Podcasts about park chung

On the martial law crisis in South Korea. For the full episode: patreon.com/bungacast Jamie Doucette, who researches contemporary political economy and Korea's development at the University of Manchester, talks to Alex and George about December 2024's coup attempt and the past 50 years in the Republic of Korea.  Why is South Korea western capitalism's best propaganda tool? Did Yoon Suk Yeol want to institute a dictatorship? Did he want to militarise all of society, or only politics? How "unreconstructed" is the South Korean right? Do they dream of dicatorship? What was the Park Chung-hee regime of the 60s and 70s like? What is authoritarian developmentalism? Why did S. Korea democratise? Did the workers win it or did elites concede it? What is the post-developmental state, how neoliberal is ROK, and what does the left-right spectrum look like now? What was the Candlelight movement of 2016? Links:  /420/ Fertility Freefall & Gender Strife in South Korea ft. Hyeyoung Woo The Postdevelopmental State: Dilemmas of Economic Democratization in Contemporary South Korea, Jamie Doucette (OPEN ACCESS) The Logic of Compressed Modernity, Chang Kyung-Sup 

It's an EmMajority Report Thursday! She speaks with John Carl Baker, director of programs at Ploughshares, to discuss the ongoing political unrest in South Korea. Then, she speaks with Giorgio Cafiero, CEO of Gulf State Analytics & adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University, to discuss the recent developments in Syria after rebel forces entered Aleppo. First, Emma runs through updates on the search for the UnitedHealthcare CEO's killer, SCOTUS' oral arguments on Tennessee's ban on trans care for minors, Memphis Police discrimination, Trump's elite-led cabinet, questions about Tulsi Gabbard's loyalties, Pete Hegseth's myriad embarrassments, Israel's genocide in Gaza, Trump's legal woes, and the future of Democratic leadership, before parsing a little deeper through yesterday's oral arguments for US v. Skrmetti in front of the Supreme Court, and the fear that they might uphold Tennessee's violently transphobic policy. John Carl Baker then joins, diving right into a step-by-step breakdown of how South Korean President Yoon's attempt (and failure) to declare and enforce martial law last Tuesday developed, beginning with his declaration and assembling of soldiers and police around the National Assembly, through the rampant protests to allow legislatures to enter the assembly to vote down Yoon's attempted coup, and to the overwhelming 190-0 (in an assembly of 300) veto of the President's martial law. After briefly touching on the limited vocal support for Yoon from among his conservative allies, Baker steps back to explore the history of South Korea's conservative ties to dictatorship, beginning with Japan's brutal 30-year occupation of Korea through the end of the Second World War – an occupation bolstered by cooperation and support from conservative, capitalist, and right-wing Koreans – and through the sequential regimes of Chon Doo-hwan and Park Chung-hee from the 1960s-80s, with Park Geun-hye (daughter of Chung-hee) even rising to the Presidency just a decade ago only to be impeached over her corrupt practices, also unpacking the continued prevalence of authoritarian strains within the South Korean right over the last century. He and Emma then look at the non-coup-related failures of Yoon's regime that created both his overwhelming unpopularity and the strong opposition he sought to undermine via coup, wrapping up the interview by unpacking the role of the US in backing Yoon's regime, and what the ideal future of US-Korean relations would look like to the Korean electorate. Professor Giorgio Cafiero then joins, first running through updates on the recent sweeping offensives by Syrian rebels, successfully taking both Aleppo and Hama from the Assad regime, before taking a sharp step back as he walks us through the evolution of the 13-year Civil War, beginning with the Arab spring and spurring the intervention of myriad regional and international actors, through the 2015 intensification of conflict at the hand of increased Russian support for Assad and Iranian-backed groups, and to the lull in tensions that started in 2020, only to break this past week. After parsing through the more specific history of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and the deep and complex ties between the Syrian and Iranian regimes, Emma and Professor Cafiero tackle the prevalent role of external conflicts in how the impact of these Syrian Rebel conquests will unfold, with Iran's involvement in Hezbollah's conflict with Israel and Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine giving two major parties conflicting interests. Cafiero expands on the precarious state of the Syrian state at this moment, looking both at what that means for a potential (however brief) lull in conflict and for the future of the Syrian government, before wrapping up with the ongoing role of Israeli relations in shaping Middle Eastern politics. And in the Fun Half: Emma is joined by Brandon Sutton and Matt Binder as they listen to Eddie from Fort Worth's Stetson Kennedy recommendations, talk with Gary from North Carolina about the divide between Trump voters and down-ballot GOP voters, and admire Jane Fonda's performance on Bill Maher. Meg from Seattle unpacks the harrowing and life-threatening impacts of repressive reproductive care, and Megyn Kelly aids in the attempted resuscitation of Pete Hegseth's potential career, plus, your calls and IM! Follow John on Twitter here: https://x.com/johncarlbaker Check out Ploughshares here: https://ploughshares.org/ Follow Giorgio on Twitter here: https://x.com/GiorgioCafiero Check out Gulf State Analytics here: https://gulfstateanalytics.com/ Become a member at JoinTheMajorityReport.com: https://fans.fm/majority/join Follow us on TikTok here!: https://www.tiktok.com/@majorityreportfm Check us out on Twitch here!: https://www.twitch.tv/themajorityreport Find our Rumble stream here!: https://rumble.com/user/majorityreport Check out our alt YouTube channel here!: https://www.youtube.com/majorityreportlive Join Sam on the Nation Magazine Cruise! 7 days in December 2024!!: https://nationcruise.com/mr/ Check out StrikeAid here!; https://strikeaid.com/ Gift a Majority Report subscription here: https://fans.fm/majority/gift Subscribe to the ESVN YouTube channel here: https://www.youtube.com/esvnshow Subscribe to the AMQuickie newsletter here: https://am-quickie.ghost.io/ Join the Majority Report Discord! http://majoritydiscord.com/ Get all your MR merch at our store: https://shop.majorityreportradio.com/ Get the free Majority Report App!: http://majority.fm/app Go to https://JustCoffee.coop and use coupon code majority to get 20% off your purchase! Check out today's sponsors: Factor: Head to https://FactorMeals.com/50majority and use code 50majority to get 50% off your first box plus free shipping. That's code 50majority at https://FactorMeals.com/50majority to get 50% off your first box plus free shipping while your subscription is active. Tushy:  Give the gift of practical luxury that benefits everyone in your household.  Go to https://HelloTushy.com/TMR now to grab your deal before it's gone!  Don't forget to give us a shout out while you're there and let them know we sent you. Blueland Cleaning Products: Blueland has a special offer for listeners. Right now, get 15% off your first order by going to https://blueland.com/majority. You won't want to miss this! https://blueland.com/majority for 15% off. Follow the Majority Report crew on Twitter: @SamSeder @EmmaVigeland @MattLech @BradKAlsop Check out Matt's show, Left Reckoning, on Youtube, and subscribe on Patreon! https://www.patreon.com/leftreckoning Check out Matt Binder's YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/mattbinder Subscribe to Brandon's show The Discourse on Patreon! https://www.patreon.com/ExpandTheDiscourse Check out Ava Raiza's music here! https://avaraiza.bandcamp.com/ The Majority Report with Sam Seder - https://majorityreportradio.com/

New season means new characters and in this interview I spoke with Seattle native Sung Ho Park. He shares his background in taekwondo, a Karate Kid connection with an early film he participated in, and how he landed a role on Cobra Kai! Twitter: @CobraKaiPod / Instagram: @CobraKaiKompanion Email: CobraKaiPod@gmail.com Cobra Kai Kompanion Website Merch store: ckkompanion.threadless.com The Kompanion Network Group

June 25, 2024 - Join us for a conversation with Dr. Peter Banseok Kwon, Assistant Professor of Korean Studies at the University at Albany, State University of New York, on his newly released book: Cornerstone of the Nation: The Defense Industry and the Building of Modern Korea under Park Chung Hee. Newly released by Harvard University Press, this book is the first historical account of the complex alliance of military and civilian forces that catapulted South Korea's conjoined militarization and industrialization under Park Chung Hee. Kwon reveals how Park's secret program to build an independent defense industry spurred a total mobilization of business, science, labor, and citizenry, all of which converged in military-civilian forces that propelled an unprecedented model of modernization in Korea. Kwon joins President and CEO Tom Byrne in conversation. For more information, please visit the link below: https://www.koreasociety.org/policy-and-corporate-programs/item/1830-cornerstone-of-the-nation-the-defense-industry-and-the-building-of-modern-korea-under-park-chung-hee

사랑받지 못하는 공화국 (2024) was written by Professor Bryan Myers, a professor of international studies at Dongseo University in Busan. Anyone familiar with North Korean studies will be keenly aware of Myers and his work as he has written some excellent books on that subject, including The Cleanest Race and North Korea's Juche Myth. His latest book reveals two firsts: It's his first written in Korean and it's his first that deals with South Korean politics. Myers has said that "the book's original thrust is the argument that the right neglected / still neglects the work of state-building, but most young people, being centrist or progressive, are just not interested in that issue." We'll try and see if he achieved that or not. The book: https://product.kyobobook.co.kr/detail/S000212218893 Myers' Blog: https://sthelepress.com/ In this conversation we are joined by Jacco Zwetsloot, host of the NK News Podcast, Park Kyunghoon (Charlie) for the third time, and Ko Eunbi from Seoul Women's University. NK News podcast: https://www.nknews.org/category/north-korea-news-podcast/latest Jacco's Twitter: https://twitter.com/JaccoZed   Discussion Outline  0:00 Introductions 3:10 Do Koreans know when their republic began? 12:15 Is South Korea a republic or a nation? 29:30 The sinking of the ROKS Cheonan 35:15 Who are North Korea? 44:45 Korea as Anti-Japanese 1:05:35 Park Chung-hee as a benevolent dictator? 1:18:10 The American hegemony of Korean Studies 1:21:23 Reading Korean history written by a foreigner 1:30:05 Personal narratives 1:35:35 Does the SK left love North Korea? 1:43:05 Closing thoughts 1:57:15 Tattoos   Korea Deconstructed by David Tizzard ▶ Get in touch: datizzard@swu.ac.kr ▶ Support us on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/user?u=62047873 ▶ Watch us on Youtube: /davidtizzard ▶ Find us on Insta: https://www.instagram.com/koreadeconstructed ▶ Listen on iTunes: https://podcasts.apple.com/kr/podcast/korea-deconstructed/id1587269128 ▶Listen on Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/5zdXkG0aAAHnDwOvd0jXEE ▶ Listen on podcasts: https://koreadeconstructed.libsyn.com/  

Video này được chuyển thể từ bài viết gốc trên nền tảng mạng xã hội chia sẻ tri thức Spiderum

Tanner Rogers is a 2023-24 Fulbright U.S. Student Program Winner. His research consists of the literary analysis of fictional texts produced during the Park Chung Hee era (1961-1979), particularly focusing on the development of “space” in its various physical and conceptual forms, and how texts engage with the rapid urbanization and industrialization of cities like Seoul and Incheon during this time. We spoke about books, life, and Korea.   This episode again featuring Jeon Yunseo  Instagram: @y_jeon_s   Discussion Outline 0:00 Tanner's Introduction to Korea 15:55 The Park Chung-hee Era 40:05 Korean Literature 53:44 The Dwarf (난장이가 쏘아 올린 작은 공) 1:11:08 The Concept of Han 1:18:05 Hwang Sok-yong 1:36:34 Changing Korean Traditions 1:55:50 The Concept of Space 2:12:05 The Urbanization of Korean Space 2:25:35 1970s Korea vs 2024 Korea 2:36:25 Book Recommendations   Korea Deconstructed by David Tizzard ▶ Get in touch: datizzard@swu.ac.kr ▶ Support us on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/user?u=62047873 ▶ Watch us on Youtube: /davidtizzard ▶ Listen on iTunes: https://podcasts.apple.com/kr/podcast/korea-deconstructed/id1587269128 ▶Listen on Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/5zdXkG0aAAHnDwOvd0jXEE ▶ Listen on podcasts: https://koreadeconstructed.libsyn.com/ ▶ Music: Mindstrap by David Tizzard ▶ Recorded at 허브 36.5: https://www.instagram.com/the_story_from_you/

Although this started as a conversation about Gwangju and Professor Don Baker's experiences there starting in 1971, including witnessing the aftermath of the massacre in 1980, we quickly understood there was much more for us to explore. This includes Don's impressions of Kim Dae-jung, gender and women in the Joseon Dynasty, Korea's historical relationship with China, Confucianism and ancestor worship, the effects of Japanese colonization, and the field of Korean Studies more broadly. It was completely spontaneous, but I also noted the following people and their work referenced throughout this conversation, demonstrating the depth and breadth of Don's knowledge: Alexis Dudden, Dave C Kang, Alexander Woodside, Jisoo Kim, Hyaeweol Choi, Carter Eckert, Andre Schmid, Jahyun Kim Haboush, Gregory Henderson, Robert Carlin, Eugene Park, Michael Seth, John Jorgensen, Kim Sun Joo, BR Myers, Bruce Cumings, James Palais, Mark Peterson, John Duncan, Steve Shields, and David Dolinger. Despite knowing the tragedy and violence taking place in Gwangju, Don snuck into the city to find his friends and understand what was really happening. His descriptions of the attacks and murder that took place in Gwangju are heartbreaking to listen to. And through all of this, he nevertheless finishes with words of hope and positivity.    Discussion Outline 0:00 Unpacking Gwangju  6:00 Kim Dae-jung 10:20 1970s Korea 20:50 On Confucianism 24:30 Korean Studies 30:00 The Joseon Dynasty 38:50 Japanese Colonization and Collaboration 51:55 Korean Studies and Factions 1:08:50 Confucianism vs Catholicism (Ancestor Worship) 1:15:30 The Assassination of Park Chung-hee 1979 1:21:40 The Gwangju Massacre 1980 1:47:00 American Involvement in Gwangju 1:55:30 Representations of Gwangju 2:03:46 Conclusions on Life and Korea Dr. Baker's Books A Korean Confucian's Advice on How to Be Moral: Tasan Chŏng Yagyong's Reading of the Zhongyong (University of Hawaii Press, 2023) Catholics and Anti-Catholicism in Chosŏn Korea (University of Hawaii Press) with Franklin Rausch. May, 2017 Korean Spirituality (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008) Chosŏn Hugi Yugyo wa Ch'ŏnjugyo ŭi Taerip [The Confucian Confrontation with Catholicism in the Latter Half of the Chosŏn Dynasty] (Seoul: Iljogak Publishing Co., 1997) Korea Deconstructed by David Tizzard ▶ Get in touch: datizzard@swu.ac.kr ▶ Support us on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/user?u=62047873 ▶ Watch us on Youtube:/davidtizzard  ▶ Listen on iTunes: https://podcasts.apple.com/kr/podcast/korea-deconstructed/id1587269128 ▶Listen on Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/5zdXkG0aAAHnDwOvd0jXEE ▶ Listen on podcasts: https://koreadeconstructed.libsyn.com/ ▶ Music: https://www.instagram.com/disorientalz/ 

Steve first came to Korea in 1975 and continues his life-long love of the land of the morning calm. He has been a missionary, pastor, and leadership development officer. He has years of experience in translations and editing, has several published books and dozens of scholarly papers to his credit, mostly in theology and the religious history of the United States. He is a life member of Royal Asiatic Society Korea, served on the board of directors for many years, two terms as vice president, and is now serving a second term as president. Discussion Outline 0:00 Coming to Korea in the 1970s 15:00 On the Korean Language 27:00 Life under Park Chung-hee 36:30 Changing economic conditions 51:20 Who was Park Chung-hee? 1:08:00 Choi Kyu-ha and life after Park 1:27:40 The Royal Asiatic Society 1:52:50 Christianity and Korea 2:30:20 The Youth of Korea   Korea Deconstructed by David Tizzard ▶ Get in touch: datizzard@swu.ac.kr ▶ Support us on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/user?u=62047873 ▶ Watch us on Youtube: /davidtizzard ▶ Listen on iTunes: https://podcasts.apple.com/co/podcast...  ▶ Listen on podcasts: https://koreadeconstructed.libsyn.com...  ▶ Music: Radical Gary - K-Invisible

October 26, 1979. The head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency assassinates South Korean President Park Chung-Hee.Support the show! Join Into History for ad-free listening and more.History Daily is a co-production of Airship and Noiser.Go to HistoryDaily.com for more history, daily.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

David Mason is not only a vessel of wisdom, he is also a masterful storyteller. In just over two hours, he explains how people came to the Korean Peninsula, how Buddhism arrived from China, how it interacted with the indigenous Shamanism, the ideological conflicts and discussions the various schools of thought generated, the creation of the Jogye Order and the Taego Order, Master Songchul, how drugs affect the development of spirituality, how Sansin is Tangun, and much more... He speaks honestly and from great experience. A conversation it felt a pleasure to be a part of and a follow-up discussion on Taoism is already being planned. David Mason is an American academic who first came to Korea in 1982. He has authored about 10 prominent books on Korean culture, spirituality, travel and mountains, and serves as a scholar, author, public speaker and tour guide. Find him online, book a tour, buy a book, and much more David Mason's Website: https://san-shin.org   Discussion Outline 0:00 How did you get into spirituality? 5:24 The religious mountains of Korea 13:20 What is Korean Buddhism? 31:50 The temples of Korea 42:32 Does Buddhism still have a role to play today? 52:22 Negative perceptions of Shamanism 1:07:06 The role of drugs in Korean shamanism 1:11:44 Sansin vs Tangun 1:19:28 Shamanism and gender 1:25:00 Illegal shamanism in modern Korea 1:28:26 The supreme patriarch: Master Seongchol 1:38:25 Shaman temples you can visit today 1:44:25 Religion as psychological comfort in modern society 1:51:05 Park Chung-hee and the national parks of Korea 1:57:36 Personal enlightenment   Korea Deconstructed by David Tizzard ▶ Get in touch: datizzard@swu.ac.kr ▶ Support us on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/user?u=62047873 ▶ Watch us on Youtube: /davidtizzard  ▶ Listen on iTunes: https://podcasts.apple.com/co/podcast... ▶ Listen on podcasts: https://koreadeconstructed.libsyn.com... ▶ Music by me: Radical Gary - The Reoccurring Peace Machine https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AAkVRbH8eyg 

Vor rund zwei Monaten gab es ein außergewöhnliches Jubiläum: Der koreanische Nationalsport Taekwondo feierte ein fünfjähriges Jubiläum. Natürlich gibt es den Kampfsport schon sehr viel länger, er wurde nach der Befreiung von der japanischen Besetzung Koreas aus dem japanischen Karate weiterentwickelt und ist seit fast 60 Jahren ein eigenständiger, weltbekannter Breiten- wie Leistungssport. 1971 wurde er vom damaligen Präsidenten Park Chung-hee zu einer Art Nationalsport erklärt, koreanische Taekwondo-Trainer verbreiteten ihn in der ganzen Welt, viele auch in Deutschland. Seit den Olympischen Sommerspielen 2000 in Sydney ist er ein offizieller olympischer Sport, und seit fünf Jahren nun auch der einzig gesetzlich anerkannte Nationalsport Südkoreas. Dazu gab es Ende März auf dem Gwanghwamun-Platz im Stadtzentrum ein Massengedenken mit einem Weltrekord von über 12.000 Taekwondo-Praktizierenden zur selben Zeit. Ergreifen wir die Gelegenheit, darüber zu sprechen!

