Podcasts about coase

Show host Gene Tunny responds to listener feedback about the private versus public sector's role in wealth creation, particularly addressing externalities like environmental harm and whether governments should fund facilities like Men's Sheds. He also explores the efficiency of the private sector compared to government spending.If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions for Gene, please email him at contact@economicsexplored.com  or send a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored. Timestamps for EP254Introduction (0:00)Externalities and Market Efficiency (4:47)Government's Role in Addressing Externalities (11:30)Coase Theorem and Market Failures (19:43)Government Spending and Efficiency (26:31)Men's Sheds and Government Support (32:51)Scott Prasser's Critique of Government Spending (39:43)Balancing Government and Private Sector Roles (45:49)TakeawaysExternalities in Wealth Creation: Private markets can overlook externalities such as pollution or public health impacts, justifying government intervention in some cases.Incentives for Efficiency: Due to market competition, the private sector generally has stronger incentives for efficiency, while government projects typically lack the same discipline.Government Spending Criticism: Many government projects, particularly those done for political reasons, are inefficient and do not consistently deliver expected benefits.Cost-Benefit Analysis is Crucial: Government spending should be evaluated through cost-benefit analysis to avoid wasting public funds.Coase Theorem and Market Solutions: While private negotiation can theoretically resolve externalities (as per the Coase Theorem), it typically does not work in practice due to high transaction costs and imperfect information.Links relevant to the conversationRelevant previous episodes:Government vs Private Sector in Wealth Creation:https://economicsexplored.com/2024/07/05/government-vs-private-sector-who-generates-wealth-ep247/White Elephant Stampede:https://economicsexplored.com/2022/10/17/white-elephant-stampede-w-scott-prasser-ep161/Coase theorem paper - “Does the Coase theorem hold in real markets? An application to the negotiations between waterworks and farmers in Denmark”https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301479711003331Urbis review of Men's Sheds:https://www.health.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2022/01/review-of-support-for-the-men-s-shed-movement-current-state-report_0.pdfBeyond Blue Report on Men's Sheds:https://mensshed.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Ultrafeed-beyondblue-Mens-Shed-in-Australia-Final-Executive-Report-2013.pdfLumo Coffee promotion10% of Lumo Coffee's Seriously Healthy Organic Coffee.Website: https://www.lumocoffee.com/10EXPLOREDPromo code: 10EXPLORED 

A reminder for new readers. That Was The Week includes a collection of my selected readings on critical issues in tech, startups, and venture capital. I selected the articles because they are of interest to me. The selections often include things I entirely disagree with. But they express common opinions, or they provoke me to think. The articles are snippets sized to convey why they are of interest. Click on the headline, contents link, or the ‘More' link at the bottom of each piece to go to the original. I express my point of view in the editorial and the weekly video below.Hat Tip to this week's creators: @reidhoffman, @dougleone, , @credistick, @rex_woodbury, @NathanLands, @ItsUrBoyEvan, @berber_jin1, @cityofthetown, @keachhagey, @pmarca, @bhorowitz, , @signalrank, @steph_palazzolo, @julipuli, @MTemkin, @geneteare, @lorakolodny, @jasminewsun, @JBFlint, @asharma, @thesimonetti, @lessinContents* Editorial: * Essays of the Week* Crossing The Series A Chasm* The Consumer Renaissance* The Creator Economy on AI Steroids* AI Is Transforming the Nature of the Firm* The Opaque Investment Empire Making OpenAI's Sam Altman Rich* Video of the Week* The American Dream - Marc Andreessen and Ben Horowitz* AI of the Week* SignalRank Version 3 Improves Performance Again* How Long Can OpenAI's First-Mover Advantage Last?* OpenAI Employees Warn of Advanced AI Dangers* A Right to Warn about Advanced Artificial Intelligence* Nvidia hits $3tn and surpasses Apple as world's second-most valuable company* VCs are selling shares of hot AI companies like Anthropic and xAI to small investors in a wild SPV market* News Of the Week* Crunchbase Monthly Recap May 2024: AI Leads Alongside An Uptick In Billion-Dollar Rounds* Elon Musk ordered Nvidia to ship thousands of AI chips reserved for Tesla to X and xAI* Introducing video to Substack Chat* Instagram's Testing Video Ads That Stop You From Scrolling Further* Startup of the Week* NBA Nears $76 Billion TV Deal, a Defining Moment for Media and Sports* X of the Week* Doug Leone - I am supporting Trump. * Reid Hoffman - I am supporting BidenEditorialI woke on Tuesday to Doug Leone of Sequoia Capital on X saying:I have become increasingly concerned about the general direction of our country, the state of our broken immigration system, the ballooning deficit, and the foreign policy missteps, among other issues. Therefore, I am supporting former President Trump in this coming election.Doug has the right to support Trump. It is also clear that the immigration system is broken, the deficit is ballooning, many things are wrong with foreign policy, and there are “other issues.” Trump as the solution is less obvious. But there it is—hot on the tails of Chamath Palihipitaya and David Sacks announcing a fund-raiser for Trump on the All-In podcast (they said they would do the same for Biden).Reid Hoffman followed up a day later with:On one level, this is a straightforward choice, but any literate attempt to analyze Leone's issues might arrive at the following conclusions:* Like many Western nations, the USA is aging rapidly and has a shrinking working-age population across all skill sets. Immigrants are needed, and pro-immigration leadership is needed, creating a path to entry for large numbers of skilled and unskilled workers to fill empty jobs as we get close to full employment.* The deficit is large, and there are many palliatives available. Selling more to China would help, but both party leaders are protectionist. Taxes to reduce the divide between the 1% and the rest would help a bit. However, what would help the most is economic growth, which requires investment in technology and productivity. Neither leader seems too focused on innovation and investment.* Foreign Policy - well, sheesh, it's a big issue. However, saber-rattling about Taiwan and provoking China seems to be a hobby shared by both parties and does not seem smart. Ukraine and the future of Europe are better in Biden's hands, but not by a lot. Europe looks very shaky. The US is increasingly isolationist. The appetite for world leadership is on the decline. Again, the solution would focus on economic growth, which seems absent.Voting for Trump is a big no-no for me. But voting for Biden is, at best, a lesser evil instinct, not a belief system. The election will not be where the future is built, but it is important. Politicians are collectively disappointing.This week's video of the week from Marc Andreessen and Ben Horowitz is called “The American Dream” and champions their view about American Dynamism. And I must confess that this comes closer to a vision of the future than either political outfit. Their vision requires political support, massive government financial commitment, and private capital investment. I see no evidence of those happening.The real winning effort seems to be happening on the ground. This week, Nvidia hit $3 trillion, eclipsing Apple as the world's second-most valuable company. This is even though Apple has 7 times the revenue of Nvidia.This week's first essays also focus on prospects for boom time. Rex Woodbury's ‘The Consumer Renaissance' examines the impact of consumer spending on our lives. In ‘The Creator Economy on AI Steroids, ' Nathan Lands focuses on how emerging tools will transform creativity. But in ‘AI Is Transforming the Nature of the Firm, ' Evan Armstrong gets closest to a future vision.”AI is the first universally flexible technology. It can interact with our digital environments in similar ways to humans, so it can have all the flexibility that we do. In that way, it may be the last technology we ever need.This seems to be the crux of hope in a world where dreams and nightmares are strangely devoid of detail. What the world needs (not only America) is hope. And hope is born from optimism. Optimism is born from success. The most likely success of the next decades will result from specific uses of AI that improve human life.I know and like Doug Leone. I know and like Reid Hoffman. Doug's bar for success needs to be higher. Voting for Trump is not right, and even if it were, it would not be sufficient.Reid also needs a higher bar. Voting for Biden will not be sufficient even if it is right.Let's focus on where success can be found, grow optimism, and breed hope. There is a need for a broad technical revolution and the social rebirth it enables. Silicon Valley and its friends globally need to invent the next version of human existence to the benefit of all. The social rebirth requires a conscious effort; technology will not magically bring it about. More in this week's video.Essays of the WeekCrossing The Series A ChasmDan GrayDan Gray, a frequent guest author for Crunchbase News, is the head of insights at Equidam, a startup valuation platform, and a venture partner at Social Impact Capital.June 5, 2024As we get deeper into 2024, there is increasing concern about the state of Series A fundraising. The bar for investment appears much higher, and fewer startups are reaching it.This is a problem for founders, and investors like Jenny Fielding, managing partner of Everywhere Ventures, who said, “Every Seed investor's dilemma: All my Series A buddies want to meet my companies early! All my companies are too early for my Series A buddies.”To attach some data to this, we can see that the median step-up in valuation from seed to Series A has gone from $19.5 million in Q1 2022 to $28.7 million in Q1 2024. Series A firms seem to be looking for much stronger revenue performance, with targets of $2 million to $3 million in ARR, compared to $1 million to $2 million just a few years ago.The outcome is that while 31.8% of Q1 2020 seed startups closed their Series A within two years, that fell to just 12% for Q1 2022 — which should worry everyone.Why are Series A investors so much more demanding?Today's Series A investors are looking at startups that raised their seed between 2021 and 2023, which identifies the root of the problem: it spans the Q2 2022 high-tide mark for venture capital.For example, there were 1,695 seed rounds of more than $5 million in 2021, rising to 2,248 in 2022, then falling to 1,521 in 2023. As a comparison, there have been just 137 so far in 2024.The result is two categories of startups that are looking to raise their Series A today:* Pre-crunch startups that raised generous seed rounds and stretched the capital out as far as they could, to grow into inflated valuations.* Post-crunch startups that raised modest seed rounds on more reasonable terms, with shorter runways and less demonstrable growth.Strictly speaking, neither is more appealing than the other; the first group has less risk, the second offers more upside, and both are adapted to current market realities. It shouldn't cause a problem for investors, provided they can distinguish between the two.The cost of market inefficiencyVenture investors have a market-based lens on investment decisions, which means looking fairly broadly at trends in revenue performance and round pricing to determine terms, e.g. a typical Series A is within certain bounds of revenue performance and valuation. While that approach may be serviceable and efficient under ideal conditions, the past few years have been far from ideal.Without distinguishing between the two cohorts, investors are now looking at the performance of Series A candidates that spent more than $5 million on a war chest for two to three years of growth alongside the valuations of candidates that raised around $2 million to prove scalability. It just doesn't work as an average, and thus the unreasonable expectations...MoreThe Consumer RenaissanceFrom Predicting Consumer AI Applications to Analyzing Consumer SpendREX WOODBURY, JUN 05, 2024“Consumer” has become something of a bad word in venture capital circles.We see this reflected in the early-stage markets: recent data from Carta showed that just 7.1% of Seed capital raised last year went to consumer startups. That's less than half the share from 2019 (14.3%).But I think consumer is actually a great place to be building and investing. Whenever something is out of favor, that's a sign it's probably a good place to spend time: this is an industry built on being contrarian, not built on following the herd. We're entering a compelling few years for consumer entrepreneurship.First, I'd argue that consumer is too narrowly defined. When people think consumer, they often think consumer social (a tough category) or consumer brands (a tough fit for venture compared to internet and software businesses, with typically lower return profiles). But consumer is broader. Consumer encompasses businesses that sell to consumers and those that rely on consumer spending. This means the obvious names—apps on our phones like Uber, Instacart, Spotify—and the enablers: Shopify, for instance, powers online retail; Faire powers offline retail; Unity powers game development. Each of the latter three is B2B2C, in its own way, but I would categorize each is also a consumer technology business.The wins in consumer can be massive. The biggest technology businesses in history began as consumer businesses—Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon. The original companies comprising FAANG—with Microsoft conspicuously absent—were allconsumer.And some of the best returns of the last five years have stemmed from consumer tech IPOs. At Daybreak, we invest ~$1M at Pre-Seed and Seed. Here's how much a $1M investment in the Seed round of five recent consumer IPOs would yield:Big consumer wins compare favorably to big enterprise wins—relative to Snowflake's market cap, Uber is ~3x in size, Airbnb is ~2x in size, and DoorDash is roughly equal. (Snowflake is the biggest enterprise IPO of the last decade.) The last few years produced a windfall of consumer outcomes, yet investors today almost write off the category.At Daybreak, we don't focus exclusively on consumer; my view is that you need to balance more binary consumer outcomes with B2B SaaS and B2B marketplaces. But we do approach investing through the lens of the consumer—how people make decisions. The buyers of products like Figma and Ramp, after all, are people, and software companies are increasingly selling bottom-up into organizations. The line between consumer and enterprise has been blurring for years.This week's Digital Native makes the argument that consumer tech is a compelling place to build and invest. We'll look at the data to back up this argument, then delve into three categories of consumer that I'm particularly interested in right now:* Checking in on Consumer Spend* Consumer Tech: The Data Doesn't Lie* What to Watch: AI Applications* What to Watch: Shopping* What to Watch: Consumer Health* Rule of Thumb: Follow the SpendThis week we'll cover #1-3, and next week in Part II we'll tackle #4-6.Let's dive in

What if understanding the hidden costs in every transaction could revolutionize how we see economics?  Stephen Medema of Duke University opens up about his academic pivot from computational tax policy to the history of economic thought, weaving in tales of detective-like intrigue and the thrill of uncovering the makers and movers behind economic theories.Beginning with John R. Commons' critical insights, and moving through Ronald Coase's focus on transaction costs as the critical difference among institutions, we explore  how these issues shape our understanding of efficiency and the "If markets are so great, why are there firms?"  Don't miss four new economics jokes (one is lawyer joke, in honor of common law!), my book recommendations, and get psyched for a summertime return to shorter, more frequent episodes.Letters:Corner Crossing:  https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/26/business/hunting-wyoming-elk-mountain-access.html?searchResultPosition=1 https://www.wyomingpublicmedia.org/natural-resources-energy/2024-05-13/corner-crossing-case-back-in-court Books:•Glenn Loury, Late Admissions: Confessions of a Black Conservative.  https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393881349 (Econtalk Podcast on the Loury book:  https://www.econtalk.org/glenn-loury-tells-all/  )•Kevin Munger, The Youtube Apparatus, from Cambridge Essentials.  https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/youtube-apparatus/36600D69788530F805C650B70976A585If you have questions or comments, or want to suggest a future topic, email the show at taitc.email@gmail.com ! You can follow Mike Munger on Twitter at @mungowitz

 We embark on a journey through the lenses of Hume, Smith, and Coase, piecing together the roles of observation and empirical study in shaping our understanding of societal conventions and moral philosophy. David Schmidtz recounts a defining moment from his academic path, sparking a robust discussion on the fusion of economics with moral considerations in the realm of ownership and resource distribution.The discussion with David delves into the essence of property ownership, dissecting what it means to hold rights over something as abstract as an idea or as concrete as land. We grapple with the notion that property is not just a "bundle of sticks" but a set of societal constructs, born from necessity and shaped by our collective desire for harmony. Through examples of conflict resolution and the negotiation of public and private interests, such as eminent domain and navigation easements, we confront the delicate dance between individual autonomy and the greater good. The philosophical undercurrents of property law are laid bare, revealing the liberal heart beating at its core.The "Desert Town" source:  https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/elements-of-justice/desert/268B6C7A9B17949572933A4DAA0CAB09Wall Street Journal article on Costco gold purchases: https://www.wsj.com/finance/investing/selling-costco-gold-bars-f14e966f Biden DOT rule on airline refunds:  https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/biden-harris-administration-announces-final-rule-requiring-automatic-refunds-airlineLynne Kiesling on The Essential Ronald Coase, Fraser Institute. Books:C. Johnson, R. Lusch, Schmidtz, Commercial Society: A Primer on Ethics & Economics (Rowman & Littlefield).  Bryan Caplan and Ady Branzei. Build, Baby, Build. Graphic novel just published by the Cato Institute  If you have questions or comments, or want to suggest a future topic, email the show at taitc.email@gmail.com ! You can follow Mike Munger on Twitter at @mungowitz

Welcome to the Mixtape with Scott! To set up this week's guest, let me just share real quick a personal anecdote. When I graduated college, I got a job as a qualitative research analyst doing focus groups and in-depth interviews. I had majored in literature, so this was my first exposure to anything related to the social sciences. I loved the freedom the job gave me to collect my own data and develop my own theories about why people did the things they did. In the evenings I would read articles and books in sociology and anthropology as I felt more grounding in the social sciences could help me in doing a better job. One night I read Gary Becker's Nobel Prize speech, “The Economic Way of Looking at Life”, at the University of Chicago's John M. Olin working paper series. I was hooked. By the time I finished his speech, I knew I wanted to be an economist. But then I read other things too, like a quantitative paper by John Lott and David Mustard's quantitative study on concealed carry laws and crime, and was equally mesmerized. And in that working paper series, I kept coming across references to someone named Ronald Coase and I then went elsewhere to learn about him and his prolific work. David Mustard was a Gary Becker student, and his paper on concealed carry had left an impression on me. He was an assistant professor at the University of Georgia so I applied there and one other school that used his county level crime data for studies on crime. I got into both and went with my ex-wife to visit the school and the faculty. In preparing for the trip, I read a paper by a professor at the University of Georgia named Peter Klein. The paper was entitled “New Institutional Economics” and it drew extensively on that Nobel Prize winning economist I had been learning about, Ronald Coase, another Nobel Laureate named Doug North at Washington University, and Oliver Williamson, a professor at Berkeley. The article was fascinating. It was about a field called “New Institutional Economics”, which I'd never heard of, and Klein explained it well. It was about the endogenous evolution of “institutions” to support and facilitate the organization of human interactions at a high level, most often to support commerce and trade though not just that. The ideas were deep and fascinating. I remember reading that article with a pen and highlighter, going over it and over it, hanging on every word. Not only was the topic fascinating, the author writing it was an excellent writer. There was not a wasted word in it. So when I met with the faculty, including Peter, I was sold on Georgia. But unfortunately, Peter was leaving Georgia for Mizzou and so I just barely missed being in the department with him. So that is a long winded bit of background into telling you that today's guest is someone I've known now for over 20 years — Peter Klein, the W. W. Caruth Endowed Chair at Baylor University in the Entrepreneurship department. Peter is now a professor as well as the department chair at Baylor in our Entrepreneurship department. And so it is my pleasure to introduce you to him. Peter did a PhD at Berkeley and studied under Oliver Williamson, who I mentioned earlier. Williamson would go on to win the Nobel Prize for extending Coase's theory of the firm and helping develop a more robust theory based on transaction cost economics. Peter's work on the firm extends a lot of this work on transaction cost economics continues in that line focusing on the organization of the firm. He is the author of countless articles as well as a new book entitled Why Managers Matter: The Perils of the Bossless Company (with Nicolai Foss). It has been a real joy having him here since I missed him the first time around.As long time listeners know, though, I typically am doing a “mini-series” within the podcast, though, and Peter fits into one of those mini-series. Those mini-series are “the econometricians”, “causal inference and natural experiment methodology”, “Becker's students”, “economists going to tech”, and then “public policy”. But another one I'm slowly picking at has to do with the wings of the profession that fall outside of the exclusively neoclassical tradition, one of which is Austrian economics. And Peter comes from that tradition, though he has mixed it with mainstream economics and made it into something of his own. So, with that being said, let me now turn you over to the podcast! Thanks again for tuning in!Scott's Substack is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Scott's Substack at causalinf.substack.com/subscribe

The Lunar Society Key Takeaways  The study of economics is a way of carrying forward big ideas about the world The best economists have real depth and breadth in their work Risk aversion is context-dependent The emergence of AI agents will show that Hayek was right about how decentralized systems evolve When a nation allows for free trade, a shockingly high percentage of the productivity gains come from the worst firms being bankrupted by the free trade “My worry is that energy becomes too cheap and people, at very low cost, can destroy things rather easily.” – Tyler CowenIn the coming world of AI, effective people will segregate their tasks in a way that reflects their comparative advantage; this will lead to a bifurcation of personal productivityRead the full notes @ podcastnotes.orgIt was a great pleasure speaking with Tyler Cowen for the 3rd time.We discussed GOAT: Who is the Greatest Economist of all Time and Why Does it Matter?, especially in the context of how the insights of Hayek, Keynes, Smith, and other great economists help us make sense of AI, growth, animal spirits, prediction markets, alignment, central planning, and much more.The topics covered in this episode are too many to summarize. Hope you enjoy!Watch on YouTube. Listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or any other podcast platform. Read the full transcript here. Follow me on Twitter for updates on future episodes.Timestamps(0:00:00) - John Maynard Keynes(00:17:16) - Controversy(00:29:43) - Fredrick von Hayek(00:47:41) - John Stuart Mill(00:52:41) - Adam Smith(00:58:31) - Coase, Schelling, & George(01:08:07) - Anarchy(01:13:16) - Cheap WMDs(01:23:18) - Technocracy & political philosophy(01:34:16) - AI & Scaling Get full access to Dwarkesh Podcast at www.dwarkeshpatel.com/subscribe

The Lunar Society Key Takeaways  The study of economics is a way of carrying forward big ideas about the world The best economists have real depth and breadth in their work Risk aversion is context-dependent The emergence of AI agents will show that Hayek was right about how decentralized systems evolve When a nation allows for free trade, a shockingly high percentage of the productivity gains come from the worst firms being bankrupted by the free trade “My worry is that energy becomes too cheap and people, at very low cost, can destroy things rather easily.” – Tyler CowenIn the coming world of AI, effective people will segregate their tasks in a way that reflects their comparative advantage; this will lead to a bifurcation of personal productivityRead the full notes @ podcastnotes.orgIt was a great pleasure speaking with Tyler Cowen for the 3rd time.We discussed GOAT: Who is the Greatest Economist of all Time and Why Does it Matter?, especially in the context of how the insights of Hayek, Keynes, Smith, and other great economists help us make sense of AI, growth, animal spirits, prediction markets, alignment, central planning, and much more.The topics covered in this episode are too many to summarize. Hope you enjoy!Watch on YouTube. Listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or any other podcast platform. Read the full transcript here. Follow me on Twitter for updates on future episodes.Timestamps(0:00:00) - John Maynard Keynes(00:17:16) - Controversy(00:29:43) - Fredrick von Hayek(00:47:41) - John Stuart Mill(00:52:41) - Adam Smith(00:58:31) - Coase, Schelling, & George(01:08:07) - Anarchy(01:13:16) - Cheap WMDs(01:23:18) - Technocracy & political philosophy(01:34:16) - AI & Scaling Get full access to Dwarkesh Podcast at www.dwarkeshpatel.com/subscribe

It was a great pleasure speaking with Tyler Cowen for the 3rd time.We discussed GOAT: Who is the Greatest Economist of all Time and Why Does it Matter?, especially in the context of how the insights of Hayek, Keynes, Smith, and other great economists help us make sense of AI, growth, animal spirits, prediction markets, alignment, central planning, and much more.The topics covered in this episode are too many to summarize. Hope you enjoy!Watch on YouTube. Listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or any other podcast platform. Read the full transcript here. Follow me on Twitter for updates on future episodes.Timestamps(0:00:00) - John Maynard Keynes(00:17:16) - Controversy(00:29:43) - Fredrick von Hayek(00:47:41) - John Stuart Mill(00:52:41) - Adam Smith(00:58:31) - Coase, Schelling, & George(01:08:07) - Anarchy(01:13:16) - Cheap WMDs(01:23:18) - Technocracy & political philosophy(01:34:16) - AI & Scaling Get full access to Dwarkesh Podcast at www.dwarkeshpatel.com/subscribe

Jonathan Hillis is the co-founder and caretaker of Cabin. In conversation with Matthew Monahan. Watch this episode on video: https://youtu.be/4hY7hWkfqYk Watch a preview: https://youtu.be/ZzpyILKLBgw Cabin: https://www.cabin.city Jon's Twitter: https://twitter.com/JonathanHillis Jon's website: https://jonhillis.com THE REGENERATION WILL BE FUNDED Ma Earth Website: https://maearth.com YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@maearthmedia Community Discord: https://maearth.com/community Podcast Feed: https://feed.podbean.com/theregeneration/feed.xml EPISODES RESOURCES A brief history of decentralized cities and centralized states: https://creators.mirror.xyz/s9h4_PQAcJyqgC0rnsWjw9geU2wJs-IBPXIzHhgi-P8 The Network State: https://thenetworkstate.com Rousseau's breadcrumbs: https://jon.mirror.xyz/Ur0cBdyFxoOWEyzx_ZVc8hBwTMDLprXYdXNQxKE2v14 Bowling Alone book: https://www.amazon.com/Bowling-Alone-Collapse-American-Community/dp/0743203046 Ronald Coase (Nature of the Firm): https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Coase.html This interview took place during ETHDenver 2023: https://www.ethdenver.com SOCIAL Farcaster: https://warpcast.com/maearth X / Twitter: https://twitter.com/maearthmedia Lenstube: https://lenstube.xyz/channel/maearth.lens Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/maearthmedia/ Mirror: https://mirror.xyz/maearth.eth LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/maearth/ Lenster: https://lenster.xyz/u/maearth Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/maearthcommunity TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@maearthmedia

