Podcasts about anglo american

In this episode, Carmen Hofmann (eabh) speaks with M. Fatih Karakaya (Istanbul University) about the historical development of consumer finance in Turkey from the early Republic to the present day. Drawing on archival research, they explore how instalment payments, retailer credit, and bank-led lending evolved within Turkey's distinctive economic and political context. Far from simply importing Anglo-American credit card models, Turkey built on a long tradition of "buy now, pay later" practices that stretched from Ottoman-era Singer sewing machines to the instalment plans of major household appliance manufacturers. The conversation examines how these historical legacies shaped modern consumer finance, what makes the Turkish experience unique, and what it can teach us about credit markets more broadly.

South Korea is a colony of Anglo-American imperialism. The Democratic Republic of Korea, otherwise known as North Korea, is a demonised state that is described as 'the aggressor' by Western Media for its defensive actions in response to the U.S. empire which killed 2.5 million innocent civilians during the 1950s Korean war and still seeks to destroy them today. To the West, the DPRK does not have an army, prisons, an intelligence service, and national interests, but death squads, prison camps, secret police, and rogue-state interests. This is the language to the West employs to victimise themselves. As taken from: 'US Aggression in Korea: playing with fire!' ( • US Aggression in Korea: playing with fire! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9okZ5KvQhKE) ______________________________________________ Subscribe! Donate! Join us in building a bright future for humanity! http://www.thecommunists.org http://www.lalkar.org http://www.redyouth.org Telegram: https://t.me/thecommunists Twitter: / cpgbml Soundcloud: / proletarianradio Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/theCommunists Odysee: https://odysee.com/@proletariantv:2 Facebook: / cpgbml Online Shop: https://shop.thecommunists.org/ Education Program: Each one teach one! http://www.londonworker.org/education... Join the struggle! https://www.thecommunists.org/join/ Donate: https://www.thecommunists.org/donate/

Even as governments draw up contingency plans to deal with expected shortages of food and fuel, freedom-loving peoples are rooting for Iran. For all the Trump regime's bombast, it has been clear from the beginning that Iran has the upper hand in the war being waged by Anglo-American imperialism. If they cannot find a face-saving retreat, the imperialists and their Zionist proxies will find they have precipitated the rapid destruction of their entire middle-eastern network of domination. Even with a de-escalation, the consequences for the global economy and for the regional power of US and British imperialism will be far-reaching and severe. --------------------------------------- Subscribe! Donate! Join us in building a bright future for humanity! www.thecommunists.org www.lalkar.org www.redyouth.org Telegram: t.me/thecommunists Twitter: twitter.com/cpgbml Soundcloud: @proletarianradio Rumble: rumble.com/c/theCommunists Odysee: odysee.com/@proletariantv:2 Facebook: www.facebook.com/cpgbml Online Shop: https://shop.thecommunists.org/ Education Program: https://thecommunists.org/education-programme/ Each one teach one! www.londonworker.org/education-programme/ Join the struggle www.thecommunists.org/join/ Donate: www.thecommunists.org/donate/

South Korea is a colony of Anglo-American imperialism. The Democratic Republic of Korea, otherwise known as North Korea, is a demonised state that is described as 'the aggressor' by Western Media for its defensive actions in response to the U.S. empire which killed 2.5 million innocent civilians during the 1950s Korean war and still seeks to destroy them today. To the West, the DPRK does not have an army, prisons, an intelligence service, and national interests, but death squads, prison camps, secret police, and rogue-state interests. This is the language to the West employs to victimise themselves. As taken from: 'US Aggression in Korea: playing with fire!' ( • US Aggression in Korea: playing with fire! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9okZ5KvQhKE) ______________________________________________ Subscribe! Donate! Join us in building a bright future for humanity! http://www.thecommunists.org http://www.lalkar.org http://www.redyouth.org Telegram: https://t.me/thecommunists Twitter: / cpgbml Soundcloud: / proletarianradio Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/theCommunists Odysee: https://odysee.com/@proletariantv:2 Facebook: / cpgbml Online Shop: https://shop.thecommunists.org/ Education Program: Each one teach one! http://www.londonworker.org/education... Join the struggle! https://www.thecommunists.org/join/ Donate: https://www.thecommunists.org/donate/

As taken from ' Is imperialism losing in Africa and Syria? Interview with Harpal Brar' ( • Is imperialism losing in Africa and Syria? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6DZmBNVzVk&pp=0gcJCR0AztywvtLA) In today's world, having a functioning government puts you in the cross-hairs of imperialism for the export of 'democracy and freedom'. No country can have a government unless it is approved by Anglo-American imperialism and a country that follows a defensive line, such as North Korea developing nuclear weapons, becomes the target of slander, lies, threats, and, if possible, the destruction and plundering of their nation with the utmost brutality. ______________________________________________ Subscribe! Donate! Join us in building a bright future for humanity! http://www.thecommunists.org http://www.lalkar.org http://www.redyouth.org Telegram: https://t.me/thecommunists Twitter: / cpgbml Soundcloud: / proletarianradio Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/theCommunists Odysee: https://odysee.com/@proletariantv:2 Facebook: / cpgbml Online Shop: https://shop.thecommunists.org/ Education Program: Each one teach one! http://www.londonworker.org/education... Join the struggle! https://www.thecommunists.org/join/ Donate: https://www.thecommunists.org/donate/

“The rules-based system just hasn't worked. China's system is so opaque that you can't see the subsidies. And when you've got China not interested in new rules and the US not interested in a referee, you've got two of the world's biggest actors who aren't on board.” — Soumaya Keynes It would have been nice to get John Maynard Keynes on the show to get his critique of Trump's trade war. But in the long run, we're all dead — even old Maynard. So instead, we found his great-great-niece, Soumaya Keynes — Financial Times columnist and co-author of How to Win a Trade War: An Optimistic Guide to an Anxious Global Economy. Having already appeared on Jon Stewart this week, Soumaya has a bit of Keynesian star quality about her. But she's also a first-rate economist. Her thesis is that the old rules-based trading system that her great-great-uncle helped design after World War II is gone. And it ain't coming back. China's subsidies are so opaque that rules can't be written to constrain them, let alone enforced. The US is no longer willing to submit to a referee. Without the two biggest players, no rules-based system is meaningful. So — now what? Keynes says we must think like a trade warrior. Donald Trump should leverage the tools available — but use them strategically. Trump's error in his second term was not being tough on China while being too tough on everyone else, especially allies like Canada and Mexico. Soumaya Keynes' most contemporary idea might be her most Keynesian one. John Maynard Keynes proposed penalties for countries running large trade surpluses as well as those running deficits — recognising that global imbalances are a two-sided problem. That idea didn't make it into the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement. Eighty years later, in equally anxious economic times, his optimistic great-great-niece is reviving it. Five Takeaways •       Can Trade Wars Be Won? Yes, Sometimes: The conventional wisdom: no one wins a trade war. Keynes and Bown agree — in theory. In practice, countries in a weaker position cave. History has examples: France in the late nineteenth century told its trading partners they were renegotiating treaties, and the smaller partners complied. Trump's tariffs in his first term produced concessions. The problem is not that trade wars can't be won. It's that the smaller power's only defence — coordinating with other smaller powers — is extremely hard to sustain. There's always an incentive to cut a deal first. •       China Is the Doper on the Sports Field: Keynes's sharpest analogy: the global trading system is like a sports game that needs rules to ensure a level playing field. China's subsidies — cheap credit, corporate handouts, opaque support for state-linked companies — are the equivalent of performance-enhancing drugs. The problem is that unlike doping in sport, China's subsidies are invisible. You can write a rule saying China won't give these handouts. But you can't verify compliance. And without enforcement, rules are meaningless. The WTO has not solved this. Nothing has solved this. •       Trump Was Right About China, Wrong About Everything Else: Keynes is careful here. She credits Robert Lighthizer in Trump's first term with identifying China as the real problem and building a focused strategy. In the second term, Trump put tariffs on everyone simultaneously — which dissipated leverage, alienated the coalition of allies needed to pressure Beijing, and mixed up the problem of China's subsidies with grievances against Canada, Mexico, and the EU. If you were genuinely tough on China, you wouldn't have put tariffs on everyone. You would have been more targeted. •       The Rules-Based System Is Gone and Isn't Coming Back: Why can't we return to the system Keynes's great-great-uncle helped build? Two reasons. China's subsidies are too opaque to write enforceable rules against. And the US has lost confidence in any international referee — a long and complex story, but the result is that America won't submit to neutral adjudication. Without the two biggest players, no rules-based system is meaningful. Yearning for the old approach is not an option. A new strategy is needed — and that's what the book is about. •       AI and the Next Trade War: Services: AI is central to the US-China conflict already — chip restrictions, military advantage, economic supremacy. But Keynes's less-noticed observation: AI could fundamentally reshape international services trade. The UK, for example, is a massive services exporter — finance, legal, consulting, accounting. If AI eliminates demand for those services, the UK faces a new current account crisis, new trade tensions, a new wave of economic conflict. Nobody knows how this plays out. Which is why, she suggests, the tools in the book will remain relevant for longer than the current tariff cycle. About the Guests Soumaya Keynes is an economics columnist at the Financial Times and host of The Economics Show with Soumaya Keynes. Before joining the FT she spent eight years at The Economist. She co-founded the Trade Talks podcast with Chad Bown during Trump's first term. Chad P. Bown is the Reginald Jones Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and former Chief Economist at the US State Department under President Biden. Together they are the authors of How to Win a Trade War: An Optimistic Guide to an Anxious Global Economy (Simon & Schuster, May 26, 2026). References: •       How to Win a Trade War: An Optimistic Guide to an Anxious Global Economy by Soumaya Keynes and Chad P. Bown (Simon & Schuster, May 26, 2026). •       Soumaya Keynes on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, May 19, 2026 — referenced in the interview. •       Episode 2892: Jason Pack on the Iran war — the companion episode on America's strategic distractions from the China problem. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouT...

“The end of labor means the end of paid slavery. And the opening up of freedom — that is to say, choice of how to spend your time. The only question, a big question, is how do you eat?” — Keith Teare Does capitalism have a future in our AI age? For Musk, Silicon Valley's baddest bad entrepreneur, the answer might surprise. Musk seems to think that in the long run, money and wealth will disappear in an age of abundant intelligence. Which, presumably, will include hundreds of billions of his own dollars. Although given Musk's determination to sue and take money from OpenAI, some might be slightly sceptical of his real faith in a post-money cornucopia. It's not just Musk and That Was the Week publisher Keith Teare who are reimagining capitalism in our AI age. The former World Bank chief economist, Branko Milanovic, drawing on Karl Marx and Adam Smith in equal measure, argues that if AI eliminates the labor component of production, things will become free — thereby creating the conditions for the destruction of capitalism. Keith agrees — and goes further than Milanovic. The end of paid labor, he insists, borrowing also from Marx, is not a catastrophe. It's the end of what he calls “paid slavery” and the opening of genuine freedom. I'm not so sure. If nobody has to work, we'll all become bad artists. The cult of the amateur. The future is of bad entrepreneurs like Elon Musk and even worse artists. Hyper-capitalism in our age of AI. Five Takeaways •       The Musk-OpenAI Trial: A Big Yawn That Cost Millions: An Oakland jury rejected Elon Musk's claim against OpenAI in under two hours — not because OpenAI didn't do what Musk alleged, but because the statute of limitations had expired. Someone should have caught this before two weeks of trial. Musk has vowed to appeal, but it's hard to see how you get around a statute of limitations. Keith's verdict: sideshow, big yawn, ego contest. The lawyers won. The real question — who owns OpenAI after it converts to for-profit — was never going to be answered here. •       Sam Altman's Credibility Problem: The New York Times took five takeaways from the trial, one of which was that Sam Altman has a credibility problem. Keith's response: not new information. What the trial did reveal is the depth of mutual animosity between Musk and Altman — two people who, despite everything, share more beliefs about where AI is going than almost anyone else in the world. Keith on who he'd back in a Stalin vs Hitler choice: Stalin, 100 times out of 100. Which is not to say he's enthusiastic about either. •       Krugman on Europe: Right Analysis, Wrong Conclusion: Paul Krugman, touring Europe, argues that GDP per capita understates European quality of life. A third of US income buys more than a third of US lifestyle in Europe — healthcare, education, travel, housing are all significantly cheaper. Keith agrees with the analysis. His counter: Europe's structural hostility to innovation means it can maintain its lifestyle but not grow it. The social democratic model is sustainable until it isn't. It needs to unlock innovation or it will slowly fall behind. Hard to do when you're spending your time writing regulations. •       Milanovic's AI Thesis: When Things Are Free: Branko Milanovic — Marxist and neoclassical economist — argues that if AI eliminates the labor component of production, value in the classical Adam Smith/Ricardo/Marx sense disappears, and things approach free. Keith agrees and goes further: this isn't just Marxist logic, it's classical economics. The organic composition of capital. If variable capital — mostly labor — tends toward zero, costs tend toward zero, prices tend toward zero, and the distinction between capitalism and its opposite dissolves. Musk says the same thing. Agree or disagree, it's the most interesting economic argument of our time. •       The End of Paid Labor Is the End of Paid Slavery: Keith's most provocative position. The end of paid labor is not something to fear. It is freedom — the opening up of genuine choice about how to spend your time. What remains are human-to-human activities: care work, travel companionship, live music, the masseur. These will be in demand. They just won't constitute most of what 8 billion people do. The question of how the previously employed population participates in society — eats, lives, has purpose — is real and large. Keith's position: it's not an inconceivable problem. Andrew's counter: if nobody has to work, we'll all become bad artists. About the Guest Keith Teare is a British-American entrepreneur, investor, and publisher of the That Was the Week newsletter. He is a co-founder of TechCrunch and Andrew's regular TWTW co-host. References: •       That Was the Week by Keith Teare. •       Branko Milanovic, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Capitalism from a Marxist and Neoclassical Point of View,” Substack. •       Paul Krugman, “Is Europe in Economic Decline?” The New York Times / Substack. •       Episode 2910: Keith Teare and Jonathan Rauch on AI — the preceding special edition, directly referenced. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters:  

Anglo American plans to sell its Australian coal mines for up to $3.8bn ahead of the company's planned merger with Teck Resources, according to a report by Reuters. The Ghanian government has asked gold miners in its country to sell some production to the country's central bank. Commercial terms are not yet determined. According to Goldman Sachs, central banks bought more gold than previously thought and are poised to ramp up their purchases further into 2026.Mining Stock Daily is sponsored by Vizsla Silver, advancing the Panuco silver-gold project in Sinaloa, Mexico — one of the highest-grade silver development projects in the world. The project hosts the world's largest, undeveloped high-grade silver resource, and the company has been aggressively expanding its drill program to grow that resource ahead of a development decision. Learn more at vizslasilver.ca.

“Fascism is the term that is everywhere and nowhere in contemporary political discussions. We can talk about right-wing populism — but the type of politics they share with classic fascism is what I call red pill politics.” — David Ost Please don't use the F-word. At least to describe the politics of Trump, Orbán, Meloni, Netanyahu, Modi, Farage et al. Rather than fascism, the best way to demystify far-right populism is via the movie The Matrix through its idea of “red pill” politics. David Ost's new book, Red Pill Politics: Demystifying Today's Far Right, argues that to grasp the threat we need to stop stepping out of the Third Reich and into The Matrix. The red pill, borrowed from the 1999 dystopian classic, has been appropriated by the far right as a metaphor for seeing through the liberal hegemony they claim distorts reality. Popping a red pill himself, Ost argues that while today's far right shares the essential DNA of classical fascism, it nonetheless operates in a world in which outright dictatorship isn't viable. Mussolini, Ost warns, didn't become totalitarian until four years after taking power. Fascism, then, is a process. It takes time. Even dystopias require patience. The book is also a manifesto for left counter-politics. Yes, Law and Justice in Poland and Orbán in Hungary have both been voted out, Ost acknowledges. But in Poland, he warns, the Tusk government won power in 2023 and then governed timidly, afraid of alienating the center, failing its own base on abortion and LGBT rights, and then losing the presidential election. So the lesson from Eastern Europe is that economic left populism, not liberal caution, is the best antidote to red pill politics. Mamdani not Starmer. Otherwise the F-word will once again become a reality. Five Takeaways •       The F-Word Has Become Meaningless: Every application of “fascism” to Trump, Orbán, or Meloni is immediately met with the counter: “Are we killing you? Are we throwing you in jail?” And seemingly the matter is put to rest. Ost's argument: the f-word has become a conversation-stopper rather than a conversation-starter. It lets the far right off the hook by setting the bar at Nazi-level violence. The actual threat — the delegitimisation of institutions, the treatment of opponents as traitors, the erosion of democratic norms — is already underway, without the gas chambers that the f-word implies. •       Opponents vs Traitors: The Defining Distinction: In a democracy, you have opponents. You disagree with them, you campaign against them, you try to vote them out. In far-right politics, you have traitors. People who disagree with you are not legitimate participants in a political contest — they are enemies of the nation, people who do not belong, people who are working against the interests of the real people. This distinction — not violence, not the gas chambers, but the redefinition of legitimate opposition as treachery — is Ost's clearest marker of the transition from normal democratic politics to something else. •       Mussolini's Four Years: How Long Before Dictatorship? When Mussolini first came to power, there were still elections. He tried to rig the game — to gerrymander, to use contemporary parlance — and institutionalise his authority. He only turned to outright dictatorship after four years in power. That was a different time. But the pattern — of coming to power through elections and then slowly making it impossible to be removed through elections — is not unique to Italy. Ost argues we may currently be in the equivalent of Mussolini's first four years in several countries simultaneously. •       What Eastern Europe Teaches America: The Tusk Warning: Law and Justice in Poland governed for eight years and was voted out in 2023. The lesson should be hopeful. But the coalition that replaced it, led by Donald Tusk, governed timidly — afraid of doing anything that might alienate the center, failing to deliver on abortion rights and domestic partnerships, and then lost the presidential election. Ost's verdict: a Biden mistake. When the center-left or left comes to power, it must be consequentially left populist — not just different from the right in tone and temperament, but materially different in what it does for regular people. Caution is its own kind of failure. •       Mamdani as Real-World Exhibit A: Ost was writing the book when Zohran Mamdani won the New York City Democratic mayoral primary. Mamdani campaigned explicitly to speak to voters who had voted for Trump — asking why they were moving in that direction and arguing that a universalist left could speak to their material concerns without abandoning minorities. For Ost, this is the model: economic populism that is genuinely redistributionist, that speaks to small cities and rural areas, that is tough on the issues rather than cautious about public opinion. A left that actually stands for something. About the Guest David Ost is an emeritus professor of politics at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. He is the author of Red Pill Politics: Demystifying Today's Far Right (The New Press, May 19, 2026), The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics, and other books. He has written for a wide range of scholarly and popular publications, has done research in Polish factories, and once drove a NYC taxi. He lives in Ithaca, New York. References: •       Red Pill Politics: Demystifying Today's Far Right by David Ost (The New Press, May 19, 2026). •       Jonathan Rauch, “Yes, It's Fascism,” The Atlantic — the piece Andrew references at the opening, and the episode we produced around it. •       Jason Stanley, How Fascism Works — cited as the book Ost's is in conversation with. •       Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die — Levitsky blurbs the book. •       Episode 2894: Marc Loustau on making Hungary boring again — the companion episode on Orbán's defeat, referenced directly. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTube

“Maps are communicating vast quantities of new knowledge that was only estimated. They convey this imaginative energy — an imaginative energy that maps today have lost, because today maps are so functional, so utilitarian.” — Peter Keating In the sixteenth century, Spanish cartographers represented California as an island. They weren't being careless. Nor were they drawing New Yorker covers. These 16th century cartographers were, instead, mapping the limits of both what they knew and what they imagined. Cartography is as much an art as a science and maps always mirror how we see the world. Thus Peter Keating's beautifully illustrated new book, Power Lines: Maps That Shaped the Way We See the World. Assembling nearly 100 of history's most consequential political maps, Keating's thesis is that maps are not neutral. They are arguments. Every map centers something — a religion, an empire, a people — and pushes something else to the margins. The story of cartography, then, is the story of power. Five Takeaways •       California Was an Island: The Power of Imagined Geography: In the sixteenth century, Spanish cartographers drew California as a large island off the coast of America. They weren't being careless — they were mapping the edge of what was known and imaginable. Before any map can draw a border, Keating argues, it has to decide what is real. The T-and-O medieval maps placed Jerusalem at the center of the world, with the biblically admitted lands of Europe, Africa, and Asia radiating outward. Only slowly, and with great difficulty, did the Western cartographic tradition absorb the fact that there was a whole continent between their imagination and the Pacific. •       The Oldest Tension in Cartography: Sacred vs Scientific: Keating identifies two traditions in constant tension throughout Western history. The cosmographical tradition: center what you know and believe, place your gods and sacred lands at the middle of the world, and mix fantasy with inquiry. The scientific tradition: starting with Ptolemy in ancient Greece and independently in ancient China, create maps that generals and kings could actually use to expand territory, find resources, and identify enemies. With Rome's Christianisation, the cosmographical tradition dominated for nearly a thousand years. The Ptolemaic scientific tradition only re-emerged with the Renaissance and exploration. •       Poland: The Most Erased Country in Cartographic History: Keating's answer to his own question — which country has been wiped off maps most often yet survived? Poland. It disappeared from maps at least three times, divided and partitioned by more geographically fortunate powers — Habsburgs, Russians, Nazis — whose cultural and military might seemed overwhelming. And yet Poland survived every erasure in the hearts of its people. A 1956 map of Poland as a carnation, published by the communist government as a May Day celebration, reads — Keating argues — as subversive under the surface: a nation asserting its existence against the regime that claimed to represent it. •       Lincoln's Favorite Map: The Slave Density Survey: The most powerful map in the book: the 1861 Coast Survey, a non-ideological government project that shaded American counties by the density of enslaved populations. Lincoln studied it obsessively. He reasoned that where enslaved people were densest, Union troops could arrive as liberators and find support. Where they were rare — in predominantly white areas of the South — he could pursue accommodation and peace. The map shaped the Emancipation Proclamation's geography. And because enslaved populations had settled where the delta soils were richest, the map also explains the cultural and political geography of the American South today. •       The Two-Color Election Map Is Making Democracy Worse: Every two years, Americans are shown the same red-and-blue electoral map. Keating's verdict: it is a bad projection, a winner-take-all distortion, and a representation of the Electoral College's biases rather than actual political sentiment. Research shows that two-color maps increase cynicism, cause people to underestimate the number of fellow-partisans in other states, and erode faith in politics. In a democracy, maps should reflect actual political support. The United States is overdue for population-based electoral maps. About the Guest Peter Keating is a narrative journalist whose work has appeared in GQ, Mother Jones, National Geographic, and Politico. He was a longtime columnist and founding member of the Investigative Unit at ESPN, where he was part of teams that won three National Magazine Awards. He is the author of Power Lines: Maps That Shaped the Way We See the World (Black Dog & Leventhal, May 12, 2026) and Dingers! A Short History of the Long Ball. He lives in Montclair, New Jersey. References: •       Power Lines: Maps That Shaped the Way We See the World by Peter Keating (Black Dog & Leventhal, May 12, 2026). •       Saul Steinberg's “View of the World from 9th Avenue,” The New Yorker, 1976 — the famous New Yorker cover discussed in the interview. •       Episode 2908: Audun Dahl on moral judgements — the parallel episode on how framing shapes perception. •       Episode 2909: Adrian Goldsworthy on Athens and Sparta — referenced in the conversation. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: (00:31) - California as an island: sixteenth-century Spanish maps (02:14) - What imagined maps teach us: the limits of knowledge (04:30) - The New Yorker cover of 1976: New York's view of the world (05:22) - Two traditions in tension: cosmographical vs scientific (08:13) - Geo...