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When did Koreans become Korean? That is the question Dr. Henry Em, Associate Professor of History at Yonsei University, and I started exploring. It wasn't planned. And it was difficult. But by then end of this, I think we got somewhere. And I got to know Henry more as a person. We're talking about the creation of nation states, official narratives, the minjok, and actors as the subjects of history. About people. About Kim Ku, about Park Chung-hee, About status and gender in Korean history, post-colonialism, communism, North Korea, and memory and violence. We even talk about K-dramas. Henry Em (임흥순) is associate professor of Asian Studies at Yonsei University, Underwood International College. He was born in Seoul, grew up in Chicago, and received his BA, MA, and PhD (History, 1995) from the University of Chicago. From 1995 to 2013, he was assistant professor at UCLA and University of Michigan, and associate professor at NYU. He was a Fulbright Senior Scholar to Korea (1998-1999) and Visiting Professor at Centre de Recherches sur la Corée, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris (2000). Professor Em began teaching at Yonsei University in 2013. His recent publications include “North Korea as Neighbor: Critical Scholarship on North Korea,” Korea Journal, 61-3 (autumn, 2021), “Christianity, the Cold War, and the Construction of the Republic of Korea,” Korea Journal, 60-4 (winter, 2020), and “Killer Fables: Yun Ch'i-ho, Bourgeois Enlightenment, and the Free Laborer,” Journal of Korean Studies, 25-1 (March, 2020). His book, The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea, was published by Duke University Press in 2013. Henry's Book: https://www.amazon.com/Great-Enterprise-Sovereignty-Historiography-Asia-Pacific/dp/0822353725 Korea Deconstructed by David Tizzard ▶ Get in touch: datizzard@swu.ac.kr ▶ Support us on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/user?u=62047873 ▶ Watch us on Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/c/DavidTizzard ▶ Listen on iTunes: https://podcasts.apple.com/co/podcast... ▶ Listen on podcasts: https://koreadeconstructed.libsyn.com... 

This episode discusses Park Chung Hee, the first president of the Third Republic of South Korea. #ParkChungHee #ParkJungHee #박정희 #SouthKorea #남한 #Korea #한국 #Atlas #History This is a homemade, free podcast. It takes a lot of work and dedication. To support it, please visit: https://anchor.fm/nicholas-sheen/support --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/nicholas-sheen/support

This episode discusses Park Chung Hee, the first president of the Third Republic of South Korea. #ParkChungHee #ParkJungHee #박정희 #SouthKorea #남한 #Korea #한국 #Atlas #History This is a homemade, free podcast. It takes a lot of work and dedication. To support it, please visit: https://anchor.fm/nicholas-sheen/support --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/nicholas-sheen/support

Little Women ซีรีส์เกาหลีสุดเข้มข้นจาก Netflix จะเป็นแนวดราม่าลึกลับ แต่ที่จริงแล้วเรื่องราวต้นฉบับที่ซีรีส์นำมาดัดแปลงนั้นเป็นนิยายสุดคลาสสิคชื่อเดียวกัน หรือที่เป็นที่รู้จักในชื่อไทยว่า สี่ดรุณี โดยหยิบยืมโครงเรื่องและตัวละครมาใช้อย่างน่าสนใจ พร้อมกับการใส่เส้นเรื่องอื่น อ้างอิงผลงานคลาสสิกทั้งวรรณกรรม ภาพเขียน และใช้สัญลักษณ์มากมาย เพื่อขับเน้นปัญหาและความโหดร้ายของสังคม แต่นำมาใช้อย่างไร วันนี้ SERIES SOCIETYจะมาความสัญลักษณ์ในเรื่องให้ผู้ชมพิจารณา อ้างอิง Little Women, Series (2022) Louisa May Alcott, Little Women (1871) https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/.../over-90-korean-women... https://www.aljazeera.com/.../the-country-with-the-worlds... https://www.seoulz.com/education-inequality-in-korea-is.../ https://english.hani.co.kr/.../eng.../e_national/922522.html https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/.../2022/03/281_266247.html... https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Count-of-Monte-Cristo https://www.britannica.com/biography/Judas-Iscariot https://www.theartist.me/artwork/the-last-supper/ http://academic.udru.ac.th/~rspg/orchid.pdf https://www.bbg.org/.../article/orchids_and_how_they_grow.... https://www.nationalgeographic.com/.../search-for-rare... รยูซังยอง, The Origins of Korean Chaebols and their Roots in the Korean War Edward M Graham, Reforming Korea's Industrial Conglomerates, Chapter 2: The Miracle with a Dark Side: Korean Economic Development under Park Chung-hee https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/.../2020/04/113_79758.html https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160114000593 https://www.ala.org/.../ALA_AlcottBroch_ReverseParallel... Little Women, Film (2019)

This week we discuss the assassination of Park Chung-Hee, the former president of South Korea. We also discuss Applebees drink-special-fights, car dealerships, and more. Enjoy.

“Hàn Quốc có phải là một quốc gia tàn ác, khi mà họ đã đưa phần lớn tổng thống của họ vào tù sau khi kết thúc nhiệm kỳ? Tôi hi vọng xã hội sẽ nhận thức được rằng không nên có thêm những tổng thống Hàn Quốc bất hạnh nữa.” Đây là lời nói của giáo sư Ra Jong-il (라종일 ) giáo sư tại Đại Học Gachon – tác giả của cuốn sách “Những tổng thống bất hạnh của Hàn Quốc” đã đưa ra quan điểm về cách đối xử tàn bạo mà những cựu tổng thống Hàn Quốc phải gánh chịu sau khi kết thúc nhiệm kỳ. Kể từ khi Quốc Hội Hàn Quốc bầu Lý Thừa Vãn trở thành tổng thống của Đại Hàn Dân Quốc, 13 nhân vật đã lần lượt được bầu chọn để ngồi vào vị trí quyền lực nhất của quốc gia này. Tuy nhiên, phần lớn trong số họ đều không có một “cái kết” có hậu sau khi mãn nhiệm. Cho tới nay, có tới 9 trong số 13 cựu tổng thống đã bị ám sát, tự tử, sống lưu vong, buộc từ chức, hoặc bị kết án tù dài hạn. Danh sách những tổng thống “bất hạnh” bao gồm: Tổng thống đầu tiên Lý Thừa Vãn (이승만) – buộc sống lưu vong tại Hawai đến khi chết, tổng thống Yun Bo-seon (윤보선) bị ép từ chức sau 2 năm cầm quyền, tổng thống Park Chung-hee (박정희) – bị bắn chết ngay trong bữa tiệc tại phủ tổng thống, tổng thống Choi Kyu-hah (최규하) bị tiếm quyền và từ chức sau chưa tới một năm cầm quyền, tổng thống Chun Doo Hwan (Jeon Du-hwan 전두환) bị kết án 8 năm tù, tổng thống Roh Tae-woo bị tuyên án 20 năm tù (노태우), tổng thống Roh Moo-Hyun (노무현) tự sát sau khi kết nhiệm kỳ 1 năm, tổng thống Lee Myung-bak (이명박) bị kết án 17 năm tù, tổng thống Park Geun-hye (박근혜) bị quốc hội phế truất và bị kết án tới 20 năm tù. Với những thống kê như trên, tổng thống Hàn Quốc đã thực sự trở thành một nghề vô cùng “nguy hiểm” trên thế giới. Nền dân chủ bậc nhất thế giới Theo đài KBS tổng hợp, Hàn Quốc đã chuyển mình từ nhóm “dân chủ khiếm khuyết” sang nhóm “dân chủ đầy đủ” vào năm 2021 và đứng thứ 2 Châu Á chỉ sau Đài Loan. Những tiếng hô vang “Park Geun Hee từ chức”, những ngọn nến dường như cháy suốt đêm, hàng trăm nghìn người biểu tình chiếm đóng khu vực phía trước dinh tổng thống và hàng loạt vị trí khác tại Seoul trong nhiều tuần liền hồi cuối năm 2016 là minh chứng rõ ràng nhất về nền dân chủ của Hàn Quốc. Người dân nước này đã chứng minh cho cả thế giới thấy rằng, họ có khả năng đưa một tổng thống lên cầm quyền và sẵn sàng hạ bệ họ nếu những người này liên quan đến những bê bối tham nhũng. Hơn ai hết, người dân Hàn Quốc hiểu rõ và trân trọng giá trị dân chủ mà họ đã phải vất vả mới dành được từ tay những nhà lãnh đạo độc tài. Một trong số những phong trào đòi dân chủ từ tay độc tài nổi tiếng nhất là phong trào dân chủ Gwangju (광주 민주화 항쟁). Hơn 2000 người dân Hàn đã ngã xuống vì bị chính quyền tổng thống Chun Doo-hwan đàn áp đẫm máu. Người dân Hàn Quốc vẫn luôn nhắc lại sự kiện này bằng tất cả những gì họ có thể thể hiện được như xây đài tưởng niệm, làm phim, viết sách, và soạn nhạc cho thế hệ sau mãi mãi không thể quên được những mất mát mà cha ông họ phải chịu đựng để có được một nền dân chủ hàng đầu Châu Á. Xã hội phân cực đáng báo động “Chúng ta phải đoàn kết lại để xây dựng Đại Hàn Dân Quốc” – đây là một tuyên bố ngay sau khi đắc cử của Tân thống thống Yoon Seok-yeol. Tuyên bố này và lượng phiếu chênh lệch chỉ 0.8% trong đợt bầu cử tổng thống vừa rồi đã chỉ ra một sự thật rằng “xã hội Hàn Quốc đang phân cực một cách đáng báo động”. Khi nhắc đến sự phân cực này, giáo sư Choi Bae-geun (최배근) đã nhắc tới sự bất bình đẳng trong thu nhập, sự suy thoái cơ cấu nhân sự, công việc liên tục rời khỏi Hàn Quốc khiến cho ngày càng ít việc làm được tạo ra, người nghèo sẽ lại càng nghèo hơn còn tầng lớp thượng lưu thì lại càng ngày càng giàu, tài sản của họ lại được thừa kế bởi thế hệ sau. Ngoài ra tình trạng lão hóa dân số cũng khắc sâu thêm vấn đề này, càng ngày càng nhiều người già nhưng số lượng trẻ em lại giảm khiến cán cân thế hệ lệch hẳn về một bên. Những sự phân cực này có thể đóng một vai trò quan trọng trong phân cực chính trị. Theo báo Hani, sự phân cực về chính trị ở mức độ rất nghiêm trọng đang hiện hữu tại Hàn Quốc. Điều này dẫn đến sự căm ghét lẫn nhau giữa hai đảng chính trị tại Hàn Quốc, họ không công nhận những nỗ lực của nhau khi đảng viên đảng đối lập đang nắm quyền tổng thống. Tuy nhiên sự phân cực này nguy hiểm hơn ở khu vực các cử tri, bởi vì họ không thể thỏa hiệp giống như giới “tinh hoa chính trị”. Họ ủng hộ đảng phái vì những lời hứa, nhưng nếu những lời hứa đó tan thành mây khói trong thời gian đảng đó cầm quyền thì sự căm giận sẽ thực sự được bộc phát. Và đảng cầm quyền ở lần bầu cử sau cần phải làm gì đó để giải quyết được quả bom đang chờ phát nổ này. Anh Gyu-Dong tại đại học KyungPook cho biết khi được phỏng vấn: “Do mâu thuẫn giữa đảng cánh tả và cánh hữu trong quá trình hiện đại hóa sau chiến tranh Triều Tiên, cả hai bên đã cố gắng tấn công mỗi bên đối lập để dành quyền kiểm soát quốc gia. Theo suy nghĩ của tôi, một sự cố tai tiếng nào đó có thể xảy ra khi một tổng thống điều hành quốc gia. Tuy nhiên, đảng đối lập không thể tha thứ cho tổng thống, vì vậy họ đã xúi giục người dân và sau đó là buộc tội tổng thống sau khi họ kết thúc nhiệm kỳ.” Mối quan hệ giữa tài phiệt và chính trị Có một tầng lớp tinh hoa của Hàn Quốc được gọi là Cheabol, họ là những tài phiệt có tập đoàn lớn và cha truyền con nối. Họ được cho là nắm giữ tới 80% nền kinh tế Hàn Quốc, chính vì vậy mối quan hệ “đôi bên cùng có lợi” (win-win) giữa nhóm tài phiệt và đảng phái luôn hiện hữu. Một ví dụ rõ nét nhất là mối quan hệ giữa “thái tử” Samsung và bà Park, cựu tổng thống Hàn Quốc giai đoạn 2013 - 2017. Ông này đã hối lộ tổng thống Park và người bạn của bà này để nhận lại sự ủng hộ trong việc kế vị và đảm bảo quyền kiểm soát tập đoàn Samsung. Sau đó, ông đã bị kết án 5 năm tù và được tha bổng sau chỉ hơn 2 năm ngồi tù, mới gần đây nhân vật này đã đại diện tập đoàn Samsung đón tiếp tổng thống Yoon và nguyên thủ Mỹ Joe Biden đến thăm nhà máy sản xuất chất bán dẫn lớn nhất thế giới. Bên trong của một xã hội dân chủ lại đang tồn tại một hệ thống bao gồm nhiều gia tộc độc tài sẵn sàng làm những việc đằng sau hậu trường để đạt được một mục đích nhất định, và dường như họ thường thắng trong cuộc chơi này. Sự chăm sóc đặc biệt từ truyền thông Trước khi được bầu làm tổng thống, các ứng cử viên sẽ được giới báo chí chăm sóc “đặc biệt”, vì dường như hầu hết đời tư của họ sẽ được đưa tin công khai với công chúng. Ngoài ra, các ứng cử viên sáng giá sẽ có những buổi tranh luận công khai trên truyền hình để cử tri hiểu rõ và quyết định nên bầu ai với tấm phiếu của mình. Và trong thời gian này, những phát ngôn của họ sẽ được công khai và bàn luận trên đủ các trang báo cũng như cử tri. Một ví dụ cho trường hợp này chính là lời phát biểu của ông Yoon (trong thời gian trước bầu cử) khi được báo Joogang phỏng vấn. Ông Yoon tuyên bố“sẽ tiến hành điều tra các hành vi tiêu cực của chính quyền ông Moon (Moon Jae-in)”nếu ông Yoon đắc cử. Báo chí được xem như quyền lực thứ 4, báo chí có thể tạo ra làn sóng dư luận hoặc có thể nhấn chìm một vụ việc nào đó bằng khả năng vô hạn của họ. Tổng thống không chỉ là tổng tư lệnh điều hành một quốc gia, đó còn là vị trí cao nhất mà cá nhân một chính trị gia có thể đạt được. Để trở thành tổng thống tại Hàn Quốc, ứng cử viên phải trải qua quá trình xác minh sơ bộ và sau đó là bầu cử công khai. Tuy nhiên, kết cục của hầu hết tổng thống tại Hàn Quốc lại là những kết cục đáng buồn. Từ đống đổ nát của chế độ thuộc địa và chiến tranh Liên Triều, những tổng thống của Hàn đã chỉ huy đất nước để đạt được “Kỳ tích sông Hán” và đưa đất nước phát triển thành một đất nước tự do dân chủ thuộc top đầu thế giới. Nhưng kết cục của họ lại quá bi thảm nếu so sánh với nửa còn lại của bán đảo Triều Tiên, nơi quyền lực được truyền nối từ thế hệ này sang thế hệ khác.

Is Vladimir Putin's regime going the same way as Park Chung-hee's in its final years? Let's test this hypothesis. Authoritarian leaders tend to go through the same stages--eerily so. Can we predict what will happen with Putin by looking at what happened to Park?Join our Patreon to get more stuffhttps://patreon.com/darksideofseoulBook a tour of The Dark Side of Seoul Ghost Walkwww.darksideofseoul.comListener Mail! Send us a message (Instagram, Facebook, email) and we might read it on air.Music by SoraksanTop tier PatronsAngel EarlJoel BonominiShaaron CullenDevon HiphnerMinseok LeeJane HargraveAlix RadillaRyan BerkebileAshley RigbyGabi PalominoSteve MarshChad StruhsMitchy Brewer Sarah FordToni ASupport the show

After steering the Korean economy out of poverty, how did Park Chung-hee's popularity decline to the point that he was assassinated by his own cohort?Join our Patreon to get more stuffhttps://patreon.com/darksideofseoulBook a tour of The Dark Side of Seoul Ghost Walkwww.darksideofseoul.comListener Mail! Send us a message (Instagram, Facebook, email) and we might read it on air.Music by SoraksanTop tier PatronsAngel EarlJoel BonominiShaaron CullenDevon HiphnerMinseok LeeJane HargraveAlix RadillaRyan BerkebileAshley RigbyGabi PalominoSteve MarshChad StruhsMitchy Brewer Sarah FordToni ASupport the show

Park Chung-hee's legacy commands controversy. The President/Dictator oversaw Korea's rapid economic rise, and he brutalized his people with his brass knuckle rule. In the first of three episodes, we discuss how his rise synced with South Korea's rise.Join our Patreon to get more stuffhttps://patreon.com/darksideofseoulBook a tour of The Dark Side of Seoul Ghost Walk[lightframe shortname="koreanfoodtours" fallback="simple" full_items="yes" flow="345108" view_item="210189"]Book online now![/lightframe]Listener Mail! Send us a message (Instagram, Facebook, email) and we might read it on air.Music by SoraksanTop tier PatronsAngel EarlJoel BonominiShaaron CullenDevon HiphnerMinseok LeeAlix RadillaRyan BerkebileAshley RigbyGabi PalominoSteve MarshChad StruhsMitchy Brewer Sarah FordToni ASupport the show

Srikanth Reddy first encountered the complex poetic world of Don Mee Choi as a translator of avant-garde Korean poetry before reading Choi's own poetry. As a poet, Choi invites readers into her personal history—which is also the history of her father and of war. Even if you haven't read Choi's poetry, you've probably seen the work of her father—a photojournalist who filmed much of the news footage that Americans saw of the Vietnam War and the Cold War era. Choi is at work on a new book, Wings of Utopia, which is the final book in what unintentionally became a trilogy. In Hardly War, Choi set out to explore the dictatorship era of South Korea, but to understand Park Chung-hee's dictatorship, she felt she also needed to delve into the 1945 national division of Korea, so she wrote a second book, DMZ Colony. Today you'll hear three poems from the final book, where Choi orbits around her father's memories as a way to explore the Gwangju Massacre, and what Walter Benjamin called “temporal magic.”

