Podcast appearances and mentions of Adam Ferguson

So what, exactly, was “The Enlightenment”? According to the Princeton historian David A. Bell, it was an intellectual movement roughly spanning the early 18th century through to the French Revolution. In his Spring 2025 Liberties Quarterly piece “The Enlightenment, Then and Now”, Bell charts the Enlightenment as a complex intellectual movement centered in Paris but with hubs across Europe and America. He highlights key figures like Montesquieu, Voltaire, Kant, and Franklin, discussing their contributions to concepts of religious tolerance, free speech, and rationality. In our conversation, Bell addresses criticisms of the Enlightenment, including its complicated relationship with colonialism and slavery, while arguing that its principles of freedom and reason remain relevant today. 5 Key Takeaways* The Enlightenment emerged in the early 18th century (around 1720s) and was characterized by intellectual inquiry, skepticism toward religion, and a growing sense among thinkers that they were living in an "enlightened century."* While Paris was the central hub, the Enlightenment had multiple centers including Scotland, Germany, and America, with thinkers like Voltaire, Rousseau, Kant, Hume, and Franklin contributing to its development.* The Enlightenment introduced the concept of "society" as a sphere of human existence separate from religion and politics, forming the basis of modern social sciences.* The movement had a complex relationship with colonialism and slavery - many Enlightenment thinkers criticized slavery, but some of their ideas about human progress were later used to justify imperialism.* According to Bell, rather than trying to "return to the Enlightenment," modern society should selectively adopt and adapt its valuable principles of free speech, religious tolerance, and education to create our "own Enlightenment."David Avrom Bell is a historian of early modern and modern Europe at Princeton University. His most recent book, published in 2020 by Farrar, Straus and Giroux, is Men on Horseback: The Power of Charisma in the Age of Revolution. Described in the Journal of Modern History as an "instant classic," it is available in paperback from Picador, in French translation from Fayard, and in Italian translation from Viella. A study of how new forms of political charisma arose in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the book shows that charismatic authoritarianism is as modern a political form as liberal democracy, and shares many of the same origins. Based on exhaustive research in original sources, the book includes case studies of the careers of George Washington, Napoleon Bonaparte, Toussaint Louverture and Simon Bolivar. The book's Introduction can be read here. An online conversation about the book with Annette Gordon-Reed, hosted by the Cullman Center of the New York Public Library, can be viewed here. Links to material about the book, including reviews in The New York Review of Books, The Guardian, Harper's, The New Republic, The Nation, Le Monde, The Los Angeles Review of Books and other venues can be found here. Bell is also the author of six previous books. He has published academic articles in both English and French and contributes regularly to general interest publications on a variety of subjects, ranging from modern warfare, to contemporary French politics, to the impact of digital technology on learning and scholarship, and of course French history. A list of his publications from 2023 and 2024 can be found here. His Substack newsletter can be found here. His writings have been translated into French, Spanish, Portuguese, Chinese, Hebrew, Swedish, Polish, Russian, German, Croatian, Italian, Turkish and Japanese. At the History Department at Princeton University, he holds the Sidney and Ruth Lapidus Chair in the Era of North Atlantic Revolutions, and offers courses on early modern Europe, on military history, and on the early modern French empire. Previously, he spent fourteen years at Johns Hopkins University, including three as Dean of Faculty in its School of Arts and Sciences. From 2020 to 2024 he served as Director of the Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies at Princeton. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a corresponding fellow of the British Academy. Bell's new project is a history of the Enlightenment. A preliminary article from the project was published in early 2022 by Modern Intellectual History. Another is now out in French History.Named as one of the "100 most connected men" by GQ magazine, Andrew Keen is amongst the world's best known broadcasters and commentators. In addition to presenting the daily KEEN ON show, he is the host of the long-running How To Fix Democracy interview series. He is also the author of four prescient books about digital technology: CULT OF THE AMATEUR, DIGITAL VERTIGO, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER and HOW TO FIX THE FUTURE. Andrew lives in San Francisco, is married to Cassandra Knight, Google's VP of Litigation & Discovery, and has two grown children. FULL TRANSCRIPTAndrew Keen: Hello everybody, in these supposedly dark times, the E word comes up a lot, the Enlightenment. Are we at the end of the Enlightenment or the beginning? Was there even an Enlightenment? My guest today, David Bell, a professor of history, very distinguished professor of history at Princeton University, has an interesting piece in the spring issue of It is One of our, our favorite quarterlies here on Keen on America, Bell's piece is The Enlightenment Then and Now, and David is joining us from the home of the Enlightenment, perhaps Paris in France, where he's on sabbatical hard life. David being an academic these days, isn't it?David Bell: Very difficult. I'm having to suffer the Parisian bread and croissant. It's terrible.Andrew Keen: Yeah. Well, I won't keep you too long. Is Paris then, or France? Is it the home of the Enlightenment? I know there are many Enlightenments, the French, the Scottish, maybe even the English, perhaps even the American.David Bell: It's certainly one of the homes of the Enlightenment, and it's probably the closest that the Enlightened had to a center, absolutely. But as you say, there were Edinburgh, Glasgow, plenty of places in Germany, Philadelphia, all those places have good claims to being centers of the enlightenment as well.Andrew Keen: All the same David, is it like one of those sports games in California where everyone gets a medal?David Bell: Well, they're different metals, right, but I think certainly Paris is where everybody went. I mean, if you look at the figures from the German Enlightenment, from the Scottish Enlightenment from the American Enlightenment they all tended to congregate in Paris and the Parisians didn't tend to go anywhere else unless they were forced to. So that gives you a pretty good sense of where the most important center was.Andrew Keen: So David, before we get to specifics, map out for us, because everyone is perhaps as familiar or comfortable with the history of the Enlightenment, and certainly as you are. When did it happen? What years? And who are the leaders of this thing called the Enlightenment?David Bell: Well, that's a big question. And I'm afraid, of course, that if you ask 10 historians, you'll get 10 different answers.Andrew Keen: Well, I'm only asking you, so I only want one answer.David Bell: So I would say that the Enlightenment really gets going around the first couple of decades of the 18th century. And that's when people really start to think that they are actually living in what they start to call an Enlightenment century. There are a lot of reasons for this. They are seeing what we now call the scientific revolution. They're looking at the progress that has been made with that. They are experiencing the changes in the religious sphere, including the end of religious wars, coming with a great deal of skepticism about religion. They are living in a relative period of peace where they're able to speculate much more broadly and daringly than before. But it's really in those first couple of decades that they start thinking of themselves as living in an enlightened century. They start defining themselves as something that would later be called the enlightenment. So I would say that it's, really, really there between maybe the end of the 17th century and 1720s that it really gets started.Andrew Keen: So let's have some names, David, of philosophers, I guess. I mean, if those are the right words. I know that there was a term in French. There is a term called philosoph. Were they the founders, the leaders of the Enlightenment?David Bell: Well, there is a... Again, I don't want to descend into academic quibbling here, but there were lots of leaders. Let me give an example, though. So the year 1721 is a remarkable year. So in the year, 1721, two amazing events happened within a couple of months of each other. So in May, Montesquieu, one of the great philosophers by any definition, publishes his novel called Persian Letters. And this is an incredible novel. Still, I think one of greatest novels ever written, and it's very daring. It is the account, it is supposedly a an account written by two Persian travelers to Europe who are writing back to people in Isfahan about what they're seeing. And it is very critical of French society. It is very of religion. It is, as I said, very daring philosophically. It is a product in part of the increasing contact between Europe and the rest of the world that is also very central to the Enlightenment. So that novel comes out. So it's immediately, you know, the police try to suppress it. But they don't have much success because it's incredibly popular and Montesquieu doesn't suffer any particular problems because...Andrew Keen: And the French police have never been the most efficient police force in the world, have they?David Bell: Oh, they could be, but not in this case. And then two months later, after Montesquieu published this novel, there's a German philosopher much less well-known than Montesqiu, than Christian Bolz, who is a professor at the Universität Haller in Prussia, and he gives an oration in Latin, a very typical university oration for the time, about Chinese philosophy, in which he says that the Chinese have sort of proved to the world, particularly through the writings of Confucius and others, that you can have a virtuous society without religion. Obviously very controversial. Statement for the time it actually gets him fired from his job, he has to leave the Kingdom of Prussia within 48 hours on penalty of death, starts an enormous controversy. But here are two events, both of which involving non-European people, involving the way in which Europeans are starting to look out at the rest of the world and starting to imagine Europe as just one part of a larger humanity, and at the same time they are starting to speculate very daringly about whether you can have. You know, what it means to have a society, do you need to have religion in order to have morality in society? Do you need the proper, what kind of government do you need to to have virtuous conduct and a proper society? So all of these things get, you know, really crystallize, I think, around these two incidents as much as anything. So if I had to pick a single date for when the enlightenment starts, I'd probably pick that 1721.Andrew Keen: And when was, David, I thought you were going to tell me about the earthquake in Lisbon, when was that earthquake?David Bell: That earthquake comes quite a bit later. That comes, and now historians should be better with dates than I am. It's in the 1750s, I think it's the late 1750's. Again, this historian is proving he's getting a very bad grade for forgetting the exact date, but it's in 1750. So that's a different kind of event, which sparks off a great deal of commentary, because it's a terrible earthquake. It destroys most of the city of Lisbon, it destroys other cities throughout Portugal, and it leads a lot of the philosophy to philosophers at the time to be speculating very daringly again on whether there is any kind of real purpose to the universe and whether there's any kind divine purpose. Why would such a terrible thing happen? Why would God do such a thing to his followers? And certainly VoltaireAndrew Keen: Yeah, Votav, of course, comes to mind of questioning.David Bell: And Condit, Voltaire's novel Condit gives a very good description of the earthquake in Lisbon and uses that as a centerpiece. Voltair also read other things about the earthquake, a poem about Lisbon earthquake. But in Condit he gives a lasting, very scathing portrait of the Catholic Church in general and then of what happens in Portugal. And so the Lisbon Earthquake is certainly another one of the events, but it happens considerably later. Really in the middle of the end of life.Andrew Keen: So, David, you believe in this idea of the Enlightenment. I take your point that there are more than one Enlightenment in more than one center, but in broad historical terms, the 18th century could be defined at least in Western and Northern Europe as the period of the Enlightenment, would that be a fair generalization?David Bell: I think it's perfectly fair generalization. Of course, there are historians who say that it never happened. There's a conservative British historian, J.C.D. Clark, who published a book last summer, saying that the Enlightenment is a kind of myth, that there was a lot of intellectual activity in Europe, obviously, but that the idea that it formed a coherent Enlightenment was really invented in the 20th century by a bunch of progressive reformers who wanted to claim a kind of venerable and august pedigree for their own reform, liberal reform plans. I think that's an exaggeration. People in the 18th century defined very clearly what was going on, both people who were in favor of it and people who are against it. And while you can, if you look very closely at it, of course it gets a bit fuzzy. Of course it's gets, there's no single, you can't define a single enlightenment project or a single enlightened ideology. But then, I think people would be hard pressed to define any intellectual movement. You know, in perfect, incoherent terms. So the enlightenment is, you know by compared with almost any other intellectual movement certainly existed.Andrew Keen: In terms of a philosophy of the Enlightenment, the German thinker, Immanuel Kant, seems to be often, and when you describe him as the conscience or the brain or a mixture of the conscience and brain of the enlightenment, why is Kant and Kantian thinking so important in the development of the Enlightenment.David Bell: Well, that's a really interesting question. And one reason is because most of the Enlightenment was not very rigorously philosophical. A lot of the major figures of the enlightenment before Kant tended to be writing for a general public. And they often were writing with a very specific agenda. We look at Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau. Now you look at Adam Smith in Scotland. We look David Hume or Adam Ferguson. You look at Benjamin Franklin in the United States. These people wrote in all sorts of different genres. They wrote in, they wrote all sorts of different kinds of books. They have many different purposes and very few of them did a lot of what we would call rigorous academic philosophy. And Kant was different. Kant was very much an academic philosopher. Kant was nothing if not rigorous. He came at the end of the enlightenment by most people's measure. He wrote these very, very difficult, very rigorous, very brilliant works, such as The Creek of Pure Reason. And so, it's certainly been the case that people who wanted to describe the Enlightenment as a philosophy have tended to look to Kant. So for example, there's a great German philosopher and intellectual historian of the early 20th century named Ernst Kassirer, who had to leave Germany because of the Nazis. And he wrote a great book called The Philosophy of the Enlightened. And that leads directly to Immanuel Kant. And of course, Casir himself was a Kantian, identified with Kant. And so he wanted to make Kant, in a sense, the telos, the end point, the culmination, the fulfillment of the Enlightenment. But so I think that's why Kant has such a particularly important position. You're defining it both ways.Andrew Keen: I've always struggled to understand what Kant was trying to say. I'm certainly not alone there. Might it be fair to say that he was trying to transform the universe and certainly traditional Christian notions into the Enlightenment, so the entire universe, the world, God, whatever that means, that they were all somehow according to Kant enlightened.David Bell: Well, I think that I'm certainly no expert on Immanuel Kant. And I would say that he is trying to, I mean, his major philosophical works are trying to put together a system of philosophical thinking which will justify why people have to act morally, why people act rationally, without the need for Christian revelation to bolster them. That's a very, very crude and reductionist way of putting it, but that's essentially at the heart of it. At the same time, Kant was very much aware of his own place in history. So Kant didn't simply write these very difficult, thick, dense philosophical works. He also wrote things that were more like journalism or like tablets. He wrote a famous essay called What is Enlightenment? And in that, he said that the 18th century was the period in which humankind was simply beginning to. Reach a period of enlightenment. And he said, he starts the essay by saying, this is the period when humankind is being released from its self-imposed tutelage. And we are still, and he said we do not yet live in the midst of a completely enlightened century, but we are getting there. We are living in a century that is enlightening.Andrew Keen: So the seeds, the seeds of Hegel and maybe even Marx are incant in that German thinking, that historical thinking.David Bell: In some ways, in some ways of course Hegel very much reacts against Kant and so and then Marx reacts against Hegel. So it's not exactly.Andrew Keen: Well, that's the dialectic, isn't it, David?David Bell: A simple easy path from one to the other, no, but Hegel is unimaginable without Kant of course and Marx is unimagineable without Hegel.Andrew Keen: You note that Kant represents a shift in some ways into the university and the walls of the universities were going up, and that some of the other figures associated with the the Enlightenment and Scottish Enlightenment, human and Smith and the French Enlightenment Voltaire and the others, they were more generalist writers. Should we be nostalgic for the pre-university period in the Enlightenment, or? Did things start getting serious once the heavyweights, the academic heavyweighs like Emmanuel Kant got into this thing?David Bell: I think it depends on where we're talking about. I mean, Adam Smith was a professor at Glasgow in Edinburgh, so Smith, the Scottish Enlightenment was definitely at least partly in the universities. The German Enlightenment took place very heavily in universities. Christian Vodafoy I just mentioned was the most important German philosopher of the 18th century before Kant, and he had positions in university. Even the French university system, for a while, what's interesting about the French University system, particularly the Sorbonne, which was the theology faculty, It was that. Throughout the first half of the 18th century, there were very vigorous, very interesting philosophical debates going on there, in which the people there, particularly even Jesuits there, were very open to a lot of the ideas we now call enlightenment. They were reading John Locke, they were reading Mel Pench, they were read Dekalb. What happened though in the French universities was that as more daring stuff was getting published elsewhere. Church, the Catholic Church, started to say, all right, these philosophers, these philosophies, these are our enemies, these are people we have to get at. And so at that point, anybody who was in the university, who was still in dialog with these people was basically purged. And the universities became much less interesting after that. But to come back to your question, I do think that I am very nostalgic for that period. I think that the Enlightenment was an extraordinary period, because if you look between. In the 17th century, not all, but a great deal of the most interesting intellectual work is happening in the so-called Republic of Letters. It's happening in Latin language. It is happening on a very small circle of RUD, of scholars. By the 19th century following Kant and Hegel and then the birth of the research university in Germany, which is copied everywhere, philosophy and the most advanced thinking goes back into the university. And the 18th century, particularly in France, I will say, is a time when the most advanced thought is being written for a general public. It is being in the form of novels, of dialogs, of stories, of reference works, and it is very, very accessible. The most profound thought of the West has never been as accessible overall as in the 18 century.Andrew Keen: Again, excuse this question, it might seem a bit naive, but there's a lot of pre-Enlightenment work, books, thinking that we read now that's very accessible from Erasmus and Thomas More to Machiavelli. Why weren't characters like, or are characters like Erasmuus, More's Utopia, Machiavell's prints and discourses, why aren't they considered part of the Enlightenment? What's the difference between? Enlightened thinkers or the supposedly enlightened thinkers of the 18th century and thinkers and writers of the 16th and 17th centuries.David Bell: That's a good question, you know, I think you have to, you, you know, again, one has to draw a line somewhere. That's not a very good answer, of course. All these people that you just mentioned are, in one way or another, predecessors to the Enlightenment. And of course, there were lots of people. I don't mean to say that nobody wrote in an accessible way before 1700. Obviously, lots of the people you mentioned did. Although a lot of them originally wrote in Latin, Erasmus, also Thomas More. But I think what makes the Enlightened different is that you have, again, you have a sense. These people have have a sense that they are themselves engaged in a collective project, that it is a collective project of enlightenment, of enlightening the world. They believe that they live in a century of progress. And there are certain principles. They don't agree on everything by any means. The philosophy of enlightenment is like nothing more than ripping each other to shreds, like any decent group of intellectuals. But that said, they generally did believe That people needed to have freedom of speech. They believed that you needed to have toleration of different religions. They believed in education and the need for a broadly educated public that could be as broad as possible. They generally believed in keeping religion out of the public sphere as much as possible, so all those principles came together into a program that we can consider at least a kind of... You know, not that everybody read it at every moment by any means, but there is an identifiable enlightenment program there, and in this case an identifiable enlightenment mindset. One other thing, I think, which is crucial to the Enlightenment, is that it was the attention they started to pay to something that we now take almost entirely for granted, which is the idea of society. The word society is so entirely ubiquitous, we assume it's always been there, and in one sense it has, because the word societas is a Latin word. But until... The 18th century, the word society generally had a much narrower meaning. It referred to, you know, particular institution most often, like when we talk about the society of, you