Podcasts about tajiks

Back Home, One week later.By FinalStand. Listen to the Podcast at Explicit Novels.There is something worse than waking up and not knowing where you are: you could wake up and not know who you are.Note: World Events Stuff ~ aka Why things are happening in Cáel's lifeThe phone was from Iskender. His boss, Oyuun Tömörbaatar (OT), the former UN ambassador from Kazakhstan and now the informal and unrecognized UN representative and chief diplomat of the Khanate to the same august body, wanted to talk with me, immediately. OT wasn't being diplomatic at the moment, that would come later.{Now this is going to get convoluted}Any inquiries to the Khanate that didn't also include immediate official recognition of the Khanate currently were being steered my (and Hana's) way. For all the behind closed doors crap, he had me, his loyal ass-monkey mutton-head. I held faint hope that this latest meeting would work out to my benefit. For the meeting, I traveled light, only Naomi (the Amazon) and Chaz (British SRR) watched over me.Now fathers who know me, hide their daughters. I'd earned my 'scoundrel' reputation. T. Sarangerel, OT's daughter, was in the room when Iskender ushered me in. She gave me an uncertain look, I shrugged and she smiled. It took me 3 nano seconds to figure that out, OT was scoping me out as a potential son-in-law. I was in Temujin's Inner Circle and a man who he trusted (a rarity). Any union with me would strengthen OT's clan's standing in the new regime.The genetic footprint Temujin, and his immediate family collectively, had put down in the 13th and 14th centuries CE today was vast. He needed that to make his plans for the internal reorganization of the Khanate work. The old republics would go away, to be replaced by a system akin to the Byzantine 'themes, the re-organization of regions based on the recruitment of the Tumens.The Khanate was aiming for an 'Autocratic Republic' ~ a term invented in the 19th century. My use of this terminology was based on my gut instinct, Alal's host of memories involving every form of governance, and my experience with human nature. That clued me in to what Temujin was up to, his Greater Plan. He wasn't going to form a false-front government. He was going to retain the decision-making powers and do so openly, thus 'Autocratic'.He also planned to have a bicameral legislative branch. The Upper House would be based in Tumens and bureaucratic leadership, intellectual standing, religious sects, and tribal entities. This body would be based on merit, not primogeniture. The Lower, main chamber, would be a democratically-elected assembly (aka a democratic republic) that advised him on policy matters, thus 'Republic'.All the power would remain in the Great Khan's hands and would be exercised by his genetic descendants (which some geneticists estimated as being as high as 25% of the Central Asian population.) Marrying into that extended family would be easy, the 'family' itself would have a vested interesting in supporting a state that benefited them.Men and women could exercise power in the government through marriage alliances, identical to the manner Hana was working through me. Being surrounded by very populous countries in various states of belligerence, empowering women wouldn't be an issue since every willing mind and pair of hands mattered. Outsiders who shone through could be offered a spouse and brought into the ruling elite since polygamy was permissible.In the Khanate there would be universal compulsive suffrage (everyone 18+ was legally required to vote) to decide on the representatives in the new legislative body. Everyone was expected to fight, so everyone voted. It would be modeled on the Duma of early 20th century Imperial Russia. Unlike the ill-fated Tsar Nicholas II, Temujin would be much more attentive to the voice of the people, in the Information Age, he had to.Or so I hoped. I spewed forth my ideas to OT who didn't agree, or disagree with my vision. Perhaps Temujin and I did share a bond that went beyond obligation. OT then pulled a 'Pamela'."He told me he knew immediately you were his brother when you and I shared that vision," he commented out of nowhere."His words: You (Earth and Sky) are the old. He (meaning me) is the new. He (me again) will show us the way." My, that was nice, obtuse and not at all helpful. What did OT want? My good buddy, the Great Khan, wanted to cash in on Hana's and my sudden popularity. His most pressing need remained 'time'. He needed to have a cease-fire in the wings when his offensive resumed the next day.The Earth and Sky had moved, well, the Heaven and Earth to get the Tumens and their accompanying national armies up and running after only a two day respite. Thanks to me, Manchuria was a mess. The Russians had carried out my 'Operation: Funhouse' with mixed, mostly positive results.Dozens of smaller Chinese military police units along the border went, 'inactive' was the term most often used in the media. They didn't disarm, yet they didn't fight the Russians either. They sat back and let events unfold. The issue wasn't the Chinese's willingness to fight and die for their country. It was the schizophrenic government in Beijing.The PRC didn't want to wage a war with the Russian Federation at that moment. The Khanate was the priority. There were two fundamentally incompatible courses of action favored for dealing with the Russians:One large group advocated a passive Option A: let the Russians step in and shield the three remaining provinces making up Manchuria that were still in Chinese possession. Later, China would use military, economic and political means to edge the Russians out, once the Khanate was dealt with.A sizable faction favored a more aggressive Option B: play a game of chicken with Vladimir Putin. Tell the Bear not to come across the border while threatening him with a bloody and pointless (for him) guerilla war if he did intervene. Events on the ground were not providing a lot of support for that school of thought,However, this split at the highest levels of leadership left the local and regional commanders to try and muddle through as best they could. To the local commanders defending the Amur River side of the Chinese-Russian border, common sense dictated that they not oppose the Russian crossings, because the Russian 35th Army would kill them.All their military units had gone west to the Nen River line. With no heavy weapons and little air support, the People's Armed Police (PAP) (paramilitary) and the Public Security Bureau (regular police) units would be wiped out for little gain.Russia's GRU (Military Intelligence) sweetened the pot by allowing the police units to remain armed and in formation. It could be argued that they weren't even committing treason. At any time, they could throw themselves into the battle, or form the core of a resistance movement. 'Conserving your strength' had been a hallmark of the Communist Chinese struggle against the Imperial Japanese and Nationalists forces from the 1920's until 1945 and it had served them well.For the party officials, civil authorities and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Army Air Force (PLAAF), and Army Navy (PLAN) who had gone with Option B, things weren't working out. In the north of Heilongjiang province at Morin Dawa/the Nen River line, the regional commander of the ad hoc forces facing the Khanate decided to duke it out with the Russian 36th Army as well. He was boned from the get-go.The PLAAF's overall command and control had been badly disrupted in the first few hours of The Unification War and had never fully recovered. Of the 22 air regiments that the PLAAF had started the war with in the Shenyang Military District (NE China), only 5 remained as effective formations flying, on average, a meager 20% of their original complement of advanced Shenyang J-16's, J-11's, Chengdu J-10's and Xian JH-7's aircraft.Replacing their aircraft losses meant sending up aged Shenyang J-8's (rolled out in 1980) and Nanchang Q-5's (in 1970) to fly and die in droves fighting their technologically superior Khanate foes. To add insult to injury, China's fleet of 97 Su-30MKK/MK2's (built in Russia) had suffered numerous suspicious mechanical and electronic failures, rendering them either flying coffins, or space holders in bomb-proof shelters.Furthermore, of the forces arrayed in the far north, only two of the five air regiments were responding. Two of the other three had begun displacing south into the Beijing Military District and preparing to defend the capital city. The fifth formation had another problem, North Korea (, more on that later.)In opposition to those two Chinese air regiments (roughly 60 aircraft of mixed types) stood seven complete and fresh Russian air regiments (over 400 front-line aircraft) and that didn't include the regiment and elements of the Far East Naval Aviation which was ALSO watching North Korea (, again more on that later.) The latter was of small comfort to the forces trying to hold the already compromised Nen River line.Behind those valiant troops, along the much more defensible Amur River line, the commander of the key city of Heihe sided with the Option A group and let the Russian 35th Army cross the river unopposed. By the time the PLA commanding general of the 'Nen Force' (the 69th Motorized Division and the subordinate 7th Reserve Division) figured that out, he was already in a shooting war with the Russians. So his supply lines weren't in danger, they were lost.The final indignity took place at Zalantun. The commander of the 3rd Reserve Div. had died during the attempt to recapture Zalantun. His replacement died when his helicopter was shot down as he was coming to assume command. In the absence of these officers, the divisional chief of staff told his men, including two hastily hustled forward mechanized brigades, to put down their arms. That meant 'Nen Force' was completely cut-off and surrounded.One battalion of the 36th Russian Motorized Brigade (yes, too many 36's running around) disarmed the Chinese troops while the rest, plus the 74th Independent Motorized Brigade raced for the prize, the city of Qiqihar. The last major mechanized formation of the 36th Rus. Army, the 39th MB was following them. However, instead of manning Qiqihar's defenses, the Chinese garrison in that city was waging war on its own populace.It wasn't only in Qiqihar; chaos reigned throughout Heilongjiang province. The Provincial Head of the Communist Party, Wang Xiankui, supported Option A. The Provincial Governor, Lu Hao, went with Option B. Both figures were rising stars in the PRC. Wang had ordered the still forming Reserve Divisions and the PAP units to disperse, thus avoiding any untimely confrontations with the Russians.Lu, without consulting Wang, ordered the same forces to launch a violent crackdown on all dissident forces, specifically all racial minorities. (It turned out that Lu was also a member of the Seven Pillars and his witch-hunt was aimed at getting the Earth and Sky organization operating in Heilongjiang).For the men and women on the other end of those phone conversations, there was no 'right' answer. Lest we forget, their organizations were already degraded by the Anthrax outbreak. Both men were powerful and represented China's future leadership, so if the person in charge at the ground level obeyed the wrong one, they could be assured of being roasted by the other.Some did try to do both, repress and disband at the same time. That meant that in the process of making mass arrests among an already war-fearful and plague-fearful populace, the law enforcement infrastructure began disintegrating.The problem with Lu's/7P's plan was that there was no 'revolutionary' organization to round up. That wasn't how the Earth and Sky operated in North-East China. They remained in tiny sabotage and reconnaissance cells. While they were scurrying for cover from the police crackdown, an opportunity presented itself.The afflicted minorities were getting furious with their treatment. These minorities saw themselves as loyal Chinese, yet they were being dragged out into the streets, put in detentions centers and (in a few cases) summarily executed. Being less than 10% of the overall population, resistance had never crossed their minds. It seemed all that those defenseless people could do was pray for Russian intervention forces to arrive.Within that mix of fear, betrayal and rage, the E and S discovered a way to start the dominos falling. The small, well-armed and well-trained E and S cells began ambushing police detachments. Weapons from those dead men and women were turned over to the pissed off locals before the cell went off to stalk the next police unit.Wash, rinse and repeat. It became a perverse and bloody case of wish fulfillment. Lu and the 7P's had been looking for an insurrection and they started one. Even though a miniscule portion of the population was involved, from the outside looking in, it reinforced the Putin Public Affairs initiative that portrayed Putin (and his army) as coming in to restore order to a collapsing civil system, which he was helping disrupt.From Moscow, the PRC's indecisiveness looked like Manna from Heaven. For the massive numbers of Russian soldiers riding through the Manchurian countryside, it felt like they were rolling into Arkham Asylum. Unlike the NATO countries' professional armies, Russia remained a largely conscript force whose normal term of service was only one year. These unseasoned troops could never tell if the local military, military police and police would attack until they rolled up on the Chinese units.At the start of that Day One of Operation: Funhouse, the Russian ROE (Rules of Engagement) was 'Ask and Verify'. It was tactically advantageous for the belligerent Chinese forces to lie about their intentions, then begin shooting at the Russians when they got close enough to hurt them. By Day Two, the standard front-line Russian soldier had adjusted that ROE to 'if they look at us wrong, light their asses up'. By Day Three, the officers had stopped trying to enforce Moscow's ROE orders.That was fine for the combat and rear echelon support troops because both the Chinese and Russian governments had another series of problems and they all centered around Pyongyang and Kim Jong-un's declaration that North Korea would intervene as well, without letting anyone know who he was 'intervening' against. To keep everyone guessing, the North Korean' People's Army was massing on all three borders, facing off with the PRC, Russia and South Korea. To prove his diplomatic intentions, Kim pledged to only mobilize half of his reserves, merely 4,250,000 extra men and women to go with his 950,000 strong standing army.It didn't take a military, or economic genius to realize the North Korean's chronically 'near death' economy was stampeding off a cliff. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was in the middle of an oil crisis and Kim was increasing their fuel consumption by 400% while decreasing his workforce by 10%. To put it in perspective, the US unemployment was around 6%. Now imagine that in one week's time it would become 26%. One week, no severance packages. Would the population become unsettled?But wait, it gets better. The Secret War was colliding with the Real World in more places than Manchuria. Setting aside the assassination attempt (Grrr) of Hana Sulkanen, my fiancée, six Nipponese elders (two women and four men) appeared in the personal quarters of the Japanese Prime Minister on the first full night of 'Funhouse' and relayed their urgent requests.Those six were the Head of the Six (formerly Seven) Ninja Families and they were there at, my urging. Cause I'm an idiot and requiring the deaths of Romanians in my personal crusade obviously wasn't enough. Now I was asking the Japanese Defense Forces (JDF) to pony up as well. So take a deep breath and put on the hip-waders.You might be wondering why I would want the JDF, see, there was part of Operation: Funhouse that was hitting a predictable snag, namely the Korea People's Navy Force (KPNF) and the uncertain determination of the PLAN:The KPNF's vessels were rather old, small and crappy. They also had a love affair with anything that could launch a torpedo and they listed over 700 of these floating deathtraps (only 13 of which could be classified as surface warships) and the fanatical crews to take them into battle.The PLAN's numbers were far more realistic and the fleet generally more modern. Only their North (18 surface warships) and East Fleets (22 plus 5 'elsewhere') could play any role in an upcoming FUBAR, and both fleets were heading out to sea, mainly to avoid the sporadic, but increasingly effective Khanate air strikes.The FU to be BAR'ed was the Russian Far East Fleet (RFEF) (6 warships strong, ) that had seized on this crazy idea (per my suggestion) to sail south, around the Korean peninsula so they could land elements of the 55th Guards Red Banner Marine Brigade (the 165th Marine Regiment and the 180th Marine Tank Battalion).Theoretically they were going to be the 'Southern Shielding Force' that would interpose itself between the Khanate and Beijing. It should surprise no one that the RFEF's flotilla was unequal to the task of taking their destination, the port of Qinhuangdao, by amphibious assault. Fortunately for the Gods of War (which did not include me), there were five other navies involved.Meanwhile, South Korea was having kittens because their always crazy northern kin were slathering on the insanity. (In how many Buddhist countries do people flock to the temples and pray that their neighbor attacks someone, anyone else, but them? That wasn't a religious conundrum I wanted to deal with.) N.Korea mobilizing meant S.Korea had to mobilize, which sucked down on their GNP as well.Besides, N.Korean dams and coal-powered plants kept the lights on in Seoul. Erring on the side of caution, the S. Korea (aka Republic of Korea, ROK) Army suggested calling up only one million of their three million person reserve force in order to assure Cousin Kim that this was a purely defensive gesture. It didn't work. Kim Jong-un castigated the ROK for antagonizing him, despite his declaration that he 'might' feel like invading the South in the immediate future.Into the emerging crisis, the ROK Navy could sortie nineteen small surface ships. Japan's Navy wasn't up to its old imperial standards, but could still deploy 45 surface warships. The 800 lb. gorilla in the room was the core of the 7th Fleet stationed at Yokosuka, Japan, the USS carrier George Washington and her 14 escort vessels.If the George Washington was the gorilla, RIMPAC 2014 was King Kong. 22 nations, 50 ships, including the USS carrier Ronald Reagan were engaged in war games in the Central Pacific. With them were 5 vessels of the PLAN, had Kim Jong-un just kept his mouth shut, this wouldn't have been an issue. Hell, if the Khanate had not come into existence and launched its Unification War, but he had and they did,To show the US was taking this escalation seriously (without tipping their hand that they knew about Funhouse, Carrier Strike Group One (CSG 1) (the Carl Vinson +10) was rushing across the Pacific from San Diego. CSG 3 (the John C. Stennis +2) was being assembled hastily so that they could rendezvous with CSG 1 ASAP. So many brave souls running toward the danger, sometimes I hate myself.So now does it make sense that I found myself in a room with a US Senator tasked with riding herd on me?Anyway, there were the other three navies still unaccounted for, Taiwan / the Republic of China (ROC) (22 surface ships), Vietnam (7) and the Philippines (3). Taiwanese involvement was easy to explain, the PRC refused to acknowledge them as an independent country and probably never would.The Vietnam People's Navy was tiny in both numbers and tonnage. Five of the vessels were 1960's Soviet frigates. What Vietnam did have was a huge grudge against the PRC. The PLA invaded Vietnam in 1979 and devastated the northernmost provinces, killing as many as 100,000 civilians.The PLAN had walloped the VPN in 1974 (technically South Vietnam) and again in 1988. Out in the South China Sea were two island archipelagos; the Paracel (occupied by a small PLA garrison and claimed by the PRC, Vietnam and the ROC) and Spratlys Islands (disputed by Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, the PRC, the ROC, and Vietnam).The Philippines had a grand total of three frigates (all between 50 and 70 years old). 99% of the time, they faced a hopeless struggle enforcing Philippines' South China Sea claims, except they were now experiencing that 1% where the PRC found itself in a life and death struggle. Even then, the PLAN's South Sea Fleet was hands-down the biggest player with 26 surface warships centered on the Carrier Liaoning.Except (and there always seems to be an 'except') virtually all the PLAN's naval aviation had gone off to fight the Khanate and it wasn't coming back, ever. In the air, the Philippines was next to useless. What did they have of offer in the struggle for the South China Sea? Bases. The ROC and Vietnam had much more to bring to the table.The Vietnamese People's Liberation Air Force (VPLAR) had about 50 front-line aircraft and 175 nearly obsolete models ~ the same models the PLAAF was now piloting. The ROC Air Force could put up 325 almost-new fighters that were now superior to their opponents on the mainland. Why would I give a shit?Things cascade. The Khanate Air Force took a two-day long deep breath as Putin's 'Policeman that only looks like an invading army' started their intervention. Forty-eight hours later, the Khanate started the fourth stage (the first lunge, defeat the PLA's counter-attack then the second lunge) of the campaign.Their initial air power was still skating on thin ice where maintenance was concerned. They need more time to thoroughly rest their pilots and bring all their top-flight equipment to 100% working condition. Against them, in two days the PLAAF's assets increased by over 250 fighters.In turn, the Khanate had added their constituent state air forces plus nearly 80 new cutting edge air planes and 25 drones. Phase Four saw rolling airstrikes all along the forces massing in front of the northern and central Tumens. For a few hours, the PLA thought they knew what was going on.They were wrong and this was where my meeting with OT came in. Jab with the right, cut them down with the left. The left in my case was Tibet. Yeah, Tibet. Economic value = not nearly enough. From the very start of the war, a small number of seemingly inconsequential air strikes had seriously eroded the PLA and PLAAFs combat power in the Tibetan Plateau while leaving the roads, bridges and towns intact.Common military logic dictated that the Khanate had to punch their way further east into Qinghai (to the south) and Gansu (to the north) provinces. That was where the population and industry where. Farther east were even greater numbers of people and factories and the Khanate forces in the North hadn't been strong enough to threaten to cut off the Qinghai-Gansu front. Then the Russians showed up and the Khanate forces threatening that flank doubled overnight.The PLA hastily reinforced their northern flank, using troops from their strategic reserves. The move resulted in incredible attrition by airpower to the freshly equipped formations. The PLA was about to get flanked, but not from the north. Southwest of Qinghai was Tibet. A third of the Khanate's mobile forces now swept around in a huge left haymaker to the south.My job? I needed the 'Free Tibet' forces in the US and UK to provide public and moral support to the Khanate move. As Khanate Special Forces seized crucial bottlenecks in Tibet, they needed the locals to keep their 'liberators' informed of PLA presences and undermine any attempt to create a guerilla movement.The five Tumens dedicated to being the Schwerpunkt (point of maximum effort) of this flanking maneuver were going to be on a tight timetable if they were going to surround the PLA forces in Central China.My plan was to convince the Tibetans that the PRC's 55 years of occupation was coming to an end and the Great Khan wanted to sign a 'Treaty of Mutual Respect' (my invention). This would require both the Khanate and Tibet to recognize each other's right to exist the moment a cease-fire was reached. That was it. No 'armed presence', or 'mutual defense' agreements.The treaty would be formally signed in Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, when the city was safe ~ as determined by the Central Tibetan Administration (the Tibetan Government in Exile, CTA). Riki came up with an additional sweetener and proved she was quickly adjusting to our group's extra-governmental capabilities.