-Lee Jae-myung visits the graveyard of former presidents Park Chung-hee and Syngman Rhee for the first time-Yoon Seok-youl says he might abolish the CIO if no improvements are made when he gets elected-Yoon Seok-youl will not take part in the debate on the 17th due to "busy schedule"-PPP gives no responses to Ahn Cheol-soo's merger proposal-PPP accuses NIS of replacing the main server to eliminate evidence of illegal acts-COVID-19 updates-이재명, 처음으로 박정희·이승만 전 대통령 묘역 참배-윤석열 유사시 공수처 폐지 추진 의사 밝혀-안철수 협상 없는 단일화 압박에도 양보 없는 국민의힘-윤석열 17일 토론 '일정 바빠서' 불참-국민의힘 국정원 '증거인멸용' 서버 교체 의혹 제기-코로나 업데이트Guest: Choi Kyungmi, ReporterSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Park Chung-Hee nổi tiếng là một nhà lãnh đạo độc tài ở Hàn Quốc những năm 60. Phong cách lãnh đạo trong của ông đã gây ra nhiều tranh cãi trong giới nghiên cứu lịch sử Hàn Quốc. Nhiều người phản đối và lên án dữ dội vì sự độc tài của Park Chung-Hee, nhưng cũng nhiều người cho rằng chính nhờ ông mà nền kinh tế xã hội Hàn Quốc đã được hồi sinh sau một thời kỳ khủng hoảng dài. ______________ Cùng tìm hiểu cuốn sách "Doing Good Better" tại: https://book.spiderum.vn/DGB Theo dõi Kênh Podcast "Người Trong Muôn Nghề" tại đây: https://b.link/youtube-podcast-NTMN Ghé Nhà sách Spiderum trên SHOPEE ngay thôi các bạn ơi: https://shp.ee/ynm7jgy Kênh Spiderum Giải Trí đã có Podcast, nghe tại đây: https://anchor.fm/spiderum-giai-tri ______________ Bài viết: PARK CHUNG HEE (END) – DI SẢN VÀ CÁI KẾT ĐẮNG CHO MỘT NHÀ ĐỘC TÀI Được viết bởi: Trần Quang Khải Link bài viết: https://b.link/youtube-park-chung-hee-p3 --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/spiderum/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/spiderum/support

Park Chung-Hee nổi tiếng là một nhà lãnh đạo độc tài ở Hàn Quốc những năm 60. Phong cách lãnh đạo trong của ông đã gây ra nhiều tranh cãi trong giới nghiên cứu lịch sử Hàn Quốc. Nhiều người phản đối và lên án dữ dội vì sự độc tài của Park Chung-Hee, nhưng cũng nhiều người cho rằng chính nhờ ông mà nền kinh tế xã hội Hàn Quốc đã được hồi sinh sau một thời kỳ khủng hoảng dài. ______________ Cùng tìm hiểu cuốn sách "Doing Good Better" tại: https://book.spiderum.vn/DGB Theo dõi Kênh Podcast "Người Trong Muôn Nghề" tại đây: https://b.link/youtube-podcast-NTMN Ghé Nhà sách Spiderum trên SHOPEE ngay thôi các bạn ơi: https://shp.ee/ynm7jgy Kênh Spiderum Giải Trí đã có Podcast, nghe tại đây: https://anchor.fm/spiderum-giai-tri ______________ Bài viết: PARK CHUNG HEE (P2) – TƯ DUY KINH TẾ SẮC SẢO CỦA NHÀ ĐỘC TÀI QUÂN SỰ Được viết bởi: Trần Quang Khải Link bài viết: https://b.link/youtube-park-chung-hee-p2 --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/spiderum/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/spiderum/support

Park Chung-Hee nổi tiếng là một nhà lãnh đạo độc tài ở Hàn Quốc những năm 60. Phong cách lãnh đạo trong của ông đã gây ra nhiều tranh cãi trong giới nghiên cứu lịch sử Hàn Quốc. Nhiều người phản đối và lên án dữ dội vì sự độc tài của Park Chung-Hee, nhưng cũng nhiều người cho rằng chính nhờ ông mà nền kinh tế xã hội Hàn Quốc đã được hồi sinh sau một thời kỳ khủng hoảng dài. ______________ Cùng tìm hiểu cuốn sách "Doing Good Better" tại: https://book.spiderum.vn/DGB Theo dõi Kênh Podcast "Người Trong Muôn Nghề" tại đây: https://b.link/youtube-podcast-NTMN Ghé Nhà sách Spiderum trên SHOPEE ngay thôi các bạn ơi: https://shp.ee/ynm7jgy Kênh Spiderum Giải Trí đã có Podcast, nghe tại đây: https://anchor.fm/spiderum-giai-tri ______________ Bài viết: PARK CHUNG HEE (P1) – KẺ ĐỘC TÀI HAY LÃNH TỤ ĐẠI TÀI CỦA HÀN QUỐC??? Được viết bởi: Trần Quang Khải Link bài viết: https://b.link/PARK-CHUNG-HEE-p1 --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/spiderum/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/spiderum/support

26 Tháng 10 Là Ngày Gì? Hôm Nay Là Ngày Sinh Của Hillary Clinton SỰ KIỆN 2017– Lễ hỏa táng cố quốc vương Thái Lan Bhumibol Adulyadej. 1967 – Mohammad Reza Pahlavi tiến hành nghi lễ đăng quang hoàng đế Iran 1940 – Máy bay tiêm kích North American P-51 Mustang thực hiện chuyến bay đầu tiên. 1863 – Hiệp hội Bóng đá Anh được thành lập tại Luân Đôn, là hiệp hội bóng đá lâu năm nhất trên thế giới. 1958 - Hãng hàng không Pan American Airways thực hiện chuyến bay thương mại đầu tiên bằng chiếc Boeing 707 từ Thành phố New York đến Paris. Sinh 1947 – Hillary Clinton, nữ chính khách Mỹ. Bà đã từng phục vụ trong nội các của Tổng thống Barack Obama với chức vụ Ngoại trưởng Hoa Kỳ 1794 - Konstantin Thon , kiến ​​trúc sư người Nga, thiết kế Cung điện Grand Kremlin 1803 - Joseph Hansom , kiến ​​trúc sư và nhà xuất bản người Anh, thiết kế Tòa thị chính Birmingham (mất năm 1882) 1967 - Keith Urban , ca sĩ, nhạc sĩ và nghệ sĩ guitar người Mỹ gốc New Zealand. Urban còn được biết đến với vai trò huấn luyện viên cuộc thi hát The Voice 2021 phiên bản Úc và làm giám khảo chương trình American Idol. Anh là chồng của diễn viên Nicole Kidman Mất 1979 – Tổng thống Hàn Quốc Park Chung-hee, Chương trình "Hôm nay ngày gì" hiện đã có mặt trên Youtube, Facebook và Spotify: - Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/aweekmedia#chulalongkorn - Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/c/AWeekTV - Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/6rC4CgZNV6tJpX2RIcbK0J - Apple Podcast: https://podcasts.apple.com/.../h%C3%B4m-nay.../id1586073418 #aweektv #26thang10 #Adulyadej #Pahlavi #P-51Mustang #HillaryClinton #KeithUrban Các video đều thuộc quyền sở hữu của Adwell jsc (adwell.vn) , mọi hành động sử dụng lại nội dung của chúng tôi đều không được phép. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/aweek-tv/message

Durante uma ceia no complexo residencial Casa Azul, Park Chung-hee, presidente da Coreia do Sul, é assassinado em 26 de outubro de 1979, após exercer um poder ditatorial por quase 18 anos. Veja a matéria completa em: https://operamundi.uol.com.br/historia/32046/hoje-na-historia-1979-ditador-sul-coreano-e-assassinado----Quer contribuir com Opera Mundi via PIX? Nossa chave é apoie@operamundi.com.br (Razão Social: Última Instancia Editorial Ltda.). Desde já agradecemos!Assinatura solidária: www.operamundi.com.br/apoio★ Support this podcast ★

In this episode of Heroic Purgatory, John and Jason revisit South Korean director, Kim Jee-woon, this time discussing his 1998 feature film debut, The Quiet Family. They talk about the comedy, the horror, and the film's political commentary on military regime of South Korean dictator Park Chung-hee. Timestamps: 3:00 Media Consumption 21:47 News 37:13 Film Discussion Website link: https://heroic-purgatory.blogspot.com/2021/06/s2e6-quiet-family-1998.html Follow the show on Twitter: https://twitter.com/HeroicPurgatory Follow Jason: https://twitter.com/filmnohito Follow John: https://twitter.com/mildly_scifi

The Peoples' School for Marxist-Leninist Studies presents a much-needed lesson on the history and politics of the DPRK. We hope you find it as informative as we did hearing it the first time. Enjoy! Interested in attending a class? Email info@psmls.org for more information Literature Used In This Class: https://www.korea-dpr.com/founding_dp...​ https://www.korea-dpr.com/foundation_...​ Recommended Reading on the DPRK: This Monstrous War by Wilfred G Burchett https://www.lulu.com/en/us/shop/wilfr...​ DPRK Archives https://drive.google.com/drive/folder...​ Also Visit: https://www.kfausa.org/​ PSMLS Website: http://peoplesschool.org/contact/​ Party of Communists USA Website: https://partyofcommunistsusa.org/about/​ Timecode Key: (Q&A) = Question & Answer / Response 0:00​ DPRK introduction 2:00​ Battle of Chongju 2:32​ U.N vote 3:00​ Syngman Rhee 3:30​ U.N agreement 3:51​ What is the name of the article? ( Q & A ) 4:11​ AKFIC 4:52​ Quislings 5:22​ Park Chung-hee 6:10​ Korean War 7:51​ Reading session 1 10:28​ Mao's son 10:37​ Elections? (Q&A) 10:56​ Chinese aid? (Q&A) 12:27​ Start of the Korean War? (Q&A) 13:54​ U.S state department 14:45​ Reading session 2 20:40​ What is Chollima? (Q&A) 21:20​ Korean farmland? (Q&A) 22:01​ What was the Chinese interest? (Q&A) 22:55​ Wilford Burchett 24:45​ Application of Marxism Leninism? (Q&A) 26:00​ Comparison of Chollima and Stakhanovite (Q&A) 27:00​ Roll of Soviet aid? (Q&A) 28:07​ World Peace Council 28:39​ Vito Marcantonio 29:12​ Veterans for peace 29:56​ Book recommendation 30:05​ What if the north had won? (Q&A) 30:39​ General comment 30:59​ Significance of the parallel split? (Q&A) 31:33​ Information recommendation 32:44​ One Korea 34:06​ Communist influence 34:46​ Book recommendations 35:22​ General comments 36:40​ U.S and Soviet confrontation? (Q&A) 37:15​ Concluding remarks

Armed with theory set out in the "Korean Revolution Manifesto" and practical experience drawn from the March 1st Independence Movement, in 1925 worker and citizen organizations including the Daegu League of Truth and Fraternity, the Changwon Black Friend League and the Jeju Island Mutual Aid group began to organize on the peninsula. In the summer of 1929 Anarchists formed an administration representing more than 2 million Koreans in the Manchurian province of Shinmin, but by the summer of 1931 Stalinist pressure in the North, Japanese pressure in the South and a series of targeted political assassinations ended a distinctly Korean experiment with an extraordinary ideology. On episode 98 of The Korea File journalist, filmmaker and screenwriter Abdul Malik joins host Andre Goulet to explore the history of this fascinating and largely forgotten era. Plus: details about our work amplifying new Left discourse at the Harbinger Media Network and what to expect from Abdul's deeply researched new sports, society and politics podcast 'Offcourt', launching in early January as a network exclusive.Find out more and get access to premium supporter-only Harbinger podcasts for as little as $3/month at https://harbingermedianetwork.com/Historical information on this episode is sourced from Ha Ki-Rak's 'A History of the Korean Anarchist Movement', published in 1986 by the Korean Anarchist Federation.Read the entirety of Hwang Dong-yun's 'Anarchism in Korea: Independence, Transnationalism and the Question of National Development from 1919 to 1984' athttps://libcom.org/files/Anarchism%20in%20Korea_%20Independenc%20-%20Dongyoun%20Hwang.pdfRead a concise summary of Anarchism in Korea by the late Irish historian Alan MacSimoin at http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/ANARCHIST_ARCHIVES/worldwidemovements/koreahis.htmlTo read about Anarchism under the Park Chung-hee regime go to https://libcom.org/book/export/html/33946Subscribe to the excellent Blue Roof Politics newsletter at https://www.blueroofpolitics.com/tag/newsletter/This conversation was recorded on December 22nd, 2020.

El dictador surcoreano Park Chung-hee y Kim Jae-gyu, el jefe de los servicios secretos, eran muy amigos. O eso parecía, porque uno de ellos traicionó al otro

El dictador surcoreano Park Chung-hee y Kim Jae-gyu, el jefe de los servicios secretos, eran muy amigos. O eso parecía, porque uno de ellos traicionó al otro