Bronwyn Williams & Martin van Staden | The Small Print In this episode, Bronwyn speaks to the head of the Free Market Foundation, Martin van Staden. They discuss property rights in South Africa, how much of South African land is publicly owned, the Khaya Lam project, the importance of giving people ownership, whether property rights are natural rights, the Coase theorem, the problem of monopolies, and more. Bronwyn Williams is a futurist, economist, trend analyst and host of The Small Print. Her day job as a partner at Flux Trends involves helping business leaders to use foresight to design the future they want to live and work in. You may have seen her talking about Transhumanism or Tikok on Carte Blanche, or heard her talking about trends on 702 or CNBC Africa where she is a regular expert commentator. When she's not talking to brands and businesses about the future, you will probably find her curled up somewhere with a (preferably paperback) book. She tweets at @bronwynwilliams. Twitter Flux Trends Website Martin van Staden is the Head of Policy at the Free Market Foundation, Editor of RaceLaw.co.za, Editor in Chief of the Rational Standard, and a columnist at the Daily Friend. He additionally serves on the Board of Advisors of BridgeAfrica, and as the South African Policy Fellow at the international Consumer Choice Center. Martin has an LL.M. (Master of Laws) degree, with distinction, from the University of Pretoria, and is pursuing an LL.D. (Doctor of Laws) at the same institution. Twitter Website Khaya Lam Subscribe to our Substack.   Follow us on Social Media: YouTube LinkedIn Facebook Twitter Instagram   Subscribe to the Discourse ZA Podcast: iTunes Stitcher Spotify RSS feed  

The twentieth century was the managerial century in the United States. An organizational transformation, from entrepreneurial to managerial capitalism, brought forth what became a dominant narrative: that administrative coordination by trained professional managers is essential to the efficient running of organizations both public and private. And yet if managerialism was the apotheosis of administrative efficiency, why did both its practice and the accompanying narrative lie in ruins by the end of the century?  In The Corporation and the Twentieth Century: The History of American Business Enterprise (Princeton UP, 2023), Richard Langlois offers an alternative version: a comprehensive and nuanced reframing and reassessment of the economic, institutional, and intellectual history of the managerial era. Langlois argues that managerialism rose to prominence not because of its inherent superiority but because of its contingent value in a young and rapidly developing American economy. The structures of managerialism solidified their dominance only because the century's great catastrophes of war, depression, and war again superseded markets, scrambled relative prices, and weakened market-supporting institutions. By the end of the twentieth century, Langlois writes, these market-supporting institutions had reemerged to shift advantage toward entrepreneurial and market-driven modes of organization. This magisterial new account of the rise and fall of managerialism holds significant implications for contemporary debates about industrial and antitrust policies and the role of the corporation in the twenty-first century. Richard Langlois was born and raised in northeastern Connecticut and educated at Williams, Yale, and Stanford. He received his Ph.D. in 1981 from the Department of Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford. His primary work has been in the economics of organization, where he has long been pushing the theory of dynamic transaction costs and the theory of modular systems, as well as in economic and business history. His 1992 history of the microcomputer industry won the Newcomen Award as the best paper in the Business History Review. Previous books include Firms, Markets, and Economic Change: a Dynamic Theory of Business Institutions (Routledge, 1995, with Paul L. Robertson) and The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Schumpeter, Chandler, and the New Economy (The Graz Schumpeter Lectures, Routledge 2007), which won the Schumpeter Prize of the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society. In this podcast, he discussed the main themes in his most recent book and how it sits within overall discussions about the large corporation, his views on institutions and the nature of American-led capitalism in the 20th century. This is possible through a reinterpretation of a large body of economic and business history rather than archival or other primary source material. As mentioned during the podcast: -Chandler, A. (1990) Scale and Scope.  -Coase, R. (1937) The Nature of the Firm. -Langlois, R. (2003) The Vanishing Hand. -Langlois, R. (2004). The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Graz Lectures). Bernardo Batiz-Lazo is currently straddling between Newcastle and Mexico City. You can find him on twitter on issues related to business history of banking, fintech, payments and other musings. Not always in that order. @BatizLazo Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

The twentieth century was the managerial century in the United States. An organizational transformation, from entrepreneurial to managerial capitalism, brought forth what became a dominant narrative: that administrative coordination by trained professional managers is essential to the efficient running of organizations both public and private. And yet if managerialism was the apotheosis of administrative efficiency, why did both its practice and the accompanying narrative lie in ruins by the end of the century?  In The Corporation and the Twentieth Century: The History of American Business Enterprise (Princeton UP, 2023), Richard Langlois offers an alternative version: a comprehensive and nuanced reframing and reassessment of the economic, institutional, and intellectual history of the managerial era. Langlois argues that managerialism rose to prominence not because of its inherent superiority but because of its contingent value in a young and rapidly developing American economy. The structures of managerialism solidified their dominance only because the century's great catastrophes of war, depression, and war again superseded markets, scrambled relative prices, and weakened market-supporting institutions. By the end of the twentieth century, Langlois writes, these market-supporting institutions had reemerged to shift advantage toward entrepreneurial and market-driven modes of organization. This magisterial new account of the rise and fall of managerialism holds significant implications for contemporary debates about industrial and antitrust policies and the role of the corporation in the twenty-first century. Richard Langlois was born and raised in northeastern Connecticut and educated at Williams, Yale, and Stanford. He received his Ph.D. in 1981 from the Department of Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford. His primary work has been in the economics of organization, where he has long been pushing the theory of dynamic transaction costs and the theory of modular systems, as well as in economic and business history. His 1992 history of the microcomputer industry won the Newcomen Award as the best paper in the Business History Review. Previous books include Firms, Markets, and Economic Change: a Dynamic Theory of Business Institutions (Routledge, 1995, with Paul L. Robertson) and The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Schumpeter, Chandler, and the New Economy (The Graz Schumpeter Lectures, Routledge 2007), which won the Schumpeter Prize of the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society. In this podcast, he discussed the main themes in his most recent book and how it sits within overall discussions about the large corporation, his views on institutions and the nature of American-led capitalism in the 20th century. This is possible through a reinterpretation of a large body of economic and business history rather than archival or other primary source material. As mentioned during the podcast: -Chandler, A. (1990) Scale and Scope.  -Coase, R. (1937) The Nature of the Firm. -Langlois, R. (2003) The Vanishing Hand. -Langlois, R. (2004). The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Graz Lectures). Bernardo Batiz-Lazo is currently straddling between Newcastle and Mexico City. You can find him on twitter on issues related to business history of banking, fintech, payments and other musings. Not always in that order. @BatizLazo Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

The twentieth century was the managerial century in the United States. An organizational transformation, from entrepreneurial to managerial capitalism, brought forth what became a dominant narrative: that administrative coordination by trained professional managers is essential to the efficient running of organizations both public and private. And yet if managerialism was the apotheosis of administrative efficiency, why did both its practice and the accompanying narrative lie in ruins by the end of the century?  In The Corporation and the Twentieth Century: The History of American Business Enterprise (Princeton UP, 2023), Richard Langlois offers an alternative version: a comprehensive and nuanced reframing and reassessment of the economic, institutional, and intellectual history of the managerial era. Langlois argues that managerialism rose to prominence not because of its inherent superiority but because of its contingent value in a young and rapidly developing American economy. The structures of managerialism solidified their dominance only because the century's great catastrophes of war, depression, and war again superseded markets, scrambled relative prices, and weakened market-supporting institutions. By the end of the twentieth century, Langlois writes, these market-supporting institutions had reemerged to shift advantage toward entrepreneurial and market-driven modes of organization. This magisterial new account of the rise and fall of managerialism holds significant implications for contemporary debates about industrial and antitrust policies and the role of the corporation in the twenty-first century. Richard Langlois was born and raised in northeastern Connecticut and educated at Williams, Yale, and Stanford. He received his Ph.D. in 1981 from the Department of Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford. His primary work has been in the economics of organization, where he has long been pushing the theory of dynamic transaction costs and the theory of modular systems, as well as in economic and business history. His 1992 history of the microcomputer industry won the Newcomen Award as the best paper in the Business History Review. Previous books include Firms, Markets, and Economic Change: a Dynamic Theory of Business Institutions (Routledge, 1995, with Paul L. Robertson) and The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Schumpeter, Chandler, and the New Economy (The Graz Schumpeter Lectures, Routledge 2007), which won the Schumpeter Prize of the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society. In this podcast, he discussed the main themes in his most recent book and how it sits within overall discussions about the large corporation, his views on institutions and the nature of American-led capitalism in the 20th century. This is possible through a reinterpretation of a large body of economic and business history rather than archival or other primary source material. As mentioned during the podcast: -Chandler, A. (1990) Scale and Scope.  -Coase, R. (1937) The Nature of the Firm. -Langlois, R. (2003) The Vanishing Hand. -Langlois, R. (2004). The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Graz Lectures). Bernardo Batiz-Lazo is currently straddling between Newcastle and Mexico City. You can find him on twitter on issues related to business history of banking, fintech, payments and other musings. Not always in that order. @BatizLazo Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/intellectual-history

The twentieth century was the managerial century in the United States. An organizational transformation, from entrepreneurial to managerial capitalism, brought forth what became a dominant narrative: that administrative coordination by trained professional managers is essential to the efficient running of organizations both public and private. And yet if managerialism was the apotheosis of administrative efficiency, why did both its practice and the accompanying narrative lie in ruins by the end of the century?  In The Corporation and the Twentieth Century: The History of American Business Enterprise (Princeton UP, 2023), Richard Langlois offers an alternative version: a comprehensive and nuanced reframing and reassessment of the economic, institutional, and intellectual history of the managerial era. Langlois argues that managerialism rose to prominence not because of its inherent superiority but because of its contingent value in a young and rapidly developing American economy. The structures of managerialism solidified their dominance only because the century's great catastrophes of war, depression, and war again superseded markets, scrambled relative prices, and weakened market-supporting institutions. By the end of the twentieth century, Langlois writes, these market-supporting institutions had reemerged to shift advantage toward entrepreneurial and market-driven modes of organization. This magisterial new account of the rise and fall of managerialism holds significant implications for contemporary debates about industrial and antitrust policies and the role of the corporation in the twenty-first century. Richard Langlois was born and raised in northeastern Connecticut and educated at Williams, Yale, and Stanford. He received his Ph.D. in 1981 from the Department of Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford. His primary work has been in the economics of organization, where he has long been pushing the theory of dynamic transaction costs and the theory of modular systems, as well as in economic and business history. His 1992 history of the microcomputer industry won the Newcomen Award as the best paper in the Business History Review. Previous books include Firms, Markets, and Economic Change: a Dynamic Theory of Business Institutions (Routledge, 1995, with Paul L. Robertson) and The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Schumpeter, Chandler, and the New Economy (The Graz Schumpeter Lectures, Routledge 2007), which won the Schumpeter Prize of the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society. In this podcast, he discussed the main themes in his most recent book and how it sits within overall discussions about the large corporation, his views on institutions and the nature of American-led capitalism in the 20th century. This is possible through a reinterpretation of a large body of economic and business history rather than archival or other primary source material. As mentioned during the podcast: -Chandler, A. (1990) Scale and Scope.  -Coase, R. (1937) The Nature of the Firm. -Langlois, R. (2003) The Vanishing Hand. -Langlois, R. (2004). The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Graz Lectures). Bernardo Batiz-Lazo is currently straddling between Newcastle and Mexico City. You can find him on twitter on issues related to business history of banking, fintech, payments and other musings. Not always in that order. @BatizLazo Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/american-studies

The twentieth century was the managerial century in the United States. An organizational transformation, from entrepreneurial to managerial capitalism, brought forth what became a dominant narrative: that administrative coordination by trained professional managers is essential to the efficient running of organizations both public and private. And yet if managerialism was the apotheosis of administrative efficiency, why did both its practice and the accompanying narrative lie in ruins by the end of the century?  In The Corporation and the Twentieth Century: The History of American Business Enterprise (Princeton UP, 2023), Richard Langlois offers an alternative version: a comprehensive and nuanced reframing and reassessment of the economic, institutional, and intellectual history of the managerial era. Langlois argues that managerialism rose to prominence not because of its inherent superiority but because of its contingent value in a young and rapidly developing American economy. The structures of managerialism solidified their dominance only because the century's great catastrophes of war, depression, and war again superseded markets, scrambled relative prices, and weakened market-supporting institutions. By the end of the twentieth century, Langlois writes, these market-supporting institutions had reemerged to shift advantage toward entrepreneurial and market-driven modes of organization. This magisterial new account of the rise and fall of managerialism holds significant implications for contemporary debates about industrial and antitrust policies and the role of the corporation in the twenty-first century. Richard Langlois was born and raised in northeastern Connecticut and educated at Williams, Yale, and Stanford. He received his Ph.D. in 1981 from the Department of Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford. His primary work has been in the economics of organization, where he has long been pushing the theory of dynamic transaction costs and the theory of modular systems, as well as in economic and business history. His 1992 history of the microcomputer industry won the Newcomen Award as the best paper in the Business History Review. Previous books include Firms, Markets, and Economic Change: a Dynamic Theory of Business Institutions (Routledge, 1995, with Paul L. Robertson) and The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Schumpeter, Chandler, and the New Economy (The Graz Schumpeter Lectures, Routledge 2007), which won the Schumpeter Prize of the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society. In this podcast, he discussed the main themes in his most recent book and how it sits within overall discussions about the large corporation, his views on institutions and the nature of American-led capitalism in the 20th century. This is possible through a reinterpretation of a large body of economic and business history rather than archival or other primary source material. As mentioned during the podcast: -Chandler, A. (1990) Scale and Scope.  -Coase, R. (1937) The Nature of the Firm. -Langlois, R. (2003) The Vanishing Hand. -Langlois, R. (2004). The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Graz Lectures). Bernardo Batiz-Lazo is currently straddling between Newcastle and Mexico City. You can find him on twitter on issues related to business history of banking, fintech, payments and other musings. Not always in that order. @BatizLazo

The twentieth century was the managerial century in the United States. An organizational transformation, from entrepreneurial to managerial capitalism, brought forth what became a dominant narrative: that administrative coordination by trained professional managers is essential to the efficient running of organizations both public and private. And yet if managerialism was the apotheosis of administrative efficiency, why did both its practice and the accompanying narrative lie in ruins by the end of the century?  In The Corporation and the Twentieth Century: The History of American Business Enterprise (Princeton UP, 2023), Richard Langlois offers an alternative version: a comprehensive and nuanced reframing and reassessment of the economic, institutional, and intellectual history of the managerial era. Langlois argues that managerialism rose to prominence not because of its inherent superiority but because of its contingent value in a young and rapidly developing American economy. The structures of managerialism solidified their dominance only because the century's great catastrophes of war, depression, and war again superseded markets, scrambled relative prices, and weakened market-supporting institutions. By the end of the twentieth century, Langlois writes, these market-supporting institutions had reemerged to shift advantage toward entrepreneurial and market-driven modes of organization. This magisterial new account of the rise and fall of managerialism holds significant implications for contemporary debates about industrial and antitrust policies and the role of the corporation in the twenty-first century. Richard Langlois was born and raised in northeastern Connecticut and educated at Williams, Yale, and Stanford. He received his Ph.D. in 1981 from the Department of Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford. His primary work has been in the economics of organization, where he has long been pushing the theory of dynamic transaction costs and the theory of modular systems, as well as in economic and business history. His 1992 history of the microcomputer industry won the Newcomen Award as the best paper in the Business History Review. Previous books include Firms, Markets, and Economic Change: a Dynamic Theory of Business Institutions (Routledge, 1995, with Paul L. Robertson) and The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Schumpeter, Chandler, and the New Economy (The Graz Schumpeter Lectures, Routledge 2007), which won the Schumpeter Prize of the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society. In this podcast, he discussed the main themes in his most recent book and how it sits within overall discussions about the large corporation, his views on institutions and the nature of American-led capitalism in the 20th century. This is possible through a reinterpretation of a large body of economic and business history rather than archival or other primary source material. As mentioned during the podcast: -Chandler, A. (1990) Scale and Scope.  -Coase, R. (1937) The Nature of the Firm. -Langlois, R. (2003) The Vanishing Hand. -Langlois, R. (2004). The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Graz Lectures). Bernardo Batiz-Lazo is currently straddling between Newcastle and Mexico City. You can find him on twitter on issues related to business history of banking, fintech, payments and other musings. Not always in that order. @BatizLazo Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/economics

The twentieth century was the managerial century in the United States. An organizational transformation, from entrepreneurial to managerial capitalism, brought forth what became a dominant narrative: that administrative coordination by trained professional managers is essential to the efficient running of organizations both public and private. And yet if managerialism was the apotheosis of administrative efficiency, why did both its practice and the accompanying narrative lie in ruins by the end of the century?  In The Corporation and the Twentieth Century: The History of American Business Enterprise (Princeton UP, 2023), Richard Langlois offers an alternative version: a comprehensive and nuanced reframing and reassessment of the economic, institutional, and intellectual history of the managerial era. Langlois argues that managerialism rose to prominence not because of its inherent superiority but because of its contingent value in a young and rapidly developing American economy. The structures of managerialism solidified their dominance only because the century's great catastrophes of war, depression, and war again superseded markets, scrambled relative prices, and weakened market-supporting institutions. By the end of the twentieth century, Langlois writes, these market-supporting institutions had reemerged to shift advantage toward entrepreneurial and market-driven modes of organization. This magisterial new account of the rise and fall of managerialism holds significant implications for contemporary debates about industrial and antitrust policies and the role of the corporation in the twenty-first century. Richard Langlois was born and raised in northeastern Connecticut and educated at Williams, Yale, and Stanford. He received his Ph.D. in 1981 from the Department of Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford. His primary work has been in the economics of organization, where he has long been pushing the theory of dynamic transaction costs and the theory of modular systems, as well as in economic and business history. His 1992 history of the microcomputer industry won the Newcomen Award as the best paper in the Business History Review. Previous books include Firms, Markets, and Economic Change: a Dynamic Theory of Business Institutions (Routledge, 1995, with Paul L. Robertson) and The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Schumpeter, Chandler, and the New Economy (The Graz Schumpeter Lectures, Routledge 2007), which won the Schumpeter Prize of the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society. In this podcast, he discussed the main themes in his most recent book and how it sits within overall discussions about the large corporation, his views on institutions and the nature of American-led capitalism in the 20th century. This is possible through a reinterpretation of a large body of economic and business history rather than archival or other primary source material. As mentioned during the podcast: -Chandler, A. (1990) Scale and Scope.  -Coase, R. (1937) The Nature of the Firm. -Langlois, R. (2003) The Vanishing Hand. -Langlois, R. (2004). The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Graz Lectures). Bernardo Batiz-Lazo is currently straddling between Newcastle and Mexico City. You can find him on twitter on issues related to business history of banking, fintech, payments and other musings. Not always in that order. @BatizLazo Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The twentieth century was the managerial century in the United States. An organizational transformation, from entrepreneurial to managerial capitalism, brought forth what became a dominant narrative: that administrative coordination by trained professional managers is essential to the efficient running of organizations both public and private. And yet if managerialism was the apotheosis of administrative efficiency, why did both its practice and the accompanying narrative lie in ruins by the end of the century?  In The Corporation and the Twentieth Century: The History of American Business Enterprise (Princeton UP, 2023), Richard Langlois offers an alternative version: a comprehensive and nuanced reframing and reassessment of the economic, institutional, and intellectual history of the managerial era. Langlois argues that managerialism rose to prominence not because of its inherent superiority but because of its contingent value in a young and rapidly developing American economy. The structures of managerialism solidified their dominance only because the century's great catastrophes of war, depression, and war again superseded markets, scrambled relative prices, and weakened market-supporting institutions. By the end of the twentieth century, Langlois writes, these market-supporting institutions had reemerged to shift advantage toward entrepreneurial and market-driven modes of organization. This magisterial new account of the rise and fall of managerialism holds significant implications for contemporary debates about industrial and antitrust policies and the role of the corporation in the twenty-first century. Richard Langlois was born and raised in northeastern Connecticut and educated at Williams, Yale, and Stanford. He received his Ph.D. in 1981 from the Department of Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford. His primary work has been in the economics of organization, where he has long been pushing the theory of dynamic transaction costs and the theory of modular systems, as well as in economic and business history. His 1992 history of the microcomputer industry won the Newcomen Award as the best paper in the Business History Review. Previous books include Firms, Markets, and Economic Change: a Dynamic Theory of Business Institutions (Routledge, 1995, with Paul L. Robertson) and The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Schumpeter, Chandler, and the New Economy (The Graz Schumpeter Lectures, Routledge 2007), which won the Schumpeter Prize of the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society. In this podcast, he discussed the main themes in his most recent book and how it sits within overall discussions about the large corporation, his views on institutions and the nature of American-led capitalism in the 20th century. This is possible through a reinterpretation of a large body of economic and business history rather than archival or other primary source material. As mentioned during the podcast: -Chandler, A. (1990) Scale and Scope.  -Coase, R. (1937) The Nature of the Firm. -Langlois, R. (2003) The Vanishing Hand. -Langlois, R. (2004). The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Graz Lectures). Bernardo Batiz-Lazo is currently straddling between Newcastle and Mexico City. You can find him on twitter on issues related to business history of banking, fintech, payments and other musings. Not always in that order. @BatizLazo Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/finance

The twentieth century was the managerial century in the United States. An organizational transformation, from entrepreneurial to managerial capitalism, brought forth what became a dominant narrative: that administrative coordination by trained professional managers is essential to the efficient running of organizations both public and private. And yet if managerialism was the apotheosis of administrative efficiency, why did both its practice and the accompanying narrative lie in ruins by the end of the century?  In The Corporation and the Twentieth Century: The History of American Business Enterprise (Princeton UP, 2023), Richard Langlois offers an alternative version: a comprehensive and nuanced reframing and reassessment of the economic, institutional, and intellectual history of the managerial era. Langlois argues that managerialism rose to prominence not because of its inherent superiority but because of its contingent value in a young and rapidly developing American economy. The structures of managerialism solidified their dominance only because the century's great catastrophes of war, depression, and war again superseded markets, scrambled relative prices, and weakened market-supporting institutions. By the end of the twentieth century, Langlois writes, these market-supporting institutions had reemerged to shift advantage toward entrepreneurial and market-driven modes of organization. This magisterial new account of the rise and fall of managerialism holds significant implications for contemporary debates about industrial and antitrust policies and the role of the corporation in the twenty-first century. Richard Langlois was born and raised in northeastern Connecticut and educated at Williams, Yale, and Stanford. He received his Ph.D. in 1981 from the Department of Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford. His primary work has been in the economics of organization, where he has long been pushing the theory of dynamic transaction costs and the theory of modular systems, as well as in economic and business history. His 1992 history of the microcomputer industry won the Newcomen Award as the best paper in the Business History Review. Previous books include Firms, Markets, and Economic Change: a Dynamic Theory of Business Institutions (Routledge, 1995, with Paul L. Robertson) and The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Schumpeter, Chandler, and the New Economy (The Graz Schumpeter Lectures, Routledge 2007), which won the Schumpeter Prize of the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society. In this podcast, he discussed the main themes in his most recent book and how it sits within overall discussions about the large corporation, his views on institutions and the nature of American-led capitalism in the 20th century. This is possible through a reinterpretation of a large body of economic and business history rather than archival or other primary source material. As mentioned during the podcast: -Chandler, A. (1990) Scale and Scope.  -Coase, R. (1937) The Nature of the Firm. -Langlois, R. (2003) The Vanishing Hand. -Langlois, R. (2004). The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Graz Lectures). Bernardo Batiz-Lazo is currently straddling between Newcastle and Mexico City. You can find him on twitter on issues related to business history of banking, fintech, payments and other musings. Not always in that order. @BatizLazo Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Why does it always seem like it's the people who move to the village that complain about the church bells? Or it is those that move next to a pub that are irritated by noise? It seems to indicate that there is an optimal way to live harmoniously. But how does the idea of neighbourliness work and what does it tell us about the nature of society? In this week's podcast, we discuss noisy neighbours. Is annoying your neighbour a tale as old as time or is it a relatively recent phenomenon? We discuss trap and drill music, Horst-Wessel-Lied, whistling, Isaiah Berlin, Coase theorem, intentional communities, Nozick's framework for utopia and cohousing. Finally, we share when we've been annoying neighbours and when we've been most annoyed. A few things we mentioned in this podcast: - Classical musician forced out of London flat after noise complaints https://www.theguardian.com/music/2023/may/14/musician-forced-london-flat-fiona-fey-mediaeval-babes-noise-abatement - The Independent Society of Musicians https://www.ism.org/?/join&gclid=CjwKCAjw6vyiBhB_EiwAQJRophs1VCEGCbtO6LFdOy9-016Q1kcqeGdUrttw82iys2x3KyUfmu2qmBoCNVEQAvD_BwE - Forager, Farmer Morals https://www.overcomingbias.com/p/forager-vs-farmer-moralityhtml - Adult ADHD: How to Succeed as a Hunter in a Farmer's World https://www.amazon.co.uk/Adult-ADHD-Succeed-Hunter-Farmers/dp/1620555751 - Robert Nozick's Political Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nozick-political/ For more information on Aleph Insights visit our website https://alephinsights.com or to get in touch about our podcast email podcast@alephinsights.com