Last time we spoke about the Long March. Amidst escalating conflicts, the Red Army, led by the newly empowered Mao Zedong, faced immense pressures from the Nationalist Army. Struggling through defeats and dwindling forces, they devised a bold retreat known as the Long March. Starting in October 1934, they evaded encirclement and crossed treacherous terrain, enduring heavy losses. Despite dire circumstances, their resilience allowed them to regroup, learn from past missteps, and ultimately strengthen their strategy, securing Mao's leadership and setting the stage for future successes against the KMT. During the Long March (1934-1936), the Red Army skillfully maneuvered through treacherous terrain, evading the pursuing National Revolutionary Army. Despite harsh conditions and dwindling numbers, advances and strategic ploys allowed them to cross critical rivers and unite with reinforcements. Under Mao Zedong's leadership, they faced internal struggles but ultimately preserved their unity. By journey's end, they had transformed into a formidable force, setting the stage for future victories against their adversaries and solidifying their influence in China.   #131 The Complicated Story about Xinjiang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. I've said probably too many times, but theres one last major series of events I'd like to cover before we jump into the beginning of the 15 year war between China and Japan. When I say Xinjiang I imagine there are two responses from you in the audience, 1) what the hell is Xinjiang or number 2) oh what about that place in northwest China. That pretty much sums it up, the history of this province, or region if you want to call it that is almost never spoken about. It was a place as we have seen multiple times in the series, where conflicts come and go like the weather. But in the 1930's things really heated up. What I want to talk about is collectively part of the Xinjiang Wars, but more specifically I want to talk about the Kumul Rebellion. There's really no way to jump right into this one so I am going to have to explain a bit about the history of Xinjiang.  Xinjiang in a political sense is part of China and has been the cornerstone of China's strength and prestige going back to the Han dynasty over 2000 years ago. In a cultural sense however, Xinjiang is more inline with the Muslim dominated middle-east. It's closer to th Turkic and Iranian speaking peoples of Central Asia. From a geographical point of view Xinjiang is very much on the periphery. It is very isolated from western asia by the massed ranks of the Hindu Kush, the Pamirs, the Tien Shan, the Indian Subcontinent of Karakoram, Kunlun, the Himalaya ranges and of course by the Gobi desert. It neither belongs to the east or west. As a province of China its the largest and most sparsely populated. It can be divided into two main regions, the Tarim Basin and Zungharia and then into two lesser but economically significant regions, the Ili Valley and Turgan Depression. The Tien Shan mountain range extends roughly eastward from the Pamir Massif, creating a formidable barrier between Zungharia and the Tarim Basin. This natural obstacle complicates direct communication between the two regions, particularly during winter. The Ili Valley, separated from Zungharia by a northern extension of the Tien Shan, is physically isolated from the rest of the province and can only be easily accessed from the west. This western area came under Russian control in the mid-nineteenth century and now forms part of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. Now it has to be acknowledged, since the formation of the PRC in 1949, Xinjiang changed in size and ethnic composition. The CCP drove a massive Han migrant wave over. Regardless, Han's make up a minority and according to some population statistics taken during the 1940s, Xinjiang was dominated by 7 Muslim nationalities, roughly 3.5 million people out of a total population of 3.7 million. 200,000 of these were Han settlers, while 75,000-100,000 were Mongols, Russians, Tunguzic peoples (those being Sibo, Solon and Manchu), a few Tibetans, Afghans and Indians. Among the various indigenous Muslim nationalities of Xinjiang, the Uighurs stand out as the most numerous and politically important. This Turkic-speaking group primarily consists of sedentary agriculturalists who reside in the oases of the Tarim Basin, Turfan, Kumul, and the fertile lowlands of the Hi Valley. In the late 1940s, the Uyghur population in Xinjiang was estimated to be approximately 2,941,000. Following the Uyghurs, the second-largest Muslim nationality in the region is the Kazakhs, with an estimated population of around 319,000 during the late Republican Period. Kirghiz come in third, with an estimated population of about 65,000 at the same time. Both the Kazakhs and Kirghiz in Xinjiang are nomadic Turkic-speaking peoples, with the Kazakhs primarily found in the highland areas of Zungharia and the Hi Valley, while the Kirghiz inhabit the upland pastures of the Tien Shan and Pamirs. There also exist a small group of Iranian-speaking 'Mountain' Tajiks living in the upland Sarikol region in the far southwest, with an estimated population of 9,000 in the mid-1940s; a primarily urban group of Uzbeks residing in larger oasis towns and cities of the Tarim Basin, numbering approximately 8,000 in the mid-1940s; and a smaller group of Tatars settled mainly in Urumqi and the townships near the Xinjiang-Soviet border, estimated at 5,000 during the same period. Lastly, it is important to mention the Hui, a group of Chinese-speaking Muslims dispersed throughout China, particularly in Zungharia and Kumul within Xinjiang, as well as in the neighboring northwestern provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia. Known as 'Tungan' in Xinjiang, the Hui population was estimated at around 92,000 in the mid-1940s and held significant political and military influence during the Republican Period. Excluding the Ismaili Tajik's of Sarikol, the Muslim population of Xinjiang, whether Turkic or Chinese speaking, are Sunni following the orthodox of Hanafi Madhhab.  As for the non Muslim population, excluding the Mongols who numbered roughly 63,000 and inhabit a narrow strip of land along the northeastern frontier between Xinjiang and the Mongolian People's Republic, Tien Shan, Ili Vally and Chuguchak, most were newcomers, migrants from the mid 18th century while the region was being conquered. Again according to the same statistics from the 1940s I mentioned, Hans represented 3-4 % of the population. Although the Han population disproportionately held power with the main administrative areas, they had no sizable territorial enclaves. The Han population can basically be divided into 5 groups; descendants of exiled criminals and political offenders; Hunanese settlers who came over after Zuo Zungtang's conquests; Tientsin merchants who were supplying Zuo's army; Shanxi caravaneers who came to trade and Gansu colonists. Lastly there were the Tunguzic Peoples and Russians. The Tunguzic speaking Sibo, Solon and Manchu settled mostly in the Ili region. The Russians also tended to live in the Ili region. These were mostly White Russian refugees from the civil war.  Xinjiang's first Republican governor was Yang Zengxin, a Yunnanese native. He had previously worked as the district magistrate in Gansu and Ningxia earning a reputation as a good manager of the local Tungan Muslim population. In 1908 he was transferred to Xinjiang and quickly found himself promoted to by the last Qing governor of Xinjiang. He held out his post after the Xinhai revolution and quelled a Urumqi rebellion soon after. Yang Zengxin's survived politically by always siding with whichever faction he thought was winning. For example in 1917, President Li Yuanghong dispatched Fan Yaonan to watch over Yang and try to replace him if possible. Yang recognized quickly whichever Warlord faction held power over the Beiyang government should be courted. Thus Yang held out for a long time and his province was comparably peaceful compared to most of warlord era China. To maintain his power, Yang enacted a divide and rule style, trying to placate the conflicts between certain groups within Xinjiang, but made sure to exclude Russian influence. Basically Yang tried his best to keep groups who could come into conflict away from each other, keeping the Uyghurs of southern Xinjiang away from the pastoral nomads of Zungharia and Tien Shan. Above all Yang considered the Bolshevik Russians to be the greatest threat to his regime, in his words “The Russians ... aimed at ... isolating the country from all outside influence, and at maintaining it in a state of medieval stagnation, thus removing any possibility of conscious and organised national resistance. As their religious and educational policy, the Russian administrators sought to preserve the archaic form of Islam and Islamic culture. . . Quranic schools of the most conservative type were favoured and protected against any modernist influence”. During his 16 year of power, Yang established himself as a competent autocrat, a mandarin of the old school and quite the capable administrator. Yet his economic policies were long term exploitative causing hardship and exhausting the province. Yang realized he was reached the threshold of what the population was willing to endure and endeavored to allow corruption to emerge within his administration provided it remained within acceptable limits. IE: did not spring forward a Muslim revolution. He opened junior positions in the administration to Muslims which had a duel effect. It made the Muslim community feel like they were part of greater things, but placed said officials in the path of the populations anger, insulating senior Han officials. Ironically it would be his fellow Han Chinese officials who would become angry with him. Some were simply ambitious of his power, others felt that Xinjiang should be more closely inline with China proper.  Rumors have it that after a dinnr party, Yang deliberately surrounded himself with opium addicts, stating to his subordinates “the inveterate opium smoker thinks more of his own comfort and convenience than of stirring up unrest among his subordinates”. Needless to say, Yang later years saw him seriously alienating senior officials. By 1926 he claimed “to have created an earthly paradise in a remote region” so he seemed to be quite full of himself. That same year he turned against his Tungan subordinates. He accused many of conspiring with Ma Qi, a Tungan warlord of Xuning in Qinghai, whom he also thought were driven by Urumqi. Deprived of his formerly loyal Tungans, Yang found himself increasingly isolated. A expedition was sent to Urumqi in 1926, whr G. N Roerich noted “The Governor's residence consisted of several well-isolated buildings and enclosed courtyards. The gates were carefully guarded by patrols of heavily armed men ... The Governor's yamen seemed to us to be in a very dilapidated condition. The glass in many of the windows on the ground floor was broken and dirty papers and rags had been pasted on the window frames. Numerous retainers roamed about the courtyards and villainous bodyguards, armed with mauser pistols, were on duty at the entrance to the yamen.” It seems likely Yang had decided to leave Xinjiang at that point. He had amassed a immense personal fortune and sent much of it to his family in China proper and also to Manila where he had a bank account. Further evidence of this was provided by Mildred Cable and Francesca French, two members of the China inland Mission who reported 'Wise old Governor Yang ... as early as 1926 ... quietly arranged a way of escape for his family and for the transference of his wealth to the security of the British Concession in Tientsin. Later in the same year, accompanied by several 'luggage cases of valuables', Yang's eldest son was sent out of Sinkiang, travelling incognito, in the company of these missionaries”. It was also at this time Yang erectd a statue of himself in th public gardens at Urumqi. According to Nicholas Roerich, this memorial was paid for with forced contributions 'from the grateful population'; by all accounts the statue was in execrable taste . While the NRA was marching upon Beijing in June of 1928, Yang ordered the KMT flag to be raised in Xinjiang. This gesture indicated to all, Yang was about to depart the province. One of Yang's most dissident subordinates, a Han named Fan Yaonan decided to act. Fan Yaonan was an ambitious modernist who received his education in Japan and someone Yang distruste from day one. Fan was appointed the post of Taoyin of Aksu by the Beijing government, an appointment Yang could have easily ingored, but was grudgingly impressd by Fans abilities. Fan proved himself very useful to Yang and was soon promoted to the Taoyin of Urumqi alongside becoming the Xinjiang Provincial Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. It seems Fan and Yang mutually disliked each other. At some point in 1926 Fan got together with a small group of like minded officials, such as the engineer at Urumqi's telegraph station and the Dean of the local school of Law, and Fan told them he wanted to assasinate Yang. Some believe Fan sought to gain favor with the KMT as motivation. Regardless on July 7th of 1928, 6 days after Yang took the post of Chairman of the Xinjiang Provincial Government under the KMT, Fan attacked. On that day, Yang was invited to a banquet to celebrate a graduation ceremony at the Urumqi law school. Fan had arranged the banquet, with 18 soldiers present, disguised as waiters wearing “red bands around their arms and Browning pistols in their sleeves”. During the meal, Fan proposed a toast to the health of Yang at which time “shots rang outsimultaneously, all aimed at the Governor. Seven bulletsin all were fired, and all reached their mark. Yang, mortally wounded, but superb in death, glared an angry defiance at his foes, 'who dares do this?' he questioned in the loud voice which had commanded instant obedience for so many years. Then he fell slowly forward, his last glance resting upon the face of the trusted Yen, as though to ask forgiveness that he had not listened to the advice so often given to him”. According to Yan Tingshan who was also wounded, Fan Yaonan finished Yang Zengxin off with two shots personally. After the assassination, whereupon 16 people were killed or wounded, Fan went to Yang official residence and seized the seals of office. He then sent a letter summonig Jin Shujen, the Commissioner for Civil Affairs in Xinjiang and Yang's second in command. Jin called Fan's bluff and refusing to come, instead sending soldiers to arrest the assassin. It seems Fan greatly miscalculated his personal support as a short gun battle broke out and he was arrested by Jin and shortly thereafter executed with his complices on July 8th. And thus, Jin Shujen found himself succeeding Yang, a less able man to the job. Jin Shujen was a Han Chinese from Gansu. He graduated from the Gansu provincial academy and served for a time as the Principal of a Provincial normal school. He then entered the Imperial Civil Service, where he came to the attention of Yang, then working as the district Magistrate at Hozhou. Yang took him on as district magistrate and Jin rose through the ranks. By 1927 Jin became the Provincial Commissioner for Civil Affairs at Urumqi. After executing Fan, Jin sent a telegram to Nanjing seeking the KMT's official recognition of his new role. Nanjing had no real options, it was fait accompli, they confirmed Jin into office and under the new KMT terminology he was appointed Provincial Chairman and commander-in-chief. In other words an official warlord.  Following his seizure of power, Jin immediately took steps to secure his newfound power. His first step was to double the salaries of the secret police and army. He also expanded the military and acquired new weaponry for them. Politically, Jin maintained the same old Qing policies Yang did, pretty much unchanged. Jin did however replace many of the Yunnanese followers under Yang with Han CHinese from Gansu. Jins younger brother, Jin Shuxin was appointed Provincial Commissioner for military affairs at Urumqi and his other brother Jin Shuqi was given the senior military post at Kashgar. His personal bodyguard member Zu Chaoqi was promoted to Brigade Commander at Urumqi. Jin maintained and expanded upon Yang's system of internal surveillance and censorship, like any good dictator would. According to H. French Ridley of the China Inland Mission at Urumqi “people were executed for 'merely making indiscreet remarks in the street during ordinary conversation”. Jin also introduced a system of internal passports so that any journey performing with Xinjiang required an official passport validation by the Provincial Chairman's personal seal, tightening his security grip and of course increasing his official revenue. Travel outside Xinjiang became nearly impossible, especially for Han officials and merchants seeking trade with China proper.  Under Jin Xinjiang's economy deteriorated while his fortune accumulated. Yang had introduced an unbacked paper currency that obviously fell victim to inflation and Jin upted the anty. Within a process of several stages, he expanded the currency, causing further inflation. Under Yang the land taxes had been a serious source of the provincial revenue, but Yang was not foolish enough to squeeze the Turkic peasantry too hard, he certainly was intelligent enough to thwart peasant revolts. Jin however, not so smart, he tossed caution to the win and doubled the land taxes, way past what would be considered the legal amount. Jin also emulated Ma Fuxiang, by establishing government monopolies over various profitable enterprises, notably the gold mine at Keriya and Jade mine at Khotan. He also monopolized the wool and pelt industry, using his police and army to force the sale of lambskins at a mere 10% of their market value. Just as with Yang's regime, wealth flowed out of the province in a continuous stream, straight into banks within China proper. According to George Vasel, a German engineer and Nazi agent hired to construct airfields in Gansu during the early 1930s, he knew a German pilot named Rathje who was secretly employed by Jin to fly a million dollars worth of gold bullion from Urumqi to Beijing. Jin did his best to keep all foreign influence out of Xinjiang and this extended also to KMT officials from China proper. Jin also of course did his best to conceal his corrupt regime from Nanjing. For all intensive purposes Jin treated Xinjiang like a feudal, medieval society. He tried to limit external trade to only be through long distance caravans. All was fine and dandy until Feng Yuxiang occupied Gansu and thus disrupted the traditional trade routes. Alongside this the Soviets had just constructed a new railroad linking Frunze, the capital of Kirghiz with Semipalatinsk in western siberia. This railroad known as the Turksib was aimed primarily to develop western Turkstan, integrating it within the new soviet system. The railroad was constructed 400 miles away from the Xinjiang frontier, on purpose to limit any activities with capitalists. When the railway was completed in 1930 it virtually strangled Xinjiang. China's share of Xinjiang's market dropped by 13% and the value of trade with the Soviets which had dropped to zero since the Russian civil war was not rising past 32 million roubles by 1930. The Soviet trade gradually was seizing a monopoly over Xinjiang and this of course affected the merchants and workers who were unable to compete. The revenue of the merchants and workers declined as new taxes were levied against them. Meanwhile alongside an increase in Soviet trade, the new railway also increased Soviet political influence over Xinjiang. It was also much faster and easier to travel from China proper to Xinjiang via Vladivostok, the trans-siberian railway and Turksib than across the North-West roads of China. For the Turkic speaking Muslims of Xinjiang, it was quite impressive and many wanted to do business and mingle with the Soviets. However to do so required a visa, and thus KMT officials in Nanjing held the keys. Jin's policies towards the Turkic Muslims, Tungans and Mongols were extremely poor from the very beginning. It seems Jin held prejudice against Muslims, some citing bad experiences with them in Gansu. Whatever the case may be, Jin rapidly antagonized both his Turkic speaking and Tungan Muslim citizens by introducing a tax on the butchering of all animals in Xinjiang and forbidding Muslims to perform the Hajj to Mecca. Some point out he did that second part to thwart a loophole on leaving Xinjiang for trade. Obviously the Muslim majority of Xinjiang and the military powerhouse of Torgut Mongols in the Tien Shan bitterly resented Jin. Despite wide scale hostility against him, the first challenges at his autocratic rule came not from various minority groups, but some ambitious Han officers under his command. Palpatin would say it was ironic.  In May of 1929 the Taoyin of Altai attempted a coup against Jin, but he was forewarned and able to confine the fighting to the Shara Sume area. In the spring of 1931 troubles broke out in Urumqi as discontented Han officers and soldiers attacked Jin's yamen. The attack failed, and the instigators of the plot were all executed. The same year, Jin annexed the Kumul Khanate, known to the Chinese as Hami, finally pushing the Turkic speaking Muslims into open rebellion. Going back in time, after Zuo Zengtangs reconquest of Xinjiang in the 1870s, a few local principalities were permitted to survive on a semi-autonomous basis. Of these Kumul was the most important and was ruled by a royal family dating back to the Ming Dynasty and descended from the Chaghatay Khans. The Khanate of Kumul dominated the chief road from Xinjiang to China proper and was therefore of strategic importance to the Chinese. It extended from Iwanquan northwards to the Barkul Tagh and along the mountains to Bai and south to Xingxingxia along the Xinjiang-Gansu border. During the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, Maqsud Shah was sitting on the throne of Kumul. He was known to the Chinese as the Hami Wang, to his subjects as Khan Maqsud or Sultan Maqsud and to Europeans as the King of the Gobi. He was the last independent Khan of Central Asia as the rest were tossing their lot in with the progress of the times. During Yangs regime he was content with allowing Kumul to train its semi autonomous status, mostly because Maqsud Shah was very friendly towards the Chinese. He spoke Turkic with a marked Chinese accent and wore Chinese clothes. On the other hand he had a long whit beard and always wore a turban or Uyghur cap. He was a staunch Muslim ruling a petty oasis kingdom from an ancient and ramshackle palace in Kumul proper, one of three towns making up the capital of Kumul, known to the Chinese as Huicheng. He had a bodyguard consisting of 40 Chinese soldiers armed with mausers and had a Chinese garrison billeted in fortified Chinese town. The third city in his domain was known as New City or Xincheng, populated by a mix of Chinese and Turkic peoples. By 1928, shortly after the assassination of Yang, it was estimated Maqsud Shah ruled over roughly 25,000-30,000 Kumulliks. He was responsible for levying taxes, dispensing justice and so forth. His administration rested upon 21 Begs, 4 of whom were responsible for Kumul itself, 5 others over plains villages and the other 12 over mountain regions of Barkul and Karlik Tagh. Maqsud Shah also maintained a Uyghur militia who had a reputation as being better trained than its Chinese counterpart at Old City. Throughout Yangs regime, Kumul remained relatively peaceful and prosperous. Maqsud Shah paid a small annual tribute to Urumqi and in return the Xinjiang government paid him a formal subsidy of 1200 silver taels a year. Basically this was Yang paying for the Sultans compliance when it came to moving through his strategic Khanate. For the Uyghurs of Kumul, they were free from the typical persecution under Chinese officials. The only tax paid by citizens of Kumul was in livestock, generally sheep or goats, given annually to the Khan. The soil of the oasis was rich and well cultivated. Everything was pretty fine and dandy under Yang, but now was the time of Jin. In March of 1930, Maqsud Shah died of old age. His eldest son Nasir should have inherited the throne of Kumul, but Jin and his Han subordinates stationed in Kumul Old City had other plans. Shortly after Maqsud Shah's death, Nasir traveled to Urumqi, most likely to legitimize his rise upon the throne. Nasir was not very popular amongst his people, thus it seemed he needed Jin's aid to bolster him. However there also was the story that it was Jin who ordered Nasir to come to Urumqi to perform a formal submission. Now at the time of Maqsud Shah's death, Li Xizeng, a Han Chinese divisional commander stationed in Kumul suggested to Jin that the Khanate should be abolished and annexed officially. There was of course a great rationale for this, if Jin took control over Kumul it would offer increased revenue and new positions for his Han Chinese officials. Thus Jin ordered a resolution be drawn up by his ministers to abolish the Khanate, dividing Kumul into three separate administrative districts, Hami centered around the capital, I-ho and I-wu. When Nasir arrived in Urumqi he was given the new position of Senior Advisor to the provincial government, but forbidden to return to Kumul. Basically it was the age old government via hostage taking. Meanwhile another official named Yulbars was sent back to Kumul with a group of Chinese officials to set up the new administration.  While the people of Kumul had no love for Nasir and were taxed pretty heavily by his father, this did not mean that they wanted the Khanate to end. For the Turkic Muslims the Khanate held a religious significance. For Uyghurs there was a question of national pride associated with it. Of course there were economic issues. Within Xinjiang Han were allowed to settle, but in the Khanate there were restrictions. In the words of the Nanjing Wu Aichen on the situation “subject peoples obstinately prefer self-government to good government”. Well Jin's government was definitely not good, so what outcome does that give? The newly appointed Han administration upset the people of Kumul from the very minute of its installation. When it was announced the privilege of being except from direct taxation by Urumqi was to be abolished, ompf. To add insult to injury, one years arrears of taxes were to be collected from the Uyghurs. On top of that, Kumul was tossed wide open to Han settlers who were incentivized to settle by giving them a tax exemption for two years. Yeah that be some wild policies. To add even more misery, Kumul being situated on the chief road from northwestern Gansu to Xinjiang saw an enormous flow of refugees from famine and warfare going on in Gansu. A column of these refugees were seen by Berger Bohlin of the Sino-Swedish Expedition of 1931. His account is as follows “During my stay at Hua-hai-tze I witnessed a curious spectacle. The Chen-fan region had for a number of years been visited by failure of the crops and famine, and large numbers of people therefore emigrated to more prosperous tracts. Such an emigration-wave now passed Hua-hai-tze. It consisted of a caravan of 100 camels, transporting 150 persons with all their baggage to Sinkiang, where it was said that land was being thrown open”. It seemed to Bohlin that the refugees looked carefree and happy and that the ruler of Xinjiang, Jin Shujen, a Gansu man himself was enthusiastic to have them come settle his province. Jin had his official in charge of I-ho district Lung Xulin provide land for the would-be settlers coming from Gansu. Lung Xulin responded by forcing his Uyghur population to leave their cultivated land and simply handed it over to the refugees. The expropriated Uyghurs were compensated for their land by being given untilled lands on the fringe of the desert where most soil was barren. The Uyghurs were also assessed for their land tax based on their old holdings. To make this even worse hear this, untilled land was exempt from taxation for two years, so they didn't even get that, while the Gansu refugees were excused from tax payments for three years. So yeah the Kumul people quickly organized a petition and sent it to the yamen in Urumqi. There was zero acknowledgement from the yamen it was received and nothing was done to address the long list of grievances, especially from the Uyghurs. Instead the Gansu settlers kept flooding in and with them the price of food skyrocketed, largely because of the enormous amount of provincial troops sent in to watch over everybody. Now for the moment the Turkic speaking Muslims in the region remained relatively peaceful, and this perhaps lulled Jin into a false sense of security. But according to Sven Hedin of the Sino-Swedish Expedition “Discontent increased; the people clenched their teeth and bided their time; the atmosphere was tense and gloomy. Inflammable matter accumulated, and only a spark was needed to fire the powder magazine.”  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The history of Xinjiang is unbelievably bizarre, complicated and quite frankly really fun. Before researching this I had no idea about anything and am really enjoying this as I write it. The next episode is going to be on the Kumul Rebellion, so buckle up buckaroo. 

