Podcasts about galwan

#cuttheclutter How have Kargil war with Pakistan, Galwan standoff with China & Op Sindoor shaped India's defence budget & expenditure? ThePrint Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta traces India's defence capital budget since 1999, how much of it was actually spent and the three phases that define the real story. Consulting Editor (Economics) Bidisha Bhattacharya and Editor (Defence & Diplomacy) Snehesh Alex Philip join in. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- To visit ThePrint Store: https://store.theprint.in/

Hello, this is your daily dose of news from Onmanorama. Tune in to get updated about the major news stories of the day.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Five years after the deadly Galwan Valley clash, India and China are suddenly warming up again. Flights are restarting, a Modi-Xi meeting is on the cards, and Beijing says that the setbacks of the past years were not in anybody's interests. But is this thaw for real or just another chapter in the freeze-thaw cycle of India-China relations? In this episode of In Our Defence, host Dev Goswami and national security expert Sandeep Unnithan unpack: - The Galwan clash and Operation Snow Leopard - India's mountain warfare edge vs China's infrastructure push - Why negotiations dragged on for 5 years - What Beijing and Delhi each gain from a "thaw" - The China angle during India's Operation Sindoor - The Donald Trump factor and whether it's pushing India and China closer

NATO military chiefs are meeting to work on security guarantees for Ukraine in the event of a peace deal with Moscow. Russia's foreign minister has called the talks a 'road to nowhere'. The Israeli Defence Ministry approves plans to call up tens of thousands of reservist soldiers ahead of an offensive to occupy Gaza City. Public offices and schools in Karachi have been closed as the city deals with deadly floods from torrential monsoon rains. Artificial Intelligence has been used to recreate the voice of a woman with motor neurone disease, by analysing seconds of old video footage of her speaking. India and China have agreed to resume direct flights and step up trade and investment flows, as they rebuild ties damaged by a deadly clash in the Galwan valley five years ago. The picturesque South Korean holiday resort island of Jeju tells tourists to mind their manners. Researchers find people can tell who their best friends may be, just by watching film clips with them... and what new research into chocolate can tell us about our tastes and our health, as well as how to make the most delicious blend.The Global News Podcast brings you the breaking news you need to hear, as it happens. Listen for the latest headlines and current affairs from around the world. Politics, economics, climate, business, technology, health – we cover it all with expert analysis and insight.Get the news that matters, delivered twice a day on weekdays and daily at weekends, plus special bonus episodes reacting to urgent breaking stories. Follow or subscribe now and never miss a moment.Get in touch: globalpodcast@bbc.co.uk

Welcome to Top of the Morning by Mint.. I'm Nelson John and here are today's top stories. Trump Pushes Biggest Ukraine Breakthrough Yet After nearly four years of war, Washington may have delivered the most concrete peace opening so far. On Monday, President Donald Trump hosted Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky and seven top European leaders to discuss security guarantees for Kyiv. The real headline came right after: Trump called Vladimir Putin for a 40-minute conversation and set the stage for a potential Putin–Zelensky face-to-face within two weeks. Trump later said he hopes to follow that with a trilateral summit including himself. Zelensky described his meeting with Trump as the “best conversation so far,” while NATO's Mark Rutte hailed Trump's offer of NATO-style guarantees as a “breakthrough.” France's Emmanuel Macron and Germany's Friedrich Merz called for Europe's role in shaping long-term security and pressed for a ceasefire as a first step. Italy's Giorgia Meloni and Britain's Keir Starmer stressed that only ironclad safeguards can deliver lasting peace. Finland's Alexander Stubb noted more progress in two weeks “than in three and a half years.” For the first time in years, the US, EU, and Ukraine seem aligned on a peace path. India's Big GST Reset Before Diwali On Independence Day, the Finance Ministry announced sweeping reforms to simplify GST. Instead of four slabs—5, 12, 18 and 28 percent—the new plan proposes just three: 5, 18, and a 40 percent “sin tax” for items like tobacco and beer. Nearly all goods in the 12 percent bracket could drop to 5 percent, making groceries, medicines, footwear, and even appliances cheaper. Most 28 percent items would shift to 18 percent, cutting costs on furniture, electronics and more.  Putin Calls Modi Amid Peace Push While Trump worked the phones with Putin, Moscow also reached out to New Delhi. On Monday, Putin called Prime Minister Narendra Modi, briefing him on the Alaska talks with Trump. Modi reiterated India's consistent line—support for dialogue and a peaceful settlement. The timing was striking: just hours before Trump's White House meeting with Zelensky. Yet this diplomatic outreach comes with pressure.  India–China Relations Thawing For the first time since the bloody Galwan clashes of 2020, India and China are signaling a thaw. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in New Delhi, insisting that peace and de-escalation along the Line of Actual Control are essential. “Differences must not become disputes,” he said. Already, concrete steps are visible: the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra has resumed after five years, India has reopened tourist visas for Chinese nationals, and talks are underway to restart direct flights. Wang Yi pointed to “shared confidence” driving progress and said both nations can offer stability to Asia and the world. The real test could come later this month, when Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping are expected to meet on the sidelines of the SCO Summit—potentially turning a painful page in bilateral ties. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Welcome to Top of the Morning by Mint.. I'm Nelson John and here are today's top stories. Wang Yi's Delhi Visit: Setting the Stage for Modi's China Trip China's foreign minister Wang Yi will be in New Delhi on August 18 to meet NSA Ajit Doval under the Special Representatives dialogue — just ahead of PM Modi's August 31 visit to Beijing for the SCO summit. The talks aim to rebuild ties fractured by the 2020 Galwan clash that killed 20 Indian soldiers. Recent thaw signs include meetings between EAM Jaishankar and Wang, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh's China visit, and the resumption of direct Delhi-Beijing flights. Analysts say Trump's 50% tariff hike on Indian imports has also pushed New Delhi to keep Beijing channels open. Perplexity's $34.5B Bid for Google Chrome AI search startup Perplexity, led by Aravind Srinivas, has made an audacious $34.5B cash offer to buy Google Chrome — despite being valued at just $18B. The firm, backed by Nvidia and SoftBank, says unnamed funds are ready to finance the deal. Chrome's 3B users could supercharge Perplexity's AI browser, Comet. Google hasn't put Chrome up for sale but faces monopoly rulings and interest from OpenAI, Yahoo, and Apollo. Karnataka MLC Admits to Killing 2,800 Stray Dogs JDS MLC SL Bhojegowda told the Karnataka Legislative Council he poisoned and buried 2,800 stray dogs to curb attacks on poor children. His statement came days after the Supreme Court ordered all stray dogs in Delhi-NCR removed to shelters within eight weeks. The admission has sparked outrage from animal rights groups and could lead to legal consequences. Zelensky Rejects Donbas ‘Land Swap' Ahead of Trump-Putin Talks With Trump and Putin set to meet in Alaska to discuss ending the Ukraine war, President Volodymyr Zelensky has ruled out ceding Donbas. He insists Ukraine must be part of the talks and warns the region is key to Russia's future offensives. Trump says he'll try to win back some territory for Ukraine, but Putin wants Kyiv to withdraw entirely from Donetsk and Luhansk — 9,000 sq km of land Russia hasn't fully seized in over a decade. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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Welcome to Top of the Morning by Mint.. I'm Nelson John and here are today's top stories. Modi's London Mission: Trade Meets Royalty It was a warm welcome from the Indian diaspora—and a pivotal handshake in British countryside diplomacy. PM Narendra Modi landed in London for a two-day visit focused on formalizing the India-UK Free Trade Agreement, a deal three years in the making. Hosted by newly elected UK PM Keir Starmer at Chequers, the two leaders are expected to finalize an FTA that could eliminate tariffs on 99% of Indian exports, while opening India to more British whisky, cars, and luxury goods. Commerce ministers Piyush Goyal and Jonathan Reynolds are likely to sign the deal in their presence. With $55 billion in bilateral trade and nearly 1,000 Indian companies in the UK, the partnership runs deep. India is also a major investor, with $20 billion in British ventures. Later, Modi is set to meet King Charles III, blending hard talks with soft diplomacy. Next stop: the Maldives, in a potential diplomatic reset after recent strain. Mayday in Ahmedabad: IndiGo's Engine Scare It was a nerve-wracking moment on the tarmac. IndiGo flight 6E 7966, heading from Ahmedabad to Diu, aborted takeoff after one engine caught fire during its takeoff roll on July 23. The ATR-76 aircraft carried 60 passengers. Pilots issued a “Mayday” and returned to the bay safely. All passengers were evacuated without injury. IndiGo cited a technical snag and promised thorough checks. This scare comes just a day after another IndiGo flight from Goa to Indore also reported a technical fault before landing. No casualties were reported, but the back-to-back incidents have raised concerns over aircraft maintenance during India's busy monsoon season. Visa Thaw: India Reopens Doors to Chinese Tourists After four tense years post-Galwan, India has officially resumed tourist visas for Chinese nationals, in what's being seen as a significant diplomatic thaw. The announcement was made quietly via WeChat by the Indian Embassy in Beijing. Chinese travelers can now begin applying online starting July 24. This follows the recent restart of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and months of border de-escalation, including the Modi-Xi meeting in Kazan and a flurry of bilateral talks. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar recently met his counterpart Wang Yi, urging the end of restrictive trade measures like China's rare earth export curbs—key for India's EV and agri sectors. From 200,000 visas in 2019 to just 2,000 last year, this move aims to reboot people-to-people ties. Trump Sends More Weapons to Ukraine—$322M Worth Amid escalating Russian attacks, the U.S. has cleared a $322 million arms package for Ukraine. The deal includes $150 million for U.S. armored vehicle support and $172 million for surface-to-air missile systems. The announcement comes just weeks after Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth paused other aid to assess U.S. stockpiles—surprising the White House. President Donald Trump, under rising pressure from isolationists, has since pivoted, declaring: “They have to be able to defend themselves.” Trump's new workaround? Let European allies buy U.S. arms and transfer them to Kyiv. Since 2022, the U.S. has sent over $67 billion in military support. Still, NATO countries in Eastern Europe are reluctant to part with their own advanced defense systems, despite mounting urgency. Chanda Kochhar Found Guilty in ₹64 Cr Bribery Case A stunning fall for one of India's most celebrated bankers. Former ICICI Bank CEO Chanda Kochhar has been found guilty of accepting a ₹64 crore bribe in return for sanctioning a ₹300 crore loan to Videocon Group. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Chinese media and online commentators are wondering why India's External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar suddenly moderate his tone during his recent China visit. On his first visit to China in five years, and the first since the 2020 Galwan clashes, was ostensibly for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Foreign Ministers' Meeting. The mood across Chinese policy circles and online platforms suggests that Beijing sees this as more than symbolic.

Welcome to Top of the Morning by Mint.. I'm Nelson John and here are today's top stories. Air India Crash Sparks Urgent Jet Checks After the tragic crash of Air India Flight 171 that claimed 260 lives, India's aviation watchdog DGCA has ordered urgent inspections of fuel switch locking systems on all Boeing 737 and 787 aircraft in the country. A preliminary probe revealed that fuel supply to both engines was cut off within a second after takeoff, with cockpit recordings capturing confusion among the pilots. The incident has cast a spotlight on a 2018 FAA advisory that was not acted upon by Air India as it was non-mandatory. Over 150 aircraft are now being inspected, with DGCA setting a July 21 deadline. The crash has reignited debate on long-ignored safety warnings in Indian aviation. Jaishankar to China: Peace First, Progress Next In his first visit to China since the 2020 Galwan clash, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar told his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi that resolving border tensions is key to rebuilding trust. “Differences must not become disputes,” he said, urging both nations to maintain momentum in de-escalation and avoid restrictive trade practices—an indirect reference to China's export curbs on critical minerals. The talks follow the October 2024 Modi-Xi meeting in Kazan and come ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation conclave. Jaishankar underlined that stable India-China ties are vital for global stability, calling for mutual respect and far-sighted diplomacy. MRP Reform on the Cards: No More Fake Discounts? Why does a product tagged ₹5,000 regularly sell at ₹2,500? The government wants to know. The Centre is considering a major revamp of the MRP (Maximum Retail Price) system, with plans to link prices to actual production and marketing costs. The aim is to prevent “price illusions” and deceptive discounts. A recent meeting led by the Consumer Affairs Department explored guidelines that could ensure more transparency in retail pricing. While officials insist it's not about price control, industry players warn that cost-plus pricing may hurt flexibility and product variety. It's early days yet—but the move could change how India shops. Trump's 50-Day Threat to Russia Donald Trump has issued a 50-day deadline to Russia: broker peace with Ukraine or face 100% tariffs and secondary sanctions on oil buyers. In a high-stakes policy shift, the former president said countries purchasing Russian oil—including China and India—could also face penalties. The announcement was made during his meeting with NATO Secretary General and caused a brief rally in Russian markets, as investors welcomed the grace period. Trump also revealed a new U.S. weapons package for Ukraine, with NATO nations footing the bill. With the ceasefire deadline looming, global eyes are now on Moscow—and its oil partners. Maglev Mania: China's 600 kmph Train In just seven seconds, it rockets to 600 kmph. China's latest Maglev train is faster than a plane, covering the Beijing-Shanghai 1,200 km route in just 150 minutes. Unveiled at the 17th Modern Railways Expo, the train levitates using magnetic fields to eliminate friction—offering a silent, ultra-fast ride. A vacuum-tube test in Hubei Province clocked the train at 404 mph in under 7 seconds. Built by state-run CRRC, it boasts a futuristic interior and aerodynamic design. The full high-speed track is expected to be completed by the end of 2025. China isn't just advancing rail tech—it's reimagining time. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

External affairs minister is on 2-day visit to China, his first since 2020 Galwan clashes. He's set to meet Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi before going to Tianjin for SCO meet.----more---- https://theprint.in/diplomacy/continued-normalisation-of-ties-can-lead-to-mutually-beneficial-outcomes-jaishankar-in-beijing/2689215/

As global tensions intensify from tariffs to terror the question arises: Are India-China relations quietly warming beneath the surface? Despite diplomatic frost after the Galwan clash, trade tells a different story. In 2023, bilateral trade reached a staggering $136.2 billion, with China remaining one of India’s top partners. From telecom to pharma, Chinese components power critical sectors of the Indian economy. China has even begun sending positive signals issuing over 85,000 visas to Indians in just four months and allowing Indian leadership in Chinese firms’ local operations. So, is this economic interdependence a path to reconciliation or just strategic convenience? Even as New Delhi curbs Chinese apps and investments, the flow of goods and even visas continues. Host Anirban Chaudhury talks to Wendong Zhang, Professor and Economist at Cornell University; Ashok Kantha, India’s former ambassador to China; and ET’s Dipanjan Roy Choudhury about why, as China faces a bruising tariff war with the US, India may be more economically indispensable than it appears. Is this economic pragmatism a sign of strategic recalibration?Tune In.Check out other interesting episodes from the host like: Tariffs trump trade, The Curious Case of IndusInd Bank, The Influencer Economy’s Quiet Reset, India’s Biggest Hospital has a Chronic Illness and much more.You can follow Anirban Chowdhury on his social media: Twitter and LinkedinCatch the latest episode of ‘The Morning Brief’ on ET Play, The Economic Times Online, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, JioSaavn, Amazon Music and Youtube.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

भारत के 28वें सेना अध्यक्ष जनरल मनोज मुकुंद नरवणे हमारे साथ हैं, उनका सफर एक कैडेट से लेकर सेना प्रमुख बनने तक और अब लेखक के रूप में एक नई भूमिका में प्रवेश करना, कई ऐतिहासिक पड़ावों से होकर गुज़रा है. इस एपिसोड में हमने बात की गलवान संकट, ऑपरेशन स्नो लेपर्ड, LAC पर चीन से तनाव, अग्निवीर योजना, श्रीलंका में भारत की रणनीति और पाकिस्तान की सेना से हमारी तुलना पर. साथ ही चर्चा की उनकी नई किताब "The Cantonment Conspiracy", जो एक रोमांचक मिलिट्री थ्रिलर है. Disclaimer: इस पॉडकास्ट में व्यक्त किए गए विचार एक्सपर्ट के निजी हैं.

This week on Worldview, there's a sudden spate of India China meetings as the two countries prepare to celebrate 75 years of diplomatic ties- and issue statements about resuming normal dialogue. As Delhi and Beijing discuss putting travel trade and visas back on track, Is India also prepared to put the LAC standoff and Galwan killings behind ? Read more here.