India Policy Watch #1: Don't Concentrate Insights on issues relevant to India— RSJIn one of the recent editions on the Hindenburg short-selling saga, I had written about how easily the Adani group had spread itself into a diverse range of sectors. The group was highly leveraged because it was so keen on getting into newer sectors and then winning bids in them with metronomic efficiency. Generally speaking, it is difficult to run a conglomerate of different businesses. You might argue that each business can be handled by a competent management team who will use the brand name and deep pockets of the parent group to build a solid business. But it is easier said than done. Capital allocation decisions, which lie at the heart of executing a business strategy, are difficult within a single line of business. They become hugely complicated within a conglomerate of businesses. Misallocation of capital, lack of focus and inability to stay competitive against smaller, nimbler players eventually follow. Soon, the businesses need to be hived off, and you find companies convincing would-be investors on how they are doing fewer things and doing them well instead of spreading themselves too thin. This is the usual cycle. Yet, you see conglomerates appearing on the business landscape across countries. In some cases, these are businesses integrating vertically or finding interesting adjacencies in their business. This kind of makes sense in the Coase-ian “Nature of Firm” way. I mean, if the transaction costs of finding someone to do a particular work are higher than you doing it yourself, sure, go ahead and do it yourself. But beyond that, there should be no economic reason for having conglomerates. Unless you have one of these conditions in the economy: a) Cost of capital is high, and access to it is difficult. Newer players find it difficult to access capital to start new businesses while older, established players with free cash flow can muscle their way into unrelated but lucrative new sectors only because they have access to capital at a lower rate. b) The playing field isn't level for newer players to make a dent. Through a mix of friendly regulations, ‘working' the networks and M&A activities, the bigger players continue to have an advantage going into a new sector over smaller players who might have expertise in cracking those sectors open.c) There's relatively little ease of doing business in those sectors or in the evening overall. The established conglomerates with an army of people, lawyers and consultants can get started relatively faster and capture the market than new entrants. You don't have to be a genius to see where the Indian policy-making framework is on the above conditions. There's common and easy access to capital through a large number of PEs and VC funds but only for a particular kind of ‘flavour of the season' variety. This also is getting difficult to access. The market for other forms of capital isn't deep enough. In the same vein, long-term capital for greenfield projects where the credit risk has to be borne by the issuer isn't available. There is always a whiff of regulatory capture especially in sectors where the government is closely involved bin decision making. Lastly, we might have moved up in the ‘ease of doing business' rankings, but it isn't clear yet how this has changed things on the ground. New businesses still find going tough for them. All of the above means that in the past five years, we are reversing a trend seen since the ‘91 reforms. That of increasing salience of conglomerates in India. You don't have to research too hard. Just take a look at any sector - already big or one that is emerging - you will have the same spectacle of a few large corporate groups getting themselves into all sorts of businesses, from defence to semiconductors or from airlines to carbonated soft drinks only because they believe they can take advantage of market distortions.As if to illustrate this point further, here's news that's only a day old. Here's Moneycontrol  reporting:“The shares of Mukesh Ambani-led Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL) rallied 3.5 percent in the morning trade on March 31 after the company said secured creditors, unsecured creditors and shareholders would meet on May 2 to approve the proposed demerger of Reliance Strategic Ventures.After the approval, the unit, which is the financial services subsidiary of the oil-to-telecom conglomerate, would be renamed Jio Financial Services.Benefits that shall accrue on the demerger of the financial services business will be the creation of an independent company focusing exclusively on financial services and exploring opportunities in the sector, the independent company can attract different sets of investors, strategic partners, lenders and other stakeholders having a specific interest in the financial services business, a financial services company can have a higher leverage (as compared to the Demerged Company) for its growth and, unlocking the value of the demerged undertaking for the shareholders of the demerged company, the conglomerate said in an exchange filing.”This isn't out of the ordinary. If you search for similar news items from the last five years, you will notice the same pattern of large conglomerates (usually the big 5) muscling into other or newer sectors because they think they have the capital and they will be able to manage the sector well. While one cannot blame these conglomerates for their ambitions, this trend suggests we might have tipped over from being pro-markets to pro-business. Coincidentally, as I was writing this, we had a paper authored by Viral Acharya (former Deputy Governor, RBI) on the opportunities and challenges for the Indian economy published by the Brookings Institution and being discussed in the media. Acharya has highlighted the concentration of power in Indian industry as a particularly worrying trend. He writes (I have paraphrased a bit):“A striking feature of this rise in industrial concentration by private companies is that it is in part due to the growing footprint of “Big-5” industrial conglomerates, based on the overall share of assets in non-financial sectors in 2021. Data shows the following patterns.First, until 2010, the Big-5 increased their footprint in more and more industrial sectors, broadening their reach to 40 NIC-2-digit non-financial sectors. After this breadth first strategy came the depth-next strategy. Starting in 2015, the Big-5 started acquiring larger and larger share within the sectors where they were present. In particular, their share in total assets of the non-financial sectors rose from 10% in 1991 to nearly 18% in 2021, whereas the share of the next big five (Big 6-10) business groups fell from 18% in 1992 to less than 9%. In other words, Big-5 grew not just at the expense of the smallest firms, but also of the next largest firms.Next, this growth of Big-5 appears to be driven in part by their growing share of overall Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) activity. Even though the aggregate number of M&A deals has dropped since 2011, the share of M&A deals by the Big-5 has doubled from under 3% in 2015 to 6% in 2021, without such an increase being seen in the next five biggest groups. Arguably, this growth has also been supported by a conscious industrial policy of creating “national champions” via preferential allocation of projects and in some cases regulatory agencies turning a blind eye to predatory pricing. Equally importantly, given the high tariffs, Big-5 groups do not have to compete with international peers in many sectors where they are present and derive most of their revenues domestically.”Acharya then goes on to list the usual downstream problems of such an increase in market power concentration - inefficient allocation of capital, favouritism in project allocation, regulatory interference, related party transactions, over-leveraging while becoming too big to fail and crowding out new players. But he also makes an important claim that this concentration of market power is one of the reasons for persistent core inflation. He concludes:“In summary, creating national champions, which is considered by many as the industrial policy of “new India”, appears to be feeding directly into keeping prices at a high level, with the possibility that it is feeding “core” inflation's persistent high level.”I won't go as far as Acharya yet on this thesis. As he admits, there's more work that needs to be done here, but his conclusion on pricing remaining high because of industry concentration does pass the smell test. And it should concern policy makers. I know there are many who will ask what's wrong in creating ‘national champions' like the tiger economies did between the 70s-90s. But there are a few differences in our case. Firstly, the focus on creating national champions elsewhere was to choose specific sectors where they might have a comparative advantage, invest in them, especially on technology and then win in global markets through an export-oriented strategy. It is a somewhat flawed approach, but it still makes sense for a low-income economy to do this. But we aren't really doing this in India. Our so-called national champions are focused on domestic markets where there's no particular need to have them. In fact, there is only a monopoly risk here with the attendant problems of price cartelisation and poor customer service. Also, the limited focus on exports that these big five domestic players have as of now is largely linked to natural resources and not large-scale, job-creating manufacturing setups. It is unclear how the broader economy is benefitting from this apparent design. Secondly, the successful national champion model in other economies didn't need high import tariffs to support their ambitions like it is now the case in India. We have written about this many times in the past. Higher tariffs will reduce the competitiveness of the domestic players in those sectors to compete globally. It is counterintuitive to have a high tariff regime if you want to build national champions. After all, global markets are much larger than the domestic market, and that's where these conglomerates must be competing. Thirdly, what's the government getting out of the apparent tilting, if it is intentional, of the playing field in favour of these players? If the idea is to have national champions despite the obvious flaws in this intent, it makes sense to have stakes in these ventures to participate in the value being created. Lastly, the overall economy will benefit if the process of creating such champions leads to factor market reforms and real ease of doing business for other participants in the process. Else, the larger players will continue to get ahead not because of better products or innovation but simply because they know how to manage the system. In other words, it is the 1970s all over again with a tadka of markets.It is difficult to see how we can trace our way back from this path, given the apparent lack of opposition and the already dominant position of these conglomerates in industry and media. Also, any walking back will require some bold antitrust kind of measures (it is what Acharya suggests) which is quite impossible in India. Possibly, the only medium-term scenario is these conglomerates start stepping on each other's toes as they continue to diversify their businesses and that competition alleviates the problems of concentration. But that might be too late in coming, or they might have a tacit understanding of the rules of the game in competing with one another. It will distort markets further. Maybe this is a tad alarmist, but it is important to acknowledge there's way too much diversification among the top conglomerates in India and that's always a sign of market distortion. India Policy Watch #2: We Need an Agnipath for India's DiplomacyInsights on issues relevant to India— Pranay KotasthaneIn edition #198, I highlighted that at least three areas of the Indian executive need a quick state capacity boost. These were: the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology (MeitY), and economic regulatory bodies such as the Competition Commission of India (CCI). Then I came across this tweet from the External Affairs Minister, which acted as a positive reinforcement for this line of thinking. Managing these engagements in an unsettled world order needs an immediate boost in India's foreign policy capacity. Solutions like incremental increases in the Indian Foreign Service (IFS), while required, will be too slow.What we need today is a ‘surge hiring' strategy. The external affairs ministry, in fact, was the first union ministry to experiment with a broader lateral entry for government officers in 2015. It also opened up positions in its policy planning and research division for people in academia and the private sector. However, these tentative trials seem to have lost steam. The underlying reason is the internal resistance from the foreign service officers, who see such attempts as a threat to their career progression.The surge hiring strategy should try a different approach. It should attempt to hire a much larger number of people below ambassadorial positions. This way, the cadre protection impulse can be side-stepped. Instead of targeting joint secretary levels, two fellowships could be attempted: one for fresh graduates and another for young professionals working within and outside the government (thanks to Nitin Pai for this idea). Given the growing prominence of technology and economic issues as foreign policy domains, this approach would help build institutional knowledge within the ministry. More importantly, the surge should target staffing for the headquarter functions in Delhi for managing various engagements and new initiatives. Indian missions abroad can continue to be led by IFS officers. Past attempts at lateral hiring were advertised as single posts in the unreserved category. By opening up a larger number of positions concurrently, the government could retain existing norms on reservations and quotas. Finally, the surge hiring strategy should have a sunset clause and a well-defined recruitment target. If it is conceptualised as a non-recurring measure keeping the current geopolitical situation in mind, it will resonate with the opposition and the parliament.With the Agnipath experiment of the defence ministry, the idea of short-term employment within the government has gained some acceptability. It is no longer anathema to the government but an idea whose time has come. Without a surge in foreign policy capacity, we will only have great ideas but tardy implementation, resulting in a perennially underperforming foreign policy. Matsyanyaaya: Reflections on the QuadBig fish eating small fish = Foreign Policy in action— Pranay KotasthaneLast week, I attended a US State Department sponsored programme that aims to invigorate think tank research on Quad collaboration in the four countries. As part of the first segment of this programme, five representatives from each country's think tanks were hosted in the US. What follows are my reflections on the Quad as a geopolitical formation, based on what I saw in this programme.* Quad ranks higher on the US foreign policy agenda than I had expected. My prior assumption was that given the multiple alliances that the US leads, a new, amorphous grouping such as the Quad wouldn't rank high on its priority list. However, the interactions with the officials suggested a conscious effort to infuse energy into the Quad. * The Quad is being positioned visibly and intentionally as a positive force that would bring benefits to the Indo-Pacific at large, rather than as an anti-China “alliance”. This is the reason why the interactions as part of the grouping have spawned into six leader-level working groups—on COVID-19 Response and Global Health Security, Climate, Critical and Emerging Technologies, Cyber, Space, and Infrastructure, and at least three initiatives—Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative, and the Quad Fellowship. The strategy, if there is one, seems to be to throw several balls up in the air, knowing fully well that some of them will get dropped, while others might be caught on their way back by all four countries, or only a subset amongst them.* As the Quad is not a traditional security alliance, its success metric will also be different. Not all cooperation will be Quad-labelled, and some of it might come in bilateral or trilateral formats. So, the increased cooperation between Japan and Australia on defence ties, and between India and Australia on economic ties, are also indicators that the Quad is moving in the right direction. * While the rationale for Quad collaboration in many areas is often “common interests” or “shared values”, an underrated frame is “mutual complementarities”. In many spheres, especially in technology, the Quad is an attractive forum for cooperation precisely because each country has complementary strengths. * Positioning Quad as a force for good in the Indo-Pacific—rather than a geopolitical grouping against China— in many areas runs the obvious risk of underperformance and loss of credibility. In international affairs, efforts at providing benefits to another country are usually known by their failures more than their successes. For instance, in May 2021, the Quad Vaccine Partnership targeted the provision of 1 billion COVID-19 vaccines. Even though the four countries individually delivered 670 million doses, including 265 million doses in the Indo-Pacific, the demand for vaccines waned by the end of 2022. The dominant narrative was that the Vaccine Partnership had failed, even though it had made a significant contribution. HomeWorkReading and listening recommendations on public policy matters* [Podcast] We were on Shruti Rajagopalan's excellent podcast Ideas of India to discuss our book and the Indian State's many puzzles. * [Podcast] A Puliyabaazi on citizencraft featuring Nitin Pai.* [Paper] This paper by Isha Bhatnagar offers evidence that gender equitable preferences are rising in India. From the abstract:Over more than a quarter-century period (1992–1993 to 2019–2021), I find a significant decline in son preference from 40 to 18 percent and an increase in gender-equitable preferences among most subpopulations. Multivariate analysis shows that for all survey years, education and frequent exposure to television significantly increased the odds of gender-equitable preferences. In the last decade, community norms supporting women's employment are also associated with gender-equitable preferences. In addition, decomposition analysis shows that compared to compositional change, social norm change accounts for two-thirds of the rise in gender-equitable preferences. These findings suggest that rising norms of gender equality have the potential to dismantle gender-biased preferences in India. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit publicpolicy.substack.com

Why do firms do some activities “in house” and contract out others? British-American economist Ronald Coase gave a cogent explanation in a classic 1937 paper on the nature of the firm. Show host Gene Tunny explains to his colleague Tim Hughes how Coase's insights (e.g. the concept of transaction costs) can be applied to understand the actions of an Australian construction firm Hutchinson's deciding to employ people to do concrete formwork rather than relying on subcontractors. Please get in touch with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored. What's covered in EP181Episode topic: What determines what activities a business does in house? [0:06]What is formwork and why does it matter? [3:29]Hutchinson's moves to bring formwork in house [8:54]When is it important to have an in-house workforce in your firm [14:42]Why you don't always contract out [20:00]What's done in house and what's outsourced? [25:03]Gig economy platforms (e.g. UpWork) [33:02]A closer look at The nature of the firm by Ronald Coase [40:56]Links relevant to the conversationCourier-Mail article on Hutchinson's decision to do its own formwork:https://www.couriermail.com.au/business/citybeat/hard-labour-hutchies-plan-to-survive-building-crisis/news-story/e3b8acc34728e49cc04d0c4b88bafc8dRonald Coase's classic article on the nature of the firm:https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.xAmerican Express article on pros and cons of hiring versus outsourcing:https://www.americanexpress.com/en-us/business/trends-and-insights/articles/pros-cons-hiring-house-vs-outsourcing/CreditsThanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show's sponsor, Gene's consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple Podcasts, Google Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Muitas vezes são demonizadas, vistas como símbolos de poder abusivo ou trituradoras de pessoas. Mas, será que as empresas são mesmo isso? A terceira temporada do [IN] Pertinente arranca com um novo especialista na área da Economia. Hugo Figueiredo vai fazer dupla com Hugo van der Ding e, neste primeiro episódio da nova temporada, vai ajudar-nos a compreender que, apesar de tudo, as empresas existem por razões bem melhores do que a fama que muitas vezes as precede; que, entre muitas outras coisas, são extremamente necessárias para que exista e funcione aquilo que nos faz avançar: a inovação.REFERÊNCIAS E LINKS ÚTEIS Porque existem Empresas? Coase, R.H. (1937), The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4: 386-405. Coase, R., & Wang, N. (2012). Saving economics from the economists. Harvard Business Review, 90(12), 36.Gibbons, Robert and Henderson, Rebecca. "What Do Managers Do?: Exploring Persistent Performance Differences among Seemingly Similar Enterprises". The Handbook of Organizational Economics, edited by Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013, pp. 680-731.  O Valor dos Gestoresdilbert.commintzberg.orgHenry Mintzberg. 2004. Managers Not MBAs: A Hard Look at the Soft Practice of Managing and Management Development. Berrett-Koehler Publishers, San Francisco.Henry Mintzberg. Species of Organisations Henry Mintzberg. Here Are Five Easy Steps to Kill Your Company (any one will do)Garvin, D. A. (2013). How Google sold its engineers on management. Harvard business review, 91(12), 74-82.Lazear, E. P., Shaw, K. L., & Stanton, C. T. (2015). The value of bosses. Journal of Labor Economics, 33(4), 823-861.Gestão e ProdutividadeWorld Management SurveyBloom, N., Genakos, C., Sadun, R., & Van Reenen, J. (2012). Management practices across firms and countries. Academy of management perspectives, 26(1), 12-33.Daniela Scur, Raffaella Sadun, John Van Reenen, Renata Lemos, Nicholas Bloom, The World Management Survey at 18: lessons and the way forward, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 37, Issue 2, Summer 2021, Pages 231–258.BIOS:Hugo van der Ding é muitas personagens. Locutor, criativo e desenhador acidental. Uma espécie de cartunista de sucesso instantâneo a quem bastou uma caneta Bic, uma boa ideia e uma folha em branco. Criador de personagens digitais de sucesso como a Criada Malcriada e Cavaca a Presidenta, também autor de um dos podcasts mais ouvidos em Portugal, Vamos Todos Morrer, podemos encontrá-lo, ou melhor ouvi-lo, todas as manhãs na Antena 3 ou por detrás dos bonecos que nos surgem todos os dias por aqui e ali.Hugo Figueiredo é professor de Economia na Universidade de Aveiro, investigador do CIPES - Centro de Investigação em Políticas do Ensino Superior e colaborador do GOVCOPP – Unidade de Investigação em Governança, Competitividade e Políticas Públicas. É licenciado em Economia pela Universidade do Porto e doutorado em Ciências Empresariais pela Universidade de Manchester. Os seus interesses de investigação centram-se nas áreas da economia do trabalho, da educação e do ensino superior.

Se un economista decidesse di studiare i cavalli, non andrebbe ad osservarli. Si metterebbe comodo nel suo studio e comincerebbe col chiedersi: “cosa farei io se fossi un cavallo?” - Ronald CoaseRonald Coase ebbe una vita lunga e straordinariamente produttiva. Nato nel 1910, morì nel 2013, all'età di 103 anni. Studiò alla London School of Economics, subendo l'influenza di Arnold Plant ed Edwin Cannan. Erano gli anni '30 e Coase esordì pubblicando “La natura dell'impresa” (1937), in cui esaminava a fondo le argomentazioni sull'allocazione dei fattori produttivi che provenivano sia dal campo liberale che da quello socialista. I successivi lavori di Coase saranno appunto dedicati a spiegare il perché l'impresa esiste, e a partire da questa indagine egli definirà dei concetti allora totalmente inediti, ma destinati a diventare basilari nell'analisi economica: la definizione dei costi di transazione e la teoria del costo sociale. Questi passaggi decisamente innovativi e rivoluzionari valsero a Ronald Coase l'assegnazione del premio Nobel per l'economia nel 1991. Fu sempre un economista empirico, nella tradizione di due grandi che molto ammirava: Adam Smith ed Alfred Marshall (di cui voleva scrivere una biografia). Pochi mesi prima di morire pubblicò, con Ning Wang, un libro illuminante per spiegare la transizione della Cina verso l'economia di mercato, tema al quale aveva dedicato gli ultimi anni di studio. Protagonista: Lisa KinspergherOspite:Carlo Stagnaro, Direttore Ricerche e Studi IBLConsigli di lettura:·“Ronald Coase, l'economista pragmatico” (2011), di Carlo Stagnaro, Occasional Paper IBL n.80, https://www.brunoleoni.it/op-80-ronald-coase-l-economista-pragmatico·“Impresa, Mercato e Diritto” (2006) di Ronald Coase, il Mulino https://www.amazon.it/Impresa-mercato-diritto-Ronald-Coase/dp/8815108726 ·“Tra Stato e Mercato” (2011) a cura di Francesco Pulitini, IBL Lbirihttps://www.brunoleoni.it/tra-stato-e-mercato-33 ·“Sull'economia e gli economisti” (2016) di Ronald Coase, IBL Librihttps://www.brunoleoni.it/sull-economia-e-gli-economisti ·Come la Cina è diventata un paese capitalista (2014) di Ronald Coase e Ning Wang, IBL Librihttps://www.brunoleoni.it/come-la-cina-232;-diventata-un-paese-capitalista Per saperne di più:·“The Essential Ronald Coase” (2021) di Lynne Kiesling, Fraser Institutehttps://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/essential-ronald-coase ·“Forever Contemporary” (2015) di Cento Veljanovski, Institute of Economic Affairshttps://iea.org.uk/publications/research/forever-contemporary-the-economics-of-ronald-coase

Season 2 | Episode 3 In this episode of Bell Curve, Mika Honkasalo and Shreyas Hariharan join us to discuss how to grow a DAO. We explore Coase's Theory of the Firm, the tradeoffs between immutability and efficiency, scalable governance frameworks and value creation vs capture. My favorite segment is "Is Your Protocol Easily Forkable?" - you won't want to miss it! - - Timestamps: (00:00) Intro: Pre-Interview (00:33) Coase's Theory of the Firm (07:29) Unique Properties of a DAO (15:01) Optimizing for Immutability vs Efficiency (24:16) MakerDAO vs Uniswap Governance Structure (28:08) “Reserve Ad” (30:22) MakerDAO vs Uniswap Governance Structure (36:21) Do DAOs Increase Transaction Costs? (39:02) Value Creation vs Value Capture (50:26) Is Your Protocol Easily Forkable? (54:05) DAO Decision Making (59:16) The Future of DAO Work - - Follow Mika: https://twitter.com/mhonkasalo Follow Shreyas: https://twitter.com/HelloShreyas Follow Mike: https://twitter.com/MikeIppolito_ Follow Jason: https://twitter.com/JasonYanowitz Subscribe on YouTube: https://bit.ly/3R1D1D9 Subscribe on Apple: https://apple.co/3pQTfmD Subscribe on Spotify: https://spoti.fi/3cpKZXH - - Resources: Coase in the 21st Century (Shreyas) http://bit.ly/3hRMujv Working In Public http://bit.ly/3GwysOA On Forking DeFi Protocols (Multicoin) https://multicoin.capital/2020/04/16/on-forking-defi-protocols/ Mika's Substack https://mhonkasalo.substack.com/ Shreyas' website https://shreyashariharan.com/ llama.com https://llama.xyz/ - - Reserve Protocol aims to protect consumers from the effects of high inflation and hopes to one day eradicate it. It's a self-service, permissionless factory where anyone can build, deploy and govern their own asset-backed stablecoins (RTokens), which can be integrated within DeFi and real-world commerce. The Reserve App is a user-friendly way for ordinary people to buy RSV stablecoin with their local currencies and use them locally. More info at https://reserve.org/ - - Disclaimer: Nothing said on Bell Curve is a recommendation to buy or sell securities or tokens. This podcast is for informational purposes only, and any views expressed by anyone on the show are solely our opinions, not financial advice. Mike, Jason, Michael, Vance and our guests may hold positions in the companies, funds, or projects discussed.

Season 2 | Episode 1 In this episode of Bell Curve, we are joined by Hasu and Chris Ahn for a deep dive into DAOs and business-governance fit. We explore the differences between L1 and application governance, the challenges of achieving scalability and resiliency, why Hasu won't work for another DAO, learnings from traditional corporate governance, token distribution failures, over-indexing on community and more! - - Timestamps (00:00) Intro: Pre-Interview (02:21) Defining Business-Governance Fit (09:34) Layer One Governance (14:15) Path Dependency & The Power Of Defaults (21:22) Why Hasu Won't Work For A DAO Again (27:15) DAO Decision Making & Finding Business Governance Fit (40:19) Progressive Decentralization, Instant Liquidity & Uphill Battles (47:37) Hasu's MakerDAO Proposal Explained (54:25) Can DAOs Achieve Resiliency & Scalability? (01:03:23) Balancing Credible Neutrality (01:09:07) Can A DAO Structure Benefit Early Stage Companies? (01:17:20) Community Is Overrated (01:25:38) Coase's Theory Of The Firm (01:27:59) Is This Only About Censorship Resistance? (01:32:03) Recap: Post-Interview - - Follow Hasu: https://twitter.com/hasufl Follow Chris: https://twitter.com/ahnchrisj Follow Mike: https://twitter.com/MikeIppolito_ Follow Jason: https://twitter.com/JasonYanowitz Subscribe on YouTube: https://bit.ly/3R1D1D9 Subscribe on Apple: https://apple.co/3pQTfmD Subscribe on Spotify: https://spoti.fi/3cpKZXH - - Resources: Business-Governance Fit (Chris Ahn) https://station.mirror.xyz/xjAWfo9cqLDLTjU2eamDIvuK09QrawY1nk5MXaXmZT4 Hasu's MakerDAO proposal https://bit.ly/3DFfzWD DAOs Are Not Corporations (Vitalik) https://vitalik.ca/general/2022/09/20/daos.html Convex and Concave Dispositions (Vitalik) https://vitalik.ca/general/2020/11/08/concave.html I Pledge Allegiance (podcast) https://spoti.fi/3zRgYIF - - Reserve Protocol aims to protect consumers from the effects of high inflation and hopes to one day eradicate it. It's a self-service, permissionless factory where anyone can build, deploy and govern their own asset-backed stablecoins (RTokens), which can be integrated within DeFi and real-world commerce. The Reserve App is a user-friendly way for ordinary people to buy RSV stablecoin with their local currencies and use them locally. More info at https://reserve.org/ - - Disclaimer: Nothing said on Bell Curve is a recommendation to buy or sell securities or tokens. This podcast is for informational purposes only, and any views expressed by anyone on the show are solely our opinions, not financial advice. Mike, Jason, Michael, Vance and our guests may hold positions in the companies, funds, or projects discussed.

