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Last time we spoke about the Ishiwara Kanji. Born in 1889 in Japan, Kanji Ishiwara was the son of a policeman from a samurai lineage. He entered military training at 13, rising through the ranks to become a Major and a respected lecturer. His unconventional views on military strategy and history led him to predict a prolonged conflict with the United States. Deeply influenced by Nichiren Buddhism, he envisioned Japan as a moral leader destined to guide Asia, advocating for reform in China while grappling with his nation's imperial ambitions. In 1928, ishiwara fell ill with influenza, leading to a six-month hospitalization. During recovery, he joined an elite study group discussing war theories. His lectures on total war gained fame, culminating in a presentation to Kwantung officers. Amid rising tensions in Japan, he advocated for control over Manchuria, believing Japan had a moral duty to stabilize China. His theories on warfare, including the devastating potential of airpower, foreshadowed the horrors of future conflicts, influencing Japan's military strategies.   #137 Ishiwara Kanji Part 2: The Mukden Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki collaborated with other members of the Kwantung Army to address what they perceived as the Manchurian issue. By the mid-1930s, the belief that Manchuria needed to be forcibly seized had become the prevailing opinion among the Kwantung Army. Ishiwara was convinced that Japan could no longer remain passive in Manchuria, as each passing day meant Japan was gradually losing its rights and interests in the region to China, risking expulsion. Abandoning Manchuria would be a national catastrophe, resulting in the loss of a crucial buffer state, valuable resources, and land for Japan's growing population to settle. In essence, Manchuria was vital for Japan's survival and growth. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviet threat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China's defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army Headquarters in Tokyo also recognized that Manchuria was a crucial defensive line against the USSR. However, unlike the Kwantung Army, which aimed to control all of Manchuria, the leaders in Tokyo focused on incorporating southern Manchuria through the South Manchurian Railway and did not pursue any territory north of it. Ishiwara, on the other hand, believed that the only way for Japan to prevent the USSR from exerting pressure on southern Manchuria was to occupy northern Manchuria and extend even further north toward the Amur River. This would allow Japan to control the mountain ranges that bordered the western and eastern frontiers of northern Manchuria. Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”. Ishiwara advanced his ideas significantly after Japan's conquest of Manchuria, recognizing the necessity of effectively administering and pacifying its diverse populations. He posited that the stability of Manchuria could be achieved through the unique skills and contributions of the various ethnic groups residing there. For instance, he believed that the Chinese would excel in developing small businesses, while the Koreans would apply their expertise in paddy farming. These racial dynamics, according to Ishiwara, would play a crucial role in the development of Manchukuo and the broader vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, it was clear that, above all, Manchuria was intended to serve Japan's interests, many of which were exploitative and economically driven. By early 1930, Ishiwara and his colleague Itagaki devised a military strategy reminiscent of the tactics employed during the Russo-Japanese War, specifically a surprise night attack. Their plan involved the Kwantung Army launching an assault on the Liaoning region, targeting key Chinese garrisons. This operation required meticulous planning, as the Kwantung Army was significantly outnumbered by the forces commanded by Zhang Xueliang. In the vicinity of Mukden alone, Zhang commanded approximately 20,000 well-equipped troops, supported by aircraft and tanks. Across Manchuria, he could mobilize around 250,000 soldiers in the event of conflict. In stark contrast, the Kwantung Army could only field about 10,000 personnel, primarily composed of garrison units stationed along the railway. They lacked substantial air support and mechanized units, and their overall equipment was inadequate. To address this stark imbalance in military strength, Ishiwara emphasized the importance of intelligence and rigorous training. He aimed to refine specific assault techniques, enabling Japanese forces to execute rapid and concentrated attacks that would overwhelm their Chinese adversaries. The overarching strategy was notably straightforward: it hinged on delivering a decisive blow to the heart of Zhang Xueliang's military stronghold at the Peitaying barracks in Mukden. Ishiwara believed that if this critical target fell, it would shatter the enemy's morale, providing the Kwantung Army with the necessary military and psychological momentum to dominate the surrounding regions. However, he acknowledged that if the Soviet Union intervened, the entire plan could unravel catastrophically. One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ” Ishiwara, as you can imagine, was deeply frustrated by the prospect of delaying action for another year. He argued passionately that the current international landscape necessitated an immediate strike. At that time, the Soviet Union was still in the midst of its ambitious five-year plan, which limited its capacity for intervention. Meanwhile, the United States, Britain, and France were grappling with their own financial crises, rendering them unable to mount significant resistance in the Far East. Most notably, the Nationalist regime in China was preoccupied with its unification efforts south of the Great Wall, but this situation was expected to shift soon. Ishiwara believed that if they postponed their plans for a year, the geopolitical environment would deteriorate further, making decisive action imperative. For Ishiwara, the moment to act was now or never. In July 1931, Ishiwara and Itagaki orchestrated a crucial reconnaissance mission aimed at familiarizing the newest Kwantung officers with the northern regions of Manchuria. To disguise their true intentions, they informed high command that the mission was a survey focused on the Soviet Union. However, the real objective was to assess the strength and influence of Chinese power in northern Manchuria. During their return journey, the team received alarming news about the disappearance of Captain Nakamura Shintaro, a Kwantung staff officer. Upon reaching Port Arthur, they learned that rumors were circulating that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under what were described as “mysterious circumstances.” In the preceding months, Manchuria had witnessed a surge in violent riots, murders, work strikes, and various other incidents, all contributing to a climate of unrest. The Nakamura affair intensified these existing tensions. In response, both the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries attempted to negotiate a resolution to the crisis. However, figures at the central army headquarters, such as Nagata Tetsuzan, who sympathized with the urgency felt by their Kwantung counterparts, felt compelled to support them. The situation was rapidly escalating, and the stakes were growing ever higher. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that's exactly what he did. The Kwantung officers moved their troops beyond the railway zone, where they had been confined, and without waiting for Itagaki's approval—who was in Japan at the time—they began preparations to send an armored train along with a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery to Mukden. Their goal was to enlist the help of the Chinese military in investigating Nakamura's disappearance. Upon learning of this, Tokyo sent a telegram instructing them to halt their departure from the railway and to refrain from using the Nakamura incident as a pretext for employing force to address the Manchurian issue. For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” . “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. Ishiwara ordered the dispatch of an armored train carrying a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery to compel the Chinese military authorities in Mukden to assist in the investigation of Nakamura's disappearance. However, central headquarters halted the train's departure at the last moment, sending a telegram from Tokyo that specifically instructed the Kwantung Army not to use the Nakamura incident to pressure a resolution to the Manchurian issue.  In addition to the Nakamura situation, another issue was brewing. Colonel Dohihara Kenji was involved in a plot to enlist Warlord Yan Xishan to attack Zhang Xueliang. This scheme was attracting unwanted attention and undermining the effectiveness of the Nakamura incident, prompting Ishiwara to swiftly suppress the plans. Rumors began to circulate in Tokyo that the Kwantung Army was preparing to retaliate against the Chinese due to the Nakamura situation. In response, War Minister General Minami dispatched Major General Yoshiji Tatekawa to Mukden to caution the Kwantung officers against any such actions. Ishiwara was informed of Tatekawa's arrival and sent urgent telegrams to his followers, warning, “Plot exposed. Act before Tatekawa's arrival.” Consequently, the launch date was moved from September 28th to the 18th. Itagaki personally intercepted Tatekawa's train, inviting him for tea and sake, and arranged for him to spend the night with a geisha on the evening of the 18th. On September 18th of 1931, 1st Lt Suemori Kawamoto of the independent Garrison Unit of the 29th infantry regiment planted bombs along the tracks near Liutiaokou. At 10:20pm they exploded doing only minor damage to 1.5 meters of track on one site. The damage was so minor a train actually passed over the tracks without difficulty 10 minutes later. Ishiwara, Itagaki and their followers quickly announced the explosion to be a Chinese atrocity and mobilized the Kwantung Army. Itagaki ordered the Independent Garrison Force and 29th infantry regiment to storm the Peitaying Barracks. Battalion commander Shimamoto was awakened by the orders via telephone and quickly dispatched the 1st (Ono) and 4th (Takahashi) companies from Mukden; the 2nd (kawakami) company at Fushun to advance to Liutiaokou. At 10:40pm the 29th regiment commander Hirata got a call from Shimamoto who ordered him to get his regiment into emergency formation and to storm the Peiyating barracks.  Two secretly hidden 24cm artillery pieces began to bombard the Peitaying barracks as 500 Japanese stormed the 7000 strong Chinese garrison. Despite being outnumbered 14 to 1, the Japanese destroyed Zhang Xueliangs small air force, routed the Chinese and occupied the Peiyating Barracks by 11pm, all at the cost of 500 Chinese lives and allegedly only 2 Japanese lives. A major reason the Japanese had ease was because Zhang Xueliang ordered his men to store away their weapons and not put up a fight if the Japanese invaded. Zhang Xueliang and Chiang Kai-shek both in Beijing at the time knew they could not initiate an offensive war against such a strong foreign country. They were hoping the League of Nations would intervene as pertaining to the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928. But later on Chiang Kai-Shek would find America too wrapped up in its depression at home, Britain indifferent and other nations without enough reason to risk anything in the far east. An hour after the attack, Ishiwara began pressing General Shigeru Honjo, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, to send reinforcements to capture all of Mukden. Initially, Honjo hesitated, but Ishiwara convinced him that there was significant provocation from the enemy, prompting Honjo to order additional units into combat to secure the entire city. Historians have since struggled to determine whether Honjo was aware of the invasion plan; it seems likely he had some knowledge, but not the full details, which made him cautious in his actions over the following weeks. In the days that followed, Honjo attempted to confine the incident, but Ishiwara and Itagaki continuously urged all forces to adhere to the secret plan they had trained for. The speed and decisiveness of their actions overwhelmed the Chinese forces and left Honjo unable to change the course of events. Famously when one colleague asked Itagaki what to do in response to cease and desist orders from Honjo, Itagaki responded “Never mind Honjo, it's Ishiwara's war”. Official orders from Tokyo came on the next day, specifically opposing the expansion of hostilities, but Ishiwara and Itagaki had come too far to stop now. They began persuading Honjo to telegram the General Staff to ask for reinforcements and freedom of action “to pursue actively the security and order of all of Manchuria”. Ishiwara and Itagaki clearly aimed to expand their offensive through official channels first, but they also circumvented these channels. One cunning tactic they used was to incite chaos among civilians in Manchurian cities, thereby heightening the demand for improved security for Japanese residents. This strategy would enable the Kwantung Army troops to move beyond their established boundaries. Shortly after what is now known as the "Mukden Incident," military agents were sent to Kirin to stir unrest in the city. Reports of disturbances from Kirin began flooding into the Kwantung Army headquarters, with Ishiwara urging Honjo to send forces to Kirin to safeguard Japanese residents. He also pushed for reinforcements from the Korean Army, but Honjo was reluctant to take that step. It seems Ishiwara feared missing a golden opportunity and chose another course of action. On the night of the 20th, he gathered together a bunch of younger Kwantung officers such as Itagaki's assistant, Captain Katakura Tadashi and told them “I can't do anything more to budge the commander and so i'm giving up my responsibilities for the direction of operations. Katakura, you take over”. Well it seems this little ploy had the intended effect as all the young officers immediately began pressuring Honjo to support Ishiwara's demands to advance to Kirin, many of them threatening to resign. After several hours of the officers nagging, Honjo related and authorized the despatch of troops.  The operation against Kirin was executed with remarkable speed. Ishiwara ordered the majority of the 2nd Division, led by General Tamon Jiro, to swiftly travel to Kirin by train. They entered the city without firing a single shot and compelled the local Chinese commander to declare the province's independence from Zhang Xueliang's regime. Within hours, the Korean army responded to an aid request from the Kwantung Army staff sent on September 21st and began advancing into Manchuria. In just 48 hours, the Japanese military had taken control of Kirin, which was outside the Kwantung operational zone, and the Korean army was invading Manchuria without Tokyo's approval, effectively undermining military discipline. Chief of Staff Kanaya Hanzo had issued specific orders to restrict the Kwantung Army's operations and granted field commanders discretionary authority for certain emergency situations, typically of a local nature. However, the Kirin expedition did not fit within these parameters. Encouraged by their success, Ishiwara and Itagaki pushed for an advance on Harbin. As noted in the previous episode, the strategy for taking Manchuria relied on speed and precision. The Kwantung Army had limited forces compared to the immediate Chinese troops in Manchuria, yet they were constrained by directives from Tokyo HQ that prohibited the movement of Kwantung troops beyond the South Manchuria Railway, where they had previously confined their actions. Ishiwara attempted to frame the situation politically, arguing that Japan should support Manchurian independence and sent this proposal directly to Tokyo central HQ. However, on October 3rd, Tokyo HQ firmly rejected the idea of expanding hostilities. Faced with this outright refusal from Tokyo HQ, the Kwantung radicals believed their only option was to create further chaos to compel a response. Ishiwara took the lead once more, aiming to unsettle Tokyo HQ. On October 8th, he donned military pilot gear and infiltrated one of five Chinese aircraft seized at Mukden airfield. He personally led a raid, although later in life, during the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, he would claim that the flight was intended solely for reconnaissance of enemy activities at Chinchou. He argued that it was only at the last moment that intelligence revealed anti-aircraft guns had been installed at Chinchou, prompting the Kwantung Army Commander to authorize their neutralization if fired upon. Ishiwara maintained that he and the four accompanying aircraft were fired upon, leading them to drop approximately 75 bombs on Chinchou. This series of events was quite dramatic, and contemporary accounts suggest it was a premeditated effort to provoke Tokyo. The raid on Chinchou certainly alarmed Tokyo, leading the staff there to worry that the West would start condemning them. Tokyo's high command found themselves in a difficult position. They felt compelled to publicly support the Kwantung Army by retroactively approving the chaotic attacks, but internally, they were furious. Major Endo Saburo from the intelligence division was dispatched to Manchuria to investigate the situation. When he asked Ishiwara about the events, Ishiwara claimed he acted on the principle of field initiative, which was why he hadn't informed Tokyo beforehand. Saburo also noted that Ishiwara's tone suggested that he and the intelligence division should stay out of the matter. Additionally, Saburo learned that there were whispers in Manchuria indicating that if Tokyo's high command did not align with them, the Kwantung Army was ready to act independently. It appeared that the radical officers of the Kwantung Army were even willing to defy the Imperial Japanese Army command to achieve their goals. Ishiwara went as far as to send this telegram to Tokyo “For the sake of the nation we are doing our very best in Manchuria, but if the Japanese government constantly interferes we cannot complete our great work. Then the Kwantung army will have to come to the point where we will have to break the glorious history of the imperial army and separate ourselves from the empire” If you found this situation quite surprising, there was also a rumor that Ishiwara and Itagaki planned to use an independent Manchuria as a base for a coup d'état against the Japanese government. Their goal was to overthrow the capitalists oppressing the people and establish a national socialist regime centered around the emperor. For those familiar with the history of political assassinations in 1930s Japan, this rumor hints at events that would unfold in 1936. It remains unclear whether Ishiwara and Itagaki genuinely intended to pursue this plan, but they certainly spread the word. On October 18th, War Minister Minami Jiro sent a telegram to the Kwantung Army, instructing them to stop any discussions about making Manchuria independent or attempting to seize control of it. Additionally, they dispatched Colonel Imamura Hitoshi from the operations section to Manchuria to reason with Ishiwara and Itagaki. They all met at a restaurant in Mukden where Imamura began by explaining the purpose of his mission, but before he could even really begin, Ishiwara blurted out “whats the matter? Doesn't central headquarters have any backbone?” A great way to start a meeting to be sure. Imamura tried to explain the situation, but Ishiwara said “if we follow the spineless Tokyo approach we'll never settle the Manchurian problem”. Imamura replied “we can't accomplish anything by following the arbitrary decision of field elements, which may create a crisis that will shake the whole army. In such a problem it is essential for the whole nation to be unified”. To this Ishiwara apparently said really loudly in the restaurant that he was sleepy, rolled over on the tatami and closed his eyes. Imamura furious haha, get up quickly after denouncing his so called hosts for conducting official IJA business at a restaurant and left. The next day they all met again, where Ishiwara and Itagaki kept speaking about the necessity to create an independent state, since there was no hope of the Chinese reforming Manchuria. After Imamura left that meeting, Ishiwara said to Itagaki “Imamura is a fine fellow, but he doesn't understand China”. Despite the chaos and turmoil, the Kwantung Army had been held back from launching any sustained military operations throughout October. As expected, Ishiwara continued to argue for an advance into northern Manchuria. In early November, he found another opportunity when he claimed that more railways had been destroyed. Allegedly, hostile Chinese forces had blown up the rail bridges over the Nonni River, south of Tsitsihar. When Japanese engineering units arrived to repair the damaged tracks, they came under fire from Chinese troops. To the high-ranking officials in Tokyo, this appeared to be a legitimate reason to take defensive action. Additionally, Kwantung intelligence reports were reaching Tokyo, suggesting that Chinese forces in northern Manchuria were planning a southward offensive. Ishiwara had also provided exaggerated reports to the Japanese public, manipulating media narratives to pressure Tokyo into supporting an advance into northern Manchuria. Tokyo approved a defensive operation, restricted in time and scope, aimed at protecting Japanese positions at the Nonni River bridges. Kwantung Army forces began moving north and soon engaged in intense fighting around the railway area of Tahsing. Ishiwara personally led troops during this engagement, marking the only time in his military career that he did so. General Honjo, rightly concerned that the Kwantung forces were becoming uncontrollable, sent a cable on November 5th announcing that under the “rinsan inmei / provisional mandate,” the general staff would assume direct command authority in Manchuria. Unsurprisingly, Ishiwara and his like-minded colleagues in the Kwantung Army were furious. Honjo followed this up by stating he would resign if they did not comply, but Ishiwara brushed off the provisional mandate stating “that the directive from the chief of staff is just a personal, not an imperial order. No matter how many we get of those we shouldn't' care. We'll just go ahead with our plans”. On november 17, the Kwantung army began advancing upon the city of Tsitsihar seizing it 2 days later.  Confronted with yet another dire situation, the IJA high command permitted the Kwantung Army to advance toward Tsitsihar. However, international outcry soon erupted, compelling them to order the evacuation of the city. Ishiwara sparked a significant debate among the staff, arguing that the evacuation was unacceptable given the sacrifices already made by the troops. Nevertheless, Honjo remained resolute. A few days later, Chinese forces began to gather at Chinchou, and tensions escalated with skirmishes occurring between Japanese and Chinese troops in Tientsin. In response, Ishiwara urgently called for Honjo to initiate an offensive at Chinchou as a way to better position their forces closer to Tientsin in case they faced overwhelming opposition. To support this advance, they also requested assistance from the Korean army. Once again, the burden fell to Tokyo. The high command in Tokyo ordered an immediate halt to the offensive and a withdrawal east of the Liao River. The Kwantung Army hesitated, not solely due to the order but also because the Korean army refused to join the offensive against Chinchou, which was crucial for their success. Ishiwara found himself in a predicament; without reinforcements, the entire offensive could fail. Then, on December 11th, a significant change occurred when Premier Wakatsuki was ousted. War Minister Minami and Chief of Staff Kanaya, who had attempted to moderate the Kwantung Army's aggressiveness, were replaced by Araki Sadao, a leader of the Kodoha faction known for its aggressive stance. To provide some context, the Japanese military was divided into factions, similar to warlord cliques, vying to influence the future operations of the IJA and, to some extent, the IJN. Two primary factions shaped the military landscape in the 1930s: the Kodoha and the Toseiha (Control Faction). The Kodoha was not an organized political party nor did it hold an official position within the IJA, but it wielded considerable influence. Its members were typically younger officers, particularly from the Kwantung Army. General Sadao Araki was a founding member of the Kodoha, which was heavily influenced by Bushido, Fascism, and the Kokutai ideology. They aimed to restore Japan to its perceived former glory, viewing liberal democracy as a detrimental force. They blamed the capitalists, industrialists, and elites—politicians, bureaucrats, and Zaibatsu leaders—for the nation's decline. Their goal was to see the Emperor reclaim full power in what they termed a "Showa Restoration." The Kodoha's primary adversary, as perceived by much of the Japanese military at the time, was the USSR and communism in general. Consequently, they supported the Hokushin-ron (Northern Strike Policy), which was Japan's theoretical plan to invade the USSR. While I don't want to delve too deeply into the details, it's important to note that the Kodoha was counterbalanced by the more moderate Toseiha faction, led by Hideki Tojo. The Toseiha opposed the Kodoha on several fronts, notably their desire to avoid a violent revolution to restore imperial dominance. Although they shared many principles with the Kodoha, the Toseiha rejected the Hokushin-ron strategy in favor of the Nanshin-ron (Southern Strike) strategy, which aimed at expanding into Southeast Asia and the resource-rich Dutch East Indies. The Toseiha faction also maintained better relations with the IJN. To contextualize this narrative within the political landscape, these two factions began to fiercely compete for dominance starting in 1931. With the influence of Araki Sadao and support from Prince Kan'in, a Kodoha sympathizer, significant changes occurred in Tokyo's command. Suddenly, offensive operations against Chinese forces in Manchuria were rebranded as “bandit suppression” campaigns. The Kwantung Army, fully backed by Tokyo, swiftly pursued all military objectives established by Ishiwara and Itagaki since September. Chinchou and Shanhaikwan were captured in early January 1932, followed by Tsitsihar in February. By spring 1932, Ishiwara urged the staff to complete the full occupation of Manchuria, both north and south. In April of that year, he presented the “Manshu haiti heiryaku,” or the program for the pacification of Manchuria. This new plan called for the seizure of Hailar in the north because “it was pivotal to the defense against the USSR”. It also called for seizing Jehol province because “it was an important condition to the independence of Manchuria”. By the end of the year Hailar was taken and in 1933 the Kwantung army was marching upon Jehol. It is clear that Ishiwara played a crucial role in the conquest of Manchuria. The Kwantung Army and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had various strategies available to address the Manchurian issue, but Ishiwara focused primarily on achieving complete control over the region for its resources, strategic advantages, and to establish a continental base for a potential war against the United States. For Ishiwara, securing all of Manchuria was essential in preparation for the Final War. While it's likely that conflict between Japan and China would have occurred in Manchuria without Ishiwara's influence, it's uncertain whether Japan would have outright taken the province. Ishiwara dedicated years to planning and pushing boundaries, but when the operation commenced, it became evident that he and his associates lacked a definitive timeline for conquest and had several missing contingency plans. Despite the chaotic circumstances, the conquest of Manchuria proved to be a remarkable success. So much so, Ishiwara said to a friend of his, Satomi Kishio in 1932 “Even if Japan has to face the entire world, she can't be beaten”. Ironically as many of you know, Japan's actions in Manchuria cost her greatly. Japan was now hated by the Chinese, well much more so. The west condemned Japan's actions, alongside the USSR. As my professor first taught me in a class about the Pacific War when I was a wee lad in his early 20's “It all was about Manchuria, everything started with Manchuria, and it ended with Manchuria in 1945”. The Manchuria incident set Japan on an unavoidable path toward the China War, which ultimately led to conflict with the West. It became a self-fulfilling prophecy. This situation also raises questions about military discipline. Many cite the concept of Gekokujo as a reason why individuals like Ishiwara and Itagaki were able to act as they did. These militaristic junior officers seemingly ran rampant, engaging in rebellious actions that defied their superiors, which forced those higher up to become complicit. While Gekokujo certainly played a role, especially in Ishiwara's case, it does not negate the fact that there was a significant level of indiscipline within the Japanese army. Ishiwara was undoubtedly aware of the potential consequences of his actions. A prime example is Colonel Komoto Daisaku, who had previously seen his career ruined after being exiled due to the Huanggutun incident. However, Ishiwara's focus extended beyond Manchuria; he was closely monitoring the political landscape in Tokyo. He recognized that the 1931 cabinet was unstable and that certain high-ranking officials, like Araki Sadao, were rapidly advancing in their careers and sympathized with his agenda. Ishiwara was betting that supporters from factions like Kodoha would gain the necessary power to further his cause. His gamble paid off handsomely, as all the key players in the Manchurian affair were rewarded for their efforts. Ishiwara received the Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd class, and returned to Japan as a celebrated hero, captivating younger officers in the Imperial Japanese Army. Ironically, the indiscipline he had nurtured within the army would later come back to haunt him as he climbed the ranks and became part of the Tokyo staff. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Ron Burgundy once said “Boy, that escalated quickly... I mean, that really got out of hand fast.” While perhaps Ishiwara did not plan for an all out war to break out against China, he certainly was the culprit to it happening. There was no going back, 15 years of blood, sweat and tears would be shed.

