMQ O1 ‘Einstein' Visa: https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/o-1-visa-individuals-with-extraordinary-ability-or-achievement Schwarzman Program: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schwarzman_Scholars ‘Sev Tameta nu Shaak' recipe: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=avqXzAUYmGM About Aditya Mehta: Aditya is a Bombay boy who has lived in Austin, Los Angeles, Washington DC, and Vancouver before making it to his current home in Seattle. He has degrees in marketing, urban planning, real estate and strategy but has spent his career in financial services, social media and now real estate - mostly as an entrepreneur and partly as an employee at Amazon. He balances Indian, Canadian and American culture, loves helping those who are new to North America and looks forward to the interesting stories that his interview guests bring each week. When not podcasting, he is helping his wife Prachi build her pharmaceutical business or hanging out with his son Arjun. Connect with Diasporaa: Instagram: @diasporaapodcast YouTube: https://linke.to/dspyoutube Bio Link: linke.to/diasporaa Listen on Spotify: https://linke.to/dspspotify Listen on Apple Podcasts: https://linke.to/dspapple Diasporaa Podcast on KKNW Alternative Talk Radio: https://linke.to/kknw1150

Today, we explore the winter travel misadventures of Helen Hui ‘28, take you inside an eating club event at Wintersession, and cover Princeton's Schwarzman Scholarship recipients. ***To sign up for 180: https://forms.gle/Tyxw2ZsHnF2wmvwu8To read more about the Schwarzman Scholars: https://www.dailyprincetonian.com/article/2025/01/princeton-news-three-seniors-win-schwarzman-scholarship

This week I continue my conversations with some of the outstanding Schwarzman Scholars who presented at the Capstone Showcase in late June. In this episode, I speak with Nainika Sudheendra about the problem of space debris and what can be done to reduce the creation of more of it or even begin removal of debris before it makes the launching of new satellites more costly or even impossible.2:34 Nainika's background and interest in the Schwarzman program5:33 Why Nainika focused on space debris 7:23 Nainika's prior knowledge about the Chinese space program and what she learned through the Schwarzman program10:30 How space debris is measured, the Kessler syndrome, and the hazards that space debris poses 14:33 The obstacles Nainika encountered in her research 16:35 How political leaders in China and the U.S. are thinking about the space debris problem20:02 How debris mitigation might [ought to?] be incentivized, who is working on the problem now, and the role of private insurers 24:03 The Wolf Amendment and Chinese private sector space companies 27:22 Technologies for mitigating and remediating debris 31:00 Lessons from another tragedy of the commons (the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer), and how the EU could take a leading role 34:59 The importance of data standardization and opportunities to negotiate fair use and safety precautions38:17 How redundancy prevents public perception — the difficulty in going from “outage” to “outrage” 40:27 What Nainika has been doing since finishing at Schwarzman Recommendations:Nainika: From Streets to Stalls: The History and Evolution of Hawking and Hawker Centres in Singapore by Ryan Kueh (another Schwarzman alum) Kaiser: Journalist Andrew Jones on Twitter; the South Indian restaurant Viks Chaat in Berkeley, California See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Olivia Fu, who this spring completed her year at Schwarzman College and wrote her Capstone project — a research paper that is required of all Schwarzman Scholars — on the rise and fall of the Beijing hip-hop scene. We explore some of the parallels to Beijing's rock scene, and how many of the same factors that stifled rock in Beijing ultimately led to Beijing's relative decline as a hip-hop city. 3:16 – Olivia's background and connection to China, and what drew her to the Schwarzman Program and studying hip-hop6:13 – Olivia's Schwarzman mentor, Paul Pickowicz 7:47 – How Olivia dealt with censorship in her Capstone project 10:24 – The parallels and differences between the hip-hop and rock scenes in China12:27 – The dakou CDs and the origins of the hip-hop scene in China 17:03 – The influences of Japanese and Korean rap and hip-hop and Black American culture18:30 – The importance of studying Beijing hip-hop 23:05 – The spirit of Beijing and societal commentary in Beijing hip-hop 27:38 – The phenomenon of Rap of China 29:50 – The divergence of PG One and GAI, and the regulatory influence of the State Administration on Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television35:13 – Sinifying hip-hop 37:21 – What the burgeoning hip-hop scene in China was like in the early 2000s40:10 – Critiques of the Beijing dialect in rap and the Beijing rap style 45:16 – Iron Mic rap battles and Shanghai, and Chinese hip-hop's critique of the educational system 48:34 – Why Beijing rap declined 59:09 – What's next for Olivia See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Learn more about Michael Wenderoth, Executive Coach: www.changwenderoth.comSHOW NOTES:Being transparent and vulnerable at work can create safe spaces, trust – and deeper relationships. BUT BE WARNED: doing so can also bite you on the butt -- and send your career backwards. In this episode of 97% Effective, Michael discusses how to be smart and strategic about how much you disclose at work. He covers insights and practical advice from distinguished guests: Professor Peter Belmi at the University of Virginia, on leading with vulnerability; Maria Incontrera, social media and thought leader consultant, on “curated transparency”; and CEO Coach Celine Teoh, on the “15% rule” and how she helps top executives apply it. You'll leave this episode with a sharp, nuanced view – and practical tips - on vulnerability.• Why you need to be careful about being authentic, transparent and vulnerable at work• Correcting misconceptions about vulnerability and disclosure• Insight #1: Professor Peter Belmi on “being situationally appropriate”• Tactics to create influence• Power up or power down• What does the situation call for – and others need to see or feel?• Warmth vs Confidence: Would you be more likely to work with a competent jerk or a lovable fool?• Insight #2: Marie Incontrera on how much should you share about yourself online• Sharing builds trust• Curate your transparency: “We all edit”• What are you choosing not to share?• Insight #3: Celine Teoh, CEO Coach, on the 15% rule developed by Carole Robin• Your comfort zone as a set of concentric circles: Where does growth occur?• What might baby steps look like for you?• Take smart risks, so you don't sink yourselfBIO AND LINKS:Michael Wenderoth is an Executive Coach that helps executives re-examine their assumptions about power, politics, and authenticity to get promoted, become more effective at work, and break glass ceilings holding them back. Having served 20 years in senior roles with companies across the globe, and then 7 years as a professional coach, he has helped accelerated the careers of clients from diverse industries, backgrounds, and levels of seniority, helping them get ahead – without having to sell their souls in the process. Michael is the award-winning author of Get Promoted, host of the 97% Effective career acceleration podcast, and a frequent speaker and media contributor on career advancement, leadership and navigating power and politics. His work has been featured in Harvard Business Review, Forbes, Stanford Business School Executive Education and IE Business School, where he collaborates with renowned professors, coaches, executives and experts. Michael holds an MBA from Stanford and trained as an executive coach at Columbia University (3CP).• Michael on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/michaelchangwenderoth/• Research (Leadership Quarterly): “Warning for excessive positivity: Authentic leadership and other traps in leadership studies” https://tinyurl.com/4ndw3ypc• Episode# 5 – Peter Belmi, Professor at University of Virginia: Social Class & Our Beliefs – How they affect our Path to Power - https://tinyurl.com/2xtrmryu• The concept of “powering-up” and “powering-down” – from Professor Deborah Gruenfeld, in her book, Acting with Power: https://a.co/d/eC5gxVX• When people would rather work with competent jerks than likeable fools. Research (Belmi and Pfeffer): https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2018-17089-001• Episode# 6 - Marie Incontrera, CEO of Incontrera Consulting: Why A Strong Digital Presence Matters: https://tinyurl.com/52rsn39b• “4 Things to Ask Before You Share Your Personal Life at Work” (Dorie Clark): https://tinyurl.com/dx6bzda4• Episode #14 - Celine Teoh, CEO Coach: Harnessing small signals, vulnerability, and conflict: https://tinyurl.com/48y9fxp3• The Schwarzman Scholars: https://www.schwarzmanscholars.org• Carole Robin's Book, Connect: https://a.co/d/9rL96VG• Michael's Book, Get Promoted: https://changwenderoth.com/#tve-jump-180481ecea3• Michael on X/Twitter: https://twitter.com/mcwenderoth• Michael on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/wenderoth.michael/• NEW: 97% Effective, now on Youtube! https://tinyurl.com/bdz53mc5• NEW: Get Promoted, now on Audiobook: https://tinyurl.com/mwf2s28yAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Linkedin / Instagram / Thread: @thevincechan Vince, an Amazon bestselling author in career management, is a globally recognized speaker on the 'future of work.' Her unique expertise comes from a blend of being a Chicago-trained behavioral economist and the former Asia-Pacific head of a billion-dollar U.S. investment firm. Raised in Hong Kong and Canada, Vince pursued economics, followed by MBA degrees from Yale University and Chicago Booth School of Business. Her professional acumen is further solidified by U.S. CPA and CFA® credentials. Vince's vibrant 15-plus-year corporate career has spanned global financial markets, with significant roles at S&P Global Ratings, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and TCW Asset Management. Among her standout achievements are raising $1 billion in collaboration with 'King of Bonds' Jeffrey Gundlach and Goldman Sachs, and facilitating over 100 multi-million-dollar funding transactions for Top 50 global banks. Separately, her contributions have been recognized with accolades such as Forbes China's Outstanding Overseas Returnee in 2015 and Yale School of Management's Outstanding Volunteer Leadership award in 2018. A decade ago, Vince boldly transitioned from finance to the 'future of work' sector. Since then, she has actively modernized the workforce, working in both traditional and digital education spheres. In Beijing, her collaboration with Renmin University of China (China's Top 10) yielded a popular career guide. She further supported career advancement for the Schwarzman Scholars. In Shanghai with New Oriental (NYSE: EDU), she designed and taught business school preparatory programs to thousands of students. In Hong Kong, she co-developed an entrepreneurship program inspired by Chicago Booth's Polsky Center. Vince's impact extends to global stages like SXSW, ASU-GSV, Web Summit, and RISE conference. There, she has shared insights alongside leaders from Degreed, Google, and Udemy, driving forward conversations on workforce development in the tech era. Her personal motto, "own your change, or be changed," reflects her resilience through 18 career transitions and six major economic crises. Vince's journey through three burnouts has become a testament to her strength, showcasing her ability to thrive through transformative challenges. Beyond her professional pursuits, Vince is a WSET certified wine connoisseur, appreciating richly structured wines. She also enjoys playing tennis, constructing intricate Lego models, and delving into deep stories across various media. Her favorites include classics like “The Godfather,” “The Sound of Music,” “Sherlock,” Vivaldi's “The Four Seasons,” as well as literary works like “On Tyranny,” “The Little Prince,” and the “Harry Potter” series. Vince Chan's Career Journey and Future Plans Vince Chan shared his professional background and future plans. He has been in the corporate and financial world for over 15 years and has worked for major institutions in Hong Kong, Asia, and the US. Post the credit crisis, he moved into entrepreneurship and became an author, writing two books for young professionals. He also worked as a leadership coach in China and Hong Kong. Vince Chan expressed his interest in setting up an investment fund for new ventures and his desire to make a greater contribution to society, especially in the areas of education technology and future skills. He also shared his personal struggles, including career changes, economic crises, and mental health issues, but emphasized his resilience and current thriving state. Resilience, Adaptability, and Future of Work Vince Chan highlighted the importance of resilience and adaptability in facing work challenges, including burnout. Michael D. Levitt shared his personal experiences with mental issues and discussed the future of work and skills in the context of AI and emerging technologies. Michael suggested an introduction between Vince Chan and a career individual seeking advice. The conversation concluded with Vince Chan discussing the significant changes brought about by the current global crisis, emphasizing the need to adapt to these unprecedented changes. Emphasizing Individual Control and Learning Amidst Covid-19 Vince Chan emphasized the importance of individuals taking control of their own change, rather than being forced to adapt to changes imposed by others. He highlighted the need for continuous learning, especially in the areas of digital and human-centric skills. However, he also pointed out that many education technology platforms merely recycle existing content without focusing on skills such as career development, navigation, and reinvention. Michael D. Levitt agreed with Vince Chan's points, noting the traumatic impacts of forced changes like lockdowns and border closures due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Embracing Change and Control in Career and Life Michael D. Levitt emphasized the importance of taking control of one's own life and career, highlighting the dangers of stressing over things beyond our control. He encouraged people to gain exposure to different experiences, including volunteering, to broaden their skills and consider career changes. He also cautioned against rushing into the use of new technologies like AI without understanding the underlying business needs first. Vince Chan agreed with Michael's points, extending the metaphor of running one's life like a business, regardless of one's profession. Portfolio Careers and Authenticity Intelligence Summary   Introductions and backgrounds @ 0:00 Vince shares his background transitioning between 16 careers in finance and experiencing burnout. Michael acknowledges the value of Vince's diverse experiences in navigating change. Navigating change and career reinvention @ 4:30 Vince asserts that owning change through authenticity intelligence allows thriving amid uncertainty. Learning new skills maintains career control. Michael affirms that diverse experiences foster adaptability. Owning your change and authenticity intelligence @ 14:45 Vince advocates becoming the CEO of one's career by embracing change. Authenticity intelligence outweighs technical skills. Michael agrees that controlling life's direction through continuous self-improvement ensures fulfillment. The future of work and skills @ 16:00 Vince stresses developing navigation and reinvention skills is critical futureproofing. Technical skills alone are insufficient. Michael concurs that testing new tools prevents wasted efforts that complicate tasks. Building your portfolio career and business model @ 22:51 Vince recommends monetizing diverse talents through an entrepreneurial mindset. Authenticity emerges from understanding one's purpose. Michael encourages volunteering to explore careers and gaining exposure for informed choices. Conclusion and next steps @ 27:45 Vince and Michael appreciate their discussion and look forward to future collaborations. Vince invites Michael on his podcast to share burnout solutions. They agree on the importance of ownership in career reinvention.  

This week on Sinica, the winners of the 2023 Schwarzman Capstone Showcase. Two individuals and one team were selected as the best research projects after review of their projects and presentation of their findings. Their work is first-rate — and if you don't factor in the very young age of the Schwarzman Scholars in competition. You'll meet Shawn Haq, who won for his work on U.S. and Chinese expert perspectives on Taiwan; Corbin Duncan, who looked at the impact of the One Child Policy on the economic and social circumstances of only children in China; and the duo of Kelly Wu and Manthan Shah, part of a larger team that studied decarbonization efforts in Shandong province in steel, aluminum, chemical, and cement production. All three of these research efforts yielded fascinating insights.2:15 – Introducing the Schwarzman Capstone Showcase: topics, judges, and process4:41 – Self-introductions from Shawn Haq, Corbin Duncan, Kelly Wu, and Manthan Shah15:07 – Shawn Haq: U.S.-China Expert Perspectives on Cross-Straits Relations29:09 – Corbin Duncan: Only Children and Contemporary China48:12 – Kelly Wu and Manthan Shah: Decarbonization of Shandong Province's Materials SectorSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week on SA Voices From the Field we interviewed Dr. Raphael X. Moffett about his own experiences working in China after many years working in student affairs within the United States. A native of Washington State, Dr. Raphael X. Moffett began his career in higher education working in Residence Life at Clark Atlanta University in 2002. He was inspired by working with college students and made the decision to pursue a career in student affairs. During the past 20 years, he has gained valuable experience serving in progressive leadership roles at Clark Atlanta University, Georgia State University, Morehouse College, and Trinity University. Known as an inspirational leader, Dr. Moffett has also served in senior leadership positions as the Vice President for Student Services at Texas Southern University in Houston, Texas and the Vice President for Student Affairs at Langston University in Langston, Oklahoma, and Dean of Students at Duke Kunshan University in Kunshan, China. Currently, Dr. Moffett serves as the Chief Student Affairs Officer at the Schwarzman Scholars program located at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China. In this role, he is responsible for strategic initiatives that support the holistic development of graduate students from 32 countries. Dr. Moffett is also the Founder of Inspire YOUniversity, LLC, a consultancy supporting universities, sports teams, corporations, faith-based organizations, and non-profit organizations to become the best versions of themselves. Dr. Moffett is a visionary that is committed to serving others by providing opportunities for students and staff to define success for themselves and pursue their goals. He is known in higher education as being a servant leader who is personable and values driven. He believes every person has the ability to achieve professional success and personal growth with the proper guidance and support.  Dr. Moffett earned a B.A. in English and Education from Washington State University. He earned a M.Ed. and Ed.D. in Educational Leadership from Clark Atlanta University. In his leisure time, he enjoys spending time with his wife and son, visiting family, reading, watching and playing basketball, calligraphy, music production, trying new restaurants, and traveling. Please subscribe to SA Voices from the Field on your favorite podcasting device and share the podcast with other student affairs colleagues!

