Podcasts about Singapore

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Battle of Hong kong. Japan's rise as a threat to British interests accelerated through the 1920s and intensified after invading China. Britain's response remained contradictory—diplomatically conciliatory yet militarily apprehensive. While Singapore and Malaya received substantial reinforcements, Hong Kong was acknowledged indefensible, yet the 1936 Defence Scheme attempted to fortify it as an island fortress. Governor Northcote urgently advocated evacuation, recognizing the futility of defense. London rejected this, fearing it would demoralize China and forfeit sovereignty claims. Reinforcement requests from commanders like Grasett fell on deaf ears until Grasett independently lobbied Canadian leaders. This persistence finally convinced Churchill to dispatch two additional battalions. On December 8, 1941, Japanese forces attacked across three fronts with overwhelming force. Within hours, the RAF was destroyed on the ground, demolitions proved ineffective, and British units rapidly retreated toward the Gin Drinkers Line, facing an enemy that outnumbered and outmaneuvered them from the opening moments.   #217 The Battle of Hong Kong Part 2: the Island Aflame Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Around 1500 hours on 9 December, Colonel Doi of the 228th Regiment arrived at Needle Hill, just north of the Gin Drinkers Line, ahead of his main force. For two hours he studied the British defensive positions through binoculars, noting trenches and bunkers—and to his surprise, washing lines fluttering with white clothes. The sight spoke volumes about the 2 Royal Scots' lax discipline. Then fog descended, reducing visibility to barely twenty meters, and heavy rain obscured the landscape. Doi sensed a fleeting advantage but lost radio contact with his battalions. Worse still, the Shing Mun Redoubt lay outside his regimental boundary, making an unauthorized attack a serious breach of protocol. When his units finally arrived, supporting artillery remained unavailable, held up by demolished roads. Doi chose to attack anyway. Doi ordered the 2nd Battalion to scout the eastern approach while the 3rd Battalion spearheaded the main assault. Major Nishiyana commanded the 3rd, sending Lieutenant Wakabayashi and Kasugai with 150 volunteers to lead. The Shing Mun Redoubt itself comprised five concrete pillboxes and an artillery observation post, connected by underground tunnels named after London landmarks—Piccadilly, Haymarket, and others. The whole complex sat on small rises above Jubilee Dam, then the British Empire's tallest. Defending the redoubt was A Company, 2 Royal Scots, under Captain Jones—just three officers and 39 men. One platoon of 25 soldiers under 2nd Lieutenant Thompson held the forward positions. Against this stood 150 Japanese attackers, with another 1,500 troops in reserve. Battalion orders forbade using the concrete works as fighting positions; they were meant for the Vickers machine-gun team and artillery protection. No mines could spare the redoubt's perimeter. On the night of the 9th, roughly half the defenders sheltered in the observation post while the remainder manned pillboxes 401b and 402. At 2000 hours, Thompson led a nine-man patrol northward to check Needle Hill and Shing Mun Valley. Despite two and a half hours in the field, the patrol returned at 2220 hours without detecting the Japanese force massing just 500 meters away. By that time, Lieutenant Kasugai's assault group had crossed Jubilee Dam undetected, bypassed unmanned Post X, and assembled below Pillbox 401b. At 2200 hours, Japanese sappers cut through two lines of wire. At 2300—H-Hour—Lance Corporal Laird heard movement in the bushes and opened fire. The Japanese answered with grenades and rushed the pillbox lines. One team entered the tunnel system; another hurled grenades through the air vents. Corporal Campbell swung his Vickers toward Pillbox 401, catching Japanese headquarters personnel in the open. Sergeant Robb mustered a counter-attack force of thirteen men. Five fell as casualties—Laird, Basnett, Coyle, Casey, and Jardine. Casey was killed; only Jardine escaped. The alert triggered gunfire from the observation post's defenders, and Forward Observer Wilcox called down 4.5-inch and 6-inch artillery fire. Without strong reinforcement and leadership, four Royal Scots and an Indian sentry abandoned the northern positions and withdrew to the observation post. Captain Jones received orders from Brigade to counter-attack, but delegated the task to Thompson. As Thompson attempted to leave the observation post, he found the gate locked from outside. This calamity had a backstory: just before the attack, Thompson had admitted a civilian at the request of Force 163 (SOE's sabotage unit in Singapore). Private Wylie had taken the observation post key from Lance Naik Kishan Singh and, upon exit, locked the gate behind him. The three officers were now literally locked out of the battle. Second Lieutenant Mochizuki and his platoon infiltrated through open trenches and began attacking the observation post from above, attempting to breach the hatches. The defenders held for three hours before Japanese sappers forced explosives down the air vents. At 0230 hours, the blast killed two Indian signallers inside. Thompson sustained a severe eye wound from grenade shrapnel; Jones and Warrant Officer Mead were both wounded. The remaining fifteen defenders surrendered; eleven became casualties. Meanwhile, a Rajput patrol engaging Japanese forces in the river valley managed to drive them back toward the redoubt. One final pillbox endured for another eleven hours before suffering the same sapper treatment. By 0400 hours on 10 December, the entire redoubt was lost. For just two killed, the Japanese had achieved a decisive victory—the breakthrough that would shift the entire campaign's trajectory. By dawn, a Japanese flag flew triumphantly from Point 255.   Major-General Maltby's assessment was stark: "This was calamitous, for Shing Mun was the key to the whole of the left position." Yet the Japanese perspective differed sharply. Having achieved a breakthrough, Colonel Doi received astonishing orders to withdraw—his success had transgressed into the 230th Regiment's sector and violated the meticulously prepared war plan. Doi refused. After heated confrontation with Major-General Ito and Lieutenant-General Sakai, his insubordination was later censured, though a divisional staff officer, Oyadomani, bore the scapegoat's burden of rebuke for failing to restrain Doi's initiative. With Shing Mun secured, Doi methodically fed reinforcements into the position. Throughout December 10th, the Japanese remained uncertain of their advantage and adopted a cautious strategy, probing British lines to exploit the evident disorder. Brigadier Wallis ordered the Royal Scots to mount an immediate dawn counterattack supported by the Rajputs and artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel White demurred; his battalion lacked any reasonable prospect of success. The resulting counterattack proved half-hearted at best. At first light on December 11th, the Japanese pressed Golden Hill forcefully, only to be repulsed by Captain Newton's Rajputs and gunfire from HMS Cicala. White positioned D Company in shallow shell scrapes and rusted wire—inadequate defenses against Japanese assault. Captain Pinkerton led a desperate bayonet charge that morning, temporarily clearing the Japanese and enabling the evacuation of wounded. Yet B, C, and D Companies absorbed devastating losses; Captains Rose and Richardson fell commanding their positions. With the Royal Scots collapsing, X Company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers and armored support rushed westward to seal the widening gap along Castle Peak Road. Meanwhile, Maltby grappled with alarming reports: Japanese landings on Lantau Island southwest of Hong Kong. Heavy artillery drove them back. A second probe at Aberdeen, where Special Naval Landing Forces approached within 300 yards of the naval base, was repelled by Canadian machine-gun fire. In hindsight, these were mere feints—never intended as the primary thrust. The stratagem succeeded. Maltby retained his island reserves—the Middlesex and two Canadian battalions—precisely where they would be needed. Had Wallis executed a forceful counterattack on December 10th with the Royal Scots and brigade reserves, the Rajputs might have retaken Shing Mun while the Japanese remained disorganized. Instead, Colonel Doi faced a furious Sakai, who had flown down from 38th Division headquarters at Taipo for what amounted to a pre-court-martial examination. The moment passed. After only 48 hours of combat, Maltby concluded the mainland was indefensible. The three battalions would withdraw intact to Hong Kong Island to assume their fortress defense roles. The naval commodore objected—demolitions, supply transfers, and troop ferrying required more time. The evacuation order was deferred 24 hours until noon on December 11th. At that hour, the decision was finalized: the mainland would be abandoned under cover of darkness. Further demolitions followed—the China Light and Power Station, the cement works on Tsing Yi Island, the docks. Yet Brigadier Wallis believed this merely a precautionary measure; he anticipated holding the mainland for at least another week. The withdrawal avoided Kowloon's congested streets, where street fighting and fifth columnists might have entrapped the British—a calculation that proved prescient, as an IJA advance column of 350 men from the 3/230th infiltrated Kowloon on the morning of December 12th to cut off the retreating garrison. The Royal Scots and Canadians retired south to Shamshuipo Barracks and Jordan Road Pier in western Kowloon; the Rajputs and supporting gunners withdrew eastward to Ma Lau Tong, which anchored the fortified Devil's Peak Peninsula. Maltby intended to hold this commanding position permanently—it was easily supplied across the narrow Lyemun Strait. The evacuation proceeded largely as planned. The Canadians and Royal Scots embarked on the afternoon and evening of December 11th under Punjabi covering fire. The Punjabis faced a harder journey—a moonlit scramble along steep Kowloon hills laden with supplies but critically short of mules. One group lost its way at a crucial junction, splitting into two columns. One proceeded toward Devil's Peak as planned; Battalion Headquarters descended into Kai Tak Airport, threaded through Kowloon City, and was evacuated by Star Ferry at Tsim Sha Tsui, fighting until the final moment as the last man boarded. The Rajputs' commander, unable to reach his Punjabi counterpart, abandoned Ma Lau Tong for the closer Hai Wan line near Devil's Peak. By 0400 hours on December 12th, the Punjabis and one Rajput company, accompanied by the gunners of the 25th Medium Battery, crossed Lyemun Strait to Hong Kong Island. Morning evacuations continued with minimal Japanese interference—a surprising restraint. Naval support proved crucial. The withdrawal completed by the morning of December 13th, though 170 mules were lost to the desertion of Chinese laborers—a deprivation that would haunt the subsequent campaign. During this passage, the IJN attempted shore bombardment. The Japanese cruiser and supporting vessels found themselves outranged by the defenders' 9.2-inch guns. The damage inflicted proved sufficient to discourage future naval adventures; for the remainder of the battle, the IJN maintained a cautious distance and played only a peripheral role. The speed and execution of the withdrawal apparently caught the Japanese unprepared. Their most probable expectation had been a full-scale assault on Devil's Peak accompanied by heavy bombardment—a day earlier, an assault without artillery preparation had been driven back with severe losses. The British appeared stronger than anticipated. The defense of the mainland had lasted only five days. With the mainland secured, the Japanese pivoted toward Hong Kong Island. The first move was diplomatic rather than military. At 0900 hours on December 13th, a small boat bearing a white flag crossed the harbor. It carried Colonel Toda, Lieutenant Mizuno, Mr. Othsu Dak, and two European women—the prominent and heavily pregnant Mrs. Macdonald and Mrs. C. R. Lee, wife of the Governor's secretary, accompanied by her two dachshunds. The surrender terms were flatly rejected. Major Boxer delivered the written refusal personally. Mrs. Macdonald remained in Hong Kong to give birth; Mrs. Lee and her dogs returned to Kowloon. The Japanese commenced systematic shelling of selected targets. On December 13th, a 9.2-inch gun on Mt. Davis was silenced; Belcher's Fort sustained damage. The following day, a 3-inch mount on Mt. Davis was hit, killing Chinese gunners and triggering morale collapse; some deserted. On December 15th, the barrage shifted to the northern shoreline, deliberately targeting pillboxes. At 2100 hours that night, approximately three Japanese companies attempted crossing the harbor in rubber rafts toward Pakshawan but were driven off by machine-gun fire. Fifth columnists intensified their operations—signaling with mirrors, sniping from concealed positions, spreading propaganda to encourage Chinese desertion. Their impact might have been catastrophic had not Rear-Admiral Chan and Colonel Yee, armed with tommy guns and grenades, systematically eliminated many of these saboteurs. By December 16th, half the pillboxes between the racecourse and Lyemun Strait lay destroyed. The intended crossing site was unmistakable. On December 17th, the Japanese dispatched a second peace mission—Colonel Toda's team now accompanied by Mrs. Lee with her dachshunds and a pregnant Russian woman. Again, the overtures were rebuffed. On December 18th, the bombardment reached new intensity. Oil storage tanks ignited, sending dense black smoke cascading across the northeast corner of the island—perfect concealment for what was to come. All signs pointed to imminent assault.  I want to note something here, you sometimes hear about how race played a role in the Pacific War and indeed it did. Racist attitudes were found on both the western and Japanese side of the war. There is a fantastic book dedicated to this by the way called, War without Mercy by John Dower, highly recommend it. What is interesting is how these racial attitudes actually affected decision making during the war. Take General Sakai's night amphibious assault for example. Western soldiers such as the Canadians in Hong Kong reported they were told by their commanders that quote "Don't worry about the Japanese, they can't see at night, they all wear glasses" another Canadian soldier wrote in a diary "They don't see well, especially at night we knew this as a matter of fact." Indeed the week before the outbreak of the battle of Hong Kong, Canadian officers attending a briefing by a British officer were informed that "Japan's aircraft were mostly obsolete, its air force had little practice in night flying, and its pilots were myopic and thus unable to carry out dive-bombing attacks". You might be asking yourself, why did they think the Japanese were myopic? The scientific explanation of the day was this "That the Japanese suffered widespread inner-ear damage. What caused this? Japanese motherhood, the practice of strapping babies to their mothers backs, it was explained caused their heads to bounce about, like when they harvested rice and permanently impaired their sense of balance". I particularly love this quote, one of my professors dedicated an entire class to the bizarre racial attitudes before and after the pacific war. There was a belief the Japanese could not see well at night, many western air force commanders actually believed there were times of day like at dawn or dusk where Japanese pilots would not operate because of this hindrance. American military commentator Fletcher Pratt in 1939 analyzed Japan's military strengths and explained it had four major weaknesses. The first was scarcity of resources such as iron, and steel. The second was that the Japanese "can neither make good airplanes nor fly them well" as a result of " the Japanese as a race have defects of the tubes of the inner ear, just as they are generally myopic. This gives them a defective sense of balance, the one physical sense in which an aviator is not permitted to be deficient.". The third was that the Japanese were short-tempered and were inclined to waste men unnecessarily when operations did not go well. The fourth was that the Japanese would simply never date to provoke a war with the US. Again Mr Pratt was an American military commentator whose information came from multiple accounts given by high ranking military officials! The British military maintained that the Japanese avoided night operations on land because they were simply incapable of caring them out well, while they avoided nighttime aerial attacks, as well as dive-bombing for the same reasons Pratt said quote "their pilots were poor and their aircraft inferior.". So take this all to mind when I talk about how certain ranking officers go about making their decisions. By the evening of 14 December, evacuated mainland units had regrouped on Hong Kong Island. The defensive structure was restructured into two brigades: Brigadier Wallis commanded the East Brigade from Taitam Gap, while Brigadier Lawson headed the West Brigade from Wongneichong Gap. This reorganization placed the 5/7 Rajputs across the north-east perimeter, defending over 3,500 metres of coastline with B Company positioned on the hills behind Taikoo Docks. The Royal Rifles of Canada held the north-east corner from Stanley to points south, with reserve positions at Lyemun. Two HKVDC companies supported from Taitam Valley and Pottinger Gap, while the veteran Hughsiliers manned the North Point power station. British and Canadian artillery provided fire support across the northern approaches. The West Brigade held the north-western and south-western shores. The 2/14 Punjab stretched from Causeway Bay to Belcher's Point, protecting Government House and General Maltby's headquarters, with battalion headquarters at Mid-Level. The Winnipeg Grenadiers covered the south-west from Wanchai Gap, with one company detached to the brigade headquarters at Wongneichong Gap. The 2 Royal Scots, severely mauled at Shing Mun, were held in reserve with fresh replacements from the HKVDC. The Middlesex Regiment's companies were dispersed along 72 pillboxes encircling the entire shoreline, while an improvised Z Company of clerks, musicians and cooks defended battalion headquarters at Leighton Hill. Supporting artillery included 9.2-inch and 6-inch guns on Mt Davis and 4.7-inch guns at Belcher's Point. As darkness fell on 17 December, Japanese reconnaissance swimmers reached Taikoo, confirming the crossing site despite detection. Reinforcements arrived: 18 additional heavy bombers from Guangzhou and 26 fighters from Taiwan joined the aerial assault. The crescendo of artillery fire on the 18th, combined with masses of small craft gathering across the harbour, signalled the imminent invasion. Japanese divisional headquarters shifted to Ma Tau Wei near Kai Tak Airport; the 23rd Army moved to Taipo. The invasion force disposed itself with the right flank embarking from east and west of Kai Tak, the left from Devil's Hill area. At 1800 hours, the invasion order was issued; by 1930 hours Sakai himself arrived in Kowloon to oversee the crossing. At precisely 2000 hours, the 2/228th Regiment silently paddled their collapsible craft toward Taikoo Docks and the nearby sugar factory as artillery support commenced. Colonel Doi embarked with 80 headquarters personnel aboard a large barge, leading the second wave. The conditions favoured the invaders—a moonless night, sporadic showers, and thick black smoke from burning oil tanks obscured their movement. They reached the midpoint undetected before searchlights and machine-gun fire scattered the small boats, separating commanders from their units. Despite this chaos, the assault pressed forward. At 2140 hours the artillery shifted to deeper targets; at 2145 hours the first wave of 3/230th landed at North Point, followed minutes later by 2/228th and then 2/229th. Three red flares signalled a successful landing. All six Japanese battalions were ashore by midnight, though wire fencing delayed their advance and Bren carriers added to the confusion on the beach. General Sano arrived at Taikoo one hour later. The 5/7 Rajputs bore the initial brunt of the assault. Despite days of preliminary shelling, the Rajputs mounted a stubborn defence; Japanese casualties mounted rapidly. The anti-tank company suffered so grievously that only a single gun remained operational. The Japanese plan was tactical rather than frontal—bypass isolated positions for later elimination and push rapidly toward high ground. Overwhelmed by numerical superiority and losing most of their officers, Rajput resistance gradually crumbled. Contradicting all evidence, Maltby remained convinced the main Japanese assault would strike directly at Victoria from Kowloon. He therefore withheld the counter-attack, instead dispatching a platoon of Middlesex troops, Royal Marines, naval personnel, and the Rajputs' reserve company—supported by artillery—to establish a defensive line blocking the Japanese advance toward Central District. Three HKVDC armoured cars were sent to protect East Brigade headquarters; two more reinforced the Middlesex battalion headquarters. It was manifestly inadequate against six Japanese battalions. In post-war dispatches, Maltby conceded his grave miscalculation: he believed he faced at most two battalions, not a full division. As the 3/230th broke through D Company of the 5/7 Rajputs, the 2/230th came ashore nearby and wheeled westward toward Victoria. Their advance halted abruptly at the North Point power station, held by an extraordinary force: four officers and 36 men of the HKVDC Hughsiliers Platoon—alongside 39 civilian volunteers from China Light & Power and Hong Kong Electric, including the station manager Vincent Sorby—plus eight Free French soldiers commanded by Captain Jacques Egal, a Shanghai businessman turned soldier. Without exception, these men were World War I veterans, many aged 55 or older. Some had fought in the Boer War. Major J. J. Patterson, the Hughsiliers' commander, had served with Allenby's Camel Corps and been mentioned in dispatches six times; he was chairman of Jardine Matheson and a legislative councillor. Private Sir Edward Des Voeux, 8th Baronet, a millionaire bullion trader and secretary of the Hong Kong Club, had enlisted as a private when deemed too old for mobilization. Private T. A. Pearce, 67 years old, was chairman of J. D. Hutchison & Company and secretary of the Hong Kong Jockey Club. Captain Bruch, the second-in-command, aged 60, chaired a major trading house. The list extended through Hong Kong's business elite, each choosing to fight rather than flee. These old men held an entire regiment at bay. When Patterson called for aid, Maltby dispatched an HKVDC armoured car with a platoon from Z Company, 1 Middlesex, but the reinforcement was ambushed before reaching the station; only nine soldiers, including 2nd Lieutenant Caruthers, broke through. Unable to dislodge the defenders by assault, the Japanese resorted to bombardment. By 0145 hours on 19 December, surrounded and ammunition exhausted, the defenders withdrew to King's Road behind a disabled bus. The Japanese deployed three machine guns, killing or mortally wounding all but Private Geoghan. A Japanese officer, believing all dead, cautiously approached—only to have Geoghan, despite his wounds, surge from cover and charge. He killed the officer and four soldiers before collapsing from wounds. Somehow Geoghan survived. Those old men—civilians and reservists, businessmen and veterans—held the entire western Japanese advance for 18 hours, buying Maltby precious time to withdraw forces and establish a new defensive line. Their stand at North Point became one of the campaign's most improbable acts of defiance. As the 2/229th Regiment advanced southward toward Mt Parker, the 3/229th landed at Aldrich Bay and turned eastward toward Lyemun, where they seized an HKVDC 6-inch gun. Major Bishop of the Royal Rifles of Canada, unaware of the landings, dispatched 15 Platoon under Lieutenant Scott to check on A Company of the Rajputs. Unexpectedly, they encountered armed men in civilian clothes at Lyemun's gate—the first indication of the Japanese presence on the island. Yet senior officers dismissed initial reports of landings and lost positions as exaggerated, a critical miscalculation that proved catastrophic. At Lyemun Fort, the 5th Anti-aircraft Battery of the HKVDC was caught completely unaware and surrendered after minimal resistance. The Japanese then committed one of many atrocities that would characterize the battle, bayoneting 29 survivors. Alerted by 15 Platoon's report, Bishop attempted a counter-attack with two platoons to retake the fort, but the defenders could not scale the six-meter wall and withdrew with nine men killed. As the 2/229th pressed southward toward Mt Parker, they overran the Salesian Mission, which had been converted into an Advance Dressing Station. No. 8 Company of the 2/229th systematized a massacre of medical personnel and the wounded—an atrocity that would later become pivotal evidence at Colonel Tanaka's war crimes trial. Yet amid the chaos, several medical staff and wounded survived to testify: Gunners Y. K. Chan and Martin H. C. Tso of the 5th Battery, Captain Osler Thomas of the HKVDC, Captain Martin Banfill of the Royal Canadian Medical Corps, and Corporal Norman Leath of the Royal Army Medical Corps. C Company of the Royal Rifles, reinforced with captured Japanese machine guns abandoned by fleeing Rajputs, inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers, with one Japanese company suffering over 65 percent losses. Yet overwhelmed by superior numbers and suffering nearly two platoons worth of casualties themselves, the Canadians were forced to withdraw, leaving only a reinforcement platoon under Lieutenant Blaver on Mt Parker. When Captain Clerke arrived at dawn with 16 Platoon to reinforce the position, he found over 100 Japanese already entrenched. With no artillery support and only two platoons available, Clerke had no choice but to withdraw, abandoning Mt Parker to the enemy. By dawn on the 19th, the East Brigade faced catastrophe. Infantry strength had been halved, and losses of artillery were equally devastating. A series of misunderstandings and misinterpreted orders led coastal gun crews at Capes D'Aguilar and Collinson to destroy their own guns in confusion or lose them to the advancing Japanese. Of the entire artillery complement, only one 18-pounder and two 3.7-inch field guns remained operational. Wongneichong—literally "yellow muddy creek" in Chinese—occupies the center of Hong Kong Island, a valley separating the eastern hills (Mt Parker, Mt Butler, Jardine's Lookout) from the western massif (Mt Nicholson, Mt Cameron, Victoria Peak). This narrow gap formed the critical artery linking northern and southern Hong Kong, making Brigadier Lawson's decision to place West Brigade Headquarters there strategically sound yet tactically vulnerable. Recognizing the exposed position after the landings, Major Lyndon had located an alternative site south of Mt Nicholson, scheduled to open the following day. In response to the Japanese landings, Lawson dispatched three platoons of Winnipeg Grenadiers to block the advance. Lieutenant C. D. French took 18 Platoon to Mt Butler, Lieutenant G. A. Birkett's 17 Platoon moved to Jardine's Lookout, and Lieutenant L. B. Corrigan's platoon took the north-west approach to the Gap. As on Mt Parker, both French and Birkett were killed almost immediately, their small forces overwhelmed by battalion-strength enemy forces with artillery support. By morning on the 19th, two battalions each of the 230th and 228th Regiments were pushing for the high ground. The 2/230th rapidly occupied Jardine's Lookout while the 3/230th moved to Mt Nicholson and the 2/228th advanced toward the Gap itself. No. 3 Company of the HKVDC under Major E. Stewart held pillboxes around Jardine's Lookout, while No. 1 Company under Captain Penn defended Taitam Valley with forward positions at Quarry Gap. The pillboxes, despite heavy bombardment, held longer than anticipated—some for as long as 24 hours. Stewart maintained his company headquarters until the 22nd, four days of continuous fighting without adequate ammunition, food, or water. No. 3 Company suffered 80 percent casualties and ceased to exist as a cohesive unit. Realizing that the enemy had penetrated to Mt Butler, Brigadier Lawson decided counter-attack was essential. Major A. B. Gresham of A Company, Winnipeg Grenadiers, was ordered to retake Mt Butler and clear Jardine's Lookout. The Canadians initially succeeded, with Warrant Officer 2 J. R. Osborne leading a bayonet charge, but a strong counter-attack by three Japanese companies drove them back by 2200 hours. The Canadians held firm until 1500 hours, when Gresham attempted surrender despite waving a white flag—the Japanese shot him regardless. In the chaos that followed, a Canadian killed a Japanese officer in response, triggering a grenade barrage. Warrant Officer Osborne caught the grenades and hurled them back as fast as they came, but one landed in an impossible position. Without hesitation, Osborne threw himself on the grenade to save his comrades. This act of supreme self-sacrifice earned him a Victoria Cross—the first Canadian VC of World War II. At dawn on the 19th, Maltby dispatched A Company of the 2 Royal Scots under Captain K. J. Campbell to reinforce the Gap, but they lost all their officers with only 15 men reaching Lawson's headquarters. A group of sailors under Commander A. L. Pears came from the south, but were ambushed en route; only a few reached the Postbridge—a house just south of the Gap—which became an isolated strongpoint. The 3/230th captured the police station perched on a mound at the southern point of the Gap, then swept eastward to seize the anti-aircraft guns of 7th Battery (barely 250 meters from brigade headquarters) and continued uphill toward Taitam Hill to capture additional 6-inch and 3.7-inch guns. Maltby's response was to call down final protective fire from the HKSRA in Happy Valley, inflicting massive casualties on the 3/230th. At 1000 hours on the 19th, Lawson reported that his headquarters was surrounded and he was about to "go outside and shoot it out." Captain H. A. Bush provided covering fire as Lawson and his entire staff, including Middlesex signallers, were cut down by machine-gun fire across the Gap. Lawson's body was discovered two days later halfway up the hill behind his headquarters, dead from a gunshot wound to the thigh. Lieutenant Kerfoot of the 2/14 Punjab with his three Bren carriers arrived minutes too late to save him. IJA who saw the fight made a note stating "he died heroically". At 1330 hours on the 19th, Maltby issued "Operation Order No. 6" calling for a massive counter-attack to commence 90 minutes later. The plan was ambitious: A and D Companies of the 2/14 Punjab were to attack east from Victoria to North Point to relieve the Hughsiliers, while HQ Company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers and the 2 Royal Scots were to attack the Gap and Jardine's Lookout. Eight field guns were promised but never materialized. There was no reconnaissance, no proper orders, and minimal coordination. The Canadians were to rendezvous with the 2 Royal Scots at Middle Gap at 1530 hours, but the Scots were late; the Canadians advanced without them. Captain Pinkerton of D Company, 2 Royal Scots, was ordered at the last minute to attack up Wongneichong Gap Road—the same route A Company had taken only seven hours earlier and been decimated—because it was reported as "lightly held." Captain A. M. S. Slater-Brown led the advance with three Bren carriers and attached engineers, followed by D Company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers. Just as the carriers reached the burnt-out trucks of A Company, they too were ambushed. Mortars and machine-gun fire rained down from Jardine's Lookout, where the Japanese occupied captured HKVDC pillboxes. Slater-Brown and 2nd Lieutenant Bell, the battalion intelligence officer, were killed instantly. The Royal Scots waited in the roadside ditches until 0200 hours before launching an attack on the police station, reaching the steps before Pinkerton was severely wounded. Captain Ford's composite company attack at 0300 hours also failed. Simultaneously, C Company under Lieutenant F. L. Stanier attacked Jardine's Lookout—also unsuccessfully. This series of piecemeal assaults cost the Royal Scots eight officers and 68 soldiers. Growing increasingly desperate, Maltby ordered Major Hodkinson, Officer Commanding HQ Company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers, to attack the Gap and proceed to Mt Parker. Requesting reinforcements from A Company and the Royal Scots, Hodkinson launched his assault with covering fire from Lieutenant Corrigan on Mt Nicholson. The Grenadiers managed to reach Mt Nicholson with only five unwounded men, though Corrigan's group advanced to within 300 meters of the Gap road. Then came an unexpected stroke of fortune: while skirting Mt Nicholson, Hodkinson's group stumbled upon approximately 500 Japanese—probably from the 3/230th—eating lunch without posting sentries. The Winnipeg Grenadiers unleashed devastating fire, inflicting heavy casualties. By 1745 hours, Hodkinson's force was only 100 meters from Repulse Bay Road. With four men and a 2-inch mortar, Hodkinson worked his way to the abandoned brigade headquarters, bringing 20 walking wounded with him. He established a foothold at the Gap, receiving orders to attack the police station at 2200 hours. Two HKVDC armoured cars with Vickers machine guns came in support, but accurate enemy fire disabled both. Like Pinkerton before him, Hodkinson reached near his objective before being severely wounded. For this action of determination and courage, Hodkinson was awarded the Distinguished Service Order. By the morning of the 20th, the Japanese had consolidated control of the Gap, but elements of D Company, Winnipeg Grenadiers, still held various pillboxes north of the position. Initially, 17 and 18 Platoons occupied forward positions with Company Headquarters and 16 Platoon in reserve, positioned across Wongneichong Road almost directly opposite brigade headquarters. Forward positions were rapidly overrun and cut off from the company. They fought without officers until withdrawal to battalion headquarters became necessary. With Captain A. S. Bowman killed and Captain R. W. Philips wounded, command fell to Lieutenant T. A. Blackwood. An attempt by B Company to relieve D Company on the evening of the 20th failed catastrophically, killing all officers and 29 men. With fewer than 50 men remaining—all wounded—Lieutenant Blackwood continued inflicting heavy casualties on the Japanese until 22 December, when exhaustion and the complete absence of ammunition, food, and water forced surrender. D Company killed over 200 Japanese soldiers. Post-war Japanese reports refused to believe that a single company had held the Gap for so long. For their stubborn defense, Philips and Blackwood were awarded the Military Cross, and three enlisted men received the Military Medal. The battle of Wongneichong Gap was characterized by fragmented planning and poor coordination. On the night of the 19th-20th, no fewer than three separate companies attacked the police station, with another company assaulting Jardine's Lookout—all within five hours, all independently organized by local commanders. Had these disparate actions been coordinated into a single simultaneous assault, fortress headquarters' objectives might well have been achieved. By the end of the 20th, the British had lost the vital ground of Wongneichong, though Postbridge House remained as an isolated holdout. For the Japanese, Wongneichong became the single costliest engagement since the invasion began, with over 800 casualties and the regimental commander of the 3/230th seriously wounded. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.   Japanese landings on 18-19 December overwhelmed the East Brigade. Brigadier Lawson died defending the vital Gap. Desperate, uncoordinated counter-attacks by British and Canadian troops failed to dislodge the enemy. D Company Winnipeg Grenadiers held the position for four days against overwhelming odds before surrendering. The Japanese suffered 800 casualties but secured this critical strategic ground.