On November 14th every year, I mourn my old friend Varsha Bhosle on her birth anniversary. This year she would have turned 69. Unfortunately she passed away in 2012, and she had ceased being her fiery public self a few years before that when she went into self-imposed exile from her column-writing.When she and I used to write together on rediff.com we used to dream of an India that would “be somebody” (credit Marlon Brando in On the Waterfront). Today India is beginning to matter, “not in full measure” (there, obligatory nod to Nehru, because Varsha shared a birthday with him), but there are “green shoots”.In Malayalam, we say vyazhavattom, or a revolution of Jupiter (which is twelve years), to denote a significant period of time in which epochal things may well have taken place. What has happened in the dozen years since Varsha left us? Let me take a general inventory.Despite misgivings about the lack of movement on serious Hindu issues (such as the freeing of temples from the grip of bureaucrats and hostile politicians) it must be granted that Narendra Modi's 10+ years have substantiated what Varsha and I honestly thought: that the only thing missing in India is leadership. (I said that in my homage to her in 2012.) Maybe, just maybe, Modi is India's Lee Kwan Yew.India is finally moving away from its dirigiste Nehruvian stupor, which was exacerbated, and extolled, by the Anglo-Mughalai hangers-on of Lutyens and Khan Market and JNU, and which resulted in an increasingly depressing relative decline compared to the rest of Asia and the rest of the world. That India is beginning to matter, especially economically, and consequently in the military and diplomatic domains, should be seen as the result of bhageeratha prayatnam, especially since the Swamp in India (not the Military Industrial Complex per se but babudom) is so powerful. Not to mention the Media, and the Judiciary.But there is so much more to be done. And Varsha would have pointed this out with her signature directness and humor: she could get away with that because she was She Who Must Be Obeyed, and imperious. She used to say things that I wouldn't dare say: for instance, she called Antonia Maino “The Shroud of Turin”.Varsha would have had a field day with the silly viswaguru meme, for instance. For, it is much better to learn from others, rather than have everybody mine our traditional knowledge systems and then go and patent them and sell the result back to us (eg. basmati, turmeric, yoga). India should be vishwa-vidyarthi. Learn, and, if possible, steal from everyone. (Ask China how to).Similarly, sabka sath sabka vikas sounds like a good slogan, but let me give you Exhibit A: Lebanon. I will not elaborate, but you can go look it up for yourself.On the other hand, as a warlike Maratha, she would have been happy to see an assertive India, one that upholds its national interests and does not bend to threats or blandishments (Exhibit B: Dalip Singh of the US trying to bully India into a sanctions regime against Russia re Ukraine).I am not quite sure what she'd have made of the Covid fuss, but I'm pretty certain she'd have gone hammer and tongs against the imperialism of the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines, and the propagandists for the same (Exhibit C: I guess I can't name names, but there's a famous and prize-winning doctor who was on every TV channel at the time deriding Indian vaccines).I write this on 18th November, another painful anniversary, that of 13 Kumaon's last stand, and here too India has made progress, standing up to China in Galwan, going eyeball-to-eyeball on the Indo-Tibetan frontier. But India has made only very slow progress in catching up on manufacturing, and for the wrong reasons (Exhibit D: a famous Indian-American economist).Yet, there is good news. Indians as a whole are more optimistic about their country's future. This may be because the economic center of gravity is shifting towards us, and because it appears the Anglosphere, China, Europe, and Wokeness are all declining at the same time, and India may well benefit from being the swing state between the West and China, both hegemons.I wonder what Varsha would have had to say about this bitter-sweet stage in India's trajectory. Alas, I can only conjecture.Varsha left us at a point when, as in the Malayalam saying, swaram nallappozhe pattu nirthuka, that is, as a singer you should stop singing when your voice is still good. People will ask you why you stopped singing, not why you haven't stopped singing. She lives on in our collective memory, fierce, powerful, a compelling voice. I miss her. May she live on, forever young.800 words, Nov 18, 2024, posted 7 Jan, 2025 This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe

Welcome to Top of the Morning by Mint, your weekday newscast that brings you five major stories from the world of business. It's Wednesday, November 27, 2024. This is Nelson John, let's get started. The Indian government is still being cautious about resuming direct flights to China due to national security concerns. Despite external pressures, Indian authorities are not budging yet. Dhirendra Kumar and Manas Pimpalkhare report that prior to the suspensions, over 500 flights plied directly between the two countries every month. Indian officials are maintaining that despite the lopsided trade balance with China, national security takes precedence over reliance on Chinese goods. The flights were suspended in 2020 after the clash in Galwan. Following bribery charges involving key executives, including chairman Gautam Adani, Moody's and Fitch have downgraded their outlook for Adani group bonds from stable to negative. This mirrors an earlier move by S&P, highlighting concerns about the group's funding capabilities and rising capital costs, reports Gopika Gopakumar. Adani Green Energy's stock dropped 7.3% after the downgrade. Moody's has adjusted the outlook for seven Adani entities, while Fitch flagged potential downgrades for bonds linked to key facilities, citing increased funding costs and governance issues. If you stay in a metro city, you might have noticed a bunch of shiny new Bluestone stores opening up recently. That's part of the jewellery maker's shift from being an online-only store to opening brick-and-mortar shops. Priyamvada C writes that the company has a relatively high selling price of around ₹50,000 and competes with established brands. It also caters to a younger audience who want lighter, everyday-wear jewellry. Can it win out against its heftier rivals in this $80 billion market? India's real estate market is booming again, especially after a stagnant period from 2016 to 2020. Since the pandemic, property prices in major metros and tier-II cities have soared, with the average price per square foot jumping by about 40.5% since 2021. The sharpest increases are seen in the NCR, Bengaluru, and Hyderabad. This price surge is driven by a 49% boost in home sales from 2022 to 2024, leading developers to focus more on luxury properties than affordable ones. Now, the burning question is: Will these rising prices stabilize, or will affordability remain a challenge? Madhurima Nandy tackles the question in today's Primer. India's economic growth is projected to slow to 6.5% in the September quarter, the slowest in six quarters, according to a poll of economists by Mint. This expected slowdown, down from 6.7% in the previous quarter, reflects an uneven performance across various sectors. While government spending and rural recovery have provided some support, a decline in private consumption growth has dampened the overall momentum. The forthcoming GDP data for the second quarter of FY25, set to be released on November 29, is anticipated to fall short of the Reserve Bank of India's (RBI) revised forecast of 7% growth for the quarter. 

Welcome to Top of the Morning by Mint, your weekday newscast that brings you five major stories from the world of business. It's Thursday, October 24, 2024. My name is Nelson John. Let's get started.It was another quiet day for Indian markets as the initial rally in IT stocks, which powered the indices upward, was quickly offset by a sharp downturn in the financial and auto pack, resulting in a flat close for both the Nifty 50 and Sensex on Wednesday.The Sensex and Nifty have fallen more than 5 percent in the last month. One thing is for certain: foreign portfolio investors are pulling out money from Indian markets. But where is this money going? Dipti Sharma writes that while China is the biggest beneficiary, other Asian countries like South Korea, Japan, and Indonesia are also seeing inflows. The shift has also happened partly due to profit-taking in India after a strong market rally. Analysts told Dipti that investors feel the potential for returns is higher in other markets, especially like Indonesia and South Korea where the valuations are more moderate.India and China have announced that they have reached an agreement on patrolling their common border. This marks a significant step towards mending the strained relationship between the two countries since the clash in Galwan in 2020. N. Madhavan writes that despite some unresolved issues, bilateral trade has in fact grown between India and China. China became India's largest trading partner this year. However, given the vast restrictions, Chinese investment in Indian companies remains scarce. Madhavan writes that India stands to gain a lot by easing these restrictions, especially in the manufacturing sector.India is rethinking its approach to highway development, shifting focus from the ambitious long-term Vision 2047 plan to prioritizing shorter-term projects. The decision comes as the complexities and delays of lengthy projects prove challenging. While Vision 2047 aimed to guide development up to India's centennial in 2047, the government now favours projects that can be quickly approved and completed. Ongoing projects under the earlier Bharatmala program will continue, with possible individual approvals for those yet to start. This strategic pivot is about efficiency—getting roads built faster and making them useful sooner, reports Subhash Narayan.Two years ago, HDFC Bank announced a huge merger with its parent company, HDFC Ltd, marking India's biggest-ever M&A deal. The merger aimed to boost synergies and enhance the housing sector and the overall economy. However, despite the initial excitement, which saw the bank's stock jump 10% on announcement day, the performance has been somewhat disappointing. Over two-and-a-half years, the stock has only seen a modest 4.7% increase, underperforming compared to market benchmarks. Market sceptics have pointed to the difficulties of maintaining growth momentum and managing financial metrics like net interest margins and the loan-to-deposit ratio on such a large balance sheet. Abhishek Mukherjee writes on how the bank's investors can learn a lesson or two on persistence from none other than the Master Blaster Sachin Tendulkar himself. Yann LeCun, Meta Platforms Inc.'s chief AI scientist, decided to visit India for a third time after an encounter with Infosys co-founder Nandan Nilekani at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Inspired by Nilekani's introduction to India's vibrant tech ecosystem, LeCun attended Meta's first 'Build with AI Summit' in Bengaluru, he told Leslie D'Monte. LeCun talked about witnessing the impressive adoption of Meta AI tools across major platforms like WhatsApp and Messenger, noting that India has the largest user community globally.  FIIs pulling out of India is not a surprise. But where is their money going?What the border pact means for India and ChinaCentre shifts to short-term goals to build highwaysPatience vs Payoff: What HDFC Bank's investors can learn from Sachin Tendulkar‘Godfather of AI' is impressed by India's AI prowess but found something lacking

India and China have reached a deal to de-escalate tensions along their bitterly disputed border in the Himalayas, potentially ending a contentious four-year stand-off between the two Asian powers. Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said on Monday that the two countries agreed to conduct joint military patrols along the border known as the Line of Actual Control. No details of the pact have been released and the Chinese government has yet to comment on the arrangement. If the two countries have, in fact, agreed to pull back their forces and disengage, it would have wide-ranging geopolitical consequences throughout Asia. Sushant Singh, a lecturer in South Asian studies at Yale University and contributing editor of The Caravan magazine in New Delhi, joined Eric & Cobus to discuss the ramifications of de-escalation along the Sino-Indian border. JOIN THE DISCUSSION: X: @ChinaGSProject | @eric_olander | @stadenesque Facebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProject YouTube: www.youtube.com/@ChinaGlobalSouth FOLLOW CAP IN FRENCH AND ARABIC: Français: www.projetafriquechine.com | @AfrikChine Arabic: عربي: www.alsin-alsharqalawsat.com | @SinSharqAwsat JOIN US ON PATREON! Become a CGSP Patreon member and get all sorts of cool stuff, including our Week in Review report, an invitation to join monthly Zoom calls with Eric & Cobus, and even an awesome new CGSP Podcast mug! www.patreon.com/chinaglobalsouth

First, Indian Express' National Education Editor Ritika Chopra talks to us about the irregularities that have come to light about the NEET UG 2024 examination. She also shares the steps that have been taken by the authorities and the reasons behind the postponement and cancellation of other national examinations.Next, Indian Express' Diplomatic Affairs Editor Shubhajit Roy speaks to us about Indo-China relations post the Galwan clash of 2020. He also shares the recent developments between the two nations and how they might impact future relations. (15:31)And in the end, we talk about Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal approaching the Supreme Court challenging the High Court's hold on his bail order. (26:10)

After a two-year gap, China has regained its position as India's largest trading partner, surpassing the United States. According to the latest GTRI report, from FY19 to FY24, while trade with the US grew, increasing India's trade surplus, India's exports to China slightly decreased, and Chinese exports to India surged by almost 45%.Does this mean the trade balance heavily favours China, with India facing a trade deficit of over $85 billion?This trade growth persists despite India's trade and investment restrictions on China since the 2020 Galwan clashes. Indian politicians often discuss reducing reliance on Chinese imports and boosting domestic manufacturing. So, why can't India stop trading with China?In this episode of Geeta's World, our host, Anna Priyadarshini, and the foreign affairs editor at India Today, TV Today Network, Geeta Mohan, discuss!Listen in!Produced by Anna PriyadarshiniSound Mix by Sachin Dwivedi

First, Indian Express' National Editor of Strategic Affairs Nirupama Subramanian joins us to talk about the India-China border crisis and the current ground situation at the LAC after 3 years of the Galwan clash.Next, Indian Express' Sohini Ghosh tells us about an Indian couple's long and messy custody battle with German authorities for their 2 years old child, Ariha (12:10).And in the end, Indian Express' Asad Rehman talks about 64 people dying in the district of Ballia (UP) in the past 4 days, and why a government health official was removed from his post (22:06).Hosted and written by Shashank BhargavaProduced by Shashank Bhargava and Utsa SarminEdited and mixed by Suresh Pawar

Global Policy Watch: Chronicle Of A Crisis Foretold Reflections on global policy issues — RSJA major state election (Karnataka) is coming up this week. But there's hardly anything worth analysing. The Congress seemed to have a slight edge in the early opinion polls, but that's wearing thin. The BJP, always with its ears to the ground, has cranked up its poll machinery in the last couple of weeks drawing upon the star power of the PM in the urban areas of the state. The friendly media houses have been mobilised to pick up ‘emotive' issues that would tilt the scale in favour of the party in power. It is not too difficult to figure out what the average voter wants if you go by the opinion polls and surveys. But those substantive issues just don't feature in the public discourse. If you read the papers or media reports on what's being debated among parties in Karnataka, it is about who is a Hindu hater, who prostrates more often before deities and how going back to the OPS (old pension scheme) is such a wonderful idea. In the classical model of how representative democracy ought to work, the voters would have a limited view of how the world works, and it is the representative who owes the voters not only his labour but also his judgment on issues (to riff on Burke). That seems to be inverted here. One set of representatives has, over the last few years, instituted all kinds of targeted laws - hijaab ban, anti-conversion laws, scrapping minority quotas and cow slaughter ban - in the hope that they will yield electoral gains. The other set is talking of another set of bans convenient to them and some really bad economic policies. We often say that this newsletter attempts to change the demand side of the political equation by making people more aware of public policies and demanding better from their representatives. What we have here is the public demanding the right kind of things (if opinion polls are to go by), but their representatives are keen on dragging them back to divisive emotive issues. The Karnataka election will be a good test of what prevails eventually. I can almost see the straight line from these polls to the general elections due almost exactly 12 months from now. We will all be debating similar trivial issues than what really should matter to India. For some reason, that doesn't make for a good topic of debate. It makes any election analysis a waste of time, really. Switching gears, as I finished writing my last week's edition on what the US Fed refuses to learn from the SVB collapse, another mid-sized US bank, the First Republic Bank (FRB), went down and was sold to J.P. Morgan, the ultimate backstop in the US financial system. No amount of assurance from FDIC to the depositors of the bank nor the combined infusion of capital about a month back from a consortium of big banks into FRB was enough to stanch the outflow of deposits. Soon the bank was insolvent, the shareholders and bondholders lost everything, and J.P. Morgan was given enough of a sweet deal to pick up the pieces. I'm sure the Fed will come out with another report on the FRB collapse where it will blame the management for not hedging its treasury risks and being lax in its risk practices. There will be a light rap to the supervisors and staff from Fed who monitored FRB, and that will be that. I hope there's some more introspection by the Fed than that. Because as the shares of PacWest and Western Alliance have sunk over the last two days, it is clear that a number of mid-sized banks are going to collapse in slow-motion and end up in the lap of J.P. Morgan or FDIC very soon. The feeble Fed response was a 25 bps hike in rates last week with a strong indication that it will hit the pause button on hikes now. The question is if that's enough to structurally save many of these banks.I have argued for the past couple of months (just after the SVB collapse) that there are three problems for the Fed to contend with, and there are no real answers for them. It is Hail Mary time. Choose the best among the worst options and brace for the impact. I will lay out the three problems it faces before suggesting what looks like the best of the worst option that the Fed has chosen. First, the Fed continued raising interest rates to fight inflation without thinking through its impact on the banking system. This much is clear now. The surprises that have come up in the shape of SVB, Signature and FRB weren't anticipated at all. As the interest rates rose, the value of the long-term assets held by banks has fallen while their liabilities, in the form of deposits, which tend to be shorter in term, haven't fallen as much. The slowdown in the economy has meant there's not enough demand for credit at elevated rates, which means banks continue to invest in long-term US treasury bills. Every time the rates go up, these held-to-maturity (HTM) assets take a notional mark-to-market loss. A recent report by the Hoover Institution suggests that at this moment, the US Banking system's market value of assets is about $ 2 trillion below their book value. In an article on Yahoo Finance, Ambrose Evan-Pritchards writes:The second and third biggest bank failures in US history have followed in quick succession. The US Treasury and Federal Reserve would like us to believe that they are “idiosyncratic”. That is a dangerous evasion.Almost half of America's 4,800 banks are already burning through their capital buffers. They may not have to mark all losses to market under US accounting rules but that does not make them solvent. Somebody will take those losses.“It's spooky. Thousands of banks are underwater,” said Professor Amit Seru, a banking expert at Stanford University. “Let's not pretend that this is just about Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic. A lot of the US banking system is potentially insolvent.”The second problem, which kind of starts giving this a contagion feel, is the state of the commercial property market in the US. Interest rates have moved up too fast, the slowdown is real with many large employers laying off people, so there's no real need for commercial capacity, and the excess liquidity fuelled by the Fed during the pandemic meant additional capacity was built up cheaply, which now has no takers. What's worse, the rapid increase in rates means that a lot of these loans that will come up for refinancing soon (at higher rates) will face defaults. The mid-sized regional banks have a sizable exposure to commercial real estate, with estimates that about two-thirds of all commercial property borrowing comes from them. From the same Yahoo Finance article:Packages of commercial property loans (CMBS) are typically on short maturities and have to be refinanced every two to three years. Borrowing exploded during the pandemic when the Fed flooded the system with liquidity. That debt comes due in late 2023 and 2024.Could the losses be as bad as the subprime crisis? Probably not. Capital Economics says the investment bubble in US residential property peaked at 6.5pc of GDP in 2007. The comparable figure for commercial property today is 2.6pc.But the threat is not trivial either. US commercial property prices have so far fallen by just 4pc to 5pc. Capital Economics expects a peak to trough decline of 22pc. This will wreak further havoc on the loan portfolios of the regional banks that account for 70pc of all commercial property financing.Estimates vary, but it is likely that even a 10-15 per cent increase in default rates on commercial property when the refinancing chickens come home to roost could mean about $ 100 billion in losses for banks. And these are real losses, not the notional variety sitting on the books. Will the regional banks be able to weather this? And what happens if 4-5 of them catch a cold together in this portfolio? The risk of contagion flowing up the banking food chain is real.Lastly, the Fed, FDIC and the government took the extraordinary step of guaranteeing all deposits after the collapse of SVB to reassure depositors and not have further runs on mid-sized banks. But that didn't stop the ever-increasing deposit erosion for FRB during April. People can do the math, and they realise there's no way the government can fill a giant hole in case there's a real deposit run. The FDIC, after all, has a little over $ 100 billion to act as insurance for such an eventuality. That's loose change in the broader scheme of things. So, the depositors will flee the more you try and convince them all's well. Plus, the blanket deposit backstop has meant there's a moral hazard built right there for the management not to be too worried about the nature of deposits they bring or the risk of serious asset-liability mismatches. At the time of SVB collapse, I wrote in edition # 205:I guess one way to look at this is if you let fiscal dominance become the central canon of how you manage your economic policy, you will eventually reach the same place as other economies (mostly developing) that have indulged in the same for years. The monetary authorities in the U.S. have been accommodating the fiscal profligacy of the treasury for years. This was accentuated during the pandemic. Trillions of dollars were pumped in to save the economy. I'm not sure how much the economy needed saving then. But that bill has come now. First in the shape of inflation, followed by rapid, unprecedented rate hikes and the inevitable accidents that are showing up now. Almost certainly, a recession will follow. Isomorphic mimicry of Latin American monetary policy indeed.Now, back to Evans-Pritchard and his article in Yahoo Finance:The root cause of this bond and banking crisis lies in the erratic behaviour and perverse incentives created by the Fed and the US Treasury over many years, culminating in the violent lurch from ultra-easy money to ultra-tight money now underway. They first created “interest rate risk” on a galactic scale: now they are detonating the delayed timebomb of their own creation.Chris Whalen from Institutional Risk Analyst said we should be wary of a false narrative that pins all blame on miscreant banks. “The Fed's excessive open market intervention from 2019 through 2022 was the primary cause of the failure of First Republic as well as Silicon Valley Bank,” he said.Mr Whalen said US banks and bond investors (i.e. pension funds and insurance companies) are “holding the bag” on $5 trillion of implicit losses left by the final blow-off phase of the Fed's QE experiment. “Since US banks only have about $2 trillion in tangible equity capital, we have a problem,” he said.Going back to the original question I posed - what will Fed do given these problems on hand? I guess it has decided to choose what it thinks is the least worst option. It cannot let go of its fight against inflation. It has to find a way to avoid recession. So, all it can afford is a controlled banking crisis. An oxymoron if ever there was one. But that's where we are headed, where we will see things unfold in a slow but almost predictable manner. The Fed will try and boost the banks' capital in the meantime and hope the best of them brave through this without any risk of contagion. Anyway, in the worst case, there's always Jamie Dimon and his chequebook.Thanks for reading Anticipating the Unintended! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support our work.Numbers that Ought to Matter: In April 2023, the Union Health Minister reported that India has 108,000 MBBS seats in 660 colleges and 118,000 BSc nursing seats in approx 900 colleges. The total number of seats on offer is quite low, despite the large number of colleges. On average, each medical college has 163 seats, and each nursing college has just 131 seats. Government policy should focus on helping existing colleges increase their intake. For more context, read edition #159.India Policy Watch #1: Coal is Out? Naah.Insights on issues relevant to India— Pranay KotasthaneEarlier this week, I came across this Business Standard report:“India plans to stop building new coal-fired power plants, apart from those already in the pipeline, by removing a key clause from the final draft of its National Electricity Policy (NEP), in a major boost to fight climate change, sources said.”My prior assumption was that given coal-based power's lower costs, India would construct many more coal-powered plants over the next two decades to meet a growing economy's demand. Hence, this news item came as a bit of a surprise. So I went through the draft National Electricity Plan to understand the reasoning.Before we dive in, some bureaucratic knots that need untangling. The cited “final draft” of the National Electricity Policy is nowhere to be found on the Ministry of Power website. But I could find an earlier draft on the IIT Kanpur's Centre for Energy Regulation website! A Policy document such as this only lists the priorities and steers the sector. From it arises a Plan that's to be released every five years by the Central Electricity Authority. The Plan document is the real deal as it does demand projections through an ‘Electric Power Survey'. It then presents the energy generation mix required to meet the projected demand scenarios. A part of this elusive plan document was released, after many delays, in September 2022. Some relevant insights from the plan:* The current installed power capacity of ~400GW split looks as follows:* By FY32, it is projected that India's energy demand will be 2538 Billion Units, and peak power demand will be 363 GW, up from 1624 Billion Units and peak demand of 216 GW in FY23. * Coal+Lignite accounted for 52.7% of total installed capacity in FY23.* Using a planning tool that optimises for factors such as fuel availability, operational availability, and sustainability, the Plan throws up a required power generation capacity mix.* After taking all these constraints into account, the Plan finds that by FY32, India would need an additional installed coal capacity of 42.6 GW in the base case scenario and 53.6 GW in the increased-demand scenario. * Around 25.6 GW of capacity addition is already in various stages of execution.Now, we come to the report claiming a ban on additional coal capacity addition beyond the current in-progress projects. It essentially means that to meet the projected demand, India will have to find other sources to compensate for coal. In the best case, an additional 17 GW capacity will have to be conjured up; and in the worst-case scenario, nearly 28 GW capacity will have to be compensated. This additional capacity goes beyond the planned additions in clean energy generation. That's why I am sceptical about this news report. It's unlikely that government will make a blanket commitment.If we assume the report to be true, advancing the date of halting further coal power generation will require compensation by another reliable source to provide the base load. Only two options can be imagined with today's technology — nuclear energy and Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS).Nuclear energy accounts for just 2 per cent of the total power generation mix today. The current plan already assumes a threefold increase in nuclear power capacity addition. For it to absorb the slack of stopping further coal addition, it has to reach six to eight times the current capacity. Given that nuclear power generation faces the problem of high capital costs and invites protests, scaling it up is tough unless the Small Modular Reactor (SMR) technology breakthrough leads to mass adoption in India. Maybe for this reason, the government is “considering” overturning a ban on FDI in nuclear power. Expanding BESS capacity also depends on the ability to develop Lithium refining expertise and bring other options, such as Sodium-ion batteries, online. So, stopping the building of new coal-fired power plants requires far too many other pieces of the puzzle to fall into place. Keep watching this space.Tailpiece: check out this Puliyabaazi episode on the chemistry, geopolitics, and significance of Lithium-ion batteries.India Policy Watch #2: Lessons from Apple's India Journey Thus FarInsights on issues relevant to India— Pranay KotasthaneApple's quarterly results are out. Its India revenue registered double-digit growth, prompting Tim Cook to make the now-commonplace “India is at a tipping point” statement. The last seven years have been stunning for Apple's India business. From being shunned away by the government for their plan to import and sale of refurbished phones to becoming a poster child of electronics manufacturing in India, Apple's India strategy has come a long way.I've always wanted to know how Apple raised its India game and whether there are broader lessons for Indian public policy from this experience. So I was delighted to read Surajeet Das Gupta's Business Standard article narrating Apple's tryst with Indian public policy. Das Gupta identifies these milestones and speed-breakers:* In 2016, after denying the import-refurbish-sell request, Apple was told to start manufacturing in India if it wanted to set up Apple-owned retail stores.* In 2017, Apple put forward two pre-conditions for starting manufacturing in India:* “15-year duty concessions (on capital equipment, components, consumables for smartphones).. and a reduction in customs duty on completely knocked down and semi-knocked down devices to be assembled in India.” * relaxation of 30 per cent local sourcing directive for foreign direct investment (FDI) in single-brand retail stores.* After both its asks were rejected, it set up an India team to work with the government and mobile phone industry associations.* After three years of lobbying, the government relented by allowing the 30 per cent local norm to be met as an average for the first five-year period, not annually. Then the government agreed to qualify the value added by Apple's contract manufacturers in India—regardless of the destination of these products—as “local sourcing”.* The government allowed Apple to set up an online store before the physical store if it brought over $200 million FDI and extracted a commitment that the online store couldn't get into heavy discounting.* When PLI rules were modified to accommodate Samsung's entry, Apple went along with the change.* After the government made the entry of FDI from China in the Indian tech sector arduous due to the Galwan clash, Apple worked with the industry body to get 12 of its Chinese suppliers approved on the condition that they would enter into joint ventures with Indian partners who would have a majority stake. (We wrote about it in edition #199).Take a breath. And it has only been seven years. There are three ways of interpreting this journey from a public policy perspective.First, to the extent that the government has been able to capture Apple's China manufacturing—even if in a really small way—its approach can be called a limited success. The government can rightfully claim that Apple's supply chain has created over a lakh jobs in India. Grabbing some part of the manufacturing of the world's biggest company has a signalling effect as well. It will also help Apple's Indian partners upgrade technologically and raise their standards. Second, Apple's up-and-down journey also serves as a warning. If the world's most well-known company had to jump as many hoops, what chance does a smaller company have? How many other businesses will have the money and patience to set up India teams that negotiate with the government to remove roadblocks, one by one, calmly? And the approval of Apple's Chinese suppliers shows that the government is comfortable making pro-business exemptions but is uncomfortable making pro-market relaxations. There's a risk of going overboard with the “market access in return for manufacturing” approach. A policy analyst must also pop the opportunity cost question. Could the government have spent precious state capacity elsewhere by following a general easing of these constraints? How many companies did India lose in the process of playing hardball with Apple? And what about the Indian consumers - what did they lose as a result of these overbearing conditions? These are tough questions to answer.Third, this journey shows that technology policy is shaping up rather well in India. Industry associations and public advocacy departments of companies are now able to put forward their demands and grouses in front of governments in a far more transparent manner. Not just that, they are able to get governments to modify policies as well.In my view, all three interpretations are simultaneously true. But this is just the beginning of India's electronics manufacturing journey. The steps required to strengthen it might be drastically different from the approach required to start it.HomeWorkReading and listening recommendations on public policy matters* [Article] Here's a RestofWorld Q&A on the US-China chip war and its implications for India featuring one of us.* [Story] FT has an excellent visual explainer on quantum computing this week.* [Article] Niranjan Rajadhyaksha's Mint column comparing Asian countries when their median age was 28 like India's is today, is insightful. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit publicpolicy.substack.com