Garett Jones is one of the smartest people I have ever talked to - and he is at his usual brilliant best in this conversation. We started by trying to see how his latest book fit into the context of less developed countries with weak rule of law. I have often remarked that Garett is underrated as a development economist. I still think so.You can listen or download to the podcast on any platform of your choice (some links here), and you can also rate us here.TranscriptTobi: WeIcome to Ideas Untrapped and today I am on with economist, Garett Jones. Garett Jones is a professor of economics at George Mason University and he has written two excellent books "Hive Mind" and "10% Less Democracy". Welcome, Garett.Garett: Thanks very much for having me, Tobi.Tobi: Thinking on the margin is something I admire so much which is what you did quite well in your latest book 10% Less Democracy. Are economists just better at this than everybody else, and if yes, why?Garett: You're right. I do try to do that a lot in the book. I agree with you, Economists, I think, are better at this than other social scientists because it's just so much a part of our training. It's so normal for us to think, do you want to buy two more peanut butter sandwiches or two fewer? Should this company hire three more workers or fire two workers? So that kind of marginalist thinking which is where... the Marginal Revolution of the 19th century embodies that. Yeah, that really helps us think about big social questions in a very productive way. When I applied this to democracy what I realised it was quickly, something that a lot of people know, which is that all of the things we call democracies are a blend of democracy with oligarchy of one form or another. So getting the balance right is more important than an all-or-nothing question. All or nothing is off the table, thank goodness, but getting the blend right between insiders and outsiders, between elite and the masses, that's something that can be evaluated and fortunately, my economist friends have evaluated it. For some people, they'll quite naturally assume that democracy means an independent judiciary, the rule of law, impartial, fairly uncorrupt government. And those things are not democracy. They are good things but they are not democracy. - GJTobi: So given all the trade-offs that are involved with social decisions and reforms, how can we be better at thinking on the margins? We live in an era of protest movement where people want sweeping changes and that's not really how society works, so how can people better train themselves to be marginalist thinkers?Garett: Yeah, you're right. There aren't that many questions where we have to go all or nothing. Most policy questions can be a question of incrementalism, so I think whenever possible we should just ask ourselves 'if I can dial this up a little bit or dial this down a little bit, which would be the better way to work? Which would be the better way to move?' Whether that's thinking about whether I want my judges to have a little bit longer terms, whether I want my voters to have a little bit more information before they walk into the voting booth, whether I want a healthcare program to be available for people who are 62 rather than 65? Just thinking about it in terms of small changes helps us better evaluate...it helps the mind better weigh the benefits versus the cost of the decision. Because when we talk about revolutionary change, there are often just too many things going on for our brains to even weigh them, to even weigh the benefits, and weigh the costs. So marginalism, I think, is better suited for human minds and fortunately most, but not all, political decisions are well suited to a little more vs a little less.Tobi: I read your book, great book by the way...Garett: Thank you very much.Tobi: The writing is fantastic, I'm a big fan. In the book, I know you are applied the 10% Less Democracy framework to rich countries...Garett: Yeah.Tobi: But I've been trying to extrapolate and apply it to developing countries, and one thing I noticed (you can shed more light on this) is, sometimes it feels like low-income and middle-income countries are torn in some kind of institutional paradox. You have multilateral institutions like [the] IMF who have these prescriptions that are bureaucratic but have long-term benefits - Central Bank independence, don't manipulate the exchange rate, keep inflation low, be responsible with your budget, and all that. And on the other side of that, you have think tanks, aid agencies and other foundations (who are also interested in development and give it advice) who seem to favour radical democratisation of everything, basically. So what do you think, as a policymaker, as a voter in a low and middle-income country, how best to approach this paradox on a mental level?Garett: I think a message that I bring up early on in the book is that most of the clear benefits of democracy come from a moderate level of democracy. As Amartya Sen, the Nobel laureate who showed that if you want to avoid famines, what you need is democracy. In modern times there's never been a famine as he defines it in a functioning democracy. But his measure for functioning democracy is a pretty basic one. It's competitive elections and a free press. And that's not too hard a standard for a lot of countries to meet and more countries are meeting it now than they were meeting it, of course, three decades ago though, perhaps, less than a couple of years ago. So if you're pushing for democratisation, I think we should draw on the best evidence we have for what it is, what kind of democracy we need to get the benefits of democracy, and that seems to be a moderate level. Also, there is a lot of lazy talk about democracy where people stuff all of the good things they like into the word democracy. For some people, they'll quite naturally assume that democracy means an independent judiciary, the rule of law, impartial, fairly uncorrupt government. And those things are not democracy. They are good things but they are not democracy. So I think just clearly speaking about what it is that you want is valuable because we realised quickly that the things we like out of modern so-called democracies are a blend of the rule of the people and the rule of insiders, with a third thing that I don't talk much about in the book directly but the rule of law - the impartial rule of law, a bureaucracy that just operates on its own according to [the] rules that have been around for a long time. That is undemocratic and it seems to be very useful. So simply talking clearly about what it is we want in a reform and is this valuable reform truly about the voice of the people or is it more about something like an independent bureaucracy? That would help us get away from this lazy jargon of calling everything good democratic.Tobi: You also discussed the relationship between democracy and growth in your book and you conclude that the evidence is a bit of a muddle. What I was thinking when I was reading that part, I thought about Chile...Garett: Uh-huhTobi: And one of the famous examples when economists and some other thinkers discuss Chile is to look at GDP growth from the Pinochet years and the democratic years, and then they conclude that, oh, GDP growth is higher after Pinochet and hence democracy is better. But again, if you look at that history a bit, you'll see that there were some things, though they weren't palatable and I'm not saying I prefer autocracies here or anything...there were some hard reforms that Pinochet pushed through that clearly had benefits even during the Chilean democracy. One such rule was the inability of the parliament to hike the budget. You either cut it low or you pass it as it is which introduced a lot of fiscal responsibility in the budgeting process. So what do you think is responsible for this muddle in the evidence in the relationship between democracy and growth? Why can't we get a really clear picture?Garett: A big problem is the real-life fact which is just that a lot of autocrats do a terrible job. They come into power and they make the place worse off. So some autocrats come to power and appear to make the country better off, or at least, it predicts better performance and other autocrats come into power and things get worse. So when we stop looking at individual anecdotes and when we pull them together and do something rigorous and statistical, the evidence that autocrats are more likely to create great reforms looked pretty weak. There are plenty of anecdotes, right? We can call them case studies where autocrats are associated with and may have put into place things that look like good pro-growth reforms. Pinochet gets a lot of credit for this kind of stories but also Park Chung-hee of South Korea. The problem is that (a) we don't have a great counterfactual (b) maybe they just got lucky. And that's why using rigorous cross-country comparisons is more useful than individual case studies and when we do that, it's very hard to find evidence that either democracy causes growth or that an autocrat taking over causes growth. It's too much of a coin flip to recommend any particular policy if our goal in choosing a government is economic growth. So this is why we should stick to the things where we have better evidence and so these big changes - autocrat in charge versus free press multi-party democracy, there there's a muddle. That's the reason why the framing in my book 10% Less Democracy is about smaller changes where we have better identified better causal stories with better testings like independent central banks, independent judges. We have more evidence for the small things than we do for the big things.Thinking in marginalist terms is important but also good public education really can improve policy if we teach true important economic ideas to people - GJTobi: Looking at this really well, is it really about voter control? Because I imagine the issues are different, for example, I think voters care a lot about Central Bank independence than, say, a national minimum wage for example. So isn't the case that in some situations or on some issues, again, sticking with Central Bank independence, politicians adjust ill-informed or ignorant and they're not necessarily responding to voter preference?Garett: That's a great point. It's always a good idea to wonder whether the politicians themselves are poorly informed and they don't have an incentive to be very well-informed on most policy issues. A friend of mine had a conversation with the prominent United States politician who I won't name and this person said...the elected official said 'my job isn't to understand all the details of the policy, that's what my staff job is. My job is to keep track of all of the other members of Congress and find out how to cut deals with them.' So their real specialty is deal-making, deal cutting. They don't know that much about the detail of policy. So you are right that basically part of the problem is that the politicians themselves don't know that much, but they need to know enough to be able to pick someone who's good to run some of these things. So running [knowing] someone who is competent to run an independent central bank, it's kind of a hard job but you can outsource that to some staff; and if you're worried about things working pretty well for a long time, then you'll task your staff with picking somebody who seems like a pretty good candidate who won't cause much trouble and who will make the economy look pretty good before the electorate. So this idea that elected officials don't know that much themselves but they do have an incentive to get some things right when they know they're going to be held accountable by the voters.Tobi: But again, wouldn't less democracy, at least, in some cases lead to populist backlash? I mean, we're seeing that with Brexit...Garett: Oh, yes.Tobi: Some part of the American polity is also in that mode. The EU is a very good example where some British voters say 'oh, we are not going to be subjected to Brussels' rule'. There's a case of Africa, also, where people respond quite negatively to what they perceive as external technocratic interventions. So wouldn't less democracy run a risk of populism in the long-term?Garett: Actually, that's a great point and it's the one that I literally never discussed in the book - it's the idea of a populist backlash. Because it's one of these things that is important and too hard to quantify. The risk of a populist backlash to 10% Less Democracy is a little bit like the risk of a doctor being reluctant to give someone tough advice about diet and exercise because the person just might not come to the doctor anymore. So this is an important question - when should informed people, when should people who are relative experts just not push that hard for the best solution because they are afraid the patient won't take the medicine? In a way that's part of the reason I stick to 10% Less Democracy. I just want people to think about a little bit longer term, a little bit more independent Central Bank because I think these things are less likely to provoke that kind of backlash. But, you're right. But know this, to the extent you're right, this should tell us something about the cost of democracy - if one of the costs of democracy is that voters don't want things that are actually good for the voters, this should be part of our understanding [of] what democracy really is. If the problem is that the voters don't want to take advice that's just some person's opinion, 'ok, well, who cares?' Voters shouldn't have to listen to some person's random opinion. But if voters don't want to take [a] medicine that's actually good for the voters themselves, that should be part of our understanding of one of the weaknesses of democracy and something we should try to find a solution to. Maybe it's the solutions I present in my book, maybe it should be something else, but understanding the weaknesses of modern democracy is important to improving it.Tobi: A good illustration of that point is trade policy. I was just reading Matthew Klein and Michael Pettis's book where they basically say that trade wars are class wars.Garett: Uh-huh.Tobi: It's a reaction. And also it's a tactic for politicians to whip up voter sentiments and possibly win votes. How can people, again, I'm quite interested especially on the key issues that matters like central banking, like trade policy... things that affect the welfare and long-term prosperity, how can voters be a lot more informed to know that taking the choices out of my hands does not really mean I'm being oppressed?Garett: Yeah. This is really an important question. Part of it is that there is some evidence that just education in schools really changes people's minds. So when my colleague Bryan Caplan - he wrote a great book Myth of the Rational Voter, and he wrote a follow-up article where he looked at whether education or IQ scores were better predictors of pro-market attitudes. And he found that particularly on free trade, there was evidence that education itself, years of education was a better predictor of pro-trade attitudes than IQ. This is a signal and it's a reminder of something that made a lot of us believe which is that one of the things you learn in school is that people in other countries are good and, sometimes, they are great people and you should care about them. Also, you might learn some complicated ideas like the benefits of free trade. So education that is focused on teaching true and important facts about public policy, I think, can be a big part of this. But there is another element, another solution is just that we should think like a marginalist and go up the marginal cost curve. Push for a little less populism on topics where the voters aren't going to resist as much. Voters around the world have been pretty cool comparatively speaking with independent central banks - letting neutral banks lend out money and respond to financial crisis, (and) I think people can kind of understand why that's better than having one political party trying to lend to its buddies all the time. So, yeah, thinking in marginalist terms is important but also good public education really can improve policy if we teach true important economic ideas to people.Tobi: Let's let's go of the cuff a bit. Why did East Asia converge faster than the rest of the developing world?Garett: This is a great question. I mean part of it you could say that they actually had pretty high levels of productivity before say about 1800. This is part of what the deep roots literature shows, of Putterman and Weil and Bill Easterly at NYU - that, like, before 1500, before the great age of exploration, East Asia was pretty close to the technological frontier for the planet as a whole and so what's happened in the last 50 years in a way is a return to trend. That's not an answer. That's just more of a reminder that sometimes the more things change the more they stay the same. But when I look for the proximate cause, something more like a proximate cause, then I turned back to my first book, Hive Mind, which is that as far back as we have data on test scores, East Asia with particular countries we had good tests on in the ’60s and early 70s - Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, and soon after that Singapore - these countries were doing pretty well on standardised tests no matter how we measure it. And I think that good cognitive skills are [a] really important ingredient of being able to jump to the technological frontier, and I think that good cognitive skills are an important part of running a good competent government. Those aren't the whole story, fortunately, China's decision to turn away from communism was one of the best decisions in all of human history; that mattered a lot for well over a billion people. But the fact that as far as we can tell, test scores, human capital as currently measured was pretty high in East Asia in the sixties and early seventies, that gave them a good solid launching pad for modern prosperity.Tobi: You've hinted I think on your Twitter feed, I'm not sure anymore, that economists know the causes of long-run prosperity. What's your explanation for that?Garett: We're really good at the proximate causes, the very nearest causes. These are simple things that come from the Solow growth model. Robert Solow, [the] Nobel Laureate, just helped us think about where do GDP come from and having a lot of machines per worker, having a way for people to use them productively is really crucial. Machines aren't your enemy, they are your friend. A lot of technology isn't your enemy, it's your friend. But when we try to look one step behind that, say, why do some nations wind up with a lot more productivity and lot more capital per worker than others, then there's more debate but a lot of people would jump just straight to something like institutions. Some places have great institutions, good competent governance, neutral rule of law, and that means the capital is willing to flow from around the world to good places. I would also add on human capital however measured - whether it's years of education or test scores are both very quite robust predictors. So economists know what works and the simplest version is one I said years ago which is, have pretty high test scores and don't be communist, and you're probably going to be rich. So if a country can find a way to raise its test scores through better run schools, through better public health, and it can avoid the massive mistake of totalitarian communism, then it's got a pretty good future ahead of it.Tobi: In your view why did you choose test scores, I mean, what's the best case for cognitive ability in human capital and long-run prosperity ahead of all these other proximate causes you mentioned like institutions or geography or industrial policy and all these other factors?Garett: The simplest version is just that it's what shows up in the data when I and others have run very serious horse races. So Eric Hanushek, professor at Stanford, leading education researcher, he's found that test scores whether you call them IQ or math and science scores are very astonishingly robust predictors of national prosperity and they really beat out years of education. There's a lot of emphasis on trying to raise measured use of education but the problem is that we know that there is schooling and then there's schooling. So if you just get a diploma but nobody ever taught you anything, the schooling didn't really make you more productive. Another reason though is because of the well-known finding from psychology research which is that skills predict kills. People who are above average in math tend to be above average in verbal stuff. People who are above average at vocabulary test tend to be better at solving three-dimensional puzzles, and so for reasons that are still poorly understood there is what I call a DaVinci effect and what others call a g-factor across mental skills. So running a modern economy at a high-level involves kind of a little bit of everything. It's a little bit of a smorgasbord, it's a little bit of a casserole. It's probably unlikely to be the case that there is going to be this one simple thing that solves all the problems. What you really want is something that is equivalent of a Swiss army knife, something that's a mediocre tool for everything rather than one tool for just one thing. And cognitive skills whether you called them IQ or g or whatever seem to be this version of sort of Swiss army knife where there's a little bit of everything. So people who do better on standardised tests tend to be a little bit more patient. Groups of folks who do better on standardised tests tend to be more cooperative, they're more likely to see the invincible hand and support market-friendly policies, they are more likely to be tolerant of others who are unlike them and these are all great things for a nation. So like I said, running a modern economy near the frontier of productivity involves a lot of little things - low corruption, competent governance, foresight, voters who understand the benefits of trade; the one thing that I can get us a lot of all those little things is higher cognitive skills.Tobi: You wrote a paper a few years ago which I like very much...Garett: Thank you.Tobi: O-ring sectors and Foolproof sectors. And if I understand your model correctly (and you're welcome to set me straight here)... so thinking about this paper and this model, if I am a high-skilled worker in Nigeria, for example, overall you're saying the returns to skill for my education and my skill level is marginal compared to a low-skilled worker. But if I move to the United States of America where obviously there are a lot more high-skilled workers than in Nigeria, the returns to my skill will still be marginal but then there's this huge gains at the national level between both countries that are pretty large, can you explain how that works?Garett: Yeah, so I'm building here on the work of Michael Kremer who just won the Nobel prize last year. He wrote a great paper about the O-ring theory of economic development. He said that a lot of economic tasks in modern economies, especially the richest economies, are kind of like building a space shuttle where if you make one mistake, even in a very complex process of launching a space shuttle, the space shuttle tend to blow up killing everyone on board. This is actually why the space shuttle challenger was destroyed because of the failure of an O-ring (basically a big piece of big rubber band) that was an important part of keeping the rocket safe. So one small failure can destroy the value of an entire product, of course, that's true with a lot of things that we value like smartphones, automobile transmissions, one broken link can destroy the whole thing. Thing is that economists without even realising it, we use another model, routinely, that's not O-ring often without thinking about it - we kind of assumed that workers of different skill levels can get to be mushed together and it's nice to have skilled workers, but maybe you can throw maybe two high-skilled workers and three low-skilled workers, maybe they are perfect substitutes for each other. You know, just throw more bodies at it and eventually the job will get done, there are certainly jobs like that. So part of what I did and really my contribution in this paper, the O-ring sector and the Foolproof sector, was to say 'what if some parts of the economy work like Michael Kremer's world where things like building a space shuttle or smartphone? Not if other things are like the way economists normally think about the world, the Foolproof sector - where if you throw enough people at it eventually the job will get done.' And I said 'what if workers have to decide which of these two sectors they are going to work in?' So let me think about you as an example... high-skilled worker, and you're trying to decide what sector you're going to work in. Well, one of the great ideas in economics is that you're going to go to where the pay is highest, ignoring all the other complications for your life, and so really the net message is that there's always going to be some combination of workers balancing between the two sectors. So if low-skilled workers are superabundant and high-skilled workers are scarce, just about all of us are going to be taking on these foolproof tasks where perfection, exact precision is not crucial. And if high-skilled workers are really abundant, most of us will be working on O-ring type tasks but there will always be some of us, sort of, in-between. This helps explain why the capital goods, hi-tech goods are made in just a few places in the world and in particular, they're usually made in places where the workers are really really expensive. You would think that firms will try to find the cheapest workers possible for any task but instead hi-tech manufacturing, especially cutting-edge hi-tech manufacturing, tends to happen in countries that are pretty high wage. The only thing that can explain this, if people are rational, is that it must be critical, it must be crucial to have high-skilled workers working on those tasks. So one of the lessons of this is that lower-skilled workers can find something really useful to do in a high wage country because if they come to a high wage country, they are competing against a lot of other high-skill workers, so all they have to do is be an okay substitute for that high-skilled worker in some tasks, maybe it's mowing lawns, maybe it's doing routine legal work and all of a sudden those workers can earn a lot more than they would in their home country. So the O-ring-Foolproof paper is in a way an important message for the value of low-skilled workers in high wage countries, but it also helps explain why cutting edge, frontier technology innovation only happens in the highest skilled countries where workers are super expensive.Tobi: The national returns to skill, how does it work with these two sectors?Garett: Well, there is an element of, sometimes, the real world is more complicated than the model, and that's, of course, true here. I have to say that I suspect there is a critical mass element to high-skilled workers. For instance, if I can bring a million of Japan's best engineers to a lower-skilled country, a million of them could run a lot of fantastic factories, be great workers and end up giving a lot of great employment opportunities to lower-skilled folks, so there is this element of...outside the model of... a critical mass element. But the O-ring-Foolproof story is a reminder that high-skilled workers who are in relatively low-skilled countries are often going to be, like, unable to make use of their full potential. Being able to have an O-ring sector of your own to go work in is really where the magic happens of economic prosperity. The greatest things that are happening and the way that economic frontiers are being built is in these O-ring sectors, and, to me, it's a reminder that this is a case for the brain drain. A case that the brain drain actually helps the world as a whole. Brain drain issues are complicated and there are lots of forces pushing both ways but I want to emphasise that there is this positive element to the brain drain which is getting high-skilled workers into countries that can make great use of high-skilled workers really helps the whole world. Has Michael Clemens has pointed out, one benefit of that is that migrants who go from low-skilled to high-skilled countries send back a lot of remittances and those remittances are super valuable. I'd like to emphasise another point, which is getting those high-skilled workers from low average-skilled countries to higher average-skilled countries means that they can contribute to the growth of ideas which makes the global pie bigger.Tobi: You sort of preempted where I was going with that. There was also this essay by Michael Clemens and I think Justin Sandefur about this brain drain issue where they sort of asserted that another element to the brain drain issue that the incentive to migrate and earn more in high wage countries leads to more production of high-skilled workers even in low-wage countries. So Nigeria exports a lot of doctors to the UK, it means a lot more students would want to be doctors so that they can migrate to the UK or wherever where they can earn a lot more than they would in their home countries. Now, here is my question: isn't there a sort of negative effect to this in that their home countries get stuck in the poverty trap... a lot of these high-growth sectors never gets built and some of these countries just depend on remittances which can be pretty tricky?Garett: Yeah. This is a hard problem. Another problem with the brain drain is that it means that the government which really needs a lot of high-skilled workers to basically run competent bureaucracies and manage difficult technical questions, a lot of those folks are gone. They've gone to move to other countries where they can earn a lot more. So I don't want to pretend that the brain drain issues are simple to resolve. But I think that the point you're making, I tend to think of it as less of a problem because people are very reluctant to move. There's a lot of evidence that people are reluctant to move from their home country and they need a really big wage premium. So if things were even sort of mediocre, if there were some moderately hi-tech positions in the home country, you would have very high rates of retention. I think that's pretty clear from the evidence from the fact that people are very reluctant to move. If they can find any excuse to stay, they stay. That's speaking a little informally but I think the data backs that up. Also though, there is this element of where the threat of exit does make home countries behave a little better. The fact that some people might leave does make a home country government say: well, we want to make ourselves more inviting. If we think about what's happened in China (to give an extreme example) over the last few decades, there's been a lot of brain drain from China as Chinese graduates, high-skilled workers often, have moved to many different countries across Asia and across Europe and North America, and one of the reasons that the Chinese government wants to be somewhat open, somewhat...wants to be unlike its totalitarian past and more like [its] authoritarian present is because they want to feel like they can come back. So the threat of exit does discipline national governments in an important way that we shouldn't forget. Brain drain means it's harder to build these hi-tech sectors that you're pointing out, but a brain drain also gives those home country governments a better incentive to behave well. I think of this as a sort of Tiebout voting with your feet story which economies should always be open to, that people voting with their feet sends a very powerful message to governments and informal and formal evidence, I think, backs up that. Tobi: Can national IQ be deliberately raised on a scale that matters? I know you talked about nutrition in hive mind. Also, I look at things like assortative mating and other things but can it really happen on a scale that moves the needle on national prosperity?Garett: This is a great question. I feel like one reason I wrote Hive Mind was to get more people thinking about the very question you asked. Like, my comparative advantage is what does IQ cause rather than what causes IQ? But I believe the Flynn Effect is real. I believe [it is], at least, substantially real. The Flynn Effect is as you know, but your listeners may not, is the longtime rise intelligence scores that's been documented around the world. Public health interventions, people getting healthier and living longer lives, I think that obviously is increasing people's cognitive skills (like, the public health element has just got to be real). I'm less confident but I'm still fairly confident that good education raises cognitive skills big enough to move the needle. And the third one is this broadly cultural story which is really Flynn, I want to attribute this to Flynn himself. My colleague Tyler Cowen and I talked about this in our podcast back in January when I was on Conversations with Tyler - IQs in East Germany rose at least five points, maybe much more, in the decade or so after the end of communism. I think there are these cultural influences on intelligence that are not just teaching to the tests, there is something about a modern open society that I think challenges the mind and makes it work better in a wide variety of settings. So I want to stick with those three right now that public health interventions are first order, good broad-based education is suggestively very important but I can't say conclusively, and then third; there is more evidence I have to say for this big cultural effect - that when your country becomes more like Popperian open society, more [a] mixture of capitalist and loosely democratic, people seem to use their brains in different ways on a regular basis that shows up on the IQ tests. Tobi: Why and I'm sure you must have experienced this maybe in discussing your work or maybe on social media and in other ways. Why is intelligence still a taboo subject so to speak? When I sit with my friends and we talk about development and I bring up Hive Mind...and people bellyache about 'oh, we can't do this or that' and you mildly suggest that 'hey guys, have you considered that our national IQ is pretty low and maybe, maybe that's why we can't get some of these things done.' There's a natural push back that you get. Why is intelligent still such a taboo subject?Garett: I think part of it is because people assume that when you're talking about intelligence you're talking about something that is supposedly a hundred percent or nearly a hundred percent genetic and something that is essential to a person in some very deep way. So I think it's very essentialist as an explanation. I think that's a mistake, I think the evidence does not support that position. And here's a test of it, because instead of using the word "intelligence", use the word "national test scores" and you talk about how education can raise test scores in an important way, then people get much less defensive about it. People are much more open to these very same ideas, the very same channels. So I think a big part of it is that intelligence sounds like something that is intrinsic to a person, unchangeable, nearly immutable and so any ascription of causation to that is personal. So I think discussing it in a Flynnian way, the way that James Flynn has, which is very evidence-based (and) where we think of intelligence as being something like an intermediate outcome... it's not the deep root cause of everything, it's an intermediate outcome that in turn is caused by other stuff. I think that opens people up to thinking about how people's minds create the economy we live in. I'd much rather talk about how our minds create the world around us than talk about what some deep, supposedly essential thing called an IQ score. Of course, the history of the misuse of IQ test is important. The mistakes and evils that have occurred in the name of intelligence research are important. But there are many other things that have been used in evil ways in the past and we cut them slack, and democracy will be, of course, one of those. But I think something about intelligence makes people think it's intrinsic, it's basically immutable and so you're telling people to despair. And if there's one thing to think about when thinking about human cognitive skills is we shouldn't think about despair, we should think about trying to find ways to improve all of the nations in the world not just the lucky few.Tobi: That's interesting. Tell us about what you're working on right now what's your next big project.Garett: I'm on sabbatical and finishing up right now and I'm writing my third book in what I call my Singapore trilogy. And that's going to be a book really about the deep roots literature which I'd mentioned earlier. I'm interested in why the past is prologue. Hive Mind is a book, in a way, about the short-run. About almost proximate causes. 10% Less Democracy is a book about the rich countries. My third book is going to be a book about the whole world and a book about persistence. A book about why the more things change, the more they stay the same. So, again, this is going to draw on the deep roots literature, it's going to draw on the late Alberto Alesina's work on cultural persistence - how migrants carry their attitudes from their home country to the country they move to to a large degree. It's been a lot of fun to write this book because it's so data-driven and it's based on a lot of research that is very influential within economics and not influential at all outside economics and my job is to change that.Tobi: You've been an advocate so speak of high-skilled migration.Garett: Uh-huh.Tobi: How does your argument square with people like Bryan Caplan and who call for open borders, I mean, just let them come?Garett: So Caplan's comic book where I make an appearance on open borders, that's a great fun read I think people should look at that and give his ideas careful attention. I like to remind people that institutions do not just create themselves ex nihilo. That they are actually created by people and I just really want people to think about that a lot. High-skilled immigration means bringing in more informed voters and low-skilled immigration means, 'well, we really need to put a lot of effort into educating those folks' and hope that they support great institutions that will keep the country rich for a very long time. Fortunately, there is a lot of evidence that even the most optimistic supporters of open borders tend to emphasise that high-skilled immigrants have a lot of positive externalities, it's easy to make that case, and less skilled immigrants have... they are more like a wash, there is probably a plus in the short to medium run but closer to a wash than with high-skilled immigration. So I want people to think hard about where good institutions come from and if people coming to your country are going to support better institutions, that should be great news. And if people [who] come to your country are likely to tear it down, you have a little bit more concern. Caplan addresses this in his book in a number of ways with his keyhole solutions. But I think the next 20 to 30 years of both academic research and historical experience will let us know which way low-skilled immigration is going to shape the government of rich countries. Tobi: Charter Cities. Are you optimistic, are you a fan? How best to think about it from a skill and immigration perspective?Garett: Yes, so, Charter Cities which is an idea that's often associated with the Nobel Laureate Paul Romer. The idea that countries should create small little areas within there that are governed by another country's rules. A country that's well-governed, frontier. So say a poor country could say 'hey, we're going to let Singapore run a small part of our country or let Singaporean legislation or Singaporean case law hold sway in this part of our country. I tend to think that the biggest barrier to charter cities as the revenge of democracy. It's very hard to avoid what voters want. I would like to believe that countries with great institutions could franchise their institutions to other poor countries, but the problem is that institutions are created by people and we need to figure out why the institutions are weak in the first country (the country that's starting the charter city). There's a pretty good chance you're going to get a revenge of democracy there and a reversion to the old ways. Some of my GMU colleagues and I have joked that Singapore should franchise it's government to a lot of countries the way McDonald's franchises it's operating model. It would be great if we could do this but it's hard to avoid the norms of democracy especially when, as I note in 10% Less Democracy, some degree of democracy is really important to have. So Charter Cities being in tension with democracy, that's the real problem we have in making Charter Cities durable. I think the solution is to have moderate Charter Cities. Countries where, say, Singaporean law or Japanese law or South Korean law is the default but the local voters can overrule it with a two-thirds vote. Something like that might be much more durable than a full charter city solution. Starting with the default of some rich country's rules but let the local voters overturn it piece by piece and build that change into the original set of rules so that people don't feel like this is out of their control. Tobi: I'm going to ask you a very specific question. So, say, I win the election in Nigeria and I ask you 'hey, Garett, my country is going to be 300 million people in 2050, what are the policies that we can embark upon right now that can get us to a middle-income country over that time period', what would be your advice?Garett: I think my biggest piece of advice would be: find a way to become a credible, attractive place for massive amounts of high-skill immigration. How do I get five million people from China, a million and [a] half people from South Korea, two million people from America to move to Nigeria? Some of those folks will, perhaps, be people of Nigerian descent, people whose ancestors are Nigerian and who want to come back. Some of those folks will be folks who just saw that there is going to be some great tax deals, some great tax incentives to move back. I think people are policy and becoming an attractive place for high-skilled immigration like Singapore is a great way to make your country richer.Tobi: Thank you very much. I've been speaking with Economist Garett Jones and it's wonderful to have you Garett.Garett: It's been great talking with you, Tobi. This is a public episode. Get access to private episodes at www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe