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Luzon. As Operation Mike 1 commenced, General Swift's 1st Corps prepared to assault Lingayen Gulf while General Griswold's 14th Corps rehearsed at Huon Gulf. Despite successful diversionary strikes, Japanese forces anticipated an invasion. On January 2, enemy ships were spotted heading towards Luzon, confirming fears of a large-scale operation. Kamikaze attacks intensified, damaging Allied vessels, including the USS Long, which sank after being hit. Amidst bombardments, Filipino citizens demonstrated resilience despite the destruction, reflecting their loyalty and hope during the turmoil. As dawn broke on January 9, Kinkaid's amphibious convoys approached Lingayen Gulf, initiating a fierce assault. Preceded by heavy bombardments, American forces landed on the beaches, facing minimal resistance. The 14th Corps advanced toward key locations, while the 1st Corps secured strategic positions despite enduring sniper fire. By nightfall, they established a significant beachhead. Despite sporadic Japanese counterattacks, American troops pressed forward, and reinforcements were deployed to maintain momentum. The stage was set for a crucial campaign in Luzon. This episode is the South China Sea Raid Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, the 1st and 14th Corps had just successfully established a beachhead on Lingayen Gulf. On January 11, General Krueger further reinforced his position by landing additional reserves, aiming to effectively confront the formidable enemy forces entrenched in the eastern hills. Concurrently, Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet units made their entrance into the South China Sea to execute an ambitious raid known as Operation Gratitude. This operation was prompted by misleading intelligence reports suggesting that the hybrid battleship-carriers Ise and Hyuga were stationed in Cam Ranh Bay. In response, Halsey ordered Admiral Bogan's Task Group 38.2 to launch an assault on these supposed targets. This task group was primarily composed of the battleships New Jersey and Wisconsin, which were directed to bombard the bay and eliminate any Japanese vessels that had sustained damage from prior airstrikes. To enhance their operational capabilities, Halsey established Task Group 38.5, specifically designed for night operations, which included the night-capable carriers Enterprise and Independence. On January 12, aircraft from these carriers were deployed for a predawn reconnaissance mission over Cam Ranh Bay and its adjacent waters in search of enemy targets. Despite their efforts, the search yielded no results, indicating that the earlier intelligence had been inaccurate. Nevertheless, all three carrier groups proceeded with their planned strikes at 07:30, while the surface action group advanced toward Cam Ranh. Halsey's strategic gamble proved to be remarkably successful. Although the Ise and Hyuga were not present in the bay, American aviators discovered a wealth of enemy shipping, including three significant Japanese convoys. Sherman's TG 38.3 encountered the most valuable target off Qui Nhon north of Cam Ranh. This was convoy Hi-86 with nine merchants and a heavy escort. The convoy had departed Cape St Jacques on January 9 and was headed north. The escort comprised light cruiser Kashii and five kaibokan. Late on January 11, it reached Qui Nhon Bay and anchored. After leaving Qui Nhon Bay, it was discovered by TG 38.3. In two large attacks, aircraft from Essex, Ticonderoga, Langley, and San Jacinto laid waste to the convoy. None of the nine merchant ships in the convoy survived this onslaught. Cargo ships Yoshu Maru and Eiman Maru (loaded with bauxite and raw rubber), along with tanker San Luis Maru, were sunk. The other six ships were damaged and forced to beach. Otsusan Maru (a cargo ship converted to tanker), passenger-cargo ship Tatebe Maru, cargo ship Kyokuun Maru, cargo ship Yusei Maru, ore carrier Tatsubato Maru, and cargo ship Banshu Maru No. 63 all became constructive total losses. The escort for this large convoy met a similar fate. Light cruiser Kashii was hit amidships by a torpedo in the early afternoon. This was followed by two bomb hits aft that detonated her depth-charge magazine. Kashii sank stern first with 621 members of her crew; only 19 survived. CD-23 was attacked north of Qui Nhon and sunk with her entire crew of 155 officers and men. CD-51 suffered the same fate. After she blew up and sank, her depth charges detonated with fatal consequences for any survivors; 159 men were lost. From the entire convoy, only kaibokans Daito and Ukuru, and corvette CD-27 survived, albeit in a damaged state. As a result, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 conducted an impressive total of 984 strike missions throughout the day. This relentless assault led to the sinking of the light cruiser Kashii, two minesweepers, eight kaibokans, two subchasers, five transport ships, fourteen cargo vessels, and nine oilers. Additionally, four kaibokans, one subchaser, three transports, four cargo ships, and two oilers were damaged. This operation marked the highest number of ships sunk by airstrikes in a single day during the war, showcasing the effectiveness of the American air campaign and the critical role of intelligence in naval warfare. In addition to inflicting significant damage on Japanese shipping, the aviators under Admiral Halsey achieved remarkable success by claiming the destruction of 113 enemy aircraft, both in the air and on the ground, while sustaining the loss of 23 American aircraft. The impact of these operations extended beyond aerial engagements; critical infrastructure was also targeted. Airfields, docks, and oil storage facilities located between Tourane and Saigon suffered considerable damage. Notably, the railway station in Nha Trang and a vital bridge on the route connecting Saigon to Bien Hoa were also affected, disrupting transportation and supply lines.   Meanwhile, Bogan's surface strike group was unable to locate any Japanese vessels during their operations and instead focused their firepower on bombarding Cam Ranh Bay, further demonstrating the ongoing conflict's intensity. Turning to the situation in Luzon, the 1st and 14th Corps were poised to advance their offensives. To the west, the 185th Regiment and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop initiated a push toward the recently vacated Port Sual. The 160th Regiment maintained a watchful presence at Aguilar, while patrols from the 148th Regiment ventured into towns occupied by guerrilla forces, specifically Urbiztondo and Bayambang. In the eastern sector, the 6th Division was temporarily held back to prevent the creation of a potentially hazardous gap along the front of the 1st Corps. However, the reinforced 43rd Division continued its advance against the most formidable Japanese defenses encountered on Luzon to date. Along the coastline, the 158th Regiment dispatched patrols into Damortis, discovering the town largely deserted. The 172nd Regiment attempted an attack on Hill 580, which ultimately proved unsuccessful, while the 63rd Regiment was deployed to close the widening gap between the 158th and 172nd Regiments. The primary objective of these coordinated efforts was to defeat Major-General Sato Bunzo's 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and secure control of the Damortis-Rosario road. The Damortis-Rosario road, a 2-lane, concrete-paved section of Route 3, led east from the junction of Route 3 and the coast road at Damortis, about 8 miles north of San Fabian, to the junction of Routes 3 and 11, 8 miles inland and a mile east of Rosario. Seizure of the Damortis-Rosario stretch of Route 3 would present 1st Corps with an easy means of access to Route 11, in turn providing a 2-lane asphalt-paved axis of advance toward Baguio along the deep valley of the Bued River. Equally important, if the 1st Corps could quickly gain control over the Damortis-Rosario road and the Routes 3-11 junction, the corps could largely overcome the threat of counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. The Damortis-Rosario road ran sometimes across wooded ravines and sometimes over ridge tops for 3/4 of the way to Rosario, and then continued across open farm land and through Rosario to a junction with Route 11. The road was dominated by broken ridges and steep-sided hills to both the north and the south for the first 5 miles inland. South of the road the hills and ridges were grass-covered; to the north many of the draws and ravines contained thick scrub growth. Bare, steep heights north, northeast, and east of Rosario controlled the Routes 3-11 junction. The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, defending the Damortis-Rosario road, had all the advantages of observation, while the relatively soft rock and dirt mixture of the hills and ridges gave the brigade ample opportunity to indulge in what was soon to appear to the 1st Corps as the Japanese Army's favorite occupation--digging caves and tunnels. Achieving this would mitigate the threat of a counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. With the security of its left flank assured, the 14th Corps could then accelerate its advance toward General Krueger's main objective: the Central Plains-Manila Bay region. This strategic maneuvering was crucial for consolidating American forces and ensuring a successful campaign in the Philippines. At the same time, the 169th Regiment faced ongoing challenges at Hill 318 and the southern part of the Japanese-held third ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment made unsuccessful attempts to advance toward the Hill 200 complex, which was firmly defended by the 2nd Battalion, 64th Regiment. Meanwhile, General Tominaga executed his final large-scale kamikaze attack during the Philippines Campaign, successfully damaging two destroyer escorts, one destroyer transport, and five merchant ships. The final attacks were recorded on January 13. Only two suicide aircraft were dispatched, both IJA Ki-84 Franks. One surprised the crew of escort carrier Salamaua. Unengaged by antiaircraft fire, the Frank hit amidships. One of the aircraft's bombs exploded on the hangar deck and the second passed through the ship creating a hole near the waterline. The carrier was left without power while major fires took hold. Damage control was ultimately successful, but not before 15 were killed and 88 wounded. Salamaua was out of the war until April. Also on this day, attack transport Zeilin was hit by a probable IJN aircraft conducting an impromptu suicide attack. Ultimately, the 4th Air Army was scheduled to evacuate to Formosa on January 15, marking the end of the threat from Japanese air power in the Philippines, although the Allies were not yet aware of this. Since the initial kamikaze assault on the Mindoro-bound convoys on December 13, Japanese aircraft had sunk 24 vessels and damaged 67 others. Casualties from these air attacks aboard ships were approximately 1,230 men killed and 1,800 wounded, while the Allies estimated they had destroyed around 600 Japanese aircraft during the same timeframe. Back in Lingayen Gulf on January 13, the 172nd Regiment once again advanced up the grassy, steep slopes of Hill 580, successfully securing most of the area against fierce resistance. Simultaneously, the 63rd Regiment attacked north from Hill 247 and captured Hill 363, despite lacking artillery support. Artillery support was to have been provided by the 43rd Division's 155-mm. howitzer battalion, the 192nd Field Artillery Battalion, since the 63rd Regiment's own 105-mm. battalion had been sent south with the rest of the 6th Division. Unfortunately, the 192nd Field Artillery did not learn it was to support the 63rd until after dark on January 12, and could not start moving to good close support positions until daylight on the 13th, after the 63rd had started its attack. Unlike a 105-mm. battalion, the 192nd did not normally operate in direct support roles and lacked the forward observers and communications the lighter battalions possessed. The 192nd might therefore have been expected to take some time to prepare for its direct support mission, but the battalion reported it could have provided some support--with at least one battery--by noon on the 13th had not Colonel Ralph C. Holliday, commanding the 63rd Regiment, insisted that wire be laid for artillery liaison officers and forward observers, a job that was not completed for almost 36 hours. Colonel Holliday may have been influenced in his decision by the fact that the artillery's SCR-610 radio did not work efficiently in the broken terrain of the middle ridge line where the 63rd was attacking. It was not, indeed, until the 43rd Division had supplied the 192nd Field Artillery with infantry SCR-300 sets that the battalion was able to establish satisfactory radio communications. Then, on January 14, the first radio brought up to the battalion's forward observers was promptly destroyed by Japanese artillery, which also cut wire that had already been laid. Support was again delayed, so the entire battalion was not in position and ready to give the 63rd Regiment the support it needed until midafternoon on January 15. Meanwhile the 169th Regiment completed the clearing of the southern end of the ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment continued its unsuccessful efforts to take Hill 200. To the west, the 6th Division established a fortified line extending from Malasiqui to Manaoag. They promptly dispatched reconnaissance units to the east and south to gather intelligence on enemy movements. The 185th Regiment achieved a significant victory by successfully assaulting Port Sual, while the 160th Regiment engaged in several skirmishes with the reinforced 23rd Reconnaissance Regiment, which had retreated from Port Sual at the onset of the conflict. Meanwhile, patrols from the 148th Regiment advanced into Wawa, strategically located between Bayambang and Urbiztondo. The following day, the 185th Regiment continued its momentum by capturing the crucial road junction town of Alaminos on the Bolinao Peninsula. Some of its elements also pushed northward toward Cabalitan Bay, where they discovered that Allied Naval Forces had already landed to establish a seaplane base, enhancing their operational capabilities in the region. Looking to the east, the 103rd Regiment made gradual but consistent progress along Hill 200, while the 169th Regiment executed a costly frontal assault to clear Hill 318, suffering significant casualties in the process. The 172nd Regiment advanced north along the third ridge, successfully seizing Hill 565 despite facing scattered resistance. The 63rd Regiment continued its slow advance northward, persistently harassed by Japanese artillery and mortar fire, which impeded their progress. Additionally, the 158th Regiment initiated an offensive toward Rosario but was quickly compelled to retreat due to intense Japanese artillery and machine-gun fire. In contrast, General Yamashita, while cautious about launching a major counteroffensive, recognized the necessity of limited offensive actions to regain the initiative. He believed that such actions would effectively disrupt the enemy's advance inland. Consequently, he ordered General Nishiyama's 23rd Division to conduct a robust raiding attack against the San Fabian-Alacan sector during the night of January 16. This strategic decision aimed to exploit the element of surprise and inflict damage on the enemy forces, thereby buying time for his troops to regroup and fortify their positions. In a strategic initiative aimed at maximizing the destruction of enemy weaponry, supplies, and critical base installations, the 58th Brigade, along with the 71st and 72nd Regiments, was instructed to assemble specialized "suicide" raiding units. These units comprised carefully selected soldiers, heavily armed with automatic firearms and supported by demolition teams trained for explosive operations. In addition, a fourth unit was to be formed from the Shigemi Detachment of the 2nd Armored Division, which had recently positioned itself on the southern flank of the 23rd Division. This unit would consist of a mobile infantry company and a medium tank company. The operational plan called for these units to breach the enemy's beachhead perimeter simultaneously at various locations on January 17. Their objective was to swiftly execute their missions and then withdraw to safety. As preparations for this limited counteroffensive unfolded, the American forces continued their own offensive operations, which had commenced on January 15. In this context, the 158th Regiment launched an eastward assault, successfully advancing approximately 1,000 yards. Meanwhile, the 63rd Regiment cautiously pushed forward over a mile and a half northward from Hill 363. The 172nd Regiment made a rapid advance to the Cataguintingan road junction, effectively establishing a battalion at the edge of Route 3, about a mile and a half west of Rosario. In contrast, the 169th Regiment encountered challenges during a two-pronged attack on Hill 355, leading General Wing to order the regiment to bypass the hill to the south and reposition overland to Route 3 at barrio Palacpalac. Conversely, the 103rd Regiment achieved significant success in their assault on the Hill 200 complex. Further to the west, patrols from the 185th Regiment advanced westward, successfully reaching Dasol Bay. Additionally, a battalion from the 129th Regiment crossed the Agno River at Wawa and continued south along a dusty gravel road toward Camiling. Other elements of the 160th Regiment also moved down from Aguilar to Camiling, consolidating their position in the area. After completing refueling operations over the previous days, Task Force 38 resumed its northern advance to launch an assault on Formosa on January 15. Despite Admiral McCain's recommendation to cancel the strike due to inclement weather conditions, Admiral Halsey opted to proceed with the operation. As a result, a series of airstrikes were executed against Formosa and the Pescadores Islands throughout the day. The 16 fighter sweeps conducted during this operation managed to destroy only 16 Japanese aircraft in the air and an additional 18 on the ground. However, the bombing missions targeting enemy shipping proved more effective, leading to the sinking of the destroyers Hatakaze and Tsuga, along with one transport vessel and two merchant ships, albeit at the cost of losing 12 American aircraft. Following these strikes, Task Force 38 redirected its course toward Hong Kong, which came under attack on January 16. Unfortunately, the American forces encountered severe weather conditions and faced intense anti-aircraft fire. This resulted in a limited success, with the Americans sinking just one transport ship, five oilers, one cargo vessel, and one guardboat. Additionally, they inflicted damage on the destroyer Hasu, three destroyer escorts, one corvette, one transport, and one oiler. The strikes also caused significant destruction to key infrastructure, including Kai Tak Airport, the Kowloon and Taikoo docks, the Aberdeen dockyard, the Kowloon-Canton railway, and the Macau Naval Aviation Center. In a broader campaign, the Americans executed secondary strikes against Canton and Hainan Island, as well as targeting several airfields along the Chinese coast, particularly between the Leizhou Peninsula and Swatow. However, this ambitious operation came at a steep cost, with Task Force 38 suffering a total loss of 49 aircraft—27 due to operational issues and 22 as a result of enemy action. With the South China Sea Raid concluded, Admiral Halsey directed his fleet toward the Luzon Strait, adhering to Admiral Nimitz's request. Ultimately, Halsey's aggressive campaign resulted in the destruction of approximately 300,000 tons of Japanese shipping and an estimated 615 Japanese aircraft, all at the expense of 201 American planes. Returning to the Lingayen Gulf, Wing's offensive operations persisted on January 16. The 63rd, 158th, and 172nd Regiments continued their assaults toward the town of Rosario. However, they encountered fierce resistance from the determined Japanese defenders, which significantly hampered their progress. In contrast, the 169th Regiment achieved a notable advancement by reaching Palacpalac, while the 103rd Regiment successfully captured the strategically important Hill 200 complex. From their newly secured positions, elements of the 103rd Regiment pursued the retreating Japanese forces toward Pozorrubio. Meanwhile, two reinforced companies advanced toward Potpot, and both towns ultimately fell into American hands on January 17. In a broader strategic context, General Krueger directed General Griswold to dispatch additional troops south of the Agno River in preparation for a decisive push toward Manila. By January 17, the 14th Corps had established outposts at key locations including Moncada, Nampicuan, Anao, and Paniqui, solidifying their control over the area. Simultaneously, Japanese General Nishiyama was preparing to initiate a local counteroffensive by nightfall on January 16. However, the 72nd Regiment's raiding unit was unable to participate due to enemy penetrations disrupting their plans. On the northern front, Sato's raiding unit conducted a minor raid against an artillery position held by the 158th Regiment, but this attack proved largely inconsequential. In contrast, the raiding unit from the 71st Regiment executed a more impactful maneuver by advancing down the Bued River valley. They successfully infiltrated the rear installations of the 172nd Regiment, where they ignited a gasoline dump, damaging several trucks in the process. This raid resulted in the deaths of two American soldiers and injuries to eight others. At Palacpalac, confusion reigned as the retreating 2nd Battalion of the 64th Regiment inadvertently engaged with the perimeter of the 1st Battalion of the 169th Regiment. This chaotic encounter cost the Japanese approximately 100 men before they retreated in disarray, further illustrating the tumultuous nature of the battlefield. In a dramatic turn of events, the tank raiding unit launched a surprise attack on the newly established outpost at Potpot. Initially, the first two tanks managed to breach the perimeter, unleashing a barrage of machine-gun fire in all directions as they sped away down the road toward Manaoag. However, the remaining tanks, along with their infantry support, encountered fierce resistance from determined defenders, leading to a sharp and intense fire fight that lasted two hours. Despite their initial success, the attackers were ultimately repelled. As dawn broke, the two tanks that had previously penetrated the defenses returned down the Manaoag road, but this time they met their demise, successfully destroyed by the defenders who had regrouped and fortified their positions. Since the onset of the invasion, the 1st Corps had suffered significant casualties, with approximately 220 men killed and 660 wounded. In stark contrast, Griswold's forces experienced far lighter losses, with only 30 killed and 90 wounded. With the enemy's counterattack thwarted, the 43rd Division managed to secure positions that effectively reduced the likelihood of another large-scale surprise offensive from the Japanese forces. However, to completely eliminate the remaining threats, Commander Wing recognized the necessity of securing control over the Rosario junction and establishing a solid hold on Route 3 to the south of this critical point. The challenge was considerable, as Japanese artillery, mortars, and machine guns positioned on the surrounding high ground commanded all approaches to Rosario. Consequently, Wing had no choice but to restrict the 172nd Regiment to a defensive holding action on its left flank while directing its right flank to seize the high ground immediately to the north and northwest of Rosario. In addition, the 63rd and 158th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the enemy stronghold along the Rosario-Damortis road. To expedite the capture of the road junction, Wing also planned for the 103rd and 169th Regiments to launch an offensive drive north along Route 3. This coordinated effort aimed to strengthen their strategic position and diminish the Japanese threat in the region, ultimately paving the way for a more secure and stable front. In response to the evolving battlefield situation, General Krueger ultimately ordered General Mullins' 25th Division to secure the right flank previously held by Wing's forces. This strategic move prompted the 27th and 161st Regiments to begin the process of relieving the 103rd and 169th Regiments. By doing so, the 6th Division would be able to resume its advance, now directed towards Urdaneta and the Cabaruan Hills, critical areas for the ongoing campaign. To the west, Krueger aimed to maintain the 14th Corps along the Agno River line until General Swift's 1st Corps could effectively neutralize the enemy resistance stretching from Damortis to Urdaneta. This would enable Swift's forces to maneuver southward alongside Griswold's corps. However, General MacArthur was eager to initiate a southern advance toward Manila as soon as possible. Consequently, he instructed the 14th Corps to reposition its main forces back to their previous outpost line south of the Agno by January 20. Following this, the corps was to launch an offensive towards Tarlac and Victoria. Once they established a presence along the Tarlac-Victoria line, the corps would prepare to advance toward Clark Field, a vital objective necessary for the successful neutralization of Japanese strongholds at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. To bolster this offensive, MacArthur also planned to deploy the 11th Corps on the western coast of Luzon, just north of the Bataan Peninsula. This amphibious operation aimed to disrupt Japanese defensive strategies in the Clark Field area, thereby enhancing the overall effectiveness of the Allied campaign. In contrast, in reaction to the loss of the Hill 200 complex, Japanese General Yamashita ordered the 2nd Tank Division to advance immediately into the Tayug sector. There, Lieutenant-General Iwanaka Yoshiharu would take command of the 10th Division forces already stationed in the region. The armored units were tasked with positioning themselves along the trail north of San Nicolas and on both sides of the Ambayabang River, with the objective of containing any potential enemy advances to the east. Additionally, the Shigemi Detachment received orders to move its main forces from San Manuel to Binalonan, where they were to defend the town resolutely, prepared to hold their ground against any assault. In addition, General Okamoto was tasked with positioning his main forces to secure the immediate approaches to San Jose. Meanwhile, General Tsuda's 105th Division was instructed to advance northward through Cabanatuan as quickly as possible to establish defensive positions behind the 10th Division, specifically at Minuli and north of Carranglan. However, not all of these strategic plans could be effectively executed. By January 17, Yamashita discovered that the Villa Verde Trail was impassable for tanks and trucks, rendering it unusable for the planned armored movements. Furthermore, the terrain in the Tayug-San Nicolas area proved to be unsuitable for armored operations, complicating the situation further. On January 17 the 14th Area Army commander belatedly learned that the 10th Division had never concentrated at San Jose and that it had made no real effort to dispose itself along the entire Tayug-Umingan-Lupao-San Jose defense line for which it was responsible. General Okamoto, the division commander, had decided that he did not have sufficient strength to hold the relatively open ground assigned to him. Most of his 39th Regiment was with the Kembu Group; the bulk of the 10th Regiment, greatly understrength, was attached to the 103rd Division for the defense of northern Luzon; and, at least as late as of January 15, he had received no word as to when he might expect the attached Tsuda Detachment to arrive in the San Jose area from the east coast. He had therefore withdrawn most of his troops up Route 5 from San Jose and had started disposing them along the line Yamashita had intended the 105th Division to hold; leaving behind only a reinforced infantry company and two artillery battalions to secure the all-important railhead. Okamoto had directed the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment to remain in the San Nicolas area, and he stationed three or four rifle companies of his 63rd Regiment along the Tayug-Lupao line and in rising ground to the southwest. Confronted with these unexpected developments, Yamashita concluded that he had no choice but to accept the redeployment of the 10th Division as an established fact. Consequently, he ordered the 2nd Tank Division, which had already begun its movement toward Tayug, to concentrate its main forces southeast of Tayug to safeguard the immediate approaches to San Jose. Additionally, the 6th Tank Regiment was assigned to position itself in Muñoz to cover the southwestern approach to the area. To further bolster defenses, Tsuda was instructed to deploy two of his five advance battalions to San Jose. However, as these tactical adjustments were being made, it became necessary to shift focus away from Luzon and turn attention toward Leyte, where the final operations on the island were unfolding. It is important to note that the majority of General Suzuki's forces had successfully retreated to the Villaba-Mount Canguipot region, although some strong elements remained isolated further to the east. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army assuming control of the island, American forces commenced the final phase of operations to secure Leyte, methodically working to eliminate any remaining pockets of resistance. From January 1 to February 15, the 11th Airborne Division conducted patrols in the Burauen area, where they engaged and successfully eliminated a well-entrenched enemy force positioned on the southern slopes of Mount Majunag. Meanwhile, the 96th Division carried out extensive patrols in the eastern mountainous regions before taking over from the 11th Airborne Division. In the southern part of the island, the 7th Division launched numerous patrols and deployed a reinforced battalion that effectively neutralized all enemy forces in the Camotes Islands. Additionally, the 77th Division focused on clearing various pockets of enemy resistance located in northwestern Leyte. By late January, the Americal Division arrived to assist in the cleanup operations in Samar and Leyte, a mission that was successfully completed by February 24, with support from the 1st Filipino Regiment. However, during this time, Japanese General Suzuki was formulating his strategy for Operation Chi-Go. This operation involved the amphibious movement of several military units to different islands within the Visayas using large motorized landing barges. Suzuki's initial plan entailed deploying the majority of the 1st Division to establish a garrison on Cebu Island, while the headquarters of the 35th Army was to relocate to Davao. This strategic move would enable him to take direct command of military operations on Mindanao. Following this, he intended to dispatch the 41st and 77th Regiments to Mindanao, assign the 26th Division to the Bacolod area on Negros Island, and send the 5th Regiment along with units from the 102nd Division to Cebu. Furthermore, the 16th Division and the 68th Brigade, commanded by General Makino, were to remain in Leyte to engage in guerrilla warfare tactics.  The 102nd Division presented certain difficulties. There had been instances of 40 to 50 deserters fleeing to Cebu or Negros on boats they had built for themselves. Deserters that were apprehended were court-martialed. General Suzuki for some time had been out of touch with General Fukei, the commanding general of the 102nd Division, which was in the Mt. Pina area. By chance, one of Suzuki's officers learned that Fukei was planning to evacuate to Cebu. Suzuki was incensed since he and his staff felt that Fukei "was violating the military code in taking these steps without consent." He therefore ordered Fukei to remain at Leyte. Fukei did not answer but his chief of staff sent the following reply: "We appreciate the efforts of Army but at the present time we are very busy preparing for retreat. The division commander and chief of staff are unable to report to Army Headquarters." Suzuki was "entirely displeased" with the reaction of Fukei and sent his chief of staff, General Tomochika, to investigate the situation. When Tomochika arrived he found that Fukei, with his chief of staff and some headquarters personnel, had already left for Cebu. The sequel to these events was that Suzuki relieved Fukei of his command and ordered him to remain on Cebu until he received further orders. Upon the arrival of Suzuki in Cebu in the spring of 1945, Fukei was sentenced to confinement for thirty days. Suzuki asked IGHQ in Tokyo for authority to court-martial Fukei but no reply was forthcoming. In the end, Fukei was released and later returned to command of the 102nd Division. In the midst of ongoing military operations, Suzuki implemented measures to ensure that the forces stationed on Leyte could sustain themselves. He instructed his troops to make the most of local resources by utilizing available food and materials. This included directives to cultivate sweet potatoes and Indian corn, with the hope of sourcing all necessary provisions from the surrounding areas outside their operational base. However, the Japanese forces faced significant challenges due to relentless American air raids and mop-up operations, which severely hindered their ability to procure supplies. The hostile environment made it difficult for them to plant and harvest the crops they had intended to grow. Despite these obstacles, the Japanese managed to capitalize on the conclusion of the harvest season. They were able to secure substantial amounts of food that had been stored by local Filipinos, including a considerable quantity of coconuts and sweet potatoes. By early January, the 1st Division began its gradual movement toward Cebu, successfully transporting around 800 men to the island by mid-January. Unfortunately, the situation worsened as enemy PT boats established a stringent sea blockade, rendering maritime transportation impractical until mid-March. This blockade left approximately 2,000 men from the 1st Division, along with other units of the 35th Army, stranded on Leyte. Simultaneously, the Imahori Detachment, alongside the Mitsui Shipping Unit and the 77th Regiment, advanced to the southern Matag-ob area and subsequently moved toward Villaba, reaching their destination in early February. The majority of the 26th Division also made progress, arriving in the region north of Ormoc in mid-January before commencing a northwestward movement. By February, they successfully established contact with the rest of the 35th Army. Meanwhile, the remnants of the 16th Division could only reach the Valencia area in February, where they would remain until the end of the month. For the foreseeable future, the Japanese units left behind on Leyte faced the daunting task of defending against the advancing Americal Division and the 1st Filipino Regiment, which were steadily gaining ground.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Admiral Halsey launched Operation Gratitude, targeting Japanese shipping. Despite misleading intel, they decimated enemy convoys, showcasing the effectiveness of airstrikes and securing strategic advances in Luzon. American forces advanced through Luzon while Task Force 38 struck Formosa and Hong Kong. Despite fierce Japanese resistance and challenging weather, the Allies steadily gained ground, though both sides suffered significant losses in the campaign.