Episode Description Episode Description Sign up to receive this Unreached of the Day podcast sent to you:  https://unreachedoftheday.org/resources/podcast/ People Group Summary: https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/18692/CH #PrayforZERO is a podcast Sponsor.         https://prayforzero.com/ Take your place in history! We could be the generation to translate God's Word into every language. YOUR prayers can make this happen.  Take your first step and sign the Prayer Wall to receive the weekly Pray For Zero Journal:  https://prayforzero.com/prayer-wall/#join Pray for the largest Frontier People Groups (FPG): Visit JoshuaProject.net/frontier#podcast provides links to podcast recordings of the prayer guide for the 31 largest FPGs.  Go31.org/FREE provides the printed prayer guide for the largest 31 FPGs along with resources to support those wanting to enlist others in prayer for FPGs

This week we discussed an excellent study of migrant workers in the Soviet Union which focused on Uzbeks, Tajiks, Georgians, Azerbaijanis who came to Leningrad and Moscow in toward the end of Union's existence.Sahadeo, Jeff. 2019. Voices From the Soviet Edge: Southern Migrants in Leningrad and Moscow.Send us a Text Message.Support the Show.

Vice President Kamala Harris closes in on the Democratic Party's nomination as enough delegates pledge to endorse her. Ahead of the Paris Olympics, French police forge deeper ties with Tajiks in the wake of two major attacks authorities say were carried out by Tajik members of ISIS-K. And Kamala Harris' campaign embraces her meme status. Sign up for the Reuters Econ World newsletter here. Listen to the Reuters Econ World podcast here. Recommended read here. Visit the Thomson Reuters Privacy Statement for information on our privacy and data protection practices. You may also visit megaphone.fm/adchoices to opt out of targeted advertising. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

GOOD EVENING. The show begins on Saipan Island in the Northern Marianas, at the 80th anniversary of the US Marine, Army and Navy landing on the beaches and defeating the Imperial Japanese Army garrison in 24 days of savage combat. To Kabul and Dushanbe, to Moscow and LA and Philly and NYC, to Rostov-on-Don, all to gather clues from ISIS members and/or Tajiks. To Lebanon, Israel, Gaza. To the South China Sea, to Hezbollah in Beirut. To Havana Harbor, to LEO. To Havana and Caracas and Brasilia. To the White House. 1944 Red Beach, saipan

1/2: #AlQaeda: #ISIS: FBI detains 8 Tajiks in LA, Philadelphia and New York & What is to be done? Bill Roggio, FDD https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/11/us/tajik-nationals-arrested-terror-ties-probe/index.html 1872 Tajikistan

2/2: #AlQaeda: #ISIS: FBI detains 8 Tajiks in LA, Philadelphia and New York & What is to be done? Bill Roggio, FDD https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/11/us/tajik-nationals-arrested-terror-ties-probe/index.html 1900 Khyber Pass

Two former chiefs of the U.S. Border Patrol join Parsing Immigration Policy this week on the occasion of the agency's 100th anniversary. Rodney Scott and Mark Morgan join host Mark Krikorian discuss how, despite a century of government policies that have often made it harder to secure the border, the Border Patrol has always remained committed to protecting America's national security. Morgan emphasizes that “bad politics, the lack of political courage, strength, and will decade after decade has made the Border Patrol's job more difficult…but yet somehow they still are able to succeed.”The Biden administration has leveraged Americans' compassion for migrants to promote policies that hinder the Border Patrol's ability to do its job. One such policy is the elimination of rapid DNA testing, which helps agents in identifying human traffickers. The mass influx of illegal immigrants that started in 2021 has overwhelmed the Border Patrol, preventing them from engaging in preventive measures like rigorously interviewing suspicious migrants. This situation has led to the departure of many experienced agents and has hindered the training of new agents to address potential national security threats at the border. Morgan and Scott emphasize that illegal immigration is not a victimless crime, underscoring that Border Patrol agents are not motivated by racism or any other nefarious motives; rather, they are safeguarding American national security and the integrity of the legal immigration system.Going forward, Morgan and Scott stress the importance of improving transparency at the border to pressure politicians to provide resources and policies that will improve border security.In his closing commentary, Mark Krikorian, the Center's Executive Director and podcast host, discusses the eight Tajikistani nationals – all of whom crossed the Southern border and were then released – who were recently arrested on terrorism charges. The vetting process failed to detect these Tajiks' terrorist ties, and once these ties were discovered, the fact that these foreign nationals were not detained allowed them to disappear into the country. Border security is ultimately a matter of national security, and cases like this showcase the limitations of vetting and the importance of detention.HostMark Krikorian is the Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies.GuestsRodney Scott is a former Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol.Mark Morgan is a former Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol.RelatedSix Suspected Terrorists with ISIS Ties Arrested in Sting OperationBiden Ends DNA Testing at the BorderIntro MontageVoices in the opening montage:Sen. Barack Obama at a 2005 press conference.Sen. John McCain in a 2010 election ad.President Lyndon Johnson, upon signing the 1965 Immigration Act.Booker T. Washington, reading in 1908 from his 1895 Atlanta Exposition speech.Laraine Newman as a "Conehead" on SNL in 1977.Hillary Clinton in a 2003 radio interview.Cesar Chavez in a 1974 interview.House Speaker Nancy Pelosi speaking to reporters in 2019.Prof. George Borjas in a 2016 C-SPAN appearance.Sen. Jeff Sessions in 2008 comments on the Senate floor.Charlton Heston in "Planet of the Apes".

PREVIEW: #AL QAEDA: #FBI: Conversation with colleague Bill Roggio of what is known about  unconnected events: FBI arresting 8 Tajiks, some of whom crossed into the US on the Southern Border; Al Qaeda promoting training camps in Afghanistan; Al Qaeda leadership residence in Iran -- and the long lag between Al Qaeda operations.  More tonight. 1872 Tajikistan

Russian security forces arrested several Tajik citizens in the wake of the March 22 attack on the Crocus City Hall outside Moscow that left more than 140 dead, claiming they were the perpetrators of the massacre. The news touched off a wave of xenophobia against Central Asian migrant laborers in Russia, with most of the suspicion and hostility directed toward ethnic Tajiks. This overt racism is also spilling over into Tajik-Russian relations. Joining host Bruce Pannier to discuss these matters and more are Edward Lemon, a professor at Texas A&M University and president of the Oxus Society for Central Asia; and Salimjon Aioubov, director of RFE/RL's Tajik Service.

HOUR 1Ukraine launches its counter-offensive against Russia  / (NYT) https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/06/05/world/russia-ukraine-newsChina warship cuts off American warship / (CBS) https://www.cbsnews.com/video/chinese-warship-cuts-off-us-navy-vessel-as-tensions-between-countries-escalate/China is our greatest threat says Congressman Dusty Johnson (R-SD) / (FOXNews) https://www.foxnews.com/world/chinas-defense-minister-says-war-us-would-unbearable-disaster Robert Kennedy was killed 55 years ago / (NPR)https://www.npr.org/2023/06/05/1179430014/robert-kennedy-rfk-assassination-anniversaryEast Turkistan's Prime Minister Salih Hudayar joins Tom with an update on the Chinese subjugation of the Uyghurs (Turkic-speaking Muslims from the Central Asian region). The Uyghurs are the largest population in the region and the most severely persecuted Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, including the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, and Hui. Support them here:  https://east-turkistan.net/leadership/US birth rate falls to lowest number in 32 years / (FOXNews) https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/american-birth-rate-plummeting-not-some-statesHOUR 2Tom and Charles discuss America's birthrate - is a decline good or badNevada's lawmakers decide whether to offer up to $380 million in public funds to help build a baseball stadium in Las Vegas for the Athletics / (MB) https://www.morningbrew.com/daily/stories/2023/06/04/nevada-public-financing-athletics-stadium?Edward Snowden has been in Russia for over 10 years while U.S. tech laws have changed / (NPR) https://www.npr.org/2023/06/04/1176747650/a-decade-on-edward-snowden-remains-in-russia-though-u-s-laws-have-changedHomeless Clean-Slate Strategy Townhall meeting in Anchorage / (ANS) https://www.alaskasnewssource.com/2023/06/03/town-hall-held-clean-slate-strategy-permanent-homeless-shelter/California spent $17 Billion on homelessness / (WSJ) https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-homeless-population-oakland-wood-street-encampment-78d42cc3?mod=hp_lead_pos7Chuck Todd retires from Meet the Press / (NBC) https://www.nbcnews.com/news/chuck-todd-will-depart-nbcs-meet-press-kristen-welker-become-host-rcna87618

In mid-May 2022, the Tajik government initiated a brutal crackdown on the people of eastern Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO): the Pamiris. Pamiris are ethnically and culturally distinct from Tajiks; and unlike most Tajiks who are Sunni Muslims, Pamiris are Shi'ite. Dozens of Pamiris have been killed, more than 100 imprisoned, and over the course of the last year, there has been a systematic destruction of Pamiri culture in GBAO. Joining host Bruce Pannier to look at the repressive targeting of Pamiris are guests Suzanne Levi-Sanchez, author of the book Bridging State And Civil Society: Informal Organizations In Tajik/Afghan Badakhshan and Bakhtiyor Safarov, founder of Central Asia Consulting in the United States, who is originally from the GBAO region of Tajikistan.

I choose to love you in silence… For in silence, I find no rejection, I choose to love you in loneliness… For in loneliness no one owns you but me, I choose to adore you from a distance… For distance will shield me from pain, I choose to kiss you in the wind… For the wind is gentler than my lips, I choose to hold you in my dreams… For in my dreams, you have no end.--Yesterday I was clever, so I wanted to change the world. Today I am wise, so I am changing myself.--This place is a dream.  Only a sleeper considers it real.  Then death comes like dawn, and you wake up laughing at what you thought was your grief.-- Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī (Persian: جلال‌الدین محمد رومی), also known as Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Balkhī (جلال‌الدین محمد بلخى), Mevlânâ/Mawlānā (مولانا, "our master"), Mevlevî/Mawlawī (مولوی, "my master"), and more popularly simply as Rumi (30 September 1207 – 17 December 1273), was a 13th-century Persian poet, Hanafi faqih, Islamic scholar, Maturidi theologian, and Sufi mystic originally from Greater Khorasan in Greater Iran. Rumi's influence transcends national borders and ethnic divisions: Iranians, Tajiks, Turks, Greeks, Pashtuns, other Central Asian Muslims, and the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent have greatly appreciated his spiritual legacy for the past seven centuries. His poems have been widely translated into many of the world's languages and transposed into various formats. Rumi has been described as the "most popular poet" and the "best selling poet" in the United States. Like other mystic and Sufi poets of Persian literature, Rumi's poetry speaks of love which infuses the world. Rumi's teachings also express the tenets summarized in the Quranic verse which Shams-e Tabrizi cited as the essence of prophetic guidance: "Know that ‘There is no god but He,' and ask forgiveness for your sin" (Q. 47:19). In the interpretation attributed to Shams, the first part of the verse commands the humanity to seek knowledge of tawhid (oneness of God), while the second instructs them to negate their own existence. In Rumi's terms, tawhid is lived most fully through love, with the connection being made explicit in his verse that describes love as "that flame which, when it blazes up, burns away everything except the Everlasting Beloved." Rumi believed passionately in the use of music, poetry and dance as a path for reaching God. For Rumi, music helped devotees to focus their whole being on the divine and to do this so intensely that the soul was both destroyed and resurrected. It was from these ideas that the practice of whirling Dervishes developed into a ritual form. His teachings became the base for the order of the Mevlevi, which his son Sultan Walad organised. Rumi encouraged Sama, listening to music and turning or doing the sacred dance. In the Mevlevi tradition, samāʿ represents a mystical journey of spiritual ascent through mind and love to the Perfect One. In this journey, the seeker symbolically turns towards the truth, grows through love, abandons the ego, finds the truth and arrives at the Perfect. The seeker then returns from this spiritual journey, with greater maturity, to love and to be of service to the whole of creation without discrimination with regard to beliefs, races, classes and nations. Here are a collection of short poetic phrases from Rumi done in the form of a meditation. Welcome to the Reality Revolution.#rumi #poetry #beauty #meditation #guidedmeditation #manifestation #lawofattraction #quantumjump    Buy My Art - Unique Sigil Magic and Energy Activation Through Flow Art and Voyages Through Space and Imagination. https://www.newearth.art/ BUY MY BOOK! https://www.amazon.com/Reality-Revolution-Mind-Blowing-Movement-Hack/dp/154450618X/ Listen to my book on audible https://www.audible.com/pd/The-Reality-Revolution-Audiobook/B087LV1R5V The New Earth Activation trainings  https://realityrevolutioncon.com/newearth Alternate Universe Reality Activationhttps://realityrevolutionlive.com/aura45338118  Like us on Facebook https://www.facebook.com/The-Reality-Revolution-Podcast-Hosted-By-Brian-Scott-102555575116999 Join our Facebook group The Reality Revolution https://www.facebook.com/groups/523814491927119 Contact us at media@advancedsuccessinstitute.com For coaching – https://www.advancedsuccessinstitute.com For all episodes of the Reality Revolution – https://www.therealityrevolution.com Subscribe to my Youtube channel https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCOgXHr5S3oF0qetPfqxJfSw    Music By Mettaversedeeply divine meditationregenerative spiritual resetmind and spirit rebootthe shiftinto the arms of the cosmosscacred frequenciesawakening  the light holdersovertonesmental and spiritual rejuvenationcosmic riverthe shift ➤ Their channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCyvjffON2NoUvX5q_TgvVkw

