Technopolitik

Last week saw a flurry of technopolitical developments as the US and India announced a slew of technology and defense deals. In case you missed it, we had a special post dissecting the preliminary details of India's accession to the Artemis Accords. Check it out here! Also tune in to this podcast episode of All Things Policy, where Pranay Kotasthane, Aditya Ramanathan, Bharath Reddy, and Saurabh Todi from the High-Tech Geopolitics team discuss the announcements in the India-US joint statement in the field of Semiconductors, Advanced Telecommunications, and Space.Matsyanyaaya 1: Concerns Surrounding TikTok and the Future of ‘Project Texas'— Anushka SaxenaOn June 16, the CEO of the controversial Chinese media platform TikTok, Shou Zi Chew, sent a letter to US Congress Senators Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), responding to their questions about the company surrounding the storage of data of American users on the platform. In his testimony to a House Committee of the US Congress, Shou had previously stated that "American data has always been stored in Virginia and Singapore." But now, a Forbes investigation from late May has revealed that this may not entirely be true. This investigation prompted said Senators to seek answers from TikTok, and Shou's letter has confirmed said suspicions.What did Forbes' investigation say?On May 30, Forbes published a report arguing that "over the past several years, thousands of TikTok creators and businesses around the world have given the company sensitive financial information—including their social security numbers and tax IDs—so that they can be paid by the platform. But unbeknownst to many of them, TikTok has stored that personal financial information on servers in China that are accessible by employees there, Forbes has learned."Further, their report argued: "TikTok uses various internal tools and databases from its Beijing-based parent ByteDance to manage payments to creators who earn money through the app, including many of its biggest stars in the United States and Europe. The same tools are used to pay outside vendors and small businesses working with TikTok. But a trove of records obtained by Forbes from multiple sources across different parts of the company reveals that highly sensitive financial and personal information about those prized users and third parties has been stored in China. The discovery also raises questions about whether employees who are not authorized to access that data have been able to. It draws on internal communications, audio recordings, videos, screenshots, documents marked "Privileged and Confidential," and several people familiar with the matter."…And what has Shou said in his letter to Blackburn and Blumenthal?The point of the letter is to confirm that over the past year, TikTok has collaborated closely with Oracle to implement various measures to enhance the protection of the application, systems, and the security of data belonging to its users in the United States. They also announced that in January 2023, they had achieved a significant milestone in this endeavour – the default storage location for US user data has been changed. All US user traffic is currently being directed to Oracle Cloud Infrastructure. While TikTok's data centres in the US and Singapore are still utilized for backup purposes, the company's ongoing efforts involve removing US users' private data from our data centres. Their objective is to fully transition to Oracle cloud servers in the United States, for which, as of March 2023, they have also started deleting previously stored data from foreign servers.But the controversy has arisen from the second main iteration of the letter, which reads: "TikTok has been clear that there are certain, limited exceptions to the definition of protected data. These exceptions are in place to help ensure interoperability of TikTok as a global platform and were determined as part of TikTok's extensive, multi-year negotiations with CFIUS that have occurred under two Administrations. Exceptions include categories such as public data, business metrics, interoperability data, and certain creator data, if a creator voluntarily signs up for a commercial program to be supported by TikTok in reaching new audiences and monetizing content. As part of Project Texas, we are also designing a trusted path to enable TikTok to respond to global government and litigation demands for documents relating to users."This confirms that if a content creator based out of the US has subscribed to paid content promotion programmes on the platform for the sake of 'interoperability', their data has been redirected to servers abroad… including those in China.The senators have responded in an obviously indignant manner, stating: "We are extremely concerned that TikTok is storing Americans' personal, private data within the reach of the Chinese government. TikTok executives appear to have repeatedly and intentionally misled Congress when answering how the company secures and protects the data of Americans. TikTok's response makes it crystal clear that Americans' data is still exposed to Beijing's draconian and pervasive spying regimes – despite the claims of TikTok's misleading public relations campaign."What is Project Texas?'Project Texas' is Shou Zi Chew's answer to the US Congress's security concerns. Through the Project, TikTok in the US would maintain local data servers disallowing any flow of information of American users outside the country, and Oracle will reportedly own these servers. Moreover, as part of the Project, TikTok might also reveal its algorithm to the US agencies for greater transparency.At this point, the countries of the 'Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance', namely the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK, as well as the European Parliament, have already collectively banned TikTok from being installed in government-issued/ federal service devices, to prevent sensitive official data from reaching the hands of China, or any externally based TikTok server that the US may have no jurisdiction over. Moreover, a Bill by US Senator McCaul on 'Deterring America's Technological Adversaries' Act (DATA Act) is already tabled for discussion in Congress since February this year, and it identifies TikTok and its parent company 'ByteDance' major security threats to American users' privacy. With the developments in the debate on TikTok and data governance likely to continue, the latest controversy surrounding the letter may well be the death knell that pushes the US to adopt broader legislation regulating civilian uses of the app. Cyberpolitik Explainer : The Soviet Semiconductor Failure— Revati GandekarSemiconductors are critical for technological sectors that produce electronic components such as transistors, diodes, integrated circuits, and microprocessors. These components are essential for computers, telecommunications, consumer electronics, military, and aerospace. The semiconductor industry played a pivotal role in shaping the technological landscape of the 20th century. While the United States and other Western countries experienced significant growth and innovation in this field, the Soviet Union also made notable advancements in the semiconductor industry. This aims to analyze the rise and fall of the semiconductor industry in the USSR, exploring what contributed to its initial success, the subsequent challenges, and ultimately the industry's failure. In the late 1950s, the USSR recognized the potential of semiconductor technology and sought to develop its industry. They established research institutes, such as the Moscow Institute of Electronic Technology and the Lebedev Physical Institute, which focused on semiconductor research and development. Additionally, collaborations with Eastern Bloc countries, such as East Germany, helped accelerate the industry's growth.Unlike the market-driven approach of the West industries, the USSR's semiconductor sector was primarily state-driven. The Soviet government heavily invested in research and development, providing massive funding and resources to semiconductor projects. This support allowed Soviet scientists and engineers to progress significantly in the field, albeit often in a more secretive and controlled environment.The Soviet semiconductor industry achieved several notable milestones during its heyday. In the early 1960s, Soviet scientists developed the first silicon planar transistor, a breakthrough that revolutionized transistor manufacturing worldwide. The USSR also made significant progress in integrated circuit technology, contributing to advancements in military electronics, space exploration, and industrial automation.While the USSR achieved remarkable progress in the semiconductor industry, it faced numerous challenges and limitations that eventually hindered its growth. One significant factor was the lack of open collaboration and information exchange with Western countries. The USSR's isolationist policies limited access to global semiconductor developments, impeding the industry's ability to keep pace with international advancements. This stifled innovation, as government committees with little technical expertise decided on resource allocation, technology adoption, and production targets. The lack of market-oriented incentives hindered the industry's ability to respond to changing market dynamics and meet international standards.One of the main challenges that the Soviet Union faced in developing its semiconductor industry was the initial ideological opposition to cybernetics, which was seen as a bourgeois pseudoscience that threatened the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This attitude changed in the late 1950s and early 1960s when Nikita Khrushchev adopted a policy that encouraged computer production and scientific research. The Soviet Union realized the strategic implications of semiconductors and set up new facilities to manufacture them in cities like Leningrad and Riga. In 1958, the Soviet government set up a whole new city, Zelenograd, a technical-type Special Economic Zone, just for semiconductor manufacturing.The Soviet Union's centralized planning and bureaucratic system also posed challenges for the semiconductor industry. This top-down approach led to inefficiencies. As a result, in 1973-74, USSR produced only basic types of semiconductors (transistors and diodes), and the production was close to only 2% of the US output. However, the Soviet semiconductor industry soon encountered another problem: technological lag behind the West. Moreover, the Soviet Union could not keep up with the rapid innovation and miniaturization of Western semiconductors, especially after the invention of the integrated circuit in 1959. It also suffered from a shortage of skilled personnel, quality control, and market incentives. To overcome these difficulties, it resorted to copying Western designs and importing Western machinery and components. For example, the KR580VM80A was a clone of the Intel 8080 CPU, and Soviet scientists also replicated the Texas Instruments SN-51, as these processors were able to execute several thousand instructions per second. The USSR also tried to obtain specialized production equipment and complete production processes from the Free World, sometimes indirectly from the US. However, this increased dependence on foreign sources violated international trade regulations and prevented original innovation. The country faced a scarcity of raw materials, inadequate infrastructure, and a lack of market-oriented incentives. Additionally, this contributed to poor quality control and an inability to compete with Western semiconductor manufacturers.The global interests of major semiconductor-producing countries, particularly the United States and its allies, also influenced the USSR's failure in the industry. The Cold War rivalry intensified the competition between the Soviet Union and the West. The US and its allies pursued technological advancements in semiconductors to gain a competitive edge in various industries, including telecommunications, computers, and consumer electronics. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the semiconductor industry in the USSR experienced a rapid decline. It marked the end of its semiconductor industry as a coherent entity. Most of the Soviet computer manufacturers ceased operations or switched to other products. A few companies that survived into the 1990s used foreign components and have yet to achieve significant production volumes. The economic turmoil, political instability, and transition to a market-based economy further eroded the industry. The dismantling of the planned economy also led to a brain drain, as skilled professionals looked for opportunities in the private sector or emigrated to other countries.The Soviet Union had some achievements in this field, such as creating the first electronic computer in continental Europe (MESM) and developing some local semiconductor facilities. However, it faced many challenges, including ideological opposition, technological lag, foreign dependence, and internal disorganization. The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in the fragmentation and decline of its semiconductor industry. In conclusion, complete government intervention in the semiconductor industry in USSR had adverse effects on isolating innovation and lagging behind foreign rivals. The government controlled and centralized the semiconductor industry but failed to foster innovation and competitiveness. The government intervention isolated it as it lagged behind the US and its allies in terms of technology, production, and market share. While the USSR made significant strides in semiconductor research and development, the industry's ultimate decline can be attributed to factors such as limited international collaboration, centralized planning, economic challenges, and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. Despite its eventual demise, the legacy of the Soviet semiconductor industry serves as a reminder of the importance of collaboration, innovation, and market-oriented policies.Matsyanyaaya 2: The Fission Factor in India-US Ties— Saurabh TodiLast month Science and Technology Minister Jitendra Singh revealed that Indian scientists are working on developing small modular reactors, or SMRs, one of the most promising emerging technologies in nuclear power. The interest in new technology and India's ambitious plan to build 10 new reactors in a decade is evidence of an enduring commitment to nuclear energy. Recently, the India-US Joint Statement following PM Modi's State Visit also affirmed nuclear energy as a necessary resource to meet our nations' climate, energy transition, and energy security needs. Both leaders also noted the ongoing discussion on developing next-generation small modular reactor technologies in a collaborative mode for the domestic market as well as for export. The nuclear industry is undergoing a renaissance. Over 50 nuclear reactors are under construction globally today. Even countries like South Korea and Japan, which were planning to phase out nuclear power, have reconsidered or scaled back their decisions. The European Union's inclusion of nuclear power as a sustainable investment has further enhanced its appeal. Technological advancements led by start-ups and established companies have further improved the long-term outlook for nuclear power. Innovations such as SMRs, pebble-bed reactors, and molten-salt reactors aim to enhance the safety, flexibility in size, and economic viability of nuclear plants. China also recently issued an operational permit for its first experimental thorium-based reactor.This sector is ripe for further and intensified cooperation between India-US and other close partners such as Japan and Australia.Matsyanyaaya 3: High-Tech Takes Centre-Stage— Pranay KotasthaneI don't think any serious policy analyst—even five years ago—would have anticipated that the press briefing of an Indian PM's Official State Visit to the US would headline concrete actions on high-tech areas such as semiconductors, critical minerals, telecommunications, Space, Quantum Computing, and Artificial Intelligence.Nevertheless, here we are. Technology is now the centrepiece of the India-US partnership. This technology framework includes strategic technologies, such as jet engine manufacturing in India and space, and also commercial technologies, such as telecommunications, optical fibres, and semiconductors.How Does it Matter?Technology occupying the pole position in India-US relations is a big change in the foreign policy outlooks on technology partnerships. Here's why.Phase 1.0After its independence, India interacted with many countries in the West to access advanced industrial technologies. The US specifically assisted India's nuclear and space programmes, helped develop IIT Kanpur, and contributed to the Green Revolution.Phase 2.0But technology became a sore point as the Cold War picked up pace. India faced stringent denial of technology from international regimes in the nuclear and space sectors. The denial of Indian membership into multilateral export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) cast a long shadow on India's foreign policy outlook. The US came to be seen as a technology denier. India's default stance over the next five decades was to protect its turf in global technological fora while simultaneously developing and shielding domestic capabilities.This is why the civil nuclear deal in 2005 was such a big deal. It helped India and the US move on from a low-level equilibrium. However, technology still remained a marginal area of cooperation at a time when terrorism and American support for Pakistan gated progress in other sectors.Phase 3.0The Modi-Biden Summit is a firm indication that India's foreign policy outlook on technology has changed. Contributing factors are a growing domestic technological base; an increased presence of Indian talent in the global technology ecosystem; emergent geopolitical realities concerning China; and the rising contribution of crosscutting technologies in national power.The Indian foreign policy establishment now has a far more positive view of technology and the opportunities it offers for collaboration and competition, apart from contestation. India also realises that technology is now a global enterprise where autarchy is not an option. The contemporary concern is to manage interdependence and make technological supply chains trusted, transparent and resilient. More recently, India's advances in large-scale digital public infrastructure—payments, identity and data-sharing—give it the confidence to use technology to deepen diplomatic ties.As for the US, technology has become a primary driver for addressing the China challenge. Nuclear weapons make large-scale conventional conflict unlikely. Similarly, China's disproportionate role in material supply chains makes any large-scale economic decoupling costly. Consequently, contestation has been in the high-technology domain.Apart from the denial of technology to China, it has also meant that the US has changed the foreign policy use of technology towards its partners. Cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS arrangement showed that the US was now willing to share sensitive technologies with partners to counter China. Back then, in the context of India's dependence on Russia for defence systems, I wrote:It is thus in the West's interest to apply this new technology alliance mindset to India. As more options become available, India will find it easier to reduce its dependence on Russia.It seems this has come true to an extent. The US has been more forthcoming in sharing technology than opening its markets. The FTA with India remains a non-starter, but technology collaboration has grown rapidly.What does it Imply?High-tech cooperation is also not as high-stakes as the more contentious areas like trade and the South China Sea. The India-US relationship is so far behind the production possibility frontier on technology, trade and defence that there are enough low-hanging fruits to pick. And that's exactly what we are seeing now.In edition #165, I proposed a tri-axis framework to look at the India-US relationship: state-to-state relations, state-to-people relations, and people-to-people relations. There has never been a problem on the people-to-people axis. As the State Visit shows, state-to-state relations have also turned a corner. However, it is the state-to-people axis that is the problematic axis. Many Indians still seem to harbour a deep frustration with the American State. On the other hand, many Americans also have doubts about India as a partner of strategic importance.Only the two administrations could do something to break this ceiling. By delivering on the asymmetric promises under the technology and defence agreements, the state-to-people axis will finally move on from recollections of the technology denial regime. The announcements are just the beginning; a lot depends on the execution from both sides in these areas.Note: this piece was earlier published on Anticipating the Unintended #216. Check it out here!Our Reading Menu[Explainer] The problem with India's new guidelines on genetically modified insects, by Dr. Shambhavi Naik.[Op-ed] India mustn't miss this chance to supercharge its electronic goods industry, by Anupam Manur and Pranay Kotasthane.[Op-ed] Our PLI schemes are in need of a coherent trade policy, by Satya S. Sahu. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Matsyanyaaya: Insights from recent OEWG discussions on Information and Communications Technologies— Anushka SaxenaThe militarisation of cyberspace is a reality. And to enable states to discuss and adopt common rules for global governance of cyberspace, on 31 December 2020, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 75/240  establishing an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on the security of and in the use of Information and Communications Technologies. The mandate for the Group extends from 2021 to 2025.The Group recently concluded its informal, inter-sessional meetings on 26 May, and deliberations put forth by various states give us some insights into the kind of talking points we could look out for during the fifth Substantive Session of the Group, scheduled for July 2023.To summarise, various stakeholders, ranging from governments and representatives of UN bodies to scholars from think tanks and technology corporations, submitted ideas about what the 2023 Annual Progress Report (APR) should entail. All of their ideas either build on or expand what has already been discussed in the previous substantive and informal sessions in 2023 or the 2022 APR. Some interesting ideas are as follows:* Iran submitted a Working Paper on establishing a provisional directory of 'Points of Contact' (PoCs) on ICT and cybersecurity.●     The first proposal to develop such a global directory was tabled in the UN Governmental Group of Experts Reports of 2013 (A/68/98). Now, every GGE and OEWG discussion notes progress on the directory.●     The aim of this directory shall be for states to appoint field experts in technical or diplomatic positions (or both), which would be a part of a global PoC network debating everything from responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and the applicability of international law to defining threats to ICT.●     As we know, the current Indian government has quite a knack for portals, and to formalise the creation of a PoCs global directory, India, too, has proposed the creation of a Global Cyber Security Cooperation Portal. The proposal, submitted by India's Permanent Representative in New York in July 2022, states that such a Portal shall be voluntarily updated by states and maintained by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs.* The UNOCT/UNCCT and the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate presented proposals for 'capacity building'. The proposal by the former was basically about glorifying the successes of its Global CounterTerrorism Programme on Cybersecurity and New Technologies. But the latter proposal, presented by the UNCTED, emphatically highlights the challenge of malicious online activity by rogue non-state actors and how existing counter-terrorism infrastructure can be leveraged to deal with it.●     The important recommendation is to develop comprehensive training programmes for law enforcement personnel and criminal justice practitioners working with digital evidence. The mention of the latter may be an important signal of more private sector participation in navigating the legalities of what constitutes 'terrorism' in cyberspace.* Submissions from the private sector mainly highlighted which governmental proposals are the most crucial for focus on in the next substantive session and how they can be expanded or narrowed down:●     Stimson Center's submission iterated that the two major emerging technologies states should agree on are common threats to ICT Security are ransomware and Artificial Intelligence.●     It should be noted that both El Salvador and Czechia had made statements during the last substantive session in March on the need for developing standards on 'responsible state behaviour' in new and emerging tech like AI and Quantum. But these efforts would be futile until states can first agree on what harmful use of AI/ Quantum is, given the dual nature of such technologies, and then move on to standard-setting.●     DCX Technologies presented anecdotes on how to avert a ransomware attack and engage with the attacker. Two suggestions stand out from their four-page intervention – one, that knowledge of critical infrastructure is essential to know how to protect it (such as by using enterprise security tools to detect malicious behaviour), and second, that any response to a large-scale ransomware attack such as the one DCX faced in 2020 requires a transparent, multi-stakeholder mitigation model.If adopted and developed, these ideas could provide meaningful direction for the next set of discussions at the OEWG-ICT. However, if we look at some of the concerns governments presented during the fourth substantive session of the Group earlier in March, we can safely conclude that some of these ideas are a massive jump ahead of the tide. For example, India's primary concern during the session was as fundamental as something can be – for states to converge on their definitions and interpretations of international law! Similarly, Kenya's proposal entailed that states at least converge on how to define 'common threats in the cyberspace'.This is, however, not to say that there exist no agreements whatsoever – states at the OEWG have now come to agree that the UN Charter is readily applicable to cybersecurity (especially provisions under Articles 2(1), 2(4), and 33). In doing so, they have cemented the idea that existing global governance institutions like the International Court of Justice can be utilised even to resolve cyber-incident disputes peacefully. This has not stopped countries like Russia and Syria from proposing a new legally-binding mechanism to govern state behaviour in ICT, citing the inability of existing mechanisms to do so. Overall, some convergence exists on building capacity, creating a global knowledge base involving both state and non-state actors, and creating a due diligence mechanism for states to respond to malicious activities originating from their territory. The next Substantive Session would be vital to understand how states respond to these ideas and whether they can agree to resolve some of the fundamental challenges facing the OEWG's ambitious goals.Cyberpolitik : A “broadly” unclear Light-Touch Regulation for India's Online Gaming Industry.— Satya SahuOnline gaming is one of the fastest-growing segments of India's digital economy, with millions of users playing various games on platforms ranging from smartphones, consoles and PCs. India's gaming population is pegged to reach 700 million by 2025, with a significant portion of players spending real money on games. (current conversion rate is about 24% or 120 million players. It is a good bet that this trend will comfortably allow the Indian online gaming industry's ambitions of growing to USD 8.6 billion by 2027. However, online gaming also comes with challenges and risks, because it can serve as a pathway to gambling using real money, addiction, an easy target for cybercrime, and exposure to illegal illicit content.So of course, the Ministry of Electronics and IT (MeitY) notified amendments to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, related to online gaming in early April 2023.  The amendments aim to enforce greater due diligence by online gaming intermediaries, such as platforms, websites, and apps that offer online games, and to protect users from illegal betting and wagering online. The amendments also envisage the creation of self-regulatory bodies (SROs) that will register and certify permissible online games and resolve complaints through a grievance redressal mechanism.In most regards, the amendments have garnered applause from the gaming industry for being an unusual example of a light-touch regulation and promoting the idea of a trustworthy self-regulating market. It is a rare example of an enabling legislation meant to promote regulatory certainty without much in the way of prescriptive mandates. But with the lack of prescription, also comes uncertainty, particularly in the matter of definitions involved in deciding what constitutes "online gaming", "betting”, or "gambling. While jurisprudence across the country is settled on the distinction being whether the game in question has an element of skill or an element of chance (with the latter legally prohibited), the Rules do not provide any assistance in making that distinction clear.There is also a significant issue about the implementation of these regulations due to the fact that gambling is a state list subject under the Indian constitution; however, the discussion on federalism in this context is beyond the scope of this post.This post's focus, however, is the definition of “user harm” in the context of online gaming. As per the explanation to Rule 3(1)(b)(ii), “user harm” and “harm” mean any effect which is detrimental to a user or child, as the case may be.Even at a cursory glance, this definition is unusually broad and vague, leaving much room for interpretation and discretion by the government and the SROs. For instance, would considerations of obscenity, defamation, hate speech, discrimination, harassment, cyberbullying, cyberstalking, phishing, hacking, identity theft, addiction, or compulsive behaviour etc be relevant while defining “harm” in the context of online gaming? How will these terms be defined and measured? Who decides whether an online game is likely to incite any of these harms? What are the criteria and standards for such decisions? How will the users be informed and educated about these harms and their consequences?Moreover, a definition of user harm that does not take into account the diversity and complexity of online gaming genres, formats, modes, and audiences would be woefully limited. Online gaming is not a monolithic phenomenon, but a rapidly evolving one, with different types of games catering to different players.In games, the depiction of drug use, violence, and sexually explicit content is handled by certification and age-rating systems like ESRB and PEGI in the US and the UK respectively, with generally consistent decision-making. In the case of India, the Rules mention the objective of tackling content-related concerns in terms of depiction of violent or inappropriate content. However, Rules 4A(8) and 4C have imposed an obligation on the SRO to ensure that the verification process to determine a game's permissibility be based on a self-devised framework which assesses whether an online game contains adequate safeguards against user harm. The only considerations to be used while formulating said framework, are “self harm and psychological harm”, which do not do much to circumscribe our definitional woes. The idea of the SROs to also act as a classification and age-rating body is a possible step in the right direction assuming that multiple SROs will not create conflicting frameworks for verification. While India's approach may end up as a beefed-up version of the US and the UK (with legal liabilities on the online gaming intermediaries, and direct oversight of the Union Government etc.) , the case of Australia's National Classification Code should serve as a warning of the kind of distortions that can be created in a regulatory regime when overbroad concepts are used to define what constitutes “harm” to the player. Australia's Office of Film and Literature Classification, bound by their legislative regime, can reject certification for a game if its depiction of sex and drug use is potentially portrayed “positively”. Because age-ratings and classifications directly impact the commercial success of games (as well as movies, which is usually used as a counterpoint against controversial classification systems which do not keep up with the changing nature of multimedia consumption), the Indian gaming market can potentially find themselves reworking key aspects of their games just to be able to get them onto the market. It is a costly endeavour to say the least.As all these teething questions abound, one only hopes that a consistent framework is proposed to guide interpretations regarding the ambit of "user harm" before dispute redressal and adjudication processes inevitably commence in the future.Antariksh Matters : China's in a Hurry to Get to the Moon— Aditya RamanathanChina has announced an official deadline of 2030 for landing humans on the lunar surface. On Monday, Lin Xiqiang, the deputy head of the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA) said the mission to put humans on the Moon was underway and would include a programme of research during short visits. Lin's announcement confirms a public comment in April by Wu Weiren, a scientist with China's lunar exploration programme, who said putting humans on the Moon by 2030 was “not a problem”. China has been steadily developing its crewed lunar programme. In 2022, it unveiled a model of a 90-metre-long moon rocket scheduled to undergo a flight test in 2027. Earlier in 2019, a promotional video showed off what appeared to be a crewed vehicle for deep space travel being developed by the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST). China's ongoing pursuit of sustained human presence in low Earth orbit will contribute to its ability to send people to the Moon. Lin's official confirmation came at a press conference in which he also presented the new three-person crew for the Tiangong space station, which will launch into orbit this week, replacing three others who have been inhabiting the space station for six months. The experience with Tiangong will especially come in handy if China manages to proceed to the next stage of its lunar project: setting up a permanent base on the Moon. Lunar LivingIn 2021, China and Russia entered into an agreement to establish a permanent presence on the Moon. Eventually dubbed International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), the project was meant to be a direct counterpart to the United States' Artemis programme, which, as of this writing, still intends to return humans to the Moon by 2025 and eventually set up a permanent presence on the lunar surface and in orbit.In April, Wu publicly discussed a multi-stage plan for the ILRS up to 2050. This would include uncrewed missions and the setting up of a “basic version” that will be followed by a “full version” put together by 2040. Other stages include setting up a nuclear power source and research infrastructure. As with Artemis, China plans to support all this by putting a large constellation of satellites into lunar orbit for position navigation and timing (PNT), relay communications to the dark side of the Moon, and remote sensing. Earthly ConstraintsILRS may have begun as a Russia-China collaboration, but since the outbreak of the war with Ukraine, Russia has been conspicuous by its absence from recent Chinese statements. Instead, China has focused on its own plans and has sought other foreign partners for its upcoming Chang'e uncrewed missions to the Moon. China's lunar ambitions are also evidently fuelled by its rivalry with the United States. However, China does not have the option of blending competition with a bit of cooperation. In 2011, the US introduced the so-called ‘Wolf Amendment', which effectively bans US government funding to be used in cooperation with any Chinese entity without clearance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). While this is not technically an outright ban on space collaboration with China, its effect is much the same. Indeed, it seems clear that NASA is determined to keep away from China. NASA's administrator Bill Nelson has made alarmist remarks about China appropriating lunar territory, presumably to bolster support for the Artemis programme. However, if China and the US are engaged in a space race to the Moon, it is a relatively muted affair at the moment. Top politicians have not expended political capital on the issue, and space agencies have not seen an explosion in their budgets. The lunar ambitions of great powers will continue to be subject to Earthly constraints like economic downturns, wars, stubborn technological challenges, and myriad other pressing issues. Our Reading Menu[Podcast] - A Day in the Life of a Cop, a new limited series on 'policing' on All Things Policy, by Shrikrishna Upadhyay and Javeed Ahmed.[Op-ed] Rs 2,000 Note Withdrawal: No demonetisation redux but RBI could have done it better, by Anupam Manur.[Report] Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelly M. Sayler. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Biopolitik: The Power of Four: Biomanufacturing and the Quad— Saurabh TodiA biological revolution is underway in global manufacturing. Products produced from genetic engineering and biomanufacturing techniques are replacing many chemical, industrial and farm-based products. According to a 2020 McKinsey report, the substitution of chemical products with biological alternatives through modern biotechnology has the potential to produce up to 60 per cent of the physical inputs required by the global economy. Similar modern biotechnology efforts are underway for milk, meat, pharmaceuticals, oils and numerous other industries. Individually, these industries are worth many billions or trillions of dollars. Combined, they make biotechnology one of the most economically lucrative emerging technologies.However, beyond the obvious economic value, there is significant strategic and social value in modern biotechnologies. The products produced by modern biotechnology are or will be essential for producing food, energy, and health management. Those that control the IP and supply chains will potentially control key determinants of society's technological progress. There are also numerous potential military applications for biotechnology that range from food security to new, lightweight polymers to understanding the potential of highly effective biological weapons (which are banned under international law).Given the immense economic and strategic importance of these technologies, it is vital that countries do not place themselves in a vulnerable position. The Quad has sought to address this potential vulnerability by establishing a Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group that will monitor trends in critical and emerging technologies, such as synthetic biology, genome sequencing, and biomanufacturing, and also identify opportunities for cooperation within Quad.China plans to establish its dominance in biomanufacturing as well. In a Chinese government document on building the bioeconomy, a central theme was biomanufacturing at scale, including plastics, oils and agri-food technology. The ASPI critical technology tracker shows that academics in China publish more of the top 10% of most-cited academic papers for biomanufacturing than in any other country. Given China's track record in establishing a lead in several emerging technologies, There's good reason to believe China will build its biomanufacturing base faster than its competitors.To capitalise on the economic potential of the biomanufacturing industry and address potential supply chain vulnerabilities, we recommended that Quad countries establish a biomanufacturing hub in India. The proposed Quad-led hub would invest in three main areas: strengthening physical infrastructure, bolstering workforce capabilities, and identifying opportunities for collaboration.Researchers at the Takshashila Institution, Saurabh Todi and Shambhavi Naik, along with researchers at Australian National University, Dirk van der Kley and Daniel Pavlich, have explored this idea in detail in a recently published as a Discussion Document. The recommendation was published as op-eds in publications like ASPI Strategist.Matsyanyaaya: Preparing for the quantum leap— Rijesh PanickerThe National Mission for Quantum Technologies and Applications (NM-QTA) seeks to strengthen India's research and development ecosystem in various quantum technologies like quantum communications, quantum computing, quantum sensing and quantum materials. It will also look to build 50-100 qubit quantum computers within the next 5-8 years.With an outlay of ₹6,000 crores over the next eight years, NM-QTA represents a significant step forward from the Quantum Enabled Science and Technology (QueST) research program, funded by the Department of Science and Technology (DST) for ₹80 crore.India has also sought international collaboration in this area. Among these is a partnership between the National Science Foundation in the US and Indian science agencies as part of the US-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) in several areas, including quantum technologies, an Indo-US quantum coordination mechanism to facilitate research and collaboration, and an agreement with Finland, which includes setting up virtual quantum centres at three institutes in collaboration with Finnish academia.Three key factors explain this acceleration in investment in quantum technologies.First, quantum technologies are disruptive in their positive and negative impact. Quantum computers use quantum bits (qubits) to perform calculations based on quantum mechanical principles, allowing them to solve certain problems exponentially faster than traditional computers, which use classical bits (0 or 1) for computation. This is because qubits can exist in multiple states simultaneously (both 0 and 1), enabling quantum computers to perform many calculations at once, whereas classical bits can only exist in one state at a time. In areas such as material sciences and chemistry, quantum computers could prove groundbreaking, helping develop new and innovative molecules and materials at a rate faster than ever. Similarly, quantum secure communications significantly improve our cyber security and threat-detection capabilities. Conversely, quantum computers above a certain size (measured in qubits) can easily break the encryption algorithms that secure most of our data today. Any actor – either state or non-state – that captures financial, military and infrastructure-related data critical to our national interest only needs to hold onto it until quantum computers are of a certain capability to be able to decrypt the data. This leaves us vulnerable to the inevitable progress in quantum computing.The second factor is the global geopolitical environment. China and the US are battling for strategic advantage, especially in emerging technologies. Countries will protect their core technology, push for their standards and maintain close control over their allied supply chains. In quantum, for example, China has chosen to push its path forward. Similarly, India should not simply depend on its allies. In the 1990s, Russia was not allowed to fully transfer cryogenic engine technology to the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) due to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that existed. Ultimately, ISRO developed its own indigenous cryogenic engine in 2014. We must avoid something similar happening to us in the quantum space.We can see this playing out in the area of quantum communications, where countries like China, Japan, and South Korea have demonstrated their own quantum secure communication networks. The standards for quantum communications are still being developed, and whoever influences these standards gains an advantage. In the quantum computing space, there are multiple methods to build a quantum computing core, each with its strengths and weaknesses. No one technology has a clear path to a viable, large-scale quantum computer. The winner of this race will undoubtedly have a long-term advantage over its competitors. A third reason to consider is our relative weakness in high-tech research and development (R&D). India has spent about 0.7% of its GDP on R&D annually over the last decade. In particular, the government accounts for over 55% of all R&D investments in India. In contrast, China spends about 2.1% and the US 3% of GDP on research, both with high levels of private sector participation. Compare the nearly $1.2 billion investment in quantum computing just in 2022 by the private sector in the US with the National Quantum Mission (NM-QTA) $730 million budget over the next eight years. A recent study by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) comparing quantum investments across countries shows India lagging the US and China, both in terms of trained manpower and in terms of research conducted (as measured by highly cited papers; probably a biased metric for quality of research, but a metric nonetheless).We must choose where to be “Atmanirbhar” and where we want to depend on others. India must decide where to wait and watch and where to go now. In some areas, like quantum communications, we have already decided to go, which is the right move.As a matter of good strategy, India must identify those parts of the quantum technology space where we need to maintain technological independence and diversity. A considered allocation of resources to build infrastructure, fund and encourage research, train manpower, and participate in and influence global standards is a great path forward.Antariksh Matters: China's secretive space plane— Aditya RamanathanChina's enigmatic space plane landed horizontally on Earth on May 8 after 276 days in orbit, according to the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC).The uncrewed reusable vehicle was launched in August 2022 on a Long March 2F rocket. This was the second such mission involving a reusable vehicle. In September 2020, a reusable craft was put into orbit for just two days, during which time it deployed two small objects into orbit. The recently concluded mission also involved putting a payload into orbit. On October 31, 2022, about three months after its launch, the craft deployed an object that may have been a small companion satellite meant to monitor the craft. Chinese crewed craft have released similar monitoring satellites in the past.The space situational awareness company Leolabs tracked the Chinese craft and has concluded that it docked with an ‘Object J' (most likely the same monitoring satellite) two or three times. Leolabs also concluded that the space plane had an independent capacity to manoeuvre and propel itself while in orbit.Everyone Likes SpaceplanesStates have been experimenting with space planes for decades. The erstwhile US Space Shuttle was the most prominent example of a reusable crewed vehicle that was launched vertically and landed horizontally.However, most ongoing space plane programmes are uncrewed, and some have explicit military roles. For instance, Boeing is developing the uncrewed X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV), which is operated by the US Space Force. The X-37B is already considerably ahead of China's space plane programme, having completed six missions, the last of which was in orbit for 908 days. Like China's space planes, the X-37B is capable of placing objects in orbit, such as the experimental FalconSAT-8 for the US Air Force. Other countries have been looking to develop space planes of their own. India took a modest first step in this direction in April when it dropped a prototype 6.5 metre-long uncrewed space plane called the Reusable Launch Vehicle from a helicopter and landed it.Private companies are also attempting to develop space planes of their own. The most prominent examples include Sierra Space's Dream Chaser, which could include both crewed and uncrewed variants, as well as the Dawn Aerospace's Mk-II Aurora. While these projects are still in their early stages, there could be strong commercial incentives for investing in them.What Are They Good For?The most obvious reason to invest in space planes is to reduce the cost of access to space: the dream of reusable craft being able to insert payloads into orbit quickly and cheaply is an old one. This is the stated reason for India's own RLV and the driving force for space plane development by private companies. The direct military utility of space planes is unclear at this stage. The US X-37B is operated by the Space Delta 9 unit of the Space Force, which is, among other things, responsible for ‘orbital warfare'. It is possible that future space planes could deploy a range of small payloads that can conduct space situational awareness (SSA) missions, carry out rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), or possibly use directed energy to dazzle or blind other orbital craft. However, the most likely military utility for space planes today is their ability to act as test beds to other technologies, such as autonomous manoeuvring in space and hypersonic capabilities. For now, at least, space planes are not harbingers of a new era of space warfare.Our Reading Menu[Report] China-Russia Space Cooperation: The Strategic, Military, Diplomatic, and Economic Implications of a Growing Relationship.[Op-ed] Globalising India's DPI for a Common Digital Future by Bharath Reddy and Saurabh Todi.[Blog] This time, it feels different by Kailash Nadh. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Cyberpolitik: AI and Crime Prevention: Is it a force multiplier?— Satya SahuCrime prevention is based on the idea that crime can be reduced or eliminated by modifying the factors that influence its occurrence or consequences. We can classify “prevention” into three main types: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary prevention addresses the root causes of crime or deters potential offenders before they commit a crime. Secondary prevention aims to intervene with at-risk groups or individuals to prevent them from becoming involved in crime. Finally, tertiary prevention efforts seek to rehabilitate or punish offenders to prevent them from reoffending. (This, however, is beyond the scope of today's discussion.)Flipping the coin, we notice that policing is based on the idea that law enforcement and public order can be maintained by enforcing the law and responding to crimes or incidents. Policing also lends itself to being classified into two main types: reactive and proactive. Reactive policing responds to reported crimes or incidents after they occur. Proactive policing anticipates or prevents crimes or incidents before they occur. On the face of it, AI can help us prevent and fight crime by enhancing both types of crime prevention and policing.AI can digest and analyse petabytes of data from disparate sources, such as social media, CCTV footage, sensors used in our Smart Cities™, and boring old digitised government records, to identify patterns, trends, and anomalies that can indicate potential criminal activity. For example, the police in Vancouver use predictive models to identify areas where robberies are expected to occur and then post officers to deter potential thieves or other criminals. Similarly, the police in Los Angeles use a system called PredPol that generates maps of hotspots where crimes are likely to happen based on past data. These systems can help the police allocate their resources more efficiently and effectively and reduce crime rates and response times.When it comes to collecting and processing evidence, such as fingerprints, DNA, facial recognition, voice recognition, and digital forensics etc., we can look at the UK Home Office's VALCRI, which uses AI to analyse large volumes of data from different sources, such as crime reports, witness statements, CCTV footage, and social media posts, to generate hypotheses and leads for investigators. For example, the police in India used ML-backed facial recognition technology to reunite thousands of missing children with their families. Moreover, AI can help the police in presenting evidence and arguments in court, such as using natural language processing to generate concise summaries or transcripts of testimonies or documents.It could augment efforts to monitor and evaluate police performance and conduct, such as using dashcams, bodycams, or drones to record their interactions with the public and/or suspects. For example, the police in New Orleans developed a program called EPIC that uses AI to analyse video footage from bodycams to identify instances of misconduct or excessive force by officers. It can also help the police in engaging with the public and building trust and confidence, such as using chatbots or social media platforms to communicate with citizens and provide critical information services, hopefully unlike the chatbot from my bank's beleaguered website.However, all this has enormous implications for the jurisprudential underpinnings of crime prevention and policing. One such significance arises when AI itself can change the nature and scope of crime and criminality. AI can enable new forms of crime that exploit its capabilities and vulnerabilities, such as cyberattacks, biometric spoofing, deepfakes, autonomous weapons, or social engineering. Unlike their current-crime counterparts, leveraging AI allows these future crimes to be more sophisticated, scalable and anonymous than conventional ones. Therefore, the legal and ethical frameworks that govern our efforts to control such crimes must, therefore, must evolve to address these new crimes. It is a foregone conclusion that without involving AI at the forefront of these efforts, it will be impossible to counter AI-enabled crimes themselves. Hence the concomitant need to update the legal and ethical norms guiding society's conceptions of policing and crime prevention.Yet another implication is that AI also transforms the roles and responsibilities of police officers and other actors involved in crime prevention or response. As the examples show, AI can augment or automate some of the tasks that police officers perform, such as data collection, analysis, or evidence processing. AI can also assist or replace some of the decisions that police officers make, such as risk assessment, resource allocation, or intervention selection. To ensure that the concerns of effectiveness and responsibility surrounding Mx. Robo-Cop are adequately balanced, clear and consistent standards and regulations for police and state actors must be established side-by-side with the development and deployment of such systems. This is not to say that we need to disavow the use of AI in the field of policing and crime prevention. The potential and limitations of AI and the skills and knowledge to use it effectively and responsibly make it so versatile and terrifying. However, it is still a tool to be wielded by the legitimate wielder of the state's punitive power: the police.The use of AI in identifying young people who are vulnerable to gang exploitation or violence and mounting efforts to prevent them from becoming involved in crime is already a burning question in the UK. This recognises that leveraging AI to provide better targeted and tailored state support and services to at-risk groups or individuals, is valuable. On the face of it, any enhancements to their state's performance, efficiency, and accountability in this regard will be applauded. But given what we know about the pitfalls surrounding AI, the opposite also holds: violating the privacy, dignity, or rights of individuals or communities will reduce the trust and legitimacy that is essential for state actors and the police to be able to police under the social contract.Referring back to my previous post here, we know that AI can create or exacerbate the digital divide or systemic social inequalities among different groups or individuals. The conversation about the use of AI in a field where the slightest deviation from the limited scope of policing is undesirable must discuss the processes involved as well as the outcomes exacted upon the population being policed. This indicates the need to ensure that AI is used in a way that respects and protects the interests and values of individuals or communities. AI is a powerful tool that can help us understand the causes of, prevent, and reduce crime. Still, it is not a substitute for human judgment or responsibility. It is not merely a technology but also a socio-cultural phenomenon to be embraced with a healthy mixture of curiosity and caution. (I use the term ‘AI' to include machine learning, Neural Language Processing, etc., here for brevity.)Matsyanyaaya: Why a local Indian rickshaw app should worry Big Tech— Shailesh ChitnisDigital platforms, such as Google and Facebook for advertising and Amazon for e-commerce, derive their power by bringing sellers and buyers together in one place. Over time, "network effects" ensure that these platforms achieve monopoly power in the market. Regulators have tried different methods to limit the reach of these platforms. The European Union prefers a rule-based approach to reining in these companies, while the United States M+A policy is focused on preventing market concentration.Neither has worked particularly well. Namma Yatri, a small ride-hailing app in Bangalore, may point in another direction. Since its launch last November, the app lists almost a third of the city's 150,000-odd rickshaw drivers on its network and routes 40% of all rickshaw rides. It is now a viable competitor to Ola and Uber, the dominant apps.Namma Yatri is unique in that it is entirely funded and run by the community. The app is based on the open-source platform Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC), which is a non-profit supported by the Indian government. A private company, Juspay Technologies create the app, and there is no commission fee.ONDC's concept is to create a common platform where buyers and sellers can easily transact. This is essentially a technological solution that deconstructs a marketplace (see figure below). By abstracting the platform from supply and demand, ONDC seeks to remove some of the barriers of large digital platforms.ONDC's approach is not unique. Last week, Bluesky, a new social media platform backed by Twitter's founder Jack Dorsey, started inviting users to its Twitter-like platform. What makes it different is that the social network is built on a decentralized system. This would allow, in theory, users from multiple social networks, each with its own systems of curation and moderation to interact.A technology-driven solution that unbundles a marketplace into different pieces may spur more competition. And given India's success with pushing large-scale digital infrastructure projects, entrenched platforms should pay attention.Though it's early days for these platforms, there are a few questions, particularly around their business model.- Can a community-supported model work for India when our open-source culture isn't that well-developed?- If private companies are developing and maintaining applications on the platform, what are the monetization models?But perhaps, the most important question is about government intervention. With ONDC, if the government actively participates in defining the protocol and in advocating its use, does that influence innovation and natural market evolution?Antariksh Matters: Challenges for the Indian private space sector— Pranav R SatyanathThe approval of the new space policy by the Union Cabinet ushers in a new era for the space sector in India. The long-awaited reform, reflected in an 11-page document, details the activities that the commercial space sector can undertake and delineates the roles of three key government agencies: Indian National Space Promotion & Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), and the Department of Space (DoS). We have covered the merits and shortcomings of the policy in a Takshashila blog. The enthusiasm for the growth of the private space sector is indeed merited, as private entities were largely denied these opportunities in the past. However, there also exists a host of challenges that the Indian private space sector will face in the future. Some of these challenges are rooted in the historical evolution of the space sector in India, while others are created by the structure of market competition in the space sector. To understand the challenges, we must first briefly analyse how the private space sector has evolved to its present state in India.Evolution of India's private space sectorPrivate sector participation in India's space sector has historically been sparse. This was because space activities were the state's monopoly for several decades, and ISRO had achieved several feats, such as developing indigenous launch vehicles with limited resources. Indeed, since space was a high-risk and relatively low-reward sector, private entities stayed away from undertaking entire space projects and instead played the role of contractors and subcontractors for manufacturing satellite and launch vehicle components.Given ISRO's monopoly over space activities, a regulatory mechanism to oversee national space activities was seen as unnecessary, even after commercial space activities became a viable undertaking for the private sector. ISRO became the de-facto regulator for the private sector as it was the only route through which the private sector could participate in space activities. The absence of a set regulatory framework, therefore, disincentivised major private sector participation.This affected the evolution of the private sector in three ways. First, due to the large capital required to establish  manufacturing facilities for the space sector, the task of taking the role of suppliers fell on the traditional heavy industries who had large resources at their disposal. Second, since the industries largely followed ISRO's guidelines on design and manufacturing, they had very little incentives to innovate on their own. Finally, an ancillary support industry or the space sector did not flourish as ISRO imported or manufactured key components in-horse. Put together, these factors would go on to place several structural constraints on India's private space sector.     The challenges for India's private space sectorWith clarity on the regulatory framework, the private space sector is free to pursue activities in both the Upstream sector (which includes satellite manufacturing and launch services) and the Downstream sector (Ground Segment and satellite services). However, the industry must overcome several hurdles before achieving a high degree of competitiveness. This essay focuses on two challenges that are discussed less frequently.Support from the governmentThe miniaturisation of satellites has given rise to a new market for satellite service providers, which has, in turn, spurred the demand for launch vehicles. Despite the boom in demand, the private space sector continues to rely on significant government funding to stay in business. For the NewSpace industry, support from the government comes in the form of purchasing services or directly funding the research and development of new technologies. Consider the example of the launch industry in the United States. Traditionally the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) purchased services from the established space and missile industry through a cost-plus arrangement. The rise of the private space launch market introduced a new fixed-cost model, where NASA and USAF paid for launches on a need basis. Furthermore, NASA has taken significant steps to involve the private industry in human spaceflight, as the national space agency has shaped itself to undertake high-risk exploration missions. The military sector has also taken major steps to integrate the private industry into the procurement ecosystem, making the government a major source of funding for the private space sector.Such a model of government funding does not exist in India. According to the new space policy, NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), an entity under the DoS, will take responsibility for operating launch vehicles developed by ISRO. Further, ISRO has also stated that it will develop a new reusable launch vehicle to replace the PSLV. There is no indication that either the DOS or the armed forces will fund private launch providers for launch services or develop new launchers.Due to the long absence of a commercial space policy, India's private space industry is in its nascent stages. As the industry matures, it will face stiff competition from well-established international players. In this regard, the Union government must be cognizant of the fact that international competitors have some level of backing from foreign governments, which skews their advantage in the international market. Access to key technologiesThe second major challenge to Indian companies arises from the lack of a robust supply ecosystem in India. As mentioned earlier, the evolution of India's space sector led to a condition where a supporting industry for the space sector had limited incentives to flourish into its full potential. Decades later, a new generation of space entrepreneurs began to rely on foreign suppliers for key components and technologies as they could not find equivalent suppliers domestically. The lack of a domestic space ecosystem has led several space entrepreneurs to shift their establishments to foreign countries, where access to technology, talent and support systems was easier.Indeed, the NewSpace ecosystem will eventually gain competence as the domestic industry begins to mature and the demand for domestically-manufactured sensors, optics, testing equipment and software increases. During the transition period, however, space startups will continue to rely on foreign suppliers. The process of procuring foreign components is often a roadblock due to the export control regime on dual-use technologies.Charging forwardWhile the new policy achieves high marks in several key areas, the transformation of India's space sector is far from complete. To achieve the vision of augmenting India's capabilities through the commercial space sector, India needs a  National Space Strategy which charts a clear path forward for both civilian and military activities. Such a strategy must lay down the objectives for India's space programme and seamlessly incorporate the interests of the commercial space sector into the national strategy.Our Reading Menu[Book] Traffic: Genius, Rivalry, and Delusion in the Billion-Dollar Race to Go Viral by Ben Smith[Report] Mapping Biosafety Level-3 Laboratories by Publications by Caroline Schuerger, Sara Abdulla and Anna Puglisi[Op-ed] CPC's tryst with private regulatory interventionism by Anushka Saxena[Podcast] Indian Space Policy - 2023 with Aditya Ramanathan and Narayan Prasad This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Cyberpolitik: The Gell-mann “AI”mnesiac Effect— Satya SahuHere are two screenshots of a hastily written prompt to which ChatGPT dutifully responded almost immediately.As I read the responses to my prompts, I was painfully aware of the fact that the second passage could very plausibly be attached alongside a doctored image of a scientist holding up a processor die and forwarded countless times on Whatsapp by thousands of my fellow citizens, all overjoyed at the prospect of India finally having become a semiconductor nation. These persuasively written passages contain no usual hallmarks of a shoddy copypasta-like questionable grammar and syntactical errors. The issue evident to anybody familiar with the global semiconductor value chain is that unless the reader of these passages also knows that efforts to produce an indigenous x86 processor are non-existent, they would not be able to discern the falsehood.While AI can generate realistic and useful content for entertainment, education, research, and communication, it can also produce and disseminate misinformation, propaganda, and fake news. Misinformation is false or inaccurate information that is deliberately or unintentionally spread to influence people's beliefs, attitudes, or behaviours. Misinformation can have serious negative impacts on individuals and society, such as eroding trust, polarizing opinions, undermining democracy, and endangering public health and safety.One of the challenges of combating misinformation is that people are often vulnerable to cognitive biases that impair their ability to evaluate the credibility and accuracy of information. One such bias is the Gell-Mann Amnesia effect, coined by Michael Crichton and named after the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Murray Gell-Mann. The Gell-Mann Amnesia effect describes the phenomenon of an expert believing news articles on topics outside of their field of expertise even after acknowledging that articles written in the same publication that are within the expert's field of expertise are error-ridden and full of misunderstanding. For example, a physicist may read an article on physics in a newspaper and find it full of errors and misconceptions but then turn the page and read an article on politics or economics and accept it as factual and reliable.The Gell-Mann Amnesia effect illustrates how people tend to forget or ignore their prior knowledge and experience when they encounter new information that is presented by a seemingly authoritative source. This effect can be exploited by AI-generated misinformation, which can mimic the style and tone of reputable media outlets and create convincing content that appeals to people's emotions, biases, and expectations. AI-generated misinformation can also leverage social media platforms and networks to amplify its reach and influence by exploiting algorithms that favour sensationalism, novelty, and popularity over quality, accuracy, and relevance.Another challenge in combating misinformation is that large language models (LLMs), the main technology behind AI-generated content, are biased and incomplete. LLMs are trained on massive amounts of text data collected from the internet, which reflect the biases and gaps present in society and culture. LLMs learn to reproduce and amplify these biases and gaps in their outputs, which can lead to harmful and misleading content. One type of bias that LLMs can perpetuate is second-order bias, which is the bias that arises from the way data is organized, categorized, and represented. Second-order bias can affect how LLMs understand and generate information, such as classifying entities, assigning attributes, inferring relationships, and constructing narratives. These can also affect how LLMs interact with users, such as how they respond to queries, provide feedback, and adapt to preferences.Second-order bias can make misinformation more problematic at scale because it can affect not only the content but also the context and purpose of information. For example, it can influence how LLMs frame and filter information to suit different audiences and agendas, as well as manipulate and persuade users to accept or reject information based on their emotions, biases, and expectations. It can also influence how LLMs conceal or reveal their sources and intentions to users.All of this is to say that the effort associated with generating false WhatsApp forwards like the example above (but far less benign!) for hundreds of thousands of people at a time is now rendered minuscule. Obviously, the public needs to develop critical thinking and media literacy skills to discern truth from falsehoods on a rapid-fire basis, but the consensus amongst researchers is that there is no silver bullet to this problem.One can only hope that the human cost of developing AI-fuelled output that is difficult to distinguish from human creative output makes us pause and take stock of the situation. It may, however, be too late.Matsyanyaaya: Cooperating to Communicate— Bharath ReddyThe telecommunications network of a country qualifies as critical infrastructure. With the increasing adoption of 5G and the Internet of Things (IoT), almost everything we do will rely on this infrastructure. The recently signed India and US initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) recognises next-generation telecommunications as one of the collaboration domains. Within this domain, iCET identifies the following two areas for collaboration:* “Launching a public-private dialogue on telecommunications and regulations.”* “Advancing cooperation on research and development in 5G and 6G, facilitating deployment and adoption of Open RAN in India, and fostering global economies of scale within the sector.”These welcome developments aim to address shared challenges for both India and US.The telecom equipment industry has high entry barriers and is dominated by a handful of vendors. The top four vendors - Ericsson, Nokia, Huawei and ZTE - share around 85% of the Radio Access Network (RAN) market share. Sanctions and bans imposed against Huawei and ZTE further limit vendor choice. The lack of competition in the market could lead to a decline in innovation, an increase in prices and the risk of disrupted supply chains.Several applications necessary for our daily life, such as communications, autonomous vehicles, and smart cities, require a secure and reliable telecommunication infrastructure. The choice of vendors is critical. It's no wonder many states have implemented sanctions against Huawei, recognising it as a potential threat to national security. The telecommunications giant has close ties to the Chinese state. Given the geopolitical climate, relying on an adversary to maintain and upgradation of critical infrastructure is not an option. The companies with the largest RAN market share are full-stack vendors that offer tightly integrated solutions. Open RAN promises to reduce entry barriers by disaggregating the RAN ecosystem. This allows smaller vendors to enter the market by building interoperable and modular components. However, this comes with the risk of complexities in system integration. The responsibility of a reliable and secure system will shift from a single vendor to system integrators and regulators. Given this market dynamic, system integrators and regulators need to develop the skills and capacity to integrate and validate the robustness of such systems.Chinese companies dominate in 5G/6G standard development organisations such as the 3GPP. The disaggregation caused by adopting Open RAN should enable more innovation and broader participation in standards development. Open RAN adoption is progressing slowly, but it can play a more significant role in 6G. Cooperation between India and US in research and development in 5G, 6G and Open RAN will stand both countries in good stead. It will help build resilient supply chains and technical competence in these critical technologies. Antariksh Matters: A vehicle worth reusing— Pranav R SatyanathOn April 2nd, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) conducted an autonomous landing test of the Reusable Launch Vehicle — a spacecraft that looks a lot like an uncrewed spaceplane. The test was indeed unique as the RLV was carried to an altitude of 4.5 km by a helicopter, after which the RLV made an autonomous landing using on-board computers and navigation receivers. The existence of the vehicle is no secret. The RLV Test Demonstrator has been in development since 2012. In 2016, ISRO mounted the test vehicle on a sounding rocket and carried out the first hypersonic flight experiment. Since then, the RLV has undergone several experiments to test the flight and landing characteristics of the vehicle. Since the vehicle's inception, ISRO has envisioned the RLV to be a test bed for a launch vehicle that could become fully operational by 2030. Of course, the RLV is more akin to the space shuttle than the reusable rockets used by SpaceX or Blue Origin. The space shuttle, for its part, was far more expensive than what the National Aeronautics and Space Administration first calculated. So the question remains: will the RLV suffer the same fate? The answer? No. This is because the ISRO's space plane design is likely to be far smaller and more nimble than the Space Shuttle (the latter was designed to carry both heavy cargo and astronauts). Concepts for space planes have existed since the 1960s, most prominent of which was the Boeing X-20 Dyna-SOAR, which never made it past early testing. The RLV could follow the X-20 style lineage, which inspired space planes like the European Space Agency's HERMES spacecraft and the DreamChaser mini space shuttle by the private company, Sierra Space. India's space shuttle, therefore, could eventually develop into a spacecraft that will be mounted on top of the LVM-III rocket and carry astronauts into space.Those who watch space activities closely will also recognise that the RLV looks rather similar to the Boeing X-37B spaceplane, whose purpose of exitance seems to be shrouded in secrecy. Indeed, as I have written in a previous edition of Technopolitik, the X-37B is far less sinister than it appears. While the spacecraft is used for military purposes, its capabilities are limited to reconnaissance and small satellite deployment. It would not come as a surprise if the RLV is repurposed for military utility. After all, ISRO's tweets mention that the test was developed along wide the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Indian Air Force. Having a spaceplane similar to the X-37B will give India's military space operators the ability to perform rendezvous and proximity operations, including the capability to deploy micro satellite for inspections. Our Reading Menu[Book] Algorithmic Modernity: Mechanizing Thought and Action, 1500-2000, edited by Morgan G. Ames and Massimo Mazzotti. [Article] Engines of power: Electricity, AI, and general-purpose, military transformations by Jeffrey Ding and Allan Dafoe.[Op-ed] The TikTok Debate Should Start With Reciprocity; Everything Else Is Secondary by David Moschella. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