Why Are Both New Year's Day Attackers Associated With The US Army Headquarters For Psychological Operations

Last time we continued speaking about the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Admiral Toyoda's Operation Sho-Go aimed to eliminate American naval forces but faced setbacks with the loss of key ships. As Japanese forces advanced, miscommunications led to disorganized attacks. Rear-Admiral Clifton Sprague's Taffy groups used smoke and air assaults to delay the Japanese, ultimately leading to Kurita's retreat after sustaining heavy damage from American air strikes. On October 25, a series of intense naval engagements unfolded, featuring airstrikes and kamikaze attacks. U.S. forces launched multiple strikes against Japanese carriers, inflicting significant damage but facing challenges from anti-aircraft fire and pilot fatigue. The day ended with the sinking of several Japanese vessels, including Zuikaku and Chitose, resulting in substantial casualties. Admiral Halsey attempted to intercept Kurita's forces but was too late. Despite heavy losses, including the cruiser Abukuma and numerous aircraft, Kurita's forces managed to reach safety. The battle marked a significant defeat for the Japanese, severely weakening their naval capabilities, though Kamikaze attacks prolonged the war. This episode is the Advance to Ormoc Valley  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last we we covered the climax of the battle of Leyte Gulf seeing the IJN basically annihilated in the waters surrounding the philippines. As the confrontation drew to a close, General Krueger's offensive was ongoing at Leyte. By October 26, General Sibert's 10th Corps and General Hodge's 24th Corps had successfully established two beachhead areas, gradually expanding their perimeter inland and pushing General Makino's 16th Division further into the island's interior. Following the failure of his earlier repositioning after the loss of Hindang and Burauen, Makino acknowledged that he could not prevent the loss of the eastern coastal plain. He decided to retreat his units to rear positions in the mountains west of Dagami and Burauen. Concurrently, as part of Operation TA, Admiral Mikawa successfully delivered the first reinforcements to Ormoc. Consequently, General Suzuki promptly ordered Colonel Sumitani Takayoshi's 41st Regiment to move towards Carigara and then to Jaro, where the remnants of the 33rd Regiment had fallen back to maintain the division's left flank. After capturing Hills B and C, the 24th Division resumed its westward assault on October 26. With General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division protecting General Irving's northern flank, the 34th Regiment advanced along Highway 2, reaching Santa Fe, while the 19th Regiment attempted to attack Pastrana but was halted short of its objective by heavy enemy fire. To the south, the 383rd Regiment patrolled towards San Vicente Hill amidst fierce resistance, as the 382nd Regiment attacked Tabontabon but was forced back to the Guinarona River by determined defenders. In addition, the reserve 3rd Battalion, 381st Regiment, embarked on a long march north along Highway 1 towards Tanauan but encountered enemy fire near Vigia Point. Further south, the 17th Regiment successfully advanced to a position about 600 yards south of Guinarona, while the 32nd Regiment fought persistently to reach the edge of the Buri airstrip. The following day, after fending off several light counterattacks, the 32nd finally secured the airstrip with minimal resistance. Additionally, the 17th pushed forward to a point approximately 2,200 yards south of Dagami, although they faced increased opposition from the retreating enemy. To the east, following an extensive artillery bombardment, the 382nd captured a majority of Tabontabon in a coordinated attack, with Colonel Dill's 1st and 3rd Battalions then moving northeast toward Kapahuan. Colonel Michael Halloran's 3rd Battalion pressed northward and ultimately took Tanauan without opposition before heading towards Kiling. Meanwhile, in the Catmon Hill area, after General Krueger released the remainder of the 381st Regiment to the control of the 24th Corps, General Bradley decided to deploy his reserve regiment to take control of the Labiranan Head position in preparation for an assault against Catmon hill. Catmon Hill had been under steady naval and artillery fire since A Day, October 20. The 96th Division artillery had constantly fired on targets of opportunity by day and harassed enemy positions in the area during the night. Starting at 21:00 on October 27, the 105-mm howitzers of the 361st Field Artillery Battalion, the 155-mm howitzers of the 198th Field Artillery Battalion, a battery of 155-mm howitzers from the 363d Field Artillery Battalion, and the 75-mm howitzers from the 780th Amphibian Tank Battalion were to deliver harassing fires on the hill until 10:30 the following day. At that time all of the artillery units were to commence firing successive concentrations beginning at the bottom of the hill and working to the top in 50-yard bounds. After the 381st Regiment, less the 3rd Battalion, attacked at 12:00 on October 28, the artillery was to fire concentrations in front of the troops as they advanced. In making his plans for the capture of Catmon Hill, Colonel Michael E. Halloran, commander of the 381st Regiment, decided to have the 1st Battalion make an enveloping movement from the northeast while the 2nd Battalion pushed west along the main ridge. The 1st Battalion, 383rd Regiment, from its position on Labiranan Head, would support the attack by fire. Further north, Irving's push westward continued as the 34th Regiment advanced unopposed to the Mudburon River, while the 19th Regiment captured Pastrana following another heavy artillery barrage. On that day, the 171st Independent Battalion arrived after a week-long voyage from Panay, preparing to join the 41st Regiment and its sister battalion towards Carigara and Jaro. On October 28, as the 41st Regiment passed through Carigara and approached Jaro, Mikawa launched his second Operation TA convoy, consisting of three echelons. The first echelon left Manila immediately without cover, transporting the 20th Antitank Battalion. Simultaneously, preparations were underway to send the 12th Independent Regiment and the recently arrived 1st Division to Leyte. Meanwhile, the 34th Regiment swiftly moved through Alangalang and advanced to the Mainit River, where they were ultimately halted by fierce Japanese resistance. Nevertheless, two companies successfully crossed the river unnoticed during a heavy rainstorm. After launching a surprise assault against the defenders, they captured a bridge over the river. At the same time, the 19th Regiment progressed to Tingib, where it established a patrol base. General Hoffman also directed his 2nd Cavalry Brigade to advance toward Carigara, with the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry making an overland move to San Miguel, while Troop C of the 7th Cavalry conducted an amphibious landing at Barugo, later engaging in skirmishes with Japanese forces at Carigara. To the south, after successfully fending off a vigorous counterattack, Colonel Dill's 2nd Battalion secured the Tabontabon area, enabling it to move north toward Kiling. In spite of determined opposition, the Japanese supply center of Tabontabon had at last been taken and approximately 350 Japanese killed in the area. During the three days of fighting, the 2d Battalion had thirty-four men killed and eighty wounded. The remainder of the 382nd fought their way to Digahongan before turning towards Kiling, eventually halting at Kansamada. Meanwhile, while the 383rd conducted reconnaissance toward San Vicente and the 9th Regiment began its retreat to Dagami, the 381st Regiment finally launched its assault on Catmon Hill. However, Halloran's two battalions were met with heavy gunfire from the surrounding foothills. Lastly, as the 184th Regiment patrolled toward Santa Ana, the 17th Regiment attacked toward Dagami. Despite facing strong opposition and difficult swamp conditions, they managed to push 300 yards beyond the enemy stronghold by nightfall, rolling up the defenders' eastern flank. Since the 2d Battalion had borne the brunt of the fighting on 28 October and had suffered numerous casualties, the regimental commander decided to have the battalion drop back into reserve. Although the drive to Dagami was to continue, the north-south line of enemy pillboxes on the left flank of the regiment could not be ignored. At 0800 on 29 October the regimental lines were to be reorganized so that the 3d and 1st Battalions, less Company B, would pass through the 2d Battalion, which would become the regimental reserve. Company B with a platoon of M8's would attack the flank and rear of the enemy in the left line of pillboxes. At 0800, under cover of a heavy artillery concentration from the 49th Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 17th Infantry, passed through the 2d Battalion without incident. Company B, reinforced by the platoon from the Cannon Company, moved out to destroy the enemy force on the regiment's left flank. The company fought the Japanese from pillbox to pillbox, catching the enemy on his flanks and rear by rifle and machine gun fire, together with time-burst fire from the self-propelled howitzers. This completely demoralized the Japanese, some of whom threw down their arms and tried unsuccessfully to escape. More than 120 enemy dead were counted in the area. The 1st Battalion entered the southern part of Dagami without encountering serious resistance. It then came under artillery fire from the hills west of the town. The 3d Battalion proceeded east of the road in a column of companies in the order L, K, and I, and met no serious opposition until it reached a cemetery south of Dagami. Overgrown with weeds seven to ten feet high and containing stone crypts built off the ground, the cemetery was divided by a path running east to west. As Company L moved into the burial ground, Company I swung around the right (east) side to come into position for the night. The leading elements of Company L passed through the cemetery and Company I moved into position without incident, but as the 1st Platoon of Company L, the reserve platoon, crossed the path, a headstone tilted back and from the open grave four Japanese opened fire with an American Browning automatic rifle and other small arms. The small arms of the 1st Platoon had no effect and it became necessary to bring forward a flame thrower to burn the enemy out. At the same time the platoon received fire from other open graves, from which the Japanese had removed the bodies. By punching holes through the stone they used the crypts as individual foxholes. The platoon broke into small units and pushed through the cemetery, destroying the enemy forces wherever they could be located. Company K, which followed Company I, placed two platoons abreast behind Company L. As it came through the weeds past the cemetery path a Japanese officer charged on the right flank with his saber and wounded one man before he could be brought down. Since the platoons were also receiving heavy fire from the tombs, the commander of Company K drew his men back to the path where they reorganized. Preceded by a battery of six flame throwers, the men then marched shoulder to shoulder through the cemetery and burnt out the enemy. About 1900 the regiment completed the action and formed its night perimeter. During the fighting, the regimental operations officer, hearing the heavy fire and not being able to communicate with the 3d Battalion headquarters, called Company K direct to ascertain if the Japanese had broken through the American lines. "Hell no," was the reported reply, "we're breaking through theirs and fighting for our bivouac." During the night small infiltration parties of Japanese tried unsuccessfully to penetrate the regiment's defenses, and sporadic artillery fire was received from the hills west of Dagami. The following day, the 3rd and 1st Battalions advanced through the 2nd Battalion to continue their northern push, successfully entering Dagami without facing significant opposition. After securing the previous headquarters of the 16th Division, the 17th Battalion spent the next two days conducting mopping-up operations and patrolling the Dagami area, effectively establishing contact with the 19th Regiment across the Binahaan River and the 382nd Regiment to the east. Simultaneously, the 32nd Regiment dispatched its 2nd Battalion toward Abuyog, which was successfully captured by midday. By October 31, Company G had further taken control of Baybay, and the 1st Battalion had landed at Panaon to support the 21st Regiment stationed there. As a result, General Arnold's 7th Division accomplished its objective of capturing the Burauen airstrips and Dagami while linking up with the 96th Division and 10th Corps. This operation resulted in an estimated 4,211 Japanese casualties, with 19 soldiers taken prisoner, while the division incurred 322 killed, 1,064 wounded, and 21 missing. Meanwhile, on October 29, the 381st Regiment executed a tank-supported offensive and ultimately captured Catmon Hill, which would be thoroughly cleared in the following two days. At the same time, Halloran's 3rd Battalion stormed and secured Kiling, with Dill's 2nd Battalion arriving shortly thereafter. On the outskirts of the barrio the battalion met stubborn and determined resistance where the Japanese, with machine guns, mortars, and rifles, fought "to the last man." The resistance was overcome, and by 1500 the Americans occupied the town, which was honeycombed with emplacements and entrenchments. At 1600 the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, was relieved by the 2d Battalion, 382d Infantry, which had come up from Tabontabon by truck. At 1800 the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, returned by truck to the area north of San Roque. However, the remainder of the 382nd Battalion was unable to penetrate the retreating 9th Regiment towards Kiling, allowing some Japanese forces to evade complete destruction. Nevertheless, Bradley's 96th Division successfully took control of the Catmon Hill mass and the key towns of Tabontabon and Tanauan, resulting in an estimated 2,769 Japanese casualties and 6 prisoners captured, at the cost of 145 men killed, 564 wounded, and 90 missing. On October 29, Colonel Newman's 3rd Battalion advanced northward, leading the charge toward Jaro. They gradually battled through Galotan and quickly captured Jaro without much resistance. The American forces moved so swiftly that Suzuki was unable to implement his strategy of using Jaro as the gathering point for the reinforcements of the 35th Army, compelling him to designate Carigara as the new rendezvous site. Due to the evident Japanese strength in the region, Hoffman ordered his units to bolster defenses in Barugo, with the remaining units of the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry arriving by nightfall, followed by the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry on October 31, and the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry on November 1.  At 08:00 on October 30 Colonel Newman ordered the 3rd Battalion of the 34th Regiment to start for Carigara down the highway. As the battalion left the outskirts of Jaro, with Company L in the lead, it came under fire from Japanese who were dug in under shacks along the road. Upon a call from the commanding officer of Company L, the tanks came up in a column, fired under the shacks, and then retired. The leading platoon was drawn back so that artillery fire might be placed on the Japanese, but the enemy could not be located precisely enough to use the artillery. Newman then ordered a cautious movement forward without artillery support, a squad placed on each side of the road and two tanks in the center. The squads had advanced only fifty yards when Japanese fire again pinned them down. When Newman came forward and discovered why the advance was held up he declared, "I'll get the men going okay." Upon hearing that the regimental commander was to lead them, the men started to move forward. The Japanese at once opened fire with artillery and mortars, and Colonel Newman was hit in the stomach. Although badly wounded he tried to devise some means of clearing the situation. After sending a runner back with orders to have the 3rd Battalion fire on the Japanese position, he said, "Leave me here and get mortar fire on that enemy position." As soon as possible Colonel Newman was put on a poncho and dragged back to safety. The following morning, while the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment moved toward Jaro, the 34th Battalion launched another attack and managed to reach the Yapan River. Despite their fierce assault, the heavy Japanese artillery and flanking fire once again stalled the Americans on their journey to Carigara, allowing the 41st Regiment to withdraw. At this stage, the 5th Air Force had officially set up its forward units on Leyte, tasked with achieving air superiority and attacking Japanese convoys and troop concentrations. However, as the 13th Air Force focused its primary efforts on airfields in bypassed areas. Poor weather had taken its toll on General Krueger's advance. Rainy, monsoon-like conditions confounded his engineers, and airfield construction at Tacloban and Dulag floundered. Landing conditions were still poor. Naval carrier aircraft, from damaged escort carriers, headed to both airfields instead of ditching at sea. As the Navy pilots attempted to land on Leyte, 25 out of 72 planes ended up damaged. Without suitable land-based US air power, the Japanese could continue to launch air attacks. Limited American air power did contest the skies against the Japanese, but could still only provide a minimum of close air support to the American troops. While Japanese aircraft continued to reach targets throughout Leyte, Kinkaid and Halsey's forces had to depart the Leyte region to resupply, so Kenney had to take over with his limited forces. MacArthur did persuade Halsey to maintain Task Group 38.2 in the area when he withdrew most of his fleet on October 29. Kinkaid also left ten escort carriers only by redistributing fleet supplies, but he also had to refit. Nonetheless, Ground commanders criticized Kenney's continued failure to provide close air support. During the early invasion period, naval carrier aviators had delivered direct support. For example, out of the 121 troop support missions from October 20 to 25, pilots flew 33 sorties in direct support of soldiers. With Kinkaid and Halsey's forces departed, Kenney's focus was on air superiority. He had eliminated most close air support missions until later in the campaign. As a result, the infantry had to rely on artillery. The escort carriers of the 7th Fleet, significantly diminished following the Battle of Leyte Gulf, were unable to provide support. Although Admiral Mitscher's carriers did conduct numerous strikes against Japanese shipping in the Visayas and Manila Bay in the last days of October, Task Force 38 had mostly been withdrawn by the end of the month. During the final week of October, the 4th Air Army and the newly-formed 1st Combined Base Air Force maintained a persistent campaign to support ground operations, gradually redirecting their attacks from amphibious shipping and carriers to the enemy-occupied airfields at Tacloban and Dulag.  Though Kenney's airfields still had minimal capacity, he had 34 P-38s from the 49th Fighter Group based at Morotai deployed to Tacloban Airfield on October 27. Three days later, only 20 P-38s remained, as Japanese air attacks destroyed or damaged several of the twin-tailed aircraft. In response, Kenney deployed more P-38s from the 475th Fighter Group. He also assigned six P-61s from the 421st Night Fighter Squadron to counter night attacks. Kenney later replaced them with F6Fs from VMF (N)-541, which improved night patrol and interception missions to include strikes on Japanese night convoys. Thus, Kenney's pilots, led by the elite aces Richard Bong and Thomas McGuire, started to make a difference. Additionally, bombing attacks disrupted airfield construction and caused aircraft losses since they were parked close together due to space limitations. Still, Army engineers with Filipino labor made inroads towards rendering the airfields fully operational. Pilots could now use an expanded 5,000ft runway at Tacloban on October 31. With a growing 5th Air Force presence, the Americans improved their ability to intercept bombers; as a consequence, the Japanese relied more on night attacks. This shift inflicted substantial damage and compelled the Americans to reinforce their positions. Alongside the primary air offensive targeting enemy supply shipping and airfields, Kamikaze units executed suicide attacks against enemy carriers operating off the east coast of the Philippines. Pilots, as well as aircraft of various types, were drawn from the 153d, 601st and 761st Air Groups. The initial corps used only bomb-equipped fighters. However, after the reorganizations of the Kamikaze corps, all types of aircraft were used.  A kamikaze suicide aircraft hit Intrepid on one of her port side gun positions; ten men were killed and another six were wounded, but damage was minimal. The USS Franklin had just refueled and returned to the Leyte action on 27 October, her planes concentrating on a heavy cruiser and two destroyers south of Mindoro. She was under way about 100 miles (160 km) off Samar on 30 October, when enemy bombers appeared bent on a suicide mission. Navy fighters shot down most of the Japanese planes, but six broke through the combat air patrol into Franklin's task group of four carriers defensively surrounded by a circle of about twenty escorting cruisers and destroyers. Shipboard anti-aircraft guns shot down three of the four kamikazes independently diving toward each of the four carriers; but the one targeting Franklin hit the flight deck and crashed through to the gallery deck, killing 56 men and wounding 60. As the remaining two kamikazes attacked, one was shot down by anti-aircraft guns and the second missed Franklin with two bombs before flying into the stern of Belleau Wood. Franklin was able to extinguish fires and patch the flight deck so planes could be recovered 76 minutes after the kamikaze hit. Both carriers retired to Ulithi Atoll for temporary repairs, and then Franklin proceeded to the Puget Sound Navy Yard, arriving on 28 November 1944 for repairs of her battle damage.  Meanwhile, on October 30, the 20th Antitank Battalion was successfully landed at Ormoc. The following day, Mikawa dispatched his remaining two echelons: the second comprised three transports carrying the Imahori Detachment, primarily made up of Colonel Imahori Tetsusaku's 12th Independent Regiment. The third included four transports and four frigates carrying most of Lieutenant-General Kataoka Tadasu's 1st Division along with around 9,000 tons of supplies and ammunition, all under the protection of Rear-Admiral Kimura Masatomi's screen of six destroyers. This would be Mikawa's last convoy, as he would soon be replaced in command of the Southwest Area Fleet by Vice-Admiral Okawachi Denshichi due to his deteriorating health. Following a smooth journey, the Imahori Detachment was quickly disembarked at Ormoc on November 1, with the remainder of the convoy arriving later that night to commence the unloading for the 1st Division. During the day, one of the transports was sent to Cebu to pick up the 35th Army Headquarters, which landed the next morning alongside Kataoka's troops. By noon on November 2, a total of 13,000 soldiers had successfully arrived, culminating in the most effective reinforcement operation of the Leyte campaign, with just one transport lost and another slightly damaged. Turning to the primary action, on November 1, two companies from the 34th Regiment were ordered to execute a broad flanking maneuver and then attack Tunga from the northeast, facing no resistance. This enabled Newman's 1st and 2nd Battalions to advance swiftly down the highway to a point approximately 1,000 yards from Sagkanan. Concerned about the enemy's considerable presence at Carigara, Sibert planned for his two divisions to launch a coordinated assault on the town the following day; however, unbeknownst to him, the disorganized Japanese forces chose to abandon the town and retreat to the mountains southwest of Capoocan. Thus, following a heavy artillery bombardment, the Americans captured Carigara without opposition and promptly established a perimeter, while the 34th Regiment advanced further to Balud, where they encountered intense enemy fire. On that same day, the 382nd Regiment took control of Dagami, from which they would engage the positions of the 16th Division on Bloody Ridge over the coming days. The capture of Carigara marked the completion of the second phase of General Krueger's plan for liberating Leyte. Irving's 24th Division successfully achieved its objectives, resulting in the deaths of approximately 2,970 Japanese soldiers and the capture of 13 prisoners, with their own losses totaling 210 killed, 859 wounded, and 6 missing. Additionally, by October 27, Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division had killed an estimated 739 Japanese and taken 7 prisoners, incurring a loss of 40 men killed, 199 wounded, and 8 missing. The next phase of Krueger's strategy involved two offensives converging on Ormoc: one moving south through Ormoc Valley led by Sibert's 10th Corps and the other advancing north from Baybay under Hodge's 24th Corps. Initially, while certain units of the 24th Corps continued pushing west to bolster troops along Ormoc Bay and clean up in southern Leyte Valley, Sibert's forces aimed to secure control of the Carigara Bay coastline from Carigara to Pinamopoan. Simultaneously, Suzuki sent the experienced 1st Division to Carigara to launch an offensive toward Tacloban. The 1st Division, which had been activated in Tokyo, had served in Manchuria during the "China Incident" and had been transferred to Shanghai in August 1944. Though it had no combat experience, this division was considered by Major-General Tomochika Yoshiharu, deputy chief of staff of the 35th Army, to be the best equipped division of the Japanese Army. Under the command of Lieutenant-General Kataoka Tadasu, it had been held in reserve by Imperial General Headquarters for the decisive battle, and it was sent to Manila with great expectations. Meanwhile the Imahori Detachment moved to the northeastern base of the heights southwest of Jaro to facilitate the assembly of the 26th Division for an impending attack on Jaro. After securing Carigara, the 68th Brigade was set to land in the north as part of the 35th Army reserve, while the 30th Division would land at Albuera on Ormoc Bay and negotiate mountainous trails to Burauen to eliminate all enemy resistance in the Dulag region. As other units of the 102nd Division were moved forward using powered schooners, a reinforced company from the 364th Independent Battalion was also deployed to Albuera to secure the landing site for the 30th Division. On the morning of November 3, the 34th Regiment moved west once again and quickly seized Capoocan, just as Kataoka's vanguard was getting close. Suzuki immediately approved the emergency dispositions already taken and issued orders temporarily attaching the various reinforcement units to the 1st Division. It was impossible, however, to notify Lt. Gen. Kataoka immediately of the changed situation, and the division advance guard moved into the vicinity west of Capoocan at 0900 on 3 November to find itself unexpectedly engaged by the enemy. Badly surprised, the advance guard fell back toward Colasian with the enemy in pursuit. Meanwhile, at 1000, Lt. Gen. Kataoka reached the high ground south of Managasnas. Finding his advance guard engaged, he immediately ordered the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment and the 20th Antitank Battalion to check the enemy advance. At the same time he dispatch ed an order to the division main body to close up at forced march. Although the defenders were initially taken by surprise, they managed to halt the enemy's progress with fierce resistance, ultimately compelling them to withdraw. It was only after artillery bombardment of the ridge parallel to the road that the 34th finally dismantled the Japanese stronghold, establishing their position for the night. Additionally, earlier in the day, Company K had conducted a reconnaissance mission using amphibian tractors from Capoocan to a location just west of Pinamopoan. However, due to heavy enemy fire, the company withdrew and returned to Capoocan. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Kataoka mistakenly perceived this as a battalion-sized enemy assault, prompting him to retreat southwest and position his forces on the eastern end of a long ridge overlooking the coast, referred to as Breakneck Ridge.  Breakneck Ridge, over which Highway 2 corkscrewed its way between Pinamopoan and Limon for about 7200 yards, was actually a hill mass with many spurs branching off from an irregularly shaped crest line toward the shores of Carigara Bay to the north and the Levte River valley to the south. Shoulder-high cogon grass was thick on the low ground, and the pockets between the hills were heavily forested. The valleys were deep, with precipitous sides. The 1st Division had heavily fortified the area, taking advantage of the innumerable thickly wooded pockets that served as natural forts. The Japanese had also built an elaborate system of trenches and other defensive positions and had honeycombed the area with spider holes. Many of the latter were on reverse slopes some distance below the crests and were protected from direct fire. In front of each spider hole the enemy had cut fire lanes through the cogon grass, which was left so short that even a crawling soldier would be exposed to fire. The constant rainfall made the hills slippery and treacherous, and, more important, provided a protective curtain in the day and covered movements of the enemy at night. Following the Japanese withdrawal, the 34th quickly secured Colasian and captured Pinamopoan without opposition the next day. Newman's 3rd Battalion advanced through the town, continuing west along the highway for about 1,700 yards, stopping just short of the ridge. Anticipating a potential enemy amphibious assault via Carigara Bay, Krueger ordered Sibert to defend the Carigara area against any seaborne attack before proceeding southward. Meanwhile, as the divisions of the 10th Corps prepared defensive measures against a possible sea invasion, Colonel Miyauchi Yoshio's 57th Regiment was ordered to get ready to launch an attack from the ridge, as Kataoka believed that the enemy force could be easily cut off. As the newly-arrived 21st Regiment took over from the 34th at the Pinamopoan defenses, the Japanese forces launched an attack on a party of artillery forward observers conducting reconnaissance on OP Hill on November 5. With the artillerymen pinned down, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Weber's 3rd Battalion moved in to assist them by the afternoon, successfully securing the northern approaches to OP Hill and the undefended Corkscrew Ridge on the left. Although the Americans were able to fend off the enemy's counterattacks, intense mortar fire on November 6 ultimately compelled them to withdraw. Despite suffering heavy casualties during the battle for Breakneck Ridge, the 1st Division had nearly completed its concentration in the Cananga area and was ready to initiate a broad four-pronged assault. However, the Japanese advance through the mountainous terrain remained exceedingly slow, leaving the 57th Regiment to conduct the attack on its own. Concurrently, Irving attached the 3rd Battalion of the 19th Regiment to the 21st Regiment and ordered the combined force to advance towards Breakneck Ridge. Consequently, Weber's troops launched an assault on Miyauchi's positions, but were completely unsuccessful in breaking through. Dissatisfied with the 21st Regiment's progress and feeling that Weber was insufficiently aggressive, Sibert replaced him with Lieutenant-Colonel William Verbeck, a seasoned veteran of the Alaska Campaign. Verbeck then made an unsuccessful attempt at a wide flanking maneuver to the east but ultimately had to entrench at the edge of Breakneck Ridge by nightfall. On the same day, Colonel Chapman dispatched Company G to Hill 1525, but it lost its way and ended up considerably further east. Thats all we have for today on the Philippines front as we now need to shift over to New Britain. In October, a decision was made to deploy the 40th Division for combat in the Philippines, transferring control of the island to the Australians. This change aligned with the Australian government's intention to utilize their own troops to reclaim territory previously occupied by the Japanese during the war. As a result, General Ramsay's 5th Division began relocating to New Britain, tasked with containing and isolating the Japanese garrison on the Gazelle Peninsula. Ramsay was instructed to maintain pressure on the Japanese forces while avoiding large-scale deployments, permitted only to conduct patrols and minor raids as limited offensive actions. By late October, the 36th Battalion had assumed control at Cape Hoskins, with the remainder of the 6th Brigade slated to land at Jacquinot Bay in early November.  At this time the Japanese had posts at intervals along the south coast as far west as Awul near Cape Dampier. It was decided that the Australian southern guerilla force would be based at Lakiri, a village in the hills two days' march inland from Waterfall Bay, and in an area into which the enemy had not ventured. It possessed a good site for dropping stores from the air and, as a preliminary, some 25,000 pounds of supplies were dropped there. To give added security to the base the Australian-led native guerillas, commanded at this stage by Captain R. I. Skinner, overcame the enemy's coastwatching posts at Palmalmal and Baien, to the south-west and south-east, respectively, killing 23 and taking three prisoners. None survived at Palmalmal, but two escaped from Baien, and it was learnt later that they reached an enemy post at Milim bearing news of what had happened. The south coast group was now placed under the command of Captain Basil Fairfax-Ross, who counted with five officers, 10 Australian N.C.O's, about 140 native troops, and such native allies as could be maintained on an air delivery of 5,000 pounds of supplies a month. After the loss of Baien the Japanese reinforced their post at Milim at the south end of Wide Bay until it was 400 strong. Far to the west they retained posts at Massau and Awul and round Cape Beechey. Fairfax-Ross decided to move discreetly into the strongly-held Wide Bay area, advancing through the hills, concentrating first on winning over the natives , and using the air power available from Bougainville as his trump card . At the same time spies would be sent into the Gazelle Peninsula. In the western area also the first task was to gain information. On 5th June an American patrol from the west led by Lieutenant White of Angau attacked the Awul garrison, which withdrew inland. An Australian platoon under Lieutenant Black thereupon marched from Jacquinot Bay to Lau and Atu. In this area they found that native guerillas about 80 strong had killed 14 Japanese and 14 of their native allies. At Awul they met White and his party. It now seemed that the Japanese from the Atu-Awul area were retreating to the north coast. Guerillas were organized and at Kensina on 18th June, "after pretending to entertain a party of about 50 enemy" , the natives attacked and killed 28, losing 5 of their own men. Black's patrol, in pursuit, found the remainder of the enemy about Rang and i n an attack on 24th June killed nine, but had to withdraw after losing one native N.C.O . As they moved north and east through hostile territory other Japanese were killed. In the eastern section in this period Lieutenant Johnson was winning the support of influential natives in the mountains south-west of Wide Bay. A heavy air attack was made on the main Milim positions on the night of 17th-18th July and as a result the Japanese with- drew some men to a new position away to the west and some men right back to Lemingi in the Gazelle Peninsula. By early September the last of the Japanese stragglers on the south coast west of Wide Bay had been killed; the Japanese had heard many reports of a strong Australian base at Jacquinot Bay-reports circulated by the Australians to dissuade the enemy from advancing westward. This base, although non-existent as yet, was soon to become a reality, and from 5th to 7th September a reconnaissance party, including officers from New Guinea Force and the 5th Division, landed from the corvette Kiama and, guided by Black, examined the area. The two-platoon force reached Milim unnoticed on 12th August, and found the enemy about 150 strong. At dawn they opened an attack in three groups, one to fire on the houses in the Japanese camp, another to fire from the flank, and the third to intercept any reinforcements from the Yaret position 500 yards to the north. Unfortunately a native fired his rifle during the approach, the enemy manned his defenses, and, after a short exchange of fire, the attackers withdrew and placed ambushes across the tracks. The same day the Swan bombarded Milim. After three days of inaction on the part of the Japanese four native soldiers crawled into the enemy's position and killed three, whereafter the Japanese fired into the bush at intervals for 36 hours. This fire ceased on the 18th and soon afterwards the position was found to be abandoned; there was much booty including boats and numerous machine-guns. It was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn to Waitavalo. Fairfax-Ross now moved his forward base to the coast at the Mu River only 6 hours' march from Waitavalo. On 17th and 18th September Fairfax-Ross, Sampson and a platoon, reconnoitring Kamandran, became involved in a fight with a Japanese force about 100 strong. Anticipating that the enemy would retaliate in force the Australians prepared defensive positions and one platoon under Sergeant-Major Josep, an outstanding N.C.O. who had come from the New Guinea Constabulary, was placed on the hillside above Milim to give warning of an enemy advance. On the night of 28th September the Japanese did in fact advance on Milim and on towards the Australian defensive position at the Mu River. Here, however, largely because of Sergeant Ranken's cool handling of his Bren gun, they were repulsed, losing 17 killed. Next day about 200 Japanese reinforcements arrived and, in a firefight with Josep's men whose presence they had not discovered, 16 Japanese and a native ally were killed. The Australians now withdrew inland. Soon the Japanese, about 700 strong, were in their original positions round Milim, where they remained until heavy air attacks on 6th, 7th and 8th October forced them out again. By 10th October the guerilla force was again concentrated at Lakiri. Consequently, on November 4, a small convoy landed the reinforced 14th/32nd Battalion at Jacquinot Bay without  encountering any resistance. In the days following the landing, ground forces secured the Jacquinot Bay area, while a New Guinean company executed an amphibious operation to Pomio on November 6.  The 6th Brigade was gradually transferred to Cutarp, with the final units arriving on December 16. Due to shipping shortages and the low priority for reinforcing forces on New Britain, all components of the 5th Division would not advance to Jacquinot Bay until April 1945. The first echelon of the 13th Brigade arrived on November 26, while the remaining units followed by the end of December. Meanwhile, in the north, the 36th Battalion dispatched patrols to connect with Australian guerrillas at Ulamona, Ubili, and Ea Ea, aiding them in fending off an enemy advance on the Balima River by the end of November.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Americans were making tremendous progress in the Philippines, advancing through the Ormoc Valley. Despite the terrible odds, it seems the Japanese would not give up an inch of territory without a fight, digging their heels to the very end. Meanwhile the Australians were dealt mop up duty on New Britain and it was going equally as well.