This week we take a look at a former Security Services Cheif of Kazakhstan on trial for treason, Russian pressure on Astana to lower the price of grain, Kyrgyzstan cracking down on the free press, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan approving a huge water deal, China stepping up its military coordination with Tajikistan, accusations of the Tajiks getting involved in Ukraine war, and Turkmenistan demand Turkmens return home for the census, whilst also trapping other at home. But first, we turn to the big story in the region this week The Presidential Elections in Kazakhstan and the reelection of Tokayev. Joining us this week: - Aigerim Toleukhanova (Eurasianet) Follow the show on @SLofCentralAsia Follow Oxus on @OxusSociety Follow Michael on @MikeHilliardAus For more info please visit - www.oxusosciety.org

This week we take a look at Kazakhstan pushing back on Russia's referendum, Kazakhstan is changing the name of its capital, a demilitarisation deal unfolding in the region, Russian troops being pulled out of Tajikistan, persecution of ethnic Tajiks, A Russian payment system being cut off, Turkey cancelling Turkmen visas nationwide, and the fallout from the recent fighting in the Batken region.  On the show this week: - Steve Swerdlow (Uni of Southen California) Follow the show on @SLonCentralAsia Follow Oxus on @OxusSociety Follow Michael on @MikeHilliardAus For more info, please visit - www.oxussociety.org

In this episode, we travel to Rumi's land, the land of magic and mysticism. A place where scenic blue lakes crystal clearly reflects the scraping mountains, where hospitality is beyond anything one can even imagine - The land of the Tajiks, Tajikistan!! This age-old Tajik folktale reminds us to value family and the true importance of the people we love. Listen, enjoy and share. ______________________ Social Media: Instagram: ohhfolk_podcast | Twitter: OhhFolk_Podcast | Facebook: OhhFolk | ______________________ Credits: *Original music score (intro, outro, primarily show beds) by Abhishek Papan Dutt | *All SFX and additional ambiance music pieces - https://freesound.org/ (Please donate and help if you are using their resource) | *A version of this story can be found in the book - The Sandalwood box: folk tales from Tadzhikistan (https://archive.org/details/sandalwoodboxfol00balt/page/18/mode/2up) --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/shilpa-dasgupta/message Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/shilpa-dasgupta/support

In this episode, M.O.N.K. takes a deep dive into the works of Rumi! Rumi (30 September 1207 – 17 December 1273), was a 13th-century Persian poet, Islamic scholar, theologian, and Sufi mystic originally from Greater Khorasan in Greater Iran. Rumi's influence transcends national borders and ethnic divisions: Iranians, Tajiks, Turks, Greeks, Pashtuns, other Central Asian Muslims, and the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent have greatly appreciated his spiritual legacy for the past seven centuries. His poems have been widely translated into many of the world's languages and transposed into various formats. Rumi has been described as the "most popular poet"and the "best selling poet" in the United States. So sit back, relax and enjoy as we read some of his mind-blowing lines. Pay special attention to the themes that God is in your midst and you are the vessel through which the divine wishes to express itself. *** Pick up the Book: Reclaiming the Man. You can connect with everything going on in the Glawry Universe by clicking here! Instagram: @_glawry_ or @xxmonkxx Twitter: @_glawry_

Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Rūmī (Persian: جلال‌الدین محمد رومی), (also known as Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Balkhī (جلال‌الدین محمد بلخى), Mevlânâ/Mawlānā (مولانا, "our master"), Mevlevî/Mawlawī (مولوی, "my master")) more popularly known simply as Rumi (30 September 1207 – 17 December 1273), was a 13th-century Persian poet, Hanafi faqih, Islamic scholar, Maturidi theologian, and Sufi mystic originally from Greater Khorasan in Greater Iran. Rumi's influence transcends national borders and ethnic divisions: Iranians, Tajiks, Turks, Greeks, Pashtuns, other Central Asian Muslims, and the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent have greatly appreciated his spiritual legacy for the past seven centuries. His poems have been widely translated into many of the world's languages and transposed into various formats. Rumi has been described as the "most popular poet" and the "best selling poet" in the United States. Standup Historian

Etter flere uker i hardt vær, varslet Arbeiderpartiets Hadia Tajik 2. mars at hun går av som arbeids- og inkluderingsminister. Det hele begynte med at Aftenposten og VG gravde i Tajiks fortid. Hva var det som skjedde for 15 år siden? Og hvorfor gikk Tajik av? Hør episoden i appen NRK Radio

From 'Hope For Afghanistan', a column in AwareNow Magazine, Russ Pritchard shares a series of true stories entitled 'Afghan Accounts'. The first in this series is entitled 'Weekend From Hell'. "I receive seven texts almost simultaneously, 'Multiple confirmed eyewitness reports of mass execution and burial of 100s of Tajiks in Kapisa and other areas of Afghanistan.' I can't stay awake any longer. It's been almost 98 hours, and I've slept less than six since Thursday. The guilt of going to sleep covers me like a blanket." Learn more about 'Hope For Afghanistan': www.awarenessties.us/hope-for-afghanistan Presented by: Awareness Ties In Partnership with: U Foundation & Afghan Medical Corps

Denne uken diskuterer Sofie, Erlend og Magnus hvordan krigen i Ukraina kan påvirke den norske innenrikspolitikken, kompleksiteten i innvandrings- og asylpolitikken og Hadia Tajiks pendlerbolig. I studio: Sofie Aune Ovnerud, Erlend Haukeland Moe & Magnus Stakkestad Produsent: Lukas Gonçalves

* Politisk opprør mot høye bonuser i statlige selskaper. Sjefen i Statkraft har fått både høy bonus og kan jobbe i halvstilling med årslønn på 4,4 millioner. SV har fått nok. * Debatt om Hadia Tajiks metode blant pressefolk, fordømte i harde ordelag en nyhetssak flere dager før den ble publisert. * Ukraina ber om hastemøte i Sikkerhetsrådet etter at Putin har varslet en avgjørelse om å anerkjenne utbryterrepublikker i øst-Ukraina som selvstendige stater. * - Vi kan ikke stole på folkets musikksmak, sier Aftenpostens kommentator etter at to anonyme menn i ulvemasker skal forsvare Norges ære i den alltid omdiskuterte Eurovision-finalen. --- Dette er noe av det vi skal snakke om i kveldens Dagsnytt 18 - med Espen Aas. Hør episoden i appen NRK Radio

Gorno-Badakhshan is a unique region in Tajikistan. People there are distinct from ethnic Tajiks and have lived in the remote mountains of the region for centuries. There have been conflicts there before, some recently, and now people are wondering if fighting is set to break out again.

Alexander Bastrykin, the head of Russia's Federal Investigative Committee, has had enough. He's had enough of youngsters and enough of "shoving" by Asians, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks, and now he's lost his patience with all the people from Krasnodar "flooding" into St. Petersburg. Specifically, Bastrykin's latest outburst was directed at Vladislav Megrelov, a 26-year-old detective based in the town of Vsevolozhsk, outside Petersburg. In a virtual meeting on October 13, the Investigative Committee's director called for Megrelov's head, saying he should be fired for supposedly bungling a case. The detective's colleagues have reportedly vowed to resign in protest if the agency follows through on Bastrykin's threats to fire him. Original Article: https://meduza.io/en/feature/2021/10/19/they-re-flooding-the-city

Programming Note: We are brewing another writing project. Since it demands some undivided attention (haha, so naïve!) we will not be posting for the next five weeks. We will republish a few of our older posts, maybe a few links and brief notes every week till then. Regular programming resumes on 23rd October 2021. Global Policy Watch #1: 9/11, Toynbee and Civilisations Bringing an Indian perspective to global issues— RSJI write this on the 20th anniversary of 9/11. Like most adults, I have a clear memory of that day. I was in Bombay then. Just about getting my bearings straight in my first job. I left work early that evening (those were the days). Nariman Point, where I worked, to Warden Road, where I lived, was a half an hour commute then. I got into a ‘kaali-peeli’ and went past Marine Drive smoking a B&H. Quite posh. Especially, for someone who grew up in a small industrial township in eastern India and smoked unfiltered Charminar in college. I usually got off at the intersection of Napean Sea Road and Warden Road. The Shemaroo (‘circulating’) library was located right opposite the Jogger’s Park. It was a dingy little place, packed with books, kids borrowing Harry Potters and a familiar musty smell of libraries that mixed with the salty Arabian Sea breeze blowing in from across. The proprietor spoke in a lazy Sindhi drawl (‘helloo, Shemaaarooo’) while keeping his eye all the time on a small TV that was mounted high on the wall on one end. On the other side of the street, further up the Napean Sea Road, was the famous Shemaroo video library. Another landmark of those times in south Bombay. Between these two establishments, my life in Bombay was a pleasant whirl of books and world cinema. And there was the paani-puri waala at the start of the Sophia College lane. Sorry, I digress.Back to that evening. I had picked up a John Updike and was checking out from the library when the man at the counter with his eyes on the TV drawled - “yeh(hh) dekho(oo)”! So, I turned right, looked up and saw the second plane crashing into the South Tower (2 WTC). Things weren’t the same again. A couple of weeks back I saw the forlorn image of the last US soldier leaving Afghanistan. A grainy night picture enveloped in a ghostly, greenish hue. And I couldn’t help thinking of the contrast to that clear, blue fall day when the planes crashed into the Twin Towers. Those two images - one clean but ominous and the other blurry and defeated - bookend perhaps the most significant period of post-Cold War history whose echo will play out through this century. 2001 was a different time though. My life was good. India was shining. The western liberal democratic order had won the battle of superpowers. Nations, long suffering under communist dictatorships, were embracing democracy all around. Free market was in vogue. China was about to enter WTO. Borders were becoming meaningless. The end of history was nigh. We could feel it in our bones.And here we are in 2021. After many meaningless campaigns in Middle East and Afghanistan, the US is on a retreat with no interest in playing the global policeman. The global financial crisis (GFC) and the Covid-19 pandemic have dealt a body blow to globalisation. Borders have become more meaningful than ever as Brexit and the backlash against immigration have shown. The anger against the elite has seen the rise of right-wing nationalism and a retreat into authoritarian setups across the many fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. China turned prosperous but it didn’t turn into a liberal, open society as many had expected. Instead, it is mounting its own threat to the liberal order offering its model of a one-party regime that draws upon its civilisational memory as an alternative. India is not exactly shining now. And for me? Well, I’m writing this newsletter. Who could have imagined this in 2001? There have been epochal events in history that changed its course. But none that lasted fewer than 20 minutes with a mere two buildings collapsing. We didn’t know it then. But they may have brought down a civilisation. In the past few years, I have found greater meaning in the essays of the great 20th-century historian, Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975), while trying to make sense of the change around us. This might seem surprising. Toynbee is hardly read any more in colleges. His last years where he made a distinct turn to the spiritual, his academic style that bypassed the factual for the ‘total human experience’, his rejection of Eurocentrism and his championing of Asian civilisational values made him an academic pariah by the end of his life. Yet, about half a century after his death, I see in his works a useful framework to appreciate the events that have unfolded in the past 20 years. I will take up two elements of this frame in this edition.Cultural Homogenisation versus Plurality of CivilisationThe idea that a dominant culture will impose its hegemony of ideas and beliefs through political will over other cultures seemed incongruous to Toynbee as he studied 19 successful and 9 abortive civilisations. That study yielded his 12-volume masterpiece, A Study of History. The two-volume abridged version by D.C. Somervell is easier to read and more accessible. For Toynbee, the dominant civilisation will export its way of life and cultural artefacts and they might even be accepted by others in a sign of apparent homogenisation. But it will be naïve to believe this acceptance and imitation of another culture signals the subsuming of a civilisation into the other. There’s a great anecdote in Toynbee’s essay Islam, The West, And The Future (as part of his 1948 book Civilisation on Trial) which illuminates this idea (reproduced below):“This state of mind may be illustrated by a conversation which took place in the nineteen-twenties between the Zaydi Imam Yahya of San’a and a British envoy whose mission was to persuade the Imam to restore peacefully a portion of the British Aden Protectorate which he had occupied during the general War of 1914-1918 and had refused to evacuate thereafter, notwithstanding the defeat of his Ottoman overlords. In a final interview with the Imam, after it had become apparent that the mission would not attain its object, the British envoy, wishing to give the conversation another turn, complimented the Imam upon the soldierly appearance of his new-model army. Seeing that the Imam took the compliment in good part, he went on: ‘And I suppose you will be adopting other Western institutions as well?’ ‘I think not,’ said the Imam with a smile. ‘Oh, really? That interests me. And may I venture to ask your reasons?’ ‘Well, I don’t think I should like other Western institutions,’ said the Imam. ‘Indeed? And what institutions, for example?’ ‘Well, there are parliaments,’ said the Imam. ‘I like to be the Government myself. I might find a parliament tiresome. ‘Why, as for that,’ said the Englishman, ‘I can assure you that responsible parliamentary representative government is not an indispensable part of the apparatus of Western civilization. Look at Italy. She has given that up, and she is one of the great Western powers.’ ‘Well, then there is alcohol,’ said the Imam, ‘I don’t want to see that introduced into my country, where at present it is happily almost unknown.’ ‘Very natural,’ said the Englishman; ‘but, if it comes to that, I can assure you that alcohol is not an indispensable adjunct of Western civilization either. Look at America. She has given up that, and she too is one of the great Western powers.’ ‘Well, anyhow,’ said the Imam, with another smile which seemed to intimate that the conversation was at an end, ‘I don’t like parliaments and alcohol and that kind of thing.’ (emphasis mine) It is difficult for the Imam to put his finger on what “kind of thing” of the western civilisation is he dead against. There’s no definition of it. You could learn the western ways, read their great texts, trade with them, watch their films and grow prosperous following their lead; and yet, you would reject ‘that kind of thing’. There’s no logic to this. It is what it is. It’s always been this way. As Toynbee continues: The Englishman could not make out whether there was any suggestion of humour in the parting smile with which the last five words were uttered; but, however that might be, those words went to the heart of the matter and showed that the inquiry about possible further Western innovations at San’a had been more pertinent than the Imam might have cared to admit. Those words indicated, in fact, that the Imam, viewing Western civilization from a great way off, saw it, in that distant perspective, as something one and indivisible and recognized certain features of it, which to a Westerner’s eye would appear to have nothing whatever to do with one another, as being organically related parts of that indivisible whole. This is the Gandhian equivalent of accepting outside influences but on our own terms (“open your windows and let the winds blow in”). And not the isomorphic mimicry of the dominant culture that the elites of weaker nations often end up doing. Eventually, the plurality of civilisation asserts itself to redress the balance. Civilisation isn’t a destination. It is ever-changing and ever assimilating. As Toynbee memorably wrote:“Civilization is a movement and not a condition, a voyage and not a harbour.” This is what the past 20 years have shown us. “Civilizations die from suicide, not by murder.” The other idea that Toynbee spent a great deal of time on was what causes civilisations to decline and fall. For Toynbee, civilisations didn’t break down because of a loss of control over their territory or human environment. Or a decline in military might or technology prowess. These are proximate causes but not the underlying reason. For Toynbee, the real decline is rooted in the social. Civilisations build and grow because of ‘creative response’ of a minority to difficult circumstances. This creative minority that battles the odds is the genesis of all civilisations. Over time, they overcome the external material threats through their military and economic might and build a stable platform for it to flourish. And then begins their focus on challenges that arise from within which require, what Toynbee calls, an inner or spiritual response. This is when a civilisation turns inwards, introspects deeply about itself and creates cultural markers that stand the test of time. The decline comes because the creative minority (the elites as we might call them today) lose their creative power, turn self-obsessed and focus all their energies on self-preservation. The majority loses their trust in them and rebels. This leads to a loss of social cohesion and the civilisation splits into three groups. A ‘dominant minority’, a pale shadow of the creative minority of the past, that’s clinging on to their power; an ‘inner proletariat’ that’s within the civilisation but has no interest anymore in following the lead of the dominant minority and rebels against it; and lastly, an ‘external proletariat’ that’s beyond the boundaries of civilisation which now no longer is in the thrall of the dominant civilisation and resists any attempt by it to dominate any more. A civilisation in decline isn’t a pretty sight. There’s a lack of clarity on which way to steer it or even who will steer it. There’s an aimless drift in its affairs. There’s a longing for the glorious past or some kind of revolution that will usher in a new future. It is a fertile ground for demagogues. Sometime during the Vietnam War, Toynbee wrote:“Of the twenty-two civilizations that have appeared in history, nineteen of them collapsed when they reached the moral state the United States is in now.” I will leave you to draw your inferences as you read the above section and look at the course America has taken over the past two decades. History might not repeat. But it rhymes. I will close with what Toynbee thought was the only way for a civilisation to revive itself:“Schism in the soul, schism in the body social, will not be resolved by any scheme to return to the good old days (archaism), or by programs guaranteed to render an ideal projected future (futurism), or even by the most realistic, hardheaded work to weld together again the deteriorating elements [of civilization]. Only birth can conquer death―the birth, not of the old thing again, but of something new.” There’s a lesson there for the US. And if you read that closely, there’s a lesson in there for India of the present too. Global Policy Watch #2: 9/11 and the Myth of Mindless ViolenceBringing an Indian perspective to global issues— Guest Post by Ameya NaikEven if you’ve never read Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, you’ve probably come across her theories on grief and loss. She proposed that the human mind processes grief in five stages: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. Modern research has built on this model, supporting what may seem intuitive - that the five stages are often not linear, and that grief can be prolonged, impacted, and circular.As a psychiatrist, Kubler-Ross developed her theories (and then applied them) in her work with terminally ill patients in Chicago and California. As anyone who has lost a family member to such a condition will know, these are intensely personal experiences, as the afflicted person and their family grapple with illness, pain, and impending loss.Such experiences can be qualitatively different from instances of societal rupture: events that become a shared experience of loss, pain, trauma, or disruption. Unlike illness, which is ultimately an anticipable part of any personal or family life story, these societal events are like the shock of a traffic accident, magnified many times over. They can be seen as ruptures precisely because those who experience them recall feeling that the world changed -- that life would never be as it was before.It was just such an experience with mass violence and disruption that sparked Kubler-Ross’ own interest in how the human mind processes death, both actual and impending. As a volunteer with the International Voluntary Service for Peace at the end of World War II, she visited the Majdanek concentration camp outside Lublin, Poland. Her biography describes a striking image she found there: on a wall in the camp, prisoners awaiting execution had somehow carved a picture of butterflies in flight. It was an illustration, she said, not only of transformation - the philosophical idea that death is not an end, but a transition - but also of dignity among the dying. That this could be found even amidst the cruelty of a concentration camp is poetic; it cannot change the fact of the deaths that followed, but it does change their meaning.There is a second sense in which violence has meaning: the perpetrators of violence often intend it to convey a specific message to a specific group, often the community to which their victims belong. That message is usually some version of “do not imagine you are safe”. Sometimes it comes with the expectation of surrender - I can hurt you, so you had best not resist my will. In other cases, as with terrorist attacks, fear is an end in itself.Much of the study of political violence is understanding when a group uses violence against another or others, and what message they aim to convey thereby. For instance, Dara Kay Cohen and her colleagues have done exceptional work on understanding the variations in use of sexual violence in conflict - who does it, under what circumstances, and with what motive or desired effect.This is the irony of studying terrorism: it is war, and hence politics, by other means - and politics is all about messaging and influence. The perpetrators of a terrorist attack are well aware of how their actions will be interpreted, and quite deliberate in choosing actions that send such a message. We know this is true, and yet, the survivors and family members of victims of a terrorist attack are probably the last people who want to hear such an analysis. Their loved ones have been snatched away from them, suddenly and painfully. Some are fortunate to find, even in that loss, a story of courage and dignity -- for instance among the passengers on United Flight 93. Others, especially when in the stages of denial and anger, will pronounce these events -- the violence and loss -- meaningless, senseless, mindless.I have spent the past week and more listening to many voices speaking about attacks of September 11th, 2001, and what the twenty years since have involved, what lessons can be learnt, and so on. There can be no dispute that this event was a rupture -- our world has not been the same as it was before. A more complete accounting of what exactly has changed, though, is likely to prove difficult.As you take in these many voices, please take it as a sign that “what 9/11 means” is far from settled; to the extent that it meant and means different things to different people, a final answer may never be possible. What is certain is that the attacks themselves, and the “Global War on Terror” that followed, was neither mindless nor meaningless; violence never is.Matsyanyaaya: The Taliban Government and What it Means for IndiaBig fish eating small fish = Foreign Policy in action— Pranay Kotasthane(This is a draft of my article which appeared first in Times of India’s Thursday, September 9th edition.)Taliban has again done what it does best: make vague promises, extract concessions, and return to their original plan. Meanwhile, the interlocutors continue to extract more promises from the Taliban — hoping that the group has changed — only to return disappointed. This cycle repeats. Afghans suffer.The newly announced Taliban government is a good illustration of this now-familiar playbook. Former President Hamid Karzai and the Head of the High Council for National Reconciliation Abdullah Abdullah's presence in Qatar gave an impression that an interim government with broader representation is in the works. The Taliban made the right noises all through the Doha agreement negotiations about creating an inclusive government. But when the government was finally announced, it was anything but inclusive.The exclusion of women in the ministry shouldn't surprise anyone. Instead, notice three other aspects. Many old-timers have found a place in the government as a reward for their role during the twenty-year war. For the Taliban, it didn't matter if the international community had put these leaders under travel and financial sanctions. For a long time, the US  believed that these sanctions could mould the Taliban's future behaviour. Not only did the Taliban ignore this carrot of removing sanctions, but it has also chosen to appoint Sirajuddin Haqqani — still on the FBI's wanted list — as the powerful Minister of Interior. When asked on a Pakistani news show about the sanctions curtailing the ministers' ability to govern, the Taliban spokesperson Suhail Shaheen countered that the US had gone back on its Doha agreement promise of removing the sanctions three months after the intra-Afghan dialogue began.  Two, as Ibraheem Bahiss of the Crisis Group points out, there are no Hazaras, just two Tajiks, one Uzbek, and hardly any representation from the north in the 33-member government. Pashtuns from the southern part of Afghanistan — Taliban's strong base — have disproportionate representation. While the world is still hoping that this caretaker government would transition to a more inclusive government in the future, the Taliban continues to maintain that it is already an inclusive formation. Despite the steadfast opposition, the Taliban's narrative has always been that without broad-based support, they wouldn't have been able to sustain a war with a superpower for twenty years.And three, the Pakistan-backed factions have cornered all the positions. Not only is the Haqqani Network in, but all candidates known to take an independent line are out. The Doha political office has been sidelined, while Mullah Abdul Ghani 'Baradar' has been relegated to a deputy prime minister role.Given the lopsided composition of this government, protests from many sections of society are likely to continue. The latest rounds of protests in Kabul were in opposition to Pakistan's interference in Afghanistan's domestic affairs. Such a perception will only gain strength with the formation of a government that came into being after an ISI Chief visited Kabul. Twitter feeds of protests in Kabul will continue to pressure other governments to modulate their engagement with the new government. Expect the resistance forces in the north to regroup once the Taliban lowers its guard there. From a foreign policy angle, the US is unlikely to grant any economic relief to this government.From the Indian perspective, hopes that the Taliban will be aggressive towards Pakistan, once in power, should be shelved for now. This government is, without doubt, a Pakistan-installed and Pakistan-controlled administration. It also means that any resumption of Indian diplomatic presence in Afghanistan will remain severely diminished for quite some time. Beyond limited contact to enable humanitarian assistance, the risks of engaging with this administration far outweigh the benefits.Finally, we shouldn't forget that the Taliban wants to transform the Afghanistan State itself. It won't be content with installing a government alone. The Taliban believes that it has freed Afghanistan from foreign powers, and its next project is to create a new constitution. Many Afghans will continue to oppose this revisionist project.India Policy Watch #1: Pluralism and its DiscontentsInsights on burning policy issues in India— Pranay Kotasthane“Civilizations die from suicide, not by murder.” RSJ’s invocation of Toynbee reminded me of an instance of majoritarianism from the past week that should scare us, once again. A Bengaluru-based ready-to-cook food manufacturer was accused of mixing cow bones in dosa batter, through a targeted disinformation campaign on popular social media. To sound even more compelling, the posts also said that the company employed ‘only Muslims', it Halal certified, and hence ‘every single’ Hindu should refrain from buying its products.At one level, none of this should surprise us. Like everything else in India, food is also not personal. It’s communal and hence communal. The Information Age version of food-based majoritarinism perhaps began in 2015 with the lynching of a Muslim man in Dadri following the circulation of three photos of meat and bones of a slaughtered animal via WhatsApp. Since then, such instances have become irregularly regular. And yet, this latest instance hurts. Perhaps because it is personal. I am an admiring customer of the brand facing baseless accusations. Their ready-to-cook food has popularised a whole new segment of breakfast eats, and inspired many a copycats in the process. On deeper reflection, I realised how this instance illustrates the instrumental significance of tolerance. Religious tolerance (or the lack of it) can even change the nature of acceptable competition in markets. In a communally-charged environment, instead of product quality and differentiation, targeting the religion of a seller becomes the shortest-path-to-ground for a hypothetical adversary. Why compete when you can communalise? What happens to an economy in which this hatred itself becomes the primary method for oneupmanship between employees and between firms? It is easy to blame social media apps that are used to propagate such messages. But its really the ‘social distancing’ between Hindus and Muslims that has allowed people to frame, disseminate, and want to believe, the most outlandish accusations against each other. And so, when I think of twenty years since 9/11, my heart sinks. While the terrorists have been defeated over the last decades, it seems to me that terrorism has won. It has deepened the divides between religious communities. Terrorism has even managed to set the terms for casual debates about politics, society, and culture. And most importantly, it has torn down the carefully constructed idea of Indian pluralism. Like with the language of terrorism, the ‘other’, the ‘enemy’ has become central to the existence of all our religious communities. If terrorism is theatre, the show’s been running for twenty years and still going strong.I’ll end this lament with a Puliyabaazi episode with Ghazala Wahab, whose book ‘Born a Muslim’ tries to bridge the knowledge gap between Hindus and Muslims. We need many more such stories if we truly want to vanquish majoritarianism.India Policy Watch #2: On-road behaviour and usInsights on burning policy issues in India— Pranay KotasthaneRoads are like big functions — you come across several annoying people whom you meet just once. But on roads, this fearsome interchange happens every single day. And so on-road behaviour tells a lot about our society, values, and priorities. Two thoughts regarding roads made me write this piece.One, the precipitous fall in observing traffic rules since COVID-19 began. In my city, driving on the left-side of the road divider was a rule largely followed before the pandemic hit. But that norm melted once the traffic thinned during the first-wave. Not surprising. But what’s interesting is the persistence of this norm-breaking. Observe how the norm, once broken, hasn’t been put together even as vehicle traffic has gone back to near normal on key roads. Is this your observation as well? What’s happened to rule-breaking on roads in your city? How can we return to the older equilibrium of more rule-following?Two, I read this tongue-in-cheek and yet not tongue-in-cheek story of the Union Roads Minister’s idea that vehicle horns should also play to their tunes, meaning that horns should sound like flutes, violins, and tabla (how sushil and sanskaari). So that the honourable minister doesn’t seem out of place, I have another wacko idea — a two-way horn that’s audible to drivers. I even wrote something on it seven years ago in CitizenMatters: A basic law of economics states that a rational person makes a choice by comparing the costs and benefits associated with it. If the marginal benefits of picking an alternative exceed the marginal costs, that alternative is picked. It is relevant in the current context because the marginal costs currently are too low for the offenders to force them to give up the benefit experienced by pressing the easily accessible horn button. Raising monetary costs alone will not be sufficient to change the predisposition of the average Indian driver, which is to use the horn as an object to reduce his/her on-road anxiety — much like an office desk stress ball.One way is to think beyond fines and instead increase the emotional costs for the offenders. This can be done, for example, by installation of horns that channel a portion of the sound they generate towards the vehicle users themselves.Currently, the users are practically shielded from the noise pollution because the design is such that the sound is amplified and expelled outwards. If, on the other hand, if a blaring horn also causes discomfort to the user’s ears, it will make him/her think twice before launching a noise assault on other road users, particularly the unarmed pedestrians.Though the design of such a system is simple and costs not high, it is natural that no vehicle maker will be interested in incorporating this for the fear of turning away possible customers. And this is where governments can step in. The Union government can create noise guidelines on the lines of the Bharat Stage emission standards. Such vehicular noise guidelines with broad specifications for horns that feed back to the user will help bring down noise levels.Along with the existing initiatives, this step of increasing emotional costs can make our urban public spaces sane and peaceful. Ideally, a society that is more empathetic towards others will not need such government interventions. But until we reach that enlightened state, we need our governments and our people to collectively tackle this social evil of urban noise pollution.HomeWorkReading and listening recommendations on public policy matters[Podcast] Dan Carlin on the retreat from Afghanistan: After 20 years in Afghanistan the U.S. exits the country thus ending the longest war in American history. Are there any lessons to be learned? [Article] Yuval Harari’s 2015 article on the theatre of terror[Podcast] Toynbee’s Reith Lectures from 1952. The BBC website has taken down the audio for five of the six parts. Thankfully, the transcripts are all available here (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). Get on the email list at publicpolicy.substack.com