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 397. I was a guest last night (Oct. 25, 2022) on the Libertarian Podcast Review ... podcast, ep. 70, with hosts Tyler Janke and Garbage Mane Andy. We discussed... well... Hoppe. They're like—why are you always the one called on to defend Hoppe? I'm thinking—I dunno, you tell me. Related links: Magness on Hoppe; the Kochtopus and the Mises Caucus Jacob Hornberger on Defamation and Alex Jones Palmer Lies about Involuntary Unemployment–yet again! ha ha ha Palmer on Coase and Hoppe https://youtu.be/NoF_4b6gTmA

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 397. I was a guest last night (Oct. 25, 2022) on the Libertarian Podcast Review ... podcast, ep. 70, with hosts Tyler Janke and Garbage Mane Andy. We discussed... well... Hoppe. They're like—why are you always the one called on to defend Hoppe? I'm thinking—I dunno, you tell me. Related links: Magness on Hoppe; the Kochtopus and the Mises Caucus "Libertarian" Lightweight and "Minarchist" (read: mini-statist) Jacob Hornberger on Defamation and Alex Jones Palmer Lies about Involuntary Unemployment–yet again! ha ha ha Palmer on Coase and Hoppe https://youtu.be/NoF_4b6gTmA

Podcast: The Lunar Society (LS 30 · TOP 5% )Episode: Austin Vernon - Energy Superabundance, Starship Missiles, & Finding AlphaRelease date: 2022-09-08Austin Vernon is an engineer working on a new method for carbon capture, and he has one of the most interesting blogs on the internet, where he writes about engineering, software, economics, and investing.We discuss how energy superabundance will change the world, how Starship can be turned into a kinetic weapon, why nuclear is overrated, blockchains, batteries, flying cars, finding alpha, & much more!Watch on YouTube. Listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or any other podcast platform. Read the full transcript here.Subscribe to find out about future episodes!Follow Austin on Twitter. Follow me on Twitter for updates on future episodes.Please share if you enjoyed this episode! Helps out a ton!Timestamps(0:00:00) - Intro(0:01:53) - Starship as a Weapon(0:19:24) - Software Productivity(0:41:40) - Car Manufacturing(0:57:39) - Carbon Capture(1:16:53) - Energy Superabundance(1:25:09) - Storage for Cheap Energy(1:31:25) - Travel in Future(1:33:27) - Future Cities(1:39:58) - Flying Cars(1:43:26) - Carbon Shortage(1:48:03) - Nuclear(2:12:44) - Solar(2:14:44) - Alpha & Efficient Markets(2:22:51) - ConclusionTranscriptIntroDwarkesh Patel (00:00:00):Okay! Today, I have the pleasure of interviewing Austin Vernon who writes about engineering, software, economics, and investing on the internet, though not that much else is known about him. So Austin, do you want to give us a bit of info about your background? I know that the only thing the internet knows about you is this one little JPEG that you had to upload with your recent paper. But what about an identity reveal or I guess a little bit of a background reveal? Just to the extent that you're comfortable sharing.Austin Vernon (00:00:29):My degree is in chemical engineering and I've had a lifelong love for engineering as well as things like the Toyota Production System. I've also worked as a chemical engineer in a large processing facility where I've done a lot of petroleum engineering. I taught myself how to write software and now I'm working on more research and the early commercialization of CO2 electrolysis.Dwarkesh Patel (00:00:59):Okay yeah. I'm really interested in talking about all those things. The first question I have is from Alex Berger, who's the co-CEO of Open Philanthropy. When I asked on Twitter what I should ask you, he suggested that I should ask “Why so shady?” Famously you have kind of an anonymous personality, pseudonymous thing going on the internet. What's up with that?Austin Vernon (00:01:25):Yeah. I think he posted a tweet that said “I don't know who this guy is or if he's credible at all, but his stuff sure is interesting”. That really made me laugh. I thought that was hilarious. Fame just doesn't seem necessary, I think I'm fine with my ideas being well known and communicating, but I have less desire to be personally famous.Starship as a WeaponDwarkesh Patel (00:01:52):Gotcha, gotcha. I wanted to start off with a sexy topic, let's talk about using Starship as a kinetic weapon. I thought that was one of the more amusing posts you wrote. Do you want to talk more about how this would be possible?Austin Vernon (00:02:08):Well, I think the main thing with Starship is that you're taking a technology and you're making it about 100 times cheaper for cargo and 1000 times cheaper for people. When things like that happen that drastically, you're just looking at huge changes and it's really hard to anticipate what some of those can be when the change is that drastic. I think there's a lot of moon-based, Mars-based stuff that doesn't really catch the general public's eye. They also have trouble imagining some of the point-to-point travel that could be possible. But when you start talking about it as a weapon, then I think it lets people know they should be paying attention to this technology. And we certainly do not want to be second or third getting it. We should make sure that we're going to be first.Dwarkesh Patel (00:03:05):Yeah. I think you mentioned this in the post, but as recently as the '90s, the cost of sending one kilogram to space was around $20,000. More recently, SpaceX has brought it to $2,000. Lots of interesting questions pop up when you ask, “What will be possible once we get it down to $200 per kilogram to send into orbit?” One of them could be about how we might manufacture these weapons that are not conventional ballistics. Do you want to talk about why this might be an advancement over conventional ballistic weapons?Austin Vernon (00:03:37):Well, regular conventional ballistic weapons are extremely expensive. This is more like a bomb truck. But usually we think of B52 as the bomb truck and this could be even cheaper than the B52, delivering just mass on target. When you think about how expensive it is to fly a B52 from Barksdale in Louisiana all the way across the world.. you can do it from south Texas or Florida with the Starship and get more emissions per day and the fuel ends up being. When you go orbital, it takes a lot to get to orbit. But then once you're in orbit, your fuel consumption's pretty good. So over long distances, it has a lot of advantage. That's why the point-to-point works for longer distances.Austin Vernon (00:04:27):There's really a sweet spot with these weapons where you want it to be pretty accurate, but you also want it to be cheap. You're seeing that problem with Russia right now as they have some fancy parade style weapons that are really expensive, like multi-billion dollar cruise missiles, but they're missing that $5,000 guided artillery shell or that $20,000 JDM that you can just pit massive. Or the multiple launch rocket system, guided rockets. They're really short on all those because I think they had just had a limited amount of chips they could get from the US into Russia to make these advanced weapons.Austin Vernon (00:05:07):But yeah, so the Starship gives you just a platform to deliver. You could put JDMs in a shroud, or you could just have the iron unguided kinetic projectiles, and it just becomes impossible for a ship to launch missiles to intercept yours if your cost is so low, you can just overwhelm them.Dwarkesh Patel (00:05:29):Okay. There are a few terms there that neither I nor the audience might know. So what is JDM? What is shroud? And why are chips a bottleneck here? Why can't it just be any micro-controller?Austin Vernon (00:05:42):So JDM is Joint Direct Attack Munition. So what we did is we took all our Vietnam surplus bonds and we put this little fin-kit on it and it costs like $20,000, which is cheap for a weapon because the actual bond costs, I don't know, $3,000. And then it turns it into a guided weapon that, before you were probably lucky to get within 500 meters of a target, now you can get it in with two meters. So the number of missions you have to do with your planes and all that goes down by orders of magnitude. So it's an absolutely huge advantage in logistics and in just how much firepower you can put on a target. And we didn't even have to make new bombs, we just put these kits on all our old bombs.Austin Vernon (00:06:33):Let's see.. Yeah the chips are a problem. There's this organization called RUSI. I think they're in the UK, but they've been tearing down all these Russian weapons they found in Ukraine and they all have American chips in them. So technically, they're not supposed to be able to get these chips. And yet, Russia can't make a lot of its own chips. And especially not the specialized kinds you might want for guided weapons. So they've been somehow smuggling in chips from Americans to make their advanced weaponsDwarkesh Patel (00:07:03):What is special about these? As far as I'm aware, the trade with China is still going on and we get a lot of our chips manufactured from Taiwan or China. So why can't they do the same?Austin Vernon (00:07:14):It's the whole integration. It's not just the specific chip, but the board. They're more like PLCs where you almost have wired-in programming and they come with this ability to do the guidance and all that stuff. It all kind of has to work together. I think that's the way I understand it. I don't know. Maybe I don't have a really good answer for that one, but they're hard to replicate is what matters.Dwarkesh Patel (00:07:43):Okay that's interesting. Yeah, I guess that has a lot of interesting downstream effects, because for example, India buys a lot of its weapons from Russia. So if Russia doesn't have access to these, then other countries that buy from Russia won't have access to these either.Dwarkesh Patel (00:07:58):You had an interesting speculation in the post where you suggested that you could just keep these kinetic weapons in orbit, in a sort of Damocles state really, almost literally. That sounds like an incredibly scary and risky scenario where you could have orbital decay and you could have these kinetic weapons falling from the sky and destroying cities. Do you think this is what it will look like or could look like in 10 to 20 years?Austin Vernon (00:08:26):Well, yeah, so the advantage of having weapons on orbit is you can hit targets faster. So if you're launching the rocket from Florida, you're looking at maybe 30 minutes to get there and the target can move away in that time. Whereas if you're on orbit, you can have them spaced out to where you're hitting within a few minutes. So that's the advantage there.Austin Vernon (00:08:46):You really have to have a two stage system I think for most, because if you have a really aerodynamic rod that's going to give you really good performance in the low atmosphere, it'll end up going too fast and just burn up before it gets there. Tungsten's maybe the only thing that you could have that could go all the way through which is why I like the original concept of using these big tungsten rods the size of a telephone pole. But tungsten's pretty expensive. And the rod concept kind of limits what you can do.Austin Vernon (00:09:28):So a lot of these weapons will have, that's what I was talking about with the shroud, something that actually slows you down in the upper atmosphere. And then once you're at the velocity where you're not just going to melt, then you open it up and let it go. So if you actually had it fall from the sky, some may make it to the ground, but a lot would burn up. So a lot of the stuff that makes it to the ground is actually pretty light. It's stuff that can float and has a large surface area. Yeah, that's the whole thing with Starship. Or not Starship, but Starlink. All those satellites are meant to completely fall apart on de-orbit.Dwarkesh Patel (00:10:09):I see. One of the implications of that is that these may be less powerful than we might fear, because since kinetic energy is mass times velocity squared and there's an upper bound on the velocity (velocity being the component that grows the kinetic energy faster), then it suggests that you can upper bound the power these things will have. You know what I mean?Austin Vernon (00:10:32):Yeah, so even the tungsten rods. Sometimes people, they're not very good at physics, so they don't do the math. They think it's going to be a nuclear weapon, but it's really not. I think even the tungsten rod is like 10 tons of T&T or something. It's a big bomb, but it's not a super weapon.Austin Vernon (00:10:54):So I think I said in the post, it's about using advanced missiles where they're almost more defensive weapons so I can keep you from pitting your ship somewhere. Yeah I could try to bombard your cities, but I can't take ground with it. I can't even police sea lanes with it really. I'd still have to use regular ships if I had this air cover to go enforce the rules of the sea and stuff like that.Dwarkesh Patel (00:11:23):Yeah. You speculated in the post, I think, that you could load this up with shrapnel and then it could explode next to an incoming missile or an incoming aircraft. Could these get that accurate? Because that was surprising speculation to me.Austin Vernon (00:11:43):I think for ships, it's pretty... I was watching videos of how fast a ship can turn and stuff. If you're going to do an initial target on a ship to try to kill their radars, you'd want to do it above the ceiling of their missiles. So it's like, how much are they going to move between your release where you stop steering and that? The answer's maybe 1000 feet. So that's pretty simple because you just shrapnel the area.Austin Vernon (00:12:12):Targeting aircraft, you would be steering all the way in. I'd say it's doable, but it'd be pretty hard. You'd actually maybe want to even go slower than you would with the ship attack. You'd need a specialized package to attack the aircraft, but if you have enough synthetic aperture radar and stuff like that, you could see these aircraft using satellites and then guide the bomb in the whole way. You could even load heat seeking missiles into a package that unfurls right next to them and launch conventional missiles too, probably. It'd be pretty hard to do some of this stuff, but they're just the things you might be able to do if you put some effort into it.Dwarkesh Patel (00:12:57):Yeah. The reason I find this kind of speculation really interesting is because when you look at the modern weaponry that's used in conflicts, it just seems directly descendant from something you would've seen in World War II or something. If you think about how much warfare changed between 1900 and 1940, it's like, yeah, they're not even the same class of weapons anymore. So it's interesting to think about possibilities like these where the entire category of weapons has changed.Austin Vernon (00:13:33):You're right and that's because our physical technology hasn't changed that much. So it really has just made more sense to put better electronics in the same tanks. We haven't learned enough about tanks to build a new physical tank that's way better, so we just keep upgrading our existing tanks with better electronics. They're much more powerful, they're more accurate. A lot of times, they have longer range weapons and better sensors. So the tank looks the same, but it maybe has several times more killing power. But the Ukraine war right now, they're using a lot of 40, 50 year old weapons so that especially looks like that.Dwarkesh Patel (00:14:20):Yeah. Which kind of worries you if you think about the stockpiles our own military has. I'm not well educated on the topic, but I imagine that we don't have the newest of the new thing. We probably have maintained versions of decades old technology.Austin Vernon (00:14:35):We spend so much, we've got relatively... This kind of gets into debate about how ready our military is. For certain situations, it's more ready than others. I'd say in general, most people talking about it have the incentive to downplay our capabilities because they want more defense spending. There's lots of reasons. So I think we're probably more capable than what you might see from some editorial in The Hill or whatever. Us just sending a few weapons over to Ukraine and seeing how successful they've been at using them, I think, shows a little bit of that.Austin Vernon (00:15:18):There's so much uncertainty when it comes to fighting, especially when you're talking about a naval engagement, where we don't just don't have that many ships in general… you can have some bad luck. So I think you always want to be a little bit wary. You don't want to get overconfident.Dwarkesh Patel (00:15:37):Yeah. And if the offensive tech we sent to Ukraine is potentially better than the defensive tech, it's very possible that even a ballistic missile that China or Russia could launch would sink a battleship and then kill the 2,000 or 1,000 whatever soldiers that are on board. Or I guess, I don't know, you think this opens up avenues for defensive tech as well?Austin Vernon (00:16:03):Yeah––generally the consensus is that defensive technology has improved much more recently than offensive technology. This whole strategy China has is something they call anti-access/area denial, A2/AD. That's basically just how missiles have gotten better because the sensors on missiles have gotten better. So they can keep our ships from getting close to them but they can't really challenge us in Hawaii or something. And it really goes both ways, I think people forget that. So yeah, it's hard for us to get close to China, but Taiwan has a lot of missiles with these new sensors as well. So I think it's probably tougher for China to do it close to Taiwan than most people would say.Dwarkesh Patel (00:16:55):Oh, interesting. Yeah, can you talk more about that? Because every time I read about this, people are saying that if China wanted to, they could knock out Taiwan's defenses in a short amount of time and take it over. Yeah, so can you talk about why that's not possible?Austin Vernon (00:17:10):Well, it might be, but I think it's a guess of the uncertainty [inaudible 00:17:14]. Taiwan has actually one of the largest defense budgets in the world and they've recently been upping it. I think they spend, I don't know, $25 billion a year and they added an extra $5 billion. And they've been buying a lot of anti-ship missiles, a lot of air defense missiles.. Stuff that Ukraine could only dream of. I think Ukraine's military budget was $2 billion and they have a professional army. And then the other thing is Taiwan's an island, whereas Russia could just roll over the land border into Ukraine.Austin Vernon (00:17:44):There's just been very few successful amphibious landings in history. The most recent ones were all the Americans in World War II and Korea. So the challenge there is just... It's kind of on China to execute perfectly and do that. So if they had perfect execution, then possibly it would be feasible. But if their air defenses on their ships aren't quite as good as we think they could possibly be, then they could also end up with half their fleet underwater within 10 hours.Dwarkesh Patel (00:18:20):Interesting. And how has your view of Taiwan's defensive capabilities changed... How has the Ukraine conflict updated your opinion on what might happen?Austin Vernon (00:18:29):I didn't really know how much about it. And then I started looking at Wikipedia and stuff and all this stuff they're doing. Taiwan just has a lot of modern platforms like F16s with our anti-ship missiles. They actually have a lot of their own. They have indigenous fighter bombers, indigenous anti-ship missiles because they're worried we might not always sell them to them.Austin Vernon (00:18:54):They've even recently gotten these long range cruise missiles that could possibly target leadership in Beijing. So I think that makes it uncomfortable for the Chinese leadership. If you attack them, you're going to have to go live in a bunker. But again, I'm not a full-time military analyst or something, so there's a lot of uncertainty around what I'm saying. It's not a given that China's just going to roll over them.Software ProductivityDwarkesh Patel (00:19:22):Okay. That's comforting to hear. Let's talk about an area where I have a little bit of a point of contact. I thought your blog post about software and the inability of it to increase productivity numbers, I thought that was super fascinating. So before I ask you questions about it, do you want to lay out the thesis there?Austin Vernon (00:19:43):Yeah. So if there's one post I kind of felt like I caught lightning in a bottle on, it's that one. Everything I wanted to put in, it just fit together perfectly, which is usually not the case.Austin Vernon (00:19:55):I think the idea is that the world's so complex and we really underestimate that complexity. If you're going to digitize processes and automate them and stuff, you have to capture all that complexity basically at the bit level, and that's extremely difficult. And then you also have diminishing returns where the easily automatable stuff goes first and then it's increasing corner cases to get to the end, so you just have to go through more and more code basically. We don't see runaway productivity growth from software because we're fighting all this increasing complexity.Dwarkesh Patel (00:20:39):Yeah. Have you heard of the waterbed theory of complexity by the way?Austin Vernon (00:20:42):I don't think so.Dwarkesh Patel (00:20:44):Okay. It's something that comes up in compiler design: the idea is that there's a fixed amount of complexity in a system. If you try to reduce it, what you'll end up doing is just you'll end up migrating the complexity elsewhere. I think an example that's used of this is when they try to program languages that are not type safe, something like Python. You can say, “oh, it's a less complex language”, but really, you've added complexity when, I don't know, two different types of numbers are interacting like a float and an int. As your program grows, that complexity exponentially grows along with all the things that could go wrong when you're making two things interact in a way that you were expecting not to. So yeah, the idea is you can just choose where to have your complexity, but you can't get rid of that complexity.Austin Vernon (00:21:38):I think that's kind of an interesting thing when you start pairing it with management theory... when you add up all the factors, the most complex thing you're doing is high volume car manufacturing. And so we got a lot of innovations and organization from car manufacturers like the assembly line. Then you had Sloan at GM basically creating the way the modern corporation is run, then you have the Toyota Production System.Austin Vernon (00:22:11):But arguably now, creating software is actually the most complex thing we do. So there's all these kinds of squishy concepts that underlie things like the Toyota Production System that softwares had to learn and reimagine and adopt and you see that with Agile where, “oh, we can't have long release times. We need to be releasing every day,” which means we're limiting inventory there.Austin Vernon (00:22:42):There's a whole thing especially that's showing up in software that existed in carbon manufacturing where you're talking about reducing communication. So Jeff Bezos kind of now famously said, "I want to reduce communication," which is counterintuitive to a lot of people. This is age-old in car manufacturing where Toyota has these cards that go between workstations and they tell you what to do. So people normally think of them as limiting inventory, but it also tells the worker exactly what they're supposed to be doing at what pace, at what time. The assembly line is like that too. You just know what to do because you're standing there and there's a part here and it needs to go on there, and it comes by at the pace you're supposed to work at.Austin Vernon (00:23:29):It's so extreme that there's this famous paper, by List, Syverson and Levitt. They went to a car factory and studied how defects propagated in cars and stuff. Once a car factory gets up and running, it doesn't matter what workers you put in there, if workers are sick or you get new workers, the defect rate is the same. So all the knowledge is built into the manufacturing line.Austin Vernon (00:23:59):There's these concepts around idiot-proofing and everything that are very similar to what you'll see. You had Uncle Bob on here. So Uncle Bob says only put one input into a function and stuff like that because you'll mix them up otherwise. The Japanese call it poka-yoke. You make it where you can't mess it up. And that's another way to reduce communication, and then software, of course you have APIs.Austin Vernon (00:24:28):So I'm really interested in this overall concept of reducing communication, and reducing how much cooperation and everything we need to run the economy.Dwarkesh Patel (00:24:41):Right. Right. Speaking of the Toyota Production System, one thing they do to reduce that defect rate is if there's a problem, all the workers in that chain are forced to go to the place where the defect problem is and fix it before doing anything else. The idea there is that this will give them context to understand what the problem was and how to make sure it doesn't happen again. It also prevents a build up of inventory in a way that keeps making these defects happen or just keeps accumulating inventory before the place that can fix the defects is able to take care of them.Austin Vernon (00:25:17):Right. Yeah, yeah. Exactly.Dwarkesh Patel (00:25:19):Yeah. But I think one interesting thing about software and complexity is that software is a place where complexity is the highest in our world right now but software gives you the choice to interface with the complexity you want to interface with. I guess that's just part of specialization in general, but you could say for example that a machine learning model is really complex, but ideally, you get to a place where that's the only kind of complexity you have to deal with. You're not having to deal with the complexity of “How is this program compiled? How are the libraries that I'm using? How are they built?” You can fine tune and work on the complexity you need to work on.Dwarkesh Patel (00:26:05):It's similar to app development. Byrne Hobart has this blog post about Stripe as solid state. The basic idea is that Stripe hides all the complexity of the financial system: it charges a higher fee, but you can just treat it as an abstraction of a tithe you have to pay, and it'll just take care of that entire process so you can focus on your comparative advantage.Austin Vernon (00:26:29):It's really actually very similar in car manufacturing and the Toyota Production System if you really get into it. It's very much the same conceptual framework. There's this whole idea in Toyota Production System, everyone works at the same pace, which you kind of talked about. But also, your work content is the same. There's no room for not standardizing a way you're going to do things. So everyone gets together and they're like, “All right, we're going to do this certain part. We're going to put it together this certain way at this little micro station. And it's going to be the same way every time.” That's part of how they're reducing the defect rates. If your assembly process is longer than what your time allotment is to stay in touch with the rest of the process, then you just keep breaking it down into smaller pieces. So through this, each person only has to know a very small part of it.Austin Vernon (00:27:33):The overall engineering team has all sorts of strategies and all sorts of tools to help them break up all these processes into very small parts and make it all hold together. It's still very, very hard, but it's kind of a lot of the same ideas because you're taking away the complexity of making a $30,000 car or 30,000 part car where everyone's just focusing on their one little part and they don't care what someone else is doing.Dwarkesh Patel (00:28:06):Yeah. But the interesting thing is that it seems like you need one person who knows how everything fits together. Because from what I remember, one of the tenets of the Toyota Production System was you need to have a global view. So, in that book, was it the machine or the other one, the Toyota Production System book? But anyways, they were talking about examples where people would try to optimize for local efficiencies. I think they especially pointed to Ford and GM for trying to do this where they would try to make machines run all the time. And locally, you could say that, “oh this machine or process is super efficient. It's always outputting stuff.” But it ignores how that added inventory or that process had a bad consequence for the whole system.Dwarkesh Patel (00:28:50):And so it's interesting if you look at a company like Tesla that's able to do this really well. Tesla is run like a monarchy and this one guy has this total global view of how the entire process is supposed to run and where you have these inefficiencies.. You had some great examples of this in the blog post. I think one of the examples is this guy (the author) goes to this factory and he asks, "Is this an efficient factory?" And the guy's like, "Yeah, this is totally efficient. There's nothing we can do, adopting the Toyota way, to make this more efficient."Dwarkesh Patel (00:29:22):And so then he's like, "Okay, let me look." And he finds that they're treating steel in some way, and the main process does only take a couple of seconds, but some local manager decided that it would be more efficient to ship their parts out, to get the next stage of the process done somewhere else. So this is locally cheaper, but the result is that it takes weeks to get these parts shipped out and get them back. Which means that the actual time that the parts spend getting processed is 0.1% of the time, making the whole process super inefficient. So I don't know, it seems like the implication is you need a very monarchical structure, with one person who has a total view, in order to run such a system. Or am I getting that wrong?Austin Vernon (00:30:12):Not necessarily. I mean, you do have to make sure you're not optimizing locally, but I think it's the same. You have that same constraint in software, but I think a lot of times people are just running over it because processing has been getting so much cheaper. People are expensive, so if you could save development time, it just ends up the trade offs are different when you're talking about the tyranny of physical items and stuff like that, the constraints get a little more severe. But I think you have the same overall. You still have to fight local optimization, but the level you have to is probably different with physical goods.Austin Vernon (00:30:55):I was thinking about the smart grid situation from a software perspective, and there's this problem where, okay, I'm putting my solar farm here and it's impacting somewhere far away, and that's then creating these really high upgrade costs, that cost two or three times more than my solar farm. Well, the obvious thing would be, if you're doing software, is like you're going to break all these up into smaller sections, and then you wouldn't be impacting each other and all that, and you could work and focus on your own little thing.Austin Vernon (00:31:29):But the problem with that is if you're going to disconnect these areas of the grid, the equipment to do that is extremely expensive. It's not like I'm just going to hit a new tab and open a new file and start writing a new function. And not only that, but you still have to actually coordinate how this equipment is going to operate. So if you just let the grid flow as it does, everyone knows what's going to happen because they could just calculate the physics. If you start adding in all these checkpoints where humans are doing stuff, then you have to actually interface with the humans, and the amount of things that can happen really starts going up. So it's actually a really bad idea to try to cart all this stuff off, just because of the reality of the physical laws and the equipment you need and everything like that.Dwarkesh Patel (00:32:22):Okay. Interesting. And then I think you have a similar Coasean argument in your software post about why vertically integrating software is beneficial. Do you want to explain that thesis?Austin Vernon (00:32:34):Yeah. I think it actually gets to what we're talking about here, where it allows you to avoid the local optimization. Because a lot of times you're trying to build a software MVP, and you're tying together a few services… they don't do quite what you need, so if you try to scale that, it would just break. But if you're going to take a really complex process, like car manufacturing or retail distribution, or the home buying process or something, you really have to vertically integrate it to be able to create a decent end-to-end experience