Podcasts about zagros

//The Wire//2300Z March 18, 2025////ROUTINE////BLUF: WAR RETURNS TO GAZA AS CEASEFIRE FAILS, ISRAEL CONDUCTS LARGE-SCALE BOMBING IN GAZA. UNITED STATES CONTINUES BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN YEMEN. // -----BEGIN TEARLINE------International Events-Middle East: The already tenuous ceasefire in Gaza has come to an end, as Israeli forces recommenced their large-scale bombing campaign throughout the Gaza Strip.-HomeFront-Washington D.C. - This evening a few thousand pages of documents pertaining to the assassination of John F. Kennedy were released. AC: Many of the files are poor quality scans of copies, or handwritten notes, as is common among decades-old government documents. As such it may take some time for analysis to be conducted to determine if anything new was actually released. Additionally, no further comment has been made regarding the much-hyped Phase 2 release of Epstein documents.At the DoJ, the FBI announced the creation of a new Task Force to investigate the Oct 7th attacks in Israel. This will involve the FBI arranging a team of agents to directly work for Israel's National Bureau of Counter Terror Finance.This afternoon D.C. District Court Judge Theodore Chuang (an Obama appointee) mandated the reinstatement of USAID funding in it's entirety.Nevada: The attacks on parked Tesla vehicles has continued via another arson attack at a service center in Las Vegas shortly before sunrise this morning. Several Teslas were set on fire with improvised incendiary devices while parked in the parking lot of the service center on Badura Avenue.USA: The swatting incidents over the past few days have continued, with an increasing number of pro-Trump social media figures being targeted by malign actors.-----END TEARLINE-----Analyst Comments: High tensions remain a standard in the Red Sea, as much false information abounds regarding current events. Various Houthi forces claimed to sink an American warship (as they do routinely), which is obviously false. Likewise, other social media accounts attempting to stoke a war with Iran claimed that an Iranian ship called the Zagros was sunk as well. This too is probably false, considering that the Zagros (an intelligence collection ship, the first of it's kind domestically produced by the Iranians) is a newer vessel that was only unveiled two months ago, and therefore might not have entered combat service yet.Analyst: S2A1Research: https://publish.obsidian.md/s2underground//END REPORT//

Das miozäne Absenkungsmuster des nordwestlichen Zagros-Vorlandbeckens

Iranian Languages and Dialects, Part XII: LORI | LURI‎‏ لُری ‏ In this episode, I dive into the fascinating world of the Lori language, spoken by ‎about five million people along the Zagros mountain range. We explore the linguistic ‎bridge Lori forms between Kurdish and Persian, and touch on the dialect split ‎between Northern and Southern Lori, marked by the Āb-e Dez River. I also discuss ‎why Lori may be under-researched, partly due to its close ties to Persian. ‎Additionally, we take a look at the inchoative marker used in Lori to indicate ‎changes of state, with real examples from my conversation with Mrs. Fatemeh ‎Bahmani, a native speaker from the Bakhtiari tribe. Don't forget to check the ‎comments for a special recording of a Lori fable!‎ For those interested in listening to living dialects of Lori, I've included a link to a video in the podcast comments where you can hear them in action: The Fable Three Fish in Lori by Fatemeh Bahmani Keywords: #IranianDialects; #ZagrosMountains; #NorthernLori; #SouthernLori; #PersianInfluence; #InchoativeMarker; #MiddlePersian; #LinguisticBridge; #BakhtiariTribe

Mandiant APT Researcher Ofir Rozmann joins host Luke McNamara to discuss some notable Iranian cyber espionage actors and what they have been up to in 2024. Ofir covers campaigns from suspected IRGC-nexus actors such as APT42 and APT35-related clusters, as well as activity from TEMP.Zagros.  For more on this topic, please see:  https://blog.google/technology/safety-security/tool-of-first-resort-israel-hamas-war-in-cyber/https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/untangling-iran-apt42-operations?e=48754805https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/suspected-iranian-unc1549-targets-israel-middle-east?e=48754805

O Irão lançou neste sábado à noite um ataque com cerca de 300 drones e mísseis contra Israel, conforme ameaçava fazer há dias, na sequência do ataque atribuído ao Estado Hebreu contra o seu consulado em Damasco que custou a vida de 16 pessoas. Teerão afirma ter atingido o seu objectivo e diz considerar o assunto "encerrado" mas ameaça responder com mais força em caso de contra-ataque. Israel que, por sua vez, diz ter conseguido repelir o ataque, refere encarar a possibilidade de ripostar. A tensão subiu um novo patamar neste domingo na sequência do ataque iraniano que visou alvos militares em Israel mas não causou vítimas. Segundo o exército israelita, 99% dos cerca de 300 engenhos lançados ontem à noite foram abatidos com o apoio dos Estados Unidos, da Grã-Bretanha e da Jordânia. Uma base aérea no sul de Israel foi afectada, o que não a impediu de funcionar, e uma criança de sete anos foi gravemente ferida por estilhaços Nenhum outro dano grave foi relatado.Teerão que pela primeira vez lançou ontem à noite um ataque a partir do seu território contra Israel, prometeu uma resposta de grande envergadura no caso de o Estado Hebreu optar por contra-atacar. "O caso pode ser considerado encerrado", disse a missão iraniana na ONU três horas depois do início da operação "Promessa Verdadeira", dizendo contudo que "se o regime israelita cometer um novo erro, a resposta do Irão será consideravelmente mais severa".Hoje, perante esta situação, foram convocadas reuniões urgentes do Conselho de Segurança da ONU e também dos países do G7. Em Israel, a situação continua a ser de alerta. Uma grande preocupação é também manifestada pelo mundo fora, nomeadamente pelos Estados Unidos, cujo Presidente tornou a assegurar a Israel o seu apoio "inabalável", mas a Casa Branca também disse que os Estados Unidos não desejam nenhuma "nova escalada" na região ou "guerra" com o Irão.Ao condenar o que qualificou de "grave escalada", o secretário-geral da ONU, António Guterres, declarou estar "profundamente alarmado com o perigo muito real de uma escalada devastadora em toda a região" e exortou "todas as partes a darem provas da maior contenção no intuito de evitar qualquer acção que possa conduzir a confrontos militares importantes em várias frentes no Médio Oriente"."Contenção", foi também o sentido do apelo de vários países, nomeadamente do Qatar, da Arábia Saudita, do Egipto que têm tido um papel de mediação na região. Este é também o teor da mensagem de Moscovo e de Pequim que também dizem recear eventuais "escaladas".Ao condenar "firmemente" um ataque "inaceitável", o chefe da diplomacia da União Europeia, Josep Borrell, considerou que ele "constitui uma escalada sem precedentes e uma grave ameaça à segurança regional". No mesmo sentido, ao tecer advertências sobre uma possível desestabilização da região, o Presidente francês que em várias ocasiões garantiu o seu apoio a Israel, tornou a expressar a sua "solidariedade com o povo israelita e o apego da França à segurança de Israel, dos seus parceiros e à estabilidade regional", não deixando contudo de também apelar à "contenção".Ivo Sobral, coordenador de mestrado de Relações Internacionais na Universidade de Abu Dhabi, considera que o ataque do Irão "foi um falhanço grande em temros militares" e diz que não está no interesse de Israel responder. Contudo, não descarta totalmente um agravamento do conflito no Médio Oriente.RFI: O que se pode dizer do ataque lançado ontem à noite pelo Irão contra Israel?Ivo Sobral: Foi uma expectável resposta da República Islâmica do Irão, que não tinha outra opção senão fazer este ataque. O Irão estava numa situação de fraqueza política porque era obrigado a responder a Israel após o ataque que Israel fez na Síria, onde assassinou dois generais particularmente importantes da força do Irão. O ataque que aconteceu neste momento foi um ataque que era expectável. Existia quase uma manobra de encenação bastante previsível, com bastantes avisos, em particular aqui em todo o Médio Oriente. Em termos de suspensão do espaço aéreo em muitos países, no Iraque, na Síria, foi uma resposta esperada. No entanto, obviamente, existem muitas outras situações. Esta é a primeira vez em termos históricos, que o Irão ataca directamente Israel. Temos que recordar que normalmente existia sempre uma possibilidade de o Irão sempre negar qualquer ataque a Israel. Isso acontecia quando existiam ataques feitos do Iémen, do Líbano ou da própria Síria e do Iraque. Neste momento, foi um ataque directo do Irão a Israel. Em termos históricos, é extremamente marcante e vai dar o tom para as próximas semanas e anos no Médio Oriente.RFI: Relativamente a este ataque, tem havido uma espécie de guerra da comunicação. Por um lado, Israel diz que conseguiu repelir todos os engenhos, enquanto o Irão diz que esta operação foi bem-sucedida e até promete enviar mais drones e mísseis no caso de Israel decidir ripostar.Ivo Sobral: Sim, é normal a guerra de palavras entre dois governos essenciais do Médio Oriente. No caso do Irão, obviamente, este ataque era necessário para a sua reputação interna e externa, é importante e essencial que o sucesso desta operação seja exacerbado e exagerado para dentro do Irão. E, obviamente, externamente. Existem muitas forças no Irão, em particular a Guarda Islâmica que foi visada nos ataques israelitas e é uma força extremamente importante dentro do Irão que terá obviamente pressionado para o Irão responder a este ataque. Portanto, aqui o Irão tem que de facto aumentar ao máximo o alegado impacto destes ataques em termos militares e em termos de atacar directamente Israel. É normal que isto aconteça da parte de Israel. Israel também tem um problema grave que aconteceu em Outubro. O ataque do Hamas demonstrou que qualquer um pode ser atacado por um ataque surpresa. E isso é uma fraqueza para o Estado de Israel. Israel é baseado numa quase meritocracia militar, ou seja, os governos israelitas têm que sempre estar na dianteira da defesa de Israel e dos israelitas. Isso falhou em Outubro e agora não poderia acontecer. Israel preparou-se obviamente muito bem para este ataque. E uma coisa que aconteceu e nota-se claramente que houve igualmente uma ligação com os seus aliados regionais e internacionais, em particular os Estados Unidos, o Reino Unido e a própria Jordânia, que ajudaram a defender o território israelita destes ataques por mísseis de cruzeiro e drones iranianos.RFI: Israel promete agora responder ao ataque do Irão. Os Estados Unidos opõem se a qualquer tipo de riposta israelita. O que é que é mais provável acontecer relativamente à decisão do governo de Netanyahu?Ivo Sobral: O ataque iraniano em termos militares é um falhanço grande e um trunfo político para Israel. Israel conseguiu defender-se de uma maneira extremamente eficiente do ataque. Isso é um trunfo político para Israel. Ou seja, Israel tem a possibilidade de aguardar e planificar a resposta ao Irão por muitos mais dias. Não há nenhuma aceleração, nenhuma precipitação em termos de resposta, o que é bom para Israel. Portanto, este tempo irá dar espaço para planificar um possível contra-ataque. Este falhanço também da parte do ataque iraniano, é igualmente uma quase que uma espécie de encenação à volta deste ataque, o que significa que é uma espécie de 'warning shot', um aviso feito pelo Irão a Israel. Agora, tudo depende da interpretação dos factos pelo governo israelita. Neste momento, o governo israelita igualmente conseguiu com este ataque reforçar a sua visão internacional, que é a visão de que Israel está sob ataque. Inicialmente temos o ataque do Hamas e agora temos o ataque iraniano. Portanto, Israel é uma vítima no Médio Oriente e isto é outro trunfo político muito importante para Israel neste momento. Portanto, muda um pouco que estava a acontecer nos últimos meses e semanas relativamente à situação em Gaza relativamente a uma resposta israelita. Obviamente, eu penso que, em termos de percentagem, podemos dizer que há uma menor probabilidade de um contra-ataque israelita em relação a este ataque iraniano, mas nunca podemos completamente meter de parte deste contra-ataque porque é a primeira vez que directamente o Irão ataca a partir do seu território usando as bases iranianas o território de Israel. Tem aqui um precedente que continua a ser preocupante, que é que uma escalada deste género pode, obviamente, provocar uma outra escalada da parte de Israel. Agora, o que é que Israel terá a ganhar em relação a esta escalada? Absolutamente nada. Iria aumentar uma outra frente militar para atacar Israel. Israel já está sobre assédio no norte e no sul do país. No norte, com o Hezbollah que inclusive aumentou os seus ataques nestes últimos dois dias. No Sul, obviamente, com a operação em Gaza. Portanto, aumentar para uma terceira frente em relação ao Irão, neste caso, iria complicar bastante a matemática da defesa israelita. Eu não creio que seria do interesse estratégico global de Israel fazer um outro ataque onde iria visar directamente o território iraniano. Poderá acontecer, mas se acontecer, será obviamente cirúrgico. O Irão tentou atacar bases militares israelitas. São nove, oito, nove bases que foram visadas, apesar de não existir nenhum ataque que tenha penetrado com sucesso as defesas israelitas. Poderá se esperar um contra-ataque israelita, na pior das hipóteses, a estas mesmas bases iranianas que estão na maioria localizadas nas montanhas dos Zagros, que é na zona ocidental montanhosa do Irão, onde existem muitas bases de drones e de mísseis iranianos, mesmo junto à fronteira com o Iraque. Mas, repito, seria uma escalada que iria muito provavelmente abrir um precedente e que iria causar um grave conflito regional aqui no Médio Oriente.RFI: Em termos de equilíbrios de forças. O Irão tem capacidade para fazer bem pior do que fez na noite passada?Ivo Sobral: O Irão tem um projecto militar há volta de 10 a 15 anos, onde investiu, mas só em capacidades militares não-convencionais, ou seja, capacidades estratégicas como mísseis de longo alcance, vários tipos de drones, várias armas 'standard weapons', ou seja, armas que são para ser utilizadas à distância e mísseis também intercontinentais, mísseis balísticos. Portanto, tem um arsenal bastante grande deste tipo de tecnologias e depois possui também uma base industrial bastante forte. Tão forte que é o Irão que produz e produziu uma grandíssima quantidade de drones que a Rússia posteriormente utilizou para atacar a Ucrânia. Portanto, este tipo de defesas israelitas são tecnologicamente muito mais avançadas, obviamente, mas têm o defeito que todas as defesas antiaéreas de mísseis podem ter, que é a sua incapacidade logística para se defender de um ataque massivo constante, uma barragem de mísseis. Isto já foi provado quando o Hamas atacou Israel a partir do segundo e terceiro dia, as defesas de mísseis israelitas foram o que se chama "overwhelmed', ou seja, o número de projécteis que foram lançados era tão grande que Israel não conseguia já defender o seu território. O Irão é muito maior do que a Palestina. Obviamente, a distância de ataque é muito maior, mas qualquer país no mundo, sem excepção, poderá ser visado por um ataque de saturação deste género. Portanto, é sempre possível. Agora, obviamente, a distribuição de forças aqui entre o Irão e Israel, não há qualquer comparação em termos de forças convencionais. Israel é um gigante em relação ao Irão que é um anão militar. Em relação a Israel, não há nenhuma comparação possível. Agora, obviamente, este investimento que o Irão fez em todas estas tecnologias, drones, mísseis, sistemas não-tripulados de longo alcance todos estes anos, obviamente já conseguiram produzir muitos sistemas. Existe sempre esta possibilidade de conseguir chegar a este nível. Se o Irão quer mesmo fazer isto, entrar numa guerra convencional com Israel, que Israel provavelmente possui, talvez o quarto ou quinto maior exército, melhor treinado do mundo. Portanto, há aqui uma grande diferença de forças.RFI: Há quem considere que Benjamin Netanyahu tem sido o maior entrave ao estabelecimento de um cessar-fogo em Gaza. Tem havido também manifestações da sociedade civil e até de familiares dos reféns contra o regime de Netanyahu e, por outro lado, têm também pressões mais à extrema-direita para que seja lançada a famosa operação terrestre em Rafah. Julga que este ataque do Irão altera um pouco o jogo político em Israel?Ivo Sobral: Netanyahu sempre foi uma figura muito questionada. Em Israel, conheceu muitos problemas políticos, mas sempre a maior capacidade de Netanyahu é sobreviver. Não só sobreviver como prosperar em situações de crise. Portanto, nos últimos cinco a seis anos, isto é uma realidade. O Netanyahu já saiu do governo, já foi dado como um 'zombie político'. Desapareceu, mas voltou outra vez. Conseguiu consolidar a sua situação política em Israel. Obviamente, um ataque externo com esta magnitude de um inimigo detestável para Netanyahu e em relação ao qual Netanyahu tece advertências há décadas, este inimigo, que aparentemente era imaginário no colectivo israelita, agora ficou uma realidade palpável. O Irão realmente atacou Israel com mísseis. É basicamente o que Netanyahu está a dizer há décadas em relação ao Irão. Portanto, em termos políticos, irá consolidar ulteriormente as forças políticas mais conservadoras dentro de Israel, que irão apoiar Netanyahu. Esta narrativa de um líder que está sob um assédio no Médio Oriente, algo que é muito palpável em quase todos os discursos da extrema-direita israelita é basicamente boas notícias para Netanyahu, sem dúvida. Portanto, aqui, obviamente, todos os líderes em Israel têm que ter sucesso a defender-se. Isso é a coisa mais importante. Basicamente, a escolha das próximas respostas militares de Israel estão na mão de Netnyahu. Não está dependente de ninguém. Israel não está a reagir como o Irão fez. Israel está a concertar as respostas, a concertar estratégias a médio e longo prazo.RFI: Esta tarde há uma reunião do G7 e há também uma reunião do Conselho de Segurança relativamente a esta situação. O que é que a comunidade internacional pode fazer neste contexto?Ivo Sobral: Fazer o que normalmente faz, que é obviamente uma nota de condenação e um apelo para não existir uma escalada do conflito aqui no Médio Oriente. Basicamente, o que aconteceu há décadas. O G7 perde poder quase todos os dias em relação, no Médio Oriente, a países como a própria China que começam a ser muito mais importantes do que o próprio G7. E relativamente às Nações Unidas, se calhar ainda é menor, porque as Nações Unidas. Irá existir, obviamente, a nota de condenação a qualquer tipo de violência e da guerra. Mas em termos do que poderá fazer, existe muito pouco. Outra reunião que está a acontecer, que é muito mais importante, é uma reunião do Conselho de Guerra de Israel. Israel irá decidir o que fazer. Israel vai decidir se vai contra atacar imediatamente ou a médio prazo ou longo prazo, ou então usar outros meios menos convencionais para atacar o Irão, como fez no passado quando atacou, em particular, cientistas iranianos ou pessoas ligadas ao programa nuclear iraniano. Eu acho que essa é a mais importante reunião de todas. As outras, em termos de peso internacional, será o normal à volta desta situação, mas com pouquíssimas consequências. Obviamente, no caso de G7, o apoio será unânime a Israel, com uma série de países que irão posicionar-se para apoiar directamente Israel contra qualquer ataque. E nas Nações Unidas, obviamente, a maioria dos países irão igualmente apoiar Israel na defesa do seu território.RFI: Como avalia actualmente o risco de isto resvalar para um conflito generalizado?Ivo Sobral: Infelizmente, pouco nos surpreende neste 2024. Há aqui uma série de condições particularmente negativas que podem aumentar a possibilidade de um grande conflito no Médio Oriente. Governos com elementos mais radicalizados das duas partes. Uma coligação internacional de países que não têm recursos suficientes para apoiar uma posição mais forte. Países ocidentais que estão numa crise bastante grande em termos de identidade e do que podem realmente fazer no Médio Oriente e outros países que começam a ter uma preponderância no Médio Oriente, como a própria Rússia ou a China. E quando isto acontece de facto, temos que pensar que uma possibilidade de um conflito enorme poderá sempre acontecer, infelizmente. Mas em termos internacionais, espero que não aconteça, porque de facto seria bastante negativo para todo o mundo. Seria a última machadada na comunidade internacional que já está tão dividida e com tantas situações de pressurização como o conflito ucraniano e, obviamente, o que está a acontecer em Gaza. Um terceiro conflito seria negativo para todos os países. Mas pensemos na grande História: se pensarmos no conflito da Primeira Guerra Mundial, a Segunda Guerra Mundial, basicamente poucos países também queriam que acontecesse um conflito, mas ele aconteceu na mesma. Eu penso que a referência se calhar à Primeira Guerra Mundial é mais efectiva para esta situação. Neste momento, há uma série de países e organizações, porque no Médio Oriente não é só uma questão de países, é uma questão também de facções, uma questão de 'proxy powers', ou seja, coisas como o Hezbollah, ou então países que são um pouco países falhados, como o próprio Líbano, como a Síria, o Iraque, O Iraque com muito esforço está a tentar estabilizar-se. Neste momento, estão a tentar fazer um bom trabalho. Mas o Iraque não é o Iraque da História, não é o Iraque de Saddam Hussein. É um país particularmente fraco, que não consegue impor-se e está um pouco no meio do vento entre o Ocidente e o Oriente. Portanto, há aqui uma série de pequenos Estados que podem, a qualquer momento, serem atingidos por uma maior crise que poderá vir de um conflito directo. Mas, repito, penso que não será o que Israel quer. O governo iraniano também é bastante experiente e não é isso que quer neste momento. Portanto, o Irão sempre fez um excelente trabalho de usar outras forças para atacar e ter sempre a possibilidade de negar o seu envolvimento em ataques. Portanto, isso sempre aconteceu e eu não creio que é o 'modus operandi' da República Islâmica do Irão entrar em conflitos convencionais, porque conhecem as suas próprias fraquezas. Também tem enormes problemas internos. Existiram tantos movimentos internos nos últimos dez anos em que a autoridade central do governo foi contestada pela população. Portanto, um outro conflito também seria um perigo para a consolidação deste governo iraniano. Portanto, aqui há uma série de factores a ter em consideração. O Irão, o Iraque, o Líbano, a Jordânia, a Síria, se é que existe a Síria, neste momento são países onde existe uma fraqueza estrutural e um pequeno desequilíbrio pode fazer cair a casa.