A new discussion document authored by Shailesh Chitnis provides a pragmatic assessment of India's capabilities in Artificial Intelligence (AI) today. It proposes one bold idea which, if properly executed, has the potential to catapult the country into a dominant position in the AI race. But why another document about AI strategy for India? The expert from the document is provided below.Most reports on AI in India follow a predictable pattern. First, they fuss over the potential of AI to alter every aspect of society and the economy. Next, they present eye-watering numbers on the impact of AI on India's economy. Finally, there's a mild caution against missing out on this once-in-a-generation boom. Left unsaid are the steps needed to get there. This is not such a report. It assumes that the reader is astute enough to know the transformational nature of AI. The reader also agrees that over time, this general-purpose technology will permeate every aspect of our lives. The extent of change depends on how successful we are in adopting this technology. But no one, this report hopes, needs to be convinced of the potential pay-off with AI. Instead, this short paper is focused on that space between strategy and outcome, namely execution. It deliberately takes a near-term – three to five years – view in its analysis, since the intent is to spur action.The problem: Staying behind in the AI raceIndia is languishing at the bottom of the artificial intelligence (AI) leaderboard when compared with its G20 peers. Other than exporting our best brains, our contributions have been tiny. Even as the gap between the United States and China on one side, and everyone else on the other widens, India's policymakers, researchers, and business leaders have shown little urgency. The first AI strategy document by the government was released in 2018, a year or so after China had released its detailed, target-linked AI plan. Five years later, India is still in the strategy and consultation phase, while China has left us behind.We need to shift gears. Our research surveyed the state of AI in India and evaluated various policy options. While there are many recommendations that can be made, we prefer those that are immediate and agile.Our big idea: BharatAIAI is mainstream. And, as the preceding sections have demonstrated, India needs to catch up. Fast. Industry leaders can wait for guidance from the government on a roadmap, with defined milestones, ample funds, and coordinated action among industry, the public sector, and academia. But India is not China. Disruptive change will come from the private sector. One approach is to launch a privately funded research lab that works on foundational models for AI. We call this lab BharatAI.This company, BharatAI, has the potential to become the hub of India's AI innovation ecosystem. Our initial estimate calls is for an investment of roughly $250 million over five years. But an unproven company that requires over $250 mn over five years with no defined product or revenue won't be flush with investor cash. The mismatch between high upfront costs and a long horizon to recoup the investments, requires patient capital. Hence we propose a pooled investment approach. Similar to a venture capital (VC) fund, BharatAI's investors will resemble limited partners (LPs) that park their money into this venture for a defined period, say 10 years. In return, they buy equity into the firm but are not involved in the company's management.Investors into this company can be of three types. a. Strategic investment from India's large technology services companiesb. Venture capital fundsc. Private endowmentsThe company will also have two other backers who will be critical for its success: a platform partner and the government. The company itself would focus on foundational AI problems with broad applicability. BharatAI should not attempt to develop end-to-end applications. It should instead provide tools through application programming interfaces (APIs) and open-source or licence its models.A single company, however, can not alter India's AI trajectory. But it can make a sizeable dent in our efforts to overcome our handicaps.BharatAI can serve as a talent magnet for high-quality, high-demand engineers. A research lab that is closely tied to industry will also promote a culture of privately-led innovation. Finally, the Indian government is keen on expanding India stack – a set of open APIs and public digital goods – globally. Having an AI layer in the stack that offers countries an alternative to Big Tech capture will be a big benefit.The full document can be found here: https://takshashila.org.in/research/rebooting-ai-india This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Cyberpolitik: A Recurring Payments Nightmare— Bharath ReddyHave you tried to make a recurring card payment to a foreign merchant only to find that your card gets declined? This is not an issue with the card being maxed out; most international payments using Indian credit or debit cards don't work because merchants find it too cumbersome to comply with India-specific regulations. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) mandated that from October 1st, 2021, for every recurring transaction below ₹5,000, banks must send a notification at least 24 hours before the renewal date. For amounts over ₹5,000, banks require a one-time password to authorise every transaction. The transaction mandate continues to be a recurring nightmare a year and a half since its introduction. While all recurring transactions faced severe disruptions initially, banks resolved the teething issues, and domestic payments worked after a few months. However, international payments continue to face issues. Publishing an impact assessment study and holding stakeholder consultations could have helped anticipate some problems beforehand. But since these mandates have already been implemented, some exemptions must be made so international payments can be functional again. Exiting from subscriptions is often deliberately complicated, and people often remain subscribed to services they don't use. Free trial periods sometimes turn into indefinite subscriptions when users forget to cancel. RBI's mandate aimed to help customers keep track of their subscriptions and exit unwanted ones. However, implementing these requirements requires coordination across the value chain of consumers, banks, mandate processing platforms, payment aggregators, and merchants. This coordination has not been seamless, and the fallout has caused much pain to businesses and consumers.The most significant impact has been on businesses whose subscription revenue dried up. Despite the adequate notice given by the RBI, companies, both big and small, had little recourse. The list included OTT platforms, news organisations, non-profits, cloud service providers, and many others. The most significant impact has been on small bootstrapped businesses, which depend on revenue from subscriptions for their day-to-day operations. An additional burden for small subscription-based businesses is the effort that now goes towards manually processing the payments for what was once an automated process.The mandate also creates hurdles for Indians who subscribe to global content and services. Most international merchants do not comply with RBI's regulations. In response to queries about declined payments from Indian subscribers, The New York Times has recommended using a valid US credit card for payments! International merchants with a significant Indian customer base might now start supporting UPI. Some might have a mobile app through which one can subscribe, but that would attract a 30% markup due to the commissions charged by Apple or Google. However, for most others, customers have no option. Such hurdles in transacting with global merchants limit customer choice and hinder the ease of doing business. During the transition period, individuals and organisations had to deal with the overhead of manually paying for subscriptions. To date, this continues to be a burden for international subscriptions or for transactions above the threshold for which a one-time password is required for each renewal. The threshold, however, has subsequently been revised to ₹15,000, which has eased some of the burdens.Before the mandate, there were problems with opting out of subscriptions in some situations, but it worked for most people. The impact of the mandates is unknown, but it has imposed concentrated costs on many businesses and consumers. Holding open consultations and inviting stakeholder comments can help anticipate most of these consequences. Publishing an impact assessment report also helps to build a consensus on the scope of the problem, the costs and benefits involved, and evaluate the impact of the policy.Since this involves multiple stakeholders across the value chain, coordination has been a challenge. Lower-cost interventions, such as requiring banks to provide consumers with the ability to view and manage their subscriptions, might have also addressed the issue without as many disruptions. However, it's worth considering whether this is the RBI's responsibility. As Andy Mukherjee says, “lopsided buyer-seller relationships are a consumer protection problem. The job of a central bank is to provide a well-oiled payment system while safeguarding the integrity of the financial network from money launderers, terrorists, scammers, and hackers. Its targets should not include Netflix Inc. or the New York Times”.It is unlikely that international merchants without a significantly large Indian customer base will take on the burden of complying with the mandates. It can get quite complex to comply with different regulatory requirements across geographies for the same payment service. Standards that have evolved might not be the most foolproof solution, but they are based on a consensus and ensure seamless interoperability. Given that these mandates have already been implemented across the country, RBI must create an exemption to ensure that international transactions can continue.Biopolitik: Growing US-China Competition in Biotechnology— Saurabh TodiDuring his remarks at the Special Competitive Studies Project Global Emerging Technologies Summit in February 2021, US NSA Jake Sullivan expressed concern about the potential risks associated with biotechnology. He stated that while biotechnology holds great promise for advancing science and medicine, it also enables the possibility of accidental or intentional misuse. Sullivan further emphasised the need for the responsible and ethical development of biotechnology, including robust regulatory frameworks and international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of dangerous biotechnology. He also called for increased investment in research and development to ensure that the US remained at the forefront of biotechnology innovation.These remarks indicated the seriousness with which the United States wants to maintain its biotechnology dominance vis-à-vis China. The US President, in September 2021, issued an Executive Order on Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation. The order aims to promote innovation and growth in the biotechnology and biomanufacturing industries. It established a national strategy for biotechnology research and development and initiatives to increase access to funding and support for small and disadvantaged businesses in the field. The order also aims to strengthen the biomanufacturing supply chain and promote collaboration between industry, government, and academic institutions to advance research and development in biotechnology. In September 2022, The United States government announced $2 billion in new investments and resources to advance its National Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Initiative. The investment includes $1.5 billion in funding for research and development, including establishing seven new biomanufacturing institutes across the US. The remaining $500 million will be used to create public-private partnerships to help support the development of new biotechnology products and solutions.More recently, The US Department of Commerce added several units of Chinese genomics company BGI to its trade blacklist, citing concerns about their alleged ties to the Chinese military and its role in human rights abuses. The move follows earlier restrictions on BGI due to concerns about potential national security risks. The US government has expressed concerns about the Chinese government's ability to access sensitive personal data collected by companies like BGI, as well as the potential for these companies to use their technologies for military or strategic purposes. The trade blacklist restricts US companies and organisations from exporting certain technologies to the listed companies without a licence from the US government.These steps seem to align with this report in the New York Times, which indicated last year that the Biden administration is mulling further export controls that would clamp down on China's ability to access cutting-edge technologies. Just as US-China competition in semiconductors got accelerated due to sanctions imposed by the US, there is a possibility that similar export-control restrictions could be imposed on high-tech biotechnology. The new biotech competition is something to keep an eye on.Antariksh Matters: Setting your watch to Moon Time— Aditya RamanathanOver the last couple of weeks, even casual followers of outer space news likely came across stories about scientists calling for a standard time for the Moon. Comments from Pietro Giordano, an engineer at the European Space Agency, prompted the most recent spurt of stories. However, discussions began in earnest at least a year ago. More importantly, the need to agree upon a time-keeping standard is implicit in the ambitious plans that states and private enterprises have outlined for the Moon. GPS for the MoonThe most ambitious plans for lunar exploration come from the United States, led by its Artemis Program, which looks to create a sustained human presence on the Moon and use it as a springboard for the exploration of Mars. We've discussed Artemis and the governance problems it creates in previous editions of this newsletter. What is clear, however, is that Artemis, as well as other more modest programmes outlined by the Europeans, Japan, China, and Russia, would benefit from a reliable lunar navigation, timing and communications infrastructure. In theory, at least, such a system would greatly increase our ability to dispatch crewed and uncrewed missions to the far side of the Moon and the lunar South Pole. It would also be crucial to the planned Lunar Gateway, a US-led project to establish a space station orbiting the Moon. Another project that would need lunar satellite-based support is the European Large Logistics Lander, which is meant to provide uncrewed logistics support to Artemis missions.  The American space agency, NASA, is already pursuing what it calls the Lunar Communications Relay and Navigation Systems or LCRNS. As the name suggests, LCRNS is an effort to put a smaller version of the Earth-bound GPS and communications satellites into lunar orbit. The ESA has a similar project of its own, dubbed Moonlight. Together they form what's called LunaNet, which, according to NASA, is meant to offer a “set of standards that can enable an open, evolving, cooperative lunar communications and navigation architecture”.Who Sets the Clocks?Earth-bound Global Navigation Satellite Systems such as GPS, the European Galileo, China's BeiDou, and India's NavIC use onboard atomic clocks and radio signals to determine positions. While accurate timing is an inherent function of any such orbital navigation system, what's undecided is how to set a time standard for the Moon. The obvious option is to link lunar time to Earth time. The International Space Station uses Universal Coordinated Time or UTC, essentially the same as Greenwich Mean Time or GMT and is maintained by the Bureau International de Poids et Mesures in Paris, with the help of an array of atomic clocks. The challenge with linking Moon time with Earth time is the effects of gravity. Because the Moon has only 16.6% of Earth's gravity, it gains about 56 microseconds per Earth day. While such time discrepancies mean little in our daily lives, they can create complications for susceptible systems like satellite navigation. Ultimately, the business of keeping time on the Moon is both technical and political. Giordano's call to create a time-keeping standard is evidence that there's real value to the complexities and drudgery of multilateral lunar governance that draws in all major players, including China, Russia, and India. The US-led Artemis Program and Artemis Accords are no substitutes for formal laws, agreements, and treaties.Our Reading Menu[Book] Great Power Politics in the Fourth Industrial Revolution by Glenn Diesen[Article] Defining the scope of AI regulations by Jonas Schuett[Discussion Document] Strengthening research, promoting innovation through richer collaboration by Shambhavi Naik This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Matsyanyaaya: Why Apple's teething troubles in India matter— Shailesh ChitnisLast year, between April and December, Apple exported more than $2.5bn worth of iPhones from India. Shipments during those eight months were nearly double the previous fiscal year's (April 2021 - March 2022) total. For India's “Make in India” ambitions, those numbers are promising.They are also tiny. According to Bloomberg Intelligence, in 2021, India produced 3 million iPhones. China produced 230 million units during the same period. The sizable difference between the two countries should give decoupling champions some pause. (Source: Financial Times)India, or any other country, cannot hope to dislodge the Chinese manufacturing Goliath anytime soon. Apple has a long history in China, going back to 2007. Unwinding its dependence will take time.The product is also highly complex to assemble. Indian contractors are learning this the hard way. Last month, the Financial Times reported that only half of all components produced at a Tata casing factory passed quality checks. The 50% yield compares poorly with Apple's goal of zero defects.Some of these teething troubles are to be expected. Private players such as Tata and Foxconn, Apple's assembly partner, have strong incentives to fix the problems. But it highlights the difficulty of building a complex manufacturing base in India.Building an iPhone requires an entire supply chain dedicated to moving components from one contractor to another quickly. In China, private contractors and the local government worked together to win Apple orders at all costs. India must show the same agility between the private and public sectors.Apple had redesigned the iPhone's screen at the last minute, forcing an assembly line overhaul. New screens began arriving at the plant near midnight. A foreman immediately roused 8,000 workers inside the company's dormitories, according to the executive. Each employee was given a biscuit and a cup of tea, guided to a workstation, and within half an hour started a 12-hour shift fitting glass screens into beveled frames. Within 96 hours, the plant was producing over 10,000 iPhones a day.From: Duhigg, (Charles & Bradsher, Keith) “How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work”. The New York Times. 21 Jan 2012Investing in skilled labour is another imperative. During Apple's early years in China, the company sent its product designers and engineers to the manufacturing units, sometimes for months at a time. It invested in building custom machinery for some of those contractors. Apple's level of involvement with China had a transformative effect on the country's manufacturing and technical capabilities. It spawned an entire network of companies that serviced Apple and its suppliers.The Indian government wants Apple to make a quarter of all its phones here by 2025. Getting there will require business and public services to scale up in ways they haven't before.Apple's investment in India is critical for both the company and the central government. The company has signalled its intention to wean off its China dependency by publicly embracing alternatives. For India, this is a test of its commitment to move “up the stack” in manufacturing. Failure here will have far-reaching consequences that go beyond a single device manufacturer.Antariksh Matters: What's the matter with commercial space stations?— Pranav R SatyanathLast week, the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) released two new documents which outline expectations for new commercial space stations. The documents outline NASA's operational and technical expectations from the new commercial space stations and add a new layer of nuance to NASA's plan for transitioning from operating on the International Space Station (ISS) and conducting all Low Earth Orbit (LEO) operations on commercial space stations.The ISS is the largest human-built structure in the Earth's orbit. It is also a really old structure, with the first module of the ISS being launched in 1998. The ISS is also a testament to international cooperation in space, as it brought together Canada, Europe, Japan, Russia and the United States to collaborate on a massive space project. The ISS has stood strong despite all the difficulties thrown at it — from geopolitical tensions to space debris. But it needs a replacement, perhaps before the end of this decade.To Bolding Go CommercialThe retirement of the ISS was initially slated for 2024, but the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to extend its life through 2030. To replace the ISS, however, NASA has taken a bold route and decided to place all its bets on commercial entities. Although the US made Artemis its primary space policy goal, it still maintains an interest in LEO. Under the Commercial LEO Development (CLD) programme, NASA aims to commercialise LEO activities by opening the ISS for commercial activities and transitioning to research commercially-owned space stations by 2030.Funding for new commercial space stations began in 2021 under the new CLD programme. NASA has funded three commercial entities to develop a private space station:• Blue Origin (with Sierra Space) for the Orbital Reef space station: $130 million.• Nanoracks (with Voyager Space Lockheed Martin) for the Starlab space station: $160 million.• Northrop Grumman for a free-flyer space station: $125.6 million.Further, NASA has also contracted Axiom Space for $140 million to develop and build a commercial module for the ISS over seven years.These new commercial stations will be far smaller than the ISS. They will, perhaps, also cater to customers beyond national space agencies and cater to space tourists and high-paying nations that do not have their own astronaut programmes.Getting Commercial Space Stations GoingSo what are the challenges of getting commercial space stations up into space? First, it's the funding. When the ISS first came into being, it had already cost a billion dollars in the 1980s to complete initial designs. Even today, the ISS consumes about a $ 3.1 billion dollars each year for operations and maintenance. Commercial space stations, meanwhile, will have to operate in a substantially together financial situation. A 2021 report by NASA's Inspector General warned that the CLD programme vastly underestimates the costs of developing commercial space stations and that NASA has set itself the ambitious goal of transitioning to private space stations by 2028. Second, if NASA goes through with the CLD programme without international partners, it risks losing the long-standing international collaboration that it has built with the Canadian Space Agency, and European Space Agency and has held since the 1970s. In February 2022, for example, the head of ESA's Washington office, Sylvie Espinasse, said that the idea of purchasing commercial services from American companies in the future would not be an entirely acceptable option for European partners.Finally, commercial space stations may not meet all of NASA's space research requirements. The newly released documents, for example, highlight that the agency wants to conduct anywhere between 130-250 experiments each year. It also estimates to transfer of about 5000 km of cargo to commercial stations each year. Of course, NASA will likely be given priority on board the new space stations when they enter service. However, the agency might not have the same level of control or flexibility when operating in a station built by companies that also want to profit from activities such as tourism.The commercial space station programme we know today may turn out very differently five years later. After all, commercial space is new territory for everyone, including NASA.Cyberpolitik: First steps to better regulate military AI— Atharwa SarnobatArtificial Intelligence, or AI, in recent days, has seen a resurgence of interest mainly due to the popularity of natural language AIs such as ChatGPT, which has captivated our imaginations with responses that simulate human conversations somewhat realistically. Similarly, governments around the world concerned with the use of AI in warfare convened for REAIM or the Summit on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain conference held at The Hague in the Netherlands. The joint conference was organised by the Netherlands and Korean governments and focused on the impact and regulation of AI in warfare.The conference was out together with three specific aspects in mind:* Countries wanted to understand how AI played a role in warfare.* Countries wanted to get a clear picture of AI's current and potential future impact in warfare.* Participants of the conference wanted to gain clarity on what the current legislative situation looked like and how that could be remedied by recommending newer legislation that could properly govern AI in warfare. The conference highlighted a few ideas and brought them to the forefront of the discourse around AI in warfare, such as the fact that autonomous weapons systems were great from a tactical perspective since they put fewer humans in the line of fire and they could potentially even take the jobs of peacekeepers in the future. It was also understood that while much of the world did not want “killer robots” on the battlefield, a complete ban could not be achieved since the genie could not be put back in the bottle, and these weapons systems were here to stay.The conference also recognised that the public discourse over the regulation of AI in warfare was severely lagging and that had to be remedied if effective laws governing its use were to be drafted and enacted by governments. It also noted that AI in warfare was a technological domain where nations were engaged in a technological arms race to maintain or achieve their superiority in the global context. A few areas of concern were identified regarding the regulation of AI in warfare. One central area of concern highlighted was the postulation that using AI in warfare would lower the threshold for using force in a conflict or armed engagement. Another was the idea that humans would be required to monitor AI weapons systems such as loitering munitions since these systems had not reached a stage where they could make those decisions by themselves. Some participants recommended potential solutions, which proposed minimum acceptable levels for human control. The conference also recognised that old treaties on warfare needed to be updated to regulate military AI. Nations must also eliminate a high threshold approach to regulating military AI since these systems have broad use cases. Therefore, counties made the case that context-specific regulation was the only way forward.  This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters #1: Can India and the US Head into Space Together?— Aditya RamanathanIndia and the United States have taken a modest leap towards greater cooperation in space.Last week, the two countries' national security advisers, Ajit Doval and Jake Sullivan, kicked off the first meeting of the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology or iCET. First set up in 2022, the focus of iCET was to enhance technological cooperation in defence as well as other sectors. A fact sheet released after the meeting outlined new avenues of India-US cooperation in defence technology, semiconductor supply chains, 5G, and space.  We'll be providing our take on some aspects of the iCET soon, but in this Technopolitik entry, I'll focus on the bits about space.Three steps outlined in the factsheet stand out. One, the two sides have agreed to train an Indian at the NASA Johnson Space Center, the main facility for training American astronauts. Two, both countries have also agreed to figure out how Indian companies can participate in NASA's Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) programme. Three, the factsheet outlines initiatives to increase commercial space cooperation and interaction between academics and experts. Let's start with human spaceflight. On India's Independence Day in 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that the Indians would be launched into space on an indigenous mission in 2022 named Gaganyaan. That ambitious plan fell behind schedule, largely thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic. At present, the first Indians are not scheduled to go into orbit only in the last quarter of 2024. Two uncrewed launches will precede the mission to send Indians into orbit to test various parameters of the human-rated spacecraft.. Starting in 2020, four Indian Air Force (IAF) officers also began training at Russia's Yuri Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Centre for the Gaganyaan mission. While their training was spectacularly ill-timed - starting right at the onset of the pandemic - they nevertheless completed the course in a year. However, with Russia's space programme financially constrained and heavily sanctioned because of the country's ongoing war with Ukraine, India is clearly looking to diversify. While the agreement to train Indian spacefarers in the United States may have come too late to speed up the schedule for the first Gaganyaan launch, it is an important step in India's hunt for a reliable partner to train its ‘vyomanauts' as ISRO has called them. India and the US have also inched closer towards cooperating on lunar exploration. The fact sheet commits ISRO and NASA to bring together Indian private sector space companies and American companies involved in the CLPS programme. CLPS is part of America's expansive plans to return to the Moon sustainably. While NASA is to focus on some of the big-ticket projects like sending humans to the lunar surface, CLPS allows private companies to take scientific payloads from NASA and others to the Moon on uncrewed spacecraft. NASA's goal is to act as a primary customer for these private missions until they become commercially viable and self-sustaining.  By engaging India with CLPS, the US appears to have two goals. One is to find Indian customers for the American CLPS companies. The other is to involve India in the US-led multinational effort to return to the Moon. Much of this comes under the rubric of what the US calls the Artemis programme. Countries that want to join the Artemis programme are required to sign the Artemis Accords, a series of ten principles governing lunar activity. While most of these principles are innocuous aspects of existing international law, a few, like those that allow the use of lunar resources and call for ‘deconfliction,' raise concerns about the creation of de facto private real estate or even de facto sovereign territory on the Moon. By last count, 23 states including the US were part of the Artemis Accords. India has not signed up, evidently because it is concerned that the accords create a parallel legal framework that is designed to primarily serve US interests and impinge on India's own lunar ambitions.  If Indian companies decide to become customers or even partners in the CLPS, it will be interesting to see if they are implicitly or even explicitly expected to agree to some of the Artemis principles. The third important aspect of space cooperation outlined in the factsheet is a handful of steps to encourage greater commercial space cooperation and interaction between experts on both sides. India's Department of Space and the US' Department of Commerce are to lead a new initiative under the existing Civil Space Joint Working Group or CSJWG to “foster U.S.-India commercial space engagement and enable growth and partnerships between U.S. and Indian commercial space sectors.” While such initiatives may seem minor, they can help pave the way for Indian and American space companies to forge productive partnerships in a heavily regulated sector. Finally, the fact sheet also announces steps to make “talent exchanges” easier and increase interaction between ISRO and NASA personnel. While these initiatives don't address some of the gripes Indian private space companies have with visa rules, they are obviously intended to build trust between the two countries' national space agencies, which have long looked at each other warily. Biopolitik: The Promise of Gene Drive— Saurabh TodiGene drives are genetic elements of an organism that are transmitted to progeny at higher than mendelian frequencies (>50%). Gene editing techniques such as CRISPR–Cas9 have made gene drives extremely efficient in laboratory settings and have shown the potential to reduce the prevalence of vector-borne diseases, crop pests, and non-native invasive species. Research in gene drives, especially on mosquitoes, is being carried out by scientists at the University of California, San Diego, Texas A&M University, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, among others. However, concerns have been raised regarding the potential unintended consequences, especially in terms of the ecological impact of gene-drive systems.Reducing the incidence of vector-borne diseases has become a technology demonstrator for gene drive technology. Mosquitoes engineered with gene drive systems can pass specific genes to the next generation at higher than Mendelian inheritance rates (>50%). This ensures that the target gene spreads through the wild-type mosquito population, despite some associated fitness costs. Gene-drive mosquito techniques work in two major ways: They reduce the population of mosquitos (population suppression); or modify (population replacement) a given vector population.Population suppression involves the release of modified male mosquitoes to suppress vector populations to a level which makes it difficult to sustain malaria transmission. Population suppression strategies are based on the inactivation, or knock-out, of genes which aim to reduce fertility or production of female progeny or are biased towards higher production of male progeny (which do not bite). In a small study, gene drive mosquitoes wiped out captive populations of mosquitoes in just eight to twelve generations. In contrast, the population replacement method aims to reduce the ability of a mosquito to transmit the malaria pathogen. Population replacement strategies are based on the inactivation of genes that enable mosquitoes to be effective vectors. For example, many potential effector genes have been identified to impair the development of Plasmodium parasites (that cause malaria) by Anopheles mosquitoes (the vector).The use of either population replacement or population suppression would depend on their relative strengths and challenges in the given situation. For example, population replacement can provide a level of environmental safety because it would not result in the elimination of an ecological niche that an opportunistic invasive species could occupy. However, it is a risky approach because the genetic modification will remain in the environment forever, increasing the likelihood of unintended consequences. To address these concerns, scientists are working on ways to reduce the risk of the unintentional spread of a gene drive mosquito and to ensure researchers hold much more control over their safe manipulation. Scientists at the University of California, San Diego, may have found a way to reduce this risk. They have created a flexible genetic "hacking" system for converting split gene drives (sDGs) into full gene drives (fGDs) while reducing the risk of using the latter.Although gene drive technology to eliminate vector-borne diseases such as Malaria hasn't been commercialised yet, it holds promise to reduce the scourge of this disease, which causes upwards of 600,000 deaths annually, predominantly in Africa.Antariksh Matters #2: Reducing Space Threats, Round 3— Pranav R SatyanathIn the previous edition of Technopolitiik, we covered the recommendations from our discussion document for our OEWG. On a positive note, that version of the document was published as a working paper for the OEWG. But not all was positive in the third round, as we shall see.Disagreements among states must not shock us. It is exactly what was expected of the group. It seems, however, that the OEWG is widening the divide between some member-states rather than bridging them. More prevailingly, the third meeting of the OEWG also revealed that states do not agree on the working procedures of the group, something that could eventually threaten to derail the entire OEWG process. I identified two issues that could cause deadlocks in the final round of the OEWG, which will be held in August this year.1. Consensus about consensus: The first major issue that occupied the minds of the member-states was regarding the procedure of the OEWG. The issue of consensus arose when Russia and China protested the participation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) during the formal session of the OEWG. They argued that since members disagree on the status of NGOs, no consensus can be reached; therefore, agreeing on the participation of NGOs is invalid. The Chair, on his part, ruled the participation of NGOs in the formal sessions as valid since no consensus could be reached.Russia, China and other states interpreted the Chair's move as divergence from the OEWG's mandate and, therefore, an abuse of the Chair's power. Russia protected the participation of NGOs into the second day, arguing that the lack of consensus about consensus threatens the future of OEWG, including the adoption of a final outcome paper.2. International Humanitarian Law: The status of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) was already a contested issue in the opening meeting of the OEWG. The contest over the status of IHL grew all the more intense in the third round. China, for its part, argued that invoking IHL would mean accepting outer space as a domain of armed conflict since IHL deals with customary laws of armed conflict. Therefore, applying IHL would mean that states automatically classify outer space as a domain for warfighting. Russia echoed these sentiments while also arguing that Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) already enables the partial demilitarisation of space. Accepting the applicability of IHL in space, in Russia's logic, would overturn the principles of the OST.Of course, the issue of the need for pure legally-binding instruments and the status of non-legally-binding measures persist between states. These matters might sound mundane to many, including veterans of the space sector. However, it is important to note that with no common principles for governing space, we may end up in a situation where no advancements are made to govern the use of dual-use technologies or the deployment of space-based conventional armaments. Resolving the debates about the founding principles of outer space security, safety, and sustainability is essential to achieve stable, universally-applicable treaties. Our Reading Menu[Twitter Thread] Why does chatGPT make up fake academic papers? by David Smerdon[Report] Controlling the innovation chain: China's strategy to become a science & technology superpower[Paper] Digital Power China This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Matsinaya: Backdoors to state control— Shailesh ChitnisThe Chinese government has signalled a shift in how it plans to control big tech. This month, news reports emerged that state-owned enterprises are set to take a 1% stake in two of its most prominent tech companies, Alibaba and Tencent.Euphemistically dubbed "golden shares," this small stake grants special privileges and gives the government an outsized role in how these companies are run. Typically, these shares come with a board seat and the right to review or veto any content decisions. The stake in Alibaba was acquired by an investment fund set up by the Cyberspace Administration of China, the country's central internet regulator and censor.So far, the arrangement seems to target companies with a significant user base for online content. Alibaba owns social media entities, including Youku, the Chinese version of YouTube, and the web browser UCWeb. Tencent operates Tencent Video, a popular Chinese streaming service. In April 2021, the government paid around 2M Rmb (~$290K) for a percent share in ByteDance Technology, the parent of TikTok.Golden shares, known in China as "Special management shares" have been around since 2015 as a mechanism to control online content platforms. But over the past three years, the government has preferred more direct intervention to curtail what it perceives as an overreach by some of its largest companies. In October 2020, Alibaba controlled Ant Financial's IPO listing, which valued the company at a staggering $313 billion, which was pulled at the last minute. In July 2021, the ride-hailing app company Didi was banned from accepting new users over data privacy concerns. In the same month, China's edtech sector was crushed overnight when the government announced rules preventing these companies from making profits, raising capital, or going public.With the Chinese economy faltering and Xi Jinping's coronation completed, Beijing appears to be taking a subtler path to control its biggest technology companies. Business leaders may see this as a preferable approach to more aggressive and, at times, unpredictable regulation. Having a government representative on the board will reduce the companies' independence. But there is less scope for sudden rule changes since the insider would be privy to all content moderation decisions. However, shareholders of these companies, in particular overseas investors, won't be too happy with this arrangement. They will have less visibility and control over how the business operates. These concerns are now playing out publicly in how TikTok is trying to operate in the US. This month, the company shared details of a proposal that would spin off the US arm into a separate entity owned by ByteDance but entirely operated by US government-approved employees. It has also offered to allow Oracle and other third-party monitors to review its video recommendation algorithm. In the absence of a deal, the company is worried that it will be forced to sell its US operations or leave the market.ByteDance's travails highlight how difficult it will be for Chinese-owned companies to straddle both the US and Chinese markets.Antariksh Matters: Opening the doors for redressing orbital dangers— Pranav R Satyanath Over the past several issues of Techopolitik, we have covered several issues surrounding the weaponisation of space and the threats faced by satellites. One topic of particular interest has been the discussions and deliberations within the Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats (OEWG). We began covering the OEWG back in May 2022, when the group held its first meeting in Geneva. The second meeting of the OEWG was help in September. And in 2023, we approach the third meeting of the OEWG.Much of the deliberations of the OEWG have been covered in a discussion document released in July 2022. During the deliberations, however, it became evident that India did little to be vocal about its own preferences for space risk reduction. After months of lamenting India's lack of proactiveness, we at the Takshashila Institution have put down our set of recommended approaches for India to pursue at the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations. The new discussion document titled, “Redressing Orbital Dangers: Approaches to Advance India's Interests in Outer Space,” also provides an analysis of the US-led moratorium destructive DA-ASAT testing and India's position on space risk reduction. Here's an executive summary:In December 2022, the United Nations overwhelmingly adopted a resolution that called for states to commit not to carry out destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests. The proposed destructive DA-ASAT missile test moratorium does not restrict the research, development and deployment of counterspace capabilities. India, however, abstained from voting on the resolution and indicated its preference for legally-binding instruments. Moreover, India has yet to put forward its proposals for members of international fora to pursue. This document recommends four approaches which India can pursue to secure its interests. These recommendations are:* Pursue legally-binding instruments which ban the destructive testing of anti-satellite capabilities in outer space.* Advocate for mutual proximity notifications wherein states notify one another during close approaches or when one satellite operator notices unusual satellite behaviour by another operator.* Promote sharing space situational awareness data to increase the knowledge of the space environment and build transparency and confidence between states.* Advance existing norms, rules and responsible behaviours in outer space by adopting and strengthening non-legally-binding measures.No single recommended approach can redress all the threats in space. India must therefore advocate for multiple approaches in tandem to achieve peace and prosperity in outer space.Cyberpolitik: Closing all backdoors through open-source— Bharath ReddyOpen-source software (OSS) can help India achieve techno-strategic autonomy, economic growth, technology leadership, and skill development. As India takes on the G20 presidency, it needs to champion the adoption of OSS and create a sustainable ecosystem around it. A pledge by G20 countries to follow an OSS-first procurement policy that opts for proprietary closed-source solutions only when OSS options are unavailable can go a long way in creating an affordable and accessible common digital future. The rise of platforms and cloud-based services is a significant cause for concern in the information age. Big tech companies wield enormous power as gatekeepers of platforms. Network effects and vertically integrated services make it increasingly difficult for users to opt-out. User data often ends up being locked in silos. The need to have ownership and sovereignty over one's data is increasingly being recognised as an essential consideration in determining our choice of software.France and Germany have recognised the perils of having government communication on siloed big tech platforms such as Slack, Teams, WhatsApp or Telegram. They have taken the lead in moving government communication to a decentralised platform based on the Matrix open standard. France and Germany also have, to different extents, banned Microsoft's Office 365 and Google Workspace, citing concerns around compliance with GDPR and data sovereignty.These moves recognise that we live in an environment of increasing geopolitical risks. OSS offers a path to techno-strategic autonomy and data sovereignty. It provides unfettered access to secure, reliable and transparent technologies and ensures that data ownership stays with the users.The ominous term surveillance capitalism accurately describes the practice followed by tech companies to exploit users' personal data for advertising-driven profit. Surveillance capitalism thrives on the power of platforms. Tech companies have convinced users to trade our privacy for convenience to such an extent that they can predict our behaviour and influence it. We need software and algorithms that are transparent and inspire trust. If we indeed want to mitigate surveillance, open-source is the way to go.Building software using OSS components is now the de-facto model. Reusable modular OSS components can reduce costs and speed up the development process. A recent study shows that almost 97% of commercial software contains open-source code. This increased reliance on OSS puts additional strain on the communities of developers who maintain the code. Maintenance of OSS, including feature updates, bug fixes, and security updates, is a significant strain on the developers maintaining this code. Given that OSS forms the backbone of most software, a sustainable ecosystem with a contribution culture is essential.Governments are some of the biggest purchasers of software and IT services. The union government already has a soft preference for OSS in software procurement. Current IT procurement policies, such as the e-Governance Policy Initiatives under Digital India of 2015, state that the government shall endeavour to adopt OSS in e-governance systems and that OSS should be mandatorily considered as one of the options. A stronger preference for OSS in government purchases can go a long way in creating a sustainable open-source ecosystem. IT procurement policies of the union and state governments should mandate that all software purchased through tax-payer funding be open-source. Proprietary and closed technologies should be considered only where adequate OSS technologies are not an option. "Public Money? Public Code!" can be the guiding principle for government software purchases. In practice, this will lead to tax-payer-funded software having the freedom for everyone to use, modify, study, change and redistribute. The trickle-down effects will benefit society as a whole.OSS is an integral part of our common digital future, and promoting it will lead to economic growth and skill development. It will promote open standards and interoperability. It will also lead to skill development, job creation and entrepreneurship. All of these benefits are aligned with the objectives of the G20 in promoting an affordable and accessible common digital future. Investing in OSS will also help countries of the global south access state-of-the-art technologies.Adopting an OSS-first procurement policy by the G20 countries can create strong incentives for a vibrant open-source ecosystem. India must lead the way by adopting such a policy and champion other countries to pledge to do the same. In addition, G20 countries should also create a common fund which shall be used to fund critical OSS projects. The multiplier effects for the economy will far exceed the costs incurred towards maintaining these projects. Our Reading Menu[Blog] TikTok is a New Type of Superweapon by Gurwinder.[Article] Trust but verify: Satellite reconnaissance, secrecy and arms control during the Cold War by Aaron Bateman.[Report] Software Power: The Economic and Geopolitical Implications of Open Source Software by Alice Pannier This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

A happy new year to all our readers! To kickstart this year's edition of Technopolitik, we have assembled a list of predictions for 2023 across tech sectors, ranging from online regulation, biotech and outer space. Maybe we can take stock of these predictions and see how much of it we got wrong (or right) at the end of this year!Beginning from this edition, we also introduce a new section to our newsletter called Biopolitik, while will cover all the fascinating tidbits about the biotechnology industry and its intersection with policy and politics.Be sure to check out our Reading Menu. This edition lists some of the best books that the authors have read from last year. With that, we wish you a great year ahead!Cyberpolitik #1: Regulatory tech battles in India— Shailesh ChitnisBig tech is vulnerable. For the first time in big-tech history, technology platforms are confronting slowing growth and bottom-line pressures. Aggressive expansion during the pandemic years has given way to cost-cutting during a cooling economy.Amazon recently announced plans to cut 18,000 workers, mostly in the retail, recruiting and devices businesses. Meta, the parent of Facebook and Instagram, has cut more than 11,000 workers, or about 13% of its staff. It's a similar story across other platforms — Salesforce, Snap, Twitter — no one seems immune.Against this backdrop, regulators are getting more active in reigning in what they see as an overreach by these platforms. In the past, Indian regulators had given technology platforms a free hand. But increasingly, the Indian government has signalled its intention to shape the country's technology landscape.In a series of rulings in October, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) fined Google almost Rs. 2,300 crores for abusing dominance with its Android operating system and the Play Store. The government is also getting into specifics of technology implementation with new rules around standardising chargers (USB-C) and upholding consumers' right-to-repair for devices.In 2023, expect more activity. The gatekeeping role of Apple and Google, which they exercise through their app stores, will be challenged. But since commissions from these stores are a significant revenue source for both these companies, any moves to change this structure will be a long legal battle. With the government's active role in market design, expect more public battles between incumbent tech and the government. Adding to the tech vs regulators battle, India will also be gearing up for general elections in 2024. As the elections draw closer, we can expect the conversations and controversies on the role of social media platforms in disseminating information to be pitched even further.Indeed, 2022 was a busy year for technology policy-making with the semiconductor manufacturing policy and a revised draft of the much-awaited digital data protection bill. But this year, the government has promised to introduce a complete overhaul of the IT Act, which governs much of the digital ecosystem. The IT Act was passed in 2000 and needs to be set up for all the complexity of the internet today - from intermediaries and platforms to AI and data privacy. We also expect the bill's first draft to cover a wide range of online platforms, including social media sites, e-commerce entities and ad-tech platforms.This act can have far-reaching consequences for businesses and civil society since all problems are now technology problems in some form.Biopolitik: Pandemics and regulatory politics— Saurabh TodiThe World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2023 is expected to accelerate negotiations on a draft international pandemic treaty governing prevention, preparedness, and response to future pandemics. The World Health Assembly (WHA) in December 2021 launched the process of negotiating a historical global accord. It established an International Negotiating Body (INB) to formulate a 'WHO convention, agreement or another international instrument' to aid a united global response to any infectious disease crises in the future. Countries felt the need for a new treaty due to various challenges made conspicuous by the experience of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. These include equitable distribution of vaccines and health services among and within countries, knowledge and data sharing, and strengthening countries' capabilities to respond to health emergencies. Although there has been a broad consensus on the ways of working and broad policies that will guide this process, there are also significant disagreements between member states.A central sticking point is the legal nature of this treaty. While the majority of the WHO member states favour a legally-binding instrument, there are differences in how to approach this issue. For example, the WHA has agreed to adopt the global instrument under Article 19 of the WHO constitution, which enables the assembly to draw up binding agreements on a wide range of issues under its mandate. But some countries want the treaty to fall under Article 21, which limits the number of topics that can have binding agreements. Furthermore, some prefer "non-legally binding recommendations" in the draft.In December 2022, at the third meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB), a Conceptual Zero Draft (CZD) of the instrument was released, which has been developed by the Bureau of the INB following widespread consultation. During the meeting, the task fell on INB to develop a "zero draft" in order to start negotiations at the fourth INB meeting scheduled for February 2023. The WHO has committed itself to a timeline where INB will deliver a progress report to the 76th World Health Assembly in 2023 and; submit an outcome document for consideration by the 77th World Health Assembly in 2024.Interestingly, India has maintained a studied silence over its position on this proposed treaty. As an advocate of the interests of the global south, it must ensure the security of the interests of the developing countries during these negotiations. Given the difference of opinion among countries on these issues, it would be interesting to see how the global community reaches a consensus on this crucial initiative.Antariksh Matters: A Space Policy at Last?— Aditya RamanathanAgainst my better judgement, I am going to make predictions that may be largely wrong. First, the easy part: sometime in 2023, the Indian government will release a Space Policy. While the release of this policy has been long-promised, it is more likely than not to be finally made public this year. Now, the more difficult part: predicting some of the broad contours of the policy. I'll start with some brief background. In 2017, the government released a draft Space Activities Bill for comments. The bill was an important step in laying down a legal framework under which space companies can operate. However, the feedback wasn't good. The bill had vague definitions and granted excessive discretionary authority to government officials. As an example of vagueness, the bill only covered Indians or private entities registered in India, leaving foreign collaborators in a regulatory dead zone.Similarly, it defined ‘space activity' so broadly that even a start-up doing preliminary research and development might find itself coping with a barrage of licensing requirements. The draft bill also offers little clarity on liability. India is a signatory to the 1972 Liability Convention, which makes states liable for damage caused by space activities. The bill simply states that the government will decide the amount of money for which a private entity is liable - the sort of provision that is virtually guaranteed to scare off investors. A lot has changed since 2017. The government has pledged to revise the 2017 draft bill based on comments received. It has also created the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) to act as a nodal agency for private space companies. The next steps are to release a Space Policy followed by the heavily modified Space Activities Bill. So here are my three predictions for the Space Policy:One, the policy will be genuinely oriented towards encouraging private sector space activity and will identify it as a key priority for India. There's enough evidence that the government takes this seriously. The private space economy is (rightly or wrongly) seen as an important component of the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” vision of a self-reliant India. The space economy is also seen as a key catalyst for high-technology industries. The Indian Prime Minister's push for the creation of the industry body Indian Space Association (ISpA) is indication enough that this support extends to the apex of the political leadership. Two, despite this commitment to private industry, the verbiage of the space policy will still place the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) at the centre of India's space aspirations. Indeed, it is quite likely that the policy will consider the primary role of India's private sector to be a supporting ecosystem for ISRO rather than a dynamic entity in its own right. This is a somewhat shakier prediction to make, and it is, more than anything else, a hunch based on statements made by ISRO officials and an awareness of the influence ISRO and the Department of Space wield. Three, the policy will likely offer a potential solution to the issue of liability. I suspect the proposal it will come up with is the creation of a space liability fund that can act as a sort of insurance pool. Typically, such funds will be built by space companies pledging a portion of their profits, but the details would probably only become clear in the Space Activities Bill. So that's my largely optimistic prediction for 2023. Whatever the actual outcomes, we'll dissect them in detail for you in this newsletter.Cyberpolitik #2: In Service of the Digital Public Infrastructure— Bharath ReddyAs we enter 2023, we will see increased deployment of different facets of digital public infrastructure (DPI). As we have seen with UPI, this can lead to financial inclusion and empowerment of citizens, but it comes at the cost of centralising platforms in the hands of the government.Different facets of DPI, such as the Account Aggregator framework, Open Credit Enablement Network, UHI for health, and enhancements to Aadhaar and Digilocker, are expected to be deployed and adopted widely. These improvements will likely lead to the seamless delivery of services and unlock easy access to citizens' data across different silos. In addition to this, as Rahul Matthan writes, DPI will also serve as a techno-legal framework for data governance. Across the world, governing how data is collected and used has proved to be a challenge. Regulations have yet to be successful. Companies have been able to circumvent the law, and the capacity required for enforcement is also relatively high. Moreover, since DPI can be encoded into the public infrastructure, they might offer a better solution for compliance. Requests for data, consent and provision of minimal purpose-specific data can be built into the infrastructure, making compliance easier to enforce.However, these advantages come at the cost of concentrating power over the platforms in the hands of the state. The state has access to large amounts of citizens' personal data and is responsible for safeguarding it. It also has regulatory control and gatekeeping privileges for these critical platforms. Concerns over regulatory access are critical given that we expect the Digital Personal Data Protection Bill (DPDPB) and Telecom Bill to be tabled in Parliament this year. The broad exemptions granted to government entities and the lack of independence of the proposed Data Protection Board in the draft DPDPB, 2022, are a cause for concern. The draft Telecom Bill 2022 has expansive definitions and allows for greater state surveillance. Since both bills have received comments already, we can expect them to be passed this year. The checks and balances they will enforce will play a crucial role.Our Reading Menu[Book] Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology by Chris Miller.[Book] 10% Human: How Your Body's Microbes Hold the Key to Health and Happiness by Allana Collen.[Book] Human-Build World: How to Think about Technology and Culture by Thomas P. Hughes.[Book] The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy by Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Matsyanyaaya #1: Opening up to open-tech— Bharath Reddy"Open Tech" refers to transparent, inclusive technology and embodies the freedom to use, study, modify and redistribute to the maximum extent possible. The definitions of open-source software, open standards, and open-source hardware are well understood. "Open Tech" is an umbrella term that includes all of these technology areas.The usual arguments promoting open source technologies highlight reducing costs, avoiding vendor and technology lock-in, and the ability to customise. But, given the current geopolitical climate, access to state-of-the-art technology cannot be taken for granted. Supply chain resilience and tech sanctions are a cause for serious concern. The acquisition of advanced technologies is not an end in itself, but a means to bring peace and prosperity to all Indian citizens. Unhindered access to state-of-the-art technology and foundational knowledge is, therefore, in India's national interest. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar echoed this sentiment when he said India "cannot be agnostic about technology" as there is "a strong political connotation in-built into technology".Open tech can help India achieve techno-strategic autonomy, economic growth, technology leadership, and skill development. The "openness" also helps foster trust, broaden access to technology and further democratic values.Open tech, by its nature, is both non-rival (its use by someone does not diminish the utility to others) and non-excludable (its access cannot be denied to anyone). In economic terms, this qualifies it as a public good. As we see with other public goods, such as clean air or street lights, the incentives are weak for markets or individuals to tend to the maintenance and upkeep of public goods. This is visible in one of the main problems facing open-source software today. A recent study shows that almost 97% of all commercial software uses open-source code. A large number of open-source projects are maintained by individuals or small communities of developers without adequate funding. This growing reliance on open-source software increases the burden on maintainers of this code to keep the software secure, bug-free and up-to-date. Other areas, such as the open-source hardware, are in a nascent stage, and India could gain a valuable head-start given a favourable policy environment. This is especially important given the silicon geopolitics playing out between the US and China. Open standards have a range of benefits, such as removing entry barriers, promoting interoperability, and lowering costs. The government needs to encourage the promotion of open standards and also represent India-specific requirements at various international Standard Development Organisations.The existing policy landscape includes a preference for open-source software in procurement and a policy on standards for e-governance at the Union and State governments. However, given the growing importance of open tech, a comprehensive open tech strategy is indispensable. This short essay is a preview of an upcoming Takshashila Report on an open tech strategy for India. Apply here: https://bit.ly/pgp-jan23-nlAntariksh Matters: Buying space power?— Pranav R SatyanathEarlier this week, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) launched its first rover, Rashid, towards the Moon's surface. The rover was carried on a Falcon-9 rocket along with a miniature rover from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). But there's a catch. The UAE did not build the Rashid rover, but it was built under contract by a Japanese private space venture called ispace. When we think of space-faring nations of the world, the UAE does not immediately strike a chord. However, the desert country has big space ambitions for the next decade. It has signed the US-led Artemis Accords. It has also signed an agreement with China to collaborate on future Moon missions. This is a surprising move since China has opposed the Artemis Accords and challenged its legality in the broader context of international space law. The country also boasts a full-fledged Mars programme. In March 2021, UAE became the first Arab country to place a probe in Mars orbit as part of the Emirates Mars Mission. The probe, named Hope or Al Amal in Arabic, was built by the Mohammed Bin Rashid Space Centre in collaboration with the University of Colorado, Boulder. Furthermore, the UAE also boasts an astronaut programme in partnership with NASA's Johnson Space Center. But UAE is not the only Arab country to veer into the lucrative and prestigious space sector. Saudi Arabia plans to invest $2.1 billion into its space programme as part of its larger Vision 2030 mission. The country set up the Saudi Space Commission in 2018 and placed the SGS-1, a communications satellite built by Lockheed Martin, in February 2019. Earlier this year, the Saudi Space Commission and Axiom Space, a US-based private space company, also signed a deal to send the Kingdom's astronauts into space.Petro-states by the likes of UAE and Saudi Arabia are the newest entries into the small and often restrictive space club. Their rise is only possible due to the large-scale commercialisation of space activities. Using their large reserves of income, petro-states can buy commercial services with relative ease and break into the space club rather than spend years building a domestic space industry from scratch. This phenomenon raises the question: what makes a country a space power? More often than not, those counties can launch rockets (or missiles), and perhaps, the ones that can build satellites are deemed as space powers. For much of the Cold War, orbital rocketry (and missile technology) captured the imagination of a space-faring nation, one that could build bigger and more powerful rockets to send payloads to the Moon and beyond. Although some of these rockets and satellites were built by private entities, their operations, for the most part, were controlled by national space agencies. Of course, not all space powers are born equal. Space powers can be ranked based on the range of activities they carry out across their civilian and military space programmes. The United States and Russia by far carry out the most space activities, with China slowly playing catch-up. France, India and Japan could fall in the category of middle space powers due to similarities in their space capabilities. Countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE and Turkey could be categorised under an entirely new category of space powers. Their power is drawn from their ability to redirect financial resources to attract commercial collaborators. As I point out in my discussion document on the future of India's space station programme, commercial collaboration is a new mechanism through which countries with limited capabilities can partner with private entities to augment their overall capabilities without the need for large-scale investment. As more private entities enter the space sector, we will likely witness more commercial collaborations in the future. Thus, making space easily accessible to many more countries.Matsyanyaaya #2: Vibing with nuclear fusion— Saurabh TodiThe Financial Times reported that the scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in California had achieved a net energy gain in a nuclear fusion reaction for the first time, which promises to become a cheap and carbon-neutral source of energy. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is expected to officially announce the breakthrough on Tuesday. This significant feat was achieved by LLNL's National Ignition Facility (NIF), which is the size of three football fields. According to the website of NIF, “NIF is the world's most precise and reproducible laser system. It precisely guides, amplifies, reflects, and focuses 192 powerful laser beams into a target about the size of a pencil eraser in a few billionths of a second, delivering more than 2 million joules of ultraviolet energy and 500 trillion watts of peak power, [generating] temperatures in the target of more than 180 million degrees Fahrenheit and pressures of more than 100 billion Earth atmospheres. Those extreme conditions cause hydrogen atoms in the target to fuse and release energy in a controlled thermonuclear reaction.”Although an extraordinary milestone, the commercialisation of nuclear fusion technology will face several resources and technological constraints that are worth considering, a popular YouTube channel Real Engineering, explained these constraints in their latest video:* Current fusion reactors combine two isotopes of Hydrogen: Deuterium (2H) and Tritium (3H), to produce Helium (4He). Although the supply of Deuterium (also called heavy water) is abundant as it is found in seawater, Tritium is a relatively rare isotope sourced primarily from nuclear reactor moderator pools where heavy water gets radiated to produce Tritium. This is a major constraint as the current supply of Tritium would significantly outstrip the demand from commercial fusion reactors, with the limited scope of increasing production.* Lithium can be used as an alternative source of Tritium as it undergoes fission to produce Tritium and Helium. However, this process requires materials made of Beryllium which is a rare and extremely expensive element. There are also safety concerns due to the presence of trace amounts of Uranium in this material.The video explains these and a few other challenges that the commercialisation of nuclear fusion would face. The path from technological breakthrough to commercialisation is a tough one, but the video ends on a hopeful note. This piece by Charles Seife in The Atlantic is also cautiously optimistic about the breakthrough while detailing the history of NIF and its several fusion experiments. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters: Shattering Space Record Myths— Pranav R SatyanathEarlier this week, a record was broken in the shadowy world of military space tech. At least, that's what some of the headlines make you believe. The secretive X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV) uncrewed spaceplane, operated by the US Space Force, landed at the NASA Kennedy Space Center on November 12th after spending 908 days in orbit. It broke the previous orbital record (780 days) by a large margin. The spaceplane, which is built by Boeing, has been in operation since 2010. Its mission and purpose are largely unknown, building some sort of a myth around this mini-Space Shuttle-looking vehicle.Let's take a step back. From all the open-source images available, we know that the X-37B has a single liquid-fuelled engine built by Aerojet and powered by storable propellants. This means it can stay in orbit by increasing its altitude. So, one can say that spaceplanes are not very different from regular satellites, which operate for years and decades in orbit. Now compare those years and decades to 908 days. Not much, right? Well, yes. So long as the spaceplane can maintain orbital speed, it can stay in orbit as long as its operators wish. Although we don't know much about the X-37B's true purpose, we know some meta details that give clues as to what the purpose might be. The programme that gave birth to the X-37B isn't a secret. Back in the early 1990s, people in the US government got pretty worried about the costs of operating the Space Shuttle. It was reusable for sure, but it was a slow and painstaking process to get the vehicle back to space. So, the US Congress told NASA to go and look at other alternatives. The result was the Access to Space study, which outlined faster, better, cheaper and smaller alternatives to the Suttle. After pondering their heads over what to test, NASA began to fund a handful of companies to research and develop reusable spaceplanes, including Single-Stage To Orbit (SSTO) tech, which is considered the pinnacle of rocketry.Chief among these experimental spaceplanes included Lockheed Martin's X-33 and Orbital Science's X-34 reusable launch vehicles, along with Boeing's X-37 experimental space manoeuvring vehicle. By 1999, NASA saw the funds dry up and no progress to show. The US Air Force (USAF) was ready to take up the X-34 and the X-37 programmes. The X-34 programme got cancelled, and the X-37 was transferred to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Two years later, the X-37B was in the hands of the USAF.From what we know, we can draw out two hypotheses:* The X-37B is a highly manoeuvrable vehicle used to inspect suspicious activities and objects in space. * The X-37B is a test vehicle for the US Space Force (and Air Force) which allows them to test hypersonic re-entry, autonomous capabilities and perhaps, deployment of small payloads.A part of the second hypothesis is already confirmed. Astronomer and space watcher Jonathan McDowell reported that the X-37B launched a subsatellite named the FalconSAT-t8, an experimental payload developed by the Air Force Academy. The second hypothesis is less likely to be true, as small satellites can perform a far better (and less suspicious) job of inspecting suspicious activities and objects.Like the US, the Chinese also have a handful of spaceplane projects. It will not be surprising that these vehicles will have both civilian and military uses. India is also testing a version of its spaceplane called the Reusable Launch Vehicle-Technology Demonstrator (RLV-TD). Spaceplanes are interesting. But we must not get carried away by spooky headlines.Comments on the Draft Telecommunications Bill, 2022— Satya Sahu and Gayathri PotiThe draft Telecommunications Bill, 2022 will do more to prohibit Digital India's growth story rather than facilitate it. We outline some of its most glaring issues:Definitional Over-breadth, Legislative Conflict and Procedural Lacunae* Explanatory Note to the Bill in para.51 reassures that provisions concerning internet shutdowns recognize citizens' rights; there is no enumeration of this safeguard in the concerned clause nor mechanisms for judicial oversight or review panels to record the legality of suspension orders à la the Telecom Suspension Rules, 2017.* The Union Government recently withdrew the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2021. In the absence of a data protection regime and an independent Data Protection Authority vested with powers to implement safeguards on the access and use of personal data by public authorities in line with the principles laid out in Puttaswamy and Shreya Singhal. , Clause 24(2)(b) contributes to the increasingly fragmented data protection framework in India, alongside the IT Act, 2000, SEBI Data Sharing Policy, 2019, Payments and Settlements Act, 2008 etc. Regulatory uncertainty and compliance costs within this framework become increasingly difficult due to the wide gamut of entities subject to the definition of "Telecommunication services" under Clause 2(2). The increased cost of compliance with implementing KYC norms and mandatory licensing regimes will result in extremely high barriers to entry for players in the OTT market. It will ensure that only market players with significant resources to meet these obligations can afford to remain in it, amplifying concerns about stifled innovation and competition in this oligopolistic sector.* Subjecting OTT platforms to DoT jurisdiction creates regulatory overlap with MeitY's powers, creating potentially conflicting laws, duplication of efforts by regulators and market players alike, ownership of implementation measures, and increasing costs of conducting business.* OTT platforms like real-time messaging services deploy E2E encryption. Currently, access to encrypted communication is governed by the 2021 Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code released by MeitY. Under this, significant social media intermediaries are only expected to enable the identification of the first originator of the information. The rules deliberately refrain from mandating access to the contents of the communication (especially since the 2015 draft rules that insisted on making available the plaintext of communications was met with heavy criticism), but Clause 24 empowers the Government to gain access to the contents of the communication as well. This conflicts with the 2021 Code and further aggravates the issue of regulatory overlap. The provision implicitly requires OTT platforms to create encryption backdoors and inevitably undermines Constitutional protection for free speech afforded by encryption.* The territorial applicability of the provisions of the Bill has not been described unlike in the Telegraph Act, 1885, and the IT Act, 2000, which circumscribe their application in terms of geography and cyber attribution. The telecom and OTT sectors depend on cross-border interconnectivity and rely on internationally administered infrastructure like satellites, marine fibre-optic cable networks, etc. It is necessary to foresee and describe the territorial limits of domestic law to avoid international conflict of laws to maintain market confidence and decrease legal costs and instances of interruption in critical services.* Clause 46 (k) of the Bill dilutes TRAI's standing to requisition information from the Government and provide recommendations before awarding licenses. Deleting the non-obstante clause and provisos to S.11 (1) of the TRAI Act eliminates TRAI's role in ensuring a level playing field for TSPs and fair and non-discriminatory treatment by the Government. Vesting TRAI with the power to investigate predatory pricing exacerbates existing overlap between the mandates of TRAI and CCI, increasing possibility of regulatory arbitrage. * Clause 24(1) vests the Central Government with the power to take temporary possession of telecommunication services, networks, and infrastructure, in the occurrence of any public emergency or in the interest of public safety. Clause 24(4) makes the exercise of this power concomitant with the duration of a public emergency or occasion. The Bill, however, does not provide any procedure for Government action nor define the terms' public safety' and 'public emergency', undermining the temporary nature of this power, inviting constitutional scrutiny and low investor confidence.Insufficient Justifications for Overarching Policy * OTT platforms should be permitted to continue operating under the existing framework without any regulatory intervention until the ITU and similar foreign jurisdictions conclusively determine the regulation of such platforms. TRAI's 2020 recommendations propose no deviation from this approach, especially since there has been limited global progress concerning OTT regulation.* Compliance with KYC norms is mandated for the issuance of SIM Cards and broadband connections; extending this requirement for accessing OTT communication services is unwarranted. The rigours associated with KYC rules are reserved for tightly regulated sectors like banking, where identity verification systems combat the incidence of high-risk pernicious activities. Mandating adherence to the KYC process for creating an account on an IM/e-mail/video telephony platform is not only disproportionate but is likely to dissuade users from accessing critical services. In particular, KYC formalities will deter consumers from testing newer platforms which could result in market stagnation.* Clause 32 envisages framing regulatory sandboxes to enable innovation and technological development in the sector. However, it allows access to regulatory sandboxes only as part of the terms and conditions under its new licensing regime defeating the intent of a regulatory sandbox. Providing access to this environment only upon the award of a license raises the costs of introducing new technology in a fixed-capital-intensive sector like telecom and entrenches the market power of already dominant entities who can bear this cost. The extent and nature of the usage of new technology cannot always be preempted in the terms of a license at the time of licensing. This creates the future burden of bearing opportunity costs of not being able to leverage its own technology in new ways on the licensee, leading to avoidable legal costs and ad hoc renegotiation.The authors are students of Takshashila's GCPP (Technology & Policy) Programme.Matsyanyaaya: Splinternet Conviction?— Bharath ReddyWe often hear predictions about a splinter-net or a bifurcated Internet. What does this mean? And what are the incentives at play other than the obvious state control and censorship?To get an idea of how the Internet could split and what it means, a good example would be Runet - the Russian national segment of the Internet. Russian interventions to create an independent national Internet range from state censorship to mandating ISPs to use national Domain Name System (DNS) servers (where website names are translated to addresses). There are also forces from outside Russia incentivising the split as well. During the initial phase of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, there were appeals by Ukraine to remove Russian domains from DNS servers which would cut them off from the rest of the Internet. This request was rejected as it could destroy trust in a global internet if the DNS does not remain neutral. However, requests by Ukraine to certificate authorities that issue SSL and TLS certificates for websites have been more successful, creating barriers in the process. Lastly, the hardware sanctions and market exits following the conflict could potentially lead to a split in internet standards.As you might know, the Internet is based on communication protocols which enable different devices to speak a common language and communicate with each other. Broadly, these protocols can be classified under - content, logic and infrastructure layers. While censorship at the content layer is quite common, a fork in the lower logic and infrastructure layers could have serious ramifications. Network effects, protocol politics and geopolitics, come together here. The largest networks have incentives to refuse to be interoperable with competitors. In the current nature of the Internet, the US and its allies wield power to cut off competitors from critical chokepoints. This power has been exercised to an extent during the recent sanctions against China and Russia. The threat of such actions creates incentives for bifurcated supply chains and in this world of bifurcated supply chains there would be takers for China's vision of national internet sovereignty. In such a scenario, future network protocols such as New IP being developed by Huawei could become more widespread. The intelligence built into the protocols at the logic and infrastructure layers could enable more surveillance and control by the ISPs and the State.The concerns around the splitting of the Internet is thus a complex interplay between technology, geopolitics, and the relation between the State and the individual.The report titled “One, Two, or Two Hundred Internets” by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich is an exciting read that covers this subject in detail. As the author hopes, it helps enable informed discussion and decision-making on splitting the Internet.Our Reading Menu[Opinion] Road Ahead for UPI: Free Public Infrastructure or Yet Another Payment Mechanism? by Rohan Pai and Mihir Mahajan.[Chapter] Gene Editing and the Need to Reevaluate Bioweapons by Shambhavi Naik.[Book] Cellular: An Economic and Business History of the International Mobile-Phone Industry by Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz and Martin Campbell-Kelly. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters: Tying commercial and military ends— Pranav R SatyanathEight months after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it is an established fact that commercial entities in space provide a vital service for enhancing military capabilities. The Ukrainian military purchased hundreds of images from companies like Maxar and Planet to monitor Russian formations. More famously, internet services provided by SpaceX's Starlink constellations proved vital for soldiers on the battlefield. Other companies, like HawkEye 360, offer services that warn the Ukrainian military of potential GPS interference. My colleague Aditya Ramanathan and I have extensively covered the issues of using commercial satellites for military purposes. After all, we covered Starlink and Russian attacks in the previous edition. The problem of commercial-military satellite entanglement, however, is indispensable. On Thursday (October 27), Russian officials warned that Western commercial satellites could be legally targeted if the United States and its allies continue their involvement in the war in Ukraine.As mentioned in previous Technopolitik editions, Professor Davi Koplow has made a robust case for legally targeting space assets. He argues that any space asset that assists a country's military operations could be legally targeted under the Law of Armed Conflict. Others have highlighted the importance of proportionality of attack under International Humanitarian Law and the need to take into consideration the possibility of indirect harm towards civilians during armed conflict.The issue that I raise here is more novel. I ponder the connection between the US-Russia bilateral noninterference agreement with National Technical Means (intelligence-gathering assets, including spy satellites) and the Law of Armed Conflict. Let's begin with National Technical Means (NTM)). During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union wished to limit the number of nuclear weapons deployed on either side. While both countries were willing to agree on some limits (starting with the 1972 Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty under SALT I), neither side showed interest in on-site inspections for verification (this changed much later). Hence, the two sides agreed to verify the treaty using “national technical means of verification”. NTMs not only include satellites but also consist of ground-based radars and telemetry gathering devices. The definition of NTMs is ambiguous on purpose, as they help countries maintain technical secrecy while acknowledging spying tools as legitimate tools of verification.Early arms control agreements between the US and the Soviet Union also led to the first steps towards space arms control. Article XII (2) of the ABM treaty stated the following:“Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.”Noninterference was codified in the bilateral agreement, which continues to be a norm in the US-Russia New START agreement. During the Cold War, commercial entities did exist to provide satellite imagery. Even when they did, governments did not use commercial images to verify arms control agreements. Things are, however, a little different today. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which launches and operates US spy satellites, began purchasing images from commercial vendors, signing billions of dollars in contracts. The end-use of these images is unknown. Since one can not conclusively determine whether commercial images are being used for arms control verification, commercial satellites can be considered to be part of NTMs.So, if companies like Maxar and Planet, which sell images to the NRO, also sell images to the Ukrainian armed forces, does the rule of noninterference apply, or does the Law of Armed Conflict take precedence? The answer, unfortunately, is that we do not know. The phenomenon of commercial-military entanglement is still unfolding. But pondering these questions is essential to keep outer space safe and secure.Matsyanyaaya #1: What did CCI just do?— Bharath ReddyOver the past few weeks, the Competition Commission of India imposed penalties of ₹1,337 crores and ₹936 crores in two antitrust cases against Google. The first was related to Google abusing its market dominance in the mobile operating system and Android app store markets to gain a significant advantage over competitors in other markets. The CCI observed that Google entered into multiple agreements with OEMs that govern their rights and obligations. One such agreement assures that Google's apps, such as search, Chrome and YouTube, come pre-installed on Android devices without an option for users to uninstall them. Other agreements ensure exclusivity of its search services and even prohibit OEMs from offering devices with alternative versions of Android (forks of the open-source code), which are not approved by Google. Access to Google's Play Store, which is essential to a smartphone, was conditional on complying with these agreements. The second was related to  Google's Play Store policies requiring developers to mandatorily and exclusively use Google Play's Billing System for app payments and in-app purchases. This increases costs for users due to the hefty service fees - Apple and Google take a 15 to 30 per cent cut from app developers and also stifles choice and innovation in the payments ecosystem.These verdicts come close on the heels of Google's failed attempt to overturn the €4.34 billion antitrust fine handed down by the European Union four years ago. The fines are a little more than rounding errors for a corporation that reported revenue of $69 billion last quarter, but the increasing antitrust cases globally might force them to reconsider their policies. There are some ostensibly valid reasons for the restrictions imposed in the agreements with OEMs. Having multiple forks of the Android operating system could lead to fragmentation, which could delay security and feature updates. Having a single app store with a gatekeeper could keep unreliable and malicious apps out. OEMs could bundle adware and malware into essential apps such as browsers. While there is a lot of attention and scrutiny about the privacy and anticompetitive practices of big tech companies, there exists a long tail of mid and small-size tech companies which have little to no oversight. Centralisation and control help avoid these risks; however, it hands over control of the entire ecosystem to Google. Google can leverage the network effects of the Android operating system to gain an unsurpassable advantage in other markets. This is achieved not only through the prominent placement of its apps on Android phones but also through the vast amounts of data about user preferences and behaviour which can be used to improve their offerings. Such self-preferencing and vertical integration are detrimental to competition and limit choice to the end user.A lot of the issues discussed above are also present in Apple's iOS and other platforms as well. Big tech companies such as Google, Apple, Meta, Microsoft and Amazon wield enormous power as gatekeepers of their platforms. The EU's Digital Markets Act which comes into force in May next year, is expected to bring about reforms which will impose obligations on gatekeepers to ensure a level playing field.Third-party app stores might become a reality ending Apple and Google's monopoly in app stores, which is also one of the demands made by the CCI. There might be some trade-offs in user freedom and security when this becomes a reality. It is also quite likely that app stores will compete to find a way to balance both of these while also avoiding the exorbitant service fees currently being charged to app developers.Matsyanyaaya #2: The CCI verdict: All bark and no bite?— Shailesh ChitnisIt was a busy October for the Competition Commission of India (CCI), India's antitrust regulator. In a one-two punch against Google, the CCI first fined it $161.9 million for forcing device makers to pre-install Google's suite of apps and penalising alternate versions of Android, its “open source” operating system. Next, the CCI hit Google with a $113 million penalty for preventing app developers from using third-party payment apps.The same week, it fined MakeMyTrip, India's largest travel portal and OYO, a hotel aggregator, a combined $47 million for restricting market access to OYO's competitors on MakeMyTrip's platform. Taking all factors together, the decision represents a clear message that the CCI is looking at digital markets and platforms a lot more closely.But do these actions have wider implications? A hot-take is to compare the penalties to the revenues of the companies and predict that it would hardly have an impact. Most companies appeal the rulings in court, and in the years that it takes for the cases to be resolved, the fines are whittled down. The CCI has also been notoriously ineffective when it comes to collections. Data shows that from 2011-2018, the CCI imposed a cumulative penalty of more than $1.3B but recovered less than 1%.But that misses the point. The CCI rulings are important because they signal that the regulator is taking a measured approach to competition in the digital ecosystem. Until this point, India had been fair “hands off” with its approach to digital platforms. Part of the reason may have been the size of online markets when compared with offline markets. But the nature of digital markets, especially the network effects, which create outsized winners, makes an intervention in this domain timely.Second, the CCI also recognizes the limits of its power. In the absence of supporting legislation and the fast-changing nature of this industry, the agency is nudging participants towards corrective action rather than enforcement. Even as Google will likely challenge these rulings in court, it has paused the requirement for developers to use Google Play's billing system. Treebo and FabHotels, Oyo's competitors, are back on MakeMyTrip. Market correction, not enforcement.Finally, the cohort of Google, Meta and others have been used to dealing with regulators around the world. India would be no different. But, for probably the first time in their existence, big tech is vulnerable. The continued slowdown in the ad-tech supported business, coupled with fears of a recession, has created uncertainty over their growth.Against this backdrop, the CCI's actions couldn't have come at a worse time.Our Reading Menu[Opinion] The US and China are battling for semiconductor supremacy by Pranay Kotasthane and Abhiram Manchi.[Article] Paradoxes of Intermediation in Aadhaar: Human Making of a Digital Infrastructure by Bidisha Chaudhuri.[Book] From Mainframes to Smartphones: A History of the International Computer Industry by Martin Campbell-Kelly and Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters: Starlink & the Dismal Attractions of Space Warfare— Aditya RamanathanThe contributors to this newsletter are not an unduly pessimistic lot. They nevertheless retained little doubt that geopolitical adversaries would seek to contest each others' ability to use space-based assets. What was harder to predict was that we would see its first instances as early as 2022. It was also harder to imagine that some of these dangers would draw public attention because of a sordid spat over money. Over the last few weeks, Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX, which runs the Starlink constellation, has been engaged in a public argument with diplomats, reporters, and assorted opinion-makers. He's been pilloried both for his unsolicited comments on the Russia-Ukraine war, and over reports that his company sought compensation from the US government for providing the Ukrainians with Starlink services. Starlink's satellite Internet services have proved crucial to Ukrainian military operations against Russia. But the story of how it became crucial to the war effort is an unusual one that involves many of the preoccupations of this newsletter: social media, private space companies, cyber attacks, remotely piloted platforms, and space warfare.Musk began despatching Starlink systems to the war zone following a tweet from a Ukrainian politician. Starlink systems directly enabled lethal strikes on Russian forces, many of which involved the use of drones. With no formal agreement in place for the use of Starlink in combat, Musk's company apparently sought substantial US Department of Defense financial support, with some accusing him of price gouging. Through all this, Russian forces attempted to disrupt Starlink services through electronic warfare. It is this last phenomenon that the remainder of this Technopolitik entry will focus on. Space Warfare is DifficultThe Russians were always keenly aware of the value of satellite communications. According to US officials, they mounted a successful cyber attack on the operations of Viasat at the outset of the war. The attack targeted Ukrainian military communications and disrupted Internet services for many civilians. It also had collateral effects beyond Ukraine's borders, most notably, disrupting the functioning of 5,800 wind turbines in Germany (see the entry from my colleague Pranav for more on this).Once the Ukrainians began making extensive use of Sarlink services, the Russians reportedly mounted an electronic warfare (EW) attack that SpaceX quickly repelled. Musk acknowledged this on Twitter by saying SpaceX had temporarily “reprioritized to cyber defense & overcoming signal jamming”The exact nature of these Russian attacks are not clear. Musk's own tweets only add to the confusion. Were they simply electronic jamming attacks? Or did they include a cyber component? It is also unclear if Russia has limited itself to electronic jamming near the Earth's surface or if it also attempted to jam the satellites themselves. After all, Russia has a mobile ground-based platform called the Tirada-2 for precisely this purpose. What is significant is that despite reports of outages, Starlink is not known to have suffered a setback similar to that of Viasat. Russia's Dilemmas and Incentive to Use Space for Military PurposesFor Russia, Starlink is a problem from hell. Legally, Starlink is probably fair game for Russian forces, since the satellite constellation is providing direct combat support to the Ukrainian military. However, the fact that it is owned by a third-party, and the fact that the third party happens to be American effectively limit Russian options. Also limiting Russia's options are the sheer number of Starlink satellites. There are more than 3,000 of these tiny satellites presently in orbit. About 400 provide service to Ukrainian forces. While Russian direct-ascent antisatellite (DA-ASAT) missile would short work of a single Starlink satellite in low earth orbit (LEO), Moscow would run out of missiles if it tried to attack the whole constellation and would likely make no serious dent on Starlink operations. In the years to come, SpaceX plans to have up to 42,000 Starlink satellites in orbit. Even if it achieves only a quarter of this number, SpaceX would have dramatically increased the number of satellites in LEO. With rivals such as OneWeb also developing their own LEO constellations, the orbits are not only likely to get crowded but also become valuable real estate for strategic purposes, providing a sanctuary for military support systems. Indeed, if space were to remain a sanctuary, as some hope it does, it would only further incentivise states to use space for military purposes. This, in turn, is likely to increase competitive pressures back on Earth to find novel ways of contesting an adversary's use of space. Starlink has given us an unexpected glimpse of the dilemmas that lie ahead.  Matsyanyaaya: What's Technological Sovereignty Anyway?— Pranay KotasthaneIn recent years, technological or digital sovereignty has been all the rage. Not only is it a term meant for government strategy documents, but an empirical reality and public policy, as witnessed most recently in the US export controls on China's semiconductor industry. And yet, we know little about what the term means. Poor-quality arguments mistake autarky for technological sovereignty or, worse, as a mission that should be achieved by a particular date rather than as a continuing process. And how do you even square technological self-sufficiency with the reality that the technology ecosystem is a multinational effort and not merely about creating national champions, as in the past? As I wrote in the third edition of this newsletter:There are significant problems with the goal of high-tech self-sufficiency and the instrument of industrial subsidies, both. That's because high-tech industries today rely on extensive cross-border movements of intermediate products, talent, and intellectual property. As R&D costs required to produce technological improvements have risen across sectors, erstwhile 'national' industries have been transformed into global supply chains. Instead of national champions making complete products independently, companies only specialise in specific parts of global supply chains. And so, while searching for a better definition of technological sovereignty, I landed on a crisp CESifo paper titled Technological Sovereignty as Ability, Not Autarky by Christoph March and Ina Schieferdecker. This paper uses our understanding of what it means to be politically and economically sovereign, to construct a definition of technological sovereignty. Their framework assessing the impact of General Purpose Technologies on political, economic, and individual sovereignty, is a foundational contribution.Then, they go on to define technological sovereignty as follows:In a narrow sense, technological sovereignty is the ability to make self-determined decisions about the development and use of technologies and technology-based innovations, especially regarding their properties (e.g. energy consumption, data usage, security, or safety) and their terms of use (e.g. restriction to certain domains, or transparency). In a broader sense, a polity is technologically sovereign, if it possesses the technological abilities necessary to maintain political and economic sovereignty.Describing technological sovereignty as an ability opens a new window for understanding the concept. This approach places innovation policy, technology transfer, and education at the front and centre. Crucially, this definition recognises the global superstructure of innovation and distances itself from self-sufficiency:The ability to understand, advance, or produce new technologies must not be confused with the attempt to actually do so in all key enabling technologies and/or components. Instead, we understand it as a widening of choice opportunities, and as a prerequisite for international trade “on eye level”. Moreover, we see capacities to innovate as a key to achieving technological sovereignty.In another section, the authors go one step further and identify the interdependence between international trade and technological sovereignty. While the simplistic arguments position these two concepts as opposites, the authors argue that the two reinforce each other. I encourage readers to read the entire paper. Papers such as these are critical for building the epistemological foundations of technology geopolitics.Cyberpolitik: Browser Wars, again?— Bharath ReddyFirefox maker Mozilla's recent report highlights how manufacturers of operating systems use market power and choice architecture to favour affiliated browsers leading to outcomes which are not in the best interest of users. Mozilla's research finds that “software can be designed to influence or even manipulate consumer outcomes. And operating systems are designed to maximise usage of their affiliated browsers.” Of the 4.2 billion mobile internet subscribers globally, roughly 72% run on Android and 27% run on iOS. The browser usage on these devices shows a strong preference for the default browser, with 65% of users on Chrome and 24% on Safari.Having a competitive playing field for browsers is in the best interest of users. The competition fosters innovation leading to better quality, security and privacy for users. When Internet Explorer was the dominant browser after crushing Netscape, innovation had taken a backseat with no significant upgrades for five years. Firefox entered the scene with better speed, security and new features such as tabbed browsing. This created more competition in the browser market with more frequent updates.Browser engines are another major area of concern. Currently, only Apple, Google and Mozilla develop and maintain browser engines. Since Apple's Webkit engine is limited to apple devices, it leaves only Google's Blink engine and Mozilla's Gecko engine as the only cross-platform options. Having such a critical access point for the web in the hands of a single company not only leads to a lack of innovation but could be a major privacy and security risk for users. The current situation has come about largely due to operating systems providers using elaborate choice architecture to encourage desired outcomes. The choice of architecture includes:  - having pre-installed browsers bundled with the OS- prohibiting or overriding changing to the defaults - using dark patterns to nudge users against changing the defaults.Other measures include having contracts that mandate OEMs to have only affiliated browsers pre-installed on the devices. App store restrictions, such as Apple's current ban on alternative browser engines, also play a big role. Similarly, features such as in-app browsing are only possible on Android using the Blink engine.As we move towards wider adoption of smart devices, virtual reality, and autonomous vehicles, browsers might be tightly bundled with all of these applications. Mozilla's report highlights how competition in the browser market is necessary to advance innovation, performance, speed, privacy and security and calls upon regulators, policymakers, and lawmakers to create a new era. Our Reading Menu[Podcast] Escalation in the US-China Tech War by Pranay Kotasthane and Pranav Satyanath.[Book] Great Power Politics in the Fourth Industrial Revolution: The Geoeconomics of Technological Sovereignty by Glenn Diesen.[Report] The War in Ukraine from a Space Cybersecurity Perspective This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters #1: Small Launchers and Small Windows of Opportunity— Pranav R SatyanathThe small satellite launch vehicle market has a new player - Firefly Aerospace. The US-based private company on Saturday (October 1st 2022) conducted the first successful launch of its rocket Firefly Alpha. The company attempted a launch in September 2021, which failed to get to orbit. Today, Firefly is one of only four private NewSpace companies in the world which provide dedicated small-satellite launch service. The other three being Rocket Lab, Virgin Orbit and Astra (the last of the three companies is an interesting case).Firefly's Alpha launch vehicle can carry a payload of just over 1 ton to low-Earth orbit (LEO) and 750 kilograms to Sun Synchronous Orbit (SSO). This puts Alpha  in the same category as the Polar  Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), which is the workhorse of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).  The Alpha launch vehicle is powered by four liquid-fuelled turbopump engines that use RP-1 (highly refined kerosene) and liquid oxygen (LOx). The second stage is powered by a single liquid-fuelled RP-1/LOx engine optimised for vacuum.The company is one of the few success stories in the highly competitive launch market, and success did not come easy. Firefly was founded as Firefly Space Systems in 2014,but the company went bankrupt and liquidated in 2017 and its assets were purchased by Ukrainian venture capitalist (also a tech entrepreneur) Max Polyakov and his company, Noosphere Ventures. Unfortunately, Polykov could only stand at a distance and watch Firefly's success as he was forced to sell his shares after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. A tough time for small launch companiesNot all companies witness success by the likes of Firefly. In December 2019, Vector Launch filed for bankruptcy before it could attempt a full orbital launch of its Vector-R rocket. The company has undergone restructuring and is preparing to begin suborbital flight tests. Another US-based company, Astra, has been attempting to launch its rocket into orbit since 2020, with very little success, leaving the company to abandon its Rocket 3.3 and move to a new design called Rocket 4 instead. Oher companies in the USIndia's own attempt to launch the Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV) failed to place its payloads in orbit after a malfunction in its sensors. The SSLV is operated by ISRO's newly- established commercial arm called NewSpace India Limited (NSIL). SSLV, unlike other launch vehicles, uses solid fuel in the first three stages. The final stage is a liquid-fuelled velocity trimming module. SSLV is India's attempt to enter the small satellite launch market, offering a launch-on-demand service to carry upto 500 kg to LEO or 300 kg to sun synchronous orbit.Several other launch companies around the world are preparing to tap into the growing small satellite market. Yet, it is unclear how many of these companies will survive in the coming years. More importantly, it is unclear whether these private entities have overestimated the market for small satellites, as a drop in demand puts at risk the sustainability of these companies.Small launch vehicles for IndiaIndian private launch companies are not far behind the world competitors. Two companies in particular, Agnikul and Skyroot, have risen to the occasion in their attempt to fulfil India's satellite launch demands. As an aspiring space power, India can not compete in the global space market by making an average of five launches a year. It requires dozens of launches (along with many many more satellites) to stay competitive on both commercial and national security grounds. India's forthcoming new space policy (long overdue and still nowhere in sight) must make it conducive for private launch providers to operate and thrive. ISRO, meanwhile, must focus its efforts on improving the reliability of its GSLV series of heavy-lift rockets and allow privateers to cater to the small satellite market needs.Siliconpolitik: India's Semiconductor Policies v2.0— Pranay KotasthaneEarlier this week, the Union Cabinet approved modifications to three of the four schemes introduced in December 2021 for developing a domestic semiconductor ecosystem. Several news websites have claimed that with the government “sweetening the deal”, investments in this sector will be more forthcoming. I agree, but not without some fundamental reservations. Here's why.Semiconductor FabsTo attract chip manufacturing companies, the original programme promised up to 50% upfront financial support for leading-edge nodes (28 nanometres and below). The promised fiscal support for trailing-edge nodes employing older technologies dropped commensurately, going down to 30% for a fab that produces chips at the 45-65 nanometre nodes. (The node size is a rough measure for the size of a building block in a chip. The smaller that number, the more building blocks that can be packed in the same area resulting in higher performance).Under the new scheme, the government promises upfront fiscal support of 50% for all node sizes. The change reflects two realities. First, trailing-edge fabs are crucial for India. The demand for older node sizes will not disappear anytime soon. Future applications such as 5G radios and electric vehicles will continue to require manufacturing at these nodes. Most current defence applications also require trailing-edge chips.Second, many countries are wooing the leading-edge node foundries with much larger incentive packages. Companies such as TSMC are being courted by all major powers, and it's unlikely they will pick India for the most-advanced nodes. India's chances are better for securing older technologies.Display FabsMost display panel manufacturers are located in East Asia — companies from China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan dominate this industry. The scheme was designed with the explicit aim of import substitution. The original scheme promised up to 50% upfront financial support subject to a cap of ₹12,000 crores. As part of the changes, this upper cap has been struck off.To me, this scheme didn't make sense even when it was announced. I have four reasons for the scepticism.* Even during the high peak of supply chain disruptions during COVID-19, there was no shortage of display panels, indicating that there are no constraints to increasing production, as is the case for chips. (The only shortage related to displays was for the driver chip, not the panels by themselves).* Apart from China and Taiwan, South Korea and Japan have leadership in specific segments of displays. So we aren't dependent on one vulnerable source, as in the case of chips.* Import dependence on China won't go away. Even if these fabs manufacture displays in India, the input materials will have to be imported from elsewhere. So the bottlenecks will shift but don't disappear.* The industry is moving to newer technologies apart from LCDs and AMOLEDs. Samsung is focusing on Quantum-dot displays instead of LCDs. The scheme might be able to get old-tech here, but for newer technologies, imports might continue.Thus, to spend ₹12000 crores for a product in the pursuit of a failed notion of import substitution doesn't justify the opportunity costs. Moreover, removing the upper cap after Vedanta-Foxconn got into this game raises concerns about rent-seeking — the tendency of businesses to distort policies to serve their own interests.Assembly, Test, Packaging Units, and Specialised Low-volume FabsFor assembly, test and packaging firms, & compound fabs, the promised financial support has increased substantially, from 30% to 50%. More importantly, the original scheme allowed disbursal once a facility had begun production. Under the modified scheme, the financial support will be upfront. Prepaid, not postpaid.These changes again warrant scrutiny. Is it another case of rent-seeking?At the margin, I am okay with the changes in this segment. India has a potential advantage because of the need for a large, mid-level trained workforce for this segment of the supply chain, in comparison to conventional semiconductor fabs.Semiconductor DesignSurprisingly, there were no modifications in the one area where India does have a comparative advantage - semiconductor design and design services. The capital requirement for this segment is at least two orders of magnitude lower than the first three segments. And yet, the response to the scheme for encouraging design firms seems less than lukewarm. We propose two changes in the policy for that segment in an article for Hindustan Times earlier this month:* To receive deployment-linked incentives under the current scheme, a design firm has to be registered in India with a 50% local stake. That clause could be watered down. Companies should qualify as long as the workforce is majorly Indian and the development happens here.* Reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers are also crucial for India's semiconductor design companies to increase operations in India.On both these counts, the status quo prevails.To summarise, the modifications reflect the government's seriousness in attracting investment in this sector. Through these changes, the government is acknowledging that India must start its chip manufacturing journey at the lower end and climb its way up. Getting good at this game takes a couple of decades. At the same time, a thin line separates responsive government policies from regulatory capture by businesses. All industrial policies run this risk, and we need to be vigilant.Antariksh Matters #2: Planetary Defence and National Defence— Aditya RamanathanOn September 26, NASA concluded what it called “the world's first planetary defense technology demonstration” in a spectacular collision. Ten months after it was first launched, NASA's 570 kilogram Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) spacecraft smashed into the asteroid Dimorphos. The collision occurred 11 million kilometres from Earth. Dimporphos is technically a 160 metre-long ‘asteroid moonlet' - called so because it orbits a larger asteroid named Didymos. While neither rock is headed towards Earth, the DART mission sought to establish the ability to deflect an asteroid from its trajectory.   The DART spacecraft was launched in November 2021 from a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket and Johns Hopkins Advanced Propulsion Laboratory (JHUAPL) managed the mission. The apparent success of DART is likely to prompt more ‘planetary defence' missions. According to the latest decadal survey published by the US-based National Academies, NASA's annual budget for planetary defence is more than $160 million. NASA has tracked about 27,000 near Earth objects (NEOs) using this funding. Yet this is barely enough to track naturally occurring threats from space. In particular, NEOs that are between 30-140 metres in size and typically collide with the Earth once every century, can be hard to detect. One such celestial body was responsible for the 1908 Tunguska event. Ambitious Proposals, Enduring SuspicionsWhile the DART mission was a kinetic collision, such interventions may not suffice for every contingency. While no civilisation-killing NEOs are likely to be headed Earth's way anytime soon, smaller NEOs that can still result in catastrophes may be detected too late for deflection. Also, kinetic collisions may risk creating fragments large enough to survive reentry and cause damage on Earth. The most common proposal for dealing with such contingencies is using explosive nuclear devices. One scientific study from 2021 concluded that such devices were likely to be useful in destroying major NEOs headed towards Earth. While it may be prudent to seriously examine the options available, NASA's planetary defence project is not without political implications. Any spacefaring capability that can destroy through kinetic collision, or worse yet, nuclear explosives, has obvious military implications. This is especially so because, as we have argued, space warfare is still primitive in character, depending on dual-use capabilities rather than specialised weapons or platforms. While the military applications of DART-like missions are unclear and fantastical at the moment, states are not known to take chances on such matters. For reasons of both survival and prestige, America's rivals may initiate their own planetary defence programmes in the near future. Our Reading Menu[Book] A History of Near-Earth Objects Research by Erik M. Conway, Donald K. Yeomans, and Meg Rosenburg[Report] Forecasting th A History of Near-Earth Objects Researche future impact of emerging technologies on international stability and human security by Marina Favaro, Neil Renic and Ulrich Kühn[Research Article] One if by Land, and Two if by Sea: Cross-Domain Contests and the Escalation of International Crises by J Andrés Gannon This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

India Needs a Holistic and Effective Techplomacy Strategy— Arjun GargeyasEarlier this year, the Takshashila Institution published the Techno-strategic Doctrine for India. The doctrine outlined the fundamental principles India must follow to springboard as a technology superpower. As the doctrine mentions, one of the critical approaches for India to reach the status of a technology superpower is by becoming a vital node in the global technology ecosystem and building strong links with states that share its interests and values and with which it enjoys economic complementarities.Takshashila's newly released discussion document titled India's Approach to Technology Diplomacy by Arjun Gargeyas provides a clear and well-defined pathway for India to become a global technology player. A summary of the arguments is the highlight of this edition ofTechnopolitik.India Needs a Holistic and Effective ‘Techplomacy' Strategy Technological advancements in the 21st Century have heightened the role of technology in the diplomacy arena. Technically adept nation-states are developing their own strategies to integrate technology with their foreign policy and diplomatic initiatives. But how can technology be used as a credible diplomatic plank by the Indian State to further its national and geopolitical interests? The government of India, driven by the nation's technological growth, has gradually embraced the concept of integrating technology into achieving national and geopolitical goals. Official government documents, departmental strategies and policy changes have increasingly focused on how science and technology can shape diplomatic efforts in the near future. The Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (STIP) 2013 was one of the instances that an intersection of technology and diplomacy found a mention in an official government document. The document states that the 'policy framework will enable strategic partnerships and alliances with other nations through both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in science, technology and innovation. Science diplomacy, technology synergy and technology acquisition models will be judiciously deployed based on strategic relationships.This was further cemented in the most recently released draft STIP-2020 document. It discusses the role of science and technology (S&T) in reorganising India's foreign policy priorities and shaping the global technology ecosystem.There has also been considerable movement on the political front regarding the role of technology in diplomacy itself. In 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi asserted that science and technology would be put at the forefront of India's diplomatic engagement in the future. In 2020, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) created technically specialised divisions, such as the Cyber Diplomacy Division, E-Governance and Information Technology Division, and the New Emerging and Strategic Technologies Division. Apart from India's policy directives, the government has ensured that technology has been incorporated into different diplomatic agreements, especially with established technological powers. These agreements are in the interest of utilising outside support to build India's technical competency and technology-based alliances. While these decisions have showcased movement on the techplomacy front, the Indian state needs a more comprehensive and well-rounded approach to using technology in the diplomatic space. This can be achieved through a three-fold strategy focusing on the pathway for any current and future administration to employ technology as a strategic diplomatic tool. The three principles are explained below.Principle 1: Focus on Areas of Strengths in India's Technology Stack The Indian state should focus on critical areas of strength in its technology ecosystem, which can serve as potential tools of diplomatic leverage. The primary task of employing technology as a soft power tool is to pinpoint certain tech-driven areas in which the country has built expertise. Once identified, these areas can be concentrated and developed further. Investment by the state (both financial and human resources) in these critical areas that India has developed a comparative advantage in can cement the country's leadership credentials in that particular domain. These areas of strength, when identified and developed, can translate into Indian influence in the global tech landscape. A framework India can use for this is to analyse the export capabilities and domestic IP innovation levels in certain areas of technologies. If India can export specific technology products on a large scale, it can positively impact the diplomatic aspect of the country as well. The biotech space, including vaccines and drugs, is an area that India can focus on. The other criterion is the ability of the Indian domestic tech industry to own IP and have a high level of innovation in a specific area of technology. The fintech ecosystem, including the digital payments arena, is where India has created a name for itself and has managed to penetrate external markets with international acceptance (UPI and RuPay are now accepted in over five different countries). A framework for assessing India's technological strengthsPrinciple 2: Foster Multilateralism as a Necessity for Tech Development The concept of self-sufficiency in emerging technologies must be re-examined with the Indian state championing and fostering multilateral efforts in its tech diplomacy outreach. It should be noted that there are no national industries but the existence of global supply chains. So the role of diplomacy will be central, not secondary.In the technology sphere, diplomacy is not about seeking entry into an exclusive alliance or club but about maximising a state's integration with the existing global value chains. Multilateralism in different critical and emerging technology fields should be more of an entrepreneurial decision to improve access and combine scientific or technical knowledge. In that regard, promoting the growth of open source technologies (and built on open standards) with very little or no entry barriers in the form of licences and royalty fees must be prioritised on the multilateral front. This can engage more stakeholders, improve accessibility, and increase multilateral efforts toward technology dissemination. But even with the case of open technologies, India must walk the talk. During the development of Covid-19 vaccines, there was a call by the developing countries to remove the intellectual property and licensing restrictions on Covid-19 vaccine research for public health reasons. However, even after the conversation on open vaccines at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Indian government did not open up the tech behind India's indigenous vaccine, Covaxin. Hence, if India wants to lead and engage in multilateral efforts, opening up its domestic technology IP to the world should be a priority. Principle 2: Foster Multilateralism as a Necessity for Tech DevelopmentThis expansion of the technology-oriented Sinosphere has made other states take cognisance and increase diplomatic outreach to counter China's ever-increasing growth. However, India, as a responsible technological power, can learn from China's tech-driven influence in two ways.Export Tech Infrastructure through Foreign Policy Projects: The Chinese government has exported digital infrastructure (hardware, software, networks and systems) with the help of their domestic private sector giants to many BRI partner countries. India can rely on its own foreign policy projects and initiatives to build digital infrastructure beyond its borders. This will ensure two things: One, it will build and support a robust domestic technology industry capable of competing on a global scale. Two, these digital infrastructure projects using Indian technologies (equipment, software etc.) will serve as strategic assets for the state and help increase the footprint of the Indian technological ecosystem. Focus on Key Battlegrounds of Digital Competition: The Chinese state actively pushes for their consumer tech to be adopted in regions such as Africa, Central Asia and South East Asia. The state has actively used its foreign policy projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to get more partners on board and convince them to use technologies developed by China and its technology companies. The Indian state's main focus should be diplomatic outreach through its domestic private sector firms to help set up infrastructure in regions still developing technologically. For example, Indian telecommunication firms such as Airtel and Jio can be used to set up 5G networks in regions like Africa and Latin America, which rely on foreign import of technology.Taking Tech-Diplomacy ForwardTech-diplomacy can only succeed when there is a push within the government, specifically the Ministry of External Affairs. A primary objective would be a foreign service officer within the government who can serve as the state's official ‘tech diplomat'. The position of Tech Ambassador within Denmark's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UK Consul General who serves as a Technology Envoy are specifically given the responsibilities of technology outreach. France's position of Digital Ambassador handles all international technology cooperation and diplomatic engagements as a state representative. The government of Australia appointed its first-ever Ambassador for Cyber Affairs and Critical Technology in 2021. These are some templates the Indian state can follow and curate a position specifically within the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) to handle technology negotiations for advancing India's national goals and interests. The role of existing Science and Tech (S&T) Counsellors under the Science Wings programme at embassies in Berlin, Tokyo, Moscow and Washington DC can be expanded to include technology outreach focusing on strategic cooperation, military applications and governance frameworks related to emerging and strategic technologies. The number of these counsellors should be increased and provided adequate technical knowledge or expertise to understand certain technologies' geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects. This can help increase engagement and ensure India drives forward conversations on technology-related foreign policies.  Finally, now that the MEA has specific divisions that have been created (such as NEST and the Cyber Diplomacy Division) under the ministry, a nodal agency can be established by the Indian state which can coordinate between the different MEA divisions, S&T counsellors and other foreign service officers specifically handling technology outreach at the multilateral level. The nodal agency can also rope in the help of the private sector's international footprint to put forth the country's case at global technology forums. The agency can eventually take on the role of coordinating India's tech diplomacy initiatives.India, in the long run, will benefit from being integrated into the global technology ecosystem and engaging with other like-minded nation-states through diplomacy. This would achieve its key objectives of economic integration and governance participation in the technology realm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters: Putting space ambitions in context— Pranav R SatyanathThe Artemis 1 mission rocket stays grounded, ready to launch on another day. The North American Space Administration (NASA) made two unsuccessful attempts to get the massive Space Launch System (SLS) rocket off the ground. The first attempt to launch the Artemis 1 mission, the rocket's Engine-3 (SLS has four engines) faced a cooling issue. During the second attempt on September 3rd, NASA aborted the launch due to a fuel leak issue.. But the SLS stands tall to be launched another day. The Artemis mission has raised the prospect of a new space race in popular media, with some even proclaiming that space is getting excited once again. But the narrative around the space race is flawed, both in the context of the Cold War and the present day. True, the United States and China plan to send humans back to the Moon by 2026. By pitting two countries' space programmes, however, we often forget the domestic politics and organisational drivers of national space programmes. The refusal to open the ‘black box' of domestic politics often skews our perception as to what really motivates countries to undertake certain actions, whether it is in the realm of national security or civilian space programmes. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union had set up their respective space programmes to achieve completely separate goals. In the US, successive Presidential administrations kept the civilian and military space programmes strictly separate, with NASA placed as the heart of all civilian space ambitions. The Department of Defense (and individual branches of the US military) took it upon themselves to drive the direction of the ballistic missile and missile defence programmes. Approval of budgets and high-level decision-making fell on the hands of the President, with each new Presidentsetting the course of the space program and fighting for NASA's budgets in Congress.In stark contrast, decision-making in the Soviet Union was decentralised. The Soviet military, in particular, prioritised the missile programme in order to match the numerical and technological prowess of the US. The technology derived from the ballistic missile programme often drove the space programme. In parallel, influential heads of design bureaus, namely Sergei Korolev (design bureau OKB-1), Vladimir Chelomey (design bureau OKB-52) and Valentin Glushko (OKB-546), led the way to propose space missions and rocket payloads to the higher Soviet leadership. The outcome of interpersonal rivalries between these men (and their design bureaus) often led to a disorganised space programme within the USSR.While the Soviets achieved great success with the launch of the world's first satellite, dog, man and woman in space, the Moon did not capture the interest of the Soviet leadership, led by Nikita Khrushchev until August 1964 — three months after the first launch of the Saturn-1 rocket that carried Apollo astronauts to the Moon. The Soviet Union ultimately lost the “race” to the Moon as the motives and commitment to a Moon race was very different from what the Americans perceived Soviet ambitions to be.Today, the new race to the Moon is also driven by domestic politics and marketed by domestic politics and asymmetric goals. The US aims to make its Moon landing sustainable with a long-term presence alongside its partners. On the other hand, China's goals are much more modest as it seeks to land humans on the Moon's surface by 2026. To claim the existence of a space race often takes away the nuances of national ambitions and achievable goals. As policy wonks, therefore, we must be wary of catchy yet flawed narratives,Matsyanyaaya #1: ​​Where Knowledge is Free and Accessible to All— Bharath ReddyA White House directive on 25th August requires agencies to update their public access policies as soon as possible to provide open access to taxpayer-funded publications and research. The move is expected to broaden access to research and yield significant benefits to the public on issues ranging from climate change to cancer research to protecting civil liberties in an automated world. This directive not only makes scientific research more accessible to the broader research community, it could also have implications for research funded by Indian taxpayers. This White House directive overrides a 2013 directive which required federal agencies with an annual grant greater than $100 million to make their research publicly available. The 2013 directive also allowed for a year-long embargo on the research and accompanying data. As expected, scientific journals use embargos to create exclusive access to research and gain subscriptions. Academics would also prefer to publish their research in journals with a better impact factor, which is a measure of the number of times an average article in the journal has been cited. The new directive expands the scope to all agencies receiving federal funding and ends the optional embargo.This move is expected to radically transform access to research and has been praised by open research advocates and the research community. The New York Times quotes Mr Tanenbaum of the Open Research Funders Group as saying the policy “broadens the circle of science. It broadens the conversation”. This move could, however, have a significant impact on the current revenue models of journals. It would force them to look at alternative sources of revenue, which might significantly increase article processing costs. Publishing research in journals has been the conventional approach of communicating research. Journals operate on a subscription-based model. They charge hefty amounts from authors for publication and are only accessible by those who pay the significant subscription charges. These paywalled articles pose a significant cost barrier, and the costs can add up when referencing dozens of articles for a paper. Many people will end up not having access to such research unless they are part of a large institution that pays for a subscription to most of the journals. Studies have shown that across disciplines, freely available articles have a greater research impact. In addition, it is unethical that the fruits of the research funded by taxpayer money should not be accessible to the public. The trend has been changing, with more research being published in online open-access journals. Open access requires granting all users an unrestricted, irrevocable, worldwide, perpetual right of access with a licence to copy, distribute, transmit and display the work publicly and digital publication in at least one open access repository. Awareness and momentum around open access to research has been growing globally with many institutions across USA and Europe adopting open access policies.India has had a policy on open access to the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) and Department of Science and Technology(DST) funded research since late 2014. Per this policy, any research partially or fully funded by DBT or DST or performed on infrastructure built with the support of these organisations should be made available in open access repositories maintained by their institutions or those maintained by DBT and DST. If the research is published prior in a journal that insists on an embargo, the policy recommends that the period of the embargo should not exceed one year. While this policy is laudable in terms of its intent, the implementation and impact have been poor. This can be attributed to poor state capacity and non-alignment of the journal and academic incentives. With the reforms imposed by the White House directive, the incentives and revenue models of the journals are expected to change significantly. This precedent could have a positive impact on Indian taxpayer-funded research as well. The MHRD must take the initiative to expand the open access policy to all government-funded research. In addition to setting up national open access repositories, high-quality open journals should also be set up in multiple disciplines to provide a credible platform for academics to publish their research. The journal editorial board should include renowned academics from around the world and be granted operational independence to ensure the quality of the research being published. The platform should not be restricted only to Indian research but must welcome excellent research from across the world. Over time the costs incurred will yield returns by providing broad access to research but also in nurturing and growing the research community.These timeless lines by Tagore can guide us, “Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high, where knowledge is free”, “Into that heaven of freedom, my father, let my country awake”.Matsyanyaaya #2: How can India use Technology as a Strategic Tool to Advance its Interests?— Arjun GargeyasIn the current Information Age, technology has become a ubiquitous part of every country's society. Citizens are empowered in a wide range of ways with improved access to technology, states' economic sectors are transitioning into the digital space, and tech development has been outpacing regulations and governance regularly. This is the era where technology is becoming a strategic tool for the state to drive growth and protect its interests. India, as a fledgling and rising technological power has the ability to leverage technology for the greater good. As seen from the past two decades, tech has simplified policy decisions and has improved the quality of governance in the country. The questions on accessibility, inclusion and levelling the playing field have been bridged by the use of technology to a certain extent. The Indian state should now start viewing technology and its adoption from a more strategic lens. But how can India use ‘technology' to tackle existing problems as well as try to deploy it as a prospective solution in key areas of governance?India's Technology Assets Frontier Areas of Expertise and Scale - India must focus on identifying and building on certain technology areas where it has made and can make a significant global impact. This can aid its technology exports and help expand its international digital and technological footprint. Low-cost telecommunication operations, renewable energy systems, and digital payment frameworks can serve as model areas that India can use as soft power tools in the technology sphere.Skilled Labour Workforce in Multiple Domains - India should look to leverage the presence of the abundant domestic human capital in the country to create a strong workforce in specific technology areas that might prove to be critically important in the near future. The availability of low-cost labour must be used to persuade technologically advanced states to look at the Indian workforce as a contributing partner to some labour-intensive supply chains. Semiconductor design and IT services are areas that continue to require large pools of human resources, and India's workforce has proven to be competent in these fields.A Notable Presence in International Technology Supply Chains - Though a rising technological power, India has become essential in key areas of the high-technology realm. Other states depend considerably on India for certain technology supply chains because of its comparative advantages and expertise in specific processes. This must be used to India's strategic advantage and to ensure it remains a factor in the international technology trade ecosystem.Research and Development The identification of critical technologies or key areas in technology supply chains to invest scientific and financial resources remains critical. The Indian state must consider extensive collaboration with the domestic private sector to enhance research and match global developments in specific strategic science and technology areas. This can eventually result in increased influence through a dominant domestic technology sector.The focus on promoting research in technology areas where India-specific solutions are needed and are unlikely to be addressed by the developed world can be prioritised. Encouraging the use of open-source technologies to promote innovation free from state intervention, technology oligopolies, and international politics can help in India's tech growth trajectory. This would make technology more accessible and more relevant to developmental challenges. Open-source technologies also serve as a counterweight to the dominance of Big Tech and aid technology sovereignty in an uncertain geopolitical climate. It can also bridge the trust deficit between the state and the citizens by addressing privacy and surveillance concerns.While gaining a foothold in technology product development can create a zero-sum game between two or more parties, the scientific knowledge in the field itself is a non-zero-sum game. The Indian state should prioritise improving the dissemination of technical expertise as part of its technology strategy.International CooperationThe Indian state should not favour isolationism especially in the field of technology development. The process of collaborating in high-technology areas to tackle the existing bottlenecks in several supply chains must be one of the sector's priorities. The principle of ‘plurilateralism being a necessity and not a choice' while dealing with critical and emerging technologies must be championed if India aims to become a leading tech power.Leading talks with fraternal multilateral groupings to build technological partnerships can be done. The Indian state should also engage in responsibilities such as improving technology-related trade, facilitating technology transfer agreements between participating states, and setting credible technology standards in critical and emerging technologies.A good example would be to move forward on the recently signed India-Europe Trade and Technology Council to build a robust technology trade infrastructure. The focus should be removing export controls on components related to critical technologies and reducing import tariffs for high-tech products.The Ministry of External Affairs must also take up a technology diplomacy approach to include science and technology as a source of outreach through appointed officials leading diplomatic conversations in the field.A non-discriminatory data-sharing framework between states so long as the data in question does not infringe on India's national security can allow India to be integrated digitally worldwide. This can include participation in multilateral technology data-sharing agreements if there are no compulsions to share critical data threatening its internal security and ensuring India's access to similar data from other signatories.Finally, the state can lead global efforts to set forth universally-acceptable and legally-binding instruments on technologies that threaten the safety and security of all states. A techno-democratic alliance that prevents the control of specific technologies by selective groups, especially those potentially impacting warfare and conflict and detrimental to international security, can be led by India and its diplomatic partners.Technology has become an integral aspect of international relations, foreign policy, military and defence in the recent past. As an aspiring world power, India should focus on utilising its strengths in the technological realm to advance its strategic interests. This would benefit both the Indian and society in the long run. Our Reading Menu[Book] The Red Rockets' Glare: Spaceflight and the Soviet Imagination, 1857-1957 by Asif A. Siddiqi.[Op-ed] Making the case for a new geolocation data privacy paradigm by Jason Sarfati.[Blog] Takshashila Issue Brief - Public Access to Knowledge Resources. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Cyberpolitik: The Internet of Yesterday and Tomorrow— Bharath ReddyThe foundation of the internet was built on three pillars:Reliance on the private sector, Light regulatory oversight, Free speech and a free flow of information. The hope was that these values would also be accepted as the internet would be accepted across the world. However this utopian vision is far from the reality of today’s internet. Gradually the internet has become less secure, more fragmented and less free. Authoritarian regimes across the world have been able to leverage control of the internet to shape narratives that strengthen their control. The US needs to recalibrate and adapt to this new reality. So begins the Council on Foreign Relations report titled “Confronting Reality in Cyberspace: Foreign Policy for a Fragmented Internet”. The authors propose a three-fold approach to confronting the new reality in cyberspace. Firstly, they recommend that allies need to come together to preserve a trusted and secure internet based on international standards. This includes working towards a shared policy on digital privacy, tackling cybercrime, and helping developing nations build cyber capacity. Secondly, there should be discussions and negotiations with adversaries to avoid cyber operations against nuclear command, control and communications systems, election systems and financial systems. This includes holding states accountable for cyber threats originating from their territory. The last recommendation involves getting the domestic house in order, which includes building cyber security talent, minimising domestic cyber security risks and prioritising digital interests in national security strategies.The predictions of the end of the global internet are growing quite common. The predictions for a fragmented internet range from a splinternet to a bifurcation between a Western and a Chinese internet. With these possibilities appearing more likely each day, India needs to rethink its own approaches to cyber security.Matsyanyaaya #1: Fission Factor: The Big Bet on Small Reactors— Aditya RamanathanWhile the world’s attention is drawn to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, where Russian and Ukrainian forces are facing off, there are potentially more significant developments underway for the future of nuclear power. In July, the United States’ Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)  announced that it would certify the NuScale 50 MWe small modular reactor. NuScale’s reactor is only the seventh design which the NRC has ever approved in the history of nuclear power. It is also the first small modular reactor (SMR) that has received the green light in the United States. China is presently ahead of the US in SMRs. A couple of weeks before the NRC announcement, the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) began the construction of an SMR demonstration plant in Hainan Province. CNNC calls the project the first “commercial onshore small modular reactor” in the world. Once the 125 MWe reactor is up and running, CNNC claims it will be capable of powering 526,000 households. The SMR PromiseThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines SMRs as reactors with up to 300 MWe capacity. As the name indicates, SMRs are much smaller than traditional reactors and modular in their design. For instance, the NuScale design is touted as being only  “about 1 per cent the size of a traditional power plant’s containment chamber, though it delivers 10 percent of a plant’s power output.” SMRs are modular for two reasons. Firstly, assemblies and components can be pre-fabricated on a factory floor and then put together on site. Secondly, additional units to t can simply be added on site to increase capacity.Proponents of SMRs have advocated their widespread adoption for several reasons. For one, SMRs need much lower initial investments and fewer operators and specialists to run them. Two, unlike traditionally large nuclear plants, finding the right patch of real estate for an SMR is much simpler. Three, proponents say SMRs are well suited to serve small communities and provide a reliable base-load for renewables. Four, the modularity of SMRs allows them to be easily scaled up as the needs of a community grow. SMR proponents argue that these reactors are safer because they are far less susceptible to human error and rely on passive safety features. For instance, NuScale designs don’t require external power sources to operate the cooling systems for their cores. Finally, if an accident occurs, the consequences with an SMR are likely to be much less severe than in previous nuclear accidents. While both the CNNC and NuScale reactors feature novel designs, they nevertheless draw from proven technologies. CNNC describes its Linglong-1 design as being a pressurised water reactor, while the NuScale design is a light water reactor. Both reactors appear to use clever design and engineering to simplify traditional reactors. This is a sensible approach to getting SMRs approved and operational. However, other companies are experimenting with more radical designs. The Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation (USNC) has designed what it calls a Micro Modular Reactor (MMR). The MMR eschews water altogether, using helium as a coolant and transferring heat through molten salt. MMRs also use a ‘Fully Ceramic Microencapsulated’ (FCM) fuel, in which small kernels of Uranium fuel, each about 1 mm across, are encased in layers of ceramic and silicon carbide. According to USNC, this makes the fuel much safer to use and transport, gives it greater temperature stability, and makes it impossible to repurpose for military purposes. In April, the company started running a pilot plant for the production of FCM fuel. USNC expects demonstration units of the reactor itself to be operational by 2026.  Besides these there are several other SMRs under development, including so-called micro-reactors from start-ups like Oklo and NuGen as well as designs from established giants like General Atomics. Finally, there are companies pursuing larger reactors like the so-called pebble-bed design as well as the Bill Gates-backed TerraPower’s molten salt design.Nuclear RealitiesFor all the promises of SMRs, it’s worth keeping in mind that they are still a long way off. Even if SMRs are all they claim to be, it may be another two decades before they dramatically impact the global energy mix. Until then, renewables and traditional nuclear plants will remain important sources of low-carbon energy. There also remain many uncertainties around SMRs, many of which feature completely unproven designs. As with every other means of power generation, there are also likely to be some downsides. For example, a Stanford-led study concluded that SMRs could produce much more nuclear waste than traditional reactors. The study looked at designs from NuScale, Terrestrial Energy, and Toshiba and concluded that these small reactors would experience greater neutron leakage, which would, in turn, create more radioactive material. While such studies are by no means conclusive, they highlight how little we will really know until prototype SMRs run for years. SMRs are also likely to be subject to the same political and social uncertainties that afflict traditional nuclear power. The supply of Uranium fuel remains highly politicised and dominated by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). And popular perceptions of nuclear power appear to be poor. Nuclear engineers may point out that the chances of a major radiation event at the Zaporizhzhia plant are very low, despite the ongoing fighting in its vicinity. However, popular perceptions are unlikely to make much allowance for expert opinion. Matsyanyaaya #2: How can the US-India iCET Succeed?— Arjun GargeyasI know we talk about the intersection of technology and international affairs in this newsletter. This time I’m trying something different, elucidating the possibility of a new technology in India which can become the global standard and shake things up in the international E-commerce arena if implemented perfectly.Over the last few weeks, we met with Mr Sanjay Jain, a member of iSPIRIT and an engineer closely working on developing the India Stack applications. This was to understand better the newly launched Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC) and how it functions. The ONDC was launched by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Government of India as an e-commerce aggregator. The primary objective was to challenge the monopoly of E-commerce giants like Amazon and Flipkart while providing the local sellers a platform to be equally competitive. After having a couple of conversations with Mr Jain, who brilliantly explained the system’s backend, India had a sense of opportunity to set a global standard through which E-commerce operates. What is it?ONDC is a massive network that acts as a facilitator for buyers and sellers. It is not a platform such as Amazon. It is built on leveraging the network effects and positive externalities of E-commerce platforms, while aggregating all existing platforms to be on the same network. It is currently developed on the Beckn Protocol, an open-source software protocol. Now, for comparison's sake, it is similar to the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), which handles all UPI transactions. Why has it been introduced?One of the main reasons for introducing ONDC in India is the movement toward E-commerce while making it inclusive and accessible to the country’s large population. There is also the movement from platform-based to network-based technology in the E-commerce domain so that users are not locked into a particular platform only and can choose from multiple options. Including local merchants, sellers and buyers to make the network have over 15,000 retailers is another key objective of the platform itself. Increasing the share of Indians using E-Commerce (from 9 crores to 25 crores) and improving geographic coverage of E-Commerce (covering 75% of PIN codes) remains the core idea behind ONDC.How can it become the E-commerce domain standard?ONDC mainly revolves around two principles: Bundling and Interoperability. It helps separate the buyers and sellers while aggregating both on a single network. It addresses lock-in and unbundles E-commerce’s buying, selling and logistics aspects. Sellers need not register on an existing app but can come together with others to create seller apps with other retailers (location-specific retailer aggregation or delivery-specific services can have their platforms for end users to choose from). There’s no centralised payment processor, but seller-side apps determine the commission for whoever decides to get onboarded.Can India use ONDC and implement it in different countries just like its digital payments system? ONDC can soon be a perfect solution for preventing monopolies in the E-commerce domain. It can also provide local entrepreneurs with a perfect opportunity to reach the end users directly without being bullied by big firms who prefer to prop their own businesses.  The US has long been talking about breaking up Big Tech. Now, in the E-commerce space, ONDC has a shot (albeit a very long one currently) to become a credible alternative to the existing model (concentrated with a few giants who have captured the market) that other nation-states can use. With that, ONDC has the possibility of improving India’s own international reach (like UPI), thus helping the country gain some diplomatic heft in the E-commerce space. Our Reading Menu[Book] From Space to Sea : My ISRO Journey and Beyond by Abraham E. Muthunayagam.[Report] Green energy depends on critical minerals. Who controls the supply chains? by Luc Leruth, Adnan Mazarei, Pierre Régibeau and Luc Renneboog.[Article] Technology and the construction of oceanic space: Bathymetry and the Arctic continental shelf dispute by Daniel Lambach This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters #1: Spying on Spy Satellites— Pranav R SatyanathIn February this year, the United States launched a nondescript satellite simply designated as NROL-87. Those who keep a close of space launches know that the NROL designation stands for national security satellites operated by the National Reconnaissance Office. The satellite likely entered a 284 x 425 km Sub-synchronous orbit with an inclination of 97.25 degrees. The NROL-87, also designated as USA 326, is suspected to be a new generation of electro-optical imaging satellite. This spy satellite, one among many operated by the US, kept to itself with nothing to bother its mission. Until now.Earlier this month, Russia launched a nondescript satellite on board a Soyuz-2.1V from the Plesetsk launch site. The secret satellite, Kosmo-2558, was launched just as NROL-87 passed above the Russian launch complex. Space watchers like Jonathan McDowell quickly predicted that Kosmos-2558 would likely reach the planar orbit of NROL-87 within 80 km of the American spy satellite’s range. The orbital behaviour of the Kosmos-2558 resembles that of an ‘inspector satellite’, which, in other words, means that Russia launched a satellite to spy on another satellite.Of course, the presence of inspector satellites in space is not a new phenomenon. Classified under the category of Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO), satellites have been launched to either inspect or potentially attack other satellites in the past. Not all RPO satellites have malign intentions. For example, in the 1990s, Canada proposed using inspector satellites to verify arms control agreements in outer space. More recently, however, RPOs have been viewed with suspicion. The sharp increase in the number of satellites being placed in orbit has made it all the more difficult to predict the purpose of satellites which may or may not have military utility. Since countries do not disclose details of the satellites they launch, the lack of transparency does little to decrease uncertainties. Policymakers and policy analysts have considered several possible solutions to the problem of transparency. Some scholars propose a pre-launch notification mechanism under which countries not only notify others of the launches of rockets and ballistic missiles that are set to take place but also provide details about the nature of the launch vehicle or ballistic missile.Pre-launch notification agreements concerning ballistic missiles have been signed in bilateral settings in the past. The United States and Russia signed such an agreement in 1988. India and Pakistan signed a similar agreement in 2005. No attempt has been made to craft similar agreements for space launch vehicles. One reason might be that providing pre-launch notifications might be because countries fear that adversary countries might take countermeasures against potential spy satellites. Such concerns were expressed as far back as 1958, as seen in the memorandum from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to the President of the United States.Another solution that has been proposed to avoid the risk of RPOs is to implement a keep-out zone for satellites. While such an agreement does not require a verification mechanism, countries could choose to use space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities to enforce a keep-out zone agreement. SSA capabilities have their limitations as no single national system can currently provide full coverage of Low-earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). Establishing a global SSA network is also challenging and expensive.Although RPOs have not been a problem till date, they may become a problem in the future. Analysts have already begun to take notice of the increase in RPOs in recent years. If countries wish to mitigate the risks associated with RPOs, they must start preliminary negotiations sooner rather than later.(The author would like to thank Aaron Bateman for providing access to declassified documents related to the US space progaramme.)Antariksh Matters #2: The Indian Army’s ‘Skylight’ Exercise— Aditya RamanathanIt would be unusual for readers of this newsletter to find an entry describing an exercise conducted by the Indian Army. However, there was much about the recently concluded Exercise Skylight that was unusual, and that warranted an entry in Technopolitik. What little is known about the exercise comes from scant official information and a few news stories. The Army’s official Twitter handle described it as a satellite communication exercise. It went on to add:“100% satellite communication assets were activated to ensure operational readiness of hi-tech satellite systems and exercise various contingencies.”The tweet would indicate Exercise Skylight tested all of the Army’s orbital communications (which are scattered across multiple satellites) and that these systems were tested for ‘contingencies’. What might be these contingencies? ThePrint cited an anonymous source who indicated the Army wanted to validate its ability to use space-based communications as a redundancy during wartime:“Conflict situations demand space-based communication because we are going by the assumption that the primary means of communication — terrestrial media — gets disrupted”.Of course, the Army understands the vital advantages space-based communications provide. This is especially evident in the Himalayas along the Line of Actual Control (LaC) with China, where satellites can enable tactical communication well beyond the line-of-sight. The Russia-Ukraine war also seems to loom over Exercise Skylight. The Times of India cited an anonymous source as saying the Army was carefully following the use of cyber and electronic warfare in that conflict. In particular, the Army appears to be impressed by the resilience of the SpaceX Starlink satellite internet constellation, which Ukrainian forces have been using to coordinate operations against Russia. In the coming years, the Army is expected to look to acquire easily portable satellite phones and “satellite high speed data backbone,” which would likely require a constellation of low earth orbit  (LEO) satellites link Starlink.Before it turns to LEO, the Army will be most eager to get its own communications satellite in geostationary orbit. In March, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh cleared the path for developing the GSAT-7B satellite for the Indian Army. At present, the Army shares satellites with the other services and civilian organisations. If the GSAT-7B is put into orbit by the planned date of 2025, the Army will join the Indian Navy (which already operates the GSAT-7A) and the Indian Airforce (which operates the GSAT-7C) in having its own dedicated communications satellites parked over the most suitable spot of orbital real estate.Matsyanyaaya: How can the US-India iCET Succeed?— Arjun GargeyasA couple of months ago, the United States (US) and India decided to enhance cooperation in the technology domain. President Biden and Prime Minister Modi’s meeting resulted in the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) announcement to expand the existing partnership between the two states in specific strategic technology sectors. One interesting aspect of the iCET remains the departments spearheading the initiative. Both states' National Security Councils have been responsible for driving forward outcome-oriented projects related to the iCET. The defence and national security angle behind the technology cooperation is clearly visible through this initiative. With certain technology sectors attaining a strategic status, the iCET has the ability to help the two states focus on technologies that might have a massive impact on the security and military side. These agreements, when announced can create a flutter of conversation and remain exciting on paper. But what are the actual policy implementations under the iCET which can actually translate into on ground impact for both the states? Are there areas of focus which can improve the effectiveness of the initiative itself is something to look at. A People-Centric Approach The single point of focus in the initiative should be the human capital model to achieve the desired outcomes. Technical knowledge is central to the overall development of emerging technology areas such as 5G, quantum computing and semiconductors. With human capital being the biggest strength for both India and US, the iCET will thrive if it is made individual-centric. The governments should facilitate this exchange of ideas and foster the talent pool that exists in both countries. One of the goals set by the initiative as per the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) was to forge better linkages between government, academia and industry in specific technology areas. This would entail cross-border human capital movement being essential to achieving those goals. Scientists, engineers and other researchers in both countries who are involved in working on critical technologies can have access to research facilities in both countries under the initiative. The exchange of STEM researchers between universities across both countries and industrial leaders and technology entrepreneurs engaged in developing strategic tech can help translate lab-level research into potential applications. An important area in the people-centric approach are the students and academic researchers studying in each other’s universities. Although this is heavily skewed towards Indians in the US academic institutions, this initiative can introduce academic fellowships for scholars to work and contribute to specific emerging technology sectors. This would help in IP creation and dissemination across borders as well as cultivate a thriving set of scientists and engineers who can contribute to technology collaboration at the government level.Focus on Funding Specific Research ProjectsAs per the White House Press Release, the US-India iCET will involve the scientific government departments from both states. As per the press statement, the National Science Foundation (NSF) of the US, along with the Department of Science and Technology (DST) will drive forward the implementation of research projects under the initiative. The statement also mentioned that the US has agreed to join six of India’s Technology Innovation hubs. This is in the hope of spearheading over 25 projects across emerging domains such as artificial intelligence and data science. This sets the foundation for another area of focus for the success of the initiative. One of the main objectives of the iCET must be to secure funding (for research and product development) for outcome-driven projects that employ critical and emerging technologies. Enhancing technological cooperation between the two states and improving the efficiency of the initiative can be done when government bodies would indulge in funding crucial research projects on emerging technologies. The iCET must put its resources into funding and supporting specific research projects that can provide a solid output and outcome. The focus must be on emerging technology areas that have the potential to use said technology to create different applications and products to tackle some of the biggest challenges faced by both countries. Improving agriculture output, mitigating climate change effects and similar research can be prioritised for funding. Another aspect would be to identify areas of technology that might dominate in the near future and focus on them. Developing state-of-the-art quantum computer systems, and building telecommunication networks using 6G are just a few among the plethora of technology areas on which the iCET can spend its resources on. Our Reading Menu[Book] A Technological History of Cold-War India, 1947–⁠1969: Autarky and Foreign Aid by William A.T. Logan.[Article] Wargame of Drones: Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Crisis Escalation by Erik Lin-Greenberg.[Report] Securing Semiconductor Supply Chains: An Affirmative Agenda for International Cooperation by William Alan Reinsch et. al. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Matsyanyaaya: The New CHIPS Bill Raises More Questions than it Answers— Arjun GargeyasIn the last week, the US Senate decided to advance a bill to promote and support semiconductor chip manufacturing in the country. The bill, known as the CHIPS Act, is an extension to the previous year’s legislation passed by the Senate which approved a $250 billion bill to reinforce US chipmaking to compete with the growing clout of China. With the global chip shortage receding and the production getting back to pre-pandemic levels, the US government pushed the bill through with the intention of improving the manufacturing capabilities of the country in the semiconductor industry. With China running its foundries at full-scale even during the height of the pandemic, the state has managed to slowly increase its market share in the global semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem. A recent Bloomberg report showcases how the last four quarters have been dominated by Chinese semiconductor firms and their operations. This has raised alarms among the Western states regarding the reduction in influence and market share in the semiconductor domain. But how much can the CHIPS act achieve the goals and objectives that the US government intends to? Will there be any unintended consequences and unfavourable effects that might arise from the act itself?Subsidies to increase manufacturing output? The CHIPS bill seeks to facilitate the semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem in the country through increased subsidies and financial incentives for the domestic players. Considering the multifaceted benefits of improved chip manufacturing capacity, the US government looks to provide subsidies worth $52 billion to domestic semiconductor companies through the CHIPS bill.One of the main reasons behind the advancement of the CHIPS bill is to reduce manufacturing dependencies on Asian semiconductor manufacturers and increase domestic manufacturing output. Another objective of the bill is to ensure self-sufficiency in the supply of semiconductor chips in case of another global chip shortage. But can subsidies translate into an increase in manufacturing? Historically, it's noticed that in technology sectors, pumping in money and favourable industrial policies cannot always translate into necessary outcomes. This is especially true for the semiconductor industry. A case in point is China itself. The Chinese government has provided a plethora of incentives, subsidies and even financed companies with the hope of improving their semiconductor manufacturing output. However, even its major firm, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Company (SMIC) took over two decades to make a mark in the industry. Currently, it still lags behind industry giants such as Intel and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). Though the CHIPS bill has the potential to positively impact semiconductor manufacturing in the country, the government should not imagine that this would completely insulate the US from supply chain dependencies. This might cover the domestic demand to an extent but international dependency will still remain. TSMC itself is building a new fab in Arizona looking to branch out from Taiwan. Manufacturing equipment still remains an issue with the need to import certain equipment from abroad. Also, there is the caveat of the bill stating how semiconductor firms would not be allowed to have any Chinese investments in their company if they benefit from the subsidies provided by the bill. Restrictions over the import and export of semiconductor products to China is also included when availing the benefits of the new legislation. The CHIPS bill will help spur semiconductor manufacturing in the country and cater to its domestic demand to an extent. But, expecting the bill to help the US attain self-sufficiency in the supply chain remains a futile expectation. Fab vs Fabless Another aspect of this legislation is the division of benefits and subsidies. The current CHIPS bill benefits the firms that have the capability to design and manufacture their own semiconductor products. This includes Intel which has the fabrication potential. The bill provides subsidies to build fabrication facilities and provides investment tax credit to purchase tools for use inside their factories.However, the entire industry is not happy with this. Fabless firms such as NVIDIA, AMD and Qualcomm have expressed disappointment at the legislation. Fabless firms are those semiconductor companies that design their products but outsource their manufacturing to Asian counterparts. The new bill does not have any direct benefits for fabless firms as they do not build foundries or buy equipment. Such firms have argued this would help just Intel and is more of a rent-seeking opportunity for Intel to dominate the market. Unfair competition between the fab and fabless firms can result in the government choosing winners (in this case, Intel) is what the other companies are saying. These fabless firms actually support an earlier version of the FABS Act (introduced earlier in the House of Representatives) which provides tax credit on both manufacturing and chip design activities giving benefits to both the type of semiconductor firms. This version of the bill was also supported by the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA). Though not officially opposing the bill, fabless semiconductor firms have questioned the impact of huge sums of money supporting their competitors.Finally, the fact that the US has the most number of semiconductor fabrication facilities in the world can also hamper the distribution of the subsidies. Will the financial incentives be proportional to the market share of the company or will it support smaller manufacturers also? These are questions that the bill might have to address before finally getting President Joe Biden’s final signature.Antariksh Matters: Space Dreams and Ground Realities— Aditya RamanathanThe Indian government may look to space tourism to sustain its human spaceflight programme. In a response to a Rajya Sabha question, the minister of state for science and technology said India was developing a homegrown capability to support space tourism. According to the minister, this capability would be developed via the Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme.Singh’s comments come even as the government has acknowledged delays in the Gaganyaan programme, which was originally planned to be launched in 2022, to mark 75 years of India’s independence. That deadline has now been pushed to 2024. Besides the formidable technical challenges involved in any human spaceflight programme, Gaganyaan was also set back by the pandemic, which forced ISRO to scale back operations. Russia’s war with Ukraine will likely add to the difficulties, since Russia’s space agency, Roscosmos, which trained an initial batch of four Indian Air Force cosmonauts, has been heavily sanctioned by Western states. “Abort Missions”Long before any space tourists (or for that matter, cosmonauts) take off on an Indian launch vehicle, there will come a series of tests. The first of these will be a so-called “abort mission,” slated for September and December of 2022. Having already tested the human-rated HS2000 rocket booster in May, ISRO will now conduct uncrewed tests of the survival systems. According to reporting in The Indian Express:‘For the abort missions, the space agency has developed test vehicles that can send the systems up to a certain height, simulate failure, and then check the escape system. Gaganyaan’s escape system was designed with five “quick-acting” solid fuel motors with a high burn rate propulsion system, and fins to maintain stability. The crew escape system will separate from the crew module by firing explosive nuts.’The next steps would be to integrate a crew module and an onboard “Onboard Launch Vehicle Health Management System” along with other elements. As ISRO chief S. Somanath recently concluded in an interview, the human-ready launch system “is yet to see the final shape”.Creating an LEO EconomyIndia’s ambitious next step for human spaceflight is to launch its own space station. Such a space station is to orbit at altitudes of 300-400 km above sea level and have more than one module. However, Singh’s statement about space tourism is a reminder than human spaceflight missions are expensive and that states - and private companies - need to find ways to recoup their costs. The Gaganyaan project alone has a price tag of INR9,000 crores (about $1.13 billion). Sending Indians into space on a regular basis will cost many times more. Other spacefaring nations, in particular, the United States and China, have recognised these realities and are seeking to create self-sustaining low Earth Orbit (LEO) economies. While the International Space Station (ISS) is slated to be deorbited in January 2031, the US is promoting the creation of an ecosystem of privately built and operated space stations to replace it. The US space agency NASA has already selected and commenced funding of three proposed space stations: those by Nanoracks, Blue Origin, and Northrop Grumman. While it is possible that some of these stations will fail to work or fail to make money, the very process of designing, building, and operating them will help develop both the technologies and the institutional experience required for a vibrant LEO economy. India remains far behind the world’s leading spacefarers in these efforts. To send Indians into space on a regular basis will ultimately require more than space tourism - it will require a thriving private space industry and international collaboration.Our Reading Menu[Article] Artificial Intelligence Regulation by Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar and Aziz Z. Huq.[Report] Fly Me to the Moon: Worldwide Cislunar and Lunar Missions by Kaitlyn Johnson.[Report] The moment for EVs: Strategies to transform American roads by Chetan Hebbale and Johannes Urpelainen. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Matsyanyaaya #1: Material Partnerships Today and Tomorrow— Pranav R SatyanathIn June 1939, the United States Congress passed the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act to ensure the steady supply of raw materials that were deemed to be critical for economic development and national security. Strategic materials at the time included those that were essential for nuclear research, like uranium and thorium. Although these materials were by no means rare in the form of natural ore, the rarity of these materials came in two forms. 1.) They were concentrated in a small number of locations around the world. 2) The process of refining the ore to useful purity was long and expensive. Of course, since nuclear energy could be harnessed for both the purposes of economic development and making nuclear weapons, securing these materials for one's own interests while stopping the adversary from doing the same became the top priority. Like-minded nations, therefore, had a keen interest in keeping their knowledge of strategic materials a secret, leading to agreements in the early years such as the Quebec Agreement of 1943, under which the US, Britain and Canada agreed to stockpile strategic materials and censor information regarding nuclear research.In the early years of the Cold War, the Americans went many steps further to ensure that the Atlantic alliance provided a steady supply of strategic materials. First, through the Marshall Plan’s controlling body, the Economic Cooperation Administration, the US incentivised their European partners to produce strategic materials which were later exported to the US. Second, the US and the NATO members established the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) to exercise control over the East-West trade on strategic materials. The goal was to restrict the export of material that were in short-supply, rather than use it as a tool for coercion. This is because it was assumed that the Eastern bloc was self-sufficient in most strategic materials.Alliances and partnerships in the early days of the Cold War played an important role in securing materials that were deemed as essential for national security. But why is this history relevant today? Last month, the United States announced the establishment of the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP), whose goal is to secure critical materials that are deemed essential for economic development. The new partnership includes Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, the European Commission, the UK, the US, and the US.Today’s strategic materials (or critical materials) are quite different from the days of the Cold War. Lithium, cobalt, samarium, europium, and neodymium make up a bulk of the elements that are crucial for the production of batteries and electronic components. China has a clear dominance in the supply of rare earths, with nearly 90% of the global supply concentrated in the Bayan Obo region of Inner Mongolia. China’s dominance over rare earth elements has remained a concern for many years, with its monopoly over strategic materials increasing due to the growing demand for green technologies. Other concerns include the exploitative nature of Chinese mining in Africa, particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo.The success of the MSP will be determined by how effectively the partnering countries can secure the supply of strategic materials and decouple from Chinese dependence. This not only means that the countries within the partnership bring together their own resources, but also successfully negotiate fair agreements with other countries, particularly resource-rich African states.India currently lacks a coherent strategy for securing strategic materials. Since the security of these materials is highly contingent on India’s ability to partner with resource-rich countries, India must make every effort to join partnerships such as the MSP. Domestically, India must set up a Department of Rare Earths to spearhead India’s rare earth diplomacy and attract investment from foreign players.Cyberpolitik: Does China See Everything?— Ranjeet Rane"Everything is seen in China." These were the famous (last?) words of a member of TikTok’s Trust and Safety team as per a  report by Buzzfeed last month. Tik Tok - the viral video-sharing app owned by Chinese tech company ByteDance - is no stranger to regulatory staredowns in the US. In 2020, President Donald Trump issued an executive order requiring TikTok to be sold to an American company or risk getting banned. TikTok contested the order in court, and later, President Biden revoked it. As it turns out, the reasons the Trump administration gave for issuing the order, namely the rampant collection of user data, including biometric data and its access by Chinese authorities, may not have been entirely incorrect. The Buzzfeed report that analysed recordings from internal team meetings points to unhindered access to US data in China despite assurances given otherwise. The chain of events set off by the report included TikTok’s response to a letter by US senators where it acknowledged that certain employees outside the US could access information from American users. The Senate Intelligence Committee has now issued a letter to the Federal Trade Commission asking it to open an investigation into TikTok’s repeated misrepresentations about its data security practices and corporate governance in front of US lawmakers. This was followed by a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) member writing to Apple and Google to ban the app from their respective app stores, citing national security concerns. Their concerns are not entirely unfounded. TikTok’s data harvesting and sharing models have come under continued scrutiny across the globe, primarily owing to the possible influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the leadership of ByteDance. This was particularly laid bare in 2018, when Zhang Yiming, ByteDance’s founder, made a public apology and shut down ByteDance’s joke-sharing app for having “content that goes against socialist core values”.Interestingly, the executive order issued by President Trump came on the back of a blanket ban issued by India in July 2020 against a slew of Chinese apps, including TikTok, as a reaction to a bloody border skirmish. The explanation given in a widely circulated press release mentioned that these apps are engaged in “stealing and surreptitiously transmitting users’ data in an unauthorized manner to servers which have locations outside India”. National security concerns were being addressed through technology policy interventions for the first time - a template the US administration may now employ for its own interests. TikTok has responded with Project Texas - an attempt to keep all American user data on the Oracle server so that the data always stays within the US. But looking at the damage already done, this may be too little and too late.Matsyanyaaya #2: How India and China can Develop a Geoengineering Governance Framework— Arjun GargeyasIn this week’s edition, I am going a little off-topic and discussing environmental policy and climate tech for combating climate change. Here is where the concept of geoengineering comes into the picture. What and why it mattersIn layman’s terms, geoengineering refers to the human involvement made in the Earth’s natural processes to counteract the effects of climate change. It involves large-scale interventions in the planet’s functioning by human actions in order to mitigate the extent of the crisis. The main principle used in the process is reducing the CO₂ content in the atmosphere through human intervention. This would result in trapping less heat in the atmosphere eventually slowing down the effect of global warming. It is considered both as an alternative to cutting carbon emissions and as a field of ‘scientific taboo’ due to its research infancy and any probable implications on the environment itself.The main field of geoengineering is the concept of solar radiation management, which involves reflecting a fraction of the incoming sunlight to cool a warming planet. One process is ‘stratospheric injection,’ which involves spraying reflective aerosols into the stratosphere. Attempts have also been made by Russian scientists in what they have called the SPICE Project. The scientists ended up pumping particles through a high-altitude balloon that would scatter them once reaching a specific height in the atmosphere.However, these experiments were frowned upon by the majority of the scientific community. Fears were raised regarding how tinkering with natural processes might alter precipitation patterns and reduce crop growth in certain areas. Further damage to the ozone layer was also considered a possibility. This kind of blow-back risked unintended consequences for humanity as a whole. With no framework to govern the use of solar engineering methods, there is a need for someone to step in and ensure responsible development of the field.Development vs deployment?India and China currently have their task cut out while framing climate-related policies. This is due to the high population and the enormous volume of carbon emissions by both countries. Geoengineering and solar radiation management is a well-thought-out approach to building cost-effective models to tackle the effects of climate change. Natural phenomena and their subsequent aftereffects have buttressed the idea of this concept.However, there have been recent calls to completely stop any solar radiation management research. The ‘International Solar Geo Non-Use Agreement’ was proposed by over 60 scholars (mostly from the West) arguing for a moratorium on research in the field. They claimed that the concept was still theoretical and that reflecting large amounts of sunlight can damage existing ecosystems and human settlements. While this might be true, it may not justify halting primary research in the field.India and China have the possibility of driving forward the conversation on continuing credible research in the field of geoengineering. Both countries have been torchbearers for the rest of the developing world at climate conferences and both can work together to formulate a well-rounded governance framework regulating the research and technology in the field. If this is indeed a fast-track solution to tackle climate change, developing countries can indulge in utilising these techniques to meet climate goals.While ethical considerations should be taken into account, the two countries can develop a holistic model (that also looks at potential negative consequences of geoengineering techniques) to have solar radiation management as a probable climate policy option. National agencies can be set up for funding solar geo-tech research and also keep tabs on the experiments being conducted. Incentivising development in the field must be a priority for both countries.However, considering the historical criticism of the field as well as the concept of unanticipated consequences of human actions, the framework must be robust enough to account for the pitfalls of the field itself. Advocating for responsible use of these techniques must be a priority for both nation-states. They must ensure that any governing mechanism that deals with geoengineering processes and techniques must address the risks that might result from human intervention. There must also be a mechanism to deploy these technologies when considerable research has been conducted and the potential effects of using these geoengineering techniques have been identified. It is in the interest of both India and China to advocate for an enhanced research environment in the geoengineering field. This can change the way states approach tackling climate change and meeting their climate goals.(This is an edited version of an article that came out first in Firstpost)Antariksh Matters: Russia’s Satellite Dazzler— Aditya RamanathanFresh open-source intelligence suggests Russia is developing a fixed laser-based satellite dazzling system. In a new article in The Space Review, Bart Hendrickx, a veteran observer of Russia’s space programme, presents evidence that Russia is building a satellite dazzling system called Kalina at the Ministry of Defence-run Krona space surveillance facility in the Caucasus. According to Hendrickx, construction began on the Kalina project in August 2019. The latest satellite imagery shows a telescope dome is already in place. Hendrickx cites tender documents that suggest Kalina will feature a dome that can separate into two sections in less than 10 minutes and enable “the telescope to scan the entire sky all the way from the zenith to an elevation of 30°”.Kalina appears to be designed to both transmit lasers and receive them when a target reflects them back, which allows for more accurate tracking. It also features an “adaptive optics system,” which is almost certainly the designed for its specific counterspace role:“Kalina most likely needs the adaptive optics system to produce images of the target that are sharp and detailed enough to make sure that the laser beams can subsequently be accurately aimed at the object’s optical systems.”Other Dazzlers Russia claims to already have at least one satellite-dazzling system in operation: the Peresvet mobile laser dazzler. First unveiled in 2018, the Peresvet was reportedly operational by December 2019. According to the Secure World Foundation’s latest Global Counterspace Capabilities report, the Peresvet “consists of a laser connected to a gimbaled mirror, all of which is mounted inside a truck-towed trailer.” The Peresvet is deployed with Russia’s strategic forces and is evidently meant to dazzle or disable both low earth orbit (LEO) satellites and aerial reconnaissance vehicles tracking batteries of mobile ICBM launchers such as the RS-24/ Topol-MR.  Hendrickx points out that it’s not clear is whether Peresvet and Kalina are meant to merely “dazzle”, that is, temporarily make the lenses on a target satellite non-operational, or whether they could “blind” a satellite, that is, permanently damage or destroy optics. What’s also left to speculation is whether these systems are actually effective: accurately aiming a laser at a satellite, keeping it on target for a sufficient period of time, and overcoming atmospheric attenuation, are all difficult tasks. Furthermore, many satellite lenses can automatically shut off when they are struck by blinding light. This may make it difficult to cause actual damage, but by forcing an adversary satellite to briefly shut its lenses, an attacker like Russia may still achieve its objectives. Indeed, one of the key attractions of such lasers is that they can be used in a variety of strategic conditions, ranging from peacetime and crises (in which they may only “dazzle”), all the way up to outright war, (in which they could seek to cause permanent damage to target satellites). Unsurprisingly, China appears to have an anti-satellite laser system deployed in Xinjiang, and reportedly “illuminated” a US satellite in 2006. In the coming years, it’s quite likely leading powers will field such systems on highly mobile land, naval, and airborne platforms. Our Reading Menu[Opinion] Nurturing open source is in our national interest by Bharath Reddy.[Book] The Nature of Technology: What it Is and How it Evolves by W. Brian Arthur.[Book] Bottled Lightning: Superbatteries, Electric Cars, and the New Lithium Economy by Seth Fletcer This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters #1: India’s Space Policy under IN-SPACe— Pranav R SatyanathOn 10 June, 2022, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the headquarters of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) in Ahmedabad, Gujarat. The setting up of IN-SPACe promises to usher in a new era for India’s commercial space sector, as the organisation is geared to function as a one-stop institution for regulating space activities and providing entities in the private sector access to facilities run by the Department of Space (DOS) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). The creation of IN-SPACe was announced in June 2020 within the pages of the Draft National Space Transport Policy published in June 2020, in light of the growing importance of commercial entities for driving innovation in the space sector. IN-SPACe is structured as an independent body within the DOS, and as of this writing, IN-SPACe has authorised two private companies to launch their payloads onboard the PSLV-C53. The structure of INSPACe’s regulatory mechanism is shown below.Before IN-SPACeTo fully appreciate the significance of a regulatory body like IN-SPACe and identify its shortcomings, we must first see the regulatory arrangement present in India before the coming of this new autonomous body. The image below shows the structure of India’s space enterprise run by the DOS. Under this arrangement, it is clear that the DOS did not have any straightforward mechanism to interact with private space companies or regulate their activities. Since ISRO operated all of India’s launch facilities and a large number of research laboratories, it became a single point of contact for private companies, and therefore, a de facto  space activities regulator.   The Structure of India’s space ecosystem prior to IN-SPACe Source: ISROAs the private space industry in India began to grow, the difficulty of gaining access to gaining critical facilities and services made it all too evident that India desperately needed a new space policy. Further, the international regulatory environment on space sustainability also began to take shape under the Long-term Sustainability (LTS) Guidelines of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). India desperately needed a coherent domestic space policy to keep up with the international standards of regulating private entities and ensuring the safety and security of India’s own space assets. Within this context, the necessity of a new regulatory body for space activities was born. The Current Structure of India’s space ecosystem Source: ISROIN-SPACe now and in the futureThe existing structure of IN-SPACe promises a smooth process for private entities to:Be granted permission to operate.Be given access to facilities operated under DOS.Be granted permission to run their own facilities.IN-SPACe also promises to share technologies and remote sensing data with private companies through a new remote sensing policy. The substance of these promises can only be analysed once the IN-SPACe begins operating in full-swing.Some of the unintended consequences of IN-SPACe may be that it might act more as a gatekeeper than an enabler. Such risks can be avoided by maintaining the autonomy of IN-SPACe and reducing the role of other stakeholders in the decision-making process. Second, the DOS must eventually ensure that ISRO becomes a scientific research institution and cedes control of its legacy space launch vehicles to New Space India Limited, which must function as a fully private launch entity that competes with other domestic players.Cyberpolitik: India Needs a Fortified Computing Ecosystem— Arjun GargeyasThe advent of the Information Age and the digital economy has brought the concept of computational capacity into the limelight. Advanced computing mechanisms such as high-performance, quantum, and cloud have taken over the field of computing. Nation-states (and even private companies) are embroiled in a high-stakes race to increase indigenous computing power for several strategic purposes. Harnessing this pivotal technological resource remains a priority for a rising technological society like India. With the country’s data generation at an all-time high, there is a need for improving the computational capabilities of the state by utilising emerging advanced computing technologies. The announcement of the National Supercomputing Mission (NSM), in 2015 by the government of India, was the first step taken by the state in the field of High-Performance Computing technologies. A jointly funded programme between the Department of Science and Technology (DST) and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), a total outlay of Rs 4500 crore has been allocated for the mission over a period of 7 years (2016-2023). The main objectives of the mission were to spearhead research in the development of supercomputers and build a National Supercomputing Grid across the country. The implementation of the mission was divided into three phases. The first involved assembling supercomputers in India (till the end of 2018) and the second was meant for designing these high-performance computing solutions in the country (completed by September 2021). The final phase, which has officially commenced, involves the indigenous design and manufacturing of supercomputers in the country. Till the end of February 2022, there have been 10 supercomputers installed at various host institutions under the mission. However, considering the distribution of the top 500 most powerful supercomputers in the world, India accounts for just 0.6% of the total. While the national mission has kick started work in the field, there is a long way to go before India can develop its own interconnected structure of supercomputers.The other major advanced computing technology dominating the market is quantum computing. While India has a dedicated supercomputer programme in the form of NSM, there has been no dedicated government policy towards the field of quantum computing specifically. However, the domestic private sector has gotten involved in the development of quantum computing hardware, software, and algorithms. The government has relied on partnership deals with major private firms to advance the quantum computing landscape in the country. In 2021, the government of India announced tie-ups with technology giants, Amazon Web Services and IBM India to improve access to a quantum computing development environment for the industrial and the scientific community. This led to the establishment of the Quantum Computing Applications Laboratory to build small-scale quantum computers. The establishment of the Greater Karnavati Quantum Computing Technology Park (GKQCTP), by the government of Gujarat and a research firm, Ingoress looks to house the country’s first-ever quantum computer.Recent progress by the state in the computing domain has showcased the government’s intent to view computational capacity as a strategic tool to possess. However, the headway has been slow and adequate measures have to be taken to ensure India does not fall behind the pack. A holistic strategy is needed to facilitate the advancement in the computing field.First, the ability to build advanced computing devices and facilities rests on a wide range of components and raw materials. It would be impossible for any state, let alone India, to indigenously manufacture the whole system from scratch. This is where the reliance on high-tech imports kicks in. Trade barriers such as export control mechanisms and import restrictions that still exist can hamper access to the building blocks of these systems. For example, advanced processors for supercomputers and cryogenic cooling systems for quantum computers are a necessity. But with existing export controls, indigenously developing them will take time for India. Cutting down on import tariffs, especially in the electronics sector, along with embracing multilateral trade agreements like the Information Technology Agreement (ITA 2015) must be the government’s priority. Moving towards a liberalised trade policy that embraces tech imports can help the country accelerate its computing programmes.Second, there needs to be a more holistic vision for developing a nationwide computing grid. China’s recently announced National Computing Network can serve as a blueprint for India to scale up its computing infrastructure. The Chinese plan talks about a geographical approach to building data centres and computing clusters across the mainland. The concept of ‘Data from east, Computing in the west’ has been proposed, which involves the setting up of computing architecture in the less developed western regions of the country to handle the data stored in centres already established in the tech-aligned eastern region. A computing grid in India can follow a similar pattern with computing clusters scattered across the country. Till now, the government has focused on academic and scientific research institutions as hosts for large-scale computing systems. Dispersing these facilities across other locations can enhance and coordinate regional development also. Creating a better network can improve the functioning and efficiency of an advanced computing grid as well as handle large-scale data processing with ease.Third, looking at the need to increase computing power from a military and strategic perspective can improve the computing technology being used currently. In an age of information warfare and cybersecurity threats, increased computational capacity is a necessity and a risk mitigation tool. Advanced computing facilities at strategic environments like naval bases, air command control centres and border outposts can help in the faster analysis and real-time data processing that contains critical military intelligence. India must focus on its computing strategy keeping in mind the defence and national security angle. Countries like the US and China are looking at advanced computing systems to simulate military operations and gain key advantages. India needs to leverage its computing capabilities effectively for defence and cannot afford to remain complacent in this domain.(An edited version of this article came out in the Hindustan Times on 10th June 2022))Antariksh Matters #2: The UK Wants to be a Big Spacefarer— Aditya RamanathanOn 23 June, the UK’s minister for science, announced four sets of proposed plans that he said were intended to encourage sustainable use of space. The minister, George Freeman, unveiled the UK’s Plan for Space Sustainability during a talk at the latest edition of the Summit for Space Sustainability, which is hosted by the US-based Secure World Foundation and the UK government.The first of Freeman’s proposed plans is to strive “to lead in the global regulatory standards for orbital activities”. The second is to pursue international cooperation in the sustainable use of space. The third is to create what Freeman called “simple, accurate metrics” to gauge space sustainability. The fourth is to create a debris removal programme. The UK’s Outsize Ambitions in Space The UK has been a particularly active participant in international debates around space governance, sustainability and security. Last year, it released a national space strategy and in February of 2022, it published a defence space strategy. It was an early signatory of the US-led Artemis Accords that seeks to lay out ground rules for lunar exploration and commercial use. The UK was also a key driver behind the setting up of an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on space threats, which completed its first meeting in May. Commercial concerns are at the heart of the UK’s activism. Freeman’s own remarks at the Space Sustainability Summit made clear the UK’s ambitions: “As it was with shipping in the 17th century and cars in the 20th, the key will be regulation which enforces good industry standards and reduces the cost of insurance and finance for a satellite launch which can show it is compliant. With London as a global capital of insurance and venture financing, we have an opportunity to use our historic role in space science to now harness responsible finance for sustainable space.” While Freeman’s comments implicitly evoked the legacy of the UK’s historic maritime power, they are in line with the goals of the national space strategy, which set out five goals:“Grow and level up our space economyPromote the values of Global BritainLead pioneering scientific discovery and inspire the nationProtect and defend our national interests in and through spaceUse space to deliver for UK citizens and the world”The UK’s own space industry is small but growing. According to a report commissioned by the UK government, space-related companies and organisations generated income of £16.5 billion in 2019-2020, a third of which came from exports. Space applications constituted the biggest share of this income, at £12.2 billion, followed by space manufacturing which accounted for £2.27 billion. The UK evidently hopes to see this industry grow much larger, but there will be some challenges ahead. While the UK will benefit from its special relationship with the US and traditional ties with Europe, it will face commercial competition from both geopolitical friends and foes. Its ambitions to set regulatory and legal standards are also likely to be contested by China and Russia. And even small-sized rivals like Luxembourg could market themselves as more attractive destinations for the registration of space companies. Notwithstanding these challenges, the UK’s activism also offers a model for other states like India. Freeman is yet to provide details of the proposals he outlined, but there’s no reason India cannot develop proposals of its own, outline a national space strategy, or actively participate in ongoing talks on space security.Our Reading Menu[Opinion] How India Can Take a Leaf Out of China’s Playbook on Battery Swapping to Form a Robust EV Ecosystem by Rohan Pai.[Report] Boost-Phase Missile Defense: Interrogating the Assumptions by Ian Williams, Masao Dahlgren, Thomas G. Roberts and Tom Karako.[Research Article] Echo Chambers, Rabbit Holes, and Algorithmic Bias: How YouTube Recommends Content to Real Users by Megan A. Brown, James Bisbee, Angela Lai et. al. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