Today on "Hot Wash," host John Sorensen and RealClearDefense Editor David Craig speak with Kamal Alam, a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council's South Asia Center and advisor to Ahmad Massoud who is opposing the Taliban from the Panjshir valley. In 1992, following the defeat of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, a loose alliance of mujahideen militias assaulted Kabul, toppling the Communist government. One of those militias was led by the charismatic commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, the “lion of the Panjshir.” Massoud's Tajik forces joined with Uzbek and Hazara factions to form the Northern Alliance. Massoud's home and nearly impenetrable fortress was the Panjshir valley, roughly 70 miles north of Kabul, from which he defied repeated assaults by the Soviets and then later the Taliban in the Civil War that followed the Communist collapse. During the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s, Massoud became the eyes and ears for western intelligence, prophetically warning about the rise of foreign fighters that became Al Qaeda. Ultimately, he was assassinated by Al Qaeda just two days before the September 11 attacks on the US. But, Massoud's Northern Alliance proved essential in early US victories over the Taliban. 20 years later, in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rapid collapse of the Afghan National Army, some Afghans are still resisting the Taliban takeover. One of those groups is led by Massoud's 32-year old son Ahmed Massoud, who has returned to the Panjshir valley that proved so defensible for his father. Calling themselves the National Resistance Front or NRF, the small group of Tajiks and former ANA commandos, have vowed to oppose the Taliban and even claim to have recently secured three districts neighboring the Panjshir. Subscribe to the Morning Recon newsletter at https://www.realcleardefense.com/daily_newsletters/ for a daily roundup of news and opinion on the issues that matter for military, defense, veteran affairs, and national security. Be sure to subscribe to Hot Wash on iTunes or wherever you listen to podcasts. https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/realclear-defense-presents-hot-wash/id1575373700

Today in another special episode from the RealClearDefense podcast, "Hot Wash," host John Sorensen and RealClearDefense Editor David Craig speak with Kamal Alam, a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council's South Asia Center and advisor to Ahmad Massoud who is opposing the Taliban from the Panjshir valley. In 1992, following the defeat of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, a loose alliance of mujahideen militias assaulted Kabul, toppling the Communist government. One of those militias was led by the charismatic commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, the “lion of the Panjshir.” Massoud's Tajik forces joined with Uzbek and Hazara factions to form the Northern Alliance. Massoud's home and nearly impenetrable fortress was the Panjshir valley, roughly 70 miles north of Kabul, from which he defied repeated assaults by the Soviets and then later the Taliban in the Civil War that followed the Communist collapse. During the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s, Massoud became the eyes and ears for western intelligence, prophetically warning about the rise of foreign fighters that became Al Qaeda. Ultimately, he was assassinated by Al Qaeda just two days before the September 11 attacks on the US. But, Massoud's Northern Alliance proved essential in early US victories over the Taliban. 20 years later, in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rapid collapse of the Afghan National Army, some Afghans are still resisting the Taliban takeover. One of those groups is led by Massoud's 32-year old son Ahmed Massoud, who has returned to the Panjshir valley that proved so defensible for his father. Calling themselves the National Resistance Front or NRF, the small group of Tajiks and former ANA commandos, have vowed to oppose the Taliban and even claim to have recently secured three districts neighboring the Panjshir. Subscribe to the Morning Recon newsletter at https://www.realcleardefense.com/daily_newsletters/ for a daily roundup of news and opinion on the issues that matter for military, defense, veteran affairs, and national security. Be sure to subscribe to Hot Wash on iTunes or wherever you listen to podcasts. https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/realclear-defense-presents-hot-wash/id1575373700

On this edition of Parallax Views, journalist Eric S. Margolis joins us for the latest in our "Reflections on Afghanistan" series. Margolis, the author of American Raj Liberation Or Domination?: Resolving the Conflict Between the West and the Muslim World and War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet, has years of experience covering Afghanistan with his reporting their going back to the 1980s. He discusses a number of issues including the corruption of the Ghani government and the opium drug trade in Afghanistan, the situation with "ISIS-K" or the Khorasan group and the Taliban, the complex multi-ethnic nature of Afghanistan (the Tajiks, Pashtuns, and Hazaras), why the U.S. lost Afghanistan, the "malefactors everywhere" in Afghanistan, the history of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, the mujahedeen, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, Eric's criticism of media coverage of Afghanistan, and much, much more.

Photo: Religious Ceremonies and Customs of the Tajiks. Dzhakhri Sect . CBS Eyes on the World with John Batchelor CBS Audio Network @Batchelorshow Putin and Xi to confer September in Tajikistan about Afghanistan; the Ballerina and the Tank Driver. @Felix_Light @CBSNews @MoscowTimes https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/08/25/putin-xi-agree-to-jointly-combat-afghanistan-threats-a74897

I DN-teltet i Arendal møtte Aps nestleder Hadia Tajik samfunnsøkonom Ola Kvaløy. De var ikke helt enige om hvordan vi skal løse klimakrisen See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Photo: Religious Ceremonies and Customs of the Tajiks. Kufi Sect Notes: This photograph is from the ethnographical part of Turkestan Album, a comprehensive visual survey of Central Asia undertaken after imperial Russia assumed control of the region in the 1860s. Commissioned by General Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufman (1818–82), the first governor-general of Russian Turkestan, the album is in four parts spanning six volumes: “Archaeological Part” (two volumes); “Ethnographic Part” (two volumes); “Trades Part” (one volume); and “Historical Part” (one volume). The principal compiler was Russian Orientalist Aleksandr L. Kun, who was assisted by Nikolai V. Bogaevskii. The album contains some 1,200 photographs, along with architectural plans, watercolor drawings, and maps. The “Ethnographic Part” includes 491 individual photographs on 163 plates. The photographs show individuals representing the different peoples of the region (Plates 1–33); daily life and rituals (Plates 34–91); and views of villages and cities, street vendors, and commercial activities (Plates 92–163). Ethnographic photographs; Photographic surveys; Prayer; Rites and ceremonies; Spiritual life; Tajiks. CBS Eyes on the World with John Batchelor CBS Audio Network @Batchelorshow #KabulDiary: Moscow and Dushanbe plan a border post and military exercises to secure Tajikistan. @ThomasJoscelyn @BillRoggio @FDD https://pajhwok.com/2021/07/25/moscow-dushanbe-vow-to-ward-off-taliban-threat/

Photo: Religious Ceremonies and Customs of the Tajiks, Dzhakhri Sect  . CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor CBS Audio Network @Batchelorshow Afghanistan National Army units fleeing into Tajikistan; & What is to be done? Jeff McCausland @CBSNews https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/more-than-1000-afghan-soldiers-flee-into-tajikistan-as-taliban-extends-control-tajik-officials-say/ar-AALNvYg