Synopsis: Rusa of Urartu wins early victories against Assyrian armies, but his intrigues in the Zagros kingdom of Mannea earn him Sargon's wrath. After a crushing defeat by Cimmerian invaders, Rusa's unable to prevent Sargon's destruction of his kingdom. “I caused there to be lamentation in the wide land Urartu and in all the mountains, and I made Rusa, their king, use flint blades, razors (and) scalpels to slash himself in mourning for as long as he lived. I made Musasir part of the territory of Assyria and assigned it to the authority of a eunuch of mine, the palace herald. The awesome splendor of the god Assur, my lord, overwhelmed Rusa, the Urartian, and so with his own iron dagger he stabbed himself in the heart like a pig and put an end to his life.” – The Annals of Sargon II Map of the Iron Age Near East: https://audio.ancientworldpodcast.com/Map_Near_East.jpg Map of the Iron Age Zagros Mountains: https://audio.ancientworldpodcast.com/Map_Zagros_Enhanced.jpg Episode Images: https://audio.ancientworldpodcast.com/C29_Images.pdf References and Further Reading: https://audio.ancientworldpodcast.com/C29_References.pdf Please contact advertising@airwavemedia.com if you would like to advertise on this podcast. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Depuis plus de 20 ans, l'écrivain et documentariste français arpente les montagnes d'Orient. Il vient de publier un recueil de nouvelles tel une ode chorale et sensible à ces montagnes et tous ceux qui les peuplent. « Si haute soit la montagne, on y trouve toujours un sentier », dit le proverbe afghan. Au gré de ses multiples voyages sur les sentes escarpées des montagnes d'Asie Centrale, des replis de l'Hindou Kouch jusqu'au Pamir en passant par le Ladakh ou les monts Zagros, entre Iran et Irak, Louis Meunier a emprunté d'innombrables sentiers, en quête d'histoires et d'une certaine vérité du monde. Ces chemins vont l'amener à suivre des nomades d'Iran en transhumance, des cavaliers afghans dans une partie fiévreuse de Bouzkachi, ce polo des hauts plateaux, ou des alpinistes, afghans toujours, partis à l'assaut du Mont Noshaq. « Si haute soit la montagne », c'est d'ailleurs le titre de son dernier livre, un recueil de nouvelles inspirées de ses multiples voyages, où Louis Meunier nous entraîne à la découverte d'hommes et de femmes libres et fiers, ivres d'espoirs et d'immensités, des montagnards au cœur pur, enfants des hauteurs et du grand air. Tandis qu'en contrebas, depuis des siècles, se joue le grand désordre des Empires et de l'Histoire. Sur les cartes, les montagnes font souvent office de frontières ou de lisières. Mais sous les mots de Louis Meunier, elles deviennent aussi traits d'union, tout en demeurant sanctuaires ou refuges à ciel ouvert. Parce que ces montagnes d'Orient sont finalement le centre de sa vie et de sa propre quête de liberté, de ses récits, mieux, du monde !Une rencontre initialement diffusée le 20/03/2022.À lire :- « Si haute soit la montagne », de Louis Meunier. Éditions Calmann-Lévy, 2022- « Voyage en France buissonnière », de Louis Meunier. Éditions Kero, 2018- « Les Cavaliers afghans », de Louis Meunier. Éditions Kero, 2014. À voir :- « Nomades d'Iran, l'instituteur des Monts Zagros», ZED & Taimani Films Productions, 2020- « Kabullywood »,Taimani Films Production, 2017- « Les Cavaliers afghans, sur les traces de Joseph Kessel en Afghanistan », Zycopolis Productions, 2016- « Prisonniers de l'Himalaya », Taimani Films Production, 2012- « 7 000 mètres au-dessus de la guerre », Taimani Films et Memento Productions, 2011. En savoir plus :- Sur l'épopée équestre de Louis Meunier et son livre « Les cavaliers Afghans ». Si loin, si proche, 29/08/2014. - Sur l'espace d'expression pour les Afghans sur le site en persan de RFI : « Écho d'Afghanistan ». En images

Depuis plus de 20 ans, l'écrivain et documentariste français arpente les montagnes d'Orient. Il vient de publier un recueil de nouvelles tel une ode chorale et sensible à ces montagnes et tous ceux qui les peuplent. « Si haute soit la montagne, on y trouve toujours un sentier », dit le proverbe afghan. Au gré de ses multiples voyages sur les sentes escarpées des montagnes d'Asie Centrale, des replis de l'Hindou Kouch jusqu'au Pamir en passant par le Ladakh ou les monts Zagros, entre Iran et Irak, Louis Meunier a emprunté d'innombrables sentiers, en quête d'histoires et d'une certaine vérité du monde. Ces chemins vont l'amener à suivre des nomades d'Iran en transhumance, des cavaliers afghans dans une partie fiévreuse de Bouzkachi, ce polo des hauts plateaux, ou des alpinistes, afghans toujours, partis à l'assaut du Mont Noshaq. « Si haute soit la montagne », c'est d'ailleurs le titre de son dernier livre, un recueil de nouvelles inspirées de ses multiples voyages, où Louis Meunier nous entraîne à la découverte d'hommes et de femmes libres et fiers, ivres d'espoirs et d'immensités, des montagnards au cœur pur, enfants des hauteurs et du grand air. Tandis qu'en contrebas, depuis des siècles, se joue le grand désordre des Empires et de l'Histoire. Sur les cartes, les montagnes font souvent office de frontières ou de lisières. Mais sous les mots de Louis Meunier, elles deviennent aussi traits d'union, tout en demeurant sanctuaires ou refuges à ciel ouvert. Parce que ces montagnes d'Orient sont finalement le centre de sa vie et de sa propre quête de liberté, de ses récits, mieux, du monde !Une rencontre initialement diffusée le 20/03/2022.À lire :- « Si haute soit la montagne », de Louis Meunier. Éditions Calmann-Lévy, 2022- « Voyage en France buissonnière », de Louis Meunier. Éditions Kero, 2018- « Les Cavaliers afghans », de Louis Meunier. Éditions Kero, 2014. À voir :- « Nomades d'Iran, l'instituteur des Monts Zagros», ZED & Taimani Films Productions, 2020- « Kabullywood »,Taimani Films Production, 2017- « Les Cavaliers afghans, sur les traces de Joseph Kessel en Afghanistan », Zycopolis Productions, 2016- « Prisonniers de l'Himalaya », Taimani Films Production, 2012- « 7 000 mètres au-dessus de la guerre », Taimani Films et Memento Productions, 2011. En savoir plus :- Sur l'épopée équestre de Louis Meunier et son livre « Les cavaliers Afghans ». Si loin, si proche, 29/08/2014. - Sur l'espace d'expression pour les Afghans sur le site en persan de RFI : « Écho d'Afghanistan ». En images

Welcome to the eighth episode of Season Four of the Kurdistan in America podcast. We are delighted to have Dr. Nahro Zagros, the Editor-in-Chief of Kurdistan Chronicle, as our distinguished guest.Dr. Zagros, previously the Vice President of Soran University, currently serves as a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy in Washington, D.C. Beyond his academic achievements, he shares his insights on politics and culture through various local and international media platforms.In this episode, our central focus revolves around Kurdistan Chronicle, journalism, and the crucial topic of press freedom in the Kurdistan Region. Moreover, Dr. Zagros also delves into the historical context of the Kurdish question in Iraq and the present-day dynamics in the relationship between Erbil and Baghdad.Join us for an enlightening and engaging conversation as we explore the realms of journalism, democracy, and Kurdish politics.

Aina Margalef y Jordi Mojica durante siete meses fueron en bicicleta y transportes públicos de Georgia a Nepal cruzando algunas de las grandes cordilleras asiáticas como el, Cáucaso, Zagros, Pamir, Tien Shan e Himalaya en donde además aprovecharon para hacer trekkings en Nepal. Fermín Goñi publica la novela "Un día de guerra en Ayacucho". Tiene como escenarios los Andes de Perú donde en 1824 se enfrentaron más de 6000 soldados de cada bando. Fermín Goñi ha viajado a lo largo de la cordillera andina y ha estado en los campos de batalla de Ayacucho.