and avoid that local optimization.Austin Vernon (00:33:20):And it's just very hard otherwise, because you just can't coordinate effectively if you have 10 different vendors trying to do all the same thing. You end up in just constant vendor meetings, where you're trying to decide what the specs are or something instead of giving someone the authority, or giving a team the authority to just start building stuff. Then if you look at these companies, they have to implement these somewhat decentralized processes when they get too complex, but at least they have control over how they're interfacing with each other. Walmart, as the vendors, control their own stock. They don't tell the vendor, "We need X parts." It's just like, it's on you to make sure your shelf is stocked.Dwarkesh Patel (00:34:07):Yeah. Yeah. So what was really interesting to me about this part of the post was, I don't know, I guess I had heard of this vision of we're software setting, where everybody will have a software as a service company, and they'll all be interfacing with each other in some sort of cycle where they're all just calling each other's APIs. And yeah, basically everybody and their mother would have a SAAS company. The implication here was, from your argument, that given the necessity of integrating all those complexity vertically in a coherent way, then the winners in software should end up being a few big companies, right? They compete with each other, but still...Austin Vernon (00:34:49):I think that's especially true when you're talking about combining bits and apps. Maybe less true for pure software. The physical world is just so much more complex, and so the constraints it creates are pretty extreme, compared to like... you could maybe get away with more of everyone and their mom having an API in a pure software world.Dwarkesh Patel (00:35:14):Right. Yeah. I guess, you might think that even in the physical world, given that people really need to focus on their comparative advantage, they would just try to outsource the software parts to these APIs. But is there any scenario where the learning curve for people who are not in the firm can be fast enough that they can keep up with the complexity? Because there's huge gains for specialization and competition that go away if this is the world we're forced to live in. And then I guess we have a lot of counter examples, or I guess we have a lot of examples of what you're talking about. Like Apple is the biggest market cap in the world, right? And famously they're super vertically integrated. And yeah, obviously their thing is combining hardware and software. But yeah, is there any world in which it can keep that kind of benefit, but have it be within multiple firms?Austin Vernon (00:36:10):This is a post I've got on my list I want to write. The blockchain application, which excites me personally the most, is reimagining enterprise software. Because the things you're talking about, like hard typing and APIs are just basically built into some of these protocols. So I think it just really has a lot of exciting implications for how much you can decentralize software development. But the thing is, you can still do that within the firm. So I think I mentioned this, if the government's going to place all these rules on the edge of the firm, it makes transactions with other firms expensive. So a few internal transactions can be cheaper, because they're avoiding the government reporting and taxes and all that kind of stuff. So I think you'd have to think about how these technologies can reduce transaction costs overall and decentralize that, but also what are the costs between firms?Dwarkesh Patel (00:37:22):Yeah, it's really interesting if the costs are logistic, or if they're based on the knowledge that is housed, as you were talking about, within a factory or something. Because if it is just logistical and stuff, like you had to report any outside transactions, then it does imply that those technology blockchain could help. But if it is just that you need to be in the same office, and if you're not, then you're going to have a hard time keeping up with what the new requirements for the API are, then maybe it's that, yeah, maybe the inevitability is that you'll have these big firms that are able to vertically integrate.Austin Vernon (00:37:59):Yeah, for these big firms to survive, they have to be somewhat decentralized within them. So I think you have... you're going to the same place as just how are we viewing it, what's our perception? So even if it's a giant corporation, it's going to have very independent business units as opposed to something like a 1950s corporation.Dwarkesh Patel (00:38:29):Yeah. Byrne Hobart, by the way, has this really interesting post that you might enjoy reading while you're writing that post. It's type safe communications, and it's about that Bezos thing, about his strict style for how to communicate and how little to communicate. There's many examples in Amazon protocols where you have to... the only way you can put in this report, is in this place you had to give a number. You can't just say, "This is very likely," you had to say like, "We project X percent increase," or whatever. So it has to be a percent. And there's many other cases where they're strict about what type definition you can have in written reports or something. It has kind of the same consequence that type strict languages have, which is that you can keep track of what the value is through the entire chain of the flow of control.Austin Vernon (00:39:22):You've got to keep work content standardized.Dwarkesh Patel (00:39:26):So we've been hinting at the Coasean analysis to this. I think we just talked about it indirectly, but for the people who might not know, Coase has this paper called The Theory of Firms, and he's trying to explain why we have firms at all. Why not just have everybody compete in the open market for employment, for anything? Why do we have jobs? Why not just have... you can just hire a secretary by the day or something.Dwarkesh Patel (00:39:51):And the conclusion he comes to is that by having a firm you're reducing the transaction cost. So people will have the same knowledge about what needs to get done, obviously you're reducing the transaction cost of contracting, finding labor, blah, blah, blah. And so the conclusion it comes to is the more the transaction costs are reduced within people in a firm, as compared to the transaction cost between different firms, the bigger firms will get. So I guess that's why the implication of your argument was that there should be bigger tech firms, right?Austin Vernon (00:40:27):Yes, yes, definitely. Because they can basically decrease the transaction costs faster within, and then even at the limit, if you have large transaction costs outside the firm, between other firms that are artificially imposed, then it will make firms bigger.Dwarkesh Patel (00:40:45):What does the world look like in that scenario? So would it just be these Japanese companies, these huge conglomerates who are just... you rise through the ranks, from the age of 20 until you die? Is that what software will turn into?Austin Vernon (00:40:59):It could be. I mean, I think it will be lots of very large companies, unless there's some kind of change in inner firm transaction costs. And again, that could possibly come from blockchain like technology, but you probably also need better regulation to make that cheaper, and then you would have smaller firms. But again, in the end, it doesn't really matter. You'd be working in your little unit of the big bank of corporate, or whatever. So I don't know what that would look like on a personal level.Car ManufacturingDwarkesh Patel (00:41:40):Yeah. Okay. So speaking of these Japanese companies, let's talk about car manufacturing and everything involved there. Yeah, so we kind of hinted at a few elements of the Toyota way and production earlier, but do you want to give a brief overview of what that is, so we can compare it to potentially other systems?Austin Vernon (00:42:02):I think all these kinds of lean Toyota process systems, they do have a lot of similarities, where mostly you want to even-out your production, so you're producing very consistently, and you want to break it into small steps and you want to limit the amount of inventory you have in your system. When you do this, it makes it easy to see how the process is running and limit defects. And the ultimate is you're really trying to reduce defects, because they're very expensive. It's a little bit hard to summarize. I think that's my best shot at it there, quickly off the top of my head.Dwarkesh Patel (00:42:49):Yeah. The interesting thing about the Toyota system, so at least when the machine was released, is they talk about... that book was released I think the nineties, and they went to the history of Toyota, and one of the interesting things they talked about was there was a brief time where the company ran... I think, was this after World War II? But anyways, the company ran into some troubles. They needed to layoff people to not go bankrupt. They had much more debt on books than they had assets. So yeah, they wanted to layoff people, but obviously the people were not happy about this, so there were violent protests about this. And in fact I think the US written constitution gave strong protections to labor that they hadn't had before, which gave labor an even stronger hand here.Dwarkesh Patel (00:43:42):So anyway, Toyota came to this agreement with the unions that they'd be allowed to do this one time layoff to get the company on the right track, but afterwards they could never lay somebody off. Which would mean that a person who works at Toyota works there from the time they graduate college or high school till they die. Right? I don't know, that's super intense in a culture. I mean, in software, where you have the average tenure in a company's one year, the difference is so much.Dwarkesh Patel (00:44:13):And there's so many potential benefits here, I guess a lot of drawbacks too. But one is, obviously if you're talking in a time scale of 50 years, rather than one year, the incentives are more aligned between the company and the person. Because anything you could do in one year is not going to have a huge impact on your stock options in that amount of time. But if this company's your retirement plan, then you have a much stronger incentive to make sure that things at this company run well, which means you're probably optimizing for the company's long term cash flow yourself. And also, there's obviously benefits to having that knowledge built up in the firm from people who have been there for a long time. But yeah, that was an interesting difference. One of the interesting differences, at least.Austin Vernon (00:45:00):I mean, I think there's diminishing returns to how long your tenure's going to be. Maybe one year's too short, but there's a certain extent to where, if you grow faster than your role at the company, then it's time to switch. It's going to depend on the person, but maybe five years is a good number. And so if you're not getting promoted within the firm, then your human capital's being wasted, because you could go somewhere else and have more responsibility and perform better for them. Another interesting thing about that story, is almost all lean turnarounds, where they're like, we're going to implement something like Toyota production system, they come with no layoff promises. Because if you're going to increase productivity, that's when everyone's like, "Oh gosh, I'm going to get laid off." So instead you have to increase output and take more market share, is what you do.Dwarkesh Patel (00:46:00):It's kind of like burning your bridges, right? So this is the only way.Austin Vernon (00:46:05):The process really requires complete buy-in, because a lot of your ideas for how you're going to standardize work content come from your line workers, because that's what they're doing every day. So if you don't have their buy-in, then it's going to fail. So that's why it's really necessary to have those kinds of clauses.Dwarkesh Patel (00:46:22):Yeah. Yeah, that makes sense. I think it was in your post where you said, if somebody makes their process more efficient, and therefore they're getting more work allotted to them, then obviously they're going to stop doing that. Right? Which means that, I don't know, do you ought to give more downtime to your best workers or something or the people who are most creative in your company?Austin Vernon (00:46:48):I was just going to say, if you're a worker at a plant, then a lot of times for that level of employee, actually small rewards work pretty well. A lot of people on drilling rigs used to give the guys that met certain targets $100 Walmart gift cards. So sometimes small, it's a reward, new ideas, stuff like that works.Austin Vernon (00:47:15):But because the whole system has to grow together, if you just improve one part of the process, it may not help you. You have to be improving all the right processes so normally it's much more collaborative. There's some engineer that's looking at it and like, "All right, this is where we're struggling," or "We have our defects here." And then you go get together with that supervisor and the workers in that area, then you all figure out what improvements could be together. Because usually the people already know. This is like, you see a problem at the top, and you're just now realizing it. Then you go talk to the people doing the work, and they're like, "Oh yeah, I tried to tell you about that two weeks ago, man." And then you figure out a better process from there.Dwarkesh Patel (00:47:58):Based on your recommendation, and Steven Malina's recommendation, I recently read The Goal. And after reading the book, I'm much more understanding of the value that consultants bring to companies, potentially. Because before you could think, “What does a 21 year old, who just graduated college, know about manufacturing? What are they going to tell this plant that they didn't already know? How could they possibly be adding value?” And afterwards, it occurred to me that there's so many abstract concepts that are necessary to understand in order to be able to increase your throughput. So now I guess I can see how somebody who's generically smart but doesn't have that much industry knowledge might be able to contribute to a plan and value consultants could be bringing.Austin Vernon (00:48:43):I think this applies to consultants or young engineers. A lot of times you put young engineers just right in the thick of it, working in production or process right on the line, where you're talking to the workers the most. And there's several advantages to that. One, the engineer learns faster, because they're actually seeing the real process, and the other is there's easy opportunities for them to still have a positive impact on the business, because there's $100 bills laying on the ground just from going up and talking to your workers and learning about stuff and figuring out problems they might be having and finding out things like that that could help you lower cost. I think there's a lot of consultants that... I don't know how the industry goes, but I would guess there's... I know Accenture has 600,000 employees. I don't know if that many, but it's just a large number, and a lot are doing more basic tasks and there are some people that are doing the more high level stuff, but it's probably a lot less.Dwarkesh Patel (00:49:51):Yeah. Yeah. There was a quote from one of those books that said, "At Toyota we don't consider you an engineer unless you need to wash your hands before you can have lunch." Yeah. Okay. So in your blog post about car manufacturing, you talk about Tesla. But what was really interesting is that in a footnote, I think you mentioned that you bought Tesla stocks in 2014, which also might be interesting to talk about again when we go to the market and alpha part. But anyways. Okay. And then you talk about Tesla using something called metal manufacturing. So first of all, how did you know in 2014 that Tesla was headed here? And what is metal manufacturing and how does it differ from the Toyota production system?Austin Vernon (00:50:42):Yeah. So yeah, I just was goofing around and made that up. Someone actually emailed me and they were like, "Hey, what is this metal manufacturing? I want to learn more about this." It's like, "Well, sorry, I just kind of made that up, because I thought it sounded funny." But yeah, I think it's really the idea that there's this guy, Dimming, and he found a lot of the same ideas that Toyota ended up implementing, and Toyota respected his ideas a lot. America never really got fully on board with this in manufacturing. Of course it's software people that are coming and implementing this and manufacturing now which is like the real American way of doing things.Austin Vernon (00:51:32):Because when you look at these manufacturing processes, the best place to save money and optimize is before you ever build the process or the plant. It's very early on. So I think if there's a criticism of Toyota, it's that they're optimizing too late and they're not creative enough in their production technology and stuff. They're very conservative, and that's why they have hydrogen cars and not battery cars, even though they came out with the Prius, which was the first large sales hybrid.Austin Vernon (00:52:12):So yeah, I think what Tesla's doing with really just making Dimming's ideas our own and really just Americanizing it with like, "Oh, well, we want to cast this, because that would be easier." Well, we can't, because we don't have an alloy. "We'll invent the alloy." I love it. It's great. Mostly, I love Tesla because they do such... I agree with their engineering principles. So I didn't know that the company would come to be so valuable. It's just, I was just always reading their stock reports and stuff so I was like, "Well, at least I need to buy some stock so that I have a justification for spending all this time reading their 10 Ks."Dwarkesh Patel (00:52:53):I want to get a little bit more in detail about the exact difference here. So lean production, I guess, is they're able to produce their cars without defects and with matching demand or whatever. But what is it about their system that prevents them from making the kinds of innovations that Tesla is able to make?Austin Vernon (00:53:16):It's just too incremental. It's so hard to get these processes working. So the faster you change things, it becomes very, very difficult to change the whole system. So one of the advantages Tesla has is, well, if you're making electric cars, you have just a lot less parts. So that makes it easier. And once you start doing the really hard work of basically digitizing stuff, like they don't have speed limit dials, you start just removing parts from the thing and you can actually then start increasing your rate of change even faster.Austin Vernon (00:53:55):It makes it harder to get behind if you have these old dinosaur processes. But I think there's a YouTube channel called The Limiting Factor, and he actually went into the detail of numbers on what it costs for Tesla to do their giga-casting, which saves tons of parts and deletes zillions of thousands of robots from their process. If you already have an existing stamping line and all that, where you're just changing the dyes based on your model, then it doesn't make sense to switch to the casting. But if you're building new factories, like Tesla is, well, then it makes sense to do the casting and you can build new factories very cheaply and comparatively and much easier. So there's a little bit of... they just have lots of technical data, I guess you could say, in a software sense.Dwarkesh Patel (00:54:47):Yeah. That's super interesting. The analogy is actually quite... it's like, Microsoft has probably tens of thousands of software engineers who are just basically servicing its technical debt and making sure that the old systems run properly, whereas a new company like Tesla doesn't have to deal with that. The thing that's super interesting about Tesla is like, Tesla's market cap is way over a trillion, right? And then Toyota's is 300 billion. And Tesla is such a new company. The fact that you have this Toyota, which is legendary for its production system, and this company that's less than two decades old is worth many times more, it's kind of funny.Austin Vernon (00:55:32):Yeah. I would say that, in that measure, I don't like market cap. You need to use enterprise value. These old car companies have so much debt, that if you look at enterprise value, it's not so jarring. Literally, I don't know, I can't remember what GM's worth, like 40 billion or something, and then they have $120 billion in debt. So their enterprise value is five times more than their market cap.Dwarkesh Patel (00:56:02):What is enterprise value?Austin Vernon (00:56:03):Enterprise value is basically what is the value of the actual company before you have any claims on it. It's the market cap plus your debt. But basically, if you're the equity holder and the company gets sold, you have to pay the debt first. So you only get the value of what's left over after the debt. So that's why market cap is... when Tesla has very little debt and a lot of market cap, and then these other guys have a lot of debt with less market cap, it skews the comparison.Dwarkesh Patel (00:56:34):Yeah, and one of the interesting things, it's similar to your post on software, is that it seems like one of the interesting themes across your work is automating processes often leads to decreased eventual throughput, because you're probably adding capacity in a place that you're deciding excess capacity, and you're also making the money part of your operation less efficient by have it interface with this automated part. It sounds like there's a similar story there with car manufacturing, right?Austin Vernon (00:57:08):Yeah. I think if we tie it back into what we were talking about earlier, automation promotes local optimization and premature optimization. So a lot of times it's better to figure out, instead of automating a process to make a really hard to make part, you should just figure out how to make that part easy to make. Then after you do that, then it may not even make sense to automate it anymore. Or get rid of it all together, then you just delete all those robots.Austin's Carbon Capture ProjectDwarkesh Patel (00:57:37):Yeah. Yeah, that's interesting. Okay. So let's talk about the project that you're working on right now, the CO2 electrolysis. Do you want to explain what this is, and what your current approach is? What is going on here?Austin Vernon (00:57:55):Yeah, so I think just overall, electrofuels right now are super underrated, because you're about to get hopefully some very cheap electricity from solar, or it could be, maybe, some land. If we get really lucky, possibly some nuclear, geothermal. It'll just make sense to create liquid fuels, or natural gas, or something just from electricity and air, essentially.Austin Vernon (00:58:25):There's a whole spectrum of ways to do this, so O2 electrolysis is one of those. Basically, you take water, electricity, and CO2, and a catalyst. And then, you make more complex molecules, like carbon monoxide, or formic acid, or ethylene, or ethanol, or methane or methine. Those are all options. But it's important to point out that, right now, I think if you added up all the CO2 electrolyzers in the world, you'd be measuring their output and kilograms per day. We make millions of tons per day off of the products I just mentioned. So there's a massive scale up if it's going to have a wider impact.Austin Vernon (00:59:15):So there's some debate. I think the debate for the whole electrofuels sector is: How much are you going to do in the electrolyzer? One company whose approach I really like is Terraform Industries. They want to make methane, which is the main natural gas. But they're just making hydrogen in their electrolyzer, and then they capture the CO2 and then put it into a methanation reaction. So everything they're doing is already world scale, basically.Austin Vernon (00:59:47):We've had hydrogen electrolyzers power fertilizer plants, providing them with the Hydrogen that they need. Methanation happens in all ammonia plants and several other examples. It's well known, very old. Methanation is hydrogen CO2 combined to make water and methane. So their approach is more conservative, but if you do more in the electrolyzer, like I'm going to make the methane actually in the electrolyzer instead of adding this other process, you could potentially have a much simpler process that has less CapEx and scales downward better. Traditional chemical engineering heavily favors scaling. With the more Terraform processes, they're playing as absolutely ginormous factories. These can take a long time to build.Austin Vernon (01:00:42):So one of the things they're doing is: they're having to fight the complexity that creeps into chemical engineering every step of the way. Because if they don't, they'll end up with a plant that takes 10 years to build, and that's not their goal. It takes 10 years to build a new refinery, because they're so complex. So yeah, that's where I am. I'm more on the speculative edge, and it's not clear yet which products will be favorable for which approaches.Dwarkesh Patel (01:01:15):Okay, yeah. And you're building this out of your garage, correct?Austin Vernon (01:01:19):Yeah. So that's where electrolyzers... Everything with electric chemistry is a flat plate instead of a vessel, so it scales down. So I can have a pretty good idea of what my 100 square centimeter electrolyzer is going to do, if I make it quite a bit bigger. I have to worry about how my flow might interact in the larger one and make sure the mixing's good, but it's pretty straightforward because you're just making your flat plate a larger area. Whereas the scale, it is different from scaling a traditional chemical process.Dwarkesh Patel (01:01:56):I'm curious how cheap energy has to be before this is efficient. If you're turning it into methane or something like that, presumably for fuel, is the entire process energy positive? Or how cheap would energy, electricity you need to get before that's the case?Austin Vernon (01:02:18):The different products and different methods have different crossovers. So Terraform Industries, they're shooting for $10 a megawatt hour for electricity. But again, their process is simpler, a little less efficient than a lot of the other products. They also have better premiums, just worth more per ton than methane. So your crossover happens somewhere in between $10 and $20 a megawatt hour, which is... I mean, that's pretty... Right now, solar, it's maybe like $25. Maybe it's a little higher because payment prices have gone up in the last year, but I think the expectation is they'll come back down. And so, getting down to $15 where you start having crossovers for some of these products like ethanol or ethylene or methanol, it's not science fiction.Dwarkesh Patel (01:03:08):I think in Texas where I live, that's where it's at right? The cost of energy is 20 or something dollars per megawatt hour.Austin Vernon (01:03:16):Well, not this summer! But yeah, a lot of times in Texas, the wholesale prices are around $25 to $30.Dwarkesh Patel (01:03:26):Gotcha. Okay. Yeah. So a lot of the actual details you said about how this works went over my head. So what is a flat plate? I guess before you answer that question, can you just generally describe the approach? What is it? What are you doing to convert CO2 into these other compounds?Austin Vernon (01:03:45):Well, yeah, it literally just looks like an electrolyzer. You have two sides and anode and a cathode and they're just smushed together like this because of the electrical resistance. If you put them far apart, it makes it... uses up a lot of energy. So you smush them together as close as you can. And then, you're basically just trading electrons back and forth. On one side, you're turning CO2 into a more complex molecule, and on the other side, you're taking apart water. And so, when you take apart the water, it balances out the equation, balances out your electrons and everything like that. I probably need to work on that elevator pitch there, huh?Dwarkesh Patel (01:04:31):I guess what the basic idea is, you need to put power in to convert CO2 into these other compounds.Austin Vernon (01:04:38):The inputs are electricity, water, and CO2, and the output is usually oxygen and whatever chemical you're trying to create is, along with some side reactions.Dwarkesh Patel (01:04:49):And then, these chemicals you mentioned, I think ethanol, methane, formic acid, are these all just fuels or what are the other uses for them?Austin Vernon (01:04:58):A lot of people are taking a hybrid approach with carbon monoxide. So this would be like Twelve Co… They've raised a lot of money to do this and 100 employees or something. You can take that carbon monoxide and make hydrogen, and then you have to send gas to make liquid fuels. So they want to make all sorts of chemicals, but one of the main volume ones would be like jet fuel.Austin Vernon (01:05:22):Let's see Formic acid is, it's the little fry of all these. It is an additive in a lot of things like preserving hay for animals and stuff like that. Then, ethanol there's people that want to... There's this company that makes ethylene, which goes into plastics that makes polyethylene, which is the most produced plastic. Or you can burn it in your car, although I think ethanol is a terrible vehicle fuel. But then you can also just make ethylene straight in the electrolyzer. So there's many paths. So which path wins is an interesting race to see.Dwarkesh Patel (01:06:13):The ability to produce jet fuel is really interesting, because in your energy superabundance paper, you talk about... You would think that even if we can electrify everything in solar and when it becomes super cheap, that's not going to have an impact on the prices to go to space for example. But I don't know. If a process like this is possible, then it's some way to in financial terms, add liquidity. And then turn, basically, this cheap solar and wind into jet fuel through this indirect process. So the price to send stuff to space or cheap plane flights or whatever––all of that goes down as well.Austin Vernon (01:06:52):It basically sets a price ceiling on the price of oil. Whatever you can produce this for is the ceiling now, which is maybe the way I think about it.Dwarkesh Patel (01:07:06):Yeah. So do you want to talk a little bit about how your background led into this project? This is your full-time thing, right? I don't know if I read about that, but where did you get this idea and how long have you been pursuing it? And what's the progress and so on.Austin Vernon (01:07:20):I've always loved chemical engineering, and I love working at the big processing plant because it's like being a kid in a candy store. If I had extra time, I'd just walk around and look at the plant, like it's so cool. But the plant where I worked at, their up time was 99.7%. So if you wanted to change anything or do anything new, it terrified everyone. That's how they earned their bonuses: run the plant a 100% uptime all the time. So that just wasn't a good fit for me. And also, so I always wanted my own chemical plant, but it's billions of dollars to build plants so that was a pretty big step. So I think this new technology of... there's a window where you might be able to build smaller plants until it optimizes to be hard to enter again.Dwarkesh Patel (01:08:21):And then, why will it become hard to enter again? What will happen?Austin Vernon (01:08:27):If someone figures out how to build a really cheap electrolyzer, and they just keep it as intellectual property, then it would be hard to rediscover that and compete with them.Dwarkesh Patel (01:08:38):And so, how long have you been working on this?Austin Vernon (01:08:42):Oh, not quite a year. But yeah, I actually got this idea to work on it from writing my blog. So when I wrote the heating fuel post, I didn't really know much about... There's another company in the space, Prometheus Fuels and I'm like, "Oh, this is an interesting idea." And then, I got talking to a guy named Brian Heligman, and he's like, "You should do this, but not what Prometheus is doing." And so, then I started looking at it and I liked it, so I've been working on it since.Dwarkesh Patel (01:09:08):Yeah. It's interesting because if energy does become as cheap as you suspect it might. If this process works, then yeah, this is a trillion dollar company probably, right? If you're going to get the patents and everything.Austin Vernon (01:09:22):I mean, maybe. With chemical plants, there's a certain limitation where your physical limitation is. There's only so many places that are good places for chemical plants. You start getting hit by transportation and all that. So, you can't just produce all th