Last time we spoke about the ongoing battles of Peleliu, Angular and Operation Ichi-Go. On September 23, Colonel Venable's regiment struggled to breach Lake Salome's defenses, leading to tactical changes and propaganda attempts to force Japanese surrender, which ultimately failed. The American command underestimated Japanese resolve, resulting in heavy bombardments and a strategic advance. By September 26, American forces had divided Peleliu and isolated Japanese defenders, facing fierce resistance but making significant progress. On September 27, 1944, Company F secured two ridges in Peleliu but struggled with Japanese forces entrenched in caves, halting progress. Despite controlling the northern shore, Marines faced persistent underground resistance from skilled Japanese miners. Meanwhile, the 5th Marines captured Hill 3, Ngesebus Island, and Radar Hill. In October, Japanese offensives continued against minimal resistance. This episode is the Japanese Triumph in China Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In our previous episode, General Mueller's infantry on Angaur had driven Major Goto's isolated forces into the Romauldo Pocket by October 1. After this victory, it was decided to shift away from costly full-scale infantry assaults. Instead, tanks, mortars, and artillery were deployed to target the remaining enemy positions directly. On 6 October artillery and mortars undertook an especially heavy bombardment. From 0700 to 1030, 155-mm. howitzers fired at especially chosen targets, including a suspected Japanese observation post, while 105-mm. howitzers, 4.2-inch mortars, 81-mm. mortars, and 60-mm. mortars laid concentrations on the flanks and rear of the remaining Japanese-held area to prevent any Japanese from escaping. At 1030 the artillery and mortars switched to smoke shells to blanket the Japanese area and at 1035 these weapons ceased fire. Following the bombardment, two companies were dispatched to feint attacks on the Japanese flanks, aiming to force them out of their fortified positions. The defenders, deceived by the ruse, were then subjected to another intense artillery and mortar barrage, which inflicted significant casualties. Additionally, in the afternoon, a major concrete and steel emplacement, likely serving as Goto's command post, was uncovered and destroyed by direct fire. With the enemy defenses considerably weakened, infantry operations resumed, focusing on sniper teams, small patrols, ambushes, and booby traps to encircle the remaining Japanese forces and cut off their supply and escape routes. Over the next few days, the Americans also rescued 183 captive natives during the final stages of their assault.  The Japanese had under their control in the final pocket a number of Angaur natives, three of whom had managed to make their way into the 322nd Regiment lines after a surrender broadcast on October 1. These related stories of hardships suffered in caves where the Japanese had kept them closely guarded and also told the 322nd that more natives were being held in the northwest pocket. First attempts by native volunteers to lead some of the others out were unsuccessful; but on October 8,137 more natives made their way out of the pocket to an area where elements of Company B, 306th Engineers, were working. The next day, three native volunteers led 90 more out of the pocket. About 1/5 of the total of 183 natives rescued from the Japanese needed extensive medical attention and all the rest were suffering from malnutrition. The healthier ones rebuilt their own village and some were ultimately used as labor on various projects at Angaur. On October 13, a coordinated attack was launched, with the 1st Battalion advancing from the west and the 2nd Battalion pushing from the north and northeast. Despite fierce resistance, by October 18 the Americans had successfully compressed the remaining Japanese into a pocket approximately 100 yards long and 50 yards wide. The following night, Major Goto was killed, and by October 21, the last pockets of resistance were eliminated. The engagement ended two days later when the Americans realized they had eliminated nearly all the Japanese troops, with only a few stragglers remaining. By the conclusion of the Battle of Angaur, approximately 1,300 Japanese soldiers had been killed, and 45 were captured. The Americans, on the other hand, suffered 264 men killed and 1,355 wounded, primarily from the 322nd Regiment. To be more specific the 321st Infantry's part in the operation had cost that regiment 26 men killed and 135 wounded. The 322d Infantry, which fought longer and against stiffer opposition, lost 211 men killed and 772 wounded.  Despite the heavy losses, capturing Angaur proved crucial in securing the Palaus and removing the island group as a threat to Allied lines of communication across the western Pacific toward the Philippines. Airdrome construction on Angaur was begun on 20 September, F plus 3, by the 1884th and 1887th Engineer Aviation Battalions. The first plane, a C-47, landed on the field on F plus 28, 15 October. Four days later two 6,000-foot landing strips were completed and work on taxiways, gasoline storage, and other air-base installations was well along. Air-base construction on Angaur presented difficult problems. There was available no conveniently located Japanese airfield which the Allies could repair, improve, and expand. Instead, the work had to begin at the beginning. Jungle had to be cut away, swamps filled, and rough terrain leveled. There was no hope that an airstrip could be prepared in three or four days as had been the case on many other islands in the Pacific. The completion of two 6,000-foot runways by 19 October, F plus 32, represented a considerable accomplishment. In defending Angaur, the Japanese lost a well-equipped, highly trained, and well-led infantry battalion. While this force might have been more effectively deployed elsewhere in the Palaus, it succeeded in its mission of delaying the American advance.  Meanwhile, General Ishii of the 32nd Division decided to reinforce the limited Japanese presence in Morotai to hinder the development of an enemy airbase capable of supporting an assault on the Philippines. Consequently, three temporary raiding detachments from the 10th Expeditionary Unit and the 211th and 212th Regiments were formed, with the 210th Regiment preparing a battalion as a follow-up force. On the night of September 26, Ishii's reinforcements began their movement to Morotai in barges, with two detachments successfully landing near Tilai and the other near Cape Posiposi despite interference from Allied PT boats. Enemy patrols around the island's perimeter blocked the use of coastal tracks, forcing the reinforcements to navigate through dense jungle. As the concealed Japanese raiders made their way toward Major Kawashima's main force in the Pilowo-Sabatai River area, the 3rd Battalion of the 210th Regiment landed in the Boesoboeso sector on October 9. The raiding detachments finally joined up with the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit on October 20. Without waiting for the 210th battalion, Kawashima initiated a series of new infiltration raids, some of which reached the airfield itself. Although these reinforcements created some disruptions by harassing Allied outposts, they did not significantly impact the situation at Morotai. This was due to high disease rates among the reinforcements and the inability to deliver enough supplies through the Allied air and naval blockade. General Anami decided more decisive action was needed to prevent the enemy from utilizing their airbase effectively. He instructed Ishii to deploy as much force as possible to Morotai to destroy the enemy. In response, Ishii planned to send additional reinforcements, including the main forces of the 210th and 211th Regiments and the 18th Shipping Engineers. By November 16, approximately 1,900 troops successfully landed south of Wadjaboela, with Colonel Kisou Ouchi taking command of all Japanese forces on Morotai. Raiding activities intensified in December, but with the new year, American torpedo boats further tightened the blockade, making it impossible for the 32nd Division to supply the ammunition and rations needed for a major offensive. Unable to dislodge the enemy from Morotai, the Japanese eventually had to withdraw to the center of the island, where they remained until the end of the war. The most notable Japanese response to the Allied landing was a series of frequent but mostly ineffective air raids. The first raid occurred on September 16 when a solitary enemy aircraft dropped three bombs on the Red Beach area, causing no damage. Between September 15, 1944, and February 1, 1945, General Sudo's 7th Air Division conducted 82 raids on Morotai, involving 179 sorties. The initial 54 raids caused minimal damage, with only twelve Allied soldiers wounded by October 4. However, the later raids resulted in 42 Allied aircraft destroyed, 33 damaged, 19 men killed, and 99 wounded. Despite these efforts, Morotai was successfully developed into a crucial base for the return to the Philippines. In Bougainville, with General Griswold's 14th Corps initially slated for the Leyte invasion, efforts were made to replace it with the Australian 2nd Corps. Although Griswold's corps would not participate in the October 20 operation, advance elements of General Savige's headquarters landed on October 6 to facilitate the transition. By mid-November, the 7th Brigade had relieved the 129th and 145th Regiments, and on November 22, Savige officially took command of Allied operations on Bougainville. By December 12, the replacement of American frontline troops by Australians was complete, and with only a few service personnel remaining, all American troops had departed by February 1, 1945. Despite having 30,000 men—though always short on heavy equipment and shipping—Savige's forces were considered sufficient to continue monitoring the Japanese and defending the perimeter around the airfields from any potential counterattacks. However, General Blamey disagreed with this approach and preferred a more aggressive strategy. He wanted his troops to actively seek out and destroy the enemy by patrolling deep into Japanese-held territory, targeting supply areas and bases to starve and eventually annihilate the Japanese garrisons. This shift in strategy signaled the start of a new offensive phase in the Bougainville Campaign. At the same time, attention shifts to North Burma, where the Allied campaign continued after the victories at Myitkyina and Mogaung. However, the strained relationship between General Stilwell and Chiang Kai-Shek was approaching its breaking point. Confronted with the impending loss of Guilin, Stilwell persuaded President Roosevelt to issue an ultimatum to Chiang, threatening to cut off American aid to China unless Stilwell was given full command of all forces in China. Chiang, perceiving this as an attempt to dominate China, countered by demanding Stilwell's immediate replacement and welcoming any other qualified American general. As a result, on October 19, Stilwell was recalled and replaced by Major-General Albert Wedemeyer by the end of the month. The China-Burma-India Theater was then reorganized: Lieutenant-General Daniel Sultan took over the India-Burma Theater, while Wedemeyer assumed command of the newly established China Theater. However, Wedemeyer would only serve as chief of staff to Chiang, not taking effective command of the Chinese forces. Thus, no American officer would be held accountable for the loss of eastern China. Nonetheless, this represented another significant diplomatic victory for Chiang Kai-Shek, though it would be his last for many years. However, it also marked the end of his relationship with Roosevelt, who had previously championed China's and the Generalissimo's interests. Meanwhile, upon taking command, Wedemeyer faced open dissent among the Chinese Nationalists, with local commanders in eastern China on the verge of insurrection against Chiang's regime, as he had refused to supply arms to those defending against the Japanese advance in Operation Ichi-Go.  There were many detailed reports that the east China commanders bitterly resented the Generalissimo's failure to support them. When Hengyang fell on August 8, Chinese claiming to be emissaries of these men presented to American authority a plan for a separatist regime and pleaded for American support. Unknown to the Americans, Chinese making identical representations had been negotiating with the Japanese since the winter of 1943-44. Intelligence reports were received at US headquarters to the effect that the Generalissimo's attitude toward the east China campaign reflected an understanding between him and the Japanese under which they would leave him undisturbed in southwest China if he in turn would not interfere while they took the airfields that presented so obvious a menace to the Japanese homeland. In 1951 a group of senior Japanese staff officers of China Expeditionary Army were interrogated on the question of Sino-Japanese relations in 1944. They denied that there had been any understanding between the Japanese and the Chinese Central Government. Two of them, Lt. Cols. Yoshimasa Okada and Yoshio Fukuyama, stated that an agreement was reached between the Japanese 23rd Army at Canton and the local Chinese commander, General Yu Hanmou, in February 1944 under which General Yu agreed not to disturb Canton when the Japanese marched north from it. Yu kept his word, according to Okada, even though the Generalissimo was ordering him to attack Canton. The Japanese officers agreed among themselves that there had been extensive contact with dissident Nationalist commanders in southeast China, and stated that through many channels they had sought to inform the Chinese that the east China drive offered no threat to them, but only to the US airfields. One of Wedemeyer's key objectives was to prevent China from fragmenting into warring factions. Additionally, he observed that air transport was delivering supplies to China at unprecedented rates, with 35,131 tons arriving in October 1944—four times the amount sent to support Stilwell in October 1943. The strength of the Allied forces in northern Burma and the weakened state of the Japanese meant that time was on Wedemeyer's side; each day China remained an active belligerent bolstered the prospect of significant American supplies soon being available. Consequently, his mission involved continuing support for General Chennault's 14th Air Force, General LeMay's 20th Bomber Command, and air transport over the Hump; further training and advising the Y-Force in Yunnan and the Z-Force in eastern China; and assisting the Generalissimo with military operations against the Japanese.  Speaking of Chennault's 14th air force, by November 1944, they now had an average strength of 398 fighters, 97 medium bombers, and 47 heavy bombers. In that same month the Fourteenth received 13,578 tons of supplies flown in over the Hump, of which 9,357 tons were gas and oil. From the Kunming airfields, the China Wing of the ATC flew these supplies to Chennault's forward fields, this intratheater transport being of course a charge on Hump tonnage. The apparent crisis in east China made it seem advisable to use all available Chinese trucks for concentrating the Chinese for the defense of Kunming; the quartermaster truck companies of the SOS were not by themselves enough to support the Fourteenth Air Force. These resources of air power, unimpressive in contrast to what Allied commanders had in Europe or the Pacific, but a good deal more than the Japanese had in China, were divided among two composite wings--the 68th and 69th--the 312th Fighter Wing, the Chinese-American Composite Wing (CACW), and the 308th Bombardment Group (H). An example of Chennault's flexibility, the 68th Wing had three fighter squadrons assigned, with bombers attached as the mission required. The 69th had four fighter squadrons and three medium squadrons. With headquarters at Kunming, it was shifting its attention from the campaign in Burma to the defense of Kunming against a Japanese attack from the south or southeast. The Chinese-American Composite Wing, headquarters at Peishiyi, had two fighter groups and one bombardment group. The 312th had two fighter groups (50 P-47's, 60 P-51's, and 6 P-61's), a total of five squadrons, protecting the B-29 fields at Cheng-tu. After the air effort and the attempts to move tonnage to the airfields and to the troops, the remaining US project in China was liaison with and training and observation of Chinese troops. On the Salween front, liaison and technical advice was given in the forward areas, while troop training continued in the rear. In east China, the reluctance of the Chinese to attempt a stand after Hengyang's fall on August 8 led to the withdrawal of almost all the Americans who had tried since January 1, 1944 to train a second 30 Divisions in east China. The so-called Z-Force Operations Staff that remained comprised an observer group with the headquarters of the Chinese 9th War Area and a liaison team of 28 under Col. Harwood C. Bowman in the city of Liuchow. This handful of Americans, in the first months of Wedemeyer's command, sought to give technical aid to the Chinese defenders of Guangxi while sending a flow of information back to theater headquarters in Chongqing. They provided air-ground liaison, supervised demolitions, helped distribute the 500 tons of munitions flown into east China in late October 1944, and helped with administrative and logistical matters. The remaining 625 men of Z-FOS, including the headquarters, were in Kunming, their future mission dependent on Wedemeyer's estimate of the situation. While these events were unfolding, Allied forces in northern Burma were preparing to launch an offensive with six divisions to eliminate the remaining Japanese presence in the region and establish a new supply route to China. Following the capture of Myitkyina and Mogaung, efforts were underway to organize two new Chinese armies, while experienced Chinese divisions continued their rigorous training in anticipation of resuming their advance southward. As the new commander of the Northern Combat Area Command and the Chinese Army in India, Sultan had the New First Army, under General Sun Liren, included the 30th and 38th Divisions. The 38th Division had been engaged since 30 October 1943, and had previously taken a creditable part in the First Burma Campaign of 1942. The division had been trained, re-equipped, and brought up to strength at Ramgarh Training Center in Bihar Province, India. Its sister division, the 30th, was also Ramgarh-trained. Its 88th and 89th Regiments had fought at Myitkyina. There was also New Sixth Army consisting of the 14th, 22nd, and 50th Divisions, commanded by General Liao Yaoxiang. The 22nd Division had fought in the First Burma Campaign, then been rebuilt at Ramgarh. It had been in action since January 1944. Lastly there was General Festing's 36th Division, and the recently-formed 5332nd Provisional Brigade at his disposal.  Current plans called for brigading the 1st Chinese Separate Infantry Regiment, which had been trained at Ramgarh in long-range penetration tactics, with two American regiments, the 475th Infantry and the 124th Cavalry. The combined unit would be the equivalent of a division, but would have the designation 5332d Brigade (Provisional). To carry out the project, the 5332d Brigade (Provisional), known later as MARS Task Force, was activated 26 July 1944. Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Arms assumed command the same day. The activating order provided for most of the brigade's subordinate units to be attached to it as they arrived in India or were activated--as of 26 July the brigade was still very much in the preparatory stage. Thus, the 475th Infantry Regiment (Long Range Penetration Regiment, Special), Lt. Col. William L. Osborne, was not activated until 5 August 1944. It included many survivors of the original American experiment in long-range penetration tactics--GALAHAD, or "Merrill's Marauders." Its companion regiment, the 124th Cavalry (Texas National Guard), Col. Milo H. Matteson, arrived in India on 30 August 1944. It did not reach the brigade's training area until 27 October. Also attached were the 612th Field Artillery Battalion (Pack), Maj. John W. Read, and six quartermaster pack troops. In mid-August 1944 the training area which had been set up about ten miles north of Myitkyina on the west bank of the Irrawaddy began receiving members of the 475th Infantry Regiment. The area was designated Camp Robert W. Landis in honor of the first member of GALAHAD to be killed in action. Unit after unit started moving into Camp Landis as the 5332d began to put on flesh and assume the likeness of a pair of regimental combat teams. Another battalion of pack artillery, the 613th under Lt. Col. James F. Donovan, the 18th Veterinary Evacuation Hospital, the 44th Portable Surgical Hospital, the 1st Chinese Separate Infantry Regiment, Col. Lin Kuan-hsiang, arrived during the fall. Unfortunately, after overseeing the 5332nd's organization and training, Arms was injured in a motor accident and was succeeded by Brigadier-General John Willey on October 31. In support of Operation Capital, it was agreed that Sultan's forces would advance through the Katha-Bhamo area towards Kunchaung, Sikaw, and Namhkam in mid-October, followed by a southern advance to the Mogok-Mongmit-Lashio line in coordination with General Slim's push towards Mandalay. Sultan planned a three-pronged attack south from Myitkyina into Japanese-held territory in northern Burma. The British 36th Division and the Chinese 50th Division would advance south along the Railway Corridor to secure the Katha-Indaw area; the Chinese 22nd Division would move southeast to capture the Broadway airstrip northeast of Katha and establish a bridgehead over the Irrawaddy at Shwegu; and the Chinese 38th Division, followed by the 30th Division, would move south from Mogaung to secure the Bhamo-Mansi area. By the end of August, Festing's forces had followed the 53rd Division to Pinbaw, then advanced cautiously until they secured Nanma in September. The British moved out on 15 October. At first, contact was light, but by the time they reached Mawlu on 31 October Japanese posts were stronger and closer together and their artillery and mortar fire was progressively heavier. However, at Mawlu the 36th was eighty miles south of Mogaung and very near the great bend of the Irrawaddy which was the goal for 15 December. The Japanese stiffened at Mawlu, and the 1st Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers, met artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire that took thirteen casualties. By evening the town was occupied. Road conditions were very bad, for the ground was still wet, and vehicles had trouble moving. After occupying Mawlu the division paused until 9 November. There were brushes with Japanese, snipings, patrol actions, but no heavy fighting. Festing used the lull to bring up the 72d Brigade, and so make his advance one of brigades in line, with the 72d on the east, the 29th on the west. The 72d would make the main effort. Moving down a dry-weather road parallel to the railway tracks, elements of the 72d Brigade on 10 November met stubborn resistance a few miles northwest of a railway station called Pinwe. It came from a cluster of bunkers, which together with heavy artillery fire and the identification of Japanese from a number of units all pointed to one conclusion for the 36th--it had met the Japanese main line of resistance in this area centering on Pinwe. The Pinwe area was well adapted to defense. Farther north the 36th had fought its way over rice fields, but here the bush made an impenetrable screen on either side of the jungle tracks. Flanking movements were so difficult that they were judged to be impossible. Frontal attacks after artillery and air preparations became the order of the day. The Japanese lines at Pinwe were held by the 119th Regiment, 53d Division. Pinwe was the hardest fighting the 53d had encountered, and the 119th received a diploma of merit for its work there. At night their infiltration parties harassed the British rear areas and sought to destroy their artillery. On one occasion, they thrust so deftly into the British positions as to cut off two companies of infantry, which had to be withdrawn at night. The fighting resolved itself into British attempts at prying the Japanese out of their strongpoints, while maintaining a close guard against Japanese raiding parties. In these days the 72d Infantry Brigade, which had been trying to force its way over the stream covering the principal Japanese positions, took heavy casualties and had to be relieved by the 29th Infantry Brigade. On 25 November the British did put a company across the stream, but found they could not reinforce or supply it. The 53d Division was also ordered to execute limited but bold attacks to its front. To relieve the pressure on the 53d Division, the 15th Division was directed to attack the right flank and rear of the enemy 36th Division along the Meza River. Although the attacks of the 15th Division and the counterattacks of the 53d failed to destroy the enemy, they were successful in checking the offensive of the 36th and enabled the 53d Division to hold the line for approximately three weeks. The order to the 53d showed the DiVision commanders the caliber and determination of the new Army commander and the 53d's success in holding bolstered the sagging combat spirit of the entire 15th Army. Pressure on the 53d Division increased as the weeks went by; and when enemy elements infiltrated into the gap between the 53d and 15th Divisions in late November, the 15th Army finally ordered the 53d to withdraw to Katha and the sector north of Tigyaing. The 15th Division was ordered to withdraw its right wing to maintain contact with the revised battle line of the 53d Division. The 15th Army finally issued orders to the 53d and 15th Divisions directing the commencement of the withdrawal movement to the Irrawaddy River line on 1 December. The 33d Division was directed to withdraw on 4 December, giving the Division additional time for disposal of munitions in its area. From positions in the Kamaing area, far behind the outposts held by the 36th Division in the Railway Corridor, the 22d began its march on 15 October. It was to move southeast toward Mogaung, but bypassing the town to save ten miles, then toward Pinbaw, then Hopin. As the march got under way it appeared that the long rest after combat had left troops and animals in poor condition. The troops were traveling as light as possible, but fatigue was evident when after three days the division reached Hopin. Predawn departures were ordered to keep to a minimum the time spent marching under the full sun, and a day of rest was spent at Hopin. At Hopin the division turned east, to take a route that would sorely test the marching powers of its troops, for the chosen trail led over the ridge that marked the eastern boundary of the Railway Corridor, down into a plain formed by a tributary of the Irrawaddy, where the old Chindit airstrip BROADWAY was located, and up again over a hill mass overlooking the Irrawaddy valley. On 26 October the division reached the airstrip, twenty-seven miles southeast of Hopin. General Liao Yueh-shang, commanding the New Sixth Army, of which the 22d Division was part, flew in to BROADWAY, and gave the division detailed orders for the final move to the Irrawaddy. The division was formed into two columns. On the west, the 64th Regiment was directed to take Shwegugale, which lay on the south bank downstream from Shwegu. The 65th and 66th were to move off as one column, then to split into combat teams just north of the Irrawaddy and cross on a broad front. Kachin irregulars and patrols reported there were no Japanese ahead, and after a three-day rest the division resumed its advance. On 3 November the division occupied the north bank of the Irrawaddy without opposition. The troops rested while commanders studied maps and waited for rubber boats and outboard motors to be airdropped. Three days later the 64th Regiment crossed the Irrawaddy and took Shwegugale against light opposition. Next day the 65th Regiment took Shwegu, and the division had its first objectives. Meanwhile, after the unsuccessful Dan offensive, General Honda reorganized the 33rd Army. The 56th Division resumed defending Longling and Mangshi, while the 18th Division took over the defense of Namhkam. Although the Yoshida Force and the Bhamo Garrison remained with the 33rd Army, the 2nd Division was reassigned to the area army and began relocating to the Pyinmana-Toungoo area by the end of October to be available for operations in central Burma. Unbeknownst to Honda, he was soon to encounter the full force of Sultan's renewed offensive. Major-General Li Hong's 38th Division had departed from Myitkyina on October 15, advancing cautiously along the road to Bhamo with minimal contact until October 28. On that date, they encountered Japanese patrols two miles north of the Taping River, which were quickly dispatched. At Myothit was the Japanese outpost line of resistance; the Chinese patrols speedily found that the Japanese meant to defend it. Strong Japanese positions were seen on the south bank, and the commander of the 38th Division, General Li Huang, saw that he would have to force a defended river line unless he could turn the Japanese position. General Li decided to use the 112th and 114th Regiments, which had been the main body of the 38th, as an enveloping force. Since they were some seven miles to the north the 112th and 114th were out of contact with the Japanese and well placed to make a wide swing to the east. The two regiments began their march through the hills, while the 113th made a show of activity around Myothit to keep the Japanese attention focused there. Once again envelopment proved its worth. The Japanese were too few to defend a long line, and the enveloping force was able to cross the Taping at an unguarded bridge upstream, go around the right end of the Japanese outpost line of resistance, and emerge on the Bhamo plain on 10 November. Pressing on west toward Bhamo, the enveloping force met a strong entrenched Japanese force at Momauk, which is eight miles east of Bhamo and is the point at which the Myitkyina-Bhamo road swings to the west for the last stretch into Bhamo. Here there was savage fighting between the 114th Regiment and the Japanese defenders. Heavily outnumbered, the Japanese outpost at Momauk was driven into the main defenses at Bhamo. The appearance of its survivors, some without rifles, others without shoes, depressed the Bhamo garrison. Hara's forces endured significant losses as they conducted a delaying action at Momauk, with the remaining reconnaissance units joining the defense of Bhamo by November 16. Meanwhile, the 113th Regiment moved west along the south bank of the Taping River and approached Bhamo from the north. However, instead of directly attacking the town, the 113th Regiment repositioned south and southeast of Bhamo. Concurrently, the 114th Regiment advanced west from Momauk to encircle the town from the north, creating a loose encirclement around the Japanese outposts in the Bhamo suburbs. This maneuver allowed the 112th Regiment to bypass the confrontation entirely and continue south towards Namhkam. By early November, Japanese patrols had also detected the presence of the 22nd Division in the region between Bhamo and Katha, apparently moving towards Mandalay. Fearing that this force might sever the Mandalay-Lashio rail line by advancing through Mongmit, Honda's staff decided to keep the 55th Regiment stationed at Namhkam and reassign the rest of General Naka's 18th Division to Mongmit to prevent the effective separation of the 15th and 33rd Armies. While the 64th Regiment remained to secure the crossing area, the 22nd Division advanced towards Man Tha along the main road south from the Japanese stronghold of Bhamo, which was captured without incident on November 14. Continuing along the Bhamo-Myitson road, the Si-u area was secured by late November, with Colonel Ernest Easterbrook's 475th Regiment also moving there after bypassing Bhamo successfully. Meanwhile, after a period of recovery due to heavy losses in September, General Wei's Y-Force was preparing to resume its Salween offensive. On October 29, Lieutenant-General Huang Jie assaulted  Longling, defended by the 146th Regiment's main force with artillery support up to 1,700 rounds and 30-40 air sorties per day carried out by 37 P-40s of the 14th Air Force. Elements of the 200th Division attacked from the south and west, targeting positions behind Colonel Imaoka's defenses, while two divisions of the 71st Army exerted heavy pressure from the north. With many positions being devastated and numerous defenders killed or wounded, General Matsuyama ordered the 146th to retreat from Longling to Mangshi on November 3. Although the Japanese managed a midnight withdrawal, the Chinese succeeded in capturing their main objective. The Japanese respite, however, unsettled the Americans, who promptly urged Chiang to continue the offensive. Following the Generalissimo's orders to advance on November 9, Wei directed the newly arrived 53rd Army through the hills north of the Burma Road to Chefang, while the 2nd and 6th Armies moved south towards Mangshi, and the 71st Army proceeded down the road itself. Against the expected offensive, the 56th Division consolidated its defense around Mangshih with eight infantry and two artillery battalions on an established defense perimeter. The Yoshida Force, which was under the direct command of the Army at Wanting, was assigned the missions of protecting the rear of the 56th Division with its main force in the area north of Chefang and the 3d Battal- ion in the Menka area. At the same time, the 3d Battalion of the 146th Infantry Regiment was moved from Mangshih to join the Yoshida Force. A detachment of about 100 replacement troops was assigned to hold Chefang Pass. Although the 56th Division continued to be optimistic about its chances of holding against the expected Chinese attack, Army Headquarters took a less hopeful view. The Division was ordered to conduct a flexible holding operation north of Wanting and not cling too tenaciously to Mangshih. After a strong Chinese offensive on November 19, and following Colonel Tsuji's insistence, Matsuyama had no choice but to withdraw during the night to the Chefang Pass. General Matsuyama was strongly in favor of conducting a holding action in the Mangshi area and merely directed a partial withdrawal of his forces to be effected on November 22, 23 and 24. Col. Tsuji, of the 33rd Army headquarters, was present at the 56th Division headquarters and warned the chief of staff against over-optimism. Tsuji stressed the point that, once the withdrawal had been decided upon, the Division should withdraw simultaneously from the entire line to the south of Chefang Pass, preferably on the eve of the general attack or on the following night, at the latest. However, Col. Kawamichi, the Division chief of staff, would not change the order because it had already been passed down to the subordinate units. Subsequently, following an inspection of the front lines and an observation of enemy activity on the 18th, Tsuji came to the conclusion that the enemy would launch a general attack at dawn on the 19th or early on the 20th. He bluntly advised General Matsuyama to change his division order and at his insistence the order was changed to a withdrawal at midnight on November 19 to Chefang Pass. At dawn of the 19th, the Chinese launched a heavy attack in an attempt to envelop the entire line, just as Tsuji had predicted. All frontline units held in their prepared positions and inflicted heavy losses. Throughout the day they were able to check the enemy, but with the tremendous forces arrayed against the Division it is probable that many of the positions would have been overrun the following day. The Division, however, succeeded in withdrawing from the entire line at midnight on November 19.As a result, the strategic Mangshi airfield fell to Wei, enabling him to land supplies rather than relying solely on airdrops.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Despite the heavy losses, capturing Angaur proved crucial in securing the Palaus and removing the island group as a threat to Allied lines of communication across the western Pacific toward the Philippines. General MacArthur was getting closer to his ultimate goa