Zafer yakındır! Şehîd Sara ve Şehîd Rûken Mersin ́de ger- çekleştirdikleri eylemde fedaileşen Zîlan çizgisinin nasıl uy- gulanması gerektiğini herkese bir kez daha gösterdi. Onların duruşu bir talimattır ve biz gençlik olarak bu talimatı APOCU gençlik ruhuyla her alanda yaymalıyız. Kasım ayı Partimizin kuruluş ayıdır. 27 Kasım ''VARLIK VE ÖZGÜRLÜK'' bayramı- dır. Bu sayıda ''Önderliksel Çıkış ve Partileşme Süreci'', Önder APO ́nun “PKK bir gençlik hareketi“ olarak doğdu belirleme- si aynı zamanda şehitler gerçeği, günümüze kadar oluşan APOCU fedai ruhun nasıl geliştiği ve daha bir çok konuyu bu sayıda ele aldık. Böylece Avrupa‘da yaşayan bütün APOCU gençliği bu seferberlik sürecinde “WERIN CENGA AZADIYÊ“ şiarıyla rol ve misyonunu yerine getirmesi gerekmektedir. Önderliğimizle özgür bir Kürdistan ́da buluşacağımıza ina- nıyor ve başarma sözümüzü yineliyoruz. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/sterka-ciwan/message

Iran Rilis Pangkalan Drone Bawah Tanah, Eksistensi Militer AS Terancam? Oleh. Drh. Lailatus Sa'diyah (Tim Kontributor Tetap NarasiPost.Com) Voice over talent: Mimi muthmainnah NarasiPost.Com-Gejolak adu kekuatan dan pengaruh di Timur Tengah kian memanas. Berbagai kekuatan militer dihimpun untuk mempertahankan negara dan pengaruh terhadap kawasan tersebut. Berbagai senjata mutakhir dikembangkan untuk menggetarkan musuh. Adalah Iran kembali menunjukkan senjata militer dengan menampilkan pangkalan drone bawah tanah dalam pemberitaan. Akankah senjata baru Iran ini mampu menciutkan nyali AS dan sekutunya? Tanggapan atas Sanksi AS Diberitakan oleh televisi pemerintah Iran pada Sabtu (29/05), militer Iran telah memamerkan pangkalan drone bawah tanah di tengah ketegangan yang memanas di Teluk. Televisi pemerintah memberitakan ada 100 pesawat tak berawak disimpan di jantung pegunungan Zagros, termasuk di dalamnya Ababil-5 yang dilengkapi dengan rudal Qaem-9. Menurut Komandan Militer Mayor Jenderal Abdolrahim Mousavi, tidak diragukan lagi bahwasanya drone milik Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Islam Iran adalah yang paling kuat di kawasan itu dan kemampuan Iran untuk meningkatkan drone tidak dapat dihentikan (republika.co.id, 29/05/2022). Naskah selengkapnya: https://narasipost.com/2022/06/04/iran-rilis-pangkalan-drone-bawah-tanah-eksistensi-militer-as-terancam/ Terimakasih buat kalian yang sudah mendengarkan podcast ini, Follow us on: instagram: http://instagram.com/narasipost Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/narasi.post.9 Fanpage: Https://www.facebook.com/pg/narasipostmedia/posts/ Twitter: Http://twitter.com/narasipost

⭕️ ZOSTAŃ NASZYM PATRONEM: https://patronite.pl/dobrapodrozJako pierwszy człowiek przeszedł samotnie Łuk Karpat i irańskie góry Zagros. A oprócz tego Islandię zimą, Pireneje latem i tysiące kilometrów po innych, mniej lub bardziej znanych szlakach. Co daje człowiekowi pokonywanie długich dystansów piechotą?Jak chodzić, by dojść? W tym odcinku rozmawiamy nie tylko o drodze, ale również o tym, jak się do niej przygotować. Od butów, przez skarpetki, po kurtkę i namiot? Jaki sprzęt powinniśmy zabrać na dalsze i krótsze wędrówki? Ten odcinek to nie tylko inspiracja do ruszenia na szlak,ale również kopalnia wiedzy praktycznej o hikingu.Zapraszamy do słuchaniaKasia i KubaTu znajdziecie stronę Łukasza:https://lukaszsupergan.com⭕️ YouTube:Subskrybuj nasz kanał:http://bit.ly/subskrybuj_dobrapodroz⭕️‍ Posłuchaj naszych podcastów na:Spotify: https://spoti.fi/34c7C7yApple Podcast: https://apple.co/38sysvB⭕️‍ Social media:Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/dobra_podroz/Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/tudobrapodroz/

Depuis plus de 20 ans, l'écrivain et documentariste français arpente les montagnes d'Orient. Il vient de publier un recueil de nouvelles tel une ode chorale et sensible à ces montagnes et tous ceux qui les peuplent. «Si haute soit la montagne, on y trouve toujours un sentier», dit le proverbe afghan. Au gré de ses multiples voyages sur les sentes escarpées des montagnes d'Asie Centrale, des replis de l'Hindou Kouch jusqu'au Pamir en passant par le Ladakh ou les monts Zagros, entre Iran et Irak, Louis Meunier a emprunté d'innombrables sentiers, en quête d'histoires et d'une certaine vérité du monde. Ces chemins vont l'amener à suivre des nomades d'Iran en transhumance, des cavaliers afghans dans une partie fiévreuse de Bouzkachi, ce polo des hauts plateaux, ou des alpinistes, afghans toujours, partis à l'assaut du Mont Noshaq.  «Si haute soit la montagne», c'est d'ailleurs le titre de son dernier livre, un recueil de nouvelles inspirées de ses multiples voyages, où Louis Meunier nous entraîne à la découverte d'hommes et de femmes libres et fiers, ivres d'espoirs et d'immensités, des montagnards au cœur pur, enfants des hauteurs et du grand air. Tandis qu'en contrebas, depuis des siècles, se joue le grand désordre des Empires et de l'Histoire.  Sur les cartes, les montagnes font souvent office de frontières ou de lisières. Mais sous les mots de Louis Meunier, elles deviennent aussi traits d'union, tout en demeurant sanctuaires ou refuges à ciel ouvert. Parce que ces montagnes d'Orient sont finalement le centre de sa vie et de sa propre quête de liberté, de ses récits, mieux, du monde !   À lire : - «Si haute soit la montagne», de Louis Meunier. Éditions Calmann-Lévy, 2022 - «Voyage en France buissonnière», de Louis Meunier. Éditions Kero, 2018 - «Les Cavaliers afghans», de Louis Meunier. Éditions Kero, 2014.   À voir : - «Nomades d'Iran, l'instituteur des Monts Zagros», ZED & Taimani Films Productions, 2020 - «Kabullywood»,Taimani Films Production, 2017 - «Les Cavaliers afghans, sur les traces de Joseph Kessel en Afghanistan», Zycopolis Productions, 2016 - «Prisonniers de l'Himalaya», Taimani Films Production, 2012 - «7 000 mètres au-dessus de la guerre», Taimani Films et Memento Productions, 2011.   En savoir plus : - Sur l'épopée équestre de Louis Meunier et son livre «Les cavaliers Afghans». Si loin, si proche, 29/08/2014.  - Sur l'espace d'expression pour les Afghans sur le site en persan de RFI : «Écho d'Afghanistan».   En images  

Un pasaje veterotestamentario cuenta que Noé, después del Diluvio, embarrancó el arca en la cumbre del monte Ararat, comenzó a labrar la tierra, plantó una viña y bebió del vino. Según los testimonios arqueológicos, el vino se produjo por primera vez durante el neolítico en los montes Zagros (en la región que hoy ocupan Irak e Irán). En una caverna de Arení, en el sur de Armenia, todavía se conservan restos de cubas de fermentación, cuencos, copas, vasijas, semillas y uvas prensadas para producir vino hace unos 6 mil años a. C. Acompáñanos a escuchar las fantasías, los relatos bíblicos y los mitos báquicos sobre la aparición de la bebida sagrada hecha a partir de la Vitis vinifera. Ve el video completo aquí: https://bit.ly/3qoXO8J Escúchanos más a gusto acá: Spotify: https://spoti.fi/3zXw7H3 Apple: https://apple.co/31TQb0y #Radiaciones # #Vino #Enología #Baco #ValledeGuadalupe #ConversacionesNecesarias #MínimoNecesario Síguenos en redes y visita nuestra página: www.minimonecesario.com.mx --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/minimonecesario/support

(Re-recorded as of May 28, 2022) Guest: Kelten First, we meet Enkidu, Gilgamesh's enemy and future soulmate, as he roams the hills eating wild grass with the gazelles. Then, we learn how foragers' attempts to manage wild herds gradually transformed into a lifestyle centered around domestic livestock, and how Neolithic hunters permanently altered the genetics of wild sheep without even having to domesticate them first. Then, we take a look at the process of domesticating wild herds of ruminants, focusing on goats in Ganj Dareh, in the highlands of western Iran. It turns out every domestic goat on the planet can trace its genealogy to a single lineage of wild male goats in the Zagros mountains in the late 9th millennium! Then, we look at the Pre-Pottery Neolithic B period outside the Fertile Crescent— that is, outside the area where it rains enough for intensive cereal agriculture without irrigation. What did the domestication of sheep and goats have to do with their herders' ability to assimilate the al-Jazira grasslands into the Neolithic economy? Did they have any thoughts on the sex lives of six-toed women? Then, we examine the four species of livestock most important to the Neolithic revolution: pigs, sheep & goats, and cattle. Finally, Enkidu makes a friend! Also, he finds out whether or not the instincts that served him so well as a wild animal might, in new circumstances, alter every aspect of his being and sever his connection with the wilderness altogether. Questions? Feedback? Email us at drumbeatforeverafter@gmail.com. Follow us on Twitter and Instagram @drumbeatforever Works cited

Some are born great, some have greatness thrust upon them, and some could be dumped out of an airplane in a brown paper bag over a country where they had never sat foot, and they would still achieve greatness.  These are the ones who are truly great.  Such was the individual born long ago of Jewish parents in the university town of Tarsus, located in the Zagros mountains of Turkey.  During the first part of his life, he was identified as Saul of Tarsus, but following a dramatic encounter with the risen Christ, he became known as Paul, the Apostle.

Guests Gage Mele, Winston Marydasan, and Yury Polozov from Anomali join Dave to discuss their research into Static Kitten targeting government agencies in the UAE and Kuwait. Anomali Threat Research uncovered malicious activity very likely attributed to the Iran-nexus cyberespionage group, Static Kitten (Seedworm, MERCURY, Temp.Zagros, POWERSTATS, NTSTATS, MuddyWater), which is known to target numerous sectors primarily located in the Middle East This new campaign, which uses tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) consistent with previous Static Kitten activity, uses ScreenConnect launch parameters designed to target any MOFA with mfa[.]gov as part of the custom field. Anomali's team found samples specifically masquerading as the Kuwaiti government and the UAE National Council respectively, based on references in the malicious samples. The research can be found here: Probable Iranian Cyber Actors, Static Kitten, Conducting Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting UAE and Kuwait Government Agencies

Guests Gage Mele, Winston Marydasan, and Yury Polozov from Anomali join Dave to discuss their research into Static Kitten targeting government agencies in the UAE and Kuwait. Anomali Threat Research uncovered malicious activity very likely attributed to the Iran-nexus cyberespionage group, Static Kitten (Seedworm, MERCURY, Temp.Zagros, POWERSTATS, NTSTATS, MuddyWater), which is known to target numerous sectors primarily located in the Middle East This new campaign, which uses tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) consistent with previous Static Kitten activity, uses ScreenConnect launch parameters designed to target any MOFA with mfa[.]gov as part of the custom field. Anomali's team found samples specifically masquerading as the Kuwaiti government and the UAE National Council respectively, based on references in the malicious samples. The research can be found here: Probable Iranian Cyber Actors, Static Kitten, Conducting Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting UAE and Kuwait Government Agencies

The German Chancellor is widely respected as good at crisis management, but public confidence in her government's pandemic policies is ebbing away. How will her party, the CDU, campaign during this autumn's general election - is it possible the next Chancellor could be a Green? Jenny Hill reports from Berlin on power struggles and shifting opinions. While the Christian Democrats confront their future, the German state is still carrying on talks with the government of Namibia about its colonial past. Land rights, official apologies and reparations have all been discussed . So has the treatment of the Herero and Nama peoples in the early 1900s, which some historians now consider "the first genocide of the 20th century". Tim Whewell met black and white Namibians still viewing their heritage though very different lenses. In Armenia the public mood is mutinous, in the aftermath of the most recent round of conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. A ceasefire agreement is holding, but there's grief and anger on the streets of Yerevan. Mark Stratton has friends in the disputed territory and hoped to revisit them, to see how they had survived the fighting. Millions of people in Iranian and Kurdish communities around the world recently celebrated Nowruz - the Persian New Year, a joyful festival full of the symbolism of rebirth. But it's enjoyed particularly passionately in the ancient town of Akre in the Zagros mountains in northern Iraq. Leila Molana Allen climbed its stone ramparts and steep hillsides to witness the spectacle. In eastern Romania, there's a village like no other: Tichilesti, home to Europe's last leprosarium - a facility where people with Hansen’s disease, better known as leprosy, were once sent for life. Nick Thorpe shares some of the stories he heard there.