En enero del 68, un grupo de comandos de Korea del Norte intenta asesinar al entonces presidente surcoreano Park Chung-hee en su residencia conocida como la Casa Azul. Las gravísimas consecuencias que pudo haber llevado este intento de magnicidio, quedaron diluidas por el incidente del USS Pueblo y la ofensiva norvietnamita de Khe Sanh. Por lo visto, la operación pudo no haber salido de la propia cabeza del gobierno norcoreano, sino por una facción izquierdista dentro de las FF.AA. nordcoreanas. Por Julio 'Caronte' y Esaú Rodríguez Casus Belli Pódcast es un Pódcast del canal Casus Belli Producciones Casus Belli Pódcast pertenece al sello Ivoox Originals Estamos en: Twitter, como @casusbellipod Facebook, nuestra página es @casusbellipodcast https://www.facebook.com/CasusBelliPodcast Telegram, nuestro canal es @casusbellipodcast https://t.me/casusbellipodcast Y nuestro chat es @aviones10 @CasusBelliPod ¿Quieres proponernos algo? También puedes escribirnos al mail casus.belli.pod@gmail.com Si te ha gustado, y crees que nos lo merecemos, nos sirve mucho que nos des un like, si nos escuchas desde la app de ivoox, sea android o IOS. Y también que comentes. Que no mordemos ;) La música que acompaña al pódcast es Ready For the War de Marc Corominas Pujadó, bajo licencia Creative Commons. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/ Casus Belli Pódcast y Casus Belli Producciones está dirigido por Dani CarAn. Las opiniones vertidas en este programa de pódcast, son de exclusiva responsabilidad de los podcasters que las trasmiten. Que cada palo aguante su vela. Muchas gracias por escucharnos, y hasta la próxima.

Tras ser puestos en una lista negra por ser críticos a la administración de la presidenta Park Geun-hye, cientos de artistas de diferentes ámbitos, se aprestaron a demandar a la jefa de la nación y otros oficales en 2017, apoyados por varios abogados asociados en una organización denominada "Grupo de Contraataque Legal para la Crisis de la Lista Negra en la Industria de la Cultura y las Artes de la administración de la Presidenta Park". Hoy lunes 2 de marzo en Hacia Asia - el programa de Circo Volador Radio dedicado a la cultura popular, alternativa y underground procedente del continente asiático - seguiremos hablando sobre el escándalo que significó para la cultura y el arte de Corea del Sur, haber sido bloqueadas y censuradas por la presidenta Park Geun-hye, quien continuó las prácticas de su padre Park Chung-hee, el dictador en el poder de 1963 a 1979 , en una serie de prácticas que se antojaban superadas en una joven nación democrática. Entérense más acerca de la presidenta vs los artistas en punto de las 19:00 por www.circovolador.org o bien el jueves 5 de marzo a las 11:00 de la mañana por la misma dirección.

Neste episódio, no arranque do ciclo dedicado ao cinema sul-coreano contemporâneo, antecipo-me aos Óscares na consagração de Parasitas, o fenómeno cinematográfico de 2019 realizado por Bong Joon-ho. Recupero também The Host - A Criatura, filme de 2006 pelo mesmo realizador que forma com aquele uma maravilhosa sessão-dupla de uma voz consciente da especificidade da experiência coreana e da universalidade das preocupações políticas e sociais do mundo livre. Errata: onde digo que na Coreia do Sul “viveu-se a chamada “era de ouro” do cinema local, esvaziada nos anos oitenta pelas políticas de repressão à liberdade de expressão durante o governo de Park Chung-hee”, devia dizer “viveu-se a chamada “era de ouro” do cinema local, esvaziada nos anos oitenta pelas políticas de repressão à liberdade de expressão durante o governo de Chun Doo-hwan”. Na verdade, Park Chung-hee também governou ditatorialmente a Coreia do Sul, porém entre 1961 e 1979. Visitem a página segundotake.com, sigam-me no Facebook e no Instagram e enviem-me as vossas opiniões e sugestões para segundotake@gmail.com.

On episode 89 of The Korea File: 'Campus Music' and martial law, the K-Pop precedent of the USFK's factory band system and some of the best music of an era. Join academic Matt Van Volkenburg (Gusts of Popular Feeling) and host Andre Goulet for an in-depth conversation on the music, personalities and history of 60s/70s Korean counter-culture.....plus: the not-so-secret history of President Park Chung-hee, composer.Music on this episode:* 송창식 - 고래사냥* 어니언스 – 작은 새 * Key Boys - 뱃노리* 강근식 - 별들의 고향 Prologue * 산울림 - A Flower in the Mist* Shin Jung Hyun And The Men - Beautiful Rivers And Mountains* Park Chung-hee - 나의 조국* 김인순 - 여고졸업반 * 한대수 – 고무신 Read Matt's long-running blog, now in its 15th year, at http://populargusts.blogspot.com/This episode was produced in collaboration with the Royal Asiatic Society- Korea Branch (RASKB). Find out about upcoming lectures and tours at www.raskb.comSupport the show at patreon.com/thekoreafileThis conversation was recorded on January 26th, 2020.