know, the American philosophical society or something like that. And the idea that there exists something called society, which is the general sphere of human existence that is separate from religion and is separate from the political sphere, that's actually something which only really emerged at the end of the 1600s. And it became really the focus of you know, much, if not most, of enlightenment thinking. When you look at someone like Montesquieu and you look something, somebody like Rousseau or Voltaire or Adam Smith, probably above all, they were concerned with understanding how society works, not how government works only, but how society, what social interactions are like beginning of what we would now call social science. So that's yet another thing that distinguishes the enlightened from people like Machiavelli, often people like Thomas More, and people like bonuses.Andrew Keen: You noted earlier that the idea of progress is somehow baked in, in part, and certainly when it comes to Kant, certainly the French Enlightenment, although, of course, Rousseau challenged that. I'm not sure whether Rousseaut, as always, is both in and out of the Enlightenment and he seems to be in and out of everything. How did the Enlightement, though, make sense of itself in the context of antiquity, as it was, of Terms, it was the Renaissance that supposedly discovered or rediscovered antiquity. How did many of the leading Enlightenment thinkers, writers, how did they think of their own society in the context of not just antiquity, but even the idea of a European or Western society?David Bell: Well, there was a great book, one of the great histories of the Enlightenment was written about more than 50 years ago by the Yale professor named Peter Gay, and the first part of that book was called The Modern Paganism. So it was about the, you know, it was very much about the relationship between the Enlightenment and the ancient Greek synonyms. And certainly the writers of the enlightenment felt a great deal of kinship with the ancient Greek synonymous. They felt a common bond, particularly in the posing. Christianity and opposing what they believed the Christian Church had wrought on Europe in suppressing freedom and suppressing free thought and suppassing free inquiry. And so they felt that they were both recovering but also going beyond antiquity at the same time. And of course they were all, I mean everybody at the time, every single major figure of the Enlightenment, their education consisted in large part of what we would now call classics, right? I mean, there was an educational reformer in France in the 1760s who said, you know, our educational system is great if the purpose is to train Roman centurions, if it's to train modern people who are not doing both so well. And it's true. I mean they would spend, certainly, you know in Germany, in much of Europe, in the Netherlands, even in France, I mean people were trained not simply to read Latin, but to write in Latin. In Germany, university courses took part in the Latin language. So there's an enormous, you know, so they're certainly very, very conversant with the Greek and Roman classics, and they identify with them to a very great extent. Someone like Rousseau, I mean, and many others, and what's his first reading? How did he learn to read by reading Plutarch? In translation, but he learns to read reading Plutach. He sees from the beginning by this enormous admiration for the ancients that we get from Bhutan.Andrew Keen: Was Socrates relevant here? Was the Enlightenment somehow replacing Aristotle with Socrates and making him and his spirit of Enlightenment, of asking questions rather than answering questions, the symbol of a new way of thinking?David Bell: I would say to a certain extent, so I mean, much of the Enlightenment criticizes scholasticism, medieval scholastic, very, very sharply, and medieval scholasticism is founded philosophically very heavily upon Aristotle, so to that extent. And the spirit of skepticism that Socrates embodied, the idea of taking nothing for granted and asking questions about everything, including questions of oneself, yes, absolutely. That said, while the great figures of the Red Plato, you know, Socrates was generally I mean, it was not all that present as they come. But certainly have people with people with red play-doh in the entire virus.Andrew Keen: You mentioned Benjamin Franklin earlier, David. Most of the Enlightenment, of course, seems to be centered in France and Scotland, Germany, England. But America, many Europeans went to America then as a, what some people would call a settler colonial society, or certainly an offshoot of the European world. Was the settling of America and the American Revolution Was it the quintessential Enlightenment project?David Bell: Another very good question, and again, it depends a bit on who you talk to. I just mentioned this book by Peter Gay, and the last part of his book is called The Science of Freedom, and it's all about the American Revolution. So certainly a lot of interpreters of the Enlightenment have said that, yes, the American revolution represents in a sense the best possible outcome of the American Revolution, it was the best, possible outcome of the enlightened. Certainly there you look at the founding fathers of the United States and there's a great deal that they took from me like Certainly, they took a great great number of political ideas from Obviously Madison was very much inspired and drafting the edifice of the Constitution by Montesquieu to see himself Was happy to admit in addition most of the founding Fathers of the united states were you know had kind of you know We still had we were still definitely Christians, but we're also but we were also very much influenced by deism were very much against the idea of making the United States a kind of confessional country where Christianity was dominant. They wanted to believe in the enlightenment principles of free speech, religious toleration and so on and so forth. So in all those senses and very much the gun was probably more inspired than Franklin was somebody who was very conversant with the European Enlightenment. He spent a large part of his life in London. Where he was in contact with figures of the Enlightenment. He also, during the American Revolution, of course, he was mostly in France, where he is vetted by some of the surviving fellows and were very much in contact for them as well. So yes, I would say the American revolution is certainly... And then the American revolutionary scene, of course by the Europeans, very much as a kind of offshoot of the enlightenment. So one of the great books of the late Enlightenment is by Condor Say, which he wrote while he was hiding actually in the future evolution of the chariot. It's called a historical sketch of the progress of the human spirit, or the human mind, and you know he writes about the American Revolution as being, basically owing its existence to being like...Andrew Keen: Franklin is of course an example of your pre-academic enlightenment, a generalist, inventor, scientist, entrepreneur, political thinker. What about the role of science and indeed economics in the Enlightenment? David, we're going to talk of course about the Marxist interpretation, perhaps the Marxist interpretation which sees The Enlightenment is just a euphemism, perhaps, for exploitative capitalism. How central was the growth and development of the market, of economics, and innovation, and capitalism in your reading of The Enlightened?David Bell: Well, in my reading, it was very important, but not in the way that the Marxists used to say. So Friedrich Engels once said that the Enlightenment was basically the idealized kingdom of the bourgeoisie, and there was whole strain of Marxist thinking that followed the assumption that, and then Karl Marx himself argued that the documents like the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, which obviously were inspired by the Enlightment, were simply kind of the near, or kind of. Way that the bourgeoisie was able to advance itself ideologically, and I don't think that holds much water, which is very little indication that any particular economic class motivated the Enlightenment or was using the Enlightment in any way. That said, I think it's very difficult to imagine the Enlightement without the social and economic changes that come in with the 18th century. To begin with globalization. If you read the great works of the Enlightenment, it's remarkable just how open they are to talking about humanity in general. So one of Voltaire's largest works, one of his most important works, is something called Essay on Customs and the Spirit of Nations, which is actually History of the World, where he talks learnedly not simply about Europe, but about the Americas, about China, about Africa, about India. Montesquieu writes Persian letters. Christian Volpe writes about Chinese philosophy. You know, Rousseau writes about... You know, the earliest days of humankind talks about Africa. All the great figures of the Enlightenment are writing about the rest of the world, and this is a period in which contacts between Europe and the rest the world are exploding along with international trade. So by the end of the 18th century, there are 4,000 to 5,000 ships a year crossing the Atlantic. It's an enormous number. And that's one context in which the enlightenment takes place. Another is what we call the consumer revolution. So in the 18th century, certainly in the major cities of Western Europe, people of a wide range of social classes, including even artisans, sort of somewhat wealthy artisians, shopkeepers, are suddenly able to buy a much larger range of products than they were before. They're able to choose how to basically furnish their own lives, if you will, how they're gonna dress, what they're going to eat, what they gonna put on the walls of their apartments and so on and so forth. And so they become accustomed to exercising a great deal more personal choice than their ancestors have done. And the Enlightenment really develops in tandem with this. Most of the great works of the Enlightment, they're not really written to, they're treatises, they're like Kant, they're written to persuade you to think in a single way. Really written to make you ask questions yourself, to force you to ponder things. They're written in the form of puzzles and riddles. Voltaire had a great line there, he wrote that the best kind of books are the books that readers write half of themselves as they read, and that's sort of the quintessence of the Enlightenment as far as I'm concerned.Andrew Keen: Yeah, Voltaire might have been comfortable on YouTube or Facebook. David, you mentioned all those ships going from Europe across the Atlantic. Of course, many of those ships were filled with African slaves. You mentioned this in your piece. I mean, this is no secret, of course. You also mentioned a couple of times Montesquieu's Persian letters. To what extent is... The enlightenment then perhaps the birth of Western power, of Western colonialism, of going to Africa, seizing people, selling them in North America, the French, the English, Dutch colonization of the rest of the world. Of course, later more sophisticated Marxist thinkers from the Frankfurt School, you mentioned these in your essay, Odorno and Horkheimer in particular, See the Enlightenment as... A project, if you like, of Western domination. I remember reading many years ago when I was in graduate school, Edward Said, his analysis of books like The Persian Letters, which is a form of cultural Western power. How much of this is simply bound up in the profound, perhaps, injustice of the Western achievement? And of course, some of the justice as well. We haven't talked about Jefferson, but perhaps in Jefferson's life and his thinking and his enlightened principles and his... Life as a slave owner, these contradictions are most self-evident.David Bell: Well, there are certainly contradictions, and there's certainly... I think what's remarkable, if you think about it, is that if you read through works of the Enlightenment, you would be hard-pressed to find a justification for slavery. You do find a lot of critiques of slavery, and I think that's something very important to keep in mind. Obviously, the chattel slavery of Africans in the Americas began well before the Enlightment, it began in 1500. The Enlightenment doesn't have the credit for being the first movement to oppose slavery. That really goes back to various religious groups, especially the Fakers. But that said, you have in France, you had in Britain, in America even, you'd have a lot of figures associated with the Enlightenment who were pretty sure of becoming very forceful opponents of slavery very early. Now, when it comes to imperialism, that's a tricky issue. What I think you'd find in these light bulbs, you'd different sorts of tendencies and different sorts of writings. So there are certainly a lot of writers of the Enlightenment who are deeply opposed to European authorities. One of the most popular works of the late Enlightenment was a collective work edited by the man named the Abbe Rinal, which is called The History of the Two Indies. And that is a book which is deeply, deeply critical of European imperialism. At the same time, at the same of the enlightenment, a lot the works of history written during the Enlightment. Tended, such as Voltaire's essay on customs, which I just mentioned, tend to give a kind of very linear version of history. They suggest that all societies follow the same path, from sort of primitive savagery, hunter-gatherers, through early agriculture, feudal stages, and on into sort of modern commercial society and civilization. And so they're basically saying, okay, we, the Europeans, are the most advanced. People like the Africans and the Native Americans are the least advanced, and so perhaps we're justified in going and quote, bringing our civilization to them, what later generations would call the civilizing missions, or possibly just, you know, going over and exploiting them because we are stronger and we are more, and again, we are the best. And then there's another thing that the Enlightenment did. The Enlightenment tended to destroy an older Christian view of humankind, which in some ways militated against modern racism. Christians believed, of course, that everyone was the same from Adam and Eve, which meant that there was an essential similarity in the world. And the Enlightenment challenged this by challenging the biblical kind of creation. The Enlightenment challenges this. Voltaire, for instance, believed that there had actually been several different human species that had different origins, and that can very easily become a justification for racism. Buffon, one of the most Figures of the French Enlightenment, one of the early naturalists, was crucial for trying to show that in fact nature is not static, that nature is always changing, that species are changing, including human beings. And so again, that allowed people to think in terms of human beings at different stages of evolution, and perhaps this would be a justification for privileging the more advanced humans over the less advanced. In the 18th century itself, most of these things remain potential, rather than really being acted upon. But in the 19th century, figures of writers who would draw upon these things certainly went much further, and these became justifications for slavery, imperialism, and other things. So again, the Enlightenment is the source of a great deal of stuff here, and you can't simply put it into one box or more.Andrew Keen: You mentioned earlier, David, that Concorda wrote one of the later classics of the... Condorcet? Sorry, Condorcets, excuse my French. Condorcès wrote one the later Classics of the Enlightenment when he was hiding from the French Revolution. In your mind, was the revolution itself the natural conclusion, climax? Perhaps anti-climax of the Enlightenment. Certainly, it seems as if a lot of the critiques of the French Revolution, particularly the more conservative ones, Burke comes to mind, suggested that perhaps the principles of in the Enlightment inevitably led to the guillotine, or is that an unfair way of thinking of it?David Bell: Well, there are a lot of people who have thought like that. Edmund Burke already, writing in 1790, in his reflections on the revolution in France, he said that everything which was great in the old regime is being dissolved and, quoting, dissolved by this new conquering empire of light and reason. And then he said about the French that in the groves of their academy at the end of every vista, you see nothing but the gallows. Nothing but the Gallows. So there, in 1780, he already seemed to be predicting the reign of terror and blaming it. A certain extent from the Enlightenment. That said, I think, you know, again, the French Revolution is incredibly complicated event. I mean, you certainly have, you know, an explosion of what we could call Enlightenment thinking all over the place. In France, it happened in France. What happened there was that you had a, you know, the collapse of an extraordinarily inefficient government and a very, you know, in a very antiquated, paralyzed system of government kind of collapsed, created a kind of political vacuum. Into that vacuum stepped a lot of figures who were definitely readers of the Enlightenment. Oh so um but again the Enlightment had I said I don't think you can call the Enlightement a single thing so to say that the Enlightiment inspired the French Revolution rather than the There you go.Andrew Keen: Although your essay on liberties is the Enlightenment then and now you probably didn't write is always these lazy editors who come up with inaccurate and inaccurate titles. So for you, there is no such thing as the Enlighten.David Bell: No, there is. There is. But still, it's a complex thing. It contains multitudes.Andrew Keen: So it's the Enlightenment rather than the United States.David Bell: Conflicting tendencies, it has contradictions within it. There's enough unity to refer to it as a singular noun, but it doesn't mean that it all went in one single direction.Andrew Keen: But in historical terms, did the failure of the French Revolution, its descent into Robespierre and then Bonaparte, did it mark the end in historical terms a kind of bookend of history? You began in 1720 by 1820. Was the age of the Enlightenment pretty much over?David Bell: I would say yes. I think that, again, one of the things about the French Revolution is that people who are reading these books and they're reading these ideas and they are discussing things really start to act on them in a very different way from what it did before the French revolution. You have a lot of absolute monarchs who are trying to bring certain enlightenment principles to bear in their form of government, but they're not. But it's difficult to talk about a full-fledged attempt to enact a kind of enlightenment program. Certainly a lot of the people in the French Revolution saw themselves as doing that. But as they did it, they ran into reality, I would say. I mean, now Tocqueville, when he writes his old regime in the revolution, talks about how the French philosophes were full of these abstract ideas that were divorced from reality. And while that's an exaggeration, there was a certain truth to them. And as soon as you start having the age of revolutions, as soon you start people having to devise systems of government that will actually last, and as you have people, democratic representative systems that will last, and as they start revising these systems under the pressure of actual events, then you're not simply talking about an intellectual movement anymore, you're talking about something very different. And so I would say that, well, obviously the ideas of the Enlightenment continue to inspire people, the books continue to be read, debated. They lead on to figures like Kant, and as we talked about earlier, Kant leads to Hegel, Hegel leads to Marx in a certain sense. Nonetheless, by the time you're getting into the 19th century, what you have, you know, has connections to the Enlightenment, but can we really still call it the Enlightment? I would sayAndrew Keen: And Tocqueville, of course, found democracy in America. Is democracy itself? I know it's a big question. But is it? Bound up in the Enlightenment. You've written extensively, David, both for liberties and elsewhere on liberalism. Is the promise of democracy, democratic systems, the one born in the American Revolution, promised in the French Revolution, not realized? Are they products of the Enlightment, or is the 19th century and the democratic systems that in the 19th century, is that just a separate historical track?David Bell: Again, I would say there are certain things in the Enlightenment that do lead in that direction. Certainly, I think most figures in the enlightenment in one general sense or another accepted the idea of a kind of general notion of popular sovereignty. It didn't mean that they always felt that this was going to be something that could necessarily be acted upon or implemented in their own day. And they didn't necessarily associate generalized popular sovereignty with what we would now call democracy with people being able to actually govern themselves. Would be certain figures, certainly Diderot and some of his essays, what we saw very much in the social contract, you know, were sketching out, you knows, models for possible democratic system. Condorcet, who actually lived into the French Revolution, wrote one of the most draft constitutions for France, that's one of most democratic documents ever proposed. But of course there were lots of figures in the Enlightenment, Voltaire, and others who actually believed much more in absolute monarchy, who believed that you just, you know, you should have. Freedom of speech and freedom of discussion, out of which the best ideas would emerge, but then you had to give those ideas to the prince who imposed them by poor sicknesses.Andrew Keen: And of course, Rousseau himself, his social contract, some historians have seen that as the foundations of totalitarian, modern totalitarianism. Finally, David, your wonderful essay in Liberties in the spring quarterly 2025 is The Enlightenment, Then and Now. What about now? You work at Princeton, your president has very bravely stood up to the new presidential regime in the United States, in defense of academic intellectual freedom. Does the word and the movement, does it have any relevance in the 2020s, particularly in an age of neo-authoritarianism around the world?David Bell: I think it does. I think we have to be careful about it. I always get a little nervous when people say, well, we should simply go back to the Enlightenment, because the Enlightenments is history. We don't go back the 18th century. I think what we need to do is to recover certain principles, certain ideals from the 18 century, the ones that matter to us, the ones we think are right, and make our own Enlightenment better. I don't think we need be governed by the 18 century. Thomas Paine once said that no generation should necessarily rule over every generation to come, and I think that's probably right. Unfortunately in the United States, we have a constitution which is now essentially unamendable, so we're doomed to live by a constitution largely from the 18th century. But are there many things in the Enlightenment that we should look back to, absolutely?Andrew Keen: Well, David, I am going to free you for your own French Enlightenment. You can go and have some croissant now in your local cafe in Paris. Thank you so much for a very, I excuse the pun, enlightening conversation on the Enlightenment then and now, Essential Essay in Liberties. I'd love to get you back on the show. Talk more history. Thank you. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe

Do you know your Adam Smith from your Adam Ferguson? What was it that sparked a historical period overflowing with ideas, intellect and philosophical musings? And what did Enlightenment ever do for Scotland? Jackie is joined by Dr Alasdair Raffe, senior lecturer at the University of Edinburgh, to unpick the tapestry of this fascinating era, meeting some of the key thinkers, makers and doers who made their impact during the 18th century. No matter how familiar you are with the Scottish Enlightenment, this episode covers the very basics, leaving you with a better understanding of an important and consequential period of European history. To enjoy more episodes of Love Scotland, please follow or subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. For more information on Newhailes, click here. For more information on the wildlife at Trust places, click here. --- Alasdair's book, Scotland in Revolution, 1685-1690, is available now.

PJ talks property with Adam Ferguson of daft.ie as their latest report shows more rent rises. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

"I'm a Bitcoin skeptic. I'm not buying Bitcoin in 2024, even if it goes back to its recent all-time highs, or higher. Here's why." ~ Ben Gran Ben breaks down his view of Bitcoin and why he cannot see or understand any reason it would go higher. Why he doesn't invest in things that don't produce anything, because this is antithetical to investment. Why he doesn't see how something that has no purpose could possibly continue increasing in value. And how something that people claim will be the most valuable asset in the world, will also be the dominant money, because (obviously) these two ideas are contradictory. It's important to refresh our understanding of the typical person's perspective of Bitcoin, in order to be able to relate to, and hopefully explain where their thinking is wrong. So that is what I hope to do in today's episode, reading "Why I'm Still Not Buying Bitcoin in 2024" from the Motley Fool... Check out the original article at Why I'm (Still) Not Buying Bitcoin in 2024. (Link: https://tinyurl.com/5xnxbe5x) Links to check out Book "When Money Dies" by Adam Ferguson for a historical perspective on economic collapses. (Link: https://a.co/d/8E8AVpZ) Guest Links Ben Gran on X (Link: https://twitter.com/kcryptoinvest) Ben Gran Website (Link: https://www.asx.capital/) Host Links Guy on Nostr (Link: http://tinyurl.com/2xc96ney) Guy on X (Link: https://twitter.com/theguyswann) Guy on Instagram (Link: https://www.instagram.com/theguyswann/) Guy on TikTok (Link: https://www.tiktok.com/@theguyswann) Guy on YouTube (Link: https://www.youtube.com/@theguyswann) ⁠Bitcoin Audible on X⁠ (Link: https://twitter.com/BitcoinAudible) Check out our awesome sponsors! Get 10% off the COLDCARD with code BITCOINAUDIBLE ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠(Link: bitcoinaudible.com/coldcard⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) Swan: The best way to buy, learn, and earn #Bitcoin (Link: https://swanbitcoin.com) “I believe that a scientist looking at nonscientific problems is just as dumb as the next guy — and when he talks about a nonscientific matter, he will sound as naive as anyone untrained in the matter.” ~ Richard Feynman --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/bitcoinaudible/message

"I'm a Bitcoin skeptic. I'm not buying Bitcoin in 2024, even if it goes back to its recent all-time highs, or higher. Here's why." ~ Ben Gran Ben breaks down his view of Bitcoin and why he cannot see or understand any reason it would go higher. Why he doesn't invest in things that don't produce anything, because this is antithetical to investment. Why he doesn't see how something that has no purpose could possibly continue increasing in value. And how something that people claim will be the most valuable asset in the world, will also be the dominant money, because (obviously) these two ideas are contradictory. It's important to refresh our understanding of the typical person's perspective of Bitcoin, in order to be able to relate to, and hopefully explain where their thinking is wrong. So that is what I hope to do in today's episode, reading "Why I'm Still Not Buying Bitcoin in 2024" from the Motley Fool... Check out the original article at Why I'm (Still) Not Buying Bitcoin in 2024. (Link: https://tinyurl.com/5xnxbe5x) Links to check out Book "When Money Dies" by Adam Ferguson for a historical perspective on economic collapses. (Link: https://a.co/d/8E8AVpZ) Guest Links Ben Gran on X (Link: https://twitter.com/kcryptoinvest) Ben Gran Website (Link: https://www.asx.capital/) Host Links Guy on Nostr (Link: http://tinyurl.com/2xc96ney) Guy on X (Link: https://twitter.com/theguyswann) Guy on Instagram (Link: https://www.instagram.com/theguyswann/) Guy on TikTok (Link: https://www.tiktok.com/@theguyswann) Guy on YouTube (Link: https://www.youtube.com/@theguyswann) ⁠Bitcoin Audible on X⁠ (Link: https://twitter.com/BitcoinAudible) Check out our awesome sponsors! Get 10% off the COLDCARD with code BITCOINAUDIBLE ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠(Link: bitcoinaudible.com/coldcard⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) Swan: The best way to buy, learn, and earn #Bitcoin (Link: https://swanbitcoin.com) “I believe that a scientist looking at nonscientific problems is just as dumb as the next guy — and when he talks about a nonscientific matter, he will sound as naive as anyone untrained in the matter.” ~ Richard Feynman --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/bitcoinaudible/message

PJ talks to Adam Ferguson of Daft.ie about the shocking findings in their latest survey Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Nick is joined by RTE and Racing TV broadcaster Jane Mangan to consider all the racing news and events of the day. Jane is at Tattersalls Derby sale, where she is joined by CEO of Tatts Ireland Simon Kerins, while Nick catches up with the buyer of yesterday's top lot (half to Douvan/Jonbon) Olly Murphy. Ahead of Irish Derby weekend, Paddy Twomey drops in to discuss whether Rosscarbery can settle an old score in the Pretty Polly, while racing manager Alex Cole tells us that Khaadem is likely to be supplemented for the July Cup following his Ascot success. Liz Price brings us a lovely interview from South Africa with former British champion jockey Michael Roberts, who could taste his biggest training success this weekend in the Durban July, while Adam Ferguson from Racing Welfare tells us about Racing Staff week.

Nick is joined by RTE and Racing TV broadcaster Jane Mangan to consider all the racing news and events of the day. Jane is at Tattersalls Derby sale, where she is joined by CEO of Tatts Ireland Simon Kerins, while Nick catches up with the buyer of yesterday's top lot (half to Douvan/Jonbon) Olly Murphy. Ahead of Irish Derby weekend, Paddy Twomey drops in to discuss whether Rosscarbery can settle an old score in the Pretty Polly, while racing manager Alex Cole tells us that Khaadem is likely to be supplemented for the July Cup following his Ascot success. Liz Price brings us a lovely interview from South Africa with former British champion jockey Michael Roberts, who could taste his biggest training success this weekend in the Durban July, while Adam Ferguson from Racing Welfare tells us about Racing Staff week.

The demand for New Homes is up 114% nationally compared to this time last year. So finds a new report from Daft.ie and their Chief Commercial Officer, Adam Ferguson spoke to Jonathan this morning on the show.

The demand for New Homes is up 114% nationally compared to this time last year. So finds a new report from Daft.ie and their Chief Commercial Officer, Adam Ferguson spoke to Jonathan this morning on the show.