Saludos geonáufragos del mundo. En la primera parte de este programa semanal, Mario, Germán (@ingeododo) y la nueva aparición de Gonzalo nos hablan de Dinosaurios y su visita a Dinópolis Teruel. Algunos enlaces para completar la información que nos proporcionan son: Fundación Dinosaurios de CyL Dinosaurios para colorear Web de Dinópolis Web Museo de Galve Blog Dinosauriomanía Y el libro del mes: “Mi enciclopedia de los Dinosaurios muy importantes” de ediciones EDEBÉ En esta contribución sobre teledetección, Jorge (@lithosferic) nos explica de un modo práctico la interpretación de una imagen de satélite en los montes Zagros de Irán. Podéis encontrar la imagen de satélite que describe y la interpretación en su blog: https://www.jorgegines.com/geonaufragos-interpretacion-geologica-imagenes-satelite-fars/ Para terminar Nahúm (@geologoenapuros), nos comenta noticas de exploración espacial centrándose en la Curiosity, Perseverance, las cuevas de la Luna y el exoplaneta GJ 1132b. Grupo de Telegram: t.me/geocastawaypodcast Web: http://geocastaway.com Twitter: http://twitter.com/geocastaway Facebook: http://facebook.com/geocastaway Youtube: http://youtube.com/geocastaway Correo: geocastaway@gmail.com Tienda: http://geocastaway.spreadshirt.es

Current scientific studies date the earliest known winemaking back to around 8000 BC  in the Zagros mountains in modern-day Iran. Who made these wines? How did they do it? What would these wine have tasted like?  Get in touch: lookatwine@illahevineyards.com

Genesis 11 implies that the Flood survivors set out westward from a camp not far to the east of the plain of Shinar in southern Iraq. A map shows that the camp must have been in the western part of the Zagros mountains. This article was written by D. Russell Humprheys, Ph.D. and podcast produced by Joseph Darnell out of the CMI-USA office. Become a monthly contributor at visit our site or simply text a donation to 84321. You can also help out by telling your family and friends to check out the podcasts. Related Resources Noah’s Ark: A Feasibility Study How Noah’s Flood Shaped Our Earth Creation Magazine Links and Show Notes Original article: Where is Noah’s Ark? Caution about ‘Ark’ discovery Special report: Amazing ‘Ark’ exposé The Ararat anomaly Pioneer of creationism Noah’s Ark Questions and Answers Find thousands of other interesting articles at Creation.com. ► Follow on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and get the eNewsletter. Check out Creation Talk our other show wherever you get your podcasts. Featured in this Episode Evidence by Raphael Costa for Soundscape Media The Five Rivers by Neil Golden for SI Publishing Secret Desert Find by Chris Mancinelli and Tom Vedvik for Soundscape Confused & Clumsy by Bobby Cole for SI Publishing Picture of the Zagros Mountains by Kyselak on Wikipedia

*** Suscribete a mi canal ***https://cutt.ly/ByNmfcgHoy vamos a hablar de una divinidad sumeria en particular, una de las más conocidas, hablaremos de Enki o Enkil, como también es conocido. Nuestra invitada Vania Radoeva ha encontrado vestigios sobre la influencia de la cultura sumeria en las tierras de Bulgaria.*** Apoyanos ***https://cutt.ly/VujVpND*** Voz de la intro ***Xavi Villanueva. Web: https://abismofm.com Twitter: @abismofm Facebook: Abismo Producciones*** Voz en off ***Valeria Surcis twitter: @valeriasurcis @QuieroContarTuHblog: www.valeriasurcis.blogspot.comE-Mail: surcisvaleria@gmail.com*** Kela Carrasco ***Blog de Kela: https://raylossuenosprohibidos.blogspot.com/Canal de Youtube de Kela: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCUKJBLjpY26KIGNymLR3u8AInstagram: @kela_carrasco_80*** Guión ***Eduar Pajaro Peña "Angel Yosniel"Web: produccionescarballes.comFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/A963852741NBInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/angelyosniel/E-Mail: angelyosniel@gmail.com*** Redes Sociales ***Twitter : @universoredFacebook: Misterioso universo en la red*** Correo Electrónico ***misteriosouniversored@gmail.com*** Unete al grupo de Telegram ***Grupo de Telegram: https://cutt.ly/DujBPxg*** Suscribete ***Apple Podcast: https://cutt.ly/CujVXTMSpotify: https://cutt.ly/EujV96TIvoox: https://cutt.ly/VujV64PSpreaker: https://cutt.ly/MujBoyU

In the dusty flood plain, 100,000 men and many times that in horses surround the walls of Baghdad. Catapults lob stones relentlessly into the city walls, hauled from great distance. Here, towers collapse under the barrage; there, ladders bring Mongol and subject peoples onto the fortifications, seizing them from the disorganized and panicking garrison. Arrows, some bearing messages, bring both confusion and injury where they land. The mighty Tigris River, the city’s lifeblood, is now part of the trap; pontoon bridges, from them dangling nets embedded with iron hooks, rest both north and south of the city to catch those trying to flee. The final ‘Abbasid Caliph sits frightened and overwhelmed in his palace, as the grasp of Hulegu Khan closes around him. Today, we discuss the fall of Baghdad, 1258. But first, we’d like to remind you that for those of you who enjoy the podcast, your support would be highly appreciated and would help us keep going. We have a patreon available for monthly or even one-time donations or, if you aren’t able to support us financially, positive reviews on Apple Podcasts or other review sites really helps us out. And now, I’m your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.   We left our previous episode off with Hulegu destroying the Nizari Ismaili state, better known at the Order of Assassins, who had controlled a series of fortresses across eastern and northern Iran. By the end of 1256, Hulegu had reduced them to but a few holdouts, and he could begin to look to his next target. Considered heretics of the worst variety by most Sunni Muslims, the Persian writer Juvaini, a member of Hulegu’s retinue, described his victory over the Nizaris in glowing terms, Hulegu as a sword of Islam carrying out God’s will. Juvaini presents Hulegu’s war as a more ‘civilized’ form of conquest compared to that of his grandfather, Chinggis Khan. Destruction was limited to Ismaili territories and the towns and fortresses that failed to submit, as opposed to the veritable tsunami of bloodshed Chinggis Khan wrought on the Khwarezmian empire over thirty years prior. What Hulegu was soon to do in Baghdad and to the titular head of Sunni Islam would not be so praised, and it is perhaps no coincidence that Juvaini’s own chronicle ends with the fall of the Ismailis. As Hulegu left Ismaili territory in the final month of 1256, his eye was drawn to the ‘Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad.   In Islam, the spiritual leader of the religion was whoever was considered the successor to the Prophet Muhammad. For Shi’a Muslims, this was the imam- for Nizari Ismailis, the Imam was the ruler of Alamut, who had just been put to death on Mongol orders. For the majority of Muslims, known as Sunnis, the head of their faith was the Caliph, literally meaning ‘successor.’The first four Caliphs to succeed the Prophet were the “Rightly Guided,” the Rashidun, whose legitimacy is generally unquestioned by most Muslims. The Rashidun were succeeded by the Umayyads, who greatly extended Muslim rule east and west, across North Africa into Spain and across Eastern Iran into Central Asia. In 750, the Umayyad Caliphs were overthrown in the ‘Abbasid revolution. Claiming descent from the Prophet’s uncle ‘Abbas, it was under the early ‘Abbasids that the Caliphal capital was moved from Damascus to the newly established Baghdad along the Tigris River. Never comparable to the power of the Umayyads at their height, from the 9th century onwards the still vast ‘Abbasid empire fragmented with threat from all directions: the Fatimids in Egypt, the Samanids, Buyids and Saffarids of Iran and finally from the steppes, the Great Seljuqs, all of which ground the ‘Abbasids down until their state hardly stretched past the walls of Baghdad. The weakening of the Seljuqs after Sultan Malik-Shah’s death in 1092 allowed the ‘Abbasids to gradually reclaim independence and some authority, even repulsing a Seljuq army attacking Baghdad in 1157. The long reigns of Caliph al-Nasir and al-Mustansir, from 1180 until 1242, saw the ‘Abbasids reclaim much of central and southern Iraq. A far cry from the sweeping power they had held in the 8th century, by the 13th century they still remained influential and held prestige. For 500 years they had been the heads of Islam, and had long cultivated an useful image as invioable and holy, above temporal affairs though they were more often than not mired in them.    For instance, in the late 12th century Caliph al-Nasir was in conflict with the Seljuqs who continued to rule in Iran. He allied with the rising power northeast of the Iranian Seljuqs, the Khwarezmian Empire. Once vassals of the Great Seljuqs, the Khwarezm-shahs now butted heads with them as they expanded southwards, and the reigning Khwarezm-Shah, Tekesh bin Il-Arslan, was happy to ally himself with the Caliph. In 1194 at Rayy, modern Tehran, Tekesh defeated and killed the last Seljuq Sultan in Iran, Toghrul III, ending the dynasty and sending the Sultan’s severed head to al-Nasir in Baghdad. Rather than provide freedom for the Caliphate, Tekesh now wanted to step into the place of Seljuqs. The Seljuqs’ territory in Iran was largely annexed by Tekesh Khwarezm-shah, who soon began making aggressive motions to the Caliph. Al-Nasir encouraged the Khwarezmians’ eastern neighbours, the Ghurids, in their war with Tekesh. Tekesh died in 1200, succeeded by his son Muhammad II as Khwarezm-shah who, through luck, timely assassinations and military victories, overcame the Ghurids, consolidated power over Iran and in 1217 tried to march on Baghdad itself. Muhammad’s march on Baghdad was halted by a vicious snowstorm as he crossed the Zagros mountains, forcing him back. Returning to the northeast of his empire, Muhammad would there make the poor decisions which led to the Mongol Invasion of Khwarezm, covered way back in episode 9 of this podcast.   Now, some authors of the period assert that Caliph al-Nasir actually invited Chinggis Khan to attack Muhammad of Khwarezm- when placed in the context of the Caliph switching to support whoever was on the eastern side of his current foe, there is definitely a logic to it. However, as we described in detail in episode 8 of the podcast, the cause of the Mongol invasion can be found in the foolery of Muhammad Khwarezm-shah alone. Had the Mongols come on the invitation of the Caliph, then surely they would have publicized that to justify the attack and sow further confusion among the Khwarezmians.    In fact, in 1221 when detachments of Jebe and Subutai’s army penetrated into northern Iraq, Caliph al-Nasir was hardly welcoming. Along with the rulers of northern Iraq’s most important cities, Muzaffar ad-Din of Irbil and Badr al-Din Lu’lu’, the de facto ruler of Mosul, the Caliph organized a short lived military coalition, which proved unnecessary as the Mongols soon withdrew. Evidently, the ‘Abbasids spread a rumour that their army was absolutely gargantuan, their power unassailable and heavenly protected, and the Mongols were hesitant to commit. Had they paid close attention in the following years, they might have called the Caliph’s bluff. In 1225 that favoured Khwarezmian rapscallion, Jalal al-Din Mingburnu, defeated a Caliphal army after the ‘Abbasids failed to provide him assistance. Jalal al-Din chased the survivors right to the suburbs of Baghdad, then went north, defeated an army from Irbil sent to assist the Caliph and captured Irbil’s ruler, Muzaffar ad-Din. Caliph al-Nasir, by then elderly, paralyzed and blind for three years, died soon after Jalal al-Din’s attack, and was succeeded by his son, az-Zahir, as the 35th Caliph… for nine months. On Caliph az-Zahir’s death in 1226, he was succeeded by his own son, al-Mustansir, the 36th and penultimate ‘Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad.    As Caliph, al-Mustanir continued to try to strengthen ‘Abbasid control in Iraq and expand the army, but Mongol rule steadily spread over the region. By the start of the 1230s, Chormaqun Noyan and his lieutenants brought the submission of most of Iran and cast Mongol authority over the Caucasus. For Caliph al-Mustansir, the Mongol empire was a vast crescent to his north and east, where it stretched seemingly indefinitely. By 1235, Mongol forces mainly under Chagatai Noyan, “the Lesser,” were probing northern Iraq and directly, but hesitantly, testing ‘Abbasid hegemony in the region. In June 1237, Chagatai Noyan captured Irbil in what is now Iraqi Kurdistan, though the Citadel held out and in August Caliphal forces relieved the city. In February of 1238, an attack was launched on Baghdad, and a panicked Caliph al-Mustansir sent messages to the remaining independent Muslim powers from the Jazira and Syria down to Egypt for aid. Only 2,000 troops from the Ayyubid Sultan of Egypt,  al-Kamil, reached Baghdad, and in June 1238 a caliphal army was defeated near the city. However, the defences of Baghdad itself remained formidable and the city stood defiant while the Mongols turned back from the walls, unprepared for both a long siege and or the fearsome Iraqi summer.  Possibly, the Mongols suffered some sort of reverse while attacking Baghdad; some sixty years later, when the Persian historian Wassaf [vassaf] visited Baghdad, he recorded a Mongol defeat outside the walls, though this goes unmentioned by the other sources.    While Baghdad remained independent, the Mongols continued to take cities in the region. Chormaqun’s successor Baiju brought the submission of the Seljuqs of Anatolia in 1243; in 1244, the Mongol general Yasa’ur rode into Syria, dislodging the remnants of Jalal al-Din’s Khwarezmians. The Ayyubids of Syria, the successors of the once mighty empire of Saladin Ayyubi, largely submitted over 1244-5, and even Antioch, one of the last of the Crusader Kingdoms, offered its submission.  In late 1245 another attack on Baghdad was launched but soon aborted. The new Caliph since 1242, al-Mustasim ibn al-Mustansir, was lucky the attack was called off, for he was rather rapidly running out of allies. It seem that the new Caliph managed to avoid further attacks with a token submission: the Franscisan Friar John de Plano Carpini, present at the coronation of Guyuk Khaan in 1246, noted ‘Abbasid envoys were present in Karakorum and believed they paid a regular tribute.    The 38th and final ‘Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad, al-Mustasim, was not the equal of his father or great-grandfather. While al-Nasir and al-Mustansir sought to strengthen the Caliphate, al-Mustasim was more interested in the luxury of Baghdad, and was nearly universally condemned for decadence. A great lover of music, he sponsored an entire neighbourhood in Baghdad to house musicians, including the most famous of the age, Saif al-Din Urmawi. A lover of pigeon racing, art, calligraphy and treasures, al-Mustasim was also indecisive and easily swayed by factions in his court, some of whom, such as the vizier, sought accomodation with the Mongols, while others urged to meet them in battle. As we will see shortly, the result was al-Mustasim vacillating in policy, wavering between antagonizing the Mongols and sending them gifts. Essentially, the worst sort of man to have in power when Hulegu marched on him with upwards of 100,000 men.    Neither was weak leadership the only problem. Corruption and decadence of Baghdad’s elite alienated the lower classes. A weak currency and high food prices contributed to revolts; many of Baghdad’s soldiers increasingly found themselves unpaid and resorted to bandity or desertion. Topping off years of natural disasters- heavy rain, storms, annual flooding, in 1256, the Tigris, the river which runs through Baghdad, flooded for over a month, washing away much of Baghdad’s lower city. Attributed to divine displeasure at the decadent al-Mustasim, for decades afterwards this flood was remembered as the “Mustasimid flood.” As Mongol armies approached the city, pestilence killed many hundreds, if not thousands. The Caliph stood in a precarious position.   Likely in late 1255, Hulegu sent a message to Caliph al-Mustasim demanding, as Hulegu had done with other rulers across the region, that Baghdad supply troops to help in the attack on the Nizari Isamilis. Al-Mustasim refused. As the ‘Abbasids had been sending tribute in the previous years and were considered vassals, such a refusal was a declaration of independence. Hulegu, having been sent in part to find how sincere the Caliph’s submission was, now had his casus belli, for to the Mongols, the Caliph of Baghdad was now in open revolt. War with the Caliph was not intended to punish Islam specifically; had the Mongols caught the Pope and considered him a rebel, certainly he would have shared a similar fate. What mattered to the Mongols was submission to their divinely mandated rule; refusal to submit was blasphemy of the highest order.   After the fall of Alamut in December 1256, and spending some time near the still-resisting Nizari fortress of Lammasar, Hulegu stayed in Qazwin, just south of Alamut, until March 1257. From Qazwin he undertook a somewhat repetitive journey: from Qazwin he went to Hamadan, then to Dinavar, then Tabriz, then back to Hamadan, then back to Tabriz, then back to Hamadan in September 1257, from whence he would finally march on Baghdad. The reasons for this were multiple, and not just because Hulegu really liked northwestern Iran, though it did give him good time to evaluate the region. Firstly, Hulegu did not want to besiege Baghdad in the summer months, and instead needed to time the march so he arrived outside the city in the winter. Secondly, it provided time for his lieutenants to secure the neighbouring theaters: Kitbuqa Noyan secured through force and diplomacy Luristan and the passes through the Zagros mountains, ensuring Hulegu’s main army could march unimpeded when the time came. In Anatolia, Baiju Noyan had needed to put down a Seljuq revolt, culminating in the battle of Aksaray in October 1256. Baiju then needed to move back east, in order to march on Baghdad from the west when the time came.   Thirdly, Hulegu and the Caliph engaged in an entertaining round of diplomatic fisti-cuffs. Hulegu offered the Caliph another chance to surrender, repudiating him for his failure to send troops against the Nizaris. Hulegu’s threat, as recorded by the Ilkhanid vizier Rashid al-Din, went as follows:   “Previously we have given you advice, but now we say you should avoid our wrath and vengeance. Do not try to overreach yourself or accomplish the impossible, for you will only succeed in harming yourself. The past is over. Destroy your ramparts, fill in your moats, turn the kingdom over to your son, and come to us. If you do not wish to come, send all three, the vizier [al-Alqami], Sulaymanshah, and the Dawatdar, that they may convey our message word for word. If our command is obeyed, it will not be necessary for us to wreak vengeance, and you may retain your lands, army, and subjects. If you do not heed our advice and dispute with us, line up your soldiers and get ready for the field of battle, for we have our loins girded for battle with you and are standing at the ready. When I lead my troops in wrath against Baghdad, even if you hide in the sky or in the earth, ‘I shall bring you down from the turning celestial sphere; I shall pull you up like a lion. I shall not leave one person alive in your realm, and I shall put your city and country to the torch.’ “If you desire to have mercy on your ancient family’s heads, heed my advice. If you do not, let us see what God’s will is.”   The Caliph refused Hulegu’s demands, and when he sent back Hulegu’s envoys, they were harassed by the people of Baghdad; the Caliph’s vizier, ibn al-Alqami, had to send soldiers to protect the envoys to ensure they weren’t killed. When Hulegu learned of the incident, he derided the Caliph as a total incompetent, and then flew into a rage when he heard the official response, which called Hulegu a young and inexperienced man: somewhat humorous, considering al-Mustasim was only four years older than Hulegu. Hulegu’s response was about as subtle as you’d expect. Again, as per the account of Rashid al-Din, quote:   “God the eternal elevated [Chinggis] Khan and his progeny and gave us all the face of the earth, from east to west. Anyone whose heart and tongue are straight with us in submission retains his kingdom, property, women, children, and life. He who contemplates otherwise will not live to enjoy them. Love of status and property, conceit, and pride in transitory fortune have so seduced you that even the words of your well-wishers have no effect on you. Your ear cannot hear the advice of the compassionate, and you have deviated from the path of your fathers and forebears. You must get ready for battle, for I am coming to Baghdad with an army as numerous as ants and locusts. Be the turning of the celestial sphere how it may, the power to command is God’s.”   Upon hearing this message, al-Mustasim’s vizier ibn al-Alqami understood the colossal danger they were in, and fervently argued for the Caliph to appease the Mongols. Al-Alqami has something of a bisecting reputation in the Islamic world. For some, reading the Mamluk sources, the Shia Muslim ibn al-Alqami was a conspirator, plotting with Hulegu to topple the head of Sunni Islam for his own gain. For those reading from Persian and Ilkhanid sources, ibn al-Alqami was earnestly trying to steer the Caliph away from annihilation and save as many lives as he could. On this last response from Hulegu, al-Alqami was able to convince al-Mustasim to send gifts, only for the Caliph to be talked out of it by the dawatdar, Mugahid al-Din Aybek, the Caliphate’s top military man and a staunch supporter of resistance against Hulegu. Convincing the Caliph to abandon the expensive gifts, al-Mustasim sent the following message to vizier al-Alqami to assuage his worries:   “Do not fear the future, and do not talk fables, for there is friendship and unity, not enmity and hostility, between me and Hülägü and [Mongke Khaan]. Since I am their friend, they are of course friendly and benevolent toward me. The envoys’ message is false. Even if these brothers contemplate opposition to or treachery against me, what has the Abbasid dynasty to fear, when the monarchs of the face of the earth stand as our army and obey our every command? If I request an army from every country and mount to repulse the foe, I can incite Iran and Turan against these brothers. Be of stout heart, and do not fear the threats of the Mongols, for although they are powerful upstarts, they pose nothing but an empty threat to the House of Abbas.” If Rashid al-Din is accurate in recording this message, then it goes some way to demonstrate just how greatly al-Mustasim misunderstood the situation. al-Mustasim’s next letter to Hulegu spoke of monarchs who had attacked the ‘Abbasids and suffered divine retribution for it, noting specifically Muahmmad Khwarezm-shah, who for his attack on Baghdad in 1217 suffered the power of Hulegu’s grandfather. Hulegu sent another threat, promising to bring the Caliph “down miserably into the jaws of a lion,” and had enough of parlay.   Hulegu had only to check with the astrologers and diviners of his retinue in order to ensure the assault had good fortune. Variously they warned of failure, catastrophe, and death for harming the Caliph. Finally, Hulegu turned to the famed Iranian scholar rescued from the Nizari fortresses, Nasir al-Din Tusi, and asked what he thought of the matter. After thinking for a moment, Tusi told Hulegu that none of these things would happen. Hulegu asked what would. Tusi replied, “Hulegu Khan will take the Caliph’s place.” And that was enough for Hulegu. The border passes were now secured, and the march on Baghdad could begin.    As Hulegu marched through Kermanshah, massacres followed him. His army approached Baghdad in three directions. Kitbuqa took a route through Luristan, and would march on Baghdad from the south. Baiju Noyan came through northern Iraq, crossing the Tigris near Irbil and closing in on Baghdad’s west and north. Hulegu took the main army through the Hulwan pass and would close off Baghdad from the east, thus encircling the city.    As the armies entered Iraq, cities and towns across Mesopotamia surrendered to them. In January 1258 as the Mongols closed in on the city, the Caliphal army under the Dawatdar tried to repulse Baiju’s army. They were lured into a feigned retreat; a dyke was broken and their camp flooded. Few survivors escaped back to Baghdad. By January 22ned, the Mongol armies had linked up around the city. Not just Mongols, but subject Iranians, Turks, Georgians and Armenians made up this force, with a thousand Chinese siege engineers. The defenders of Baghdad were outnumbered and without hope. For a week, the Mongols prepared their siege lines. Pontoon bridges were built across the Tigris, nets and iron hooks hanging from them to ensure none could escape either up or downriver. No stones for the catapults were within the area, so they needed to be hauled in from elsewhere. A ditch was dug around the city, the earth from the ditch used to build a rampart with gates set in it. Protective coverings were built for the siege engines. With the typical thoroughness of the early Toluids, Baghdad was closed off, its fate sealed.   The assault began on January 29th. An incessant barrage of stones and arrows brought the defenders to their knees. The artillery upon the walls of Baghdad was poorly maintained and outranged by that of the Mongols, useless in the words of one source. Under mobile wooden shelters, the Mongols advanced on the walls, sending arrows deeper into the city. One of the Caliph’s daughters was killed when an arrow passed through a window in his palace. Messages were tied to arrows, proclaiming that all those who did not resist would be spared. By the start of February, towers and bastions along the walls were collapsing. By February 3rd, Mongol forces were capturing the walls. When one of Hulegu’s commanders was killed by an arrow sent from the city, he angrily forced his army on at greater speed.   Realizing just how monumentally he had erred, al-Mustasim sent envoys, among them the once bellicose Dawatdar, to discuss terms with Hulegu. They were quickly put to death. Nothing but the unconditional surrender of the Caliph himself was good enough. Finally, on February 10th, al-Mustasim and his family came out from Baghdad, and put his life in the hands of Hulegu. Initially, the Caliph was treated respectfully. Other notables came out to submit to Hulegu, and many others fled out of the city to escape the pestilence which had already claimed thousands within. These who came out were trapped between the walls of Baghdad and the Mongol palisade. Once the garrison and its weapons were collected, on the 13th of February, the sack of Baghdad began.   In popular culture, the sack of Baghdad is uncontrolled, disorganized, horrifically violent and results in the city’s utter destruction and death of a million people. In reality it was controlled, organized, horrifically violent and resulted in only most of the city’s destruction and deaths of thousands. Rather than wiping Baghdad from the map, it was more of an organized dismemberment. Evidence comes from multiple accounts, but we’ll focus on that of the musician, Urmawi. In contrast to the image of the mob running wild over Baghdad, Urmawi’s account, recorded by the Mamluk historian Shihab al-Din al-’Umari, records the Mongols meticulously planned the sacking. Depending on rank, commanders were given 1 to 3 days to collect loot from sections of the city allotted to them. In Urmawi’s case, his neighbourhood was allotted to Baiju Noyan and his retinue- notably just men Baiju picked to bring into the city with him, rather than a whole portion of his army. Urmawi greeted Baiju with gifts and hosted a feast for him, entertaining him with music and ingratiating himself to the Noyan. Baiju was so pleased he urged Urmawi to come with him to play before Hulegu. Hulegu enjoyed a concert before the walls of Baghdad, ordered Urmawi’s neighbourhood spared and protected with picked men, and even granted Urmawi gardens which had belonged to the Caliph.   Likewise, various sources note that a number of segments of the populations were spared and their property protected: Christians, notably Nestorian priests; Shi’ites and Alids; Khurasani merchants, Qadis, scholars, shaykhs and in one source, Jews. Individuals are mentioned petitioning Hulegu to spare their homes- likely for a hefty payment, of course- but in order to follow these orders, the forces looting the city had to be disciplined enough to actually take note of addresses. Even the oft-repeated statement that the Tigris River ran black with ink of the books of Baghdad’s library must be re-examined, for Nasir al-Din Tusi took many with him to Maragha, where he built his famous observatory. A number of sources indicate the city’s looting lasted only a week, rather than a full month.   Clemency was extended to multiple groups… but for the majority of the city’s population who did not fall into these categories, it appears no quarter was given. For all the gated neighbourhoods like Urmawi’s which were protected, many more were gutted and looted. Treasures collected over the city’s 500 years were stolen, the finest architecture of the ‘Abbasids ruined and torn down. Hulegu entered the city on February 15th, visiting the Caliph’s palace, where al-Mustasim was forced to reveal where he had hidden his wealth. 12,000 severed ears were brought before Hulegu to mark the slain citizenry. The dead littered the street; after a few days, the heat and stench of the rotting bodies led Hulegu to end the looting by February 20th. Notably, the city was not to be left to brigandage: a governor and Mongol officials were appointed, ibn al-Alqami kept his position as vizier, to clean up the bodies and restore the city.   On the 20th of February, Hulegu moved to the village of Waqaf to avoid the foul air of Baghdad, from which he apparently fell sick. At Waqaf, Hulegu had al-Mustasim put to death, most likely rolled into a carpet and stomped upon to avoid spilling his blood on the earth. His family soon followed him.  In European accounts, the popular version was that Hulegu locked Mustasim in his treasury, where he starved to death in an ironic punishment to mark the Caliph’s failures to pay for troops and defences.   So ended the 500 year old ‘Abbasid Caliphate. The impact on Islam is hard to understate. Since the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, there had been a widely recognized successor to him in the form of the Caliphs -Rashidun, Umayyad and ‘Abbasid. Most Muslims saw him as the spiritual, if not the actual political, head of Islam. For the Caliphate, seemingly inviolable and permanent, to come to such a violent and sudden end sent shockwaves throughout the Islamic world. Caliphates had been overthrown before; previous dynasties like the Buyids and Seljuqs had held the Caliphs as puppets and militarily defeated them, while the Nizari Assassins had claimed the lives of at least two; but never before had the Caliphate actually been erased from existence by a power claiming universal sovereignty in its place. Distant relations of al-Mustasim were eventually set up in Mamluk Cairo as new Caliphs, but were never widely recognized. The Ottoman Sultans would also claim the title of Caliph in time, but none have ever been able to step into the position held by the ‘Abbasids. It’s no surprise that many Muslims throughout the following centuries have referred to the sack of Baghdad as a scar of the psyche of the ummah, one which it has not recovered from today. With the fall of Baghdad, Hulegu could now cast his eyes onto Syria, down the Levantine coast to the newly established Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt. The sense was real that Hulegu was about to bring the whole of Islam under the authority of the house of Chinggis. Our next episode takes us to the Mongol drive to the Meditteranean- and the famous clash of ‘Ayn Jalut, an episode you won’t want to miss. Be sure to subscribe to our podcast, and to help up continue bringing you great content, consider supporting us on Patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. I’m your host David, and we’ll catch you on the next one.