-A native of Washington State, Dr. Raphael X. Moffett began his career in higher education and motivational speaking at Clark Atlanta University in 2002. He was inspired by working with college students and made the decision to pursue a career in student affairs. During the past 20 years, he has gained valuable experience serving in progressive leadership roles at Clark Atlanta University, Georgia State University, Morehouse College, and Trinity University. Known as a leader that motivates people to succeed, Dr. Moffett has also served in senior leadership positions as the Vice President for Student Services at Texas Southern University in Houston, Texas and the Vice President for Student Affairs at Langston University in Langston, Oklahoma, and Dean of Students at Duke Kunshan University in Kunshan, China. Currently, Dr. Moffett serves as the Chief Student Affairs Officer at Schwarzman Scholars located at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China. In this role, he strives to create and promote a community that supports the holistic success of students both inside and outside of the classroom. Dr. Moffett is a visionary that is committed to enhancing the quality of life for others by providing them with skills and tools needed to succeed. He is known in higher education as being a servant leader who is personable, goal oriented, and values driven. Dr. Moffett focuses on providing all of his constituents with effective services and unique developmental opportunities with the intent to help them maximize their potential. His philosophy is that every person has the ability to achieve professional success and personal growth with the proper guidance and support. Dr. Moffett also is the President and Founder of Inspire YOUniversity, LLC, a consultancy supporting universities, sports teams, corporations, faith-based organizations, and non-profit organizations to become the best versions of themselves. He specializes in motivational speaking, executive coaching, team building, professional skill development, cultural competence training, and leadership development. His goal is to help participants grow their capacity to succeed and live fulfilling professional and personal lives. He has keynoted and/or consulted for several organizations including but not limited to Sam's Club, Harvard University, Texas A&M University, University of Central Oklahoma, Marshall University, University of West Georgia, Langston University Men's Basketball, Clark Atlanta University, Executive Women International, and Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Incorporated. Dr. Moffett received his Bachelor's degree in English from Washington State University in 2002. He earned his Master's degree in Educational Leadership from Clark Atlanta University in 2004 and earned his doctorate from Clark Atlanta University in 2008. In his leisure time, he enjoys spending time with his wife and son, visiting family, reading, watching and playing basketball, calligraphy, music production, trying new restaurants, and traveling. To follow him and his family's journey, you can follow Dr. Moffett at the following: IG: @rxmoffett WeChat: @rxmoffett Thank you for taking some time to listen to this episode and for leaving your constructive feedback. The success of our show and the promotion of mental health in underrepresented and global communities depends on your support. Please subscribe to our Youtube channel, @aspire_counselingwell, and if you are interested in receiving more relevant mental health information, visit www.aspirecounselingwell.com and subscribe to our newsletter to join our community. You can also follow us on Instagram at our new account, @blackexpatexperience and on Twitter at @blackexpatlives. Be well and remember to prioritize your mental health today! --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/blackexpatexperience/message

Today, we're covering the recipients of two prestigious international scholarships, the signing of the Respect for Marriage Act, and a potential winter storm.

Chinese president Xi Jinping warns against expanding military alliances and the weaponisation of economic sanctions at a BRICS summit, attended by Vladimir Putin. But what leverage does this group of emerging economies wield on the world stage? Join host Hashem Ahelbarra. Guests: Einar Tangen, Senior Fellow at Taihe Institute Sanusha Naidu, Senior Research Fellow at Institute for Global Dialogue, South African Think Tank focusing on China and Africa Nancy Snow, Visiting Distinguished Professor at Tsinghua University's , Schwarzman Scholars program