We at the Takshashila Institution like to begin with first principles. Since the beginning of our High Tech Geopolitics Programme, we’ve pondered the key ideas and approaches that ought to inform our approach to the subject. After many discussions, message threads, and chats over lunches, we’ve distilled our thoughts into a short and crisp Techno-Strategic Doctrine. This doctrine provides a foundation which India’s policy wonks and policymakers can use as they craft domestic and international technology policy for the Information Age. Like the lighthouse that graces our institution’s emblem, we hope this doctrine illuminates our path forward and helps us navigate the perilous shoals that undoubtedly lie ahead. The Techno-strategic Doctrine has been written in recognition of two important factors:First, technology has become instrumental in augmenting the national power of states. The development of advanced technologies can help states achieve their national goals.Second, the creation of technological capabilities, their use and control are highly conducive to cooperation, contestation and conflict along geopolitical lines. In recognition of these factors, the Techno-Strategic Doctrine lays down the path that India must take to pursue technological excellence and become a major power in the global order:Policymakers and analysts alike must recognise India’s comparative advantages in scientific and technological development, namely a large talent pool and relatively low-cost labour.India must pursue international cooperation with the goal of widening access to scientific knowledge, critical supply chains, and advanced technological capabilities.India’s technology policy must align with and enshrine the values of the Indian Constitution and the UN Charter.The doctrine is divided into three sections. The Preamble encompasses the principles and values that guide the rest of the doctrine. The section on Objectives sets the goals that the doctrine must achieve. Finally, the section on Approaches explains what India must do, domestically and internationally, to become a global technology power.We’d love to hear your thoughts on the doctrine. You can find the PDF version here.A Techno-strategic Doctrine for India— Takshashila’s High Tech Geopolitics TeamPreamble 1. Technology is crucial for India’s development in the Information Age. It is also an important element of national power. The acquisition of advanced technologies is not an end in itself but a means to bring peace and prosperity to all Indian citizens. Unhindered access to state-of-the-art and foundational knowledge is, therefore, in India’s national interest. 2. India seeks a global environment where technology is accessible to humanity. It will also promote a global order where technology strengthens the values enshrined in the Indian Constitution and the UN Charter. 3. India shall strive for effective technology governance that can contribute to all aspects of human development. 4. India must be prepared for cooperation, competition, and conflict in the areas of knowledge creation, human capital, influence, raw materials, and norms.Objectives 1. To establish India as a major power in international affairs.2. To invest in the development of advanced scientific and technological capabilities in the public, private, and social sectors.3. To harness India’s capabilities in the technology domain to achieve national goals.4. To promote sustainability by using technology.5. To ensure that technology empowers citizens and safeguards constitutional rights.Approaches1. Since human capital is India’s biggest strength, it will strive to maintain the largest talent pool in every technological sector.2. India will advocate the free movement of people, knowledge, and capital across national boundaries.3. India will adopt governance frameworks that enable research and development, early deployment, and adoption of technological innovation.4. In order to protect its strategic autonomy in the technological domain, India will champion open technologies.5. India will possess top-tier capabilities for information warfare. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters #1: Fishing out illegal fishing vessels— Pranav R SatyanathDuring the Quad Summit held in Tokyo on May 23, the leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the United States agreed to establish the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA). This initiative hopes to extend the existing mechanisms for maritime cooperation among the four countries and harness commercially-available data to put together a more accurate picture of the maritime domain.The Quad countries also plan to use greater cooperation to tackle the issue of illegal fishing by Chinese vessels, as reported by Demetri Sevastopulo in the Financial Times. The report states that the partner countries will use space-based capabilities and existing maritime fusion centres to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing carried out by Chinese vessels in the Indian Ocean. The problem of IUU fishing by Chinese vessels is not new, with the IUU Fishing Index 2021 giving China an overall score of 3.86 (a score closer to 1 being the best) – making China the worst performing among 152 countries.Space-based capabilities to track maritime activities are not new and remain crucial marine safety and sustainability pillars. However, the Quad initiative to enhance maritime awareness through data exchanges is novel, as it brings together state-capacity, commercial capabilities of the partnering countries and publicly-available data to better monitor the maritime domain. There are three main ways to monitor and track maritime activities, which are likely to be used in tandem by the Quad countries. Each of these methods is described below:Transponder signatures: Any vessel that ventures into the seas is required to have onboard the Automatic Identification System (AIS), a transponder which transmits data about a vessel’s set course, speed and manoeuvres carried out. Further, it also provides details of the vessel’s registry under the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the vessel’s dimensions and its call sign. Although AIS transponders are not registered, they can be identified by a vessel’s unique 9-digit Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI), which is included in all transmissions.The IMO requires all international vessels weighing 300 gross tons or more to carry onboard AIS transponders. This requirement initially served the purpose of avoiding accidents and collisions at sea. Today, the AIS data, which anyone with a correctly configured receiver can access, has become an essential pillar of coastal security, monitoring IIUU fishing, tackling anti-piracy, and enforcing international sanctions.International Registry: The registry of a vessel under the IMO is an authoritative and legitimate identification of a vessel. IHS Markit assigns each registered vessel a unique 7-digit identification number on behalf of the IMO, which can be publicly accessed free of charge. This number remains permanent, even after a vessel changes its flag (the country where the ship is registered). The IMO registry provides details such as the vessel’s ownership, physical features, and registered flag. It remains the most authoritative form of maritime identification.Physical identification: The final way of identification is by a vessel’s physical features. Since the details of a vessel’s dimensions are already available in the public domain, it can be verified either by coastal surveillance or through satellite imagery. The use of satellite images has become commonplace in the shipping industry. Besides using optical images, new commercially-available technologies such as synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites have made it possible for private entities and NGOs to verify several aspects of illegal maritime activities. Furthermore, the use of machine learning to identify vessels at sea is also an upcoming technology used in the maritime domain.International cooperation has always been an important initiative in combating illegal maritime activities. The United States, for example, has forged several multilateral partnerships to curtail IUU fishing across the world. Based on the available details about the Quad’s IPMDA initiative, we can speculate that the fusion centres in India, Singapore, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu will use the methods mentioned above to monitor and track IUU fishing activities. In addition, data gathered by coastal radars, patrol boats, drones and manned patrol aircraft could act as a force multiplier in their effort to mitigate illegal maritime activities.Matsyanyaaya: A Roadmap for the Quad’s Emerging Technology Working Group— Arjun GargeyasThe official statement released by the White House following the first-ever in-person Quad summit in September, outlined the broad areas that the partners were looking at. From 5G and semiconductors to biotechnology, critical areas were identified for the alliance to develop a strategic advantage in. With the launch of the ‘Quad Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative’, the group signaled its intent to establish itself in the technology domain.Notwithstanding this pledge, there still exists uncertainties regarding the commitments made on the technology front. There is also the question of how much progress has been made by the member states regarding critical and emerging technologies. With the remnants of the COVID-19 pandemic and new geopolitical events such as the Russia-Ukraine war still affecting several technology supply chains, the Quad has to focus on three main areas to create an immediate impact in the technology domain.Bubbles of TradeExtending the concept of the ‘bubbles of trust’ approach that envisages better diplomatic relations between like-minded states, the Quad should set up a mechanism for the free flow of goods, labour, and capital-related to strategic technologies. Taking the example of the semiconductor industry, it is clear that key technology sectors have burgeoned globally and have relied on international cooperation for their growth and sustainability. This ensures that they cannot be restructured in such a short period of time. Robust infrastructure and an efficient value chain have been developed in high-tech sectors due to free trade.But the current situation has thrown up several key challenges for the Quad to navigate. This includes protectionist measures resulting in high import tariffs and export control regulations preventing access to critical components for building key technology ecosystems. The military applications of these technologies have also raised the fears of weaponisation resulting in lesser collaboration efforts. The Quad should aim for creating a more liberalised and open market policy that helps the four countries indulge in a greater exchange of goods, labour and capital related to strategic technology sectors. Favourable trade policies encouraging the exchange of technology sector-centric trade must be a priority. The governments of the Quad should focus on developing a comprehensive trade policy suited or catered to building strategic technology ecosystems across all the states.A Robust IP Protection RegimeWith the technological rise of China and the fears of economic espionage, there has been a restriction on the transfer of critical technology between states, thereby hampering the level of growth and innovation in certain fields. This can be addressed by the Quad coming together to build a strong intellectual property (IP) protection framework. It can help in formulating transfer of technology agreements in critical technologies between the states without fears of IP theft. Securing technology supply chains have become a challenge due to the intrinsic dependencies that have been created in several areas. Technology transfers remain a solid solution to build resiliency in these value chains themselves. However, the qualms of the IP-owning countries have been the fear of these critical technologies leaking out and reaching adversaries.A starting point for the Quad would be to introduce and ensure the enforcement of strict IP theft rules and regulations to facilitate technology transfer agreements. Prevention of exports, restrictions on domestic operations, and levying fines or penalties for specific firms violating IP theft guidelines will ensure innovation-based competition and create a favorable environment for multilateral collaboration. It must be noted that almost all modern-day technological powers have benefited from the transfer of technology from more advanced states. Hence, it remains in the interest of the Quad to share critical technologies between its alliance members. Joint Standards DevelopmentThe race for technological superiority has moved from the domination of market share to the establishment of governance mechanisms for certain critical technologies. This is where technology or technical standards come into play. Setting standards in crucial technologies have allowed states and companies to reap economic and geopolitical benefits. The Quad has the collective technical expertise to formulate and set technical standards in various emerging technologies. In recent times, there has been a steady increase in governments’ participation in the process of standards-setting. States are now openly advocating for certain technical standards to be adopted as the global ones which would eventually benefit the state and its domestic private sector. The Quad, as a group, must prioritise pre standardisation research as well as advocate and push for jointly developed technical standards at international standard-setting bodies. An increase in Chinese influence in these global standard-setting bodies has set alarm bells ringing in the West. The Quad can take over the mantle and establish committees to spearhead standard development activities in technologies like advanced communications, quantum technology, and artificial intelligence. This would put the alliance in the driver’s seat to set and formulate standards that will end up shaping the way future technologies might work.Antariksh Matters #2: Can you ban space weapons?— Aditya RamanathanDoes it make sense for India to pursue arms control in space? The recently concluded session of the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) meeting in Geneva has infused urgency into this question. The OEWG focused on how space threats could be reduced through norms, principles, and guidelines My colleague Pranav R. Satyanath covered the OEWG in the previous edition of this newsletter.For our purposes, the OEWG meeting was notable for both the absence of any substantial efforts to ban space weaponry and for the lack of active Indian participation. This Indian reticence will keep it from shaping the future of space security. But to actively intervene in future discussions, Indians will need to agree on a few basics. As Pranav pointed out, states are debating about:“whether to regulate space capabilities or to regulate space activities; and second, whether to negotiate legally-binding treaties or whether to agree on non legally binding transparency and confidence-building measures.”This week, I’ll stick to considering the first of these themes: space capabilities. There’s been widespread scepticism about the prospects for arms control in space. One reason for this, as we previously argued, is that space warfare is essentially primitive in its current state – at least when you compared to the highly evolved systems of warfare on Earth that incorporate speciated weapons and platforms fulfilling niche roles on battlefields.As two scholars with the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) pointed out, potential space weapons are often ‘dual-capable’ systems such as repair satellites that can be used for more hostile purposes. In addition to these dual-capable systems, there exist multi-use capabilities such as direct ascent ASAT missiles, which are largely derived from existing ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems.If potentially offensive space capabilities are either dual-capable or multi-use, can they really be curbed? To consider this issue, it’s best to look at key factors that usually help decide success in arms control. Paul Scharre suggests three factors that influence the feasibility of a workable deal: “the perceived horribleness of the weapon; its perceived military utility; and the number of actors who need to cooperate for a ban to work.”We can add two more criteria to this list. One, whether the capability is dual-capable or multi-use. Two, whether verification of compliance with an agreement is feasible.How do these criteria fare against the implements of space warfare? Since space warfare can be waged on both Earth and in space we must consider each category of weapons. On Earth, space warfare is waged with well-established arms and modes of fighting. The combat aircraft, long-range missiles, or elite infantry forces used to attack Earth-based space assets will not be subject to bans for obvious reasons.This leaves us with those capabilities that directly target space-based assets. Specifically, these are:Electronic warfare and cyber attack capabilitiesKinetic ASAT missiles (whether direct ascent or co-orbital)RPO satellites (such as the aforementioned repair satellites or debris- clearing craft)Directed energy weapons (such as lasers and high-powered microwaves)Any future space-to-Earth kinetic weapons such as the once-proposed ‘Rods from God’The proscribing of offensive space capabilities would work best when:the perceived horribleness is highthe perceived military utility is lowthe number of actors that need to agree is lowthe capability in question in not dual-capable or multi-useverification is feasibleThe table below maps how five types of offensive space capabilities fare against these conditions:Naturally, there is much that is subjective about arms control. In particular, ‘horribleness’ is a slippery concept. For instance, anti-personnel laser weapons that can blind people are proscribed while lasers that target weapons platforms are allowed along with all manner of other conventional and nuclear weaponry that shred or incinerate human beings. As a rule of thumb, weapons that specifically target humans are subject to much greater scrutiny than those that target things – even if attacks on those things leads directly to human suffering. Therefore, electronic warfare and cyber attacks, RPO satellites, and lasers that attack orbital craft are unlikely to elicit the visceral opposition as blinding lasers. The one exception to this rule is the kinetic destruction of satellites. While kinetic collisions in space may not directly kill anyone (though the resultant debris could notionally endanger spacefaring humans), they create serious practical problems and impose high reputational costs, which could, in turn, have serious diplomatic consequences during a conflict.Candidates for Arms ControlThe table makes clear that only one type of system meets all the ideal conditions for arms control: orbital space weapons meant to attack Earth-based targets, such as the so-called ‘Rods from God’ fanciful proposals for orbital craft that will unleash 20-foot-long tungsten rods that act like artificial meteorites, striking hardened targets such as bunkers or ICBM silos.Despite their evident horribleness, such weapons would have low military utility simply by virtue of being highly vulnerable. To be able to get weapons on target quickly, the orbiting platforms would have to be in low earth orbit, making them easy targets for Earth-based countermeasures such as ASAT missiles. Any user would also need to maintain a sizeable a constellation of these platforms to ensure adequate coverage.Besides this, no state has invested serious resources into developing ‘Rods from God’, meaning the number of actors is presently zero. Furthermore, any such platform is not dual-capable/ multi-use and their existence can be easily verified, since these large orbital platforms will resemble nothing else circling the Earth.The other candidate for some manner of arms control is Earth and space-based kinetic ASAT weapons. On the one hand, these weapons possess some clear utility: destroying a satellite puts it out of action permanently and signals serious intent to an adversary. However, a closer examination reveals these weapons score low on military utility and high on horribleness.Consider utility: the violence of kinetic collisions narrows down its potential use to the sole circumstance of high intensity conventional conflict. If used first by a spacefaring state, it opens itself up to retaliation in kind. Furthermore, to substantially degrade an adversary’s use of space, several satellites will need to be targeted. While non-kinetic capabilities theoretically offer the ability to disrupt multiple satellites for specific periods of time or over specific ground tracks, attempting something similar with kinetic collision could create enough debris to risk India’s own celestial lines of communication.With high horribleness, low military utility and a relatively small number of actors (only five states including India have proven ASAT capabilities), kinetic kill ASATs seem like good candidates for a ban. However, the multi-use nature of direct-ascent ASAT missiles and the makes any effective ban impractical. What is possible is a ban on destructive ASAT tests. Back in March, we had advocated India unambiguously back such a ban. The following month, US Vice-President Kamala Harris committed the US to a self-imposed ban on such tests and establishing such a moratorium “as a new international norm for responsible behavior in space.”Having already conducted a successful destructive test in 2019, India is in a good position to support an international moratorium on destructive tests with direct-ascent ASAT missiles.Working out a Negotiating PositionIndia’s stance on space security is likely to evolve in the coming years. While traditional arms control is unlikely to serve as a foundation for its strategy, India may do well to propose outright bans on space-to-Earth kinetic weapons, and back a global ban on destructive DA-ASAT tests.In the coming weeks and months, Pranav and I will examine the effects of the OEWG on space threats, consider ways in which India can best secure its interests.[Book] The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900 by David Edgerton.[Article] “Operational Monitoring of Illegal Fishing in Ghana through Exploitation of Satellite Earth Observation and AIS Data by Andrey A. Kurekin et. al.[Blog] Artifice and Intelligence by the Center on Privacy & Technology This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters #1: Dual-use Dilemmas in the OEWG on Space Threats— Pranav R SatyanathThe first session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Reducing Space Threats was held last week between the 9th and 13th of May in Geneva. The OEWG was created under the requirement of the United Nations Resolution 75/36 which called on member states to exchange views on norms, threats and behaviours in outer space.Deliberations on matters of space security are not new. They’ve been taking place under the framework of the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), with countries divided between two broad themes: first, whether to regulate space capabilities or to regulate space activities; and second, whether to negotiate legally-binding treaties or whether to agree on non legally binding transparency and confidence-building measures.The latest set of deliberations have attempted to focus on the norms, principles and behavioural guidelines that can be established in order to make space a secure environment for all countries. However, since space capabilities and space activities carried out by countries are intrinsically linked, and since space assets have both civilian and military applications, any attempt to regulate space activities will have both direct and indirect consequences on the interpretation of international law. The dilemma of dual-use capabilities, was highlighted in a presentation made by David Koplow of Georgetown University, who pointed to the intersection of dual-use capabilities in space and the Law of Armed Conflict (LoAC). Koplow argues that by making it harder to distinguish civilian and military assets in space, countries may be violating a vital tenet of the LoAC. During an armed conflict, any asset of a country used for military purposes can be targeted by the adversary. Therefore, countries must separate their civilian and military assets to the greatest extent possible.Making this distinction in practice is, however, a challenge as countries regularly use civilian assets for carrying out military activities. For example, civilian rockets are used to launch military satellites and the Global Positioning System (GPS) and similar systems are used for both civilian and military purposes. Some countries also use commercial Earth-imaging services for gathering intelligence on an adversary's military capabilities, making them potential targets during a conflict.One possible solution to this problem was suggested by Almudena Azcárate Ortega, a researcher at the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Ortega proposed that countries could choose to distinguish their space capabilities into two categories:Dual-use assets: Space capabilities that are designed to perform both civilian and military functions. GPS satellites and similar systems fall into this category.Dual-capable assets: Space capabilities that perform civilian functions but that can be repurposed for military functions. Satellites used for debris removal or on-orbit servicing fall into this category.Categorising space assets as dual-use or dual-purpose may indeed serve useful. However, some capabilities are more difficult to distinguish than others. For example, it is reported that  Ukrainian forces are using Starlink satellites for assisting in drone strikes in Russia. Starlink is a space-based Internet service provided by the American company SpaceX. It is alleged that Russia attempted to cyberattacks on Starlink in order to prevent its use by Ukrainian forces.As dual-use space technologies proliferate to more countries, the need for regulating both capabilities and activity will likely become a greater challenge for the international community.Cyberpolitik: China's Position in OEWG (2021-2025) on Information Security— Megha PardhiBetween 28 March and 1 April 2022, the UN held the second substantive session of the "Open-ended Working Group on the Security of and the use of Information and Communications Technologies" (OEWG (2021-2025)). This is the second such working group constituted by the UN on information security. The OEWG (2021-2025) was formed in Nov 2020 and commenced in 2021. The final report of the working group will be presented to the UN General Assembly in 2025.These working groups are the international community's attempts to shape norms governing cyberspace. Developing norms of behavior in cyberspace has been a contested issue for a long time. Russia was among the first countries to propose rules and norms on cyberspace. However, early attempts fell prey to geopolitical tug of war.In the recently concluded session, many countries have put out statements expressing their position, suggestions, and concerns. In the statement released by the Chinese delegation, the Chinese government seems more worried about cyberspace norms being used against China or basically whoever does not fit into the US' definition of acceptability. The Chinese delegation made four key points:Maintaining peace in cyberspace is crucial. The division of cyberspace into peaceful and non-peaceful periods would send the wrong signal to the international community.Security of cyberspace is necessary for all countries. The statement also has the usual rhetoric of abandoning 'Zero-sum thinking' and 'cold war' mentality.First mover advantage in cyberspace should not be weaponized. China objected to the use of unilateral sanctions and weaponizing the first-mover advantage 'some countries' have over others.The Chinese statement reflected that some countries are creating "deliberately creating closed, exclusive circles for discussing supply chain issues."Objections over the division of activities in the peaceful and non-peaceful periods are understandable. Activities in cyberspace tend to intersect personal and state matters. Wars often blur this distinction. However, normalizing such division in cyberspace might set a dangerous precedent for the norms of behavior in cyberspace.There is a veiled reference to the Quad in the statement. The reference to "closed, exclusive circles for discussing supply chain issues" is similar to the terminology used when Chinese leaders and foreign ministry spokespersons talk about Quad and AUKUS. This again reflects the fact that the Quad and AUKUS have got Beijing worried about similar groupings emerging in cyberspace. Beijing's fear of isolation might seem contradictory as China's own 'Great Firewall' has strived to separate Chinese cyberspace from the world. However, there is a difference between choosing to stay isolated and being forced to isolate. Currently, Beijing decides the rules of operation in China's cyberspace. If states form an alliance to isolate China in cyberspace, the rules would be different. The Chinese government understands it could be detrimental to China's long-term interests.Additionally, the point of reference to the Quad and AUKUS is not just Beijing's fear of isolation. These references and the complaints of a 'cold war' mentality also mean China is trying to project itself as a norms follower while projecting others as 'arm twisting' bullies trying to get their own way. This is most evident in the fourth point of China's statement which roughly says, "this makes people doubt that the real goal of some countries participating in the UN information security process is to build 'international rules of cyberspace that other countries abide by, but they are above all countries’" (这令人不得不怀疑，某些国家参与联合国信息安全进程的真实目标是，构建 "其他各国都遵守，而其自身则凌驾于各国的网络空间国际规则").The war in Ukraine also loomed over the second session of the OEWG (2021-2025). Some states expressed concerns over the way Ukraine War will shape behavior in cyberspace and objections and statements over cyber activities during the war. China's objection to the use of unilateral sanctions and weaponizing first-mover advantage by 'some countries' most likely refers to the sanctions imposed by US and allies on Russia. Again, Chinese leaders have used similar terminology to express their displeasure over sanctions on Russia.Antariksh Matters #2: How Adversaries Might Challenge India’s Use of Space— Aditya RamanathanSceptics sometimes ask me how, in fact, India’s space assets could be threatened in the future and what forms such threats could take. It’s true that it’s hard to envisage what such attacks might look like. Our understanding of space warfare is limited by a merciful lack of precedence. Limited as our understanding may be, it’s worth trying to think of the conditions under which India’s chief adversaries, China and Pakistan, might use space warfare capabilities against it. Broadly, India could face space warfare under three types of circumstances: peacetime (meaning the absence of unusual tensions), crisis (a spike in tensions and/or standoffs, skirmishes) or conflict (a state of violent hostilities in one or more theatres).In the table below, I attempt to map the tools of space warfare to the circumstances India is likely to face.Peacetime In peacetime, adversaries will focus on demonstrating capabilities, probing defences, mounting disruptive cyber attacks, and infiltrating computer worms and viruses. Demonstrations of capabilities can help an adversary deter future threats. These could include ‘dazzling’ satellites with lasers, electronic jamming or spoofing, or conducting non-kinetic rendezvous and proximity operations around a satellite.CrisesIn crises, adversaries will primarily want to signal not just the existence of a capability but also the resolve to use it imminently if its demands are not met. Therefore, while an RPO craft circling around a satellite in peacetime is mainly a demonstration of capability, in a crisis, it is a coercive act meant to shape the outcomes of high stakes bargaining. ConflictIn conflict, the tools of space warfare will most likely be used for effect – to actively deny the use of space and consequently degrade the effectiveness of the adversary’s Earth-based forces. An adversary could strike in six ways during a conflict: A splendid first strike could deny India the effective use of space. Such a strike, usually carried out at the outset of a conflict (the frequently discussed ‘space Pearl Harbor’), would probably be part of a broader plan to degrade Indian forces with simultaneous strikes in space and on Earth. A graduated response would involve managing an exchange of blows and seeking to end it on favourable terms. This would entail targeting specific space capabilities in retaliation and attempting to dissuade the other side from further action.A focused strike targets specific capabilities for a finite set of time in a bid to degrade specific Earth-based capabilities. An Indian strike on Chinese ISR satellites over the Indian Ocean is an example of such a strike.Disruptive strikes create uncertainty about the reliability of space assets. These are low grade, seemingly random strikes that force the state under attack to continually react rather than seize the initiative.Disproportionate retaliation occurs in response to a smaller strike and is meant to dissuade the adversary from launching further attacks. Disproportionate retaliation must remain partial or temporary to provide the adversary an incentive to halt space warfare.A catalytic strike seeks to precipitate third party intervention in a conflict and force its termination on the best terms available. The American political scientist Vipin Narang  argues that Pakistan has, in the past, used the catalytic threat of nuclear strikes to hasten American intervention in crises with India. A kinetic attack from a future Pakistani ASAT missile could catalyse frantic calls for ending a conflict that is tilting in India’s favour.To be clear, none of these types of strikes falls into discrete or self-contained categories. A focused strike can lead to a graduated response, which can, in turn, devolve into disruptive strikes or escalate into disproportionate retaliation. These categories are simply meant to clarify the likely intent behind the waging of space warfare. There are reasons for the aforementioned sceptics to be, well, sceptical about the value of an exercise such as this. In the real world, any target state would find it difficult to accurately gauge an adversary’s intentions while an attack is underway. Also, future contingencies are likely to take unexpected forms and contain surprises. However, the value of this sort of undertaking is that it can (a) help clarify the sort of situations that can trigger an attack on space assets, (b) provide clarity on the sort of challenges India will need to deter in the coming years. As the much-used adage goes, plans are useless but planning is indispensable.Siliconpolitik: The Transatlantic Semiconductor Alliance in the Making— Pranay Kotasthane(First published on takshashila.org.in)Over the last couple of years, we have consistently argued that in order to make the semiconductor supply chain resilient, plurilateral cooperation is a necessity, not a choice. Subsidising semiconductor firms in the hope of achieving national self-sufficiency is counterproductive and futile. Futile in the limited sense that such measures won’t achieve the aim of full indigenisation. Counterproductive because a sole focus on domestic subsidies would displace the opportunity to really make a resilient, China-independent, cutting-edge semiconductor supply chain.Nevertheless, as it so often happens, subsidies are an easier policy option. This pro-business instrument—as against a pro-market one—also suits semiconductor firms better. Subsidies finance their heavy capital investments in the short term. And so, we had a number of national governments—the US, the EU, Japan, South Korea, China, India, and Taiwan to name a few—launch their own versions of semiconductor subsidy programmes.However, it does seem that the tide is now turning from a public and foreign policy perspective. Apart from subsidies, governments are now realising the value of coordinating their efforts. In an earlier post, I had discussed a reported semiconductor alliance involving the US, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Although we haven’t heard about this grouping since then, there is now a new grouping that we need to take note of.The US and EU announced a new initiative on similar lines as part of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) that concluded in Paris on Monday, 16th May. The detailed joint statement shows that the scope of this transatlantic partnership on technology is vast. Initiatives were announced on areas as diverse as solar supply chains, climate and cleantech, rare earth materials, technology standards and semiconductors. For this post, let’s focus on understanding what the announcements on semiconductors mean to the US, the EU, and India.The Transatlantic Approach for SemiconductorsAs part of the initiative, the two parties agreed on two key areas:That the US and the EU will coordinate their respective chip investments so that it doesn’t end up being a ‘subsidy race’ to the bottom. In practice, this means that the US and EU are likely to share information with each other on their planned fab investments, the companies they plan to target, and so on. In ideal circumstances, they would like to reach a stage where the EU has enough production capacity for automotive chips, while the US invests in production capacity for leading-edge nodes. In the future, the two partners would also want to agree on preferential treatment for their own fabless companies to access the fabs in each other’s national jurisdiction. For now, they have agreed on consulting each other on subsidies for semiconductor firms.The two partners also agreed to develop an early warning detection system for supply chain disruptions. A similar announcement was also made as part of the Quad Semiconductor Supply Chain initiative during the last Summit meeting, where the four members agreed to “map capacity, identify vulnerabilities, and bolster supply-chain security for semiconductors and their vital components.” The motivation for this initiative is to keep a closer eye on wafer capacities across the globe so that stockpiling or additional capacity addition can be coordinated.Both the moves indicate the willingness to collaborate with partners instead of going it all alone.The India AngleThese moves are consequential for India. Apart from the US, the EU has a Trade and Technology Council arrangement with just one other nation-state—India. India should use this arrangement and become a part of this semiconductor supply chain alliance. There’s also the opportunity to combine the US-EU effort with the Quad’s Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative, as the goals of the two mechanisms are identical.With these new semiconductor alliances taking shape, it’s important for India to become a part of these formations. Foreign Policy in the Information Age needs to go beyond the traditional defensive approach of ‘protecting’ one’s critical technologies and instead become a key driver for enhancing India’s high-tech power.Our Reading Menu[Article] Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War: The Enduring Hider-Finder Competition in Air Warfare by Antonio Calcara, Andrea Gilli, Mauro Gilli, Raffaele Marchetti, Ivan Zaccagnini[Book] The Atlas of AI: Power, Politics, and the Planetary Costs of Artificial Intelligence by Kate Crawford This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters #1: Telangana’s SpaceTech Framework— Aditya PareekIn its latest policy document, “SpaceTech Framework”, the Government of Telangana acknowledges the central role of private enterprise in the rapidly growing global space economy. The twelve page long document lays down a framework to nurture the state’s own private space tech sector. There is a notable focus on enabling entrepreneurship in both upstream and downstream applications as well as removing many bottlenecks and regulatory hurdles.The policy seeks to attract global investment and setup partnerships with international entities to boost space related manufacturing in the state. Telangana also wishes to become a globally preferred destination for setting up new space related ventures and as a sandbox or testbed for SpaceTech applications like remote sensing. The framework laid out to achieve these objectives, has four key policy pillars - enabling access to infrastructure, business facilitation & collaboration, skill development & training, promoting research and innovation. The policy also pays due regard to involving varied stakeholders and deriving socio-economic benefits across areas & sectors - such as agriculture, insurance, urban development & planning, disaster management, digital connectivity and ecological protection etc.    Hyderabad, Telangana’s capital, already has many advantages, including being the base of institutions and high-tech facilities like ISRO’s National Remote Sensing Centre (NRSC) and the International Advanced Research Centre for Powder Metallurgy and New Materials (ARCI). Telangana has also contributed a significant share to ISRO’s national space efforts, most recently with supplying almost 30% of parts used in India’s Mars Orbiter Mission(MOM).Building on this momentum, the Government of Telangana has identified a “space market value chain”, which stretches from identifying end users to the upstream manufacturing sub sectors. To support this value chain, Telangana aims to encourage public private partnerships and the sharing of expensive high-tech testing and Research & Development(R&D) facilities by both government institutions and startups who can’t afford to set up their own. Some specifically identified R&D and testing facilities apart from the above mentioned ISRO-NRSC and ARCI include - Electronics Corporation of India Limited(ECIL) and the regional complexes of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). By identifying some high-impact use cases, the Government of Telangana also aims to prioritise solving problems which are pressing and have a direct impact on the state, its industry, populous and the nation at large.The government of Telangana also plans to provide competitively priced land in strategic locations inside the state for SpaceTech companies to set up their facilities - including commercial ground stations for satellite constellations. Telangana also has plans for an INR 1,300 crore fund meant for supporting startups under its Information and Communicational Tech.(ICT) policy, the policy explicitly says that space tech startups would also be eligible for support from this fund. As a way to harmonise its other high-tech initiatives such as Telangana’s AI Mission (T-AIM) and Open Data Platform, the policy also advocates for the State Government, Union Government and space tech companies involved in geospatial applications like earth observation, to synergise all efforts. Furthering the cause for synergising the state’s development goals and national space endeavours, Telangana hopes to facilitate partnerships between its own space tech industry and national Public Sector Undertakings (PSU), Union Government agencies, and foreign companies. The Government of Telangana also plans to support individuals and startups in the space tech sector with Intellectual Property (IP) development and preservation by providing advisory services in filing patents and ensuring legal compliance both domestically and internationally. The focus is also on the insurance, banking and financial services sectors. The policy highlights the need for a better understanding in analysing the risk associated with building and operating big ticket items like privately owned and built space launch vehicles and satellites. Matsyanyaaya: How Does the India-EU Trade and Technology Council Work?— Arjun GargeyasI had written long back in this newsletter about the proposed US-EU Trade and Technology Council and how it actually reveals the fissures that divide them with respect to technology cooperation and regulation. Fast forward to the present and we have the president of the European Union (EU), Ursula von der Leyen visiting India during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. An interesting aspect of the visit was the harmony between both India and the EU on most matters with the exception of the Ukraine war. But the highlight of the visit was the establishment of the India-EU Trade and Technology Council modeled after the US-EU agreement. This is the first time India has signed any such agreement with any of its partners. It will allow the two partners to address challenges in trade, trusted technology, and security, deepening cooperation in these fields. The primary objective behind the agreement is to ensure both sides can work in collaboratively in fields such as 5G, artificial intelligence, climate modelling, and health-related technology.While the talks behind the proposed India-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) have gone on for over a decade, this agreement comes as a positive step towards building a partnership between India and its third-largest trading partner. It should also be noted that the EU has extended this kind of agreement in technology-related domains only to the US and India thus far. Reports say that the Trade and Technology Council will provide the political steer and the necessary structure to operationalise political decisions, coordinate technical work, and report to the political level to ensure implementation and follow-up in areas that are important for the sustainable progress of European and Indian economies. The current Technology Council between the US and EU has introduced the concepts of different working groups and departments in charge of translating the political decisions into actual deliverables. These working groups range from investment screening, climate technologies, and supply chain resiliency among others. A similar working setup is likely to be adopted in the India-EU agreement depending on the comparative advantages that both partners have to offer in the technology markets.But one of the other questions that still needs to be answered is the effectiveness of the agreement. This depends on the extent to which the EU is amenable to sharing critical technology with India. There are some strategic areas of technology that domain leaders like the EU might not be willing to pass on to India. The question of how they can navigate this kind of impasse can determine the extent to which the agreement can flourish. Similar to the US-EU Trade and Tech Council agreement, this agreement will have the clouds of technology regulation hanging over it. Both partners view the process of regulating technology from a different perspective. The differences in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and India’s proposed Personal Data Protection Bill highlights the change in approach taken by both parties. Finding a common ground to important questions like these is imperative if the signed agreement can actually result in deliverables. It is indeed a welcome surprise that the India-EU Trade and Technology Council has been initiated considering the indecisiveness that existed in finalising the FTA. This offers a great opportunity for both countries to tap into each other’s strengths and overcome their weaknesses in the technology sector through consistent cross-border trade and flow of labour, capital and IP.Antariksh Matters #2: ISRO’s Annual Report Looks at Both Hits and Misses— Pranav R. SatyanathThe Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) released its annual report last month, which highlights the organisation’s major activities in the past year and plans for future missions and satellite launches. Main highlights of the report are as follows:ISRO’s accomplishments in developing indigenous navigation capability: The Navigation Indian Constellation (NavIC) consists of a constellation of eight satellites which provide standard positioning services for civilian use and restricted services for the government and military services. According the the report, ISRO has worked towards enabling NavIC services on mobile devices, and integrated the Second Generation Distress Alert Transmission (SG-DAT) to provide services such as the broadcasting distress alerts in remote locations.Advancements in indigenous launch capabilities According the ISRO’s annual report, there have been two major improvements in the development of indigenous launch capabilities, First, the development of the three-stage solid-fueled Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV) which can launch small satellites weighing upto 500 kg into Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Second, the development of the Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) is currently under initial ground-testing stage using a demonstration vehicle.Development of the Gaganyaan Human Space Flight missionThe 2021-2022 annual report provides a greater level of detail into the Gaganyaan Programme in comparison to last year’s year’s report. Information regarding the design of the orbital module, crew module and the parameters of testing along with the results of the initial testing of the service module propulsion systems have been provided. Although an initial date for the launch is yet to be confirmed, it is likely that the first unmanned launch will occur some time in 2023.Other highlights include ISRO’s steps in building space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities. The report highlights the  use of the  radars and electro-optical telescope for tracking objects up to 10cam or higher in LEO, and tracking objects 40cm or higher in Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO). In March 2022, ISRO released its first report on Space Situational Assessment, which goes into greater detail regarding India’s debris mitigation activities. During the recent US-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, India and the US signed a Memorandum of Understanding on SSA cooperation. The US currently operates the world’s largest SSA network, called the United States Space Surveillance Network and provides open-access data of all indexed objects in space.Although ISRO’s annual report highlights several developments in the past year, it is also a reminder of some of the key shortcomings that India faces in the space sector. The most prominent of which is the lag in the number of launches. India conducted just one launch of the PSLV between 2021 and 2022. Further, ISRO also faced a major setback when the GSLV F10 failed to launch due to low pressure in the cryogenic upper stage of the rocket. At a time when the world has witnessed a record number of space launches, India’s lack of sustainable launch capability is a reminder that India must build capacity  — in both state-owned and private space industry.Antariksh Matters #3: Developing an Indian Augmentation for GPS— Aditya RamanathanLast week, ISRO and Airports Authority of India (AAI) made significant progress on the path to operationalizing the homegrown satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) called GAGAN.On 28 April, an IndiGO ATR 72 aircraft landed at Kishangarh airport near Ajmer, Rajasthan, using GAGAN-based Localiser Performance with Vertical Guidance or LPV. LPVs are similar in concept to the more conventional Instrument Landing System (ILS) used in larger airports, which enables aircraft to land in less-than-ideal conditions. The key difference is that while ILS requires the airport to have the requisite antennae and transmitters, LPV uses satellite signals from an SBAS. In effect, LPVs allow aircraft to land at smaller airports that lack ILS, even when there’s poor visibility or bad weather. The SBAS PromiseGAGAN is a relatively new entrant in the SBAS club. The American Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), which covers North America, was a pioneer. Other systems include the European Union’s EGNOS and Japan’s MSAS. China is developing an SBAS of its own based on its BeiDou constellation of navigation satellites. South Korea, Australia, Russia are among other states either operating or developing their own SBAS. The primary use of SBAS is for aviation, and any operational SBAS must be reliable and accurate enough for such “safety of life” uses. Besides aviation, SBASs can also be used by ships maneuvering in narrow canals or by public road and traffic management services. GAGAN is short for GPS Aided GEO Augmented Navigation. Like all other augmentation systems, it uses a combination of ground stations and satellite-based transmitters. On Earth, 15 reference stations receive GPS signals, which are then collated at two master control centres, which correct them for ionospheric distortion, orbit errors, and timing errors on the atomic clocks that navigation satellites use. Three geostationary satellites (GSAT-8, GSAT-10 and GSAT-15) then broadcast the corrected signal back to Earth. Adopting GAGANIndia’s aviation regulator, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has already made it compulsory for all aircraft registered in the country after July 2021 to have GAGAN receivers onboard. However, for adoption to really take off, SBAS around the world will have to ensure seamless interoperability. India is part of an Interoperability Working Group with representatives from GAGAN, WAAS, EGNOS, and MSAS. But the task of interoperability is only likely to get more complicated in the future, as SBASs begin to rely on multiple satellite navigation constellations and transmit in multiple frequencies. This newsletter will keenly track these developments.Our Reading Menu[Opinion] How should India respond to the US's unilateral ASAT test ban? by Pranav R. Satyanath who is also a contributor to this newsletter[Article] How military technology reaches Russia in breach of U.S. export controls by David Gauthier-Villars, Steve Stecklow and John Shiffman[Article] Data as a weapon: Psychological Operations in the age of irregular information threats by Jon Reisher, Charity Jacobs and John Beasley[Blog] On space barons and global poverty by Harun Onder This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Matsyanyaaya: Russia’s response to Crippling Tech Sanctions— Aditya PareekThe Russian government’s response to the devastating series of embargoes, sanctions and export controls barring high-tech components and semiconductor chips is interesting. One of the measures intended for immediate relief is the legalisation of parallel or gray imports. Parallel imports will lead to the Russian market being supplied with products without their Original Equipment Manufacturer(OEM) or Intellectual Property(IP) rights holder’s permission. Gray or parallel imports are generally seen as iterations of a product intended for another market being sold in another - which is either illegal in some jurisdictions or a gray area in others. This gray trade is generally undertaken by intermediaries, stockpilers or resellers who have no formal ties to the OEM or IP owner. The prevalence of gray imports can also lead to lower quality or counterfeit products being supplied, but there are few alternatives for Russia in the short term. In the medium term, Russia is also hoping that Chinese foundries and other production facilities will supply the needed semiconductor chips. However, it is unclear if Chinese companies which own these facilities will risk being slapped with secondary sanctions and losing access to much-needed US IP, to fulfil demand from the Russian market. As identified in our issue paper on the subject, Russia has a few major players like Mikron Group, Zelnograd Nanotech Center, GS Nanotech. However, these Russian companies only have the equipment to work on trailing edge 250-90nm chips and not cutting edge ones. In the long term, Russia plans to invest almost 3.19 Trillion Roubles in setting up more domestic manufacturing capacity. A key goal highlighted behind this new investment is to set up production facilities that can churn out 28nm chips by the year 2030. As identified in these Russian media reports, despite the government throwing money at the problem, it will be a tough nut to crack within 7-8 years as the 2030 timeframe implies. Historical precedent shows that even in more cordial times, it has not been easy for Russia to secure semiconductor manufacturing equipment from foreign sources. Cutting out foreign sources entirely and manufacturing complex photolithography equipment needed for this goal would take even more time, possibly 2-3 decades, by which time the plot will be lost. If you enjoy the contents of this newsletter, please consider signing up for Takshashila’s Graduate Certificate in Public Policy(GCPP) Programmes.Click here to know moreAntariksh Matters: Nuance is important in the era of dual-use of space— Aditya PareekWhile the India-US Space situational Awareness(SSA) agreement is a huge development, it is important to understand the nuance in the fact that which agencies from the two countries signed it.As I highlighted in this tweet thread:Transparency around SSA is an issue that ISRO hadn’t prioritised before, as Pradeep Mohandas & I opined in this The Wire Science article in December 2020. Glad to see that things are now changing with ISRO coming out with a “Space Situational Assessment 2021”.False Information around Russia & StarlinkA worrying claim was circulating on social media around 16th April, that Russia’s military was ordered to destroy Starlink satellites. The reason alleged in the fake statement was that Starlink helped target the Russian Navy’s capital ship “Moskva”. The fake statement was attributed to the deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia and the chairman of the Russian party in power, “United Russia”. The website which hosted this fake statement had almost identical content (apart from the fakes) to the genuine website of United Russia.The fake website appears to have since been taken down, but according to Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine it existed since at least 2004.Provocative fake content is nothing new in the information domain and has become a major part of modern hybrid wars but the potential for escalation around the conflict in space is a sensitive issue. With the earth’s orbit becoming densely populated with satellites and spacecrafts, any attempts by belligerent countries to take out another’s space objects will also endanger the space assets of countries not involved in any hostilities. Debris generated from a kinetic attack against any space object may indiscriminately damage and destroy anything in its path. This can lead to collaterally affected countries either seeking damages from the country responsible for the attack, or, in a more extreme case, retaliating against it.Matsyanyaaya: How China is Winning the Quantum Computing Race — Arjun GargeyasAn edited version of this article came out in CNN-News18 on April 14, 2022. Recent reports from China have mentioned how researchers and scientists from the country have managed to develop cooling systems using Helium gas as an alternative to the traditional cryogenic cooling systems used in the development of quantum computers. Quantum computing has clearly become an area of concern for the US with regard to China’s rise in the domain as well as potential military applications of the technology so it is not surprising that techno-nationalist tendencies have been showcased by the American government in this regard. For instance, the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) was extended to quantum technology products in 2018. This included critical quantum refrigerators and cryogenics along with software and AI for building quantum computers. This was done in order to make cross-border collaboration with Chinese nationals and academic institutions more difficult. China and its Rapid Rise While establishing itself as the leader in quantum communications technology, China soon started dedicating its resources to developing alternative quantum computing technologies. As the global leader in patents related to quantum communication and cryptography, China has advanced by leaps and bounds in the quantum computing domain over the last decade. Once behind the West in developing quantum computers, China now houses two of the world’s fastest quantum computers on its soil. The unveiling of ‘Zuchongzhi-2’, the country’s fastest quantum computer, in late 2021 has effectively made the country a powerhouse in quantum computing and on par with the US. The pace at which China has adopted quantum computing technology is truly exceptional, with the country claiming ‘quantum advantage’ in both the superconducting qubit and photonic tech (two different types of technologies used to develop quantum computers). Immense state support has been provided by the Chinese government to both academic institutions (University of Science and Technology China (USTC), Tsinghua and Peking Universities) and private companies (Origin Quantum, Qasky, and Huawei Cloud) for the development of quantum computers in the country. The recent advances made by China in the domain of quantum computing have resulted in increased global protectionism in the field.The Catalysts for the Rise Quantum computing works on the principle of ‘qubits’, also called quantum bits that have the ability to store values anywhere between 0 and 1 resulting in more computational capacity. To operationalise these qubits, there are several different technologies that have been developed. Each has its own advantages and dependencies, based on which the choice is made by the government or private sector to invest. In China, the role of the state and the government have played an important role in spearheading its scientific and technological progress. The synergy that exists between the state and the domestic private sector has been exemplary in various domains and quantum technology remains no exception. The government has provided funding to academic institutions in setting up labs for quantum computing research and financial support to domestic tech companies engaged in building real-world applications for quantum computers. In a way, the state acts like a bridge and a facilitator, helping translate academic research in the quantum computing space to build actual quantum computers and develop applications for these devices. Apart from the role of the government and the state, one of the main catalysts for the rise of China in certain critical and strategic technologies is the ability to bypass restrictions that might prevent its growth and development in the field. There have been numerous export controls and import restrictions in the quantum tech domain on cryogenic (very low temperatures) cooling systems. But Chinese researchers ended up developing breakthroughs in an alternative field of quantum computing technology such as photonic computing that does not need intense refrigeration. Recently, there were also reports about Chinese scientists developing cooling systems using Helium gas that would dilute the existing restrictions in place. Shanghai-based researchers were able to create a device that could create the extremely low temperatures that quantum computers typically operate in. This would mean that China, regardless of the technological sanctions and other restrictions on its industry, continues to rise in the quantum computing field leaving others trailing behind. The Chinese government’s role as a facilitator to academia and the private sector ensured continuous uninterrupted technological development. The ability to negate the restrictions placed by the US and its allies in the quantum computing field also entrenched its position in the domain. It has also led to key technological breakthroughs that would not have seemed possible in case the controls were not in place. Hence, this has created a win-win scenario for the Chinese quantum tech industry, generating both IP and reducing dependencies on the West. India should seek to learn from China’s catalysts for growth to succeed in its own quantum computing initiative. Our Reading Menu[Book] China and Great Power Responsibility for Climate Change by Sanna Kopra[Opinion] As Russia Reels Under Cascading Effects of Chip Starvation, China May Not Be a Dependable Partner by Aditya Pareek and Arjun Gargeyas who are also contributors to this newsletter[Research Article] Mutually assured surveillance at risk: Anti-satellite weapons and cold war arms control by Aaron Bateman[Article] The forgotten history of small nuclear reactors by M.V. Ramana This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Cyberpolitik: Invasion and Infektion— Prateek WaghreIn a recent edition of The Information Ecologist, I had referred to the activity around the IStandWithRussia and IStandWithPutin hashtags that seemed to include a number of accounts associated with India.The second India subplot is the presence of seemingly India-associated accounts in Twitter trends such as ‘IStandWithRussia’ and ‘IStandwithPutin’. See this thread by @NovelSci and these threads by (1,2) by @MarcOwenJones.Since then, we’ve had more investigations looking into this aspect. A DFR Lab investigation observed [Jean Le Roux - DFRLab]:The Top 12 most retweeted tweets belonged to accounts with low follower counts. Despite this, they seemed to gain very few followers. In some cases, accounts started sharing some of these tweets within minutes of their creation (an example in Jean Le Roux’s post references an account that shared 3 of the top 12 tweets within 2 minutes of being created) even though they didn’t follow any of these accounts. If you head over to the post and look at the collage of these tweets, many of the handles appear to have ‘Indian-sounding’ names.