My Conversation with Adedayo was an enjoyable experience, as you can tell from the lighthearted tone. He is brilliant and still very much underrated. He also has an incredible personal story - the triumph of choice, opportunity, and knowledge. I hope he gets to tell it one day. The recurrent theme in our conversation is knowledge (human capital) and its importance to development. You can also listen on Stitcher here or read the transcript below. Many thanks to Quadbee for the continued Herculean efforts in making these conversations possible.TranscriptTobi: This is Ideas Untrapped and I am here with Adedayo Bakare. Adedayo is an investment banker, an economist, an entrepreneur and an all-round smart guy. So Dayo it's nice to have you here.Dayo: Thanks for having me, Tobi. I've been looking forward to this and...so I'm very excited.Tobi: So have I, actually. So...let me just jump right in on something you said very recently about trade that, for example, if a country collects twenty percent of its taxes in tariffs, it's definitely killing trade. Just explore that angle a bit and get us into your frame of mind in thinking about that.Dayo: I think I was responding to a tweet about the implications in terms of tax revenues if Africa countries get to implement this continental trade agreement that was recently signed that would start being implemented in 2020. And so I think one of the issues, (i mean) at least protests, from some segment of, say, policy analysts is that a lot of African countries actually depend on revenues from trade - that is, tariff revenues - and one of the ways I think that happens is...(I mean) most African economies are informal in nature. In Nigeria, for instance, I think IMF estimates that [the] level of informality we have in the economy is around sixty percent. So what happens is if government is not able to tax a lot of productive activities that is going on in the economy, and one of the easiest ways to continue to raise money, which is also tied to industrial policy, is around [raising] tariffs.In Nigeria, for instance, we are very big on tariffs to encourage what they call local production even if in some cases we do not have the capacity to do it, but [the] government never stops. The auto policy for instance that was implemented under the Jonathan  era raised tariffs on motor vehicles to like seventy percent to encourage FDI into assembly plants for cars and all sorts. Then you start to imagine how does this even make any sense when we really do not have the capacity, we don't have the skill, expertise, we don't have a good business environment that will support industrialization. So why are we embarking on such a policy? And since the implementation of that policy it has failed woefully, because, obviously, I think it's only Innoson that has been able to, at least, benefit from that policy; and even when you think in terms of his manufacturing capacity, how many cars does he produced in a year? In terms of how affordable the car is, is it affordable for the ordinary Nigerian to buy? It's not. So obviously you have... you have that problem.The starting point should not be that a lot of African countries will lose revenues from tariffs. The starting point should be that does it even make sense for an economy to be reliant on trade for its revenues, that is, in terms of tariff revenues as a share of total government revenues. - ABNow in terms of revenues, one of the easiest ways to actually raise revenue is also to raise tariffs. You can have thirty percent tariffs, you can have fifty percent tariffs on some items and that is why overtime when you combine that with a largely informal economy (where taxation is very very [low], tax to GDP ratios are lower than, say, other emerging markets and advanced economies) then you tend to get a sense of why tariff revenues make up in a very large of share government's revenue.Now, my argument is, the starting point should not be that a lot of African countries will lose revenues from tariffs. The starting point should be that does it even make sense for an economy to be reliant on trade for its revenues, that is, in terms of tariff revenues as a share of total government revenues. If we look at most of, say, the advanced economies you'll see that tariff revenues are a very very small component...Tobi: Yeah.Adedayo: Of total government earnings and I feel like that is what Africa should try to explore.Clears throatAnd by exploring that we could open up a new vista of opportunities for the economy which could propel growth and prosperity. But the catch is this, it is very very easy to quantify one, the other is very hard to quantify. Tobi: Yeah.Adedayo: You can easily quantify the fact that, oh, if we export a certain amount of goods in a year, if we tax it at this rate we're going to obtain this size of revenue. But when you tell a government to, oh, relax your tariffs to encourage maybe even your manufacturing sector such that they have access to quality raw materials, it's hard to capture into, you know, the productivity gains for the company or basically the employment potential of it, and even the taxes that accrue to the government from that extra productivity. It's actually hard for economies to quantify them. So that is why it is easy for someone to come out and say, oh, Cote d'Ivoire is going to lose 10% of their, er...Tobi: Revenue.Adedayo: Revenues... because of the implementation of the AfCFTA [African Continental Free Trade Agreement]. So apart the fact that a lot of Africans do not even trade... a lot of African countries do not trade with Africa, so a large chunk of the tariff is actually trade with external partners, that is, Asia primarily now and maybe Europe in the case of Nigeria. I think our major trading partners are Asia and Europe. So even when we start to develop, you know, local value chains to say, oh, we're exporting into the African market. Some of the natural resource that we have, most African countries do not even have the capacity or the industry to use it so we still have to export a lot of those things outside Africa and you can still generate whatever tariff revenues you're obtaining from that. But really the idea is that, for African countries, we have to look past trade as this money-spinning machine for the government. It's something that should spur enterprise and development and the development of processing industries and local value chains. We should see it as something...we should see in the sense that... the way the World Bank captures ease of doing business, say, oh, access to roads or the time it takes to...er say...Tobi: Register a company.Adedayo: To register a company or to register a property. Tobi: Yeah.Adedayo: Trade should also be something like that. I mean, tariffs should also be something like that - how liberal your tariffs are. Especially in the developing countries. Because it is also important, it goes a long way in what you have in the manufacturing sector and I think nobody would argue, even the government, with what we've seen  between 2015 and 2016 when we had the currency crisis and a lot of manufacturing companies could not obtain raw materials to use in production and we saw the impact on the books those companies and even for government which eventually collects revenue from them. So I think that is the way to actually think about it [but] unfortunately trade is very very contentious, and...Tobi: Why is that, really? Is it really a case of failing to learn from history because, I mean, you talk about quantifiability, it may be difficult in the case of any specific country to prospectively quantify how much you'll gain from trade. But historically we know there are gains from trade. Huge gains actually. So is it simply a case...or what is really the constraint?... why is trade so contentious for us?Adedayo: Umm, it's really the way we think about it. In Nigeria for instance, many people see trade - imports - for instance, they see it as "if you're importing from someone, you're at a disadvantage". That's the general idea which the Nigerian media will call waste. So Nigeria wastes 200 million dollars in importing tomato paste.Tobi: YeahAdedayo: Or Nigeria wastes...Tobi: Or we're losing...Adedayo: Oh, we're losing our FX [foreign exchange] in importing iPhones...but they never say that about iPhones...LaughsTobi: Or Champagnes for that matter.LaughsAdedayo: They never say. So you start to wonder why? I think there are several reasons. One of the reasons that I feel like most people overlook is: the average Nigerian believe that when it comes to certain kind of products, (agriculture is one) the Nigerian might have a palm oil tree in their house or they do maize, you know, in their backyard - they plant maize in their backyard which even if it's not commercial farming, for subsistent use - and a lot of them...it's hard for them to understand that people trade based on what we now know as comparative advantage. You specialise in something you can do better than other countries such that by the time you're exporting to other countries they will buy it cheaper and it's good for everybody.But the average Nigerian believes, you know, agriculture. We are very big on agriculture. We have the land so I can plant oranges behind my...in my garden, so why are you now saying Nigeria cannot produce this and we have to import it? They do not understand that it's probably cheaper, maybe fifty percent even cheaper to plant rice in Thailand or Vietnam than in Nigeria. Most do not understand that maybe the soil you have (the soil formation you have) is not conducive to deriving high yields of those products; and it is on that basis that you have trading with other nations because you assume that oh, a country can do it better than you and you go there to import it; and basically the average Nigerian doesn't understand that. They just want to know that - palm oil...we are good at palm oil. Malaysia - they came to get their seeds...Tobi: Yeah, how true is that story by the way?LaughsAdedayo: I actually don't know how true that is but they will tell you that - Malaysia - they came to get their seeds for palm oil in Nigeria. And now look at them, they're the largest producers of palm oil... [stuttering]Tobi: Whatever proxy we use...Adedayo: Exactly...in and the world. And you begin to ask that okay so let's even assume they got the seedlings from Nigeria, what have you done to improve those seedlings? There are different varieties of palm oil, for instance - they have this Tenera, there is Pisifera, there is another one [Dura]. And what you find that a lot of Nigerians are planting, they are varieties that have not been improved. So in terms of yield, it's very very poor. The gestation period is extended, some go into six, seven years. You see palm trees taller than houses- like, you're basically going to hire someone to help you harvest your fruits. Many do not think in the sense that that is unproductive. They don't think in the sense that yields are very very poor; because when you process, what you can derive, the output you can derive is actually very very low compared to other countries. They just think in terms of we can plant it in Nigeria. They don't think in terms of "can we plant it better than other countries"? I mean, rice or palm oil or whatever it is essentially. So in a way, I feel like that is actually a crucial factor because in my discussions with ordinary Nigerians, they will tell you "I plant cassava, I plant this" but the question is not if you can plant it... Tobi: We have Bamboos so why do we have to import toothpicks?Adedayo: Why did we have to import toothpicks, exactly. But do you have the ecosystem to support the production of toothpicks? Oh, we have... there [are] tomatoes wasting in the North why are we importing tomato paste?Tobi: Yeah.Adedayo: It goes beyond primary production, being able to produce tomatoes. Then you start asking, what kind of variety of tomatoes are you even producing? Are they suitable for processing? So those are the questions that Nigerians do not understand. Then there's also the case which is something connected to what is, I think, happening all over the world. We're seeing rising protectionism.Tobi: Yeah...yeah.Adedayo: It's actually all over the world and one of the things is...Tobi: It's sad.Adedayo: It is sad. LaughAdedayo: So for trade, overall, there is a net gain, right?Tobi: Yeah.Adedayo: It's been proven historically that there is a net gain to society from trading. However, there could also be displacements...Tobi: Definitely.Adedayo: In certain sectors or industries, so you have politicians appealing to those sentiments and a lot of that view. People too, we tend to appeal to those sentiments because even when you see the conversations around the free trade agreement in Africa, a lot of people would say, "oh, they will come and dump goods in Nigeria - the manufacturing sector, they're going to kill jobs, they're going to do this"; and I always tell them "have you even taken a look at the manufacturing sector in Nigeria?" As a share of GDP it's not so big, but when you take it in absolute terms I think there are only, maybe, three more countries that have bigger manufacturing sectors - maybe Egypt. Morocco is also doing a lot now and South Africa.Tobi: YeahAdedayo: Now the challenge with Nigeria is our manufacturing is not quite as sophisticated or complex as what you have in South Africa, in Morocco or in Egypt for instance. But in terms of saying "oh, do we have a big manufacturing sector?" Yeah, we have a bigger manufacturing sector than most of [our] African peers. We actually export a lot of manufacturing products through land and, of course, there's a question where... also when you think in terms even the trade balance (manufacturing trade balance with other African countries) I think we only have a negative trade balance with probably South Africa. When you look at West Africa as a whole in terms of manufacturing, we actually have a positive trade balance with West Africa because we have a big manufacturing sector even if it's just textiles or footwear and garments being manufactured in Abia... I mean Aba. We are sending it to [the] Benin Republic, we're sending it to Togo, we're sending it to Cameroon. If it's not even as sophisticated but we are, at least, doing something.Tobi: The problem is we don't want them to send to us.Adedayo: Exactly. Now, the problem is you don't want those things to come into Nigeria. So in that sense, there's a lot of fear around the dislocation of, maybe, workers, and there's a lot of literature on it as well and many people would usually say "oh, they should, maybe, train people who lose jobs and try to integrate them into other sectors of the economy" but I think one of the things we're missing is: even in terms of manufacturing, if we have liberal trade in Africa it could actually open the doors for other industries which we've actually not looked at in Africa that would actually take up some of the [un]employed people. As a share of employment, the manufacturing sector is very low. I don't think the manufacturing sector employs up to ten percent. We all scream "Dangote! Dangote! Dangote!" How many people can Dangote Cement employ? And even that is connected to my ideas around seeing manufacturing as a way to growth and prosperity in Africa.Tobi: Yeah, we will get to that.Adedayo: When you start to explore it. So, really, trade is actually very very tedious in terms of the underlying concepts called comparative advantage. The ordinary man does not understand that and I think that is really the biggest misconception about trade and why we have challenges [in] having to implement liberal trade policies in Africa.Tobi: You talked about agriculture.Adedayo: Yeah.Tobi: I'll like to explore something I was discussing recently with some people. You know, agriculture (and you can correct me if I'm wrong on this) currently employs about fifty percent of the workforce...Adedayo: Very close. Very close. Yes, forty-five... about forty-five percent.Tobi: But, again, when you look at history for example; over, say, the last 300 years; the global population - we've grown the global population by about sevenfold from around a billion to seven billion currently. We've grown agricultural productivity to about tenfold, that is, we actually produce a lot of food. But when you see agriculture share of employment, it has gone from about 75% to about 2.5% currently.Adedayo: Exactly.Tobi: So, now, my question is, isn't our share of agricultural jobs really a problem for productivity rather than people looking at it as a positive, you know, like, "oh, agriculture is the largest employer of labour in Nigeria hence you have to direct resources to it here". But isn't the correct framework to look at it be that to achieve agricultural productivity we might actually have to lose agricultural jobs?Adedayo: Yeah, absolutely. It's very interesting because there was something I explored when I was at PwC [PriceWaterhouseCoopers] and we were looking at job creation in Nigeria and we were looking at basically services, the industrial sector, and agriculture and that forced me to, like, look at advanced economies and to see the structural transformation of the economies (that is, the structure of the GDP over time) and what you discover is as these societies evolve, as they continue to grow, the share of [agriculture] employment has reduced drastically, later on manufacturing starts falling and really what starts expanding is [services]. It's the services that really becomes the biggest share of GDP. So in Nigeria, it's actually quite interesting that you mentioned that because we have too many people in agriculture. I believe we have too many people in agriculture and they are largely unproductive. So...I've been reading a lot about what I call political crops in Nigeria.Tobi: That's interesting.LaughsAdedayo: They are very political. Rice is one of them...Tobi: Okay...Adedayo: Tomato is one of them...Tobi: Okay...Adedayo: Oil palm is one of them.Tobi: All from Kano.LaughterAdedayo: Rice from Kano. So one of the experiences that has shaped my ideas about agriculture is the project I was on with CUSO International. We had to work with farmers in different sub-sectors of agriculture and what you find out is: the challenge is actually...it's a lot of challenges, really.When you go to the field you discover that it's not necessarily cheap money that is the problem of farmers. I had farmers in my project who had money but it was very difficult for them to source inputs. - ABThe farmers, for instance, one of the ways government approaches it is to say "let's pump more resources into agriculture". By more resources, basically more money - cheap money. But when you go to the field you discover that it's not necessarily cheap money that is the problem of farmers. I had farmers in my project who had money but it was very difficult for them to source inputs. They had to travel, you know, to the next town or the next city just to get fertilizer or to get inputs into what they were doing. So in my thinking about agriculture, what I would like to say is mainly Nigerian farmers are unproductive, yields are very very low and they've not improved for decades. Cereal, for instance, we say one of the most consumed things globally is cereal, right? And, so, I remember I was writing a report and I had to just go and look at how yields are trended over the years and I discovered that over the past four decades Nigeria has made no notable progress; in terms of expanding yields for cereal which is actually...which you could say is crucial to food security, right?Tobi: YeahAdedayo: Draw a chart of other countries - Asian countries - and you'll see the rapid kind of improvements they've made. And I feel like that is what we have to start looking at. Government has to start looking at "how can we drive productivity?" One of the things I've been exploring of late too is: we're giving money to all these people [to] go and start farms. What is the total arable land we have in Nigeria? With the level of productivity we have in this country, when the population doubles according to [the] UN by 2050; if we plant rice on all arable lands in Nigeria, will you be able to feed 400 million people with the level of youth you have currently?  So the question is - how do we do more using less land resources and getting more value per hectare? (And) that is one area I think the government needs to focus on that they've not been able to focus on, and to do that, really, you probably have to let go of most of the manpower you have [in agriculture]. Because it ties into what you're saying. When you start thinking [about it], agriculture is difficult but in Nigeria it is usually the last hope for someone who can't hack it in other fields. "I'll go back to the farm", right? Tobi: Yeah.Adedayo: They'll say they will go back to the farm as if agriculture is something that requires no intelligence, no form of knowledge or skill. "I'll go back to the farm or I'll plant this". And that is why a lot of them can't get out of the trap; because when you are involved in agriculture then you start thinking about "you want to start a farm"...a large [organisation like] PZ, for instance, which is doing a lot of backward integration. They want start a farm, they'll go and look for "okay, where are the best places in Nigeria to site this farm?" I want to plant rice, am I planting rice...the land I have, is it upland or lowland? Will I be able to irrigate the lands? The yields on irrigated lands are better [than] on non-irrigated lands for rice. [But] a lot of Nigerian farmers do not know this because they have no skill, they did not go to school, they have no knowledge. Fertilizer: what percentage of fertilizer should I apply? What size? What are the nutrients necessary for this type of crop? The average farmer cannot know this because they did not go to school, they did not have access to even informal education to learn this; then you start asking yourself, should agriculture really be for the people who have not been able to do anything in their life - without skill, without knowledge? It's not. Government is shouting food security. To achieve that, by boosting productivity, we actually need to evolve in the way our agriculture is structured in Nigeria. Smallholder farmers will eventually not take us to the destination we want because they are too unproductive, they're too unorganised and that's even when you're producing a lot, [then] aggregating it becomes very very difficult in terms of access to, maybe, improved seedlings. Government is not doing enough in investing in the research institutes we have. We have agricultural research institutes - I know for one that NIFOR [Nigerian Institute for Oil Palm Research] is in Benin and a lot of the palm oil farmers I monitored then usually travel to Benin to actually get seed for planting in the nursery and sell it to farmers.Tobi: There is a cocoa research institute in Ibadan.Adedayo: Exactly. They are not investing a lot for them to actually generate ideas that could unlock our productivity deficit in agriculture. So for me, I feel it is necessary for Nigeria to move beyond the current structure we have where we have a lot of smallholder farmers. Like I've said; they are not fit for the job. If our task is really to feed Nigerians by producing locally, and with full knowledge that eventually we're going to get to the stage where we won't be able to import all of our food needs and we will need to start investing locally in food value chains because if we're going to have 200 million more mouths to feed in the next 30 years.Tobi: That's scary.Adedayo: It's scary. And you want to ask "what are we doing?" I mean, I don't know what the government is going to do about it but the current structure - if we want economic prosperity, if we want food security - it can't stand. We need to go into ... When people say large-scale (large-scale) farming, it is because a large-scale farmer would probably be a bit more serious, [she] would apply more thought before going into farming than someone who believes - "Farming is my last resort. When I go to Lagos and it fails, I go back to the farm". A large-scale manufacturer will not think in terms of that. We are recently consulting for a giant in Nigerian consumer space now. [A] household name. So they are backward integrating and they want to start...they've actually started - oil palm plantations. And, do you know what their challenge is now? It's actually to estimate the size of the market. Because there is no reliable data on something as simple as oil palm consumption in Nigeria and that's basically what we're working with them on.Tobi: Wow.Adedayo: They want to commit a lot of resources into it and that is why they are thinking about it that - "oh, do these opportunities really exist?'' In terms of selecting the place to site their farms, we know we have more oil palm businesses in the Niger Delta - Benin and Cross-Rivers and all these places. The thought required in terms of the soil requirement, the seedlings requirement, the fertilizer requirement - you can't rely on the smallholder farmers to make those decisions. It is the large-scale farmers, the commercial farmers that would undertake that, even if later on they employee labourers on the fields. But from the strategy perspective and in terms of boosting yields and everything, they are going to apply more thought than the ordinary smallholder farmer. So the question is how does this end? On the part of government I'm really not optimistic that they would do more than just giving cheap loans or giving subsidized fertilizer. Which is another policy area that is challenging. Government will say "oh, we will ban the importation of fertilizer" but different farms, different crops need different fertilizer requirements. It's also a very complex decision for framers to make but you're selling the same type of fertilizer or you're trying to sell the same type of fertilizer for every farmer; for the person planting maize, for the person...laughsFor the farmer planting tomatoes and everything. So you start asking yourself "now, okay, how does this make any sense?" And to break out of this chain, I think what will just happen is a lot of Nigerian companies especially those listed [on the stock exchange] and which we talk to their management regularly, we've discovered that they are trying to backward integrate as much as possible. So maybe that would spur some form of commercial activity and maybe we will continue to have private interests, maybe beyond the requirements for them to process their goods. They are going to start looking to export markets and, you have, maybe, PZ for instance. [They] have an oil palm plantation which they do not use all of the output maybe they would now start exploring outside markets (market outside Nigeria) and that could cause a chain of continuous investment in the value chain. That is the way I see it currently, that those companies (private interests) can continue to expand and slowly we see... because think about it- if Olam continues to invest in rice for instance and we know Olam will prioritize yields and all those things and they will be a bit more productive, at least, than the smallholder farmer; we could get to a stage where Olam (even in the domestic market) become very competitive such that even the normal farmer won't be able to go to the market and say "oh, I want to go and sell my paddy" because there is an Olam who has a large farm with very very high yields and, maybe, probably cheaper prices, better quality rice output that would now make the smallholder very uncompetitive and as a result of that you'll see that the share of smallholder farmers in terms of planting some of these crops that are so vital to food security continues to fall and you continue to have a lot of a private interest in that area. Unfortunately data in Nigeria is actually very hard to gather and that is one of my issues also with development interventions in Nigeria because when you look at multilateral firms or NGOs. Once they embark on projects, there's usually a bit more thought into it; even in terms of monitoring and evaluating such projects.Tobi: Even if they sometimes invest in the wrong projects.Adedayo: Yes. Even if they sometimes invest in the wrong projects but to an extent, you can, at least, get data to analyse and see. Because we say "knowledge! knowledge!" Knowledge is compounding.Tobi: Yep.Adedayo: We just didn't start using laptops or iPhones. It was some people that started and we kept building on it, we kept accumulating that type of knowledge. So the questions for the Nigerian policy makers is: all the government interventions which is one of the reasons why... probably why all these bad ideas persist anyway because nobody actually tracks anything. You don't monitor it. The CBN does not issue a policy paper to explain their reasons for backing cassava [or] for backing oil palm or collect data on loans that were extended to farmers, repayment terms and everything. On productivity, monitoring those firms sort of productivity for their yields. I've never seen any report on that from the CBN or from the Federal Ministry of Agriculture. Yet they pump billions. Then it's now difficult for us to measure - did this program actually work? Did it not work? What are the lessons from the past that we can actually apply to recent policies? We don't. Because nobody is keeping the data. So it's one of the ways I think all these bad ideas persist because we're not collecting data on it. There is nothing to analyse. You're basically flying blind. So as analysts, we basically just say "oh, this is not likely to work" because this this this or because in other countries that have done it this is how they've gone about. But in Nigeria, we've been doing development intervention since when?Tobi: Yeah, a long time.Adedayo: For a very long time and you will discover that the same ideas continue till today.Tobi: Exactly.Adedayo: So you start to ask if it's not working then why do you think it's going to work now? What are we doing differently? Are we learning any lessons? I feel like if we've been learning a lot from those decades we should have had a body of knowledge that we should have discarded some ideas already that this is not working and we should continue to build on it even if it takes a long time. Currently, it seems like everything is the same. Which is the same thing. They closed the border in the 1980s, they are closing the border today. So, really, that is the way out, I think. We are going to have more private capital into agriculture, not deliberately or incentivised by government themselves but by the fact that as more companies see reasons to backward integrate, as they see reasons to even improve competitiveness even in terms of their sourcing because they need to protect their margins and to be competitive globally. We're going to see a bit more interest and that would maybe force us to explore export market and that is the way out, basically. I have no faith in the government to take us out of...Tobi: That's interesting. There are two things I'll just like to quickly pick up on from what you said. You talked about political crops...LaughsTobi: I don't know, I love that term so much and it's one of my challenges with the concept of comparative advantage...Adedayo: Okay.Tobi: I think that the problem with comparative advantage in our own context is that we naturally see our comparative advantages in our natural resources and when we try to do development that's where we...Adedayo: Focus on...Tobi: Funnel resources into, and historically you'll see that that actually causes deindustrialisation because some of your trading partners (they) then specialise and they will only deal or trade with you based on your identified comparative advantage which may just be primary products and then you make a lot of money when prices (international prices) are high but you have no industrial capacity whatsoever. So do we really need to rethink the concept of comparative advantage in our own context?And then secondly, maybe a bit of a push back on large-scale farming. One underexplored area is land rights for farmers. I don't work with farmers so I don't know much in that area but from a little bit of experience, I know that some of them work in farming collectives. Some of them do not even have rights to the land on which they plant and if