Adam Segal, Ira A. Lipman chair in emerging technologies and national security and director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program at CFR, leads a conversation on cyberspace and U.S.-China relations. FASKIANOS: Welcome to the first session of the Winter/Spring 2022 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record, and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have Adam Segal with us to discuss cyberspace and U.S.-China relations. Adam Segal is CFR's Ira A. Lipman chair in emerging technologies and national security and director of the Council's Digital and Cyberspace Policy program. Previously, he served as an arms control analyst for the China Project at the Union of Concerned Scientists. He has been a visiting scholar at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, MIT's Center for International Studies, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and Tsinghua University in Beijing. And he's taught courses at Vassar College and Columbia University. Dr. Segal currently writes for the CFR blog, Net Politics—you should all sign up for those alerts, if you haven't already. And he is the author several books, including his latest, The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age. So, Adam, thanks very much for being with us. We can begin with a very broad brush at cyberspace, the role cyberspace plays in U.S.-China relations, and have you make a few comments on the salient points. And then we'll open it up to the group for questions. SEGAL: Great. Irina, thanks very much. And thanks, everyone, for joining us this afternoon. I'm looking forward to the questions and the discussion. So broadly, I'm going to argue that the U.S. and China have the most far-reaching competition in cyberspace of any countries. And that competition goes all the way from the chip level to the rules of the road. So global governance all the way down the to the chips that we have in all of our phones. Coincidentally, and nicely timed, last week the Washington Post did a survey of their network of cyber experts about who was the greater threat to the United States, China or Russia. And it was actually almost exactly evenly split—forty to thirty-nine. But I, not surprisingly, fell into the China school. And my thinking is caught very nicely by a quote from Rob Joyce, who's a director at the National Security Agency, that Russia is like a hurricane while China is like climate change. So Russia causes sudden, kind of unpredictable damage. But China represents a long-term strategic threat. When we think about cyberspace, I think it's good to think about why it matters to both sides. And on the Chinese side, I think there are four primary concerns. The first is domestic stability, right? So China is worried that the outside internet will influence domestic stability and regime legitimacy. And so that's why it's built an incredibly sophisticated system for controlling information inside of China that relies both on technology, and intermediate liability, and other types of regulation. China is worried about technological dependence on other players, in particular the U.S., for semiconductors, network equipment, and other technologies. And they see cybersecurity as a way of reducing that technology. China has legitimate cybersecurity concerns like every other country. They're worried about attacks on their networks. And the Snowden revelations from the—Edward Snowden, the former NSA contractor—show that the U.S. has significant cyber capabilities, and it has attacked and exploited vulnerabilities inside of China. And while the Chinese might have used to think that they were less vulnerable to cyberattacks given the shape of the Chinese network in the past, I think that probably changed around 2014-2015, especially as the Chinese economy has become increasingly dependent on ecommerce and digital technology. It's now—GDP is about a third dependent on digital technology. So they're worried about the same types of attacks the United States is worried about. And then, fourth and finally, China does not want the United States to be able to kind of define the rules of the road globally on cyber, create containing alliances around digital or cyber issues, and wants to constrain the ability of the U.S. to freely maneuver in cyberspace. Those are China's views. The U.S. has stated that it's working for a free, open, global, and interoperable internet, or an interoperable cyberspace. But when it looks at China, it has a number of specific concerns. The first is Chinese cyber operations, in particular Chinese espionage, and in particular from that Chinese industrial espionage, right? So the Chinese are known for being the most prolific operators, stealing intellectual property. But they're also hacking into political networks, going after think tanks, hacking activists—Uighur activists, Tibetan activists, Taiwanese independence activists. We know they're entering into networks to prepare the battlefield, right, so to map critical infrastructure in case there is a kinetic conflict with the United States—perhaps in the South China Sea or over the Taiwan Strait—and they want to be able to deter the U.S., or perhaps cause destructive attacks on the U.S. homeland, or U.S. bases in South Korea, or Japan. The U.S. is also extremely concerned about the global expansion of Chinese tech firms and Chinese platforms, for the collection of data, right? The U.S. exploited the globalization of U.S. tech firms. Again, that was something that we learned from the Snowden documents, that the U.S. both had legal and extralegal measures to be able to get data from users all around the world because of their knowledge of and relationship to U.S. tech firms. And there's no reason to believe that the Chinese will not do the same. Now, we hear a lot about, you know, Huawei and the national intelligence law in China that seems to require Chinese companies to turnover data. But it would be very hard to believe that the Chinese would not want to do the same thing that the U.S. has done, which is exploit these tech platforms. And then finally, there is increasingly a framing of this debate as one over values or ideology, right? That democracies use cybertechnologies or digital technologies in a different way than China does. China's promoting digital authoritarianism, that has to do about control of information as well as surveillance. And the U.S. has really pushed back and said, you know, democracies have to describe how we're going to use these technologies. Now, the competition has played itself out both domestically and internationally. The Chinese have been incredibly active domestically. Xi Jinping declared that cybersecurity was national security. He took control of a small leadership group that became a separate commission. The Cyberspace Administration of China was established and given lots of powers on regulating cybersecurity. We had a creation of three important laws—the cybersecurity law, the data security law, and the private—personal information protection law. We see China pushing very hard on specific technologies they think are going to be important for this competition, especially AI and quantum. And we see China pushing diplomatically, partly through the idea of what's called cyber-sovereignty. So not the idea that internet is free and open and should be somewhat free from government regulation, but instead that cyberspace, like every other space, is going to be regulated, and that states should be free to do it as they see fit, as fits their own political and social characteristics, and they should not be criticized by other states. They promoted this view through U.N. organizations in particular. And they've been working with the Russians to have a kind of treaty on information and communication technologies that would include not only cybersecurity, but their concerns about content and the free flow of information. The U.S. right now is essentially continuing a policy that was started under the Trump administration. So part of that is to try and stop the flow of technology to Chinese firms, and in particular to handicap and damage Huawei, the Chinese telecom supplier, to put pressure on friends to not use Huawei. But the most important thing it did was put Huawei on an entity list, which cut it off from semiconductors, most importantly from Taiwan Semiconductor, which has really hurt the Huawei of products. The U.S. tried to come to an agreement about—with China about what types of espionage are considered legitimate. And not surprisingly, the U.S. said there was good hacking and back hacking. And the good hacking is the type of hacking that the U.S. tends to do, and the bad hacking is the type of hacking that the Chinese tend to do. So, basically the argument was, well, all states were going to conduct political and military espionage, but industrial espionage should be beyond the pale. Or if you put it—you can think of it as the way President Obama put it, you can hack into my iPhone to get secrets about what I'm discussing with my Cabinet, but you can't hack into Apple to get the secrets about how iPhones are made to give to Huawei. There was an agreement formed in 2015, where both sides said they weren't going to engage in industrial espionage—cyber industrial espionage. For about a year and a half, that agreement seemed to hold. And then it—and then it fell apart. The Chinese are engaged in that activity again. And as a result, the U.S. has once again started indicting Chinese hackers, trying to create—enforce that norm through indictments and naming and shaming. The U.S. probably also—although I have no evidence of it—has engaged in disrupting Chinese hackers. So we know under the Trump administrationm Cyber Command moved to a more forward-leaning posture, called defending forward or persistent engagement. We've heard about some of those operations against Russian or Iranian actors. John Bolton, before he left the NSC, suggested they were getting used against Chinese cyberhackers as well. So what comes next? And it's often hard, if not impossible, to end cyber talks on a positive note, but I will try. So I think from a U.S. perspective, clearly the kind of tech pressure, not only of Huawei but on a broader range of companies, is going to continue. The Biden administration has shown no signal that it is going to roll any of that back. And it's actually expanded it, to more companies working on quantum and other technologies. The Biden administration has worked much more actively than the Trump administration on building alliances around cybersecurity. So in particular, the tech and trade competition group with the Europeans and the quad, with Australia, India, and Japan all have discussions on cybersecurity norms. So how do you actually start imposing them? Now, where you would hope that the U.S. and China would start talking to each other, again, is where I hope the Biden administration can eventually get to. So there were some very brief discussions in the Obama administration. The Trump administration had one round of talks, but that were not particularly useful. The Chinese were very unwilling to bring people from the People's Liberation Army to actually kind of talk about operations, and generally were in denial about that they had any cyber forces. But you want both sides really to start talking more about where the threshold for the use of force might be in a cyberattack, right? So if you think about—most of what we've seen, as I said, is spying. And so that is kind of the—is below the threshold for use of force or an armed attack, the thing that generally triggers kinetic escalation. But there's no general understanding of where that threshold might be. And in particular, during a crisis, let's stay, in the street or in the South China Sea, you want to have some kind of clarity about where that line might be. Now, I don't think we're ever going to get a very clear picture, because both sides are going to want to be able to kind of skate as close to it as possible, but we would certainly want to have a conversation with the Chinese about how we might signal that. Can we have hotlines to discuss those kind of thresholds? Also, we want to make sure that both sides aren't targeting each other's nuclear command and control systems, right, with cyberattacks, because that would make any crisis even worse. There's some debate about whether the Chinese command and control systems are integrated with civilian systems. So things that the U.S. might go after could then perhaps spillover into the Chinese nuclear system, which would be very risky. So you want to have some talks about that. And then finally, you probably want to talk—because the Chinese open-source writing seems to suggest that they are not as concerned about escalation in cyber as we are. There's been a lot of debate in the U.S. about if escalation is a risk in cyber. But the Chinese don't actually seem to think it's much of a risk. And so it would be very useful to have some discussions on that point as well. I'll stop there, Irina, and looking forward to the questions. FASKIANOS: Thank you, Adam. That was great analysis and overview and specifics. So we're going to go first to Babak Salimitari, an undergrad student at the University of California, Irvine. So please be sure to unmute yourself. Q: I did. Can you guys hear me? SEGAL: Yeah. Q: Thank you for doing this. I had a question on the Beijing Olympics that are coming up. Recently the told the athletes to use, like, burner phones because the health apps are for spying, or they've got, like, security concerns. What specific concerns do they have regarding those apps, and what do they do? SEGAL: So I think the concerns are both specific and broad. I think there was a concern that one of the apps that all of the athletes had to download had significant security vulnerabilities. So I think that was a study done by Citizens Lab at the University of Toronto. And it basically said, look, this is a very unsafe app and, as you said, allowed access to health data and other private information, and anyone could probably fairly easily hack that. So, you know, if you're an athlete or anyone else, you don't want that private information being exposed to or handled by others. Then there's, I think, the broader concern is that probably anybody who connects to a network in China, that's going to be unsafe. And so, you know, because everyone is using wi-fi in the Chinese Olympics, and those systems are going to be monitored, those—your data is not going to be safe. You know, I'm not all that concerned for most athletes. You know, there's probably not a lot of reason why Chinese intelligence or police are interested in them. But there are probably athletes who are concerned, for example, about Xinjiang and the treatment of the Uighurs, or, you know, maybe Tibetan activists or other things, and maybe have somewhere in the back of their minds some idea about making statements or making statements when they get back to the U.S. or safer places. And for those people, definitely I would be worried about the risk of surveillance and perhaps using that data for other types of harassment. FASKIANOS: I'm going to take the written question from Denis Simon, who received two upvotes. And Denis is senior advisor to the president for China affairs and professor of China business and technology. When you say “they” with respect to Chinese cyber activity, who is “they”? To what extent are there rogue groups and ultranationalists as well as criminals involved? SEGAL: Yes, Denis, will send me a nasty email if I don't mention that Denis was my professor. We're not going to go how many years ago, but when I was at Fletcher. So, and Denis was one of the first people I took—was the first person I took a class on Chinese technology. So, you know, and then I ended up here. So I think, “they.” So it depends what type of attacks we're talking about. On the espionage side, cyber espionage side, what we've generally seen is that a lot of that was moved from the PLA to the Ministry of State Security. The most recent indictments include some actors that seem to be criminal or at least front organizations. So some technology organizations. We do know that there are, you know, individual hackers in China who will contract their services out. There were in the '90s a lot of nationalist hacktivist groups, but those have pretty much dissipated except inside of China. So we do see a lot of nationalist trolls and others going after people inside of China, journalists and others, for offending China or other types of violations. So “they” is kind of a whole range of actors depending upon the types of attack we're talking about. FASKIANOS: Thank you. So our next question we're going to take from Terron Adlam, who is an undergraduate student at the University of Delaware. And if you can unmute yourself. Q: Can you hear me now? FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: Hi. Good evening. Yes. So I was wondering, do you think there will be a time were we have net neutrality? Like, we have a peace agreement amongst every nation? Because I feel like, honestly, if Russia, U.S., Mexico, any other country out there that have a problem with each other, this would be, like, there's rules of war. You don't biohazard attack another country. Do you think—(audio break)—or otherwise? SEGAL: So I think it's very hard to imagine a world where there's no cyber activity. So there are discussions about can you limit the types of conflict in cyberspace, though the U.N. primarily. And they have started to define some of the rules of the road that are very similar to other international law applying to armed conflict. So the U.S.' position is essentially that international law applies in cyberspace, and things like the International Humanitarian Law apply in cyberspace. And you can have things like, you know, neutrality, and proportionality, and distinction. But they're hard to think about in cyber, but we can—that's what we should be doing. The Chinese and Russians have often argued we need a different type of treaty, that cyber is different. But given how valuable it seems, at least on the espionage side so far, I don't think it's very likely we'll ever get an agreement where we have no activity in cyberspace. We might get something that says, you know, certain types of targets should be off limits. You shouldn't go after a hospital, or you shouldn't go after, you know, health data, things like that. But not a, you know, world peace kind of treaty. FASKIANOS: Thank you. So I'm going to take the next question from David Woodside at Fordham University. Three upvotes. What role does North Korea play in U.S.-China cyber discussions? Can you China act outside of cybersecurity agreements through its North Korean ally? SEGAL: Yeah. I think, you know, like many things with North Korea, the Chinese probably have a great deal of visibility. They have a few levers that they really don't like using, but not a huge number. So, in particular, if you remember when North Korea hacked Sony and because of the—you know, the movie from Seth Rogan and Franco about the North Korean leader—those hackers seemed to be located in northern China, in Shenyang. So there was some sense that the Chinese probably could have, you know, controlled that. Since then, we have seen a migration of North Korean operators out of kind of north China. They now operate out of India, and Malaysia, and some other places. Also, Russia helped build another cable to North Korea, so the North Koreans are not as dependent on China. I think it's very unlikely that the Chinese would kind of use North Korean proxies. I think the trust is very low of North Korean operators that they would, you know, have China's interest in mind or that they might not overstep, that they would bring a great deal of kind of blowback to China there. So there's been very little kind of—I would say kind of looking the other way earlier in much of North Korea's actions. These days, I think probably less. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Joan Kaufman at Harvard University. And if you can unmute yourself. Q: Yes. Thank you very much. I'm also with the Schwarzman Scholars program, the academic director. And I wanted to ask a follow up on your point about internet sovereignty. And, you know, the larger global governance bodies and mechanisms for, you know, internet governance and, you know, China's role therein. I know China's taken a much more muscular stance on, you know, the sovereignty issue, and justification for firewalls. So there's a lot—there are a lot of countries that are sort of in the me too, you know, movement behind that, who do want to restrict the internet. So I just—could you give us a little update on what's the status of that, versus, like, the Net Mundial people, who call for the total openness of the internet. And where is China in that space? How much influence does it have? And is it really—do you think the rules of the road are going to change in any significant way as a result of that? SEGAL: Yeah. So, you know, I think in some ways actually China has been less vocal about the phrase “cyber sovereignty.” The Wuzhen Internet Conference, which is kind of—China developed as a separate platform for promoting its ideas—you don't see the phrase used as much, although the Chinese are still interjecting it, as we mentioned, in lots of kind of U.N. documents and other ideas. I think partly they don't—they don't promote as much because they don't have to, because the idea of cyber sovereignty is now pretty widely accepted. And I don't think it's because of Chinese actions. I think it's because there is widespread distrust and dissatisfaction with the internet that, you know, spans all types of regime types, right? Just look at any country, including the United States. We're having a debate about how free and open the internet should be, what role firms should play in content moderation, should the government be allowed to take things down? You know, we've seen lots of countries passing fake news or online content moderation laws. There's a lot of concern about data localization that countries are doing because of purported economic or law enforcement reasons. So I don't think the Chinese really have to push cyber sovereignty that much because it is very attractive to lots of countries for specific reasons. Now, there is still, I think, a lot of engagement China has with other countries around what we would call cyber sovereignty, because China—countries know that, you know, China both has the experience with it, and will help pay for it. So certainly around the Belt and Road Initiative and other developing economies we do see, you know, the Chinese doing training of people on media management, or online management. There was this story just last week about, you know, Cambodia's internet looking more like the Chinese internet. We know Vietnam copied part of their cybersecurity law from the Chinese law. A story maybe two years ago about Huawei helping in Zambia and Zimbabwe, if I remember correctly, in surveilling opposition members. So I think China, you know, still remains a big force around it. I think the idea still is cyber sovereignty. I just don't think we see the phrase anymore. And I think there's lots of demand pulls. Not China pushing it on other countries, I think lots of countries have decided, yeah, of course we're going to regulate the internet. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question, from Ken Mayers, senior adjunct professor of history and political science at St. Francis College. Following up on Denis Simon's question, to what extent to Chinese state actors and U.S. state actors share concerns about asymmetric threats to cybersecurity? Is there common ground for discussion? And I'm going to—actually, I'll stop there, because— SEGAL: All right. So I'm going to interpret asymmetric threats meaning kind of cyber threats from other actors, meaning kind of nonstate or terrorist actors, or criminal actors. So I think there could be a shared interest. It's very hard to operationalize. Probably about six or seven years ago I wrote a piece with a Chinese scholar that said, yes, of course we have a shared interest in preventing the proliferation of these weapons to terrorist actors and nonstate actors. But then it was very hard to figure out how you would share that information without exposing yourself to other types of attacks, or perhaps empowering your potential adversary. On cyber—for example, on ransomware, you would actually expect there could be some shared interest, since the Chinese have been victims of a fair number of Russian ransomware attacks. But given the close relationship between Putin and Xi these days, it's hard to imagine that the U.S. and China are going to gang up on Russia on ransomware. So, again, I think there could be, it's just very hard to operationalize. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. So just to follow on from Skyler Duggan, who is an undergraduate at the University of Waterloo. Likewise, to these questions, how do we differentiate individual criminal groups from the state? And how can we be sure this isn't China just trying to abdicate—or, one party, he doesn't specify, trying to abdicate the responsibility? SEGAL: Yeah, I think—because there's—one of the challenges faced by the U.S. and other liberal democracies is that we tend to primarily keep a fairly tight legal control over the cyber operations. They tend to be, you know, intelligence operations or military operations. So Title 10 or Title 50. There's kind of a whole set of legal norms around it. The U.S. does not rely on proxy actors. And other, you know, liberal democracies tend to don't. And U.S. adversaries in this space tend to do so. We know Iran does. We know Russia does. We know China does, although less than the others. Now according to this discussion group that I mentioned before at the U.N., the group of—what's called the group of government experts, one of the norms that all the actors agreed upon was the norm of state responsibility, which is a common one in international law, that you are responsible for whatever happens in your territory. So using proxies should not, you know, be able to give you an out. You shouldn't be able to say, well, it's happening from our territory, we just—you know, we don't know who they are and we can't control them. But, you know, in operation that norm is being fairly widely ignored. Now, the other problem, of course, is the—is how do you actually decide who the actor is, the attribution problem, right? So here, you know, a lot of people are basically saying, well, we have to rely on the U.S. or the U.K. or others to say, well, you know, we say it's these actors, and how do we know—how do we know for sure? Now, attribution is not as hard as we once thought it was going to be. When I first, you know, started doing the research for the book that Irina mentioned, attribution was considered, you know, a pretty big challenge. But now, you know, there's a fairly high expectation that the U.S. will be able to eventually identify who's behind an attack. Now, it may take some time. And we may not be able to completely identify who ordered the attack, which is, you know, as you mentioned, the problem with the proxies. But it's not—it's also not completely reliant on digital clearances. It's not just the code or the language of the keyboard. All those things can be manipulated, don't necessarily give you proof. Lots of time the U.S. is pulling in other intelligence—like, human intelligence, signals intelligence, other types of gathering. So, you know, part of it is how much do we believe the attribution, and then how much of it is—you know, what can you do with it afterwards? And, you know, I don't think the proxy problem is going to go away. FASKIANOS: Great. So I'm going next to Tim Hofmockel's question. It's gotten seven upvotes. He's a graduate student at Georgetown University. To flip Denis Simon's question: Who should the “we” be? To what extent should the U.S. intelligence community and the Department of Defense cooperate on offensive cyber operations? And how would we signal our intentions in a crisis given the overlap in authorities between the intelligence community and DOD? SEGAL: Yeah. I mean, so right now NSA and Cyber Command are dual hatted, meaning that one person is in charge of both of them, General Nakasone. So to some extent that could theoretically help deconflict between kind of intelligence gathering, offensive operations, and kind of signaling to the Chinese. But it's unclear. It's very—signaling in cyber so far seems to be kind of developing and unknown. That seems to be one of the big theories between the U.S. taking these more kinds of operations and, in fact, kind of bringing the fight to the Chinese is a very kind of sociological understanding of deterrence is that over time both sides will kind of understand where those red lines are by engaging and seeing where they're acting. You know, others have talked about could you create some kind of watermark on the actual attack or vulnerability, so that the—you know, you might discover some type of malware in your system and there'd be like a little, you know, NFT, maybe, of sorts, that says, you know, the U.S. government was here. We're warning you not to do this thing. You know, a lot of these have, you know, kind of technical problems. But the question of signaling I think is really hard, and that's part of the reason why, you know, I think these discussions are so important, that at least we have a sense that we're talking about the same types of things, and the same general set of tools. But I think probably through cyber signaling is going to be really hard. It's going to be mostly other types of signaling. FASKIANOS: Next question from Maryalice Mazzara. She's the director of educational programs at the State University of New York's Office of Global Affairs. How can people who are working with China and have a very positive relationship with China balance the issues of cybersecurity with the work we are doing? Are there some positive approaches we can take with our Chinese colleagues in addressing these concerns? SEGAL: Good question, Ali. How are you? So I guess it's very—so I do think there are forward-looking things that we can talk about. You know, several of the questions have asked, are there shared interests here? And I do think there are shared interests. You know, you we mentioned the proliferation one. We mentioned the nonstate actors. You know, there is a lot of language in the most recent statement from the Chinese government about—you know, that the internet should be democratic and open. I don't think they mean it in the same way that we do, but we can, I think, certainly use that language to have discussions about it and hope push to those sides. But I think it is hard because it is—you know, partly because government choices, right? The U.S. government chooses to attribute lots of attacks to China and be very public about it. Chinese for the most part don't attribute attacks, and don't—they talk about the U.S. as being the biggest threat in cyberspace, and call the U.S. The Matrix and the most, you know, damaging force in cyberspace. But for the most part, don't call out specific actors. So they kind of view it—the Chinese side is often in a kind of defensive crouch, basically saying, you know, who are you to judge us, and you guys are hypocrites, and everything else. So I think there are lots of reasons that make it hard. I think probably the way to do it is to try to look forward to these shared interests and this idea that we all benefitted immensely from a global internet. We now have different views of how open that internet should be. But I think we still want to maintain—the most remarkable thing about it is that we can, you know, still communicate with people around the world, we can still learn from people around the world, we can still draw information, most information, from around the world. And we want to, you know, keep that, which is a—which is—you know, not to use a Chinese phrase—but is a win-win for everybody. FASKIANOS: Great. I see a raised hand from Austin Oaks. And I can't get my roster up fast enough, so, Austin, if you can unmute and identify yourself. Q: So I'm Austin Oaks. And I come from the University of Wisconsin at Whitewater. And I used to live in Guangdong province in China. And I used to go visit Hong Kong and Macau, more Hong Kong, very often. And Hong Kong has this very free internet, which China doesn't particularly like. Macau tends to be more submissive to Beijing rather than Hong Kong does. But Chinese government has kind of started to put in people in the Hong Kong government to kind of sway the government into Beijing's orbit more. So then how—so what is China doing in the cyberspace world for both of its separate administrative regions? Because one is a lot easier to control than the other. SEGAL: Yeah. So I think the idea of Hong Kong's internet being independent and free is—it's pretty much ending, right? So the national security law covers Hong Kong and allows the government to increasingly censor and filter and arrest people for what they are posting. We saw pressure on U.S. companies to handover data of some users. A lot of the U.S. companies say they're going to move their headquarters or personnel out of Hong Kong because of those concerns. So, you know, it certainly is more open than the mainland is, but I think long-term trends are clearly pretty negative for Hong Kong. I expect Macau is the same direction, but as you mentioned, you know, the politics of Macau is just so much different from Hong Kong that it's less of a concern for the Chinese. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Robert Harrison, a law student at Washburn University School of Law. My understanding is that there have been significant thefts of American small and medium-size business intellectual property by Chinese-based actors. This theft/transfer of knowledge may reduce the competitive edge from the original property holder. Are there any current efforts to curb IP thefts? Any ongoing analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative to evaluate the use of IP acquired by theft? SEGAL: Yeah. So, you know, as I mentioned, the U.S. tried to reach this agreement with China on the IP theft challenge. China held to it for about a year, and then essentially kind of went back to it. It's been very hard to quantify the actual impact of what the theft has been. You know, there are numbers thrown around, a certain percent of GDP, or 250 billion (dollars) a year. There is what's called the IP Commission, which is run out of the National Bureau of Asia Research that has been updating its report. But it's very hard because, you know, a lot of the knowledge and data that's stolen is tacit knowledge. Or, you know, is actual blueprints or IP, but they don't have the tactic knowledge. So you can have the blueprints, but it's then hard to turn from that to an actual product. And it's hard in the civilian space to kind of track lots of products that seem stolen from U.S. products, as opposed to—on the military side you can look at, oh, here's the Chinese stealth jet. It looks a lot like the U.S. stealth jet. Now, this could be physics. It could be intellectual property theft. But it's harder on the commercial side to kind of put a number on it and see what the impact is. Although clearly, it's had an impact. We do know that Chinese operators, you know, go after other targets other than the U.S., right? So they certainly go—are active in Europe. We've seen them in Southeast Asia. Most of that is probably political espionage, not as much industrial espionage. Although, there has been—has been some. I don't know of any specific cases where we can point to anything along the Belt and Road Initiative that, you know, seems in and of itself the outcome of IP theft. FASKIANOS: I'm going to take a written question from Caroline Wagner, who is the Milton and Roslyn Wolf chair in international affairs at Ohio State University. Chinese actors seem to have incredibly pervasive links to track online discussions critical of China. Are these mostly bots, or are there human actors behind them? SEGAL: So I'm going to interpret that to me for the net outside of China. So, yes. I think what we're learning is there's several things going on. Part of it is bots. So they have, you know, a number of bots that are triggered by certain phrases. Some of it is human, but increasingly probably a lot of it is machine learning. So there was a story maybe last month in the Post, if I remember it correctly, about, you know, Chinese analytical software data companies offering their services to local Ministry of State Security to basically kind of scrape and monitor U.S. platforms. And that is primarily going to be done through, you know, machine learning, and maybe a little human operations as well. FASKIANOS: Thank you. And this is a bit of a follow-on, and then I'll go to more. William Weeks, who is an undergraduate at Arizona State University asks: What role does unsupervised machine learning play in China's cyberspace strategy? SEGAL: Yeah, it's a good question. I don't have a lot of details. You know, like everybody else there, they are going to start using it on defense. It is a big push on what's called military-civil fusion. You know, we know that they are trying to pull in from the private sector on AI, both for the defense and the offense side. But right now, all I can give you is kind of general speculation about how actors think about offense and defense with ML and AI. Not a lot of specifics from the Chinese here. FASKIANOS: Thank you. OK, Morton Holbrook, who's at Kentucky Wesleyan College. Q: Yes. Following up on your comment about Hong Kong, about U.S. companies reconsidering their presence due to internet controls, what about U.S. companies in China and Beijing and Shanghai? Do you see a similar trend there regarding internet controls, or regarding IPR theft? SEGAL: I think, you know, almost all firms that have been in China, this has been a constant issue for them. So it's not particularly new. I think almost all of them have, you know, made decisions both about how to protect their intellectual property theft—intellectual property from theft, and how to maintain connections to the outside, to make them harder. You know, VPNs were fairly widely used. Now they're more tightly regulated. We know that the Chinese actually can attack VPNs. So it think, you know, those issues have been constant irritants. I think, you know, COVID and the lack of travel, the worry about getting kind of caught up in nationalist backlashes online to, you know, Xinjiang issues or if you refer to Taiwan incorrectly, those are probably higher concerns right now than these kind of more constant concerns about cyber and IP. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Anson Wang, who's an undergraduate at the University of Waterloo. We have three upvotes. Is China considered the major threat to the U.S. hegemony because China is actively trying to replace the U.S. as the new global hegemon? Or simply because China is on a trajectory to get there, without or without their active intention in involving other countries' internal politics, the same way that the U.S. does? SEGAL: Yeah. So I think this is a—you know, a larger question about what China wants in the world. And do we—you know, we do we think it has a plan or ideology of replacing the U.S.? And does it want—or, would it be happen even with regional dominance? Does it just want to block U.S. interest and others? It's a big debate. You know, lots of people have contrasting views on where they think China is coming. I'll just use the cyber example. And I think here, you know, the Chinese started with wanting to block the U.S., and prevent the U.S. from criticizing China, and protect itself. I don't think it had any desire to reshape the global internet. But I think that's changed. I think under Xi Jinping they really want to change the definitions of what people think the state should do in this space. I think they want to change the shape of the internet. I don't think they want to spread their model to every country, but if you want to build their model they're certainly welcome to help you. And they don't mind pushing, perhaps highlighting, in some cases exploiting the weaknesses they see in the U.S. as well. FASKIANOS: OK. Thank you. I'm going to go to Helen You, who's a student at NYU. It appears that governments are reluctant to restrict their cyber capabilities because they fundamentally do not want to limit their own freedom to launch cyberattacks. As a result, countries fail to follow voluntary norms on what is permissible in cyberspace. To what extent are industry standards influencing international cybersecurity norms? And what incentives would need to be in place to move these conversations forward? SEGAL: Yeah, that's a great point. I mean, I think that's one of the reasons why we haven't seen a lot of progress, is because states don't have a lot of reason to stop doing it. The costs are low, and the benefits seem to be high. Now, I understand your question in two separate ways. One, there is a kind of private attempt to push these norms, and basically arguing that states are going too slow. Part of that was promoted by Microsoft, the company, right? So it promoted the idea of what they were calling the Digital Geneva Convention, and then they have been involved in what's now known as the Paris Accords that define some of these rules, that the U.S. just signed onto, and some other states have signed onto. But again, the norms are pretty vague, and haven't seemed to have that much effect. There's a thing called the cybersecurity—Global Cybersecurity Stability Commission that the Dutch government helped fund but was mainly through think tanks and academics. It also has a list of norms. So there is a kind of norm entrepreneurship going on. And those ideas are slowly kind of bubbling out there. But you need to see changes in the state to get there. That's when we know that norms matter. And that we really haven't seen. On the—there is a lot of work, of course, going on, on the standards of cybersecurity, and what companies should do, how they should be defined. And that happens both domestically and internationally. And of course, the companies are very involved in that. And, you know, that is much further, right? Because that has to do about regulation inside of markets, although there's still, you know, a fair amount of difference between the U.S. and EU and other close economies about how those standards should be defined, who should do the defining, how they should be implemented. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take group two questions from Dr. Mursel Dogrul of the Turkish National Defense University. In a most recent article we focused on the blockchain literature expansion of superpowers. In terms of publications and citations, China clearly outperformed the United States and Russia. Do you believe the technological advancement will have an impact on the cybersecurity race? And the Michael Trevett—I don't have an affiliation—wanted you to speak a little bit more about the cyber triangle with Russia. How are China and Russia coordinating and cooperating? SEGAL: Yeah. So the first question, you know, clearly, as I have briefly mentioned in my opening comments, that the Chinese are pushing very hard on the technologies they think are going to be critical to the—to the future competition in this space—blockchain, quantum, AI. The Chinese have made a lot of advances on quantum communication and quantum key distribution. Probably behind the U.S. on quantum computing, but it's hard to say for sure. And blockchain is a space the Chinese have developed some usages and are rolling some test cases out on the security side and the internet platforming side. On the China-Russia question, so closer cooperation. Most of it has been around cyber sovereignty, and the ideas of kind of global governance of cyberspace. The Chinese were, you know, pretty helpful at the beginning stages, when Russia started using more technological means to censoring and controlling the Russian internet. So helping kind of build some of the—or, export some of the technologies used in the China great firewall, that the Russians could help develop. Russia is pretty much all-in with Huawei on 5G. And so a lot of cooperation there. Although, the Russians are also worried about, you know, Chinese espionage from Russian technology and other secrets. They did sign a nonaggression cyber pact between the two, but both sides continue to hack each other and steal each other's secrets. And have not seen any evidence of cooperation on the operations side, on intelligence. with them doing more and more military exercises together, I would suspect we would perhaps start seeing some suggestion that they were coordinating on the military side in cyber. But the last time I looked, I didn't really see any—I did not see any analysis of that. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question from Jeffrey Rosensweig, who is the director of the program for business and public policy at Emory University. Q: Adam, I wonder if you could fit India in here anywhere you would like to? Because it think it'll be the other great economy of the future. SEGAL: Yeah. So India's a—you know, a really interesting actor in this space, right? So, you know, India basically think that it has two major cyber threats—Pakistan, and China being the other. China, you know, was reportedly behind some of the blackouts in Mumbai after the border clash. I am somewhat skeptical about reporting, but it's certainly a possibility, and there's no reason to doubt the Chinese have been mapping critical infrastructure there. India pushed back on TikTok and ByteDance. You know, also concerns about data control and other things. There is a long history of kind of going back and forth on Huawei. The intelligence agency has not really wanted to use, but others wanting to help, you know, bridge the digital divide and build out pretty quickly. India right now is talking about its own type of 5G. But from a U.S. perspective, you know, I think the most important thing—and this is often how India comes up—is that, you know, we want India to be an amplifier, promoter of a lot of these norms on cyber governance, because it is a, you know, developing, multiethnic, multiparty democracy. And so we want it just not to be the U.S.' voice. Now, India's a pretty complicated, difficult messenger for those things these days, right? India leads the world in internet shutdowns, and we've seen a lot of harassment of opposition leaders and other people who are opposed to Modi. So it's not going to be easy. But I think the U.S. for a long time has hoped that we could forge a greater understanding on the cyber side with India. FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to take the next question from Michael O'Hara, who is a professor at the U.S. Naval War College. And I'm going to shorten it. He asks about China's fourteenth five-year plan, from 2021 to 2025. It includes a section titled “Accelerate digitalization-based development and construct a digital China.” Do you see their five-year plan as a useful way for thinking about Chinese future in cyberspace? SEGAL: Yes. So we're on the same page, the digital plan came out two or three weeks ago. It was just translated. Yeah, I mean, the plan is useful. Like, all Chinese plans are useful in the sense that it certainly gives us clear thinking about the direction that China wants to go, and the importance it puts on a topic. You know, the implementation and bureaucratic obstacles and all those other things are going to play a role. But as I mentioned, I think, you know, the Chinese economy is becoming increasingly digitalized. And in particular, they want to digitize, you know, more and more of the manufacturing sector and transportation, mining, other sectors that are traditionally not, you know, thought of as being digital, but the Chinese really want to move into that space. Now, from a cybersecurity perspective, that, you know, raises a whole range of new vulnerabilities and security issues. And so I think that's going to be very high on their thinking. And just today I tweeted a story that they held a meeting on thinking about cybersecurity in the metaverse. So, you know, they're looking forward, and cybersecurity is going to be a very high concern of people. FASKIANOS: Well, we couldn't have the Naval Academy without the U.S. Air Force Academy. So, Chris Miller, you wrote your question, but you've also raised your hand. So I'm going to ask to have you articulate it yourself. Q: Well, actually, I changed questions, Irina. Adam, thank you. FASKIANOS: Oh, OK. (Laughs.) But still, the Air Force Academy. Q: So two quick questions. I'll combine them. One is: I'm curious how you see the new cyber director—national cyber director's role changing this dynamic, if it at all, or changing the parts of it on our side of the Pacific that we care about. And second of all, curious how you see China viewing the Taiwanese infrastructure that they probably desire, whether or not they eventually take it by force or by persuasion. SEGAL: Yeah. So I don't think the NCD changes the dynamic very much. You know, I think there's lots of—you know, everyone is watching to see how the NCD and the National Security Council, and CISA, the Cybersecurity Infrastructure and Security Agency, work out the responsibilities among the three of them, which will have an impact, you know, of making us more secure. And, you know, Chris Inglis, the head of the NCD has given lots of talks about how they're going to manage and work together. And I think we're beginning to see some signs of that. But I think that's probably the most direct impact it'll have on the dynamic. Your second question, you know, I think primarily is about, you know, Taiwan Semiconductor. And, you know, do the Chinese eventually decide, well, chips are so important, and the U.S. is working so hard to cut us off, that, you know, for all the other reasons that we might want to see Taiwan, you know, that one is going to get moved up? You know, I think it's a possibility. I think it's a very low possibility. I do think we don't know what the red lines are on the tech war, right? You know, there's been talk about cutting off SMIC, the Shanghai manufacturer of integrated circuits, are also a very important company to the Chinese. Would that push the Chinese to do more aggressive or assertive things in this space? You know, what is it that we do in that space that eventually pulls them out? But I think it's very hard—(audio break)—that they could capture TSMC in a shape that would be useful. Am I breaking up? FASKIANOS: Just a little bit, but it was fine. We have you now. SEGAL: Yeah. That you could capture TSMC in a shape that would be useful, right? I mean, there was that piece, I think, that was written by an Army person, maybe in Parameters, that, you know, the U.S. and Taiwan's plan should be basically just to—you know, to sabotage TSMC in case there's any invasion, and make that clear that that's what it's going to do. But even without that risk, you're still dealing—you know, any damage and then, flight of people outside of Taiwan, because the Taiwanese engineers are really important. So it would be very high risk, I think, that they could capture it and then use it. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Well, I am sorry that we couldn't get to all the questions, but this has been a great conversation. Adam Segal, thank you very much for being with us. You know, you're such a great resource. I'm going to task you after this, there was a question from Andrew Moore at the University of Kansas about other resources and books that you would suggest to learn more about China and cybersecurity. So I'm going to get—come to you after this for a few suggestions, which we will send out to the group along with the link to this video and the transcript. So, Andrew, we will get back to you and share with everybody else. And so, again, you can follow Dr. Segal on Twitter at @adschina. Is that correct, Adam? SEGAL: That's right. FASKIANOS: OK. And also sign up for—to receive blog alerts for Net Politics you can go to CFR.org for that. Our next webinar will be on Wednesday, February 9, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Time. And we're excited to have Patrick Dennis Duddy, director of the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at Duke, to talk about democracy in Latin America. So thank you for being with us. You can follow us on Twitter at @CFR_Academic. Visit CFR.org, foreignaffairs.com and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for new research and analysis on other global issues. And again, Adam, thank you very much for being with us. We appreciate it. SEGAL: My pleasure. FASKIANOS: Take care. FASKIANOS: Welcome to the first session of the Winter/Spring 2022 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record, and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have Adam Segal with us to discuss cyberspace and U.S.-China relations. Adam Segal is CFR's Ira A. Lipman chair in emerging technologies and national security and director of the Council's Digital and Cyberspace Policy program. Previously, he served as an arms control analyst for the China Project at the Union of Concerned Scientists. He has been a visiting scholar at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, MIT's Center for International Studies, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and Tsinghua University in Beijing. And he's taught courses at Vassar College and Columbia University. Dr. Segal currently writes for the CFR blog, Net Politics—you should all sign up for those alerts, if you haven't already. And he is the author several books, including his latest, The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age. So, Adam, thanks very much for being with us. We can begin with a very broad brush at cyberspace, the role cyberspace plays in U.S.-China relations, and have you make a few comments on the salient points. And then we'll open it up to the group for questions. SEGAL: Great. Irina, thanks very much. And thanks, everyone, for joining us this afternoon. I'm looking forward to the questions and the discussion. So broadly, I'm going to argue that the U.S. and China have the most far-reaching competition in cyberspace of any countries. And that competition goes all the way from the chip level to the rules of the road. So global governance all the way down the to the chips that we have in all of our phones. Coincidentally, and nicely timed, last week the Washington Post did a survey of their network of cyber experts about who was the greater threat to the United States, China or Russia. And it was actually almost exactly evenly split—forty to thirty-nine. But I, not surprisingly, fell into the China school. And my thinking is caught very nicely by a quote from Rob Joyce, who's a director at the National Security Agency, that Russia is like a hurricane while China is like climate change. So Russia causes sudden, kind of unpredictable damage. But China represents a long-term strategic threat. When we think about cyberspace, I think it's good to think about why it matters to both sides. And on the Chinese side, I think there are four primary concerns. The first is domestic stability, right? So China is worried that the outside internet will influence domestic stability and regime legitimacy. And so that's why it's built an incredibly sophisticated system for controlling information inside of China that relies both on technology, and intermediate liability, and other types of regulation. China is worried about technological dependence on other players, in particular the U.S., for semiconductors, network equipment, and other technologies. And they see cybersecurity as a way of reducing that technology. China has legitimate cybersecurity concerns like every other country. They're worried about attacks on their networks. And the Snowden revelations from the—Edward Snowden, the former NSA contractor—show that the U.S. has significant cyber capabilities, and it has attacked and exploited vulnerabilities inside of China. And while the Chinese might have used to think that they were less vulnerable to cyberattacks given the shape of the Chinese network in the past, I think that probably changed around 2014-2015, especially as the Chinese economy has become increasingly dependent on ecommerce and digital technology. It's now—GDP is about a third dependent on digital technology. So they're worried about the same types of attacks the United States is worried about. And then, fourth and finally, China does not want the United States to be able to kind of define the rules of the road globally on cyber, create containing alliances around digital or cyber issues, and wants to constrain the ability of the U.S. to freely maneuver in cyberspace. Those are China's views. The U.S. has stated that it's working for a free, open, global, and interoperable internet, or an interoperable cyberspace. But when it looks at China, it has a number of specific concerns. The first is Chinese cyber operations, in particular Chinese espionage, and in particular from that Chinese industrial espionage, right? So the Chinese are known for being the most prolific operators, stealing intellectual property. But they're also hacking into political networks, going after think tanks, hacking activists—Uighur activists, Tibetan activists, Taiwanese independence activists. We know they're entering into networks to prepare the battlefield, right, so to map critical infrastructure in case there is a kinetic conflict with the United States—perhaps in the South China Sea or over the Taiwan Strait—and they want to be able to deter the U.S., or perhaps cause destructive attacks on the U.S. homeland, or U.S. bases in South Korea, or Japan. The U.S. is also extremely concerned about the global expansion of Chinese tech firms and Chinese platforms, for the collection of data, right? The U.S. exploited the globalization of U.S. tech firms. Again, that was something that we learned from the Snowden documents, that the U.S. both had legal and extralegal measures to be able to get data from users all around the world because of their knowledge of and relationship to U.S. tech firms. And there's no reason to believe that the Chinese will not do the same. Now, we hear a lot about, you know, Huawei and the national intelligence law in China that seems to require Chinese companies to turnover data. But it would be very hard to believe that the Chinese would not want to do the same thing that the U.S. has done, which is exploit these tech platforms. And then finally, there is increasingly a framing of this debate as one over values or ideology, right? That democracies use cybertechnologies or digital technologies in a different way than China does. China's promoting digital authoritarianism, that has to do about control of information as well as surveillance. And the U.S. has really pushed back and said, you know, democracies have to describe how we're going to use these technologies. Now, the competition has played itself out both domestically and internationally. The Chinese have been incredibly active domestically. Xi Jinping declared that cybersecurity was national security. He took control of a small leadership group that became a separate commission. The Cyberspace Administration of China was established and given lots of powers on regulating cybersecurity. We had a creation of three important laws—the cybersecurity law, the data security law, and the private—personal information protection law. We see China pushing very hard on specific technologies they think are going to be important for this competition, especially AI and quantum. And we see China pushing diplomatically, partly through the idea of what's called cyber-sovereignty. So not the idea that internet is free and open and should be somewhat free from government regulation, but instead that cyberspace, like every other space, is going to be regulated, and that states should be free to do it as they see fit, as fits their own political and social characteristics, and they should not be criticized by other states. They promoted this view through U.N. organizations in particular. And they've been working with the Russians to have a kind of treaty on information and communication technologies that would include not only cybersecurity, but their concerns about content and the free flow of information. The U.S. right now is essentially continuing a policy that was started under the Trump administration. So part of that is to try and stop the flow of technology to Chinese firms, and in particular to handicap and damage Huawei, the Chinese telecom supplier, to put pressure on friends to not use Huawei. But the most important thing it did was put Huawei on an entity list, which cut it off from semiconductors, most importantly from Taiwan Semiconductor, which has really hurt the Huawei of products. The U.S. tried to come to an agreement about—with China about what types of espionage are considered legitimate. And not surprisingly, the U.S. said there was good hacking and back hacking. And the good hacking is the type of hacking that the U.S. tends to do, and the bad hacking is the type of hacking that the Chinese tend to do. So, basically the argument was, well, all states were going to conduct political and military espionage, but industrial espionage should be beyond the pale. Or if you put it—you can think of it as the way President Obama put it, you can hack into my iPhone to get secrets about what I'm discussing with my Cabinet, but you can't hack into Apple to get the secrets about how iPhones are made to give to Huawei. There was an agreement formed in 2015, where both sides said they weren't going to engage in industrial espionage—cyber industrial espionage. For about a year and a half, that agreement seemed to hold. And then it—and then it fell apart. The Chinese are engaged in that activity again. And as a result, the U.S. has once again started indicting Chinese hackers, trying to create—enforce that norm through indictments and naming and shaming. The U.S. probably also—although I have no evidence of it—has engaged in disrupting Chinese hackers. So we know under the Trump administrationm Cyber Command moved to a more forward-leaning posture, called defending forward or persistent engagement. We've heard about some of those operations against Russian or Iranian actors. John Bolton, before he left the NSC, suggested they were getting used against Chinese cyberhackers as well. So what comes next? And it's often hard, if not impossible, to end cyber talks on a positive note, but I will try. So I think from a U.S. perspective, clearly the kind of tech pressure, not only of Huawei but on a broader range of companies, is going to continue. The Biden administration has shown no signal that it is going to roll any of that back. And it's actually expanded it, to more companies working on quantum and other technologies. The Biden administration has worked much more actively than the Trump administration on building alliances around cybersecurity. So in particular, the tech and trade competition group with the Europeans and the quad, with Australia, India, and Japan all have discussions on cybersecurity norms. So how do you actually start imposing them? Now, where you would hope that the U.S. and China would start talking to each other, again, is where I hope the Biden administration can eventually get to. So there were some very brief discussions in the Obama administration. The Trump administration had one round of talks, but that were not particularly useful. The Chinese were very unwilling to bring people from the People's Liberation Army to actually kind of talk about operations, and generally were in denial about that they had any cyber forces. But you want both sides really