In this episode our host, Ash Bhardwaj, speaks to Colonel Jax Powell. Colonel Powell joined the Army in 1994, commissioning into the Royal Logistic Corps (RLC). She has served on operations in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and Mali. She has also held several Staff roles including stints at the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), Army Headquarters, Home Command, and at the Development Concepts Doctrine Centre. Her junior career included a tenure as a Platoon Commander at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) and, more recently, she has been an Officer Commanding (OC) of an RLC subunit on Op HERRICK in Afghanistan, and the Commanding Officer (CO) of 25 training regiment. Since joining the General Staff, Col Powell has been Deputy Commandant RMAS and Commander University Officer Training Corps (UOTC). Col Jax will be the next Corps Colonel for the RLC. In this episode, we discuss ‘being scared of being scared' on operations, and how being open about fearing fear is not something to be ashamed of. Col Jax also speaks ablut emotional intelligence and how different people have different requirements based on the context of a situation, and how understanding others emotions, as well as your own, in high-pressure situations is crucial to good leadership. She recognises the importance of kindness in leadership, yet balancing this with the necessity to remove emotion and be transactional when applying discipline.

In this episode our host, Ash Bhardwaj, speaks to Colonel Jax Powell. Colonel Powell joined the Army in 1994, commissioning into the Royal Logistic Corps (RLC). She has served on operations in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and Mali. She has also held several Staff roles including stints at the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), Army Headquarters, Home Command, and at the Development Concepts Doctrine Centre. Her junior career included a tenure as a Platoon Commander at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) and, more recently, she has been an Officer Commanding (OC) of an RLC subunit on Op HERRICK in Afghanistan, and the Commanding Officer (CO) of 25 training regiment. Since joining the General Staff, Col Powell has been Deputy Commandant RMAS and Commander University Officer Training Corps (UOTC). Col Jax will be the next Corps Colonel for the RLC. In this episode, we discuss ‘being scared of being scared' on operations, and how being open about fearing fear is not something to be ashamed of. Col Jax also speaks ablut emotional intelligence and how different people have different requirements based on the context of a situation, and how understanding others emotions, as well as your own, in high-pressure situations is crucial to good leadership. She recognises the importance of kindness in leadership, yet balancing this with the necessity to remove emotion and be transactional when applying discipline.

Last time we spoke about the Invasion of Saipan, Tinian and Guam. The Japanese mistakenly believed that the Americans were preparing for a decisive battle near New Guinea, not realizing the real target was Saipan. The US assembled a large fleet for Operation Forager, aiming to capture Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, advancing the US strategy to establish strategic airfields to hit  Tokyo. Japanese defenses were ill-prepared, with shortages of ammunition and inadequate inland defenses. The Americans hit Saipan with extensive air and naval bombardments, neutralizing Japanese positions, and faced stiff resistance during landings but ultimately secured a beachhead. The 23rd Marines of Colonel Louis Jones, advanced through Charan Kanoa and secured Mount Fina Susu despite significant losses. Heavy artillery pinned them down at the O-1 Line, leading Jones to reposition his forces. Casualties mounted on both sides as American forces fought to secure the beachhead and push inland. This episode is the the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Before his death Admiral Yamamoto instilled a sort of mind virus into the Imperial Japanese Navy. To be honest, the virus was a pre war doctrine, laying around ever since perhaps the First-Sino Japanese War of 1894-1895, but Yamamoto certainly focused attention more so upon it. The infamous decisive naval battle. The event that could turn the tide of the war, to bolster Japan's poker hand for peace negotiations. If Japan could simply knock out a enormous sum if not the entire strength the American Pacific fleet, something extremely unrealistic by this point of the war, but if they could, would America not reconsider settling this all up at the peace table? It had been the strategy of not just the IJN but for the Japanese military as a whole. Japan would never be able to win a war of attrition with the US, but they could make them pay so dearly, perhaps the Americans would just sue for peace. This idea consumed Yamamoto, leading to the disaster at the Battle of Midway. After the Guadalcanal Campaign, Japan lost the initiative, they retreated behind an inner perimeter. Henceforth the IJN scoured over the actions of the American navy, looking for any opportunity to unleash their full might down upon a significant American naval force. So many times the American navy eluded them, but here, with the invasion of Saipan, the IJN felt the decisive naval battle had finally come.  Admiral Turner and General Smith's American forces had just successfully invaded Saipan, establishing a beachhead with some challenges by June 17. This incited a strong Japanese response, as Admiral Toyoda initiated Operation A-Go, the IJN's strategy for a decisive battle that could potentially win them the war. Following Admiral Koga's Plan Z, Toyoda's A-Go involved Admiral Kakuta's land-based aircraft providing early warning and reconnaissance, aiming to neutralize one third of the enemy carriers before Admiral Ozawa's carriers completed the destruction of the enemy fleet with large-scale daytime air attacks, operating beyond the enemy's aircraft range. Additionally, Toyoda planned a nighttime surface engagement where enemy screening forces would be targeted by massed torpedo attacks. On June 16, at 9:00, the First Mobile Fleet departed the Guimaras and headed to the northeast. At 5:30pm, the Japanese fleet entered the Philippine Sea through the San Bernardino Strait. Admiral Ugaki's battleships Yamato and Musashi were not with the main body, but were proceeding independently through the Philippine Sea with two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and five destroyers to join with Ozawa. Once into the Philippine Sea, Ozawa headed southeasterly. At about 5:00 on the 16th, Yamato and Musashi joined with the First Mobile Fleet. The Japanese began to refuel which was not completed until 10:00 on the 17th.  In response, Admiral Spruance directed Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58, strengthened by Admiral Lee's battleships and Turner's cruisers and destroyers, to remain positioned west of the Marianas, prepared to counter any IJN attack. On June 16, Mitscher continued strikes against Guam and Tinian. Several Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the ground and in the air, but their airfields remained usable. The following day saw an increase in Japanese air activity. A small strike flown from Truk, five torpedo bombers and one J1N1-S night fighter attacked a transport group east of Saipan at 5:50pm. Three Japanese aircraft were claimed as destroyed, but a torpedo hit the small landing craft LCI-468 that later sank. On June 18th, the Japanese mounted a larger raid, this time from Yap Island. This operation featured 31 Zeros, 17 Judys and two P1Y twin-engined bombers. Combat Air Patrol did not intercept this group before it attacked shipping off the landing beach at Saipan that resulted in damage to an LST. The attack group then encountered the American escort carrier groups and attacked them at dusk. Two escort carriers were nearmissed and Fanshaw Bay was hit by a bomb which penetrated to the hangar deck. The carrier was forced to retire for repairs. As usual, Japanese aviators over-claimed, stating that three or four carriers from Task Force 58 had been hit.Furthermore, Admirals Lockwood and Christie's submarines were tasked with reconnaissance of IJN fleet movements, launching attacks when possible, and rescuing downed aircrews. Since Ozawa's fleet maintained radio silence and operated beyond the reach of American search planes, the only way to track his movements was through submarines, leaving the Americans mostly uninformed until the battle began. Unknown to Ozawa and Toyoda, Mitscher's carrier aircraft had already disabled Kakuta's land-based air power in the area, which significantly weakened a major part of A-Go. Additionally, the Americans, who had acquired Plan Z on April 3, were prepared for the critical carrier battle, although they were hesitant to engage in nighttime combat. Meanwhile, on June 18, the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions began their attacks at 10:00 a.m. The 4th Marine Division attacked toward the east coast with three regiments abreast: 25th Marines on the right, 24th Marines in the center, and 23rd Marines on the left. The 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, remained attached to the 23rd Regiment. Good progress was made by the 24th and 25th Marines, although the former sustained an attack at 10:15 by two Japanese tanks which surged to within 350 yards of the front lines. The situation for a while was alarming: American tanks had departed for rear areas to refuel and rearm so that only bazookas were immediately available for anti-tank defense. Though the 24th Marines' Weapons Company was immediately alerted, it arrived too late to participate in the fight. The enemy tanks were finally chased by bazookas and artillery, but not before they had sprayed the area, causing 15 casualties with machine-gun and small cannon fire. A portion of the O-3 line was reached by the 24th and 25th Marines during the day, placing the latter along the coast of Magicienne Bay. This healthy gain severed the island's southern portion, including Nafutan Point, from the remainder of the island. To maintain the momentum of the attack and avoid the long delay of a mopping-up process, the 24th Marines by-passed the southern extremity of a heavily defended cliff line running north and south through its zone of action. However, since the direction of attack for the division would soon Swing north through the by-passed area, it was necessary to secure the cliff line. This mission was assigned to the division reserve, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines. This, the unit's first experience with cleaning cave positions, proved a sIow, unpleasant and dangerous task. Rather than a coordinated move, the task took the form of a series of small, separated actions, each employing groups of four or five men. At 7:30, the 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, relieved Haas' 1st Battalion on the division's left wing and commenced the move on O-2, which would serve as the line of departure. As will be seen, however, events of the day prevented the regiment from reaching this line. Organizational readjustments within the 23rd Marines included the attachment of the 3rd Battalion's rifle companies and 81mm mortar platoon to Dillon's 2nd Battalion and formation of a composite battalion from the 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion Headquarters. The latter unit would support the attack of the other two battalions from positions on Mt. Fina Susu. Machine-gun fire stopped the 23rd Marines' left elements after an advance of 200 to 250 yards. Most of this fire came from a clump of trees to their front, but a definite location of enemy weapons was impossible. Frequent barrages of Japanese mortar fire hampered efforts to spot the enemy, and the attack faltered. At this juncture, Cosgrove's composite battalion was committed on the left of the 3rd Battalion. 24th Marines, in an attempt to retain the impetus, and the attack again moved forward. But the advance was slow. By 5:15, the 23rd Marines had moved to a line about 400 yards short of O-2. Prior to darkness, 23rd Marines' patrols were dispatched to the east. On the right, these patrols reached O-2, but on the left machinegun fire denied movement as far as O-2. Colonel Jones, the 23rd Marines' commander, requested permission from General Schmidt to withdraw to more favorable ground for the night. General Schmidt approved, and the 23rd pulled back to a position about 400 yards east of Lake Susupe, breaking contact with the 2nd Division. The 23rd Marines emerged from the swamps, the 24th Marines reached the base of Hill 500, and the 25th Marines progressed to Magicienne Bay, effectively dividing the island. General Smith's soldiers also captured the Aslito Airfield, with the 165th and 105th Regiments securing Cape Obiam and the area south of the field. This isolated numerous Japanese forces in the north at Nafutan Point. Concurrently, General Saito was shifting his remaining troops to the Garapan-Mount Tapotchau area, facing relentless artillery, naval, and air attacks that left the Japanese in a dire situation.  The chief of staff of the 31st Army, General Igeta, drafted a message on the morning of June 18th to the commanding general at Yap Island and the chief of staff in Tokyo. In it he summarized the situation as he saw it and, in the process, revealed how very little he knew of what was taking place. Not that the general was caught in the bog of apathy, nor was he too frightened or lazy to find out what was going on; it was simply impossible for him to penetrate the shroud of obscurity resulting from ruptured communications in the vast area over which the action was taking place. As such, he erroneously reported that the 43rd Division HQ “underwent an enemy attack this morning and the division CO died along with his staff officers.” In another dispatch later in the day, Igeta corrected his error in regard to the division commander's death, reporting that General Saito was “all right, but that his staff officers were wounded.” He also added that “the secret documents in custody of the 31st Army Headquarters… were completely burned at 1830 of 18 June…” Recognizing the desperate circumstances, Prime Minister Tojo sent a fatalistic message to the garrison, despite reinforcements en route. “Have received your honorable Imperial words. By becoming the bulwark of the Pacific with 10000 deaths; we hope to acquire Imperial favor.” Reports indicated that Ozawa's mobile fleet was approaching the Marianas and expected to arrive on June 19. When Spruance finally received the spotting report from Cavalla, this prompted a decision that turned out to be the most important of the battle. Assuming that the report from Cavalla was Ozawa's main force, and assuming it would continue at a speed of 19 knots to the east, Spruance's staff calculated that the Japanese would still be about 500nm from TF 58 at 5:30 on the 18th. This placed the Japanese well out of range of American searches or strikes. The only way to alter this situation was to steam TF 58 to the southwest toward the contact and plan to locate and engage the Japanese during the afternoon of the 18th. Mitscher advised the aggressive option of steaming to the southwest to close the range on Ozawa's force. He wanted to launch afternoon strikes to locate and possibly attack Ozawa and even advocated a nighttime surface engagement. While this offered the possibility of opening the battle on terms set by the Americans, there were several problems with it in Spruance's calculating mind. The first was that TF 58 was not yet concentrated; TGs 58.1 and 58.4 were not due to link up with the other two task groups operating west of Saipan until 1200 on the 18th. If he allowed Mitscher to take off to the west, it would only be with two task groups. Since the Japanese possessed longer-range strike aircraft, this offered Ozawa the chance to attack TF 58 and defeat it piecemeal. As for the prospects of a night engagement, both Spruance and Lee declined that possibility.  In response, Spruance adopted a cautious approach, instructing Mitscher to gather his carrier groups and redirect them toward Saipan. In a last effort to change Spruance's mind, Mitscher sent him a message at about 11:30pm and proposed a course change to the west at 1:30am in order to position TF 58 to launch a strike against the Japanese carrier force at 5:00am. At 12:38am on the 19th, Spruance sent a message rejecting the proposal. The die was finally cast for a defensive battle on June 19.Spruance's priority was to safeguard the invasion force rather than eliminate the Japanese fleet. At 6:00am on the 18th, Japanese search floatplanes from the First Mobile Fleet spotted six carriers from TF 58. In the afternoon, seven aircraft from Carrier Division 1 flying out to 420nm spotted TF 58 after its 1200 rendezvous. The first report was issued at 3:14pm and included detection of an American task group with two carriers. A second aircraft sighted a task group with an “unknown number of carriers” at 4:00 and later issued another report at 1710 which identified two task groups, each with two carriers. These were within strike range, but Ozawa elected not to launch an immediate strike since his pilots were so inexperienced in night flying. Nonetheless, Rear-Admiral Obayashi Sueo of the 3rd Carrier Division boldly ordered the launch of 67 aircraft from the carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda, hoping to surprise the Americans. However, when he learned of Ozawa's decision, Obayashi reluctantly called off his strike. Ozawa had correctly assessed that the enemy would hold its position near Saipan, allowing him to maintain his own position without fearing an American attack. With this understanding, he changed course southwest to maintain the distance, while Admiral Kurita's Vanguard Force moved east, and Forces A and B shifted south. At 03:00 on June 19, all three forces turned northeast and increased their speed to 20 knots. Ozawa executed his plan flawlessly, positioning himself to launch significant attacks against the unsuspecting Americans the next morning. His only misstep was breaking radio silence at 20:20 to coordinate the decisive operation with Kakuta, who consistently misrepresented the true condition of his air forces while giving overly optimistic reports of successes by his aviators. As a result, an American station intercepted the transmission and geo-located it accurately. Once the mobile fleet reached strike positions, the Japanese began launching search aircraft, sending 16 floatplanes at 04:45 and another 14 planes about 30 minutes later. Although they lost seven scouts, the Japanese were able to spot the northern elements of Task Force 58 and the picket destroyers deployed ahead by 7:00. Starting at 05:30, Mitscher's combat air patrol engaged Japanese aircraft from Guam, which were unsuccessful in bombing destroyers. At 6:30am, American radar detected Japanese air activity over Guam and four Hellcats were sent to investigate. At 7:20am, these arrived and found themselves in the middle of many Japanese aircraft taking off. More Hellcats rushed in and, beginning at 8:07am for the next hour, there was constant combat over and near Guam. Up to 33 American fighters were involved, and they claimed 30 fighters and five bombers. The Americans claimed to have destroyed 30 aircraft, successfully hindering Kakuta's support for Ozawa's decisive battle. However, with the return of Japanese floatplanes, Ozawa was preparing to launch his first strike, deploying 69 aircraft: 16 Zero fighters, 45 Zeros with bombs and eight Jills with torpedoes at 08:30 under Obayashi's command. Fortunately for the Americans, radar warnings enabled Mitscher to dispatch every available Hellcat for interception. At 10:23am, launching of every available Hellcat from TF 58 began as the force headed east into the wind. The American carriers cleared their decks and all airborne bombers on search and patrol missions were instructed to clear the area. This allowed the fighters to return as necessary to rearm and refuel. The goal was to keep as many fighters in the air as possible to intercept incoming threats. The Hellcats had reached their interception altitudes of between 17,000 and 23,000ft when at 10:35am they spotted the incoming Japanese aircraft identified as two groups of strike aircraft with escorting Zeros on each flank. The first American fighters on the scene were Hellcats from Essex. Lieutenant Commander C. Brewer of Fighter Squadron 15 VF-15 led them.  The escorting Japanese fighters did not protect the bombers and the bombers scattered making them easy to pick off. Brewer claimed four aircraft, and his wingman claimed another four. In all, VF-15 pilots claimed 20 Japanese aircraft. Joining the Hellcats from Essex were others from Hornet and Bunker Hill as well as from five light carriers for a total of 50 Hellcats. Altogether, some 25 out of the 69 Japanese aircraft in this raid were accounted for by this initial interception. In return, three Hellcats were lost in combat and a Bunker Hill Hellcat was lost when it ditched on its way back to its carrier. The remaining Japanese aircraft continued their approach but were intercepted by Bunker Hill's Hellcats, which claimed another 16. Only around 28 Japanese planes remained and made minor attacks on Admiral Lee's group. Two targeted battleship South Dakota, with one scoring a direct bomb hit at 10:49, though causing minimal damage. Another narrowly missed heavy cruiser Minneapolis, while another almost missed cruiser Wichita. The Japanese reported  losing 42 aircraft:  eight fighters, 32 fighter-bombers, and two torpedo bombers. Most had been destroyed by Hellcats, with anti-aircraft gunnery from TG 58.7 accounting for the rest. Meanwhile, Ozawa launched his main strike at 08:56, composed of the 1st Division's best-trained pilots from three fleet carriers. This was a large strike designated Raid II from the three fleet carriers of Carrier Division 1 with the best-trained aviators in the First Mobile Fleet. The raid consisted of 128 aircraft – 48 Zero fighters, 53 Judy dive-bombers and 27 Jills with torpedoes. Launching began at 08:56 but was disrupted when at 09:09 Taiho came under attack by American submarine Albacore. The submarine fired six torpedoes at the fast-moving carrier. A last-second glitch in the boat's fire-control computer made it necessary to fire the six torpedoes by eye. One of Taiho's aircraft saw the torpedoes headed for the ship and dove into one in an effort to save the ship. In spite of this, one of the torpedoes hit the carrier abreast the forward elevator and created a hole which resulted in flooding. The ship's forward elevator, which was raised for the launch, was knocked out of alignment and fell several feet. Within 30 minutes, the elevator space was planked over by damage-control personnel and the launch continued. In addition to the aircraft lost from Taiho, eight other aircraft developed engine trouble and were forced to return. More trouble soon followed. When the attack group flew over the Vanguard Force deployed about 100nm in front of the main carrier force, it was engaged by the Japanese ships. This fire was effective enough to shoot down two more aircraft and damage another eight that were forced to return.  This attack and some friendly fire reduced the Japanese force to just 109 aircraft for the largest strike of the day, which was detected by radar. In a swirling action that began at 11:39am, the Hellcats again tore through the Japanese formation. McCampbell claimed three Judys and his wingman two. Other Hellcats joined the fray resulting in about 70 Japanese aircraft being shot down. VF-16 from Lexington claimed 22 Japanese aircraft without a loss; 12 Bunker Hill Hellcats were unable to gain a solid intercept but still claimed five kills, and Hellcats from light carriers Bataan, Monterey and Cabot claimed ten, seven and five, respectively. VF-1 from Yorktown also scored heavily. This still left a number of Japanese aircraft headed for TF 58. Twenty were reported in three groups at 11:45. Most of these made the mistake of attacking the picket destroyers deployed in advance of TG 58.7 or Lee's battleship force itself. Destroyer Stockham reported being under attack for 20 minutes, but again the ship suffered no damage. Around noon, TG 58.7 came under attack. Two torpedo bombers attacked South Dakota with no success, and two more selected Indiana in the center of TG 58.7's formation as their target. One crashed into the waterline of the heavily armored ship but caused little damage. Another Jill went after Iowa, but again missed. Alabama was undamaged by two bombs aimed at her. Potentially more serious was a group of six Judy dive-bombers that escaped the Hellcats and proceeded south until running across TG 58.2. Of this group, four selected carrier Wasp for attack. None scored a hit, but one of the bombs detonated overhead which rained down shrapnel that killed one and wounded 12 crewmen. The other two selected TG 58.2's other fleet carrier, Bunker Hill, for attack at 12:03. They scored two near misses that caused minor fires and other damage, in addition to killing three and wounding 73. Both carriers continued in action. Four of the aircraft were shot down by antiaircraft fire, with the other two landing on Rota and Guam. Finally, six B6N bombers attacked Admiral Reeves' carriers, but their attacks began at 11:57 and were also ineffective, failing to hit any targets. One missed Enterprise, and another three attacked light carrier Princeton, but all three were destroyed by antiaircraft fire.Thus, Ozawa's second strike resulted in a significant loss for the Japanese, with 97 of the 128 aircraft not returning to their carriers. His losses totaled 32 fighters, 42 dive-bombers and 23 Jills. At 5:30, the third group of Japanese scout aircraft took off. This comprised 11 Judys from Shokaku and two Jakes from heavy cruiser Mogami. The aircraft flew 560nm to the east. Two contacts were radioed back to Ozawa. The first, at 9:45, was reported at a position well to the south of TF 58's actual position. The problem resulted from an uncorrected compass deviation on the search aircraft. This contact was designated “15 Ri” by the Japanese. The second contact, designated “3 Ri”, was reported at 10:00. It was of a task force of three carriers and escorts to the north of TF 58's actual position, but may have been of TG 58.4.This third Japanese strike designated Raid III by the Americans was mounted by Carrier Division 2. This effort, from Junyo, Hiyo and Ryuho, comprised 47 aircraft including 15 fighters, 25 Zeros with bombs, and seven Jills with torpedoes. The remaining 20 aircraft saw what they believed to be two battleships but chose to keep searching for carriers. After a failed search, the group eventually attacked the battleships they initially spotted at 12:55 but were intercepted by Hellcats and lost seven aircraft. Nonetheless, the group pressed on and attacked Rear-Admiral William Harrill's carriers at 13:20. The effort was ineffective with one aircraft dropping a bomb 600 yards from Essex. Ozawa's third strike had accomplished nothing, but at least 40 of its 47 aircraft survived to return to their carriers. At 11:00, Ozawa launched his final attack of the day, consisting of 82 aircraft from the carriers Junyo, Hiyo, Ryuho, and Zuikaku of Carrier Division 1. It comprised 30 Zero fighters, ten Zeros with bombs, 27 Vals and nine Judys and six Jills. The planes set off for the new, incorrect southern target and found nothing, causing them to divide into three groups. The largest group of 49 planes headed toward Guam, where the Americans had been periodically discarding their ordnance to neutralize Kakuta's airfields.  As Ozawa sent his series of strikes against TF 58, Spruance directed Mitscher to keep a number of Hellcats active over Guam to disrupt any Japanese attempt to mount attacks from there. This reflected Spruance's fear that the Japanese would use Guam as a base for “shuttle bombing” using aircraft from the 1st Mobile Fleet. Before the first Japanese carrier raid, Hellcats encountered airborne Japanese aircraft over Guam. This action continued throughout the day and periodically intensified when TF 58 dive-bombers and Avengers, ordered to the east to steer clear of the air battle, dumped their ordnance on Guam. Before noon, 15 Yorktown and 17 Hornet Helldivers bombed Orote Field on Guam. Another attack was mounted at 13:30 by Dauntlesses from Lexington and Enterprise, nine Avengers from Enterprise and ten Hellcats for escort. The armor-piercing bombs carried by the dive-bombers did little damage, but the Avengers succeeded in cratering the runway. Other attacks continued throughout the afternoon including Hellcats from Bunker Hill strafing Japanese aircraft on the ground and 11 Helldivers from Essex just before 14:00. The price to keep Guam suppressed during the day was steep – six Hellcats and one Helldiver – but the Base Air Force did not support Ozawa's main attack. Back over at the carrier action, Ozawa's first group approaching Guam were picked up by TF 58 radar at 1449hrs. Before long, 27 Hellcats were on the scene. Among these were 12 from light carrier Cowpens, seven from Essex again led by McCampbell, and eight from Hornet. The Hellcats did great execution, shooting down 30 of the 49 Japanese trying to land on Guam. The remaining 19 planes landed but were damaged on the ground and could no longer fly.Another 15 aircraft headed for Rota but changed course to attack Montgomery's group when they sighted it en route. Six aircraft approached Wasp unmolested until 2:23 when they were engaged by antiaircraft fire just as they were dropping their bombs. Adept maneuvering by Wasp thwarted the aircraft, identified as Judys. Another group of divebombers appeared and split up; two went after Bunker Hill, and one after Wasp. All missed, and of the nine attackers, only one escaped. The final 18 aircraft of Raid IV, including the eight from Zuikaku and ten Zeros with bombs, were returning to their carriers when they encountered two American scout groups consisting of Hellcats and Avengers some 200nm west of Guam.This encounter cost the Japanese six aircraft, but they did gain a measure of revenge when at 3:30 the same group of returning Japanese aircraft encountered and shot down two Bunker Hill aircraft on a search mission. Despite these efforts, none of the American ships were hit during this fourth attack, while Ozawa suffered a significant loss of 73 aircraft. The situation worsened when the submarine Cavalla spotted Shokaku recovering aircraft at 11:52 and launched six torpedoes. Three torpedoes hit the carrier's starboard side at 12:22, sparking fires in the hangar and causing the ship to list. Soon, the ship came to a halt and was left behind when Carrier Division 1 moved north. At 1310, the fires on the hangar set off a bomb that set off fumes from the cracked forward fuel tank. Large explosions ensued and it was obvious the carrier was doomed. Shokaku sank at 15:01, resulting in the deaths of 1,272 crew members. The light cruiser Yahagi and destroyers Urakaze, Wakatsuki, and Hatsuzuki rescued Captain Matsubara and 570 men. Additionally, a torpedo hit Taiho, cracking the forward aviation fuel tank and turning the IJN's newest and most heavily protected carrier into a floating bomb. At 3:32pm, a massive explosion hit Taiho, lifting her flight deck and causing damage to her hull that led to the ship sinking. Despite Ozawa's initial desire to stay with the carrier, he and his team were eventually evacuated by a destroyer. However, 660 members of Taiho's crew perished as the ship sank. The transfer to the Haguro, added to the confusion for Ozawa was the fact that he and his staff were jammed into inadequate facilities aboard heavy cruiser Haguro after they were forced to depart from Taiho. Communications were grossly inadequate; Ozawa admitted later that he should have turned over command to Kurita until he could have moved to a ship with adequate command and control facilities. After the final strike aircraft returned, the Japanese turned northwest at 18:08, preparing to refuel the following day before continuing their attack. In their four strikes, the Japanese had launched 373 aircraft; of these 243 were lost. Added to these losses were another 50 from Guam, nine when Shokaku went down, and another 13 from Taiho to bring the total to 315. Some 296 Hellcats had been engaged during the day in combat, and only 14 were lost in combat with another six recorded as operational losses. The lack of sufficient training and experience among Japanese aircrews was evident, as seasoned American pilots compared the battle to “an old-time turkey shoot down home.” As a result of the significant losses inflicted on Japanese aircraft by American forces, the aerial portion of the Battle of the Philippine Sea was known as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. In the war upon the land, after an uneventful night, the 2nd Marine Division conducted patrols as Generals Schmidt and Smith focused on securing the rest of southern Saipan. Although the 4th Marine Division's assault was postponed due to their need to disperse a sizable Japanese group near Tsutsuran village, the 27th Division pressed forward in the morning with the 165th Regiment swiftly reaching Magicienne Bay. In contrast, the 105th advanced more slowly through challenging terrain, resulting in a gap between the two regiments and requiring the 165th to extend its lines to maintain contact. Further north, Colonel Jones' 23rd Marines succeeded in advancing close to Hill 500 after intense artillery bombardment, but were compelled to withdraw about 400 yards to protect their vulnerable flank. At this stage, Brigadier-General Arthur Harper's Corps artillery had arrived on the island, offering essential reinforcement to the division's artillery units. By the end of the day, Schmidt's division realigned its regiments and shifted north. The most vicious action of the night occurred in the sector occupied by the 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines. Starting at about 3:50am and lasting until daylight, an enemy force of approximately 75 attacked the Marines with grenades and bayonets. In the close-in fighting that ensued, 11 Marines were wounded, but, in the process, the enemy attack was broken. By daylight, many of the attackers were sprawled forward of the Marines' foxholes, the rest had taken to their heels. Meanwhile, Admiral Mitscher, having retrieved all his aircraft, set a westerly course and increased speed to 23 knots in an attempt to catch up with the enemy. However, on June 20, his usual morning search found no results. The Japanese also maintained radio silence during the day, with no new intelligence obtained by American submarines or PBM flying boats based in Saipan. In the afternoon, a successful search finally established contact, prompting Mitscher to prepare for a bold night strike against an enemy fleet beyond the maximum strike range. Meanwhile, the plan to refuel the 1st Mobile Fleet on June 20 fell through amid confusion, prompting Ozawa to abandon the attempt after noon. He transferred to the Zuikaku and restored communications, discovering the extent of his aircraft losses. Ozawa's hope that he could continue strikes was buoyed by reports from Kakuta that some of Ozawa's aircraft had landed on Guam and the prospects that additional land-based aircraft reinforcements would flow into the area. The only concession he made was to move his next attack until the 21st. However, at 16:45, Ozawa's reconnaissance revealed he had been spotted, so he decided to retreat northwest at 24 knots. Thirty minutes later, when his scout aircraft located Task Force 58, Ozawa opted to initiate a night attack with seven B5Ns and three radar-equipped B6Ns. Meanwhile, Mitscher launched a full deckload from 11 carriers, including 85 Hellcats, 77 dive-bombers, and 54 Avengers. The First Mobile Fleet was not well positioned to meet the attack. The Van Force with most of the heavy escorts and the best antiaircraft capabilities was not the closest formation to the incoming American strike. Each of Ozawa's three groups was headed northwesterly with the Van Force to the south, Carrier Division 2 in the center and Zuikaku to the north. Astern of the carrier groups were the two supply groups composed of six oilers with their escorts, making this the closest group to the Americans. After an uneventful flight, the American aircraft found the 1st Mobile Fleet at 18:40, at the edge of their fuel range after nearly 300 miles. Lacking time for a coordinated attack, the American aircraft easily bypassed the 40 fighters and 28 bombers sent to intercept them and individually targeted the enemy carriers. The veteran carrier Zuikaku was defended by 17 fighters and put up a good fight with heavy antiaircraft fire and adept maneuvering. She avoided the four torpedoes aimed at her from the Hornet Avengers and took only a single direct hit by a 500- pound bomb aft of the island. After departing, the Americans reported the big carrier with heavy fires onboard. However, the damage was not as great as it appeared. The single bomb hit penetrated to the upper hanger deck where a fire started among the remaining aircraft. These were not fueled, so after a few tense moments and an order to abandon ship that was quickly rescinded, the fire was extinguished. Six near misses were recorded, but overall damage was light. Zuikaku, the last surviving carrier from the Pearl Harbor attack force, lived to fight again. Aircraft from Bunker Hill, Monterey, and Cabot attacked the Chiyoda group, which evaded five torpedoes and sustained one bomb hit, surviving to fight another day. The Japanese were organized into three groups, each centered on a light carrier with several escorting battleships or heavy cruisers. The Zuiho and Chitose groups were not attacked, but the Chiyoda group was. The light carrier was the target of over 20 Helldivers and Avengers with bombs, but only a single bomb hit Chiyoda on the flight deck resulting in 20 dead, 30 wounded and two aircraft destroyed. The Avengers from Monterey probably scored the single hit, which caused a fire that was quickly extinguished. Chiyoda successfully dodged five torpedoes from Bunker Hill Avengers and lived to fight another day. Escorting battleship Haruna was hit by a 500-pound bomb that penetrated her stern and flooded the steering compartment. The ship's speed was reduced, and 15 crewmen were killed and 19 wounded. Cruiser Maya endured a near miss that caused flooding. The strike group from Lexington, with support from the Avengers from Enterprise, Yorktown, and Belleau Wood, and the bomb-carrying Hellcats from Hornet and Yorktown, attacked Admiral Jojima's carriers. They inflicted minor damage on Junyo and Ryuho. Most of Lexington's Dauntless dive-bombers selected Junyo for attention. At 7:04, one or two bombs hit the carrier's island, and several near misses created minor flooding. Casualties included 53 dead, but overall damage was light. Light carrier Ryuho was attacked by the five Avengers from Enterprise with bombs at 7;10; eight hits were claimed, but only slight damage was caused by near misses. The carrier also survived attacks from Enterprise Dauntlesses, Avengers from Yorktown five with torpedoes and probably Hellcats from Hornet. Hiyo suffered the most successful attack of the evening. The carrier left the formation to launch two Jills to lay a smoke screen and was caught behind the main body when the American strike arrived. In the opening attack by Dauntlesses from Lexington, one bomb hit the foremast and exploded above the bridge resulting in heavy casualties to bridge personnel. The Japanese reported that another bomb hit the flight deck. However, the group of four Belleau Wood Avengers with torpedoes caused fatal damage. Three conducted an anvil attack, and one torpedo hit the carrier's starboard engine room. This was followed by a dive-bomb attack from six Enterprise Dauntlesses. The single torpedo hit, the only one scored by Avengers during the entire attack, proved fatal to the largely unprotected carrier. Within minutes, the damage created a list. The ship proceeded for a time on its port engine, but then went dead in the water. Just before sunset, at 1917, there was a large explosion amidships that caused a loss of power. The Japanese were convinced that this was the result of a submarine-launched torpedo, but there were no submarines in the area. A fuel-fed conflagration ensued, causing multiple explosions. The fire was beyond being contained, and the order to abandon ship was given. Hiyo sank at 20:32, claiming 247 crew members. The final American counterattack came from Wasp's aircraft, targeting Ozawa's Supply Group to disrupt the withdrawal of the 1st Mobile Fleet by damaging the oilers. Three oilers were damaged, and two were later scuttled. In this series of uncoordinated attacks, the Americans lost 20 aircraft and destroyed 80 Japanese planes; although the results were underwhelming, with only one carrier sunk, they fared better than Ozawa's combined strikes the previous day. At 20:45, American aircraft began returning to their carriers. The distance from the targets to TF 58 was between 240 and 300 miles, so fuel exhaustion was a real danger for many pilots. On a dark night, the returning aircraft began to return to their carriers at 8:45. Mitscher decided to ignore the potential Japanese air and submarine threats and ordered his ships to use extra illumination beyond the normal landing lights on each carrier deck to guide his appreciative aviators home. Any pretense of order was quickly lost and soon aircraft were ordered to land on any deck in sight. Almost half of the returning aircraft landed on the wrong carrier. This hectic scene took over two hours to play out. When the final accounting was complete, aircraft losses were expectedly heavy. The Americans would end up losing a total of 100 pilots and 109 crew members. Meanwhile, Admiral Toyoda ordered Ozawa to disengage from the decisive battle and retreat northwest, with the Japanese fleet successfully evading Mitscher's slow pursuit and reaching Okinawa on the afternoon of June 22. Once more, the Japanese sought a decisive battle but were decisively defeated. By the end, they had lost three carriers sunk, two carriers damaged, 395 carrier aircraft, about 200 land-based aircraft, two oilers, and four other damaged ships, with around 3,000 Japanese fatalities. In contrast, the Americans lost 130 aircraft and 76 aviators, with none of their damaged ships rendered out of service. The Battle of the Philippine Sea, the last carrier-versus-carrier battle of the war, stood out because the most conservative and defensive-minded side emerged victorious. In terms of scale the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot dwarfed the four carrier battles that preceded it. At the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, and the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands, the largest carrier engagement involved 7 carriers at Midway; by comparison there were 24 carriers at the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. It was, by a factor of almost 350 percent, the biggest carrier battle in history. Though Mitscher's Combat Air Patrol was not flawless, the combination of inadequate Japanese aircrew training and American radar-directed fighter interception rendered a significant Japanese strike ineffective. Ozawa conducted an intelligent battle, accurately assessing American intentions to launch carrier air strikes that would have been catastrophic to a carrier task force by 1942 standards. Nevertheless, his tools failed him. Despite Ozawa's skilled fleet handling, he lacked the airpower to inflict serious damage on Task Force 58. Admiral Spruance has faced criticism for his cautious approach, which exposed his carriers to attack without a strong chance of striking back at the enemy. Only the significant difference in skill between American and Japanese aviators and some good luck prevented this strategy from failing.  Now back over on Saipin, General Watson continued to focus mainly on patrolling, while the 8th Marines worked to secure Hill 500. Colonel Wallace's 2nd Battalion encountered minimal resistance, enabling them to quickly advance to the O-4 Line. Around 09:00, the 25th Marines moved towards Hill 500, subjecting the Japanese to a severe, thundering beating administered by the 4.5-inch rockets. As the Marines charged up the hill through the thinning smoke, artillery shells walked ahead in sturdy escort. Shortly before noon the hill was seized, and mopping up of the cave network began. Compartments at different levels and angles made it possible for the Japanese occupants to retreat from one cave-room to another, and the cleaning out process was a slow one. The price for Hill 500 was not light. Chambers' battalion suffered 49 casualties, nine of whom were killed. Counted Japanese dead numbered 44. Upon examination, it was found that Hill 500 had been well organized for defense but that the positions were not strongly manned. As darkness approached, the Marines dug in to defend their newly won possession. Meanwhile, the 24th Marines also reached the O-4 Line near Tsutsuran, but the 27th Division struggled to push the Japanese forces onto the challenging terrain at Nafutan Point. Additionally, the 106th Regiment arrived on June 20, and Aslito Airfield became operational, putting the security of the Japanese home islands in jeopardy. The following day involved reorganizing, resupplying, mopping-up, and patrolling to prepare for the next day's attack into central Saipan. General Smith's infantry continued their offensive south toward Nafutan Point, making incremental progress through each cave and ravine.  At 12:15, while engaged in the Nafutan Point attack, the 27th Division received a change of mission and disposition. NTLF Operation Order 9 dictated less one battalion and one light tank platoon, to assemble northwest of Aslito Airfield in NTLF reserve. Control of the division artillery would pass to the 23rd Corps Artillery. The designated infantry battalion was ordered to “operate in the Garrison Area and mop up remaining enemy detachments, maintain anti-sniper patrols within the Garrison Area and along the coast line to protect installations within its zone of action with particular attention to Aslito Airfield.” At 5:00, after consideration of the NTLForder, Ralph Smith telephoned Holland Smith and urged that a complete regiment be used to clean up Nafutan Point, rather than one battalion. He said that he planned to use the 105th Infantry for the job and that he believed they could finish in a couple of days. Holland Smith agreed to this but specified that one battalion of the 105th must be retained in reserve for possible use elsewhere. For this task, the 2nd Battalion would be selected. This modification was later confirmed in a mailbrief from NTLF which arrived at the 27th Division command post at 8;30, 22 June. Ralph Smith then issued an order to his division, the 105th will hold the present front line facing Nafutan Point, with two battalions on the line and one battalion in regimental reserve. It would relieve elements of 165th now on the front line by . Reorganization of the present front line to be effected not later than 11:00, 22 June and offensive operations against the enemy continued. Reserve battalion will maintain anti-sniper patrols in the vicinity of Aslito Airfield.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Battle of the Philippines  was the last hurrah of the once proud IJN carrier fleet that had humbled the American two and a half years earlier. Admiral Spruance's strategic patience led to a decisive American victory. Japan's carrier threat, which had driven its early wartime expansion, was annihilated in the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.