“A large portion of the sampled accounts appeared to originate in India”. How? (one should bear in mind that OSINT analysis often requires making a lot of educated guesses)Language cues, tweets about local sports and politics, early follows (likely region-based suggestions), and the time zone in which the accounts were most active all pointed towards India as the origin of many of the accounts in the network.And that a “large proportion” of the accounts were created this year, and Feb 24th and Mar 2nd were the dates on which the most accounts were created. Let’s revisit the ‘appeared to originate in India’ aspect.While Marc Owen Jones’ sample of 20000 tweets referenced India as a frequently appearing user-reported location (though, in that sample, it wasn’t right on top), he cautions that just because a location is reported does not mean it is accurate. Last week, the New York Times published an investigation based on data from Marc Owen Jones (I assume more data was collected since the article mentions a 2-week period) [Kate Conger, Suhasini Raj - NYTimes]. (emphasis added, I also wish there were fewer blues, it was hard to differentiate between the other countries)Users who said they were from India made up nearly 11 percent of the hashtag trend in the two weeks after the invasion. Just 0.3 percent were from Russia and 1.6 percent from the United States during that time.Around the time Technopolitik 21 went out, Carl Miller posted a network map which indicated that many replies/mentions were directed at accounts in India (if you zoom in, you’ll see accounts of some minsters, Indian embassies, opposition figures and media houses). Worth noting that this map appeared to be account-specific and not hashtag-specific. Aside 1: One of the network maps on Jean Le Roux’s post did mention Indian and Russian diplomatic accounts (image link).About 10 days later, Carl Miller posted a map that sub-categorised them based on language clusters, followed by a white paper on March 25th.Aside 2: If you’re wondering why I was sketching out a timeline, it is because there was a minor subplot developing. Both the tweets I’ve included here reference an information operation. However, researchers like Shelby Grossman (tweet) and Emerson Brooking (replies) pointed out that they provide no evidence of a coordinated information operation.The white paper, when it came out, didn’t call it a single information operation, either. However, it did make for an interesting analysis. It also highlighted that the information ecosystem is a couple of degrees more complex than we assume and that the way we answer questions like ‘who is winning the information war?’ are influenced heavily by who is asking and what part of it they’re looking at (like the parable about the visually challenged people and the elephant).While I can’t speak authoritatively about the research methodology and the clustering of accounts based on linguistic similarities, I’ve included an image with some of my notes from the white paper. Two dates pop up frequently, 24th February (the day the invasion began) and 2nd March (the date of the UN General Assembly vote and ultimately a resolution which “demand[ed] that Russia ‘immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.’” [UN.org])Here’s what the white paper said about the mixed Hindi/English cluster.We also observe that Russia-related message decreases sharply after the UN vote, but overall volumes of messaging does not. Our speculation is that many of the RED accounts are members of a ‘paid to engage’ spam network that can be rented to supply amplification to a number of different clients, and has over our time of study been used to amplify BJP politics, a commercial cinema release and also the invasion of Ukraine.This is not surprising. It still doesn’t answer the question of who paid, of course, which would require a tremendous amount of investigative work to establish a clear money trail.Do friends target friends with information operations?While we may never find who paid for the Indian-language clusters’ amplification of pro-invasion messaging, it is worth taking a queue from Mike Caulfied’s tweet thread and looking at history.Chapter 22 of Thomas Rid’s Active Measures references a Soviet Active Measure trying to create the narrative that AIDS was a bio-weapon created by the US (that should sound familiar for many reasons) that had an Indian connection. As per the source material he cites, it was, at some point, code-named Operation INFEKTION by the HVA (the foreign intelligence branch of East Germany’s Ministry for State Security).“AIDS may invade India: mystery disease caused by U.S. lab experiments.” So read the sensational first-page headline in Patriot, an Indian newspaper, on July 16, 1983. Patriot, under a picture of five smiling girls, printed an anonymous letter from a “well-known American scientist and anthropologist.” There was no name in the byline, only “New York.”The Patriot letter was a masterfully executed disinformation operation: comprising about 20 percent forgery and 80 percent fact, truth and lies woven together, it was an eloquent, well-researched piece that gently led the reader, through convincing detail, to his or her own conclusion.He points out that The Patriot had been funded by the Soviet Union, when it opened in 1962, “for the explicit purpose of circulating Soviet-friendly stories and publishing disinformation”. And while the article did not seem to have any direct impact (Rid notes that neither was it picked up in India, nor was it noticed in Europe and the US), it did play a role later:In KGB's efforts to further a narrative in coordination with partners code-named Denver (in 1985).The point of departure of the planned active measures campaign, as the KGB told its Soviet bloc partners, was the “factual” article published in Patriot. The KGB then instructed its partners to help spread the theory that AIDS was U.S.-made to “party, parliamentary, social-political, and journalistic circles in Western countries and the developing world.” The “facts” published in the Indian press offered the blueprintIn October 1985 - it was attributed as a source in another article that, as per Rid, would prove to be consequential in the future.On October 30, Literaturnaya Gazeta ran the headline “Panic in the West: or, What Is Hiding Behind the Sensation Surrounding AIDS.”23 The paper was the KGB’s “prime conduit in the Soviet press for propaganda and disinformation,” according to Oleg Kalugin. The piece that relaunched the DENVER campaign closely mirrored the earlier measure in the Indian press. Its author, Vitaly Zapevalov, accurately cited details about the new disease and its spread in American cities over the past two years, basing his analysis on authoritative U.S. news reports.“Why,” he asked ominously, would AIDS “appear in the USA and start spreading above all in towns along the East Coast?” Next, the Gazeta piece outlined several covert American biological warfare programs, again based on verifiable public sources. Zapevalov also cited accurate details about Fort Detrick. The author then referred to the two-year-old Patriot forgery to connect the dots. “All of this information, taken together with the AIDS mystery, leads to serious considerations. The solid newspaper Patriot, published in India, for instance, openly expressed an assumption that AIDS is the result of similar inhuman Washington experiments.”I’ve just quoted specific sections here, I recommend reading the complete chapter (and perhaps the whole book).So, do friends target friends with information operations? As my colleagues Nitin Pai and Pranay Kotasthane will tell you - there are no friends in international relations, only interests.Antariksh Matters: Russia, Ukraine & Space Entanglement— Aditya RamanathanRussia’s war with Ukraine is testing a key feature of any state’s military space strategy: entanglement. Entanglement or intertwining is the act of relying on domestic or foreign civilian space assets to conduct military operations. Days after the war broke out, Ukraine pleaded with commercial satellite operators to share their imagery, especially those from synthetic aperture radars (SAR). In a letter later made public, Ukraine’s minister for digital transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, wrote that his country “badly needed the opportunity to watch the movement of Russian troops, especially at night”. The minister’s letter made four specific requests:“Provide high-resolution satellite imagery in the real time to Armed Forces of Ukraine; Provide data from synthetic aperture radar, or SAR, satellites in the [sic] real time to Armed Forces of Ukraine; Cooperate with EOS Data Analytics and Max Polyakov as our representative for data processing and analytics; Stop other types of activities that may support military operations of Russian and Belarus government.” According to later reporting by The Washington Post, five private companies have already begun sharing such data.A more stark example of entanglement comes from SpaceX’s Starlink satellite internet constellation. Following a tweet from Fedorov, SpaceX’s Elon Musk made arrangements for Starlink to go live in Ukraine and began supplying the country with thousands of antennas. It has since emerged that Ukrainian forces are using Starlink to facilitate communications and coordinate attacks against Russian forces. As The Telegraph of London reported: “Drone teams in the field, sometimes in badly connected rural areas, are able to use Starlink to connect them to targeters and intelligence on their battlefield database. They can direct the drones to drop anti-tank munitions, sometimes flying up silently to Russian forces at night as they sleep in their vehicles.”For Russia, Starlink embodies the dilemmas of entanglement. If this civilian satellite-based communication system is being used for military purposes, does it become a legitimate target? After all, it’s reasonable to argue that, in this case, Ukrainian forces have failed to separate themselves from civilian infrastructure.  There are, of course, practical reasons for Russia not to target Starlink. It is obviously not going to use kinetic weapons such as ASAT missiles against a US-owned target. Even lower-order options like cyber capabilities may either not be feasible, may take weeks or months to develop, or contain escalatory potential that Russia seeks to avoid. For the moment at least, Russia is apparently limiting itself to jamming Starlink signals where possible. In the years to come, other states may face Russia’s entanglement dilemma, perhaps in starker form. If the Russia-Ukraine war sets a precedent of impunity - essentially leaving space alone as some sort of ‘sanctuary’ - it could encourage other spacefaring states to deepen their own entanglements and share those capabilities with other states at war. If you enjoy the contents of this newsletter, please consider signing up for Takshashila’s Graduate Certificate in Public Policy(GCPP) Programmes.Click here to know moreMatsyanyaaya: Can Crafty Fintech help De-Dollarise— Aditya PareekUnprecedented sanctions, restrictions and export controls are inflicting enormous costs on Russia’s economy in the wake of the ongoing conflict. As many large Russian banks have been cut off from SWIFT and conducting business in the US dollar, there is a lot of buzz around the prospects of a new de-Dollarising nexus emerging between Russia and China. In a recent research note, Anupam Manur and I explored the question if Central Bank Digital Currencies(CBDC)s can help them circumvent and cushion the blow of US sanctions.Russia and China have both sought to ban and discourage the use and mining of private cryptocurrencies, citing both financial stability and security concerns. The two have instead chosen to adopt blockchain technologies for their central bank-issued-and-regulated digital currencies. These Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC)s have no inherent advantage compared to electronically transferred denominated sums in paper fiat currency counterparts as far as international trade is concerned. As a tool to circumvent sanctions, CBDCs could be theoretically effective in avoiding the US banking system. However,the willingness of another party to accept the CBDC may not always be certain. The value of a currency,whether it be digital or paper,comes from it being widely accepted, which is an uncertain variable at this juncture.Furthermore, holding CBDCs issued by an isolated and sanctioned nation may not be a desirable prospect. The pariah status of the sanctioned states limits the holder of the CBDC to only conducting transactions with either the issuing states or a small number of other states who might also accept it.  Depending on the international political environment, the holders and accommodators of the pariah nation’s CBDCs could also be at the receiving end of secondary sanctions by the international community, further reducing their desirability. The exchange rate volatility and other associated risks will still apply to Russian and Chinese or any other CBDCs, thus, they make little sense in revolutionising the paradigm of international trade in their current form. The CBDCs could be used to settle a limited set of transactions, for instance,India’s defence deals with Russia, which are not a regular day on day or month on month feature.Furthermore, even if fintech solutions and alternatives exist to some problems, cooperation between Russia and China has always been lopsided, benefiting China above and beyond.A clear example of this lopsided cooperation is the adoption rate of China’s payments messaging service Cross Border Interbank Payments System (CIPS),to which over 23 Russian banks have subscribed. Meanwhile, only one Chinese bank has signed up for Russia’s equivalent System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS). China is also likely to insist on conducting the transactions and any financing predominantly in the Yuan, as a key strategic goal for China is to make Renminbi a reserve currency alongside the US Dollar.To know more about how a de-dollarising nexus between Russia and China may be a mirage, check out the full text of the research note here.Our Reading Menu[Report] Secure World Foundation’s Annual Global Counterspace Capabilities Report[Report] CSIS’s Space Threat Assessment 2022 report[Report] Arms control in outer space: Status, timeline, and analysis By Jessica West and Lauren Vyse[Opinion] Charting a course for India’s Arctic engagement by Aditya Pareek and Ruturaj Gowaikar who are also contributors to this newsletter This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Matsyanyaaya: The Effects of Tech Sanctions on the Russian Economy — Arjun GargeyasAn edited version of this article came out in Hindustan Times on March 16, 2022.   The current actions taken against Russia have mainly been in the form of targeting the Russian economy through sanctions and embargoes, specifically targeting sectors that Russia relies on export revenues. The US has also introduced high-tech sanctions, mainly depriving Russia of access to critical technologies  (like semiconductors, quantum, artificial intelligence, and big data) and their applications.  This is the first time that specific embargoes have been put in place against the import and export of high-tech components targeting a particular country, in this case, Russia. The sanctions by the United States effectively prevent Russia from importing a range of products, from chips to telecommunications equipment. But what is noteworthy is that the sanctions prevent Russian imports of both American products as well as products manufactured in other countries that use proprietary technology of any American firm or company to manufacture the products under the sanctioned list. This would mean that any firm, located in any country around the world, cannot export certain products even if they have been manufactured on that country’s soil utilising any sort of American technology during the process of design and manufacturing. The sanctions also have the caveat that the export of dual-use devices is also prohibited.   Another significant aspect of these technology sanctions has been the varied responses by major technology companies themselves. While some companies have to fall in line with the government’s sanctions due to the usage of American IP, some tech giants have taken unilateral decisions to cut off ties with Russia and stop all business from the country. While unilateral decision-making by tech companies is not new, this large-scale shunning of Russia by major tech companies around the world should sound alarm bells to the Russian federation. It is important to understand how these decisions might spell trouble for the overall growth and development of the state’s economy. Domestic Consumerism Takes a Hit  While the official technology sanctions mentioned that the supply of consumer goods to Russia and Belarus would not be disrupted, the actions taken by tech companies themselves can reduce the access to tech products for the average Russian consumer. Major electronic smartphone manufacturers like Apple and Samsung have paused product sales in the country. They have also cancelled all existing and future shipments of finished products (like mobile phones) to Russia. Other electronic goods manufacturers like Dell and HP, both leaders in laptops and personal computers production, have also halted operations and suspended the sale of all their products in Russia. This can hamper access to basic electronic goods like mobile phones and laptops for the domestic consumer. It is also not just the individual consumer who will be affected. Companies that supply electronic goods on a large-scale basis to businesses and governments have also joined in the embargoes. Telecommunications equipment dealers like Nokia, Ericsson, and Cisco have all decided to stop all business in the country with no equipment being sold in the near future. On the semiconductor front, major companies like Intel and AMD have decided to stop the supply of chips. Taiwanese giant TSMC has also joined the sanctions train and suspended all chip supply and manufacturing contracts to Russia. This would mean that Russian sectors like the automobile and consumer electronics industry will suffer from a high shortage of semiconductor chips.  Web-Based Services and Online Sectors  Apart from the hardware front, the technology services and software industry has also taken a massive hit with the existing sanctions. Microsoft has prevented access to Skype, GitHub, and cloud-based services Azure. Netflix has stopped all streaming services in the country. Another critical company, Cloudfare, has vowed not to provide any protection for all Russian web resources. Website hosting sites like GoDaddy are now shutting down Russian websites and preventing any new ones with the .ru extension from going live. This could affect domestic businesses, with many relying on web-based services and social media for their marketing campaigns.  It is clear that the United States government sanctions on technology have triggered a chain reaction with each major technology company looking to impose its own restrictions on Russia. Significant economic repercussions must be expected due to these actions taken by companies. Revenues through import duties for technology goods and services would be cut off. There would also be a significant dip in access to technology goods in the market, thereby decreasing domestic consumption. Domestic businesses would bear the brunt of the sanctions with no access to social media sites and other critical software.  If you enjoy the contents of this newsletter, please consider signing up for Takshashila’s Graduate Certificate in Public Policy(GCPP) Programmes. Click here to know moreCyberpolitik : Tech-Geopolitics at the WTO— Sapni G KIn this newsletter, we look at multiple interesting angles of the intersection of technology and geopolitics. Encountering trade as a major concern within these contours is not new, given that it is the most manifest expression of the intersection of geopolitics and trade. Around September 2021, there were reports about built-in censorship efforts on Chinese devices that were operated by Lithuanian officials. The matter had escalated to a point where the Lithuanian side decided to openly question the trade relationship between the two nations. The importance of Lithuania as one of the inroads into China’s European trade meant that this was not taken lightly.By the end of January 2022, the European Union (EU) made a request for consultation at the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to the request submitted to the Dispute Settlement Body, the EU urged that the consequences of sparks that flew between Lithuania and China affected the overall trade in goods and services between the EU and China. It alleged that the measures taken by China violated the terms of the Marrakesh Agreement and the additional agreements such as the Trade Facilitation Agreement and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.The larger complaint raised by the EU concerns the disruption of the supply chain because of China’s actions in its trade with Lithuania. Specifically, the EU accuses the Chinese measures asimport bans or import restrictions on the products at issue, from the EU;export bans or export restrictions on the products at issue from China to the EU; andrestrictions or prohibitions on the supply of services from the EU or by a service supplier from the EU in the territory of China or in respect of EU consumers of services provided by Chinese service suppliers.The measures against Lithuania, and in extension, against the EU, challenge the notions of global free trade envisioned by the WTO. It also contributes to the Chinese imposition of censorship through interference, which is an obvious concern to the EU. The specific location of Lithuania makes it an important part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and is important to both China and the EU. China’s tech prowess has been a comparative advantage for the trade-in this route, particularly in the case of eastern European nations. In the background of the continuous rise of Chinese influence in this sphere, this request for consultations is worth noting. Requests to join consultations have poured in from Australia, Japan, USA, Canada, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, and the UK. Clearly, the quad nations except India are showing an active interest in taking up this matter. India should demonstrate its awareness that the technology game is political, and is a means to many ends in today’s world.Dhruvapolitik: India’s Arctic Policy— Aditya PareekIndia published its Arctic Policy last week. India’s engagement in Polar exploration and research goes back quite a while and is primarily motivated by scientific pursuits. There are some highlights from the policy I pointed out in a Tweet thread recently:With the ongoing Ukraine conflict between Russia and Ukraine, there is a clear threat of food shortage because the two belligerents are major suppliers of grain to the world. Thankfully, India currently has enough grain and can even export. As the policy states, ensuring India can plan for safeguarding its development and food security goals requires studying weather patterns and the melting of ice and thawing of permafrost in the Arctic. By arguing that the Himalayas are the third pole, India elevates its place in the geostrategic discourse. The centrality of the Himalayas to the global discipline of Meteorology can’t be overstated. India’s certainly playing an important role in producing pharmaceuticals around the world and indeed as a major link in the global supply chains. However, the mention of traditional systems of medicine like Ayurveda, Sidha and Unani, is an imprint of the direction the Government of India takes to promote India’s cultural heritage. Another reason can be that the Arctic Council (cooperation with which is also a major priority in the policy) features discourse and sub-fora where similar traditions of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic are represented.It is no secret that India’s oceanography/hydrography capability is well regarded in the world, with India’s National Hydrographic Office being the nodal agency. Indian Navy also plays the central role in not only staffing the NHO but also carrying out the actual surveys with dedicated research vessels in its fleet.You can find out more about India’s hydrography capabilities in an article I wrote with Aditya Ramanathan in February 2021.Finally, India does not have an official merchant marine but contributes one of the highest numbers of seafarers and crew to merchant vessels, hydrocarbon carriers(Natural Gas and Crude oil) and container ships worldwide. India can supply crew and professionals who will be important to meet the high demand ushered in by the increased viability of alternate shipping routes like the Northern Sea Route(NSR). Our Reading Menu[Blog] Yes, the UK is trying to Brexit the Internet by Heather Burns[Policy Document] Tamil Nadu Data Policy 2022 by Government of Tamil Nadu[Issue Brief] India’s Arctic Policy: Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development by Anurag Bisen[Opinion] As China Threat Looms over Taiwan, This is How India Can Keep Global Chip Industry Afloat by Arjun Gargeyas, who is also a contributor to this newsletter. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters: Let’s Not Destroy Satellites in Peacetime — Aditya RamanathanIs it in India’s interests to support a ban on destructive anti-satellite tests? It’s a question Delhi may have to find an answer to in the near future. The trigger for this question is Russia’s ASAT missile test on 15 November 2021. The broader context is a series of moves that could eventually lead to substantial talks on space security. On 15 November, Russia apparently used an A-235 PL-19 “Nudol” Anti Ballistic Missile Interceptor to destroy a defunct Celina-D electronic intelligence satellite at an altitude of 480 kilometres. The collision unleashed 1,500 pieces of debris that could potentially threaten both satellites and inhabited craft such as the International Space Station and the Chinese space station Tiangong. A little over a month after the test, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 76/231 on 24 December, committing itself to convening an open-ended working group that will meet multiple times through 2022 and 2023 to discuss ways to reduce threats in space “through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours”. While the working group is likely to consider a range of space-related matters, destructive ASAT missile tests are likely to figure prominently. Partly this is because the resumption of destructive ASAT missile testing since 2007 has created growing concern about space debris. The other reason is that the idea of a ban on destructive tests appears to be gaining ground. A number of prominent authorities on space are calling for a ban. These include Takshashila’s own director, Nitin Pai, as well as scholars from the US-based Secure World Foundation (SWF), a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and academics. The Return of ASAT MissilesDuring the Cold War, the USSR and the US considered banning ASAT missiles entirely as a class of weapons. These efforts culminated in negotiations in 1978-79 that eventually failed as both states prioritized nuclear arms control and as their relations began to sour over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, from December 1985, the US and the USSR effectively upheld a voluntary moratorium on destructive tests. The moratorium was shattered on 11 January 2007 by the most destructive kinetic ASAT test in history. On that day,  China struck one of its own satellites with an SC-19 missile at an altitude of 865 kilometres. The test left behind at least 3,000 pieces of tracked debris along with perhaps 32,000 pieces of untracked flotsam.  In 2008, an American sea-based SM-3 ballistic missile interceptor struck a malfunctioning satellite at an altitude of 370 kilometres. In 2019, an Indian Prithvi Delivery Vehicle Mark-II was tested against a target satellite at an altitude of 282 kilometres. This was followed, most recently, by the Russian test.While states have also continued to carry out both non-destructive tests of ASAT weapons and tests of missile interceptors, it is the destructive ASAT tests that have sparked the greatest concern because of the dangerous debris they generate. The Case for a BanThe upside of a ban is easy to see. Orbital debris from such tests can pose a serious threat to satellites and space stations, especially those in low Earth orbit (LEO). By eliminating this source of debris, spacefaring states make the-already crowded orbits safer for themselves and others. The second (and more uncertain) advantage of a ban is that it could slow down other states pursuing direct ascent ASAT capabilities. However, this advantage is, at best, notional, since ballistic missile defence systems capable of high altitude interceptions, can be easily repurposed into direct ascent ASAT missiles. The potential downside of a ban is that it might affect the development of India’s own ASAT capabilities. This downside is also more notional than real: having already unambiguously demonstrated its ability to intercept and destroy a satellite in LEO, India has no real need to perform destructive tests. While DRDO may consider it necessary to conduct more tests to validate India’s direct-ascent ASAT capabilities, these do not require actual kinetic interception. Indeed, the challenge of intercepting a long-range ballistic missile is far more challenging than that of intercepting an LEO satellite on a known trajectory. What about intercepting satellites at higher altitudes? Here, the limitations of kinetic ASAT weapons become evident. For one, striking satellites in high Earth orbit (HEO) requires purpose-built missiles of much greater range. Furthermore, such missiles would take so long to reach their targets that it would make it much easier for the adversary to take evasive action. Finally, creating debris fields at such altitudes would cause much greater and indiscriminate destruction, endangering India’s own satellites. At higher altitudes, India, like many other states, would be better off employing electromagnetic radiation to disrupt or destroy satellites. In summary, a ban on destructive testing would not constrain India’s own ASAT capabilities and would make the orbits safer for everyone’s satellites. Such a ban is also a low-hanging fruit that could open the door for further negotiations with other states on specific space weapons and space operations more generally. India would do well to unambiguously support a ban on destructive tests.If you enjoy the contents of this newsletter, please consider signing up for Takshashila’s Graduate Certificate in Public Policy(GCPP) Programmes. Click here to know moreCyberpolitik: Deplatforming or Unplatforming a country— Prateek WaghreUkraine’s appealsUkraine’s Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov’s Twitter account has made appeals to various technology companies to act against Russia by stopping services, providing information, etc. I’ve compiled some of these in a work-in-progress mega note about internet and information ecosystem governance-related aspects of this situation [SochMuch]. Another set of significant appeals was made through letters to ICANN and RIPE NCC to [Pastebin, via Internet Governance Project]:Revoke, permanently or temporarily, the domains “.ru”, “.рф” and “.su”. This list is not exhaustive and may also include other domains issued in the Russian Federation.Contribute to the revoking for SSL certificates for the abovementioned domains.Shut down DNS root servers situated in the Russian Federation(to RIPE NCC) Withdraw the right to use all IPv4 and IPv6 addresses by all Russian members of RIPE NCC (LIRs - Local Internet Registries), and to block the DNS root servers that it is operating.The European Union, for its part, called for an EU-wide ban on Russian state media and announced that it was building tools the block their disinformation in Europe [Politico.EU]. However, there were questions around whether it was legally allowed to do so. We’ll get to some responses, but it is worth noting that these appeals cover large swathes of the internet stack from social media platforms, web services, IP intelligence services, CRM services to Internet Registries. And if you look at the dates, there is something of a pattern here. The appeals start at the user-facing end of the stack and then extend to the more infrastructural parts of it. Now, Ukraine is well within its right to make the appeals it thinks will protect its interests. How other countries, private corporations and people, in general, respond will set some precedents. Company ResponsesSince this is a developing space, I will not try to put down a comprehensive list, but the following resources should give you a sense (note that this is mainly for technology companies):A long thread by Anna Rogers.RestofWorld’s compilation (which does not look like it has been updated for a few days).Techmeme filtered for Russia and Ukraine (utility may drop as the news cycle shifts). Social media platforms started off with limiting ads/monetisation capabilities, more labelling/fact-checking - and, in response to the EU’s calls, restricted Russian state media in Europe. However, evelyn douek is right when she says there seems to be no normative framework. In this instance, social media platforms may have done what many wanted, and a number of interests aligned, as Rasmus Kleis Nielsen stated. But that doesn’t take away from the reality that these actions were arbitrary (note, I am not arguing at this stage, whether they were necessary or not).And as Mike Masnick points out - it won’t always be this way. Because precedent is wielded by whoever thinks they can take advantage of it. Or, if you assume that bad-faith actors will do certain things anyway (which is not an unreasonable assumption, to be fair), then also consider that they will use said precedent as a pretext or justification or weave it into their whataboutery. As Ben Thompson noted [Stratechery (potential paywall)]:Given this, Facebook being available in Russia seems like a net win, and, by the way, I would question exactly what effect banning Russian state media in the E.U. will actually have on this conflict; it seems clear that Russia is losing the battle of public opinion to a degree that no number of pro-Russia articles could undo. It doesn’t matter either way in the short term, but I do worry about the long-term: if Facebook is clearly following the government’s lead in the E.U., it is going to be difficult to see how the company stands up to other governments in the future, even if their requests are more problematic to the readers of this newsletter.Note that not all technology companies acted in response to direct appeals from Ukraine or demands/pressure from EU countries. Many acted of their own accord to stop operations, sales, software updates, close offices, etc., in Russia.Hammers and SplintersOne aspect common to Ukraine’s appeals and actions that were taken by various technology companies is that they move in the direction of effectively deplatforming Russia and Russia-based users. And while I can’t speak to the complete nature of support/opposition for the war against Ukraine among large sections of the Russian population and whether that should serve as justification for attempts to ‘cease the means of communication’ - one has to wonder about the long term ramifications of such actions.Mahsa Alimardani recounts that it can be counterproductive based on the Iranian experience. The unintended consequences of such actions are, in the short term, leaving domestic populations at the risk of greater control, exposure to lower quality information and propaganda, resulting in further isolation. And in the medium-long term, further splintering (perhaps even accelerating) of the internet as many sovereign states will want to avoid being in a similar situation. And this may not stay limited to the realm of the internet but extend to any ‘foreign’ firms. Some take solace in the fact that the internet, as we know it, today does not understand international boundaries. I would caution that it does not mean it never will. Here’s an extract from a conversation between Cloudflare’s CEO Mathew Prince and Ben Thompson [Stratechery (paywall)]Right. But given the nature of the internet, isn’t that the whole problem? Because, anyone in Germany can go to any website outside of Germany.MP: That’s the way it used to be, I’m not sure that’s going to be the way it’s going to be in the future. Because, there’s a lot of atoms under all these bits and there’s an ISP somewhere, or there’s a network provider somewhere that’s controlling how that flows and so I think that, that we have to follow the law in all the places that are around the world and then we have to hold governments responsible to the rule of law, which is transparency, consistency, accountability. And so, it’s not okay to just say something disappears from the internet, but it is okay to say due to German law it disappeared from the internet. And if you don’t like it, here’s who you complain to, or here’s who you kick out of office so you do whatever you do. And if we can hold that, we can let every country have their own rules inside of that, I think that’s what keeps us from slipping to the lowest common denominatorUnplatformingLet’s look at the Russian Government’s response in this limited context (over the last 5-6 days):It has throttled and reportedly blocked the likes of Facebook and Twitter as well as the websites of many western news outlets. There are also question marks over whether it will try to disconnect itself from the internet. As per Oleg Shakirov, that does not appear to be the plan as of now (stress on the as of now).It has updated its criminal code to add a possible 15-year prison term for spreading ‘fake news’ [Reuters].Lawmakers passed amendments to the criminal code making the spread of "fake" information an offence punishable with fines or jail terms. They also imposed fines for public calls for sanctions against Russia."If the fakes lead to serious consequences then imprisonment of up to 15 years threatens," the lower house of parliament, known as the Duma in Russian, said in a statement.In response to these changes, TikTok restricted live streams and new videos in Russia [BBC] and news outlets such as BBC, CNN, Bloomberg have suspended reporting from the country [Hindustan Times].There is a possibility that the Russian government may ‘unplatform’ itself and its citizens from the global internet before it gets deplatformed.An India-related subplot (but not the one you think, i.e. the U.N. votes)In a December 2021 edition of The Information Ecologist (54: Committee Reports), I was critical of certain aspects of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Communications and Information Technology reports on:Suspension of Telecom Services/Internet and its impact relating to the Ministry of Communications (Department of Telecommunications)Ethical Standards in Media Coverage relating to the Ministry of Information and BroadcastingThere were suggestions to explore “banning of selective services, such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, etc.” in Report 1, and “develop some legal provisions to counter as big a challenge as fake news” in Report 2. Russia’s own anti-disinformation law, when passed in 2019, included a provision for a 15-day prison term in case of repeated offences [The Moscow Times]. The Russian Government’s actions over the last few months and recent responses tell us that once you have a hammer… Basically, be careful which hammer you give to whom. This also holds for the EU’s as-yet-unspecified plans for ‘anti-disinformation’ tools.Cyberpolitik #2 : The conflicts question for DCNs— Sapni G KThis is adapted from Sapni’s OpEd in the Hindu. Read the full piece here. Through the previous editions of this newsletter, we have discussed DCNs at length. Per our definition, social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, etc., are examples of DCNs. As we study this space, the evolving conflict in the Russian aggression towards Ukraine raises more significant questions around DCNs. This time, predominantly civilian technology has become a realm of geopolitical show of power, as against the earlier instances where military power and natural resources were the most intertwined with conflict. In the absence of norms around how social media platforms should function as a technology and how these corporations should act, we continue to be a gray area. The challenges specific to the case now are not new. Armed conflicts within and between states have played out in cyberspace for years. It is no surprise then to see the same dynamics play out on social media platforms. The world outside Europe and North America has seen more than its share of conflicts, materialising and exacerbating the troubles of kinetic conflict through cyberspace. Social media platforms have gone by the mantra of “tech neutrality” to avoid taking decisions that may be considered political for too long. The years that have passed have seen an active ignoring of the concerns around social media platforms during a conflict. The lack of clear systems within social media companies that claim to connect the world is appalling. It is time that they should have learned from multiple instances, as recent as the Israeli use of force in Palestine.There was no unpredictability over conflicts in the information age spilling over to social media platforms. It did not even require pre-emption, since these have been recurrent events in the past decade. The international community and the liberal world order had to be proactive but failed to do so. We have missed the chance to have established a clear protocol on balancing the business interests of social media platforms and their intersection with global public life in critical situations. Though late, it would be valuable to have insights and clear frameworks to guide the behaviour of states and these corporations in cases of conflict, which will inevitably spill over to social media platforms in today’s information age. This space appears to be one where India could pursue a diplomatic course. Once these tensions abate, India could initiate conversations on setting norms on responses by social media platforms while conflicts are underway. It would be an opportunity to regain some of India's lost currency in the global order by attempting to establish a rule-based system in a fairly gray area. It is in our national interest and that of a rule-based global polity that social media platforms be dealt with more attention across spheres than with a range of reactionary measures addressing immediate concerns alone. Our Reading Menu[Opinion] The role of space in the Russia-Ukraine War by Aditya Pareek who is also a contributor to this Newsletter[Opinion] Ukraine war is bound to affect India's space programme by Aditya Ramanathan who is also a contributor to this Newsletter[Opinion] Ukraine War Won’t Affect Global Semiconductor Supply, But Will Hit Russia Hard by Arjun Gargeyas and Aditya Pareek who are contributors to this Newsletter[Opinion] In conflict, a ‘settings change’ for social media by Sapni G K who is also a contributor to this Newsletter This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Cyberpolitik #1: Wanted - Greater scrutiny of content takedown orders— Prateek WaghreLast week, reports suggested that the Union Government of India had issued an order to ban 54 apps. This would constitute the fifth such instance since June 2020 (when TikTok and 58 other apps were blocked), three of which have been accompanied by press releases.June 2020: 59 apps (accompanied by a press release)July 2020: 47 (not accompanied by a press release)September 2020: 118 apps aka PUBG ban (accompanied by a press release)November 2020: 43 apps (accompanied by a press release)At the time of writing, this latest instance has not been accompanied by a press release. In response to queries from the press, Google has indicated that it received orders to remove apps from the Play Store. In a video discussion, Sarvesh Mathi of Medianama noted the potential existence of a pattern - in that the July 2020 instance (which did not come with a press release) mainly covered cloned/renamed apps. That appears to be the case here too. A senior official from the ministry was quoted as saying:“Many of the apps from the stable of Tencent and Alibaba, have changed hands to hide ownership. They are also being hosted out of countries like Hong Kong or Singapore, but the data was ultimately going to servers in Chinese destinations,” said a senior official while pointing out that “even apps such as ByteDance-owned TikTok and Tencent’s WeChat were available for download through alternative means such as APK files, and the government has taken cognizance of it.” These orders have been passed under Section 69A of India's IT Act.There have been other recent instances where content takedown orders were accompanied by press releases too.In December 2021: 20 YouTube channels and 2 websites operated by groups from Pakistan as per a press release.In January 2022: 35 YouTube channels and 2 websites operated by groups from Pakistan as per a press release.These orders have been issued under the emergency rules included in the IT Rules and Digital Media Ethics 2021 (Rule 16).Transparent when convenientThe Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009, which specify the procedure to be used when restricting access to information, include a clause for confidentiality. There have been instances in the past when the fact that blocking orders were issued were only discovered because one of the companies that received them voluntarily disclosed them via the Lumen Database. In my opinion, when such orders are accompanied by press releases or information is provided by unnamed sources to the press, one should assume it happens because it is convenient to do so. This is perhaps why Google’s suggested “win-win for both sides” in a meeting between officials from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and representatives from Google, Facebook, and Twitter, as reported by Reuters, was not viewed as one.Executives from Google told the I&B officials that one way to resolve that was for the ministry to avoid making takedown decisions public. The firms could work with the government and act on the alleged fake content, which could be a win-win for both sides, Google said, according to one of the sources.The idea was summarily rejected by the government officials, who said the takedowns also publicise how the companies weren't doing enough to tackle fake news on their own, the person said.The proverbial house, as they say, always wins.A higher burden of proof and greater scrutinyAs Raman Chima points out, such orders are escaping scrutiny. And while it is not the intention of this author to bat for TikTok in any way whatsoever - the charges against it do not seem to have been substantiated. And while much of the cheerleading surrounding the move played up the economic impact it would have, TikTok has since surpassed 1 billion active users - while creators from India appear to have been denied a global audience.The two emergency takedown orders issued in December 2021 and January 2022 also present an interesting case study. While both press releases indicate aggregate view counts and membership numbers across the YouTube channels listed - they do not explain what portion of those views were from India - as YouTube view counts do not break down viewership numbers by country. In attempting to highlight the impact of these 'digital strikes', the 2 press releases also include a 'combined subscriber base'. However, these numbers appear to be just a total of the subscriber numbers across the listed channels, without accounting for the (highly likely) possibility that one account is subscribed to more than one channel - meaning that the number overstates the real 'combined subscriber base' and the impact. These are the kind of elementary questions that would be asked if such orders were being subjected to basic levels of scrutiny. Matsyanyaaya: Understanding China’s High-Tech Espionage Efforts— Arjun GargeyasAn interesting aspect of the November 2021 Department of Defense (DOD) report on China’s military was the focus on Beijing’s industrial espionage efforts on certain advanced technologies which the government thinks holds the key to enhancing the quality of their military systems. There are four main areas that the PLA is targeting and it is imperative to understand how these technologies can help develop advanced military systems. First, the report mentions specialised integrated circuits (ICs) specifically meant for military use as one of China’s targets. This includes radiation-hardened ICs and monolithic microwave ICs, which are tailor-made for withstanding military-grade conditions. These specialised electronic components consume very little power and need enhanced fabrication processing to immunise the system against any kind of latch-up when exposed to extreme radiation or temperature. Their applications can range from nuclear warheads to any weapons or platforms that might be subject to radiation effects from nuclear attacks. Due to the complex method of manufacturing these components, the technology remains concentrated with certain players only which makes it a lucrative target for China.Second, the focus on memory chipsets in the report has raised eyebrows on China’s potential military plans. The growth of non-volatile (NV) memory, which are memory chips that can retain the data stored in it even after the removal of power supply, has created interest in the possibility of using such components in military vehicles. The two key factors of retention ability and endurance remain on the higher side for these kinds of chipsets. Military electronics manufacturers now advocate the use of NV memory chips (like NVSRAMs) in military equipment due to their faster read and write speeds, long-term data storage, and high reliability. An application where these chips are in massive demand is in the development of autonomous weapon systems. High-grade memory chips being a potential target of Chinese espionage efforts opens up a possibility of new weapon systems being developed by their forces for modernising the existing military systems.Third, the use of sensors to develop tools like accelerometers and gyroscopes is on China’s radar. These components are used for adequate measurements and sensing especially in building tactical weapon systems. Gyroscopes, especially, have been crucial in the transition of low to high-grade precision and navigation systems. They have been used in long-range missiles for precision guidance as well as in improving the accuracy of the armed forces’ navigation systems. China’s interest in these devices validates that tracking, detection, and accurate sensing remains absolutely critical during warfare. New technologies have also improved the quality of devices like accelerometers that are now used by uncrewed military vehicles. The sensors in the accelerometers help in providing precise data on additional parameters like wind speed, temperature, and physical strain movement for improving the lifespan of the vehicle. It would be a major development if China manages to acquire such technology that would significantly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their forces.Finally, there are mentions of advanced communication systems specialising in electronic warfare being one of China’s foremost high-tech espionage targets. A specific area of these systems that the Chinese are looking to develop technical expertise is in military communication jamming equipment. When deployed, these jamming systems help defence forces in gaining a crucial advantage in the electronic warfare domain by preventing any wireless communications from taking place on the battlefield. It is no surprise that China is looking to focus on jamming systems as a way to disrupt any sort of communication between the opponent’s control towers and the ground. The possession of modern electronic warfare systems has become one of China’s priorities in its pursuit of military technologisation which can be severely detrimental to its foes.China’s recent border skirmishes with India have brought technology and its importance in building robust and secure military systems into the limelight. The DOD report has clearly outlined what the Chinese might be going after when looking to build a stronger and better force. It is essential that counter intelligence and intellectual property protection remain India’s and other technologically advanced states’ priority to ensure that these critical technologies stay out of the hands of the Chinese military.Cyberpolitik #2: An Indian perspective on Online Harms on DCNs— Sapni G KThe land of technology regulation is one that never stops giving. Every edition of this newsletter has enough thought on policy and regulatory measures to leave observers amused. Newer ideas (sometimes beneficial, often not) have had a sustained presence here. In the land of cyberpolitik, the hue and cry for "regulation of the internet" has been a political moot point for over a year now, thanks to Jan 6, 2021 incident in the US Capitol. Yet, the claims of the internet and its most prominent avatar - social media - being the "wild west" is insincere. It is a sentiment that has caught the attention and sympathies of regulators and the public alike, across the globe. Readers would recollect our inquiries into this space, as has been detailed earlier here and here. Our inquiries into the governance of Digital Communication Networks (DCNs) previously looked at harms and benefits. We defined DCNs as composite entities which had the components of capability, operator, and networks. This time around, I looked at the current legal framework on online harms on DCNs in India. I define online harms as a set of actions that can occur on DCNs that can cause legal injuries to users, whether individuals or groups of individuals. This is distinct from the approaches taken by Australia and the UK, where proposals attempt to regulate the entirety of the internet from the perspective of addressing harms. The framing of the debate on online harms on DCNs often ignores available remedies that can adequately address many legal injuries that occur on DCNs, paving the way for censorship. In an attempt to exhaustively study these remedies, I categorised identifiable online harms as clearly defined by the law and harms having a less clear definition. Claims that certain legal injuries are not actionable simply because there are no laws governing them appear insincere. The document identifies that many incidents could still be remedied by the law currently in place. An innovative interpretation of the law can be useful in cases where ambiguity persists to help victims get speedy justice for legal injuries that occur on DCNs. The big picture shows that these long-established provisions have their fair share of drawbacks that need to be remedied. However, these have been moulded for the better through judicial interpretation and practical implementation over the years. The conversation about changing the regulatory landscape around DCNs is progressing in India. At this juncture, it is critical to take note of the system that is currently in place. As a frontier for the exercise of the freedom of speech and expression, any change in the framework regulating this space should be wary of the risks of overregulation and censorship.  Read the full issue paper as a PDF here. This is a work in progress, as part of our investigations into the ecosystem of DCNs. If you have thoughts/comments on the same, do reach out via Twitter DMs (@SapniGK) or email me ( AT takshashila.org.in).Our Reading Menu[Blog] How Cambodia’s Internet gateway will harm the Internet by Adrian Wan and Charles Mok, Internet Society[Opinion] Regulators are Playing a Dangerous Game on the Internet by Carey Lening[Article] A recent spy case shows how China has been able to pull off its whirlwind military modernization by Stavros Atlamazoglou[Blog] DoD's 2021 China Military Power Report: How Advances in AI and Emerging Technologies Will Shape China’s Military by Adam Segal This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

MineralPolitik: REEs, If the Price is Right— Aditya PareekThe global contention for securing Rare Earth Elements(REE) supply chains is in full swing. Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, three countries have primarily been the movers and shakers of the REE world, the current market hegemon China, Australia, and the US. This is directly consequential to India’s national interests, as China is its strategic adversary, and the US and Australia are its Quad allies willing to cooperate with New Delhi to counter China. However, apart from a Competition Commission of India(CCI) probe into India’s state-owned India Rare Earths Limited(IREL) for abuse of “its dominant position”,  “by indulging in prohibitive increase in the sillimanite prices”, there has been little movement or development in India’s own REEs sector. ChinaChina has moved to centralise and consolidate a major chunk of its heavy REE industry under one state-controlled and supervised company, China Rare Earth Group. As this briefing by renowned business consultancy, Dezan Shira & Associates says, The new conglomerate will make up 62 per cent of China’s national heavy rare earth production.The move is meant to ensure China’s effective control on the pricing of key heavy REEs “such as dysprosium and terbium”, this will have consequences for the worldwide pricing of these heavy REEs and their supply chains.The prohibition of  “foreign investments in exploration, mining, and beneficiation of rare earth, radioactive minerals, and tungsten”, under broader state-issued negative lists. Contrary to the Hainan Free Trade Port negative list, which says no restrictions on foreign investment will be applicable in the REE sector.Another consolidated conglomerate with light REE producers and processing companies in China may be constituted soon for similar reasons of controlling the price of REEs.Consistent with the picture painted by Dezan Shira & Associates, this report in Bloomberg talks of a meeting between China’s automakers, electronics producers and the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. The meeting was reportedly aimed at discussing measures to bring down the surging prices of REEs, which is leading to higher production costs and affecting several key high tech industries.It is also interesting to note that the Laotian Ministry of Plans and Development has been warm to China’s Tong Lee Seung Industrial Development Company exploring REEs on Laotian territory. To make matters a little complicated, this Radio Free Asia report talks about the possible uprooting of villagers from the Laotian land in question.  AustraliaAmong the Quad countries, Australia has emerged as the most proactive threat to China’s REEs sector dominance. The much talked about Lynas Rare Earths Ltd has seen record profits and revenue, which, according to this Reuters report is due to strong demand for Electric Vehicles(EV). Lynas was the recipient of much Australian government aid and investment recently, and the growth in its revenue and business is a positive development. According to this FT report, Australia is looking to repeat this success with another company called Hastings Technology Metals which has set up a mine called Yangibana REEs mine in Western Australia’s Gascoyne region. The Australian government will provide “A$140mn (US$100mn)” of the total A$400mn( approx. US$ 286mn) borrowed capital needed for the project. As the FT article says, If all falls in place, It is likely that Hastings can become the second-largest exporter of Australian REEs. Hastings can potentially supply as much as “8 per cent of global demand for neodymium and praseodymium”, which are critical REEs used in manufacturing high-efficiency magnets for industrial and defence applications, among others.The REEs supplied by Hastings will primarily go to the European auto industry, including vendors like Thyssenkrupp(which also makes naval submarines and warships under its HDW subsidiary). Australia can capture as much as 30% of the total REEs market globally in the future. This is in contrast to China’s existing control of 70-90%(according to varying estimates) of the worldwide REEs market.USA new bill has been introduced in the US Senate, sponsored by Republican Sen. Tom Cotton and Democrat Sen. Mark Kelly, aimed at breaking China’s vice on the global REEs supply chain. Called the “Restoring Essential Energy and Security Holdings Onshore for Rare Earths (REEShore) Act”, it seeks to stop the use of Chinese REEs in US Department of Defence supplies. Under the bill, US Defence contractors will be required to source their REEs from elsewhere within a 4-year time frame(by 2026), with waivers applicable only in special cases. The waivers will only be allowed if REEs of the required “quantity and quality are not available at reasonable prices from sources outside of” China, and if “such a waiver is in the interests of national security”.The manufacturers of weapons supplied to the US Department of Defence will be required to declare where the REEs used in their products were sourced from.The US would need to establish a strategic REEs and REE products reserve that can support them even in case of a supply chain disruption for over a year.The US will investigate China’s policies and practices in the REEs sector and if any sanctions by the US for any transgressions are required.The US would encourage the production and use of REEs sourced domestically and from its allies instead of adversaries like China.CyberPolitik: Moving ahead on deep synthesis tech regulation— Sapni G K2022 started with interesting developments on the technology regulation front. As discussed in the previous edition of this Newsletter, China’s regulatory experiments on emerging technology are underway in full swing. This week we have more information and analysis on further tech regulation experiments from China. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) released the draft Provisions on the Administration of Deep Synthesis Internet Information Services last week. These draft regulations cover a broad range of technologies that use deep synthesis, which is defined as the use of technologies using generative sequencing algorithms to make text, images, audio, video, virtual scenes, or other information, as represented by deep learning and virtual reality. Media coverage of the same appears to place more emphasis on deepfakes, which is only one amongst the many use cases of deep synthesis technologies. The provisions envision regulation as a mix of increased self-regulation alongside state supervision. Unlike other laws and drafts published recently, this draft misses a lot of granularity in the approach towards institutional capacity on regulation. It provides for contentious and controversial provisions such as real-name identity verification for users of deep synthesis services. Interestingly, this might be one of the first pieces of regulation that may have been drafted with the metaverse in mind, as the draft points to Virtual Reality as a field of application. The lack of free rein to experiment in a space where American companies have a demonstrated advantage could result in displeasure from Chinese Tech giants. This could also have interesting consequences in the application of deep synthesis technologies in military tech, as my colleague Megha wrote here. The presumed leaders of developing global norms on regulation have been slow in catching up against such technologies. Law and regulation have historically trailed miles behind technology. It is fascinating to see changes in this dynamic. However, caution must be exercised in replicating such exercises. Multitudes of emerging technology essentially expand the horizon of expression. Deepfakes have been famously used as media of criticism, parody, and sarcasm. It is not to discredit the harms that have been perpetrated through the use of deep synthesis technology – notoriously the cases of revenge porn and financial crimes. Clearly, the line between regulation and censorship is thin. This draft also reflects the continued trend of China's heightened attempts to regulate cyberspace under the guise of preventing the propagation of false information in the interest of national security and social stability. It can only be hoped that the Chinese population and their freedoms are not sacrificed for these regulatory experiments.Matsyanyaaya: A Four-Point Action Plan for Quantum Technologies (An edited version of this article came out in the Hindustan Times on January 15th, 2022)— Arjun GargeyasIn the 2020 Budget speech, finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced the National Mission for Quantum Technologies and Applications (NM-QTA) with a total outlay of ₹8000 crores over five years for strengthening the quantum industry in the country. A Lok Sabha question posed in July 2021 enquired about the status and progress of the mission. In response, the Minister of State for Science and Technology, Jitendra Singh, mentioned that the mission had not yet received approval. Singh also announced that no funds were allocated, disbursed, or utilised under NM-QTA during the financial year 2020-21.With no credible advancements made by the government, there is a need to rethink how the proposed NM-QTA will evolve if India plans to harness the benefits of quantum technology. The focus should be to develop an overarching strategy for the next 10-15 years.  Adequate attention to those who can contribute to developing quantum technology must be the government’s top priority. In the current scenario, our view is that the government must follow a four-fold path to build a robust quantum ecosystem in the country.First, the primary focus must be on establishing centres of excellence dedicated to quantum science and technology within academic institutions as well as government research institutes. Quantum technology remains a field highly concentrated in long-term research and development (R&D). Even the famed quantum industry of China started in a university laboratory, led by Pan Jianwei at the University of Science and Technology of China in 2008. In 2022, China boasts of developing the world’s first quantum satellite, creating a quantum communication line between Beijing and Shanghai, and owning two of the world’s fastest quantum computers. This was the result of a decade of research carried out in the hope of achieving critical breakthroughs. Hence, a majority of the Indian government’s outlay has to be pumped into institutions specialising in quantum R&D.Second, the establishment of “quantum innovation hubs” in partnership with selected state governments can help direct investments efficiently and build a well-connected quantum research network in the country.  These hubs, set up with the help of government resources, can serve as centres of collaboration between academia and the private sector. Finally, it is the responsibility of both the union and state governments to establish a conducive fiscal and legal environment to foster innovation. This can potentially attract international firms to conduct their research in the country while involving local talent.Third, the power of startups and large corporations, like Google, Microsoft and IBM, involved in developing quantum technology and applications must be harnessed. The government must recognise the leaps made by these companies. While academic institutions are largely involved on the research side, quantum tech corporations and startups are vital in converting and commercialising this research into products that can be of use. The government must facilitate connections between academic institutions and industry to translate research into real-world applications.Finally, the necessity of international cooperation cannot be ignored. The quantum value chain remains highly complicated, and it will be hard for India to remain self-reliant to build a successful quantum ecosystem. The first step could be for the government to engage with its allies in key groupings such as Quad and BRICS. Technology alliances are gaining traction, and India must look at signing some bilateral or multilateral agreements to leverage others’ growth in the domain. This is imperative for India to win critical technology transfer deals, get external technical advice or mentoring, and establish state-of-the-art facilities for joint R&D on quantum technologies.The government has taken the first step by acknowledging the importance of quantum technologies through its plan of kick-starting a national mission in the country. The global quantum industry has already taken incredible strides and seen massive investments made by both governments and the private sector in recent years. India, which has fallen behind other technologically advanced states in the field of quantum technology, cannot afford to miss the bus this time.Read the full discussion document on ‘Building India’s Quantum Ecosystem’ published by The Takshashila Institution.Matsyanyaaya: Pardesi, Pardesi, Aana Nahin! — Pranay Kotasthane (@pranaykotas)Over the last few weeks, a few reports suggest that Technopolitik has intensified in another critical dimension: cross-border movement of high-tech human capital.Nikkei reported that South Korea intends to keep a close tab on the movement of chip engineers across its borders. The purported objective is to discourage Chinese companies from poaching engineers and prevent tech leaks.In January, SCMP reported that Australia and Japan now require foreign students enrolled in "sensitive" science and technology subjects to hand over detailed background data. Of course, the primary motivation, in this case, is again China.These actions follow related developments in the US. In the first week of the year, a Chinese national pleaded guilty to stealing trade secrets from Monsanto and transferring it to the Chinese government. There was also a rather embarrassing case against an MIT professor of Chinese descent, alleging that he had failed to disclose his affiliation with Chinese institutions. The US government subsequently dropped the case.All these incidents point towards a significant shift in technology geopolitics. As some technology areas get labelled as "critical" or "strategic", movements of professionals and international tie-ups involving China will be scrutinised closely. In other words, human capital movement restrictions will be the next frontier in pursuit of high-tech self-sufficiency.The movement of human capital is an underrated aspect of technology geopolitics. It is a force multiplier in high-tech research and is perceived as such by nation-states. This is especially true in today's high-tech areas where international collaborations are easy, efficient, and effective. For instance, MacroPolo, a think tank, notes that over half of all top-tier AI researchers are immigrants or foreign nationals working in another country.The host and source countries both benefit due to a dense comingling of researchers. While the benefits for the host country are obvious, the source country benefits over a longer-term — through connections to a better research ecosystem, by way of returning immigrants, or in rare cases, through blatant economic espionage.China's attempt at tech self-sufficiency through talent transfer has three independent aspects. First, the party-state has tried to use industrial espionage for strategic advantage. Second, attracting human capital is seen as a legitimate path to indigenisation. Talent poaching may sound evil but is a fair strategy to build a local ecosystem by attracting talent from outside, in the hope that their prior knowledge will accelerate homegrown efforts. Third, there has been an organic movement of Chinese researchers back home with better living conditions and opportunities — outcomes of robust economic growth for nearly three decades.It is tough to estimate which of the three aspects have contributed more to China's rapid strides in gaining high-tech expertise. Regardless, as a whole range of technologies gets labelled as “strategic”, the first of the three aspects will gain narrative dominance, leading to stricter controls on tech transfer and people movement.Such moves will have significant costs to both China and the host countries. But once technologies start getting defined in national security terms, cost-benefit calculations fall aside. While other countries might suffer costs, they are likely to go ahead and put barriers to the movement of people into China. To be sure, China has invited these moves onto itself because of its geopolitical conduct.The mileage of restricting human capital movement may vary widely. For instance, nearly 10 per cent of Australia's university students are Chinese. For the government to align interests and develop the capacity to effectively screen them all is going to be a gargantuan task. Similarly, the flow of technology ideas and professionals from China into the US is too large to restrict.Ultimately, the second-order effects at the level of international collaborations might be more significant. Scientists from these countries are likely to reduce collaborations with their Chinese counterparts, fearing government restrictions on funding and higher scrutiny on outputs.This augurs well for India and Indians though. The China sized gap in students and researchers can only be filled by one other country. We will keep a close eye on this dimension of Technopolitik.Our Reading Menu[Opinion] US hawks and Chinese communists agree: no rare earths for Pentagon by Alex Lo[Column] The Future Of EVs Depend On Rare Earths. Should The US Still Delegate To China? by Ken Silverstein[Opinion] Rare Earths: Fighting for the Fuel of the Future by y Brendan P. Dziama, Juan Manuel Chomón Pérez, and Andreas Ganser[Article] How Quantum Tech Could Upend Global Power Structures by Taylor Owen[Report] Is seeing still believing? The deepfake challenge to truth in politics by William A. Galston This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