Austin Vernon is an engineer working on a new method for carbon capture, and he has one of the most interesting blogs on the internet, where he writes about engineering, software, economics, and investing.We discuss how energy superabundance will change the world, how Starship can be turned into a kinetic weapon, why nuclear is overrated, blockchains, batteries, flying cars, finding alpha, & much more!Watch on YouTube. Listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or any other podcast platform. Read the full transcript here.Subscribe to find out about future episodes!Follow Austin on Twitter. Follow me on Twitter for updates on future episodes.Please share if you enjoyed this episode! Helps out a ton!Timestamps(0:00:00) - Intro(0:01:53) - Starship as a Weapon(0:19:24) - Software Productivity(0:41:40) - Car Manufacturing(0:57:39) - Carbon Capture(1:16:53) - Energy Superabundance(1:25:09) - Storage for Cheap Energy(1:31:25) - Travel in Future(1:33:27) - Future Cities(1:39:58) - Flying Cars(1:43:26) - Carbon Shortage(1:48:03) - Nuclear(2:12:44) - Solar(2:14:44) - Alpha & Efficient Markets(2:22:51) - ConclusionTranscriptIntroDwarkesh Patel (00:00:00):Okay! Today, I have the pleasure of interviewing Austin Vernon who writes about engineering, software, economics, and investing on the internet, though not that much else is known about him. So Austin, do you want to give us a bit of info about your background? I know that the only thing the internet knows about you is this one little JPEG that you had to upload with your recent paper. But what about an identity reveal or I guess a little bit of a background reveal? Just to the extent that you're comfortable sharing.Austin Vernon (00:00:29):My degree is in chemical engineering and I've had a lifelong love for engineering as well as things like the Toyota Production System. I've also worked as a chemical engineer in a large processing facility where I've done a lot of petroleum engineering. I taught myself how to write software and now I'm working on more research and the early commercialization of CO2 electrolysis.Dwarkesh Patel (00:00:59):Okay yeah. I'm really interested in talking about all those things. The first question I have is from Alex Berger, who's the co-CEO of Open Philanthropy. When I asked on Twitter what I should ask you, he suggested that I should ask “Why so shady?” Famously you have kind of an anonymous personality, pseudonymous thing going on the internet. What's up with that?Austin Vernon (00:01:25):Yeah. I think he posted a tweet that said “I don't know who this guy is or if he's credible at all, but his stuff sure is interesting”. That really made me laugh. I thought that was hilarious. Fame just doesn't seem necessary, I think I'm fine with my ideas being well known and communicating, but I have less desire to be personally famous.Starship as a WeaponDwarkesh Patel (00:01:52):Gotcha, gotcha. I wanted to start off with a sexy topic, let's talk about using Starship as a kinetic weapon. I thought that was one of the more amusing posts you wrote. Do you want to talk more about how this would be possible?Austin Vernon (00:02:08):Well, I think the main thing with Starship is that you're taking a technology and you're making it about 100 times cheaper for cargo and 1000 times cheaper for people. When things like that happen that drastically, you're just looking at huge changes and it's really hard to anticipate what some of those can be when the change is that drastic. I think there's a lot of moon-based, Mars-based stuff that doesn't really catch the general public's eye. They also have trouble imagining some of the point-to-point travel that could be possible. But when you start talking about it as a weapon, then I think it lets people know they should be paying attention to this technology. And we certainly do not want to be second or third getting it. We should make sure that we're going to be first.Dwarkesh Patel (00:03:05):Yeah. I think you mentioned this in the post, but as recently as the '90s, the cost of sending one kilogram to space was around $20,000. More recently, SpaceX has brought it to $2,000. Lots of interesting questions pop up when you ask, “What will be possible once we get it down to $200 per kilogram to send into orbit?” One of them could be about how we might manufacture these weapons that are not conventional ballistics. Do you want to talk about why this might be an advancement over conventional ballistic weapons?Austin Vernon (00:03:37):Well, regular conventional ballistic weapons are extremely expensive. This is more like a bomb truck. But usually we think of B52 as the bomb truck and this could be even cheaper than the B52, delivering just mass on target. When you think about how expensive it is to fly a B52 from Barksdale in Louisiana all the way across the world.. you can do it from south Texas or Florida with the Starship and get more emissions per day and the fuel ends up being. When you go orbital, it takes a lot to get to orbit. But then once you're in orbit, your fuel consumption's pretty good. So over long distances, it has a lot of advantage. That's why the point-to-point works for longer distances.Austin Vernon (00:04:27):There's really a sweet spot with these weapons where you want it to be pretty accurate, but you also want it to be cheap. You're seeing that problem with Russia right now as they have some fancy parade style weapons that are really expensive, like multi-billion dollar cruise missiles, but they're missing that $5,000 guided artillery shell or that $20,000 JDM that you can just pit massive. Or the multiple launch rocket system, guided rockets. They're really short on all those because I think they had just had a limited amount of chips they could get from the US into Russia to make these advanced weapons.Austin Vernon (00:05:07):But yeah, so the Starship gives you just a platform to deliver. You could put JDMs in a shroud, or you could just have the iron unguided kinetic projectiles, and it just becomes impossible for a ship to launch missiles to intercept yours if your cost is so low, you can just overwhelm them.Dwarkesh Patel (00:05:29):Okay. There are a few terms there that neither I nor the audience might know. So what is JDM? What is shroud? And why are chips a bottleneck here? Why can't it just be any micro-controller?Austin Vernon (00:05:42):So JDM is Joint Direct Attack Munition. So what we did is we took all our Vietnam surplus bonds and we put this little fin-kit on it and it costs like $20,000, which is cheap for a weapon because the actual bond costs, I don't know, $3,000. And then it turns it into a guided weapon that, before you were probably lucky to get within 500 meters of a target, now you can get it in with two meters. So the number of missions you have to do with your planes and all that goes down by orders of magnitude. So it's an absolutely huge advantage in logistics and in just how much firepower you can put on a target. And we didn't even have to make new bombs, we just put these kits on all our old bombs.Austin Vernon (00:06:33):Let's see.. Yeah the chips are a problem. There's this organization called RUSI. I think they're in the UK, but they've been tearing down all these Russian weapons they found in Ukraine and they all have American chips in them. So technically, they're not supposed to be able to get these chips. And yet, Russia can't make a lot of its own chips. And especially not the specialized kinds you might want for guided weapons. So they've been somehow smuggling in chips from Americans to make their advanced weaponsDwarkesh Patel (00:07:03):What is special about these? As far as I'm aware, the trade with China is still going on and we get a lot of our chips manufactured from Taiwan or China. So why can't they do the same?Austin Vernon (00:07:14):It's the whole integration. It's not just the specific chip, but the board. They're more like PLCs where you almost have wired-in programming and they come with this ability to do the guidance and all that stuff. It all kind of has to work together. I think that's the way I understand it. I don't know. Maybe I don't have a really good answer for that one, but they're hard to replicate is what matters.Dwarkesh Patel (00:07:43):Okay that's interesting. Yeah, I guess that has a lot of interesting downstream effects, because for example, India buys a lot of its weapons from Russia. So if Russia doesn't have access to these, then other countries that buy from Russia won't have access to these either.Dwarkesh Patel (00:07:58):You had an interesting speculation in the post where you suggested that you could just keep these kinetic weapons in orbit, in a sort of Damocles state really, almost literally. That sounds like an incredibly scary and risky scenario where you could have orbital decay and you could have these kinetic weapons falling from the sky and destroying cities. Do you think this is what it will look like or could look like in 10 to 20 years?Austin Vernon (00:08:26):Well, yeah, so the advantage of having weapons on orbit is you can hit targets faster. So if you're launching the rocket from Florida, you're looking at maybe 30 minutes to get there and the target can move away in that time. Whereas if you're on orbit, you can have them spaced out to where you're hitting within a few minutes. So that's the advantage there.Austin Vernon (00:08:46):You really have to have a two stage system I think for most, because if you have a really aerodynamic rod that's going to give you really good performance in the low atmosphere, it'll end up going too fast and just burn up before it gets there. Tungsten's maybe the only thing that you could have that could go all the way through which is why I like the original concept of using these big tungsten rods the size of a telephone pole. But tungsten's pretty expensive. And the rod concept kind of limits what you can do.Austin Vernon (00:09:28):So a lot of these weapons will have, that's what I was talking about with the shroud, something that actually slows you down in the upper atmosphere. And then once you're at the velocity where you're not just going to melt, then you open it up and let it go. So if you actually had it fall from the sky, some may make it to the ground, but a lot would burn up. So a lot of the stuff that makes it to the ground is actually pretty light. It's stuff that can float and has a large surface area. Yeah, that's the whole thing with Starship. Or not Starship, but Starlink. All those satellites are meant to completely fall apart on de-orbit.Dwarkesh Patel (00:10:09):I see. One of the implications of that is that these may be less powerful than we might fear, because since kinetic energy is mass times velocity squared and there's an upper bound on the velocity (velocity being the component that grows the kinetic energy faster), then it suggests that you can upper bound the power these things will have. You know what I mean?Austin Vernon (00:10:32):Yeah, so even the tungsten rods. Sometimes people, they're not very good at physics, so they don't do the math. They think it's going to be a nuclear weapon, but it's really not. I think even the tungsten rod is like 10 tons of T&T or something. It's a big bomb, but it's not a super weapon.Austin Vernon (00:10:54):So I think I said in the post, it's about using advanced missiles where they're almost more defensive weapons so I can keep you from pitting your ship somewhere. Yeah I could try to bombard your cities, but I can't take ground with it. I can't even police sea lanes with it really. I'd still have to use regular ships if I had this air cover to go enforce the rules of the sea and stuff like that.Dwarkesh Patel (00:11:23):Yeah. You speculated in the post, I think, that you could load this up with shrapnel and then it could explode next to an incoming missile or an incoming aircraft. Could these get that accurate? Because that was surprising speculation to me.Austin Vernon (00:11:43):I think for ships, it's pretty... I was watching videos of how fast a ship can turn and stuff. If you're going to do an initial target on a ship to try to kill their radars, you'd want to do it above the ceiling of their missiles. So it's like, how much are they going to move between your release where you stop steering and that? The answer's maybe 1000 feet. So that's pretty simple because you just shrapnel the area.Austin Vernon (00:12:12):Targeting aircraft, you would be steering all the way in. I'd say it's doable, but it'd be pretty hard. You'd actually maybe want to even go slower than you would with the ship attack. You'd need a specialized package to attack the aircraft, but if you have enough synthetic aperture radar and stuff like that, you could see these aircraft using satellites and then guide the bomb in the whole way. You could even load heat seeking missiles into a package that unfurls right next to them and launch conventional missiles too, probably. It'd be pretty hard to do some of this stuff, but they're just the things you might be able to do if you put some effort into it.Dwarkesh Patel (00:12:57):Yeah. The reason I find this kind of speculation really interesting is because when you look at the modern weaponry that's used in conflicts, it just seems directly descendant from something you would've seen in World War II or something. If you think about how much warfare changed between 1900 and 1940, it's like, yeah, they're not even the same class of weapons anymore. So it's interesting to think about possibilities like these where the entire category of weapons has changed.Austin Vernon (00:13:33):You're right and that's because our physical technology hasn't changed that much. So it really has just made more sense to put better electronics in the same tanks. We haven't learned enough about tanks to build a new physical tank that's way better, so we just keep upgrading our existing tanks with better electronics. They're much more powerful, they're more accurate. A lot of times, they have longer range weapons and better sensors. So the tank looks the same, but it maybe has several times more killing power. But the Ukraine war right now, they're using a lot of 40, 50 year old weapons so that especially looks like that.Dwarkesh Patel (00:14:20):Yeah. Which kind of worries you if you think about the stockpiles our own military has. I'm not well educated on the topic, but I imagine that we don't have the newest of the new thing. We probably have maintained versions of decades old technology.Austin Vernon (00:14:35):We spend so much, we've got relatively... This kind of gets into debate about how ready our military is. For certain situations, it's more ready than others. I'd say in general, most people talking about it have the incentive to downplay our capabilities because they want more defense spending. There's lots of reasons. So I think we're probably more capable than what you might see from some editorial in The Hill or whatever. Us just sending a few weapons over to Ukraine and seeing how successful they've been at using them, I think, shows a little bit of that.Austin Vernon (00:15:18):There's so much uncertainty when it comes to fighting, especially when you're talking about a naval engagement, where we don't just don't have that many ships in general… you can have some bad luck. So I think you always want to be a little bit wary. You don't want to get overconfident.Dwarkesh Patel (00:15:37):Yeah. And if the offensive tech we sent to Ukraine is potentially better than the defensive tech, it's very possible that even a ballistic missile that China or Russia could launch would sink a battleship and then kill the 2,000 or 1,000 whatever soldiers that are on board. Or I guess, I don't know, you think this opens up avenues for defensive tech as well?Austin Vernon (00:16:03):Yeah––generally the consensus is that defensive technology has improved much more recently than offensive technology. This whole strategy China has is something they call anti-access/area denial, A2/AD. That's basically just how missiles have gotten better because the sensors on missiles have gotten better. So they can keep our ships from getting close to them but they can't really challenge us in Hawaii or something. And it really goes both ways, I think people forget that. So yeah, it's hard for us to get close to China, but Taiwan has a lot of missiles with these new sensors as well. So I think it's probably tougher for China to do it close to Taiwan than most people would say.Dwarkesh Patel (00:16:55):Oh, interesting. Yeah, can you talk more about that? Because every time I read about this, people are saying that if China wanted to, they could knock out Taiwan's defenses in a short amount of time and take it over. Yeah, so can you talk about why that's not possible?Austin Vernon (00:17:10):Well, it might be, but I think it's a guess of the uncertainty [inaudible 00:17:14]. Taiwan has actually one of the largest defense budgets in the world and they've recently been upping it. I think they spend, I don't know, $25 billion a year and they added an extra $5 billion. And they've been buying a lot of anti-ship missiles, a lot of air defense missiles.. Stuff that Ukraine could only dream of. I think Ukraine's military budget was $2 billion and they have a professional army. And then the other thing is Taiwan's an island, whereas Russia could just roll over the land border into Ukraine.Austin Vernon (00:17:44):There's just been very few successful amphibious landings in history. The most recent ones were all the Americans in World War II and Korea. So the challenge there is just... It's kind of on China to execute perfectly and do that. So if they had perfect execution, then possibly it would be feasible. But if their air defenses on their ships aren't quite as good as we think they could possibly be, then they could also end up with half their fleet underwater within 10 hours.Dwarkesh Patel (00:18:20):Interesting. And how has your view of Taiwan's defensive capabilities changed... How has the Ukraine conflict updated your opinion on what might happen?Austin Vernon (00:18:29):I didn't really know how much about it. And then I started looking at Wikipedia and stuff and all this stuff they're doing. Taiwan just has a lot of modern platforms like F16s with our anti-ship missiles. They actually have a lot of their own. They have indigenous fighter bombers, indigenous anti-ship missiles because they're worried we might not always sell them to them.Austin Vernon (00:18:54):They've even recently gotten these long range cruise missiles that could possibly target leadership in Beijing. So I think that makes it uncomfortable for the Chinese leadership. If you attack them, you're going to have to go live in a bunker. But again, I'm not a full-time military analyst or something, so there's a lot of uncertainty around what I'm saying. It's not a given that China's just going to roll over them.Software ProductivityDwarkesh Patel (00:19:22):Okay. That's comforting to hear. Let's talk about an area where I have a little bit of a point of contact. I thought your blog post about software and the inability of it to increase productivity numbers, I thought that was super fascinating. So before I ask you questions about it, do you want to lay out the thesis there?Austin Vernon (00:19:43):Yeah. So if there's one post I kind of felt like I caught lightning in a bottle on, it's that one. Everything I wanted to put in, it just fit together perfectly, which is usually not the case.Austin Vernon (00:19:55):I think the idea is that the world's so complex and we really underestimate that complexity. If you're going to digitize processes and automate them and stuff, you have to capture all that complexity basically at the bit level, and that's extremely difficult. And then you also have diminishing returns where the easily automatable stuff goes first and then it's increasing corner cases to get to the end, so you just have to go through more and more code basically. We don't see runaway productivity growth from software because we're fighting all this increasing complexity.Dwarkesh Patel (00:20:39):Yeah. Have you heard of the waterbed theory of complexity by the way?Austin Vernon (00:20:42):I don't think so.Dwarkesh Patel (00:20:44):Okay. It's something that comes up in compiler design: the idea is that there's a fixed amount of complexity in a system. If you try to reduce it, what you'll end up doing is just you'll end up migrating the complexity elsewhere. I think an example that's used of this is when they try to program languages that are not type safe, something like Python. You can say, “oh, it's a less complex language”, but really, you've added complexity when, I don't know, two different types of numbers are interacting like a float and an int. As your program grows, that complexity exponentially grows along with all the things that could go wrong when you're making two things interact in a way that you were expecting not to. So yeah, the idea is you can just choose where to have your complexity, but you can't get rid of that complexity.Austin Vernon (00:21:38):I think that's kind of an interesting thing when you start pairing it with management theory... when you add up all the factors, the most complex thing you're doing is high volume car manufacturing. And so we got a lot of innovations and organization from car manufacturers like the assembly line. Then you had Sloan at GM basically creating the way the modern corporation is run, then you have the Toyota Production System.Austin Vernon (00:22:11):But arguably now, creating software is actually the most complex thing we do. So there's all these kinds of squishy concepts that underlie things like the Toyota Production System that softwares had to learn and reimagine and adopt and you see that with Agile where, “oh, we can't have long release times. We need to be releasing every day,” which means we're limiting inventory there.Austin Vernon (00:22:42):There's a whole thing especially that's showing up in software that existed in carbon manufacturing where you're talking about reducing communication. So Jeff Bezos kind of now famously said, "I want to reduce communication," which is counterintuitive to a lot of people. This is age-old in car manufacturing where Toyota has these cards that go between workstations and they tell you what to do. So people normally think of them as limiting inventory, but it also tells the worker exactly what they're supposed to be doing at what pace, at what time. The assembly line is like that too. You just know what to do because you're standing there and there's a part here and it needs to go on there, and it comes by at the pace you're supposed to work at.Austin Vernon (00:23:29):It's so extreme that there's this famous paper, by List, Syverson and Levitt. They went to a car factory and studied how defects propagated in cars and stuff. Once a car factory gets up and running, it doesn't matter what workers you put in there, if workers are sick or you get new workers, the defect rate is the same. So all the knowledge is built into the manufacturing line.Austin Vernon (00:23:59):There's these concepts around idiot-proofing and everything that are very similar to what you'll see. You had Uncle Bob on here. So Uncle Bob says only put one input into a function and stuff like that because you'll mix them up otherwise. The Japanese call it poka-yoke. You make it where you can't mess it up. And that's another way to reduce communication, and then software, of course you have APIs.Austin Vernon (00:24:28):So I'm really interested in this overall concept of reducing communication, and reducing how much cooperation and everything we need to run the economy.Dwarkesh Patel (00:24:41):Right. Right. Speaking of the Toyota Production System, one thing they do to reduce that defect rate is if there's a problem, all the workers in that chain are forced to go to the place where the defect problem is and fix it before doing anything else. The idea there is that this will give them context to understand what the problem was and how to make sure it doesn't happen again. It also prevents a build up of inventory in a way that keeps making these defects happen or just keeps accumulating inventory before the place that can fix the defects is able to take care of them.Austin Vernon (00:25:17):Right. Yeah, yeah. Exactly.Dwarkesh Patel (00:25:19):Yeah. But I think one interesting thing about software and complexity is that software is a place where complexity is the highest in our world right now but software gives you the choice to interface with the complexity you want to interface with. I guess that's just part of specialization in general, but you could say for example that a machine learning model is really complex, but ideally, you get to a place where that's the only kind of complexity you have to deal with. You're not having to deal with the complexity of “How is this program compiled? How are the libraries that I'm using? How are they built?” You can fine tune and work on the complexity you need to work on.Dwarkesh Patel (00:26:05):It's similar to app development. Byrne Hobart has this blog post about Stripe as solid state. The basic idea is that Stripe hides all the complexity of the financial system: it charges a higher fee, but you can just treat it as an abstraction of a tithe you have to pay, and it'll just take care of that entire process so you can focus on your comparative advantage.Austin Vernon (00:26:29):It's really actually very similar in car manufacturing and the Toyota Production System if you really get into it. It's very much the same conceptual framework. There's this whole idea in Toyota Production System, everyone works at the same pace, which you kind of talked about. But also, your work content is the same. There's no room for not standardizing a way you're going to do things. So everyone gets together and they're like, “All right, we're going to do this certain part. We're going to put it together this certain way at this little micro station. And it's going to be the same way every time.” That's part of how they're reducing the defect rates. If your assembly process is longer than what your time allotment is to stay in touch with the rest of the process, then you just keep breaking it down into smaller pieces. So through this, each person only has to know a very small part of it.Austin Vernon (00:27:33):The overall engineering team has all sorts of strategies and all sorts of tools to help them break up all these processes into very small parts and make it all hold together. It's still very, very hard, but it's kind of a lot of the same ideas because you're taking away the complexity of making a $30,000 car or 30,000 part car where everyone's just focusing on their one little part and they don't care what someone else is doing.Dwarkesh Patel (00:28:06):Yeah. But the interesting thing is that it seems like you need one person who knows how everything fits together. Because from what I remember, one of the tenets of the Toyota Production System was you need to have a global view. So, in that book, was it the machine or the other one, the Toyota Production System book? But anyways, they were talking about examples where people would try to optimize for local efficiencies. I think they especially pointed to Ford and GM for trying to do this where they would try to make machines run all the time. And locally, you could say that, “oh this machine or process is super efficient. It's always outputting stuff.” But it ignores how that added inventory or that process had a bad consequence for the whole system.Dwarkesh Patel (00:28:50):And so it's interesting if you look at a company like Tesla that's able to do this really well. Tesla is run like a monarchy and this one guy has this total global view of how the entire process is supposed to run and where you have these inefficiencies.. You had some great examples of this in the blog post. I think one of the examples is this guy (the author) goes to this factory and he asks, "Is this an efficient factory?" And the guy's like, "Yeah, this is totally efficient. There's nothing we can do, adopting the Toyota way, to make this more efficient."Dwarkesh Patel (00:29:22):And so then he's like, "Okay, let me look." And he finds that they're treating steel in some way, and the main process does only take a couple of seconds, but some local manager decided that it would be more efficient to ship their parts out, to get the next stage of the process done somewhere else. So this is locally cheaper, but the result is that it takes weeks to get these parts shipped out and get them back. Which means that the actual time that the parts spend getting processed is 0.1% of the time, making the whole process super inefficient. So I don't know, it seems like the implication is you need a very monarchical structure, with one person who has a total view, in order to run such a system. Or am I getting that wrong?Austin Vernon (00:30:12):Not necessarily. I mean, you do have to make sure you're not optimizing locally, but I think it's the same. You have that same constraint in software, but I think a lot of times people are just running over it because processing has been getting so much cheaper. People are expensive, so if you could save development time, it just ends up the trade offs are different when you're talking about the tyranny of physical items and stuff like that, the constraints get a little more severe. But I think you have the same overall. You still have to fight local optimization, but the level you have to is probably different with physical goods.Austin Vernon (00:30:55):I was thinking about the smart grid situation from a software perspective, and there's this problem where, okay, I'm putting my solar farm here and it's impacting somewhere far away, and that's then creating these really high upgrade costs, that cost two or three times more than my solar farm. Well, the obvious thing would be, if you're doing software, is like you're going to break all these up into smaller sections, and then you wouldn't be impacting each other and all that, and you could work and focus on your own little thing.Austin Vernon (00:31:29):But the problem with that is if you're going to disconnect these areas of the grid, the equipment to do that is extremely expensive. It's not like I'm just going to hit a new tab and open a new file and start writing a new function. And not only that, but you still have to actually coordinate how this equipment is going to operate. So if you just let the grid flow as it does, everyone knows what's going to happen because they could just calculate the physics. If you start adding in all these checkpoints where humans are doing stuff, then you have to actually interface with the humans, and the amount of things that can happen really starts going up. So it's actually a really bad idea to try to cart all this stuff off, just because of the reality of the physical laws and the equipment you need and everything like that.Dwarkesh Patel (00:32:22):Okay. Interesting. And then I think you have a similar Coasean argument in your software post about why vertically integrating software is beneficial. Do you want to explain that thesis?Austin Vernon (00:32:34):Yeah. I think it actually gets to what we're talking about here, where it allows you to avoid the local optimization. Because a lot of times you're trying to build a software MVP, and you're tying together a few services… they don't do quite what you need, so if you try to scale that, it would just break. But if you're going to take a really complex process, like car manufacturing or retail distribution, or the home buying process or something, you really have to vertically integrate it to be able to create a decent end-to-end experience and avoid that local optimization.Austin Vernon (00:33:20):And it's just very hard otherwise, because you just can't coordinate effectively if you have 10 different vendors trying to do all the same thing. You end up in just constant vendor meetings, where you're trying to decide what the specs are or something instead of giving someone the authority, or giving a team the authority to just start building stuff. Then if you look at these companies, they have to implement these somewhat decentralized processes when they get too complex, but at least they have control over how they're interfacing with each other. Walmart, as the vendors, control their own stock. They don't tell the vendor, "We need X parts." It's just like, it's on you to make