Find this audio article on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vPVfhc9QiNY&t=212s If you like our audio articles, please support us by becoming a member or donating to our non-profit company: - www.ancient.eu/membership/ - www.ancient.eu/donate/ - www.patreon.com/ahe Mesopotamia is an ancient region in the Middle East, east of the Mediterranean by the Zagros mountains, between the two rivers Tigris and Euphrates. The name ‘Mesopotamia’ comes from the Greek meaning ‘between two rivers’. The region is now known as Iraq but once included some parts of modern-day Iran, Syria, and Turkey. This area is also known as the Fertile Crescent, and as the Cradle of Civilization.

His passion is undertaking expeditions through the mountains, thousands of kilometers long, on foot and usually alone.  These journeys provide an opportunity to look within and ponder life's most profound questions.  For more than 2 decades he has walked over 20,000 km through mountain ranges in Europe and Asia.  In 2004 he did a first ever solo thru-hike of the Carpathian Mountains and in 2014 he hiked through the Zagros mountains in Iran.  Inspired by a summer adventure in Iceland, he returned to Iceland in 2020 to complete an east to west crossing in winter.  You can learn more at his website lukaszsupergan.com. Lukasz Supergan, welcome to The Pursuit Zone.

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This week, we’re talking Iran escalation and Donald Trump’s genius strategy of galvanizing a nation, but there’s a little more nuance than normal. So, Riley (@raaleh), Hussein (@HKesvani), Nate (@inthesedeserts), and Alice @AliceAvizandum join special guest Séamus Malekafzali (@Seamus_Malek), who’s a writer and analyst working in Beirut. This one will stimulate the logic center of your brain more than a thousand Ben Shapiro podcasts. Hope you enjoy! If you want access to our Patreon bonus episodes and powerful Discord server, sign up here: https://www.patreon.com/trashfuture *COME SEE MILO* If you want to catch Milo’s stand-up on tour, get tickets here: https://linktr.ee/miloontour

Ciclos de conferencias: Creadores de imperios (III). Darío I y el Imperio persa aqueménida. Manel García Sánchez. Darío I (522-486 a. C.) fue coronado como Gran Rey de Persia en el año 522 a. C., tras la muerte sin herederos de Cambises, el hijo de Ciro el Grande y fundador del Imperio aqueménida. Tras el triunfo en la conjura que le proporcionó el cetro y la corona, Darío hubo de sofocar una larga crisis de alzamientos locales e intrigas palaciegas que mantendrían al imperio convulso durante tres años, pero tras su victoria consiguió ampliar el Imperio aqueménida, el imperio multicultural y multiétnico más grande de todos los existentes hasta entonces en la Antigüedad y que se extendió desde el Mar Negro y las estepas rusas hasta la India, Libia y Egipto. Pero su deseo de expansión también por Europa fue frenado por los griegos en la épica batalla de Maratón en el año 490 a. C., naciendo entonces un tópico de larga duración relativo al triunfo de la libertad helena frente al despotismo oriental, de la civilización frente a la barbarie. Conocido entre los autores clásicos como el "monarca mercader", Darío dividió el imperio en provincias o satrapías, estableció un eficiente sistema tributario, diseñó una red viaria de calzadas reales que vertebraban todo el imperio, acuñó por primera vez moneda entre los persas, los famosos dáricos de oro, y fijó por escrito por primera vez la lengua de los antiguos persas en escritura cuneiforme y en monumentos para su eterna gloria como el del relieve de Behistun, en un despeñadero de los montes Zagros en el actual Irán. En el año 518 a. C. decidió fundar una nueva capital para su gran imperio, junto a las ya existentes de Pasargada, Susa o Ecbatana: Persépolis, una ciudad ritual a los pies de la montaña de Mitra, en el monte Kuh-e Rahmat, y por donde desfilaban en la celebración del Año Nuevo todas las delegaciones venidas desde los cuatro puntos cardinales del imperio para rendir tributo al Gran Rey. Explore en www.march.es/conferencias/anteriores el archivo completo de Conferencias en la Fundación Juan March: casi 3.000 conferencias, disponibles en audio, impartidas desde 1975.