Back in our 15th episode of this series, we looked at Khwarezmian prince Jalal al-Din Mingburnu's exploits in India in the early 1220s. Having fled there after Chinggis Khan's devastating invasion of the Khwarezmian Empire, Jalal al-Din's flight brought India to the attention of the Mongols. While Chinggis Khan did not invade the subcontinent, this was not the last that India would see of the Mongols. In today's episode, we return to northern India, dominated by the Sultanate of Delhi, and look at its interactions with the Mongols who repeatedly raided its borders. Why the Delhi Sultans, from Iltutmish, Balban to Alauddin Khalji were able to largely successfully resist the Mongols will be examined, over nearly the century of Mongol-Delhi interactions. I'm your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.   The Delhi Sultanate arose from the ruins of the Ghurid Empire which had stretched from Afghanistan to Bengal. The Ghurids, or Shansabanids,  had been a regional power in central Afghanistan emerging in the ninth century but were subdued by the Ghaznavids, also known as the Yamanids, a persianised Turkic dynasty which dominated much of the Iranian world up to the borders of India from the tenth to the twelfth centuries. The Ghaznavids under their great expander, the mighty Mahmud of Ghazna, reduced the Ghurids to a subject state early in the eleventh century, though in turn the Ghaznavids were pushed from Iran by the Seljuqs with the famous battle of Dandanaqan in 1040, and became tributary to the Seljuqs under their Sultan Sanjar at the start of the twelfth century. In this time, the Ghurid elite converted from Buddhism to Islam, and could be said to have bided their time. The Seljuqs weakened over the twelfth century with the arrival of  the Qara-Khitai, the Ghuzz Turk invasions and independence of the Khwarezmian Empire in the north. In turn, the weakness of the Seljuqs advanced the weakness of the Ghaznavids, which provided an opportunity for the Ghurids to rise in the second half of the twelfth century. Under the brilliant leadership of Mu'izz al-Din Muhammad Ghuri, better known simply as Muhammad of Ghor, and his brother Ghiyath al-Din, the Ghurids conquered the remnants of the Ghaznavids. Repulsing invasions by the Ghuzz  Turks and proving a staunch foe to the Qara-Khitai and Khwarezm-Shahs, Muhammad of Ghor received backing from the Caliph and expanded across the region. By the end of his life, he had forged an empire stretching from eastern Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan across Northern India to Bengal.   Muhammad of Ghor's military might rested in large part on his loyal ghulams, Turkic slave soldiers, though over the thirteenth century the term gave way to mamluk. A similar institution existed in the form of the Ottoman janissaries. While it was common for any good regional warlord to employ nomadic Turkic tribes due to their military prowess, they often proved unreliable and self-interested. For the conquest-minded Muhammad of Ghor, he could not put much stock on nomad chiefs  who may value their own advancement over Muhammad's glory. Instead, Muhammad looked to the classic islamic institution of slave soldiers. Ghulams and Mamluks were young boys, generally sold by enemy Turkic tribes, that were brought into the Islamic world and raised from birth to be elite soldiers. Generally having already some horse and archery skills from their youth, these boys were converted to Islam and given the finest training in military matters, with top of the line equipment, weapons and horses, in addition to receiving education and even salaries. The result was a core of fierce warriors loyal not to any tribal or family ties, but to their fellow ghulams and their master, who sheltered and provided for them. No shortage of Islamic princes lamented on how their ghulams tended to be more loyal than their own sons; the sons awaited only the death of the father, while the ghulams wanted only his glory. Famously, the child-less Muhammad of Ghor is supposed to have remarked that, while other monarchs could have a few sons, he had thousands in the form of his ghulams.   The source of many of Muhammad of Ghor's ghulams were various Qipchap Turkic tribes from the great steppe. As in late Ayyubid and early Mamluk Egypt, and indeed much of the islamic world, the Cuman-Qipchaqs were prized as warriors. His ghulams proved themselves in combat repeatedly. Though supported by local tribes, both Turkic and Pashtun, Muhammad of Ghor over his life increasingly relied on his ghulams, and in time they commanded his armies and acted as his governors. Attacking the Hindu kingdoms of northern India at the close of the twelfth century, Muhammad of Ghor had to return to Afghanistan to face the Khwarezm-Shah Tekish, and Tekish's son Muhammad. Muhammad bin Tekish, of course, we know best as the gentleman who antagonized Chinggis Khan some two decades later. In Muhammad of Ghor's absence fighting the Khwarezmians, his ghulams like Qutb ad-Din Aybeg were left to command his troops and govern his territories in India. And these same loyal ghulams, upon the childless Muhammad of Ghor's assassination in 1206, then quite loyally tore the Ghurid empire to pieces, each one declaring himself master of his own domain.    Qutb ad-Din Aybeg claimed Delhi, and though he tried to establish a dynasty, his early death in 1210 in a polo accident resulted in his young son pushed out by one of his own ghulams, his son-in-law Shams-ud-Din Iltutmish. Iltutmish, a Qipchaq like Aybeg, consolidated the Delhi Sultanate as one of the chief powers of northern India. So began the first of five separate Turko-Afghan dynasties that would rule the Delhi Sultanate over the next three centuries. Because of the ghulam, or mamluk origin of the first dynasty, the first dynasty of the Delhi Sultanate is sometimes known as the Mamluk Sultanate of Delhi, sometimes to mirror the contemporary Qipchaq founded Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt. For the next two hundred years, their foreign policy on their northern border was defined by the Mongol Empire and its successor states.    Relations between the Delhi Sultanate and Mongols began in the 1220s, in the middle of Iltutmish's reign, when Chinggis Khan himself rode to their borders chasing the Khwarezmian Prince Jalal al-Din Mingburnu, son of the late Khwarezm-Shah Muhammad II. Chinggis did not invade India, though he sent some forces to pursue Jalal al-Din in India. According to the Persian writer Juvaini, Chinggis actually did advance some days into the Punjab, having hoped to find a route that would allow him to march around the Himalayas and attack the Jin Dynasty from the south, but could not find such a road. Other medieval sources and modern historians offer alternative explanations for Chinggis' refusal to spend more time in India, with reasons ranging from respect for Delhi's neutrality, the heat of northern India, bad omens, Delhi's diplomacy appeasing the Khan through token submission, to the simple fact that Chinggis may not have had interest expanding into a new, unknown territory while already dealing with much of Iran, Central Asia and China, with Chinggis intending all along to return to China and deal with the Jin and Tangut. We discussed the matter more in episodes 9 and 15. As it was, Chinggis returned to the east, and died while on campaign against the Tangut in 1227. As we saw in episode 15, Jalal al-Din spent a few years in India making a mess of things, nearly attacking Delhi before withdrawing to Iran after a massive coalition of the post-Ghurid and Hindu forces threatened him.  The great consequences of Mingburnu's time in India was that he and the Mongols sent to pursue him  greatly undermined Iltutmish of Delhi's other Ghurid rivals in the northwest and the Punjab. Thanks to wars between the Khwarezmian and Mongol forces, Iltutmish over the late 1220s and 1230s gradually absorbed the other post-Ghurid powers up to the Indus River. In addition, he became overlord of a number of regional Hindu kingdoms; some have for this region compared the Delhi Sultanate to a collection of subkingdoms. By Iltutmish's death in 1236, the Delhi Sultanate was the great power of northern India and the Gangetic plain, from the Indus to Bengal, with recognition from the Caliph as the only Muslim sovereign in India, and indeed, one of the mightiest Muslim rulers in the world.   However, in Iltutmish's final years the Mongol presence on his border increased. When Chormaqun Noyan and his army entered Iran at the start of the 1230s to complete the conquest of the region and finish off Jalal al-Din -something we discussed in detail in episode 15- a portion of his force was sent into southeastern Iran and Khurasan, which included modern Afghanistan. The remnants of the empire Jalal al-Din Mingburnu had left in Afghanistan and India submitted to the Mongols, and the Mongol Empire now directly bordered the Delhi Sultanate. A tamma force under Dayir was stationed in Afghanistan, and part of the duty of the tamma was to disrupt the states along the borders of the Mongol Empire. As such, Mongol raids into the Punjab and Sind began with increasing regularity in the late 1230 and 40s, which proved difficult for Iltutmish's troubled successors.   Iltutmish's eldest son and heir had been groomed for the throne, but his premature death in Bengal was a severe blow to the Sultan. A younger son, Rukn ud-Din Firoz Shah, ultimately succeeded Iltutmish, but the youth enjoyed alcohol and good times more than the complicated court machinations and governance. The boy's mother acted as the true governor, using her power to take out her grievances. It was not a winning combination. Within months a rebellion removed Firoz Shah and his mother from the scene, which placed Iltutmish's daughter Raziyya on the throne. Famous as the only female Muslim monarchs in India's history, and popularly known as Raziyya Sultana, her ascension owed much to the strong Turkic force in the government, many of whom were only recent converts to Islam. Some are known to have been denizens of the former Qara-Khitai empire, which had influential women empresses, and therefore the prospect of a woman ruling in her own name was not as dreadful to them.    Apparently Raziyya had been expected to act as a figurehead, though proved herself, in the vein of all good Qipchap women, to be very assertive and insisted on a prominent, public role. Enjoying horseback archery and riding elephants in public, she supposedly even dressed as a man. Seeking to expand her powerbase, she sought to create additional sources of support in competition to the Turkic ghulams. Her appointees to power included Ghuris, Tajiks, Hindus and even Africans. The ghulams did not appreciate it, and by 1240 Raziyya was deposed and, after a brief attempt to restore her to the throne, killed in favour of her brother, Bahram Shah. So ended the brief reign of perhaps the most well known female Muslim monarch. Her brother and successor Bahram Shah did not long enjoy the throne. A brave and often blood thirsty individual, his effort to totally remove the powerful Turkic aristocracy, increasingly showing itself a rival to power to the Sultan, resulted in his commanders storming Delhi and killing him only two years into his reign.  Bahram Shah's most notable act was appointing Juzjani, a refugee from Khwarezm, as grand qadi of Delhi. Minhaj-i-SIraj Juzjani is one of the most important sources for the period, writing a mammoth history in the 1250s. We've visited it often in the course of this series to generally remark on his well known hatred of the Mongols but it is a key for the early history of the Delhi Sultanate. His great history, the Tabaqat-i-nasiri, was translated into English in the late nineteenth century by Major Raverty, and can be found in two volumes free to download by archive.org.   After Sultan Bahram Shah's death, he was succeeded by Rukn ud-Din Firoz's son, ‘Ala al-Din Mas'ud Shah. Despite having gained the throne with the support of the Turkic aristocracy,  like his predecessors Mas'ud shah sought to weaken them. His four year reign ended with his death at the hands of the youngest surviving son of Iltutmish, Mahmud Shah. From 1246 until 1266, Mahmud proved the longest reigning of Iltutmish' sons. He was though, the most ineffective, and gradually found himself reduced to puppet by his na'ib, Balban, who we will return to shortly.   While these political upheavals rocked the capital, the Mongols pressed on the northwestern border. In 1241 a Mongol force under Bahadur Tair took Lahore, and Multan was captured in 1245, and by the 1250s, Sind and the Punjab were largely under Mongol control and Mongol raids were a nearly annual occurrence. By the reign of Mahmud Shah, the authority of the Delhi monarch, both within his court and northern India, had declined dramatically. Fortunately for the Delhi Sultan, no full Mongol invasion yet threatened, but the stream of refugees from Iran and Central Asia must have brought constant news of the Mongol terror. Juzjani certainly reported seemingly every rumour he heard, and was certainly under the impression that at least some of the Mongol leadership, particularly Chagatai, favoured the extermination of Islam. The learned and informed in Delhi must have feared greatly what would happen if the Mongols pushed the advantage while Delhi was in the midst of another coup.   Sultan Mahmud Shah bin Iltutmish was overshadowed by his wazir and eventual successor Balban, who changed Delhi policy to the Mongols. An Ölberli Qipchaq and ghulam, Balban had risen in influence over the 1240s, and finally between 1246 and 1249 was raised to the viceroyalty, his might beneath only the Sultan himself. Often, you will see him referred to as a member of the “Forty,” or the “Forty Chiefs.” These were, if you believe some modern writers, forty ghulams of Sultan Iltutmish who acted as kingmakers in Delhi since Iltutmish's death. However, as pointed out by historians like Peter Jackson, the “Forty”  are only mentioned by Ziya' al-Din Barani, an official writing in Persian in the Delhi Sultanate in the mid-fourteenth century. No other source on Delhi from the thirteenth or fourteenth centuries, especially the more contemporary Juzjani, mention such a distinct coalition. It seems likely that “Forty” refers to the fact that these men commanded corps of forty elite men; such groups are mentioned in other contemporary sources, and the same organization was present in the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt at the same time.  The “Forty” was not some provisional governmental body composed of forty men who tried to exert their power over the Sultans, but rather Barani's way to refer to the influential members of the aristocracy and elite- many of whom were Qipchaq Turks, but including Ghuris, Tajiks and even Hindus-  who were associated with the military elite and had a vested interest in remaining influential, and were no monolithic body. Balban was a part of this elite, a man experienced with command and the court.   From 1249 through to 1266, with only a brief break, Balban was the #2 man in the Delhi Sultanate, the na'ib, who handled government himself, styled himself Ulugh Khan and married his daughter to the Sultan. Sultan Mahmud Shah turned into a shadowy figure behind Balban's power. In 1266, Mahmud Shah and his children died in unclear, but almost certainly not natural, circumstances, and Balban took the throne himself. So ended the line of Iltutmish. After many years in the viceroyalty, Balban had moved his allies and friends into prominent positions of power, and thus held the throne securely. He was therefore able to finally act more aggressively towards the Mongols. Initially, diplomacy under Mahmud Shah and Balban had sought to appease the Mongols, and envoys from Hulegu in the 1250s had been honoured and respected, friendly relations urged. Considering the size and might of Hulegu's army, it was a wise decision. But following Hulegu's death in 1265, the outbreak of civil war between the Mongols and Balban's direct seizure of the throne in 1266, Balban went on the offensive. On his order, the Sultanate retook Multan and Lahore by force. Balban worked to fortify India's rugged border through building forts garrisoned by the various mountain tribes. Further, Balban welcomed Mongols, Persian and Central Asian refugees fleeing the Mongol civil wars in the 1260s, and gave many of them military positions which provided the Delhi Sultans' with knowledge of Mongolian military tactics. Similar to the Mamluks of Egypt, Mongol refugees were valuable immigrants and their flight was welcomed. Supposedly entire neighbourhoods in Delhi were formed from the Mongols who fled there. Some of these men of Mongol background came to positions of great prominence, after their conversion to Islam of course. Under Balban and his successors, these neo-Muslims, as they were called by Barani,  were given command of armies and powerful positions close to the Sultan. One of these men was a member of the Khalaj tribes, named Jalal al-Din.   Beginning in the 1260s, the source of the Mongol incursions into India changed. Rather than an imperial effort, it became led by the Neguderis based in southern Afghanistan, known also as the Qaraunas. With the outbreak of war between the Ilkhanate and Golden Horde, the Ilkhan Hulagu had attacked the Jochid forces who had been a part of his army. Many fled to southern Afghanistan under their general Neguder, becoming a local and unruly power the Ilkhan and Chagatai princes sought to control. From then on, the Neguderis undertook nearly annual raids into India's northwestern frontier.   Over Balban's long reign he often still relied on diplomacy to keep the Mongols at bay in between periods of fighting. While he consolidated Delhi's hold on northern India, Balban expanded southwards and restored the Delhi Sultante's hegemony after a nadir in the 1240s. While often successful and gaining valuable experience with Mongol tactics, Balban received a great shock in 1285 when his favourite son and heir, Muhammad Shah, governor of Lahore, Multan and Dipalpur, was killed in a vicious Mongol attack on Multan. The once vigorous Balban lived the rest of his life quietly, and largely retired from governance, dying in 1287, succeeded by an inept grandson named Kayqubad. Of the eight sultans who reigned between 1236 and 1296, Sultan Balban was the only one known to have died of natural causes.   Sultan Kayqubad's reign ended quickly, and following his murder in 1290, Jalal al-Din Khalji established the second dynasty of the Delhi Sultanate, the Khalji dynasty.  The name Khalji refers to their background, for their family came from Khalaj tribesmen of what is now Afghanistan.While generally later medieval and modern biographers have seen the Khalaj as a Turkic people, the indication from contemporary sources is that they were seen as a group distinct from the Turks- perhaps due to not being associated with horsemanship or ghulams. The Khalaj were originally Turkic speakers, but over  centuries had mingled with the various Pashtun peoples of Afghanistan. The Pashtun are a branch of the Iranian peoples, speaking a language from the Eastern Iranic language family. While associated with the Pashtun, the Khalaj were distinct from them; Juzjani, during his writing in the 1250s, always distinguished the Khalaj from Turks, Persians and Pashtuns. As such, you will often find the Khalji remarked as a Turko-Afghan dynasty. Individuals of Khalaj stock were certainly raised to prominent positions under the Khalji Sultans, but contrary to some statements, it was not a replacement of the existing multi-ethnic, but still largely Turkic nobility, but a mere another addition to it, just one group among Turks, Mongols, Hindus, Persians and more.   Around 70 years old when he became Sultan in 1290, Jalal al-Din Khalji first appeared in Mongol service. According to the fourteenth century Ilkhanate historian Wassaf, Jalal al-Din had held command over the Khalaj on behalf of the Mongol appointed governor of Binban, west of the Indus River. A fifteenth century source identifies Jalal al-Din's father as Yughrush, the name of the Khalaj Amir who is known to have taken part in a Mongol embassy to Delhi in 1260. In the ebb and flow of frontier fortunes, perhaps falling out with the Mongols or too ambitious for the existing climate, at some point in the 1260s Jalal al-Din and a body of his men fled to the Delhi Sultanate to offer their services to Sultan Balban, who rewarded them a position on the frontier against the Mongols. This was part of a growing trend in the second half of the thirteenth century. Whereas Iltutmish and the early Sultans had given command of the borders to men trained as ghulams or mamluks, under Balban and the Khaljis the border with the Mongols was increasingly defended by Turkic tribal leaders, who came with their own retinues and forces. Many had even been in Mongol service and therefore had intimate experience with them. It was a position for any ambitious general to develop a reputation, experience and a sizable military following.    Jalal al-Din's prominence grew over the reign of Balban as he built his reputation against the Mongols. In the reign of Balban's grandson Kayqubad, Jalal al-Din Khalji was invited to Delhi to assist against Kayqubad's court rivals. Despite becoming Kayqubad's regent, it did little good for the young sultan who was soon murdered, and  Jalal al-Din seized power in the aftermath, though faced stiff court resistance throughout his reign.    Sultan Jalal al-Din Khalji is generally portrayed as downright mild-mannered. A devout  and forgiving Muslim, often shown to be extraordinarily benevolent and generous to his subjects, he was also very capable miltiarily, personally leading armies against independent Hindu kingdoms and Mongols invaders, a great contrast to Sultan Balban who only rarely headed armies during his long dominance. One of his most notable victories came at Bar-Ram in 1292, where when a ceasefire was declared, some 4,000 of the Mongols under their Prince decided to stay in India after converting to Islam. Sultan Jalal al-Din also cultivated good relations with the Ilkhans. A notable exception to the Sultan's demeanor, an outright moral failing in the view of his medieval biographers like Barani, was the brutal murder of a famous sufi whose hospice was found to be attached to a conspiracy against him. Jalal al-Din Khalji's violent reaction was rather unusual for him, given his general clemency to others who plotted against him.    The general kindness, almost certainly overstated, made him appear weak to his ambitious nephew, Alauddin. In 1296 Alauddin Khalji killed his uncle, and arrested and blinded his sons and their allies, and thus usurped power in the Sultanate. So began the reign of the most famous Delhi Sultan. You may know him best as the primary antagonist in the recent Bollywood film, Padmavat, where he is portrayed by Indian actor Ranveer Singh.  Alauddin Khalji was not noted for any benevolence, but for his cunning, ruthlessness, and paranoia alongside an iron will and exceptional military ability. Cruel but highly capable, his reign began with a large Neguderi incursion, attacking Multan, Sind and Lahore. Alauddin's commanders Ulugh Khan and Zafar Khan were mobilized with a larger army than the Mongols, and at Jaran-Manjur defeated them, capturing many men, women and children and executing them.   Alauddin Khalji initiated a number of reforms to strengthen his control and prepare against Mongol invasions. Most of these were directed to enlarging the Delhi military and making it more effective, and building new fortifications. His army and officers were paid in cash and the Sultan had personal control over the army, rather than leaving it in the hands of his amirs. Economic reforms were undertaken as well, with high taxes, up to 50% of each crop, and efforts to prevent hoarding to keep prices low, making it cheaper to feed his men. His position was strengthened by a strong spy network and his loyal eunuch and possible lover, Malik Kefar, who secured him from court intrigues. Alauddin Khalji showed exceptional cruelty as he waged war against Mongol and Hindu alike. His wars in Gujarat were accompanied by the destruction of hundreds of Hindu temples and the massacres of men, women and children. The only extant history written in the reign of Sultan Alauddin, that of Amir Khusrau, speaks of the sultan killing some 30,000 Hindus in a single day during his 1303 campaign in Chittoor. In the words of Khusrau, he cut them down as if they were nothing but dry grass. Alauddin's conquest of the independent Hindu kingdom of Ranthambore in Rajasthan in 1301, a state which had long held out against the Delhi Sultans, was an event which has since held significance in Indian memory. A number of later poems were written on the fall  of Ranthambore which have done much to cement Alauddin's legacy for Indians as a cruel tyrant with a near genocidal hatred for Hindus. Whether Alauddin actually carried such hatred for Hindus, or this was a consequence of a violent imitation of the cruelty associated with the very successful Mongols, is of little consolation for the many thousands killed on his order.   While these developments were occurring within the Sultanate, to the north was a major shift in the Mongol territory, largely covered in our second episode on the Chagatai Khanate and on Qaidu Khan. With Qaidu's influence, Du'a was appointed as Khan over the Chagatai Khanate. Splitting rule of central Asia between them, Du'a and his oldest and favourite son, Qutlugh Khwaja, were able to finally bring the fearsome Neguderis, or Qara'unas,  under their power in the 1290s. Qutlugh Khwaja was given command over them. While Qaidu and Du'a focused on the border with Khubilai Khan in the northeast, Qutlugh Khwaja from his southern base turned the Chagatayid-Neguderi attention to India in the closing years of the thirteenth century.  The reasons for this are unclear: we lack sources from the Chagatai perspective, but Ilkhanid and Indian sources give Du'a an intense interest in India. India was famously wealthy and barring raids into the Punjab, was largely untouched by the Mongols. Further, the defeats suffered in the previous incursions into India needed to be avenged, much like Khubilai and his wrath towards Japan or the Ilkhans towards the Mamluk Sultanate. While the Chagatayids could feel they lacked the ability to make great gains against the Ilkhanate or the Yuan, they could have felt a haughtiness to the Turkic and Hindu forces that awaited them in India, and therefore anticipated easy successes.   While generally the Mongol attacks on India are termed as raids, intended for plunder and undertaken on the direction of individual Neguderi chiefs, the most serious invasions which threatened the Delhi Sultanate occurred on Du'a's order. The 1296 attack was already noted, and two years later another Mongol force was sent into India. Alauddin Khalji's army under Ulugh Khan was campaigning in Gujarat when the Mongols attacked in 1298. The commander left in Delhi, Zafar Khan, was able to raise a large army and defeat the Mongols, once more driving them back across the border. The residents of the Sultanate, despite having repulsed attacks before, were not unaware of the destruction caused by the Mongols: many of the new inhabitants of Delhi over the previous decades had been refugees fleeing Mongol terror.  Each Mongol attack was therefore a cause for panic and fear. Thus, Zafar Khan was very popular after his victory, which may have given the always suspicious Sultan Alauddin concern over his loyalty. It was not unfounded that a prominent general with enough reputation could make a claim for the throne: Alauddin's own uncle Jalal al-Din had done just that.   In late 1298 or 1299 began the most serious Mongol invasion of India. On the orders of Du'a Khan, his sons Qutlugh Khwaja and Temur Buqa marched with 50-60,000 Neguderi and Chagatai horsemen over the border. According to sources like Barani, the purpose of this assault was expressly for conquest, and even if we cannot corroborate it from the Chagatai perspective it is evident that this was a serious undertaking compared to earlier attacks. With the arrival of Qutlugh Khwaja's army, greater than any preceding it, the Sultanate erupted into panic. Qutlugh Khwaja intended to make his mark as the next great Mongol conqueror.   The sources have Qutlugh Khwaja bypassing villages to maximize speed, intending to strike directly at the city of Delhi itself while the Sultan's army was once again on campaign in Gujarat. At the River Jumna, Zafar Khan confronted Qutlugh but was defeated and forced to retreat to Delhi. News of the defeat of the heroic Zafar Khan caused thousands to abandon their homes in fear, and the capital was soon flooded with refugees flying before the oncoming army. Famine, overcrowding and fear now gripped Delhi as the swarm drained its resources, all while Qutlugh Khwaja closed in.   Alauddin held a council with his generals in the city, where he was advised to abandon the capital: the Mongols were too numerous, too powerful and too close for them to stand a chance.  Alauddin trusted his sword however, and raised what forces he could. Some 24 kilometres north of Delhi, Alauddin Khalji met Qutlugh Khwaja at a site called Kili.   While the sources give Alauddin a force of some 300,000 men with 2,700 war elephants, it is nigh impossible Alauddin suddenly put together and supplied an army of such a size on short notice. Modern estimates give a more feasible number at around 70,000 with 700 elephants, still a huge army that likely outnumbered the Mongols. Both forces deployed in the standard formation for steppe armies, a center and two wings. The Sultan took the Delhi center, while Zafar Khan commanded the right wing and Ulugh Khan the left, with elephants dispersed among the three groups. Like the Mongols, the Delhi forces relied on Turkic horse archers, light and heavy cavalry, with much of their army experienced in the same style of warfare as the Mongols.    Zafar Khan, looking to avenge his defeat on the Jumna, led the first charge, attacking the Mongol left flank, which broke before him. Zafar gave chase to drive them from the field, but as he was led further away from the rest of the army, he soon found that he had fallen for a feigned retreat. Zafar was encircled, the Noyan Taraghai leading the ambush. Zafar realized that he had been left to die: the Sultan made no effort to rescue the clearly doomed force, his mistrust of his subordinate's growing popularity being too great. Abandoned and surrounded, Zafar gave his best until he was captured. Qutlugh Khwaja was impressed by Zafar's courage, and offered to let him join the Mongols, where surely his bravery would be appreciated, even offering to make him Sultan of Delhi. Zafar Khan was to the end loyal to his Sultan, and refused, and Qutlugh Khwaja ordered the execution of him and all his men and elephants.   With this victory, Qutlugh Khwaja was poised to defeat Alauddin and conquer the Sultanate. At this point however, the Mongol forces retreated. It seems that at some point over the course of the battle, perhaps in a final struggle during the execution of Zafar Khan's troops, Qutlugh Khwaja was seriously injured, causing his army to retreat. Before he could make it back home, Qutlugh died of his injuries. The Chagatais had lost their prince and another invasion, and Du'a Khan his eldest son, with little to show for it.    This defeat did not end the Mongol invasions of India though, as Noyan Taraghai attacked in 1303 while Alauddin was returning from campaigning in Chittoor where his forces suffered heavy losses. Much of his army was still occupied besieging a major Hindu stronghold. Isolated and besieged near Delhi, inconclusive fighting continued for two months as Sultan Alauddin led a grim resistance. The approaching summer heat and the stalemate tested Taraghai's patience, and he too retreated, almost certainly unaware how tenuous Alauddin's position had been.  From 1304 until 1308 invasions were annual, but victories over major Mongol armies had broken down much of the aura of Mongol terror, Alauddin appearing divinely protected. Mongol armies were defeated in battle, their commanders trampled to death by elephants in Delhi and pillars constructed of Mongol skulls outside the city, and Alauddin undertook a massacre of the Mongols living in Delhi.   The question remains: why were the Mongols so ineffective in India? Delhi familiarity with Mongol tactics was a major factor, both from combat experience, similar army models and the presence of Mongol defectors. Alauddin's military and economic reforms allowed him to afford and quickly raise large armies, while his strong, centralized government kept his state from collapsing under the pressures of these invasions. India's hot summers were hard on the Mongols and their horses, impacting pasturage and limiting when the Mongols attacked. Finally, Alauddin and his generals were simply skilled commanders and a match for the Mongol captains, with luck on their side more often than not. Indian sources however, generally ascribed victory to divine intervention rather than skill, which may be why these Mongol defeats are not remembered like Ayn Jalut.    After Qaidu's death, Du'a helped organize a general peace between the Mongol Khanates, even suggesting they put aside their differences and launch a joint attack on India. However, the death of Du'a in 1307 and reemergence of tension with the neighbouring Khanates brought the attention of the Chagatais away from India. In 1328-1329 Du'a's son Tarmashirin undertook the final major Mongol offensive into India, with similar results desultory. Tarmashirin was briefly the Chagatai Khan from 1331-1334, but his death, as well as the collapse of the Ilkhanate, put Central Asia into chaos. Mongol forces were now focused on internal conflict rather than external assault. Much of this we covered in our third episode on the Chagatai khanate, which created the opportunity for a certain Barlas tribesman named Temur to take power in 1370.    Alauddin Khalji continued to rule with an iron hand and expanded the Sultanate. He fell ill in his final years and grew ever more paranoid and disinterested in government, giving more power to his viceroy, Malik Kafur. On Alauddin's death in 1316, he was succeeded by a young son with Malik Kafur acting as regent. Kafur was quickly murdered and Alauddin's son deposed by a brother, Mubarak Shah. Mubarak Shah ruled for only four years before he was murdered by his vizier in 1320, ending Delhi's Khalji Dynasty. The usurper was quickly overthrown by one of Alauddin Khalji's generals, Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq, and so began the Delhi Tughluq Dynasty, the third dynasty of the Sultanate   Like Jalal al-Din Khalji, Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq had rose to prominence as a frontier commander against the Mongols, particularly from his post at Depalpur during the reign of Alauddin. Sources of the period, including the Moroccan traveller Ibn Battuta who visited his court, indicate Ghiyath al-Din was of nomadic background, possibly Mongol or Neguderi, who had entered the Sultanate during the reign of Alauddin Khalji's uncle, working as a horse keeper for a merchant. The long reigns of Ghiyath al-Din's successors, Muhammad Tughluq and Firuz Shah were stable, but saw the slow decline of Delhi's power and permanent losses of Bengal and of the Deccan. Hindu and other smaller Muslim empires expanded at the expense of the Delhi Sultante. As the Tughluq Dynasty stagnated in the closing years of the fourteenth century, the great conqueror Temur cast his eye towards the jewel of northern India. In late 1398 Delhi was sacked and looted by Temur, but limped on until the 16th century when it was finally destroyed by a descendant of both Temur and Chinggis Khan, Babur.      The later interaction of the Delhi Sultanate with the heirs of the Mongols is a topic for future discussions, so be sure to subscribe to the Kings and Generals Podcast to follow. If you enjoyed this, then consider supporting us on patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals to help keep bringing you great content. This episode was researched and written by our series historian, Jack Wilson. I'm your host David, and we'll catch you on the next one.