Adam Ferguson of Daft.ie talks about the latest survey showing a fall in Cork city but there's a bit more to it than that. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The research of psychedelics as a therapeutic for anxiety, depression, and PTSD has gained a lot of traction over the last decade. Given their potent effects on the nervous system, what are the unique benefits and possible side effects of psychedelics for the SCI population? And further, what is their potential to elicit functional recovery? If you ask the community, it doesn't take long to find anecdotal evidence that the benefits go beyond just the psychological realm. Read Jim Harris' account in Outside Magazine, as an example (https://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/exploration-survival/psychedelics-research-paralysis-treatment-jim-harris/). In this episode, Matthew and Jason speak with Jessica Nielson to explore the potential psychedelics may hold for the SCI community. Jessica is an SCI and Bioinformatics researcher at the University of Minnesota. She is also the Executive Director of Psychedelic Society of Minnesota. They discuss psychedelic research and where it could cross paths with spinal cord injury. They also discuss the hypothesized mechanism of psychedelics and whether they might or might not bring about some of the range of changes that SCI self-experimenters have reported. Guest Bio Jessica Nielsen is a tenure-track Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychiatry & Behavioral Sciences, and Core Faculty in the Institute for Health Informatics at the University of Minnesota, and is the Executive Director of the Psychedelic Society of Minnesota. Jessica completed doctoral training in the lab of Dr. Oswald Steward at UC Irvine focusing on animal models of spinal cord injury, and did postdoctoral training with Dr. Adam Ferguson at UCSF, where she developed a preclinical database of SCI studies that seeded the Open Data Commons for SCI. During her time at UCSF, she began conducting research on the psychedelic tea, ayahuasca, to investigate whether it might be an alternative treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). She is currently conducting computational psychiatry research to identify more precise phenotypes of PTSD from large clinical data repositories, and is Principal Investigator of the first psilocybin clinical trial at the University of Minnesota. She is currently co-developing a new survey study around how people with SCI respond to psychedelics, to inform the community about risks and benefits to promote harm reduction as the hype around psychedelics reaches a broad range of patient populations interested in using psychedelics to alleviate suffering.

Hello Interactors,Today is part one of a two-part exploration. I was curious as to why conventional economics continues to rely so heavily on deterministic mathematical models that assume perfect conditions even though they know such inert situations don't exist in nature. It may tie back to the Enlightenment and the popular beliefs of Newton and Descartes who merged Christian beliefs with mathematic certainty – despite viable alternative theories they helped squelch.  As interactors, you're special individuals self-selected to be a part of an evolutionary journey. You're also members of an attentive community so I welcome your participation.Please leave your comments below or email me directly.Now let's go…THE SPERMISTSIsaac Newton and René Descartes were spermists. They believed they entered this world through preformation. This theory states every future organism is wrapped up in a seed or sperm as a preformed miniature version of itself. This was the dominant belief among Europe's most respected Enlightenment thinkers. They believed not only did a Christian god create all the plants and animals, including humans, but all the future ones too. Intercourse, they surmised, is a magical act that initiates the growth of microscopic animacules which then grow until they are fully formed. It's easy to brush this off as a point in time lack of knowledge and excuse these brilliant minds. We might say, “They just didn't know any better.” But it turns out there were other brilliant minds at the time who thought they were crazy.But powerful people are not easily persuaded. They, along with the church, continued to push the idea that preformation is as elementary to evolution as mathematical axioms are to theorems. A mathematical certainty that one day seduced many scientists, and later economists, into similar deterministic expressions.One of the early preformation influencers was the Dutch philosopher, mathematician, and theologian, Bernard Nieuwentyt (1654-1718). Three years before his death, he published a soon to be popular book, The Religious Philosopher: Or, The Right Use of Contemplating the Works of the Creator. In it he writes,“This however is sure enough…that all living Creatures whatever proceed from a Stamin or Principle, in which the Limbs and Members of the Body are folded and wound as it were in a Ball of Thread; which by the Operation of adventitious Matter and Humours are filled up and unfolded, till the Structure of all the Parts have the Magnitude of a full grown Body.”His book was translated into English in 1724 and its influence spread. In 1802, the English clergyman and philosopher, William Paley (1743-1805), expanded on the ‘Ball of Thread' analogy with his infamous watchmaker analogy. Using examples of mechanistic functions of the human body like joints and muscles, he expanded the popular notion that this is the work of a supreme designer – their Christian god. He writes, “Contemplating an animal body in its collective capacity, we cannot forget to notice, what a number of instruments are brought together, and often within how small a compass. It is a cluster of contrivances.”But Paley wasn't alone, nor was he the first. Both Descartes and Newton had already remarked as much. Newton once wrote, “like a watchmaker, God was forced to intervene in the universe and tinker with the mechanism from time to time to ensure that it continued operating in good working order."The confidence of spermists was buoyed when spermatozoa was discovered by the Dutch microscopist Antoine van Leeuwenhoek in 1677. But the seed of the idea dates all the way back to Pythagoras. He believed male semen is fluid that collects and stores different elements from the body like the bone and brain. He said, “semen is a drop of the brain.” The woman provided a host and nourishment so the male semen could unfold inside her body.Another Greek philosopher, Empedocles, refuted the Pythagorean claim 100 years later noting offspring often inherit characteristics of the mother. He proposed there was a blending of male and female root reproductive elements in plants and animals that has the potential to produce blended varieties as their offspring. Empedocles was on to something, but his theory was overshadowed by a more popular theory and powerful name, Aristotle.THE OVISTSAristotle believed both men and women provided different forms of reproductive purified blood in the form of semen and menstrual fluids. Because semen appeared more pure than menstrual fluids, he surmised it must have the advantage. Therefore, the male provided the instructions, design, or blueprint for formation and the woman provided the material. The ‘blood' metaphor is alive today despite our knowledge of genetics. J.K Rowling did her part in her Harry Potter series to perpetuate and popularize the blood metaphor with ‘pure-bloods' and ‘half-bloods' or the derogatory ‘mud-bloods'.Aristotle's ideas were brought to life in the 17th and 18th century by the spermists nemesis, the ovists. Ovists were rallying behind the discoveries of William Harvey (1578-1657) and Antonie van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723) of female eggs in female bodies, the union of the sperm and egg, and the formation of an embryo which in turn unleashed the production of various parts of the body. Harvey called this cellular formation of individual parts in plants and animals epigenesis. An idea Aristotle also suggested.But one Dutch spermist, Jan Swammerdam (1637-1680), used this to further the preformation theory, but with a twist. Evidence of the union of egg and sperm, he suggested, must mean the future organism is embedded inside the head of the sperm in miniature form waiting to become whole with the help of the egg. A century later, this prompted a Swiss scientist, Charles Bonnet (1720-1793), to offer a counter ovist preformation theory. He suggested a Christian god planted future generations not inside the sperm, but inside the egg – like nested eggs within eggs.Meanwhile, a group of naturalist scientists opposed these Cartesian and Pythagorean, mechanistic preformation theories. The French naturalist, mathematician, and philosopher, Pierre Louise Maupertuis (1698-1759), further rejected theological explanations and believed both the male and female possess particles that come together to form unique characteristics in their offspring. He is credited with being the first to observe evolutionary hereditarian changes in organisms over time suggesting some characteristics are dominant while others are recessive.The German physiologist Caspar Friedrich Wolff (1733-1794) expanded on this work and revived Harvey's theory of epigenesis. By observing chick embryos, he discovered a supernatural action occurs once the sperm is implanted in the egg. This sparks what he called a vital action “vis essentialis” that culminates over the period of gestation creating a fully formed body. This is the origins of what we now call embryology.Those in the mechanistic and theological Cartesian camp weren't having it. They, like the church, rejected talk of indescribable, supernatural, and immaterial ‘vital actions.' It was not only heretical, but suggested science was going backwards to embrace medieval miracles of the occult. Either way, if there were forces at work on matter, the preformation mechanists believed it too would have been preordained by a Christian god. The co-inventor of differential calculus, German polymath and theologian, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), reasoned like this, “But if in truth an intelligible explanation is to be sought in the nature of the thing it will come from what is clearly apprehended in the thing…for the success of the whole system is due to divine preformation.”THE NATURALISTSToward the middle of the 18th century the French naturalist and mathematician, Comte de Buffon (1707-1788), began publishing his work on natural history, Histoire Naturelle – an opus that amassed 36 volumes that continued to be amended even after his death. By looking at the history and evolution of the natural world, Buffon was the first to articulate patterns of ecological succession – the successive structural change of species over time. He rejected Christian Creationism and theories of the preordained mechanistic unfolding of nature and provided vivid and expertly rendered illustrations to the contrary.He took elements of Aristotle's blood theories, qualitative approaches to inquiry, and aspects of both spermists and ovists to merge them with empirical evidence and compelling writing to make convincing arguments for unexplainable actions vital to the creation and evolution of the natural world.As the late professor of history and Director of Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Studies at UCLA, Peter Hanns Reill, wrote, Buffon “emphasized the primacy of living over inanimate matter, asserted the existence of inner, active forces as central agents in nature, envisioned a world of new creation and leaps in nature, and proclaimed the ineffable quality of individuality and the manifold variety of nature.”Through “comparison”, “resemblance”, “affinity”, and “analogical reasoning” he “revitalized and historicized nature without denying the existence of a comprehensible order.” This provided a path for science to embrace qualitative reasoning without foregoing the rigor, language, and quantitative aspects of mathematics embraced by mechanists like Newton and Descartes.It wasn't only ecological communities that could be explained this way. Society and politics could too. This admission further worried mechanists and theologians. They feared any acknowledgement that mysterious random events, be it at a particle or societal level, that could lead to a ‘vital action' creating unforeseen mutations accuses the Christian god of not understanding his own creations. It would reject both ‘divine preformation' and ‘God's will'.This came at a time of social revolutions, debates, and contestations over human rights, freedoms of religion, and ‘we the people.' Mechanists married the certainty of mathematics with the certainty of their Christian god to explain the world. If nature and society lacked the linear precession of clocks, compasses, and mathematical calculations, they feared such uncertainty would unravel societal order and unleash chaos.Naturalists continued to point to ‘internal' vital forces that created perceptible ‘external' microscopic and macroscopic evolutions that countered the dominant inert, deterministic, and mechanical philosophies and beliefs. But the seduction of certainty remains with us to this day, even when we know it not to be true.The Scottish philosopher and historian, Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), suggested as much writing, “Our notion of order in civil society is frequently false: it is taken from the analogy of subjects inanimate and dead; we consider commotion and action as contrary to its nature; we think it consistent only with obedience, secrecy, and the silent passing of affairs through the hands of a few.”Ferguson goes on to use a brick wall as an analogy. He continues,“The good order of stones in a wall, is their being properly fixed in places for which they are hewn; were they to stir the building must fall: but the order of men in society, is their being placed where they are properly qualified to act. The first is a fabric made of dead and inanimate parts, the second is made of living and active members. When we seek in society for the order of mere inaction and tranquility, we forget the nature of our subject, and find the order of slaves, not of free men.”  Buffon's new modes of inquiry transformed fields formally beholden to mechanistic dogma like medicine, physiology, and chemistry. But it seems economics remain seduced by the determinism of linear, mechanistic, mathematical approaches despite it being a branch of the social sciences. While it may have dropped religion, it has yet to fully embrace the “notion of order in civil society is frequently false.” It's time conventional economics acknowledge there are mysterious ‘vital forces' internal to nature and society resulting in external perturbations that propagate indeterminant permutations.  Tune in next week as I explore what that might look like.Thank you for reading Interplace. This post is public so feel free to share it. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit interplace.io

PJ talks to Padraig who says if his tenancy ended he would be in trouble getting a new place with rent hikes. He also talks to Adam Ferguson, Daft.ie, about their latest Cork survey. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In this episode, Brad sits down with Sunny Ray and Kyle Kemper. Ray is the cofounder of one of the largest exchanges in India, Unocoin, while Kemper is Justin Trudeau's half-brother and a diehard Bitcoiner. Ray and Kemper are also the hosts of the Love and Freedom podcast, a platform that discusses "current events, challenges, & the opportunities for freedom." The trio talk about the state of politics in Canada and their wish for Bitcoin advocate and Conservative Party leader Pierre Poilievre to come to power. They also debate what global money printing portends for the common person and why this proves the case for Bitcoin once more. Tune in for these and more!Timestamps00:00:00: Intro by Brad and commentary on Canadian politics 00:09:48: Conservative Party leader Pierre Poilievre is a champion for Bitcoin 00:13:20: The excessive money printing in Canada and how Bitcoin comes in00:33:00: On securing your financial future with Bitcoin 00:42:50: Could central banks and surveillance capitalists be behind NFTs and DeFi?00:49:00: Ethereum's proof of stake model flies against principles of decentralization 00:53:23: Delving into Web 3 scams and Dogecoin & Elon Musk01:06:50: For some countries, Bitcoin is not a luxury 01:23:00: Why we need unification in crypto 01:28:35: The role of money printing in propagating wealth inequality01:45:16: Bitcoin is on track to being worth a hundred thousand dollarsCanada's Justin Trudeau in February invoked the Emergencies Act — the never-before-used law since it was enacted in 1988. The unprecedented move was in response to the Freedom Convoy that had caused blockades in major border crossings in the country and gridlock in the capital. The Convoy was protesting against vaccine mandates and passports. The Emergencies Act cleared the "occupation" in Ottawa and also froze the bank accounts of tens of the Convoy organizers and participants. These actions were described by protesters and the opposition as unconstitutional and an overreach. For Bitcoin adherents, it illustrated the need for Bitcoin. Brad, Sunny and Kyle sit down against this backdrop. The three discuss how the Conservative Party — one most Canadians have never voted for — suddenly became the party of choice in the face of everything. It helps that PC leader Pierre Poilievre is a Bitcoin champion. What do all those events mean for the crypto pioneer? The three delve into that, as well as why you personally need Bitcoin, the space's scams, Elon Musk's promoting Dogecoin, Jack Dorsey quitting Twitter, and more. Below are some of the highlights of the conversation. #1. Securing Your Financial Future With BitcoinCovid 19 saw several countries opting to print more money to help keep their economies afloat. But printing more money is bad for the economy since it can trigger inflation. This rampant cash printing saw many corporates previously wary of touching Bitcoin shovelling money into the asset to derisk their finances. Brad reminds people of the importance of doing the same. He and Kyle emphasize the importance of not placing your financial future on whoever is elected.Brad remarks on Bitcoin being more a "productive protest" than a physical protest that the government will crack down on anyway. Sunny contends that Bitcoin needs only to continue existing to prove its importance in the face of such extremes by central banks. #2. Does Ethereum Have a Decentralization Problem?Many praises have been sung on Ethereum's transition from Proof of Work (PoW) validation model to Proof of Stake (PoW). Environmentalists are happy because it will reduce carbon emissions and sections of the cryptocurrency community welcome it because it takes off some of the weight of the environmental impact blame. But PoS allows only those with the means to become validators, making the network more centralized. Brad notes that the Bitcoin documentary "This Machine Greens'' recognizes that PoW can actually help us "to accelerate to renewable energy." As such, PoW is not the environmental threat it's claimed to be. #3. The Resilience of BitcoinThe trio deliberate on the rise of Web 3 products from DeFi to NFTs and whether that's stifling for Bitcoin. The answer is no, with Bitcoin being the "truth and the signal" à la Brad. Kyle likens Bitcoin to a rat for having everything thrown at it but still thriving. Also, the citizens of countries such as Nigeria, El Salvador and Venezuela aren't overly concerned with all these blockchain offshoots because their main concern is Bitcoin, which has a real difference to their lives. Podcast Mentions:Bitcoin conference MiamiUnocoin Exchange Love and Freedom podcast Chrystia Freeland's Cognitive State Capture(book)Jeff Booth episode Robert Breedlove episode The Lightning network When money Dies by Adam Ferguson (book) Principles for Dealing With a Changing World Order by Ray Dalio (book)"This Machine Greens" - Bitcoin Documentary Find Sunny Ray on:Sunny Ray Twitter Sunny Ray Instagram Find Kyle Kemper on:Kyle Kemper TwitterKyle Kemper YouTubeKyle Kemper Instagram Kyle Kemper Facebook Find Brad Mills on:Brad Mills TwitterMagic Internet Money TwitterBrad Mills YouTube Magic Internet Money FacebookMagic Internet Money Instagram

Interviu cu Adam Ferguson (președinte pe segmentul marketing produse la HMD Global) de la IFA 2022 din Berlin

Elisabeth Braw and Kapil Komireddi discuss Ukraine, including Sweden and Finland's moves towards Nato and India's stance on Russia. Plus: Boris Johnson and Rishi Sunak are fined over partygate, Marine Le Pen's chances and we meet Adam Ferguson, 2022's Sony World Photography Awards photographer of the year.