In this episode, our host Colonel Henry Llewellyn-Usher speaks with Commander UK Strategic Command, General Sir James (Jim) Hockenhull, KBE, ADC Gen. General Jim commissioned into the Intelligence Corps in 1986 and has extensive operation experience across the globe. His Staff experience includes role at the UK Ministry of Defence, and at the US Command and General Staff College. He has extensive experience working in and with multinational forces. He was Chief of Campaign Plans in Headquarters Multinational Force Iraq, and Chief Plans at Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and subsequently deployed to Afghanistan. On promotion to Brigadier in 2009, he assumed the role of Director Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) at Army Headquarters, and in Sep 2011 he returned to the Ministry of Defence as Head Military Strategic Planning. In June 2013, he was promoted to Major General, and deployed to Kabul as Director of the Ministry of Defence Advisory Group, before taking up his post as Director Cyber Intelligence and Information Integration in Mar 2015. In Dec 2018, General Jim assumed the appointment of Chief of Defence Intelligence on promotion to Lieutenant General. In 2022 General Hockenhull was appointed Commander UK Strategic Command.

In this episode, our host, Captain Ash Bhardwaj, speaks to Lieutenant Colonel Dean Canham OBE, SO1 Centre for Army Leadership. This conversation with Colonel Dean is a raw and honest insight into the realities of leadership on kinetic operations, and dealing with the consequence of your decisions. CONTENT WARNING: In this episode, we cover the topics of the deaths of soldiers on operations, improvised explosive devices, and dealing with the trauma of those tragedies. If these topics are difficult for you to hear about, you may want to skip this episode. It is totally natural that the examples given in this episode may affect you, and you may find it useful to speak with someone about how you feel. You can find a range of support resources at the Army's Ask for Help page linked at the bottom of these show notes. Commissioning in 2000 into the 1st Battalion Worcestershire and Sherwood Foresters, the then Second Lieutenant Canham joined the Regiment on their residential tour of Northern Ireland. He deployed to Sierra Leone on Op SILKMAN and to Afghanistan on Op HERRICK 1 as a Reconnaissance Platoon Commander. Later, he returned to Helmand on Op HERRICK 6 as the Battlegroup Operations Officer. He then Commanded A (Grenadier) Company of the 2nd Battalion the MERCIAN Regiment on Op HERRICK 15, also deploying to the Falklands and leading the 2 MERCIAN contingent at the London 2012 Olympic Games. He took command of 1 MERCIAN Regiment in 2020, and led the Battlegroup in Estonia on Op CABRIT 8 in 2021. He has worked at the Army Personnel Centre (APC) Glasgow, Army Headquarters and the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), where he was awarded an OBE for his work in support of operations in South Sudan and Somalia. He has instructed at the Infantry Training Centre Catterick, the Platoon Commander's Division at Brecon, and on the Intermediate Command and Staff Course (ICSC) at Shrivenham. He now heads up the Centre for Army Leadership, based at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS). The British Army's Ask for Help Page: https://www.army.mod.uk/people/health-wellbeing-welfare-support/health-performance-and-wellbeing-in-the-army/managing-stress/ask-for-help/

In this episode, our host, Captain Ash Bhardwaj, speaks to Lieutenant Colonel Dean Canham OBE, SO1 Centre for Army Leadership. This conversation with Colonel Dean is a raw and honest insight into the realities of leadership on kinetic operations, and dealing with the consequence of your decisions. CONTENT WARNING: In this episode, we cover the topics of the deaths of soldiers on operations, improvised explosive devices, and dealing with the trauma of those tragedies. If these topics are difficult for you to hear about, you may want to skip this episode. It is totally natural that the examples given in this episode may affect you, and you may find it useful to speak with someone about how you feel. You can find a range of support resources at the Army's Ask for Help page linked at the bottom of these show notes. Commissioning in 2000 into the 1st Battalion Worcestershire and Sherwood Foresters, the then Second Lieutenant Canham joined the Regiment on their residential tour of Northern Ireland. He deployed to Sierra Leone on Op SILKMAN and to Afghanistan on Op HERRICK 1 as a Reconnaissance Platoon Commander. Later, he returned to Helmand on Op HERRICK 6 as the Battlegroup Operations Officer. He then Commanded A (Grenadier) Company of the 2nd Battalion the MERCIAN Regiment on Op HERRICK 15, also deploying to the Falklands and leading the 2 MERCIAN contingent at the London 2012 Olympic Games. He took command of 1 MERCIAN Regiment in 2020, and led the Battlegroup in Estonia on Op CABRIT 8 in 2021. He has worked at the Army Personnel Centre (APC) Glasgow, Army Headquarters and the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), where he was awarded an OBE for his work in support of operations in South Sudan and Somalia. He has instructed at the Infantry Training Centre Catterick, the Platoon Commander's Division at Brecon, and on the Intermediate Command and Staff Course (ICSC) at Shrivenham. He now heads up the Centre for Army Leadership, based at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS). The British Army's Ask for Help Page: https://www.army.mod.uk/people/health-wellbeing-welfare-support/health-performance-and-wellbeing-in-the-army/managing-stress/ask-for-help/

The recent arrest of Pakistan's former Prime Minister Imran Khan has only added to the already dire situation. In response, supporters of his political party PTI targeted the army and even attempted to storm the Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi. But we've often heard that Pakistan's economy remains in turmoil. So why hasn't this sentiment against the Army developed earlier in Pakistan? And several key commanders are believed to have advised General Asim against a showdown with Imran Khan. why is it that a faction within the army counsel against confronting Imran Khan? And with what has ensued, what's next for Imran Khan?

Lt Gen Pannu has held a string of important command and staff appointments and took an active part in many operations. He has also attended major prestigious courses like the Defence Services Staff College, Senior Command, Higher Command and National Defence College course in his career.  0:47- About Lt Gen PJS Pannu and his journey. Former Deputy Chief Indian Integrated Defence Staff (Operations) responsible for coordinating military operations of the three services.  He was responsible for raising the Defence Space and Cyber Agencies, as well as the Special Forces Division. He conducted the first-ever space exercise in India nicknamed IndspaceX in 2019.  He served three tenures in the Military Operations Directorate at Army Headquarters and on two UN missions, Mozambique and Sudan both as Chief Operations Officer.  He was the Chairman of the Executive Committee of CENJOWS (Centre for Joint Warfare Studies) and USI (United Services Institute) of India, both premier Defence Think Tanks. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/tbcy/support

Colonel Alex Cann serves as both Chief Instructor, Ghana Military Academy and Operations and Training Staff Officer, Headquarters Central Command, Ghana Army, as well as a Research Fellow, Africa Research Institute, Doctoral School on Security and Safety Sciences, Obuda University. Colonel Cann has over 20 years of military experience with extensive backgrounds in Leadership, Security Policy, Operations Management, Humanitarian Operations, Program Management, Monitoring & Evaluation, Training, And Conflict, Crisis & Security Management. His extensive, management and leadership experience and positions on national and international United Nation missions has equipped him with a variety critical problem-solving skills. Colonel Cann is also a professional security management specialist, a certified protection professional, Senior Consultant for United Nations Institute for Training and Research's Multilateral Diplomacy Program, a member and Subject Matter Expert for the International Association of Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection (PHAP) Program, and a member of ASIS International, an American professional security management group with about 40,000 members. Colonel Cann previously has served in a wide variety assignments including as Chief Military Training and Evaluation Officer of UN Peacekeeping Mission in Mali; led the operational, logistics, and administrative efficiency of Ghanaian troops UN peacekeepers in South Sudan; led an international team of commissioned Officers to monitor and report cease fire violations in a remote village in Democratic Republic of Congo; served as Director of Army Peacekeeping Operations, Army Headquarters in the Ghana Army. Colonel Cann has studied at the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration with a focus on Public Administration and Defense and Conflict studies, the Ghana Military Academy, with a focus on Military Operational Art and Science Studies, has an MBA in Finance from University of Leicester, and is currently completing his PhD, with a focus on Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Support the show

This was one of the most powerful stories I have heard since starting the Move Your Mind Podcast. Kyle Tyrrell is a Lieutenant Colonel turned high performance coach who overcame issues such as PTSD to eventually thrive and find his calling in helping others. He has seen things that most of us will never experience and openly shares his learnings. At the age of 15 Kyle was awarded the Australian Defence Force Scholarship to become an Army Officer ushering in a 24 year career as a combat commander.From bombs and bullets on the front line in Iraq, to the war rooms in Army Headquarters and finally to the Board Rooms of Australia, Kyle has been acknowledged as an inspiring and talented leader and strategist.He holds an MBA, is a Graduate of the AICD Company Directors Course, is a certified coach, and is a Graduate of the Australian Command and Staff College. In the 2007 Queens Honours he was the recipient of the Commendation for Distinguished Service for outstanding command and leadership in war. He left the Army at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.You can learn more about Kyle here:kyletyrrell.com.au/instagram.com/kyletyrrell2/...Thanks for listening! We would love your support so we can keep growing this show! Please sign up to nickbracks.com to receive a free chapter of my book. We would love you to subscribe, review, share and comment on the podcast to help us make a difference!The Move Your Mind book & Audiobook is now Available in stories Australia wide and online globally! You can find free chapters & order here: Move Your Mind Book or on my site: nickbracks.comYou can also sign up to our new Move Your Mind community group here: moveyourmind.me or here: Move Your Mind Community You can find all of the other links here: https://linktr.ee/moveyourmind Our GDPR privacy policy was updated on August 8, 2022. Visit acast.com/privacy for more information.

In this episode I have a chat with Jill as she tell me about her life and we have an hilarious laugh along the way, she has had a pretty good life with some wonderful experiences and our lives crossed professionally at Army Headquarters.