Jason Bordoff, cofounding dean, Columbia Climate School, founding director of the Center on Global Energy Policy, and professor of professional practice in international and public affairs at Columbia University, leads a conversation on energy policy and efforts to combat climate change.   FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the CFR Fall 2021 Academic Webinar Series. I am Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record. And the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have with us today Jason Bordoff to talk about energy policy and efforts to combat climate change. Jason Bordoff is cofounding dean of the Columbia Climate School, founding director of the Center on Global Energy Policy, and professor of professional practice in international and public affairs at Columbia University. He previously served as special assistant to President Obama and senior director for energy and climate change on the National Security Council, and he has held senior policy positions on the White House's National Economic Council and Council on Environmental Quality. He is a columnist for Foreign Policy magazine and is often on TV and radio. So, we're really happy to have him with us today. So, Jason, thank you very much. We are just coming off the COP26 conference that took place in Glasgow that started on October 31, I believe, and concluded last Friday, November 12. Could you talk about what came out of the conference at a high level, if you think that the agreements that were reached went far enough or didn't go far enough, and what your policy recommendations are to really advance and fight the countdown that we have to the Earth warming? BORDOFF: Yeah. Thanks. Well, first, thanks to you, Irina, and thanks to CFR for the invitation to be with you all today. Really delighted to have the chance to talk about these important issues. I was there for much of the two-week period in Glasgow representing the Energy Center and the Climate School here at Columbia. I think it's kind of a glass half-full/glass half-empty outlook coming out of Glasgow. So I think the Glasgow conference was notable in several respects. We'll look back on it, I think, and some of the things we will remember are—some of the things we'll remember—(dog barking)—sorry—are the role of the private sector and private finance, I think, was much more prominent in Glasgow this year. I think there were commitments around some important things like methane, a very potent greenhouse gas, was much higher on the priority list in this U.N. climate meeting than in prior ones. You had pledges on deforestation and other things that are important. And then the final agreement did have some important elements to it, particularly around Article 6, how you design carbon markets around the world. But the glass half-empty outlook is still we are nowhere close to being on track for the kind of targets that countries and companies are committing to: net zero by 2050 or 1.5 degrees of warming. I think there were—there should be hope and optimism coming out of COP. The role of the youth—at Columbia, we were honored to organize a private roundtable for President Obama with youth climate activists. It's hard to spend time with young people in COP or on campus here at Columbia or anywhere else and not be inspired by how passionately they take these issues. So the activism you saw in the streets, the sense of urgency among everyone—activists, civil society, governments, the private sector—felt different, I think, at this COP than other COPs that I have attended or probably the ones I haven't attended. But there was also for some I saw kind of we're coming out of this and we're on track for below two degrees. Or, you know, Fatih Birol, the head of the International Energy Agency, tweeted that when you add up all the pledges we're on track for 1.8 degrees Celsius warming. He's talking about all of the pledges meaning every country who's promised to be net zero by 2050, 2060, 2070, and at least from my standpoint there's a good reason to take those with a grain of salt. They're not often backed up by concrete plans or ideas about how you would get anywhere close to achieving those goals. So it's good that we have elevated ambition, which is kind of one of the core outcomes of the COP in Glasgow. But it is also the case that when you elevate ambition and the reality doesn't change as fast or maybe faster than the ambition is changing, what you have is a growing gap between ambition and reality. And I think that's where we are today. Oil use is rising each and every year. Gas use is rising. Coal use is going up this year. I don't know if it's going to keep going up, but at a minimum it's going to plateau. It's not falling off a cliff. So the reality of the energy world today—which is 75 percent of emissions are energy—is not anything close to net zero by 2050. It is the case that progress is possible. So if you go back to before the Paris agreement, we were on track for something like maybe 3.7 degrees Celsius of warming. If you look at a current outlook, it's maybe 2.7, 2.8 (degrees), so just below three degrees. So progress is possible. That's good. If you look at the nationally determined contribution pledges—so the commitments countries made that are more near term, more accountability for them; the commitments they made to reduce emissions by 2030, their NDCs—we would be on track for about 2.4 degrees Celsius warming, assuming all those pledges are fulfilled. But history would suggest a reason to be a little skeptical about that. The U.S. has a pledge to get to a 50 to 52 percent reduction in emissions by 2030, and look at how things are working or not working in Washington and make your own judgment about how likely it is that we'll put in place the set of policies that would be required to get to that ambitious level of decarbonization by 2030. And I think the same healthy dose of skepticism is warranted when you look elsewhere in the world. But even if we achieve all of those, we're still falling short of below two degrees, nevertheless 1.5 (degrees). And so, again, I think the outcome from COP for me was optimism that progress is possible—we have made a lot of progress in the last ten years—but acute concern that we're nowhere close to being on track to take targets like 1.5 degrees Celsius or net zero by 2050 seriously. And we just need to be honest as a climate and energy community—and I live in both of those worlds; there's a lot of overlap between them, obviously—about how hard it is to achieve the goals we are talking about. Renewables have grown incredibly quickly. Optimistic headlines every day about what is happening in solar and wind. Costs have come down more than 90 percent. Battery costs have come down more than 90 percent in the last decade. But solar and wind create electricity, and electricity is 20 percent of global final energy consumption. The outlook for electric vehicles is much more promising today. Lots of companies like Ford and others are committing to be all-electric by a certain date ten or twenty years from now. Cars are 20 percent of global oil demand. About half of the emission reductions—cumulative emission reductions between now and 2050 will need to come from technologies that are not yet available at commercial scale and sectors of the economy that are really hard to decarbonize like steel and cement and ships and airplanes. We're not—we don't have all the tools we need to do those yet. And then, in Glasgow, the focus of a lot of what we did at Columbia was on—we did a lot of different things, but one of the key areas of focus was the challenge of thinking about decarbonization in emerging and developing economies. I don't think we talk about that enough. The issue of historical responsibility of loss and damage was more on the agenda this year, and I think you'll hear even more about it in the year ahead. The next COP is in Africa. There was growing tension between rich and poor countries at this COP. I think a starting point was what we see in the pandemic alone and how inequitable around the world the impacts of the pandemic are. Many people couldn't even travel to Glasgow from the Global South because they couldn't get vaccinated. We need, between now and 2050, estimates are—a ballpark—$100 trillion of additional investment in clean energy if we're going to get on track for 1.5 (degrees)/net zero by 2050. So the question that should obsess all of us who work in this space: Where will that money come from? Most of it's going to be private sector, not public. Most of it is going to be in developing and emerging economies. That is where the growth in energy is going to come from. Eight hundred million people have no access to energy at all. Nevertheless, if you model what energy access means, it's often defined as, you have enough to turn on lights or charge your cellphone. But when you talk about even a fraction of the standard of living we take for granted—driving a car, having a refrigerator, having an air conditioner—the numbers are massive. They're just huge, and the population of Africa's going to double to 2.2 billion by the year 2050. So these are really big numbers and we need to recognize how hard this is. But we should also recognize that it is possible. We have a lot of the tools we need. We need innovation in technology and we need stronger policy, whether that's a carbon price or standards for different sectors. And then, of course, we need private-sector actors to step up as well, and all of us. And we have these great commitments to achieve these goals with a lot of capital being put to work, and now we need to hold people accountable to make sure that they do that. So, again, I look back on the last two weeks or before, two weeks of COP, the gap between ambition and reality got bigger. Not necessarily a bad thing—ambition is a good thing—but now it's time to turn the ambition into action. We need governments to follow through on their pledges. Good news is we have a wide menu of options for reducing emissions. The bad news is there's not a lot of time at our current rate of emissions. And emissions are still going up each and every year. They're not even falling yet. Remember, what matters is the cumulative total, not the annual flow. At our current rate of emissions, the budget—carbon budget for staying below 1.5 (degrees) is used up in, around a decade or so, so there's not much time to get to work. But I'm really excited about what we're building with the first climate school in the country here at Columbia. When it comes to pushing—turning ambition into action, that requires research, it requires education, and it requires engaging with partners in civil society and the public sector and the private sector to help turn that research into action. And the people we're working with here every day on campus are the ones who are going to be the leaders that are going to hopefully do a better job—(laughs)—than we've done over the last few decades. So whatever you're doing at your educational institution—be it teaching or research or learning—we all have a role to play in the implementation of responsible, forward-thinking energy policy. I'm really excited to have the chance to talk with you all today. Look forward to your questions and to the conversation. Thank you again. FASKIANOS: Jason, that's fantastic. Thank you very much for that informative and sobering view. So let's turn to all of you now for your questions. So I'm going to go first to—I have one raised hand from Stephen Kass. Q: OK. Thank you. Jason, thank you for the very useful and concise summary. What specific kinds of energy programs do you think developing countries should now be pursuing? Should they be giving up coal entirely? Should they be importing natural gas? Should they be investing in renewables or nuclear? What recipe would you advise developing countries to pursue for their own energy needs? BORDOFF: It's going to need to be a lot of different things, so there's no single answer to that, of course. And by the way, I'll just say it would be super helpful if people don't mind just introducing yourself when you ask a question. That would be helpful to me, at least. I appreciate it. I think they need to do a lot of different things. I think I would start with low-hanging fruit, and renewable electricity is not the entire answer. The sun and wind are intermittent. Electricity can't do certain things yet, like power ships and airplanes. But the low cost of solar and wind, I think, does mean it's a good place to start, and then we need to think about those other sectors as well. I think a key thing there comes back to finance, and that's why we're spending so much time on it with our research agenda here. Access to financing and cost of capital are really important. Clean energy tends to be more capital-intensive and then, like solar and wind, more CAPEX, less OPEX over time. But attaining financing in poor countries is really difficult and expensive. Lack of experience with renewable energy, local banks are often reluctant to lend to those kinds of projects. And then foreign investors, where most of that capital is going to come from, view projects often in emerging markets and developing economies particularly as more risky. Local utilities may not be creditworthy. There's currency inflation risk in many developing countries, people worry about recouping their upfront investment if bills are paid in local currency. There's political risk, maybe corruption, inconsistently enforced regulations. And it can be harder to build clean energy infrastructure if you don't have other kinds of infrastructure, like ports, and roads, and bridges and a good electrical grid. So I would start there. And I think there's a role for those countries to scale up their clean energy sectors, but also for policymakers and multilateral development banks and governments elsewhere—there was a lot of focus in Glasgow on whether the developed countries would make good on their promise made in Copenhagen to send $100 billion a year in climate finance to developing countries. And they fell short of that. But even that is kind of a rounding error, compared to the one to two trillion (dollars) a year that the International Energy Agency estimates is needed. So there are many other things besides just writing a check that government, like in the U.S. or elsewhere, can do. The Development Finance Corporation, for example, can lend to banks in local and affordable rates, finance projects in local currency, expand the availability of loan guarantees. I've written before about how I think even what often gets called industrial policy, let's think about some sectors—in the same way China did with solar or batteries fifteen years ago. Are there sectors where governments might help to grow domestic industries and, by doing that, scale—bring down the cost of technologies that are expensive now, the premium for low-carbon or zero-carbon cement or steel. It's just—it's not reasonable to ask a developing country to build new cities, and new highways, and all the new construction they're going to do with zero-carbon steel and cement because it's just way too expensive. So how do you bring those costs down? If we think about investments, we can make through U.S. infrastructure or other spending to do that, that not only may help to grow some domestic industries and jobs here, that can be its own form of global leadership if we're driving those costs of those technologies down to make it cheaper for others to pick up. So I think that's one of the places I'd start. But there are a lot of other things we need to do too. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question—and let me just go back. Stephen Kass is an adjunct professor at NYU. So the next question is a written question from Wei Liang, who is an assistant professor of international policy studies at Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. And the question is: I wonder if you could briefly address the Green Climate Fund and individual countries' pledge on that. BORDOFF: Yeah, I mean, it touches a little bit on what I said a moment ago about the need for developed countries to provide climate finance to developing countries. And so I think that's—it's important that we take those obligations seriously, and that we, in advanced economies, step up and make those funds available. And but, again, we're talking—the amount we're still talking about is so small compared to the amounts that are needed to deal both with the impacts of climate change, and then also to curb climate change, to mitigate climate change. Because we know that developing countries are in the parts of the world that will often be most adversely impacted by climate impacts—droughts, and heat waves, and storms, and food security issues—from a standpoint of equity are the parts of the world that have done the least to cause this problem, responsible for very few emissions. If you look cumulatively at emissions since the start of the industrial age, about half—nearly half have come from the U.S. and EU combined. Two percent from the entire continent of Africa. So they are using very little energy today, haven't therefore contributed to the problems, and have the fewest resources, of course, to cope with the impacts, and also to develop in a cleaner way. Sometimes it's cheaper to develop in a cleaner way. Renewables are often today competitive with coal, even without subsidy. But there are many areas where that's not the case, and there is a cost. And we need to help make sure that, you know, we're thinking about what a just transition looks like. And that means many different things for different communities, whether you're a coal worker or an agricultural worker in California that may, you know, be working outside in worse and worse heat. But it also means thinking about the parts of the world that need assistance to make this transition. So I think we need to be taking that much more seriously. FASKIANOS: Next question is a raised hand from Tara Weil, who is an undergraduate student at Pomona College. Q: Hi. So, given that developed nations are the largest contributors to carbon emissions, as you've said, how can larger powers be convinced as to the importance of addressing global inequality with regards to climate change? And thank you so much, also, for giving this talk. BORDOFF: Yeah. Thank you for being here. I don't have a great answer to your question. I mean, the politics of foreign aid in general are not great, as we often hear in events at CFR. So I do think one—we need to continue to encourage, through political advocacy, civil society, and other ways, governments in advanced economies to think about all the tools they have at their disposal. I think the ones that are going to be—I'm reluctant to try to speak as a political commenter rather than a climate and energy commenter on what's going to work politically. But part of that is demonstrating what—it's not just generosity. It is also in one's self-interest to do these things. And just look at the pandemic, right? What would it look like for the U.S. to show greater leadership, or any country to show even greater leadership and help cope with the pandemic all around the world in parts of the world that are struggling to vaccinate their people? That is not only an act of generosity, but it is clearly one of self-interest too, because it's a pretty globalized economy and you're not going to be able to get a pandemic under control at home if it's not under control abroad. Of course, the same is true of the impacts of climate change. It doesn't matter where a ton of CO2 comes from. And we can decarbonize our own economy, but the U.S. is only 15 percent of annual emissions globally. So it's not going to make a huge difference unless everyone else does that as well. There is also the potential, I think, to—and we see this increasingly when you look at the discussion of the Biden infrastructure bill, how they talk about the U.S.-China relationship, which of course are the two most important countries from the standpoint of climate change. It is one of cooperation. That was one of the success stories in Glasgow, was a commitment to cooperate more. We'll see if we can actually do it, because it's a pretty difficult and tense U.S.-China relationship right now. So the question is, can you separate climate from all those other problems on human rights, and intellectual property, and everything else and then cooperate on climate? It's been hard, but there's a renewed commitment to try to do that. But also, a recognition that action in the clean energy space is not only about cooperation but it's also about economic competition. And you have seen more and more focus on both the Republican and Democratic sides of the aisle on thinking about the security of supply chains, and critical minerals, and the inputs in lithium and rare earth elements that go into many aspects of clean energy. To my point before about aspects of industrial policy that might help grow your own domestic economy, I think there are ways in which countries can take measures that help—that help their own economies and help workers and help create jobs, and that in the process are helping to drive forward more quickly the clean energy technologies we need, and bring down the cost of those technologies to make them more accessible and available in some of the less-developed countries. So I think trying to frame it less as do we keep funds at home, do we write a check abroad? But there are actually many steps you could do to create economic opportunities and are win-win. Without being pollyannish about it, I think there is some truth to some of those. And I think we can focus on those politically as well. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take an international question from Luciana Alexandra Ghica, who is an associate professor for international cooperation at the University of Bucharest. What type of topics do you think we should address immediately in university programs that provide training in climate, development, global policies, or international public affairs, so that a new generation of leaders really pushes forward the agenda on climate change? BORDOFF: Yeah. Well, I'll say a quick word about what we're doing at Columbia, and maybe it's relevant to that question, because Columbia has made this historic commitment to build a climate school. There are many initiatives, and centers, and institutes. There was not only a handful of schools—law school, business school, medical school, engineering school. And it is the largest commitment a university can make to any particular topic, is something on the scale of a school with degree-granting authority and tenure-granting authority, and all the things that come with a school. And it's just the scale at a place like Columbia, and many other places, is just enormous. That's what we're doing on climate. We have created a climate school. And I'm honored President Bollinger asked me to help lead it. And we're going to build a faculty. We have our first inaugural class of masters' students, about ninety students that are going through the program right now, and we have a building in Manhattan for the climate school, and on and on. The idea—but the question is, what is climate, right? Because academia has been historically organized into traditional academic disciplines. So you have people who you hire through a tenured search, and they go to the engineering faculty and build their lab there. And there's law professors, and their business school professors, and on and on and on, social work. But for climate, you need all of those, right? They all kind of need to come together. And, like, interdisciplinary doesn't even sort of do justice to what it means to think about approaching this systemic—it's a systemic challenge. The system has to change. And so whatever solution you're talking about—if you want to get hydrogen to scale in the world, let's—you know, for certain sectors of the economy that may be hard to do with renewable energy, or in terms of renewable energy and, say, green hydrogen. You need engineering breakthroughs to bring down the cost of electrolyzers, or you need new business models, or you need financial institution frameworks that figure out how you're going to put the capital into these things. You need the policy incentives. How are you going to—you need permitting and regulation. How do we permit hydrogen infrastructure? It's barely been done before. There are concerns in the environmental justice community about some aspects of technologies like that or carbon capture that need to be taken seriously and addressed. There are geopolitical implications, potentially, to starting to build a global trade in ammonia or hydrogen, and what security concerns—energy security concerns might accompany those, the way we thought about oil or gas from Russia into Europe. I have an article coming out in the next issue of Foreign Affairs about the geopolitics of the energy transition. So we need disciplines that come together and look at a problem like that in all of those multifaceted dimensions, so we can figure out how to get from a lab to scale out in the world. And so when we think about the areas of concentration here, climate finance, climate justice, climate in society, climate in international security—I mean, a range of things that I think are really important to help people understand. And that's going to be a major focus of what we do at the climate school here. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Let's go next to Sean Grossnickle, who has raised his hand. A graduate student at Fordham University. Q: Speak now? Hi, this is not Sean but Henry Schwalbenberg, also at Fordham, where I teach in our international political economy and development program. I went to a conference about a month ago in Rome. And there was a physicist from CERN. And he was a big advocate of something I'd never heard of, and this is this thorium for nuclear reactors. And he was going through all the pros, but I wanted a more balanced perspective on it. And I'm hoping that you might give me a little pros and cons of this thorium nuclear reactor technique. BORDOFF: Yeah. I will be honest and say that nuclear is not my area of focus. We have a pretty strong team here that works in nuclear, and I think is optimistic about the breakthroughs we're going to see in several potential areas of nuclear—advanced nuclear technology, that being one of them, or small modular reactors, and others. At a high level, I will say I do think if you're serious about the math of decarbonization and getting to net zero by 2050, it's hard to do without zero-carbon nuclear power. It's firm, baseload power. It runs all the time. Obviously, there are challenges with intermittency of solar and wind, although they can be addressed to some extent with energy story. Most of the analyses that are done show not necessarily in the U.S. but in other parts of the world significant growth in nuclear power. The International Energy Agency just modeled what it looks like to get to net zero by 2050, and this pathway that got a lot of attention for saying things like we would not be investing in new oil and gas supply. The world has to change a lot pretty quickly. And they have about a hundred new nuclear plants being built by 2030, so that's a pretty big number. So we're going to need all tools—(laughs)—that we have at our disposal. And unfortunately, I worry we may still fall short. So I think at a high level we need to think really hard about how to improve nuclear technology. The people who know that really well I think are optimistic about our ability to do that. And I will follow up on thorium in particular with my colleagues at Columbia, and happy to follow up with you offline about it. FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to take a written question from Stephen Bird, who's an associate professor of political science at Clarkson University. He thanks you, and he wanted you to talk a little bit more about political will. The overall dollar amounts are clear. Much cheaper to address climate change than to ignore it. That said, countries are, clearly, lagging. Is it a case of countries just don't want to take action now because of issues of fairness or because of lack of domestic political support, i.e., citizens aren't convinced that they should pay costs now with payoffs that come later, and what might we do to improve that issue in terms of persuading or arguing for more political will? BORDOFF: Yeah. It's a question for, you know, a political scientist as much as an energy or climate expert, and I wish I had a better answer to it. I think it is—climate is one of the trickiest problems for so many reasons but one of those is there is no acute event now that you sort of respond to, hopefully, and pull everyone together. It's a set of things that, you know, of course, there would have been storms and droughts before but we know they're intensified and made worse. It's hard to rally public support. We often respond to a crisis kind of proverbial, you know, frog in the boiling water kind of thing. So that makes it hard. There are huge issues—we talked about a just transition a few minutes ago—there are huge issues with intergenerational equity when we talk about climate. There are, clearly, climate impacts and damages today but some of the worst will be in the future, including for people who may not be born yet, and we don't do a great job in our political environment about thinking about those and valuing them today and how you do that, and from an economic standpoint, of course, there are questions about discount rates you apply and everything else. I think, politically, one of the things that has mobilized stronger climate—support for climate action, so it is encouraging that if you look at polling on climate change, the level of urgency that the public in many countries, including the U.S., broadly, ascribe to acting on climate has gone up a lot. It's higher today than it was, you know, a decade or so ago. That's a result of people seeing the impacts and also advocacy campaigns and political campaigns. It is often tied to—it's like a win-win. Like, President Biden says when he thinks of climate he thinks of jobs, and so we're going to deal with climate and we're going to grow the economy faster and we're going to create jobs, and there is truth to that. It is also the case that there are costs. The cost of inaction are higher, but there are costs associated with the transition itself. So if you survey the American public, I think, climate, according to the latest YouGov/Economist poll I saw, you know, it was number two on the list of things they cared the most about. That's much higher than in the past. And then if you ask the American public are they willing to pay $0.25 a gallon more at the pump to act on climate, 75 percent say no. And you look at the challenges the Biden administration is having right now sort of thinking about a really strong set of measures to put in place to move the ball forward on climate, but acute concern today about where oil prices are and inflation and natural gas prices as we head into the winter. If the weather is cold then it's going to be really expensive for people to heat their homes in parts—some parts of the country like New England, maybe. So that's a reality, and I think we need to—it was interesting, in the roundtable we did with President Obama with climate activists, that was a message he had for them. You know, be impatient, be angry, keep the pressure on, but also be pragmatic. And by that he means, like, you know, try to see the world through the eyes of others and people who are worried about the cost of filling up at the pump, the cost of paying their heating bills. They're not—some of them may not be where you are yet. They may not have the same sense of urgency with acting on climate that many of us on this Zoom do and need to take those concerns seriously. So I think that's a real challenge, and it can be addressed with good policy, to some extent, right, if you think about the revenue raised from a carbon tax and how it could be redistributed in a way that reduce the regressive impacts. I've written about how, at a high level—I'll say one last point—if we get on track for an energy transition, which we're not on yet, right. (Laughs.) Oil and gas use are going up each and every year. But imagine we started to get on track where those were falling year after year. It's still going to take decades, and that process of transition is going to be really messy. It's going to be really volatile. We're going to have fits and starts in policy from Obama to Trump to Biden. We're going to make estimate—we're going to make bets on technologies and maybe get those technologies wrong or misunderstand the cost curves, the potential to shut down investment in certain forms of energy before the rest are ready to pick up the slack. If it's messy and volatile and bumpy, that's not only harmful economically and geopolitically, it will undermine public support for stronger climate action. So you see, like, in Washington they're selling off the Strategic Petroleum Reserve because we're moving to a world beyond oil and also we have all this domestic oil now with shale. We need more, not fewer, tools to mitigate volatility for the next several decades if we're serious about making this transition, and I think the same is true for thinking about sort of buffers you could build into geopolitics, foreign policy, and national security, because there will be—in a post-oil and gas world, you know, you may say, well, we're not going to worry as much about the Middle East or about, you know, Russia's leverage in Europe. But there will be new risks created and we can talk about what some of those might be, and we need new tools of foreign policy to mitigate those potential foreign policy risks. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question. Raised hand from Chloe Demrovsky, adjunct instructor at NYU. Q: Hey, can you hear me? BORDOFF: Yes. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: Hi. Chloe Demrovsky, adjunct at NYU and president and CEO of Disaster Recovery Institute International. Thanks for being with us, Jason. So my question is about the feasibility and your thoughts on artificially altered clouds or solar geoengineering. What are the ethical and geopolitical implications of, perhaps, using this to buy a little time for our energy transition? Thanks. BORDOFF: Yeah. A super interesting question, and I will say, again, I'm sort of—think of myself as an energy expert. So that is where I spend more time than thinking about tools like solar geoengineering. I guess, it seems there's, obviously, huge risks associated with something like that and we need to understand them. We need to do research. We need to figure out what those risks may be. There are global governance concerns. It's actually pretty cheap to do solar geoengineering. So what happens when some country or some billionaire decides they want to start spraying stuff into the atmosphere to cool the planet? And for those who don't know that, you know, solar—I mean, you think of after a volcano the planet cools a little bit because of all the particulates up in the atmosphere. When you model in an energy system model how much phasing out coal will reduce warming, you, obviously, have much less carbon dioxide emissions but that's offset slightly—not completely, of course—it's offset a little bit by the fact that you have less local air pollution, which is a good thing from air pollution. But air pollution has a slightly cooling effect, because you have these little particles floating around that reflect sunlight. So the idea is can we create that artificially and cool the planet, and you can imagine lots of reasons why that could go wrong when you're trying to figure out what—how much to put in there, what unintended consequences could be. You still have other impacts of carbon dioxide like ocean acidification. Maybe you go too far in one direction, that's like you're setting the thermostat. That's why one of the companies doing carbon removal is called Global Thermostat. You're kind of figuring out what temperature it should be. But I will say so it's an area that needs research and I think, given how far we are away from achieving goals like 1.5 and net-zero 2050, I guess what I would say is in the same way that when I worked in the Obama administration it was—I wouldn't say controversial, but there were some people who didn't want to talk about adaptation because it was kind of a more—there was a moral hazard problem there. It was, you know, less pressure to mitigate and reduce emissions if we thought adaptation was a solution. People worry about that from the standpoint of solar geoengineering. But the likelihood—I hope I'm wrong, but the likelihood that we roll the clock forward, you know, later this decade and we realize we've made progress but we're still pretty far short, and the impacts of climate change in the same way the IPCC 1.5 report said, you know what, 1.5 is going to be pretty bad, too, and that's even worse than we thought, the more we learn about climate the more reason there is to be concerned, not less concerned. It seems very plausible to me that we will kind of come to a growing consensus that we have to think about whether this technology can, as you said, buy us time. This is not something you do permanently. You need to get to net zero to stop global warming. But if you want to reduce the impacts of warming on the rate of Arctic sea ice melt and all the rest, can you buy time, extend the runway, by doing this for some number of decades. And I think—I don't have a strong view on the right answer to that. But I think it's something we, certainly, need to be thinking about researching and understanding what the consequences would be because we're going to have to figure out how to take more abrupt actions to close that gap between ambition and reality unless the reality starts to change much more quickly than is the case right now. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I saw a raised hand from Maya but she lowered it. So if you want to raise your hand again, please do so. And in the meantime, I'm going to take a written question from Jennifer Sklarew, who's an assistant professor of energy and sustainability at George Mason University. Was CCS/CCUS, which carbon capture and storage/carbon capture utilization and storage, to write out those acronyms, promoted as a climate change solution in Glasgow and was there a pushback against this technology option as both a climate change solution and a support mechanism for continued fossil fuel use? BORDOFF: There was some pushback but, I think, actually, more in the other direction. So I think there has been a growing recognition from many in the climate world that carbon capture technology, carbon removal technology, need to be part of the solution. I think there's almost no climate model at this point that shows how you would get to 1.5 degrees or net zero—1.5 degrees without huge amounts of negative emissions—carbon removal. Some of that can be nature based, but a lot of it will be—some of it will be technology based as well and focusing on what we care about, which is the emissions, is the most important thing. So and this is not, I don't think, the primary thing you're going to do. You want to do the things that are easiest and cheapest and present the fewest risks. So putting a lot of renewables into the grid, getting electrification into the vehicle fleet—there's a lot of things that you would do before that. But if you think about some of the sectors in the economy we talked about before that are hard to decarbonize like steel and cement, it may well be the case that carbon capture is part of the technology there. There was a big announcement yesterday from the NET Power Allam Cycle gas plant in Texas that they had finally come online with delivering net-zero power to the grid. It was sort of a milestone in that technology. So we need to advance this technology and figure out how we're going to—how we're going to get where we need to be. We need to hold that kind of technology accountable to make sure that it's actually meeting the standards we're talking about so that it actually is very low, if not zero, carbon. But if you look at, you know, most of the scenarios I'm aware of, whether it's—Princeton did the study “Net-Zero America,” how we get to net zero by 2050 in the U.S. The International Energy Agency, as I said, did it for net zero globally. There is a meaningful role for carbon capture, to some extent, in the power sector in these heavy industry sectors like steel and cement, and then making, say, hydrogen some of that will be blue hydrogen. Most of it, eventually, will be green, but there may be some role for blue hydrogen, which is—which is gas with carbon capture. So I think, if anything, there's been a growing understanding that we need all tools on deck right away and, again, I fear even with all the tools we may still fall short. FASKIANOS: Great. There's a written question from Laila Bichara, who's at SUNY Farmingdale, international business. There was a New York Times article, “Business Schools Respond to a Flood of Interest in ESG,” talking about the issue of the scarcity of skills in recent graduates to help with social impact, sustainable investments, climate finance, and social entrepreneurship. And she wanted to know if there are resources that you could point the group to in terms of foundation courses or certification that would provide all students with a basic foundation. BORDOFF: Yeah. That's a really good question and it's a growing area of focus and I think universities should be doing more in. The Tamer Center of Columbia Business School does a lot of work in ESG. We hosted a really interesting roundtable at the Center on Global Energy Policy yesterday on ESG and actually been doing a lot of work thinking about that in the context of state-owned enterprises and national oil companies, which we don't talk about enough. But they're a really, really big part of the problem we're talking about. We tend to focus more on these very well-known private sector companies or financial institutions in places like New York. So there—Bloomberg Philanthropies has done a huge amount in this space. I think there's some really good educational programs with some universities and business schools that have done a lot in the ESG space. But I think it's a need, to be frank. I mean, the fact that you're asking the question and I'm pointing to a few examples, but not a huge number, and it is something that universities need to educate themselves about but then is an opportunity for us to educate others. Maybe a revenue one, too, with executive education or something. But there's a lot of companies and financial institutions that want to understand this better. I worry that while there's a huge growing focus on climate, which is a good thing, in the financial community, the phrase ESG kind of means so many different things right now. It's this alphabet soup of regulations and standards and disclosure requirements, and some may make a difference and some may not and it's hard to figure out which ones matter, and for people who want to do the responsible thing what does that really mean. That's an area where research is needed. I mean, that's a role for what we do every day to think about if the SEC is going to regulate what makes a difference and what doesn't, if you're going to create green bonds. If you're going to call everything green in the finance community, what's real and what's not? What moves the needle? What doesn't? What are the returns for greener portfolios? How is that affecting the cost of capital for clean energy versus dirty energy? You know, on and on. I think those are important research questions for us to take on and then it's our job to help educate others as well. FASKIANOS: Great. So the next question I'm going to take from—oh, OK. Good. Maya Copeland (sp) has written her question. She's a political science major at Delaware State University. Do you believe developed nations like the U.S. have done a lot in reference to climate change or mostly talk? If you believe nations like the U.S. have dropped the ball in this aspect, what do you think it would take to get those powerhouses serious about environmental change? BORDOFF: I think advanced economies have done—many have done a lot. I mean, the European Union has taken climate seriously and has reduced emissions and has pretty strong measures in place with a carbon market, for example, with a pretty high carbon price right now. The politics of this issue are not quite as favorable in the U.S., but the U.S. has seen emissions decline more than most over the last decade and a half, in part because of policy measures that have, you know, advanced renewable energy and brought the cost of that down as well as cheaper natural gas displacing coal for a while. But at a broader level, you know, have we done enough? The answer is no one's done enough—(laughs)—which is why emissions are still going up every single year. So that—so the answer is no, we haven't done enough. Almost no country has done enough at home to be on a trajectory for net zero 2050. You saw the announcements from countries like India saying, we'll get to net zero by 2070, and, you know, people said, oh, well, that's terrible. They're not saying 2050. And implicit in that is sort of saying, well, if you want to get global to net zero by 2050 we're not all going to move at the same speed, right. Some countries have advanced with the benefit of hydrocarbons since the Industrial Age and some haven't. So, presumably, the pathways are going to look different, right. And, you know, that's not always how countries in the advanced—in the developing—in the developed world talk about it. The commitment from the Biden administration is net zero by 2050. So I would say there's been—there are some models to point to of countries that have taken this issue seriously but we're not doing enough and partly because the political will is not there and partly—I come back to what I said before—this problem is harder than people realize. So you say which countries are doing enough, like, point to some models, right, and somebody might point to Norway, which, you know, the share of new vehicles sold that are electric in Norway went from zero to, I think, it's 70 percent now. I mean, that's amazing. Seventy percent of new car sales are electric. And if you go back to the start of that trajectory, about a decade or decade and a half, oil demand is unchanged in Norway. So we can talk about why that is and it's because a lot—as I said earlier, a lot of oil is used for things other than cars, and it's increased for trucks and planes and petrochemicals. It takes time for the vehicle fleet to turn over. So when you start selling a bunch of electric cars, you know, average car is on the road for fifteen years so it takes a while before that—the vehicle stock turns over. So I saw that kind of mapped out on a chart recently, just two lines—one is electric vehicle sales going straight up and then the other is oil demand in a flat line. It's a reminder of how unforgiving the math of decarbonization is. The math of climate is really unforgiving, like, you know, the kind of harmful impacts we're going to see with even 1.5 degrees warming. But the math of energy and decarbonization is really unforgiving, too. It's—and we just need to be honest with ourselves about what it takes to get where we need to go. Because I think it's good to have optimism and ambition, but I worry there should be optimism but not happy talk. We should recognize that there's a lot of work to do and let's get to work doing it. FASKIANOS: Great. So there are several questions in the chat about China. I'm going to start off with Andrew Campbell, who's a student at George Mason University. Is LNG—liquefied natural gas—a bridge toward renewable energy still being considered? If not, how are India and China's expected growth and increase in coal use going to be addressed? And then there are a couple of other comments or questions about China. You know, what's your take on China as the biggest emitter and return somewhat to coal? Can we actually even make stated and adequate new goals? And, you know, given the relationship between U.S. and China, which is contentious, you know, what is the cooperation going to be between U.S. and China on climate? So there's a lot packed in there, but I know you can address it all. (Laughs.) BORDOFF: Yeah. I think the China question is really hard, as I said earlier, this kind of, like, competition and cooperation and we're going to try to do both, and I think there was a hope early on—Secretary Kerry said it—that climate could be segmented from the broader challenges in the U.S.-China relationship, and I think that has proven harder to do than people had hoped, in part, because, you know, you need both parties to want to do that. I think China has signaled it's not necessarily willing to segment cooperation on climate from lots of other issues. And then these things bleed together where, you know, there's measures being taken in Washington to restrict imports of solar panels from China, that there were concerns that were made with—in ways that have human rights abuses associated with them with forced labor or maybe have unfair trade practices in terms of subsidies. China is—you know, the leadership in China takes climate seriously. This is a country that recognizes, I think, climate change is real and that needs to be addressed. They have a set of national interests that matter a lot, obviously, to them in terms of economic growth, and the pathway to get there is challenging. So it's a country that's growing clean energy incredibly quickly, as we're seeing right now, in part because there's a(n) energy crunch throughout Europe and Asia. They are ramping up the use of coal quite a bit again, but also taking some pretty strong measures to advance clean energy and, over time, hopefully, move in a lower carbon direction for reasons both about concerns over climate but also local air pollution, which is much, much worse in many parts of China than it is here and that's a huge source of concern for the public there. So when it comes to things like coal they need to figure out how to address those air pollution problems. And then for reasons of economic competition, like I mentioned a minute ago. I mean, China dominates the global market for refining and processing of critical minerals for solar panels, and there are economic and national competitiveness and strategic reasons to do that. So all of those things motivate them to move in the direction of clean energy, but they need to be moving faster to phase down hydrocarbon energy for sure. And then you ask a really hard question about—not hard, but one of the most contentious questions is about the role of natural gas in the transition, and we can have a whole separate session about that. I think there is a view of many in the climate community and many in developing countries—in developed countries that there's not space left in the carbon budget for natural gas, and you saw the Biden administration recently declare through the Treasury Department that, except in very rare cases of the poorest of the poor like Sierra Leone or something, they would not finance natural gas projects through the multilateral development banks. The vice president of Nigeria, I think, responded—speaking of CFR—in Foreign Affairs by writing that this was not fair and you need to think about a viable pathway for a country like Nigeria to develop and it just—it doesn't work to get there that fast. There has to be a bridge. The role of gas looks very different in different parts of the world. It looks different in the U.S. than it does in an emerging or a developing economy. It looks different in the power sector, where there are a lot more alternatives like renewables than it does in heavy industry or how we heat our homes. It looks different for, say, in the Global South, where you're talking about people who are still using coal and charcoal and dung for cooking to think about solutions like liquefied petroleum gas. So all of those things are true, but we need to think about gas also with the carbon budget in mind. I mean, the math is just the math. (Laughs.) If you're going to build any gas infrastructure and not have it blow through the carbon budget, it's going to have to be retired before the end of its normal economic life and you need to think about how that might look in different parts of the world. So you need to be fair to people, to allow them to grow, but also recognize that the math of carbon, you know, is what it is. FASKIANOS: Great. I just want to credit those last—the China questions came from Lada Kochtcheeva at North Carolina State University and Joan Kaufman, who's director of Schwarzman Scholars based in China. We are really at the end of our time—we started a couple minutes late—and I just wanted to go back to—there are students on the call who are following with a professor on the webinar who wanted you just to comment on blue hydrogen, whether or not it is contributing or helping to reduce greenhouse gases. BORDOFF: I think the answer is it can. You just need to make sure that it actually does. So the question of—and by blue hydrogen we mean, you know, using gas with carbon capture to create hydrogen. It needs to have very low methane leakage rates. It needs to have very high capture rates, and we know that is technically possible. It doesn't mean it will be done that way. So if people are going to pursue blue hydrogen as part of the solution in the—particularly in the near term, you need to make sure that it's meeting those standards. I think in the long run my guess and, I think, most guesses would be that green hydrogen is going to make more sense. It's going to be cheaper. The cost is going to come down. And so if we have a significant part of the energy sector that is hydrogen and ammonia in, say, 2050, more of that's going to be green than blue. But there can be a role for blue if you make sure it's done the right way. You just have to actually make sure it's done the right way. FASKIANOS: Great. And, Jason, we are out of time, but I wanted to give you one last, you know, one-minute or thirty seconds, whatever you want, just to say some parting words on your work at the center or, you know, to leave the group with what they can do, again. So— BORDOFF: Well, I would just say thanks for the chance to be with you all and for the work that you're doing every day. You know, I think Glasgow was a moment when the world came together to elevate ambition and roll up our sleeves and say this is—this is the decisive decade. Like, we'll know ten years from now—(laughs)—if we got anywhere close to making it or not. And so it's time for everyone to kind of roll up their sleeves and say, what can we do? We're doing that, I think, at Columbia with the creation of this new climate school. We do that every day at the Center on Global Energy Policy. And so just in all of your institutions, you know, what does that mean for you? What does it mean for the institution? What does that mean for your own research and time and how you allocate it? How do we step up and say, what can we do in the biggest and boldest way we can? Because we need—we're creating a climate school because I think the view is—you know, a hundred years ago there were no schools of public health and now it's how would you deal with a pandemic without a school of public health? So I think our view is decades from now we'll look back and wonder how we ever thought it was possible to handle a problem as complex and urgent as climate change without universities devoting their greatest kind of resource to them. And the measure of success for universities has to be research and new knowledge creation. It has to be education. It has to be serving our own communities. For us, it's, you know, the community here in New York, Harlem. But also are we focusing the extraordinary resources and capacity and expertise of these great institutions to solve humanity's greatest problems? That has to be a motivating force, too, for much of—maybe not all of but a lot of what universities do. So I'd just ask all of us to go back and think about how we can do that in our own work every day. and we have to do it through partnerships. I think universities don't work together as well as they need to. But this is only going to work if we work together. FASKIANOS: Great way to end. Thank you very much, Jason Bordoff. We really appreciate it. We'll have to look for your article in Foreign Affairs magazine, which is published by CFR. So, we are excited that you continue to contribute to the magazine. You can follow Jason Bordoff on Twitter at @JasonBordoff. Very easy to remember. Our final academic webinar of the semester will be on Wednesday, December 1, at 1:00 p.m. (ET). Michelle Gavin, who is CFR's Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy studies, will talk about African politics and security issues. So in the meantime, follow us at @CFR_Academic. Come to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues, and we look forward to continuing the conversation with you. Take care. BORDOFF: Thank you. (END)