1ière heure : Pékin et Washington font monter les enchères - Entrevue de Michel Désautels avec Jean-François Di Meglio, président de l’Asia Centre ; Et si la laïcité était une question de génération - Reportage de Marie-Laure Josselin ; L’Iran ne respectera plus l’accord sur son programme nucléaire - Entrevue de Michel Désautels avec Pierre Pahlavi, professeur titulaire au Collège des Forces canadiennes de Toronto ; Sixième extinction de masse à l’horizon - Reportage de Janic Tremblay. 2ième heure : Ecatepec, la ville mexicaine de toutes les violences - Reportage de Michel Labrecque ; Le pape décrète l’obligation de dénoncer les agressions sexuelles à la justice de l’Église - Entrevue de Michel Désautels avec Alain Crevier ; La fin de la démocratie - Entrevue de Michel Désautels avec l’essayiste français Jean-Claude Kaufmann ; Zagros, ou l’univers sensible et poétique des artisans qui fabriquent les tapis orientaux - Entrevue de Michel Désautels avec la documentariste Ariane Lorrain.

Rough times happen. Falling into a rut happens. The question becomes, how do you respond to these types of circumstances? In this episode, we talk with international member (from Denmark) Zagros who experienced some bumps in his journey, but as you’ll see, no excuses… he did what needed to be done. Even though he is a younger guy, there is something that we all (no matter our age) can take away from Zagros and his journey up until this point. For me, it was pure motivation and inspiration that when life feels “off”, you just need to look in the mirror and take matters into your own hands. He is working hard on his trading knowledge and doing what needs to be done to set himself up to give him the best possible chances to succeed in the market. Let’s get to it! Notes Today we talk with community member Zagros from Denmark. His interest in the market was due to a search online about various jobs he could work digitally with lots of flexibility. He doesn’t have the largest family but he wanted to provide for them while having the ability to travel. Zagros expressed an interest in Clay’s courses at 16 years old and after his mother was assured that he was truly interested she helped him pay for the first course. He was having a rough time in his life so he took a break from trading education and volunteered for military service. This service led him to find the discipline he lacked prior to joining. When he finished his service, he enrolled in University and began his educational journey. Zagros takes in information best by both listening, watching, and transcribing what is taught to give him the best odds of retaining the data. Zagros utilizes options in the US market because he enjoys having the ability to cap his risk and also decide what type of probability of profit he would like. This is another example of how trading is different from one person to the next. His risk profile will most likely differ from your risk profile. After trying to create a ‘holy grail’ type system, he realized that this was a fool’s errand and scaled it all back to just the very basics. Price action and volume are kings but implied volatility is also an option traders friend. Quotes I wanted to make money online so I could care for my mother and travel. I knew I could not do it with a traditional 9-5 job. Clay said ‘discipline discipline discipline.’ I wasn’t a very disciplined guy so I wanted to kick myself in the butt. A defined risk is a beautiful thing. You can theoretically have an ‘all weather’ portfolio by adjusting your positions. When I tried to make my own system, I put so many indicators on the chart that it was crazy. So I went back to basics.

La civilización sumeria es la primera de la historia. ¿Qué significa eso? Significa que es la primera civilización que nos ha legado un testimonio escrito. Por un puro convencionalismo, se denomina prehistoria a aquel periodo de la existencia del hombre sobre la tierra en el que no se utiliza la escritura. Este convencionalismo es curioso, si lo analizamos detenidamente, más bien cae en un absurdo. De hecho casi todos los profesores de prehistoria que he conocido aceptan el nombre un tanto a regañadientes. Si la historia es la ciencia o el saber que estudia los hechos de los hombres a través del tiempo, resulta que el prefijo “pre” que significa “antes de”, debería referirse en sentido estricto a lo acontecido antes de que el hombre apareciese en la tierra, prehistoria sería hablar , que se yo, de los dinosaurios, de los trilobites… Quizás debería llamarse “primera historia” o “protohistoria”, pero el nombre ya está y todos lo dan por bueno, supongo que por el prolongado uso. Es el periodo más largo de la humanidad. Abarca desde los primeros seres que se puedan considerar humanos hasta alrededor del 4000 a.C. 4000 años de historia, frente, a 4 millones de años de prehistoria. Cuando un grupo humano deja escritos, podemos saber, hasta cierto punto que es lo que pasaba por sus mentes. En el caso de la prehistoria sólo contamos con restos materiales, lo que se llaman restos arqueológicos y de ahí debemos hacer todas las deducciones. Ese período de 4 millones de años me da pánico, procuro evitarlo en mis programas. ¿Por qué? Pues por una sencilla razón: nunca acabas de estar al día. Toda teoría o hipótesis se basa en elucubraciones que tienen como base un puñado de huesos y una piedra rota de la que se discute si era un guijarro roto fortuitamente o una verdadera herramienta construida de forma deliberada. Cualquier nuevo hallazgo puede hacer que todo lo dicho anteriormente quede en agua de borrajas. Por solo poner un ejemplo: aún guardo libros que me tocó estudiar hace ya unos cuantos años en la asignatura de prehistoria: ahí se sostiene como incuestionable que el hombre de Neandertal y el de Cromagnon eran genéticamente incompatibles… Hoy los modernos estudios han determinado que los europeos tenemos un cierto porcentaje (creo recordar que algo así como un 4%, de genes Neandertales). En esos libros el famoso yacimiento de Atapuerca, que ha revolucionado todas las teorías sobre los primeros pobladores de Europa, se cita como de pasada, se conoce que cuando se escribió el libro aún no había comenzado a estudiarse a fondo. Por cierto, el otro día leí una entrevista a un paleoantropólogo que ponía en duda que la famosa sima de los huesos de Atapuerca fuese un enterramiento, él sostiene que todos los esqueletos fueron transportados allí por corrientes de aguas subterráneas, vamos hace una enmienda a lo totalidad de lo que es hoy la versión oficial. ¿Tiene razón? No lo sé. Pues ese larguísimo y oscuro perido denominado prehistoria a su vez se divide en dos, el paleolítico y el neolítico. “Paleo” es un prefijo griego que significa “antiguo” líticio, viene de “litos” palabra griega que significa piedra… vamos los dos grandes periodos de la prehistoria se podrían traducir como “piedra antigua” y “piedra nueva”. Aún recuerdo los libros de historia de creo 5º de EGB, el equivalente al actual 5ª de primaria, de cuando tendría unos 10 años. Creo que eran de esa época, no estoy seguro… lo que si que veo claro es la ilustración, comparaba una “hacha de sílex” del paleolítico con las huellas de los golpes de talla en la superficie, con otra del neolítica de superficie regular y pulida. Piedra vieja, tosca, piedra nueva pulida… esa es la gran diferencia. Pues bien, la diferencia entre los dos periodos de la prehistoria es mucho más profunda… La gran diferencia es el paso de una economía depredadora y nómada (caza, pesca y recolección) a la producción de alimentos (agricultura y ganadería) y sedentarismo. Y de eso se dervian luego muchas, muchas consecuencias… Vamos a centrarnos en el Neolítico y más concretamente en su fase final. La fase final del Neolítico, con la aparición de las herramientas de metal, en el Próximo Oriente. Porque, hay que decirlo, estas periodificaciones de la historia tienen bien poco de universal, hasta hace poco más de un siglo aún habían comunidades humanas sumidas en el paleolítico en el desierto de Kalahari o en Australia. Gordon Childe fue un investigador que estudió el Neolítico del próximo oriente en la primera mitad del siglo pasado y acuñó el término “Revolución Neolítica”, como fue el primero, su denominación se mantiene, aunque podría ser discutida. Revolución es un cambio radical en un breve lapso de tiempo. El cambio de hábitos de nómadas a sedentarios, de cazadores a granjeros, etc. Es radical pero paulatino y proyectado en el tiempo, no parece que se diese de la noche a la mañana. Más bien sería una “evolución” que una “revolución”. Pero Childe era un marxista convencido que aplicaba la teoría del materialismo histórico a su investigación y claro el término “revolución” le ponía. Pues bien vamos a poner la lupa sobre el próximo oriente y la “Revolución Neolítica” para describir el marco en el que surgirá la cultura sumeria. Hay una zona llamada el “Creciente Fertil” (por analogía con la forma de la luna en cuarto creciente) que es una franja de tierra que cubriría un “arco” que va desde el cauce de los Ríos Eufrates y Tigris (lo que llamamos Meosopotamia) junto con todas las montañas que lo bordean por el este y el norte (lo que hoy sería el occidente de Irán y el sur de turquí), continúa por Siria, Palestina y Egipto… Pondré un mapa en el blog de Primum Gradus para que os situéis, pero basta con que vayáis a Google imágenes y escribáis “creciente fértil”. Dicho rápidamente, y obviando matices, que me perdonen los eruditos, en esa zona están los ancestros silvestres de muchas de las especies agrícolas actuales, especialmente de los cereales. También especímenes salvajes de animales de ganado, como vacas, ovejas, cabras, asnos… En los bordes de ese creciente fértil, al sur de Turquía o en los montes Zagros, están localizados los primeros yacimientos de aldeas agrícolas, también en Palestina, donde encontramos la ciudad de Jericó que, cuando yo estudiaba (no se ahora…) se consideraba la ciudad más antigua (con su muralla y todo) habitada ininterrumpidamente desde casi el 9000 aC. Ahí se dan los primeros “escarceos” agrícolas. Empieza el cambio que poco a poco se extiende a los fértiles valles del Nilo y del Tigris y el Eufrates que son los que nos interesan. El gran cambio no es sólo económico, de depredadores a productores de alimentos. Es también social, se consiguen excedentes de alimentos, con los que intercambiar, nace el comercio, algunos miembros de la comunidad pueden liberarse total o parcialmente de las tareas de producir alimentos para especializarse en producir herramientas, primero de piedra, luego de metal primero cobre, luego bronce , cerámica, otro gran descubrimiento…. Aparece una proto-organización política, se empiezan a diferenciar las clases sociales por la acumulación de bienes etc. La última zona en ser colonizada por estos granjeros son las zonal fluviales, que precisan de una gran organización para construir diques y acequias, obras públicas en definitiva. La zona comprendida entre los ríos Eufrates y Tigris la llamada Mesopotamia

Como ya sabéis, Victoria Caroline Adams de Beckham es uno de nuestros personajes favoritos y, por ello, hoy le dedicamos este especial en el que recordamos su salto a la fama como "Posh Spice" de la mano de las Spice Girls, su carrera musical en solitario y su éxito actual como diseñadora de moda. Pero como esto es FNB, dedicamos buena parte del programa a hablar de su drama de tvmovie con Rebecca Loos, la niñera hispano-holandesa que aseguró haberse acostado con su marido David cuando los Beckham vivían en Madrid. Tampoco podemos dejar pasar por alto su supuesta pelea con Ana Obregón en el gimnasio "Zagros" de La Moraleja. ¿Leyenda o realidad? #Fug&Busted ¡SIGUE NUESTRO PODCAST! · Ivoox: http://bit.ly/fnb-ivoox · Itunes Store: https://apple.co/2VhBwmS · Tunein: http://bit.ly/fnb-tunein ¡SÍGUENOS! Web: https://fugandbusted.com/podcast Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/fugnbusted Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/fugandbusted/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/fugandbusted Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/fugandbusted/