As the wine flows in the Spring of 92 AD, Gaius and Germanicus shift their focus to the power of ceremony and the "paper tiger" status of modern empires. They analyze the symbolic "disrespect" shown during a meeting between the American and Chinese emperors in Beijing, noting how ritualized slights reflect a collapsed military reputation. Germanicus argues that the United States has "defanged" its own sea power, rendering a clash over Taiwan unnecessary because the global power dynamic has already shifted. The duo also delves into historical revisionism, suggesting the Pacific War was an avoidable tragedy exacerbated by failed diplomacy with Japan. Amidst "upbeat stories" for the resting centurions, they conclude that the Anglo-American alliance is viewed as a single entity by Eastern powers, much as it was during the 20th century. The retired soldiers find comfort in these tales of strategic errors that do not reflect their own storied service. (2/3)1937 IMPERIAL JAPAN ARMY IN SHANGHAI

“Retirement is a false construct created a hundred years ago by the government. It was basically created when Social Security was born. Prior to that, people worked until they died — because they didn't live as long.” — Michael Clinton At the ripe young age of 70, Michael Clinton hiked nine days to Everest Base Camp and ran the Tenzing-Hillary Marathon down. Now 72, he is president of his own longevity consultancy, a columnist for Esquire and Men's Health, a private pilot, part-owner of a vineyard in Argentina, and the author of Longevity Nation: The People, Ideas, and Trends Changing the Second Half of Our Lives (Atria/Beyond Words, May 5, 2026). Rather than about living forever, Longevity Nation dares us to redefine what the second half of our lives can look like. And Clinton wants us to reinvent society accordingly. A hundred years ago, he reminds us, only seven million Americans were over 65. Today there are 62 million, which will quickly grow to 80 million. The whole world is aging, and its institutions are not keeping up. Retirement, Michael Clinton explains, is a false construct invented a century ago by industrial age governments. Rewire, the septuagenarian marathoner says. Don't retire. Five Takeaways •       This Is What 72 Looks Like Today: Clinton's opening provocation: at 70, he hiked to Everest Base Camp and ran the marathon down. He's visited 125 countries, run marathons on all seven continents, holds two master's degrees, and is a private pilot. His point is not to brag. It is that the cultural image of what 70 or 80 looks like has not caught up with the reality of what a subset of 70 and 80-year-olds — and, increasingly, a growing proportion of 70 and 80-year-olds — actually look like and are capable of. When he was 40, 72 seemed ancient. Now he is 72. It doesn't. •       GLP-1: Hotel California or Longevity's First Democratised Drug? The sharpest exchange in the interview. Andrew's framing: GLP-1 is Hotel California — you can check in but not check out. Stop taking it and the weight and inflammation return. Clinton's response: yes, that seems to be the story right now, and nobody knows the long-term play. But GLP-1 is coming to Medicare this summer, price cut in half, and it may become the first truly democratised longevity drug — reducing obesity, inflammation, and cardiovascular risk across the income spectrum, not just for the wealthy. Exciting and uncertain in equal measure. •       Retirement Is a False Construct: Social Security was created at a moment when most Americans died before collecting it. Life expectancy was 62. The retirement age was 65. The construct was built for a world that no longer exists. Clinton's prescription: don't retire. Rewire. You don't have to do the same thing, but do something. Stay engaged. Stay purposeful. If you're 65 and live another thirty years, the retirement construct — move to Florida, play golf, wait — is not merely insufficient. It is actively harmful to cognitive and physical health. •       Longevity Nation vs Gerontocracy: Andrew raises the counter-argument: is longevity nation actually gerontocracy? Trump, Biden, Trump. Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Nancy Pelosi. A class of elderly people who won't step aside, hoarding power and preventing generational renewal. Clinton's response: he is opposed to formal retirement ages for anyone. His answer to the political hoarding of power is not age limits but engagement — people need purpose, and purpose should be redirected, not cut off. Andrew's unspoken counter: this is easy to say when you're not the one being blocked by an eighty-year-old senator. •       Who Do You Want Around Your Deathbed? Clinton's most personal observation, via the book he co-authored: as you think about living longer, ask yourself — who are the five people you would want around your deathbed? And are you maintaining those relationships? The grandson of a funeral director, Clinton has a different relationship with death than most. His prescription: the longer you live, the more important it becomes to keep your closest relationships strong. Longevity without community is not longevity. It is just duration. About the Guest Michael Clinton is the former president and publishing director of Hearst Magazines, founder of Roar Forward, and the author of Longevity Nation: The People, Ideas, and Trends Changing the Second Half of Our Lives (Atria/Beyond Words, May 5, 2026) and Roar: Into the Second Half of Your Life (Before It's Too Late). He is a columnist for Men's Health and Esquire, a private pilot, a marathon runner on all seven continents, and a part-owner of a vineyard in Argentina. He lives in New York City and Water Mill, Long Island. References: •       Longevity Nation: The People, Ideas, and Trends Changing the Second Half of Our Lives by Michael Clinton (Atria/Beyond Words, May 5, 2026). •       Stanford Center on Longevity, New Map of Life — cited by Clinton as one of the major research frameworks behind the book. •       Samuel Moyn, Gerontocratic Nation — the Yale professor's forthcoming counter-argument, referenced by Andrew. •       Cara Swisher, Cara Swisher Wants to Live Forever — the CNN series referenced at the opening as the sceptical counterpart to Clinton's optimism. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: (00:31) - Introduction: Cara Swisher wants to live forever (01:33) - How old are you, Michael? 72 and proud (01:57) - The Everest Base Camp hike at 70 (02:17) - Is the longevity boom a coastal elite phenomenon? (03:15) - A hundred years ago: seven million over-65s; today, 62 million (03:46) - The cultural shift:...

“Soccer matches are poorly designed experiments — you don't necessarily find out which team was better. But any soccer fan will tell you that. Oftentimes, the better team does not win.” — Nick Greene, via a NASA scientist On June 11, the World Cup comes to North America. Fifty-six years ago, I watched the searing injustice of Johann Cruyff's Holland getting robbed in the 1974 final by Germany. Today I talk with someone who explains how this kind of injustice is built into the game's DNA. Nick Greene — long-suffering Newcastle United fan and author of How to Watch Basketball Like a Genius — has a new book, How to Watch Soccer Like a Genius, which tells us what architects, stuntwomen, paleoanthropologists and computer scientists tell us about the beautiful game. What they tell us is that the game isn't fair. One NASA scientist tells Greene that soccer is a “poorly designed experiment” because the low-scoring nature of the game means results don't reliably identify the better team. Thus the dark fate of the free-scoring, brilliantly inventive Hungarians in 1954 and the Dutch in 1974. So if you want to watch the World Cup like a genius, don't expect the best team to win the tournament. Which may explain why Greene suspects that England — where the pain of World Cup injustice is a national fetish — will win in 2026. On penalties probably. Arsenal style. After 120 minutes of goalless football. Five Takeaways •       Soccer Is a Poorly Designed Experiment: A NASA scientist published a peer-reviewed paper concluding that soccer is a “poorly designed experiment” — the low number of goals means results don't reliably identify the better team. Greene's observation: any soccer fan could have told him that, and saved the journal space. But this is also what makes the game what it is. Unlike basketball's seven-game playoff series — which gives the best team enough chances to emerge on top — a single World Cup match, in a single-elimination tournament, means one error can have outsized consequences. The imperfect and the human are inseparable. •       Justice Has Nothing to Do With It: The 1974 Dutch vs 2004 Greece: Andrew's most painful memory: the 1974 World Cup final, where the magnificent Dutch side led by Cruyff was beaten by the Germans. The Dutch didn't win, but they are remembered as one of the greatest teams in history. The 2004 Greek side, which won Euro 2004 by parking the bus and grinding nil-nil victories, actually won — and are remembered as a fluke. The lesson Greene draws: the shared understanding built into soccer watching is that winning is only one metric, and often not the most important one. It is an imperfect and profoundly human enterprise. •       How to Appreciate Defense: The cliché American complaint about soccer is the low scoring. Greene's response: this is partly a failure to appreciate defense, which in soccer can look like the absence of good offense. He discusses Italy's history of outstanding defensive play — the Catenaccio system, Paolo Maldini, Beckenbauer — and the intelligence required to prevent goals. Andrew's contribution: his wife, who watches American football, taught him that defense is where the sophistication lives. The same is true of soccer. The genius watcher watches the defenders. •       VAR: Too Much, Going in the Right Direction: Greene's measured verdict on VAR — video assistant refereeing. His worst case: when it ruins a goal celebration. The player scores, the crowd erupts, the flag goes up, three minutes of review, okay everyone start celebrating again. That destroys the cathartic moment that makes soccer's rare goals so electrifying. His prediction: VAR will evolve toward the coach's challenge model used in American football and basketball — a limited number of challenges per half, preserving the flow of the game while correcting the worst errors. It's relatively young. It'll be futted and fidgeted with. •       Don't Bet On It. Watch the Game: Greene's best advice for American newcomers to soccer. Not about tactics, not about history. Betting on soccer is a mug's game — partly because results don't reliably reflect the better team (the NASA paper again), and partly because talking about your bets is the least interesting conversation you can have about sport. His prediction for the tournament: England. Reasoning: Harry Kane is playing. Andrew's reaction: Kane is a Spurs man, so reluctant endorsement. But please, Nick. Don't. About the Guest Nick Greene is a contributing writer at Slate and the author of How to Watch Soccer Like a Genius: What Architects, Stuntwomen, Paleoanthropologists, and Computer Scientists Reveal About the World's Game (Abrams Press, May 12, 2026) and How to Watch Basketball Like a Genius (Abrams Press, 2021). His work has appeared in the Washington Post, Chicago Magazine, and elsewhere. He is a Newcastle United fan and lives in Berkeley, California. References: •       How to Watch Soccer Like a Genius by Nick Greene (Abrams Press, May 12, 2026). •       Simon Kuper, Going to the Match — referenced in the introduction as a recent KOA episode on nine consecutive World Cups. •       Franklin Foer, How Soccer Explains the World — referenced as the prior KOA World Cup episode. •       David Winner, Brilliant Orange: The Neurotic Genius of Dutch Soccer — blurbed the book; relevant to the 1974 Dutch discussion. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: 

“The dangers are human, not AI. What's dangerous is what a human does with AI, not what the AI does itself. In fact, even the idea that there is such a thing as the AI in itself is a mistake.” — Keith Teare I'm in Korea this week. So rather than doing a traditional one-on-one That Was the Week tech summary, Keith Teare and I are trying something different. We invited Jonathan Rauch — Brookings Institution senior fellow, serial author and one of the most rigorous minds in Washington — onto the show to discuss AI. Rauch had a simple mission. He wanted to find out why Keith Teare is just about the only person in the universe who believes that AI is benign. Jon had five buckets of doom to dump on Keith: labour market disruption, political upheaval, mental health and cognition, malicious actors, and the biggest daddy of all — AI developing consciousness, setting its own agenda, and killing everyone (even Keith). But Keith maintained his Yorkshire stoicism under intense scrutiny from the analogue Rauch machine. AI is a word-counting machine, he explained. Large language models train on words, not experience. They split words into a probabilistic graph of correlations. When you ask a question, a large statistical engine fires, word by word. In that sense, he says, AI is no cleverer than a calculator. The idea that it has awareness, consciousness, or a plan is mythological. What's dangerous is what a human does with AI, not what AI does itself. The dangers, he says, are human. Jon wasn't entirely reassured (his Brookings brand is scepticism, after all). What worries him most is that humans will handle these technologies irresponsibly. On that, he and Keith agree. The short-term labour disruption will be significant. White-collar service provision — legal, accounting, junior consulting — is already going. Jobs will go too. Work, Keith insists, will not. But nobody in politics is having the conversation about what comes next. Not JD. Not AOC. Only Keith and Jon. Five Takeaways •       AI Is a Word-Counting Machine: Keith's Core Argument: Large language models train on words and only words. They split those words into a probabilistic graph — how close is word A to word B? When you ask a question, a large statistical engine fires, producing output word by word. There is no awareness. There is no consciousness. There is no plan. The idea that such a system could develop its own agenda is mythological. It's no cleverer than a calculator. It's just a very big, very fast calculator. Rauch's counter: the brain is also just dumb neurons. We get emergence from dumb neurons. Keith's reply: what the AI can do is constrained by what humans allow it to do. The agency is human. •       Doomerism as Business Model: Before engaging with any specific AI doom argument, Keith signals a prior: whenever there is ambiguity in a major technological change, a business model emerges to monetize doubt. It was true of nuclear power. It was true of climate change. It is true of AI. This doesn't mean the fears are groundless — they wouldn't sell if they weren't reasonable. But it means they should be approached with prior scepticism. The doom argument works precisely because AI genuinely contains possible negative outcomes. The business model packages and amplifies those possibilities beyond their actual probability. •       The Guardrails Are Human: Keith's metaphor: AI sits in a prison where humans decide what the doors are. If you give it access to email, it can email. If you don't, it can't. It cannot take actions it has not been permitted to take. The word “guardrails” is commonly used, and it's apt: the constraints on what AI can do are entirely under human control. The word output is the statistical engine — that's not controllable. But its ability to act on words is highly constrained. The danger is not what AI does. It is what humans choose to allow AI to do. •       Jobs vs Work: The Labour Disruption Argument: Rauch's young friends in junior consulting are watching their jobs go in real time. Keith distinguishes between jobs — paid labour — and work, which is closer to effort and creative agency. Jobs can go. Work, he argues, will not — humans will always be reinterpreting the future they want and working to make it happen. But the short-term disruption will be significant: white-collar service provision (legal, accounting, consulting), teaching, driving. The wealth creation AI enables could supplement the end of paid labour. But no one in government is having that conversation. •       Rauch's Verdict: Clarified, Not Reassured: After fifty minutes with Keith Teare, Jonathan Rauch reaches a considered position: his worst fear — that AI becomes an autonomous engine of anti-human malfeasance — is unlikely to happen unless humans make it happen. His residual concern: that humans will not handle these technologies as maturely as one could wish. He's not optimistic about political systems that are already too rigid, too partisan, and too dysfunctional to adjust as they did to the industrialization of the late nineteenth century. On that, he and Keith agree. Nobody knows. Not Keith. Not Andrew. And, despite his brilliance, not Jonathan Rauch. About the Guests Keith Teare is a British-American entrepreneur, investor, and publisher of the That Was the Week newsletter. He is a co-founder of TechCrunch. Jonathan Rauch is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a contributing writer at The Atlantic. He is the author of The Constitution of Knowledge: A Defense of Truth, The Happiness Curve, Kindly Inquisitors, Gay Marriage: Why It Is Good for Gays, Good for Straights, and Good for America, and many other books. He is based in Washington, D.C. References: •       That Was the Week by Keith Teare. •       The Constitution of Knowledge: A Defense of Truth by Jonathan Rauch. •       Eliezer Yudkowsky and Nate Soares, If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies — the AI doom book referenced in the conversation. •       Sam Harris and Tristan Harris podcast on AI risk — referenced by Rauch as the catalyst for his questions. •       Episode 2902: Keith Teare on his jobless AI future vision — the preceding TWTW episode directly referenced. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. 

“History is really interesting because it's about people. And people are interesting. So there are plenty of different ways of doing this, and I think there's room for everybody.” — Adrian Goldsworthy The greatest rivalry in antiquity is also uncomfortably relevant to us today. In Athens and Sparta: The Rivalry That Shaped Ancient Greece, the classical scholar Adrian Goldsworthy covers the long fifth century BC, from the Persian Wars that forced Athens and Sparta into alliance, through the Peloponnesian War that set them against each other. The parallels of the rivalry between Sparta and Athens are uncannily relevant today. Goldsworthy traces the NATO-like structure of the Athenian alliance, with its familiar complaint that the allies weren't paying enough. He notes that Athens, which outgrew its ability to grow its own food, had to secure its grain supply from the Black Sea — in the same way as closing the Straits of Hormuz has disrupted modern supply chains. And he observes that the Spartans won the Peloponnesian War by getting Persian money — while the Athenians were doing exactly the same thing. Persia, he notes, is always lurking in the background. There would be no “west” without it. Five Takeaways •       Athens and Sparta: Two Experiments, One Greek Longing: Both city states were driven by the same competitive Greek impulse — the desire to excel, to be the best. But they ran radically different experiments in how to achieve it. Athens: radical democracy, open society, maritime empire, philosophy, drama. Sparta: apartheid military state, in which a tiny Spartan elite was freed from all labour by a vast population of helots, so that they could devote their entire lives to being warriors and citizens. Two models for a polity that still structure political argument today. •       Thucydides: Essential but Embittered: The History of the Peloponnesian War is the essential source — and the problematic one. Thucydides was an Athenian general who failed to save a city from a Spartan-led force and went into exile as a result. He is analytical and apparently balanced in ways that seem modern. But he cannot hide his biases: the demagogue Cleon gets speeches written for him that make him look like a self-interested buffoon. And his silences are as revealing as his words — large events, including an Athenian disaster in Egypt, are mentioned only vaguely. He tells us what he wants to tell. •       The NATO Parallel: They Weren't Paying Enough: The Delian League — the Athenian alliance that emerged after the Persian Wars — has a structural similarity to NATO that Goldsworthy notes carefully. Athens, like the United States, is the dominant naval power that has mobilised for a great threat and then chosen not to demobilise. The allies, like European NATO members in successive administrations' complaints, weren't willing to send ships or men. They'd just send a bit of cash. The Athenian fleet ends up overwhelmingly Athenian. As the threat recedes, the other states increasingly resent the protection they're receiving from it. •       Persia Is Always There: The Spartans won the Peloponnesian War by securing subsidies from the Persian Empire. The Athenians were doing the same thing. The irony: both sides of the Greek world's greatest internal conflict ended up funded by the barbarian power they had united to defeat a generation earlier. Goldsworthy draws the modern parallel delicately: America is now fighting a war in Iran, once known as Persia. Europe chose not to join. The question of who Persia is in any given age is always live. Persia, he says, is always there. It always has been. •       Athens as a Theme Park: The Roman Legacy: In the Roman period, Athens and Sparta became what Goldsworthy calls “university cities or, in Sparta's case, a theme park.” Sparta, having lost any real military or political power, invented a public performance of its old customs — a tourist attraction for Roman visitors who wanted to see the old ways enacted. Athens was a university town for the Roman elite, whose children went there as we might go to Oxford. What we think we know about classical Greece is partly filtered through this late antique nostalgia — a celebration of how great we used to be. About the Guest Adrian Goldsworthy is a historian, novelist, and YouTuber with a DPhil from Oxford. He is the author of Athens and Sparta: The Rivalry That Shaped Ancient Greece (Basic Books, May 12, 2026), Caesar: Life of a Colossus, Augustus: First Emperor of Rome, How Rome Fell, Philip and Alexander, Rome and Persia, and many other books. He lives in Penarth, South Wales. References: •       Athens and Sparta: The Rivalry That Shaped Ancient Greece by Adrian Goldsworthy (Basic Books, May 12, 2026). •       Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War — the essential and problematic source, discussed at length. •       Episode 2897: Patrick Wyman on Lost Worlds — directly referenced in the interview as a contrasting style of history. •       Episode 2892: Jason Pack on the Iran war — the companion episode on the modern Persian conflict, referenced in the interview. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: 