In Episode #4 of his podcast, Thomas Fraser talks about three noteworthy examples of how people are involved and providing leadership in philanthropy and volunteering.  Stephen Schwarzman's Schwarzman Scholars program, Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan's pledge of Facebook shares and the volunteering of many people in Seward, Nebraska are all excellent examples of how people can get involved, he says.To learn more about the Tom Fraser Podcast and to listen to additional episodes, please go to www.tlfraser.com/podcasts.This podcast was originally published at www.tlfraser.com on December 5, 2015.The information provided in this podcast does not constitute the provision of legal, tax or investment advice.  This information is provided for general informational purposes only.Copyright 2015-2021 Thomas L. Fraser.  All Rights Reserved.

Tuesday, 9 February 2021, 1 – 2pm An 'in conversation' with Dr Peter Hamilton (School of Histories and Humanities) and hosted by Dr Isabella Jackson, (Trinity Centre for Asian Studies) Dr Hamilton will discuss his career and his latest publication, Made in Hong Kong: Transpacific Networks and a New History of Globalization. About Made in Hong Kong: Transpacific Networks and a New History of Globalization Between 1949 and 1997, Hong Kong transformed from a struggling British colonial outpost into a global financial capital. Made in Hong Kong delivers a new narrative of this metamorphosis, revealing Hong Kong both as a critical engine in the expansion and remaking of postwar global capitalism and as the linchpin of Sino-U.S. trade since the 1970s. Peter E. Hamilton explores the role of an overlooked transnational Chinese elite who fled to Hong Kong amid war and revolution. Despite losing material possessions, these industrialists, bankers, academics, and other professionals retained crucial connections to the United States. They used these relationships to enmesh themselves and Hong Kong with the U.S. through commercial ties and higher education. By the 1960s, Hong Kong had become a manufacturing powerhouse supplying American consumers, and by the 1970s it was the world's largest sender of foreign students to American colleges and universities. Hong Kong's reorientation toward U.S. international leadership enabled its transplanted Chinese elites to benefit from expanding American influence in Asia and positioned them to act as shepherds to China's reengagement with global capitalism. After China's reforms accelerated under Deng Xiaoping, Hong Kong became a crucial node for China's export-driven development, connecting Chinese labor with the U.S. market. Analyzing untapped archival sources from around the world, this book demonstrates why we cannot understand postwar globalization, China's economic rise, or today's Sino-U.S. trade relationship without centering Hong Kong. Dr. Peter E. Hamilton is the Assistant Professor in Modern Chinese History at Trinity College Dublin. He is the author of Made in Hong Kong: Transpacific Networks and a New History of Globalization (Columbia University Press, Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, 2021). His research has been published in Twentieth-Century China, The Journal of Historical Sociology, and The International History Review and has received financial support from the Fudan Development Institute, the Schwarzman Scholars, the Weatherhead East Asian Institute of Columbia University, the Institute for Historical Studies at the University of Texas at Austin, and the Hong Kong-America Centre.