Anadolu’da Bağcılık ve Şarabın Kısa Tarihi Anadolu Bağcılık ve Şarap sanatının doğum yerine çok yakındır, hatta doğduğu bölge diyebiliriz aslında ve bunun büyüdüğü, geliştiği en önemli beşiklerden birisidir. Arkeolojik ve genetik kanıtların da gösterdiği gibi çok sayıda yabani asma çeşidinden birisi, belki de en uyumlusu “Vitis Silvestris” kendini insanoğluna Kafkas Dağları’nın güneyinde Karadeniz ile Hazar denizi arasında düzlüklerde ve alçak tepelerin yamaçlarında teslim etmiştir. Bağ ve şaraba ilişkin başlangıç efsaneleri kutsal kitaplardaki öyküler ve onları destekleyen arkeolojik veriler bu coğrafyada yoğunlaşır. Gürcistan, Ermenistan, Van Gölü çevresi, Iğdır, Azerbaycan, Batı İran ve Zagros Dağları’nı içine alan bir kuşak içinde insanoğlu, yerleşik hayata geçişinden çok önce tatlı meyvesinin ve şırasının peşinde olduğu Vitis Silvestris’i Vitis Vinifera’ya dönüştürecek sabırı göstermiştir. Araştırmacılar Viti Silvestris’in alt türünü saptadılar. Vitis Vinifera Silvestris ve Vitis Vinifera Warsativa. Paleo botanikçilerin özellikle verimli hilal adı verdiği yani Zagros, Doğu Toroslar, Amanos ve Lübnan Dağları’nın oluşturduğu hilal formlu coğrafyanın adıdır burası. Bölgedeki neolotik iskanlarda yapılan arkeolojik kazılarda ele geçen üzüm çekirdeklerini inceleyerek ilk kültür asmasının ne zaman ortaya çıktığını saptamayı hedeflediler. Günümüzden yaklaşık 9000 yıl önce yaşanmış Lübnan, Suriye, Türkiye, İsrail ve Yunanistan’daki neolitik iskanlarda yapılan kazılarda çok miktarda üzüm çekirdeği, kömürleşmiş meyve ve salkım kabukları gün ışığına çıkarıldı. Bunlar formları ve boyutlarından hareketle yabani üzüm çekirdeği olarak teşhis edildiler. Aslında yabani üzüm ile kültür üzümü çekirdeklerini birbirinden ayırmak her zaman kolay değildir. Geniş bir şekilde koleksiyonun dikkatli gözlemlenmesiyle farkı tespit etmek mümkün olmaktadır. Kazılarda elde edilen çok sayıda üzüm çekirdeği Erken Bronz Çağı’ndan Geç Bronz Çağı’na, yani günümüzden 5000 ile 3100 yıl öncesine kadar yabani üzümden kültür alınmış çeşitlere doğru bir değişimi göstermektedir. Vitis Vinifera Warsativa olarak tespit edilen en eski kültür üzümü çekirdekleri ise Gürcistan’da bulunmuştur. Günümüzden yaklaşık 7000 yıl önceye tarihlenen yerleşme tabakalarında ele geçen bu çekirdekler, bu tarihlerde Kafkaslar’ın güneyindeki bölgede asma yetiştiğini göstermektedir. Bu tarihten sonra asma kültürü Lübnan, Suriye, Filistin, Anadolu ve Yunanistan’a yayılmış olmalıdır. Anadolu’da kazılar sırasında neolitik yerleşkelerin sadece ikisinde yabani üzüm çekirdekleri tespit edilmiştir. Bunlardan biri Nevalichori, diğeri ise Can Hasan’dır. Can Hasan Karaman’da, Nevalichori ise Şanlıurfa’dadır. Bu dönemde asmanın kültürünün alınmış olduğunu gösteren bir kanıt yoktur. Yani en eski kültür asması Gürcistan’da bulunurken, en eski yabani asma Anadolu topraklarında bulunmuştur. Ayrıca Anadolu neolitiğinin sınırlı sayıdaki kap formları bir şarap kültürünü işaret etmesi bakımından da çok yeterli değildir. Neolitik Dönem’in ardından gelen ve Kalkolitik olarak adlandırılan dönemde iskan görmüş höyük kazılarında ele geçen çekirdeklerin çoğu yabani asma ürünü olmalarına karşın Hasseköyük’te yani Şanlıurfa’da asmanın kültürü alındığını gösteren üzüm çekirdekleri bulunmuştur. İsa’dan önce 4800 ile 3000 civarları diyebiliriz bu dönem için. Kalkolitik dönem kültürü değişik kat formlarının özellikle kadeh kültüründe kapların ortaya çıktığı dönemdir ve bağcılığın, şarap üretiminin Anadolu’ya bu dönemde yayılmış olduğunu ileri sürmek mümkündür. İsa’dan önce 3000’li yılların 2. yarısına tarihlenen Orta Anadolu’da Hatti kültürüne ait Alacahöyük Kral Mezarlığı’nda ölü hediyesi olarak ele geçen altından kadehler ve gaga ağızlı testiler bu dönemde Anadolu’da şarabın özellikle yönetici sınıflar arasında yaygın olarak kullanıldığını gösterir.

In this lesson, we continue the study of Sohrab Sepehri's dar golestāné by learning more about the words and phrases in the middle section of our selection.As promised, here is an image of the beautiful red poppy flowers in the Zagros mountains in Iran: 

In this lesson, we continue the study of Sohrab Sepehri's dar golestāné by learning more about the words and phrases in the middle section of our selection.As promised, here is an image of the beautiful red poppy flowers in the Zagros mountains in Iran: 

In this lesson, we continue the study of Sohrab Sepehri's dar golestāné by learning more about the words and phrases in the middle section of our selection. As promised, here is an image of the beautiful red poppy flowers in the Zagros mountains in Iran:

El programa que hoy planteamos es de vital importancia para una parte del mundo, Oriente Próximo, que desde el año 2011 está siendo azotada por continuos conflictos en los que los kurdos han sido los que mejor han sabido defender su propio territorio. El Kurdistán es una vasta región, poco homogénea y cuya única seña de identidad es la tierra donde viven los pueblos kurdos. Tiene una extensión de cerca de 400.000 kilómetros cuadrados aunque distribuidos entre Turquía (190.000), Siria (12.000), Iraq (65.000) e Irán (125.000), y en menor cuantía en las Repúblicas de Armenia y Azerbaiyán. Las cordilleras TAURUS, HAKKARI y ZAGROS se convierten en fronteras naturales de una zona en la que convergen las culturas turca, árabe y caucásica, no sólo la kurda. El Kurdistán cuenta con, al menos, 30 millones de habitantes, repartidos entre Turquía (el 19% de la población9, Iraq (el 17%), Siria (el 8,5%9, Armenia (el 1,1%9, Azerbaiyán (el 2%). El planteamiento de independencia que han hecho las autoridades de la Región Autónoma del Kurdistán Iraquí, constituye una seria amenaza para la región con posibles intervenciones en fuerza de Irak, Turquía e incluso Irán. Este es el tema que hoy abordaremos de la mano de nuestros analistas de prestigio, Dña. Marta González Isidoro, Carlos Paz, Manuel Gazapo , Iván de Vargas y de D. Fernando Montoya Cerio.

El programa que hoy planteamos es de vital importancia para una parte del mundo, Oriente Próximo, que desde el año 2011 está siendo azotada por continuos conflictos en los que los kurdos han sido los que mejor han sabido defender su propio territorio. El Kurdistán es una vasta región, poco homogénea y cuya única seña de identidad es la tierra donde viven los pueblos kurdos. Tiene una extensión de cerca de 400.000 kilómetros cuadrados aunque distribuidos entre Turquía (190.000), Siria (12.000), Iraq (65.000) e Irán (125.000), y en menor cuantía en las Repúblicas de Armenia y Azerbaiyán. Las cordilleras TAURUS, HAKKARI y ZAGROS se convierten en fronteras naturales de una zona en la que convergen las culturas turca, árabe y caucásica, no sólo la kurda. El Kurdistán cuenta con, al menos, 30 millones de habitantes, repartidos entre Turquía (el 19% de la población9, Iraq (el 17%), Siria (el 8,5%9, Armenia (el 1,1%9, Azerbaiyán (el 2%). El planteamiento de independencia que han hecho las autoridades de la Región Autónoma del Kurdistán Iraquí, constituye una seria amenaza para la región con posibles intervenciones en fuerza de Irak, Turquía e incluso Irán. Este es el tema que hoy abordaremos de la mano de nuestros analistas de prestigio, Dña. Marta González Isidoro, Carlos Paz, Manuel Gazapo , Iván de Vargas y de D. Fernando Montoya Cerio.