Colin Lowther and Megan Nollet give the history of the development and describe the details of the most efficient, clean, modern, and top-rated airport in the world. Their story will encourage you to travel to Singapore soon.https://spotlightenglish.com/uncategorized/the-airport-that-is-a-travel-destination-of-its-own/Download our app for Android at http://bit.ly/spotlight-android Download our app for iOS at http://bit.ly/spotlight-appleFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/spotlightradioAre you learning English? Are you looking for a way to practice your English? Listen to Spotlight to learn about people and places all around the world. You can learn English words, and even practice English by writing a comment.isit our website to follow along with the script: http://spotlightenglish.comCheck out more Spotlight English content at: www.SpotlightEnglish.com 

Jeff and Jim open with the unavoidable topic of AI agents and the tension between enabling innovation and governing agent permissions, then run through a packed fall conference schedule. The August mailbag pulls questions from Singapore, Toronto, Prague, Johannesburg, Helsinki, and Seoul. They discuss when externalized authorization makes sense, why passkey recovery can become the weak link in phishing-resistant authentication, what EU digital identity wallets may mean for enterprises, how continuous access evaluation changes the meaning of terminating access, and how to build resilience around a centralized identity provider without creating a second full-scale IdP. The episode closes with a lighter question: if every IAM product needed a giant warning label, what should it say?Connect with us on LinkedIn:Jim McDonald: https://www.linkedin.com/in/jimmcdonaldpmp/Jeff Steadman: https://www.linkedin.com/in/jeffsteadman/Visit the show on the web at http://idacpodcast.com00:10 - Welcome and have we talked about AI too much?01:32 - Governing AI agents without becoming the progress prevention department03:50 - Fall conference season and IDPro04:40 - Cybersecurity Summits in Chicago and Atlanta06:40 - SailPoint Navigate, InfoSec World, FIDO Authenticate, and Identiverse DC10:40 - 3D printing, challenge coins, and superfan status11:56 - August mailbag begins12:19 - Singapore: Is externalized authorization ready for mainstream IAM?20:30 - Toronto: Passkeys, account recovery, and help desk social engineering25:55 - Prague: What should enterprises do about EU digital identity wallets?31:44 - Johannesburg: Continuous session revocation and what “terminate access” really means38:04 - Helsinki: Designing identity resilience around a centralized IdP45:23 - Seoul: What warning label should every IAM product have?48:26 - Wrap-up and how to send future mailbag questionsIDAC, Identity at the Center, Jeff Steadman, Jim McDonald, IAM, identity and access management, August 2026 mailbag, externalized authorization, authorization, policy-based access control, passkeys, account recovery, phishing-resistant authentication, identity verification, EU digital identity wallet, continuous access evaluation, shared signals, session revocation, token revocation, identity resilience, identity provider, disaster recovery, business continuity, AI agents, agentic identity, IDPro, FIDO Authenticate, Identiverse DC, InfoSec World, SailPoint Navigate

In this week's episode of This Week in AML, John Byrne and Elliot Berman break down Treasury's renewed sanctions campaign against Iran and discuss what it could mean for global trade, enforcement efforts, and China's role in the sanctions landscape. They also examine the U.S. decision to remove Syria from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list, a move that could pave the way for reintegration into the global financial system and future engagement with FATF standards. Additional topics include Singapore's new Social Media Code of Practice aimed at reducing financial scams on major platforms, Europol's warning about increasingly violent museum heists, updates from OCCRP on corruption and money laundering investigations, and the FDIC's efforts to streamline the deposit insurance application process for new banks. Plus, a look at recent anti-corruption research from the Basel Institute on Governance and upcoming AML-focused educational events.

Treasury just launched "Operation Economic Outcast" and buried in the announcement is proof that supposed U.S. allies have been quietly propping up Iran's economy for years. Lance Wallnau breaks down the $21.3 billion trade cutoff, the countries caught funneling money to Tehran, and what it means heading into the midterms. Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent unveiled a sweeping new sanctions campaign targeting Iran's financial lifelines, including digital assets, gold, aviation, and shipping, and the list of "allies" who've kept the regime afloat is more surprising than you'd expect. Lance walks through the UAE's own admission that it's suspending financial transactions with Iran after $14.8 billion in trade last year alone, the shell company networks in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Dubai moving oil revenue on Iran's behalf, and Glenn Beck's conversation with Patrick Bet-David calling this Iran's "economic D-Day." He also ties it back to Trump's education reform agenda and the bigger spiritual and cultural battle playing out before the midterms. In this episode: Why Lance believes right-wing podcast hosts like Theo Von, Joe Rogan, and Tim Dillon have gone quiet on Trump, and what he says caused the shift Trump's education agenda, including the $1,700 school choice tax credit, the $500 million charter school investment, and why Lance says the left is losing ground on this "cultural mountain" Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's announcement of Operation Economic Outcast, and why one guest on Glenn Beck's show called it Iran's "economic D-Day" The UAE's secret $21.3 billion trade relationship with Iran, and why the country is now suspending financial transactions with the regime The shell company network in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Dubai that Lance says has been funneling oil revenue to keep Iran's economy afloat Lance's prayer for peace in the region and stability heading into a tense midterm season   Podcast Episode 2224: Why Some U.S. Allies Were Secretly Funding Iran All Along | don't miss this! Listen to more episodes of the Lance Wallnau Show at lancewallnau.com/podcast  

Register for our free masterclass on the tools you need to level up your points gamehttps://webinar.geobreezetravel.com/?utm_source=youtube Timestamps:00:00 Why First Class00:49 Convenience Perks01:45 Next Level Lounges02:55 Iconic Onboard Experiences03:53 Routes Are Limited05:26 Build Trips Around Space07:01 Guide and Resources07:43 Finding Award Availability09:02 Status and Outsourcing09:58 Know Your Aircraft11:41 Taxes Fees and Upgrades14:12 Points Value Rules15:04 Wrap Up You can find Julia at: ➤ Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/geobreezetravel/ ➤ Credit card links: https://www.geobreezetravel.com/cards  Opinions expressed here are the author's alone, not those of any bank, credit card issuer, hotel, airline, or other entity. This content has not been reviewed, approved or otherwise endorsed by any of the entities included within the post. The content of this video is accurate as of the posting date. Some of the offers mentioned may no longer be available.

Hi, everybody! I'm Georgiana, your English teacher and founder of SpeakEnglishPodcast.com. Recently, one of my students from Singapore asked me a very good question: "How does listening help me speak English?" Maybe you've wondered the same thing. You probably know that listening is important, but how does it actually help you speak? When you listen to English that you understand, your brain hears many examples of how English works. You hear common words, useful expressions, pronunciation, rhythm, and the way words naturally go together. Get the transcript on my website: https://speakenglishpodcast.com/389-how-listening-helps-you-speak-english/

Value: After Hours is a podcast about value investing, Fintwit, and all things finance and investment by investors Tobias Carlisle, and Jake Taylor. We are live every Tuesday at 1.30pm E / 10.30am P.────────────────────── ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠VALUE OPTIONS LETTER⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Three to five curated ideas every week — cash-secured puts, covered calls, and spreads on businesses we'd want to own at strikes we'd be willing to pay. Every trade includes the business thesis in plain English, the fair-value estimate and its key assumptions, the specific option trade with target premium, and the pre-identified exit criteria.Every idea reviewed and approved by an analyst before it hits your inbox.⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠valueoptionsletter.com/subscribe⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠──────────────────────See our latest episodes at https://acquirersmultiple.com/podcastAbout Jake Jake's Twitter: https://twitter.com/farnamjake1Jake's book: The Rebel Allocator https://amzn.to/2sgip3lABOUT THE PODCASTHi, I'm Tobias Carlisle. I launched The Acquirers Podcast to discuss the process of finding undervalued stocks, deep value investing, hedge funds, activism, buyouts, and special situations.We uncover the tactics and strategies for finding good investments, managing risk, dealing with bad luck, and maximizing success.SEE LATEST EPISODEShttps://acquirersmultiple.com/podcast/SEE OUR FREE DEEP VALUE STOCK SCREENER https://acquirersmultiple.com/screener/FOLLOW TOBIASWebsite: https://acquirersmultiple.com/Firm: https://acquirersfunds.com/ Twitter: ttps://twitter.com/GreenbackdLinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/tobycarlisleFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/tobiascarlisleInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/tobias_carlisleABOUT TOBIAS CARLISLETobias Carlisle is the founder of The Acquirer's Multiple®, and Acquirers Funds®. He is best known as the author of the #1 new release in Amazon's Business and Finance The Acquirer's Multiple: How the Billionaire Contrarians of Deep Value Beat the Market, the Amazon best-sellers Deep Value: Why Activists Investors and Other Contrarians Battle for Control of Losing Corporations (2014) (https://amzn.to/2VwvAGF), Quantitative Value: A Practitioner's Guide to Automating Intelligent Investment and Eliminating Behavioral Errors (2012) (https://amzn.to/2SDDxrN), and Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors (2016) (https://amzn.to/2SEEjVn). He has extensive experience in investment management, business valuation, public company corporate governance, and corporate law.Prior to founding the forerunner to Acquirers Funds in 2010, Tobias was an analyst at an activist hedge fund, general counsel of a company listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, and a corporate advisory lawyer. As a lawyer specializing in mergers and acquisitions he has advised on transactions across a variety of industries in the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Australia, Singapore, Bermuda, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, and Guam. He is a graduate of the University of Queensland in Australia with degrees in Law (2001) and Business (Management) (1999).

In this episode of Unfiltered Waters, Elizabeth Beisel and Todd Anderson fill in for Katie Hoff, about a week out from giving birth, and sit down with Olympic medalist Katharine Berkoff right before the Pan Pacific Championships. She's coming off a hard lesson in Singapore last year: getting sick and having to trust her training instead of her control. The 100 back is the race she says has her heart. So what does it take to let go of what you can't control and still call it a successful meet?Katharine breaks down swimming straight outdoors: staying close enough to the lane line to catch it in her peripheral vision, turning her head side to side when wind kicks up chop. Her Pan Pacs lineup is the 50 and 100 back plus relays, and the 100 is the one she trains hardest for. She tried Pilates for the first time before a meet in Indianapolis, and a reformer session left her shaking on the easiest setting. Elizabeth asks when wind becomes a real problem, and Katharine has a clear answer.Along the way, the conversation goes places most swim interviews don't: adopting a kitten named Chowder, already famous for chaos in the car; her dad's hobby of tracking mountain lions, including the time he followed a blood trail to a kill site and got stalked back himself, pistol in pocket just in case; and her plans for her next backpacking trip. Asked about that goal, she brings up a hiker who got impaled by his own trekking pole and hiked out with it still in him, admitting that unlike her father, she is not a risk taker.Underneath the racing talk is a real reckoning with legacy and self trust. Katharine is candid about her father, Olympian David Berkoff, admitting they rarely talk swimming, and that his brief stint coaching her ended fast because his input frustrated her. She traces her stubborn self belief to making her first sectional cut at nine, and to when it first wavered at Junior Nationals, watching girls already on the national junior team. Her fix, then and now, is trusting her process looks nothing like anyone else's. It's a thread that lands harder coming from Elizabeth.Whether you're a swimmer learning to trust your own process or someone who has never touched a pool but loves a good father daughter story, this episode delivers. Watch the episode, then head to the comments and let us know: what's something you've had to let go of to actually enjoy competing? Subscribe to the show on your favorite podcast platform, and follow us on social media (https://linktr.ee/unfilteredwaters) for clips, bonus content, and updates throughout the week.Note: this conversation was recorded before the 2026 Pan Pacific Championships, so Katharine's answers reflect where her head was heading into the meet. By the time this episode airs, the meet itself will already be over.FOLLOW KATHARINE BERKOFF ON:Instagram: @KatharineBerkoff#UnfilteredWaters #Swimming #KatharineBerkoff #ElizabethBeisel #PanPacs2026

Stijn Schmitz welcomes Matthew Piepenburg to the show. Matthew Piepenburg is Partner – Von Greyerz Gold Switzerland, Author – Gold Matters. Piepenburg argues that despite 2026 volatility, including war, a historic gold correction, and US government debt surpassing $40 trillion, the secular gold bull market remains in its early chapters. He sees shakeouts and price interventions as features, not an end, and believes conditions today are stronger than the 1970s run, driven by $265 trillion global debt, negative real rates, and currency debasement. He contends that governments and central banks have narrowed options and increasingly rely on hidden QE, misleading inflation and employment data, and dollar debasement to manage debt, while Main Street suffers a real recession and middle-class erosion, and stock market gains mostly benefit top wealth. Piepenburg highlights central bank gold accumulation at record levels, especially after dollar weaponization, as a sign gold is replacing Treasuries as global collateral. He notes the shift in physical gold flows from Western exchanges to Eastern central banks and sovereign funds, and the development of Shanghai-Hong Kong physical settlement, challenging paper price discovery. He expects continued eastward shift, not dollar collapse, but a significant repricing. Matthew discusses possible US gold revaluation, either marking gold certificates to market or letting gold run, as a form of “gold QE” that would further debase the dollar. He sees miners as leveraged opportunity after sentiment lows, and stresses patience and education. For high-net-worth investors, physical gold outside the banking system in Switzerland and Singapore serves as wealth preservation. He closes that gold won't get one rich quickly but protects from getting poor. Timestamps: 00:00:00 – Introduction 00:01:10 – Volatile Year Market Overview 00:03:48 – Gold Bull Market Status 00:08:20 – Mining Sector Investor Interest 00:18:55 – Global Debt & Demographics 00:28:30 – Inflation & Conflicts 00:35:55 – Central Banks & Gold Holdings 00:45:30 – Gold Revaluation Mechanics 00:54:17 – Gold & Gov’t Debt Doubling 01:01:12 – Preparing for Coming Risks 01:07:34 – Von Greyerz Storage Services Guest Links: X: https://twitter.com/GoldSwitzerland Website: https://goldswitzerland.com/ Articles: https://signalsmatter.com/ Book (Amazon): https://tinyurl.com/pvpfmy8c Matthew Piepenburg is a Partner of Von Greyerz and the author of the popular book, “Rigged to Fail”. Matt is fluent in French, German, and English. He is a graduate of Brown (BA), Harvard (MA), and the University of Michigan (JD). His widely-respected reports on macro conditions and the changing behavior of risk assets are published regularly at SignalsMatter.com

Right now, every Mamamia subscriber is automatically entered to win a $5,000 Dreamworld holiday for four; flights, accommodation, express passes and more included. Subscribe here to enter. T&Cs apply. Dolly Parton has died at 80, and the world has lost one of its most beloved icons. Mia, Amelia and Em unpack what made Dolly so universally loved. From her music and iconic look to her extraordinary business brain and the millions of books she’s given to children. Plus, would you have a baby for $75,000? Singapore is offering new parents a huge cash incentive to tackle its declining birth rate. And is the humble ‘pop-in’ officially cancelled? Is turning up at someone’s house unannounced rude or even, controversial? Get access to Very Peri, Mamamia's exclusive perimenopause series, for just $59. 25 world-leading experts, over 20 on-demand sessions, available now. We’ve sorted through the noise so you don't have to. Go to veryperi.com.au today. You hot? Same. What To Listen To Next: Listen to Unleashed: 'I'm Wearing Red Undies For Financial Reasons' Listen to our latest episode: New Couple Launch & A Very Hollywood Situationship Listen: The Swans Aftermath & WTF Harry And Meghan? Listen: Would You Go Topless In Front Of Your Dad? Listen: The Lindsay Clancy Conversation Listen: The Part of Hayden Panettiere's Story Everyone's Missing Listen: The Fake Bump Conspiracy Continues. Anne Hathaway Edition. Listen: Logies Recap & The Melbourne Lawyer Fired for a TikTok Connect your subscription to Apple Podcasts Check out the Mamamia Out Loud newsletter. Discover more Mamamia Podcasts here including the very latest episode of Parenting Out Loud, the parenting podcast for people who don't listen to... parenting podcasts. SUBSCRIBE here: Support independent women's media You can now watch our show in full length video on the Apple Podcast app - make sure your phone is up to date and we can't wait for you to see Mamamia Out Loud on Apple What to read: Legendary country singer Dolly Parton has died, aged 80. 'The world feels a lot less sparkly': All the celebrities paying tribute to Dolly Parton. 'I'm a doctor and this is why women over 40 are full of s***. Literally.' Apparently we're all constipated right now, but most of us won't admit it. The real reason less of us are having babies in 2025. THE END BITS: Check out our merch at MamamiaOutLoud.com GET IN TOUCH: Feedback? We’re listening. Send us an email at outloud@mamamia.com.au Share your story, feedback, or dilemma! Send us a voice message. Join our Facebook group Mamamia Outlouders to talk about the show. Follow us on Instagram @mamamiaoutloud and on Tiktok @mamamiaoutloud Mamamia acknowledges the Traditional Owners of the Land on which we have recorded this podcast.Become a Mamamia subscriber: https://www.mamamia.com.au/subscribeSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Disney Cruise Line just dropped its Fall 2027 and Spring 2028 itineraries—and New York City is BACK! Doug, Michelle, and Joe from Back to the Mouse break down the biggest announcements, the best-looking itineraries, and why Florida is about to become an even bigger Disney Cruise hub. RDOD — Disney Cruise Line Fall 2027 & Spring 2028 Itineraries Are HERE! The wait is over! Disney Cruise Line has released its Fall 2027 and Spring 2028 cruise itineraries, and there is a LOT to talk about. This week on Rope Drop On Deck, Doug and Michelle are joined by Joe from Back to the Mouse to break down the new Disney Cruise Line schedule and figure out which sailings deserve your attention. And there's one announcement that immediately caught everyone's attention: Disney Cruise Line is returning to New York City! The Disney Wish will spend part of Fall 2027 sailing from New York, including voyages to Bermuda, New England and Atlantic Canada. But New York isn't the only big story.

S&P futures are flat following a broadly higher Asia session. Semiconductor and AI stocks were gaining momentum ahead of NVIDIA's earnings. South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Mainland China, and Hong Kong all closed in the green today. Australia and Singapore saw minor losses. European markets opened mixed this morning.Companies Mentioned: Meta, Alibaba, Par Pacific

Paul Walsh, Michelle Weaver and Daniel Blake discuss how thematic mapping can help investors separate true beneficiaries from market hype and identify risks hiding beneath the surface.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Paul Walsh: Welcome everyone to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Paul Walsh, Morgan Stanley's Head of Research in Europe. Michelle Weaver: And I'm Michelle Weaver, U.S. Thematic and Equity Strategist. Daniel Blake: And I'm Daniel Blake, Head of Asia Thematic Strategy. Walsh: And today we're discussing why thematic investing may be entering a new phase – moving from simply identifying big ideas to systematically measuring them.It's Tuesday, the 25th of August at 2pm in London. Weaver: It's 9am in New York. Blake: And it's 9pm in Singapore. Walsh: Daniel, let's kick our discussion off today. Thematic investing has become one of the most important ways for investors to think about long-term opportunities. But your latest work suggests the framework itself is evolving. So, what's changing? Blake: Well, if you look at where we've started. So thematic investing has been narrative-driven, focusing on identifying major structural trends for investors. So, at Morgan Stanley, we've identified core themes of artificial intelligence and tech diffusion, the future of energy, societal shifts, and the transition to a multipolar world. So, what's changing is that investment approaches are becoming much, much faster. So, we're now seeing clients deploy agentic AI to drive trade recommendations. And sure, AI can read a new 100-page thematic report from Morgan Stanley faster than humans. But for the right conclusions, it's important to connect these models with high-quality data sets. And we think that's going to be helpful for human investors as well. So, this is where the third phase of thematic investing comes in. The first phase was identifying secular trends that cut across markets and industries. The second phase was creating investable products around those themes. But this next phase is about measuring that exposure systematically in real time. So, this allows investors and their AI agents to identify whether a theme's importance is broadening or fading and to track individual companies' exposure to that theme over time. Walsh: So, the thematic investing is moving from narrative-driven to a higher velocity data-driven approach. And I guess that's where our thematic mapping exercise really comes in. So, Michelle, when investors hear the term thematic map, they may think it's just another screening tool. But it's much, much more than that, isn't it? Weaver: Absolutely. The easiest way to think about it is it's a research framework that sits on top of traditional sector and regional analysis. Historically, investors organize portfolios by country, sector, or industry group, and those verticals are still very important. But increasingly, the biggest investment forces cut horizontally across those boundaries. AI touches software companies, industrials names, healthcare, financials, and it's even had a huge impact on the utility sector.Thematic mapping helps us identify where those exposures exist across thousands of stocks, and importantly, how significant those exposures are – all with the help of our analyst experts. And the innovation isn't simply identifying if a company's exposed to AI, energy transition, or defense spending. It's determining whether that exposure is central to the investment thesis, just supportive or insignificant. And that's very different from traditional thematic baskets. Walsh: So, we identify the exposure, but the idea of significance seems particularly important because investors constantly hear companies talking about themes on earnings calls for example and in their public communications. But how do you separate genuine exposure from a more marketing-driven language around thematics, Daniel? Blake: This we see as the most valuable and ultimately human-driven part of the framework. So, as an example, we know that many companies are outlining their AI initiatives, and not all of them will end up being AI beneficiaries. So, the key question is how a given theme will impact revenues, margins, competitive positioning, and valuations. And this requires the deep knowledge of both the industry and the company, as well as where things are going. And so that's where our analysts come in. Across all countries, all sectors, mapping the materiality of their entire coverage, that's almost 4,000 companies, to every global theme in real time. Sp. our job in the thematic strategy team is to coordinate the framework, help identify emerging themes, and draw out the insights and recommendations. But the core insights are really coming at the analyst level, company by company. Walsh: And so, to your point, Daniel, it's about the analyst overlay in terms of significance that is really important. So, investors really shouldn't think of thematic exposure as a simple yes or no question… Blake: Exactly. That's really the new innovation in this framework, and most companies will sit somewhere along that spectrum for a given theme. And there's value in tracking how that position is changing over time. Walsh: Yeah, rate of change is clearly critical. And Michelle, one of the things I found particularly interesting is that the framework isn't just about identifying winners. It's also about identifying companies that may be challenged by structural change as well. Why don't you help our listeners understand why that's so important? Weaver: Because every major theme, yes, creates a lot of opportunity, but it also creates disruption. And I think investors naturally focus on beneficiaries. Where are we looking on the long side? But in many cases, understanding who might be negatively exposed can be just as valuable. If you think about AI, there are obvious beneficiaries, whether those are the big enablers or they're companies adopting the technology successfully. But there could also be companies facing pricing pressure, margin pressure, or broader disruption because of that same theme. And that's equally true whether we're thinking about the future of energy, societal shifts and big demographic realignments, or the multipolar world. And a complete thematic framework should help investors understand both parts of that equation. And this is becoming increasingly important as markets move from broad thematic enthusiasm towards more selective stock picking. Walsh: Absolutely. The ability of the thematic mapping to help us understand both sides the equation clearly incredibly important. Let's bring it back to investors' portfolios. Daniel, how should investors think about thematic mapping as part of portfolio construction rather than simply stock selection? Blake: If you're looking at that portfolio construction level, whether you're a retail investor or you're one of the largest asset owners of sovereign funds, one of the biggest benefits is for revealing and managing hidden exposures.So, an investor might believe that their portfolio is diversified with positioning across many sectors and markets. But when you use the thematic map to underline, to explore the underlying thematic exposure, you might find that many of these holdings are tied to the same structural trend. So, the thematic map allows investors to better diversify portfolios while retaining the best expressions of desired themes. And as you mentioned, it's not just a screening tool. But it's pretty useful as a screening tool as well if you want to take exposure to a given theme overlay with valuations and preferences. It's very helpful for that reason as well. Walsh: Yeah, understood Daniel. And Michelle, as we look stock markets right now, how are you seeing the opportunities via the thematic mapping work that we've done? Weaver: Flagging potential rotations is another key part of what this analysis offers. And if we think about your question from a valuation perspective, AI adopters currently look relatively inexpensive, but they still offer strong expected earnings growth. And we're also seeing analyst sentiment beginning to improve. You're seeing a growing number of companies having their earnings estimates revised higher. We're also seeing a similar opportunity across our societal shifts themes. Valuations here are well below their typical levels over the past decade. And at the same time, we're also seeing earnings expectations improve here. Walsh: So, perhaps the biggest takeaways are that thematic investing is becoming more measurable, more transparent, and more integrated into portfolio management. It's no longer just about spotting the next big idea. It's about understanding where that idea exists, how much it matters, and of course, how it's evolving. Michelle, Daniel, thanks so much for taking the time to talk. Weaver: Great speaking with you Paul. Blake: Thanks for having us. Walsh: Thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

visit: https://www.ysguys.comDave McCann and Blaine Fowler open a truly global episode of Y's Guys — with viewers chiming in from Singapore, Cambodia, Italy, Australia, New Zealand and across Cougar Nation — by running down a stacked stretch of preseason news heading into the Sept. 5 opener against Utah Tech. BYU checks in at No. 6 in ESPN's preseason power rankings (per Mark Schlabach), running back LJ Martin picks up preseason Second Team All-America honors from USA Today and the AP along with Big 12 Offensive Player of the Year buzz, and Bret McMurphy's AP-voter research names BYU the single most underrated preseason team in the country over the last 12 years. National forecasters pile on from there: Stewart Mandel (New York Times) has BYU going 11-1 and winning the Big 12, while CBS Sports and CFB Kings both project the Cougars reaching the College Football Playoff.Former Cougar linebacker and current BYUtv football analyst Harvey Langi joins for the back half of the news segment, pulling back the curtain on NFL cutdown day — the anxiety of waiting for "the grim reaper" to call, and how some of the league's biggest stars (Taysom Hill, Zach Wilson, Todd Christensen, Fred Warner) turned early setbacks into Hall of Fame-caliber careers. He then breaks down what a healthy, more experienced Bear Bachmeier means for BYU's offense entering year two, how he'd scheme to defend him, and closes with his own ranking of BYU's five toughest games of the season — landing on Arizona, not Notre Dame, as the No. 1 measuring-stick game.The second hour brings the Re-Lyte Athlete of the Week (soccer's Emma Hamberlin, who scored twice to beat USC), a big basketball headline as BYU beats out Kentucky for transfer big man Jaxon Kohler, and a full campus-notes sweep across women's basketball (Delaney Gibb and Canada's run to the 2028 Olympic qualifying final), soccer, volleyball, cross country and baseball. Two Hotel Park City/Ruth's Chris BYU Super Fans round out the show — Greg Schroeder of Twin Falls, Idaho and Provo-studio guest Dean Taylor — each sharing their Cougar histories and playing a round of "Where Were You?" through classic BYU moments, before the Redmond Roots Rollout and a look ahead to next Monday's Game Week Bonanza with Jaren Hall, Rod Zundel, Adam Edmunds and Michael Johanson.Timestamps (approximate):0:00 – Show Open: Live From Singapore to Cambodia, Cougar Nation Tunes In9:31 – BYU vs. Utah Tech Game Week Details + BYU Cracks ESPN's Top 611:04 – LJ Martin's Historic Preseason All-American Honors12:54 – BYU Named Most Underrated Preseason Team in the Country16:27 – Stewart Mandel Predicts BYU Wins the Big 12 and Reaches the CFP21:11 – Week Zero College Football Preview + Cougars in the NFL Before Cutdown Day28:11 – Harvey Langi Joins the Show30:10 – Inside NFL Cutdown Day: Harvey Langi on the "Grim Reaper"35:11 – Harvey Langi on Taysom Hill, Zach Wilson & the Biggest Cuts in NFL History43:00 – How Would You Defend Bear Bachmeier? Harvey Langi Breaks It Down51:37 – Harvey Langi Ranks BYU's 5 Toughest Games of 2025 (Arizona Is No. 1)1:00:37 – Re-Lyte Athlete of the Week: Emma Hamberlin's Game-Winning Goals1:04:47 – BYU Basketball Lands Jaxon Kohler, Beats Out Kentucky1:14:22 – Super Fan Greg Schroeder & the "Where Were You?" Game1:30:35 – Super Fan Dean Taylor: From Oklahoma State Fan to True Blue Convert#YsGuys #BYUFootball #BYUCougars #CougarNation #GoCougs #Big12Football #HarveyLangi #LJMartin #BearBachmeier #KalaniSitake #EmmaHamberlin #JaxonKohler #DelaneyGibb #StewartMandel #BYUBasketball #BYUSoccer #DallinHall #BYUSuperfans #DaveMcCann #BlaineFowler #lds Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Vision Sunday (2022).Full episode :- https://youtu.be/rn3NVuOv4LcThis is not just a podcast - it's a move of God.Shan Kikon, from Nagaland, India, is the Lead Pastor of Faith Harvest Church, carrying a heart to ignite revival across the nations. Once he had a desire for a corporate future, but everything changed after a supernatural encounter with Jesus Christ in Singapore in 1996. In that moment, he laid down his desires to become a bold voice for the Gospel.Marked by the anointing and grounded in truth, Shan Kikon delivers revelation that cuts deep, awakens the spirit, and transforms lives. This is not just teaching; this is an encounter.For inquiries, prayer requests, or more information, feel free to reach out to us at : faithharvestnagaland@gmail.com