Moderator: Alex Gladstein, Human Rights Foundation Panelists: Dr. Darren Byler: Anthropologist and Uyghur technopolitics expert Megha Rajagopalan: Buzzfeed international correspondent and investigative journalist Bethany Allen-Ebrahiminan: Axios China reporter What is unfolding in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (also referred to as East Turkestan) is considered one of the worst human rights abuses in the world today. The Uyghur Region — known as the Xinjiang province in China — is often referred to as a dystopian surveillance state and an open-air prison. The actions of the Muslim minorities living in the region are heavily monitored through cell phone applications, frequent home inspections, and an array of checkpoints throughout the region. Anywhere from 1 to 3 million people, including Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Tajiks, and other ethnic minorities, are forcibly confined to the Uyghur Region by the Chinese government — simply because they speak a different language, practice religion, and embrace a different culture. Within these concentration camps built by the Chinese government, Uyghurs are forced to take “re-education” courses, and are subject to mental & bodily harm and torture. In many cases, they are coerced and trafficked into state-sponsored forced labor schemes to ramp up production in factories across the country. Featuring spotlight speakers and engaging panelists, this 2-day event aims to provide participants with a holistic and multi-dimensional understanding of the genocide unfolding in the region. Participants will leave equipped with concrete ideas on how they can help stand up against these atrocities.

The Long-Arm of Authoritarianism Moderator: Jenny Wang, Human Rights Foundation Panelists: Dr. Sean Roberts, Director of International Development Studies Program at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs Dr. Timothy Grose, Associate Professor of China Studies at the Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology Alex Chow, Hong Kong activist and 2018 Nobel Peace Prize nominee What is unfolding in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (also referred to as East Turkestan) is considered one of the worst human rights abuses in the world today. The Uyghur Region — known as the Xinjiang province in China — is often referred to as a dystopian surveillance state and an open-air prison. The actions of the Muslim minorities living in the region are heavily monitored through cell phone applications, frequent home inspections, and an array of checkpoints throughout the region. Anywhere from 1 to 3 million people, including Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Tajiks, and other ethnic minorities, are forcibly confined to the Uyghur Region by the Chinese government — simply because they speak a different language, practice religion, and embrace a different culture. Within these concentration camps built by the Chinese government, Uyghurs are forced to take “re-education” courses, and are subject to mental & bodily harm and torture. In many cases, they are coerced and trafficked into state-sponsored forced labor schemes to ramp up production in factories across the country.