Speakers: Fred Hu, Founder and Chairman, Primavera Capital Group Shelley Rigger, Brown Professor of East Asian Politics at Davidson College David Daokui Li, Founding Dean of the Schwarzman Scholars program, Mansfield Freeman Professor of Economics, and Director of the Center for China in the World Economy (CCWE), Tsinghua University Yuan Ming, Dean of Yenching Academy, Peking University Moderator: William Kirby, Spangler Family Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School; T. M. Chang Professor of China Studies, Harvard University; Chairman, Harvard China Fund Introductions by: Winnie (Chi-Man) Yip, Professor of the Practice of Global Health Policy and Economics, Department of Global Health and Population, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health; Director, Harvard-China Health Partnership; Acting Director, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies

Lessons From Billionaire Stephen A. Schwarzman

Building a business in China is one of the most notoriusly difficult tasks to accomplish. Now doing that as a foreigner? Next to impossible! Argentinian national Tomas Fuentes Benitez, however, begs to differ with convention. He is accomplishing the impossible though his startup, STOKES, the first and only all-natural beef jerky statup in China - which is well on its course to disrupt a US$ 3B category. In this episode of Millennial Musings, Anurag chats with Tomas on how he grew STOKES from a makeshift food lab he built in his dorm room, to now becoming one of the hottest food products in Chinese supermarkets - largelly all by himself. Along the way, he has attracted investments and support from massive names, such as football legend Javier Mascherano. The rocketship rise definitely has had many ups, but also several challenges. But at its core, this is truly a story of perseverence, dogged persistence, and rising up to the occasion. Make no mistake, Tomas is an absolute inspiration for budding entrepreneurs around the world. About Tomas: Tomas Fuentes Benitez is a business lawyer turned entrepreneur from Argentina. He has lived in China for several years, where he founded STOKES, the first all-natural beef jerky startup in this market. Because of his experience in doing business in China, he also serves as the Investment Advisor of Argentina's Embassy in Beijing. About STOKES: Founded in the dorms of Schwarzman Scholars at Tsinghua University, STOKES is the first and only all-natural beef jerky startup in China. Based in Beijing and with factories in Shanghai, we are disrupting a US$3B category. Our products are on the shelves of supermarkets across China and have become category best-sellers in only a few months. Among our investors is football legend Javier Mascherano, former captain of FC Barcelona. Follow Anurag on: Instagram: @anuragrc and @millennialmusings_podcast Title music Ikson-Alive is obtained from the artist's website, and used with due credit given. Support Ikson's music on https://soundcloud.com/ikson

Amy Wang (Director of Content at BT) is joined by Schwarzman Scholars Michael Shin ('19) and Amanda Morrison ('20) in a discussion of the value of cross border communication and how the program has adapted to the global pandemic. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/business-today/support

The arrival of the coronavirus in both China and the United States has further strained an already frayed bilateral relationship. Yet, if the world is to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic and prepare for future health crises, the two nations must work together to confront the immediate issues of medical treatment and equipment, and the longer-term need to develop and produce necessary vaccines. On April 28, 2020, the National Committee hosted a virtual program where Joan Kaufman of Schwarzman Scholars moderated a conversation with two leading medical experts: Margaret Hamburg of the National Academy of Medicine and Winnie Yip of the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, during which they discussed the potential for collaboration between the United States and China on global health strategies. For more information on the coronavirus's impact on U.S.-China relations, visit www.ncuscr.org/coronavirus.  

Surya Karki is one of the most inspirational people you will ever come across. He was born and brought up in poverty by a single mother in a village where education was a rare sight and schooling was a 2.5 hours walk to-and-from the school. He left his family and his village at 8 years old to study in the capital of Nepal and went on to study at the United World College of Venezuela, finished his undergraduate from the College of the Atlantic in Maine and his Masters Degree as a Schwarzman Scholar in China. Recognizing the opportunity he had, he dedicated his life to educating those with a similar background to him--building over 34 schools and educating over 5200 vulnerable children in Nepal, through his organization, United World Schools in Nepal. In this episode of Millennial Musings, Anurag chats with Surya about his incredible journey, and tries to understand the mentality, dedication, and perseverance of one of the most impactful young leaders in the world today. They further discuss some of their experiences as Schwarzman Scholars in Beijing, a year that bonded them for life. While Surya does not like to discuss his awards and recognition, Anurag has no problem revealing it. For his work in education and sustainable development, in 2014, he was awarded the Prince of Wales and UNILEVER Sustainable Living Young Entrepreneurs Award; in 2016, he was recognized as one of 30 under 30 International Literacy Association leaders; and in 2017, he was listed in the Forbes 30 under 30 Asia. Follow Surya and his work: United World Schools Nepal Website Follow Anurag on: Instagram: @anuragrc and @millennialmusings_podcast Title music Ikson-Alive is obtained from the artist's website, and used with due credit given. Support Ikson's music on https://soundcloud.com/ikson

Fifty years ago, as a senior at Abington High School in suburban Philadelphia, Stephen Schwarzman got waitlisted Harvard College. So he found the number for Harvard’s dean of admissions and called him up to plead his case directly. When told by the dean that no one would be admitted from the waiting list that fall, Schwarzman told him that he was making a mistake. It was all for naught, but this chutzpah was a bit of a hallmark: A year earlier, Schwarzman spearheaded a successful effort to get Anthony and the Imperials—then one of the most popular musical acts in the country—to play at Abington High School. Today, Schwarzman is chairman, CEO, and co-founder of Blackstone, and the founder of the Schwarzman Scholars, a graduate fellowship program housed at the new Schwarzman College in Tsinghua University in Beijing. He has just written a new book, What It Takes: Lessons in the Pursuit of Excellence, and in this episode of Skydeck, Schwarzman and I discuss the origins of his audacity, his path to success, and what he’s learned from the low points.

427: Blackstone CEO Stephen Schwarzman shares stories from his childhood, his time as an undergraduate at Yale, on Wall Street, and business school at Harvard, and his experiences at Lehman Brothers and Blackstone. These stories how he went from nearly failing in an English course in college to the Dean's List, how he offered constructive criticism to the Dean of Harvard Business School while he was a student, how he led one of the biggest mergers in history to date as a fourth-year associate at Lehman Brothers who had never done a merger, as well as tales from the founding and growth of Blackstone. We also discuss the importance of having a strong culture and hiring the best people, how and why China bought 9.9 percent of the firm when Blackstone was going public, the Schwarzman Scholars program that he has developed in China, among other topics.

427: Blackstone CEO Stephen Schwarzman shares stories from his childhood, his time as an undergraduate at Yale, on Wall Street, and business school at Harvard, and his experiences at Lehman Brothers and Blackstone. These stories how he went from nearly failing in an English course in college to the Dean’s List, how he offered constructive criticism to the Dean of Harvard Business School while he was a student, how he led one of the biggest mergers in history to date as a fourth-year associate at Lehman Brothers who had never done a merger, as well as tales from the founding and growth of Blackstone. We also discuss the importance of having a strong culture and hiring the best people, how and why China bought 9.9 percent of the firm when Blackstone was going public, the Schwarzman Scholars program that he has developed in China, among other topics.