A.M. Edition for Aug. 24. Trade talks between Canada and the U.S. have broken down, with Mark Carney betting no deal is better than a bad deal. WSJ trade reporter Gavin Bade details the new tariffs. Plus, Paramount begins settlement talks with several Democratic states today in a bid to avert an antitrust lawsuit over its takeover of Warner Bros. Discovery. And Nvidia, not satisfied with producing the computing power for AI, spends billions of dollars on developing open-weight AI models to compete with China. Luke Vargas hosts. Sign up for the WSJ's free What's News newsletter. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Singapore has announced plans to offer parents $55,000 per child to encourage people to have more children. Also, the pope joins Spain in calling for a more humanitarian approach to migrants. And, physical activity hasn't increased globally in two decades. Plus, what hospitals could sound like in the future. Learn about your ad choices: dovetail.prx.org/ad-choices

Last time we spoke about the reaction after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. After four years of fighting Japan almost alone, China's Chiang Kai-shek learned of Pearl Harbor with profound relief. Japan's attack, meant to neutralize American naval power, instead galvanized the entire Western world against Tokyo. Within hours, Chiang declared war on the Axis powers, transforming China from an isolated nation to a recognized Allied member. The strategic mathematics were clear to Chiang: America's industrial might would ultimately crush Japan. China simply needed to survive long enough. The United States quickly formalized this partnership, pledging military support through Lend-Lease and elevating Chiang to leadership of Allied forces in the China theater. Yet Pearl Harbor brought catastrophe for Western civilians in China. Americans and Britons, previously protected as neutral foreigners, were suddenly rounded up and interned in camps. For many, decades of presence in China ended in hasty evacuation, leaving behind lives built over generations.   #216 The Battle of Hong Kong Part 1: The Approaching Storm Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Japan emerged as a significant threat to British interests during the 1920s following the collapse of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This concern intensified dramatically after Japan's invasion of China, with the ensuing Sino-Japanese War escalating tensions further. British assets in the region came under direct assault, including attacks on Western military and commercial vessels such as HMS Ladybird. Yet despite these provocations, the British Government maintained an inconsistent stance toward Japan, responding with only feeble diplomatic and military countermeasures. This contradiction characterized London's approach: while diplomatic channels remained conciliatory, military planners viewed Japan with genuine apprehension. During the 1930s, Singapore and Malaya represented Britain's most valuable and prosperous holdings in the Far East and consequently received substantial garrison reinforcements. By contrast, Hong Kong was widely acknowledged to be indefensible—a conclusion reached repeatedly by successive military studies. Despite this consensus, the British Government proceeded with the Hong Kong Defence Scheme in 1936, which aimed to transform Hong Kong Island into a fortified redoubt while establishing delaying positions in Kowloon and the New Territories. The Hong Kong Garrison's mandate was straightforward: repel external attacks and prevent enemy use of the harbour and dry dock. The underlying strategy relied on a simple principle: hold Hong Kong Island as an impregnable fortress and await relief from the Royal Navy. Consequently, protecting the harbour became the paramount objective. Japanese strategists were correctly identified as Hong Kong's primary threat, with military planners anticipating attack from the sea rather than overland. To counter such an offensive, the defence scheme incorporated five successive layers of protection: naval mines fitted with indicator nets and anti-submarine booms formed the first barrier; coastal artillery provided the second; beach installations featuring pillboxes, wire entanglements and mines constituted the third; infantry strongpoints positioned on commanding heights guarded against amphibious landings; and finally, a mobile reserve force stood ready to counterattack and eliminate any successful enemy incursion. The 1936 plan also mandated extensive fortification of Kowloon's bottleneck approaches through bunkers, trenches and blocked passages, with a principal defensive line—resembling a miniature Maginot Line—constructed across the mountains immediately north of Kowloon. The garrison structure comprised three infantry battalions plus the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC), a unit approximately regiment-strength equipped with armoured cars, engineers, artillery, anti-aircraft guns and infantry. These forces organized into three brigades: mainland, island, and garrison reserve. The air component was planned to be formidable: a reconnaissance squadron, a fighter-bomber squadron, two torpedo squadrons and a flight of auxiliary spotting aircraft operated by the HKVDC. Naval forces consisted of a modest destroyer contingent, an MTB flotilla, gunboats and patrol vessels. When Japan occupied Guangzhou, Hong Kong found itself effectively encircled. In response, limited conscription was implemented, though restricted to non-Chinese males for HKVDC service. Chinese personnel were largely confined to non-combat positions such as air-raid precautions and medical duties. The expanding Japanese threat prompted a substantial expansion of the Hong Kong Garrison to four regular infantry regiments—two British units (one specializing in medium machine-gun support) and two Indian regiments. Supporting forces included two coastal artillery regiments, a field artillery regiment-plus, and an anti-aircraft regiment. The Royal Navy expanded to include the 2nd MTB flotilla (eight 60-foot, 29-knot motor torpedo boats armed with twin torpedoes and eight Lewis guns each, plus two smaller 55-foot vessels), four shallow-draught river gunboats (HMS Cicala, Tern, Moth and Robin), four aging World War I S-class destroyers (HMS Thracian, Thanet, Scout and Tenedos—the last transferred to Singapore in 1939), HMS Cornflower sloop, and various auxiliary vessels including tugs, boom defence ships and minelayers. The Fleet Air Arm deployed three Supermarine Walruses—single-engine reconnaissance amphibians—at Kai Tak Airport. The Royal Air Force remained the weakest service, equipped with only four Vickers Wildebeest torpedo-bombers and a handful of HKVDC aircraft: one Avro Tutor, two Hornet Moths and two Cadet biplanes. When World War II erupted in Europe, Britain's focus necessarily shifted to national survival, inevitably leaving distant imperial outposts like Hong Kong neglected. Rather than receive reinforcements, Hong Kong actually lost capable personnel; many veteran troops were repatriated to Europe, leaving behind a less proficient garrison. Peacetime duties had proven a poor preparation for combat—officers and men had passed their time socializing rather than maintaining combat readiness. Governor Sir Geoffrey Northcote persistently urged London to adopt a firmer stance against relentless Japanese provocations: aircraft incursions, sinking of junks and fishing vessels, and infiltration by Taiwanese fifth columnists (Japan had colonized Taiwan in 1895). Recognizing the hopelessness of his position, Northcote recommended withdrawal in October 1940, arguing that defending the colony would inevitably result in mass civilian casualties and widespread destruction—a pragmatic assessment given Hong Kong's indefensible state. London categorically rejected this proposal, reasoning that withdrawal would demoralize China, embolden Japan and undermine American confidence in British resolve. Underlying this decision was an additional consideration: the long-standing dispute over Hong Kong's sovereignty. Since Britain acquired Hong Kong in 1841, the prospect of surrendering it, even temporarily, raised fears about reclaiming it afterward. Preserving the appearance of British determination was deemed crucial to demonstrating to Chiang Kai-shek, Nationalist China's leader, that Britain intended to retain the territory. Despite these political calculations, London consistently refused fresh troop deployments. Major-General A. E. Grasett, the China theatre commander, requested reinforcements only to face rejection—London offered only Indian or other colonial forces. Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, appointed British commander in the Far East in 1941, likewise pressed for garrison strengthening, to no avail. The situation shifted dramatically after Grasett, a retired Canadian who had recently left his China post, travelled to Britain via Canada. Upon arriving in Canada, he independently approached his former classmate Major-General Crerar, Chief of the Canadian General Staff, and advocated for reinforcement. Grasett argued persuasively that deploying two or more additional battalions would enable the Hong Kong garrison to withstand an extended siege. When Grasett reached London in early September 1941, he presented this case directly to the British Chiefs of Staff, simultaneously proposing that Canada could provide the extra units. His arguments proved persuasive; the Chiefs of Staff altered course and convinced a reluctant Churchill to reconsider. In light of accelerating Japanese pressure, Britain substantially enlarged the Malaysia/Singapore garrison from nine to 32 battalions and despatched two capital ships—HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse—to the region, reasoning that this show of force would deter Japanese aggression against British Far Eastern interests, including Hong Kong. The original defence strategy envisaged holding Hong Kong Island exclusively while denying the harbour to attackers. A single battalion (the Punjabis) would execute delaying actions across the New Territories, followed by a three-battalion defensive stand on the Gin Drinkers Line. This brief mainland resistance would allow time for demolishing stores, power installations, docks and wharves, clearing food stocks and removing vital matériel before withdrawing to Hong Kong Island for a protracted resistance awaiting relief from Singapore or American forces from the Philippines. The Gin Drinkers Line—styled after the French Maginot Line in miniature—ran approximately 18 kilometres south of the Sino-Hong Kong border. Beginning near Gin Drinkers Bay west of Kowloon, it extended 17 kilometres across the Kowloon Peninsula hills toward its eastern extremity. The strategic expectation was that this line would delay the Japanese assault for three weeks or longer, permitting battalion withdrawal to Hong Kong Island for sustained resistance while mainland forces completed evacuation procedures. The 1937 war plan stipulated that four battalions would be necessary for an effective delaying action and seven for an adequate Gin Drinkers Line defence—figures which excluded the aircraft and naval support essential to success. With only a single army brigade available and virtually no air capability, planners abandoned the mainland defence concept, leaving defensive works incomplete and deteriorating under tropical conditions. Chinese personnel were conspicuously absent from initial war preparations and strategic planning, only being incorporated late in the process. The largest Chinese component was the volunteer contingent serving with the HKVDC. On the regular army side, approximately 150 Chinese recruits were enlisted in mid-1941 for the 5th Anti-Aircraft Regiment. The Hong Kong Chinese Regiment, hastily constituted on 3 November 1941, comprised officers borrowed from British and Indian units alongside 52 Chinese junior NCOs and other ranks with minimal training. A Royal Engineers troop staffed entirely by Chinese soldiers saw service, and some Chinese personnel served with the Royal Navy and Dockyard Defence Corps. Chinese participation increased substantially in auxiliary services—air-raid precautions, auxiliary police, nursing, St John Ambulance and fire brigades. This reluctance to fully integrate Chinese forces likely reflected prevailing attitudes of the era. Pre-war British propaganda had frequently mocked Japanese military capability, portraying officers and soldiers as myopic and incompetent. Japanese combat prowess was systematically underestimated; their victories in China were attributed to facing inferior opposition rather than evidence of genuine military strength. Japanese weaponry was dismissed as inferior to European standards. Consequently, British confidence remained high that the colony could hold indefinitely if adequately reinforced. In September 1941, Hong Kong received heartening news: two additional Canadian battalions would be deployed to the garrison. Brigadier John Maltby promptly revived the pre-war plan for defending the Gin Drinkers Line, developing a strategy centred on three mainland battalions (2nd Royal Scots, 5/7 Rajputs and 2/14 Punjab) supported by HKVDC elements and four artillery troop detachments, while three island battalions (1st Middlesex, Royal Rifles of Canada and Winnipeg Grenadiers) bolstered by the bulk of the HKVDC would hold Hong Kong Island. Command responsibility was divided between two brigades: the Island Brigade (Hong Kong Infantry Brigade) under Brigadier Lawson, a recently arrived Canadian, and the mainland Kowloon Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Wallis. The Canadian regiments arrived on 16 November 1941. Maltby was commissioned into the Indian Army in 1911, and  saw extensive service across multiple campaigns: World War I, the Persian Gulf (1913–14), and the North-West Frontier (1923–24). His early promise earned him selection for accelerated advancement through prestigious staff colleges at Quetta and RAF Andover. By 1937, he was again serving on the North-West Frontier, and by 1939 commanded both the 3rd Jhelum Brigade (later the Calcutta Brigade) and the 19th Infantry Brigade in Deccan. In 1940, posted to China, Maltby orchestrated the closure of the North China Command by withdrawing two infantry battalions from Shanghai. Promoted to major-general as GOC China in August 1941, he had only three months to prepare the colony's defenses, a race against time he could not win.  The Gin Drinkers Line occupied a naturally dominant position atop mountains spanning northern Kowloon's breadth, yet possessed inherent weaknesses that would prove fatal. The line lacked defensive depth and remained vulnerable to flanking manoeuvres, with two sectors representing particular danger: Customs Pass and the gap between Golden Hill and Laichikok Peninsula near Gin Drinkers Bay. Given the extended front, each battalion arranged its forces in a string of platoon positions with gaps covered by daytime fire and nighttime patrols. One company per battalion could be held in reserve within prepared positions guarding the most dangerous sectors. The reserve company of the centre battalion (2/14 Punjab) initially advanced as forward troops, screening demolition operations and delaying the enemy's initial thrust. The hasty decision to establish mainland defences meant that essential support systems—communication networks, artillery registrations, mortar calibrations—remained incomplete when combat commenced. Ammunition shortages compounded the problem. For instance, the 2/14 Punjab conducted only a single 3-inch mortar practice session before the attack; adequate ammunition arrived only in November and totalled a mere 70 rounds per battalion for both training and combat. These mortars were registered for the first time in their battle positions, with combat beginning just 12 hours later. The 2-inch mortar situation was even more desperate: troops received live ammunition only as fighting started, making their baptism of fire an actual combat situation. Transportation deficiencies—trucks and animals in short supply—forced manual ammunition transport across Hong Kong's challenging terrain, imposing severe physical demands on already stretched personnel.   On 6 November 1941, Imperial Japanese Headquarters ordered its Commander-in-Chief in China to prepare plans for capturing Hong Kong. The 23rd Army, part of the China Southern Expeditionary Army Group and commanded by Lt. Gen. Sakai Takashi with Maj. Gen. Kuribayashi Tadamichi serving as Chief of Staff, would form the invasion's backbone. All preparations were to be completed by the end of November 1941. The operation, designated 'Operation C', sought to 'seize Hong Kong within ten days'. Takahashi was the son of a factory worker, and rose through the ranks to become a veteran of China campaigns. He was tasked with capturing Hong Kong using the 38th Division normally assigned to the Southern Expeditionary Army Group. Despite setbacks and humiliation over requests for additional resources—particularly following intelligence reports of tanks (actually Bren carriers) in Hong Kong—Sakai remained determined to succeed. He served as Governor of Hong Kong from 26 December 1941 to 20 February 1942. Kuribayashi, best remembered as the Japanese commander at Iwo Jima, graduated from the Army Academy in 1914 specializing in cavalry. He served as deputy military attaché to Washington and Canada and studied at Harvard University. In December 1941, he held the position of Chief of Staff to the 23rd Army during the Hong Kong operation. Operation C followed a straightforward strategic framework. A blocking force would prevent Chinese interference from the rear, while the main invasion force would spearhead the assault. The 23rd Army, comprising four divisions plus a mixed brigade and two infantry regiments, received the assignment to attack Hong Kong. Of these four divisions, only the 38th played a substantive role in the invasion itself. The attack employed a combined-arms approach. Naval forces would establish a blockade and deliver bombardment while aircraft targeted key installations. Ground forces from the 38th Division—specifically the 228th, 229th, and 230th Regiments—would execute the land invasion using a three-pronged strategy. The right column would sweep westward in a wide arc, clearing Castle Peak Road and targeting the western flank of the Gin Drinkers Line near Laichikok Peninsula. The centre force would press directly through the line's middle, while the left column would cross Tidal Cove (Tolo Harbour) toward Kai Tak Airport and eastward toward Devil Peak, a crucial defensive position. The objective was to annihilate British forces on the mainland and compel Hong Kong's surrender through sustained bombardment. Should British forces resist, the island phase of the campaign would commence. Securing the rear against the Chinese National Army of the 7th Military District and Communist guerrillas fell to the 66th Regiment, normally part of the 51st Division but attached to the 38th for this operation. The 66th would simultaneously occupy and secure rear areas throughout the New Territories and Kowloon while the three assault regiments engaged the main defensive forces. This rearguard operation was organised into columns named after their commanding officers: Kitazawa, Kobayashi, Sato, and Araki. The Japanese selected the narrowest approach between Kowloon and Hong Kong Island, targeting the eastern coast near Lyemun Passage where only 410 metres of water separated the mainland from the island. Upon landing, forces would rapidly advance inland to seize the critical junction of Wongneichong Gap, then pivot westward and southward to capture Victoria City and the remainder of Hong Kong. The naval contingent divided into two groups: the Bombardment Group and the Attack Group. Approximately 300 personnel from the Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) were attached to the invasion force. Air support came from the First Air Brigade under Col. Habu Hideharu, which contributed 56 light bombers and fighters. Their mission was to neutralise the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, thereby securing aerial and maritime superiority for the ground campaign.   On the eve of war, the British garrison numbered 13,981 all ranks, including nursing staff and St John Ambulance personnel. Of these, 8,919 were British and Canadian, with 4,402 Indian and Chinese. The core infantry force comprised 5,422 regular soldiers, complemented by approximately 6,000 additional personnel across artillery, engineering, naval, and Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC) units. By 1941, the Royal Navy had become a shadow of its former self as the once-dominant China Squadron. Of the three World War I destroyers present on 8 December, two had been sent to Singapore—the third undergoing repairs—by 1930. This redeployment stemmed partly from the futility of defending the colony and partly from a commitment by senior US Navy officers: Britain would reinforce Singapore with Hong Kong's fleet in exchange for four American destroyers at Singapore. This American guarantee, however, never materialized. The defensive infrastructure focused primarily on countering a seaborne attack: twenty-nine coastal guns (9.2in., 6in., 4.7in., and 4in. calibres), ten 18- and 2-pounder beach defense guns, and twenty-eight field guns (60-pounder, 6in., 4.5in., and 3.7in. calibres). The Hong Kong Garrison's infantry comprised four regular army battalions—two British and two Indian—bolstered by five HKVDC infantry companies, each averaging 100 men. The 1st Middlesex Regiment, deployed in August 1937, served as a machine-gun battalion equipped with forty-eight Vickers medium machine guns. Having been abroad since 1931, the regiment had deteriorated through protracted garrison service, Hong Kong being among the softest postings available. From September 1939 onward, all regiments—including the 5/7 Rajputs (arrived June 1937) and the 2/14 Punjab—experienced systematic loss of experienced officers and NCOs to other theaters. The Royal Scots proved particularly hard hit, suffering disciplinary problems and an unusually high court-martial rate. Units like the Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery suffered critical leadership gaps that went unaddressed. By December 1941, many formations fielded inexperienced replacement troops, significantly undermining combat readiness. The Punjabis exemplified these deficiencies. Stationed in Hong Kong since November 1940, they received their vehicles and mortars only in August 1941—three months before combat. Compounding this, forty percent of their strength consisted of raw recruits arrived just in October. When war erupted, artillery regiments found themselves relying on junior officers in senior roles, with British commanders unfamiliar with Urdu directing Indian troops, a handicap that severely compromised effectiveness. Deficient equipment compounded leadership shortages. Shells dating from 1918 detonated prematurely upon discharge, while ammunition shortages crippled operations. On 8 December, all field guns deployed with merely 100 rounds apiece, with 200 rounds held in reserve for the entire campaign, and coastal guns received only 25 rounds each. Insufficient cross-training meant many infantrymen failed to understand the artillery "clock face" targeting system, causing them to miss their objectives. Malaria devastated European troops, particularly the Royal Scots. Of approximately 770 personnel, at least 180 suffered recurring malarial episodes from the Shing Mun Redoubt area's notoriously endemic conditions. Staff shortages forced nearly every unit to promote junior officers to positions beyond their rank, exacerbating structural weaknesses. Although the Canadians' arrival bolstered the garrison, significant handicaps undermined their effectiveness. Both battalions carried a C-class designation—deemed unfit for foreign service—having spent years in soft garrison postings without rigorous training. The deficit was stark: each Canadian soldier received only thirty-five rifle practice rounds. The two battalions incorporated 115 men with fewer than sixteen weeks' training, while sixty-two of seventy-five recruits joining the Winnipeg Grenadiers in June came directly from a training depot lacking even basic rifles. Twelve percent of the Canadian force remained untrained. Equipment deficiencies proved even more damaging. A standard 1941 Canadian infantry battalion required 102 motor vehicles—including twenty-two Universal Carriers, thirty-seven ¾-ton trucks, thirteen 1-ton trucks, thirty-one bicycles, and twenty-two Boys anti-tank rifles. When the Canadians landed, logistical failures left them with only six Bren carriers, two water tankers, twelve ¾-ton trucks, and a single Boys anti-tank rifle. Although they carried 3in. mortars, neither ammunition nor radios accompanied them. Canada possessed only 300 3-inch mortar bombs in its entire inventory at that time, making any allocation to Hong Kong impossible. A second vessel, the SS Don Jose, was dispatched with replacement vehicles and equipment but never reached Hong Kong before 8 December. The Japanese seized it en route to Manila. Despite these shortcomings, the force departed on 27 October with 1,975 men and arrived on 16 November. Intelligence estimates regarding Japanese available forces varied widely, ranging from two to four divisions. On 6 December evening, Chinese reports confirmed the previous day's arrival of three Japanese divisions at Buji township, located eight miles from the border in what is now Shenzhen. Earlier, around 1 November, a Japanese deserter provided intelligence of significant troop concentrations north of the frontier, including large-calibre artillery indicative of at least divisional strength.   The Hong Kong invasion force comprised three service branches: the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) deployed the 38th Infantry Division, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) committed the Second China Fleet, and the Imperial Japanese Air Force (IJAF) contributed the 1st Air Group. Command of the ground assault rested with Lieutenant-General Sano Tadayoshi of the 38th Division, supported by Major-General Ito Takeo heading the infantry group, while supporting arms including artillery, engineers, armor, and transport fell under Sano's authority. The main assault force consisted of three infantry regiments from the 38th Division, each led by a colonel: the 228th under Doi Teihichi, the 229th under Tanaka Ryosaburo, and the 230th under Shoji Toshishige. The 38th Division itself was a standard 1940s B-class infantry division of approximately 20,000 troops (ranging from 18,000–21,000 depending on operational requirements), organized into three regiments with three battalions each. Reflecting the Japanese army's reliance on animal and human transport, each regiment fielded roughly 3,800 troops supported by some 700 horses. Battalion strength averaged around 1,071 personnel, with companies numbering approximately 180 men. Japanese infantry battalions of this period featured a distinctive organization: rifle platoons consisted of four sections (three equipped with rifles and light machine guns, one with light mortars and rifles), complemented by an additional heavy machine-gun company fielding twelve Type 92 weapons and a troop of light artillery—likely Type 92 70mm infantry guns. The divisional field artillery regiment operated 75mm Type 41 mountain guns organized into three 688-man battalions, each with two troops of two guns. Mountain artillery units, numbering 36 guns total, carried additional personnel (3,400) and animals (1,400) to navigate the terrain complexities of Hong Kong operations. Recognizing the need for overwhelming firepower to compel Hong Kong's surrender, the IJA augmented the invasion force with heavy artillery—15cm and 24cm howitzers commanded by Major-General Kitashima Kineo. News of the Canadian reinforcements arriving in Hong Kong forced a reassessment. Commander-in-Chief Sakai Takashi of the 23rd Army informed his superiors that the original ten-day timeline was unrealistic and requested additional troops. Although most formations were already committed to other operations, Imperial Headquarters eventually authorized two depot regiments from Japan to support the campaign. Intended for second-line duties rather than frontline combat, these units were to be returned promptly after freeing experienced personnel for Hong Kong operations. This arrangement allowed the 19th and 20th mixed brigades—approximately 6,000 men organized in five infantry battalions, a field artillery battalion, and an engineer battalion—to be released for Hong Kong. However, Sakai's request for reinforcements met with disapproval from Imperial Headquarters, and he received an unmistakable message: a swift, decisive campaign was essential. His situation worsened when Japanese agents mistakenly identified British Bren carriers as tanks, forcing Sakai to improvise armor by raiding the 1st Reserve Tank Battalion and tankette units from infantry depot divisions. In attempting to secure additional armor from the 11th Army's 9th Reconnaissance Regiment, Sakai encountered resistance. General Hata Shunroku lodged sustained complaints with senior officials, and Sakai received a sharp rebuke—further requests would not be entertained, and his replacement would follow if necessary. Stung by this loss of face, Sakai abandoned all additional requests and became even more determined to achieve success. Vice-Admiral Niimi Masaichi, commanding the 2nd China Expeditionary Fleet, oversaw the entire naval element, divided into bombardment and attack groups. His flagship, the light cruiser Isuzu, carried Captain Ura Koichi, who simultaneously commanded the bombardment group. This naval force assembled ships from various China Expeditionary Fleet units, particularly from the Canton Special Base Force, 15 Squadron, and 11 Torpedo Boat Division at Guangzhou. Reflecting Niimi's lack of confidence in the army's air support capabilities, the seaplane tender IJN Kamikawa Maru joined the operation on his insistence, providing organic naval aviation against the threat posed by British Wildebeests. Niimi also petitioned for destroyers IJN Wakaba and Yugure to counter the three British destroyers, though this request was denied. The Special Naval Landing Forces (SNLF) were assigned to conduct diversionary attacks south of Hong Kong Island, intended to distract British forces from the main land invasion thrust. The IJAF's 1st Air Brigade, commanded by Colonel Habu Hideharu, centered on the 45th Air Regiment with 34 Kawasaki Ki-32 Type 98 'Mary' light bombers. This composite force drew aircraft and units from airfields across China and Manchuria—Beijing, Shanghai, Taiwan, and Qiqihar—all assembled at Baiyun Aerodrome in Guangzhou on 7 December 1941. Supporting the 1st Air Brigade were the 10th Independent Squadron under Captain Takatsuki Akira with 13 Nakajima Ki-27 Type 97 'Nate' fighters, 3 Mitsubishi Ki-15 Type 97 'Babs' command reconnaissance aircraft from the 18th Independent Reconnaissance Squadron, and the 44th Independent Squadron fielding 6 Tachikawa Ki-36 Type 98 'Ida' observation aircraft. Years before the invasion, the Japanese cultivated an extensive network of agents and sleeper operatives in Hong Kong, methodically gathering intelligence and mapping military installations. This sophisticated network proved remarkably effective: invasion maps carried by IJA officers were actually Hong Kong Government and British military maps, overprinted with Japanese annotations and interpretations. British officers later discovered in captivity that the Peninsula Hotel's regular barber was a Japanese Navy lieutenant-commander who had exploited the intimate setting to extract valuable information about British force dispositions. Intelligence operatives infiltrated every level of Hong Kong society—the garrison tailor and barber both served as spies. This groundwork enabled exceptional accuracy in artillery fire and bombing campaigns. The Japanese further leveraged criminal networks, recruiting gangsters throughout Hong Kong and Guangdong province with money and arms, turning them into irregular auxiliaries supporting the invasion.   On Sunday, 7 December, seven hundred members of the 2nd Royal Scots and Middlesex Regiment marched to St John's Cathedral for the morning service. As Major-General Maltby read a passage from Matthew, his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant I. MacGregor, delivered an urgent message that would change everything. Preparations for conflict had already begun. On 5 December, the HKVDC had mobilized fully, yet Hong Kong's broader population remained unmoved—the Happy Valley racetrack reported record attendance that very day. The contrast was stark: while one institution prepared for war, another celebrated as though nothing threatened. Japanese forces had been positioned advantageously since autumn 1941. The 23rd Army was already stationed west of Guangzhou, with contingents scattered across Foshan Town, Zhuhai, and other locations on the Pearl River delta. Upon orders for war on 1 December, they faced minimal distances to cover. The army regrouped at Humen, Shilong Town, and Guangzhou itself—staging areas for the invasion. The first visible signs arrived on 4–5 December when Japanese forces landed at Mirs Bay; the 228th Regiment moved into its staging area at Buji Town, now part of Shenzhen City. Maltby received these reports and immediately departed the cathedral service to issue urgent stand-to orders. Yet skepticism persisted within military circles. Some dismissed the threat, dismissing such intelligence as "astonishingly erroneous." Meanwhile, the Imperial Japanese Navy massed in the waters beyond Hong Kong's horizon. The Kowloon Infantry Brigade held a stretched defensive line: the 5/7 Rajputs anchored the centre, the 2/14 Punjab the east, and the 2nd Royal Scots the west. Forward positions extended far—C Company, 2/14 Punjab, under Major S. Burns ranged along Castle Peak Road toward Yuen Long. The brigade screen, C Company of the 2/14 Punjab, held Shueng Shui and Taipo Market with four Bren carriers and two armoured cars from the HKVDC, backed by engineers and the 22nd Fortress Company. The Hong Kong Infantry Brigade held Hong Kong Island itself. The Winnipeg Grenadiers occupied Victoria City on the north-west coast, while the Royal Rifles of Canada stretched along the north-east shores from Saukiwan to Lyemun. Brigadier Lawson commanded from his headquarters at Wongneichong Gap in the island's centre. At 0355 hours on 8 December, the code word "Blossom Blossom" was transmitted. Eleven minutes later, Lieutenant-General Sakai ordered the invasion to commence. Fifty minutes after that, at 0445 hours, Major Charles Boxer—a fluent Japanese speaker formerly of the Lincolnshire Regiment—was roused by Radio Tokyo announcing that war was imminent. Governor Young and Major-General Maltby were informed at once. By 0500 hours, the forward demolition points had been blown by Major Gray, OC of C Company 2/14 Punjab, and the HKVDC engineers under Major J. H. Bottomley. At 0645 hours, the garrison received formal notification: Britain and Japan were at war. Seventy-five minutes later, air-raid sirens wailed. Within moments, smoke billowed from Kai Tak Airport as Japanese aircraft destroyed virtually the entire air garrison. The Wildebeests, Walruses, HKVDC biplanes, and several civilian planes were engulfed in flames. Only two Ju-52s of the Eurasia Corporation and one CNAC T-32 Condor escaped destruction—dispersal bays had never been built due to lack of funds. The Japanese then turned to secondary targets, bombing Shamshuipo Camp and the neighbouring police station. The Canadians suffered few large-scale casualties in the initial strikes, though Sergeant Routledge and Signalman Fairley of the signal platoon were wounded—the first Canadian soldiers injured in World War II. Remarkably, Hong Kong Island's theatres, cinemas, and restaurants continued operating as though the island faced no peril. Japanese demolition efforts proved only minor obstacles. Bridges blown were quickly replaced. The invasion proceeded on three fronts: the 230th Regiment advanced westward along the northern route toward Yuen Long and Castle Peak, targeting the northern slope of Tai Mo Mountain. The 228th Regiment drove down the centre, following the Sheung Shui–Taipo–Kowloon road toward Grassy Hill north of the Shing Mun Redoubt. The 229th Regiment, crossing at Sha Tau Kok and by boat at Starling Inlet, proceeded via Taipo toward Tai Shui Hang and Ma On Mountain. Whenever confronted with strongly defended positions, the Japanese bypassed them entirely rather than engage. The first day brought scattered but spirited resistance. Around 1300 hours, the Punjabis inflicted the first serious check, drawing blood from advancing Japanese forces. At 1830 hours, they ambushed and decimated several Japanese platoons south of Taipo market town. The HKVDC's armoured cars and Bren carriers struck similar successes nearby. The 2 Royal Scots' reconnaissance platoon clashed with elements of the 229th Regiment around Yuen Long. Despite these minor victories, Japanese momentum continued. Armed with stolen British maps and guided by fifth columnists, they pushed forward relentlessly. By late afternoon on the 8th, the Punjabis withdrew toward Grassy Hill to avoid being outflanked. The artillerymen of the 12th Battery engaged an IJN destroyer and Japanese forces around Taipo, inflicting heavy casualties. Farther south near Shatin, on the Taipo–Kowloon highway, rapidly advancing Japanese troops surprised the defenders and severed the fuse at an HKVDC demolition point. Their triumph proved momentary; the engineers completed the backup circuit and detonated the bridge, destroying it along with the Japanese soldiers crossing it. By early morning on 9 December, orders came to withdraw all mainland units to the Gin Drinkers Line. The Punjabis, already at Shatin Wai overlooking Tide Cove, held their position under pressure and continuous shelling for the next two days. The HKVDC withdrew to Fotan, a village south of Shatin. Maltby ordered D Company, 5/7 Rajputs, under Captain H. R. Newtons to Smuggler's Ridge to close the gap between the 2 Royal Scots and 2/14 Punjab. HKVDC armoured cars and Bren carriers continued patrols along Castle Peak Road while HMS Cicala, having survived two air attacks, maintained station in Castle Peak Bay. Despite an IJN blockade, the destroyers HMS Thanet and Scout slipped anchor and escaped to Singapore around 2130 hours. The surviving CNAC and Eurasia aircraft took off with high-value evacuees: Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's widow and her two equally renowned sisters—the Soong sisters—along with Chinese Finance Minister H. H. Kung. Also departing was Lieutenant-Colonel H. Owen-Hughes of the HKVDC, who carried orders to coordinate with the Chinese Nationalist Army for a rear-guard attack on Japanese forces to relieve the pressure on Hong Kong. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On 8 December 1941, Japan attacked Hong Kong with the 38th Division, supported by naval and air forces. Despite British defenses manned by undertrained, under-equipped troops, Japanese forces advanced rapidly across three fronts. Within hours, the RAF was destroyed, demolitions proved futile, and British units withdrew toward the Gin Drinkers Line facing overwhelming odds.