“We need to develop better theories of why the other side believes what they do. Having an accurate theory includes recognizing if somebody is a psychopath — but also recognizing that psychopaths are rarer than we think.” — Audun Dahl If you're not a liberal at twenty, you have no heart; if you're not a conservative at forty, you have no head. While this sounds like an annoying cliché (especially to people under forty), it does recognize that our moral views change. But, as the Cornell psychologist Audun Dahl argues in his new book Between Fixed and Fickle: Why Our Moral Views Keep Changing, the most interesting question is why our moral principles always seem in flux. Why people who say cheating is wrong cheat. Why people who say violence is wrong turn a blind moral eye to their own insurrections. Dahl is a psychologist, not a moralist. He is not interested in what we should believe, but in what we think we believe. His central finding is that human morality is neither fixed nor fickle. People change their moral views when they believe they have good reasons to — reasons they can, indeed, articulate. The problem isn't hypocrisy per se. It's that we struggle to understand why the other side believes what it does. In morally polarised societies like contemporary America, we over-attribute psychopathy to political opponents. Most Republicans and most Democrats do have genuine moral commitments. But they are just different principles, applied to parallel moral hierarchies. Rather than morality perhaps, we need more empathy. Don't judge. Understand. Five Takeaways •       Two Kinds of Moral Change: Dahl identifies two forms of moral change that should trouble us. Situational moral change: people espouse one principle and act against it in a specific situation — the person who says cheating is wrong and cheats on an exam, the January 6th rioter who says violence is wrong. Historical moral change: the same principles coexisting with practices that contradict them — Thomas Jefferson proclaiming inalienable rights while enslaving hundreds. Both are not simply hypocrisy: they reflect the genuine messiness of moral life, where competing principles create constant conflict. •       Morality Emerges in the First Three Years of Life: Dahl's most striking empirical finding: by around age three, virtually all children develop an intrinsic concern with how we ought to treat other sentient beings. It is not taught as an external rule. It emerges. A three-year-old will say: it's wrong to harm others, you shouldn't steal. No other animal acquires this. It is a uniquely human characteristic. The question is not whether people have moral commitments — almost everyone does. The question is how those commitments interact with other concerns, pressures, and competing principles. •       We Over-Attribute Psychopathy to the Other Side: One of the most robustly documented findings in political psychology: Republicans and Democrats don't merely think the other side is wrong. They think the other side is evil — likely to condone things they would never condone. Research shows both sides significantly over-estimate the other's extremism and moral depravity. Dahl's prescription: develop better theories of why the other side believes what it does. An accurate theory includes recognising genuine psychopaths and bad actors when they exist. It also includes recognising that they are rarer than we think. •       Jefferson, Epstein, and the Exceptions: Two historical anchors. Jefferson: the author of the Declaration of Independence's inalienable rights, who enslaved hundreds. The question is not whether he was a hypocrite — he clearly was — but how someone could hold both positions simultaneously. The answer Dahl finds most compelling: conflicting moral principles applied with different weights in different contexts, not the absence of moral concern. Epstein: the opposite case, a man who concealed an absence of moral concern behind a veneer of respectability. The lesson: some people genuinely lack it, but they are exceptions. •       Elbow Room: The Hilary Mantel Closer: Dahl's two wishes for a more moral world. First: that we understand why the other side disagrees. Second: that we have more “elbow room” — the phrase from Hilary Mantel's Cromwell trilogy — to make decisions based on what we actually think is right rather than what we need to do to survive. Machiavelli and Cromwell operated in a world where survival left almost no room for principled action. If that is becoming our world again, the prospects for moral progress are bleak. Dahl is cautiously hopeful. The creative, restless energy of each new generation — willing to say this is unjust, this is unfair — is what abolished slavery. It is what drives moral change still. About the Guest Audun Dahl is Associate Professor of Psychology at Cornell University. He is the author of Between Fixed and Fickle: Why Our Moral Views Keep Changing (Harvard University Press, April 2026). He grew up in Norway and is based in Ithaca, New York. References: •       Between Fixed and Fickle: Why Our Moral Views Keep Changing by Audun Dahl (Harvard University Press, April 2026). •       Hilary Mantel, Wolf Hall trilogy — cited by Dahl as capturing the “elbow room” problem of moral action under survival pressure. •       Viktor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning — referenced in the same context as Mantel. •       Episode 2906: Dylan Gottlieb on Yuppies — the companion episode on how professional class morality was shaped by competing incentives. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: (00:31) - The Churchill/Adams quote: liberal at 20, conservative at 40 (02:08) - Dahl's Norwegian grandpa and the disputed attribution (02:30) - Two kinds of troubling moral change: situational and historical (03:10) - Jefferson's Declaration of Independence and his enslaved peopl...

“Being a father is probably one of the toughest and most rewarding jobs I've ever had. A lot of the principles I used to teach snipers apply to kids: dealing with negativity, replacing negative self-talk, learning that well-meaning adults can say terrible things — and you don't have to take that on as baggage.” — Brandon Webb Brandon Webb defines himself as an author, entrepreneur, Navy SEAL sniper, and father. But not in that order. The first three he leveraged into a series of bestselling books about the art of sniping. The fourth — the art of being a loving father — he dodged and ducked for years. But fatherhood might be Webb's real calling. People regularly pulled him aside after meeting his grown children to ask him about his “secret” for being an effective dad. His kids were making eye contact, they were asking good questions rather than staring at their phones. Most astonishingly, they seemed happy. Webb's new book, Puddle Jumpers: Simple and Proven Ways to Raise Confident and Joyful Kids, reveals his secret of parenting. It applies the positive performance psychology Webb learned as a Navy SEAL sniper instructor — how to redirect negative self-talk, how to deal with well-meaning adults who say damaging things, how to build mental toughness without destroying connection — to the work of raising children. It outlines his parenting philosophy of both high expectations and high support. Think of Puddle Jumpers as simultaneously the manual for tiger and the bunny parenting. Brandon Webb's ultimate calling in life is as a parent. Father, author, entrepreneur and Navy SEAL sniper. In that order. Five Takeaways •       The Sniper Instructor as Parenting Coach: Webb was running the Navy SEAL sniper program at 27 years old. The psychology they taught there — positive self-talk, replacing negative internal narratives, dealing with adversity without being broken by it — is what he applied to parenting. The connection is not as strange as it sounds: both sniping and parenting require performing under pressure, dealing with failure without catastrophising, and building confidence that is genuine rather than brittle. The difference is that the stakes in parenting last a lifetime. •       High Expectations, High Support: Webb's alternative to the false choice between permissive parenting and authoritarian discipline. Permissive parenting replaces preparation with protection. Authoritarian discipline breaks connection. Puddle Jumper Parenting holds both simultaneously: clear expectations and emotional safety. Kids need to know what's required of them. They also need to know they won't be abandoned when they fail. Webb's word for children raised this way: puddle jumpers — kids who leap into life's messy moments with full-hearted abandon, not because they're fearless but because they trust themselves to recover. •       The Credit Card Lesson: Don't Bail Them Out: Webb's son Jackson managed a self-storage facility through college and ended up with a $25,000 ownership payout as a sophomore at St Andrews. He spent it like a drunken sailor on shore leave, got a credit card, ran up $12,000 in debt at predatory interest rates, and called his father for help. Webb's response: you remember that conversation we had? Figure it out. He let his son suffer. Jackson's girlfriend hated Webb for two years. At the end, Jackson paid off the debt with a new business and told his father it was one of the best lessons he'd ever been taught. It would have been easy to bail him out. The suffering was the lesson. •       Purpose and the War Veteran: Viktor Frankl's Lesson: How does a combat veteran come home intact? Webb's answer: purpose. His Afghanistan deployment had clear moral logic — the propaganda posters in the caves, the training camps, the towers. That clarity carried him through. Iraq was different. Soldiers who went to Iraq with no understanding of why they were there — and whose friends in 2010 were saying we have no idea what we're doing here — came home broken. Viktor Frankl's Man's Search for Meaning: purpose is the thing that makes endurance possible. Without it, violence that cannot be assigned rational meaning produces serious mental illness. •       Teach Kids About Money: The American Economy Preys on Them: Webb has strong opinions: America's economy is largely fuelled by consumer debt. Credit card companies prey on college students because they know the parents will bail them out. Kids need to understand the system before the system takes advantage of them. His prescription: teach them age-appropriate financial literacy early. The Acorns Early app gamifies financial learning for children. The deal he struck with all his kids in college: I pay for school, you have a roof and food, but if you want to socialise, get a job. The lesson is not just about money. It's about agency. About the Guest Brandon Webb is a combat-decorated Navy SEAL sniper, multiple New York Times bestselling author, Harvard Business School alumnus, and father of three. He is the author of Puddle Jumpers: Simple and Proven Ways to Raise Confident and Joyful Kids (Authors Equity/Simon & Schuster, May 12, 2026), The Red Circle, The Killing School, and The Making of a Navy SEAL. He divides his time between Portugal and New York City. References: •       Puddle Jumpers: Simple and Proven Ways to Raise Confident and Joyful Kids by Brandon Webb (Authors Equity/Simon & Schuster, May 12, 2026). •       Viktor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning — Webb cites it as one of his favourite books, and the source of his thinking on purpose and combat trauma. •       Episode 2888: Helen Benedict on The Soldier's House — directly referenced in the interview; Webb's purpose-in-war argument is the complement to Benedict's moral injury argument. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple Podcasts

Dan Edelstein is a professor of French, history, and political science at Stanford University. He's also the author of several books on revolution and the Enlightenment, including The Revolution to Come: A History of an Idea from Thucydides to Lenin, Let There Be Enlightenment: The Religious and Mystical Sources of Rationality, Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions, and The Enlightenment: A Genealogy. Greg and Dan discuss the changing meaning of “revolution” as an idea rather than a catalog of revolts. Dan explains how Greeks distinguished violent upheaval (stasis) from regime change, how “revolution” entered political vocabulary via Polybius's rediscovered Book VI, and how fears of cyclical instability shaped mixed-constitution thinking from antiquity to the American founders.  They contrast pre-1789 “revolution” as restoration (including England's Glorious Revolution) with the French Revolution's progress-driven, consensus-seeking model that produces counterrevolution, factional purges, and a “Red Leviathan.” The discussion covers Enlightenment cultural uses of “revolution,” the ancients-vs-moderns debate and historical progress, differences between Anglo-American common-law rights and French state-centered reform, the tainted term in 1989, revolutionary “playbooks,” and how literary training and novels illuminate revolutionary psychology. *unSILOed Podcast is produced by University FM.* Episode Quotes: From preserving order to accelerating history 12:42: Once this new-fangled idea of historical progress starts to get going in France in the 18th century, suddenly you can have a totally different vision of yourself. You're not just trying to prevent change and maintain the existing situation as long as you can. Suddenly, you might become an accelerator—you might become—and this is when the word "revolutionary" emerges in France, in 1789—you want to be on the right side of history. You want to be, you know, in favor of progress. And so I think that this new idea, both about history and about the role of revolutions in this sort of progressive vision of history, it really has huge effects on how people think about themselves, how they act, and ultimately how these historical revolutions from 1789 onward play out. Why ancient thinkers designed politics to prevent revolution 06:52: For people, even before Polybius, people like Plato and Aristotle, this did become the question of political thought. Like, how do you prevent a state from being ripped apart by division and just leading to this kind of destruction and death that accompanies revolutions? And this is where we get the idea of a well-balanced constitution. Protection vs. power  39:02: The English and the Americans, you know, there's just this deep skepticism towards the government. You want to really protect the individual from governmental encroachment. The French are almost coming to the revolution wanting to empower the government for good, like it's going to solve all our problems. Show Links: Recommended Resources: Age of Enlightenment Revolution Polybius Niccolò Machiavelli Voltaire Montesquieu John Adams Anacyclosis Vladimir Lenin Velvet Revolution Marquis de Condorcet Anne Robert Jacques Turgot Barebone's Parliament Millenarianism J. G. A. Pocock Norman Cohn Stefanos Geroulanos Guest Profile: Faculty Profile at Stanford Profile at the Hoover Institution Social Profile on X Guest Work: Amazon Author Page The Revolution to Come: A History of an Idea from Thucydides to Lenin On the Spirit of Rights Networks of Enlightenment: Digital Approaches to the Republic of Letters Let There Be Enlightenment: The Religious and Mystical Sources of Rationality Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions The Enlightenment: A Genealogy The Terror of Natural Right: Republicanism, the Cult of Nature, and the French Revolution The Super-Enlightenment: Daring to Know Too Much Yale French Studies, Number 111: Myth and Modernity Google Scholar Page Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

“As recently as the mid-seventies, under 5% of Ivy Leaguers are headed to Wall Street. It's actually not that attractive. But as Wall Street's deregulated, it changes the incentive structure — it makes it much more profitable and demands this huge labor force.” — Dylan Gottlieb They stalked the sidewalks of Manhattan in button-down shirts embroidered with the names of investment banks. They jogged. They drank Beaujolais Nouveau. They gentrified neighborhoods. They were the Yuppies — and with the Boston-based Dylan Gottlieb, they've found their young urban professional biographer. In Yuppies: The Bankers, Lawyers, Joggers, and Gourmands Who Conquered New York, Gottlieb offers both a social history of financialization and a collective biography of the professional class that came of age in the Reagan years. Rather than a passing 1980s stereotype, Gottlieb argues that the Yuppie is a phenomenon that remade the American economy, city, and political class. As recently as the mid-1970s, under 5 percent of Ivy League graduates went to Wall Street. A decade of deregulation later, banks were recruiting a third of graduating classes from top universities. The sweatshop of the meritocracy was born. Most of us are still sweating. Five Takeaways •       From Yippie to Yuppie: The Word's Origins: Yuppie resonates with Yippie — the iconographic late-sixties radicals of the New Left, for whom Jerry Rubin was the signifier. The word first appeared in a Chicago alt-weekly in the late 1970s to describe highly educated young people trickling into gentrifying North Side neighbourhoods. It didn't achieve full cultural dominance until 1984, when it became the frame for supporters of Gary Hart's presidential campaign — a prototypical Yuppie candidate who stormed the Democratic primary and represented a new professional vanguard within the party. The word named something that was already happening. It didn't create it. •       The Incentive Structure Changed: Under 5% to One Third: As recently as the mid-1970s, under 5 percent of Ivy League graduates went to Wall Street. It was seen as the preserve of WASPy children who used family connections to get a bank job. By the mid-1980s, banks were recruiting roughly a third of graduating classes at top universities. What happened: deregulation made finance enormously more profitable; finance demanded a large educated labour force to do the work of putting finance at the centre of the American economy; and the most talented students — those who might have become poets or public servants — followed the money. At mid-century, the most prestigious option for a Princeton graduate was middle management at a Fortune 500 company. By 1985, it was Wall Street. •       Democratization and Distinction: The Double Movement: Gottlieb's central thesis is a double movement. The Yuppie era brought genuine diversification to America's elite: Jewish lawyers could now make partner at firms previously closed to them; women entered investment banks in numbers that would have been inconceivable in 1965; Black and Asian Americans got at least a foot in the door. This was new, and it mattered. Simultaneously, that newly diversified elite pulled further away from the rest of America, extracting profits from companies being financialized and rents from communities being gentrified. Democratization and distinction in constant tension. The elite became more diverse and more remote at the same time. •       The Pyramid to Cylinder Shift: AI is about to do to the Yuppie what the Yuppie did to everybody else. Gottlieb spoke recently to an HR representative at an investment bank — name and bank withheld — who said the firm was moving from a pyramid structure to a cylinder structure for employment. The wide base of entry-level workers that finance has depended on since the 1980s will shrink dramatically. Only the best and brightest will be selected; the rest will be automated. Gottlieb wrote about the era of the large pyramid — the exploited many at the bottom who hoped to reach the top. What happens to the professional class when that pyramid disappears? •       Are the Yuppies Becoming Socialists? A long-running trend: the pressures of the sweatshop of the meritocracy have embittered many members of the professional class. Academics work in conditions demonstrably worse than they were forty years ago. Doctors are evaluated on metrics that resemble those of factory workers. Journalists are precarious. The housing market in the cities where professionals cluster has made the cost of replicating their social status for their children prohibitive. And into this comes AI, threatening the entry-level pipeline. Gottlieb's question: will the investment bankers see their plight as similar to the Amazon warehouse worker's? Or will the edifice of meritocratic myth-making — the deep conviction that you're special — hold them back from that solidarity? About the Guest Dylan Gottlieb is Assistant Professor of History at Bentley University and co-host of the Who Makes Cents: A History of Capitalism podcast. He is the author of Yuppies: The Bankers, Lawyers, Joggers, and Gourmands Who Conquered New York (Harvard University Press, May 12, 2026), winner of the Herman E. Krooss Prize for Best Dissertation in Business History. He has written for the Washington Post, Gotham, the Journal of American History, and Public Seminar. References: •       Yuppies: The Bankers, Lawyers, Joggers, and Gourmands Who Conquered New York by Dylan Gottlieb (Harvard University Press, May 12, 2026). •       Noam Scheiber, Mutiny: The Rise and Revolt of a College-Educated Working Class — the companion book, referenced in the interview as directly relevant to Gottlieb's thesis. •       Barbara Ehrenreich — referenced by Gottlieb as the first to identify the downwardly mobile tranche of the professional class. •       Episode 2895: Glyn Morgan on the rise and fall of American Europe — the companion episode on how the professional class shaped American foreign policy. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeAp...

“All the warnings were there. It was almost a carbon copy — the same warnings that were ignored before Paradise, ignored again before the Palisades. And nobody was held accountable.” — Jonathan Vigliotti On January 7, 2025, the Palisades Fire ignited in Los Angeles. Over the first few hours of the fire, the second-largest city in America had no firefighters on the front lines and no coordinated evacuation. Residents fought the flames with garden hoses. “Where are the firefighters?” somebody, running from the fire, screamed into a live television shot. Where, indeed, were Los Angeles firefighters? Jonathan Vigliotti — CBS national correspondent, Emmy and Edward R. Murrow Award winner — was there from the beginning. His new book, Torched: How a City Was Left to Burn and the Olympic Rush to Rebuild Los Angeles, is the searing firsthand account of the tragic failure of the Los Angeles authorities to respond to the fire. The story Vigliotti tells is not new. In some ways, it is a carbon copy of the 2018 Camp Fire that destroyed Paradise in Northern California. First as tragedy then as farce: inadequate evacuation routes, uncleared fuel loads, officials who failed to act were repeated almost exactly in Pacific Palisades and Altadena. More than eighty people died in Paradise and more than thirty in the LA fires. The economic damage in LA will likely make it the costliest natural disaster in US history. And when the LA mayor and the Californian governor appeared in the first press conference after the fires broke out, Vigliotti reports, all Karen Bass and Gavin Newsom were talking about was the 2028 Olympics. The political reckoning has not happened, Vigliotti warns. Bass is still mayor and Newsom is a Presidential frontrunner for 2028. California's current governor's race is dominated by homelessness and crime. Wildfire — the existential threat to the state, the one where more than $2 billion in taxpayer money was pumped into agencies over several years with more than half a billion unaccounted for — is barely mentioned. The fires will be back, Vigliotti warns. Maybe this year for the World Cup, maybe in 2028 for the Olympics. So where are the firefighters? Five Takeaways •       Where Are the Firefighters? The Central Question: Vigliotti was on scene from the first moments of the Palisades Fire. What struck him was not the scale of the flames — he'd seen wildfires before — but the absence of any official response. No firefighters at ground zero. No coordinated evacuation. The traffic gridlock that formed within an hour of ignition blocked fire trucks from getting through. Residents fought embers with garden hoses. A man running from the hillside screamed into Vigliotti's live shot: “Where are the firefighters?” That question became the question of the disaster — and the book. •       A Carbon Copy of Paradise: The 2018 Camp Fire destroyed the Northern California town of Paradise. More than eighty people died. Before it happened: weeks and months of warnings about inadequate evacuation routes, uncleared fuel loads, and officials who failed to act. The same warnings, in almost identical form, were issued for Pacific Palisades and Altadena before January 7, 2025. They were ignored in the same way. The LA fires killed more than thirty people and will likely be the costliest natural disaster in US history. Nobody has been held accountable. Nobody has been fired. •       The Olympics Come First: Vigliotti's most damning reporting: in the first press conference after the Palisades Fire broke out, Mayor Karen Bass and Governor Gavin Newsom were already talking about the 2028 Olympic Games and Los Angeles's ability to rebuild in time. The fires were still burning. The framing was already: how do we make this a story of resilience and recovery? Vigliotti's counter: the story is not resilience. It is accountability. The question is not whether Los Angeles can rebuild. It is whether it can avoid the same disaster happening again. •       $2 Billion, Half a Billion Unaccounted For: California's taxes are already among the highest in the country. More than $2 billion in taxpayer money was pumped into homeless-related agencies over several years. More than half a billion was unaccounted for. And the agencies responsible for wildfire prevention and emergency management are chronically underfunded. Vigliotti's argument: it is not that Californians need to pay more taxes. It is that the taxes they pay need to go to the right agencies. The budget for fighting climate change and protecting communities from fire is dwarfed by the budget for crime. Fire kills more people. •       The Political Reckoning That Hasn't Happened: California's governor's race, in the wake of the deadliest and costliest fire season in recent memory, is dominated by homelessness and crime. Wildfire — the existential threat to the state — is barely mentioned. Nobody in the political class, Vigliotti reports, has come to him asking for advice or analysis. He is not holding his breath. His warning: this summer, and every summer, the fire will come back. The conditions that created the Palisades disaster have not been remedied. Los Angeles is not ready. About the Guest Jonathan Vigliotti is a CBS News national correspondent and Emmy and Edward R. Murrow Award winner. He is the author of Torched: How a City Was Left to Burn and the Olympic Rush to Rebuild Los Angeles (Atria/One Signal, May 12, 2026) and Before It's Gone: Stories from the Front Lines of Climate Change in Small-Town America. He is based in Los Angeles. References: •       Torched: How a City Was Left to Burn and the Olympic Rush to Rebuild Los Angeles by Jonathan Vigliotti (Atria/One Signal, May 12, 2026). •       Lizzie Johnson, Paradise: One Town's Struggle to Survive an American Wildfire — the companion book on the 2018 Camp Fire, referenced in the interview. •       Watch Duty — the wildfire monitoring app Vigliotti mentions as standard equipment for California residents. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstack

 “They're all me. Every single one. I see them almost as if they're inoculated on various petri dishes, and the petri dishes are all put into this pressure-cooker situation — that of a missile alert.” — Vincent Yu So what would you do with the last 19 minutes of your life? That's the question Vincent Yu plays with in Seek Immediate Shelter. Triggered (so to speak) by a 2018 Hawaii missile alert of an apocalypse that fizzled, Yu's novel is about a false alarm that sent Asian-American residents of a small Massachusetts town into 19 minutes of existential panic. Seek Immediate Shelter really starts after the fictional all-clear. Because now everyone has revealed their cards. The real games begin. F. Scott Fitzgerald famously wrote that there are no second acts in American lives. Seek Immediate Shelter is really a novel about third acts, not second. The first act is normal life. The second is the nineteen minutes of terror. The third — the one that really matters — is the reckoning: the mother who used the alert as an excuse to cruelly insult her daughter; the man who hit the gas and sped away from his family; the woman who confessed her unrequited love. So all clear does not mean all right. The missile alert strips away all the lies of daily life. What's left is a truth as explosive as any missile. Five Takeaways •       The Third Act, Not the Second: F. Scott Fitzgerald said there are no second acts in American lives — and Yu's novel is a direct argument against that claim. But the book's real focus is the third act: not the nineteen minutes of terror (the second), but the aftermath. The mother who used the alert as permission to say something cruel. The man who sped away from his wife and child. The woman who confessed her love. These are the decisions people made when they thought it was the end. Now they have to live with them. All clear does not mean all right. •       The Petri Dish Method: Yu has a background in biology and no formal training in fiction. He approaches writing scientifically: characters as specimens on petri dishes, a missile alert as the experimental conditions. The pressure-cooker situation strips away the social armour and reveals the character beneath. His goal was not cruelty but pressure — there's a difference. He feels profound empathy for every character. When asked if any are based on real people: they're all me. Every single one. •       Asian American Silence and the Langston Hughes Principle: Yu originally wrote the characters without race. But honesty required him to make them Asian American — citing Langston Hughes's argument that a Black poet cannot write outside of race even if he wants to. Asian American fiction has long focused on immigrant trauma and the difficult parent-child relationship. Yu wants to push beyond that: third- and fourth-generation stories, people who are simply American. The missile alert forces the silence of striving and quiet excellence to break. What's underneath is the novel's real subject. •       Can AI Write This Kind of Novel? Yu has never used AI for his writing and — he admits — hasn't been curious enough to try. His verdict: AI is nowhere close to writing a novel like this. Some genres, with more uniform rubrics, are more vulnerable. But the distinctive cadences of AI writing are currently easy to detect. He is, however, optimistic: the proliferation of AI-generated plots may make readers more discerning, better at recognizing tropes, more hungry for genuinely fresh storytelling. AI might, paradoxically, sharpen the audience for literary fiction. •       The Cuban Missile Crisis, Trump, and COVID as Crucibles: Andrew's provocation: was the Cuban Missile Crisis actually good for America? Did it force a national reckoning? And might Trump and COVID do the same? Yu is reluctant to apply this logic to countries — he deals in characters. But at the individual level: yes. A crucible that forces you to confront what you most cannot bear to part with, what truly matters, can be clarifying. The novel's premise is that the missile alert was such a crucible. The broader lesson may be that we are all living through one. About the Guest Vincent Yu is a fiction writer and sales manager at W. W. Norton/Liveright. He is the winner of the 2021 Ashley Bourne Prize for fiction from Ploughshares and the author of Seek Immediate Shelter (Flatiron Books, May 5, 2026). His short fiction has been published in Prairie Schooner, StoryQuarterly, Ninth Letter, Able Muse, and elsewhere. He lives in Brooklyn, New York. References: •       Seek Immediate Shelter by Vincent Yu (Flatiron Books, May 5, 2026). •       The 2018 Hawaii missile alert — the real-life false alarm that inspired the novel. •       Langston Hughes, “The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain” (1926) — the essay Yu cites on writing within race. •       Episode 2898: James Lasdun on The Family Man — the companion episode on fiction's capacity to go where journalism cannot. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: 

In 1941, Pamela met Averell Harriman, the American overseeing Lend-Lease, and immediately recognized his importance to British survival. Tasked with enlisting him to the British cause, she used her beauty and intelligence to "bewitch" him, turning the aloof statesman into a passionate advocate for UK aid. Pamela became Churchill's "secret weapon," gathering vital military intelligence and White House thinking from influential Americans like Harriman and CBS reporter Ed Murrow. She and Murrow shared a deep, passionate relationship, and she fed him information to shape American public opinion in favor of the European war effort. Simultaneously, she managed multiple high-profile liaisons with American generals and intelligence officers, maintaining these critical back-channels without causing scandal. Her work helped solidify the nascent Anglo-American alliance. She was so well-embedded in the military leadership that she knew the timing of the D-Day invasion before it was publicly announced. (3/8)1650 HOLLAND

Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940. 

“We're losing home on so many different levels. Physically. Politically. Morally. And after AI, spiritually — because language, our spiritual home, is taken away from us. We now have to share it with an unhuman entity.” — Ece Temelkuran Do you feel homeless — physically, politically, morally or spiritually? That's the question posed by Ece Temelkuran's new book Nation of Strangers: Rebuilding Home in the Twenty-First Century. Shortlisted for the 2026 Women's Prize for Nonfiction, the narrative is structured as a series of letters from one homeless stranger to another. Temelkuran left Turkey in 2016, after threats to her life made staying untenable. After seven years of exile — in Beirut, Tunis, Oxford, Paris, Zagreb, and now Berlin — she has written both her own and our story in today's globalized, populist age. She's been called everything from a 21st century Hannah Arendt to a “ruthless Cassandra.” And yet she retains faith in the future — as a defiant stance, a can-do-no-other attitude against rootlessness and loneliness. The wisdom of survival, Ece Temelkuran argues, lies with refugees, exiles and migrants like herself. This nation of strangers are rebuilding home in our homeless world. Five Takeaways •       Four Kinds of Homelessness: Temelkuran identifies four simultaneous crises of home. Physical homelessness: refugees, migrants, the displaced. Political homelessness: people who no longer recognize their countries, who feel unrepresented by any party, who cannot feel that they belong where they are. Moral homelessness: people who see the cruelty of our times and find no institution — state, court, international organization — capable of stopping it. And spiritual homelessness: the loss of language as our innermost home, now shared with AI. Four levels of being unhoused at once. That is the human condition of 2026. •       Minneapolis as a Nation of Strangers: The week the book was published in the US, Minneapolis happened — ordinary people forming human chains to resist ICE agents. Temelkuran's reading: that was a Nation of Strangers in action. People who had never met, people from different communities who owed each other nothing in the old sense, holding on to each other because they recognized a shared condition. Not an ideology, not a party, not a leader — just strangers building a home together in real time. That, she says, is what the book is about. •       Digital Refugees: When Elon Musk bought Twitter, millions of people fled to Mastodon, Bluesky, and other platforms — behaving, Temelkuran observes, exactly like refugees. Looking back at the old home while building a new one. Checking both simultaneously. She asks: why did no one think to occupy Twitter? To say: this is ours, not yours? Her conclusion: our political imagination has become extraordinarily limited. We accept displacement, digital or physical, as inevitable. We do not think to resist it by occupying the space rather than fleeing. •       Gaza and the Move-On Ideology: Gaza was the ultimate test of how much humanity can swallow. Temelkuran draws an arc from Colin Powell's tube in the UN Security Council in 2003 — when a global anti-war movement was brushed aside — to today. Each time people mobilize and are ignored, they lose a little more faith in themselves, in politics, in institutions. What devastated Temelkuran most was not the bombing but Jared Kushner at Davos presenting his PowerPoint for a seaside resort in Gaza. That, she says, is what neoliberal morality looks like. Move on. That is the lowest of the low. •       The Pioneers of History: Refugees as the Advance Guard: Temelkuran resisted writing her own story for years — she came from a leftist family where talking about yourself was suspect, and she feared being seen as a victim. What changed: she realized her story intersected with the story of the masses. The wisdom of survival — how to remake home from scratch, how to survive with dignity, how to rebuild identity after losing everything — belongs to refugees, exiles, and migrants. These are the pioneers of history. Soon everyone will need what they know. That is why their stories matter now. About the Guest Ece Temelkuran is a Turkish writer, political thinker, and public speaker. She is the author of Nation of Strangers: Rebuilding Home in the Twenty-First Century (Simon & Schuster, May 2026), shortlisted for the 2026 Women's Prize for Nonfiction; How to Lose a Country: The Seven Steps from Democracy to Fascism; and Together: A Manifesto Against a Heartless World. She was born in Turkey and is based in Berlin. References: •       Nation of Strangers: Rebuilding Home in the Twenty-First Century by Ece Temelkuran (Simon & Schuster, May 2026). •       How to Lose a Country: The Seven Steps from Democracy to Fascism by Ece Temelkuran — the book that made her reputation in the West. •       Together: A Manifesto Against a Heartless World by Ece Temelkuran — the second book, between How to Lose a Country and Nation of Strangers. •       Episode 2894: Marc Loustau on why Orbán lost and how to defeat Trump — the companion episode on defeating fascism from within the system. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: (00:31) - Is Ece still retaining faith in the future? (01:47) - Faith as a stance: like Martin Luther, here I stand (02:30) - How to Lose a Country and what comes next (02:57) - Minneapolis as a Nation of Strangers (04:00) - Four kinds of homelessness: physical, political, moral, spiritual (04:35) - AI and the loss of language as spiritual home (05:10) - Why this book now — and why it's the most personal

“You can't be confident about human decision-making. You can be confident on the potential of technology. Humans are quite capable of making both wrong and bad decisions.” — Keith Teare Is a jobless AI future really something to celebrate? That Was the Week publisher Keith Teare certainly thinks so. His editorial “Civilization: What Is Worth Doing” this week imagines a future in which nobody has to work unless they choose to, basic necessities are no longer scarce, leisure time is abundant, and governance fades to near-invisibility. I'm not so sure. As I told Keith, “That sounds incredibly boring. I don't want to live in that kind of society.” The conversation this week has been civilizational. A few days ago, the podcaster Patrick Wyman came on the show to argue that history is mostly unintentional and unexpected. But Keith says civilization is broadly linear and tends, if not toward justice, toward progress. Wyman says civilizations are plural and never inevitable. “Why History Keeps Happening” is how Wyman put it. The end and the beginning of history are, thus, delusional. We are, then, always in the middle of history. That's the wisdom missing from all the ridiculous hysteria about AI. It's just one chapter in our history. The promise that AI will create mass abundance is as somnolent as the fear it will wipe out our civilization. Pass the Soma. Five Takeaways •       Civilization: Singular or Plural? Wyman's argument: civilizations are plural, nonlinear, full of failure and unintended consequence. Keith's counter: civilization — singular — is the long arc of human progress collectively, broadly linear over two hundred years. Both are right at different scales. Andrew's instinct: we're in a nonlinear moment masquerading as progress. Keith's: we're at a fork in the road. That much they agree on. The more interesting question is who controls which direction the fork takes. •       Paul Ehrlich and the Limits of Forecasting: Norman Lewis's cautionary tale: Paul Ehrlich predicted in the 1970s that population growth would exhaust the Earth's resources within a generation. He was famously, totally wrong. Andrew's application: most people are probably wrong about AI right now — both the doomers and the optimists. The future is not the thing you think you're heading toward. The Wyman principle: history keeps happening in directions nobody predicted. •       The Pyramid of Change: Keith's model for how history gets made. Agents of change form a pyramid. At the top: a small number of people who have a much larger influence on what happens than everyone at the base. Most people receive change rather than make it. Those who step outside the norms and make things happen — those are the ones who make history. The question of our moment: who is at the top of the pyramid? And do they share your values? Or anyone else's? •       AI Panic in the Media: Reflecting, Not Forming: Nirit Weiss-Blatt's research into ten studies on AI coverage: the media is overwhelmingly negative. Keith's reading: media reflects opinion rather than forming it. Negativity around AI is a reasonable reaction to not knowing. When you don't know, you can believe anything, and most of the available influence is negative. If AI delivers real benefits, opinion will change, and media will follow. Andrew's reading: the cause is genuine uncertainty, not media panic. •       Keith's Utopia: “That Sounds Incredibly Boring”: Keith's vision: everyone eats, everyone is warm, nobody has to work unless they choose to, leisure time is abundant, paid labour replaced by a society that provides for all, governance shrinking toward irrelevance as satisfaction rises. Andrew's verdict: “that sounds incredibly boring. I don't want to live in that kind of society.” The Germans, Keith notes, will still be putting their towels out at dawn to claim the beach. Some scarcities will always remain. About the Guest Keith Teare is a British-American entrepreneur, investor, and publisher of the That Was the Week newsletter. He is a co-founder of TechCrunch and Andrew's regular TWTW co-host. References: •       That Was the Week: “Civilization: What Is Worth Doing” by Keith Teare. •       Norman Lewis, “The Future Is Not Scarce,” Nervous. •       Nirit Weiss-Blatt, “What 10 Studies Revealed About AI Panic in the Media.” •       Ezra Klein, “Why the AI Job Apocalypse Probably Won't Happen,” The New York Times. •       Episode 2897: Patrick Wyman on Lost Worlds — the companion episode on civilization's unintended consequences, directly referenced in this conversation. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: 

“It was a completely unthinking exercise in cost-cutting that made no sense in terms of the newspaper. I think perhaps if you want to destroy the newspaper, it made sense.” — Simon Elegant on being ‘eliminated' by the Washington Post Hong Kong in 2019. A dismembered body is found in a landfill. A disgraced police superintendent is called back from internal exile to solve it. The city around him is burning. Rather than a John Woo movie, this is the setting for a Simon Elegant thriller. Born in Hong Kong, former Beijing bureau chief for Time magazine, most recently the Washington Post's man in China until Jeff Bezos “eliminated” him three months ago — Elegant has written the definitive Hong Kong novel. First and foremost, City on Fire: A Novel of Hong Kong is a crime thriller. Superintendent Killian Tong — half-Chinese, half-Irish, loved by no one in his department — investigates a murder while his sister is noisily demonstrating on the other side of the barricades. But the book doubles as a compressed history of Hong Kong: from Palmerston's “barren rock” in the 1840s — seized from China after the opium wars — through the ninety-nine-year lease, the handover in 1997, and the slow strangulation of the “one country, two systems” promise. Elegant is neither a hardline China hawk nor an apologist for Beijing. Yes, he credits the British with a relatively enlightened administration — from its public housing to the uncorrupt civil service that inspired the Singapore model. But he is also clear about what happened after 1997. Hong Kong people assumed Beijing would honour the Thatcher-Deng terms, and then discovered, to their horror, that they had no rights. It was a silent coup rather than a gaudy takeover of power. And so the 2019 protests — when a million people went onto the streets — are not just a backdrop to City on Fire but also the real-life stage on which Hong Kong burnt. Five Takeaways •       Enlightened Colonialism — With Caveats: Was Hong Kong an example of enlightened British colonialism? Elegant says: relatively, yes. The administration was light-handed. The public housing was so good that Singapore copied it. The civil service was — after 1972, when they had to create the ICAC following a police corruption scandal — genuinely clean. Milton Friedman praised the free-market model. But it was also racialized: the upper levels were almost entirely white Anglo, and the Chinese were largely excluded from administrative power. Governor Jock MacLehose changed this. Enlightened colonialism, Elegant concludes, is not a contradiction in terms — but it is relative. Compared to the Belgian Congo, Hong Kong was paradise. •       One Country, Two Systems: A Promise Broken: The terms negotiated by Thatcher and Deng in the 1980s guaranteed Hong Kong's autonomy until 2047. Hong Kong people assumed these terms were real and would be adhered to. They were not. The first attempt to pass a national security law came in 2004. There were mass protests in 2014. In 2019, a million people — in a city of six million — were on the streets. Beijing's choice was not between crushing them or not. It was between blood in the streets and a silent coup. They chose the silent coup. The national security law of 2020 was the final instrument. There is no longer any meaningful “one country, two systems.” •       The Policeman as Moral Complexity: Elegant's decision to make his protagonist a policeman — rather than a protester — is the novel's central artistic choice. Superintendent Killian Tong is not a villain. He is a man caught between institutions he has served his whole life and a conscience that knows what's happening is wrong. His younger sister is on the other side of the barricades. The murder investigation forces him to confront not just the crime but the system that made it possible. Elegant wanted to write about moral complexity, not propaganda — and the only way to do that was to give the story to the person most implicated in the system. •       Bezos ‘Eliminated' the Washington Post's Foreign Staff: Simon Elegant's final paycheck from the Washington Post used the word “eliminated.” He was one of 35-40 foreign correspondents let go in a single exercise — one of the biggest foreign staffs at any American newspaper. No one, he says, can explain what the thinking was, or if there was any. Every person he meets in Washington has cancelled their subscription. The Post still has excellent national security reporters, but in terms of foreign coverage it is, Elegant says, “doomed.” His conclusion: “perhaps if you want to destroy the newspaper, it made sense.” •       Hemingway's Iceberg, Applied: What did writing fiction teach Simon Elegant after a career in journalism? The iceberg principle, which Hemingway described: seven-eighths of a book — the knowledge, the research, the reported detail — should sit below the waterline. Only the tippy-top should be visible. The weight of the knowledge gives the visible surface its authority. The book started at 128,000 words — every reported detail jammed in. By the third or fourth round of cuts with the editor's blade, it was 75,000. The lesson: don't jam in your entire notebook. Fiction goes more directly into the heart. It bypasses the brain and seeks a different truth. About the Guest Simon Elegant is a journalist and novelist born in Hong Kong. He was Beijing bureau chief for Time magazine and most recently China bureau chief for the Washington Post. He is the author of City on Fire: A Novel of Hong Kong (Pegasus Crime, May 5, 2026), A Floating Life (Ecco/HarperCollins), and A Chinese Wedding (Piatkus). He is based in Kuala Lumpur. References: •       City on Fire: A Novel of Hong Kong by Simon Elegant (Pegasus Crime, May 5, 2026). •       Episode 2870: Eyck Freymann on Defending Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War with China — the companion episode on Taiwan and the growing China crisis. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple Pod...

“Fraud makes up between 40 and 50 percent of all crime in the UK. Police resource dedicated to fraud: 1 percent. No country is giving fraud the attention it deserves.” — Becky Holmes Was Shakespeare a fraud? Possibly, says Becky Holmes, the Stratford-upon-Avon-based writer and the lady behind the X account @deathtospinach. She should know. Best known as the author of Keanu Reeves Is Not In Love With You, a cult hit among the romance fraud crowd, Holmes' latest book is The Future of Fraud. It's a short, sharp, witty history and anatomy of fraud, from the first recorded case in ancient Greece to today's AI-enabled deepfakes and romance scams. Holmes' most alarming statistic is that fraud accounts for between 40 and 50 percent of all crime in the United Kingdom, while only 1% of police resources are dedicated to investigating it. No wonder so few fraudsters are ever prosecuted. Holmes wants more Sherlocks. She wants fraud awareness on every school curriculum. And she wants our language to change. No, you didn't “fall for” a scam. Your money was stolen from you. As if you were mugged on the street or your home was broken into. The internet was bad enough for fraud. But AI, she warns, offers online criminals even more opportunity. It's not just Keanu Reeves who isn't in love with you. Never trust a handsome soldier, she says. Especially a virtual one. Five Takeaways •       The First Recorded Fraud: 300 BC, Greece: A Greek merchant took out an insurance policy on his boat, borrowed money, and planned to sink it and collect the proceeds. It didn't go according to plan. But the basic structure — a false representation designed to extract money or goods from another party — has not changed in 2,300 years. Every fraud since, from the South Sea Bubble to Bernie Madoff to AI-enabled romance scams, is a variation on the same theme: getting something from someone by not telling the truth. •       AI Has Erased All the Red Flags: Holmes used to advise romance fraud victims and potential victims: if he won't do a video call, that's suspicious. If the voice sounds wrong, that's suspicious. If he can't meet in person, that's suspicious. AI has rendered all of these warnings useless. You can now have a fully convincing video call, voice message, and real-time conversation with someone who doesn't exist. Deepfakes mean you can't even trust what your eyes tell you. The “red flags” that protected fraud victims for thirty years are gone. •       40 to 50 Percent of Crime, 1 Percent of Resource: In the United Kingdom, fraud accounts for between 40 and 50 percent of all recorded crime. Police resources dedicated to investigating fraud: 1 percent. Holmes cites a comparable US statistic: in one state, there were millions of people and ten police officers dedicated to cybercrime — and not one of them did it as their primary job. No country, Holmes argues, is giving fraud the attention it deserves. The gap between the scale of the problem and the resources devoted to it is not a funding issue. It is a political choice. •       You Didn't Lose Your Money. It Was Taken from You: Holmes has a crusade about language. The phrase “fell for a scam” implies the victim's credulity caused the loss. “Lost their money” implies carelessness. Both are wrong: in fraud, money is taken by a deliberate criminal act. Holmes wants the language changed because language shapes understanding, and understanding shapes policy. If fraud victims are seen as complicit in their own victimhood, society finds it easier to underfund investigation and under-prosecute offenders. Reclaiming the language is not symbolic. It is strategic. •       Fraud Awareness Should Be on Every School Curriculum: Holmes's most concrete prescription. Every person on the planet will encounter fraud at some point. Teaching children to recognise it should be as basic as teaching them to cross the road safely. It should be age-appropriate: fraud awareness around gaming sites and online chat when children first go online; around bank accounts and credit cards when they turn eighteen; around investment fraud at university level. The alternative — leaving it to parents, who are often themselves uneducated about fraud — is not good enough. The next generation of fraudsters is already on the gaming headsets. About the Guest Becky Holmes is the creator of the X account @deathtospinach, a fraud prevention speaker and writer, and the author of The Future of Fraud (Melville House, April 2026) and Keanu Reeves Is Not In Love With You: The Murky World of Online Romance Fraud. She lives in Stratford-upon-Avon. References: •       The Future of Fraud by Becky Holmes (Melville House, April 2026). •       Keanu Reeves Is Not In Love With You: The Murky World of Online Romance Fraud by Becky Holmes (Unbound, 2024). •       Episode 2890: Anja Shortland on Dark Screens — ransomware as the companion episode on the booming business of cybercrime. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: (00:31) - Introduction: Was Shakespeare a fraud? (01:35) - Everyone has been into fraud at some point in history (01:44) - What is fraud? A working definition (02:41) - Anja Shortland and the British women and fraud connection (03:16) - How Becky got into fraud: handsome soldiers on Twitter during lockdown (03:32) - @deathtospinach: the origin of the handle (04:53) - Where does romance fraud end and marketing oneself begin? (05:27) - Motive is the line: wanting money from a relationship (06:09) - Fraud for sex and power: a different kind of romance fraud (06:50) - The spinach debate: raw vs. cooked (...