Amidst the spotlight of a momentous event, the Indian Army's commissioning of five women in their Artillery Regiment, Lieutenant Rekha Singh's extraordinary story shines through. Overcoming tragedy, Singh's unwavering determination after losing her husband, Naik Deepak Singh, during the Galwan clash has set her on a path to honor his legacy. On June 15, 2020, Naik Deepak Singh was killed in action by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).This week's focus is on Singh's exceptional journey that captures the essence of unwavering determination and destiny, shedding light on the evolving landscape of women's participation in the armed forces. Alongside her story, Abhishek and also Dev delve into the motivations behind this shift, questioning if is it merely a public relations effort or a well-thought-out policy decision? Tune in!Produced by Anna PriyadarshiniSound mix by Amrit Regi

India Policy Watch #1: What Do Successive Defence Budgets Reveal?Insights on burning policy issues in India— Pranay Kotasthane(An edited version of this article was published in Hindustan Times on 13th Feb)Another defence budget zoomed past us on Feb 1. Since then, analyses have focused on how the defence spending for the coming year departs from the last year. Some have waved a red flag as defence spending has fallen below 2 per cent of GDP for the first time in many years. On the other hand, the defence ministry's post-budget press release emphasised a 44 per cent increase in operational spending, which is expected to “close critical gaps in the combat capabilities and equip the Forces in terms of ammunition, sustenance of weapons & assets, military reserves etc.” The ministry also highlighted that the capital outlay for modernisation and infrastructure development has risen by a seemingly handsome 57 per cent over the last five years. How, then, do we make sense of these conflicting narratives?Comparing allocations with those in the previous year gives us a confusing picture. Every interest group can pull up a number from the budget to suit their pre-formed narrative. Taking a step back from these narratives, this article will show that this was another run-of-the-mill defence budget, just like the previous one was. Nothing in it indicates any significant change in the defence posture. Unlike Japan, which has announced a doubling of its military spending in the next five years, India's approach is about gradually improving the operational efficiency of the armed forces.Looking under the hoodThis article looks at the defence expenditure over the last six budgets to make sense of the numbers. To put numbers into context, let's use an earlier year (FY16). FY16 is a useful reference point as it predates two major developments: China's visibly aggressive posture on the border and the budgetary commitments arising from the One Rank One Pension (OROP) scheme. Three observations follow from such an analysis.One, not only has defence spending fallen as a proportion of GDP, but it has also fallen as a percentage of government expenditure. In other words, defence has slipped in priority relative to non-defence functions (Figure 1). Two, the China challenge hasn't led to any spectacular change in the composition of defence expenditure. Defence spending can be divided into four major components: salaries, pensions, capital outlay, and others. As Figure 2 shows, capital outlay was being squeezed by rising pension expenditure over the last few years. For two consecutive years (FY19 and FY20), more money was spent on pensions than on capital acquisition and modernisation. The balance has now been marginally restored since FY21, after the Galwan crisis flared up.Crucially, the rises in pension and capital expenditures have come at the cost of operational and maintenance expenditures, including ammunition stores (under the Others category). It is hence not surprising that the latest budget is trying to arrest this decline in combat capabilities.Three, this period has been relatively better for the Indian Navy in terms of capital expenditure. Since the procurement of new platforms happens over multiple years, a temporal view is useful in analysing how capital outlay is split between the three armed forces. Figure 3 suggests that the big change in the last four years is in the capital outlay for the Indian Navy, with the FY24 figure having doubled in absolute terms since FY20.The Big PictureBy connecting these dots over the last five years, the picture that emerges is this: the government seems confident that China can be handled without a substantial rise in defence expenditure. The latest budget serves as a bellwether indicator for this claim. It was the first budget of the post-pandemic period, at a time when the economic prospects for India had improved considerably. The government achieved better-than-expected buoyancy in income taxes and GST in the current financial year, while the cooling of global fertilizer prices has led to a decline in the projected subsidy bill. Consequently, the government, for the first time in many years, had some fiscal room to play with. It has used that space to increase the overall capital outlay to Rs 10 lakh crore, almost three times the outlay in 2019-20. Despite this increase in the overall capital outlay, the defence budget resembles the middle overs of a one-day cricket match.From a financial savings perspective, there have been just two important changes over this period in the defence domain. The first was the announcement of the Agnipath scheme. It might reduce the pension burden, but these savings will reflect only after a decade-and-a-half. Other proposals, such as theatre commands, haven't come to fruition yet. The proposal to create a non-lapsable fund for modernisation — a proposal the union government gave an in-principle agreement way back in Feb 2021, still hasn't found a mention in the latest budget.Probably, the defence budget is the wrong place to infer India's strategic posture against China. Perhaps, the government considers other tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, or non-conventional—more suitable for the purpose. This point needs deeper reflection. The discussions over the roles of these tools of statecraft currently operate under mistaken assumptions. Attempts at getting India into an anti-China alliance are spurned at the altar of “strategic autonomy”. The opponents seem to assume that India only needs to equip its armed forces with greater firepower. For too long, many parliamentary standing committees and defence organisations have gone hoarse trying to convince the government that defence expenditure should be raised to 3 per cent of GDP. If anything, the change is in the opposite direction.The defence budget trends are a reminder that the government does not prefer using the military instrument to outflank China. At best, it wants to equip the armed forces such that China's incursions can be matched or repulsed. Given that there's no significant increase in allocations for the Navy and the Air Force, it also means that the government is not considering an increased presence in the South China Sea. So, the military is being equipped to plug a vulnerability and not to gain an asymmetric political advantage over China. This line of thinking probably makes sense. There's no point in matching China's defence spending dollar-for-dollar. After all, the Indian armed forces are more adept at fighting at high altitudes. But this line of thinking should also make it apparent that India must develop capabilities in domains other than those involving force to inflict pain on China. The government should build a political consensus that closer relations with China's adversaries are not a matter of choice but an imperative. That we need to double down on economic growth and technological upgrading if we are to constrain China's hand in other domains. It also means that we shouldn't be indiscriminately banning China's investments in India; a better approach would be to make their companies in non-strategic domains more dependent on the Indian market. We will then have more tools in our kit to deploy if the situation on the border worsens. Each of these posture changes needs an updating of our priors and payoffs. For that to happen, it is necessary that the government comes clean about China's incursions. Pretending that all's well might give us false comfort, but they will also dissuade the strategic establishment from confronting the tough trade-offs in non-military domains. Without this pivot, we would merely rely on hope as a strategy. India Policy Watch #2: Through The Looking GlassInsights on burning policy issues in India— RSJWe talk about the arbitrary powers of the state on these pages often. Now, we cannot grudge the state's sovereignty because we have voluntarily handed it that power. One argument that follows from this is that such power is often prone to be used arbitrarily. And that's a problem for the citizens. The typical solution we have offered on these pages over time is to restrict the domain of the state to a narrow set where it can make the maximum impact or to design its incentives in a way that makes the state act with accountability. Now, these are good design principles. We could use them to create structures and institutions that are strong and independent that could hold their own against any arbitrary use of power. But are these enough? A natural question that should follow is how do we know things are working in practice like they were meant to? How do we get authentic information about how the state is conducting itself? How do we confirm that it is not subverting the institutional design that is in place to control its powers? These questions lead us to the other pillar of a well-functioning democracy - transparency. It is a topic we haven't discussed enough on these pages. Transparency is a moral good, and it is vital for a healthy democracy. Darkness stunts democracy. It needs light to thrive. In the early part of the 20th century, the US Supreme Court judge Louis Brandeis famously remarked, “sunlight is the best disinfectant” while making a case for a transparency imperative. Or, if we were to go further back, Bentham, often credited to have done the most original thinking on transparency, summed it up with - the more strictly we are watched, the better we behave - a principle he put at the heart of his advocacy for an open government. So, what has triggered my early morning ruminations on transparency? Well, there are two reasons. Here's one. The Indian Express reports:“The Supreme Court said it did not want to accept in a “sealed cover” the Centre's suggestions on who could be the members of a committee the court had proposed to assess the market regulatory framework and recommend measures, if any, to strengthen it in the wake of the Adani-Hindenburg affair. It refused to accept any suggestions on names from the petitioners as well.Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, who headed a three-judge bench hearing a clutch of petitions on the Hindenburg Research report and its aftermath, told Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, the court wanted to maintain “full transparency”. The court would appoint a committee of its own that will promote a sense of confidence in the process, he said.”CJI Chandrachud said, “We would rather not accept the sealed cover suggestions from you for this reason; in constituting a committee which we want to do, we want to maintain full transparency. The moment we accept a set of suggestions from you in a sealed cover, it means the other side is not seeing them. Even if we don't accept your suggestions, they will not know which of your suggestions we have accepted and which we have not. Then there may be an impression that well, this is a government-appointed committee which the Supreme Court has accepted even if we have not accepted your suggestions. So, we want to maintain the fullest transparency in the interest of protecting the investors.”Bravo. The Chief Justice was almost channelling Bentham there, who famously wrote, “secrecy, being an instrument of conspiracy, ought never to be the system of a regular government.” I mean, what even is a sealed cover in a matter that concerns millions of ordinary investors? Why should there be secrecy in the name of experts and their recommendations? A sealed cover is a strange invention. It gives the sheen of a fair and independent process to what is essentially a subversion of a democratic principle. It ranks up there among one of the great Indian coinages. The top spot, of course, is forever occupied by ‘mild lathicharge'. And now, onto the other reason for all this talk on transparency. This was the headline-grabbing news of this week in India - “Weeks after its documentary taken off, BBC gets I-T knock”. Here's the Indian Express reporting on this with many quotes from “unnamed government sources”:“The Income-Tax Department surveys at the premises of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in Delhi and Mumbai on Tuesday (February 14) were conducted in view of the BBC's “deliberate non-compliance with the transfer pricing rules” and its “vast diversion of profits”, government sources said.The surveys were looking into “manipulation of prices for unauthorized benefits, including tax advantages”, sources said.The BBC has been “persistently and deliberately violative of transfer pricing rules, it has “deliberately diverted a significant amount of the profits”, and has not followed the “arm's length arrangement” in the allocation of profit, the sources said.”A very garrulous source there with a lot of information. I don't want to ascribe motives to the tax raids yet. There's enough in the timing of these ‘surveys' to raise suspicions. The I-T department has been used to settle political and other scores for decades. It speaks poorly of our institutional strength and independence. But that's not the issue we are discussing today. The question is about transparency. Does anyone know why the surveys were carried out? The sources have cleverly given some reasons, but what stops the department from giving an official reason for them? Is it because it is likely that if they give the official reason, there will be further questions on the arbitrary nature of the actions? So, it is best to share nothing officially, selectively leak information to the media to paint the BBC in poor light and get away with harassment that then sends a message across to other foreign media outlets. Because even based on the merits of what the sources have said, it is difficult to justify a two-day survey. To quote the same news report:“Transfer pricing issues are very common for foreign companies but survey/search actions against them are not common. Assessment is usually opted for but is not the only route through which such cases can be approached. If tax officers want to do a survey/search, then transfer pricing issues can get covered.However, it is an approval-driven process with prior approvals required within the tax department before carrying out survey action. They would be having some information against the company and there might be a history of non-compliance too,” a Delhi-based tax expert said.  A notice preferably is issued to a company in an assessment exercise by the tax authorities flouting transfer pricing rules before undertaking any such action, experts said."It shouldn't surprise anyone that political actors don't like transparency. It adds to their burden of accountability and increases the political costs of any missteps, deliberate or otherwise. So, how should the citizens keep up the demand for transparency in a democratic setup? After all, for the citizens to be involved in the governance process, they must have access to the government's information, plans and intentions. Also, there is a line beyond which too much transparency could be counterproductive. Too much information, too early in the process, could mean stalling the plan as interest groups jump in and skew the decision-making process. I have outlined three frames that one could use to think about transparency in a democracy.First, it is in the long-term interest of political parties to seek transparency in a democratic setup. For those in the opposition, it is about making the incumbent party in power more accountable. For the incumbent, too, there's always the uncertainty about the future when they might not be in power. In such a scenario, it is better for them to have stronger laws on transparency for their own access to government information, which they can use to hold others accountable. A lack of certainty about future electoral prospects for any party is a feature of a good democracy. It is in this environment most transparency laws are made. In India, too, the RTI came about because of grassroots activism and a broad consensus among the political class led by the party in power then. However, it is important to note that the Overton window was right during that time when getting re-elected was an exception. It meant the political actors were keen to have access to information in future. In that sense, any period when transparency is suppressed in a democracy is a good surrogate for the power of the party in power. In India, the RTI laws allow for access to a significant amount of government information. The problem is that there is a gradual erosion of its ambit as the dominant political class comes to view it as an irritant. The only way to counter this is for the citizenry to continue using the RTI tool to its fullest extent. The more people know the tool's power, the harder it will be to blunt it. Second, it is important to devolve transparency to state and local governments. This is where the political uncertainty is still high in India, which means there's an incentive for political actors to support transparency moves to guarantee their own access to information in future. This is also the space where petty corruption is still rampant. One of the challenges of RTI in India is that most of the activism here is focused on big-ticket issues. The opportunity to bring sunlight as a disinfectant and its payoffs are the highest at the local level of governance. Separately, there are also specific areas in the private sector that could do with improved transparency. This is tricky territory, and let me be very specific about this. There's a significant amount of information that's collected, often without explicit consent, from the citizens by the private sector, which is then monetised in various ways. The mechanism by which their information is used and the extent to which the private sector, especially the social media platforms,  benefits from it are not transparent to the citizens who are the customers. If your attention is being monetised through multiple trackers and personalised ads, it is only fair you must know the rules of the game and agree to play it. This is still a white space of policymaking in India.   Lastly, the oft-cited risk of policy waters being muddied because of transparency, where various interest groups will lobby for their positions and slow down the decision-making process, is a bit misplaced. Those in favour of transparency do not argue for the innards of policymaking being put out for display. That process requires stakeholder mapping and seeking inputs in a way that's been documented by various policy thinkers. We have written about the eight-step process of policymaking on these pages on multiple occasions. The issue of transparency is important in two areas. First, the implementation and measurement of a policy proposal. How did a policy fare compared to its promise? Were the public resources and efforts prudently used? Was there a clear understanding of why something failed? Access to this information is important for the public and experts outside the government to hold the government accountable and improve future decisions. Second, the size of the state in India often means it is the biggest, often the sole, customer in multiple sectors and its decision on setting the rules of games in these sectors, awarding contracts and its performance in managing its budget should be available for public scrutiny. Again, this doesn't mean the government should vet its decisions at each stage with prevailing public opinion. Rather it must be able to explain its process and the rationale for decisions openly and transparently. The practice of sealed covers or I-T surveys and raids without a clear reason isn't new to India. What's new is the somewhat strange support for these actions by the mainstream media that are being fed by the ever-bizarre theories cooked by the partisans on social media. BBC isn't doing a documentary on Gujarat because China is now funding it. Nor is there a leftist cabal that's busy bringing Adani down one week and using BBC the next to show the government in a bad light. This playbook is reminiscent of the Indira era of the mid-70s, where in the name of national interest, we buried transparency and accountability. It took us decades to get out of that mire. Learning from history is free, but most of us fail the eventual test.PolicyWTF: Casually Banning Films Committee, RepriseThis section looks at egregious public policies. Policies that make you go: WTF, Did that really happen?— Pranay Kotasthane Last week, I came across an excellent report by Aroon Deep in The Hindu that explains how the Central Board for Film Certification (CBFC) is going way beyond its usual stance of “demanding” cuts of scenes showing sexual content, violence, or abusive language. Instead, the CBFC now also has a perspective on dietary preferences (demanding that mention of “beef” be struck off), foreign policy (demanding that references to ex-KGB officers, China, and Pakistan be removed), and even corruption (how can a filmmaker dare depict a police officer accepting a bribe?). Seriously, what an omniscient body.Despite its activism, the Censor Board hasn't impressed the extremists. One Hindu group leader has called for creating a ‘Dharma Censor Board' “to review Bollywood films and keep a check on any anti-religious content or distortion of facts about Sanatan Dharma.” In his words:“Our experts will see a film when it is released and if we find it suitable for people belonging to Sanatan Dharma, we will issue a certificate. At present, films passed by the censor board set up by the government have been found carrying scenes that hurt the sentiments of people. We have repeatedly asked for a religious person to be included in the censor board but this demand has not been accepted. This is why we had to constitute our own board.”While it sounds absolutely absurd at face value, there is a liberal way out to assimilate this conservative critique. We covered it in edition #122, and I want to re-emphasise those points.In 2016, my former colleagues Madhav, Adhip, Shikha, Siddarth, Devika and Guru wrote an interesting paper in which they recommended that film certification should be privatised.Deploying the Banishing Bureaucracy framework, they wrote:The CBFC be renamed the Indian Movie Authority (IMA) and that the primary purpose of the IMA would be to license and regulate private organisations called Independent Certifying Authorities (ICAs) which will then certify films.So, the Hindu group can very well have its own ICA, which will rate the movie on its Sanatana Dharma compliance score. But…The certificate granted by ICA will only restrict what age groups the film is appropriate for. This is the only form of pre-censorship that is necessary in today's age as all other restrictions on film exhibition should be applied retrospectively. The choice of ICAs available for producers to approach will render the question of subjectivity moot as the producer can switch to another ICA if unsatisfied with the certificate. The IMA will set the guidelines for the ICAs to follow and will be the first point of appeal.In other words, this solution reimagines the CBFC as a body that grants licenses to independent and private certification organisations called ICAs. These ICAs must adhere to certain threshold criteria set by the CBFC. Beyond these criteria, some ICAs may specialise themselves as being the sanskaari ones trigger-happy to award an “A” certification, while others may adopt a more liberal approach. In the authors' words:This will allow the marketplace of ideas to draw the lines of what kind of content is fit for what kind of audience with the government still being capable of stepping in to curb prurient sensibilities.This solution has the added benefit of levelling the playing field between OTT content and films. Currently, the CBFC has no capacity to certify the content being churned out on tens of streaming services. By delegating this function to private ICAs, the government can ensure adherence to certification norms.In essence, just as governments can often plug market failures, markets too can sometimes plug government failures. Reforming our ‘Censor Board' requires giving markets a chance.There's much more detail in the paper about grievance redressal, certification guidelines, and appeals procedure. Read it here.HomeWorkReading and listening recommendations on public policy matters* [Podcast] Over at Puliyabaazi, we discuss technology geopolitics with Anirudh Suri, author of The Great Tech Game.* [Paper] Laxman Kumar Behera's take on the defence budget.* [Paper] This paper has a fantastic framework for understanding policy failures and successes. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit publicpolicy.substack.com