David Pyne and I discuss the increasing threat of China and their nuclear expansion. The Washington Times news agency reported the Chinese are building a third intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field, that would be the home of over 100 new missiles. This could put the US and our western allies in a major pickle. The Chinese could effectively conduct nuclear blackmail of a US President, with just a threat of nuclear annihilation. David Pyne currently serves as Deputy Director of National Operations for the EMP Task Force on National and Homeland Security, as a Vice President for the Association of the United States Army's Utah chapter and as a West Valley City Police Honorary Colonel. David is a former U.S. Army Headquarters staff officer, as a Consultant for the U.S. Missile Defense Agency and as an International Analyst for both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and for the Department of the Navy. Mr. Pyne served as National Security Policy Director for U.S. Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT), as the founder of Sen. Lee's Military Advisory Committee and as 2nd Vice President of the Salt Lake Total Force Chapter of the Military Officers Association of America. He also served as Chairman/Vice Chairman of the Utah State Legislative Compensation Commission from 2009-2017. David holds a MA degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University's prestigious School of Foreign Service. He has been interviewed on television, on several talk radio shows and has been quoted in a number of newspapers, magazine articles and books. Mr. Pyne has had his op-eds published in The National Interest, Real Clear History, Deseret News, Salt Lake Tribune, the Provo Daily Herald, WorldNetDaily.com and Military.com. He, along with other EMP Task Force leaders, are available to speak to national or state policymakers and staffers, emergency management professionals or to civic and political groups on the EMP threat and other existential threats facing our great nation. Links Article mentioned in the interview and others by Mr. Pyne can be found here: https://nationalinterest.org/profile/david-t-pyne Article in the discussion: https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/aug/12/china-engaged-breathtaking-nuclear-breakout-us-str/?fbclid=IwAR2EHNpYTuLYgF_-qgo7LQCxYGHIlWSe4j9vAirwZzpHBS0QX4uichbVNDQWebsite: https://emptaskforce.us/ Civil Defense Radio Information Website: https://www.civildefenseradio.com/Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/CivilDefenseRadio Telegram: Civil Defense Radio ChannelMeWe: Civil Defense RadioResources Links mentioned in showMad Moneyhttps://news.bitcoin.com/mad-moneys-jim-cramer-recommends-5-of-portfolios-in-crypto/Financial Advisory Surveyhttps://news.bitcoin.com/financial-advisor-survey-26-plan-to-recommend-cryptocurrencies/These are the five countrieshttps://dailyhodl.com/2021/08/14/these-are-the-five-countries-paving-the-way-for-crypto-adoption-according-to-binance/Iconic US Magazinehttps://dailyhodl.com/2021/08/13/this-iconic-92-year-old-us-magazine-plans-to-hold-ethereum/Four Institutional Investment Managershttps://dailyhodl.com/2021/08/16/four-institutional-investment-managers-get-btc-exposure-after-purchasing-250204-shares-of-grayscale-bitcoin-trust/Learn more about Crypto terms herehttps://www.coingecko.com/en/glossary?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-08-9-newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_source=coingecko&utm_content=+Binance+is+safe%3F&utm_campaign=CoinGecko+Newsletters#AGlobal Partnershttps://prestonschleinkofer.vcardinfo.com/GSTelecom is a blockchain secure email. text, and chat app powered by G999 digital tokensThis video is a short intro to this service: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vRtRvjiVZVcGSTelecom Apps (Remember, these apps literally run on the blockchain, and you must have G999 crypto tokens to pay for use. You may purchase the coins from a number of exchanges, or through the Global Partners link above.)Android:https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=block.chain.chatiPhone:https://apps.apple.com/tt/app/gstelecom-by-g999-blockchain/id1547577247NOTE: Civil Defense Radio is a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for sites to earn advertising fees by advertising and linking to Amazon.com. This site also participates in other affiliate programs and is compensated for referring traffic and business to these companies

Just in time for the anniversary of the beginning of the Gettysburg Campaign, we're re-releasing Narrative Episode 2, this time with all three parts strung together so you don't have to go searching for each part. This episode brings you through the month of June up the the night of June 30.  Excerpts from the script: Synopse [BEGIN “BEAR WALTZ”] As 1863 began, the Union Army of the Potomac found itself in a general malaise. Its failed attempt at another push towards Richmond, known as the “Mud March,” had served as the nail in the coffin of army commander Ambrose E Burnside. When Joseph Hooker took his place as commander of the Army of the Potomac, the changes he implemented helped boost the morale and confidence of his troops. But Hooker squandered that goodwill by bungling the Chancellorsville Campaign, in the early days of May 1863. While many believed that drunkenness or the artillery round that knocked him out for a short time were the probable causes of such bungling, Hooker himself told Major General Abner Doubleday, while on the road to Gettysburg,  “I was not hurt by a shell and I was not drunk. For once I lost confidence in Hooker, and that is all there was to it.”     After Chancellorsville, while Hooker was looking for ways to redeem himself, Robert E. Lee was setting the wheels in motion for his second invasion of the north.    Meanwhile, every day citizens in a bustling country town called Gettysburg, were going about their daily business while reading about the war in any or all of the town’s three newspapers. War had not left them untouched, however. They had sent their ablest young men off to fight for the Union cause and constant threats of invasion plagued them since they first sent their local militia, the “Gettysburg Blues”, to fight to preserve the Union, in 1861. By the Fourth of July of 1863, this small town of 2400 would be left with the daunting tasking of cleaning up the carnage and healing 10 times their number.     By mid-June, two great armies, totaling somewhere around 150,000 men, with tens of thousands of horses and mules, miles of wagons and, in one of those armies, human beings that were owned by other human beings, marched north into Pennsylvania. One army moving cautiously in order to determine its enemy’s intentions, while the other army smashd a Union garrison at Winchester and then happily ran roughshod over the lush and untouched farmlands of Pennsylvania while its citizens, like Gettysburg’s Sarah Broadhead wondered where their own army even was.    On the last day of June, a Tuesday, the lead elements of these two armies would be poised for the commencement of the greatest, bloodiest battle ever fought in the Western Hemisphere, but very few, if any, had any notion of that as they closed their eyes to sleep.   [BEAR WALTZ END] ........... THE BATTLE OF BRANDY STATION FRANK ROBERTSON: “The only time in my 14 month service with General Stuart that he seemed rattled was when Frank Dean, one of his couriers, dashed up and told him the Yankees were at Brandy Station. This was startling indeed. Frank Robertson, General Stuart’s Staff.” [FADE IN DIFFERENT NIGHT SUMMER AMBIENCE][FADE IN GENTLE RIVER SOUND] No fires were allowed in the Union cavalry camps on the night of June 8. Troopers ate cold dinners, then slept on the ground with their horses’ reins looped around an arm. All was quiet and calm, for, just across the Rappahannock, camped Jeb Stuart’s confederates.  Pleasonton's combined force of 11,000 cavalry and infantry was poised for a double-envelopment of JEB Stuart and his 9500 cavaliers.  Just around 4:30am, John Buford’s Union division, led by the brigade of Colonel Benjamin “Grimes” Davis, crossed the Rappahannock River at Beverly Ford  [HORSES SPLASHING] in a thick fog and brushed aside confederate pickets from the 6th Virginia Cavalry. [LIGHT MUSKETRY] CONFEDERATE SOLDIER: “At about daylight the Yanks drove in our pickets stationed at Beverly’s Ford on the Rappahannock and came near surprising us in bed...they charged up to our camp and killed and wounded several horses before we could get out. Confederate Artilleryman” Behind the picket line were four batteries of Stuart’s horse artillery, parked in preparation for the day’s march. Further behind them, about two miles from the ford, at St James Church, was the brigade of William “Grumble” Jones.  Carbine and pistol shots crackled through the morning air waking Jones. It took only a moment for him to come to his senses and, once aware of what was going on, Jones sent the 6th and 7th Virginia to meet the threat. In their haste to get at these Yankees [CHAOTIC VOICES, TRAMPLING HOOVES, GUNFIRE] some troopers were barely dressed and many rode their horses bareback. Major Cabell E. Flournoy, of the 6th Virginia, was able to rally about 100 men and charged with them into the Federals. But Flournoy was soon forced to withdraw in a hurry as he and his men were badly outnumbered.  Lieutenant R. O. Allen’s horse was wounded, causing Allen to be left behind during Flournoy’s withdrawal. Allen took cover in a treeline when he spotted a Union officer, Colonel Benjamin Grimes Davis, at the head of the column of the Yankees.  Down to one bullet in his revolver, Allen decided it would be best spent taking out the brave blue-bellied officer daring to lead his men from the front. So Allen spurred his wounded horse towards Davis, whose back was turned.  In the nick of time, Davis turned around and faced Allen for long enough to see that Allen was charging at him. Davis began swinging his saber in an effort to hit the charging rebel. Allen saved himself by dropping down to his horse’s side and fired his revolver at Davis, sending his last bullet through the colonel’s brain. Allen galloped off to the safety of his own lines.  [ABOVE SOUND EFFECTS DIP IN VOLUME AND PAN TO LEFT SPEAKER] The action of Grumble Jones’ men enabled most of Stuart’s artillery, which was camped dangerously close to Buford’s troops, [OFFICERS SHOUTING ALL KINDS OF ORDERS; MOST INDISTINCT...CHAOS] to to fall back and form a line around St James Church.  Meanwhile, on Fleetwood Hill, Stuart, was drinking his morning coffee at his headquarters. Fleetwood Hill, which ran north and south, and was about a half mile northeast of Brandy Station and around four miles behind the scene of Buford’s crossing. Stuart hastily sent his supply wagons towards Culpeper while his staff scurried this way and that to get themselves together to meet whatever danger was about to befall them. Stuart then ordered reinforcements ahead to the sound of the fighting.  As Buford’s brigades pushed their way further into the confederate lines, they were met by the confederate troops of Brigadier General Wade Hampton, who formed his brigade to the right of Grumble Jones.  At that moment, Major Robert Morris, commander of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, was ordered to clear the confederates from his front. Morris and the 6th Pennsylvania, also known as “Rush’s Lancers”, charged against the Confederate artillery.  CAPTAIN HENRY WHELAN- “We flew along-- our men yelling like demons. Grape and canister were poured into our left flank and a storm of rifle bullets on our front. We had to leap three wide, deep ditches and many of our horses and men piled up in a writhing mass in those ditches and were ridden over. Captain Henry Whelan, 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry.” The 6th Pennsylvania’s charge failed when Confederates counterattacked and drove them back after a brutal hand-to-hand melee.  Major Morris was captured. One Confederate described the charge as “brilliant and glorious.” [CHARGING CAVALRY, MEN SHOUTING, CANNON FIRING LOUDLY, HORSES SCREAMING]  The 6th PA suffered the highest casualty rate of any regiment at Brandy Station.  This charge, however, seemed to stabilize the battle for the time being.  As Buford’s troopers began to fall back towards the Rappahannock, groups of them would dismount and join the infantrymen of Adelbert Ames’ brigade which had come up in support.  While his regiments were forming to charge, messengers from Beverly Robertson's brigade brought Grumble Jones, on the confederate right, some unwelcome news: a large dust cloud had been seen rising from the direction of Kelly’s Ford to the Confederates’ right-rear. Jones rushed a courier to Stuart.  JEB Stuart was on the scene of the St James Church line. The seriousness of the event still didn’t seem to occur to Stuart or his staff as a few of his more youthful staff members climbed a nearby cherry tree. Jubilantly, they picked and ate and picked and threw cherries down to their comrades on the ground until a federal shell carened through the tree. The shell sent splintered branches flying and the young staff officers plummeting to the relative safety of the ground.  Stuart, beside himself with laughter, said: “What’s the matter, boys? Cherries getting sour?” Around this time one of Jones’ couriers rode up to Stuart and delivered the message about the threat to his flank. The doubtful Stuart arrogantly replied, “Tell General Jones to attend to the Yankees in his front, and I’ll watch the flanks.” Upon receiving this reply, Jones grimly scoffed: “So he thinks they ain’t coming, does he? Well, let him alone, he’ll damned soon see for himself.” ........... What the Second Battle of Winchester dispelled, however, were doubts about Ewell’s competency at the helm of a corps and confirmed the faith that his troops had in him. One of the Union boys lying mortally wounded by Ewell’s bullets, was a member of the 87th Pennsylvania, Johnston “Jack” Skelly, a native and citizen of Gettysburg.  Upon learning of Jack’s presence, Confederate soldier, John Wesley Culp, went to find him. Jack and Wes had grown up together in Gettysburg. In the 1850s, Wesley had taken employment with local carriage maker, C. William Hoffman. In 1856, Hoffman decided to move his business to Shepherdstown, Virginia and invited several of his employees along. Wes’s brother, William declined, but Wesley Culp accepted the invitation, leaving his childhood home, family and friends behind in Gettysburg. In Shepherdstown, Wesley and Hoffman’s three sons joined the Hamtramck Guards, the local militia and drinking club. When Civil War broke out, Wesley bid his fellow Gettysburg transplants a fond adieu as they left to return to Pennsylvania and fight for the Union. Wesley and the rest of the Hamtramck guards enlisted in the Confederate service on the 20th of April, 1861 at Harpers Ferry. They became Company B of the 2nd Virginia, which was placed in the First Brigade under the command of Colonel Thomas Jonathan Jackson The brigade and the man would, in a short time, earn the nickname “Stonewall”.    But Culp was a confederate. Sure that he was dying, Jack asked Wesley to deliver a letter to Jennie should he ever find himself back home in Gettysburg. Wesley took the letter, promising to do so.  LINCOLN: “To General Hooker: Winchester and Martinsburg were both besieged yesterday...the enemy holds both places. Confederate troops are crossing the Potomac at Williamsport… I would like to hear from you.-- Abraham Lincoln.”  [CADENCE BEGINS] From  Winchester, Ewell sent Robert Rodes’ infantry division, north to raid Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. Along with Rodes’ Division was the irregular cavalry brigade of Albert Jenkins, a colorful character who often tucked his long beard into his belt when the wind was up.  At 2am, on June 15, Jenkins led his cavalry on the road to Chambersburg.  ............. SARAH BROADHEAD: “No alarm was felt until Governor Curtin sent a telegram, directing the people to move their stores as quickly as possible. This made us begin to realize the fact that we were in some danger from the enemy, and some persons, thinking the Rebels were near, became very much frightened, though the report was a mistake. Sarah Broadhead” Sarah “Sallie” Broadhead, was a Gettysburg resident and wife of train engineer Joseph. Thirty year old Sarah and Thirty-two year-old Joseph had a four year-old daughter named Mary. Together, they lived at 217 Chambersburg Street. After hearing the news of Confederate mischief along the Potomac, Sarah began a journal.  Ever since word of the Confederates crossing the Potomac first reached them, residents of Gettysburg and many other south-central Pennsylvania towns were beginning to panic and prepare as best they could for the approaching invaders. No one knew just where the Confederates were heading. No one knew what the Confederates would do to them should they descend on their city or town. And no one knew where their own army was to protect them and drive off the rebel hordes.  Civilian militias began to form. Still, the townspeople worried, for what good could days-old militia do against Robert E Lee’s formidable veterans? TILLIE PIERCE: “We had often heard that the rebels were about to make a raid, but had always found it a false alarm. ~ Tillie Pierce, Gettysburg Resident” In truth, Gettysburg lived under a constant cloud of worry ever since the Civil War broke out in 1861. Just ten miles to its south, is the border with Maryland. While a border state that remained within the Union, Maryland’s doing so was fragile. Its citizens had sympathies for both sides of the war.  Virginia, the state which was home to the Confederate capital of Richmond, was not much farther beyond Maryland.  On April 22, 1861, Gettysburg proudly sent “The Gettysburg Blues”, its local militia that mainly had experience performing ceremonial duties, off to fight for the Union. Almost immediately, townspeople began to feel uneasy about sending its only armed forced away. And, so, that same night, the people of Gettysburg gathered in the courthouse to discuss forming a new Home Guard to ease the peoples’ minds. Out of nowhere, two unknown men burst into the courthouse yelling “the Rebels are burning Hanover and Gettysburg is next!” The report was that 500 or more “pug-uglies” from the city of Baltimore--a city with deep Confederate sympathies-- were heading towards Gettysburg. As the citizens filtered out into the street, a single rider galloped into town along York Street. “To arms! The Rebels are coming!” The calm curiosity that the people of Gettysburg embodied only a moment before, gave way to utter panic and chaos. Word spread quickly through the town. The streets were crowded with panic-stricken people. Bells pealed across town to raise alarm. Riders in the style of Paul Revere were dispatched in every direction to warn neighboring hamlets and farms. Of course, all firearms and the ammunition for those firearms had left hours earlier with the Gettysburg Blues. All that was left was a smattering of shotguns, antique muskets, shovels, hoes, axes, knives and various other items of little to no real use against the coming pug-uglies. Finally, after midnight, Gettysburg’s cooler heads decided to send a train to Hanover to see just what was up.  The train returned around dawn with the shocking news: it was a false alarm. Furthermore, those unknown harbingers of alarm who started the pandemonium, were nowhere to be found.  Time and time again, between June of 1861 and June of 1863, the alarm would be raised, panic would ensue, and all would be let down as no Rebel threat had developed. The only time that the threat came close to being real was in 1862 when Jeb Stuart’s Cavalry invaded Pennsylvania and raided Chambersburg, then appeared at the foot of the mountains at Cashtown, just 8 or so miles west of Gettysburg. But Stuart had no interest in Gettysburg that day and her citizens, once again, breathed a sigh of relief.  Stuart’s raid aside, a sense of “the boy who cried wolf” began to lull the people of Gettysburg into a complacency that would last up until the first shots of the battle.  By nightfall of June 15, 1863 Jenkins cavalry brigade, the lead element of Robert Rodes’ Confederate division, had reached Chambersburg, some 25 miles to the west of Gettysburg. A flood of refugees would soon filter through Gettysburg with that same old song of “the Rebels are coming.” Not all Gettysburg residents brushed these warnings off in June of 1863. Michael Jacobs, a professor at Pennsylvania College, was not so dismissive when he noted in his diary that there were “unmistakable signs of the coming storm.” ............. MEADE TAKES COMMAND [FADE IN GENTLE SUMMER NIGHT SOUNDS. CRICKETS, crackling fire, etc.] It was 3 am and so quiet at Fifth Corps headquarters that the slightest sounds could be noticed. So it was no surprise that Fifth Corps Commander Major General George Meade’s slumber was disturbed by the sound of voices outside his tent. There was a visitor to camp who was asking for access to the General. Being that Meade’s staff officers were all camped in the vicinity of his tent, they, too, could hear the voices and, one by one would emerge, curious as to the matter at hand.   When Meade lay down to sleep only a few hours earlier, he did so having fulfilled his duties for the day and expecting to wake up in the morning and fulfill whatever duties he would be assigned for that day. He marched his men 16 miles from near the Monocacy River to Ballinger’s Creek, three miles due south of Frederick, Maryland. Upon arrival, he went ahead into town to find Hooker, whom he had not seen since June 13. Hooker had not yet arrived, so Meade returned to his corps, saw to their encampment and retired for the night. He was unaware that Hooker had resigned the night before and that one of General-in-Chief Halleck’s staff officers, Colonel James A. Hardie, and a small party were on their way to Meade.  Hardie roused Meade in his tent and told him that he came bearing “trouble”. Meade, whose sense of humor was just as groggy as he was at this hour, assumed that Hardie’s mission was, as he wrote his wife, “to either relieve or arrest me”. So, Meade’s response to Hardie’s joke was “my conscience is clear.” Hardie then handed Meade a communication to read which relieved Hooker as commander of the army of the Potomac and put Meade in his place. Unlike previous times when Lincoln replaced a general, this was not an offer, nor a request. It read:  “GENERAL: You will receive with this the order of the President placing you in command of the Army of the Potomac. Considering the circumstances, no one ever received a more important command; and I cannot doubt that you will fully justify the confidence which the Government has reposed in you.” It was an order... and Meade, ever the dutiful soldier, complied with the order.  [BLEND IN THREE HORSES AT A WALK] And so, Meade, Hardie and Meade’s son and staff officer, Captain George Meade, Junior, rode to Army Headquarters in Frederick to meet with Hooker. There was little conversation among the three as they rode. Now and again Meade, the elder, would depart from his visibly evident deep-thought and ask Hardie a question. Then he’d go back to thinking.  [CROSS FADE HORSES TO INDOOR SOUNDS. CRACKLING FIRE, FOOTSTEPS ON A WOODEN FLOOR, PERHAPS AND INDISCERNIBLE VOICES] At Frederick, he met with Hooker who, with his usual charm, tried his best to assuage the embarrassment and awkwardness of the occasion. They sat down and had a lengthy discussion and were eventually joined by the Army’s chief-of-staff, Daniel Butterfield.  [CROSS FADE INDOOR TO CRICKETS] Finally, Meade came out of the meeting with the same grave look on his face as when he went in. Upon seeing his son, he perked up slightly, “Well, George,” he said, “I am in command of the Army of the Potomac.” It can be assumed that Meade learned about the disposition of the army, though he did admit that he had “no exact information about the condition of the troops and the position of the enemy.” He would also later claim that Hooker offered him “no intimation of any plan or any views he may have had up to that moment.” Meade formally accepted command in a message to Halleck. MEADE: “The order placing me in command of this army is received. As a soldier I obey it, and to the utmost of my ability will execute it. George Gordon Meade.” Overall, Meade’s appointment to command was well received, even though most outside of his own fifth corps knew little about the man. A good deal of the rank and file wished that McClellan would be reinstated and Lieutenant Henry P. Claire, the 83rd NY’s adjutant, prayed that McClellan be placed in command, once again. If not, then he prayed that “Jeff Davis enters Washington, hangs Lincoln and all his damnable associates proclaiming himself President.” Claire was willing to part with a month’s pay “to see Washington sacked and the present clique chased like bayed foxes with bloodhounds after them.” In the high command, Major General Daniel Sickles was the only general who was sad to see Hooker go and he and Meade were not friends. The others were pleased with the selection. John F Reynolds was the ranking general of them all and Lincoln had offered him command of the army prior to assigning it to Meade. But Reynolds had seen how much Washington meddled with the army commander’s operations and respectfully declined the offer. Reynolds was also Meade’s friend. When Reynolds first saw Meade after he took command, Meade told him that his new job was, not only a surprise, but an unwelcome one, at that. Reynolds told Meade that the commanding general could rely on him and that he was satisfied to see Meade at the head of the army.  Things were now accelerated. Meade conferred with staff and drew up orders announcing that he was placed in command of the army along with marching orders for the day. Each corps knew where it needed to be by nightfall and by what roads and, by nightfall, all were where they should have been. Only Hancock’s Second Corps was just a few miles short of its destination because it got a late start due to receiving its orders late. GENERIC UNION SOLDIER: “Carrying rifle, knapsack and contents, accoutrements, haversack containing rations and sixty rounds of cartridges-- over fifty pounds.-- Union Sixth Corps soldier.” Lee’s Army was enjoying the bliss of ignorance. Longstreet’s and Hill’s Corps were concentrated around Chambersburg, to the west of Gettysburg, while Ewell was still split up between York, to the east and Carlisle, to the north. Stuart had now ridden himself so far from Lee that the Union army was separating the two. Therefore, Lee had lost the “eyes and ears”-- as he described cavalry’s main role-- of his army.  The 9th Alabama, of Anderson’s Division of AP Hill’s Corps, passed through Marion and Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. One soldier recorded a touching event that he witnessed in his diary.  GENERIC CONFEDERATE SOLDIER: “The females of Chambersburg seem to be spiteful, make faces, sing, wave their banners, etc. A widow in the place discovered the knapsack of her deceased husband in the command. She wished it and the soldier gave it to her. He had picked it up on the battlefield of ‘Gaine’s Mills,’ where we fought the Pennsylvania Bucktails. Such is war.” At around 3am on the morning of June 28, JEB Stuart’s cavalry had finally crossed the Potomac and was in Maryland. But Stuart... was east of the Union army... which was east of his own army. Along the way, Stuart’s men managed to cut the telegraph lines connecting Frederick, Maryland to Washington D.C., stymying the Army of the Potomac’s ability to quickly communicate with Washington. Meade set up a courier  service along the telegraph route, but this slowed information coming to and going from his Headquarters. As Hooker had to before him, Meade had to rely on Colonel Sharpe’s Bureau of Military Information.  It was Lee’s intention to hold the Cashtown Gap in order to protect his lines of communication, supply and retreat back into the valley and Virginia. A.P. Hill’s Corps took the lead, east through the mountains to Cashtown, followed by Longstreet’s Corps. At the head of Hill’s column was the division of newly-minted Major General Henry “Harry” Heth. Upon reaching Cashtown, Heth detached a mix of North Carolina and Mississippi troops to guard his flank to the south at Fairfield with specific instructions to keep an eye on the approaches from Emmitsburg, Maryland to the south.  Upon reaching Cashtown, a gunner in Hill’s corps was unsettled by the words of a woman on the roadside: "You are marching mighty proudly now,” she shouted, “but you will come back faster than you went.” Unable to resist the temptation, an officer asked why she thought that was. “Because,” she quickly replied, “you put your trust in General Lee and not in the Lord Almighty.” Up north in Carlisle, General Ewell declared this day “a day of rest”. Despite this, he sent Jenkins’ Cavalry ahead to Harrisburg, his next objective. Stonewall Jackson’s former chaplain, the Reverend B. Tucker Lacy, held two church services at the Carlisle Barracks. General Ewell  was asked by local clergy if he objected to their offering their routine prayer for President Lincoln at their respective churches. Ewell replied, “Pray for him. I’m sure he needs it.” Longstreet’s and Hill’s Corps were almost entirely up in the Keystone state with Longstreet at Chambersburg and Hill, about seven miles to Longstreet’s east, at Fayetteville. Both corps were within twenty five miles of Gettysburg.  Meanwhile, General-in-Chief Halleck gave Meade a wide berth with which to command the army. In essence, he gave Meade what he denied Hooker. --OR (read both)-- the red tape was cut in order to expedite the response to this national emergency. When Meade requested permission to pull the 7000-man garrison from Harpers Ferry, Halleck approved.  Part of Meade’s orders placing him in command also gave him the authority to promote, demote or replace any officer in the army to a position that he saw fit. Between June 28 and June 30, Meade would jump three promising young captains up four ranks to brigadier general. Those junior officers were Elon J Farnsworth, Wesley Merritt and the long-haired George Armstrong Custer.  Early in the evening of the 28th, Gettysburg resident, Samuel Herbst, whose horse, somehow eluded Early’s Confederates on the 26th, rode the animal to the south, towards Emmitsburg, Maryland. He returned with very welcomed news: thousands of Federal soldiers were on their way to Gettysburg. One Gettysburg resident remembered: “The news flew through the town like wildfire.” _______________________________________________________ Help us make these episodes come out more quickly. Become a patron! CLICK HERE

Major General Sharon Nesmith was commissioned into the Royal Corps of Signals in 1992. She spent much of her early years at Regimental Duty in Germany, serving in the Electronic Warfare Regiment and 1st (United Kingdom) Armoured Division Headquarters and Signal Regiment, during which time she completed 3 tours in the Balkans. Major General Nesmith commanded 1st Mechanized Brigade Headquarters and Signal Squadron (215), over the period of the Brigade conversion to Bowman and deployment on Op TELIC 10. She later commanded 22nd Signal Regiment as the Regiment re-roled to provide command support to Headquarters ARRC, and led on the introduction of FALCON into Service. She also commanded MOD Stafford. Following the Advanced Command and Staff Course (2001/03), Major General Nesmith’s black bag appointment was within the Directorate of Capability, Resources and Scrutiny in the Ministry of Defence, where she provided affordability advice to senior officers and Ministers at key investment decisions for equipment programmes. She subsequently served as SO1 Capability in Army Resources and Plans. On promotion to Colonel she served as the Assistant Director Capability Plans, leading on the delegation of capability development to the Army Headquarters in support of Director General Capability, and attended the Higher Command and Staff Course (2014). Major General Nesmith commanded the 1st (United Kingdom) Signal Brigade from August 2014 to July 2016, supporting Headquarters ARRC and the UK JTFHQs. She was then Head of Manning (Army), before being appointed Director Personnel in March 2019. #InspiringLeadership #leadership #CEOs #MotivationalSpeaker #teamcoach #Boards See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

LTCOL Keirin Joyce has been the SO1 UAS in Army Headquarters for the past 3 years. In this role Keirin was the Capability Manager for Army across all UAS. A huge role as I found out! In this podcast I asked Keirin about his time in this role, his major achievements, the Army's lines of operation/effort, technologies, frustrations and also his advice on how industry can best engage with Defence. He also let's slip his all time favourite UAVs (there's two!) We also discuss a fantastic industry organisation called the Australia Association for Unmanned Systems (AAUS). If you're not aware of AAUS or want more information, check them out at www.aaus.org.au. A special thanks to Defence Media for approving this podcast to be recorded and released. Thank you! Thank you to LTCOL Keirin Joyce for his support of the Drones for Good podcast and willingness to participate. Thank you! You can find Keirin on Twitter @keirinjoyce Enjoy.

“The VETLANTA Story & Why It Matters” Veteran Voices, Episode 2 Episode 2 features Lloyd Knight and John Phillips. Lloyd Knight is a Senior Director of International Air Freight based at UPS Supply Chain Solutions corporate campus in Alpharetta, GA. Lloyd began his career with UPS in 2007 and in addition to his current assignment has served multiple capacities including Director of Global Freight Forwarding, Director of Global Government Operations and Government Operations Manager. In addition to these roles, Lloyd has been selected for several special assignments including a six month rotation with corporate HR establishing the UPS Veterans Management Training Program, a six week deployment to Hong Kong in 2017 to support peak season and the Chairman of the UPS Veterans Council in 2019. Lloyd retired from the Air Force in 2007 after 20 years of service. During his military service, Lloyd logged over 3,000 flight hours as a Loadmaster on several aircraft including the C-141 Starlifter, C-5 Galaxy, and C-23 Sherpa. He also served as a Functional Manager at HQ Air Mobility Command and First Sergeant for Medical and Communications Squadrons. Lloyd participated in Operations “Just Cause”, “Desert Storm” “Northern Watch”, “Southern Watch”, “Allied Force” and supported Operations “Enduring Freedom” and “Iraqi Freedom”. Lloyd started the first UPS Veterans Business Resource Group in Atlanta and co-founded and is the President of VETLANTA, an industry collaboration of veteran friendly/affiliated organizations striving to make Atlanta the premier community for veterans and their families. He is an active volunteer supporting multiple non-profits including American Corporate Partners, FourBlock, Veterans Empowerment Organization and Hire Heroes USA. Lloyd is the recipient of the 2017 UPS Jim Casey Community Service Award. This award is given annually to just one of 454,000 global UPS employees for demonstrating an exceptional commitment to helping others in their community. He is also two time recipient of the President's Volunteer Service Award and was awarded an Atlanta Journal Constitution Hometown Hero Award in 2018. Lloyd has associate degrees in Aircrew Operations and Human Resources Management from the Community College of the Air Force, a Bachelor Degree and Master’s Degree in Transportation & Logistics Management from American Military University. Lloyd is married to Suzan for 31 years and has two sons. Connect with Lloyd Knight on LinkedIn and learn more about UPS here: https://gate.sc/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ups.com&token=7e9f97-1-1581734796313 (www.ups.com) John W. Phillips is author of the Amazon best seller “Boots to Loafers” and is co-founder & Vice President for VETLANTA. He has had a distinguished career in both military and civilian service. John is a retired US Army Field Artillery officer and Comptroller with 20+ years of service in Corps Artillery, Division Artillery, Army Headquarters and Forces Command, the largest command and the generating force provider for combatant commanders - at home and abroad. He has served in Europe, throughout the Middle East and the United States. He has been awarded the Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, and the Air Assault Badge among other awards and decorations. John has worked in corporate finance, program and project management, and sales roles for The Coca-Cola Company located in Atlanta, Georgia. In his spare time, John spends his time in either the mountains of North Georgia fly fishing, in the British Virgin Islands sailing with his wife or out west camping, rafting or canoeing with his best friends. John holds a BS in Finance from University of Central Florida and an MBA from Syracuse University. John lives in the foothills of the North Georgia Mountains outside the Atlanta area with his wife. This episode was hosted by Scott Luton. For more information, please visit our episode page...