What could new sanctions mean for Iran's economy and its trading partners? Meanwhile, President Trump announces plans for a 50% tariff on Canadian vehicles from 2027. Also, Singapore announces a $55,000 incentive aimed at encouraging people to have more children. And China showcases its growing humanoid robot industry.Presenter: Bisi Adebayo Producer: Niamh Mc Dermott

Nel The Essential di martedì 25 agosto, Chiara Piotto parla di: 00:00 quello che l'Europa e l'Italia faranno di nuovo per supportare l'Ucraina; 04:25 USA e Canada litigano non solo sui dazi; 06:20 Singapore studia un pacchetto natalità da 50mila euro per le famiglie per ogni figlio nato. Scopri Deposito Supersmart Premium: https://buonielibretti.poste.it/depositi-supersmart/deposito-supersmart-premium?STZ=DPR5412 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Ready for a fun episode!  It's GTWM Year 15 Episode 49with the boys as they tackle calls from 3 females from 3 different generations!  It's a real interesting look at the issues in different stages of adulthood.  Let's go!Caller #1 is Michelle 50yrs from Manchester, England. Michelle is close friends with a 38yr old European who cant get the hint that she wants to have sex with him. They are laying in bed, spooning, grinding, and everything but the actual move. Caller #2 is Claire 23yrs Manila.  Claire has met her unicornfubu and after one week of intense sex, she is worried more of this may lead to developing feelings. Caller #3 is another Claire 39yrs Singapore.  Claire in analpha in her marriage and as a more successful and organized person, her husband may feel a bit emasculated by it. He has since moved back to Manila with their daughter so he can attempt a career on his own, but is this a recipe for disaster?Send money to the Philippines withSendwave

On this week's installment of our Summer Playlist, we welcome Russell Robertson back into the SmarterMarkets™ studio. Russell is Chief Business Development Officer at Abaxx Exchange and Clearinghouse in Singapore.   David Greely sits down with Russell to discuss his perspective on India's evolving role in the gold and silver markets and its growing importance to the global commodities derivatives industry. They also talk about the developing new network of markets and trading corridors stretching from India to the Middle East, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Singapore – and the opportunities it creates.  

Michael talks with Steve Atkiss, former Special Assistant to President George W. Bush for Operations and a longtime presidential trip director, about the extraordinary security maneuver that separated President Trump from Air Force One in Turkey. Atkiss takes listeners inside the secretive world of presidential travel and continuity-of-government planning, sharing stories from Bush's surprise Thanksgiving trip to Baghdad, the Trump–Kim Jong Un summit in Singapore, and other high-stakes moments where security, secrecy and presidential decision-making collide. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See https://pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