SHOW NOTES The birth of SCHWARZMAN SCHOLARS [2:08] The application process ✍ [4:10] Eligibility requirements [5:16] Defining and defying your version of leadership [7:37] Collaborate and playing well with others [8:52] Number of scholars currently selected annually through a competitive process [10:37] Sharing stories and carrying out the mission through a steadily growing alumni network [12:16] Duration of trips [12:50] Recognizing the knowledge and network of China [14:32] Going to the same university as current and past presidents of China [16:10] Recruiting an eclectic group of students from around the world [16:52] Application deadlines for both processes and what happens upon selection [18:57] The role language plays in the process [21:40] Doubts recipients face prior to their trip [24:21] Learning from diverse backgrounds [27:50] Schwarzman College [30:10] The capstone project [34:15] Excursions for the scholars [39:46] Schwarman's Youtube channel [43:48] The magic of the mundane [46:07] When is the best time to apply for the Schwarzman [49:18] Christian's Book Recommendations [53:10] Media recommendations [56:42] Re-applying for a Schwarzman Scholarship [59:00]

Joan Kaufman is the New York-based Senior Director for Academic Programs at Schwarzman Scholars, a newly launched elite international master’s program training leaders in global affairs at Tsinghua University in China. She is also a Lecturer in Global Health and Social Medicine at Harvard Medical School. As an expert on both China and global health policy, she was Director of Columbia University’s Global Center for East Asia (Beijing) from 2012-2016 and Associate Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia’s Mailman School of Public Health. Her experience in China goes back to 1980, when she was the first international program officer for the United Nations Population Fund, and since then she has lived and worked in the country for 15 years. Ta for Ta is a new biweekly podcast, which captures the narratives of women from Greater China at the top of their professional game. “Ta for Ta” is a play on the Chinese spoken language that demonstrates equality between the sexes. Tā 他 is the word for “he”; tā 她 is also the word for “she.” For more musings and links about the people and topics covered in Ta for Ta, check out Juliana's Medium page. Juliana loves to hear from listeners — send her a message at ta.for.ta.china@gmail.com. 

Joan Kaufman is the New York-based Senior Director for Academic Programs at Schwarzman Scholars, a newly launched elite international master’s program training leaders in global affairs at Tsinghua University in China. She is also a Lecturer in Global Health and Social Medicine at Harvard Medical School. As an expert on both China and global health policy, she was Director of Columbia University’s Global Center for East Asia (Beijing) from 2012-2016 and Associate Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia’s Mailman School of Public Health. Her experience in China goes back to 1980, when she was the first international program officer for the United Nations Population Fund, and since then she has lived and worked in the country for 15 years. Ta for Ta is a new biweekly podcast, which captures the narratives of women from Greater China at the top of their professional game. “Ta for Ta” is a play on the Chinese spoken language that demonstrates equality between the sexes. Tā 他 is the word for “he”; tā 她 is also the word for “she.” For more musings and links about the people and topics covered in Ta for Ta, check out Juliana's Medium page. Juliana loves to hear from listeners — send her a message at ta.for.ta.china@gmail.com. 

Gaining Leadership Skills & In-Depth Knowledge of China through the Schwarzman Scholars' Program [Show Summary] Dr. Rob Garris, Global Director of Admissions for the Schwarzman Scholars Program, discusses the Schwarzman Scholars’ program and admissions policies. Through the program, participants from around the world earn a Masters in Global Affairs at Tsingua University in Beijing. The entire program is focused on providing the scholars with in-depth knowledge of China while developing their global knowledge and leadership skills. Modeled after the Rhodes Trust, Schwarzman Scholars provides full tuition, room and board, and a stipend to participants during the year of study. Dr. Rob Garris, Global Director of Admissions, Speak About the Schwarzman Scholars' Program [Show Notes] Today’s guest, Dr. Rob Garris, earned his Ph.D in European History from UNC in 1998. While at UNC he also launched his career in academic administration when he worked as the Director for Educational Programs for UNC’s Center for European Studies. That was followed by other positions including a stint as Senior Associate Dean for Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs and Managing Director of the Rockefeller Foundation. All these positions prepared him for his current role. Since 2014 Rob has worked as the Global Director of Admissions for the Schwarzman Scholars Program, where he oversaw the development of the Admissions Office for Schwarzman Scholars and has spearheaded recruitment efforts. Let’s start with the basics since there are probably listeners who aren’t familiar with the Schwarzman Scholars program. What is the Schwarzman Scholars program? [2:15] The Schwarzman Scholars program is an educational and leadership development program designed to ensure that decades from now there are people in leadership roles in every part of the world and in every major professional field who are better at what they do because they understand China and who also function together as a network and as an intermediary between China and the world. China is already playing an important role in many different aspects in global trends. We think it is important that people have factual knowledge of how China interacts with the rest of the world coupled with professional and interpersonal relationships so there can be much smoother flows of information between China and other major world powers. At Tsinghua there is a very strong academic program developed by Tsinghua and other universities around the world about how China relates to the rest of the world. In addition to the classroom experience, we give students incredible opportunities to learn outside of the university about China and its role– students travel around the country, visit with professionals in fields they are interested in, discuss topics including the environment, health, technology, and urban planning. We also match each scholar with a senior mentor in his/her field to learn in a firsthand way from someone who has been successful in that field. At the end of the year we help place scholars into an internship-like experience to continue learning in a workplace environment. We have relationships with 70+ institutions in Beijing so students can end their year with a very practical hands-on experience. Can you give us a bit of background on how it came into being? [7:44] The program was inspired by a particular moment in the professional life of Steve Schwarzman, cofounder and chairman of Blackstone. In 2007 when Blackstone was preparing for its IPO, the Chinese government contacted Steve to express interest in participating in the deal. Through the negotiations that resulted, Steve became very aware that many of the business and political leaders he turns to when trying to think through an important transaction didn’t have the same level of awareness of how the Chinese government went about making decisions, or factors driving participation in an IPO of a North American finan...

Max Seunik is a degree candidate at Tsinghua Univeristy in Beijing as one of 110 of the inaugural cohort of Schwarzman Scholars, a fully funded graduate program focused on leadership & China (3% acceptance rate). Most recently he led two national field studies in Uganda aimed at evaluating development interventions with Innovations for Poverty Action, a global non-profit that discovers effective solutions to global poverty problems. He serves as Deputy Executive Director of Young Diplomats of Canada, a national non-partisan, non-profit organization that connects young leaders with global summits of the G20, World Bank & IMF, and UN. Max is also a Global Shaper of the World Economic Forum. Previously, Max has advised and worked alongside the Minister of Health of Rwanda to manage a 5-country global health innovation research team, design health evaluation curriculum for a Rwandan university, and spearhead a new digital communications strategy. In civil society, Max works with CIVICUS -- the world alliance for citizen participation -- to redefine civic engagement for youth, including through liaising with partners from Europe to Southeast Asia. Max has presented original research at the United Nations, written for The Globe and Mail, and spoken at conferences around the world, including at TEDxGillings and in Indonesia, Turkey, Colombia, the United States and Canada. He studied public health and Islamic studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Gillings School of Public Health as a Morehead-Cain Scholar.

Joan Kaufman is a fascinating figure: Her long and storied career in China started in the early 1980s, when she was what she calls a “cappuccino-and-croissant socialist from Berkeley.” Today, she is the director for academics at the Schwarzman Scholars program at Tsinghua University and a lecturer in the department of Global Health and Social Medicine at Harvard Medical School. Joan shares some stories about her time in China at organizations like the United Nations Population Fund and the Ford Foundation, including a visit to a condom factory in the 80s. She discusses the newest developments in the China educational and non-governmental organization (NGO) sectors after the adoption in 2016 of new laws regulating foreign NGOs, and the realities of working on the ground with NGOs in China. We also talk about current trends in China’s openness to U.S.-China academic partnerships, and questions of censorship at the China campuses of U.S. universities. Recommendations: Jeremy: Kishore Mahbubani, former senior diplomat and dean at the Practice of Public Policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, usually has an interesting perspective on China’s relationship with the rest of the world, particularly on the U.S.-China relationship. Check out his article in the Huffington Post: “It’s a problem that America is still unable to admit it will become #2 to China.” Joan: China File’s new China NGO Project, recently launched on June 7. The website has five sections, including the latest updates, laws, and regulations, and other resources to help NGOs understand the ins and outs of operating in China under the new NGO law. Kaiser: The Hi-Phi Nation podcast produced by Vassar College philosophy professor Barry Lam uses investigative journalism techniques to look at real-world events through a philosophical lens, all while weaving in creative narrative storytelling and sound design.

In this podcast, Jasmin Sadler gives us an inside view of China from her perspective as a member of the ’17 inaugural class of Schwarzman Scholars at Beijing’s Tsinghua University. This is a stellar up-close-and-personal report of “what’s hot and what’s not” among Chinese of college age and just beyond. A Swiss citizen, Jasmin’s been going to China since she was 16, and speaks Mandarin fluently. She explains how not only having read and being able to discuss Romance of the Three Kingdoms— the historical novel beloved by all Chinese, and the basis for hugely popular video games—gives her the ability to connect on the most personal level with Chinese friends. We talk of just how connected our world could be if everyone learned at least one foreign language and could speak it with people for whom it is their native tongue. We also talk of why China is the perfect place for entrepreneurs right now, how young Chinese with experience in the West feel empowered in straddling two worlds, why Chinese are optimistic about their future, and what challenges could get in the way of that future being realized.

This is Special English. I'm Ryan Price in Beijing. Here is the news. The State Council, China's Cabinet, has issued a guideline on government information sharing. The guideline, approved by Premier Li Keqiang, aims to increase government credibility, while improving administrative efficiency and government services. The guideline divides government information into three categories, namely, unconditionally shared, conditionally shared and unshared. The guideline said sharing should be the principle while unsharing should be the exception. According to the guideline, information could be categorized as "unshared" only when backed by laws, regulations or national policies. It said all government information systems should be linked to a national data-base, so the public will have no need to submit the same information twice. This is Special English. China's space lab the Tiangong-2 may serve for more than five years and co-exist with China's first space station which is scheduled for completion around 2020. With a designed life of two years, Tiangong-2 was originally built as a backup to Tiangong-1, which completed its mission in March. But space scientists expect Tiangong-2 to serve for more than five years given the introduction of an in-orbit propellant technique for the first time. In April next year, China's first cargo spaceship Tianzhou-1 will be sent into orbit to dock with the space lab, providing fuel and other supplies. If the fuel-supply experiment goes well, China will then become the second country after Russia to master the in-orbit propellant technique. While in space, the 8-tonne space lab will maneuver itself into orbit almost 400 kilometers above the Earth. As it is higher than previous manned space missions, the Tiangong-2 will be more cost-effective and have a longer lifespan. Though it looks similar to Tiangong-1, Tiangong-2's interior living quarters and life support system have been improved to allow longer astronaut stays. It is designed to enable two astronauts to live in space for up to 30 days and to receive manned and unmanned cargo spaceships. The space lab will also be used to conduct space science experiments on a relatively large scale compared to China's previous efforts. You're listening to Special English. I'm Ryan Price in Beijing. Chinese President Xi Jinping has sent a letter congratulating the opening of the China-US Schwarzman College at Tsinghua University. Xi said in the letter that education is an important force that pushes forward human civilization. Nowadays the young people in all countries should establish a world vision and raise awareness of cooperation through education. He said the China-US exchanges in education have played a positive role in promoting understanding and friendship among the people as well as improving the relations between the two nations. He added that the two countries should deepen cooperation in this field. He hoped that the Schwarzman College can be built into an international platform for cultivating the world's excellent talents, providing study opportunities for the youth of all countries and helping them enhance understanding and exchanges. US President Barack Obama has also sent a congratulation letter for the opening ceremony. The Schwarzman Scholars program of Tsinghua University is a one-year post graduate program co-founded by the university and Stephen Schwarzman. It aims to cultivate students with international vision, overall quality, leadership and knowledge of China. The first group of 110 scholars came from 70 colleges in 31 countries. This is Special English. Chinese and Russian naval forces have carried out a joint drill on air defense and anti-submarine in the South China Sea off southern China's Guangdong Province. Vessels that took part in the exercise included a missile destroyer, anti-submarine vessels, missile frigates, ship-based helicopters and conventional submarines. The vessels were divided into two fleets and confrontations were staged off the eastern waters of Guangdong Province. A senior officer of the joint drill said the exercise was carried out under a background of actual combat; and expected aim of the exercise had been reached. Chinese and Russian navies held the "Joint Sea-2016" drill that runs from Sept. 13 to Sept. 19. It features navy surface ships, submarines, fixed-wing aircraft, ship-borne helicopters, marine corps and amphibious armored equipment from both sides. This is Special English. The proportion of Chinese people who can communicate in Mandarin Chinese is expected to exceed 80 percent by the year 2020. That's according to a national work plan for popularizing Mandarin during the period spanning from 2016 to 2020. The work plan has been released by the nation's Language Committee together with the Ministry of Education. Statistics from the language committee showed that as of 2015, more than 70 percent of people across China can use Mandarin in their daily lives. However, at the end of the 20th century, the proportion was 53 percent. The Education Ministry said a lot of efforts were made during the past decade to popularize the use of Mandarin among people from across the country. Among the efforts is the Mandarin Chinese Week, an event launched in 1997 to help people from different ethnic groups to learn to use Mandarin. This year, the event was held from Sept 8 to 14, for the 19th time. Some outstanding learners from ethnic groups were asked to share their experiences and benefits of learning the language. The work plan also included increasing efforts to protect the languages of the country's other ethnic groups, particularly some of the endangered ones. The ministry said the languages of ethnic groups are part of China's culture and the ministry will try to work out more scientific and effective ways to prevent them from dying out. You're listening to Special English. I'm Ryan Price in Beijing. You can access the program by logging on to newsplusradio.cn. You can also find us on our Apple Podcast. If you have any comments or suggestions, please let us know by e-mailing us at mansuyingyu@cri.com.cn. That's mansuyingyu@cri.com.cn. Now the news continues. The U.S. subsidiary of Baidu, a Chinese web services company, has been issued a permit to test self-driving vehicles in California. The testing permit, from the California Department of Motor Vehicles, would allow the Baidu USA to test its autonomous driving technology in the Golden State. Headquartered in Beijing, Baidu announced the formation of an autonomous driving team in the United States, as part of Baidu Autonomous Driving Unit that operates in Chinese cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen. Fourteen other companies, including German automakers Mercedes Benz and BMW, as well as U.S. automaker Ford, have obtained the permit to operate self-driving vehicles on public roads in California. Following the move, Baidu said it would test its vehicles "very soon". Baidu said it has already built a strong team in Silicon Valley to develop autonomous driving technology, and being able to do road tests will greatly accelerate their progress. The Baidu USA is based in Sunnyvale in northern California. This is Special English. Police have detained 13 residents in a village in Guangdong province, accusing them of disrupting public order and inciting illegal assemblies. A statement by the Lufeng city bureau of public security named the leaders of the protests. The statement said the protests disrupted social order, preventing fishermen from going to work and others from opening their shops for business; and the crowds also disrupted the normal operation of schools. Police have therefore detained the 13 for further investigation, in an effort to safeguard the interests of the residents and restore order. The village of Wukan came under the media spotlight at home and abroad in 2011, when the villagers staged three large-scale rallies over four months, protesting local officials' illegal land grabs and corruption, as well as violations of financing and election rules. The rallies finally came to an end when an agreement was reached in a face-to-face talk between the residents and senior Guangdong provincial officials in 2012. You're listening to Special English. I'm Ryan Price in Beijing. Three security lanes created especially for women have begun processing passengers at the Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport in Guangdong province. The move aims to protect the privacy of female passengers and help them to avoid the embarrassment of being checked by male security guards. The lanes use pink as their identifying color. All the security guards who work in the lanes are women. Meanwhile, children who fly with their mothers are also allowed to use the lanes. It also offers special baby baskets. The Guangzhou airport is said to be the first on the Chinese mainland to have opened such special security lanes. Officers checked more than 3,600 female passengers and dozens of children during the opening day. According to the airport, by using the lanes, female passengers saved 15 percent of the time they would normally use standing in the line. A Women's Federation official from Guangzhou said the lanes provided great convenience to women and increased efficiency for the airport. This is Special English. Many parents of lower-grade primary school students are concerned about whether their children will adapt to study, as their noon nap habits can hardly be carried out in a classroom, affecting their afternoon performance. But the Hangzhou Danfeng Experimental Primary School in East China's Zhejiang province has reassured parents as it innovatively prepares 12 "sleeping rooms" for each first and second-grade classes, as well as pillows and blankets for each student. The sleeping rooms are as big as a classroom, and are covered with foam pads. Children can enjoy a 50-minute noon nap until 1:05 pm after laying down on their pillows and blankets. Every sleeping room has a teacher attending. Teachers will pacify naughty children or tuck sleeping students in quilts. If some students are unwilling to sleep, they are allowed to read books on the condition that they do not bother others. The principal of the primary school, Cao Xiaohong, said school teachers disagreed with students napping on desks, as many do in other schools, because it was unhealthy. Two years ago, a first grade primary student in the province reportedly went to the hospital complaining of cervical vertebra aches. The diagnosis revealed a dislocation of her cervical spine and the doctor thought it was related to her long-term napping on desks. Cao said the school moved to a new building this year and there are enough spare classrooms. Since sleeping on the ground would likely lead to students catching a cold during the cooler weather, the sleeping rooms will be open in May, June, September and October. This is Special English. （全文见周日微信。）