India Policy Watch: Our Week With AdaniInsights on current policy issues in India- RSJThat was an eventful week in India. In the last edition I had written these lines on the ongoing Adani saga that have now come back to bite me:“The FPO might struggle a bit to sail through. But that amount is a chump change for the group. A week or so of volatility, some questions from regulators, a few lawsuits, some strategically timed PR events and the group will be done with this kerfuffle by February. This is nothing more than a minor speed bump in its fortunes.”Ooh. It didn't turn out to be a minor kerfuffle. After the Adani Group came out with their 400+ page response to the Hindenburg report who then retorted with their characteristic bite, we witnessed a free fall in Adani stocks in the first few days of the week. The FPO barely saw any retail participation. A few anchor investors including an Abu Dhabi sovereign fund participated. And then at the eleventh hour we had family offices of prominent Indian industrial houses and few domestic institutional investors subscribe to it and the FPO just about sailed through. Social media was abuzz with either ‘see, this is the spirit of new India' or ‘upar se call aaya hoga' (they must have got a call from the top) kind of messages. But even this news didn't mean much. The free fall continued that day. Eventually, the Group canceled the FPO and positioned itself as a martyr to the cause of investors who have stood by them over the years. Well, you live long and you get to see everything. There was further negative news for the group as the Dow Jones decided to remove Adani Enterprises, the flagship company of the group, from their sustainability index. A few global banks reported they wouldn't accept Adani bonds as collaterals from their clients for margin trading. Only late on Friday, was there some good news coming in from the Group. They confirmed they kept their bond payout commitments and that all interest payments have been made till date. A couple of credit agencies, that prescient lot who you will remember didn't have a clue till a day before the Lehman crisis that something was wrong, confirmed there's no debt maturing among the group companies till 2025. Only then did the stocks find some respite.So, you see not exactly what I had predicted. And so I'm somewhat less certain now if this will only just be a minor bump in the road for the group.The other big event during the week was the Union budget that was presented on Feb 1. This was the last full budget to be presented before the 2024 general elections and there was an expectation that the government would tilt towards being more populist. Even here, I had made a prediction at the start of the year:“..this government has always been careful about fiscal deficit, and it is particular about the risk of the fiscal space. The government has committed to a 4.5 per cent target for the union government deficit in the next 3 years from the current levels, that's expected to be 6.4 per cent. I see a tightening in the fiscal stance during the year with a gradual reduction in some of the pandemic-related subsidies and better targeting of the benefits improving distribution efficiency."Phew. On this I was right. The government cared more for its fiscal deficit trajectory than being populist. The surprising part, and the one I got wrong, was the significant capex push that is budgeted to grow 33 percent to Rs. 10 trillion in the coming year. Despite this, the government expects the deficit to be down to 5.9 percent in line with its three-year plan. How did it manage that? Well, forget populism, this government plans to cut down on subsidies and expenditures during a pre-election year. The subsidies budget is down 27 percent from Rs. 5.2 trillion to Rs. 3.7 trillion. At a macro level, this is an important message about its fiscal management philosophy. The infra push follows three themes that are all good in my opinion: a) internal connectivity through investments in railways, roads, airports and last mile connectivity; b)rural and low cost housing and c) decarbonisation to reduce dependence on fossil fuel and stay within range to the Paris commitment.There wasn't anything more to write home about. The market borrowing figure is big but in line with expectations. The numbers make sense and broadly stack up. It is good to see this happening and the legacy of being clever with them is now well past. There was the usual tinkering of the personal tax rates - the old switch and bait of give few visible breaks and take some concessions away in footnotes - and some tweaks on custom duties on dozens of items which we love doing all the time. The rest of the speech was spent on announcing the outlays for various sectors with some old and new scheme names. In a way, it was good to have a boring budget with capex focus. Anyway, the Adani story and the capex push in the budget sets up this piece nicely. I mean in normal times all the announcements about investment in infra and green economy would have been music to the ears of the Adani shareholders. There are three issues to discuss in this context. One, the usual, what does all of this mean for the Adani Group? Two, does this change the view of global investors about corporate India and its governance? How will that impact the ambitious capex push of this budget? Three, will this trigger a more fundamental look at how to invest in public infrastructure programs in India?For the Adani group, the immediate issue is how to get out of this bad news cycle and find a patch of terra firma to plan their future. Last week I was certain that this would happen within a couple of weeks for them. Now I'm not so sure. The reason for this goes to the heart of corporate finance, the multiple players involved across the chain and their many interlinkages. It is not Dollars or Rupees which is the currency of corporate finance. It is that strange thing called trust. Someone wants to borrow money from you. Of course, you're sceptical about their ability to repay. So they come back to you with data, track record, promises and commitments to convince you to trust them. You price your trust and give them the money. There's nothing that you get in return for the money you have given. It's all trust. This one transaction founded on trust then spawns hundreds of others. There's some kind of alchemy at work where that single root branches out into millions of transactions based on parties trusting each other. Sometimes when you look at the complex web of financial relationships that span countries, currencies and time horizons, you forget how this complex megapolis with these towering skyscrapers and beautiful structures is founded on something as fragile and intangible as human integrity. Once that is tainted, even partly, the megapolis isn't the same anymore. At the heart of it, the Adani Group has built maybe three core competencies. One, it wins more government tenders than others because they have the pulse for it. Not surprising because Adani after all anagrams to naadi (pulse in Hindi). He he, sorry about that. Two, it is a capital raising machine from banks and bond markets using the highly valued equity of its group companies as collateral. And three, unlike the previous infra players, it has, so far, broadly delivered on its projects. You might say the real test lies ahead because of how much it has taken on its plate. But it has a decent track record on delivery.The key to all of these is its ability to raise capital and no matter what the ‘nation first' brigade will tell you, a large part of this capital will need to come from outside India. And that capital flow will dry up a bit for the Group. Of course, there's then apparent $ 2 trillion dry powder that's available with the oil rich Gulf states who are always ready to come in to rescue. But even they might pause on their funding. That apart, the brazen ease with which the group wins projects might slow down a bit. The mainstream media might not highlight this but now that the light has been shone on its business practices, global media and investors will keep a tab on this. It might mean the law of averages catching up on its win rate. Lastly, the implementation track record that has been good so far might be under cloud if the funding environment becomes tighter or costlier, or both. A few well published delays and failures in completion of projects and the sheen of getting things done will wear off. Will they be able to complete their existing projects to build and maintain ports, roads, airports and more? So, there are more clouds on the horizon than anticipated in the early days of the report. The group is probably aware of the thin ice they are skating on now. Adani also anagrams to anadi (simpleton) but don't got by that one. Expect some quick, big moves.For the global investors, this is a moment to put the Indian model of economic development or nation-building as the government calls it in the context of what they have seen elsewhere. India does seem to present a tremendous opportunity in the light of China's likely secular slowdown and lack of big opportunities elsewhere. So, they will keep a close eye on what is the India model of growth that emerges. So far, the model since 1991 has been to try a bit of everything - market, crony capitalism, socialistic redistribution and flailing in its own way managing them all. The current thinking, or maybe it is that Gujarat model, is to identify ‘national champions' like Adani and bet on them to deliver. Indian elite take pain to explain that this is different from the Russian kleptocracy model. And it is true to a large extent. Indian business houses, unlike the Russian oligarchs, don't squat on national resources like oil and gas, sell them abroad at a premium and then stash away their profits in tax havens outside. In fact, it is quite the reverse. Indian business houses raise funds from outside, leverage themselves to the hilt, deliver in India (or hope to) and make profits in India. The risk is largely external while the value creation is domestic. But this is a game where those taking the risk (largely external institutions) should be knowingly in on the game that their downside risk is protected because of the way capitalism works in India. Once that faith in the unique India model goes, they will go back to riding the high horse of governance or ESG and stay out of long term investments. This is something India can ill afford. This is its third attempt at ‘nation building'. So far, implementation has been its bug bear. It cannot come back in this new shape again. What will restore faith is not the usual demand to eliminate ‘national champions' in favour of true market forces playing out in the nation-building space. That's a pipe dream. The hope for foreign investors and fund houses is to have an honest attempt to set right the governance of ‘national champions'. Maybe build them like South Korea did with their chaebols. Let no one be too big to fail or too large to govern. Spread the spoils more evenly. Avoid getting into situations where an honest reckoning by domestic regulators and fund houses about such entities won't be possible because too much is at stake. This doesn't work well ever. A house of cards, no matter how high, is still a house of cards.Lastly, how should we look at long term reform of the public infrastructure sector and investments in it? The simplest answer is to follow the first principles here. An open and transparent bidding process, a regulatory regime that's focused on market failures of information asymmetry and market power and has the teeth to intervene, a clear roadmap for government investment plan and its ability to support private enterprise and a strong market linked mechanism to reward or punish performance. The problem is this will mean the state will have to voluntarily relinquish a lot of its arbitrary power that has brought us here in the first place. The real reform is not just in announcing a 33 percent jump in infra spending in the budget. It is about creating a rule-based mechanism that ensures there is delivery on these big plans that's on time and continues uninterrupted. Adani is just a symptom of the problem of planning for infrastructure in India. What the symptom shows is the failure of imagination in revamping public policy here. I don't often agree with Mihir Sharma but he makes a valid point in his Bloomberg piece:“Nobody else in Modi's India has this specific mixture of confidence in government support, ability to navigate byzantine regulations, and willingness to risk enormous sums of money. Some worry that Adani is too big to fail. He isn't. But he may be too unique to fail. Wherever the money may have come from — public sector banks, pension funds, faceless pools of offshore capital — what matters for India's growth is how productively it is spent. Effective oligarchs might be dangerous for a country and, if they're corrupt, even more so — just ask Russia. Inept oligarchs are calamitous.If Adani's companies can deliver a fraction of what he has pledged, then perhaps, in time, they might even grow into the valuations they have already achieved on paper. If they fail, then a lot more goes down than his investors; Adani will take down India's industrial policy with him.”There is indeed a lot more at stake here than just the Adani empire.Not(PolicyWTF): Chinese Companies Can Make in India - Conditions ApplyThis section looks at surprisingly sane policies- Pranay KotasthaneAn interesting recent development is the government's change in stance on Chinese manufacturers of electronic components. Instead of an unsaid, outright ban on Chinese manufacturers, the government has now given a preliminary approval to 14 of Apple's 17 Chinese suppliers to set up joint ventures in India.This preliminary approval is just that — it comes with many conditions that do not apply to non-Chinese companies. For example, Chinese companies must compulsorily establish a joint venture with an Indian firm. Apparently, the latter also needs to have a controlling stake. Moreover, the FDI restrictions announced after the 2020 Galwan clashes are still in play, meaning that all these investments from China are still subject to receiving the appropriate government aashirwaad.Back in 2020, we had written that tightening the FDI rules for all sectors is a policyWTF. Existing FDI rules back then already had restrictions on foreign investments in strategic sectors. To overlay this reasonable condition with a region-specific ban on investments across sectors didn't make sense.Given this backdrop, the small opening the government has now offered to Chinese suppliers of Apple is a positive course correction.It's a bitter pill to swallow, but there's just no other way to achieve the stated goal of creating $300 billion in electronics manufacturing by 2026, with overseas sales of $120 billion, than to engage Chinese manufacturers. See what this excellent explainer by Surajeet Das Dupta says:“Nearly 80 per cent of the global mobile device supply chain is in China and is run by Chinese companies. It has been built over the past 15-20 years because the biggest mobile device brands from Apple, Xiaomi, Vivo and Oppo have their production bases there. Suppliers in Vietnam or Thailand are also owned by Chinese companies — and the governments of those countries have gone out of their way to encourage them.” [Business Standard, Jan 29]We have also written in the past that 64% of India's chip imports come from China and Hong Kong. And this number will only increase over the next 7-8 years as India's mobile manufacturing scales up. And that's alright for now.We must go beyond economic nationalism and come to a modus vivendi with China on the economic front. If Chinese companies are willing to invest in India in non-strategic products, we shouldn't be turning our face away. That's exactly what China did. It took investments from its richer and more capable adversaries—Japan, Taiwan, and the US—when it was the weaker power.Deng Xiaoping, on his first visit to Japan after Mao's death, famously said that the roles have now reversed — you are the teachers, and we are the students. While the India-China equation is quite different, we shouldn't be afraid of exploiting Chinese investments to Make in India.HomeWorkReading and listening recommendations on public policy matters* [Article] Tyler Cowen writes that the Industrial Policy of the Information Age will spur globalisation, not impede it.* [Article] Indian nation-building, Modi and the Adani crisis: Adam Tooze has a thoughtful piece on the Adani episode. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit publicpolicy.substack.com

Richa Chaddha aka Mrs. Ali Fazal mocks Indian Army over Galwan Valley Clash. Her husband was a supporter of the anti-CAA ruckus. Bollywood was broadly ant-CAA. Sanjay Dixit calls for boycotting this C grade actress in particular and Bollywood in general.