you recall one of the big policy changes in Asia, for example, was to give farmers the rights to their land. Even smallholder farmers became productive. So is it really about farms sizes or is it about who owns the land, basically?Adedayo: Let me start [with] the first question. Yeah. I think in terms of comparative advantage, us looking at natural resources, I feel like...I really don't think it's a problem with comparative advantage. It's more of a problem with what we've decided to focus on, which is also connected to I think what you mentioned earlier about government organisations going into wrong projects. I think the starting point is trying to ask this question: how do we...in the case of Nigeria, for instance, how do we create millions of jobs, right? So I think what they look at is just - which sector employs...Tobi: Close to that?Adedayo: Close to that. Oh, Agriculture. Okay, let's invest in agriculture. So it's something of that sort because they would say... they'll say you have comparative advantage. Why? because a lot of them are in agriculture already. Like I said earlier, they are really not very knowledgeable people, so they're already in agriculture. I can't say Nigeria is even more productive in terms of maybe planting tomato than a comparable country. They [policy makers] can't also say that. So rather than say, maybe, explore other sectors or maybe even other sub-sectors even under agriculture that could kind of bring a lot of change, they keep focusing on the same thing. For me, I really don't think it's about comparative advantage. You see comparative advantage in what you can explore. If you don't believe human capital can be explored for development, for instance; it's hard for you to want to now say "oh" or for a development organisation you could say - oh, Nigeria has a lot of people - or we have a lot of young graduates and if we don't see them as capital to an extent, we might not much see them as comparative advantage...because basically some do not look at human capital as comparative advantage and it could actually be one of the things that could unlock maybe some of the progress we want to see. But you are fixated on agriculture. You start from the sector and you're now trying to find within the sector what Nigerians can do better. I really don't think development interventions is from the perspective of what people can do better. It's from what are people doing and how can we make them better at what they are doing? That's why if you read FAO, World Bank and all those research, they'll say "oh, we have a lot of people, we have women in farming". The question is should these women be in farming? Are they planting the right things? Should they be trained to go into other sectors where they could be better used as labourers? No. What they try to do is: they're already farming, why don't we make them better at what they're already doing? It's really not from the idea that... maybe we should...Tobi: What's the best to use...Adedayo: What's the best use of these...Tobi: Of their...Adedayo: Of their labour?Tobi: Of their capacity?Adedayo: Or their capacity. So it's basically around - let's just help them do what [they do]. It's just like the average Nigerian man and maybe you are a rich family man where people come and knock on your door and they come and meet you and you're like "okay, what are you doing now?" [The person responds] "Oh, I'm into furniture".Tobi: And you give them money.Adedayo: And you'll be like "so, what do you need to improve your business?" Oh, I need a loan. You give them the loan. You're not asking whether "should you be doing carpentry? Shouldn't you explore something that would be better for you? It's a very lazy approach, I agree with you. So in terms of comparative advantages, I think we've been... we've not been open-minded a lot about it and we're not ready for the kind of changes we're going to have to make to look past maybe the natural resources sector has comparative advantages for Nigeria. In terms of (also) natural resources that are very very easy to get, the oil and gas sector for instance; one could say is natural resources, right? And it's one of those sectors where overtime maybe we should have seen more industrialisation if we've had a lot of local content into the industry. But it was so easy for us because we just had the resources. We had no capital. We didn't even have the labour because we don't have skilled personnel to actually say "oh, we want to mine oil or anything". We just hired...Tobi: IOCs [International Oil Companies]Adedayo: IOCs. "Come and do this for us". It's like you're in your house...so I hire cooks, I hire cleaners. If I live in a rich man's house or my father is rich, I might not know how to do those things and they could be useful skills for you maybe in terms of application even if you don't want to become a cook or you don't want to become a cleaner. But nobody thinks about that and that is one of the things I've seen in that sector as well. Because if you think about oil and gas, it's very capital-intensive. You need a lot of knowledge. We need to be able to build things and apply things and yet we've not seen it (kind of) spur innovation in other sectors of the economy (that is, the knowledge we've learnt from building ships or building rigs or doing all those things), we've not been able to see it in other parts of the economy.Tobi: We can't even maintain refineries.LaughsAdedayo: Not talk of building new things. Even in natural resources, there are unexplored areas that could actually cause a chain of development in other sectors. We've not seen it, really and it's actually quite disappointing. I think also [that] it's on the part of [the] government to do most of these things. In terms of local content, they're celebrating this Egina field. They're saying they did a fabrication and whatever at Ladol here in Nigeria. But ain't we like four decades late or something? because imagine if we've had that from the start...Tobi: Yeah.Adedayo: A lot of those people would have...with the knowledge they've acquired in oil and gas they would have probably gone into other sectors maybe the one servicing the oil and gas industry then you'll see knowledge keeps, um..Tobi: Percolating.Adedayo: Exactly. All over the economy. So I think for us, it's not really just even about natural resources, [our] oil and gas experience, we've not taken advantage of some of the benefits it would have offered us in terms of building an industrialized economy or a knowledge economy. The second question was on, umm...Tobi: Farmers. Land rights.Adedayo: Land rights. Yeah. So let me give you a bit of perspective of what I've learnt. Okay, so I worked in Yala local government. It's very close to Ogoja. Ogoja is one of the popular places in Cross River and Obudu.Tobi: Okay.Adedayo: Yeah, very close to Obudu [in] northern Cross River and [in] one of the villages we worked in, one of the issues discovered was [that] it was very difficult to get land for women because women were not sort of entitled to lands. So even if the father dies and there is heritance, land inheritance...Tobi: YeahAdedayo: It goes to the men. It doesn't go to...Tobi: To the women.Adedayo: To the women. And one of the things we were trying to do then is try to talk to the communities to actually relax some of those rules. So using that as an example, I would say to an extent, yeah, it affects because they pay rent on the land. And [for] some, the cost of acquiring some of the land can be bad. So for women farmers even if they're very productive on their farmlands, when you account for the cost of acquiring the land or even securing the land you will discover that they are not getting quite much in terms of their output. Yeah, I absolutely agree that land rights are critical to farmers but I don't believe it's the major thing holding farmers back.I feel like knowledge; you can have land and not have knowledge and you'll still be unproductive without knowledge. So maybe the farmers we had in Asia (it's maybe something I have to read up on)...farmers have access to land, right? It's a good thing for farmers in Asia but I believe that was not the single most important determinant of their productivity.Tobi: Definitely. Definitely. Adedayo: Exactly. There is still a bit of knowledge gap with an average Asian farmer compared with a Nigerian farmer. But I feel like, from the experience I had on the ground, land is absolutely crucial; because it gave us a lot of headache. You know when we've invested a lot of people - technical training, giving them grants, train them, sponsoring them, feeding them, and at a point where they're supposed to start engaging in that activity they weren't able to secure lands or the lands they were able to get which men were able to get very easily, women had a challenge getting it or they had to pay a high price for it and you discover in most cases most of the lands they eventually get are those lands that are not quite as good and that would take them to walk long hours before you get to... you know when you have to walk 1 hour 30 minutes. You want to go and farm, you have to walk for 1 hour 30 minutes...Tobi: Wow.Adedayo: To get to your land before you... you can imagine the energy you've lost by walking 1 hour 30 minutes...Tobi: Yeah.Adedayo: Just before you get to your farm then you start asking, you know... and that is one of the challenges most of these people have in terms of securing access to land. So I feel it's crucial for us to figure out a way to encourage farmers to have access to lands, especially for women. Women are at a particular advantage but I feel like it's still not going to (kind of) release the kind of impact we want in that sector we still need knowledge, really.Tobi: I agree and a quick side note on that point. I think one of the least appreciated things about development in Asia is the Incredible amount of human capital that went into some of the reforms, you know... like, when you see people, they say "oh, Asia did this and hence we should do it too". We usually don't think about the state capacity for one, that is, the human capital that is within the government bureaucracy itself. These are incredibly knowledgeable guys who read a lot, who researched a lot, who actually were on ground and know what is going on in their countries and they could actually push through those reforms and they could see where things are going wrong and tweak and change course if necessary. You think about Korea -  sometimes we think of that history begins at the inflection point but usually, it doesn't, you know...Adedayo: Exactly.Tobi: Because I've read multiple papers about even the incredible amount of human capital even in terms of industrial capabilities that Korea acquired under Japanese colonization. But we look at an independent Korea and what they did and we say "oh, yeah, they did so and so policy and we should try and replicate that".Adedayo: Neglecting the knowledge transfer.Tobi: Exactly. So I agree with you about human capital, it's extremely important and I'm quite big on that as well. Let's talk about private capital now which you mentioned earlier. Now, shouldn't capital [also] be going to processing? I remember in one of your articles you talked about the processing gap in agriculture in Nigeria. Should private capital really be going into the same things that we've been doing which is production? Because you read things like Ivory Coast, for example, only gets about one point something billion [dollars] from cocoa exports whereas Germany processes the same cocoa into coffee and other products and gets three, four times the value. So shouldn't private capital be exploring processing? Wouldn't that be a bit more... trails off Adedayo: Yeah, yeah, I believe so. And one of the things I explored in that article was to say one of the things holding processing back (agricultural processing back) for most of the companies we have in Nigeria is because, most times, in terms of the inputs they want, in terms of quality of the inputs, in terms of the quantity of the inputs, they can't get it locally because of the way Agric is done currently. We have a lot of smallholder farmers spread across [a] vast geography. Sometimes unorganised, even in their organised state, sometimes they're still very very tiny. And as a company, you want a reliable source...Tobi: For your supply.Adedayo: Of supply because you don't want disruptions to productions, you have commitments to meet as well...Tobi: Yeah.Adedayo: For your business. So one of the ways Nigerian companies are trying to overcome that is actually what they now say backward integration where they have to do everything on their own. So rather than rely on the farmers to give me the quality and the quantity I have, why don't I invest in the primary bit? And most of the challenges Nigerian farmers have, I am able to leapfrog in because, maybe, I build a warehouse, I build storage facilities and all those things. But to come to the point about shouldn't private capital be going into processing? Yes. Absolutely. I believe private capital should go into processing, not just [in] terms of raw materials. If Dufil Prima or...(that's the makers of indomie)... or PZ... If they're able to get a lot of land and they're able to improve processing, of course, a lot has to do (also) with the business environment in Nigeria for you to now say processing is competitive for other the market. Because in a situation where there's a lot of protection of industries, how do you know you're truly competitive?Tobi: Yeah Adedayo: When all you do is sell to Nigerians? So when you now start looking at processing and you discover that we're only just 200 million people and you need to export outside the country, then the protection you've enjoyed from government might actually now put you at a disadvantage in terms of being able to compete with someone from Ghana or someone from Cote d'Ivoire. The initial stage is what we're seeing currently in terms of companies themselves going into primary agriculture. Like I've said, knowledge is going to be accumulated - with the progress we are able to see over time, if they are able to not just improve the way they do their business and if they're able to really maybe fine-tune whatever models they are using because many backward integration models have failed as well.Tobi: Hmm...Adedayo: Dangote Tomato, for instance, I think they've opened it since 2016, they've not produced anything. Tobi: Is it really closed? I hear it's closed.Adedayo: It's closed; because people just think things are easy to do [simply] because you see tomato waste in some place. So I think what he did was he had a contract with the farmers that, oh, don't worry, I'll give you seedlings, I'll give you maybe fertilizers, I'll give you a bit of capital. Plant this thing for me and come and sell to me. The model failed because some of these farms...it's still the same farmers, right?Tobi: Yeah.Adedayo: They're still not knowledgeable enough or anything. Then some would say, oh, they didn't get the inputs on time before the planting season or the capital on time. Some would say the agreement they had with Dangote Tomato (maybe) at the point of planting...markets change rapidly, prices change rapidly. If I signed a contract to give one ton of tomato to Dangote at five thousand naira per ton or something, for an example...Tobi: And you lock that in.Adedayo: And I lock that in and...Tobi: And then...Adedayo: And upon harvest, I discovered that the market price is seven thousand [naira]. The Nigerian farmer doesn't... Tobi: Wahala ti de [there is trouble].Adedayo: There is obviously conflict then...then how do I maximize the output? So in most cases you'll see them, (they'll go and sell to the...) they will go and sell at the open market to get... which of course I can't blame the farmer but it's one of the things you have to start thinking about even when you say, oh, I want to contract farmers to do all kinds of businesses for me. So that has actually also failed. Some companies also, [as a result of] lessons from what they've done before, they are trying to use it to start new programs or new backward integration schemes that would actually, maybe, be more favorable to them and support their type of business. For me I believe if we are able to get to an extent where a lot of these firms...a lot of them are able to do this or keep doing this, it could even force a lot of investment into processing. If I know that Olam, for instance, can supply these raw materials rather than exporting it out of Nigeria, you could have maybe private capital come into Nigeria. Even maybe local capital [would] want to go into processing because, at least, it's easier to...I mean, I can source locally from competitive producers - Olam or even if it is PZ that wants to later do that, even if they don't intend to expand processing to that scale.I feel like the developments we see could spur some interest in processing locally because you've had a lot of private interests that would come into the market and be like "okay, if there is not a reliable stream of supply for this product, do I want to commit? I don't have the capital to commit to doing primary agriculture, even the resources in terms of both money and personnel to now continue to go into that. Of course, I can't quantify the number of businesses that would likely go into that but I feel like that is one of the advantages we could derive from people who are truly interested in one of those segments but do not want to do the rest of those segments. And [if] we have private capital into primary production, it could spur a lot of more industrial processors. And I feel like in every country, someone has to do the primary production anyway...Tobi: Definitely.Adedayo: Exactly. So, even if, before you have processing or whatever in the US and everything, someone still does the primary production but I feel like we can do it to an extent that it could now generate a lot of interest from processors in Nigeria.Tobi: Okay. So let's look at the role of infrastructure in all this because...and I think you've also written about this so I'll be leaning on that a bit.Adedayo: Yeah.Tobi: I heard that line multiple times even from our chief economic officer or is it the Central Bank governor...LaughsWho say things like "oh, I asked textile manufacturers what is the problem? They said power". And then CBN is going to fix that. "Oh, I talked to toothpick manufacturers and they said power or roads or"... So what exactly are the infrastructure bottlenecks around industrialisation in Nigeria? Because what you see is that a lot of policy even around infrastructure still mimic are structural problems. For one, we know that after the colonialists left we stopped investing in railways, for example. That's a colonial infrastructure for some reasons, and even around things like road repairs or road construction, you'll still see things like ethnic fractionalization. Depending on who is financing the road, you'll see a lot more inter-state projects if it's the Federal Government and at local level you don't really see big infrastructure projects, you just see water pumps and um...Adedayo: Toilets. Tobi: And toilets. So what are the infrastructure bottlenecks and what can break the logjam?Adedayo: I like what you said around the CBN governor - [the] minister of everything - going to meet this person "what do you need?" Oh, meet that person "what do you need?" I feel like it's a bad way to go about policy because it shows that we don't even have... like a vision towards the kind of country we want or like a coherent strategy. I feel like if we have maybe our economic priorities figured out, then our infrastructure should kind of be tailored. The kind of infrastructure we build should be tailored to the kind of vision we have for the economy. So the challenge is this: we have a lot of young unemployed people, in fact, we have... one in two Nigerians...they are either unemployed or underemployed. Now this is at the moment...Tobi: One in two, is that right?Adedayo: Yeah. Underemployment and unemployment is almost 50%.Tobi: Wow!Adedayo: If I remember correctly. Okay, maybe a little over 40% anyway. But I know for youth...it's worst for youth.Tobi: Yeah.Adedayo: Yeah. So the challenge is going to become even more achening in the next 20-30 years when we have a lot of people in the country. So the question is, is policy really thinking about all these things? I don't think they are thinking about it. But what should they be doing? I think they should be thinking about it and to come up with a strategy. I've seen a lot of debates around so what is really the vision for economic prosperity in Nigeria? Do we have a vision to say oh, we want to industrialize or we want a knowledge economy or we want to do anything we want to? There is no vision for that. Even when we see the economic programs that [the] government brings out, they basically want to do everything and everything they want to do still mirrors what we have currently on ground. We invest in agriculture, we invest in agriculture, we do this, we do that. We don't know what we're trying to achieve by investing in agriculture. We don't know what we're trying to achieve by investing in human capital. We're just doing everything, and, for me I think, um, prioritising... because there's a shortage of resources. And in economics we say, oh...it's essentially the study of opportunity costs because you can only have so much and you have so many things to do. So I have this farmer coming, I have textile coming, I have Nollywood coming, I have these people coming to... I mean, to come and meet me and I am trying to do different kinds of things for them. I'm not thinking in terms of what should the economy really be focusing on for the future? What will be the biggest driver of jobs or productivity gains in the economy and let me invest or build infrastructure around that for people? I think one of the reasons why Emefiele is doing that is because they've not thought about that in terms of having a coherent strategy or a vision for the Nigeria of the future, or how the economy is going to be or how we're going to create jobs for people. But in terms of infrastructure imperatives, for me, I always tend to think in terms of...I'm very very... I'm really not keen on industrialisation so to say...Tobi: Hmm.Adedayo:: 'cause l feel like... I just feel like that has passed for Nigeria. I don't know why. I keep reading a lot about industrialisation and [how] it was the biggest driver of growth in Asia. It lifted millions of people out of poverty, right?Tobi: Yeah.Adedayo: And even in terms of countries that are leaning more towards services like India, we've seen that they have also been struggling economically. They've not done enough in terms of lifting a lot of people out of poverty or creating economic prosperity or the kind of growth they had in China, sort of. But in Nigeria there are just too many competing factors. For manufacturing, we say, oh, we need road infrastructure. We know road infrastructure is terrible in Nigeria. Ordinary moving goods...Tobi: Hellish.Adedayo: Hellish, right? I was seeing something... I was reading an article and it's cheaper to import from outside the country (from China) than to move goods from one end of Nigeria to another end.Tobi: It's cheaper to lay an intercontinental fibre optic cable than to take it from Lagos Island to mainland.Adedayo: Exactly. So... and I start thinking what is really the way out for businesses? Does it make any sense for businesses to go to that extent? Of course we have our ports infrastructure issue, which is also crucial to industrialisation, because I can't start a manufacturing plant in Borno and decide that Lagos is the port I'm going to be importing materials from.Tobi: Yeah. Adedayo: I don't see how that makes any sense for the country to have.Tobi: Yeah.Adedayo: It makes no sense for your business to say, oh, I have a manufacturing plant in this place and I want to import through this same port in Lagos. In terms of roads too, the roads are not just bad, then you have human actors (state actors) on the road who are on the roads for safety but who are encumbrance to doing business, because they'll be asking you for money; and If you speak to businessmen they will tell you if you're moving goods - interstate in Nigeria - the kind of bribes you'll pay before you get your goods down to where you're taking them to. So, obviously, I feel like roads are also absolutely critical. In Nigeria, my major idea is, I won't say I know all the kind of infrastructure we need to build... my own is we should agree on what we really want to do. If we think industrialisation is the way to go to accommodate a lot of Nigerians into the labour force, then let's say this is what we are pursuing and let's try to build infrastructure that will make it happen. You know you need roads, you need ports, you need rail, you need those things. You need power. If it's service economy you want to build, then you start thinking differently again. You mentioned laying fibre and if you want to have a service economy you might want to start thinking about communications and having to invest in broadband and all those things. So it's basically a decision between what you want to do - you don't need to privatise everything... build rail, build...we don't even have the capacity to do it. The government doesn't have the capacity to do it and we don't have a lot of private capital to pursue that. So I think if government comes out with a coherent strategy then we'll know the kind of infrastructure that is actually critical. If you say you want a service economy, you need human capital. Even in industrialisation too, you need human capital, but the level will obviously be different. Knowledge economies will have... you can't compare service workers in the US to factory workers in Vietnam or in Bangladesh. Even if they're educated and you need human capital in manufacturing. I don't want to call it, maybe, low skilled... obviously within human capital there are different strands, some are low-skilled, some are higher-skilled in what they're doing.   So for Nigeria, I think it's something that we need to come out and decide and build the required infrastructure. Maybe we then really need to build a lot of rail. Maybe we need to just build (expand) our broadband or something and invest in more schools and in more health clinics rather than building a lot of roads going to nowhere. So I feel like in my thinking about infrastructure, and that was really the idea around the article - to say we are resources starved and we really need to prioritise. We really need to say this is what we want to do and invest in the infrastructure to make it happen. In a case where we have that, then all these distractions of the committee of Nollywood people coming to my office...Tobi: LaughsAdedayo: Or committee of cow farmers coming to my office to say, oh, this is infrastructure we need, this is infrastructure we need. Because that acts as a signal to private enterprise, to people in the economy, that this is government's focus and they will also start to explore opportunities along that line and you're not bothered about all these distractions about people doing rice farming or tomato farming or how you can help them build their own infrastructure. We can't do everything. We really need to prioritise.Tobi: Do we need more private initiatives? Because I don't know...I get squeamish a bit when big things that could really really move the lever of the economy relies a bit too much on government. Because we all know some of the problems in that area, and the slow decision-making process and everything. For example, Tolaram is building a port in Lagos, I think with Lagos state government and a few other partners. So should policy really be about making such initiatives easier and then letting private capital just do some of these things?Adedayo: For me, I think, the role of government is absolutely crucial even for whatever you want to do. I was reading about when US wanted to go to space and the kind of investment they made and how that sort of created knowledge for other industries and how they were able to build capacities along that line. And you want to think that was state-led to an extent. It's very easy to not credit some of the inventions you see to government even if it was as a result of a government grant or government-funded projects (on behalf of government). So I believe, absolutely, we really need high-quality people in power, to be honest. I think that's probably one of the challenges we have in Nigeria.Tobi: Yeah. I take that point but it's interesting you mentioned the Apollo project. Because, really, even for a big economy like the US undertaking such a huge project, what you see is that behind the veil of everything there are lots of private contractors, private companies and government just acts basically as the coordinator. So should we just let government coordinate rather than looking for money to invest and saying that "oh, because tax-to-GDP ratio is low, we can't have good roads; and because you can't raise VAT, the second Niger bridge will be slow" and things like that.Adedayo: Exactly. I absolutely agree with... I agree with that. But you know, the thing is coordination too...Tobi: Takes knowledge.Adedayo: Takes knowledge. And you need Trust. For instance, you talk about PP projects and in some cases government will take it over again, right?Tobi: Yeah, and sometimes...Adedayo: But they will not meet their commitment Tobi: Yeah. Yep.Adedayo:  So imagine you...Tobi: There is actually lots of that in oil and gas...er [industry]Adedayo: So imagine when you are now saying...you come out with a very bold policy proposal and they're saying "oh, don't worry we're just going to coordinate everything" and... I mean I'm even assuming you have the quality human capital to actually create strategies and to probably coordinate such systems and you invite private capital to "oh, let's come and do this". I feel like for Nigeria to do that, a lot of private interests will be reluctant because of the kind of history we've had. So it's not just about even knowledge, it's about trust in the ability of the government to do some of the things they want to do. So yeah, I absolutely agree with you that government can lead a lot of things and they do not necessarily have to do it themselves.Tobi: Yeah.Adedayo: They do not need to provide the capital themselves, private interests will do that on their behalf but they need to get coordination right. They need to get the strategy right initially and you need people in government to do that. Private contractors are not the people that decide what the US government should do. It's people, knowledgeable people within...Tobi: The government itself.Adedayo: The government that come up with it and now say "oh, invite private capital to pursue some of these things". It's something we need to think of. I feel like government needs to completely eradicate this mindset that they are going to fix everything because that the idea we're seeing with this loan they want to go and get. That oh, we refurbished this, we refurbished that. You want 30 billion dollars that you can't even pay for, you can't even pay for the existing level of debt.Tobi: That you probably cannot even raise.Adedayo: Exactly. Because I don't know who will give you 30 billion dollars.Tobi: I was talking to my partner on that and my first reaction was there is no way the Nigerian government can raise 30 billion dollars. This particular government.Adedayo: Exactly. I feel like it's something we're ... we really need more quality people in government. Unfortunately, we don't have enough quality human capital...maybe the few people who want to do it (they) get frustrated out of the system because of bureaucracy and all kinds of challenges we have. But I believe the starting point is getting hiring right in the public sector. To have people who would then say "private capital, come and do this or come and do that...this is what we want to do but we want you guys to lead the effort".Tobi: There's an interesting story in the news around that area recently. Adedayo: Of course.Tobi: So yeah. Getting hiring right. It's absolutely crucial even in public service. People usually think that you don't need smart minds to work in government but it's probably even a lot more important. P