Xander Snyder and Jacob L. Shapiro talk about the geopolitical consequences of new U.S. sanctions against Russia, North Korea and Iran.Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: goo.gl/hfTxMX TRANSCRIPT: Jacob L. Shapiro: Hello, everyone, welcome to another Geopolitical Futures Podcast. I'm Jacob Shapiro. I am joined once more by Xander Snyder. Xander, it's always good to talk to you. XS: Thanks, good to be here. JLS: We've been trying some different things with the podcast in the last couple weeks. Last week, Kamran and I had a little discussion about democracy and geopolitics. We appreciated all your feedback on that. Before that, we were doing some talk about history and battles and geopolitical contingencies. This week, we're going to go in a little bit of different direction. We're going to just try and take a sense of what's been going on this week in geopolitics in 30 minutes and try and talk through some of the major issues and the things that have happened this week that might actually have staying power beyond the week itself. Because some many of the things itself, so many of the headlines and the things that happen in the news really don't matter that much once the headline is out there. So we're going to try and get to the deep stuff that we think is going to matter in the long term. And the major thing I think, Xander, that really affected this week was not just the House but the Senate also apparently has just passed sanctions not just on Russia – although that's getting most of the attention – but also on North Korea and also on Iran. Just this morning as we're recording before we went live, I saw that a bunch of different news organizations were reporting that North Korea also tested some kind of missile this morning too. We don't know whether it was an ICBM or something else. But it seems to me the real magnetic issue of this week has been sanctions, would you agree? XS: Yeah seems like a lot has been revolving around sanctions this week. And very quick timeline of it is back in mid-June, the Senate overwhelmingly approved some form of sanctions and then it kind of got negotiated between the House and the Senate for another month. And then the House earlier this week passed sort of a new and improved version that both houses had agreed to by I think it was like 419 to 3, an overwhelming majority, and then the Senate passed it again with an overwhelming majority of like 98 to 2. And one of the big changes in the new version of the sanctions bill – well compared to the sanctions that were passed against Russia in 2014 when Russia invaded Crimea and took control of that area of Ukraine – basically ties President Trump's hands in a lot of ways. So the way that some of these clauses were phrased in the original sanctions bill was saying the president “may” choose to implement one or several of the different measures that are provided for in the sanctions bill. And in this new one that just passed both houses essentially an amendment was proposed that changes the word “may” to the word “shall,” so the president shall implement all of these sanctions. And what that does is it removes a certain degree of power from the president to decide who sanctions who or what corporate entity sanctions are going to be levied against. And it also reduces his ability to issue waivers against individuals or individual entities that do have sanctions levied against them. So that's just kind of like the starting point for how a lot of activity has revolved around these sanctions over the last week. JLS: Yeah, I think one of the interesting things to point out is that both President Obama and President Bush tried to really reset relations with Russia in a more positive direction. That was definitely something Trump wanted to do as well. And Trump has encountered the same types of geopolitical obstacles externally that both Obama and Bush did. I mean, there are just interests that are divergent between Russia and the United States and no matter how much Putin and Trump may or may not like each other, those issues seem to come to the forefront. But Trump also seems to have on top of that, a domestic situation in the United States that is blocking him from doing anything even in some of the foreign policy realms, right? You talked a little bit about how it's enforcing and making Trump raise a bunch of sanctions that were only there through executive order in which he had some options with. But so Congress is basically forcing his hand in that bit. But there are also some parts of the sanctions that relate to energy and I know that you did a closer look at some of the energy-related stuff, especially in terms of where Russian energy goes, so do you want to talk a little bit about that? XS: Yeah, I think the point that you make speaks to one way that we look at the world, which is leaders always encounter constraints and frequently they encounter constraints that they were not anticipating on the campaign trail. So they're able to use boastful rhetoric and you know say almost anything that they want to. Either not realizing or maybe recognizing but not playing up the fact that they're not nearly going to be able to do as much as they say they're going to when they get into office. And this has just been sort of another one of these constraints in the foreign policy world that Trump has run into when he's been in office. Now, the European Commission and Germany in particular have taken umbrage, they've been a little concerned with the set of sanctions that were passed this week. This is because the sanctions bill provide for measures to be taken against companies with residents in any country really that have a certain degree of involvement with Russian energy companies, and I think the threshold is something like 30 percent investment in a joint venture project. Antonia, one of our senior analysts, wrote a Reality Check on that earlier this week in a little bit more detail so you can go read up on that there. But the idea is that since the sanctions can potentially target companies that are not Russia, and Germany has some energy projects that they've co-invested with Russia because Germany gets a lot of their both natural gas and oil from Russia but especially their natural gas. And now they're concerned that potentially both their companies and potentially their energy securities to a certain degree can be threatened by these sanctions. And they're saying, “Well, you know, the U.S. shouldn't have the right to target non-Russian companies when the point is to go after Russia with these sanctions.” So that's been one of the other issues that's kind of arisen surrounding the sanctions bill. JLS: Yeah. And I think one thing to point out there is that the sanctions themselves I don't think are the major story. Sanctions have been levied a lot of different times by a lot of different countries and I wrote a piece the other day that sort of talked about how sanctions are usually, not always but usually a fairly ineffective obstacle. It's not the sanctions so much that are interesting. I don't think the sanctions are going to compel Russian behavior one way or another. It is though I think from the Russian point of view, a provocation. So especially with the sanctions that are being levied against Russia in this particular case, Russia's not going to be able to not respond in some kind of way. And we've already seen in the last couple days, I would call it weird stuff happening in the Ukraine. Just electricity being cut off to one region, the stuff about Saakashvili, the former president of Georgia who became a Ukrainian citizen and was a governor of Odessa in Ukraine. His citizenship has been revoked. There have just been some signs that Ukraine seems to be feeling a little bit more willing to push back against Russia. And of course, the big thing was that the new special representative to Ukraine that the State Department appointed suggested that the United States would look into arming Ukraine with defensive weaponry. So all of those things mean not that sanctions are going to do what the United States wants necessarily. I think Russia is going to perceive this as a challenge and Russia's going to have to try and push back if not in the Ukraine, probably somewhere else along the periphery and I think that's why this issue is going to be important going forward for a while. XS: Yeah just before I hopped on to do the podcast, I was reading that Russia has begun to retaliate a little. They've basically begun kicking out some U.S. diplomats and reduced the number of U.S. diplomats in Russia to the number of Russian diplomats in the U.S. which was fewer and have begun to seize some U.S. diplomats' vacation properties and some warehouses I guess that were used to store U.S. diplomats' goods. So that's something sort of short term but another way you can look at sort of Russia's flexibility in terms of how they can retaliate in a larger way, I mean one way you could look at that is in the energy world because a lot of Europe is dependent on Russia for its supply of energy. Europe imports really a lot of its energy needs. I think Germany in particular imports approximately 60 percent of its energy consumption. And something like 55-plus percent of its natural gas consumption comes from Russia. So there is some deeper structural dependencies on Russia in the energy market that actually gives it the ability to retaliate at least against U.S. allies in a somewhat more serious way than just kicking out a couple of diplomats. JLS: Yeah, absolutely. Moving on from Russia, though, Russia is not the only player in the sanctions regime. I think that it's getting the most attention because of the complicated and convoluted relationship between Donald Trump and Russia and the United States, but the bill originally was not designed as a sanctions bill for Russia. It was designed as a sanctions bill against specifically Iran. And you know both Russia and North Korea were things that were added on later. Iran and North Korea are both countries that the United States has been having trouble with for a long time and has been trying to use sanctions with for a long time. And it seems that Congress is trying to reinforce that method but I'm not sure it's going to work. You know Iran really was able to come to terms with the United States not so much because of sanctions I think but really because the Islamic State rose and broke Iranian strategy. And Iran really had to measure what was the more important enemy and I think that they prioritized defeating the Sunni Arab force in the Islamic State over basically the nuclear program that they were developing and when you see Iran testing and still using missiles. I don't think they've necessarily abandoned that program. They may not be enriching uranium and I think they are probably abiding by the terms of the deal. But that doesn't mean that they aren't working on other parts of a delivery system. And on top of that we have North Korea which seems to not be going away and I know that a lot of listeners probably have been hearing us talking for a while about how the situation in North Korea is deteriorating and the tensions are high. But we continue to see it that way. You know, I think one of the things that we're doing is there's probably some kind of negotiation or diplomatic process going on there. And you know, I think there's a lot of misdirection coming out of the U.S. right now. On the one hand, you get the three carrier battlegroups there. Then the carrier battlegroups disperse and you have the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff saying, “We're going to give the diplomatic route a couple months.” And we'll see from that so. You've looked a lot at North Korea, Xander, what is your sort of current read on U.S. posture towards North Korea and how do you see it going forward in the next couple weeks after this test, especially if it turns out to be an ICBM that was tested? XS: Yeah, we are still waiting on confirmation on whether it was or not. If this most recent launch was another ICBM, that would appear obviously a lot more threatening because it could potentially show that North Korea is making progress on developing a delivery system that could potentially deliver some sort of nuclear warhead. We don't believe that they're there yet even though they may have missiles that can fly further now as we saw earlier this month. As far as North Korea generally goes, sanctions like you said they generally don't work. When we say generally, we don't mean never. I think you cited a report from the Peterson Institute in your piece that said something like two-thirds of the time sanctions prove ineffective. And North Korea has been sanctioned repeatedly for 20 years and all we've seen them do in that time is basically start a nuclear weapons program, develop it, get to a point where they are very close to, you know, within a year or two having some sort of miniaturized nuclear warhead, potentially having intercontinental delivery capabilities. So sanctions just don't really seem to work a whole lot about North Korea and if you try to put yourself in the mindset of the North Korean regime, it kind of makes a little bit more sense. You know, a lot of people think that Kim Jong Un is just crazy and that the Kim regime is insane, that you know it's this terribly oppressive autocratic regime, and it is an oppressive autocratic regime. But a perspective that doesn't get out there as frequently, is that this is a regime that's been around for 70 years. They've withstood the collapse of their biggest patron, the Soviet Union, for several decades. And they've gotten through increasing pressure placed on them from the United States and arguably China recently, although those numbers are a little bit harder to read. I think it's difficult to claim that a regime that's been around and has stayed stable for that long is truly insane. They have to be acting at least to some degree rationally. And if you look at the effects or lack of effects of sanctions on North Korea, you know, the regime believes that it is at constant threat from the United States and if it gives on some of the things that the United States wants it to give on, that it's going to be at even a greater risk of if not collapse then losing its control on the governing institutions in North Korea. So for a regime that feels completely threatened for survival, it seems like sanctions are, they're going to be more willing to just accept that their country will be hurting than to just give up control, give up reins of power on their country. JLS: Yeah, and I think that the other side of this is that sanctions are probably not going to compel North Korea to give up its program. Like you said, if they haven't given it up already with the sanctions that have been levied against them, it's doubtful that this new batch of sanctions is going to be the one to do it. But I think the other thing that this brings up is that everybody is wondering what is China's role in helping manage North Korea and how much can they actually do? And one of the things that we looked at this week was new data out of Korea that said that while Chinese imports from North Korea have decreased by about 25 percent year-on-year, their exports to North Korea have gone up quite a bit, almost 20 percent that way. And so that's not a new thing, we've seen data from China itself confirming that earlier in the year and Donald Trump even tweeted, you know, about how China wasn't living up to its end of the bargain in terms of taking care of North Korea. But I think this is a good way of showing also the sort of ineffective logic of sanctions because, OK, so you've sanctioned North Korea, but the hard thing with sanctions – it's also the hard thing in getting something like an OPEC agreement to work – is making sure that everybody does it in the exact same way. The problem is that everybody doesn't have exactly the same interests. So you can't necessarily expect everyone to carry out the sanctions the same way or to be completely 100 percent consistent. So maybe China, it's dealing with North Korea in the way that it's dealing with it, perhaps not in the way that the United States wants. Are you just going to go and sanction China then? Like where does it stop? The problem at the end of the day is that North Korea is developing a nuclear weapon that can strike the United States. And you can sanction North Korea all you want and you can sanction China all you want, you know, unless those sanctions are going to compel someone to stop developing a nuclear program or are going to compel China to do something to stop North Korea from developing that program ­­– and I am not convinced China can do anything to stop that – it's not really going to work, right? XS: It seems unlikely, yeah. One thing that we are focused on that we've talked about before, certainly internally, I think maybe we've written some Watch List items on it, is whether or not the United States will be effective in obtaining sanctions on imports of crude oil to North Korea. Late last year, there were sanctions placed on North Korean coal exports to China, and that was seen as a significant or at least sort of a milestone in the development of the sanctions regime against North Korea because that's one way that North Korea receives a lot of hard foreign currency from abroad. But it seems like their supply of crude oil hasn't technically changed that much, and Tillerson mentioned a couple weeks ago that that's one thing that they would be seeking through conversations with China. But North Korea, there's some reports, some data that seems to indicate that they get a lot of crude oil both from China and Russia. It's hard to know because those numbers are no longer officially published by China and I don't think they've ever been officially published by Russia so they come through like North Korean defectors who supposedly have been dealing with imports from Russia. So that might be one area of sanctions where, if somehow the U.S. could pull that off, it might change the game a little bit because it could impact North Korea's ability to wage a conventional war. But there's no reason, or I can't see any reason at least, why China would get in line behind that or certainly why Russia would. It seems like they would want to extract pretty significant concessions from the U.S. in other parts of the world in order to actually implement a sanctions regime like that. JLS: Yeah, and then of course, the last piece to the puzzle of these sanctions here is Iran. And I think Iran has fallen a little bit by the wayside in terms of people's attention and in terms of even the U.S. attention. You know, before he was secretary of defense, James Mattis was very, very focused on Iran in general when he was thinking about U.S. foreign policy. And I think that Iran is going to become more and more of an issue for the United States. I think the Middle East is going to become more and more of an issue for the United States, not necessarily because of Iran itself but because the battle against the Islamic State is progressing. I don't think that it's imminently over. I think the Islamic State is going to stand and fight for quite a while longer. But you can sort of begin to see the end game for the Islamic State and for defeating this particular iteration of the Islamic State. And I think that you're not going to get peace out of that. What you're going to get is that the coalition that formed against ISIS is going to break apart and there's going to be a lot of power vacuums all over the Middle East that different countries are going to be looking to fill, and I think Iran is the one that is most aggressively pursuing those things. So we've had a couple years here with a very uneasy understanding between the United States and between Iran. I don't expect the nuclear deal to fall apart anytime soon or anything like that. And like I said, I think we're still looking at another year maybe two of the Islamic State being a major actor. But I think if you start thinking about the Middle East five years, 10 years out, and you think about what's going to happen once the Islamic State loses some of its what core territory is left remaining to it. Iran and the United States don't see eye to eye in the Middle East. The United States is trying to reconstruct a balance of power there and Iran is trying to set itself up as a regional hegemon. It is expending a lot of money and a lot of even its own soldiers in Iraq, in Syria, even in Lebanon with its relationship with Hezbollah to try and make that come to fruition. So I don't think that these sanctions themselves will be that consequential in terms of the relationship between the United States and Iran, but I think that relationship overall is probably trending in a negative direction. I don't think that we should think for a moment that just because the nuclear accord happened a couple years ago, that things are going to stay rosy there. XS: You mentioned a couple of minutes ago that your of Iran's acquiescence to the nuclear accord was not due to the prior sanctions regime implemented by the U.S. but rather the regional challenge it faced by a potential Sunni leader, ISIS. Could you explain a little bit more what you mean by that? JLS: Sure, and I don't want to fall into the fallacy of saying that one thing is the most determinative or deciding thing, right? Like obviously all these things were working in concert together. And I do think that the sanctions that the U.S. carried out against Iran in 2010, they certainly hurt the Iranian economy. We have plenty of evidence in terms of shrinking GDP and people not buying Iranian oil across the board that indicated that Iran's economy was hurting and that average, everyday Iranians were hurting. Again, though, when you have a country like Iran that has for so long been a U.S. enemy and frankly has some reason to think of the U.S. as an enemy. The U.S. was involved in trying to – I mean, not trying – helped a military coup in Iran in 1953. This is not a country that has a reason to trust necessarily United States motives. So I am saying that to say in the same way that we were talking about North Korea and we're saying, “Well, are sanctions really going to affect a regime that has already sacrificed so much and which has such a level of sort of autocracy and dedication in the population itself?” I sort of see Iran the same way. Iran is a very proud country with a very well-defined national identity, and I don't think that Iran is going to bend just because the United States or the West even is trying to make Iran feel things economically. I think what Iran did was, I think that before 2010, they saw a very real chance of extending their influence from Tehran all the way to the Mediterranean Sea. Iraq was in shambles and that's a majority Shiite Arab country, so they thought that they could dominate there. You had Syria, which was under the control of Bashar al-Assad and that was another Iranian – I don't want to say client state, but another Iranian ally in the region and definitely looked towards Iran for guidance and money and things. And then you had Hezbollah, which had basically taken over large parts if not all of Lebanon and is that rare militant group that has gone from militant group to governing group, and has done that fairly well. That was the story in 2010. There was an arc of Shiite influence going to the Mediterranean and things looked very good for Iran. That all fell apart because ISIS rose in Iraq and significantly challenged the Iranian idea of stability there. Bashar al-Assad faced rebels in his own country, which ISIS eventually came to capitalize on. Brought Hezbollah into that fight, so Hezbollah can no longer focus on annoying Israel or doing any of the other proxy things that it does. It's committed to almost a conventional-style war in Syria. So you had all of these strategic things just fall apart on Iran, and you have to understand that for Iran, it's Iran's Ukraine, basically. You know we talked earlier about how Russia has such a deep interest in Ukraine. Iraq and the state of things beyond the Zagros mountains in that direction is the same type of thing for Iran. So I think sanctions played a role, and I think sanctions hurt the Iranian economy, and I think it would certainly be hard for Iran to go back to where it was before. We've seen very high GDP growth numbers out of their economy, and I think that both Iran and some of the Western companies that are partnering with Iran would make real sanctions hard to enforce. But overall, when I look at the deciding factors over why that deal had to be made, the United States decided that it needed to defeat ISIS and it needed to defeat ISIS first and then it could deal with other problems later. And I think Iran sort of saw the same thing. They were worried about ISIS not just taking over Syria and knocking out one of their client states along the way to the Mediterranean but also significantly threatening Baghdad, and it's not an idle threat and it's not something that they were imagining. I mean Saddam Hussein – the Sunnis were ruling but it was not only a secularist regime – but the point is that was Iran's mortal enemy. They fought one of the worst wars that's not talked about I think in the 20th century between 1980 and 1989. So that's kind of what I meant about that. I think that the United States and Iran, the sanctions stuff is all surface level. The deeper problem there is that the United States wants a balance of power in that region, and Iran wants to be the power in that region. And for as long as that's the case – and I don't see that stopping anytime soon – they are going to butt heads, and sanctions aren't going to do anything to change that underlying reality. XS: So despite these conflicting long-term divergences in national interests, countries can still find ways to cooperate on short-term security interests? JLS: Yeah, absolutely. I mean the United States and Russia are definitely at odds against each other in Ukraine. They're tacitly cooperating in Syria. I mean that goes underreported, I think. I mean there's no way that the United States could have the assets running around that it does in Syria and Russia could have the assets that has running around in Syria and there not be some level of coordination. And when we look at the U.S.-backed forces in the region, especially the Syrian Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces, and we look at what the Syrian Army is doing, which is backed by Russia, you can see a coherent strategy of basically trying to cut the ground out from underneath ISIS. And sure maybe there's not a formalization or maybe they're not having tea and cookies in the afternoon together, but there's definitely some level of communication between the United States and Russia on that issue. So yeah, it's very rare that you have a relationship between two countries that is just totally hostile and has no bounds for cooperation. I would say one example, though, of where there isn't a lot of – there's really no grounds of cooperation that I can think of between North Korea and the United States. Can you think of anything there? XS: I mean not really. North Korea's core security imperative is to deter an attack from the United States, which requires developing a weapon which would violate one of the United States' core security imperatives, which is keeping North Korea from having a deliverable nuclear weapon. JLS: And I mean one of the results of North Korea being such a closed regime to the rest of the world is that North Korea really does not on a global stage have a lot of power that it can play with or bargain with, right? There's nothing that North Korea can do for the United States in East Asia if the U.S. did want to make some kind of deal. Whereas Iran is a powerful country and has power over a lot of different actors that the United States sometimes has trouble interacting with. In that sense, Iran is much more like China. China is trying to present itself as an actor that can help the United States or can find common ground with the United States so the United States should cooperate with it. North Korea doesn't really function that way. North Korea really is shut off and is really crouched into a defensive posture. Mostly because I don't think there is any other real way for them to do it. And in some sense, they've succeeded. They have created a situation that is incredibly difficult even for very powerful countries like China and the United States to deal with. XS: So if you're interested in this stuff, we've written a lot about sanctions but really about how sanctions sit on top of a lot of deeper, underlying structural causes for why we see nations acting the way they do. We've written a lot about that this week. You can check out the RC that Jacob you did yesterday. Antonia published one on sanctions earlier this week. I will be having a piece that will analyze Europe's energy dependency on Russia and perhaps give some sense of how Russia could retaliate there and that will published on Mauldin Economics, our partner's website, on Monday. And that should give you a bit of a deeper understanding of what's really going on behind these sanctions. JLS: Yeah, and I think it will be an interesting exercise of maybe 3-6 months from now, Xander, we sit down and we start a podcast and we see where these sanctions are and what impact they've actually had over the course of the last 3-6 months. XS: Let's do it. JLS: Yeah. On that note, thanks, everyone, for listening. We're glad you are enjoying the podcast, we will catch you next week. See you out there.

Twenty-five years ago, thousands of Iraqi Kurds lost their lives as they fled the forces of Saddam Hussein into the Zagros and Taurus mountains of northern Iraq, towards Iran and Turkey. Massively outgunned, many were killed by the helicopter gunship fire and tanks at the command of Saddam's well trained and brutal troops. BBC Middle East correspondent Jim Muir revisits the exodus.

On Air With Lemon 8 01.Constant Progress - Lowlands 02.LoQuai - DNA 03.Sweet & Sour - Thinking Of You (Slow Down Mix) 04.Randomatic - You and I 05.Constant Progress - Le Cygne Cristalinn 06.Shipstad & Warren - Near Perfect 07.Constant Progress - Timeline 08.Sound Quelle - Caprica 09.Delerium - Innocente (Gladiator Remix) 10.Thy Breed - Mental Coach - (Harry Lemon Remix) 11.Lutzenkirchen - Somebody 12.H2AT ft Ino - Getaway (Magitman Remix) 13.Beat Factory - Roswell (Cid Inc Remix) 14.Taster Peter & Phunk - Rockin Africa 15.Lerry Müller - I'm Your Computer 16.Ballroom - Passenger 17.Joshua Ryan - Pistol Whip (James Holden Remix) 18.Zagros & Pacific - The Grand - (Lemon8 Remix) 19.Origene - Sanctuary (Lemon 8 Mix)

On Air With Lemon 8 01.Constant Progress - Lowlands 02.LoQuai - DNA 03.Sweet & Sour - Thinking Of You (Slow Down Mix) 04.Randomatic - You and I 05.Constant Progress - Le Cygne Cristalinn 06.Shipstad & Warren - Near Perfect 07.Constant Progress - Timeline 08.Sound Quelle - Caprica 09.Delerium - Innocente (Gladiator Remix) 10.Thy Breed - Mental Coach - (Harry Lemon Remix) 11.Lutzenkirchen - Somebody 12.H2AT ft Ino - Getaway (Magitman Remix) 13.Beat Factory - Roswell (Cid Inc Remix) 14.Taster Peter & Phunk - Rockin Africa 15.Lerry Müller - I'm Your Computer 16.Ballroom - Passenger 17.Joshua Ryan - Pistol Whip (James Holden Remix) 18.Zagros & Pacific - The Grand - (Lemon8 Remix) 19.Origene - Sanctuary (Lemon 8 Mix)