“If she wanted to burn her hands with fire and talk about how the Indian army or the Indian establishment doesn't treat China and Pakistan the same way, there was a better way of doing it.” Can sensitivity in this matter be overlooked? Listen in!

Richa Chadha apologizes after being trolled over "Galwan says hi" tweet, Pakistan PM picks Lt Gen Asim Munir as new army chief, ‘Shocking': TMC leader demands action against ‘foreigners' at BJP rally and other top news in this bulletin.

Global Policy Watch: Tu Cheez Badi Hai Musk, Musk (umm, sorry)Insights on global policy issues — RSJOne of the great problems of policy, or even philosophy, is who should own things that are or that behave like public utilities. For instance, who should own news broadcasting services? Suppose you prepare a case study explaining what's news broadcasting, the perils that someone abuses such a service to spread fake news and propaganda, and the damage they do to society. Now hand over this case to a bunch of well-meaning people and ask them: how would they frame a policy on ownership of such a service? What do you think the answer will be? I don't have any empirical evidence to back this, but I think in most scenarios, you will find a group of well-meaning people supporting some kind of ownership by the state or a distributed set of individuals. They might suggest a set of tightly regulated norms on what should be broadcast, and they could also throw in a stringent penalty regime for violations. It is unlikely that any group will come up with the answer that it should be owned by a megalomaniac rich man who believes in free speech, flips the bird to regulators on most occasions and has a penchant for poop emojis. A public utility cannot be left to such unstable people regardless of their genius, is what most would say. Twitter is the equivalent of a global public square where news stories are broken, and opinions and trends are generated. Should it be owned widely by the public with a governing board that regulates the platform, its content and its algorithm? Or should it be owned by the state, which can run it like a public utility without a profit motive? Or should Elon Musk own it? What do you think?Twitter Is DifferentBefore I venture to write about the options, it will be useful to lay out the unique character of Twitter as a platform. During the week, I reached out to Amit Varma (doesn't need an introduction to readers here), who always has a clear-eyed view of things, to understand what he makes of the happenings at Twitter. His views helped me articulate my thoughts better. Read his insightful piece on Twitter here. First, unlike broadcasting services of the past, Twitter is exceptionally quick because it is a hyperconnected network of people. Events unfold in real-time on it, and trends catch on fast. Mobilisation on Twitter is faster than the speed of response of any state. It plays an outsized role in shaping the discourse because speed is a feature in today's age. Two, the incentive architecture of Twitter is designed to reward extreme positions. The ‘retweet' or ‘quote' button, the notion of having ‘followers' and the constraint of the 280 characters all mean there's more purchase for broad generalisations, provocative positions and performative behaviour to pander to your own tribe. Three, Twitter is a monopoly in a very unique sense. Granted, there are other platforms that take a share of our attention, but there's only one platform that richly rewards us for our attention with the dopamine hit in the manner Twitter does. Social media platforms tend to be ‘winner takes all' plays because, as a user, once you build a certain kind of network and reach that's unique to that platform, there's little incentive to start building it all over again for the same benefits in another. The switching costs are just too high. #OwningTwitterThink of these features of a broadcasting service together - hyperconnected and quick, rewarding fringe behaviour and a natural monopoly. How should we think about its ownership? Now look at the three options of its ownership - a) the state (or a group of states), b) a widely-held listed public company or c) a Musk-like figure. One way to think through this is to understand the natural incentives of these respective owners, how they will use the platform to achieve those and what will be the net societal outcomes of those actions. Take the state first. All good intentions aside, as we have demonstrated over and over again on these pages, the primary incentive of the state is to perpetuate itself. Or, the party that runs the state to continue being in power forever. While to many in India who are brought up to think of the state as the mai-baap, it seems like a fair arbiter of how a public utility should be managed, the evidence all around us should go against that intuition. A public utility like Twitter controlled by a state that's benign and fair can be a tremendous aid for the welfare of the community. But in public policy, you must consider the ‘corner cases'. You must ask, what if a utility like Twitter is in the hands of the politician you dislike the most? Will they be fair and benign? And then think about ownership and governance of such a utility and its consequences. So, the argument that a global public square like Twitter should be owned by a state or a group of states and managed like a global public good appears pious and workable on paper but is fraught with the risk of a bad faith actor with sovereign power taking it over. That will mean only one kind of fringe taking over. Bad things will follow.  Next, let's consider the ownership by a publicly held company which is how Twitter used to be till Musk bought it out. The management of such a company is the shareholders' agent, and its incentives are aligned with what's best for the shareholders. The management, therefore, works to maximise shareholder returns which get tracked every quarter based on the company's performance. Regardless of how visionary the management team is, they are toast if they do not deliver every quarter. There's no avoiding short-termism here. What's the incentive for any manager to fundamentally retool this company, take short-term hits for many quarters and live in the hope that the strategy will pay off in the long term? Nada. Shunya. Nobody has seen the long-term, and the shareholders have other places to invest than to wait for so long. Twitter has dug itself into a hole where outrage and fringe positions bring in engagement, and that engagement is monetised for advertisers. Even if you had an enlightened management team that knew the damage this ad-dependent business model was doing to society, it would find it impossible to junk the model and change the engines mid-air, so to speak. Because any change in course will need to be dramatic, meaning significant short-term pain. That would understandably test the time and patience of the shareholders. You would need a Steve Jobs-like reality-distortion capability to convince them otherwise. There aren't many Steve Jobs around to run a public company as professional CEOs. The best that Twitter, in its public company avatar, could do is to be managed efficiently. That's it. That efficiency on its current model however would mean it would only get better in coarsening our discourse and widening cultural chasms. I think this is what is called irony. Lastly, let's consider the option of a Musk-like figure buying out Twitter and doing what he pleases with it. What happens here? While it was somewhat easier to appreciate the incentives that drive the state or the shareholders of a public company, we can only speculate on Musk's incentives. There's no academic research done (yet) on Musk's behaviour and actions. So, we can only think in terms of scenarios here. Scenario 1 is what I call the ‘Matt Levine view of Musk'. Levine is a modern-day Plato. The most lucid interpreter of capital and economy in the world today. His newsletter is quite simply the best chronicle of our times. And it's free. What a legend! He has built a theory of Musk's purchase of Twitter in many delightful editions. In this theory, to Musk, Twitter is a video game he loves. Ordinary people, like you and me, play a game, get addicted to it and then, over a period of time, get bored with it. We start hating a feature, or a new upgrade isn't to our liking, or we see too many people playing it. Whatever. We move on. But Musk is not any of us. He's the world's richest man. He is also the world's most addicted user of Twitter. He loves to troll people there, responds with poop emojis to the tweets of others and originates many meme cycles. He's the shahenshah of all Twitter super users. So he buys up the video game company. Now he can play around with features as he fancies so that he can continue to enjoy the game. He placed a bid for it that was high. Then as the tech stocks and the markets crashed, that bid looked worse. Like any rational actor, he tried to get a better deal by threatening to pull out of the deal. Eventually, he bought it because a) he always wanted to buy it or b) maybe, because legally, he couldn't opt out of it. Whatever. It is his now. Is there a reason to believe this theory of Levine? The answer is yes. Musk is rich enough to throw $44 billion for his favourite toy. In any case, he's not paying everything from his own pocket. Maybe about half of the $44 billion. Nothing in how Musk has used Twitter so far suggests he has any great vision for the platform. In fact, he enjoys and leverages all the toxic features of the platform. Musk will play with this for some more time, and during that time, he will keep it running with some mix of charisma and his unique gift to meme-ify things. He will then hand it over to a sucker and walk out with a tidy profit. Twitter will then collapse in a heap. Or maybe it will collapse under his watch itself. An expensive way to amuse himself? Sure. But does he care? Either way, he'd have had his fun. That was his only incentive. Scenario 2 is the alternative that I want you to consider. I don't necessarily believe in it, but it has equal merit to exist as the Levine scenario. Think of it as the RSJ scenario. For a moment, consider that Musk is an incredibly rich man because he makes things that people pay a nice premium to own. In short, he's not a Sam Bankman-Fried. His businesses that are live offer genuine products with real software running within. People die if he gets them wrong. He has often mentioned in his interviews (listen to him speaking to Lex Fridman or Seth Rogen) that his primary concern is the survival of the human race. Therefore his preoccupation with autonomous cars, clean energy and finding an alternative to Earth as a home for our species. He doesn't think about them like a scientist. He isn't interested in the theory beyond a point. He wants to build products that will use science to solve these problems. He's an innovator. In this scenario, he views Twitter in its current form as a net negative for the race. He sees it going only from bad to worse. It is worth his time and money to intervene. To innovate. This is hard work. Remember, he doesn't need to work for a single day in his life. He can donate a tiny fraction of his wealth to build museums and libraries and earn all the praise and fame for posterity. His problem is there won't be any posterity. He isn't interested in delaying the inevitable. He wants to build an alternative for the inevitable. He doesn't want to tweak Twitter for it to be a net positive. He is certain it won't help. The old Twitter has to be changed at its foundation. That's why he is at the Twitter HQ working long hours (and occasionally tweeting). This is a different frame to look through. If you consider this scenario, Musk's incentives are to build a platform for good that doesn't have to cater to extreme positions for engagement and ad revenues. He has no short-term pressure to show better numbers, no shareholders to answer to, and no sword hanging over his head to show instant results. He is his own man. He will change Twitter for it to be a force of good at his own pace and time. $44 Billion is important even for as rich a man as he is. He could have put it anywhere to make more wealth. He's sinking it into a platform he thinks can do enormous good for humanity if it is changed. That's the only incentive that matters to him. Now consider how things will play out if you take the Levine and RSJ scenarios together. In both, Musk will behave based on his incentives. One of the two results is only possible then. Twitter will die in short order or turn itself around and be a force of good. In either case, we will be better off from where we are now with Twitter. Stacking It All UpSo, let me summarise this ownership and consequences thing here. a) The state(s) could own Twitter, and their incentive will mean they will weaponise it further to perpetuate themselves. This will be bad for everyone. It will be worse than where we are today. b) Or Twitter could continue being a widely-held public limited company with incentives that will dig a deeper hole for itself. It will mean ever-spiralling toxicity forever. Again a worse outcome. c) Or, Twitter could be owned by someone like Musk. Here, it will either die quickly or become a force for good. Either scenario will be an improvement on Twitter in its current form. Which ownership option from among the three would you choose?     Applications for the re-awesomed Post-Graduate Programme in Public Policy are now open. Check details here.Matsyanyaaya: Managing China the Aussie WayBig fish eating small fish = Foreign Policy in action— Pranay KotasthaneAnthony Albanese, the new Australian PM, had a tough couple of days this week. Asked about Taiwan's candidature for the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) — a regional trade pact of 11 countries — he said, “The CPTPP is a relationship between nation-states which are recognised”. Since the statement came just three days after Albanese met Xi Jinping, it ruffled quite a few feathers. Did the statement mean Australia was trying to build bridges with China again? Was Australia changing its position concerning Taiwan as a result? In any case, the Australian government swung into action, clarifying that Canberra remains open to Taiwan joining the CPTPP. Albanese, too issued an explanation:“Our position has not changed. We will deal with applications that are dealt with by consensus for economies applying to join the CPTPP. At the moment, they're dealt with one at a time.”So, it's pretty likely that the Australian PM misspoke. There doesn't seem to be any change in the Australian position on Taiwan or China. However, this incident provides a window into the debate in Australia on its China policy.Australia, in recent years, has been the most vocal opponent of Chinese expansionism and authoritarianism. The surfacing of a case of Chinese interference in Australian domestic polity in 2017 was an inflexion point in Australia's China policy. Since then, it has actively tried to counter China's aggression unilaterally and balance China's power multilaterally. It is also the most enthusiastic participant of Quad 2.0. There is a bipartisan consensus that Australia needs to partner with the US and other powers to counter China, even if it means significant economic setbacks. And yet, there are some in Australia who oppose this consensus. Hugh White is one of them. In a recent Quarterly Essay, White opposes Australia's current China policy. He locates his opposition in realism and not idealism or liberalism. Some of his arguments echo the voices in India who are opposed to a closer collaboration with the West. For this reason, it's worth studying it in some detail. Here's my summary of the essay.BackgroundHugh White is a well-known Australian professor of strategic studies. He wrote Australia's Defence White Paper 2000. A constant theme in his writings has been that Australia should not overly rely on the US. It should instead learn to co-exist with a powerful China by drawing a few red lines. Essentially, he makes what we know in India as the “strategic autonomy” argument.TL;DRWhite argues that the US will “abandon” Australia as the costs to the US for meaningfully challenging China in East Asia are far higher than the benefits. The stakes for the US are far lower, unlike in Europe. In contrast, the stakes for China are much higher, and it will be willing to sacrifice a lot more to oust the US. Australia must therefore chart an independent strategy towards China, India, and Indonesia.Highlights from White's Essay* White admits that his view is out of the Overton Window. Both the Liberal and Labour parties of today consider China the paramount strategic threat and consider the alliance with the US vital.* He says Australian leaders thought they could “swing” between the US and China until 2017. They underestimated China's “ambition to push America our of East Asia and take its place as a leading regional power”.* Three factors led to Australia becoming the most strident anti-China country in the region within three years: Trump's China position, Xi Jinping's grip on power in Beijing and evidence of repression, and Malcolm Turnbull's premiership.* He takes Obama's China policy to the cleaners when he says: “They were deeply committed to the idea of preserving US primacy in Asia… but were reluctant to acknowledge, address and accept the costs and risks of doing so against a rival as formidable as China was turning out to be. They were in denial.”* The US, under Trump, declared China to be its rival for Asia but didn't do anything material. There was no significant increase in military capability in the Western Pacific and no enhancement of diplomatic or economic heft in the region.* Biden's policy that “America only reform at home to triumph abroad is deeply delusional. It is a delusion based on exceptionalism.” However, just as economic productivity and population made America a great power earlier, the same forces are now working for China. The exceptionalism mindset implies that the US doesn't have to make any hard choices or sacrifices to defeat China.* Both the Democrats and Republicans agree that America's policies abroad shouldn't cost voters at home. And so, no American leader will compete effectively with China.* White then goes on to analyse all the reasons why the US might want to confront China in East Asia and counters each of them. He reasons that the US forsakes isolationism only when there's a power strong enough to dominate the entire Eurasian continent. In the current scenario, China is nowhere near subjugating other Eurasian powers such as Russia, Europe, and India. For this reason, the US would be disinclined to commit its resources against China.* On the dimensions of a possible US-China conflict, White says that the US cannot match China's economic dynamism, its proximity, and the opportunities it offers. And the failed Trans-Pacific Partnership talks show that the US is not even trying. He trashes the diplomatic counter —the Quad — as a talk shop. He then says that the most important dimension is the military, as both sides explicitly threaten war if the other makes a wrong move.* Since China's stakes are higher, it would be willing to go to any length over questions such as a war over Taiwan. The US won't. Taiwan should be left for China.* He assumes a multipolar order is likely, where India, China, Europe, and Russia will have their spheres of influence. And so, he regrets that:“Instead of helping America to manage the strategic transition in Asia wisely, we are encouraging Washington to confront Beijing in a contest it cannot win”.* Australia must chart an independent policy towards India, Japan, and Indonesia.* Finally, he believes that China will not necessarily be a ruthless and bitter enemy with which Australia cannot do business. It is possible but unlikely. What's the Takeaway?White represents a view that's politically out-of-fashion in Australia. Yet, it is an analysis founded on realism. But some of his underlying assumptions are contestable. For one, Biden's current policies on China (like the semiconductor export controls) indicate that the US is willing to incur costs on its own companies and citizens to counter China. While it is true that the US cannot decouple from China in most fields, there is definitely a willingness to counter China in economic areas that the US considers core to its national security interests. This is a significant commitment that the Biden administration has made. It doesn't seem like the US will give China a walkover in East Asia.Secondly, it is unclear how a shaky outreach to China will be better for Australia than one in which China's powers are restrained because of a partnership with the US. If the US does back out from the region, it would indeed make sense for Australia and others to make peace with China — even if it is on the latter's terms. But we are far away from that happening.Thirdly, the fact that White's view is not acceptable to both political formations in Australia is proof of Xi Jinping's failed foreign policies. China is the most important trade partner for perhaps every country in its neighbourhood, and yet it has managed to put itself into a situation where many of these trade partners have reached a domestic consensus on standing up to China politically.Fourthly, I agree with White that the US does need to demonstrate its commitment to the Quad and IPEF quickly. If the US cannot commit itself to a trade arrangement with China's adversaries, its effectiveness as the paramount power in East Asia will decline. Countries will start cutting their own deals with China.And finally, India's position in this game differs from Australia's. While it is tempting to draw lessons for India from White's fear of depending on the US, that would be to miss a fundamental determinant of international relations: power. To the extent that the future prospects of a country of India's size keep growing, we need not fear about the loss of “strategic autonomy”. India's engagement with the US will be very different from the Australia-US partnership. And so, it doesn't look like Australia is changing its position on China after all. But there are no finalities in international relations. This space is worth watching.Not(PolicyWTF): A Perfect TakeoffThis section looks at egregious public policies. Policies that make you go: WTF, Did that really happen?— Pranay KotasthaneThis week marked a milestone for India's space sector. Hyderabad-based Skyroot Aerospace successfully launched India's first privately developed rocket into space. There's a lot left to be accomplished, but today is a good day to reflect on a rather-interesting story of policy reform. Aap Chronology Samajhiye…Until 2020, the space sector was effectively a government monopoly. Yes, a few private companies developed satellites or supplied materials and equipment to ISRO, but more ambitious projects were out-of-bounds for private companies. In this sector, liberalisation seemed particularly challenging because the government umpire and player — ISRO — was doing a far better job than other public sector organisations. So why reform something that's not broken? Why invest political capital in liberalisation and not double ISRO's budget instead? That would have been the starting position for politicians and bureaucrats. Many papers arguing for the liberalisation of the sector had been written earlier. As late as Jan 2020, there was no indication that a big reform was on the government agenda. My Takshashila colleagues had also put out a policy brief proposing a policy and regulatory structure to develop India's nascent private space sector. And then, the COVID-19 pandemic began. The horrendous lockdown was announced in March. The future looked scary. On 5th May, the border clashes in Ladakh began. On June 15th, the Galwan clash claimed the life of 20 Indian soldiers (and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers). The satellite imagery displayed in the public domain came from constellations of private companies in the West. And on June 24th, the union cabinet “approved” private sector participation in space activities. These connections are merely speculations, as we have no idea about the internal decision-making process of the government. Nevertheless, a few things are instructive.The government was searching for success in various domains after the botched lockdown. As for the space sector, the government could well have chosen a “big bang” reform to double the ISRO budget to improve India's presence in the space domain. The PM would have announced it on Twitter, and people would have cheered. Crucially though, the government had other policy solutions to choose from when the crisis hit. And it is praiseworthy that the government chose the option to liberalise rather than expand ISRO's mandate. By 2021, the government also had de-regulated geospatial information collection and dissemination. And by 2022, the first private-sector rocket had been launched.A lot more remains to be done in this sector. The role of ISRO and the new regulatory body needs clarification. But the key lesson for policy analysts is to be ready with well-articulated solutions before a crisis hits. While the crisis provided urgency, it could have also made the situation worse had the liberalisation option not been internalised by policy entrepreneurs in the government. Congratulations to SkyRoot. And thanks to the government for getting out of the way.HomeWorkReading and listening recommendations on public policy matters* [Newsletter] "What do Joe Biden's harsh Chinese chip controls mean for India?" Rohan Venkataramakrishnan and Pranay discuss this question in Rohan's excellent India Inside Out newsletter.* [Paper] Internal Drivers of China's External Behaviour by Shivshankar Menon is a must-read.* [Article] Nitin Pai explains why the opening up of India's space sector is a big reform.* [Podcast] On Puliyabaazi, historian Aashique Ahmed Iqbal gives an account of aviation in India. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit publicpolicy.substack.com