The death of Park Chung Hee would remain in the minds of the public for years after his assassination as citizens debated how his years in the Blue House influenced generations of politics in South Korea.

From humble beginnings to becoming South Korea's second president in 1963, Park Chung Hee’s time in office pitted the booming economy against the rigid censorship of his authoritarian regime. But not everyone would endorse his brand of politics...

This episode of the Korea Now podcast features an interview that Jed Lea-Henry conducted with Peter Banseok KWON. They speak about the origins of South Korean “self-reliant national defence” under Park Chung-hee, the pressures that forced this change in policy direction, the relative absence of indigenous industry inside the country at this time, the intertwining of defence building with economic development, the role played in this process by the Heavy and Chemical Industrialization Plan (HCIP), the central position that the Chaebol found themselves in during this period, the spin-offs (in both directions) from this dual track of military and economic development, the success and failures of these policies, and their remaining legacy inside Korea after the assassination of Park Chung-hee. Peter Banseok KWON is an Assistant Professor of Korean Studies at the State University of New York (Albany), and is a previous recipient of the Soon Young Kim Postdoctoral Fellowship in Korean Studies at the Korea Institute, Harvard University. Peter received his Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from the Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations at Harvard University, and has held positions as an Associate Researcher at the Institute of Korean Studies at Yonsei University. The articles used as the primary research for this interview are: ‘Mars and Manna: Defense Industry and the Economic Transformation of Korea under Park Chung Hee' (https://www.academia.edu/37491411/Mars_and_Manna_Defense_Industry_and_the_Economic_Transformation_of_Korea_under_Park_Chung_Hee), and ‘Beyond Patron and Client: Historicizing the Dialectics of US-ROK Relations amid Park Chung Hee's Independent Defense Industry Development in South Korea, 1968–1979' .(https://www.academia.edu/35797935/Beyond_Patron_and_Client_Historicizing_the_Dialectics_of_US-ROK_Relations_amid_Park_Chung_Hee_s_Independent_Defense_Industry_Development_in_South_Korea_1968_1979). Support via Patreon – https://www.patreon.com/jedleahenry Support via PayPal – https://www.paypal.me/jrleahenry Website – http://www.jedleahenry.org Libsyn – http://korea-now-podcast.libsyn.com Youtube – https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_qg6g1KyHaRXi193XqF6GA Twitter – https://twitter.com/jedleahenry Academia.edu – http://university.academia.edu/JedLeaHenry Research Gate – https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jed_Lea-Henry

As inter-Korean relations continue to improve, many believe that this time is fundamentally different than past episodes of détente. This is primarily driven by the decision-makers at the top, especially Kim Jong Un, argues Yonsei University's John Delury. He believes Kim may be the next East Asian authoritarian reform-driven strong man - à la South Korea's Park Chung-hee and Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew - who cares deeply about reform and economic development while placing human rights and liberties on the back burner. John Delury is an historian of modern China and expert on U.S.-China relations and Korean Peninsula affairs. He teaches Chinese Studies at Yonsei University in Seoul. About the podcast: The “North Korea News Podcast” is a weekly podcast hosted exclusively by NK News, covering all things DPRK: from news to extended interview with leading experts and analysts in the field and insight from our very own journalists. Looking for holiday gifts for a North Korea watcher this season? We have DPRK-inspired limited edition t-shirts, vintage posters and a 2019 calendar in our NK Shop,  just in time for the holidays. As a thank you for your continued support, we'd like to offer listeners a special discount: just use code nkpodcast10 at checkout for an instant 10% off your total purchase. *NK News Subscription Giveaway: Congratulations to October's winner, Patricio Worthalter (U.S.). Please contact podcast@nknews.org with proof of your username identity, to redeem your subscription. Each month, we'll be choosing a lucky reviewer on iTunes to to win a FREE NK News subscription. Want to gain instant access to breaking news stories and in-depth analysis discussed in our podcast? You can sign up for an annual NK News subscription, and save $50 by using promo code “podcast” at checkout: nknews.org/signup

This episode of the Korea Now podcast features an interview that Jed Lea-Henry conducted with Matt VanVolkenburg. They speak about the rise of youth culture in South Korea during the 1960's and 1970's, the Western influences behind this movement, the challenge this represented to traditional values and ways of life, the crackdown on this youth culture by the Park Chung-hee government, and the centuries old fear that the import of Western technology might also bring about the end of Korean culture. Matt VanVolkenburg has lived in Korea, on-and-off, since 2001. His research focuses on modern Korean history, through an analysis of music, film, inter-cultural reactions, and the approach taken to foreigners. This research contributed to the United Nations Committee on the Eradication of Racial Discrimination bringing a case against the Korean government over its HIV testing of foreign professionals. Matt runs the blog ‘Gusts of Popular Feeling' (http://populargusts.blogspot.com/). Donate at Patreon – https://www.patreon.com/jedleahenry Website – http://www.jedleahenry.org Libsyn – http://korea-now-podcast.libsyn.com Youtube – https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_qg6g1KyHaRXi193XqF6GA Twitter – https://twitter.com/jedleahenry Academia.edu – http://university.academia.edu/JedLeaHenry Research Gate – https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jed_Lea-Henry  

NUGGET CONTEXT Vinay discusses Narasimha Rao’s strategy to usher in liberalization without too much fanfare given the fragile situation he was in. He shares his thoughts on how some other politicians have managed to drive tough change with the support of the public which involved long term gains (Park Chung-hee in South Korea, Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore) but short term pain. GUEST Vinay Sitapati is an Assistant Professor in Political Science and Legal studies at Ashoka University. He has a PhD in Politics from Princeton University, in addition to degrees from National Law School Bangalore and Harvard University. His book - Half Lion: How P.V Narasimha Rao Transformed India (Published by Penguin Randomhouse) - traces P.V. Narasimha Rao’s journey from his modest beginnings in Telangana to the post of the Prime Minister. More importantly, the book talks about the fact that despite heading a minority government, P.V. Narasimha Rao was able to drive significant reforms that have fundamentally altered the economic trajectory of the country. In our conversation, we spoke about P.V. Narasimha Rao’s unfettered curiosity across disciplines, his resilience that saw him manage the vicissitudes in his political career, his intellectual and implementation agility, his ability to reflect and introspect, judgment around playing like a Lion, Fox or a Mouse depending on the context, capacity to reinvent himself across various shifts and turns in his journey, how he built teams and added value as a leader, how not making a decision was a decision in itself and driving change through a complex system where there is visible short-term pain but long-term gain. This podcast is for information and learning purposes only. All content and opinions expressed in this podcast are that of the guests and are not necessarily the opinions of Deepak Jayaraman or Transition Insight Private Limited (TIPL). Deepak Jayaraman and TIPL do not have any political affiliations or associations of any sort and this conversation is intended to be a non-partisan interaction. Published in June 2018. HOST Deepak is a Leadership Advisor and an Executive Coach. He works with leaders to improve their effectiveness and in helping them make better decisions specifically around organizational and career transitions. He currently runs Transition Insight (www.transitioninsight.com) and works with leaders to handle phases of transition thoughtfully. He has worked as an Operations Consultant with KPMG in UK, Strategy Consultant with McKinsey in the US and as a Leadership Consultant with EgonZehnder (a Swiss Leadership Advisory firm) where he helped companies recruit CEOs, CXOs and Board Members and worked on Leadership Development. Deepak is a certified CEO Coach and is an alumnus of IIT Madras, IIM Ahmedabad and London Business School. His detailed profile can be found at https://in.linkedin.com/in/djayaraman DISCLAIMER All content and opinions expressed in the podcast are that of the guests and are not necessarily the opinions of Deepak Jayaraman and Transition Insight Private Limited. Views expressed in comments to blog are the personal opinions of the author of the comment. They do not necessarily reflect the views of The Company or the author of the blog. Participants are responsible for the content of their comments and all comments that are posted are in the public domain. The Company reserves the right to monitor, edit, and/or publish any submitted comments. Not all comments may be published. Any third-party comments published are third party information and The Company takes no responsibility and disclaims all liability. The Company reserves the right, but is not obligated to monitor and delete any comments or postings at any time without notice.

Spotlight on Asia, focuses on the jailing of South Korea's former president 66 year-old Park Geun Hye. Produced and presented by RFi's Rosslyn Hyams with guests John Nilsson-Wright and Noh Jung-sun. South Korea's first woman president Park Geun-hye, was found guilty of 16 counts of corruption and abuse of power, and fined her close to 100 million euros. The people of South Korea, more than 50 per cent of who in February 2013 elected the daughter of former late South Korean dictator Park Chung-hee, are divided over the unprecedented sentence, and noisy supporters protested outside the court after her sentence on 6 April 2018. John Nilsson-Wright, a senior lecturer at Cambridge University in the UK and Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at the Asia Programme at Chatham House, notes that "there's certainly a will and a desire on the part of the current government of president Moon Jae-in, to change the political and economic culture of South Korea. He was a beneficiary of the candle-lit protests against President Park that led to her impeachment." While acknowledging that some analysts see corruption and influence peddling as an issue which runs through the various strata of South Korean society, and noting that questions could be asked about the fairness of Park's heavy sentence, he considers "it will send a very powerful signal to other politicians and to corporate Korea." Click the start arrow to hear more from John Nilsson-Wright and from Korean academic Noh Jung-sun on this issue. Park's former culture minister, Cho Yoon-sun was jailed for two years in January for her role in drawing up a blacklist of between 9,000 and 10,000 artists seen as critical of Park's government, by criticising her or her late father, or who had voiced support for opposition parties. The list, included artists in film, theatre, dance, music, fine arts and literature, and included world-renowned personalities including novelist Han Kang, winner of the 2016 Man Booker International Prize for The Vegetarian, and 2018 contender, and film director Park Chan-wook, whose Oldboy took the Grand Prix at the Cannes Film Festival in 2004, and the Jury Prize in 2009 for Thirst. Former President Park had denied she was involved in the blacklist, along with other corruption charges that led to her stiff sentence.

We're featuring two Korean American novelists, Jimin Han and Yoojin Grace Wuertz, who read from their debut novels that interrogate 1970s and 1980s Korean politics. Both books follow university students in the US and in Seoul as they fall in love, build friendships, and understand how they relate to the turbulent changes in South Korean society. Wuertz’s novel, Everything Belongs to Us, centers around two Seoul National University students under President Park Chung-hee’s 1970s authoritarian industrialization, while Han’s novel, A Small Revolution, flashes back to the student protests that helped inculcate Korean democracy. Introduced and moderated by E. Tammy Kim, former AAWW Open City Fellow and Editor at The New Yorker.

This is the first podcast in a two-part series containing clips from an interview with Richard A. Ericson, the political counselor in Seoul from 1965-1968. In this podcast, Ericson recounts the assassination attempt on South Korea's President, Park Chung-hee in 1968 as well as US reactions to this event. To find the full Moment in U.S. Diplomatic History, click here: http://adst.org/2013/01/the-uss-pueblo-incident-assassins-in-seoul-a-spy-ship-captured/ If you like the podcast, don't forget to drop by our website and donate today! http://adst.org/donations/ ADST: American Diplomacy, Warts and All.

In 2000, then President Kim Dae-jung became the first Korean to receive a Nobel Prize, for his life’s work dedicated to democracy and, to quote the Nobel Committee: “peace and reconciliation with North Korea in particular." The award was granted shortly after the first North-South Korean summit in June of the same year, and in recognition of the merits of the Sunshine Policy in general. Yet fifteen years later, Kim Dae-jung’s legacy remains controversial: not only is the success of the policy debatable, but some have also criticized the costs he was willing to pay in the name of reconciliation. An outspoken critic of Kim Dae-jung’s approach to North Korea is journalist and author Donald Kirk, who published in 2010 a b iography of the late president with a focus on his political career and the Sunshine Policy entitled: Korea Betrayed: Kim Dae Jung and Sunshine. In this episode we spoke with him about Kim’s priorities when dealing with North Korea and his lifelong quest for the Nobel Peace Prize. Donald Kirk is a veteran journalist and correspondent in the Asia-Pacific. He has reported from many of the conflicts and hotspots in the region since 1965 and covered the Vietnam, Gulf and Iraq wars. He has also extensively reported on Korean affairs, including the assassination of President Park Chung-hee in 1979, the Gwangju Uprising in 1980, the nuclear crisis of 1994 and the 2000 Inter-Korean Summit. He is the author of several publications, among them an unauthorized biography of Chung Ju-yung, the founder of Hyundai. Donald Kirk is a graduate of Princeton University and the University of Chicago. He has received numerous awards, including the Overseas Press Club of America Award, the George Polk Award for foreign reporting and the Chicago Tribune’s Edward Scott Beck award. He was also a Ford fellow at Columbia University, a Fulbright Scholar in India during the sixties and in the Philippines during the nineties, and the recipient of a National Endowment for the Humanities grant at MIT among many others.

Matt VanVolkenburg's prolific blog 'Gusts of Popular Feeling' celebrates it's 10th year of analysis on Korean society, history, urban space, film and current events this month. In the final segment of a 3-part interview, Matt talks about marijuana, rock music and the counterculture and their relationship with dictator Park Chung-hee in the military police state of 1970s South Korea. For an epic 10 year run of writing check out VanVolkenburg's archived work athttp://populargusts.blogspot.kr/ Music in this episode- Young Sound '???' https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ImP9ZzJ5Oi0

Matt VanVolkenburg's prolific blog 'Gusts of Popular Feeling' celebrates it's 10th year of analysis on Korean society, history, urban space, film and current events this month.In the final segment of a 3-part interview, Matt talks about marijuana, rock music and the counterculture and their relationship with dictator Park Chung-hee in the military police state of 1970s South Korea.For an epic 10 year run of writing check out VanVolkenburg's archived work at http://populargusts.blogspot.kr/Music in this episode- Young Sound '달무리'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ImP9ZzJ5Oi0

South Korea is a vibrant democracy, having successfully completed its transition from authoritarian rule since the late 1980s. At the same time, a number of laws and regulations dating back to the Park Chung-hee era are still in effect. Libel and defamation laws in particular seem to be invoked by the authorities with increasing frequency. Critics argue the government is attempting to influence the public discourse and silence dissenters. One of these critics is Professor Park Kyungsin, who has been advocating freedom of speech and opinion in South Korea, especially online. He gracefully agreed to be our guest for this episode, to talk about internet and press censorship, defamation and libel law, and the political environment of these measures. Professor Park is a lawyer and law professor at the Korea University Law School, the Executive Director of the PSPD Public Interest Law Center, Commissioner at the Korean Communication Standards Commission and one of the leading figures behind OpenNet, a non-governmental organization defending the freedom and openness of South Korea’s internet. He earned his J.D. from the University of California at Los Angeles and an A.B. in Physics from Harvard.

In Seoul's Hongdae district, Colin Marshall talks with Daniel Tudor, former Economist correspondent in Korea, co-founder of craft beer pizza pub chain The Booth, author of the books Korea: The Impossible Country, A Geek in Korea, and (with James Pearson) North Korea Confidential. They discuss the difference between Gangnam and Gangbuk style; the recently emerging trend toward Korean nostalgia, and what happens when you pull out an two-year-old mobile phone; what he discovered in Korea during the time of the 2002 World Cup; his time among the "studying machines" that constitute Korean youth, and why so few want to break from that hard-driving mode; education, especially abroad, as a means of "jumping the queue" back in Korea; the greater progressivism he's found among Koreans who've never left the country; why it matters when a foreigner voices the same criticism of Korea that Koreans think; whether he felt any fear of legal action when he publicly stated that Korean beer sucks; why Korean beer has continued to suck for so long; what it takes to get decent beer into Korea today; the "emotionalism" of Korean conversational style, and whether it plays in the wider world; to what extent Korea may westernize, given the presence of a certain "spineless love of all things American"; whether Korea's narrative of weakness can accommodate the country's new strength; what it was like writing for The Economist, a magazine newspaper given to short sentences, cynical humor, and an interest in "North Korea, North Korea, and sometimes North Korea"; where he still feels the presence of dictator Park Chung-hee, and the backlash to his "developmentalist" mindset that seems to have begun; the possibility of "de-Seoulification"; what he experiences on train trips that tells him too much has concentrated in Seoul; the parallels between Park Chung-hee and Margaret Thatcher; Korea's nature not as a conservative country, but as a country with a conservative veneer; the "natural socialism" that coexists in Korea with extreme capitalism; why Koreans believe their food too spicy for any foreigner to handle; why he hates even to hear the Korean term for "foreigner"; whether Korea can afford to continue burning so much energy on purely internal competition; the parallels between the chaebol system and North Korea; how soon a Pyongyang branch of The Booth would open after reunification; and what the English could stand to learn from the attitudes of the Koreans.

In Seoul's Insadong district, Colin talks with Michael Breen, author of The Koreans: Who They Are, What They Want, Where Their Future Lies as well as other books on Kim Jong-il and Sun Myung Moon as well as founder and CEO of Insight Communications Consultants. They discuss what you can infer about Korean society from the way Koreans drive versus now versus when he first wrote wrote The Koreans; the difference in the role of the law where it has traditionally oppressed people, as in Korea, and in society like the United States; the permanently red traffic lights in front of the president's house, and how you get through by "looking at the man"; what effect the sinking of the Sewol and the "third-world accidents" that preceded it had on the country's psyche as a developed nation; why those from already-developed countries have a hard time advising less-developed nations on matters like corruption; how "the politics lags behind the quality of the the people" in Korea, why the skills of rhetoric matter less there than elsewhere, and what the situation might have in common with Yes Minister; the dictator Park Chung-hee, "son of a bitch, but our son of a pitch" who ordered the country into development; why the South Korean government has no long-term plan for unification with the North; what sort of country he thought he'd got into in 1982, the extent of his ignorance about it at first, and the theoretical frameworks and attitudes he thereby escaped; the moment he found himself taking the side of journalist-beating cops; how Korean dictators, not just "random brutes" who rose to power, got put there by a particular system; why the potential "Seoul Spring" after the fall of Park Chung-hee didn't immediately lead to democracy, but to conflicts between the citizenry and the police; what he heard (and couldn't hear) in North Korea; how many branches of Starbucks he could hit with a stone (and how different were the old coffee shops in which dissidents met); what got stamp collectors arrested in the "old" South Korea; what lengths the South Korean government goes to not to allow its citizens their own judgment on North Korea; the lingering sense, in South Korea, that the North may have taken the high road; the issue of how unbroken Korean history really could have remained over the millennia; the Korean lack of an idea of Korean philosophical tradition; what got him interested enough in the Koreans to write The Koreans; the traditionally condescending (if thoughtfully condescending) attitude foreigners had toward Korea; what may change in the next edition in The Koreans, especially its coverage of culture; whether modern Korea remains recognizably the same place he came to in 1982; and what issues might make the most impact on the country soon.

In Seoul's Gangnam district, Colin talks with Laurence Pritchard, writer, teacher, and enthusiast of Korean literature. They discuss the Korean phenomenon of the "English gentleman" and the presence of English culture in the country; the idea that westerners "are all incredibly promiscous"; the expectations of an Englishman; the constant hurry of Seoul; his experience in France versus the Korean France of the imagination; the importance of swirling with the biggest wine glass you can get; the "disaster" of Korean bread the better part of a decade ago, and how it comes up against the English refusal to mix the sweet and the savory; what exposure to Korean culture he had before meeting his Korean wife in Paris; how he tuned into Korean film's tendency to mix styles; what literature has taught him about the central idea of han; Dalkey Archive's library of Korean literature; how he has come to get a handle on Korean class distinctions and intergenerational conflict; how his unhesitating decision to move to Korea came about; when he realized the true strictness of the hierarchies here, especially through how they manifest in novels; the greater importance of the president of Samsung than the president of South Korea; what it's like teaching English to high-powered executives; the drinking habits in Seoul (such as going straight to hard liquor and falling down escalators) versus those seen in English pubs; the failure of the "hipster" or "bohemian" idea, let alone irony, to penetrate Korean dress; the expatriate tendency to demonstrate they know more about the culture than you do; the ways that people in Korea don't connect; the parallels between attitudes toward Park Chung-hee and Margaret Thatcher; the default business of the fried-chicken shop; the difference between getting into French culture with French literature and getting into Korean culture with Korean literature; what goes into a "Gangnam novella"; the advantage of writing about Seoul rather than writing about Paris; what he gains by having a life and family established in Korea, and the prospect of doing a language exchange with his own daughter; how you don't go up to someone in England and say, "Hey, I'm from England"; the promising Korean literature translations of Deborah Smith; whether you can work with the "great truths" imparted by literature when plunged into a foreign culture; the necessity of assuming the impossibility of knowing about the foreign culture you plunge into; and his experience in a Seoul "bullet taxi," just like the ones Kim Young-ha describes in I Have the Right to Destroy Myself.