“Justice may have been served, but the human element of the story didn't seem to add up.” — James Lasdun In March 2023, Alex Murdaugh — wealthy scion of a South Carolina prosecutorial dynasty — was found guilty of murdering his wife Maggie and his son Paul at their family estate. With its opioid addiction, fatal boat crash, staged suicide, and a cousin called Eddie, the case could have been invented for our true crime age. And who better to tell the story of the mysterious Mr Murdaugh than the literary crime writer James Lasdun whose 2023 New Yorker piece about the trial became the magazine's most-read story of the year. Lasdun's new book, The Family Man: Blood and Betrayal in the House of Murdaugh, tries to answer the one question the trial never answered. Why would a father annihilate his son? The prosecution claimed that Alex killed Maggie and Paul to distract from a web of financial crimes about to be exposed. While this is theoretically possible, Lasdun acknowledges, it is totally implausible psychologically. Coming from a family of prosecutors, Murdaugh would have known he would be the prime suspect. And this family annihilator, as the prosecutor described him, murdered not just his wife, but his boy. Who would annihilate their beloved child to muddy a prosaic embezzlement? The Southern gothic case isn't over. The court clerk who managed the Murdaugh trial resigned in disgrace after it emerged she had interfered with the jury — fabricating a Facebook post to remove a juror who was bending toward acquittal. Murdaugh has appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court. A retrial isn't inconceivable. But even if the murder conviction is overturned, Murdaugh faces forty years inside for his financial crimes. So he's never going free. But James Lasdun's core question remains unanswered. Why? “Justice may have been served,” Lasdun concludes, “but the human element of the story didn't seem to add up.” Mr Murdaugh remains a mystery, perhaps even to himself. Five Takeaways •       The Family Annihilator: A Psychological Category: The term “family annihilator” — first used at the Murdaugh trial — is not a well-developed criminological category. There isn't much psychology behind it. What Lasdun found in his research: most family annihilators are men who kill their families when they believe everything is about to be taken from them — not out of hatred, but out of a grotesque form of ownership. The family is theirs. If their world is ending, the family ends with it. This pattern, Lasdun argues, begins to illuminate what happened at Moselle. Not excusing it. Illuminating it. •       The Thirteen Minutes of Mystery: The murders took place in a thirteen-minute window at the kennel at Moselle. In thirteen minutes, Alex was supposed to have shot his wife with a shotgun and his son with a rifle, staged the scene, called 911, and composed himself sufficiently to appear on a video call immediately afterward showing no signs of distress. Lasdun's question: was he capable of that? The prosecution said yes, and the jury agreed. Lasdun is not saying they were wrong. He is saying that the how and why of those thirteen minutes remain genuinely mysterious — and that the mystery is part of what makes the case important. •       Cousin Eddie and the Staged Shooting: Three months after the murders, Alex arranged a meeting on a rural road with his cousin Eddie — a distant relative — and emerged with an entry and exit wound at the back of his head. Alex claimed he had asked Eddie to shoot him dead so that his surviving son Buster could collect his $10 million life insurance. Eddie denies this account entirely. The police concluded quickly that the “shooter” was not a stranger seeking vengeance for the boat crash, as Alex had initially claimed. Lasdun's reading: Alex was trying to reinforce the vendetta narrative that would implicate Anthony and Connor Cook, the young men who had been on the boat when Mallory Beach was killed. •       The Court Clerk and the Removed Juror: One juror was leaning toward acquittal in the final hours of deliberation. That juror was removed from the jury on the last day of the trial, after the clerk of court produced evidence that the juror had been indiscreet about the case on Facebook. It subsequently emerged that the clerk had fabricated the Facebook post. She resigned in disgrace. The Murdaugh appeal is partly based on this interference. The South Carolina Supreme Court has taken it seriously. A retrial is not inconceivable. The legal situation is still live. •       Murdaugh as an American Story: Lasdun's book, like Capote's In Cold Blood, is not ultimately about a crime. It is about a society. The Murdaughs were prosecutors — the family that put people in prison, that sent people to death row. The corruption that enabled Alex's embezzlement was not unusual in Hampton County; it was systemic. The opioids that fuelled his addiction were everywhere. The insularity and entitlement of the Lowcountry ruling class created the conditions in which Alex Murdaugh could operate for twenty years without exposure. The murders are a symptom. The disease is American. About the Guest James Lasdun is a poet, novelist, memoirist, and staff writer at The New Yorker. He is the author of The Family Man: Blood and Betrayal in the House of Murdaugh (W. W. Norton, May 5, 2026), Afternoon of a Faun, Give Me Everything You Have, and many other works. He was born in London and lives in Brooklyn, New York. References: •       The Family Man: Blood and Betrayal in the House of Murdaugh by James Lasdun (W. W. Norton, May 5, 2026). •       James Lasdun's two New Yorker pieces on the Murdaugh case — the magazine's most-read stories of the year. •       Truman Capote, In Cold Blood — the comparison Lasdun's reviewers have drawn and that the interview raises explicitly. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple Podcasts

“Every single person that we meet was both the endpoint of thousands of years that brought them there, and the midpoint of some other process, and was the beginning of something else entirely. Think of yourselves as the middle and the beginning, not just the end.” — Patrick Wyman History, we are often told, is a simple story of progress — from caves and villages to cities; from forests and farms to factories; from chieftains and kings to democracies. But, for Patrick Wyman, host of the enormously popular Tides of History and Fall of Rome podcasts, that's far too linear a narrative. In his new book, Lost Worlds: How Humans Tried, Failed, Succeeded, and Built Our World, Wyman argues that rather than a teleological inevitability, civilization is a chaotic ten thousand year story of improvisation, experiment, failure, and unintended consequence. It is never ending. We are always in the middle of it. Dramatic advances in archaeological technology triggered Wyman's argument in Lost Worlds. Ancient DNA, isotope analysis, LiDAR, cutting-edge excavation are all opening up what Wyman calls “a golden age for popular historians.” We can now trace the lives of individuals in ways that were inconceivable just a generation ago. Wyman's star is Ötzi the Iceman — a man murdered 5,300 years ago in the Alps, whose gut contents, DNA, last meal, and likely killers we now know. Rather than a symbol of prehistoric life, Ötzi the Iceman reveals why history keeps happening. Five Takeaways •       The Prelapsarian Fallacy: Hunter-Gatherers Weren't Paradise: The romantic idea — popular in the last decade as people read Graeber and Wengrow or Yuval Noah Harari — is that hunter-gatherers had it better. Farming made us smaller, sicker, more crowded, more unequal. Wyman's counter: yes, on some metrics early farmers were less healthy than foragers. But farming also supported enormously larger populations. It expanded the possibilities of human life in ways that foraging never could. Looking back at the past and calling it paradise says more about the critique of the present than about the actual realities of past lives. •       Civilization Was Not Inevitable: We have a story about how we got from foragers to cities: people settled, started farming, produced surplus, developed specialisation, built states. But Wyman's new archaeology shows that this story is wrong at every step. Farming didn't always replace foraging. Villages didn't automatically spark agriculture. Cities didn't necessitate rigid hierarchies. For every society that moved from one stage to the next, there are others that moved in different directions, collapsed, hybridised, or simply chose something else. The line of progress is a retrospective fiction. •       Ötzi the Iceman: A Man With a Story: Wyman's most vivid example of what the new archaeology makes possible: Ötzi, a man murdered 5,300 years ago in the Alps, whose mummified body was found in 1991. From isotope analysis of his teeth, we know where he grew up. From his gut contents, we know what he ate in his last meal — venison and ibex. From his DNA, we know his ancestry. From the arrow in his back, we know how he died. We don't know his name, but we know enough to recognise him as fully human. That is what the new tools give us: not symbols of a lost world, but individual people with individual stories. •       The Fall of Rome Was Not a Tragedy: Wyman spent fifteen years of his life thinking about the fall of the Roman Empire and hosting a podcast about it. Writing this book changed how he sees it. He used to view it as a tragedy — something lost. Now he views it as a natural part of the rhythms that pulse through human societies over long periods of time. The remarkable thing about Rome is not that it fell. All empires fall. All societies eventually reach the limits of their technologies, their environments, their ways of organising life. The remarkable thing is that it lasted as long as it did. Six hundred years. That's the story. •       Think of Yourself as the Middle, Not the End: Wyman's message for the AI apocalypticists — and for everyone else who believes they're living at the final chapter of human history. Every person at every point in the past believed the same thing. The Neolithic farmers Wyman studies. The Bronze Age city-dwellers. The Romans. Every one of them was both an endpoint and a beginning. The AI revolution may transform the world. But it will not end it. Stop thinking in terms of next quarter. Start thinking of yourself as part of something much, much bigger — that will extend long after your name has been forgotten. About the Guest Patrick Wyman is the host of the Tides of History, Fall of Rome, and Past Lives podcasts, and the author of Lost Worlds: How Humans Tried, Failed, Succeeded, and Built Our World (Harper, May 5, 2026) and The Verge: Renaissance, Reformation, and Forty Years That Shook the World. He has a PhD in History from USC and lives in Phoenix, Arizona. References: •       Lost Worlds: How Humans Tried, Failed, Succeeded, and Built Our World by Patrick Wyman (Harper, May 5, 2026). •       Tides of History podcast by Patrick Wyman — currently covering the Iron Age. •       Fall of Rome podcast by Patrick Wyman. •       Episode 2891: John Steele Gordon on information technology and American unity — the companion piece on how technology changes history at the deep level. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: (00:31) - Introduction: from the Ice Age to the Bronze Age...

“Post-war Europe is essentially an American protectorate. Europeans don't like to admit that. They only came to realize just how dependent they were on the United States in 2025, when Trump basically leveraged US security and forced Europe into a very disadvantageous trade deal.” — Glyn Morgan Post Second World War Europe was always an American project. At least according to The Rise and Fall of American Europe by Glyn Morgan, the Director of the Moynihan Center of European Studies at Syracuse University and a proud Welshman. All that post-war civilizational jazz — the Marshall Plan, NATO, the EU — weren't really European achievements. Instead, they were American-designed ideas and institutions that proud Europeans boasted they had built themselves. For Morgan, post-war Europe was, in fact, little more than a US protectorate. Gaul colonized by Rome. Wales as a backwater of Great Britain. Europeans only discovered this unpalatable truth in 2025, when Trump leveraged their security dependence to force a ruinous trade deal. JD Vance made the official press announcement at the Munich Security Conference. Today's crisis of NATO is its obit. The original architects of American Europe were deeply Europeanized Americans — Bill Bullitt, who loved France; George Kennan, who spoke better German than most Germans; Ivy League Libs who cherished Europe as a café-rich sibling of New York City. That imaginary continent lasted eighty years. Morgan defines its MAGA replacement as “civilizational America.” It's a United States that sees itself as a distinct civilization with distinct interests, willing to transact with Russia and China and leave an increasingly marginalized Europe to fend for itself. Wales is the future of Europe, Morgan says. The Welsh lost the Darwinian struggle for world power very early — conquered, then absorbed and shrunken into a rainy museum for English romantics. Sheep, rugby and singing ex-miners. That's the fate of 21st century Europe. Bon Voyage. And don't forget your umbrella. Five Takeaways •       American Europe Was a US Protectorate: The story Europeans like to tell is that they built post-war Europe themselves — the Marshall Plan, the Treaty of Paris, the Treaty of Rome, the EU. Morgan's counter: the construction of post-war Europe was theorized by Americans and pushed through by American pressure. Europeans resisted and begrudgingly went along. NATO provided the security. The EU organized the trade. Democratic nation states were the units. Enlargement was the engine. Europeans got comfortable inside this structure and convinced themselves they were in charge. Trump's arrival in 2025 revealed the truth they had been avoiding for eighty years. •       The Architects: Bullitt, Kennan, and the Europeanized Americans: The Roosevelt Democrats who built American Europe were deeply European in origin and values. Bill Bullitt loved France. George Kennan spoke better German than most Germans. They were steeped in the idea that America and Europe were one civilization. They wanted to rescue Europe both from the Europeans themselves and from the Soviet threat they were among the first to identify clearly. Bullitt and Kennan broke with Roosevelt over the Soviets — Roosevelt thought a deal could be struck; they said no. A strong democratic Europe as a bulwark against Soviet communism was the founding logic of the whole enterprise. •       Trump and Vance: The Return of Isolationism: American isolationism — powerful in the 1930s, defeated by Pearl Harbor, marginalized through the Cold War — has returned. It returned in JD Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2025, and in Trump's leveraging of European security dependence to force a disadvantageous trade deal. Morgan's framing: what has emerged is “civilizational America” — a United States that sees itself not as the guarantor of European democracy but as a distinct civilization with distinct interests, willing to transact with Russia and China and leave Europe to manage its own affairs. •       Putin and Trump Are Playing the Same Playbook: Putin seeks a Europe of nation states — not the integrated EU — where he can deal transactionally, playing different European states against each other. Europeans were slow to realize that's what they were facing. Then they faced the same thing from Trump. The beneficiary of the collapse of American Europe, Morgan argues, is China: investing in Eastern Europe, doing trade deals across the continent, acquiring economic leverage while Russia and America compete for security dominance. A Chinese Europe in fifty years is not inconceivable. •       No Solution: Look to Wales: Europe faces an impossible dilemma. Rebuild the military and lose the welfare state. Or preserve the welfare state and rely on security that may no longer be provided. De Gaulle's line: it is a fundamental error to think that to every problem there is a solution. At some moments there is no solution. We await a Bismarck; we have mediocre politicians who can only stop things from getting worse. The bleak future: a pleasant museum, highly dependent on American tech, visited by Chinese and American tourists. Morgan is from Wales. Wales lost the struggle for world power very early. He can see what's coming. About the Guest Glyn Morgan is Director of the Moynihan Center of European Studies at Syracuse University and the author of The Rise and Fall of American Europe (Polity, August 2026) and The Idea of a European Superstate. References: •       The Rise and Fall of American Europe by Glyn Morgan (Polity, August 2026). •       Episode 2875: Daniel Bessner on Cold War Liberalism — the companion episode on the Cold War liberal tradition that built American Europe. •       Episode 2887: Steven J. Ross on The Secret War Against Hate — referenced in the interview; the American neo-Nazi tradition that ran alongside American Europe. •       Episode 2881: Adrian Wooldridge on The Revolutionary Center — the crisis of liberalism that American Europe's collapse is accelerating. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual intervi...

“Orbán rigged the electoral system to highly benefit the winner. He thought he would never face the realistic possibility of losing. When someone actually threatened his plan, he just couldn't imagine it. And that person got more than 55% — a two-thirds-plus majority. Orbán shot himself in the foot.” — Marc Loustau On April 12, Viktor Orbán — the populist who invented the illiberal playbook — got booted out of office by the Hungarian electorate. His defeat, says Marc Loustau, Harvard PhD and fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study at Central European University, represents a playbook for defeating illiberalism. Orbán had rigged the electoral system so dramatically — giving the winner 1.5 votes for every vote the loser got — that when Péter Magyar got more than 55 percent of the vote, Orbán's own system destroyed him. The gods must have their fun — Hungarian poetic justice. Orbán's cronies, Loustau reports, are fleeing to Dubai with their hot rod car collections and ill-gotten gains from sixteen years in power. But the mid- and upper-tier bureaucrats, Loustau warns, are still in office. Not having any other skills, they're going to be difficult to dislodge. Making Hungary a functional democracy again won't happen overnight. The goal of Péter Magyar's government, Loustau says, is to “make Hungary boring again.” That should be the lesson for the anti-Trumpists in his native America, Loustau says. Build the broadest possible coalition, never kick anyone out of it, and refuse to be drawn onto the deadly culture-war terrain. When Orbán banned the Budapest Pride parade to force Péter Magyar to take a stand on LGBTQ issues, Magyar flew to a Greek island. It was, Loustau says, the smartest move of the campaign. Make America boring again. The anti-Hollywood playbook for defeating illiberalism. Are you watching Gavin & Kamala? Five Takeaways •       Poetic Justice: Orbán's System Destroyed Him: Orbán rigged Hungary's electoral system to massively benefit the winner: if you get more than 55 percent of the vote, you get roughly 70 percent of parliamentary seats, and effectively 1.5 votes for every vote your opponent receives. He did this because he never imagined anyone could get above 50 percent against him. When Péter Magyar did — comfortably — Orbán's own system gave Magyar a supermajority. Loustau's verdict: it is rare that there is genuine poetic justice in life. This is one of those moments. •       The Cronies Are Heading for Dubai: Sixteen years of a two-thirds majority in parliament allowed Orbán to pack every institution in Hungary with loyalists — friends, family, friends of friends — from top to bottom. In the end, this became part of his undoing: when you bleed out talent and fill institutions with cronies, you end up with an inept government. The most visible Orbán figures are now heading to Dubai with their hot rod car collections. But the mid-level “authoritarian cadre circles” burrowed into every institution will be much harder to remove. It will take years to restore functional public services. •       Make Hungary Boring Again: The incoming government's agenda, in Loustau's formulation, is to make Hungary boring again. No more brinkmanship between Russia, Brussels, and Washington. No more geopolitical risk-taking. Hungary belongs in the EU, and if the EU likes anything, it is stultifying bureaucracy. That, paradoxically, may be the best thing for ordinary Hungarians. It does not signal the end of the far-right threat globally. So long as Putin is alive, Loustau argues, we must remain vigilant. •       Magyar Goes to Greece: The Culture War Lesson: One of Orbán's favourite tactics was to force opposition politicians to take a stand on LGBTQ issues. He banned the Budapest Pride parade specifically to create a trap for Magyar — either come out against the ban and look soft on “family values,” or attend the parade and look radical. Magyar's response: he went on holiday to Greece. He wasn't even in the country. Loustau calls it one of the slyest moves of the campaign. The lesson for Trump's opponents: never engage on the terrain your opponent has chosen. •       Can Disaffected Trumpians Defeat Trumpism? Magyar came from within Orbán's government and broke with him at a moment of genuine moral crisis — a scandal involving pardons for those who covered up sexual abuse at state-run orphanages. That moral authority gave him a platform. Loustau's honest assessment: disaffected Trumpians who had any dealings with Trump are radioactive, perhaps permanently. But the broader lesson holds: when government inaction harms the innocent and powerless, someone who stands up and says “enough is enough” can build a majority. Magyar didn't win on policy. He won on decency. About the Guest Marc Loustau is a Harvard PhD, Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study at Central European University in Budapest, and author of the At the Edges Substack. He writes on Central and Eastern European politics, religion, and society. References: •       At the Edges by Marc Loustau — his Substack on Central and Eastern European politics. •       Episode 2880: Gal Beckerman on How to Be a Dissident — the companion episode on the theory of resistance that Magyar's campaign enacted. •       Episode 2881: Adrian Wooldridge on The Revolutionary Center — on the crisis of liberalism that Orbán exploited and Magyar may have reversed. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: (00:31) - How significant was the Hungarian election in historical terms? (01:30) - Orbán's authoritarianism: model for the world, now defeated (02:56) - Was the left paranoid? How did Orbán actually lose? (03:50) - Poetic justice: Orbán rigged the system and it destroyed him (05:46) - Corruption uncovered: the regime unraveling (06:38) - Sixteen years of cronyism: what remains? (07:51) - Authoritarian cadre circles: how long to dislodge them? (08:24) - The cronies heading for Dubai with their hot rod collections (10:38) - Romania, Ceauşescu, and celebrat...