From COVID to WHO to Galwan Exposing China Expansionist Ideology | Aabhas Maldahiyar SrijanTalks

On June 16 2020, Indian and Chinese forces clashed high in the Himalayan mountains in Aksai Chin. Beijing and New Delhi both claim control over this remote region in a territorial dispute dating back decades. Sources differ on how many soldiers died in the skirmish, fought with fists and clubs rather than guns, with the potential dead ranging into the dozens. Looking back two years later, Galwan marked a clear turning point in relations between the two Asian countries, with India now taking a much harsher line towards China, joining the U.S., Australia and Japan in the so-called Quad Alliance, banning Chinese-affiliated apps like Alibaba and TikTok. Why has the border between China and India been disputed for so long? And what made the bloody clash at Galwan a watershed for New Delhi? Manoj Joshi in Understanding the India-China Border: The Enduring Threat of War in High Himalaya (Hurst: 2022) explains where this dispute came from, how it sometimes sparked war, and the many failed attempts to find a negotiated solution. Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. He has been a journalist specializing on national and international politics and is a commentator and columnist on these issues. As a reporter, he has written extensively on issues relating to Siachen, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka and terrorism in Kashmir and Punjab. Today, Manoj and I talk about the border dispute, where it came from, and why both countries have been unable to reach a negotiated solution. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Understanding the India-China Border. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

On June 16 2020, Indian and Chinese forces clashed high in the Himalayan mountains in Aksai Chin. Beijing and New Delhi both claim control over this remote region in a territorial dispute dating back decades. Sources differ on how many soldiers died in the skirmish, fought with fists and clubs rather than guns, with the potential dead ranging into the dozens. Looking back two years later, Galwan marked a clear turning point in relations between the two Asian countries, with India now taking a much harsher line towards China, joining the U.S., Australia and Japan in the so-called Quad Alliance, banning Chinese-affiliated apps like Alibaba and TikTok. Why has the border between China and India been disputed for so long? And what made the bloody clash at Galwan a watershed for New Delhi? Manoj Joshi in Understanding the India-China Border: The Enduring Threat of War in High Himalaya (Hurst: 2022) explains where this dispute came from, how it sometimes sparked war, and the many failed attempts to find a negotiated solution. Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. He has been a journalist specializing on national and international politics and is a commentator and columnist on these issues. As a reporter, he has written extensively on issues relating to Siachen, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka and terrorism in Kashmir and Punjab. Today, Manoj and I talk about the border dispute, where it came from, and why both countries have been unable to reach a negotiated solution. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Understanding the India-China Border. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

On June 16 2020, Indian and Chinese forces clashed high in the Himalayan mountains in Aksai Chin. Beijing and New Delhi both claim control over this remote region in a territorial dispute dating back decades. Sources differ on how many soldiers died in the skirmish, fought with fists and clubs rather than guns, with the potential dead ranging into the dozens. Looking back two years later, Galwan marked a clear turning point in relations between the two Asian countries, with India now taking a much harsher line towards China, joining the U.S., Australia and Japan in the so-called Quad Alliance, banning Chinese-affiliated apps like Alibaba and TikTok. Why has the border between China and India been disputed for so long? And what made the bloody clash at Galwan a watershed for New Delhi? Manoj Joshi in Understanding the India-China Border: The Enduring Threat of War in High Himalaya (Hurst: 2022) explains where this dispute came from, how it sometimes sparked war, and the many failed attempts to find a negotiated solution. Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. He has been a journalist specializing on national and international politics and is a commentator and columnist on these issues. As a reporter, he has written extensively on issues relating to Siachen, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka and terrorism in Kashmir and Punjab. Today, Manoj and I talk about the border dispute, where it came from, and why both countries have been unable to reach a negotiated solution. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Understanding the India-China Border. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

On June 16 2020, Indian and Chinese forces clashed high in the Himalayan mountains in Aksai Chin. Beijing and New Delhi both claim control over this remote region in a territorial dispute dating back decades. Sources differ on how many soldiers died in the skirmish, fought with fists and clubs rather than guns, with the potential dead ranging into the dozens. Looking back two years later, Galwan marked a clear turning point in relations between the two Asian countries, with India now taking a much harsher line towards China, joining the U.S., Australia and Japan in the so-called Quad Alliance, banning Chinese-affiliated apps like Alibaba and TikTok. Why has the border between China and India been disputed for so long? And what made the bloody clash at Galwan a watershed for New Delhi? Manoj Joshi in Understanding the India-China Border: The Enduring Threat of War in High Himalaya (Hurst: 2022) explains where this dispute came from, how it sometimes sparked war, and the many failed attempts to find a negotiated solution. Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. He has been a journalist specializing on national and international politics and is a commentator and columnist on these issues. As a reporter, he has written extensively on issues relating to Siachen, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka and terrorism in Kashmir and Punjab. Today, Manoj and I talk about the border dispute, where it came from, and why both countries have been unable to reach a negotiated solution. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Understanding the India-China Border. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

On June 16 2020, Indian and Chinese forces clashed high in the Himalayan mountains in Aksai Chin. Beijing and New Delhi both claim control over this remote region in a territorial dispute dating back decades. Sources differ on how many soldiers died in the skirmish, fought with fists and clubs rather than guns, with the potential dead ranging into the dozens. Looking back two years later, Galwan marked a clear turning point in relations between the two Asian countries, with India now taking a much harsher line towards China, joining the U.S., Australia and Japan in the so-called Quad Alliance, banning Chinese-affiliated apps like Alibaba and TikTok. Why has the border between China and India been disputed for so long? And what made the bloody clash at Galwan a watershed for New Delhi? Manoj Joshi in Understanding the India-China Border: The Enduring Threat of War in High Himalaya (Hurst: 2022) explains where this dispute came from, how it sometimes sparked war, and the many failed attempts to find a negotiated solution. Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. He has been a journalist specializing on national and international politics and is a commentator and columnist on these issues. As a reporter, he has written extensively on issues relating to Siachen, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka and terrorism in Kashmir and Punjab. Today, Manoj and I talk about the border dispute, where it came from, and why both countries have been unable to reach a negotiated solution. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Understanding the India-China Border. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

On June 16 2020, Indian and Chinese forces clashed high in the Himalayan mountains in Aksai Chin. Beijing and New Delhi both claim control over this remote region in a territorial dispute dating back decades. Sources differ on how many soldiers died in the skirmish, fought with fists and clubs rather than guns, with the potential dead ranging into the dozens. Looking back two years later, Galwan marked a clear turning point in relations between the two Asian countries, with India now taking a much harsher line towards China, joining the U.S., Australia and Japan in the so-called Quad Alliance, banning Chinese-affiliated apps like Alibaba and TikTok. Why has the border between China and India been disputed for so long? And what made the bloody clash at Galwan a watershed for New Delhi? Manoj Joshi in Understanding the India-China Border: The Enduring Threat of War in High Himalaya (Hurst: 2022) explains where this dispute came from, how it sometimes sparked war, and the many failed attempts to find a negotiated solution. Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. He has been a journalist specializing on national and international politics and is a commentator and columnist on these issues. As a reporter, he has written extensively on issues relating to Siachen, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka and terrorism in Kashmir and Punjab. Today, Manoj and I talk about the border dispute, where it came from, and why both countries have been unable to reach a negotiated solution. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Understanding the India-China Border. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/south-asian-studies

On June 16 2020, Indian and Chinese forces clashed high in the Himalayan mountains in Aksai Chin. Beijing and New Delhi both claim control over this remote region in a territorial dispute dating back decades. Sources differ on how many soldiers died in the skirmish, fought with fists and clubs rather than guns, with the potential dead ranging into the dozens. Looking back two years later, Galwan marked a clear turning point in relations between the two Asian countries, with India now taking a much harsher line towards China, joining the U.S., Australia and Japan in the so-called Quad Alliance, banning Chinese-affiliated apps like Alibaba and TikTok. Why has the border between China and India been disputed for so long? And what made the bloody clash at Galwan a watershed for New Delhi? Manoj Joshi in Understanding the India-China Border: The Enduring Threat of War in High Himalaya (Hurst: 2022) explains where this dispute came from, how it sometimes sparked war, and the many failed attempts to find a negotiated solution. Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. He has been a journalist specializing on national and international politics and is a commentator and columnist on these issues. As a reporter, he has written extensively on issues relating to Siachen, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka and terrorism in Kashmir and Punjab. Today, Manoj and I talk about the border dispute, where it came from, and why both countries have been unable to reach a negotiated solution. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Understanding the India-China Border. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On June 16 2020, Indian and Chinese forces clashed high in the Himalayan mountains in Aksai Chin. Beijing and New Delhi both claim control over this remote region in a territorial dispute dating back decades. Sources differ on how many soldiers died in the skirmish, fought with fists and clubs rather than guns, with the potential dead ranging into the dozens. Looking back two years later, Galwan marked a clear turning point in relations between the two Asian countries, with India now taking a much harsher line towards China, joining the U.S., Australia and Japan in the so-called Quad Alliance, banning Chinese-affiliated apps like Alibaba and TikTok. Why has the border between China and India been disputed for so long? And what made the bloody clash at Galwan a watershed for New Delhi? Manoj Joshi in Understanding the India-China Border: The Enduring Threat of War in High Himalaya (Hurst: 2022) explains where this dispute came from, how it sometimes sparked war, and the many failed attempts to find a negotiated solution. Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. He has been a journalist specializing on national and international politics and is a commentator and columnist on these issues. As a reporter, he has written extensively on issues relating to Siachen, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka and terrorism in Kashmir and Punjab. Today, Manoj and I talk about the border dispute, where it came from, and why both countries have been unable to reach a negotiated solution. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Understanding the India-China Border. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/asian-review