sure your shelf is stocked.Dwarkesh Patel (00:34:07):Yeah. Yeah. So what was really interesting to me about this part of the post was, I don't know, I guess I had heard of this vision of we're software setting, where everybody will have a software as a service company, and they'll all be interfacing with each other in some sort of cycle where they're all just calling each other's APIs. And yeah, basically everybody and their mother would have a SAAS company. The implication here was, from your argument, that given the necessity of integrating all those complexity vertically in a coherent way, then the winners in software should end up being a few big companies, right? They compete with each other, but still...Austin Vernon (00:34:49):I think that's especially true when you're talking about combining bits and apps. Maybe less true for pure software. The physical world is just so much more complex, and so the constraints it creates are pretty extreme, compared to like... you could maybe get away with more of everyone and their mom having an API in a pure software world.Dwarkesh Patel (00:35:14):Right. Yeah. I guess, you might think that even in the physical world, given that people really need to focus on their comparative advantage, they would just try to outsource the software parts to these APIs. But is there any scenario where the learning curve for people who are not in the firm can be fast enough that they can keep up with the complexity? Because there's huge gains for specialization and competition that go away if this is the world we're forced to live in. And then I guess we have a lot of counter examples, or I guess we have a lot of examples of what you're talking about. Like Apple is the biggest market cap in the world, right? And famously they're super vertically integrated. And yeah, obviously their thing is combining hardware and software. But yeah, is there any world in which it can keep that kind of benefit, but have it be within multiple firms?Austin Vernon (00:36:10):This is a post I've got on my list I want to write. The blockchain application, which excites me personally the most, is reimagining enterprise software. Because the things you're talking about, like hard typing and APIs are just basically built into some of these protocols. So I think it just really has a lot of exciting implications for how much you can decentralize software development. But the thing is, you can still do that within the firm. So I think I mentioned this, if the government's going to place all these rules on the edge of the firm, it makes transactions with other firms expensive. So a few internal transactions can be cheaper, because they're avoiding the government reporting and taxes and all that kind of stuff. So I think you'd have to think about how these technologies can reduce transaction costs overall and decentralize that, but also what are the costs between firms?Dwarkesh Patel (00:37:22):Yeah, it's really interesting if the costs are logistic, or if they're based on the knowledge that is housed, as you were talking about, within a factory or something. Because if it is just logistical and stuff, like you had to report any outside transactions, then it does imply that those technology blockchain could help. But if it is just that you need to be in the same office, and if you're not, then you're going to have a hard time keeping up with what the new requirements for the API are, then maybe it's that, yeah, maybe the inevitability is that you'll have these big firms that are able to vertically integrate.Austin Vernon (00:37:59):Yeah, for these big firms to survive, they have to be somewhat decentralized within them. So I think you have... you're going to the same place as just how are we viewing it, what's our perception? So even if it's a giant corporation, it's going to have very independent business units as opposed to something like a 1950s corporation.Dwarkesh Patel (00:38:29):Yeah. Byrne Hobart, by the way, has this really interesting post that you might enjoy reading while you're writing that post. It's type safe communications, and it's about that Bezos thing, about his strict style for how to communicate and how little to communicate. There's many examples in Amazon protocols where you have to... the only way you can put in this report, is in this place you had to give a number. You can't just say, "This is very likely," you had to say like, "We project X percent increase," or whatever. So it has to be a percent. And there's many other cases where they're strict about what type definition you can have in written reports or something. It has kind of the same consequence that type strict languages have, which is that you can keep track of what the value is through the entire chain of the flow of control.Austin Vernon (00:39:22):You've got to keep work content standardized.Dwarkesh Patel (00:39:26):So we've been hinting at the Coasean analysis to this. I think we just talked about it indirectly, but for the people who might not know, Coase has this paper called The Theory of Firms, and he's trying to explain why we have firms at all. Why not just have everybody compete in the open market for employment, for anything? Why do we have jobs? Why not just have... you can just hire a secretary by the day or something.Dwarkesh Patel (00:39:51):And the conclusion he comes to is that by having a firm you're reducing the transaction cost. So people will have the same knowledge about what needs to get done, obviously you're reducing the transaction cost of contracting, finding labor, blah, blah, blah. And so the conclusion it comes to is the more the transaction costs are reduced within people in a firm, as compared to the transaction cost between different firms, the bigger firms will get. So I guess that's why the implication of your argument was that there should be bigger tech firms, right?Austin Vernon (00:40:27):Yes, yes, definitely. Because they can basically decrease the transaction costs faster within, and then even at the limit, if you have large transaction costs outside the firm, between other firms that are artificially imposed, then it will make firms bigger.Dwarkesh Patel (00:40:45):What does the world look like in that scenario? So would it just be these Japanese companies, these huge conglomerates who are just... you rise through the ranks, from the age of 20 until you die? Is that what software will turn into?Austin Vernon (00:40:59):It could be. I mean, I think it will be lots of very large companies, unless there's some kind of change in inner firm transaction costs. And again, that could possibly come from blockchain like technology, but you probably also need better regulation to make that cheaper, and then you would have smaller firms. But again, in the end, it doesn't really matter. You'd be working in your little unit of the big bank of corporate, or whatever. So I don't know what that would look like on a personal level.Car ManufacturingDwarkesh Patel (00:41:40):Yeah. Okay. So speaking of these Japanese companies, let's talk about car manufacturing and everything involved there. Yeah, so we kind of hinted at a few elements of the Toyota way and production earlier, but do you want to give a brief overview of what that is, so we can compare it to potentially other systems?Austin Vernon (00:42:02):I think all these kinds of lean Toyota process systems, they do have a lot of similarities, where mostly you want to even-out your production, so you're producing very consistently, and you want to break it into small steps and you want to limit the amount of inventory you have in your system. When you do this, it makes it easy to see how the process is running and limit defects. And the ultimate is you're really trying to reduce defects, because they're very expensive. It's a little bit hard to summarize. I think that's my best shot at it there, quickly off the top of my head.Dwarkesh Patel (00:42:49):Yeah. The interesting thing about the Toyota system, so at least when the machine was released, is they talk about... that book was released I think the nineties, and they went to the history of Toyota, and one of the interesting things they talked about was there was a brief time where the company ran... I think, was this after World War II? But anyways, the company ran into some troubles. They needed to layoff people to not go bankrupt. They had much more debt on books than they had assets. So yeah, they wanted to layoff people, but obviously the people were not happy about this, so there were violent protests about this. And in fact I think the US written constitution gave strong protections to labor that they hadn't had before, which gave labor an even stronger hand here.Dwarkesh Patel (00:43:42):So anyway, Toyota came to this agreement with the unions that they'd be allowed to do this one time layoff to get the company on the right track, but afterwards they could never lay somebody off. Which would mean that a person who works at Toyota works there from the time they graduate college or high school till they die. Right? I don't know, that's super intense in a culture. I mean, in software, where you have the average tenure in a company's one year, the difference is so much.Dwarkesh Patel (00:44:13):And there's so many potential benefits here, I guess a lot of drawbacks too. But one is, obviously if you're talking in a time scale of 50 years, rather than one year, the incentives are more aligned between the company and the person. Because anything you could do in one year is not going to have a huge impact on your stock options in that amount of time. But if this company's your retirement plan, then you have a much stronger incentive to make sure that things at this company run well, which means you're probably optimizing for the company's long term cash flow yourself. And also, there's obviously benefits to having that knowledge built up in the firm from people who have been there for a long time. But yeah, that was an interesting difference. One of the interesting differences, at least.Austin Vernon (00:45:00):I mean, I think there's diminishing returns to how long your tenure's going to be. Maybe one year's too short, but there's a certain extent to where, if you grow faster than your role at the company, then it's time to switch. It's going to depend on the person, but maybe five years is a good number. And so if you're not getting promoted within the firm, then your human capital's being wasted, because you could go somewhere else and have more responsibility and perform better for them. Another interesting thing about that story, is almost all lean turnarounds, where they're like, we're going to implement something like Toyota production system, they come with no layoff promises. Because if you're going to increase productivity, that's when everyone's like, "Oh gosh, I'm going to get laid off." So instead you have to increase output and take more market share, is what you do.Dwarkesh Patel (00:46:00):It's kind of like burning your bridges, right? So this is the only way.Austin Vernon (00:46:05):The process really requires complete buy-in, because a lot of your ideas for how you're going to standardize work content come from your line workers, because that's what they're doing every day. So if you don't have their buy-in, then it's going to fail. So that's why it's really necessary to have those kinds of clauses.Dwarkesh Patel (00:46:22):Yeah. Yeah, that makes sense. I think it was in your post where you said, if somebody makes their process more efficient, and therefore they're getting more work allotted to them, then obviously they're going to stop doing that. Right? Which means that, I don't know, do you ought to give more downtime to your best workers or something or the people who are most creative in your company?Austin Vernon (00:46:48):I was just going to say, if you're a worker at a plant, then a lot of times for that level of employee, actually small rewards work pretty well. A lot of people on drilling rigs used to give the guys that met certain targets $100 Walmart gift cards. So sometimes small, it's a reward, new ideas, stuff like that works.Austin Vernon (00:47:15):But because the whole system has to grow together, if you just improve one part of the process, it may not help you. You have to be improving all the right processes so normally it's much more collaborative. There's some engineer that's looking at it and like, "All right, this is where we're struggling," or "We have our defects here." And then you go get together with that supervisor and the workers in that area, then you all figure out what improvements could be together. Because usually the people already know. This is like, you see a problem at the top, and you're just now realizing it. Then you go talk to the people doing the work, and they're like, "Oh yeah, I tried to tell you about that two weeks ago, man." And then you figure out a better process from there.Dwarkesh Patel (00:47:58):Based on your recommendation, and Steven Malina's recommendation, I recently read The Goal. And after reading the book, I'm much more understanding of the value that consultants bring to companies, potentially. Because before you could think, “What does a 21 year old, who just graduated college, know about manufacturing? What are they going to tell this plant that they didn't already know? How could they possibly be adding value?” And afterwards, it occurred to me that there's so many abstract concepts that are necessary to understand in order to be able to increase your throughput. So now I guess I can see how somebody who's generically smart but doesn't have that much industry knowledge might be able to contribute to a plan and value consultants could be bringing.Austin Vernon (00:48:43):I think this applies to consultants or young engineers. A lot of times you put young engineers just right in the thick of it, working in production or process right on the line, where you're talking to the workers the most. And there's several advantages to that. One, the engineer learns faster, because they're actually seeing the real process, and the other is there's easy opportunities for them to still have a positive impact on the business, because there's $100 bills laying on the ground just from going up and talking to your workers and learning about stuff and figuring out problems they might be having and finding out things like that that could help you lower cost. I think there's a lot of consultants that... I don't know how the industry goes, but I would guess there's... I know Accenture has 600,000 employees. I don't know if that many, but it's just a large number, and a lot are doing more basic tasks and there are some people that are doing the more high level stuff, but it's probably a lot less.Dwarkesh Patel (00:49:51):Yeah. Yeah. There was a quote from one of those books that said, "At Toyota we don't consider you an engineer unless you need to wash your hands before you can have lunch." Yeah. Okay. So in your blog post about car manufacturing, you talk about Tesla. But what was really interesting is that in a footnote, I think you mentioned that you bought Tesla stocks in 2014, which also might be interesting to talk about again when we go to the market and alpha part. But anyways. Okay. And then you talk about Tesla using something called metal manufacturing. So first of all, how did you know in 2014 that Tesla was headed here? And what is metal manufacturing and how does it differ from the Toyota production system?Austin Vernon (00:50:42):Yeah. So yeah, I just was goofing around and made that up. Someone actually emailed me and they were like, "Hey, what is this metal manufacturing? I want to learn more about this." It's like, "Well, sorry, I just kind of made that up, because I thought it sounded funny." But yeah, I think it's really the idea that there's this guy, Dimming, and he found a lot of the same ideas that Toyota ended up implementing, and Toyota respected his ideas a lot. America never really got fully on board with this in manufacturing. Of course it's software people that are coming and implementing this and manufacturing now which is like the real American way of doing things.Austin Vernon (00:51:32):Because when you look at these manufacturing processes, the best place to save money and optimize is before you ever build the process or the plant. It's very early on. So I think if there's a criticism of Toyota, it's that they're optimizing too late and they're not creative enough in their production technology and stuff. They're very conservative, and that's why they have hydrogen cars and not battery cars, even though they came out with the Prius, which was the first large sales hybrid.Austin Vernon (00:52:12):So yeah, I think what Tesla's doing with really just making Dimming's ideas our own and really just Americanizing it with like, "Oh, well, we want to cast this, because that would be easier." Well, we can't, because we don't have an alloy. "We'll invent the alloy." I love it. It's great. Mostly, I love Tesla because they do such... I agree with their engineering principles. So I didn't know that the company would come to be so valuable. It's just, I was just always reading their stock reports and stuff so I was like, "Well, at least I need to buy some stock so that I have a justification for spending all this time reading their 10 Ks."Dwarkesh Patel (00:52:53):I want to get a little bit more in detail about the exact difference here. So lean production, I guess, is they're able to produce their cars without defects and with matching demand or whatever. But what is it about their system that prevents them from making the kinds of innovations that Tesla is able to make?Austin Vernon (00:53:16):It's just too incremental. It's so hard to get these processes working. So the faster you change things, it becomes very, very difficult to change the whole system. So one of the advantages Tesla has is, well, if you're making electric cars, you have just a lot less parts. So that makes it easier. And once you start doing the really hard work of basically digitizing stuff, like they don't have speed limit dials, you start just removing parts from the thing and you can actually then start increasing your rate of change even faster.Austin Vernon (00:53:55):It makes it harder to get behind if you have these old dinosaur processes. But I think there's a YouTube channel called The Limiting Factor, and he actually went into the detail of numbers on what it costs for Tesla to do their giga-casting, which saves tons of parts and deletes zillions of thousands of robots from their process. If you already have an existing stamping line and all that, where you're just changing the dyes based on your model, then it doesn't make sense to switch to the casting. But if you're building new factories, like Tesla is, well, then it makes sense to do the casting and you can build new factories very cheaply and comparatively and much easier. So there's a little bit of... they just have lots of technical data, I guess you could say, in a software sense.Dwarkesh Patel (00:54:47):Yeah. That's super interesting. The analogy is actually quite... it's like, Microsoft has probably tens of thousands of software engineers who are just basically servicing its technical debt and making sure that the old systems run properly, whereas a new company like Tesla doesn't have to deal with that. The thing that's super interesting about Tesla is like, Tesla's market cap is way over a trillion, right? And then Toyota's is 300 billion. And Tesla is such a new company. The fact that you have this Toyota, which is legendary for its production system, and this company that's less than two decades old is worth many times more, it's kind of funny.Austin Vernon (00:55:32):Yeah. I would say that, in that measure, I don't like market cap. You need to use enterprise value. These old car companies have so much debt, that if you look at enterprise value, it's not so jarring. Literally, I don't know, I can't remember what GM's worth, like 40 billion or something, and then they have $120 billion in debt. So their enterprise value is five times more than their market cap.Dwarkesh Patel (00:56:02):What is enterprise value?Austin Vernon (00:56:03):Enterprise value is basically what is the value of the actual company before you have any claims on it. It's the market cap plus your debt. But basically, if you're the equity holder and the company gets sold, you have to pay the debt first. So you only get the value of what's left over after the debt. So that's why market cap is... when Tesla has very little debt and a lot of market cap, and then these other guys have a lot of debt with less market cap, it skews the comparison.Dwarkesh Patel (00:56:34):Yeah, and one of the interesting things, it's similar to your post on software, is that it seems like one of the interesting themes across your work is automating processes often leads to decreased eventual throughput, because you're probably adding capacity in a place that you're deciding excess capacity, and you're also making the money part of your operation less efficient by have it interface with this automated part. It sounds like there's a similar story there with car manufacturing, right?Austin Vernon (00:57:08):Yeah. I think if we tie it back into what we were talking about earlier, automation promotes local optimization and premature optimization. So a lot of times it's better to figure out, instead of automating a process to make a really hard to make part, you should just figure out how to make that part easy to make. Then after you do that, then it may not even make sense to automate it anymore. Or get rid of it all together, then you just delete all those robots.Austin's Carbon Capture ProjectDwarkesh Patel (00:57:37):Yeah. Yeah, that's interesting. Okay. So let's talk about the project that you're working on right now, the CO2 electrolysis. Do you want to explain what this is, and what your current approach is? What is going on here?Austin Vernon (00:57:55):Yeah, so I think just overall, electrofuels right now are super underrated, because you're about to get hopefully some very cheap electricity from solar, or it could be, maybe, some land. If we get really lucky, possibly some nuclear, geothermal. It'll just make sense to create liquid fuels, or natural gas, or something just from electricity and air, essentially.Austin Vernon (00:58:25):There's a whole spectrum of ways to do this, so O2 electrolysis is one of those. Basically, you take water, electricity, and CO2, and a catalyst. And then, you make more complex molecules, like carbon monoxide, or formic acid, or ethylene, or ethanol, or methane or methine. Those are all options. But it's important to point out that, right now, I think if you added up all the CO2 electrolyzers in the world, you'd be measuring their output and kilograms per day. We make millions of tons per day off of the products I just mentioned. So there's a massive scale up if it's going to have a wider impact.Austin Vernon (00:59:15):So there's some debate. I think the debate for the whole electrofuels sector is: How much are you going to do in the electrolyzer? One company whose approach I really like is Terraform Industries. They want to make methane, which is the main natural gas. But they're just making hydrogen in their electrolyzer, and then they capture the CO2 and then put it into a methanation reaction. So everything they're doing is already world scale, basically.Austin Vernon (00:59:47):We've had hydrogen electrolyzers power fertilizer plants, providing them with the Hydrogen that they need. Methanation happens in all ammonia plants and several other examples. It's well known, very old. Methanation is hydrogen CO2 combined to make water and methane. So their approach is more conservative, but if you do more in the electrolyzer, like I'm going to make the methane actually in the electrolyzer instead of adding this other process, you could potentially have a much simpler process that has less CapEx and scales downward better. Traditional chemical engineering heavily favors scaling. With the more Terraform processes, they're playing as absolutely ginormous factories. These can take a long time to build.Austin Vernon (01:00:42):So one of the things they're doing is: they're having to fight the complexity that creeps into chemical engineering every step of the way. Because if they don't, they'll end up with a plant that takes 10 years to build, and that's not their goal. It takes 10 years to build a new refinery, because they're so complex. So yeah, that's where I am. I'm more on the speculative edge, and it's not clear yet which products will be favorable for which approaches.Dwarkesh Patel (01:01:15):Okay, yeah. And you're building this out of your garage, correct?Austin Vernon (01:01:19):Yeah. So that's where electrolyzers... Everything with electric chemistry is a flat plate instead of a vessel, so it scales down. So I can have a pretty good idea of what my 100 square centimeter electrolyzer is going to do, if I make it quite a bit bigger. I have to worry about how my flow might interact in the larger one and make sure the mixing's good, but it's pretty straightforward because you're just making your flat plate a larger area. Whereas the scale, it is different from scaling a traditional chemical process.Dwarkesh Patel (01:01:56):I'm curious how cheap energy has to be before this is efficient. If you're turning it into methane or something like that, presumably for fuel, is the entire process energy positive? Or how cheap would energy, electricity you need to get before that's the case?Austin Vernon (01:02:18):The different products and different methods have different crossovers. So Terraform Industries, they're shooting for $10 a megawatt hour for electricity. But again, their process is simpler, a little less efficient than a lot of the other products. They also have better premiums, just worth more per ton than methane. So your crossover happens somewhere in between $10 and $20 a megawatt hour, which is... I mean, that's pretty... Right now, solar, it's maybe like $25. Maybe it's a little higher because payment prices have gone up in the last year, but I think the expectation is they'll come back down. And so, getting down to $15 where you start having crossovers for some of these products like ethanol or ethylene or methanol, it's not science fiction.Dwarkesh Patel (01:03:08):I think in Texas where I live, that's where it's at right? The cost of energy is 20 or something dollars per megawatt hour.Austin Vernon (01:03:16):Well, not this summer! But yeah, a lot of times in Texas, the wholesale prices are around $25 to $30.Dwarkesh Patel (01:03:26):Gotcha. Okay. Yeah. So a lot of the actual details you said about how this works went over my head. So what is a flat plate? I guess before you answer that question, can you just generally describe the approach? What is it? What are you doing to convert CO2 into these other compounds?Austin Vernon (01:03:45):Well, yeah, it literally just looks like an electrolyzer. You have two sides and anode and a cathode and they're just smushed together like this because of the electrical resistance. If you put them far apart, it makes it... uses up a lot of energy. So you smush them together as close as you can. And then, you're basically just trading electrons back and forth. On one side, you're turning CO2 into a more complex molecule, and on the other side, you're taking apart water. And so, when you take apart the water, it balances out the equation, balances out your electrons and everything like that. I probably need to work on that elevator pitch there, huh?Dwarkesh Patel (01:04:31):I guess what the basic idea is, you need to put power in to convert CO2 into these other compounds.Austin Vernon (01:04:38):The inputs are electricity, water, and CO2, and the output is usually oxygen and whatever chemical you're trying to create is, along with some side reactions.Dwarkesh Patel (01:04:49):And then, these chemicals you mentioned, I think ethanol, methane, formic acid, are these all just fuels or what are the other uses for them?Austin Vernon (01:04:58):A lot of people are taking a hybrid approach with carbon monoxide. So this would be like Twelve Co… They've raised a lot of money to do this and 100 employees or something. You can take that carbon monoxide and make hydrogen, and then you have to send gas to make liquid fuels. So they want to make all sorts of chemicals, but one of the main volume ones would be like jet fuel.Austin Vernon (01:05:22):Let's see Formic acid is, it's the little fry of all these. It is an additive in a lot of things like preserving hay for animals and stuff like that. Then, ethanol there's people that want to... There's this company that makes ethylene, which goes into plastics that makes polyethylene, which is the most produced plastic. Or you can burn it in your car, although I think ethanol is a terrible vehicle fuel. But then you can also just make ethylene straight in the electrolyzer. So there's many paths. So which path wins is an interesting race to see.Dwarkesh Patel (01:06:13):The ability to produce jet fuel is really interesting, because in your energy superabundance paper, you talk about... You would think that even if we can electrify everything in solar and when it becomes super cheap, that's not going to have an impact on the prices to go to space for example. But I don't know. If a process like this is possible, then it's some way to in financial terms, add liquidity. And then turn, basically, this cheap solar and wind into jet fuel through this indirect process. So the price to send stuff to space or cheap plane flights or whatever––all of that goes down as well.Austin Vernon (01:06:52):It basically sets a price ceiling on the price of oil. Whatever you can produce this for is the ceiling now, which is maybe the way I think about it.Dwarkesh Patel (01:07:06):Yeah. So do you want to talk a little bit about how your background led into this project? This is your full-time thing, right? I don't know if I read about that, but where did you get this idea and how long have you been pursuing it? And what's the progress and so on.Austin Vernon (01:07:20):I've always loved chemical engineering, and I love working at the big processing plant because it's like being a kid in a candy store. If I had extra time, I'd just walk around and look at the plant, like it's so cool. But the plant where I worked at, their up time was 99.7%. So if you wanted to change anything or do anything new, it terrified everyone. That's how they earned their bonuses: run the plant a 100% uptime all the time. So that just wasn't a good fit for me. And also, so I always wanted my own chemical plant, but it's billions of dollars to build plants so that was a pretty big step. So I think this new technology of... there's a window where you might be able to build smaller plants until it optimizes to be hard to enter again.Dwarkesh Patel (01:08:21):And then, why will it become hard to enter again? What will happen?Austin Vernon (01:08:27):If someone figures out how to build a really cheap electrolyzer, and they just keep it as intellectual property, then it would be hard to rediscover that and compete with them.Dwarkesh Patel (01:08:38):And so, how long have you been working on this?Austin Vernon (01:08:42):Oh, not quite a year. But yeah, I actually got this idea to work on it from writing my blog. So when I wrote the heating fuel post, I didn't really know much about... There's another company in the space, Prometheus Fuels and I'm like, "Oh, this is an interesting idea." And then, I got talking to a guy named Brian Heligman, and he's like, "You should do this, but not what Prometheus is doing." And so, then I started looking at it and I liked it, so I've been working on it since.Dwarkesh Patel (01:09:08):Yeah. It's interesting because if energy does become as cheap as you suspect it might. If this process works, then yeah, this is a trillion dollar company probably, right? If you're going to get the patents and everything.Austin Vernon (01:09:22):I mean, maybe. With chemical plants, there's a certain limitation where your physical limitation is. There's only so many places that are good places for chemical plants. You start getting hit by transportation and all that. So, you can't just produce all the chemical for the entire world in Texas and transport it all around. It wouldn't work. So you're talking about a full, globe-spanning thing. At that point, if y