When we first dicsussed the Summer of Simulative AI in 2024 we knew it would be a brief summer, but it has recently come back with a vengeance with SimGym in April and now Simile AI's $2B Series B, backed by GreenOaks and Index Ventures with prominent backers like Fei-Fei Li and Andrej Karpathy, running tens of millions of simulations for Fortune 100 clients like CVS and 85–99% accuracy vs human focus groups. Time to catch up on why this Second Summer of simulation is working!From creating Smallville, the landmark 2023 paper on Generative Agents that showed AI characters could remember, plan, socialize, and develop emergent behaviors, to now building foundation models of human behavior, Joon Sung Park is trying to answer a much bigger question: what if we could simulate the world before making decisions in it? In this episode, the Simile co-founder and CEO joins us to unpack the path from generative agents to digital twins, why today's frontier models still fail to capture how humans actually behave, and what it would take to eventually simulate all 8 billion people on Earth.We go deep on Simile's approach to modeling human behavior: long-form interviews, observational and transaction data, randomized controlled trials, population-level and individual-level models, and post-training on the causal mechanisms behind why people make decisions. Joon explains how his research created digital twins that reproduced human behavior and attitudes 85% as accurately as people reproduced their own responses, why models optimized to be rational can be bad simulations of irrational humans, and why understanding “social physics” may require changing model weights rather than simply prompting frontier LLMs.We also explore the much larger ambition behind simulation: testing products and policies before deploying them, finding counterintuitive paths toward desired outcomes, modeling emergent behavior across entire societies, and potentially tackling problems like climate change, democratic instability, and UBI. Joon reflects on scaling laws for simulation, the economics of data-center-scale simulated worlds, the connection to Thomas Schelling and psychohistory, why simulation is surprisingly similar to painting, and whether we might already be living in one.We discuss:* How Smallville and Generative Agents led to Simile* Why Joon's team asked: “What if we can just recreate the world that we live in?”* Why useful personal agents require deep models of their users* Memory architectures, Markdown files, and the limits of prompting* “Social physics” and behavioral foundation models* Why web data captures what people say more than what they actually do* Interviews, transactions, observational data, and randomized controlled trials* Why predicting the future matters less than understanding how to shape it* How Simile creates representative simulated populations* Simulation versus prediction and the connection to Foundation's psychohistory* How to evaluate simulations instead of simply stacking LLM hallucinations* Creating digital twins of 1,000 real people and reaching 85% behavioral accuracy* Why frontier models can struggle to reproduce real human behavior* Why good simulations need to reproduce human biases and mistakes* Post-training models on randomized controlled trials* Population-level versus individual-level simulation* Scaling laws for human simulation* The long-term ambition to simulate all 8 billion people on Earth* Whether simulations could help solve climate change or detect collapsing democracy* Thomas Schelling and the history of agent-based modeling* Why future simulations could require an entire data center* Multi-agent simulations and what happens when simulated people interact* Replacing expensive human panels with synthetic populations* Why market research is only the starting point for simulation* Why Joon sees simulation as surprisingly similar to painting* Using simulation to study questions like UBI* Whether we are already living in a simulation* Why AGI and simulation may be the twin technologies of advanced civilizationsJoon Sung Park* LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/joonspark* X: https://x.com/joon_s_pk* Website: https://www.joonsungpark.com* Simile: https://www.simile.comTimestamps00:00:00 Introduction and Joon's Path from Art to AI00:01:46 Smallville, Generative Agents, and the Origins of Simulation00:05:03 “Let's Just Create a World” and the Future of Personal Agents00:09:53 Social Physics and Behavioral Foundation Models00:14:08 Prediction vs. Simulation: How Do You Shape the Future?00:16:59 How Simile Models Real People and Populations00:25:35 Evaluating Simulations, Digital Twins, and 85% Accuracy00:30:23 Post-Training Models to Reproduce Human Behavior00:40:04 Scaling Laws and Simulating 8 Billion People00:43:10 From Schelling to Society-Scale Agent Simulations00:46:13 The Cost and Economics of Simulating the World00:52:05 Real-World Use Cases, Synthetic Populations, and the Market00:57:27 The Future of Simulation, Painting, and UBI01:04:23 Are We Already Living in a Simulation?01:06:08 Building Simile and HiringTranscriptIntroduction: Joon Sung Park, Simile, and the Story So FarVibhu [00:00:00]: Today, we have Joon in the podcast. Excited to kick this one off. Very exciting company. I wanna kick off and ask you the question, talk us through the story of your life. How have you gotten here?Joon [00:00:13]: Yeah, for sure. I'm really excited to be here. A story of my life. So I was born in Korea, and I lived there for a good 11 years or so of my life, and then my family moved to Boston. So we moved when I was 11, and my parents were doctors, so they were going through their postdoctoral studies. My dad was a surgeon, so he was doing his sabbatical years at the Boston Children's Hospital. So I grew up there, not too close to tech. I was very much a music and artsy, painting kind of guy.Vibhu [00:00:49]: Painting.Joon [00:00:49]: Exactly. I got into painting a little bit later, in high school, but that's what I used to do. And then I grew up mostly in the East Coast after Korea. So I lived a good number of years in New Hampshire, and then I went to college in Pennsylvania. And I got into more of this tech scene, in college. So I was originally trained to be an artist. I thought that would be my professional career. So it wasn't a hobby. It was like, “Hey, let's make a living out of this.” And then gradually, I got really interested in this idea of, hey, the greatest artist often creates their own medium, and the best medium that we had available today was in computation. So I decided to go deeper into that, and one thing led to another, and we can go deeper into this, but I decided that research was something that I gradually got interested in, and here I am.Smallville, Generative Agents, and the 2023 Breakout PaperSwyx [00:01:46]: So there's a lot that you packed into the research components. You had one of the best papers of 2023, which was the generative agents paper, commonly known as the Smallville paper.Swyx [00:01:58]: Feel free to call back to anything else that you mentioned, but most people would have heard of you from this. Do you have any statistics on how many people have, like, read it? arXiv gives you something, right? Some stats.Joon [00:02:10]: Yeah, it's a good question. How many people have read it, I'm not sure.Joon [00:02:14]: I know we do keep track of citations, and they are going up quite fast.Swyx [00:02:23]: Yeah, Google Scholar has 7,200 citations.Vibhu [00:02:25]: I feel like it made a bigger hit than that, and it was a pretty instrumental paper. It got cited so many times.Swyx [00:02:34]: It is frequently the answer when people ask, “What is the best paper you've read recently?” It's this one.Vibhu [00:02:39]: I thought the memory component was pretty underrated. It was a very good early memory system, and one of the biggest papers.Foundation Models and the Search for Killer ApplicationsJoon [00:02:47]: Yeah, so maybe I can talk a little bit about how this particular paper came together. So when I got into research, it was back in 2020 when I started my PhD program at Stanford, and that was the year, when we were about to get GPT-3 to be available. So we already had GPT-2, and you could sense that there was this new class of models that was just becoming available in the market, and the team got very intrigued. And the general consensus was, “Well, is this model going to be useful for anything?” “It's really strange that these models are not trained to do any particular task.” But we decided to take a bet. So a large group of scholars at Stanford, and it was led by one of my co-founders, Percy Liang, and we came togetherSwyx [00:03:35]: Who coined foundation models.Joon [00:03:36]: Who coined the term foundation models. We wrote this paper, where that term came from called Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models. And during that process, really the thing that I started to think deeply about was, here is a model that is fundamentally new in our ecosystem. The reason why this was new was it wasn't, again, trained to do anything in particular, but its premise was it could do anything and everything. It was like a stem cell, if you were to take a biology analogy. And I got really interested in this idea that, well, if we were to really think about what are the killer applications that this particular technology would enable, what would that be? Many of my colleagues were using this for simple classification, simple generations. Interesting that these models can do that, but from an interaction perspective, not that interesting. We've known how to do that for many decades. And what we came down to was these models are trained on this very broad data from the web, right? So these are human behavioral data. It's social media, Wikipedia, all these data. So if you poke at the right angle, then you could see human behavior that would just pop out that's quite realistic, and we've never seen that before.The Time Machine Game and Recreating the WorldJoon [00:04:45]: So that got us really interested. The exercise that we decided to do, with this particular group of colleagues, Michael Bernstein, Percy Liang, and myself, who ended up becoming my co-founder at Simile, we sat down and we played this game that we call the time machine game.Joon [00:05:03]: Imagine we were to get on a time machine and fast-forward 10 years and look back. What would have been the single application that will have mattered that would be the most interesting and inspiring? And when we thought, “Well, what if we can just recreate the world that we live in?” it's really hard to get more ambitious than that. Like, let's just create a world.Joon [00:05:24]: And that's where we started. And initially, we had this paper that was a precursor to the generative agents paper called Social Simulacra.Swyx [00:05:32]: Before you go further, were there other candidates for the most ambitious thing in the time machine exercise? What was number two or number three?Personal Agents, User Models, and Why Simulation Came FirstJoon [00:05:44]: There is a close second that we were considering, which ended up becoming more of these automation tools, especially the vision around really personalized agents that would do things for you.Swyx [00:05:59]: That's also happening.Joon [00:06:00]: It's also happening. But it was interesting for us, right, in that the reason why, we decided to go with the idea of simulation, one, I was a huge science fiction nerd, and this idea of creating simulation, I was personally really just fascinated. I loved the idea. It's really cool to see, like, a game town like this and just see these agents live in it. But at the same time, my bet was if you were to create a really amazing personal assistant out of this technology, what you need first is an amazing model of your users. So I told a model, “Hey, can you go buy late dinner for me?” And it orders Hawaiian pizza, and I do not like pineapples on my pizza. Then it totally failed. The way for it to not make that mistake is only by having a deep understanding of who I am. And I gave a very simple and dumb example here, but you can imagine how this core understanding of people is instrumental. This is how, if we have our family and closest friends, they have a good mental model of who we are. That's the basis of our social connection. So our bet also was this technology around simulation, creating accurate representation of people ought to precede the more complex agents that would automate the world that we live in. So that was the bet. But that was a very close second, and I'm still very much fascinated by it. I think there's a lot of interesting work that's going around. My hot take here, though, is I don't think we've seen a true personal assistant that's useful, in ways that meet the ambition of that particular line of work. I think there are early applications that are interesting, and if you talk to even ChatGPT nowadays or Claude, they know a lot about us. So a lot of the generation it's doing, I do think it's much more tailored, but I think the ambition is quite large in that field, and I don't think we quite have all the right ingredients just yet.Swyx [00:08:01]: So OpenClaw and these personal agents, what do you want to see from them that they don't currently have?Memory, Markdown, and the Limits of PromptingJoon [00:08:09]: I do think it's slowly getting there, but I do generally want them to have much deeper understanding of the person. Right now, you look at the models. OpenClaw, what it's leveraging is a Markdown file, and I think it's quite clever, right? So if you look at the generative agents paper, this was the same intuition that we had, where initially when we were creating the memory architecture for the generative agents, and, like, this is, like, back in 2022, so we didn't really quite have the idea of even agentive architecture or the term agent. But the intuition that we shared with some of the work that's coming out today was we initially thought, “Well, do we want to make the memory into, let's say, knowledge graph? Do we want to train a bespoke model?” All of these things. And what we decided to do was, “No. Just forget about all this.” These language models are quite good at modeling text and understanding and reasoning about text. So just put everything in a Markdown file or a text file. You're done. I thought that was quite interesting that we could do that, and there's a lot of strength in doing that. But also, there are limitations. It's the way you retrieve and make sense of data that's extremely large, it takes a lot of work. So I think that technology is getting better. I also do, however, think, there are certain things you just cannot shape just by prompting the model. So to some degree, you do need to touch the parameters of the model itself. So there is this work that I do think does need to happen, and it is happening. The question is, how far can we take it? How do we source data, and how do you also create an ecosystem where people are continuously feeding data to this model so it's learning about you?Vibhu [00:09:50]: What's the intuition between why you need to do it in the model?Social Physics and Behavior Foundation ModelsJoon [00:09:53]: My intuition behind the actual when do you train or even post-train a model versus just prompt a model is if the model has to learn the underlying physics of the world that it's operating in. So it has to learn new social physics. The places where it doesn't have to train are the places where it already has the physics. We trust the physics. It already has the base statistics, but it's just trying to react to an environment. Then I think you can just prompt your way into getting the actions out of it. I don't think the models that are out in the open have yet learned the complete mapping of social physics of humanity. This is one of the core theses of Simile, right? And one of the core reasons why that is the case is if you look at the data that the model was trained on, these models were trained on the web data, like, whatever was available on the web. And these are really interesting data sets, but they are fundamentally the self-exposed attitudinal data with some behavior data that's sprinkled around here and there. And it has yet to learn the really deep behavioral nature of people, not just what people say they do online, but what they do in real life. And this is one of what I would consider to be the dark knowledge of humanity that we haven't quite captured. And it's these data that would also need to get factored into the model creation.Vibhu [00:11:21]: You call it behavior foundation model.Vibhu [00:11:23]: There's a good one-liner here, but outside of that, what type of data do you need? What are you changing on the model level? How do you go about modeling, doing a behavior foundation model?The Three Data Buckets: Interviews, Behavior, and CausalityJoon [00:11:35]: We think about data in three buckets. So one bucket is interview data. It's quite interesting. Rich qualitative data is interesting. It's not behavioral, but we would literally ask people, “Hey, tell me the story of your life.”Vibhu [00:11:53]: It's just what we're doing here exactly.Joon [00:11:54]: The question that you all asked at the beginning of this interview literally is the question we also ask. And we ask our participants to go a little bit deeper, than how far I went. Maybe I can give more of my life story in lieu of this. But the reason why that data is interesting is by learning about this very long-tail information about people, you get a lot of texture around this model, like, this person as a model. So even understanding their childhood memory or even their trauma, their first love, these things, quite informative in ways that's really hard to predict. So that's one. Then there are two tranches of what I would consider to be the behavioral data. One kind of behavioral data is observational. So these might be like transaction data, or these might be data that you can get by scraping the web, right? So you can imagine why these data sets would be interesting, right, because they give you the base statistics of people's behavior.Joon [00:12:55]: But then there is the last category of data, that I personally think is perhaps the most important, which is the data that describes the causal mechanism, the whys of people. Some of this is covered by the interview data, the qualitative, because people talk about why they made certain decisions. But really, where you get to see the most behavioral aspect of this is in randomized controlled trials, like RCTs. Imagine you have the same setup, but you have a few different variables that you are trying to tweak. Can you get realistic human behavior out of it in ways where, imagine you had this particular option. Imagine you're even trying to choose whether you're going to drink coffee or not. The day you drink coffee versus the day you didn't drink coffee, does your behavior change? That's a data set that describes a causal mechanism. This is quite important in modeling people. The reason why this is important is oftentimes when people come to us, or not just to us, but the reason why people are interested in simulation isn't because they want to predict the future. If you're trying to win against the stock market, predicting the future is interesting.Prediction vs. Simulation: Shaping the FutureJoon [00:14:08]: But most people, most decision-makers, what they want to know is, how can we shape the future? It doesn't really help you to hear that your sales are going to tank in two quarters. They're just gonna say, “Wow, that sucks.” What they want to know is, well, what do we need to do now to avoid that future? That's the causal mechanism. And this is also very hard data to come by, right, because the world is our ground truth, but it happens once. So in a very controlled setup where everything is equal except for one variable, this kind of data set rarely happens. So this is a reason why this data set is both hard to come by and quite important if you're trying to model human behavior.Swyx [00:14:50]: So behavior, I think, is the hardest data set to acquire. What is out there? What is even possible? You're not going to know a lot of details about my life. I don't even have data for myself on my own health or habits, and I just don't log everything. So how can you have that data?Joon [00:15:14]: So we run a lot of randomized controlled trials.Swyx [00:15:17]: But you put people in the lab, they watch them sleep, or what?Joon [00:15:20]: We do care a lot about the consent process. People know that we invite them to be a member of this community to both share data and have themselves represented in different forms. But we bring a lot of people to the lab, or virtual lab, where we design experiments that would pose them real behavioral decisions. And often in these experimental setups, what makes the difference between what is attitudinal versus behavioral is whether the stake in your decision is real. That's ultimately what makes it behavioral. So in these setups, we are inspired by our colleagues in social sciences, psychology, and so forth. So when they run studies, the techniques they utilize is imagine there's an online store that you're inviting people to come by. Then whatever they purchase in this experiment, they actually get that item delivered. Like, these are the things that make the stakes real. So we run a lot of these experiments, and we also do partner with firms. Right now, we also have customers who are quite excited to at least give us a glimpse of the behaviors that their users exhibit so that we can get a little bit deeper understanding of how people behave in these different platforms.How Customers Use Simile: Populations, Queries, and ExperimentsVibhu [00:16:39]: I think on the customer side, they have a lot of data about their users, who has bought. They have the action data.Vibhu [00:16:47]: Can you walk us through an example of what someone comes to you for? What questions would they want solved? Do you customize a model for them? Do you have something off the shelf? What does that look like?Joon [00:16:59]: Today, when people leverage our models, it's often to better understand the population of their interest. So usually, the start of the relationship, we come together and hear about what population they want us to model, right? So it might be that if you're a CPG company that's selling to all of the US, then maybe it's fairly straightforward. You want to model the gen pop of the US. But at the same time, if there is a vertical or if there's a market that they're trying to go into, imagine, they want to better understand, let's say, people in their 20s and 30s living in California. That's a much more specific population. So we hear about this population, and we go recruit these people, with consent, and with incentives, and we collect some of their data and create a model of these people. Then what our product allows you to do is query them. So it can take as input a filter that is a description of the population that you want to talk to, just like the one I just mentioned, and an environment. The environment can literally be survey questions, behavioral experiments, It can be A/B testing. Oftentimes, the core use cases are things like concept testing, to start with. But also, people sometimes want to do focus groups or one of the fun use cases that we also serve is even modeling things like earnings calls for public companies.Joon [00:18:21]: So these are the use cases that we often start with.Swyx [00:18:23]: Concept testing, is that an established term? I've never heard of concept testing.Concept Testing, Gallup, and PoliticsJoon [00:18:27]: Yeah. So it has to do with they have, let's say, different messaging, different products, different ideas.Swyx [00:18:32]: It's like a marketing exercise.Swyx [00:18:33]: Okay, got it. Got it. Politics?Joon [00:18:36]: We do, have a strategic partnership with Gallup, and of course, Gallup is deep into policy space and so forth. Right now, we have not worked deeply with politics, like that area just yet, however.Swyx [00:18:49]: I'm curious if there is demand or if they really would have different needs that somehow fundamentally don't mix with your existing, users or people.Joon [00:19:00]: I think there's certainly demand.Joon [00:19:02]: But we are very much mindful of how this technology gets adopted and the societal impact that we'll end up having with this technology. And I do see politics as an area where a company has to be particularly thoughtful about the way they operate and make impact. So this is where we also want to make sure that we form enough of guardrail and perspective on how to leverage this technology before we go on to serve markets like the politics.Swyx [00:19:29]: I'll give people an example. one of my favorite shows is The West Wing. I don't know if people have watched.Swyx [00:19:34]: One of the key storylines is, like, the president has, multiple sclerosis, but they haven't. they need to figure out how to disclose it. So they run a poll with a fake governor and ask people to respond on the poll,Counterfactuals, Polling, and When Simulation Is UsefulSwyx [00:19:47]: They try to make decisions based on the results of that poll on, like, how well they'll be received, like where, how should we play this?Swyx [00:19:54]: And I'm like, well, I think those counterfactual things, I would use a simulation for this if I could trust it.Joon [00:20:01]: For sure.Joon [00:20:02]: In that show, how'd it go?Swyx [00:20:04]: In that show, it was, like a foregone conclusion. They were like, “We know it's bad. We just don't know how bad.” And then the poll came back. It was like, “It's really bad.” And then they just did it anyway.Joon [00:20:14]: Part of it is to show, right? So you're, you're looking at the ideaSwyx [00:20:17]: Maximizing drama.Joon [00:20:18]: How bad could it be? Oh, it's horrible.Swyx [00:20:20]: And to some extent, I think that is part of the trick of the, or the challenge or with being a customer of yours, which is that if I know it's. if I roughly know and can intuitSwyx [00:20:35]: What the effect is going to be, do I need you? What sensitivity of it, of effect do I need in order to make a decision, right? So for example, if I, my approval rating is 50%Swyx [00:20:48]: And I, they have this negative piece, news item comes out, and it drops to 30.Swyx [00:20:52]: If it drops to 20, if it drops to 40, do I care? No. It, I know it drops. It's negative. So when do I care about simulations?Joon [00:21:01]: You do something that's clearly bad, that's not popular, and people don't like you, like, yeah, it's likeSwyx [00:21:05]: You don't need a simulation.Joon [00:21:07]: Yeah. Well, so there are a couple of things. one is, there are use cases where, like every day, developers, designers, policymakers, marketers, every single day, they create assets. They create new products. And turns out, it's many of the decisions in hindsight is obvious. Yes, of course this is bad, but we still run those studies because understanding the magnitude and understanding how acute something is quite difficult, even if, we feel like, of course, like this makes sense. this is the reason why we make so many mistakes. Like, every time somebody goes online and say something that has huge backlash, you look at that and like, “What an idiot.” However, it's tough. That's one. There's also another aspect here, which is, again, this is the reason why simulation is different from prediction. In simulation, in the ideal case scenario. So what simulation is trying to show is it's trying to show each step of the way or each step that we need to take to get to a certain outcome, right? So in the most advanced simulations, sometimes the next step that we're suggesting might be quite counterintuitive. The analogy that I sometimes give, and I ground it in a more realistic example, but, I, as I mentioned, I'm a huge fan of science fiction, and I don't know how, many of the audience members have read, like, things like the Foundation series by Asimov.Simulation as a Path, Not Just a PredictionSwyx [00:22:37]: Oh, yeah. We've mentioned psychohistory a number of times.Joon [00:22:39]: Okay, fantastic. So I might be, talking to the right crew. If you read Foundation series, literally the first act is there's a group of scientists who have found out that, “Oh, our galactic empire is going to collapse, and we're going to have 30,000 years of unrest.” And they run psychohistory, the simulator that tries to teach them, “Okay, how can we keep this unrest to a 1,000 years?” And they plan this out, and the first step of that plan is to get the scientists who say, “Okay, this is coming,” exiled into this random place in this, galax- galaxy.Swyx [00:23:18]: Terminus.Joon [00:23:19]: Exactly. And that's so counterintuitive. Like, what a strange move that you literally sent the group of scientists who was raising voice around this potential collapse of galactic empire into nowhere. How is that the right first move? Well, it turns out in this particular simulation, that was the move.Joon [00:23:40]: It's these things, right? And the reason why these reasoning is possible is because you're showing the step function or each step that results in a particular outcome. So really what simulation allows you to do in its highest form is you give it not a problem or question, like what would people answer to the survey? That's not what we do. What we tell it is, “Here is a goal that we have. In the context of foundation, we want to keep the unrest to a 1,000 years. What is the path that we need to take now to get to that particular future?” And that's what simulation allows you to do. Now, translating that into real market, imagine you're a automobile company and you're about to release a, EV, and you're trying to understand, well, how do we market EV, to make sure that our stock price goes up? But what if the answer comes down that, well, you can market your EV in XYZ way, but that might change people's perception around the cars that's not EV and make your overall sales to go down. Not very intuitive, especially all you're trying to optimize is EV salesss, and that's the only thing that you're tracking, then that might result in a completely wrong solution, or at least different solution than what you would have expected, whether it's right or wrong.Joon [00:24:57]: That's the power of simulation.Swyx [00:24:58]: For listeners, we covered a similar topic with Mikhail Parakhin from Shopify, where they are working on SimGym. I don't know if he ever talked to you about it. it's very similar.Joon [00:25:07]: ISwyx [00:25:07]: The goal is increased conversion, but then the journey is very unusual.Joon [00:25:12]: Journey is unusual.Swyx [00:25:12]: Yeah. The-- He's trying to look for interventions on a shopping trajectory, which is similar to what you're saying. Like, it's not about the attitudinal, is your word for it.Swyx [00:25:24]: It's about behavior.Joon [00:25:25]: It's about behavior.Swyx [00:25:25]: And that's exactly the difference, right? It's, like, not about the near-term direction about-- but it's more about, like, how do you affect multiple turns of interactions.Vibhu [00:25:35]: You had a good quote at the start about this as well. It's not about people wanting to know the outcome. It's about how they can change it, change the way to get there, something like that. But I wanna take it back to how do we know this is grounded? LikeGrounding and Evaluating Digital TwinsVibhu [00:25:47]: How do you run evals? How do you test that simulations come through? if I was to do the same thing that you described with, say, your favorite LLM, Opus, GPT-5.6, have some agent to map out these thingsVibhu [00:26:02]: How different are the answers we would get if I give it the same goal, the same objective, make a decent system? You're saying that you need to change the model weight. You have your own solution to this. But how far off are we, and how do you check if it's grounded? you have some interesting stuff on your site that points to how you run real evals, but if you could take us through that side. I think that's one of the big concerns that people have. They're like, “LLMs hallucinate.”Vibhu [00:26:27]: “You're just hallucinating layer after layer,” right?Joon [00:26:30]: The way we do this, and this is the paper that we worked on after the generative agents paper that really became the, at least for Simile and also the field of simulation and synthetic panels, really became the foundation. Yeah, this is the paper. the paper is called Generative Agent Simulations of 1000 People. Here's what we've done. For this paper, we brought 1,000 people that's representatively sampled from the US to a virtual lab. And what we have done was we spent two hours collecting fairly wide-ranging data. In this particular study, we focused a lot on this interview data, that was, whose script was taken from this project called American Voices Project. And then we would also pair that with a lot of behavior data and so forth, whatever we can collect within two hours. And then we would send these people away for a couple of weeks. And during that time, I would use this data to create their digital twins. And I would bring the humans, participants back after 2 weeks and have them complete a battery of surveys, experiments, behavior studies. So we have the list here, which included things like behavioral economics games. We would run literally, like, Big Five personality test, General Social Survey. We would also go ahead and run the randomized controlled trials that were published on PNAS. And we would have their digital twins predict how the source individuals would have acted in these studies and surveys. And this is where we could replicate people's behaviors and attitudes 85 percent as accurately as people would replicate their own. So that was the first really paper that gave this validated results that we can model individuals in an accurate way. And what we ended up finding now, of course, in AI space, so this paper came out at the end of 2024. AI space, a year and a half, 2 years, that's a lifetime.85% Accuracy and Why Frontier Models Miss Human BehaviorSwyx [00:28:24]: Yeah. Just, for listeners who are not seeing the YouTube, I just wanna say, like, the headline figure is 85 percent accuracy, like, which is a big improvement over all the otherSwyx [00:28:34]: Methods that you showed.Joon [00:28:36]: But the part that was particularly striking to us, especially as we improved this technology even further, was the generative AI models like ChatGPT, Claude that's coming out, it does give you the right foundation. However, what they do not consider is the true attitudinal and behavioral aspect of people, especially in the population that you care about. So what these models are really good at today is they're trying to become the super rational, objective machines, right? So you go get their data from places like Mercor, Scale. You talk to professional programmers, scientists to create model that's amazing at reasoning. That's what they do. Simile doesn't care about any of this. The models that we're talking about here, what we're trying to create are models that are as dumb as I am, right? So if I make some mistakes, the model has to make the same mistake.Swyx [00:29:34]: Oh, that's very hard.Joon [00:29:35]: That's very hard.Swyx [00:29:36]: You're solving Murphy's paradox.Joon [00:29:37]: That's exactly. And this is a completely different data and training objective. This is also where we see quite a bit of discrepancy in the performance in human behavior prediction between the frontier models, Simile's model, and the models being created in this space, where in some cases, the model performance of frontier models go all the way down to 20, 30 percent, especially if you go into that more niche population on topics that our customers would care about. On more gen pop, it might be around 50 to 60 percent. So it's not very robust. Like, you wouldn't want to make your decision off of these and these findings. If you can bring that up to 85 percent, that is ultimately what people end up getting very excited about.Swyx [00:30:20]: Yeah. Do we wanna keep going on the paper, routes?Joon [00:30:23]: Yeah, for sure. So the last one, was an interesting one. So this, paper was the follow-up paper that we had, to the 1000 agents paper, where the idea was now can we augment the models even further and post-train a model based on a lot of randomized controlled trials? So this was an interesting one. The data is always the most interesting part of modeling in many ways. The data that we got here was there's this, there's this platform called Open Science Framework. So some, the audience might be familiar with this. And there has been, especially in the social sciences over the past 5 years or so, there has been this concern around replicability of studies. And so it was a bit of a crisis, the scientists acknowledged, where we rerun the study and we don't see the same finding.Post-Training on RCTs and Replication StudiesVibhu [00:31:12]: Oof.Joon [00:31:12]: It's tough. And the reason why it's there-- that was often the case was there's this survival bias where the papers that get published often need to maintain what we call the value of less than 0.05 in the experiments that we ran. That suggests that only-- there's only 5% chance that the results that we saw is false positive. But the tricky part was all the papers that were not published, and there's still a 5% chance that whatever we publish is totally just randomly generated. Like, there's a 5% chance that, hey, this effect is not real, but it just happened to be real because of the sampling bias. So because of that, what scientists started to do was they started to register their studies. So before running an experiment, they would go to this platform and say, “Here is the data. Here is the population that we're collecting, and here's the hypotheses.” And they would just say, “Here is our hypothesis.” Like, “This is what we believe.” And you cannot retroactively change those hypotheses. This is what gives us more scientific statistical confidence that whatever effect that you ended up seeing is true. So that ended up creating this really interesting platform where there's one platform that has now contains tens of thousands of real-world experiments and hypotheses. And a lot of these are really high-quality, like, professionally designed behavior studies and random- randomized controlled trials. So we got the data and the studies from this platform and used that to make a point. And this particular, model is not, something that we're serving commercially because this was a part of the open science. But this particular data set, helped us make a point that by collecting a lot of these randomized controlled trials, that are really well-designed, we can make significant improvement in model's capability to predict human behaviors. So that's what this paper was about.Vibhu [00:33:10]: Is this stuff done on a individual level? Like, do I need to tune the model per individual, per company? Is there foundation model changes and then some slight post-training? Anything you can share there?Population-Level vs. Individual-Level ModelsJoon [00:33:21]: So this particular model was trained. the data we had at the level of individuals, but this particular model was trained. We experimented with both. And this is what we end up doing at Simile too. We always train 2, distinct model. One is what we call the population-level model. The other is what we call the individual-level model. And both take very similar input, which is the description of a subpopulation or individual and a stimuli. In this particular work, we've done the same. Here, the results that we are reporting are much more geared towards individuals because we do think that is a harder task in many ways, but that's what we have done.Vibhu [00:34:02]: You seen anything on the questions that humans can solve that models can't solve? So likeHuman Biases, Mundane Choices, and What Models MissVibhu [00:34:09]: Currently, it's, I live 5 minutes walk away from a car wash. It's a 10-minute drive. Should I walk or drive?Joon [00:34:16]: Huh.Vibhu [00:34:16]: The model will say, “Oh, walk to the car wash.” And, you don't have your car.Vibhu [00:34:20]: Is anything like this a problem in simulation? You would assume, like, very simple for human to think about, but if the model is saying you should walk to the car wash, anything here?Joon [00:34:32]: It's less, what can we solve, but I think it's more about what biases or mistakes do people make that models miss. Like, imagine that you are, like the. When I was still at Stanford, I lived in Palo Alto. So it's about, I would say, 40-minute walk from the campus. You ask the model, “Okay, let's go home. What can I, what can I do?” It would likely call an Uber or, give me, the bus time. But for the longest time, I really liked walking back. And the reason why I wanted to do that was not for efficiency. It really helped me think. And I like to walk for, half an hour or 40 minutes or so a day, where I just get to, just think about ideas, research, just get lost in my thoughts. That's very human activity. Unless the model has seen that and understands the importance of that activity, it would miss these kinds of features. So that I think, is fundamentally what we're trying to model. Like, what is fundamentally human might not be the most efficient thing to do, might not be the right thing to do, but things that make us who we are.Swyx [00:35:43]: I'm curious if, there are some data sets that you really want that would materially help you. One version of this may be interesting, which is more valuable to you to acquire as a data set, all of LinkedIn, all of Twitter, all of Facebook?What Data Matters: Social Media, Transactions, and FacebookJoon [00:35:57]: It's a little bit hard to rank, in part because, there's, there's this product saying where no feedback is wrong because it teaches you something about your users. Doesn't matter what feedback.Joon [00:36:11]: I think it's a little bit like that.Swyx [00:36:12]: So just whatever is bigger.Vibhu [00:36:13]: What about a different domain? Say it was. What about all of Amazon data?Joon [00:36:17]: Oh, yeah.Vibhu [00:36:18]: Shopping data, right?Joon [00:36:18]: Shopping data. So Amazon data is interesting in that it's very much behavioral, although, like, what people do on social media, you could squint and say that is also behavioral. But the transaction data is always interesting. It is also most commonly available, however.Joon [00:36:33]: If we were to look at purely social media, like if you really, if I were, if I had to really pick, Facebook likely is interesting because I do think it is most a default version of people. Because you go to LinkedIn, it's very much professional environment. So people put up their, they have their guards up, right? And that still is interesting because that is true human attitude and behavior, but it is not your base state. you go to Twitter- Twitter, people have their own crazy personas, or depending on who you are. Like, my Twitter profile and, persona is very much, initially was I was very much an academic. “Hey, I'm here to share my studies.” Now, I share, things that's related to Simile. But Facebook is one of those more private space where people just connect with their friends. In that way, I do think it shows you a little bit more about who that person is. So if I had to pick, I'd likely pick, Facebook.Swyx [00:37:30]: Yeah. And you're interested in, like, the whole person and their background and philosophy. I, is it too clinical or too machine learning-oriented to just say this is just ways to inject variance and biases? The broad question, is, like, is this any better than a randomized, like, combinatorial explosion version? So we have a link to the TencentBillion Personas, Synthetic Demographics, and Bespoke DataSwyx [00:37:54]: Billion persona paper, where they did not do any of the groundwork that you are doing.Swyx [00:37:59]: They just did like a cross matrix of here's all the professions in the world, here's all the people, possible backgrounds in the world, do a dot product across all of them, and that's it. That's your prompt for a billion people.Swyx [00:38:12]: This will do something. I don't know if it'll do what you do, but it gets you some way, some percent of the way there.Joon [00:38:18]: So this was an interesting paper. Like, what I admired about this paper when it came out was the scale. And you do gradually want to be able to simulate really large societies and interactions. So the scale is definitely admirable. it is relying heavily on the known statistics that went into training the model. So to the extent that you believe that statistics is correct, this is not a bad way to go about this. But the thesis here, and this is something that we also have seen in the market, like if this works, then we have solved simulation.Joon [00:38:54]: It,Swyx [00:38:55]: Because I survey, like, okay, 5% of the US population is in construction.Swyx [00:39:01]: The other 5% is in medicine, whatever, right? And then you just keep going down the list, and then you do the other side. 5% has, like, the big 5 personalitySwyx [00:39:08]: Of, like, neurotic or whatever. That's it.Joon [00:39:11]: That's it. So if you believe that the underlying data set and the platform that we're leveraging has all the right statistics, then this will have solved it. you're at that point merely retrieving the knowledge that is already embedded in the model, in the model parameters. That's not, unfortunately, what we see, where there is such detailed and also niche knowledge about people that if you just take one example, it might feel very mundane, but it's quite rich when you put together, that you do need to do a lot of bespoke data collection to better understand people. And this is also, I think what makes this particular, job fun, which you want to deeply understand people, and the process of deeply understanding them requires a lot of attention to the details. And you do need to pay attention to and pay respect to the daily lives that people lead.Scaling Simulation: From Thousands to SocietiesVibhu [00:40:04]: I wanna talk about scaling simulation.Vibhu [00:40:07]: So what can't we simulate, what can we simulate, and how does scaling affect this? So how big are the models? What if we go from, 8B, like, couple 100 billionVibhu [00:40:18]: Like billion000 parameters, billion000? Do we get scaling? Any interesting emergence? Like, at a certain scale, at a certain amount of training, you uncover anything unusual and any learnings from that?Joon [00:40:31]: What we are seeing is at Simile, so we do post-train our own model. The thing that we're seeing is the early glimpse of scaling law in simulations. The more data about humans and more compute you ingest, you start to get predictive and predictable gains of the model performance in simulating it, simulating people.Vibhu [00:40:51]: Ooh. We need a scaling law curve.Joon [00:40:52]: It's scaling law. Whenever you find it's a beautiful thing. And we're starting to see the glimpse of it, which is quite exciting. But if you talk about the ambition of simulation as a whole, it's not merely about building a model. It's about building a model, then creating the agents that become the individuals in a much larger ecosystem. So they're creating this multi-agent simulation. Down the line, you want these multi-agent simulation to also live in a very rich environment, right? What we are really trying to get to at that point is, hey, can we create. All right, let's do a time machine game again, and 5 years, 10 years into the future, can we create a simulation of 8 billion people living on Earth? I think that's quite interesting. And that really is the vision. And once you get to that state, the questions that you can help answer for the society also start to change from my perspective. The answers are fundamentally about emergence of the emergent behavior of society and large groups of people.Joon [00:41:53]: So the questions that I get excited by, and maybe this is a stodgy- a bit. I have my, academic side of me.Joon [00:42:01]: And for me, it's questions like, can we help solve climate change? If you look at climate change as a problem space, this is what we, like social scientists would often call it the wicked problems, problem where you have many actors with competing incentives for trying to make a very complex decision and coordinating that coordination decision. Very difficult to really solve in real life, which is also the reason why we couldn't solve it. Can simulation help us solve that? Another one is, can we understand the signals for collapsing democracy, or can we understand or can we uncover the origin story of the monetary system? These are societal questions that we never really had a good way of answering. If we can create simulations of our society, you have to believe that these are the problems that we can solve. So that's really the ambition of this field. And, I also think, yes, I think there's a Nobel Prize to be won there, which wouldn't be surprising. And I think there's some amazing societal impact that we can have to help people make better decisions.Climate Change, Democracy, and Societal SimulationSwyx [00:43:04]: Nobel Prize in economics?Joon [00:43:06]: In economics.Swyx [00:43:06]: Oh, I see. I see. Rooting for you to write that paper.Joon [00:43:10]: One of these days. But, one of the scholars that I was deeply inspired by, When I was coming into the space of simulation, is this scholar, named Thomas Schelling.Schelling, Agent-Based Models, and the Nobel PrizeSwyx [00:43:23]: Schelling point?Joon [00:43:24]: So the canonical example of the work that he's done was he was one of the creators of agent-based modeling. So this was, like, in the 1970s and 80s. It's very early days, but this was truly one of the first exemplars of simulations. And one of the canonical model from that time, and of course many of these simulations are trying to tackle the societal problems that's most relevant for their era, it was called the model of segregation. So racial segregation was a big topic, that, we cared about. And what they've done was they created this grid world where they had red dots and blue dots. And these dots were, back in the day, like, they were the agents, and they had a simple rule that governed their behavior. If certain percentage of your neighbors are of different color and if that goes above certain threshold, then you move to a new location at random.Joon [00:44:21]: One of the striking finding of this paper or this agent-based model was for the longest time, people thought the segregation within society was caused by explicit and overt racism.Joon [00:44:34]: But if you look at this model, people's preference towards living with people of the same color, that preference can be very minute.Joon [00:44:42]: But the very small difference causes the society to segregate completely over time. This was very counterintuitive for a lot of people. And this particular work ended up informing housing policies. Mixed income housing, got really inspired by this work. And Thomas Schelling ends up winning the Nobel Prize for having laid the groundwork for very early versions of simulations. The opportunity that I do see here in the more scientific terms, is agent-based models for the longest, had impact in the 1980s, 90s, to some extent, early 2000s, but it has now gotten forgotten by the community a little bit. Because as you can imagine, red dots and blue dots is not really a rich description of people.Joon [00:45:31]: But with the emergence of things like generative AI and, in particular, generative agents, we do have an opportunity to create these agent-based models that are high fidelity enough to help us make really complex decisions. And that's the opportunity that I see. If that truly works, then yes, that is the work that will result in a Nobel Prize.Swyx [00:45:53]: Yeah. For what it's worth, and I grew up in Singapore. 80% of Singapore is in public housing, and public housing has, enforced racial quotas for exactly that reason, which is very interesting. okay, so we talk about scaling, we talk about all these, the agent possible applications.Cost, Reuse, and the Economics of SimulationSwyx [00:46:13]: I'm scared about the cost. if you even-- let's just keep it to the US, about 8 billion people.Swyx [00:46:21]: But, how much does it cost to model so many hundreds of millions of people?Joon [00:46:26]: Oftentimes today, we don't start at that scale, this stage of the, of industry and simulation as technology. But we can get our users extremely rich and meaningful insights even by modeling thousands, tens of thousands of people. And today what we do is every week we are collecting data on the scale of tens of thousands people's data, and we have panel partnerships that gets us to tens of millions of people globally. So that's what we do today.Swyx [00:46:55]: And just as a side note once you've collected one person for one studySwyx [00:46:59]: Can you reuse that same person for all the subsequent studies?Joon [00:47:03]: That's exactly right.Swyx [00:47:03]: Okay.Joon [00:47:04]: The beauty of this model and these agents is the fact that they are domain-agnostic.Joon [00:47:08]: That what you're really trying to understand is what is the fundamental nature of these people? What's their social physics? And there are a lot of, a lot of, people that does change over time. Like, even, like, even things like, how many times have you gone have you been to, like, CVS the past week? that will change. But there's so many traits about people that are also known to never change. Like, your risk tolerance doesn't really change over time. It's very consistent. So it's these things that we're trying to learn. But the scale we are operating is right now hundreds or, tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. And in many of the core use cases that we are deployed in, and this is more than enough population, to cover those. Really, at that point, what you care about is less the number of people, but more do you have the right subpopulation of interest covered? And this is also the reason why people want a larger sample. It's not because they want, stronger statistical guarantees. It's more that can they filter down to any population of their interest. However, you can also imagine in 10 years, if we truly believe that the compute is going to scale, that we'll have much more availability for compute, and our ambition for simulation is also going to scale accordingly, there's definitely a reason for us to create an entire data center worth of simulations.Joon [00:48:35]: Or in my hunch here is I do think in the next some number of years, we will start creating simulations that will cost as much as training a foundation model. But perhaps it's going to be so valuable to the society that it would be a no-brainer. Right now, even today, like, we are training bunch of new foundation model just so we can say we trained one and we spent tens of millions. But if we can create a simulation at the level of society that would solve climate change, I would run that today. I would raise the money right now just to run that.Multi-Agent Simulation and Social InfluenceSwyx [00:49:10]: Amazing. the follow-up question is, does it also compound if you let the simulations talk to each other?Swyx [00:49:18]: Or do they already do that today? They don't, right, as far as I understand?Joon [00:49:22]: It depends on what simulation you're trying to run.Joon [00:49:24]: In the multi-agent simulation setup, the agents do talk to each other.Swyx [00:49:28]: Right, which is exactly Smallville, right?Joon [00:49:29]: That's right.Swyx [00:49:30]: But a lot of times, for example, in commerce, you're just by yourself, so there's no point talking. which is way cheaper.Vibhu [00:49:37]: But they use all these levels, right? Like, you decide what you will buy based on what other people around you buy and talk about, right?Swyx [00:49:43]: It depends.Vibhu [00:49:44]: It depends.Swyx [00:49:45]: Again, I'm, I'm coming at this from a cost point of view. I'm like, “Oh my God.” LikeVibhu [00:49:48]: I thinkSwyx [00:49:49]: If there is, like, some combinatorial thing of, like, thousands of people talking to thousands of people, then that one million X's might cost.Vibhu [00:49:56]: I have a very different view as the cost point aside. Like, running these studies in reality is a lot more expensive, right? Running any study like this is you gotta have people do it, you gotta sign people up. It's very expensive and sometimes, like, not feasible to run the study.Vibhu [00:50:14]: But the outcome or the decisions you make are very expensive on them, right? So spend X million on something that, the overall process costs 100 million might as well, right? There's, there's a lot of value to be had there. It's a small cost, but I'm excited on the cost side.Joon [00:50:33]: To some extent, and when you deploy technology, you often want to deploy in a way where you can replace existing budget or you can make things more efficient, and that is the best way to deploy. However, the way you capture the long-term value of the technology is making the argument that, no, it's the upside, that by making this better decision using simulation, you have saved yourself or made yourself hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars, and that's a case to be made.Vibhu [00:51:06]: Random tangent question. So if you're doing a lot of inference, a lot of model multi-agent stuff, are you at the point where it makes sense to, train a model that' very sparse? You're expecting to do multi-million dollar runs. Are you thinking about this in model architecture standpoint or inference efficiency, or, you're still at the research phase of it works, we're not super there yet?Joon [00:51:34]: Efficiency, we do think quite a bit about. this is technology that is deployed now in some of the largest enterprise companies in the world, and we do process significant number of queries, that are trying to, simulate the populations in the world. So efficiency is a consistent thing. we don't want to over-optimize too early, so I wouldn't say, like, this is the higher bid Right now, but this is definitely something that we think pretty carefully about.Swyx [00:52:05]: Yeah. Are there other case studies? So we, you talked about CVS, talked about Gallup, Deloitte, Wealthfront.Efficiency, Enterprise Use, and Real-World Case StudiesJoon [00:52:12]: Wealthfront is an interesting one, because one of the things they were trying to do, they were one of the first customers that wanted to do product testing that goes beyond just asking people what they think about, let's say, behavior experiments and so forth. So there, really what we had to do was reason about multimodal input, so images, but also you can also imagine, like, these agents traversing through Figma mockups or websites. So some of the things that our agents can also do is it can be given a domain, like, or, like, a website URL and go use it for a while. It's these things. And Wealthfront was one of the first, customers, that was very excited about this possibility.Vibhu [00:52:53]: What have people been asking? Like, is there any demand that we have not covered? Like, UI testing, right?Vibhu [00:52:59]: I wanna try a new. I wanna ship a new feature, test the UI, simulate how people will do it. Any interesting things that you're seeing demand for?Product Testing, Websites, and Synthetic PanelsJoon [00:53:08]: Today, a lot of the demand does come from like, the places where people have historically used human panels, we can now replace with agents, and these synthetic populations. And this is not replacing human panel. in many ways, the simulation that Simile is building is grounded. So the way that I think about this is we are trying to represent humanity at scale. And in that way, the use cases are what we would expect, but it's the scale of deployment that surprises me.Joon [00:53:44]: Turns out there are so many decisions that people make every day in these organizations, groups, and we want to be able to say, “We listen to people. We have consulted our users.” But in reality, that is rarely the case because getting to people and asking them many questions, it's difficult. It's both costly, time-consuming, but most importantly, people are just not available. If I had to answer 1000 survey questions for this one particular, vendor, even if I wanted to do that, like, I would never do it. And that's very much the case. What simulation can do is ensure that the voices of people are always represented in rooms where the decisions for them is made, right? So all the stakeholders of this particular product launch, ideally they're consulted. That's what this technology really is trying to enable.Market Size, TAM, and Human Decision-MakingSwyx [00:54:39]: In my mind, that means it skews towards more consumer focus, right? Like, anything with a wide enough customer base where you do benefit from the diversity that you represent. What are some rough statistics, just for people who are not familiar with this market in general, what's the market size that. I'm sure you have some, like, rough numbers. market size is, like, a vague questionSwyx [00:55:01]: But, like, how much do people spend?Joon [00:55:03]: So market research is a $100 billion industry.Joon [00:55:06]: But the thing about simulation is not a tool for market research. Simulation is a tool for human decision-making. So the question around what is a TAM here is quite tricky, right? Because it's easy to say, “Well, market research TAM is roughly 100 million or 100 billion.” so is it a TAM? And not really, right? Because in many ways, you're trying to inform all human decision-making. You're trying to inform every decision that are made about humans for humans. What is a TAM for that? It's really unclear. And I'll be honest. Like, I have a scientific background, I have a research background, so I didn't come into the field calculating, oh, what is the TAM for human decision-making? But I just had to assume, well, if we can inform every decision that is made about human for human, that has to be big.Swyx [00:55:58]: Some- something valuable.Joon [00:55:59]: Exactly.Swyx [00:55:59]: To some extent, you are a unicorn founder now, and you have to care as a CEO. But, like, I do think, like, yeah, when you go into these boardrooms with people that you're quoting millions of dollars of contracts for, like, you have to say, “Well, here's what you spend on humans-”Swyx [00:56:15]: “. And here's what we save you, and it's 85% similar.”Joon [00:56:19]: And certainly, the value case, is something that we care deeply about. Like, what is the value that we provide to the users and the decision-makers? But this is also where, like, as a founder, I think valuation only tells one very superficial aspect of the story, and I try not to think too much about valuation, in general, because that's not what also motivates a team or certainly doesn't. I'm, I-- Again, the interesting thing about researchers is we are happy living in academia, getting paid next to. we get paid okay. we don't get paid that much, as a researcher here in academia, but it's the impact and it's the, it's the value that we can provide to the individuals and the society that really drives us. And in that way, ultimately what drives us is the impact. Does the simulation we provide have a real impact in people's decision-making in ways that progresses our society forward? If the answer is yes, then yes. that has to be great business, and we see that in numbers, and we do care deeply about that upside story, but that's the heart of it.Where Simulation Goes NextVibhu [00:57:27]: Do you have any timeline predictions? So we talked about scaling laws of simulations.Vibhu [00:57:33]: You brought up, okay, maybe one day we can simulate how to solve climate change.Vibhu [00:57:38]: Where are we now?Vibhu [00:57:40]: If that's not the end state, what is an end state, and what does progress look like?Joon [00:57:45]: So what I sometimes tell people is simulation as industry, it feels a lot like where GPT-3.5, GPT-4 was, for the AGI saga, which is we have now technology that is powerful enough to do real damage on the verticals that we are tackling. At the same time, there's a lot of progress that is yet to come. And that's, I think, where this is. So the way I see it, I do think there will continue to be breakthroughs both in data, in algorithms, and there will be much more aggressive scaling that will also happen over the next few years. But I think that's roughly where we are.Swyx [00:58:27]: I think that was about the ro

The Father's HeartThis is not just a podcast - it's a move of God.Shan Kikon, from Nagaland, India, is the Lead Pastor of Faith Harvest Church, carrying a heart to ignite revival across the nations. Once he had a desire for a corporate future, but everything changed after a supernatural encounter with Jesus Christ in Singapore in 1996. In that moment, he laid down his desires to become a bold voice for the Gospel.Marked by the anointing and grounded in truth, Shan Kikon delivers revelation that cuts deep, awakens the spirit, and transforms lives. This is not just teaching; this is an encounter.For inquiries, prayer requests, or more information, feel free to reach out to us at : faithharvestnagaland@gmail.com

Value: After Hours is a podcast about value investing, Fintwit, and all things finance and investment by investors Tobias Carlisle, and Jake Taylor. We are live every Tuesday at 1.30pm E / 10.30am P.────────────────────── ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠VALUE OPTIONS LETTER⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Three to five curated ideas every week — cash-secured puts, covered calls, and spreads on businesses we'd want to own at strikes we'd be willing to pay. Every trade includes the business thesis in plain English, the fair-value estimate and its key assumptions, the specific option trade with target premium, and the pre-identified exit criteria.Every idea reviewed and approved by an analyst before it hits your inbox.⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠valueoptionsletter.com/subscribe⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠──────────────────────See our latest episodes at https://acquirersmultiple.com/podcastAbout Jake Jake's Twitter: https://twitter.com/farnamjake1Jake's book: The Rebel Allocator https://amzn.to/2sgip3lABOUT THE PODCASTHi, I'm Tobias Carlisle. I launched The Acquirers Podcast to discuss the process of finding undervalued stocks, deep value investing, hedge funds, activism, buyouts, and special situations.We uncover the tactics and strategies for finding good investments, managing risk, dealing with bad luck, and maximizing success.SEE LATEST EPISODEShttps://acquirersmultiple.com/podcast/SEE OUR FREE DEEP VALUE STOCK SCREENER https://acquirersmultiple.com/screener/FOLLOW TOBIASWebsite: https://acquirersmultiple.com/Firm: https://acquirersfunds.com/ Twitter: ttps://twitter.com/GreenbackdLinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/tobycarlisleFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/tobiascarlisleInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/tobias_carlisleABOUT TOBIAS CARLISLETobias Carlisle is the founder of The Acquirer's Multiple®, and Acquirers Funds®. He is best known as the author of the #1 new release in Amazon's Business and Finance The Acquirer's Multiple: How the Billionaire Contrarians of Deep Value Beat the Market, the Amazon best-sellers Deep Value: Why Activists Investors and Other Contrarians Battle for Control of Losing Corporations (2014) (https://amzn.to/2VwvAGF), Quantitative Value: A Practitioner's Guide to Automating Intelligent Investment and Eliminating Behavioral Errors (2012) (https://amzn.to/2SDDxrN), and Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors (2016) (https://amzn.to/2SEEjVn). He has extensive experience in investment management, business valuation, public company corporate governance, and corporate law.Prior to founding the forerunner to Acquirers Funds in 2010, Tobias was an analyst at an activist hedge fund, general counsel of a company listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, and a corporate advisory lawyer. As a lawyer specializing in mergers and acquisitions he has advised on transactions across a variety of industries in the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Australia, Singapore, Bermuda, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, and Guam. He is a graduate of the University of Queensland in Australia with degrees in Law (2001) and Business (Management) (1999).