Happy Independence Day!- Pranay Kotasthane and RSJThis newsletter can often seem pessimistic about India. That isn’t true, though. Every year, on Independence Day, we remind ourselves and our readers why we write this newsletter. This is how we ended the Independence Day edition of 2020:“What we have achieved so far is precious. That’s worth reminding ourselves today. We will go back to writing future editions lamenting our state of affairs.We will do so because we know it’s worth it.”  This year we thought it would be fun (?) to run through every year since 1947 and ask ourselves what happened in the year that had long-term repercussions for our nation. This kind of thing runs a serious risk. It can get tedious and all too familiar. Most of us know the landmark events of recent history and what they meant for the nation. Maybe. Maybe not. We’ve given an honest try (of over 8000 words) to see if there’s a different way of looking at these familiar events and their impact on us. Here we go.1947 - 1960: Sense Of A Beginning 1947Perhaps the most significant “What, if?” question for independent India surfaced on 17th August 1947 when the Radcliffe Line was announced. The partition of the Indian subcontinent has cast a long shadow. What if it had never happened? What if Nehru-Jinnah-Gandhi were able to strike a modus vivendi within a one-federation framework? These questions surface every year around independence.The indelible human tragedy of the partition aside, would an Akhand Bharat have served its citizens better? We don’t think so. We agree with Ambedkar’s assessment of this question. In Pakistan or the Partition of India, he approaches the question with detachment and realism, concluding that the forces of “communal malaise” had progressed to such an extent that resisting a political division would have led to a civil war, making everyone worse off. The partition must have been handled better without the accompanying humanitarian disaster. But on the whole, the partition was inevitable by 1947.“That the Muslim case for Pakistan is founded on sentiment is far from being a matter of weakness; it is really its strong point. It does not need deep understanding of politics to know that the workability of a constitution is not a matter of theory. It is a matter of sentiment. A constitution, like clothes, must suit as well as please. If a constitution does not please, then however perfect it may be, it will not work. To have a constitution which runs counter to the strong sentiments of a determined section is to court disaster if not to invite rebellion.” [Read the entire book here]1948What if Mahatma Gandhi wasn’t killed that year? How would the course of our history change? Gandhi spoke like an idealist and worked like a realist. He was possibly the most aware of the gap between the lofty ideals of our constitution and the reality of the Indian minds then. He knew the adoption of the constitution was only half the work done. He’d likely have devoted the rest of his life to building a liberal India at the grassroots level. His death pushed a particular stream of right-wing Hindu consciousness underground. We still carry the burden of that unfinished work.1949The Constituent Assembly met for the first time in December 1946. By November 26th 1949, this assembly adopted a constitution for India. Even a half-constructed flyover in Koramangala has taken us five years. For more context, Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly began work on 10th August 1947, and their first constitution came into force in March 1956, only to be abrogated two years later. India’s founding fathers and mothers were acutely aware that they were elite, unelected, and unrepresentative of the median Indian. They dared to imagine a new nation-state while grappling with that period's harsh economic, social, and political realities. Their work should inspire us to strengthen, improve, and rebuild—but never to give up on—the Republic of India.For more, check out the miracle that is India’s Constitution in our Republic Day 2021 special edition.1950We have written about our Constitution a number of times. It is an inspiring and audacious document in its ambition to shape a modern nation. It has its flaws. Some consider it too liberal; others think it makes the State overbearing. Some find it too long; others feel it comes up short. This may all be true. However, there is no doubt our constitution has strengthened our democracy, protected the weak and continues to act as a tool for social change. It is our North Star. And a damn good one at that. 1951Few post-independence institutions have stood the test of time as the Finance Commission (FC), first established in 1951. In federal systems, horizontal and vertical imbalances in revenue generation and expenditure functions are commonplace. Closing the gap requires an impartial institution that is well-regarded by various levels of government and the people. The Finance Commission is that institution.It’s not as if it didn’t face any challenges. As a constitutional body established under article 280 of the Constitution, it was sidelined by an extra-constitutional and powerful Planning Commission until 2014. But we have had 15 FCs in total, and each key tax revenue-sharing recommendation has become government policy.1952Our Constitution adopted a universal adult franchise as the basis for elections. Every citizen was to be part of the democratic project. There was to be no bar on age, sex, caste or education. And this was to be done in one of the most unequal societies in the world. The ambition was breathtaking. To put this in context, women were allowed to vote in Switzerland only in 1971. Not only did we aim for this, but we also moved heaven and earth to achieve it in 1952. In his book India After Gandhi, Ram Guha describes the efforts of the government officials led by the first Election Commissioner, Sukumar Sen, to reach the last man or woman for their ballot. The elites may lament vote bank politics or cash for votes scams and question the wisdom of universal franchise. But we shouldn’t have had it any other way. And, for the record, our people have voted with remarkable sophistication in our short independent history. 1953 For a new nation-state, the Republic of India punched above its weight in bringing hostilities on the Korean peninsula to an end. Not only did the Indian government’s work shape the Armistice Agreement, but it also chaired a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) that was set up to decide the future of nearly 20,000 prisoners of war from both sides. This experience during the Cold War strengthened India’s advocacy of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).  1954Article 25 guaranteed the freedom of conscience and the freedom to profess, practice, and propagate religion to all citizens. But how does one define a religious practice? And can a practice under the garb of religion breach the boundary of individual rights or public morality? This is a familiar conflict zone in secular States and would inevitably show up in India because everything in India can be construed as a religious practice. Like Ambedkar said during the constituent assembly debates:“The religious conceptions in this country are so vast that they cover every aspect of life from birth to death…there is nothing extraordinary in saying that we ought to strive hereafter to limit the definition of religion in such a manner that we shall not extend it beyond beliefs and such rituals as may be connected with ceremonials which are essentially religious..."In 1954, the Supreme Court gave a landmark judgment on what constitutes a religious practice in what’s known as the Shirur Math case. It held that the term religion would cover all practices integral to that religion. Further, the Court will determine what practice will be deemed essential with reference to doctrines within that religion itself.This test of ‘essentiality’ in religion has kept the public, the legislature and the courts busy since (entry of women in Sabarimala, headscarf in Islam, to name two). The outcome has bent towards individual liberty in most contexts, but the ambiguity in the definition of essential means it could go the other way too.1955Another wild "What, if” moment that we like to recall relates to Milton Friedman’s visit to the Indian finance ministry in 1955. What shape would India’s economy have taken had his seminal document “A Memorandum to the Government of India 1955” been heeded?In this note, Friedman gets to the root of India’s macroeconomic problems—an overburdened investment policy, restrictive policies towards the private sector, erratic monetary policy, and a counterproductive exchange control regime. Being bullish about India’s prospects was courageous when most observers wrote epitaphs about the grand Indian experiment. But Friedman was hopeful and critical both.The Indian government, for its part, was humble enough to seek the advice of foreigners from opposing schools of thought. At the same time, it was too enamoured by the Soviet command and control model. In fact, many items from Friedman’s note can be repurposed as economic reforms even today.Here’re our points from Friedman’s note.1956The idea of One Nation, One ‘X’ (language, election, song, tax, choose any other) is both powerful and seductive. It is not new, however. Back in the 50s, there was a view that we must not strengthen any identity that divides us. So when the question of reorganisation of the colonial provinces into new states came up, an argument was made that it must be done on factors other than language. Nehru, ever the modernist, thought the creation of language-based states would lead us down the path of ethnic strife. The example of nation-states in Europe built on language in the 19th century and the two devastating world wars thereafter were too recent then. So, he demurred.Agitation, hunger strikes and deaths followed before we chose language as the primary basis for reorganising the states. It was perhaps the best decision taken by us in the 50s. As the years since have shown, only a polity assured of its heritage and identity will voluntarily accept diversity. The melding of our diversity into a single identity cannot be a top-down imposition. We should never forget this.1957India’s economic strategy of state-led industrialisation through deficit financing in pursuit of import substitution took off with the Second Five-Year Plan. Heavy industries needed imported machinery, inflating India’s import bill. Since the exchange rate was pegged to the British pound, it meant that Indian exports became pricier. This imbalance between rising imports and flagging exports was financed by running down the foreign exchange reserves. By 1957, India witnessed its first foreign exchange crisis. This event had a significant effect on India’s economy. Instead of devaluing the rupee, the government opted for foreign exchange budgeting - every investment in a project needed government approval for the foreign exchange required to buy foreign inputs. The immediate crisis in 1957 led to controls that worsened India’s economic prospects over the next 35 years.1958The government nationalised all insurance companies a couple of years earlier. India hadn’t gotten into a socialist hell yet, so this was a bit of a surprise. The proximate cause was a fraud that few private life insurers had committed by misusing the policyholders’ funds to help their industrialist friends. A run-of-the-mill white-collar crime that should have been dealt with by the criminal justice system. But the government viewed it as a market failure and moved to nationalise the entire industry. It would take another 45 years for private players to come back to insurance. Insurance penetration in India meanwhile remained among the lowest in the world.  Also, in 1958, Feroze Gandhi took to the floor of Lok Sabha to expose how LIC, the state insurer, had diverted its funds to help Haridas Mundhra, a Calcutta-based businessman. The same crime that private insurers had done.The government would repeat this pattern of getting involved where there was no market failure. The outcomes would inevitably turn out to be worse. Seven decades later, we remain instinctively socialist and wary of capital. Our first reaction to something as trifling as a surge price by Ola or a service charge levied by restaurants is to ask the State to interfere.1959“The longest guest of the Indian government”, the 14th Dalai Lama pre-empted the Chinese government’s plans for his arrest and escaped to India. Not only did India provide asylum, but it also became home to more than a hundred thousand Tibetans. Because of the bold move by the Indian government in 1959, the Central Tibetan Administration continues its struggle as a Nation and a State in search of regaining control over their Country to this day. This event also changed India-China relations for the decades to come.1960Search as hard as we might; we hardly got anything worth discussing for this year. Maybe we were all sitting smugly waiting for an avalanche of crisis to come our way. Steel plants, dams and other heavy industries were being opened. The budget outlay for agriculture was reduced. We were talking big on the international stage about peace and non-alignment. But if you had looked closer, things were turning pear-shaped. The many dreams of our independence were turning sour.The 60s: Souring Of The Dream1961The Indian Army marched into Goa in December 1961. The 450-year Portuguese colonial rule ended, and the last colonial vestige in India was eliminated. It took this long because Portugal’s dictator Antonio Salazar stuck to his guns on controlling Portuguese colonies in the subcontinent, unlike the British and the French. Portugal’s membership in NATO further made it difficult for the Indian government to repeat the operations in Hyderabad and Junagadh. Nevertheless, that moment eventually arrived in 1961. This was also the year when India’s first indigenous aircraft, the HAL HF-24 Marut, took its first flight. Made in Bengaluru by German designer Kurt Tank, the aircraft was one of the first fighter jets made outside the developed world. The aircraft served well in the war that came a decade later. It never lived up to its promises, but it became a matter of immense pride and confidence for a young nation-state.1962Among the lowest points in the history of independent India. We’ve written about our relationship with China many times in the past editions. The 1962 war left a deep impact on our psyche. We didn’t recover for the rest of the decade. The only good thing out of it was the tempering of idealism in our approach to international relations. That we take a more realist stance these days owes its origins to the ‘betrayal’ of 1962.1963ISRO launched the first sounding rocket in November 1963. Over the years, this modest beginning blossomed into a programme with multiple launch vehicles. The satellite programmes also took off a few years later, making India a mighty player in the space sector. 1964If you told anyone alive in 1964 that less than 60 years later, Nehru would be blamed for all that was wrong with India by a substantial segment of its population, they would have laughed you out of the room. But here we are in 2022, and there’s never a day that passes without a WhatsApp forward that talks about Nehru’s faults. It seems inevitable that by the time we celebrate the centenary of our independence, he would be a borderline reviled figure in our history. But that would be an aberration. In the long arc of history, he will find his due as a flawed idealist who laid the foundation of modern India. 1964 was the end of an era.1965As the day when Hindi would become the sole official language of the Indian Union approached, the anti-Hindi agitation in the Madras presidency morphed into riots. Many people died in the protests, and it led to the current equilibrium on language policy. The “one State, one language” project moved to the back burner, even as Hindi became an important link language across the country. The lesson was the same as in the case of the 1956 states reorganisation: melding our diversity into a single identity cannot be a top-down imposition.1966The two wars in the decade's first half, the inefficient allocation of capital driven by the second and third five-year plans, and the consecutive monsoon failure meant India was on the brink in 1966. The overnight devaluation of the Rupee by over 50 per cent, the timely help with food grains from the US and some providence pulled us back from it. The green revolution followed, and we have remained self-sufficient in food since.The experience of being on the brink taught us nothing. We still believe in the Pigouvian theory of market failure, where government policies are expected to deliver optimality.  Strangely, the idea that we reform only in crisis has only strengthened. There cannot be worse ways to change oneself than under the shadow of a crisis. But we have made a virtue out of it.1967This was the year when the Green Revolution took baby steps, and the Ehlrichian prediction about India’s impending doom was put to rest. But it was also the year when the Indian government made a self-goal by adopting a policy called items reserved for manufacture exclusively by the small-scale sector. By reserving whole product lines for manufacturing by small industries, this policy kept Indian firms small and uncompetitive. And like all bad ideas, it had a long life. The last 20 items on this list were removed only in April 2015. We wrote about this policy here. 1968In the past 75 years, we have reserved some of our worst public policies for the education sector. We have an inverted pyramid. A handful of tertiary educational institutions produce world-class graduates at the top. On the other end, we have a total failure to provide quality primary education to the masses. It is not because of a lack of intent. The National Education Policy (NEP) that first came up in 1968 is full of ideas, philosophy and a desire to take a long-term view about education in India. But it was unmoored from the economic or social reality of the nation. We often say here that we shouldn’t judge a policy based on its intentions. That there’s no such thing as a good policy but bad implementation because thinking about what can work is part of policy itself. NEP is Exhibit A in favour of this argument.1969 The nationalisation of 14 private-sector banks was a terrible assault on economic freedom under the garb of serving the public interest. The sudden announcement of a change in ownership of these banks was challenged in the courts, but the government managed to thwart it with an ordinance. Fifty years later, we still have low credit uptake even as governments continue to recapitalise loss-making banks with taxpayer money.1970The dominant economic thinking at the beginning of the 70s in India placed the State at the centre of everything. But that wasn’t how the world was moving. There was a serious re-examination of the relationship between the State and the market happening elsewhere. The eventual shift to a deregulated, small government economic model would happen by the decade's end. This shift mostly passed India by. But there were a few voices who questioned the state orthodoxy and, in some ways, sowed the intellectual seeds for liberalisation in future. In 1970, Jagdish Bhagwati and Padma Desai published their monograph, India: Planning for Industrialisation, which argued that our economic policies since independence had crippled us. It showed with data how central planning, import substitution, public sector-led industrial policy and license raj have failed. But it found no takers. In fact, we doubled down on these failed policies for the rest of the decade. It was a tragedy foretold. What if someone had gone against the consensus and paid attention to that paper? That dissent could perhaps have been the greatest service to the nation. It is useful to remember this today when any scepticism about government policies is met with scorn. Dissent is good. The feeblest of the voice might just be right.The 70s: Losing The Plot1971Kissinger visited China in July 1971 via Pakistan. Responding to the changing world order, India and the USSR signed an Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August of that year. India had become an ally of the USSR. Four months later, the India-Pakistan war pitted India and the USSR against Pakistan, China, and the US. The Indian strategic community came to internalise USSR as a super-reliable partner and the West as a supporter of India’s foes. It took another three decades, and the collapse of the USSR, for a change in this thinking. Even today, Russia finds massive support in the Indian strategic establishment. We had problematised this love for Russia here. 1972India won the 1972 war with Pakistan and liberated Bangladesh. India’s unilateral action stopped a humanitarian disaster. The victory was decisive, and the two parties met in Simla to agree on the way forward. This should have been a slam dunk for India in resolving festering issues on the international boundary, Kashmir and the role of the third parties. But international diplomacy is a two-level game, and Bhutto played that to his advantage. We explained this in edition 30. We paid a high price for giving away that win to Bhutto.1973The Kesavananda Bharti verdict of the Supreme Court rescued the Republic of India from a rampaging authoritarian. The basic structure doctrine found a nice balance to resolve the tension between constitutional immutability and legislative authority to amend the constitution. Bibhu Pani discussed this case in more detail here. 1974You are the State. Here are your crimes. You force import substitution, you regulate the currency, you misallocate capital, you let the public sector and a handful of licensed private players produce inferior quality products at a high cost, you raise the marginal tax rate at the highest level to 97 per cent, you run a large current account deficit, and you cannot control Rupee depreciation.Result?People find illegal ways to bring in foreign goods, currency and gold. And so was born the villain of every urban Bollywood film of the 70s. And a career option for a capitalist-minded kid like me. The Smuggler.But the State isn’t the criminal here. The smuggler is. And the State responded with a draconian law to beat all others. An act the knowledge of whose expanded form would serve kids well in those school quizzes of the 80s. COFEPOSA — The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act. A predatory state's defining feature is how it forces ordinary citizens to do unlawful activities. COFEPOSA was the mother of such laws. It has spawned many children. 1975This blank editorial by the Indian Express says it all. 1976We view our population as a core problem. The politicians, the public servants and the ordinary citizens share this view. We don’t want to acknowledge our governance deficit. Calling population a problem allows us to shirk the responsibility of running a functioning State. We have written about the flaw in thinking about the population as a problem on many occasions.How far could we go to control the population? Well, in 1976, during the peak of the Emergency, the State decided to sterilise male citizens against their wishes. This madness ended when the Emergency was lifted. But even today calls for population control keep coming back. 1977The first non-Congress union government was an important milestone for the Indian Republic. While Morarji Desai’s government did reverse the worst excesses of the Emergency rule, its economic policies were less successful. This period went on to witness a demonetisation in search of black money (2016 from the future says Hi!), and the same old counter-productive policies in search of self-reliance.1978Despite all available evidence that statist socialism was an abject failure, the Janata government that came to power decided to double down on it. One of the great ideas of the time was to force MNCs to reduce their stake in their Indian subsidiaries to below 40 per cent. A handful agreed, but the large corporations quit India. One of those who left was IBM in 1978. The many existing installations of IBM computers needed services and maintenance. In a delightful case of unintended consequences, this led to the nationalisation of IBM’s services division (later called CMC). Domestic companies started to serve this niche. Soon there were the likes of Infosys, Wipro and HCL building a business on this. CMC provided a good training ground for young engineers. And so, the Indian IT services industry got underway. It would change the lives of educated Indians forever.1979In a classic case of violating the Tinbergen rule, the Mandal Commission recommended that the reservation policy should be used to address relative deprivation. While the earlier reservations for oppressed castes stood on firm ground as a means for addressing unconscionable historical wrongs, the Mandal Commission stretched the logic too far. Its recommendation would eventually make reservation policy the go-to solution for any group that could flex its political muscles. We wrote about it here. 1980After ditching the Janata experiment and running out of ideas to keep Jan Sangh going, the BJP was formed. It wasn’t a momentous political occasion of any sort then. A party constitution that aimed for Gandhian socialism and offered vague promises of a uniform civil code and nationalism didn’t excite many. Everything else that would propel the party in later years was to be opportunistic add-ons to the ideology. The founding leaders, Advani and Vajpayee, would have been shocked if you told them what the party would be like, four decades later.The 80s: A Million Mutinies Now1981This year witnessed a gradual shift away from doctrinaire socialism in economic policymaking. “The Indira Gandhi government lifted restrictions on the expansion of production, permitted new private borrowing abroad, and continued the liberalisation of import controls,” wrote Walter Anderson. The government also “allowed” some price rises, leading to increased production of key input materials. The government also permitted foreign companies to compete in drilling rights in India. All in all, a year that witnessed changes for the better. 1982The great textile strike of Bombay in 1982 was inevitable. The trade unions had gotten so powerful that there was a competitive race to the bottom on who could be more militant. Datta Samant emerged intent on breaking the monopoly of RMMS on the city's workers. And he did this with ever spiralling demands from mill owners in a sector that was already bloated with overheads and facing competition from far eastern economies. There was no way to meet these demands. The owners locked the mills and left. Never to come back. The old, abandoned mills remained. The workers remained. Without jobs, without prospects and with kids who grew up angry and unemployed. The rise of Shiv Sena, political goondaism and a malevolent form of underworld followed. Bombay changed forever. It was all inevitable.1983The Nellie massacre in Assam and the Dhilwan bus massacre in Punjab represent the year 1983. Things seemed really dark back then. It seemed that the doomsayers would be proved right about India. Eventually, though, the Indian Republic prevailed. 1984Her Sikh bodyguards assassinated India Gandhi. The botched Punjab policy of the previous five years came a full circle with it. An unforgivable backlash against innocent Sikhs followed. A month later, deadly gas leaked out of a Union Carbide factory in Bhopal, killing and paralysing thousands. 1984 will rank among the worst years of our republic. There were two silver linings in retrospect. One, we would learn to manage secessionist movements better from the harrowing Punjab experience. Two, had Indira continued, would we have had 1991? Our guess is no.1985This was an eventful year in retrospect. Texas Instruments set up shop in Bangalore. It was to begin one of modern India’s true success stories on the world stage. This was also the year when the Anti-defection law transformed the relationship between the voter and her representative. Political parties became all-powerful, and people’s representatives were reduced to political party agents. We have written about this changing dynamic here. This was also the year when the then commerce minister, VP Singh, visited Malaysia. The visit was significant for India because it served as a reference point for Singh when he visited that country again in 1990, now as the Prime minister. Surprised by Malaysia’s transformation in five years, he asked his team to prepare a strategy paper for economic reforms. This culminated in the “M” document, which became a blueprint for reforms when the time for the idea eventually came in 1991.1986Who is a citizen of India?  This vexing question roiled Assam in the early 80s. The student union protests against the widespread immigration of Bangladeshis turned violent, and things had turned ugly by 1985. The Assam accord of 1985 sought to settle the state's outstanding issues,, including deporting those who arrived after 1971 and a promise to amend the Citizenship Act. The amended Citizenship Act of 1986 restricted the citizenship of India to those born before 1987 only if either of their parents were born in India. That meant children of couples who were illegal immigrants couldn’t be citizens of India simply by virtue of their birth in India. That was that, or so we thought.But once you’ve amended the definition of who can be a citizen of India, you have let the genie out. The events of 2019 will attest to that.1987Rajiv Gandhi’s ill-fated attempt to replicate Indira Gandhi’s success through military intervention in another country began in 1987. In contrast to the 1971 involvement, where Indian forces had the mass support of the local populace, the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) got itself embroiled in a bitter Sri Lankan civil war. Not only did this involvement end in a failure, it eventually led to Rajiv Gandhi’s brutal murder in a terrorist attack. The policy lesson internalised by the strategic community was that India must stay far away from developing and deploying forces overseas.1988Most government communication is propaganda in disguise. However, there are those rare occasions when government messaging transcends the ordinary. In 1988, we saw that rare bird during the peak era of a single government channel running on millions of black and white TV sets across India. A government ad that meant something to all of us and that would remain with us forever. Mile Sur Mera Tumhara got everything right - the song, the singers, the storyline and that ineffable thing called the idea of India. No jingoism, no chest beating about being the best country in the world and no soppy sentimentalism. Just a simple message - we might all sing our own tunes, but we are better together. This is a timeless truth. No nation in history has become better by muting the voice of a section of their own people. Mile Sur Mera Tumhara, Toh Sur Bane Hamara, indeed.  19891989 will be remembered as the year when the Indian government capitulated to the demands of Kashmiri terrorists in the Rubaiya Sayeed abduction case. It would spark off a series of kidnappings and act as a shot in the arm of radicals. 1990VP Singh dusted off the decade-long copy of the Mandal Commission report and decided to implement it. This wasn’t an ideological revolution. It was naked political opportunism. However, three decades later, the dual impact of economic reforms and social engineering has increased social mobility than ever before. Merit is still a matter of debate in India. But two generations of affirmative action in many of the progressive states have shown the fears of merit being compromised were overblown. The task is far from finished, but Mandal showed that sometimes you need a big bang to get things going, even if your intentions were flawed.1990 also saw the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits (KPs) from the valley. A tragedy that would bookend a decade of strife and violence in India. The only lesson one should draw from the sad plight of KPs is that the State and the people must protect minority rights. We’re not sure that’s what we have taken away from it. And that’s sad.The 90s: Correcting The Course1991With the benefit of hindsight, the 1991 economic reforms seem inevitable. But things could well have been different. In the minority government, powerful voices advocated in favour of debt restructuring instead of wholesale reforms. In the end, the narrative that these changes were merely a continuation—and not abandonment—of Nehru and Indira Gandhi’s vision for India carried the day. This political chicanery deserves some credit for transforming the life of a billion Indians. 1992Harshad Mehta scammed the stock markets. It wasn’t a huge scam. Nor did it hurt the ordinary Indians. Fewer than 1% invested in markets back then. Yet, the scam did something important. It set in motion a series of reforms that made our capital markets stronger and safer for ordinary investors. Notably, over the years, Mehta came to be seen as some kind of robber baron figure. Capitalism needed an anti-hero to catch the imagination of people. Someone who could reprise in the 90s the Bachchan-esque angry young man roles of the 70s. Mehta might not have been that figure exactly, but he helped a generation transition to the idea that greed could indeed be good.Also, Babri Masjid was brought down by a mob of kar sevaks in 1992. It will remain a watershed moment in our history. The Supreme Court judgement of 2019 might be the final judicial word on it. But we will carry the scars for a long time.1993The tremors of the demolition of the Babri Masjid were felt in 1993. Twelve bombs went off in Bombay on one fateful day. The involvement of the city’s mafia groups was established. The tragic event finally led to the government rescuing the city from the underworld. Not to forget, the Bombay underworld directly resulted from government policies such as prohibition and gold controls. 1994One of the great acts of perversion in our democracy was the blatant abuse of Section 356 of the constitution that allowed the union to dismiss a state government at the slightest pretext. Indira Gandhi turned this into an art form. S. R. Bommai, whose government in Karnataka was dismissed in this manner in 1988, took his case up to the Supreme Court. In 1994, the court delivered a verdict that laid out the guidelines to prevent the abuse of Section 356. It is one of the landmark judgments of the court and restored some parity in Union and state relationship.Article 356 has been used sparingly since. We are a better democracy because of it.1995India joined the WTO, and the first-ever mobile phone call was made this year. But 1995 will forever be remembered as the year when Ganesha idols started drinking milk. This event was a precursor to the many memes, information cascades, and social proofs that have become routine in the information age. 1996Union budgets in India are occasions for dramatic policy announcements. It is a mystery why a regular exercise of presenting the government's accounts should become a policy event. But that’s the way we roll. In 1996 and 1997, P. Chidambaram presented them as the FM of a weak ragtag coalition called the United Front. But he presented two budgets for the ages. The rationalisation of income tax slabs and the deregulation of interest rates created a credit culture that led to the eventual consumption boom in the next decade. We still carry that consumption momentum.1997The creation of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) is an important public policy milestone for India. By no means perfect, the setting up of TRAI helped overturn a norm where government departments were both players and umpires. TRAI made the separation of “steering” and “rowing” functions a new normal. That template has been copied in several sectors thereafter, most recently in the liberalisation of the space sector. 1998India did Pokhran 2, which gave it the capability to build thermonuclear weapons. We faced sanctions and global condemnation. But the growing economy and a sizeable middle class meant those were soon forgotten. Economic might can let you get away with a lot. We have seen it happen to us, but it is a lesson we don’t understand fully.Also, in 1998, Sonia Gandhi jumped into active politics. The Congress that was ambling towards some sort of internal democracy decided to jettison it all and threw its weight behind the dynasty. It worked out for them for a decade or so. But where are they now? Here’s a question. What if Sonia didn’t join politics then? Congress might have split. But who knows, maybe those splinters might have coalesced in the future with a leader chosen by the workers. And we would have had a proper opposition today with a credible leader.1999This was a landmark year for public policy. For the first time, a union government-run company was privatised wholly. We wrote about the three narratives of disinvestment here. 2000We have a weak, extended and over-centralised state. And to go with it, we have large, unwieldy states and districts that make the devolution of power difficult. In 2000, we created three new states to facilitate administrative convenience. On balance, it has worked well. Despite the evidence, we have managed to create only one more state since. The formation of Telangana was such a political disaster that it will take a long time before we make the right policy move of having smaller states. It is a pity.The 2000s: The Best Of Times2001Not only was the Agra Summit between Musharraf and Vajpayee a dud, but it was followed by a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament. It confirmed a pattern: PM-level bilateral meetings made the Pakistani military-jihadi complex jittery, and it invariably managed to spike such moves with terrorist attacks. 2002There was Godhra and the riots that followed. What else is there to say?2003The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act and the Civil Services Pension Reform are two policy successes with many lessons for future policymakers. We have discussed these on many occasions. 2004The NDA government called for an early election, confident about its prospects. India Shining, its campaign about how good things were, wasn’t too far from the truth. It is how many of us felt during that time. The NDA government had sustained the reform momentum of the 90s with some of the best minds running the key departments. Its loss was unexpected. Chandrababu Naidu, a politician who fashioned himself like a CEO, was taken to the cleaners in Andhra Pradesh. Apparently, economic reforms didn’t get you votes. The real India living in villages was angry at being left out. That was the lesson for politicians from 2004. Or, so we were told.Such broad narratives with minimal factual analysis backing them have flourished in the public policy space. There is no basis for them. The loss of NDA in 2004 came down to two states. Anti-incumbency in Andhra Pradesh where a resurgent Congress under YS Reddy beat TDP, a constituent of NDA. TDP lost by similar margins (in vote share %) across the state in all demographics in both rural and urban areas. There was no rural uprising against Naidu because of his tech-savvy, urban reformist image. Naidu lost because the other party ran a better campaign. Nothing else. The other mistake of the NDA was in choosing to partner with the ruling AIADMK in Tamil Nadu (TN) over DMK. TN was famous for not giving split verdicts. It swung to extremes between these two parties in every election. And that’s what happened as AIADMK drew a blank.Yet, the false lesson of 2004 has played on the minds of politicians since. We haven’t gotten back on track on reforms in the true sense. 2005The Right to Information Act and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act came into force in 2005. The “right to X” model of governance took root.2006In March 2006, George W Bush visited India and signed the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Manmohan Singh. From facing sanctions in 1998 for Pokhran 2 to the 123 Agreement, this was a victory for Indian diplomacy and its rising status in the world. You would think this would have had bipartisan support among the political class in India. Well, the Left that was part of UPA and the BJP that worked on the deal when it was in power, opposed it. Many shenanigans later, the deal was passed in the parliament in 2008. It is often said there’s no real ideological divide among parties in India. This view can be contested on various grounds. But events like the opposition to the nuclear deal make you wonder if there are genuine ideological positions on key policy issues in India. Many sound policy decisions are opposed merely for the sake of it. Ideology doesn’t figure anywhere. 2007It was the year when the Left parties were out-lefted. In Singur and Nandigram, protests erupted over land acquisition for industrial projects. The crucible of the resulting violence created a new political force. As for the investment, the capital took a flight to other places. The tax on capital ended up being a tax on labour. Businesses stayed away from West Bengal. The citadel of Left turned into its mausoleum.2008Puja Mehra in her book The Lost Decade traces the origin of India losing its way following the global financial crisis to the Mumbai terror attack of 2008. Shivraj Patil, the home minister, quit following the attack and Chidambaram was shifted from finance to fill in. For reasons unknown, Pranab Mukherjee, a politician steeped in the 70s-style-Indira-Gandhi socialism, was made the FM. Mehra makes a compelling case of how that one decision stalled reforms, increased deficit and led to runaway inflation over the next three years. Till Chidambaram was brought back to get the house in order, it was too late, and we were halfway into a lost decade. It is remarkable how bad policies always seem easy to implement while good policies take ages to get off the blocks.2009The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) was established in January 2009 to architect a unique digital identity for persons in a country where low rates of death and birth registrations made fake and duplicate identities a means for corruption and denial of service. Under the Modi government, the digital identity — Aadhaar — became the fulcrum of several government services. This project also set the stage for later projects such as the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Abha (Health ID).2010There’s petty corruption everywhere in India. It is pervasive. Not surprisingly, it is one political issue leading to mass movements in India. The anti-corruption mood gripped India in 2010 on the back of the 2G spectrum scam, where the chief accountant of the government claimed a notional loss of about Rs. 1.8 trillion to the exchequer. Auctioning of natural resources wasn’t exactly a transparent process then. It was evident there was a scam in the allotment of the 2G spectrum. But the 1.8 trillion number was a wild exaggeration that anyone with a semblance of business understanding could see through. It didn’t matter. That number caught the imagination. UPA 2 never recovered from it. More importantly, the auction policy for resources was distorted forever. We still suffer the consequences.The 2010s: Missed Opportunity2011India’s last case of wild poliovirus was detected in 2011. Until about the early 1990s, an average of 500 to 1000 children got paralysed daily in India. The original target for eradication was the year 2000. Nevertheless, we got there eleven years later. India’s pulse polio campaign has since become a source of confidence for public policy execution in India. We internalised the lesson that the Indian government can sometimes deliver through mission mode projects. 2012If you cannot solve a vexing public policy issue, turn it into a Right. It won’t work, but it will seem like you’ve done everything. After years of trying to get the national education policy right, the government decided it was best to make education a fundamental right in the Constitution. Maybe that will make the problem go away. A decade later, nothing has changed, but we have an additional right to feel good about.2013This year saw the emergence of AAP as a political force via the anti-corruption movement. AAP combines the classic elements of what makes a political party successful in India - statist instincts, focus on aam aadmi issues, populism and ideological flexibility. Importantly, it is good at telling its own version of some future utopia rather than questioning the utopia of others. 2014The BJP came to power with many promises; the most alluring of them was ‘minimum government, maximum governance’. Over the past eight years it has claimed success in meeting many of its promises, but even its ardent supporters won’t claim any success on minimum government. In fact, it has gone the other way. That a party with an immensely popular PM, election machinery that rivals the best in the world, and virtually no opposition cannot shake us off our instinctive belief in the State's power never ceases to surprise us.2015The murder of a person by a mob on the charges of eating beef was the first clear indication of the upsurge of a new violent, majoritarian polity. It was also one of the early incidents in India of radically networked communities using social media for self-organisation. Meanwhile, 2015 also witnessed the signing of a landmark boundary agreement between India and Bangladesh, which ended the abomination called the third-order enclave. The two States exchanged land peacefully, upholding the principle that citizen well-being trumps hardline interpretations of territorial integrity. 2016There will be many case studies written in future about demonetisation. Each one of them will end with a single conclusion. Public policy requires discussion and consensus, not stealth and surprise. We hope we have learnt our lesson from it.2017Until 2017, many in India still held the hope of a modus vivendi with China. Some others were enamoured by the Chinese model of governance. However, the Doklam crisis in 2017, and the Galwan clashes in 2020, changed all that. Through this miscalculation, China alienated a full generation of Indians, led to better India-US relations, and energised India to shift focus away from merely managing a weak Pakistan, and toward raising its game for competing with a stronger adversary. For this reason, we wrote a thank you note to Xi Jinping here. 2018It took years of efforts by the LGBTQ community to get Section 377 scrapped. In 2018, they partially won when the Supreme Court diluted Section 377 to exclude all kinds of adult consensual sexual behaviour. The community could now claim equal constitutional status as others. There’s still some distance to go for the State to acknowledge non-heterosexual unions and provide for other civil rights to the community. But the gradual acceptance of the community because of decriminalisation is a sign that our society doesn’t need moral policing or lectures to judge what’s good for it.2019The J&K Reorganisation Act changed the long-standing political status quo in Kashmir. Three years on, the return to political normalcy and full statehood still awaits. While a response by Pakistan was expected, it was China that fomented trouble in Ladakh, leading to the border clashes in 2020. 2020We have written multiple pieces on farm laws in the past year. The repeal of these laws, which were fundamentally sound because of a vocal minority, is the story of public policy in India. Good policies are scuttled because of the absence of consultation, an unclear narrative, opportunistic politicking or plain old hubris. We write this newsletter in the hope of changing this. 2021The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic left behind many bereaved families. People are still trying to pick up the pieces. The sadness was also interrupted by frustration because of the delays in getting the vaccination programme going. India benefited immensely from domestic vaccine manufacturing capability in the private sector. Despite many twists and turns in vaccine pricing and procurements, the year ended with over 1 billion administered doses. In challenging times, the Indian State, markets, and society did come together to fight the pandemic. So, here we are. In the 75th independent year of this beautiful, fascinating and often exasperating nation. We are a work in progress. We might walk slowly, but we must not walk backwards. May we all live in a happy, prosperous and equal society. Thanks for reading Anticipating the Unintended! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support our work. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit publicpolicy.substack.com