Reproduced from ‪@garlandn‬ with thanks. https://www.youtube.com/live/DF8LUavwio4 This week I spoke with Garland Nixon about ‘democracy' in western imperialist nations. What is its true content and who does it serve? Can working people really influence the structures of power and governmental decision-making? And if not, why not? We talked about the class nature of the state and democracy, and highlighted the prejudices which are instilled so deeply in workers' heads from such a young age that we find it hard to see past the shibboleths of ‘everybody knows ...' and recognise the extent to which we have been lied. We also discussed the steady shift away from ruling by consent to ruling by force, and the role that political policing is now playing in western societies. True to form, the British ruling class has introduced political policing in a roundabout, arms-length way, by creating and funding allegedly ‘independent' (zionist) organisations which are turning out to be thoroughly embedded into the state machinery, but which allow the government to retain plausible deniability. In fact, Britain's zionist political police function in much the same way as Anglo-American imperialism's zionist settler colony, which polices the middle east/west Asian region and practices all kinds of repressive techniques that are then brought back to be used on the home population. All while allowing the imperialists to pretend that the crimes being committed there are nothing to do with them. ______________________________________________ Subscribe! Donate! Join us in building a bright future for humanity! http://www.thecommunists.org http://www.lalkar.org http://www.redyouth.org Telegram: https://t.me/thecommunists Twitter: / cpgbml Soundcloud: / proletarianradio Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/theCommunists Odysee: https://odysee.com/@proletariantv:2 Facebook: / cpgbml Online Shop: https://shop.thecommunists.org/ Education Program: Each one teach one! http://www.londonworker.org/education... Join the struggle! https://www.thecommunists.org/join/ Donate: https://www.thecommunists.org/donate/

“Anyone that's properly using AI now knows that you tell it what you want, it gives you a plan, carries out the work, and you judge and tweak. You're not a passive victim — you're an active user with outcomes in mind.” — Keith Teare Do we really want a no-hands job from Silicon Valley? That Was the Week newsletter publisher Keith Teare — who thinks all tech innovation results in human progress — thinks we do. No hands, no problem, Keith says. But I'm not sure. Especially given the powers-that-be giving us that no-hands job. Keith welcomes the end of what he calls the “typed” and “touched” computing era — keyboards, mice, touchscreens, and all the manifold ways we have used our hands to interact with computers since the 1980s. That's the outcome, he predicts, of the race to AGI. So far so good. But what happens if our no-hands AI future is controlled by Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and Facebook? This week these four behemoths committed 00 billion to AI infrastructure investment in 2026 alone — 2 percent of all US GDP. These companies are racing to build (and own) the foundational mechanics of AGI. That's always how it's been, Keith says, embracing our no-hands future. I'm less open-armed. What happens if we want our hands to fend off AGI? No, I'm not so keen on a no-hands job from Silicon Valley. Especially one couched in the altruism of human progress. Five Takeaways •       The End of the Hand-Driven Computing Era: Andrej Karpathy's observation at Sequoia's AI Ascent: he no longer uses his hands to do his work. He speaks to the computer; the computer acts; he judges and refines. The keyboard, the mouse, the touchscreen — all the hand-driven interfaces that have defined computing since the 1980s are entering their twilight. Karpathy calls it “software 3.0”. Keith, two years ago, wrote an editorial called “eyes, hands, ears, and mouth” about the inclusion of other human attributes beyond hands. That prediction has arrived. •       $700 Billion: The CapEx Explosion: A post by @Signal framed the week's numbers: $700 billion in AI infrastructure spending in 2026, equivalent to 2 percent of all US GDP. This kind of spending, the post observes, usually happens via governments or wars. This time, it's four private companies — Microsoft, Amazon, Google, and Meta — racing to build the foundational mechanics of AGI. Meta was punished by Wall Street for overspending; Google was rewarded because its numbers were strong enough to justify it. The same bet, two different verdicts, depending on your quarterly earnings. •       Was the Internet Privately Built? The ARPANET Argument: Keith's claim: innovation waves have always been privately financed. The railways, the telephone, the electricity grid, the commercial internet. Andrew's counter: ARPANET was a massive government investment that created the protocols on which the internet runs. Keith's response: ARPANET was a university bulletin board that created the precedent, not the infrastructure. Andrew's response: that's not exactly what ARPANET was. They agree that government research matters. They disagree on how much credit it deserves for what became the commercial internet. •       The Revenge of the Idea Guy: Sam Altman's line of the week. In the past, an idea person came up with a concept and then needed expensive engineers to build it. Many ideas never saw the light of day because the engineering cost was prohibitive. Now, anyone can speak an idea into existence. AI builds the plan, executes the work, and you judge and refine. That changes the economics of creativity, advertising, software development, and anything else that used to require specialist execution. The specialist is not dead — but specialists will increasingly use AI to scale themselves, rather than being hired one at a time. •       Should Kids Use AI in Schools? A New Yorker piece asks what it would take to get AI out of schools. Keith's view: the premise misunderstands how AI works now. The fear is passive students asking chatbots for answers and having their brains atrophy. The reality is that proper AI use requires active judgment at every step — telling it what you want, refining the plan, evaluating the output. If schools understand that, they embrace AI. If they don't, they produce graduates unequipped for a world in which the idea guy with AI tools now has the power the engineering team used to have. Andrew's prediction: the kids whose parents ban AI will eventually sue them. About the Guest Keith Teare is a British-American entrepreneur, investor, and publisher of the That Was the Week newsletter — a daily curation of the most important stories at the intersection of technology, business, and culture. He is a co-founder of TechCrunch and a long-time interlocutor on Keen On America. References: •       That Was the Week newsletter by Keith Teare — this week's editorial: “Hand Job?” •       Andrej Karpathy at Sequoia Capital AI Ascent 2026 — the Karpathy interview on Software 3.0 and the end of typed input. •       @Signal, “$700 billion on AI infrastructure” — the post that framed the CapEx question. •       Jessica Winter, “What Will It Take to Get AI Out of Schools?” The New Yorker, 2026. •       Episode 2891: John Steele Gordon on how information technology knitted America together — the ARPANET backstory that feeds directly into this week's argument. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: (00:31) - Keith leads with “Hand Job?” — explaining the headline (03:27) - Karpathy at Sequoia: the end of typed and touched input (04:30) - CapEx: the real story of the week (05:35) - $700 billion — 2% of US GDP on AI infrastructure (06:38) - Was the commercial internet privately built? (07:35) - ARPANET: pathetic bulletin board or foundational infrastructure? (09:08) - Keith and Andrew agree to disagree on government's role (11:00) - Big Tech earnings: Google up, Meta down, and why (17:00) - OpenAI's strategy: the long game

The partnership between Dwight D. Eisenhower and Winston Churchill was one of the defining relationships of the Second World War. At the heart of the Anglo American alliance, they worked closely to plan major operations, manage coalition warfare, and steer the Allies towards victory. In this episode, I am joined by Jonathan W. Jordan to explore how that relationship worked in practice, shaped by the pressures of global conflict and the demands of leadership at the highest level. The conversation also looks at how their connection continued beyond the war, as both men navigated the uncertain early years of the Cold War, drawing on insights from Jonathan's book Ike and Winston.   patreon.com/ww2podcast  

“Nobody has ever made money selling America short. We're an extraordinary country.” — John Steele Gordon To honor America's semiquincentennial birthday, the Wall Street Journal has been celebrating the most impactful American inventions of all time: 1. Internet2. Light bulb3. Integrated circuit4. Personal computer5. Airplane The railroad doesn't even make the top twenty. But the business historian John Steele Gordon validates the list. Gordon's piece for the WSJ series is titled “From the Telegraph to the Smartphone: How Information Technology Unified a Nation.” His argument is that the United States was always in danger of falling apart and the telegraph saved the republic. Then radio, television, and even the now vilified internet knitted it even closer together. Otto von Bismarck quipped that God looks after three things: fools, drunks, and the United States of America. Gordon agrees with the Prussian unifier of Germany. Nobody, he notes, has ever made money selling America short. As for the now venerable republic, he thinks it's still in pretty good hands. The ever expanding national debt, however, is another matter. That certainly wouldn't get onto Gordon's top 250 most impactful American inventions. Five Takeaways •       Hanging by a Thread: The Communication Crisis at the Founding: George Washington's fear was not philosophical: it was geographic. The original United States, stretching to the Mississippi, was larger than all of Western Europe. The trans-Appalachian West couldn't get its commerce over the mountains — it had to go down the Mississippi, which was controlled by Spain. Washington said the West was hanging by a thread. Every subsequent expansion — to California in 1850, to Oregon and Washington — only deepened the crisis. The republic could not exist without communication. That is why the post office was almost constitutionally important in Washington's time, and why the telegraph and the transatlantic cable were understood as national security technology, not merely as business. •       The Atlantic Cable: Ten Days to Ten Seconds: In 1800, a transatlantic crossing took two months westbound and six weeks eastbound. By the 1850s, with steam, it was ten days either way. Cyrus Field — a paper merchant who knew nothing about cable technology — read about undersea cables and decided to lay one across the Atlantic Ocean. Gordon compares this to reading about Sputnik and deciding to go to Mars. It took six tries and ten years. William Thomson — Lord Kelvin — did the physics. The result: ten days to ten seconds. Basically simultaneous. The nineteenth century was right to call itself an age of miracles. •       The Robber Barons Were Misunderstood: As early as the 1850s, the New York Times was calling Commodore Vanderbilt a “robber baron” — after the medieval German toll barons on the Rhine who wouldn't let your boat pass without paying. Gordon's verdict: the dead can't sue, but they should. Vanderbilt built a faster, safer, cheaper transportation network than had existed before. He died the richest man in America in 1877, worth $105 million. Henry Ford did the same thing with the automobile: took a rich man's toy invented in Germany and built one the average man could afford. Gordon sees Elon Musk's reusable rocket in the same tradition. Nobody complained about their products. They complained about their wealth. •       The Internet Is the Greatest American Invention: The Wall Street Journal's ranking puts the Internet at number one, above the light bulb, the integrated circuit, and the personal computer. Gordon agrees. The Internet has changed everything in thirty years, and — he thinks — we've basically seen nothing yet. Scholars bless Google every day. Gordon spent decades going from index to index in the books behind him; today the entire intellectual world is at everyone's fingertips. The railway, which actually unified the national economy by allowing factories in Worcester, Massachusetts to ship shoes across the continent at lower prices, doesn't make the list. Gordon doesn't quarrel with that either. •       God Looks After Fools, Drunks, and the United States: Gordon's July 4th assessment: optimistic about the republic, alarmed about the national debt. The debt, he says, used to be used only for wars and great depressions. It is now used to ensure that no member of Congress ever loses an election. The budget system of the federal government is an unbelievable national disgrace. But the republic itself? Bismarck was right. Nobody has ever made money selling America short. It remains, Gordon believes, a blessed country beyond any other in the history of the world. He's not sure about the fools and the drunks. But he's pretty sure about the Americans. About the Guest John Steele Gordon is an American business and technology historian and journalist. He is the author of An Empire of Wealth: The Epic History of American Economic Power, A Thread Across the Ocean: The Heroic Story of the Transatlantic Cable, and many other books. He writes for The Wall Street Journal and Commentary. References: •       John Steele Gordon, “From the Telegraph to the Smartphone: How Information Technology Unified a Nation,” The Wall Street Journal, 2026. •       An Empire of Wealth: The Epic History of American Economic Power by John Steele Gordon. •       A Thread Across the Ocean: The Heroic Story of the Transatlantic Cable by John Steele Gordon. •       Episode 2874: Don Watson on From One Mad King to Another — the companion episode on American history and what has always made America America. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: (00:31) - The Wall Street Journal's most impactful US inventions: Internet at number one (01:52) - The founding fear: the US was t...

“Trump has no strategy and no endgame. No amount of success in tactics will win. No military campaign has ever been won solely from the air.” — Jason Pack Happy May Day! Today's papers are leading with stories about Obamacare, a Gaza flotilla, and the price of oil. Everything but the story at both the front and back of our minds. Only the Wall Street Journal leads with Iran. Which is more than a bit odd, given that America is supposed to be at war there. Or is it? Jason Pack — Middle East analyst, host of the Disorder podcast, and our man in London — joins for a special May Day show on the most surreal conflict in recent memory. Both sides, Pack argues, care more about the narrative war than about actual military strategy. The official word out of DC and Tehran is the same: we're winning. But no military campaign in history has been won solely on the airwaves. Pack sees two sides that are doing their surreal best to ignore a war that they are both fighting. If you pretend it's not happening, then maybe it isn't. Don't mention the war. On this May Day, everyone is Basil Fawlty. Five Takeaways •       Two Sides with No Strategy: Both Trump and the Iranian regime are more invested in the narrative war — the story of who is winning — than in having an actual endgame. Trump says the blockade will make the Iranians cry uncle. The Iranians say they are surviving and therefore winning. Neither has clearly stated what they want from this conflict: not on the nuclear file, not on territory, not on regime change. Pack's verdict: he sees two sides that don't even know what they want to get out of a war they're both pretending is going well. •       No Campaign Has Ever Been Won Solely from the Air: The American military has showcased extraordinary AI-enabled tactical capability in the Iran conflict. But war is about outcomes and strategy. Territory must be controlled. New leaders must be installed. These things cannot be done from altitude. The Israeli Twelve-Day War hit the head of the snake — the Iranian regime — but may have overplayed its hand. A Shia axis that was being systematically degraded could come back like a phoenix if the narrative of martyrdom and resistance is allowed to reconsolidate around shared injury. •       Trump Does Projection: Pack's most pointed observation: track what Trump accuses his adversaries of, and you learn what he is about to do. He says the blockade will make the Iranians cry uncle. Which means he is on the verge of backing down. The absolute worst outcome, Pack argues, would be Trump as the one who folds — not because America loses a war, but because it loses the credibility that underwrites the entire international order. His fear: that is exactly what is about to happen. •       Pakistan: The Sleeping Giant: The story the world's media has mostly not told: Pakistan's role. Pakistan has nuclear weapons. Pakistan has a large Shia minority and a complex relationship with Iran. It also has a complex relationship with China, with the Gulf states, and with the United States. Any escalation that involves Iran necessarily involves the question of what Pakistan does. Pack considers this one of the most under-covered dimensions of the conflict and one of the most consequential. The sleeping giant has not yet been asked to choose sides. That moment may be coming. •       The First AI War: London Antisemitism and Russian Disinformation: Six antisemitic attacks in London in six weeks since the Iran war began. Pack's argument: the disinformation driving radicalisation on social media is not purely Iranian. Russia and North Korea are seeding the most outlandish conspiracy theories about Jewish people — great replacement, Epstein, the rest — and someone with mental health problems eventually acts. This, combined with AI-enabled targeteering and logistics in the actual conflict, makes this the first AI war. Future historians will untangle what that means. For now, it means the world is more disordered than it looks from any single headline. About the Guest Jason Pack is a Middle East analyst, host of the Disorder podcast, and a Fellow at the Middle East Institute. He is the author of Libya and the Global Enduring Disorder and a regular contributor to international media on North Africa, the Middle East, and great power competition. References: •       Disorder podcast by Jason Pack — disorder.fm. •       Episode 2877: Keith Teare — Let's Just Say It Out Loud: AI Is Not Dangerous — the Silicon Valley seminary argument, now tested in the first AI war. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: (00:00) - Chapter 1 (00:31) - May Day check-in: is there even a war happening? (02:09) - Both sides care more about the narrative than strategy (02:37) - Trump's lack of endgame: no military campaign is won from the air (04:18) - How is the war covered in the Middle East? (06:09) - Shia vs Sunni: does it still matter? (07:54) - Hussein, martyrology, and the Shia willingness to fight the losing battle (09:21) - Syria and the Alawis: off the map? (11:00) - Pakistan: the sleeping giant (14:00) - Is this the equivalent of Suez? (18:00) - A new world order: does America want to lead it? (22:00) - The Gulf states and the new regional order (26:00) - Trump does projection: crying uncle (30:00) - China, Russia, and who benefits (34:22) - The first AI war: what will historians say? (37:25) - AI company stocks keep going up (38:02) - London antisemitism: six attacks in six weeks (40:12) - Russian and North Korean disinformation driving radicalization (42:13) - Disorder podcast: subscribe. The world needs it.  

Hello and welcome to another Bible in the News.This week the world watched a remarkable scene: King Charles III addressing the United States Congress during his state visit to America. Nearly 250 years after American independence, a British monarch stood before American lawmakers and celebrated not division, but deep and enduring unity.For Bible students, the moment was striking - for in Ezekiel 38:13 we read:“Sheba, and Dedan, and the merchants of Tarshish, with all the young lions thereof, shall say unto thee, Art thou come to take a spoil?”This prophetically places a nation called Tarshish, in the latter days (after Israel has been regathered to their land - Ezekiel 38:8), when a group of nations headed up by a character called Gog comes down against the mountains of Israel. When this event happens, the prophecies tell us it will herold the return of Jesus Christ to the earth who will establish God’s Kingdom.If Tarshish is Britain, then one of her clearest young lions is America. And this enduring bond is what we are witnessing this week - a sure sign of our times. 

“It's like wrecking a car to steal a pair of sunglasses. The sunglasses are the ransom. The damage to the car is fifty to seventy-five billion dollars a year.” — Anja Shortland Cybercrime is booming. Ransomware attacks — where criminal gangs encrypt your servers and hold your data hostage until you pay — cost victims somewhere between fifty and seventy-five billion dollars a year in damage. The hackers themselves pocket around a billion. As Anja Shortland, professor of political economy at King's College London and author of Dark Screens: Hackers and Heroes in the Shadowy World of Ransomware, puts it: “it's like wrecking a car to steal a pair of sunglasses.” The sunglasses are the ransom. The wrecked car is the damage to the rest of us. Shortland is an expert in extortive crime — transactions where a legal entity has to make a deal with a criminal group under conditions of zero trust. She has studied kidnap for ransom, Somali piracy, art theft, and now the booming business of ransomware. What fascinates her is not the crime itself but the institutions that emerge in the space between the legal world and the criminal underworld: the insurance companies that price the risk, the negotiators who manage the transaction, the norms that make it possible for a corporation to pay a criminal gang and actually get its data back. In Russia, hacking Westerners isn't even a crime. In North Korea, it's an actual department with a small army of government employees. In Iran, it's a foreign policy. Criminality, Shortland thus argues, is defined by whoever holds power. The game-changer, she argues, is cryptocurrency. Without it, ransomware doesn't work — you can't move money anonymously at scale without it. Regulate cryptocurrency, and you take the profit motive out of most of what she studies. The irony is that the current American administration is amongst the most crypto-friendly in history. Meanwhile, AI — specifically Anthropic's Claude Mythos, the hacking model that was leaked rather than released — is about to give criminals tools that only well-resourced banks and corporations can currently deploy defensively. So cybercrime will continue to boom. Expect a pile-up of wrecked cars on our information highway.Five Takeaways •       We Know You Can Pay a Million: The title of the UK edition of Shortland's book is the most revealing line in ransomware. Criminal gangs don't pick ransom figures arbitrarily. They spend weeks inside the victim's systems, studying cash flow, cash reserves, and insurance coverage, before setting a demand on the painful side of affordable. The victim usually pays — because the alternative is losing access to patient records, customer data, or patents permanently. The hackers know this. The negotiation that follows is, in Shortland's framing, a transaction between parties with zero trust and one thing in common: both want a deal. •       In Russia, It's Not a Crime: Ransomware is not a uniform global crime. In Russia, theft and extortion directed at Westerners is not considered a criminal act. In North Korea, hacking is organised as a government department — a state revenue stream, not a criminal enterprise. The line between crime and legitimacy is drawn by whoever holds power. This complicates any enforcement response: you cannot extradite a North Korean government employee. You cannot prosecute a Russian hacker in a Russian court. The only effective levers are diplomatic, financial, and technical — and all three are currently being weakened. •       Insurance Orders Criminality: Shortland's most counterintuitive argument: insurance companies are not passive bystanders in ransomware. They are active market-makers. By pricing the risk, they create the conditions under which a corporation can make a rational decision to pay. By negotiating on behalf of victims, they create norms — what a fair ransom looks like, what proof of decryption looks like, what happens if the hackers don't deliver. Insurance, in Shortland's telling, is what makes the criminal market function. Most people think insurance is boring. They are not thinking about this. •       Cryptocurrency Is the Real Game-Changer: Ransomware as a profitable business model did not exist before cryptocurrency. Without the ability to move money anonymously at scale, without blockchain verification that payment has been received, the transaction between criminal and victim cannot be completed. Regulate cryptocurrency — apply the anti-money-laundering frameworks that govern wire transfers and bank accounts — and you take the profit motive out of most of what Shortland studies. The irony: the current American administration is among the most crypto-friendly in history, and the president's own family has direct financial interests in the sector. •       Claude Mythos and the Asymmetric AI Problem: Anthropic's Claude Mythos — the AI model built to find software vulnerabilities, which was leaked rather than formally released — is the next phase of this war. The defensive use case is real: a well-resourced bank can use it to find and fix its vulnerabilities before attackers do. The problem is asymmetry. A large financial institution can deploy Claude Mythos defensively. Wiltshire County Council, a local hospital, a dental practice, a legal firm — the soft targets that ransomware gangs prefer — cannot. The hackers will eventually get it. The debate about who should be allowed to use it, and under what conditions, has not happened. That is what worries Shortland most. About the Guest Anja Shortland is a Professor of Political Economy at King's College London and the author of Dark Screens: Hackers and Heroes in the Shadowy World of Ransomware (Princeton University Press, 2025; US edition April 2026) and Kidnap: Inside the Ransom Business. She was a member of the Ransomware Task Force. References: •       Dark Screens: Hackers and Heroes in the Shadowy World of Ransomware by Anja Shortland (Princeton University Press, US edition April 2026). •       Steven Levy, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution (1984) — referenced in the interview as the origin story of hacking culture. •       Episode 2885: Keith Teare on Adulting — the week Anthropic's Claude Mythos was discussed; the Shortland interview is the companion piece on what it means in practice. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the histo...

Ella Rule, former Chair of the CPGB-ML delivers a presentation on the history of Sudan, from colonialism and liberation through to the present. Southall Seminar with Joti Brar and Mohamad Hassan. Delivered 3rd April 2026. Who are the Rapid Support Forces? Who is funding them? Why when Iran struck the UAE during the “40 day Ramadan War” could the RSF no longer fight and cause chaos in Sudan? Qui Bono? Who benefits from the dent slavery and conflict that is making the lives of the Sudanese people miserable? Which side should we support? What is the path that the people of Sudan must take to achieve liberation and how can we support them? Victory to the Axis of Resistance! Victory to Iran! Victory to Palestine! Down with Anglo-American imperialism, their genocidal Zionist colony, and their disgusting stooge Arab regimes; Qatar, UAE, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia!