The end of the year means photo compilations, and Sarah and Allen go through some of their favorites from the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times with work by Allen Schaben, Francine Orr, Marcus Yam, Kent Nishimura, Wally Skald, Jay L. Clendenin, Ashley Gilbertson, Brenda Ann Kenneally, Sergey Ponomarev, Ryan Christopher Jones, Kholook Eid, Sandy Kim, Adam Ferguson, Kenny Houston, Michael Cialgo and more!Plus Instagram allows users to prevent embedding, and Lina Scheynius wonders why Instagram allows her images to be stolen. Happy Holidays, and here's to a better 2022!

Adam Ferguson is an Australian freelance photographer. He was born and grew up in regional New South Wales, Australia, before studying photography at the Queensland College of Art, Griffith University. After graduating he travelled from port to port through the Caribbean and Mediterranean as crew on a sailboat to fund the start of his photographic career until, in 2008, he flew to New Delhi on a one-way ticket and spent the next eight years based in Asia.Adam first gained recognition for his work in 2009 when he embarked on a sustained survey of the US-led war in Afghanistan. Since that time he has worked internationally, contributing to The New York Times Magazine, TIME Magazine and National Geographic, among others. Much of his work focuses on conflict and on civilians caught amidst geopolitical forces. In recent years, it has also concentrated on climate change. Adam's portraits of various heads of state have appeared on numerous Time Magazine covers and over the years he has been the recipient of awards from World Press Photo, Pictures of the Year International (POYI), Photo District News, National Portrait Gallery of Australia, and American Photography. His photographs have also been included in several solo and group exhibitions worldwide.Adam lives in Brooklyn, New York and is currently working on two monographs: a war diary of his time in Afghanistan and a survey of his home country's sparsely populated interior and its colonial legacy.On episode 167, Adam discusses, among other things:His experience of hotel quarantine in Sydney, Australia.His substack newsletter / blog.His return to Australia to work on a story there.Reflections on climate change.Reflections on Afghanistan in the aftermath of the recent withdrawal.His idealism and naeivty going in.A shift towards portraiture.How he embraced a beginner's mindset to brush up on his lighting and studio skills.The Afghans portrait series.The Bombs They Carried series.Being the equivalent of a film director.PTSD, Ayuaushca and a veterens on retreat story. Referenced:Philip Jones GriffithsTim PageMichael Borremans Website | Instagram | Facebook | Twitter | Substack Blog“Every time I light something I learn something about lighting."

Hayek termina su libro con una crítica a la dirección que ha tomado la sociología, la cual se ha alejado de alguno de sus fundadores, como Bernard de Mandeville, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson y David Hume. En este epílogo, Hayek se dedica a desarrollar algunos de los puntos que los autores mencionados pudieron descubrir de su observación de la sociedad y el desarrollo evolutivo del hombre.

  This session looks at the beginnings of modern European social theory in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The English political philosophers, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704), set out a distinction between the ‘state of nature' and the ‘state of society' in order to identify rights and obligations associated with private property. Their writings are widely seen in the context of the later development of capitalism, but are much more directly concerned with the justification of colonialism with which they were each directly engaged. In the eighteenth century, writers associated with the Scottish Enlightenment –for example, David Hume (1711-1776), Adam Smith (1723-1790), William Robertson (1721-1793), John Millar (1735-1801), and Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) – developed a typology of different types of society as stages of historical development. In this session, we consider how these ideas contributed to the view that ‘freedom' was a product of European modernity and that modernity operated in terms of an internal logic from which colonialism was effaced. Reading Bhambra, Gurminder K. and John Holmwood 2021. ‘Hobbes to Hegel: Europe and its Others' in Colonialism and Modern Social Theory. Cambridge: Polity Hegel, G. W. F. 1975 [1830]. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction: Reason in History. Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Hobbes, Thomas 1991 [1651]. Leviathan. Edited by Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Lebovics, Herman 1986. ‘The Uses of America in Locke's Second Treatise of Government,' Journal of the History of Ideas 47 (4): 567-581 Locke, John 1960 [1698]. Two Treatises of Government. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by Peter Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Meek, Ronald 1976. Social Science and the Ignoble Savage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Welchman, Jennifer 1995. ‘Locke on Slavery and Inalienable Rights,' Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (1): 67-81  

Simu Liu, the Chinese-Canadian actor who stars in Marvel's latest blockbuster, revealed that he was once paid $100 to be a stock photo model. Since that single photo shoot in 2014, Liu says he has seen himself on ads hawking everything from software to YMCA memberships. His advice: Think twice before doing a stock photo shoot.Also in the show: Adam Ferguson documents climate change for TIME over the course of 5 weeks, more and more photographers are publishing newsletters using tools like Substack and Facebook's Bulletin, Facebook apologizes for comparing Black men to primates, and Apple puts its child safety features on pause after experts weigh in.

Adam Ferguson is an Australian photographer, a member of the VII Photo Agency and a contributor to The New York Times, Time Magazine and National Geographic, among others. A true visual storyteller, his work has won numerous awards and much recognition, and is always thoughful & compelling. Adam shares some insight into his career & process, and we chat about many of his projects and assignments that have taken him from Australia to Afghanistan and beyond. Subscribe to Adam's newsletter: https://adamferguson.substack.com/ Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/adamfergusonstudio/ Have you heard? A game-changer in the preset world has arrived. Introducing QUEST. Quest is a subscription-based platform with exclusive access to new signature presets & profiles for only $8/month. Subscribers also get access to great bonus content & tutorials, live edit sessions and Q&As, and the chance to connect with a community in our Quest Facebook group. https://archipelagoquest.com/ Podcasts listeners can get their first month of Quest membership FREE with code: PODCAST35 This is a limited time offer, available until the end of August 2021.

20 HAZİRAN 2021 DÜNYA TARİHİNDE BUGÜN YAŞANANLAR 404 - Ayasofya, çıkan isyanlar sırasında yakıldı. 1837 - Kraliçe Victoria, 18 yaşında Birleşik Krallık tahtına çıktı. 63 yıldan fazla tahtta kalarak en uzun süre saltanat süren Birleşik Krallık Hükümdarı olacaktır. 1840 - Samuel Morse, telgrafın patentini aldı. 1877 - Alexander Graham Bell, dünyanın ilk ticari telefon hizmetini Kanada'nın Ontario Eyaleti'ndeki Hamilton şehrinde başlattı. 1991 - Alman Parlamentosu, ülkenin başkentini Bonn'dan tekrar Berlin'e taşıma kararı aldı. TÜRKİYE TARİHİNDE BUGÜN YAŞANANLAR 1481 - II. Bayezid ile Cem Sultan arasında Yenişehir Ovası'nda yapılan taht savaşını, Cem Sultan kaybetti. 1938 - 19 Mayıs, 3466 sayılı kanunla Millî Bayram olarak kabul edildi. Gençlik Marşı, Gençlik ve Spor Bayramı Marşı olarak kabul edildi. 1987 - Pınarcık katliamı: PKK militanları, Mardin'in Ömerli ilçesindeki Pınarcık köyünde 16'sı çocuk 30 kişiyi öldürdü. BUGÜN DOĞANLAR  1723 - İskoç Aydınlanmasının filozofu ve tarihçi Adam Ferguson, doğdu. 1916 - Türk ses sanatçısı Hamiyet Yüceses, dünyaya geldi. 1946 - Türk müzisyen, yazar, yönetmen ve politikacı Zülfü Livaneli, doğdu.  BUGÜN ÖLENLER  1277 - Karamanoğulları Beyliği'nin kurucusu ve ilk Hükümdarı Karamanoğlu Mehmed Bey,  vefat etti. 1984 - Türk diplomat ve Türkiye'nin Viyana Büyükelçiliği Çalışma Ateşesi ("Ermeni Devrimci Ordusu" adlı örgütün düzenlediği suikast sonucu) Erdoğan Özen, hayatını kaybetti.

This episode is also available as a blog post: http://donnyferguson.com/2017/05/09/adam-ferguson-and-the-spontaneous-order-of-society/ --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/donny-ferguson/message

May is Marathon Mates month for UK sight loss charity RNIB. They're asking us to pair up, virtually if necessary, to run a marathon distance, 26.2 miles, over the month of May, not too taxing! RNIB Connect Radio's Allan Russell spoke to Adam Ferguson and his son Jacob to find out why they're getting involved in the fundraiser and what's Jacob's favourite RNIB service. You can still sponsor Adam and Jacob, go to https://www.justgiving.com/jacobandthefergies If you'd like more info about fund raising for RNIB, go to www.rnib.org.uk/fundraising   You can also get more details by calling the Helpline on 0303 123 9999.#RNIBConnectImage: RNIB's Marathon Mates logo

As Admiral Richard Howe prepares to return to London, General Henry Clinton deploys a small fleet under Captain Patrick Ferguson to wipe out a "nest of pirates" at Little Egg Harbor, New Jersey. General Casimir Pulaski, who has assembled his legion, marches to Little Egg Harbor to defend against the raid. Visit my site at https://blog.AmRevPodcast.com for more text, pictures, maps, and sources on this topic. Book Recommendation of the Week: Casimir Pulaski: Cavalry Commander of the American Revolution, by Francis C. Kajencki. Online Recommendation of the Week: Biographical sketch: or, Memoir of Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick Ferguson, by Adam Ferguson: https://archive.org/details/biographicalsket00ferg Follow the podcast on Twitter @AmRevPodcast Join the Facebook group, or follow the Facebook Page for American Revolution Podcast.  American Revolution Podcast mail list: https://mailchi.mp/d3445a9cd244/american-revolution-podcast-by-michael-troy Support this podcast on Patreon or via PayPal. Find more books at https://bookshop.org/shop

As Admiral Richard Howe prepares to return to London, General Henry Clinton deploys a small fleet under Captain Patrick Ferguson to wipe out a "nest of pirates" at Little Egg Harbor, New Jersey. General Casimir Pulaski, who has assembled his legion, marches to Little Egg Harbor to defend against the raid. Visit my site at https://blog.AmRevPodcast.com for more text, pictures, maps, and sources on this topic. Book Recommendation of the Week: Casimir Pulaski: Cavalry Commander of the American Revolution, by Francis C. Kajencki. Online Recommendation of the Week: Biographical sketch: or, Memoir of Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick Ferguson, by Adam Ferguson: https://archive.org/details/biographicalsket00ferg Follow the podcast on Twitter @AmRevPodcast Join the Facebook group, or follow the Facebook Page for American Revolution Podcast.  American Revolution Podcast mail list: https://mailchi.mp/d3445a9cd244/american-revolution-podcast-by-michael-troy Support this podcast on Patreon or via PayPal. Find more books at https://bookshop.org/shop

From rough beginnings to divinely inspiring the next generation of young men. This time we had a very improvised podcast with my IMC monk friend Adam Ferguson, he goes by “Monster”. Don’t be mislead by society. Follow a code of ethics. Adam Ferguson is a mentor for the youth. He is the creator of LighthouseMentors. This is an organization promoting mentorship for the youth. More importantly it’s an idea, that every man be a light in his community, that the youth have a guide and role model leading them to safety. In this generation, strength is missing. We need to become a father and protector to our communities again. Our Instagrams: https://www.instagram.com/adams.house/ https://www.instagram.com/flozoneacademy/ OSS! Listen now and never be the same again… --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/sumedh-chatterjee/message