On episode #5 of Scroll Ideas, we are joined by India's former Foreign Secretary and China expert, Shyam Saran to discuss how China sees India. We talk about the Chinese perception of India, from ancient history right down to the Galwan clash of 2020. Our chat covers Buddhism, Mao and even how the British used Indian troops to attack China in the colonial age. Saran busts multiple myths about China, arguing that the country was not central to the world or even Asia, throughout history. In fact, India has a better claim to those achievements. Writer and host: Shoaib Daniyal | Producer: Karnika Kohli | Graphics design: Shruti Rego, Rubin D'Souza

3.488 km sull'Himalaya, la catena montuosa più alta del mondo: è la linea del confine tra Cina e India, i due Paesi più popolosi del pianeta. Il 15 giugno 2020 indiani e cinesi si sono scontrati in 48 ore di tafferugli nella valle del fiume Galwan. Uno scontro sui generis, a colpi di mazze ferrate. Alcuni indiani e cinesi sono morti, il numero dei feriti è imprecisato. Quello tra India e Cina, due nemici naturali, è un confine disputato da sempre, in particolare dal 1962 quando i due Paesi combatterono una guerra sanguinosa durata 40 giorni. Vinse la Cina, che spostò il confine dove è oggi. E con la Cina sempre più aggressiva e muscolare in Asia e un'India che pur guardando soprattutto al proprio interno, aspira a un ruolo di super potenza, quella linea di contatto torna a essere una zona di tensione latente nel territorio asiatico. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this episode we are in conversation with the former chairman of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) Shyam saran about his new book, How China sees India and the world and the authoritative view of India-China relationship. Two years after the Galwan clashes on June 15-16, 2020, in which at least 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers were killed, the government says it has still not ascertained why China amassed its troops in such large numbers at the border. In this episode, author Shyam Saran lists a number of reasons while also delving deep into the historic relationships between the two countries. With dates, events and personality, this book sums up volumes of Chinese history, giving it a very comprehensive and uniquely Indian perspective as well. In this episode of the On Books podcast, we discuss some of the history but most importantly talk about what we can learn from China that will help up deal with this challenge today and in the future. 

In its version of the clash, a Chinese military channel ran a clip from a documentary featuring Chen Xiangrong, one of the four PLA soldiers who died in Galwan. ----more---- https://theprint.in/opinion/chinascope/what-the-chinese-govt-media-told-people-on-two-years-of-galwan/1003228/  

During foreign minister Wang Yi's recent visit to Delhi, there was speculation that China might be willing to step back on its position in Eastern Ladakh. That seems unlikely now. ----more---- https://theprint.in/opinion/chinascope/pla-soldiers-mastering-hindi-and-chinese-court-jails-man-for-disrespecting-galwan-martyr/900780/

China has used its economic clout and superpower status with increasing sophistication. The adeptness of China in flipping the international outcry on COVID originating from its lands into a sophisticated pandemic diplomacy, with the sharing of equipment and medicines, across the world, was evident. With everything from the world's biggest trade deal the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or new `Silk Road', China is growing by leaps and bounds. India's engagement with China has involved friction lately, particularly after the Galwan valley confrontation. In this interaction, Prof. Vaidyanathan and Dr. Guha Majumdar speak of going beyond rhetoric and jingoism, particularly when such banter is for suiting the narrative of certain international factions such as that around the United States or for needless self-righteousness, and understand the evolving geopolitics and international economics in play. They close their interaction with a discussion of huayuquan, which approximately translates as discourse power, in Chinese foreign affairs, along with need for India to use its soft power as well as promote increasing awareness as well as engagement with China. To support Infinity Foundation's projects including the continuation of such episodes and the research we do: इनफिनिटी फ़ौंडेशन की परियोजनाओं को अनुदान देने के लिए व इस प्रकार के एपिसोड और हमारे द्वारा किये जाने वाले शोध को जारी रखने के लिए: http://infinityfoundation.com/donate-2/ Do check out our YouTube channel 'Rajiv Malhotra Official' and do follow us on Facebook '@RajivMalhotra.Official' and Twitter '@InfinityMessage' and '@RajivMessage'. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/kurukshetra/support

In the third episode of our series, hosted by Sushant Singh (Senior Fellow, CPR), featuring leading experts on the various facets of Sino-India relations, we are joined by Taylor Fravel (Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science & Director, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) to discuss the strategic aspects of Sino-India relations. Singh and Fravel unpack the relevance of the Chinese strategic guidelines for India and the significance of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) ground forces in a challenge against India. They also discuss the concept of active defence and the current PLA deployment at the Indian border, what could prompt Chinese aggression and its definition of a red line. Fravel also sheds light on China's domestic affairs, the Galwan incident and increase of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sponsored nationalism. Finally, Singh and Fravel unpack the breakdown of the India-China SOPs that had been held for over three decades, the events in Doklam, China's intentions for the border crisis and what we can expect in the future.

A version of this essay was published by Chintan at https://chintan.indiafoundation.in/articles/poor-optics-retreat-from-the-quad-and-proliferation-make-aukus-a-bad-pact/The AUKUS strategic alliance among Australia, the US and the UK was an unexpected bombshell. Among the unpleasantly surprised were India and Japan, partners of the US and Australia in the Quad quasi-alliance. France (and the rest of the European Union) were also upset. (France also had a reasonable commercial peeve: its diesel-submarine order worth $40 billion with Australia was cancelled without notice).AUKUS has been spun by American and especially British commentators as a wonderful new initiative to contain China, this time with some military might. Meanwhile China continues to rampage in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, and threatens to capture the continental shelves of nations like Indonesia and Vietnam via ‘research’ ships.However, there are serious concerns, especially from the point of view of India, which obviously has its own military issues relating to China, based on the latter’s nibbling away at the Indo-Tibetan Himalayan border, leading of course to June clashes in Galwan. Reports about a huge build up of infrastructure and war materiel in Tibet, incursions deep into Indian territory, and the setting up of villages inside Bhutan point to a ‘salami slicing’ approach.In the context of the looming Chinese threat to the prevailing international order, it is only natural that the US should take steps to preserve its primacy. Thus the Quad, which was first mooted by Prime Minister Abe of Japan: a coalition of democracies in the Indo-Pacific, with a common interest in containing a rampaging China, and the muscle to enforce their will. They will never say “contain China”, but that’s the intent.Former US President Obama allegedly made a “pivot to Asia”, but it was on his watch that China captured the South China Sea, suffering no consequences therefrom. Former US President Trump at least made noises about decoupling from China and attempted to bring in a consensus about lakshmana rekhas around China.In this context, three things current US President Biden has done appear to be counter-productive: one, the humiliating exit from Afghanistan; two, the AUKUS announcement, and three, the acceptance of Chinese hostage-taking tactics in the case of the CFO of Huawei.All three instances created doubts about American credibility, dependability, and will/ability to stand up for its partners. In the aftermath of the withdrawal from Kabul and the announcement about AUKUS, China has redoubled its intimidation of Taiwan; it will likely do the same to Japan re the Senkakus; and generally do the same all over Asia.It is true that the US needed to exit Afghanistan, but surely not like this. The headlong retreat implied that America’s friendship is hostage to expediency, and can be withdrawn any moment based on domestic compulsions. Henry Kissinger’s quip that “it is dangerous to be America's enemy, but fatal to be its friend” leaps to mind.Similarly, maybe the US needed to bring Australia under its wing, but surely not like this. By sneaking the AUKUS announcement in a few days before the Quad summit, Biden deemed the Quad a lame duck. All the flowery language in the Quad declaration couldn’t conceal the fact that it had been downgraded. That the two non-white members of the Quad, India and Japan, were kept in the dark about AUKUS suggests certain agendas. Besides, AUKUS does not seem to have troubled the Chinese very much: that, in and of itself, is ominous. The Chinese, as part of their ‘wolf-warrior’ diplomacy, habitually fly into a rage at the slightest of provocations: this is an intimidation tactic. But the official Chinese reaction to the AUKUS announcement was muted. Here’s what they said: “extremely irresponsible” and “seriously undermines regional peace and intensifies the arms race.” Even the excitable Global Times only said, “Washington is losing its mind by trying to rally its allies against China”, “The US intends to turn the Quad and AUKUS into ‘sinister gangs’ containing China,” and “[we] warn solemnly Japan, India and Australia not to follow the US too far in confronting China. Once they step on the red line of China’s core interests, China will not care about their relations with the US, and China will not hesitate to punish them.” That is very restrained by Chinese standards: the only conclusion we can draw is that they agree with Napoleon’s epigram: “Never interrupt the enemy when he’s making a mistake“. They think AUKUS is a win for them. The Chinese are probably right. Despite the spin doctoring, this marks a historic retreat by America. The Biden team are laboring under an atavistic Atlanticist illusion of a white Anglophone alliance to dominate the world. Those days are long gone. The UK in particular is on a downward spiral after Brexit, and may soon be shorn of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.If the US wanted to proliferate nuclear submarine propulsion technology to Australia, they could have done so. Why choose an intermediary like the UK that doesn’t add value? I am reminded of the classic scene from Catch-22, where Yossarian wonders why the comatose patient needs to be an intermediary between the drip feed bag and the waste removal bag. Why not just connect the two?, he asks.That also brings up the nuclear question. Why is the US proliferating nuclear technology to Australia, a non-nuclear power and a fierce NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) adherent which refused to sell uranium to India citing the NPT? Maybe I am missing something, but doesn’t this US act eviscerate the NPT? If India were to transfer nuclear tech to Taiwan, would everybody be so quiet? Of course not: there are serious double standards in play. Besides, Australia is pretty far away from China, and in any case the first submarines under the AUKUS deal will not (according to plan) appear till the 2040s. Too little, too late. The spurned parties, France, Japan and India, should perhaps form a triad. France has nuclear propulsion technology; surely it can do a technology transfer to India (forget the NPT); and France has a lot of interests in the Indo-Pacific, far more than the UK. On the whole, AUKUS seems like a very bad deal, despite the PR storm that shows it in a good light.1030 words, 4 Oct 2021 This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com