I'm in Washington, DC, and it so happens that King Charles III was too, and we both visited the White House. The King's moment that says everything about the true state of the “special relationship.” From his sharp jokes about the War of 1812 to the gift of a bell from the President's namesake ship, we look at how Charles managed to charm Washington just as Keir Starmer has been undermining Anglo‑American trust.We then dig into Trump's speech on American heritage, why it matters that he called America not just an “idea” but a people rooted in Anglo‑Saxon courage and English liberty, and what that means for Britain today. Finally, we turn to the uncomfortable truth about British military decline, American frustration, and how decades of elite “managed decline” have left the UK struggling to act like a serious power, even as the King tries to stitch the relationship back together with soaring rhetoric and symbolism.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Our show is independently supported by you, consider signing up to our substack to get added benefits like ad-free and extended episodes here: https://www.winstonmarshall.co.uk/----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

America is once again at war. Helen Benedict is one of our most distinguished writers on the moral consequences of war. Her new novel, The Soldier's House, is set in the aftermath of the Iraq war. But it could, equally, be about the aftermath of Afghanistan. Or even Iran. “The war turned me into a monster,” veterans tell Benedict, again and again. “How am I supposed to face my wife, my children, when I know I'm a monster?” On George W. Bush, Benedict is unambiguous. “He was a war criminal,” she says. On the Iraq war, she is equally clear: America went in on lies and killed nearly a million Iraqis, used depleted uranium in violation of international law. Today, Trump is repeating the same catastrophic playbook in Iran. In The Soldier's House, Benedict shows how Iraq turned some American soldiers into monsters. “War is morally corrosive — especially a war where the soldiers can find no justification for what they're doing,” Benedict says. That's the unintended consequence of even the most morally clean war. Expect the same in Iran. If Trump's half peace becomes a George W. Bush total war. Five Takeaways •       He Was a War Criminal: Benedict's verdict on George W. Bush, stated flat and without hedge. He went to war on lies. He killed, depending on who's counting, somewhere near a million Iraqis. The Americans and the British used depleted uranium in violation of international law — polluting the land and spreading poison, producing an epidemic of birth defects among Iraqi civilians and, some veterans claim, among their own children. The forgiveness of Bush — common on the left since Trump — is, in Benedict's view, memory loss. He was not better than Trump. He was better in some things and just as bad in others. The bar is not very high. •       The Other Half of the Story: The Iraq war produced reams of American writing about American soldiers. For years, nobody thought to write about how the civilians felt. Benedict's novel is structured to correct that: Naima, the Iraqi widow, is given equal weight and depth as Jimmy, the American veteran. The point is to push back against the worldwide demonization and scapegoating of Muslim refugees by creating characters who are just as human as anyone we know — who could be your friend, your sister, yourself. She had soldiers and Iraqis read the manuscript to ensure accuracy on both sides. •       Why Fiction, Not Nonfiction: Benedict had already written the nonfiction: The Lonely Soldier, three and a half years of research and interviewing. But no matter how intimate the interviews, she always felt she couldn't get deep inside the experience. In interviews, people put up self-protective barriers: things they don't want to remember, things they are ashamed of, things that are private. Fiction allows her to go where nonfiction cannot. Take everything learned in research. Apply imagination to it. Fill it out. Illustrate the interior experience of war from moment to moment. That is the territory of the novel, and nothing else. •       Moral Injury: The War Turned Me Into a Monster: Benedict's central subject across all her books on war is moral injury: the damage done to a person's conscience when they do things they know, deep down, they had no right to do. A war without justification is maximally corrosive because the soldier can find no frame in which the violence makes sense. It just becomes about violence. Soldiers come home carrying that. It affects everyone who knows them. It affects towns, villages, countries. We bring the war home with us. Every poet who has written about war has said so. Benedict's novels make it visible. •       The Afghan and Iraqi Interpreters: A Betrayal: Trump's abandonment of Afghan and Iraqi interpreters — people who risked their lives and their families' lives working for the US military — is both morally appalling and strategically stupid. Benedict has met many soldiers and marines who agree. They made promises: I will save your family. I will protect you. Now they are forced to break those promises, and it hurts them. Trump started closing these programs in his first administration. The current proposal to send Afghan interpreters and their families to the Democratic Republic of Congo, or return them to the Taliban, is a betrayal of everything America promised. Nobody is going to trust us at all. About the Guest Helen Benedict is a Professor of Journalism at Columbia University and the author of The Soldier's House (Akashic Books, April 2026), The Good Deed (Dayton Literary Peace Prize finalist), The Lonely Soldier: The Private War of Women Serving in Iraq, and many other works of fiction and nonfiction. She is a dual British-American citizen and lives in New York City. References: •       The Soldier's House by Helen Benedict (Akashic Books, April 2026). •       The Lonely Soldier: The Private War of Women Serving in Iraq by Helen Benedict — the nonfiction companion to the novel. •       The Good Deed by Helen Benedict — Dayton Literary Peace Prize finalist; about the Greek refugee crisis. •       Episode 2882: Peter Wehner — Something Has Gone Terribly Wrong in America — the companion episode on Hegseth's unholy war, referenced in the interview. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: 

“Violence has been misdiagnosed. And there's a misdiagnosis that has caused us to not be able to control it as we could.” — Dr. Gary Slutkin Human violence appears ubiquitous. In Iran. In Gaza. In Ukraine. In Sudan. In American cities and homes. So widespread, indeed, that it seems naturally hardwired into us. Our species-being, so to speak. But, for Dr. Gary Slutkin, there is nothing inevitable about human violence. Slutkin — an epidemiologist who spent years fighting cholera, tuberculosis, and AIDS in Africa before focusing his medical mind on violence — argues that violence is neither a character flaw nor a moral failing. Rather than being baked into our natures, Slutkin sees violence as a contagious disease. It meets the clinical definition of a plague, he says. The more violent our homes, communities, media, politics, the more virally it spreads. Slutkin's new book, The End of Violence: Eliminating the World's Most Dangerous Epidemic, makes the case that violence has been misdiagnosed for centuries. We analyse it as a crime problem, a character problem, an inter-state problem. So we punish, incarcerate and bomb. But none of these approaches confront the contagion. This can only be done, Slutkin argues, with what he calls “violence interrupters” — people from within the infected community who find the most at-risk individuals and cool things down before they escalate. Communities that have applied this approach have seen reductions in violence of 40 to 70 percent, Slutkin boasts, with Cherry Hill, one of Chicago's most dangerous neighbourhoods, experiencing 450 days without a shooting. There will be a time, he promises, when the plague of human violence will be mostly overcome. I hope Dr. Slutkin is correct. But suspect that his brave new violence-free world, like Huxley's, might be simultaneously utopian and dystopian. Five Takeaways •       Violence Meets the Clinical Definition of a Contagious Disease: Slutkin is not speaking metaphorically. Violence meets the definition of a disease: characteristic signs and symptoms causing morbidity and mortality. It meets the definition of contagious: it causes more of itself. One violent event leads to another — in a home, in a community, in a region, in a war. The more you are exposed to it, the more likely you are to do it. This is the same mechanism as measles, as cholera, as COVID. Susceptibility varies — for violence, it has to do with how much you feel humiliated, how much social pain you carry, how much grievance a leader has taught you to feel. But the operating system is the same. •       Violence Has Been Misdiagnosed: For centuries, we have treated violence as a moral failing: a matter of bad people making bad choices. The response has been punishment, incarceration, war. None of these interrupt the contagion. In fact, incarceration concentrates the infection. The misdiagnosis has cost millions of lives. The correct diagnosis — epidemic disease spreading through exposure — changes everything. You don't blame a cholera patient for drinking contaminated water. You don't punish a COVID patient for breathing. You interrupt the spread. You treat the susceptibility. You cool it down. •       Violence Interrupters: The Epidemic Control Playbook: Cure Violence Global trains and deploys violence interrupters: people from the same community, who speak the same language, who have often been involved in violence themselves. Their job is to find the most at-risk individuals — the ones most likely to shoot or be shot next — and intervene before the next event. The approach works. Communities that have applied it have seen reductions of 40 to 70 percent. Over a dozen American cities are at fifty- or sixty-year historic lows. Cherry Hill in Chicago went 450 days without a shooting. Baltimore, New York, and other cities have had similar results. •       Authoritarian Violence Disorder: Chapter eight of The End of Violence is called “Infections of the State.” Slutkin's argument: authoritarian leadership is itself a form of epidemic violence. It spreads violence outward into its own population — through ICE raids, through threats, through the approval and scripting of violence by others. It also spreads it abroad, through war. Violence doesn't know borders. The mechanism is the same: exposure increases transmission; grievance and humiliation increase susceptibility. Trump's Iran war is not just a war. It is authoritarianism causing war. And the spread doesn't stop at the border. •       Uganda Dropped HIV 85 Percent with Behavior Change Alone: In 1987, Slutkin arrived in Uganda, then the most infected country in the world, where a third of the population had what was then a 100 percent lethal disease. Using the epidemic control playbook — no medicines, just behaviour change interventions — they dropped the rate 85 percent. The same approach drove down Ebola, drove down TB long before medication existed. Slutkin's point: we do not need pharmacological intervention to eliminate violence. We need the right people doing the right interventions with the right understanding of how contagion works. We have done it. We can do it again. About the Guest Dr. Gary Slutkin is an epidemiologist and the founder and CEO of Cure Violence Global. He is the author of The End of Violence: Eliminating the World's Most Dangerous Epidemic (Health Communications, Inc., 2026). He is a Professor of Epidemiology and Global Health at the University of Illinois Chicago and a former WHO epidemiologist. References: •       The End of Violence: Eliminating the World's Most Dangerous Epidemic by Gary Slutkin (2026). •       Cure Violence Global — Slutkin's organisation. cvg.org. •       Episode 2887: Steven J. Ross on The Secret War Against Hate — the historical companion on American violence and authoritarian disorder. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify 

“The truth is paywalled, and the lies are free.” — Current Affairs editor, quoted by Brewster Kahle The internet, we were promised, would remember everything. Rather than memory, however, it is now most distinguished by its digital forgetfulness. That's the warning in Vanishing Culture, a new series of essays published by the San Francisco-based Internet Archive. In its concluding essay by Brewster Kahle — founder of the Internet Archive, member of the Internet Hall of Fame, and the closest thing the web has to an official librarian — he makes the case for preserving the online library system. “Our evolving digital age can be our next Carnegie moment or it can be a Library of Alexandria moment. It is up to us.” Today's internet library system, Kahle argues, is worse than the analogue one he grew up with. It's faster, he acknowledges, but shallower. The 1976 Copyright Act means that rather than buying digital books, libraries can only rent access in surveillance environments controlled by a handful of corporations. Sixty percent of news organisations now have paywalls. Academic publishing is controlled by three conglomerates. So an entire generation is growing up without access to the published works of the twentieth century. “The truth is paywalled, and the lies are free,” as the editor of Current Affairs put it. That is today's internet. No laughter. Only forgetting.Five Takeaways •       Carnegie Moment or Alexandria Moment: The Internet Archive's pamphlet Vanishing Culture opens with a choice. Andrew Carnegie invested in public libraries during the early twentieth century: every town in America got one, and by the time the US was thrust onto the world stage after World War II, an educated public was ready. The Library of Alexandria burned. Kahle's argument: we are at the same fork in the road. The digital transition can be a Carnegie moment — everyone with access to all human knowledge — or it can be an Alexandria moment. Sixty percent of news organisations now have paywalls. Academic publishing is controlled by three conglomerates. The library system we have is worse, not better, than the one Kahle grew up with. •       The 1976 Copyright Act as Original Sin: Copyright used to be opt-in: you had to put a ‘c' on your work and register it. The 1976 Act made it opt-out: everything is copyrighted by default, forever, with terms that keep being extended. The consequences: Wikipedia had to be written from scratch because the encyclopedias already written couldn't be shared openly. Academic papers are walled inside publisher systems, which is why arXiv exists. Libraries can no longer buy digital books — only rent access in surveillance environments. The bargain between publishers, libraries, authors, and the public that functioned for centuries has been dissolved by lobbyists writing copyright law. •       The Truth Is Paywalled and the Lies Are Free: Kahle's most quotable line belongs to someone else — the editor of Current Affairs. But Kahle endorses it fully. An entire generation is now growing up without access to the published works of the twentieth century. People are genuinely confused about whether the Holocaust happened — not because the information doesn't exist, but because it's behind a paywall. What is free on the internet is what serves the interests of the platforms: viral, emotional, algorithmically optimised, frequently false. The deep, sourced, accurate record costs money to access. That inversion is not an accident. It is the business model. •       Turnkey Tyranny: Kahle quotes Edward Snowden's phrase for what surveillance capitalism has built: turnkey tyranny. All it needs is someone motivated to think tyrannically, and all the laws, policies, and technologies are already in place. The internet was built on a protocol: play by the rules and you're in. That openness is gone. What replaced it is a small number of platforms with enormous centralised control of distribution, purchasing the upstream sources — Comcast buying movie studios, Amazon buying MGM. Whoever controls distribution, Lawrence Lessig's maxim holds, will eventually control everything upstream from it. •       AI Mass Larceny? The Real Loser Is People: Asked the binary question — is AI mass larceny, yes or no? — Kahle refuses it. His answer: the fight between publishers and AI companies is Coke versus Pepsi. The real dynamic is large corporations — whether you call them AI companies or publishing conglomerates — taking from people's goodwill, their creative output, their authorship, and landing the value in very few hands. What Kahle wants is public AI: ClimateGPT, reading the Sri Lankan 1953 fish reports and seeing the patterns in them. AI that serves the public good, not the shareholders of one, two, or three gigantic players. The answer isn't either Coke or Pepsi. It's water. About the Guest Brewster Kahle is the founder and Digital Librarian of the Internet Archive, a member of the Internet Hall of Fame, and the author or editor of Vanishing Culture (Internet Archive, 2024). He was previously the founder of WAIS and Alexa Internet. He lives in San Francisco. References: •       Internet Archive — archive.org. •       Vanishing Culture: A Report on Our Disappearing Digital Heritage, ed. Brewster Kahle et al. (Internet Archive, 2024). Available free at archive.org. •       arXiv (arxiv.org) — the open-access preprint server that routes around academic publishing. •       Episode 2877: Keith Teare — Let's Just Say It Out Loud: AI Is Not Dangerous. The counterpoint to Kahle's wariness about AI centralisation. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: (00:30) - The internet's librarian: forgetting vs. surveillance (01:55) - Carnegie moment or Alexandria moment? (03:20) - Andrew Carnegi...

This Day in Legal History: Lincoln Suspends Habeas CorpusOn April 27, 1861, President Abraham Lincoln authorized military officials to suspend the writ of habeas corpus along the rail lines between Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. The order came in the opening weeks of the Civil War, when Washington was vulnerable, Union troops were moving through hostile territory, and federal officials feared sabotage and rebellion along critical transportation routes.Habeas corpus is one of the oldest protections in Anglo-American law, allowing a detained person to demand that the government justify their imprisonment before a court. By suspending it, Lincoln allowed military authorities to detain certain people without immediately producing them for judicial review. The legal problem was that the Constitution says habeas corpus may be suspended “when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it,” but it does not clearly say which branch of government may do the suspending.Lincoln argued that the rebellion created an emergency that required swift executive action. Critics argued that the suspension power belonged to Congress, not the president, because the Suspension Clause appears in Article I, the part of the Constitution dealing mostly with legislative powers. The conflict soon came to a head in Ex parte Merryman, after John Merryman, a Maryland secessionist, was arrested by military authorities and denied ordinary habeas review.Chief Justice Roger Taney, sitting as a circuit judge, ruled that Lincoln had exceeded his constitutional authority and that only Congress could suspend the writ. Lincoln did not comply with Taney's order, maintaining that the survival of the Union justified extraordinary action. Congress later gave statutory support for wartime habeas suspension, but the controversy over Lincoln's initial action has remained central to debates over presidential power, civil liberties, and constitutional government during crisis.The U.S. Supreme Court is set to hear a case involving Cisco Systems and the Alien Tort Statute, focusing on whether U.S. companies can face liability for allegedly helping foreign governments commit human rights abuses. The case comes from Falun Gong practitioners who claim Cisco built surveillance tools for China's “Golden Shield” program that helped officials identify, detain, torture, and persecute members of the religious movement. A federal district court dismissed the case, but the Ninth Circuit revived much of it in 2023, finding the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that Cisco aided and abetted violations of international law. Cisco argues that the Ninth Circuit improperly expanded the Alien Tort Statute by recognizing aiding-and-abetting liability even though Congress did not expressly create that cause of action. The company says the ATS was originally meant to cover only a narrow set of claims, such as piracy, violations of safe conduct, and harms to ambassadors. Cisco also relies on Supreme Court precedent to argue that courts should not create secondary liability unless Congress clearly authorizes it.The Falun Gong plaintiffs respond that aiding-and-abetting liability has long been part of international law and is especially important when serious abuses require technology, infrastructure, or corporate support. They argue that torture, extrajudicial killing, disappearances, and prolonged arbitrary detention are already recognized as serious international-law violations that can support ATS claims. Business groups and the federal government warn that expanding ATS liability could chill foreign investment and interfere with U.S. foreign relations by forcing American courts to judge the conduct of foreign governments. Supporters of the plaintiffs argue that corporate accountability can discourage companies from profiting from foreign repression and can promote fair competition for businesses that follow human rights standards. The Supreme Court's ruling could shape how much legal risk U.S. companies face when selling technology or services to governments accused of human rights abuses.Justices To Focus On Alien Tort Statute In Cisco Spying CaseThe U.S. Supreme Court is hearing Bayer's attempt to limit or end a large wave of lawsuits over Roundup, the weedkiller Bayer acquired when it bought Monsanto in 2018. The case involves John Durnell, a Missouri man who won a $1.25 million jury verdict after claiming years of Roundup exposure contributed to his non-Hodgkin lymphoma. Bayer argues that federal pesticide law should block state-law failure-to-warn claims because the Environmental Protection Agency has approved Roundup labels without a cancer warning. The company says EPA approval shows the product was not legally “misbranded” and that Bayer could not substantially change the label without agency approval. Durnell's lawyers argue that EPA registration does not make the label immune from challenge and that Missouri warning law mirrors federal requirements rather than adding new ones.The dispute turns on the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, which regulates pesticide labeling and limits states from imposing requirements that differ from federal law. Bayer says more than 100,000 plaintiffs have brought Roundup-related cancer claims and that a Supreme Court win could largely end the litigation. The company has also proposed a $7.25 billion settlement to resolve many current and future claims, though some pending appeals and excluded claims would remain outside the deal. Agricultural and crop industry groups, along with the Trump administration, support Bayer, while environmental, farmworker, and public health groups support Durnell. Bayer warns that the lawsuits could threaten its ability to keep supplying glyphosate products to farmers. A decision is expected by the end of June.US Supreme Court hears Bayer's fight against Roundup lawsuits | ReutersElon Musk's lawsuit against OpenAI, Sam Altman, Greg Brockman, and Microsoft is headed to trial in federal court in Oakland, California. Musk claims OpenAI betrayed its original nonprofit mission by creating a for-profit structure after he left the board, while using his name and early financial support to build what he calls a profit-driven enterprise. He is reportedly seeking $150 billion in damages, with money going to OpenAI's charitable arm, and also wants OpenAI returned to nonprofit status. OpenAI denies wrongdoing and argues that Musk's real motive is to regain control and help his own AI company, xAI. Microsoft also denies collusion and says its partnership with OpenAI began after Musk had left.The trial is expected to feature testimony from major tech figures, including Musk, Altman, and Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella. Internal documents are likely to play a major role, including diary entries from Brockman that reveal tension inside OpenAI over Musk's influence and the organization's future. Musk's side points to those materials as evidence that OpenAI's leaders became focused on profit rather than the public-benefit mission. OpenAI's side says Musk knew about possible restructuring plans, wanted to be CEO, and later attacked the company after it became successful. The case comes as OpenAI faces heavy competition, major computing costs, and possible IPO plans, while Musk's xAI is also trying to compete in the AI market. The broader fight is not just about money, but about who controls one of the most influential companies in artificial intelligence.Elon Musk's trial against Sam Altman to reveal the ongoing power struggle for OpenAI | ReutersCole Tomas Allen, a 31-year-old California man, is expected to appear in Washington federal court after allegedly trying to breach security at the White House Correspondents' Association Dinner while President Donald Trump was present. Authorities say Allen shot at a U.S. Secret Service agent at a hotel checkpoint before being tackled and arrested. The agent was hit, but a tactical vest stopped the shot, and the agent was later released from the hospital. Formal charges had not yet been filed at the time of the report, but prosecutors said Allen is expected to face charges including assault on a federal officer and using a firearm during a crime of violence. Officials also said more serious charges, including attempted assassination, could still be considered as the investigation continues.Authorities say Allen traveled from California to Washington by train and booked a room at the Washington Hilton, where the dinner was held. They also say he left family members a manifesto referring to himself as the “Friendly Federal Assassin” and discussing plans to target senior Trump administration officials. Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche said Trump may have been among the intended targets. The shooting disrupted the high-profile dinner, forced attendees to take cover, and led security personnel to move senior officials out of the room. Monday's court hearing is expected to be brief, with a judge advising Allen of his rights and prosecutors likely asking that he remain detained. The incident has renewed concerns about security for Trump and other public officials.Suspect in Washington dinner shooting set to appear in court | Reuters This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

“White men are 29 percent of the population but hold 90 percent of Fortune 500 CEO positions, 90 percent of venture capital, and 98 percent of all money managed by money managers. Is that because they're smarter? Or is it because there is preference, inequality, and active bias in favor of white men?” — Steve Phillips Are white men really smarter than other Americans? Some white men might think so, but few others are convinced. Especially the Stanford educated Steve Phillips whose new book, Are White Men Smarter Than Everybody Else? is designed to “play offense” in the fight for American racial justice. The title of Phillips's new book is, of course, a provocation. White men are 29 percent of the population, he tells us, but hold 90 percent of Fortune 500 CEO positions, 90 percent of venture capital, and 98 percent of all investment funds managed by money managers. Is that really because they're smarter than everybody else? Or is it because the system is biased in favor of white dudes who graduated from Harvard, Princeton and Stanford. After the murder of George Floyd in 2020, Phillips argues, there was, albeit all-too-briefly, broad agreement that systemic racism existed and needed to be addressed. Then came the 2024 election and the MAGA war against DEI. It's time to fight back, Phillips says. Rather than defending affirmative action, Phillips says that the question is why, in the richest country in the world, white men hold 90 percent of the power when they are only 29 percent of the population. Until that mathematical inconsistency is explained, there's no point in pretending that the arc of American history bends toward justice. Five Takeaways •       29 Percent of the Population, 90 Percent of the Power: The book's central data point. White men are 29 percent of the US population. They hold 90 percent of Fortune 500 CEO positions. They receive 90 percent of venture capital funding. They manage 98 percent of all investment money in the country. Phillips's argument: you don't need to allege conscious racism to explain this. You just need to acknowledge that a system shaped by centuries of exclusion doesn't self-correct. The question the title asks is the question nobody wants to answer: if the system is meritocratic, why do these numbers look like this? Either white men are smarter than everybody else, or the system is not meritocratic. •       Playing Offense: The book began as a study of what happened to the post-George Floyd consensus. The broad agreement that systemic racism existed — widespread in June 2020 — dissolved within months. By 2024, the political momentum had reversed entirely. Phillips's diagnosis: the left spent the intervening years playing defense — defending DEI, defending affirmative action, defending the language of equity. The result was a retreat. His prescription: stop defending programmes and start prosecuting the inequality. Make the other side explain the numbers. Reframe the question from “should we have DEI?” to “why do white men hold 90 percent of the power?” •       The Biker Gang Analogy: To the objection — common from white Americans — that they personally didn't create the racial wealth gap: Phillips offers the biker gang. A gang comes into someone's house, takes all the resources, occupies the house, and passes it on to their children. The children can say: I didn't do anything. But they inherited a structurally unequal situation. The GI Bill after World War II gave billions of dollars in wealth-building to white Americans while largely excluding people of color. The average white family has more than ten times the assets of the average black family. “I didn't do it” is not the same as “I don't benefit from it.” •       The Confederates Never Stopped Fighting: Phillips's underlying argument: the division in American politics is not left vs. right. It is an existential question that has never been resolved — is this a white country, or is this a multiracial democracy? The Confederates and their ideological heirs never conceded the answer. White fear and resentment at equality is the single most consistent driving force in Republican politics since 1965, the year Lyndon Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act and no Democratic presidential candidate has won the majority of the white vote since. •       America Can't Pass a Bill to Study Reparations: The wealth of the United States was created by the labour of enslaved black people and on land taken from Native Americans. Banks and insurance companies trace their original capital to the bodies and labour of enslaved people. The racial wealth gap is the direct structural consequence of that history. Congress has repeatedly failed to pass a bill not to pay reparations, but merely to study the question. Not a single vote to begin the conversation. Until America can have that conversation, it hasn't begun to confront what is owed. About the Guest Steve Phillips is the founder of Democracy in Color and the author of Are White Men Smarter Than Everybody Else?, How We Won the Civil War, and Brown Is the New White. He is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former San Francisco school board president. References: •       Are White Men Smarter Than Everybody Else? Playing Offense in the Fight for Racial Justice in America by Steve Phillips. •       Democracy in Color — Phillips's organisation focused on race and politics. •       Episode 2883: Melvin Patrick Ely on A Terrible Intimacy — the companion episode on interracial life in the slaveholding South that immediately precedes this one. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTubeApple PodcastsSpotify Chapters: (00:30) - Introduction: from slavery to the present — has anything changed? (01:11) - The short answer: no. And what it took to end slavery. (02:03) - Why the racial wealth gap persists (03:26) - The Confederates never stopped f...