CyberPolitik: China’s Norm-game— Sapni G KIn the 8th edition of this newsletter, I had written about the draft "Internet Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation Management Provisions" released for comments by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC). After a few months of deliberations, including their process of public consultation, the draft was finalised this month. The newly released “Internet Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation Management Provisions” lays down rules around the use of algorithmic recommendation technology in internet-based services. This includes a wide range of internet services ranging from social media platforms, gig work platforms, and e-commerce. It could also have potential ramifications on the much-hyped Metaverse and the generative algorithms used in these virtual spaces.A majority of the principles in the draft version are replicated in the provisions. It is interesting to note that the final version of the provisions has been issued jointly by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the competition watchdog State Administration for Market Regulation, and the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), where the latter is responsible for overall coordination. The new additions include a provision that bars providers from unreasonable use of algorithms to engage in monopolistic behaviour or restrict other providers, implying a heightened interest in antitrust action through the provisions.The changes also pertain to giving more attention to “algorithmic fake news”. A new Article 13 mandates licensing for algorithmic recommendation service providers operating in online news and prohibits algorithmic generation of fake news. The elderly have been identified as a new protected category by the provisions. Accordingly, covered providers are required to take special care while providing their services to the elderly. The earlier draft had a clear mandate against the use of discriminatory tags to classify users. However, the provisions have omitted the anti-discriminatory user tag clause. This peculiar change is worthy of attention, given the cons of the vagueness in language as against practices of recommendation algorithm providers to use discriminatory tags.The provisions are set to be effective from 1 March 2022. Its impact will be visible across services, including independent providers of recommendation algorithm services, who do not have a user-facing business model. Algorithm regulation is a policy issue that cannot be avoided for long. China’s efforts in this sphere can act as an international norm because of its first-mover advantage. The state overtures in these provisions should not guide the baseline for algorithmic regulation. This will be consequential to all players – states, businesses, civil society organisations, and users. Nuanced and informed thought must be employed as regulatory policy is formulated in this sphere, but it must pick up pace.  Matsyanyaaya #1: Why did China just release a National Standardisation Development outline?— Arjun Gargeyas(This section is adapted from the Takshashila Issue Paper on China’s Technical Standardisation Framework)China’s ‘Standards 2035’ project gained headlines in April 2020 at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. October 2021 saw the release of the National Standardisation Development (NSD) outline document as the first official document detailing China’s ambitions in the coming decade on technical standardisation processes. The NSD visualizes a standardised system that promotes high-tech innovation and “opening up” of the technology sector, while also leading to high-quality development. The core points covered in the document provide a glimpse into the Chinese state’s strategic approach towards technical standards.But the question is why is the Chinese government pulling out all the stops in the current political climate on its standardisation programme? An analysis of the outline document provides an insight into the State Council’s aspirations in the standard-setting domain and the current objectives of the national technical standardisation strategy. Some key takeaways from the document help us understand the timing and the necessity of the project for the Chinese state.Standards and Tech InnovationWith the development of critical and emerging technologies, there is a definitive need for the upskilling of technology ecosystems across the world. China feels the need to remain relevant and updated on the usage and creation of applications related to critical technologies. Significant investments in advancing emerging technologies remain one of China’s priorities. The Chinese government now is banking on technical standards to achieve technical competence and excellence in critical technologies which remain integral to the global economy in the coming decades. Gaining technical expertise would in turn help in influencing the standard-setting process allowing China to dictate the terms of technological innovation in certain critical technologies. China feels that it is the ripe time for them, as a technically adept state, to mutually support technological growth as well the ability of Chinese companies to set standards in the domain. Improving Industrial Standards’ Level Though a manufacturing powerhouse, China’s exports as a share of GDP have halved over the past decade. This has made the Chinese government understand the importance of establishing norms that govern the systems according to which goods are produced and the flow of these products or services. This is the critical aspect of technical standards which can provide better economic gains in the form of licenses and royalties for the already established manufacturing sector in the country. The Chinese government believes that the strategic and geopolitical game is no longer limited to market domination and is inherently influenced by system design and rulemaking. The standardisation process is essentially the aspect of making global rules according to which industries function. This can facilitate the country’s industrial transformation by acquiring the first-mover advantage in key sectors.A Base for ‘Green’ Development Climate goals remain integral to the country’s commitment to following certain sustainable development models. The reason for China’s focus on creating climate-specific standards for local companies to adhere to is in its pursuit to tap into the renewable energy sector. With a significant head start compared to other countries, China has successfully captured the renewable energy market being the global leader in solar, EV batteries, and nuclear power. The threat of climate change looms large which makes the renewable energy markets an economic opportunity for a country like China. Technical standards in the realm are just a way of controlling the extremely lucrative renewable energy markets. China sees the 2020s as an opportune time for driving a robust green energy infrastructure-led growth model which would eventually help them capture market space in the domain. Technical standards related to climate reinforce both China’s commitment towards ‘green development’ as well as use that development as leverage for geoeconomic gains.With different objectives in mind, the government’s recent ‘National Standardisation Development’ outline has officially kicked off the ambitious ‘Standards 2035’ project of China. It remains to be seen if they are actually successful in their attempt to control the global technical standards domain. Antriksh Matters: NATO’s Vision for Space— Aditya PareekThe North Atlantic Treaty Organisation(NATO) recently published its aptly titled “overarching space policy”. The most striking feature of the policy is its consistency with other familiar aspects of NATO. Below are some distilled highlights of the text:The policy declares that NATO doesn’t wish “to become an autonomous space actor”, meaning, it will be heavily reliant on the national space programmes of its constituent members. This mirrors the alliance’s stance in other domains and theatres, where the personnel and equipment used by NATO comes directly from the forces of its members. Another important point is the emphasis on the voluntary nature of capabilities that NATO members may provide for the alliance’s operations in space. Furthermore, the voluntary provision of these capabilities would be in line with the granting state’s “national laws, regulations and policies”.The policy declares that NATO wishes to serve as the platform for “political-military consultations” related to the alliance’s mandate on “relevant deterrence and defence related space developments”. The goal behind it being the facilitation of “information sharing” between the members so that NATO’s combined “situational awareness”, “decision making”, and “readiness and posture management” can be handled well. The point about ensuring that NATO’s concerns about space are relevant “across the spectrum of conflict” also signals that NATO wisely considers space to be just one part of wider strategic context. Another point to note is the stated intention to engage with other international fora and organisations on “the development of legal and behavioural norms”. This is doubtless a reference to various UN General Assembly resolutions, and a newly constituted Open Ended Working Group(OEWG) aimed at figuring out the rules of the road for responsible behaviour in outer space. It is interesting that the policy also insists NATO members should work towards developing a common understanding of concepts related to the role of space in crisis or conflict. Another focus of the policy is considering “ways to improve space resilience”. This would undoubtedly extend to satellites and other space objects that may provide ISR (Intelligence, Search and Reconnaissance) capabilities to members of the alliance. The policy states that the desired reliability which may enable this resilience would be achieved through “exploiting force multiplier redundancies”. Matsyanyaaya #2: Over thinking China’s foray into ‘Mind Control’ technologies— Ruturaj GowaikarCurrent AffairThe year 2021 didn’t end on a pleasant note for two dozen Chinese private technology companies and a dozen government research institutes. These entities were blacklisted and sanctioned by the US for alleged involvement in research related to mind control technologies. Notable among these is the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS). As per US news reports these technologies were being developed with China’s ethnic minorities in mind but could also be easily deployed abroad. These sanctions are aimed at preventing any technology being developed in the US to be exported to these blacklisted Chinese entities as well as to restrict their funding.But none of the reports clearly mention what these technologies could be. Most of the private firms are involved in facial recognition and AI based research. These can be easily used for surveillance but lack any mind-control elements. The government research institutes seem to be involved primarily in biotechnology research. There are two possible explanations that might have led to the clubbing of these entities together into a black-list. And that could be the way research is planned and regulated in China.The broader philosophy of Civil-Military fusion in technology development, adopted by the PLA is part of a national strategy to leverage academic and commercial developments. And the creation of the CMC steering committee on Military Scientific Research handling both research related to biotechnology and brain-machine interface.The bogey of China possessing mind-control weapons was raised previously in 2019 and might be raised again for political reasons. There exists a lot of confusion regarding the nature of research involved in this domain. Recent developments are cause for us to consider the types of research in the field of neuroscience and their military applications.Neuroscience research or can be broadly classified into three areas.1) Assessment technologies(Imaging -fMRI, electrophysiological recordings, genetics)2) Interventional Technologiesi) Performance enhancementBetter sensory perception, control over sleep patterns, faster cognition etc(chemical/biological entities, Brain machine interfaces (BMI), brainStimulation, brain implants)ii) Performance degradationLoss of consciousness , sedation, hallucination, incoherence, paralysis,disorientation etc(chemical/biological entities, electromagnetic/energy )iii) Delivery systemsMicrobes, nanoprobes, direct contact3) Ethical dialogs and frameworksSide effects, dependency, dual use nature of technologiesInterventional technologies are the most sought after by the militaries of the world as they can be either used to improve the cognitive performance of one’s own soldiers or degrade the performance of the enemy. There are several challenges in both these sub-fields. The major one in the neuro-enhancement research is the possibility of dependence and withdrawal in case of chemical agents. And in the case of a cortical stimulation devices, there is the large time requirement to customise such a device for an individual operator. Efficient delivery mechanism remains a major challenge for neuro-degradation technology.The only confirmed product developed by China that can fall under the above classification so far is by the now black-listed AMMS. It is a chemical named Night Eagle that can suppress sleep for 72 hours. Various militaries have dabbled in such chemicals to give an edge to their armed forces. Others are likely to explore this field further.Our Reading Menu[Essay Collection] Getting the Multi-domain Challenge Right Edited by Brad Roberts from Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.[Article] The remnants of diplomacy: how Moscow and Washington are fighting "Russian hackers" by Oleg Shakirov.[Article] The COVID-19 pandemic: territorial, political and governance dimensions of the crisis by Klaus Dodds. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

CyberPolitik #1: When can Governments Snoop on your Personal Data?— Sapni G KOver the past couple of weeks in this newsletter, we have covered the varying aspects of benefits that DCNs bring us. In earlier editions, we covered the harms that are associated with DCNs. Personal data and its governance has been a recurring theme within both these analyses. In addition to the dynamics of private entities dealing with data, it is important to consider government access to data. After all, open-source intelligence (OSINT) already gives away a lot of sensitive information to private, state, and non-state actors. In this context, the might of the state must not be misused to exploit the availability of large quantities of personal data.There are no agreed international standards on government access to data yet. Broad principles such as respecting the privacy of individuals and the business interests of companies are acknowledged. In 2020, the OECD embarked on an initiative to formulate common principles on the basis of which governments could access personal data held by private companies for national security and law enforcement purposes. Such conversations becomes crucial as invasive products such as the Pegasus snoopware become widely avaialable.Theodore Christakis, Kenneth Propp, and Peter Swire wrote about the developments in this sphere in Lawfare. It highlights practices employed by governments to access personal data held by private companies. Practices such as the purchase of personal information from data brokers are inimical to trust in government processes. The use of direct access methods, such as hacking, also weakens legal provisions. The challenge, therefore, is to identify reasonable steps that can help maintain the rule of law and provide some protection to citizens.The group tasked with identifying principles appear to have broadly come to a consensus on the following seven principles:Legal bases: that law enforcement acts only within a clearly established legal framework.Pursuit of legitimate aims: that such a legal framework ensures that the scope of data acquisition and use is consistent with narrow, specified purposes echoing the idea of proportionality.Requirements for approval: that such framework has procedural safeguards for government access requests that respect individual rights.Handling of personal data: that the handling of personal data is commensurate with principles of minimisation, maintenance of data integrity and security, and minimal retention.Transparency: that such framework be as transparent as is feasible.Oversight: that a range of oversight mechanisms be provided to abate non-compliance and provide remedies for the same.Redress: that effective redress in the form of independent courts and impartial entities be provided by the legal framework.The conversations at the OECD are currently stalled due to disagreements between two factions. One faction, which included the US, is arguing for immediate consensus on all concerns barring direct access. The other faction, led by the EU, wants more comprehensive coverage by including direct access methods such as hacking and espionage. Even if a consensus is reached, it will remain non-enforceable, as OECD instruments are non-binding. However, when multiple countries across the globe are thinking of revaluating their surveillance and personal data protection regimes, these developments are worth noting.CyberPolitik #2: In Apple, CCI Antitrusts? — Prateek WaghreBack in September 2021, a non-profit called Together We Fight Society (TWFS) had filed a complaint against Apple for its app store practices, with the Competition Commission of India (CCI). The specific charges were unknown at the time, but Medianama (paywall) had a deep dive into the complaint. On the eve of 2022, CCI issued an order in the case, instructing the Director-General (DG) to carry out a more detailed investigation. As actions from antitrust regulators/watchdogs around the world continue to pick up steam (aside: Channele2e attempts to track them by country and company), it is instructive to look at the this initial ruling by India’s antitrust regulator. It is worth noting that CCI is also currently investigating Google/Alphabet and Whatsapp. But we’ll look at those cases in future editions of Technopolitik.While these investigations are fairly intensive processes, at a high-level an antitrust complaint should do the following: Define a relevant market.The complaint defined 3 markets. Medianama’s deep dive notes:1. The market for non-licensable smart mobile device operating systems in India: This market includes smartphone operating systems that cannot be licensed by third-party original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Apple’s iOS falls under this. It is different from the licensable smart mobile devices operating system market under which Android falls. This key distinction makes it easier for the complainant to establish market dominance.2. The market for app stores for Apple iOS in India: This market comprises all the channels through which developers distribute their apps to iOS device users.3. The market for apps facilitating payment through UPI: This refers to the market for apps that enable UPI payments, but the complainant does not provide any rationale as to why this market is of interest in this particular antitrust case.Make the case for the firm’s dominance in that market. The 1st and 2nd market definitions in the complaint essentially narrow down the market to Apple’s App Store, where it is the only firm.Prove that the firm has abused its dominance.Broadly, the complaint alleged that:Review guidelines on the App Store are arbitrary.The 30% commission that Apple charges on in-app purchases (IAP) is excessive.Developers are forced to use IAP as the only method for payment processing, along with a number of other restrictions.Notably, Apple had contested these relevant market definitions on the grounds that they are too narrow. They also cited market research data from IDC which put Apple’s share at 0-5% of the smartphone market in India, to counter any assertion that they were dominant. The CCI, however, accepted the definition “The market for app stores for Apple iOS in India” drawing a distinction between the markets for consumers (where Apple’s use of smartphone market share data would have been relevant), and developers. It also said that a prima facie case violating various clauses of The Competition Act, 2002 existed (paraphrased in the table below), which needed to be investigated in detail.The DG’s investigation will be worth watching out for. Rohan, Sapni and I had also discussed these developments on an episode of All Things Policy that went out earlier this week.Incidentally, back in September 2021, Reuters had reported that a CCI investigation concluded that Google had abused its dominance in Android. Antariksh Matters: China tells UN its Space Station Narrowly Dodged Starlink Satellites— Aditya PareekIn early December, China apprised the United Nations(UN) and the international community of two separate instances involving near misses between its space station “Tiangong” and US private sector owned communications satellites. The satellites in question, which were being de-orbited after reaching end of their service life, belong to one of Elon Musk’s SpaceX Starlink mega constellations. Starlink satellite constellations are generally spread out at altitudes of about 550 km. Starlink-1095 approached an orbit of 382 km, converging with “Tiangong” in July 2021. Starlink-2305 followed a similar collision course with Tiangong around 21st October 2021. The Tiangong which currently has only its core module “Tianhae” in orbit will be coupled with two more laboratory modules “Wentian” and “Mengtian” which are yet to be launched, by the end of 2022.Starlink hopes to be a worldwide wireless internet service provider with a constellation made up of tens of thousands of individual satellites.There are provisions for redressal if any actual damage is caused, under the Outer Space Treaty(OST) of 1967 and the UN convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. Nothing is specified in any international law or treatise for near misses beyond keeping the UN Secretary General apprised. In the communiqué to the UN, China has also highlighted that any damage caused by a space object would be the responsibility of the state to which it belongs. Even if the object is owned and operated by a private entity like SpaceX, the responsibility and financial liability would fall solely on the state in which the private company is headquartered. The UN General Assembly and an Open Ended Working group constituted by it is currently engaged in figuring out “norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors relating to threats by States to space systems.” The stated purpose of this process is to create a set of norms that would be accepted by all space faring states. These norms are supposed to bolster co-ordination between states and help avoid close passes and convergences in orbit.Elon Musk has rejected criticism about the mega constellations SpaceX is deploying in low earth orbit, which already houses a vast number of artificial space objects. China’s state-backed outlet Global Times has published a unique take on the issue, with Chinese experts opining that the move was meant as a test of China’s Space Situational Awareness(SSA) and collision avoidance capabilities.  Siliconpolitik: The TSMC Question— Pranay KotasthaneTaiwan has been front-and-centre of the current moment in semiconductor geopolitics. Last week, there was some more action on this front. An article in the US Army War College Quarterly titled Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan argues that:China can be deterred from invading Taiwan short of a full-scale warOne of the items in a deterrence package should include an explicit threat that Taiwan would self-destroy TSMC should a Chinese invasion occur.This is not the first time this argument has been made. Nevertheless, the authors go further than others in developing it. Detailing #2, the authors argue:If Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s facilities went offline, companies around the globe would find it difficult to continue operations. This development would mean China’s high-tech industries would be immobilized at precisely the same time the nation was embroiled in a massive war effort. Even when the formal war ended, the economic costs would persist for years. This problem would be a dangerous cocktail from the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party, the legitimacy of which is predicated on promises of domestic tranquility, national resilience, and sustained economic growth.This is an interesting thought. Since the purpose is deterrence, two lines of enquiry are relevant here. The first is "would such a threat be a credible one?". The second is "even if such a threat is credible, would it alter China's decision making?"The authors have tried to address the first question in some detail:Chinese decisionmakers must absolutely believe Taiwan’s semiconductor industry would be destroyed in the event of an invasion. If China suspects Taipei would not follow through on such a threat, then deterrence will fail. An automatic mechanism might be designed, which would be triggered once an invasion was confirmed. In addition, Taiwan’s leaders could make it known now they will not allow these industries to fall into the hands of an adversary. The United States and its allies could support this endeavor by announcing plans to give refuge to highly skilled Taiwanese working in this sector, creating contingency plans with Taipei for the rapid evacuation and processing of the human capital that operates the physical semiconductor foundries.In a section aimed at the Taiwanese people and government, the authors recommend:No doubt the Taiwanese will have grave concerns about threatening China with a defensive war that likely cannot be won. The prospects of implementing scorched-earth and guerilla-warfare tactics will be similarly unappealing. It will therefore be a major challenge to make these threats credible to China, though perhaps not as difficult as convincing Beijing that Taiwan and the United States are willing to risk a great-power war over Taiwan’s political status. Paradoxically, however, it is only by making these threats credible that they will never have to be carried out. In any case, the threats outlined above—even if carried out to the maximum extent—will be far less devastating to the people of Taiwan than the US threat of great power war, which would see massive and prolonged fighting in, above, and beside Taiwan.I am interested in the second line of enquiry — even if the credibility-enhancing steps suggested are followed, would it change China's decision-making calculus? I don't think so, for two reasons.Invasion directly implies TSMC's downfall. If such an action is being debated, the costs of losing TSMC will be assumed by China, regardless of a scorched-earth strategy. That's because a China-controlled TSMC would still be dependent on ASML for EUV machines, on Japanese companies for photoresists, and on many US firms for other critical manufacturing equipment. In case of an invasion, all these lines are highly likely to be cut off. Thus, China's decision to invade will rest on the assumption that TSMC becomes a diminished entity in the semiconductor space. If anything, the status quo works better for China where it can poach TSMC engineers to build its own manufacturing industry. A scorched-earth strategy doesn't change China's payoffs from invasion.TSMC is neither irreplaceable nor indelible in the long run. TSMC's credentials are impressive indeed. But many countries, including China, can replicate its success over time if it were ever to be destroyed. The monetary and opportunity costs would be huge, no doubt. But given a few years, others can catch up. The key ingredients are access to adequate human capital, humungous capital investment, and most crucially continued access to global vendors and customers. And so, an invasion can't be deterred because the economic loss of such an action is temporary and reversible.For more, read this two-part (1,2) series in The Diplomat by John Lee and JP Kleinhans.Our Reading Menu[Article] Three Takeaways From China’s New Standards Strategy by Matt Sheehan, Marjory Blumenthal and Michael R. Nelson.[Opinion] India Can Take Lessons From China’s Technical Standardisation Strategy by Arjun Gargeyas who is also a contributor to this newsletter.[Book] Routledge Handbook of Space Law Edited by Ram S. Jakhu and Paul Stephen Dempsey[Article] Norwegian Undersea Surveillance Network Had Its Cables Mysteriously Cut This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antriksh Matters: Russia’s in Cooperative Mood on Space Stations— Aditya PareekDespite the ubiquity of remotely operated space vehicles, inhabited orbital stations remain a symbol of prestige and scientific endeavour. In Russia’s case, much of its spacefaring tradition is tied to its history as a pioneer of the final frontier. Russia has continued to support the International Space Station(ISS) and has launched another module, this time a docking node called “Prichal”, the Russian word for pier. The Prichal is the second module launched and successfully integrated to the ISS by Russia this year, and according to RIA Novosti it might be the last one Russia has planned for the ISS as of now. The Prichal has five docking slots that can accommodate cargo and crew spacecraft wishing to dock to the ISS. It is also interesting that Russian state space company ROSCOSMOS, according to another RIA Novosti article, is in discussions with NASA on how SpaceX’s Crew Dragon can dock with Prichal. According to the article: a docking interface, that is, a special adapter, would be required for American spacecraft.ROSCOSMOS has acknowledged the revolutionary role SpaceX has played in bringing new efficiencies to spacefaring. Significantly for the Russians, SpaceX has given NASA an alternative to the Soyuz missions for sending crews and cargo to the ISS. Only India among the BRICS can HelpWhile Russia has not closed the door on the ISS, it has nevertheless started pursuing its own alternative, a unilateral space station tentatively called “Russian Orbital Service Station (ROSS)”. The project was at one point envisioned to be undertaken with BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China) partners. However, no significant support in terms of financial commitments came through from BRICS or any other partners. Now ROSCOSMOS is moving ahead with the design of ROSS with Russian state funding.Furthermore, China has started assembling its own unilateral space station, the “Tiangong” with its core module “Tianhe” already operational in orbit.Brazil and South Africa do not seem to have similar financial wherewithal or short-medium term ambition on sustained human presence in orbit. That leaves only India. The country’s human spaceflight efforts are set to begin with the Gaganyaan mission which, as ISRO chairman Dr. K. Sivan recently said, is a major thrust area for international cooperation, especially with Russia. It would be interesting to see if Russia is able to persuade India to work with it on a joint space station derivative of, or integrated with, ROSS project.According to a report in Russian business newspaper Kommersant, Russian Ambassador to India Nikolai Kudashev said India and Russia are also discussing joint production:The ambassador also noted that in the field of space, Russia and India "are discussing not only the supply of engines, but are also talking about joint engine building, joint development of launch vehicles - heavy, light and ultralight, joint creation of satellites.”The ambassador also indicated joint Lunar exploration is still on the Russia-India agenda, though this was yet to be discussed in detail by both countries.If you like the content of this newsletter consider signing up for our Post-Graduate Programme in Public Policy (PGP). The course is targeted at dynamic individuals who wish to enter the growing professional sphere of policy, public affairs, governance and leadership, while pursuing their current occupations. The PGP equips participants with a core set of skills in policy evaluation, economic reasoning, effective communication and public persuasion.Matsyanyaaya: China’s ‘Quantum Leap’ Overhyped or Genuine Threat?— Arjun Gargeyas(An edited version of this article first appeared in The South China Morning Post on 23rd December 2021.)President Xi Jinping, back in 2016, established a national strategy for China to become technologically self-reliant and soon surpass the United States as the global leader in emerging and critical technologies. At the heart of this was quantum innovation and research. Apart from allocating funds for a long-term quantum mega project, President Xi also announced the establishment of a National Laboratory for Quantum Information Sciences. An announcement made by a group of Chinese scientists in late 2021 buttresses the country’s growth in the field. They declared the creation of a quantum communication network in space using their quantum satellite to secure the national power grid against blackouts and other long-distance attacks. This is a massive leap forward in building secure communication networks using quantum science and technology. It also underlines the strides made by China in the field and the significant advantage it has gained over its competitors in the recent past. It was in 2008 that a certain Pan Jianwei returned to China in the hope of facilitating quantum research in the country. Hailed as the ‘Father of Quantum Physics’ in China, Jianwei founded a lab at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) dedicated to achieving quantum breakthroughs. This ushered in a quantum revolution in the country with extensive research projects on quantum science, especially communications, taking shape. This focus on quantum communications resulted in advanced telecommunications and cryptography systems being developed by the scientific community in the country.The Beijing-Shanghai communication line, which was opened in 2017, was a result of this decade-long quantum research. It was hailed as the world’s longest un-hackable communication line. Though not a fully realised quantum connection, the line is divided into multiple nodes (based on the distance traveled by each photon before succumbing to noise) which provided a high level of security. China also launched the world’s first quantum satellite in 2016 that was pushed to a higher orbit for a wider coverage to develop the quantum internet. The satellite programme was started in the hope of securing communications between military outposts, embassies, government bodies, and financial institutions. These advancements have effectively made China the global leader in quantum communications. In terms of quantum computing and its applications, China was behind the United States in both investments and technological superiority until this year. The revealing of Zuchongzhi, a Chinese-made quantum computer comprising of superconducting 66 qubits easily surpasses the speed and computing power of Google’s quantum computer, Sycamore. There was also a  major improvement to their photonic quantum computer raising the number of qubits from 76 to 113. Owning two of the fastest computers in the world, China now is the only country to achieve a quantum advantage in both photonic and superconducting quantum computing. With China pulling ahead in the quantum race, there are also threats of the Chinese government exploiting and weaponising critical quantum technologies for military purposes. This would mean that the Chinese military might develop capabilities to neutralise many offensive and defensive military technologies of its rivals. A Chinese company, Electronic Technology Group Corporation, has claimed having developed Quantum Radar which is supposedly capable of determining the type of airplane and the weapons the airplane is carrying. This would render any stealth technology useless. The Chinese National Academy of Science has reported the development of a quantum submarine detector using extremely sensitive sensors called SQUIDs (Superconducting Quantum Interference Devices). This has the ability to detect a submarine from a long distance away creating limitations for all opposing forces. If these technologies are functional as the Chinese claim, the possibility of China gaining a military quantum advantage is imminent. China has definitely made incredible progress in building its quantum ecosystem. With quantum research driven by the state and concentrated in a few university research labs, the funding provided by the Chinese government consistently remains on the higher side. This has resulted in critical breakthroughs in the domain. However, inherent challenges remain for China to navigate before officially winning the quantum race. CyberPolitik #1: DCNs Reporting for National Security Duty — Prateek WaghreIn August 2021, the actions that the likes of Facebook, Twitter were about to take (or not take / or had not taken in the months/year before it) in the aftermath of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan were the subject of intense scrutiny and debate. These were yet another reminder of how entangled DCN firms are in decisions that have significant geopolitical implications as well as the national security of individual states.Literature on the role of DCNs primarily invokes the lenses of competition, privacy and speech. However, a recent paper, ‘National Security by Platform’ by Elena Chachko, proposes a framework for analysing their role in the privatisation of national security functions.Before going into the framework, there are some key points the paper makes which are worth considering upfront. I’ve paraphrased my interpretation here:Ad hoc developments: The growing role of DCN firms in geopolitics and national security weren’t the product of a deliberate, consensus-building exercise. Instead, these were ad hoc, piecemeal and incremental steps in response to significant events such as terrorist attacks, concerns over election integrity, etc.Contradiction with Competition: While competitive markets envisage many private firms taking part, a market with a limited set of large-scale operators is better suited for cooperation with the national security apparatus and rapid, uniform responses/actions.DCN capabilities and intent: Are DCN firms capable of meeting national security challenges, and are they likely to prioritise addressing them over profits?Chachko makes the following points about the relationships between DCN firms and governments (I’ve separated them into bullet points for better readability) :… Involve threat analysis and policy development cooperation, information sharing, and platforms replicating government practices and methods. A mutually beneficial, at times even symbiotic, relationship has emerged between platforms and government agencies in addressing certain important national security and geopolitical challenges. On other fronts, however, platforms and government have clashed.These trends can be considered to be forms of ‘indirect, informal national security privatization’, and proposed the following categories:A. Hard Structural ConstraintsThere can be institutional or constitutional limitations/constraints on state actors. For example, state actors likely have neither the capability to detect/respond to sophisticated disinformation operations nor the authority to control what information can or cannot be posted/shared in other jurisdictions. DCN firms, on the other hand, exercise more control over these spaces (at least the ones they operate) and have the tools/capabilities/expertise to understand these threats better than state actors. This creates a need for state actors to rely on private actors.B. Bureaucratic WorkaroundsEven in the absence of ‘hard constraints,’ state actors may choose to rely on / cooperate with DCN firms to work around legal/administrative requirements and/or political opposition, speed up response times, limit the visibility of their role, etc.Both categories A and B require varying degrees of cooperation between state actors and DCN firms. They are also not mutually exclusive. C. Platforms as SubstitutesIn cases of inaction by state actors, or when their desired/preferred actions are at odds with government policy prescriptions/direction, DCN firms may resort to acting unilaterally, essentially substituting for state actors.And while privatisation in the context of national security, both formal and informal, are not unique to platforms, Chachko argues that it is the change in scope that is significant:The breadth of security and geopolitical policy and execution discretion that platforms currently exercise is striking. Questions such as what to do about genocide in Myanmar, what kinds of coordinated behavior constitute security threats and require enforcement, what foreign government blowback might ensue following such enforcement, what is necessary to secure the Indian election and protect its integrity, how to respond to Turkish demands to silence opposition,or what constitutes credible information about COVID-19 are complex and open-ended. They require far broader and more diverse expertise and greater exercise of policy discretion than identifying individual terrorism suspects or monitoring violent groups, finding breaches of computer systems, exposing zero-day vulnerabilities, or even attributing computer breaches to perpetrators.CyberPolitik #2: Consider the benefits of Digital Communication Networks— Sapni G KThis entry is adapted from one of the sections of a forthcoming discussion document by Prateek Waghre and Sapni G K on the opportunities and benefits associated with Digital Communication Networks.As Prateek had written in the previous issue of this Newsletter, the discourse around Digital Communication Networks (DCN) tends to be dominated by the harms they have caused. Literature around DCNs focuses heavily on the myriad of troubles they have exacerbated with little consideration of their benefits, particularly from the Indian perspective. In our latest discussion document, we attempt to examine the potential opportunities and benefits that could be attributed to DCNs. We broadly look at how DCNs interact with the market and the society at large. In this section, I will write about the interaction between DCNS and the market, which has contributed to the creation of new economic opportunities and efficiencies.DCNs have facilitated the growth of business models that were thought to be highly improbable or previously associated with high transaction costs. This includes the booming creator economy with its turbocharged growth during the pandemic. They even enabled new job categories such as social media managers and curators, which did not exist in the world before DCNs. They also help many people to reach out to their extended networks for job opportunities, which has facilitated the freelance economy. Since DCNs transcended geographies and economic divides, a range of new opportunities was created and amplified. This benefitted Indian businesses in multiple ways. Their operations were globalised, with small and medium enterprises also eyeing the global market. Analytics and visualisation tools that are a part of most DCNs helped firms understand trends in real-time and modify their business practices. DCNs also facilitated the opening up of entirely new markets, such as the thrifting- used clothes retail, that has historically been looked down upon. The advertisement model that DCNs presented helped businesses to move into targeted marketing. Many DCNs operate on the advertisement-supported business model where they provide access to their services in return for tracking users’ activities, both on and off the platforms, and serving them targeted advertisements.Calculating the economic efficiency of different domains is an inherently difficult task. At the level of algorithm design, calculations have historically considered informativeness as the near equivalent of economic efficiency. Through the document, we identify increased informativeness and online social graphs as tools for creating economic efficiency, which has led to the compounding of benefits created by DCNs. While the points mentioned above only represent a small portion of our document, they serve the purpose of reiterating why it is important to reorient our perspectives on conversations about the governance of DCNs. We argue that these cumulative benefits should not be lost out as proposals for governance and regulation are presented across the globe. India, in particular, has benefitted immensely from DCNs, and caution must be exercised when we think of regulating them.You can read the entire document here. This is a work in progress, as part of our investigations into the ecosystem of DCNs. If you have thoughts/comments on the same, do reach out via Twitter DMs (@SapniGK) or email me ( AT takshashila.org.in ).Our Reading Menu[Chapter]Approaching the Third Rail? A Trilateral Treaty to Prohibit Space-Based Missile Defenses[Report] Getting the multidomain challenge right [Paper] State policy against information war by Dmitry Shibaev and Nina Uibo[Paper] The role of internet media in informational counteracting between Ukraine and Russiaduring the war in the East by Nadia Herasymchuk and Anatolii Yakovets This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Matsyanyaaya: The US-Australia Quantum Tech Agreement — Arjun GargeyasThe Quantum race has just heated up. November saw an official agreement between the United States and Australia on quantum technology cooperation. An official statement underlined the importance of science and technology in the information age along with the need for collaborative and transnational efforts in the pursuit of scientific discovery and societal benefit. The statement also described quantum technology, as being a critical and emerging technology that could enable the development of faster computers, secure communication networks, and more accurate sensors. This new agreement comes at a time when the global quantum ecosystem is developing across the globe with increased participation from different states. This includes the realisation of the field’s benefits with the hope of new quantum-enabled economies coming up. What does the Agreement Entail?The agreement goes into the prospects of new theoretical and practical applications of quantum technology along with the translation of credible research in the field into potential applications that would be of mutual benefit to both countries. It also emphasizes the need for joint research and development along with critical technology transfers between the two countries. There is also a focus in the agreement on building a quantum technology market with the help of the private sector and other industry bodies. The agreement is also a step towards diversifying supply chains in this field. The agreement delves into the need for improvement in the field of quantum education in both countries. Cross border education in the field can help in fast-tracking significant research in the field and can build a competent workforce for the future. The exchange of skills and development can help in the protection of intellectual property along with building safe and secure research environments. Finally, the sharp focus on quantum technology can help the two states collaborate in developing and setting technical standards that foster interoperability, innovation and transparency. Other than the objectives of the agreement, there was also a mutual decision taken between the two governments in holding the Quantum Policy Dialogue that would involve senior government officials, who are experts in quantum technologies, meeting regularly to flesh out the subsequent agendas for the cooperation agreement. This would eventually help in the identification of practical initiatives that can be taken forward by both governments. With China pursuing quantum technology, this agreement looks to be a joint effort between two technologically advanced states to counter their common adversary. The applications of quantum technology are broadening with strategic angles to the technology driving forward this focus. There is still a long way to go before computing power or stable communication networks using quantum technologies can be deployed on a large scale. But the race to achieve what is commonly known as ‘Quantum Supremacy’ has definitely begun. It is something worth watching out for. CyberPolitik #1: Can Digital Communication Networks have benefits?— Prateek WaghreThis entry is adapted from one of the sections of a forthcoming discussion document by Prateek Waghre and Sapni GK on the opportunities and benefits associated with Digital Communication Networks.Back in July, we had published a paper categorising the various kinds of harms attributed to Digital Communication Networks as potential market failures, social problems and cognitive biases. I’m including some screenshots from the tables just to give you a sense of it - for the complete tables, do look at the original document.In the course of writing that paper and a bunch of discussions during and after it on whether benefits are self-evident or not - we also realised that much of the analysis around the benefits/opportunities hadn’t really evolved much since the early/mid-2010s. Maybe we were just looking at the wrong sources… but what we found were either variations of the ‘Democratising Force’/Arab Spring angles or very specific and narrow use-cases.So we signed off saying:In subsequent work, we plan to identify the benefits that DCNs enable, assess overlaps and contradictions between proposed/enacted DCN governance measures, and explore the role of global internet governance mechanisms with the aim to define appropriate frameworks to govern DCNs.This was back in July, mind you, long before the Facebook Files/Papers/Documents sent our heads spinning. Nevertheless, as Dean Eckles points out in his testimony to the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (on Pages 1 and 5); or as Rebekah Tromble said in this episode of the TechPolicy.Press podcast; or as Rebeca Mackinnon noted in this episode 2 of the Internet of Humans podcast - we don’t have a grasp on the benefits.So, in a forthcoming paper, we try to list out potential opportunities and benefits in the context of markets and societies. In this section, I’ll write a bit about how we approached their role in imparting social benefits.One of the things we did in the harms paper was to define the concept of Digital Communication Networks (DCNs). DCNs as composite entities consisting of:Capability: Internet-based products/services that enable instantaneous low-cost or free communication across geographic, social, and cultural boundaries. This communication may be private (1:1), limited (1:n, e.g. messaging groups), or broad (Twitter feeds, Facebook pages, YouTube videos, live streaming), and so on.Operator(s): Firms/groups that design/operate these products and services.Networks: The entities/groups/individuals that adopt/use these products and services, and their interactions with each other.And while the term may not ever catch on, its usage was deliberate.The purpose of introducing a new frame is to encourage the study of DCNs from the perspective of their effects on societies as a whole rather than a specific focus on a specific set of firms, technologies, sharing mechanisms, user dynamics, and so on.  In the context of societies, we tried to focus on the role of capabilities and networks, and not the firms themselves - though, it isn’t possible to always ignore them.First, we had to try and visualise what societies look like. When attempting something like this, there will always be layers of abstraction - and no model (no matter how good) can perfectly capture systems as complex as modern societies. Nevertheless, we found that the model that Christian Fuchs and Daniel Trottier propose in Social Media, Politics and the State could be a useful one. Some key points from it:It contains the following subsystems: overlapping state and economic spheres, a cultural sphere, and a civil sphere that mediates the cultural and overlapping state and economic spheres.The civil sphere is composed of socio-political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural movements.These movements are struggles for different ends by various social roles within the subsystems.The Movements are:Socio-political: For the “recognition of collective identities via demands on the state.”Socio-economic: For the “production and distribution of material resources created and distributed in the economic system.”Socio-cultural: Have “shared interests and practices relat[ed]  to ways of organising one’s private life.”The Roles:Trottier and Fuchs use the tripleC framework to explain that DCNs allow actors to perform tasks of creation (cognition), share them with others who can respond (communication), and modify them (cooperation) in an integrated manner, and that they can all occur in the same social space (capability built by DCN operators).Then, building on this model, we identify five types of actions that DCNs enable. Note that these are not mutually exclusive. And, in most cases, they overlap. We had to use a non-exhaustive set of examples in the paper to show where DCNs played a role in minimising harms or enabling benefits through a combination of one or more of these actions, since many of these effects could not be quantified.Information Production/Consumption: Low entry costs and capabilities for users to generate and share content enable participation in DCN Networks at scale. Under this action, we refer narrowly to the ability to transmit information or receive information.Interaction: Interaction involves receiving and then responding to information. This can manifest itself in various ways. It can mean mutual communication between two or more actors belonging to any of the societal subsystems. This communication can also be directed at a completely different set of actors and may or may not include the original set of actors. Responses need not be limited to communication / sharing on DCN networks but can also include actions taken off them such as physical actions, internalising information, or any of the five kinds of actions identified in this section.Identity Formation/Expression: Identity formation and expression are complex processes. User profile-centric DCN services provide a natural home for the performance of identity, which itself can lead to the accumulation of social capital. Identities also evolve as actors across the subsystems consume information, interact with information and other actors across DCN networks. These identities (individual or collective) may then be further expressed using DCN capabilities and features.Organisation: A combination of DCN capabilities and networks reduces barriers for groups of people to cooperate and act towards achieving common or similar goals. They can also aid the scaling phase of self-organising or spontaneous movements. It should be noted that the mere existence of DCN capabilities and networks is not sufficient. The networks also need to include motivated actors with incentives to do so.Financial Transactions: In this context, we refer to transactions where DCNs play a connective role, and not where the DCN operators are themselves a party to the financial transaction (ad revenue sharing, creator pay-outs, create their own tokens, news partnerships, funds for research and civil society organisations, and so on).We don’t have a link yet but we’ll include one in the edition right after the document is published.In the meanwhile, if you want to talk to me about it / see a draft - you can reach out via Twitter DMs (@prateekwaghre) or email me ( AT takshashila.org.inIf you like the content of this newsletter consider signing up for our Post-Graduate Programme in Public Policy (PGP). The course is targeted at dynamic individuals who wish to enter the growing professional sphere of policy, public affairs, governance and leadership, while pursuing their current occupations. The PGP equips participants with a core set of skills in policy evaluation, economic reasoning, effective communication and public persuasion.Siliconpolitik: India’s Semiconductor Strategy Needs to Focus on Five Areas— Pranay Kotasthane & Arjun Gargeyas(An edited version of this article first appeared in Hindustan Times on 2nd December 2021)With a short-term approach of securing a deal to establish a manufacturing facility in the country, the conversation currently solely rests on the path of India’s foray into semiconductor manufacturing. Setting up one fab manufacturing facility won’t significantly reduce India’s strategic vulnerability in the domain. There is a clear need for a shift in the government approach and a change in mindset at the highest decision-making level to improve India’s position in the entire semiconductor ecosystem. Looking at the experiences of other leading countries in the domain, the time taken to build robust domestic semiconductor industries remains a marathon process. A similar strategy needs to be envisioned for India right now. First, India needs one 20-year semiconductor roadmap. This needs to begin with an audit of the chips that form the core of key defence equipment and critical infrastructure. Once this vulnerability assessment is done, the government needs to ensure that over time, such equipment should have chips produced end-to-end within the trusted semiconductor ecosystem.  Second, the 20-year roadmap needs a 20-year financial support plan. The roadmap needs to sequence semiconductor initiatives depending on the government’s financial wherewithal. For instance, focusing on getting a leading Taiwanese or South Korean ATMP player to India could be considered immediately, at a lower opportunity cost. Co-investing in a chip production unit at a trailing-edge, speciality chip fabrication unit could then be the next big step for the government. Concurrently, the government can focus on funding new semiconductor materials research, new design architectures for critical equipment, intellectual property protection, and technical standards. Over a two-decade period, this could well give the confidence to global investors to co-invest in a leading-edge fab here. Three, plurilateral strategic cooperation on semiconductors is a necessity for India, not a choice. The Quad Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative, announced in the first in-person leadership summit meeting in September 2021, is a good starting point. India now needs to push for a Quad Supply Chain Resilience Fund with the goal of ensuring redundancy in this supply chain to immunise it from geopolitical and geographic risks. For instance, while the US focuses on restarting manufacturing at leading-edge nodes (5 nanometres and below), the group should be able to fund specialised analog, memory fabs operating at trailing-edge nodes (45 nanometres and above) in India, Japan or Australia. Over time, this initiative can coalesce other major semiconductor powers such as Taiwan, South Korea, the EU, and Israel.Fourth, favourable trade policies are critical for building a plurilateral semiconductor ecosystem. Over the past few years, the union government has been increasing import duties using the rhetoric of Aatmanirbharta. Such policies have major implications on the semiconductor industry globally. For example, even Taiwan, which produces over fifty per cent of contract manufactured chips needs specialised equipment that needs to be imported. Unsurprisingly, a reduction in tariffs was reportedly a major issue of contention in talks between India and Taiwan over a semiconductor collaboration earlier this year. Similarly, considering the nascent domestic market for semiconductor chipsets, foreign entities manufacturing chips in India will primarily be exporting their products. In essence, a fab in India will still be deeply connected with the world — buying equipment from some countries and selling chips to others. Finally, the 20-year roadmap needs a robust infrastructure plan. Significant quantities of reliable water and electricity supplies are non-negotiable requirements for fabs. It is not possible to meet these specialised requirements all across the country. Fabs will be clustered in a few states that have the risk appetite to get into this sector. Hence, it’s important that the union government works with interested state governments to build the necessary infrastructure.CyberPolitik #2: Norms for AI - UNESCO’s Recommendations— Sapni G KThe 41st General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) concluded on 24 November 2021 with a major step on the global development of norms on the use and regulation of Artificial Intelligence (AI). 193 member states of UNESCO signed and adopted the draft AI Ethics Recommendation. It can be touted as the first globally accepted normative standard-setting instrument in the realm of AI. The voluntary, non-binding commitment is a major point of cooperation in identifying principles of ethics in the regulation of AI systems. This is one step further in conversations that presume the inevitability of AI systems’ involvement in decision making. Consequentially, it could be a first in outlining the foundations of global AI governance. Given the encouragement for multilateral and intercultural efforts, these recommendations appear to be a good starting point for engaging further in the discussions for rulemaking and governance. The structure of the document, dividing the recommendations into values and policy actions facilitates the same.Values and Value-based PolicyIn addition to furthering UNESCO’s longstanding values, the recommendation also suggests policy actions to translate these principles into globally accepted normative standards. It calls for establishing compliance mechanisms to ensure human rights and rule of law are upheld, in consonance with the constitutional provisions of the signatories. It urges the signatories to incorporate ethical impact assessments as part of operationalising AI systems. It nudges states to include a transversal gender impact assessment as part of such ethical impact assessments, which is a welcome suggestion that is seldom raised in conventional conversations around AI ethics. As recommendations spanning the field of AI systems and applications, future policies on the regulation on AI in various specific scenarios, including DCNs, military, and welfare applications can draw from these recommendations.Geopolitical SignificanceBarring China, there is little broad-based regulation of AI that can affect a sizeable population of the world. The United States of America is not a member of UNESCO, which leaves it outside the list of signatories to the recommendation. The European Union’s proposed AI Act hopes to set the norm, repeating the feat achieved by the General Data Protection Regulation in 2017. The new recommendation could be reflected in the path that the AI Act chooses, essentially becoming the normative standard for decades to come. As far as India is concerned, being a passive observer of these developments might not augur well for establishing its interests in the regulation of emerging technologies.Our Reading Menu[Paper] International Cooperation in Space Activities amid Great Power Competition by Ludmila V. Pankova, Olga V. Gusarova, Dmitry V. Stefanovich[Article] Quantum USA Vs. Quantum China: The World's Most Important Technology Race by Paul Smith-Goodson[Article] Semiconductors – the Next WaveOpportunities and winning strategies for semiconductor companies[Opinion] AI Strategic Competition, Norms, and the Ethics of Global Empire by Joseph Bouchard This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters: Will Debris-Swallowing Satellites Eat Space Norms for Breakfast?— Aditya RamanathanOn the morning of 23 October 2021, a Chinese Long March 3b rocket shot into space, putting a satellite into geosynchronous transfer orbit, the elliptical path into which any satellite must first enter before moving into a geosynchronous orbit.Under normal circumstances, the launch would have received little attention, but this Long March rocket’s payload was different. According to the state-run Xinhua, the satellite, named Shijian-21, would be “used to test and verify space debris mitigation technologies.” These seemingly innocuous words immediately drew the attention of space-watchers, since any debris removal satellite is also a potential space weapon. Chinese authorities have not released any details about the Shijian-21. However, in early November, reports indicated that the US Space Force had detected another object, possibly a rocket body component, that was orbiting alongside the Shijan-21 in geosynchronous orbit. China’s Shijan-21 test is shrouded in secrecy, which is only bound to provoke speculation. However, we must acknowledge that removing space debris is likely to be increasingly necessary and may present commercial opportunities. How do you solve a problem like space debris?Space debris is perhaps the most challenging governance problem in orbital space. About 27,000 pieces of debris are routinely tracked. Besides these, there are an estimated 100,000 pieces of debris between 1 cm and 10 cm in size, another 900,000 less than 1 cm and greater than 1mm, and some 130 million pieces of debris that are less than 1mm. In lower orbits, debris can fly at speeds of 28,000 km per hour or about 7.8 km per second. For reference, a standard 4 gram (62 grain) bullet from a full-size M16A2 rifle has a muzzle velocity of about 853 metres per second. The problem of space debris is likely to get worse without the creation of clear guidelines to which space actors will adhere. A major culprit is likely to be the planned mega-constellations of low earth orbit (LEO) satellites that are to provide everything from satellite internet to military surveillance. Following the incredibly destructive Chinese ASAT test in 2007, the UN General Assembly backed a set of Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. However, more rules will need to be put in place to slow down the accretion of orbital debris. In the meantime, some of the debris already in orbit needs to be removed. China is not the only state or entity experimenting with debris-mitigating satellites. In March, a Japanese start-up called Astroscale launched an experimental satellite to test “space debris docking and removal.”The European Union is also funding a project called RemoveDebris, which seeks to develop a “low cost in-orbit demonstrator mission” that will engage in active debris removal (ADR). According to a description of the mission:“A microsatellite called here RemoveSAT, will release, capture and deorbit two space debris targets, called DebrisSats, in sequence using various rendezvous, capture and deorbiting technologies thus demonstrating in orbit, key ADR technologies”.In 2018, one of the experimental RemoveDebris satellites deployed a net at an altitude of 300 km to ensnare a simulated piece of debris. Other proposals include a Chinese one for a laser-wielding orbital craft to burn space junk, and an Airbus plan to harpoon a defunct French satellite. Of Ploughshares and SwordsEvery one of the proposed methods of debris mitigation has obvious anti-satellite applications. Whether such crafts use robotic arms, harpoons, nets, lasers, or kamikaze-hugs that result in de-orbiting, they can all be employed on active satellites. These platforms can also serve an effective coercive function in international politics: the very act of placing a laser-armed craft next to an adversary’s satellite can send a powerful signal and change the adversary’s behaviour. Such platforms are also far more usable than kinetic-kill weapons like ASAT missiles: given the very nature of debris-mitigating technology, using one of them to put an active satellite out of commission is unlikely to affect satellites in orbit. Today, there are few, if any, dedicated space weapons. Even Direct Ascent- ASAT missiles are largely derived from ballistic missile defence (BMD) platforms. At present, the US Space Force has only one publicly-acknowledged weapon for space warfare: an Earth-based jammer that can target communications satellites. Russia also fields the Tirada-2S, which performs the same function, and China is reportedly developing similar platforms. While there has been talk of a secret US space weapon, information in the public domain tells us states are yet to turn their space ploughshares into swords. That means any attempt at arms control that seeks to limit hardware is likely to fail at this time.  