On the podcast this week, Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age by John Gray. Next time: Postjournalism and the death of newspapers. The media after Trump: manufacturing anger and polarization by Andrey Mir. Normally Jerry writes an ideological Turing test summary for the book we discuss, but it's impossible with this one as you'll hear us say. So here are some of Jerry's highlights from the book itself: If the Enlightenment myth of progress in ethics and politics continues to have a powerful hold, it is more from fear of the consequences of giving it up than from genuine conviction. the collapse of communism was a world-historic defeat for the Enlightenment project. Communism was not a type of oriental despotism, as generations of Western scholars maintained. It was an authentic continuation of a Western revolutionary tradition, and its downfall – after tens of millions of deaths were inflicted in the pursuit of its utopian goals – signalled the start of a process of de-Westernization. It is an inquiry into the right whose agenda is justice and whose content is given, not by any investigation of human beings as we find them in the world, with their diverse histories and communities, but by an abstract conception of the person that has been voided of any definite cultural identity or specific historical inheritance. Consider, in this regard, the central category of the intellectual tradition spawned by Rawls's work – the category of the person. In Rawls's work, as in that of his followers, this is a cipher, without history or ethnicity, denuded of the special attachments that in the real human world give us the particular identities we have. Emptied of the contingencies that in truth are essential to our identities, this cipher has in the Rawlsian schema only one concern – a concern for its own good, which is not the good of any actual human being, but the good we are all supposed to have in common, which it pursues subject to constraints of justice that are conceived to be those of impartiality. In this conception, the principles of justice are bound to be the same for all. The appearance of a plurality of ciphers in the Rawlsian original position must be delusive, since, having all of them the same beliefs and motives, they are indistinguishable. The subject matter of justice cannot, except indirectly, be found in the histories of peoples, and their often tragically conflicting claims; it must be always a matter of individual rights. It is obvious that this liberal position cannot address, save as an inconvenient datum of human psychology, the sense of injustice arising from belonging to an oppressed community that, in the shape of nationalism, is the strongest political force of our century. The task of political philosophy is conceived as one of deriving the ideal constitution – assumed, at least in principle, to be everywhere the same. This is so, whether its upshot be Rawls's basic liberties, Nozick's side-constraints, or Dworkin's rights-as-trumps. The presupposition is always that the bottom line in political morality is the claims of individuals, and that these are to be spelt out in terms of the demands of justice or rights. The consequence is that the diverse claims of historic communities, if they are ever admitted, are always overwhelmed by the supposed rights of individuals. The notion that different communities might legitimately have different legal regimes for abortion or pornography, for example, is hardly considered. If the theoretical goal of the new liberalism is the supplanting of politics by law, its practical result – especially in the United States, where rights discourse is already the only public discourse that retains any legitimacy – has been the emptying of political life of substantive argument and the political corruption of law. Issues, such as abortion, that in many other countries have been resolved by a legislative settlement that involves compromises and which is known to be politically renegotiable, are in the legalist culture of the United States matters of fundamental rights that are intractably contested and which threaten to become enemies of civil peace. Communitarian thought still harbours the aspiration expressed in those forms of the Enlightenment project, such as Marxism, that are most critical of liberalism – that of creating a form of communal life from which are absent the practices of exclusion and subordination that are constitutive of every community human beings have ever lived in. Old-fashioned toleration – the toleration defended by Milton, and by the older liberals, such as Locke – sprang from an acceptance of the imperfectibility of human beings, and from a belief in the importance of freedom in the constitution of the good life. Since we cannot be perfect, and since virtue cannot be forced on people but is rather a habit of life they must themselves strive to acquire, we were enjoined to tolerate the shortcomings of others, even as we struggled with our own. On this older view, toleration is a precondition of any stable modus vivendi among incorrigibly imperfect beings. If it has become unfashionable in our time, the reason is in part to be found in the resistance of a post-Christian age to the thought that we are flawed creatures whose lives will always contain evils. This is a thought subversive of the shallow optimistic creeds of our age, humanist or Pelagian, for which human evils are problems to be solved rather than sorrows to be coped with or endured. Toleration is unfashionable for another, more topical reason. It is unavoidably and inherently judgemental. The objects of toleration are what we judge to be evils. When we tolerate a practice, a belief or a character trait, we let something be that we judge to be undesirable, false or at least inferior; our toleration expresses the conviction that, despite its badness, the object of toleration should be left alone. we tolerate ersatz religions, such as Scientology, not because we think they may after all contain a grain of truth, but because the great good of freedom of belief necessarily encompasses the freedom to believe absurdities. Toleration is not, then, an expression of scepticism, of doubt about our ability to tell the good from the bad; it is evidence of our confidence that we have that ability. The idea of toleration goes against the grain of the age because the practice of toleration is grounded in strong moral convictions. Such judgements are alien to the dominant conventional wisdom according to which standards of belief and conduct are entirely subjective or relative in character, and one view of things is as good as any other. Indeed, when a society is tolerant, its tolerance expresses the conception of the good life that it has in common. In so far as a society comes to lack any such common conception – as is at least partly the case in Britain today – it ceases to be capable of toleration as it was traditionally understood. What the neutrality of radical equality mandates is nothing less than the legal disestablishment of morality. As a result, morality becomes in theory a private habit of behaviour rather than a common way of life. What a policy of toleration would not mandate is the wholesale reconstruction of institutional arrangements in Britain such that homosexuals acquire collective rights or are in every context treated precisely as heterosexuals. This is not to say that the current law of marriage is fixed for all time, any more than the rest of family law, such as the law on adoption, is so fixed. Further, it is to say that such extension of legal recognition would not be to homosexuals as a group but to individuals regardless of their sexual orientation. To make a political issue that is deeply morally contested a matter of basic rights is to make it non-negotiable, since rights – at least as they are understood in the dominant contemporary schools of Anglo-American jurisprudence – are unconditional entitlements, not susceptible to moderation In modern Western pluralist societies, policies which result in the creation of group rights are inevitably infected with arbitrariness and consequent inequity, since the groups selected for privileging are arbitrary, as is the determination of who belongs to which group. a stable liberal civil society cannot be radically multicultural but depends for its successful renewal across the generations on an undergirding culture that is held in common. This common culture need not encompass a shared religion and it certainly need not presuppose ethnic homogeneity, but it does demand widespread acceptance of certain norms and conventions of behaviour and, in our times, it typically expresses a shared sense of nationality. The example of the United States, which at least since the mid-1960s has been founded on the Enlightenment conviction that a common culture is not a necessary precondition of a liberal civil society, shows that the view that civil peace can be secured solely by adherence to abstract rules is merely an illusion. In so far as policy has been animated by it, the result has been further social division, including what amounts to low-intensity civil war between the races. As things stand, the likelihood in the United States is of a slow slide into ungovernability, as the remaining patrimony of a common cultural inheritance is frittered away by the fragmenting forces of multiculturalism. The kind of diversity that is incompatible with civil society in Britain is that which rejects the constitutive practices that give it its identity. Central among these are freedom of expression and its precondition, the rule of law. Cultural traditions that repudiate these practices cannot be objects of toleration for liberal civil society in Britain or anywhere else. The radical tolerance of indifference has application wherever there are conceptions of the good that are incommensurable. the claim that there may be, and are present among us, conceptions of the good that are rationally incommensurable is not one that supports any of the fashionable varieties of relativism and subjectivism, since it allows, and indeed presupposes, that some conceptions of the good are defective, and some forms of life simply bad. the radical tolerance of indifference is virtually the opposite of old-fashioned toleration in that its objects are not judged to be evils and may indeed be incommensurable goods. Woodrow Wilson's project of imposing a rationalist order conceived in the New World on the intractably quarrelsome nations of Europe. Like Marxism, this rationalist conception had its origins in the French Enlightenment's vision of a universal human civilization in which the claims of ethnicity and religion came long after those of common humanity. In the wake of Soviet communism, we find, not Homo Sovieticus or any other rationalist abstraction, but men and women whose identities are constituted by particular attachments and histories – Balts, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Russians and so on. Western opinion-formers and policy-makers are virtually unanimous in modelling the transition process of the post-communist states in terms which imply their reconstruction on Western models and their integration into a coherent international order based on Western power and institutions. Underlying this virtually universal model are assumptions that are anachronistic and radically flawed. It assumes that the system of Western-led institutions which assured global peace and world trade in the post-war period can survive, substantially unchanged or even strengthened, the world-wide reverberations of the Soviet collapse; the only issue is how the fledgling post-communist states are to gain admission into these institutions. This assumption neglects the dependency of these institutions on the strategic environment of the Cold War and their unravelling, before our eyes, as the post-war settlement disintegrates. The strategic consequence of the end of the Cold War has been the return to a pre-1914 world – with this difference, that the pre-1914 world was dominated by a single hegemonic power, Great Britain, whereas the return to nineteenth-century policies and modes of thinking in the United States leaves the world without any hegemonic power. the Soviet collapse has triggered a meltdown in the post-war world order, and in the domestic institutions of the major Western powers, which has yet to run its course. the crisis of Western transnational institutions is complemented by an ongoing meltdown of the various Western models of the nature and limits of market institutions in advanced industrial societies. The alienation of democratic electorates from established political elites is pervasive in Western societies, including the United States. Contrary to Hayek, who generalizes from the English experience to put forward a grandiose theory of the spontaneous emergence of market institutions that is reminiscent in its unhistorical generality of Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx at their most incautious, the English example is a singularity, not an exemplar of any long-run historical trend. The English experience is sui generis, not a paradigm for the development of market institutions, because the unique combination of circumstances which permitted it to occur as it did – immemorial individualism and parliamentary absolutism, for example – were replicated nowhere else. Where market institutions did develop elsewhere on English lines, as in North America and Australasia, it was in virtue of the fact that English cultural traditions and legal practice had been exported there more or less wholesale. Market institutions of the English variety failed to take root where, as in India, their legal and cultural matrix was not successfully transplanted. It is noteworthy that, until its collapse in 1991, the Swedish model performed well in respect of what was, perhaps, its principal achievement, an active labour policy that kept long-term unemployment very low, and so effectively prevented the growth of an estranged underclass of the multi-generationally unemployed. The German or Rhine model of market institutions, as it developed in the post-war period up to reunification, was not the result of the application of any consistent theory, but rather of a contingent political compromise between a diversity of theoretical frameworks, of which the most important were the Ordoliberalismus of the Eucken or Frankfurt School and Catholic social theology. It represented a political settlement, also, between the principal interest groups in post-war Germany, including the newly constituted trade unions. It would be false to imagine that China lacks ethnic conflict, or separatist movements. As a portent for the future, there appears to be an Islamic separatist movement in the far-western ‘autonomous region' of Xinjiang, which has borders with the new republics of Kyrgystan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and with Afghanistan and Pakistan; and there are undoubtedly strong separatist movements in neighbouring Tibet and Mongolia. it would not be entirely surprising, but would in fact rather accord with long-term patterns in Chinese history, if the Chinese state were to fragment in the coming years, perhaps after the death of Deng Xiaoping; market institutions have as their matrices particular cultural traditions, without whose undergirding support the frameworks of law by which they are defined are powerless or empty. Scottish thinkers, such as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, who not unreasonably generalized from their own historical experience to such a connection, this result of their inquiries evoked anxiety as to the eventual fate of market institutions, since – like later thinkers such as Joseph Schumpeter – they feared that individualism would consume the cultural capital on which market institutions relied for their renewal across the generations. Our experience suggests that such fears as to the ultimately self-defeating effects of market institutions that are animated by individualist cultural traditions are far from groundless. The growth of lawlessness in Russia, the threat posed to social and business life by organized criminality, and the apparent powerlessness thus far of the Yeltsin government in the face of this threat, suggest that an authoritarian turn in Russian political life, whether by the Yeltsin government or by a successor, and whether or not the army has a decisive role in any subsequent authoritarian regime, would be in accord both with the exigencies of current circumstances and with Russian historical precedent. Authoritarian government is likely to emerge in Russia both in response to the dangers of fragmentation of the state and ensuing civil strife and as a response to growing criminal violence in everyday and business life. The Soviet collapse, far from enhancing the stability of Western institutions, has destabilized them by knocking away the strategic props on which they stood. The prospect of the orderly integration of the post-communist states into the economic and security arrangements of the Western world is a mirage, not only because of the unprecedentedly formidable difficulties each of them confronts in its domestic development, but also because the major Western transnational institutions and organizations are themselves in a flux, amounting sometimes to dissolution. The world-historical failure of the Enlightenment project – in political terms, the collapse and ruin, in the late twentieth century, of the secular, rationalist and universalist political movements, liberal as well as Marxist, that that project spawned, and the dominance in political life of ethnic, nationalist and fundamentalist forces – suggests the falsity of the philosophical anthropology upon which the Enlightenment project rested. On the alternative view that I shall develop, the propensity to cultural difference is a primordial attribute of the human species; human identities are plural and diverse in their very natures, as natural languages are plural and diverse, and they are always variations on particular forms of common life, never exemplars of universal humanity. The task for liberal theory, as I see it, is not vainly to resist the historical falsification of the universalist anthropology that sustained the Enlightenment philosophy of history, but to attempt to reconcile the demands of a liberal form of life with the particularistic character of human identities and allegiances – to retheorize liberalism as itself a particular form of common life. Agonistic liberalism is that species of liberalism that is grounded, not in rational choice, but in the limits of rational choice – limits imposed by the radical choices we are often constrained to make among goods that are both inherently rivalrous, and often constitutively uncombinable, and sometimes incommensurable, or rationally incomparable. Agonistic liberalism is an application in political philosophy of the moral theory of value-pluralism – the theory that there is an irreducible diversity of ultimate values (goods, excellences, options, reasons for action and so forth) and that when these values come into conflict or competition with one another there is no overarching standard or principle, no common currency or measure, whereby such conflicts can be arbitrated or resolved. Value-pluralism imposes limits on rational choice that are subversive of most standard moral theories, not merely of utilitarianism, and it has deeply subversive implications for all the traditional varieties of liberal theory. The thesis of the incommensurability of values is then not a version of relativism, of subjectivism or of moral scepticism, though it will infallibly be confused with one or other of these doctrines: it is a species of moral realism, which we shall call objective pluralism. Its distinguishing features are that it limits the scope of rational choice among goods, affirming that they are often constitutively uncombinable and sometimes rationally incommensurable. It is a fundamental contribution of Raz's political philosophy to have shown that a rights-based political morality is an impossibility. rights claims are never primordial or foundational but always conclusionary, provisional results of long chains of reasoning which unavoidably invoke contested judgements about human interests and well-being. If the truth of value-pluralism is assumed, such that there are no right answers in hard cases about the restraint of liberty, then it seems natural to treat questions of the restraint of liberty as political, and not as theoretical or jurisprudential questions. Despite its self-description as political liberalism, then, Rawls's is a liberalism that has been politically emasculated, in which nothing of importance is left to political decision, and in which political life itself has been substantially evacuated of content. The hollowing out of the political realm in Rawlsian liberalism is fatal to its self-description as a form of political liberalism and discloses its true character as a species of liberal legalism. The liberal legalism of Rawls and his followers is, perhaps, only an especially unambiguous example of the older liberal project, or illusion, of abolishing politics, or of so constraining it by legal and constitutional formulae that it no longer matters what are the outcomes of political deliberation. In Rawlsian liberal legalism, the anti-political nature of at least one of the dominant traditions of liberalism is fully realized. In historical practice, the effect of attempting to abolish or