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Qaidu was raised in Chinggis Khan’s camp, and after Ogedai Khaan he served in Mongke Khaan’s retinue. After him, he was with Ariq Boke, conspiring and amking efforts to elevate him to the khanate. When Ariq Boke went before Kublai Khaan and submitted to him, Qaidu was wary of Kublai Khaan because it was the law that no creature should change the Khaan’s command or decree, and any who did would be branded as criminals. He had transgressed the law and rebelled, and from that time until present, ona account of his rebellion, many Mongols and Tajiks have been annhilated, and flourishing land has been devastated.”       So our oft-cited friend Rashid al-Din describes, rather negatively, his contemporary Qaidu, Khan of the house of Ogedai and master of Central Asia in the late thirteenth century. Qaidu is best known for his daughter Qutulun, the wrestler-princess, his long resistance against his cousin Kublai, Great Khan of the Yuan Dynasty, and enjoys a popular image as a spirited defender of traditional Mongolian culture- or, for writers like Rashid al-Din, an image of little more than a brigand harassing settled regions. To explore Kublai’s failed attempts to exert power over the western half of the Mongol Empire, we will look at the long life of Qaidu, master of the uluses of Ogedai and Chagatai. I’m your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.   While Kublai Khan overcame his brother Ariq Boke to become Khan of Khans in 1264, that was not the end of his troubles from his Mongolian kinsmen. Many refused to recognize Kublai’s authority, or actively took up arms against him, most famously Qaidu, a grandson of Ogedai Khan who led a 40 year campaign of resistance against Kublai Khan. While most famous for stories of his warrior daughter Qutulun and for his own personal sternness and military ability, Qaidu’s reign has often been misportrayed as an effort to seize the title of the Great Khan. His main focus however, was securing the position of the descendants of Ogedai within a fragmenting Mongol Empire.       Chinggis Khan had granted parts of eastern Kazakhstan, Xinjiang and western Mongolia as personal ulus, or territory, to his son Ogedai, serving as a base for Ogedai’s family until the 1250s. The Toluid Revolution, which by now you should know very well, saw the seizure of the throne by the sons of Tolui, away from the line of Ogedai following the death of the final Ogedeid Great Khan, Guyuk, in 1248. After Tolui’s eldest son Mongke became Khan in 1251, he discovered an alleged conspiracy against him by Ogedai’s family. This served as pretext for a purge of the Ogedaids, killing many and confiscating their lands and armies, effectively dissolving the Ogedaid ulus, as explained back in episode 21 of this series. Those few who survived, such as the young Qaidu, were granted distant lands to appease them but which were too poor to serve as a base for resistance. Born only around 1235 or 6, Qaidu was only just entering manhood when Mongke carried out his purges, deemed too young to be a threat. In proper Ogedeid fashion Qaidu’s father, Ogedai’s fifth son Qashi, drank himself to an early death shortly before Qaidu’s birth, leaving Qaidu’s early years to quietly rule over what little people, herds, pastures and towns Mongke Khaan had allotted him around Qayaliq, in what is now southern Kazakhstan. We can only imagine Qaidu’s frustration and anger, a sense that everything that was his by right had been taken from him, anger at the theft by the house of Tolui- not of the Great Khanate, which Qaidu was unlikely to have ever inherited, but of the ulus of Ogedai itself, the personal territory Chinggis Khan had granted that line of the family. One tradition from Qaidu’s earliest youth that survives, recorded by Jamal al-Qarshi, is that Ogedai Khaan once held the young boy and was so impressed with the 5 year old, that he stated Qaidu would one day succeed him and ordered his every need to be provided for. Even if the story were true, it must be remembered that Ogedai indicated about half of his sons and grandsons should have succeeded him at various points, and anyways, Qaidu was no mroe than six years old at the time of Ogedai’s death. No, the young Qaidu was not ever destined, nor likely ever considered himself to be, for the throne of the Great Khan.       Qayaliq was too poor to offer a base of resistance on its own, but it did not stop Qaidu from pushing his boundaries. In 1256, Mongke Khaan sent a judge to Qaidu’s territory as an official imperial representative- the exact mission unclear in the sources- and the 20 year old Qaidu promptly captured him, holding him captive for the next two decades. No reaction is recorded from Mongke, who may have been preoccupied with his forthcoming assault on the Song Dynasty to divert attention to an annoying Ogedeid boy. Perhaps Mongke had been planning to deal with him upon his return from campaign, but as we know, he never got the opprotunity: Mongke died on campaign in August 1259, precipitating the conflict between two of his brothers, Ariq Boke and Kublai, for the imperial throne.        Qaidu was initially neutral in the war between Ariq Boke and Kublai, supporting Ariq only when his appointed ruler to the Chagatai Khanate, Alghu, revolted and attacked Qaidu’s territory. It seems Alghu attacked Qaidu for supporting Ariq Boke, which forms the only real evidence for Qaidu’s  actual support of Ariq. With Ariq’s surrender to Kublai in 1264, Qaidu turned to the Khan of the Golden Horde, Berke, for support against Alghu. Supposedly Berke found Qaidu’s horoscope favourable, and provided him an army and resources, and a promise for rule over the ulus of Chagatai if he was successful. Winning his first encounter against Alghu, Qaidu suffered a serious defeat in the second  and seemed to be placed on the backfoot. But Heaven showed Qaidu its favour when Alghu, Berke, and the Il-Khan Hulegu all died over 1265-1267 and Kublai was focused on the Song Dynasty. This created a sudden power vacuum all across Central Asia; while his neighbours sorted out matters of succession, Qaidu expanded his territory from Almaliq to Taraz to Beshbaliq; in rapid succession, Qaidu successfully reclaimed much of the former territory of Ogedai’s ulus. Many of Ariq Boke and Alghu’s former supporters joined Qaidu, including the brilliant finance minister Ma’sud Beg, whose skills helped with the economic rejuvenation of Qaidu’s ulus. Many of these men were dispossed by the changes in power over these years, and were happy to throw their lot in with a bright-eyed, up and coming warlord showing he had some favour from Heaven. When Kublai summoned Qaidu to him in order to affirm his vassalage, Qaidu refused, claiming the distance was too great to travel. Though Kublai tried to encourage him by sending him revenues from conquered Chinese territory, Qaidu was intent on preserving his independence and fragile ulus. Kublai’s capital was moved from Karakorum in central Mongolia to Shangdu on the border with China, and then into China proper at Khanbaliq, greatly limited his ability to control his kinsmen deep in the steppe. In the next years, Qaidu’s pretensions would increased dramatically.        In the Chagatai Khanate power was taken by Baraq, who ruled with Kublai’s approval and was almost immediately at war with Qaidu. With the aid of the new Khan of the Golden Horde, Mongke-Temur, Qaidu defeated Baraq near Khojand in 1267, after which Qaidu proposed a joint peace between the Central Asian Khanates. Likely on the Qatwan Steppe, just south of Samarkand, in 1267 or 69, Qaidu, Baraq, and Mongke-Temur’s representatives made agreements to divide the territory of Transoxania between them,  Qaidu and Baraq became anda (blood brothers) and agreed to a joint-attack the Ilkhanate in Khurasan. Notable about this meeting was a total disregard for Kublai’s authority. Though Kublai was nominally Great Khan, by the end of the 1260s each Khanate was now an independent state, the Khans all now meeting without his consultation. Recorded in the Yuan shi, the assembled Khans apparently sent a jointly written letter, of questionable veracity, to Kublai decrying his sinicization and ‘adoption of Han laws.’ As mentioned by historian Michal Biran, this is the only direct textual evidence of Mongolian, and specifically Qaidu’s, opposition to Kublai’s adoption of Chinese policy and custom. While often presented as a “defender of the old ways,” Qaidu’s agreements on the Qatwan Steppe and actions over his life were always directed at his own power and independence in the Ogedeid ulus, rather than  whatever laws the fat Khan in Khanbaliq tried to pass.     Qaidu did provide forces for Baraq’s assault on the Ilkhanate, but they were instructed to abandon Baraq before battle was met. Baraq’s army was crushed by the Il-Khan Abaqa at Herat in 1270, and his death shortly afterwards was Qaidu’s most important opportunity. Many of Baraq’s commanders and armies fled to Qaidu, and only a month after Baraq’s death Qaidu was declared Khan of the Ogedeid ulus. We must emphasize this: he was declared Khan of the territory belonging to the House of Ogedai. He was never declared Great Khan of the Mongol Empire, or Khan of the Chagatayid ulus. He never made pretensiosn to claim either of those thrones, and his conflict with Kublai was not over who should be the Great Khan, but over Qaidu’s personal autonomy- and his right to appoint the Chagatai Khan after Baraq’s demise. When Qaidu’s first appointee rebelled alongside the sons of Alghu and Baraq, Qaidu overcame them and chose Baraq’s son Du’a as Chagatai Khan in 1282. Du’a would be Qaidu’s right hand man for the next twenty years, and as co-rulers they dominated Central Asia from the Yenisei River to the borders of India, and from Transoxania to the Mongolian Altai, a border keeping Kublai’s control confined to the east.   Kublai’s campaign against the Song Dynasty kept him from interfering with Qaidu’s domination of the Chagatai Khanate, instead relying on defence. As early as the mid 1260s, Qaidu was raiding Kublai’s frontier: in 1268 Kublai’s armies had to push Qaidu’s forces from Beshbaliq and the Uighur lands. By the end of the 1260s, Kublai was posting a large garrison in Mongolia under his son Nomukhan. Nomukhan was not terribly successful: he was betrayed by his subordinates and sent over to the Golden Horde in 1276, and Karakorum fell into the hands of these rebellious princes. Qaidu played no role in this, distracted as he was at that time by trying to exert control over the ulus of Chagatai. In an effort to make the local garrisons self sufficient, Kublai spent considerable amounts attempting to expand agriculture and set up military colonies in the Tarim Basin, Gansu corridor and Mongolia, but only in Mongolia did he see limited success. Qaidu’s raids were too successful and the regions too arid, and Kublai only succeeded in throwing away huge sums of money and resources.   By the 1280s, Qaidu had a firm hold on Central Asia and loyal ally in his appointed Chagatai Khan, Du’a. Finally, they could take advantage of rebellions across Kublai’s frontier, such as that in Tibet in 1285 and of Nayan in Manchuria in 1287, with whom Qaidu tried to coordinate with. Kublai, realizing Mongolia itself was now threatened, took to the field himself. Sending an army west to counter Qaidu and an army into southern Manchuria to distract the other local Mongol dissident, Khadan, the aging Kublai led the third army from a platform mounted on the backs of four elephants. Nayan was swiftly caught and executed. Qaidu had advanced on the old Mongol capital of Qaraqorum as per the suggestion of Ariq Boke’s sons, but the threat of facing Kublai himself led to Qaidu’s withdrawal. This was the closest the two ever came to fighting one another in person. While Karakorum may have held symbolic value, strategically it would be nearly impossible for Qaidu to hold it, and as he was making no claim to the title of Great Khan, its symbolism was useless to him. Karakorum was but a brief flirtation for him, egged on by his allies to take advantage of Kublai’s perceived weakenss, rather than a long awaited goal. The aging Kublai had shown he still had teeth, and Qaidu would not make such an attempt again for the remainder of Kublai’s life.       Qaidu does not seem to have taken advantage of Kublai’s death in 1294, and Kublai’s successor, Temur Oljeitu, abandoned his grandfather’s foreign adventures, focusing greater resources on combating Qaidu along the northwestern frontier. In winter 1298, Qaidu’s Chagatai Khan Du’a attacked the Yuan frontier and captured Temur Oljeitu Khan’s brother-in-law Korguz, who died before he could be rescued. This was an embarrassment and insult for the new Khan of Khans, and Temur Oljeitu sprung into action, ordering his nephew Qaishan to Mongolia, where he assembled a great army and marched west to crush Qaidu in 1300.       In spring 1300, east of the Altai mountains at Kuobielie, Qaishan’s army overtook Qaidu. In a furious assault, they forced Qaidu to retreat west into the Altai mountains in western Mongolia. Qaishan was a cautious commander, only proceeding once he acquired sufficient provisions, which gave Qaidu time to call to Du’a for aid. Du’a initially refused, but did send two armies later that summer, a first to reinforce Qaidu while Du’a himself led a second. The onset of winter halted the campaign, and for most of 1301 Qaishan struggled to locate Qaidu’s smaller, highly mobile force in the Altai. Qaidu needed to hold out for the arrival of Du’a reinforcements, but couldn’t retreat lest he allow Qaishan to overrun his hard won ulus.       Finally in August 1301, Qaishan’s scouts informed him that Qaidu’s army was encamped at Mount Tiejiangu, and that Du’a’s reinforcements were close at hand. On the 3rd of September the Yuan army attacked. The Yuan assault was devastating: Qaidu’s smaller force was overrun, Qaidu himself wounded in the battle. Only nightfall forced the two armies apart, and Qaidu employed a tool of his great-grandfather. He ordered his men to each light several fires, and to the Yuan forces, it appeared that Du’a’s enforcements had suddenly arrived and lit their own campfires. Their enemy refusing to advance, Qaidu used this distraction to pull his forces back. When morning revealed the truth, Qaishan was hesitant to immediately pursue, fearing Qaidu would employ a feigned retreat. This provided Qaidu time to meet with forces sent by Du’a two days later at Qara Qada, along the Irtysh River. Learning of Du’a’s reinforcements, Qaishan split his force: one section would intercept Du’a and his army, while Qaishan took the rest of the Yuan forces to catch Qaidu.   When Qaishan arrived at Qara Qada, Qaidu was prepared. This time, the Yuan army was not as successful, though Qaishan himself broke through Qaidu’s lines, seizing his military supplies, rescuing captive princes and turning about to lead a rear assault on a section of Qaidu’s line. But Qaidu held firm, and his horse archers kept the Yuan back until nightfall once again split them apart. Not far away at an unidentified location called Wuertu, Yuan forces defeated and wounded Du’a, who then seems to have retreated back to his own territory.       The following day was the final confrontation. Qaidu, now approaching 70 years old, held his vetetan forces together against the Yuan’s superior numbers. Arrows filled the air, and the Yuan army was in an inconclusive engagement. An effort to pull the Yuan forces back and redeploy was foiled by a full charge by Qaidu, and the Yuan retreat now threatened to turn into a rout. Qaishan fought bravely as rearguard, and once more broke through Qaidu’s line, forcing them back and allowing the Yuan army to undertake an orderly retreat back to Qaraqorum, Qaishan burning the steppe behind them to hamper Qaidu’s pursuit. But Qaidu did not follow, instead falling back, given pause by his losses and his own injuries sustained, which were likely his cause of death a few weeks after the battle.       The Ogedeid ulus did not long survive Qaidu’s death. Qaidu’s lifetime of carving out a restored Ogedeid state within the Mongol Empire was undermined by his own longtime ally. Almost immediately, Du’a sabotaged Qaidu’s successors. Du’a, it seems, had had enough of war with the Yuan Dynasty, and desired peace in order to resume the Central Asian trade, as well as focus resources on the border with India. To do this though, he would need to break the ability of the house of Ogedai to control the Chagatayids. Qaidu had wanted his youngest son Orus to succeed him, but Du’a maneuvered Qaidu’s ineffective and unhealthy older son Chapar to become Khan, forming rifts within the ulus. Du’a furthered the division of the Ogedeid ulus into appanages, and infighting broke out among Qaidu’s heirs. A brief attempt  to unite the Ogedeyid princes against Du’a was crushed in 1306 by Chagatayid troops with Yuan backing, and many of the top princes and generals of the Ogedeyid ulus surrendered to Du’a or to the Yuan. Du’a unleashed his horsemen to track down those Ogedeyids who remained independent, and one such Chagatayid raid even resulted in the death of Qaidu’s famed daughter Qutulun.        Ah yes, Qutulun! She is worth a short digression, as she is most famous among Mongolian princesses of this period, and many of you have likely wondered why we have not yet mentioned her role in her father’s battles. Qutulun is usually most well known as the famed ‘wrestler-princess.’ In the version popularized in Marco Polo’s account, wherein she is called Ay Yaruq, moonshine in Turkic, she refused to marry any man who couldn’t best her in a wrestling match. In fact, she claimed the herds of every man she was able to throw to the ground. She was such a good wrestler that, according to Polo, she had a herd of 10,000 animals she had claimed over her career. To carry on the fable-like nature of his version, Polo has an unnamed prince of quite some wealth attempt to win her hand. Qaidu, having agreed to let Qutulun marry who she wanted but recognizing it was a powerful match, encouraged his daughter to let the man win. Qutulun instead threw the prince to the ground and claimed his horses. Polo also asserts that she would fight beside her father, riding into enemy formations to grab and steal men. It’s a bebrudging respect for evidently a highly skilled and dangeorus woman! What’s more, it’s a depiction of a woman of physical prowess and military capability which is actually backed up by some contemporary writers, such as the Ilkhanid author Rashid al-Din and ‘Abd Allah Qashani. The Ilkhanid vizer Rashid al-Din was less impressed than Marco Polo regarding Qutulun, writing the following:       “Qaidu had a daughter named Qutulun… he loved her the most of all his children. She went around like a boy and often went on military campaigns, where she performed valiant deeds. She was listened to by her father, and she handled the administration for him. Her father refused to marry her off, and people accused him of having relations with her… a few years ago, because of shame and the accusations people were making, he was forced to marry her off to a man named Aitqun of the Qorolas clan.”       Rashid al-Din, as we said at the start of the episode, had no fondness for Qaidu. Rashid’s employers, the Toluid Ilkhans, were often at war with him after all. Rashid al-din is too refined to openly say he agreed with such horrendous rumours about father and daughter, but was not above mentioning the fact people were spreading them. Qutulun in the end, but likely of her own choice, married a member of his father’s  keshig, one of his royal cooks. That the fellow’s name and lineage differs in the accounts, and Qutulun is still described leading her minghaans, units of a thousand, indicates that her new husband did little to overawe her military ability.   After Qaidu’s death, Qutulun staunchly supported her father’s chosen heir, Orus. She recognized early  Du’a effort to undermine the Ogedeyid ulus and spoke out against him at an assembly. Du’a dismissed her concerns thus, saying “Women’s opinions and talk should be about the spindle and spinning wheel, not on the crown and the khanate’s throne. What do you have to do with rulership and government?” The frustrated Qutulun found no support from her brothers and withdrew with her family and followers to the Tien Shan mountains, in what is now Kyrgyzstan, where she guarded her father’s tomb. Though she largely removed herself from the affairs of the Ogedeyid Khanate, when her brothers sought to make a stand against Du’a in 1306, the contemporary author Qashani mentions that Qutulun showed up to assist them, leading her 1,000 men beside them. Even with her assistance, a combined Chagatayid-Yuan army under Du’a defeated the Ogedeyid army. Generals and even her brothers began deserting to the Chagatayids or to the Yuan realm, and as mentioned Du’a sent raiding parties to track down those who escaped. Qutulun returned to her encampment near her father’s tomb, where she held out until 1307. That year, Qashani records, Chagatayid forces found them, drowning her husband and two sons.Qutulun’s final fate is unmentioned, but it is presumed she was killed sometime around then. The Ogedeyid Khanate did not long outlive her. By 1310 when Chapar submitted to the new Yuan Emperor, Qaishan, the Ogedeyid ulus ceased to exist, only some 60 years after Qaidu had restored it.        Du’a died in 1307, but his sons continued to dominate the Chagatayid ulus for the next 30 years, incorporating much of the former Ogedeid territory. After the death of the last of Du’a’s sons, the Chagatai Khanate entered a period of great instability, gradually breaking into two halves, a western based in Transoxania, and another east of the Syr Darya River, which came to be known as Moghulistan. In the western half, the authority of the Chagatai Khan weakened sooner, a power vacuum which led to the eventual rise of Amir Temur in Transoxania, better known in the west as Tamerlane. But that’s a topic for another day, so please consider subscribing to our podcast to follow for future episodes. If you’d like to help us continue bringign you great content, please consider supporting on patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. This episode was researched and written by our series historian, Jack Wilson. I’m your host David, and we’ll catch you on the next one.

“The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN) aimed at promoting world peace and security through international cooperation in education, the sciences, and culture. It has 193 member states and 11 associate members as well as partners in the nongovernmental, intergovernmental, and private sector. Headquartered in Paris, France, UNESCO has 53 regional field offices and 199 national commissions that facilitate its global mandate.” “Xinjiang borders the countries of Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The most well-known route of the historical Silk Road ran through the territory from the east to its northwestern border. It is home to a number of ethnic groups, including the Turkic Uyghur, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, the Han, Tibetans, Hui, Tajiks, Mongols, Russians and Xibe. Only about 9.7% of Xinjiang's land area is fit for human habitation.” “Chipotle is one of the first chains of fast casual dining establishments. In 1998, the first restaurant outside of Colorado opened in Kansas City, Missouri. The company opened its first location in Minnesota by opening near the campus of the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis in March 1999. The company trades on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol CMG.” Wikipedia.org --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app

Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī (Persian: جلال‌الدین محمد رومی‎), also known as Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Balkhī (جلال‌الدین محمد بلخى), Mevlânâ/Mawlānā (مولانا, "our master"), Mevlevî/Mawlawī (مولوی, "my master"), and more popularly simply as Rumi (30 September 1207 – 17 December 1273), was a 13th-century Persian poet, Hanafi faqih, Islamic scholar, Maturidi theologian, and Sufi mystic originally from Greater Khorasan in Greater Iran. Rumi's influence transcends national borders and ethnic divisions: Iranians, Tajiks, Turks, Greeks, Pashtuns, other Central Asian Muslims, and the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent have greatly appreciated his spiritual legacy for the past seven centuries. His poems have been widely translated into many of the world's languages and transposed into various formats. Rumi has been described as the "most popular poet" and the "best selling poet" in the United States. Rumi, 1207– 1273 CE,  was a 13th-century Persian Muslim poet, jurist, Islamic scholar, theologian, and Sufi mystic.  Rumi's influence transcends national borders and ethnic divisions in the Muslim world and beyond. His poems have been widely translated into many of the world's language. Rumi has become a widely read and popular poet, even in the US. Like other mystic and Sufi poets of Persian literature, Rumi's poetry speaks of love which infuses the world. Rumi's teachings also express the tenets summarized in the Quranic verse which Shams-e Tabrizi cited as the essence of prophetic guidance: "Know that ‘There is no god but He,' and ask forgiveness for your sin" (Q. 47:19). In the interpretation attributed to Shams, the first part of the verse commands the humanity to seek knowledge of tawhid (oneness of God), while the second instructs them to negate their own existence. In Rumi's terms, tawhid is lived most fully through love, with the connection being made explicit in his verse that describes love as "that flame which, when it blazes up, burns away everything except the Everlasting Beloved." Rumi believed passionately in the use of music, poetry and dance as a path for reaching God. For Rumi, music helped devotees to focus their whole being on the divine and to do this so intensely that the soul was both destroyed and resurrected. It was from these ideas that the practice of whirling Dervishes developed into a ritual form. His teachings became the base for the order of the Mevlevi, which his son Sultan Walad organised. Rumi encouraged Sama, listening to music and turning or doing the sacred dance. In the Mevlevi tradition, samāʿ represents a mystical journey of spiritual ascent through mind and love to the Perfect One. In this journey, the seeker symbolically turns towards the truth, grows through love, abandons the ego, finds the truth and arrives at the Perfect. The seeker then returns from this spiritual journey, with greater maturity, to love and to be of service to the whole of creation without discrimination with regard to beliefs, races, classes and nations. Here are a collection of short poetic phrases from Rumi done in the form of a meditation. Welcome to the Reality Revolution. Music By Mettaversedeeply divine meditationalways nowcosmic riverthe shift639hz increase love and harmony ➤ Listen on Soundcloud: http://bit.ly/2KjGlL➤ Follow them on Instagram: http://bit.ly/2JW8BU2➤ Join them on Facebook: http://bit.ly/2G1j7G6➤ Subscribe to their channel here: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCyvjffON2NoUvX5q_TgvVkw Guided Meditations https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLKv1KCSKwOo_BfNnb5vLcwouInskcEhqL For all episodes of the Reality Revolution – https://www.therealityrevolution.com Join our facebook group The Reality Revolution https://www.facebook.com/groups/403122083826082/  Contact us at media@advancedsuccessinsitute.com#rumi #poetry #beauty #meditation #guidedmeditation #manifestation #lawofattraction #quantumjump #TotalHumanOptimization

People Group Summary https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/15201 Listen to the "Gateway to the Unreached" with Greg Kelley, produced by the Alliance for the Unreached: https://alliancefortheunreached.org/podcast/

Lisa og Sigrid beklager.  See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

From learning to teach on the fly, to learning absolute obedience to Tajik grandmothers, to learning to adapt to ten-hour taxi rides, Chane Corp kept his wits, his sense of humor, and his love of Central Asia.

In History of the Tajiks: Iranians of the East(I.B. Tauris, 2019), Richard Foltz provides a comprehensive cultural, political, and linguistic history of the Tajik people. Throughout the book, he traces the history of this Persian-speaking Iranian ethnic group, starting with the pre-historic groups who first settled in the regions of contemporary Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan, and ending in the present day. Inspired by the work and career of Richard N. Frye, Foltz puts forward a clear argument about the place of the Tajiks in the broader Persianate world. Suitable for both academic and broader audiences, this book is a must-read for anyone interested in the history of the Tajik-populated regions of Central Asia, or for those seeking a broader understanding of the long durée of Persianate history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In History of the Tajiks: Iranians of the East(I.B. Tauris, 2019), Richard Foltz provides a comprehensive cultural, political, and linguistic history of the Tajik people. Throughout the book, he traces the history of this Persian-speaking Iranian ethnic group, starting with the pre-historic groups who first settled in the regions of contemporary Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan, and ending in the present day. Inspired by the work and career of Richard N. Frye, Foltz puts forward a clear argument about the place of the Tajiks in the broader Persianate world. Suitable for both academic and broader audiences, this book is a must-read for anyone interested in the history of the Tajik-populated regions of Central Asia, or for those seeking a broader understanding of the long durée of Persianate history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In History of the Tajiks: Iranians of the East(I.B. Tauris, 2019), Richard Foltz provides a comprehensive cultural, political, and linguistic history of the Tajik people. Throughout the book, he traces the history of this Persian-speaking Iranian ethnic group, starting with the pre-historic groups who first settled in the regions of contemporary Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan, and ending in the present day. Inspired by the work and career of Richard N. Frye, Foltz puts forward a clear argument about the place of the Tajiks in the broader Persianate world. Suitable for both academic and broader audiences, this book is a must-read for anyone interested in the history of the Tajik-populated regions of Central Asia, or for those seeking a broader understanding of the long durée of Persianate history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In History of the Tajiks: Iranians of the East(I.B. Tauris, 2019), Richard Foltz provides a comprehensive cultural, political, and linguistic history of the Tajik people. Throughout the book, he traces the history of this Persian-speaking Iranian ethnic group, starting with the pre-historic groups who first settled in the regions of contemporary Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan, and ending in the present day. Inspired by the work and career of Richard N. Frye, Foltz puts forward a clear argument about the place of the Tajiks in the broader Persianate world. Suitable for both academic and broader audiences, this book is a must-read for anyone interested in the history of the Tajik-populated regions of Central Asia, or for those seeking a broader understanding of the long durée of Persianate history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Trine Eilertsen og Lars Glomnes kaster seg i podkaststudio før Eilertsen setter kursen mot USA. Tema: Rune Bjerke, DNB og Panama og Hadia Tajiks rakryggede monarki-angrep. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

* Justisdepartementet har sviktet som beredskapsdepartement, slår Riksrevisjonen fast. - Sikkerheten er ikke blitt bedre etter 22.juli 2011. * Sosialistisk Ungdom og Elevorganisasjonen vil kvitte seg med eksamen i skolen. Men lektorlaget mener den må beholdes - for rettferdighetens skyld. * At Hadia Tajik både er muslim og feminist forstyrrer islamkritikernes bilde av islam, skriver Vårt Land. - Slett ikke, vi er glade for Tajiks opprør, innvender Human Rights Service * Freuds teorier er ikke vitenskap, hevder biologi-professor. En påstand basert på uvitenhet, svarer professor-kollega Dette er noen av temaene i dagens Dagsnytt atten i NRKP2 og NRK2 med Sigrid Sollund i studio