Welcome to Episode 321 of Autism Parenting Secrets. Parents make high-stakes decisions for their children all the time. And those decisions become much harder when they're surrounded by conflicting opinions, uncertainty, pressure, and fear. My guest this week is Dr. Taylor Bean, a Naturopathic Doctor and MAPS Fellow who is passionate about helping parents understand their options so they can make more informed decisions for their unique child. Her own journey into informed consent began when she became a mother, and that principle now runs throughout her work with families. In this conversation, we cover a lot of ground. Dr. Bean explains why she thinks the earliest years matter so much for establishing microbial health, why food introduction deserves more thought than it often receives, and how genetics can help practitioners better understand a child's inflammatory response. We also explore Vitamin A, probiotics, homeopathy, fever, and practical ways parents can prepare before their child gets sick. And we dive into vaccine decision-making, including why Dr. Bean believes so many parents find themselves in a "gray zone" where they aren't looking for someone to tell them what to do.  They want to understand their options so they can decide for themselves.. That's the bigger message here. You don't need someone else to make the decision for you. You need the information, support, and confidence to make an informed decision that's right for your child. The secret this week is…  Never Make Decisions Out Of FEAR You'll Discover: Why informed consent became foundational to Dr. Bean's work (3:15) Why MTHFR isn't the whole story when considering inflammatory response (15:50) Why Vitamin A plays such an important role in Dr. Bean's approach (19:32) How being prepared can reduce fear when your child gets sick (27:47) Why so many parents are stuck in the vaccine "gray zone" (40:44) About Our Guest: Dr. Taylor Bean is a Naturopathic Doctor and owner of TaylorMade Wellness in Salmon Arm, British Columbia. Becoming a mother is where her core value of achieving informed consent was born. While her profession taught her to be curious and treat each patient individually, it was her positive birthing experiences that changed her perspective on what a true doctor-patient relationship means. Her career started in Singapore, where she supported patients throughout Southeast Asia. She has been supporting Canadian families since 2016. www.drtaylorbean.com Vaccine Education Masteclass References in this Episode: MAPS Parent Conference - September 12-13, 2026 in Philadelphia, PA - Use code PARENT20 for discounted admission Medical Academy of Pediatrics & Special Needs (MAPS) Dr. Ben Lynch Additional Resources: To learn more about personalized 1:1 support go to www.elevatehowyounavigate.com If you enjoyed this episode, share it with your friends.

When acclaimed playwright, actor and theatre director Jovanni Sy went back to school a few years ago, he was told to direct something funny. He originally wanted to take on The Way of the World — William Congreve's British Restoration comedy from 1700. But over time, that morphed into a modern-day, fast-paced Asian rom-com set in Singapore. It's called The Tao of the World, and it opens at the Stratford Festival tonight. Jovanni joins guest host Garvia Bailey in the Q studio to explain how and why that all happened.

Tess Remy-Schumacher is is a Grammy® nominated cellist and producer. She's won a whole bunch of awards including the World Entertainment Award for “Best Classical Album”, first Prize at the International Carlo-Zecchi Competition in Rome, and multiple medals at the Global Music Awards. As a concert soloist, she has recorded at Abbey Road Studios as part of the Six String Symphony with the London Symphony and recorded over 20 albums. She's performed in Europe, Asia, Australia, and the U.S., including at Wigmore Hall in London, Jubilee Hall in Singapore, and the Grammy Museum in Los Angeles. As an educator she is a professor at the University of Central Oklahoma. My featured song is “The Buzz”, one of my recent singles. Spotify link. —------------------------------------ The Follow Your Dream Podcast: Top 1% of all podcasts with Listeners in 200 countries! Click here for Start Here Click here for All Episodes  Click here for Guest List  Click here for Guest Testimonials Click here for Pillars Click here for Robert's Project Grand Slam Click here to Subscribe  Clickhere to receive our Email Updates Click here to Rate and Review the podcast —---------------------------------------- CONNECT WITH TESS: CLICK HERE   "MA PETITE FLEUR STRING QUARTET CLICK HERE FOR ALL LINKS —----------------------------------- ROBERT'S NEWEST RELEASE:“THE BUZZ” - Ft. Darius de Haas (vocals) and Dave Eggar (Celo). Short, Sweet and Totally Different CLICK HERE FOR OFFICIAL VIDEO CLICK HERE FOR ALL LINKS —-------------------------------------- Audio production: Jimmy RavenscroftKymera FilmsConnect with the Follow Your Dream Podcast:Website - www.followyourdreampodcast.comFollow Robert's band, Project Grand Slam, and his music:Website - www.projectgrandslam.com      

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers in America and around the world:The AI race between America and China isn't just about whose AI models are at the frontier or get adopted most widely. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I am joined by Ryan Fedasiuk, a fellow at AEI and the author of the Substack Choosing Victory, where he focuses on US-China relations, technology, and national power. He's also an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University. Recently, Fedasiuk has written about the US-China AI race, and while much of the debate has focused on the models themselves, Fedasiuk is focused on the role of compute in shaping the global balance of power, which is also the subject of a new report, Voltcraft: Industrial Competition in the Age of AI.We discuss the speed at which AI capabilities are improving, the dimensions of the US-China AI race, and why Fedasiuk thinks compute will be central to that competition. We also discuss a global US strategy and, as AI abilities increase, what role the American government could play in ensuring safety.In This Episode:* How Fast Is AI Moving? (0:54)* The US-China AI Race (7:08)* The Future of the AI Industry (12:42)* The Compute Race (17:04)* Expanding US AI Infrastructure Abroad (22:05)* Geopolitics and National Security (25:10)A lightly edited transcript of our conversation will appear in my Week in Review issue on Saturday. (Another option is using the Substack auto transcript function.)But here are some edited highlights from the chat:On the pace of AI progress…At least according to definitions circa the late 2010s, we're living through what I would describe as a fast takeoff. We have, as far as I am concerned, artificial general intelligence capable of meeting the performance of human beings or exceeding it at most tasks. And I think that things are only likely to improve from here.On the US-China AI race…We are obviously living through this uncertainty. When Mythos was unveiled on April 6, I think it sent a real tremor through the Chinese national security apparatus and kind of a moment of, “What is this? What do the Americans have? What is this system capable of achieving? When can we produce our own?”On why compute is critical…The fact is that to make the most out of frontier AI and to run it at scale, you still need tons of devices that turn electricity into tokens. You still need tons of compute. And really, I think the name of the game is going to be who can build and install computational power around the world.On why America needs to export its compute…If compute is the substrate of the global intelligence economy, we want to make sure that it's US-designed compute that other countries are choosing to buy and install rather than compute manufactured in China.On who should get access to American compute…If we can expect the developer ecosystem in Singapore is going to take off like wildfire and start building and using a lot of AI applications, maybe we want to make sure that Singaporeans are building on American compute ASAP before China's compute becomes a viable alternative that could serve that market. Maybe we want to make sure that that market is served even before certain constituencies in Des Moines.On government intervention in frontier AI labs…I think that we are already seeing some shadow of this, even if it isn't declared. I think we will likely see a continued molding and merging of private sector capability with the resources and infrastructure of the national security enterprise.On sale everywhere: The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Pacific War. In late 1941, the Second Battle of Changsha ended with Chinese forces claiming victory despite suffering nearly 100,000 casualties against roughly 1,670 Japanese losses. Chiang Kai-shek's government launched an aggressive propaganda campaign, flooding international press with fabricated triumph narratives to sustain national morale. Behind closed doors, Chiang was furious at his generals' tactical failures, executing commanders and dismantling units. Meanwhile, geopolitical forces threatened China's survival. Japan's 1939 defeat at Nomonhan crushed hopes for a Soviet alliance against Tokyo. Germany's pact with the Soviet Union left China isolated, while Western powers remained reluctant to commit meaningful support. Britain offered little; the US provided only modest loans. By 1941, facing potential collapse, Chiang desperately searched for allies while Wang Jingwei's Japanese-backed rival government beckoned as an alternative. China's exhausted people endured horror—including a 1941 bombing massacre in Chongqing that killed over 400 trapped civilians. Then Japan unleashed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.   #215 An Implosion in the East Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   In the early morning of December 7, 1941, the US Pacific Fleet was anchored at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Two waves of Japanese bomber aircraft, launched from six aircraft carriers, attacked the vessels and their sleeping crews, destroying the battleship Arizona outright and damaging seventeen others, as well as most of the military aircraft parked nearby. Some 2,400 Americans died, and another 1,100 were wounded. Within a day Japanese invasion forces had attacked Siam, Malaya, and the Philippines. Chiang Kai-shek heard the news at one o'clock in the morning and immediately dictated a letter of support to President Roosevelt, pledging commitment to a new "common battle." The news reached Zhou Fohai in Shanghai as well. On December 8 across the international date line from Hawaii he had heard the sounds of firing as the Japanese took over the rest of the city, and then received reports that Japan had declared war on the Western powers. "I heard they'd bombed Honolulu, Manila, Singapore, and Hong Kong. From now on, the Pacific becomes a killing ground."   When Japanese carrier planes descended on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, they were executing far more than a tactical strike. They were unleashing the culmination of a strategic vision that had shaped Japanese military planning since the 1920s: the Nanshin-ron, or "Southern Advance" doctrine.    The Nanshin-ron represented a critical strategic choice that emerged from internal Japanese debates during the 1920s and 1930s. Japan faced an inescapable vulnerability: it was an island nation with virtually no natural resources of its own. The nation's population had doubled since the Meiji Restoration, growing to over 70 million by 1941. An industrial economy of tremendous sophistication, capable of producing world-class warships, aircraft, and military equipment, depended entirely on imported raw materials. Oil, rubber, tin, iron ore, bauxite, copper, and manganese all had to be acquired through foreign trade or conquest. This resource dependency was not a luxury problem; it was an existential one. A nation that could not feed itself or fuel its economy was a nation vulnerable to strangulation by enemies who controlled the resources it needed. Japanese strategic thinkers divided into two camps on how to resolve this vulnerability. The Hokushin-ron advocates, primarily within the Army, pushed for expansion northward into Siberia and Mongolia, seeking to conquer Soviet territory and resources. The Soviet Union possessed vast tracts of land, mineral wealth, timber, and agricultural output. From a purely materialist perspective, the Northern Advance made geographic sense—it was contiguous with Manchuria, which Japan had already secured in 1931. Yet by the late 1930s, the Hokushin-ron strategy had suffered a catastrophic blow. In 1938 and 1939, Japanese and Soviet forces clashed at Khalkhin Gol in Mongolia in what the Japanese called the Nomonhan Incident. The battles revealed a terrifying truth: the Soviet Red Army, under General Georgy Zhukov, was far more formidable than Japanese military planners had anticipated. Soviet armor, air power, and coordinated tactics annihilated Japanese forces. Japan suffered over 60,000 casualties while inflicting perhaps 10,000 on the Soviets. The defeat was concealed from the Japanese public, but it was unmistakable to military planners. A direct clash with Soviet power could end catastrophically. The Northern Advance, it became clear, would almost certainly provoke war with a nation capable of destroying the Japanese Army. This strategic defeat tilted the balance decisively toward the Nanshin-ron. If Japan could not safely expand northward, it must expand southward, toward Southeast Asia, the Dutch East Indies, Indochina, and the western Pacific. The appeal of the Nanshin-ron was immediately apparent to the Navy, which had always been more oriented toward maritime commerce and expansion across the ocean. The territories to the south were not militarily formidable. The colonial powers, Britain, the Netherlands, France, were either already defeated in 1940 or distracted by their own desperate struggles leaving Britain fighting alone against Germany. The United States, though potentially a formidable adversary, was not yet at war, and there was a chance, however slender, that a decisive blow against American naval power might convince America to negotiate rather than fight. But beyond strategic opportunity, the Nanshin-ron offered something that the Hokushin-ron did not: it offered resources of staggering abundance. The Dutch East Indies possessed oil reserves that could dwarf Japan's consumption for years. Malaya produced the world's rubber. Thailand offered agricultural bounty and geographic position. Burma's timber and agricultural products could feed Japan's growing empire. The Philippines possessed harbors, airfields, and economic output. These were not marginal additions to Japan's economy—they were transformative. Together, they would convert Japan from a resource-hungry island nation into the master of an imperial domain encompassing hundreds of millions of people and containing most of the strategic materials necessary for sustained industrial warfare. In the last episode I explained the western sanctions and embargoes that drained Japan's military of the resources they required to continue the China War. By 1941, Japan faced a civilization crisis. Japan imported roughly 90 percent of its petroleum, and the bulk of that came from the Dutch East Indies and the United States. Suddenly, the American supply was cut off entirely. Reserves would last perhaps 18 months if Japan's military and industrial consumption continued at existing rates. After that, the military machine would sputter and die. The industrial economy would collapse. Even civilian life would become impossible to sustain. Japan was facing not merely economic inconvenience but literal strangulation by the Western powers.   Yet it would be a mistake to reduce Japanese motivation to just materialism. Japanese military leaders wrapped their conquests in an ideological framework, one that many of them genuinely believed, or wanted to believe, served a higher historical purpose. The concept of the Daitoa Kyoeiken, the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," posited a new regional order in which Japan would play the leading role in liberating Asian peoples from Western colonial domination and creating an Asian-centered political and economic system. This ideology drew on genuine anti-colonial sentiment. For a century, Western powers had dominated Asia, treating Asian peoples and nations as subordinate, colonized territories existing to serve Western economic interests. Japan, which had modernized and Westernized enough to avoid colonization, saw itself as the natural leader of an Asian renaissance—a civilizing force that would restore Asian dignity and independence even as it established Japanese hegemony. Of course, this was propagandistic. Japanese conquest represented a substitution of one imperial master for another, and often a harsher and more brutal one at that. But for understanding Japanese decision-making, the ideology mattered profoundly. It provided Japanese leaders with a moral narrative for conquest. It allowed them to understand themselves as liberators rather than mere conquerors. It provided a rationale for extracting resources from occupied territories and for mobilizing subject populations to support the Japanese war effort. And it resonated with anti-Western sentiment throughout Asia, making Japanese occupation seem, in some quarters, preferable to continued Western colonial rule. The slogan Hakko ichiu—"eight corners under one roof", captured this ideological vision: a unified Asia and eventually world under Japanese guidance. Whether Japanese leaders truly believed this vision or cynically deployed it as propaganda, it shaped how they understood their actions and justified them to their subjects. Now I know this is a podcast dedicated to the century of humiliation, ie: China's experience. But I thought it was necessary just to have one episode explain what Dan Carlin titled "a supernova in the east" and I have titled an implosion in the east. I won't go into depth into the campaigns as some of them have a lot of Chinese involvement and we will be covering them in depth, but rather I will explain the rationale for Japan's numerous invasions following the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.   Japan's assault on Malaya began within hours of the Pearl Harbor attack, indeed, Japanese troops were already landing on the Kota Bharu beachhead on the Malaysian peninsula before dawn on December 8, 1941 local time. Malaya was one of the world's largest rubber producers, and Singapore, at the tip of the peninsula, was the linchpin of British naval power in the Far East.The Japanese interest in Malaya was straightforward but crucial: rubber. The Japanese military consumed vast quantities of rubber for tires, gaskets, hoses, and countless other applications. American and Dutch rubber supplies were now cut off by embargo. Malaya's rubber plantations represented perhaps the world's richest reservoir of this strategic material. Beyond rubber, Malaya and the surrounding region were major tin producers—essential for alloys and manufacturing. For Japan to conduct prolonged warfare, Malaya was not a luxury target; it was a necessity. Singapore represented something different: a symbol of Western power in Asia and a strategic chokepoint. As the major British naval base in the region, Singapore served as the anchor of British imperial authority across the South China Sea. By seizing Singapore, Japan would not only capture crucial resources and port facilities but would also deliver a psychological blow to the entire edifice of Western dominance in Asia. The fortress city that the British considered nearly impregnable fell within seventy days, a stunning demonstration of Japanese military capability and the vulnerability of overextended Western empires. If Malaya was critical for rubber, the Dutch East Indies was essential for oil. The region, comprising present-day Indonesia, was the world's third-largest oil producer and had reserves that could sustain Japanese military operations for years. This was the jewel of the resource-conquest strategy. Japanese planners had long eyed the East Indies, but direct conquest had seemed risky while Britain and America remained neutral or opposed. With both now at war, the window of opportunity had opened. Japan needed the oil so desperately that when the Dutch East Indies Petroleum Company initially agreed to some Japanese oil purchases before the war, Tokyo was already planning its takeover. The conquest of the Dutch East Indies would provide not just oil but also tin, nickel, bauxite, and other materials essential to an industrial war machine. The islands would also provide air and naval bases from which Japan could defend its new empire and potentially threaten Australia. The Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies, which began in late December 1941 and accelerated through January and February 1942, was methodical and comprehensive. Various island groups were targeted systematically: Java, Borneo, Celebes, and the Moluccas. Dutch military forces, though brave, were overwhelmed. By March 1942, Japan had secured the entire archipelago,a stunning logistical and military achievement that delivered vast resources into Japanese hands. Thailand presented a fundamentally different case from Japan's other targets. Rather than conquest, Japan pursued alliance with military strongman Plaek Phibunsongkhram, who had seized power in a 1938 coup as a nationalist ideologue determined to reassert Thai sovereignty and recover territory lost to French colonialism in the nineteenth century. Thailand was the last independent state in mainland Southeast Asia, hemmed in by British-controlled Burma and Malaya to the west, and French Indochina to the east. For a century, Thailand had survived by playing European imperial powers against each other. But by the late 1930s, this strategy was becoming obsolete. Europe was distracted by Hitler's Germany. Colonial powers were weakening. Japanese power was visibly ascending. Phibunsongkhram recognized both danger and opportunity. He could resist Japan and invite invasion, or he could ally with Japan and profit from rising Asian power. Japanese diplomats approached Thailand with sophistication: they offered military alliance and support for Thai territorial expansion at French expense. This addressed Thailand's deepest national wound, the humiliation of nineteenth-century territorial losses to France. The Franco-Thai War of 1940-1941 became transformative. With Japan providing military support, advisors, tanks, aircraft, Thai forces defeated the French for the first time in history. By May 1941, Thailand had recovered 54,000 square kilometers of Cambodian territory and portions of Laos. For Phibunsongkhram, this was extraordinary: he had achieved what Thai leaders could not in a century, reclaiming territory from a Western imperial power. Domestically, his position was dramatically strengthened. The parallel to China's century of humiliation—the foundation of your podcast is striking: Thailand too was reversing colonial diminishment through association with rising Asian power. The Thai-Japanese relationship was unique. Unlike the Philippines, Malaya, or the Dutch East Indies, Thailand would retain nominal independence. Phibunsongkhram remained in power. Japanese occupation was light. Thai forces maintained their own command structure. Most importantly, Thailand's territorial gains from the Franco-Thai War were recognized and secured. Japan valued Thai cooperation more than conquest. Burma, controlled by the British, was the next target in Japan's southwestward advance. Japanese planners had multiple motivations for invading Burma. First, it was strategically positioned on India's eastern frontier, and Japan harbored ambitions of eventually striking toward India and linking up with Germany in the Middle East or at least destabilizing the British position in South Asia. Second, Burma was a significant producer of timber and agricultural products. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the invasion of Burma was meant to cut the Burma Road, the crucial supply line that allowed American aid to reach Nationalist China. The invasion of Burma began in late 1941 and accelerated through early 1942.  The invasion of the Philippines, which began on December 10, 1941, just days after Pearl Harbor, served multiple strategic purposes. Like the assault on Pearl Harbor itself, it was meant to neutralize American military power in the region, in this case, the American garrison under General Douglas MacArthur and the American colonial administration. But the Philippines were also valuable in their own right. The islands sat directly in the path of what Japan envisioned as its defensive perimeter. By controlling the Philippines, Japan would make it extraordinarily difficult for American forces to project power westward into Southeast Asia. The territory would provide naval and air bases critical to defending Japan's new empire. Additionally, the Philippines possessed some agricultural and industrial resources valuable to the war effort, and their conquest delivered a psychological victory, defeating American forces and ending American colonial rule in Asia, which appealed to anti-Western sentiment that Japan tried to cultivate. Beyond Southeast Asia and the Philippines, Japan rapidly invaded Guam and Wake island to extend Japan's defensive perimeter further into the Pacific and eliminate American air and naval bases that could threaten Japanese operations. Guam, seized on December 10, 1941, fell within two days, the American garrison was small and the island's strategic value lay primarily in denying the United States a forward staging ground for any counteroffensive. Wake Island, attacked the same day and finally captured on December 23 after a brief but heroic American defense, served similar purposes: cutting off American reconnaissance and interdicting potential supply lines to the Philippines.  Now I believe that's enough of the implosion in the east, let's get back to the situation in China. After Chiang Kai-shek sent his letter of support to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, pledging Chinese commitment to what he termed a new "common battle." he did something most revealing about his mood towards the global war. He played "Ave Maria" on his gramophone, celebrating with an almost spiritual gratitude the implications of what had just transpired in the American Pacific. This moment crystallized the profound difference Pearl Harbor would mean to different members of the emerging Allied coalition. For the United States, the attack was pure shock, a violation of the sanctity of American soil and the complacency of American isolationism. For Britain, it was like the pricking of a large, painful blister—painful but perhaps not entirely unexpected given Japan's regional ambitions. But for China, the relief that surged through the government and the consciousness of the Chinese people surpassed even Britain's response. For four long years, China had fought Japan almost alone, watching as Western nations remained neutral or limited their commitment to rhetorical support and modest material assistance. Now, suddenly, the trajectory of the entire conflict had shifted with breathtaking speed. Chiang's emotional state at this moment could scarcely be contained, and those close to him understood that beneath his carefully maintained Confucian composure burned an intoxicating sensation of vindication. These Western powers who had been so impatient with Chinese strategy, who had mocked the retreats of the Nationalist Army and spoken scornfully of Japanese capabilities, were now themselves in headlong retreat from those very islanders. In Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila, British and American forces would be fighting desperately for their lives against the Japanese military that China had been contending with for years. Chiang could not have failed to perceive the irony: the Japanese had conquered vast stretches of China through relentless campaigns, yet Westerners had dismissed Chinese resistance as inadequate. Now the Japanese were proving that they posed a formidable challenge to Western military power as well. There was a bitter satisfaction in this vindication, even as Chiang understood that the strategic implications of American entry far outweighed any emotional satisfaction. What was pragmatic and strategically clear to Chiang, however, was far more important than any emotional satisfaction. The United States was now at war, and it was on China's side. This represented the transformation for which Chiang had labored for years, bringing the full weight of American industrial capacity and military might to bear against the Japanese enemy. The diplomatic foundations for this alliance had already been laid in the months preceding Pearl Harbor. Beginning in the spring of 1941, the United States had begun to commit significant resources to supporting China. In April 1941, following the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality agreement, which had devastated Chinese morale by suggesting that Japan might attack the Soviet Union rather than move southward, the Roosevelt administration had determined to provide $45 million worth of militarily useful commodities to China as an immediate gesture of support. Then, on May 6, 1941, President Roosevelt had made a more formal commitment by announcing that the munitions provisions of the Lend-Lease Act applied to China, declaring a phrase that captured the strategic logic of American assistance: "defending China is the key to defending America." This declaration represented a significant shift in American policy, elevating China from a regional concern to a central element of American grand strategy in Asia. Subsequently, in July 1941, Roosevelt had sent Owen Lattimore to China to serve as political adviser to the Chinese government, a position that signaled deepening American engagement with Chinese affairs. In August, the administration appointed John Magruder as military attaché and head of the American Military Mission to China (AMMISCA), with the primary responsibility of overseeing the delivery of Lend-Lease material to the Chinese armed forces. On the diplomatic front, Chiang moved with remarkable alacrity. He had already severed relations with Germany on July 2, 1941, the very day after Hitler had formally recognized the Wang Jingwei puppet government in an attempt to appease Japan and encourage it to finally implement the Southern Advance. Now, on December 8, 1941, just one day after the Pearl Harbor attack, Chiang took the decisive step of formally declaring war against the Axis powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan. This declaration transformed China's position from a beleaguered nation fighting a war of survival into a formal member of the Allied coalition. Chiang had seized the opportunity that Pearl Harbor presented to ally China with a genuinely strong power against Japan, a gambit that fundamentally altered the diplomatic weight and international legitimacy of both the Chinese government and the Chinese cause. From a strategic perspective, the Japanese had committed what Chiang and others immediately recognized as a catastrophic blunder. On the operational level, Pearl Harbor was indeed a devastating tactical success, the American Pacific Fleet was crippled, and Japanese forces now enjoyed temporary naval superiority throughout much of the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Yet strategically, Pearl Harbor represented a failure of epic proportions, a miscalculation rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of the intangibles of warfare: what motivated the Chinese people and what motivated the Americans. The Chinese had understood, through four years of brutal conflict, that warfare was about more than territorial conquest and resource acquisition. It was about will, about endurance, about the capacity to absorb punishment and continue fighting. The Japanese had learned this lesson imperfectly in China, where despite overwhelming military advantages they had been unable to force a decisive conclusion or compel Chinese surrender. The Americans would teach the Japanese this lesson even more emphatically. The attack on American sailors in Hawaii instantly galvanized the American population to prosecute an unlimited war, with Tokyo itself as the ultimate destination of American counterattack. While Americans would remember the "date that will live in infamy" primarily because of the assault on Pearl Harbor itself, the strategic consequence was that Japanese actions in Hawaii had introduced numerous new adversaries into the Pacific conflict: not only the United States, but also Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands. These additions transformed what had been, from the Japanese perspective, a regional conflict with manageable parameters into a global war that Japan could not possibly win through any conceivable means. What made this particularly disastrous for Japan was the context in which the new theater had been opened. Japan was already deeply mired in a quagmire in China—a "malignant quagmire," as one observer would later characterize it, that had consumed vast resources, inflicted enormous casualties, and failed to produce decisive victory. In military strategy, it is sometimes wise to open a new theater in order to attack an enemy from an additional and unexpected direction, thereby dispersing their forces and creating new challenges for them to manage. But opening a new theater that introduces an entirely new, powerful adversary, and doing so when one is already overextended in an existing theater is a prescription for strategic catastrophe. This was precisely what Japan had done at Pearl Harbor. Chiang Kai-shek understood the magnitude of Japan's miscalculation with crystalline clarity. He understood that whatever the military complexities that lay ahead, whatever the challenges of coordinating with Western allies, and whatever the limitations of Western military assistance to China might be, the fundamental equation had changed. The United States would ultimately defeat Japan. The Chinese did not need to defeat Japan by themselves; they merely needed to survive long enough for American industrial and military capacity to grind the Japanese military into defeat. In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, Chinese and American officials moved swiftly to formalize the alliance and establish the mechanisms of wartime cooperation. Roosevelt asked Chiang Kai-shek to serve as commander in chief of the Allied forces in the China theater, a designation that recognized China's central role in the Pacific War and elevated Chiang's international standing to something he had long sought: a position as an equal partner in the Allied coalition, a seat at the "top table of global decision-making" alongside Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. To support this expanded role and to ensure effective coordination of the military effort, Roosevelt dispatched Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell to China. Stilwell was not chosen randomly; he brought fifteen years of experience in China, a deep familiarity with the country, its military, and its complexities that few American officers possessed. Stilwell was appointed to serve simultaneously as the U.S. government's military representative in China, as chief of staff of the China Theater, and as commander in chief of the American forces in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater. This appointment established the framework for joint Chinese-American military cooperation and represented an American commitment to the Asian theater that, while never receiving the resources devoted to the European theater, nonetheless signified recognition of China's strategic importance. Trust me, going forward we will be having a lot of time dedicated to the hilarious bromance / bro hatred of Vinegar Joe and Peanut.  Yet the formation of an alliance and the establishment of command structures was easier than the practical implementation of military cooperation. The fundamental challenge that would plague Chinese-American relations throughout the war emerged almost immediately: the problem of delivering military assistance to China. Before Pearl Harbor, the United States and China had reached agreement on three major points regarding military assistance. First, the United States would provide training and technical support to assist China in establishing a modern air force. Second, the United States would provide training and equipment for a ground army consisting of thirty divisions. Third, the United States would assist China in constructing railways and highways from Yunnan to Burma, along with the provision of rolling stock and vehicles to support these new transportation routes. These were ambitious plans, reflecting the extent of Chinese need and American willingness to support the Chinese war effort. However, the outbreak of the Pacific War threw American plans into disarray. The fundamental strategic doctrine guiding American policy was the "Europe first" strategy, which meant that the European theater and the defeat of Nazi Germany received priority over the Pacific theater. Additionally, China's geography made it extraordinarily difficult to supply. China could only be reached through supply lines of extraordinary length and complexity, either through the port of Rangoon in Burma and then overland via the treacherous Yunnan-Burma Road, or through the port of Hong Kong, which immediately fell into Japanese hands after Pearl Harbor. The first Sino-American loan agreement had specified that the United States would deliver commodities worth $45 million to China in 1941. However, shipping shortages meant that only $26 million worth of commodities actually left the United States. These commodities were shipped to the transit port of Rangoon, where a massive traffic jam developed as supplies accumulated faster than they could be distributed onward to China. Along the Yunnan-Burma Road, that "much-contested life line" as it came to be known, conditions were chaotic. The road had always been a source of trouble: it was long, extraordinarily difficult to keep in repair, fantastically dangerous to travel, and too narrow to permit much volume of traffic at any one time. Due to mismanagement and pilfering, the commodities that were shipped out of Burma suffered heavy losses in transit, and only one-third of them eventually arrived in Chongqing. Yet the United States had already established one valuable asset in China that could be deployed relatively quickly: an air force nucleus. Just before Pearl Harbor, a group of American aviators had been formally organized in Chongqing who worked on volunteer status for China under the command of Colonel Claire Chennault, an American aviation officer who served as instructor at the Chinese Air Force Cadet School. Some of these men had been flying in China since the Kuomintang first began purchasing American aircraft, having come to demonstrate the aircraft and remaining to pilot and teach. Others had hurried to China after being released from their volunteer service in Spain, where they had gained combat experience during the Spanish Civil War. It was a familiar joke that pilots from both sides of the Spanish conflict were likely to meet and work side by side in China, but political convictions proved immaterial to these professional aviators, they got on well enough with each other, mercenaries of the twentieth century united by their expertise and their willingness to fight. When American traffic on the Burma Road swelled in volume and became chaotic, with cargo lost to pilfering and trucks breaking down from mishandling, the air freight service into Chongqing became increasingly vital to maintaining Chinese military capabilities. The backbone of this organization was American, and it had been in operation for months before the Japanese attack. Halfway down the Burma Road, over the border in Burma, was a plane factory backed by American and Chinese capital, providing some degree of repair and maintenance capacity for the aircraft operating out of China. Recognizing the strategic value of these experienced aviators and the need to formalize and expand their operations, American and Chinese officials moved quickly to incorporate this volunteer group, formally known as the American Volunteer Group or "Flying Tigers," into the U.S. Army Air Force. This transformation of volunteer aviators into official American military personnel represented a commitment to providing air support to Chinese operations, recognizing that air power could compensate to some degree for Chinese numerical disadvantages in ground combat. In Chongqing, it was clear that among the United Nations fighting Japan, America was the only one taking China seriously, the only one prepared to invest significant resources in Chinese military capabilities and the Chinese war effort. Yet Pearl Harbor brought consequences that extended far beyond the strategic and diplomatic spheres. For Western civilians living in China,missionaries, teachers, doctors, businessmen, and journalists, the attack represented a catastrophic change in their status and their fate. Until December 8, 1941, Westerners residing in China had maintained a curious protected status as foreign neutrals, even in areas nominally controlled by the Japanese. This status had provided them with a measure of distance from, and protection against, the grinding reality of the war that had devastated Chinese populations. For a century, Americans had been part of an imperial presence in China, sometimes benevolent, sometimes violent, but always ultimately under Western control. That world came to an abrupt end on December 8, 1941. All across eastern China, Americans and Britons were rounded up and interned. The International Settlement of Shanghai—that remarkable oasis of neutrality that had persisted in the midst of a war-torn city—was now reunified under Japanese control. Thousands of foreigners with Allied nationality were sent to holding camps scattered throughout occupied China. Some, like the eleven-year-old British boy Jim Ballard, would remain imprisoned for the remainder of the war, enduring hunger, cold, and disease in camps like Longhua, which housed approximately 2,000 detainees. Forty years later, as the novelist J. G. Ballard, he would memorialized this experience in his semi-autobiographical novel Empire of the Sun. For missionaries like Velva Brown, the evacuation process was degrading and final. The missionary staff were permitted to pack no more than three suitcases with their belongings. As they prepared to leave, Japanese and Taiwanese "sightseeing" parties arrived to decide which houses they might want to occupy. The journey home aboard crowded Japanese ships offered no concessions to status or dignity; ambassadors, consuls, merchants, and missionaries alike were given "bed-sized strips of Chinese matting which we spread side by side on the iron floor of the hold," as Brown recorded. The humiliation was compounded by the finality of it all. For many, their decades-long presence in China was ending not in orderly retreat but in hasty evacuation, leaving behind "servants, many of whom had been with us for fifteen or twenty years." Despite these immediate human tragedies, the strategic transformation that Pearl Harbor wrought for China was undeniable. Chiang Kai-shek now embarked on an entirely new sort of life, heavily involved with the leaders and generals of the Western powers. He held diplomatic discussions with the leaders of the United Nations and military planning sessions with Western generals. In these unfamiliar circumstances, he did his best to live up to the Confucian ideal of the gentleman, seldom permitting the mask to slip—though the pressure of these new responsibilities and the intoxicating combination of vindication and anxiety would occasionally prove too much even for his considerable self-control. Within weeks of Pearl Harbor, Chiang demonstrated the value he could bring to the new alliance. He visited India and spoke with the leaders of the Indian independence struggle as an ally and friend, as a fellow non-European speaking to others seeking to escape from colonialism and imperial domination. He joined the Allies in their first joint campaign, not in China but in the jungles of neighboring Burma, committing Chinese forces to operations outside China's borders in support of the broader Allied military strategy. Yet the price that Chiang would pay for China's belated entry into the global alliance against the Axis powers would prove to be a heavy one. Chiang desperately needed his new American and British partners, but accepting this alliance would unleash forces within Chinese society that would threaten the very basis of his political control. The complexities of this bargain would become most visible in the four-year struggle between Chiang and General Joseph Warren Stilwell, the American officer who would become simultaneously his chief of staff and the administrator of American military assistance to China. This relationship, shaped by mutual suspicion, different strategic visions, and incompatible political agendas, would define Chinese-American military cooperation during the Pacific War and would have profound implications extending far beyond the battlefields of Asia. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Pearl Harbor's shock reverberated through Asia. Japan's assault on Hawaii, combined with invasions of Burma, the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island, inadvertently transformed regional conflict into global war. Chiang Kai-shek, vindicated after four years of isolation fighting Japan, embraced American alliance with profound relief. The U.S. committed military aid, appointed General Stilwell as chief of staff, and recognized China as a co-belligerent. For Chiang, this partnership brought diplomatic status but also internal tensions that would define the Pacific War's final chapter.