to marginalize political life has been – especially in the United States, where legalism is strongest – the politicization of law, as judicial institutions have become arenas of political struggle. The end-result of this process is not, however, the simple transposition of political life into legal contexts, but rather the corrosion of political life itself. The treatment of all important issues of restraint of liberty as questions of constitutional rights has the consequence that they cease to be issues that are politically negotiable and that can be resolved provisionally in a political settlement that encompasses a compromise among conflicting interests and ideals. In conflicts about basic constitutional rights, there can be no compromise solutions, only judgements which yield unconditional victory for one side and complete defeat for the other. Allegiance to a liberal state is, on this view, never primarily to principles which it may be thought to embody, and which are supposed to be compelling for all human beings; it is always to specific institutions, having a specific history, and to the common culture that animates them, which itself is a creature of historical contingency. On the view being developed here, allegiance to a liberal state is always allegiance to the common culture it embodies or expresses, and, in the late modern context in which we live, such a common culture is typically a national culture. the only things, on the account here defended, that can command allegiance. In our world they are nations, or the common forms of life which national cultures encompass and shelter. The point may be put in another, and perhaps a simpler way: there can be no form of allegiance that is purely political; political allegiance – at least when it is comparatively stable – presupposes a common cultural identity, which is reflected in the polity to which allegiance is given; political order, including that of a liberal state, rests upon a pre-political order of common culture. As Berlin has put his position: The fact that the values of one culture may be incompatible with those of another, or that they are in conflict within one culture or group or in a single human being at different times – or, for that matter, at one and the same time – does not entail relativism of values, only the notion of a plurality of values not structured hierarchically; which, of course, entails the permanent possibility of inescapable conflict between values, as well as incompatibility between the outlooks of different civilisations or of stages of the same civilisation. He sums up his view: ‘Relativism is not the only alternative to universalism … nor does incommensurability entail relativism'. Berlin's point, which is surely correct, is that there may be a specifiable minimum universal content to morality, and some forms of life may be condemned by it; but the items which make up the minimum content may, and sometimes do, come into conflict with one another, there being no rational procedure for resolving such conflicts. because the universal minimum in all of its variations underdetermines any liberal form of life, many of the regimes that meet the test of the universal minimum – probably the vast majority of such regimes to be found in human history – will not be liberal regimes. The likely prospect, on all current trends, is not only of the East Asian societies overtaking Western liberal individualist societies in the economic terms of growth, investment, savings and living standards; it is also of their doing so while preserving and enhancing common cultural forms which assure to their subjects personal security in their everyday lives and a public environment that is rich in choiceworthy options. By contrast, the prospect for the Western individualist societies is one of economic development that is weak and feeble in a context of cultural impoverishment in which the remnants of a common culture are hollowed out by individualism and legalism. The prospect for the Western liberal societies, and particularly for those in which individualism and legalism have by now virtually delegitimized the very idea of a common culture, is that of a steep and rapid decline in which civil peace is fractured and the remnants of a common culture on which liberal forms of life themselves depend are finally dissipated. The self-undermining of liberal individualism, which Joseph Schumpeter anticipated in the mid-1940s, is likely to proceed apace, now that the Soviet collapse has removed the legitimacy borrowed by Western institutions from the enmity of a ruinous alternative, and the East Asian societies are released from the constraints of the post-war settlement to pursue paths of development that owe ever less to the West. When our institutional inheritance – that precious and irreplaceable patrimony of mediating structures and autonomous professions – is thrown away in the pursuit of a managerialist Cultural Revolution seeking to refashion the entire national life on the impoverished model of contract and market exchange, it is clear that the task of conserving and renewing a culture is no longer understood by contemporary conservatives. In the context of such a Maoism of the Right, it is the permanent revolution of unfettered market processes, not the conservation of traditional institutions and professions, having each of them a distinctive ethos, that has become the ruling project of contemporary conservatism. At the same time, neo-liberalism itself can now be seen as a self-undermining political project. Its political success depended upon cultural traditions, and constellations of interests, that neo-liberal policy was bound to dissipate. liberal civilization itself may be imperilled, in so far as its legitimacy has been linked with the utopia of perpetual growth powered by unregulated market processes, and the inevitable failure of this utopia spawns illiberal political movements. Indeed, unconstrained market institutions are bound to undermine social and political stability, particularly as they impose on the population unprecedented levels of economic insecurity with all the resultant dislocations of life in families and communities. A central test of the readiness to think fresh thoughts is the way we think about market institutions. On the view defended here they are not ends in themselves but means or tools whose end is human well-being. Indeed, among us, market liberalism is in its workings ineluctably subversive of tradition and community. This may not have been the case in Edmund Burke's day, in which the maintenance of the traditions of whig England could coexist with a policy of economic individualism, but in our age a belief in any such harmony is a snare and a delusion. Among us, unlike the men and women of Burke's day, markets are global, and also, in the case of capital markets, nearly instantaneous; free trade, if it too is global, operates among communities that are vastly more uneven in development than any that traded with one another in Burke's time; and our lives are pervaded by mass media that transform tastes, and revolutionize daily habits, in ways that could be only dimly glimpsed by the Scottish political economists whom Burke so revered. The social and cultural effects of market liberalism are, virtually without exception, inimical to the values that traditional conservatives hold dear. Communities are scattered to the winds by the gale of creative destruction. Endless ‘downsizing' and ‘flattening' of enterprises fosters ubiquitous insecurity and makes loyalty to the company a cruel joke. The celebration of consumer choice, as the only undisputed value in market societies, devalues commitment and stability in personal relationships and encourages the view of marriage and the family as vehicles of self-realization. The dynamism of market processes dissolves social hierarchies and overturns established expectations. Status is ephemeral, trust frail and contract sovereign. The dissolution of communities promoted by market-driven labour mobility weakens, where it does not entirely destroy, the informal social monitoring of behaviour which is the most effective preventive measure against crime. Classical liberalism, or what I have termed market fundamentalism, is, like Marxism, a variation on the Enlightenment project, which is the project of transcending the contingencies of history and cultural difference and founding a universal civilization that is qualitatively different from any that has ever before existed. In this paleo-liberal or libertarian view, the erosion of distinctive cultures by market processes is, if anything, to be welcomed as a sign of progress toward a universal rational civilization. Here paleo-liberalism shows its affinities not with European conservatism but with the Old Left project of doing away with, or marginalizing politically, the human inheritance of cultural difference. That this perspective is a hallucinatory and utopian one is clear if we consider its neglect of the sources not only of political allegiance but also of social order in common cultural forms. Market liberalism, like other Enlightenment ideologies, treats cultural difference as a politically marginal phenomenon whose appropriate sphere is in private life. It does not comprehend, or repudiates as irrationality, the role of a common culture in sustaining political order and in legitimizing market institutions. Market liberalism is at its most utopian, however, in its conception of a global market society, in which goods, and perhaps people, move freely between economies having radically different stages of development and harbouring very different cultures. Human beings need, more than they need the freedom of consumer choice, a cultural and economic environment that offers them an acceptable level of security and in which they feel at home. The conservative idea of the primacy of cultural forms is meant to displace not only standard liberal conceptions of the autonomous human subject but also ideas of the autonomy of market institutions that liberal thought has been applied – or misapplied – to support. It is not meant to support nostalgist and reactionary conceptions of organic or integral community which have no application in our historical circumstances and which, if they were implemented politically, could end only in tragedy or – more likely in Britain – black comedy. The idea of a seamless community – the noumenal community, as we may call it, of communitarianism – is as much of a fiction as the autonomous subject of liberal theory. We all of us belong to many communities, we mostly inherit diverse ethnicities, and our world-views are fractured and provisional whether or not we know it or admit it. We harbour a deep diversity of views and values as to sexuality and the worth of human life, our relations with the natural environment and the special place, if any, of the human species in the scheme of things. The reactionary project of rolling back this diversity of values and world-views in the pursuit of a lost cultural unity overlooks the character of our cultural inheritance as a palimpsest, having ever deeper layers of complexity. It is clear only that, for us at any rate, a common culture cannot mean a common world-view, religious or secular. It is an implication of all that I have said, however, that we have no option but to struggle to make our inheritance of liberal traditions work. At present, the principal obstacle we face in the struggle to renew our inheritance of liberal practice is the burden on thought and policy of market liberal dogma. The central difficulty is that the enlargement of leisure that Mill, by contrast with the gloomier classical economists, expected to come from stability in population and output against a background of improvement in the industrial arts is occurring in the form of ever higher levels of involuntary unemployment. It may be that proposals for a basic or citizen's income, where that is to be distinguished from the neo-liberal idea of a negative income tax, and for a better distribution of capital among the citizenry, need reconsideration – despite all their difficulties – as elements in a policy aiming to reconcile the human need for economic security with the destabilizing dynamism of market institutions. Almost as significant in disclosing the Americocentric character of the new liberalism was its anaemic and impoverished conception of pluralism and cultural diversity. The incommensurability of values affirmed in doctrines of objective ethical pluralism was understood as arising in the formulation of personal plans of life rather than in conflicts among whole ways of life. And cultural diversity was conceived in the denatured form of a cornucopia of chosen lifestyles, each with its elective identity, rather than in the form in which it is found in the longer and larger experience of humankind – as the exfoliation of exclusionary forms of life, spanning the generations, membership of which is typically unchosen, and which tend to individuate themselves by their conflicts and by their historical memories of enmity. The core project of the Enlightenment was the displacement of local, customary or traditional moralities, and of all forms of transcendental faith, by a critical or rational morality, which was projected as the basis of a universal civilization. This is the project that animated Marxism and liberalism in all their varieties, which underpins both the new liberalism and neo-conservatism, and to which every significant body of opinion in the United States continues to subscribe. That liberal individuality is, in practice, invariably a prescription for abject conformity to prevailing bien-pensant opinion is, on the view being presented here, not the chief objection to it. The most disabling feature of these and other constitutive elements of the new liberalism is what they all betoken – namely, a rejection of the political enterprise itself, and of its animating value of peace. For the pluralist, the practice of politics is a noble engagement, precisely on account of the almost desperate humility of its purposes – which are to moderate the enmity of agonistic identities, and to generate conventions of peace among warring communities. The pluralist embrace of politics is, for these reasons, merely a recognition of the reality of political life, itself conceived as an abatement of war. from the truth of a plurality of incommensurable values the priority of one of them – liberty, autonomy or choice-making, say – cannot follow. Value-pluralism cannot entail, or ground, liberalism in any general, still less universal way. Pluralists reject this Old Right project for the same reason that they reject the Enlightenment project. Both seek to roll back the reality of cultural diversity for the sake of an imaginary condition of cultural unity – whether that be found in a lost past or in a supposed future condition of the species in which cultural difference has been marginalized in a universal civilization. Both perspectives are alien to that of the pluralist, which takes the reality of cultural difference as a datum of political order. A pluralist political order may nevertheless deviate from the central institutions of a liberal civil society at crucial points. It need not, and often will not possess an individualist legal order in which persons are the primary rights-bearers. The principal bearers of rights (and duties) in a pluralist political order will be communities, or ways of life, not individuals. The pluralist standard of assessment of any regime is whether it enables its subjects to coexist in a Hobbesian peace while renewing their distinctive forms of common life. … By this standard, the current regime in China might well be criticized for its policies in Tibet; but such a criticism would invoke the intrinsic value of the communities and cultural forms now being destroyed in Tibet, not universalist conceptions of human rights or democracy. Here I think Raz has grasped a point of fundamental importance, perceived by Mill but not by Rawls – that a liberal state cannot be neutral with regard to illiberal forms of life coming within its jurisdiction. Or, to put the matter still more shortly, Raz is entirely correct in seeing liberalism itself as a whole way of life, and not merely a set of political principles or institutions. The trouble is that, if value-pluralism is true at the level of whole ways of life, then the liberal form of life can have no special or universal claim on reason. In the late modern period in which we live, the Enlightenment project is affirmed chiefly for fear of the consequences of abandoning it. (The United States is, as ever, an exception in this regard, since in it both fundamentalist religion and fundamentalist affirmations of the Enlightenment project remain strong. The collapse of these fundamentalisms in the United States, however, were it to occur, would likely be accompanied by an outbreak of nihilism of a violence and intensity unknown in other Western countries; such an outcome is prefigured in much contemporary North American art, literature and popular entertainment.) There can, in my view, be no rolling back the central project of modernity, which is the Enlightenment project, with all its consequences in terms of disenchantment and ultimate groundlessness. … the thought of Nietzsche, especially but not exclusively his thinking about morality, is unavoidably and rightly the starting-point of serious reflection for us, at the close of the modern age which the Enlightenment project, in all its diversity, inaugurated. the political forms which may arise in truly post-Enlightenment cultures will be those that shelter and express diversity – that enable different cultures, some but by no means all or even most of which are dominated by liberal forms of life, different world-views and ways of life, to coexist in peace and harmony. For this development to be a real historical possibility, however, certain conceptions and commitments that have been constitutive, not merely of the Enlightenment and so of modernity, but also, and more fundamentally, of the central traditions of Western civilization, must be amended, or abandoned. Certain conceptions, not only of morality but also of science, that are central elements in Enlightenment cultures must be given up. Certain understandings of religion, long established in Western traditions, not as a vessel for a particular way of life but rather as the bearer of truths possessing universal authority, must be relinquished. The most fundamental Western commitment, the humanist conception of humankind as a privileged site of truth, which is expressed in Socratic inquiry and in Christian revelation, and which re-emerges in secular and naturalistic form in the Enlightenment project of human self-emancipation through the growth of knowledge, must be given up. Further, and perhaps decisively, once liberal practice is released from the hallucinatory perspective of liberal theory, it will be seen for what it always was – not a seamless garment, but a patchwork quilt, stitched together and restitched in response to the flux of circumstance. … If, as I believe, liberal practice is best conceived as a miscellany of ad-hoc improvisations, made over the generations in the pursuit of a modus vivendi, then no part of it can be regarded as sacrosanct; it can, and should, be rewoven, or unravelled, as circumstances and changing human needs dictate. The conception of the natural world as an object of human exploitation, and of humankind as the master of nature, which informs Bacon's writings, is one of the most vital and enduring elements of the modern world-view, and the one which Westernization has most lastingly and destructively transmitted to non-Western cultures. In this last period of modernity, Western instrumental reason becomes globalized at just the historic moment when its groundlessness is manifest. The embodiment of instrumental reason in modern technology acquires a planetary reach precisely when the animating humanist project which guided it is overthrown. Nothing remains of this project but the expansion of human productive powers through the technological domination of the earth. It is this conjunction of the global spread of the Western humanist project with the self-undermining of its most powerful modern embodiment in the Enlightenment that warrants the claim that we find ourselves now at the close of the modern age. In truth, the likelihood is that, now that the imperatives of the Cold War period are over, the European countries and the United States will increasingly decouple, not only strategically and economically, but also culturally, so that their cultural and political differences will become more, not less, decisive. It is difficult to believe that the forms of liberal culture will not diverge greatly, as a result of this likely decoupling, between the United States and the various European nations. Indeed, even as things stand now, Rorty's post-modern liberalism is an expression of American hopes, which are far from being shared by other liberal cultures, such as those in Europe. For liberalism to become merely one form of life among others would involve as profound a cultural metamorphosis as Christianity's ceasing to make any claim to unique and universal truth. The surrender of the will to power has its most important application in our relations with other forms of life, and with the earth. The project of subjecting the earth and its other life-forms to human will through technological domination is Western humanism in its final form.