Supply Chain Now Radio, Episode 121 “The VETLANTA Story & Why It Matters” The VETLANTA Voice Series on SCNR Episode 121 features Lloyd Knight and John Phillips. Lloyd Knight is a Senior Director of International Air Freight based at UPS Supply Chain Solutions corporate campus in Alpharetta, GA. Lloyd began his career with UPS in 2007 and in addition to his current assignment has served multiple capacities including Director of Global Freight Forwarding, Director of Global Government Operations and Government Operations Manager. In addition to these roles, Lloyd has been selected for several special assignments including a six month rotation with corporate HR establishing the UPS Veterans Management Training Program, a six week deployment to Hong Kong in 2017 to support peak season and the Chairman of the UPS Veterans Council in 2019. Lloyd retired from the Air Force in 2007 after 20 years of service. During his military service, Lloyd logged over 3,000 flight hours as a Loadmaster on several aircraft including the C-141 Starlifter, C-5 Galaxy, and C-23 Sherpa. He also served as a Functional Manager at HQ Air Mobility Command and First Sergeant for Medical and Communications Squadrons. Lloyd participated in Operations “Just Cause”, “Desert Storm” “Northern Watch”, “Southern Watch”, “Allied Force” and supported Operations “Enduring Freedom” and “Iraqi Freedom”. Lloyd started the first UPS Veterans Business Resource Group in Atlanta and co-founded and is the President of VETLANTA, an industry collaboration of veteran friendly/affiliated organizations striving to make Atlanta the premier community for veterans and their families. He is an active volunteer supporting multiple non-profits including American Corporate Partners, FourBlock, Veterans Empowerment Organization and Hire Heroes USA. Lloyd is the recipient of the 2017 UPS Jim Casey Community Service Award. This award is given annually to just one of 454,000 global UPS employees for demonstrating an exceptional commitment to helping others in their community. He is also two time recipient of the President's Volunteer Service Award and was awarded an Atlanta Journal Constitution Hometown Hero Award in 2018. Lloyd has associate degrees in Aircrew Operations and Human Resources Management from the Community College of the Air Force, a Bachelor Degree and Master’s Degree in Transportation & Logistics Management from American Military University. Lloyd is married to Suzan for 31 years and has two sons. Connect with Lloyd Knight on LinkedIn and learn more about UPS here: www.ups.com John W. Phillips is author of the Amazon best seller “Boots to Loafers” and is co-founder & Vice President for VETLANTA. He has had a distinguished career in both military and civilian service. John is a retired US Army Field Artillery officer and Comptroller with 20+ years of service in Corps Artillery, Division Artillery, Army Headquarters and Forces Command, the largest command and the generating force provider for combatant commanders - at home and abroad. He has served in Europe, throughout the Middle East and the United States. He has been awarded the Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, and the Air Assault Badge among other awards and decorations. John has worked in corporate finance, program and project management, and sales roles for The Coca-Cola Company located in Atlanta, Georgia. In his spare time, John spends his time in either the mountains of North Georgia fly fishing, in the British Virgin Islands sailing with his wife or out west camping, rafting or canoeing with his best friends. John holds a BS in Finance from University of Central Florida and an MBA from Syracuse University. John lives in the foothills of the North Georgia Mountains outside the Atlanta area with his wife. This episode was hosted by Scott Luton. For more information, please visit our episode page at: www.supplychainnowradio.com/episode-121

President Donald Trump Speech at The Celebrate Freedom Rally Paying tribute to those who have proudly served our nation in uniform. On this my very first Independence Day celebration as President, there is no place I'd rather be than with you President Trump recognized and introduced Harry Miller who fought in the Battle of the Bulge And Captain Luis Avila  https://youtu.be/HaQc1i7eYMw      0-00 thank you but thank you very much this 0-04 is some group some group nice to win 0-08 isn't it isn't it nice to wear Robert 0-12 thank you very much for that incredible 0-14 introduction and thank you to everyone 0-16 from First Baptist Dallas 0-19 Thank You pastor you and Amy have stood 0-25 with us since the very very beginning 0-27 and I will always stand with you I've 0-30 told you that and I mean that I will 0-32 always be with you I appreciate it thank 0-34 you and I'm honored to join you at the 0-42 first ever fourth of July freedom rally 0-46 taking place here at the Kennedy Center 0-48 as we pay tribute to those who have 0-51 proudly served our nation in uniform 0-54 thank you very much 0-56 [Applause] 1-05 tonight we have been inspired by music 1-08 that fills our heart stirs ourselves and 1-11 reminds us all of who we are one nation 1-14 under God 1-17 [Applause] 1-24 to First Baptist music director Doran 1-28 bug and to every musician and member of 1-32 the choir who has performed with such 1-35 incredible grace and skill and I heard 1-38 them backstage I said let me out there 1-41 that is the most beautiful music 1-49 I just want to say that your music 1-52 honors our heroes more eloquently than 1-55 words could ever do and I just want to 1-59 thank you that's real talent standing 2-01 behind me thank you folks 2-03 [Applause] 2-07 and let me say to the hundreds of 2-10 veterans with us tonight that for my 2-13 very first Independence Day celebration 2-16 as president there is no place I'd 2-19 rather be than with you 2-22 tell you that 2-24 [Applause] 2-31 and I promise you then you see it 2-34 happening day by day just the other day 2-37 we signed veterans accountability 2-40 they've been trying to do it for 40 2-42 years 2-43 [Applause] 2-52 for 40 years they've been trying you 2-55 couldn't fire somebody if they were 2-56 horrible doing a terrible job for the 2-58 veterans robbing stealing hurting people 3-02 you couldn't do anything it's called the 3-05 Veterans Accountability Act and now you 3-07 can say you're fired 3-27 thank you and I promise you that we will 3-31 always take care of our great veterans 3-35 always right Louie you better believe it 3-37 and Paula's up there 3-40 Paula White has been so helpful you've 3-43 thank you I love you too actually you've 3-50 shed your blood you've poured your love 3-52 and you've bared your soul in defense of 3-55 our country our people and our great 3-59 American flag your loyalty to our nation 4-03 is measured not merely in words but in 4-06 deeds you race through gunfire stare 4-09 down enemy forces and ran past the gates 4-12 of hell to fight and to win for America 4-18 and you won for America and we're going 4-20 to take care of it 4-21 [Applause] 4-34 the story of America's men and women in 4-36 uniform is the story of freedom and 4-39 overcoming oppression the strong 4-42 protecting the weak and the good 4-44 defeating evil there's a lot of evil out 4-48 there I want to tell you there's a lot 4-50 of evil I was left a mess the fact is 4-54 but we're cleaning it up 4-56 you watch cleaning it up cleaning it up 5-06 we are awed by your service and your 5-09 sacrifice and so to the veterans here 5-12 tonight of which there are many will you 5-15 please stand right now please stand 5-18 thank you 5-43 [Applause] 5-56 on behalf of our very grateful nation 5-59 thank you very much thank you very much 6-03 we will always always remember what you 6-07 did for us tonight we celebrate veterans 6-11 we also reflect on everything we cherish 6-15 as Americans we love our country we love 6-18 our families we love our freedom and we 6-22 love our God 6-24 [Applause] 6-36 since the signing of the Declaration of 6-39 Independence 241 years ago America 6-42 always affirmed that Liberty comes from 6-46 our Creator our our rights are given to 6-50 us by God and no earthly force can ever 6-54 take those rights away 6-57 [Applause] 7-06 that is why my administration is 7-08 transferring power out of Washington and 7-11 returning that power back to where it 7-15 belongs to the people to the people the 7-26 fake media is trying to silence us but 7-31 we will not let them because the people 7-36 know the truth 7-39 the fake media tried to stop us from 7-42 going to the White House but I'm 7-45 president and they're not 7-47 [Applause] 8-22 we won and they lost the fact is the 8-28 press has destroyed themselves because 8-32 they went too far 8-36 instead of being subtle and smart they 8-41 use the hatchet and the people saw it 8-44 right from the beginning 8-49 the dishonest media will never keep us 8-53 from accomplishing our objectives on 8-56 behalf of our great American people will 9-01 never happen their agenda is not your 9-09 agenda you've been saying it I will 9-11 never stop fighting for you I am 9-14 delivering on trade on the economy on 9-17 the Supreme Court on the Second 9-20 Amendment on our military for our 9-22 veteran and on our borders 9-27 where we are doing record record 9-31 stoppage 9-32 [Applause] 9-40 thank you 9-45 and we are supporting our incredible 9-50 police and law enforcement 10-05 [Applause] 10-08 we will save American lives protect 10-11 American sovereignty and we will ensure 10-15 the Forgotten men and women of our 10-18 country are never forgotten again for 10-28 too long 10-29 politicians have tried all have they 10-31 tried to centralize authority among the 10-35 hands of a small few in our nation's 10-39 capital I see them all the time 10-43 bureaucrats think they can run over your 10-45 lives overrule your values meddle in 10-49 your faith and tell you how to live what 10-53 to say and where to pray but we know 10-57 that parents not bureaucrats know best 11-01 how to raise their children and create a 11-05 thriving Society 11-07 [Applause] 11-19 and we know that families and churches 11-23 not government officials know best how 11-27 to create a strong and loving community 11-35 and above all else we know this in 11-39 America we don't worship government we 11-42 worship God 11-43 [Applause] 12-11 our religious liberty is enshrined in 12-15 the very first amendment in the Bill of 12-19 Rights the American founders invoked our 12-23 Creator four times in the Declaration of 12-27 Independence Benjamin Franklin reminded 12-31 his colleagues at the Constitutional 12-34 Convention to begin by bowing their 12-38 heads in prayer I remind you that we're 12-43 going to start saying Merry Christmas 12-46 again 12-59 hmm 13-03 inscribed on our currency are the words 13-07 In God We Trust but not only has God 13-15 bestowed on us the gift of freedom he's 13-18 also given us the gift of heroes willing 13-22 to give their lives to defend that 13-25 freedom you just stood in every struggle 13-32 against evil throughout our history as 13-34 America's service members have huddled 13-36 around campfires and sought refuge in 13-39 foxholes they've called on their Creator 13-43 for support in world war two when 13-46 General George Patton that was a real 13-49 general we got some patents today too I 13-58 found them Mad Dog matters 14-03 [Applause] 14-10 and he doesn't like doing a lot of 14-12 talking but I want to tell you Isis the 14-15 whole different ball game folks they're 14-22 going fast but when Patton ran into a 14-26 problem that he couldn't solve he knew 14-30 what to do he prayed frustrated by range 14-33 that were stalling the advance of his 14-36 third army across Europe in early 14-39 December 1944 horrible weather Patton 14-45 asked an army chaplain to come up with a 14-48 good prayer for the weather Patton then 14-53 had a quarter of a million copies of 14-55 that prayer printed and distributed to 14-57 the soldiers of the Third Army just 14-59 before the Battle of the Bulge that was 15-02 a big one did very well there 15-06 five hundred thousand American soldiers 15-09 fought that pivotal battle of the Second 15-12 World War one of those soldiers is here 15-16 with us tonight his name is Harry F 15-20 Miller where's Harry where's Harry Harry 15-26 stand up Harry 15-28 [Applause] 15-58 like many of the heroes of his 16-00 generation 16-01 Harry wasn't exactly straightforward 16-03 about his age when he enlisted in the 16-08 Army Reserves shame on you how he was 16-13 just 15 but he told them he was old 16-15 enough to join then he immediately asked 16-19 for a transfer to active duty six months 16-23 after he had listed private Miller was 16-26 on his way to Europe to fight for our 16-29 country 16-33 [Applause] 16-39 a couple of months after that he was in 16-41 the freezing cold how cold cold he said 16-46 really cold and driving range of Belgium 16-51 with the 740 of tank battalion attached 16-56 to the 82nd airborne as the Battle of 17-00 the Bulge began Harry got his orders to 17-03 go find tanks at a weapon storage 17-06 facility 17-07 when he arrived he says he and his 17-09 friends found nothing but tanks they 17-12 were all over the place right nothing 17-14 but tanks but they didn't let the tanks 17-18 stop them out of what spare parts they 17-23 could find and through sheer grit and 17-26 resolve they somehow managed to repair 17-29 three of those tanks and get them all 17-32 set for action and ready to fight and 17-35 before long those three tanks were nose 17-38 to nose with the lead elements of a 17-40 German SS Panzer Division and that was 17-43 tough stuff in a short time those tanks 17-47 had knocked out the first three tanks of 17-49 the enemy and the entire German division 17-52 retreated they left 18-00 that's good Harry 18-02 [Applause] 18-04 that's good Harry 18-09 [Applause] 18-40 Herry fought through the battle and the 18-43 rest of the war and he went on to serve 18-46 our armed forces for 22 years retiring 18-49 as a Senior Master Sergeant a lot of 18-52 guts 18-52 tomorrow Harry will be 89 tomorrow so on 19-04 behalf of this very large group in this 19-06 beautiful building senior master 19-09 sergeant Miller happy birthday thank you 19-11 for your lifetime of service and thank 19-14 you for helping out thank you very much 19-17 [Applause] 19-25 every veteran with us tonight from every 19-27 branch of the military Army Navy Marines 19-31 Air Force and Coast Guard I want you to 19-34 know that we will always keep our 19-36 promises to those who have kept us free 19-40 since my very first day in office we've 19-43 taken one action after another to make 19-45 sure that our veterans get the care they 19-48 so richly deserve 19-50 we've published wait times those wait 19-54 times were bad weren't they but boy are 19-57 they getting better and fast and we've 20-00 published them at every VA facility 20-03 delivered same day mental health 20-05 services at every VA Medical Center 20-09 nearly doubled 20-11 [Applause] 20-18 the number of veterans given approvals 20-21 to see the doctor of their choice and as 20-31 I said just signed brand-new legislation 20-35 went through the house went through the 20-38 Senate and I signed it so fast we didn't 20-42 want to take any chances right Harry to 20-46 ensure every VA worker is held 20-48 accountable for the quality of care they 20-51 provide to our veterans 20-54 [Applause] 20-59 tonight we are deeply honored to be 21-01 joined by a number of wounded warriors 21-04 from Walter Reed I was over there 21-07 recently these are incredible people the 21-09 enthusiasm and the spirit and some of 21-13 them were hurt really badly 21-15 they've got so much spirit and they love 21-17 this country so much these American 21-20 heroes risked everything so that you and 21-23 I can live in freedom they gave all they 21-26 had everything for their comrades their 21-31 country and for victory they liked 21-33 winning we like winning again don't we 21-36 [Applause] 21-42 you know the old days we used to win we 21-45 sort of just keep fighting and fighting 21-47 and fighting gonna win again folks 21-50 we applaud their strength their courage 21-54 and we really support that incredible 21-59 wind that they have the will the will is 22-03 so strong and that's what they want to 22-06 do is they want to win and they want to 22-07 win for you so thank you all very much 22-09 for being here that was great 22-11 [Applause] 22-16 one such hero is Captain Luis Avila 22-22 where is he 22-24 Luis Luis 22-27 [Applause] 22-30 we love you Louise 22-32 [Applause] 22-35 the ways Wow 22-36 [Applause] 22-55 Louisa's here tonight along with his 22-57 wife Claudia Thank You Claudia thank you 23-00 darling 23-01 thank you thank you Louise served in the 23-06 Army for 16 years he held many different 23-09 positions on five combat tours and he 23-13 was always a leader and everybody always 23-15 said I did some checking on you Louise 23-17 that you did a great job no matter where 23-20 you were no matter where you went on his 23-24 fifth deployment Louise bravely led his 23-27 company on a successful mission to 23-29 recover vital intelligence during this 23-33 critical mission his vehicle was struck 23-36 by explosives Louise was gravely wounded 23-40 and lost his leg he received a Purple 23-43 Heart for service and sacrifice to Lewis 23-47 and Claudia we will never forget the 23-50 courageous sacrifice that you made for 23-52 all of us in this room tonight and for 23-55 everyone in our country thank you thank 23-57 you 23-58 [Applause] 24-23 I want you all and all of our incredible 24-29 wounded warriors to know you have an 24-32 entire nation of more than 300 million 24-37 people behind you and our nations 24-39 getting strong again you notice getting 24-42 strong again our hearts and our prayers 24-47 are joined with yours 24-49 your legacy like our gratitude will live 24-54 forever and I want to thank you thank 24-56 you very much and Claudia thank you very 24-58 much thank you 25-05 I also want to speak to all of the 25-09 people see you thought I forgot in our 25-12 faith community who are here with us 25-15 tonight veterans and non-veterans alike 25-25 you're never gonna be forgotten you'll 25-28 never be forgotten my administration 25-32 will always support and defend your 25-35 religious liberty 25-37 [Applause] 25-43 we don't want to see God forced out of 25-45 the public square driven out of our 25-48 schools or pushed out of our civic life 25-52 we want to see prayers before football 25-55 games if they want to give prayers 26-17 we want all children to have the 26-19 opportunity to know the blessings of God 26-24 we will not allow the government to 26-27 censor sermons to restrict the free 26-32 speech of our pastors and our preachers 26-35 and the people that we most respect like 26-42 Robert 26-54 that is why just as I promised pastor 27-00 Jeffress and other faith leaders I just 27-04 signed an executive order following and 27-07 this is something that makes me very 27-08 happy and very proud following through 27-12 on my campaign pledge to stop the 27-16 Johnson amendment from interfering with 27-19 your First Amendment rights 27-37 as long as I am president no one is 27-41 going to stop you from practicing your 27-44 faith or from preaching what is in your 27-48 heart we want to hear him one of the 27-55 most grave and dire threats to religious 27-58 freedom in the world today is the threat 28-01 of terrorism and specifically it just 28-05 seems it's called radical Islamic 28-08 terrorism and we cannot allow this 28-15 terrorism and extremism to spread in our 28-19 country or to find sanctuary on our 28-23 shores or in our cities 28-33 we want to make sure that anyone who 28-36 seeks to join our country shares our 28-39 values and has the capacity to love our 28-44 people 28-45 [Applause] 29-01 thank you 29-04 together we will protect our families 29-07 our nations and our borders and yes by 29-11 the way for those that are curious we 29-13 will build the wall okay because we 29-19 understand that a country is more than 29-22 just its geography a nation is the sum 29-27 of its citizens their hopes their dreams 29-30 their aspirations America is a land rich 29-34 with history traditions and values and 29-36 as we have seen tonight what a group 29-40 this is tonight America is also a land 29-44 rich with heroes 29-47 [Applause] 29-55 and though we have many stories we all 29-59 share one home and one glorious destiny 30-05 a destiny that's getting better and 30-08 better every single day 30-15 and whether we are black or brown or 30-18 white and you've heard me say this 30-21 before we all bleed the same red blood 30-32 we all salute the same great American 30-38 flag and we are all made by the same 30-46 Almighty God 30-48 [Applause] 31-09 we face many challenges there are many 31-12 hills and mountains to climb but with 31-16 the strength and courage of the Patriots 31-19 assembled in this room tonight we will 31-23 scare I mean and you say it and you see 31-25 it all the time and we're doing it all 31-27 the time because we're scaling those 31-30 summits and we will get the job done we 31-41 will all prove worthy of this very 31-45 important moment in history and we will 31-48 prove worthy of the sacrifice that our 31-52 brave veterans have made as long as we 31-56 have pride in our beliefs courage in our 31-59 convictions and faith in our God we will 32-04 not fail 32-07 [Applause] 32-16 as long as our country remains true to 32-19 its values loyal to its heroes and 32-24 devoted to its creator then our best 32-28 days are yet to come because we will 32-32 make America great again 32-35 [Applause] 32-46 thank you 32-52 - my friend pastor Jeffers and dePaula 32-57 and to Louie into Harry and de lewis and 33-03 everybody in this room and everybody in 33-05 this country thank you for your great 33-09 support I appreciate it 33-12 I will not let you down - all of our 33-16 incredible veterans 33-17 - the people in the military and - 33-21 evangelical Christians who came out in 33-24 record record record numbers thank you 33-27 have a wonderful Independence Day god 33-31 bless you god bless our nation's 33-34 veterans 33-34 god bless the United States of America 33-39 thank you very much 33-44 you   Army Veteran Harry Miller shares his story from Battle of the Bulge   https://youtu.be/tDLcEomh474    On December 16, 1944, the Germans launched what is considered their last major offensive of World War II. Just shortly after the Allied force’s successfully invaded Normandy, France, the surprise attack from Hitler’s forces caught them off guard. The battle lasted until January 25, 1945. The United States suffered 19,000 fatalities and more than 89,000 casualties. In commemoration of the 72nd anniversary of this historic battle of courage and fortitude, we invite you to meet Army Veteran, Harry Miller. Harry served in the Army from 1944 – 1953 during World War II. He first served as a member of a tank crew, then transitioned to a messenger center clerk. He fought in the Battle of the Bulge. During the battle, the 1st Army Headquarters instructed the tank crews to go down to an ordnance depot and take whatever they needed for the tanks. “We had to take good parts off of one tank and put it on another. We finally got three tanks and a tank destroyer that would operate and run, and had a gun,” he said in an interview with VA. They took the three working tanks and sent them to their C Company. Those three tanks ended up taking out three German tanks, which ended up being members of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler being, Hitler’s old bodyguards. After World War II, Harry went on to serve in Korea and Vietnam and served enlistments in both the Army and the Air Force. Listen to the audio below for Harry’s full account of his service before, during, and shortly after the Battle of Bulge.   nscript English 0-00 HARRY F. MILLER- Your life is dependent on everybody that's around you. 0-03 I mean, I know of cases where 0-06 a man would be talking to another man, 0-08 a round would come in and hit the one guy, 0-11 and the other guy not get a scratch, 0-13 and you depend on the guy next to you, 0-18 you depend on the people in back of you, and 0-21 you depend on everybody. 0-25 Everything was going fine until the 16th of 0-28 December, 1944 and the Germans broke 0-32 through, and at first nobody was too 0-35 concerned about it except for the fact 0-37 that we had only green divisions in the 0-39 Ardennes at that time. And so, they kept 0-44 pressing further and further. Well, 0-45 finally the first Army headquarters told 0-47 us to go down to this ordinance depot 0-51 and take anything we want. The only thing 0-54 that was there was old shot up tanks 0-56 and one with holes in them and worn-out 0-59 engines messed up. And we had to take 1-03 good parts of one tank and put it on another. 1-05 We finally got three tanks and a 1-07 tank destroyer that would operate, and 1-11 would run, and had a gun and it would fire. 1-14 So, we got those and they 1-17 gave them to our C-Company and they told them 1-20 to go down to the railroad station at 1-23 Stoumont, Belgium. To approach this train 1-26 station -- it sat here and there was a row 1-28 that came around a curve and right 1-31 down to the train station. 1-33 Well, our C-Company met them at this 1-36 curve, and the first American tank saw the 1-39 first German tank, and they fired at him 1-41 and the round -- 'course the guns and had not been 1-44 checked to see how accurate they were -- 1-46 but they fired and the round bounced, and 1-49 went into the German tank and knocked it out. 1-54 It was just ... just a lucky shot... knocked out the 1-57 first tank. Well, he reloaded -- the American 2-00 tank reloaded, and round got stuck so he 2-03 motioned for the next tank to come 2-04 around. When he came around the curve he 2-08 caught the second tank, and he fired on it, 2-10 and knocked it out. 2-11 Same thing happened on the next round. 2-14 The third tank was a tank destroyer which 2-16 has a 90 millimeter gun on rather than 2-18 75 or 76, so he hit this German tank and 2-22 knocked it out. Well, this was the First SS 2-25 Panzer Division, which was Hitler's old bodyguard. 2-29 And they were a tough bunch of so-and-sos. 2-33 And they were treated that way 2-35 for the rest of the war, by the way. By us.  

On December 16, 1944, the Germans launched what is considered their last major offensive of World War II. Just shortly after the Allied force's successfully invaded Normandy, France, the surprise attack from Hitler's forces caught the Allies off guard. The battle lasted until January 25, 1945. The United States suffered 19,000 fatalities and more than 89,000 casualties. In commemoration of the 72nd anniversary of this historic battle of courage and fortitude, we invite you to meet Army Veteran Harry Miller. During the Battle of the Bulge, the 1st Army Headquarters instructed the tank crews to go down to an ordnance depot and take whatever they needed for the tanks. “We had to take good parts off of one tank and put it on another. We finally got three tanks and a tank destroyer that would operate and run, and had a gun,” he said in an interview with VA. They took the three working tanks and sent them to their C Company. Those three tanks ended up taking out three German tanks, which ended up being members of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitlerbeing, Hitler’s old body guards.

Jo Condrill "How to Reinvent Yourself in 7 Simple Steps - Move Forward in a New Way in Your Career and Your Life" (book 10) Jo Condrill is considered by many to be an outstanding mentor, author, and professional speaker. Her company, GoalMinds, Incorporated, has provided services for some of the country's most respected corporations. She is co-author of the popular book, "101 Ways to Improve Your Communication Skills Instantly" and author of, "Take Charge of Your Life: Dare to Pursue Your Dreams." For her work as a non-military leader at U.S. Army Headquarters in the Pentagon, she was recognized by the Army with the highest civilian award, the Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service. Contact: www.jocondrill.com    Larunce Pipkin and Rich Perry are your hosts and personal coaches for Bankrolling Your Mind! Get FREE training for your leadership and team plus watch their webinar at: www.vortexmastermind.com

We are honored to have Joseph McMoneagle on the show this week. We talk about Remote Viewing during Project Stargate as well as Joseph's near death experiences Joseph's books can be found at his website http://www.mceagle.com  Joseph McMoneagle has well over 30 years of professional expertise in research and development, in numerous multi-level technical systems, the paranormal, and the social sciences. Experience includes: experimental protocol design, collection and evaluation of statistical information, prototype design and testing, Automatic Data Processing equipment and technology interface, management, and data systems analysis for mainframe, mini-mainframe, and desktop computer systems. He is currently a full time Research Associate with the Laboratories for Fundamental Research, Cognitive Sciences Laboratory, Palo Alto, California, where he has provided consulting support to research and development in remote viewing for 14 years. As a consultant to both SRI-International and Science Applications International Corporation, Inc., (1984–1995), he’s participated in protocol design, statistical information collection, R&D evaluations, as well as hundreds of remote viewing trials in support of experimental research and active intelligence operations for what is now known as Project STARGATE. He is well versed with developmental theory, methods of application, and current training technologies for remote viewing, as currently applied under strict laboratory controls and oversight. With a career spanning 34 years, Mr. McMoneagle has provided professional support to the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Drug Enforcement Agency, Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Customs, the National Security Council, and most major command within the Department of Defense. Twenty of those years have been within paranormal operations, as viewer No. 001 (372). McMoneagle has also been responsible for a Military Occupational Specialty at Army Headquarters level, to include control and management of both the manned and unmanned sites, within the Continental United States as well as overseas. He was responsible for all tactical and strategic equipment, including aircraft and vehicles, development of new and current technology, planning, support and maintenance, funding, training, and personnel. He has performed responsibly in international and inter-service negotiations and agreements in support of six national level intelligence agencies. And he has acted as a direct consultant to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Washington D.C., as well as the Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), Pentagon. Other employment has included, Assistant to the Security Officer for a multi-billion dollar overseas intelligence facility, with responsibilities that included physical plant communications, personnel, and technology security; as well as counter-terrorist, counter-intelligence operations. He has served as the Detachment Commander at two remote intelligence-collection sites overseas, providing field intelligence collection, analysis and reporting at theater, region, country, and city levels. He has also served on an Air and Sea Rescue team, in long range reconnaissance, as a quick reaction strike force team leader, and rifleman. He has earned 28 military decorations and numerous awards, to include a Legion of Merit for support to the Nations Intelligence Community. About Path 11 Productions: You can find DVDs of our films on our website at thepathseries.com or by streaming on vimeo.com, gaiamtv.com & itunes find us on facebook and follow us on twitter, @thepathseries