What has greater chances of success are the efforts to put in place norms for behaviour in space. As states haggle over the details in the coming weeks and months, we’ll keep you posted on the developments. Watch this space. If you like the content of this newsletter consider signing up for our Post-Graduate Programme in Public Policy (PGP). The course is targeted at dynamic individuals who wish to enter the growing professional sphere of policy, public affairs, governance and leadership, while pursuing their current occupations. The PGP equips participants with a core set of skills in policy evaluation, economic reasoning, effective communication and public persuasion.Cyberpolitik: Blurred Battle Lines on DCNs— Sapni G KFrance is all set to go polls next year, which could prove decisive for the incumbent President Emmanuel Macron. Two days before the final vote during the 2017 elections that Macron won, “Macron Leaks” – a series of materials that accused Macron and his campaign team of committing tax evasion and election fraud. This had limited effects on the result of the polls itself, arguably due to the near-total pre-electoral silence period mandated by French law. The limited availability of time played a crucial part in preventing the spread of these sets of claims. It was later discovered to be a coordinated operation involving hackers affiliated with the Russian Federation’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), its foreign military intelligence agency. The information that was part of the leaks was found to be false information interspersed with select genuine campaign material.Repeated attempts to orchestrate such incidents, as recent as Russia’s alleged involvement in disinformation campaigns on Facebook in Sudan, is cause for worry in France. Reports also suggest that foreign information operations on social media platforms have been identified in other European countries, including Spain and Germany. Given this background, France is taking proactive steps to reduce and counter politically destabilising events on DCNs. In January 2021, France created an office called VigiNum dedicated to detecting and analysing foreign media manipulation. This office has been functioning under the Prime Minister’s office since October 2021, in consonance with the intelligence services and the election regulator.Interestingly, French Defense Minister Florence Parly presented a new cyber influence doctrine last month called lutte informatique d’influence, roughly translating into the doctrine of computer influence warfare. According to the doctrine, these are “military operations conducted in the informational layer of cyberspace to detect, characterize and counter-attacks, support strategic command, provide information (intelligence) or deceive, either stand-alone or in combination with other operations”.  Under this doctrine, French armed forces are permitted to use social media for information operations, within the bounds of State and international laws. These operations are primarily to “detect, characterize, and counter” adversarial operations, but also to “provide information; conduct deception; or support strategic communication”. It is amusing to see transparency from a country on Information Operations, while the undercurrents of States covertly conducting these operations on social media and other networked platforms have been around for long. However, with this shift in narrative and transparency, the vulnerabilities of DCNs ( as we have discussed earlier in this newsletter) are evident. They have brought intelligence and war-like operations closer to the ordinary citizen, effectively blurring the line between a civilian and an actor in a military conflict. It also depicts the incapability of large private corporations that operate DCNs to prevent such coordinated operations or take action to protect the users from manipulation. Course correction might no longer be an option for DCNs, as such incidents are facilitated by features that have been entrenched into their mechanics. With decisive state elections pending in 2022 in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Manipur, etc., these are developments that India should keep a close watch on. Information manipulation campaigns need not be restricted to foreign interference. They can be conducted within the country by vested interests of varying kinds. India must re-evaluate its methods to ensure that free and fair elections can take place without the electorate being subject to information operations. It is time India adopts a defensive strategy for manipulation from external actors on networked information ecosystems, including DCNs. However, ensuring that deterrent mechanisms of the State are not used for information operations within the country is critical. Treading that thin line is challenging but crucial to sustaining democratic processes. Matsyanyaaya #1: Signals and Signalling from Syndey— Arjun GargeyasLast week saw the world’s first-ever conference dedicated to emerging and critical technologies. The Syndey Dialogue, a brainchild of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), was held virtually from 17th to 19th of November. The presence and the delivery of keynote addresses from key political leaders emphasised the criticality of the dialogue. In the current digital and information age, emerging technologies have become both an intrinsic part of everybody’s lives as well as tools of statecraft. There was a common vision that echoed throughout the discussions at the dialogue: the design, deployment, and usage of these technologies need effective regulations to minimise the harms and maximise the benefits that critical and emerging technologies have to offer.Shaping global technology governance by democratic states and institutions across the globe was the single point of focus by the different panelists and dignitaries at the event. Finding the right balance of governance in the technology domain remains essential for the betterment of modern society. This can be achieved through the governance of technical standard-setting processes, design principles, ethical frameworks, and legal enforcement of technology legislations. Ensuring all democratic states a seat at the table for creating a uniform technology governance framework remains a primary objective as more technologies emerge that can prove to be economically and geopolitically significant. The need for democratic states to come together on technology governance was underlined by the challenges technology creates for government institutions. Technology remains a double-edged sword creating vulnerabilities for every advantage it creates. Tackling these vulnerabilities and challenges remains critical for ensuring a safe environment for those using technology as an enabler in their daily lives. The abuse of technology platforms for spreading disinformation by non-state actors has resulted in catastrophic consequences (COVID-19 vaccine misinformation resulted in the loss of many lives) for citizens and has resulted in some states piggybacking on online harms for gaining strategic advantage. There is also the fear of technology abuse by authoritarian regimes resulting in stifling their own citizens’ voices. The Quad’s recent take on technology has laid the groundwork for democracies around the world working towards fostering an open, accessible, and secure technology ecosystem. The all-important issue of protecting the privacy rights of individuals, especially in the wake of the Pegasus revelations, remains at the forefront of government tech policy objectives. Governments across the globe have the responsibility to keep the internet ‘open’ - away from surveillance and towards an inclusive, transparent system of data flows. The socio-economic influence of ‘Big Tech’ companies raises question marks over the issue of governments’ sovereignty in the technology domain. Basic regulatory practices, specific to the technology sphere, are the need of the hour for finding the right balance between protecting individuals and the industry’s rights.The Syndey Dialogue was a major step forward taken by technologically advanced states around the world to signal their governments’ intentions of playing a role in presiding over global technology governance frameworks. Emphasis was placed on the fact that certain rules cannot be left to the whims and fancies of private companies. Stress on the need for crucial legislation concerning the utilisation of technologies was signalled through the keynote addresses from major political leaders. The dialogue also underlined the commitment towards organising multi-group forums with the presence of private technology companies, government bodies, and civil society organisations for formulating effective policies concerning technologies. The lessons from Syndey show the intent of collaboration between democratic states to protect technology and its growth. Governments are now finding it imperative for their presence in the field. The sight of governments taking on an active role in shaping discourse related to critical and emerging technologies is something to watch out for. Matsyanyaaya #2: Pegging China’s Tech Power— Pranay Kotasthane(Crossposted from Anticipating the Unintended — a public policy newsletter by Pranay and RSJ)If one were to judge the technological prowess of a nation-state on the basis of daily news, China comes across as heads and shoulders above the rest. Hardly any day passes by without reports reminding us that China is well on its path to creating a self-reliant technology industry.While China’s technological progress is quite real, I want to list three caveats to make you recalibrate exponential growth projections and over-optimistic predictions about China’s tech ecosystem.1. CCP’s self-preservation imperativeAcross many critical sectors such as defence and technology, the CCP exaggerates its capabilities. This strategy is not meant to be just an information operation aimed at other nation-states. It is also a domestic imperative for the CCP, to create a perception that it has things under control at all times.Projecting control requires demonstrating success. For this reason, CCP propaganda projects promising initiatives by individual companies as world-beating solutions. What we forget is that such reportage is prone to survivorship bias — it overlooks the many companies and initiatives that have failed.Take the example of Tsinghua Unigroup — which made a lot of news in 2015 for its bid to buy the American memory chipmaker Micron. Once touted as China’s leading chip design house, it has failed to make any significant breakthroughs. As of now, it is reeling under debt, and the government is coordinating its buyout to another player. Similarly, companies such as the Wuhan Hongxin Semiconductor Project (HSMC), once projected to unleash China’s first seven-nanometer foundry, went bust last year. But you’ll hardly see reports about the costs and consequences of such failures.2. US’ Need to Align Domestic VectorsThe second reason we should be wary of tall claims is that it is in the interest of the US military-industrial complex to overplay China’s technology capabilities. Few things can fire national imagination like a well-equipped, seemingly more advanced adversary.Just as the Sputnik moment aligned the domestic constituencies in the US and resulted in path-breaking institutions such as the DARPA, overplaying China’s technological advances creates room for prioritising expenditure on key technologies and their governance structures.It’s not surprising then that the first National Strategy for Critical & Emerging Technologies (C&ET) put out by the Trump administration explicitly cautions against China’s pursuit to become a global leader in Science & Technology.As an example, consider the debate over semiconductor policy in the US. China’s shadow over East Asia has allowed the US semiconductor industry to make a persuasive case for higher incentives and government support.3. Opportunity Cost NeglectA lot of China’s technological success is being financed by governments at the city, provincial, and central levels. While the benefits and successes of these initiatives make news, the costs do not. And as a student of public policy, the first question that comes to my mind is: what is the opportunity cost of China’s governments pouring money, attention, and time into this quest for all-around self-reliance?Predicting a linear growth path based on current trends misses asking the opportunity cost question completely. In my view, the odds of getting anywhere near the US’ technological capabilities are stacked against China for three reasons.One, China’s per capita GDP is one-eighth of the US GDP per capita. Simply put, every dollar used in pursuit of one technology goal in China is eight times as costly as a dollar used for the same purpose in the US. With limited resources available, China might well be able to take a lead in a few areas, but the opportunity costs are likely to catch up much before it reaches anywhere near self-reliance.Two, until now, the opportunity costs were partially being borne by other countries, particularly the US. FDI from the US and uninhibited access for its citizens to the technology ecosystems of other countries allowed China to make rapid progress in key technology domains. That party is now over. The US is now acutely aware of the asymmetric advantage that China enjoyed in the old-world globalisation period. The US has already started putting in place restrictions on the movement of knowledge and capital to China. Under this changed geopolitical scenario, China’s technological superiority is far from inevitable.Take the example of the recent Alibaba announcement of Yitian 710 - a cutting-edge server chip. The Taiwanese foundry TSMC is the only company that can mass-produce this chip. And there are already murmurs in the US to restrict TSMC from accepting orders from Alibaba on the grounds that this chip can potentially have military applications.And three, the US still remains a vibrant destination attracting the best tech talent from across the world. Chinese governments, at various levels, can throw money but are unlikely to attract top global talent in the same manner. And in the high-tech domain, skilled labour holds the key.And so, the next time you come across another technological breakthrough in China, take a deep breath and consider if any of the three factors outlined in this note modulates the hype.Our Reading Menu[Paper] Algorithmic Governance and the International Politics of Big Tech by Swati Srivatsava. Perspectives on Politics. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–12. doi: 10.1017/S1537592721003145[Article] How the Kremlin has weaponized the Facebook files by Jessica Brandt[Book] The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia Studies[Takshashila Unredacted Note] about Russia's Direct Ascent Anti Satellite Test on 15th November 2021 by Aditya Pareek and Aditya Ramanathan, who are also contributors to this Newsletter. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Cyberpolitik #1: France’s Influence Operations Doctrine— Prateek WaghreIn October, France announced a new doctrine for Information Warfare. This development has received surprisingly little attention in English-language discourse over the last three weeks. It was initially reported by Francesco Busseletti, who highlighted: Objective: to counter the growing spread of fake news and disinformation, aimed at weakening the image of Paris and weakening its armed forces, especially abroad such as the Sahel. Considering that its adversaries no longer hesitate to use the weapon of social media against its military operations, France intends to “win the war before the war”. Its strategy boils down to “being on the offensive” …The Defence Minister Florence Parly’s speech also highlighted this aspect of the “war before the war”. Here’s an excerpt from a google-translated version of her speech.“When used wisely, the weapon of information allows you to win without fighting.”What does the doctrine say?The doctrine identifies six characteristics of the “informational layer of cyberspace”:Contraction of space and time.Ability to conceal/falsify origin due to anonymity.Difficulty with erasing information since it can be duplicated, moved, and re-used without the original context.Any individual can produce and broadcast information. (The minister’s speech seems to have gone as far as stating these individual and anonymous actors are at par with media organisations)The point is that social networks have an equalizing power: on Twitter, the voice of an anonymous user counts as much as that of a major media whose essential function is to inform (sic).Continuous innovation such as deepfakes, AI, AR/VR, etc.The presence of operators who impose their own regulations. A challenge for law enforcement as the space is ‘dematerialised.It defines two types of actors that threaten armed forces:Noting that information war is already an everyday reality for the military, it goes on to say that ‘mastery’ in the information field is now a pre-condition for ‘operational superiority’. And that cyberspace offers opportunities to create effects in ‘both information and physical environments’. The document is peppered with many important statements about Lutte Informatique D’influence (L2I).Definition:military operations conducted in the informational layer of cyberspace to detect, characterize and counter attacks, support StratCom, provide information or (perform) deception, independently or in combination with other operations.L2I stands at “the confluence of cyber defence and influence”. And that it requires skills in common with LID (defensive cyber operations) and LIO (offensive cyber operations).L2I offers opportunities for ‘intelligence gathering’ and ‘deception' operations’. (The minister’s speech defined some boundaries explicitly)the French armies will not conduct an information operation (within) the national territory. The French armies … will not destabilize a foreign state through information actions that would target, for example, its electoral processes.As future challenges, the doctrine identifies the need to build skills and tools, as well as cooperation with firms that specialise in the field and coalitions with allies to coordinate responses.Operationally, this would fall within the purview of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces, who would further rely on the Cyber Defense Commander (COMCYBER) and specialised military units.Two more questionsFor France to come out and explicitly state its doctrine is undoubtedly a significant step. But this also raises two broader questions.What should other democracies do?What will DCN operators do?Camille Francois rightly points out that it raises the question of what democracies can/should do in this space and the possibility of gaining a better understanding of techniques used by countries not named - Russia, China, or Iran.Thomas Rid, in his book Active Measures, argues that liberal democracies cannot be good at disinformation. “For liberal democracies in particular, disinformation represents a double threat: being at the receiving end of active measures will undermine democratic institutions—and giving in to the temptation to design and deploy them will have the same result. It is impossible to excel at disinformation and at democracy at the same time. The stronger and the more robust a democratic body politic, the more resistant to disinformation it will be—and the more reluctant to deploy and optimize disinformation. Weakened democracies, in turn, succumb more easily to the temptations of active measures.”Then, there’s the question of Digital Communication Networks which have become the battlefield for such operations. As Lukasz Olenik notes in his overview of the French doctrine, Facebook has taken action against Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour it identified originating from a network with links to the French Military in December 2020:We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in Francophone Africa. Although the people behind it attempted to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links to individuals associated with French military.Now that France has explicitly stated its doctrine (and maybe others will follow), will platforms act more aggressively, considering they are already under fire for either enabling or not doing enough to mitigate the fallout from influence operations? Or, will there be wink-wink-nudge-nudge arrangements between them and a particular set of states?Note: Google Translate was used for French to English translations.If you enjoy this newsletter please consider taking our 12 week Graduate Certificate Programmes in Technology & Policy, Public Policy, Defence & Foreign Affairs and Health & Life Sciences. Click here to apply and know more. You can also get a gift coupon worth ₹1000 every time you successfully refer a friend to our programmes.Siliconpolitik #1: AI Chips — Arjun GargeyasWhat are They?One of the emerging applications of semiconductor devices is the concept of Artificial Intelligence (AI) chips. With new and emerging technologies cropping up, there is an increased need for chipsets with increasing computational power and capabilities. Technologies like Machine Learning and Deep Neural Networks, which are part of the AI ecosystem, have a tremendous workload that cannot be fulfilled by traditional chipsets. AI algorithms work on parallel processing or parallelism, which is the ability to multitask and simultaneously run different computational processes. AI chips, in recent years, have tried to incorporate the needs of AI algorithms into chipsets that can be used both in the cloud as well as at network edges (in smartphones, tablets, and other consumer devices).The diverse applications of AI chips have increased its role in the global economy with companies from various industries all looking to maximise the benefits of AI chip technology. Robotics and autonomous driving, for example, need AI algorithms for efficient and effective working, with the computational power of the chipsets needing incredibly fast processing speeds. This has evolved the role of chipsets with AI capabilities from only being used in the cloud or servers to being used in consumer products at the network edges. However, applications such as Biometrics and Image Recognition need AI chips in the cloud or servers for maintaining a large amount of data. The use of AI chips remains integral in data centers which eventually reduces operational costs and improves information management. Why They MatterThe market for AI chips has consistently increased in the last decade with AI chipsets projected to account for 22% of the global AI revenue by 2022. A strong compounded annual growth rate of 54% has been projected for the AI chips market with technologically advanced regions like the Americas and Europe dominating the market in the future. AI chips also rely on a variety of companies, ranging from smartphone manufacturers like Apple, Samsung, and Huawei, to traditional chip designers like Qualcomm and MediaTek, to intellectual property (IP) license providers like ARM. With most of the major semiconductor companies across the world in the business, AI chips look to be the next big thing for the industry. Semiconductor companies have already thrown their hats in the AI ring with the development of advanced AI chips like Graphical Processing Units (GPUs). NVIDIA has a dedicated application programming language called CUDA used in parallel computing on GPUs. Other targeted AI chips like Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) and Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) are developed for specific applications of AI technology. Companies like Microsoft and Google have also invested in the manufacture of these chipsets keeping in mind specific needs such as the speech processing unit of Google Assistant.With increasing global economic revenue and a large market ripe for capture, the presence of China in the AI chips has also been increasing. AI chip funding activity in China has been driven by the hope of creating industry-leading capabilities in machine learning, deep compression, pruning, and system-level optimization for neural networks. Chinese technology companies like Alibaba and Huawei have invested heavily in the manufacture of AI chips for smartphones and other devices. Some Bitcoin mining equipment manufacturers are also getting into the AI optimization game. With domestic AI research in China still playing catch up to the capabilities of Western countries like the United States, these local manufacturing companies have relied on tweaking existing algorithms to create modified AI models. But increased investments along with state support and financing, similar to the semiconductor industry in China, has made AI chips an important technology worth pursuing in technologically adept states. The race for the domination of the global AI chips markets is something to watch out for in the very near future. Cyberpolitik #2: Are Norms Possible?— Sapni G KSince the last edition of this newsletter, much has happened on cyberspace and international action for establishing norms for its operation and regulation. The United States of America joined the Paris Call for Trust and Security in the cyberspace. The 2018 Call led by the French, proposes a multi-stakeholder model for laying down norms for activity in cyberspace during peacetime. This includes, but is not limited to cybersecurity and the concerns of systemic harms to individuals and critical infrastructure. The Call details nine principles that are open for states, local governments, companies, and civil society organizations to support.  Protect individuals and infrastructureProtect the internet Defend electoral processes Defend intellectual propertyNon-proliferation Lifecycle security Cyber hygiene No private hack back International norms They incorporate norms of international law, including the ideas put forth by the UDHR, customary international law, and state laws on the governance of information and communication technologies. This operates as a non-binding, non-enforceable set of principles that are to guide the supporters of the Call and their actions. Most major US tech companies including Microsoft, Google, Facebook Inc (now Meta) are already supporters of the Call and have engaged closely with the various associated working groups. However, the US officially supporting the Call signals that it is no longer holding back in international norm-setting in cyberspace. This could also be read as a furtherance of the USA’s reinvigorated interest in cyber norms, both in peacetime and military applications, as evidenced by recent documents such as the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and the recent report by the Department of Defense. However, it is noteworthy that the US has not yet made any concrete steps to sign up to the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, an effort led by research institutes in the Netherlands and Singapore with the support of the French, Dutch, and Singapore governments,  which is also engaged in drawing out international norms for cyberspace during peacetime and armed conflict. China, Russia, Israel, and Iran are other major actors in cyberspace that have not supported the call yet. This is indicative of the fissures in international norm-setting on cyberspace, particularly when China is marching ahead creating a regulatory environment that can have ripple effects internationally. India has not officially supported the Call, but several Indian enterprises and the Karnataka Centre of Excellence of Cybersecurity have joined the Call. It is a proposal worth consideration for the Indian government. An early head start can give India a definitive say in the development of doctrines as well as import legislative principles that can be beneficial to the many millions of Indians who go online every day.  Siliconpolitik #2: US-China-Chips — It’s Complicated— Pranay KotasthaneThree recent news reports have turned the world's attention back to the links between the US and China in the semiconductor domain. Until now, the commonplace understanding is that the US is focused on constraining China's progress in the semiconductor domain, a weak link in China's otherwise impressive technology stack. These news reports contest this narrative by suggesting the constraints don't seem to be working, as many US investors and firms are still flocking to China.WSJ reports that between 2017 and 2020, many US companies, including Intel, have invested in Chinese design companies. The number of deals (58) has more than doubled when compared to the 2013-2016 period.Bloomberg reports Intel wanted to start a manufacturing plant in Chengdu, but the White House officials discouraged it.These reports come on the heels of another big claim in mid-October, when Alibaba unveiled a 5nm server chip, making many heads turn. This news seemed to indicate that China's pursuit of semiconductor self-sufficiency is bearing fruit despite the geopolitical headwinds.Connecting the DotsIntel seems to be interested in China a lot. While the WSJ report showed that Intel is among the active investors in a Chinese Electronic Design Automation (EDA) firm, the Bloomberg report points out that Intel also wants to build a fab in Chengdu. It’s notable that both these stages of the semiconductor value chain are precisely where the US had planned to restrict Chinese access during the Trump administration. Reportedly, the US NSA Jake Sullivan and a few senators, want to change the investment screening methods to prevent such deals in the future.Why are US companies still rushing to China?The supply side: The Chinese government's incentives are 'crowding in' investments from Chinese firms and global semiconductor players alike.The demand side: A significant number of customers of chip makers are based in China - laptop manufacturers, phone manufacturers, servers etc. Companies still want a piece of that pie because homegrown alternatives in China are not enough, yet. It's a mouth-watering market, still.My initial assessmentThe number of investment deals between 2017-20 (58) doesn't sound that big in the overall scheme of things. They also mostly appear to be in chip design firms. What this does suggest is like many industrial policies, there is a crowding-in of capital. When a player the size of the Chinese government throws big money at a problem (starting the Chip Fund in 2014), this is expected to happen. There will be national champions and duds, both. The question really is, how long such subsidies can be sustained.The time period 2017-2020 suggests that the US companies rushed into China before the Trump administration tightened the export controls.Intel's investment in a Chinese EDA firm and a possible fab is indeed worrying. Although, the tone of the Chengdu fab proposal suggests it is more a tactic to get the CHIPS Act passed in the US, which will guarantee big subsidies for the likes of Intel back home. The report had no numbers, or plans, just a few unnamed sources.The demand side question is an important one. As long as China remains the hub for electronics Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), chip makers will find it attractive to sell their products to China. Solving this will require a plurilateral effort to move electronics manufacturing -- and not leading-edge chip manufacturing alone -- out of China.Finally, the Alibaba server chip news report has many unknowns. Unveiling a chip is different from being able to produce it. Manufacturing at 5nm is not possible in China. They must rely on TSMC (and now Samsung) for this purpose. Moreover, the processor IP is still ARM, something that Alibaba hasn't been able to displace.The reportage of the kind WSJ, Bloomberg is putting out is indicative of the change in mindset in the US. A few years ago, no one would have even cared about such investments. These are front-page news items now.I expect some more export controls and more subsidies from the US government, both.Our Reading Menu1. [Full Text] of the Paris Call for Trust and Security in the cyberspace2. [Full Text] 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance of the White house 3. [Policy Study] Principles for Content Policy and Governance by Chris Riley, R Street 4. [Article] by Oleg Shakirov discussing the US-Russia rapprochement on Information and Cyber Security5. [Blog] by Oleg Shakirov explaining why US-Russia cooperation on countering Ransomware threats makes sense This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Siliconpolitik: India and Taiwan Want to Complement Each Other’s Strengths — Arjun GargeyasThere were reports earlier this month that Indian and Taiwanese officials had met to discuss the possibility of a $7.5 billion investment in India by the Taiwanese government and its premier semiconductor foundry, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). This was to set up a long-pending state-of-the-art semiconductor manufacturing facility in the country. While India has been strong at semiconductor IC design, it has also made efforts to create a presence in fabrication. Taiwan, on the other world, dominates the semiconductor manufacturing market, with two of its major companies, TSMC and UMC, jointly accounting for over 60% of the global revenue in manufacturing and fabrication. With Taiwan’s presence in the semiconductor IC design also growing gradually with companies like MediaTek looking to challenge the fabless American firms, the Indian semiconductor fraternity’s experience in the design cycle is attractive for Taiwanese design firms looking to upscale their operations.Semiconductor manufacturing has been at the heart of a possible technology alliance between the two states. However, with both India and Taiwan having their own comparative advantages in the semiconductor industry, there is significant potential for collaboration in other areas of the semiconductor supply chain. Research and Development: The government of India has, for a long time, envisioned setting up a semiconductor fabrication facility in the country that can indulge in cutting-edge research. Its attempt started way back in the 1980s with the establishment of the Semiconductor Company Limited (SCL). But a major fire and sluggish innovation have now restricted SCL to research in specific fields like space technology. Taiwan’s semiconductor success story lies in its consistent investments, funded by the Taiwanese government itself in research and development to improve semiconductor manufacturing processes. India and Taiwan should look to invest in an R&D center that can bring together both semiconductor firms and universities from both states.Design: Though Taiwan’s stranglehold over the semiconductor industry originates from its ‘Pure Play Foundry’ business model focusing on manufacturing semiconductors for its clients, the IC design ecosystem in the country has gradually grown, dominated by firms like MediaTek. However, these semiconductor design firms indulge in the low-cost design of trailing edge nodes as an alternative to the Western companies’ products. The major market for Taiwanese design firms remains the Chinese mainland. With relations deteriorating between the two countries, Taiwanese firms will look at alternative markets. India, with its ever-increasing demand for high technology products, can step into the role. A thriving semiconductor design services market in the country can also help Taiwanese firms reach the level of American firms with the Indian workforce’s expertise in the field.Assembly and Testing: While India’s ambitions to invest in a semiconductor fabrication facility are commendable, the costs associated with semiconductor manufacturing remain very high. Exorbitant equipment costs and the need to pump in investments regularly can hamper India’s plan to become a major player in the foundry business. Instead, India, which has already gained expertise in downstream assembly and testing processes can look at Outsourced Assembly and Test (OSAT) opportunities. With low-skilled labor only needed, unlike semiconductor manufacturing, India can serve as a source of low cost and low skilled labor for Taiwanese firms like ASE Technology and Powertech Technology, which look to outsource such operations offshore. The Indian government’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) has also released schemes like SPECS to attract foreign firms for OSAT operations. The Scheme for Promotion of Manufacturing of Electronic Components and Semiconductors (SPECS) will provide a financial incentive of 25% on capital expenditure for the identified list of electronic goods that comprise downstream value chain of electronic products, i.e., electronic components, semiconductor/ display fabrication units, ATMP units, specialized sub-assemblies and capital goods for manufacture of aforesaid goods, all of which involve high value-added manufacturing. India and Taiwan’s technology trade has gradually increased in the last two decades. With increasing technological cooperation between the two countries, the semiconductor industry, and both their complementary strengths in it offer a great opportunity for better collaboration in the domain. This can cover a wide area in the supply chain, going beyond just the talk on semiconductor manufacturing and fabrication facilities. If you enjoy the contents of this newsletter consider reading and subscribing to China Tech Dispatch for weekly updates on China’s military and civilian tech sectors. Yogakshema: Is it Worth Debating Responsible Behaviour in Cyberspace and Outer Space?— Aditya PareekThe Japanese Defence Minister Nobuo Kishi recently remarked that "An invasion may begin without anyone realizing it, and a war may be fought without the use of military forces." The challenges Kishi alludes to are aggravated when taking hightech domains like cyberspace and outer space into account. There is a lot of shadowy, hard-to-attribute activity associated with rendezvous and proximity operations(RPO)s in outer space as well as in cyber attacks. With near misses in outer space and major attacks against infrastructure and finances via the use of cyberspace, a lot of finger pointing between states ensues.There is a multilateral push for figuring out rules of the road or more formally, to establish some mechanism to set norms for responsible behaviour in cyberspace and outer space. Two draft resolutions have been submitted to the UN General Assembly’s First Committee that try to address these topics. The first is earmarked as agenda item 95 titled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, and advancing responsible State behaviour in the use of information and communications technologies”. The second is earmarked as agenda item 98 (d) “Prevention of an arms race in outer space: reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours”.India and China are both absent from the list of sponsors of both resolutions for the moment, but this may change as the time nears for the UNGA to take a general votes on the resolutions.At first glance the subject and titles of the two draft resolutions might seem to be signalling some sort of consensus emerging in the UNGA simultaneously over norms of responsible behaviour in cyberspace and outer space. However, on closer study, the two draft resolutions are reflective of the same tense international relationships which are the cause for friction in these domains in the first place. On the draft dealing with cybersapce, as Elena Chernenko of Kommersant (a Russian business media outlet) points out in her reporting, The development of a joint draft document by Russia and the United States can be considered an important event, if only because in recent years the two countries have often acted in the UN as rivals or even adversaries. And the subject of cybersecurity, until recently, was no exception in this regard.    As expected of a document prepared as a compromise between geopolitical adversaries, it features very amenable language while clearly highlighting that its contents are aimed at “voluntary, non-binding norms” which “do not seek to limit or prohibit action that is otherwise consistent with international law” in cyberspace.The draft dealing with responsible behaviour in outer space features sponsors countries that enjoy good relations with the US. Some of these sponsors are lesser adversaries in their own right to Russia, like the United Kingdom and Poland. The draft notably has several references to “a combination of legally binding obligations and political commitments” as being essential on issues ranging from “instruments on the prevention of an arms race in outer space” to a more broadly focused issue of “space security”. These references to legally binding obligations will likely dissuade a lot of state including some major powers that prefer to achieve their political goals via the use of asymmetric means. If a consensus is not likely and some major powers will continue to keep their options open, then the whole point of the resolutions becomes moot. Whatever toothless guidelines the resolutions incorporate will be ignored and worse may even be flouted, degrading the momentum and credibility of the international efforts that went in the drafting of these resolutions.Cyberpolitik: Going Meta— Sapni G KMired in controversy and bad press, the Facebook Company has been having some of the worst days of its existence. The last couple of months saw it facing suits that pushed for breaking up the company to whistle-blower revelations which contradicted multiple positions it took while addressing allegations raised against it. Amidst these serious allegations, it has also been trying to reinvent itself to attract and retain more users on its various platforms. After weeks of conversations led by CEO Mark Zuckerberg on the metaverse, the company has found a home in that idea to find a better future for itself.The term "metaverse" has its origins in Snow Crash, the 1992 dystopian science fiction novel by Neal Stephenson ( who clarified that he has got nothing do with the company). The book envisions metaverse as a full-fledged alternate reality built in a virtual space. Life is brutal on the metaverse, but it is worse in Snow Crash's real world. This virtual escape fuelled further science fiction writing on the idea, now culminating in the world's largest social media company changing its name to " Meta" to reflect its interest in building the metaverse future. Meta now holds the range of apps such as Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, and technologies such as Oculus.In the keynote introducing Meta, Zuckerberg outlined his vision for the metaverse as a space different from the siloed worlds created by the social media age. He sees it as a collection of protocols that are interoperable and not owned by one company. Here users can jump into the virtual to connect with others and have experiences in different worlds. Meta is not pioneering the idea. Epic Games and Roblox have already created similar worlds, where some failed decades ago. However, it is trying to shift the status quo from today's walled gardens to open protocols. This is a huge leap in Meta's ethos (RIP the Facebook Company) which rallied ahead by creating siloed spaces. It is also reflective of how our platformised lives are moving further towards gamification.Critics and industry observers have called this a gimmick to divert attention from the pressing issues raised against the company. Even if that were the case, changing the name of the company will do little to save it from public ire and demands for addressing these concerns better. However, it is worth noting this change in priorities as we continue to look to fix the problems in the social media platforms. While Zuckerberg proclaimed that 'since the Metaverse isn't here yet, this offers a chance for policymakers to stop playing catch up with technology but direct its development and regulation', Meta would not be the desirable choice for many to drive this change. Its shady track record in norm-setting on platform governance only exacerbates worries.For India, this change might currently have no visible difference. Access to today's Metaverse is limited, mostly through expensive VR headsets. The penetration of such technologies in India is limited, though growing. However, learning from the smartphone boom, India could see this as an opportunity to amp up the capabilities in manufacturing of the devices and development of software that are necessary for interacting in the metaverse. The manufacturing and design economies can gain from this. A thriving design and manufacturing economy could also have knock-on effects creating more professionals who understand the functioning of the "metaverse" better. Finally, it can give India a seat on the table in virtual reality/metaverse regulation and policymaking, which in current nascent stages in restricted to China, the EU and, the USA.Yogakshema: Hyperbole Over Hypersonics — Aditya RamanathanIn a television interview on 27 October, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark A. Milley acknowledged reports of recent Chinese tests of hypersonic weapons. Presumably seeking to strike a balance between underplaying and overplaying the significance of the tests, Milley described them as “a very significant event,” adding that  “I don’t know if it's quite a Sputnik moment but I think it’s very close to that.”The cliche of a “Sputnik moment” refers to the dawn of the space age. The Soviet launch of the world’s first artificial satellite, on 4 October 1957, sparked fears in the US that it was being left behind, and spurred its own space programme. In the years since, politicians have used the phrase to evoke the sense of a much-needed wake-up call for the US . President Barack Obama called the recession of 2008-09 a “Sputnik moment” and Senator John Kerry used the term in the context of clean energy technology.  Roger Launius, senior curator of the NASA museum’s space history division summarised the parable of the “Sputnik moment” the best:"A Sputnik moment is a trigger mechanism, an event that makes people collectively say that they need to do something, and this sets a course in another direction".Are China’s new capabilities significant enough for the US to rejig its defence priorities? Not quite. The Hypersonic Rationale: Let’s begin by trying to understand what exactly it was that China tested in July and August of this year. On 21 October, The Financial Times reported that China used a Long March rocket to launch a “fractional orbital bombardment” system that, in turn, carried a hypersonic glide vehicle. The Soviets experimented with fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) in the 1960s. The broad idea of FOBS was to evade US early warning systems that were largely focused towards the North Pole. It would achieve this by launching a craft that would only complete a partial orbit before de-orbiting and plunging towards its target on Earth. Theoretically, a FOBS system would allow the Soviets to attack the US via the South Pole, and achieve complete surprise. The Soviets deployed small numbers of such systems for about two decades during the Cold War.That leaves us with hypersonic boost glide vehicles. While regular long-range ballistic missiles such as ICBMS use space as a rapid-transit zone to reach distant spots on Earth, boost glides fly at much flatter trajectories, below the 100-kilometre that marks the boundary between the upper atmosphere and space. The key advantages of boost-glides are that their flatter trajectories allow them to hide behind the Earth’s curvature for longer periods (thus delaying detection) and that navigation technologies allow them to manoeuvre unpredictably on their approach to a target, possibly making interception even harder. So why is China developing such systems? The short answer is the US ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme. And China is not alone in this effort. In 2018, Russia unveiled a series of experimental systems designed specifically to evade US ballistic missile defences. These included a long-range ballistic missile that could approach the continental United States via the South Pole as well as a cruise missile with a nuclear-powered engine that would give it unprecedented range. If the Russians and Chinese are resorting to such exotic weapons, we must ask two questions. One, are they the only solution for tackling US BMD? And two, do hypersonic boost glides have problems of their own?The Uncertain Glory of BMD: The current US BMD programme has its origins in 2002, when the country withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The political pretext for this move was the 9/11 attacks. The technological rationale was the revolution in sensory and computing technology that allowed for far more accurate tracking and targeting of incoming missiles. Some also argue that US BMDs also continue to provide it with negotiating leverage in any future arms control talks.However, while US BMDs are far more effective today than they were even a decade ago, they still face two fundamental obstacles: they have at best a 50% chance of successfully intercepting a ballistic missile, and they’re far more expensive. In short, BMDs are expensive and only partially effective. US BMDs are not meant to defend against a full-fledged attack by another state; they’re only meant to stop stray missiles, either from a rogue launch or from the remnants of an adversary’s nuclear arsenal after most of it has been destroyed. The reality is that an arsenal of regular ICBMs, each  with bristling with  multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and decoys is more than a match for BMDs. Exotic weapons like boost-glides are at best an augmentation to existing capabilities. The Limited Advantages of FOBS and Boost Glides: While FOBS and boost-glides may have their place, there’s a reason why the USSR did not rely heavily on such systems during the Cold War. FOBS weapons need a small rocket to de-orbit, meaning a reduced payload. And today’s boost-glides can carry only a single warhead. Therefore, a combined FOBS-boost glide system will only carry a single, relatively small warhead. Also, since boost-glides actually travel at lower speeds than ICBM warheads on re-entry, they may actually become easier to intercept in the future. The Prospects: Nothing is settled in the matter of long-range missiles. New developments could make boost glides and FOBS more accurate and capable of delivering greater payloads. BMD systems could also become more effective in the future. As of now, however, we must acknowledge that whatever China tested earlier this year, was probably not revolutionary, and hardly amounts to a Sputnik moment.Our Reading Menu[Opinon] Facebook and YouTube’s vaccine misinformation problem is simpler than it seems by Will Oremus on Wahsington Post [Opinons] Why Facebook has become Meta on Financial Times by Hannah Murphy and Madhumita Murgia[Book] Tiger Technology: The Creation of a Semiconductor Industry in East Asia [Article] Russia, China, The US: Who will win the Hypersonic Arms Race? [Paper] Outer Space and Cyberspace: A Tale of Two Security Realms This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Siliconpolitik: Where Do We Go Now?— Pranay KotasthaneI have a follow-up paper for NUS-ISAS discussing the next steps for the Quad Semiconductor Supply Chain initiative. I argue that the Quad Principles Document on Technology Design, Development, Governance and Use is a good reference point for the collaboration on semiconductors.An initiative to map capacity and identify vulnerabilities is a welcome first step. However, a lot more needs to be done to create a secure, resilient semiconductor supply chain. Another vital document released on 24th September — the Quad Principles on Technology Design, Development, Governance, and Use document — serves as a helpful guide for realising the ultimate goal. This section maps key principles in the document to potential initiatives in the semiconductor domain.One, the document on principles argues that resilient, diverse, and secure technology supply chains are vital to the shared national interests of the Quad countries. To achieve this goal, the document advocates "close cooperation on supply chains with allies and partners who share our values” since this “will enhance our security and prosperity, and strengthen our capacity to respond to international disasters and emergencies."A way to map this principle to the semiconductor domain would be to form a Quad semiconductor consortium that manages a jointly held Quad Supply Chain Resilience Fund. This consortium can then create a roadmap for new semiconductor manufacturing facilities across the Quad countries. The goal should be to ensure redundancy in the ecosystem such that this supply chain is not susceptible to geopolitical or geographic risks. For instance, while the US focuses on restarting manufacturing at leading-edge nodes (5 nanometres and below), the consortium could work together to build specialised analog, memory foundries operating at trailing-edge nodes (45nm and above) in India, Japan, or Australia.Another way to realise this principle is for the consortium to create one centre for excellence (CoE) in each Quad country in an area of its immediate interest. For example, Australia could host the CoE for new materials in electronics, Japan could host the CoE for silicon manufacturing equipment, while the US and India could host CoEs on fabless design architectures.Two, the principles document recognises the importance of "international standards development that foster interoperability, compatibility, and inclusiveness." This principle can translate into cooperation on developing new standards for open-standard instruction set architectures such as RISC-V and for manufacturing on semiconductor composites such as Gallium Nitride.Three, the principles document underscores that the Quad countries are "committed to facilitating the exchange of researchers and movement of highly skilled personnel to enhance science and technology collaboration". This applies well to semiconductor R&D cooperation, where governments can do a lot to foster technology exchange, visitation and research participation, and joint development between companies in the Quad countries. For instance, lowering employment barriers for semiconductor professionals in the Quad countries could facilitate more joint development. Beyond skilled personnel movement, lowering investment barriers and export controls within the Quad bubble can facilitate more cross-licensing arrangements.Further, I identify three key factors that could determine how far this initiative goes:One, the US needs to review its approach to technology protection in the semiconductor domain. Given that US-headquartered companies alone account for 62 per cent of global fabless firm revenues and 51 per cent of global integrated design manufacturers (IDM) revenues, the US role in creating a resilient supply chain is critical.In the past, the US government adopted strict trade and regulatory mechanisms restricting technology transfer. This restrictive approach needs to give way to a collaborative mode in the Quad. In a paper titled "An Allied Approach to Semiconductor Leadership", Stephen Ezell lists some measures that the US could take. These include enrolling partner countries in trusted foundries programmes, co-investing in semiconductor moonshots, reducing export controls, lowering foreign investment screening barriers with like-minded countries, and sharing information on intellectual property theft. Just as the US is now willing to share critical technologies with partners through the AUKUS defence arrangement, an allied approach should be adopted in the semiconductor domain.Two, all four Quad countries need to work to increase trust in each other's legal enforcement mechanisms. The four members need to harmonise their contract enforcement, regulatory practices, and patent protection mechanisms. Such measures will encourage companies to collaborate across borders.Three, the Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative should become a platform that coalesces other powers in this domain, such as Taiwan, South Korea, Israel, Singapore, and the European Union (EU). The larger the grouping of like-minded countries, the more resilient and secure the semiconductor supply chain is likely to be. What do you think?Antriksh Matters #1:Lab On A Chip for Space Missions— Ruturaj GowaikarIndian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and Indian Institute of Science (IISc) have jointly prepared a device to conduct cell biology-based experiments in space. The device, called MANAS, Sanskrit for Mind  stands for Microbial Analysis in Space. It  is a technology demonstrator and uses the lab-on-a-chip (LOC) concept. The details of this device were published in the Journal Acta Astronautica.Cell-biology experiments in spaceMicrogravity, as experienced in space, be it in low earth orbit (LEO) or outer space, can affect various cell processes at the cellular and subcellular level. These effects can vary from alteration to the cytoskeleton and shape of a cell, to alteration in the metabolism of cells. The effect of this is that pathogenic microbes might behave differently in space and insight into their growth dynamics can have a bearing on the health of personnel involved in manned-space missions. Altered growth rates  also affect microbial output of space bioreactors being developed for manned missions. The aim of these bioreactors is to produce protein-based medicines, help in recycling water on-board etc.  in order to reduce frequency of re-supply missions. India’s manned space mission- Gaganyaan – is underway and platforms like MANAS are useful to conduct preparatory experiments for future missioClonger durations.Design of MANASMANAS is a milli-fluidic device that was fabricated using 3D printing while some components were CNC machined. It consists of a cylindrical cavity in an aluminum block called the bacterial chamber and some smaller antechambers. It is surrounded by optically transparent material (PMMA) plates. This allows the LED and photo-diode sensors to measure optical cell density-the standard way to count cells using principles of spectroscopy. It has a modular design so multiple such chambers can be housed together to form cassettes designed specifically to conduct one experiment. Such multiple cassettes can also be loaded as cartridges to perform different experiments. The device has a microcontroller to initiate the experiment remotely, measure the optical density (OD), and store data on-board.MANAS was tested using the spore forming bacteria Sporosarcina pasteurii. The bacteria were deactivated metabolically by converting them into spores. Spores were then lyophilized and suspended in a sucrose solution and loaded into MANAS, while the nutrient media was kept in a different chamber separated by a NC solenoid. The OD scores were a readout for the growth and were used to prepare growth curves. The growth curves were cross-validated using electron-microscopy. MANAS was tested under vacuum conditions and altered atmospheric conditions as well.The bacteria chosen is also significant because it is an ureolytic bacteria and thus can prepare calcium carbonate crystals. ISRO research on this bacterium has made it a contender to form space bricks for lunar habitation.Thus, this self-contained, leak proof, orientation-agnostic, remotely operable LOC platform is one small step in the right direction  for India’s space research programme. The next step is to test it in flight mode and design more complex experiments.Antriksh Matters #2: Lessons from UK’s National Space Strategy— Aditya PareekThe UK has come out with its first ever national space strategy document. The document builds on the UK’s Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper that came out earlier this year and featured space prominently.The strategy document has several aspects which any similar strategic publication on space by India could also take inspiration from and integrate:1. A focus on “Whole Ecosystem Approach” for the advancement of the Indian space sector.2. Focus on procurement of dual-use space technologies and platforms for the fulfilment of national space goals - without compromising on the deliverable specs.3. Focus on making space sustainable by actively contributing to space debris removal, and explore technologies and services that may extend the service life of satellites and other space objects while in orbit.4. Earmarking a venture capital fund for private finance access to New Space sector companies - along the lines of UK’s Seraphim Space Investment Trust.5. Acknowledge the operating environment vis a vis adversarial counterspace capabilities and include a back-of-the-envelope estimate for potential damage they can inflict on Indian economy.Check out the All Things Policy Podcast featuring our take on the UK’s national space strategy here.If the content in this newsletter interests you, consider taking up Takshashila’s short course on Evidence-based policy-making for responding to COVID-19. The course introduces participants to the various public policy aspects of managing recurring COVID-19 waves. Topics will include the role of the government, tackling misinformation, ethical decision-making during a pandemic, and the adoption of emerging technologies to fight the pandemic. You can register yourself for this course on or before 21st October 2021. To know more, click here.Yogakshema: An US-EU Tech Partnership in the Making— Arjun GargeyasOfficials from both the European Union (EU) and United States (US) met in Pittsburgh a couple of weeks back for the first-ever meeting of the “EU-US Trade and Technology Council” (TTC). This comes on the back of the Quad summit, where technology played an important role in the discussions, especially in outlining the main objectives of the ‘Critical and Emerging Technologies Working Group’ by the alliance. It is also following the declaration of the AUKUS pact, with the US and UK signing agreements to transfer nuclear submarine technology to Australia. The rise of China and its influence on the global technology ecosystem through its tech giants have made the West, and especially the United States, take a fresh look at mechanisms for regulating and using critical technologies. Despite sharing concerns with regard to China’s technological growth and the global semiconductor chip shortage, the US and EU have very differing views on how to regulate the use of technology. The new EU-US technology council will have a hard time navigating the partnership as it looks to counter China’s tech dominance. Trying to Find a Middle GroundThe European Union’s approach to regulating and governing technology has evolved from an individual-centric approach keeping in mind the rights of its citizens. Fundamental rights like privacy have been accorded the greatest importance when it comes to framing laws related to technology. This can be seen from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Act, which addresses data protection and privacy in the European Union along with protecting personal data from being shared outside the EU area. The EU has been willing to intervene when it feels that the rights of European citizens have been infringed upon by any public or private entity. The United States, on the other hand, has always followed a minimal regulatory framework on technology. It has stressed how multiple rules and regulations might hamper the growth of emerging technologies. Following a market-driven and hands-off approach to governing technology, the United States has let the private sector and institutions take the lead while providing just minimal responsibilities to the state. This makes it necessary for both the actors to arrive at a compromise. But this kind of differential pattern also allows for both to complement each other’s strengths. The partnership can eventually help the EU obtain the geopolitical relevance that the US owns in the field while the US can obtain the rights and freedoms relevance that the EU policies champion. However, this requires political alignment which is yet to be seen between the two. Time will tell whether both will compromise on the principles they follow while regulating technology.The French Reservation While the first summit of the US-EU TTC focused on the ongoing semiconductor shortages, regulation of artificial intelligence technology, and the upholding of competition in tech, reports said that there were some grumblings from a certain EU member regarding the discussions which took place at the summit. French diplomats specifically asked to remove certain clauses and language which referred to a proposed semiconductor supply chain that mentioned the mutual dependency between the US and EU.France also has differing opinions when it comes to the security of supply aspects with it looking beyond just semiconductor chips as a potential shortage of supply. This has made the French stress on a rather cautious approach towards a potential US-EU partnership, with it emphasising the need to rebuild transatlantic trust.The French anger over the AUKUS deal seems to have subsided but the overall reservation they hold can put the brakes on the working of the TTC, which looks to take off soon.What will the focus be on?The EU comprises over 25 different countries with contrasting views and interests. Other than the China-centric focus, the EU partnership with the US should be driven by easier access to and dissemination of technology. Foreign investments in each other’s regions and reducing dependencies on global supply chains of critical technologies should be the focus of the TTC. Better collaboration in the research and development field of emerging technologies between technically advanced blocs like the US and EU can eventually act as a counterbalancing measure against the increasing Chinese influence.The question which remains is, will the US and EU’s common anxieties and fears help to forge a credible working partnership or will the dream of a transatlantic technology group remain just a dream? George W. Bush and Barack Obama, during their time in office, tried bringing the EU to the table for better cooperation on technology but eventually failed. Will the rapid rise of China in the technology space during the past decade possibly provide a new impetus to the partnership?CyberPolitik : DCNs are trying Regulatory Fixes (Again, and again)— Sapni G KOver the past few editions, we have presented our working idea of what a Digital Communications Network is. Commentators across the globe have identified the difficulty in finding adequate regulatory responses to the fissures that appear in our lives that are intertwined with DCNs. We have also warned that regulatory fixes for the troubles of (some may say troubles caused by) DCNs are not easy to find. While policymakers across the globe scratch their heads looking for solutions, these DCNs have suggestions to offer. It is not the first time suggestions come from the very platforms that are due for regulation. Such overtures into policymaking have been attempted by every industry that attracted global attention, from telecom to tobacco. The technology industry itself has ventured into designing regulatory solutions. As governments are evidently not keen on this sort of self-regulation to continue, new tactics emerge from the playbooks of tech giants. Twitter released a position paper titled “Protecting the open Internet” on 13 October 2021. It outlines five broad guiding principles for the regulation of the internet. In short, it calls for the adoption of universal standards for the internet and its regulation, while adhering to established norms of human rights. It recasts the decades-old vision of a cyber utopia, which has sadly come crumbling down. Trust, competition, and transparency are central to Twitter’s recommendations. It proclaims that this vision would help big and small players alike, and honour the vision of the internet. Such documents or recommendations, called by their myriad titles, have been produced by every tech company and the multitude of people who helm them.However, things are different in practice. In response to regulatory warnings in Australia, a misinformation oversight committee was created within the Digital Industry Group Inc. (DIGI), an industry body publicly backed by Facebook, Google, and Twitter. This contradicts Twitter’s proclamations for open standards and giving space to smaller players. As India moves ahead in regulating DCNs, this experience gives us two valuable lessons. Firstly, taking the proclamations they make at face value might not be in the best interest of our society or the regulatory regime that we intend to create. Secondly, DCNs should have access to the policymakers’ tables, but it must be as limited as any other stakeholder group such as civil society or law enforcement agencies. Devoting more attention, time and regard may give way to them usurping the process to the possible loss of other stakeholders and industry players. Antriksh Matters #3: ISpA a new beginning? — Aditya RamanathanOn 11 October, India’s Prime Minister made a clear indication of the importance the government attaches to India’s commercial space sector. Launching the industry body, the Indian Space Association, the Prime Minister identified four “pillars” of space reform: freedom of innovation for the private sector, the role of the government as an enabler, preparing India’s young workforce for the future, and to see the space sector as a resource for the development of the wider populace. The founding members of the Indian Space Association are largely established vendors for ISRO. For instance, last year, Larson & Toubro provided a booster segment for ISRO’s Gaganyaan Launch Vehicle, that is key to India’s human spaceflight programme. Another long-time ISRO vendor is Walchandnagar Industries, which is presently helping to develop solid propellant boosters for the GSLV Mk III launchers. One of the newer companies on the list of founding members is OneWeb, the satellite internet company backed by a consortium of investors led by Bharti Enterprises. During the launch of the Indian Space Association, Bharti Enterprises chairman Sunil Mittal announced that OneWeb would soon become ISRO’s first private Indian customer for satellite launches. Other core members of the association include Hughes India, Centum Electronics, state-owned BEL, and Maxar India. That the Indian Space Association is dominated by ISRO’s vendors (barring exceptions like OneWeb), is a natural result of the way India’s space sector has evolved for decades, with private players simply acting as suppliers. The Indian Space Association will also presumably complement and compete with existing representative bodies like the Satcom Industry Association and Association of Geospatial Industries. Given the Indian Space Association’s backing from industry and the government (it will be headed by Lt. General A.K. Bhat, a decorated officer who retired from service last year), it will not be surprising if it supersedes the existing organisations.While the Indian Space Association will provide commercial space players a mechanism to both consult each other and approach the government, its success will ultimately depend on the receptiveness of the government. If India is to achieve the vision laid out by the Prime Minister, it will need to move faster. In 2020, it set up the regulatory body INSPACe under the Department of Space. However, it took until September this year to appoint Pawan Goenka, the former managing director of Mahindra & Mahindra as its chairperson. While the appointment of an auto industry stalwart (rather than a government official) was widely welcomed, it took too long, suggesting resistance from within the system. The government must now work to staff up INSPACe and respond quickly to what is reportedly a growing pile of pending applications from private players. More broadly, it provide a fresh set of regulations and policies that will allow India’s space industry to grow from vendors into world-class spacefarers. Our Reading Menu[Opinion] Robert Reich characterises the Supreme court of USA, Facebook, and the Fed as the horsemen of democracy’s apocalypse drawing a thread of unaccountability from them as wielders of great power. [Book] “On Operations” by Capt. B. A. Friedman USMC Reserve.[Book] Klimat: Russia in the Age of Climate Change by Thane Gustafson.[Policy Communique] detailing the EU’s Arctic Strategy. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com