Adam Ferguson and Ben Cooper-Woolley join Rik Brown for a chat about all things 2020. Both Adam and Ben reside in Sydney shaping a slightly different check in. Covid 19 has impacted the whole of Australia - but Victoria has been most severely impacted. So Adam and Ben have been more active with work during 2020. For those of you experiencing the various stages of Start Up or if you are interested in this world - this is the perfect mini conversation for you. Adam is a regular on Leadership of Fools. With Ben they are the founders of sitehive.co and you will soon discover how Shark Tank and Love Island have shaped their journey. Enjoy. Make sure you check us out at thepeoplespot.com

Presenter David Maxwell visits Hillsborough Castle gardens a year after it reopened to the public. He chats to garden manager, Claire Woods in the lost garden about tree ferns and gets some top tips from Adam Ferguson on growing the perfect pears. David also meets up with Claire McNally, the new head gardener at Rowallane gardens near Saintfield. Also on the programme – an update from Amy Kelly on her allotment in Newtownards and David will take listeners questions with expert Reg Maxwell.

Mentioned: Henri Huet, Eddie Adams, Horst Faas, Adam Ferguson. This was originally published in 2016.

Mentioned: Henri Huet (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henri_Huet), Eddie Adams (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eddie_Adams_(photographer)), Horst Faas (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horst_Faas), Adam Ferguson (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Ferguson_(photographer)). This was originally published in 2016.

On this episode Photographer Adam Ferguson and I talk about how he got into photography, what lead him to document the US lead war in Afghanistan, misconceptions people have about war, how he goes about pitching to publications, changes he has seen within the photography industry, why just being a photographer today isn't enough, his creative process and so much more. Adam Ferguson IG: https://www.instagram.com/adamfergusonstudio/Adam Ferguson Website: https://adamfergusonstudio.com/13 Ways To Sell & Market Your Work As A Freelance Photographer or Artist: https://pitchedindustries.com/

How did a George Washington letter find a home Scotland? In this episode of Conversations at the Washington Library, Jim Ambuske talks with Rachel Hosker, deputy head of special collections and archives manager at the University Edinburgh Library about a document that connects Washington to Adam Ferguson, one of the major figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. Recorded in Edinburgh at the library's Centre for Research Collections, Ambuske and Hosker also look over Washington's Political Legacies, a book published in New York in the months just after Washington's death. They also discuss Hosker's early fascination with manuscripts and rare books and the university library's amazing collections. Haste ye back! About Our Guest: Rachel Hosker is Deputy Head of Special Collections and Archives Manager at the University of Edinburgh. Whilst making the collections available to staff, students and the wider community, she has also been known to perform in the Edinburgh Fringe Festival talking about her work. She has worked for Universities, Businesses, government and in consultancy and served on national and international archival advisory groups. About Our Host: Jim Ambuske, Ph.D. leads the Center for Digital History at the Washington Library. A historian of the American Revolution, Scotland, and the British Atlantic World, Ambuske graduated from the University of Virginia in 2016. He is a former Farmer Postdoctoral Fellow in Digital Humanities at the University of Virginia Law Library. At UVA Law, Ambuske co-directed the 1828 Catalogue Project and the Scottish Court of Session Project.  He is currently at work on a book about emigration from Scotland in the era of the American Revolution as well as a chapter on Scottish loyalism during the American Revolution for a volume to be published by the University of Edinburgh Press.

How did a George Washington letter find a home Scotland? In this episode of Conversations at the Washington Library, Jim Ambuske talks with Rachel Hosker, deputy head of special collections and archives manager at the University Edinburgh Library about a document that connects Washington to Adam Ferguson, one of the major figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. Recorded in Edinburgh at the library's Centre for Research Collections, Ambuske and Hosker also look over Washington's Political Legacies, a book published in New York in the months just after Washington's death. They also discuss Hosker's early fascination with manuscripts and rare books and the university library's amazing collections. Haste ye back! --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/mountvernon/message

Michael Adam Ferguson is a Cognitive Neurology, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Laboratory for Brain Network Imaging and Modulation--Harvard Medical School, Department of Neurology. He is the host of the Luminous Brain Podcast. Follow Michael @neuromichaelphd If you want to register for the Soul & Brain, click here. Kazingram Dialogue

While many banks are closing branches, our latest guest believes there’s potential for banks to evolve their “stores” and go beyond the transactional experience to create a place of connections, advice and security. It’s where the magic of data coupled with thoughtful and knowledgeable advisors go from “let’s get you a savings account” to “let’s talk about the options you have with a new baby on the way”. But it’ll take courage and patience to get there. Join Lee Peterson and Adam Ferguson, SVP Brand Director at Huntington National Bank, as they discuss issues banks are facing today and what the future can hold.

While physical retail continues to hold on, the numbers are telling a clear story: shoppers aren’t frequenting stores as much as they used to and ecommerce continues to grow. Despite this, online retailers and traditional bricks-and-mortar brands alike continue opening physical experiences at retail. Lee Peterson discusses all things stores in this panel session from CBUS Retail 19 including Jude Reter with Express, Adam Ferguson with Huntington National Bank, Bob Welty with ROWE Creative Union and Allison Westrick with Sketch Blue.

Matt Ridley believes that evolution is way of understanding human society; therefore in this talk based on his latest book The Evolution of Everything: How Ideas Emerge (2016). The complexity of ecosystems is a combination of form and function that has been explained from Darwin's perspective, however in human society complexity we tend to think someone is in charge, an idea that Ridley discusses with a quote from Adam Ferguson and the example of human languages. "It's very clear that language evolved to be a complex, diverse and dynamic thing without human direction, without humans inventing it or innovating”. In the history of technologies such as tools, music instruments and airplanes, there is a similar evolution process where several variations of the same product are created, there is competition between prototypes and when one out stands, there is replication of the design, where the phenomena of convergence could happen and finally there could be extinction of the technology. "Every technology you possess is a combination of other technologies”. Later Matt talks about economic ideas such as exchange, that is unique to human beings, because in other animals and between species you do find division of labour. Trade is ancient and universal practice and there is evidence from very early times, that Ridley shows to the audience. Another topic discussed is, where does innovation come from? Ridley explains why isolation is the enemy of innovation. Simultaneous innovation is another situation that has happened throughout time; the light bulb, famously invented by Edison, is a great example, since 23 other persons also invented it in other places of the world. The evolution of everything is inevitable and inexorably and we are yet to see the impact it may have in the future, Ridley concludes.

Rik Brown, Alice Sidhu, Adam Ferguson and our special guest David Marquet Commander of the nuclear submarine Santa Fe. davidmarquet.com Please enjoy this conversation about practical ways to approach leadership. And if you enjoy it - please subscribe and rate wherever you do your listening. leadershipoffools.com

Someday soon, you might be finally able to count all the grains of sand on the beach, because there might be no beaches—and no sand—left. With the global population and its attendant consumption booming, we’re running out of sand in our quest to build larger cities and better smartphones. This essential resource, so easy to overlook, ranks just below air and water on a global scale of how much we use. But as journalist Vince Beiser explains in his new book, The World in a Grain, its over-extraction is harming us, whether in the form of murder in the black markets of India, pollution from fracking sand mines in Wisconsin, or islands that have simply disappeared.Go beyond the episode:Vince Beiser’s The World in a GrainRead his article on India’s black market in Wired, “The Deadly Global War for Sand”For more on how sand mining works, watch this aerial video (from a sand mine worker) of a quarry in Central TexasVisit our episode page to see photographs from Adam Ferguson, who accompanied Beiser on his visit to IndiaTune in every week to catch interviews with the liveliest voices from literature, the arts, sciences, history, and public affairs; reports on cutting-edge works in progress; long-form narratives; and compelling excerpts from new books. Hosted by Stephanie Bastek.Subscribe: iTunes • Feedburner • Stitcher • Google Play • AcastHave suggestions for projects you’d like us to catch up on, or writers you want to hear from? Send us a note: podcast [at] theamericanscholar [dot] org. And rate us on iTunes! Our theme music was composed by Nathan Prillaman. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Someday soon, you might be finally able to count all the grains of sand on the beach, because there might be no beaches—and no sand—left. With the global population and its attendant consumption booming, we’re running out of sand in our quest to build larger cities and better smartphones. This essential resource, so easy to overlook, ranks just below air and water on a global scale of how much we use. But as journalist Vince Beiser explains in his new book, The World in a Grain, its over-extraction is harming us, whether in the form of murder in the black markets of India, pollution from fracking sand mines in Wisconsin, or islands that have simply disappeared.Go beyond the episode:Vince Beiser’s The World in a GrainRead his article on India’s black market in Wired, “The Deadly Global War for Sand”For more on how sand mining works, watch this aerial video (from a sand mine worker) of a quarry in Central TexasVisit our episode page to see photographs from Adam Ferguson, who accompanied Beiser on his visit to IndiaTune in every week to catch interviews with the liveliest voices from literature, the arts, sciences, history, and public affairs; reports on cutting-edge works in progress; long-form narratives; and compelling excerpts from new books. Hosted by Stephanie Bastek.Subscribe: iTunes • Feedburner • Stitcher • Google Play • AcastHave suggestions for projects you’d like us to catch up on, or writers you want to hear from? Send us a note: podcast [at] theamericanscholar [dot] org. And rate us on iTunes! Our theme music was composed by Nathan Prillaman.  See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

If we’re working from a 17th century model of publishing science, then what effect does that have on translating science to clinical relevance? Kate and I had a mind expanding conversation (for laypeople) around this idea with Dr. Adam Ferguson, Professor and Principal Investigator at the Brain and Spinal Injury Center at UCSF. You may have already seen his fascinating presentation at Working 2 Walk this past year, “Big Data Analytics: Bringing Dark Data to Light for Enhancing Discovery and Translation in Spinal Cord Injury“. We tried to unpack some of the ideas and possibilities that came from that presentation.

Salvador Litvak the great writer, director and host of the Accidental Talmudist sits down with Danny to tell his story of immigrating from Chile, Umbrella Stabbings, Harvard rowing, bad performance art and Mexican weed. They also talk Judaim, the holocaust and of course about the philosopher Alex Fossella picked for them Adam Ferguson. Brought to you by FairEnoughComic.com Issue #2 now available!

Kieran Fitzpatrick, Adam Ferguson, Colin Beattie & Rik Brown Why is it that not every senior manager makes the transition to Executive or succeeds at an Executive Level of an organisation? - What is the difference b/w an executive and senior management role? - Choosing b/w right and right. - Letting go of mindsets and approaches that hold you back. - And a very deliberate attempt to Pivot the podcast to attract a certain very passionate fan group. Please follow us on linkedin.com/company/leadership-of-fools/ Visit our website leadershipoffools.com And wherever you are listening - it is great to get your feedback and see your reviews.      

Check out part 1 of our interview with Loren Cassin Sackett and Nic Kooyers, two awesome researchers who were hanging out with Adam Ferguson at Mpala Research Centre. To learn more about Loren's work, you can follow her really active Twitter profile at twitter.com/LorenCSackett. Nic's research is collected in his personal website, found here: sites.google.com/site/nkooyers/ If you dig the music in this podcast, check it out here on iTunes, or purchase it through your music service of choice. Support those starving musicians! I Am A Nightmare - Brand New Missed the Boat - Modest Mouse Montana - Youth Lagoon

J Seth Anderson and Michael Adam Ferguson were catapulted into the public spotlight when they became the first same-sex couple to be legally married by the state of Utah. Seth and Michael both grew up in LDS homes, completed full-time missions for the Church, and throughout their twenties, undertook tortuous journeys to renegotiate their relationships with both the institution and with the faith of their childhoods. Seth and Michael recently completed their graduate work at the University of Utah--Seth finishing his master's degree in social history focusing on the history of sexuality in the Western United States, and Michael defending his PhD dissertation in bioengineering in which he developed new analytical methods for monitoring brain activity using fMRI. Since November 2012, Seth and Michael have been embroiled in a first-of-its-kind lawsuit against a gay conversion therapy organization in New Jersey named JONAH: Jews Offering New Alternatives to Healing (formerly Jews Offering New Alternatives to Homosexuality), filed by the Southern Poverty Law Center. On June 25, 2015, a New Jersey jury unanimously found JONAH liable for multiple counts of consumer fraud and unconscionable business practices. Seth and Michael are actively involved in education and advocacy on behalf of LGBT and queer individuals, including the project Team Truth--a grassroots campaign they are creating with advocates and allies to end the lies and harm of gay conversion therapy.

J Seth Anderson and Michael Adam Ferguson were catapulted into the public spotlight when they became the first same-sex couple to be legally married by the state of Utah. Seth and Michael both grew up in LDS homes, completed full-time missions for the Church, and throughout their twenties, undertook tortuous journeys to renegotiate their relationships with both the institution and with the faith of their childhoods. Seth and Michael recently completed their graduate work at the University of Utah--Seth finishing his master's degree in social history focusing on the history of sexuality in the Western United States, and Michael defending his PhD dissertation in bioengineering in which he developed new analytical methods for monitoring brain activity using fMRI. Since November 2012, Seth and Michael have been embroiled in a first-of-its-kind lawsuit against a gay conversion therapy organization in New Jersey named JONAH: Jews Offering New Alternatives to Healing (formerly Jews Offering New Alternatives to Homosexuality), filed by the Southern Poverty Law Center. On June 25, 2015, a New Jersey jury unanimously found JONAH liable for multiple counts of consumer fraud and unconscionable business practices. Seth and Michael are actively involved in education and advocacy on behalf of LGBT and queer individuals, including the project Team Truth--a grassroots campaign they are creating with advocates and allies to end the lies and harm of gay conversion therapy.

Theories, explanations and justifications of enmity, from Adam Ferguson in the Eighteenth Century to Carl Schmitt in the Twentieth.