“Sam Altman's best case scenario is that abundance lifts everyone up to a much higher standard, but it also exacerbates inequality. That was his favorite outcome.” — Keith Teare This week's editorial from Keith Teare, publisher of the That Was the Week newsletter, is entitled “Adulting.” His verdict: this was the week the AI industry finally started behaving like grown-ups. The evidence: OpenAI launched ChatGPT 5.5 and Image 2.0, both outstanding, and then made a move Keith considers more significant than either — pivoting Codex from a programmer's tool into the central interface for everything. The gravity has shifted from the model to the user interface. You shouldn't be using ChatGPT anymore. You should be using Codex. Meanwhile, freemium is working: less tokens, much better output, a functional free tier, and the heaviest users paying for more. Anthropic's week was more complicated. The first four days were, in Keith's word, awful: Opus 4.7 launched with a massive deterioration in performance, hallucinations back, service throttled, timeouts everywhere. Then Anthropic removed features from its paid product, got a furious backlash, and reinstated them within twenty-four hours — what Keith calls Dario's adolescent-teenager moment. But Friday redeemed the week: Google committed up to $40 billion in infrastructure investment, Amazon added $5 billion. The money goes into data center capacity and chips — TPUs from Google, Trainium from Amazon, both competing with Nvidia. Two axes are emerging: OpenAI–Nvidia on one side, Anthropic–Google–Amazon on the other. The bigger question: what does adulting actually require of AI? Keith's reading of the week's most interesting piece — on the future of work — is that the durable jobs in an AI economy will be in the relational sector: nurses, therapists, teachers, craft brewers, live performers, care workers. Human-to-human is the scarce resource. Reid Hoffman adds: technology's arc bends toward access, but not on its own — it requires political will. And Altman himself, in his interview with Greg Brockman, described his best-case scenario as one in which abundance lifts everyone up but exacerbates inequality. Which is to say: even optimism, in Silicon Valley, ends in more inequality. Adulting, it turns out, has its limits. Five Takeaways •       Codex Is Now the Central App: The most significant move of OpenAI's week wasn't ChatGPT 5.5 or Image 2.0 — both outstanding — but the repositioning of Codex. What was a programmer's tool has become the central interface: it does more things, has access to all the models, and represents a shift in where the gravity of the company sits. From the model to the user interface. Keith's verdict: you shouldn't be using ChatGPT anymore for any purpose. You should be using Codex. The freemium model is working because less tokens produce much better output, making the free tier genuinely functional — and the heaviest users still pay for more. •       Dario's Adolescent-Teenager Week: Anthropic's first four days were, in Keith's reading, a study in how not to adult. Opus 4.7 launched with massively deteriorated performance — hallucinations returned, the service was throttled, users got timeouts. The infrastructure was creaking under load. Then, to compound the problem, Anthropic removed features from its paid tier. The backlash was immediate and furious. They reinstated the features within twenty-four hours. Keith's diagnosis: reactive, adolescent, exactly the opposite of what OpenAI was demonstrating that same week with deliberate, long-term thinking. •       $45 Billion and Two Axes: Friday changed the Anthropic picture entirely. Google committed up to $40 billion in infrastructure investment — $10 billion initially. Amazon added an initial $5 billion. The money funds data center capacity and proprietary chips: TPUs from Google, Trainium from Amazon, both in competition with Nvidia. The implication: two separate technological axes are now forming. OpenAI and Nvidia on one side. Anthropic, Google, and Amazon on the other. Keith's view: great for Google and Amazon; a long-term bet for Anthropic that they don't need to be an Nvidia customer. •       The Future of Work Is Human-to-Human: Keith's most interesting read of the week: a piece on the future of work that argues the durable jobs in an AI economy will be in the relational sector — the jobs where the human element is the product itself. Nurses, therapists, teachers, craft brewers, live performers, care workers, spiritual guides. Not prompt engineering (transitional). Not monitoring AI systems (transitional). Human-to-human. Nursing is already the most popular university major. Keith's extension: as work disappears, so does the social connection it provides — family, friends, colleagues. Which means religion probably makes a comeback. •       Sam Altman's Best Case: More Inequality: In his interview with Greg Brockman on the Core Memory podcast, Altman described three possible AI futures. His favourite: abundance lifts everyone up to a much higher standard, but also exacerbates inequality. That was the good outcome. The others were worse. Reid Hoffman adds a necessary corrective: technology's arc bends toward access, but not on its own — it requires human agency and political will. Keith's gloss, via Robert Heinlein's For Us, The Living: the heritage check — a monthly dividend to all humans from the automated economy's surplus. Money as a mechanism for allocating scarce resources becomes less meaningful when scarcity itself disappears. About the Guest Keith Teare is a British-American entrepreneur, investor, and publisher of the That Was the Week newsletter — a daily curation of the most important stories at the intersection of technology, business, and culture. He is a co-founder of TechCrunch and a long-time interlocutor on Keen On America. References: •       That Was the Week newsletter by Keith Teare — this week's editorial: “Adulting.” •       Greg Brockman and Sam Altman on the Core Memory podcast — the OpenAI interview that anchors the week. •       Reid Hoffman, “Faith in the Possible,” Substack — technology's arc bends toward access, but not on its own. •       Episode 2878: Victoria Hetherington on The Friend Machine — Keith weighs in on AI companionship and the loneliness question. •       Episode 2877: Keith Teare — Let's Just Say It Out Loud: AI Is Not Dangerous. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. 

“They weren't interested in being on the side of God so much as they are insistent that God is on their side.” — Peter Wehner on Hegseth and Trump According to Peter Wehner, something has gone terribly wrong in America. And that something, Wehner has been warning us now for more than ten years, is Donald Trump. In his latest Atlantic piece, “Hegseth's Unholy War,” Wehner aims his moral rifle at Trump's latest outrage, the Iranian conflict. Citing Hegseth's prayer at the Pentagon for “overwhelming violence of action against those who deserve no mercy,” Wehner argues that the Bible, in his Crusader-like hands, has been weaponized into a theological cover for bloodlust. Something has gone terribly wrong with the intersection of faith and American politics, Wehner believes. The evangelical church, which once commanded real moral authority, has largely become what he calls a defamation of Jesus. Thus the significance of Pope Leo XIV's public opposition to Trump. Rather than a social media spat, Wehner sees this Papal indictment of Trump as a kind of moral war which has been brewing for some time. In a recent New York Times op-ed co-authored with Jonathan Rauch, Wehner argued that the Trump administration has reached its psychotic stage. Having filled key institutions with Hegseth-style lackeys and hoodlums, this psychosis is now infecting not just the federal government but the whole world. Thus Iran. It's the kind of fiasco you wouldn't expect from middle schoolers planning a field trip, Wehner says. His fear is that as Trump is humiliated by both the Papacy and Tehran, the President of the United States will have what psychologists call an extinction burst — a five-year-old's out-of-control tantrum. Yes, something has indeed gone terribly wrong in America. Five Takeaways •       Hegseth's Unholy War: At a Pentagon worship service, Hegseth prayed for “overwhelming violence of action against those who deserve no mercy,” invoking imprecatory psalms — emotional laments written from the perspective of the powerless — as theological cover for the most powerful military force in history. Wehner's sharpest line: Hegseth and his allies are not interested in being on the side of God; they are insistent that God is on their side. The Bible becomes not a text for self-examination but a weapon aimed outward. Wehner's diagnosis: Hegseth has a bloodlust, unresolved resentments, and a conversion that is at least in part real — but real in the sense that he has locked onto a particular brand of faith to validate things he already believes. •       Something Has Gone Terribly Wrong: The evangelical church, which once commanded moral authority, has become — by and large, in Wehner's view — an awful depiction of the Christian faith and a net negative contribution to American civic life. Figures like Franklin Graham, Tony Perkins, Robert Jeffress, and Al Mohler have become vocal Trump supporters, using the name of Jesus to validate cruelty and crudity. Wehner's explanation: too many people who know better are afraid to speak out — afraid their congregations will split, afraid of the institutional costs. But the silence is not neutral. A watching world has seen these evangelicals and concluded: you are a bunch of hypocrites who act worse than the people you criticize. •       Pope Leo XIV vs. Trump: Wehner thinks this is not a tiff. It is an intellectual war, and it has been carefully planned. Pope Leo — an American pope, significantly — represents a set of contrasts almost too clean to be coincidental: a moral man against an amoral one, a person of faith against a person of no faith, someone who uses language with care against someone who cannot help but dehumanize his critics. And an institution-builder against an institution-destroyer. Wehner credits Leo with performing a necessary function that almost no one else in American public life is capable of performing — confronting Trump on explicitly moral terms with unblemished authority. •       Vance: The Mask He Wears: Wehner distinguishes Hegseth from Vance: Hegseth is, in some sense, a true believer; Vance's conversion to MAGA was transparently cynical, driven by enormous ambition. That makes him more morally culpable, not less. But Wehner also notes a psychological dynamic: when you live a life at odds with what you truly believe, cognitive dissonance is painful, and the mind mitigates that pain by rationalizing, by beginning to believe what you say. You become the mask you wear. Vance, Rubio, Graham, Johnson — these are people who knew better, decided to make a figurative deal with the devil, and convinced themselves they could do more good than harm. •       The Republican Party Has Become a Dark Force: Without the Republican Party, none of this could have happened. The party is hugely accountable. Trump is sociopathic — colorblind when it comes to morality, probably unable to help himself. But the Republicans in the party did know better and went along anyway. Mike Johnson, very big on proclaiming his evangelical faith, is a pathetic and disreputable figure. His reputation has been stained beyond belief. Wehner's verdict on the party's future: if it has any association with the current iteration, it deserves condemnation. The roots of MAGA go too deep for a snapback. This may get more chaotic after Trump leaves than less. History will get it right, Wehner believes. These people were on the wrong side of their faith, their morality, their politics, and their justice. And it will be known. About the Guest Peter Wehner is a contributing writer at The Atlantic and a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center. He served in the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush administrations. He is the author of The Death of Politics and several other books. He lives in McLean, Virginia. References: •       Hegseth's Unholy War by Peter Wehner, The Atlantic, April 2026. •       “Pete Hegseth's Moral Unseriousness,” by Peter Wehner, The Atlantic, April 2026. •       “The Trump Administration Is in a Psychotic State,” by Peter Wehner and Jonathan Rauch, The New York Times, April 10, 2026. •       The Barmen Declaration (1934) — Bonhoeffer's theological break with the German Protestant church under Nazism, discussed as a historical precedent. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Ke...

“Liberalism was founded in the middle of the eighteenth century as a revolutionary philosophy — a philosophy that tried to subvert the old world. That set of beliefs has continued to be radical and revolutionary. When liberalism fell into decadence, it examined itself, subverted itself, and became once again a revolutionary faith.” — Adrian Wooldridge We've lost our revolutionary center. At least according to Adrian Wooldridge, the distinguished British political writer. That revolution, Wooldridge insists, is the genius of liberalism — the radical eighteenth-century ideology that shaped the modern world. Today, however, he argues in The Revolutionary Center: The Lost Genius of Liberalism, “liberalism” has become conservative, perhaps even reactionary, in its senescent infatuation with cultural identity. Meanwhile, the biggest threat to liberal individualism is big tech: fragmenting attention, spreading misinformation, manipulating choices through algorithms designed to excite emotion rather than inform reason. Rather than making us geniuses, Silicon Valley is turning all of us into idiots. To the ramparts then, Wooldridge pronounces. Liberals need to seize back the revolutionary center. Or, as Wooldridge, a Fellow of All Souls, would spell it, centre. Five Takeaways •       Erasmus and the Liberal Way of Life: Liberalism begins not as an ideology but as a way of living. Erasmus, charting a middle path between the Reformation and the counter-Reformation, offers the founding insight: a good life involves reading books, drinking wine, having discussions, and not bullying people to adopt your faith. What liberalism adds to this is intellectual skepticism — the recognition that you can't be absolutely certain of your beliefs, and therefore that power must be constrained by constitutions. When liberalism became purely associated with political philosophy, Wooldridge argues, it lost this sense of liberalism as a way of life — and that loss is part of what needs to be recovered. •       Bobo Orthodoxy and Its Wounds: The liberalism of the last forty years has been Bobo liberalism — bohemian bourgeois, David Brooks' term. Maximum individual freedom in both the marketplace and personal conduct; no judgementalism on lifestyle choices; celebration of diversity and immigration as ipso facto goods. It did a great deal of good. Gay marriage. The dismantling of corporatist economics. But it also created problems it couldn't see, because its own philosophy prevented it from acknowledging them. In Britain: the Bobo establishment's inability to confront the grooming gangs, because its multiculturalist assumptions made it terrified of accusations of racism. In America: tent cities, drug addiction, the social costs of choices that nobody felt entitled to criticize. •       Big Tech Is a Bigger Threat Than Putin: Wooldridge's most provocative claim: the biggest threat to liberalism is not Putin or Xi but the tech oligarchy. Putin is a dictator; that system will eventually collapse. But big tech is dismantling liberal individualism from within. Liberalism's foundational premise is that individuals, as the building blocks of society, must be well-informed, capable of self-control, and able to act as rational agents. What information capitalism is deliberately engineering — through algorithms designed to excite emotion, fragment attention, and spread misinformation — is the destruction of all three of those conditions. These companies need to be broken up. Not on socialist grounds. On liberal ones. •       Liberalism as Senescence: Biden and Harris: Exhibit A for the Bobo orthodoxy's exhaustion: the 2024 election. Biden, visibly too old to lead, unable to string sentences together; a whole liberal establishment around him, imprisoned by its own assumptions, running a candidate nobody could defend. Then Harris — chosen, in Wooldridge's blunt phrase, as an affirmative action candidate. The old liberal establishment — Pelosi and the rest — had been in power since the 1990s, had accrued all the defects of the establishment, and had no blueprint to address the real problems people were encountering. The last time British liberalism looked this dead was the 1890s. Then a new programme and new talent arrived: Churchill, Lloyd George, Asquith. •       The Revolutionary Center: Save Capitalism from Itself: Wooldridge's prescription is not to destroy capitalism but to reform it, as Teddy Roosevelt and Louis Brandeis did. Break up vast conglomerations of economic power. Tax inherited wealth. Recreate the conditions for a mass middle class. Brandeis's argument: if people can buy votes, you can't have democracy. If people have vast fortunes, you can't have democracy. You need to save capitalism in order to make it the best version of itself. Mill understood this too: once he saw that factory owners and workers had structurally different choices, he began supporting trade unions and moved left on economics. A radical center is not a soft center. It is a center that is willing to blow up the orthodoxies that have calcified within liberalism itself. About the Guest Adrian Wooldridge is the global business columnist at Bloomberg Opinion and former political editor and Bagehot, Schumpeter, and Lexington columnist at The Economist. He is the author of The Revolutionary Center: The Lost Genius of Liberalism (Pegasus Books, 2026), The Aristocracy of Talent, and Capitalism in America (with Alan Greenspan). He holds a DPhil from All Souls College, Oxford, and lives in London. References: •       The Revolutionary Center: The Lost Genius of Liberalism by Adrian Wooldridge (Pegasus Books, 2026). •       Episode 2880: Gal Beckerman on How to Be a Dissident — the companion conversation on liberalism, dissidence, and the question of the revolutionary center. •       Episode 2869: Jacob Mchangama on The Future of Free Speech — the free speech crisis that contextualises Wooldridge's argument about liberalism's lost genius. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTube

“Pessimism is not fatalism. Fatalism is the belief that things will always necessarily be worse. Pessimism is the belief that things will probably get worse. Within that ‘probably,' it opens up space for action.” — Gal Beckerman In the first months of Trump II, Gal Beckerman watched American society do something that shocked him: comply. In one pathetic example after another, prominent law firms, universities, and senior federal employees buckled to every Trumpian whim. America appeared unable to resist authoritarianism. There were no dissidents. Thus How to Be a Dissident. Beckerman's new manual of resistance is inspired by history's more insistent dissenters — from Mandelstam and Solzhenitsyn to Navalny, Ai Weiwei, Thoreau, Havel, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, and demonstrators on the streets of Minneapolis. The quiet manifesto focuses on what Beckerman considers the ten most essential qualities of how to be a dissident: Be alone. Be pessimistic. Be funny. Be reckless. Be watchful. Pessimism, above all. Not fatalism — the belief that things will always necessarily be worse — but the belief that things will probably get worse. Optimism, in Beckerman's mind, undermines urgency and thus enables passivity. Pessimism forces resistance. It's the first lesson in how to be a dissident. Five Takeaways •       Moral Nausea: Beckerman's term for the feeling most of us recognise but most of us suppress: seeing something wrong — a neighbour treated badly, a homeless person in a terrible situation, a dead child in a newspaper — and knowing ourselves somehow implicated. Most of us swallow it back down. We don't do anything. We try not to think about it. The dissident is the person who doesn't. What separates them, Hannah Arendt argued after studying Germans who resisted the Nazis, is a single question: can I live with myself? If the answer is no — if living with myself would mean living with a murderer — the dissident acts. That question, and the refusal to avoid it, is what makes a dissident a dissident. •       The Pre-Political: Havel's definition of where dissidence begins: not in ideology or revolution, but in the defence of whatever allows a human life to feel normal. For Havel, it started with a rock band — the Plastic People of the Universe, arrested for playing unauthorised concerts in communist Czechoslovakia. They weren't political. They sang about drinking beer. But they were gathering people together outside state sanction, and that was enough. For Iranian dissidents: being able to drive unaccompanied, or not cover one's hair. For the Tiananmen tank man: getting home to make dinner. The dissident defends those pre-political conditions — the normal life — when the state moves to violate them. •       Mandelstam's Answer: Osip Mandelstam composed a poem mocking Stalin in the early 1930s — at the height of Stalin's repressive era — and never wrote it down. He repeated it to his wife, Nadezhda, night after night in bed until she had memorised it. When it reached the secret police, he was arrested and brought to the Lubyanka. The interrogator asked: why did you do this? He could have denied it. Blamed his wife. Said it was a game of telephone. Instead he said: I wrote it because I hate fascism. It's as simple as that. Beckerman opens the book with this moment because it captures the dissident at their most elemental — a man who, when asked the Arendt question, answered honestly. •       Navalny Goes Back: After being poisoned by Putin and spending months recovering in Germany, Navalny returned to Russia, knowing almost certainly that in the best case he would be in prison for a very long time, and that Putin would most likely find another way to kill him. Which he did. Why go back? Navalny's answer, in his memoir: he had made a promise to the Russian people. How could he stand on the sidelines while asking others to sacrifice so much? The scene Beckerman describes from the prison: Navalny finds a moment away from the cameras, pulls his wife Yulia aside, and tells her he's accepted that he's probably not getting out alive. She says: I know. I've thought the same thing, and I've accepted it. He kisses her. He needs to know she isn't engaging in magical thinking. Optimism, in this context, would not have helped him. •       Be Pessimistic: Beckerman's most counterintuitive prescription, and his favourite. The assumption is that anyone engaged in quixotic world-changing behaviour must be an optimist. Beckerman argues the opposite. Pessimism — not fatalism — is healthier. The distinction matters: fatalism says things will always necessarily be worse. Pessimism says things will probably be worse. The “probably” leaves room for action. If you assume someone else will solve climate change, or that authoritarianism will inevitably collapse, you wait. The pessimist acts now, with what time they have, because they know things probably won't work out otherwise. It is, Beckerman suggests, akin to accepting death: the ultimate pessimistic reality we all face, which is also the only thing that makes each day matter. About the Guest Gal Beckerman is a staff writer at The Atlantic and the author of How to Be a Dissident (Crown, April 21, 2026), The Quiet Before: On the Unexpected Origins of Radical Ideas, and When They Come for Us, We'll Be Gone: The Epic Struggle to Save Soviet Jewry (Sami Rohr Prize winner). He has a PhD from Columbia University and lives in Brooklyn. References: •       How to Be a Dissident by Gal Beckerman (Crown, April 21, 2026). •       Nadezhda Mandelstam, Hope Against Hope — the memoir Beckerman calls one of his favourite books. •       Alexei Navalny, Patriot — the memoir Beckerman draws on for the prison scene with Yulia. •       Episode 2869: Jacob Mchangama on The Future of Free Speech — the companion episode on the crisis of free speech that contextualises this one. About Keen On America Nobody asks more awkward questions than the Anglo-American writer and filmmaker Andrew Keen. In Keen On America, Andrew brings his pointed Transatlantic wit to making sense of the United States — hosting daily interviews about the history and future of this now venerable Republic. With nearly 2,900 episodes since the show launched on TechCrunch in 2010, Keen On America is the most prolific intellectual interview show in the history of podcasting. WebsiteSubstackYouTube

16. KING CHARLES AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE.GREGORY COPLEY. Gregory Copley discusses the King's role in mending rifts between unpopular US and UK leaders. The visit celebrates Americanindependence while offering the King a platform to improve diplomatic relations. (18) 50 RIALS IRAN