A series of questions have been sparked by the indigenous urgency of the moment: What does it mean to live through a world coming undone? How do people carry on amid rupture, loss, and grief? Decolonial Endurance: Lisu Worldmaking Against Chinese Settler Colonialism (Stanford University Press, 2026) explores these questions through the turbulent lives of Indigenous Lisu subsistence farmers in China's Eastern Himalayas, bordering Myanmar and Tibet. Like many of China's Indigenous borderlands, this mountainous region has long borne the force of encroaching Chinese state power. Since the 1980s, the Chinese state has been compelling the Lisu to give up their subsistence lifeways, move into urban settlements, and send their children to government boarding schools. In exchange for the so-called gifts of development—healthcare, income, and education—they suffer environmental and social catastrophes such as mass landslides, strange new illnesses, and toxic food. Drawing on over a decade of engagement with the Lisu, Ting Hui Lau takes readers into the world of ex-shamans, heart-pained mothers, restless spirits, and demon-mad migrants as they grapple with the fallout from state development, which Lau argues is the latest phase in a centuries-long project of settler colonialism along China's Southwest frontier. At once a portrayal of loss and an ethnography of hope, Lau chronicles Lisu worldmaking amid this destruction, centering their quiet resistance through everyday acts of communal caretaking. In a time of escalating geopolitical and ecological crisis, this book calls for a new decolonial politics rooted in the transformative power of endurance. Ting Hui Lau (email address: lau.th@nus.edu.sg) is Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the National University of Singapore. She studies sociocultural, psychological, and medical anthropology, development and environmental change, Indigeneity and colonialism, and the borderland areas of East and Southeast Asia. Yadong Li is an anthropologist-in-training. He is a PhD candidate of Socio-cultural Anthropology at Tulane University. More details about his scholarship and research interests can be found here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

A series of questions have been sparked by the indigenous urgency of the moment: What does it mean to live through a world coming undone? How do people carry on amid rupture, loss, and grief? Decolonial Endurance: Lisu Worldmaking Against Chinese Settler Colonialism (Stanford University Press, 2026) explores these questions through the turbulent lives of Indigenous Lisu subsistence farmers in China's Eastern Himalayas, bordering Myanmar and Tibet. Like many of China's Indigenous borderlands, this mountainous region has long borne the force of encroaching Chinese state power. Since the 1980s, the Chinese state has been compelling the Lisu to give up their subsistence lifeways, move into urban settlements, and send their children to government boarding schools. In exchange for the so-called gifts of development—healthcare, income, and education—they suffer environmental and social catastrophes such as mass landslides, strange new illnesses, and toxic food. Drawing on over a decade of engagement with the Lisu, Ting Hui Lau takes readers into the world of ex-shamans, heart-pained mothers, restless spirits, and demon-mad migrants as they grapple with the fallout from state development, which Lau argues is the latest phase in a centuries-long project of settler colonialism along China's Southwest frontier. At once a portrayal of loss and an ethnography of hope, Lau chronicles Lisu worldmaking amid this destruction, centering their quiet resistance through everyday acts of communal caretaking. In a time of escalating geopolitical and ecological crisis, this book calls for a new decolonial politics rooted in the transformative power of endurance. Ting Hui Lau (email address: lau.th@nus.edu.sg) is Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the National University of Singapore. She studies sociocultural, psychological, and medical anthropology, development and environmental change, Indigeneity and colonialism, and the borderland areas of East and Southeast Asia. Yadong Li is an anthropologist-in-training. He is a PhD candidate of Socio-cultural Anthropology at Tulane University. More details about his scholarship and research interests can be found here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/native-american-studies

A series of questions have been sparked by the indigenous urgency of the moment: What does it mean to live through a world coming undone? How do people carry on amid rupture, loss, and grief? Decolonial Endurance: Lisu Worldmaking Against Chinese Settler Colonialism (Stanford University Press, 2026) explores these questions through the turbulent lives of Indigenous Lisu subsistence farmers in China's Eastern Himalayas, bordering Myanmar and Tibet. Like many of China's Indigenous borderlands, this mountainous region has long borne the force of encroaching Chinese state power. Since the 1980s, the Chinese state has been compelling the Lisu to give up their subsistence lifeways, move into urban settlements, and send their children to government boarding schools. In exchange for the so-called gifts of development—healthcare, income, and education—they suffer environmental and social catastrophes such as mass landslides, strange new illnesses, and toxic food. Drawing on over a decade of engagement with the Lisu, Ting Hui Lau takes readers into the world of ex-shamans, heart-pained mothers, restless spirits, and demon-mad migrants as they grapple with the fallout from state development, which Lau argues is the latest phase in a centuries-long project of settler colonialism along China's Southwest frontier. At once a portrayal of loss and an ethnography of hope, Lau chronicles Lisu worldmaking amid this destruction, centering their quiet resistance through everyday acts of communal caretaking. In a time of escalating geopolitical and ecological crisis, this book calls for a new decolonial politics rooted in the transformative power of endurance. Ting Hui Lau (email address: lau.th@nus.edu.sg) is Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the National University of Singapore. She studies sociocultural, psychological, and medical anthropology, development and environmental change, Indigeneity and colonialism, and the borderland areas of East and Southeast Asia. Yadong Li is an anthropologist-in-training. He is a PhD candidate of Socio-cultural Anthropology at Tulane University. More details about his scholarship and research interests can be found here. Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/southeast-asian-studies

A series of questions have been sparked by the indigenous urgency of the moment: What does it mean to live through a world coming undone? How do people carry on amid rupture, loss, and grief? Decolonial Endurance: Lisu Worldmaking Against Chinese Settler Colonialism (Stanford University Press, 2026) explores these questions through the turbulent lives of Indigenous Lisu subsistence farmers in China's Eastern Himalayas, bordering Myanmar and Tibet. Like many of China's Indigenous borderlands, this mountainous region has long borne the force of encroaching Chinese state power. Since the 1980s, the Chinese state has been compelling the Lisu to give up their subsistence lifeways, move into urban settlements, and send their children to government boarding schools. In exchange for the so-called gifts of development—healthcare, income, and education—they suffer environmental and social catastrophes such as mass landslides, strange new illnesses, and toxic food. Drawing on over a decade of engagement with the Lisu, Ting Hui Lau takes readers into the world of ex-shamans, heart-pained mothers, restless spirits, and demon-mad migrants as they grapple with the fallout from state development, which Lau argues is the latest phase in a centuries-long project of settler colonialism along China's Southwest frontier. At once a portrayal of loss and an ethnography of hope, Lau chronicles Lisu worldmaking amid this destruction, centering their quiet resistance through everyday acts of communal caretaking. In a time of escalating geopolitical and ecological crisis, this book calls for a new decolonial politics rooted in the transformative power of endurance. Ting Hui Lau (email address: lau.th@nus.edu.sg) is Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the National University of Singapore. She studies sociocultural, psychological, and medical anthropology, development and environmental change, Indigeneity and colonialism, and the borderland areas of East and Southeast Asia. Yadong Li is an anthropologist-in-training. He is a PhD candidate of Socio-cultural Anthropology at Tulane University. More details about his scholarship and research interests can be found here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/critical-theory

A series of questions have been sparked by the indigenous urgency of the moment: What does it mean to live through a world coming undone? How do people carry on amid rupture, loss, and grief? Decolonial Endurance: Lisu Worldmaking Against Chinese Settler Colonialism (Stanford University Press, 2026) explores these questions through the turbulent lives of Indigenous Lisu subsistence farmers in China's Eastern Himalayas, bordering Myanmar and Tibet. Like many of China's Indigenous borderlands, this mountainous region has long borne the force of encroaching Chinese state power. Since the 1980s, the Chinese state has been compelling the Lisu to give up their subsistence lifeways, move into urban settlements, and send their children to government boarding schools. In exchange for the so-called gifts of development—healthcare, income, and education—they suffer environmental and social catastrophes such as mass landslides, strange new illnesses, and toxic food. Drawing on over a decade of engagement with the Lisu, Ting Hui Lau takes readers into the world of ex-shamans, heart-pained mothers, restless spirits, and demon-mad migrants as they grapple with the fallout from state development, which Lau argues is the latest phase in a centuries-long project of settler colonialism along China's Southwest frontier. At once a portrayal of loss and an ethnography of hope, Lau chronicles Lisu worldmaking amid this destruction, centering their quiet resistance through everyday acts of communal caretaking. In a time of escalating geopolitical and ecological crisis, this book calls for a new decolonial politics rooted in the transformative power of endurance. Ting Hui Lau (email address: lau.th@nus.edu.sg) is Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the National University of Singapore. She studies sociocultural, psychological, and medical anthropology, development and environmental change, Indigeneity and colonialism, and the borderland areas of East and Southeast Asia. Yadong Li is an anthropologist-in-training. He is a PhD candidate of Socio-cultural Anthropology at Tulane University. More details about his scholarship and research interests can be found here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/medicine

A series of questions have been sparked by the indigenous urgency of the moment: What does it mean to live through a world coming undone? How do people carry on amid rupture, loss, and grief? Decolonial Endurance: Lisu Worldmaking Against Chinese Settler Colonialism (Stanford University Press, 2026) explores these questions through the turbulent lives of Indigenous Lisu subsistence farmers in China's Eastern Himalayas, bordering Myanmar and Tibet. Like many of China's Indigenous borderlands, this mountainous region has long borne the force of encroaching Chinese state power. Since the 1980s, the Chinese state has been compelling the Lisu to give up their subsistence lifeways, move into urban settlements, and send their children to government boarding schools. In exchange for the so-called gifts of development—healthcare, income, and education—they suffer environmental and social catastrophes such as mass landslides, strange new illnesses, and toxic food. Drawing on over a decade of engagement with the Lisu, Ting Hui Lau takes readers into the world of ex-shamans, heart-pained mothers, restless spirits, and demon-mad migrants as they grapple with the fallout from state development, which Lau argues is the latest phase in a centuries-long project of settler colonialism along China's Southwest frontier. At once a portrayal of loss and an ethnography of hope, Lau chronicles Lisu worldmaking amid this destruction, centering their quiet resistance through everyday acts of communal caretaking. In a time of escalating geopolitical and ecological crisis, this book calls for a new decolonial politics rooted in the transformative power of endurance. Ting Hui Lau (email address: lau.th@nus.edu.sg) is Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the National University of Singapore. She studies sociocultural, psychological, and medical anthropology, development and environmental change, Indigeneity and colonialism, and the borderland areas of East and Southeast Asia. Yadong Li is an anthropologist-in-training. He is a PhD candidate of Socio-cultural Anthropology at Tulane University. More details about his scholarship and research interests can be found here. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/anthropology

Perched on a hill in Singapore is one of the world's most unusual attractions. Haw Par Villa was built to teach morality through Chinese folklore, but it is the Ten Courts of Hell that have haunted generations of visitors. Join us as we explore the remarkable story behind this extraordinary park, the ancient beliefs that inspired it, why so many Singaporeans remember it from childhood, and the eerie atmosphere that continues to surround it - especially during Hungry Ghost Month.The BOOKBY US A COFFEEJoin Sarah's new FACEBOOK GROUPSubscribe to our PATREONEMAIL us your storiesJoin us on INSTAGRAMJoin us on TWITTERJoin us on FACEBOOKVisit our WEBSITEResearch Links:https://www.hawparvilla.sg/https://www.hawparvilla.sg/about-us/https://www.hawparvilla.sg/hells-museum/https://www.hawparvilla.sg/plan-your-visit/https://www.roots.gov.sg/places/places-landing/Places/national-monuments/haw-par-villahttps://www.sg101.gov.sg/resources/archives/haw-par-villa/https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_765_2005-01-19.htmlhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haw_Par_Villahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diyuhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ten_Kingshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yama_(East_Asia)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meng_Pohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghost_Festivalhttps://www.channelnewsasia.com/cna-insider/haw-par-villa-hells-museum-afterlife-chinese-beliefs-2947686https://www.timeout.com/singapore/things-to-do/haw-par-villahttps://www.atlasobscura.com/places/haw-par-villahttps://www.atlasobscura.com/places/hells-museumhttps://www.reddit.com/r/singapore/comments/by9wxp/haw_par_villa_is_creepy/https://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/Attraction_Review-g294265-d317855-Reviews-Haw_Par_Thanks so much for listening, and we'll catch up with you again on tomorrow.Sarah and Tobie xx"Spacial Winds," Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)Licenced under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 Licencehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/SURVEY Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

We continue our Summer Playlist this week by welcoming Sunil Kashyap back into the SmarterMarkets™ studio. Sunil is Managing Director at FinMet Pte Ltd., Singapore.   David Greely sits down with Sunil to discuss the surge of new developments and new initiatives being announced in Asia's gold and silver markets including the growth in trading activity of Abaxx Exchange's gold and silver futures markets in Singapore, the Hong Kong Exchange reviving its gold futures market in Hong Kong, and Singapore pursuing an OTC gold clearing initiative to create a Loco Singapore market.  

John Kachuba is an award-winning author of twelve books as well as numerous articles, short stories, and poems. Holding advanced degrees in Creative Writing, John has taught through Ohio University and the Gotham Writers Workshop and is a member of the Historical Novel Society and Horror Writers Association. His expertise has also taken him around the world, working with writers and students in Cambodia, Malta, Portugal, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Beyond writing, John has developed a deep fascination with the paranormal, folklore, supernatural traditions, and the strange stories cultures have told for generations.A popular speaker on paranormal and metaphysical subjects, John has appeared at universities, libraries, paranormal conferences, and across radio, television, and podcasts. One of the most fascinating areas of John's research is the centuries-old belief in shapeshifters—humans, spirits, witches, and mysterious entities said to transform from one form into another. From ancient legends to modern encounters, John explores the question: Are shapeshifters simply folklore, or could something very real be hiding behind these incredible stories?Spaced Out Radio is your nightly source for alternative information, starting at 9pm Pacific, 12am Eastern.  We broadcast LIVE every night. #UFO #UAP #AlienDisclosure #UFOSightings #UFOCoverUp #Aliens #SpacedOutRadio #Paranormal #UFOCommunity #disclosure -------------------------------------------------------You can now join the Space Traveler's Club;Join us at  https://www.patreon.com/sor_space_travelers_club  --------------------------------------------------------Grab Our Latest Spaced Out Radio Gear At:http://spacedoutradio.com/shop  It's a great way to support our show!--------------------------------------------------------OUR LINKS:TWITTER: https://www.twitter.com/spacedoutradio   FACEBOOK:https://www.facebook.com/spacedoutradioshow  SPACED OUT RADIO - INSTAGRAM:https://www.instagram.com/spacedoutradioshow  DAVE SCOTT - INSTAGRAM:https://www.instagram.com/davescottsor   TWITCH: https://www.twitch.com/spacedoutradioshow  WEBSITE: http://www.spacedoutradio.comGUEST IDEAS OR QUESTIONS FOR SOR?Contact Klaus at bookings@spacedoutradio.comBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/spaced-out-radio--1657874/support.

The CPG Guys are joined in this episode by Phil Camarota, Chief Creative Officer at Flywheel, the commerce acceleration division of Omnicom.Follow Phil on LinkedIn at: https://www.linkedin.com/in/phil-camarotaFollow Flywheel online at: http://www.flywheeldigital.comPhil answers these questions:1. Walk us through what it actually means to be Jury President — how much of it is scoring work versus managing a room of strong personalities with different creative instincts?2. Before you even got to Cannes, what did the prep work look like — building a "shared language" or judging framework with your jurors before deliberations began?3. Creative Commerce is a relatively young category compared to Film or Print — did that shape how you approached defining what "great" looks like this year?4. You've talked about expecting "AI tension" going into this year's judging — where did that show up in the room, and how did the jury navigate it?5. With jurors from Singapore to South America to Europe, how do you reconcile genuinely different regional definitions of great commerce creativity into one Grand Prix?6. Were there moments where you, personally, had a strong point of view on a piece of work but had to hold back because — as you put it — you're "not the arbiter of taste"?7. Commerce creativity spans everything from in-store experience to retail media to end-to-end digital journeys — how do you judge fairly across such different formats and channels?8. You're Global CCO at Flywheel, one of the biggest players in commerce creativity — how did you handle the optics and reality of judging a category so close to your day job?9. Were there conflict-of-interest guardrails Cannes puts in place for Jury Presidents whose own agencies or clients might have submitted work?10. Did anything from your Flywheel vantage point — pattern-spotting across retailers and brands — sharpen or distort your lens as a judge?11. What did last year's Grand Prix winner, VML's "Preserved Promos" for Ziploc, teach you about what separates good commerce work from truly great work — and did that shape your criteria this year?12. Now that it's behind you, what's one thing about the jury process that surprised you, and what would you tell next year's Creative Commerce Jury President to expect?CPG Guys Website: http://CPGguys.comFMCG Guys Website: http://FMCGguys.comSheCOMMERCE Website: https://shecommercepodcast.com/Rhea Raj's Website: http://rhearaj.comLara Raj in Katseye: https://www.katseye.world/DISCLAIMER: The content in this podcast episode is provided for general informational purposes only. By listening to our episode, you understand that no information contained in this episode should be construed as advice from CPGGUYS, LLC or the individual author, hosts, or guests, nor is it intended to be a substitute for research on any subject matter. Reference to any specific product or entity does not constitute an endorsement or recommendation by CPGGUYS, LLC. The views expressed by guests are their own and their appearance on the program does not imply an endorsement of them or any entity they represent.CPGGUYS LLC expressly disclaims any and all liability or responsibility for any direct, indirect, incidental, special, consequential or other damages arising out of any individual's use of, reference to, or inability to use this podcast or the information we presented in this podcast.

America Out Loud PULSE with Dr. Randall Bock – Sean Flynn argues that America's healthcare crisis stems from hidden prices, distorted incentives, and third-party payments. Drawing lessons from Singapore, he proposes patient-controlled health savings accounts, transparent pricing, competitive care, catastrophic protection, and a safety net that lowers costs while preserving access, choice, and security...

For today's podcast, Mike Granato & Shaun Webb's guest is Nick Duffy, Director of Instruction at Athletic Motion Golf and coach of the 2024 NCAA individual champion. Nick started working with his star pupil at 14 and rebuilt an unorthodox, already-winning swing into a championship game...so we dug into everything he's learned about developing junior golfers, and why so much talent gets wasted.We cover the growth-spurt "drop-off" (why bones grow first, muscles second, and the nervous system last — and what it does to a young swing), the two things that quietly end junior careers, how over-involved parents can drive a kid out of the game, and the coach-vs-parent line (the famous Butch Harmon & Earl Woods conversation). Nick shares his student's wild path — two years of Singapore military service, visualizing his swing on a Navy boat, then qualifying for a college event straight off the boat — and the mental fortitude that mattered more than any technique. Plus: building a backup shot for the days your swing isn't there, the "smaller field" mindset, and inside-the-ropes stories from the 2024 Masters and US Open at Pinehurst.Then we get into instruction: why the trail arm is the #1 fault masking everything else, the "parlor trick" of fixing the backswing so impact fixes itself, why the best players want the simplest information, and why your body pivot has to match your shot shape.

Konstantin Kisin argues that Britain is poor and getting poorer, and that almost nobody knows it. He points to polling showing most Britons believe they are as rich as Switzerland, Singapore or Australia, when on a per capita basis Britain sits far down the table and is close to being overtaken by Poland. Konstantin also examines the grooming gangs scandal, which he describes as organised crime run through kinship networks, and rejects outright the idea that Britain can accommodate two legal systems. Konstantin Kisin is a writer, social commentator, comedian, and co-host of the free speech podcast Triggernometry. He is a regular on British and American TV and radio shows including Question Time, Good Morning Britain, BBC Breakfast, Daily Politics, LBC Cross Question, The Joe Rogan Experience, and many others. He is also the author of An Immigrant's Love Letter to the West.

A.M. Edition for Aug. 13. A Journal investigation finds that thousands of North Korean operatives have landed jobs at American companies and are funneling millions of dollars back to the regime. Plus, big businesses like Apple and FedEx start reeling in hundreds of millions in tariff refunds. And the WSJ's Stu Woo details how American chatbots are towing Beijing's party line. Luke Vargas hosts. Sign up for the WSJ's free What's News newsletter. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Episode 539 / Adam De BoerAdam de Boer is an artist who graduated with a BFA in Painting from the College of Creative Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara (2006) and an MA in Fine Art from the Chelsea College of Art, London (2012). His work has been exhibited at Plato, New York (2024); Taymour Grahne Projects, London (2024, 2022); The Pit, Los Angeles (2023); Gajah Gallery, Jakarta and Singapore (2023, 2022); Ben Brown Fine Arts, London and Hong Kong (2022); The Hole, New York and Los Angeles (2023, 2022); Hunter Shaw Fine Art, Los Angeles (2020, 2018); World Trade Centre, Jakarta (2018); and Art Jog, Yogyakarta (2018, 2015).Adam is a Joan Mitchell Foundation Fellow and in 2017 was awarded a Fulbright Research Fellowship to Java, Indonesia. Other grants include The International Art Prize presented by Winsor & Newton and Paul Smith's Foundation, Arts for India from the University of the Arts, London, and those from The Cultural Development Corporation, The DC Commission on the Arts and Humanities, and The Santa Barbara Arts Fund.