I det här avsnittet pratar vi om vad ett företag är eller förväntas vara och frågar oss om och hur den uppfattningen kommer att behöva förändras i framtiden.Nature of the firm (R. Coase)Sverigedemokraterna och migrationspolitiken (SvD:s podd Ledarredaktionen) Our GDPR privacy policy was updated on August 8, 2022. Visit acast.com/privacy for more information.

In this week's episode, the Gwartney team follows the writings of R.H. Coase, specifically the relationship between the market for goods and the market for ideas. Why do regulators desire to regulate the market for goods, but insist on maintaining a free market for ideas? Has society transitioned into a less openly free speech one? Join the conversation now! Timeline: Market for Ideas / 2:30 Importance of Truth / 7:00 Intellectual Class / 10:15 Wield the Whip? / 20:45 Belongs to the People / 24:20 Potential for Abuse / 29:45 The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas by R. H. Coase https://web.ntpu.edu.tw/~guan/courses/Coase74.pdf

durée : 00:04:00 - Le Pourquoi du comment : économie et social - par : Laurence Scialom - Toute transaction entraîne des coûts qui varient en fonction de la nature de la transaction, mais aussi selon la façon dont elle s'organise.

Economist Robert Pindyck of MIT talks about his book, Climate Future, with EconTalk host Russ Roberts. Pindyck lays out what we know and do not know about climate change. He argues that because of the nature of greenhouse gases, adaptation must be part of the policy response to climate change.

Jonathan Hillis is the founder of Creator Cabins. It began as a single cabin in the Texas Hill Country, a place for creators to gather together to work on exciting projects 'IRL'. They've since launched a token and formed the Cabin DAO and now they're expanding into a decentralized city.  Prior to founding $CABIN, Jon was Director of Product, Shoppers, and Marketplace at Instacart, where during the pandemic, he grew their workforce of shoppers 5x.Jon also recently published an excellent essay on the history of centralization and decentralization cycles in Western Civilization.We cover all of that and more in this episode. Enjoy!In this episode we discuss:Decentralization and centralization cycles throughout historyAre we headed for collapse? Civil war? What about America vs China?What role will decentralized cities play in the futureCreating a playbook for future decentralized cities / nodes Opportunities for blockchain / innovation in governmentWhy are all the "internet intellectuals" moving to Austin, Texas?How the gig economy helped pave the way for Web3Is remote work a disadvantage for young people starting out in their careers?What people and companies get wrong about 'hybrid' (office/remote) workWhy Jon left Instacart (after growing their gig work force 5x)Promises and perils of working in the gig economyIs it fair to criticize Web3 for not living up to it's decentralization ideals?How to make it as a creator - what are the most relevant skillsets / experience to have today?Six ways to make $100,000 as a creator on the internet these daysOvercoming the "ickyness" of sharing your life and work on social mediaHow to succeed by finding community / "your corner of the internet" Links:Jon's essay: A brief history of decentralized cities and centralized states (https://creators.mirror.xyz/s9h4_PQAcJyqgC0rnsWjw9geU2wJs-IBPXIzHhgi-P8)Jon's essay: Six economies of online creators (https://www.meatspacealgorithms.com/six-economies/)Clay Christensen's theory of Disruptive Innovation (https://hbr.org/1995/01/disruptive-technologies-catching-the-wave)The Nature of the Firm by R. H. Coase (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x)My first impressions of web3 by Moxie Marlinspike (https://moxie.org/2022/01/07/web3-first-impressions.html)   

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Six economics misconceptions of mine which I've resolved over the last few years, published by Buck on the effective altruism forum. Here are six cases where I was pretty confident in my understanding of the microeconomics of something, but then later found out I was missing an important consideration. Thanks to Richard Ngo and Tristan Hume for helpful comments. Here's the list of mistakes: I thought divesting from a company had no effect on the company. I thought that the prices on a prediction market converged to the probabilities of the underlying event. I thought that I shouldn't expect to be able to make better investment decisions than buying index funds. I had a bad understanding of externalities, which was improved by learning about Coase's theorem. I didn't realize that regulations like minimum wages are analogous to taxes in that they disincentivize work. I misunderstood the economics of price controls. In each, I'm not talking about empirical situations at all—I'm just saying that I had a theoretical analysis which I think turned out to be wrong. It's possible that in many real situations, the additional considerations I've learned about don't actually affect the outcome very much. But it was still an error to not know that those considerations were potentially relevant. 1. Divestment I used to believe that personally divesting in a company didn't affect its share price, and therefore had no impact on the company. I guess my reasoning here was something like “If the share is worth $10 and you sell it, someone else will just buy it for $10, so the price won't change”. I was treating shares as if they were worth some fixed amount of money. The simplest explanation for why you can't just model shares as being worth fixed amounts of money is that people are risk averse, and so the tenth Google share you buy is worth less to you than the first; and so as the price decreases, it becomes more worthwhile to take a bigger risk on the company. As a result, divestment reduces the price of shares, in the same way that selling anything else reduces its price. In the specific case of divestment, this means that when I sell some stocks, the price ends up lower than it was. I first learned I was wrong about this from this Sideways View post, published May 2019. 2. Index funds I used to think that it wasn't possible for individuals like me to get higher returns than I'd get from just buying an index fund, because in an efficient market, every share is equally valuable. This is wrong for a few reasons. One is that the prices of shares are determined by the risk aversion of other market participants; if your risk aversion is different from the average, some shares (specifically, risky ones) will be much better investments than others. Secondly, because I'm risk averse, I prefer buying shares which are going to do relatively well in worlds where I'm relatively poorer. For example, if I'm a software engineer at a tech company, compared to a random shareholder I should invest more in companies which are as anticorrelated with software engineer salaries as possible. Or if I live in the US, I should consider investing in the markets of other countries. I didn't understand this fully until around April this year. 3. Prediction markets Relatedly, I thought that the fair market price of a contract which pays out $1 if Trump gets elected is just the probability of Trump getting elected. This is wrong because Trump getting elected is correlated with how valuable other assets are. Suppose I thought that Trump has a 50% chance of getting reelected, and that if he gets re-elected, the stock market will crash. If I have a bunch of my money in the stock market, the contract is worth more than 50 cents, because it hedges against Trump winning. (Here's a maybe more intuitive way of seeing th...

Dropkickdarren and Mark11 sit down with the Frax Finance Co-founder, Sam Kazemian!Fresh off the plane from Dubai, Sam sits down with us to talk about the synergies between FRAX, OHM, and TOKE, Frax v3, and why Bitcoin can never be a currency...What we touch on:Sam's Crypto background (0:54)Past stablecoins experiments (4:06)How a partially collateralized stablecoin mimics Central Banks (4:50)Frax origins (7:37)Sam's introduction to Olympus (9:16)FRAX V3 and AMO's - Automated Market Operators (10:57)The synergy between TOKE, FRAX, and OHM (20:02)FRAX balance sheet (26:28)How does FRAX AMO's work? (31:26)FRAX and Olympus PRO (32:56)FRAX price index (FPI) (34:17)Tracking off-chain CPI metrics (38:51)Frax's decentralization ratio (42:31)How the FPI would be backed by OHM (47:30)Collaborations with intellectuals on the FPI (49:35)Why Bitcoin can't be a currency (51:50)Coase's Theory of the Firm and how it applies to crypto (55:53)FRAX partnership with GMX and zkSync (1:00:59)Gamifying Governance (1:02:53)Regulatory risks for stablecoins and protocol founders (1:06:01)Crypto conferences (1:08:51)Closing remarks (1:10:55)Useful links-Great analysis on Frax Finance:https://www.mechanism.capital/frax/Coase's Theory of the Firm:https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.xWe touch on a lot in this one Ohmies, how did we do?https://forms.gle/cNUnz2TwEaBUHMCE7…Let us know how you feel about the podcast by filling in the google form that we've linked above.^Sam Kazemian:- Twitter: https://twitter.com/samkazemian- Frax Finance: https://twitter.com/fraxfinanceOlympus Agora:- Twitter: https://twitter.com/AgoraDispatch- Medium: https://medium.com/@agoradispatchHosts:- Dropkickdarren: https://twitter.com/dropkickdarren- Mark11: https://twitter.com/Mark11ETHIf you're looking to contribute to the podcast- or think you can add something to our product quality, what are you waiting for Ohmie? Come and join us in the OlympusDAO discord!https://discord.gg/9BcV6DM8

Peter J. Hill is Professor of Economics Emeritus at Wheaton College and a Senior Fellow at the Property and Environment Research Center in Bozeman, Montana, where he currently resides. He joins Garrett on Forgotten America to discuss free-market environmentalism (FME) and the property rights framework he uses to evaluate conservation issues. P.J. also gives us a look back into the truth about the Wild West and whether or not it was really all that wild.    Follow P.J.'s work and the work of PERC at https://www.perc.org/    Rachel Carson's Silent Spring: http://www.rachelcarson.org/SilentSpring.aspx   Learn more about the economist Ronald Coase: https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Coase.html    Read about Terry Anderson at PERC: https://www.perc.org/people/terry-anderson-2/     You can buy the book Free Market Environmentalism for the Next Generation on Amazon.    Edward Abbey was originally discussed in Ep. 021.    The Not So Wild, Wild West by Terry Anderson & P.J. Hill    The Foundation for Economic Education teaches about the Knowledge Problem.  ------------------------------------------------------------------------   You can support the Cardinal Institute by donating or following us on social media:    Donate: www.cardinalinstitute.com/donate Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/cardinalinstitute Newsletter: www.cardinalinstitute.com/contact YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCosCMp86mjLbf8ZWfE5yS7Q Twitter: @CardinalWV Facebook: /CardinalInstitute/ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/cardinal-institute-for-wv-policy/ Instagram: @teamcardinalwv  

In der Wettbewerbs-WG von Justus Haucap und Rupprecht Podszun, den beiden Professoren der Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf, gibt es in dieser Woche nur ein Thema: Darf Vonovia die Deutsche Wohnen übernehmen? Für rund 150.000 Mieter in Berlin ist die geplante Fusion auf dem Immobilienmarkt ungefähr so beruhigend wie eine Baustelle vorm Schlafzimmerfenster. Aber was werden die Kartellbehörden sagen? In der Rubrik „Selbstauskunft“ gibt Haucap preis, mit welchem Politiker er sympathisiert, und Podszun, wohin er gerne zum Frühschoppen geht. Und zum Schluss kommt auch noch der Baggerführer Willibald vorbei. -------------- Weitere Informationen: Baggerführer, Willibald (1970). Coase, R. H.(1974), The Lighthouse in Economics, The Journal of Law & Economics Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 357-376. IW Köln, IfD Allensbach, Sparda Banken e.V. (2021), Wohnen in Deutschland 2021.

Ostrom explica los procesos temporales en los cuales se ven enfrentadas las comunidades para llegar a acuerdos institucionales que hacen sustentable la extracción de los recursos comunes. De manera secuencial, incremental, las instituciones van cambiando hasta llegar a un equilibrio institucional. El artículo es el discurso que dio Ronald Coase cuando recibió el Nobel. Ahí explica sus dos mayores contribuciones al estudio de la economía y las leyes, la importancia de las instituciones para el funcionamiento correcto de los mercados reduciendo los costos de transacción.

Negative loggingI love this stuff:Companies eager to offset their emissions are paying Southern timberland owners not to cut more than a million acres... this stuffCoase theoremsays that really about transaction costs institutional shareholders Lumber Prices Soar, But Logs Are Still Dirt Cheap losing more than a billion dollars I wrote consolingly margin loans gone wrongcutting back riskmaking noisesHow Credit Suisse rolled the dice on risk management — and lostthrow away a financial careersettled with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authorityfired him last yearmarijuana jokeaccording to the Securities and Exchange Commission defended Musk a little here’s an article about Dogecoin Made Trading Easy Rebel Soccer League CollapsesUS-style football financesMysterious Demise Bidding War Escalates Black Workforce NumbersQuestion Credit SuisseThe IRS Prompts Viral Postspecial agenta croissant stuck in a treesubscribe at this linkheredemand responsethe reduction from that baseline

Economia Underground - Um Podcast Institucionalista Seguindo a “porta aberta” no último episódio, essa semana exploramos uma abordagem mainstream, a Nova Economia Institucional. Mais especificamente, a Teoria do Custo de Transação de Oliver Williamson. Apresentamos o conceito de “indivíduo contratual” e os elementos que giram em giram em torno da transação Williamsoniana. Referências citadas no episódio: Coase, Ronald (1937) “The Nature of the Firm”. Economica, New Series, 4: 387-405 Pessali, Huáscar (2006) “The rhetoric of Oliver Williamson's transaction cost economic” Journal of Institutional Economics, 2(1): 45-65 Silva, Vivian Lara e Azevedo, Paulo Furquim (2006) “Contratos interfirmas em diferentes ambientes institucionais: o caso McDonald's França versus Brasil” Revista De Administração, 41(4), 381-393 Williamson, Oliver. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press.

In this episode of the Bet On Yourself podcast I'm talking with Kathleen Breitman who is a co-founder of Coase, a software company that aspires to lower transaction costs. She previously co-founded Tezos, a smart contract platform and cryptocurrency with an on-chain governance mechanism to coordinate and push upgrades to its network. She has also worked at Accenture, Bridgewater Associates, and The Wall Street Journal.'' This episode is crazy. It's totally different from all the rest of the episodes we've had so far and I think you're really going to enjoy it. In this chat Kathleen gives us a completely different perspective on all the disasters you would hope to avoid, and how she has handled them, when starting a company. Kathleen studied philosophy and got into the internet by chance. She met her now husband, Arthur, in her sophomore year who had a crypto currency project on the side that he was playing around with at the time. Kathleen describes this becoming an ‘'if you can't beat them join them'' moment, which is where her Crypto career started. In this interview Kathleen talks about levelling up and becoming an expert in a field you know nothing about - which is something I definitely relate to from my own career. She also touches on: -How working with her spouse as a co-founder accelerated their learning and growth by years. -The problems that arose after their funding rounds -Dealing with difficult board members -Trusting your instincts As well as going to your mentors for advice when you need them and knowing which voices to listen to and which to ignore. I really loved her honesty. I think she offers an interesting perspective and gives insight into the crypto world which I personally still find pretty confusing! Also, just a quick FYI that we've chosen not to beep a few instances of colorful language in this episode to keep the original tone with which Kathleen shared her journey. Buckle up! This one is fun! --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/ann-hiatt/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/ann-hiatt/support

En esta entrega damos seguimiento a la reciente resolución que facilita la regularización de venezolanos y analizamos el teorema de Coase y su efecto en el derecho

En esta entrega damos seguimiento a la reciente resolución que facilita la regularización de venezolanos y analizamos el teorema de Coase y su efecto en el derecho

Tesla führt derzeit einen Formatkrieg, den bisher kaum jemand bemerkt hat. Wenn Tesla den Krieg gewinnt, dann manövrieren sie nicht nicht nur die anderen Automobilhersteller aus, sondern auch die Mineralölkonzerne. Tesla kann dadurch auf mittlere Sicht zu einem Monopolisten werden, der durch ein kundenunfreundliches Geschäftsmodell dieses Monopol auch ausnutzen kann. Die Theorie dahinter erklärt dieses Video. Als weitere Informationen zum Thema Elektromobilität: Disruptive Innovationen https://youtu.be/aOv36VFoarg Coase-Vermutung: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coase-V... Netzwerkeffekte: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netzwer... Hinweis: Der Titel dieses Videos war anfangs „Wie Tesla die Kunden austrickst“, aber viele Zuschauer haben mir gesagt, dass dies eine zu negative Interpretation sei. Da die beschriebenen Strategien natürlich zugleich gut für die Aktionäre sind, habe ich den Titel jetzt neutraler formuliert. * Von mir erwähnte Produkte finden Sie hier: https://www.amazon.de/shop/profrieck Dort sind auch ein paar andere Produkte, die ich empfehle (ich bin Buch- und Technik-Junkie;-) Mit * gekennzeichnte Links sind Affiliate-Links, bei denen ich eine kleine Provision bekomme, ohne dass Sie mehr bezahlen. Vielen Dank, falls Sie diese Links nutzen! Lust auf ein gutes Video jede Woche? Dann klicken Sie hier: https://www.youtube.com/c/ProfRieck?s... Mein Instragam-Account: https://www.instagram.com/profrieck/ Und zu Twitter: https://twitter.com/ProfRieck

Tom Critchlow. Move. Think. Create. https://tomcritchlow.com/2020/09/22/coordinating-indies/ writingblogchainsstrategyRSS feedwikiaboutnowconsultingnewsletterErica HeinzToby ShorinThe Nature of the Firmtransaction costs.a summary of Coase’s paper:http://interconnected.org/home/2014/12/23/corporationsResearchOps groupResearch Skills FrameworkJanuary 10, 2020https://www.wethos.coThe Uncertainty Mindsethttps://otherinter.net/squad-wealth/

CoinDesk's annual conference on the future of the global financial system is happening this week. Consensus: Distributed features hundreds of hours of programming with more than 150 speakers over five days, from May 11th-15th.HighlightsChris Giancarlo and Martin Chorzempa talking with CoinDesk Asia about the Digital DollarGiancarlo is a renowned blockchain technology advocate and key contributor to the global discourse on cryptocurrencies and digital assets. Mr. Giancarlo is the founder of the Digital Dollar Project, dedicated to catalyzing exploration of a US central bank digital currency. During his tenure as Chairman of the CFTC, the agency published primers on virtual currencies and smart contracts, the first bitcoin futures contracts were offered, and the CFTC launched LabCFTC as the agency's stakeholder in the digital evolution of derivatives trading markets. Martin Chorzempa, research fellow, joined the Peterson Institute for International Economics in 2017. He gained expertise in financial innovation while in Germany as a Fulbright Scholar and researcher at the Association of German Banks. He conducted research on financial liberalization in Beijing, first as a Luce Scholar at Peking University's China Center for Economic Research and then at the China Finance 40 Forum, China's leading independent think tank.Kathleen Breitman discussing Blockchain GamingKathleen is the co-founder of Coase, a software company which aims to lower transaction costs online, and Tezos, a smart contract platform.Caitlin Long on Bitcoin and Crypto Custody.Caitlin Long is a 22-year Wall Street veteran who has been active in bitcoin and blockchain since 2012. She led the charge to make her native state of Wyoming an oasis for blockchain companies in the US, where she helped Wyoming enact 13 blockchain-enabling laws in 2018 and 2019. From 2016-18 she jointly spearheaded a blockchain project for delivering market index data to Vanguard as chairman and president of Symbiont, an enterprise blockchain start-up. Caitlin ran Morgan Stanley's pension solutions business (2007-2016), held senior roles at Credit Suisse (1997-2007) and began her career at Salomon Brothers (1994-1997). QuadrigaCX Bankruptcy and FalloutQuadrigaCX, you know the story: CEO found missing, $190 million of customer's funds missing, mismanagement, conspiracy. It's been a little over a year since former CEO Gerald Cotten's death was reported, setting off a whirlwind investigation, and this panel will give you insight into where the case stands today. And if you're a frustrated creditor, just allow you to vent and be heard.Tong Zou (Speaker) - QuadrigaCX Affected User, a software engineer, used to be based in San Francisco, now based in Vancouver.Evan Thomas (Speaker) - Evan is a Canadian litigator focusing on cases involving technology, privacy and data. He advises clients in the crypto space on matters relating to regulatory enforcement, litigation and other risks.Magdalena Gronowska (Speaker) - Quadriga Bankruptcy Inspector; Partner • MetaMesh. Magdalena is active in Canada's digital asset ecosystem – she recently supported the IPO launch of North America's first regulated, TSX-listed Bitcoin Fund, sits on the Board of Inspectors overseeing the CAD214 million bankruptcy of Quadriga, is a Partner at Metamesh – a blockchain and digital asset consultancy, and advises the Blockchain for Climate Foundation. Prior to joining the private sector, Magdalena managed multiple $million to $billion public sector initiatives that helped businesses start up, compete globally, and adopt technology.JPMorgan Extends Banking Services to Bitcoin Exchanges - JPMorgan is said to be now serving crypto exchanges. Coinbase and Gemini are reportedly the bank's first clients. This is the first time JPMorgan has taken clients from the crypto space. Coinbase and Gemini's accounts were approved last month, and transactions are now starting to be processed, per the report. JPMorgan is reportedly providing cash-management services to the crypto exchanges and handling dollar-based transactions for their U.S.-based customers. It will process wire transfers, and deposits and withdrawals through the Automated Clearing House (ACH) network. "It's quite significant news in my opinion," a banker told The Block. "There is little business in fees associated with processing wire and ACH payments, I would expect that there are other associated benefits to JPM from any associated banking services, additional collaboration with both of those firms, potential for winning any future IPO or another angle such as JPM coin being offered on either of those platforms." The banker added that the whole of Wall Street will notice this news, and it may lead to further doors being opened for crypto firms at other banks. "In the same way, the Paul Tudor Jones news gives macro hedge funds a justification to look at bitcoin, the largest bank offering crypto exchange services means a lot of credibility for the space."TON is officially dead. - Telegram founder Pavel Durov wrote in his public channel Tuesday that the Telegram Open Network (TON) project would be discontinued due to the company's ongoing legal fight with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). "Today is a sad day for us here at Telegram. We are announcing the discontinuation of our blockchain project. Below is a summary of what it was and why we had to abandon it," he wrote. An accompanying blog post said the SEC's winning of a preliminary injunction in a U.S. court led to the decision because it barred Telegram from launching TON or distributing its gram tokens. The move is an abrupt shift for Telegram, which said less than two weeks ago it would be launching the network in April 2021. Telegram announced at the end of April its investors could receive 72% of their funds back immediately, or 110% back in a year, once TON had launched. U.S. investors would not be able to take the latter option, Telegram said in a later update. In Tuesday's post, Durov did not say whether all investors would be immediately refunded or how much they'd receive. "Sadly, the U.S. judge is right about one thing: We, the people outside the U.S., can vote for our presidents and elect our parliaments, but we are still dependent on the United States when it comes to finance and technology (luckily not coffee)," he wrote. The dollar and its influence on the global financial system give the U.S. immense power, Durov said, adding that the country can also influence Apple and Google to remove apps from their respective app stores. "So yes, it is true that other countries do not have full sovereignty over what to allow on their territory," he wrote. Durov closed his post with an appeal to decentralization. "I want to conclude this post by wishing luck to all those striving for decentralization, balance and equality in the world. You are fighting the right battle," he wrote. "This battle may well be the most important battle of our generation. We hope that you succeed where we have failed."References: CoinDesk The Block

The choice between rules and standards in lawmaking is a central question. But the line between the two forms is not as clear as most scholars presume. This talk argues that the lack of a coherent unifying principle in the rules-and-standards distinction is becoming more evident as technologies behind lawmaking evolve. It will explore the leading accounts of rules and standards, the insights they have provided into the process and meaning of law, and why the distinction may be reaching the end of its useful life. The talk will conclude with thoughts on how we should think about forms of law going forward. This lecture is in honor of Ronald Coase. Coase, who spent most of his academic career at the University of Chicago Law School, helped create the field of law and economics through groundbreaking scholarship that earned him the 1991 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences and through his far-reaching influence as a journal editor. Anthony J. Casey is Professor of Law and Mark Claster Mamolen Teaching Scholar. This Coase Lecture was presented on February 21, 2017.

The choice between rules and standards in lawmaking is a central question. But the line between the two forms is not as clear as most scholars presume. This talk argues that the lack of a coherent unifying principle in the rules-and-standards distinction is becoming more evident as technologies behind lawmaking evolve. It will explore the leading accounts of rules and standards, the insights they have provided into the process and meaning of law, and why the distinction may be reaching the end of its useful life. The talk will conclude with thoughts on how we should think about forms of law going forward. This lecture is in honor of Ronald Coase. Coase, who spent most of his academic career at the University of Chicago Law School, helped create the field of law and economics through groundbreaking scholarship that earned him the 1991 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences and through his far-reaching influence as a journal editor. Anthony J. Casey is Professor of Law and Mark Claster Mamolen Teaching Scholar. This Coase Lecture was presented on February 21, 2017.