Last time we spoke about the ending of the Second Battle of Changsha. In late September and early October 1941, Chinese commander Chen Cheng planned an operation to retake Yichang, a strategic Yangtze River city whose control was essential for protecting the approach to Chongqing. Japanese forces were pulling back from Changsha, weakened by supply problems and casualties, which created an opportunity for Chen to intensify his campaign. Yichang had been captured by Japan in 1940, a defeat that Chen carried as a personal and political burden. He therefore moved to encircle the Japanese 13th Division inside Yichang and drive it to collapse. Although the Chinese held a clear manpower advantage—fourteen divisions against the encircled Japanese—progress was slowed by stubborn fighting from prepared, entrenched positions. The battle inside the city produced desperate close-quarters combat and heavy casualties, showing how the fate of Yichang and the wider defense of Chongqing were tightly linked.    #214 War hits the Pacific Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   The guns fell silent on October 9, 1941, as the Ninth War Zone's forces restored their pre-battle positions, marking the end of the Second Battle of Changsha. The balance sheet was grim on both sides, but it was China that bore the heavier cost. The Ninth Military Front suffered 70,672 killed, wounded, or missing. The concurrent Yichang offensive added a further 21,368 casualties to the Sixth Military Front, a force that outnumbered its Japanese opponents ten to one yet still failed to retake the city. By the time the dust settled, the Chinese army had lost nearly 100,000 men across both theatres. The Chinese command was frank, at least in private, about what had gone wrong. The Japanese had moved with a speed that recalled Blitzkrieg, advancing 130 kilometres in eleven days and withdrawing at twelve kilometres a day, catching the defenders perpetually off-balance. The 26th, 37th, 10th, and 74th Corps had been picked apart piecemeal rather than fighting in concert, the original plan to destroy the Japanese south of the Miluo River coming to nothing. Elite formations had paid a disproportionate price: the 74th Corps suffered 14,521 casualties, the 37th Corps 14,015, and the 58th Division alone lost 6,192 of its 11,907 men, nearly its entire fighting strength.   Yet none of this was the story the public would hear. On October 10th, China's National Day, radio stations announced the "Second Great Victory in Northern Hunan", the annihilation of over 40,000 enemy troops. Newspapers rushed out special editions. Congratulatory telegrams flooded in from government ministries and civic organizations. Senior officials seized on the moment: Sun Ke, Premier of the Executive Yuan, declared that the victory "laid the foundation for the counter-offensive and the recapture of Hankou and Guangzhou," while General Bai Chongxi called it "the pivotal moment for us to turn defeat into victory." Chiang Kai-shek, reading through the pages of triumphant commentary produced overnight by his propagandists, was reportedly impressed by their industry, if not convinced by their content. He had not wanted to call it a victory at all, but the political calculus was unavoidable: after four years of war, an exhausted nation needed the psychological sustenance that only "victory" could provide.   The gap between public performance and private reality was nowhere more visible than in the arrival of a twenty-two-member international press delegation on October 13th. Journalists from Britain, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Hong Kong, and major Chinese newspapers were flown to Changsha and carefully guided through selected battlefields, where they inspected mountains of war trophies and heard testimony from soldiers and civilians. They left satisfied, presenting their war souvenirs—swords, binoculars, Japanese military flags—to their audiences back home as proof of Chinese heroism and Japanese defeat. Both China and Japan were claiming victory simultaneously. The only conclusion the foreign press could draw was that one side was lying, and it was not the side that had shown them the evidence.   Chiang Kai-shek's real verdict came at the Third Nanyue Military Conference, held from October 16 to 21. His anger was withering. He condemned his generals for their obsession with defending sprawling outer perimeter lines while leaving city centres barely fortified, a mentality so rigid, he said, that the Japanese could announce the exact time of their advance and withdrawal in advance and still execute it on schedule without interference. "Generals, what a disgrace this is!" On the failure to capture prisoners, only 263 prisoners were claimed across the entire front, of whom only 16 names were actually published, he was almost incredulous: "We can definitely defeat the enemy, capture many enemy prisoners, and seize countless enemy weapons! Even if we cannot capture ten thousand prisoners, we should at least capture a thousand! If not a thousand, then at least a hundred! But now, you don't even have ten!" The conference handed down punishments to match the rhetoric. Liao Lingqi, commander of the shattered 58th Division, was sentenced to death for desertion and shot on October 22nd. His men were so outraged that three regimental commanders resigned in protest; the division was pulled from the order of battle entirely and given three months to rebuild. Li Yutang, commander of the 10th Corps, was dismissed—though the Third Battle of Changsha would begin before his replacement could take post, and he would be reinstated to play a key role in the city's defence.   On the Japanese side, the 11th Army acknowledged 1,670 killed, 5,184 wounded, and 14 missing, far fewer than Chinese claims, though post-war regimental histories suggest the true figure was higher. Lieutenant General Anami, who had championed the operation, found himself stung by the charge that the battle had served mainly as material for Chinese propaganda. On November 23rd, he reportedly reacted with visible displeasure when someone in his headquarters said as much aloud.  Anami's annoyance was easy enough to understand, but the accusation carried a troubling degree of accuracy. The Second Battle of Changsha had yielded no decisive strategic gain and no substantial alteration in the military balance. What it did generate, rather effectively, was a story and by the autumn of 1941, stories were one of the few things China still had in plentiful supply. The most consequential struggles were taking place not along the Miluo River, but in foreign ministries and embassies, in Washington and Moscow, in the messages passing between Chongqing and London, and in the increasingly strained calculations of statesmen trying to determine, amid rapidly changing circumstances, whom to support and for how long.   For Chiang Kai-shek, the challenge was never merely military. It was structural, and had been so from the outset. He had always seen clearly, precisely because he understood China's weakness, that Japan could not be defeated by China alone. The country lacked the industrial base, the logistical reach, and after four years of relentless attrition more and more the manpower needed to force a decisive result on the battlefield. China's survival depended on making its war inseparable from the wars of other powers. Since 1937, Chiang's diplomacy had pursued that single objective: convincing enough great powers that their interests were aligned with China's, and holding that coalition together long enough for Japan to be subdued. That effort turned out to be vastly more difficult than it ought to have been.   The problem started with the international order in which the war emerged. Chiang had hoped to assemble a concert of allies willing to help defend China against Japanese aggression. He was blocked not just by the reluctance of neutral states to aid China, but by the speed with which alliances shifted in the opening years of the Second World War. He had never welcomed the prospect of a general European conflict, correctly fearing that it would push China even further to the margins of world attention. Even so, he recognized that once the lines had hardened between the imperial democracies and fascism, new alignments might become possible. From his perspective, the growing amity between Berlin and Moscow was therefore disastrous. He had been eager to draw the USSR into war against Japan. Instead, the Soviets were now effectively aligned with the Nazis, who were themselves allied with Tokyo.   The world created after Versailles had already enraged many Chinese. After all, the May Fourth demonstrations of 1919 had arisen directly from the settlement reached at the Paris Peace Conference. Yet that older order had at least possessed recognizable anchors, especially the dominance of the two great European empires and the United States. Now those empires were weakening, and no one could say with confidence what the new geopolitical order would be. For all Chiang knew, Germany might emerge as Europe's new dominant power. The early years of the European war produced a bewildering spectacle of diplomatic realignment.   The Nationalist government had previously enjoyed a short-lived flirtation with Nazi Germany. In fact, Hitler's regime continued supplying Chiang with munitions in the first months of China's war against Japan. The Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 had theoretically joined Germany, Italy, and Japan into the Axis, but mutual distrust prevented them from forming anything like a fully coherent alliance. Chiang found it useful to imply to Western powers that he might be pushed into closer alignment with Germany, a particularly disturbing possibility for the USSR, which faced enemies in both Europe and Asia. But eventually the contradictions in German policy toward East Asia became too severe. In April 1938, Germany yielded to Japanese pressure and ended its support for China.   Britain offered little meaningful help. Neville Chamberlain became prime minister in May 1937 at the head of a Conservative-led National Government, and was quickly overwhelmed by the deteriorating European situation. If Czechoslovakia was for him a "far-off country of which we know nothing," China's fate was even more distant and obscure to many,  perhaps most  policymakers in London. The Nationalists had more success in cultivating the United States. At the Nine-Power Conference in Brussels in November 1937, the Chinese delegation failed to persuade Washington to impose sanctions on Japan and confront it directly. By the middle of 1938, however, American views were beginning to shift. As Japan pushed deeper into southern China, it became increasingly obvious that the occupied territory would be closed to foreign trade. In December 1938, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau arranged a private American loan of $25 million to China, to be repaid through shipments of tung oil, a varnish product whose real importance lay not in itself, but in what the arrangement signified: a quiet American expression of faith that Chongqing would survive. Chiang also held on to the hope of an even less likely partnership. He had become fiercely anti-Communist during the 1920s, yet in the early years of the anti-Japanese war his greatest hope still rested on Soviet entry into the conflict. Soviet advisers and pilots had aided China from 1937 to 1939, but the USSR never formally declared war on Japan. Still, as Japanese aggression in northern Asia intensified, it remained possible that the Soviets would eventually be drawn in.   Then, as so often happened whenever Chiang tried to impose some control over the course of the war, events beyond China's borders altered the struggle in fundamental ways. While Western attention remained fixed on Europe's darkening horizon, a battle with major consequences for East Asia unfolded on the frontiers of Outer Mongolia, Manchukuo, and the eastern Soviet Union. Throughout much of 1938 and early 1939, one faction within the Japanese Imperial Army sought to pressure the Soviets along their eastern frontier. The USSR appeared vulnerable; Stalin's paranoid purges had executed or exiled many of the Red Army's best officers. In May 1939, fighting broke out near Nomonhan between forces from Soviet-backed Mongolia and Japanese troops from Manchukuo. Within days, both sides had reinforced heavily, until nearly 60,000 Soviet troops faced about 40,000 soldiers from the Kwantung Army. Over the next four months, until mid-September, they fought a major battle ending in a decisive Japanese defeat and establishing the reputation of General Georgi Zhukov, who would later become one of Stalin's most celebrated wartime commanders. The much-derided Soviet Army had fought with formidable effectiveness, and the result was not only a ceasefire but also a nonaggression pact between the two sides, extinguishing, in one stroke, Chiang's hopes for a Chinese-Soviet military alliance. The final blow came after developments in northern Europe. In the Winter War of 1939–1940, the Soviet invasion of Finland led Britain and France to back a motion expelling the USSR from the League of Nations. China, then a member of the League Council, declined to use its veto to block the resolution. Stalin was enraged by Chiang's failure to prevent Soviet expulsion, and mutual suspicion thereafter poisoned relations between the two leaders for the rest of the war against Japan. China would now have to continue without further major Soviet backing.   By the spring of 1940, China's position had become deeply precarious. In March, senior Japanese negotiators sought an agreement with Chiang in Chongqing, while Wang Jingwei was trying to formalize his rival Nationalist government in Nanjing. This effort, known in Chinese as the Tong Operation, and in Japanese as Operation Kiri, led to talks in Hong Kong from March 7 to 10, 1940. Militarily, the Nationalists were in grave danger: the United States remained neutral, and Europe was in chaos. Indeed, that same spring, with France seemingly near collapse, the British government also sent out discreet feelers to explore the possibility of a negotiated peace with Germany. For China, Western assistance was nowhere in sight. The Japanese judged the moment favorable for pressing Chiang toward concessions. Faced with serious danger to his regime, Chiang allowed the door to negotiation to open just slightly.   As a consequence, the Japanese delayed full recognition of Wang Jingwei's new government. Through the summer and autumn of 1940, Tokyo remained uncertain about the defector. Prominent Japanese figures such as Count Arima Yoriyasu of the Privy Council said Wang's conduct demonstrated his untrustworthiness, and Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke continued to express interest in an agreement with Chongqing. Zhou Fohai captured the defectors' frustration, men who believed they had made the highest patriotic sacrifice when he wrote: "Chongqing sees us as collaborators, we see ourselves as heroes. We think only peace can save the country — that's why we think of ourselves as heroes. If we end up classed as heroes, then China and Japan will be at peace. If we end up classed as collaborators, then China and Japan will never be at peace."That formulation conveyed something genuine about the moral dizziness of the period. Most of the defectors were not men devoid of principles; they were men whose principles had carried them to a place that history would find exceptionally hard to pardon.   The "New Fourth Army Incident" brought to a close one of the most consequential years in modern Chinese political history. The battle of ideas unfolding in 1940 was already visible to informed contemporaries. Early in 1941, US Ambassador Nelson Johnson sent Washington a detailed assessment of the Chinese political situation in reply to another report passed along by Major Evans Carlson, an American officer who had made an extensive journey through the Chinese interior. The contrast between the two documents revealed a widening split in American views of China. Carlson, together with his travelling companion, the New Zealander Rewi Alley, had become increasingly sympathetic to the Communists after visiting their territories in 1938 and admiring their discipline. Carlson described the Nationalists as moving toward "fascism," and argued that American aid should be conditioned on Chiang's government being compelled to adopt more "democratic" institutions.   Johnson strongly disagreed. It was "only normal and natural," he wrote, that the Nationalists wanted to retain power, but during the war they had established the National Political Consultative Council, in which multiple parties, including the Communists, were represented. He also noted that the CCP could publish its own newspaper in Chongqing in a way that would have been impossible before the war. One might have expected the Nationalists to use the war as a justification "to extinguish . . . all political opposition," yet instead they had chosen to "muddle along." Johnson further thought that the influence of competing cliques inside the Nationalist Party had been overstated. Chiang Kai-shek, by contrast, had "grown in stature, as he has come to be recognized as the symbol of united resistance to Japanese encroachment"; ultimately, "it is he who makes the final decisions." Johnson did agree with Carlson that Chiang's regime was hesitant to encourage a broad-based popular movement animated by anything beyond anti-Japanese feeling, though he also pointed to Nationalist cooperative programs and county-level reforms. But he rejected the idea that American support should depend on sweeping political transformation. Chiang was committed to continuing the war against Japan, and Washington should back him in that effort. In a notably farsighted passage, Johnson wrote: "It is my view that since the fall of the Manchu dynasty and the collapse of the traditional Chinese concept of government the Chinese people have been feeling their way along toward a new evolving form of government. A definitive form of government has not yet been established and may not be established for decades; it may or may not be in the form of a democracy, but it will be a type of government that will be adapted to the needs of China and its people." The tension between these two American interpretations,  Carlson's idealized belief in the Communists and Johnson's pragmatic support for Chiang was more than a minor bureaucratic dispute. It foreshadowed a debate that would dominate American foreign policy for the next decade, and would still echo when the People's Republic was proclaimed in 1949.   The disastrous experience of 1940 seemed to cast doubt on whether any future for China existed outside the Japanese Empire. As 1941 wore on, another dreadful event shook the exhausted wartime capital. On June 5, Chongqing endured roughly five hours of bombing, driving the population into air-raid shelters. In one tunnel in the Shibati district, the conditions were even worse than usual. The large shelter was supposed to have lights and electric fans, but the generators had never been connected. Inside, the air was dark, hot, and suffocating. Around ten that evening, people began emerging from the tunnel when rumors spread that the Japanese were returning with poison-gas bombs. Air-raid wardens forced people back inside, even as others were still trying to come out. Bodies toppled over one another, and panic spread as people realized they could not breathe. Over the next few hours, hundreds died underground in the darkness. The exact number was never definitively established: the official figure was 461, though a contemporary police report placed it far higher, at 1,527. What rescuers remembered most vividly were the tortured expressions of the dead, people tangled together in each other's arms as they lost consciousness, clothing ripped to shreds by desperate hands clawing at one another, and bodies so drenched in sweat that they looked as though they had been soaked in water. One survivor, Tang Zhengchang, remembered a hand reaching out from a pile of corpses and pleading, "Sir, please help me . . ." The grip on Tang's shorts was so tight that it pulled them off; he escaped the tunnel naked from the waist down. Official descriptions of the disaster were softened. Even so, the tragedy deepened the city's gloom and in a place already saturated with grief, an added layer of darkness mattered a great deal.   Yet events elsewhere would soon offer the National Government a narrow margin of hope. Late in 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt won re-election as president of the United States. "I am not going to send your boys into any foreign wars," he had proclaimed during the campaign against Wendell Willkie. But Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull both understood that Nazi domination of Europe posed a grave challenge to American influence there. And with China's "Open Door" to trade effectively shut by Japanese occupation, it was becoming increasingly clear that strict neutrality might not remain viable. In a 1941 report on China's domestic and foreign situation, Ambassador Johnson noted that during Germany's sweeping victories across Europe in mid-1940, the Chinese had become anxious about whether the Allies would remain committed to their cause. Britain's refusal to surrender, however, together with continuing Soviet goodwill, lifted public morale in China. People now looked toward the United States and Britain for support and felt that "victory" was "virtually theirs."   Then, on June 22, 1941, the world awoke to news that roughly three million German soldiers were advancing into the Soviet Union. Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's invasion of the USSR, dramatically overturned the nonaggression that had governed relations between the two major European dictatorships for the previous two years. It transformed the war in Europe entirely. Less obviously, it also transformed the war in Asia. Thanks to intelligence leaks, Chiang Kai-shek had already realized that war between Germany and the USSR was likely. After the neutrality treaty between the USSR and Japan was signed on April 13, 1941, Chiang predicted that the United States would be drawn into the Asian war, and even that Japan might eventually reverse course and strike the Soviet Union. If that happened, China would become the critical Asian ally of both Washington and Moscow. Stalin had been caught off guard by the German assault — largely because he ignored increasingly urgent warnings from senior colleagues receiving intelligence from well-placed spies in Germany and the Comintern, eager to preserve its alliances, now pressed the Chinese Communists to cooperate more closely with the Nationalists. On June 23, 1941, the CCP Central Committee responded with a declaration that it would "persevere in the Anti-Japanese United Front, persevere in Nationalist-Communist cooperation," and would align itself with the British, the Americans, and others resisting the "fascist rulers" of the Axis.   In Chongqing and Yan'an, the German attack on the Soviet Union was interpreted as a hopeful sign that Japan's fortunes might be beginning to turn. In Nanjing, the reaction was different. On June 22, Zhou Fohai recorded in his diary that, although the outcome "cannot be predicted," members of the Nanjing regime "all believe Germany will win and will take Moscow within two months." Zhou speculated that Japan could not easily reconcile its neutrality treaty with the USSR and its membership in the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was supposed to unite the Axis against Soviet expansionism. Still, because Germany had struck first, Japan was under no formal obligation to help. Zhou also continued to view events through a lens he had never abandoned: that of Chinese nationalism. "If Chongqing joins the Allies and they win," he wrote, "then this is good for China." If they lost, it would be disastrous for Chiang Kai-shek; but because Wang Jingwei had established a government in Nanjing under Japanese sponsorship, China now had "a foot in both boats." It was a ruthless calculation, but not a wholly dishonorable one. Zhou was not merely advancing Japanese interests. He was hedging, wagering on multiple futures in the name of a China he believed would endure beyond whatever constellation of powers happened to dominate at the moment. Whether posterity would judge that conduct prudent or collaborative was a question he could neither settle nor live to see resolved to his satisfaction.   The summer of 1941 marked a major geopolitical turning point in the war. Until then, the conflicts in China and Europe had remained separate, if desperate, struggles on the Eurasian continent. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union now forced Japan to decide whether it too would enter war against the USSR. Debate in Tokyo was brief. Although some officials, including Foreign Minister Matsuoka, favored striking north before moving south, both the Kwantung Army and the Navy advised against helping Germany at least until Germany had succeeded in drawing substantial Soviet forces away from Siberia and into Europe. Konoye, once again prime minister, agreed. With the northern option set aside, Japanese leaders turned toward another great power instead: the United States. Japan's failure to gain further decisive momentum in China had fueled demands for broader regional expansion, especially into Southeast Asia, with its abundant oil, rubber, and other strategic resources. From 1940 onward, measures such as the pressure to close the Burma Road made it increasingly obvious that Tokyo had adopted a more aggressive posture in Asia. Unable to subdue China, Japanese policymakers chose instead to escalate the conflict still further.   Japanese political life had become ever more dominated by the unresolved war in China. As early as 1938, military expenditures consumed about 70 percent of the national budget, and that same year a National Mobilization Bill granted the government "total war control" over the zaibatsu, Japan's major industrial conglomerates. By 1940, the New Order was making itself felt throughout everyday life, with campaigns against luxury and extravagant consumption taking on new prominence. In February 1940, a parliamentarian was expelled from the Diet simply for daring to criticize the "holy war" in China. In such an atmosphere, retreat from imperial ambitions became increasingly unthinkable. That figure, 70 percent of the national budget devoted to the military is worth dwelling on, because it reveals something essential about the trap in which Japanese strategists had placed themselves. The war in China had not been won, yet abandoning it would have meant admitting a failure so severe that it would have shaken the ideological and institutional foundations of military supremacy in Japanese politics. The only apparent ways out required pushing further in: more conquest, more extraction, more expansion. The logic was brutally clear, and profoundly destructive.   The Roosevelt administration watched these developments with growing alarm. Though still formally neutral, the United States was already using Lend-Lease to provide major assistance to Britain and the Soviet Union in their struggles against Germany. It now expanded aid to China as well. On February 10, Roosevelt's representative Lauchlin Currie visited Chongqing to inform Chiang Kai-shek that the United States would soon provide $45 million in military equipment. General John Magruder, head of the small AMMISCA mission,  the American Military Mission in China had been sent to Chongqing in September 1941, as part of quiet preparation for possible Chinese entry into an alliance against Japan. The China branch of the OSS, precursor to the CIA, was led by General William "Wild Bill" Donovan, whom Roosevelt had dispatched to China in early 1941.   The Americans repeatedly tried to discourage Japan from moving south into Southeast Asia, but relations only grew more confrontational. Japan occupied the southern part of French Indochina, and in response the United States imposed an oil embargo in July 1941. The consequences were immense. Japan imported around 80 percent of its oil from the United States. Without that supply, its navy, the essential instrument for southern expansion  had reserves for perhaps eighteen months. The real question facing Tokyo, then, was not whether it must act, but how soon. Unable any longer to resist mounting military pressure for war, Konoye resigned on October 16 and was replaced as premier by General Tōjō Hideki. Tokyo accelerated its preparations for conflict with the Western powers. Planned targets included Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. I should note, if you want to learn about all of this history in more detail, you can go check out the pacific war channel on youtube. I have a chronological series that is just now talking about events like the Japanese invasion of french indochina and the road to pearl harbor.   Throughout the autumn of 1941, increasingly desperate negotiations took place between Japan and the United States. Washington insisted that Japan withdraw from China; Tokyo was equally firm that it would do no such thing. From the Japanese point of view, the demand to leave China was not a serious negotiating position but a demand for national humiliation a call to repudiate four years of war, vast casualties, and the ideological basis of Japanese militarism in a single diplomatic act. In the end, the gulf between the two positions could not be bridged.   While civilian and military leaders in Tokyo argued over the pace at which they should move toward war, few among Japan's rulers doubted that war was coming. At the imperial conference of November 5, it was formally agreed that if no satisfactory diplomatic solution had been reached by December 1, war would follow soon after. Talks in Washington between Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburō, diplomat Kurusu Saburō, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull led nowhere. On November 26, Hull delivered a note repeating the American position that Japan must withdraw from both China and Indochina. On December 1, the imperial conference resolved to go to war; the following day, the date of attack was fixed as December 8, December 7 by American time. In one sense, this was the culmination toward which the entire previous decade had been moving. The war in China had started as a localized conflict, then expanded into a continental one, and was now about to become something larger still: a truly global war, stretching from the North Atlantic to the western Pacific. China's long, lonely resistance would suddenly gain new dimensions and new allies,  though not the ones Chiang had spent four years trying to cultivate, and not under circumstances he would have chosen.   In the early morning of December 7, 1941, the US Pacific Fleet lay anchored at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, its sailors and officers still largely asleep as dawn crept across the Pacific. The attack did not come without warning signs,  American and Japanese diplomats had been locked in increasingly desperate negotiations throughout the autumn, each side hardening its position until no room remained to maneuver. Washington had demanded that Japan withdraw from China, a condition Tokyo viewed not as a serious opening offer but as a demand for national humiliation: a call to repudiate four years of brutal war, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the entire ideological foundation upon which Japanese militarism rested. No agreement was possible on those terms, and both sides privately knew it.   The strike force assembled in secret was formidable. Six aircraft carriers,  the Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku had sailed under strict radio silence across the North Pacific, launching their aircraft in two successive waves before the American base had any meaningful chance to respond. The first wave of approximately 183 planes swept in just before 8 a.m., targeting the rows of battleships moored along Battleship Row and the military airfields at Wheeler, Hickam, and Ford Island simultaneously, ensuring that American aircraft could not scramble in time to mount an effective defense. A second wave of roughly 170 planes followed less than an hour later, pressing the attack on damaged ships and harbor installations.   The destruction was staggering. The battleship Arizona suffered a catastrophic magazine explosion after a armor-piercing bomb penetrated her forward decks, killing nearly 1,177 of her crew in minutes, almost half of the total American dead from the entire attack. The Oklahoma capsized after being struck by multiple torpedoes. The West Virginia and California sank at their moorings. In total, seventeen vessels were damaged or destroyed, and the vast majority of military aircraft at the nearby airfields were caught on the ground and obliterated before they could take flight. Around 2,400 Americans were killed and another 1,100 wounded, making it the deadliest single attack on American soil or territory in the nation's history to that point.   Yet the attack was not a complete strategic success for Japan. The US Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers, the vessels that would ultimately decide the naval war in the Pacific happened to be at sea that morning and escaped unharmed. The harbor's fuel storage and repair facilities were also left largely intact, allowing the fleet to reconstitute faster than Japanese planners had anticipated. What Japan achieved in tactical devastation, it partly squandered in strategic miscalculation. The attack ended American neutrality instantly and irrevocably. The following day, President Roosevelt addressed Congress, calling December 7 "a date which will live in infamy," and within hours the United States declared war on Japan. For China, after more than four years of fighting alone, the blow that devastated Pearl Harbor paradoxically carried a thread of desperate hope at last, the great power Chiang Kai-shek had spent years trying to draw into the conflict had arrived, not under circumstances he would have chosen, but arrived nonetheless. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After years of fighting, China's situation darkened in 1941 with intense bombing of Chongqing and fears of poison-gas attacks. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June shifted alliances and pressured Japan toward wider war. Japan escalated plans for Southeast Asia, suffered an oil embargo, and negotiations with the United States broke down over withdrawing from China and Indochina. Then the Pearl Harbor attack began the Pacific War.

Sarah's brainstorming her camp plans for this summer, and she just might solve climate change single-handedly. We learn about "dopamine sites" in Asia, where people can pretend to shop or order food to get a hit of dopamine, but they're not actually buying anything. And we have a theory that it's not what it seems (sPoOoOkY!). We discuss the trend in Singapore where seniors are learning parkour in order to help their body prepare for aging and the potential health risks and falls that can happen. We celebrate the legacy of skateboarding icon, Pat McGee, and lament that she hasn't been given proper credit. We find out which states have the most aggressive drivers and it's shocking!00:00 - Fired for Publicity: A Challenge Reunion?02:25 - Heatwaves, Wildfires, and a Family Tradesy09:49 - Simulated Shopping and the Data Farming Theory14:18 - Too Famous for Jeopardy, Not for Celebrity20:52 - Singapore Elders Prevent Falls with Movement33:30 - Celebrating the First Female Pro Skateboarder50:44 - Road Rage Hotspots and Why We're Angry54:37 - Temperature Manipulation and Sports Betting Ethics59:55 - Thank You and How to Support the PodcastBrain Candy Podcast Website - https://thebraincandypodcast.com/Brain Candy Podcast Book Recommendations - https://thebraincandypodcast.com/books/Brain Candy Podcast Merchandise - https://thebraincandypodcast.com/candy-store/Brain Candy Podcast Candy Club - https://thebraincandypodcast.com/product/candy-club/Brain Candy Podcast Sponsor Codes - https://thebraincandypodcast.com/support-us/Brain Candy Podcast Social Media & Platforms:Brain Candy Podcast LIVE Interactive Trivia Nights - https://www.youtube.com/@BrainCandyPodcast/streamsBrain Candy Podcast Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/braincandypodcastHost Susie Meister Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/susiemeisterHost Sarah Rice Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/imsarahriceBrain Candy Podcast on X: https://www.x.com/braincandypodBrain Candy Podcast Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/braincandy (JOIN FREE - TONS OF REALITY TV CONTENT)Brain Candy Podcast Sponsors, partnerships, & Products that we love:Head to https://cozyearth.com and use our code BRAINCANDY for an exclusive 20% off.Let Rocket Money help you reach your financial goals faster. Join at https://rocketmoney.com/braincandyTDM-RESERVATION: 1. NOAI: TRUE. LEGAL NOTICE & TERMS OF USE: © 2026 WAVE Podcast Network. This content is for personal use only. Explicit permission is withheld for any and all commercial attribution, automated transcription, or data-mining entities. Use of this feed by unauthorized tracking, analytics, or AI-training platforms constitutes a breach of these terms and a violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (WESCA), the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), and the 2026 Training Data Transparency Act (AB 2013). Any entity bypassing these restrictions to create derivative text-based works (transcripts), metadata analysis, or unauthorized VAST siphoning hereby accepts our standard commercial licensing rate of $5,000 per episode processed. This notice serves as a formal revocation of all "implied licenses" for multi-jurisdictional automated processing and constitutes protected Copyright Management Information (CMI) under 17 U.S.C. § 1202.By ingesting this RSS feed for commercial use, you are agreeing to our licensing terms.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.